Court Opinion

ID: 9568269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:02:03.015406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:32.131537
License: Public Domain

Mallett, J.
(concurring in part). For the most part, I agree with Chief Justice Brickley with respect to the constitutionality of 1994 PA 112. However, I disagree *395with his analysis of § 17. Therefore, I write separately to explain why I disagree with parts n(A), (b), and (C) of his opinion. I find that § 17 of 1994 PA 112 imposes an unconstitutional burden on the appellants’ exercise of their right to freely associate as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
i
SECTION 17 OF 1994 PA 112 ABRIDGES APPELLANTS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
Subsection 17(1) provides:
A bargaining representative or an education association shall not veto a collective bargaining agreement reached between a public school employer and a bargaining unit consisting of employees of the public school employer; shall not require the bargaining unit to obtain the ratification of an education association before or as a condition of entering into a collective bargaining agreement; and shall not in any other way prohibit or prevent the bargaining unit from entering into, ratifying, or executing a collective bargaining agreement. The power to decide whether or not to enter into, ratify, or execute a collective bargaining agreement with a public school employer rests solely with the members of the bargaining unit who are employees of the public school employer, and shall not be delegated to a bargaining representative or an education association or conditioned on approval by a bargaming representative or an education association. [Emphasis added.]
Chief Justice Brickley interprets this subsection as regulating the relationship between the local bargaining units and the education associations by “prohibit[ing] statewide education associations from exercising a veto-like power over local bargaining units after the local negotiators reach a tentative collective *396bargaining agreement.” Ante at 368-369. Further, in an attempt to lessen the blow of the act, he interprets § 17 as allowing the education associations the power to “persuade,” “assist,” and “advise,” see ante at 374 and 378, the bargaining units during the collective bargaining process. I disagree with that interpretation. The language of § 17 extends beyond merely touching associational freedoms and reaches farther into the intricate structure of the unions than suggested by the Chief Justice. I believe that the language of § 17 reaches the point of interfering with constitutional rights derived from the First Amendment.
Simply put, the issue presented is whether 1994 PA 112, § 17, infringes on rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the federal constitution and the equivalent provisions of the Michigan Constitution.1 I believe that it does.
*397A. THE FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE2
First Amendment rights protected by the federal constitution are applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There exists no expressly articulated right of freedom of association. Rather, as stated by Chief Justice Brickley, “[t]he right of freedom of association is a right derived from the freedom of speech.” Ante at 370.3 This right of association was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in NAACP v Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 US 449, 460-461; 78 S Ct 1163; 2 L Ed 2d 1488 (1958).4 The Court stated:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. ... It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the “liberty” assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of *398speech. ... Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny. [Emphasis added.]
In Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 618; 104 S Ct 3244; 82 L Ed 2d 462 (1984), the United States Supreme Court stated that “the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case.” There are no limits or set parameters on potential associational freedoms. Further, there exists no bright-line test for determining the appropriate measure of constitutional protection against state interference with associational rights. Accordingly, the nature and extent to which the state may interfere with the freedom of association is dependent upon the type of associational rights implicated in each particular case.
Chief Justice Brickley states that “[t]he essential right protected under the freedom of association doctrine is the right to join together in a group of like-minded individuals and exercise free speech rights.” Ante at 371. However accurate this statement may be, I prefer to rely on a broader statement describing the freedom of association. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment “implies a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.” [Bd of Directors of Rotary Int’l v Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 US *399537, 548; 107 S Ct 1940; 95 L Ed 2d 474 (1987) (emphasis added).]
