Court Opinion

ID: 9899704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 16:06:56.040665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.467575
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                         No. 123,260

                                     STATE OF KANSAS,
                                        Appellant,

                                              v.

                                    MARIA ACADIA RUIZ,
                                        Appellee.

                               SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
       The Kansas Department of Revenue does not have an "interest" in unremitted
sales taxes collected by retailers under the Kansas Retailers' Sales Tax Act, K.S.A. 79-
3601 et seq., and is thus not an "owner" of those unremitted taxes for purposes of K.S.A.
2022 Supp. 21-5801.

2.
       For purposes of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5801, a retailer does not exert unauthorized
control over collected sales taxes by failing to remit them at the time mandated by K.S.A.
79-3607.

3.
       The Kansas Retailers' Sales Tax Act imposes statutory duties upon retailers with
respect to the collection and payment of sales taxes. K.S.A. 79-3615 provides the State a
self-contained set of remedies for a retailer's violation of those statutory duties.

                                               1
4.
        Collected, unremitted sales taxes do not qualify as a "debt" between retailers and
the Kansas Department of Revenue within the meaning of section 16 of the Kansas
Constitution Bill of Rights.

        Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed April 8, 2022.
Appeal from Ford District Court; LAURA H. LEWIS, judge. Oral argument held December 14, 2022.
Opinion filed November 17, 2023. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is
reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.

        Jodi Litfin, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy
solicitor general, Stacy Edwards, deputy attorney general, Rebecca Silvermintz, assistant attorney general,
Derek Schmidt, former attorney general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with her on the
briefs for appellant.

        Patrick H. Dunn, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs
for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

        WILSON, J.: After Maria Acadia Ruiz failed to remit almost $50,000 in sales taxes
she collected while operating her business, the State charged her with one count each of
felony theft and violation of the Kansas Retailers' Sales Tax Act. On Ruiz' motion after
preliminary hearing, the district court dismissed the felony theft charge as multiplicitous.
A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the two charges were
not multiplicitous and that the State presented sufficient evidence to bind Ruiz over on
the felony theft charge.

                                                        2
       Ruiz petitioned this court for review, which we granted. After oral arguments, we
ordered the parties to submit additional briefing, which they did. We conclude that the
State's theory of felony theft is insufficient as a matter of law on these facts. Here, the
State is not an "owner" of the taxes for purposes of our felony theft statute, so Ruiz did
not exercise "unauthorized control" over them. Rather, the taxes she owed to the State
constitute a specific, legislatively created liability. Finally, the opening phrase of the
Kansas Retailers' Sales Tax Act's criminal penalty provision, and the potential civil
penalties throughout the entire statutory section, convey legislative intent to confine the
applicable criminal ramifications to those set forth in the Act. We thus affirm the district
court's dismissal of Ruiz' felony theft charge and reverse the panel's ruling on the same
point, although on different grounds.

                             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       According to evidence presented at the preliminary hearing before the district
magistrate judge, Ruiz started a business in 2014 called Ruiz Enterprise LLC. As the
business' sole member-manager, Ruiz ran a restaurant called the Inn Pancake House in
Dodge City, Kansas. Between August 2015 and December 2016, Ruiz' business filed
sales tax returns without paying any sales tax—a total of $50,774.06 over the period—
although Ruiz subsequently paid $1,500 to bring the total down to $49,274.06. Rather
than paying the collected taxes to the state, Ruiz spent the money on routine business
expenses because her business "fell on hard times."

       Ruiz' business closed in 2017. Since then, Ruiz has made no payments toward the
$49,274.06 still outstanding.

       The State ultimately charged Ruiz with one count of violating the Kansas
Retailers' Sales Tax Act (Tax Act), and one count of felony theft. Ruiz moved to dismiss

                                               3
the felony theft charge, arguing the charge impermissibly "attempts to expand the tax
act." After the parties argued the motion at preliminary hearing, the district magistrate
judge denied the motion, concluding "that the specific and general crime [doctrine] does
not apply to this case, that there are two separate crimes that were committed and that she
could be prosecuted on both." The magistrate also found sufficient evidence to bind Ruiz
over on felony theft.

