Court Opinion

ID: 9474716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:06:42.516382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:17.173865
License: Public Domain

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
For several years this Circuit has endeavored to decipher the silence of the New York Appellate Division when it affirms without opinion a criminal conviction. We are obliged to do this because Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), forbids federal habeas corpus consideration of a constitutional claim not adjudicated on the merits by the state courts by reason of procedural default unless there was cause for the default and resulting prejudice. When a procedural default has occurred at trial and the Appellate Division affirms without opinion, we are left to guess whether that Court relied on the default and did not reach the merits, or ignored the default and reached the merits, deciding the issue adversely to the defendant. In several cases we have been willing to assume that silence meant reliance on procedural default, at least where the defendant failed to observe “a well-known rule of trial practice,” Taylor v. Harris, 640 F.2d 1, 2 n. 3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942, 101 S.Ct. 3089, 69 L.Ed.2d 958 (1981), such as the requirement of objection to a jury charge or to trial evidence, see Johnson v. Harris, 682 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041,103 S.Ct. 457, 74 L.Ed.2d 609 (1982); Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 53-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849, 103 S.Ct. 109, 74 L.Ed.2d 97 (1982); Taylor v. Harris, supra.
However, in Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.1985), we declined to apply this approach rigidly out of respect to the New York courts, which have their own exception to their usual rule concerning procedural default. In New York, a limited category of alleged trial errors, including claimed defects in a jury charge, will be reviewed on appeal, despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection normally required to preserve an issue for review. The category has been described as including an alleged error that “goes to the essential validity of the proceedings,” People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 296, 383 N.Y. S.2d 573, 578, 347 N.E.2d 898, 903 (1976), aff'd sub nom. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), or challenges a procedure “at basic variance with the mandate of law prescribed by Constitution or statute,” People v. Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467, 471, 429 N.Y. S.2d 584, 586, 407 N.E.2d 430, 432 (1980), or constitutes “a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right,” People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167, 172, 256 N.Y.S.2d 799, 802, 204 N.E.2d 846, 849 (1965). Since New York has announced that it will review such claims of error, we held in Hawkins v. LeFevre, supra, that silent affirmance by the Appellate Division, in a case where such a claim of error was made, must be understood to be a ruling on the merits of the claim.
*66In the instant case, we are again presented with a claim of error, which, if correct on the merits, would “go[] to the essential validity of the proceedings” as New York uses that phrase. We need not guess about it; we know it for a fact from the New York Court of Appeals decisions in Patterson and Thomas. In Patterson, the claimed error, reviewed despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection, was that the trial court’s charge placed on the defendant the burden of proof as to extreme emotional disturbance, which, if established, would have reduced the defendant’s degree of culpability. The claimed error in the instant case is an even stronger candidate for inclusion in the category of errors reviewed despite lack of contemporaneous objection. Here the claimed error is that the trial court’s charge placed on the defendant the burden of proof as to duress, which, if established, would have resulted in complete exoneration.
In Thomas, the New York Court of Appeals discussed its ruling in Patterson and made clear that the type of error alleged in the instant case is reviewable despite lack of objection. Thomas involved a jury instruction that arguably could be interpreted as placing the burden of proof on the issue of intent on the defendant, contrary to Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). The Court of Appeals ruled that a claimed error of this sort was not reviewable absent objection at trial, specifically noting the distinction between the claimed errors in Thomas and Patterson:
In Patterson then the trial court had expressly and unequivocally instructed the jury, as the statute directed, that the burden of proof was on the defendant to prove the affirmative defense. In the case now before us, on the other hand, there is no contention that the court expressly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant or explicitly relieved the People of their burden of proving every element of the crimes charged. Rather it is urged that a portion of the court’s charge is capable of being so interpreted and having this effect although, as indicated, the court specifically instructed the jury that the burden was on the People throughout. A claim that the court erred by expressly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant or relieving the People of their obligation to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt presents a more basic defect, and is potentially more prejudicial, than a contention that a portion of the charge may be interpreted as having this effect.
People v. Thomas, supra, 50 N.Y.2d at 472, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 587, 407 N.E.2d at 433. In the instant case the claim is precisely that “the [trial] court erred by expressly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.”
Rather than recognize this case as one presenting an issue that New York courts review on the merits despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection, the majority suggests that the New York Court of Appeals reached the merits in Patterson only because the law concerning burden of proof had been placed in doubt by Mulla-ney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). The problem with this purported distinction is that the New York Court of Appeals did not adopt it. That Court did not cite Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, as the reason for reviewing the issue on the merits. In Patterson the Court did not even mention Mullaney until after it had concluded that the issue on the merits was within the special category that always deserves review despite the absence of contemporaneous objection. 39 N.Y.2d at 296, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 578, 347 N.E.2d at 903. Instead of interpreting Appellate Division silence in the pending case to mean that the New York rule as set forth in Patterson and Thomas was followed on the threshold issue of reviewability, the majority speculates that the Appellate Division more likely declined to reach the merits because it concluded that defense counsel had thought his contention was untenable at trial and had made a deliberate decision not to make his argument on the *67merits to the trial court. This interprets the silence of the Appellate Division in affirming the conviction as having interpreted the silence of defense counsel in failing to object to the charge. That interpretation of silence divines more meaning than I can accept. It ignores not only what the New York Court of Appeals did in Patterson but also what the Supreme Court did in Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979), and what this Court did in Hawkins v. LeFevre, supra.
In Ulster County the Supreme Court entertained a claim on the merits as to which no contemporaneous objection had been made. It did so in reliance on New York appellate practice as expressed in People v. McLucas, supra. 442 U.S. at 151 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. at 2221, n. 10. This Court did the same thing in Hawkins, also relying on McLucas, 758 F.2d at 872-73. My colleagues gently mock Hawkins by suggesting that it is a departure from an unyielding practice, in the fashion of the celebrated departure of Lord Byron’s damsel from her practice of not yielding. Whatever fancies of the moment may have prompted the lady to consent, I would have thought that the Supreme Court in Ulster. County and this Court in Hawkins were making more principled decisions that we are obliged to follow, especially when they both rely on decisions of New York’s highest court, whose appellate policies we are striving to respect.
Despite its expressed view that the merits of appellant’s claim were not properly before the District Court and hence not properly before our Court, the majority considers the merits and rejects appellant’s claim. Since I agree that under New York law the issue of duress is a matter of defense, which the defendant may constitutionally be required to prove, and not part of an element of the offense, which the prosecution must prove, I concur in the affirmance of the District Court’s judgment.