Court Opinion

ID: 9856845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:01:42.086507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:26.438317
License: Public Domain

WYNN, Judge
concurring in the result.
I write separately to emphasize that judicial restraint guides our interpretation of the affirmative defense to product liability codified in N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 (“the modification defense”). Here, the language of the statute is clear and we are duty-bound to follow the law as written. Nonetheless, while I concur with the majority in following the clear language of the statute, I do so mindful that the statutory language appears inconsistent with general principles of negligence, modification defenses in all other states, and possibly even the intent of our legislature itself.
To begin, it warrants mention that Plaintiff’s claims are based on Defendant’s alleged negligence in the design of the Ford Taurus. It is a well-established principle in negligence cases that the plaintiff can*16not prevail “[w]hen it clearly appears from the evidence that the injury complained of was independently and proximately produced by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of an outside agency or responsible third person.” Smith v. Sink, 211 N.C. 725, 727, 192 S.E. 108, 109 (1937). It does not matter if the “responsible third person” is a party to the action; what matters is that the person’s actions constitute intervening negligence insulating the defendant from liability. The fact that the case sub judice is a products liability action should not, without more, mean that intervening negligence is only given legal effect when the person who proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury is a party to the suit. Indeed, this Court has stated that “[i]n an action to recover for injuries resulting from the negligence of a manufacturer, plaintiff must present evidence which tends to show that the product manufactured by defendant was defective at the time it left defendant’s plant, and that defendant was negligent in its design of the product, in its selection of materials, in its assembly process, or in its inspection of the product.” Jolley v. General Motors Corp., 55 N.C. App. 383, 385, 285 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing Cockerham v. Ward, 44 N.C. App. 615, 262 S.E.2d 651, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 195, 269 S.E.2d 622 (1980)).
The common sense corollary is that when a product is modified after “the time it left defendant’s plant” the defendant is insulated from claims of negligent design, regardless of whether the modifier is a party to the action. Indeed, at first blush it seems illogical to subject a manufacturer to liability for injuries resulting from a modified product potentially quite different from that initially placed into the stream of commerce solely on the grounds that the modifier had not been joined in the action. However, “[i]n interpreting statutes,... it is always presumed that the Legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law.” Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695, 239 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1977). Thus, in light of the fact that N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 directly addresses the affirmative defense of product modification in products liability actions, I concede that the language therein must control this Court’s decision.
Nonetheless, it is troubling that strict adherence to the statutory language regarding modification defense represents so dramatic a departure from the view held in all other states regarding the legal effect of product modification on the liability of manufacturers. While a number of other states recognize a defense to such liability when the product has been modified, none limit the defense to apply only when modification was performed by a party to the litigation.
*17Some of the statutes in other states explicitly allow for a defense when anyone other than the manufacturer or seller modifies the product. For example, Indiana provides a defense in a products liability action when the product is modified or altered “by any person after, the product’s delivery to the initial user or consumer . . . .” Ind. Code § 34-20-6-5 (LexisNexis 2008). Similarly, in Kentucky a modification defense to products liability applies “to alterations or modifications made by any person or entity, except those made in accordance with specifications or instructions furnished by the manufacturer.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.320 (West 2006); see also Smith v. Louis Berkman Co., 894 F.Supp. 1084, 1090 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (“KRS 411.320 indicates the Kentucky legislature’s intent to benefit product manufacturers by precluding their tort liability when their products are modified or altered by someone else.”).
Other statutes fail to even mention the identity of the modifier. In Michigan, “[a] manufacturer or seller is not liable in a product liability action for harm caused by an alteration of the product unless the alteration was reasonably foreseeable.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2947(1) (2000). In North Dakota, the modification defense applies when the alteration or modification “occurred subsequent to the sale by the manufacturer or seller to the initial user or consumer.” N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.3-03 (2006).
Finally, there are state statutes which provide a modification defense as long as the manufacturer/seller is not responsible for the modification. For example, the Idaho statute defines the type of alteration or modification giving rise to a defense in a products liability action as that which “occurs when a person or entity other than the product seller changes the design, construction, or formula of the product, or changes or removes warnings or instructions that accompanied or were displayed on the product.” Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1405(4)(a) (2004).
In sum, after reviewing products liability statutes in states other than North Carolina, it appears that the clear language under our statute, N.C.G.S. § 99B-3, creates within our borders a unique legal regime with respect to products liability. However, I recognize and respect the fact that “[t]he decisions from other jurisdictions, while helpful in construing the provisions of our statute, are not controlling; neither is the interpretation placed upon a statute similar to ours, binding on this Court.” Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N.C. 257, 266, 22 S.E.2d 570, 576 (1942).
*18I also respect the principle that “[w]hen the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.” Diaz v. Division of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006) (citation omitted). Here, I agree with the majority that the legislature’s use of the word “party” renders the language of the statute clear and unambiguous. I further note that even if the language were “ambiguous,” there is no definitive proof in the legislative history of N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 that the General Assembly intended to apply a contrary meaning to the word “party.” See id. (“[W]hen the language of a statute is ambiguous, this Court will determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature in its enactment.”).
On 29 January 1979, Senate Bill 189 was introduced in the N.C. Senate. This bill, which was the first attempt in that legislative session to pass products liability reform, stated:
No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable in any product liability action where a contributing cause of the injury, death or damage to property was either (a) an alteration or modification of the product which occurred after the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller, or (b) a use of the product in a manner for which the product was not originally designed, manufactured, recommended or warranted.
S.B. 189, 1979 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1979). Notably, this initial conception of the modification defense focused on the time when modification took place (i.e. after the product left the control of the manufacturer) rather than the identity of the modifier.
On the same day that Senate Bill 189 was introduced, House Bill 235 was introduced with the exact same language. On 28 February 1979, a joint public hearing of the committees considering Senate Bill 189 and House Bill 235 met to discuss the proposed legislation. There was no mention at this joint public hearing about limiting the modification defense to modifiers that were parties in the products liability action.
Indeed, the first reference to the identity of the modifiers was added on 8 March 1979 when Senate Bill 189 was amended to read
No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable in any product liability action where a contributing cause of the injury, death or damage to property was either (a) an alteration or mod*19ification of the product which occurred after the product left the control of such manufacturer or such seller if the alteration or modification was not done by the manufacturer or seller, or (b) a use of the product in a manner for which the product was not originally designed, manufactured, recommended or warranted.
S.B. 189, 1979 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1979) (as amended 8 Mar. 1979) (emphasis added). This amendment limited the defense to modifications made by someone other than the manufacturer or seller, but again did not indicate that the modifier must be a party to the case.1
On 30 March 1979, Representative Martin Lancaster introduced House Bill 993 as a proposed alternative to Senate Bill 189. House Bill 993 was, according to Rep. Lancaster, the Uniform Products Liability Bill prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Rep. Lancaster stated “[t]he Senate Bill provides that the manufacturer or seller of a product is not liable when the injury is the result of an alteration or modification of the product which occurred after the product left their hands. My Bill will provide that same protection.” Hearing on H.R. 993 Before H. Judiciary II Comm., 1979 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1979) (statement of Rep. Martin Lancaster, Member, Judiciary II Comm.). Again, there was no indication that the availability of such protection depended on whether the modifier was a party to the case.
House Bill 993 was the first draft of products liability legislation to include the word “party” but it did so as follows:
A product seller shall not be liable for harm that would not have occurred but for the fact that his product was altered or modified by a third party unless:
(1) the alteration or modification was in accordance with the product seller’s instructions or specifications;
(2) the alteration or modification was made with the express consent of the product seller; or
(3) the alteration or modification was the result of conduct that reasonably should have been anticipated by the product seller.
H.R. 993, 1979 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1979) (emphasis added).
*20The three proposed bills concerning products liability (House Bill 235, House Bill 993, and Senate Bill 189) were referred to a special study subcommittee of the House Judiciary II Committee. The subcommittee drafted a proposed Committee substitute and this House Substitute bill was given a favorable report. This House Committee substitute bill is the first one that introduced the “by a party other than the manufacturer or seller” language. Ultimately, this language was retained in N.C.G.S. § 99B-3.
My research reveals no indication as to why the members of the special study subcommittee of the House Judiciary II Committee chose to add language to the statute. This is disconcerting in light of the fact that all of the previous versions of the modification defense seem to envision broad protection for modifiers whose products were modified, regardless of whether the modifier was a party to the suit, as long as the modification occurred after the product left the manufacturer’s control. However, basic rules of statutory construction dictate that our legislature does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has replaced with other words or phrases. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43, 94 L. Ed. 2d 434, 454 (1987) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, “the General Assembly is presumed to have acted advisedly and with a knowledge of the meaning of language ... and it will never be assumed, if any other conclusion is permissible, that it has done a vain and foolish thing . . . .” Bank v. Loven, 172 N.C. 666, 670-71, 90 S.E. 948, 950 (1916) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the language of the modification defense as written limits its availability to situations in which the modifier is a party to the litigation.
It is worthwhile to query whether the burden of the legislature’s limitation of the modification defense to “parties” could have been mitigated by adding Tonya and Gordon Stark as new parties in this case. The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure permit a defending party to implead a new party “who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 14(a) (2009). As such, Rule 14 allows impleader when the third-party defendant may be liable to the original defendant for contribution or indemnification. Spearman v. Pender Cty. Bd. of Educ., 175 N.C. App. 410, 412, 623 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2006). Furthermore, “[i]t is not necessary that the third-party defendant’s liability be previously determined.” Rouse v. Maxwell, 40 N.C. App. 538, 543, 253 S.E.2d 326, 329, appeal dismissed, 298 N.C. 570, 261 S.E.2d 124 (1979).
*21Indeed, in the instant case, Defendant was granted leave to file a third-party complaint seeking indemnification or, in the alternative, contribution from Tonya and Gordon Stark. The trial court granted this motion and subsequently ordered the severance of the third-party suit from the principal action to avoid delaying the trial in the latter. Although this severance ultimately rendered the modification defense unavailable to Defendant, Defendant did not argue on appeal that the severance was error, and as such that issue is not before the Court.
In conclusion, because the language of the statute is clear, I agree with its application in this case. If in fact the legislature intended the modification defense to apply when the modifier is not a party to the products liability action, it can revisit the issue and amend the statute. As written, however, the language is subject to only its plain and ordinary interpretation, which comports with that of the majority.

. A subsequent amendment, adopted on 15 March 1979, clarified that for the modification defense to apply the modification must have been a proximate cause of the injury. S.B. 189, 1979 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1979) (as amended 15 Mar. 1979).