Court Opinion

ID: 9517920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:36:59.219726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:00.131025
License: Public Domain

GARIBALDI, J.,
dissenting.
I would reverse, not because I disagree with the majority’s basic assumption that an unmarried cohabitant will not suffer the same *116emotional distress at the tragic death of her companion that she would have suffered if she were married to the victim of a fatal accident, but because I perceive no sufficiently limiting principle in the majority’s standard for deciding who qualifies as an intimate family member. I do not doubt that many couples who live together without formal marriage are bound by “emotional ties as strong as those that bind formally married partners.” Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal.3d 267, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 258, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (1988). Yet, “The same would often be true of very close friends.” Ibid. A demonstrable strength of emotional ties and a real potentiality of severe emotional trauma, however, do not and should not end our inquiry.
For example, in Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980), we held that to maintain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress a parent actually had to witness the accident that had resulted in her son’s death. We did not believe that Mrs. Portee would not have experienced severe emotional trauma had she only heard an account of the tragic accident that befell her son. Rather, we recognized that the class of persons able to recover for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander had to be limited. We, therefore, set forth a four-factor test that a bystander-claimant would have to demonstrate to prevail: “(1) the death or serious physical injury of another caused by defendant’s negligence; (2) a marital or intimate, familial relationship between the plaintiff and the injured person; (3) observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and (4) resulting severe emotional distress.” 84 N.J. at 101, 417 A.2d 521.
In developing the Portee test, we relied on the decision of the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968). As the dissent below correctly noted, the California Supreme Court “has since rejected an expansion of the cause of action to a cohabitant relationship with similarities to a marital relationship.” 261 N.J.Super. at 125, 617 A.2d 1248 (Muir, J.AD., dissenting); see Elden, supra, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582 (holding that unmarried cohabitant could *117not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress as bystander). In its decision today, the majority attempts to distinguish our experience in New Jersey from the California experience by noting that “[a]fter Dillon, California courts had expanded nearly all the boundaries of liability set out in the several prongs of the Dillon analysis.” Ante at 105, 642 A.2d at 375.
I agree that we have hitherto construed all the elements of the DiUon-Portee test narrowly. Unlike the majority, I would continue to do so. I believe that the majority’s opinion will substantially expand the numbers of those seeking recovery for bystander emotional distress. I perceive no public policy reason to support such an increase. Moreover, I think it will cause confusion in many other areas of the law in which spouses continue to be treated differently from unmarried cohabitants.
I
The Elden majority determined that courts must draw a bright line to limit the scope of liability of a negligent actor. As the Elden Court stated, no principled distinction exists between de facto spouses, de facto siblings, de facto parents, de facto grandparents, or defacto children. 250 Cal.Rptr. at 260-61, 758 P.2d at 588. “The ‘problems of multiplication of actions and damages’ [sic] that would result from such an extension of liability would place an intolerable burden on society.” Ibid (quoting Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 308, 563 P.2d 858, 864 (1977)).
Where we draw the line is “ultimately a question of fairness.” Portee, supra, 84 N.J. at 101, 417 A.2d 521 (quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291 (1962)). The proper analysis should include a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution. Goldberg, supra, 38 N.J. at 583, 186 A.2d 291. We should adopt a rule that clearly delineates the scope of liability and clearly defines those persons who may seek redress within the judicial system. Although such a rule of thumb should guide the *118Court in its analysis of all common-law causes of action, the Court should apply it with added vigor in the context of causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because emotional injuries, unlike physical injuries, are hard to define and the number of potential claimants is virtually limitless.
The majority thinks that excluding unmarried cohabitants from the class of eligible plaintiffs for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress is arbitrary line-drawing. I agree, but a certain degree of arbitrariness is necessary in setting the outer limits of tort liability in general and in setting the outer limits of liability in the field of emotional distress in particular. As Justice Pollock reminded us in Frame v. Kothari, 115 N.J. 638, 649, 560 A.2d 675 (1989), “Whenever a court draws lines, it risks the criticism of arbitrariness. Drawing lines, however, is the business of the courts and lines must be drawn to provide remedies for wrongs without exposing wrongdoers to unlimited liability.”
Moreover, “Everyone is subject to injury, disease, and death. Common experience teaches that the injury or death of one member of a family often produces severe emotional distress in another family member.” Id. at 642, 560 A.2d 675. Yet, Portee arbitrarily required that to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs had to be actual bystanders to the death or injury of another. Does anyone believe that a mother who is told that her child was killed crossing the street, or that a mother who witnesses the prolonged agony of her child dying as a result of a car accident that she did not see, suffers less emotional distress than the mother who was present at the scene of the accident?
We limit recovery to actual bystanders because
[e]motional distress is an intangible condition experienced by most persons, even absent negligence, at some time during their lives. Close relatives suffer serious, even debilitating, emotional reactions to the injury, death, serious illness, and evident suffering of loved ones____ That relative will have severe emotional distress is an unavoidable aspect of the “human condition”. * * * The overwhelming majority of “emotional distress” [that] we endure, therefore, is not compensable.
*119[Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 880, 771 P.2d 814, 828-829 (1989).]
As defendant aptly points out, however, wherever the line is drawn, one can always find someone outside the line who arguably should be inside. For instance, if engaged cohabitants may recover, one could argue that engaged couples who do not cohabitate also should be allowed to recover. One could also argue that lifelong friends also should be allowed to recover? However, allowing such recovery would bring us closer to limitless liability, which we reject.
II
I believe, as did the dissenting judge below, that Portee meant to limit the class of plaintiffs eligible to recover for bystander emotional distress to those bystanders with a marital or blood relationship to the victim of the accident. Indeed, the plain language of Portee, “marital or intimate familial relationship,” 84 N.J. at 101, 417 A.2d 521 (emphasis added), supports that interpretation. In fact, most of the cases have interpreted the DillonPortee “marital or intimate familial relationship” requirement as referring only to close relatives or immediate family members. E.g., Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., 239 N.J.Super. 312, 327, 571 A.2d 318 (App.Div.) (interpreting Portee as holding that “a bystander may not recover damages for emotional distress unless he has been present and has observed the actual injury inflicted on a member of his family”), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 188, 584 A.2d 248 (1990); Henderson v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 198 N.J.Super. 418, 431, 487 A.2d 742 (App.Div.) (noting that “[t]he remedy afforded by Portee v. Jaffee is clearly designed to provide a recovery for plaintiffs emotional distress resulting from the death or serious bodily injury to a close relative”), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 250, 501 A.2d 922 (1985); Eyrich ex rel Eyrich v. Dam, 193 N.J.Super. 244, 473 A.2d 539 (App.Div.) (holding that close friend and neighbor of young child killed by circus leopard when entrusted to her care could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 583, 483 A.2d 127 (1984).
*120III
In addition to limiting the scope of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, other valid public policy reasons argue in favor of excluding unmarried cohabitants from the class of persons eligible to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Drawing the line at marriage conforms to the general expectation of society as reflected in the statutes of New Jersey that spouses shoúld be treated differently than unmarried cohabitants. The New Jersey Legislature abolished common-law marriage in 1937. See N.J.S.A 37:1-10. Although social mores have changed since 1937, the Legislature has not reauthorized common-law marriage. Thus, the legal distinction between the duties and responsibilities of married and unmarried cohabitants remains. Moreover, the underlying rationale for the abolishment of common-law marriage still exists:
Inherent in the common law marriage are a non-recognition of the legal process, and a lack of commitment which often gives rise to an impermanent and ephemeral arrangement, such that economic support, let alone dependency, may be withheld randomly. The union, which in the eyes of the public remains an uncertainty, may dissolve at any time. Such a couple may not both use an identical surname, file joint tax returns, or be deemed an entity for census-taking, welfare or social security eligibility.
[Parkinson v. J. & S. Tool Co., 64 N.J. 159, 163, 313 A.2d 609 (1974).]
Thus, unmarried cohabitants, regardless of their demonstrable level of commitment for one another, continue to be treated differently than spouses for the purposes of the administration of benefits under workers’ compensation and insurance policies.
The distinction between the treatment of spouses and unmarried cohabitants is apparent in other areas of the law. For example, unlike spouses, unmarried cohabitants cannot inherit by intestate succession. N.J.S.A. 3B:5-3; see Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 541, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982) (declining to find wife-in-fact to be “heir”). Unmarried cohabitants also are not allowed to recover for wrongful death under N.J.S.A 2A:31-4, the Wrongful Death Act. See Sykes v. Propane Power Corp., 224 N.J.Super. 686, 697, 541 A.2d 271 (App.Div.1988) (holding that plaintiffs status as unmarried cohabitant barred her claim for wrongful *121death); Cassano v. Durham, 180 N.J.Super. 620, 626, 436 A.2d 118 (Law Div.1981) (holding that plaintiff who cohabitated with decedent without marriage was not “surviving spouse” within meaning of intestacy statute and therefore could not recover under Wrongful Death Act). Only spouses, and not unmarried cohabitants, can receive alimony. See Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132, 447 A.2d 173 (1982) (holding that alimony-authorization statute, N.J.S.A 2A34-23, does not embrace action on contract between unmarried cohabitants). N.J.S.A 44:l-140(a) requires spouses to support each other, but, absent an agreement to the contrary, one unmarried cohabitant can walk out on the other without any notice or restrictions. Cf. Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 386-87, 403 A.2d 902 (1979) (finding that enforcement of an agreement between two unmarried parties is far different from creating new cause of action in favor of an unmarried cohabitant).
