Court Opinion

ID: 9702786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:23:29.559544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:41.564416
License: Public Domain

BERGER, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion significantly modifies the meaning of the phrase “displays what appears to be a deadly weapon” for purposes of a first degree robbery conviction. This new interpretation conflicts with several of our precedents and prevents the prosecution of many serious crimes at the level the General Assembly intended. I see no need to take the restrictive construction now adopted by the majority and, therefore, dissent.
For more than 25 years, Delaware courts have relied on the decision in State v. Smallwood32 in deciding whether a defendant “displays what appears to be a deadly weapon.” Smallwood explained that the word “display” means “exhibit to the sight or mind,”33 and held that the “display” requirement of § 832 is satisfied if the weapon is “manifested to any of a victim’s senses.”34 In that case, defendant had his hand in his jacket pocket and pointed it at the victim as if holding a weapon. Other first degree robbery convictions have been sustained where: 1) defendant had one hand inside a coat and made a verbal threat; 35 2) defendant had his hands clasped together pointed at the victim and told her to “Hold it right there;”36 3) defendant tapped a bulge in his waistline and made a verbal threat;37 and 4) defendant reached into his coat pocket while threatening the victims.38 Ap*880plying Smallwood, this Court also upheld a first degree robbery conviction where the victim could not see the defendant, and the only “manifestation” of a weapon was the defendant’s verbal threat.39
Thus, until last year, the “display” requirement could be satisfied based only on the victim’s belief that defendant possessed a deadly weapon and some objective manifestation of a weapon. In most cases, the objective manifestation involved defendant claiming to have a weapon while concealing his hand under a piece of clothing. In the one case where a conviction was overturned, there was no verbal threat or manifestation of a weapon. Defendant said “This is a holdup,” but he never claimed to have a weapon and the victim never saw defendant’s hands to know whether he appeared to be concealing something.40’
Then, in a 2002 panel decision, this Court modified the long line of precedents reviewed above. In Word v. State,41 defendant gave a bank teller a note that demanded money and stated, “I am armed.” Defendant’s hand was concealed inside a bag that he placed on the counter after passing the teller his note. The Word Court held that these facts were insufficient to support a first degree robbery conviction because the teller’s belief that defendant had a gun was based on his note and not on the fact that his hand was concealed in a bag.
The Word Court made no effort to reconcile its holding with the recent precedent in McKamey v. State.42 In that case, the victim was a cab driver who never saw anything that purported to be a weapon. The defendant was seated behind him and simply told the driver that he had a gun. This Court upheld his conviction of first degree robbery, citing Smallwood, Harrigan, Deshields, and Mercado for the proposition that a person displays what appears to be a deadly weapon when he “intimidates [the victim] by ... manifesting the presence of such a weapon even though it is not seen by the victim.”43 The Word court ignored McKamey, calling it unreliable precedent.44
Now, we have the follow-up to Word and, again, the majority tries to make it seem that it is simply applying settled principles as announced in Smallwood. In Smallwood, however, the Court expressly recognized that a weapon is “displayed” to a victim if the weapon is exhibited to the victim’s mind through any of the victim’s senses.45 Using that long-standing definition, the display requirement would be satisfied here. The victim saw a note saying defendant has a bomb, and also saw defendant’s hand concealed in his pocket. The note contained the threat and the objective manifestation of that threat was the concealed hand, which could have been holding a detonator, grenade, or small explosive device. Under settled law, these facts are sufficient to support a conviction of first degree robbery.
The majority suggests that upholding this conviction would trivialize the statuto*881ry elements of the crime of first degree robbery. If that is so, then the “display” element has been trivialized for 25 years. This Court has always required a verbal threat and some objective manifestation of that threat. In almost every case, the objective manifestation was a hand concealed under clothing. The victim generally did not see the weapon or even the outline of a gun-shaped object in the defendant’s concealed hand. All the victim saw was the concealed hand. Here, too, the victim saw a concealed hand — the same “conduct” that satisfied this Court in the past.
Finally, I dissent because the majority’s construction of the statute is preventing an important category of serious crimes from being prosecuted to the extent intended by the General Assembly. A person who robs a bank or other business establishment presents a grave threat to its employees and any members of the general public who happen to be there during the robbery. If the robber threatens the victim by saying he has a gun or a bomb while concealing his hand in a pocket or bag, under the majority opinion, he will not be subject to prosecution for first degree robbery. Indeed, if the alleged weapon is a bomb, it is unclear from the majority opinion whether anything short of waving the device in plain sight would suffice as a “display” of what appears to be a deadly weapon. Yet the potential presence of a deadly weapon greatly increases the risk of harm to all who are present, since the victim, and well-meaning bystanders, may react by attempting to “disarm” the robber through force or with weapons.
In sum, I would not modify our long line of precedents on the meaning of the “display” element of first degree robbery. Our prior interpretation of the statutory language was settled, clear and readily understood by prosecutors and defense lawyers. In my view, that precedent gave full effect to the intent of the General Assembly and full protection to the public. I would affirm defendant’s conviction of first degree robbery. Accordingly, I dissent.

. 346 A.2d 164 (Del.1975).

. Id. at 166 (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary Merriam (1964)).

. Id. at 167.

. Harrigan v. State, 447 A.2d 1191 (Del.1982) (Defendant threatened to shoot one of the victims); Wright v. State, 1997 WL 317409 at *1 (Del.Supr.) (Defendant said, ‘‘Don’t make me use this.”).

. Williams v. State, 494 A.2d 1237, 1238 (Del.1985).

. Mercado v. State, 1986 WL 17411 at *1 (Del.Supr.) (Defendant told the victim he would ‘‘pull this piece” if the victim did not hand over the money.); Deshields v. State, 706 A.2d 502 (Del.1998).

. DeShields v. State, 1988 WL 71442 (Del.Supr.).

. McKamey v. State, 1997 WL 45060 (Del.Supr.)

. Johnson v. State, 1991 WL 28889 (Del.Supr.).

. 801 A.2d 927 (Del.2002).

. 1997 WL 45060 (Del.Supr.).

. Id. at *2.

. The majority now acknowledges that Word overruled McKamey. The majority does not, however, explain how it happened that our recent precedent was overruled without consideration by the Court en banc. See: Internal Operating Procedure VI(6), mandating en banc consideration before overruling a prior decision of this Court.

. 346 A.2d at 165.