Court Opinion

ID: 9401036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 19:14:49.941602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.367826
License: Public Domain

No. 21-0905 — West Virginia Division of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Damein
              Robbins                                                                   FILED
and                                                                                June 9, 2023
                                                                                     released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                                 EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
No. 21-0906 — Isaiah Blancarte & Bryon Whetzel v. Damein Robbins                 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                      OF WEST VIRGINIA

BUNN, JUSTICE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

              I agree with the majority’s determinations as to the Division of Correction’s

appeal and their conclusion that the circuit court correctly denied Officer Whetzel’s motion

to dismiss. I dissent and write separately because I believe Mr. Robbins failed to plead a

claim against Officer Blancarte sufficient to overcome qualified immunity.

              Mr. Robbins asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging, in relevant part, that

Officer Blancarte violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment by failing to protect him from violence committed by other inmates. In

response to Mr. Robbins’s claim, Officer Blancarte filed a West Virginia Civil Procedure

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based in relevant part on his entitlement to qualified

immunity. The circuit court denied Officer Blancarte’s motion and the majority affirms

this ruling. I would have reversed and granted dismissal to Officer Blancarte.

              Federal substantive law controls the analysis of Officer Blancarte’s

entitlement to qualified immunity “because the claims to which qualified immunity are

                                             1
being asserted arise under federal law.” Ballard v. Delgado, 241 W. Va. 495, 504, 826

S.E.2d 620, 629 (2019).

                      In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727,
               73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court of the United
               States addressed qualified immunity, holding that
               “government officials performing discretionary functions,
               generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
               as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
               or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
               have known.” Id. [at] 818, 102 S. Ct. [at 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d
               396].

Ballard, 241 W. Va. at 504, 826 S.E.2d at 629. As the majority correctly observes, a

government official’s entitlement to qualified immunity depends on the answer to two

questions: (1) when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Robbins, do the facts alleged

show that Officer Blancarte’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) is the

constitutional right asserted clearly established? See Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L Ed. 2d 272 (2001)). The parties do not dispute that

the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is clearly established.

Accordingly, my analysis focuses on whether Mr. Robbins sufficiently alleged in his

complaint that Officer Blancarte violated that right.

               The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “is to test the sufficiency of the

complaint.” Cantley v. Lincoln Cnty. Comm’n, 221 W. Va. 468, 470, 655 S.E.2d 490, 492

(2007) (per curiam). “‘For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in

the light most favorable to plaintiff . . ., and its allegations are to be taken as true.’” W. Va.

Bd. of Educ. v. Marple, 236 W. Va. 654, 660, 783 S.E.2d 75, 81 (2015) (quoting John W.

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Lodge Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 161 W. Va. 603, 605, 245 S.E.2d 157, 158 (1978)).

The trial court should grant dismissal only when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim [that] would entitle him to relief.” Syl. pt.

3, in part, Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., Inc., 160 W. Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977)

(citation omitted).

              However, “a plaintiff may not ‘fumble around searching for a meritorious

claim within the elastic boundaries of a barebones complaint[.]’” Boone v. Activate

Healthcare, LLC, 245 W. Va. 476, 481, 859 S.E.2d 419, 424 (2021) (quoting Chaveriat v.

Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1430 (7th Cir. 1993) (additional quotations and

citation omitted)). Instead, “a complaint must be intelligibly sufficient for a circuit court or

an opposing party to understand whether a valid claim is alleged and, if so, what it is.”

State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 776, 461 S.E.2d

516, 522 (1995). Even though a “plaintiff's burden in resisting a motion to dismiss is a

relatively light one,” to overcome the motion a plaintiff must “at a minimum . . . set forth

sufficient information to outline the elements of [the] claim,” and if the complaint “fails to

do so, dismissal is proper.” Price v. Halstead, 177 W. Va. 592, 594, 355 S.E.2d 380, 383

(1987). Thus, “[g]eneral allegations . . . are insufficient,” and a complaint must assert more

than “mere sketchy generalizations of a conclusive nature unsupported by operative facts.”

