Court Opinion

ID: 9808710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:47:49.811297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:35.621861
License: Public Domain

Merrimon, C. J.
dissenting: The policy upon which this action is founded contains this provision, which is expressly made a material part of the contract of insurance: “This company will not be liable for * * * loss if there be any prior or subsequent insurance, whether valid or invalid, without written consent of the company endorsed hereon.” The plaintiffs were not inadvertent to this provision. It clearly appears that they had actual knowledge of and understood its meaning and purpose. It is clear that it was a material part of the contract.
It is contended, however, by the plaintiffs that the defendant waived this provision and the condition embodied by it, and this contention is founded upon this evidence: “The witness (one of the plaintiffs) then proceeded to say, that after insuring in the defendant company he had a conversation with Dr. J. N. Ramsey, agent of the defendant company, before he took out additional insurance, telling him that he wanted additional insurance, and that Dr. Ramsey said it would be all right.” This witness, in reply to further interrogatories, objected to by the defendant, said “he told Ramsey that he wanted additional insurance in the Pelican Insurance Company and- the Virginia Fire and Marine Insurance Company; the conversation was in his store; that later on he said he wanted additional insurance in the Liverpool, London and Globe Insurance Company, and in (he Mt. Vernon Insurance Company; that he did not know who was present, except his clerk, R. T. Gay; that Ramsey said it would all be right, so that he did not take out policies over three-fourths value of the goods; that he had two conversations with Ramsey, and told him that he had an idea of taking additional insurance; that he said it was all right; that *483he told him that he wanted $2,000 in the Virginia Fire and Marine, and $1,000 in the Pelican; the second conversation he told him that he wanted $500 in the Liverpool, London and Globe and $500 in the Mt. Vernon; that these conversations were before the additional insurance was effected.” Another witness'said he “heard the conversations between Grubbs and Ramsey; Grubbs said that he did not have insurance sufficient; that Ramsey said it was all right, so that he did not get more than three-fourths value of his stock.”
Dr. J. N. Ramsey, mentioned, testified “that a few days after he issued the policy to the plaintiff sued on, Grubbs said to him that he would want further insurance; that he said to him that he thought that he could get it if he wished it; * * * that he did not know that Grubbs was insured in any other company until after the fire.”
The plaintiffs obtained additional insurance in other companies, and it was admitted that no written consent was endorsed upon the policy sued upon that the plaintiffs might take such or any additional insurance upon the property insured by‘the defendant.
Now, it seems to me, that putting aside all question as to the authority of Ramsey, as agent of the defendant, to waive the condition in question, the evidence accepted as true did not, in any fair view of it, constitute such waiver. The plaintiffs knew of the coudition that if they took other further insurance without consent on the part of the defendant written on the policy sued upon, the latter would be void. They did not'ask Ramsey, the agent, to waive the condition, to say that further insurance might be taken without consent written on the policy, nor did they give him or the defendant notice that they had takeii further insurance, nor did the defendant, or its agent, have such notice until after the loss; at most, they only suggested their desire and purpose to obtain more. Nor did Ramsey tell them that they might take other insurance without having consent of the *484defendant endorsed on the policy sued upon, and that they might do so without notice to him or the defendant. The fair and just interpretation of what and all that was said by the plaintiffs and Ramsey is, that the former suggested their wish and purpose to obtain further insurance, and the latter said, in reply, they might do so, not exceeding two-thirds of the value of the property insured, in the -way and as contemplated by the policy of the defendant held by the plaintiffs. Ramsey did not say they might do otherwise. What motive or reason had he to waive the condition? And what reasonable ground was there to merely infer that he did? And what just reason had the plaintiffs to believe that the agent consented to or intended such waiver? And is it not clear that plaintiffs carelessly and negligently failed to have the defendant’s consent written on the polic}1', or that they felt apprehensive that the defendant would not consent? Collins v. Insurance Co., 79 N. C., 279; Sugg v. Insurance Co., 98 N. C., 143; Hansus v. Insurance Co., 111 Ind., 90; Henly v. Insurance Co., 5 Nev., 268; May on Insurance, §§369, 372; Wood on Insurance, § 496.
It is further contended that the defendant, after the plaintiffs sustained the loss, waived the condition in question, or is estopped to claim and have benefit of the same, in that its ■ agents took steps to ascertain the extent of the loss, with a view to pay what it might be liable for upon the policy. But the defendant’s agents did not say their purpose was to waive the condition; nor wras there any fair implication that they did; nor was there any consideration for such waiver. The mere fact that such inquiry was made could not reasonably or justly be treated as such waiver or an. estoppel. The defendant might, without waiving any right or defence, make such inquiry in order to learn what it ought, without regard to its legalliability, fairly to pay, if anything. It might by such inquiry ascertain whether the loss was fairly sustained— whether-the insurance was too great — whether the stock of *485goods was as great as represented, or whether the same was over-valued, etc. Simply such inquiry ought not to conclude the defendant as to any proper defence it might have. So far as appears there are no considerations, valuable or otherwise, that in their nature do or ought to so conclude the defendant. It does not appear that the defendant was notin some way prejudiced by the additional insurance. May on Ins., §507 (2 Ed).
The contract of insurance is plain and unequivocal in the respect in question. The plaintiffs clearly understood its meaning and purpose. It is the duty of the Court to uphold and enforce it in its integrity, as it affects the rights created by it of both parties. Reasonably and justly a waiver of any material part, provision or condition of it, to be effectual,should appear, not by mere conjecture or inference, but by evidence that reasonably tends to prove the same, and the burden in this respect is on the plaintiffs. I do not think there was such evidence in this case.
Per Curiam. Affirmed. ■