Court Opinion

ID: 9444448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:01:24.364324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:52.628520
License: Public Domain

SANBORN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Judge Ridge, who decided this case, has adequately and accurately stated the essential facts as follows:
“The only issue between the parties is as to the validity of the ‘driver exclusion’ endorsement attached to the policy of liability insurance issued to Muriel M. Wymer and covering her 1953 Mercury automobile.
“A policy was issued to insured on November 15, 1952, covering a 1951 Mercury. A ‘driver exclusion’ endorsement, excluding coverage to Donald Wymer, was attached to that policy on January 26, 1952, with the consent of the insured, after insured had been informed by the insurer’s agent, that if her son Donald Wymer had access to, and did drive and operate the Mercury automobile, an additional premium would have to be paid to the plaintiff. Insured, Muriel Wymer, signed and accepted endorsement on January 26, 1952, effective at 12:01 A.M.
“On May 22, 1953, Mrs. Wymer purchased a new 1953 Mercury. On the same day, in consideration of additional premium of $6.35, an ‘automobile substitution endorsement’ was attached to the above policy. By said endorsement, the insurance with respect to the 1951 Mercury was ‘discontinued’, insured was given credit for $70.83 return premium, and in consideration of $77.18 additional premium, insurance coverage was afforded to her 1953 Mercury, subject to all the terms, conditions and limitations of the policy then existing.
“The ‘driver exclusion’ endorsement was then a part of said policy.
“A loss payable clause was contained in the automobile substitution endorsement in favor of defendant Jenkins-Greer Motor Company.
“On October 27, 1953, while Donald Wymer was driving the 1953 Mercury, with the consent of his mother, he was involved in a collision with a car driven by Harold B. Wackerle. As a result thereof, Harold B. Wackerle and his wife, Evelyn Wackerle, recovered judgment against Donald Wymer, in the total sum of $17,500.00, in ensuing litigation.”
The Judge reached the following conclusions of law:
“The ‘discontinuance’ of insurance coverage as to the 1951 Mercury automobile owned by the insured Muriel Wymer, and the ‘afford (ing of) insurance with respect to the (new) automobile described’ in the ‘Automobile Substitution Endorsement' was in legal effect the substitution of a new contract for an old one existing between the parties. The payment of an additional premium by insured for such new contract, *9in and of itself, was sufficient consideration to sustain the ‘driver exclusion’ endorsement attached to the policy of insurance in suit.
“Under said ‘driver exclusion’ endorsement, insurance coverage was not afforded if the 1953 Mercury automobile was being driven by Donald Wymer.”
I regard Judge Ridge’s decision as sound and logical. The appellants have failed to convince me that it is based upon any misconception or misapplication of the law of Missouri.
Unquestionably, the contract to insure the 1953 Mercury did not come into existence until May 22, 1953. The contract was evidenced by the “Automobile Substitution Endorsement” which expressly made the terms and conditions of the policy which had covered the 1951 Mercury applicable to the coverage on the 1953 car. Surely that made the “driver exclusion” endorsement in the contract covering the 1951 car a term or condition of the contract covering the 1953 car.
What the insured and the Company did on May 22, 1953, was, in legal effect, the full equivalent of cancelling the policy on the 1951 car by mutual consent, applying the unearned premium on that policy upon the premium applicable to the new contract on the 1953 car, with terms and conditions identical with those of the policy it superseded, including the endorsement which excluded Donald Wymer from coverage.
But if the contract to insure the 1953 Mercury were to be considered as a mere continuation of the policy on the 1951 Mercury and subject to its infirmities, I would still be of the opinion that the endorsement excluding Donald Wymer from coverage was not without consideration. It is obvious that the insured, at the time she agreed to this endorsement, was faced with doing that or with having to pay a higher premium for her insurance or with having the insurance cancelled by the Company. She voluntarily chose a limitation of the risk insured against. I can see no valid basis for refusing to give effect to what the parties, under the circumstances, agreed to. Nor do I think there is any sound reason why an insured, to save an automobile liability policy from cancellation, may not agree with his insurer to exclude an accident-prone member of the insured’s family from liability coverage.
In federal cases controlled by state law this Court has consistently relied upon and ordinarily accepted the considered views of the trial judges with respect to doubtful questions arising under the laws of their respective states. Very recently, Judge Johnsen in Kasper v. Kellar, 8 Cir., 217 F.2d 744, 747, said of our rule in that regard:
“ * * * And on the question of resolving what local law is, which is unclear or unsettled, we have particularly emphasized, as our many decisions indicate, that we desire and will heavily rely upon the considered appraisal of a District Judge as to what the local law of his jurisdiction is.
“This is as it should be, for factors of evaluation and judgment on unsettled questions will naturally be present at the local level, which are not available to us, such as unreported trial-court decisions, percolating judicial trends, accepted legal climate, and familiarity with prevailing professional thought and temper.”
See, also, Guyer v. Elger, 8 Cir., 216 F.2d 537.
It seems particularly important to me that this rule should be adhered to in cases involving doubtful questions of insurance law, since so much of it reflects the local practices and customs of insureds, insurers and insurance agents, as well as existing judicial and legal trends and attitudes. About six months ago, in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Nance, 8 Cir., 212 F.2d 4, 8, Judge Ridge was affirmed by this Court upon the ground that his decision was based upon a permissible conclusion as to a doubtful question of Missouri insurance law. It can be said in the instant case, as we said in that case:
*10“The arguments and briefs of counsel, who are Missouri lawyers, have demonstrated that the question of law presented for review is a doubtful one. It has been decided adversely to the Company by a Missouri federal district judge who was ejntirely competent to rule upon the question and who has given it careful consideration. Our conclusion is that the District Court has reached a permissible conclusion as to a doubtful question of local law, and that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.”
Other cases in which we have declined to substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge with respect to doubtful questions of local insurance law are: Magill v. Travelers Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 133 F.2d 709, 713; Doering v. Buechler, 8 Cir., 146 F.2d 784, 788; Railway Mail Ass’n v. Chamberlin, 8 Cir., 148 F.2d 206, 208; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Wol-cott & Lincoln, Inc., 8 Cir., 152 F.2d 545, 547; Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Coleman, 8 Cir., 186 F.2d 40, 43. See also and compare, Buder v. Becker, 8 Cir., 185 F.2d 311, 315.
I would affirm the judgment appealed from.