Court Opinion

ID: 9628679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:29:00.818866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:24.987505
License: Public Domain

BERRY, Justice
(dissenting).
As I read the provision of testator’s will which is in controversy, it is clear that in the event his wife survived him, testator intended to’ create a life estate in his wife in the property in -controversy and a contingent remainder in his children and grandchildren. The interest of testator’s children in the property was wholly contingent upon their surviving the life tenant who was their mother. The interest of the grand•children was wholly contingent upon their parent, who was a contingent remainder-man, predeceasing the life tenant. In view of the fact that the grantor (Relia Z. Riddle) of the deed in controversy died prior to the death of the life tenant, the contingent interest resting in Relia never came into being and to the contrary, upon her death, said interest vested in her children who took the interest not as grantor’s heirs but as contingent remaindermen under testator’s will.
At p. 500 of “Patton on Titles”, it is said that “when a contingent remainder is transferred, it is, of course, subject to the same contingencies in the hands of the assignee as it was before * * At p. 617, Sec. 150, 33 Am.Jur. “Life Estate and Remainders”, it is said that “While a contingent remainder may, by statute, be transferred by a warranty deed so as to vest the title in the grantee, where the grantor of such an interest dies before the contingency happens upon which the estate is to vest, nothing passes by the deed.”
If the provisions of the will and deed alone are considered, it is clear that Rella’s grantee (Cecil D. Jay) only took Rella’s contingent interest in the property which interest expired upon Rella’s dying prior to the life tenant’s death. It follows that if Rella’s grantee is to prevail herein, it must be on the theory that the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment or the rule of after-acquired title served to create a title in him and served to vest in him an interest that he otherwise would not have.
The doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment is not applicable. The deed in controversy was executed in 1915 and the probate proceeding in which the final decree was rendered was not instituted until the 1920’s, which means that Rella’s grantee acquired his' asserted title before and not after the proceedings to probate the will were instituted. In Morrissey v. Shriver et al., 88 Okl. 269, 214 P. 702, this .was said in the second paragraph of the syllabus:
“The general rule is that no one, except the parties and their privies, is bound by a judgment and a party is not *1078a privy to a judgment involving property or a right, unless he ácquires his interest either after suit is brought in which the title or right is involved, or after judgment was rendered.”
Under “Judgment”, Vol. 9, West’s Okla.Dig., a number of cases to the same effect as the foregoing case are cited.
A person who is not bound by a judgment cannot, as a general rule, urge the judgment as res judicata. This is said in the 7th paragraph of the syllabus to De Watteville et al. v. Sims, 44 Okl. 708, 146 P. 224:
“A person who would not have been bound by a judgment against the party in whose favor it was-rendered cannot, as a general rule, avail himself of such judgment as res judicata, as such judgment is ordinarily wanting in the requisite mutuality of effect upon the person pleading and the person against whom it is plead.”
See also 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 756, p. 275.
If the converse of the situation before us were presented, it would be clear that the final decree would not conclude Rella’s grantee. In brief, if testator had bequeathed to Relia vested remainder and the county court had construed testator’s will as bequeathing only a contingent remainder, the decree would not be binding upon Rella’s grantee and serve to destroy the interest that Relia conveyed to him. Since the decree is not binding upon the grantee as a stranger to the probate proceeding, he is not in a position to assert the final decree as res judicata.
In the fourteenth paragraph of the syllabus to Cressler v. Brown et al., 79 Okl. 170, 192 P. 417, 418, this was said:
“The general rule is that estoppel by judgment must be mutual.”
Also see 30A Am.Jur. “Judgments”, Sec. 392, p. 440, where it is said that “The general rule is that an estoppel resulting from a judgment is equally available to either party in a subsequent action. * * * The requirement of mutuality has also been stated in the form that no party is bound in a subsequent suit by a judgment, unless the adverse party, now seeking to secure the benefit of the former adjudication, would have been prejudiced by it if it had been determined the other way.” And see 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 789, p. 327.
It is apparent to me that under the facts of this case, Rella’s grantee is not in a position to urge that the final decree estops Rella’s children from asserting their interest in the property in controversy.
To my way of thinking, the rule of after acquired is not applicable under the facts of 'this case. The referred-to rule is based upon an estoppel (see cases cited under “Estoppel”, Vol. 6A, West’s Okl.Dig. and 16 Am.Jur.,' “Deeds”, Sec. 340, p. 632) which arises where a grantor (1) conveys a certain interest and (2) covenants that he is seized of said interest. It is the grantor and those that claim by, through or under him that are estopped and not persons who do not so claim. As heretofore pointed out, Rella’s children claim under testator’s will and not as the heirs of Relia. At 4 Am. Jur., “Assignments”, Sec. 60, p. 277, this is said:
“ * * * A transfer of an expectancy has been held binding on the heirs of the grantor. But where the one making the transfer dies before his ancestor, the transfer is not valid as against his heirs, who, in such case, take as heirs of the ancestor, and not as heirs of the grantor.”
In Nix v. Brogan et al., 118 Okl. 62, 251 P. 753, we said in the third paragraph of the syllabus that “The general rule-is that the law will impute notice and knowledge to a party of the conditions of instruments under which he holds or claims title.” I am, therefore, of the opinion that Rella’s grantee is charged with the provisions of the will, which will forms the basis of Rella’s asserted title to the property in question. If this Court were to adhere to the rule that subsequently acquired title will not inure to the benefit of a grantee who knew of the deficiencies in his grantor’s title (31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 21, p. 205) Rella’s grantee could not in any event rely upon the Final, Decree as creating title in Relia.
*1079I am of the conviction that Jay as Rella’s .grantee cannot, for reasons given, base his asserted interest in the property in controversy on the Final Decree rendered in the probate proceeding. To my way of thinking, the only interest that Jay acquired in the property was Rella’s interest therein at the time she made a deed to him. Her interest at said time was wholly contingent upon her surviving the life tenant, and since she predeceased the life tenant, her interest and that of Jay terminated. Rella’s •death, prior to that of the life tenant, was the event that caused the interest that she would have taken had she lived to pass to her children, not as her heirs but as contingent remaindermen under the provisions ■of testator’s will.
I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justices WELCH and JOHNSON concur in the views herein expressed.