Court Opinion

ID: 9352832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 23:03:26.759227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:47.124529
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220183-U
                                      No. 2-22-0183
                               Order filed January 9, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                           IN THE

                            APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of Kendall County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) Nos. 21-CF-69
                                       )       21-DT-33
                                       )       21-TR-675
                                       )
MICHAEL S. SEWELL,                     ) Honorable
                                       ) Stephen L. Krentz,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Hutchinson and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

                                           ORDER

¶1     Held: Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. Judgment affirmed.

¶2     Defendant, Michael S. Sewell, was charged (1) in case No. 21-DT-33, with one count of

driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2020)); (2) in case

No. 21-CF-69, with two counts of aggravated DUI (id. § 11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(A)) and one count

of driving while license suspended (DWLS) (id. § 6-303(d-2) (West 2020)); and (3) in case
2023 IL App (2d) 220183-U

No. 21-TR-675, with operating an uninsured vehicle (id. § 3-707(a) (West 2020)). The cases

proceeded together.

¶3     Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to admit evidence that defendant was

convicted on August 29, 2012, of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The trial court

granted the motion over defendant’s objection that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially

outweighed the probative value of the evidence.

¶4     Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. At

trial, Joseph McElroy testified that between 11 and 11:15 p.m. on March 5, 2021, he woke to a

crash or bang. His power went out. He looked out the window and saw headlights come on and

then go off. The headlights were in a field. McElroy went outside with a flashlight, called 911,

and drove in his truck on Little Rock Road toward where he had seen the headlights. McElroy did

not see anyone as he drove toward that location. McElroy stopped when he saw a Volkswagen in

a field off the roadway. McElroy surmised that the Volkswagen had left the road where a curve

began and had proceeded straight for approximately 100 yards before coming to rest.

¶5     McElroy saw nobody on the road or walking in the field. McElroy saw defendant exit the

passenger side of Volkswagen and walk toward him. Defendant’s gait was unsteady, his eyes were

“glossed over,” and there was a small amount of blood on his forehead. McElroy asked if there

was anyone else in the vehicle. Defendant said no. Defendant started to get into McElroy’s truck

and asked McElroy to take him away from there. McElroy told defendant to stay out of the truck,

adding that help was on the way. Defendant then started to walk at a rapid pace toward McElroy’s

house. At some point, defendant fell in a field. During his interaction with defendant, McElroy

noticed the smell of alcohol.

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¶6     Plano police officer Matt Johnson arrived at the scene and saw defendant lying on the

ground in a field. Johnson testified that defendant’s clothing was unkempt, and he had a small

laceration on his head. After an ambulance arrived, Johnson and Sergeant Roberto Hernandez

searched the area, looking for anyone else who might have been in the Volkswagen. They found

no one. Johnson did not see any footprints leading from the Volkswagen into the field. Johnson

testified that a downed utility pole was in the area between the road and the Volkswagen.

¶7     Johnson testified that he returned to the area where emergency medical technicians were

attending to defendant. In speaking with defendant, Johnson noted that defendant’s speech was

“slurred and mumbled.” Johnson also smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage. As a result,

Johnson formed the opinion that defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Johnson then

placed defendant under arrest. Johnson asked defendant to take a Breathalyzer test, but defendant

refused. Johnson then obtained a search warrant to draw defendant’s blood for testing to determine

his blood alcohol concentration (BAC). At about 3:30 a.m., defendant was transported to a nearby

hospital, where his blood was drawn at about 4 a.m. Test results showed a BAC of 0.202. While

being transported to the Kendall County jail, defendant told Johnson that he would beat the case

on technicalities.

¶8     The State presented evidence that police found the Volkswagen’s key fob in defendant’s

pocket at the scene. The court admitted an abstract of defendant’s driving record into evidence,

which showed that defendant’s license was suspended on March 5, 2021. In addition, the parties

stipulated that, after his arrest, defendant could not produce an insurance card for the Volkswagen

when asked to do so.

¶9     Defendant testified that on March 5, 2021, he did not have a car and needed a ride from

Elgin to Geneva for a job interview. Defendant asked his neighbor Juan for a ride, but Juan did

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not have access to a vehicle. Defendant was able to borrow his friend Jorge’s car so that Juan

could drive him to the interview. Jorge lived in Plano, but he arranged to have someone drive the

car to Elgin. Juan drove defendant to Geneva for his interview, after which they returned to Elgin.

