Court Opinion

ID: 9781593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:53:33.658969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:27.675457
License: Public Domain

FEW, C.J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s analysis of Issues I and II, and therefore dissent. Because my position on either Issue I *81or II would resolve this appeal, I would not reach Issues III and IV.
I. Jurisdiction
Hulsey moved for a new trial and for relief from judgment on the ground that jurisdiction never re-vested in the state court after removal, and therefore federal law prohibited the state court from proceeding with the case. The plain language of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(d) and 1447(c) required that the motion be granted.

a. The Plain Language of Sections 1446(d) and 1447(c)

Section 1446(d) provides that after an action has been removed to federal court “the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” A remand order based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, such as the remand order in this case, is governed by section 1447(c),21 which requires that “[a] certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court.” The next sentence of section 1447(c) — “The State court may thereupon proceed with such case” — is the key to this case. The word “thereupon” sets the point in time when the case is “remanded.” Before a certified copy of the remand order is mailed, the state court may not proceed; afterwards, it may. The section 1446(d) prohibition of “shall proceed no further” remains in effect until the section 1447(c) requirement that a “certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed” has been met. This plain language is all that is necessary to resolve this appeal. A certified copy of the order of remand was never mailed to the state court clerk. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(d) and 1447(c), therefore, the state court had no power to proceed. Because the state court acted when federal law prohibited it from doing so, the resulting judgment was void. The trial court’s failure to grant relief from the judgment was error and must be reversed.
The majority takes the position that the mailing of a certified copy of the remand order does not determine the point in *82time when a state court may proceed after remand. Their position is based primarily on two grounds. First, the majority argues that the mailing of a certified copy of the remand order is not required in the Fourth Circuit under the authority of In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731 (4th Cir.1996). Second, the majority argues that to the extent the requirement is applicable, it is procedural, and the right to enforce it has been waived in this case.

