Court Opinion

ID: 9908173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 22:03:09.185943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:57.798772
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U
                                                                                   Fourth Division
                                                                           Filed December 7, 2023
                                          No. 1-23-0433

        NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent
        except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                     IN THE
                           APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                 FIRST DISTRICT

In re D.D., a Minor,                                       Appeal from the
      Appellee                                             Circuit Court of Cook County

                                                           No. 2019 JA 01454
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-
Appellee, v. Desiree F. and Luis D., Respondents           The Honorable Peter J. Vilkelis,
(Desiree F., Respondent-Appellant)).                       Judge, presiding.

        JUSTICE OCASIO III delivered the judgment of the court.
        Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1      Held: We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The trial court’s findings that D.D. was
              neglected and abused were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. D.D’s
              mother had standing to challenge the trial court’s dispositional rulings making D.D.
              a ward of the court and transferring custody to a legal guardian, but those orders
              were not an abuse of discretion or against the manifest weight of the evidence, and
              the transcript of the trial court’s oral ruling satisfied the statutory requirement of
              written findings.

¶2      On April 23, 2019, a nine-months-pregnant teenager named Marlen Ochoa 1 went missing.
That same day, paramedics were called to a home on the southwest side of Chicago, where

respondent-appellant Desiree F.’s mother, Clarisa, lived and where Desiree and her fiancé,

respondent Luis D., frequently stayed because they had no fixed residence. At the home, the

1
    Marlen’s last name is also given as Ochoa-Uriostegui and Ochoa-Lopez in various record
    materials.
In re D.D.                                                                           No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

paramedics found a newborn baby who was not breathing. They took the infant to Advocate Christ

Medical Center, where he was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit with a diagnosis of

respiratory distress. Three weeks later, police investigating Marlen’s disappearance found her

partially decomposed body in a black trash can in the backyard of that same home. Clarisa and

Desiree were arrested and charged in connection with the killing. The infant, whose family named

him Yovanny, died in June 2019.

¶3      While in pretrial detention at the Cook County Jail, Desiree gave birth to a son, D.D., whose

welfare is the subject of this appeal. He left the hospital in the care of his father, Luis. But one

month later, the State filed a petition to have him adjudicated a ward of the court. The court later

found that D.D. was neglected and abused, and it ultimately made him a ward of the court, found

that Desiree and Luis were unfit and unable to care for him, and assigned legal custody of him to

the Department of Children and Family Services. On appeal, Desiree challenges all of those

determinations. We affirm.

¶4                                      BACKGROUND

¶5      D.D. was born on November 1, 2019. At the time, his mother, Desiree, was in custody at

the Cook County Jail awaiting trial on charges related to the deaths of Marlen and Yovanny. D.D.

was discharged from the hospital into the care of his father, Luis. He remained there until

December 5, when the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) took him into

protective custody.
¶6      On December 9, 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for D.D. The

petition alleged that, in April 2019, Desiree had helped Clarisa (Desiree’s mother and D.D.’s

maternal grandmother) lure Marlen to their home under false pretenses, kill her by strangulation,

and cut into her body to remove the still-living infant. 2 In the weeks that followed, Desiree and

2
    The petition did not specifically name Marlen and Clarisa, referring to them as a “pregnant
    woman” and the “maternal grandmother,” respectively. We use their actual names for clarity.

                                                 -2-
In re D.D.                                                                            No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

Clarisa pretended that the infant was Clarisa’s son. That pretense collapsed when law enforcement

personnel found Marlen’s body at the home where Clarisa lived with Desiree and Luis. The infant

later died due to medical complications associated with the attack. Although the petition did not

allege that Luis participated in the killing, it did allege that he was at the home on the same day it

occurred and that he was seen driving the victim’s car afterward. The petition also alleged that

Desiree had reported that Luis had committed acts of domestic violence against her, including

striking her multiple times and throwing bolt-cutters at her shortly after the killing. It noted that

Desiree was incarcerated on charges related to the killings of Marlen and Yovanny. Due to all of

these circumstances, the petition alleged that D.D. was a neglected minor because his environment

was injurious to his welfare (see 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) and that he was an abused

minor because a parent, an immediate family member, a person responsible for his welfare, a

person in his family or household, a person who lived in his home, or one of his parents’ paramours

created a substantial risk of causing physical injury to him by nonaccidental means that would be

likely to cause death, disfigurement, impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairment of

bodily function (see id. § 2-3(2)(ii)), and it asked that he be adjudged a ward of the court.

¶7     Along with the petition, the State filed a motion for a temporary custody order. The motion

was supported by an affidavit sworn by a DCFS investigator. The investigator averred, upon

information and belief, that Desiree had “committ[ed] an egregious act against another human

being” and was “responsible for the death of a mother and her child.” The investigator further

averred that Desiree’s “action and blatant disregard for human life” posed “substantial risk” to

D.D. and that D.D. required placement under the circumstances because Desiree was “incarcerated

and unable to care for” him. The affidavit made no mention of Luis.

¶8     A temporary custody hearing was held on the same day that the petition was filed. Luis

attended the hearing; Desiree, who had not been provided notice, did not. The court appointed the

public guardian to serve as D.D.’s attorney and guardian ad litem. It appointed a private attorney

                                                 -3-
In re D.D.                                                                            No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

to represent Luis. It granted a DCFS administrator temporary custody of D.D. Three days later, it

reaffirmed the temporary custody order and appointed the public defender to represent Desiree.

¶9      For reasons that are not clear from the record, no hearing to adjudicate the allegations of

neglect and abuse was held within the 90-day statutory limit. See 705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West

2020). On September 30, 2020, the parties, with the court’s approval, waived the time limit. See

id. § 2-14(d).

¶ 10    The matter proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing on November 17, 2022. At the hearing,

the trial court received six exhibits that had previously been offered by the State, including records

from the medical examiner related to Marlen and Yovanny, medical records from D.D.’s birth and

a routine check-up five days later, payroll records from Luis’s employer showing that he was not

at work on the day of the killing, and electronically recorded interviews (ERIs) of Luis and Desiree

related to the killing.

¶ 11    The hospital records from D.D.’s birth through his discharge are voluminous and need not

be discussed in detail. The records reflect that D.D. was delivered at full term via cesarian section

after an abnormal heart rate or rhythm was detected during labor. That sole complication does not

appear to have led to any lingering concerns, and the records generally show that D.D. was born

healthy and normal.

¶ 12    The hospital records show that, in view of Desiree’s incarceration, medical personnel

decided to consult with a social worker about who should care for D.D. upon discharge. The social

worker contacted the DCFS hotline. After obtaining information about D.D.’s medical and social

circumstances, DCFS said that there was no abuse or neglect because D.D.’s father was not a risk

to D.D., was “not inappropriate” with D.D., and had no other issues, and because D.D.’s mother

was “appropriate with the baby,” would not be around him, and had not been convicted. DCFS

therefore declined to take a report. Based on that consultation, which took place on the afternoon

of November 2, 2019, hospital personnel decided to follow their normal protocol, which was to

release D.D. into the care of the person designated by his mother, who was Luis. If hospital staff

                                                 -4-
In re D.D.                                                                             No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

either observed Luis “being inappropriate with” D.D. or found out that he posed a risk of some

kind to D.D., or if they became aware of any other issues, they were to contact DCFS. The records

do not show that any further concerns were raised, and D.D. was discharged into Luis’s care on

November 4.

