Court Opinion

ID: 9958008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-06 06:14:44.153175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:41.284587
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed April 4, 2024

                                      In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                              No. 11-22-00360-CR
                                  __________

                     RUSSELL JAY WILKES, Appellant
                                         V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                             Ector County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 22-0388-CCL2

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
       Appellant, Russell Jay Wilkes, was charged by information for the offense of
indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08 (West
Supp. 2023). Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and, after a jury trial, the jury
found him guilty of the charged offense and assessed his punishment at ninety days’
confinement in the Ector County Jail and a $1,000 fine. The trial court sentenced
him accordingly.
       Appellant raises four issues on appeal: (1) the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s
application and motion to secure a material and necessary out-of-state witness,
(3) the trial court erred in its assessment of certain court costs, and (4) the trial court
erred when it included the fine it assessed against Appellant in the bill of costs. We
modify and affirm.
                                I. Factual Background
       Zoe Silvas worked at the Chick-fil-A restaurant located on University
Boulevard in Odessa at the time of the offense. Her duties included taking orders
via an iPad outside in the drive-through line; this involved using a portable card
reader to take a customer’s payment. The card reader could also be used to scan
customers’ cell phones; Silvas explained that Chick-fil-A maintains a “rewards app,”
which allows customers to earn loyalty points by scanning a barcode in their mobile
phone application.
       Another duty for which Silvas was responsible when working the drive-
through line was identifying the vehicle of each customer when taking their order,
to facilitate the speedy fulfillment and delivery of each customer’s food order. Silvas
explained that an overarching priority for employees who work the drive-through
line at Chick-fil-A is speed—greeting a customer, entering their order, and securing
payment as quickly as possible.
      Silvas was working the drive-through line on July 20, 2021, when a white,
single cab, Ford pickup with a black front pulled up into her lane. Inside the vehicle
was a middle-aged white male. Silvas described him as “mostly bald” with a
“scruffy” goatee. He was wearing a white shirt and blue jeans. The man gave Silvas
his name and ordered a chicken sandwich; he intended to pay for the order with a
credit card. As Silvas presented the portable card reader to scan the man’s credit

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card, she saw him smile and noticed his hands move. She thereafter looked down to
the man’s lap, and she saw that his pants were pulled down to his mid-thigh, and his
erect penis was exposed. Silvas noticed that the man’s pubic area appeared “white,
shaved, bald” and that she did not see any pubic hair. Silvas testified that she looked
at the man’s penis for a “split second” before it “hit [her] brain” and she “looked up
and froze.” She saw the man smile a “creepy joker smile,” a “[v]ery big smile,” and
noticed that he did not seem to be embarrassed. Silvas completed the payment
process, and the man also scanned his loyalty rewards app. Then he drove away to
the window, leaving Silvas frozen in shock.
         Shaken, Silvas retrieved a headset from a coworker to communicate with
personnel inside the restaurant to advise them about what had occurred in order to
prevent others “from seeing what [she had seen].” She then continued to take drive-
through orders for a brief period of time. When a police patrol unit entered the drive-
through line, Silvas reported the incident and then went inside the restaurant to
discuss the incident with her manager.
         Three days later, law enforcement met with Silvas at the beginning of her shift
to discuss what had occurred. Law enforcement later presented Silvas with a photo
lineup to identify the driver of the white pickup who had exposed his genitals to her,
but Silvas was unable to identify the perpetrator. Appellant was included in the
photo lineup.      Silvas and her director of operations reviewed the restaurant’s
surveillance video footage and Silvas positively identified the white pickup on the
footage. They also retrieved the receipt from the restaurant’s transaction with the
driver of the white pickup. The timestamps from the video footage and the receipt
matched, and the receipt showed Silvas as the person who took the perpetrator’s
order.     Silvas testified (and Chick-fil-A’s business records and video footage
showed) that she took about twenty orders that morning and only two were from

