Court Opinion

ID: 9384755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 21:00:42.970666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.285279
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 20-1913

                   FLAVIO ANDRADE-PRADO, JR.,

                          Petitioner,

                               v.

                      MERRICK B. GARLAND,

                United States Attorney General,

                          Respondent.

               PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
                THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

                             Before

                Kayatta, Gelpí, and Montecalvo,
                        Circuit Judges.

     Jason Giannetti, with whom Law Offices of Jason Giannetti,
Esq. was on brief, for petitioner.
     Jeffrey R. Leist, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of
Immigration Litigation, with whom Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and Anthony C. Payne,
Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on
brief for respondent.

                         April 4, 2023
            GELPÍ, Circuit Judge.        Petitioner Flavio Andrade-Prado,

Jr. ("Petitioner" or "Andrade-Prado") seeks review of a final order

of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA").

The   BIA   dismissed    Andrade-Prado's      appeal        of   the   immigration

court's decision concluding that his Brazilian conviction (which

carried a sentence of over seven years) constituted both                        an

aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime rendering him

ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of

removal, and voluntary departure.          The BIA upheld the immigration

court's conclusion that Andrade-Prado's foreign conviction was

valid and thus barred him from relief.                      Because substantial

evidence supports the BIA's determination, we find no error of law

and deny Andrade-Prado's petition for review.

            I. Background

            A. Andrade-Prado's Foreign Conviction

            Petitioner was born and raised in Poço Fundo, Minas

Gerais, Brazil.        Throughout his childhood and teenage years, he

dealt with physical and psychological trauma largely due to police

militias and criminal groups in his hometown.                    While in Brazil,

Petitioner was in a relationship with a woman to whom we shall

refer as M.C.D.P., which ended in 2004.              In April 2005, M.C.D.P.

accused     Petitioner    of   rape,     which   led    to       his   arrest   and

prosecution.     Petitioner remained in pre-trial detention for the

pendency    of   his   case,   was     represented     by    a    court-appointed

                                     - 2 -
attorney, appeared in court once -- on September 28, 2006 -- for

an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the charges against him,

and     through     his   attorney,      presented    a     defense,   produced

documentary evidence, and had the opportunity to cross-examine the

victim at that evidentiary hearing (although he declined to do

so).       Subsequently, a Brazilian judge convicted Petitioner of rape

and sentenced him to seven years and six months of imprisonment.

In May 2008, while Petitioner was in a work release program, he

escaped from prison and fled to Panama, and eventually entered the

United States in August 2008 via a Texas border crossing.                    A

Brazilian arrest warrant was issued on July 13, 2012.

               B. Life in the United States

               While working in Taunton, Massachusetts, Petitioner met

his wife.       They began dating in 2010, moved to Brockton in 2011,

had their first child a year later, and were married in November

2013.       Their second child was born in 2018.          Petitioner's wife and

children are U.S. citizens.        Along with his wife, Petitioner owned

a carpentry business.         In 2017, Petitioner engaged a Brazilian

lawyer to try to expunge his Brazilian rape conviction.1

               On April 25, 2019, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

("ICE")       officers,   along   with    Brockton,   Massachusetts     police

       It is unclear from the record the status of the proceedings
       1

to expunge the foreign conviction. Petitioner's contact with said
Brazilian attorney has since ceased.

                                      - 3 -
officers,    arrested      Petitioner       after    Department       of     Homeland

Security ("DHS") agents were notified by a Brazilian Civil Police

Agent about the 2012 arrest warrant for Petitioner. Shortly before

the   arrest,   the      International       Criminal    Police       Organization,

commonly known as INTERPOL, issued a Red Notice for Petitioner.2

            On April 25, 2019, DHS served Petitioner with a Notice

to Appear charging that he was subject to removal under section

212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"),

8 U.S.C.    § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i),        as    a    noncitizen    who    was    neither

admitted nor paroled.        He conceded the allegations in the Notice

to Appear and sought asylum, withholding of removal, protection

under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), cancellation of

removal, voluntary departure, and adjustment of status.

