Court Opinion

ID: 9824758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:19:18.303613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:27.302730
License: Public Domain

SAMFORD, J.
 Demurrers to the indictment were properly overruled. Code 1923, § 4121, and section 4556, form 62; Jennings v. State, 17 Ala. App. 640, 88 So. 187.
A bill of lading issued by a common carrier, is “any instrument or writing, being or purporting to be the act .of another,” within the meaning of section 4121, Code 1923, the false and fraudulent making of which is forgery in the second degree.
On the trial of this case the defendant offered no testimony, and when the evidence was all in the court, at the request of the state, in writing gave this charge:
“The court charges the jury that if they believe the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt they must find the defendant guilty.”
In view of the giving of this charge, it becomes unnecessary for us to pass upon the several objections and exceptions to evidence reserved during the trial, provided the undis-, puted evidence in the case entitles the state to the instruction given by the court.
- Divested of all superfluous and collateral matter the case made by the evidence without dispute is as follows: The defendant, who was president of the Hall-Beale Cotton Company, presented to the Fourth National Bank drafts aggregating more than $20,000, which drafts could not be credited to the Hall-Beale Company until there was attached to them certain bills of lading representing and carrying title to certain bales of cotton in the possession of the railroad for shipment to market; the drafts to be paid by the purchaser of the cotton upon imesentation and delivery and transfer of the bills of lading. These drafts were cashed by the bank by placing the amount to the credit of HallBeale Cotton Company, and at the instance of defendant was checked out by them immediately» on checks drawn by defendant. The bills of lading were fictitious. There was no cotton as represented therein. The whole Of the bills of lading were false, and upon being confronted with the fraud defendant admitted both the forgery and the uttering thereof, his only excuse being, “I had to do it.” The venue and time were admitted. We have the corpus delicti proven and a full admission from defendant that he alone did it, and a statement from him exonerating the other active member of the firm. In Johnson v. State, 73 Ala. 523, the rule is laid down, even where the question of intent is involved, that:
“In all cases free from doubt, where the evidence is not conflicting, the whole question is one for the court.”
The question in the Johnson Case arose over a charge of larceny, which, as to intent, is similar to forgery, and that ease expressly overrules the McMullen Case, 53 Ala. 531.
The charge given in this case does not take' away from the jury the right to weigh the evidence. They are charged that they must not only believe the evidence, but such belief must be beyond a reasonable doubt, still leaving the question of guilt, based on the evidence in the province of the jury. The hold*478ing here is not in conflict with the case of Nichols v. State, 4 Ala. App. 115, 58 So. 681.
There is some argument made in brief that the court committed error in admitting the bills of lading in evidence because it is not shown that Mr. Lowery was the agent of the Central of Georgia Railway. Lowery testified to this fact himself without objection, and that the bill of lading set out in the indictment was not signed by him, nor any of his clerks who were authorized to sign it. This answers the foregoing argument.
As we have said, in view of the action of the court in giving the charge requested by the state, it will be useless to pass upon the other questions raised, as under any phase of the evidence, after allowing all legal presumption in favor of the defendant, there can be but one legal conclusion drawn. If the jury believe this evidence beyond a reasonable doubt they should find the defendant guilty. The court was not in error in giving the charge as requested; and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.