Court Opinion

ID: 9499438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:48:21.656348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:30.294776
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Like my colleagues, I think “it would be inappropriate to adopt a categorical rule that would, in every case, uphold a finding of probable cause to search a particular location simply because a suspected drug trafficker resides there.” Op. at 16. I write separately, however, because I fear the majority has come dangerously close to doing exactly that.
Probable cause amounts to a showing “(1) that it is noiv probable that (2) contraband, evidence of a crime, or a fugitive toill be on the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed.” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 126 S.Ct. 1494, 1500, 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The majority concludes that CI-1’s undated account of seeing Brown cook crack at the residence and law enforcement’s observation of Poston, an alleged cocaine trafficker, entering the home and leaving behind a backpack, establish a nexus between" drug trafficking and the premises, thereby sidestepping an ill-advised categorical rule. I cannot be so sure.
*920In my view, that CI-1 witnessed Brown cook crack at the residence at an unspecified time is of little probative value. The warrant affidavit gives no indication whatsoever as to when Brown was observed cooking crack. And, “[i]n determining whether probable cause exists, magistrates should consider, as one factor, the age of the information in the supporting affidavit.” United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (7th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 824 F.2d 563, 564 (7th Cir.1987)). Because CI-1’s single observation might have been several years old, it could hardly predict whether contraband would be found on the premises on the day of the search. Admittedly, as the majority notes, where an ongoing pattern of criminal activity is involved, staleness is less of a concern. But, even where ongoing criminal activity is at issue, at some point an event becomes too old to have meaningful predictive value. Given the total lack of information regarding the date of CI-1’s observation, we have no way of discerning whether that threshold has been reached here.
Nor does the additional fact that an alleged cocaine trafficker set foot in the home and left behind a backpack get the government over the probable cause hurdle. The officers knew nothing of the backpack’s contents or even whether it was purposefully left behind. And, given the three-hour duration of Poston’s stay, it is as likely that he entered the home for a social call as for a drug transaction. In this way, any suspicions regarding the purpose of Poston’s visit were just that— suspicions — and where probable cause is concerned, “mere suspicion is not enough.” United States v. Ingrao, 897 F.2d 860, 862 (7th Cir.1990). On this record, then, I do not think it can be said that officers were likely to find evidence of drug dealing at Brown’s home at the time of the search. (And, notably, no cocaine, large sums of money, or drug-transaction records were found during the search.)
In the end, the affidavit did little more than establish that Brown resided at the home and had probably trafficked in crack cocaine outside of his home. Because I am not prepared to conclude that police officers always have probable cause to search the residence of a suspected drug trafficker, I would affirm Brown’s conviction not by concluding that there was probable cause for the search, but because the police acted in good faith.