Court Opinion

ID: 9895563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 19:03:37.329163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:31.915028
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/7/23 Marriage of Thompson CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 In re the Marriage of RICHARD
 LEE THOMPSON and RHONA
 FOGARTY THOMPSON.

 RICHARD LEE THOMPSON,
                                                                        A164210
             Appellant,
 v.                                                                     (San Mateo County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 19FAM01440)
 RHONA FOGARTY THOMPSON,
             Respondent.

         Richard (Rick) Lee Thompson appeals from an order requiring him to
pay Rhona Fogarty Thompson1 $300,000 in sanctions pursuant to Family
Code section 271.2 Rick makes two claims on appeal—the trial court abused
its discretion by refusing to hear live testimony and the court erred in finding
he failed to pay an earlier discovery sanction. We agree with the latter
contention and therefore reverse in limited part. In all other respects, we
affirm.

         1    As do the parties, we use first names for clarity.
       All further statutory citations are to the Family Code unless
         2

otherwise indicated.

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                              BACKGROUND3

      Two years into this contentious divorce proceeding, Rhona sought
$600,000 in sanctions against Rick pursuant to section 271. She maintained
Rick refused to engage in behavior that advanced settlement or assisted in
preparing the case for trial. In her supporting declaration, Rhona averred
Rick failed to reply to Rhona’s attempts to resolve multiple issues, impeded
the discovery process, maintained an unreasonable position regarding the
status of the marital estate, and instructed his attorney to communicate with
him only once a month. As an example, Rhona stated her counsel had
proposed to Rick’s counsel that the parties appoint a discovery referee, but
Rick failed to respond. Indeed, he had yet to respond at the time she filed her
section 271 motion.
      Rick filed opposition, which included his own declaration. Rick took
issue with Rhona’s claim he had engaged in obstructive conduct and
maintained there was no basis to award sanctions. According to Rick, the
parties had reduced litigation costs by reaching multiple stipulations, he had
attempted to reach a settlement with Rhona but she took unreasonable
positions, and any alleged discovery misconduct did not, in any event,
warrant sanctions. Rick also requested that the court defer the motion until
trial, so each side could fully present their case and the court could evaluate
the totality of the parties’ conduct to determine whether sanctions were
warranted. He did not, however, specifically request an evidentiary hearing

      3 We draw some of the background from our prior opinion in Rick’s
appeal from an order interpreting the parties’ premarital agreement
(Thompson v. Thompson (August 14, 2023, A164992) [nonpub. opn.]), of
which we take judicial notice on our own motion. (Evid. Code, § 459.)

                                       2
pursuant to section 217. Nor did he identify any witness(es) whose testimony
he sought to elicit at such a hearing.4
      At the hearing on Rhona’s motion, the trial court stated it had read
over 500 pages of pleadings, including the parties’ moving and opposing
papers and their declarations. For the first time, Rick requested an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 217 and California Rules of Court,
rule 5.113 (rule 5.113). He maintained the pleadings demonstrated that
material facts were in controversy, which mandated a hearing to assess the
parties’ credibility. Other than generally asserting the court needed to assess
the credibility of “each party,” Rick did not identify whose testimony he
sought at such an evidentiary hearing, nor did he make an offer of proof as to
the parties’ supposed testimony.
      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated the parties’ oral
presentations were a “rehash” of what was in the pleadings, and it took the
matter under submission to consider Rick’s belated request for oral testimony
under section 217.
      Several weeks later, the court issued a written order granting Rhona’s
motion and ordering Rick to pay $300,000 in sanctions. The court found Rick
had engaged in obstreperous and dilatory behavior that frustrated
settlement, behaved in a manner that impeded communication, and failed to
engage in good faith settlement discussions. It further found Rick had failed

      4  In his opposing memorandum, Rick did not cite to section 217, did not
make any mention of testimony by or cross-examination of Rhona, and
implied only that he desired to present his “side of the story.” He reiterated
the latter point in his declaration, stating an evidentiary hearing was needed
to “fully present [his] side of the story.” He did serve Rhona with a notice to
appear pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987, but again made no
reference to section 217.