¶ 13     The medical records also show that Luis brought D.D. in for a routine outpatient check-up

on November 6, 2019. There is no indication that D.D. had any particular health concerns. Luis

reported that D.D. was doing well and that D.D. was “not his first baby.”3 D.D. was being fed
every three hours, producing eight wet diapers and approximately five bowel movements daily,

sleeping on his back in a separate crib, and using a car seat. Luis had family support, and no

smokers lived in the home. At Luis’s request, he was given a list of clinics closer to where they

lived.

¶ 14     Desiree’s ERI depicted a series of interviews that took place in an interview room at Area 2

between May 14 and May 16, 2019. During the first interview, she feigned ignorance until

confronted with photographs of her and Luis in Marlen’s car. Desiree eventually said that Clarisa,

whom she described as “mentally ill,” told her that she was going to kill Marlen and take the baby.

She asked Desiree to help, and Desiree refused. When Desiree told Luis what Clarisa had asked

her to do, he stood up and said, in Clarisa’s presence, that, if she did anything like that, he would

call the police and tell Clarisa’s mother, who lived upstairs. Clarisa played it off as an April Fool’s

Day joke. Desiree told Luis that her mother was crazy and was going to kill someone for a baby.

Luis agreed and said that he had to get Desiree out of the house, but they had nowhere else to go.

Clarisa later told Desiree that Marlen had agreed to give Clarisa the baby and then leave Chicago

to return to Iowa. According to Desiree, on April 23, Marlen came to the house and gave Desiree

3
    According to a DCFS integrated assessment report that was completed in March 2020, but not
    made a part of the record until it was introduced as an exhibit at the dispositional hearing in
    2023, D.D. is Luis’s third child. His first child died of an immunodeficiency disease at the age
    of two years, and his second child lived with the mother but sometimes visited Luis. There is no
    indication of DCFS involvement with either child.

                                                 -5-
In re D.D.                                                                            No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

the keys to her car and warned her that it was likely to get reported as stolen. Desiree took the keys

and went to get some phones from her sister. When she returned, nobody was home, and she later

learned that paramedics had come and taken the baby to the hospital. She did not learn what had

happened to Marlen until May 13, when Clarisa admitted that she had cut the baby out of Marlen

and put the body in a garbage can in the backyard. Feeling that she had to let Marlen’s family know

but unwilling to call the police on her own mother, Desiree created a Facebook account under a

fake name and sent a message to one of Marlen’s relatives before deleting the account.

¶ 15      Shortly before 11 p.m. on May 15, detectives questioned Desiree again after she asked to

talk to them because she wanted to know what was going on. At first, she admitted that, after taking

Marlen’s car, she had thrown Marlen’s phone out of the window, but she maintained that she had

not been there when Marlen was killed. About one hour into the interview, though, she relented

and agreed to tell the detectives what had happened if she could be the one to tell Luis. She

admitted that she had been in the home when Marlen was killed. She told police that Clarisa told

her in the kitchen what she was going to do after Marlen was already at the home, sitting on the

couch. Clarisa came up from behind Marlen with a wire and put it around her neck. Desiree was

supposed to hold Marlen’s arms down, but she let them go, and Marlen reached up and tried to

pull the wire off her neck. When Clarisa told Desiree that she was “not doing her f***ing job,”

Desiree pried Marlen’s fingers off the wire and held her arms down. It took about four minutes to

strangle Marlen. At Clarisa’s direction, Desiree retrieved a blanket, a garbage bag, and a meat-

cutter.

¶ 16      During a follow-up interview the next day, Desiree maintained that she was not present

when Clarisa extracted the baby from Marlen’s body, which happened while Desiree was retrieving

the garbage bag from the downstairs. When she got back upstairs, Marlen’s body was already

wrapped in a blanket. She saw the umbilical cord hanging out of a bucket, and she assumed the

baby was inside, but she did not want to see it. The baby was not crying, and Clarisa thought

something was wrong. Desiree handed Clarisa the garbage bag, and Clarisa pulled it around the

                                                 -6-
In re D.D.                                                                            No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

body in the blanket, tied it, picked it up, carried it outside, and put it in the garbage can. At that

point, Desiree realized that there would be paramedics coming, so she left. Later, when she picked

Luis up from work, he realized that she was driving Marlen’s car. When he asked what had

happened to Marlen, Desiree told him—as she had been instructed to by her mother—that Marlen

had gone to Iowa. Luis seemingly believed the lie. He thought the car was “hot,” so he got rid of

the plates and Marlen’s wallet, but he did not know what had happened to her. In the days after

Marlen’s killing, Luis noticed something was off with Desiree and started asking her what was

wrong. Not wanting to make him an accomplice by putting him in a position where he knew what

had happened, she lied and said that nothing was wrong, which led them to fight.

¶ 17   Less than an hour after that interview, detectives brought Luis into the room. Desiree told

him that she had helped Clarisa kill Marlen, explaining that she was afraid that Clarisa would kick

them out of the house and they would have nowhere to live with the baby if she refused. While she

confessed what she had done, Luis buried his head in his hands and cried.

¶ 18   Desiree’s ERI also contained information about episodes of domestic violence involving

Luis. She noted in passing that Luis sometimes struck her, and she said that Luis tended to get

aggressive when he had not used marijuana. She also told police that, during one of the arguments

they got into shortly after Marlen’s killing, she decided she was going to leave him and drive to a

women’s shelter in Marlen’s car. While she was packing, he let the air out of the car’s tires so she

could not leave. They resumed arguing when she came back, and Desiree shoved him away when

he got too close to her. He grabbed a pair of bolt-cutters and swung them at her, but she ducked,

and he hit the car window, breaking it.

¶ 19   Luis’s ERI depicted his interview with police on the evening of May 15. During the

interview, he denied that he knew about or was involved in planning the killing of Marlen. He told

police that Marlen had come to the home a few times in the month preceding the killing to get

clothes. He first met Marlen on April 1, when she picked him and Desiree up from a prenatal

doctor’s appointment and drove them to Clarisa’s house. While they were waiting for Marlen to

                                                 -7-
In re D.D.                                                                               No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

arrive, Desiree told Luis that she had received a text message from Clarisa saying something to

the effect that that she was about to do something dumb and prayed that God would forgive her.

Marlen arrived, and she drove them all to Clarisa’s house. While Marlen, Desiree, and Luis were

at the house, Clarisa kept bringing Desiree into a room to talk to her. The last time Desiree came

out, she was shaking. Luis warned her that if she did something dumb, he would call the police

and tell Desiree’s grandmother, who lived upstairs. They started to argue, so he grabbed his

marijuana and went outside to smoke, telling himself that he would make sure that Marlen would

come out. Marlen came out unharmed and left. She was followed by Desiree, who said, “You dumb

mother***er, it was only an April Fool’s joke.” He was later told that Marlen had agreed to give

her baby to Clarisa and then go to Iowa. On April 23, Desiree picked him up from work in Marlen’s

car and told him that Marlen had come with the baby and given it to Clarisa. He admitted that he

had driven around in Marlen’s car for a few days afterward. He said that he broke one of the car’s

windows when he tried to hit Desiree with a “lock turner” during an argument over her leaving,

and he also admitted letting the air out of the tires. He told police that, until he was told earlier that

day that a body had been found, he had assumed that Marlen was living in Iowa as she had planned.

