Court Opinion

ID: 9774667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:29:15.826464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:12.988271
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, concurring. I concur. I harbor serious doubts that the appellant is entitled to a “Denno” hearing at this stage of the proceeding, but the record is sufficiently confusing on this point that I believe caution dictates one. Arkansas Criminal Procedure requires a defendant to file a motion to suppress if he objects to the use of any evidence he claims was illegally obtained. A.R.Cr.P. Rule 16.2(a). The Rule includes objections pertaining to a confession or admission of a defendant involuntarily made. A.R.Cr.P. Rule 16.2(a)(3). However, where an omnibus proceeding is utilized by the trial court, Rule 16.2 does not apply. Here, the trial court utilized an omnibus hearing, which is authorized by A.R.Cr.P. Rules 20.1—20.4. Under Rule 20.3, the trial court, among other things, must make rulings on any motions or other requests then pending and determine whether there are any procedural or constitutional issues which should be considered. A.R.Cr.P. Rule 20.3(a)(iv) and (v). Unless the trial court directs otherwise, all motions and requests made prior to trial should be reserved and presented orally. A.R.Cr.P. Rule 20.3(b). Any pretrial motion, request or issue which is not raised at the omnibus hearing shall be deemed waived, unless the party concerned did not have the information necessary to make the motion or raise the issue. A.R.Cr.P. Rule 20.3(c). In the present case, appellant never raised the motion and issue he now argues. On March 1,1989, he filed a motion to strike the statements he made to the police because the rights form utilized by the officers did not apprise him that he had a right to a lawyer free of charge. On March 13, 1989, he filed four other motions which he orally presented to the trial court at an omnibus hearing held on March 17, 1989. The trial court denied those other motions. However, the record , of the March 17 hearing reveals the appellant never mentioned the motion to strike that he had filed on March 1,1989, and as a consequence, the trial court never ruled on it. If the balance of the record did not otherwise confuse this issue, I would be of the strong opinion that, under Rule 20.3(c), the appellant simply waived his right to raise his motion to strike because he failed to present it. After all, defendants have a right to raise and later abandon any issue they choose. My problem arises from what transpired at trial on May 30, 1989. When officer A. J. Gary testified to the statement he took from the appellant, appellant’s counsel objected and the prosecutor said, “I’d ask the court to hold with its previous ruling which is that it should not be suppressed.” And again later in the trial, appellant’s counsel stated that he wished to renew his motion to strike the statement he gave the police and the trial court denied that motion and the others appellant had previously made. From reading these exchanges between counsel and the trial court, it appears that at some time, the trial court actually ruled on appellant’s motion to strike his statement and the court refused to suppress the introduction of the appellant’s statement. The Supreme Court has held that in making the primary determination of voluntariness of a confession, the judge need not make formal findings of fact or write an opinion, but his conclusion that the confession is voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity. Sims v. State of Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967). Here, the record before us reveals that, at some time prior to trial, the trial court may have ruled on the appellant’s motion and denied his request to suppress his confession. Certainly, the record is not clear on what transpired, and if the court made such a ruling, the record fails to clearly reflect it. When confronted with such doubts that “Denno” standards may not have been satisfied, courts have opted to remand, as our court is doing, so a hearing can be conducted by the trial court to ensure the defendant’s constitutional rights will have been clearly protected. State of Minnesota v. Tahash, 364 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1966); Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965). For the reasons given above, I join in the majority court’s remand of this case for a “Denno” hearing.