Court Opinion

ID: 9352171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 16:00:36.857953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:58:18.823170
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-1410     Document: 010110793313        Date Filed: 01/05/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           January 5, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 21-1410
                                                    (D.C. No. 1:09-CR-00266-CMA-1)
  DAVID A. BANKS,                                               (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Defendant David Banks and several codefendants were convicted in 2011 of

 mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud. After

 the convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, one of Banks’s

 codefendants sought and was granted a new sentencing proceeding pursuant to 28

 U.S.C. § 2255. That codefendant then successfully moved to seal portions of the

 hearing transcripts and records in his § 2255 proceeding. Banks filed a motion

 effectively challenging the district court’s sealing order and, alternatively, seeking a

 new order unsealing the sealed transcripts and documents. The district court denied

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 21-1410    Document: 010110793313       Date Filed: 01/05/2023     Page: 2

 Banks’s motion. Banks now appeals. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

 § 1291, we affirm the district court’s order.

                                             I

                           The original criminal proceedings

       Banks is a former member of the Colorado Springs Fellowship Church

 (CSFC). Banks’s mother, Rose Banks, is the pastor of CSFC. Banks, along with

 other members of CSFC, including Gary Walker, Demetrius Harper, Clinton Stewart,

 David Zirpolo, and Kendrick Barnes, “helped run IRP Solutions Corporation [(IRP)],

 a software development company.” United States v. Walker, 761 F. App’x 822, 826

 (10th Cir. 2019). “IRP was formed to produce computer software . . . that would

 supposedly provide a nationally accessible database for law-enforcement agencies,

 ‘computerize their systems,’ and ‘prevent hacking and identity theft.’” United States

 v. Banks, 761 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014). “Banks was the Chief Operating

 Officer” for IRP. Id. at 1171. Banks and the other five members who helped run IRP

 were collectively known as the IRP-6.

       In the course of running IRP, the IRP-6 “falsified employee time cards and

 hired several staffing companies without having any ability to pay for their services.”

 Walker, 761 F. App’x at 827. To persuade the staffing companies to work for IRP,

 the IRP-6 falsely claimed that IRP was doing business with various local and federal

 law enforcement agencies. Later, when IRP failed to pay the staffing companies’

 invoices and the staffing companies questioned defendants about this, the IRP-6

 “gave false assurances that payment would be forthcoming, and they continued to

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 imply that they were doing business with large government law-enforcement

 agencies.” Banks, 761 F.3d at 1173. The IRP-6 also “employed various tactics to

 prevent the victim companies from learning that they would not be paid,” including

 “us[ing] entities they controlled as references in credit applications,” “submit[ing]

 time cards to staffing companies in which they reported time using various aliases,”

 and “report[ing] overlapping hours for the same employee at multiple staffing

 companies.” Id. “In the end, forty-two different staffing companies were left with

 outstanding invoices totaling in excess of $5,000,000—amounts [defendants and IRP]

 had not paid (and apparently could not pay).” Id.

       In June 2009, a federal grand jury indicted the IRP-6 “on multiple counts of

 conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, and committing mail fraud and wire

 fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1341, and 1343.” Id. The case proceeded

 to trial in September 2011. “Although defendants were represented by counsel prior

 to trial, they elected to proceed pro se during trial.” Id. “On October 20, 2011, the

 jury returned guilty verdicts as to all [d]efendants on one or more counts of mail

 fraud and wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud.” Id. at

 1174. “Defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 87 to 135

 months.” Id. at 1170.

       Banks and his codefendants appealed their convictions. This court

 consolidated the appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court. Id. at 1170

 and 1174.

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                                Walker’s § 2255 motion

       In 2015, Gary Walker, one of Banks’s codefendants, “filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255

 motion, in part raising a claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel.”

 Walker, 761 F. App’x at 826. “The district court convened an evidentiary hearing, at

 which sixteen witnesses testified, including . . . Walker; former CSFC members; and

 Gwendolyn Maurice Lawson and Joshua Lowther, counsel for . . . Walker at

 sentencing.” Id. “The district court concluded . . . Lawson, who is a member of the

 CSFC, operated under a conflict of interest because Pastor Rose Banks of . . . CSFC

 dictated counsel’s strategy.” Id. Accordingly, the district court granted Walker relief

 in the form of a resentencing proceeding.

       Walker’s motion to restrict access to the transcript of his § 2255 hearing

       “Walker moved to restrict access to the transcript of his § 2255 hearing, and

 the district court granted the motion.” Id. “Lawson, on behalf of herself and . . .

 Walker’s codefendants, twice moved to obtain the hearing transcript.” Id. “The

 district court predominantly denied the motions but permitted . . . Lawson access to

 the portion of the transcript containing her own testimony.” Id.; see ECF Nos. 1090

 and 1092. “Lawson, again on behalf of herself and . . . Walker’s codefendants,

 noticed an appeal.”1 Walker, 761 F. App’x at 826. “Thereafter, . . . CSFC moved to

       1
          In her appellate brief, Lawson repeatedly listed herself as the “Attorney for
 Barnes, Banks, Harper, Stewart, and Zirpolo.” Appellant’s Principal Brief, United
 States v. Walker, No. 17-1415 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2018). The notice of appeal also
 identified Lawson, Harper, Barnes, Stewart, Banks, and Zirpolo as parties to the
 appeal. Ultimately, however, this court concluded that Banks was not a party to the
 appeal. 761 F. App’x at 829 (“We . . . conclude that . . . Lawson lacked a basis to
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 unseal the transcript.” Id. “The district court denied . . . CSFC’s motion, concluding

 that releasing the transcript was likely to result in CSFC members harassing and

 threatening . . . Walker, as well as the former CSFC members who testified at the

 § 2255 hearing.” Id.; ECF No. 1114. CSFC appealed from the district court’s order

 denying its motion.

                                   The original appeals

       In their respective appeals, Lawson and CSFC argued “that the strong

 presumption in favor of the public right of access to judicial records exceeded . . .

 Walker’s interest in restricting access to the transcript.” Walker, 761 F. App’x at

 826. Lawson asserted “four additional arguments for vacating or reversing the

 district court’s denial of the[] motions to receive the transcript.” Id.

       On January 23, 2019, this court issued an order and judgment “vacat[ing] the

 district court’s order as to . . . CSFC and remand[ing] for further proceedings because

 the district court did not adequately account for the strong presumption in favor of

 public right of access to judicial records and did not narrowly tailor its orders

 restricting access to the transcript.” Id. This court also “affirm[ed] the district

 court’s rulings on the motions to receive the transcript by” Lawson, who “did not

 raise a public right of access argument” and whose other arguments the panel

 concluded were either “unpreserved or wholly without merit.” Id.

 file the motions and notice of appeal on behalf of . . . Banks and we do not include
 him as an appellant in Case Number 17-1415.”).
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                               The proceedings on remand

        On June 9, 2019, the CSFC filed a motion asking the district court to direct the

 court reporter to provide CSFC a certified copy of the transcript of Walker’s habeas

 corpus proceedings, and directing the clerk of the district court to unseal all

 documents and other records in Walker’s habeas corpus proceedings.

        On November 21, 2019, CSFC’s attorney entered appearances on behalf of

 Banks, Harper, Stewart, and Zirpolo. On that same date, CSFC, Banks, Harper,

 Stewart, and Zirpolo filed a joint motion asking the district court judge to recuse

 herself from all further proceedings in the case and to reassign the case to a different

 district court judge.

