Court Opinion

ID: 9683556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:31:22.662533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:48.752534
License: Public Domain

OPINION CONCURRING IN DENIAL OF APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The majority opinion on original submission verifies a paraphrastic rendition of a certain common law maxim: The hard Greenwood case made bad law. See Greenwood v. State, 823 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), affirming Greenwood v. State, 802 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th] 1990). Accord: O’Neal v. State, 826 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).
The Greenwood court went beyond the narrow context of the question presented, first to lay down and then elaborate on a broader proposition, viz.: “The presumption of Rule 53(d) does not apply to sufficiency challenges.” Id., at 661-662.1 In the instant cause the Court adheres to Greenwood, although again the issue is not properly presented here.
The State asserts here, as it did in the court of appeals, that appellant “violated Rule 53(d).” Brief for the State, at 2; Brief for the State, at 2. As the record reflects, the fact of the matter is that appellant failed to comply with the mandatory requisite condition prescribed in Rule 53(d) for appealing on a partial statement of facts, viz.: “[Appellant] shall include in his request [for a partial statement of facts] a statement of the points to be relied on and shall thereafter be limited to such points.”2
For that reason alone the motion for rehearing is without merit.3 Accordingly, I *637now concur only in the judgment of this Court affirming the judgment below.

. In Greenwood, supra, defendant filed and obtained a rehearing on his motion for new trial. When it was denied he then gave notice of appeal and "pursuant to Rule 53(d)” requested the court reporter to prepare a statement of facts, designating "only the testimony of [a named juror] from the Motion for New Trial hearing.” His designation enumerated ten points of error upon which he would rely on appeal, one of which claimed that “[t)he evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction." On appeal all other points dealt with alleged jury misconduct. Greenwood (Clinton, J., concurring at 665); see also Greenwood, supra, 802 S.W.2d, at 11-12.
Notwithstanding that an issue of sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial to sustain a judgment of conviction may be tendered as an issue by motion for new trial, Rule 30(b)(9), the rule still is that "new” testimony extrinsic the record to establish insufficiency cannot be used to contradict, supersede or substitute for evidence introduced at trial. Greenwood (Clinton, J., concurring at 666). The rule is not to be confused with, for example, that which is “newly discovered evidence" See e.g., Jones v. State, 711 S.W.2d 35, at 36-37 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). All emphasis supplied above and throughout is mine unless otherwise indicated.

. Contemporaneously with his notice of appeal appellant filed the following papers:
Designation of Record on Appeal — in which he requested the record include, inter alia-.
2. The testimony of Darius Neyland.
3. The testimony of Frank Skinner.
11. The request by the Defendant for a Statement of Facts in this cause.
Motion for Free Statement of Facts — without limitation
Request for Preparation of Statement of Facts — in which he “specifically" requested the court reporter to "transcribe the entire proceedings in this cause[.]”
Defendant’s Affidavit for Indigency — swearing that he was unable to pay for, inter alia, “the Statement of Facts,” and requesting the court to order the reporter to furnish "a Statement of Facts of the entire trial proceedings[.]”
Some two weeks later appellant filed an "Amended Request for Preparation of Statement of Facts,” in which he “specifically requested that the reporter transcribe the matters and proceedings set forth in the Designation of Record filed herein.” See above. On the same day the judge of the trial court signed an "Order Granting Statement of Facts.”
In none of these pleadings did appellant include "a statement of the points to be relied on,” as required by Rule 53(d).

. The procedural default aside, the simple facts of this case reveal the utter errancy of rationale in Greenwood.
Its linchpin is that to comply with its constitutional mandate a reviewing court must be enabled to "consider all relevant evidence in a given case,” and its asserted belief is that "presentation of only a partial record makes such consideration impossible.” Id., at 661. Not true in this cause.
*637The indictment alleged appellant delivered a controlled substance to Darius Neyland [an undercover officer] by actual transfer [in count one], and by constructive transfer [in count two]. Tr. 3-6. That appellant personally delivered the cocaine to officer Neyland behind the closed door in a bedroom of appellant's house when no one else was in the room is absolutely undisputed. Neyland testified that appellant placed two packets of "a white powdery substance” on the bed and pushed them across the bed to Neyland, he picked them up and "checked to see what I had;” he then immediately identified State’s Exhibit One as the two packets "that were pushed across the bed to me” containing the "white powdery substance,” which "tested positive for presence of cocaine” in a field test. II S.F. 14-16. In his own testimony Appellant disputed none of those facts, relying instead on an entrapment defense initiated by a woman who urged him to get "some cocaine” for her friend, who turned out to be Neyland. II S.F. 22-43.
The court charged the jury only on "constructive transfer" alleged in count two, and appellant represents that was done on election by the State; in any event, the prosecutor did not object. II S.F. 55. Appellant moved for an instructed verdict on the ground that there was no evidence of a "constructive transfer." After the jury returned its verdict and the court rendered a written judgment, appellant moved for judgment non obstante verdicto and to vacate the judgment on the same ground.
On appeal he presented only one point of error, viz;
‘The trial judge erred in failing to grant appellant's motion for directed verdict, for the reason that there was no evidence of a constructive transfer."
Appellant’s Brief at 2. Stated another way, his sole contention is that the undisputed evidence shows an "actual transfer" rather than a “constructive transfer," and therefore the verdict of the jury is not supported by, and indeed is contrary to “all the relevant evidence.” In short, the question is one of law, not fact.
In my judgment, appellant presented a record that most certainly contains “all the relevant evidence” of the offense alleged in count two of the indictment, the only offense the court submitted to the jury, and that is germane to his single point of error. To say that the point may not be decided by an appellate court because the record does not contain a statement of facts of demonstrably irrelevant evidence is not only an egregious injustice to this appellant, but a total rejection of judicial policy considerations supporting utilization of a partial statement of facts, as well as a disservice to the studied determination of this Court to effectuate and implement those considerations by adopting and promulgating Rule 53(d).