       Ruiz appealed to the district court, the appropriate procedure when the magistrate
judge is a lay person. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3609a(1). After a hearing, at which the State
discussed the general/specific offense doctrine set out in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5109(d),
the district court dismissed the felony theft charge on multiplicity grounds. Although the
court wrote that it '"does not find a need to address the parties' additional arguments of
general vs. specific statutory analysis or the Rule of Lenity,"' it still discussed aspects of
the parties' general vs. specific arguments. State v. Ruiz, No. 123,260, 2022 WL 1051898,
at *2 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion).

       After the district court denied the State's subsequent motion to reconsider, the
State moved to dismiss the Tax Act violation charge without prejudice, which the district
court did. The State then appealed.

       A panel of the Court of Appeals declined to address the general/specific offense
statute (K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5109[d]), or the doctrine itself, because the district court
"explicitly declined to make a finding on the general versus specific statute rule." Ruiz,
2022 WL 1051898, at *4. The panel instead suggested the parties raise the issue on
remand. 2022 WL 1051898, at *4. The panel also rejected the district court's multiplicity
analysis. 2022 WL 1051898, at *3. Finally, the panel concluded that the State presented
sufficient evidence for the court to bind Ruiz over on felony theft. 2022 WL 1051898, at
*5.

                                               4
       Ruiz petitioned this court for review, which we granted. After the parties presented
oral arguments to this court, we ordered them to submit additional briefing on four
questions we raised sua sponte. First, is a pretrial motion to dismiss on multiplicity
grounds premature? Second, is a claim for relief under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5109(d)
(statutory codification of the general/specific doctrine) premature? Third, what have other
states' appellate courts said about whether a person may be convicted of both a failure to
pay a tax imposed and theft when interpreting statutes similar to ours? Finally, does
imprisonment for the crimes charged here violate section 16 of the Kansas Constitution
Bill of Rights? The parties submitted thorough briefs on these questions, clearing the way
for our analysis. E.g., City of Wichita v. Trotter, 316 Kan. 310, 322, 514 P.3d 1050
(2022) (when an appellate court sua sponte raises an issue, counsel should be afforded a
fair opportunity to brief the new issue).

                                            ANALYSIS

       At their core, all of Ruiz' challenges—whether predicated on multiplicity, the
general/specific offense doctrine codified by K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5109(d), the self-
contained nature of the Tax Act, the sufficiency of the evidence, or the definition of
"owner" for purposes of our theft statute, K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5801(a) and (b)(2)—
center on the asserted legal incompatibility between statutory theft and a statutory Tax
Act violation. We thus consider her claims collectively as presenting a question of
statutory construction.

       We review issues of statutory construction de novo. E.g., State v. George, 311
Kan. 693, 696, 466 P.3d 469 (2020). Our framework is well known:

                                               5
               "'The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the
       Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. In ascertaining this intent, we begin
       with the plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary meaning.
       When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about
       the legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading
       something into the statute that is not readily found in its words. But if a statute's language
       is ambiguous, we will consult our canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity.'

               "An apparently clear statute may nevertheless manifest ambiguity when applied
       to the particular facts of a case. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Scheuerman, 314 Kan. 583,
       587, 502 P.3d 502, cert. denied 143 S. Ct. 403 (2022).

       Thus, K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5109 provides our starting point:

               "(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of
       more than one crime under the laws of this state, the defendant may be prosecuted for
       each of such crimes. . . .

               ....

               "(d) Unless otherwise provided by law, when crimes differ only in that one is
       defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a
       specific instance of such conduct, the defendant:

               (1) May not be convicted of the two crimes based upon the same conduct; and

               (2) shall be sentenced according to the terms of the more specific crime."