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persons who operated white pickups. The individual in the white pickup that Silvas
indicated was not involved in the incident had ordered several meals, paid with cash,
and entered the drive-through line about twenty minutes after the incident occurred.
The individual in the first white pickup, which Silvas identified as being involved in
the incident, paid with a credit card and ordered only one meal.
      On cross-examination, Silvas agreed that in her written statement to law
enforcement she neither mentioned that the perpetrator had scanned his Chick-fil-A
loyalty app nor identified the white pickup as a Ford.
      Alyssa Vega, the director of operations for this Chick-fil-A restaurant,
explained that to use Chick-fil-A’s loyalty rewards application, customers must
create a profile with their personal information, such as a phone number and e-mail
address, to accumulate digital points and rewards. When a customer scans their
loyalty app at the restaurant, their individual loyalty identification number is auto-
populated on the receipt for their order. The order receipt will also identify the
specific Chick-fil-A location, the order number, and the last four digits of the credit
card used to pay for the order, if applicable. Vega testified that although the receipt
that is printed and given to the customer does not include the customer’s name,
Chick-fil-A maintains an internal system that records the name that the customer
provides to the Chick-fil-A employee who takes the customer’s order. Vega further
testified that although she and Silvas reviewed the restaurant’s surveillance video
footage and Silvas had identified the white pickup driven by the perpetrator, the
footage was never provided to law enforcement.
      The receipt that Silvas and Vega identified that correlated with the white
pickup on the surveillance video footage showed that (1) the last four digits of the
credit card used for payment were “3091,” (2) the credit card belonged to
“Wilkes/Russell,” and (3) the loyalty rewards number that was scanned was

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89001141702048. The restaurant’s record of the orders Silvas took that day showed
that the customer who made this purchase gave “John” as their name and that the
customer (John) was driving a white pickup.
      A similar incident occurred at a Chick-fil-A location in Midland just three
days after this incident. Jessica Watt testified that she worked for the Chick-fil-A
franchise located on West Loop 250. On July 23, Watt was working the drive-
through when a white pickup with a black front drove up. Watt described the driver
as an older man with white facial hair; he was wearing a hat and sunglasses. She
testified that she thought he had shoulder-length hair. Watt’s task in the drive-
through that day was to deliver food orders to the customers who had ordered and
were waiting in their vehicle for their order. This particular order contained one bag
of food and three drinks in a drink carrier.
      Watt testified that as she handed the man his food order, she looked into the
vehicle and saw the man’s exposed genitalia. The incident was brief and the man
drove away—Watt then reported it to a manager and the location’s general manager.
Watt reviewed the restaurant’s surveillance video footage and was able to identify
the white pickup. Watt and her managers also recovered a receipt that matched the
order Watt recalled delivering to the white pickup. The time stamps from the
surveillance video footage showed that the white pickup and the receipt matched.
They contacted the police and Watt spoke with law enforcement later that evening.
Like Silvas, Watt was unable to identify the perpetrator in a photo lineup, which
included Appellant.
      Stephanie Fitzpatrick, the operating partner of the Midland Chick-fil-A,
testified that her location collects receipts in its system and that the receipts include
the transaction number, the date, the customer’s order, and the customer’s loyalty
number (if used), as well as the customer’s name if they provide one. Fitzpatrick

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explained that if a cashier entered the name that a customer provided them in the
drive-through line, that name would override the name associated with the
customer’s loyalty rewards app (if they scanned the app).
        Fitzpatrick reviewed the surveillance video footage of the drive-through for
that day and retrieved the correlating receipt after Watt told her about the incident.
The receipt recorded an order taken at 11:39 a.m., and the surveillance video footage
showed a white pickup with a black front moving past the drive-through window at
11:41 a.m. The pickup’s license plate number was Texas JFZ6302. The receipt also
showed that (1) the last four digits of the credit card used to pay for the food order
were “3091,” (2) the credit card belonged to “Wilkes/Russell,” (3) the loyalty
rewards number ended in “2048,” which is Appellant’s loyalty number, and (4) the
customer who made the food purchase was driving a white pickup and said his name
was “John.”
      Appellant and his wife, Sherri Wilkes, testified. Sherri testified that she has
been married to Appellant for seventeen years and that they are frequently intimate
with each other. She testified that Appellant does not shave his pubic hair, that she
sees him undressed every day, and that she would have noticed if he had shaved his
pubic hair. She also stated that Appellant is bald. Sherri testified that their lives had
been “devastated” by the accusations made against Appellant and that he is a good
Christian man. According to Sherri, she and Appellant attend the same church as
the owner of the Chick-fil-A located on West Loop 250, and that they go to this
Chick-fil-A all the time. However, Sherri was not with Appellant on July 20 or
July 23 during the times when the incidents at the Chick-fil-A locations allegedly
occurred.
      Appellant denied that he exposed himself at either Chick-fil-A location. He
also denied that he shaves his pubic hair. He did not dispute that Silvas saw someone

