Court Opinion

ID: 9546573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:32:18.113939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:38.230750
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I concur in the reasoning and the conclusion in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor that the action of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles in refusing to annex the strip of land (county island) embraced within the West Los Angeles Housing Authority Project constituted a violation of the agreement between the authority and the city which the city was directed to perform by the writ of mandate issued by this court in Housing Authority v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 853 [243 P.2d 515], but I do not agree that no punishment should be imposed for the refusal of the city to obey said writ.
While I think there is no question that the contract between the city and the authority clearly contemplated the annexation of land which might be considered necessary for the contemplated project, it is clear that under the factual situation disclosed by the agreed statement of facts in this proceeding, the city is estopped to deny annexation of the area here involved by its conduct which induced the authority to believe that the annexation proceeding would be consummated and the authority was therefore justified in acquiring the area.
There can be no question that the city has the power to annex the area in question under the Annexation of Uninhabited Territory Act of 1939 (Gov. Code, § 35300 et seq.). *689It is authorized to exercise that power in aid of the development of a housing project as the Housing Cooperation Law expressly provides that the city may “do any and all things, necessary or convenient, to aid and cooperate in the planning, undertaking, construction or operation of ” a housing project. (Health & Saf. Code, § 34516.) It is clear from the record before us that the plan and design of the present housing project contemplated the annexation of this small parcel of land which was entirely surrounded by territory within the boundaries of the city of Los Angeles, and there can be no doubt that the city council had knowledge that the West Los Angeles site included the county island and that annexation of that island was contemplated. With this knowledge the city approved acquisition and use of the site for a housing project. In reliance on this approval the authority acquired the property. The city council on November 22, 1950, approved the proposal to acquire the site and the request of the housing authority relating thereto.
The council’s approval, however, was more than approval of the acquisition of the site, it was also an express concurrence in the authority’s plan to use the site for a housing project. But the matter did not rest there. After the authority had proceeded with its design for the project to the point where the number and ground locations of the proposed project had been determined, it applied to the city planning commission for a conditional use of the site for a housing project. That application described the site as “lying partly in unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles It was also accompanied by maps and other data clearly showing the existence of this county island in the middle of the site, and the contemplated location on it of some of the buildings. It was also accompanied by a copy of the authority’s “Development Program” which embraced a narrative description of the proposed project. In it appeared the following statement: “It (the proposed site) is situated around a small slum area in the county owned by four private individuals. There should not be any difficulty in acquiring the county strip and annexing it to the City.”
There can be no doubt that the planning commission was fully aware of this situation and of the necessity for annexation. It must, of course, be assumed that the commission was familiar with the record upon which it acted. In addition, in the planning department’s report approving and recommending this annexation, it is said with reference to the *690commission’s previous acts, that the planning commission had “approved the site for a housing project, which included the property under consideration (the county island).” Furthermore the sites selected by the authority were reported to the city planning department, and on June 26, 1950, the director of planning reported on the compatability of the West Los Angeles site with the city’s zoning plan. With that knowledge the planning commission approved the authority’s application on April 26, 1951. On June 26, 1951, the city council having before it all the data and exhibits which were before the planning commission, concurred in the latter’s grant of a conditional use of the West Los Angeles site for a housing project. In its resolution of concurrence the council recited that this site was “fully described in the application for a conditional use.” The description referred to the site as “lying partly in unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles.” This action of the city clearly indicated its approval of a housing project on the proposed West Los Angeles site. Such action was taken with full knowledge of, and without objection or exception to, the fact that a small part of the proposed site lay outside of the city, and it was taken after the planning commission and the council had been told that acquisition of the property and its annexation were contemplated. In these circumstances there was ample justification for the authority’s belief that whatever was necessary and could be lawfully done to bring this county island into the city and, therefore, make it usable as part of the whole project, would be done. It was not until this action had been taken that the authority bound itself to the acquisition of title to the county island.
It is clear that all of the elements of estoppel are present— with knowledge of the facts the officials of the city approved acquisition of the site and its use for public housing, upon which actions the authority relied in acquiring the property. Knowing that annexation was necessary to enable the authority to use the site thus acquired for the housing project, may it not be said that a legal duty was imposed upon the city officials to consummate the annexation proceeding ? Admittedly there is no legal barrier against such action—the city council has the power to annex the area. Then why should the doctrine of estoppel not apply in such a case?
