Court Opinion

ID: 9515024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:53:10.81534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:24.121670
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent. The best interests of the child as an individual person has been, and should continue to be, the standard by which child custody determinations are to be made by a trial court.
[¶ 27.] The trial court concluded that it was in Christian’s individual best interest to change his custody to his father, Jody. It also concluded that there was no compelling reason to separate Christian from his half-brother Michael. As a result, it ultimately concluded that it was in the best interests of both siblings to remain in their mother’s custody. The. trial court’s two conclusions regarding Christian’s best interests are inconsistent with each other. Accordingly, the case should be reversed and remanded.
[¶ 28.] Court involvement and supervision in child custody determination dates back to our very first territorial code:
In an action for divorce, the court may, before or after judgment, give such direction for the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or proper, and may at any time vacate or modify the same.
1877 Dakota Territorial Civil Code § 72 (emphasis added). Although the specific language of the statute placed no express limits on judicial discretion, the earliest cases on this issue clearly declare that the best interests of the child are controlling as “[t]he rights of either or both parents are subservient to- those of the child.” Wallace v. Wallace, 26 S.D. 229, 235, 128 N.W. 143, 145 (1910).
In a divorce cáse the children are, and continue to be virtually wards of the court. It is the welfare of the children that the court is concerned with, not the wishes of either of the parents[.]
Houghton v. Houghton, 37 S.D. 184-89, 157 N.W. 316, 317 (1916) (internal citation omitted).
[¶ 29.] Beginning with Mayer v. Mayer, 397 N.W.2d 638, 642 (S.D.1986), this Court declared, “[i]t is universally recognized that in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, the best interest of siblings require that they be raised together whenever possible.” See also Adam v. Adam, 436 N.W.2d 266 (S.D.1989); Olson v. Olson, 438 N.W.2d 544 (S.D.1989); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 444 N.W.2d 367 (S.D.1989). This doctrine was epcpanded to include half-siblings. Friendshuh v. Headlough, 504 N.W.2d 104 (S.D.1993). Finally, in Mitzel v. Black Cloud-Walberg, 511 N.W.2d 816 (S.D.1994), in a 3-2 decision issued on February 2, 1994, this Court held that the no split siblings rule had been violated because while the trial court found that “unique” circumstances existed for splitting half-siblings, “'[u]nique’ does not equate with ‘compelling.’ ” Mitzel, 511 N.W.2d at 818.
[¶ 30.] It is not mere coincidence that the 1994 Legislature amended SDCL 25-*3544-45 for the first time since its enactment back in 1877.
In such action for divorce, the court may, before or after judgment, give such direction for the custody, care, and education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or proper, and may at any time, vacate or modify the same. In awarding the custody of a child, the court shall be guided by consideration of what appears to be for the best interests of the child in respect to the child’s temporal and mental and moral welfare. If a child is of a sufficient age to form an intelligent preference, the court may consider that preference in determining the question. As between parents adversely claiming the custody, neither parent may be given preference over the other in determining custody.
1994 SDSessL ch 192 (emphasis added). Relevant to this case are three important changes brought forth by this amendment. First, the best interests of the child standard is now codified. Second, the word “children” in the plural which was previously used in this code section, now becomes “child” in the singular. Third, there is no codification of the “compelling interests” rule that became ever more pervasive since our 1986 Mayer decision. Thus, this is a clear legislative mandate that a determination of the best interests of a child is to be based solely on that child’s interests alone and not blended into what may or may not be the best interests of other children of the marriage or relationships.
[¶ 31.] “The primary determination in a custody dispute is to ascertain the best interest of the child.” Price v. Price, 2000 SD 64, ¶ 18, 611 N.W.2d 425, 430. “Trial courts possess broad discretion in deciding the best interests of a child; their decisions will only be disturbed upon a finding of abuse of discretion.” Fuerstenberg v. Fuerstenberg, 1999 SD 35, ¶ 22, 591 N.W.2d 798, 807.
[¶ 32.] “Although keeping siblings together is generally considered to be the better practice, the effect of separating siblings from each other is just one of several factors courts consider in determining the best interests of the children.” Pace v. Pace, 22 P.3d 861, 867-68 (Wyo.2001). These factors include: 1) parental fitness; 2) stability; 3) primary caretaker; 4) child’s preference; 5) harmful parental misconduct; 6) separation of siblings; and 7) change in circumstances, substantial or otherwise. Price, 2000 SD 64 at ¶ 18, 611 N.W.2d at 430. Thus, the general rule against splitting siblings cannot be elevated above all factors, but must be weighed in conjunction with them. Crouse v. Crouse, 552 N.W.2d 413, 419 (S.D.1996). “Keeping siblings together is a splendid aspiration, but it cannot override the controlling questions of their best interests.” Id.
[¶ 33.] Here the trial court concluded that there had been a substantial change in circumstances and that Christian’s best interests were served by awarding custody to his father. It then concluded that it was in the best interests of both half-siblings to remain with their mother. It, in effect, used the general rule against splitting custody to trump what it determined was Christian’s best interest. If it was, in fact, in Christian’s best interest to be in his father’s care, that provides the compelling reason to split custody. As merely one factor in determining a child’s best interest, the general rule against splitting siblings, “must yield to the paramount principle that the best interests of each individual child must be the determining factor in custody decisions.” Haag v. Haag, 336 Pa.Super. 491, 485 A.2d 1189, 1193 (1984).
*355[¶ 34.] A rule adopted with good intentions to be a guide to trial courts as to what constitutes the best interests of an individual child has now taken on a life of its own. Rather than the flexible analytical tool it was intended to be, it now has become a wooden barrier that must be vaulted before the best interests of the child can be addressed.
[¶ 35.] When applied to today’s world of “his kids, her kids, their kids,” either in and out of a marriage setting, it becomes even more unworkable. “Importantly, the traditional ‘Cleaver’ family is becoming less and less common in contemporary society. As society changes, some of our laws become antiquated and fail to provide just results.” Meldrum v. Novotny, 2002 SD 15, ¶ 66, 640 N.W.2d 460, 473 (Amundson, J., concurring specially).
[¶ 36.]’ We will never get a clearer example of the negative effect this rule now exercises on the best interests of the child than in this case. The trial court found:
The [c]ourt determines that it is in Christian’s, individually, best interest that custody be changed to his father Jody Bergheim, but that [it] is in the best interest of Michael McComish, individually, to remain with his mother, Heather Hathaway.
The [c]ourt determines that there are no compelling reasons to separate the siblings, Christian Richard Bergheim and Michael Thomas McComish. Therefore, it is in the best interest of both children as siblings to remain in the custody of their mother, Heather Hathaway.
[¶ 37.] This “rule” now violates the directions of SDCL 25-4-45 and its standard of best interests of the child. It is the best interests of Christian and Christian alone that control where he should reside, not Christian and “his kids, her kids and their kids.” Admittedly, the current state of the “no split siblings” rule can free the trial courts from having to make difficult custody decisions that require the wisdom of Solomon. It is certainly much easier to determine: 1) are there siblings or half-siblings and, if so, 2) are there compelling reasons to split them? However, as the children are wards of the court, the goal should not be bright line rules, but rather a consistent, although at times difficult, determination of what constitutes the best interests of the child.
[¶ 38.] In this case, the order appealed from should be reversed and the case remanded for a redetermination of Christian’s best interest, giving the separation of siblings’ issue its proper weight and no more. For the above reasons I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 39.] GORS, Acting Justice, joins this dissent.