       We next turn to the statutory definitions of the crimes charged: a Tax Act
violation and felony theft. K.S.A. 79-3615, in relevant part, sets forth criminal penalties
for applicable violations of the Tax Act:

                                                     6
               "(h) In addition to all other penalties provided by this section, any person who
       willfully fails to make a return or to pay any tax imposed under the Kansas retailers' sales
       tax act, or who makes a false or fraudulent return, or fails to keep any books or records
       prescribed by this act, or who willfully violates any regulations of the secretary of
       revenue, for the enforcement and administration of this act, or who aids and abets another
       in attempting to evade the payment of any tax imposed by this act, or who violates any
       other provision of this act, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not less than $500, nor
       more than $10,000, or be imprisoned in the county jail not less than one month, nor more
       than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned, in the discretion of the court."
       (Emphases added.)

       K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5801, in relevant part, defines theft:

               "(a) Theft is any of the following acts done with intent to permanently deprive
       the owner of the possession, use or benefit of the owner's property or services:

               (1) Obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over property or services;

               ....

               "(b) Theft of:

               ....

               (2) property or services of the value of at least $25,000 but less than $100,000 is
               a severity level 7, nonperson felony." (Emphases added.)

       Central to its theft charge, the State alleges that Ruiz exerted unauthorized control
over $49,274.06 in collected sales taxes by intentionally failing to remit those funds with
an intent to permanently deprive the State—the funds' owner—of their possession, use, or

                                                     7
benefit. While this legal theory at first sounds plausible, a detailed examination of the
elements reveals its infirmities.

       K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5111(s) broadly defines "owner" as "a person who has any
interest in property," (emphasis added) and K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5111(t) clarifies that
the Kansas Department of Revenue—as a government agency—is a "person." K.S.A.
2022 Supp. 21-5111(w) defines "property" as "anything of value, tangible or intangible,
real or personal."

       While it may at first appear the amount of sales tax collected by a retailer would
constitute an "interest" in "property," the State has no immediate right to that specific
amount, any more than it has an immediate right to the retailer's property in general. The
tax "property" exists, if at all, only as a liability on a balance sheet to be paid on a
statutorily mandated date. The retailer may deposit all the funds in her own bank account,
and the State has no right even to question the bank account's balance, let alone attempt
to do anything with the collective amount—whether it is payment for the pancakes or for
the sales tax on the pancakes. No law prevents the funds from being commingled or even
spent before the taxes become due.

       So what, if any, "interest" does the State have in collected, unpaid sales taxes?
After all, while a balance sheet liability may have "value" as an accounting construct—
and so qualifies as "property" under the broad definition of the Kansas Criminal Code—
its inherently unrealized nature undercuts the notion that the State has an "interest" in it
under our theft statute. The answer to this question also necessarily casts doubt on
whether—and at what point—a retailer exercises "unauthorized" control over sales taxes.
To better understand these problems, we take a step back to consider the duties imposed
on retailers by our tax statutes.

                                               8
       K.S.A. 79-3603 establishes a tax on the sale of various goods and the provision of
various services "[f]or the privilege of engaging in the business of selling tangible
personal property at retail in this state or rendering or furnishing any of the services
taxable under this act." K.S.A. 79-3604 then details a retailer's obligations under the Tax
Act:

                 "The tax levied under the Kansas retailers' sales tax act shall be paid by the
       consumer or user to the retailer and it shall be the duty of each and every retailer in this
       state to collect from the consumer or user, the full amount of the tax imposed or an
       amount equal as nearly as possible or practicable to the average equivalent thereof. Such
       tax shall be a debt from the consumer or user to the retailer, when so added to the original
       purchase price, and shall be recoverable at law in the same manner as other debts . . . .

                 ....

