Court Opinion

ID: 9739872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:22:41.477388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.426768
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion in this case. I cannot, however, agree with the majority statement:
“Indiana’s Product Liability Act imposes strict liability in tort upon sellers of a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer.”
Although Ind.Code § 33-1-1.5-3 states, in part:
“Codification and Restatement of Strict Liability in Tort. The common law of this state with respect to strict liability in tort is codified and restated as follows: ....”
The use of the term “strict liability” in this statute is a misnomer and a corruption of the term, for what follows in the statute is actually a legislative statement of what constitutes liability under certain acts of negligence. This corruption of legal terminology has for some unknown reason become widespread throughout the case law and treatises concerning products liability.
This anomaly was properly characterized by the United States Court of Appeals in LaRossa v. Scientific Design Co. (3d Cir. 1968), 402 F.2d 937, 29 A.L.R.3d 1416 (1970). Although the court observed:
“In recent years the New Jersey cases have held the manufacturer liable, either under implied warranty or strict liability in tort, for direct property loss, as well as personal injury....” Id. at 941, 29 A.L.R.3d at 1421.
The Court went on to say:
“In all the cases decided by the New Jersey courts there existed a defect in the product which caused the injury to the ultimate consumer. Even when described as strict liability in tort the underlying principle has been analogized to the sale of goods.” Id. at 941, 29 A.L.R. 3d at 1421.
I see nothing in the Indiana statute which actually imposes strict liability- In all instances, both under the case law and the statutory law of this state, some act of negligence is required to impose liability. The result in this case does not transcend that principle.
I therefore concur in the result.
PIVARNIK, J., concurs.