Court Opinion

ID: 9411265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 15:01:14.644317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:05.775970
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-3275
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America,

                        lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,

                                           v.

                            Christopher Joseph Conrad,

                       lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
                                        ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
                                  ____________

                              Submitted: June 12, 2023
                                Filed: July 26, 2023
                                   ____________

Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

       Christopher Conrad pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a
previously convicted felon. See U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). At sentencing, the
district court determined a base offense level of 24 after concluding that Conrad had
sustained two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The court sentenced
Conrad to 96 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Conrad argues that the district court
committed procedural error when it calculated his base offense level and failed to
follow the procedures of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3). We affirm the
sentence, but remand for correction of the court’s statement of reasons.

       Conrad first argues that the district court committed procedural error in
calculating his base offense level. The guidelines set a base offense level of 24 if “the
defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least
two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). The guidelines define “crime of violence” to include
“any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1). The district
court concluded that Conrad’s prior convictions for aggravated robbery under 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. § 5/18-1(b)(1) and for domestic abuse assault under Iowa Code
§ 708.2A(2)(c) qualified as crimes of violence.

       Conrad contends that his conviction in Iowa for domestic abuse assault with
the use or display of a weapon is not a crime of violence. An offense under Iowa
Code § 708.2A(2)(c) is punishable by more than a year in prison. The elements
require proof that an offender (1) committed an assault against a person with an
enumerated domestic relationship to the offender, Iowa Code § 708.2A(1), and (2) did
so with intent to inflict serious injury upon another, or used or displayed a dangerous
weapon in connection with the assault. Id. § 708.2A(2)(c).

       In United States v. McGee, 890 F.3d 730, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2018), this court
held that assault while displaying a dangerous weapon in violation of Iowa Code
§ 708.2(3) qualifies as a crime of violence, because the “display” of a dangerous
weapon requires at least the threatened use of physical force. As the only difference
between the assault statute at issue in McGee and the domestic assault statute at issue
here is the identity of the victim, the reasoning of McGee governs § 708.2A(2)(c) as

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well. See United States v. Tinlin, 20 F.4th 426, 428 (8th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 143
S. Ct. 1054 (2023).

      Conrad argues, however, that McGee is not controlling, because the “use” of
a dangerous weapon and the “display” of a dangerous weapon are alternative means
of committing the offense. He contends that the “use” of a dangerous weapon to
commit a domestic assault does not meet the definition of violent force required by
federal law. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).

        While Conrad’s appeal was pending, this court decided United States v.
Shannan, 66 F.4th 1177 (8th Cir. 2023). Shannan determined that there is no
distinction between the “use” and the “display” of a dangerous weapon under Iowa
Code § 708.2(3), and that the offense categorically qualifies as a crime of violence.
Id. at 1178. For the same reason, Conrad’s offense of domestic abuse assault with the
“use” of a weapon is a crime of violence under the force clause. The district court
thus made no procedural error in calculating Conrad’s guideline range.

       Conrad next argues that the district court did not comply with the federal rules
of criminal procedure in resolving disputed issues at sentencing. In particular,
Conrad contests the district court’s handling of his objection to a paragraph of the
presentence report (PSR) stating that he was affiliated with a criminal gang. Rule
32(i)(3) requires a sentencing court to rule on any disputed portion of a presentence
report or to determine that a ruling is unnecessary, and to append those
determinations to any copy of the presentence report made available to the Bureau of
Prisons. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B)-(C).

      Conrad contends that the district court did not append an accurate statement of
reasons to the presentence report that was provided to the Bureau of Prisons. At
sentencing, the government did not offer evidence to support the disputed paragraph
on gang affiliation, and the district court neither resolved Conrad’s objection nor

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relied on asserted gang affiliation when imposing sentence. In its statement of
reasons, however, the district court stated that it adopted the presentence report
without change. The court did not check the box on the statement of reasons
identifying “portions of the report in dispute but for which a court determination is
unnecessary because the matter will not affect sentencing or the court will not
consider it.”

       “District courts are arbiters of justice, not editors of PSRs.” United States v.
Hernandez-Espinoza, 890 F.3d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 2018). As such, the district court
was not required to resolve every disputed issue and to amend the presentence report
accordingly. But Rule 32 does impose a duty either to resolve disputes or to
determine that a ruling is unnecessary, and then to append a copy of the court’s
determinations to the report. Conrad requests, and the government does not resist,
a remand for the district court to amend its statement of reasons to reflect that it did
not resolve Conrad’s objection to the presentence report regarding gang affiliation.
We agree that this remedy is warranted.

       For these reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed, but remand solely for the
court to amend its statement of reasons in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32(i)(3).
                        ______________________________

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