Court Opinion

ID: 9411965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 17:04:37.08351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:21.503821
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/28/23 In re M.R. CA2/5

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                          DIVISION FIVE
 In re M.R., a Person Coming                                        B325275
 Under Juvenile Court Law.
 _______________________________                                    (Los Angeles County Super.
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                  Ct. No. 18CCJP08147A)
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 E.R.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed.
      Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Mother.
      Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Father.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ______________________
                         INTRODUCTION
       This is the second time this case has come before us on
appeal from termination of parental rights to daughter. We
initially reversed the termination order, concluding the juvenile
court erred in denying mother’s request for a bonding study. (See
In re M.R. (Oct. 28, 2021, B311061) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand,
the juvenile court ordered and received a bonding study from a
psychologist who observed mother and daughter together. The
court also received more extensive analysis of the parent-child
relationship from social workers and daughter’s caregiver, who
had monitored visitation.
       The parents again appeal from termination of parental
rights to daughter, asserting substantial evidence did not support
the juvenile court’s decision not to apply the parental-benefit
exception to adoption set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).1 We affirm.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.     Dependency Proceedings Prior to This Appeal2
       In December 2018, the Los Angeles Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) detained then-seven-year-old

1     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
      Father joins all of mother’s arguments on appeal but does
not make any of his own. Mother solely argues there was a
beneficial parent-child relationship between mother and
daughter.

2     The following section is taken from the majority opinion in
In re M.R. (Oct. 28, 2021, B311061) [nonpub. opn.]. We grant
mother’s request for judicial notice of that opinion. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, 459.)

                                 2
daughter and her younger brothers (then ages three years and
one month) from the parents due to severely unsanitary
conditions in the family home. Daughter told the social worker
mother cared for her, provided her clean clothes, and cooked her
meals. However, the social worker documented repeated
instances of health hazards in the home. In January 2019, the
court declared the children dependents, and removed them from
their parents’ custody. The three children were placed with the
same foster family. The court ordered reunification services for
the parents and monitored visitation. Mother appealed—the first
of three overall appeals in these proceedings—and we affirmed
the court’s orders. (See In re M.R. (Sept. 27, 2019, B295466)
[nonpub. opn.].)
       In September 2019, the juvenile court held a six-month
review hearing. DCFS reported the parents had had “sporadic
visitation with the children,” however, mother called daughter
every day, and daughter, now eight years old, said she wanted to
return to mother’s care. The court ordered DCFS to provide
additional reunification services.
       For the next six months, mother proceeded to consistently
attend weekly visits with the children and call them daily. In
March 2020, mother stopped in-person visits due to concerns
about COVID-19. Mother maintained daily contact with the
children by either phone or video chat.” In August 2020, DCFS
reported that daughter was building “a healthy appropriate
relationship with foster mother,” but still missed mother and
wanted to return to her care. Foster mother monitored the
children’s calls with mother and “reported no major concerns with
mother.” Mother “did her best to try to engage with the children

                               3
but it was challenging at times to maintain” the attention of the
now five-year-old and one-year-old.
       In October 2020, the court held a review hearing, and
terminated reunification services. The juvenile court set a
“permanency planning review hearing” under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26. Over the months leading up to
the section 366.26 hearing, mother continued to call or video chat
with the children daily. During these visits or calls, mother
“focuse[d] more on” daughter than the younger children, and
“mainly” spoke to daughter as the five-year-old was “unable to
stay on the phone.” Mother was “appropriate during video or
telephone calls, as she ask[ed] the children about their day and
ma[de] conversation about what she does at home.”
       DCFS recommended termination of parental rights and
adoption by the children’s foster parents who had expressed a
willingness to adopt. While daughter reported feeling “happy and
safe in the home” of her caregivers, she continued to express a
desire to return to her mother’s care. In February 2021, the court
held a selection and implementation hearing. At the hearing,
mother’s counsel asked the court to order a bonding study and
hold a contested hearing “under the parental bond exception.”
Minor’s counsel, who represented all three children, argued only,
“I would oppose setting this for a contest on the parental bond
exception and point out that although mother had had regular
visits, she hasn’t had a parental role with the children, which
would be required to sustain the parental bond exception.” The
court agreed on the ground, “Mere visitation with the children is
not enough to trigger the parental bond exception.”
       Neither counsel nor the court addressed the children’s
individual relationships with mother or any specific facts in the

