Court Opinion

ID: 9966280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 16:09:09.659439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:39.326831
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ROBERT DEMERY                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 36 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 5, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0001859-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.:                                  FILED: May 6, 2024

       Robert Demery (“Demery”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas (“the trial court”)

after a jury found him guilty of persons not to possess a firearm.1 On appeal,

Demery challenges the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. Because

we find no error in the trial court’s decision, we affirm.

       The certified record reflects that on January 8, 2020, Detectives Joshua

Stegena (“Detective Stegena”) and Brian Nicholas (“Detective Nicholas”) of

the Allegheny County Police were conducting surveillance at the Harrison

Village Housing Complex in McKeesport, Pennsylvania. N.T., 11/15/2021, at

4, 7. At around 3:00 p.m., a black Jeep parked in a nearby handicap space.

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
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Id. at 4-5. Steven McQueen (“McQueen”) exited the passenger side of the

Jeep and entered apartment 9G.        Id.   Approximately two minutes later,

McQueen exited the apartment. Id. McQueen appeared nervous, was looking

all around the complex, and was clutching something in front of his body as

he returned to the Jeep. Id. at 5. The detectives then conducted a traffic

stop of the Jeep for illegally parking in a handicap space. Id. at 5-6. During

the stop, McQueen admitted to the detectives that he had marijuana; the

detectives searched the Jeep and found it in the passenger door compartment.

Id. at 6. McQueen then told the detectives that Demery was inside apartment

9G. Id. at 7.

     During the stop of the Jeep, Lieutenant Sid Summers (“Lieutenant

Summers”) of the McKeesport Police Department arrived as backup.           Id.

Lieutenant Summers informed Detective Stegena that Demery had an active

felony arrest warrant related to drug and firearm offenses. Id. at 7-8. The

police officers did not observe anyone else leave apartment 9G, so they

proceeded to knock on the door of the apartment and asked Demery to come

to the door.    Id. at 7. After knocking on the door, the police officers heard

someone running frantically around the apartment.           Id.   Police were

concerned that Demery, given the nature of his arrest warrant, was either

arming himself or destroying evidence.        Id. at 8.    Consequently, they

contacted the McKeesport Housing Authority, who quickly arrived on the scene

to provide a key to the apartment. Id. Although police were able to unlock

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the door, they were only able to open it about an inch because Demery had

barricaded it. Id. at 8-9. Demery eventually removed the barricade, and

police entered the apartment. Id.

      Once they entered, Detective Nicholas handcuffed Demery and two

police officers conducted a protective sweep of the apartment to confirm no

one else was present.    Id. at 9.   Police noted that the apartment had an

overwhelming odor of marijuana. Id. at 10.

      Eventually, the leaseholder of the apartment and Demery’s paramour,

Shardasia Williams (“Williams”), arrived at the scene.     Id.   After officers

advised Williams of the situation and her rights regarding a search of the

apartment, she consented to a search.      Id. at 10-11.   During the search,

police discovered box of .380 caliber handgun ammunition in the kitchen, a

stolen Smith & Wesson .40 caliber firearm, 17 ounces of marijuana, and a

digital scale with marijuana residue. Id. at 11.

      Police placed Demery under arrest, and the Commonwealth charged him

with receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance,

possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, possession of

drug paraphernalia, and persons not to possess a firearm. On March 24, 2021,

Demery filed a suppression motion in which he argued that his arrest warrant

was insufficient to authorize police to enter Williams’ apartment because it

was not his residence. Demery asserted that because apartment 9G was the

residence of a third party, police needed a warrant authorizing the search of

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the premises based on probable cause. Demery contended that, as a result,

police illegally entered and searched the apartment without valid authority.

Following a hearing on Demery’s motion, the trial court denied the motion.

       On March 14, 2022, the trial court entered an order severing the persons

not to possess a firearm charge from the other offenses. On July 21, 2022,

the trial court held a jury trial on the severed firearms charge, at the

conclusion of which the jury found him guilty.2

       On December 5, 2022, the trial court sentenced Demery to four-and-a-

half to nine years in prison. This timely appeal followed. Both the trial court

and Demery have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

1925. Demery now presents the following issue for review:

       Whether the [trial court] erred in denying [Demery]’s motion to
       suppress evidence, where the police conducted a warrantless
       entry and search of a third party’s residence where [Demery] was
       an overnight guest, and the third[-]party leaseholder did not give
       voluntary consent?

