Court Opinion

ID: 9566086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:33:27.864019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:05.957929
License: Public Domain

Judge BRIGGS
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the court’s judgment and join in Parts I-IV of the opinion. I write separately in regard to Part V because of my disagreement with what appears to be the purpose and scope of the remand for further proceedings.
Defendant seeks reversal of the conviction based on the alleged failure of the court to provide defense counsel at trial with all of the victim’s mental health records authorized by the court’s pre-trial order of October 29, 1990. The court had ordered that defendant have access to the victim’s mental health records for the times she received therapy preceding the filing of the information in this case and for the therapy the victim received from the therapist who testified at trial. Defendant asserts that the certified record on appeal establishes that the court failed to provide all of these records to defense counsel at trial and that this violated defendant’s right to due process, as well as his rights of confrontation and cross-examination.
Defendant bases his argument solely on the mental health records included in the record on appeal. On page one of those records there is a handwritten notation: “COPIES OF ITEMS PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT. J.R. Leh 10/29/90.” On page 49 of those records there is another handwritten notation: “COPIES OF ITEMS NOT PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT. J.R. Leh 10/29/90.”
From this record the majority assumes that the notation refers to every page which follows it; that the signature is that of the judge who reviewed the records; that defendant in fact received the first 48 pages of the record and not the remainder; and that this occurred because of oversight by the court. We have no record to support any of these assumptions.
It is the obligation of the party asserting error in a judgment to present a record that discloses the error, for a judgment is presumed to be correct until the contrary affirmatively appears. Schuster v. Zwicker, 659 P.2d 687 (Colo.1983). The majority here presumes the opposite: the trial court failed to provide defense counsel with all relevant records and failed to do so through erroneous oversight. The apparent purpose of the remand is to determine whether the presumed error was harmless.
During oral argument on appeal, counsel for defendant stated that trial counsel for defendant had confirmed in a telephone conversation that only the first 48 pages of the record had been provided to defendant. Aside from the fact that even at trial such a statement would be inadmissible hearsay, argument of counsel on appeal is not a substitute for what must be confirmed by the record. See Westrac, Inc. v. Walker Field, 812 P.2d 714 (Colo.App.1991).
*444The fact that the record has been certified establishes no more than that these are authentic documents which by request of either party or by stipulation are directed to be included in the record. See C.A.R. 10(a)(1). The mere presence of these records as part of the record on appeal, without more, establishes nothing about the authenticity of the signatures which appear on the records as that of the trial judge. Nor does it establish the truth of the matter asserted in the notes before the signatures.
Even if we were to assume that the signatures on the record are those of the trial judge, and that the court in fact provided to defense counsel at trial only the first 48 pages of the records, there is no- basis in the record for assuming that this was the result of an oversight by the trial court. There are other possible explanations for not providing all of the records to the defendant. The trial court may have relied on a basis we have not considered for excepting certain records from the general scope of the order, or it might have determined a modification of its earlier order was justified. We simply cannot determine on the basis of the mental health records themselves, even with the two notations on them, whether such explanations might exist, and if so, whether they might explain the failure to provide defense counsel with the records in question.
Defendant has not sought remand pursuant to Crim.P. 33(e) so the trial court could address a motion for new trial. Such a procedure would have allowed the court to determine whether and why it failed to provide to defendant all the records within the scope of its earlier order. Any appeal from that ruling would present the same issue for review, but with the record created in that proceeding.
Remand is nevertheless appropriate under C.A.R. 10(e), but for a limited purpose. C.A.R. 10(e) provides, in pertinent part, that if any differences arise as to whether the record “truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth.”
Here, the record does not fully disclose what occurred at trial. Thus, the cause must be remanded, but solely for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to establish what actually occurred and why. Defendant can then pursue available remedies based on a true and complete record.
For these reasons, I concur that the cause must be remanded pursuant to C.A.R. 10(e), but I would direct that it be for a purpose and scope narrower than that stated by the majority.