Court Opinion

ID: 9947356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 17:10:21.757527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:22.624869
License: Public Domain

J-S47033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SAMIR BENTLEY                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3103 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 12, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002293-2022

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                           FILED MARCH 4, 2024

       Appellant, Samir Bentley, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on October 12, 2022, in the Montgomery County Court of Common

Pleas. We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history, thoroughly laid out by the

trial court, are as follows:

              The four-day jury trial commenced on October 7, 2022 and
       established the following facts. On October 23, 2021, at
       approximately 8:26 p.m., Officer Eric Weber, of the Pottstown
       Police Department was on patrol and was dispatched to the 400
       block of East High Street, Pottstown for a call of shots fired. (N.T.,
       Trial by Jury, 10/7/22, p. 39, 40). He arrived on the scene and
       found Robert Stiles with two gunshot wounds to his abdomen. Id.
       at 43. While rendering aid to the victim, the officer testified that
       he did not find any weapon on or in the vicinity of the victim. Id.
       at 43 - 44. Officer Weber secured the crime scene, and canvassed
       the area for evidence. Id. at 43, 47. He observed a significant
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S47033-23

     amount of shell casings, a 22 caliber, a .9 caliber, and .45 caliber.
     Id. at 48. The paramedic also provided the officer with a bullet
     fragment that fell from the victim’s clothing. Id. at 44 - 45.
            Detective Brooke Hatfield of the Pottstown Police
     Department responded to the initial crime scene. Id. at 53. She
     located video surveillance from the area and from a Wawa in
     Royersford. Id. at 58 - 59. The surveillance video audio from the
     Blue Moon Deli, right where the murder occurred, at 8:24 p.m.,
     recorded Quadir Nixon saying, “Jig, Mir, and (unintelligible) are
     robbing County right now, have him gunned down in the corner
     now. They have a gat to him right now.” Id. at 66. The video
     depicted Mohammed, the individual in a black and white
     sweatshirt pull the victim into the cut. Id. at 67, 69. It also showed
     Harrison, who was wearing a pink hat hand the gun to Appellant.
     Id. Appellant, who was wearing a teddy bear sweatshirt, fired
     three shots at the victim. Id. at 67, 69 - 70. Another video
     depicted much of the same, in addition the video depicted a single
     shot being fired, followed by three more shots. Id. at 71 - 73. The
     significance of this video was that law enforcement found one
     9mm shell casing inside the cut and three .45 caliber shell casings
     on the sidewalk where Appellant fired the three shots. Id. at 73.
     The video also showed that in response to the shooting, Eric Baker
     fired off seven or eight .22 caliber shell casings. Id. No firearms
     were found at the crime scene, and no weapon was recovered
     from the victim's belongings. Id. at 78. In addition to this video
     evidence, detective Hatfield testified that a grey minivan was
     associated with the murder, and that a license plate reader
     determined it was a stolen vehicle. Id. at 92, 94.
            Detective Heather Long with the Montgomery County
     Detective Bureau testified that surveillance footage showed that
     after the murder, Appellant and Mohammed got into the minivan
     and drove off, while Harrison fled the scene on foot. Id. at 228.
     Additional surveillance footage recorded the minivan traveling
     towards a Wawa in Royersford. Id. at 128 - 129. Mohammed
     made a purchase in Wawa, and he had a handful of cash. Id. at
     129. Appellant and Mohammed exited the Wawa and got into a
     different vehicle. Id. at 130.
            Dr. Supriya Kuruvilla performed the autopsy on the victim
     on October 24, 2021. (N.T., Trial by Jury, 10/10/22, p. at 23). The
     doctor noted two gunshot wounds, one on the right lower back,
     and the other was to the right lower abdomen. Id. at 25. Both of
     these wounds involved extensive damage to the victim's internal
     organs and either could have been fatal. Id. at 25 - 26, 30, 39.