        On November 21, 2019, the district court issued an order unsealing, in part, the

 evidentiary hearing transcripts from Walker’s habeas corpus proceedings. In the

 opening section of its order, the district court recounted the procedural history of the

 case and noted, in particular, that “[t]he record show[ed] that Pastor Banks and some

 CSFC members ha[d] engaged in a consistent pattern of harassment against anyone

 who d[id] not strictly comply with the demands of Pastor Banks.” ECF No. 1146 at

 4. The district court also noted that Lawson, “at the conclusion of her testimony” at

 Walker’s habeas corpus evidentiary hearing, “surreptitiously substituted a ‘dummy

 binder’ of the same size and color as the Court’s Exhibit Notebook, but which

 contained only tabbed dividers and blank sheets of paper, for one of the Court’s

 Exhibit Notebooks and walked out of the courtroom with the Court’s Exhibit

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 Notebook.”2 Id. at 4–5. Considering this court’s directions in Walker, the district

 court concluded “it [wa]s evident that the safety of many of the witnesses [wa]s still

 at risk, and therefore, some, but not all, of the testimony must remain restricted.” Id.

 at 10. The district court explained that “[t]he safety and welfare risk to many of the

 witnesses” who testified at Walker’s evidentiary hearing “remain[ed] high.” Id. It

 noted in support:

        A Just Cause, an organization founded by CSFC to act on behalf of and
        in coordination with the IRP-6, has engaged in a campaign to harass all
        involved with this case, and the Court has no reason to conclude that it
        will halt its pattern of harassment. As recently as October 22, 2019, A
        Just Cause alleged, without evidence, that the Court is concealing
        misconduct and “secretly used her court to conduct personal attacks
        against [IRP-6’s] Pastor (Rose Banks) and Church (Colorado Springs
        Fellowship Church).” A Just Cause, Colorado Federal Judge and
        Prosecutor Entangled in Misconduct Cover-Up (Oct. 22, 2019),
        http://www.digitaljournal.com/pr/4481574 [https://perma.cc/68RS-
        CNTM]. If all witness testimony from the § 2255 hearing were to be
        unsealed, the Court is concerned that CSFC would turn its attention
        away from the Court and begin harassing these witnesses. Therefore,
        the Court determines that circumstances have not changed significantly,
        and as such, those witnesses who testified about CSFC must remain
        protected and their testimony will remain sealed.

 Id. at 10–11.3

        2
         The district court noted that “[t]here had previously been similar
 unprofessional activity on the part of the Defendants” during their criminal trial.
 ECF No. 1146 at 5. In particular, the district court noted that defendants removed
 one of the jury rosters on the first day of trial, and proceeded thereafter to harass
 multiple jurors. Id.
        3
          The article cited by the district court is no longer available at the Digital
 Journal hyperlinked URL address. The Perma citation, however, does link to the
 cited article.
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       The district court also purported to weigh the public’s right to access judicial

 transcripts against the risks to the witnesses. In doing so, it began by noting that “the

 relevant facts and circumstances [we]re such that restricting public access [wa]s

 essential to preserving the safety and security of many of the testifying witnesses.”

 Id. at 11. The district court noted it was “particularly concerned that, because CSFC

 ha[d] previously engaged in harassment and intimidation tactics, it m[ight] do so

 again, this time targeting witnesses from the § 2255 hearing.” Id. The district court

 found that “CSFC lashes out—unrelentingly—towards those whom Pastor Banks

 perceives to have wronged her or her church,” and that CSFC “staged a coordinated

 effort to contact and repeatedly harass members of the jury” after the initial trial. Id.

 The district court also found that “Lawson’s intentional swapping of a ‘dummy

 binder’ for the Court’s Exhibit Notebook and CSFC’s harassment of the jurors

 demonstrate[d] that CSFC members w[ould] go to great, even possibly illegal,

 lengths on behalf of CSFC.” Id. at 12. The district court in turn concluded that

 CSFC’s claim that it needed the hearing transcripts “to determine the extent to which

 it ha[d] been maligned by the testimony” was “disingenuous” because “[m]embers of

 the CSFC were present in the courtroom throughout the § 2255 hearing . . . and . . .

 generally kn[e]w what was said.” Id. The district court stated it “believe[d] that

 CSFC want[ed] transcripts of the testimony so that its members . . . c[ould] threaten

 and harass witnesses who were critical of CSFC.” Id. The district court in turn

 concluded that if it “were to release the detailed testimony of all the witnesses, the

 precise language would serve only to enflame CSFC and put the witnesses at risk of

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 harm.” Id. The district court concluded “that this is one of those cases in which the

 right of public access to judicial records is outweighed by the importance of

 protecting certain witnesses from further harm.” Id. at 13.

       The district court then proceeded to “consider[] in detail the three particular

 factors that [this court] highlighted” in Walker, i.e., “reliance on sealed records to

 determine substantive rights; the absence of a jury; and whether sealed information

 has already been disclosed.” Id. With respect to the first of these factors, the district

 court noted that “in determining . . . Walker’s resentencing,” it “considered only

 testimony given in open court,” and it in turn concluded that “[t]his public access

 mitigate[d] concern about using the restricted testimony to determine . . . Walker’s

 substantive legal rights and undermine[d] any argument that [its] ruling was made

 based on testimony unavailable to the public.” Id. at 14. The district court therefore

 concluded “that, because it allowed public access to the proceedings, restricting

 access to the testimony of witnesses who are at risk of harassment [wa]s the most

 appropriate way to ‘carefully balance[]’ the public’s right of access to the transcripts

 with safety concerns for those witnesses.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d

 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 1989)). With respect to the second factor, i.e., the absence of a

 jury, the district court again noted that it “allowed full public access to” Walker’s

 resentencing hearing, “which was attended by members of the public,” and it also

 noted that “A Just Cause even issued multiple press releases about the hearing, which

 amplified the public’s awareness of the Court’s decisions.” Id. Thus, the district

 court “f[ound] that, although there was no jury present, there was attendance by and

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  engagement from the public, which help[ed] keep [it] accountable.” Id. at 15. The

  district court also noted that “Walker, the defendant, [wa]s not at risk of unfair

  treatment regarding the sealing of the transcripts because he was the party who

  requested the restrictions.” Id. Indeed, the district court noted, it was “concerned

  about unfair treatment and harassment of . . . Walker, as well as other witnesses, if

  the records are not sealed.” Id. (emphasis omitted) It therefore concluded that “one

  of the ultimate goals of having a jury present for court proceedings—protecting the

  defendant—[wa]s actually best accomplished by upholding the Level 2 restriction on

  certain witness testimony.”4 Id. As for the third factor, i.e., whether the sealed

  information had already been disclosed, the district court noted that “all the witness

  testimony in [Walker’s] § 2255 hearing was given in an open courtroom.” Id. The

  district court concluded that “[w]here, as here, witnesses face a significant risk of

  harassment, the distinction between merely hearing their testimony audibly as

  opposed to accessing transcripts of the testimony matters significantly.” Id. The

  district court in turn noted that it if “were to release the testimony of many of the

  witnesses, those [persons] not present at the hearing could identify, locate, and harass

  those who gave testimony critical of CSFC.” Id. at 15–16. Concern about the

  harassment of witnesses, the district court noted, was real rather than “theoretical”

  based upon “CSFC members’ prior harassment of Jurors.” Id. at 16. “Therefore,”

