Court Opinion

ID: 9388998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 07:08:29.917544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:24.380723
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 18, 2023

                                       In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                           First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                               NO. 01-22-00426-CV
                            ———————————
                      JUSTIN CARL FOLSOM, Appellant
                                         V.
                   CORIN CARDENAS FOLSOM, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the County Court at Law
                         Washington County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. CCL9686

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Justin Carl Folsom appeals from the trial court’s Final Decree of

Divorce. In a single issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred by holding that the

house where Appellant lived with his former wife was the equal, undivided
separate property of both spouses and awarding a fifty percent interest in the house

to each spouse. We affirm.

                                     Background

The Purchase of the House

      Corin Cardenas Folsom (“Corin”) and Justin Carl Folsom (“Justin”) began

dating in December 1999 and married in July 2005.1 The parties started living

together as a couple in 2003 or 2004, when Corin moved in with Justin and his

grandfather. In September 2004, while the parties were still living together, Justin

purchased a house in Brenham, Texas (“House”) from Corin’s parents. Justin did

not make a down payment. He signed a Deed of Trust and Note (“Purchase

Documents”) for the House. The Purchase Documents indicate the House was

purchased by “Justin C. Folsom, a single man.” Corin’s name does not appear on

the Purchase Documents.

      In 2004, Justin and Corin moved into the House and they opened a joint

bank account. They subsequently married on July 23, 2005. Beginning with the

“initial payments,” the House mortgage was paid out of the joint bank account

where both of the parties’ paychecks were deposited. Property taxes for the House

were also paid from the joint bank account. Once Corin and Justin moved into the

1
      Corin and Justin had one child but the portion of the divorce decree that pertains to
      the child is not on appeal.

                                            2
House, they lived there together until they “split up” in November 2020. At that

time, they separated their finances.

The Bench Trial

      Corin filed a pro se suit for divorce, and Justin filed an answer, also pro se.

Corin subsequently hired counsel and filed amended petitions for divorce. Corin

filed her First Amended Petition in January 2022, and her Second Amended

Petition on the same day as trial, on April 4, 2022. In her Second Amended

Petition, Corin asks for reimbursement to the community estate “for funds or assets

expended by the community estate for the benefit of Justin Carl Folsom’s separate

estate.” In her Statement of Relief Requested, also filed on April 4, 2022, Corin

prayed for the House to be awarded as fifty percent her separate property and fifty

percent Justin’s separate property.

      After an unsuccessful mediation, the parties appeared for a bench trial on

April 4, 2022. Justin appeared pro se and Corin was represented by counsel. At

the beginning of trial, Justin stated that he thought the only issue left to be decided

was child support, and he moved for a continuance to hire an attorney. The trial

court denied his oral motion for continuance, and the bench trial commenced.

      Corin and Justin were the only witnesses at trial. The trial court heard

testimony regarding the amount of child support, the division of debt, and the

disposition of the House. Only the disposition of the House is at issue in this

                                          3
appeal. Corin argued that the House should be confirmed as the separate property

of both spouses because they lived together and paid for the House together. Justin

argued that the House should be confirmed as his separate property.

      Corin testified that she and Justin had been in a relationship since 1999 and

started living together in 2003, when she moved in with Justin and his grandfather.

According to Corin, when she and Justin were living together at Justin’s

grandfather’s house, they “were both actively looking for a place to purchase on

[their] own.” She testified that her parents knew she and Justin were looking for a

place to live, and Justin told her father that if he was interested in selling the

House, Justin would be willing to buy it, which Justin eventually did in 2004.

Corin testified that when Justin purchased the House from her parents, she and

Justin had been living together at Justin’s grandfather’s house, and they then

moved in “together as a couple” to the House.

      Corin testified that her name was not included on the House Purchase

Documents because she and Justin “were in a mutual agreement that it was only

going to be his name on there. . . . There was no real specific reason. . . . He

mentioned it, and I just went along with it. I was in agreement.” She explained that

Justin did not make a down payment for the House because he qualified for “a

first-time buyer program.” Corin testified that after they moved into the House,

she and Justin combined finances, opening a joint bank account where both of their

                                         4
paychecks were deposited.         Corin testified that all of their House expenses,

including the mortgage, taxes, and utilities, were paid from their joint bank

account.2 They also paid for “[a]ll living expenses, vehicles, bills, food” from their

joint bank account. Corin testified that she lived with Justin in the House until

they separated in November 2020, at which time they also separated their finances.