                 "Whenever the director of taxation determines that in the retail sale of any
       tangible personal property or services because of the nature of the operation of the
       business including the turnover of independent contractors, the lack of a place of business
       in which to display a registration certificate or keep records, the lack of adequate records
       or because such retailers are minors or transients there is a likelihood that the state will
       lose tax funds due to the difficulty of policing such business operations, it shall be the
       duty of the vendor to such person to collect the full amount of the tax imposed by this act
       and to make a return and payment of the tax to the director of taxation in like manner as
       that provided for the making of returns and the payment of taxes by retailers under the
       provisions of this act. The director shall notify the vendor or vendors to such retailer of
       the duty to collect and make a return and payment of the tax.

                 "In the event the full amount of the tax provided by this act is not paid to the
       retailer by the consumer or user, the director of taxation may proceed directly against the
       consumer or user to collect the full amount of the tax due on the retail sale." (Emphases
       added.)

                                                      9
       K.S.A. 79-3607 imposes additional duties upon retailers, including filing returns.
K.S.A. 79-3607(a) clarifies that "[t]he retailer shall, at the time of making such return,
pay to the director the amount of tax herein imposed," although it also empowers the
director of taxation to "extend the time for making returns and paying the tax required by
this act for any period not to exceed 60 days under such rules and regulations as the
secretary of revenue may prescribe." K.S.A. 79-3617 establishes a procedure for the
collection of delinquent taxes, which includes the issuance of a warrant and the initiation
of court proceedings. Finally, K.S.A. 79-3615 sets forth a plethora of interest and
penalties that may be added to the tax assessments for various violations of the Tax Act,
along with ways the interest and penalties may be waived, reduced, abated, or refunded.

       Thus, the ultimate destiny of sales taxes—whether or not collected by a retailer—
rests with the State, by statute. But this is different from the State having an "interest" in
the collected sales taxes for purposes of the Kansas Criminal Code. We have previously
recognized that "owners" may commit theft by stealing their own property from those to
whom a special, superior possessory interest has been granted. E.g., State v. Etape, 237
Kan. 380, 383, 699 P.2d 532 (1985) ("one who has a mechanic's lien on property has a
superior possessory interest as against the general owner, and if the general owner takes
the property without permission and without satisfying the lien he may be guilty of theft
provided it is done with a felonious intent to deprive the lienholder of his rights"); State v.
Coburn, 220 Kan. 750, 756, 556 P.2d 382 (1976) (in a theft case when multiple parties
claimed ownership over tangible property, court held that a consideration of which party
"'had a greater right to possession'" "comport[ed] with our statutory definition of an
owner as one who has 'any interest in property'").

       "Under ordinary circumstances a person cannot commit a larceny by taking possession of
       his own property, but, if the general owner has transferred a special interest or ownership

                                                   10
       to another, one taking the possession of the property from the other, with the intent to
       deprive him of his rights and interest, may be guilty of larceny." State v. Hubbard, 126
       Kan. 129, 131, 266 P. 939 (1928).

But the tax statutes do not grant KDOR a superior possessory right—and thus an
interest—in the collected sales taxes. Instead, they grant KDOR the authority to proceed
against a delinquent taxpayer for the collection of those taxes in various ways, including
the imposition of statutory penalties. In other words, our Tax Act does not grant the State
an ownership interest in a retailer's general accounts; it merely imposes on the retailer the
duty to pay the State the taxes it owes—a duty reinforced by statutory penalties and other
enforcement mechanisms specific to the Tax Act.

