Court Opinion

ID: 9647157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:25:11.729049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:36.889433
License: Public Domain

HOWELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority is indulging in a double standard. Friendly’s pleadings are being treated with smiling leniency; its special exception is being converted into a motion for judgment. Yet Brown's answer is treated with draconian strictness. The result is not just.
The majority relies upon Dixon v. May-field Building Supply Co., 543 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1976, no writ), to hold that Brown’s answer was not properly verified. Actually Dixon compels the opposite conclusion. The crucial portion of that opinion reads:
Swearing to the statement by the party making and signing it is essential to the validity of an affidavit....
The general test applied to determine the sufficiency of an affidavit is that if the facts are falsely sworn to, the affiant may be prosecuted and convicted of perjury. ...
“It is essential that one making an affidavit swear or affirm under oath that the facts stated are true.”
(Citation omitted). The majority has quoted the full text of the notarial act in Dixon plus the notarial act here in issue. Dixon follows the classic language of a notarial acknowledgement, the form necessary to prove the execution of a deed or other instrument transferring rights in property. See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE S 121.-007 (Vernon 1986). The notarial certificate recited that Dixon had “acknowledged.... that the facts contained therein are true and correct” (emphasis added). Plainly, an acknowledgement is not an oath and Dixon swore to nothing.
The distinction from the case in bar is stark. Here the notarial certificate recites below the signature of appellant the words: “SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, ... by Robert L. Brown” (emphasis added). Dixon has no application. The phrase “sworn to” can only refer to the pleading that precedes it. Hence it meets the requirements of an affidavit and the mandate of Rule 185. An affidavit in virtually identical terms was approved in International Shelters v. Corpus Christi State National Bank, 475 S.W.2d 334, 339 (Tex. Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1971, no writ).
Even if the affidavit is viewed as defective for failure to point out with precision exactly what portions of the pleading were being sworn to, the trial court erred in rendering judgment without allowing the right to re-plead. When a special exception to a pleading is sustained, the trial court must afford the offending pleader an opportunity to amend. Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex.1974). It is true that the court had previously sustained one special exception wherein Brown had completely failed to verify his denial. Clearly, however Brown’s second pleading represented at least a bona fide attempt to meet the requirements of the rules, which failed, if at all, in the most minute detail. Neither does the record contain a finding that Brown had purposely engaged in dilatory conduct, and the record suggests nothing to this effect. To the contrary, Brown filed his amended pleading promptly after the trial court had sustained an exception to the previous pleading. The plaintiff, knowing that trial was imminent, waited two weeks to renew his exception, did not file it until the date of trial and did not urge it upon *121the court until after the jury was seated. If any opprobrium is to be meted out, it must go to the plaintiff. The trial court had ample grounds to hold that plaintiff had waived its special exception to Brown’s trial pleading by failing to urge it more timely.
The trial court was possessed of yet another alternative. From all appearances, affiant Brown was readily available, if not physically present in the courtroom when the court entered judgment. If the court felt impelled to sustain the special exception, why could it not grant a short recess to allow defendant an opportunity to make a trial amendment attaching to its pleadings a verification meeting the plaintiff’s objections? The trial could have proceeded on that very day. Of course, the plaintiff had little interest in obtaining a revision to the affidavit. What the plaintiff really desired was to effect a forfeiture. Suffice to say, the trial court erred in accommodating the plaintiff’s desires.
I dissent. This case should be reversed for trial upon its merits.