Court Opinion

ID: 9827996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:00:20.855877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:41.267567
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Appellees call attention to Garrison v. Crowell, 67 Tex. 626, 4 S. W. 69, In that case Garrison and John H. Stephens were claiming adversely to each other a survey of land. In settlement Garrison conveyed to Stephens a portion of the tract. Garrison claimed “that the agreement was that he should make a deed to the latter to 640 acres only, and that quantity of land was actually measured off and surveyed, and the south boundary thereof distinctly marked upon the ground; but that, supposing that the south-west corner of the land so surveyed was the same as the south-east corner of the G. Hodge survey, and on the north boundary line of the A. O. Davis survey, he in his deed described the ■boundaries as extending to that corner and that line. Beginning at the north-west corner of the land intended to be conveyed, the deed calls for the west line as running ‘south 839 varas, to the south-east corner of said Hodges survey, in the N. B. line of the A. O. Davis survey,’ and ‘thence east at 450 varas, said Davis N. E. corner at 3,550 varas, the E. B. line of said Frost survey,’ etc. The distance called for in the west boundary line does not reach the Davis survey by some 79 varas, but does reach the line actually run at the time the survey was actually made. The strip lying between the latter line and that made by the north boundary of the Davis tract, and its extension, is the matter of contention in- this suit.
“Some time after the conveyance Stephens moved his fence upon the more southern line, and took actual possession of the disputed land. Stephens subsequently sold the land to defendant Crowell.”
In sustaining a judgment in favor of Cro-well, Judge Gaines said:
“If it be determined that Crowell is a bona fide purchaser, without notice, of the land in question, the judgment must be affirmed, without reference to any other question presented by this appeal; and we have no doubt that he must be so held. It does not appear that he knew that the distance of the west line called for in the deed would not reach the Hodges corner and the Davis line. Therefore, there was nothing on the face of the conveyance to put him upon inquiry as to any claim upon part of appellant. He found \stephens in possession of the premises in controversy, holding under a duly recorded deed from appellant himself, which, according to well established rules of construction, embraced the land so possessed. He paid his money upon the faith of a conveyance which imported an absolute title in his vendor at least against appellant in this case, and we fail to see any reason why he should be ex-, cepted from the rule which protects the innocent purchaser for value against the claim of his adversary, which was unknown to him at the time of his purchase. * * *
“The court below found against appellant upon the main proposition presented by his pleading — that is, that the Hodges corner and Davis line were called for in the deed by mistake; and we are inclined to think that the finding is correct. But we need not consider that question; appellee Crowell being a bona fide purchaser for value, appellant cannot recover.”
In the present case the residence in the northwest corner of the tract burned some time before the insurance company acquired its lien. M. K. Miller, the borrower, was in possession of the entire lot from the railway south to the south boundary line. Miller had constructed buildings along the whole of the west line of the property. Appellants’ representative inspected the property and there was nothing in its physical aspect or in its occupancy which could have put the insurance company upon notice of any claim adverse to M. K. Miller. Under these circumstances and the authority of the case cited, we hold the insurance company, as a bona fide lienholder without notice, is protected against the adverse claim of title of appellants_nrising out of the boundary dispute; and, since the jury found the property had been abandoned as a homestead at the time it was conveyed to M. K. Miller, the judgment in favor of the insurance company should be affirmed.
We overrule all of appellants’ assignments which question the correctness of the judgment rendered in favor of such company.
The evidence raises an issue against M. IC Miller as to notice of the adverse claim of appellants and as to him our former ruling is not changed.
The motion for rehearing is granted in part and it is now ordered that the judgment in favor of the Southland Life Insurance Company be affirmed and the judgment in favor of M. K. Miller reversed and the cause remanded.