Court Opinion

ID: 9686275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:38:27.923323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:17.160729
License: Public Domain

Lesinski, C. J.
(dissenting). On September 8, 1969, defendant Paul Joseph Jaworski was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony or larceny, MCLA §§ 750.92, 750.110 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.287, Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 28.305). Following sentencing, he appeals claiming that the plea was improperly accepted because the trial court failed to advise him of his right against compulsory self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to *556the United States Constitution. The majority of this panel affirms this conviction upon a plea of guilty.
On June 2, 1969, at a time prior to this defendant’s plea of guilty, the United States Supreme Court reversed a state court guilty plea in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 US 238 (89 S Ct 1709, 23 L Ed 2d 274), finding it impossible to determine, from the record before it, whether the guilty plea was voluntarily and understandingly given. Upon the authority of Boykin, applicable in the instant case, I find that the failure of the instant record to disclose that the trial court advised the defendant of his right against compulsory self-incrimination constitutes reversible error. See, also, People v. Taylor (1970), 383 Mich 338. (Concurring opinion of Justices Black and Dethmers; dissenting opinions of Justices Adams, T. G. Kavanagh and T. M. Ka-VANAGH.)
The requirement of an adequate record was made clear by the Boykin Court’s discussion of the standard of review applicable to guilty pleas:
“A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 US 220, 223 (47 S Ct 582, 583, 71 L Ed 1009, 1012). Admissibility of a confession must be based on a ‘reliable determination on the voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant.’ Jackson v. Denno, 378 US 368, 387 (84 S Ct 1774, 1786, 12 L Ed 2d 908, 922). The requirement that the prosecution spread on the record the prerequisites of a valid waiver is no constitutional innovation. In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 US 506, 516 (82 S Ct 884, 890, 8 L Ed 2d 70, 77), we dealt with a problem of waiver of the right to counsel, a Sixth Amendment right. We held: ‘Presum*557ing waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and under standingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’
“We think that the same standard must be applied to determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made. For, as we have said, a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality. The question of an effective waiver of a Federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course governed by federal standards. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 US 415, 422 (85 S Ct 1074, 1078, 13 L Ed 2d 934, 938).
“Several Federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1 (84 S Ct 1489, 12 L Ed 2d 653). Second, is the right to trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 (88 S Ct 1444, 20 L Ed 2d 491). Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers. Pointer v. Texas, 380 US 400 (85 S Ct 1065, 13 L Ed 2d 923). We cannot presume a waiver of these three important Federal rights from a silent record.” 395 US 238, 242, 243. (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority herein holds that Boykin stands for the proposition that a valid plea of guilty waives the three Federal constitutional rights specifically enumerated above. However, a guilty plea, to be valid, must be “understandingly and voluntarily made,” GrCB 1963, 785.3(2); Boykin, supra, 395 US at 242, 243. (Emphasis supplied.) In the constitutional sense, a guilty plea cannot be “understandingly made” unless the defendant has knowledge of the *558consequences of his act. Since the majority agrees that one of the consequences of pleading guilty is to waive three important constitutional rights, it follows that the defendant must have knowledge of the existence of these rights to effectively waive them. See Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 US 458, 464 (58 S Ct 1019, 82 L Ed 1461) (a valid waiver under the due process clause is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”). Contrary to the position of the majority, this, in my opinion, is what Boykin stated.
The majority argues that the case of Brady v. United States (1970), 397 US 742 (90 S Ct 1463, 25 L Ed 2d 747), supports their interpretation of Boy-kin. I disagree. The guilty plea in Brady was taken on April 30, 1959, over 10 years before the decision in Boykin. Further, the proceedings occurred in a Federal district court, before the 1966 amendment to Fed Rule Crim Proc 11 requiring that the district court advise defendant of the consequences of the plea and question him personally. McCarthy v. United States (1969), 394 US 459 (89 S Ct 1168, 22 L Ed 2d 418). Since both McCarthy and Boykin are to be applied prospectively only, Holliday v. United States (1969), 394 US 831 (89 S Ct 1498, 23 L Ed 2d 16); People v. Taylor (1970), 23 Mich App 595; People v. Butler (1970), 23 Mich App 643, it follows that any discussion in Brady of the meaning of McCarthy and Boykin is mere obiter dictum.
