Court Opinion

ID: 9726920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:12:29.700081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:03.218562
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the Majority Opinion for the following reasons:
(1)It permits a collateral attack on a final judgment by conferring jurisdiction upon the trial court where none exists. This is accomplished by violating legislative policy under the Declaratory Judgment Act and by permitting an appeal of an agreed judgment containing non-judicial determinations.
(2) It applies the contract theory of substantial performance to a final agreed judgment which was never intended by the Indiana Supreme Court.
(3) It erodes and undermines the sacred and cardinal principle of finality which is the keystone to any meaningful system of justice.
The Majority Opinion has permitted a collateral attack upon a final agreed judgment where none is permitted. It has permitted the parties by agreement to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court under the Declaratory Judgment Act where none exists. The Indiana Legislature never intended the review of final judgments under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Ind.Code 34-4-10-1 to 16, 10 I.L.E. Declaratory Judgments § 11 (1958); Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (1935), 208 Ind. 432, 196 N.E. 324. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act was to furnish a remedy where none had previously existed.1 Where an actual controversy existed as to the rights and duties of parties under a contract, ordinance, or statute, those rights and duties can be determined in the form of a judgment for the future actions of the parties. Here, the Majority has not only permitted an interpretation of a final judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act, but an appeal of the final judgment as well. Other remedies are available. Rainwater v. Merriman (1957), 127 Ind.App. 520, 142 N.E.2d 467.
A remedy was available to Weiss under the Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 60(B)(7) which provides:
“(B) Mistake—Excusable neglect— Newly discovered evidence—Fraud, etc. on motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his *152legal representative from an entry of default, final order, or final judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:

******

“(7) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; ...”
Weiss has spurned and ignored the Ind. Rules of Trial Procedure. Litigants can not agree to follow the Rules only when it is convenient or when it suits their particular purpose. All litigants and courts in Indiana are bound to follow the Rules and statutory provisions when they are applicable. Here, the Declaratory Judgment Act and the policy of the Indiana Legislature clearly excluded an interpretation of a final judgment. Another remedy, TR. 60(B)(7) was available. Rainwater v. Merriman, supra.
When the agreed judgment was entered by the trial court, it was conclusive as an adjudication between the parties. As our Supreme Court noted in State v. Huebner (1952), 230 Ind. 461, 104 N.E.2d 385, 388:
“That the judgment was rendered by consent of the parties does not detract from its dignity, or lessen its conclusiveness as an adjudication between the parties, but the consent is a waiver of error precluding a review upon appeal.” (Citations omitted.)
The Supreme Court further explained why an agreed judgment can not be appealed:
“Such a decree does not represent the judgment of the court. It is merely the agreement of the parties, consented to by the court. Because it is not a judicial action it may not be appealed. On appeal the action of a lower court is reviewed to determine whether it committed error. If an appeal should be allowed from a consent decree, the appellate court would examine the record not to determine whether the lower court committed error, but to determine whether or not the parties erred in making the stipulation or in giving their consent thereto. Appellate courts do not have such authority. McNelis v. Wheeler, 1947, 225 Ind. 148, 153, 73 N.E.2d 339, supra. Bergman v. Rhodes, 1929, 334 Ill. 137, 165 N.E. 598, supra.”
Id. If the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals do not have authority to review “whether or not the parties erred in making the stipulation or in giving their consent”, it is difficult for me to understand how the trial court, ignoring the Ind.Rules of Trial Procedure and the policy of the Declaratory Judgment Act, has the authority.2
When the agreed judgment was entered, Weiss received a substantial benefit. At page 21 of the Appellant’s Brief, it states:
“Paragraph 3 of the agreed judgment further states that General Discount would recover of the defendants, Weiss Machinery Corporation and Edward Weiss, the sum of $55,589.21 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from July 31, 1980, until paid, the additional sum of $2,800.00 attorney’s fees, plus miscellaneous expenses of $3,335.00 and court costs (R.A., p. 69). These sums and any subsequently incurred attorney’s fees, expenses, and court costs, were to be waived if the Appellees totally complied with the terms and provisions of the agreed judgment by delivery of the equipment and payment of the $55,589.21 within the time frame set forth therein. *153The second full literary paragraph of section 3 of the agreed judgment stated that:
‘Failure to pay the sums set forth above, or to perform any part of this agreed judgment will constitute a default herein and the settlement provisions of this paragraph and paragraph 2 above will be null and void, entitling plaintiff to collect the full amounts set forth above, including interest, attorney’s fees, expenses and court costs, and requiring said defendants to immediately deliver possession of the equipment described above to plaintiff at S and H Contractors, Walton, Kentucky. (R.A., p. 69; Emphasis Added.)’ ” (Emphasis original; parentheses original.)
and again at page 26:
“The terms and provisions of the agreed judgment (R.A., p. 68—71) and the minute entry of the Circuit Court (R.A., p. 62) clearly indicate that the Appellees have received a benefit by virtue of the agreed judgment. They paid to counsel for General Discount the sum of $21,-844.83 on the 21st of July, 1980. Thereafter, General Discount delivered to the Appellees certificates of title on certain equipment, free of lien. Therefore, the Appellees have accepted the benefits of the agreed judgment in recognition of its terms and provisions. Under the authorities cited above, they are precluded from challenging the terms and provisions thereof.” (Parentheses original.)
When the parties have actively participated in drafting an agreed judgment and one of the parties has benefited from the entry of the judgment, there can be no collateral attack on the agreed judgment. The benefited party is estopped from attacking the final judgment except as may be provided by the Ind.Rules of Trial Procedure. State v. Helslar (1972), 257 Ind. 625, 277 N.E.2d 796.
The Indiana Supreme Court never intended that the standard of substantial compliance should be wrenched from its comparative analysis in Helslar and Huebner and used to determine whether a judgment has been satisfied. In Helslar, Justice Hunter was making a comparative analysis with the Court’s position in Huebner. He was pointing out that Helslar did not involve a consent or agreed judgment. He stated:
“Huebner involved a consent decree in which the parties together stipulated the finding of facts and the conclusions of law and handed these stipulations to the judge in open court evidenced by the written O.K. of their attorneys of record. This Court felt that in such an instance the judge was not called upon to perform a judicial act but his function was only ministerial. Such an agreement was considered a contract which did not represent the judgment of the court but merely recorded the agreement of the parties with respect to all rights and matters in that litigation, and as such was not reviewable by appeal. This was clearly not the situation in the instant case.” (Emphasis original.)
State v. Helslar, supra, 277 N.E.2d at 797. This comparative analysis by Justice Hunter was used to explain why an appeal may not be taken from an agreed judgment in the absence of fraud. As Huebner emphasized, it was the parties’ lawsuit and their judgment. There was no judicial action, except mere ministerial action, taken by the trial court for a review; therefore, the parties waive an appellate review of the agreed judgment.
“Since the written instrument in question was but an agreement on a stipulation of facts and conclusions of law that the parties plaintiff and defendant each for himself and itself understanding^ entered into, by and through their respective attorneys at law, neither, except for fraud, can attack the action which they have caused the court to take. That there may have been errors in the agreed stipulation of facts or in the agreed conclusions of law cannot matter now for the parties had a right to make the stipulations as they desired. It was their lawsuit....” (Citation omitted.)
*154State v. Huebner, supra, 104 N.E.2d at 388. It is totally incorrect to glean from this comparative analysis that the contract theory of substantial performance may be applied to determine the satisfaction of an agreed judgment. It is equally incorrect to glean from this comparative analysis that an appeal may be had at the trial level for an interpretation of the judgment and that the trial court’s interpretation may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. Quite clearly, the rule that an agreed judgment may not be appealed is made meaningless if the procedure proposed by the Majority Opinion is allowed to stand unchallenged.
The Majority Opinion erodes and undermines the sacred, cardinal principle of finality which is the keystone of our judicial system. At some point, litigation must be finalized. Traditionally, the conclusion of litigation has meant a final judgment. Litigants should be encouraged to settle their controversies by agreed judgments. But, when litigants exclude the participation of the trial court and with the assistance of legal counsel prepare their final determination of the controversy, they should not be permitted to appeal to the courts to correct their errors or misunderstandings. If interpretation, review, and appeal of the agreed judgment are permitted, the entire purpose of agreed judgments is defeated. Instead of lessening the amount of litigation in our courts, we have increased it manyfold. If a final agreed judgment is not final, res judi-cata and other sacred rules used to terminate and conclude litigation are in jeopardy.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.

. State v. Brennan (1952), 231 Ind. 492, 109 N.E.2d 409.

. The Majority Opinion refers to the inherent power of the court and cites Wilson v. Wilson (1976), 169 Ind.App. 530, 349 N.E.2d 277. However, the Wilson case is not authority for this proposition. The Wilson case was decided under the authority of Ind.Rules of Trial Procedure, Trial Rule 60(B)(7). In Wilson, the Court stated:
“We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the petition for an interpretation of its judgment and to consider the petition as one seeking relief pursuant to TR. 60(B)(7) or TR. 13(M), and this cause was not barred by IC 1971, 33-1-6-3.”
Wilson, supra 349 N.E.2d at 280. The inherent power statement may be found in dictum used by the Wilson case where Wabash Railway Co. v. Todd (1916), 186 Ind. 72, 113 N.E. 997 is cited. Id.