Court Opinion

ID: 9890685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 23:03:10.73355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:34.775719
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 Theno v. Fernandez CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 KIP THENO,                                                       B314277

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct.
           v.                                                     No. 20STCV08597)

 FRANK FERNANDEZ et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lia R. Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
     Klapach & Klapach and Joseph S. Klapach for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     Hunton Andrews Kurth, Michele J. Beilke, Julia Y.
Trankiem, Veronica A. Torrejón and JeeHyun Yoon for
Defendants and Respondents.
                     ——————————
       Plaintiff Kip Theno appeals from orders granting motions
to quash service of summons in favor of his former supervisors,
defendants Frank Fernandez and Keith Boettiger. Theno’s
complaint alleged causes of action against Fernandez and
Boettiger for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. On appeal, Theno contends California may exercise
specific jurisdiction over Fernandez and Boettiger because they
purposefully directed tortious activity at California by: (1)
making defamatory statements to Theno’s coworkers and
colleagues in California, and (2) retaliating against him after he
complained about violations of medical privacy laws and the use
of a competitor’s trade secrets. We conclude Theno failed to meet
his burden to show his claims are related to Fernandez and
Boettiger’s contacts with California. Specifically, there was no
evidence that Fernandez or Boettiger made defamatory
comments or engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
directed at California. Therefore, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Employment History

     In 2018, Boettiger was the president of the
neuromodulation division of St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Abbott Laboratories (collectively referred to
as Abbott). Boettiger lived in Texas.
     One subdivision of neuromodulation is chronic pain
therapies. Ryan Walters was the vice president of chronic pain
therapies. Chronic pain therapies are divided into five

                                2
geographic areas, with each area managed by an area vice
president. Walters supervised the five area vice presidents.
       In 2018, Boettiger and Walters contacted Theno, who is a
California resident, to recruit him for the position of Area Vice
President – West. Walters offered Theno the position, although
Theno believes Boettiger made the decision to hire him.
       Theno received and executed employment documents in
California. Abbott provided Theno with a computer for use in his
home office in California. Although Theno traveled out of state
for work, his primary workplace was his home office in
California.
       Theno managed four regions in California and three
regions in other western states. Abbott employed regional sales
managers, territory managers, and clinical specialists in each
region. During his employment with Abbott, Theno had between
30 and 45 California residents working for him and his sales
team.
       Shortly after Theno began working for Abbott, Fernandez
replaced Walters as the vice president of chronic pain therapies
and became Theno’s direct supervisor. Fernandez lives in
Florida.
       Fernandez communicated with Theno nearly every day. He
was aware of Theno’s business travel schedule. Fernandez sent
messages to Theno about who to hire, who was performing poorly,
and who to fire.
       Fernandez and Boettiger held weekly telephone calls with
the five area vice presidents. Theno was in California during the
calls, and the participants discussed general business matters.
       In February 2019, Theno received a message from Abbott
employee Spencer Elder about a “trial initiative plan” to increase

                                3
the number of implants on patients who had tested for a
neuromodulation device, but not had the device implanted.
Theno believes Boettiger and others created the initiative to
increase sales. Fernandez, Boettiger, and Elder directed Theno
to participate in the initiative.
       On February 15, 2019, Theno told Fernandez and Elder
that he thought the initiative violated medical privacy laws. He
asked for written confirmation that Abbott’s compliance or legal
departments approved the plan, but Theno was simply told “it’s
ok.” Fernandez refused to answer Theno’s questions and told
Theno to “just fucking do it.” Theno refused to participate until
he was assured the initiative had been reviewed by the legal
department. Fernandez and Elder referred to the initiative as a
“PTA gap process analysis.” Theno believed the name of the
initiative simply disguised its true nature, but he ultimately
complied because he was afraid that he would lose his job. Theno
believes his complaints about the initiative would have been
reported to Boettiger immediately.
       Fernandez once visited Theno in California, riding with
him to visit doctors and other customers in California. They did
not discuss anything related to the initiative. Fernandez once
met with a doctor in Theno’s territory in California without
including Theno, which made Theno feel undermined and
excluded. Fernandez had contact with most of the physicians in
California working with Abbott, knew of the territory manager’s
business plans for California, and considered California to be an
essential part of his territory.
       Theno was a top performer at Abbott. His sales number
and other metrics were consistently higher than other area vice
presidents. In June 2019, however, Fernandez gave Theno a

                                4
performance improvement plan (PIP) while they were together in
Austin, Texas, which Theno believes was approved by Boettiger.
       In September 2019, Boettiger and Fernandez sent the area
vice presidents a list of a competitor’s salespeople, including their
sales numbers. Theno was instructed to try to recruit the
salespeople. Theno refused, because he believed it would be an
illegal use of a competitor’s trade secret information and a
violation of Abbott’s policies. Theno complained to Abbott’s
human resources and employee relations departments about the
release of the competitor’s information.
       Shortly afterward, Boettiger assigned his executive
assistant Jessica Cline to work for Theno in California. Cline
asked Theno about his PIP and his complaints, and she
communicated with Boettiger.
       When Theno was at home in California on October 11,
2020, Fernandez called and terminated Theno’s employment over
the telephone.

Litigation Initiated

      On February 28, 2020, Theno filed an action against Abbott
and St. Jude Medical, Inc. (collectively the employer defendants),
as well as individual defendants Fernandez, Boettiger, and Cline.
The complaint alleged causes of action against the employer
defendants for retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of
public policy, unfair business practices, and waiting time
penalties. The complaint alleged causes of action against all of

                                  5
the defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation.
       In May 2020, the employer defendants removed the case to
federal court. They argued that Cline should be disregarded for
diversity purposes, because Theno could not state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress or defamation against
Cline. They argued, among other reasons, the managerial
privilege precluded Theno from suing an individual defendant for
making personnel decisions within the scope of her employment,
and the actions alleged did not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct. Theno filed a motion to remand the matter
to state court, which the federal court granted. The federal court
concluded that a fact intensive inquiry into Cline’s conduct was
inappropriate at that stage of the pleadings because Theno could
amend the complaint to allege new or different facts
demonstrating that Cline’s conduct went beyond the scope of her
normal employment activities or that she behaved in a manner
exceeding the bounds of conduct tolerated in society.

Allegations of Operative Complaint

       Theno filed the operative, unverified amended complaint in
this case for the same causes of action against the same
defendants based on the following factual allegations. After
Theno raised his concerns about medical privacy violations,
Fernandez started a campaign of retaliation against him as
follows: Fernandez spoke poorly about Theno to the other area
vice presidents and to Theno’s sales team in California. He was
negative and disrespectful to Theno, ignored him, and was hostile
toward him during meetings and in front of coworkers.

                                 6
       Fernandez, Cline, and Boettiger told Theno’s sales team
(half of whom were located in California), territory managers
(many of whom lived in California), and the other area vice
presidents that Theno was not competent and not trustworthy, or
words to that effect, and that Theno was performing poorly,
which was objectively false.
       During telephone meetings, Fernandez praised the other
area vice presidents and skipped Theno, even though Theno’s
sales numbers were higher. Several of Theno’s California sales
team members were on the calls.
       After Fernandez placed Theno on the PIP in June 2019,
Fernandez spoke regularly with Theno’s regional sales managers,
three of whom lived in California, with and without Theno.
Theno was informed and believed that during these conversations
Fernandez told the employees that Theno was not competent in
his role, was performing poorly and was not trustworthy. Each of
these statements were false, as Theno was performing well, and
in most cases, much better than his counterparts.
       Theno was shocked when Cline was reassigned to serve as
Theno’s executive assistant. Cline repeatedly asked Theno about
the PIP and why he was in contact with employee relations.
Several coworkers told Theno not to trust Cline, because she
would report Theno’s actions back to Boettiger. Cline was
assigned to Theno to help Boettiger and Fernandez intimidate
Theno and eventually terminate his employment. Cline made
Theno extremely anxious, making it nearly impossible to do his
job. Theno and Cline, who both resided in California,
communicated every day. At one point, Cline told Theno that his
job had been filled. The next day, she said that she had spoken
with Boettiger and learned his job had not already been filled.

                               7
Her response showed she was reporting her conversations with
Theno to Boettiger.
      Around October 4, 2019, Fernandez refused to speak with
Theno. On October 11, 2019, a week after complaining to human
resources about the use of information about a competitor’s
personnel, Theno was terminated.
      With respect to the cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, the complaint alleged the defendants’
conduct was outrageous and discriminatory. The defendants
acted with an intent to cause, or reckless disregard for the
probability of causing, Theno to suffer severe emotional distress.
As a result of the infliction of emotional distress, Theno has
sustained loss of earnings and other employment benefits, and
has suffered severe emotional distress. The defendants acted
outside the normal scope of business for the purpose of causing
Theno to suffer financial loss and severe emotional distress, and
are guilty of oppression and malice justifying punitive damages.
      The cause of action for defamation additionally alleged that
beginning in the summer of 2019, the defendants made the
following statements about Theno without believing them to be
true: (1) that Theno was performing poorly for the employer
defendants, (2) that Theno was insubordinate and incompetent at
work, and (3) that Theno, in his professional capacity, could not
be trusted. The statements were made by management-level
employees of the employer defendants, including Fernandez,
Cline, and Boettiger. The defendants made these statements to
Theno’s sales team, coworkers, and other employees of the
employer defendants without any business reason to do so. The
statements were heard by people in California and the United
States, including Theno’s coworkers and other members of the

                                 8
profession. The publication of the statements were motivated by
hatred or ill will toward Theno for reporting the defendants’
potential violations of California law. In addition, the defendants
caused the statements to be published to punish Theno for his
complaints and were motivated by discriminatory animus. The
statements were false.

