Court Opinion

ID: 9618814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:17:36.054962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:43.253289
License: Public Domain

SILER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, not because I think that my colleagues do not know the law, but because this is such a discretionary matter that I believe when the district court correctly calculates the Guidelines range and then considers the § 3553(a) factors, the sentence should be upheld, unless the court adds a factor which should not have been considered under § 3553(a) or unless the circumstances of the crime or the offender were such that no variance from the Guidelines could be justified.
Obviously, the decision in United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491 (6th Cir.2006), is the law of this circuit. From that decision, we get the quotation which the majority uses in this case: “ ‘[T]he farther the judge’s sentence departs from the guidelines sentence ... the more compelling the justification based on factors in Section 3553(a)’ must be.” Id. at 496 (quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.2005)). In Davis, we found that a downward variance of 99.89% was unreasonable under the circumstances. The primary circumstances used by the court in the variance in Davis were the long time interval between his crimes and his sentence and the defendant’s advanced age, 70 years old.
Compared to the decision in Davis, we upheld a downward variance of 99.91% as reasonable in light of extraordinary family circumstances in United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 333 (6th Cir.2007). There we distinguished Davis by discussing the fact that the court should consider the “worthiness” of each individual defendant. Id. at 333. Thus, Husein was a worthy defendant who had no prior criminal history, was very remorseful, and had a difficult family situation at home.
As the majority opinion recites, this case represents a 206% upward variance from the top of the Guidelines range. However, to adopt the reasoning in Husein, Poynter here was a repeat sex offender who is about as unworthy as any defendant can be. The district court was highly offended by the fact that Poynter had previously been involved in sexual abuse with minors, that he gave alcohol and other drugs to the children, and that he did not learn anything from his counseling after the first offense. The district court saw the families of the victims and was no doubt distressed because Poynter had continued in his prior conduct of sexually abusing juveniles. At the time of these present offenses, he was on parole from his previous offenses of sodomy with a minor. Although the upward variance in this case is double what the downward variance was in Husein, there is no set figure beyond which a sentencing court may vary, and Poynter here is as unworthy as Husein was worthy of a downward variance.
In United States v. Bridgewater, 479 F.3d 439 (6th Cir.2007), we found that the maximum sentence of 120 months for the defendant under a charge of possession of child pornography was not substantively unreasonable. In Bridgewater, the district court considered the horrible nature of the crime and emphasized the destructive effect the child pornography had on the lives *360of children. The court opined that “it would not take a chance on him victimizing anybody else.” Id. at 442. Although that decision does not indicate what the sentencing range was, still it shows that the court could render a maximum statutory sentence to protect children. Therefore, I would find that in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rendering the sentence against Poynter. Thus, I would affirm.