Court Opinion

ID: 9380565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 16:03:51.106955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:25.334687
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 171631
                                              No. 1-17-1631

                                                                   FIRST DIVISION
                                                                     March 20, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
      ____________________________________________________________________________

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                   )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                             )      of Cook County.
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                             )
                                                             )
      v.                                                     )      No. 11 CR 19367
                                                             )
      DAVID TAYLOR,                                          )
                                                             )      The Honorable
             Defendant-Appellant.                            )      Alfredo Maldonado,
                                                             )      Judge Presiding.

      ____________________________________________________________________________

             JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
             Justices Lavin and Coghlan concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                                   OPINION

¶1          After he entered a negotiated guilty plea to two counts of attempted murder, the trial court

     sentenced defendant to two concurrent sentences of 31 years’ imprisonment. Subsequently,

     defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. His postplea counsel filed a certificate

     pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Defendant now challenges

     whether his postplea counsel’s certification complied with Rule 604(d). We reverse and remand

     for further proceedings.

¶2                                           BACKGROUND
     1-17-1631

¶3           Defendant David Taylor was charged with multiple counts of attempted murder, armed

     robbery, attempted armed robbery, and aggravated battery for shooting Oben Pilado and his father,

     Jose Pilado, in September 2011. On May 6, 2014, defendant agreed to plead guilty to two counts

     of attempted murder in exchange for a negotiated sentence of two concurrent sentences of 31 years’

     imprisonment.

¶4           On June 17, 2014, defendant filed a timely pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

     arguing that his attorneys falsely informed him that, if he did not plead guilty, he would spend the

     rest of his life in prison and could not appeal and that his guilty plea, consequently, was

     involuntary. The trial court heard arguments from counsel and defendant regarding this motion but

     failed to appoint new counsel to represent defendant. Defendant appealed the failure to appoint

     new counsel, and we summarily remanded the case in March 2016 to comply with Illinois Supreme

     Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) and Rule 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

¶5           Upon remand, the trial court appointed an attorney from the public defender’s office, who

     filed a certificate in September 2016 averring that he had complied with Rule 604(d). In December

     2016, a different attorney from the public defender’s office took over defendant’s case.

¶6           Then, in March 2017, the new counsel filed a superseding Rule 604(d) certificate averring

     that he had (1) consulted with defendant by mail and in person about his contentions of error

     concerning his guilty plea, (2) examined the trial court file and transcripts of the plea hearing, and

     (3) declined to amend defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea because it adequately stated

     defendant’s grounds for relief. On March 22, 2017, at a status hearing, the new public defender

     stated that he was aware that prior counsel had filed a certificate but that his superseding certificate

     followed his “own assessment” of defendant’s case.

                                                       -2-
       1-17-1631

¶7             On June 14, 2017, the court held a hearing on defendant’s motion. Defendant’s new public

       defender represented to the trial court that defendant was proceeding on his contention that his trial

       counsel lied to him and told him that he could not appeal if he was convicted and that he would

       spend the rest of his life in prison. Defendant testified in support of his contention. The State

       presented the testimony of Assistant Public Defenders Wendy Steiner and Kyan Keenan,

       defendant’s trial counsel. Both attorneys denied telling defendant that he could not appeal from a

       jury verdict and that, if he were found guilty by a jury, he would spend the rest of his life in prison.

¶8             The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding that Assistant Public Defender Steiner

       credibly testified that she had explained defendant’s right to appeal and had not told him that he

       could not exercise those rights if found guilty by a jury. The trial court also found Assistant Public

       Defender Keenan credible in all respects and determined that neither counsel had threatened or

       coerced defendant’s plea. The trial court found that defendant’s recollection of his meetings with

       counsel, in which he testified his attorneys told him that he could not appeal a jury verdict and

       that he would lose his case, was not credible.

¶9                                                 ANALYSIS

¶ 10           Defendant argues that his postplea counsel’s Rule 604(d) certification did not strictly

       comply with the rule because it failed to state that counsel had consulted with defendant about his

       contentions of error in his sentence and that he reviewed the report of proceedings for his

       sentencing hearing. In response, the State argues that his counsel’s certification complied in all

       respects with Rule 604(d) and that counsel was not obligated to certify that he had consulted with

       defendant on sentencing issues where defendant’s fully negotiated plea barred counsel from raising

       sentencing issues as a basis for withdrawing the plea.

