Court Opinion

ID: 9930122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 14:02:18.487335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:04:23.508729
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: February 6, 2024

                       S23A0854. JACKSON v. THE STATE.
                        S23A0855. CASTLE v. THE STATE.

        BETHEL, Justice.

        Following the deadly shooting of Norman Ray Moore, Jr.,

(“Norman”) at a party in Bartow County, Dedric Jackson and

Dimitrius Castle were jointly tried and convicted of felony murder

and other related crimes.1 On appeal, Jackson contends that he

        1 The crimes occurred on March 13, 2010. On October 21, 2010, a Bartow

County grand jury indicted Castle, Dedric Jackson, and Leondris Jackson for
malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault for
fatally shooting Norman (Count 2), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
for non-fatally shooting Norman in the forearm (Count 3), possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 4), and battery (Count 5).
Leondris Jackson’s case was resolved in juvenile court and is not part of this
appeal. Following a joint trial from November 14-17, 2011, the jury found
Jackson and Castle not guilty of malice murder (Count 1), but guilty of all other
counts. The trial court sentenced Jackson and Castle to serve life in prison on
Count 2, twenty years in prison on Count 3 to be served consecutively to Count
2, five years in prison on Count 4 to be served consecutively to Count 2, and
twelve months on Count 5.
       Jackson and Castle timely filed a joint motion for new trial, which they
received ineffective assistance in several ways. Specifically, Jackson

alleges that his trial counsel: withdrew his request for a jury charge

on justification and failed to request a charge on defense of

habitation; failed to object to evidence of a prior crime and of bad

character; failed to object to certain witness testimony; and failed to

object to two jury instructions. Jackson further asserts that the

cumulative prejudice resulting from these actions and omissions

violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. Finally, Jackson

argues that the trial court erred by not charging the jury sua sponte

on what he characterizes as his sole defense of justification.

      Castle contends the following: that the evidence at trial was

insufficient to sustain his conviction for battery (Count 5); that trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request jury

instructions on justification and related principles and accomplice

corroboration and by calling a cumulative defense witness who

amended several times through new counsel. Following a hearing on June 28,
2022, the trial court denied the amended motion on July 14, 2022. Jackson and
Castle then filed timely notices of appeal, and their cases were docketed to the
August 2023 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                       2
opened the door to impeachment evidence of Castle’s defense theory;

and that the trial court erred by failing to merge the aggravated

assault verdict (Count 3) into the felony murder conviction (Count

2). For the reasons detailed below, each of Jackson’s and Castle’s

claims fail. Accordingly, we affirm in both cases.

                            Background Facts 2

      The evidence presented at trial showed the following.3

Appellants Castle and Jackson, who are brothers, lived with their

mother in an apartment complex in Cartersville. On the evening of

March 13, 2010, they held Jackson’s eighteenth birthday party

there. Leondris Jackson (“Leondris”), who was Appellants’ younger

cousin, attended the party, along with Jackson and Castle.

      Norman, the victim, came to the party with his cousin, Trinis

Moore (“Trinis”), and a friend, Algernon Shaw. When Norman’s

group arrived at the complex in an automobile, Norman rolled down

      2 The background facts for both cases are consolidated because the
appellants were jointly tried.
      3 Because the appellants were tried in 2011, the provisions of Georgia’s

former Evidence Code apply here.
                                      3
his window and attempted to talk to a girl on the sidewalk outside

of the apartment building. A group of people, including Jackson,

Castle, and Leondris, were mingling on the apartment’s front porch

and just inside the door. According to Trinis, someone in Castle and

Jackson’s group taunted Norman’s group, daring them to get out of

the car.

      Norman and Trinis exited the car, shouting “east side” and “on

the E,” which were references to their gang. Jackson and Castle’s

group walked out to meet them, with some shouting “BBS” 4 as they

approached Norman’s group. Trinis testified that when they exited

the vehicle, Norman cocked his gun, pointed the gun down, and

approached Jackson and Castle’s group. The two groups met

between the sidewalk and driveway. Several other witnesses either

heard or saw Norman cock his gun, and Leondris’s sister observed

Norman put the gun in his pants. After seeing Norman’s gun,

      4 Testimony at trial established that Jackson and Castle were members

of a group known as “BBS,” which stood for “Bottom Boy Survivors.” Leondris’s
sister testified that there were “probably like ten” people in BBS, and several
lay witnesses characterized the group as a gang.
                                      4
Jackson and Castle ran into their apartment to retrieve their own

guns. Defontae Leonard, who also attended the party, testified that

Castle’s weapon was a “40” and Jackson’s a 9-millimeter.

     When Jackson and Castle reemerged, they confronted Norman

and Trinis. Jackson began arguing with Norman, while a few feet

away, Castle argued with Trinis. Alex Florez, a friend of Castle and

Jackson, testified that Castle, Jackson, and Trinis carried guns

during the confrontation, but that Norman was not holding a

weapon. Several witnesses testified that, as the argument escalated,

they saw Jackson hit Norman in the head with the gun, and Jackson

and Norman then “got to fighting” on the ground. A crowd formed

around Norman, with several people kicking and punching Norman.

A family member of Trinis separated him from Castle. Florez then

pulled Jackson off Norman.