It has been said generally that a governmental agency may not be estopped by the conduct of its officers or employees (10 Cal.Jur. 650-651), but there are many instances in which *691an equitable estoppel in fact will run against the government where justice and right require it. (Farrell v. County of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624 [145 P.2d 570, 153 A.L.R. 323] ; City of Los Angeles v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 373 [35 P. 1002]; Fresno v. Fresno C. & I. Co., 98 Cal. 179 [32 P. 943]; Sacramento v. Clunie, 120 Cal. 29 [52 P. 44]; Brown v. Town of Sebastopol, 153 Cal. 704 [96 P. 363, 19 L.R.A.N.S. 178]; Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.2d 309 [44 P.2d 547]; Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 332 [16 P. 7, 5 Am.St.Rep. 442]; City of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.2d 624 [72 P.2d 138, 113 A.L.R. 370] ; Contra Costa Water Co. v. Breed, 139 Cal. 432 [73 P. 189] ; County of Los Angeles v. Cline, 185 Cal. 299 [197 P. 67] ; La Socieie Francaise v. California Emp. Com., 56 Cal.App.2d 534 [133 P.2d 47] ; McGee v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 390 [57 P.2d 925] ; Ernst v. Tiel, 51 Cal.App. 747 [197 P. 809] ; People v. Gustafson, 53 Cal.App.2d 230 [127 P.2d 627] ; Hewel v. Hogin, 3 Cal.App. 248 [84 P. 1002].) A few instances may be pointed out in which the justice of invoking estoppel is present as much or even less than here. In Times-Mirror Co., v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.2d 309 [44 P.2d 547], the city of Los Angeles was held estopped to abandon eminent domain proceedings where, in reliance thereon, defendant property owner had acquired other property and constructed a building thereon. It was there said (p. 330), “If the city had expressly agreed by its officers with defendants’ grantors, even in parol, that a certain line should constitute the boundary line between the street and the grantor’s property, and upon the faith of such agreement the grantors had erected a block of buildings flush with the line of the street as agreed upon by all parties, it would be a hard law that would allow the city to repudiate that agreement, and destroy the grantor’s property. No court should countenance such a thing, and an estoppel in pais will rise up in the pathway of a city to bar it and its principal, the people, from the commission of such a grievous wrong; and to give the acts of this city a very limited meaning we think its conduct in the present case at least equivalent to an oral agreement as to the location of the true boundary Une of the street.” (To the same effect, see McGee v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 390 [57 P.2d 925].) In City of Los Angeles v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 373 [35 P. 1002], the city was estopped to claim property which it owned but said it did not and in reliance thereon the person who had been in possession thereof built a building on it. The same situation, except it was a canal *692through a city, was involved in Fresno v. Fresno C. & I. Co., 98 Cal. 179 [32 P. 943]. Land claimed by the city as streets was considered in Sacramento v. Clunie, 120 Cal. 29 [52 P. 44]. In City of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.2d 624 [72 P.2d 138, 113 A.L.R. 370], a county was held estopped to collect from a railroad company additional payments for use of its land when it had been accepting certain payments for 15 years. In Contra Costa Water Co. v. Breed, 139 Cal. 432 [73 P. 189], the city was held liable for water it received and was estopped to deny liability on the claim that its ordinance providing for payment was invalid. In Tyra v. Board of Police Etc. Commrs. 32 Cal.2d 666 [197 P.2d 710], it was held that the city was estopped to plead the statute of limitation in an action by an employee for a pension where the pension commissioners had erroneously told him he could not receive a pension while he was receiving workmen’s compensation. Baird v. City of Fresno, 97 Cal.App.2d 336 [217 P.2d 681], is particularly applicable. It was there held that the city was estopped, when a pension was claimed, to rely on the invalidity of its determination made many years before that its employee should be credited with nine years of service with the city. Mention is made in some of these cases that where there is general power authorizing action by a governmental body in a particular field, the government may be estopped to assert irregularity in the exercise of that power. None of the foregoing authorities presents a clearer case for estoppel than the case at bar.
