Court Opinion

ID: 9531488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:12:10.556759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:29.504103
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Jeremy Long, was charged with two counts of unlawful possession with intent to deliver cocaine (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2002)) and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24— 1.1(a) (West 2002)), after the police found cocaine and a set of brass knuckles on his person. Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and to suppress evidence as well as a motion to suppress statements, arguing that the pat-down search that led to the discovery of the brass knuckles was invalid. The State appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County granting defendant’s motions. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. FACTS At the hearing on the motions, the State called Todd McLester, a Rockford police officer. McLester testified that, on May 7, 2004, at approximately 10:15 p.m., he and several other Rockford police officers responded to an anonymous report that four individuals, all of whom had shaved heads and three of whom were armed with handguns, had entered the El Navegante bar on 7th Street in Rockford. McLester indicated that the bar was located in a “very high-crime area,” well known for prostitution and narcotics trafficking. McLester also said that on the night in question, he and the other officers had information from confidential informants that the bouncers at the El Navegante bar were selling cocaine. McLester explained that on six different occasions between March 2004 and May 7, 2004, he and other officers on the tactical team of the Rockford police department received this information regarding the bouncers from several street people and prostitutes in the 7th Street area. McLester testified further that, upon entering the bar, he and his fellow officers dispersed and began questioning several of the patrons in the bar. McLester testified that both male and female patrons were questioned. McLester also testified that several male patrons were patted down for weapons. McLester acknowledged that it was “probable] ” that many, if not all, of the male patrons were patted down for weapons. McLester testified that he did not know whether the frisking was confined to males with shaved heads. McLester testified that, as he was speaking to patrons, he saw two men, later identified as defendant and Marcelino Vargas, sitting at a table near the front door of the bar. McLester assumed that the two men were bouncers, given their location in the bar. McLester testified that Vargas’s head was shaved and that defendant’s hair was so closely cut that his head “could have been shaved.” As McLester walked back toward the front door, he saw Rockford police sergeant Joe Caltagerone speak with Vargas and then arrest him. At the same time, McLester saw Rockford police officer Michael McDonald approach defendant and speak with him. McLester then observed defendant stand up and extend his arms out to his sides. McDonald patted defendant down and removed a set of brass knuckles from his rear pants pocket. McLester testified that, as he observed this interaction, an officer directed his attention to a bottle, wrapped in gray duct tape, that was sitting on the footrest of the table where Vargas and defendant had been sitting. McLester testified that the bottle was found to contain narcotics and was the basis for Vargas’s arrest. Rockford police sergeant Joe Caltagerone testified that, on May 7, 2004, he and other officers, including McDonald and McLester, responded to a report that three armed males with shaved heads had entered the El Navegante bar. Caltagerone testified that he and his fellow officers “did a person-by-person check of every shaved head [sic] male subject in the bar.” Elsewhere in his testimony, however, Caltagerone stated that the officers “checked every male patron in the bar.” Caltagerone testified that by “checked,” he meant patted down for weapons. Caltagerone testified that, after he and his fellow officers completed this “check,” they walked back toward the front door. As they prepared to leave, they saw Vargas and defendant sitting across from each other on barstools at a table near the front door. Caltagerone testified that Vargas and defendant both had shaved heads but had not yet been “checked.” Caltagerone approached Vargas and asked whether he had “anything on him.” Caltagerone then took hold of Vargas’s arm in preparation for frisking him. In doing so Caltagerone observed a white pill bottle, wrapped in duct tape, lying about one inch away from Vargas’s left foot. Caltagerone recognized the bottle as the kind that is used to transport narcotics. Intending to check the bottle, Caltagerone “handed off’ Vargas to other officers. As he bent down to retrieve the bottle, Caltagerone observed a plastic “baggy” and a loose baggy end lying on the floor between the wall and the table “about halfway between” defendant and Vargas. Inside the first baggy were “several smaller baggy ends” that were individually wrapped and contained a white powdery substance that was later determined to be cocaine. The loose baggy end also contained a white powdery substance later determined to be 5.9 grams of cocaine. After finding the bottle and the baggies, Caltagerone asked McDonald to “check out” defendant, i.e., pat him down for weapons. Caltagerone testified that there were between 35 and 40 patrons in the bar when he and the other officers entered. Officer Michael McDonald testified that, on May 7, 2004, he and fellow officers went to the El Navegante bar in response to a call that “four subjects with shaved heads, possibly Mexican males[,] had entered the bar” and that the men were armed with guns. When McDonald entered