Court Opinion

ID: 9898624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 20:11:02.782596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:23.598411
License: Public Domain

J-S26018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 MAMADOU BARRY AND MIRIAM                :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 BARRY                                   :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
                   Appellants            :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :    No. 232 EDA 2023
 NATIONWIDE AND NATIONWIDE               :
 MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY                :

             Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                           No(s): 220303161

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                   FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2023

     Mamadou Barry and Miriam Barry (“the Barrys”) appeal from the order

sustaining   Nationwide   and   Nationwide    Mutual   Insurance    Company’s

(“Nationwide”) preliminary objections for lack of service and dismissing the

Barrys’ complaint. After review, we affirm.

     The trial court set forth the facts and procedural history as follows:

     [On July 17, 2014, the Barrys were involved in a car accident.]
     The accident occurred when Mr. Barry was driving westbound on
     Luzerne Street near its intersection with Front Street in
     Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, with Ms. Barry in the passenger seat.
     Another vehicle travelling westbound, operated by Juan Delacruz
     (“Mr. Delacruz”), collided with the rear of their vehicle. [The
     Barrys] allege that they sustained injuries from the accident,
     caused solely by the negligence of Mr. Delacruz. [The Barrys filed
     suit against Mr. Delacruz and settled with him in or around June
     2018.] After discovering that Mr. Delacruz did not maintain
     sufficient limits of liability insurance, [the Barrys] sought
     [underinsured motorist benefits (“UIM benefits”)] for the alleged
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     injuries and losses they sustained from the accident, to which they
     believed they were entitled under their insurance policy with
     Nationwide.

     [The Barrys commenced this action by filing a complaint on March
     30, 2022, alleging that Nationwide failed to pay them [UIM
     benefits] provided by their insurance policy.]

     Nationwide filed preliminary objections to [the Barrys’] complaint
     on October 3, 2022, seeking dismissal of the action for failure to
     serve the complaint. Nationwide stated that as of the date of filing
     its preliminary objections, the Barrys had not filed an affidavit of
     service, and it was unaware of any attempts, defective or
     otherwise, to serve the complaint since they had initiated the
     action 197 days earlier. On October 4, 2022, the Barrys filed a
     praecipe to reinstate the complaint, more than six months after
     its initial filing.

     On October 24, 2022, [the Barrys] filed a response to Nationwide’s
     preliminary objections. In their response, they asserted that the
     court should overrule the preliminary objections because
     Nationwide was on notice of their claim and had not been
     prejudiced by the delay in service and because they had not
     intentionally delayed service. [The Barrys] stated that before
     settling their case against Mr. Delacruz in 2018, Nationwide
     granted their request for consent to settle by way of letter dated
     June 13, 2018. In September 2020, before initiating the current
     action, [the Barrys] sent a settlement demand to Nationwide, to
     which they state Nationwide responded on October 5, 2020,
     requesting additional information.          [The Barrys] attached
     Nationwide’s letters from June 13, 2018 and October 5, 2020 as
     Exhibits A and B to their response. Based on the correspondence
     from June 13, 2018 and October 5, 2020, [the Barrys] contend
     that Nationwide was on notice of their UIM claims against it,
     despite not initiating this action until March 30, 2022. They admit
     that the complaint was inadvertently not served after it was filed
     because of “an oversight on [the Barrys’] counsel’s part.”

     In their response, [the Barrys] also state that the day after
     Nationwide filed its preliminary objections, they realized the
     complaint had not been served and filed a praecipe to reinstate
     the complaint. While they claim they subsequently served the
     complaint by regular mail, return receipt requested, they provided
     no proof that service was effectuated in the manner described and

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        there is no affidavit of service or other evidence on the docket
        reflecting any attempt at service.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/23, at 1-3 (citations and footnotes omitted).

        On January 4, 2023, based on the lack of evidence of any attempt to

serve the complaint over the course of almost a year since the action was

initiated, and no affidavit of service, the trial court sustained Nationwide’s

preliminary objections and dismissed the Barrys’ complaint.

        On January 12, 2023, the Barrys filed this timely appeal. The Barrys

and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

1925.

        The Barrys raise the following single issue:

        Whether the trial court abused its discretion and misapplied the
        law when it sustained [Nationwide’s] preliminary objections
        regarding [the Barrys’] unintentional delay in serving the
        complaint even though [Nationwide] was aware of the claim and
        [] did not suffer any prejudice, whatsoever, by the delay in
        service?

Barrys’ Brief at 6.