        Corin testified that she and Justin “moved in[to the House] before the

closing,” but Justin testified that he and Corin did not move into the House until

after the House purchase was complete.3 Despite this discrepancy, the parties

agree that they moved into the House before they got married on July 23, 2005.

Justin testified:

       I bought this house. I fixed this house. And after we purchased this
       house, this is when we moved in together and eventually put our
       assets together as in checking accounts and whatnot.

(Emphasis added.) Justin testified that he and Corin started living together as a

couple at his grandfather’s house at “the end of . . . 2004.”4 He testified that he and

Corin were not living together when he bought the House, but during cross-

examination, he testified that he and Corin were living at his grandfather’s house

“and then [they] moved in together, as a couple, to [the House].” Justin also

2
       Justin did not controvert this testimony.
3
       The Purchase Documents indicate the closing date was September 16, 2004.
4
       On appeal, Justin explains that he and Corin began living together in 2003.

                                             5
acknowledged that he never lived at the House until he and Corin moved into the

House together.

      According to Justin, he purchased the House because Corin’s parents were

in financial trouble and were facing a potential foreclosure. He testified that he

was on the market for a house, and that he bought the house in his name only

because he and Corin were not married. But during his testimony, Justin also

testified that he bought the House “so we’d have a place to live.” Justin did not

dispute that all payments for the House were paid from the parties’ joint bank

account.

      During closing arguments, Corin’s counsel argued that the House should be

confirmed as the equal, undivided separate property of the parties, while Justin

requested that the House be confirmed as his separate property. At the end of the

trial, the trial court held that the House was the equal, undivided separate property

of Corin and Justin:

      [W]ith respect to the home, the Court will find and affirm that it is one
      half [Corin’s] separate property and one half [Justin’s] separate
      property. It appears from the Court, based on the facts, that you were
      together, you bought the home together, you moved into it together,
      you lived in it together and have for many, many years. And so it’s
      clearly – it wasn’t bought while you were married so it’s not
      community property, but I do believe it’s half each of your separate
      property at this point.

      This appeal followed.

                                         6
                                      Discussion

      In a single issue on appeal, Justin argues the trial court erred by confirming

the House as the equal, undivided separate property of both spouses. He argues the

evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding because

the House is entirely his separate property and Corin has no interest in the House.

Justin claims there is no evidence that he and Corin “intended any sort of

partnership or joint venture in the purchase” of the House, and that the mere fact

the parties paid for the House with joint funds is insufficient to characterize the

House as the parties’ equal, undivided separate property.

A.    Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s characterization of marital property in a divorce

proceeding for an abuse of discretion. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 80

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Goode v. Garcia, No. 01-20-

00143-CV, 2021 WL 6015296, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 21,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily,

unreasonably, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. Low v. Henry,

221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). A trial court lacks discretion to award the

separate property of one spouse to the other. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554

S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977) (“Trial courts have a broad latitude in the division of

                                           7
the marital community property, but that discretion does not extend to a taking of

the fee to the separate property of the one and its donation to the other.”).

      In family law cases, legal and factual sufficiency challenges, while not

independent grounds for asserting error, are relevant factors in determining

whether the trial court abused its discretion. Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335, 346

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (citing Syed v. Masihuddin, 521

S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)). “In determining

whether an abuse of discretion exists because the evidence is legally or factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s decision, we consider whether the trial court

had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion and whether it

erred in its application of that discretion.” Id. We may not substitute our judgment

for that of the finder of fact if the evidence “falls within the zone of reasonable

disagreement.” Id. at 347.

      In conducting a legal sufficiency review of a finding regarding the separate

character of property, we review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the

finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm

belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id.; see also Boyd v. Boyd, 131

S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (“While the proof must

weigh heavier than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence, there is no

requirement that the evidence be unequivocal or undisputed.”).            In our legal

                                           8
sufficiency review, we “credit[] favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could

do so and disregard[] contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not.”

