Court Opinion

ID: 9925782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 23:00:49.557541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:36.081323
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-7011     Document: 010110987317       Date Filed: 01/22/2024 Page: 1
                                                                             FILED
                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Tenth Circuit
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                       January 22, 2024
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
                          _________________________________          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 23-7011
                                                   (D.C. No. 6:20-CR-00138-RAW-1)
  DUSTIN KYLE MARRIS,                                         (E.D. Okla.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       A jury convicted Dustin Kyle Marris, an Indian, of (1) assault with a

 dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm in Indian country in violation of

 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3), 1151, and 1153, and (2) use of a firearm in relation to a

 crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). Marris contends

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-7011    Document: 010110987317        Date Filed: 01/22/2024        Page: 2

 that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. 1 Exercising jurisdiction

 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                             I

       Given that this case presents a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, a slightly

 more extensive recitation of the evidence is warranted. At trial the jury was

 presented with the following evidence: On the evening of November 9, 2020,

 Okmulgee Police Department Deputy Bailey Smalley was patrolling an area near

 Henryetta, Oklahoma—a well-known area of illegal drug activity. She observed a

 vehicle sitting at a stop sign for an unusually long time, which raised a red flag.

 Deputy Smalley decided to follow the vehicle.

       When Deputy Smalley realized that the vehicle was travelling more than thirty

 miles above the speed limit, she activated her emergency lights and tried to initiate a

 traffic stop; but instead of stopping, the vehicle ran a stop sign and continued

 speeding. She activated her siren and continued to pursue the vehicle, which reached

 speeds of more than 100 miles-per-hour. Although Deputy Smalley could not see

 who was driving the vehicle, she saw what appeared to be a handgun thrust out of a

 window on the driver’s side of the vehicle. Immediately thereafter, she saw three

 muzzle flashes and heard three gunshots. The light from the muzzle flashes allowed

       1
          The jury also convicted Marris of possessing methamphetamine with intent to
 distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and of being a
 felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
 He does not challenge these convictions. Marris was acquitted of assault with intent
 to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(1), 1151, and 1153.
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 Deputy Smalley to see that (1) there was a handgun sticking out of the vehicle’s

 window, (2) the gun was pointed at her patrol car, and (3) the muzzle flashes were

 also aimed in her direction. After the shots were fired, she created some distance

 between her patrol car and the vehicle.

       Deputy Smalley immediately notified dispatch that shots had been fired.

 Shortly thereafter, she saw the vehicle crash into a ditch. When she pulled up to

 the scene of the crash, the driver’s door was open, and the driver had fled. She

 approached the vehicle, which contained two female passengers later identified

 as Kolepah Berryhill, who was sitting in the front passenger seat, and her

 sixteen-year-old daughter, J.B., who was sitting in the back behind the driver’s seat.

       During a search of the area, Deputy Smalley located a black semiautomatic

 handgun in the tall grass near the front driver’s side tire. Other law enforcement

 personnel who arrived on the scene searched the vehicle and found a glass smoking

 pipe and two baggies containing what was later determined to be methamphetamine.

 The following day, Marris was apprehended at a nearby property. During a search of

 his person, law enforcement uncovered four baggies of methamphetamine in his front

 pockets. Marris was arrested and taken into custody.

       After waiving his Miranda rights, 2 Marris consented to an interview with law

 enforcement, portions of which were played for the jury during the government’s

 case-in-chief. He said that he knew the police were looking for him when he fled the

       2
           See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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 scene, but he did not know why, and explained that he ran because he knew the

 vehicle could be traced back to his mother. Although Marris admitted that he was in

 possession of the weapon found by Deputy Smalley near the vehicle, he denied

 shooting at anyone or hearing any gunshots at all. According to Marris, the last time

 he saw the gun it was on the floorboard of the vehicle between the seat and center

 console. The government also presented portions of recorded jail-house telephone

 conversations between Marris and his girlfriend, in which he spoke about the

 incident.

