Court Opinion

ID: 9882055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 21:20:41.621072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:38.879515
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                          2023 IL App (3d) 200209-U

                                  Order filed October 4, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                     IN THE

                                     APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                               THIRD DISTRICT

                                                       2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                         )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                          )       of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
                                                         )       Peoria County, Illinois,
              Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                         )       Appeal No. 3-20-0209
              v.                                         )       Circuit No. 10-CF-500
                                                         )
      DOMINICK M. SANDERS,                               )       Honorable
                                                         )       Paul P. Gilfillan,
              Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices McDade and Hettel concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   ORDER

¶1          Held: The court did not err by summarily dismissing the defendant’s postconviction
                  petition.

¶2          The defendant, Dominick M. Sanders, appeals the first-stage dismissal of his

     postconviction petition, arguing that the Peoria County circuit court erred by dismissing the

     petition because it stated the gist of a claim that his sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him.

¶3                                            I. BACKGROUND
¶4           After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)

     (West 2010)), aggravated battery with a firearm (id. § 12-4.2(a)(1)), aggravated discharge of a

     firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(1)), aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1)), and unlawful

     possession of a weapon by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)). The evidence established that Nick and Davon

     Renfro engaged in a verbal argument with Willie Wilson, which turned into a physical altercation.

     People v. Sanders, 2016 IL App (3d) 130511, ¶ 4. After the conclusion of the fight, Joyce Renfro

     (Nick and Davon’s mother) engaged in an argument with a woman named Patrice. Id. Patrice

     summoned the defendant, who exited a nearby apartment and began shooting an automatic firearm.

     Id. The defendant shot Joyce in the leg and Nick in the back. Id. Nick died while being transported

     to the hospital. Id.

¶5           The defendant was originally sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder,

     plus a 25-year firearm enhancement; a consecutive term of 25 years’ imprisonment for aggravated

     battery with a firearm; and concurrent terms of 10 years’ imprisonment for aggravated discharge

     of a firearm and 7 years’ imprisonment for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Id. ¶ 1. On the

     unlawful use of a weapon by a felon count, no sentence was entered. Id. ¶ 6. However, on direct

     appeal this court reversed the defendant’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing as

     the court erroneously considered a factor inherent in the offense of first degree murder. Id. ¶ 17.

¶6           On remand, the defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) was updated, but also

     included information from the previous PSI. The PSI stated that the defendant denied any

     involvement in gangs and denied committing the offenses. The defendant had been on probation

     at the time he committed the offenses in this case. He had multiple prior convictions. The defendant

     had completed the ninth grade. He had never been employed until he went to the Illinois

     Department of Corrections (IDOC). While the defendant had taken general education diploma

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     (GED) courses in the IDOC, he had not obtained his GED. Regarding the defendant’s family, he

     noted that he had last seen his father when he was 12 or 13 years old and was raised by his mother,

     Helen Sanders. The defendant reported that he began smoking cannabis and drinking alcohol when

     he was 18 years old. Prior to his arrest, he smoked five or six “blunts” a day and drank alcohol on

     the weekends. He had no prior drug or alcohol treatment, was in good mental and physical health,

     and took no prescription medications. The defendant was 22 years old at the time he committed

     the offenses.

¶7           Helen had filled out a PSI questionnaire in 2013, which stated that the defendant did not

     have any problems during his childhood and was not a disciplinary problem as a child or teen. The

     defendant had a good relationship with his mother. He was not violent and did not have any

     learning disabilities. Helen stated that the defendant did not have a drug or alcohol problem, and

     his friends and peers were a good support and a good influence. According to Helen, the defendant

     was not abused as a child.

¶8           The case proceeded to a new sentencing hearing. The State did not present any evidence in

     aggravation. Helen testified that she talked to the defendant regularly since he had been in the

     IDOC and noted that he had matured significantly. She stated that the defendant was very

     remorseful for his actions. The defendant chose not to offer a statement in allocution. The court

     sentenced the defendant to the same sentence he had previously received. In doing so, the court

     stated, inter alia,

                            “The defendant is 28 years old. He was somewhere around 21 at the time,

                     I think. Not a child. Not a babe in the woods. There was no crowd around him,

                     chanting him on. There was no evidence that anybody pushed him out the door

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                    and said, ‘Go get ‘em, pal.’ He was a table of 1, no waiting, all by himself and a

                    gun.”

     The defendant again challenged his sentence on direct appeal. This court affirmed the sentence.

     People v. Sanders, 2019 IL App (3d) 170188-U, ¶ 2.

¶9          On March 9, 2020, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which is the subject

     of this appeal. In the petition, the defendant argued, in pertinent part, that his sentence violated the

     eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the

     Illinois Constitution. The defendant cited Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and related case

     law regarding juvenile sentencing. The defendant stated:

                            “Although, [the defendant] was a young adult of [22] years of age at the

                    time the alleged crime occurred, the same science with respects to the brain

                    development in juvenile offenders applies likewise to young adults, where studies

                    have concluded that the brain is not fully developed up to and including individuals

                    24 years of age. [The defendant] was raised in a single parent household in an

                    impoverished gang and drug infested housing projects in Peoria, Illinois. [The

                    defendant] was recruited and joined a violent street gang “Gangster Disciples[”] or

                    (G.D.’s) at the age of 11 years old, where he was continuously influenced by

                    negative influences throughout his adolescent years into young adulthood. At the

                    age of 13 he began to experiment with drugs and started to abuse various narcotic

                    substances, and as a result his values and interest in obtaining an education

                    diminished.”

     The defendant attached to the petition his affidavit stating that everything contained in the petition

     was true and accurate as well as a document titled “Scientific Rationale to Extend the

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       Graham/Roper/Miller protections upward from age 18 to 25,” written by James Garbarino at

       Loyola University Chicago. On May 15, 2020, the court issued a written order summarily

       dismissing the defendant’s petition. The defendant appealed.

¶ 10                                               II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11           The defendant argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition

       as frivolous and patently without merit. Specifically, the defendant argues that his petition stated

       the gist of an arguable claim that his sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him, where he was

       22 years old at the time of the offenses and the court did not consider his youth and its attendant

       characteristics in imposing the de facto life sentence.

¶ 12           At the outset, we note that the State argues that the defendant’s claim is barred by

       res judicata as the defendant could have raised it during his direct appeal. However, as the

       defendant raises an as-applied constitutional challenge, we find that his claim is more properly

       raised in a postconviction petition. See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 41 (finding “a

       reviewing court is not capable of making an as-applied finding of unconstitutionality in the ‘factual

       vacuum’ created by the absence of an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact by the trial court”

       and the defendant’s juvenile sentencing claim would be more properly raised in a collateral

       proceeding (quoting People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563 ¶ 19)). Therefore, we will consider whether

       his petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim.

¶ 13           The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) provides a

       process for a criminal defendant to assert that his conviction or sentence resulted from a substantial

       denial of his rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both. People

       v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). The defendant need only state the “gist” of a constitutional claim

       at the first stage. Id. The petition may be summarily dismissed at the first stage of proceedings if

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       it is frivolous or patently without merit, such that it “has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

       Id. at 16. “A petition which lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact is one which is based

       on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” Id.

¶ 14           The defendant raised his claim under both the eighth amendment to the United States

       Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The eighth

       amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const., amend. VIII.

       The United States Supreme Court has applied the eighth amendment to juvenile offenders who

       have committed serious offenses. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding the

       eighth amendment prohibited imposition of the death penalty for offenders under the age of 18);

       Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (the eighth amendment prohibits life without parole

       for juvenile offenders convicted of a crime other than homicide); Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (the

       eighth amendment forbids mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders). The Illinois

       Supreme Court has further extended these protections. See People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-

       10 (Miller applied to de facto life sentences); People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41 (defining a

       de facto life sentence for a juvenile as one of more than 40 years). For juvenile claims under the

       eighth amendment, the United States Supreme Court has specifically drawn the line at the age of

       18. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 465). Therefore, the defendant’s claim,

       as it relates to the eighth amendment, is meritless since he was 22 years old at the time of the

       offenses.

¶ 15           The Illinois Supreme Court has included the possibility that young adult offenders could

       raise a claim arguing their sentence was unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause.

