Court Opinion

ID: 9943652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 23:02:19.721205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:39.677639
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 P. v. Powell CA1/5
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
          Plaintiff and Respondent,                               A167066

 v.                                                               (Alameda County Super. Ct.
 DIANTAY POWELL,                                                   No. 171602A)
          Defendant and Appellant.

        Defendant Diantay Powell appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
postjudgment motion under Penal Code1 section 1203.01. In that motion, he
requested a Franklin/Cook2 proceeding to preserve evidence for a future
youth parole hearing. The court denied the motion on the ground that Powell
was statutorily ineligible for a parole hearing because he was 18 years old at
the time of his offenses and was sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP). Powell contends that his exclusion from youth offender
parole consideration violates his right to equal protection under the state and

        1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

        2 (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 269 (Franklin) [youth

offender parole hearings require record of mitigating evidence tied to the
defendant’s youth]; In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452 (Cook) [same].)

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federal Constitutions and constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the
state Constitution and the Racial Justice Act (RJA). We disagree and affirm.
                              I. BACKGROUND
      In 2016, a jury convicted Powell of first degree murder with a multiple
murder special circumstance as to one victim and second degree murder as to
another victim. The jury also found true allegations that Powell personally
discharged a firearm during the commission of each offense, causing death or
great bodily injury. Powell was 18 years old at the time he committed the
murders, and the victims he shot were teenage girls. (People v. Powell (Dec.
15, 2017, A149038) [nonpub. opn.].) Powell was sentenced to LWOP plus 65
years to life. In Powell’s appeal from that judgment, this court remanded the
matter for the trial court to exercise its newfound discretion to strike the
firearm enhancement but otherwise affirmed. (Id. at pp. 6–7.) On remand,
the trial court struck the firearm enhancement and resentenced Powell to
LWOP plus 40 years to life.
      In 2022, Powell filed a section 1203.01 motion seeking a Franklin/Cook
proceeding so he could preserve mitigating evidence for a future youth
offender parole hearing. The motion argued that the exclusion of 18- to
25-year-old offenders sentenced to LWOP from youth offender parole
consideration violated Powell’s right to equal protection as well as the state
Constitution’s ban on cruel or unusual punishment. The trial court denied
the motion on the ground that section 3051 expressly excludes from youth
offender parole consideration offenders who were 18 years or older at the
time of their offense and sentenced to LWOP. In doing so, the court rejected
Powell’s arguments that section 3051 violated equal protection or the ban
against cruel or unusual punishment.
      Powell timely appealed.

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                               II. DISCUSSION
      A. Denying a Youth Offender Parole Hearing to Young Adult Offenders
         Like Powell Does Not Violate Equal Protection.
      Under section 3051, juveniles sentenced to LWOP are eligible for a
youth offender parole hearing after 25 years of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd.
(b)(4).) Likewise, young adults between the ages of 18 and 25 who are
sentenced to 25 years to life are eligible for a youth offender parole hearing
after 25 years. (Id., subd. (b)(3).) But young adults sentenced to LWOP like
Powell are ineligible for such a hearing. (Id., subd. (h).)
      Powell contends section 3051, subdivision (h) violates equal protection
because there is no rational basis for distinguishing between young adult
offenders with respect to their eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing
based solely on their sentence. After independently reviewing Powell’s equal
protection argument, we disagree. (People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
193, 202 (Sands).)
      The federal and state Constitutions “ ‘guarantee all persons the equal
protection of the laws.’ ” (People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 778
(Acosta).) This means persons who are similarly situated for the purposes of
the law challenged must receive like treatment unless there is a rational
reason for different treatment. (Ibid.) The equal protection analysis has two
steps: “First, we consider whether ‘ “the state has adopted a classification
that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” ’
[Citation.] The groups need not be similar in all respects but must be
similarly situated for the purposes of the challenged law. [Citation.] Second,
if two similarly situated groups have been identified and no suspect class or
fundamental rights are at issue, we must decide whether there is any

