Court Opinion

ID: 9827199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:16:29.918335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:26.071123
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
At a former day, this cause was reversed and the injunction granted by the district 1 court dissolved. Appellees have filed a motion for rehearing alleging error:
First. That this court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal, for the reason that the appeal bond of appellants was defective in several particulars set out in the motion. They particularly objected to the sufficiency of the bond on the ground that Tyler county school district No. 40 was not named as one of the payees in .the bond. Tyler county school district No. 40 was not a party to the suit. It is not named as plaintiff in the petition. The objection to the bond that same is not made payable to the county school board of Tyler county is without force. The record discloses that plaintiffs, without objection on the part of appellants, dismissed their suit as to said party. Furthermore, without discussing the other objections offered by appellees to said bond, we think appellees are not in position to insist upon any of their objections to said bond. The transcript herein was filed in this court November 16, 1922. By agreement of .the parties, the cause was advanced, and on December 21, 1922, was submitted on briefs and oral arguments for both parties, and judgment rendered January 4, 1923. No motion was made to dismiss for want of proper bond, nor was the jurisdiction of this court in any way questioned until this motion for rehearing was filed herein by appellees. The objection to the bond, if at all well taken, comes too late. Court of Civil Appeals Rules 8 and 9 (142 S. W. xi); Gilbough v. Stahl Building Co., 91 Tex. 621, 45 S. W. 385; Hugo v. Seffel, 92 Tex. 414, 49 S. W. 369; Richer Lee & Co. v. Collins, 81 Tex. 662, 17 S. W. 378.
What we have said here disposes of ap-pellees’ third allegation of error.
Second. Appellees insist that we erred in rendering judgment against them and generally for appellants dissolving the injunction, because school district No. 2 of Hardin county and Hardin County State Bank, defendants below, failed to give notice .of appeal, and not having given notice of appeal, were not entitled to relief, and that as to them the judgment should be affirmed.
It is true that the transcript does not show that said defendants gave notice of appeal, but same was not called to our attention until in this motion for rehearing by appellees. As' a matter of fact, they did give notice of appeal, as is shown by a certified copy of the entry on the judge’s trial docket made by the trial judge at the time of the rendition of the judgment, and as is also shown by the affidavit of the attorney who tried the case for defendants, both of which are attached to appellants’ answer to appellees’ motion for rehearing, and asked to be considered in connection with and in supplement to the transcript here. The certificate of the clerk of the trial court to the entries on the judge’s *731trial docket is regular, and the entry made by the trial judge shows:
“All parties announced ready. Demurrers heard and taken with case, on full hearing defendants’ exceptions overruled and judgment for plaintiff, to all of which defendants except and in open court give notice of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Ninth Supreme Judicial District, at Beaumont, Tex.”
Counsel for appellants in their answer to the motion for rehearing, state that the judgment of the trial court was prepared by the attorneys for appellees on the eve of adjournment of the court for the term, and that the attorneys for appellants resided in another county, and not having been furnished with a copy of the judgment, were not aware that such omission appeared in the judgment until after the court adjourned for the term, but that it was understood and agreed that the judgment should show that all the defendants excepted thereto and gave notice of appeal, and that, in fact, such notice was given. The judgment as drawn and entered of record specified the names of the defendants that excepted to the judgment, and gave notice of appeal, but omitted to name Hardin county school district No. 2 and Hardin County State Bank. The entry on the trial docket, however, shows that all the defendants, in fact, excepted to the judgment and gave notice of appeal, and therefore were properly before this court and entitled to the relief granted. The jurisdiction of this court depends upon the fact that notice of appeal was actually given and not upon the record of such fact. Vernon’s Sayles’ Civil Statutes, art. 1593; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. O’Keefe, 87 Tex. 423, 28 S. W. 945; Gilbough v. Building Co., 91 Tex. 621, 45 S. W. 385; Williams v. Knight Realty Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 217 S. W. 755-757; Luse v. Parmer (Tex. Civ. App.) 221 S. W. 1031; Maury v. Turner (Tex. Com. App.) 244 S. W. 809.
Moreover, whatever may be said as to the failure of the defendants, Hardin county school district No. 2 and Hardin County State Bank, to give notice of appeal (the perfected record shows such notice was, in fact, given), but if said defendants had not given such notice and had in no manner attempted to appeal from said judgment, still the judgment against them could not be affirmed, for there was but one question, one issue in litigation, and that was the validity of the so-called consolidated county line school district. It was the only question in which any of the parties litigant was interested, and its determination affected all of one side or the other alike. The interest of the parties defendant was not severable, and hence the judgment was an entire and inseparable judgment, and if any one of the parties defendant appealed and obtained judgment favorable to the one appealing, it operated as a reversal as to all of the defendants. Vernon’s Sayles’ Civil Statutes, art. 1997; Burleson v. Henderson, 4 Tex. 49; Dickson v. Burke, 28 Tex. 117; Brown v. Robertson, 28 Tex. 555; Tynberg v. Cohen, 76 Tex. 409, 13 S. W. 315; Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 565, 11 S. W. 548; Thompson v. Kelley, 100 Tex. 539, 101 S. W. 1074; Nasworthy v. Draper, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 650, 29 S. W. 557; Reed v. Cavitt, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 373, 30 S. W. 575; Ferguson v. Dickinson (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 221; Telegraph Co. v. Dong (Tex. Civ. App.) 183 S. W. 421.
Fourth. Appellees vigorously insist that we erred in holding that the only way in which county line school districts could be consolidated was in the manner pointed out in our original opinion, and also erred in holding that “the law has never given the local trustees of school districts the power to alter or change their districts or to consolidate them,” ;as was attempted in the instant case; appellees insisting that such consolidation could be had by the agreement of the trustees of the districts , sought to be consolidated, asserting that “the second way of consolidating districts is set forth in section 54, bulletin 48, of the School Daws of Texas, being article 2762 of Vernon’s Sayles’ Civil Statutes,’’ and quotes the same as follows:
“By agreement of trustees, except as herein provided, no part of the school fund apportioned to any district or county shall be transferred to any other district or county; provided, that districts lying in two or more counties and situated on the county line, may be consolidated for the support of one or more schools in such consolidated district; and, in such case, the school funds shall be transferred to the county in which the principal school building for such consolidated district is located; and provided, further, that all the children residing in a school district may be transferred to another district, or to an independent district, upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the trustees of said districts interested.”
Appellees strongly contend that—
“The above article clearly confers upon the trustees of said districts, to, by agreement, consolidate such districts for the purpose of maintaining one or more schools, etc.”
We have not been favored with a copy of “Bulletin 48 of the School Daws of the State of Texas,” section 54 of which purports to be article 2762 of the Revised Civil Statutes, nor do we know by whom or by what authority same was issued; but we will say that there is no such article in the Revised Statutes as is quoted by appellees and claimed to be article 2762, Vernon’s Sayles’ Civil Statutes. Article 2762 is section 92 of the Acts of 1905 (Gammel’s Daws, vol. 12, p. 288), and does not contain the words “by agreement of trustees,” beginning the article as quoted by ’appellees. It is true that in the Revised Statutes there is a headline to said article *732reading that way, but same is no part of the article itself, never was, and the headline, we take it, was placed there by the publisher merely to call attention to the provision in said article permitting the transfer of funds and children from one district to another. Furthermore, the article, 2762, does not even attempt to provide for the consolidation of county line school districts, hut merely deals with the transfer of school children and school funds from one district to another “upon such terms as may he agreed upon by the trustees of said districts interested,” and not in any way affecting or providing for the consolidation of districts.
No error having been shown, the motion is overruled.