        On appeal, the Barrys’ claim that the trial court erred in granting

Nationwide’s preliminary objections based on lack of service.     Specifically,

they argue that the failure to serve the complaint was inadvertent and they

did not act in bad faith by delaying service to gain an advantage in the

litigation. Barrys’ Brief at 12. According to the Barrys, they alleged in their

response to Nationwide’s preliminary objections that they served the

complaint in October 2022 after receiving the preliminary objections, but the

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trial court disregarded this. They further maintain that, after the court ruled

on Nationwide’s preliminary objections and issued its opinion, they filed an

affidavit of service.   The Barrys, therefore, claim that the court erred in

concluding that they presented no evidence of service. Id. at 13-14.

      The Barrys also argue that Nationwide was not prejudiced by the delay

in service. According to the Barrys, Nationwide had actual notice of their UIM

claim based on letters they sent to Nationwide regarding their settlement with

Mr. Delacruz and their settlement demand for UIM benefits, to which

Nationwide responded. Id. at 13, 15. They further point out that Nationwide

did not even claim it was prejudiced. Consequently, the Barrys argue that the

trial court erred in taking the extreme measure of dismissing their complaint.

Id. at 12.

      For the following reasons, we disagree.

      In considering a trial court's order sustaining preliminary objections for

improper service of process,

      our standard of review . . . is to determine whether the trial court
      committed an error of law. When considering the appropriateness
      of a ruling on preliminary objections, the appellate court must
      apply the same standard as the trial court. When considering
      preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the
      challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all inferences
      reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which
      seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only
      in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader
      will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right
      to relief.

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Bellan v. Penn Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 271 A.3d 506, 509 (Pa. Super.

2022), appeal denied, 283 A.3d 793 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted).

      Rule 1028(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure permits a

party to raise preliminary objections based on “improper form or service of a

writ of summons or a complaint.” Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1). This includes failure

to properly serve a complaint in compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of

Civil Procedure for service of original process.        McCreesh v. City of

Philadelphia, 888 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. 2005).

      This Court has stated: “[s]ervice of process is a mechanism by which a

court obtains jurisdiction of a defendant, and therefore, the rules concerning

service of process must be strictly followed. Thus, improper service is not

merely a procedural defect that can be ignored when a defendant

subsequently learns of the action against him or her.” Lerner v. Lerner, 954

A.2d 1229, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Cintas Corp. v. Lee's Cleaning

Services, Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. 1997)).

      Rule 401 provides that “original process shall be served within the

Commonwealth within 30 days after the issuance of the writ or the filing of

the complaint.”   Pa.R.C.P. 401(a).    If the plaintiff is unable to serve the

defendant within this time, he/she may file a praecipe for reissuance of the

writ or reinstatement of the complaint in order to continue its validity.

Pa.R.C.P. 401(b). “So long as the plaintiff files [the] writ or complaint before

the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to [the] cause of action,

the original filing, as well as any subsequent reissuances or reinstatements,

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tolls the statute of limitations.” Gussom v. Teagle, 247 A.3d 1046, 1048

(Pa. 2022).

     Recently, in Gussom, our Supreme Court assimilated several major

cases addressing the dismissal of a complaint for lack of service and their

holdings, including Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1976), Farinacci v.

Beaver Co. Indus. Dev. Auth., 511 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1986) and McCreesh,

supra. The Court articulated the following standard:

     In sum, Lamp and its progeny require a plaintiff to make a good-
     faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on a defendant.
     When a defendant presents a factual dispute as to whether a
     plaintiff fulfilled this duty, the plaintiff carries an evidentiary
     burden to demonstrate that she met her good-faith mandate. If
     a plaintiff presents credible evidence that she made this attempt
     at service, then she fulfills her requirement to prove good faith.
     If a plaintiff does not present such evidence, then she has failed
     to satisfy her evidentiary burden, regardless of whether her
     actions (or inaction) were intentional, unintentional, or otherwise.
     However, pursuant to McCreesh, a trial court should not punish
     a plaintiff by dismissing her complaint where she is able to
     establish that her improper but diligent attempts at service
     resulted in the defendant receiving actual notice of the
     commencement of the action, unless the plaintiff’s failure to serve
     process properly evinced an intent to stall the judicial machinery
     or otherwise prejudiced the defendant.

Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1057 (emphasis added).             It is within the sound

discretion of the trial court to determine whether a good-faith effort to

effectuate notice was made. Id. at 1048.

     Here, the trial court concluded that the Barrys failed to satisfy their

burden that they made a good-faith effort to diligently and timely serve the

complaint on Nationwide as required. Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/23, at 3, 5.

