Court Opinion

ID: 9829593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:27:44.473643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:03.303343
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees file their application for a rehearing in this case, and in their motion challenge the soundness of our conclusion and state their view as the converse of our holding. They say that “this is a suit by an heir to recover property and effects belonging to estates of deceased persons, and it is necessary to allege that no administration was at such time pending on such estates, and that no administration was necessary,” and that appellant alleges in his trial pleading:
“That Santos Leal, Sr., died intestate on or about the 17th day of February, A. D. 1903, that there was no administration upon his estate, and that said Joaquina G. Leal died intestate on or about the 12th day of April, A. D. 1922, and that there has been no administration upon her estate.”
And appellees further urge and insist that “there is no allegation in such pleading which could reasonably be construed to mean that there was no necessity of an administration upon the estates of either of appellant’s ancestors,” and cite the following cases: Lopez v. Calzado (Tex. Civ. App.) 281 S. W. 324; Richardson v. Vaughan, 86 Tex. 93, 23 S. W. 640; Ins. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.) 235 S. W. 650; Johnson v. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 242 S. W. 293; Freeman v. Klaerner (Tex. Civ. App.) 190 S. W. 543; Laas v. Seidel, 95 Tex. 442, 67 S. W. 1015.
In the very face of the motion they copy language of the petition specifically showing the required allegation, “that there was no administration upon his estate.” Such a statement in the petition presupposes that there was no necessity for. an administration. If there was no necessity for an administration, conversely none should be had. It is contended by appellees that the allegations must be made “no administration was had and none was necessary.” But both allegations are not necessary; only one or the other. It must either be alleged that there was no administration, or that no administration was necessary.
The statute (article 3356) provides:
“Administration not Gtramted.—No administration upon any estate shall be granted unless there exists a necessity therefor, such necessity to be determined by the court hearing the application.”
Heirs inherit without the necessity of an administration. The authorities cited in the motion for rehearing do not support ap-pellees’ contention, but conversely do support our views.
This is not a suit to recover anything against the estate, and the estate was not sued, but this was a suit of one heir against others, in which no creditor was or could be interested. In the case cited by appellees (Richardson v. Vaughan, supra), Justice Gaines, one of the wisest and most learned of all, said:
“ginee our statute casts the legal title of property belonging to the estate of deceased' persons directly upon the heirs (subject, however, to the payment of debts), we think it might properly have been held, that after the lapse of a reasonable time without administration upon the estate, they should have the right to sue for the recovery of any chose in action or other property which had descended' to them. But from an early day a different doctrine has been announced in the court, and it is now too late to depart from it. As a general rule, the holding has been, that the heirs cannot sue without alleging and proving that there is-no administration upon the estate, and that there is no necessity for one.
“In Walker v. Abercrombie, 61 Tex. 69, an exception was recognized. There three years had elapsed since the death of the ancestor and no administration upon his estate had been applied for; the estate was alleged to be insolvent,, and it appeared that-the debt which was sought to be recovered was about to be barred by limitation. It would seem that where a suit is necessary to preserve the property, the right of the heirs to bring it ought to be maintained, especially where a considerable time has elapsed without > administration. Creditors who have not seen proper to attempt the collection of their claims through the probate court are not' likely to suffer any injury in such a case by permitting the heirs to sue.”
Appellees call our special attention to the eases Laas v. Seidel, supra, and Freeman v. Klaerner, supra. The allegation that there was no administration upon the estate, as shown by the cited cases, was sufficient, and, if necessary, under that general allegation, proof could be offered that there was no necessity therefor. It is held in Webster v. Willis, 56 Tex. 468:
“The general rule is laid down in' the case of Giddings v. Steele, 28 Tex. 748 [91 Am. Dec. 336], ‘that the heirs cannot sue in their own right as heirs for property of the estate; the executor or administrator must sue.’ ‘There are exceptions to this rule, as when the administration has been closed, or when there are no debts against the estate and no administration; in these cases, the reason of the rule not applying, the heirs may sue.’ ”
In the opinion written for this court by: its Chief Justice, in the case of Lopez v. Calzado, supra, it was held:
“There was no allegation or proof that there had been no administration, or that there was no necessity for administration, of the estate-of the deceased. This allegation is absolutely essential-in suits by or against an estate, and a failure to make such allegation and proof is-fundamental error, and will necessitate a reversal of a judgment obtained under such pleadings.”
It will be observed that we hold the-allegation is “essential” 'in suits by or against. *343an estate and a failure to make such allegation and proof is fundamental error. Now, under the allegation that there was “no administration had upon the estate,” it is pre-' sumed that the probate court passed upon the question as the statute provides (Van Grinderbeck v. Lewis [Tex. Civ. App.] 204 S. W. 1042) or left open to proof that there was no exception for it; taking it out of the class .of fundamental error. A special exception would raise the question as to necessity in the pleading of alleging further that there was no necessity for an administration, be-oause, in the light of the allegation that there was no administration, it inferentially must appear that there was no necessity for one. We unqualifiedly accept as the law what is said by Justice Brown in Laas v. Seidel, supra:
“A general demurrer has the effect to admit ,as true for that purpose all facts which are •alleged in the pleading challenged, as well as all facts which may reasonably be inferred from .the facts alleged. If a fact necessary to be proved to sustain a recovery on the part of the plaintiff be neither alleged in the petition, nor fairly inferable from facts alleged, a demurrer to the petition must be sustained.”
When the allegation is that there was no .-administration on the estate, is it not “fairly -inférable from facts alleged” that there was :no necessity therefor?
The other allegations in the petition, as -shown in our original opinion, and apparent ■on the face of the opinion, sufficiently show, ,not only directly but inferentially, that there was no necessity for any administration.
This was a suit between heirs for an accounting of money, years after the time in which an administration could have been had. Whether there had been or • had not ..been an administration of the estate, this •had no effect on their estate at this time.
It is the individual opinion of the writer that the petition is too long and prolix to be ■well understood, and it should be again written so as to be more lucid and in order.
It was error to sustain the general demurrer ; an amendment perhaps would meet any •special exceptions.
The motion is overruled.