                                           6
with their penis exposed on the day of the incident, but he denied that he was the
perpetrator. Appellant testified that he was driving a work pickup at the time of
these incidents, that he purchased lunches at these two Chick-fil-A locations on
July 20 and 23 in that vehicle, and that it was his vehicle in the surveillance video
footage from the Midland location that showed license plate number JFZ6302.
When asked whether there was anyone else that could have driven or been in the
vehicle at the time, he stated, “No. It -- it would be me in there,” and he “admit[ed]
that, yes, [Appellant] did go pick up lunch, and that is [his] vehicle.” Appellant
agreed that he typically scans his loyalty rewards app when he orders food from
Chick-fil-A and stated that he has not shared his rewards account with anyone else.
                              II. Standards of Review
      We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d
756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010).
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that
we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912,
915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). As such, we defer to the factfinder’s

                                          7
credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole judge of the
witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. See Garcia,
667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at
899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13
(West 2007). This deference accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts
in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761;
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of
the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State,
4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports
conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor
of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia,
667 S.W.3d at 762; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
      Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial
evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 851
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). It is not necessary that the evidence directly
prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct
evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be sufficient to
establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. A guilty verdict
does not require that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s
guilt if the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to
support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the

                                          8
evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v.
State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
      Finally, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the
charged offense as defined by the hypothetically correct charge for the case.
Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this regard, to determine whether
the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
under the Jackson standard, we compare the elements of the offense to the evidence
adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). The hypothetically correct charge “accurately sets out
the law, is authorized by the [charging instrument], does not unnecessarily increase
the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability,
and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.”
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
      We review a trial court’s determination for whether an out-of-state witness is
necessary and material for an abuse of discretion. Ashby v. State, 646 S.W.2d 641,
644 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, pet. ref’d). A trial court abuses its discretion
when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles or when it acts
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App.
2019) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
                                     III. Analysis
      A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
      In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction. As relevant to this appeal, a person commits the offense of
indecent exposure if he exposes any part of his genitals with the intent to arouse or
gratify his sexual desire, and he is reckless about whether another is present who

                                           9
will be offended or alarmed by his act.        PENAL § 21.08(a).      “A person acts
‘recklessly’ when he is (1) subjectively aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that specific circumstances existed and (2) consciously disregards that risk.”
Romano v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing PENAL
§ 6.03(c)). “The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.” PENAL
§ 6.03(c) (West 2021).
      For his first issue, Appellant’s primary point of contention is that the evidence
is insufficient to identify Appellant as the person who committed the charged
offense. Identity is an essential element of any criminal offense, and the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed, or
was a participant in the commission of, the charged offense. Johnson v. State, 673
S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Direct, in-court identification is the
preferred method to establish a person’s identity as the offender. See, e.g., Hime v.
State, 998 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d).
Where an equivocal in-court identification is corroborated by other evidence, the
defendant’s conviction may be affirmed. Prihoda v. State, 352 S.W.3d 796, 803
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing Anderson v. State, 813 S.W.2d
177, 179 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no pet.)).          In such a case, the witness’s
uncertainty of the person’s identity goes to the weight of the witness’s testimony,
not its admissibility.    Id.   However, identity may be proven by direct or
circumstantial evidence, or by reasonable inferences from the evidence admitted at
trial. Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing
Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). Eyewitness
testimony is not necessary. See Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App.