¶ 20    Luis testified at the hearing on his own behalf. He testified that, after his birth, D.D. lived

with Luis and Luis’s mother in a residence other than the one that Luis had previously shared with

Desiree and Desiree’s mother. D.D. lived there for about a month before DCFS came and took

temporary custody of him. A DCFS agent told Luis that they needed to take D.D. to the hospital

“just to do a check,” but they did not bring him back after taking him. Luis denied that any domestic

violence had occurred between him and Desiree, but he acknowledged that they had argued a lot

before D.D.’s birth and that Desiree had once called the police on him during an argument. He

later went to jail for an unrelated reason. While there, he found out that a warrant had been issued

against him on a domestic-violence charge, but the case was dropped at his initial appearance.

¶ 21    Apart from Luis’s testimony, no evidence was presented concerning the circumstances of

D.D’s living situation at the time the petition for wardship was filed.

                                                   -8-
In re D.D.                                                                                No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

¶ 22   During closing argument, the State acknowledged that it was proceeding under a theory of

anticipatory neglect. It argued that Desiree’s “previous actions that led to the death of [Yovanny]

is more than sufficient to demonstrate *** an injurious environment for [D.D.], as well.” It also

contended that, even if he did not participate in the killing, Luis at least knew about it and that Luis

had admitted to engaging in conduct that, even if it did not result in injury to Desiree, still

constituted domestic violence.

¶ 23   Based on the evidence, and relying on the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, the court found

that D.D. was neglected in that his environment was injurious due to “the breach of a parent’s duty

to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for her children.” It also found that D.D. was abused because

there was a substantial risk of injury to him. It identified both Desiree and Luis as responsible for

that neglect and abuse. The majority of its oral findings addressed Desiree’s conduct. With respect

to Luis, it found as follows:

                   “The petition alleges—does not allege [Luis] was actively
               involved in the murder of [Marlen] and the forcible surgical removal
               of her child in the home, but it does allege history of domestic
               violence. And the Court finds that there's sufficient corroboration
               based on mom's statement and dad’s statement and Luis saying that
               he was actually arrested on a warrant for domestic violence but it
               was dismissed.

                   I mean, it was obviously a tumultuous relationship, and the fact
               that while the authorities were sorting all this out that the baby lived
               with Luis and his mom for a month before they took protective
               custody is really of no import to this Court because it took a while
               for folks—I mean, the facts of this case boggle the mind. They are
               so horrific. And while it's not pled in the petition, the word that
               comes to this Court's mind is depravity. The depraved behavior of
               not only [Desiree] and her mother, but [Luis], as well, as described
               in their statements.”
¶ 24   The dispositional hearing was held three months later, on February 6, 2023. Desiree

introduced five exhibits, which were certificates from various programs she had completed while

in jail. The State introduced two exhibits.

                                                  -9-
In re D.D.                                                                           No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

¶ 25     The State’s first exhibit was an integrated assessment report prepared by DCFS in March

2020. The report, which was based on interviews and screenings conducted in January 2020,

included assessments of Luis, D.D., and D.D.’s then-foster mother. Desiree was not assessed due

to her incarceration.

¶ 26     Relevant to this appeal is the assessment of Luis, which made up a majority of the report.

The report stated that the interviewer did not observe any safety concerns at Luis’s home. Luis told

the interviewer that he wanted to reunite with D.D. and was willing to participate in any services

that might be recommended. He also expressed concern about D.D.’s welfare in foster care after

he found a sanitary napkin in D.D.’s diaper during one visit and because D.D. was not wearing

socks during the most recent visit. He said that he wanted D.D. removed from the foster home and

placed with one of his relatives. 4 He also said that he thought Desiree’s parental rights should be
terminated.

¶ 27     The report identified several unresolved concerns that might significantly impact Luis’s

ability to care for D.D. First, Luis’s previous romantic relationships with both Desiree and the

mother of his first two children had involved constant arguments, and his relationship with Desiree

had also involved being subjected to her controlling behavior and acts of domestic violence by

both partners. Second, Luis apparently had knowledge of, or involvement in, Marlen’s killing.

Third, Luis reported significant daily marijuana use—anywhere from two to ten blunts daily

depending on his stress level—dating back to the death of his first child from an autoimmune

disease several years earlier, although he said that he had only used marijuana once during the

month that D.D. had been in his care. Fourth, although there was no indication that Luis had ever

abused a child, he scored in the top 1% for risk of future child abuse on the Child Abuse Potential

4
    In addition to the concerns raised by Luis, the report noted that D.D.’s substitute caregiver had
    provided unsafe sleeping conditions for D.D., had difficulty estimating how much and how often
    D.D. was eating, and was oblivious to indications that D.D.’s development was lagging. Other
    material in the record suggests that D.D. was eventually removed from her care and ultimately
    placed with one of Luis’s relatives.

                                                 -10-
In re D.D.                                                                              No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

Inventory. Based on his scores on various subscales and his social history, the report suggested

that the elevated risk of future abuse was due to his lifelong exposure to violence, including

witnessing his mother physically abuse his sister, and a rigid parenting style that could lead him to

adopt fixed and unrealistic expectations for a child in his care.

¶ 28    The report concluded that the prognosis for D.D. to reunify with either of his parents was

poor. With respect to Desiree, it recommended “legal screening for expedited termination of [her]

parental rights given her pending homicide charges and the risk she poses to any child in her care.”

With respect to Luis, it noted his elevated risk for future child abuse, and it identified his

knowledge of, or involvement in, Marlen’s and Yovanny’s deaths and his own level of functioning

as “barriers to reunification” that were likely to affect his ability to safely care for D.D. The report

recommended that Luis’s ability to safely care for D.D. be further evaluated by having him undergo

a parenting-capacity assessment and through continuing supervised visits with D.D. In the event

that he was found to have the capability to effectively parent D.D., it recommended that Luis

complete a variety of programs before reunifying him and D.D.

¶ 29    The State’s second exhibit was a family service plan prepared by DCFS in December 2022,

roughly two months before the dispositional hearing. The plan described D.D. as “a very happy

three year old” who was living with a relative of Luis and her three teenage daughters. He had no

contact with Desiree. Starting in September 2022, there was a plan in place for Luis to visit him

twice a month, but Luis had only come to three of those visits. It noted that Luis was employed.

He had completed a drug assessment in February 2021, and his “random drops” had come back

negative until they prematurely ended in April 2021. 5 He had attended, but failed to fully engage
in or successfully complete, a nurturing-parent program. The plan’s permanency goal was for D.D.

to return to Luis’s care within 12 months, which would allow Luis “time to correct the behaviors

5
    The plan offers contradictory explanations for why random testing stopped, stating both that
    Luis had failed to appear and that testing had stopped during a transition to a new case-
    management team.

                                                 -11-
In re D.D.                                                                                No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

that brought his son into care.” It reported that Luis had made satisfactory progress in some areas

supporting that goal but unsatisfactory progress on others.

