Court Opinion

ID: 9695012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:04:10.512649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:07.644378
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The district court accurately predicted that our court would abandon the harsh rule for recovery established in Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 581, 95 N.W.2d 40, 46 (1959), in favor of a more realistic view of suicide cases based on a chain of causation. Applying the new rule to the facts of this case convinced the district court that recovery of workers’ compensation was clearly established. I agree.
The district court reviewed this case, as do we, under the restrictions of 17A.19 of the Administrative Procedure Act. We do not make findings of fact anew but are charged with the responsibility of correcting errors at law. Giere v. AASE Haugen Homes, Inc., 259 Iowa 1065, 1070, 146 N.W.2d 911, 914 (1966). For this reason, we are not bound by an agency’s erroneous conclusions of law. King v. City of Mount Pleasant, 474 N.W.2d 564, 565 (Iowa 1991).
The Industrial Commissioner decided this case applying the law of Schofield, which the majority now decides is not the law and does not apply. Notwithstanding, the majority affirms the Industrial Commissioner’s decision that denies recovery on the ground that we are bound by the Commissioner’s finding of no factual causation. It is here the majority’s analysis goes awry.
There is no dispute on what the facts are in this case. Only the legal conclusion to be drawn from the facts is in question. The Commissioner concluded that the suicide was not work related and therefore not compensable. He based that result on his view that Dr. Taylor’s opinion was more believable than the opinions of Dr. Kjenaas and Dr. Barnett. Of course, the Commissioner’s conclusion here is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact to which we are bound. None of the doctors had talked to *859Dean Williams and were testifying from hearsay as to the probability that his suicide arose out of his employment. There was no factual dispute for the Commissioner to resolve. See Schreckengast v. Hammermills, Inc., 369 N.W.2d 809, 810-11 (Iowa 1985).
In applying Schofield erroneously, the Commissioner made his findings and legal conclusions looking for a suicidal act motivated by an uncontrollable impulse or a delirium of frenzy. In so doing, how can it be said that when neither of these conditions is found, that neither could it be found that there was a “chain of causation” linking the employment injury to Williams’ “loss of normal judgment and domination by a disturbance of the mind, causing the suicide”? I submit it cannot. The Commissioner’s decision based on the wrong law has no preclusive effect on the issue to be answered under the right law.
Even under the discredited law of Scho-field, the Commissioner’s decision is unsupportable. We review to see if the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f). The Commissioner based his decision not only on evidence that fails to meet this standard, but worse, is woefully weak. The evidence relied upon is Dr. Taylor’s opinion testimony which is totally based on hearsay. Moreover, it is vacuous because Dr. Taylor did not say that the suicide was not work related. Here is not an opinion lacking absolute certainty but a statement without probative substance. See Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Iowa 1974); see also Auxier v. Woodward State Hosp. Sch., 266 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Iowa 1978). Two other psychiatrists testified that it was work related because of depression linked to Williams’ unshakable feeling of personal responsibility for the failure of the store he managed. The record “as a whole” shows two qualified doctors who said the suicide injury to Williams was work related and one who could not say. The fact that the one who could not say felt he needed more information does not elevate the value of his testimony a single degree.
The evidence was not in conflict; rather a choice appears between facts and opinion supporting a work-related cause and an opinion that equivocates without any evidence to indicate the suicide was from some other cause. The evidence is substantial not to support the Commissioner’s decision but to reject it.
The substantial evidence standard to prove that Williams’ suicide arose out of and in the course of his employment is actually abundantly met by plaintiff. The recitation of the undisputed facts in the majority’s opinion is itself persuasive. The record also discloses that Williams uncharacteristically did not make any purchasing trips or buy new merchandise for the 1982 season. He was urged by his wife to seek professional help for his depression during the last few weeks of his life, but he declined to do so. Williams had a terrible fear of ending up like his father whom he viewed as a failure. No cause for his suicide other than his work-related problems appears in this record. The rejection of this abundance of evidence in favor of the statement that some unnamed, unknown cause might have accounted for Williams’ death casts a death pall over the chance that any claimant for workers’ compensation benefits in a suicide case will ever succeed.
The more enlightened rule now embraced by the majority will, in reality, be a mirage, no more realistic or compassionate than the Schofield rule. The door to benefits for the family of an injured worker will slam shut just as tightly.
An error of law was made by the Industrial Commissioner in following law now held to be inapplicable and in reaching a result unsupported by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(e) and (f). Remand on the legal issue is not necessary because we can correct any error of law. Dillinger v. City of Sioux City, 368 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Iowa 1985). In a law action we may also interfere when findings are undisputed or no conflicting inferences may be drawn from them. Beneficial Fi*860nance Co. of Waterloo v. Lamos, 179 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Iowa 1970). The Commissioner’s decision also violates section 17A.19(8)(g) in being arbitrary and characterized by an abuse of discretion. I would affirm the trial court and remand to the Industrial Commissioner for a determination of benefits. At the least, I would remand to the Commissioner to apply the proper rule as now held by the majority, see Sondag, 220 N.W.2d at 908, although I believe doing that would be a redundancy.