Thus, 1 believe that associational rights afforded by the First Amendment are broader than recognized by Chief Justice Brickley.
Additionally, Chief Justice Brickley narrows the possibilities for state infringement on the freedom of association. In determining whether association rights are implicated, he focuses primarily on whether an individual’s attempt to join an organization is impeded by state interference. See ante at 371. Chief Justice Brickley’s “attempt to join” test is overly restrictive of the implication of associational rights. I believe that implication of First Amendment freedom of association rights may occur through many possible means and would not focus solely on whether an individual is impeded from joining an organization before feeling justified to invoke constitutional protections. Specifically, once an individual decides to join a group or organization, the associational freedoms that existed when the individual made the decision and joined the group remain intact and even become strengthened. Therefore, any governmental intrusion on the internal structure and organization of a group may pose questions of constitutional significance. See Roberts, 468 US 623 (government infringement on the freedom of association may result from “interfering] with the internal organization or affairs of the group”).5
*400It is well understood that employee unions enjoy freedom of association rights. Generally, in the context of labor unions, the freedom of association works to advance the collective economic interests of the labor union. See 4 Rotunda & Nowak, Constitutional Law (2d ed), § 20.41, p 249. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Brown v Alexander, 718 F2d 1417, 1422 (CA 6, 1983), stated “that first amendment protections extend to labor union activities and the right of employees to associate together as a labor organization.” Further, it is undisputed that public employee unions also enjoy freedom of association rights.6 However, the First *401Amendment does not guarantee public employee unions collective bargaining rights or even recognition. Id. at 1421.7 Thus, I am fully aware that public employee collective bargaining rights are statutorily created and are not part of the First Amendment package of fundamental rights. However, I believe that § 17 goes , well beyond aiming at statutorily created collective bargaining rights and targets First Amendment associationai freedoms.
I believe that § 17 of 1994 PA 112 directly deprives the public school employees of the ability to run their organizations as they desire.8 The ability to control the internal structure of one’s organization is an essential component of the freedom of association.
As in the case of most unions, the AFL-CIO and the mea are hierarchical structures. When the individual bargaining unit members choose to associate with the statewide or the larger association, these people willingly relinquish the right to assert, in isolation and *402absent a statewide context, what is best for the individual bargaining unit. The individual bargaining unit members realize that they will benefit from the association’s overall pattern of collective action. The United States Supreme Court expressly articulated the importance of the affiliation relationship to the effectiveness of the labor union.
The essence of the affiliation relationship is the notion that the parent will bring to bear its often considerable economic, political, and .informational resources when the local is in need of them.
* * *
“[I]f a union is to perform its statutory functions, it must maintain its corporate or associational existence, must elect officers to manage and carry on its affairs, and may consult its members about overall bargaining goals and policy.” . . . We see no reason why analogous public-sector union activities should be treated differently. [Lehnert v Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 US 507, 523; 111 S Ct 1950; 114 L Ed 2d 572 (1991) (citations omitted).]
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated:
An “affiliate” in an organization is defined for some purposes as an associate. To be affiliated with a group or organization is to be associated with, attached to, or identified with that organization. We believe this subsection [of the challenged act] directly limits freedom of association between labor organizations, and their members or members of other such organizations, and thus it could restrain or restrict freedom of association, a fundamental first amendment right. [Brown v Alexander, 718 F2d 1425 (emphasis added).]
Section 17 of Act 112 changes the very structure of the labor organizations. It transposes them from hier*403archical to laterally operating entities. Thus, I would hold that tampering by the state with the affiliation relationship or internal structure is an infringement on the freedom of individuals to choose the kind of organization with which they choose to be affiliated.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of expert advice and consultation to the effectiveness of labor unions.
The right of members to consult with each other in a fraternal organization necessarily includes the right to select a spokesman from their number who could be expected to give the wisest counsel. [Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1, 6; 84 S Ct 1113; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964).]
Further, the Court has stated:
The First Amendment protects the right of an individual to speak freely, to advocate ideas, to associate with others, and to petition his government for redress of grievances. And it protects the right of associations to engage in advocacy on behalf of their members. [Smith v Arkansas State Hwy Employees, Local 1315, 441 US 463, 464; 99 S Ct 1826; 60 L Ed 2d 360 (1979) (emphasis added; citations omitted).]
The right to assist and advise within one’s organization is a constitutionally guaranteed right. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 377 US 6. In the context of labor unions, the rights of members to consult, assist, and advise each other necessarily flows into the power of certain delegated members to preclude activity by the whole organization. The state cannot intrude on the rights of groups or the groups’ constituent members to delegate authority, select leaders, *404and receive consultation within the group as they so choose.9
Under the language of § 17, the hierarchical structure, affiliation system, and internal agreements inherent in the labor organizations involved here are made illegal and subject the organizations to penalties. Section 17 precludes the entities and constituent members from defining their relationship and operating under their chosen parameters.10
In his treatise on Constitutional Law, Tribe discusses four ways that associational freedoms are implicated.11 As discussed, § 17 intrudes on the internal organization of the associations. Further, § 17 conditions the privileges or benefits of collective bargaining on whether the organization has designated an exclusive bargaining representative. Section 17, in effect, states that an individual may not belong to an organization that requires the designation of an exclusive bargaining agent. If a bargaining unit enters into membership of a larger organization that requires, as *405part of membership, the designation of an exclusive bargaining representative with full veto power, the larger organization and the bargaining unit itself are subject to penalties. Therefore, § 17 effectively limits the groups with whom individuals may associate and penalizes those public employees who are already members of such an organization. By burdening or regulating the operations of the group as a whole, § 17 affects and burdens the associational rights afforded by the First Amendment to the individual.12
*406The infringement by § 17 on individual rights cannot be ignored. In reality, § 17 restricts the individual public school employee from joining or participating in the organization of his choice. Specifically, § 17 mandates that, in order to have a voice, the individual public school employee join an association whose internal organization is not hierarchical in nature. See ante at 401-403. Through implementation of § 17, the Legislature has conditioned an individual’s receipt of a protected benefit on an unconstitutional burden of associational freedoms. The Legislature may not grant an individual the benefit to collectively bargain, and then turn around and unconstitutionally burden the individual’s pursuit of that benefit.
[It is] clear that even though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. [Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593, 597; 92 S Ct 2694; 33 L Ed 2d 570 (1972).]
I believe that “the wide latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms of expression and association,” Healy v James, 408 US 169, 194; 92 S Ct *4072338; 33 L Ed 2d 266 (1972), undoubtedly calls for implication of such rights in the present case. Thus, guided by First Amendment jurisprudence and pursuant to art 1, §§ 3 and 5 of the Michigan Constitution, I would hold that the freedom of association extends to and is implicated in situations where legislation attempts to interfere with the internal structure and mechanics of membership organizations.
B. HOW MUCH CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IS NECESSARY?
As set forth above, it is clear that application of § 17 to the appellants does, to some extent, implicate freedom of association rights. However, not all associational relationships require the same level of constitutional protection. The United States Supreme Court has developed what appears to be a sliding scale approach when freedom of association rights are implicated. In Roberts, the United States Supreme Court stated:
[There] lies a broad range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the State. Determining the limits of state authority over an individual’s freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments. ... We need not mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with any precision. We note only that factors that may be relevant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent. [468 US, 620.]
On the constitutional spectrum, I believe that the associational freedoms implicated by § 17 invoke the application of greater constitutional protection than *408that applied in ordinary economic legislation cases. As demonstrated, § 17 effectively destroys the rights of the unions to internally govern and the rights of individuals to organize as they desire. These functions go to the heart of the effectiveness of any group or organization.13
In the briefs submitted to this Court, the parties disagree regarding the appropriate scrutiny applicable to the challenged act. The state argues that only a rational basis is appropriate. Conversely, the appellants contend that strict scrutiny should be applied when examining the constitutionality of § 17. Because § 17 infringes greatly on First Amendment freedom of association rights, I would apply an intense level of scrutiny rather than simply a rational basis test. Particularly, in instances such as this, I agree with the United States Supreme Court’s statement in NAACP and would impose the “closest” scrutiny.
Typically, legislation that affects public employee labor unions is examined for a rational basis. However, as demonstrated, this case involves implication of the freedom of association. In Brown v Alexander, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied strict scrutiny when confronted with a freedom of association issue similar to the one presented in this case. The plaintiff union members challenged a Tennessee statute “which deprive[d] them and their unions of the benefit of payroll deductions for union dues,” if they failed to satisfy certain *409articulated statutory conditions. 718 F2d 1420. Thus, other unions that met the statutory conditions were exempt from the statute and were permitted the benefit of a dues checkoff.
Initially, the court found that no essential First Amendment right was involved in the seeking of a dues checkoff provision.14 However, the statute at issue conditioned dues checkoff on, inter alia, an independent employee organization.15 Thus, the court examined statutory condition number 6, which implicated freedom of association concerns. The court struck this subsection of the act after applying strict scrutiny, stating:
*410We believe this subsection directly limits freedom of association between labor organizations, and their members or members of other such organizations, and thus it could restrain or restrict freedom of association, a fundamental first amendment right. The advocacy of particular policies and practices of parent or affiliated organizations may well be directly affected by this limitation, and thus it requires strict scrutiny ....
[T]he requirement that an organization be “independent” and non-affiliated with another labor organization strikes at the heart of freedom of association. Therefore we construe subsection (6) to require stricter scrutiny, that the state demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the limitation. [718 F2d 1425-1426 (emphasis added).]
Although the court analyzed subsection 6 within the framework of equal protection, it applied strict scrutiny on the basis of the implication of the freedom of association. Like subsection 6 in Brown, § 17 of Act 112 strikes at the heart of freedom of association in that it intermeddles with- the organizational structure of the groups and the associational relationships of individuals. See part i(a). Accordingly, I believe that § 17 must be examined under the powerful magnifying glass of strict scrutiny. The degree to which § 17 infringes on the internal workings of the organizations and individual freedoms in this case is to an extent I find to be constitutionally intolerable. The state has not demonstrated a compelling interest sufficient to justify this infringement on the freedom of association.16 Therefore, § 17 cannot pass constitu*411tional muster and must be stricken. Once the state chooses to give a benefit, even if it is not a fundamental right, the state cannot impose an unconstitutional burden on that benefit.17 The Legislature has attempted to infringe on the freedom of association in the context of public employee collective bargaining. This cannot be tolerated.18
*412H
CONCLUSION
Because I believe that § 17 imposes an unconstitutional infringement on the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding § 17. In the absence of the ability to gamer a majority willing to find § 17 unconstitutional on its face, I agree with Justice Levin that the portions of the Court of Appeals and trial court opinions that find § 17 constitutional should be vacated. I agree with Chief Justice Brickley that the remaining provisions of 1994 PA 112 are constitutional.
Cavanagh and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Mallett, J.