¶ 30   The author of the family service plan, DCFS social worker Abigail Lampe, testified at the

hearing. Her testimony was consistent with the information found in the plan. In addition, she

testified that D.D. had been placed in the care of a paternal relative for about three years. That

environment was both safe and appropriate. D.D. had no developmental or health concerns, and

he was attached to his caregivers, well-adjusted, and happy. Luis had participated in some, but not

all, of the services that had been recommended in the integrated assessment three years earlier.

Although Luis had not consistently attended scheduled in-person visits with D.D., he spoke to

D.D. every week or two using FaceTime. Desiree had no contact with D.D. Lampe recommended

that D.D. be made a ward of the court with a long-term goal of returning home.

¶ 31   In entering its findings orally, the court incorporated its findings from the adjudicatory

hearing by reference. It first found that it was in the best interest of D.D. that he be made a ward

of the court. It then turned to the appropriate disposition, starting with each of D.D.’s parents’

respective ability and fitness to parent him:

                   “Again the Court finds the mother is unable because of
               circumstances to care for, train, or discipline the minor. The mother,
               based on the evidence admitted on the Adjudication, and the Court
               finds her unfit.

                   As to father [the] Court also finds him unable for some reasons
               other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train, or
               discipline the minor based on the evidence admitted at the
               Adjudicatory Hearing including but not limited to the inciden[ts] of
               domestic violence. The Court also find him to be unfit.”

It next found that there had been reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove

D.D. from the home but that appropriate services meant to promote reunification had so far proved

unsuccessful. It therefore determined that it was in the best interest of D.D. to be removed from

                                                -12-
In re D.D.                                                                             No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

his parents’ custody, and it placed him in the custody of the DCFS guardianship administrator. The

court also prohibited Desiree from visiting with D.D.

¶ 32     On March 7, 2023, Desiree filed a notice of appeal from the adjudicatory and dispositional

orders. 6 Luis has not appealed.

¶ 33                                         ANALYSIS

¶ 34     On appeal, Desiree challenges the trial court’s determinations at both the adjudicatory

hearing and the dispositional hearing. With respect to the adjudicatory hearing, she argues that the

trial court’s findings that D.D. was a neglected minor and an abused minor were against the

manifest weight of the evidence and legally erroneous insofar as those findings rested on a theory

of anticipatory neglect. With respect to the dispositional hearing, she argues that the trial court

erred by making D.D. a ward of the court, by not articulating in writing the factual basis for its

findings that Desiree and Luis were unfit, and by entering a dispositional order that did not award

custody of D.D. to Luis. For the reasons that follow, we reject those arguments and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

¶ 35     The right of parents to raise their children “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty

interests recognized by” the United States Supreme Court. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 362 (2001) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). That
right is not interfered with lightly. Cf. id. (stating that courts do not “easily terminate” parental

rights). Nevertheless, “[s]tate interference with fundamental parental childrearing rights is justified

in limited instances to protect the health, safety, and welfare of children.” Wickham v. Byrne,

199 Ill. 2d 309, 317 (2002). One way that Illinois protects the health, safety, and welfare of children

is through Article II of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act), which authorizes

6
    The notice of appeal was filed on March 7, 2023. The court granted multiple requests for brief
    extension from the parties, and it allowed the State to file its brief instanter. We therefore find
    that there is good cause for issuing our decision more than 150 days after the notice of appeal
    was filed. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018).

                                                 -13-
In re D.D.                                                                            No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

courts to assume wardship of neglected, abused, or dependent minors. See 705 ILCS 405/2-1 et

seq. (West 2022).

¶ 36   Article II sets out a comprehensive process for deciding whether to remove a minor from

his or her parents and make the child a ward of the court based on allegations of neglect, abuse, or

dependence. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 462 (2004). The State invokes that process by filing

a petition for wardship alleging that a minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. See 705 ILCS

405/2-13 (West 2022). Upon filing of the petition for wardship, the court holds a temporary

custody hearing where it decides whether there is probable cause to believe that the minor is

abused, neglected, or dependent. If so, the court is empowered to enter appropriate orders for the

care and custody of the minor pending a final resolution of the petition. See id. § 2-10(1). The next

step in the process is an adjudicatory hearing at which the court decides whether it is more likely

than not that the minor is neglected, abused, or dependent. See id. §§ 1-3(1), 2-21. That finding is

jurisdictional. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464. A finding that the minor is not neglected, abused, or

dependent ends the proceedings. Id. at 478. If the court does make such a finding, it proceeds to a

dispositional hearing, where it decides whether being made a ward of the court is in the minor’s

best interest and, if so, determines what disposition would best serve the health, safety, and

interests of both the minor and the public. See 705 ILCS 405/2-22, 2-23 (West 2022).

¶ 37   In evaluating this case, we are mindful of two powerful, but often competing, interests. “A

proceeding for adjudication of wardship ‘represents a significant intrusion into the sanctity of the

family which should not be undertaken lightly.’ ” Arthur H., 212 Ill.2d at 463 (quoting In re

Harpman, 134 Ill. App. 3d 393, 396–97 (1985)). But at the same time, as in any proceeding under

the Juvenile Court Act, the most significant factor is acting in the best interest of the child. In re

A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18. This tension is reflected in the act’s express purpose “to preserve and

strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing him or her from the custody of his

or her parents only when his or her safety or welfare or the protection of the public cannot be

adequately safeguarded without removal.” 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 2022).

                                                -14-
In re D.D.                                                                               No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

¶ 38                              I. Findings of Neglect and Abuse

¶ 39    Desiree first challenges the trial court’s findings at the November 2022 adjudicatory

hearing that D.D. was neglected and abused. At an adjudicatory hearing, the court must “determine

whether the allegations of [the] petition *** that a minor under 18 years of age is abused, neglected

or dependent *** are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(1) (West

2022). The issue is not whether the parents are neglectful or abusive; it is whether the minor is

neglected or abused. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 467. It is the State’s burden to prove allegations of

abuse and neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17. Cases

involving accusations of neglect are sui generis, so they must be decided according to their

particular facts. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 463.

¶ 40    The parties dispute the applicable standard of review. Ordinarily, a finding that a minor is

neglected or abused will be reversed only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Arthur

H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464. Desiree, however, argues that, to the extent the trial court’s findings were
based on the circumstances surrounding the killing of Marlen and her infant son, review should be

de novo because the evidence showing those circumstances was documents and video footage, not

live testimony. For two reasons, we decline to review the trial court’s findings de novo. First, we

do not believe that the trial court’s findings as to neglect and abuse can be neatly separated into

those related to the killings and those related to domestic violence. As just noted, every case

involving allegations of neglect and abuse is one-of-a-kind and must be decided based on the

unique circumstances of that particular case. Id. at 463. Luis’s live testimony was relevant to the

allegation of neglect and the allegation of abuse, so this is not a case where the trial court’s findings

were based solely on documentary evidence. Second, unlike the cases Desiree relies on in arguing

for de novo review, this case does not involve stipulated or otherwise undisputed facts. See In re

Zion M., 2015 IL App (1st) 151119, ¶ 28 (reviewing neglect finding de novo because it was based

on a stipulated record); Alderson v. Southern Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 832, 846 (2001) (reviewing

                                                   -15-
In re D.D.                                                                              No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

jurisdictional determination de novo because there was “no material dispute regarding the facts”).

