Court Opinion

ID: 9889522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 16:11:14.860138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:44.133764
License: Public Domain

J-S34037-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JEMERE L. PEARSON                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1163 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 19, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                 Criminal Division at CP-02-CR-0008537-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED: October 10, 2023

       Jemere L. Pearson (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of one count each of driving under

the influence (DUI) and driving while operating privilege is suspended or

revoked.1 We affirm.

       The trial court recounted the following facts:

             On June 14, 2019, Officer Benjamin Gery of … [the] City of
       Pittsburgh Police was dispatched for a vehicular accident at Fifth
       Avenue. Upon arrival[,] Officer Gery observed a black Audi parked
       down the street from a tree that had been struck and the vehicle
       had heavy front-end damage. (T.T. 5-6). He approached the
       vehicle and observed Appellant[, the owner of the car,] in the
       driver’s seat[; Appellant’s sister was also present, sitting in the
       front passenger seat]. (T.T. 7). Appellant was disoriented with
       slurred speech and glassy eyes. He was unable to provide his
       registration upon request, instead giving the officer some type of
       pamphlet. (T.T. 8-10). Appellant was removed from the vehicle
____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1) and 1543(a).
J-S34037-23

       and refused to submit to field sobriety tests. Appellant was taken
       into custody due to [Officer Gery’s] belief [that Appellant] was
       under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him
       incapable of safe driving, and transported to Zone 6 for an
       intoxilyzer test per Appellant’s consent. However, once at the
       police station, he was deemed a refusal. (T.T. 10, 13-15, 24-25).
       Appellant’s driver history showed that he had a suspended driver’s
       license[.] (T.T. 15). Appellant was arrested and charged herein.4

              4  The Commonwealth introduced a video which
              captured Appellant at the scene and at the Zone 6
              station.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 4 (one footnoted omitted, one in original).

       The trial court held a bench trial on August 15, 2022, and found

Appellant guilty of both charges.              On August 19, 2022, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to six months of probation and a $300 fine. Appellant

timely appealed.2

       Appellant raises a single issue for review:

       Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction at Count I
       ─ DUI because the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a
       reasonable doubt that [Appellant] drove, operated or was in actual
       physical control of the disabled vehicle where police found his
       sister and him?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing this

claim, “we ‘must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable

to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a

____________________________________________

2 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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reasonable doubt.’” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 242 A.3d 659, 664 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (citation omitted). “[T]he Commonwealth’s evidence need not

preclude every possibility of innocence in order to prove guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt,” and the Commonwealth may prove each element of the

crime through circumstantial evidence. Id. at 665. It is within the purview

of the fact-finder to determine which evidence to believe — all, part, or none

— and we do not reweigh the evidence on sufficiency review. Id.

      Appellant was charged with DUI (General Impairment/Incapable of

Driving Safely) of the Vehicle Code, which provides:

      An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
      control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient
      amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable
      of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of
      the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).       To sustain a conviction under Subsection

3802(a)(1), the Commonwealth must prove “the accused was driving,

operating or in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle during

the time when he or she was rendered incapable of safely driving due to the

consumption of alcohol.”   Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879

(Pa. 2009) (holding Subsection 3802(a)(1) is an “at the time of driving”

offense).

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       Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to establish that he was

operating the vehicle while under the influence.3 Appellant’s Brief at 10-17.

       “The term ‘operate’ requires evidence of actual physical control of
       either the machinery of the motor vehicle or the management of
       the vehicle’s movement, but not evidence that the vehicle was in
       motion.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa.
       Super. 2003).

             “Our precedent indicates that a combination of the following
       factors is required in determining whether a person had ‘actual
       physical control’ of an automobile: the motor running, the location
       of the vehicle, and additional evidence showing that the defendant
       had driven the vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Woodruff, [ ], 668
       A.2d 1158, 1161 ([Pa. Super.] 1995). A determination of actual
       physical control of a vehicle is based upon the totality of the
       circumstances. [Commonwealth v.] Williams, [871 A.2d 254,
       259 (Pa. Super. 2005)]. “The Commonwealth can establish
       through wholly circumstantial evidence that a defendant was
       driving, operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.”
       Johnson, supra at 263.

Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2010).

       Appellant argues:

       The Commonwealth’s evidence revealed that more than four
       hours elapsed between the time that police received a dispatch
       that the vehicle hit a tree and when they arrived at the scene.
       Though [Appellant] was in the driver’s seat when police arrived, it
       was certainly reasonable that he moved to that location at some
       point during the long wait period.

             No other evidence established [Appellant] drove.
       [Appellant] and his sister told police that he was not the driver,
       and there were no eyewitnesses.
____________________________________________

3 By not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction

for driving while operating privilege was suspended or revoked, Appellant
concedes the evidence was sufficient to show he drove “a motor vehicle on
any highway or trafficway[.]” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a).

