Court Opinion

ID: 9960089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 12:02:07.392942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:10.365176
License: Public Domain

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                             Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

                GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC v. JANE E.
                          CLARK ET AL.
                            (AC 44582)
                           Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Palmer, Js.

                                           Syllabus

         Pursuant to statute (§ 8-265ee (a)), ‘‘a mortgagee who desires to foreclose
             upon a mortgage . . . shall give notice to each homeowner who is a
             mortgagor by registered, or certified mail, postage prepaid at the address
             of the property which is secured by the mortgage. No such mortgagee
             may commence a foreclosure of a mortgage prior to mailing such notice.’’
         In 2014, the plaintiff G Co. sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain residen-
             tial property owned by the defendant mortgagor. In 2015, G Co. filed its
             affidavit of compliance with the state’s Emergency Mortgage Assistance
             Program (EMAP), pursuant to § 8-265ee (a). W Co. was thereafter substi-
             tuted as the plaintiff. The court granted W Co.’s motion for summary
             judgment as to liability, and subsequently rendered a judgment of strict
             foreclosure. The defendant filed an appeal, which was dismissed after
             he failed to file an appellate brief. The defendant thereafter filed a
             postjudgment motion to dismiss on the basis that the court lacked
             subject matter jurisdiction because G Co. failed to send an EMAP notice
             before commencing the action. The trial court denied the motion to
             dismiss. The court found that, although G Co. had failed to provide the
             defendant with timely notice of EMAP before bringing the present action
             in violation of § 8-265ee (a), the public policy of finality outweighed
             providing the defendant with a second opportunity to avail himself of
             EMAP, especially after he undertook to mediate the dispute for nearly
             one year before fully litigating the matter to a judgment and an appeal.
             The court further concluded that to allow the defendant to sit on his
             rights, only to collaterally attack the existing judgment, would have
             permitted a strategic delay of the proceedings. On the defendant’s appeal
             to this court, held that this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment
             denying the defendant’s postjudgment motion to dismiss on the disposi-
             tive alternative ground that the defendant waived his right to raise a
             claim concerning G Co.’s compliance with EMAP: although G Co. had
             failed to timely comply with the EMAP notice requirement and the
             defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an impermissible collateral attack
             on the foreclosure judgment, as the trial court retained jurisdiction to
             open the judgment at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss,
             this court concluded that the defendant had waived his right to raise a
             claim concerning G Co.’s EMAP notice compliance, as G Co. effectively
             alerted the defendant to an issue with compliance in its affidavit by
             averring that it had given the notice containing the information required
             by § 8-265ee to the defendant in 2015, more than one year after the
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                          Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark
          present action had been commenced, and, despite being made aware
          of this failure to comply with EMAP, at no point during the two years
          that passed between the filing of G Co.’s affidavit and the trial court’s
          judgment of strict foreclosure did the defendant raise G Co.’s noncompli-
          ance with EMAP by way of a motion to strike, in his answer, or in
          opposing W Co.’s motion for summary judgment, the defendant did not
          file any opposition to W Co.’s motion for judgment of strict foreclosure,
          and, although the defendant filed an appeal, that appeal was dismissed
          after he failed to file an appellate brief; accordingly, although W Co.
          failed to satisfy a mandatory condition precedent, no motion was filed
          challenging the action on that basis prior to the court’s rendering judg-
          ment of strict foreclosure or the defendant’s first appeal from that judg-
          ment.
             Argued December 6, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024

                                  Procedural History

          Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop-
       erty owned by the named defendant et al., and for other
       relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
       trict of Hartford, where the named defendant et al. were
       defaulted; thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended
       complaint; subsequently, Wilmington Savings Fund
       Society, FSB, doing business as Christiana Trust, not
       individually but as trustee for Pretium Mortgage Acqui-
       sition Trust, was substituted as the plaintiff; subse-
       quently, the court, Robaina, J., granted the substitute
       plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability;
       thereafter, the court, Dubay, J., granted the substitute
       plaintiff’s motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and
       rendered judgment thereon, from which the defendant
       Charles I. Merlis appealed to this court, which dismissed
       the appeal; subsequently, the court, M. Taylor, J.,
       denied the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant
       Charles I. Merlis, and the defendant Charles I. Merlis
       appealed to this court. Affirmed.
         Charles I. Merlis, self-represented, the appellant
       (defendant).
         Jeffrey M. Knickerbocker, for the appellee (substitute
       plaintiff).
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                              Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