Newton v. Morgantown Mach. & Hydraulics of W. Va., Inc., 242 W. Va. 650, 654, 838

S.E.2d 734, 738 (2019) (quotations and citation omitted). See also Par Mar v. City of

Parkersburg, 183 W. Va. 706, 710, 398 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1990) (acknowledging that

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“sketchy generalizations of a conclusive nature unsupported by operative facts do not set

forth a cause of action”).

              Furthermore, it is well established that cases involving qualified immunity

require a heightened pleading standard. See Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va.

139, 149, 479 S.E.2d 649, 659 (1996) (“[I]n civil actions where immunities are implicated,

the trial court must insist on heightened pleading by the plaintiff.”); Marple, 236 W. Va. at

660, 783 S.E.2d at 81 (same).

              The uniqueness of qualified immunity and its provision of total
              immunity from suit rather than just a defense is an important
              reason for . . . heightened pleading. . . . [“]That is, plaintiffs
              ‘should supply in their complaints or other supporting
              materials greater factual specificity and particularity than is
              usually required.’ [Elwood v. Rice Cty., 423 N.W.2d 671, 676
              (Minn. 1988)].”

W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. Est. of Grove, 244 W. Va. 273, 282, 852 S.E.2d

773, 782 (2020) (quoting Xiao v. Rodriguez, No. A18-0646, 2019 WL 1983488, at *8

(Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2019)).

              To properly plead that Officer Blancarte violated the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment founded on a failure to protect, Mr. Robbins

had to allege facts supporting two required elements of his claim: (1) that the conditions of

his incarceration posed an objectively substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) that Officer

Blancarte acted with deliberate indifference to Mr. Robbins’s health or safety, which is a

subjective component of his claim. As the United States Supreme Court explained,

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                     [i]t is not . . . every injury suffered by one prisoner at
              the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability
              for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety. Our
              cases have held that a prison official violates the Eighth
              Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the
              deprivation alleged must be, objectively, “sufficiently
              serious[.]” . . . For a claim (like the one here) based on a failure
              to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated
              under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm . . . .

                     The second requirement follows from the principle that
              “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates
              the Eighth Amendment.” . . . To violate the Cruel and Unusual
              Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a “sufficiently
              culpable state of mind.” . . . In prison-conditions cases that
              state of mind is one of “deliberate indifference” to inmate
              health or safety[.]

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994)

(citations omitted).

              Mr. Robbins’s complaint failed to allege any facts against Officer Blancarte

to support his Eighth Amendment claim. While the complaint included factual allegations

as to how Officer Whetzel allowed other inmates to have access to Mr. Robbins and that

Officer Whetzel observed the incident and failed to intervene,1 no such facts were alleged

              1
                  The complaint alleged that

                      19.   Upon information and belief, the three inmates
              entered the lock down cell after an unknown corrections
              officer, Bryon Whetzel, acting as the Tower Officer unlocked
              the cell door and permitted them entry . . . .

                       ....

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against Officer Blancarte. The only factual allegations against Officer Blancarte in the

complaint are:

                     8.     At all relevant times, Defendant Isaiah Blancarte
              was a corrections officer at Potomac Highlands Regional Jail.

                      ....

                     30.     During the assault of Plaintiff, Defendant
              Blancarte was functioning as the rover in pod A-6. Defendant
              Blancarte and Defendant Whetzel permitted inmates to roam
              around A-6 pod together and allowed entry of other inmates
              into Plaintiff’s cell

Other allegations pertaining to Officer Blancarte merely state unsupported conclusions.2

              As the majority observes, “deliberate indifference entails something more

than mere negligence, . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the

                     27.    During the assault, Plaintiff was paraded around
              the pod to other cells for the purpose of humiliating him and to
              “show off” what was done to him. Defendant Bryon Whetzel
              observed these actions yet did nothing to intervene.