                                          10
1986). Here, Silvas was never asked to identify Appellant in court. Nor could Silvas
identify him in a photo lineup. Despite this, the circumstantial evidence linking
Appellant to the offense is compelling.
      Silvas testified that the driver of a white Ford pickup with a black front
exposed his erect penis to her while she was working the drive-through of the Odessa
Chick-fil-A on July 20. The man was middle-aged, white, and had scruffy gray and
white facial hair. The man scanned his Chick-fil-A loyalty rewards app and paid
with a credit card. According to Silvas and Vega, both the loyalty rewards number
and credit card used to purchase the food belonged to Appellant.
      Three days after this incident, at a Chick-fil-A location in Midland, a white,
middle-aged man with gray and white facial hair drove a white Ford pickup with a
black front into the drive-through and exposed his penis to a worker there (Watt).
The pickup’s license plate number was obtained from surveillance video footage and
matched Appellant’s work vehicle. Again, the perpetrator scanned his loyalty
rewards app and paid for the food he ordered with a credit card. Further, the same
loyalty rewards number and credit card, both of which are registered to Appellant,
were used by the perpetrator to purchase food at the Odessa and Midland locations.
      Appellant admitted that he was present at both locations, on July 20 and
July 23, in his white Ford pickup with a black front, at the time both incidents
occurred. He did not report that his credit card had been stolen or used by someone
other than himself. He further admitted that he scanned his loyalty rewards app and
paid for the food that he ordered with a credit card at both locations.
      Nevertheless, and despite the evidence presented at trial, Appellant maintains
that he did not commit the charged offense and that this is a case of mistaken identity.
But the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and of the weight to be
given to the evidence and thus they were free to believe or reject all, part, or none of

                                          11
Appellant’s testimony and his theory of mistaken identity. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d
at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Although Silvas was not able to positively
identify Appellant as the perpetrator from a photo lineup or at trial—possibly
because she was not asked to identify Appellant during the trial—eyewitness
testimony was not required for the evidence to sufficiently establish Appellant’s
identity as the perpetrator of the offense; Appellant’s identity may be inferred, and
is logically inferred, from all the circumstances. Ingerson, 559 S.W.3d at 509; Earls,
707 S.W.2d at 85. As we have said, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct
evidence and can, without more, provide a sufficient basis to establish a defendant’s
guilt. Carrizales, 414 S.W.3d at 742 (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13).
      It is the jury’s duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to weigh the evidence,
and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. If the evidence conflicts, we must presume
that the jury resolved any conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to the jury’s
determination in that regard. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
Therefore, we resolve any conflicting inferences, if supported by the record, in favor
of the jury’s determinations. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–
26; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
      We have considered all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict and we conclude that the record before us contains
sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have logically inferred
and found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because the cumulative force and effect of the evidence, circumstantial or otherwise,
is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Appellant was guilty of indecent
exposure as charged in the information, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.

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      B. Application to Secure Out-Of-State Witness
      In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied his pretrial application and motion to secure an out-of-state witness.
Appellant contends that this denial violated his constitutional right to due process,
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 10 of
the Texas constitution.
      Criminal defendants have a right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. The right to compulsory process
is “the right to present a defense [and] the right to present the defendant’s version of
the facts as well as the prosecution’s [version of the facts] to the jury so it may decide
where the truth lies.” Coleman v. State, 966 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998) (internal quotation omitted). However, the right to compulsory process is not
absolute and is subject to trial court discretion. Ortegon v. State, 267 S.W.3d 537,
542 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Drew v. State, 743 S.W.2d 207,
225 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). It does not guarantee the defendant the right to
secure evidence from any and all witnesses; rather, compulsory process only
guarantees the defendant’s ability to obtain evidence that would be both material and
favorable to his defense. Coleman, 966 S.W.2d at 527–28.
      To exercise this right, the defendant must make a plausible showing to the
trial court, by sworn evidence or agreed facts, that a witness’s testimony would be
both material and necessary to his defense. Weaver v. State, 657 S.W.2d 148, 150–
51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (citing Ex parte Armes, 582 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1979)); see CRIM. PROC. art. 24.28, § 4 (West 2009). The same
showing must be made—materiality and necessity—to justify the grant of the
defendant’s request to secure the attendance of an out-of-state witness under
Article 28.24, Section 4, of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Weaver, 657

