Court Opinion

ID: 9549762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:24:32.549672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:53.494236
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The Court of Appeals in this case stated that:
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and by article one, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. This right is not absolute. It does not necessarily include the right to counsel of one’s own choosing. State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980).
State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 760 P.2d 1207 (1988). Clayton, if closely read, makes it clear that in that case defendant did not want to go to trial with the attorney whom the magistrate had appointed at the initial arraignment, and who had represented him at the preliminary hearing and in district court appearances short of trial. That defendant provided the district court with no basis for making a substitution of counsel, and so the defendant elected to proceed pro se. However, the trial court requested appointed counsel’s presence at the trial with instructions to provide the defendant with any desired assistance.
A logical surmise is that the Court of Appeals meant to say of the Clayton case that once an accused indigent requests an attorney, the accused does not have the constitutional right to refuse the services of attorney “X” in the public defender’s office and instead select from that office “Y” or “Z,” or, in counties where there is not a public defender, the indigent defendant has no right to select any attorney of his choice. A better statement of the applicable law comes from State v. Wozniak, 94 Idaho 312, 320, 486 P.2d 1025 (1971), namely that,
[A]n indigent defendant is not entitled to choose which attorney will be appointed to represent him unless extraordinary circumstances exist.
The instant case differs substantially from Clayton and from Wozniak. Carman sought to be represented by a private attorney, not a public defender, and not a different public defender. Furthermore, as will be noted from the Court of Appeals opinion, the basis of its ratio decidendi was safeguarding judicial economy, i.e., accept the trial court’s desire to keep things moving by forcing the public defender to go ahead with the defense, notwithstanding that a privately retained attorney was available to represent Carman, which could have saved the county money either directly or indirectly. However, the Court of Appeals although not at fault for having concern for judicial economy should have had equal regard for fiscal economy — a subject with which all county commissioners have extreme concern.
Not only was the county shorted financially by not allowing substitution, but no sound reason appears for not allowing Car-man’s privately retained counsel to take over the defense — assuredly resulting in a deprivation of the right of counsel of one’s own choice. Thus, this appeal presents a question of constitutional dimension which appears to have been inadequately resolved by the Court of Appeals.
As will be noted in the Court of Appeals opinion, the attorney whom the defendant wanted to retain and substitute for the public defender advised the district court of *195his willingness to come into the case, but conditioned it on the caution that he needed a short continuance in order to prepare. There was then in place a trial date of March 26, and there was also then in place a motion filed by the public defender on March 12, to postpone, based on his need for more time to prepare. Additionally, as that opinion notes the motion to postpone was denied, substitution of counsel was denied and Carman was obliged to continue his defense with the services of the public defender. Interestingly, on the date of trial, March 26, the court did grant a postponement of trial until May 7.
The philosophy of the Court of Appeals opinion boils down to weighing the constitutional right of a defendant to be represented by counsel of his own choice versus “the judicial objective of effective court management,” which in this instance turned out to be not all that effective, and certainly not that important — but it was management.
The Ada County Public Defender in the brief supporting the petition for review puts forth a compelling argument that Car-man’s constitutional rights were violated by the refusal to allow substitution of counsel and grant a continuance. Unable to improve on the argument there advanced, that portion of the public defender’s brief is attached as Appendix A. Every point stated therein and the applicability of the authorities finds me in complete accord. It would be presumptuous to rewrite that brief as though it originated with me.
ADDENDUM
Since expressing my views on this narrow issue presented, Justice Huntley’s views have been made known. My views were formulated without having the benefit of that opinion, and I am in accord with all that he has written, other than that I am not persuaded that “a call to the Administrative Office of the Courts would have made available another judge and another courtroom at any reasonably convenient time.” 1 What I hear from some informed persons suggests rather persuasively that in situations such as were presented here the district judge in all likelihood was under “time standard constraints” imposed upon all district judges by the administrative director.
