Court Opinion

ID: 9864450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 13:09:02.668639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:20.183803
License: Public Domain

Grieein Smith, C. J., concurring. I agree with my Brethren of the Bench that the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act should be liberally construed. In the instant case the minor, who became a sailor and was such when the cause was tried, appeared by his mother and asked affirmative relief. The Chancellor no doubt .thought the record contained all information necessary to a determination of the issues, and that nothing the intervener could testify to was material. Whether there was, or was not, an abuse of discretion depends upon one’s viewpoint. Certainly no imputation of arbitrary conduct should attach to the trial court because we determine, in a borderline case, that the spirit of the Act would be better served by a reversal of the decree. The federal legislation is somewhat contradictory. Its purpose is first said to be “to suspend enforcement of civil liabilities.” No liability is sought to be asserted against James W. Reynolds. Section 52Tof the Act, however, contemplates that a stay may be directed on behalf of either the plaintiff or defendant if such litigant be a solider, sailor, etc. My disagreement here is not with the result of the decision this court has rendered, but with language in the opinion where it is said: “. . . Reynolds has asked for a stay, and in so doing, in our opinion, has taken away from the trial court any discretion that it might have had, on its own motion, in the absence of request for a stay b}7-the sailor, and has made the allowance of a stay mandatory‘unless in the opinion of the court the ability . . . of the defendant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military service’.” It seems to me we have now said trial courts are without discretion, and that any exercise of judgment within what would ordinarily be termed the ambit of discretion must inevitably meet a reversal. Nor do I agree that the “clear and convincing evidence rule” applicable to chancery decrees setting aside written instruments (and kindred transactions) has any place in the decision. While the case at bar happens to come from chancery, the next may be from circuit court. I would not lay down a hard and fast rule exceeding - the Act of Congress. The consequence will be that no trial court can exercise a discretion — this because, in effect, the majority says discretion reposes here, not there. On the other hand, I 'would resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of the soldier, sailor, or marine, to the end that no substantial right be impinged and that no opportunity to assort a right be denied because of the circumstance of absence.