Court Opinion

ID: 9584418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:47:56.709267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:45.157188
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully in Division 1 of the majority opinion, but respectfully dissent to Division 2. As the majority correctly points out, an owner’s surrender of the work site to an independent contractor will absolve it of liability. Torrington Co. v. Hill, 219 Ga. App. 453, 455-456 (465 SE2d 447) (1995). Nonetheless, I am unconvinced that no issue of fact remains on such issue, i.e., the record shows that the work of general contractor KW&P proceeded in the presence of senior AT Plastics personnel; that, among other responsibilities, AT Plastics’ site manager had overall responsibility for safety on the work *890site; and that questions concerning the installation of the press,, whether from the general contractor or its subcontractors, were directed to AT Plastics’ site manager or his on-site engineering process manager. Rozier, in effect, corroborated such a standard operating procedure, deposing that he and one of KW&P’s site supervisors had approached AT Plastics about the desirability of putting feet on the press.
Neither am I able to conclude that no issue of fact remains as to whether the accident could have been prevented if Dyer had read Wabash’s operating instructions and warnings. While Dyer’s extensive deposition testimony may be deemed contradictory as to whether and to what extent he would have heeded the installation instructions for the press had AT Plastics provided them to him, Dyer ultimately deposed that he would have done so to the extent possible. Such response from Dyer, a reluctant witness who obviously took pride in his considerable experience as a pipefitter, reasonably explained the whole of his testimony as contradictory. See Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 (343 SE2d 680) (1986) (if reasonable explanation offered for contradictory testimony, such testimony not construed against the party-witness). Therefore, AT Plastics’ failure to provide Dyer the operation and installation manual for the press cannot, as a matter of law, be foreclosed as concurrently causing Dyer’s injuries.
In sum, the grant of summary judgment to AT Plastics, in my view, was error and must be reversed. “A de novo standard of review applies from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga. App. 459 (1) (486 SE2d 684) (1997).
I am authorized to state that Judge Barnes and Senior Appellate Judge Pope join in this opinion.