Demery’s Brief at 4.

       Our standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion is well-

settled:

             Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the
       denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether
       the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the
       record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
       are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
       suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
____________________________________________

2  As of sentencing in this case, Demery’s remaining charges were still
pending. See N.T., 12/5/2022, at 2-3.

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      Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
      remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
      a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
      supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may
      reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The
      suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an
      appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
      court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
      of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

            Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the
      evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a
      ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.

Commonwealth v. Carey, 249 A.3d 1217, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      In support of his sole issue on appeal, Demery argues that the trial court

erred in denying his suppression motion because the police engaged in a series

of unconstitutional warrantless searches that violated both the United States

and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See Demery’s Brief at 14-26. He raises three

distinct arguments in support of this claim—pertaining to the lawfulness of the

initial entry into Williams’ apartment, the protective sweep, and the search

conducted pursuant to Williams’ consent—which we address seriatim. Id.

           Lawfulness of the Initial Entry into the Apartment

      First, Demery argues that the initial illegal search occurred when police

unlocked the door to apartment 9G and partially forced the door open. Id. at

17-22. Demery contends that his arrest warrant did not authorize police to

enter the apartment because it was not his residence, but was the residence

of Williams, a third party. Id.

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        “Both the Fourth Amendment [to] the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals[’]

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.”          Commonwealth v.

Duke, 208 A.3d 465, 470 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks

omitted).    “A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8, subject to a few specifically

established, well-delineated exceptions.”     Commonwealth v. Smith, 285

A.3d 328, 332 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the

plain   view   exception,   the   inventory   search   exception,   the   exigent

circumstances exception, the automobile exception ..., the stop and frisk

exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v.

Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and

citation omitted).

        Demery relies on Commonwealth v. Romero, 183 A.3d 364 (Pa.

2018) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (“OAJC”), to support

his claim. Demery’s Brief at 17-21. In Romero, Earnest Moreno (“Moreno”)

absconded from a halfway house in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to which he

had been released on state parole and consequently, a warrant was issued for

his arrest. Romero, 183 A.3d at 372. United States Marshals attempted to

execute the arrest warrant at the home of Moreno’s half-brother, Angel

Romero (“Romero”). Id. Although Moreno was not in Romero’s home, the

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marshals searched the entire residence and discovered a marijuana grow

operation in Romero’s basement. Id. The marshals informed the Philadelphia

Police Department who obtained and executed a search warrant on Romero’s

home. Id. Police arrested Romero and his wife, and they were charged with

numerous drug offenses. Id.

      Romero and his wife filed suppression motions, which the trial court

granted. Id. at 373.    In granting the suppression motions, the trial court

relied on Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (stating that “an

arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited

authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason

to believe the suspect is within” ), and Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.

204, 212-22 (1981) (holding that an arrest warrant does not authorize entry

into the home of a third party not named in arrest warrant absent consent or

exigent circumstances). Based on the evidence presented at the suppression

hearing, the trial court in Romero determined that “a reasonable belief could

not have been formed to suggest Moreno lived in the Romero residence[,]”

and therefore, “the authorities[’] entry into Romero’s … residence was

unlawful”. Romero, 183 A.3d at 374.

      On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for trial, holding that

where the police possess a reasonable belief that the subject of an arrest

warrant lives at a certain location, they can enter the home without a search

warrant for the residence.    Id. at 375.    This Court determined that the

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marshals reasonably believed that Romero’s home was Moreno’s most likely

residence, and because they possessed a valid warrant for Moreno’s arrest,

the marshals had a legal basis to enter Moreno’s home. Id. At 376.

     On appeal to our Supreme Court, the OAJC analyzed “the interaction

between Payton and Steagald in determining the scope of the authority

provided by an arrest warrant to enter a private residence.”      Id. at 377.