                                4
record. The juvenile court concluded generally that mother could
not establish an exception to the termination of parental rights as
to any of her children, terminated parental rights, and ordered
adoption as the permanent plan. Mother appealed.
       On October 28, 2021, we reversed termination of parental
rights, concluding the juvenile court abused its discretion in
denying mother’s request for a bonding study. (See In re M.V.
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1179 [“Bonding studies supply expert
opinion about the psychological importance to the child of the
relationship with his or her parent(s) to assist the court in
determining whether ‘the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)”].)
2.     Bonding Study
       Following remand, on January 13, 2022, DCFS (not
mother) requested the juvenile court order a bonding study. On
January 20, 2022, the juvenile court appointed Dr. Gerardo
Canul, a licensed psychologist and evaluator, to conduct the
bonding study addressing the “parent-child bond, if any, and the
impact of severing the parent-child relationship, if any.”
       On April 1, 2022, Dr. Canul interviewed mother, and on
April 16, 2022, he observed daughter and mother together during
a regular visit. Dr. Canul found their interactions were positive
and they appeared comfortable with each other. Daughter
“appeared to be calm and interested in socializing/visiting with”
mother, and was “happy to see her mother and seek warmth from
the mother.” During the visit, daughter followed directives and
redirection from mother.
       Dr. Canul stated mother’s “interpersonal skills in
particular with [daughter] were mostly appropriate yet, appeared
subdued and with a mildly flat affect.” Dr. Canul said there was

                                5
“evidence to indicate the presence of a moderately positive
emotional interdependence between [daughter] and the mother
that has been developing.”
        Dr. Canul also observed that daughter tried to engage
mother through questions, like asking “what is my favorite color”
and multiplication math problems. Although interested, mother
could not answer the questions and was unable to “verbally
reciprocate in a manner that the minor found satisfactory.”3
        Dr. Canul reported: “The minor and the mother’s
relationship [is] interactive and/or moderately reciprocal in a
positive manner. The mother has a low-average awareness of the
minor’s overall psychological, developmental, and emotional
needs. I believe[] that the mother is sincere in professing her
‘love’ for [daughter]. [¶] The nature and quality of their
relationship is moderately strong. [¶] In order for the child to
more fully develop physically, socially, and psychologically the
minor will need to live in a stable and consistent home and [sic.]
caregiver(s).”
        In a supplemental statement dated June 23, 2022, Dr.
Canul wrote, “I am providing the following supplemental
statement. The [daughter] being adopted outweighs the
detriment she may experience from discontinuing contact with
her biological mother through in-person visits and phone calls.”
3.      Visitation with Mother
        While the initial order terminating parental rights was on
appeal, mother remained in contact with daughter. Following

3     In October 2019 the court had ordered a psychological
evaluation of mother; the ensuing report (not from Dr. Canul)
indicated mother had low-average intellectual functioning range,
and general, but not severe, intellectual limitations.

                                6
remand and up until the October 2022 section 366.26 hearing,
mother had consistent visitation on Saturdays and Sundays with
daughter for a total of six hours per week, monitored by
daughter’s caregiver. Mother and daughter also talked regularly
on the phone. Although daughter initially described the visits as
good overall, daughter often became bored, and mother typically
relied on a computer tablet to entertain her. Daughter was
regularly frustrated by mother’s repetitive questions about daily
life and well-worn stories. Daughter felt that mother did not
have anything to talk about and acted “like a 7 year old.”
Because mother was nonresponsive to daughter’s questions about
what mother did with her time outside of visitation, daughter
sensed that mother did not trust her. The caregiver, who
monitored the visits, also reported that mother asked daughter
repetitive questions about her daily life and school, and had
difficulty engaging with daughter. The caregiver described the
mother’s conversations with daughter as “limited.”
       Daughter expressed that the back-to-back weekend visits
with mother took up time from other things she wanted to do,
like summer camp. In June 2022, daughter refused to talk to
mother on the phone, declining mother’s phone calls and not
initiating calls. By September, daughter resumed telephone
contact with mother.
       Neither daughter nor mother expressed affection in a
physical manner toward each other. They did not hug, kiss, or
tell each other they cared for one another. Mother sometimes
played with daughter’s hair as a sign of affection, but that was
rare. During visits, daughter did not sit next to mother because
there were several instances where insects came out of items that
mother carried. On one occasion in September 2022, roaches

