Court Opinion

ID: 9895223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 15:14:43.789727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:44.388440
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Pittsburgh,                            :
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
               v.                              :    No. 1076 C.D. 2022
                                               :
Fraternal Order of Police                      :    Argued: October 10, 2023
Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1                          :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENEE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                          FILED: November 6, 2023

               The City of Pittsburgh (City) appeals from the August 30, 2022 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court), denying its statutory
appeal and confirming a class action grievance arbitration award issued under what is
commonly known as the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act1 (Act 111).
Upon review, we affirm.
                              Factual and Procedural History
               The Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 (FOP), is the
collective bargaining representative of police officers employed by the City. The City
and FOP are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) effective January l,
2019 to December 31, 2022, which addresses the terms and conditions of employment
between the parties pursuant to the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act2 (PLRA) and Act
111. Section 14.B.II.9 of the CBA addresses retiree healthcare. It provides:

      1
          Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. 111, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.10.
      2
          Act of June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 211.1-211.15.
Any employee who retires after January 1, 2001, provided he
or she was hired before January 1, 2005, will be allowed to
continue his or her medical insurance coverage for
himself/herself and spouse only, through the City. The City
shall contribute towards the cost of this husband and wife
coverage, for each employee so electing, an amount equal to
the amount charged for such insurance by the carrier
providing such coverage on the date of his/her retirement.
The plan(s) that the City will provide are the same plan
choices provided to active employees described in Section
14(B)(1).

For any employee who retires on or after January 1, 2001, the
City will be the health insurer of the last resort. As the health
insurer of the last resort, the City will provide health
insurance benefits for a Police Officer and his/her spouse
who retires after January 1, 2001, where such Police Officer
and his/her spouse does not have access to enroll in any other
group health insurance plan. The City’s obligation to provide
continuation of health insurance coverage is terminated if the
employee is or becomes employed or self-employed or has
access to private medical insurance coverage or Medicare
through his/her spouse or if his/her spouse has private
medical insurance or Medicare or any opportunity to obtain
such coverage.

                            ****

a. Any employee who retires after January 1, 2001 who at
   the time of retirement has group medical coverage or
   Medicare or access to such coverage because of other
   employment or through his/her spouse will not continue
   to be covered by the City of Pittsburgh, provided
   however, that should such coverage terminate or cease to
   be available, the employee will be reinstated to his/her
   medical insurance benefits by the City of Pittsburgh.

b. Any employee who retires after January 1, 2001, who
   after retirement has group medical coverage or Medicare

                               2
                  or access to such coverage from another source either
                  through his/her employment or through his/her spouse
                  will not continue to receive health insurance benefits from
                  the City of Pittsburgh, provided however, that should
                  such coverage terminate or cease to be available the
                  employees will be reinstated to his/her medical insurance
                  benefits by the City of Pittsburgh.
(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 253a-54a.)
               The instant litigation stems from the death of retired Master Police Officer
Gary Rupert on March 8, 2021. Mr. Rupert left behind a wife, Erin, and four dependent
children. On April 12, 2021, Mrs. Rupert went for a routine mammogram appointment
and was informed that she no longer had healthcare coverage. After her appointment,
she received a letter dated April 13, 2021, informing her that her benefits were
terminated as of March 31, 2021, due to the death of her husband. Her option was to
apply for Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 19853 (COBRA)
continuation coverage because she was not Medicare eligible due to her age. Mrs.
Rupert contacted the FOP, which was unaware of the City’s practice in terminating a
spouse’s health insurance benefits after the death of a retiree. Thereafter, the FOP
reached out to other members to determine how many others were impacted.
               On April 19, 2021, the FOP filed a class action grievance seeking
cessation of the City’s unilateral actions of eliminating City-sponsored healthcare
coverage for the widows and widowers of retired police officers. The FOP alleged that
the City violated various sections of the CBA by unilaterally terminating
widow/widower and qualified spousal healthcare coverage. Specifically, it asserted
that the City “by unilaterally canceling the widow and qualified spouse of retired police
officer Gary Rupert from its obligation to provide her and any other member’s qualified
spouse or domestic partner from retiree medical insurance or Medicare Part B

      3
          29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169.