b. In re Lowe

The question before the court in Lowe was different from the question we face. Thus, the rule announced there is not applicable here. The majority’s argument that the mailing of a certified copy of the remand order is not required in the Fourth Circuit is based on the following passage from Lowe: “we hold that a federal court loses jurisdiction over a case as soon as its order to remand the case is entered. From that point on, it cannot reconsider its ruling even if the district court clerk fails to mail to the state court a certified copy of the remand order.” 102 F.3d at 736. The majority has incorrectly framed the issue by relying on this passage.
The majority’s argument begins by correctly recognizing that section 1446(d) allows the state court to proceed as soon as the case is “remanded.” However, the majority incorrectly concludes that the above statement from Lowe answers the question of when that occurs. I agree that Lowe sets the point in time when the federal court may not reconsider a remand order. However, that ruling is based on the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of section 1447(d), not section 1446(d). Therefore, the majority is mistaken that Lowe sets the point in time when the case is remanded, and that it is not necessary to interpret section 1447(c) in order to determine when the state court may proceed. Rather, we are required to enforce the section 1447(c) requirement that a certified copy of the remand order be mailed before the state court may proceed.
A careful analysis of Lowe demonstrates that the question it answered was different. The plaintiff sued her employer and two of its managers in the state court of North Carolina. 102 F.3d at 732. After the defendants removed the case to federal *83court, the plaintiff moved to remand. Id. A federal magistrate judge granted the motion on the grounds that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 102 F.3d at 732-33, 736. The federal clerk mailed the order to the clerk of the state court, but the copy mailed was not certified. 102 F.3d at 733. Six months later, a different federal magistrate judge granted the defendants’ motion to reconsider. Id. After the second magistrate denied two motions to remand, the plaintiff petitioned the Fourth Circuit for a -writ of mandamus requiring the district court to return the case to the state court. Id. After concluding generally that remand orders issued for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are not reviewable, 102 F.3d at 733-34, the Fourth Circuit framed the specific issue before it as follows: “[t]he only question remaining, then, is to identify when a court’s decision to remand becomes unreviewable.” 102 F.3d at 734.
The court analyzed the question by focusing on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), and in particular the word “order.”
Subsection 1447(d) provides only that a remand “order” may not be reviewed; it does not condition reviewability on any other event. Thus, the plain language of subsection (d) indicates that a court may not reconsider its decision to remand, as soon as it formalizes that decision in an “order.”
102 F.3d at 734. The Lowe decision thus turns on the court’s interpretation of the word “order” in section 1447(d) and not, as the majority claims, on the timing of “remanded” under section 1446(d). In fact, Lowe does not even mention section 1446. The court clarifies its reliance on section 1447(d) with the language “[1447(d) ] does not condition reviewability on any other event.” Id. This statement makes it clear that Lowe is not based on sections 1446(d) or 1447(c), which refer respectively to the events of “remanded” and “mailed.” Therefore, the majority’s contention that Lowe defines “remanded” is not correct.
Moreover, Lowe contemplates that the section 1447(c) requirement of a mailing remains a part of the process of remand. Noting that it has read sections 1447(c) and (d) independently, 102 F.3d at 734 n. 3, the court explains that section 1447(c) “directs the district court clerk to mail a ‘copy’ of the remand order to the state court, certainly implying that *84the order itself, the document § 1447(d) tells us is unreviewable, is in existence before the time of the mailing.” 102 F.3d at 734. If the Fourth Circuit’s “minority” approach made the mailing required by section 1447(c) unnecessary, the Lowe court would have had no reason to provide this explanation that the section comes into play after the event of an “order” contemplated in section 1447(d).
The majority and I agree that the plain language “shall proceed no further” in section 1446(d) prohibits a state court from acting on a removed case until the case is “remanded.” The question we face is when federal law sets that point in time, and thus removes the “shall proceed no further” prohibition. The answer to that question is not found in Lowe’s interpretation of section 1447(d), but in the plain language of sections 1446(d) and 1447(c).
c. Waiver
The majority’s second ground for its position is that the section 1447(c) requirement of mailing a certified copy is a procedural requirement rather than a jurisdictional one. The distinction is irrelevant in this case. Congress enacted a statute providing that when a case is removed to federal court the state court is prohibited from further action “unless and until the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). This prohibition may not be avoided by labeling the mailing requirement procedural. The prohibition is imposed by a federal statute and is likewise lifted only in accordance with federal statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(d) and 1447(c). The question we face in this appeal requires us to interpret these statutes and apply their plain language to the facts of this case. See Media Gen. Commc’ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 388 S.C. 138, 148, 694 S.E.2d 525, 530 (2010) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, ... the court has no right to impose another meaning.”).
The majority’s ruling not only imposes another meaning on these statutes, but it also renders an entire sentence of the United States Code meaningless by eliminating the section 1447(c) requirement that the federal clerk mail a certified copy of the remand order. This court is not permitted to interpret *85a statute so as to render a part of it meaningless. See Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 102 F.3d 712, 715 (4th Cir.1996) (“Absent clear congressional intent to the contrary, we will assume the legislature did not intend to pass vain or meaningless legislation.”); Duvall v. S.C. Budget & Control Bd., 377 S.C. 36, 42, 659 S.E.2d 125, 128 (2008) (“The Court must presume the Legislature intended its statutes to accomplish something and did not intend a futile act.”).
By characterizing the mailing requirement as procedural, the majority has converted section 1447(c) to a notice statute, so that the requirement of mailing a certified copy can be ignored because, as the majority states, “Hulsey cannot, and does not, maintain notice was insufficient.” I do not believe this court is free to be so loose with the requirements of federal law. If Congress intended that notice of a remand was sufficient to enable the state court to proceed, it could easily have drafted sections 1446(d) and 1447(c) accordingly.
The majority’s waiver argument also suggests that the issue is not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised to the trial court before judgment was entered. The situation in which the federal removal statutes prohibit a state court from proceeding after a case is removed is analogous to the situation in which the federal bankruptcy stay prohibits a state court from taking action against a debtor who has filed a bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2004 & Supp. 2010). In that instance, as in this one, the validity of a judgment entered in state court during the time in which federal law prohibits it can be raised at any time. See Ex Parte Reichlyn, 310 S.C. 495, 498-99, 427 S.E.2d 661, 663-64 (1993) (declaring a judgment void when the judgment was entered during the pendency of the bankruptcy stay).

d. Bryan v. BellSouth Communications, Inc.