the bar, he saw other officers “checking the patrons of the bar for weapons.” WTiile he was in the bar, McDonald saw two men, later identified as defendant and Vargas, seated at a table. McDonald witnessed fellow officer Caltagerone recover a pill bottle from the floor under the table. Caltagerone then asked McDonald to “detain” defendant. Accordingly, McDonald asked defendant to stand. McDonald testified: “As [defendant] stood up, I asked him if I could check him for weapons, any contraband, and he consented.” McDonald testified that, after defendant “consented,” he stood up, spread his feet, and held his arms out. McDonald did a pat-down search of defendant and found a set of brass knuckles in a rear pocket of his pants. McDonald placed defendant under arrest. McDonald then performed a full search of defendant, finding several small plastic bags containing a substance that was later determined to be cocaine. McDonald testified that he was in the bar for about five minutes before he performed the pat-down search of defendant. During that interval, McDonald saw fellow police officers perform pat-down searches of other patrons in the bar. McDonald testified that, to the best of his recollection, all male patrons of the bar were “checked out,” i.e., frisked for weapons, that night. On cross-examination, McDonald acknowledged that he wrote the following in his report: “ ‘[Defendant] was asked to stand up so he could be checked for weapons and he complied. *** [Defendant] stood up and held his arms out to his side so officers could check him. I began to pat down [defendant] over his clothing.’ ” McDonald clarified that defendant said nothing in response to McDonald’s requests but simply stood up, spread his feet apart, and raised his arms to about shoulder height. McDonald also testified that he never informed defendant that he had the option of refusing to be searched. The State introduced into evidence a booking photograph of defendant from the night of his arrest. Defendant’s hair is closely cropped in the photograph. Defendant was the sole witness for the defense. Defendant testified that he was sitting at a table near the door of the El Navegante bar when the police entered. On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he was a bouncer at the El Navegante bar. According to defendant, the police performed pat-down searches of the male patrons. After a few minutes, an officer approached Vargas, who was sitting with defendant at the table. The officer “grabbed [Vargas’s] arm and detained him.” The officer searched Vargas by “reaching in his pockets and waistband.” The officer directed a second officer over to defendant and said “check that one.” When asked what happened next, defendant related as follows: “A. The officer told me to get up, and I stood up. Q. Okay. Did he say anything else? A. Umm. He told me to put my arms out and started searching. Q. He told you to put your arms out? A. Yes. Q. Did you put your arms out? A. Yes. Q. Okay. What did he do then? A. He started searching me. Q. Okay. Did the officer, to the best of your ability, did the officer ask you whether or not you wanted to get up? A. No. ❖ ^ ❖ Q. *** Do you remember whether he asked you if he could check you for weapons? A. No. Q. No what? A. No, he didn’t ask me if he could check me for weapons. Q. Okay. Did he then — did he search you? A. Yes. Q. Did he give you any choice as to whether or not you would be searched? A. No.” The trial court agreed with defendant that there was no justification for the search that led to the discovery of the cocaine on his person. The trial court rejected the various theories the State posited in defense of the search. First, the trial court found that defendant did not consent to the pat-down search that led to the discovery of the brass knuckles on his person, which in turn led to his arrest and incidental search. The trial court found that the interaction between defendant and McDonald occurred just as described in McDonald’s report: “I think [McDonald’s] report is very accurate in terms of what he did. He said the defendant was asked to stand up and be checked for weapons and complied. That’s what his report says, and I think that’s what he did. He asked him to stand up, I’m going to check you for weapons, stand up so I can check you for weapons, and he complied.” Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that defendant did not freely agree to the pat-down search: “I don’t — I don’t believe that this can be considered to be a request for consent or a voluntary consent. [McDonald] may have asked [defendant] to stand up, but he wasn’t giving him an option. He wasn’t you know, saying, may I have consent to search you for weapons? He was directing him. He was directing him to stand up. He asked him to stand up and be checked for weapons, and he complied. [Defendant] was acquiescing to what — the officers were in control of the situation, and they needed to be in control of the situation. It was a potentially dangerous situation, and problems [sz'c] with the officers being there in force and being in control of the situation, it’s essential that they do that. *** It was not a free and voluntary consent at all. [Defendant] had been sitting there watching every other male person in the bar being searched, they came to him, it was his turn, stand up, I’m gonna search you for weapons, he stood up and was searched ***. The officers, acting on an anonymous tip, frisked the defendant and every other male subject in the bar without asking for consent *=:=* ” Next, the trial court found that the anonymous tip did not justify the pat-down search of defendant. The trial court described the tip as mentioning armed men who “had shaved heads and were possibly I believe Hispanic.” Defendant did not meet this description, the trial court found, because though he “had short hair clearly, *** he did not have a shaved head and he is Caucasian, not Hispanic.” The court also found that the police had no particular reason to suspect that defendant posed a threat. Last, the trial court determined that the arrest of defendant, and the full search that followed, was not independently justified by the plastic bag of cocaine that was discovered on the floor near defendant’s feet prior to his arrest. The court held that the contraband may have “[given] the police reason to question [defendant]” but did not provide probable cause to arrest him. The trial court granted defendant’s motions to quash arrest and to suppress evidence. The State filed this timely appeal. II. ANALYSIS On appeal, the State argues first that the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant such that the pat-down search of defendant was lawful incident to arrest. Second, the State argues that the pat-down search was a lawful Terry frisk. Finally, the State argues that defendant consented to the pat-down search. Because we find that the State’s first argument has merit, we do not reach its second and third arguments. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: “Findings of historical fact made by the circuit court will be upheld on review unless such findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the circuit court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses’ demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony. However, a reviewing court remains free to undertake its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues presented and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted. Accordingly, we review de novo the ultimate question of whether the evidence should be suppressed.” People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 268 (2005). We hold that at the time McDonald patted defendant down, the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for actual possession of the baggies of cocaine found under the bar table. Therefore, the challenged pat-down search was a lawful search incident to arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969). Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.  Probable cause exists if there are “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343, 349-50, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632 (1979). The objective reasonableness of the facts relevant to a probable cause determination is paramount, and the officer’s subjective intentions are irrelevant. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 98, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 918, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996) (holding that probable cause is assessed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable police officer). “To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to’ probable cause.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769, 775, 124 S. Ct. 795, 800 (2003), quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 919, 116 S. Ct. at 1661-62. Where officers are working together in investigating a crime, the knowledge of each constitutes the knowledge of all, and probable cause can be established from all the information collectively received by the officers. People v. Ortiz, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1065 (2005).  A proper analysis of the probable cause issue in this case has two steps. First, it must be determined whether, under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable to infer that a crime had been committed. If so, secondly, it must be determined whether, under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to infer that defendant committed that crime. This second step requires a determination of whether the probable cause was particularized with respect to defendant. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 245, 100 S. Ct. 338, 342 (1979) (“a search or a seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person”). We find the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769, 124 S. Ct. 795, useful in conducting this two-step analysis. In Pringle, a police officer stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding and located $763 in the glove compartment and five glassine baggies of cocaine behind the backseat armrest. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 773, 124 S. Ct. at 798. The Nissan was occupied by three men, and the defendant was the front-seat passenger. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 773, 124 S. Ct. at 798. When questioned, none of the three men offered any information regarding the ownership of the drugs or money. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368-69, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 774, 124 S. Ct. at 798. The officer placed all three men under arrest. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 369, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 774, 124 S. Ct. at 798. Later, the defendant told police that the cocaine belonged to him and that the other two occupants of the Nissan did not know about the drugs. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 369, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 774, 124 S. Ct. at 798. After the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest unsupported by probable cause, a jury convicted the defendant. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 369, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 774, 124 S. Ct. at 799. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s judgment but the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 369, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 774, 124 S. Ct. at 799. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals of Maryland, holding that the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 374, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 777, 124 S. Ct. at 802. In conducting its analysis, the Pringle Court first noted that upon recovering the cocaine from the Nissan, the officer had probable cause to believe that the felony offense of possession of a controlled dangerous substance had been committed. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 774-75, 124 S. Ct. at 799. As such, the sole question, according to the Court, was whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed that crime. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 775, 124 S. Ct. at 799. In concluding that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant, the Court wrote: “In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in a Nissan Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of rolled-up cash in the glove compartment directly in front of Pringle. Five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat armrest and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money. We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable police officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371-72, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 776, 124 S. Ct. at 800-01. In rejecting the defendant’s attempt to characterize the case as a guilt-by-association case, the Court held further: “Here we think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three men. The quantity of drugs and cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against him.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 777, 124 S. Ct. at 801.  The first step of the analysis, that is, whether it was reasonable to infer that a crime was committed, was quickly resolved in Pringle. The Court declared that it was uncontested that the officer had probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed. Similarly, in this case, it was reasonable to infer that someone committed a crime. See 720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2004) (except as authorized by the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, it is unlawful for any person to possess any amount of cocaine). With respect to the second step of the analysis, whether there was particularized probable cause as to defendant, defendant suggests that the cocaine just happened to be under the table at this inopportune time, unbeknownst to him and Vargas. While this is possible, a far more reasonable inference is that defendant, Vargas, or both men had cocaine on their persons and discarded it upon observing police officers enter the bar and begin to question and pat down patrons. Even in a bar in a “very high-crime area” known for prostitution and narcotics trafficking, it is reasonable to infer that cocaine in substantial quantities is rarely dropped inadvertently on the floor. Cocaine is a valuable illegal substance, ordinarily handled with care. See People v. Nettles, 23 Ill. 2d 306, 308 (1961) (“Because of this illegitimate nature of narcotics, they are sold for exorbitant sums on the black market and are therefore of great value to the person possessing them. Furthermore, since their mere possession may subject such person to severe criminal consequences, the narcotics traffic is conducted with the utmost secrecy and care”). Moreover, it is unlikely that, in the rare event that cocaine is inadvertently dropped on a bar floor, the valuable and addictive substance would remain there very long. In our judgment, cocaine is more often deposited upon the ground when individuals unexpectedly approached by the police hasten to disassociate themselves from the substance, for fear of criminal prosecution. An additional indication that the cocaine was intentionally and not inadvertently deposited beneath the table was the precise location in which the cocaine was discovered. Photographs admitted at the hearing on defendant’s motions show that the table at which Vargas and defendant were sitting was a rectangular wooden table, bar-height, situated perpendicular to the bar wall. The base of the table rests on a pedestal of sorts. The pedestal is also rectangular and roughly the size of the tabletop such that persons sitting on barstools around the table can rest their feet on the pedestal. The table was pushed up against the wall so that there was little if any gap between the wall and the tabletop or the wall and the pedestal. According to Caltagerone, who located the narcotics, the baggies of cocaine were located between the wall and the table an equal distance between defendant and Vargas. Caltagerone indicated that “unless you are looking for it you are not going to see it back there.” Based on the foregoing, it was reasonable to infer that the cocaine had been secreted away between the wall and the table in an intentional effort to conceal it. In addition to the presence of the cocaine and its location, there was other evidence presented from which a reasonable officer could infer a connection between the cocaine found under the table and the men sitting at the table. McLester testified that, on six different occasions between March 2004 and May 7, 2004, he and other officers on the tactical team of the Rockford police department received information from several street people and prostitutes in the 7th Street area serving as confidential informants that the bouncers at the El Navegante bar were selling cocaine. A combination of tips from informants and firsthand corroborative observation of suspicious activity will provide probable cause for an arrest. United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1990), citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); United States v. Shepherd, 714 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1983). McLester also testified that he assumed that Vargas and defendant were the bar’s bouncers on