Court Opinion

ID: 9746338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:12:46.384039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:12.267941
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.
I respectfully dissent. The record contains no substantial evidence that, as of the date of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22 hearing on August 26, 1997, the return of the minors to their mother would constitute a substantial risk of detriment to their physical or emotional well-being. I would therefore grant the mandate petition.
The majority begins its analysis with the statement: “We agree with the mother that there is evidence there would be no risk of substantial detriment if the children were returned to her.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 708.) The majority decides the case, however, on “the countervailing revelations in the various reports,” finding that these countervailing revelations “constituted substantial evidence of the risk of requisite detriment if the three children were returned to their mother.” (Ibid.)
The “countervailing revelations” for the finding of risk of substantial detriment are the following: (1) petitioner has never had custody of any of her eight children “on a full time basis and been drug free” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 708); (2) all eight of petitioner’s children are currently subject to dependency court jurisdiction or have been adopted; (3) return of the minors to petitioner would be detrimental “because it would end the loving and stable relationship which had developed over a two-year period in the foster home . . .” (id. at p. 709.); (4) the mental health professionals concluded that petitioner would be unable to cope with return of the three children at the present time; and (5) there is evidence that petitioner is “incapable of acting as a proper parent” while the children are in her custody (id. at p. 708).
In my view, the first three factors cited by the majority are irrelevant to this proceeding. Dependency proceedings begin because a parent has a problem, and require the government to provide services through which the parent can overcome that problem. “The purpose of the [service] plan is to overcome the problem that led to removal in the first place.” (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 687].) To hold that the existence of a problem at the beginning of the proceedings could constitute substantial evidence of substantial risk of detriment three *713years later would be contrary to the intent of the Legislature, and to the law. As this very court acknowledged only last month in an opinion authored by Presiding Justice Paul Turner, “Family preservation is the first priority when dependency proceedings are commenced. [Citations.]” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].)1
Moreover, I find troubling the majority’s reliance on In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 85, 878 P.2d 1297] to support a finding of detriment because return of the children to their mother would terminate the foster relationship. It must be understood that any outcome of this dependency proceeding will result in detriment to the children: They will lose either the love and affection of their mother, whom they love and want to live with, or of their foster parents, with whom they have developed loving bonds during their time in their home. However, the fact that the children will lose the love and support of their foster parents cannot, standing alone, form the basis of a finding of substantial risk of detriment, and Jasmon O. does not hold otherwise.
In Jasmon O., the “mental health professionals” opined that the minor never developed a close relationship with her father and suffered acute anxiety as visitation with her father increased, and that the father “failed to or was unable to empathize with his daughter’s distress.” (In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 408.) Under those circumstances, when the evidence was that the child had not developed a parent/child relationship with the parent and did not trust the parent to care for her, but did develop an attachment to her foster parents, a divided court upheld the trial court’s finding that return of the minor to her father would be detrimental to the child. That is a far cry from the evidence in this case, where Dr. Ward, the only mental health professional to observe the interactions of petitioner and her children, attested to the strong bond between them, and Tara and Jynifer expressed a desire to return to their mother’s care.
*714The real gist of the matter here, however, and what is most troubling to me, is the nature of the evidence presented to support the conclusion of the social worker, the trial court, and the majority, that petitioner is not a “capable” parent. The trial court cited in support of its order that petitioner “has not demonstrated the ability to parent the children.” Thus, in remarks directed to petitioner, the court states: “The problem is that after more than three years there is not before the court any evidence of a demonstrated ability to parent the children on a long-term regular basis. And the evidence before the court is that, notwithstanding all of the accomplishments that you have made in your personal life, you have overcome the drug problem. You have gone to the individual counseling, you demonstrated personal and adult responsibility, but there is not a demonstrated ability to take care of the children on a regular basis, so I can’t let the children go back today.” This comment places the burden of proof squarely on petitioner. However, it is the DCFS who has the burden to establish that the return of the children to petitioner would create a substantial risk of detriment to their physical or emotional well-being. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22, subd. (a).)
