Court Opinion

ID: 9687639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:40:36.192213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:29.743009
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
Financially supported by the state legislature,1 the North Dakota State Fair Association seeks to block quiet and peaceful actions of those who would lawfully override deci*438sions of the legislature. ■ The majority finds this state action “reasonable.” I do not.
The right to free speech, the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, and the state constitutional rights of initiative and referendum are part of the fabric of our liberty. The majority too easily permits state action to tear that fabric.
The majority says Heffron v. International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981), “preordains our analysis of the Association’s regulation in this case.” It does not. True, both Heffron and this case involve state fairs. The Heffron rules, however, were content neutral, while the rules in this ease are not.
In Heffron, “the Rule applies evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds. No person or organization, whether commercial or charitable, is permitted to engage in such activities except from a booth rented for those purposes.” Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649, 101 S.Ct. at 2565, 69 L.Ed.2d at 307. The Court specifically noted “the Rule does not prevent organizational representatives from walking about the fairgrounds and communicating the organization’s views with fair pa-trons.... ” Heffron, 452 U.S. at 643-44, 101 S.Ct. at 2562, 69 L.Ed.2d at 304.
In this case, the Association’s rule regulates distribution of literature and concessions — on their face, content-neutral regulations. Unlike Heffron, there is no prohibition on solicitation of funds — a rule held content neutral because funds could be solicited for all causes and purposes. Much like in Heffron, the Association’s regulations allow fair patrons to be approached anywhere on the fairgrounds by any person to discuss any views, causes or beliefs. But then the Association crosses the line by singling out “the gathering of signatures for petitions” — a restriction not contained in Heffron, and not content neutral.
As the United States Supreme Court said in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 1891, 100 L.Ed.2d 425, 434 (1988), “The circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves ... the expression of a desire for political change_” The Association has singled out “ ‘core political speech,’ ” Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422, 108 S.Ct. at 1892, 100 L.Ed.2d at 435, circulating initiative and referendum petitions, engaged in by those having a specific set of views — a desire to change the action or inaction of the legislature.2
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently struck down provisions of Minnesota statutes:
“Section 10A.25 subd. 13 singles out particular political speech — that which advocates the defeat of a candidate and/or supports the election of her opponents — for negative treatment that the state applies to no other variety of speech.... We have no difficulty concluding that this is a statute that ‘by [its] terms distinguish[es] favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed,’ and thus it cannot by content-neutral. Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. F.C.C., — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. [2445] at 2459 [129 L.Ed.2d 497].”
Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1361 (8th Cir.1994). As in Day, the rule singles out particular political speech — that which would change the legislature’s action or inaction.
The Association asserts its rule is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest— protecting the safety and convenience of fair-goers, and avoiding disruption. Yet the evidence before the trial court clearly reflects that no disruption, safety or convenience problems arose during the two days the Temporary Restraining Order allowed the *439gathering of signatures anywhere on the fairgrounds.
The Association stipulates that fair patrons can be approached anywhere, and the petitions discussed anywhere. The Association fails to establish how a greater problem would be created by allowing those who can be approached anywhere, to sign anywhere.
In the words of the Eighth Circuit, the restriction “is assuredly not ‘necessary to serve the asserted interest.’ ” Day, at 1362 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 1852, 119 L.Ed.2d 5, 15 (1992)).
The restriction on the gathering of signatures for petitions, is conceded as government action, affects core political speech, is not content neutral, and should properly be lifted. I would reverse.

. See e.g., 1993 N.D.Sess.Laws, ch. 32, § 1, and ch. 32; 1991 N.D.Sess.Laws, ch. 13.

. The term "petitions” is clearly used by the Association to identify those circulated for initiative or referendum. They are the ones primarily affected as they need thousands of signatures, as opposed to the handful to a few hundred signatures needed to place a candidate's name on the ballot. See e.g., N.D.Const., Art. Ill, § 4; N.D.C.C. §§ 16.1-ll-06(2)(c), and 16.1-11-ll(2)(c). Even in the case of candidates, the "outsiders” who must petition are treated differently than political party candidates who are routinely placed on the ballot by certificate of endorsement. See N.D.C.C. §§ 16.1-11-06, and 16.1-11-11.