Court Opinion

ID: 9915997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 15:09:46.849176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:23:21.866533
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Condemnation of Premises               :
Owned by Roy E. Powell, II, In                :
Township of Logan by Altoona/                 :   No. 227 C.D. 2022
Logan Township Mobile Emergency               :
Medical Department Authority                  :   Submitted: December 4, 2023
                                              :
Appeal of: Roy E. Powell, II                  :

BEFORE:       HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
              HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                        FILED: January 9, 2024

              In this eminent domain proceeding, Roy E. Powell, II (Powell) appeals
pro se from the February 16, 2022 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
(trial court), which denied his motion for joinder, trespass, and ejectment. Upon
review, we affirm.
                           I.      Factual and Procedural History
              The Altoona/Logan Township Mobile Emergency Department Authority
(Authority)1 constructed a new ambulance station in the Lakemont section of Logan
Township, Blair County. To supply adequate electricity to the facility, Pennsylvania
Electric, Inc. (Penelec), the public utility corporation which supplies the region with

       1
          The Authority is a Pennsylvania municipal authority incorporated by the City to provide
emergency medical and ambulance services to Altoona and the Township of Logan in Blair County
pursuant to the Municipalities Authorities Act of May 2, 1945, P.L. 382, as amended, formerly 53
P.S. §§ 301-322, repealed by the Act of June 19, 2002, P.L. 287. Similar provisions are now found
at 53 Pa. C.S. §§ 5601-5623, the Municipality Authorities Act.
electrical service, determined that it was necessary to install a three-phase electrical
power line. Penelec also determined that the most cost-effective and efficient way to
do so was to upgrade an existing single-phase power line which already ran along an
unopened alley behind the properties in the neighborhood where the ambulance station
was being built. This line has provided three-phase power to other properties in the
neighborhood for many years but became a single-phase line at the block before the
Authority’s property. The single-phase power line had been in place for many decades
and was already providing power to all the properties located along the unopened alley,
including Powell’s property. Penelec’s position was that it already possessed a 15-25-
foot prescriptive easement for the existing single-phase power line but desired a 25-
foot easement for the three-phase line, which was its standard. As a result, additional
easements needed to be acquired to provide the additional desired width. Penelec
tasked the Authority with acquiring easements from the owners of all the properties on
the block before its property to facilitate installation of the line. The Authority was
able to obtain easements from all the owners effected, other than Powell and one other
property owner.
             As a result, the Authority filed a Declaration of Taking on November 19,
2019, to condemn a portion of property owned by Powell for the purpose of installing
a three-phase power line on existing poles for purposes of providing for the new
ambulance facility’s electrical requirements. Powell filed Preliminary Objections to
the Declaration of Taking. The trial court overruled the Preliminary Objections by
order dated March 17, 2020. Powell then filed an appeal to this Court on July 15, 2020.
On July 6, 2021, this Court reversed the trial court’s June 17, 2020 order, holding that
the Authority did not have statutory power to condemn for the purpose of installing the
power lines and that the description of the property in the Declaration of Taking was

                                           2
inadequate and failed to identify what portion of the property would be condemned.
See In Re: Condemnation of Premises Owned by Roy E. Powell, II, in the Township of
Logan by Altoona/Logan Township Mobile Emergency Medical Department Authority,
260 A.3d 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).
             The matter then proceeded to judicial mediation before the Honorable
Jolene Grubb-Kopriva on December 3, 2021. The case was not resolved. In the
meantime, Penelec trimmed the trees on Powell’s property which interfered with its
single-phase power line and installed the necessary wires to upgrade the line to three-
phase power. According to Penelec, at all times relevant hereto, Penelec’s tree
trimming and wire installation did not exceed the 15-foot prescriptive easement which
Penelec maintains it already possessed for the existing single-phase line.
(Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 23b.)
             On January 27, 2022, Powell filed a “Motion for Joinder, Trespass and
Ejectment” (Motion), asserting that on September 4, 2020, Penelec cut five mature
trees on his property at the area where the Authority had previously proposed a new
electrical line. The motion further asserted that “[o]n or about October 25, 2020,
Penelec and/or its agents, acting at the Authority’s direction, constructed an electrical
transmission line over the land of Powell” without his permission. (Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 1a.) Powell alleged that Penelec constructed the power line “at the
request of the [Authority].” Id. at 2a. Powell alleged that he contacted Penelec to
request that it remove the power line, but Penelec did not respond. Id.
             In his Motion, Powell sought the joinder of Penelec as a party to the instant
eminent domain matter so that it could be ordered to remove the three-phase power line
and be assessed damages for a supposed trespass to Powell’s property. Id. at 1a. In
the Motion, Powell took the position that the Authority was somehow in control of

