Court Opinion

ID: 9689730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:44:47.912125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:51.848698
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, J.
¶ 12. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I conclude that Perez used a dangerous weapon within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 968.20(lm)(b).
¶ 13. The majority states that Perez was convicted of "carrying a concealed weapon." While "carrying a concealed weapon" is the label which is conventionally applied to this type of offense and is the title of the statute under which Perez was convicted, see WlS. Stat. § 941.23, the actual statutory language states, "Any person except a peace officer who goes armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.) In keeping with the facts of the case and the statute, the criminal complaint against Perez alleged that he "did unlawfully go armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon."
¶ 14. The elements of going armed with a concealed weapon are the following:
First, that the defendant went armed with a dangerous weapon.
Second, that the defendant was aware of the presence of the weapon.
Third, that the weapon was concealed.
Wis JI — Criminal 1335.
¶ 15. Perez pled no contest to the charge, functionally admitting that he committed each element of this offense. I cannot accept the majority's conclusion *245that a defendant who has admitted arming himself or herself with a dangerous weapon and then concealing the weapon has not used the weapon for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 968.20(lm)(b).
¶ 16. Pursuant to Webster's dictionary definition, the majority concludes that the word "use" in WlS. STAT. § 968.20(lm)(b) contemplates something more than mere possession of a weapon. However, in addition to the definitions cited by the majority, Webster's also defines "use" as "to carry out a purpose or action by means of." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2524 (1993). Here, Perez necessarily had to use the weapons to carry out the violation of the concealed weapon statute. My point is not to quarrel with the majority's cite to those portions of the dictionary definition which support its interpretation. Rather, my point is to demonstrate that the term "use" is so elastic and varied that it can carry multiple meanings in a given context.
¶ 17. More importantly, the rule which allows us to look to a dictionary for assistance is not absolute. When interpreting a term used in a statute, its "meaning must be found in its context and relation to the subject matter." Lang v. Lang, 161 Wis. 2d 210, 221, 467 N.W.2d 772 (1991) (citation omitted). We also construe the term "in conformity with and to promote [the statute's] objects and purposes." Gelencser v. Industrial Comm'n, 31 Wis. 2d 62, 68, 141 N.W.2d 898 (1966). In the absence of a statutory definition, a court can establish the meaning of a term by reference to its common usage as reported in a recognized dictionary. See Wilson v. Waukesha County, 157 Wis. 2d 790, 795, 460 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1990). But where the term is ambiguous, the court will refer to the scope, history, *246context, subject matter and object of the statute to discern legislative intent. See id.
¶ 18. The majority does not expressly say whether WlS. STAT. § 968.20(lm)(b) or the word "use" is ambiguous or unambiguous. I would submit that the term is at least ambiguous as applied to the concealed weapon statute. Regardless, I am persuaded that the subject matter and object of the statute require a conclusion that Perez used the weapons.
¶ 19. The legislative history regarding WlS. STAT. § 968.20(lm)(b) is meager. However, as the majority notes, the Legislative Reference Bureau's analysis does say, "If the person committed a crime with a firearm ... the firearm . . . may not be returned to him or her." State v. Williams, 148 Wis. 2d 852, 857, 436 N.W.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1989). It is interesting to note that this analysis uses the phrase "with a firearm" — latent language which hardly supports the majority's conclusion that the statute envisions a more active use of the weapon. Rather, this language tells me that the legislature intended a broader meaning of the term "use."
¶ 20. The majority also says that the term "use" means that "[t]he firearm had to be part of the crime in some way." Majority at ¶ 6. But here the firearms were part of the crime. Perez armed himself with the weapons and then concealed the weapons. Without those two elements, which require affirmative conduct relative to the weapons, there would be no crime. By the majority's own words, the weapons were "part of the crime" of going armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon.
¶ 21. The majority also says that its opinion "does not render the carrying a concealed weapon statute meaningless." Majority at ¶ 10. True. But the majority opinion certainly renders WlS. STAT. *247§ 968.20(lm)(b) meaningless as applied to the concealed weapon statute. And, as the majority concedes, it also renders the statute meaningless as applied to certain other statutes which prohibit the possession of dangerous weapons or the arming of oneself with a dangerous weapon in various settings. See WlS. STAT. § 948.605(2)(a) (prohibiting the possession of a firearm in a school zone); WlS. Stat. § 941.235(1) (prohibiting the carrying of a firearm in a public building); WlS. Stat. § 941.237(2) (prohibiting going armed with a handgun on certain premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages).
¶ 22. But this list does not end with the statutes cited by the majority. Under the majority opinion, WlS. Stat. § 968.20(lm)(b) is also unenforceable relative to the following offenses: WlS. Stat. § 948.61(2), prohibiting the possession of or going armed with dangerous weapons other than firearms on school premises; WlS. Stat. § 941.20(l)(b), prohibiting the arming of oneself while intoxicated; WlS. STAT. § 941.26(l)(a), prohibiting the sale, possession or transport .of a machine gun or other full automatic firearm;1 and WlS. STAT. § 941.28(2), prohibiting, the possession or arming of oneself with a short-barreled shotgun or rifle.
¶ 23. The majority opinion also mandates the return of firearms possessed by the category of persons *248set out in Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2). Like the concealed weapon statute, all the statute requires is that the person possess a firearm. This statute covers persons convicted of felonies, juveniles adjudged delinquent for acts which would be felonies if committed by an adult; persons found not guilty or not responsible by reason of insanity or mental disease; persons committed for treatment under Wis. STAT. ch. 51; and, of particular concern to me, persons subject to domestic abuse and child abuse restraining orders and injunctions. I find it difficult to conclude that the legislature intended to allow these categories of persons to retain the weapons which formed the basis for the criminal offense.
¶ 24. Given the context, subject matter, object and purpose of WlS. STAT. § 968.20(lm)(b), I conclude. that the legislature intended the statute to apply to persons convicted of going armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon.
¶ 25. I respectfully dissent.

 Interestingly, WlS. STAT. § 941.26(l)(a) also bars the "use" of a machine gun or other full automatic firearm. Under the majority's reasoning, if the defendant were convicted of using a weapon under this statute, the weapon could be forfeited since the forfeiture statute speaks of "use." But if the defendant were convicted of selling, possessing or transporting the weapon, the weapon could not be forfeited under the majority's reasoning. That inconsistent application of the forfeiture statute does not make sense to me.