Court Opinion

ID: 9718609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:27:54.756721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.669796
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. I agree that the standard of review is “abuse of discretion,” and I can imagine a like case where additional factors might support an affirmance. But, in my opinion, the essential facts, the very “sparse[ness of the] factual record,” require Judge DiMauro’s disqualification. There simply are no facts to weigh on the other side of the question. The Court’s imposition of the burden on defendant to dispel any doubt that the perception of partiality requires the judge’s disqualification turns the standard of review on its ear. In my view, once the threshold is reached, it is up to the State to overcome the force of defendant’s argument. In this case, the State presented nothing to rebut the appearance of partiality, and I conclude there is “no reasonable basis” for affirmance.
The unavoidable public view in Vermont is that a twelve-officer state police barracks is a tightly knit organization of peace keepers dedicated to serving and protecting the community. The import of the Court’s opinion is that this perception is not borne out for lack of detail in the evidence, and is merely “the speculation of a suspicious mind.” But, it takes no “evidence” to establish that officers in the Rockingham barracks should care deeply about how the judges at Windham District Court handle the cases generated by any one of them.
This case is not an isolated incident where spouses’ professional roles just happen to cross. The judge’s husband is permanently employed at the Rockingham barracks, which is the state police venue for Windham County. Judge DiMauro’s court and Trooper DiMauro’s office are involved in one case after another. It is no stretch to imagine that employees in those two places take more than a passing interest in the interaction of their work. For instance, the judge might be required to rule on a motion to suppress the fruits of a search conducted by a local state trooper, one of her husband’s eleven co-workers. Not only will the judge be conscious of the potential reactions her ruling may engender at the barracks, she will be aware also that she will have to make such rulings again and again.
*566Finally, there are no countervailing concerns here about a disruption in the efficient administration of the court. Defendant gave plenty of warning by filing his motion to recuse before the judge’s investment in the case was significant enough to cause a hardship to anyone. In fact, the Court’s affirmance redirects the hardship the other way, onto the moving party, as Justice Johnson points out in her dissent.
None of the cases cited by the Court establishes anything like the kind of blanket authority it has created here. The administrative judge is given limitless discretion. There is nothing in the standard created today that would stop the administrative judge from allowing Judge DiMauro to sit on a case investigated by another member of the uniformed patrol division in the Rockingham barracks or even one Trooper DiMauro himself investigated. I am not saying by this that the Court would approve of Judge DiMauro sitting, only that the Court has given no parameters for the administrative judge to use in ruling on future cases. In sum, I think this case stretches discretion beyond the breaking point.
I respectfully dissent.