                               7
came out of a bottle of hand sanitizer that mother had brought
daughter. At another visit a few weeks before that, roaches were
seen coming from mother’s belongings.
4.     Daughter’s Feelings About Adoption
       Daughter understood that her caregivers (who had cared
for her since December 2018) wanted to adopt her and cut her
ties with her biological parents. The caregivers, who were in the
process of adopting daughter’s younger brothers, did not want to
be daughter’s guardians. If daughter was not adopted by the
caregivers, she would likely lose contact with her brothers.
       Daughter was 10 years old in April 2022, when the social
worker asked daughter how she felt about adoption. Daughter
stated she was not opposed to it and that she did not want to be
separated from her brothers because she would miss them.
Daughter expressed that she loved her parents, would not like to
lose contact with them, and would be “sad” not seeing the parents
anymore, “but then said, ‘Whatever.’ ” Recalling “all of the
roaches, bugs and rats,” daughter stated that she feared mother’s
home. Daughter was unsure what outcome she desired because
she “want[ed] to maintain a relationship with all of her family.”
       In May 2022, daughter “presented as serious and
responded with short answers” when asked about adoption.
Daughter said she was “aware of what adoption is,” and “is okay
with [the prospective adoptive parents] adopting her.” However,
she did not want to change her last name to that of her
caregivers. Daughter felt the prospective adoptive parents
treated her well, and she liked playing with their daughter.
Daughter stated she would “not feel anything” if she stopped
visiting mother.

                               8
       In June 2022, daughter “appeared to be saddened by the
conversation” about adoption, and said she “wants to be adopted
by” her current caregivers. Daughter added that she felt “more
worried about losing contact with her brothers than keeping
connected to her biological parents.” Also in June, daughter’s
therapist of two months, who had had nine sessions with
daughter, attested that she explained to daughter and daughter
understood “that following adoption, she will no longer have
visits with her biological mother.”
       When asked about adoption in September 2022, daughter
continued to want to have contact with mother, but if she could
not return to mother, she desired to stay with her current
caregivers. Then, “in a jovial tone,” daughter told the social
worker, “ ‘I will protest if you take me from here,’ ” meaning her
caregivers’ home. Daughter reiterated that if she had to choose
between mother and her younger siblings, she would choose her
younger siblings and lose connection with her biological parents.
       In October 2022, just before the section 366.26 hearing,
daughter reiterated her desire to be adopted so she could be with
her younger siblings. She “wanted to stay connected to her
younger siblings more than she wants to stay in contact with her
parents.” Daughter explained that she “ ‘treasures the
relationships with her siblings more than the biological
parents.’ ” Daughter also still felt some fear when recalling the
home she lived in with her biological parents and her “constant
worry that bugs would crawl in her mouth or ears.”
       DCFS assessed that, although mother had consistent
visitation, the quality of visits had not improved. Mother had
been unable to establish a strong emotional bond with daughter

