Court Opinion

ID: 9760492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:57:46.689395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.415266
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
concurring in result.
I agree that the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1d(1) does not admit of an interpretation that will allow a court to resentence *564pre-Code sex offenders to a period of parole ineligibility. I thus concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court. I believe, however, that we should address an issue left open by that interpretation as it affects such a prisoner’s eligibility for parole. Absent such consideration, a sentencing loophole could be created that would allow pre-Code sex offenders who refuse rehabilitative treatment to avoid serving the punitive aspects of their sentence. Because a sentence without a parole-ineligibility period cannot realistically have adequate punishment factored into it, the result would be a two-class prison population of equally-culpable sex offenders, with the pre-Code offenders having easier access to parole.
A brief review of the relevant sentencing and parole provisions places the issues in perspective. We stated those principles in detail in State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 471 A.2d 389 (1984); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 471 A.2d 370 (1984); and New Jersey State Parole Board v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 460 A.2d 103 (1983). Hence, I merely summarize them.
The 1979 Code marked a clean break with the past in sentencing practices. It rejected the indeterminate pre-Code sentencing that contemplated rehabilitation of prisoners as a goal of sentencing. Under the Code, the philosophy of sentencing is primarily retributive — the punishment must fit the crime, not the criminal. The Code allows the sentencing court to determine hard time for punitive purposes by setting a period of parole ineligibility.
Concurrent with the adoption of the Code, the Legislature enacted the Parole Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to -123.69 (L. 1979, c. 441). That too marked a clean break with the past. Under prior law, sentences did not directly determine eligibility for parole. A complex set of factors and computations required by statute, administrative regulations, and institutional practices governed the amount of time an inmate was required to serve in prison. Under the former parole system, the sufficiency of punishment exerted great influence on the parole determi*565nation. The Parole Board had broad discretion to determine whether the inmate had served enough time in prison and had been sufficiently punished. Byrne, supra, 93 N.J. at 204, 460 A.2d 103.
The current Code and Parole Act contrast sharply with the previous schemes. Setting the parole-eligibility date is now a judicial responsibility to be exercised at the time of sentencing and within bounds set by the Legislature. Sentencing courts can require offenders to serve mandatory-minimum terms before they can be considered for parole. Even sex offenders who are sentenced to a period of diagnostic treatment can be sentenced to mandatory-minimum terms before they can be considered for parole. State v. Chapman, 95 N.J. 582, 472 A.2d 559 (1984).
Our State’s parole process has consequently undergone significant changes. In effect, the Parole Act eliminated the customary discretion given to the Parole Board to determine the adequacy of punishment and transferred it substantially to the judiciary as a function of its sentencing authority. The new statute provides only that a prisoner “shall be released on parole at the time of parole eligibility, unless * * * there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of this State if released on parole at such time.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53. The legislation reduces the complex set of factors previously considered by the Parole Board to a single and exclusive standard for parole entitlement — the likelihood of recidivism. The result is a shift of the burden to the State to prove that the prisoner is a recidivist and should not be released. “The longer sentences and mandatory minimum terms anticipated under the Code are presumed to ensure that the punitive aspects of the inmate’s sentence will be satisfied by the time the parole eligibility date arrives.” Byrne, supra, 93 N.J. at 205, 460 A.2d 103. So powerful are those considerations that we found that a “federally-protected liberty interest [in parole] exists” under the scheme. Id. at 207, 460 A.2d 103.
*566By not factoring those developments into the parole process, the effect in this case will be to give the pre-Code sex offender the benefits of the Parole Act of 1979 without the concomitant “recognition of the more definite and severe sentences provided by the Code.” Id. at 205, 460 A.2d 103. I am sure that that is not what the Legislature intended.
In In re Parole Application of Trantino, 89 N.J. 347, 446 A.2d 104 (1982), we recognized this lacuna between pre-Code and post-Code sentences in the general prison population and interpreted the Parole Act of 1979 to require that the punitive aspects of a pre-Code sentence be fulfilled before the prisoner is released on parole. I believe that before the resentenced preCode sex offender is released, the Parole Board must determine that the punitive aspects of the sentence have been fulfilled.
GARIBALDI, J., joins in this opinion.