Court Opinion

ID: 9733068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:52:22.223153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.137044
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). I do not join the majority opinion's holding that the court *559of appeals should have addressed the issue of whether Vorwald had a recognizable property interest in his employment. Majority opinion at 556.1 conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the school district mentioned the recognizable property interest issue in passing, without developing the issue in the court of appeals brief.1 Because the school district did not brief the issue in the court of appeals, I conclude that the court of appeals, in its discretion, could have declined to address this issue.2 The court of appeals has similarly exercised its discretion in a number of cases.3 Indeed, even if a party does *560brief the issue, an appellate court has discretion not to decide the issue. Our court has picturesquely written: "An appellate court is not a performing bear, required to dance to each and every tune played on an appeal." State v. Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 564, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978).
This court does not generally review the court of appeals' exercise of discretion,4 and I would not do so in *561this case.5 Nor would I criticize the court of appeals explicitly or implicitly for failing to address an issue (or if you prefer, for failing to address an argument)6 not briefed in that court.
The majority opinion places a significant burden on the court of appeals by holding, in effect, that the court of appeals errs when it fails to address every issue or argument a party's brief may mention in passing. This is a burden no court can manage.
I believe the appellate practice rules applicable to this case can be summarized briefly as follows:
Issue Must Be Preserved. If a litigant wants an appellate court to decide an issue as a matter of right, the party must preserve the legal issue for appellate review *562by adequately alerting the circuit court and the appellate court to the issue.
Appellate Courts' Discretion. The court of appeals and this court have the power to address issues even if the parties fail to preserve these issues in the circuit court or fail to address them in the petition for review to the supreme court or in their appellate court briefs.
Court of Appeals. If an appellant wants the court of appeals to address an issue, the appellant must brief the issue in the court of appeals. If the appellant mentions the issue in passing but does not brief it, the court of appeals may decline to address the issue. Even if the appellant briefs an issue, the court of appeals need not decide the issue if it concludes another issue is determinative.
In this case the majority opinion states the issue as whether Vorwald had a recognizable property interest in his employment; the majority looks to the terms of the employment contract for the answer. As is clear from the excerpts of the school district's briefs appearing in the majority opinion (554-555), the school district chose to present a different issue to the courts. It briefed only the issue of whether the Worker's Compensation Act deprived Vorwald of any property right.
Although the school district's brief in the court of appeals "maintains" that Vorwald had no recognizable property interest in employment, the brief never explains on what basis the district "maintains" this position. The brief discusses only the effect of worker's compensation on Vorwald's claim.7
*563The school district's brief in this court concedes that the district presented only the worker's compensation issue to the court of appeals. The district describes the issues it presented to the court of appeals as follows: "The issues on appeal [before the court of appeals] were *564the operation of the exclusivity provision of the Worker's Compensation Act; the exhaustion requirement; and post deprivation due process." School District's Supreme Court Brief at 2-3.
Supreme Court. If a petitioner wants to have the supreme court address an issue upon the court's granting the petition for review, the petitioner must set forth the issue in the petition for review. Section (Rule) 809.62(6), Stats. 1989-90, provides that "if the petition is granted, the petitioner cannot raise or argue issues not set forth in the petition unless ordered otherwise by the supreme court.. . ."
In its petition for review (p. 2), the school district stated the issue as follows: "When determining the existence of a constitutionally protected interest in employment, does the applicability of a State Worker's Compensation Act to the issues of the case preclude the existence of an enforceable entitlement to employment?" The school district's petition for review, like the presentation in the circuit court and the court of appeals, limited the discussion of Vorwald's recognizable property interest to the issue of whether the Worker's Compensation Act deprives the employee of a property interest.
Despite the deficiency in the petition for review, I believe this court should exercise its discretion to reach the issue of Vorwald's recognizable property interest. The parties' briefs in this court touch on the issue.8 If the parties believe the court has failed to consider the recognizable property interest fully, the remedy is a motion for reconsideration.
*565For the reasons set forth, I write separately and concur in the mandate.

The opinion of the court of appeals states: "The school district maintains that Vorwald has no recognizable property interest in his employment. Because this issue is neither argued nor briefed, we decline to address it. See In re Balkus, 128 Wis. 2d 246, 255 n. 5, 381 N.W.2d 593, 598 n.5 (Ct. App. 1985)." Vorwald v. River Falls School Dist., 160 Wis. 2d 536, 542 n.3, 466 N.W.2d 683 (Ct. App. 1991).

The court of appeals, in its discretion, also could have addressed the issue or asked for supplemental briefs.
So that the reader may evaluate the court of appeals' decision not to address the issue, I have quoted at note 7 the school district's full discussion of its claim that Vorwald has no recognizable property interest in employment.