I desire particularly to call attention to the very pertinent language used by Mr. Justice Shenk in speaking for this court in Housing Authority v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 853 at pages 869 and 870 [243 P.2d 515] : “In Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.2d 309 [44 P.2d 547], the city of Los Angeles attempted to withdraw from and abandon condemnation proceedings to acquire land and properties of the Times-Mirror Company for use in a contemplated civic center. In the meantime the Times-Mirror had constructed a building on another location. The writ of mandamus issued in effect to prevent abandonment by the city of the pending condemnation proceedings by directing the respondent court to proceed with the trial of the condemnation action. The issuance of the writ was indicated by the application even as against the public body of the equitable doctrine of estoppel. This court, citing City of Los Angeles v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 373, observed (at p. 330 [35 P. 1002]) that there are limits beyond which even a *693city in representing the rights of the public might not go. That and the Cohn case constitute authority that the court is not bound by precedent in determining what facts and circumstances compel the issuance of the writ but that the writ will issue as against a city or other public body or officer wherever law and justice require such action. The present matter involves more than equity and justice. As has been noted the statutory provisions impose the duty upon the city to perform the administrative acts contemplated by the state legislative action in a matter of state concern. The policy of that law is not a matter of judicial concern or control. Both the Congress of the United States and the Legislature of this state have provided for the cooperative effort evidenced by the contracts between the city and the housing authority. Each of these entities as governmental agencies of the state was authorized to enter into the contracts here sought to be enforced as a public duty on the part of the city.” The foregoing is particularly applicable here as it correctly applied the doctrine of estoppel rule of the Times-Mirror Company and Cohn cases to the factual situation then before this court which is identical with that disclosed by the record now before us.
The record in this case presents a sordid picture of political intrigue and chicanery and resort to fine-spun legal theories on the part of a majority of the city council of the city of Los Angeles to abrogate its contract with the housing authority and thus obstruct, delay and defeat the housing project contemplated by said contract. A narration of the official acts contained in the “Stipulation of Facts re Contempt” and the briefs' of counsel should demonstrate to any unprejudiced mind that after December 4, 1951, a majority of the city counsel undertook to wreck and destroy the housing project here involved. The following appears without contradiction: On September 14, 1951—only two days after the authority had acquired title to all of the county island, and, therefore, as soon as it could do so without affecting the interests of private owners in the area—the authority requested the council to annex this county island pursuant to the Annexation of Uninhabited Territory Act of 1939. That request expressly directed attention to and quoted the provisions of paragraph 7 of the cooperation agreement relating to the city’s promise to cooperate with the authority by “such other lawful action or ways as the Authority may find necessary in connection with the development and construction of *694the Project”; stated that this county strip should be annexed to the city; and requested that the necessary proceedings be taken to accomplish that result.
Promptly upon receipt of this request the council began the processing procedure customarily followed in such matters. The first step was to refer the matter to the Coordinating Board of the City of Los Angeles, composed of representatives of various of the city’s departments and of which the city director of planning is chairman. That board received reports on the annexation question from: the street widening and opening division of the department of public works; the board of public utilities and transportation; the health department; the planning department; and the department of water and power. Bach of these departments approved and recommended annexation, several of them pointing out that annexation of county islands was in keeping with the city’s policy of absorbing them and creating regular boundary lines. Accordingly, on October 11, 1951—less than a month after the authority’s request—the coordinating board made its report to the council unanimously recommending and approving the proposed annexation.
The council referred this report to its planning committee. That committee reported back on October 24, 1951. The committee’s report stated that the coordinating board had recommended annexation “as requested by the Los Angeles Housing Authority”; and had advised “that the annexation of this strip would conform to the City’s policy of absorbing county islands, thereby creating a more regular city boundary line. ...” Approval of the proposed annexation was, therefore, recommended in accordance with the coordinating board’s recommendation. On November 14, 1951, the council adopted the committee report and ordered preparation of a resolution of intention under the Annexation of Uninhabited Territory Act of 1939.
Between November 14 and November 29, 1951, the city attorney prepared the resolution of intention and transmitted it to the planning department. That department approved the resolution on November 29, 1951. On December 4, 1951, the city attorney transmitted it to the council and the council referred it to its planning committee. There it rested until after the rendition of this court’s original-decision in the instant cause.