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rational basis to support treating the groups differently.” (Sands, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 202.)
      “[E]qual protection of the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose.’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.) “We
must accept any plausible rational basis without questioning its wisdom,
logic, persuasiveness, or fairness, and regardless of whether the Legislature
ever articulated it.” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 204.)
      As explained below, we reject Powell’s equal protection challenge
because there is a rational basis for treating young adults like Powell who
have been sentenced to LWOP differently than other young adult offenders.
            1. We Assume, Without Deciding, That Young Adult LWOP
               Offenders Are Similarly Situated to Other Young Adult
               Offenders.
      Powell contends that for purposes of section 3051, young adult
offenders sentenced to LWOP are similarly situated to young adult offenders
not sentenced to LWOP. Powell relies on People v. Hardin (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 273, 285 (Hardin), which reasoned that both young adult groups
are similarly situated because they committed their crimes before their
brains were fully developed and before they reached emotional or cognitive
maturity in their judgment and decision-making. But other appellate
districts have reached a contrary conclusion. (See, e.g., People v. Jackson
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 199 (Jackson) [finding the two groups not
similarly situated for purposes of section 3051]; but see Acosta, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 779 [finding the two groups similarly situated for purposes
of section 3051].) We, however, need not wade into this disagreement
because we find a rational basis for differential treatment.

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            2. A Rational Basis Exists for Treating Young Adult LWOP
                 Offenders and Young Adult Non-LWOP Offenders Differently.
      Powell acknowledges that most courts of appeal, including this division,
have found a rational basis for distinguishing between young adult LWOP
offenders and young adult non-LWOP offenders. (See, e.g., Sands, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th 193; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326; Jackson,
supra, 61 Cal.App.5th 189; Acosta, supra 60 Cal.App.5th 769; In re Williams
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427.) Nonetheless, Powell argues that based on section
3051’s goal—to provide young adults a meaningful opportunity for parole
based on youth-related mitigating factors—“there is no plausible basis for
distinguishing between same-age offenders based solely on the crime they
committed.” Relying heavily on Hardin—the one court of appeal that has
found section 3051’s distinction between young adults with LWOP and
non-LWOP sentences violative of equal protection—Powell argues that the
relative culpability tied to crimes like special-circumstances murder that
result in a mandatory LWOP sentence and crimes like murder without a
special-circumstances finding, do not establish a rational basis for differential
treatment. (Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 288.) We, however, join with
People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116 (Ngo) in rejecting Hardin and
reaffirm our holding in Sands finding a rational basis for treating young
adult offenders sentenced to LWOP differently than those who are not under
section 3051.3
      As an initial matter, we agree with Ngo that “cutting off the most
culpable youthful offenders from parole entirely” does not appear to be
“inconsistent with the goals of section of section 3051.” (Ngo, supra, 89

      3 The California Supreme Court has granted review in Hardin and Ngo.

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Cal.App.5th at p. 125.) As Ngo explained, section 3051 “is, in part, a
sentencing statute” because it “does not make all youth offenders eligible for
parole at the same point in their incarceration” even though they “have been
simultaneously maturing and outgrowing their youthful impulses.” (Ngo, at
p. 125, italics in original.) For example, section 3051 distinguishes between
young adult offenders sentenced to a determinate term, an indeterminate
term of less than 25 years, and an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
(Ngo, at p. 125.) Under section 3051, each of these three groups is eligible for
a parole hearing at a different time. (Ngo, at p. 125.) Thus, section 3051
provides young adults with a meaningful opportunity for parole based on
youth-related mitigating factors notwithstanding its exclusion of young
adults sentenced to LWOP (“the most culpable youth offenders”). (Ngo, at p.
125.)
        In any event, we are not persuaded by Hardin that relative culpability
is not a rational basis for treating young adults sentenced to LWOP
differently under section 3051. According to Hardin, relative culpability
cannot serve as a rational basis for differential treatment because section
3051 allows young adults “who have committed multiple violent crimes
(albeit not special-circumstance murder) and were sentenced to a technically
parole-eligible indeterminate state prison term that is the functional
equivalent of life without parole” to obtain a parole hearing. (Hardin, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 289.) According to Hardin, “[w]hile we must accept any
gross generalizations the Legislature may seem to have made when
conducting rational basis review [citation], the exclusion of young adult
offenders sentenced to life without parole was a deliberate and focused choice,
not an inadvertent consequence of broadly worded legislation.” (Id. at
p. 290.) But as we explained in Sands, “the Legislature may rationally treat

