Court Opinion

ID: 9889354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-09 20:04:11.434003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:46.797609
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/9/23 P. v. Robleto CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                        (Colusa)
                                                            ----

THE PEOPLE,                                                                                  C097000

                   Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. CR59083)

         v.

DANIEL A. ROBLETO,

                   Defendant and Appellant.

         In October 2017, defendant Daniel A. Robleto entered an open plea of no contest
to second degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison.
         The factual basis for the plea included the “evidentiary stipulation” that defendant
“did personally commit an act of strangulation upon Lisa Marie Madrid, a human being,
and by committing the said act of strangulation did unlawfully and with malice
aforethought murder” her. That written stipulation--verbally confirmed by counsel for
the People as well as defense counsel at the change of plea hearing--was read out loud as

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the factual basis, in defendant’s presence, at the hearing, and immediately after its
reading defendant entered his no contest plea.
       In May 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under former Penal Code
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied the petition in August 2022,
reasoning defendant was the actual killer based on the stipulated factual basis for his plea.
       Defendant raises several claims on appeal from the trial court’s order, each of
which we address in detail and reject, post. We affirm the order.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Defendant’s plea and sentencing
       In 2017, defendant was charged with a single count of murder. The first amended
complaint alleged defendant “unlawfully and with malice aforethought, murder[ed], [the
victim]” in violation of section 187, subdivision (a). Defendant pleaded no contest to the
charge of second degree murder, and counsel for both parties stipulated to the following
factual basis for the plea: “[I]f the People were called upon to do so, the People would
produce evidence both physical and testimonial, including the testimony of a [forensic
pathologist] that on or about June 29, 2017, including the prior evening, [defendant] did
personally commit the act of strangulation on [the victim]; by committing the act of
strangulation, did unlawfully and with malice aforethough[t], murder [the victim] with
asphyxiation. [Defendant] did leave [the victim’s] body on [a local road].” (Italics
added.) This stipulation was filed as an exhibit to the plea agreement. Further,
defendant initialed the relevant box (item no. 15) on his plea form wherein he agreed to

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

   Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to section
1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the statute.
Although defendant filed his petition under former section 1170.95, we will cite to the
current section 1172.6 in the remainder of our opinion.

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the term: “Written statement of factual basis will be filed herein prior to the plea and will
be the subject of an evidentiary stipulation.”
       At the change of plea hearing, the trial court inquired as to the factual basis for the
plea, which it had not yet received but noted was referenced in item no. 15 of the written
plea form. That written stipulation--verbally confirmed by defense counsel as well as the
prosecutor--was then read out loud, in defendant’s presence, at the hearing. Immediately
after its reading, defendant entered his no contest plea. In December 2017, defendant
was sentenced to state prison for 15 years to life.
       Defendant’s section 1172.6 petition
       After defendant filed his petition for resentencing in May 2022, the trial court
appointed counsel for him. The prosecution filed an opposition to the petition, arguing
defendant was not charged with murder under any theory of imputed malice. Noting that
the factual basis of defendant’s plea stated that he personally strangled the victim with
malice aforethought, the prosecution further argued defendant was ineligible for relief as
a matter of law.
       During a July 2022 hearing on defendant’s petition, at which defendant was not
personally present, defense counsel stated he had not filed a reply brief because he “d[id]
not disagree” with the prosecution’s “factual allegations regarding the history of the
case.” The trial court admonished counsel that failure to file a reply would be interpreted
as a concession, although the court would still independently examine the record to
determine whether a prima facie case had been made. Defense counsel stated he would
submit without filing a reply to the People’s opposition to defendant’s petition as he did
“not believe that the [petition] is well-founded.” The court tentatively agreed with
counsel regarding defendant’s ineligibility for relief but continued the hearing to permit
any further filings.
       The trial court held a second hearing later that month, and defense counsel again
advised that he did not believe the requested relief was “appropriate.” The court agreed,

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noting that the factual basis for the plea “demonstrates [that defendant] was not convicted
of murder as an accomplice under the Felony Murder Rule or the Natural [and] Probable
Consequences Doctrine, but rather as the sole principal in the commission [of] the
murder, which was perpetrated directly by [defendant] by means of strangulation of the
victim.” The court denied defendant’s petition.
       On appeal, defendant contends the trial court engaged in improper fact finding to
determine that he was the actual killer. In the alternative, he argues his stipulation did not
render him categorically ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. Finally, defendant
argues his lawyer improperly conceded ineligibility despite defendant’s lack of consent to
the concession. He adds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                     Legal Background
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437), which
became effective on January 1, 2019, “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
       Section 188, which defines malice, now provides in part: “Except as stated in
subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely
on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1172.6, which allows those convicted of
murder under the felony murder theory to petition the trial court to vacate the conviction
and resentence the defendant. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) “If the petitioner makes a prima

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facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show
cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is “limited.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) The court “ ‘ “takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ”
(Ibid.) The court may rely on the record of conviction in determining whether defendant
has made a prima facie showing, and “ ‘if the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court
is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see
also People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 [it is appropriate for a court to deny
a defendant’s resentencing petition if the record shows defendant is ineligible for relief as
a matter of law].) The court “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972.)
                                                     II
                                  Ineligibility as a Matter of Law
       Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing
because his petition was facially sufficient under section 1172.6 and the record does not
establish he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. He points out that the complaint did
not specify any theory of murder and there were no jury instructions to clarify on what
theory the prosecution relied. He acknowledges the stipulated factual basis admits he
strangled the victim to death with the requisite malice but argues he did not personally
stipulate to doing so. Citing People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, he argues the
stipulation here does not render him categorically ineligible for relief. Accordingly, he
alleges the court engaged in improper fact finding to conclude that he was the actual
killer and ineligible for relief. We disagree.