See, e.g., In the Interest of J.A.B., 153 Wis. 2d 761, 769, 451 N.W.2d 799 (Ct. App. 1989) (appellant "does not develop that argument, however, nor does she refer us to any authority to shore up her assertions. . . . Consequently, we deem the issue abandoned."); Polan v. Department of Revenue, 147 Wis. 2d 648, 660, 433 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1988) ("We deem abandoned a position turning on a point of law known to exist but not briefed or argued."); In re Balkus, 128 Wis. 2d 246, 254, 381 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1985) (claimant "cites no cases or authority in support of her argument. In light of the inadequate briefing of this issue we decline to address it."); Reiman Associates v. R/A Advertising, 102 Wis. 2d 305, 306, n.1, 306 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1981) ("In *560their notice of cross-appeal, plaintiffs specified as objectionable that portion of the judgment dismissing with prejudice their complaint against the individual defendants. That issue has not been briefed or argued on appeal, and we deem it abandoned.") State v. Shaffer, 96 Wis. 2d 531, 546, 292 N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1980). ("The argument is supported merely by a general citation to four pages from the record where the trial court denied a motion to strike concerning this unspecified earlier testimony. Such an appellate argument is inadequate and does not comply with sec. 809.19(1)(e), Stats. In the future this court will refuse to consider such an argument, or summarily affirm on this issue. Section 809.83(2).")
Section 809.19(l)(e), Stats. 1989-90, provides in part:
(1) The brief must contain:
(e) An argument arranged in the order of the statement of issues presented. The argument on each issue must be preceded by a one sentence summary of the argument and is to contain the contention of the appellant, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on as set forth in the Uniform System of Citation.
Section 809.83(2), Stats. 1989-90, provides:
(2) Noncompliance with rules. Failure of a person to comply with a requirement of these rules, other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal or cross-appeal, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the appeal but is grounds for dismissal of the appeal, summary reversal, striking of a paper, imposition of a penalty or costs on a party or counsel, or other action as the court considers appropriate.

State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 368-69, 334 N.W.2d *561903 (1983); Aparacor, Inc. v. ILHR Dep't, 97 Wis. 2d 399, 404, 293 N.W.2d 545 (1980).

I add, however, that the court of appeals declination to review this unbriefed issue makes good sense. Because neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals addressed the issue of Vorwald's recognizable property interest, the parties could have addressed that issue in circuit court on remand. Indeed, Vorwald argues in this court that the intent and practice of the parties regarding the employment contract is an issue of fact that should be decided at trial.

I use the word issue, but the reader may, if he or she wishes, substitute the word argument. I do not find the majority's distinction between "argument" and "issue" helpful because the distinction depends on the level of generality used to state the issue. See State v. Weber, 164 Wis. 2d 788, 793-95, 476 N.W.2d 867 (1991) (on motion for reconsideration) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
The litigants decide what issues or arguments they will address in the circuit or appellate courts, although a court may consider issues (or arguments) the parties do not address. The litigants may frame the legal issue in broad or narrow terms.

I quote below in full those parts of the school district's brief in the court of appeals that refer to the recognizable property interest issue.
The school district's brief (p. 3) in the court of appeals states:
The determination of whether the Appellant [Vorwald] has a prop*563erty interest deserving a constitutional due process protection is primarily dependent on the recognition of such an interest under State law. [Citations omitted.] Therefore, a public employee must have an enforceable expectation of continued employment under State law to trigger the due process requirement of pre-determination notice and hearing. [Citations omitted.]
The school district's brief (p. 5) in the court of appeals continues:
Respondents [school district] maintain that Appellant [Vorwald] has no recognizable property interest in employment under Wisconsin's laws; and that even if he did, the availability of a Worker's Compensation Hearing provides adequate due process.. . . (Emphasis added.)
The school district's brief (pp. 8-9) in the court of appeals concludes its Worker's Compensation Act analysis as follows:
In this case, Curtis Vorwald claims he was denied notice and an opportunity for a hearing regarding his employment termination; there is no dispute that the termination arose under the Worker's Compensation Act. The Respondents [the school districts] are not claiming that the Worker's Compensation Act, or any other State legislation, can preclude substantive Federal constitutional claims. What the Respondents are saying is that the facts of this case are based upon a property interest in employment; that such a properly interest is determined by reference to interest created and enforceable under state law; and that there is no interest that is enforceable under State law in this case because of the operation of the Worker's Compensation Act. Appellant's claim for deprivation of due process based on property interest in employment must fail where the Worker's Compensation Act is applicable and provides the exclusive remedy for the Appellant's claim of right. (Emphasis added.)
The remainder of the school district's brief discusses the Worker's Compensation Act and the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies.

See Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 462, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992).