                                           13
S.W.2d at 150–51; see also CRIM. PROC. art. 24.28, § 4; Johnson v. State, 746 S.W.2d
791, 794 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1987, pet. ref’d); Ashby, 646
S.W.2d at 643.
      In this case, the out-of-state witness that Appellant sought to secure is
Whitney Wright, the prosecuting attorney for the incident that occurred at the
Midland Chick-fil-A location. Wright moved from Midland County and accepted
employment in Colorado between the time of the charged offense and the trial
underlying this appeal. Although this appeal concerns only Appellant’s indecent
exposure conviction that is related to the incident at the Odessa Chick-fil-A location,
Appellant anticipated before trial that the State would present—and it indeed filed
its notice of intent to introduce—extraneous-offense evidence of the incident that
occurred at the Midland Chick-fil-A location three days later.
      The trial court held a pretrial hearing on Appellant’s motion to secure
Wright’s attendance at trial. There, Appellant’s trial counsel explained that Wright
was a material witness because she could verify that Watt changed her statement
concerning her description of the perpetrator in the Midland incident. Appellant’s
trial counsel argued that Wright would be material and necessary as an impeachment
witness if Watt denied that she changed her statement during Appellant’s upcoming
trial regarding the Odessa Chick-fil-A location incident. Appellant’s trial counsel
candidly conceded, however, that “if she tells the truth that she did change her story,
we won’t need [Wright].” Appellant’s trial counsel also noted that Wright had
informed him that she was willing to testify by telephonic means on the issue of
“materiality,” but that she was unavailable to appear in-person due to work
obligations.
      The State responded that Appellant had not carried its burden to show that
Wright was a material and necessary witness. In fact, Appellant’s trial counsel

                                          14
admitted that Wright may not be a material and necessary witness, depending on
how the parties’ strategies developed at trial. The State also pointed out that the
charges arising from the Midland incident had been dismissed and thus the
admissibility of any evidence offered from that case would be subject to a
Rule 404(b) analysis.
      The State further argued that, in the event that extraneous-offense evidence
was offered and admitted, Wright’s testimony would be inadmissible hearsay unless
an exception for impeachment applied. Appellant had not, the State asserted,
established that such an exception would apply to Watt’s extraneous-offense
testimony—that is, even if Watt had changed her story regarding the Midland
perpetrator’s description, Appellant had not shown that Watt had since recanted
changing her statement. Appellant could have subpoenaed Watt to appear at this
pretrial hearing, the State argued, to present her testimony and establish whether
impeachment evidence would be necessary. Nor did Appellant attach an affidavit
to his motion showing that he had spoken with Watt and learned that she had changed
her statement again.    Thus, Appellant had failed to establish a basis for an
impeachment exception to the hearsay rule with respect to Wright’s proposed
testimony.
      As the State urged, if Watt testified that she had provided two different
descriptions of the perpetrator, her testimony would be consistent with Wright’s
testimony—thus nothing from Wright would be material or necessary. But for
purposes of his motion and application, the State asserted, Appellant bore the burden
to establish that Watt had or would change her statement a third time, that is, deny
that she gave two different descriptions of the perpetrator. According to the State,
Appellant had not done so. The State also emphasized that although the motion
stated that Appellant was indigent (the motion requested that county funds be

                                         15
dispersed to cover Wright’s travel expenses and accommodations), Appellant had in
fact retained trial counsel and no other evidence established his claimed indigency.
      After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court stated that Appellant
had shown the “potentiality” of materiality but had not established that the out-of-
state witness (Wright) was clearly material and necessary. The trial court further
noted that Appellant was free to secure Wright’s attendance on his own, that is,
without the assistance of county funds. After these comments, the trial court denied
Appellant’s motion.
      We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Appellant’s motion. As the trial court noted at the pretrial hearing, Appellant at most
showed the potential materiality and necessity of Wright’s attendance at trial.
Appellant’s trial counsel admitted that Wright might not be needed at trial. Indeed,
Wright would not become a material and necessary witness if the State did not offer
witness-testimony concerning the Midland incident or, even if it did, if Watt did not
testify inconsistently with her previous statements, thus creating the need to impeach
her. As the State pointed out, Appellant neither subpoenaed Watt to the pretrial
hearing nor affixed an affidavit to his motion that established that Watt would or
would not testify inconsistently. Thus, Appellant did not carry his burden to show
that Wright was a material and necessary witness.
      During trial, when the State alerted the trial court and Appellant’s trial counsel
that it intended to present Watt as a witness, Appellant’s trial counsel renewed his
objection to the trial court’s denial of his motion and application to secure Wright as
a witness, and re-urged his motion, which the trial court again denied. Appellant did
not request a continuance in order to then secure Wright’s attendance as a witness,
although he asserted during the pretrial hearing that he would need to do so under

