Court Opinion

ID: 9730352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:10:02.41184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:05.987052
License: Public Domain

FRANSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, habit evidence standing alone does not constitute substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction. It is too tenuous; no reasonable trier of fact would find a defendant guilty beyond all reasonable doubt solely on the basis of such evidence.
The key element of the crime of auto burglary is that the doors of the vehicle be locked at the time of the entry. (Pen. Code, § 459.) This means that absent direct evidence that the doors were locked there must be some evidence of a forced entry into the vehicle to satisfy the prosecution’s burden of proof. (People v. Toomes (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 465 [306 P.2d 953]; People v. Massie (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 812 [51 CaI.Rptr. 18]; cf. People v. Malcolm (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 217 [120 Cal.Rptr. 667].) In the present case, the only evidence that the vehicle’s doors were locked is the owner’s testimony that, although he could not recall whether he had locked the doors on this particular occasion, he made “a habit of locking [his] car” and that it was his “normal practice” to lock his car. This evidence is insufficient to fill the hiatus caused by the absence of direct evidence that the doors were in fact locked. On the other hand, if there were evidence of a broken window or forced entry into the car, the void would be filled because of the reasonable certainty that a person would break into a vehicle only upon finding the doors locked. In short, although habit evidence may be considered relevant to prove conduct on a particular occasion, it is not sufficiently persuasive to satisfy the certainty required in criminal cases.1
To support a criminal conviction on appeal, the evidence tending to show guilt must be “substantial” as to each essential element of the *69crime. To be substantial, the -evidence must be credible and of “solid value.” It must inspire confidence. (People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 139 [70 Cal.Rptr. 193, 443 P.2d 777].) Evidence which merely raises a strong suspicion of guilt is not sufficient to support a conviction. “Suspicion is not evidence; it merely raises a possibility, and this is not a sufficient basis for an inference of fact.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755 [79 Cal.Rptr. 529, 457 P.2d 321].)
Wigmore explains the problem of accepting habit or custom to prove an act: “There is, however, much room for difference of opinion in concrete cases, owing chiefly to the indefiniteness of the notion of habit or custom. If we conceive it as involving an invariable regularity of action, there can be no doubt that this fixed sequence of acts tends strongly to show the occurrence of a given instance. But in the ordinary affairs of life a habit or custom seldom has such an invariable regularity. Hence, it is easy to see why in a given instance something that may be loosely called habit or custom should be rejected, because it may not in fact have sufficient regularity to make it probable that it would be carried out in every instance or in most instances. Whether or not such sufficient regularity exists must depend largely on the circumstances of each case.” (1 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 92, p. 520; italics added.)
Although people commonly believe that they make a habit of locking their car doors, the vagaries of human behavior often cause them to forget to lock their doors—as is evidenced by the number of thefts from unlocked cars on the public streets. Thus, an owner’s testimony that he routinely locks his car doors does not constitute evidence of such invariable regularity within the Wigmore standard as to constitute substantial proof that the doors in fact were locked on a particular occasion.
I find no California case holding that habit evidence alone is sufficient to support a criminal conviction. People v. Wein (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 79 [137 Cal.Rptr. 814], relied on by the majority, is clearly distinguishable. In that case, in addition to testimony by members of the family of the deceased that she habitually kept money hidden in her bedroom, the family members testified that the decedent had stated that she intended to save her money to make certain purchases. The court there said, “Here evidence that Mrs. George had a habit of saving money and hiding it in the bedroom coupled with her various declarations that she intended to do so .. . constituted substantial evidence that she did in fact have money concealed in the bedroom.” (69 Cal.App.3d at p. 91.) Thus, Wein does *70not stand for the proposition that habit evidence alone will support a criminal conviction.
Turning now to appellant’s due process challenge to the “any substantial evidence” rule in California as it applies to appellate review of criminal convictions, I would emphasize Justice Elkington’s prophetic assertion in his concurring opinion in People v. Blum (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 515, 521 [110 Cal.Rptr. 833], that the constitutional requirement that no person shall be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. 358, 364 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375]) requires a consideration of the whole record in determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a view of the supporting evidence in context with the other evidence. (People v. Blum, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d 515 at p. 525; see also Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1978 supp.) Appeal, § 683, p. 999.) Justice Elkington also stated in Blum; “It is abhorrent to any sense of justice that persons be convicted of crimes they did not commit. Perfection of course is not obtainable in this world, but that furnishes no reason why the law should not, within reason, continually strive to prevent such miscarriages of justice. Yet nothing would seem better calculated to perpetuate such injustice, than an ‘any substantial evidence’ rule which limits the evidence which may be considered in determining whether, as a matter of law, there is sufficient evidence to convict.” (People v. Blum, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d 515 atp. 529.)
In Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781], the United States Supreme Court recently held in a juvenile proceeding that a federal habeas corpus court must consider not whether there was any evidence to support a state court conviction, but whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, citing In re Winship, supra. The high court held that In re Winship presupposes as an essential of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made to suffer a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense. This “subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused . . . symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself.” (Jackson v. Virginia, supra, at p. 315 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 571].) The critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a *71criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt (or that a trial or juvenile judge understood the heavy burden of proof) but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant question thus is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The conclusion is inescapable: under the authority of Jackson v. Virginia, supra, the any substantial evidence rule is no longer the law in California in the review of criminal convictions since it does not comport with due process. The appellate court must examine the entire record in deciding whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction. This being so, the habit evidence in the present case must be viewed in light of the victim’s inability to recall shortly after leaving the vehicle whether he had locked the doors, the absence of signs of forced entry into the vehicle, and the absence of any burglary tools such as a wire clothes hanger in appellant’s possession. When all of these facts are considered, it is readily apparent that no reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond “all reasonable doubt” that the doors were locked when appellant entered the vehicle.
The affirmance of the juvenile court’s finding that appellant committed an auto burglary deprives him of his constitutional right to the presumption of innocence.
I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 12, 1979.

 In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068] explains that the reasonable doubt standard is the prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. It “ ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.’ ” (Id., at p. 364 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 375]; italics added.)