Court Opinion

ID: 9624043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:49:19.175626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:59.857884
License: Public Domain

*112OPINION ON REHEARING
Blume, Justice.
A petition for rehearing has been filed in this case. Every point now raised was fully and carefully considered and discussed in the original opinion except the point, now raised for the first time, that if any crime was committed it was that of obtaining money under false pretenses, rather than that of forgery, which carries a penalty nearly as severe as that of forgery. It is now too late to raise that point. However, we may say that it may well be the defendant might have been prosecuted for that crime rather than for forgery. But we do not think the State, under the facts herein, was prevented from prosecuting him for the latter crime.
Counsel argue that the defendant, as an experienced contractor, knew that if he would engage in a forgery with which he is charged “the road would be short, rough and would end abruptly.” One would have thought so. It was rather shocking to the writer to *113find that a man of apparent intelligence should attempt to obtain money in such bungling manner as seems to have been true in the case at bar. To carry the statement of counsel to a logical conclusion, defendant also knew or should have known that to use money which did not belong to him, as he did, the road would be just as short and rough. He obtained §2,500 which he did not borrow and which did not belong to him. He used it illegally. It is difficult to see how he could hope to escape the penalty for doing so, no matter by what name the illegal method by which he obtained it is called.
Counsel argue again the point of intent to defraud. It may well be that at the time the forgery was committed the defendant merely intended to persuade Kos-miski to let the defendant do the work of repairing Kosmiski’s home and when he found he could not do so he used the money obtained by him intending in good faith, as he told Jensen, to personally pay the note in question herein and subsequently found himself in the unfortunate circumstance of not being able to do so. That is not an improbable explanation of the facts; and while not excusable, the sentence imposed on the defendant was, in that light and considering all the circumstances in the case as stated in the original opinion, perhaps rather severe. But the answer to all that is that this court is not a fact-finding body — a fact which counsel frequently overlook or choose to ignore. We cannot arbitrarily substitute our opinion for that of the jury. The function of this court is merely to declare the law. The sole question before us is as to whether or not there was evidence in the record sufficient to justify the jury in finding that there was an intent to defraud. We cited authorities on that point in the original opinion which counsel have evidently not considered, and which show that, as a matter of law, the evidence was not alone sufficient but ample. *114Hence, limited as our power is, we cannot see how we are justified in interfering with the verdict of the jury and see no reason for a rehearing.
Counsel for the defendant, who have not heretofore appeared for him, have taken a great amount of care in preparing their brief which accompanies the petition for rehearing. Their arguments are able, and at times call on the emotion. However, after reading over again our original opinion and considering it carefully in the light of the petition for rehearing, we are not persuaded that we were wrong in any of our conclusions. A second oral argument would not help us any. The petition for rehearing must accordingly be denied.

Rehearing denied.

Riner, C. J., and Harnsberger, J., concur.