                                                         -3-
       1-17-1631

¶ 11          Rule 604(d) “governs the procedure to be followed when a defendant wishes to appeal from

       a judgment entered upon a guilty plea.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Curtis, 2021

       IL App (4th) 190658, ¶ 29. The rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

              “No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the

              defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial

              court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged,

              or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate

              the judgment. *** The motion shall be in writing and shall state the grounds

              therefor. *** The motion shall be presented promptly to the trial judge by whom

              the defendant was sentenced ***. The trial court shall then determine whether the

              defendant is represented by counsel, and if the defendant is indigent and desires

              counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel. *** The defendant’s attorney shall

              file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the

              defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain

              defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty,

              has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of

              guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any

              amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in

              those proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

¶ 12          It is well established that counsel must strictly comply with the certificate requirements of

       Rule 604(d). See People v. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 19; People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 33 (1994).

       However, “[t]he certificate need not recite word for word the verbiage of the rule.” People v. Wyatt,

       305 Ill. App. 3d 291, 297 (1999). If counsel does not comply, we must remand the matter to the

                                                        -4-
       1-17-1631

       trial court “for the filing of a new Rule 604(d) certificate, for the filing of a new motion to withdraw

       guilty plea or to reconsider sentence, and for a new hearing on the motion.” See Gorss, 2022 IL

       126464, ¶ 31. “Whether counsel complied with Rule 604(d) is a legal question that we review

       de novo.” Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 13           Before 2015, Rule 604(d) instructed that, when a pro se defendant filed a motion to

       withdraw his guilty plea and before proceedings on the motion could commence, counsel must, in

       pertinent part, “ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence or the entry of the plea

       of guilty” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014).

¶ 14           The language of the rule changed after our supreme court interpreted this particular clause

       in People v. Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329. While the State argued that the use of the word “or” was

       disjunctive and meant that an attorney did not need to certify consultation about both the sentence

       and the plea, the supreme court disagreed. Id. ¶ 11. The supreme court found that the purpose of

       the rule was “to enable the trial court to ensure that counsel has reviewed the defendant’s claim

       and considered all relevant bases for the motion to withdraw the guilty plea or to reconsider the

       sentence.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 16. This would enable the trial court to correct possible

       errors at an earlier opportunity. Id. ¶ 19. The court determined that the word “or” should be read

       as “and,” requiring attorneys to certify consultation about both the guilty plea and the sentence. Id.

       ¶ 20.

¶ 15           After Tousignant, the supreme court amended Rule 604(d), effective December 3, 2015, to

       read that counsel must consult with the defendant regarding the “contentions of error in the

       sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Dec. 3, 2015).

¶ 16           Here, postplea counsel certified that he consulted with defendant about errors in the guilty

       plea and reviewed the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty, but he did not certify that he

                                                         -5-
       1-17-1631

       consulted with defendant about alleged errors in his sentence or examined the report of proceedings

       of the sentencing hearing. The State argues that remand is not necessary where the certificate filed

       by postplea counsel contained all relevant information mandated for inclusion by that rule in fully

       negotiated plea cases.

¶ 17          We find that postplea counsel did not comply with the certification requirements pursuant

       to Rule 604(d). Our supreme court has determined that compliance with Rule 604(d) requires that

       postplea counsel certify that he consulted with a defendant regarding his contentions of error both

       in the entry of his plea and also in his sentence. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 26. In Gorss, our supreme

       court addressed whether postplea counsel strictly complied with Rule 604(d) where the counsel

       did not certify that he consulted with the defendant to ascertain his contentions of error with the

       entry of the plea of guilty. The defendant entered an open plea of guilty to aggravated DUI and

       was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. Id. ¶ 4. On appeal, the supreme court held, “The

       language of the rule is clear—counsel must certify that a consultation to ascertain the defendant’s

       contentions of error as to both the sentence and entry of the guilty plea took place. This is to ensure

       that the defendant’s interests are protected.” Id. ¶ 26 (citing People v. Easton, 2018 IL 122187,

       ¶ 32). “[W]here the language used [in a statute] is plain and unambiguous, [a reviewing court] may

       not ‘depart from its terms’ or read into the rule exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict

       with the drafters’ intent.” Id. ¶ 10 (citing Acme Markets, Inc. v. Callanan, 236 Ill. 2d 29, 38

       (2009)).