                                            3
Penelec’s actions and that liability for said actions was shared between them. Powell
conceded that eminent domain proceedings are governed by the Eminent Domain
Code, 26 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-1106, and not the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
(Pa.R.Civ.P.). Nevertheless, he argued that Pa.R.Civ.P. 2252(a)(1) and (2),2 were
“instructive” because he believed Penelec may be “liable to or with the joining party
on any cause of action arising out of the transaction.” Id. at 3a.
               The Authority filed a response, arguing that joinder of Penelec to pursue
trespass and ejectment claims was inappropriate as Penelec is an entity clothed with
the power of eminent domain and that the exclusive remedy was to treat Penelec’s
actions as a de facto taking and to proceed under Section 502(c) of the Eminent Domain
Code, 26 Pa. C.S. § 502(c).3 Id. at 14a-15a. It further argued that this Court’s July 6,

      2
          Pa.R.Civ.P. 2252(a)(1) and (2) (Right to Join Additional Defendants) provides:

               (a) Except as provided by Rule 1706.1, any party may join as an
               additional defendant any person not a party to the action who may be

                       (1) solely liable on the underlying cause of action against the
               joining party, or

                       (2) liable to or with the joining party on any cause of action
               arising out of the transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or
               occurrences upon which the underlying cause of action against the
               joining party is based.

      3
          Section 502(c) of the Eminent Domain Code provides:

               (c) Condemnation where no declaration of taking has been filed.--

                       (1) An owner of a property interest who asserts that the owner’s
               property interest has been condemned without the filing of a declaration
               of taking may file a petition for the appointment of viewers
               substantially in the form provided for in subsection (a) setting forth the
               factual basis of the petition.

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                   4
2021 decision effectively terminated the condemnation action, and restored all of
Powell’s property rights acquired by the Authority’s Declaration of Taking, and that
the only matter remaining in the eminent domain action was the determination of
proper amount of any attorney’s fees and costs which may be owed under Section
306(g) of the Eminent Domain Code.4 Id. at 16a.
                Penelec also filed a Response to the Motion, arguing as the Authority did,
that neither the Eminent Domain Code nor the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
authorize its joinder to the condemnation proceeding so that Powell can assert claims

                        (2) The court shall determine whether a condemnation has
                occurred, and, if the court determines that a condemnation has
                occurred, the court shall determine the condemnation date and the
                extent and nature of any property interest condemned.

                        (3) The court shall enter an order specifying any property
                interest which has been condemned and the date of the condemnation.

                       (4) A copy of the order and any modification shall be filed by
                the condemnor in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county in
                which the property is located and shall be indexed in the deed indices
                showing the condemnee as grantor and the condemnor as grantee.

26 Pa. C.S. § 506(c).

       4
           Section 306(g) of the Eminent Domain Code provides:

                (g) Costs and expenses.--

                       (1) If preliminary objections which have the effect of
                terminating the condemnation are sustained, the condemnor shall
                reimburse the condemnee for reasonable appraisal, attorney and
                engineering fees and other costs and expenses actually incurred
                because of the condemnation proceedings.

                       (2) The court shall assess costs and expenses under this
                subsection.

26 Pa. C.S. § 306(g).

                                                  5
for trespass and ejectment. Id. at 22a-25a. Penelec explained that the line in question
has been in place since approximately 1931, and that since that time it or its
predecessors have continually owned, operated, and maintained the single-phase power
line and the poles. Id. at 24a. Penelec maintained that its use of the single-phase power
line over the last 90 years included the periodic trimming of trees on Powell’s property,
that it owns a prescriptive easement over Powell’s property, and that the easement
permits the normal evolution to accommodate the newer and more capable three-phase
power line. Id.
               On February 16, 2022, the trial court entered an opinion and order
dismissing Powell’s Motion, without prejudice to Powell’s right to file an appropriate
action against Penelec pursuant to the Eminent Domain Code.                       The trial court
determined that Powell had not cited any authority under the Eminent Domain Code
that would permit the joinder of Penelec. The trial court also agreed with the Authority
that because this Court’s July 6, 2021 decision effectively terminated the
condemnation, and restored all of Powell’s property rights pursuant to Section 306(g)
of the Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa. C.S. § 306(g), he was entitled only to reasonable
appraisal, and attorney and engineering fees, along with actual costs and expenses
incurred during the condemnation. Powell now appeals.5 His Statement of Questions
Involved includes the following three issues which are set forth verbatim:

               1. Whether [the Authority] committed criminal trespass
                  ([]18 Pa. C.S. §§ 3503(a)[,] (b)[, and] (b.1)), by obtaining
                  a signed easement from Judge Sullivan of the [t]rial
                  [c]ourt, which permitted Penelec, an Agent of [the
                  Authority] to cut trees and construct and install a new
       5
         “In eminent domain cases, this Court reviews whether the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion or an error of law. When an appeal presents a question of law . . . our scope of review is
plenary.” In re Condemnation by PPL Electric Utilities Corporation of Real Estate Situate in
Schuylkill County, 68 A.3d 15, 18 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (citation omitted).