Motions to Quash Service

       Fernandez specially appeared and filed a motion to quash
service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. He filed his
declaration in support of the motion stating as follows. He is
employed as the Division Vice President of Chronic Pain
Therapies overseeing five geographical areas – West, Midwest,
Central, East, and South – each managed by an area vice
president. Fernandez had responsibility to manage Theno and
the other area vice presidents across the United States. Theno,
as Area Vice President – West, had responsibility for the western
United States, including California and approximately a dozen
other states. Fernandez met with Theno on different occasions in
Texas, Arizona, Maryland, Utah, and Florida. Fernandez
communicated with Theno through email and telephone calls.
Fernandez did not always know where Theno was when they
spoke.
       Fernandez declared that he did not attempt to discredit
Theno with his sales team or state that Theno was incompetent,
untrustworthy, or insubordinate. He did not knowingly pressure
or intimidate Theno to do anything that violated any laws or
regulations.

                                 9
       Fernandez has never resided in California or had a
business office in California. He has never been employed by an
employer in California. He does not own real or personal
property in California, a business interest in California, or any
assets in California. He has never paid taxes in California or
sued anyone in California. On average, Fernandez travels to
California once a year, solely for business. He was last in
California in July 2019 to meet with a physician, not with Theno.
       Boettiger also specially appeared and filed a motion to
quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Boettiger filed his declaration in support of his motion stating the
following facts. He is responsible for Abbott’s entire global
business and implements plans on a business-wide level, not
targeted solely toward California or any other state. The only
time that Boettiger met Theno in person was at a dinner in
Colorado shortly after Theno began working with the company
and at national sales meetings in Austin, Texas. Most of
Boettiger’s communications, plans, and directives were
implemented through Fernandez. When Boettiger communicated
with Theno by email or telephone, he did not know Theno’s
location, as Theno frequently traveled for work.
       During Theno’s employment, Boettiger did not try to
discredit him with his sales team. He did not say Theno was
incompetent, untrustworthy, or insubordinate. He did not direct
Cline to spy on Theno or collect information about him.
       Boettiger has never resided in California or had a business
office in California. He has never been employed by an employer
in California. He does not own real or personal property in
California, a business interest in California, or any assets in
California. He has never paid taxes in California or sued anyone

                                10
in California. On average, Boettiger travels to California four
times per year, solely for business. He was last in California in
March 2020.
       Boettiger also filed excerpts from Theno’s deposition.
Theno had no knowledge that Boettiger was involved with his
performance improvement plan, but he believes Boettiger knew
of the performance plan. Theno had no discussions with
Boettiger about the medical privacy issue with respect to the
initiative or the use of a competitor’s information.

Opposition to Motions to Quash and Further Proceedings

      Theno filed an opposition to Fernandez’s motion to quash.
He submitted his declaration in support of the opposition
containing evidence described further in the discussion below.
He submitted text messages and email exchanges, as well as the
performance improvement plan and his written response to
Fernandez. He also submitted copies of his complaints to
employee relations and human resources.
      Theno filed an opposition to Boettiger’s motion to quash
service of summons as well. He filed a declaration in support of
his opposition as described further in the discussion below.
Fernandez and Boettiger each filed replies.
      The trial court entered an order on June 22, 2021, granting
Fernandez’s motion to quash service of summons. On June 23,
2021, the trial court entered an order granting Boettiger’s motion
to quash service as well. Theno filed a timely notice of appeal
from the June 22, 2021 order and the June 23, 2021 order.

                                11
                          DISCUSSION

      Theno contends Fernandez and Boettiger are subject to
specific jurisdiction in California because they purposefully
directed tortious conduct and communications at California. We
conclude that Theno failed to meet his burden of proof to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all the
jurisdictional criteria were met.

General Principles of Personal Jurisdiction

       California courts “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the
United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) The federal
Constitution permits a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant “if the defendant has such minimum
contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not
violate “ ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” ’ ” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 434, 444.)
       Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. (Thomson
v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 265–266 (Thomson).)
The parties agree that the sole issue in this case is whether
Fernandez and Boettiger are subject to specific jurisdiction. A
defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction when (1) the
defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum
benefits; (2) the controversy at issue arises from or is related to
the defendant’s forum-related contact; and (3) assertion of
jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice.

                                12
(Ibid. at p. 265; Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th
262, 269 (Pavlovich).)

Case Law Illustrating Purposeful Availment

       The focus of the first step of the jurisdiction inquiry
depends on the nature of the claim. (Casey v. Hill (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1143, 1170 (Casey).) In contract claims, courts
consider whether the defendant purposefully and voluntarily
directed activities toward the forum such that the defendant
should expect to be subject to the court’s jurisdiction based on the
benefits received from contacts with the forum. (Ibid.) In tort
claims, courts use a “purposeful direction” test and consider
evidence that the defendant directed actions at the forum, even if
the defendant’s actions were taken outside of the forum. (Ibid.)
The purposeful direction test requires evidence of intentional
conduct that deliberately targets the forum state along with the
defendant’s knowledge that the conduct would cause harm in the
forum. (Ibid.)
       It is the defendant’s intentional and allegedly tortious
conduct directed at the forum that creates the necessary contacts
to assert personal jurisdiction. (Casey, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1171; (Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 395–396
(Rivelli).) “Applying these principles, numerous courts have found
the purposeful direction requirement met where the nonresident
defendant purposefully sent tortious communications into a
forum and thereby injured its residents.” (Casey, at p. 1171.)
       The United States Supreme Court introduced the “effects”
test in Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783 (Calder). In Calder,
an actress who lived and worked in California filed a libel action

