Court Opinion

ID: 9949865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 19:06:51.305969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:06.942079
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/12/24 Leisy v. Weil CA1/1

                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                   DIVISION ONE

 KATE LEISY,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A164066
 v.
 AARON WEIL,                                                             (Alameda County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. RG21096171)

         Aaron Weil interviewed for a job at Allbirds, a sustainable shoe and
apparel company, but Allbirds declined to offer him a position. One year
later, Weil launched an aggressive online campaign accusing Allbirds of
stealing advertising ideas he sent to the company’s recruiting team after his
interviews. Weil subsequently focused his attacks on Kate Leisy, an Allbirds
designer who participated in one of his interviews.
         Leisy filed a lawsuit against Weil for defamation, false light and
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court
denied Weil’s special motion to strike Leisy’s complaint under California’s
anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, concluding Weil’s
statements were not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute because they
were neither pre-litigation communications nor related to a matter of public

                                                               1
interest, and that even if the statements were protected, Leisy established a
probability of prevailing on her claims.1 We affirm.
                             I.    BACKGROUND
      Allbirds is best known for its minimalist and sustainable sneakers
which incorporate ecofriendly materials such as recycled cardboard and
plastic bottles. In 2019, Leisy was a Senior Designer at Allbirds.
      In July 2019, Weil applied for a position as a User Experience Designer
in Allbirds’s Digital Product team. Although Leisy was not involved with the
“user experience” elements of Allbirds’s designs, she agreed to participate in
the last of three interviews the company conducted with Weil to provide an
additional opinion on his candidacy and as a favor to the Digital Product
team. The day after his interview, Weil sent Allbirds’s recruiter a thank you
note which included presentation slides with advertising ideas he developed
regarding the sustainability of Allbirds’s products. For example, Weil
submitted an advertising mockup for an Allbirds shoe that was labeled with
an environmental impact score within a circular design. The recruiter
indicated she would forward Weil’s email to Leisy and another one of Weil’s
interviewers, but none of the individuals responsible for the hiring decision
viewed the slides at that time. In fact, within 24 hours of the interview,
Allbirds had already determined Weil was not a good fit for the role. This
fact, however, was not communicated to Weil who did not receive a rejection
letter or any further correspondence from Allbirds.
      Around April 2020, Weil came across an Allbirds advertisement which
he believed included designs that were similar to the ideas he submitted
along with his thank you note in 2019. Convinced that Allbirds had stolen

      1All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
                                       2
his designs, Weil hired counsel to send a letter to Allbirds accusing it of
design theft and demanding that the company begin “meaningful discussions”
with Weil before he resorted to “any and all means” to protect his rights. The
letter stated that Weil had already registered the domain
www.allbirdstheft.com to tell his story publicly and expressed hope that the
parties could “reach an equitable resolution before the site goes live.”
      In response, Allbirds informed Weil that his claims lacked merit.
Among other things, Allbirds pointed out that the group of individuals
responsible for the company’s advertising campaign was “entirely different”
from the individuals who interviewed Weil and received his work. Allbirds
also indicated that it had used circular designs similar to the new “carbon
footprint” score in prior advertising materials.
      Dissatisfied with Allbirds’s response, Weil began an online campaign in
which he accused the company of stealing his designs, including his idea that
products be labeled with a “carbon footprint” score. To this end, he launched
a website titled “Allbirds Theft” at allbirdstheft.com, and created the Twitter
handle @AllbirdsTheft (Twitter account) and a publicly-accessible Instagram
account with the handle @AllbirdsTheft (Instagram account). Weil posted
hundreds of vitriolic and occasionally profanity-laced accusations that
Allbirds stole his advertising ideas and designs on his website and Twitter
account.
      At some point, Weil began using the Twitter account to target Leisy
and accuse her of stealing his design ideas. He also used the Instagram
account to follow Leisy’s personal Instagram account; contacted at least 62 of
Leisy’s friends, family members and professional contacts on Instagram,
sending many of them direct messages stating that Leisy stole his work and
was a thief; and tweeted a video with his design theft accusations that tagged