            C. Removal Proceedings

            1. Immigration Court

            Petitioner appeared before the immigration court on

July 23,    2019    for     removal     proceedings.            Having       conceded

removability,      the    focus   of        the    hearing     was    Petitioner's

eligibility for relief.        As a threshold matter, individuals with

rape convictions are statutorily barred from all forms of relief

      2"An INTERPOL Red Notice is 'a request to law enforcement
worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending
extradition, surrender, or similar legal action.'" Hernandez Lara
v. Barr, 962 F.3d 45, 48 n.3 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting
Red Notices, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-
work/Notices/Red-Notices (last visited Feb. 9, 2023)).

                                      - 4 -
Petitioner requested, except for CAT deferral.     Though Petitioner

conceded that he had been convicted of rape in Brazil, he argued

that his foreign conviction is not applicable for immigration

purposes for two reasons.   First, he advanced that his conviction

was "in absentia," making it invalid for immigration purposes.     In

the alternative, he argued that the conviction should nevertheless

be set aside because the proceedings were so flawed as to render

the conviction invalid.

            When questioned by the immigration judge ("IJ") about

the   "in   absentia"   reference   on   Petitioner's   Form   I-213,3

Petitioner's counsel stated that it was his understanding "that

[Petitioner] was present for a trial in Brazil[.]"4      Because the

question of whether Petitioner's Brazilian conviction was valid

for immigration purposes would dictate the relief available, the

IJ set a hearing on that issue for August 16, 2019.      Accordingly,

DHS submitted a memorandum explaining that Form I-213's indication

that Petitioner had been convicted in absentia was an error because

      3Form I-213 is "a standard government form that documents
biographical and factual information about a deportable or
inadmissible [noncitizen]."    Garcia-Aguilar v. Lynch, 806 F.3d
671, 673 (1st Cir. 2015).    The relevant text from Petitioner's
Form I-213 reads: "On 05/08/2008, [Petitioner] escaped from the
prison in Poço Fundo, Minas Gerais and was convicted in Brazil for
rape in absencia [sic]."
      4Counsel additionally clarified that "[t]he conviction on
rape was not an in absentia conviction. [Petitioner] was in Brazil
for that hearing."

                               - 5 -
the in absentia language on said document referred to Petitioner's

prison escape.    Thus, DHS maintained that the conviction was valid

for removal purposes.     Petitioner replied that he was not afforded

due process, his only time in court was for his arraignment, and

he was unable to cross-examine his accuser and present evidence.

He further argued that he learned of his conviction when he

received a letter, while in prison, that notified him of the time

he had to serve.

          At     the   August 16,    2019    hearing,   the   IJ   informed

Petitioner's counsel and DHS that if he found that the rape

conviction was not valid for immigration purposes, the only relief

available to Petitioner would be under the CAT. The parties agreed

with the IJ, as well as on the classification of the offense as an

aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime due to the

seven-year sentence imposed.        Likewise, the parties agreed that

the only disputed issue was the foreign conviction's validity for

immigration purposes.       The removal proceedings were continued

until September 26, 2019.      At said hearing, Petitioner, who had

court-appointed counsel, testified about his upbringing and his

relationship with M.C.D.P.      He also stated that after his arrest

in Brazil, his case was assigned to a judge who had run against

his cousin in a mayoral election.5          He further explained that he

     5Although Petitioner's testimony before the IJ did not hint
as to when his cousin and the Brazilian judge ran against each

                                    - 6 -
was present at a hearing where both he and M.C.D.P. testified, and

he denied the charge against him.            When questioned by the IJ about

having     the   opportunity     to    cross-examine    M.C.D.P.,    Petitioner

replied that although his attorney had the chance to, he decided

not to.      He was also allowed to present evidence, such as the

police report and medical evaluation, to bolster his defense.                    He

was not convicted at said hearing itself.                Rather about a year

later, he received a letter in prison notifying him of his rape

conviction.      He appealed said conviction, and was denied in 2007.