        4
           The district court’s local rules define Level 2 access as “limit[ing] access to
  the filing party and the court.” D. Colo. Civ. R. 7.2(b) (outlining three levels of
  restriction on court documents and proceedings).
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  the district court concluded, “the testimony of many of the witnesses must remain

  under Level 2 restriction,” depending upon “the relevant facts and circumstances of

  the testimony of each of the witnesses.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

         The district court then turned to narrowly tailoring the restrictions that it

  placed on public access to the hearing transcripts. To begin with, the district court

  stated that it intended to refute A Just Cause’s public allegations that the district

  court “want[ed] to keep transcripts sealed to hide the Court’s misconduct” by

  “releasing all statements by the Court during the § 2255 hearing, except any names of

  witnesses whose identities are sealed.” Id. at 17. The district court noted CSFC’s

  concerns that the testimony at the hearing contained misinformation and innuendo

  regarding CSFC, and concluded that “CSFC’s reputation w[ould] be best protected

  by not releasing testimony that criticizes it.” Id. at 18. With that in mind, the district

  court noted “that the testimony of thirteen witnesses w[ould] remain under Level 2

  restriction, while the testimony of two witnesses [would be] released in full.” Id.

  The district court proceeded to summarize the reasons it was maintaining Level 2

  restriction on the testimony of the thirteen witnesses:

          Walker: The district court concluded that Walker’s testimony should “remain

            at Level 2 restriction because he spoke critically about CSFC, and therefore,

            the public disclosure of his testimony could threaten his personal safety.” Id.

            at 19.

          Witness #2 and Witness #7: The district court found that both of these

            witnesses “work at the Federal Bureau of Prisons in Florence, Colorado,” and
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           “may have daily contact with incarcerated CSFC members.” Id. at 19–20.

           “Because their testimony reflects negatively on some CSFC members,” the

           district court concluded that both were “at risk of harassment.” Id. at 20. The

           district court further concluded that “[r]edacting their names w[ould] not

           sufficiently protect [them] because their identities may easily be determined

           through the particular details of the testimony.” Id. In sum, the district court

           concluded that “maintaining a level 2 restriction [wa]s essential to preserving

           [their] safety, and that this overc[ame] any legitimate interest the public has in

           viewing the transcript.” Id.

         Witness #3: This witness “[wa]s an expert witness.” Id. The district court

           concluded that “full disclosure of [this witness’] testimony could embarrass”

           Lawson. Id. Consequently, the district court expressed concern “that Witness

           #3 [wa]s at risk of being a target of harassment by CSFC.” Id. The district

           court noted that it “considered the Tenth Circuit’s suggestion of releasing the

           testimony with narrowly tailored redactions of Witness #3’s identity,” but it

           noted that “because the witness’ identity could be determined through docket

           entries, simply redacting Witness #3’s name would not be sufficient, as CSFC

           could then connect Witness #3’s identity with the corresponding testimony.”

           Id. at 20–21.

         Witness #5: The district court found that this witness “ha[d] already endured

           harassment from Pastor Banks,” and it therefore expressed “concern[] that

           Pastor Banks and other CSFC members could use Witness #5’s testimony to
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           ‘gratify private spite’ by harassing this witness with additional vigor.” Id. at

           21 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). As a

           result, the district court “maintain[ed] the level 2 restriction on Witness #5’s

           testimony.” Id.

         Witness #6: This witness was “an expert witness” who “testified extensively

           about [their] examination of, and conversations with, . . . Walker.” Id.

           “Because this testimony describe[d] what . . . Walker experienced and how this

           relate[d] to Witness #6’s determination that . . . Walker was under the undue

           influence of Pastor Banks,” the district court expressed “concern[] that both

           Witness #6 and . . . Walker could be retaliated against for Witness #6’s

           testimony.” Id. The district court concluded that “[p]reserving both Witness

           #6’s and . . . Walker’s safety [we]re interests that outweigh[ed] the

           presumption of public access to the testimony.” Id. at 21–22. The district

           court therefore “ke[pt] Witness #6’s transcript at a Level 2 restriction.” Id. at

           22.

         Witnesses #9 through #14: These six witnesses were former members of CSFC

           and they each “testified about their experiences with the church, their treatment

           by Pastor Banks, and their treatment by members of CSFC who remained in

           the church after they left.” Id. The district court stated that it “remain[ed]

           extremely concerned for the safety of the former CSFC members who testified,

           and fear[ed] that any of their testimony m[ight] be used by CSFC in retaliation

           against those witnesses.” Id. The district court noted that these witnesses
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            “spoke very personally about the circumstances that led to either their

            expulsions from CSFC or their choices to leave CSFC,” and it therefore

            concluded that “simply redacting their names would not protect their

            identities.” Id. The district court ultimately concluded “that the public’s

            general right to access to these records [wa]s outweighed by the ‘higher

            value[]’ of preserving the safety of these witnesses.” Id. (quoting Press-Enter.

            Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cty., 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986)).

          Witness #15: This was an expert witness whose “testimony contradict[ed]t he

            public image that CSFC seeks to project to the Colorado Springs community.”

            Id. at 23. As a result, the district court concluded that this witness “could be at

            risk of harassment if this witness’ testimony [wa]s released.” Id. The district

            court also expressed “concern[] that the identity of Witness #15 c[ould] be

            determined through docket entries,” which in turn could result in this witness

            “incur[ring] significant harassment.” Id.

         The district court also described the two witnesses whose testimony it was

  unsealing. First, the district court noted that Witness #4, Vernon Lee Gaines, “was

  the second process server who attempted to serve Pastor Banks with a subpoena,” and

  he “describe[d] the steps he took to locate Pastor Banks and serve process on her.”

  Id. at 23. The district court “conclude[d] that . . . Gaines [wa]s not at risk of

  harassment because he d[id] not speak negatively about CSFC.” Id. at 23–24.

  Second, the district court noted that Witness #8, Joshua Lowther, “was co-counsel for

  . . . Walker and his codefendants during their sentencing and other post-conviction
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  matters.” Id. at 24. The district court concluded “that . . . Lowther’s testimony [wa]s

  not likely to be used for a spiteful or scurrilous purpose,” and it in turn concluded

  that “the public’s right to access judicial records outweigh[ed] other competing

  concerns.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the district court

  ordered “Lowther’s testimony [to] be released in full.” Id.

        On the same day that it issued its order unsealing in part the hearing

  transcripts, the district court also issued a separate order denying the joint motion for

  recusal as moot. CSFC and the other defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of

  the district court’s order. On December 9, 2019, the district court granted in part and

  denied in part the motion for reconsideration. More specifically, the district court

  “analyze[d] the arguments in” the motion for recusal “without focusing on the issue

  of mootness,” and ultimately denied the request for recusal on the merits. ECF No.

  1149 at 1–2.

                                   CSFC’s second appeal

        On February 7, 2020, CSFC filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s

  orders granting CSFC limited access to the evidentiary hearing transcript and denying

  CSFC’s motion to recuse. On December 2, 2020, this court issued an order and

  judgment dismissing as untimely the portion of the appeal that sought to challenge

  the district court’s November 21, 2019 order denying CSFC’s motion for access to

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  the entire transcript,5 and affirming the district court’s December 9, 2019 order

  granting reconsideration but denying CSFC’s motion to recuse. United States v.