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             On October 25, 2021, Officer Eric Pistilli of the Royersford
     Borough Police Department received a call for an abandoned
     minivan in a residential driveway at 962 Walnut Street. Id. at 52
     - 54. The Wawa where Appellant and Mohammed were caught on
     surveillance was just north of this location. Id. at 57. The right
     passenger tire was completely flat and there were bullet holes in
     the driver's side. Id. at 54. The officer determined that it was a
     stolen vehicle. Id. at 55. The minivan was taken to a secure
     facility. Id. at 56. Detective Terrance Lewis from the Montgomery
     County Detective Bureau processed the minivan on October 26,
     2021. Id. at 68. In part, the detective recovered ballistic evidence
     from the minivan and he turned over this evidence and additional
     ballistic evidence to Detective Nelson, a firearms examiner. Id. at
     77, 78.
             Firearm expert, Detective Eric Nelson, conducted several
     examinations on the ballistic evidence. Id. at 86, 92, 96. He
     examined seven 22 caliber fired shell casings ("FCC"), three 45
     caliber shell casings, and one .9mm shell casing, which were all
     found at the murder scene. Id. at 98. From a microscopic analysis
     he determined, that all of the 22 caliber FCCs were fired from the
     same firearm. Id. The three .45 caliber FCCs were fired from the
     same firearm. Id. at 100. Detective Nelson could not compare any
     of these FCCs to a specific firearm since none were recovered. Id.
     at 98, 100. He further explained that the bullet recovered during
     the autopsy and the bullet fragment recovered from the surgery
     on the victim were both 45 caliber and from the same firearm[.]
     Id. at 103.
             Co-conspirator Harrison was called to testify. On October of
     2022, he was living in Philadelphia. Id. at 142. He was good
     friends with Appellant and had known him for over ten years. Id.
     at 142, 144. Harrison had been in a relationship with Appellant's
     sister for years, and Appellant is his daughter's uncle. Id. at 143
     - 144. Harrison knew Appellant's nickname to be Miro and Mir. Id.
     at 147. Harrison also knew the victim, and knew him as County.
     He had bought marijuana from County many times over the years.
     Id. at 154 - 155. However, Harrison only met Mohammed on the
     day of the murder. Id. at 147.
             During the afternoon of October 23, 2021, Harrison went
     from his home in Philadelphia to Pottstown. Id. at 156. The plan
     was to hang out with his brother and work on rap videos together.
     Id. Appellant picked Harrison up from his home around 3 or 4
     p.m., in a dark minivan. Id. at 158, 159. Mohammed was also
     present when Harrison was picked up. Id. at 160. Harrison
     admitted to having a 45 caliber firearm with him. Id. at 161. When

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     they got to Pottstown, they pulled into the Gulf gas station, and
     he saw Quadir Nixon (“Nixon”) and the victim there. Id. at 162 -
     163. Nixon was pumping gas, and he saw the victim in the back
     seat of the white car counting cash, about $300 or $400. Id. at
     164, 166. Harrison joked with the victim about having all that
     money, and he laughed and pulled out more money. Id. at 167.
     He estimated it was a total of $5000. Id. at 168. When Harrison,
     Appellant, and Mohammed were all back in the vehicle,
     Mohammed was on his phone on FaceTime. Id. at 170. The person
     on the phone was asking whether they knew of someone to rob.
     Id. at 170 - 171. After the call ended, Harrison mentioned that
     the victim and Nixon were just flashing money, so they could rob
     one of them. Id. at 172. Harrison told Mohammed that the plan
     would be that Mohammed would ask the victim if he had
     marijuana, get him away from everyone, and Mohammed would
     rob him, using a gun. Id. at 172, 174. Harrison offered
     Mohammed his gun, but he did not take it. Id. at 175. Appellant
     wasn't really a part of the conversation because he had his
     earphones in, but it was possible he heard it. Id. at 175. Harrison
     said that Appellant would be the lookout. Id. at 176.
           Harrison knew that the victim and Nixon would be in front
     of the Blue Moon Deli, and Appellant drove there. Id. at 177, 232.
     The three of them get there around 6 p.m, and parked the minivan
     across the street. Id. at 177, 178. While they were hanging out
     there, the topic of the robbery came back up. Id. at 178. They
     were talking about what was going to happen. Id. at 233. Harrison
     told police in his statement that Appellant and Mohammed were
     both involved in the conversation about the robbery with him. Id.
     at 234 - 235, 236. Harrison said he would go into the Blue Moon
     Deli and ask the victim if he had any marijuana, which he did. Id.
     at 178. The victim told him he did not have any marijuana. Id. at
     179. He communicated this back to Mohammed and to Appellant.
     Id. at 179, 180. This did not change the plan, because Harrison
     knew the victim had money. Id. at 180. The opportune moment
     presented itself when the three of them were three stores down
     from the Blue Moon Deli, right near the cut. Id. at 181. Harrison
     turned around and looked at Appellant. Id. at 182. He gave
     Appellant a head nod as a signal to put the plan in motion. Id.
     Harrison turned away. Id. at 183, He heard Nixon say, “Y’all
     weird. What y’all doing?” Id. Appellant told him to “Chill.” Id.
     Appellant was positioned between the cut and Nixon. Id. at 183 -
     184. Nixon walked away. Id. at 183. Once Harrison walked past
     the cut, he realized that the robbery was happening. Id. He saw
     the back of the victim, and it looked like the victim was going into