In support of their respective positions, Appellants and Respondent cite different clauses in the same footnote from the Fourth Circuit’s second opinion in Bryan v. BellSouth Communications, Inc., 492 F.3d 231 (4th Cir.2007) (Bryan II).22 As I will explain, the footnote supports the position I *86have taken in this dissent. To understand Bryan II, however, it is important to note that the remand order was not made pursuant to section 1447(c).23 Instead, after dismissing two federal claims on the merits, the district court determined a third claim was not federal, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it, and remanded it to state court. Bryan II, 492 F.3d at 234 — 35; Bryan I, 377 F.3d at 425. Because the Bryan remand was not based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore was not made pursuant to section 1447(c), any statement in Bryan II interpreting that subsection is technically dictum. However, both parties have cited Bryan II as authoritative, as has the majority. Mindful therefore of the admonition of former Chief Judge Sanders that “those who disregard dictum, either in law or in life, do so at their peril,” I will give due regard to the footnote from Bryan II. Yaeger v. Murphy, 291 S.C. 485, 490 n. 2, 354 S.E.2d 393, 396 n. 2 (Ct.App.1987).
The footnote states:
A remand is effective when the district court mails a certified copy of the remand order to the state court, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West 2006), or, if the remand is based on the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal process, when the remand order is entered....
Bryan II, 492 F.3d at 235 n. 1 (emphasis added). The disjunctive word “or” indicates that the purpose of the footnote is to differentiate between the two types of remand: those made pursuant to section 1447(c) and those made for some other reason. In particular, the footnote differentiates between the points in time when each is “effective” to allow the state court to proceed.24 Citing to section 1447(c), which *87applies only to remand orders such as the one in this case, the first clause states the rule that the “remand is effective when the district court mails a certified copy of the remand order to the state court.” The only situation in which the first clause of the footnote can be an accurate statement of law is when the statement is made to answer the precise question we face in this appeal — When does federal law remove the “shall proceed no further” prohibition so that a state court may proceed with a case after a remand made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)?25
Finally, the text of Bryan II contains a statement that is contrary to the majority’s interpretation of the footnote. Responding to a separate argument made by BellSouth, the court again described the point in time when the state court regained jurisdiction to proceed after the remand, and cited section 1447(c). In the parenthetical after the citation in which it explained the meaning of 1447(c), the court stated “providing that the state court may proceed with a case once the district court mails a certified copy of the remand order to the state court.” 492 F.3d at 241. This is consistent with the plain language of the statutes and refutes the majority’s interpretation of the footnote. Therefore, I interpret the footnote to include in its first clause the rule applicable to the issue we face in this appeal, and thereby to support my position that the federal clerk was required to mail a certified copy of the remand order to the state court clerk before the state court had jurisdiction to proceed.

