Court Opinion

ID: 9646174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:50:58.222731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:34.993951
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge.
These appeals are from convictions for aggravated robbery. Punishment was assessed at seven years in each case.
*476A single ground of error was raised in the brief filed on behalf of both appellants. In it appellants argued that evidence admitted at trial was the product of an unlawful arrest and incident search and seizure, relying on Art. 14.04, V.A.C.C.P., and the Texas and United States Constitutions. On original submission a divided panel held the requirements of Art. 14.04, supra, were not satisfied and reversed the convictions. On rehearing we conclude the panel misconstrued the requirements of Art. 14.04, and we find the evidence was not unlawfully obtained.
Art. 14.04, supra, provides:
“Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace officer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused.”
The panel majority construed this statute to contain four requirements:
“(1) the person who gives the information to the peace officer must be credible, (2) the offense must be a felony, (3) the offender must be about to escape, and (4) there must be no time to procure a warrant.”
In applying this construction to the facts of the case, the panel majority looked for evidence that the offender in fact was about to escape and that there was in fact no time to procure a warrant. Finding insufficient evidence of these two requirements, the panel majority held the arrest was unlawful.
We hold Art. 14.04, supra, does not require a showing that the offender in fact was about to escape, nor does it require a showing that there in fact was no time to procure a warrant. The statute merely requires a showing that the officer was acting upon satisfactory proof from representations by a credible person that the felony offender “is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant.”
Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Cr.App.), relied on by the panel majority, is clearly distinguishable from the facts in this case. In Honeycutt the defendant “was home in bed with her shoes removed. The record reflects that [the arresting officer] knew she lived there for more than a year. There was no evidence of an escape or an attempt to escape.” Likewise, in Rippy v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 101, 53 S.W.2d 619, the defendant’s arrest was not authorized under the predecessor of Art. 14.04, where the record showed the defendant was partially undressed and in bed when arrested, and there was no evidence he was about to escape.
In sharp contrast to the evidence in Ho-neycutt and Rippy are the facts presented in Maloy v. State, 582 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.Cr.App.), and in the instant case.
In Maloy, supra, a credible person reported to the arresting officers the defendant’s “name and address and told them that he was about to ‘bug out’ or flee the city soon.” This was held sufficient to authorize an arrest under Art. 14.04, supra.
Even stronger are the facts in this case, where it is undisputed that the robbery victim reported to investigating officers that one of the robbers told him “Just as soon as he got back and packed his stuff up, he was leaving,” and that several of the robbers said they were leaving for California that day. This clearly was sufficient to constitute a report “that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant.” It is also sufficient to show exigent circumstances authorizing a warrantless arrest under Texas and federal constitutional law.
The State’s motion for rehearing is grants ed and the judgments are affirmed.
ONION, P. J., and ROBERTS, CLINTON and TEAGUE, JJ., dissent.