Court Opinion

ID: 9642829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:10:16.671857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:52.720073
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice McBride:
I concur wholeheartedly in the result. I reach my conclusion, however, by a somewhat different though not inconsistent path.
*295It has been argued here that the action was barred by the statute unless brought “within two years from the time when the injury was done and not afterward . . .” and that the injury was done at the time of the surgery, not the date of discovery of the presence of the sponge. Even if this is true, still the result reached by the Court is right. It must be conceded that even at the time the injury was inflicted upon Ayers it as well as its cause was not only unknown to him but was unknowable.
Article I, Section 11, of our Constitution, provides as follows: “All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law . . .”
Statutes of limitations must be read in the light of this provision for the running of time is not the only test of validity of such statutes. They are desirable in that they prevent oppression by forbidding plaintiffs to litigate stale claims and thus compel defense at a time when such defense is no longer practicable and sometimes even impossible. Nevertheless, the restrictions imposed may not be so arbitrary as to preclude a reasonable opportunity for one who has been harmed to make his claim. If the legislature were permitted absolute discretion it would not be merely regulating the remedy but would be abolishing it. Cf. Rodebaugh v. Philadelphia Traction Company, 190 Pa. 358, 42 A. 953. This may not be done either in a statute which operates retrospectively or one which operates prospectively for in either event it would amount to a denial of justice. The legislature could not have intended such a result.
Although courts will not inquire into the wisdom of a statute, nevertheless, they do have power to declare a statute unconstitutional as applied to a given ease, *296or, alternatively, to interpret the statute so as to include an essential requirement which would make its application constitutional. I believe this case requires us to adopt this alternative course.
The principle stated in Smith v. Bell Telephone Co., 397 Pa. 134, 153 A. 2d 477, a case involving subsurface conditions, is applicable here. The statutory period runs “from the time of discovery of the cause of the harm or the time when the cause of the harm reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is earlier.”
This is not judicial legislation but is instead constitutional interpretation for without it the statute of limitations, as applied to the facts of this case, would be unconstitutional.