Court Opinion

ID: 9391027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 22:02:28.130442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.107736
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/28/23 Valdez v. Valdez CA1/5

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 DAVID VALDEZ,
            Plaintiff and Respondent,                             A163041
 v.
 NORMAN J. VALDEZ, JR.,                                           (Lake County
            Defendant and Appellant.                              Super. Ct. No. FL213745)

      This appeal reaches back to a violent altercation between
brothers David Valdez and Norman Valdez, Jr. (“Joe”)1 in 2017.
Following this incident, the brothers applied for and obtained
mutual three-year domestic violence restraining orders (See Fam.
Code,2 §§ 6220, 6300).

      Three years later, Joe (but not David) applied
unsuccessfully to renew his restraining order and make it
permanent. On appeal from the order denying his application, he
argues David’s attorney committed misconduct; that the court
misconstrued the law; and that it abused its discretion by failing
to properly consider all pertinent facts and evidence. We affirm.

        The brothers share a common surname, so for clarity we
        1

will use their first names.
      2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

                                                1
                          BACKGROUND
      In the proceedings on the original applications, the trial
court found Joe was the initial aggressor and that David used
disproportionate force when he responded by twice striking Joe
on the head with a 14-pound piece of steel. The court granted
both brothers’ applications and issued mutual three-year
restraining orders.

       Three years later Joe applied to permanently renew his
restraining order against David, whom he alleged had repeatedly
violated court orders and continued to harass and disparage him.
In opposition, David argued that Joe failed to demonstrate the
objectively reasonable apprehension of future abuse required to
renew a restraining order. (See § 6345; Rybolt v. Riley (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 864, 874.) According to David, his sole transgression
was acting excessively in self-defense during the 2017 altercation;
moreover, Joe had been evicted from their father’s property (the
site of the altercation) and moved to a different county, so there
was no longer any reason for the brothers to encounter each
other.

       Joe disagreed. In addition to recounting a markedly
different version of the October 2017 incident and what he
described as a long history of David’s use of violence against him,
he maintained it was possible the brothers would encounter each
other in the future at family gatherings, in dealing with their
father’s failing health, or if Joe were deployed to fight wildfires
on David’s or their father’s properties.

      The brothers agreed to proceed on the declarations they
submitted. After reviewing the evidence, the prior court’s 2018
tentative oral ruling, and its final statement of decision, the trial
court found no basis to conclude a reasonable person in Joe’s
circumstances would have a reasonable apprehension of future
abuse without a protective order. Accordingly, it declined to
renew his restraining order.
                                  2
                          DISCUSSION
                                A.
       Pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (§ 6200
et seq.), upon “reasonable proof” of past abuse a court may issue a
protective order effective up to five years to prevent a recurrence
of domestic violence and ensure a period of separation of the
persons involved. (§§ 6220, 6300, 6345, subd. (a).) Upon a
protected party’s request, the court has the discretion to
subsequently renew the order for five or more years or
permanently without a showing of further abuse. (§ 6345, subd.
(a).) If the other party contests the renewal request, however, the
court may not grant it unless it finds the applicant has an
objectively reasonable fear of future abuse. (Ritchie v. Konrad
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290; Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 319, 331-332 (Lister).)

                                B.
      Joe contends David’s lawyer committed fraud on the court
by misstating the prior court’s factual findings for the 2018
restraining orders. Specifically, he asserts attorney Steven
Brown intentionally misled the current court by referring to the
2018 tentative oral ruling as if it were the final, superseding
statement of decision issued four months later; misrepresented
witness statements quoted in the 2018 oral ruling as the court’s
factual findings; and made statements that directly conflicted
with the evidence, factual findings, and rulings in the 2018
proceedings. This purported chicanery, he contends, mandates
reversal and the imposition of sanctions on both Brown and
David.

       The contention is meritless. Joe failed to assert an
attorney misconduct claim in the trial court and therefore has
forfeited it for appeal. (North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen
Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 28 [issue not raised in
the trial court is waived].) In any event, there could be no
                                3
prejudice. The trial court explicitly noted that it had reviewed
the prior court’s oral ruling and final statement of decision. Even
assuming for purposes of argument that Brown misstated the
record as Joe claims (to be clear, we make no finding on that
point), the record thus contradicts any claim that the court was
misled about or ignored the prior court’s final rulings.

       On the merits, Joe argues the trial court applied the wrong
legal standard by focusing on the probability of future abuse,
rather than on a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. It did
not. Renewal of a restraining order is proper if “ ‘the probability
of future abuse is sufficient that a reasonable woman (or man, if
the protected party is a male) in the same circumstances would
have a “reasonable apprehension” such abuse will occur unless
the court issues a protective order.’ ” (Lister, supra, 215
Cal.App.4th at p. 332.) To find a party’s apprehension
reasonable, the evidence must demonstrate that it is more
probable than not there is a risk of future abuse that justifies the
apprehension. (Id. at p. 333.) On the other hand, a strictly
subjective fear of further abuse is insufficient. (Id. at p. 332.)

        The court correctly applied these principles. It stated: “The
fact that Joe is fearful of David, however, does not, in and of
itself, justify the renewal of the restraining order. As both sides
stated in their [p]leadings, I can renew the restraining order only
if I find the probability of future abuse is sufficient that a
reasonable person in the same circumstances would have a
reasonable apprehension such abuse will occur unless the Court
issues a protective order.” That is precisely what the law
requires. (Lister, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 332-333.)

      Joe further contends the court (1) mistakenly believed it
could not renew his restraining order unless David had
committed new abuses while the prior order was in effect (see §
6345 [restraining order may be renewed without a showing of
further abuse]); and (2) failed to comprehend or “look at” the

                                  4
“correct set of facts” supporting the initial protective order or
consider later purported incidents in which Joe claims David
violated court orders. The record substantiates neither claim and
we will not assume error unless it is shown. (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [judgment is presumed correct;
appellant must affirmatively show error]; Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [self-represented status does not
excuse litigants from procedural rules].)

      Joe’s remaining arguments essentially invite this court to
reassess the record and find in his favor. However, the trial court
reasonably drew different inferences from the evidence. As a
reviewing court, we may neither reweigh the evidence nor
substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court. (M.S. v.
A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1145.)

                            DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. David is entitled to costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), 8.278(a)(2).)

                                 5
                                         ______________________
                                         BURNS, J.

We concur:

____________________________
JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________
LANGHORNE, J.*

A163041

     * Judge of the Napa County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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