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[non-LWOP] offenders . . . less harshly because it deems their underlying
crimes, such as first-degree murder, less grave than special circumstance
murder.” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 204.) Indeed, “special
circumstance multiple murder ‘carries a mandatory sentence of LWOP or
death (§ 190.2, subd. (a)), which are the harshest penalties available under
our penal system and are reserved for crimes of the most heinous nature.’ ”
(Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 780.) Because “ ‘[t]he Legislature
rationally judged this crime to be more severe and more deserving of lifetime
punishment than nonspecial circumstance first degree murder,’ ” it could also
rationally conclude that young adults convicted of that crime to be
undeserving of parole. (Ibid.)
      Hardin’s claim that “a technically parole-eligible indeterminate state
prison term” may be “the functional equivalent of life without parole” does
not support a contrary conclusion. (Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 289.)
As Ngo correctly noted, “the Legislature could rationally distinguish between
[youthful] offenders with de jure and de facto LWOP sentences” because a “de
jure LWOP sentence provides a bright-line test.” (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 126–127.) Indeed, “using a special circumstance as a bright-line test of
culpability is well-established.” (Ibid.) Thus, “[t]he Legislature’s distinction
is not irrational simply because some offenders sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole are arguably less culpable than some offenders receiving
lesser sentences.” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204–205.)
      Finally, Hardin ignores that equal protection “allows not only
incremental regulation, but also incomplete regulation.” (Ngo, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 126, italics in original.) “ ‘A classification is not arbitrary or
irrational simply because there is an “imperfect fit between means and
ends” ’ [citations], or ‘because it may be “to some extent both underinclusive

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and overinclusive” ’ [citations]. Consequently, any plausible reason for
distinguishing between [two classes] need not exist in every scenario in which
the statutes might apply.” (Johnson v. Dept. of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871,
887.) Thus, the Legislature could choose to exclude young adults sentenced
to LWOP from the relief otherwise available to other young adult offenders
under section 3051 without jeopardizing the entire remedial scheme. (Ngo, at
p. 126.)
      We therefore decline to follow Hardin and reaffirm our conclusion in
Sands that there is a rational basis for treating young adults sentenced to
LWOP and other young adult offenders under section 3051 differently.
      B. Denying a Parole Hearing to Young Adult LWOP Offenders is Not
           Cruel or Unusual Punishment.
      Powell next argues that section 3051 constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment because a LWOP sentence is disproportionately severe for young
adults in comparison to older adults. Powell further contends that a
mandatory LWOP sentence is too severe because it does not allow the trial
court to consider youth-related mitigating circumstances. Again, we disagree
and hold, consistent with other courts of appeal, that the denial of a youth
offender parole hearing to young adults sentenced to LWOP does not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment.
      Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution prohibits the
“inflict[ion]” of “[c]ruel or unusual punishment.” In doing so, it
“ ‘ “independently lays down the same prohibition” ’ as the Eighth
Amendment.” (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 191
(Edwards).) Thus, a punishment violates this prohibition only if it is “so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch

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(1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.) “[I]n making this determination,” courts “assess
. . . (1) the nature of the offense and the offender, and the degree of danger
posed to society; (2) a comparison with sentences for more serious offenses
under California law; and (3) a comparison with sentences imposed by other
states for the same offense.” (Edwards, at p. 191.)
      In arguing that depriving young adults sentenced to LWOP of the
opportunity for a parole hearing violates the ban on cruel or unusual
punishment, Powell urges us to apply the reasoning of Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller). There, the high court held that a mandatory
LWOP sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on
juveniles. (Id. at pp. 474–477.) Claiming that young adults “share key
characteristics with those under the age of 18,” Powell contends that he
should have the same opportunity for a parole hearing as juveniles under
section 3051. Those shared characteristics include a heightened
vulnerability to outside influences, the lack of a fully developed brain, and a
greater likelihood of exhibiting extreme recklessness, impulsivity, and risk-
taking.
      We, however, decline to extend Miller to young adults like Powell. As
the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[w]hile drawing the
line at 18 is subject to the objections always raised against categorical rules,
that is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between
childhood and adulthood” and is for example, “the age at which the line for
death eligibility ought to rest.” (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 554
(Roper).) Miller did not change this. Indeed, following Miller, our own high
court reaffirmed the age of 18 as the bright line that our society uses to
separate childhood from adulthood for many purposes, including the
propriety of certain criminal punishments like the death penalty. (People v.

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Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234 (Tran).) Because Powell was already 18
at the time he committed the murders, Miller does not apply to him.
      Next, Powell argues that imposing a mandatory LWOP sentence on
young adults like himself is “too severe” because “it does not allow a
sentencing court to consider a young adult’s individual circumstances.”
Once again, Powell urges this court to apply the reasoning in Miller, where
the high court encouraged consideration of a juvenile offender’s individual
circumstances before imposing LWOP. (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp.
476–477.) And once again, we decline to reject the bright line established by
the United States Supreme Court in Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at page 547, and
the California Supreme Court in Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at page 1234. As
explained in People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482, “[m]aking
an exception for a defendant who committed a crime just five months past
his 18th birthday opens the door for the next defendant who is only six
months into adulthood. Such arguments would have no logical end, and so a
line must be drawn at some point.”
      Accordingly, we conclude that the imposition of a mandatory LWOP
sentence on individuals 18 and older does not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment in violation of the California Constitution.4

      4 Because we are bound by our high court’s holding that the most

extreme punishment—death—is constitutional for 18-year-olds (Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), we cannot rely on the
decisions of other state courts extending the reasoning of Miller to young
adults to reach a contrary conclusion. Absent a change of opinion by our high
court, only the Legislature may extend the right to a parole hearing to young
adults sentenced to LWOP.

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     C. Powell Cannot Assert a Claim Under the Racial Justice Act in this
         Appeal.
     Lastly, Powell argues for the first time on appeal that the imposition of
LWOP on African Americans like himself constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment “because it is disproportionate under the Racial Justice Act
[(RJA)].” We need not reach the merits of this argument because Powell
cannot make a RJA claim in this appeal.
     The RJA became effective on January 1, 2021. (§ 745, added by Stats.
2020, ch. 317, § 3.5.) It was enacted “to eliminate racial bias from
California’s criminal justice system” and “to ensure that race plays no role at
all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.” (Stats. 2020, ch.
317, § 2(i).) To this end, the RJA states that “[t]he state shall not seek or
obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the
basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a).) In its current
form, the RJA applies retroactively (§ 745, subd. (j)) and provides that “[a]
defendant may file a motion pursuant to this section, or a petition for writ of
habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7, in a court of competent
jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a). For claims based on the
trial record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision
(a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence.” (§ 745, subd. (b)).
     As this is not a direct appeal from a conviction or sentence, Powell
cannot raise a RJA claim in this appeal from the denial of a motion under
section 1203.01. (See § 745, subd. (b).) Powell is not, however, precluded
from raising his RJA claim through any other procedural mechanism
allowed under section 745, subdivision (b).
                              III. DISPOSITION
     The December 29, 2022, order is affirmed.

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                                  CHOU, J.

We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.

BURNS, J.

People v. Powell / A167066

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