Court Opinion

ID: 9653137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:39:29.077641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:47.777452
License: Public Domain

GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and LEN-ROOT, Associate Judge
(specially concurring).
We concur in the conclusion that the applicant is not entitled to registration of its mark which it describes as “a silver strand which is incorporated in the rope during the laying-in operation.” We do so, however, upon different grounds than those stated in the opinion of the majority. As we understand the majority opinion, it proceeds upon the theory that confusion would result with opposer’s mark if registration were allowed. In our opinion, the decision should rest upon the ground that the applicant’s mark is not registrable, per se.
There has been much litigation concerning the mark of the opposer here, which is described in the agreed statement of facts herein to be “a helical stripe of uniform width and distinctive color produced by painting one of the strands of the rope red.” These cases are referred to in the majority opinion. Leschen & Sons v. Broderick, 201 U. S. 166, 26 S. Ct. 425, 426, 50 L. Ed. 710; Leschen & Sons v. Broderick, 36 App. D. C. 451; Leschen & Sons’v. Fuller (C. C. A.) 218 F. 786.
In none of these eases wa.s the validity of the alleged trade-mark of the opposer upheld. In the case first above cited, the Supreme Court was passing upon the registered mark of Leschen & Sons. This mark was described as a “streak of distinctive col- or produced in or applied to a wire rope. ‘This mark is usually applied by painting one strand of the wire rope a distinctive col- or, usually red.’ ” The court held the mark invalid, 201 U. S. 166, 26 S. Ct. 425, 426, 50 L. Ed. 710, saying, in part:
“Whether mere color can constitute a valid trademark may admit of doubt. Doubtless it may, if it be impressed in a particular design, as a circle, square, triangle, a cross, or a star. But the authorities do not go farther than this. * * *
“It is unnecessary to express an opinion whether, if the trademark had been restricted to a strand of rope distinctively colored, it would have been valid. * ■* * ”
In the ease secondly above cited, 36 App. D. C. 451, 456, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia stated, in addition to what is quoted in the majority opinion herein: “We have assumed, for the purposes of this opinion, that the Patent Office was right in holding that a mark consisting of a stripe of uniform width, spirally disposed around the surface of wire rope, may constitute’ a valid trademark. We have not deemed it necessary to consider the question, since neither party is in a position to raise it here.”
In the case last above cited, 218 F. 786, 788, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, in refusing to enjoin the use *461of a yellow strand rope by one of opposer’s competitors, said, in part: “ * * * A colored strand, not restricted to any color, is not a valid trade-mark. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 134 F. 571, 573, 67 C. C. A. 418, 420; Samson Cordage Works v. Puritan Cordage Mills, 211 F. 603, 604, 607, 128 C. C. A. 203 [L. E. A. 1915F, 1107]. If it was the latter, and if that is a valid trade-mark, it is so because, and only because, it is limited to a red stripe or strand, and that limitation permits the use by others of wire ropes with strands of other colors, and the defendants do not infringe that trade-mark because they use a yellow strand.”
Comparing the language just quoted with the reasoning of the majority opinion, conflict is observed. If the language of the Supreme Court and of the Circuit Court of the Eighth Circuit above quoted are to be construed as a,ny intimation that the Lesehen red strand mark is a valid trade-mark, it must be so because the Lesehen mark is restricted to one color; namely, red. Hence, logically, that being true, the applicant here might legally claim the right to use a silver strand, because no rights of the opposer would be violated thereby.
But we believe that both reason and the weight of legal authority justify the view that neither a silver strand nor a red strand in a wire rope, by itself, constitutes a valid trade-mark. Such a mark consists of coloring a certain part of a manufactured article in a certain way, and nothing more. It would certainly not be held to be a valid trade-mark to color the entire rope in a certain way. As was said by the Supreme Court in Lesehen Rope Co. v. Broderick, supra: “Certainly a trademark could not be claimed of a rope, the entire surface of which was colored.”