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In reaching this decision, the trial court noted that, after the complaint was

filed in March 2022, there was no indication that the Barrys served or

attempted to serve Nationwide for almost a year during the pendency of the

litigation. Id. at 5. In fact, the Barrys admitted that counsel inadvertently

failed to serve the complaint but offered no explanation as to what caused

counsel’s oversight. Id. at 7-8.       As the trial court observed, although

unintentional, counsel’s neglect nevertheless does not establish a good faith

effort to effectuate service.   Id. at 8 (citing Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1048

(affirming dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint based on plaintiff’s failure to

timely serve defendant even though the plaintiff’s actions in failing to serve

were not intentional); Farinacci, 511 A.2d at 760 (holding a delay in service

attributable to counsel’s failure to take necessary steps to effectuate service

was insufficient to establish good-faith effort)).

      The trial court further found unavailing the Barrys’ claim that, once they

received the preliminary objections, they took steps to serve Nationwide. The

court acknowledged that, on October 4, 2022, one day after the preliminary

objections were filed, the Barrys filed a praecipe to reinstate the complaint

and claimed in their response to the preliminary objections that they served

the complaint on Nationwide by regular and certified mail, return receipt.

However, the trial court highlighted that, they “provided no affidavit of service

or other proof that such an attempt was ever made.” Id. at 5, 8. Instead,

the Barrys only made a bald assertion that the complaint had been sent out

for service. See id. at 3, 8.

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      However, the Barrys now claim, for the first time, that they filed an

affidavit of service, and this proves that they actually mailed the complaint to

Nationwide in October 2022, as they claimed in their response to Nationwide’s

preliminary objections. Thus, they contend that the trial court’s disregard of

this mailing and resulting dismissal of their complaint for lack of service was

invalid. Barrys’ Brief at 14.

      Upon review of the record, we conclude that reference or reliance on

affidavit of service would be improper in this case. The affidavit of service is

not part of the certified record and therefore, this Court cannot consider it.

See Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006). “[A]n

appellate court is limited to considering only the materials in the certified

record when resolving an issue . . . . [U]nder the Pennsylvania Rules of

Appellate Procedure, any document which is not part of the officially certified

record is deemed non-existent.” Id. Moreover, the Barrys’ inclusion of an

updated trial court docket showing that the affidavit was filed with the trial

court (not even an actual, time stamped copy of it) cannot remedy this

deficiency. See id.

      The emphasis on the certified record is necessary because, unless
      the trial court certifies a document as part of the official record,
      the appellate judiciary has no way of knowing whether that piece
      of evidence was duly presented to the trial court or whether it was
      produced for the first time on appeal and improperly inserted into
      the reproduced record. Simply put, if a document is not in the
      certified record, the Superior Court may not consider it.

 Id. at 6-7.

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      This is exactly what occurred here. The trial court clearly did not have

the benefit of considering the affidavit of service, as it was filed well after the

trial court entered its order sustaining Nationwide’s preliminary objections and

the notice of this appeal. As such, the document is beyond our scope of review

and the Barrys cannot now use it to prove their claim that service was properly

effectuated.

      For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion or err in determining that the Barrys failed to establish they

engaged in a good-faith effort to serve Nationwide with their complaint in a

diligent and timely manner.

       Nevertheless, the Barrys argue that their complaint should proceed

because Nationwide had actual notice of their action for UIM benefits, despite

the lack of service.    They maintain that the correspondence they sent to

Nationwide in 2018 put Nationwide on notice of their action in 2022. As such,

Nationwide was not prejudiced, and the trial court should not have sustained

the preliminary’s objections to dismiss their complaint. In support of their

position, they cite McCreesh, supra. Barrys’ Brief at 10, 14-15.

      In McCreesh, the plaintiff served the writ of summons on the

Philadelphia City Law Department within the applicable statute of limitations

period, but served it by certified mail, which was procedurally improper. There

was no dispute, however, that the City’s attorney actually received the writ of

summons at that time. See McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 666. The plaintiff later

effected proper service by hand delivery as required, but after the statute of

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limitations had expired. The McCreesh Court determined, however, that the

plaintiff’s technically deficient service by mail constituted a good-faith effort

at notice, where the City’s attorney received actual notice of the litigation

within the statute of limitations and was not otherwise prejudiced. Id. at 666

n.1. Consequently, the Court concluded that the plaintiff made a good-faith

effort to serve the City with notice, even though she did not comply strictly

with the rules. See id. at 674.

