Court Opinion

ID: 9896106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 16:04:50.182749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:00.582318
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Florida
                            ____________

                         No. SC2022-1221
                           ____________

                 MICHAEL GORDON REYNOLDS,
                          Appellant,

                                 vs.

                       STATE OF FLORIDA,
                            Appellee.

                         November 9, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Michael Gordon Reynolds, a prisoner under sentence of death,

appeals the trial court’s order summarily denying his successive

motion for DNA testing filed under Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.853. For the reasons given below, we affirm. 1

                          BACKGROUND

     In 2003, a jury convicted Reynolds of brutally murdering

Danny Privett, Robin Razor, and their eleven-year-old daughter,

Christina Razor. When initially questioned by law enforcement

     1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
about these crimes, Reynolds denied ever entering the victims’

trailer. Yet, during trial, the State introduced DNA evidence

showing that Reynolds’s blood was “scattered throughout the

interior of [that] trailer.” Reynolds v. State (Reynolds I), 934 So. 2d

1128, 1141 (Fla. 2006). Specifically, his blood was on a Rugrats

blanket, a pillow, white panties, and a piece of wood above the air

conditioning unit. Reynolds’s hair was also found in the trailer.

     In addition to the blood and hair evidence, the State also

presented incriminating statements made by Reynolds. For

example, he admitted to having an altercation with Danny several

weeks before the murder. Later, following his formal arrest,

Reynolds confessed to two inmates that he committed the murders.

In addition, the State presented evidence that a car similar to

Reynolds’s vehicle was near the victims’ residence on the night of

the murders and that, the following morning, Reynolds was seen

washing his clothes with bleach.

     During the defense’s case, Reynolds argued a theory of

innocence, suggesting that an individual named Justin Pratt 2 and

      2. Pratt owned the trailer that Danny, Robin, and Christina
lived in at the time of the murders.

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his accomplices were the ones who committed the murders.

Reynolds also sought to undermine the State’s DNA evidence.

According to Reynolds, that evidence was contaminated and

mishandled and, thus, should not be credited.

     Ultimately, the jury found Reynolds guilty of four crimes,

including two counts of first-degree murder for killing Robin and

Christina and one count of second-degree murder for killing Danny.

At the penalty phase, following the State’s presentation of

aggravating circumstances, Reynolds waived his right to introduce

mitigating evidence. Thereafter, the penalty-phase jury

unanimously recommended a sentence of death for each first-

degree murder conviction.

     During the ensuing Spencer 3 hearing, Reynolds pressed a

theory of residual doubt, which he supported through his own

testimony. After the sentencing hearing, the court imposed two

death sentences.

     On direct appeal, we affirmed the convictions and death

sentences in all respects. Reynolds I, 934 So. 2d at 1161. Since

     3. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).

                                -3-
that time, Reynolds has unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief

on several occasions. Relevant to this appeal, Reynolds requested

DNA testing of 24 items of physical evidence in a 2013 motion. The

trial court denied that motion, and Reynolds appealed. We affirmed

on the merits, noting that the testing “would not give rise to a

reasonable probability of acquittal or lead to a lesser sentence in

light of Reynolds’ previous confession and other DNA evidence

pointing to his presence at the crime scene.” Reynolds v. State

(Reynolds II), 192 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 2015) (table decision).

     The current case arose after Reynolds filed a second motion

requesting DNA testing. All the items he requested to be tested in

the successive motion were documented at the time of his trial, and

a majority of them were the subject of his prior unsuccessful rule

3.853 motion. The trial court summarily denied the successive

motion, finding it procedurally barred and insufficiently pled.

Reynolds now appeals.

                              ANALYSIS

     Reynolds argues that the trial court erred in summarily

denying his successive motion for DNA testing. Because his DNA

                                 -4-
claim is both procedurally barred and without merit, he is not

entitled to relief. 4

                                  I.

      Reynolds’s request for DNA testing is procedurally barred.

“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction proceedings are

procedurally barred from being relitigated in a successive motion.”

Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014) (citing Van

Poyck v. State, 116 So. 3d 347, 362 (Fla. 2013)). Additionally, a

postconviction litigant is barred from bringing any claims that could

have been raised in prior litigation. See Barwick v. State, 361 So.

3d 785, 795 (Fla. 2023); see also State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287,

290 (Fla. 2003) (noting that collateral estoppel bars identical parties

from relitigating the same issue in later proceeding).

      In Reynolds’s 2013 motion, he requested, among other things,

the testing of white panties, a concrete block, a switch plate, the

victims’ clothing, and hair found in one victim’s hand. The current

motion also requested testing of those same items. Because we

have already affirmed the denial of additional DNA testing on these

     4. “The standard of review here is de novo.” Rogers v. State,
327 So. 3d 784, 787 n.5 (Fla. 2021).

                                 -5-
pieces of evidence, Reynolds II, 192 So. 3d at 41, Reynolds’s claims

as to those items are now barred.

     Reynolds also requests DNA testing on certain items that were

not included in the prior motion. 5 However, his request for DNA

testing of these items is still procedurally barred. See Barwick, 361

So. 3d at 795 (affirming denial of claim that could have been raised

in prior postconviction proceeding). The additional items were

known to Reynolds at the time of his trial—well before the filing of

his prior motion. Reynolds failed to include these items in his

earlier motion, despite being aware of their existence. He is thus

barred on res judicata grounds from now requesting that those

items be tested. See Tanzi v. State, 94 So. 3d 482, 494 (Fla. 2012);

Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1254-55 (Fla. 2004) (holding that

res judicata bars claims that could have been raised in earlier

proceedings).6

     5. Though not entirely clear, items CR22 (swabs); ME10
(blood stains); ME11 (blood stains); TC57 (a ring with hair); K10-
K12 (hair); K13 (hair); Q6 (hair); Q10-Q14 (hair); Q15-Q19 (hair);
Q30-Q34 (hair); Q72 (hair); and RR1 (swabs) appear to be new
requests.

      6. In addition, the methods of testing requested by Reynolds
in his successive motion—mitochondrial DNA testing, Y-STR, and

                                 -6-
                                  II.

     Even if Reynolds’s claim were not procedurally barred, his

motion still would not support relief. Under rule 3.853, Reynolds

was required to demonstrate that there was “a reasonable

probability that [he] would have been acquitted or . . . received a

lesser sentence” had “the DNA evidence . . . been admitted at trial.”

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(5)(C); Hitchcock v. State, 866 So. 2d 23, 27

(Fla. 2004) (noting that the petitioner must “demonstrate the nexus

between the potential results of DNA testing on each piece of

evidence and the issues in the case”). Reynolds cannot meet this

standard.

     Inconsistent with Reynolds’s contention that DNA evidence will

exonerate him—which is based on his premise that DNA evidence

was the primary reason for his guilt—we have repeatedly found that

Reynolds’s convictions do not depend solely on DNA evidence.

See Reynolds I, 934 So. 2d at 1146; Reynolds II, 192 So. 3d at 41.

As we noted in Reynolds’s direct appeal:

     [T]he State also introduced expert testimony from a
     medical examiner demonstrating that the injury to

M-VAC—were all available when he previously requested DNA
testing in 2013.

                                 -7-
     Reynolds’ hand was inconsistent with his explanation of
     the injury; testimony from a neighbor of the victims who
     saw Danny Privett sitting on Reynolds’ car, which was
     parked at the victims’ residence the night the crimes were
     committed; microscopic and DNA analysis of a pubic hair
     found at the crime scene matched a hair sample taken
     from Reynolds; Reynolds’ admission during an interview
     with law officers that he had a heated argument with
     Danny Privett; eyewitness testimony corroborating the
     circumstances surrounding the argument between
     Reynolds and Danny Privett; evidence that Reynolds
     denied ever being in the victims’ residence—a statement
     that was clearly inconsistent with the considerable DNA
     evidence presented at trial which placed him inside the
     trailer; testimony from Reynolds’ neighbor who saw him
     washing clothes at 5:30 a.m. on the morning the bodies
     were discovered; clothes found hanging on Reynolds’
     clothesline the morning the bodies were discovered that
     appeared to have been strongly bleached; and the
     testimony of two prisoners who had previously been
     incarcerated with Reynolds that Reynolds admitted to
     them that he had in fact committed the crimes.

Reynolds I, 934 So. 2d at 1146.

     Given the evidence presented at trial, there is no reasonable

probability that additional testing would lead to an acquittal.

See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(5)(C).

     Reynolds also failed to show that there is a reasonable

probability that DNA testing would result in a reduced sentence.

See id. He asserts that Pratt’s (or some other unknown assailant’s)

involvement in the murders provides a basis for his death sentences

                                  -8-
to be reduced to life sentences. In support of this mitigated-

sentence argument, he relies on the doctrine of relative culpability.

However, during the pendency of this appeal, we abandoned that

doctrine. Cruz v. State, 48 Fla. L. Weekly S140, S144 (Fla. July 6,

2023). 7 Accordingly, Reynolds’s argument relying on relative

culpability cannot support his request for additional DNA testing.

Thus, Reynolds’s reduced-sentence argument also fails.

                           CONCLUSION

     For the reasons given above, we affirm the trial court’s denial

of Reynolds’s successive motion for DNA testing.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
SASSO, J., did not participate.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County,
    Donna L. Surratt-McIntosh, Judge
    Case No. 591998CF003341A000XX

     7. Regardless, relative culpability would not have applied to
Reynolds because the claim is speculative. The State did not
charge anyone else besides Reynolds with the murders, nor is there
reason to believe the State would do so.

                                 -9-
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Julissa R.
Fontán, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle
Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

     for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Patrick
Bobek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,

     for Appellee

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