When the facts are undisputed, de novo review is appropriate because the only dispute is about

“the legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts.” Alderson, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 846. While there

was no disagreement about what is depicted on the ERI videos, for instance, the inferences to be

drawn from the statements on those videos about Desiree’s involvement in the killing of Marlen

and about Luis’s knowledge of the scheme were hotly disputed, as were the inferences about what

that conduct showed concerning the likelihood of future neglect or abuse of D.D. It is not our role

as a reviewing court to revisit those inferences anew. See Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 351 (2006)

(“A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding *** the

inferences to be drawn.”)

¶ 41   Accordingly, we review the trial court’s findings of neglect and abuse under the manifest-

weight standard. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence “only when an opposite

conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on

the evidence.” Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 252 (2002). This standard is extremely

deferential. When applying this standard, we must view “all of the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party.” Melamed v. Melamed, 2016 IL App (1st) 141453, ¶ 37. We may

not reweigh the evidence, nor may we reverse merely because we might have entered a different

factual finding. People ex rel. Illinois Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych, 186 Ill. 2d 267, 278

(1999). “When there are different ways to view the evidence, or alternative inferences to be drawn

from it, we accept the view of the trier of fact as long as it is reasonable.” Id. at 278. If either the

finding of neglect or the finding of abuse can be upheld under the manifest-weight standard, then

we will affirm. In re Jordyn L., 2016 IL App (1st) 150956, ¶ 29.

¶ 42   The State’s allegation that D.D. was neglected was based on section 2-3(1)(b) of the

Juvenile Court Act, which deems to be neglected any minor “whose environment is injurious to

his or her welfare.” 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (2022). “Child neglect is by its very nature incapable

of a precise and detailed definition.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Z.L., 2021 IL

                                                 -16-
In re D.D.                                                                             No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

126931, ¶ 90 (quoting People v. Schoos, 15 Ill. App. 3d 964, 967 (1973)). Although “the term

‘injurious environment’ cannot be ‘defined with particularity,’ *** it includes the breach of a

parent’s duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children.” Id. ¶ 89 (quoting Arthur

H., 212 Ill. 2d at 463). “[A] finding of an ‘injurious environment’ does not require a showing of

actual harm. In other words, courts need not wait for a child to get hurt.” (Emphasis in original.)

In re K.F., 2023 IL App (1st) 220816, ¶ 49. At the same time, our supreme court has “emphasize[d]

that the State must be held to its burden of proof,” meaning that “the natural ties between parents

and their children may not be severed on the basis of mere speculation.” Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at

477-78. The State’s second allegation, which was that D.D. was abused, was based on section 2-

3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, which provides that any minor “whose parent or

immediate family member, or any person responsible for the minor's welfare, or any person who

is in the same family or household as the minor, or any individual residing in the same home as

the minor, or a paramour of the minor's parent *** creates a substantial risk of physical injury to

such minor by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement,

impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function” is deemed to be

abused. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 2022).

¶ 43   The allegations that D.D. was neglected and abused rested on the same factual basis:

Desiree’s involvement in the deaths of Marlen and her infant son, Luis’s awareness of the killing

and involvement in the plot (if not the killing itself), and the incidents of domestic violence

between Desiree and Luis. The State did not allege that D.D. had previously been neglected or

abused. Because the factual basis for the petition pertained to events that had occurred more than

six months before D.D.’s birth, the State’s petition and the trial court’s finding that D.D. was

neglected and abused necessarily rested on a theory of anticipatory neglect. “Under the

anticipatory neglect theory, the State seeks to protect not only children who are the direct victims

of neglect or abuse, but also those who have a probability to be subject to neglect or abuse because

they reside, or in the future may reside, with an individual who has been found to have neglected

                                                 -17-
In re D.D.                                                                           No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

or abused another child.” Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides

that the proof of neglect of one minor “shall be admissible evidence” on the issue of the neglect of

another minor, but such evidence is not conclusive proof of the neglect of another minor. 705 ILCS

405/2-18 (West 2023); In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. In other words, the neglect of one child

does not establish, per se, that any other children in the household are also neglected. See In re

S.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1022 (2004) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to support

the finding that mother’s son was a neglected minor while mother’s daughter was found neglected

and made a ward of the court); In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 28 (1995). Like any other

case, a case involving the theory of anticipatory neglect must be reviewed according to its own

distinct facts. Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d at 28.

¶ 44   Initially, we observe that the trial court’s assessment of the heinous and depraved nature of

the deliberate killing of Marlen, which ultimately led to the death of her son Yovanny, was

supported by the evidence. Its finding that Desiree’s participation in that crime, which was patently

contrary to Yovanny’s welfare, showed that she could not “be trusted to care of an infant on [her]

own” was entirely reasonable. But the question before the trial court was not whether Desiree was

(or would be) a neglectful mother; it was whether D.D. was a neglected or abused child. Arthur

H., 212 Ill. 2d at 467. A parent’s past neglectful or abusive actions do not establish anticipatory

neglect if that parent will not be in the child’s environment going forward. See In re Zion M., 2015

IL App (1st) 151119, ¶ 34 (holding that theory of anticipatory neglect failed where the parent who

had neglected and abused the minor’s siblings was “no longer living in the home” with the minor

and the mother). There is no dispute that Desiree has been in custody at the Cook County Jail since

2019, and there was no evidence presented suggesting that was likely to change any time soon. As

there was no basis for finding that Desiree will be in a position to neglect or abuse D.D., her

deplorable conduct with respect to Marlen and Yovanny cannot establish that D.D. is, or is likely

to be, neglected.

                                                 -18-
In re D.D.                                                                            No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

¶ 45   Luis testified at the adjudicatory hearing that, before D.D. was taken away by DCFS, he

was living with Luis and Luis’s mother. That testimony went unchallenged. The trial court’s task,

then, was to evaluate what D.D.’s care and condition would be if left in the care of his father and

paternal grandmother. In re Zion M., 2015 IL App (1st) 151119, ¶ 34 (“[W]here the child is alleged

to be neglected under the theory of anticipatory neglect, *** the court needs to evaluate the

individual with whom the child will reside.”).

¶ 46   When the State advances a theory of anticipatory neglect, whether the minor in question is

neglected “should be measured not only by the circumstances surrounding [the other neglected or

abused child], but also by the care and condition of the child in question.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. at 468 (quoting In re Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 797 (2003)). The record contains

very little information about D.D.’s environment during the month of his life that he lived with his

father. The only evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing touching on his care and condition

during that period of time were the medical records from D.D.’s post-discharge check-up on

November 6, 2019, when he was only five days old. Those records generally show that Luis was

caring for D.D. appropriately: he was being regularly fed, producing frequent wet diapers and

bowel movements, being secured in a car seat when driven, and sleeping on his back in a crib.

Other than that basic information suggesting that D.D.’s environment was not injurious, the record

does not show one way or another the nature of D.D.’s care and condition while being cared for

by Luis and Luis’s mother.

¶ 47   But the absence of evidence of neglect or abuse during the one-month period that D.D. was

in Luis’s care and custody is not dispositive because the State’s allegations and the trial court’s

findings relied on the theory of anticipatory neglect. That theory necessarily “concedes that the

child has not been the victim of neglect or abuse.” Zion M., 2015 IL App (1st) 151119, ¶ 34. It is

based instead on “a probability” that he will “be subject[ed] to neglect or abuse” in the future.

Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. With respect to Luis, the trial court found that such a probability

existed for two reasons.

                                                 -19-
In re D.D.                                                                                No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

¶ 48     First, although the trial court did not find that Luis had participated in the killing of Marlen,

it did find that his conduct related to the killing demonstrated “depravity.” In the context of child-

protection proceedings, depravity is a term of art that means “an inherent deficiency of moral sense

and rectitude.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re A.M., 358 Ill. App. 3d 247, 253 (2005)

(quoting Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 498 (1952)). 7 In finding that D.D. was neglected, the court
further stated that “somebody who could do what happened to” Yovanny could not “be trusted to

take care of an infant on their own.” We understand this finding to apply not only to Desiree based

on her direct involvement in Marlen’s killing but also to Luis—whom the trial court specifically

identified as a “perpetrator[] of the neglect and abuse”—in light of his actions before and after the

killing. Those actions demonstrated a lack of judgment and the absence of a sense of responsibility

for other human beings that would be necessary for him to discharge his duty as a parent “to ensure

a safe and nurturing shelter for” D.D. See Z.L., 2021 IL 126931, ¶ 89. We cannot say that the trial

court’s assessment of Luis’s character is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not supported by evidence.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party (Melamed, 2016 IL App

(1st) 141453, ¶ 37), the evidence showed that Luis became aware that Clarisa had discussed

harming Marlen and taking the baby as early as April 1, 2019. Although he made his opposition to

any such plan known and warned that he would contact the authorities if Marlen was hurt, he never

warned Marlen that Clarisa might be dangerous or contacted the authorities himself. Rather than

physically intervening to ensure Marlen’s safe departure on April 1, he went outside to smoke

marijuana with the hope that she would come out of the house unharmed. On April 23, he did not

go to the police when Desiree unexpectedly showed up driving Marlen’s car. Instead, he accepted

the highly improbable story that Marlen had decided to abandon her baby and go to Iowa without

7
    Depravity is usually relevant because it provides a basis for terminating parental rights based
    on unfitness. See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022) (authorizing termination if parent is an
    “unfit person”); 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2022) (providing that depravity is a ground for
    finding that a parent is an unfit person). In this case, the State has not sought to terminate either
    Desiree’s or Luis’s parental rights.

                                                   -20-
In re D.D.                                                                              No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

her car or her wallet—an explanation that was unlikely enough to justify a belief that he was not

merely gullible but willfully blind to Marlen’s fate so he could take advantage of having access to

the car and the money that had been left in it. The trial court’s conclusion that this conduct reflected

deficiencies in Luis’s character, including his judgment and sense of responsibility, that made it

likely he would not provide a safe and nurturing environment for his son was not an unreasonable

one.

¶ 49   Second, the trial court found that Luis had a history of committing acts of domestic violence

against Desiree. This finding readily finds support in the evidence. Both Luis and Desiree told

police about the incident where he broke the window of Marlen’s car while trying to strike Desiree

with a tool of some kind. In her brief on appeal, Desiree minimizes the significance of that

altercation, characterizing it as an isolated incident with no relevance to D.D. The trial court was

not unjustified in finding otherwise. The evidence showed that the bolt-cutter incident was not

isolated. Desiree acknowledges that she told police that Luis had pushed her on other occasions.

But she also reported that Luis tended to act aggressively when not using marijuana, not only

suggesting that there were additional instances of violent behavior but supporting a finding that

Luis’s aggressive behavior posed a substantial risk of injury to D.D. We also do not agree that the

bolt-cutter incident had nothing to do with D.D. Desiree was three months pregnant when Luis

tried to strike her with an object that was heavy enough to shatter a car window. That action did

not merely show a willingness to harm Desiree but a disregard for the health and safety of D.D. in

utero, which spoke to both the environment that Luis would provide and the existence of a

substantial risk of injury to D.D.

¶ 50   In short, the trial court reasonably found that Luis’s actions evinced a lack of the empathy,

judgment, and responsibility that are required to provide a safe and nurturing environment for a

child and a willingness to use physical violence against family members when upset—even at the

risk of harming his own son. Viewed together, those findings supported the trial court’s conclusions

that, if left in Luis’s care, D.D. would more likely than not be (1) neglected by being in an

                                                 -21-
In re D.D.                                                                            No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

“environment *** injurious to his *** welfare” and (2) abused because he faced “a substantial risk

of physical injury *** by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death,

disfigurement, impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function.” See

705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b), (2)(ii) (West 2022). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s findings

that D.D. was neglected and that D.D. was abused were not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 51                                       II. Disposition

¶ 52   Desiree next challenges the trial court’s findings at the dispositional hearing. At the

dispositional hearing, the court makes two determinations. First, it decides “whether it is in the

best interests of the minor and the public that the minor be made a ward of the court.” 705 ILCS

5/2-22(1) (West 2022). If the minor is made a ward of the court, it next selects “the proper

disposition best serving the health, safety and interests of the minor and the public.” Id.; see id.

§ 2-23(1)(a) (listing proper dispositions). These are distinct inquiries. See In re M.M., 2016 IL

119932, ¶ 19 n.1 (stating that the wardship determination “must precede” the inquiry into the

proper disposition). Here, the trial court found that it was in D.D.’s best interest to be made a ward

of the court, and it selected placement with a legal guardian as the appropriate disposition. See id.

§§ 2-23(1)(a)(2), 2-27(1)(a). Desiree challenges both determinations.

¶ 53   In general, our review of the trial court’s dispositional determinations is deferential. We

may reverse only if the decision is based on factual findings that are against the manifest weight
of the evidence or if the disposition selected by the trial court is so clearly inappropriate that it

amounts to an abuse of discretion. In re B.S., 2022 IL App (2d) 220271, ¶ 32. A factual finding is

against the manifest weight of the evidence “only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when

the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” Eychaner, 202 Ill.

2d at 252. The trial court abuses its discretion only if it adopts a view that no reasonable person

                                                -22-
In re D.D.                                                                              No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

would take or its decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL

118432, ¶ 41.

¶ 54                                        A. Wardship

¶ 55   Desiree first challenges the trial court’s determination that it was in the best interest of D.D.

that he be made a ward of the court. She argues that D.D.’s best interest would have been served

by returning him to Luis’s custody. We think that this argument is misplaced. As noted above,

whether the minor should be made a ward of the court is a question that is distinct from the

selection of an appropriate disposition. M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 19 n.1. Even if the minor is made

a ward of the court, placement is not the only possible disposition. See 705 ILCS 405/2-23(1)(a)

(West 2022). A ward of the court may also be “continued in the custody of his or her parents” or

“restored to the custody of the parent [or] parents” with DCFS oversight. See id. § 2-23(1)(a)(1),

(3). At the wardship stage, the court is not deciding who should take custody of the minor. Instead,

it is effectively determining whether it is in the minor’s best interest for the court—as opposed to

the parents—to make that decision.