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     his jacket pocket. Id. at 184 - 185. Although Harrison could not
     see what was coming out of his pocket, he never saw the victim
     with a gun. Id. at 185. He assumed that the victim was giving
     things up as part of the robbery. Id. at 186. Mohammed was
     behind the victim in the cut. Id. at 185. Harrison also heard
     Appellant say, “He got a jawn, he got a jawn.” Id. at 186 - 187.
     Harrison believed Appellant was referring to Nixon, that Nixon had
     a gun. Id. at 187, 238 - 239. Harrison turned around, walked
     towards Appellant, and handed him his 45 caliber gun. Id. at 187,
     188. Harrison walked to the street, and heard grabbing and
     wrestling in the cut. Id. at 189. Harrison heard a single gunshot
     from inside the cut, ran away, and heard three more shots from
     around the cut. Id. at 190. The three of them ran back to the
     minivan. Id. at 191. Harrison took an Uber back to Philadelphia.
     Id. at 194. Five days later he heard that there was a warrant for
     his arrest, and he turned himself in on November 1, 2021. Id. at
     196.
            William Bentley, Appellant's older brother, spoke to
     detectives in December 30, 2021 about conversations he had with
     Appellant after the murder. Id. at 248, 249, 251. Mr. Bentley told
     detectives that at the time of the interview Appellant was in North
     Carolina and gave them his address. Id. at 251. He also told
     detectives that Appellant had changed his appearance by cutting
     off his hair. Id. Mr. Bentley spoke to Appellant, with Mohammed
     present, after the murder, and Appellant told him he did
     something stupid. Id. at 253. Mr. Bentley told detectives that
     Appellant told him the plan was to rob the victim and Mohammed
     would do the robbery. When Mohammed pulled out his gun, the
     victim hit him. Id. at 255, 257. Mr. Bentley also relayed that
     Appellant told him that Mohammed and the victim were fighting,
     and Mohammed shot him. Id. at 257. Because the victim was still
     moving, Appellant took the gun from Mohammed and shot the
     victim. Id. Mr. Bentley knew from Appellant that they set the
     robbery up as a drug deal, but there was never any intent to do a
     drug deal. Id. It was strictly a robbery. Id. at 258. Mr. Bentley
     also knew that after the robbery they went to Wawa. Mr. Bentley
     encouraged Appellant to go to North Carolina. Id. at 260.
            On cross-examination, in part, defense counsel tried to
     undercut Mr. Bentley[’s] testimony. He noted inconsistencies in
     Mr. Bentley's statement to police, namely that Mohammed was
     the one who was going to buy the marijuana, but that he also told
     police that it was Appellant who set up the drug deal. Id. at 272
     - 277. Defense counsel also highlighted that Mr. Bentley's trial
     testimony that was erroneous in that he told detectives that

                                    -5-
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     Appellant told him that the gun he used was from Mohammed and
     that the minivan broke down when they were driving. Id. at 277
     - 278.
            On re-direct, Mr. Bentley was able to clarify that Appellant
     and Harrison were going to set up the drug deal because they
     knew him, but that it was Mohammed who was going to actually
     rob him, since the victim did not know him. Id. at 278 - 279.
            Appellant testified in his own defense. He admitted to having
     killed the victim, but stated that he did not intend to. (N.T., Trial
     by Jury, 10/11/22, p. 8). Appellant denied knowledge of the
     robbery plot or of any intention to be part of the robbery plan. Id.
     Appellant claimed that he never heard the conversation between
     Harrison and Mohammed in the minivan about the robbery
     because he had his earbuds in on a loud volume. Id. at 20 - 22.
     He also denied that [he] was part of the conversation outside the
     Blue Moon Deli about the robbery, the fake drug deal, or that he
     would be the lookout. Id. at 26 - 27. Appellant told the jury that
     right before the murder he was near the cut trying to sell Xanax.
     Id. at 29. He heard feet shuffling against cement, and he look[ed]
     over to the cut and saw the victim there. Id. at 30. He denied
     seeing a struggle between the victim and Mohammed. Id. He
     thought it was just a drug deal. Id. at 31. He recalled Nixon
     walked over and said, [“]What you got going on?[”] Id. at 32.
     Appellant responded, “He handling his business. He getting
     money. The same thing you got going on.” Id. Nixon replied and
     said, “You all weird.” Id. At one point Appellant looked over at
     Mohammed and he saw what looked like the victim reaching
     toward his waistband. Id. at 33. Appellant testified that the victim
     lifted up his shirt or jacket, and he saw a gun handle. Id. He was
     scared and getting ready to run away. He told Harrison that the
     victim had a gun, and Harrison handed him his gun and told him
     to protect Mohammed. Id. at 34. According to Appellant, he
     turned back to the cut, and got the gun in position, and a shot
     went off. Id. at 34 - 35. Appellant then fired three shots. Id. at
     35. Appellant believed the victim had fired the first shot, and he
     was afraid for his life. Id. at 36, 37. He was also afraid that if he
     tried to leave he would be shot and he was afraid that Ahmed
     would be shot. Id. at 38. After shooting the victim, Appellant ran
     to the minivan, and when Harrison was there he got his gun back
     from the backseat. Id. at 39. Appellant denied ever having a
     conversation with his brother. Id. at 44.
            At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of
     guilty of the aforementioned charges. [Appellant] was sentenced
     to a life term of imprisonment for his second-degree murder

                                     -6-
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      conviction, and a concurrent aggregate sentence of 11 to 22 years'
      imprisonment on his remaining convictions. A post-sentence
      motion was timely filed on October 24, 20223, which was denied
      on November 14, 2022. A timely appeal followed.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 3-11.

      On appeal, Appellant raises these six issues verbatim:

      I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
      TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF SECOND-DEGREE MURDER, ROBBERY, AND
      CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
      SHOWED APPELLANT DID NOT PLAN A ROBBERY, KNOW OF THE PLOT
      TO COMMIT ROBBERY AMONG HIS CO-DEFENDANTS, OR KNOWINGLY
      PARTICIPATE IN THE ROBBERY OF THE DECEDENT?

