Court Opinion

ID: 9518208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:47:14.512557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:47.848757
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the Majority, but write to emphasize my belief that our decision carves out a narrow exception to the general rule that pensions are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA).1 \
Today we are confronted with reconciling two conflicting statutes, section 701 of PERA and section 607 of the Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act (Act 205)2, both of which affect collective bargaining over public employee pension benefits. Section 701 of PERA imposes an obligation to bargain in good faith over “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 43 Pa.C.S. 1101.701. Courts *544have long held that pension benefits are “terms and conditions of employment” subject to bargaining under section 701. See, e.g., Appeal of Rose Tree Media School District, 48 Pa. Commw. 368, 409 A.2d 1374 (1980); Pennsylvania State Education Association v. Baldwin Whitehall School District, 30 Pa.Commw. 149, 372 A.2d 960 (1977). Thus, it is clear that the City of Pittsburgh had a duty under PERA to bargain with District Council 89 over the revised benefit plan as retirement benefits are a mandatory subject of bargaining.
In contrast, section 607 of Act 205 allows a municipality to implement a benefit plan for newly hired municipal employees with the “consultation” of the employees’ collective bargaining unit. This section clearly and unambiguously states that the benefits of newly hired employees shall be in the scope of collective bargaining subsequent to the establishment of the revised benefit plan. Thus, I agree with the Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Zappala that the plain language of Act 205 allows a municipality to implement a revised pension plan after only consulting with the employees’ representative. However, I disagree with Mr. Justice Zappala that the analysis ends with the unambiguous language of Act 205. Section 701 of PERA and Act 205 are clearly in conflict. Under our canons of statutory interpretation, whenever the provisions of two or more statutes are irreconcilable, the latest statute prevails. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1936. In the instant case, Act 205 would prevail as it is the more recent of the two statutes. However, I believe that it is unnecessary to hold that Act 205 repealed the mandatory bargaining provisions of section 701 of PERA. I agree with the Majority that these two statutes can be reconciled by finding that a municipality’s decision to avail itself of Act 205 is an “inherent management decision” under section 702 PERA.
I write separately today for two reasons. First, I believe that the Majority fails to set forth and apply the proper standard of review for a decision of the Labor Relations Board. Second, I believe that the Majority fails to limit its decision properly to carve out only a narrow exception to the *545rule that retirement benefits are a mandatory subject of bargaining.
It is well settled that a decision of the Labor Relations Board must be upheld if the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, and if conclusions of law drawn from those facts are reasonable, not capricious, arbitrary or illegal. Joint Bargaining Committee of Pennsylvania Social Services Union v. PLRB, 503 Pa. 236, 241, 469 A.2d 150, 152 (1983); Commonwealth v. PLRB, 502 Pa. 7, 11, 463 A.2d 409, 411 (1983). In the instant case, I believe that deference to the final order of the PLRB is unwarranted because the conclusions of law contained therein are plainly erroneous. The PLRB found that the words “consultation”, “collective bargaining” and “establishment” were undefined in Act 205, and were, therefore, ambiguous. The PLRB then interpreted Act 205 by referring to sources outside the Act. I believe that the PLRB committed an error of law in finding Act 205 ambiguous. The language of a statute must be construed according to common and approved usage. Commonwealth v. Hill, 481 Pa. 37, 42 n. 6, 391 A.2d 1303, 1306 n. 6 (1978); Odd Fellows Home of Pennsylvania v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 56 Pa. Commw. 115, 119, 424 A.2d 961, 964 (1981). Thus, although the terms “consultation”, “collective bargaining”, and “establishment” are undefined, they are unambiguous as each has a common and approved usage. Accordingly, I find the PLRB’s interpretation of Act 205, and the Board’s resolution of this case which flows from this interpretation, to be unreasonable.
As recognized by the Majority, section 702 of PERA provides an exception to the general rule established by section 701 that wages, hours and terms of employment are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Section 702 states that “[pjublic employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy ...” 43 Pa.S. § 1101.702. The Majority also correctly recognizes that the determination of whether a particular matter falls within the scope of section 702 rather than section 701 is determined by applying the balancing test established by this Court in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, *546461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975). In State College we held that where an item of dispute is a matter of fundamental concern to the employees’ interest in wages, hours and other terms of employment “[i]t is the duty of the PLRB in the first instance and the courts thereafter to determine whether the impact of the issues on the interest of the employe in wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment outweighs its probable effect on the basic policy of the system as a whole.” State College, 461 Pa. at 507, 337 A.2d at 268. The Majority strikes such a balance, but offers scant reasoning as to how it arrives at this balance.
As required by State College, we must examine the employees’ interest in wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. I believe that pensions and retirement benefits are at the heart of “wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment,” and, therefore, employees have a strong interest in collective bargaining over these matters. As discussed supra, courts of this Commonwealth have consistently held that retirement benefits are mandatory subjects of bargaining under PERA. I believe that only in the rarest of circumstances will an employer have an interest in the “basic policy of the system as a whole” sufficiently strong to tilt the balance in favor of making a pension-related decision an “inherent management decision” under section 702 of PERA. In my opinion, the instant situation is such a rare case. Act 205 was established as “a recovery program for municipal pension systems determined to be financially distressed.” Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act of 1984, P.L. 1005, No. 205 (1984) (Preamble). In the present case, the City of Pittsburgh elected to utilize Program Level III which is reserved for “severely distressed municipal pension systems.” See 53 Pa.S. § 895.604. The establishment of a revised benefit plan is a mandatory remedy under the Act for all municipalities availing themselves of Recovery Program Level III. I believe that the City’s interest in rescuing its distressed pension system outweighs the interest of the employees, albeit strong, in collectively bargaining over the implementation of a revised benefit plan. For this reason, I *547agree that the City’s decision to invoke section 205 is an “inherent management decision” under section 702 outside the scope of mandatory bargaining required by section 701.
Of course, a municipality’s ability to avail itself of Act 205 is necessarily limited by our decision in Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 528 Pa. 355, 598 A.2d 256 (1991). In District Council 33, a municipality, pursuant to Act 205, attempted to establish a revised benefit plan which altered the pension plan in effect under the collective bargaining agreement. We refused to allow the municipality to adopt the revised plan holding that “[o]nce the matter is included in a collective bargaining agreement, it becomes, like any other contractual provision, binding on the parties to the agreement.” District Council 33, 528 Pa. at 362, 598 A.2d at 259-60 (citations omitted). In the instant case, the City of Pittsburgh enacted an ordinance establishing a revised benefit plan pursuant to Act 205 in September of 1987 while negotiating with the union for a successor collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement expired on December 31, 1987, and the revised benefit plan was to go in effect on January 1,1988. The City refused to bargain over the revised plan and the instant unfair labor practice complaint followed. Thus, I agree with the Majority that the instant case is distinguished from District Council 33 because the City was not attempting to abrogate a collective bargaining agreement, but merely adopted a revised benefit plan after the expiration of a previously negotiated agreement. District Council 33 is properly limited to the proposition that a municipality may not abrogate an existing collective bargaining agreement by unilaterally imposing a revised benefit plan under Act 205. However, once a collective bargaining agreement has expired, the municipality may avail itself of Act 205 and unilaterally adopt a revised benefit plan without collective bargaining as an “inherent management decision.”
For the reasons set forth above, I concur in the result reached by the Majority.
CAPPY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. Public Employee Relations Act of 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195 (1970) (codified at 43 Pa.S. § 1101.101-1101.2301)

. Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act of 1984, P.L. 1005, No. 205 (1984) (as amended by 53 Pa.C.S. § 895.101-895.803 (Purdon Supp.1994))