                                13
in California against a reporter and an editor working in Florida
based on an article about her in a nationally-syndicated
newspaper. (Id. at pp. 784–786.) The defendants moved to quash
service on the ground that California lacked personal jurisdiction
over them as Florida residents. (Id. at pp. 785–786, 789.) The
Calder court disagreed, concluding the defendants had relied on
California sources, wrote an article about the California activities
of a California resident, knew the article would have a potentially
devastating impact on the plaintiff, and knew the harm from
emotional distress and reputational injury would be suffered in
California, where the newspaper had its largest circulation. (Id.
at pp. 788–790.) “In sum, California [was] the focal point both of
the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over [the
defendants was] proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their
Florida conduct in California.” (Id. at p. 789.) “An individual
injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from
persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the
injury in California.” (Id. at p. 790.)
      The defendants in Calder argued that they had no control
over their employer’s marketing and no direct economic stake in
the employer’s California sales. (Calder, supra, at p. 789.) The
court acknowledged that the defendants’ contacts with California
were not to be assessed based on their employer’s activities in
California. (Id. at p. 790.) “On the other hand, their status as
employees does not somehow insulate them from jurisdiction.
Each defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be assessed
individually. [Citation.] . . . In this case, [defendants] are
primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally
directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is
proper on that basis.” (Id. at p. 790.)

                                14
       In Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277 (Walden), the
United States Supreme Court explained that the jurisdiction
analysis focuses on the relationship of the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation. (Id. at pp. 283–284.) The defendant’s conduct
must create contacts with the forum that are the basis for
jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 285–286.) Jurisdiction is not created
simply based on contacts between the forum and the plaintiff or a
third party. (Id. at p. 284) Similarly, jurisdiction must be based
on the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, not merely on
the defendant’s contacts with people who happen to reside in the
state. (Id. at pp. 285–286.) “To be sure, a defendant’s contacts
with the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions or
interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But a defendant’s
relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 286.)
       The Walden court provided additional explanation of the
Calder opinion: “[T]he reputation-based ‘effects’ of the alleged
libel connected the defendants to California, not just to the
plaintiff. The strength of that connection was largely a function
of the nature of the libel tort. However scandalous a newspaper
article might be, it can lead to a loss of reputation only if
communicated to (and read and understood by) third persons.
[Citations.] Accordingly, the reputational injury caused by the
defendants’ story would not have occurred but for the fact that
the defendants wrote an article for publication in California that
was read by a large number of California citizens. . . . In this
way, the ‘effects’ caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the
injury to the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of the
California public—connected the defendants’ conduct to
California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there. That

                                15
connection, combined with the various facts that gave the article
a California focus, sufficed to authorize the California court’s
exercise of jurisdiction [in Calder].” (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at
pp. 287–288, citations & fn. omitted.)
       Where there is no evidence that a defendant directed
allegedly tortious activity at California, even if the plaintiff
experienced injury in California, courts have found no basis to
exercise jurisdiction. For example, in Pavlovich, supra, the
California Supreme Court applied the effects test to conclude that
a nonresident defendant who merely posted a California
plaintiff’s proprietary information on a website accessible to the
general public did not expressly aim his tortious conduct at or
intentionally target California. (Id. at pp. 273–279.)
       Similarly, in Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 8 (Burdick), a skin care company employee living in
Illinois made a public social media post suggesting a group of
bloggers had criminal histories. (Id. at pp. 14–15.) The bloggers
filed an action in California against the employee. (Id. at p. 16.)
The Burdick court concluded that merely posting an allegedly
defamatory statement on social media while knowing the
plaintiffs were in California, which was the suit-related conduct
in that case, did not create a “substantial connection” between
the defendant and California. (Id. at pp. 25–26.) There was no
evidence that the social media page had a California audience
through the defendant’s social media connections or
advertisements on the page. (Ibid.) Simply posting on a public
social media page, knowing the plaintiff was in California, was
insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the defendant.
       In Zehia v. Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 543, 554
(Zehia), the court found it proper to exercise jurisdiction based on