                                                 6
                     [t]hree-phase transmission line on and over [] Powell’s
                     property requested by [the Authority] via a work order to
                     Penelec during an appeal that was reversed and nullified
                     by the Commonwealth Court?

                 2. Whether cause for ejectment (231 Pa. Code § 1352)
                    (Ejectment Rule 1055) is justified to remove [the
                    Authority’s] requested [t]hree-phase transmission line
                    from [] Powell’s Property, which [the Authority] did not
                    attain property rights to [] Powell’s Property?

                 3. Whether Penelec can be [j]oined to this lawsuit? (34 Pa.
                    Code §§ 131.36) (Rule 2227[,] Rule 2229 (a)(b)(c)(d)
                    (sic) and Rule 2232(a)(b)(c)?
(Powell’s Br. at 6.)6
                                                    1.
                 Powell’s first question put to this Court is whether the Authority
committed a criminal trespass as defined by 18 Pa. C.S. § 3503(a), (b), and (b.1)7 by

       6
         In the Argument section of his brief, Powell offers a litany of bald allegations and, general
assertions, as well as random, irrelevant, and superfluous arguments and exhibits which he believes
supports his demand for removal of the power line and receipt of monetary damages related to a claim
sounding in tort, making his appeal largely unintelligible. Nevertheless, this Court has endeavored
to properly analyze his claims.

       7
           18 Pa. C.S. § 3503(a), (b), and (b.1) provides:

                        (a) Buildings and occupied structures.--

                        (1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not
                        licensed or privileged to do so, he:

                        (i) enters, gains entry by subterfuge or surreptitiously remains
                        in any building or occupied structure or separately secured or
                        occupied portion thereof; or

                        (ii) breaks into any building or occupied structure or separately
                        secured or occupied portion thereof.

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                    7
                (2) An offense under paragraph (1)(i) is a felony of the third
                degree, and an offense under paragraph (1)(ii) is a felony of the
                second degree.

                (3) As used in this subsection:

                “Breaks into.” To gain entry by force, breaking, intimidation,
                unauthorized opening of locks, or through an opening not
                designed for human access.

                (b) Defiant trespasser.--

                (1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not
                licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place
                as to which notice against trespass is given by:

                (i) actual communication to the actor;

                (ii) posting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely
                to come to the attention of intruders;

                (iii) fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to exclude
                intruders;

                (iv) notices posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably
                likely to come to the person’s attention at each entrance of
                school grounds that visitors are prohibited without
                authorization from a designated school, center or program
                official;

                (v) an actual communication to the actor to leave school
                grounds as communicated by a school, center or program
                official, employee or agent or a law enforcement officer; or

                (vi) subject to paragraph (3), the placement of identifying
                purple paint marks on trees or posts on the property which are:

                (A) vertical lines of not less than eight inches in length and not
                less than one inch in width;

                (B) placed so that the bottom of the mark is not less than three
                feet from the ground nor more than five feet from the ground;
                and

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                            8
obtaining a signed easement from the trial court which permitted Penelec to cut trees
and construct and install the three-phase power line. As a threshold matter, there is
nothing in the record in this case that suggests that the trial court ever signed an
easement in favor of the Authority. Moreover, a cursory review of the provisions of
the criminal trespass statute makes clear that it is of absolutely no relevance to the
instant matter. There is no allegation that Penelec entered any building or structure, it
is clearly not a defiant trespasser and did not commit any of the acts which could define
it as a simple trespasser, nor have any such acts been alleged. As a result, the statute

                   (C) placed at locations that are readily visible to a person
                   approaching the property and no more than 100 feet apart.

                   (2) Except as provided in paragraph (1)(v), an offense under this
                   subsection constitutes a misdemeanor of the third degree if the
                   offender defies an order to leave personally communicated to
                   him by the owner of the premises or other authorized person.
                   An offense under paragraph (1)(v) constitutes a misdemeanor
                   of the first degree. Otherwise it is a summary offense.

                   (3) Paragraph (1)(vi) shall not apply in a county of the first class
                   or a county of the second class.