 Const 1963, art 1, § 5 reads as follows:
Every person may freely speak, write, express and publish his views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right; and no law shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.
Const 1963, art 1, § 3 reads as follows:
The people have the right peaceably to assemble, to consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives and to petition the government for redress of grievances.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

 Michigan case law on the subject of the freedom of association is quite sparse. The birth and growth of First Amendment associational freedoms have developed through the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and its interpretation of the federal constitution. I will, therefore, rely on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal constitution in this area of First Amendment jurisprudence.

 Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. [Healy v James, 408 US 169, 181; 92 S Ct 2338; 33 L Ed 2d 266 (1972).]

 In NAACP v Alabama, the NAACP challenged a state court order to produce many records, including its membership lists. The NAACP refused to produce its membership lists and was fined. The United States Supreme Court held that the NAACP was entitled under the federal constitution to refuse to disclose its membership lists.

 See Tribe, Constitutional Law (2d ed), § 12-26, p 1015. Tribe identifies four specific instances in which legislation may infringe on freedom of association rights. He states:
*400Government can abridge this implied first amendment freedom, and therefore be guilty of violating due process unless a showing of compelling necessity is made, in any of four ways: (1) directly punishing the fact of membership in a group or association or the fact of attendance at a meeting of such a group or association; (2) intruding upon the internal organization, or integral activities, of an association or group, including its decisions of whom to include as members and its decisions as to which non-members to invite to take part in its processes; (3) withholding a privilege or benefit from the members of a group or association; and (4) compelling disclosure of a group’s membership or of an individual's associational affiliations, either through a focused investigation or as part of a general disclosure rule, in circumstances where anonymity is likely to prove important to the continued viability of various associational ties.
Thus, by simply focusing on whether a piece of legislation has the effect of discouraging an individual from joining an organization, Chief Justice Brickley ignores these additional means by which the freedom of association may be implicated.

 In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1, 5-6; 84 S Ct 1113; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964), the Supreme Court stated:
It cannot be seriously doubted that the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech, petition and assembly give railroad workers the right to gather together for the lawful purpose of helping and advising one another in asserting the rights Congress gave them in the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, *401statutory rights which would be vain and futile if the workers could not talk together freely as to the best course to follow.

 The public employee surely can associate and speak freely and petition openly, and he is protected by the First Amendment from retaliation for doing so. . . . But the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain with it. [Smith v Arkansas State Hwy Employees, Local 1315, 441 US 463, 465; 99 S Ct 1826; 60 L Ed 2d 360 (1979).]

 Chief Justice Brickley states that § 17 “does not diminish other valuable services education associations may provide their members outside [the collective bargaining] process.” Ante at 374. I disagree. The effect of § 17 over the course of time will render the processes of assisting, advising, and providing valuable services meaningless. Section 17 apparently still permits consultation, but delegates the decision to seek out consultation to the local unions. This is inconsistent with the purpose of joining a statewide organization where behavioral norms are established that must be adhered to by everyone to maximize the collective benefits.

 Further, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled adversaries . . . and for them to associáte together to help one another to preserve and enforce rights granted them under federal laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal ethics. [377 US 7 (citations omitted).]

 As appellant points out in its brief, the effect of § 17 on the single-unit unaffiliated bargaining unit clearly presents a freedom of association problem. Section 17 dictates that the bargaining representative who is duly elected by the members of the unaffiliated local union and given the exclusive power to bargain on behalf of the union, cannot effectively exercise these powers. This is an infringement on the freedom to associate.

 See n 5.

 Although not briefed or focused on by the parties, a strong argument can be made that § 17 of 1994 PA 112 operates as a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is, as described by Tribe, “trial by legislature — the use of the lawmaking process, or of a trial-like process in a lawmaking setting, to inflict punitive disabilities on identifiable persons . . . .” Tribe, supra, § 10-4, p 641. The prohibition against bills of attainder is found at art I, § 9 of the United States Constitution and art 1, § 10 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution. Significantly, the bill of attainder prohibition is not predicated on any other constitutional amendment. It stands on its own and forms an independent basis for questioning constitutional validity. See, generally, Welsh, The bill of attainder clause: An unqualified guarantee of process, 50 Brook L R 77 (1983).“[T]he [United States] Supreme Court has consistently avoided narrow historical definitions of the [bill of attainder] clause in favor of a broader functional approach.” Note, Beyond process: A substantive rationale for the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 Va L R 475, 476-477 (1984). Further, the Court has broadly defined what may constitute punishment for bill of attainder jurisprudence, stating that “[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment [depending on] the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation . . . .” Cummings v Missouri, 71 US (4 Wall) 277, 320; 18 L Ed 356 (1866). This seldom discussed constitutional protection lends support to my conclusion that § 17 is unconstitutional.
In United States v Brown, 381 US 437; 85 S Ct 1707; 14 L Ed 2d 484 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held that a law making it a crime for one who belonged to the Communist Party to serve as a member of the executive board of a labor organization was a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. The Court found that the statute “designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party.” 381 US 450. In the present case, it is clear that the Legislature enacted 1994 PA 112 because it was “troubled by the existence of K-12 public school employee strikes.” Therefore, § 17, apart from affecting associational freedoms, targets specific individuals *406within the labor organizations who, according to appellees, have the ability to incite disagreements that may culminate in strikes. Pursuant to the Brown holding, the Legislature may not designate persons who possess feared characteristics and legislatively inflict a deprivation on them. Thus, I briefly mention bill of attainder jurisprudence to set forth an additional constitutional framework within which § 17 may be examined.