       Further, nothing in our tax statutes either imposes a fiduciary duty upon retailers in
favor of the State or requires a retailer to set aside collected sales taxes in a trust or
separate account, as some jurisdictions do. For example, in Kibbey v. State, 733 N.E.2d
991, 995 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), the tax statute specifically stated the retail taxes were
held from the time of collection "'in trust for the state,'" giving the State an explicit, and
immediate, interest in the collected funds. Likewise, in State v. Kennedy, 130 N.C. App.
399, 402, 503 S.E.2d 133 (1998), aff'd 350 N.C. 87, 511 S.E.2d 305 (1999), the sales tax
collected was statutorily required to be held by the retailer "as trustee for and on account
of the State . . . ." And while the Texas Court of Appeals in Davis v. State, 904 S.W.2d
946, 953 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), found an implicit agency relationship creating a fiduciary
duty to the state in those segregated tax dollars, we find no such implication in our tax
act. Instead, our statutes leave retailers free to comingle collected sales taxes with the rest
of their general funds. Thus, as long as the retailer collects the appropriate tax from
purchasers and is able to pay the required amount of sales taxes from some source at the
time the payment is due, it fulfills its statutory obligations under K.S.A. 79-3604 and
K.S.A. 79-3607(a). We do not read these statutes to grant the State constructive

                                                   11
ownership over a retailer's accounts just because the Tax Act confers upon retailers a duty
to remit collected taxes. Instead, the Tax Act provides enforcement mechanisms for the
State to collect on the amount owed to it by retailers if they fail to remit payment at the
time they make a return, as Ruiz did.

       Of the cases cited by the parties in response to our request for supplemental
briefing, two stand out as particularly persuasive. First, in State v. Marcotte, 418 A.2d
1118, 1119 (Me. 1980), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered whether an
individual could be charged both with failure to remit sales taxes and with theft by
misapplication of property. Noting the concern voiced in comments to the theft by
misapplication of property statute that its subject matter "'lies close to the border between
criminality and mere civil failure to perform a contractual obligation,'" 418 A.2d at 1119,
the court concluded that, under the theft by misapplication of property statute:

       "[I]f there exists no agreement or legal obligation to make payment from the property
       obtained or its proceeds or from property to be reserved in equivalent amount, there can
       be no criminal liability. This requirement is similar in nature to a fiduciary or trust
       relationship.

               "The question then becomes whether 36 M.R.S.A. ss 1751-2113, dealing with
       sales and use taxes, require a retailer to reserve funds for payment to the state, such that
       his intentional or reckless failure to pay sales tax which is due and owing constitutes theft
       within the meaning of section 358 [i.e., by misapplication of property]. We hold that
       there is no such duty and that consequently no criminal liability exists under section 358
       in this case." Marcotte, 418 A.2d at 1121.

       Marcotte then distinguished a pair of cases from Indiana and Pennsylvania, both
of which required the retailer to set aside collected taxes as a form of trust fund that
belonged to the state. 418 A.2d at 1122 (citing State v. Gates, 394 N.E.2d 247 [Ind. Ct.

                                                     12
App. 1979], and Commonwealth v. Shafer, 414 Pa. 613, 616-17, 202 A.2d 308 [1964]).
Like Kansas, Maine's retail sales tax statute at the time neither contained any such
requirement nor created a fiduciary relationship between the retailer and the state.

         Finally, Marcotte disposed of the prosecution's backup argument: that even if the
failure to remit sales tax did not constitute theft by misapplication of property, it still
qualified under the more general theft statute. Marcotte, 418 A.2d at 1122. As the court
wrote:

         "Consequently, the state would prove 'Theft by Unauthorized Taking' under 17-A
         M.R.S.A. s 353. The conduct alleged in the indictment, however, involved no
         'unauthorized control over the property of another.' Under title 36, the retailer is
         authorized to exercise control over and comingle sales tax receipts. Thus, we conclude, as
         to the facts alleged in this case, that the result is no different under either section 353 or
         section 358." Marcotte, 418 A.2d at 1122.

         As in Marcotte, Ruiz was under no duty to segregate collected sales taxes and
could pay the State what she owed out of any source available to her. Her failure to remit
the collected taxes along with her returns did not transform her control over the funds
into "unauthorized" control because the State had no authorization to give. When
considering the specific dollars collected, the State did not own those funds initially and
did not later acquire ownership of them. Accordingly, Ruiz' failure to remit collected
sales taxes does not satisfy the elements of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5801(a) and (b) as a
matter of law.