                   (b.1) Simple trespasser.--

                   (1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not
                   licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place
                   for the purpose of:

                   (i) threatening or terrorizing the owner or occupant of the
                   premises;

                   (ii) starting or causing to be started any fire upon the premises;
                   or

                   (iii) defacing or damaging the premises.

                   (2) An offense under this subsection constitutes a summary
                   offense.

                                                9
cited in Powell’s first question is totally inapplicable to the matters before the trial court
which resulted in the order currently on appeal. We need not address the issue further.
                                              2.
              Next, Powell contends that the trial court should have forced “[the
Authority] and Penelec, an agent of [the Authority], to remove the [t]hree-phase
transmission line from [his] property which can be done through a Work Change Order
to Penelec.” (Powell’s Br. at 16.) We reject Powell’s argument for several reasons.
              First, the Authority does not own or have any control over Penelec’s
power lines. They belong to Penelec. Therefore, the trial court could not have forced
the Authority to remove them.
              Second, to the extent Powell seeks an order forcing Penelec to remove the
power lines, such a request cannot be made in a Motion which would require action on
the part of a non-party to the case. A court must have personal jurisdiction over a party
to enter a judgment against it. Action taken by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity.
Vogt v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 900 A.2d 912, 917 (Pa. Super. 2006).
              Third, Penelec is an entity clothed with its own power of eminent domain.
Penelec’s occupation of any portion of Powell’s land, if any, is an issue that must be
dealt with by filing a de facto taking or inverse condemnation action against Penelec.
“When an entity clothed with the power of eminent domain enters and appropriates
private property for its own use, the landowner may treat the entity’s actions as a de
facto taking or inverse condemnation and the landowner’s exclusive remedy is to
proceed under the Eminent Domain Code.” Fulmer v. White Oak Borough, 606 A.2d
589, 591 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). In St. Catherine Church v. Mountaintop Area Joint
Sanitary Authority, 427 A.2d 726 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), the landowners filed an action
in trespass and ejectment, alleging that the sewer authority constructed sewer lines

                                             10
across their land without filing a declaration of taking. The trial court dismissed the
action, concluding that the exclusive remedy of the landowners was to petition for the
appointment of viewers under former Section 502(e) of the Eminent Domain Code of
1964.8
               Any damage caused to Powell’s Property by Penelec’s installation of the
three-phase power line is expressly covered by the Eminent Domain Code. Section
701 of the Eminent Domain Code provides that “[a] condemnee shall be entitled to just
compensation for the taking, injury or destruction of the condemnee’s property,
determined as set forth in this chapter. Other damages shall also be paid or awarded as
provided in this title.” 26 Pa. C.S. § 701. Thus, should Powell prove his case against
Penelec in eminent domain, the Eminent Domain Code provides a complete remedy.
                                                3.
              In his third issue, Powell argues that he should be permitted to join Penelec
as an additional defendant in this eminent domain action pursuant to “34 Pa. Code
§131.36,” “Pa.R.C[iv].P. [] 2227 and 2229(a)(b)(c)(d)” and “Pa.R.C[iv].P.
2232(a)(b)(c).” (Powell’s Br. at 6.) He does not address the applicability of these rules
in his argument, nor does he address how joinder of Penelec is permitted in an eminent
domain action. He simply states that Penelec is an “indispensable party.” Id. at 12.
We reject this argument, as well.
              The Eminent Domain Code provides the complete and exclusive
procedure in law to govern condemnation of property for public purposes and it does
not authorize the joinder of additional defendants. Moreover, due to the termination of
condemnation by this Court’s reversal of the trial court’s decision overruling the
Preliminary Objections, the award of any damages to Powell is constrained by Section

       8
        Act of June 22, 1964, Sp. Sess., P.L. 84, as amended, formerly 26 P.S. § 1-502(e), repealed
by the Act of May 4, 2006, P.L. 112.

                                                11
306(g) of the Eminent Domain Code. As a result, the only damages available to Powell
instantly are fees, costs, and expenses permitted to be recovered pursuant to that
section. It appears that the reason for attempting to join Penelec as part of the instant
matter is to allow the assertion of claims for additional damages, which are simply not
available to Powell due to the procedural setting of this case.
             The order of the trial court is affirmed.

                                            ________________________________
                                            PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                                           12
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Condemnation of Premises       :
Owned by Roy E. Powell, II, In        :
Township of Logan by Altoona/         :    No. 227 C.D. 2022
Logan Township Mobile Emergency       :
Medical Department Authority          :
                                      :
Appeal of: Roy E. Powell, II          :

                                   ORDER

            AND NOW, this 9th day of January, 2024, the February 16, 2022 Order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                          ________________________________
                                          PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge