Court Opinion

ID: 9697154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:07:26.600654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:55.065688
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C. J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
I believe that the majority opinion proceeds from a fundamental misunderstanding of the no-fault act, and that as a result its treatment of both issues considered is erroneous.
I begin with Underhill v Safeco Insurance Co, 76 Mich App 13, 15; 255 NW2d 349 (1976). Plaintiff motorcyclist was insured under a motorcycle policy that did not include no-fault PIP benefits. Plaintiff was injured in a collision with a motor vehicle and sought to recover PIP benefits from the insurer of the motor vehicle. The Court said:
"Since, in the instant case, plaintiff was not operating a 'motor vehicle’ under the act, he was not required to maintain security for the payment of personal protection insurance benefits. However, since defendant’s insured was the owner of a four-wheel vehicle, he was required to maintain security for the payment of personal protection insurance benefits. Further, because plaintiff was not the owner of a 'motor vehicle’ which was involved in the accident, he is not precluded from *154receiving benefits under the exclusion provided in MCLA 500.3113; MSA 24.13113. MCLA 500.3115; MSA 24.13115 provides that an individual who suffers accidental bodily injury while not an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits first from the insurers of owners or registrants of motor vehicles which are involved in the accident. This is precisely the action plaintiff took and precisely the action upheld by the court below.”
Next, in Davidson v Johnson, 76 Mich App 497; 257 NW2d 139 (1977) (hereinafter Davidson I) (affirming in part and reversing in part), on rehearing, 79 Mich App 660; 262 NW2d 887 (1977) (hereinafter Davidson II) (modifying and affirming as modified), this Court considered the no-fault act’s application to slightly different facts.1 There each plaintiff motorcyclist was covered under a PIP endorsement to his automobile insurance policy containing a $5,000 deductible. The Court in Davidson I agreed with and adopted the reasoning quoted above from Underhill, supra, and concluded that "The motorcyclist can recover (in the same way as a pedestrian) upon the no-fault policy covering the automobile involved in the accident”. Davidson I, supra, at 501.
The Davidson I Court went on to consider the effect of the cross-reference in § 3115,2 read in *155conjunction with § 3105,3 and concluded:
"One can see the legislative intent to tie responsibility to the motor vehicle involved in the accident. If there are two motor vehicles, then each party recovers upon his own policy, but it is farfetched to reach other insurance just because it might be construed to apply where not required by the act. Statutes must be read so as to harmonize, to be constitutional. We are asked to declare the troublesome § 3109 unconstitutional as a denial of the Equal Protection Clause (US Const, Am XIV) or as a violation of the separation of powers (Const 1963, art 3, § 2) between legislative and administrative bodies. This inquiry is suggested because of the difficulty in reconciling §§ 3114 and 3115. The public is better served by an interpretation of the sections that will result in certainty, rather than further declarations of invalidity and uncertainty. Where a motor vehicle is involved, the insurance on that vehicle shall be primary. Where a section of the statute deals with non-occupants, it shall be given meaning. Cross-references in statutes should not be used to pervert an otherwise harmonious statutory scheme. Section 3114 deals with occupants. Section 3115 refers to non-occupants throughout and we are dealing with a non-occupant. The cross-reference in substance means 'except when an occupant’. There being only one motor vehicle involved, its coverage must bear the responsibility for the no-fault losses. The fact that by happenstance plaintiff had some nonrequired coverage does not alter the liability of the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.”Davidson I, supra, at 502-503 (Emphasis added).
In my opinion, Judge Miller’s opinion in Davidson I comes closer to a correct interpretation of the meaning of the cross-reference in 3115(1) than does that of the majority or the opinion in David*156son II because it recognizes that motorcycles, because they are not "motor vehicles” as defined in the act,4 are not included within the comprehensive scheme of no-fault coverage established by the act.5 That a motorcyclist elects to purchase additional, nonrequired PIP coverage, included as an endorsement to his automobile policy, to cover medical expenses and lost wages (or to provide survivor’s benefits)6 to protect himself in the event of catastrophic injury resulting from an accident in which no motor vehicle is involved to whose PIP coverage he might look for recovery is irrelevant to the question of whose coverage is primary when a motor vehicle is in fact involved. Cf. Shoemaker v National Ben Franklin Insurance Co of Michigan, 78 Mich App 175; 259 NW2d 414 (1977). Hill v Aetna Life & Casualty Co, 79 Mich App 725; 263 NW2d 27 (1977).7 A non-motor-vehicle-occupant *157motorcyclist who collides with a motor vehicle looks to the motor vehicle’s insurers for compensation for his medical expenses and lost wages, according to the priorities set out in § 3115(1) (a) and (b). Davidson I, supra.
Additional support for this view is drawn from a careful reading of § 3114(1)8 and (4).9 Section 3114(4), which establishes the priorities of coverage in situations involving "occupants”, includes the same cross-reference to § 3114(1) contained in § 3115(1), which establishes the priorities of coverage in nonoccupant situations. Section 3114(1) then establishes a separate priority of coverage, applicable in both occupant and nonoccupant situations by virtue of the cross-references to that section contained in §§ 3114(4) and 3115(1), whenever "personal protection insurance benefits are payable to or for the benefit of an injured person under his own policy and would also be payable under the policy of his spouse, relative, or relative’s spouse”. MCLA 500.3114(1); MSA 24.13114(1).10 Thus, whenever the injured person *158could recover from either his own policy or the policy of another person whose coverage is applicable to him under the first sentence of that section, because he is a related member of the same household, § 3114(1) merely establishes the priority of coverage as among those policies. It is plain, therefore, that § 3114(1) has no application in this case, because no question of priority of coverage as among insurers of related members of the same household is here involved.
This is the fundamental misunderstanding from which the majority opinion proceeds: The majority reads § 3114(1) as merely providing that when a nonoccupant has PIP coverage of his own, he must look solely to his own coverage for recovery. This view is insupportable, not only because § 3114(1) is inapplicable by its own terms to the situation at bar, but also because plaintiffs optional PIP coverage is not within the framework of the act;11 it is coverage provided by plaintiffs automobile insurer as a service to a (motorcyclist) automobile policy owner to safeguard against catastrophic loss arising from an accident in which no "motor vehicle”, under the act’s definition, is involved.
From the foregoing analysis, I conclude that the cross-reference, to which the majority would properly give effect,12 does not come into play, and that *159therefore the priorities established for nonoccupants in § 3115(1) apply. It is thus unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the $5,000 deductible formerly13 authorized by the commissioner. If the question were presented for our decision, however, I would uphold such a deductible insofar as it applied only to the coverage provided for a non-motor vehicle not included within the scope of the act,14 and thus not required to maintain any PIP coverage. See MCLA 500.3101(2), 500.3105; MSA 24.13101(2), 24.13103. Cf. Shoemaker, supra, at 179 (admitting the possibility of recovery in a non-motor-vehicular accident situation under some other "contractual provision on which liability can be based”). This result would follow from the fact that such a deductible is neither authorized nor prohibited by § 3109 of the no-fault act. The provisions of the no-fault act pertaining to the coverage required for a "motor vehicle”, as that term is defined in the act, simply have no bearing upon the validity of an optional endorsement providing PIP coverage for a non-motor vehicle.
*160Since, in this case, plaintiff has settled his claims against the owner and insurer of the only motor vehicle involved in the accident, he is entitled to no additional recovery under his own policy. The catastrophic loss PIP provisions in plaintiffs automobile insurance policy endorsement providing coverage for plaintiffs motorcycle would come into play only if plaintiff had been injured in an accident not involving a motor vehicle.15 Therefore I would reverse the summary judgment for Michigan Mutual, which was granted on erroneous grounds, and remand for entry of an order dismissing plaintiffs claims.

 I recognize that the Davidson panel reversed itself, in part, on the question of the validity of the $5,000 deductible provision here at issue, and that the opinion issued on rehearing superseded the opinion in that case published at 76 Mich App 497; 257 NW2d 139 (1977). Davidson II (On Rehearing), 79 Mich App 660, 662, fn 1;262 NW2d 887 (1977). I believe that the first opinion in Davidson was the better reasoned, and rely on it for its logical support of my own position on this question.

 MCLA 500.3115(1); MSA 24.13115(1), which provides: "Except as provided in subsection (1) of section 3114, a person suffering accidental bodily injury while not an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of priority:
"(a) Insurers of owners or registrants of motor vehicles involved in the accident.
*155"(b) Insurers of operators of motor vehicles involved in the accident.” (Emphasis added.)
Subsection (1) of § 3114, MCLA 500.3114(1); MSA 24.13114(1) provides, in pertinent part:
"[A] personal protection insurance policy applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, his spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household. When personal protection insurance beneñts are payable to or for the beneñt of an injured person under his own policy and would also be payable under the policy of his spouse, relative, or relative’s spouse, the injured person’s insurer shall pay all of the benefits and shall not be entitled to recoupment from the other insurer.” (Emphasis added.)

 MCLA 500.3105; MSA 24.13105, which provides:
"(1) Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.)

 Section 3101(2), MCLA 500.3101(2); MSA 24.13101(2), provides:
"(2) 'Motor vehicle’ as used in this chapter, except for section 3103, means a vehicle, including a trailer, operated or designed for operation upon a public highway by power other than muscular power which has more than two wheels. ” (Emphasis added.)
In Hill v Aetna Life & Casualty Co, 79 Mich App 725; 263 NW2d 27 (1977), this Court upheld the "exclusion” of motorcycles from the no-fault act’s coverage, holding that "such exclusion is reasonable and not 'essentially arbitrary’ in view of the purpose of the act,” which is "to insure the compensation of persons injured in automobile accidents”. (Emphasis added.) The Court noted that "the only requirement for recovery [is that] there be a motor vehicle involved in the accident”.

 The act requires only that "An owner or registrant of a motor vehicle with 2 wheels shall provide security against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for property damage, bodily injury, or death suffered by a person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of that motor vehicle”. MCLA 500.3103; MSA 24.13103.

 See MCLA 500.3105, 500.3107, 500.3108; MSA 24.13105, 24.13107, 24.13108.

 In Shoemaker plaintiff motorcyclist collided with a farm tractor pulling a manure spreader on a public highway and attempted to recover no-fault benefits under his father’s no-fault automobile insurance policy. The motorcycle was not insured under the automobile policy and the tractor and manure spreader were "implements of husbandry” excepted from registration, and hence not covered by the *157no-fault act’s definition of a "motor vehicle”. The Court said that "it would work an absurdity to hold that plaintiffs can recover for injuries from a motorcycle accident, because of the fortuitous purchase of an automobile no-fault policy, after the Legislature went to great lengths to exclude tractors and motorcycles from coverage under the act”. Id., at 178. It is in just such a situation that the PIP endorsement to plaintiffs automobile policy in this case would come into play to provide protection when none other was available because no "motor vehicle” was involved in the accident.
The Court reached the same result in Hill v Aetna Life & Casualty Co, 79 Mich App 725; 263 NW2d 27 (1977). See fn 4, supra. In Hill only plaintiffs motorcycle was involved in the accident.

 See fn 2.

 MCLA 500.3114(4); MSA 24.13114(4) provides:
"Except as provided in subsections (1) to (3), a person suffering accidental bodily injury while an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of priority:
"(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupied.
"(b) The insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied.”

 The first sentence of that section provides:
*158"Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), a personal protection insurance policy applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, his spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household.”
I conclude that § 3114(1) must be read without reference to the priorities contained in § 3115(1) and § 3114(4), since the priorities established in § 3114(1) apply only to the limited situation in which questions of coverage arise as among multiple insurers of related members of the same household as a result of the first sentence of § 3114(1), defining the class covered by personal protection insurance,

 See Shoemaker, supra, fn 7, and Hill, supra, fns 4 and 7.

 It is in this respect alone that I differ with the Davidson I Court, which appears to have taken the position that the cross-reference in *159§ 3115(1) would not be given effect in order to harmonize the act, rather than recognizing that the cross-reference simply did not come into play because no question of multiple insurance coverage as among related members of the same household was there involved.

 "Section 3109a was added by 1974 PA 72, and at that time the commissioner rescinded the $5,000 deductible authorization and permitted an additional premium for the endorsement.” Davidson v Johnson, 76 Mich App 497, 499; 257 NW2d 139 (1977), Davidson v Johnson (On Rehearing), slip opinion at p 2, 79 Mich App 660 (1977).

 In this case the $5,000 deductible applies only "if the named insured or relative sustains bodily injury while occupying a two (2) wheel motor vehicle owned by the named insured or a relative”. Of course, if the $5,000 deductible approved by the commissioner applied to automobile PIP coverage, it would be in excess of the $300 maximum deductible permitted under § 3109(3), MCLA 500.3109(3); MSA 24.13109(3), and a different question would be presented. That is not our case, however.
I note that under newly enacted § 3109a, MCLA 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1), such a deductible would be permissible if "reasonably related to other health and accident coverage on the insured”.

 It is unnecessary to consider whether this would be so if plaintiff had been injured in a collision with a motor vehicle owned or operated by a person related to plaintiff and domiciled in the same household, thus possibly invoking the separate priority provided for such situations by § 3114(1).