                                             3
payments has expressly violated its obligations under the [CBA].” Id. at 317a. The
FOP requested that the City provide a list of those retiree spouses who were denied
coverage under similar circumstances. Id. Moreover, the FOP demanded a “make[-
]whole remedy to compensate those widows[/widowers] and/or qualified domestic
partners who have been affected by the City’s unilateral actions by eliminating retiree
medical benefits and Medicare Part B payments.” Id.
             In response, the City contended that no violation of the CBA had occurred
because it claimed to have acted in accordance with the parties’ past practice. Id. at
319a. In support, it referenced an October 1993 Memorandum from Carla Coyne,
Compensation Administrator, Department of Finance, to Patrick McNamara, then-
President of the FOP, entitled “October 15, 1993 Retirement Meeting,” in which it
asserted authorized termination coverage for surviving spouses. Id. at 319a-20a. The
October 1993 Memorandum referenced a handout that Ms. Coyne intended to
distribute at the upcoming meeting, which stated in the last paragraph on the second
page that “[t]he City will provide the retired Police Officer and his/her eligible spouse
with the applicable benefits from the date of his/her retirement until the retired Police
Officer becomes deceased.” Id.
             The grievance was timely processed in accordance with the grievance
procedure of the parties’ CBA. Evidentiary hearings were conducted on October 13,
2021, and October 15, 2021. The ultimate issue, as agreed upon by the parties, was
“whether the City violated Section 14 of the CBA when it denied medical coverage to
the surviving spouse of a retiree and, if so, what shall the remedy be.” Id. at 68a.
             On October 13, 2021, the FOP presented the testimony of Penny Jo
Cummins, spouse of deceased retired police officer, Glenn Cummins. Mr. Cummins
passed away on March 25, 2021, and the City terminated Mrs. Cummins’ benefits

                                           4
without notice. Id. at 71a. She discovered that she no longer had health insurance
when she was unable to refill her prescriptions. Thereafter, she received a letter from
the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, providing that she and her son
qualified for welfare benefits. Id. On cross-examination, she testified she never
received any information from the City regarding termination of her healthcare
benefits, or her eligibility for COBRA continuation coverage. Id. at 72a.
            Mrs. Rupert testified that she was married to her deceased husband, Gary,
for almost 25 years. In 2020, Mr. Rupert was employed as the chief of police at
Washington and Jefferson College where Mrs. Rupert also worked as a substitute
teacher. Both lost their jobs and healthcare coverage due to circumstances related to
the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, they were reinstated on the City’s retiree
health insurance plan. Id. at 74a-75a. Mrs. Rupert received a letter dated April 13,
2021 from the City, noting the cessation of benefits and her eligibility for healthcare
under COBRA. She contacted the pension office which confirmed her termination of
benefits. Mrs. Rupert sought COBRA benefits but was informed that her coverage
would be approximately $1,400.00 per month, which is the entirety of her spousal
pension benefit. Mrs. Rupert is currently on Medicare and her dependent children are
covered under the CHIP program. Id. at 75a-76a.
            The FOP called FOP President Robert Swartzwelder.                President
Swartzwelder has been an active member of the FOP since 1995 and testified that this
was the first instance where he heard of the City stopping widow/widower medical
coverage. He confirmed this with the FOP Executive Board. President Swartzwelder
confirmed that the FOP has very few, brief interactions with widows/widowers, usually
only for life insurance inquiries.      Id. at 80a.     President Swartzwelder was
knowledgeable in the CBA retiree healthcare provisions and noted only minor changes

                                          5
to the language since the 1990s. He testified that, for hires before 2005, “[t]he
employee plus spouse has standing under the contract to receive retiree medical from
their retirement date up until age 65. Once that person reaches age 65, they must make
a timely notice to receive Medicare and also their Medicare Part B benefits.” Id. at
79a-80a. A retiree’s dependent children are not given healthcare coverage. He testified
that spousal coverage terminates only when coverage is available through alternative
means, such eligibility for group health insurance or Medicare. Healthcare benefits are
automatically reinstated should a retiree or spouse be dropped from such coverage. Id.
             On cross-examination, President Swartzwelder testified that police
officers had to be hired prior to January 1, 2005, to receive retiree medical coverage.
Officers hired from 2005 through 2015 receive retiree medical coverage in a medical
trust. Officers hired after 2015 do not receive such benefits. Furthermore, he testified
that the instant matter is a class action grievance and the FOP reached out to retiree
members and their families to calculate how many widows/widowers were denied
coverage. He acknowledged that the FOP receives notice once a member dies and
provides general guidance to the widow/widower, if contacted.          Id. at 84a-85a.
Moreover, President Swartzwelder testified regarding the October 1993 Memorandum,
cited by Deputy Sheriff Stangrecki in denying the grievance. The October 1993
Memorandum, titled “October 13, 1993 Retirement Meeting,” was communicated to
former FOP President Patrick McNamara who intended to present it at the meeting.
The last paragraph on the second page provides: “[t]he City will provide the retired
Police Officer and his/her eligible spouse with the applicable benefits from the date of
his/her retirement until the retired Police Officer becomes deceased.” Id. at 425a. On
redirect, President Swartzwelder testified that the October 1993 Memorandum was
never cited or incorporated into the parties’ CBA. Id. at 90a-92a.

