Court Opinion

ID: 9859601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:07:25.203248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:54:54.413012
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, specially concurring: I do not have major disagreement with the result of the majority opinion. However, I believe that the analysis regarding the denial of the motion to suppress is overly broad. Therefore, I submit the following analysis to affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. The officers arrested defendant because of two outstanding warrants, one for a felony charge and one for a misdemeanor trespass charge. The felony warrant was, unbeknownst to the officers, withdrawn. The officers therefore had a rational basis to take defendant to the county jail rather than to a local police department. Assuming, arguendo, that they did not have a rational basis, the result would be the same. Defendant’s argument regarding the statutory basis for suppression, including the argument regarding the “general population” of the jail, is a red herring. Defendant has failed to cite to any authority that suggests that a criminal defendant has the right to be taken to a municipal facility, instead of being remanded to the sheriff or a correctional institution, when a court enters an order of arrest. Defendant was processed in the ordinary course of the jail procedures and was strip-searched. Defendant claims that he should not have been strip-searched because of section 103 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code), which provides: “No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled substance, shall be strip searched unless there is reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance.” 725 ILCS 5/103 — 1(c) (West 2002) The trial court found that the above section was inapplicable because it “shall not apply when the person is taken into custody by or remanded to the sheriff or correctional institution pursuant to a court order.” See 725 ILCS 5/103 — 10') (West 2002). The misdemeanor warrant, although for trespass rather than a weapons or controlled substance violation, was instituted by a trial court and, therefore, was pursuant to an order of the court. The bench warrant, unlike that in Johnson, was not for a failure to appear, even though the trial court here made reference to failure to appear as a distinguishing difference. I believe that it is immaterial whether a warrant is based upon a criminal charge or a failure to appear so long as the warrant is issued by a court. Defendant places substantial emphasis on his assertion that he was not going to be put into the “general population” of a correctional institution and, thus, that the section 103 — l(j) exception should not apply to section 103 — 1(c). There is no exception relating to the “general population” in the section 103 — l(j) exception. Therefore, the section 103 — l(j) exception applies and there is no reason to address defendant’s statutory argument further. Defendant also asserts that the strip search was a violation of his fourth amendment rights. I agree with the analysis of the majority regarding this argument. Finally, I have an observation regarding the analysis concerning the stipulated bench trial. The majority states as follows: “There is no question of fact involved here; the first issue presents solely a question of law. This court reviews pure questions of law under a de novo standard of review, without deference to the circuit court. People ex rel. Waller v. Harrison, 348 Ill. App. 3d 976, 979 (2004). Accordingly, we hold that whether a stipulation amounts to a guilty plea is a question to be reviewed de novo.” 353 Ill. App. 3d at 844. I believe that the conclusion, “whether a stipulation amounts to a guilty plea is a question to be reviewed de novo,” is overly broad. Additionally, it is not clear whether the two clauses in the first quoted sentence constitute a premise and a conclusion based upon the premise, or if the clauses are independent. I can foresee other instances where there may be questions of fact as to what the stipulation may have been. I believe that the conclusion is correct only when there are no questions of fact involved as indicated in the first sentence of the quote, but not in the conclusion. Therefore, I wish to distance myself from the pronouncement of the de novo standard of review which implies or holds that de novo review applies in all cases involving a purported stipulation constituting a guilty plea.