                                16
more limited effects in California. In Zehia, a defendant located
in Michigan sent direct messages to a plaintiff in California,
fabricated messages with allegedly defamatory statements about
the plaintiff and impersonating the plaintiff, and sent the
fabricated conversations to a third party in California. (Id. at
p. 556.) The Zehia court concluded the defendant’s messages
were targeted exclusively at a California audience (the plaintiff
and the third party), so the defendant’s contacts with California
were not random, fortuitous, or attenuated, and did not result
from unilateral activities of the plaintiff. (Zehia, supra, 45
Cal.App.5th at p. 557.) In addition, the alleged reputational
injury occurred when the defamatory statements were received
by the California residents, which connected the defendant’s
conduct to California. (Ibid.) And the content of the allegedly
defamatory conversations had a California focus. (Ibid.)
       Based on these factors, the Zehia court concluded the
defendant’s suit-related conduct established a substantial
connection with California. (Zehia, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at
p. 558.) By sending messages and conversations directly to
California residents for the alleged purpose of interfering with
their relationship and causing reputational injury in California,
the court found Zehia purposefully reached beyond his state and
into California, such that he should reasonably anticipate being
required to respond in a California court. (Ibid.)
       Other courts have found jurisdiction proper where the
plaintiff suffered injury in California and the defendant’s alleged
tortious conduct directed at California implicated an important
interest of the forum as expressed by state statute. In Schlussel
v. Schlussel (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 194 (Schlussel), for example,
the plaintiffs filed an action in California for intentional infliction

                                  17
of emotional distress based on obscene and threatening telephone
calls allegedly made to them by the defendant, who was a
resident of Florida. (Id. at p.196.) The Schlussel court noted that
California had a stated interest in protecting residents from
annoying and obscene telephone calls, as provided in the
California Penal Code. (Id. at pp. 197–198.) The court concluded
the criminal nature of the telephone calls were effects that made
it an exceptional case and the motion to quash should have been
denied. (Id. at pp. 198–199.)
       More recently, in Hogue v. Hogue (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th
833 (Hogue), a wife living in California sought a restraining order
against her estranged husband living in Georgia. The husband
did not deny sending a video message to her on social media
pretending to shoot himself in the mouth. (Id. at p. 838) The
Hogue court concluded that the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
(Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) reflected California’s concern with an
exceptional type of conduct that it subjects to special regulation.
(Id. at p. 839.) The court further stated, “The act of purposefully
sending a video of a mock suicide to plaintiff in California
(particularly in the context of alleged domestic violence taking
place in Georgia) is indisputably conduct that would disturb
plaintiff's peace of mind within the meaning of the act and be the
basis for granting a restraining order. [Citations.] As a result,
this was sufficient to vest personal jurisdiction in the courts of
this state over defendant to enjoin any further such conduct.”
(Ibid.)

                                18
Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

       “When a nonresident defendant challenges a trial court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden to demonstrate facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.
[Citations.] To meet this burden, a plaintiff must do more than
make allegations. A plaintiff must support its allegations with
‘competent evidence of jurisdictional facts. Allegations in an
unverified complaint are insufficient to satisfy this burden of
proof.’ ” (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.)
       “The plaintiff has the right to conduct discovery with
regard to the issue of jurisdiction to develop the facts necessary to
sustain this burden.” (Mihlon v. Superior Court (1985) 169
Cal.App.3d 703, 710.) A declaration that lacks foundation or
consists of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to meet the
plaintiff’s evidentiary burden. (Floveyor Internat., Ltd. v.
Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 796.) “Declarations
cannot be mere vague assertions of ultimate facts, but must offer
specific evidentiary facts permitting a court to form an
independent conclusion on the issue of jurisdiction.” (In re
Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100,
110.)
       “If the plaintiff makes this showing by a preponderance of
the evidence on the first two requirements (i.e., that the
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the forum and the
plaintiff’s claims relate to or arise out of the defendant’s forum-
related contacts), the burden shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.” (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.)

                                 19
       “On appeal, we independently review the trial court’s legal
conclusions as to whether a defendant’s contacts with California
justify requiring that defendant to mount a defense in the forum.
[Citation.] If the facts giving rise to jurisdiction are conflicting,
we will not disturb the trial court’s express or implied factual
determinations where supported by substantial evidence.
[Citation.] ‘When no conflict in the evidence exists, however, the
question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing
court engages in an independent review of the record.’ ” (Rivelli,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.)
       A motion to quash does not test whether the complaint
states a cause of action, as a demurrer would, and it does not
entail a determination of the merits of the complaint. (Kroopf v.
Guffey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1360.) The issue is not
whether the plaintiff will succeed on the ultimate issues of
liability. “[N]evertheless, when the plaintiff seeks to predicate
jurisdiction on causing tortious effects in the forum state and
when the record tends unequivocally to establish that the
defendant’s conduct did not cause such effects, the plaintiff
‘cannot demand that we judge the question of jurisdiction in the
light of a claim he apparently does not have.’ ” (J. M. Sahlein
Music Co. v. Nippon Gakki Co., Ltd. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 539,
545.)

Specific Jurisdiction as to Boettiger

      Theno contends Boettiger is subject to specific jurisdiction
in California because he purposefully directed defamatory and
retaliatory conduct at California, knowing Theno would
experience the effects in California. We conclude that Theno did

                                 20
not meet his burden to establish the jurisdictional facts by a
preponderance of the evidence.

