Court Opinion

ID: 9762139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:12:02.461904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:30.637894
License: Public Domain

SCOLNIK, Justice,
with whom McKU-SICK, Chief Justice, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority as to Count I of the indictment, but I must dissent as to Count II.
Rule 7(c) of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an “indictment or ... information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” It was adopted in order to simplify criminal pleading, to reduce the ornate complexity of pleading at common law. M.R.Crim.P. 7 reporter’s notes. There is no mechanical test for determining the sufficiency of an indictment, but our appraisal must be governed by practical rather than technical considerations. 3 Glassman, Maine Practice: Buies of Criminal Procedure Annotated § 7.11 at 82 (1967) (citing Duke v. United States, 233 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.1956)).
This Court has long adhered to the principle that an indictment is sufficient if a respondent of reasonable and normal intelligence would, by the language of the indictment, be apprised of the crime charged and the nature thereof. State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58, 68 (Me.1981); State v. Wing, 426 A.2d 1375, 1376 (Me.1981); State v. Char-ette, 159 Me. 124, 127, 188 A.2d 898, 900 (1963). However, “[t]his longstanding rule must be applied in view of the indictment’s purpose,” State v. Allison, 427 A.2d 471, 473 (Me.1981), which is to avoid unfair surprise, to aid the respondent in preparing an adequate defense, and to protect him from further jeopardy. State v. Myrick, 436 A.2d 379, 381 (Me.1981); Allison, 427 A.2d at 473. To this end, it is essential that an indictment or other charging instrument be con*865strued m a common sense manner, and not be subjected to arbitrary, artificial, or hy-pertechnical requirements. State v. Carter, 444 A.2d 37, 39 (Me.1982); Glassman, supra, § 7.11 at 82.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 7(c), the requirements for criminal pleading were much stricter in Maine. In Haller v. State, we held it to be “a cardinal rule of criminal pleading that all of the essential elements of the crime sought to be charged must be alleged, and that the description of the offense must be certain, positive, and complete, and not by way of recital, argument, intendment, implication, or inference.” 241 A.2d 607, 609 (Me.1968).1 In State v. Warner, decided prior to Haller but involving an early application of Rule 7(c), we reviewed an indictment charging the defendant with reckless homicide, but which omitted the requisite allegation that the victim had died within a year of the precipitating cause. We held that, because the date of the initial accident had been January 1, 1966, and the indictment, stating that the victim had died, was dated February 2, 1966, the defendant could infer the information necessary to complete the indictment. 237 A.2d 150, 156 (Me.1967).
In State v. Martin, we said that a charging instrument is sufficient “if all essential elements of the offense are charged by necessary intendment or implication," 387 A.2d 592, 593 (Me.1978) (emphasis in original), and in State v. Carter we observed that “[t]he constitutional provisions applicable to charging instruments ... look to the substance of the charge rather than to niceties of form.” 444 A.2d at 39. These principles are echoed in State v. Pierce, relied upon by the majority, in which we held that “[t]he language of the formal accusation must be such that the identity of the criminal statute allegedly violated may be readily ascertained; compliance with this constitutional requirement is not achieved if the indictment does not aver all the essential elements of the crime charged ... explicitly or by the use of equivalent terms.” 438 A.2d 247, 255 (Me.1981) (emphasis added).
In light of the purpose for which Rule 7(c) was adopted, I fail to see how the statutory reference in Count II of the indictment is fatal under Maine law. It acts only as a trailblazer, leading the respondent directly to statutory language which gives him a full explication of the element charged. This position is supported in a number of other jurisdictions, and reflects, in my view, a more rational interpretation of the requirements of post-common law pleading. See, e.g., Government of Canal Zone v. Hodges, 589 F.2d 207, 209 (5th Cir.1979); Smith v. United States, 466 A.2d 429, 432 (D.C.1983); People v. Phelan, 99 Ill.App.3d 925, 930-31, 55 Ill.Dec. 600, 604, 426 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1981); State v. Cren-shaw, 274 S.C. 475, 266 S.E.2d 61, 62 (1980); State ex rel. Bell v. County Court for Columbia County, 82 Wis.2d 401, 408, 263 N.W.2d 162, 166 (1978).
This Court has shown no aversion, in the past, to directing criminal defendants to statutory language offering greater information as to the offense charged.2 Rule *8667(c) itself requires that “[tjhe indictment or information shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated.” This requirement is viewed as “another means of providing notice to the defendant .... ” M.R.Crim.P. 7 reporter’s notes. A charging instrument is not defective when it uses words or terms of art, such as “intent,” “traffick,” or “scheduled drug,” for which resort to the Code is necessary for a full explanation.3 The Code itself is replete with internal cross-references, which, however crucial to an adequate defense, pose no discernible threat to the constitutional principles addressed by the majority.
The majority suggests that, because an error in citation to a statute in the charging instrument is not per se reversible error, it would be unfair to supply defendants with notice of an essential element simply by statutory reference. This ignores the underlying premise of post-common law pleading. Rule 7(c) states that “[ejrror in the citation of a statute or its omission shall not be grounds for the dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.” (emphasis added).4 The question is not whether incorporation by statutory reference is insufficient per se, but whether a respondent of reasonable and normal intelligence would, by the language of the indictment, be able to determine the nature of the offense charged.
Count II of the indictment at issue does not rely on a bare statutory reference, but instead refers to “drug paraphernalia as defined in” the specific statutory subsection. Using practical rather than technical considerations, this language is clearly adequate to apprise the defendant of the crime with which he was charged. This indictment does not subject a defendant of reasonable and normal intelligence to unfair surprise, nor does it deprive him of the ability to prepare an adequate defense or fail to protect him from further jeopardy. The statutory reference here was clear, and by simply opening the Code this defendant would have been fully apprised of the elements of the alleged offense. The indictment is in accord with the practical requirements of Rule 7(c), and I would therefore reverse the decision of the Superior Court as it relates to Count II.

