Court Opinion

ID: 9534424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:39:26.60467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:36.542712
License: Public Domain

Rose, J.,
with whom Springer, J., joins,
dissenting:
I dissent. The district court failed to adequately canvass Tillema to establish that he intelligently and knowingly waived his right to counsel. The canvass was cursory and consisted only of the district court advising Tillema that self-representation was a bad idea and what the role of standby counsel would be should he elect to represent himself. The inquiry included nothing of the crimes charged, the possible defenses, or Tillema’s background. Based solely on this issue, we should reverse and remand this case.
A criminal defendant has the right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1975). However, an accused who chooses self-representation must knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel. Id. at 835. Such a choice can be competent and intelligent even though the accused lacks the skill and experience of a lawyer, but the record should establish that the accused was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Id.
The trial court must canvass a defendant to determine whether his or her waiver of the right to counsel is valid. Cohen v. State, 97 Nev. 166, 168, 625 P.2d 1170, 1171 (1981).
“To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.”
*273Id. (quoting Garnick v. Miller, 81 Nev. 372, 376, 403 P.2d 850, 853 (1965)).
The test of the validity of a waiver is not whether the court explained the elements of the charged offense or possible defenses to the defendant or provided other specific warnings or advisements, ‘“but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.’ ” Arajakis v. State, 108 Nev. 976, 980, 843 P.2d 800, 802-03 (1992) (quoting People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 716 (Cal. 1989), cert.
While this court has indicated that we will review a Faretta canvass as a whole and it is not necessary that the accused establish that he is competent to represent himself, these cases establish that coverage of certain matters should be part of a Faretta canvass. These matters are: (1) the nature of the charges, (2) the sentences for each charge and the total possible sentence the defendant could receive, (3) the possible defenses and mitigating facts the defendant might be able to assert, (4) the background and education of the accused, (5) the defendant’s experience with and understanding of the legal system, and (6) the defendant’s understanding of the right to legal representation that he is surrendering and the disadvantages of self-representation.
Tillema did not raise on appeal the validity of his waiver of counsel, but this court may address plain error and constitutional error sua sponte. Sterling v. State, 108 Nev. 391, 394, 834 P.2d 400, 402 (1992). A review of the record in this case shows that the canvass conducted by the district court was inadequate. The district court gave Tillema some sound advice, helpful explanation, and relevant warnings. The court explained the role of standby counsel, advised Tillema of the inherent disadvantage in vouching for his own credibility if he testified, and warned him that an attorney could better handle matters such as a motion by the State to introduce his prior convictions into evidence. However, the transcript of the canvass shows that Tillema’s waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing and intelligent.
The district court did not discuss the nature of the charges against Tillema even after it discovered that Tillema did not understand that he no longer faced the charge of failing to register as an ex-felon, nor did the court discuss the possible defenses or mitigating facts — a subject that was highly relevant when Tillema several times asserted that the prosecution had a very weak case. *274Regarding Tillema’s knowledge of the range of allowable punishments, the trial court informed Tillema that he faced the possibility of a life sentence if he were declared a habitual criminal. However, Tillema was not told he faced the possibility of three consecutive life terms, which he in fact received at his sentencing, and there is no indication in the record that he knew of this possibility when he chose to represent himself.
The district court did inquire into Tillema’s legal knowledge and experience with the legal system. However, this inquiry only showed that Tillema was laboring under many legal misconceptions. Tillema did not understand that he could not testify while cross-examining the State’s witnesses. When the court attempted to clear up this misconception and warned Tillema that he would not be allowed to make statements during cross-examination, Tillema responded by reiterating that the case against him was weak and that he was innocent. This was Tillema’s response at several points to the court’s canvassing.
Tillema’s responses to the district court did not demonstrate that he understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation or apprehended the facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. On the contrary, they showed that Tillema confused his right to testify and the process of cross-examination, was unaware that he no longer faced one charge, and felt that his professed innocence was relevant to the decision to represent himself. When the court asked Tillema if he understood that the State would introduce and challenge the credibility of his preliminary hearing testimony, Tillema answered that he understood that it had been his right to testify at the preliminary hearing. Although the court then asked Tillema again if he understood that the State would use what he had said at the hearing against him and Tillema said he understood that, responses such as these did not indicate that his decision was a knowing and intelligent one.
The trial court did not inquire into Tillema’s background and education, other than his legal experience. It did not discover that Tillema had never graduated from high school or attained a GED. His relatively low-level of education was relevant to this proceeding.
The canvass included nothing of the charges against Tillema, possible defenses or mitigating factors, or his background or experience. It did not establish that Tillema had any apprehension of the facts essential to a broad understanding of his case and the decision to forgo assistance of counsel. Rather, the record demonstrates that he did not appreciate the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation when he chose to represent himself. On the possible maximum sentence, Tillema was actually misinformed. *275The court informed Tillema that he could receive a life sentence for being a habitual criminal. It did not inform him that his three felony convictions could each be converted to a life sentence under the habitual criminal statute and run consecutively. This exposed Tillema to three consecutive life sentences, each requiring a minimum of ten actual years (no good time credits) in prison, a sentence Tillema actually received.
There is no doubt that Tillema was prejudiced at trial by his lack of competent counsel. For example, he failed to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence in regard to the charge of burglary of a department store. Even with this hearsay, the evidence of this shoplifting burglary was insufficient. Nevertheless, the jury convicted Tillema of this crime, and the majority now affirms it.
The jury found Tillema guilty of three counts of burglary and two counts of possession of burglary tools. The district court adjudicated Tillema a habitual criminal and sentenced him to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole on the burglary counts. The district court’s canvass failed to establish that Tillema understood the fact that this harsh a punishment was even possible or other facts essential to an understanding of the disadvantages of self-representation and the risks and complexities of his case. The record shows that Tillema did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.