                                           6
             A second arbitration hearing was conducted on October 15, 2021, during
which the City presented the testimony of Jamie Warnock, the manager of Wellness
and Benefits for the City of Pittsburgh, hired in 2002. She testified that she administers
the retiree benefits and assists retirees and their spouses with Medicare eligibility. She
testified that, at least since 2006, the City has terminated healthcare for spouses of
deceased retirees. Id. at 143a. When she is notified that a spouse is under the age of
65, she will contact the group health insurance so necessary COBRA paperwork is
circulated. Id. at 144a. Where the spouse is over the age of 65, he/she is removed for
Medicare Part B benefits. Id. She testified that 13 surviving spouses, under 65, were
removed from medical benefits dating back to 2013. The most recent data shows that
104 surviving spouses, over 65, were removed from Medicare Part B benefits dating
back to 2013. Id. at 142a-45a. Ms. Warnock testified regarding a Retirement Benefit
Instruction Sheet for Police Officers, dated July 14, 1994. Id. at 145a. On cross-
examination, Ms. Warnock conceded that the FOP is not notified when a surviving
spouses’ medical coverage is terminated. Six spouses, over 65, were terminated from
the City’s healthcare in 2021, 5 of which since the grievance was filed. Four spouses,
under 65, were terminated from the City’s healthcare in 2021, 3 of which after the
grievance was filed. Id. at 146a-52a.
             Tara DiSimono, office manager of the Policemen’s Relief and Pension
Fund, was called as a witness via subpoena. She testified that when a retiree passes
away, Ms. DiSimono is usually notified by the family. She will ask the spouse whether
he/she is over the age of 65, and if so, Medicare Part B supplemental benefits will be
terminated. The surviving spouse will have a choice between two Medicare plans. If
the spouse is under 65, she will inform them he/she is to receive COBRA packets. On
cross-examination, she conceded that she plays no role in the cancellation of the

                                            7
medical benefits or the Medicare supplemental benefit. She will instruct the surviving
spouse to contact the Wellness and Benefits Office for further information. Id. at 152a-
58a.
             The Arbitrator issued his Award on March 15, 2022, sustaining the
grievance. The Arbitrator found that the language of the CBA is not ambiguous, and
clearly sets forth the reasons for termination of the surviving spouse’s coverage and the
“death of the retiree is not one of those reasons.” (Award at 15; R.R. at 28a.) The
Arbitrator also determined that the City failed to establish that the termination of
surviving spouse healthcare benefits was an established past practice between the
parties. The Arbitrator concluded that the City violated the clear and unambiguous
provisions of Section 14 of the CBA when it discontinued the healthcare coverage for
the surviving spouse upon the death of the retiree.
             Citing Elkouri & Elkouri, “How Arbitration Works,” 6th Edition (2003),
the Arbitrator noted that a past practice must be unequivocal, clearly articulated and
acted upon, and ascertainable over a period of time between the parties. Here, he
discredited the City’s claim that the October 1993 Memorandum authorized the
termination of such coverage because the City provided no documentation or other
evidence that the attached pages were, in fact, presented at any meeting between the
parties, or that the parties ever discussed or adopted the exclusion of medical coverage
for surviving spouses upon the death of the retiree. Moreover, the Arbitrator noted that
no such language was ever included in the CBA and that the October 1993
Memorandum was not incorporated into the parties’ CBA. Id. The Arbitrator found
the testimony of President Swartzwelder credible that the FOP first became aware of
the City’s actions in April 2021, and that, although the practice was in effect for 15
years, it was not mutually recognized by the parties. Id.