                                            Opinion

            ALVORD, J. The self-represented defendant Charles
         I. Merlis1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court
         denying his motion to dismiss the foreclosure action
         following the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered
         in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Wilmington Savings
         Fund Society, FSB, doing business as Christiana Trust,
         not individually but as trustee for Pretium Mortgage
         Acquisition Trust (Wilmington).2 On appeal, the defen-
         dant claims that the court improperly denied his post-
         judgment motion to dismiss the action because the orig-
         inal plaintiff, Green Tree Servicing, LLC (Green Tree),
         failed to give him proper notice of the state’s Emergency
         Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP), as required by
         General Statutes § 8-265ee (a).3 We disagree because
             1
              The complaint also named Jane E. Clark; St. Francis Hospital and Medical
         Center; Webster Bank, National Association; Tortora, Da Silva and Flaherty;
         and National Credit Adjusters, LLC, as additional defendants. Clark was
         defaulted for failure to plead, Webster Bank, National Association, was
         defaulted for failure to disclose a defense, and the remaining additional
         defendants were defaulted for failure to appear. None of the additional
         defendants have participated in this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to Charles
         I. Merlis as the defendant.
            2
              Green Tree Servicing, LLC (Green Tree), commenced this foreclosure
         action in 2014. In November, 2015, the court granted the motion to substitute
         Ditech Financial, LLC, as the plaintiff. In September, 2016, the court granted
         the motion to substitute Wilmington as the plaintiff.
            3
              General Statutes § 8-265ee (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘a mortgagee
         who desires to foreclose upon a mortgage which satisfies the standards
         contained in subdivisions (1), (9), (10) and (11) of subsection (e) of section
         8-265ff, shall give notice to each homeowner who is a mortgagor by regis-
         tered, or certified mail, postage prepaid at the address of the property which
         is secured by the mortgage. No such mortgagee may commence a foreclosure
         of a mortgage prior to mailing such notice. Such notice shall advise the
         homeowner of his delinquency or other default under the mortgage and
         shall state that the homeowner has sixty days from the date of such notice
         in which to (1) have a face-to-face meeting, telephone or other conference
         acceptable to the authority with the mortgagee or a face-to-face meeting with
         a consumer credit counseling agency to attempt to resolve the delinquency
         or default by restructuring the loan payment schedule or otherwise, and (2)
         contact the authority, at an address and phone number contained in the
         notice, to obtain information and apply for emergency mortgage assistance
         payments if the homeowner and mortgagee are unable to resolve the delin-
         quency or default.’’
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                           Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

       we conclude that the defendant waived his claim. We
       therefore affirm the judgment of the court.
          The following facts and procedural history are rele-
       vant to our resolution of this appeal. In March, 2014,
       Green Tree commenced this action against the defen-
       dant and Jane E. Clark to foreclose a mortgage on
       residential property in West Hartford. The parties par-
       ticipated in the foreclosure mediation program; see
       General Statutes § 49-31m; until mediation was termi-
       nated due to the defendant’s failure to attend a sched-
       uled mediation and to provide required financial infor-
       mation. Upon termination of mediation in February,
       2015, the parties reengaged in discovery and motion
       practice.
          On August 31, 2015, Green Tree filed an affidavit of
       compliance with EMAP. In the affidavit, a paralegal
       employed by Green Tree’s counsel averred that,
       ‘‘[b]ased on . . . [the] business records [of Green
       Tree’s counsel] and its regular business practices,
       [Green Tree] has complied with the [EMAP] by [Green
       Tree’s counsel] giving on March 20, 2015 to all mortgag-
       ors a notice containing the information required by said
       statute.’’4 A few days later, on September 4, 2015, the
       defendant, who was then represented by counsel,5 filed
       a motion to strike the complaint on the basis that Green
       Tree had misstated his name as ‘‘Charles I. Clark,’’ and
       requested that Green Tree file a new complaint correct-
       ing his name. In September, 2015, Green Tree responded
       to the motion to strike by filing the operative amended
       complaint. In November, 2015, the court granted Green
       Tree’s motion to substitute Ditech Financial, LLC, as
         Although § 8-265ee has been amended since the events underlying this
       appeal; see Public Acts 2021, No. 21-44, § 8; those amendments have no
       bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer
       to the current revision of the statute.
         4
           The affidavit did not have any attachments.
         5
           See footnote 11 of this opinion.
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                             Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

         the plaintiff, and, in September, 2016, the court granted
         the motion to substitute Wilmington as the plaintiff.
            On January 11, 2017, the defendant filed an answer
         and special defenses to the amended complaint. His
         special defenses alleged that Wilmington lacked stand-
         ing, that Wilmington did not possess the original note,
         and payment. In June, 2017, Wilmington filed a motion
         for summary judgment as to liability. The defendant
         filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment
         and affidavit in support of his objection. Therein, he
         presented argument in support of his special defense
         of payment and also argued that Green Tree had failed
         to provide him with a valid notice of acceleration. The
         court, Robaina, J., granted Wilmington’s motion for
         summary judgment as to liability on September 11, 2017.
         Wilmington thereafter filed a motion for judgment of
         strict foreclosure, to which the defendant did not file
         a response, and the court, Dubay, J., granted the motion
         on November 13, 2017. The court set law days to com-
         mence on January 29, 2018.
           On December 1, 2017, the defendant filed an appeal
         with this court.6 Following four extensions of time, the
         defendant failed to file his appellate brief, and the
         appeal was dismissed on August 23, 2019. Following
         the dismissal of the appeal, on December 2, 2019, the
         court granted Wilmington’s motion to reenter the judg-
         ment of foreclosure and reset the law days to commence
         on March 23, 2020. Over the course of the litigation,
         the court reset the law days a total of eight times.
           On October 6, 2020, the defendant filed, on a Judicial
         Branch form designated for motions to open a judg-
         ment, a motion in which he argued that the court lacked
             In October, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for articulation, in which
             6

         he requested articulation as to his special defense of payment and his
         contention that Wilmington did not possess the original note. The motion
         for articulation was denied.
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                         Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

       subject matter jurisdiction because Green Tree had
       failed to comply with the EMAP notice requirements,
       in light of this court’s decision in MTGLQ Investors,
       L.P. v. Hammons, 196 Conn. App. 636, 638, 230 A.3d
       882 (2020) (overruled by KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar, 347
       Conn. 381, 297 A.3d 968 (2023)), cert. denied, 335 Conn.
       950, 238 A.3d 21 (2020). The defendant requested that
       the court extend the law days for sixty days to permit
       the parties to brief the subject matter jurisdiction issue.
       The court granted the motion to set a new law day and
       set law days to commence on December 8, 2020. The
       law days were subsequently extended two additional
       times, to March 30, 2021.
         On December 7, 2020, the defendant filed a motion
       to dismiss the foreclosure action on the basis that the
       court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action
       because Green Tree had failed to send an EMAP notice
       before commencing the action. The defendant also filed
       a memorandum of law in support of his motion. On
       December 18, 2020, Wilmington filed a memorandum of
       law in opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
       arguing that it had complied with the EMAP require-
       ment by sending a letter on March 20, 2015,7 and that
       the defendant’s argument was barred by his failure to
       raise the issue in his prior appeal.
         The defendant filed a reply on February 19, 2021,
       arguing that the mailing of the notice more than one
       year after commencing the foreclosure action did not
       constitute compliance with EMAP and that his claim
       was not waivable because it implicated the court’s sub-
       ject matter jurisdiction. On February 22, 2021, Wilming-
       ton filed a surreply, in which it argued that the defen-
       dant’s challenge constituted an impermissible collateral
         7
           Wilmington attached to its memorandum of law in opposition to the
       defendant’s motion to dismiss a copy of the March 20, 2015 letter with a
       certified mail tracking number.
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                            Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

         attack on the foreclosure judgment, citing Bank of New
         York Mellon v. Tope, 202 Conn. App. 540, 541, 246 A.3d
         4 (2021), rev’d, 345 Conn. 662, 286 A.3d 891 (2022).
         Wilmington additionally argued that § 8-265ee does not
         require an EMAP notice to be sent to a borrower when
         a second borrower, in this case Clark, no longer lives
         at the property. A hearing was held on the motion on
         February 22, 2021.8
            On March 4, 2021, the court, M. Taylor, J., issued a
         memorandum of decision in which it denied the defen-
         dant’s motion to dismiss. The court first found that
         Green Tree mailed an EMAP notice to both the defen-
         dant and Clark on March 20, 2015. No return receipt
         was provided, and the defendant claimed that he did
         not receive the notice and, thus, he did not avail himself
         of the program. On the basis of the untimely mailing,
         the court found that Green Tree ‘‘failed to provide the
         defendant with timely notice of the EMAP program
         before bringing this action to foreclose the mortgage
         on his home, in contravention of the requirements of
         § 8-265ee (a).’’
            The court framed its inquiry as ‘‘whether the statutory
         EMAP provision, requiring notice of mortgage assis-
         tance programs, ought to nullify a judgment of strict
         foreclosure after years of litigation, during which the
         defendant exercised his right to mediation as well as an
         appeal after judgment, albeit dismissed on procedural
         grounds.’’ The court explained that ‘‘the procedural con-
         text of a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is an
         important consideration, leading courts to disfavor col-
         lateral attacks on judgments.’’ The court noted that
         the ‘‘underlying right to notice of EMAP has existed
         throughout these proceedings and was, therefore, an
         existing and knowable legal right.’’
           8
             The transcript of the hearing on the motion to dismiss was not filed in
         this appeal.
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                           Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

          The court considered the important public policy
       underlying EMAP, which it described as especially
       important in the present case, in which the defendant
       had challenged the underlying default of his monthly
       mortgage payment. The court explained: ‘‘Absent the
       opportunity to apply for mortgage relief and resolve his
       dispute with the plaintiff in a pre-litigation forum such
       as EMAP, the dispute has continued into this long-stand-
       ing litigation. In mitigation of his rights under EMAP,
       though distinguishable, the defendant undertook the
       opportunity to mediate his dispute with the plaintiff for
       nearly a year before litigating the dispute to judgment
       and an appeal. Therefore, whatever procedural and sub-
       stantive rights may have flowed upon proper notice of
       EMAP, the defendant was afforded the opportunity to
       resolve the matter through court-sponsored mediation,
       albeit subsequent to engaging the machinery of litiga-
       tion. Although court-supervised mediation did not
       resolve the foreclosure, EMAP similarly does not guar-
       antee the resolution of the dispute between the par-
       ties.’’9
         The court determined that, ‘‘[a]t this stage of the
       proceedings . . . based upon the facts and procedural
       posture of this case, the public policy of finality out-
       weighs providing the defendant with a second opportu-
       nity, to begin again and avail himself of EMAP, espe-
       cially after taking the opportunity to mediate the dispute
       for nearly one year before fully litigating the matter to a
       judgment and an appeal, albeit dismissed on procedural
       grounds. To allow a defendant to sit on his or her know-
       able rights, only to arise and collaterally attack an
       existing judgment after seven years of litigation and an
       appeal, would permit a strategic delay of proceedings
         9
           The court stated in a footnote that it had ‘‘no basis to conclude that the
       defendant intentionally delayed his motion to dismiss for strategic pur-
       poses,’’ but it expressed a concern that, ‘‘[t]o hold otherwise, here, might
       allow for such abuse in other cases.’’
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                        Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

         that would have otherwise come to a conclusion on the
         underlying merits of the case.’’ This appeal followed.
            After this appeal was briefed and argued, this court
         ordered consideration of the appeal deferred until the
         final disposition by our Supreme Court of two pending
         cases, Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope, 345 Conn. 662,
         663, 286 A.3d 891 (2022), and KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar,
         347 Conn. 381, 384, 297 A.3d 968 (2023), which were
         released on December 20, 2022, and August 1, 2023,
         respectively. This court then ordered the parties to file
         supplemental briefs addressing the effect of those deci-
         sions on the present appeal and heard additional oral
         argument on December 6, 2023.
           On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
         improperly denied his postjudgment motion to dismiss
         the action because Green Tree failed to comply with
         the EMAP notice requirement.
            We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘A motion
         to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the
         court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as
         a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that
         should be heard by the court. . . . A motion to dismiss
         tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the
         court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the
         court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determi-
         nation] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.’’ (Inter-
         nal quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
         v. Melahn, 222 Conn. App. 828, 838–39, 307 A.3d 911
         (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 951, 308 A.3d 1038
         (2024). ‘‘[If] the trial court reaches a correct decision
         but on [improper] grounds, this court has repeatedly
         sustained the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist
         to support it. . . . [W]e . . . may affirm the court’s
         judgment on a dispositive [alternative] ground for which
         there is support in the trial court record.’’ (Internal
         quotation marks omitted.) Id., 840–41.
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                      Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

          We next set forth the EMAP notice requirement.
       ‘‘[Section] 8-265ee prohibits the initiation of a valid suit
       without providing the EMAP notice by affirmatively
       providing that [n]o such mortgagee may commence a
       foreclosure of a mortgage prior to mailing such notice.
       . . . [General Statutes §] 8-265dd, which establishes
       EMAP, also prevents the court from rendering any judg-
       ment of foreclosure until the EMAP notice has been
       sent, the sixty day response time has expired, and, if
       relevant, a determination has been made on the applica-
       tion for emergency mortgage assistance payments. . . .
       Specifically, the statute provides in relevant part: [N]o
       judgment of strict foreclosure nor any judgment order-
       ing a foreclosure sale shall be entered in any action
       instituted by the mortgagee . . . for the foreclosure of
       an eligible mortgage unless . . . notice to the home-
       owner who is a mortgagor has been given by the mort-
       gagee in accordance with section 8-265ee and the time
       for response has expired . . . .
          ‘‘Moreover, the EMAP does not require a return
       receipt for the provision of the required notice to a
       mortgagor, and the lack of a return receipt in the record
       does not affect [a mortgagee’s] compliance with the
       [EMAP]. . . . Consequently, [it is sufficient] to estab-
       lish that a letter was actually placed in the mail. . . .
       Whether a letter actually was placed in the mail may
       be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence.
       It may be proved by the testimony of the person who
       deposited it or by proof of facts from which it may be
       reasonably inferred that it was duly deposited.’’ (Cita-
       tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
       844–45.
         Our Supreme Court has held that compliance with
       the EMAP notice requirement is a condition precedent
       to the commencement of a foreclosure action. Specifi-
       cally, it stated: ‘‘To have a cause of action on which
       relief can be granted, the notice requirement must be
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                          Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

          fulfilled. The legislature has made it clear that the bur-
          den rests with the mortgagee to demonstrate compli-
          ance with the EMAP notice requirement. Specifically,
          subsection (b) of § 8-265ee requires the mortgagee to
          file an affidavit with the court stating that the notice
          provisions of subsection (a) have been complied with
          and that the relevant time period has expired. Only after
          the mortgagee files such an affidavit may the foreclo-
          sure suit continue. See General Statutes § 8-265ee (b).
          If a mortgagee fails to comply with § 8-265ee (a), it has
          failed to satisfy a mandatory condition precedent and,
          therefore, has failed to allege a claim on which relief
          can be granted.’’ KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar, supra, 347
          Conn. 393–94.
             The court agreed with the plaintiff’s contention that
          the EMAP notice requirement does not implicate a
          court’s subject matter jurisdiction, overruling MTGLQ
          Investors, L.P. v. Hammons, supra, 196 Conn. App. 636.
          KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar, supra, 347 Conn. 396–97. In
          rejecting the argument that a determination that the
          EMAP notice requirement is not jurisdictional would
          frustrate the legislative intent of the EMAP amend-
          ments, the court stated: ‘‘Our holding that the EMAP
          notice is a mandatory condition precedent does nothing
          to dilute or impair the legislative intent or public policy
          underlying the 2008 amendments. The mortgagee is still
          mandated to provide the homeowner with the EMAP
          notice. Therefore, the public policy underlying the
          notice requirement—informing homeowners of their
          rights and the resources available to them to assist in
          avoiding foreclosure—is fulfilled. A foreclosure action
          may not proceed unless the EMAP notice requirement
          is carried out. If the plaintiff does not satisfy that condi-
          tion, it has failed to allege a claim on which relief can
          be granted.’’ Id., 398.
            In a footnote, the court in Yazar identified the proce-
          dural avenues available to a mortgagor seeking to raise
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                      Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

       a challenge to the mortgagee’s compliance with the
       EMAP notice requirement, explaining that ‘‘[t]he failure
       to state a claim on which relief can be granted is typi-
       cally addressed through a motion to strike, and, if the
       motion is granted, the plaintiff is allowed an opportunity
       to replead the stricken claim. See Practice Book §§ 10-
       39 (a) (1) and 10-44. The failure to send an EMAP notice,
       however, cannot be cured, as the plaintiff must send
       the EMAP notice prior to initiating suit to have an
       actionable claim to relief. In these instances, we have
       stated that the use of a motion for summary judgment
       to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is
       appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause
       of action and the defendant can establish that the defect
       could not be cured by repleading. . . . As such, either
       a motion to strike or a motion for summary judgment
       is an available procedural avenue to challenge the fail-
       ure to send an EMAP notice.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Id., 394 n.9.
          Most recently, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Melahn,
       supra, 222 Conn. App. 830–31, 838, this court affirmed
       a judgment of strict foreclosure, finding no error in the
       trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss
       the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the
       basis of allegations that the plaintiff had filed false
       affidavits regarding its compliance with the EMAP
       notice requirement. The court first considered the trial
       court’s determination that the motion constituted an
       impermissible collateral attack. Id., 838. This court
       rejected that basis for the denial of the motion to dis-
       miss, stating that, because there was no final judgment
       at the time the court decided the motion to dismiss,
       the motion was not an impermissible collateral attack.
       Id., 840. However, this court affirmed the judgment on
       the alternative ground that, because ‘‘the question of a
       plaintiff’s compliance with the EMAP notice require-
       ment no longer implicates the court’s subject matter
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                         Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark

          jurisdiction over the foreclosure action . . . the court
          would have been entitled to deny the motion to dismiss
          because it failed to raise properly a claim that the court
          lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.’’
          (Citation omitted.) Id., 841. The court also stated that
          ‘‘the [trial] court addressed the merits of the defendant’s
          EMAP claim when it adjudicated both the defendant’s
          motion to dismiss and the plaintiff’s motion for sum-
          mary judgment. . . . [T]he court properly determined
          that the defendant failed to raise a genuine issue of
          material fact regarding the plaintiff’s compliance with
          the EMAP notification requirement.’’ Id.
             In the present case, at the time the trial court denied
          the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court, to the
          extent that it concluded that the defendant’s motion to
          dismiss constituted an impermissible collateral attack
          on the judgment, relied on this court’s decision in Bank
          of New York Mellon v. Tope, supra, 202 Conn. App. 540.
          In Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope, supra, 345 Conn.
          665, 671, however, our Supreme Court reversed this
          court’s decision and concluded that the defendant’s
          motion to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale did
          not constitute a collateral attack on an earlier judgment.
          It noted that ‘‘an attack on a judgment within the same
          action or proceeding in which it was obtained can be
          a collateral attack if the judgment has become final and
          the court that rendered the judgment no longer has
          jurisdiction to open it.’’ Id., 672. The court explained,
          however, that ‘‘[i]n a foreclosure by sale, the court
          retains jurisdiction to modify the judgment until the
          foreclosure sale is approved.’’ Id., 673. Because the sale
          had not been approved, the judgment was not final and,
          ‘‘[a]s a result, when the court rendered the July, 2017
          judgment, a new, four month limitation period was trig-
          gered, under which the modified judgment could be
          opened. Therefore, at the time the defendant filed his
          motion to open the judgment on September 28, 2017,
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       the trial court had jurisdiction to open the judgment
       under [General Statutes] § 52-212a.’’ Id., 676. Accord-
       ingly, the court determined that the motion to open
       was not an impermissible collateral attack. Id.
          In the present case, the court retained jurisdiction
       to open the foreclosure judgment at the time of the
       filing of the motion to dismiss. See Real Estate Mortgage
       Network, Inc. v. Squillante, 184 Conn. App. 356, 360,
       194 A.3d 1262 (‘‘[w]hether the trial court has jurisdiction
       to open a judgment of strict foreclosure is generally
       dependent on whether title has vested in the encum-
       brancer’’), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 950, 197 A.3d 390
       (2018); see also General Statutes § 49-15 (providing that
       no judgment of strict foreclosure ‘‘shall be opened after
       the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer’’).
       Accordingly, the motion did not constitute an impermis-
       sible collateral attack on the judgment. See, e.g., Wells
       Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Melahn, supra, 222 Conn. App. 840
       (motion to dismiss was not impermissible collateral
       attack due to absence of final judgment).
          As noted previously in this opinion, however, this
       court may affirm the court’s judgment on a dispositive
       alternative ground for which there is support in the trial
       court record. Accordingly, we consider Wilmington’s
       contention that the defendant has waived his right to
       raise a claim concerning EMAP compliance. We con-
       clude that he has.10
          It is axiomatic that ‘‘[t]he court’s function is generally
       limited to adjudicating the issues raised by the parties
       on the proof they have presented and applying appro-
       priate procedural sanctions on motion of a party. . . .
       The parties, may, under our rules of practice, challenge
         10
           Because we conclude that the defendant has waived his claim regarding
       EMAP compliance, we need not reach Wilmington’s proposed alternative
       ground for affirmance that no EMAP notice was required because Clark no
       longer lived at the property.
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          the legal sufficiency of a claim at two points prior to
          the commencement of trial. First, a party may challenge
          the legal sufficiency of an adverse party’s claim by filing
          a motion to strike. Practice Book § 10-39. Second, a
          party may move for summary judgment and request the
          trial court to render judgment in its favor if there is no
          genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled
          to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book §§ 17-
          44 and 17-49. In both instances, the rules of practice
          require a party to file a written motion to trigger the
          trial court’s determination of a dispositive question of
          law. The rules of practice do not provide the trial court
          with authority to determine dispositive questions of law
          in the absence of such a motion. . . .
             ‘‘A court may not grant summary judgment sua
          sponte. . . . The issue first must be raised by the
          motion of a party and supported by affidavits, docu-
          ments or other forms of proof. . . . When a rule of
          practice requires a written motion, a memorandum of
          law and supporting documentation, it is because the
          issue to be decided is of considerable importance. In
          the case of summary judgment, which results in a swift,
          concise end to often complex litigation without benefit
          of a full trial, the parties and the court need to be as
          well informed as possible on the applicable law and
          facts.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Emeritus Senior Living v.
          Lepore, 183 Conn. App. 23, 25–26 n.3, 191 A.3d 212
          (2018).
             Our Supreme Court in Yazar explained that motions
          to strike or for summary judgment are appropriate pro-
          cedural avenues to challenge a plaintiff’s compliance
          with EMAP because ‘‘a mortgagee [who] fails to comply
          with § 8-265ee (a) . . . has failed to satisfy a manda-
          tory condition precedent and, therefore, has failed to
          allege a claim on which relief can be granted.’’ KeyBank,
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       N.A. v. Yazar, supra, 347 Conn. 393–94 and n.9. In set-
