Court Opinion

ID: 9646417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:59:41.145943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:38.003373
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
I believe several different situations should be noted:
First: Suppose both parents litigate in State A the issue of which one of them should have custody of the child, and custody is awarded to one parent. If the other parent then nevertheless, by trick or force, takes the child to State B, or if the child is there on a visit and the parent refuses to return the child, in my opinion the court in State B should give full faith and credit to the award of custody entered by the court in State A. To say that the court in State B is free to reexamine the issue of which parent should have custody can only encourage resort to force: it is the same as saying to the parent disappointed by the award entered by the court in State A, “If somehow you can get the child out of State A and into State B you can have the court in State B try the custody case all over.”
I suggest that what I have just said is supported by Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336 (1968), where it was said that “the Full-Faith-and-Credit clause . would seem to require every Court in Ohio to give full faith and credit to the Pennsylvania Court’s Custody Order and, in the absence of substantial and important changed circumstances, an Ohio Court should not be permitted to ignore or nullify or modify the Pennsylvania Court’s Custody Order.” Id., 429 Pa. at 525, 241 A.2d at 341. While this statement *370implies that full faith and credit will not be given where there are “substantial and important changed circumstances”, it seems to me that where the “changed circumstances” derive from the act of one parent in wrongfully taking, or refusing to return, the child, they cannot be characterized as “important.”
I am quite unpersuaded by the suggestion that the court in State B should be allowed to try the custody case “[b]ecause the child’s welfare is the controlling guide,” and “a custody decree is of an essentially transitory nature.” See Dissenting Opinion, HOFFMAN, J., at 1388, footnote 4, quoting Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER. The court in State A knows as well as the court in State B that the child’s welfare is the controlling guide. The point, it seems to me, is that unless the parent who was initially denied custody is required to return to State A — that is, is required to return because of the refusal of the court in State B to disturb the award entered by the court in State A — then the parent will be encouraged to kidnap the child from State A and initiate a custody proceeding in State B. It is essential that we make it plain that resort to such measures will be futile. We do not make it thus plain by uttering a vague caveat to the effect that although the court in State B may try the custody case, it should “take into account” the parent’s action in “flouting” the law by kidnapping the child. In no litigation do emotions run so high as in custody cases. The only way to deter kidnapping is for the court to which the kidnapped child is presented to refuse to adjudicate who should have custody of the child.1
*371Second: Suppose one parent litigates custody in State A, the other parent not appearing because of having received no notice of the action. Then, I agree, in a later custody proceeding the court in State B is not obliged to give full faith and credit to the award of custody entered by the court in State A. That is what I think Friedman v. Friedman, 224 Pa.Super. 530, 307 A.2d 292 (1973), stands for; to the extent that it stands for anything more, I disagree with it, and withdraw my joinder in it.
Third: Suppose one parent litigates custody in State A, the other parent not participating despite having initially appeared to litigate. That is the present case. The father started this custody action in Mississippi ex parte. The ensuing award of custody was therefore not entitled to full faith and credit. (See Situation No. 2, just discussed). Then, however, the mother appeared, filing a motion for continuance and for further time to plead. Having done so, she was obliged, in my opinion, to continue with the litigation and to present to the Mississippi court whatever evidence she believed supported her claim to custody. Instead, she got control of the child — the child was with her on a visit — and she refused to return with the child to Mississippi. She thereby defied lawful process just as effectively as though she had completed the litigation in Mississippi, and after losing, had kidnapped the child and taken her to Pennsylvania. Thus in substance the present case is the same as that supposed in Situation No. 1, discussed above.2
*372Accordingly, I believe the lower court was correct in giving full faith and credit to the award of the Mississippi court. I therefore concur in the affirmance of the lower court’s order.
CERCONE, J., joins in this opinion.

. Such a refusal to adjudicate custody may now be based on statute, as distinguished from on an interpretation of the scope of the full faith and credit clause. On June 30, 1977, the General Assembly enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Act No. 1977-20, 11 P.S. §§ 2301-2325, effective July 1, 1977. Section 9(b) of the Act provides in part:
Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child *371after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of custody . . . (Emphasis added.)
The meaning of “[u]nless required” remains to be developed by the cases; “required” is, however, a strong word, and would seem to impose a very heavy burden of proof on the kidnapper parent.

. I do not intend the three situations supposed to be an exhaustive enumeration. Other situations may be imagined, more difficult. Suppose, for example, that one parent (having kidnapped the child) litigates custody in State A, and gives notice of the action to the other parent, who is in State B. If the parent in State B ignores the notice, is the order entered by the court in State A entitled to full faith and credit? For cases manifesting the same concern I have expressed here see Stuard v. Bean, 27 Ariz.App. 350, 554 P.2d 1293 (1976); Jolly v. Avery, 220 Kan. 694, 556 P.2d 449 (1976). See also 4 *372FLR 1069, comments on parental kidnapping. And see the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, cited note 1, supra; the Act makes reference to a wide variety of possible situations, although not in the context of the full faith and credit clause.