      In Gussom, the Court explained that McCreesh did not change the

requirement that a plaintiff must act diligently in serving the complaint:

      the Court sought to resolve a pattern of conflicting opinions from
      the intermediate courts. On the one hand, some of those decisions
      required plaintiffs to comply strictly with the rules regarding
      service to satisfy the Lamp-Farinacci good-faith requirement,
      while, on the other hand, different panels allowed “a more flexible
      approach, excusing plaintiffs’ initial procedurally defective service
      where the defendant has actual notice of the commencement of
      litigation and is not otherwise prejudiced[.]” McCreesh, 888 A.2d
      at 666. After explaining that “[n]either our cases nor our rules
      contemplate punishing a plaintiff for technical missteps where he
      has satisfied the purpose of the statute of limitations by supplying
      a defendant with actual notice[,]” the Court stated that it
      embraced the logic of cases which “would dismiss only those
      claims where plaintiffs have demonstrated an intent to stall the
      judicial machinery or where plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the
      Rules of Civil Procedure has prejudiced defendant.” McCreesh,
      888 A.2d at 674.

      Although McCreesh made clear that a plaintiff could fulfill her
      good-faith service mandate without strictly complying with the
      service rules as long as her efforts resulted in actual notice of the
      lawsuit to the defendant, like Farinacci, McCreesh did nothing
      to modify a plaintiff's duty to act diligently to serve notice of
      the commencement of an action so as not to undermine the
      policies that drive the statute of limitations. Nor, for that matter,
      did McCreesh change the rule clarified in Farinacci that the

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     plaintiff carries an evidentiary burden to prove that she made a
     good-faith effort to effectuate service of process in a timely
     manner. To the contrary, as observed throughout this opinion,
     the McCreesh Court alluded to this evidentiary requirement. See
     id. at 672 (“We subtly altered our holding in Lamp in Farinacci,
     requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate ‘a good-faith effort to
     effectuate notice of commencement of the action.’”).

Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1056-57.

     Here, the trial court properly concluded that McCreesh did not apply.

The court explained:

     [T]he “flexible approach” adopted in McCreesh concerns
     “technical missteps where [plaintiff] has satisfied the purpose of
     the statute of limitations by supplying a defendant with actual
     notice.” This refers to cases where service was defective but
     good-faith efforts were made such that defendant had “actual
     notice of the commencement of litigation and was not otherwise
     prejudiced.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified that this
     does not “modify a plaintiff’s duty to act diligently to serve notice
     of the commencement of an action so as not to undermine the
     policies that drive the statute of limitations.”

Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/23, at 7.     As discussed above, the trial court

concluded that, unlike McCreesh, there was no evidence on the record that

the Barrys took any steps, either proper or improper, to effectuate service

diligently and in good faith after they filed their complaint. Consequently,

they did not meet their burden of proof. Id.

     The trial court also concluded that the Barrys’ correspondence to

Nationwide did not provide Nationwide with actual notice of a formal

complaint. The court logically explained:

     [The Barrys] produced two letters from Nationwide dated June 13,
     2018 and October 5, 2020 responding to settlement inquiries as
     proof that Nationwide had "actual notice" of their UIM claim,

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      despite the delay in service. They argued that because Nationwide
      was aware of their UIM claim, they were on notice of this action
      and were not prejudiced by the delay in service. Those brief
      correspondences, however, took place well before this action was
      initiated. Nationwide could not have been on notice of a complaint
      filed in March 2022 based on letter correspondence exchanged
      once in 2018 and once in 2020.

      Further, just because Nationwide previously might have known
      about the UIM claim does not prove they had actual notice of this
      action, initiated years after they informally sought those benefits
      under their insurance policy. The relevant time frame concerning
      notice of the commencement of this action could not have begun
      before the action was commenced, and there is no evidence on
      the record after the commencement of this action showing that
      Nationwide had actual notice of its commencement.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/23, at 6. The Barrys cite no authority to support

their claim that notice of a potential claim is the same as the notice of a formal

complaint or actual lawsuit.

      Thus, contrary to the Barrys’ contention, Nationwide did not have actual

notice of their action. Accordingly, there was no reason for the trial court to

consider whether the Barrys sought to stall the litigation by their conduct or

whether Nationwide was prejudiced.

      Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in determining that the Barrys failed to establish that they made

a good-faith effort to serve Nationwide.       As such, the court did not err in

sustaining Nationwide’s preliminary objections for lack of service and

dismissing the Barrys’ complaint.      Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s

order.

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     Order affirmed.   Judge Stabile joins.   Judge McLaughlin issues a

concurring memorandum.

Date: 11/14/2023

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