Court Opinion

ID: 9897053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:06:20.772184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:43.809708
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

    POLYMER EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGY INC. d/b/a GLASSLAM,
                        Appellant,

                                    v.

                 GLASSHAPE MANUFACTURING, LTD.,
                            Appellee.

                            No. 4D2023-0142

                           [November 8, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Hon. Carlos A. Rodriguez, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE19-
019553.

  John D. Heffling of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., West Palm Beach, for
appellant.

  Adam M. Foslid and Elisa H. Baca of Winston & Strawn LLP, Miami,
and Timothy A. Kolaya of Stumphauzer Kolaya Nadler & Sloman, PLLC,
Miami, for appellee.

GROSS, J.

   The defendant below, Polymer Extrusion Technology, Inc. (“Polymer”),
appeals an order denying its motion to vacate a $5,250,000 judgment
entered after it failed to timely move for a trial de novo following a non-
binding arbitration. We reverse, holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to set aside the judgment.

   The Pleadings

   Glasshape Manufacturing, Ltd. (the “plaintiff”), a glass manufacturer,
sued Polymer, a resin manufacturer, alleging that Polymer supplied it with
defective resin which caused discolored glass after UV exposure.

    The plaintiff’s complaint asserted three counts: (1) breach of implied
warranty of merchantability; (2) breach of implied warranty of fitness; and
(3) common law indemnification. Polymer answered and raised affirmative
defenses, denying that the resin was defective. In addition, Polymer
contended that a limited warranty controlled the plaintiff’s damages, if
any, and asserted that the plaintiff was negligent either in its mixing of the
resin or production of the laminated glass.

   The Non-Binding Arbitration

    The parties participated in a non-binding arbitration on August 23,
2022, after submitting statements, summaries, an expert report and
related materials. On August 31, 2022, the arbitrator issued a decision
for the plaintiff for $5,250,000. At the outset, the arbitrator acknowledged
that “there remains testimony to be elicited via depositions and/or expert
analysis and reporting[.]” The arbitrator believed that “[w]hile additional
evidence or testimony may be impactful and bolster the Defendant’s
position on the warranty, . . . the currently submitted and proffered
warranty evidence is insufficient.” The arbitrator also noted that “[s]everal
of the arguments presented by the Defendant created doubt, but not
enough in their current form to bar or overcome Plaintiff’s claims, as they
are presented.” Ultimately, the arbitrator favored the plaintiff’s expert’s
opinion over one offered by Polymer’s expert on whether the resin was
defective.

   Trial Court’s September 2, 2022 Order Setting Case for Trial

   On August 31, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the plaintiff’s
previously-filed motion to specially set a jury trial. Two days later, the
court set the case for trial during a jury trial docket beginning February
13, 2023.

   Polymer Fails to Request Trial de Novo

  Polymer failed to timely request a trial de novo as required by Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h).

   Polymer Moves to Vacate the Judgment

  On October 11, 2022, the plaintiff moved for entry of final judgment.
The same day, Polymer moved to vacate the judgment.

    On October 19, Polymer filed an amended motion to extend the time to
file a motion for trial de novo; in the alternative, it moved to vacate any
judgment entered on the arbitrator’s decision pursuant to Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(1) on the grounds of excusable neglect, mistake,
and inadvertence. Polymer further asserted that it “has meritorious
defenses to Plaintiff’s claims, including that the discoloration of laminated

                                      2
glass . . . was not caused by the resin supplied by the Defendant, and that
there is a limited warranty that would limit any damages recoverable by
Plaintiff.” Polymer pointed out that the arbitrator noted “in his decision
that additional testimony and expert analysis is needed.”

   Affidavits in Support of Motion to Vacate

    Basically, the affidavits in support of the motion to vacate alleged a
miscommunication between Polymer’s counsel and his legal assistant,
who was in the process of leaving his firm, and the failure of the assistant
to calendar the deadline for filing a motion for trial. Polymer’s counsel
advised his assistant and her replacement that the arbitration did not go
well and that a motion for trial would need to be filed as soon as the
arbitrator’s written decision came in. However, after the replacement
assistant took over, she saw the September 2 order setting the case for
trial, along with discovery and disclosure deadlines calendared by her
predecessor, and she assumed that the setting was in response to a post-
arbitration motion for trial.

   The Final Judgment

    The trial court entered a final judgment on October 27, 2022, and
allowed Polymer to schedule an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
vacate.

   Evidentiary Hearing on the Motion to Vacate

    At the hearing, Polymer’s attorney testified consistently with the
previously-filed affidavits. The plaintiff conceded that Polymer had acted
with due diligence, but argued that “this is simply a situation where a
party forgot about a deadline,” which was not excusable neglect. The
plaintiff also asserted that Polymer failed to establish a meritorious
defense. Polymer’s counsel replied that Polymer had “raised two defenses
to this,” and he also suggested that the arbitrator’s decision supported the
existence of a meritorious defense.

   The Trial Court Denies the Motion to Vacate

   The trial court denied the motion to vacate, finding neither excusable
neglect nor a meritorious defense. This appeal ensued.

