Court Opinion

ID: 9928108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 20:05:32.98914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:51.577050
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/30/24 In re R.L. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 In re R.L. et al., Persons Coming                                     B325295
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                    (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                                Super. Ct. No.
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                                  22CCJP02199A-B)

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 J.M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tamara E. Hall, Judge. Dismissed.
      Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       The parties are familiar with the facts, and our opinion
does not meet the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.1105(c).) We accordingly resolve the cause before us,
consistent with constitutional requirements, via a written opinion
with reasons stated. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; Lewis v. Superior
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1261–1264 [three-paragraph
discussion of issue on appeal satisfies constitutional requirement
because “an opinion is not a brief in reply to counsel’s
arguments”; “[i]n order to state the reasons, grounds, or
principles upon which a decision is based, [an appellate court]
need not discuss every case or fact raised by counsel in support of
the parties’ positions”].)
       J.M. (father) appeals from juvenile court orders assuming
dependency jurisdiction over his daughters, R.L. (born February
2005) and G.L. (born January 2006), based on mother’s physical
abuse and father’s failure to protect, and removing both children
from his custody.
       The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department) argued in its respondent’s brief
that father’s appeal should be dismissed as moot with respect to
R.L., because she had turned 18. Father did not address the
mootness argument in his reply brief.
       On January 4, 2024, we invited the parties to file
supplemental letter briefs addressing whether the appeal was
moot and should be dismissed because G.L. had also reached the
age of majority. The Department urged us to dismiss father’s
appeal as moot. The Department attached minute orders
reflecting that the juvenile court had terminated dependency
jurisdiction over R.L. on March 10, 2023, and over G.L. on

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December 13, 2023.1 In his letter brief, father asked this court to
exercise its discretion to reach the merits of his appeal because
the difference between a determination that father is an
offending parent versus a non-offending parent could impact
father in future juvenile dependency or child custody proceedings
involving other children.
       “ ‘[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency
appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any
effective relief if it finds reversible error.’ ” (In re Rashad D.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163; see In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 275.) An “ ‘appeal may become moot where subsequent
events, including orders by the juvenile court, render it
impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief.’ ”
(Rashad D., at p. 163.) “A reviewing court must ‘ “decide on a
case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile
dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision
would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (D.P.,
at p. 276.)
       “Even when a case is moot, a court may exercise its
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Discretionary review generally
is appropriate only when a case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy between the
parties may recur, or when a material question remains for the
court’s determination. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court identified
several additional, non-exhaustive factors for evaluating whether
discretionary review of a moot case may be warranted. (Id. at

      1 We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s minute
orders. (Evid.Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 455, 459.)

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pp. 284–286.) First, the court may consider whether the
challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current or future
dependency proceedings, for example, by influencing the child
protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency petition or
the juvenile court’s determination about further reunification
services. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, the court may consider the
nature of the allegations against the parent: “The more
egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the
parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Third, the court may consider whether the case became moot due
to prompt compliance by parents with their case plan: “It would
perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine
resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional findings
only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the court has
issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)
       Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings and
removal order is moot. Both G.L. and R.L. reached the age of 18
while father’s appeal was pending, and the juvenile court has
terminated the dependency case. Even if we were to agree with
father’s arguments on appeal, reversal of challenged findings and
orders would have no practical effect in light of the termination of
the underlying dependency case. We are unpersuaded by father’s
argument about the possible adverse effects of allowing the
jurisdictional findings to go unchallenged. Not only is father’s
argument speculative, it also falls flat in light of his prior
involvement with the Department, including a dependency case
that ended in termination of father’s parental rights as to a
different daughter, and prior substantiated referrals of emotional
abuse and general neglect. Under these circumstances, we see no

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good reason to exercise our discretion to decide the moot issues of
jurisdiction and removal.

                         DISPOSITION

      The appeal is dismissed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                            MOOR, J.

We concur:

      RUBIN, P. J.

      KIM, J.

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