Court Opinion

ID: 9744939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:24:23.843297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:09.969290
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE JONES delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant has filed a petition for rehearing in the instant case based upon our ruling on the third issue presented for review. Defendant contends that the information supplied by the citizen informer fell short of establishing probable cause for either the initial stop of the truck or the viewing of the VIN plate by Officer Nunn.  As to that portion of defendant’s contention pertaining to the viewing of the VIN plate, we need only reiterate that Officer Nunn checked the VIN plate only after he had been given permission to do so by the driver of the truck. It is well settled that a specifically established exception to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 90 L.Ed. 1477, 66 S.Ct. 1277, vacated on rehearing on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800, 91 L.Ed. 1259, 67 S.Ct. 857; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court recognized in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, one in possession of an automobile, who is not the owner, can validly consent to a search of the automobile. In that case a policeman stopped a car after observing that one headlight and the license plate light were burned out. In the car were six men, three in the front seat and three in the back seat. Joe Alcala, one of the men in the front seat, not the driver, claimed that the car belonged to his brother who was not present. Alcala consented to a search of the car, which led to the discovery of evidence of a crime. Recognizing the validity of the search, without specifically commenting upon the fact that Joe Alcala was not the car owner, the court stated: “In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit actiyity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence. In the present case for example, while the police had reason to stop the car for traffic violations, the State does not contend that there was probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search was incident to a valid arrest of any of the occupants. Yet, the search yielded tangible evidence that served as a basis for a prosecution, and provided some assurance that others, wholly innocent of the crime, were not mistakenly brought to trial. And in those cases where there is probable cause to arrest or search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search may still be valuable. If the search is conducted and proves fruitless, that in itself may convince the police that an arrest with its possible stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search pursuant to a warrant is not justified. In short, a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity.” (412 U.S. 218, 227-28, 36 L. Ed.2d 854, 863, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048.) By allowing the employee-driver to exercise authority over the truck by operating it on the public highway, defendant assumed the risk that the driver would allow someone to look at the inside of the door where the VIN plate was located. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 22 L.Ed.2d 684, 89 S.Ct. 1420. The more important concern with respect to defendant’s present contention is whether the initial stop by Officer Nunn was justified. We are of the opinion that it was. Officer Nunn stopped the truck after being directed to do so by Sergeant McEuen. Sergeant McEuen had earlier received a call from a private citizen (whom he had known for two or three years) informing him that the described truck was stolen. He had then driven to the area mentioned by the informer and observed the vehicles there. The truck which he directed Officer Nunn to stop was the only truck completely fitting the description given by the informer. Defendant argues that the private citizen-informer’s tip and observations made by Sergeant McEuen cannot constitute probable cause for the stop by Officer Nunn. Even assuming these factors to not constitute probable cause, we must nevertheless conclude the stop was justified. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868, the Supreme Court has recognized that a police officer may legitimately make an investigatory stop of an individual, based upon the officer’s suspicion, short of probable cause, that criminal activity is occurring. The court stated: “One general [and legitimate governmental] interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” 392 U.S. 1, 22, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880. While Terry concerned an investigatory stop of a pedestrian whose activity had been personally observed by the policeman and also dealt with the validity of a “frisk” following such a stop, the effect of the Terry ruling with respect to investigatory stops is not limited to pedestrian situations or to situations involving a “frisk” as well as a stop. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 92 S.Ct. 1921, a police •officer, acting upon an informant’s tip, approached a car in which a man (Williams) was seated, in order to investigate the informant’s report. The officer tapped on the window and asked the occupant to get out of the car. Instead of getting out of the car, the occupant rolled down the window, whereupon the officer reached inside the car and removed a gun from the man’s waistband. The man was then arrested and a subsequent search of the car produced other weapons and narcotics. Before the Supreme Court Williams contended that the initial seizure of the pistol was unjustifiable on the informant’s tip, absent a more reliable informant or some corroboration of the tip. With respect to the officer’s approach to the car, or the initial “stop,” the court found justification based upon that portion of Temj quoted above. The court then went on to state: “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response, [citation] A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 617-18, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923. Very recently the validity of an investigatory stop was again recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 95 S.Ct. 2574. In that case the court stated that law enforcement officers policing the United States-Mexican border could briefly stop a vehicle to investigate circumstances which reasonably provoke suspicion that the vehicle is carrying aliens illegally into the country. The court went on to hold, however, that in that particular case the officers were unjustified in stopping the car, since the only factor upon which the officers had relied in stopping tire car was that the occupants appeared to be of Mexican ancestry. Mexican appearance, though a relevant factor, cannot alone justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to investigate the status of their citizenship. Numerous other Federal and Illinois cases applying Terry and Williams have found investigatory stops to be justified under varying sets of facts leading to reasonable suspicion but short of probable cause. See, for example: Ballou v. Massachusetts (1st Cir. 1968), 403 F.2d 982, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 909, 22 L.Ed.2d 222, 895 S.Ct. 1024; United States v. Grandi (2d Cir. 1970), 424 F.2d 399, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870, 34 L.Ed.2d 121, 93 S.Ct. 199; United States v. Harflinger (8th Cir. 1970), 436 F.2d 928, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973, 29 L.Ed.2d 137, 91 S.Ct. 1660; United States v. Sanchez (10th Cir. 1971), 450 F.2d 525; United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357; United States v. Hernandez (7st Cir. 1973), 486 F.2d 614, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 959, 39 L.Ed.2d 574, 94 S.Ct. 1488; United States v. Cage (10th Cir. 1974), 494 F.2d 740; People v. Tassone, 41 Ill.2d 7, 241 N.E.2d 419, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 567, 89 S.Ct. 1318; People v. Lee, 48 Ill.2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 488; People v. Watson, 24 Ill.App.3d 237, 321 N.E.2d 187; People v. Ussery, 24 Ill.App.3d 864, 321 N.E.2d 718; People v. Housby, 26 Ill.App.3d 92, 324 N.E.2d 465; People v. Brisbon, 26 Ill.App.3d 268, 324 N.E.2d 644. Also see Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, §107 — 14. In the instant case Officer Nunn was justified in making an investigatory stop of the track based upon the informer’s report and Sergeant McEuen’s determination that the truck stopped was the only truck fitting the description given by the informer. The subsequent viewing of the VIN plate by Officer Nunn was justified because of the driver’s consent. The petition for rehearing is therefore denied. EARNS, P. J., and CARTER, J, concur.