                                     3
   Standard of Review

   “A trial court’s denial of 1.540(b) relief is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Acosta v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 88 So. 3d 415, 417 (Fla.
4th DCA 2012). We apply “abuse of discretion, not gross abuse, as the
standard of review, when the trial court has denied a motion to vacate.”
George v. Radcliffe, 753 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). By contrast,
the higher standard of “gross abuse of discretion” must be satisfied to
overturn a trial court’s decision granting relief from judgment. Halpern v.
Houser, 949 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

   The Interplay of Rules 1.820(h) and 1.540(b)

   If a party fails to move for a trial de novo “within 20 days of service on
the parties of [an arbitrator’s] decision” in a non-binding arbitration, the
decision “shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such
orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the
decision.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h). If the presiding judge enters a final
judgment, a motion to vacate that judgment “should be considered on its
merits and in light of case law pertaining to motions to vacate for excusable
neglect” under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. Preferred Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Davis, 629 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Florida public
policy favors “deciding a case on its merits rather than on a technicality.”
J.J.K. Int’l, Inc. v. Shivbaran, 985 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

    On a defendant’s motion to set aside a default judgment under rule
1.540(b), the defendant must demonstrate excusable neglect in failing to
respond as required, the existence of a meritorious defense, and due
diligence in seeking relief after learning of a default. Wright v. Regions
Bank, 360 So. 3d 427, 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

   Excusable Neglect

   “Excusable neglect is found where inaction results from clerical or
secretarial error, reasonable misunderstanding, a system gone awry or any
other of the foibles to which human nature is heir.” Elliott v. Aurora Loan
Servs., LLC, 31 So. 3d 304, 307 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

   A calendaring error by an attorney or an attorney’s staff constitutes
excusable neglect. See Pierre v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 346 So. 3d 62, 63 (Fla.
4th DCA 2022) (“A calendaring error by an attorney’s staff is one of the
common reasons that relief is granted under rule 1.540(b)(1).”); Suntrust
Mortg. v. Torrenga, 153 So. 3d 952, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (finding

                                     4
excusable neglect where, due to a clerical or administrative error, an
attorney failed to calendar the trial date into her internal case management
system and thus failed to appear at trial); Al Hendrickson Toyota, Inc. v.
Yampolsky, 695 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (noting that “the
established case law deems that calendaring errors are regarded as
excusable neglect”); but see Suntrust Bank v. Hodges, 12 So. 3d 1278,
1280–81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction
but nonetheless stating in dicta that the defendant failed to establish
excusable neglect where counsel for defendant “had inadvertently failed to
place the motion for trial de novo on the firm’s ‘tickler’ system”).

   By contrast, excusable neglect will not be found where a party or his
attorney “(1) simply forgot or (2) intentionally ignored the necessity to take
appropriate action; that is to say, where the conduct could reasonably be
characterized as partaking of gross negligence or as constituting a willful
and intentional refusal to act.” Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d
1103, 1105–06 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); see also Chernoff Diamond & Co. v.
Gallin Assocs., Inc., 258 So. 3d 563, 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (no excusable
neglect where defendant’s president “forgot about the lawsuit until he
received notice of the entry of a final judgment”); In re J.B., 990 So. 2d 520,
522 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (no excusable neglect where mother in termination
of parental rights proceeding “just forgot” about the trial).

   Here, the situation surrounding the missed deadline for filing a motion
for trial de novo constitutes excusable neglect. The circumstances
ultimately boil down to a calendaring error stemming from a series of
oversights and miscommunications between Polymer’s counsel and his
legal assistants. This was not a case where Polymer’s counsel “simply
forgot” about the motion for new trial.

   Notably, the transition between legal assistants is further evidence of a
system gone awry, as the new assistant had an understandable
misunderstanding in believing that a motion for trial de novo had already
been filed by her predecessor, because her predecessor had calendared
various deadlines associated with the February 2023 trial date.

   Meritorious Defense

   In the context of a typical rule 1.540(b) motion, a “meritorious defense
may be shown by either an unverified pleading or an affidavit.” Gibraltar
Serv. Corp. v. Lone & Assocs., Inc., 488 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 4th DCA
1986). A meritorious defense “means simply that the defendant plans to
raise a defense that may have some merit. The movant need only show
that the defense it has raised is meritorious, not that it is likely to

                                      5
succeed.” Household Fin. Corp., III v. Mitchell, 51 So. 3d 1238, 1241 (Fla.
1st DCA 2011). “[A]ffirmative defenses, even when pled with minimal
specificity, can qualify as meritorious.” Id.

   Assuming the requirement of demonstrating a meritorious defense
applies, 1 Polymer made a sufficient showing for the purpose of its motion
to set aside the judgment. Polymer’s answer to the complaint asserted
several affirmative defenses, including that the defective glass was caused
by the plaintiff’s own negligence and that any damages were limited by the
terms of a limited warranty. Significantly, the arbitrator’s decision
recognized that “there remains testimony to be elicited” in discovery,
adding that additional evidence or testimony could bolster Polymer’s
position on the warranty issue.

    Conclusion

   For these reasons, we reverse the final judgment and remand for the
case to be set for a trial de novo.

    Reversed and remanded.

WARNER and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

                           *         *        *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1Polymer did not preserve the argument that it was not required to show a
meritorious defense.

                                    6