¶ 56   Viewed in that light, the trial court’s determination that the best interests of D.D. and the

public at large called for it to assume wardship of D.D. was eminently reasonable. As discussed

above, the court had already found that Desiree and Luis’s conduct surrounding Marlen’s killing

and Yovanny’s subsequent death reflected a deficient moral character. Even apart from that finding,

the evidence that was adduced at the adjudicatory hearing gave the court reason to distrust the
judgment of both Desiree and Luis. Desiree herself told detectives during one of her interviews

that, without Luis to guide her, she was prone to making very bad decisions. That assessment was

borne out by her decision to participate in the brutal killing of a pregnant teenager for the purpose

of allowing Clarisa, whom Desiree believed was mentally ill, to raise the child as her own. As for

Luis, his attempt to strike a then-pregnant Desiree with a tool heavy enough to shatter a car window

showed that he was willing to place his own desire to express his emotions through violence over

                                                 -23-
In re D.D.                                                                              No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

the safety and well-being of D.D., justifying a belief that he was ill-suited to make crucial decisions

about D.D.’s future. Luis’s poor judgment in matters affecting his son was further shown by the

DCFS integrated assessment report that was introduced at the dispositional hearing. Among other

things, the report stated that Luis admitted that he smoked marijuana before his interview with the

DCFS worker, which was self-evidently crucial to his prospects for reuniting with his son in the

future, and that he appeared to be blind to how his actions affected other people and to his own

deficiencies as a father. The trial court also had before it the testimony of D.D.’s caseworker, who

recommended wardship. Based on this record, the trial court’s decision to make D.D. a ward of

the court was neither against the manifest weight of the evidence nor an abuse of discretion.

¶ 57                                        B. Placement

¶ 58   Desiree next challenges the trial court’s selection of placement with a legal guardian, which

effectively transferred custody of D.D. from his parents to that guardian, as the appropriate

disposition. A minor who has been made a ward of the court may be placed into the custody of a

relative or some other legal custodian or guardian if the court determines that: (1) the minor’s

parents are unfit or either unable or unwilling “to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor”

and (2) allowing the parents to retain custody would jeopardize “the health, safety, and best interest

of the minor.” 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2022). The purpose of placement “is not to terminate

parental rights, but rather to decide what future actions are in the best interests of the child.” In re

Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 374 (2005). When the State does not seek termination of parental
rights, which is the case here, the court “is concerned only with placement of the minor.” Id.

¶ 59                                    1. Parental Unfitness

¶ 60   Desiree challenges the trial court’s unfitness finding on two distinct grounds. First, she

argues that the trial court failed to comply with a statutory requirement that the court must

articulate the factual basis for a finding of unfitness in writing. Second, she argues that the trial

court’s finding that Luis was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                                 -24-
In re D.D.                                                                            No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

¶ 61                            a. Requirement of Written Findings

¶ 62    Desiree contends that a remand is necessary because the trial court failed to articulate in

writing the basis for its finding that she and Luis were unfit, as required by the Juvenile Court Act.

See 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2022) (requiring the trial court to “put[] in writing the factual

basis supporting the determination” of unfitness); Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 378 (remanding for

trial court to enter more specific findings). Because the purpose of requiring written findings is to

provide the parties with notice of the reasons for the finding and to permit appellate review of

those reasons, that requirement can be satisfied by a transcript of explicit oral findings.

Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75. Here, the trial court did not enter a written order detailing its

findings, but it did make oral findings that have been transcribed. We must therefore “examine

whether the trial court’s oral statement on the record in the instant matter was explicit and advised

respondent of the basis for its determination.” Id. at 377. Whether the trial court satisfied the

written-findings requirement presents a question of statutory interpretation, so review is de novo.

Id. at 372.

¶ 63    The trial court began its findings at the dispositional hearing by expressly incorporating by

reference its findings from the adjudicatory hearing. See supra ¶ 23. After determining that

wardship was in D.D.’s best interest, the court found that Desiree and Luis were each unfit and

unable parents. With respect to Desiree, it found that she was “unable because of circumstances”

and unfit based on the evidence at the adjudicatory hearing. With respect to Luis, it found that he

was unable and unfit “based on the evidence admitted at the Adjudicatory Hearing including but

not limited to the inciden[ts] of domestic violence.” These terse findings were not ideal, but they

were also not entirely generic. Cf. Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 377-78 (holding that the trial court’s

oral findings were inadequate because they merely “mirror[ed] the statutory language” and

articulated “no meaningful specific factual basis” for the finding of unfitness). Desiree’s

“circumstances” obviously referred to the fact that she was in jail and would remain in custody for

the foreseeable future. The court specified Luis’s history of domestic violence as part of the factual

                                                -25-
In re D.D.                                                                              No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

basis for its determination. The court also incorporated by reference its findings at the adjudicatory

hearing, where it found (among other things) that Desiree’s and Luis’s conduct demonstrated

depravity and that “somebody who could do what happened to” Yovanni could not “be trusted to

take care of an infant on their own.” We believe that the transcript of the trial court’s oral findings,

including the ones it made at the adjudicatory hearing and referenced at the dispositional hearing,

allows us to discern the basis on which the court found Desiree and Luis unfit and unable and,

accordingly, permits an adequate review of that determination, which satisfies the purpose of the

written-findings requirement. See Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75. We therefore decline to

remand for the entry of a detailed written order and proceed to the merits.

¶ 64                         b. Finding that Luis Was Unfit and Unable

¶ 65    Desiree next challenges the factual basis for the trial court’s finding that Luis was, in the

language of the statute, “unfit or unable, for some other reason than financial circumstances alone,

to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor.” See 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2022).

¶ 66    Initially, we note that Desiree does not argue on appeal that the trial court’s findings that

she was unfit and unable were erroneous; she only challenges its findings with respect to Luis.

That means she has forfeited any claim that the trial court erred by finding that she was neither fit

nor able. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). But it also implicates her ability to challenge

the trial court’s determination. In his brief, the public guardian suggests that Desiree might not

have standing to challenge those determinations because they pertain to Luis’s rights, not hers. As
the public guardian correctly notes, however, at least one Illinois reviewing court has held that a

parent has an interest in assuring that the minor’s best interest is served by the court’s dispositional

order. In re Al. S., 2017 IL App (4th) 160737, ¶ 37 (holding that a father had standing to challenge

trial court’s determination that allowing neglected minor to remain in the mother’s custody was in

the minor’s best interest). The United States Supreme Court has, in fact, recognized that parents

have a “fundamental liberty interest *** in the care, custody, and management of their child.”

                                                 -26-
In re D.D.                                                                           No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

Sontosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). We see no reason to depart from Al. S., so we hold

that Desiree has standing to challenge the trial court’s findings that Luis was unfit and unable.

¶ 67     We begin with the trial court’s finding that Luis was unfit. Although the Adoption Act
specifically defines the term unfit person (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)), the term unfit is

not defined in the Juvenile Court Act, and case law recognizes that the two terms are not

interchangeable. See In re K.S., 203 Ill. App. 3d 586, 600 (1990). Because the term unfit is

undefined for the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act, we assume that the legislature used it in its

plain and ordinary sense. Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2009). In general,

something is unfit when it is “incapable of meeting requirements or qualifications” or “not

suitable.” Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary 1996 (2d ed. 1964). When used to describe

a person, unfit means “not having the requisite qualities or skills to undertake something

competently.” New Oxford American Dictionary 1844 (2001). And in the context of family law,

unfit usually means “[m]orally unqualified” or “incompetent.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019).

¶ 68     “At the dispositional phase, the State bears the burden of proving [unfitness] by a

preponderance of the evidence.” In re B.S., 2022 IL App (2d) 220271, ¶ 31. Desiree advances two

arguments to support her claim that the trial court’s finding was erroneous. Neither has merit.