       See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44 (finding a 19-year-old defendant was “not

       necessarily foreclosed from renewing his as-applied [Miller] challenge in the circuit court” in a

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postconviction petition). “The key question in this case is whether defendant falls into the category

of ‘young adult offenders.’ ” People v. Montanez, 2022 IL App (1st) 191930, ¶ 54. “The vast

majority of [appellate court] cases have drawn a bright line at 21 years old in determining who

qualifies as a ‘young adult offender.’ ” Id. ¶ 55. Our legislature has also continuously drawn the

line at 21 years old. As the court said in People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 34:

                       “While 21 is undoubtedly somewhat arbitrary, drawing a line there is in

               keeping with other aspects of criminal law and society’s current general recognition

               that 21 is considered the beginning of adulthood. In Illinois, a person under the age

               of 21 when he or she commits first degree murder is now eligible for parole review

               after serving 20 or more years of his or her sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West

               Supp. 2019). The Illinois legislature has also prohibited the sale of nicotine and

               tobacco products to persons under 21 (720 ILCS 675/1 (West Supp. 2019)),

               prohibited the sale of alcohol products to persons under 21 (235 ILCS 5/6-16 (West

               2016)); and made possession of a firearm by those under the age of 21 an

               aggravating factor for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-

               1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I) (West 2016)).”

The majority of cases concerning a 22 year or older defendant have upheld the first-stage dismissal

of the defendant’s postconviction petition in similar circumstances. See, e.g., People v. Guerrero,

2022 IL App (1st) 210400, ¶ 34 (upholding first-stage dismissal of the defendant’s postconviction

petition where the defendant was 22 years old); People v. Williams, 2021 IL App (1st) 190535,

¶ 36 (same); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶¶ 35-36 (same for 23-year-old

defendant). We agree with this line of reasoning and find that, because the defendant was 22 years

old at the time of the offense, he was not a young adult offender, and his claim has no basis in law.

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¶ 16           Moreover, even accepting the defendant’s age, the defendant’s petition did not state the

       gist of a constitutional claim. Though he only needed to present a limited amount of detail in his

       petition, that does not mean that he was “excused from providing any factual detail at all

       surrounding the alleged constitutional deprivation.” People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (2008).

       For the defendant to make his claim under Miller and its progeny, he had to allege how the evolving

       science on juvenile maturity and brain development applied to the facts of his case. See Harris,

       2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46. “In other words, defendant’s claim must allege facts specific to him as a

       22-year-old adult and how they rendered him more akin to a juvenile when he committed his

       offenses.” Williams, 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, ¶ 28. While a first-stage petition is liberally

       construed, the court need not take facts as true if they are affirmatively rebutted by the trial record.

       People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998); People v. Rademacher, 2016 IL App (3d) 130881,

       ¶ 26.

¶ 17           Here, the only factual allegations the defendant raised in his petition were he (1) was raised

       in a single parent household in “impoverished gang and drug infested housing projects,” (2) joined

       a gang when he was 11, (3) was “influenced by negative influences” into adulthood, and (4) was

       13 years old when he began experimenting with drugs and abusing various narcotics. However,

       many of these allegations are rebutted by the record from the defendant’s sentencing hearing. The

       defendant reported in his PSI that he never joined a gang, did not use narcotics, and began smoking

       cannabis and drinking alcohol when he turned 18 years old. The defendant committed the crime

       on his own; it was not the product of peer pressure or negative influence. His mother also reported

       that the defendant did not have a drug or alcohol problem, his friends and peers were a good

       support and a good influence, and the defendant was not abused as a child. There is nothing to

       show that the defendant’s cognitive abilities were somehow affected or lessened by the

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       circumstances of his upbringing or that his cognitive development was that of a juvenile at the

       time he committed the offenses. Because Miller and its progeny do not apply to a 22-year-old

       offender, the defendant’s factual allegations are rebutted by the record, and the defendant’s

       cognitive abilities were not that of a juvenile at the time of the crime, we find that the court properly

       dismissed the defendant’s postconviction petition at the first stage.

¶ 18           In coming to this conclusion, we reject the defendant’s reliance on People v. Savage, 2020

       IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 76, which advanced a postconviction petition to the second stage where

       the defendant was 22 years old, finding that the claim was not frivolous. We disagree with the

       determination that such a claim is not frivolous, and we decline to follow Savage. See People v.

       McKee, 2017 IL App (3d) 140881, ¶ 33. Further, Savage is factually distinguishable. In Savage,

       the defendant alleged that his long-term drug addiction left him more susceptible to peer pressure

       and rendered him “ ‘more volatile in emotionally charged settings.’ ” Savage, 2020 IL App (1st)

       173135 ¶ 71. The defendant argued that his drug addiction and other issues made him the

       functional equivalent of a juvenile. Id. ¶ 60. The Savage court found the defendant’s allegations

       were supported by detailed hospital records and the PSI. Id. ¶ 72. This is a vast difference from

       the defendant’s claim, where his allegations were rebutted by the record.

¶ 19                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20           The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 21           Affirmed.

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