Juan had a friend who needed some brake work on his car. Defendant agreed to do the work to

repay Juan for the favor of driving him to Geneva. They then traveled to Montgomery to repair

Juan’s friend’s car. They finished at about 7 p.m. While working on the car, they were drinking.

Defendant probably had about 12 beers. Juan then drove defendant to a bar in Somonauk, where

they continued to drink. When they left the bar to return to Elgin, defendant lay down in the

backseat while Juan drove. The route to Elgin took them onto Little Rock Road. While traveling

on Little Rock Road, defendant felt the vehicle leave the roadway. The vehicle traveled into a

field and hit a pole. Defendant hit his head and was rendered unconscious. When he regained

consciousness, defendant noticed that Juan was not in the driver’s seat and the engine was still

running. Defendant grabbed the car key fob to turn off the engine. He then put the key fob in his

pocket.

¶ 10      After defendant’s testimony, the defense rested, and the State introduced the sentencing

order showing defendant’s prior conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The

trial court found defendant guilty of all charges. The trial court merged all DUI convictions into

one aggravated DUI conviction in case No. 21-CF-69 and sentenced defendant to concurrent

prison terms of three years for aggravated DUI and one year for DWLS. In addition, the court

imposed a fine in case No. 21-TR-675. This appeal followed, and the trial court appointed the

Office of the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant.

¶ 11      Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and People v. Jones, 38 Ill. 2d 384

(1967), the appellate defender moves to withdraw as counsel. In his motion, counsel states that he

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read the record and found no issue of arguable merit. Counsel further states that he advised

defendant of his opinion. Counsel supports his motion with a memorandum of law providing a

statement of facts and an argument why this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit. We

advised defendant that he had 30 days to respond to the motion. That time is past, and defendant

has not responded.

¶ 12   Counsel advises us that he considered arguing on appeal whether (1) the evidence was

sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions of aggravated DUI, DWLS, and operating an

uninsured vehicle; (2) defendant’s jury waiver was valid; (3) the trial court erred in granting the

State’s motion in limine; and (4) the trial court erred at sentencing. Counsel concludes that none

of these issues is arguably meritorious. We agree.

¶ 13   On the first potential issue—evidentiary sufficiency—we note that a reviewing court will

not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it

creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985).

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in

original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

¶ 14   We consider first the evidence to support the aggravated DUI conviction. Section 11-

501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2020))

provides:

               “(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within

       this State while:

               ***

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2023 IL App (2d) 220183-U

               (2) under the influence of alcohol[.]”

¶ 15   We initially consider whether there is any basis for arguing that the State failed to prove

that defendant drove the Volkswagen. The evidence shows that defendant was alone when

McElroy discovered him emerging from the Volkswagen at the scene of the accident. Moreover,

defendant possessed the vehicle’s key fob. Finally, a police search of the area found no one else

who might have driven the Volkswagen. Thus, there is no arguable basis for challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence that defendant drove the Volkswagen.

¶ 16   The next question is whether defendant was under the influence of alcohol when driving.

The governing law is:

       “A defendant is under the influence of alcohol when, as a result of consuming alcohol or

       any other intoxicating substance, the defendant’s ‘ “mental or physical faculties are so

       impaired as to reduce [the] ability to think and act with ordinary care.” ’ [Citation.] To be

       under the influence of alcohol, a defendant must be under the influence to a degree that

       renders her incapable of driving safely. [Citation.] Whether a defendant was intoxicated

       is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. [Citation.]” People v. Groebe, 2019

       IL App (1st) 180503, ¶ 57.

¶ 17   Factors supporting a finding that a motorist was under the influence include (1) the odor of

alcohol on his or her breath (People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207, ¶ 31); (2) “glossy” eyes

(People v. Hewitt, 212 Ill. App. 3d 496, 504 (1991)); (3) “slurred speech” (People v. Phillips, 2015

IL App (1st) 131147, ¶ 19); and (4) the motorist’s admission to consuming alcohol (People v.

Jophlin, 2018 IL App (4th) 150802, ¶ 50). All those factors were present here. In addition,

defendant refused to submit to testing of the alcohol level of his blood, breath, or urine. His refusal

was evidence of consciousness of guilt. People v. Love, 2013 IL App (3d) 120113, ¶ 36. Given

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this evidence, it would be frivolous to argue that the State failed to prove that defendant was under

the influence of alcohol.

