Court Opinion

ID: 9623952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:46:58.254645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:45.003758
License: Public Domain

TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority that this interlocutory appeal which affects no substantial right should be heard pursuant to the Court’s discretion under Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
The order is interlocutory because it is not a final determination of all of the claims. Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 265 S.E.2d 240 (1980). Interlocutory orders are appealable only as allowed by North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or North Carolina General Statutes sections 1-277 and 7A-27(d). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § § 1A-1, Rule 54(b); 1-277; and 7A-27(d) (1999). Because the trial court’s order does not contain a Rule 54(b) certification that there is no just reason for delay, plaintiff’s right to an immediate appeal, if one exists, depends on whether the order affects a substantial right. Hudson-Cole Dev. Corp. v. Beemer, 132 N.C. App. 341, 511 S.E.2d 309 (1999). No substantial right has been identified by the majority. In fact, the majority concedes that “Plaintiff’s appeal is from an interlocutory order that does not affect a substantial right.” “If an appealing party has no right of appeal, an appellate court. . . should dismiss the appeal.” Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 201, 240 S.E.2d 338, 340 (1978) (citations omitted).
Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for the suspension of rules by an appellate court.
To prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the public interest, either court of the appellate division may, except as otherwise expressly provided by these rules, suspend *721or vary the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a case pending before it upon application of a party or upon its own initiative, and may order proceedings in accordance with its directions.
N.C. R. App. P. 2. The majority has pointed towards no manifest injustice that is prevented by hearing this appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently spoken to the limited nature of Rule 2 as follows:
While it is certainly true that Rule 2 has been and may be so applied in the discretion of the Court, we reaffirm that Rule 2 relates to the residual power of our appellate courts to consider, in exceptional circumstances, significant issues of importance in the public interest, or to prevent injustice which appears manifest to the Court and only in such instances.
Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 66, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299-300 (1999). I do not believe such public interest or manifest injustice is implicated in this case. Rather, the Court’s ruling encourages the very kind of “fragmentary, premature, and unnecessary appeals” that the rules prohibiting the appeal of interlocutory orders are intended to prevent. Waters, 294 N.C. at 207, 240 S.E.2d at 343. Consequently, I would dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.
Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent.