Court Opinion

ID: 9545540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:15:12.304545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:03.872345
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.,
concurring:
I join in the opinion of the court, but wish to add a comment. This case presents a head-on collision between two common law rules, and we must choose which one is of the greater significance in the administration of justice. We have heretofore recognized the rule which condemns a civil damage verdict reached by means of the quotient process. Lee v. Clute, 10 Nev. 149; So. Nev. M. Co. v. Holmes M. Co., 27 Nev. 107, 73 P. 759. Also, we have frequently announced and applied the rule, in civil and criminal cases, that a juror will not be allowed to impeach the verdict returned. State v. Stewart, 9 Nev. 120; State v. Crutchley, 19 Nev. 368, 12 P. 113; So. Nev. M. Co. v. Holmes M. Co., supra; Priest v. Cafferata, 57 Nev. 153, 60 P.2d 220; State v. Lewis, 59 Nev. 262, 91 P.2d 820; Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d 824; Close v. Flanary, 77 Nev. 87, 360 P.2d 259. The reasons supporting each rule are well known and need not be restated. It is apparent that in most cases a breach of *23the doctrine condemning quotient damage verdicts can become known to a court only by permitting a violation of the rule against verdict impeachment by jurors. It seems to me that the rule against verdict impeachment is of more importance, and must win, when the two principles come into conflict. This result does not render the rule against quotient damage verdicts without meaning and substance. That rule may still properly be the basis for an appropriate jury instruction, if requested by counsel.