                                        3
Leisy’s personal Twitter account. Beyond all this, Weil tweeted messages
suggesting he was tracking Leisy’s online activity and the activity of her
family and friends. For example, at one point, Weil tweeted that his IP
records indicated that a “person in Santa Rosa Beach” had been “visiting [his]
site obsessively since 6am,” and that he would “[s]ubpoena” the “IP address
in Santa Rosa Beach” which had “visit[ed] the site every 30 minutes,
sometimes early in the morning.”
      In February 2021, Weil registered two new websites:
AllbirdsRapedMe.com and KateLeisyTheft.com. The homepage for both of
these websites stated: “An Allbirds designer (Kate Leisy) stole my work,
product ideas, Carbon Footprint Score, Number and Label design, visual and
UX design as well as historical and thematic imagery.” Weil also created
another Instagram account with the handle @KateLeisyTheft. The heading
at the top of that account read: “Got raped by a designer. Kate Leisy, the
designer at Allbirds, stole my designs after I applied for a job there.” The
account also provided a link to the KateLeisyTheft.com website. That same
month, Weil had people stand outside of Allbirds stores with signs that
included a link to the AllbirdsRapedMe.com website.
      This lawsuit followed. In April 2021, Leisy filed a complaint against
Weil alleging claims for defamation, false light, and infliction of emotional
distress. The complaint averred that Weil’s harassment and attacks were
baseless as carbon labeling had become a popular and growing way for many
companies to market their goods, Allbirds began assigning a “carbon
footprint” to its products months before Weil’s first interview, Leisy did not
work on the “carbon footprint” feature, and the designers who worked on the
feature never met with Weil or viewed his slides. The complaint also alleged
that Allbirds informed Weil of these facts but he persisted in his online

                                       4
harassment of Leisy, which led to her experiencing significant emotional
distress.
      Weil filed a special motion to strike each cause of action in the
complaint. (§ 425.16.) He asserted that his online statements regarding
Leisy’s theft of his design ideas arose from protected speech under section
425.16 because Allbirds, its business practices, and its well-publicized
“carbon footprint” advertising campaign were topics of public interest. Weil
also contended that Allbirds garnered media attention in 2019 concerning its
own allegations of idea theft against Amazon.com, and his statements
constituted consumer warnings. In support, Weil proffered evidence of
internet searches on major news media websites such as Bloomberg.com and
CNBC.com that yielded numerous articles about Allbirds. He also submitted
news articles that covered Allbirds’s “carbon footprint” advertising campaign,
and an article addressing Allbirds’s own criticism of Amazon.com for copying
its shoes. Additionally, Weil contended that Leisy could not establish a
probability of prevailing on her claims because, among other things, the
complaint relied on allegations that concerned only Allbirds and not Leisy
herself.
      In opposition, Leisy asserted that a general interest in Allbirds or
issues of sustainability did not support a public interest in Weil’s allegations
of design theft, and Weil’s statements did not qualify as consumer protection
because they related to Allbirds’s marketing designs and said nothing about
its products or services. She also argued she would prevail on her claims
because Weil’s statements were false and did not constitute nonactionable
opinion; Weil had no reasonable basis for believing his allegations were true;
and his conduct was outrageous. In support, Leisy submitted a declaration
stating that she helped interview Weil for a position that was not on her team

                                        5
and unrelated to her job. She also indicated that her involvement in his
recruitment was limited to a 30-minute video interview and the filling out of
a scorecard with her thoughts about the interview. As for the slides attached
to Weil’s thank you email, Leisy represented that she did not even open them
until Weil began his online harassment campaign. Leisy also detailed the
emotional toll Weil’s campaign had taken on her.
      In reply, Weil asserted for the first time that his statements were pre-
litigation communications directed towards getting Allbirds to resolve his
claims against it. He submitted a supporting declaration attesting that he
made each of his statements as a “part of [his] negotiation of claims against
Allbirds.” Weil indicated that he previously had to resort to “stating [his]
case on social media” to get entities and individuals to compensate him for
his work. As such, he contended the public communications were “intended
to give Allbirds another chance to settle and make things right.” He also
alleged that after creating the social media account, he made “thousands and
thousands” of tweets about “Allbirds [sic] actions, its IPO, related social
justice issues, and related issues in Silicon Valley regarding diversity, theft,
and even ‘brain-rape.’ ”
      The trial court denied the special motion to strike. It concluded Weil’s
statements were neither pre-litigation communications nor related to a
matter of public interest. Further, the court held Leisy established a
probability of success on her claims.
                               II.      DISCUSSION
      Weil argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his special
motion to strike because his conduct was protected under the anti-SLAPP

