Court Opinion

ID: 9925980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 16:17:49.140658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:57.452997
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                              2024 WY 9

                                                                 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                          January 23, 2024

  LEOPOLDO HERMOSILLO
  ALVARADO,

  Appellant
  (Petitioner),
                                                                     S-23-0185
  v.

  THE STATE OF WYOMING,

  Appellee
  (Respondent).

                      Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County
                       The Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      James O. Bardwell, Woodhouse Roden Ames & Brennan, LLC, Cheyenne,
      Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney
      General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kellsie J. Singleton,
      Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Leopoldo Alvarado petitioned the district court to terminate his duty to register as a
sex offender pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304 of the Wyoming Sex Offender
Registration Act. Under that statute, termination of the duty to register is only available to
offenders who have been registered for at least ten years. The district court denied the
petition, concluding the time Mr. Alvarado spent on probation did not count toward the
ten-year statutory prerequisite. We conclude the district court’s statutory interpretation is
in error and reverse.

                                                    ISSUE

[¶2]      Mr. Alvarado raises a single issue which we rephrase:

                   Did the district court err when it interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann.
                   § 7-19-304 to mandate the successful completion of probation
                   before the ten-year registration period begins?

                                                    FACTS

[¶3] The facts are undisputed. Mr. Alvarado was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor
in the third degree in December 2012 and was sentenced to five years of probation with a
suspended period of incarceration. Mr. Alvarado successfully completed his probation on
March 21, 2018. Following his conviction, Mr. Alvarado continuously registered as a sex
offender for ten years. In December 2022, he filed a petition to be removed from the
registry under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304. The prosecutor argued that Mr. Alvarado was
not eligible for relief from the registration requirement because the ten-year prerequisite
for his petition did not begin until after he completed probation. 1 The district court agreed
and denied Mr. Alvardo’s petition. This timely appeal followed.

                                        STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶4] “Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.” Wyo. Jet
Ctr., LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 6, ¶ 11, 432 P.3d 910, 915 (Wyo. 2019)
(citing Phoenix Vintners, LLC v. Noble, 2018 WY 87, ¶ 10, 423 P.3d 309, 312 (Wyo.
2018)). We afford no deference to the district court’s determinations. Alpine Lumber Co.
v. Capital W. Nat’l Bank, 2010 WY 62, ¶ 6, 231 P.3d 869, 871 (Wyo. 2010) (citations
omitted).

                   When interpreting statutes, we seek the legislature’s intent as
                   reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used

1
    On appeal, the State has abandoned its argument to the district court and supports Mr. Alvarado’s position.

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              in the statute, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence.
              The plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of words used in a
              statute controls in the absence of clear statutory provisions to
              the contrary. Where there is plain, unambiguous language used
              in a statute there is no room for construction. The omission of
              words from a statute is considered to be an intentional act by
              the legislature, and this [C]ourt will not read words into a
              statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them.

Minter v. State, 2023 WY 35, ¶ 24, 527 P.3d 1249, 1254 (Wyo. 2023) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).

                                       DISCUSSION

The clear and unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304 does not require
probation be completed before the ten-year registration period begins to run.

[¶5] The district court found Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304 unambiguously requires a
“clean record” for ten years, and “[t]he offender cannot have a statutory clean record until
he completes any probationary period.” The language of the statute does not support the
district court’s interpretation. See Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, ¶ 10, 391 P.3d 1086,
1091 (Wyo. 2017) (“We construe statutory provisions in pari materia, which requires that
we give effect to every word, clause, and sentence according to the interplay between the
provisions.” (citation omitted)).

[¶6]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304, in pertinent part, provides:

              (a)    The duty to register under W.S. 7-19-302 shall begin on
              the date of sentencing and continue for the duration of the
              offender’s life, subject to the following:

                     (i)     An offender specified in W.S. 7-19-302(g) or
                     adjudicated as a delinquent for offenses specified in
                     W.S. 7-19-302(j), who has been registered for at least
                     ten (10) years, exclusive of periods of confinement and
                     periods in which the offender was not registered as
                     required by law, may petition the district court for the
                     district in which the offender is registered to be relieved
                     of the duty to continue to register if the offender has
                     maintained a clean record as provided in subsection (d)
                     of this section. Upon a showing that the offender has
                     maintained a clean record as provided in subsection (d)
                     of this section for ten (10) years, the district court may

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                            order the offender relieved of the duty to continue
                            registration;

                                                   .     .     .