     Florez and Leonard testified that, when Jackson stood up, he

shot Norman. Florez stated that Castle came “from around where he

was” near the truck, about 10 or 15 feet away, and shot Norman a

second time. Leonard testified that this second shot hit Norman in

                                 5
the chest. Castle and Jackson’s aunt testified that she “might have”

seen Castle shoot someone, though she could not be sure. This was

not the only version of events recounted at trial. Another witness

testified that she saw Leondris hit Norman in the face with the gun,

and three witnesses claimed that they saw Leondris shoot Norman.

     At the scene of the shooting, police discovered Jackson’s

driver’s license at Norman’s feet. Police also discovered a .40-caliber

Smith & Wesson bullet in the road, as well as a Winchester 9-

millimeter Luger shell casing. After the shooting, Jackson asked a

friend to “hold the gun,” but the friend refused.

     Norman was transported to the hospital, where he was

pronounced dead. The medical examiner testified that Norman had

an abrasion to his face caused by a blunt force injury, a non-fatal

gunshot wound to his left forearm, and a fatal gunshot wound to his

chest. At the hospital, a loaded semiautomatic Glock handgun was

discovered tucked into the front of Norman’s shorts, and an EMT

testified that the weapon was not visible during transport.

     A witness later told an investigator that, after the shooting, she

                                  6
saw Leondris and Castle sneak out the back of the apartment with

Leondris’s father. Later that evening, a car owned by Leondris’s

father was seen leaving the complex, and the occupants of the

vehicle’s backseat had their heads ducked down. Police discovered a

brochure for a 9-millimeter handgun in the vehicle’s trunk, 5 as well

as Winchester 9-millimeter Luger bullets.

                          Case No. S23A0854

     1. Jackson argues that he received ineffective assistance from

his trial counsel in numerous regards. To prevail on his claims of

ineffectiveness, Jackson

     has the burden of proving both that the performance of
     his lawyer was professionally deficient and that he was
     prejudiced as a result. To prove deficient performance, [an
     appellant] must show that his trial counsel acted or failed
     to act in an objectively reasonable way, considering all of
     the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional
     norms. To prove resulting prejudice, [an appellant] must
     show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
     deficiency, the result of the trial would have been
     different. In examining an ineffectiveness claim, a court
     need not address both components of the inquiry if the
     defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.

     5 Leondris’s father disclaimed ownership of a 9-millimeter handgun.

                                    7
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Floyd v. State, 307 Ga. 789, 799

(4) (837 SE2d 790) (2020). “A strong presumption exists that

counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of professional

conduct.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ford v. State, 298 Ga.

560, 566 (8) (783 SE2d 906) (2016). With these principles in mind,

we consider each of Jackson’s claims of ineffective assistance in turn.

     (a) Jackson first argues that his trial counsel performed

deficiently by withdrawing his request for a jury charge on

justification. We disagree.

     At the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel

testified that, based on the evidence presented at trial, he chose to

pursue the “better” defenses of mere presence and association,

arguing that someone else was responsible for the shooting. Counsel

testified that he did not pursue a justification defense because

Jackson had not admitted to firing any shots generally, let alone in

self-defense, and such an admission was a “strong part” of pursuing

the defense.

                                  8
     On appeal, Jackson argues that trial counsel’s reasoning for

withdrawing the charge was unsound because there was witness

testimony that Jackson shot Norman, and Jackson’s trial counsel

testified that evidence showing that Jackson had fired shots during

the altercation would have changed his mind about the justification

defense. Jackson further argues that because he was indicted as a

party to the crime, he need not have actually fired the fatal shot at

all. One of his co-defendants could have fired the fatal shot, and had

he been justified in doing so, that defense would have been available

to Jackson.

     However, properly assessing the performance of counsel “calls

for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel’s

performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind.” Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 110 (131 SCt 770, 178 LE2d 624) (2011) (citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 688 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d

674) (1984)). See also Head v. Carr, 273 Ga. 613, 615-16 (544 SE2d

409) (2001) (“To show deficient performance, [a claimant] must

demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance was not reasonable

                                  9
under the circumstances confronting them before and during the

trial, without using hindsight.”) (internal citations removed); Shaw

v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 875 (3) (a) n.7 (742 SE2d 707) (2013) (“[W]e

are not limited in our assessment of the objective reasonableness of

lawyer performance to the subjective reasons offered by trial counsel

for his conduct. If a reasonable lawyer might have done what the

actual lawyer did – whether for the same reasons given by the actual

lawyer or different reasons entirely – the actual lawyer cannot be

said to have performed in an objectively unreasonable way.”). “Trial

counsel’s decision about which defense to present is a matter of trial

strategy,” Floyd, 307 Ga. at 802 (4) (b), and “will generally be

considered reasonable if supported by evidence in the record,”

Wilson v. State, 313 Ga. 319, 322 (869 SE2d 384) (2022). “Unless the

choice of strategy is objectively unreasonable, such that no

competent trial counsel would have pursued such a course, we will

not second-guess counsel’s decisions in this regard.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 685 (c) (872 SE2d

722) (2022).

