Court Opinion

ID: 9544170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:52:53.828904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:17.502723
License: Public Domain

Munson, J.
(concurring)—I am constrained to concur that the admission of the tape-recorded telephone conversation between the police department and the defendant was prejudicial error.
The legislature has mandated that a political subdivision of the state may not intercept, record, or divulge a private communication transmitted by telephone, without first obtaining the consent of all the participants to the communication, except that police and fire personnel may record incoming telephone calls for the purpose and only for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of reception of emergency calls. By so doing, the legislature has replaced judicial decisions allowing undisclosed mechanical recording of conversations, State v. White, 60 Wn.2d 551, 555-57, 374 P.2d 942 (1962); State v. Slater, 36 Wn.2d 357, 362-65, 218 P.2d 329 (1950); State v. Salle, 34 Wn.2d 183, 192-93, 208 P.2d 872 (1949), and two cases in which conversations were recorded with the consent of one of the participants but not all, State v. Jennen, 58 Wn.2d 171, 173-74, 361 P.2d 739 (1961), and State v. Lyskoski, 47 Wn.2d 102, 108-10, 287 P.2d 114 (1955). Here, there is no evidence of the express *122consent of all participants to the communication. There is no evidence the officer notified the defendant or her friend that the conversation was being recorded, which would have given them an opportunity to terminate the conversation. He did not ask their consent to continue the recording, nor did they acknowledge that they knew it was being recorded.
A substantial body of law in other jurisdictions holds that the consent of one of the participants to the interception or recording of a conversation, be it in person, by telephone, or other transmitting device, is admissible in evidence. See Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1283 et seq. However, when our legislature specifically stated that the consent of all the participants is required, that body of law became inapplicable in this state.
The next question is whether there is an implied consent. In Commonwealth v. Gullett, 329 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1974), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a telephone call to the police to report a homicide, the location of the body, and the possibility that this would be but one in a series of killings, was not a confidential conversation. The court said it was apparent the caller did not intend the privacy of the communication to be maintained, based upon the information conveyed, the emergency atmosphere the communication engendered, and the particular agency to which the disclosure was directed. The court held that it was an inescapable conclusion that a call made under such circumstances carried with it the permission of the caller to divulge the communication to authorized personnel other than the officer who happened to take the message and to use the communication to investigate the reported crime by any reasonable means.
I would adopt that rationale in this case were it not for the specific provision of RCW 9.73.090, which permits police personnel to record incoming telephone calls “for the purpose and only for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of reception of emergency calls.” This does not carry the con-
*123notation that the legislature intended calls recorded for that specific purpose be extended beyond the language used. The police are bound to act upon the message and to use it as an entree to an investigation, but, under this statute, not as evidence against a caller. As noted in Commonwealth v. McCoy, 442 Pa. 234, 239, 275 A.2d 28, 30-31 (1971):
[T]he Legislature has determined as a matter of state public policy that the right of any caller to the privacy of his conversation is of greater societal value than the interest served by permitting eavesdropping or wiretapping. Such a determination, when within constitutional limits, is solely within the discretion of the Legislature.
That rationale is applicable in the interpretation of the legislative intent of this statute. Cf. People v. Kurth, 34 Ill. 2d 387, 216 N.E.2d 154, 20 A.L.R.3d 1409 (1966). It is on this basis, and on this basis alone, that I concur that the admission of the recorded conversation was prejudicial error.