  Walker, 838 F. App’x 333 (10th Cir. 2020) (Walker II).

                                       Banks’s motion

         On February 5, 2021, approximately two months after this court rejected

  CSFC’s appeal, Banks, represented by the same counsel who represented CSFC in its

  unsuccessful appeal, filed a pleading entitled “MOTION TO DIRECT COURT

  REPORTER TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT TO DEFENDANT-MOVANT, AND TO

  UNSEAL ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED THEREIN.” ECF No. 1171 at 1. The

  motion, at its outset, asked the district court to issue an order (a) “[d]irecting the

  Court Reporter to provide a certified copy of the transcript” of Walker’s habeas

  corpus proceedings, and (b) “[d]irecting the Clerk of the Court to unseal all

  documents and other records” in Walker’s habeas corpus proceedings. Id. The

  motion then outlined the procedural history of the case and noted, in particular, this

  court’s rulings in Walker and Walker II. Banks asserted in the motion that, because

  of this court’s ruling in Walker II, “there ha[d] been no final determination, by the

  Court of Appeals, as to the validity of the November 21, 2019 ruling of [the district

  court] regarding the unsealing of the Walker Habeas proceeding.” Id. at 3. Banks

  then asserted that it was his “position . . . that . . . as a co-defendant of Walker in the

         5
            This court concluded that CSFC filed its notice of appeal seventeen days too
  late to timely challenge the district court’s order denying CSFC’s request for access
  to the evidentiary hearing transcript.
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  original criminal proceeding he ha[d] a right to a copy of the demanded records,” and

  that, “in any event, the unsealing Order of the [district court issued on November 21,

  2019] violate[d] the basic tenets of the law that there is an all but irrebuttable

  presumption that trial records and judicial proceedings should be open and available

  to the public at large.” Id. Banks further argued, in apparent reference to the district

  court’s November 21, 2019 order, that the district court “failed, not only to properly

  apply [its own local rules regarding the sealing of documents], but also, in its

  attempted explanation as to what was being sealed, and why it was being sealed did

  not comply with either the [local rule] or the established precedent.” Id. at 5. Banks

  also asserted that he was “the only one of the original Defendants who [wa]s still

  under the supervision of U.S. Probation,” and “[a]s a co-defendant of . . . Walker[,]

  he ha[d] a fundamental right to access all judicial proceedings that m[ight] impact his

  sentence, and any consequences—civil or criminal—that m[ight] arise out of his

  conviction.” Id. at 6. That “include[d],” Banks asserted, “any motion he m[ight]

  seek for the restoration of his civil privileges, denied as a result of his conviction, and

  any relief he m[ight] seek for expungement of his record.” Id. In particular, Banks

  mentioned the possibility of seeking an expungement of his convictions “under the

  All Writs Act,” or “seek[ing] a pardon from the President.” Id.

         The district court denied Banks’s motion on November 3, 2021, noting as

  follows:

                The Court has already considered, at length, the arguments in
         favor of unsealing the relevant transcripts, and the Court incorporates
         that analysis here. (See Doc. #1146). The Court has reviewed Mr.

                                              17
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        Banks’s motion (Doc. #1171), the relevant portions of the record, and
        the Court’s prior order on the matter (Doc. # 1146). Having considered
        all of Mr. Banks’s arguments in light of the present circumstances, the
        Court stands by its prior conclusion that “this is one of those cases in
        which the right of public access to judicial records is outweighed by the
        importance of protecting certain witnesses from further harm.” (Doc.
        #1146). Specifically, Mr. Banks and his confederates have a
        demonstrated history of harassing and intimidating witnesses and jurors
        and of making misrepresentations to the Court. The Court has serious
        concerns that granting Mr. Banks’s motion to access the requested
        records would facilitate further harassment and intimidation. These
        concerns for witness and juror safety outweigh Mr. Banks’s interest in
        accessing the requested records.

               Furthermore, Mr. Banks has failed to demonstrate a legitimate
        reason for accessing the requested records. The records in question do
        not concern Mr. Banks; rather, they concern another defendant’s claim
        that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at certain phases of his
        criminal prosecution. (Doc. []#902). Mr. Banks fails to explain how
        such records are relevant to his case. To the contrary, Mr. Banks
        appears to concede that the records will not have any practical impact
        on his conviction or sentence. (Doc. #1171, pp.6–7). Though Mr.
        Banks claims that he intends to seek a presidential pardon, he fails to
        explain how the records in question would help him achieve that goal.
        (Doc. #1171, pp. 6–9).

               In sum, Mr. Banks has failed to provide any basis for unsealing
        those transcripts that this Court has not already considered and rejected.
        (See Doc. #1171).

  ECF No. 1178 at 1–2.

        Banks filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                             II

        In his appeal, Banks seeks to challenge what he describes as “(a) the continued

  refusal of the lower court to unseal portions of the record notwithstanding both the

  earlier rulings of this Court, and the case law,” and “(b) the reliance of the lower

  court upon unfounded claims as to a basis for denying relief.” Aplt. Br. at 19.

                                             18
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         The threshold question we face in addressing Banks’s arguments is how to

  properly characterize the motion that he filed in the district court. We conclude, after

  examining the substance of the motion, that Banks was both seeking reconsideration

  of the district court’s November 21, 2019 sealing order and, alternatively, asking the

  district court to issue a new order removing the seal that it had placed on portions of

  the transcripts and other documents from Walker’s § 2255 proceeding.

  Consequently, we shall compartmentalize and address his appellate arguments

  accordingly.6

                                              A

         We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for

  reconsideration. United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 358 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.

  2004). Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly authorize

  motions for reconsideration, such motions are proper and may be filed by the

  defendant or the government. United States v. Randall, 666 F.3d 1238, 1241–42

  (10th Cir. 2011). “Because motions to reconsider in criminal cases are not grounded

  in a rule or statute, the time limits are not well established.” Id. at 1242.

  Recognizing the problems that would occur if motions for reconsideration could “be

         6
           We previously directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the
  issues of issue and claim preclusion. We ultimately do not reach those issues,
  however, because “[t]he ‘determination of identity between litigants for the purposes
  of establishing privity is a factual question’” that we are not comfortable deciding in
  the first instance in this case. Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 878 F.2d
  1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Astron Indus. Assocs. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
  405 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1968)).
                                              19
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  brought at simply any time,” this court has held that such “motion[s] must be brought

  within the time for appeal.” Id. Thus, for a criminal defendant such as Banks, a

  motion for reconsideration must be filed within fourteen days of the entry of the

  order for which reconsideration is sought. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).

        It is beyond dispute that Banks filed his motion more than fourteen days after

  the district court’s November 21, 2019 order. We therefore conclude that the district

  court did not abuse its discretion in denying Banks’s motion to the extent that the

  motion challenged and effectively sought reconsideration of the court’s November

  21, 2019 order.

        Most of Banks’s appellate arguments, in our view, challenge the propriety of

  the district court’s November 21, 2019 order. For example, Banks argues in his

  opening brief that the district court “failed to follow established precedent and sealed

  almost the entire record[,] . . . and ignored the prior Orders of this Court to conduct a

  proper analysis as to what, if any, portions of the record should be under seal.” Aplt.