                                 10
     Trial counsel’s decision to pursue mere presence and

association defenses in this case was not objectively unreasonable,

as the record reflects that multiple witnesses testified to seeing

Leondris, not Jackson, strike and shoot Norman, and Jackson did

not admit to the shooting. And “[t]he fact that the chosen strategy

failed while another reasonable strategy remained unemployed does

not render trial counsel deficient.” State v. Tedder, 305 Ga. 577, 584

(826 SE2d 30) (2019). See also Muller v. State, 284 Ga. 70, 72 (3)

(663 SE2d 206) (2008) (holding that counsel’s decision to withdraw

request for charge on justification not deficient because “[a]lthough

others might have pursued a different strategy, that withdrawal did

not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). Moreover, a self-defense instruction would

have been inconsistent with the mere presence defense, and counsel

generally is not deficient for failing to request jury instructions that

are contrary to a reasonably chosen defense strategy. See Gaston v.

State, 307 Ga. 634, 637 (2) (a) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (“[I]t is rarely

an unreasonable strategy not to pursue defenses that logically

                                  11
conflict.”); Williams v. State, 292 Ga. 844, 853 (3) (f) (742 SE2d 445)

(2013) (counsel’s decision not to request instruction on self-defense

was not deficient where the instruction was inconsistent with the

defense theory). Accordingly, this argument fails.

      (b) Jackson next argues that trial counsel was deficient because

he failed to consider and request a charge on defense of habitation.

Jackson argues that slight evidence6 supported such a charge

because Norman and his companions came to Jackson’s home and

“started trouble” by brandishing a loaded gun. Jackson further

argues that, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense

counsel agreed that it could have been possible to argue a defense of

habitation before the jury.

      OCGA § 16-3-23 authorizes the use of force reasonably believed

necessary to prevent or terminate another’s unlawful entry into or

attack upon a habitation. A person is authorized to use deadly force

only if, as applicable here,

      6 See Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 297 (6) (687 SE2d 427) (2009) (“A

request to charge the jury is appropriate where there is any evidence, however
slight, on which to predicate it.”).
                                     12
     [t]he entry is made or attempted in a violent and
     tumultuous manner and he or she reasonably believes
     that the entry is attempted or made for the purpose of
     assaulting or offering personal violence to any person
     dwelling or being therein and that such force is necessary
     to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence[.]

OCGA § 16-3-23 (1). However, “[w]here there is no evidence that the

victim was attempting to enter or attack the habitation at the time

he was injured by the defendant, the defense of habitation is not

available.” Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 297 (6) (687 SE2d 427)

(2009).

     Here, the record is clear that the confrontation between

Norman and Jackson that culminated in the fatal shooting occurred

outside Jackson’s home, in an area near the complex’s parking lot.7

Moreover, despite Jackson’s suggestion that the defense could have

applied, our review of the record uncovers no evidence that Norman

entered Jackson’s habitation at any point during this confrontation,

that he made any attempt to enter Jackson’s habitation, or that he

threatened to enter Jackson’s habitation. And Jackson directs us to

     7 Jackson does not argue that the confrontation occurred on the curtilage

of the home.
                                     13
no evidence supporting a reasonable belief on Jackson’s part that

any of those things happened in conjunction with a threat to assault

or do personal violence to any person inside the residence.8

Accordingly, OCGA § 16-3-23 was unavailable to him as a defense.

See id.; Walker v. State, 301 Ga. 482, 486 (2) (b) (801 SE2d 804)

(2017). And because a request for a charge on defense of habitation

would have failed, trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing

to request such a charge. See Coleman, 286 Ga. at 297 (6) (a).

     (c) Jackson next argues that his trial counsel was deficient in

failing to object to the testimony of Tonya Hall, who recounted the

details of a verbal altercation with Castle and Jackson. On appeal,

Jackson contends that this testimony amounted to evidence of his

“bad character.” This argument fails.

     At trial, Hall testified that, on the night of the crimes, she

stopped at the apartment complex, leaving her children in her

vehicle while she quickly went inside the apartment. When Hall

     8 There is also no indication that Jackson was in a vehicle during the

confrontation.
                                   14
returned to the vehicle, her son was “having a conversation” or

“words” with Castle. Hall testified that Castle swore repeatedly at

her and her son, and said, “Come on, I got something for you,” and

“I got something for y’all a**,” while reaching behind his back; on

this basis, Hall believed Castle had a gun. Hall also testified that,

while she called 911 to report the incident, Castle said, “That’s all

that b***h a** do is just call the police on us back and forth.” While

Hall’s testimony primarily related to her confrontation with Castle,

she also testified that Jackson came outside during this

confrontation and said that “they didn’t want to get their b***h a**

beat down again.” On cross-examination, trial counsel elicited

testimony that Hall had previously called the police five or more

times regarding Castle and Jackson, though she claimed that the

police never did anything in response and made it seem like she and

her family were “villains” or “bad people.”

     Even assuming that this testimony was objectionable, Jackson

has not shown prejudice under the facts of this case. Indeed,

multiple eyewitnesses placed Jackson at the scene of the murder and

                                 15
testified that they saw him shoot Norman. In light of the strong

evidence against him, “[t]here is not a reasonable probability that

the trial result would have been different in the absence” of Hall’s

testimony. See, e.g., Stallworth v. State, 304 Ga. 333, 335 (2) (a) (818

SE2d 662) (2018) (no reasonable probability of different trial result

where three eyewitnesses placed appellant and co-defendant at

crime scene and appellant was seen “violently arguing with the

victim prior to the shooting”).

      (d) (i) Jackson next argues that trial counsel was deficient in

failing to object to the testimony of three witnesses who saw Jackson

with a gun prior to the incident.9 Jackson contends that, because the

weapons were not linked to the murder, the testimony was

irrelevant and constituted inadmissible propensity evidence. Again,

we disagree.

      As an initial matter, no bullets were recovered from Moore’s

      9 Specifically, one witness testified that he saw Jackson with a gun the

day before the crimes, a second witness testified that he saw Jackson with a
.22-caliber pistol a few weeks before the crimes, and a third witness testified
that he saw Jackson holding a 9-millimeter handgun during the confrontation
with Norman.
                                      16
body and it was unclear from the wounds what caliber of gun was

used to shoot him. However, a 9-millimeter casing was found at the

scene, and one of the witnesses testified to having seen Jackson

holding a gun of the same caliber during the confrontation, while a

second testified to seeing Jackson with a gun of an unspecified

caliber the day before the shooting. This evidence is “relevant to a

disputed issue at trial” — that is, whether Jackson did, in fact, carry,

brandish, and fire a handgun at the time of the party — “inasmuch

as it tended to show that he had access to such a gun.” Thomas v.

State, 293 Ga. 829, 833 (4) (750 SE2d 297) (2013). And it does not

constitute propensity evidence. See Nichols v. State, 282 Ga. 401,

405 (2) (651 SE2d 15) (2007) (“[I]n order to show a defendant has a

propensity for certain behavior, the State must introduce evidence

of the defendant’s other similar behavior.”). Cf. Palmer v. State, 271

Ga. 234, 240 (8) (c) (517 SE2d 502) (1999) (deputy’s testimony that

he pulled defendant over several years before the murder and

noticed a rifle in the back seat of the defendant’s car, which was the

same weapon used in a later murder, was not similar transaction

                                  17
evidence but was relevant evidence that defendant possessed

murder weapon).

     Moreover, to the extent Jackson argues that Davis v. State, 301

Ga. 397 (801 SE2d 897) (2017) and Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 682 (755

SE2d 703) (2014) held that evidence tending to show a defendant

possessed a weapon prior to the crimes at issue is categorically

inadmissible, he is incorrect. In Davis, we said that any error in the

admission of “so-called similar transaction evidence” regarding a

defendant’s possession of a firearm two years prior to the shooting

and his statement about it some months beforehand was harmless

given the strength of the other evidence in the case. 301 Ga. at 400-

401 (3). And in Moore, although we held that evidence of appellant’s

tattoo depicting a gun was impermissibly offered as evidence of

appellant’s propensity to carry or use a firearm, we ultimately

concluded, under the facts of that case, that its erroneous admission

was harmless and did not mandate a new trial. See 294 Ga. at 685-

686 (3). Accordingly, Jackson’s counsel was not deficient for failing

to object to the testimony on these grounds.

                                 18
     As for the witness testimony that Jackson was seen with a .22-

caliber pistol in the few weeks leading to the murder, even if we

assume that such testimony was inadmissible and that trial counsel

should have objected, we cannot say that Jackson has established a

reasonable probability that, had counsel done so, the outcome of his

trial would have been different. Jurors also heard the other strong

evidence presented at trial, including testimony from eyewitnesses

who saw Jackson shoot Norman. See Kitchens v. State, 289 Ga. 242,

244 (2) (b) (710 SE2d 551) (2011) (no prejudice in failing to object to

testimony where there was strong evidence of appellant’s guilt,

including several eyewitnesses who testified that appellant shot the

victim). For these reasons, Jackson’s claim of ineffective assistance

on these grounds fails.

     (ii) Jackson also argues that trial counsel should have objected

to testimony about Jackson having a Taser prior to the shooting, but

Jackson fails to point to any specific witnesses who testified to ever

seeing Jackson with such a device. To the extent Jackson points to

the record, he relies only on portions that involve witnesses who

                                  19
testified that they saw individuals other than Jackson with a Taser

prior to the murder. We cannot say that forgoing an objection to

testimony about other individuals having a Taser was so patently

unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have made the same

decision. See Jackson v. State, 317 Ga. 95, 105 (2) (c) (891 SE2d 866)

(2023) (“[I]t is well established that the burden is on the party

alleging error to show it by the record.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)). Cf. Durham v. State, 292 Ga. 239, 242 (4) (a) (734 SE2d

377) (2012) (decision not to object to hearsay testimony that was not

harmful to the defendant was trial strategy that fell “within the

range of reasonable professional conduct”).

     (e) Jackson also argues that trial counsel should have objected

to testimony regarding his gang membership because the crimes

were not gang-related and the testimony was “highly prejudicial.”

Specifically, Jackson argues that trial counsel should have objected

to testimony that he and Castle were members of BBS and that the

group members shouted “BBS” when they confronted Norman and

his companions, as well as testimony about the meaning of BBS and

                                 20
its affiliated colors. We disagree that trial counsel’s failure to object

on these grounds was objectively unreasonable.

     The State was permitted

     [to] present evidence of a defendant’s motive for allegedly
     committing a crime. If that motive directly involves
     appellant’s membership in ‘an unsavory group,’ the
     relevant evidence does not become immaterial because it
     incidentally places appellant’s character or reputation in
     evidence.

Marshall v. State, 275 Ga. 740, 745 (10) (571 SE2d 761) (2002). The

evidence at trial showed that, immediately preceding the conflict

that resulted in Norman’s death, Norman and his companions called

out their group identifier (“east side”) and Jackson and his

companions     responded     with    their   own   identifier   (“BBS”).

Accordingly, the testimony at issue provided evidence of a possible

motive for the conflict and would have been admissible for this

purpose. See id. Moreover, under the former Evidence Code, “[t]he

State [was] entitled to present evidence of the entire res gestae of a

crime,” which would include the testimony regarding the gang

identifiers that were declared by the opposing groups immediately

                                    21
prior to the murder, “even if the defendant’s character [was]

incidentally placed in issue.” Corza v. State, 273 Ga. 164, 166 (2)

(539 SE2d 149) (2000). Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to

make a meritless objection. See Watson v. State, 303 Ga. 758, 763 (3)

(814 SE2d 396) (2018).

     (f) Jackson next argues that his counsel performed deficiently

by failing to object to testimony that Florez was threatened after

giving a statement to law enforcement officials against Jackson and

Castle. Jackson asserts that the testimony was improper because

there was no evidence that the threat was “made by,” “connected to,”

or “directed by” Jackson or was otherwise related to him. Jackson’s

argument fails because he has not established the requisite

prejudice.

     Florez testified at trial that he was friends with Castle and

Jackson, was a member of BBS, was at the party, and witnessed and

participated in the fight. Florez conceded that he initially lied to the

police when he was first interviewed, but stated that he later gave a

second, honest statement implicating the defendants to the police.

                                  22
Florez further testified that, after making the second statement, he

received phone calls saying that, if he testified, “they were going to

get me.” Florez did not explain who “they” were, nor did he identify

the caller.

     While evidence that a defendant has attempted to obstruct

justice, including by intimidating a witness, can be relevant

circumstantial evidence of guilt, see Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. 247,

256 (2) (a) (869 SE2d 447) (2022), there was no evidence that

Jackson or Castle made or directed the calls here. And although a

trial court has discretion to admit testimony of an anonymous threat

to explain a witness’s conduct on the stand, see Coleman v. State,

278 Ga. 486, 487-488 (604 SE2d 151) (2004), it does not appear from

the record that this testimony was used to explain Florez’s conduct.

     Assuming without deciding that trial counsel’s failure to object

was deficient, Jackson has not established that he was prejudiced

by this testimony. Florez’s reference to the anonymous threats was

fleeting, the threats were not tied to Jackson or Castle, and it does

not appear from the record, nor does Jackson argue, that there was

                                 23
any other mention of these threats. In light of the other evidence

presented at trial, including testimony from eyewitnesses who saw

Jackson shoot Norman, we cannot say that Jackson has established

a reasonable probability that, had trial counsel objected to this

evidence, the outcome of his trial would have been different. See

Atkinson v. State, 301 Ga. 518, 528 (6) (j) (801 SE2d 833) (2017).

Accordingly, this argument fails.

        (g) Jackson also contends that his trial counsel performed

deficiently by failing to object to two jury instructions; the first

instructed the jury that it could consider the intelligence of

witnesses in determining their credibility and the second concerned

the resolution of conflicts in witness testimony. These arguments

fail.

        (i) Citing McKenzie v. State, 293 Ga. App. 350 (667 SE2d 142)

(2008), Jackson asserts that the trial court erred by charging the

jury that intelligence is a factor in determining credibility. Prior to

McKenzie, the pattern jury charge identified intelligence as a factor

                                  24
that could inform the jury’s determination of credibility. 10 McKenzie

suggested that this portion of the charge was problematic and

confusing, though not “so harmful as to require a reversal”; after

that 2008 decision, the reference to intelligence in the jury

instruction was removed. Id. at 352 (2). See also Suggested Pattern

Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed.) § 1.31.10 (2023).

     Since McKenzie, this Court also has expressed concern with

respect to this portion of the charge, but we have held that, “[e]ven

assuming the better practice is to omit intelligence as one of the

factors in the credibility charge, its inclusion is not reversible error.”

Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741, 747 (6) (707 SE2d 80) (2011). See also

Redding v. State, 311 Ga. 757, 763 (4) (858 SE2d 469) (2021); Moore

v. State, 306 Ga. 532, 535 (2) (c) (832 SE2d 384) (2019); Ingram v.

     10 The pattern charge provided:

     In deciding credibility, you may consider all of the facts and
     circumstances of the case, the manner in which the witnesses
     testify, their intelligence, their interest or lack of interest in the
     case, their means and opportunity for knowing the facts about
     which they testify, the nature of the facts about which they testify,
     the probability or improbability of their testimony, and the
     occurrences about which they testify.
(Emphasis supplied.) Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal
Cases (4th ed.) § 1.31.10 (2007).
                                       25
State, 297 Ga. 854, 857 (778 SE2d 781) (2015); Gamble v. State, 291

Ga. 581, 583 (731 SE2d 758) (2012). And because the inclusion of the

intelligence portion of the instruction is not itself reversible error,

Jackson cannot show the prejudice necessary to succeed on his claim

that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the

charge, and this claim fails. See Howard, 288 Ga. at 747 (6).

        (ii) Jackson’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the jury charge on conflicts in testimony, which

he contends was akin to the charge disapproved in Noggle v. State,

256 Ga. 383, 386 (4) (349 SE2d 175) (1986), also lacks merit. The

relevant portion of the charge given in this case instructed the jurors

that:

        [I]f you should find that there is a conflict in the testimony
        of the witnesses or a conflict between a witness or
        witnesses, it is your duty to settle this conflict if you can
        without believing that any witness has made a false
        statement. If you cannot do this, it then becomes your
        duty to believe that witness or those witnesses which you
        think are best entitled to belief. In short, it is for you alone
        to determine what testimony you will believe and what
        testimony you will not believe.

        The court’s jury charge on conflicts in the evidence largely

                                      26
tracked the pattern jury charge that was in effect at the time of

Jackson’s trial in 2011:

           When you consider the evidence in this case, if you
     find a conflict, you should settle this conflict, if you can,
     without believing that any witness made a false
     statement.
           If you cannot do so, then you should believe that
     witness or those witnesses whom you think are best
     entitled to belief.

Pattern Charge 1.31.20, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions,

Volume II, Criminal Cases (4th ed. 2007). 11 And as we previously

noted in Smith v. State, 308 Ga. 81, 87-89 (3) (839 SE2d 630) (2020),

because this instruction had been approved by controlling case law

at the time of Jackson’s trial in 2011, we cannot say that Jackson’s

counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way by failing to

object. See Smith, 308 Ga. at 87-89 (3). Accordingly, Jackson’s claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

     (h) Finally, Jackson contends that, taken together, the

     11 This pattern jury charge was in effect until 2013. See Smith v. State,

308 Ga. 81, 89 (3) n.6 (839 SE2d 630) (2020). We have since noted that more
recent editions of the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions now state that
“[t]here is no support for this former charge in current law.” Id. at 89 (3).
                                     27
cumulative effect of trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies prejudiced

him such that his convictions should be reversed. “[I]t is the

prejudice arising from counsel’s errors that is constitutionally

relevant, not that each individual error by counsel should be

considered in a vacuum.” Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811 (II)

n.1 (642 SE2d 56) (2007), overruled on other grounds, State v. Lane,

308 Ga. 10, 23 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020).

     We assumed deficiency in Division 1 (c), (d) (i), (f), and (g)

relating to counsel’s failure to object to evidence of Jackson’s

character and testimony regarding Jackson’s possession of a firearm

in the weeks leading to the murder and the anonymous threats, and

the portion of the jury instructions pertaining to intelligence.

However, given our other conclusions above regarding the strength

of the evidence against Jackson, including voluminous eyewitness

testimony, we cannot conclude that, absent these errors, a different

outcome would have been reasonably probable. Jackson has thus

failed to establish that the combined prejudicial effect of these

assumed errors requires a new trial. See Jackson v. State, 317 Ga.

                                28
95, 106-107 (4) (891 SE2d 866) (2023). Therefore, Jackson’s claim of

cumulative prejudice fails.

     2. During the charge conference, Jackson withdrew his

previous request for a jury charge on justification. He now contends

that the trial court nonetheless should have given such a charge sua

sponte because it was his sole defense. Because Jackson did not

object to the trial court’s failure to give this instruction at trial, we

review this claim only for plain error. See State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29,

31-32 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011).

     In order to reverse a conviction on this ground, all four
     prongs of the standard adopted in Kelly must be met: the
     instruction, or in this case the failure to give it, was
     erroneous; the error was obvious; the failure to give the
     instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings;
     and the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
     public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Hoffler v. State, 292 Ga. 537, 542 (4) (739 SE2d 362) (2013); Kelly,

290 Ga. at 33 (noting that the “error or defect” must not have been

“intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived,

by the appellant”). Jackson’s claim regarding a jury instruction on

justification falters at the first step of the plain error analysis.

                                   29
     During the first few days of trial, Jackson filed a request that

the court give a charge on justification. However, at the charge

conference after the close of evidence, Jackson explicitly withdrew

his request for a justification instruction through counsel. Thus,

Jackson affirmatively waived any right to a justification charge and

cannot show plain error in this regard, and we need not address the

remaining prongs of the plain error standard. See Walker v. State,

301 Ga. 482, 485 (2) (a) (801 SE2d 804) (2017); Brown v. State, 298

Ga. 880, 882 (3) (785 SE2d 512) (2016). Accordingly, this

enumeration fails.

                         Case No. S23A0855

     3. On appeal, Castle argues that the evidence presented at trial

was insufficient to sustain his conviction for battery based on the act

of striking Norman in the face with a handgun (Count 5) because

the evidence showed that either Jackson or Leondris pistol-whipped

Norman. We disagree.

     When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, the proper inquiry

is whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant

                                  30
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S.

307, 318-319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). We view

the evidence in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with

deference to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of

the evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State,

292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013). Castle was charged

individually and as a party to the crime of battery. See OCGA § 16-

2-20 (a). “Whether a person is a party to a crime may be inferred

from that person’s presence, companionship, and conduct before,

during,   and   after   the   crime.”   (Citation   and   punctuation

omitted.) Williams v. State, 304 Ga. 658, 661 (1) (821 SE2d 351)

(2018). And “[w]hether the evidence supports such an inference is a

question for the jury.” Mohamed v. State, 307 Ga. 89, 90 (1) (834

SE2d 762) (2019).

     Castle asserts that the evidence failed to establish that he was

party to the crime of battery because, he says, “there was no

evidence that [he] facilitated or encouraged the pistol-whipping

performed by a third party.” Castle is correct that “a person’s mere

                                  31
presence at the scene of the crime and mere approval of the criminal

act are insufficient to establish that [he] was a party to the crime,”

Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 837 (1) (785 SE2d 285) (2016), but there

was evidence from which the jury could infer more than Castle’s

mere presence or approval.

     Indeed, several witnesses testified that, when Norman fell to

the ground after being pistol-whipped, Castle joined in attacking

him, and that Castle shot Norman while he was lying on the ground

after being beaten. And the trial court properly instructed the jury

on the law of party to a crime and mere presence. It thus “makes no

difference here” that the evidence showed that someone else was

responsible for pistol-whipping Norman; Castle’s “conduct supports

the jury’s conclusion that he shared an intent” to batter Norman.

Mohamed, 307 Ga. at 90 (1). Accordingly, Castle’s sufficiency

argument fails.

     4. Castle next argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective in three ways: (1) by failing to request jury instructions

on justification and related principles; (2) by failing to request a jury

                                   32
instruction on accomplice corroboration; and (3) by calling a defense

witness, Trinis, whose testimony was unnecessary and who opened

the door to substantial impeachment of Castle’s defense theory. His

arguments fail.

     (a) At trial, Castle pursued an identity defense. On appeal,

however, Castle argues that, because “any reasonable construction

of the evidence placed [him] squarely within Georgia’s party to a

crime doctrine” with respect to the shooting (going so far as to say

that “overwhelming evidence supported Castle’s presence at the

scene, armed, and involved in the altercation that eventually led to

the shooting”), justification was his only legally viable defense.

Castle asserts that trial counsel’s failure to pursue a justification

defense was based on a misunderstanding of the law.

     In particular, in his motion for new trial, Castle pointed to his

counsel’s statement at trial that he did not anticipate putting Castle

on the stand and therefore did not anticipate asserting self-defense.

On appeal, Castle focuses on trial counsel’s testimony at the motion-

for-new-trial hearing in which trial counsel indicated that he did not

                                 33
believe he could pursue a justification defense without Castle

testifying and admitting that he shot Norman. Assuming, arguendo,

that counsel misunderstood the state of the law at the time of trial

and that his performance was therefore deficient, 12 this claim

nevertheless fails because Castle has not established the requisite

prejudice.

     Here, trial counsel presented an identity defense, arguing that

Castle was not the person who shot Norman. To that end, trial

counsel successfully elicited testimony from multiple witnesses that

supported Castle’s defense strategy. Moreover, the evidence

supporting an instruction on justification was weak and attempting

to argue that Castle acted in self-defense could have drawn attention

to the fact that, when Norman was shot, he was not holding a gun,

he was lying on the ground, and he had just been beaten. And, as we

     12 But see McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 865 (1) (834 SE2d 96) (2019)

(clarifying whether the admission necessary to assert an affirmative defense
was “a legal admission that [was] binding upon the defendant or merely a non-
binding assumption of facts for the sake of argument,” and noting that the
phrase “admits the doing of the act charged” could have been “easily
misinterpreted”).
                                     34
held in Division 1 (a) above, jury instructions on justification and

related principles would have been inconsistent with an identity

defense.

      Moreover, the evidence against Castle, including eyewitness

testimony, was strong. Accordingly, even if counsel’s failure to

pursue a justification defense resulted from a misunderstanding of

law, we cannot say that this mistake prejudiced Castle’s defense.

See, e.g., Stallworth, 304 Ga. at 335 (2) (a) (no “reasonable

probability that the trial result would have been different” where

three eyewitnesses placed appellant and co-defendant at crime

scene and appellant was seen “violently arguing with the victim

prior to the shooting”). Accordingly, Castle’s ineffective assistance

claim fails.

      (b) Citing former OCGA § 24-4-8,13 Castle argues that his trial

counsel was deficient in failing to request a jury charge on

      13 Former OCGA § 24-4-8 provided, “The testimony of a single witness is

generally sufficient to establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including . .
. felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single
witness is not sufficient.” The language of this former Code section was carried
over to the current Evidence Code. See OCGA § 24-14-8.
                                       35
accomplice corroboration as to Florez’s testimony. Castle is

incorrect.

     Even assuming for the sake of argument that Florez was an

accomplice, controlling precedent at the time of Castle’s trial “held

that refusal to give a requested charge on accomplice corroboration

was not error, so long as some corroborating evidence was

presented.” Robinson v. State, 303 Ga. 321, 325 (3) (a) (812 SE2d

232) (2018) (relying on Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252 (244 SE2d 833)

(1978)). While we later overruled Hall’s holding in Hamm v. State,

294 Ga. 791, 796 (2) (756 SE2d 507) (2014), that decision came three

years after Castle’s trial. And it is well settled that “there is no

general duty on the part of defense counsel to anticipate changes in

the law, and only in a rare case would it be ineffective assistance by

a trial attorney not to make an objection that would be overruled

under prevailing law.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lyman

v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 322 (3) (a) (800 SE2d 333) (2017).

     Nor did any prejudice arise from counsel’s failure to request an

accomplice   corroboration   charge   because    Florez’s   testimony

                                 36
connecting Castle to the altercation and shooting was corroborated

by multiple other witnesses. For example, one witness testified that

Castle had a gun during the altercation with Norman, and she heard

him cock it. A second witness testified that Castle was fighting with

Norman, that Castle had a gun, and that he hit Norman. A third

witness testified that she saw Castle kick Norman and that Castle

had a gun in his hand. A fourth witness testified that she saw Castle

“jump” and hit Norman and that she saw Castle with a gun. And a

fifth witness testified that he saw Castle shoot Norman. It is

therefore “unlikely that the omission of the accomplice corroboration

instruction affected the outcome” of Castle’s trial. (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Robinson, 303 Ga. at 326 (3) (a). For these

reasons, Castle has failed to establish that trial counsel was

deficient or that he was prejudiced as a result, and therefore his

claim of ineffective assistance fails.

     (c) Castle also argues that his trial counsel was deficient for

calling Trinis as a defense witness because, he says, Trinis’s

testimony was discredited in various respects and otherwise failed

                                   37
to support Castle’s defense. Again, we disagree.

      “[D]ecisions about which witnesses to call at trial are matters

of trial strategy and tactics, and such strategic and tactical decisions

do not amount to deficient performance unless they are so

unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made them

under similar circumstances.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Roseboro v. State, 308 Ga. 428, 437 (2) (b) (841 SE2d 706) (2020). See

also Muller v. State, 284 Ga. 70, 72 (3) (663 SE2d 206) (2008) (“In

the realm of specific decisions regarding trial strategy, and in

particular decisions about which witnesses should be called to

testify, defense attorneys are afforded wide discretion.”).

     Here, Trinis’s testimony underscored the confused nature of

the brawl and Norman’s confrontational arrival at the party,

potentially helping Castle’s defense. That Trinis was impeached in

some respects does not render the decision to call him objectively

unreasonable, especially given that his impeachment might have

benefited Castle’s defense by calling into question any unfavorable

testimony Trinis did happen to give. See Watkins v. State, 285 Ga.

                                  38
355, 358 (2) (676 SE2d 196) (2009) (holding that trial counsel’s

decision to call a detective as a witness was not so unreasonable as

to constitute deficient performance even though the detective ended

up giving unfavorable testimony). And Castle’s after-the-fact

disagreement with this strategy is not grounds for deficient

performance. See McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342, 348 (4) (c) (667

SE2d 43) (2008) (“The fact that appellant and his present counsel

now disagree with the difficult decisions regarding trial tactics and

strategy made by trial counsel does not require a finding that

appellant   received    representation    amounting    to   ineffective

assistance of counsel.”). This claim of error fails.

     5. Finally, Castle argues that the trial court erred by imposing

separate sentences for felony murder predicated on the uncharged

aggravated assault of Norman by fatally shooting him (Count 2) and

for the aggravated assault of Norman by shooting him in the forearm

(Count 3). Castle contends that, because he and Jackson were each

charged for both gunshot wounds inflicted to Norman and because

witnesses testified inconsistently about who fired which shot, the

                                   39
two shots were effectively the “same crime” and should have merged.

     As we stated in State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 65 (1) n.4 (799 SE2d

770) (2017), as to each count charged in an indictment, a trial court

is required “to enter either (a) a written sentence on the count or (b)

a written notation that the count merged into another count for

purposes of sentencing or was vacated by operation of law.” Thus, in

entering its final judgment, a trial court necessarily must determine

whether to impose a sentence on a count or whether to merge that

count for sentencing. It is well settled that, where a defendant’s

crimes arise from “the same conduct,” he may not be convicted of

more than one crime if, among other things, “[o]ne crime is included

in the other[.]” OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) (1). “[W]here one crime is

completed before another crime, the ‘same conduct’ does not

establish the commission of both offenses.” Cordero v. State, 296 Ga.

703, 711 (3) (770 SE2d 577) (2015). One crime is completed before

the other where the crimes were separated by a “deliberate

interval.” Id. at 710-711 (3).

     At sentencing, counsel argued to the trial court that there was

                                  40
“either one or two guns . . . involved . . . . so I think factually there

was one assault,” and argued that the court should not sentence

Castle separately on the aggravated assault count. It was against

this backdrop that the trial court entered separate sentences on

Counts 2 and 3, and thus we conclude that the court implicitly found

that there were two assaults. See State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389, 389

(858 SE2d 42) (2021) (“When – as here – a trial court makes no

explicit findings in ruling on a motion that does not require such

findings to be made, we presume that the trial court implicitly made

all the findings in support of its ruling that the record would allow.”).

And because there was witness testimony at trial authorizing such

a finding, those implicit factual findings are not clearly erroneous on

this record.14 See, e.g., id. at 390 (“we assume that the trial court

implicitly resolved all disputes of fact and credibility in favor of its

ruling, and we generally accept such implicit factual findings unless

     14 The testimony summarized above included that of Florez, who testified

that, after Jackson shot Norman, Castle came back “around from where he was
around the truck,” which was “maybe ten to fifteen feet” away and then shot
Norman again.
                                    41
clearly erroneous.”); Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 410, 411 (478 SE2d 762)

(1996) (holding that merger was inappropriate where the defendant

shot the victim, approached the victim after he fell to his knees, and

stood over the victim while he pleaded for his life before “taking

deliberate aim” and shooting the victim a second time). Moreover,

these facts support a conclusion that there was a deliberate interval

between two aggravated assaults. Accordingly, Castle’s final

enumeration fails.

     Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 42