e. Conclusion as to Jurisdiction

Limehouse argues that the result of a straightforward interpretation of sections 1446(d) and 1447(c) under the circumstances of this case “makes no sense.” The majority refers to *88it as “jurisdictional limbo” and “jurisdictional hiatus.” It is true that interpreting the statutes according to their plain meaning creates a scenario in which for some period of time neither the federal court nor the state court had the power to act. In most cases, however, this period is very brief; in any case it is a situation required by the plain language of federal statutes. Whenever the period becomes lengthy, as it did here, the federal court has the power to order its clerk to comply with the statute.26
I acknowledge that the result I propose appears at first to be harsh on the facts of this case. However, the section 1446(d) prohibition of “shall proceed no further” is absolute and contemplates no exceptions, even in the face of a harsh result. When the Legislative branch sets forth plain and unambiguous language in a statute, the Judicial branch is constrained to follow it. If the results are harsh, the Legislature may change the statute but the courts may not.27 How*89ever, the result I would reach is not harsh, nor even unfair. Limehouse’s motion to remand to state court cites 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) in its first sentence. Presumably his lawyers read the subsection, in which the requirement of mailing a certified copy of the remand order is plainly and unambiguously stated. Having cited the subsection to his advantage, it is not at all unfair that Limehouse be bound by the subsection when its plain terms work to his disadvantage.
In summary, the following rules apply to remand in the Fourth Circuit. A remand order based on some ground other than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal procedure, such as the decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in Bryan, is reviewable, but the remand is effective allowing the state court to proceed as soon as the order is entered. On the other hand, a remand order which is based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, such as the order in this case and in Lowe, is unreviewable as soon as it is entered. However, this type of remand is effective such that the state court may proceed only after the federal clerk has complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) by mailing a certified copy of the remand order to the state court clerk. Because the federal clerk never complied with this requirement, the case was never “remanded,” the state court had no power to proceed, and the resulting judgment entered in violation of federal law is void.
II. Rule 55(c)
Hulsey moved for relief from default, which the trial court denied in an order filed February 7, 2007. In the subsequent decision of Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Industries, Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 681 S.E.2d 885 (2009), our supreme court explained how the reasons for the default are to be analyzed in determining the existence of “good cause” under Rule 55(c). In light of Sundown, the analysis used by the trial court was controlled by an error of law. I would remand to the circuit court to reconsider the question of good cause under the standard set forth in Sundown.

a. Good Cause under Rule 55(c) before Sundown

Our appellate courts have stated that Rule 55(c) is to be liberally construed to promote justice and dispose of cases on *90the merits. See, e.g., In re Moore, 342 S.C. 1, 5 n. 7, 536 S.E.2d 367, 369 n. 7 (2000); Melton v. Olenik, 379 S.C. 45, 54, 664 S.E.2d 487, 492 (Ct.App.2008). In addition to this general guidance, our appellate courts have consistently listed three factors, which have become known as the Wham factors, that a trial court should consider in deciding whether good cause exists. See Wham v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 298 S.C. 462, 465, 381 S.E.2d 499, 501-02 (Ct.App.1989). These factors, (1) the timing of the defendant’s motion for relief, (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3) the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is granted, have been cited as the only factors to be considered in almost every opinion since Wham addressing good cause under Rule 55(c). See, e.g., Richardson v. P.V., Inc., 383 S.C. 610, 616, 682 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2009) (decided after Sundown); Melton, 379 S.C. at 55, 664 S.E.2d at 492.
Neither the general guidance to liberally construe Rule 55(c) in order to promote justice and dispose of cases on the merits nor the Wham factors instruct a trial court to require, or even to consider, the reason the party went into default. Nevertheless, trial courts and practicing lawyers have been generally aware that some explanation for the default is important to the analysis of good cause under Rule 55(c). In fact, in New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Bey Corp., 312 S.C. 47, 435 S.E.2d 377 (Ct.App.1993), this court quoted Dean Lightsey and Professor Flanagan in listing four factors “relevant under” Rule 55(c), including “the reasons for the failure to act promptly.” 312 S.C. at 50, 435 S.E.2d at 379 (quoting Harry M. Lightsey & James F. Flanagan, South Carolina Civil Procedure 82 (1985)). Until Sundown, Bey Corp. was the only South Carolina appellate decision interpreting Rule 55(c) to have addressed the reasons for the default. However, other than to state it is a relevant factor, Bey Corp. gives no explanation as to how this fits into the analysis of good cause.
Therefore, at the time of the hearing and order on Hulsey’s motion for relief from default, South Carolina law provided that the party seeking relief from the default must show good cause, and that in deciding the motion the judge should consider four relevant factors in light of the general guidance that Rule 55(c) is to be liberally construed to promote justice and dispose of cases on the merits. The factors were (1) the *91timing of the defendant’s motion for relief, (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, (3) the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is granted, and (4) the reasons for the failure to act promptly.