Kelly, 624 S.W.3d at 346–47 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827

(Tex. 2005)). We will not sustain a legal sufficiency or “no evidence” point unless

the record demonstrates that: “(1) there is a complete absence of a vital fact; (2) the

court is barred by the rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only

evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence to prove a vital fact is no

more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence established conclusively the opposite of

the vital fact.” Aaron v. Aaron, No. 14-10-00765-CV, 2012 WL 273766, at *1

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing City of

Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810).

      In a factual sufficiency review, we consider the evidence that the finder of

fact could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at

611; Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at 347. We determine “whether, based on the entire

record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the

allegations were proven.” Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 611. We will set aside a finding

only if it is “so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be

manifestly unjust.” Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 80 (citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d

175, 176 (Tex. 1986)).

                                          9
      Finally, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. Stavinoha v.

Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d 604, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.);

Tatum v. Tatum, No. 14-11-00622-CV, 2012 WL 1795112, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] May 17, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Characterization of

marital property is a conclusion of law. Id. We must uphold the trial court’s

conclusions of law “if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported

by the evidence.” In re Marriage of Green & McDaniel, No. 12-17-00034-CV,

2017 WL 3224866, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing City of Houston v. Cotton, 171 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th

Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)). If findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither

requested nor filed, as in this case, it is “implied that the trial court made all the

findings necessary to support its judgment.” Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108,

109 (Tex. 1990) (citing Lemons v. EMW Mfg. Co., 747 S.W.2d 372, 373

(Tex.1988)).

B.    Analysis

      Justin argues the trial court mischaracterized the House by designating it as

the equal, undivided separate property of both spouses. He asserts his purchase of

the House, in his sole name, nearly eleven months before his marriage to Corin is

dispositive.   He further argues that Corin, who conceded the House is not

community property, did not present any evidence that she or Justin intended for

                                         10
the purchase of the House to be a joint venture or partnership, and that there is no

evidence they agreed they would co-own the House. Thus, he argues, the House

was entirely his separate property.

      Corin responds that purchase of the House prior to her and Justin’s marriage

does not preclude a finding she has an equal, undivided separate interest in the

House. Relying on Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) and Aaron v. Aaron, No. 14-10-00765-CV, 2012

WL 273766 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.),5

she argues the trial court did not err in confirming the House as the equal,

undivided separate property of the parties because all payments on the House were

paid from the parties’ joint account and “the parties’ intent is an important factor.”

      A spouse’s separate property consists of “(1) the property owned or claimed

by the spouse before marriage; (2) the property acquired by the spouse during

marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and (3) the recovery for personal injuries

sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning

capacity during marriage.”      TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.001.         Community property

“consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse

5
      Corin relies primarily on Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) on appeal. During trial, she relied on Aaron v.
      Aaron, No. 14-10-00765-CV, 2012 WL 273766 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
      Jan. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                          11
during marriage.” Id. § 3.002. A trial court lacks authority to divest a spouse of

separate property. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at 348.

      “We presume that property possessed by either spouse during or on

dissolution of the marriage is community property.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 3.003(a)). The spouse who seeks to overcome that presumption has the burden

to establish the separate character of the property by clear and convincing

evidence.   TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003; Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at 348; Pearson v.

Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011); see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007

(‘“Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of

the allegations sought to be established.”).

      At trial, neither party argued the House was community property. The only

issue before the trial court was whether the House should be characterized as the

sole separate property of Justin or the equal, undivided property of both spouses.

The nature of property—whether it is separate or community—is generally

determined by its character at inception. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at 348. The “Inception

of Title” doctrine provides that the nature of property is determined “when a party

first has a right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested.”

Id. at 349. However, the intention of the spouses as shown by the circumstances

surrounding the inception of title is the foremost consideration in determining the

                                          12
characterization of property as either community or separate property. Boyd, 131

S.W.3d at 612 (citing Scott v. Estate of Scott, 973 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 1998, no pet.)).

      At first blush, the Inception of Title doctrine suggests the House is Justin’s

separate property. He alone signed the Purchase Documents, which reflect Justin

purchased the House, prior to his marriage to Corin, as “Justin C. Folsom, a single

man.” But the intention of the spouses as shown by the circumstances surrounding

the purchase of the House cast doubt on the argument that the House is Justin’s

sole separate property.