      A. Evidence of Boettiger’s Conduct

      In Theno’s briefs on appeal, he contends the following
evidence submitted in opposition to Boettiger’s motion to quash
established the necessary jurisdictional facts as to Boettiger.
Theno stated in his declaration that Boettiger participated in
weekly calls with the five area vice presidents, including Theno,
who was in California during the calls, to discuss general
business matters. Boettiger had a significant interest in
California because it was one of the highest performing regions.
After Theno questioned the legality of the trial initiative plan and
refused to implement it without assurances from Abbott’s legal
department, Boettiger became overly aggressive with Theno on
the weekly telephone calls with the area vice presidents.
      After Theno complained about the use of a competitor’s
information to recruit employees, Boettiger assigned Cline to
work as Theno’s executive assistant in California. Cline was in
constant communication with Boettiger. Cline asked Theno
about his performance improvement plan and his complaints.
      Theno speculated that Boettiger instructed Cline to ask
questions of Theno and that Cline relayed Theno’s answers to
Boettiger. He assumed Boettiger assigned Cline to Theno to
harass him, gather information, and/or force him to quit. Cline’s
surveillance caused Theno to be constantly nervous and suffer
from daily depression and anxiety. Theno believed Cline told
members of Theno’s team that he was incompetent and
untrustworthy.

                                21
      Theno also believed Boettiger directed Fernandez’s actions
toward Theno. He believed that Boettiger would have approved
the performance improvement plan and the termination decision
before Fernandez implemented those actions.

      B. Purposeful Availment and Relatedness

       Each defendant’s contacts with California must be assessed
individually. Theno’s evidence that Boettiger engaged in tortious
conduct directed at California was that Boettiger had weekly
telephone calls with a group of area vice presidents that included
an employee in California (Theno), and after Theno complained
about the trial initiative, Boettiger spoke overly aggressively to
Theno during these calls. After Theno complained about the use
of a competitor’s information, Boettiger arranged for his former
executive assistant to work for Theno in California. Theno
remained in close communication with the assistant in
California. Theno speculated in his declaration that Boettiger
instructed Cline and Fernandez to take actions that Theno found
to be harassing. He believes Boettiger must have approved the
PIP and Theno’s termination.
       There is no evidence Boettiger made any allegedly
defamatory statement. In Theno’s complaint, he alleged
Boettiger said he was insubordinate, incompetent, or
untrustworthy, but he did not submit any evidence that Boettiger
made any of these statements. In support of his argument on
appeal, Theno simply cites the allegations of his unverified
complaint, which are not evidence, and refers to the portion of his
declaration in opposition to Fernandez’s motion stating that
Fernandez unjustly criticized Theno’s performance during

                                22
telephone calls with the area vice presidents. There is no
evidence that Boettiger made any statement, let alone an
allegedly defamatory statement to a California audience with
effects in California.
       With respect to intentional infliction of emotional distress
through retaliatory conduct, Theno provided evidence that after
he complained about perceived policy violations, Boettiger was
overly aggressive toward him on weekly phone calls with area
vice presidents, placed his former executive assistant to work for
Theno and remained in communication with her, and likely
approved the performance improvement plan and termination of
Theno’s employment. We conclude there is no evidence of
extreme and outrageous conduct directed at California with the
knowledge that it would cause harm, and Theno’s claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is not related to the
conduct in evidence.
       In Rivelli, the plaintiffs provided evidence that a Swiss
company defendant purposefully availed itself of forum benefits
through ongoing contractual relationships with a California
company, and an individual Swiss defendant purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California
through his directorship at the California company and by
negotiating a transaction between the two companies. (Rivelli,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 397, 405.) The Rivelli court found
the plaintiffs’ evidence did not establish the necessary
connection, however, between the defendants’ activities in
California and the plaintiffs’ claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory
violations of the Corporations Code. (Id. at p. 399.)

                                23
       The Rivelli court found it significant that the plaintiffs
provided no evidence of fraudulent or tortious conduct, or any
actual wrongdoing, that was directed at the forum by the
individual defendant. (Id. at pp. 402, 406.) As a result, there
was no evidence of fraudulent or tortious conduct that was
directed at California by the Swiss company defendant, whose
contacts with the forum were through the individual defendant.
(Id. at p. 402.) “Therefore, appellants have not presented
‘competent evidence of jurisdictional facts’ [citation] tying [the
Swiss company’s] actions to the fraud claim.” (Ibid.) The
evidence showed the contacts between the Swiss company and
California were contractual, while the tort claims in the
complaint did not arise from or relate to the contractual
relationship and were not supported by the jurisdictional
evidence. (Id. at p. 404.)
       After examining the evidence submitted in connection with
the motion to quash, the Rivelli court noted that the individual
defendant had disclosed his role to the board of the California
company, did not vote on the transaction at issue in the case or
participate in the discussion of alternative agreements, and there
was no evidence the shareholders of the California company had
been misled about the individual defendant’s role in the
transaction. (Id. at p. 406.) The court concluded, “Having
carefully reviewed the record presented of [the individual
defendant’s] contacts with California through his service on the
[California company’s] board, and the nature of [the Swiss
company defendant’s transaction with the California company],
we conclude that in each instance appellants have not
demonstrated the required relatedness between the California
forum, [the individual or the company defendant], and the

