Court Opinion

ID: 9794836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:12:36.683533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:11.784249
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Pringle
concurs in the result:
I concur in the result. I do so because I feel that the judgment must be reversed by reason of the failure of the trial court to resolve as a matter of law the ambiguities contained in C.R.S. 1963, 40-5-31. In effect, by giving the statute verbatim as an instruction without placing upon it the proper construction, the trial court left the proper meaning of the statute as a matter to be resolved by the jury. The meaning and intent of statutes are never to be determined by juries, but are matters of law to be determined by a court. E.g., State ex rel. Wheat v. Moore, 154 Kan. 193, 117 P.2d 598; Seybert v. County of Imperial, 162 Cal. App.2d 209, 327 P.2d 560.
I agree with the interpretation placed upon C.R.S. 1963, 40-5-31 by the majority opinion. I would, therefore, hold that it was the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the statute involved in accordance with the views expressed in the majority opinion.
I do not agree with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court should have determined as a matter of law that “probable cause” for the “arrest” existed under the circumstances of this case. The majority opinion implies that whenever the facts and cir*252cumstances surrounding an arrest are undisputed, the court must, as a matter of law, determine whether probable cause exists.
In my view, this is directly contrary to an unbroken line of cases which holds that where reasonable persons might draw different inferences from testimony, the jury must resolve the issues. And I believe that this principle must also apply to false arrest cases as well as to any others. In my opinion, the testimony here would have permitted the jury to infer, if they saw fit to do so, that the security officers acted negligently in making their observations and so were not entitled to the protection of the “probable cause” defense to a false arrest action.
Mr. Justice Day has authorized me to say he joins in the views expressed herein.