                                          3
to timely pay the previously ordered discovery sanctions and his excuse for
failing to do so was disingenuous.5 The court denied Rick’s request for an
evidentiary hearing, concluding “that live testimony was not necessary to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and that the pleadings and
arguments by counsel were sufficient for the court to make its determination
without need for an additional hearing. . . .”
                                 DISCUSSION
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      Section 271, subdivision (a) provides: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney’s fees and
costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or
frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where
possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between
the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to
this section is in the nature of a sanction. . . .” The statute “imposes a
‘minimum level of professionalism and cooperation,’ to effect the policy
favoring settlement of family law litigation—and a reduction of the attendant
costs.” (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1524.)
      Section 217, subdivision (a) provides that at a hearing on a motion
brought pursuant to the Family Code, the trial “court shall receive any live,
competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and
the court may ask questions of the parties.” However, “[i]n appropriate cases,
a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony

      5 Although Rhona also claimed Rick violated various temporary
restraining orders, the trial court reserved those matters for trial. We
express no opinion as to whether such conduct, if proven, would justify an
award of sanctions under section 271.

                                        4
and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing.” (Id.,
subd. (b).) Rule 5.113 lays out factors for a court to consider in making a
finding of good cause under section 217, including whether “a substantive
matter is at issue,” “material facts are in controversy,” and “live testimony is
necessary for the court to assess the credibility of the parties or other
witnesses. . . .” (Rule 5.113(b)(1)–(3).) If the court finds “good cause to
exclude live testimony, it must state its reasons on the record or in writing.
The court is required to state only those factors on which the finding of good
cause is based.” (Rule 5.113(c).)
      “Sanctions under section 271 are committed to the discretion of the
trial court, and will be reversed on appeal only on a showing of abuse of that
discretion, that is ‘only if, considering all of the evidence viewed more
favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor,
no judge could reasonably make the order.’ ” (In re Marriage of Davenport,
supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524.) A court’s good cause determination under
section 217 is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Hearn
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 390.) However, “ ‘[w]e review any factual findings
made in connection with [a sanctions] award under the substantial evidence
standard.’ ” (Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1177.)
Refusal of Live Testimony
      The trial court concluded “that live testimony was not necessary to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and that the pleadings and
arguments by counsel were sufficient for the court to make its determination
without need for an additional hearing at a later date.” The court did not
abuse its discretion in reaching such a conclusion.
      At the hearing, the court advised the parties it had reviewed the
entirety of their submissions—which totaled more than 500 pages—and at

                                        5
the end of the hearing, it stated their arguments were a “rehash” of what was
in those pleadings. These statements “notified the parties that the court was
well-informed as to the relevant events and the parties’ positions” and
signaled “that the court was familiar with the facts and the arguments.” (In
re Marriage of Binette (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1132 [court impliedly
concluded material facts were not in controversy and that live testimony was
not necessary to assess the parties’ credibility]; see In re Marriage of Hearn,
supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 391 [no abuse of discretion where trial court
stated it had reviewed the parties’ submissions, was familiar with the case,
and it determined the matter had been so exhaustively briefed that an
evidentiary hearing would not give the court information not already
included in the written submissions].)
      Rick insists the trial court needed oral testimony for three reasons: a
substantive matter was at issue; material facts were in dispute; and to assess
the parties’ credibility.
      Substantive Matter at Issue (Rule 5.113 (b)(1))
      Requests for sanctions are not “ ‘substantive matter[s]’ ” under section
217 and rule 5.113. (In re Marriage of Diamond (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 595,
605 (Diamond).)
      Rick claims, however, that “[s]ection 217 vested the trial court with the
discretion to determine whether the issue was substantive or not and it found
that it was.” He cites no authority for any such “discretion” on the part of the
trial court. Nor does he cite to any such finding by the trial court here.
Rather, he asserts “the absence of a finding in the court’s [order] that a
substantive matter was not at issue means the court necessarily found
Rhona’s sanctions request was a substantive matter.” Not surprisingly, Rick
also cites no authority for this remarkable proposition.