¶ 18   Finally, the offense was properly enhanced from simple DUI to aggravated DUI based on

defendant’s two prior violations of the DUI statute. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(A) (West 2020).

The two prior violations are not elements of the offense and need not be proven at trial. See People

v. May, 2021 IL App (4th) 190893, ¶ 32. At sentencing, the State submitted defendant’s driving

record abstract showing two prior violations of the DUI statute. The abstract was prima facie

evidence of the facts stated therein. 625 ILCS 5/2-123(g)(6) (West 2020). Defendant presented

no evidence to refute the facts stated in the abstract. Therefore, it would be frivolous to argue that

the State failed to meet its burden of proving the prior violations. In conclusion, there is no

arguably meritorious basis for challenging defendant’s aggravated DUI conviction.

¶ 19   We also agree with counsel that there is no potentially meritorious basis for challenging

the evidence’s sufficiency to support defendant’s DWLS conviction. Section 6-303(a) of the

Vehicle Code (id. § 6-303(a)) provides, in pertinent part: “any person who drives or is in actual

physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person’s

driver’s license *** is revoked or suspended *** shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.” As

discussed above, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant

was driving on March 5, 2021. Furthermore, defendant’s driving record abstract, admitted at trial,

stated that a statutory summary suspension of defendant’s driver’s license was in effect on March

5, 2021.

¶ 20   In addition, defendant’s DWLS conviction was properly enhanced to a Class 4 felony

because section 6-303(d-2) of the Vehicle Code (id. § 6-303(d-2)) provides:

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2023 IL App (2d) 220183-U

               “Any person convicted of a third violation of this Section is guilty of a Class 4

       felony and must serve a minimum term of imprisonment of 30 days, if:

               (1) the current violation occurred when the person’s driver’s license was suspended

       or revoked for a violation of Section 11-401 or 11-501 of this Code, or a similar out-of-

       state offense, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or a statutory summary suspension

       or revocation under Section 11-501.1 of this Code; and

               (2) the prior convictions under this Section occurred while the person’s driver’s

       license was suspended or revoked for a violation of Section 11-401 or 11-501 of this Code,

       a similar out-of-state offense, a similar provision of a local ordinance, or a statutory

       summary suspension or revocation under Section 11-501.1 of this Code, or for a violation

       of Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, relating to the

       offense of reckless homicide, or a violation of subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of

       subsection (d) of Section 11-501 of this Code, relating to the offense of aggravated driving

       under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or

       compounds, or any combination thereof when the violation was a proximate cause of a

       death, or a similar out-of-state offense.”

At sentencing, the court admitted an abstract of defendant’s driving record abstract, which showed

that defendant had two prior convictions of DWLS. Both convictions arose from the statutory

summary suspension of defendant’s license. Accordingly, it would be frivolous to argue that the

evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s felony DWLS conviction.

¶ 21   Counsel is also correct that it would be frivolous to challenge the evidence supporting

defendant’s conviction of driving an uninsured vehicle. Section 3-707(a) of the Vehicle Code (id.

§ 3-707(a) (West 2020)) provides that “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle in this State

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unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy.” As previously discussed, the

evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was driving a vehicle

on March 5, 2021. Section 3-707(b) of the Vehicle Code (id. § 3-707(b)) provides, in pertinent

part, that “[a]ny person who fails to comply with a request by a law enforcement officer for display

of evidence of insurance *** shall be deemed to be operating an uninsured motor vehicle.”

“However, no person charged with violating this Section shall be convicted if such person

produces in court satisfactory evidence that at the time of the arrest the motor vehicle was covered

by a liability insurance policy ***.” Id. § 3-707(c). Defendant did not provide proof of insurance

for the Volkswagen either when the police requested it on March 5, 2021, or later in court.

Accordingly, there is no colorable basis for challenging the evidence’s sufficiency to sustain

defendant’s conviction of driving an uninsured vehicle.

¶ 22   On the second potential issue—whether defendant’s jury waiver was valid—the following

principles apply:

       “To be valid, a jury waiver must be knowing and understanding. [Citation.] A court need

       not give any particular admonishments or advice to effect a valid jury waiver. [Citation.]