  Br. at 19. Relatedly, Banks questions “[h]ow . . . the lower court can take the

  position, in its November 21st, 2019 Order, that sealing 85% of the transcript

  constitutes a narrow tailoring of the record” and argues that this “is unexplained . . .

  and baffling.” Id. at 24 n.8. Banks further argues that the district court’s decision

  “not only mis-characterizes [sic] the supposed ‘threats’ that served as [the district

  court’s] basis for sealing the record, but has no basis in law.” Id. at 25. And he

  complains that there is no “indication in the record that [the district court] referred

  the matter to either federal or state law enforcement for investigation.” Id. at 26.

                                              20
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  Because we construe all of these arguments as challenges to the district court’s

  November 21, 2019 order, we conclude that they are all foreclosed due to Banks’s

  failure to timely seek reconsideration of that order.

                                              B

        We now turn to Banks’s remaining arguments regarding the district court’s

  refusal to issue a new order removing the seal it placed on portions of the transcripts

  and records in Walker’s § 2255 proceeding. We review for abuse of discretion a

  “district court’s decision to seal or unseal documents,” but we review de novo “any

  legal principles the district court applied when making its decision.” Walker, 761 F.

  App’x at 833. “We apply the overarching abuse of discretion standard because the

  decision whether to seal or unseal is ‘necessarily fact-bound.’” Id. (quoting United

  States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1985)).

        In Walker, this court outlined the general legal principles that apply regarding

  the sealing of judicial records and documents. Of relevance here is the following:

        After a court orders documents before it sealed, the court continues to
        have authority to enforce its order sealing those documents, as well as
        authority to loosen or eliminate any restrictions on the sealed
        documents. This is true even if the case in which the documents were
        sealed has ended. If after a court seals its records a motion is made “to
        remove such a seal, the district court should closely examine whether
        circumstances have changed sufficiently to allow the presumption
        allowing access to court records to prevail.

  Id. at 835 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

        We conclude, after reviewing the district court’s order and the record on

  appeal, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove the

                                             21
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  seal that it placed on portions of the transcripts and records in Walker’s § 2255

  proceeding. The district court determined, as we read its order, that circumstances

  had not changed sufficiently to allow the presumption of public access to the

  transcripts and records to prevail. Notably, Walker does not seriously suggest

  otherwise. To be sure, he argues that the district court did not find that he personally

  represented a threat of misusing the transcripts and records. But that is immaterial

  because the district court determined that the threat of misuse of the transcripts and

  records by Banks’s mother and members of CSFC remained and Banks does not

  challenge that finding. Banks does complain that the district court has never referred

  his mother or members of CSFC “to either federal or state law enforcement for

  investigation.” Aplt. Br. at 26. But that is irrelevant to our review of the district

  court’s decision.

                                             III

        AFFIRMED. The motions filed by the United States to seal Volumes II

  through V of its supplemental appendix and to take judicial notice of seven

  documents (ECF Nos. 1088, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1106, 1114, and 1171) filed in the

  district court are GRANTED.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Mary Beck Briscoe
                                               Circuit Judge

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  21-1410, United States v. Banks
  McHUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

         I concur with the majority’s assessment that the district court did not abuse its

  discretion in maintaining a restriction on portions of the transcript from the hearing on

  Gary Walker’s § 2255 motion. Where I diverge from the majority is with respect to the

  documents in Mr. Walker’s § 2255 proceeding. Through his motion, David A. Banks

  asked the district court to “unseal all documents and other records” related to

  Mr. Walker’s § 2255 proceeding. Nothing in the record suggests the district court

  performed the tedious review necessitated by this request. For, had the district court

  reviewed each of the documents presently under a Level 2 restriction, it would have

  discovered that many of the documents dealt with routine court proceedings and did not

  discuss the Colorado Springs Fellowship Church (“CSFC”), Pastor Rose Banks, any

  member of the CSFC, or the testimony of any § 2255 hearing witness. Therefore, I

  respectfully dissent in part and would order the district court to unrestrict access to many

  of the documents filed in Mr. Walker’s § 2255 proceeding.

                                    I.    BACKGROUND

         The majority provides a detailed factual and procedural history, with which I take

  no disagreement. I merely supplement and highlight a few facts relevant to the issue of

  the restricted documents, on which I dissent.
Appellate Case: 21-1410      Document: 010110793313           Date Filed: 01/05/2023      Page: 24

         In October 2015, Mr. Walker pursued relief under § 2255 and first moved the

  district court to place a Level 2 restriction on documents filed in his § 2255 proceeding.1

  Thereafter, when filing documents in his § 2255 proceeding, Mr. Walker also filed

  motions for leave to restrict. The Government did not oppose Mr. Walker’s motions for

  leave to restrict and, on occasion, itself moved for leave to restrict. The district court

  granted Mr. Walker’s and the Government’s requests that a significant number of

  documents in the § 2255 proceeding be filed under a Level 2 restriction. In total, the

  district court approved a Level 2 restriction on seventy-eight documents.2 See Banks’s

  App. at A-122–24, A-127–40 (ECF Nos. 899, 902, 913–14, 917, 921, 930–31, 937, 940–

  41, 947–49, 952–56, 960–64, 966, 970–71, 973, 976–77, 980, 984, 986, 988–89, 992–93,

  995, 999–1000, 1003, 1005–08, 1011, 1014–16, 1020–23, 1025–27, 1029–30, 1033–36,

  1042, 1044, 1047, 1050, 1055–56, 1059, 1065–66, 1068, 1071, 1074, 1076, 1081, 1085).

  The district court also placed a Level 2 restriction on almost the entire transcript of the

  hearing on Mr. Walker’s § 2255 motion, allowing more expansive access to only the

         1
          Under the District of Colorado Local Rules, a Level 2 restriction limited access
  to a document such that only Mr. Walker, the Government, and the district court could
  access a document. See D. Colo. Local Civ. R. 7.2(b); D. Colo. Local Crim. R. 47.1(b).
         2
           Of the seventy-eight documents, seven documents filed by Mr. Walker are
  restricted at Level 2 access but list Mr. Banks as an individual capable of accessing the
  documents. See Banks’s App. at A-125–28 (ECF Nos. 921, 930–31, 937–38, 947–48).
  The record does not reveal why the docket lists these seven documents differently than
  the other seventy-one Level 2 restricted documents, and I cannot say whether Mr. Banks
  actually has access to these seven documents. In any event, the public does not have
  access to these seven documents.
                                                 2
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  testimony of Gwendolyn Lawson, a CSFC member who is an attorney and represented

  Mr. Walker and several of his co-defendants during phases of the criminal case.

         In 2019, after this court vacated in part the district court’s orders placing a Level 2

  restriction on the transcript of Mr. Walker’s § 2255 hearing, see United States v. Walker,

  761 F. App’x 822, 840 (10th Cir. 2019) (Walker I) (unpublished), the CSFC filed a

  motion to unrestrict.3 In its motion, the CSFC asked for an order directing (1) the court

  reporter to provide a transcript of the § 2255 hearing; and (2) “the Clerk of the Court to

  unseal all documents and other records as submitted in [Mr. Walker’s § 2255]

  proceeding.” Motion to Direct Court Reporter to Provide Transcript to Movant, and to

  Unseal all Documents Submitted Therein at 1, United States v. Banks, No. 1:09-cr-

  00266-CMA (D. Colo. June 9, 2019), ECF No. 1131. The CSFC further stated, “it is

  respectfully requested that the Court direct the Clerk of the Court to provide to counsel

  for the Movant, a copy of all of the Exhibits, Documents, and other Pleadings as

  submitted in the aforesaid action, that are currently under Seal.” Id. at 2.

