Court Opinion

ID: 9772272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:12:48.501891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:43.208725
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
The prevailing legal principle to be remembered in this context is that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit
... successive prosecutions or multiple punishments for repeated discrete violations of the same penal statute. Rather it prohibits successive prosecutions or multiple punishments for conduct which necessarily violates a penal statute only once or, presumably, for conduct which necessarily violates more than one penal statute at a time.
State v. Houth, 845 S.W.2d 853, 870-71 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)(Benevides, J., concurring).1 This ease involves “successive prosecutions ... for repeated discreet violations of the same penal statute.” The problem is, how can we ascertain that the separately alleged offenses are distinct from one another, given that the face of the subsequent indictments would support the same convictions that would also have been supported under the initial indictment. See Ex parte Coleman, 940 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).
The majority says we do so by looking to the proof offered at trial:
... trial upon an indictment does not bar every offense that could be prosecuted under its language; instead, trial upon the indictment bars prosecution only for offenses for which proof was offered at trial. And even for the latter category, the State or the trial court can exclude an instance of conduct from the jeopardy bar through an election.
Majority opinion at 860-61. But if we have to look to the proof at trial to determine what is jeopardy barred, then to what has jeopardy “attached” before proof is offered? After all, we know jeopardy attaches in a jury trial the moment the jury is empaneled and sworn. E.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Is the majority suggesting jeopardy does not *862attach until proof is offered? Certainly not, but we are not enlightened in this regard.
In my view, jeopardy most likely attaches to the indictment and all that can be known for certain from its face at the point at which the jury is empaneled and sworn. For instance, jeopardy attaches to the elements and factual matters pled in the indictment, but not to any specific date, since the State is not bound to prove the date alleged. See Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Crim.App.1997). As trial proceeds, jeopardy attaches more specifically to those offenses that otherwise fit the indictment and for which proof is offered.2 Jeopardy may be further narrowed (or un-attached) by the State’s election of a particular offense on which it will rely for conviction.3
While I believe this explanation to be reasonable and logical, I fear I may be overlooking á tidier resolution of this problem.4 If there is one, however, the majority does not point to it.
Otherwise agreeing jeopardy attached in the instant case to the two instances of conduct offered by the State at the previous trial, and in the absence of evidence that those instances will be prosecuted under the new indictments, I concur in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals.5

. For this reason, Judge Baird’s analysis fails. Under his view of things, jeopardy would ultimately bar prosecution for a defendant’s repeated but like offenses against the same victim, all occurring during the same statutory period. This is surely wrong.

. It might be more precisely stated that jeopardy had already attached in a broad sense, but the specific incident to which it attached becomes more clear upon proof at trial.

. In other words, jeopardy "un-attaches” to those offenses which would otherwise fall within the terms of the indictment, but are designated as extraneous. It remains attached to the offense the State "elects” as the one upon which it will seek a conviction. The notion that jeopardy may attach and un-attach is not novel. The “un-attaching” of jeopardy should, however, remain largely within the control of the defendant except in extraordinary circumstances. Cf. Brown v. State, 907 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(jeop-ardy does not bar retrial when defendant essentially waives it by requesting mistrial or when there is manifest necessity). For this reason, it would seem that election should be a right to be asserted only by the defendant. In other words, the State can be forced to elect, and thus un-attach jeopardy, only upon objection (to evidence as extraneous) and/or request (for election) by the defendant. Cf Proctor v. State, 841 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)(criminal charge abandoned or dismissed on prosecution’s motion after jeopardy attaches may not be retried); Ex parte Preston, 833 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)(if State dismisses, waives, or abandons portion of indictment after jeopardy attaches, State is barred from later relitigating those allegations).

. I have previously suggested that jeopardy may attach to anything conceivably, but not certainly, within the terms of the indictment, but I now conclude this view is overly broad. See Proctor and Lemell, at 3-4 (Meyers, J., concurring)(suggesting that indictment alleging "on or about” places defendant in jeopardy for any such alleged offense within applicable statutory period).

. The Court of Appeals held the thirteen new indictments were not jeopardy barred “because they each refer to a separate occurrence and not to the occurrence made the subject of the dismissed trial.” This conclusion is premature. It cannot be ascertained from the faces of the thirteen new indictments what specific occurrences are referred to. For this reason, appellant fails to prove a jeopardy bar. The majority does not mention the Court of Appeals' opinion, other than to say its judgment is “affirmed.”