Court Opinion

ID: 9480229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:41:36.727285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:33.203201
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
By this decision, the court converts a rule into a license. In dealing with the language of Rule 11(a)(2), the court reads into the phrase “with the approval of the court” a license for trial courts to withhold their approval for any reason or no reason without the possibility of review under any circumstances. In our legal system, the instances are extremely rare in which grants of authority are absolutely insulated from review. We should not read the language of Rule 11(a)(2) as one of those rare examples.
Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976), provides a striking example of just how unusual the cases are in which judicial action escapes all review. Before the Thermtron decision, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) looked like as clear a prohibition of appellate review as one could write. With respect to orders remanding removed cases to state courts, section 1447(d) states that: “An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.... ” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982). In Thermtron, a district court remanded a case to the state court from which it was removed for the reason that the district court’s docket was too crowded for the district court to hear the case on a timely basis. See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 342, 96 S.Ct. at 589. The Supreme Court held, however, that although section 1447(d) normally protected remand orders from review, a crowded docket was not a permissible reason for remanding a case to state court. See id. at 351, 96 S.Ct. at 593.
Thermtron proves, therefore, that even where Congress announces an express policy against review, there may be reasons *1531given by a trial court for a decision that may subject the decision to appellate review. In my judgment, nonreviewability must be read into the language of Rule 11(a)(2) in order to reach our present result, unlike Thermtron where the language of section 1447(d) was express. A fortiori, some limited scrutiny of clearly unlawful reasons remains under Rule 11(a)(2). In this case, I am persuaded that the trial court gave the one reason that it cannot give as a basis for its decision.
As the majority has noted, the trial court gave an explanation of why it refused to give its consent to a Rule 11(a)(2) plea. I can read the court’s statement no other way than to say it rejects the underlying premise of Rule 11(a)(2) and therefore will exercise no discretion whatever. As the majority noted, the court said in support of its decision:
I am not going to go ahead and impose a penalty in this ease after a presentence report and the Defendant can shop and see what he wants to do, and then take an appeal on the pretrial orders.
The Defendant would have to withdraw unequivocally all motions before the Court accepts the plea. Considering the nature of what was inherent in those motions, I will not entertain a Rule 11 matter, so an interlocutory appeal can be taken up while the Defendant is serving his time....
Record, vol. 4, at 6. It may be that if the court had given no reason, but held subjectively this attitude, its decision would have escaped review. It may also be true, as has often been said, that a willful trial judge can find a way to disguise successfully even inappropriate decisions. One should not ascribe such motivation to trial judges, and this judge has not done ■ so. The trial court having been forthright, I believe it is our duty to review the matter and inform the trial judges that however broad their discretion may be, they do not have authority to refuse to exercise the discretion that Congress deliberately has given them simply because they don’t like the policy that underlies Congress's choice.
Aside from this issue, I agree with what the majority has said about the other issues in the case.* My difference is that I would remand to the trial court with direction to exercise Rule 11(a)(2) discretion.

 As I understand the court’s opinion, even in the broad discretion granted for departure from the guidelines, it correctly has reserved the power of the circuit to review that exceptionally broad discretion if not correctly applied or if the application is illegal. United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 553, 107 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989).