      Corin testified that she and Justin lived together as a couple starting in 2003,

before Justin purchased the House. She testified that when Justin purchased the

House from Corin’s parents, she and Justin were “both actively looking for a place

to purchase on [their] own.” Shortly after Justin purchased the House from Corin’s

parents, Corin and Justin moved into the House as a couple. Justin never lived at

the house alone. Corin testified, and Justin agreed, that they moved into the House

together. Corin testified that neither she nor Justin maintained separate bank

accounts while they were living together in the House. Instead, the parties opened

a joint bank account shortly after moving into the House, and according to Corin’s

undisputed testimony, all House expenses, including the mortgage, taxes, utilities,

and other House-related expenses, “ran through the same account and [were] paid

                                         13
for together” from the parties’ joint bank account. Justin did not make a down

payment to purchase the House. And there is no indication Justin signed an earnest

money contract or that he paid closing costs from his separate funds, and there is

no evidence showing that Justin used separate funds to pay for any other House

expenses. Justin asserted during trial that because he made more money than

Corin, he paid the mortgage and she paid utilities and other items. But it is

undisputed that the funds all came from the same joint checking account.

      Corin relies on Harrington to support her argument that the House is the

equal, undivided separate property of both spouses. In Harrington, the husband

(“Brian”) complained of the trial court’s determination that he and his former wife

(“Gay”) each owned an undivided one-half interest in a house he purchased two

years before their marriage. Id. at 723. Like Justin does here, Brian asserted that

when he purchased the house, the credit application and title to the property were

only in his name. Id. The evidence showed that the Harringtons lived together

prior to the purchase of the house and that they looked for prospective houses

together. Id. at 724–25. Gay testified that Brian told her that because she was

“earning so little money at the time,” he would apply for the house loan himself

and put his name on it. Id. at 725. She agreed, not understanding the nature of

separate versus community property. Id. She testified that she and Brian referred

to the house as “our home,” that Brian did not claim the house was only his before

                                        14
their separation, that they both contributed to improving the house through their

separate bank accounts, and that Brian never indicated to Gay she would not have

an ownership interest in the house. Id. We determined there was some evidence to

support the trial court’s conclusion that the couple intended to purchase the

property as partners, and as such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

determining the parties owned the property as tenants in common with each having

an undivided one-half interest as separate property.6 Id.

      Justin contends Harrington is inapposite because there is no evidence he and

Corin agreed they would co-own the House. Justin argues he “simply did not see

why he would have purchased his House for Corin’s benefit so long as they were

not yet married.” Yet, Justin conceded during trial that he never lived in the House

6
      Although she does not rely on it on appeal, at trial Corin relied on Aaron v. Aaron,
      No. 14-10-00765-CV, 2012 WL 273766, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
      Jan. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Aaron, “Daryl” and “Kimberly” began to
      live together after moving into a house two years before they were married. Id. at
      *1. When they separated after nearly seven years of marriage, the court awarded
      an undivided one-half interest in the house to each spouse as separate property. Id.
      at *4. The trial court noted that the closing documents and earnest money contract
      were only in Daryl’s name, but that the couple had determined the house would be
      purchased in Daryl’s name alone because Kimberly’s poor credit would have
      resulted in a higher interest rate if she had co-purchased the house. Id. at *3-4.
      The court held that the couple had purchased the house jointly and intended to be
      joint owners of the house, noting that Kimberly paid half of the down payment and
      closing costs. Id. at *4. The court held Daryl and Kimberly were tenants in
      common. Id. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at *1.
      In distinguishing the present case from Aaron, Justin says there is no evidence that
      Corin paid any part of the closing costs for the House. But during trial, Justin did
      not controvert Corin’s testimony that there was no down payment and that all
      House–related expenses were paid for jointly.

                                           15
without Corin, and that he bought the House “so [they would] have a place to live.”

Justin also testified that he and Corin lived together when he purchased the House,

and during his testimony, he referred to the purchase of the House as the parties’

purchase: “[A]fter we purchased this house, this is when we moved in together and

eventually put our assets together as in checking accounts and whatnot.”