                                24
specific claims at issue, as would be required to permit the
constitutional exercise of case-linked jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 408.)
       In In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II, supra, 135
Cal.App.4th at p. 111, the plaintiffs alleged several foreign car
manufacturers were subject to jurisdiction in California because
each participated in a conspiracy that harmed California
consumers. The plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that he had no
evidence of conspiracy as to three of the foreign manufacturers,
but relied on inferences from evidence implicating other parent
manufacturers. (Ibid.) The trial court found the evidence was
too imprecise and speculative to support finding jurisdiction. (Id.
at p. 112.)
       On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that they were not
required to demonstrate the jurisdictional facts by a
preponderance of evidence because the facts necessary to
establish jurisdiction were “ ‘inseparably intertwined’ ” with the
facts necessary to establish liability. (In re Automobile Antitrust
Cases I & II, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 112.) They argued that
establishing jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of evidence
would effectively require them to prove the merits of their
conspiracy case. (Ibid.)
       The appellate court concluded the trial court was not
required to draw an inference from the evidence that would
compel a finding of liability, and therefore, jurisdiction. (Ibid.)
Requiring the trial court to draw an inference from the evidence
in favor of jurisdiction would relieve the plaintiffs’ burden of proof
as to the jurisdictional facts. (Id. at p. 113.) Also, the inference
sought in that case violated the principle that jurisdictional facts
must be established as to each individual defendant. (Ibid.) In

                                 25
addition, a mandatory inference would interfere with the trial
court’s role as a fact finder on jurisdictional issues. (Ibid.)
      The appellate court noted, “These guidelines are not clear
cut and are not susceptible to mechanical application. Instead,
courts take a highly realistic approach, weighing the facts in each
case to determine whether the defendant’s contacts with
California are sufficient to support an exercise of jurisdiction
consistent with federal due process.” (In re Automobile Antitrust
Cases I & II, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.)
      In the present case, there is no evidence that Boettiger
engaged in any extreme and outrageous conduct directed at
California.1 Boettiger’s conduct directed at California consisted

      1 “The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress are: ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by
the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s
outrageous conduct.” ’ ” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54
Cal.3d 868, 903.) To be considered outrageous, the conduct must
be “ ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated
in a civilized community.’ ” (Ibid.) “Liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities.” ’ ” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.)
Actions necessary to carry out the duties of business and
personnel management include “hiring and firing, job or project
assignments, office or work station assignments, promotion or
demotion, performance evaluations, the provision of support, the
assignment or nonassignment of supervisory functions, deciding
who will and who will not attend meetings, deciding who will be
laid off, and the like.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996)

                                 26
of general personnel management activity. Theno failed to show
that his claim intentional infliction of emotional distress arose
out of or were related to Boettiger’s contacts with California. “It
is correct that a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction
does not implicate the merits of the complaint, but the plaintiff,
in opposing the defendant’s motion to quash, must present
evidence to justify a finding that the requisite jurisdictional
minimum contacts exist[.]” (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior
Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 540; but see Bader v. Avon
Products, Inc., (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 186, 198 [plaintiff opposing
motion to quash service need not prove product defect where
evidence of sale of allegedly defective product in forum created
basis for jurisdiction].) The trial court properly quashed service
of the complaint as to Boettiger.

Specific Jurisdiction Over Fernandez

      Theno similarly contends Fernandez is subject to specific
jurisdiction in California because he purposefully directed
defamatory and retaliatory conduct at California, knowing Theno
would experience the effects in California. We conclude that

46 Cal.App.4th 55, 64–65.) “Managing personnel is not
outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but
rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society.
A simple pleading of personnel management activity is
insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.” (Id.
at p. 80.)

                                27
Theno did not meet his burden to establish the jurisdictional
facts by a preponderance of the evidence as to Fernandez.

      1. Evidence of Fernandez’s Conduct

       In Theno’s briefs on appeal, he contends the following
evidence submitted in opposition to Fernandez’s motion to quash
established the necessary jurisdictional facts as to Fernandez.
Theno declared that after he complained about the trial
initiative, Fernandez became hostile toward Theno on the weekly
telephone calls with the area vice presidents. Theno was in
California during the calls, while the other area vice presidents
were presumably outside of California. Fernandez falsely
criticized Theno’s performance or ignored him during the calls.
Fernandez praised other area vice presidents and not Theno,
even though Theno’s sales numbers and other metrics were
consistently higher than the employees receiving praise.
       Fernandez placed Theno on a performance improvement
plan that stated he was not meeting performance expectations,
inadequately assessed employees for hiring and promotion
decisions, and was a poor planner. Although the plan was
communicated to Theno in another state, Fernandez’s subsequent
communication about the plan was made to Theno in California.
       For the first few months on the PIP, Theno attempted to
comply with the plan by including Fernandez in calls with
Theno’s sales team, but Fernandez was never able to join the
calls. Although Fernandez was not complying with the plan, he
yelled at Theno about perceived mistakes, contradicted himself
about hiring decisions, and unjustly accused Theno of being a
poor leader without evidence to support his statements.

