Court Opinion

ID: 9583908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:01.366518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:40.333880
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in the dissent of Presiding Judge McMurray. The primary issue at this stage, as we review the grant of summary judgment to defendant proprietor, is whether there is admissible evidence of a declaration against interest or res gestae statement made by an agent of defendant to prove prior, superior knowledge of the foreign substance by the proprietor. If there is, then the jury must decide if the proprietor breached its duty of care for its invitee.
Hagan, the injured plaintiff, testified in deposition that he did not know what the substance was that he had slipped on until “the employees” told him “somebody had spit up on the floor.” In explaining this, he testified as recited by Presiding Judge McMurray. In addition, he related that the manager, a woman, told them to go to Humana Hospital and that Goody’s should be billed. He did not know the manager’s name or what she looked like but said his wife did. Sales clerk Stacy Franklin testified by affidavit that the assistant store manager on duty, whom she notified of Hagan’s fall right after it happened, was Ann Tapley. Although Franklin testified that a few minutes prior to Hagan’s fall she was able to observe the aisle “and did not see any foreign substance or liquid on the floor,” she did not testify that she was looking for such or that none was there. There is contrary evidence showing that the substance was present when Hagan fell and that whoever was the source of it had time to leave the area.
Lundy v. Tucker, 34 Ga. App. 721, hn. 1 (130 SE 924) (1925), holds that an extrajudicial statement need not be established by the witness who establishes the existence of the statement but may be shown “by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of other witnesses.” The witness in Lundy who heard the statement, which was against the declarant’s interest in the lawsuit, did not know the *590woman who made it or whether that woman was the defendant. Even though this testimony was cumulative of another witness’ testimony that he heard defendant make the statement, the court reversed the denial of a new trial because the trial court had excluded the first witness’ testimony and this was error prejudicial to plaintiff.
Decided July 3, 1997
Reconsideration denied July 25, 1997
Samuel W. Cruse, for appellant.
Fulcher, Hagler, Reed, Hanks & Harper, David H. Hanks, Elizabeth McLeod, for appellee.
Collins v. S. H. Kress & Co., 114 Ga. App. 159 (150 SE2d 373) (1966), like this case, involved a slip and fall in a store. Plaintiff produced an alleged statement made by some unidentified person soon after the incident to the effect that “ ‘I told you ten minutes ago to get that stuff up, that somebody was going to break their neck.’ ” Id. This was properly excluded as an admission of the proprietor’s knowledge of the presence of a foreign substance because there was no evidence that the declarant was an agent of defendant. There must be some affirmative evidence of this fact, “though it is not essential that the identity of the person making the statement be shown.” Id. at 160 (1).
Viewing the evidence in favor of Hagan as the nonmoving plaintiff, Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991), a jury could draw a reasonable inference that assistant store manager Ann Tapley- was one of the persons who explained to the Hagans the source of the foreign substance, indicating a prior knowledge of it by some employee, even if not herself. The jury could also reasonably infer that, because the child and his mother were no longer present, the child’s sickness had occurred long enough in advance of Hagan’s fall for the proprietor to clean it up or warn invitees of its presence.