Court Opinion

ID: 9731622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:52:28.048717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:03.114212
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
dissenting:
In awarding First Virginia Bank prejudgment interest on deficiencies owed to it by consumers under the Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA), Maryland Code (1975, 1990 *567Repl.Vol.), § 12-626(e)(4) of the Commercial Law Article, the majority departs from precedent and ignores clear indications of the General Assembly’s intent.
(1)
This Court, a decade ago in Union Trust Co. v. Tyndall, 290 Md. 102, 428 A.2d 428 (1981), provided an exhaustive analysis of RISA, stating that “whether one talks in terms of finance charges or interest one is speaking economically in terms of compensation for the use of capital” and holding unequivocally that neither may be imposed on the buyer after the sale of the repossessed goods. 290 Md. at 113, 428 A.2d at 433 (emphasis added). The majority quotes extensively from Tyndall but misses the point of the case when, in one breath, it disallows First Virginia Bank prejudgment interest on the deficiencies owed at the same rate as the finance charge provided in the contracts, but, in the next breath, allows an award of prejudgment interest at the legal rate. Nothing in the Tyndall opinion limited the holding of that case to the interest rate provided in the agreement. Furthermore, such limitation is inconsistent with the reasoning in Tyndall.
The majority’s holding today improperly erodes the protection of RISA as interpreted by this Court in Tyndall, implying that, in Tyndall, we misinterpreted the Legislature’s purpose when it amended RISA in 1965. The majority, however, overlooks the principle that “the General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court’s interpretation of its enactments and, if such interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in that interpretation.” Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 210, 438 A.2d 1301, 1305 (1981). See also, Nationwide v. USF & G, 314 Md. 131, 143-144, 550 A.2d 69, 75 (1988); Farmers & Merchant Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 60, 507 A.2d 172, 178 (1986). If this Court’s interpretation of RISA in Tyndall was other than what the General Assembly intended, then the Legislature presumably would have amended the Act in the ten years since the Tyndall case was decided. *568This presumption is strengthened by the Legislature’s amending § 12-626(e) in 1984 but not changing the holding in Tyndall. See Williams, supra, 292 Md. at 210, 438 A.2d at 1305; Nationwide, supra, 314 Md. at 143-144, 550 A.2d at 75; Frank v. Storer, 308 Md. 194, 203, 517 A.2d 1098, 1102-1103 (1986).
This Court emphasized in Tyndall that the purpose of RISA “obviously is to protect unsophisticated buyers” and that the statute “is a carefully constructed and carefully thought out piece of consumer protection legislation enacted by the Maryland General Assembly many years before the more recent concerns relative to consumer protection.” 290 Md. at 105, 110, 428 A.2d at 429, 432. See also, 63 Op.Att’y Gen. 92 (1978). Nevertheless, the majority today has accommodated First Virginia Bank, the holder in this case, at the expense of the consumers, the very class of individuals the Act was enacted to protect. For the most part, the majority overlooks the fact that this case is governed by statute and that our function is to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent. After quoting Tyndall and stating that the case is dispositive with regard to the rate of interest set forth in the agreement, the majority relies on cases having nothing to do with RISA in order to justify awarding First Virginia Bank prejudgment interest.

(2)

Moreover, although I am convinced that RISA does not allow prejudgment interest on deficiency judgments, at the very least such interest should only be awarded where it is specifically provided for in the installment sales contract. The 1965 Amendments to RISA, if nothing else, provided that, in connection with a deficiency judgment, the buyer would only be liable for what was provided for in the contract. § 12-626(e)(4). See 63 Op.Att’y Gen. 92 (1978). It seems obvious that prejudgment interest on a deficiency judgment should not be awarded in the cases before us because the agreements did not so provide.
*569(3)
Finally, if prejudgment interest were allowable under § 12-626(e)(4) in accordance with common law principles, then it should be left to the discretion of the trial court to decide whether or not to award it. I. W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 17-18, 344 A.2d 65, 75 (1975) (“[t]he law in Maryland with reference to interest is well settled. The general rule is that interest should be left to the discretion of the [trial court],” quoting Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. R.W.L. Wine & Liquor Co., 213 Md. 509, 132 A.2d 582 (1957)). Nonetheless, in cases involving liquidated sums prejudgment interest is generally allowed. Ibid. For a sum to be liquidated, it is not necessary that the exact amount of money owed be expressly stated in the contract; however, the sum must be capable of ascertainment at the time of breach. 5 A.L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1046 (1964). See I. W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., supra, 276 Md. 1, 344 A.2d 65; Atlantic States Constr. Co. v. Drummond & Co., 251 Md. 77, 246 A.2d 251 (1968); Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. R.W.L. Wine & Liquor Co., supra, 213 Md. 509, 132 A.2d 582.
The majority today holds that prejudgment interest must be awarded, as a matter of law, where at the time of breach the sum owed is not known and can not be ascertained. In the case before us, at the time of breach the amount owed by the buyers could not be calculated until the sale of the collateral, an event occurring subsequent to breach. The Maryland cases cited by the majority do not require the allowance of prejudgment interest under these circumstances.
CHASANOW, J., has authorized me to state that he dissents for the reasons set forth in Part (3) of this opinion.