 Chief Justice Brickley states that under my proposed holding and interpretation of § 17, there are five statutes in MCL 423.217; MSA 17.455(17), that would arguably infringe on the freedom of association. See ante at 376. In the absence of argument and briefing, his suggestion that the referenced statutes would be unconstitutional, while interesting, is premature.

 Just as dues checkoff is not a fundamental right, no one in this case contends that collective bargaining is fundamentally guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The court, in Brown, stated that the problem with the challenged statutory provision was it “enable[d] the state to differentiate between plaintiffs and other labor associations if either meets certain conditions and the other does not as to a dues checkoff privilege.” Id. at 1423. Therefore, the underlying problem was in the nature of an equal protection violation. However, the court applied strict scrutiny, not on the basis of equal protection, but because a First Amendment freedom of association right was implicated.

 The statute read, in pertinent part:
[(a)] Officers and employees of the state may authorize deductions to be made from their compensation for the payment of membership dues in any employee associations or organizations that meet all of the following criteria:
(6) Is an independent employee organization including, but not limited to, those who are not required to have their charter or bylaws approved by a parent or affiliate, can not be required to merge with another employee organization or unit, can not have its membership dues established by an affiliate or parent, can not be taken control of by a parent, affiliate or other labor organization for any reason whatsoever. [718 F2d 1419 (citation omitted).]

 I agree with appellants. There has been no showing that giving individuals or affiliated organizations the final authority to approve or reject a collective bargaining agreement has had a demonstrable adverse effect on the actual operation of all school districts.
*411Further, appellee Michigan Employment Relations Commission argues that 1994 PA 112 attempts to level the playing field in the situation where a single local school district is required to bargain with a multidistrict bargaining unit. Amicus curiae, Michigan Association of School Boards, bolsters this view and states that § 17 was a response to the “imbalance between public school unions and employers in the ratification of agreements and its detrimental effect on the collective bargaining process . . . .” The MERC relies on Combined Hebrew/Yiddish Cultural Schools, 1969 MERC Lab Op 486, for the proposition that “[e]mployers lack the corresponding ability to engage in multi-employer associations.” Hebrew/Yiddish Cultural Schools held that an employer “cannot . . . submit [a] tentative agreement reached to a third party and allow that third party, who is a stranger to the negotiations, to exercise a veto over the whole agreement.” 1969 MERC Lab Op 490. Whether employers are legally able to form multiemployer associations is an open question, not presented to this Court and clearly answerable by the Legislature.

 In the present case, the Court of Appeals stated that “[i]f the state is not constitutionally required to recognize public-sector bargaining, then it follows that the state may impose restrictions or conditions on public-sector bargaining, as long as those conditions or restrictions are not otherwise unlawful.” 212 Mich App 472, 480; 538 NW2d 433 (1995).

 Apparently, Justice Levin believes that this is an improper time to evaluate the constitutionality of § 17 and further, that declaratory relief is inappropriate. The state does not and cannot dispute that the purpose of this act is to interdict the abilities of the MEA to compel conformity. The state not only does not suggest that declaratory relief is inappropriate because of the absence of a factual record, it offers factual hypothesis intended to narrow the scope of the statute. The state contends that at this stage, and even after application in the manner it suggests, § 17 is constitutional. I disagree.