Court Opinion

ID: 9543881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:50:09.017783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:23.691262
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the judgment of my colleagues in the majority and from what I perceive to be the strained construction they have given MCLA 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).1 The conclusion is inescapable that the majority has inappropriately broadened the plain meaning of the footnoted language to include Mr. Betts’ obviously unfortunate accident within the insurance coverage provided under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. Although I share the compassion my colleagues have for the plaintiff, after consideration of the facts and circumstances in the case before us, I must conclude that to hold that the plaintiff was a.n "employee” of Ann Arbor Public Schools would be to extend the scope and coverage of the Worker’s Disability Compensation *517Act beyond that provided by the Legislature and, as a result, effectively rewrite the statute.
At the time of Mr. Betts’ injury, he was enrolled at the University of Michigan as a full-time student. His major course of study was physical education. One of the requirements for his degree was that he train under the supervision of a certified teacher for a period of time in an undertaking commonly known as "student teaching” or "directed teaching”. In accordance with this curriculum requirement, Betts was assigned to "student teach” at a junior high school in the Ann Arbor Public Schools. As a student teacher, Betts did not receive any pay from the defendant school system, nor did he enter into a contract of hire with it, nor was he promised future employment in the school system after his student teaching requirement was fulfilled.
On Betts’ last day of "directed teaching”, several students in the physical education class grabbed him and attempted to throw him into the swimming pool. In the course of this horseplay, a whistle attached to an elastic lanyard around Betts’ neck hit his eye, resulting tragically in loss of the eye.
Betts filed a claim for workers’ disability compensation benefits against the Ann Arbor Public Schools. Following a hearing and an appeal to the Worker’s Disability Compensation Appeal Board, in a split decision, he was awarded benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed, judging Betts not to be an employee of the Ann Arbor Public Schools at the time of his injury.
The Worker’s Disability Compensation Act provides that:
"An employee, who receives a personal injury arising *518out of and in the course of his employment * * * shall be paid compensation * * * MCLA 418.301; MSA 17.237(301).
In the public sector, an employee is defined as:
"Every person in the service of the state or of any county, city, township, village, or school district, under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written. * * *” MCLA 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).
The sole point of controversy today is whether Betts was an employee of the Ann Arbor school district within the meaning of the Michigan Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. In my judgment, he was not.
The essential purpose of workers’ compensation legislation is to provide financial protection, in particular the partial restoration of lost wages, for workers whose earning power is interrupted or terminated as a consequence of injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment. Wilson v Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Co, 358 Mich 510; 100 NW2d 226 (1960); Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich 578; 99 NW2d 490 (1959); Pigue v General Motors Corp, 317 Mich 311; 26 NW2d 900 (1947). The entire philosophy which underlies the legislation assumes that the worker is in a gainful occupation at the time of injury. See IB Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 47.10.
In concluding, for the purpose of compensation insurance, that an employment relationship existed between Betts and Ann Arbor Public Schools, today’s majority overlooks both the expressed intent of the Legislature in enacting the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act and the social philosophy which underlies it. The facts of this case dictate the conclusion that Betts was not in the *519employ of Ann Arbor Public Schools at the time he incurred the injury to his eye.
While a student at the University of Michigan, Betts was assigned to a junior high school in Ann Arbor to fulfill his "directed teaching” requirement. His stay at the junior high school was not pursuant to any public appointment nor was there any express or implied contract between himself and the defendant school system. The controlling agreements were between Betts and the University of Michigan and in turn the University of Michigan and the Ann Arbor Public Schools. Betts’ purpose at the junior high school was to further his education and collaterally to fulfill a University of Michigan requirement for a degree in physical education.
As between Ann Arbor Public Schools and Betts, the element of consideration for his services was totally lacking. The fact that Betts did not expect to receive monetary compensation is uncontroverted and the benefit of academic credits, referred to in the majority opinion, was awarded by the University of Michigan rather than the defendant. Moreover, there was no evidence that the period of student teaching was in any manner a condition precedent to future employment with the defendant. On the contrary, it is undisputed that Betts participated in the "directed teaching” program in order to fulfill one of the requirements for attaining a degree in physical education from the University of Michigan.
In essence, the facts of this case disclose that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was no more than an arrangement whereby the Arm Arbor Public Schools accommodated Betts and the University of Michigan by providing the setting for in-classroom training. As such, it is evident that plaintiffs injury did not arise "out of and in the course of’ an employment relationship with defendant school system. See Board of Educa*520tion of Chicago v Industrial Commission, 53 Ill 2d 167; 290 NE2d 247 (1972).2
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Coleman, J., concurred with Ryan, J.

 "1) An employee as used in this act shall mean:
"a) Every person in the service of the state or of any county, city, township, village, or school district, under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written”.

 In Board of Education of Chicago v Industrial Commission a student working toward a bachelor of science degree in elementary education spent 100 hours in a Chicago public school tutoring students in reading readiness, substituting for teachers and supervising kindergarten activities under the supervision and approval of the assistant principal. These 100 hours fulfilled a DePaul University requirement for the education degree. While substituting for a teacher at the school, the student-teacher fell down a stairway and sustained a severe injury to her leg. The student-teacher filed for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming she was an employee of the Chicago Board of Education.
An arbitrator for the Industrial Commission awarded workers’ compensation benefits to the student-teacher and the Industrial Commission affirmed the award. The Cook County Circuit Court reversed the decision of the Commission and denied compensation. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court judgment, denying benefits. The Court emphasized the fact that the element of consideration was totally lacking and that under the above described arrangement, neither the school nor the plaintiff could consider themselves to have an employer-employee relationship.