       ting forth the procedural avenues available to a defen-
       dant seeking to raise EMAP noncompliance, our
       Supreme Court did not identify any postjudgment
       motions.
          In the present case, Green Tree effectively alerted
       the defendant to an issue with its EMAP compliance
       in its affidavit, which was filed on August 31, 2015.
       ‘‘Subsection (b) of § 8-265ee requires the mortgagee to
       file an affidavit with the court stating that the notice
       provisions of subsection (a) have been complied with
       and that the relevant time period has expired. Only after
       the mortgagee files such an affidavit may the foreclo-
       sure suit continue.’’ KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar, supra, 347
       Conn. 394. In the present case, it was averred that Green
       Tree had given, on March 20, 2015, a notice to the
       mortgagors containing the information required by § 8-
       265ee (a). Although the affidavit averred compliance
       with the provisions of the statute, the affidavit clearly
       stated the date on which it claimed it had given notice,
       which date, significantly, was after the filing of the
       present action.
         Despite being made aware of Green Tree’s failure to
       timely comply with EMAP, more than two years passed
       between the filing of the affidavit and the court’s render-
       ing of a judgment of strict foreclosure. At no point
       during those two years did the defendant raise Green
       Tree’s noncompliance with EMAP. Although the defen-
       dant, who was then represented by counsel,11 filed a
         11
            The defendant was represented by Attorney John L. Giulietti from Sep-
       tember 4, 2015, until after the rendering of judgment on November 13, 2017.
       On December 6, 2017, Giulietti filed a motion to withdraw his appearance,
       which the court granted on December 18, 2017. In addition to filing the
       motion to strike, answer, and opposition to Wilmington’s motion for sum-
       mary judgment, Giulietti also filed on the defendant’s behalf a motion to
       dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction predicated on a claim that
       Wilmington lacked standing. That motion was later withdrawn.
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          motion to strike the complaint shortly after the EMAP
          affidavit was filed, the only ground alleged in the motion
          to strike was that the complaint had misstated the
          defendant’s last name. Following the filing of an
          amended complaint to correct the misstatement, the
          defendant did not thereafter attempt to challenge Green
          Tree’s compliance with EMAP by filing a second motion
          to strike, assuming it would have been permissible to
          do so.12 Moreover, once the defendant filed his answer
          to the amended complaint, he waived his right to chal-
          lenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint in a motion
          to strike. See, e.g., Rogan v. Rungee, 165 Conn. App.
          209, 216 n.3, 140 A.3d 979 (2016) (party waived right to
          raise issue properly raised in motion to strike by filing
          answer); see also Practice Book §§ 10-6 and 10-7. In his
          answer, the defendant did not raise noncompliance with
          EMAP as a defense. Additionally, the defendant did not
          at any time file a motion for summary judgment. In
          responding to Wilmington’s motion for summary judg-
          ment, filed in June, 2017, the defendant again failed to
          raise EMAP noncompliance. Finally, the defendant did
          not file any opposition to Wilmington’s motion for judg-
          ment of strict foreclosure. He subsequently filed an
          appeal from the judgment of foreclosure, but the appeal
             12
                Although our appellate courts have yet to address the issue, decisions
          of our Superior Court have held that ‘‘the rules of practice preclude a party
          from filing successive motions to strike when the grounds raised in a later
          motion could have been raised in the initial motion . . . . [A] second motion
          to strike may be appropriate in limited circumstances. For example, when
          a plaintiff, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44, files a subsequent pleading
          alleging new facts . . . . Additional motions to strike, however, are not
          allowed when the grounds asserted therein could have been raised in an
          earlier motion. . . . [Because] [t]he Practice Book provides for pleading
          multiple grounds in a single motion to strike and, further, provides that
          pleadings are to advance after the adjudication of each enumerated pleading,
          a defendant may not impede the progress of the suit by dividing his grounds
          and pleading them in consecutive motions to strike.’’ (Citation omitted;
          internal quotation marks omitted.) Red Law Firm, LLC v. Webster Bank,
          Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
          S (February 7, 2014).
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       was dismissed in August, 2019, after the defendant had
       failed to file his appellate brief.
          Thus, although Wilmington failed to satisfy a manda-
       tory condition precedent, no motion was filed challeng-
       ing the action on that basis prior to the court’s rendering
       of a judgment of foreclosure or the defendant’s first
       appeal from that judgment. Moreover, because ‘‘the
       question of a plaintiff’s compliance with the EMAP
       notice requirement no longer implicates the court’s sub-
       ject matter jurisdiction over the foreclosure action . . .
       the court would have been entitled to deny the motion
       to dismiss because it failed to raise properly a claim
       that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
       the action.’’ Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Melahn, supra,
       222 Conn. App. 841; see also, e.g., Bank of New York
       Mellon v. Croce, Superior Court, judicial district of Fair-
       field, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 11, 2023)
       (denying motion to dismiss that claimed plaintiff failed
       to comply with EMAP on basis that failure to comply
       with EMAP is not subject matter defect and defendant
       had waived her right to file motion to dismiss on other
       grounds by filing her answer).
         Accordingly, we conclude, under the specific proce-
       dural facts and circumstances of the present case, that
       the defendant waived his right to challenge Green Tree’s
       compliance with EMAP and that the court’s denial of
       the defendant’s postjudgment motion to dismiss does
       not constitute reversible error.
         The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded
       for the purpose of setting new law days.
         In this opinion the other judges concurred.