Court Opinion

ID: 9950186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 15:12:21.443113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:01.168835
License: Public Domain

No. 158               March 6, 2024                     391

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

              In the Matter of the Marriage of
                      Mary B. WARD,
                   Petitioner-Respondent,
                             and
                     Michael W. WARD,
                aka Michael William Ward,
                   Respondent-Appellant.
              Columbia County Circuit Court
                    19DR11213; A177528

  Michael T. Clarke, Judge.
  Argued and submitted February 8, 2024.
   Collin McKean argued the cause for appellant. Also on
the briefs was McKean Smith.
   Michelle L. Prosser argued the cause for respondent. Also
on the brief was Stahancyk, Kent & Hook, P.C.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Kamins,
Judge.
  KAMINS, J.
  Affirmed.
392                                                      Ward and Ward

         KAMINS, J.
         Father appeals from the judgment in this dissolution
proceeding. The parties were married for nearly 14 years
and share three minor children. Following a trial, the trial
court issued a letter opinion deciding the disputed matters
between the parties and entered judgment. Father raises
three assignments of error challenging the trial court’s deci-
sions on child custody, spousal support, and attorney fees.
We affirm.
         At the outset, we address a question of preserva-
tion that impacts father’s arguments on appeal. Father’s
arguments rely, in great part, on the premise that the trial
court erred in failing to enforce the terms of documents that
he asserts constitute a stipulated agreement of dissolution
filed by the parties in Cowlitz County, Washington (plead-
ings which were rejected by the Cowlitz County Court) prior
to the commencement of the present litigation. Mother con-
tends that father failed to preserve the argument that the
trial court must abide by the terms of the Cowlitz County
agreement. We agree. Although the parties discussed the
Cowlitz County agreement before the trial court, father did
not seek to enforce the agreement’s terms. See Peeples v.
Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219, 191 P3d 637 (2008) (“The general
requirement that an issue, to be raised and considered on
appeal, ordinarily must first be presented to the trial court
is well-settled in our jurisprudence.”).
         Father seeks de novo review of all three assign-
ments of error. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (“Upon an appeal in an
equitable action or proceeding other than an appeal from
a judgment in a proceeding for the termination of parental
rights, the Court of Appeals, acting in its sole discretion, may
try the cause anew upon the record or make one or more fac-
tual findings anew upon the record.”). We consider a series
of factors in deciding whether to take de novo review. ORAP
5.40(8)(d).1 Because the parties have provided us with an
   1
       ORAP 5.40(8)(d) provides:
       “The Court of Appeals considers the items set out below to be relevant to
   the decision whether to exercise its discretion to try the cause anew on the
   record or make one or more factual findings anew on the record. These con-
   siderations, which are neither exclusive nor binding, are published to inform
   and assist the bar and the public.
Cite as 331 Or App 391 (2024)                                                393

analysis of those factors, we address them here. In certain
“exceptional cases,” we will exercise de novo review of a trial
court’s decision, Dept. of Human Services v. D. W. M., 296
Or App 109, 111, 437 P3d 1186 (2019) (citing ORAP 5.40(8)(c));
in making that determination, we consider the factors con-
tained in ORAP 5.40(8)(d)).
          Initially, we note that father generally requests that
we find certain facts anew (or perhaps try the entire case
anew), but he fails to identify which facts with any specific-
ity, making our evaluation of his request for de novo review
difficult. Turning to the de novo review factors, we first con-
sider whether the trial court made express factual findings,
including demeanor-based credibility findings, which would
weigh against taking de novo review. ORAP 5.40(8)(d)(i).
Here, the record reflects that the trial court made express
factual findings to support its decisions to grant mother
legal custody, award spousal support, and order father to
pay a portion of mother’s attorney fees. Second, we examine
whether the trial court’s decision comports with its express
factual findings or with uncontroverted evidence in the
record, which would also weigh against exercising de novo
review. ORAP 5.40(8)(d)(ii). The trial court’s decision in
this case is consistent with its findings, and its decision is
internally consistent. For instance, the court found that
mother was more “in-tuned” with the children and their
needs, which supports its decision to grant mother legal
      “(i) Whether the trial court made express factual findings, including
   demeanor-based credibility findings.
       “(ii) Whether the trial court’s decision comports with its express factual
   findings or with uncontroverted evidence in the record.
       “(iii) Whether the trial court was specifically alerted to a disputed fac-
   tual matter and the importance of that disputed factual matter to the trial
   court’s ultimate disposition of the case or to the assignment(s) of error raised
   on appeal.
       “(iv) Whether the factual finding(s) that the appellant requests the
   court find anew is important to the trial court’s ruling that is at issue on
   appeal (i.e., whether an appellate determination of the facts in appellant’s
   favor would likely provide a basis for reversing or modifying the trial court’s
   ruling).
        “(v) Whether the trial court made an erroneous legal ruling, reversal or
   modification of which would substantially alter the admissible contents of
   the record (e.g., a ruling on the admissibility of evidence), and determination
   of factual issues on the altered record in the Court of Appeals, rather than
   remand to the trial court for reconsideration, would be judicially efficient.”
394                                          Ward and Ward