      II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE COMMONWEALTH
      DISPROVED SELF-DEFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT WHERE
      APPELLANT TESTIFIED AS TO HIS FEAR FOR HIS LIFE UPON SEEING
      THE DECEDENT WITH A FIREARM?

      III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL
      WHERE THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE,
      AS IT RELIED ON THE TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT'S BROTHER, WHOSE
      TESTIMONY WAS SO RIDDLED WITH INCONSISTENCIES AS TO MAKE
      IT IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE?

      IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING OTHER BAD ACTS THAT
      THE ALLEGED GETAWAY VAN HAD BEEN REPORTED STOLEN TEN DAYS
      PRIOR TO THE ALLEGED HOMICIDE AND THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED
      TO SHOW KNOWLEDGE ON PART OF APPELLANT OF THE VAN'S STOLEN
      STATUS?

      V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING OTHER BAD ACTS OF
      APPELLANT IN POSSESSION OF FIREARMS NOT ALLEGED TO HAVE
      BEEN USED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES HE WAS CONVICTED
      OF AND ALLEGEDLY IN HIS POSSESSION SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE
      HOMICIDE?

      VI. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING THE AUDIO PORTION OF
      SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE WHEREIN A DECLARANT IDENTIFIES
      APPELLANT WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO CALL THE
      DECLARANT AS A WITNESS AT TRIAL?

                                    -7-
J-S47033-23

Appellant’s Br. at 6-7.1

       Appellant’s first issue is that the evidence was insufficient to convict him

of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy to commit

robbery. Appellant’s Br. at 6. We are constrained to conclude that Appellant's

sufficiency claim is waived, as Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement did not

sufficiently identify the error that Appellant intended to challenge on appeal.

       As this Court has consistently held:

       If Appellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was
       insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the
       element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.
       This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal.
       [Where a] 1925(b) statement [] does not specify the allegedly
       unproven elements[,] . . . the sufficiency issue is waived [on
       appeal].

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008),

quoting Commonwealth v. Flores, 921 A.2d 517, 522-523 (Pa. Super.

2007).
     In this case, Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement simply declared, in

boilerplate fashion, that the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions. See Appellant's 1925(b) Statement, 12/28/22, at 1. The

statement thus failed to “specify the element or elements upon which the

evidence was insufficient” to support Appellant's conviction, and we must

____________________________________________

1 Appellant has waived his fifth issue on appeal and declined to set forth an

argument; thus we will address issues one, two, three, four, and six. See
Appellant’s Br. at 28 (withdrawing issue as moot).

                                           -8-
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conclude that Appellant's sufficiency of the evidence claim is waived on appeal.

Williams, 959 A.2d at 1257.

      Appellant’s second issue is that the Commonwealth failed to meet its

burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant acted in self-

defense. Appellant’s Br. at 6. Specifically, Appellant claims that his testimony

that the victim had a firearm and Appellant was scared for his life upon seeing

it was uncontradicted by the Commonwealth. Id. at 19. We view Appellant’s

second issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence

disproving the element of Appellant’s self-defense claim that he reasonably

believed himself to be in danger.

      Our review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is well

settled:

      In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
      must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
      favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, together with
      all reasonable inferences therefrom, the trier of fact could have
      found that each and every element of the crimes charged was
      established beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not weigh the
      evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. To
      sustain a conviction, however, the facts and circumstances which
      the Commonwealth must prove must be such that every essential
      element of the crime is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Cain, 906 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 916 A.2d 1101 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). Lastly, the finder of fact

may believe all, some or none of a witness's testimony. Id.

      In order to legally establish one's right to self-defense and to use deadly

force, three factors must be shown to have existed at the time of the incident:

                                      -9-
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      First, the actor must have reasonably believed himself to be in
      imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, and that it was
      necessary to use deadly force against the victim to prevent such
      harm. Second, the actor must have been free from fault in
      provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the slaying.
      Third, the actor must have violated no duty to retreat. 18
      Pa.C.S.A. § 505; Commonwealth v. McGuire, 487 Pa. 208, 409
      A.2d 313 (1979); Commonwealth v. Black, [474 Pa. 47, 376
      A.2d 627 (1977)]; Commonwealth v. McComb, 462 Pa 504,
      341 A.2d 496 (1975).

Commonwealth v. Brown, 421 A.2d 660, 662 (Pa. 1980). See also

Commonwealth v. Molina, 516 A.2d 752 (Pa. 1986).

      When     a   defendant    presents      evidence   of   self-defense,   “the

Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving the self-defense claim beyond

a reasonable doubt. Although the Commonwealth is required to disprove a

claim of self-defense . . . a jury is not required to believe the testimony of the

defendant who raises the claim.” Commonwealth v. Chine, 40 A.3d 1239,

1243 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128,

1135 (Pa. 2011)). However, “[t]he Commonwealth cannot sustain its burden

of proof solely on the fact[-]finder's disbelief of the defendant's testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1221 (Pa. 2009) (citations,

internal quotation marks, and modifications omitted).

      The Commonwealth sustains that burden of negation “if it proves
      any of the following: that the slayer was not free from fault in
      provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the slaying;
      that the slayer did not reasonably believe that [he] was in
      imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that it was
      necessary to kill in order to save [him]self therefrom; or that the
      slayer violated a duty to retreat or avoid the danger.”