The appellate court in In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214 [250 Cal.Rptr. 468] reversed a finding of substantial risk of detriment on just this type of evidence. In that case, the petition, filed when the minor was a year old, alleged that the mother had been arrested on an out-of-county warrant for theft, had a history of mental problems, and had had two other children removed and subsequently freed for adoption due to the mother’s inability to care for them. The petition was sustained.
The countervailing revelations contained in the various reports included in the record in Heather P. indicated that prior to Heather’s birth, her mother had been repeatedly hospitalized for mental illness, had suffered “regular incarcerations,” and was “in and out of therapy and terribly transient in her living arrangements.” She was described by her own foster mother as a “bag lady,” and had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic who failed to exhibit “adequate, nondetrimental or healthy parenting capabilities.” (203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1220.)
At the 18-month hearing, the court found that there had been “moderate compliance” with the reunification plan: She had maintained her residence for approximately one year, had maintained regular monthly visits with her daughter, and had received parent education and psychotherapy. The mother’s therapist had previously stated, in a report presented at the 12-month hearing, that the mother had made progress in therapy, but that “more of an improvement is required before the minor could be allowed back into [the mother’s] physical custody.” In addition, the social worker’s report stated *715that “initially Heather is reluctant to have contact with [the mother] and must be coaxed by her mother. Heather interacts even less with her mother when other adults are present in the room.” (203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1222.) Thus, although the mother “completed the requirements of the service plan, the social worker could not recommend that Heather be placed in her custody because [the mother] had not received a positive evaluation from her therapist indicating that the minor would be at a low or no risk for neglect or endangerment if she were returned to [her mother’s] custody.” (Id. at pp. 1222-1223.) Based on the foregoing, the trial court found that return of the child to her mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the child, and ordered that permanency planning proceedings be conducted pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.25.
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court order, holding that the finding was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the court held that the social worker’s, and trial court’s, reliance on the absence of a positive evaluation from the mother’s therapist improperly shifted the burden of proof to the mother in contravention of the statute, and that the social worker’s report, which was essentially the only evidence received at the hearing, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the return of the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the child. (203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1226-1228.)
Like the court in Heather P., I believe that the trial court here impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the mother, so that she was required to prove her “ability to parent” the children, and that the social worker’s reports, which constituted the great bulk of the evidence presented below, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the return of the children to their mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to their physical or emotional well-being.
The majority finds compelling the “fact” that petitioner is “unable to handle” weekend visits. The social worker arrived at this conclusion, in turn, based on the fact that petitioner called the foster mother with questions regarding care of the children during the early weekend visits; that petitioner cut two of eight weekend visits short, one because she was sick and the other because Tara and Jynifer’s father, whom DCFS had told petitioner not to permit to visit the girls, indicated that he was going to visit; that two-year-old Kyrie scraped her leg on a bolt that was protruding from a bed which petitioner was assembling for her; that petitioner’s home was “in disarray with toys and clothing on the living room floor [and] a sink full of dirty dishes as well as dirty dishes on the kitchen counter;” that petitioner allows *716the children to eat sugary foods and watch television for extended periods of time, and other, similar behaviors.
The fact that petitioner seeks help from the foster mother when she needs it is, in my estimation, a positive trait, not a negative one. Likewise, that petitioner is resisting the actions of one of the fathers in seeking to insert himself into this family’s life should be applauded and assisted, not cited as evidence that she is an unfit mother. And the social worker’s observations of toys and clothes scattered around the living room, dirty dishes in the kitchen, the consumption of too much junk food and the watching of too much TV are evidence of modem living (and the frequent complaint of grandparents), not of a risk of substantial detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the minors.2
Petitioner’s parenting ability is also questioned based on her candid admission that the prospect of caring for three active, young girls can be overwhelming. The honesty and forthrightness of petitioner exhibited in this statement were qualities extolled by Dr. Ward in his Evidence Code section 730 report, but seen by the DCFS as evidence of “inability to parent.” Surely a parent’s frank assessment of the daunting enterprise of parenting should not be turned on its head and treated as evidence of unfitness to parent.