                                         6
statute and Leisy did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her
claims.
      A.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      The Legislature enacted section 425.16 to combat “a disturbing
increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances” (§ 425.16, subd. (a))—otherwise known as strategic lawsuits
against public participation (SLAPPs). The anti-SLAPP statute provides in
relevant part that any “cause of action against a person arising from any act
of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike,
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).)
      This language creates a “ ‘two-step process for determining whether an
action is a SLAPP.’ ” (Rivero v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps.,
AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 918 (Rivero).) “First, the defendant
must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by
section 425.16.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Section 425.16,
subdivision (e) enumerates four categories of protected conduct including, as
relevant here, communications made in connection with an issue under
consideration by a governmental proceeding; statements or writings made in
a public place or forum in connection with an issue of public interest; or any
other conduct in furtherance of petitioning or free speech activity in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Id. at subd.
(e)(2)–(e)(4).) If the defendant makes the required showing at the first step,

                                        7
the “burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by
establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, at p. 384.)
      “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP
statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even
minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.”
(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, italics omitted.) We review de
novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. (Park v. Bd. of Trustees of
California State Univ. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)
      B.    Merits of the Anti-SLAPP Motion
      Weil argues he satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis
because his statements were made in connection with an issue of public
interest or, in the alternative, that they constituted pre-litigation
communications. Next, he asserts Leisy did not demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on her claims because, among other things, many of his
statements concerned Allbirds and not Leisy or were protected statements of
opinion based on disclosed facts. We need not reach the issue of whether the
second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute was satisfied because Weil has failed
to establish his statements constitute protected activity.
            1.     Matter of Public Interest
      Weil contends the anti-SLAPP statute applies because Leisy’s claims
arise from his online communications regarding an issue of public interest—
namely, Allbirds’s theft of Weil’s designs for use in its “carbon footprint”
advertising campaign. More particularly, Weil asserts that Allbirds’s
business practices are a topic of public interest, its “carbon footprint”

                                        8
campaign received extensive media coverage, and it is an entity in the public
eye. We are not persuaded.
      To come within section 425.16, subdivision (e), the speech or activity
must be in connection with “an issue of public interest.” (§425.16, subd.
(e)(3), (e)(4).) Although the statute does not define “an issue of public
interest” (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132), the “most
commonly articulated definitions” focus on “whether (1) the subject of the
statement or activity precipitating the claim was a person or entity in the
public eye; (2) the statement or activity precipitating the claim involved
conduct that could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct
participants; and (3) whether the statement or activity precipitating the
claim involved a topic of widespread public interest . . . [and] contribute[d] to
the public debate.” (Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898
(Wilbanks).)
      Here, the statements giving rise to Leisy’s defamation and emotional
distress claims do not come within these definitions. Leisy averred that Weil
published statements on his publicly-available websites—
KateLeisyTheft.com and AllbirdsRapedMe.com—that accused her of raping
him and stealing his designs after he applied for a position at Allbirds. This
issue is not one of public interest. The record is devoid of any evidence that
Leisy, who is the subject of the statements, is a person in the public eye.
Further, any design theft she may have committed would not affect large
numbers of people, and finally, there is no indication the design features used
in Allbirds’s “carbon footprint” campaign is a topic of widespread public
interest or the subject of a public debate that was furthered by Weil’s
conduct. (See, e.g., Rivero, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 924 [holding that
statements regarding plaintiff’s supervision of eight custodians did not relate