        J.B. testified as a witness for the government. She told the jury that Marris

 picked her and her mother up the night of the incident and agreed to drive them to

 Walmart. 3 J.B. sat behind Marris, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, and her

 mother sat in the front passenger seat. She explained that Marris started driving very

 fast when the police car turned on its lights. J.B. testified that she started to cry and

 buckled her seat belt. According to J.B., the front driver’s side window was open,

 and she heard gunshots coming from outside the driver’s side of the vehicle. At this

 point, J.B. said that she and her mother kept their eyes trained on each other. J.B.

 also told the jury that when she heard the gunshots, she looked up and saw Marris

 turning back around in the driver’s seat and “readjusting himself.” R., Vol. III at 99.

 After the vehicle crashed in the ditch, Marris fled across the road, leaving J.B. and

        Marris and Berryhill, who had a history of drug addition, were friends. The
        3

 government tried to subpoena Berryhill for trial but could not locate her.
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 her mother inside the vehicle. J.B. further testified that she did not see her mother

 throw a weapon out of the vehicle after the chase.

       An area resident testified that he was watching television on the night of the

 incident and heard police sirens followed by four gunshots. He looked out the

 window and saw a police car pursuing another vehicle, which he estimated was

 200 to 400 yards behind the vehicle being chased.

       Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Travis Smiddy testified

 as an expert witness. He opined that damage to the rear driver’s side of the vehicle

 was consistent with a bullet ricocheting off the vehicle. Although Agent Smiddy was

 unable to determine the distance between the bullet’s point of origin and the damage,

 he testified that the damage was consistent with someone leaning out of the driver’s

 side window and firing a gun towards the rear of the car at a slight downward angle.

       Last, Okmulgee County Sheriff’s Office Lieutenant Duston Todd testified

 that the vehicle was tested for gunshot residue several weeks after the incident.

 Specifically, he tested the door, seat, and ceiling of the driver’s side front door and

 the same areas in the passenger’s side front door. None of those areas tested positive

 for gunshot residue; however, Lieutenant Todd conceded that he did not test the

 steering wheel or gear shift, even though it would have been difficult for Mr. Marris

 to drive the vehicle without touching those areas.

       Marris did not testify or otherwise put on a case. The district court denied

 Mr. Marris’ motions for judgment of acquittal.

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                                             II

       “We review the sufficiency of the evidence and the district court’s denial of a

 motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.” United States v. Xiang, 12 F.4th 1176,

 1184 (10th Cir. 2021). “We take the evidence—both direct and circumstantial, and

 reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence—in the light most favorable to the

 government and ask only whether a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty

 beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Rufai, 732 F.3d 1175, 1188 (10th Cir.

 2013) (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, “we do

 not weigh the evidence or consider the relative credibility of witnesses.” Xiang,

 12 F.4th at 1184.

       “The evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,

 must be substantial, but it need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable

 hypothesis and it need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” Rufai, 732 F.3d

 at 1188 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). This “highly deferential”

 standard of review results in reversal “only if no rational trier of fact could have

 found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Xiang,

 12 F.4th at 1184 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Nevertheless, we will not

 uphold a conviction that was obtained by nothing more than piling inference upon

 inference or where the evidence raises no more than a mere suspicion of guilt.”

 Rufai, 732 F.3d at 1188 (brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted).

       To sustain the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do

 bodily harm under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3), the government had to prove beyond a

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 reasonable doubt that Marris either willfully attempted to inflict injury upon Deputy

 Smalley with the intent to do bodily harm or threatened to inflict injury on Deputy

 Smalley with the intent and apparent ability to inflict bodily harm, which caused a

 reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. See United States v. Muskett,

 970 F.3d 1233, 1241 (10th Cir. 2020). 4 Further, assault with a dangerous weapon is

 categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See 18 U.S.C.

