Court Opinion

ID: 9730971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:29:34.659999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:11.771236
License: Public Domain

SACKETT, Justice
(specially concurring).
I concur with the majority decision to affirm. I agree with the majority that it was not error to admit evidence of the sexual abuse accommodation syndrome here where the defendant put in issue the question of whether the victim fabricated her testimony and the evidence of the sexual abuse accommodation syndrome served to rehabilitate her testimony.
I write separately because I want to make it clear in agreeing with the majority that I am not sanctioning the use of evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome for purposes the evidence is not intended to be and was not intended to be used.
Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome first came from an article titled, “The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome” published in 1983 and written by Dr. Roland Summit. Summit described *359five characteristics commonly observed in sexually abused children: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommodation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction. The accommodation syndrome was never intended to detect sexual abuse. Rather, it assumes the presence of abuse, and explains the child’s reaction to it. The accommodation syndrome is not probative of abuse. Additionally, accommodation does not have established reliability. The place of the accommodation syndrome in the courtroom is only to explain delayed reporting of abuse, recantation of allegation of abuse, and denial that abuse has occurred. It is only for these rehabilitative functions that the accommodation syndrome serves a useful forensic function. See John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Neb.L.Rev. 68 (1989).
The problems with this type of evidence is it may incorrectly be used by a fact-finder as evidence of abuse. State v. Dodson, 452 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Iowa App.1989). There is a very fine line between an opinion that is helpful to a jury and an opinion that merely conveys a conclusion concerning the defendant’s guilt. See State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 98 (Iowa 1986); State v. Horton III, 231 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1975).
I recognize, as does the majority, the increased number of cases involving child sexual abuse coming before our courts. I also am aware of the awesome responsibility we all have to protect children from this treatment and punish offenders. I also recognize the responsibility to determine the truth of allegations, to assure safety for children, and to assure only the guilty are convicted places a considerable burden on the fact-finder. Consequently, there is a temptation to seek the help of persons who hold themselves out as experts in child sexual abuse diagnosis and use their opinions in whole or in part to allegedly assist the fact-finder in arriving at the truth.
However, before any expert’s evidence is used to assist a fact-finder in arriving at the truth it should be clearly shown the expert provides reliable data. A recent clinical study of expert assessments of children’s allegations of sexual abuse by Thomas M. Horner, a Clinical Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Infancy and Early Childhood Clinic in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Michigan School of Medicine and Melvin J. Guyer,- a Professor of Social Psychology in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Michigan School of Medicine, who holds a Ph.D in psychology and a J.D. from the University of Michigan clarifies a large range of erroneous inference by clinical experts and cautions courts against indiscriminate use of experts in cases of alleged child sexual abuse. See Thomas M. Horner & Melvin J. Guyer, Prediction, Prevention and Clinical Expertise in Child Custody Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made, XXV Family Law Quarterly, 383 (Fall 1991). They suggest:
For the most part, when evidence of sexual abuse exists, it does not require a mental health expert to draw the appropriate inferences, and when evidence does not exist, or is ambiguous, opinions offered by an expert only bias the judicial decisionmaking away from the presumptions that are operative in the justice system, namely, that duly elected or appointed persons, (i.e. judges and juries) should make decisions affecting the so-ciolegal conditions of individuals and families. As several commentators have argued, experts sometimes intrude on, and therefore detract from, the institutionalized authority of established judicial matters. This is especially so when they offer opinions that preempt the ultimate fact-finding authority and responsibilities of the judge or jury. It has become increasingly evident that experts frequently adopt an activist stance in their testimony, seeking to maneuver the court into a frame of mind that overestimates the likelihood that child sexual abuse has occurred, in cases where there are ambiguities or contradictions.
Thomas M. Horner & Melvin J. Guyer, Prediction, Prevention, and Clinical Expertise in Child Custody Cases in Which *360Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made, XXV Family Law Quarterly, 402-03 (Fall 1991).
The accommodation syndrome has not been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community as a means of detecting abuse. See People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886 (1988); Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky.1986). The other serious problem with the accommodation syndrome is that in some instances it seeks to show why the behavior of an alleged abused child is the same as, not different from, the behavior of a nonabused child. The testimony may seek to explain why the child acted normally. See Dodson, 452 N.W.2d at 612. The fact that a child acted normally is not evidence of abuse.