       Given that a defendant typically speaks and acts through his or her attorney, jury waivers

       are typically valid when made by defense counsel in a defendant’s presence where the

       defendant does not object. [Citation.]” People v. Manning, 2020 IL App (2d) 180042,

       ¶ 20.

Here, with defendant present in court, defendant’s attorney advised the trial court that defendant

had signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial (the waiver was filed with the court and is in

the appellate record). The court then questioned defendant to determine whether he had enough

time to consult with counsel before signing the waiver. Defendant responded that he did. The

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court explained that defendant had a constitutional right to a trial by a jury of his peers and

confirmed that defendant had discussed with counsel the benefits and detriments of waiving a jury

trial. The court also confirmed that no one had forced or coerced defendant to waive his right to a

jury trial. Accordingly, we agree that there is no arguably meritorious basis for challenging

defendant’s jury waiver.

¶ 23    We also find no potential merit in the third potential issue: whether the trial court erred in

granting the State’s motion in limine to admit, for impeachment, defendant’s prior conviction of

possession of a controlled substance. Illinois Rule of Evidence 609(a) (eff. Jan. 6, 2015) provides,

in pertinent part:

                “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness

        has been convicted of a crime *** is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable

        by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was

        convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment

        unless (3), in either case, the court determines that the probative value of the evidence of

        the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”

Illinois Rule of Evidence 609(b) (eff. Jan. 6, 2015) provides that “[e]vidence of a conviction under

this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction

or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date.” Here, there is no

question that defendant’s prior conviction was punishable by more than a year in prison and that

it fell within the 10 years. However, during the hearing on the motion in limine, defendant argued

that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence.

In granting the motion, the trial court did not specifically address that argument, commenting only

that “on balance [the conviction] does fall within the ten years.” However, even if the trial court

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2023 IL App (2d) 220183-U

failed to properly weigh the conviction’s probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice,

the defendant forfeited the issue by failing to include it in his motion for a new trial. See People

v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).

¶ 24   Under appropriate circumstances, a reviewing court may consider forfeited errors under

the plain-error rule. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). As our supreme court has recently

explained:

       “[T]he plain error rule allows reviewing courts discretion to review forfeited errors under

       two alternative prongs: (1) when a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so

       closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the

       defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) when a clear or obvious error

       occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and

       challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.”

       People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 20.

¶ 25   Here, the evidence was not closely balanced. To overcome forfeiture, defendant would

have to establish second-prong plain error, equivalent to “structural error.” Id. ¶ 28. “Structural

errors” are ones that “affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than mere errors

in the trial process itself.” Id. ¶ 29. Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court did not properly

weigh the danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value of the prior conviction, the error

did not affect the framework within which the trial proceeded. Hence, no plain error occurred, so

it would be frivolous to challenge the trial court’s ruling on the State’s motion in limine.

¶ 26   On the final potential issue—whether the trial court erred at sentencing—counsel notes that

defendant forfeited any challenge to his sentence by failing to file a postsentencing motion in the

trial court. See People v. Johnson, 2021 IL App. 2d 180775, ¶ 12. Counsel adds that there is no

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2023 IL App (2d) 220183-U

apparent basis for plain-error review. We agree. To show plain error in the sentencing context,

the defendant must show that a “clear or obvious error occurred” at sentencing and “either that

(1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious

as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010).

“The first step of plain-error review is determining whether any error occurred.” People v.

Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010). From our record review, we find no error in sentencing,

let alone plain error.

¶ 27    It is well established that “[a] sentence imposed within the statutory range is presumed to

be proper and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” People v. Charleston, 2018 IL

App (1st) 161323, ¶ 16. A court abuses its discretion when it imposes a sentence that “is greatly

at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of

the offense.” Id. Here, defendant’s aggravated DUI conviction was a Class 2 felony (625 ILCS

5/11-501(d)(2)(B) (West 2020)) punishable by a prison term of three to seven years (730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2020)). Defendant’s DWLS conviction was a Class 4 felony (625 ILCS 5/6-

303(d-2) (West 2020)) punishable by a prison term of one to three years (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a)

(West 2020)). The trial court imposed the minimum prison terms and ordered them served

concurrently. There is no potentially meritorious basis for arguing that these sentences were an

abuse of discretion.

¶ 28    After examining the record, the motion to withdraw, and the memorandum of law, we agree

with counsel that this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit. Thus, we grant the motion to

withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County.

¶ 29    Affirmed.

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