 § 924(c)(3)(A); Muskett, 970 F.3d at 1241-42. Given our conclusion in Part III that

 Marris was properly convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, it necessarily

 follows that the evidence supported his conviction for using a firearm in connection

 with a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A); Muskett, 970 F.3d at

 1241-42.

                                           III

       On appeal, Marris argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he

 was the shooter or that the shooter intended to harm Deputy Smalley. See Aplt.

 Opening Br. at 8. Specifically, Marris suggests that the evidence pointed to either

 J.B. or Berryhill as the shooter and “[w]hoever fired the gun was merely attempting

 to scare Deputy Smalley into ending the pursuit.” Id. at 18. As support, he argues

 that (1) Berryhill had a motive to shoot at Deputy Smalley because she was afraid

 of losing custody of her daughter if she was arrested for drug possession, (2) as a

 front-seat passenger, Berryhill had access to the firearm, (3) J.B. was not credible

       4
         The parties stipulated that Marris is an Indian and the incident took place
 within Indian country.
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 because she was kicked out of her grandmother’s house for bad behavior, (4) there

 was no gunshot residue found in the driver’s or passenger’s side front doors, (5) there

 was no gunshot-residue testing in the driver’s side rear passenger door where J.B.,

 the other possible shooter, was seated, (6) the trajectory of the bullet that damaged

 the rear side of the vehicle suggested the firearm could have been fired from the rear

 driver’s side window, and (7) the downward angle of the bullet that ricocheted off the

 vehicle demonstrated there was no intent to shoot at Deputy Smalley.

       Our review of the direct and circumstantial evidence and the reasonable

 inferences drawn from that evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the

 government—convinces us that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that

 Marris was the shooter. First, during his interview Marris admitted that (1) he owned

 the gun found at the scene, (2) he kept the weapon on the floorboard near the center

 console, and (3) he knew how to operate the weapon and kept a stash of bullets

 handy. By contrast, there was no evidence that either J.B. or Berryhill knew where

 the weapon was located or how to operate it. Second, Deputy Smalley testified that

 she saw a handgun thrust out of a window on the driver’s side of the vehicle and

 heard gunshots coming from outside the driver’s side. Further, J.B. testified that the

 front driver’s side window was open during the chase, and she heard gunshots

 coming from outside the driver’s side of the vehicle. Third, the evidence indicated

 that one of the bullets ricocheted off the left rear driver’s side of the vehicle. Fourth,

 the sound of gunshots caused J.B. to look up in time to see Marris turn around in the

 driver’s seat and readjust himself. Fifth, even though Marris said that he did not hear

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 any gunshots, both Deputy Smalley and a nearby resident testified to hearing three to

 four shots being fired. Sixth, Marris conceded at trial that he was a convicted felon

 in possession of a firearm who fled the scene, which in turn permitted the jury to

 infer that his flight was evidence of guilt. Seventh, we cannot second-guess the jury

 by reweighing the evidence or considering the relative credibility of witnesses.

       Again, our review of the direct and circumstantial evidence and the reasonable

 inferences drawn from that evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the

 government—convinces us that there was ample evidence from which the jury could

 find that Marris acted with the necessary intent. Although Deputy Smalley did not

 see who fired the shots, she testified that she was close enough to the vehicle to see

 the shooter thrust the gun out the window, aim it at her patrol car, and fire three times

 before she backed off. According to Deputy Smalley, she was terrified, which was

 confirmed by her shaking voice when she called dispatch. Further, the evidence was

 that the bullets could have covered the distance between the vehicle and patrol car,

 regardless of the bullet’s trajectory. Finally, in a recorded jail-house conversation

 with his girlfriend, Marris admitted that he wanted to shoot Deputy Smalley,

 although he denied pulling the trigger.

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                                           IV

         The evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the government,

  supports the jury’s conclusion that Marris was guilty of assault with a dangerous

  weapon with intent to do bodily harm and use of a firearm in relation to a crime of

  violence. We affirm the district court’s denial of Marris’ motions for judgment of

  acquittal.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Carlos F. Lucero
                                             Circuit Judge

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