                               28
       In August 2019, every area vice president was below their
sales quotas, but Theno was the closest to reaching his sales
target for the month. In a weekly phone call with the area vice
presidents, Fernandez singled out Theno and berated him
regarding the trial initiative. Theno found the comments
demeaning in light of his performance. Some of Theno’s peers on
the telephone call were surprised and concerned by Fernandez’s
remarks to Theno about the trial initiative and discussed the
comments with Theno after the call. Fernandez also stated,
“nobody survives a PIP from me.” Theno was the only area vice
president on a performance improvement plan. Theno was
humiliated and embarrassed by Fernandez’s comment, and afraid
he would be terminated because of his complaints about medical
privacy violations.
       In September 2019, Fernandez began participating in
Theno’s weekly calls with his sales team, as well as initiating
calls to Theno’s team inside and outside California without
Theno. Theno and many of his sales team members were in
California. During the calls with Theno’s sales team, Fernandez
constantly undermined Theno, talked over him, and berated him,
making him feel irrelevant and incompetent in front of his own
team.
       Boettiger and Fernandez sent the area vice presidents a list
of salespersons to recruit from a competitor, which Theno
believed was an illegal use of the competitor’s trade secrets.
Theno refused to participate.
       On October 4, 2020, Fernandez told Theno that he had not
seen any progress from Theno, although Theno was consistently
the top performer and had been sending weekly updates about
his progress on the plan. Theno was in California during this

                                29
conversation. Fernandez continued to hold Theno responsible for
things that resulted from Fernandez’s actions or were out of
Theno’s control. That day, Theno sent a formal complaint to
employee relations and to human resources stating that he was
being retaliated against for complaining about medical privacy
violations and the use of competitor sales information.
       On October 11, 2020, Fernandez called Theno in California
and terminated his employment.

     2. Purposeful Availment and Relatedness

       Theno’s evidence of intentional tortious conduct by
Fernandez directed at California was that Fernandez
participated in weekly telephone calls with a group of area vice
presidents that included an employee in California (Theno).
After Theno complained about the trial initiative, Fernandez
became hostile toward him during these weekly calls and
criticized Theno’s performance or ignored him.
       Fernandez caused Theno to be placed on a PIP. In
conversations between them, Fernandez yelled at Theno about
perceived mistakes, contradicted himself about hiring decisions,
and told Theno that he was a poor leader. Theno was in
California during these conversations.
       On a weekly call with the area vice presidents, Fernandez
berated Theno about the trial initiative. He also stated, “nobody
survives a PIP from me,” knowing Theno was the only person on
the call with a performance improvement plan.
       Fernandez eventually participated in weekly calls with
Theno’s sales team as well, many of whom were in California. In
these calls, Fernandez undermined Theno, talked over him, and

                               30
berated him. One time, Fernandez met with a doctor in Theno’s
territory in California without Theno present.
       After Theno complained to employee relations about
medical privacy violations and use of a competitor’s trade secrets,
Fernandez called Theno in California and terminated his
employment.
       There is no evidence Fernandez made any statement that
was allegedly defamatory. In Theno’s complaint, he alleged that
Fernandez said he was insubordinate, incompetent, and
untrustworthy, but in opposition to the motion to quash, he did
not submit evidence that Fernandez made any of these
statements. On appeal, Theno cites the allegations of his
unverified complaint, which are not evidence, and refers to the
statement in his declaration that Fernandez unfairly criticized
Theno’s performance during telephone calls with the area vice
presidents. To the extent it can be inferred from Theno’s
declaration that Fernandez’s criticism was a statement that
Theno was incompetent, Theno was the only area vice president
located in California during the calls. The allegedly defamatory
statements were made to individuals outside of California during
these calls and cannot support specific jurisdiction over
Fernandez.
       With respect to Theno’s claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, he provided evidence of personnel
management activities directed at California but did not provide
evidence that Fernandez engaged in any extreme and outrageous
conduct directed at California with the knowledge that it would
cause harm in California. Unlike the cases finding a defendant
purposefully availed himself of forum benefits, Fernandez’s
conduct was directed to an individual employee who he

                                31
supervised and not a general California audience, and there was
no argument that Fernandez’s conduct implicated a forum
interest expressed in a state statute. Theno failed to show that
his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress arose out
of or were related to the evidence of Fernandez’s conduct that he
submitted. The trial court properly granted the motion to quash
the complaint as to Fernandez as well.

                                 32
                      DISPOSITION

     The orders are affirmed. Respondents Frank Fernandez
and Keith Boettiger are awarded their costs on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      MOOR, J.

I concur:

            KIM, J.

                            33
Kip Theno v. Frank Fernandez et al.
B314277

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring

      The majority correctly holds there is no personal
jurisdiction over defendant Frank Fernandez and I join the
majority’s analysis of that issue. As to defendant Keith
Boettiger, I agree the majority reaches the correct result. The
claimed tortious conduct by Boettiger, principally occurring on
telephone calls with area vice-presidents for other regions of the
United States, was not “‘California-directed’ in any meaningful
sense.” (Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 1062, 1076.)

                       BAKER, Acting P. J.