Court Opinion

ID: 9674941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:37:37.274415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:09.916336
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the disposition of point one.
That the judicial process itself can emotionally traumatize children who are the victims of sexual assault is within the realm of common knowledge. Their natural vulnerability, reticence, and sensitivity makes that conclusion self-evident. Assuming, however, that the prosecutor’s hyperbole — i.e., comparing the child-victim’s emotional trauma from testifying in court to another act of rape by the defendant — is beyond the bounds of permissible argument, the question is whether the denial of Villarreal’s motion for a mistrial is error. See Washington v. State, 822 S.W.2d 110, 118 (Tex.App. — Waco 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 856 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Whether the court acted properly depends upon the efficacy of the curative instruction. Did it remove the prejudicial effect of the improper argument? See Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). If it did, then there is no error in denying the mistrial, and no harm analysis is required. See id.
Ordinarily, an instruction to disregard will cure the harm from improper argument. Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). In this particular instance, however, the majority holds that the argument is so extreme and manifestly improper, and thus so inflammatory, that the instruction did not erase its prejudicial effect on the punishment verdict. See Hernandez, 819 S.W.2d at 820. This is the precise point of my disagreement.
Unlike the constitutional right to remain silent, which is shielded from prosecutorial comment by a mandatory statute, the constitutional right to a jury trial enjoys no such protection. See Tex.Code CRIM.Pkoc.Ann. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1979). Nor did the prosecutor’s argument inject new facts into the case. Instead, the only reason given for holding the instruction ineffective is the following: “Testifying as a witness is the responsibility of every citizen, regardless of the odious nature of the evidence. To equate the fulfillment of this responsibility with being subject to rape is the type of argument that should be considered extreme and manifestly improper and thus so inflammatory that its prejudicial effect could not reasonably be removed from the minds of the jurors by the instruction given.”
Apparently after only 35 minutes of deliberation, the jury convicted Villarreal of the aggravated sexual assault of a 9-year-old girl. Because he had no prior criminal record, the punishment on this first-degree felony ranged from 5 years to 99 years or life, plus a fine. See TexPenal Code Ann. § 12.32 (Vernon Supp.1993). Acting solely on the evidence produced during the guilt-innocence phase, the jury assessed punishment at 25 years in prison.
*651The majority does not point to anything in the record indicating that the instruction was ineffective. To the contrary, that the jury heeded the court’s instruction to disregard is best illustrated by the punishment verdict itself. It is measured to the evidence and certainly not excessive. Only if the 25-year sentence is excessive can one reasonably and fairly say that the instruction to disregard was fruitless. To find the punishment excessive under the facts of this case simply ignores the reality of the record and the common-sense view of the evidence by the jury.
Therefore, I disagree with the majority holding that the curative instruction was ineffective. As a result, I also disagree with their finding of error from the denial of the motion for a mistrial. I would hold that there is no error. Without error, no harm analysis is necessary. See Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). Agreeing with the balance of the majority opinion, I would affirm Villarreal's conviction. For these reasons I dissent.