It is well settled that a valid trade-mark cannot be acquired in the use of a color not connected with some symbol or design. Seriven Co. v. Morris (C. C.) 154 F. 914; Newcomer v. Scriven (C. C. A.) 168 F. 621; In re Waterman Co., 34 App. D. C. 185, 18 Ann. Cas. 1033; Taylor v. Bostick (C. C. A.) 299 F. 232; In re American C. L. Co., 28 App. D. C. 446.
What is the distinctive design which the registrant here claims? It says that it colors one strand of its rope silver. What sorts of ropes it manufactures, or how the strands are arranged, is not clearly defined. Whether its ropes consist of two, three, or ten strands is not stated. If the occasional view of a colored strand is to be the mark, such view may vary as the ropes vary in manufacture. Such a coloring of a rope strand does not, to our minds, indicate a design, but is rather a fortuitous matter, depending upon circumstances. It would be equally appealing to the reason' if the manufacturer of tables would paint the tops of his tables red and the legs blue, and claims this for his trade-mark, irrespective of the kind of table manufactured. The same simile might be carried into every avenue of trade and commerce. Assume that a maker of automobiles paints the bodies of his cars yellow and the wheels black. This may constitute a design, for which he might possibly have a design patent; but may he register the same as a trade-mark composed of said col- or design alone?
If he may, then it is because his color mark may be said to be associated with some distinctive symbol or design, for such is the law as laid down by the authorities. Then, if he is entitled to register such trade-mark under the laws of the United States, no one else may be permitted to use his trade-mark, by simply changing the colors, as, for instance, painting the bodies black and the wheels yellow. The majority opinion holds, and it is well-settled law, that one may not appropriate the trade-mark of another by simply changing the colors in which it is displayed. In this connection, reference is had to the authorities cited, in connection with other suggestions made herein.
This being true, to grant registration to sueh a color combination in such a case is to grant to the applicant a practical monopoly on all color combinations. Either such a registration must be restricted to the particular colors described in the application, or, in legal effect, it is as broad as the solar spectrum itself. Certainly, the latter was never intended by the law.
The more reasonable view of the matter, wo think, is that one may not register a trade-mark which consists only of coloring one part of his article of manufacture in a certain way, unaccompanied by any other design or symbol. If the part of his manufactured article is of a particular form, so that it may bo distinctive when colored, the design patent laws give ample protection for the shape and design of said part. This in itself, however, should give him no right to register the said combination of form and color as a trade-mark for his goods.
Wo believe the weight of better authority inclines to the view that such distinctive *462coloring of a part of a device, as a strand of a rope, does not constitute a valid registrable trade-mark.
In re Waterman Co., 34 App. D. C. 185, 18 Ann. Cas. 1033, dealt with a mark proposed to be registered, which consisted in coloring the feed bar of a fountain pen red, and the portion of the fountain pen reservoir or handle adjacent thereto, black. In its application, the applicant said, “The trademark is applied to the goods during the manufacture by coloring the feed bar red.” The Court of Appeals, citing the decision of the Supreme Court in Leschen & Sons v. Broderick, supra, refused to permit the registration,. stating, “It is well settled that a trademark cannot be acquired in the use of color not connected with some symbol or design.”
In Re American Circular Loom Co., 28 App. D. C. 446, a trade-mark was sought to be used on insulating tubes or coverings •for electric wires which consisted in flakes of -mica impressed on the external surface of the same. The Court of Appeals denied the registration, stating that this was nothing more than an ingenious attempt to obtain a trade-mark of which color, unconnected with some symbol or design, was the essential feature.
In Sawyer v. Horn (C. C.) 1 F. 24, a party was claiming as a trade-mark in part; a package consisting of‘a cylinder with a metal perforated top, sealed with red sealing wax. Such claim was held to be without' legal right.
In Scriven Co. v. Morris, supra, it was sought to sustain a trade-mark which consisted of a piece of buff colored insertion used in drawers, which themselves were made of white jean. The court held that no valid trade-mark could be acquired therein, because it was the use of a color not connected with some'symbol or design. This case was'approved in Newcomer v. Scriven, supra.
