Court Opinion

ID: 9566396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:38:48.292645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:23.023176
License: Public Domain

WREN, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) :
I agree that the order revoking probation should be affirmed, but I respectfully decline to endorse the action of this Court in directing that the sentence be modified because the trial judge abused his discretion.
The power granted this Court under A. R.S. § 13-1717 is to be exercised only with great caution; and the discretion of the trial court in sentencing is not to be disturbed, save in unusual circumstances, as long as it is within the statutory limits. State v. Villa, 111 Ariz. 371, 530 P.2d 363 (1975) ; State v. Hunt, 9 Ariz.App. 484, 453 P.2d 995 (1969).
As stated in State v. Fischer, 108 Ariz. 325, 326, 498 P.2d 147, 148 (1972):
“The legislature has vested in the trial court broad discretion in sentencing the defendant by setting minimum and maximum statutory periods. Since the trial court generally is better able to evaluate the defendant’s crime in light of the particular facts of the case as well as the background circumstances relative to his moral character, we will not disturb that sentence unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” (citations omitted). •
I can find no such clear abuse of discretion here. The record before Judge Rose, including a Probation Violation Report and a Presentence Investigation report, reflects a previous criminal history encompassing four pages on the F.B.I.’s “rap-sheet”, including eight previous felony convictions, three of them for forgery. The record further indicated two previous parole violations, and that defendant “had been a heroin addict for twenty-nine years and had served seven penitentiary sentences for drug-related offenses.” The judge was also aware of the fact that, while defendant was charged with only the three checks, he had actually forged eight of them totaling $701, two of which had been passed some three months previous to the other six. As to his probation violation, in addition to pleading guilty to possession of marijuana, open-end, he had violated the other terms and conditions of his probation which had been previously imposed by the court.
Quite understandably to me, Judge Rose, when again finding the defendant before him in court, ignored the recommendation of the probation officer that he be sentenced. to a minimum term in prison, and decided that the protection of society and cessation of drug-related offenses by defendant were of paramount concern. The situation here is analogous to that in State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 120 P.2d 798 (1942), where although noting that a 30 to 35 year sentence for rape was rather severe and would probably be set aside if it were defendant’s first offense, our Supreme Court stated:
“Considering that the defendant is a recidivist, we do not feel that he was excessively punished.” Id. at 433, 120 P.2d at 803.
*220It is permissible, under the obvious intent of the law, to graduate punishment in accordance with the general nature of the offense, the defendant’s previous criminal conduct and the character of the party convicted. It is also obvious that the enhanced punishment meted out here was not just for the three forged checks, but rather was cognizant of all the relevant factors noted above. It was within the trial judge’s discretion to make the sentences Consecutive, as he was in the best position to evaluate the defendant’s crimes in the light of all the facts of the case.
In my opinion, the fact noted in the majority opinion that none of defendant’s crimes, present or past, were of a violent nature should have no efficacy here. Throughout the criminal code the legislature has seen fit to exact a more severe penalty for certain nonviolent crimes than for certain violent ones. For instance, the penalty for forgery is from one to fourteen years, whereas the penalty for aggravated assault is from one to five years, and may even be treated as a high misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of one year in the county jail.
That this Court may disagree with the sentence imposed is of no import. If such punishment is too severe, it is a defect to be remedied by the'legislature, rather than by the courts. In fact it would be extremely doubtful that any two out of ten sentencing judges, given this identical set of facts, would agree as to a proper punishment. See, Sentencing: Disparity, Inconsistency, and a New Federal Criminal Code, 20 Catholic U.L.Rev. 748 (1971). If something or someone is to be faulted for the sentence rendered here, then let it be the system which permits such a wide discrepancy, and not the trial judge who finally decided that he had had enough, and imposed a penalty severe enough to get an habitual criminal off the streets so that he could not commit another crime; for, rest assured, upon his release, commit it he surely will.
I would affirm the sentence imposed.