                                          16
these circumstances.1 Thus, and as the trial court noted at the hearing, even with the
denial of his motion, Appellant was free to secure Wright’s attendance on his own
without the assistance of county funds.
        Watt testified at trial about the perpetrator’s description. She testified that she
could not positively identify him but that she recalled that the man was wearing a
hat and sunglasses. She also recalled “seeing grey hair on his shoulders, and [that]
he had a lot of gray facial hair.” During cross-examination, Appellant’s trial counsel
asked Watt if she had given Wright a different description of the perpetrator. Watt
replied that she did not remember speaking to Wright. Appellant’s trial counsel
specifically asked Watt: “Do you remember telling [Wright] that the person had
curly hair, was sticking out of a baseball cap?” Watt replied: “No.” Appellant’s trial
counsel asked Watt: “Also, as far as what you do remember, it was shoulder-length
hair, correct?” To which Watt replied: “Yes.” Appellant’s trial counsel also asked
Watt if the perpetrator’s pubic hair was “clean-shaven,” to which she replied, “I
don’t know,” although she testified on direct that she did not recall seeing any pubic
hair.
        Rule 613 of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs the use of extrinsic evidence
to impeach a witness concerning their prior inconsistent statements. See TEX. R.
EVID. 613(a)(4). Such extrinsic evidence is not admissible unless the witness is first

        1
          Appellant neither objected at trial nor does he complain on appeal that Watt’s testimony about the
incident at the Midland Chick-fil-A location was inadmissible and constituted improper extraneous offense
evidence. Because identity was a contested issue at trial, we note that such testimony could be admissible
to establish Appellant’s identity and to rebut his defensive theory. Page v. State, 213 S.W.3d 332, 336
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (to be admissible to prove identity by comparing common characteristics, the
extraneous offense “must be so similar to the charged offense that the offenses illustrate the defendant’s
‘distinctive and idiosyncratic manner of committing criminal acts.’”); Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 468
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (extraneous offense evidence is admissible to prove identity when there are
distinguishing characteristics and similarities that are common to the extraneous offense and the charged
offense); Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (the common characteristics of
the charged offense and the extraneous offense may act as the defendant’s “signature”); see also TEX. R.
EVID. 404(b)(1).

                                                    17
questioned regarding the prior inconsistent statement and the witness fails to
unequivocally admit to making the statement. Id. In examining a witness about their
prior inconsistent statement, a party must first advise the witness of (1) the contents
of the statement, (2) the time and place that the statement was made, and (3) the
person to whom the witness made the statement. TEX. R. EVID. 613(a)(1). Here, in
cross-examining Watt, Appellant’s trial counsel did not fulfill the second
requirement of Rule 613(a)(1). Thus, because Watt was not properly impeached,
extrinsic evidence, such as Wright’s testimony, would not have been admissible.
      The right to compulsory process hinges on a defendant’s ability to show that
the evidence he seeks to present at trial is material and necessary for his defense.
Here, Appellant failed to make the required showing on either component. Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Appellant had not carried
his burden to prove that Wright was a material and necessary out-of-state witness.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.
      C. Assessment of Court Costs and Inclusion of the Fine in the Bill of Costs
      In his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its assessment
of court costs. Appellant argues that because he was convicted of an offense that
occurred after January 1, 2020, the court costs and fees should have been assessed
in accordance with the statutes in effect at the time; in this regard, he asserts that
certain itemized court costs should have been charged and assessed instead as a local
consolidated court cost of $123. The State responds that the court costs assessed by
the trial court are accurate, but that some costs should have been consolidated into a
single amount. Here, the court costs assessed against Appellant separately charge
costs for certain accounts and funds, such as the clerk of the court account, the county
jury fund, the technology fund, and courthouse security.