                                         6
      In short, there is no merit to Rick’s assertion that this factor entitled
him to an evidentiary hearing with live witnesses.
      Material Facts in Controversy (Rule 5.113 (b)(2))
      Rick maintains the material facts “were . . . hotly disputed.” He points
out, for example, that Rhona claimed his attorneys were “purposefully
uncommunicative,” but he averred his attorneys “consistently responded to
Rhona where necessary and it was she, not him, who had been
nonresponsive.” He points out Rhona claimed he had not made “good faith
offers” in settlement negotiations, but he averred “the exact opposite,” that it
was Rhona “who failed to negotiate settlement in good faith.”
      However, what Rick is taking issue with are not the operative facts, but
rather, conclusions that could be drawn therefrom. As to the operative facts,
there appears to be very little dispute, and none that Rick demonstrates was
material.
      Furthermore, even if the operative facts were in dispute, a trial court is
not required to hear live testimony but can make findings based solely on the
documentary evidence before it. (See Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d
474, 479 (Shamblin) [a trial court’s ability to “assess credibility and resolve
any conflicts in the evidence” is entitled to great weight, and “appellate
court[s] should defer to the factual determinations made by the trial court
when the evidence is in conflict,” irrespective of “whether the trial court’s
ruling is based on oral testimony or declarations”].)
      Accordingly, Rick has not made a case of entitlement to an evidentiary
hearing under this factor.
      Parties’ Credibility (Rule 5.113 (b)(3))
      Rick devotes most of his argument to the issue of witness credibility,
insisting live testimony was required for the trial court to make the

                                        7
credibility calls purportedly underlying its findings against him. According
to Rick this was “a classic case of ‘he said, she said’ ” that could only be
resolved by the court considering live testimony and on that basis assessing
the parties’ credibility.
      To begin with, as we have recited, a live evidentiary hearing is not
required for a trial court to assess credibility. It is well-established that a
court sitting as a finder of fact can make credibility determinations on the
basis of sworn declarations and other record evidence. (See Shamblin, supra,
44 Cal.3d at p. 479; accord, Desert Outdoor Advertising v. Superior Court
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 866, 868, fn. 1 [appellate courts give deference to trial
court’s credibility call whether based on oral or documentary evidence].)
      Furthermore, while Rick points to several supposed evidentiary
disputes that purportedly turn on witness credibility which should have been
assessed on the basis of live testimony, in fact, the operative facts are, again,
largely undisputed.
      For example, Rick points out Rhona submitted a copy of a text message
wherein he stated, “I have told my attorneys I don’t want to hear from them
but once a month.” He then points to his own declaration wherein he averred
he is “in regular communication with” his attorneys, he knows “everything
that has been going on” in the case, and his “attorneys consistently respond
to opposing counsel in a timely fashion when and if necessary.” Rick did not,
however, deny making the text statement. In fact, he conceded there were
instances where his counsel did not respond to Rhona, stating that because “I
choose not to pay my attorneys to respond to her unnecessary provocations,”
“does not make me uncooperative or unreasonable.”
      As another supposed example, Rick points to a dispute over the
payment of taxes. Rhona proposed a stipulation regarding the filing of

                                         8
returns and payment of taxes, and two months later sent an updated
proposal. Rick’s counsel did not respond to either. When Rhona’s counsel
followed up, Rick’s counsel advised she had sent the stipulation on to Rick
and was “awaiting his response.” When Rhona filed the instant motion for
sanctions six weeks later, Rick’s counsel had yet to respond. And when
Rhona filed her reply memorandum (five months after the updated
stipulation had been sent to Rick’s counsel), Rick’s counsel still had not
returned an executed stipulation. In his opposing declaration, Rick admitted
he never signed the stipulation, but averred the taxes were paid from the
sources and in the manner set forth in the stipulation, making the stipulation
unnecessary. While the taxes may have gotten paid in the manner proposed
by Rhona, this does not change the fact that Rick needlessly stonewalled
Rhona and exhibited zero cooperation on this issue.
      Rick also points to 14 stipulations he did agree to as exhibiting
cooperation. However, Rhona declared that her attorneys proposed and
drafted 11 of those stipulations, and her attorney had to repeatedly contact
Rick’s counsel for responses. Nothing Rick says contradicts Rhona’s
declaration.
      Rick additionally points to the parties’ efforts to appoint a discovery
referee as illustrative of an evidentiary conflict that should have been
resolved on the basis of live testimony. Again, he vastly overstates any
supposed conflict. Rhona proposed the parties appoint a referee, and she
averred in her declaration that Rick did not respond. In opposition, Rick
declared, “contrary to Rhona’s assertions, we have now appointed a discovery
referee.” It is true that by the time Rick filed his opposition, the parties had
reached an agreement on a referee. It is also undisputed that Rick ignored
Rhona’s proposal for four months. He responded only after being sanctioned