custody. See DHS v. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold,
236 Or App 535, 541 n 6, 238 P3d 40 (2010) (“[W]e would
decline to exercise our discretion to review de novo, particu-
larly where, as here, the trial court issued extensive factual
findings, ORAP 5.40(8)(d)(i), and its decision comports with
those findings, ORAP 5.40(8)(d)(ii).”).
         Next, we assess whether the trial court was specif-
ically alerted to the disputed factual matter and the impor-
tance of that matter to the court’s ultimate disposition of
the case or to the assignments of error raised on appeal.
ORAP 5.40(8)(d)(iii). In this case, father contends that the
trial court was alerted to a disputed factual matter—the
enforceability of the Cowlitz County agreement. However,
that is a legal, not a factual, matter. And, although the trial
court was certainly made aware of the existence of those doc-
uments, father did not alert the court to his desire to enforce
them in this proceeding.
          Fourth, we consider whether the facts that we are
requested to find anew are important to the trial court’s rul-
ing that is at issue on appeal. ORAP 5.40(8)(d)(iv). Father
identifies the court’s best-interests determination as the
“factual finding” he requests that this court find anew.
However, a new best-interests decision is not a pure finding
of fact, but a discretionary determination by the trial court.
See Sjomeling v. Lasser, 251 Or App 172, 187 n 10, 285 P3d
1116, rev den, 353 Or 103 (2012) (describing best-interests
determinations as “case-determining ruling[s]” that we
review for abuse of discretion). It is impossible for us to
review this factor without father identifying which factual
findings he requests the court find anew. As such, it does
not weigh toward taking de novo review. Finally, the parties
agree that the fifth factor—whether the trial court made an
erroneous legal ruling, the reversal or modification of which
would substantially alter the admissible contents of the
record, ORAP 5.40(8)(d)(v)—is inapplicable in this case. In
sum, we are unconvinced that this case is an “exceptional”
one, D. W. M., 296 Or App at 111, warranting de novo review.
         Accordingly, we turn to the merits, reviewing the
trial court’s custody determination for an abuse of dis-
cretion, and we will reverse the decision only if it is not a
Cite as 331 Or App 391 (2024)                                                395

“legally permissible one.” Southard and Larkins, 275 Or App
89, 97-98, 364 P3d 1006 (2015), rev den, 359 Or 39 (2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In his first assignment
of error, father argues that the trial court erred in granting
legal custody to mother. Father first contends that the trial
court did not correctly apply the best-interests factors, spe-
cifically taking issue with the trial court’s analysis under
ORS 107.137(1)(e) and (f).2
         We conclude that the trial court adequately applied
the factors. Although the trial court observed that father
“has worked to become an equal caregiver,” the court iden-
tified mother as “the primary caregiver,” ORS 107.137(1)
(e). And, in its analysis of ORS 107.137(1)(f), the trial court
weighed evidence that father had drained the parties’ bank
account, leaving mother no money to support herself or the
children, threw away family memorabilia, and for a time
failed to make an effort to see the children. While father
points to conflicting evidence in the record, it cannot be said
that the trial court exercised its discretion in a manner that
is “clearly against all reason and evidence.” Botofan-Miller
and Miller, 365 Or 504, 506, 446 P3d 1280 (2019), cert den,
___ US ___, 141 S Ct 134, 207 L Ed 2d 1079 (2020).
         Within his first assignment of error, father expresses
concern that the trial court, in making its best-interests
determination, faulted father for needlessly litigating the
dissolution in two states. But the record contains evidence
to support the trial court’s finding that father’s decision to
   2
       ORS 107.137(1) provides, in relevant part:
       “Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, in determining
   custody of a minor child under ORS 107.105 or 107.135, the court shall give
   primary consideration to the best interests and welfare of the child. In deter-
   mining the best interests and welfare of the child, the court shall consider
   the following relevant factors:
         “* * * * *
       “(e) The preference for the primary caregiver of the child, if the caregiver
   is deemed fit by the court; and
       “(f) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encour-
   age a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the
   child. However, the court may not consider such willingness and ability if one
   parent shows that the other parent has sexually assaulted or engaged in a
   pattern of behavior of abuse against the parent or a child and that a continu-
   ing relationship with the other parent will endanger the health or safety of
   either parent or the child.”
396                                           Ward and Ward

