Court Opinion

ID: 9439124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:22:37.069543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:10.384581
License: Public Domain

TATEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
During a recess at the end of McLaughlin’s cross-examination, the district court ordered him not to discuss with his lawyer anything “relating to his testimony and potential redirect examination.” United States v. McLaughlin, 955 F.Supp. 132, 133 n. 1 (D.D.C.1997). Objecting both before and after the break, McLaughlin’s lawyer informed the court that she wished to consult with her client because she had “identified other areas” that she “might want to explore” with him on redirect. This court, reasoning that McLaughlin had no constitutional right to the recess in the first place, now holds that he had no right to consult with his lawyer because Sixth Amendment rights cannot turn on “happenstance.” Maj. Op. at 5. But this ease has nothing to do with a defendant’s right to a recess. The question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel required the court to allow McLaughlin’s lawyer to consult with him regarding the important tactical decision of whether to conduct redirect. Because I believe it did, I respectfully dissent.
It is a bedrock principle of our system of justice that “to minimize the imbalance in the adversary system,” United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973), a criminal defendant has the fundamental right to “the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Indeed, “ ‘[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.’” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956)).
In Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976), the Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees not just the right to have counsel, but also the right to consult with counsel about important tactical decisions. More than merely allowing the defendant to participate in tactical decisions, consultation enables the lawyer to obtain factual information crucial to making them. Cedars reversed the conviction of a defendant ordered by the trial court not to discuss his testimony with anyone, including his lawyer, during an overnight recess between his direct and cross-examinations. Acknowledging that trial courts ordinarily enjoy wide discretion to sequester witnesses in order to insulate them from “improper attempts to influence thefir] testimony,” id. at 87, 96 S.Ct. 1330, the Court nonetheless found that an overnight sequestration order.unconstitutionally limits the right to counsel. “Such recesses,” the Court said, “are often times of intensive work, with tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed.” Id. at 88, 96 S.Ct. 1330. Observing that “[t]he lawyer may need to obtain from his client information” and “pursue inquiry along lines not fully explored earlier,” id., the Court held that the conflict between a trial court’s otherwise proper sequestration order and a defendant’s right to consult with counsel about tactical decisions must be resolved in favor of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 91, 96 S.Ct. 1330.
The tactical decision involved in this case— whether to conduct redirect examination— undoubtedly required the assistance of counsel, including the opportunity for defense counsel to consult with the defendant in order to obtain information. While redirect examination allows a defendant to clarify tes*18timony, it also presents serious risks, for it subjects the defendant to further cross-examination. Given the uncertainty surrounding recross, prudent defense counsel must always consider whether the expected benefit of redirect outweighs its potential cost. See Mark A. Dombroff, Dombroff on Direct and Cross-Examination § 11.2 (1985) (“The major question which you confront in conducting a redirect examination is the extent to which that redirect should be pursued.”); Francis X. Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials § 353 (1949) (“[I]t is highly important for an advocate ... to pause and consider carefully whether the status of the witness’ testimony, and the witness, after cross-examination, will be improved by a redirect examination.”). Defense counsel cannot responsibly assess these risks and benefits without first consulting the client about what occurred during cross.
Imagine a cross-examination that elicits ambiguous testimony not explored on direct examination that, left alone, would harm the defense by confusing the jury. It cannot be that instead of permitting defense counsel to consult with the defendant to ascertain the facts underlying the ambiguous testimony, the law requires counsel to rely on educated guesswork in deciding whether to explore the ambiguity on redirect. The district court’s order forbidding McLaughlin’s attorney from consulting with him prior to redirect did exactly that: It forced her to choose between proceeding with redirect on a hunch or foregoing the opportunity to clarify her client’s testimony. After the recess, the attorney told the court:
I should ... stress for the record that [during the break] I did think to myself what other areas I might want to explore with Mr. McLaughlin. I have identified other areas, and I would be prepared to consult with him on that. But given the Court’s ruling, I am not permitted to do that, so I have no further questions.
The district court’s order conflicts with Ged-ers’s holding that the Sixth Amendment requires trial courts to allow defense counsel to obtain information from their clients prior to making important tactical decisions.
Nothing in Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989), displaces Geders. Unlike the overnight recess in Geders, in Perry there was “virtual certainty” that any conversation between the defendant and his lawyer during a fifteen minute recess between direct and cross would relate only to his ongoing testimony and would not “encompass matters ... that the defendant [has] a constitutional right to discuss with his lawyer, such as ... trial tactics.” Id. at 283-84, 109 S.Ct. 594. Citing Geders with approval, Perry reaffirmed the principle that a trial court’s interest in thwarting external influences on testimony, while legitimate, cannot defeat a criminal defendant’s right to consult with counsel about tactical decisions. See id. at 284, 109 S.Ct. 594 (stating that the fact that discussions between a defendant and his attorney “will inevitably include some consideration of the defendant’s ongoing testimony” does not compromise the basic right to “unrestricted access” to counsel regarding trial tactics). The difference between Geders and Perry turns not on the length of their respective recesses (as my colleagues suggest), but on the fact that during the pre-cross-examination recess in Perry, no legitimate tactical decisions had to be made, nor did the defendant have any need to provide information to his lawyer. The defendant’s decision to testify left him with no choice but to submit to cross-examination and to answer the prosecutor’s questions truthfully. Indeed, Perry’s analysis focused exclusively on the importance of maintaining the integrity of cross-examination and protecting the prosecution’s ability to elicit uninfluenced testimony from the defendant. See id. at 282, 109 S.Ct. 594 (“[C]ross-examination is more likely to elicit truthful responses if it goes forward without allowing the witness an opportunity to consult with third parties, including his or her lawyer.”); id. (“Cross-examination often depends for its effectiveness on the ability of counsel to punch holes in a witness’ testimony at just the right time, in just the right way.”); id. (“[C]ross-examination of a witness who is uncounseled between direct examination and cross-examination is more likely to lead to the discovery of truth than is cross-examination of a witness who is given *19time to pause and consult with his attorney.”). To be sure, Mudd v. United States, a pre-Perry decision, identified several subjects that defendants might want to discuss with counsel between direct and cross, such as demeanor, speaking style, and not mentioning excluded evidence. 798 F.2d 1509, 1512 (D.C.Cir.1986). But after Perry, no right to counsel attaches to such considerations because their discussion would interfere with the government’s right to unencumbered cross-examination.