I note as well my concern that the only live testimony at the hearing to determine the fate of these three children is that of petitioner herself. The remainder of the evidence consists of various reports and correspondence submitted by the social worker Nancy Mars, the Evidence Code section 730 evaluator Dr. Michael Ward, petitioner’s therapist Samuel Hill, and Jynifer’s therapist Christine Kaye Campbell. Thus, the conclusions of the mental health professionals were not tested by cross-examination. Of the documentary evidence presented, the only current professional report presented to the trial court at the time of this hearing was that of the social worker, who had decided shortly after being assigned to this case in late 1995 or early 1996 that these children should be adopted. Unfortunately, Dr. Ward’s most current report, in which he recommended continued reunification services, was dated January 20, 1997, and thus was eight months old at the time of this hearing. Likewise, the “professional opinion” evidence provided by Jynifer’s therapist consisted of a three-paragraph letter dated January 15, 1997, based on eight individual counseling sessions with Jynifer during the previous summer. This is not the type of evidence which we should be *717relying on in making decisions which, no matter the outcome, will permanently affect the lives of these children.
In sum, I believe that the evidence relied on to support the finding of substantial risk of detriment in this case is in the same vein as the “failure to ‘internalize’ general parenting skills” which the Court of Appeal found “simply too vague to constitute substantial, credible evidence of detriment” in Blanca P. v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at page 1751.
At the time this case was set for permanency planning, petitioner had received the required drug counseling, had tested clean for almost two years, and was maintaining a drug-free home. She completed the proscribed parenting classes and faithfully participated in individual counseling until her therapist became ill. At the time of the hearing, petitioner was scheduled to resume counseling with another therapist. Petitioner made herself available for drug-testing, was free of drug use, and had regular and happy visits with her children. There is no indication of any domestic violence in her home or in her relationship with her children. She had thus done everything the court had asked her to do and had remediated every circumstance which caused the petition to be filed.
In my view, the “substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the minor” standard set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22 is essentially the same as that applicable to the initial assumption of jurisdiction over the minors. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.) That is to say, if the behaviors of petitioner which the DCFS cites as deficient would not bring the minors within the jurisdiction of the court under a new petition, the provisions of section 366.22 have not been met. Here, in the final analysis, the DCFS based its recommendation that these children be taken from their mother and put up for adoption on its assessment of petitioner’s deficient parenting skills. I do not believe that the Legislature intended that children be deprived of their parents, and parents of their children, because the parent is less than ideal.
“Our society does recognize an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ presumptive right to retain the care, custody, management, and companionship of one’s own child, free of intervention by the government. [Citations.] Maintenance of the familial bond between children and parents — even imperfect or separated parents — comports with our highest values and usually best serves the interests of parents, children, family, and community. Because we so abhor the involuntary separation of parent and child, the state may disturb an existing parent-child relationship only for strong reasons and subject to careful procedures.” (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 76 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290].)
*718In sum, the evidence here presented establishes that petitioner, like many parents, is not an ideal caretaker or role model. However, this evidence does not establish a substantial risk of detriment to the physical and emotional well-being of these children. Put another way, the children are not currently being abused or neglected when in petitioner’s care, and there is no evidence in the record to conclude that they would be at substantial risk of abuse or neglect if returned to their mother’s custody. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (j).) Accordingly, I would grant the mandate petition.
Petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 29, 1998.

DCFS (the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services) argues that the possibility that petitioner will return to drug use provides sufficient evidence for the required finding of substantial detriment. Thus, DCFS sites Dr. Michael Ward’s report which states that “while [petitioner] has been clean and sober for some time, given these data and her past history, one would still have to have significant concerns about some underlying emotional instability and the possibility of relapse in terms of things like substance abuse.” After noting that petitioner has commented on the difficulty of caring for young children, DCFS concludes, “Therefore, there is a risk that if petitioner had difficulties and the responsibility became too great, she could relapse.”
To allow children to he permanently removed from their home due to the possibility that their mother, though currently sober and in full compliance with the case plan, might return to drug use would turn the statutory scheme into a farce. Furthermore, in the unlikely event the mother did relapse and place the children at risk because of her use of drugs, DCFS would be free to initiate a new proceeding based upon facts occurring after the return of the children to the mother.

The record before us contains no evidence that these conditions have been detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the minors. The issue is not whether the petitioner is living up to the social worker’s standard of a “good parent,” but whether the parent’s conduct is harmful to the children.