Petitioner additionally testified before the IJ that the purported

victim had recanted, and presented a statement dated May 7, 2019,

to the IJ that, he asserted, the victim had emailed to his wife

recanting the rape allegation.

             2. The IJ's Decision

             On December 10, 2019, the IJ issued his decision denying

Petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, protection

under the CAT, cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure.

The   IJ    determined        that    Petitioner's     rape    conviction,      and

corresponding seven-year sentence, was cognizable for immigration

purposes     and    constituted       both   an   aggravated     felony   and     a

particularly serious crime (which the Petitioner had conceded

during     the     previous     hearing),      statutorily     barring    asylum,

other, in his reply brief he states that the electoral campaign
occurred "over fifteen year[s] prior" to the rape charges.

                                       - 7 -
withholding relief, and cancellation of removal.                  The IJ found

that            Petitioner          testified           "credibly           and

consistently . . . regarding his experience in Brazil and his fear

of return, as well as the hardships his children would experience

upon his removal[.]"            The IJ refused to credit Petitioner's

testimony as to his arrest and alleged in absentia conviction.

The IJ instead credited DHS's representation that the in absentia

statement on Petitioner's Form I-213 was an error based on a

misreading of the record.           While Petitioner may have appeared

before the Brazilian court only once, he admitted that he was

allowed    to    appear   and   present    evidence,    had     court-appointed

counsel,    had    witnesses     testify    in   his   favor,    and   received

notification of his conviction.           Thus, the IJ found that there was

insufficient evidence demonstrating that he had been convicted in

absentia, or that the proceedings in Brazil did not sufficiently

comply with due process.

            The IJ also determined that the Petitioner committed a

serious nonpolitical crime in Brazil -- a second bar to asylum and

withholding of removal.           The IJ gave little to no weight to

evidence proffered by Petitioner because he sought to rely on an

attachment to an email that appears to be a sworn letter by

M.C.D.P. recanting her accusations (the "recantation letter"),

presented no evidence to validate its authenticity, and M.C.D.P.

was not present to testify or be cross-examined.

                                     - 8 -
           Regarding     the   CAT   claim -- focusing      solely   on   CAT

deferral -- the IJ decided that the evidence was insufficient to

indicate that Petitioner was tortured in the past by government

officials or that he was more likely than not to be tortured in

the future.      While the IJ credited that Petitioner suffered

"physical and psychological abuse while imprisoned at the hands of

other inmates and prison guards," he explained that "harsh prison

conditions alone" do not necessarily constitute torture.             As such,

the IJ held that Petitioner was ineligible for deferral of removal

under the CAT.

           Finally, the IJ concluded that a crime of moral turpitude

barred Petitioner from cancellation of removal but, even assuming

arguendo that he was not barred from said relief, he failed to

provide sufficient evidence to show that his wife and children

would   endure   "exceptional    and    extremely   unusual    hardships."

Likewise, Petitioner was statutorily ineligible for voluntary

departure due to the aggravated felony conviction.

           3. Appeal to the BIA

           The     BIA     dismissed         Petitioner's     appeal      on

September 16, 2020.      Citing to BIA precedent, it first noted that

it had no jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on the

merits of the Brazilian conviction and would refrain from opining

on its validity.    See Matter of McNaughton, 16 I. & N. Dec. 569,

571 (B.I.A. 1978). It subsequently affirmed the IJ's determination

                                     - 9 -
on the validity of the rape conviction for immigration purposes.

Likewise,    the    agency       affirmed    the       IJ's    "particularly     serious

crime"    and      "serious        nonpolitical           crime"      determinations -

- observing      that         neither     were     meaningfully        challenged     by

Petitioner -- thus affirming de novo the asylum and withholding of

removal bars.       The BIA found no "legal or clear factual error"

regarding    the        IJ's    determination          that    Petitioner    failed   to

establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution

on the statutorily enumerated grounds.                   It also found Petitioner's

appellate     arguments         regarding        past    persecution      unpersuasive

because they were unsupported by citation to legal authority.

Regarding cancellation of removal, the agency affirmed the IJ after

concluding that the claim was barred because Petitioner did not

challenge    "the       [IJ's]    determination         that    his   rape    conviction

constitutes a disqualifying offense for cancellation of removal

purposes."      As for Petitioner's claim that the IJ's denial of his

asylum   application           violated    his    due    process      rights,   the   BIA

likewise found no error where he failed to demonstrate prejudice

resulting    from       the     alleged    violation.           Lastly,     Petitioner's

submission of additional evidence on appeal -- a declaration by an

ICE   officer,      a    duplicate        copy    of    the     Brazilian     conviction

certificate, and correspondence from his Brazilian attorney -- was

construed as a motion to remand.                  The BIA concluded that remand

was unwarranted because Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the

                                          - 10 -
evidence submitted was previously unavailable and that it was

material to his claims.           Petitioner timely appealed.

            4. Proceedings Pending Appeal

            On October 19, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion to stay

removal pending the resolution of his petition for review, which

this   court      granted.        On    May 3,   2021,     this      court,   at     the

government's request, vacated in part the BIA's decision and

remanded the matter for the BIA to clarify its reasoning in finding

that Petitioner had not meaningfully addressed the IJ's denial of

deferral    of    removal    under      CAT,   and   if   necessary,     to     make   a

determination on the merits of said relief.                    On August 31, 2022,

the IJ denied Petitioner's application for CAT deferral and ordered

him removed to Brazil. Consequently, Petitioner and the government

jointly requested that we rescind the stay of removal previously

issued.    As a result, on October 3, 2022, we lifted the stay.                      Soon

after, Petitioner was removed to Brazil, where he remains.                         Thus,

the only    live issue before us is the Brazilian conviction's

validity for immigration purposes.

            II. Standard of Review

            "Where, as here, 'the BIA adopts and affirms an IJ's

decision,    we    review    the   IJ's    decision       to   the   extent     of   the

adoption, and the BIA's decision as to [any] additional ground.'"

López-Pérez       v.   Garland,    26    F.4th   104,      110    (1st   Cir.    2022)

(alteration in original) (quoting Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56,

                                        - 11 -
59-60 (1st Cir. 2007)). We review factual findings for substantial

evidence, which we accept as true "unless the record is such as to

compel a reasonable factfinder to reach a contrary conclusion."

Dorce v. Garland, 50 F.4th 207, 212 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting

Mazariegos-Paiz v. Holder, 734 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2013)).

Questions of law are reviewed de novo, with some deference given

to the agency's reasonable interpretation.     Id.

             III. Discussion

             Petitioner argues that his Brazilian conviction was in

absentia and that both the IJ and BIA erred in determining that

said conviction is valid for immigration purposes, thus barring

him   from     obtaining   asylum,   withholding   of   removal,   and

cancellation of removal.       Even without an in absentia finding,

Petitioner argues that his Brazilian conviction is nevertheless

invalid for immigration purposes either because the proceedings

were fundamentally deficient -- a "travesty of justice" -- or

because the trial judge was politically motivated.      We discern no

error.

             A. Statutory Prerequisites for Relief

             To qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate

that he or she has not been convicted of a particularly serious

crime.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).     Moreover, the statute

provides that an applicant "who has been convicted of an aggravated

felony shall be considered to have been convicted of a particularly

                                 - 12 -
serious crime."      8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(B).         An    aggravated     felony       is   a    "crime       of

violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment is at least "one

year."   8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).          The same statutory bars apply

to an applicant who seeks withholding of removal.               See DeCarvalho

v.   Garland,   18   F.4th    66,   69-70    (1st   Cir.    2021);       8   U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).      Similarly, a noncitizen is ineligible for

cancellation of removal if he or she has been convicted of an

aggravated felony or a crime involving moral turpitude.                  See Soto-

Vittini v. Barr, 973 F.3d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 2020) ("A permanent

resident convicted of an 'aggravated felony' after admission is

not only removable under the INA, . . . but also ineligible for

cancellation of removal." (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),

1229b(a))).     Petitioner conceded before the IJ that his foreign

conviction, if found to be valid, constitutes an aggravated felony

and a particularly serious crime that statutorily bars the relief

sought (except for CAT deferral, which was denied on other grounds

as explained supra).         Given the foregoing concession, and after

weighing the evidence, the IJ ultimately found the conviction to

be valid, statutorily barring Petitioner from relief.                We discern

no error.

            B. Petitioner's In Absentia Claim

            Petitioner    challenges    the    IJ's    finding      as       to   the

validity of his Brazilian conviction, arguing that it was in

                                    - 13 -
absentia because he was only present at the arraignment hearing

and did not learn of his sentence until he eventually received

notice via a letter sent to him in jail.                  In support of his

contention,    he   quotes    the   Foreign     Affairs       Manual   from    the

Department of State which explains that "[a] conviction in absentia

does   not   constitute   a   conviction,      unless    the    accused    had   a

meaningful     opportunity     to        participate     in      the     judicial

proceedings."       Additionally,        he   advances    that     because     the

information in a Form I-213 is presumed trustworthy, the agency

should have treated the form's characterization of his conviction

as reliable evidence that his conviction was in absentia.                      The

record before us belies Petitioner's arguments.                  Ample evidence

supports the IJ's findings, which were affirmed by the BIA.

             Here, the record supports the BIA's conclusion that

Petitioner was able to meaningfully participate in his Brazilian

proceedings and thus his resulting conviction was not in absentia.

Petitioner    was   represented     by   court-appointed       counsel    at   the

Brazilian court, was allowed to testify, the victim and two

witnesses -- the latter testifying in Petitioner's favor -- were

present, he offered documentary evidence (a police report and a

medical evaluation), and he got notice of his conviction, which he

appealed.     Petitioner posits that his attorney did not cross-

examine the victim, however, the record indicates that, in fact,

the attorney could have asked her questions but chose not to, which

                                    - 14 -
Petitioner admitted before the IJ.          Petitioner is unable to point

to anything that suggests that having one hearing -- where the

victim,   the   accused,   as   well   as    other   witnesses testified -

- renders a conviction in absentia.          As Petitioner recognizes in

his brief, "[a] foreign conviction entered after a trial at which

the defendant was present suffices, in and of itself, to establish

probable cause."    See Matter of V-D-B-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 608, 610

(B.I.A. 1960) (finding that the applicant's conviction in the

Netherlands was not a conviction in absentia when he had notice of

the proceedings, appeared after the conclusion, took no appeal,

and paid the fine).

           Petitioner similarly advances that the immigration court

failed to do a "searching review" of the evidence supporting the

foreign conviction before finding it barred relief and thus the

conviction should be disregarded.           He relies on sibling circuit

caselaw to back up his theory, arguing that in Esposito v. INS,

936 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit held that the

BIA may disregard or give less weight to an in absentia conviction

when evidence calls into question the fundamental fairness of the

proceedings which generated said conviction.           Id. at 914-15.   He

further alleges that, contrary to the proceedings before the IJ,

the court in Esposito conducted a "careful and searching review of

the evidence" in order to corroborate its validity and fairness.

We find, without needing to reach the question of whether the rule

                                  - 15 -
in Esposito applies in this circuit, that there is no merit to

Petitioner's argument.       First, Esposito is readily distinguishable

because unlike the Petitioner's case, the Seventh Circuit was

presented with an actual in absentia conviction, which justified

closer inspection of the underlying offense.                  See id. at 915.

Second, far from conducting a "careful and searching review of the

evidence" underlying the conviction as Petitioner suggests, the

Esposito court reviewed the hearing for "exceptional procedural

infirmities" and concluded that there were none, such that the in

absentia conviction was valid for immigration purposes.                        Id.

