Court Opinion

ID: 9478119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:40:29.164679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:14.895510
License: Public Domain

LAY, Chief Judge,
concurring.
This court holds that the district court did not err in excluding the opinion of the plaintiff’s expert on whether the buffer was defective and unreasonably dangerous because of inadequate warning.
The question of admissibility of evidence is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and should not be overruled unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 685 (8th Cir.1981). For that reason I do not dissent to this court's ruling on the admissibility of the expert opinion. However, I would hope that our holding will not be considered as precedent to exclude expert testimony in the form of an opinion on whether a product may be defective and unreasonably dangerous absent adequate warning. Such knowledge is not within the general knowledge of a lay jury and should ordinarily be admissible as expert opinion.
The testimony plaintiff sought was subject to cross-examination, and under such circumstances the jury could have decided how much weight should have been given the evidence. In considering the question of whether expert testimony would be useful to a jury in determining ultimate liability issues, Judge Weinstein in his treatise states:
Because of the Federal Rules emphasis on liberalizing expert testimony, doubts about whether an expert’s testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility unless there are strong factors such as time or surprise *69favoring exclusions. The jury is intelligent enough, aided by counsel, to ignore what is unhelpful in its deliberations.
3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 702[02] at 702-14—702-15 (1987) (footnote omitted).
Closing Argument
In view of the fact a retrial is necessitated I also question whether the trial court should have allowed defendant’s counsel to read a direct quote from Ann Landers’ column of a newspaper. I would agree counsel should be given wide latitude in closing argument and should be able to use allegory or resort to metaphor borrowed from literature, current events and the like.1 I am certain the average juror would not put much stock in Ann Landers’ opinion on product liability or safety. In this area she has about as much scientific credibility as one’s horoscope. Yet because of her notoriety there could be individual jurors who feel she speaks with unusual experience and might possibly be guided by her advice. Clearly her opinion, let alone her news column, could not be admitted into evidence. Under the circumstances I question whether counsel should have been able to read her verbatim opinion in closing argument. Since the case is to be reargued I would think it more in the sound exercise of discretion for the trial court to exclude the reading of the statement the next time around.

. Counsel could have argued the essence of what she said without attributing the quote to her. It seems somewhat ironic to me that we indirectly approve the use of a news columnist’s opinion on product safety but exclude from evidence an opinion by a qualified scientific expert.