Court Opinion

ID: 9709652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:52:40.776224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:49.795075
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ZAPPALA, Justice.
This case involves a claim for survivor’s benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended. On April 11, 1973, Nicholas Taglianetti suffered a fatal heart attack while in the course of his employment in the General Services Department of Appellee, University of Pennsylvania Hospital. On April 3, 1979, Appellant Grace Taglianetti, the widow of Nicholas Taglianetti, filed a fatal claim petition for workmen’s compensation benefits. After a hearing, the referee held that Appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed her petition.1 The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court both affirmed. Taglianetti v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 63 Pa. *272Cmwlth. 456, 439 A.2d 844 (1981). We granted Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal, and now affirm.
The pertinent facts relating to the filing of Appellant’s petition, as found by the referee, are as follows: subsequent to the death of her husband, the Appellant received a letter from the Appellee dated April 13, 1973, along with a check in the amount of $2,948.49, representing “three months death gratuity for wife of deceased employee”; the Appellant requested information in May and July of 1973 from Appellee as to any widow’s benefits due her;2 the Appellee informed Appellant that apart from life insurance and the death gratuity, she had no other widow’s benefits; the Appellant did not seek any advice from any other source regarding an alleged claim for work-related benefits which she may have; and that Appellant did not realize that she might have such a claim until she read a newspaper article on June 3, 1978 regarding this Court’s decision in two other “heart attack” cases.3
The referee concluded, as demonstrated in the record, that no evidence was presented relating to fraud, misrepresentation, or of conduct by the Appellee which would have lulled the Appellant into a false sense of security that a claim would be provided for or paid. The referee dismissed the Appellant’s claim because it was not filed within the' requisite time limitation.
The time limitation applicable to a claim arising out of the death of an employee is set forth in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 602, which provides:
... In cases of death all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, unless within three years after the death, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation under this article; or unless, within three years after *273the death, one of the parties shall have filed a petition as provided in article four hereof.4
It is undisputed that the Appellant did not file a petition within three years after her husband’s death. Failure to file a claim within the statutorily prescribed period extinguishes the right, as well as the remedy, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. If, however, the employer fraudulently or deceptively lulls the claimant into inaction, the employer will be estopped from raising the statute of limitations. The principle of estoppel recognizes that an employer should not be able to claim the defense of untimeliness when a claimant’s failure to timely file a petition has resulted from the employer’s own actions.
The Appellant contends that the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that Appellee did not deceive or mislead Appellant as to her right to compensation. The record is devoid of any evidence that the Appellee acted to defraud the Appellant. Nor is there any evidence from which it could be reasonably interpreted that the Appellee’s words or conduct lulled the Appellant into a false sense of security. We are not confronted here with an employer’s actions which promote a claimant’s incorrect belief that a claim has been or will be processed.
The record demonstrates that the Appellant contacted the employer’s personnel office on two occasions subsequent to her receipt of death gratuity benefits to determine whether she was entitled to any additional benefits. On those occasions, Appellant was informed that she would not receive additional benefits. There was no discussion related to *274workmen’s compensation benefits or the filing of a claim.5 The Appellant maintains that the Appellee’s statements unintentionally deceived her as to her rights and that the statute of limitations should be tolled as a result. The Appellant has failed to demonstrate, however, conduct by the employer which could reasonably be interpreted as misleading. The issue of workmen’s compensation benefits was never addressed by either the Appellant or the Appellee. The Appellant was never informed of the existence or non-existence of workmen’s compensation benefits or the right to file a claim. The discussions with the Appellee regarding workmen’s compensation benefits did not occur until 1978, approximately two years after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
Having failed to establish conduct by the Appellee which would toll the statute of limitations, Appellant is urging us, in effect, to impose an affirmative duty upon an employer to apprise an employee or potential claimant of any and all available benefits. Appellant concedes, however, that an employer has no affirmative duty to provide information of possible benefits. We cannot here, as asserted, impose a duty upon an employer where none exists.
The Order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.
LARSEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROBERTS, C.J., joins.

. Appellant was the only witness to testify at the hearing, and her testimony consisted solely of direct examination; Appellee waived its opportunity to cross-examine.

. The Appellant could identify the person with whom she spoke only as a female in the personnel office.

. With respect to the decision of this Court referred to in the 1978 newspaper article, see Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Bernard S. Pincus Company, 479 Pa. 286, 388 A.2d 659 (1978).

. At the time of Mr. Taglianetti’s death, the applicable statute of limitations was two years. Prior to the running of this statute, however, the statute of limitations was amended to three years. Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, § 13. The three year statute, therefore, applies to this case. See City of Hazelton v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 35 Pa.Cmwlth. 477, 386 A.2d 1067, 1070 (1978) (statute of limitations in Workmen’s Compensation Act is procedural rather than substantive so that amendments to the statute operate retroactively; when statute is amended before the expiration of the original deadline for filing, claim is governed by the longer limitation period of the amended statute).

. Nor was Appellant’s inquiry of a nature which would prompt a discussion regarding a claim for workmen’s compensation benefits. In fact, Appellant testified that she did not know of any rights as a widow which would result from her husband’s death at work prior to reading the newspaper article (N.T. 8). Consequently, Appellant's reliance in her brief on cases in which workmen’s compensation benefits were discussed with an employer is misplaced.