                                9
because “mother is not able to have a conversation with
[daughter] in which mother can follow from start to finish.”
5.     The Section 366.36 Hearing
       On October 31, 2022, the juvenile court held the contested
section 366.26 hearing, and received into evidence DCFS’s
reports, which included the information summarized above and
the bonding study.
       Mother’s counsel argued for application of the parental-
benefit exception to adoption, codified at section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Counsel cited the contents of the bonding
study as evidence of a strong child-parent bond. Counsel also
pointed out that the bonding study discussed issues regarding
mother’s ability to care for daughter, which were not relevant to
the parent-child bond per In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614
(Caden C.).
       Mother’s counsel highlighted daughter’s statements that
she did not want to change her last name or lose connection with
mother as evidence of a strong parent-child relationship. Counsel
argued that the caregivers and DCFS placed daughter under
immense pressure to select adoption as her preferred permanent
plan.
       Daughter’s counsel argued that since remand from
mother’s appeal of the first termination of parental rights, the
record consistently documented statements from daughter that
she wanted adoption and was aware of its ramifications on her
relationship with mother. Daughter’s counsel pointed out that
although mother and daughter had maintained a relationship, it
had been limited by mother’s inability to interact with daughter
beyond repetitious questions. Counsel also asserted that the

                                10
analysis of the parental-benefit exception should focus on
daughter’s stated wishes to be adopted.
       DCFS joined in daughter’s counsel’s arguments. DCFS
conceded mother had regular, consistent visitation, but
highlighted that daughter was bored and they were not
affectionate at visits. DCFS asserted the benefit of remaining
with the caregivers, who daughter and her siblings had been with
for four years, outweighed the benefit of maintaining a
relationship with mother. DCFS stated that daughter
understood how adoption would impact her relationship with
mother, yet still wanted to go forward with adoption.
       The court found that mother had not demonstrated the
necessary factors to establish the parental-benefit exception
under Caden C. The juvenile court declined to apply the
exception, terminated parental rights, and identified adoption as
daughter’s permanent plan. In its minute order, the court stated:
“The Court finds that the parent has not maintained regular
visitation with the child and has not established a bond with the
child. [¶] The Court finds that any benefit accruing to the child
from his/her relationship with the parent(s) is outweighed by the
physical and emotional benefit the child will receive through the
permanency and stability of adoption, and that adoption is in the
best interests of the child.”
                           DISCUSSION
       The parents argue the court erred when it found the
parental-benefit exception did not apply. They contend the
bonding study was inadequate and thus the juvenile court lacked
substantial evidence to terminate parental rights.

                               11
1.     The Parental-Benefit Exception
       The goal of section 366.26 proceedings is “to provide stable,
permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).)
In cases where the juvenile court terminates reunification
services, adoption is the Legislature’s preferred permanent plan
for the child. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); see also In re Celine R.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) If the juvenile court finds the child is
adoptable, “the court must order adoption and its necessary
consequence, termination of parental rights,” unless a parent can
demonstrate one of the section 366.26 exceptions to adoption. (In
re Celine R., at p. 53; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625.)
       Under the parental-benefit exception to adoption, the
parent must “establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,”
“(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the
continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629, 631.) “What it requires a
parent to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, is that
the parent has regularly visited with the child, that the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship, and that
terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child.”
(Ibid.)
       The first element is straightforward. For the second
element, “the focus is the child. And the relationship may be
shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.’ . . . [C]ourts often
consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk

                                12
about their parents.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) As
to the last element, “[w]hat courts need to determine, therefore,
is how the child would be affected by losing the parental
relationship — in effect, what life would be like for the child in an
adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at
p. 633.)
       When assessing whether the parental-benefit exception
applies, “the court balances the strength and quality of the
natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against
the security and the sense of belonging a new family would
confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would
deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment
such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for
adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not
terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
Essentially, “the exception applies in situations where a child
cannot be in a parent’s custody but where severing the child’s
relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the
benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
       We review the juvenile court’s findings on the first two
elements — visitation and the existence of a beneficial parent-
child relationship — for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) We review for abuse of discretion the
court’s assessment whether termination of parental rights would
be detrimental to the child. (Id. at p. 640.)
2.     The Court Did Not Err When It Denied the Parental-
       Benefit Exception
       Although the juvenile court found insufficient proof of
regular visitation, at the hearing, mother’s counsel, daughter’s