b. The Impact of Sundown

In Sundown, the supreme court began its analysis by discussing the reasons for the default. However, the Sundown court elevated that factor to a requirement, stating that the good cause standard “requires a party seeking relief from an entry of default under Rule 55(c) to provide an explanation for the default.” 383 S.C. at 607, 681 S.E.2d at 888. The court went even further and also required that the moving party “give reasons why vacation of the default entry would serve the interests of justice.” Id. Thus, the standard of good cause is now interpreted in two ways that are different from the law available to the trial court. First, the reason for the default is no longer merely a factor to be considered. Rather, the party seeking relief from default is required “to provide an explanation for the default.” Second, the party seeking relief must give “reasons why vacation of the default would serve the interests of justice.” The circuit court must consider all of this in determining whether or not the explanation for the default is satisfactory.28

c. The Sundown Analysis Applied to These Facts

In this case, Hulsey has complied with the requirement of providing an explanation for the default: an attorney miscalculated the due date of the answer. The next question posed by Sundown was never considered by the trial court. Instead of considering whether vacating the default would serve the interests of justice, the trial court focused on whether the explanation was reasonable. The court found “no good reason” was presented. It also stated that there was “no reasonable basis” for the “assumption that the 30 day time to file an answer starts completely anew upon remand.” (emphasis omitted). At one point the trial court called this “confusion.” The *92reasonableness of the explanation is certainly a valid factor to consider. However, Sundown requires a broader inquiry, namely that the reasonableness of the explanation be considered as a part of the analysis of whether vacating the default would serve the interests of justice.
The facts of this case demonstrate the importance of the broader inquiry. The conduct of the lawyer in this case was not “reasonable.” First, he should have filed an answer in federal court before the remand order was entered. See Rule 81(c)(2), FRCP. Second, when he learned of the remand order, he should have raced to the county courthouse to file it. A trial judge must consider the attorney’s unreasonable failure to do this. However, as to the specific question of whether excusing the unreasonable failure in this case serves the interests of justice, there are additional factors that are important to consider. First, the lawyer was apparently attempting to correctly calculate the deadline for his answer. Second, South Carolina law provides no guidance as to when the answer was actually due in state court. Even the majority declines to define the due date for the answer, stating only that Hulsey failed to meet it, whatever it was.
The fact that the lawyer was trying to correctly follow the rules is particularly relevant to “the interests of justice.” Many of our appellate decisions have stated the principle that a lawyer’s negligence in failing to file an answer is imputable to the defaulting litigant, and thus weighs against granting relief from default. See generally Richardson, 383 S.C. at 618-19, 682 S.E.2d at 267. In each of the cases citing this principle, the negligence was in failing to attempt to answer the complaint, not in failing at an attempt to serve a timely answer. This distinction is important to the interests of justice. Justice should not reheve a lawyer or litigant who makes no attempt to comply with the rules, or who negligently fails to comply with a rule that is clear. However, the interests of justice should protect a lawyer who attempts to comply with the rules, particularly when the lawyer is attempting to meet a deadline which is so unclear that no rule or court has ever defined it.
In my opinion, applying the newly-defined standard for good cause under Sundown is likely to yield a different result. In *93reaching this conclusion, I am influenced by the reasoning of our supreme court in affirming the trial court’s order granting relief for a late answer in Lee v. Peek, 240 S.C. 203, 125 S.E.2d 353 (1962). Though Lee is not controlling because it was decided before the Rules of Civil Procedure based on a standard other than good cause, the facts of Lee are strikingly similar to the facts presented here, and the court’s analysis seems particularly relevant in light of Sundown.
Davis Lee sued the NAACP and six residents of Anderson County in the Court of Common Pleas of Abbeville County. 240 S.C. at 204, 125 S.E.2d at 353. Three of the Anderson County residents retained a lawyer, who made a motion to change venue to Anderson. 240 S.C. at 205, 125 S.E.2d at 353. Before the motion to change venue could be heard, the NAACP removed the case to federal court. Id. The three Anderson residents represented by the lawyer filed a motion to remand, which was granted. Id. The same attorney then refiled the motion to change venue. Id. During all of this time, the lawyer did not file an answer because “he was under the erroneous impression that it was not necessary for him to answer or demur in the State Court until the motion for change of venue had been decided.” 240 S.C. at 205, 125 S.E.2d at 354.
The Lee attorney’s failure to answer was unreasonable. The circuit judge “found as a matter of fact that counsel had misconceived the applicable procedural law.” 240 S.C. at 206, 125 S.E.2d at 354. That finding is much like that of the trial court here that “there was no good reason presented by the defendants for their failure to file a timely answer, other than attorney confusion about the deadline for when an answer was due.” However, the trial judge in Lee did not focus on the reasonableness of the lawyer’s action. Rather, focusing on what the Sundown court has now instructed trial courts to consider, the circuit judge in Lee held “that it was in the furtherance of justice that the respondents be relieved of any default.” Id. (emphasis added).