(Emphasis added.) There is no indication that at the time of purchase, Justin

intended for the House to be his alone. Rather, Corin’s testimony that she and

Justin “were both actively looking for a place to purchase on [their] own,” coupled

with Justin’s testimony that he and Corin were living together when he bought the

House, that he purchased the House so that he and Corin would “have a place to

live,” that he never lived in the House prior to moving there with Corin, and that he

and Corin always used joint funds to pay for all expenses suggests Justin and Corin

intended the House to be theirs together.

      Justin further argues that “[m]ere cohabitation and payment from joint funds

is insufficient to divest Justin of any portion of his separate property[.]” But the

evidence before the trial court was not limited to cohabitation and payment from

joint funds. As noted, the evidence reflected that the couple lived together prior to

moving into the House, they both actively looked together for a house, and the

House was purchased so they would have a place to live. Further, Justin never

established that he used separate property to pay closing costs, an earnest money

                                            16
contract, or any other house-related expenses. See Schneider v. Schneider, No. 2-

02-075-CV, 2004 WL 254247, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 12, 2004, pet.

dism’d) (mem. op.) (holding dog acquired by wife before marriage was owned by

spouses as tenants in common; evidence showed spouses lived together before

marriage, comingled their funds in joint bank account, used comingled funds to

purchase dog, and neither spouse established by clear and convincing evidence that

dog was purchased with separate property funds).

      We find Leighton v. Leighton, 921 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1996, no writ), upon which Justin relies, to be distinguishable. In

Leighton, a man who was deeded an unimproved ranch married a month after

receiving the ranch. Id. at 366. The couple built a home on the land after jointly

executing a loan application, lien, note, and deed of trust. Id. When the couple

divorced, the wife contended that while the ranch had been the husband’s separate

property, he gave her a half interest in the ranch when they built a home on it. Id.

at 367. The husband denied giving her any interest in the ranch, but the wife

argued that property acquired with borrowed funds being repaid with community

income belongs to the community estate. Id. The trial court characterized the

ranch as community property but we reversed and remanded, holding that the

ranch was the husband’s separate property: “The ranch . . . was not acquired with

borrowed funds. It was improved with borrowed funds. Once separate property

                                        17
character attaches, that character does not change because community funds are

spent to improve the property.” Id. (emphasis in original). By contrast, the

evidence in the present case shows that Corin and Justin both paid for the House.

Even though Justin’s name is the only name on the Purchase Documents, there is

no evidence Justin acquired the House or paid for any house-related expenses with

separate funds. Therefore, Leighton is not controlling.

      In light of Corin’s undisputed testimony that she and Justin lived together

prior to the purchase of the House, that they both actively looked for a house in

which to live together, that they moved into the House together, that Justin only

lived in the house with Corin, and that all payments toward the House came from

the joint checking account the parties established upon moving into the House, we

find there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s judgment that the House

is the equal, undivided separate property of both spouses. Indeed, in holding each

spouse has a fifty percent interest in the House as separate property, the trial court

observed that they were together when the House was purchased, they “bought the

home together,” they moved into it together, and they lived in it together for

“many, many years.” See In re Marriage of Louis, 911 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 1995, no writ) (“In determining whether there is sufficient

evidence of a joint venture, the participation, activities, and objectives of the

parties may all be considered.”); Harrington, 742 S.W.2d at 724 (holding parties’

                                         18
intent is “an important factor” in determining whether partnership exists between

spouses or cohabitants in purchase or ownership of property) (citing Negrini v.

Plus Two Advertising, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1985, no writ)); cf. Aaron, 2012 WL 273766 at *4 (holding house purchased in

husband’s name alone prior to marriage was owned by both spouses as tenants in

common after divorce because they intended to be joint owners of house, wife paid

one half of down payment and closing costs, and wife paid for food and utilities

each month equal to husband’s mortgage payments; fact that husband signed

earnest money contract and closing documents was not dispositive with regard to

characterization of property).

      We overrule Justin’s sole issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the House

as the equal, undivided separate property of the parties, and awarding the spouses

an undivided one-half interest in the House.

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

                                         19