In Davis v. Davis (C. C.) 27 F. 490, an arrangement of soap in a box by which a certain pattern of colors was presented to the eye was held not to be such a trademark as could be legally registered.
In Dodge Mfg. Co. v. Sewall et al. (C. C.) 142 F. 288, a manufacturer of rope secured a registration as a trade-mark of a colored thread twisted into the rope. The court held that, if this manufacturer had any trade-mark at all, it must be confined to a blue thread, which was the only one it had ever used; but added that no trade-mark could be held to be valid which did not involve a figure or design.
Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co. (C. C. A.) 142 F. 727, 729, involved an alleged trade-mark which consisted of coloring the head of a match red, with a blue tip thereon. The court held that such a mark did not constitute a valid trade-mark, stating, among other things, “Sometimes a col- or, taken in connection with other characteristics, may serve to distinguish one’s-goods, and thus be protected by the courts(Fairbank Co. v. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 F. 869,. 23 C. C. A. 554; Ohio Baking Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 127 F. 116, 62 C. C. A.. 116); but, as a rule, a color cannot be monopolized to, distinguish a product (Fleischmann v. Starkey [C. C.] 25 F. 127; Mumm v. Kirk [C. C.] 40 F. 589).”
In Parker Pen Co. v. Finstone (D. C.) 7 F.(2d) 753, a registered trade-mark was involved which consisted of the drawing of a fountain pen with a red body portion and two black end portions; no claim being made for the representation of the fountain pen apart from the color. It was said that the trade-mark was applied by producing the same directly upon the pen body. The owner of this mark sought to enjoin the use by others of a similar mark, likewise used on fountain pens, with some slight difference. The court held that the use of red and black in the manufacture of fountain pens was not such a matter as could be the subject of monopoly, and held that the registered trademark was invalid.
In Samson Cordage Works v. Puritan Cordage Mills (C. C. A.) 211 F. 603, 607, L. R. A. 1915F, 1107, a manufacturer of sash cord, by braiding into his cord a colored strand, gave to the finished cord the appearance of having a series of spots arranged spirally about the circumference of the same. This had been registered as a trade-mark. The court said: “ * * * How, apart from its color, can the exposed, though broken, surface of a braided strand be said to be a distinctive design, when the product of all manufacturers normally presents precisely the same feature and the same design; for (to apply the expressions of Mr. Justice Lurton in Newcomer & Lewis v. Scriven Co., which we have quoted above) the color thus is not impressed upon an ‘arbitrary design/ nor is it employed in association with ‘characteristics which serve to distinguish the article as made and sold by’ complainant. In the absence of controlling *463authority to the contrary, we are constrained to agree with the views expressed hy the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit. This, we think, results in a denial of the validity of complainant’s trade-mark. * 'i * Complainant’s alleged mark, if infringed by that of defendant, occupies the field as against all colored marks effected by the use not only of one braided strand, but even of two in a twelve strand cord, and whether so arranged as that the segments appear upon the surface two together or twice as close to each other. We think this result would give complainant an unwarranted monopoly, and that the District Court rightly dismissed the bill in the trade-mark ease.”
We had a somewhat similar matter before us in Lufkin Rule Co. v. Master Rule Mfg. Co., 40 F.(2d) 991, 17 C. C. P. A. 1227. In that case, it was sought to register as a trade-mark the words “Blue End,” together with coloring blue the ends of rules which were manufactured by the applicant. The ease was a close one and went off, not so much upon the question of color, as upon the fact that the words, “Blue End” were used as a part of the combination trademark. Wc did, however, in that ease, state that if the matter depended upon the coloring alone of the ends of the rules, it did not constitute a valid trade-mark, because, by permitting the registration of such a mark, the applicant would secure a monopoly on all colors for ends of rules. That case went as far as we would be willing, in our present views of the matter, to go, in permitting registration of such marks.
In conclusion, we are of opinion the applicant is not entitled to registration of its mark. We do not believe it is such a mark as is entitled to registration under the TradeMark Act of February, 1905, as amended, and registration should be denied upon that ground.