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740-41 (Pa. 2012).

                                     - 10 -
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      As the trial court notes in its opinion, the Commonwealth sufficiently

established that the Appellant and his co-conspirators provoked the use of

force by robbing the victim at gunpoint, negating the provocation element. Tr.

Ct. Op. at 17. Moreover, the record reflects that Appellant's allegations that

he acted in self-defense were called into question during the trial. Only the

Appellant stated the victim had a firearm and no firearm was recovered from

the body of the victim. N.T., 10/7/22, at 78. Appellant admitted that the victim

did not lunge at him, threaten him, or point a gun at him. N.T., 10/11/22, at

78, 76. These findings, and the rational inferences to be drawn from them,

are    not     based      on      a     mere      disbelief    of     Appellant's

testimony. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452 (Pa. Super.

2021) (concluding that the Commonwealth disproved self-defense where the

appellant shot victim after a bar fight; noting that no weapon was found on

the victim, none of the witnesses saw the victim with a weapon, and threats

made by the victim did not involve use of a firearm or a weapon). The

Commonwealth met its burden by cross-examining Appellant which resulted

in these findings. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 825 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (finding the Commonwealth met its burden in disproving a self-

defense claim when defendant’s allegation that he acted in self-defense was

challenged during the trial). As such, Appellant's assertion that the evidence

was insufficient to disprove his self-defense claim is without merit.

      Appellant’s third claim is that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s

request for a new trial when the verdict was against the weight of the

                                      - 11 -
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evidence. Appellant’s Br. at 22. Specifically, Appellant submits that the

testimony of Appellant’s brother, William Bentley, was so riddled with

inconsistencies and contradicted independent evidence that it cannot be

believed. Id.

      Initially, the following legal principles apply when a challenge to the

weight of the evidence supporting a conviction is presented to the trial court:

      A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary
      to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient
      evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no
      obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
      verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight
      of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A
      new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the
      testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have
      arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than
      reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would
      not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges,
      in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the
      trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
      certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
      or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (citations,

footnotes and quotation marks omitted). Thus, to allow an appellant “to

prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so

tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the

[trial] court.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super.

2016) (internal citation omitted).

                                     - 12 -
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      An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a weight

of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the

trial court:

      Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
      discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is
      against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the
      opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court
      will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced
      by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
      reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction
      that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and
      that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in

original).

      A challenge to the weight of the evidence must be preserved by a motion

for a new trial or else it is waived. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). Additionally, in order

to preserve a challenge to either the sufficiency or weight of the evidence on

appeal, an appellant's Rule 1925(b) concise statement must state with

specificity the elements or verdicts for which the appellant alleges that the

evidence was insufficient or against the weight of the evidence. See

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1248-49 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(finding waiver of appellant's sufficiency and weight challenges where the

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement was too vague to permit the court to identify (1)

which crimes, or the elements of any crimes, that the Commonwealth

allegedly failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; or (2) which verdicts

were contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the specific reasons why the

                                     - 13 -
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verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence). Any attempt by the trial

court to correctly identify and address weight and sufficiency issues does not

affect our finding of waiver. Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 76

(Pa. Super. 2020).

      Here, Appellant preserved the weight claim by raising it in a post-

sentence motion. However, he did not specify in his concise statement which

of his three convictions he believes were against the weight of the evidence.

His concise statement asserts only that “the trial court err[ed] in failing to

grant a new trial where the verdict was against the weight of the evidence . .

. .” Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement, 12/28/22. In Commonwealth v. Rogers,

250 A.3d 1209, 1225 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme Court held that appellate courts

may reach the merits of a weight claim, notwithstanding the brevity of a Rule

1925(b) statement, where the trial court has no difficulty apprehending the

claim or addressing its substance, and meaningful appellate review is

unhampered. Id. Here, Appellant’s post-sentence motion states that “the

verdict convicting Mr. Bentley of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal

conspiracy to commit robbery was so against the weight of the evidence as to

shock the conscience.” Post-Sentence Motion, 10/24/22, at 4 (unnumbered).

He further specifies which evidence he believes was inconsistent or

contradictory, resulting in the verdicts begin against the weight of the

evidence. Id. Thus, we will address the merits.

      Appellant asserts that his conviction is against the weight of the

evidence because his brother, who was not present for the robbery, testified

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to facts of the robbery as they were apparently relayed to him by Appellant in

the days following it, but Appellant denied having a conversation with his

brother about the incident. Appellant’s brother testified that Appellant

received a firearm from Mohammed, but Appellant testified he received the

firearm from co-defendant Harrison. Appellant’s brother further stated that

Appellant’s minivan “just stopped working” when Appellant testified it stopped

working because an individual was shooting at it. Appellant’s Br. at 24.

Appellant contends that these inconsistencies prove he never spoke with his

brother about the robbery and thus his brother was not to be believed.

