Court Opinion

ID: 9819327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:22:44.595692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:34.512507
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: We cannot reverse the trial judge’s decision unless he abused his discretion. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971); People v. Peterson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 38 (1999). According to our supreme court, “[this] standard has been recognized as ‘the most deferential standard of review available with the exception of no review at all.’ ” People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387 (1998), quoting M. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 469, 480 (1988). An abuse of discretion occurs only if the judge’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or no reasonable person would agree with it. See People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1 (2000). Yet the majority reasons that the judge’s decision is reversible because it “does not seem to be in the best interests of justice or of public policy concerning resolution of cases.” 334 Ill. App. 3d at 294. Wrong standard. The majority rides the coattails of State v. Hager, 630 N.W2d 828 (Iowa 2001), without specifically explaining how the judge’s decision meets the true criteria for an abuse of discretion. All the majority really explains is why it disagrees with the judge’s policy regarding negotiated guilty pleas. But such disagreement hardly signals an abuse of discretion. Reasonable minds can differ on this issue, as evidenced by the line of cases upholding rejections of guilty pleas on timeliness grounds. See United States v. Gamboa, 166 P.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 1991); People v. Cobb, 139 Cal. App. 3d 578, 188 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1983); People v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2001); People v. Grove, 455 Mich. 439, 566 N.W.2d 547 (1997); State v. Brimage, 271 N.J. Super. 369, 638 A.2d 904 (1994). By the very definition of the standard, an abuse of discretion cannot exist under such circumstances. Docket management is a legitimate concern resting within a trial judge’s sound discretion. In the instant case, the judge said he had a policy of not accepting negotiated pleas after commencement of trial proceedings. His policy was geared toward conserving judicial time and resources. I realize that the judge could have saved the time and expense of a trial by accepting Henderson’s plea. However, Henderson caused the State to expend resources for selection of a jury that was never used. This fact distinguishes the instant case from Hager, where the defendant tendered his plea before jury selection. Henderson’s disregard for the court’s rules caused a waste that was missing in Hager. By taking a stand, the judge sent a message calculated to inhibit such waste in the future. He also attempted to foster respect for rules. Lack of such respect is what causes a need for guilty pleas in the first place. These concerns explain why — in the exercise of his sound discretion — the judge decided to reject Henderson’s guilty plea. The majority’s assertion that the judge failed to even initiate an exercise of his discretion is conclusory at best. Also misplaced is the majority’s focus on how the judge apparently would have handled an untimely open plea. Regardless of that hypothetical outcome, the judge’s decision to reject Henderson’s negotiated plea is simply not reversible unless it fails the abuse of discretion standard. Although persons may disagree on the soundness of the judge’s approach, how can the majority believe that no reasonable person would agree with it? How do the judge’s actions satisfy the definitions of arbitrary and fanciful? The majority has not satisfactorily explained how, and I do not believe it can. I thus dissent.