(noting Esposito was represented by counsel and was able to present

evidence,    cross-examine       witnesses,     and   make   arguments    to   the

court). As we discuss infra, no exceptional procedural infirmities

existed     in    Petitioner's      Brazilian     proceedings        to   justify

disregarding his conviction.           Thus Petitioner's Esposito argument

fails.

            In    an   attempt    to   further    question,    and    ultimately

invalidate       his   foreign   conviction,     Petitioner     challenges     an

explanation proffered by DHS regarding the statement contained in

Form I-213 (indicating that Petitioner was convicted in absentia),

which was relied upon by the IJ and BIA.                He claims that DHS's

explanation was inadmissible due to its hearsay character and thus

prejudicial because it was the only evidence available to cast

                                       - 16 -
doubt on the "inherently trustworthy" nature of Form I-213.                           We

review de novo.        Dorce, 50 F.4th at 212.

             Here, DHS clarified before the IJ that, after speaking

with colleagues in Brazil, Form I-213's statement indicating that

Petitioner "was convicted in Brazil for rape in absentia" was based

on a misinterpretation -- what it actually indicated was that

Petitioner had escaped from custody and was missing thereafter.

The    IJ   was   cautious     in   giving    significant         weight     to      the

clarification provided by DHS but ultimately found it credible.

The BIA agreed.

             An   IJ's   determination      "shall    be    based    only       on   the

evidence produced at the hearing."               8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).

While DHS's statement could be regarded as hearsay, immigration

proceedings are not governed by the rules of evidence.                     See Yongo

v. I.N.S., 355 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The Federal Rules of

Evidence do not apply in INS proceedings."); Matter of Barcenas,

19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A. 1988). Petitioner's own testimony

about his attendance at the proceeding in Brazil indicated that

the form was incorrect, and from that point the form was no longer

inherently trustworthy.         See Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec.

at    611   ("Absent     any   indication    that    a     Form   I-213     contains

information that is incorrect . . . , that document is inherently

trustworthy            and       admissible          as           evidence            to

prove . . . deportability.").            Here,      "the    record    as    a     whole

                                    - 17 -
presents          a     picture   consistent    with      the   IJ's    adverse   []

determinations."             Jianli Chen v. Holder, 703 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir.

2012).       Regardless of Form I-213, the evidence in the record (as

we have discussed supra) independently establishes that Petitioner

was not convicted in absentia.               Thus, we find no error of law and

hold       that       the   Brazilian   conviction   is   valid   for   immigration

purposes.          Having found that the Brazilian conviction was not in

absentia, we consider Petitioner's alternate claims.

                  1. Travesty of Justice

                  Petitioner posits that his foreign conviction was an

"unpersuasive travesty of justice" that should have persuaded the

IJ to evaluate the fundamental fairness of his foreign conviction.

He proffers that the Brazilian judge was biased, that the IJ gave

no credit to the recantation letter, and that he was only present

at the initial hearing.                 He additionally alleges that the BIA

failed to consider the merits of his claim.

                  Petitioner relies on sibling circuit caselaw that held

that the IJ erred by failing to consider the legitimacy of the

conviction where the foreign conviction had multiple mishaps and

was a "farce."              See Doe v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 445, 451-52 (7th

Cir. 2007).6            Even assuming that such a collateral attack on the

      Doe involved the trial for the murder of one Jesuit priest
       6

and five members of the order in El Salvador during the civil war
that raged from 1980 to 1992.    Doe's trial attorney was on the
payroll of the high command of the Salvadoran armed forces and

                                          - 18 -
foreign conviction is permitted,7 we are not persuaded that the

"farce"   or   "travesty    of    justice"    labels    apply     here.      The

circumstances in Doe are different from the case at hand.                 In Doe,

the trial attorney did not defend his client, presented no evidence

on Doe's behalf, did not cross-examine any of the witnesses, and

the judge trying the case failed to instruct the jury on the law.