                                        9
in connection with a prior discovery dispute. Moreover, the parties could not
agree on a referee until Rhona filed the instant motion for sanctions. In
short, it is undisputed that one full year passed between Rhona’s suggestion
to appoint a discovery referee and the appointment of a referee.
      In any case, even if Rick were correct in asserting the parties’
declarations conflicted “on almost every material fact,” he has not
demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding an
evidentiary hearing was not required to assess credibility. The court
reviewed the pleadings and stated it was able to resolve any conflicts in the
evidence. (See Shamblin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 479.) Moreover, “[w]hen two
or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing
court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”
(Id. at pp. 478–479; see also In re Ana C. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329
[even if we “could reasonably make a different assessment of credibility[, this]
is not sufficient grounds for reversal”].)
      Due Process
      We are also not persuaded by Rick’s assertion that section 271, when
read in conjunction with section 217, and taking into account due process
concerns, mandated live testimony and superseded any finding of good cause
not to hold such a hearing. He has not cited, nor are we aware of, a single
authority supporting such a construction of the statutes.
      Sanctions may be awarded pursuant to section 271 “only after notice to
the party against whom the sanction is proposed to be imposed and
opportunity for that party to be heard.” (§ 271, subd. (b).) Rhona served her
request for sanctions on Rick and he had an opportunity to respond and,
indeed, did so both in writing and at the hearing. No additional process was
required. (See Diamond, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 605.)

                                        10
      No Prejudice
      Finally, even if we were to assume that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing Rick’s belated request for live testimony, Rick has
failed to show how he was thereby prejudiced. He made no offer of proof in
the trial court as to what he or Rhona would have said on the witness stand,
either directly or on cross-examination. Accordingly, Rick cannot prevail on
appeal. “ ‘To preserve an evidentiary ruling for appellate review, the
proponent of the evidence must make an offer of proof regarding the
anticipated testimony. [Citation.] The offer of proof must address the
“substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence” (Evid. Code,
§ 354, subd. (a)), and must set forth the actual evidence to be produced and
not merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued [citation]. . . .’
(People v. Carlin (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 322, 334 . . .; see also In re Mark C.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 433, 444 . . . [failure to make an adequate offer of proof
precludes consideration of the alleged error on appeal].)” (Bowman v. Wyatt
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 329; see Diamond, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
p. 605 [husband did not identify testimony he would have elicited cross-
examining wife “that would have had a bearing on the court’s decision”].)
Finding Regarding Prior Discovery Sanctions
      The trial court found “that [Rick’s] failure to timely pay the previously
ordered sanctions (based on the court’s failure to include a deadline for
payment, despite the deadline to comply with the court’s companion order) to
be disingenuous.” Rick maintains this finding is not supported by the record.
We agree on this point.
      In ruling on Rhona’s earlier motion to compel discovery responses, the
court granted the motion and ordered Rick to provide amended discovery
responses and within 30 days to pay $15,000 in sanctions. As it is

                                        11
undisputed Rick paid the sanctions within the 30-day deadline, the court’s
finding is not supported by substantial evidence. However, while Rick timely
paid the sanctions, he did not supply further discovery responses for another
two months, taking almost three months to serve the responses. His
explanation was that the court’s discovery order did not include a deadline for
the further responses. Thus, it is possible the trial court was referring to this
explanation in finding Rick to be “disingenuous.” But for better or worse, the
court’s order specified a deadline only for the payment of sanctions not for
service of the further discovery responses.
      We cannot discern whether this finding impacted the amount of the
sanctions award. As Rick points out, the amount of section 271 sanctions
must be tied to the amount of attorney fees and costs the moving party
incurred because of the obstructive behavior. In other words, the trial court
cannot award an amount that simply seems a fair penalty for the misconduct.
(Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1152–1156.) We shall
therefore remand for the limited purpose of having the trial court determine
whether the amount of the sanctions awarded included attorney fees incurred
in connection with purported delay in paying the discovery sanctions and, if
so, reducing the amount of the 271 sanctions accordingly.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order dated December 2, 2021, is REVERSED in part and the
matter is remanded for the limited purpose of having the trial court
determine whether the amount of the sanctions awarded included attorney
fees incurred in connection with purported delay in paying the discovery
sanctions and, if so, reducing the amount of the 271 sanctions accordingly.
The order is otherwise AFFIRMED. Parties to bear their own costs on
appeal.

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                                         _________________________
                                         Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Margulies, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Getty, J.*

**Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A164210, Thompson v. Thompson

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