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Appellant’s Brief at 10.

      In rejecting this argument, the trial court stated:

      Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the testimony and evidence
      admitted at trial, which included the video of Appellant’s conduct
      at the scene and at the Zone 6 police station, established that
      Appellant was the driver and owner of the vehicle which he
      wrecked [because] of his intoxicated state, thus causing
      significant front-end damage. Specifically, he was observed by
      Officer Gery in the driver’s seat, disoriented, with slurred speech
      and glassy eyes. Further, he was unable to produce a valid vehicle
      registration or driver’s license. He refused to submit to field
      sobriety tests and was later deemed a refusal when officers
      attempted to [perform] an intoxilyzer test on him at the police
      station.

             Based upon the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that
      Appellant operated and/or was in actual physical control of the
      vehicle at the time Officer Gery arrived, and had consumed an
      amount of alcohol that rendered him incapable of safe driving.
      [See Williams, 871 A.2d at 258-61] (holding evidence was
      sufficient to convict the defendant of DUI[,] finding [defendant]
      was in actual physical control of the vehicle while under the
      influence of alcohol, even though another individual claimed to
      have been driving, when the police found the vehicle with the
      engine running, headlights on, and defendant asleep in the driver
      seat with his hands on the wheel and head resting on his hands).

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 6-7.

      The record supports the trial court’s rationale.      Appellant improperly

views the evidence in the light most favorable to his argument. See Clemens,

242 A.3d at 664; Appellant’s Brief at 10-17. At trial, Appellant claimed there

was a four-hour delay between the time police were notified of the accident

and their arrival at the scene. Officer Gery testified he received the dispatch

call at 12:41 a.m., but did not know how much time passed from when he

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J-S34037-23

received the call to when he arrived at the accident scene. N.T., 8/15/22, at

18-19. Video taken from another officer’s camera was time-stamped 4:45

a.m. Id. at 12 (Video 1). However, the Commonwealth introduced the DL-

26 form and breathalyzer report which indicated they were executed and

administered at the police station shortly after 2:00 a.m. See Commonwealth

Exhibits 3 and 5; N.T., 8/15/22, at 10-11. Thus, the evidence, viewed in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to prove that police

arrived at the accident scene approximately one hour after receiving the

dispatch call.

      Neither Appellant nor his sister testified at trial, although Appellant

refers to the recorded statements he and his sister made on the police video.

See Video 1. Notably, Appellant and his sister contradicted each other. Id.

Appellant claimed his sister was the driver, while his sister denied driving, and

claimed an unknown third party was driving the car. Id. It was well within

the discretion of the trial court to not credit the unsworn, recorded statements

of Appellant and his sister.       Clemens, 242 A.3d at 665; see also

Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“the finder

of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”)

(citation omitted).

      Further,   we    are    unpersuaded     by    Appellant’s    reliance   on

Commonwealth v. Price, 610 A.2d 488 (Pa. Super. 1992). See Appellant’s

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Brief at 14-15. In Price, police responded to a complaint of reckless driving

and found the defendant sitting alone in a disabled vehicle and displaying signs

of intoxication.   Price, 610 A.2d at 488-89.      The defendant claimed his

girlfriend had been driving the car when it broke down, and had gone to seek

help from a friend who lived nearby.     Id. at 489.    At trial, the defendant

produced several witnesses who corroborated his account. Id. However, the

jury convicted the defendant of DUI. Id. The defendant appealed, and this

Court reversed the judgment of sentence. We noted evidence indicating the

jury’s response to a special interrogatory asking whether the Commonwealth

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been operating the

vehicle; the jury had responded “no.”      Id.   We determined the jury had

credited the defendant’s witnesses.     Id. at 490.    This Court’s disposition

reversing the judgment of sentence was based on our conclusion that the

Commonwealth “failed to meet its burden of proving the element of actual

physical control and, thus, failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence to support

[the defendant’s] conviction.” Id. at 491.

      Here, Appellant did not present any evidence to corroborate his version

of events. Unlike Price, there is nothing in the record to indicate the trial

court, sitting as finder-of-fact, deemed the Commonwealth’s evidence

insufficient. In sum, Appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction for DUI does not merit relief. See Commonwealth v.

Corbett, 253 A.3d 304 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 7-

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8)4 (rejecting appellant’s reliance on Price, supra, and finding the evidence

sufficient to show appellant drove while intoxicated where a witness observed

appellant alone and slumped out of the car’s window; the car belonged to

appellant’s boyfriend; and evidence showed the car had been recently driven).

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 10/10/2023

____________________________________________

4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential memoranda decision of

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).

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