Doe, 484 F.3d at 451.       We do not need to discuss, once again, why

Petitioner's circumstances are distinct from the ones in Doe.

Moreover, Petitioner suggests that, unlike the court in Esposito,

936 F.2d at 911, here the IJ had "credible evidence of actual

innocence" -- the      victim's      recantation       letter -- which        he

disregarded.      An   IJ   may   "sift     through    relevant    documents,

"focused his efforts not on defending [Doe] but on asserting the
innocence of the high command, though no members of that body were
on trial." 484 F.3d at 446-47, 451.
     7  "Courts normally reject [noncitizens'] attempts in
immigration proceedings to mount collateral attacks on foreign
convictions," and "[o]nly if there is some evidence that the
foreign conviction was obtained in a manner that falls below the
standards accepted by any civilized system would it be appropriate
[to entertain a collateral attack on a foreign conviction]." Chia-
I Lui-Dix v. Holder, 528 Fed. App'x 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2013).
There is no per se rule that foreign convictions in absentia are
not valid for immigration purposes, although "a petitioner may
present evidence that calls into question the fundamental fairness
of the proceedings which generated an in absentia conviction, and
if that evidence is sufficiently compelling, the Board would be
precluded from giving it any weight at all." Esposito, 936 F.2d
at 914. In the rare case "in which the proceeding that resulted
in the conviction was demonstrably . . . a travesty -- a parody -
- of justice," the foreign conviction may be invalid for
immigration purposes. Doe, 484 F.3d at 445.

                                   - 19 -
determining which documents are persuasive and which statements

within a particular document should be given weight."          Jianli Chen

v. Holder, 703 F.3d at 26.            The IJ considered the victim's

recantation letter but found it unreliable because Petitioner did

not provide an original copy of the letter (he claimed that a

digital copy was emailed to his wife), there was no evidence to

evaluate its authenticity, and the victim was not present to

testify or be cross-examined.       See Mashilingi v. Garland, 16 F.4th

971, 978 (1st Cir. 2021) (explaining that the IJ did not err in

giving   limited    weight   to    petitioner's   children's       statements

because they were not available for cross-examination); Tawadrous

v. Holder, 565 F.3d 35, 39 n.2 (1st Cir. 2009) (agreeing with the

BIA's assessment that petitioner's father's statement had little

or no weight because it was an unauthenticated photocopy).

           For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner falls well short

of even raising prima facie a basis for suggesting that the

Brazilian proceedings were a farce.         The IJ considered all of the

evidence before him and made credibility determinations that well-

supported the denial of relief.        We discern no error.

           2. Politically Motivated Conviction

           Lastly, Petitioner argues that his foreign conviction

was a politically motivated one that should not bar him from relief

under     8        U.S.C.     § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I),           8       U.S.C.

§§ 1101(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)       and    1101(a)(43)(F),    and     22      C.F.R.

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§ 40.21(a)(6)(2006).       His arguments can be summarized as follows:

He was almost killed -- before the rape charges -- by corrupt law

enforcement in his town because they wanted him "eliminated"; his

cousin politically challenged the Brazilian judge that handled his

rape proceedings and he was convicted because of the judge's bias;

and the IJ misinterpreted the term "political offense."        However,

he points to no evidence supporting his first three conclusory

statements that the conviction was politically motivated rather

than the result of the rape accusation and victim's testimony.       As

to   the      "political      offense"     interpretation,   Petitioner

perfunctorily posits that the offense itself was not inherently

political, rather he argues that his conviction was the result of

the "corrupt [Brazilian justice] system" and the "political animus

and prejudice of the judge," which prevented him from having a

fair trial.    He does not, however, elaborate on this or otherwise

support said assertion with legal authority. Where the substantial

evidence supports the IJ's conclusion that Petitioner's conviction

was not politically motivated, we discern no error.

           IV. Conclusion

           For all the above reasons, Andrade-Prado's petition is

DENIED.

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