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       First, the trial court reviewed and relied upon the plea colloquy and plea form,
which is part of the record of conviction. The court may rule against defendant on this
basis, and doing so was not error. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [a court may
deny a petition at the prima facie stage based on the record of conviction].)
       Second, as we have explained in detail ante, defendant initialed his signed plea
form at item no. 15, acknowledging that as a term of his open plea to second degree
murder he was entering into an “evidentiary stipulation” that would serve as the factual
basis for the plea. The stipulation was read into the record at the hearing, as the factual
basis for the plea, in defendant’s presence, immediately before he changed his plea to no
contest. The stipulation unequivocally established that defendant was the actual killer
and had the requisite malice. That the trial court so found was not error.
       Rivera, upon which defendant relies, is distinguishable. In that case, testimony
before a grand jury showed that defendant drove an accomplice to a location where the
accomplice shot and killed a victim. (People v. Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 224.)
The defendant pleaded no contest to second degree murder, and his counsel stipulated to
the transcript of the grand jury proceedings as the factual basis for the plea. (Id. at pp.
225-226.) The trial court denied the defendant’s subsequent section 1172.6 petition,
reasoning the defendant had pleaded no contest to second degree murder with malice.
(Rivera, at pp. 226-227.) The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant’s bare
admission to second degree murder did not establish as a matter of law that he committed
the murder with actual malice given the generic description of the crimes in the
indictment. (Id. at p. 234.) Further, the defendant had not admitted the truth of specific
facts such that his counsel’s stipulation to the transcript as the factual basis for the plea
precluded relief. (Id. at pp. 234-235.)
       This case is nothing like Rivera. Here, through the stipulated factual basis,
defendant agreed to specific facts establishing as a matter of law that he was not
convicted under any theory of imputed malice, but was the actual killer with the requisite

                                               6
mental state. Defendant initialed the relevant portion of the plea form and signed the
form. He entered his no contest plea immediately after the recitation of what both the
prosecutor and defense counsel announced was the agreed-upon factual basis for the plea.
Further, unlike Rivera, nothing in this record suggests that someone other than defendant
committed the murder. No one else was charged with the crime. Rivera is inapposite and
the trial court did not err in finding defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law based
on the record of conviction, including the charging document, the plea form, and the
stipulation.
                                              III
                         Defense Counsel’s Actions and Inactions
       Defendant next argues his counsel erroneously conceded he was ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6. He cites McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) __ U.S. __ [200
L.Ed.2d 821] to argue a Sixth Amendment violation by virtue of his counsel’s decision to
not file a reply to the prosecution’s opposition brief and to otherwise admit defendant’s
ineligibility as a matter of law. He argues counsel’s reluctance to argue defendant’s
eligibility for relief was contrary to defendant’s interests and violated his clear objective
to be resentenced under section 1172.6. In the alternative, defendant argues his counsel
was ineffective in failing to argue in favor of granting defendant relief. We see no merit
in these claims.
       First, because defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at this stage of
the proceedings, see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 973, defendant cannot argue a
violation of that right. Second, even were we to entertain the argument, defendant has
failed to establish that his attorney acted in disregard of his explicit and continuing
instructions.
       “When a client expressly asserts that the objective of ‘his defence’ is to maintain
innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may
not override it by conceding guilt.” (McCoy v. Louisiana, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [200

                                               7
L.Ed.2d at p. 831].) If trial counsel overrides a defendant’s autonomy on a fundamental
decision that is reserved for the client, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are
violated. (Id. at p. ___ [200 L.Ed.2d at pp. 829-830].) But the only evidence defendant
cites as indicating that he expressly asserted a clear objective to continue to pursue his
resentencing petition is the fact that he originally filed the petition. The record is silent as
to any continued position taken by defendant (as opposed to by his counsel), or any
conversations between the two. (See People v. Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883, 891
[no Sixth Amendment violation where nothing in the record indicated defendant ever
made clear to his counsel that the objective of his defense was to maintain innocence].)
       Finally, given our conclusion that defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of
law, defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel, because there was no
reasonable probability that the outcome of the hearing would have been different had
counsel acted differently. (See People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009-1010 [to
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that (1) trial
counsel’s representation was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficiency resulted in
prejudice to defendant, meaning “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different”]; see
also People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463 [trial counsel’s representation is not
deficient “for failing to make meritless objections”]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th
324, 387 [“counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make motions or
objections that counsel reasonably determines would be futile”].) Defendant’s claims of
error based on his counsel’s actions and inactions fail to persuade.

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                                    DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition is affirmed.

                                                      /s/
                                                Duarte, Acting P. J.

We concur:

     /s/
Krause, J.

     /s/
Boulware Eurie, J.

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