         Instead, the Tax Act establishes remedies available to the State—a specific set of
remedies unique to sales taxes. This brings us to the second persuasive case cited by the
parties. In State v. Larson, the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered whether a retailer

                                                       13
who failed to remit sales taxes it collected on automobile lease buyouts could be charged
with failure to pay over state funds when another statute specifically penalized failure to
remit sales taxes. After noting that the statute for failure to pay over state funds—and its
predecessors—really addressed "embezzlement of public funds by anyone who has
access to such funds," the court held that a prosecution under that statute for "[d]iverting
sales tax funds"—which was criminalized in a separate statute—would "pervert[]
legislative intent." State v. Larson, 605 N.W.2d 706, 716 (Minn. 2000). While noting that
"as a general matter prosecutors may choose to prosecute under any statute that covers
the prohibited activity," the court held the general rule inapplicable:

               "This, however, is not an instance where we encounter overlapping criminal
       provisions. The legislature, in drafting chapter 297A and including a criminal
       enforcement mechanism, intended non-remittance of sales tax to be covered by what is
       now section 289A.63. Instead of allowing 609.445, a felony statute, to act as the
       enforcement mechanism for collecting and remitting sales tax funds, the 1967 legislature
       drafted a criminal penalty provision for failure to turn over sales tax funds and made the
       penalty a misdemeanor." Larson, 605 N.W.2d at 717.

       Larson reinforces another point stressed by Ruiz: that our Tax Act limits criminal
liability to the penalties set forth in K.S.A. 79-3615, as shown by the use of the phrase,
"In addition to all other penalties provided by this section . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Other
cases cited by the parties reinforce the importance of this language. See, e.g., Kennedy,
130 N.C. App. at 402 (sales tax code did not provide exclusive remedy for prosecution
when it proclaimed that its penalties were "'in addition to other penalties provided by
law'"); State v. Pescatore, 213 N.J. Super. 22, 26-29, 516 A.2d 261 (1986) (rejecting
claim that sales tax statute was self-contained because the statute's penalties were "'in
addition to any other penalties herein or elsewhere prescribed'"), aff'd 105 N.J. 441, 522
A.2d 440 (1987); Shafer, 414 Pa. at 623 ("'the criminal offenses and penalties therefor
prescribed by [the Sales Tax Act] shall be in addition to any criminal offenses prescribed

                                                   14
by the general laws of this Commonwealth'"). Through its focus on what is provided in
"this section," the plain language of K.S.A. 79-3615(h) provides more evidence the
Legislature intended to preclude the State from prosecuting retailers for not remitting
sales tax under our felony theft statute.

       But we pause to highlight the limits of our opinion today. We do not construe the
phrase, "In addition to all other penalties provided by this section"—or similar
language—to reflect universally a legislative intent to limit criminal liability to a specific
section. Such a construction would contradict the broad discretion given to prosecutors
under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5109(a). We only conclude that the limiting, introductory
phrase of "by this section" further supports the Legislature's intent that the State is not the
"owner" of sales taxes collected by retailers until those taxes are paid to the State, and
that a retailer does not exert "unauthorized control" over those taxes by failing to pay
them to the State at the time mandated by K.S.A. 79-3607.

       We note a prior Court of Appeals panel's implication—in dicta—that the State is
an owner of sales tax collected by a retailer. State v. Parsons, 11 Kan. App. 2d 220, 221,
720 P.2d 671 (1986) ("the sales tax did not belong exclusively to the State of Kansas";
further rationalizing that a retailer has an "interest" in collected sales tax because it is
required to pay a percentage of its gross receipts to the State as a privilege tax [emphasis
added]). We now clarify that a retailer's duties to collect sales tax from purchasers under
K.S.A. 79-3604 and to pay those collected amounts to the State under K.S.A. 79-3607 at
a set time do not make the State the "owner" of those funds under the meaning of K.S.A.
2022 Supp. 21-5111(s).