                                        9
to an issue of public interest where plaintiff previously received no public
attention or media coverage and the only individuals affected by the situation
were plaintiff and the eight custodians].)
      Weil attempts to rely on Allbirds’s status as a public entity to
demonstrate his statements involved an issue of public interest. This
approach is misguided as the statements giving rise to Leisy’s claims are
directed towards Leisy herself and not the company as a whole. Further,
even if the subject statements related to Allbirds’s theft of Weil’s design for
its “carbon footprint” advertising campaign, there is no evidence of
widespread public interest in this issue or of anyone who would be affected by
the theft apart from Weil himself. In this regard, we agree with Leisy that
though Weil submitted news articles pertaining to Allbirds’s use of “carbon
footprint” labels on its products, any public interest in the broader issue of
carbon labeling is not tantamount to a public interest in the specific design
used in a particular labeling campaign. (See, e.g., Rand Resources, LLC v.
City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 616 [public interest in a city’s plan to
possibly build a NFL sports stadium did not equate to a public interest in the
issue of who should represent the city in its negotiations with the NFL].)
      Next, Weil asserts his statements were protected consumer warnings
because they contributed to the discussion of a matter of public interest—
namely, the business ethics of Allbirds. This argument is not well taken.
      Though Weil is correct that consumer information is generally viewed
as information concerning a matter of public interest when it affects a large
number of persons (see Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 898), he
erroneously focuses again on the business practices of Allbirds when the
statements giving rise to Leisy’s claims relate only to her purported theft of
Weil’s design ideas after she interviewed him. Nothing in the record

                                       10
indicates that Leisy is a business entity or that she has any customers. As
such, the facts here are starkly different than those in the consumer
information cases relied on by Weil, such as Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145, Summit Bank v. Rogers (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 669,
694, ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1008,
Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 23, and Wong v. Jing (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 1354, 1367, where the plaintiff either owned the business, was a
business, or provided services to the public.
      Lastly, Weil asserts his online campaign was not merely about a
private dispute, but was a public protest connected to an issue of public
interest. In support, he relies on Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238
(Geiser), where the California Supreme Court reversed an appellate court
determination that a protest outside of a housing developer’s home concerned
only a private dispute. Weil’s reliance on Geiser is misplaced. There, two
homeowners whose house was foreclosed on by a development company
sought the assistance of an organization whose mission was “ ‘to save homes
from foreclosures’ ” and to “ ‘fight against the displacement of long-term
residents.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1243–1244.) Activists with this organization engaged
in various forms of public protest to help the homeowners repurchase their
home. (Id. at p. 1244.) These efforts culminated in a demonstration outside
the home of the CEO of the development company where 25 to 30 people
gathered to protest the unfair and deceptive practices used by the company to
acquire the property and evict the homeowners. (Id. at p. 1245.) The Court
of Appeal held this activity was not protected because, among other things,
the motivation for the protests were purely personal and did not address any
societal issues of residential displacement. (Id. at pp. 1246–1247.) Our high
court disagreed. (Id. at p. 1243.)

                                       11
      In reversing the Court of Appeal’s decision, the California Supreme
Court set forth the two-step inquiry it established in FilmOn.com Inc. v.
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn) for determining if activity
from which a lawsuit arises falls within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4)’s
protection of “other conduct” in furtherance of free speech or petitioning
activity in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.
(Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1243.) Under that framework, “first, we ask
what public issue or issues the challenged activity implicates, and second, we
ask whether the challenged activity contributes to public discussion of any
such issue.” (Ibid.) With respect to the first step, Geiser stated: “FilmOn’s
first step is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered
in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public
issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute. Only when an expressive
activity, viewed in context, cannot reasonably be understood as implicating a
public issue does an anti-SLAPP motion fail at FilmOn’s first step.” (Id. at
pp. 1253–1254, italics added.) Our high court then concluded that in the
matter before it, the first step was satisfied because an objective observer
could reasonably understand the sidewalk protest in front of the developer’s
home to implicate the public issues of unfair foreclosure and residential
displacement practices, even if it stemmed from the homeowners’ personal
interest in regaining their property. (Id. at pp. 1254–1255.) Among other
things, the court noted that an observer of the protest stated in his
declaration that the purpose of the demonstration was to protest unfair and
deceptive practices used by the development company. (Id. at p. 1251.)
Further, the involvement of a housing advocacy organization in the protest
clearly indicated the organization viewed the homeowners’ situation as an
opportunity to further its mission, and there were 25 to 30 other individuals