      The record reflects that Appellant’s brother testified correctly to most of

the details of Appellant’s robbery. During Appellant’s cross-examination, he

admitted that his brother had most of the details correct including the

relationship between Appellant and his co-defendant, that he shaved his head

after the robbery, that he went to Wawa and then fled to North Carolina, that

the victim was a weed dealer and had weed on him the day of the robbery,

that Appellant shot and killed the victim, and that Appellant used a gun he

was handed by one of his co-conspirators. N.T., 10/11/22, at 66-73. The trial

court quotes portions of Appellant’s cross-examination and states in its

opinion,

      The testimony brought out on cross-examination shows that
      [Appellant’s brother]'s testimony was not inaccurate and not
      riddled with inconsistencies. Quite the opposite, his testimony
      showed that he knew most of the pertinent details, despite getting
      a few wrong. This undercut Appellant's testimony that he did not
      talk to his brother after the murder. Further, [Appellant’s

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      brother]'s testimony was corroborated by the facts as stated by
      Harrison. This bolstered [Appellant’s brother]'s testimony.
      Accordingly, the weight of the evidence supported the verdict.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 25.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion

for a new trial because the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the

evidence.    Appellant’s   brother’s   testimony   mostly   corroborated   Daijon

Harrison’s testimony of the events of the robbery. Although Appellant claimed

he never spoke to his brother about the robbery, Appellant’s brother claimed

to have learned those facts from Appellant. Thus, the jury did not believe

Appellant’s testimony that he never spoke to his brother about the robbery,

which it was free to do. Cain, supra. Notwithstanding Appellant’s claims that

he was unaware of the robbery being planned and carried out around him, the

jury did not lend his testimony credibility, and the trial court determined that

the facts opposing Appellant’s version to events to be of greater weight. Thus,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a

new trial.

      Appellant’s fourth claim is that the trial court erred in admitting prior

bad acts of Appellant. Appellant’s Br. at 25. Specifically, he contends that the

Commonwealth introduced evidence that the van used during the robbery had

been stolen ten days prior but did not produce any evidence that Appellant

knew of the van’s stolen status. Id.

      Our standard of review over evidentiary matters is well-settled: “[the]

admission of evidence is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the trial

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court, whose decision thereon can only be reversed by this Court upon a

showing of an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 792 A.2d

1261, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 815 A.2d 633 (Pa. 2002), cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 828, (2003) (citation omitted).

      Evidence of prior bad acts committed by a defendant is not admissible
      solely to show the defendant's bad character or his propensity for
      committing bad acts. However, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible
      where there is a legitimate reason for the evidence, such as to establish
      motive. In order for evidence of prior bad acts to be admissible as
      evidence of motive, the prior bad acts must give sufficient ground to
      believe that the crime currently being considered grew out of or was in
      any way caused by the prior set of facts and circumstances. In weighing
      whether evidence of prior bad acts will be admissible, however, the trial
      court must still weigh the relevance and probative value of the evidence
      against the prejudicial impact of that evidence.

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 883 A.2d 570, 578 (Pa. 2005) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Furthermore, our courts have long recognized the special significance of

evidence which provides jurors with the res gestae, or complete history, of a

crime. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 308 (Pa. 2002). In Paddy,

our Supreme Court permitted the introduction in the Commonwealth's case-

in-chief of prior bad acts, even though the evidence was clearly prejudicial to

the accused:

      the [trial] court is not . . . required to sanitize the trial to eliminate
      all unpleasant facts from the jury's consideration where those
      facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the
      history and natural development of the events and offenses for
      which the defendant is charged.

                                       - 17 -
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Id. (citation and quotation omitted). The court reasoned that this res gestae

evidence was necessary for the jurors to be able to evaluate properly the

totality of the evidence, and further, to be able to draw accurate inferences

therefrom. Id. Instantly, our scope of review is limited to an examination of

the trial court's stated reason for its decision to allow the admission testimony

that the van used in the robbery had been stolen. Commonwealth v.

Minerd, 753 A.2d 225, 229 (Pa. 2000).

      Here, the van that was driven by Appellant in committing the robbery

had been reported stolen ten days prior. N.T., 10/10/22, at 55. Two mentions

of the van’s stolen status were made during trial: First, Detective Hatfield

testified that she reviewed the video, and a license plate reader was used to

determine based on the license plate that the van used to flee the scene was

stolen. N.T., 10/7/22, at 92-93. Officer Pistilli testified that when he located

the van abandoned in a driveway and ran its registration, it came back stolen.

N.T., 10/10/22, at 54-55.

      Our review of the trial court’s stated reason for admitting this evidence

reveals that the trial court deemed the van’s stolen status to be relevant to

the natural unfolding of events:

      Officer Pistilli testified how he responded to the call of an abandoned
      vehicle, and his attempts to identify what the vehicle was doing at that
      location. In doing so, he testified how he ran the registration. It was
      only a natural way of discussing the results of his attempt to investigate
      the abandoned vehicle, to explain the results of running the registration.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 29.

