Court Opinion

ID: 9628751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:30:57.769401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:10.825765
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
It is conceded by the majority that tax exemption statutes are to be strictly construed. The qualification that a construction must also be “reasonable” does not destroy the constructional preference for the tax-ability of property. It follows that if the statute is susceptible to either of two constructions, each of which is reasonable, we must accept the construction which spells liability for the taxpayer.
In the present case the statute provides for an exemption only when the property “is actually and exclusively occupied or used in the literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific work” carried on by the qualifying institution. It stretches the meaning of the terms of the statute to describe the process of constructing a building as the actual and exclusive use or occupancy for the purposes specified. But conceding that these terms can have this meaning, it would seem that the majority would have to admit that it would be at least as reasonable to construe the language to mean that the exemption was not to be given unless the institution actually carried on some “literary, be*350nevolent, charitable or scientific work” on the property.① If the latter construction is reasonable, then the rule of strict construction which we have previously followed (and which I believe is sound) would require us to deny the exemption in this case.
I suspect that the source of the majority’s error can be found in the phrase “strict but reasonable.” The addition of the qualification “reasonable” to the strict construction rule is unfortunate. A statute must always be reasonably construed in the sense that the construction should not run counter to the purpose of the legislature. However, the word “reasonable” is frequently used by courts to mean that construction which is the more reasonable of two feasible alternatives. This permits the court to weigh the alternatives and choose the one which in its judgment seems the most just and equitable. I believe that the majority engaged in this ldnd of a weighing process in the present case. But the rule of strict construction prevents the court from freely maldng this kind of choice. The court must construe tax statutes “most strongly against those petitioning for the exemption.” Oregon Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Tax Com., 226 Or 298, 306, 360 P2d 293 (1961). Tested by this principle of construction, the claim for exemption in the present case should *351be denied. This court may feel that it is desirable to allow an exemption to an educational institution which, by beginning construction of a building on its property, has taken steps to use the property for its purposes. But unless we are prepared to say that the statute cannot rationally be construed as it was in the Cedars of Lebanon Hospital case, we must deny the claim for exemption.
The decree of the Tax Court should be reversed.

 The latter construction was given to similar language by the court in Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal2d 729, 221 P2d 31 (1950). The court said: “* * * Such express limitation, making use the focal point of consideration, contemplates actual use as differentiated from an intention to use the property in a designated manner. It has been generally so held in the construction of kindred exemption laws in other jurisdictions * * and again:
«* * * The same observation may well be made in this case for regardless of the rule of strict construction here applicable, it would appear that under no theory of construction could a building in the course of erection be viewed as being used for any purpose.” (221 P2d at 39.)