In contrast to Perry, this ease presents no threat to the government’s right to cross-examination uninfluenced by defense counsel because the prosecution had completed McLaughlin’s cross. Also unlike in Perry, McLaughlin’s lawyer faced a tactical decision — whether to conduct redirect — a decision she believed she could not make without consulting her client. It seems to me that this decision presented the defense with the same set of issues that it confronted when deciding whether McLaughlin should take the stand in the first place. McLaughlin was thus essentially in the same position between cross and redirect as he was before deciding whether to testify at all. Surely no one would argue that he had no Sixth Amendment right to consult with his lawyer regarding that tactical decision.
Although Perry also stated in broad language — language that my colleagues agree is dicta, see Maj. Op. at 5-6 — that “a defendant ... has no constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he is testifying,” id. at 281, 109 S.Ct. 594 (emphasis added), nothing in Perry suggests that the Court intended the word “testifying” to apply to redirect examination. Not only did the Court never mention redirect examination, but Perry’s rationale cannot be extended to this case without running afoul of the very rule that it reaffirmed: When tactical questions arise, the Sixth Amendment requires defendants to be allowed to consult with their attorneys. My colleagues fault me for not offering a definition of the word “testifying” that excludes redirect, see Maj. Op. at 5 n.l, but they themselves make no effort to define the word to exclude the overnight recess between direct and cross in Geders. Indeed, because the Geders recess came while the defendant was still “testifying,” and because Perry unquestionably reaffirmed that the right to consult with counsel attached during the Geders recess, the Perry Court could not have intended the word “testifying” to be as broad as my colleagues read it.
A few final thoughts bear mentioning about my colleagues’ effort to recharacterize McLaughlin’s Sixth Amendment claim as a claim that he had a right to a recess. To begin with, affording defense counsel a reasonable opportunity to confer with the defendant prior to redirect would not necessarily require a recess; depending upon the circumstances, allowing the defendant and counsel to whisper to one another for a minute or two might suffice. But if a recess is required, the district court must order one not because the defendant has a right to a recess, but because the defendant has a constitutional right to counsel. This case no more involves a constitutional right to a recess than a prisoner’s right to visits from his lawyer involves a constitutional right to visitation.
Second, McLaughlin’s brief plainly argues that the right to counsel does not depend on the court declaring a recess. See Appellant’s Br. at 34 (“[I]t was error ... for the court to deny defendant the right to confer with counsel during the 25-minute recess that took place, whether or not counsel would have had such a right had no recess been ordered.”). True, counsel said the opposite at oral argument, but surely a defendant’s constitutional right cannot turn on counsel’s hasty answer to a judge’s question, particularly where, as here, the brief is to the contrary.
Finally, the language from Perry that my colleagues quote out of context for the proposition that McLaughlin had no right to a recess before redirect has no applicability to this case because, once again, Perry focused solely on protecting the prosecution’s right to a clean cross-examination. The full passage reads:
“Once the defendant places himself at the very heart of the trial process, it only comports with basic fairness that the story presented on direct is measured for its *20accuracy and completeness by uninfluenced testimony on cross-examination.”
Thus, just as a trial judge has the unquestioned power to refuse to declare a recess at the close of direct testimony — or at any other point in the examination of a witness — we think the judge must also have the power to maintain the status quo during a brief recess in which there is a virtual certainty that any conversation between the witness and the lawyer would relate to that ongoing testimony.
Perry, 488 U.S. at 283-84, 109 S.Ct. 594 (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). By using the word “thus,” the Court clearly linked its reference to a recess to the previous sentence’s discussion of the importance of unencumbered cross-examinations, a discussion without relevance to the issue before us.
The irony of this court’s decision is not only that it impairs the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but that by inhibiting redirect examination it also hampers the truth-seeking process, the central concern of both Geders and Perry. While cross-examination promotes the goal of truth-seeking, so does redirect. Redirect allows counsel to help the defendant clarify testimonial inconsistencies and ambiguities elicited through cross-examination that might otherwise leave the factfin-der confused or distracted. The importance of redirect to the truth-seeking process cannot be overstated. “[0]ur adversarial system of justice ... is premised on the well-tested principle that truth ... is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the equation.” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (internal quotation omitted). While the possibility of improper coaching exists at any stage of any witness’s testimony, Geders pointed out that lawyers operate under ethical standards that distinguish between “discussing testimony and seeking improperly to influence it,” and that cross — in this case recross — allows the prosecutor to expose any such influence. Geders, 425 U.S. at 89-90 & n. 3, 96 S.Ct. 1330. And as Geders squarely held, any remaining conflict between the risk of improper influence and an accused’s fundamental right to counsel must be resolved in favor of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 91, 96 S.Ct. 1330.
I would reverse McLaughlin’s conviction on the ground that the district court’s refusal to allow him to consult with his lawyer before redirect violated the Sixth Amendment. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 278-80, 109 S.Ct. 594 (holding that harmless error analysis does not apply to claims of “denial of access” to counsel). Accordingly, I would not reach the double jeopardy issues.