                                     - 18 -
J-S47033-23

      Here, the trial court classified the van’s stolen status as evidence of a

prior bad act, but justified the admission of the evidence based on the res

gestae exception. We do not agree that the fleeting mentions of the van's

stolen status were evidence of a prior bad act of Appellant thereby requiring

an exception or another legitimate reason to be admitted. “Evidence of prior

bad acts committed by a defendant is not admissible solely to show the

defendant's bad character or his propensity for committing bad acts. However,

evidence of prior bad acts is admissible where there is a legitimate reason for

the evidence . . . .” Dowling, supra (emphasis added). That a van was stolen

is evidence of a crime, wrong, or bad act on the part of some individual, but

not necessarily Appellant or his co-defendants. No testimony regarding the

stolen van by either Detective Hatfield or by Officer Pistilli tended to attribute

the theft of the van to Appellant. Appellant was not charged with theft of the

van   or   receiving   stolen   property.   No   allusions   were   made   by   the

Commonwealth or its witnesses that Appellant had knowledge of the van’s

stolen status. The fact that the van was stolen served only to complete the

story for the jurors as to the reason for and result of Officer Pistilli running the

vehicle’s registration.

      Moreover, the trial court twice gave a cautionary instruction to the jury

regarding the use of this evidence; one instruction was given after Officer

Pistilli’s testimony about it, and one was given before the jury began

deliberations. N.T., 10/10/22, at 55; N.T., 10/11/22, at 171-72. The trial

court’s first cautionary instruction stated this:

                                      - 19 -
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      Let me give the instruction there. This defendant is not charged
      with any crime related to stealing the van or receiving stolen
      property, but the evidence is admissible to tell you the natural
      development of the facts in this case and the complete story. You
      should consider this evidence for that purpose only. You must not
      consider it as evidence that would tend to show that the defendant
      is a person of bad character, or criminal tendencies from which
      you might be inclined to infer guilt.

N.T., 10/10/22, at 55. The second instruction advised the jury:

      You've heard evidence concerning other acts that the defendant
      is not charged with, for example, whether the car was stolen,
      whether it was a receiving stolen property situation, and then you
      heard about drug activity on the day in question. Once again, the
      defendant is not charged with these things. It's introduced to allow
      you to understand the whole story of the case, the natural
      development of the facts. It may not be considered by you in other
      ways such as you may not regard this evidence as showing that
      the defendant is a person of bad character or criminal tendencies
      from which you might be inclined to infer guilt.

N.T., 10/11/22, 171-72.

      It is well established that it is possible to eradicate any prejudice

resulting from reference to prior criminal activity through a curative instruction

to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Haag, 562 A.2d 289, 295 (Pa. 1989)

(“where the Commonwealth did not deliberately elicit the reference to a prior

unrelated crime, did not exploit the reference, and introduced no evidence of

the prior unrelated crime, a prompt curative instruction is sufficient to negate

any prejudice which may have resulted.”). Juries are presumed to follow a

court's instruction including an instruction that certain matters are not to be

considered for certain purposes. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 715 A.2d 1136,

1139 (Pa. Super. 1998). Thus, we find that the court did not abuse its

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discretion in admitting the evidence that the van was stolen because it was

not evidence of a prior bad act of Appellant’s and because there was no

prejudice to Appellant.

       Appellant’s sixth issue is that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s

motion in limine to exclude the audio portion of the video footage of the

robbery wherein a declarant identified Appellant. Appellant’s Br. at 28.

       Our standard of review of a denial of a motion in limine is as follows:

       When ruling on a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
       in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of
       review. The admission of evidence is committed to the sound
       discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's ruling regarding the
       admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that
       ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice,
       bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Moser, 999 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

omitted).

       At trial, the audio portion of the video footage showing the robbery was

admitted. In the footage, Quadir Nixon can be heard saying, “Jig, Mir, and

(unintelligible) is just robbing County right now on the corner bro. They just

gunned him down right now, bro. He got the gat to County right now, bro.”2

Motion in Limine, 7/29/22, at 2. Appellant’s nickname is Mir, so the statement

implicated him, but the Commonwealth did not call Quadir Nixon, the

declarant in the audio, as a witness. Appellant asserts that the audio

____________________________________________

2 “Jig” is the nickname for Nafis Hawkins. “Mir” is the nickname for Appellant,

Samir Bentley. “County” is the nickname for the victim, Robert Stiles. A “gat”
is a gun.

                                          - 21 -
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identification was hearsay and fails to meet the statement of identification

exception because the declarant was never called as a witness to be

questioned about making the identification. Appellant’s Br. at 29.

      Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of

the matter asserted, and it is generally inadmissible unless it falls within an

exception to the hearsay rule set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.

Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 482 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citing Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2015);

Pa.R.E. 801 and 802). There is an exception for statements made for the

purpose of identification:

      The following statements are not excluded by the rule against
      hearsay if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-
      examination about the prior statement: . . . A prior statement by
      a declarant-witness identifying a person or thing, made after
      perceiving the person or thing, provided that the declarant-
      witness testifies to the making of the prior statement.

Pa.R.E. 803.1(2) (emphasis added).

      Here, the trial court concluded that the statements made by Nixon in

the audio recording were admissible under the excited utterance and the

present sense impression exceptions to hearsay. Tr. Ct. Op. at 32. Our

Supreme Court has consistently defined “excited utterance” as:

      [A] spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been
      suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by
      some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which that person has
      just participated in or closely witnessed, and made in reference to
      some phase of that occurrence which he perceived, and this
      declaration must be made so near the occurrence both in time and

                                    - 22 -
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      place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated in whole
      or in part from his reflective faculties.