(Emphasis added).
              2
                For example, Mr. Robbins alleges that Officers Whetzel and Blancarte
“displayed a deliberate indifference to the safety and security of Plaintiff when they
permitted other inmates to enter Plaintiff’s lockdown cell”; “displayed deliberate
indifference to the Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment when they ignored the physical and sexual assault at the hands of the other
inmates”; and “were aware of the substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff when they permitted
the three other inmates to enter Plaintiff’s lockdown cell when he was known to be
incarcerated as a result of a sexual offense criminal conviction.” There are no facts alleged
in the complaint to support these conclusory statements.
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very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 835, 114 S. Ct. at 1978, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811. Pursuant to Farmer,

               a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
               Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
               confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an
               excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
               be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
               a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
               the inference.

Id. at 837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811. Mr. Robbins failed to allege sufficiently

detailed information to support these elements or permit inferences that they existed with

respect to his Eighth Amendment claims against Officer Blancarte. See Fass v. Nowsco

Well Serv., Ltd., 177 W. Va. 50, 52, 350 S.E.2d 562, 563 (1986) (per curiam) (“The

complaint must set forth enough information to outline the elements of a claim or permit

inferences to be drawn that these elements exist.”). Nothing in Mr. Robbins’s amended

complaint indicates that Officer Blancarte was “aware of facts” from which he could infer

“that a substantial risk of serious harm” to Mr. Robbins existed, or that Officer Blancarte

actually drew such an inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979, 128 L. Ed. 2d

811. Mr. Robbins did not allege that Officer Blancarte knew why Mr. Robbins was in

felony pod A-6, a segregated housing unit, or that Mr. Robbins was promised his cell would

remain locked. Mr. Robbins did not allege that Officer Blancarte was ever actually present

in pod A-6 at any time during the assault, which, according to Mr. Robbins’s counsel,

occurred over a period of about four-and-one-half hours.3 Finally, Mr. Robbins did not

               3
                 In denying Officer Blancarte’s motion to dismiss, the circuit court
incorrectly stated that “Plaintiff alleges that . . . [i]n his role as a rover, Defendant Blancarte
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allege that Officer Blancarte had knowledge of the assault yet failed to intervene. Because

Mr. Robbins failed to adequately plead his Eighth Amendment claim against Officer

Blancarte, I would have reversed the circuit court and remanded with instructions to

dismiss Mr. Robbins’s claim against Officer Blancarte.4

was present within the lock down pod on numerous occasions throughout the time of the
assault.” Mr. Robbins made no such allegation in his amended complaint.
               4
                   I am aware that

               [a] plaintiff is not required to anticipate the defense of
               immunity in his complaint, Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,
               640, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 1923-24, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1980), and,
               under the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff
               is required to file a reply to a defendant’s answer only if the
               circuit court exercises its authority under Rule 7(a) to order
               one. We believe, in cases of qualified or statutory immunity,
               court ordered replies and motions for a more definite statement
               under Rule 12(e) can speed the judicial process. Therefore, the
               trial court should first demand that a plaintiff file “a short and
               plain statement of his complaint, a [statement] that rests on
               more than conclusion[s] alone.” Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d
               [1427,] 1433 [(5th Cir. 1995)]. Next, the court may, on its own
               discretion, insist that the plaintiff file a reply tailored to an
               answer pleading the defense of statutory or qualified immunity.

Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 150, 479 S.E.2d 649, 660 (1996). In this
case, Mr. Robbins does not complain that he was deprived of an opportunity to address Mr.
Blancarte’s immunity claim. See, e.g., C.C. v. Harrison Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 245 W. Va.
594, 614 n.1, 859 S.E.2d 762, 782 n.1 (2021) (Armstead, J., concurring) (“[T]he record
before us does not reflect that Petitioners allege specific error on the part of the circuit court
for any alleged failure to provide them the opportunity to amend their pleadings to address
the [defendant’s] assertion in its Motion to Dismiss that it was immune from Petitioners’
claims pursuant to [the] Tort Claims Act.”).
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