       Because the State did not own the sales taxes collected by Ruiz, her failure to pay
them at the statutorily mandated time did not constitute the exertion of unauthorized

                                               15
control, as required for a felony theft prosecution. Consequently, the State's attempt to
prosecute her for felony theft fails as a matter of law. The district court thus correctly
dismissed Ruiz' felony theft charge, although we reach this conclusion by a different
analytical pathway.

       Before concluding, we address three final issues. First, though we asked the
parties to brief whether a multiplicity analysis is premature, we leave that question
unresolved for now. Under these facts, a charge for felony theft does not lie. Left with
one viable charge—criminal violation of the Tax Act—multiplicity does not arise.

       Second, a claim here for dismissal under the version of the general/specific
offense doctrine codified in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5109(d)—whether or not premature
before trial—likewise is inapplicable. Although we conclude a theft prosecution for Ruiz'
alleged Tax Act violation is contrary to legislative intent, our rationale lies outside the
general/specific offense doctrine. See State v. Williams, 250 Kan. 730, 829 P.2d 892
(1992); State v. Wilcox, 245 Kan. 76, 775 P.2d 177 (1989). See also 2010 Final Report to
the Kansas Legislature, Vol. I, Kansas Criminal Code Recodification Commission,
approved Dec. 16, 2009, Appendix A, p. 8 (citing Williams as an example of the rule
being codified). Contra State v. Euler, 314 Kan. 391, 396, 499 P.3d 448 (2021)
(disapproving the judicially created general/specific offense doctrine; noting—in a
modified opinion—that the defendant may have had a statutory claim under K.S.A. 2020
Supp. 21-5109[d] but failed to preserve it).

       Finally, we also asked the parties to brief the issue of whether imprisonment for
the crimes charged here violates section 16 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights,
which prohibits imprisonment for "debt, except in cases of fraud." Although we have
concluded that a prosecution for theft cannot lie on these facts, we must still consider
whether section 16 condones imprisonment for a Tax Act violation. See K.S.A. 79-

                                               16
3615(h) (listing, among other potential penalties, "imprison[ment] in the county jail [for]
not less than one month, nor more than six months"). Because we view a retailer's
obligations under the Tax Act as specific statutory duties, sales taxes collected by a
retailer necessarily fall outside the meaning of "debts" as we have historically understood
it—at least, as between the retailer and the Department of Revenue. K.S.A. 79-3604
("Such tax shall be a debt from the consumer or user to the retailer."). E.g., Burnett v.
Trimmell, 103 Kan. 130, 134, 173 P. 6 (1918) ("[P]enalty is not for failure to pay a debt,
but for failure to do the thing expressly enjoined by the statute in reference to preparing a
list of creditors."); In re Wheeler, 34 Kan. 96, 99, 8 P. 276 (1885); State v. Krumroy, 22
Kan. App. 2d 794, 798-99, 923 P.2d 1044 (1996). We have consistently viewed
"debts"—for purposes of section 16 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights—as arising
upon contracts, express or implied. State v. Jones, 242 Kan. 385, 389-90, 748 P.2d 839
(1988); Wheeler, 34 Kan. at 100. Ruiz has made no serious argument or constitutional
analysis suggesting our caselaw is wrong. Consequently, the Legislature's criminalization
of a retailer's failure to remit sales tax does not violate section 16's proscription on
imprisonment for "debt." Cf. People v. Buffalo Confectionery Co., 78 Ill. 2d 447, 462,
401 N.E.2d 546 (1980) (Illinois use tax statute made retailers debtors of the state,
therefore prohibiting prosecution for theft when a retailer failed to remit taxes).

                                         CONCLUSION

       We affirm the district court's dismissal of the felony theft charge on different
grounds and reverse the Court of Appeals panel's decision on that point.

       Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed.
Judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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