Court Opinion

ID: 9629367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:41:39.151681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:18.596215
License: Public Domain

DORAN, J., Dissenting.
I dissent. The prevailing opinion is based upon the familiar rule that an appellate court, when called upon to determine whether there is evidence to support the judgment, will disregard the fact, if it is a fact, that the evidence is conflicting. That substantial evidence is sufficient to support a judgment even though other .evidence, equally substantial or less substantial, is in conflict therewith, there can be no question. The conflict, however, in order to justify the application of the rule, must be real and not merely apparent.
In my judgment, appellant’s contention is sound. The evidence of the physical facts, which are beyond dispute, together with the inferences' that, by reason of the laws of nature, are inescapable, demonstrate to my satisfaction that the alleged damage is the result of the construction of the breakwater and not the groins. The logical and inevitable inference to be drawn from such evidence is secure as against any attempt to create an apparent conflict by means of opinions that at most are but speculative or wistful. An appellate tribunal is not bound to affirm a judgment that thus offends the rules of reason. The judgment of the trial court appears to me to result from the failure to distinguish between an inference and an opinion. The former has the qualities of certainty and definiteness, whereas the latter not only lacks such qualities, but may be and frequently is the product of speculation mingled with desire or even expediency.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on March 18, 1940.