litigate this matter in two states was in bad faith, causing
both parties to incur additional expenses and thus dimin-
ishing mother’s ability to financially care for the children.
Moreover, the court’s letter opinion reflects that the trial
court otherwise considered all the statutorily prescribed
factors in ORS 107.137(1). Accordingly, we conclude that the
court did not abuse its discretion by considering father’s liti-
gious actions in making its best-interests determination.
         In his second assignment of error, father claims
that the trial court’s award of spousal support was unjust
and unreasonable in amount and duration. In reviewing
a trial court’s decision to award spousal support, we are
tasked with “deciding only if evidence in the record supports
the trial court’s findings and reviewing its legal conclusions
for errors of law.” Wirth and Wirth, 319 Or App 169, 174, 509
P3d 685 (2022). Here, the record shows that, in compliance
with ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C) the trial court considered the
length of the marriage, the age of the parties, the health of
the parties, the standard of living of the parties during the
marriage, the relative earning capacities of the parties and
the parties’ employment skills, and mother’s new partner-
ship and child born with that partner. The court thus “com-
port[ed] with the applicable legal framework and describe[d]
the basic reasons for the decision.” Olson and Olson, 218
Or App 1, 15, 178 P3d 272 (2008). And there is ample evi-
dence in the record to support the trial court findings.
          Father also argues that the trial court erred in
determining that father had spousal support arrearages of
$4,402 for payments due from June through November 2019.
As the trial court observed, father indicated that he agreed
to pay mother $1,500 per month over these six months.
Father testified that he intended to leave $1,500 in the par-
ties’ joint bank account beginning in June 2019. And the fact
that he placed $1,500 per month into a joint account during
the relevant period supports the trial court’s conclusion that
he indeed agreed to pay that amount. Because there was
evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding
that father agreed to pay spousal support, the trial court did
not legally err in ordering father to pay his remaining spou-
sal support obligation. See Stokes and Stokes, 234 Or App
Cite as 331 Or App 391 (2024)                           397

566, 579-80, 228 P3d 701 (2010) (discussing a limited judg-
ment requiring the husband to pay temporary spousal sup-
port retroactively prior to trial).
         Finally, in his third assignment of error, father
contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay
a portion of mother’s attorney fees without adhering to
ORCP 68. We reject the contention. The record shows that
mother filed a motion for attorney fees and costs she accrued
while litigating father’s motion to dismiss. ORCP 68 C(2)(b)
(requiring allegation of entitlement to attorney fees in
motion or response to motion). In that motion, she com-
plied with ORCP 68, explaining why the award of attorney
fees was reasonable and appropriate, presenting a detailed
account of the breakdown of the attorney fees she accrued,
and describing which ORS 20.075 factors the court should
consider in determining the amount of fees to award. Cf.
Cramblit v. Diamond B Constructors, 197 Or App 358, 372,
105 P3d 906 (2005) (concluding that the trial court erred in
awarding attorney fees to the defendant where the defen-
dant “made no attempt to allege the facts, statute, or rule
[that] provides a basis for a fee award” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). On this record, we are unpersuaded that
the trial court erred in ordering father to pay a portion of
mother’s attorney fees.
        Affirmed.