d. Conclusion as to Rule 55(c)

Sundown changed the analysis of good cause by requiring for the first time that the trial court focus on “reasons why *94vacation of the default entry would serve the interests of justice.” I believe that if the trial court had analyzed this question, rather than whether the attorney was reasonable in failing to file a timely answer, the outcome might have been different. The supreme court recognized in Lee that the decision as to what is “in the furtherance of justice” is for the circuit court. It is not the task of this court to answer the question posed by Sundown. However, it is the duty of this court to see that the question gets answered. I would reverse the judgment of the lower court, and remand the case for a determination of whether good cause exists under Sundown.

. Section 1447(c) states: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”

. The first opinion was Bryan v. BellSouth Communications, Inc., 377 F.3d 424 (4th Cir.2004) (Bryan I).

. Section 1447(c) applies to remands on the basis of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal procedure. As the Fourth Circuit pointed out in Bryan I, the district court "concluded that removal was proper because Bryan presented a federal question.” 377 F.3d at 427. The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Bryan I demonstrates that it agreed. "On appeal, we held that the remanded claim was a federal claim....” Bryan II, 492 F.3d at 234 (citing Bryan I, 377 F.3d at 432). Because the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims, the remand was not made pursuant to section 1447(c).

. The court makes this differentiation in order to explain how the remanded state court proceedings and the appeal of the remand order *87to the Fourth Circuit could proceed simultaneously. 492 F.3d at 235. In fact, the footnote appears at the end of this sentence in the text of the opinion: "While BellSouth’s appeal was pending, Count A, which had been remanded to state court by the district court, was proceeding in state court.” Id.

. It is not possible to interpret the clause to apply to anything other than a section 1447(c) remand, not only because the clause cites to the section, but also because the mailing referred to is not required except when the remand is made pursuant to section 1447(c).

. While the federal court's remand order becomes final and unreviewable upon its filing, that event does not deprive the federal court of the power to order its clerk to complete the ministerial task of mailing a certified copy of the order to the state court clerk. See Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354, 116 S.Ct. 862, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996) (‘‘[A] federal court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction ... to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.”). As a practical matter, an informal reminder to the federal clerk that a certified copy of the order had not been mailed would almost certainly have solved the problem. As a technical matter, the district court has mandamus power to compel its clerk to complete this ministerial task. This is, in fact, exactly what happened in Lowe. After the district court concluded there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit granted a writ of mandamus with instructions that the district court return the case to state court. 102 F.3d at 736. Given the substance of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling that the district court’s order remanding the case was unreviewable upon filing, the only task left to complete at that point was the ministerial task of sending a certified copy of the remand order to the state clerk.

. Neither Limehouse nor the majority contends this is a situation in which the court may ignore a statute’s plain meaning because to do so would yield an absurd result. See Harris v. Anderson Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 381 S.C. 357, 363 n. 1, 673 S.E.2d 423, 426 n. 1 (2009) ("One rule of statutory construction allows the Court to deviate from a statute’s plain language when the result would be so patently absurd that it is clear that the Legislature could not have intended such a result.”).

. The court went on to explain that the Wham factors come into play after the explanation is accepted by the court. "Once a party has put forth a satisfactory explanation for the default, the trial court must also consider [the Wham factors].” 383 S.C. at 607-08, 681 S.E.2d at 888.