¶ 69     First, Desiree argues that the trial court disproportionately emphasized the conduct that

formed the basis for the original allegations of neglect and abuse in 2019 over Luis’s fitness as a

parent at the time of the dispositional hearing in 2023. As discussed above, however, the trial court

found that Luis’s conduct before and after Marlen’s death showed depravity; i.e., a deficiency in

his moral character that made him “unfit to have a child,” at least as that term is defined in the

Adoption Act. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D), (D)(i) (West 2022). It also found that Luis had a history of

committing acts of domestic violence, including one incident where he placed D.D.’s welfare in

jeopardy before he was born. Although another factfinder might have thought differently, we have

already held that those findings were not so unreasonable as to be against the manifest weight of

                                                -27-
In re D.D.                                                                               No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

the evidence. Having found that Luis was depraved and had a history of domestic violence, it was

hardly unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that Luis was not fit to care for D.D.

¶ 70    Second, Desiree argues that Luis satisfied what she characterizes as DCFS’s own standards

for “minimum parenting skills.” She does not direct our attention to either material in the record

or any DCFS rules or regulations setting out such a standard. She supports her claim by citing to

an opinion that, in its recitation of the facts, stated that the trial court in that case had “noted that

[the] respondent possessed at least the minimum parenting skills because he could feed, clothe,

baby-sit, and shelter the children.” In re Alicia Z., 336 Ill. App. 3d 476, 484 (2002). Alicia Z. plainly

does not support Desiree’s argument that any person who is able to feed, clothe, baby-sit, and

shelter a child is necessarily fit. The trial court’s finding that Luis was unfit, moreover, was not

based on the absence of basic child-care skills. Instead, it relied on the determinations it had made

about Luis at the adjudicatory hearing, which included findings that he had a history of domestic

violence and had engaged in conduct indicative of depravity. The trial court could reasonably

conclude that Luis’s character and past conduct rendered him unfit notwithstanding his ability to

provide basic elements of care. Cf. In re Hollis, 135 Ill. App. 3d 585, 588 (1985) (“When a parent

engages in extreme or repeated cruelty, his conduct at other times is largely irrelevant.”).

¶ 71    Based on the evidence admitted and the findings entered at the adjudicatory hearing with

respect to Luis’s character and history of family violence, we cannot say that its finding that Luis

was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because that finding was a sufficient

basis on which the court could go on to consider whether placement was in D.D.’s best interest,

we need not evaluate whether it properly found that Luis was also unable.

¶ 72                               2. Best-Interests Determination

¶ 73    Finally, Desiree argues that the trial court erred by not placing D.D. into the custody of

Luis. She correctly notes that there is a constitutional presumption that a fit parent will act in the

child’s best interest. In re M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 26 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68

                                                  -28-
In re D.D.                                                                             No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

(2000) (plurality op.)). That presumption is reflected in the Juvenile Court Act, which permits

placement as a disposition only if the child’s parents are unfit, unable, or unwilling to provide the

necessary care. See 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2022). Here, the trial court found that Luis was

not a fit parent, and that finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly,

there was no longer any presumption that it was in D.D.’s best interest to have Luis reassume

custody. That is not dispositive, though, because the fact that the child’s parents are not fit does

not justify placement in and of itself. Placement is an appropriate disposition only if the trial court

properly concludes that “the health, safety, and best interest of the minor will be jeopardized if the

minor remains in the custody of his or her parents.” Id.

¶ 74   While Desiree argues that D.D.’s best interest would have been served by returning him to

Luis’s custody, we think the trial court reasonably concluded otherwise. By assigning custody of

D.D. to the DCFS Guardianship Administrator, who had been D.D.’s temporary custodian since

December 2019, the court effectively decided that it was in the best interest of D.D. to maintain

the status quo, which had him living with paternal relatives with the goal of reunifying him with

Luis. In making that determination, the court was required to consider whether “appropriate

services aimed at family preservation and family reunification have been unsuccessful in rectifying

the conditions that have led to a finding of unfitness or inability to care for, protect, train, or

discipline the minor.” Id. § 2-27(1.5)(a). Here, it expressly found that such services had thus far

proved unsuccessful. That finding was supported by the DCFS family service plan, which stated

that Luis had not made satisfactory progress toward complying with random drug drops, making

himself available to visit and interact with D.D., and obtaining a parenting-capacity assessment

that would provide recommendations for him to follow.

¶ 75   The trial court’s decision to leave the status quo in place was also consistent with the

statutory factors a court must consider whenever it makes a best-interests determination. See

705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022). Most obviously, leaving the current arrangement intact

promoted D.D’s “need for permanence,” including his “need for stability and continuity of

                                                 -29-
In re D.D.                                                                           No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives.” Id. § 1-3(4.05)(g). More

importantly, the arrangement promoted D.D.’s “sense of attachments” by ensuring that he was in

a home that was familiar to him, where he felt loved and secure, and where he would be guaranteed

continuity of affection. Id. § 1-3(4.05)(d). DCFS social worker Abigail Lampe testified that D.D.

was attached to his caregivers, well-adjusted to life in their home, and appeared happy. By contrast,

he had never known a time in his life where he had lived with Luis, and efforts to build a bond

between them had been hampered by Luis’s failure to regularly attend scheduled in-person

visitations.

¶ 76    The trial court’s dispositional decision also promoted D.D.’s “physical safety and welfare.”

Id. § 1-3(4.05)(a). Lampe testified that she had visited the home where D.D. was living, which

appeared to be safe and appropriate, and there were no safety concerns, instances of corporal

punishment, or unusual incidents associated with that placement. Per the integrated assessment

report, Luis’s home also appeared to be safe, and the record reflects no concerns about D.D.’s

welfare during the month he was in Luis’s custody. That was offset, however, by Luis’s history of

substance abuse and his high risk for child abuse, both of which were reflected in the integrated

assessment report. Concern about possible abuse was especially salient in light of Luis’s history

of domestic violence, including the incident where he attacked Desiree while she was pregnant

with D.D.

¶ 77    Because D.D. was living with one of Luis’s relatives, moreover, not returning him to Luis’s

custody did not come with the same downsides that a different arrangement might have

engendered. It did not impair the development of his identity, and it kept his familial and cultural

ties in place. Id. § 1-3(4.05)(b), (c). It avoided many of “the risks attendant to entering and being

in substitute care,” including concerns that Luis himself had noted during D.D.’s prior placement

with an unrelated foster parent. Id. § 1-3(4.05)(i).

¶ 78    In short, the evidence before the trial court showed that D.D. was living in a home where

he was safe and well-cared for by relatives with whom he had bonded. The trial court’s decision

                                                 -30-
In re D.D.                                                                          No. 1-23-0433
2023 IL App (1st) 230433-U

to place D.D. in the custody of the Guardianship Administrator, which enabled him to continue

living in that environment, was not an unreasonable one. Accordingly, that decision was not against

the manifest weight of the evidence before the court, and it was not an abuse of the discretion.

¶ 79                                    CONCLUSION

¶ 80   For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s findings that D.D. was

neglected and abused, its decision to make him a ward of the court, or its selection of placement

as the appropriate disposition.

¶ 81   Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 82   Affirmed.

                                               -31-