                                           8
             The Arbitrator disagreed with the City’s position that consideration of past
practices was necessary to clarify the language of Section 14 because he found Section
14 was unambiguous. In his view, Section 14 “clearly sets forth the reasons for
termination of the surviving spouse’s coverage and the death of the retiree is not one
of those reasons.” Id. Rather, the Arbitrator noted the only conditions identified in
the CBA in which the City may terminate spousal coverage are in instances of group
health or Medicare eligibility. He emphasized that if the City sought for medical
benefits to terminate upon the death of a retiree, “it would have been a simple and
elementary concept to incorporate.” Id. Based on his interpretation of the CBA, the
Arbitrator concluded that the City had violated the clear and unambiguous provisions
of Section 14 when it discontinued the healthcare coverage for the surviving spouse
upon the death of the retiree. As the remedy, the Arbitrator directed the City “to make
restitution to the adversely affected survivors who are not otherwise excluded from
coverage.” Id. at 16; R.R. at 29a.
             On April 18, 2022, the City appealed the Arbitration Award to the trial
court. The City argued that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by adding a term
about survivors to the retiree provisions of the CBA. (R.R. at 8a.)
             On August 30, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying the City’s
appeal and upholding the Arbitration Award.          The trial court reasoned that the
Arbitration Award was a proper interpretation of the CBA rather than a reformation of
it because the City can legally provide healthcare, healthcare benefits are a benefit
under the terms of the CBA, and the CBA, as interpreted by the Arbitrator, does not
state that death of the retiree is an instance which terminates healthcare to the retiree’s
surviving spouse.

                                            9
               The City now appeals4 and raises the following issue:

               Did the [trial court] abuse its discretion when it found that
               [the Arbitrator] did not exceed his authority where his
               grievance award overtly reformed the working agreement
               between the City [] and the [FOP] by adding the term
               “surviving spouse” to the section pertaining to healthcare?
(City’s Brief at 8.)
                                             Discussion
               The City argues that the Arbitrator “overtly reformed” the CBA by adding
the term about survivors to the provisions addressing medical coverage benefits. It
contends that this not only exceeded the Arbitrator’s authority, but it was also contrary
to the City’s long-standing practice of ceasing benefits on the last day of the month of
the eligible retired employee’s death, which is consistent with the October 1993
Memorandum. Applying principles of contract interpretation, the City contends that

       4
           The scope of judicial review applicable to such an appeal is “narrow certiorari,” which
applies to the decisions of the courts reviewing arbitration awards. Township of Wilkins v. Wage &
Policy Committee of the Wilkins Township Police Department, 696 A.2d 917 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).
Narrow certiorari restricts the court to questions only concerning: (1) the jurisdiction of the
arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the arbitration proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator’s powers;
and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights. Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers
Association, 741 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 1999); Township of Moon v. Police Officers of the Township of
Moon, 498 A.2d 1305, 1313 (Pa. 1985).
        A dual standard of review applies to Act 111 appeals. Pennsylvania State Police v.
Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Association, 840 A.2d 1059 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Where resolution of
an issue turns on a pure question of law, or the application of law to undisputed facts, the court’s
review is plenary. However, where resolution of an issue depends upon factfinding or upon
interpretation of the CBA, reviewing courts apply the extreme standard of deference applicable to Act
111 awards; that is, they are bound by the arbitrator’s determination of these matters even though the
reviewing court may find them to be incorrect. Id. Courts are required to give great deference to an
arbitrator’s award, which furthers the legislative intent of not bogging awards down in litigation.
Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers’ Association, 901 A.2d 991, 998 (Pa. 2006).
Errors of law, erroneous interpretation of, or misapplication of, language in a collective bargaining
agreement “are not a valid basis for vacating an Act 111 arbitration award.” City of Pittsburgh v.
Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 224 A.3d 702, 708 (Pa. 2020) (City of Pittsburgh).

