Court Opinion

ID: 9480809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:59:01.522475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:55.228519
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Because in my view the pre-guidelines sentence entered by District Judge Gibbons was nothing more than a conditional sentence, a sentence perfectly consistent with pre- and post-guidelines sentencing practices, I decline to join in the majority’s holding.
While Mistretta was pending in the Supreme Court, district judges who maintained serious doubts about the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines faced the difficult challenge of selecting from two sentencing schemes, one which recently had been statutorily overruled, and the other which arguably violated separation of powers. In response to this challenge, some district judges imposed on convicted defendants two-track sentencing schemes in anticipation of the Mistretta decision. This manner of conditional sentencing really is nothing new to pre- or post-guidelines sentencing, under which district judges customarily impose various conditions, for example, good behavior or restitution, on a defendant’s particular level of confinement. See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 5B-F (1989) (setting forth conditions that sentencing judge may place on sentences, including measures “used to enforce conditions such as fine or restitution payments, or attendance in a program of treatment such as drug *1178rehabilitation.”)- Two-track sentencing therefore is just a variation on an old theme. Rather than turning on his own conduct, Martin’s conditional sentence was dependent on the future conduct of the Supreme Court.
Conditional sentencing has been approved by at least one other Court of Appeals in a similar context. See United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.1989) (“We believe the District Court acted prudently in using this two-track procedure.”), approving the District Judge’s reasoning in Brittman as follows:
Of course, the sentence which will be entered on the Judgment and Commitment form will be the [pre-guidelines sentence] only, because that will be the only lawful sentence under the opinion of the Court. However, if the Court is reversed and the Guidelines upheld, a new Judgment and Commitment will have to be entered, but this may be done without any further sentencing hearing. This approach will, it is hoped, effect some efficiency in the light of the uncertainties involved.
United States v. Brittman, 687 F.Supp. 1329, 1331 (E.D.Ark.1988).
There is neither a technical, rule-based problem nor a more fundamental, principle-based problem with the District Court’s procedure because Martin was advised and clearly knew that his sentence was conditional. See Gauntlett v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 213, 219 (6th Cir.1988) (“Gauntlett was on notice that his appeal could lead to a more severe sentence, a factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of an expectation of finality.”); United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“[A] defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased.”). As the panel majority notes, “the trial judge, at the September 2, 1988 sentencing hearing, explained with clarity the dual sentencing that she announced in her earlier Thomas decision and it is equally correct that the defendant acknowledged his understanding of the dual sentencing pro-cedure_” Ante at 1175. Thus it is clear that Martin had no reasonable expectation in the finality of the pre-guidelines sentence.
Judge Gibbons’s clear explanation of the conditional nature of Martin’s sentence was no less effective as a colloquy at a sentencing hearing than as a journal entry, as prescribed by the majority. Courts speak frequently without written orders. For example, evidentiary rulings from the bench properly are accorded the full weight of authority that any judicial decision, written or otherwise, deserves.
I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that Rule 35’s restrictions about first correcting sentences in district courts applies to this case. Imposition of a conditional sentence does not constitute a corrected sentence within the meaning of Rule 35. Even if the conditional sentence were, however, viewed as a corrected sentence, Rule 35 nonetheless would permit the guidelines to determine Martin’s sentence. Rule 35 permits a district court on remand “to correct a sentence that is determined on appeal under 18 U.S.C. 3742 to have been imposed in violation of law_” Fed. R.Crim.P. 35 (1990). Because the guidelines were in effect when Martin was sentenced, any sentence imposed under the preguidelines scheme was entered illegally. This fact is unaltered by the pendency of a Supreme Court challenge to the guidelines. Therefore, if the Court rejects the view that the dual sentence was a conditional sentence, then we should remand the case to the District Court with instructions to do just what Judge Gibbons did in the first place: to sentence Martin under the federal sentencing guidelines.