. Haller was decided after adoption of Rule 7(c), but concerned an indictment returned pri- or to the adoption of that rule. Glassman, supra, § 7.8 at 10-11 (Supp.1975).

. In State v. Coleman, the defendant was charged with burglary, but the indictment failed to specify the class of the offense. While such is not required in an indictment, the Court nevertheless referred the defendant to the statute so as to determine for himself, “by a process of elimination,” the class of burglary for which he was charged. 452 A.2d 397, 399 (Me.1982). In State v. Martin, the defendant was charged with OUI, but the Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint failed to allege that he was operating a motor vehicle, an essential element. We held this element to be implied, but stated, “[m]oreover, had defendant consulted the statute itself, he could only have been assisted and not misled as to the identity of the charged offense.” 387 A.2d 592, 594 (Me. 1978). Similarly, in State v. Carter, a defendant was charged with OUI but the charging instrument referred only to “liquor,” rather than “intoxicating liquor.” We held the word “intoxicating” to be implied, given the common and everyday meaning of “liquor,” but went on to say that “[i]f there were any remaining doubt in the matter, the traffic ticket on its face referred defendant to 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312. *866Even the briefest perusal of that statute reveals that it is concerned with intoxicating liquor and blood-alcohol tests.” 444 A.2d 37, 39 (Me. 1982). In State v. Myrick, we held that a defendant was placed on notice of certain aspects of the offense charged by the “mere existence” of a related statutory provision not mentioned in the indictment. 436 A.2d 379, 382 (Me. 1981).

. See, e.g., 17-A M.R.S.A. § 2 (defining “act”, “deadly force,” “armed with a dangerous weapon,” “dwelling place,” “firearm”, “intentionally,” “knowingly,” “recklessly”, etc.); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251 (defining "spouse,” “sexual intercourse,” “compulsion,” etc.); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 352 (defining “property,” “property of another,” “intent to deprive,” etc.); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 701 (defining “falsely utters,” “falsely completes,” “written instrument,” etc.); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 851 (defining “prostitution,’.’ “engages a prostitute,” “promotes prostitution,” etc.); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 952 (defining “bookmaking,” “gambling,” “player,” etc.); and 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1101 (defining “marijuana,” “scheduled drug,” “traffick,” etc.).

. To the extent that the portion of the statutory reference “... (A-KII-13)” is deemed a misci-tation, it is not misleading, since the portion of the statute which was correctly cited contains the element of intent which the majority maintains should have been explicitly set forth in Count II of the indictment.