                   (d)    An offender seeking a reduction in his registration
                   period as provided in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii) of this section shall
                   demonstrate to the court that he has maintained a clean record
                   by:

                            (i)   Having no conviction of any offense for which
                            imprisonment for more than one (1) year may be
                            imposed;

                            (ii)    Having no conviction of any sex offense;

                            (iii) Successfully completing any periods                        of
                            supervised release, probation and parole; and

                            (iv) Successfully completing any sex offender
                            treatment previously ordered by the trial court or by his
                            probation or parole agent.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(i) and (d) (LexisNexis 2023).

[¶7] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(i) defines an offender who may be eligible for relief
from registration—an offender with a duty to register and who has been registered for a
minimum of ten years. This subsection makes clear that the ten-year registration
requirement excludes “periods of confinement and periods in which the offender was not
registered as required by law.” Mr. Alvarado registered immediately after the imposition
of the sentence pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302(c)(ii). 2 For ten years, Mr. Alvarado

2
    Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302(c)(ii) sets forth the time and place of registration:
                  (c)      Offenders required to register under this act shall register with the
                  entities specified in this subsection and within the following time periods:
                                                    .    .   .
                           (ii)     Offenders who are convicted of an offense subjecting
                           them to registration under this act but who are not sentenced to a
                           term of confinement shall register immediately after the
                           imposition of the sentence. The sheriff of the county where the
                           judgment and sentence is entered shall register the offender and
                           perform the related duties specified in W.S. 7-19-305 unless the
                           offender does not reside in the county where the judgment and
                           sentence is entered, in which case he shall register in the county

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continuously complied with the registration requirements and had no periods of
confinement, thus avoiding the statutory tolling periods identified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-
19-304(a)(i).

[¶8] It is undisputed that Mr. Alvarado was on probation for five of the ten years he
registered as a sex offender. Probation is not listed as a tolling event. “The ‘omission of
words from a statute is considered to be an intentional act by the legislature, and this
[C]ourt will not read words into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include
them.’” Minter, ¶ 24, 527 P.3d at 1254 (quoting BC-K v. State, 2022 WY 80, ¶ 11, 512
P.3d 634, 638 (Wyo. 2022)); Harrison v. State, 2021 WY 40, ¶ 7, 482 P.3d 353, 356 (Wyo.
2021).

[¶9] Subsection (a) defines an eligible offender as an offender who has been registered
for at least ten years with a clean record as provided in subsection (d). Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 7-19-304(a)(i). Subsection (d) sets forth conditions that an offender must satisfy during
the ten-year registration period.

[¶10] Subsection (d) requires that a petitioner “shall demonstrate to the court that he has
maintained a clean record by” meeting four conditions. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(d)
(emphasis added). The word “by” is a preposition meaning “through the agency or
instrumentality of.”        By, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/by (last visited Jan. 19, 2024). To show eligibility, the offender
must meet all four conditions during the ten-year registration period. The first two
conditions address specified criminal offenses and direct that the offender have no
convictions for these offenses. The third mandates that an offender must have successfully
completed all the terms of probation, and the fourth requires the successful completion of
any sex offender treatment ordered by the court or other proper authority. Subsection (d)
does not modify the definition of an eligible petitioner under (a), and it does not require
that any of the four conditions including probation be completed before the ten-year
registration period commences. An offender demonstrates a clean record during the ten-
year period set forth in subsection (a) by proving compliance with subsection (d). This is
the only reading of the statute that gives effect to both subsections (a) and (d).

[¶11] We note that our research has found no case law or other legal authority supporting
a conflicting interpretation of analogous language in federal or other states’ statutes. To
the contrary, the cases assume that the period of probation is included in the ten-year clean
record calculation. See, e.g., In re Hamilton, 725 S.E.2d 393, 399 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(denial of 2011 petition for termination of duty to register reversed when undisputed
evidence demonstrated petitioner’s 2001 guilty plea was followed by successful
participation in a sexual abuse treatment program and probation, and petitioner had not

                       in which he resides within three (3) working days[.]
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2023).

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committed any new offenses); United States v. Templin, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1182–83
(D. Mont. 2019) (“Because Templin was released from prison on August 7, 2008, he
became eligible to seek termination of his registration requirement as of August 2018 so
long as he has maintained a ‘clean record’ in that 10-year period.” Templin met the
requirements after submitting 2013 report from his treatment provider.).

[¶12] Under the plain and unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(i) and
(d), Mr. Alvarado was not required to complete probation before the ten-year registration
clock started. We reverse the district court’s denial of his petition and remand for the
district court to consider whether he should be relieved of the duty to continue registration.
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(i) (Upon proper showing, “the district court may order
the offender relieved of the duty to continue registration.”).

[¶13] Reversed and remanded for further consideration.

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