Court Opinion

ID: 9794784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:11:36.617917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:37.395857
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY:
I dissent.
In my opinion the evidence clearly shows that it was the intention of the plaintiffs and defendants at the time the lease-was executed that the building in question would be used for a retail food store. Any alterations authorized by the lease could be made only for such store purposes. The words “its use” are plain and unambiguous, and refer to Safeway Stores, Incorporated, only, and any sublease allowable under the intention of the parties and the terms of the contract would of necessity be for food store purposes and for Safeway inter-corporate purposes.
The intention of the parties and the words used in a lease-are to be given effect. From reading the majority opinion, the conclusion may be reached that one owning such property may not restrict its use under a lease to a specific purpose. This is a dangerous precedent with which I cannot agree.
It is not my understanding that, under the facts of this case, the owner of the property may be compelled in protecting his property by insurance, to pay a much higher fire insurance premium and have his property wasted by a different and more destructive use, by a sublessee, where as here the property was originally leased for food store purposes. See R.C.M. 1947, section 42-106, which provides-in part: “When a thing is let *283for a particular purpose, the hirer must not use it for any other purpose # * *.”
I agree with the equitable principles announced by the Alabama Supreme Court in Woolworth Co. v. Nelson, 204 Ala. 172, 85 So. 449, 451, 13 A.L.R. 820, wherein that court in considering and interpreting a similar lease clause which was as follows: “The lessee [F. W. Woolworth Co.] shall have the right to make such alterations and changes in such parts of the building as it finds necessary for its purposes, * * * providing that such alterations will not injure the building ’ ’ said:
“We observe, at the outset, that this authority to change and alter is granted to the lessee and is limited (1) by the necessities of its contemplated use, and (2) by the inhibition against injury to the building. It seems clear that this authority was not intended for the independent benefit of sublessees, and cannot be extended to include the changes prompted by their necessities, much less by considerations of convenience merely. It evidently related to the business of the Woolworth Company, and contemplated such interior changes as actual use“and experience might show the necessity of.
“But conceding, for the argument, that these proposed changes are sanctioned and directed by the Woolworth Company under the grant of authority to it, or that its sublessee, the Parisian Company may by privity claim for itself the authority granted to the original lessee, we are convinced that such changes are not authorized, and amount to legal waste. Certainly they injure the physical structure of the building, by destroying its substance and profoundly changing its structural adaptations.” Emphasis supplied. Citing many cases.
Here the original lease between plaintiffs and defendants contained the following provision: “Lessee may make such repairs, alterations and improvements in demised premises as it may deem desirable for its use of the same.” Certainly such alterations could only be made for food store purposes, and then only for intercorporate purposes. This clause does not, by its terms, extend to any other sublessee. Here the change in use results in *284added burdens. This building was erected, specified and structurally built solely for food store purposes, and has been so used for some thirteen years. It is only common sense and common knowledge that such a building will deteriorate much faster under the stress, vibrations and use as a garage than when used for the purpose for which it was designed and built, thereby creating legal waste of the estate. The rule announced in the majority opinion has no application in this case where our statute, section 42-106, prescribes a different rule. Where the terms of the lease do not disclose the true intent of the parties at the time of execution, or where the terms are silent on some particular or cannot be readily understood, such intent of the parties may be shown by parol evidence where as here the offered proof was not to vary nor to contradict the terms of the written agreement, but only to explain the intent of the parties in the use of certain words. Equity grants relief to a lessor to restrain a lessee that is limited to a particular use of the demised premises from using the property for a use that will waste the estate, or from the use thereof for a completely different purpose than was anticipated. Compare Boh v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 5 Cir., 128 F. (2d) 864; Surface v. Brock, 142 Kan. 805, 51 Pac. (2d) 1005; Godfrey v. Black, 39 Kan. 193, 17 Pac. 849.
I know of no rule of law that requires that each of the parties to a lawsuit must, as a witness, testify that the contract as written does not express, or is not clear as to the intentions of the parties. Compare Parchen v. Chessman, 53 Mont. 430, 436, 164 Pac. 531; Whorley v. Koss, 122 Mont. 446, 206 Pac. (2d) 809.
In my opinion the district court committed reversible error in denying plaintiffs’ offers of proof No. 1 and No. 2, which offered evidence was not to vary the terms of the ■written contract, nor to contradict its terms, but to explain the intent of the parties in the use of the words thereof, and the court erred in refusing to find under the evidence as a matter of fact, that the use of the building as a garage places an uncontemplated burden on *285the building and the owners thereof, which constitutes a legal waste of the estate.
I would reverse the judgment and order a new trial.