Emphasizing the distinction between cases involving the Fourth Amendment

rights of the subject of an arrest warrant and those of a third-party

homeowner where the police attempt to execute an arrest warrant, the OAJC

explained:

     The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy interests in all
     homes. To overcome that privacy interest, a warrant used to
     enter a home must reflect a magisterial determination of probable
     cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is contained
     therein. The form of the warrant is significant only in that it
     ordinarily signifies “what the warrant authorize[s] the agents to
     do.” Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213[.] That is, the central distinction
     between an “arrest warrant” and a “search warrant” is the
     identification of the particular person or place that the magistrate
     has found probable cause to seize or to search. If an arrest
     warrant is based solely upon probable cause to seize an individual,
     then it authorizes precisely that seizure. If entry into a residence
     is necessary to search for that individual, then the warrant must
     reflect a magisterial determination of probable cause to search
     that residence, regardless of whether the warrant is styled as an
     “arrest warrant” or a “search warrant.” The critical inquiry is
     whether the warrant adequately addresses all of the Fourth
     Amendment interests that are implicated by the contemplated
     action.

Id. at 403-04. Absent a warrant, “an entry into a residence is excused only

by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 406. Thus,

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our Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination

on whether the contents of the arrest warrant reflected probable cause to

search Romero’s home. Id.

      In Commonwealth v. Mullen, 267 A.3d 507 (Pa. Super. 2021), this

Court analyzed Romero in the context of police executing a search warrant

where they located the subject of the warrant, Christopher Mullen (“Mullen”),

at his paramour’s home. Id. at 509. The police had received an anonymous

tip about Mullen’s whereabouts and observed him inside the residence through

a window. Id. at 509. Mullen argued that under Romero, “a magistrate must

determine that officers have probable cause to believe the residence in

question is the residence of the person sought to be arrested prior to the

officers’ entry into a home.” Id. at 511.

      In rejecting Mullen’s argument, this Court determined that Romero was

factually distinguishable as it “addressed the rights of third parties who were

not the subject of an arrest warrant[,]” and “made clear throughout its

disposition that the facts of Romero were distinguishable from those

scenarios involving an arrestee’s rights.” Id. at 516. Instead, we found our

Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Stanley, 446 A.2d 583, 586

(Pa. 1982) (holding that a valid arrest warrant and mere “reason to believe”

that the subject of the warrant was within a residence was all that police

needed to lawfully enter), controlling. Mullen, 267 A.3d at 516. Because

Mullen was the subject of an arrest warrant and the police observed him inside

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of his paramour’s residence, our Court concluded that police possessed the

reasonable belief necessary to enter the paramour’s home. Id. at 516-17.

     Here, Demery’s reliance on Romero is unavailing, and instead we find

this case analogous to Mullen. In the instant case, like Mullen, Demery was

the subject of an arrest warrant. N.T., 11/15/2021, at 7-8. Additionally, as

in Mullen, police had reason to believe that Demery was inside apartment 9G,

as McQueen, who had just left that apartment, informed the officers that

Demery was inside. Id. at 7. Pursuant to Mullen, Demery cannot assert

Williams’ privacy interest in her apartment—the interest of a third party—to

his own benefit. See Mullen, 267 A.3d at 516. Therefore, we conclude that

police possessed the arrest warrant and reasonable belief necessary to

lawfully enter the apartment. See Mullen, 267 A.3d at 516-17. Accordingly,

Demery’s argument that the police officers unlawfully entered the apartment

because they did not have a search warrant fails.

                  Lawfulness of the Protective Sweep

     Demery argues that the second illegal search occurred after he

unbarricaded the door and police conducted a protective sweep of the

apartment. Demery’s Brief at 21-22. Demery asserts that he was handcuffed

outside the apartment, police had been observing the area and saw no one

else enter the apartment, and they therefore had no reason to believe anyone

else was in the apartment or fear for their safety. Id. 21-22, 26.

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      “A protective sweep is a quick and limited search of premises, incident

to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.”

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 2001) (quotation

marks and citation omitted). There are two levels of protective sweeps. See

id. “Pursuant to the first level of a protective sweep, without a showing of

even reasonable suspicion, police officers may make cursory visual inspections

of spaces immediately adjacent to the arrest scene, which could conceal an

assailant.” Commonwealth v. Potts, 73 A.3d 1275, 1281-82 (Pa. Super.

