Court Opinion

ID: 9719424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:52:17.209503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:07.148838
License: Public Domain

OPINION
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge.
Respondents Margaret Schlichte and Glen Schlichte filed a personal injury action against appellants Dale Keilman, Gary Pullman, and MeWCon Construction, Inc., after Peggy Schlichte was accidentally injured during an accident at work. The jury determined that appellants’ negligence was the direct cause of respondent’s injuries and awarded damages in the amount of $790,000. Following the jury verdict, a Tyroll hearing was held to determine set-offs to the verdict based on workers’ compensation benefits paid and payable. The trial court reduced the award by the amount of workers’ compensation benefits paid. Appellants challenge the trial court’s refusal to reduce the award for future loss of earning capacity, retraining, future disability, and future medical expenses. Because the trial court concluded that recovery of these benefits under workers’ compensation is speculative, we affirm.
FACTS
In 1995, respondent Margaret Schlichte was employed by People’s Electric as an electrician. While respondent was working at the MalWO-Meal plant, appellant Dale Kielan, an employee of appellant Met-Con, while working, accidentally dropped a steel pole on respondent from an overhead catwalk. Respondents filed the personal injury action against appellants in 1997.
Prior to trial, appellants entered into a reverse-Naig settlement agreement with People’s and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier. For $25,000, People’s and its workers’ compensation insurer released appellants from any subrogation claims for workers’ compensation benefits paid or payable to Margaret Schlichte.
At trial, the parties agreed that a Tyroll hearing would be held after the jury verdict for the court to determine the appropriate reduction in damages based on workers’ compensation benefits paid and payable.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of respondents, awarding damages totaling $790,000. The jury-awarded damages breakdown and the trial court’s reductions for workers’ compensation benefits already paid are as follows:
*187Damages Jury award Reduction Net award
Past loss of earnings $ 5,000 $ 1,958. $ 3,042.
Past medical expenses 25,000 13,018.16 11,981.84
Past pain and suffering 20,000 20,000
Past disability 12,000 12,000
Future loss of earning 435,000 435,000
Retraining 100,000 100,000
Future medical 75,000 75,000
Future pain and suffering 70,000 70,000
Future disability 42,000 42,000
Loss of consortium 6,000 6,000
$790,000 $775,023.84
At the Tyroll hearing, appellants called as an expert witness Barbara Heck, an attorney who practices exclusively in the area of workers’ compensation. Heck testified that, in preparing for the hearing, she assumed, in part, that plaintiff will (a) have flare-ups of her injury; (b) be unable to continue working in her current position; and (c) find a lower-paying job. But Heck admitted that: (a) if respondent remains employed, she will not have a claim for wage loss unless her wage fall below their level at the time of injury; (b) there is no guarantee that a workers’ compensation court would entertain respondent’s claims; and (c) there is no way to determine with reasonable certainty what worker’s compensation benefits respondent will receive in the future.
Respondents called expert witness Steven Hawn, an attorney with extensive experience in workers’ compensation eases. Hawn testified that (a) future workers’ compensation claims may or may not be awarded by a judge and that the jury’s decision in this case will have no relevancy to a future workers’ compensation claim; (b) even if all of appellants’ assumptions were to come to pass, workers’ compensation benefits could still be denied; and (c) retraining benefits are rarely granted. Finally, Hawn concluded that, although it is possible that respondents will receive future workers’ compensation benefits, it is very speculative.
The trial court denied a reduction in damages for future loss-of-earning capacity, retraining, future disability, and future medical expenses. The denial was based on the trial court’s conclusion that (1) appellants had not sustained its burden of establishing that respondent will receive future workers’ compensation benefits; and (2) respondents’ possibility of recovering those damages under workers’ compensation is speculative.
ISSUE
Did the trial court clearly err by denying reductions to the jury award based on future damages after concluding that recovery of those damages under workers’ compensation is speculative?
ANALYSIS
On appeal from a judgment, this court’s scope of review is limited to deciding whether the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous and whether it erred in its legal conclusions. When the trial court’s findings are reasonably supported by the evidence, they are not clearly erroneous * * *.
Blaine Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Royal Elec. Co., 520 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn.App.1994) (quoting Citizens State Bank v. Leth, 450 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Minn.App.1990)).
Appellants first argue that the trial court addressed the issue of whether respondents’ future damages are reasonably certain to occur, contending that review of this issue violates the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Appellants’ argument is not consistent with Minnesota caselaw. Collateral estoppel applies where
*188(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the es-topped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.
Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn.1982) (quoting Victory Highway Village, Inc. v. Weaver, 480 F.Supp. 71, 74 (D.Minn.1979)). Collateral estoppel does not apply unless an issue has been actually litigated and decided. In re Trust Created by Hill, 499 N.W.2d 475, 484 (Minn.App.1993), review denied (Minn. July 15, 1993). The trial court did not question whether future damages are reasonably certain to occur, as the jury had already concluded, but rather, it addressed whether respondent would prevail on a workers’ compensation claim for future damages.
Appellants also argue that, if future damages do occur, then a workers’ compensation claim must cover these damages if they are reasonable, necessary, and related to the injury. Appellants provide no authority for this argument.
Although an award of benefits should be reduced by the “amount of the workers’ compensation paid and payable by the employer/insurer,” Sayre v. McGough Constr. Co., 580 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn.App.1998) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 18, 1998), future workers’ compensation benefits cannot be found to be “payable,” if after the Tyroll hearing, the trial court concludes that recovery of those benefits is merely speculative. See Tyroll v. Private Label Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d at 61 (explaining that in calculation of workers’ compensation benefits payable in future, trial judge should determine the benefits based on evidence available and by making reasonable assumptions).
The trial court’s conclusion that recovery of future workers’ compensation benefits remains speculative is supported by the testimony offered at the Tyroll hearing. Based on this conclusion, the trial court did not err by refusing to reduce the jury award for future benefits.
DECISION
The trial court did not err by denying reductions to the jury award based on future damages because it found that recovery of those damages under workers’ compensation remains speculative.
Affirmed.