Court Opinion

ID: 9468838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:25:05.78389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:04.911785
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I concur in Judge Sloviter’s opinion, I write separately to emphasize my concern regarding the continuing uncertainty in the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The rule, which accords the trial court discretion to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” is often used in conjunction with Rule 404(b) to admit potentially prejudicial evidence of prior “bad acts.” See United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (3d Cir. 1976). Admittedly, the realities of trial preclude a detailed exegesis by the trial judge of the decision to admit or exclude relevant, prejudicial evidence. But the exercise of a judge’s discretion requires just that — exercise, application, overt action. Thus, as I urged in United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S.Ct. 577, 58 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978), and as the majority suggests here, the trial court should make certain that in ruling on an objection premised on Rule 403, the record reflect “some reckoning of the balance between relevance and prejudice and the alternatives available for the substitution of less prejudicial proof.” Id. at 770. This is an oft-repeated admonition, not only in our Court, but in a number of other circuits as well. See, e.g., Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 794 & n. 40-41 (D.C.Cir.1978); United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 928 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Robinson, 530 F.2d 1076, 1081 (D.C.Cir.1976). See generally J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence ¶ 403[02], at 404-14 to -15 (1980 & Supp.). The point bears reiteration in the case before us today.
Put simply, an appellate court should not be expected to strike the correct balance between prejudice and probativeness in the Rule 403 context. Such an analysis, at least when undertaken by an appellate court in the first instance, necessarily entails considerable after-the-fact speculation. For example, the view of the appellate judges may differ significantly from that of the trial judge, who can assess the credibility of the witnesses and the potential impact of their testimony, in light of the entire environment of the trial. Faced with a barren or inadequate record, however, an appellate court — unable to determine whether the trial judge has used, let alone abused, his or her discretion — has limited choices: it can reverse and remand the case, or it can engage in its own balancing process. Neither alternative is completely satisfactory. Both consume time and limited judicial resources, and, even more important, either choice may result in a misinformed judgment by the appellate court.
*903In the present case, there is an indication that, in ruling on the objection to Dr. Ro-senbloom’s testimony, the trial judge was exercising the discretion granted him under Rule 403. The testimony was preceded by a lengthy side bar conference between counsel and the trial judge. While Rule 403 was not mentioned by name, the defense attorney did state that the judge must “determine whether or not [the evidence] is prejudicial, and whether the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. ...” Appendix at 87. After the conference, the court was recessed for ten minutes while the judge considered the issue. When the trial resumed, the judge announced his ruling, but did not explicitly set forth on the record either the probative worth of Dr. Rosenbloom’s testimony or the possibility of unfair prejudice. From this, the majority concludes — and I cannot disagree — that the trial judge’s decision was the result of a proper exercise of discretion.
The fact that the Court today is willing to infer from the record what preferably should have been made explicit at trial, however, does not obviate the risk that district judges take when they neglect to indicate, in some fashion, the basis for an evi-dentiary ruling under Rule 403. At best, the appellate tribunal is forced to second-guess the trial judge in such a situation. At worst, an improperly documented Rule 403 ruling may be cause for a reversal and remand. Accordingly, defense attorneys should clearly invoke Rule 403, either by name or by reference to its contents, when objecting to potentially prejudicial evidence. Trial judges likewise should indicate on the record that they have engaged in the requisite balancing process.
With this caveat I join in the opinion of the majority.