Court Opinion

ID: 9669352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:53:24.385873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:55.838161
License: Public Domain

NEUMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. One slot machine may be the same as the next. But the legislature was looking at the bigger picture, and so must we.
Under the guise of entertainment and economic development, the State permits gaming corporations to lawfully part their customers from their money. Quite a lot of that money — thankfully—returns to the State in the form of tax receipts. The question is whether that taxing scheme, which differentiates between gaming on riverboats and gaming at racetracks, bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. I think it does. At least the challengers here have not convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt that it does not.
Riverboats are not the same as racetracks. From an entertainment perspective, they speak to different cultural traditions — river lore versus agriculture. The majority questions these distinctions once gaming is attached to the enterprise. But there is no constitutional impediment to a legislature favoring diversity in cultural attractions for its citizens and tourists. And, rightly or wrongly, a legislative majority could rationally determine that a riverboat casino holds more romantic tourist appeal than a casino stuck in a dog track.
To advance these policy decisions, a reasonable legislature would also want to recognize a very pragmatic distinction between the two gambling venues: riverboats are mobile, racetracks are not. If the economic climate turns unfavorable here, a riverboat merely unties its lines and sails elsewhere. So it is not unreasonable for the legislature to create economic incentives to develop or retain riverboat gambling while maintaining the status quo with respect to other forms of the sport.
*564In short, there are a number of rational reasons why the legislature might tax land-based casinos differently from river-based ones. They are different enterprises. We might not agree with the legislature’s rationale; we might think the tracks should enjoy a more competitive playing field or that gambling is a bad idea all the way around. But our views on the matter are irrelevant. Our concern is limited to finding a rational basis for the taxing scheme that passes constitutional muster. Because such a rational basis exists here, I would affirm the district court’s rejection of the appellants’ constitutional challenge.
CARTER and CADY, JJ., join this dissent.