2013). “The scope of the second level permits a search for attackers further

away from the place of arrest, provided that the officer who conducted the

sweep can articulate specific facts to justify a reasonable fear for the safety of

himself and others.”    Id. at 1282.    When officers conducting a protective

sweep observe or encounter evidence of criminal activity, they are not

required to ignore it. Id.

      The record reveals that when police officers knocked on the door of

apartment 9G and asked Demery to come to the door, they heard someone

running frantically around the apartment. N.T., 11/15/2021, at 7. They were

concerned that Demery was either arming himself or destroying evidence

because he had an arrest warrant related to firearm and drug offenses. Id.

at 8. The record further reflects that although police were able to unlock the

door, they were only able to open it about an inch because Demery had

barricaded it. Id. at 8-9. Demery eventually removed the barricade, and

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police entered the apartment, at which point they conducted a protective

sweep and encountered an overwhelming odor of marijuana. Id. at 8-10.

Although police had been observing the apartment for approximately one to

two hours, they had not been there all night and could not know for sure that

no one else other than Demery was inside.          Id. at 12-13.    Additionally,

testimony reflects that there was a backdoor to the unit, and police did not

know whether anyone entered the apartment that they could not see. Id. at

12.

       Based on the record before us, we conclude that the police officers

possessed specific facts sufficient to justify a reasonable fear for their safety

and the safety of others to support a protective sweep of the apartment. See

Potts, 73 A.3d at 1281-82. Therefore, Demery’s argument that the police

conducted an illegal protective sweep of apartment 9G likewise fails.

                      Lawfulness of Williams’ Consent

       Finally, Demery argues that the third illegal search occurred after police

used   the   information   they   obtained    during   the   sweep—namely    the

overwhelming odor of marijuana—to improperly coerce Williams into

consenting to a search of the apartment. Demery’s Brief at 23-25. Demery

asserts that under these circumstances, Williams’ consent to search was not

voluntary. Id.

       As stated above, a warrantless search of a premises is “presumptively

unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible.”            Commonwealth v.

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Lehnerd, 273 A.3d 586, 589 (Pa. Super. 2022). Voluntary consent, however,

is an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 590. “To be considered

valid, the consent must be the product of an essentially free and unrestrained

choice—not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will

overbo[]rne—under the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v.

Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).      The following factors are relevant to a

determination of whether consent to search is voluntarily given:

      1) the presence or absence of police excesses; 2) whether there
      was physical contact; 3) whether police directed the citizen’s
      movements; 4) police demeanor and manner of expression; 5)
      the location of the interdiction; 6) the content of the questions
      and statements; 7) the existence and character of the initial
      investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness; 8)
      whether the person has been told that he is free to leave; and 9)
      whether the citizen has been informed that he is not required to
      consent to the search.

Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 257 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quotation

marks and citation omitted). Importantly, “[w]hile knowledge of the right to

refuse to consent to the search is a factor to be taken into account, the

Commonwealth is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a

prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.” Id. at 9 (quotation marks

and citation omitted).

      In this case, the entire basis of Demery’s claim that Williams’ consent

to search apartment 9G was not voluntary was that, upon her arrival at the

scene, police immediately confronted her with the information that they had

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arrested Demery, they had detected the odor of marijuana in the apartment,

and they were obtaining a search warrant. Demery’s Brief at 23-26. Demery

fails to articulate any argument regarding the factors set forth in Hawkins or,

more generally, as to how the police coerced Williams into consenting to the

search. At most, Demery asserts that police were able to obtain Williams’

consent with the information he argues they illegally obtained during the

protective sweep.    Id.   We have already concluded, however, that the

protective sweep of the apartment was lawful. Moreover, the record reflects

that police advised Williams of her rights regarding a search of the apartment

prior to her giving consent. N.T., 11/15/2021, at 10-11; see also Hawkins,

257 A.3d at 9.   As Demery has failed to set forth any other argument in

support of his contention that Williams did not voluntarily consent to the

search of the apartment, his final argument fails.

      We find no merit to any of the claims Demery raises on appeal. We

therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying his suppression

motion.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 05/06/2024

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