         The district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. After

  discussing prior conduct by CSFC members and its concerns that the CSFC would harass

  certain witnesses or use the restricted material for a spiteful purpose if the CSFC gained

  access to portions of the transcripts, the district court (1) maintained the restriction as to

  thirteen witnesses; (2) removed the restriction as to two witnesses; and (3) removed the

         3
          I discuss the CSFC’s motion because the district court “incorporate[d]” its ruling
  on the CSFC’s motion into its ruling on Mr. Banks’s motion. Gov. App. Vol. I at 221.
  Thus, any reasoning offered by the district court when ruling on the CSFC’s motion
  supports its decision to deny Mr. Banks’s motion.
                                                 3
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  restriction as to some statements made by the court. In the conclusion, or decretal, section

  of its order, the district court stated:

         For the foregoing reasons, the Court UNSEALS the transcripts IN PART:
         1. The Court MAINTAINS the Level 2 restriction with respect to the
            testimony of Witness #1, Witness #2, Witness #3, Witness #5, Witness
            #6, Witness #7, Witnesses ##9–14, and Witness #15;
         2. The Court LIFTS the Level 2 restriction with respect to the testimony of
            Witness #4 and Witness #8; and
         3. The Court LIFTS the Level 2 restriction with respect to any statements
            by the Court, except those which reveal the identities of protected
            witnesses.
         Any interested parties may submit a request and payment to the Court
         Reporter for a certified transcript of statements that are no longer under a
         Level 2 restriction.

  Gov. App. Vol. I at 201–02. The docket text entry describing the order used identical

  language. See Banks’s App. at A-148–49. The order’s decretal and the docket text entry

  omitted any reference to the CSFC’s request to unrestrict the documents, exhibits, and

  pleadings filed in Mr. Walker’s § 2255 proceeding. And no discussion or analysis of

  whether to unrestrict the documents, exhibits, and pleadings can be found in the district

  court’s order. In fact, the word “document” or “documents” appears but eight times in the

  order, seven times when the district court stated the general legal standards governing

  restrictions on public access and once when the district court quoted a press release

  issued by A Just Cause. Likewise, the district court did not discuss the need to maintain

  the restriction on any exhibits, using the word “exhibit” only when discussing

  Ms. Lawson’s theft of an exhibit binder during the § 2255 hearing.

         Turning to Mr. Banks, he filed a motion entitled “Motion to Direct Court Reporter

  to Provide Transcript to Defendant-Movant, and to Unseal all Documents Submitted

                                               4
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  Therein.” Banks’s App. at A-155. And Mr. Banks began his motion by asking the district

  court to issue an order directing (1) the court reporter to provide a copy of the § 2255

  hearing transcript and (2) “the Clerk of Court to unseal all documents and other records

  as submitted in [Mr. Walker’s § 2255] proceeding.” Id. After discussing the case’s

  procedural history and the governing standards regarding restricting access to judicial

  documents and proceedings, Mr. Banks argued the district court did not comply with its

  own local rules or with Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent when permitting

  Mr. Walker to file documents under a Level 2 restriction. In concluding his motion,

  Mr. Banks reasserted his need for “access to all of the records and proceedings in the

  Walker matter” and “requested that the Court direct the Clerk of the Court to provide to

  counsel . . . a copy of all of the Exhibits, Documents, and other Pleadings as submitted in

  the aforesaid action, that are currently under Seal.” Id. at A-161–62. And Mr. Banks

  contended “the same principles and reasoning that the Court of Appeals relied upon [in

  Walker I when vacating the district court’s orders] regarding the access to the transcript

  applies to all other documents, exhibits and pleadings.” Id. at 162.

         The district court denied Mr. Banks’s motion. As the majority quotes, the district

  court began its analysis by stating that it had “already considered, at length, the

  arguments in favor of unsealing the relevant transcripts, and the [c]ourt incorporates that

  analysis here.” Gov. App. Vol. I at 221 (emphasis added). The district court then

  summarized its position that release of the “requested records” could jeopardize witness

  and juror safety, which outweighed the interests advanced by Mr. Banks. The district

  court concluded its order by stating,

                                                5
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                In sum, Mr. Banks has failed to provide any basis for unsealing
         those transcripts that this [c]ourt has not already considered and rejected.
         Therefore, for the reasons stated above and in the [c]ourt’s prior order, it is
                ORDERED that Banks’s motion to unseal the transcript is DENIED.
         It is
                FURTHER ORDERED that Banks’s motion for a status update is
         DENIED AS MOOT.

  Id. at 222–23 (emphasis added) (docket citations omitted).

         Mr. Banks timely appealed from the district court’s order. See Fed. R. App. P.

  4(a)(1)(B)(i) (permitting sixty days to file notice of appeal in action where the United

  States is a party); see also United States v. Pinto, 1 F.3d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir. 1993)

  (concluding sixty-day time period in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) applies to

  appeal from order in § 2255 proceeding). On appeal, Mr. Banks challenges the district

  court’s denial of his motion to permit access to both portions of the transcript of the

  hearing on Mr. Walker’s § 2255 motion and the documents and pleadings submitted in

  the § 2255 proceeding.

         Specific to the documents and pleadings, Mr. Banks remarks that “[t]hroughout

  this entire proceeding the District Court ordered that almost all of the submitted pleadings

  be filed under seal.” Appellant’s Br. at 12 (citing as examples ECF Nos. 1065, 1066, and

  1071). In summarizing his argument, Mr. Banks contends the district court “failed to

  follow established precedent and sealed almost the entire record — both the transcripts of

  the Walker habeas evidentiary proceeding, and the filings made by both [Mr. Walker’s]

  counsel and the Government — and ignored the prior Orders of this Court to conduct a

  proper analysis.” Id. at 19. In more detail, Mr. Banks argues the district court’s

  maintenance of the Level 2 restriction on the filings and on most of the transcript (1) ran

                                                6
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  contrary to the presumption of public access; (2) was not narrowly tailored; (3) did not

  comply with the District of Colorado Local Rules; (4) did not take into account

  Mr. Banks’s personal interest in reviewing the restricted materials; and (5) was based on

  speculation and holding Mr. Banks responsible for actions of other CSFC members,

  including Pastor Banks. Id. at 20–27; see also Reply at 10–11 (noting the district court

  did not deny a single motion to restrict access and arguing that “review of [Mr. Walker’s

  motions for leave to restrict] makes it clear that they were filed for every single document

  and record in the case with no differentiation as to the content of the subject documents

  or records”). Mr. Banks concludes his opening brief by asking this court to remand the

  case so the district court can “conduct a proper analysis of the entire record — both

  pleadings and transcripts — and only seal those portions that should be properly kept

  confidential under the existing case law.”4 Appellant’s Br. at 28 (emphasis added).

