Court Opinion

ID: 9641339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:29:28.638073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:36.083645
License: Public Domain

(concurring).
I concur.
This appeal once more raises the rule of evidence prohibiting cross-examination of a witness about prior arrests, charges, or indictments which do not lead to conviction. The State now urges the court to re*618lax the rule where the cross-examiner is trying to show that the witness is biased or has an interest in the outcome of the trial. The witness in this case contradicted the police version of a scuffle between defendant and two police officers. The State asserts that it may impeach the witness by placing his arrest record before the jury to show that he was prejudiced against policemen and may have been lying to “get back” for past arrests.
The State’s argument shows that confusion still surrounds the evidentiary rule against admission of police records to impeach a witness’ character for truthfulness. I find (1) that the rule is strict and allows rare exceptions; (2) that prior arrests do not, in any event, establish bias or interest in the outcome of a criminal prosecution; and (3) that the use of police arrest records to impugn a witness’ good name tends to discriminate invidiously against black people as a class and should be prohibited as a matter of public policy.
The majority opinion sets out in some detail the rule prohibiting cross-examination about arrests, charges, or indictments. I would add that this rule does not admit to the policy of multiple admissibility, whereby evidence which is inadmissible for one reason becomes admissible for another.
Furthermore, the rule allows few exceptions. As this court noted in State v. Williams, 492 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.App.1973), a prosecution witness may be cross-examined about an indictment in the same court if such questioning would tend to show that the witness’ testimony may have been influenced by an offer of leniency or immunity. See State v. Bradley, 234 S.W.2d 556 (Mo.1951) and State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969). An exception has also been found where two persons have been indicted for the same offense and one testifies in support of the other. Cross-examination about the fact of the indictment has been allowed to show mutuality of interest between the two defendants. Keveney v. State, 109 Ohio St. 64, 141 N.E. 845 (1923).
The reason for the rule against admission of arrest records is fundamental to our system of justice. A man is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Testimony about an arrest is mere hearsay. Without more, it says nothing about a person’s guilt or character for truth and veracity. It happens to the innocent as well as the guilty. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948).
The State contends, however, that a witness may be cross-examined about his arrest record if the sole purpose of the questioning is to show bias or prejudice against policemen. Implicit in this contention is the argument that the rule against admission of arrest evidence may be evaded by multiple admissibility. This notion has been rejected.
But even if we assume arguendo that such evidence might be admitted, I fail to see how a person’s arrest record can establish bias or prejudice. The law is well-settled that a cross-examiner may question a witness about his bias or interest in a case in suit. But the bias must be personal against one of the parties to the suit, and the interest must be particular in the outcome of that suit. See State v. Curry, 372 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.1963); State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942 (Mo.1958) and Thornton v. Vonallmon, 456 S.W.2d 795 (Mo.App.1970). Here the State alleges only a general prejudice against all policemen as a class. Policemen as a class are not parties to this proceeding.
The fact of past arrests also offers little to show prejudice on the part of the witness towards policemen. The alleged prejudice might just as well be found in both directions. An actual showing of the witness’ bias would require more evidence than this, and would lead to time-consuming trials on issues collateral to the defendant’s guilt. The basic purpose of the trial *619would be lost in a maze of irrelevant and prejudicial (to the defendant) facts.
I am finally convinced that, because of the distinct possibility of discrimination, a person’s arrest record should not be used against him in court, for any purpose, as a matter of both law and public policy. Crime and population statistics have established that blacks are arrested much more frequently than whites. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 27 percent of all arrests in 1970 and 1971 have involved Negroes.1 Yet blacks make up only 11.1 percent of the national population. Other authorities report that adult blacks are arrested about five times as often as whites,2 and that 56 percent of the black males residing in our major cities have been arrested at one time or another.3
If we were to permit the use of police arrest records to impeach witnesses, to show either untruthfulness or bias, we would be allowing the burden of an unsound rule of evidence to fall harder on blacks than whites. Black citizens would be discouraged from appearing in court to exercise their constitutional rights to free speech and a fair trial. Some 56 percent of the black males in society might be effectively foreclosed from giving any testimony at trial. This result is unconscionable. The potential harm of such an exception far outweighs the minimal probative value to be gained by allowing such testimony or cross-examination.
For these reasons and the reasons given in the majority opinion, I concur with the majority in reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the case for a new trial.

. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (1970, 1971).

. Tlie Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. A Report by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 44 (1967).

.Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 247 (1968).