¶ 18          We recognize that the defendant in Gorss entered an open plea of guilty, as opposed to

       defendant in the instant case who entered a negotiated plea of guilty. In People v. Gillespie, 2017

       IL App (1st) 152351, however, we addressed the factual situation present in the instant case. In

       Gillespie, the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea and later moved to withdraw his

                                                        -6-
       1-17-1631

       plea. Counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate, stating, in relevant part, that he consulted with the

       defendant about his contentions of error in the entry of the guilty plea. Id. ¶ 1. Following a hearing,

       the trial court denied the motion to withdraw. Id. ¶ 4.

¶ 19          On appeal, we held that former Rule 604(d), which Tousignant had explained required

       postplea counsel to certify counsel consulted with a defendant regarding contentions of error in

       the entry of plea and sentence, along with the other requirements, applies equally to both open and

       negotiated pleas. Id. ¶ 12. Relying on People v. Martell, 2015 IL App (2d) 141202, ¶ 9, which

       rejected the proposition that Tousignant applied only to open pleas, we found “Tousignant and the

       rule’s language are not limited to open pleas, and if our supreme court intends that it be so limited,

       it will say so explicitly.” Gillespie, 2017 IL App (1st) 152351, ¶ 12. We also noted the rule’s

       purpose, which was an attorney’s duty to consult with his or her client, regardless of whether the

       consultation affects the content of the motion. Id. Regarding the State’s contention that if the plea

       is negotiated, counsel will not be able to challenge the sentence through a written motion, we

       recognized that Rule 604(d) “focuses on the attorney’s duty to consult with his or her client, and

       that consultation has value even if it does not ultimately affect the content of the motion” and there

       still exists a “concern that a fully negotiated plea might include an improper sentence is real.” Id.;

       see Martell, 2015 IL App (2d) 141202, ¶ 9.

¶ 20          In addressing the State’s argument, neither party pointed to cases in which the Third

       District found that postplea counsel’s failure to certify that he examined the report of proceedings

       of the sentencing hearing does not render the Rule 604(d) certificate noncompliant. See People v.

       Stefanski, 2019 IL App (3d) 160140, ¶¶ 22-25; People v. Jackson, 2018 IL App (3d) 170125, ¶ 49.

       In both cases, the reviewing courts found that, because the defendant entered into a negotiated plea

       of guilty, there was no sentencing hearing and, instead, the trial court accepted the defendant’s

                                                        -7-
       1-17-1631

       guilty plea and sentenced him to the agreed-upon sentence. Stefanski, 2019 IL App (3d) 160140,

       ¶ 23; Jackson, 2018 IL App (3d) 170125, ¶ 49. “Thus, by certifying that she had reviewed the

       report of proceedings of the plea of guilty, counsel also certified that she had reviewed the

       transcript of the court’s discussion of defendant’s sentence.” Jackson, 2018 IL App (3d) 170125,

       ¶ 49. However, the facts in the instant case are distinguishable where postplea counsel not only

       failed to certify that she examined the report of the proceedings of the sentencing hearing, but

       counsel also failed to certify that she consulted with defendant to ascertain defendant’s contentions

       of error as to his sentence.

¶ 21           Accordingly, we follow Gillespie and reject the State’s argument that the Rule 604(d)

       requirement that postplea counsel certify that counsel consulted with the defendant regarding the

       entry of the plea of guilty and sentence applies only to open pleas. Postplea counsel did not file a

       substantively compliant certificate. A second remand to the trial court for de novo postplea

       proceedings and compliance with Rule 604(d) is thus necessary. See People v. Hagerstrom, 2016

       IL App (3d) 140559, ¶ 13 (finding that a second remand for compliance with Rule 604(d)

       admonishments is permissible).

¶ 22                                            CONCLUSION

¶ 23           We vacate the trial court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty

       plea and remand for (1) the filing of a new postplea motion (if defendant so wishes), (2) a new

       hearing on defendant’s postplea motion, and (3) compliance with the requirements of Rule 604(d).

¶ 24           Vacated and remanded.

                                                       -8-
1-17-1631

                     People v. Taylor, 2023 IL App (1st) 171631

Decision Under Review:    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CR-
                          19367; the Hon. Alfredo Maldonado, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                 James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, Manuel S. Serritos, and Linda
for                       Olthoff, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for
Appellant:                appellant.

Attorneys                 Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique
for                       Abraham, Douglas P. Harvath, Janet C. Mahoney, and David H.
Appellee:                 Iskowich, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the
                          People.

                                        -9-