                                                  10
the record evidence indisputably demonstrates that the parties did not have a meeting
of the minds or have a mutual intention about continuing medical coverage for
surviving spouses; therefore, the Arbitrator’s reformation of the CBA was unjustified.
The City maintains that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the parties
shared an intention about the purpose of Section 14 which was not accurately expressed
in the writing and required reformation. It notes that the term “surviving spouse” does
appear once in the CBA, to provide healthcare benefits to the surviving spouse of an
officer killed in the line of duty. (CBA at 67.) Therefore, the City contends, it is clear
that the parties’ intent was to grant healthcare benefits only to the surviving spouse of
an officer killed in the line of duty, not to the surviving spouse of retired employees.
Accordingly, the record here did not support the Arbitrator’s overt reformation of
Section 14 of the Agreement.
             Pennsylvania case law holds that a labor arbitrator’s powers lie solely in
interpreting the parties’ agreement, City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police,
Lodge No. 5, 786 A.2d 291 (Pa. 2001), and a grievance arbitrator does not have the
authority to add terms to the CBA or change the language contained therein. Borough
of Montoursville v. Montoursville Police Bargaining Unit, 958 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2008). It is firmly settled that the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained
in the writing itself; when a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must
be determined by its contents alone, and an arbitrator is required to give effect to that
language. Id.; Clairton Slag, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 2 A.3d 765, 773
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); East Crossroads Center., Inc. v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 205 A.2d 865,
866 (Pa. 1965).
             In interpreting such a contract, the ultimate goal is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the contracting parties as reasonably manifested by the language

                                             11
of their written agreement. Department of Transportation v. Pennsylvania Industries
for the Blind and Handicapped, 886 A.2d 706, 711 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). “Arbitrators
are required to address the issues submitted within the context of the positions of the
parties and effectuate the relief requested, not to reform the collective bargaining
agreements.” Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5, of Fraternal Order of Police v. City of
Philadelphia, 129 A.3d 1221, 1230 (Pa. 2015) citing Marple Township v. Delaware
County F.O.P. Lodge 27, 660 A.2d 211, 215 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). “[A]n arbitrator does
not have a roving commission to do what he or she believes is necessary to put
everything right, to construct a ‘better agreement.’” Id. at 1230.
             The silence of a labor contract or absence of language dealing specifically
with an issue does not prevent an arbitrator from drawing conclusions related to the
issue. School District of City of Allentown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees
International Union, Local No. 391, AFL-CIO, 654 A.2d 86 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). An
arbitrator has leeway to craft an award that addresses the issues raised by the parties.
Wilkins Township v. Wage Policy Committee of Wilkins Township Police Department,
162 A.3d 581 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Once an issue is properly placed in dispute,
arbitrators are free to resolve that issue in a fair manner within the total context of the
agreement; they may examine the writing itself, in addition to the circumstances
surrounding its execution, as well as other indicia of the parties’ intentions. Association
of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 436 A.2d 987 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981); City of Wilkes-Barre v. City of
Wilkes-Barre Police Benevolent Association, 814 A.2d 285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
             Here, the City’s position that the Arbitrator impermissibly and “overtly”
reformed the CBA is based chiefly on the fact that the term “surviving spouse” does
not appear in Section 14.B.II.9 of the CBA. The City contends that the Arbitrator

                                            12
“added” the term surviving spouse to Section 14.B.II.9 of the CBA, and that the
Arbitrator’s reformation of the CBA in this manner “was contrary to ordinary contract
principles of mutual intention.” (City’s Brief at 21.) It contends that principles of
contract law permit reformation under very limited circumstances, for example, when
there is evidence of a mutual mistake, or where the writing does not capture the
intention of the parties. Id. at 19. The City argues that the evidence before the
Arbitrator indisputably demonstrated that the parties did not have a meeting of the
minds or have a mutual intention about continuing medical coverage for spouses who
survive after the death of a retired police officer. Specifically, it points to evidence of
its past practice of stopping coverage for the surviving spouse at the end of the month
of the retiree’s death. Therefore, it contends, the Arbitrator’s overt reformation of the
CBA to add survivor benefits was improper because it was unnecessary to enable
specific performance of the parties’ intentions.
             We find the City’s argument unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First,
the City touts principles of contract interpretation to support its main argument that the
Arbitrator’s reformation of the CBA was unwarranted in this situation. That assertion
fails, not only because it requires us to accept the City’s premise that a reformation of
the CBA indeed occurred, but also because it would require us to consider whether the
Arbitrator erred in interpreting the law, i.e., the principles of contract interpretation,
which falls outside our standard of review. Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police
Officers Association (Franceschina), 952 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)
(“[E]rror of law is not enough to allow a court to vacate an Act 111 arbitration award.”).
Second, our review of the record shows that, contrary to the City’s contention, the
Arbitrator did not exceed his authority by overtly reforming the CBA.