                                       12
involved in the protest who had no apparent connection with the
homeowners. (Ibid.)
      Here, in contrast, neither the speech nor the context in which it arose
suggests that public issues were involved. Though Weil attempts to frame
his online communications and physical protests as implicating Allbirds’s
business practices as a whole, an objective observer of the statements he
posted on his Twitter account and the websites attacking Leisy make clear
that what is at issue is Weil’s personal grievance that Leisy and/or Allbirds
stole his design and work. For example, relative to Allbirds, Weil tweeted
messages such as: “The idea for the carbon footprint score came from me!
THEY RAPED AND ROBBED ME” and “I applied for a job at @allbirds and
they raped me, then robbed me. Stole my design and work! #rapedmybrain.”
With respect to Leisy, the connection to Allbirds’s business practices is even
more attenuated, with Allbirds being referenced only in the context of
employing Leisy, who purportedly stole Weil’s work.
      We therefore conclude that Weil’s accusations of Allbirds’s and/or
Leisy’s design theft cannot reasonably be understood as implicating a public
issue. Further, any attempt by Weil to connect this grievance to any broader
issues relating to the ethics of Allbirds’s business practices is a textbook
example of a “synecdoche theory” of public interest whereby a defendant
attempts to define his or her narrow dispute by its slight reference to a
broader public issue, a practice the California Supreme Court has expressly
frowned upon. (See FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 152; Rand Resources, LLC
v. City of Carson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 625 [rejecting “fleeting or tangential”
connections between challenged conduct and issue of public interest because
“[a]t a sufficiently high level of generalization, any conduct can appear
rationally related to a broader issue of public importance”].)

                                       13
      In sum, Weil has failed to establish Leisy’s claims arise from an issue of
public interest under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) or (e)(4).
             2.    Pre-Litigation Communication
      Weil additionally contends his communications were protected because
they were part of his pre-litigation efforts to resolve his claims against
Allbirds. In support, he points out that many of the communications alleged
in the complaint directly reference impending litigation, including: “Hi, nice
to meet. I was raped, robbed, and threatened with false charges by @allbirds.
#rapedmybrain #stolemywork”; “You lie under oath, you go to jail”;
“Subpoena of IP address in Santa Rosa Beach. So many visits, has to be
related or the guilty party”; and “Allbirds . . . had over 6 months to settle . . .
Instead, [they] promote[d] the thief, gasli[t] and threaten[ed] to sue . . . for
extortion.” Weil’s argument lacks merit.
      Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) protects statements made in
connection with an issue “under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law.” This subdivision’s protection extends to communications concerning the
subject of the dispute and made “ ‘in anticipation of litigation “contemplated
in good faith and under serious consideration.” ’ ” (Neville v. Chudacoff
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1268.) Examples of protected prelitigation
communications include prelitigation demand letters (Malin v. Singer (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1293); intent to sue notices (CKE Restaurants, Inc. v.
Moore (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 262, 265); and statements asserting a
particular legal position and threatening litigation, followed soon thereafter
by the filing of a lawsuit (Digerati Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Ent., LLC
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 873, 888).

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      Weil has failed to demonstrate the communications at issue fall into
these or similar categories. Nor does he establish his statements were made
in anticipation of litigation against Leisy that was contemplated in good faith
and under serious consideration. (See Neville v. Chudacoff, supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at p. 1268.) In fact, Weil does not direct us to any evidence in
the record that he had any serious intentions to sue Leisy directly. As Leisy
points out, Weil’s initial demand letter from June 22, 2020 threatened public
defamation, rather than a lawsuit. Specifically, he wrote: “Weil has
registered the domain www.allbirdstheft.com to tell his story publicly. We
hope that the parties can reach an equitable resolution before the site goes
live.” Further, the demand letter was not addressed to Leisy but to Allbirds,
thus demonstrating that even if litigation was contemplated, it was directed
towards the company and not towards Leisy herself. Additionally, Weil’s
statements did not assert a particular legal position and threaten litigation
followed by a lawsuit. Instead, Weil messaged Leisy’s friends, professional
contacts and family referencing her purported theft. Finally, there were no
real “intent to sue notices” to speak of when Weil registered two additional
websites (AllbirdsRapedMe.com and KateLeisyTheft.com), both alleging that
an “Allbirds designer (Kate Leisy) stole [Weil’s] work, [and] product ideas.”
Rather, these behaviors and online posts continued for several months
without any serious attempts by Weil to file anything in court. As such, Weil
fails to demonstrate his communications were pre-litigation communications
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
                              III.   DISPOSITION
      The order denying Weil’s special motion to strike is affirmed. Leisy is
entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

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                                              LANGHORNE WILSON, J

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

CASTRO, J.

A164066


 Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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