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      Court costs are legislatively mandated obligations that result from a criminal
conviction. See Cadena v. State, No. 11-22-00225-CR, 2023 WL 8459093, at *7
(Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). The imposition of court costs against a criminal defendant is a
“nonpunitive recoupment of the costs of judicial resources expended in connection
with the trial of the case.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014)).
      In 2019, the legislature enacted the Cost Act, which took effect on January 1,
2020, and completely revised the manner in which court costs are assessed in
criminal cases. See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, 2019 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3981. Among other things, the Cost Act increased the amount of certain costs,
consolidated others, repealed some costs altogether, and recategorized certain costs
as fines. See, e.g., Contreras v. State, No. 05-20-00185-CR, 2021 WL 6071640, at
*6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g, not designated
for publication).
      As relevant here, the Cost Act consolidated several fees that are recited in trial
court judgments into one local consolidated court cost fee which is to be assessed in
every case. See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, § 1.05, 2019 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3981, 3985. Prior to the enactment of the Cost Act, all local fees were
assessed individually. Here, Appellant’s bill of costs shows that he was assessed
several fees that were repealed, updated, consolidated, and superseded by the local
consolidated court cost fee provided by the Cost Act. See id.; see also TEX. LOC.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 134.102 (West Supp. 2023).
      The State argues that, although these repealed fees are improperly itemized
and should be consolidated, their assessment is not improper because together they
comprise the local consolidated court cost that is required by the Cost Act. See LOC.

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GOV’T § 134.102. The State reasons that we should delete the first eight fees set
forth in the bill of costs and replace them with the local consolidated court cost—the
sum total of these eight itemized fees is the same as the statutorily mandated local
consolidated court cost fee: $123. See id. The State thus concedes that Appellant’s
third issue is meritorious and should be granted, at least to the extent it requests that
we modify the bill of costs to delete the itemized fees and replace them with the local
consolidated court cost fee.
      Here, Appellant simply asserts that his bill of costs should be “corrected,”
and he cites to Section 134.102(a) and to the “County Clerk’s Misdemeanor
Conviction Court Cost Chart” located on the State’s court website. Id.; County
Clerks’ Court Costs, Fines, & Reimbursement Fees on Conviction Chart,
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1444861/county-court.pdf.               As    such,    we
understand Appellant’s prayer for relief to comport with the State’s concession.
Therefore, we sustain Appellant’s third issue and modify the bill of costs to delete
the first eight designated fees assessed and replace them with the local consolidated
court cost fee prescribed by Section 134.102(a): $123. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b);
Bryant v. State, 642 S.W.3d 847, 850 (Tex. App.—Waco 2021, no pet.) (concluding
that appellate courts are authorized on direct appeal to order a modification of a bill
of costs independent of a finding of error in the trial court’s judgment); Cadena,
2023 WL 8459093, at *9.
      In his fourth issue, Appellant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial
court erred when it included in the bill of costs the $1,000 fine that it assessed against
Appellant when he was sentenced.
      Unlike court costs, fines are punitive and a part of the convicted defendant’s
sentence. See Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);
Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A bill of costs

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contains “items of cost.” CRIM. PROC. art. 103.001(b) (West 2018). As such, an
assessed fine cannot be included in the bill of costs. See Williams v. State, 495
S.W.3d 583, 591 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. dism’d).
      The fine assessed against Appellant was erroneously included in the bill of
costs. See id.; see also CRIM. PROC. art. 103.001(b); Armstrong, 340 S.W.3d at 767.
The proper remedy when a trial court erroneously includes amounts as court costs is
to modify the trial court’s judgment and the bill of costs to delete the erroneously
included amounts. See, e.g., Brumfield v. State, 641 S.W.3d 568, 583 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2022, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, we sustain Appellant’s fourth issue and modify
the bill of costs to delete the $1,000 fine. See id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b).
                                   IV. This Court’s Ruling
      As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P.
43.2(b).

                                                W. STACY TROTTER
                                                JUSTICE

April 4, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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