Court Opinion

ID: 9635242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:43:11.281091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:21.800371
License: Public Domain

TIM TAFT, Justice,
dissenting from denial of en-banc review.
This is not a case in which appellant, Danny -Edward Hull, violated the terms and conditions of his probation and the trial court surprised appellant by suddenly springing a zero tolerance policy, saying “Gotcha!” The Panel Opinion’s rendition of the trial court’s remarks before revoking appellant’s probation clearly shows that the trial court had admonished appellant at the time probation was assessed that any violation of even a single condition of his probation would result in revocation. Indeed, when appellant took the stand at the revocation hearing, the third question from his attorney was, “At the time that you were granted probation, you were aware that the Judge had placed you on what’s called a zero tolerance probation?” Appellant answered that he knew that. The next question elicited that appellant knew what zero tolerance probation meant. Later, appellant’s counsel repeated inquiries demonstrating that appellant understood what kind of probation the trial court had given him, and appellant acknowledged that he had taken the trial court seriously. Finally, appellant was asked what he wanted the trial court to do, and he said, “To take off zero tolerance and give me a chance.”
As the Panel Opinion set out, appellant had entered a plea of true to the allegation of failure to report. Appellant’s attorney argued that appellant freely admitted and took full responsibility for failing to report. After covering the mitigating and extenuating circumstances, appellant’s attorney asked the trial court to continue appellant on probation.
The only defense presented at trial was for appellant to take responsibility for an admitted violation and throw himself on the mercy of the court. Neither appellant *608nor his attorney ever mentioned any objection to the trial court’s zero tolerance policy, much less that it violated due process. To the contrary, by their actions, appellant and his attorney led the trial court to believe that they accepted the trial court’s authority to require a zero tolerance policy, but merely asked that the trial court make an exception in appellant’s case due to the extenuating circumstances. Even after the trial court made it clear he was going to proceed to revoke pursuant to his zero tolerance policy, which was prior to the trial court’s actually announcing its decision to revoke, neither appellant nor his counsel put the trial court on notice there was any objection to the trial court’s procedure.
Having unsuccessfully pursued the strategy of seeking an exception from the trial court’s policy at trial, appellant now, for the first time on appeal, challenges the trial court’s zero tolerance policy as a violation of due process. To the Panel Opinion’s willingness to overlook appellant’s failure to preserve error, I must vigorously dissent.
To allow appellant to raise his complaint about the trial court’s zero tolerance probation for the first time on appeal is simply not fair to the trial court. We would be engaging in a “Gotcha” procedure against a trial court that had not engaged in such a “Gotcha” procedure with appellant. Our action would abrogate both the letter and spirit of the contemporaneous objection rule. See Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (holding purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule are to avoid playing “Gotcha” with either the trial court or the opposing party). Particularly in regard to appellant’s not moving to recuse the trial court, the Panel Opinion’s reliance on a Dallas Court of Appeals opinion to excuse any trial objection for lack of opportunity is unpersuasive.
This is not a case like Jefferson v. State, 808 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1991, pet. refd). In Jefferson, the failure to object was excused under circumstances found to preclude an opportunity to object:
The following testimony reveals the abrupt nature of the judge’s assessment of punishment and thus defendant’s inability to recognize that the assessment of punishment would be based on factors other than the evidence.
A. [The trial court] asked the probation man did he promise me anything and he said, yes, 20 years; and [the trial court] said, you know what time it is, 20 years.
We find nothing in this record to indicate that the judge did anything more than ask the probation officer what he promised to this defendant, then assessed that exact punishment period. Under these conditions, the defendant could not know until after the judge had assessed punishment that he needed to request recusal. We conclude that appellant did not knowingly waive the right to a fair and unbiased tribunal.
Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
Contrast the abruptness of the trial court’s sentence in Jefferson with the trial court’s reminder to appellant in this case of the trial court’s previous admonishment about the zero tolerance policy and the trial court’s assertion that he was a man of his word, well before the trial court announced its decision to revoke. This was a clear indication that the trial court was about to revoke appellant’s probation, as promised.
Lack of opportunity to object to the sentencing procedure in the Jefferson case is buttressed by the manner in which the trial court conducted the hearing on Jefferson’s motion for new trial. When the trial court began questioning Jefferson, over counsel’s objection, counsel objected to the court’s procedure, but was overruled and ordered to sit quietly. Id. at 471. Such rough treatment certainly would not have encouraged objections at the trial court level. By contrast, the record in this case shows no trial court behavior that *609would have discouraged objections to the trial court’s procedure. The record in this case simply does not provide any excuse for appellant’s not objecting at trial to the trial court’s zero tolerance policy.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to the denial of en-banc review, which I requested to enforce the most basic of appellate rules, the contemporaneous objection rule.