         4
            The Government argues that, although Mr. Banks “moved the district court to
  unseal all documents and other records submitted in the § 2255 proceeding,” he waived
  this court’s review of the district court’s order as to the documents and pleadings by not
  advancing any argument specific only to the documents and pleadings. Appellee’s Br. at
  34. However, as the above paragraph demonstrates, Mr. Banks’s opening brief presents
  numerous arguments applicable to the Level 2 restriction placed on the documents by the
  district court. Further, Mr. Banks, although incarcerated at the time of the hearing on
  Mr. Walker’s § 2255 motion, may have some knowledge of the general nature of the
  testimony at the hearing given the hearing was open to the public and attended by CSFC
  members. The same, however, cannot be said for the documents. Under the District of
  Colorado Local Rules, when a party moves for leave to file with restricted access, access
  to a document is automatically restricted until the district court rules on the motion for
  leave to file with restricted access. See D. Colo. Local Civ. R. 7.2(e) (“A document
  subject to a motion to restrict shall be filed as a restricted document and shall be subject
  to restriction until the motion is determined by the court.”); D. Colo. Local Crim. R.
  47.1(e) (same quotation). Thus, unlike the hearing transcript, Mr. Banks has no way of
  knowing what a specific document contains and is not in a position to advance specific
                                               7
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                                        II.     DISCUSSION

         I start by summarizing the standard of review, as well as the legal standard for

  restricting public access to judicial proceedings and court documents. Then I briefly

  explain why I concur with the majority’s affirmance as to the § 2255 hearing transcript.

  Further, I explain why I dissent in part from the majority’s affirmance of the district

  court’s maintenance of restricted access as to all documents in Mr. Walker’s § 2255

  proceeding. Finally, I discuss why I dissent in part from the majority’s decision to grant

  the Government’s motion to file four appendix volumes under seal.

                                   A.         Standard of Review

         We review a district court’s decision to seal or unseal documents for an abuse of

  discretion, but we review any legal principles the district court applied in considering a

  motion to seal or unseal de novo. United States v. Pickard, 733 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th

  Cir. 2013). We apply the abuse of discretion standard because the decision whether to

  seal or unseal is “necessarily fact-bound.” United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708

  (10th Cir. 1985). “An abuse of discretion has been characterized as an arbitrary,

  capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v.

  Vill. at Deer Creek Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 685 F.3d 977, 981 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal

  quotation marks omitted). A district court abuses its discretion where it “(1) commits

  legal error, (2) relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, or (3) where no rational basis

  exists in the evidence to support its ruling.” Dullmaier v. Xanterra Parks & Resorts, 883

  arguments about a given document or set of documents. Accordingly, I reject the
  Government’s waiver argument.
                                                   8
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  F.3d 1278, 1295 (10th Cir. 2018). Further, a district court abuses its discretion if it issues

  its ruling without sufficiently developing a record that allows for “meaningful appellate

  review.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1031 (10th Cir.

  2007). But, under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s decision will not be

  disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court

  made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the

  circumstances.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, 611 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2010).

                     B.      Legal Standard for Restricting Public Access

         The majority and Walker I adequately state the legal standard governing access to

  judicial documents and proceedings. See Maj. Order. at 21; Walker I, 761 F. App’x at

  834–36. I, nonetheless, highlight three points. First, “[i]t is clear that the courts of this

  country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents,

  including judicial records and documents.” Walker I, 761 F. App’x at 834 (quoting Nixon

  v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). From this, “‘there is a strong

  presumption in favor of public access’ as ‘the interests of the public are presumptively

  paramount when weighed against those advanced by the parties.’” Id. (brackets and

  ellipsis omitted) (quoting Pickard, 733 F.3d at 1302). Second, any order restricting access

  to judicial records “must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve the interest’ being protected by . .

  . restricting access to the records.” Id. at 835 (brackets omitted) (quoting Press-Enter. Co.

  v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986)). Third, when “denying a motion to

  unseal, ‘the trial court must articulate the interest warranting sealing along with findings

  specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was

                                                  9
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  properly entered.’” Id. at 836 (brackets omitted) (quoting Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v.

  U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 156 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 1998)).

                                   C.     Hearing Transcript

         I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the district court did not abuse its

  discretion by maintaining the restriction of access on the transcript of the testimony of

  thirteen of the witnesses at Mr. Walker’s § 2255 hearing. The district court expressed

  concern that granting public access to these portions of the transcript might result in

  harassment of the witnesses. And the district court rooted this conclusion in the past

  conduct of CSFC members, including the harassment of jurors and Ms. Lawson’s alleged

  theft of an exhibit binder during the § 2255 hearing.5 Further, in its order, the district

  court discussed the testimony of each witness and included copious citations to the

  record, demonstrating that the court, as to the § 2255 hearing transcript, engaged in the

         5
           Mr. Banks argues he should not be held responsible for the actions of CSFC
  members and that the district court employed a guilt-by-association approach when
  denying his motion to unseal. However, Mr. Banks relied primarily on a public-right-of-
  access argument in his motion. Mr. Banks did not explicitly propose the lesser remedy of
  a change in the restriction level from Level 2 to Level 1 so that he, but not the public,
  could access the hearing transcript. See D. Colo. L. Civ. R. 7.2(b) (“There are three levels
  of restriction. Level 1 limits access to the parties and the court. Level 2 limits access to
  the filing party and the court.”); see also D. Colo. L. Crim. R. 47.1(b) (“Unless otherwise
  ordered, there are four levels of restriction. Level 1 limits access to the parties and the
  court. Level 2 limits access to the filing party, the affected defendant(s), the government,
  and the court.”). Nor did Mr. Banks, despite being aware of the district court’s reasons
  for maintaining the restriction, provide any assurances, including proposing safeguards,
  that release of the full transcript to him would not result in the CSFC and Pastor Banks
  gaining access to the transcript. Accordingly, the district court was within its right to
  consider what might happen to witnesses should the transcript be made public and the
  CSFC gain access to the transcript.

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  tedious analysis required when considering a motion to unrestrict. Accordingly, I am

  unable to conclude that the district court reached an arbitrary, whimsical, or manifestly

  unreasonable result by maintaining the restriction as to the thirteen witnesses.

                 D.     Documents Filed in Mr. Walker’s § 2255 Proceeding

         For two primary reasons, I reach a different conclusion regarding the documents.6

  First, as I read the district court’s orders and reasoning, I am unconvinced the district

  court considered Mr. Banks’s request that it unrestrict access to the documents, exhibits,

  and pleadings filed in Mr. Walker’s § 2255 proceeding. Unlike with the hearing

  testimony where the district court took a witness-by-witness approach, the district court

  did not discuss any individual document or group of documents in its orders. Nor did the

  decretals in the district court’s orders make any mention of the documents and pleadings,

  be it to unrestrict or maintain the restriction of them. Further, as discussed next, the