                                 13
counsel, and DCFS all agreed that mother satisfied this element.
We also assume, without deciding, that mother satisfied the
second element, i.e., that daughter would benefit from continuing
her relationship with mother. Daughter had spent the first seven
years of her life with mother, sought warmth from mother, was
interested in socializing with mother, and was happy to see
mother. Their relationship was “moderately strong” and
“interactive and/or moderately reciprocal in a positive manner.”
       That said, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion when it assessed that the benefit of daughter’s
relationship with mother was outweighed by the physical and
emotional benefit daughter would receive through the
permanency and stability of adoption. By the time of the second
section 366.26 hearing, daughter was 11 years old and had
repeatedly stated she wanted to be adopted by her caregivers,
even if that meant losing her connection with mother.
Understanding that adoption would keep her in the same
household as her brothers, daughter consistently chose adoption,
explaining that she “ ‘treasures the relationships with her
siblings more than the biological parents.’ ”
       In the months leading up to the section 366.26 hearing,
daughter expressed annoyance with the tedium of mother’s visits
and her difficulty connecting with mother. Mother could not
answer daughter’s questions in a satisfactory and reciprocal
manner. Because mother was minimally responsive to
daughter’s questions about aspects of mother’s life, daughter also
felt mother did not trust her. The bonding study opined that
“mother has a low-average awareness of the minor’s overall
psychological, developmental, and emotional needs.”

                               14
       Although daughter received some benefit from a
relationship with mother, the record indicates the relationship
was not crucial to daughter’s happiness. Daughter in fact desired
fewer visits with mother because they interfered with other
things she wanted to do. Daughter told the social worker that
she would “not feel anything” if visits stopped. [¶ deleted.]
Accordingly, the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion
that daughter’s attachment to mother was not significant enough
to overcome the security and the sense of belonging adoption
would confer on daughter. Simply put, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it found that severing the child’s
relationship with the parent would not be so detrimental as to
outweigh the benefits of adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 631–632.)
       Citing In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836 (M.G.), mother
argues the bonding study inappropriately focused on mother’s
perceived ability to meet daughter’s needs, and did not
sufficiently address daughter’s emotional attachment to mother.
She asserts the juvenile court erred by relying on the study.
       In M.G., Division Eight of this district reversed an order
terminating parental rights because the juvenile court relied on a
bonding study that “offered minimal if any information about the
nature of the child’s relationship with his parents in the context
of their developmental disabilities” and improperly compared
“the parents’ ability to manage [the child’s] medical and
developmental needs” to the caregiver’s ability to meet the child’s
needs. (M.G., supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 851.) In M.G., the
bonding study was essential to assess the parent-child bond
between the non-verbal and developmentally disabled three-year-
old child and his developmentally disabled parents. (Id. at

                                15
p. 850.) The appellate court reversed because the inadequate
study was the principal evidence regarding the parent-child bond.
(Ibid.)
       Although the M.G. bonding study was conducted by the
same psychologist as, and contains similar language to the
bonding study here, M.G. is distinguishable. Here, a great deal of
evidence outside the bonding study conveyed the quality of
mother’s relationship with daughter. The record contains
observations from the caregiver and social workers about months
of visitation and parent-child interactions. Statements from
daughter herself, indicating she wanted to be adopted, spoke
volumes about the significance of the parent-child relationship.
Such evidence was unavailable in M.G.
       We also observe that even though the bonding study
expressed concerns about mother’s ability to care for daughter, it
also positively described aspects of the parent-child bond and was
cited by mother’s counsel in support the parental-benefit
exception. This was not a case of a trial court finding the
adoptive parents would be better parents than the biological
mother.
       Lastly, mother asserts the juvenile court and the
prospective adoptive parents placed daughter in “an impossible
and unacceptable position” by having her choose between a
relationship with mother or a home with her brothers and
prospective adoptive parents. The questions put to daughter
apparently prompted some answers that perhaps generally
compared the adoptive and biological parents, but the record
disclosed that those answers represented daughter’s feelings, not
coercion by the adoptive parents.

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                      DISPOSITION
    The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

                                  RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

               BAKER, J.

               KIM, J.

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