Court Opinion

ID: 9741698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:00:40.782424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.546633
License: Public Domain

Edwards, J.
(concurring in partial denial of compensation) . Plaintiff in this matter, Harvey Loucks, was injured June 20, 1947, in the course of his employment as an oil well pumper. It appears that on the date in question, in attempting to start an oil well pump by kicking the flywheel with his foot, the pump started suddenly, catching his foot or feet and throwing him around. Essentially undisputed facts indicate severe mangling of the left leg which resulted in its amputation, and injury to his right knee.
Claimant filed application for compensation October 24, 1947, listing the nature of his disability as “left leg amputated above the knee,” and he was subsequently awarded compensation for 200 weeks for this specific loss against the 2 coemployers currently named.
The 200-week payments expired on April 20, 1951. Three years subsequent thereto, on November 12, 1954, plaintiff filed another application for hearing and adjustment of claim, in this instance citing injury to the right leg, acknowledging compensation for the loss of the left leg, but claiming that the injury to the right leg was the basis for present disability.
On hearing before Referee James Nolan, the referee found:
“Plaintiff has a disability in his right leg as a result of the injury of June 20, 1947. However, he has suffered no wage loss since November 9, 1953, and is therefore not entitled to compensation benefits.”
It is apparent that the hearing referee felt that he was governed in his limitation of compensation *530by tbe provisions of a 1943 amendment to the workmen’s compensation act, being CL 1948, § 413.14 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.188).
Plaintiff Loucks did not appeal this award. Defendants, seeking relief from an “open end” award which would occasion compensation in the event of disability-induced loss of wages, did appeal. Defendants’ appeal claimed (1) that the original order for specific loss of the left leg was res judicata as to all injuries sustained at the time of the accident and that the effect of the subsequent award by the appeal board was to grant a rehearing beyond the authority of the appeal board; and (2) that there was no notice of injury to the right leg within statutory limitations.
No issue was presented to the appeal board relevant to the 1943 amendment, since obviously its application by the referee was in defendants’ favor and there was no cross appeal by plaintiff.
The workmen’s compensation appeal board found that a disabling injury to the right knee did take place in 1947 and that notice of the accident was ample notice to the employer of such injury. Thus, the 2 grounds for appeal urged by defendants were rejected by the appeal board and as to them it affirmed the referee’s award.
The appeal board also went further, however, and on its own motion modified this award by granting compensation for 2 periods preceding November 9, 1953 — from May 11, 1951, to December 31, 1951, at the rate of $21 per week, and from January 1, 1952, to December 31, 1952, at the rate of $8.68 per week. In this regard it was undoubtedly acting under decisions of this Court which have held that an appeal board hearing is de novo and not limited to just those questions which one party seeks to present. CL 1948, § 413.11 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.185); Margenovitch v. Newport Mining Co., 213 Mich 272; Thompson v. *531Continental Motors Corporation, 320 Mich 219; Fawley v. Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Co., 342 Mich 100.
Subsequent to the appeal board decision defendants again appealed, this time with an added ground. We granted leave to appeal limited to the contention that the 1943 amendment to the workmen’s compensation act served to bar recovery for any period which is more than 1 year prior to the date of the filing of the application.
In its opinion the appeal board did not deal at all with the effect of the 1943 amendment which reads:
“If payment of compensation is made (other than medical expenses) and an application for further compensation is later filed with the commission, no compensation shall be awarded by the commission for any period which is more than 1 year prior to the date of the filing of such application.” CL 1948, § 413.14 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.188).
This omission does not, however, appear to be sheer inadvertence. The appeal board did, apparently, have the issue before it, since its order makes reference to the 1-year limitation date applied by the referee. Whatever the reason may be for the appeal board’s omission, in my view, the language of the amendment is clear and, as the referee indicated, it bars recovery in the fact situation presented as to any compensation prior to November 9, 1953. See Lynch v. Briggs Manfg. Co., 329 Mich 168.
I agree with the Chief Justice that the findings of fact of the appeal board indicate that this was a claim for further compensation due to another injury which occurred at the same time as the original accident, rather than a subsequent development from the original injury (cf., Morgan v. Lloyds Builders Inc., 344 Mich 524) or a change in physical condi*532tion after the original adjudication (cf., White v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 352 Mich 201).
Under the record presented to us it appears to the writer that defendants are entitled to argue before us their claim of error as to failure of the appeal board to apply the 1943 amendment limitation in its own modification sua sponte of the referee’s award.
The award of the appeal board should be affirmed, except as to the compensation awarded prior to November 12,1953.
Kavanagh, J., did not sit.