On July 21, 1952, the planning committee reported the resolution out to the council, but a motion to adopt it failed. On *695the following day that action was reconsidered and the matter postponed to August 1, 1952. The council, however, failed to meet on the latter day for want of quorum. On August 4, 1952, another motion to adopt the resolution of intention failed. This action was also reconsidered on the next day and the matter postponed to August 15, 1952. On that day the council amended the proposed draft so as to recite that the reason for the annexation was the compulsion of this court’s mandate and the desire of the council to comply “in the event it should be judicially determined that compliance therewith requires annexation of this territory. ’ ’ The resolution was further amended by changing the date of public hearing from September 4 to September 19, 1952.
The public hearing called for by the resolution of intention was held on September 19, 1952. No protests, oral or written, against the proposed annexation had been or were received. The council then ordered preparation of an ordinance approving annexation. That was done and the ordinance was introduced for adoption on September 25,' 1952. Unanimous consent to act on it that day was requested and refused, respondent Harby objecting. The ordinance was, therefore, laid over one week. Then ensued a series of attempts to procure adoption of the ordinance. All of them failed, the only action which the council would take being further postponement to November 10, 1952. In the meantime the application for a writ of certiorari had been denied on October 13, 1952, so there was no longer any basis for delay on the ground of the pendency of that proceeding.
This refusal to annex a small, contiguous uninhabited county island, annexation of which had been recommended and approved by all city departments concerned, and to which there is no public protest, is unprecedented in the history of the city. Not one request for such an annexation—and there have been some 34 of them from private owners and from governmental agencies—has been refused since enactment of the Annexation of Uninhabited Territory Act of 1939. The city’s policy was always to annex and absorb such islands in order to create more regular city boundaries.
The decision of this court ordering the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate was filed on April 28, 1952, and the writ was issued on June 27, 1952, after one stay had been granted and another refused by this court and by a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Decision of the cause *696brought no immediate change in the respondents’ attitude, notwithstanding that at the hearing on the mandate petition the court was told by the city attorney that all that was needed or wanted by respondents was a determination of the basic question of the city's duty to proceed with performance of the cooperation agreement. The same attitude of defiance and refusal to act which compelled the authority to apply for mandate in the first instance persisted even after that determination had been made. As a result, no substantial action in aid of the projects was taken, although there were then pending previously filed requests for cooperation by way of street closing, inspection and review of plans and specifications, conveyance of tax-deeded lands, and annexation of the West Los Angeles county island.
This attitude on the part of the city council was not merely the result of holding matters in suspense pending action on the application to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. It was rather an attitude prompted by a refusal to accede to and comply with the writ of mandate. That is best shown by a resolution, adopted by the council on June 25, 1952 (one month after this court’s decision had become final and two days after a further stay had been refused) in which it was said:
“. . . this Council action constitutes notice to all persons and parties, including the Mayor; the City Housing Authority, its officers and agents, that this Council will resist any efforts at furtherance of the public housing program. ...”
It is further shown by the continuous efforts of respondents to effect abandonment of that program, notwithstanding the judgment of this court. Thus, the council persisted in holding an election on that question, even though on several occasions the city attorney informed this court that decision of the basic question would settle that issue too. Again, on May 7, June 19 and June 20, 1952, the council formally requested the state Legislature and the Congress to enact legislation permitting abandonment or cancellation of the program.
It is interesting and significant to contrast the expeditious way in- which this matter was handled before December 4, 1951, with the tortuous, delaying actions of the respondents after that time. Of course, before December 4, 1951, respondents were cooperating in good faith in the common objective of developing and constructing these projects. After that time, and notwithstanding this court’s mandate, they *697were doing their best to prevent accomplishment of that objective.
It has been aptly said: “If we say with Mr. Justice Holmes, ‘Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government,’ it is hard to see why the government should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens.” (48 Harv.L.Rev. 1299.)
Frankly, I am not impressed with the contention of any of the respondents that their refusal to cooperate with the authority by consummating the annexation proceeding was motivated by a conscientious desire to perform his official duty. The duty to cooperate cannot be distorted into a power to frustrate. The mandate issued by this court was clear and unambiguous. Any person who honestly desired to comply with it would have cooperated in consummating the annexation proceeding and thus enable the housing authority to complete its project. I cannot, therefore, see any justification for the tortuous, delaying, and frustrating actions of respondents as disclosed by the record before us.
It is my opinion, therefore, that those respondents who have refused to cooperate in consummating the annexation proceeding here involved, have wilfully violated the mandate of this court issued on June 27,1952, in the original mandamus proceeding, and that an appropriate fine should be imposed upon each of them for this violation.