the night in question because they were sitting at the table closest to the front door, where the bouncers would ordinarily sit. Additionally, the recovered cocaine was itself evidence of illegal drug dealing because the cocaine was, at least in part, individually wrapped in small amounts, presumably for individual sale. Bouncers generally remain at their posts such that bar patrons do not typically occupy the bouncers’ station, making it reasonable to infer that it was unlikely that anyone other than the bouncers deposited the cocaine under the table at which the bouncers were stationed. The reasonable inference is that the quantity of cocaine, a portion of which was packaged for individual sale, discovered under the table at which the bar’s bouncers were sitting, within a bar from which the bouncers were suspected of dealing cocaine, was put there by one or both of the bouncers. It is important to remain mindful that a probable cause determination tolerates the existence of other inferences from the evidence that point to noncriminal behavior, as long as the inferences supporting arrest remain reasonable. While the degree of probability for purposes of establishing probable cause that a suspect committed a crime has not been defined with precision, it is clear that the standard is something less than demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed a crime. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 277, quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 514, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“Probable cause, i.e., sufficient evidence to justify the reasonable belief that the defendant has committed or is committing a crime, ‘does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false’ ”); People v. Burks, 355 Ill. App. 3d 750, 757 (2004) (“probable cause does not require evidence sufficient to support a conviction, nor even evidence demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed the crime”); United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding of probable cause does not require evidence demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed a crime). In this case, even if we apply the more exacting standard of “more likely than not,” there was probable cause to believe that defendant, Vargas, or both men committed the offense of possession of cocaine. Thus, irrespective of the possibility that the cocaine had not been discarded by Vargas or defendant and was present unbeknownst to either, the inference that one or both of the men discarded the cocaine when the police entered the bar is reasonable. Our analysis, however, is not complete. Pringle recognizes that something more than proximity to illegal contraband is required to meet the particularized probable cause requirement. In Pringle, that something was the unlikelihood of the admittance of an innocent person to the small confines of an automobile containing evidence of illegal drug dealing. In Pringle, the evidence of drug dealing was the quantity of cocaine (five glassine baggies) together with $763 in rolled-up cash in the glove compartment. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 777, 124 S. Ct. at 801. Like Pringle, there was evidence of drug dealing in this case, specifically, the information from confidential informants that the bouncers at the bar in question were selling cocaine, together with the quantity of cocaine, a portion of which was individually packaged. In Pringle, the Court concluded that it was reasonable to infer a common enterprise among the three men in the Nissan because a drug dealer is not likely to admit an innocent person to a vehicle containing evidence of drug dealing, for fear that the innocent person might provide evidence against him. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 777, 124 S. Ct. at 801. The reasonable inference of a common enterprise between Vargas and defendant is similarly reached. Where a bar’s bouncers are known to deal drugs, it is reasonable to infer that both bouncers simultaneously working the bar’s door are engaged in drug dealing. It would be difficult for one bouncer to engage in such an activity without his partner detecting it and thereby gaining the potential to furnish evidence against him. As such, we conclude that there was particularized probable cause that defendant had actual possession of the cocaine sometime before the officers discovered it. We recognize that the Court in Pringle distinguished the relatively small automobile that the defendant and his companions occupied from the public tavern in which the defendant in Ybarra was located. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 776-77, 124 S. Ct. at 801. In this case, however, it is important to note that an inference of common enterprise is not reached based on Vargas’s and defendant’s presence in a public tavern. Rather, the inference is based on their roles as bouncers, and the concomitant activities of bouncers, in a bar where the bouncers were known to deal cocaine. III. CONCLUSION In sum, we conclude, in a fashion similar to the Court in Pringle, that it is an entirely reasonable inference from the historical facts that both defendant and Vargas were engaged in illegal drug dealing and that both men had actual possession of the cocaine before the officers entered the bar. Consequently, we hold that a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that defendant committed the offense of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly. The fact that McDonald may have thought the pat-down was otherwise justifiable is of no relevance (see Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 98, 116 S. Ct. at 1774). For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County and remand this cause for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. GILLERAN JOHNSON, J., concurs.