Furthermore, in Portee, supra, we noted that the causes of action for loss of consortium and for negligent infliction of emotional distress are quite similar. 84 N.J. at 98 n. 6, 417 A.2d 521. Nonetheless, although spouses may recover for loss of consortium, unmarried cohabitants cannot. Leonardis v. Morton Chem. Co., 184 N.J.Super. 10, 11, 445 A.2d 45 (App.Div.1982). The refusal to allow claims for loss of consortium in the absence of a marriage is based on a number of sound policy considerations, which apply equally well to the present case. See Schroeder v. Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., 712 F.Supp. 39, 42-43 (D.N.J.1989). Perhaps most persuasive is the recognition that once the cause of action no longer depends on the marital status, no clear principle exists to limit liability at all. “[0]n social policy grounds, liability at some point must be delimited.” Id. at 42.
“If a loss of consortium were to be extended to include unmarried individuals, the certainty of who is entitled to prosecute such a claim is destroyed____ Friends and relatives may also suffer a loss of society and companionship when an endeared one is injured. To compensate for such losses, however, would involve costs far beyond those society can afford.”
[Ibid, (quoting Denil v. Integrity Mutual Ins. Co., 135 Wis.2d 373, 401 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Ct.App.1986)).]
*122IV
Public policy reasons aside, I would still object to the majority’s decision today because it adopts an unworkable and ultimately unwise standard for determining who may qualify as a plaintiff in bystander emotional-distress actions. The majority’s decision will open the door to more bystander claims because many people live together in “significant other” relationships. The inquiry into whether a bystander has the requisite “close, substantial, and enduring relationship” will require the courts and defendants to delve into the intimate details of claimants’ lives. The proofs will undoubtedly deal with a couple’s sexual fidelity, their commitment to one another measured in time intervals, their economic interconnectedness and interdependence, not to mention their estate plans. Undoubtedly, speculation will arise regarding the particulars of a couple’s day-to-day relationship and the manner in which the couple relates to one another in attending to life’s mundane requirements. See ante at 112, 642 A.2d at 378. Yet, in the end, only the two people involved in the relationship really know how close and stable their relationship is. In the majority of bystander emotional-distress actions, however, only the bystanding survivor will be available to disclose the details of the relationship. Clearly, the defendants will be at a disadvantage. That disadvantage can be recouped only through lengthy, expensive, and intrusive investigations.
Those are precisely the reasons that the California Supreme Court cited in declining to extend the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress to cover unmarried cohabitants. In its words,
A determination whether a partner in an unmarried cohabitation relationship may recover damages for emotional distress based on such matters as the sexual fidelity of the parties and their emotional and economic ties would require a court to undertake a massive intrusion into the private life of the partners. Further, application of these factors would not provide a sufficiently definite and predictable test to allow for consistent application from case to case.
[Elden, supra, 250 Cal.Rptr. at 260, 758 P.2d at 587.]
And although I applaud the Court’s effort to impose standards that must be met before an unmarried cohabitant may prevail in a *123bystander action, the standards remain necessarily open-ended. The end result will be that courts will be forced to evaluate all sorts of personal relationships and necessarily assign to them a rank in some large hierarchy. Ranking relationships is not our role. As eloquently noted in Childers v. Shannon, 183 N.J.Super. 591, 595, 444 A.2d 1141 (Law Div.1982),
It is not the function of this court to sift through the myriad relationships of a party in a negligence action to determine which of those near and dear have suffered an injury proximately caused by tortious conduct Should this court allow this plaintiff’s claim for loss of consortium, other courts will be forced to determine which plaintiffs have relationships sufficiently meaningful to entitle them to claim consortium. Plaintiffs here were engaged to be married at the time of the accident; how long an engagement will support a claim? One month? One week? “Going steady”? Or is cohabitation to be the test, as it apparently was in Bulloch? Again: For how long? Was there joint payments of rent? Grocery bills?
V
As Chief Justice Wilentz and I noted in a prior case involving negligent infliction of emotional distress, “We acknowledge that the trend of the prior decisions in the area of bystander emotional distress has been to expand liability. It is not, however, the trend, but the social policy underlying it, that should guide the development of the common law.” Frame, supra, 115 N.J. at 638, 560 A.2d 675 (concurring opinion).
Again, I have no disagreement with the majority’s basic assumption that a person involved in “an intimate familial relationship that is stable, enduring, substantial, and mutually supportive [and] is cemented by strong emotional bonds and provides a deep and pervasive emotional security” will suffer as much emotional distress on the death of his or her partner as a spouse. See ante at 115, 642 A.2d at 380. Nevertheless, the need to draw clear lines in this area of the law, coupled with the expensive and undoubtedly arduous task of proving which relationship meets the majority’s standards, compels me to vote to reverse.
For affirmance—Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and STEIN-5.
For reversal—Justice GARIBALDI—1.