         6
           In addition to my two primary reasons for dissenting in part, I observe the
  majority construes part of Mr. Banks’s motion in the district court as a motion for
  reconsideration. For several reasons, I do not adopt this approach. First, the district court
  did not construe Mr. Banks’s motion as one for reconsideration that raised arguments in
  an untimely manner. Second, the Government never contended Mr. Banks’s motion was
  a motion for reconsideration and this court never received any briefing on the matter.
  Third, this was Mr. Banks’s first attempt to gain access to the transcript and documents
  and the interests he asserted in these records, including hoping to use the records to seek
  a presidential pardon, are not identical to the interests advanced by the CSFC in its
  motions to unrestrict. Fourth, the Government conceded at oral argument that a party may
  file a new motion to unrestrict. Thus, nothing compelled Mr. Banks to pursue access to
  the transcripts and documents through a motion for reconsideration rather than a
  standalone motion to unrestrict. Fifth, where the district court had already ruled on the
  CSFC’s motion to unrestrict, which raised some of the same arguments as Mr. Banks’s
  motion, it was logical for Mr. Banks, in pursuing his own motion, to address the
  arguments previously adopted by the district court. Therefore, Mr. Banks’s discussion of
  the district court’s prior order does not, in my opinion, convert his motion into a motion
  for reconsideration.
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  substance of many of the documents demonstrates that, had the district court reviewed

  each document and employed the approach it did with the transcript, it would have

  quickly and easily realized that many of the documents do not contain materials falling

  within its reasons for maintaining the restriction on parts of the transcripts. Finally, the

  continued restriction on some of the documents, specifically the district court’s orders

  that contain its own analysis, is inconsistent with the district court’s decision to unrestrict

  many of the statements it made during the § 2255 hearing. This also supports the

  conclusion that, despite Mr. Banks’s clear request for access to the documents, the district

  court did not review the documents. Accordingly, I would conclude the district court

  failed to review the documents and necessarily abused its discretion.

         Second, even if one could read the district court’s orders as suggesting it reviewed

  each of the restricted documents because it used the word “records” in its order denying

  Mr. Banks’s motion, in my estimation, the district court’s decision to maintain the

  restriction on all documents would be an abuse of discretion. Given the subject and

  characteristics of the seventy-eight restricted documents, I view the documents as falling

  into three categories.

         One category involves documents that contain discussion of the merits of

  Mr. Walker’s § 2255 motion and/or a significant number of statements critical of the

  CSFC, Pastor Banks, or other members of the CSFC. See e.g., United States v. Walker,

  No. 1:09-cr-00266-CMA-3 (D. Colo.), ECF Nos. 899, 902, 921, 930–31, 937, 941, 947–

  48, 952, 956, 966, 970, 986, 989, 992–93, 999–1000, 1005, 1008, 1011, 1014, 1020,

  1023, 1025, 1042, 1044, 1055, 1059, 1081, 1085. As to these documents, I would affirm

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  the district court’s order on harmless error grounds because the reasons offered by the

  district court for maintaining the restrictions on the transcript unquestionably apply to

  these documents. And I have no reservations that if this court were to remand for the

  district court to assess these documents in the first instance, the district court would

  maintain the restriction on these documents. Cf. United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938,

  943 (10th Cir. 1987) (conclusion on appeal that district court abused its discretion “does

  not require reversal if that abuse amounted to harmless error”); United States v. Lane, 474

  U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (explaining that abuse of discretion is harmless unless it impacts a

  litigant’s substantial rights by influencing the outcome of the proceedings).

         A second category consists of documents that (1) contain passing discussion of

  conduct by the CSFC or its members; (2) include the names and other identifying

  information of witnesses or individuals involved in the medical examination of

  Mr. Walker; and/or (3) involve matters likely to garner increased public interest, such as

  the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ failure to timely comply with certain orders issued by the

  district court. See, e.g., Walker, No. 1:09-cr-00266-CMA-3, ECF Nos. 949, 953, 962–63,

  971, 976, 988, 1021, 1026, 1047.7 As to this category of documents, I would direct the

  district court to unrestrict the documents but remand to give the district court the

  opportunity to permit redactions of materials within the documents that invoke the

         7
           In identifying these documents, as well as the third category of documents, I look
  only at the primary docket entry and do not suggest that I would order the district court to
  unrestrict any or all of the exhibits filed as attachments to some of these two categories of
  documents.

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  concerns raised by the district court when maintaining the restriction of portions of the

  § 2255 hearing transcript. Such an approach would draw the proper balance between the

  strong presumption in favor of public access and the need to protect witnesses. And it

  would result in restrictions to public access that are narrowly tailored to the reasons

  supporting restriction.

         The third category of documents involves (1) motions seeking what I will call

  relatively routine matters of procedure, such as seeking extensions of time or leave from

  the court to file documents or to take preliminary or discovery-based steps in pursuing

  § 2255 relief; and (2) orders of the court, often addressing these types of motions, which

  do not discuss in any great detail the arguments relative to Mr. Walker’s § 2255 motion

  or the conduct of the CSFC, Pastor Banks, or other members of the CSFC.8 See, e.g., id.

  at ECF Nos. 913–14, 917, 938, 940, 954–55, 960–61, 964, 973, 977, 980, 984, 995, 1003,

  1006–07, 1015–16, 1022, 1027, 1029–30, 1033–36, 1050, 1056, 1065–66, 1068, 1076.

  None of the district court’s reasons for maintaining the restriction on portions of the

  transcript apply to these documents. And having reviewed each document, I do not

  believe the district court could articulate any non-arbitrary reason for maintaining the

  restriction to access on these documents. Accordingly, at present, the district court’s

  restriction of access as to this third category of documents neither complies with the

  requirement that any restriction be narrowly tailored nor adequately accounts for the

  strong presumption of public access to judicial documents. Therefore, I am unable to

         8
          Because these documents remain restricted in light of the majority’s decision, I
  describe them with a certain degree of generality.
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  concur with the majority’s affirmance of the district court’s denial of Mr. Banks’s motion

  relative to these documents. Instead, I would order the district court to fully remove the

  restriction on access as to these documents.

                E.      Government’s Motion to File Appendices under Seal

         Finally, the Government has moved to submit four volumes of its proposed

  appendix under seal. The majority grants this motion. The volumes of the proposed

  appendix that the Government moves to file under seal contain some of the restricted

  documents discussed in the previous section, as well as the transcript of the testimony of

  fifteen witnesses from the hearing on Mr. Walker’s § 2255 motion. While I recognize the

  Government attempts to assist this court by filing the proposed appendix, I am unable to

  conclude that the governing law permits the Government to file the appendix volumes

  under seal in their current form. Specifically, the transcript submitted by the Government

  includes the testimony of two witnesses that the district court already unsealed. Thus,

  while I would consider granting the motion to the extent the Government seeks to provide

  this court with a copy of the restricted portions of the transcript,9 I would deny the motion

  to the extent the proposed appendices include transcripts of witness testimony already

  made accessible to the public by the district court. See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140,

  1149 (10th Cir. 2007) (where information has already been exposed to public view, the

  interest of the party seeking to restrict access is diminished); see also Pickard, 733 F.3d

         9
           In the alternative, I would consider denying the motion as unnecessary and
  striking the four sealed volumes of the appendix submitted by the Government because
  this court can already access these transcripts and documents through the district court.
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  at 1305 (noting that sealed information that was once “made public suggests that much of

  the information . . . could be unsealed”).

                                    III.   CONCLUSION

         I respectfully dissent in part. While I would affirm the district court’s decision to

  maintain the restriction on part of the § 2255 hearing transcript and some of the

  documents filed in Mr. Walker’s § 2255 proceeding, I would order the district court to

  unrestrict a wide swath of documents filed in the proceeding. I would also deny, in part,

  the Government’s motion to file four volumes of its appendix under seal.

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