Further, my review of the 1959 transcript of Robert M. Brady’s guilty plea convinces me that “under none of our Michigan holdings” would Brady’s plea “have been held valid.” See People v. Taylor (1970), 383 Mich 338, 357 (per Brennan, C. J.).
The problem, therefore, becomes one of determining whether the defendant possessed the requisite *559knowledge. The majority appears to believe that “knowledge” can be inferred from the mere fact that the defendant pled guilty “voluntarily”. I disagree. Even assuming that the proffered plea is the result of negotiation with the prosecutor and not the product of “coercion, terror, inducements, or subtle or blatant threats”, the record must still reveal that the defendant knew of the specific constitutional rights sought to be treated as waived, i.e. that the plea is not the product of “ignorance [or] uncomprehension”. A constitutional right cannot be waived inferentially. Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 US at 243. See, also, McCarthy v. United States, supra, and Johnson v. Zerbst, supra.
Those who are hesitant to upset guilty pleas when the record fails to reveal a “knowledgeable” waiver, take haven in the specific difficult facts of Boykin, where the defendant, a Negro, was sentenced to death for common-law robbery and where only a bare journal entry recorded the guilty plea.
While it may be true that the harsh facts of Boykin moved the Supreme Court to the strong pronouncement made in that opinion we cannot allow legal pedantry to limit the application of the Boykin rule. If we did, then the universal effect of other “harsh” cases would also be in doubt. See, for example, In re Gault (1967), 387 US 1 (87 S Ct 1428,18 L Ed 2d 527), Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 US 478 (84 S Ct 1758,12 L Ed 2d 977), and Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 US 436 (86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694). Additional citation of authority is unnecessary to demonstrate the error of such a position. The “Boy-kin rule” is as much a part of our jurisprudence as the "Miranda rule” or the "Escobedo rule”.
It is unfortunate that the import of Boykin did not make the impact on the judiciary and the bar of this state that Escobedo, Miranda and Gault did. Un*560doubtedly this will ultimately adversely affect the validity of many pleas of guilty taken after Boykin. However, the sooner we recognize the significance of Boykin, the sooner we can eliminate the shortcomings in those cases, such as the instant one where the plea taking was exemplary except that Boykin was not followed, and concentrate on preventing any confusion in future cases.
One other point needs mention. The appellate reports of this state are replete with cases arising after defendants were granted a right of appeal by our 1963 Constitution questioning the guilty plea taking procedures. Some of the opinions in these cases would appear to be attempts to lay to rest once and for all the issue of what constitutes a valid plea of guilty. I believe that all of the confusion and needless writing in this area could be avoided if trial courts would spend just a few minutes more in the taking of a plea of guilty.
“What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought (Garner v. Louisiana, 368 US 157, 173 [82 S Ct 248, 256, 7 L Ed 2d 207, 219]; Specht- v. Patterson, 386 US 605, 610 [87 S Ct 1209, 1212, 18 L Ed 2d 326, 330]), and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.” Boykin v. Alabama, supra, at 243, 244.
This is a small request to make of the judicial system where the effect of a valid guilty plea is to save the trial courts many days of trial and expense and expose defendants to possible long-term imprisonment, and the effect of an invalid plea is to place a *561great burden on appellate courts and make convictions, after reversal, more difficult to obtain due to passage of time and disappearance of witnesses.
The plea in the instant case should thus be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. In so recommending I reiterate the exemplary nature of the plea procedure in this case except for the failure to follow the Boykin rule set down just prior to this plea.