Court Opinion

ID: 9395664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 16:01:01.73276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:10.503458
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 18 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-50098

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:09-cr-00466-DSF-9
 v.

JOSE GONZALEZ,                                  MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted May 9, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: HURWITZ and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and KANE,*** District
Judge.

      Jose Gonzalez challenges the sentence imposed upon revocation of

supervised release following his admission to illegal entry after deportation, among

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
other violations. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

      1.     Gonzalez first argues that the district court plainly erred by failing to

adequately explain its reasons for imposing a twenty-four-month sentence, which

was above the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) range of six

to twelve months. “Whether the district court provided an adequate statement of

reasons for the sentence it imposed is a question of law that we review de novo”—

however, “[i]f a defendant fails to object to the district court’s failure to adequately

state reasons,” the “sentence is reviewed for plain error.” United States v. Miqbel,

444 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006). The district court did not plainly err because

it made appropriate reference to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and 3553(a), stating that

“this greater period of incarceration than would otherwise be the sentence range is

appropriate” because of the “greater likelihood” that Gonzalez would “pose a

continuing danger to the community, relapse into criminal activity, and continue to

breach the [c]ourt’s trust.” The cases cited by Gonzalez are inapposite. See United

States v. Hammons, 558 F.3d 1100, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2009) (court failed to give

any reasons for imposition of sentence); United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 546,

554 (9th Cir. 2008) (court “gave no reasons in reference to the § 3553(a) factors

before imposing the sentence”).

      2.     Gonzalez then argues that the district court erred by failing to find, by

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clear and convincing evidence, the facts upon which it relied to increase his

sentence. Gonzalez failed to preserve this issue below, and therefore we review for

plain error. See United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2001). Any

error cannot be “plain” because Gonzalez points to no controlling authority

indicating that the district court should have applied the clear and convincing

evidence standard—not the preponderance of the evidence standard—when

considering the relevant § 3583(e) factors during the revocation of supervised

release. See United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d 419, 428 (9th Cir.

2011).

      3.     Finally, Gonzalez contends that the district court’s sentence was

substantively unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a

sentence for abuse of discretion, regardless of whether the defendant objected to

the sentence’s reasonableness before the district court. Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007); United States v. Grant, 727 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 2013).

In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we “take into account the totality of the

circumstances,” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, and “recognize that ‘[t]he sentencing judge is

in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the

individual case,’” United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010)

(alteration in original) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). In imposing a sentence, “the

district court abuses its discretion only if its decision was ‘(1) illogical,

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(2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the

facts in the record.’” Grant, 727 F.3d at 933 (quoting United States v. Maier, 646

F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011)).

      Viewing the totality of the circumstances, which involved law enforcement’s

post-deportation discovery of Gonzalez living in this country in a home with a

loaded semi-automatic rifle, and a large quantity of stolen goods in his garage, the

district court’s imposition of a twenty-four-month sentence, which was more than

the six- to twelve-month Guidelines range but less than the thirty-three months

sought by the government, and within the sixty-month statutory range, was not

substantively unreasonable. Recognizing the district court’s “superior position to

find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a),” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (citation

omitted), the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a twenty-four-

month sentence upon revocation of Gonzalez’s supervised release.

      AFFIRMED.

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