Commonwealth v. Keys, 814 A.2d 1256, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2003). The

present sense impression exception has been characterized as follows:

      This exception requires that the declarant see the event and make
      an observation about it to another person also present at the
      scene; the observation must be made at the time of the event, or
      so shortly thereafter that it is unlikely that the declarant had the
      opportunity to form the purpose of misstating his observation.
      Commentators have generally characterized the occurrence giving
      rise to the declaration as an unexciting event. Reliability is
      considered assured by the contemporaneousness of the
      statement, and by the fact that the observation is made to another
      person.
             The Supreme Court has observed further that[] under this
      exception the necessity for the presence of a startling occurrence
      or accident to serve as a source of reliability is not required. The
      truthfulness of the utterance is dependent upon its spontaneity. It
      must be certain from the circumstances that the utterance is a
      reflex product of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by
      retrospective mental processes. Restated, the utterance must be
      “instinctive, rather than deliberate.”

Commonwealth v. Harper, 614 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1992) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      The present sense impression exception applies to “[a] statement

describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately

after the declarant perceived it.” Pa.R.E. 803(1). The rationale for the present

sense impression exception is that the “[r]elative immediacy of the declaration

ensures that there will have been little opportunity for reflection or calculated

misstatement.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 326 A.2d 387, 389 (Pa. 1974).

For example, a call to 911 may qualify as a present sense impression if the

statement   is   reported   contemporaneously     with   the   event   or    is   so

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instantaneous “that it is unlikely that the declarant had the opportunity to

form the purpose of misstating his observation.” Commonwealth v.

Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 573 (Pa. Super. 2002). The excited utterance

exception applies to “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition,

made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”

Pa.R.E. 803(2). Thus, “[t]he spontaneity of such an excited declaration is the

source of reliability and the touchstone of admissibility.” Coleman, 326 A.2d

at 389.

      In explaining its reasons for denying the motion in limine, the trial court

stated:

      This [c]ourt rejected defense counsel's position, because it is
      simply not the law and Cordona, supra, does not support his
      position. While the persuasive case does stand for the proposition
      that under Pa.R.E. 803.1(2), the hearsay exception, “prior
      statement of identification by declarant-witness” does require the
      declarant to testify at trial and that the declarant has to also testify
      to making the prior statement; it does not stand for the
      proposition that defense counsel suggested. When a party invokes
      a hearsay exception, a court must ascertain whether the proffered
      statement meets the exacting demands of the exception. That is
      exactly what occurred here. The Commonwealth invoked both the
      presence sense impression and excited utterance hearsay
      exceptions. The Commonwealth detailed how the statement fit
      both the present sense impression, and the excited utterance
      exception. This [c]ourt agreed with this analysis.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 33.

      We agree. Because Nixon was the declarant of the out-of-court

statement and was not called as a witness, the statement in the audio

recording is hearsay and must have satisfied a hearsay exception in which the

                                      - 24 -
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declarant’s availability is immaterial—i.e., an exception enumerated in Pa.R.E.

803— in order to have been properly admitted. The trial court found the

exceptions in Pa.R.E. 803(1) and 803(2) to be satisfied.

       However, we need not perform an independent analysis to determine if

the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the present sense

impression and excited utterance exceptions were met because Appellant did

not challenge on appeal the finding that the statements satisfied the present

sense impression and/or excited utterance exceptions. He devoted his

argument entirely to the point that the Commonwealth needed to additionally

meet the more stringent requirement for statement of identification, requiring

the declarant testify in court to the statement made for the purpose of

identification, which it did not. Appellant’s Br. at 28-30. That is not the law;

one layer of hearsay requires one hearsay exception for the evidence to be

admissible, and no additional hearsay exception is required to be met. See

Commonwealth v. Harris, 658 A.2d 392, 394 (Pa. Super. 1995) (murder

victim's statement identifying appellant was admissible as present sense

impression     where    it   gave    a   “contemporaneous   verbalization   of   her

observation” of him outside her door); see also Commonwealth v. Kulb,

220 A.3d 652, 2019 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2694 at *10 (Pa. Super. 2019)3

(witnesses’ statements identifying Appellant were properly considered excited
____________________________________________

3 We note that, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished non-precedential

decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their
persuasive value. We find guidance in the unpublished memorandum cited
supra and find it to be persuasive in this matter.

                                          - 25 -
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utterances and admitted under that exception to the hearsay rule); see also

Commonwealth v. Harper, A.2d 1180, 1183 (Pa. Super. 1992) (although

declarant identified appellant’s clothing, the observation was relayed as a

present sense impression and thus admissible); see also Commonwealth v.

Holton, 906 A.2d 1346, 1250, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2006) (when a detective

wearing a hidden wire bought drugs from a woman, the audio tape was

admissible     without   the   woman’s   testimony   under   the   co-conspirator

exception, which does not require availability of the declarant as a witness,

despite the woman identifying appellant as her drug dealer in the audio

recording). Accordingly, the audio was properly admitted and Appellant’s

claim fails.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 3/4/2024

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