                                            13
             In City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1
(On-Duty and Off-Duty Pay for Events), 111 A.3d 794 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc),
this Court found the arbitrator impermissibly reformed the parties’ CBA because his
award was not based on any contractual interpretation, but rather on his opinion of what
he believed would be a fair outcome. There, two City police officers were assigned to
direct traffic at multiple sporting events while on-duty and paid in accordance with the
CBA executed by the City and the police officers’ union. The police officers later filed
grievances alleging that off-duty police officers performing the same job were paid at
a higher, secondary employment rate of pay. The City denied the grievances and the
matter proceeded to grievance arbitration. The arbitrator ultimately issued an award
sustaining the grievances and directing the City to pay on-duty police officers working
large events the same rate being paid to off-duty officers working those events as
secondary employment. The arbitrator reasoned “based upon the grievances and the
arguments presented, that on-duty officers sent to work special events should be paid
at the same rate of pay as the rate being paid to officers working the special events as
a secondary employment detail” and concluded that it would be “unfair” to pay on-
duty officers less than those working secondary employment. Id. at 799 (emphasis
added).
             The common pleas court vacated the award and dismissed the grievances.
The common pleas court held, inter alia, that the arbitrator had disregarded the CBA’s
compensation terms and “instead made a judgment as to what the CBA should say as
opposed to what it actually says.” Id. at 798 (emphasis in original). The common
pleas court also noted that the arbitrator could not point to any language in the CBA to
support his analysis.

                                          14
              Before this Court, the union argued that the arbitrator’s award was based
on his “interpretation of” a provision in the CBA regarding compensation for secondary
employment work. Id. at 800. The City rejoined that the arbitrator did not interpret
the CBA, but rather he wrote a new term to raise the pay of the on-duty officers to
match the pay of off-duty officers. The City argued that the CBA did not require that
officers doing the same or similar tasks be paid the same. Id. at 800-01.
              This Court affirmed the common pleas court’s order, noting that although
the question posed to the arbitrator was whether the wages paid to on-duty officers
violated the CBA, the arbitrator did not discuss, much less purport to interpret, the
language of any provision in the CBA. Id. at 801. We explained

              [t]he purpose of grievance arbitration is to resolve disputes
              over a provision of an existing contract. The arbitrator
              explained his award on the grounds that it would be
              “inequitable” not to give on-duty officers the same wage paid
              to an off-duty officer. An Act 111 grievance arbitrator does
              not have jurisdiction or authority to rely on principles of
              equity to reform the CBA.
Id. at 802.
              We concluded, therefore, that the arbitrator’s award was not based on his
interpretation of the CBA and, thus, constituted an instance of “overt reformation,”
which was beyond his jurisdiction and authority. Id.
              In contrast, City of Pittsburgh involved a union’s unsuccessful contention
that an arbitrator’s award impermissibly reformed the parties’ CBA because it imposed
an entirely new contractual obligation upon the City. There, unable to fill posts through
volunteers, the City’s Bureau of Police required 70 officers to work the 2016 Pittsburgh
Marathon on their “pass days.” 224 A.3d at 704. The officers were paid a minimum
of four hours overtime at a time-and-a-half rate, plus additional overtime for any more

                                           15
hours worked. The union filed a grievance, arguing that the City violated the CBA by
mandating officers work secondary employment when the CBA stated it was strictly
voluntary. Id. The grievance placed several sections of the CBA before the arbitrator,
including: “Section 4 Management, Section 8 Hours of Work, Section 24 Secondary
Employment, Section 6 Salaries, Section 9 Overtime, and Section 17 Scope of
Agreement.” Id. at 704.
             The arbitrator found that there was nothing in the CBA “defining the
compensation to be paid for the cancellation of a pass day, whether a pass day can be
partially cancelled, or when a pass day shift begins for purposes of cancellation and
compensation.” Id. at 706. The arbitrator thus reasoned that it was necessary to “look
to related contractual language regarding hours of work and compensation in order to
determine the parties’ intent with regard to these pass day subjects.” Id.
             On appeal, this Court held that the arbitrator impermissibly reformed the
CBA to add a provision for compensation for loss of a pass day that was not in the
CBA. We reasoned:

             The arbitrator acknowledged that the CBA did not contain
             any provision for additional compensation for the
             cancellation of a pass day. Moreover, the arbitrator held that
             Section 8.D of the CBA applied to the cancellation of pass
             days and provided that four hours was the minimum overtime
             pay set by the CBA for such a callout. Instead of basing her
             award on an interpretation of these provisions or any other
             provision of the CBA related to compensation, overtime, or
             callouts, the arbitrator held that officers were entitled to a
             minimum of eight hours of overtime pay for cancellation of
             a pass day because “the City could not partially cancel a pass
             day without negating the concept of [two] consecutive days
             off.” In essence, the arbitrator created a remedy for loss of a
             pass day that she acknowledged did not exist in the CBA; she

                                           16
              “decided, apparently, what the CBA should say and did not
              rely upon what it does say.”

Id. at 708-09.
              The Supreme Court allowed the union’s appeal to consider whether this
Court erred. Discerning no “overt instance of reformation,” the Supreme Court
reversed this Court agreeing with the union that “the arbitrator’s legal reasoning,
however flawed, demonstrate[d] sufficient interpretive focus.” Id. at 714.
              Here, unlike in On-Duty and Off-Duty Pay for Events, 11 A.3d 794, where
the arbitrator relied on principles of equity in fashioning his award, the Arbitrator’s
reasoning was clearly based on his examination of different provisions of the CBA and
based his Award on what the CBA said. The parties held differing interpretations of
the CBA, disagreeing as to healthcare coverage for the surviving spouse upon the death
of the retiree.
              In relevant part, Section 14.B.II.9 of the CBA states that a City police
officer who retires after January 1, 2001, provided he or she was hired before January
1, 2005, will be allowed to continue his or her medical insurance coverage for
himself/herself and his or her spouse. The City shall contribute to towards the cost of
this “husband and wife coverage” if the retiree so elects. For employees who retire
after January 1, 2001, the City will be the health insurance of last resort, and the City
will provide health insurance benefits for the retired police officer and his/her spouse
who do not have access to any other group health insurance plan. The City’s obligation
terminates when the retired employee has access to private medical insurance coverage
or Medicare through his/her spouse or his/her spouse has private medical insurance or
Medicare, or any opportunity to obtain such coverage. Section 143.II.7 requires that
for a spouse to qualify for the healthcare benefit he/she must be “the spouse [of the
retiree] at the time of retirement.” (CBA at 67.)

                                           17
             The Award did not “add” surviving spouses to Section 14.B.II.9, as
contended by the City. Rather, the Arbitrator found, based on the above, that the CBA
explicitly lists terminating events for health insurance coverage, and that the death of
a retired officer is not one of those enumerated terminating events. (“There is no
reference to the death of the retiree.”) (Award at 15.) The Arbitrator took that to mean
that a surviving spouse will continue to have health insurance coverage until one of the
specific terminating events occurs. This case is more akin to City of Pittsburgh, where
the arbitrator examined the provisions of the CBA, construed them, and offered an
interpretation. Although the City’s argument is couched in terms of an impermissible
and overt reformation, its argument is, in reality, no more than an assertion that the
Arbitrator erred in construing Section 14.B.II.9 of the CBA. Whether a surviving
spouse is entitled to continued healthcare coverage after the death of his/her retired
spouse is a question of contract interpretation and the parties and this Court are bound
by the Arbitrator’s construction within the narrow certiorari standard of review.
Borough of Jenkintown v. Hall, 930 A.2d 618, 622 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Interpreting
the health insurance provision of the CBA and its meaning in the absence of specifics
regarding the death of a retiree was far from an “overt” instance of reformation.
Because the Arbitrator’s Award was based on the Arbitrator’s interpretation of disputed
terms and conditions in the CBA, it is entitled to deference. Borough of Montoursville,
958 A.2d at 1089.
             Based on the foregoing, the order of the trial court is affirmed.

                                           ________________________________
                                           PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                                           18
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Pittsburgh,                    :
                      Appellant        :
                                       :
             v.                        :    No. 1076 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Fraternal Order of Police              :
Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1                  :

                                   ORDER

             AND NOW, this 6th day of November, 2023, the August 30, 2022 order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                           ________________________________
                                           PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge