Court Opinion

ID: 9774756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:32:39.528401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:15.139636
License: Public Domain

TIJERINA, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
*174The established general rule of venue provides that a defendant is entitled to be sued in his county of residence unless it clearly appears that one exception set forth in TEX.REY.CIY.STAT.ANN. art. 1995 applies. See Goodrich v. Superior Oil Co., 150 Tex. 159, 237 S.W.2d 969, 972 (1951). In the instant case the evidence favorable to the implied findings and the judgment clearly established that appellant and appellee entered into a written contract whereby ap-pellee was to perform labor and services on appellant’s oil and gas well located in La Salle County. It is undisputed that the C-l Well on the Cooke “C” Unit was located in La Salle County and that appellee reentered and reworked this well increasing production. The dispute as to whether appel-lee timely performed under the contract will have to be determined on the trial of the merits. The written agreement of the parties appears in the record as exhibit B and exhibit C and provides in pertinent part as follows:
You agree that in the event we timely commence the re-entry operations upon the C-l well, we shall have an option for a period of one-hundred twenty (120) days from the date said well is recomplet-ed as a producer of oil or gas ... to re-enter the Cooke B-l well located on the lands described under lease No. 1 above and to re-work said well ....
In the event we have timely commenced re-entry operations upon the B-l well, you grant to us an option for a period of one-hundred twenty (120) days from the date we either recomplete said well as a producer of oil or gas or abandon same as a dry hole, to re-enter the Cooke A-l well located on the lands covered by leases Nos. 2 through 5 as listed above,....
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(2) During all of our operations on any well your representative shall have full access to the derrick floor at all times and to all information regarding the well. ■
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Thus it appears that both appellant and appellee were to perform under the written contract in La Salle County. It was further stipulated that the wells in question were located in La Salle County. Under subdivision 5(a) of article 1995, supra, the written contract must expressly name the county of performance or a definite place therein. Harkness v. Employers National Insurance Co., 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.1973); Durant Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Towel & Uniform Co., 624 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ). Proof of the existence of a cause of action is not required under subdivision 5. See Vahlsing, Inc. v. Esco Ltd., 496 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1973, writ dism’d). Separate instruments contemporaneously executed as a part of the same transaction and relating to the same subject matter may be construed together as a single instrument. Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex.1979).
The trial court resolved all disputed fact issues for venue purposes, and the appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Gulf Energy & Development Corp. v. Davis, 624 S.W.2d 394, 395 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1981, no writ). The exception to exclusive venue was clearly established under subdivision 5(a) of article 1995, supra. I would deny the motion for rehearing.