Also now before me is the specially concurring opinion of Justice Johnson. Differing in some respects from the views of Justice Bakes, Justice Johnson perceives that there was a duty on Mr. Carman to “raise an objection to being represented by the public defender at trial.” This view is expressed without any citation of authority, and I do not presently understand the rationale behind the statement. To the contrary, where an accused has found an attorney of his choice to represent him, and a motion is made for substitution of the privately retained counsel in the stead and place of the public defender, it simply does not occur to me that some objection on some grounds to being confined to the services of public defender must be raised. And, if so, to whom and how? The public defender himself made the motion. He was then representing the defendant, and in the courtroom was the person authorized to speak for the defendant; and he did so. The defendant would have been ruled out of order had he been so foolish as to attempt to supplant the public defender, and for himself argue anything to the judge.
Frankly, I am equally at a loss to understand the purpose of reporting the colloquy between the Court and Mr. Carman which is set out in Justice Johnson’s opinion. That colloquy was initiated by the court; he was addressing Mr. Carman directly regarding one specific point, i.e., that obtaining a continuance per his counsel’s request amounted to a waiver of his right to a speedy trial. The judge was entirely correct in so addressing the defendant in order *196to become assured that the defendant himself was aware of the implications of obtaining the continuance. This is of interest, and shows the judge’s proper concern for the rights of the defendant. Because the right of speedy trial is peculiar to the accused, not his attorney, hence the court properly addressed the defendant himself. Moreover, I do not see that the right to a speedy trial is an issue before us, or that it was an issue which the Court of Appeals was required to address.
Justice Johnson in turn is entirely correct in asserting that in the colloquy Mr. Car-man gave no indication that he was dissatisfied with the public defender or that he wanted Mr. Smith as his attorney. As mentioned above, a motion to that effect had been earlier presented to the district court, with Mr. Smith also present, but the motion was denied. The choices of a prudent defendant in such circumstances are two fold, namely to acquiesce or to acquiesce. Justice Bakes writing for the majority recognized just such an acquiescence in a similar case involving the right to counsel, State v. Brown 98 Idaho 209, 560 P.2d 880 (1977):
The record does disclose that before trial Brown had been displeased with his court appointed counsel but had been unable to retain other counsel. After trial he asked to have his appointed counsel discharged and to retain other counsel. Under these circumstances he should have been granted a reasonable continuance to allow for new counsel to be retained and to be present at the sentencing hearing.
Counsel for Carman included that citation in his brief. The majority opinion strangely gives it no consideration.
In all of my experience I have never seen, nor have I heard of, a circumstance where an apparently rational, albeit criminally accused, defendant on being asked to answer specific questions put to him by the court, has been so foolish and meddlesome as to assume the part of supplanting his attorney in an attempt to bicker with the court on a ruling which has been made. Moreover, where the constitutional right to retained counsel of one’s own choice is involved, I do not comprehend that one must convince the trial judge of one’s dissatisfaction with the public defender, or with other court-appointed counsel, as was the circumstance in State v. Brown; 98 Idaho 209, 560 P.2d 880 (1977).
The trial bar may well wonder when there is applicable case-precedent, and diligent counsel have cited to it, why it goes unmentioned in the opinion for the Court.
APPENDIX A
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Whether the trial court’s failure to grant the defendant’s request for a continuance so he could retain counsel of his own choice constituted reversible error
It is the defendant’s contention that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the trial court refused to grant a continuance so defendant could be represented by retained counsel of his own choosing. Although, the defendant acknowledges that the general rule that the decision to grant or to deny a continuance rests within the judge’s sound discretion, State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 569 P.2d 916 (1977), it must be pointed out that our Supreme Court has ruled that such discretion is abused if denying a continuance results in an abridgement of an accused’s right to counsel. State v. Brown 98 Idaho 209, 560 P.2d 880 (1977).
In the Brown case, supra, the court noted that “a defendant may not indefinitely postpone trial or sentencing by continually changing counsel or arriving for hearings unrepresented by counsel” 98 Idaho at 212, 560 P.2d at 883. But, absent a showing of such circumstances the court in Brown, supra, held that a defendant is entitled to a reasonable continuance for the purpose of obtaining counsel.
In this case there was no showing that the defendant sought to change attorneys to postpone the proceeding, but rather his first attorney withdrew and he was merely trying to get an attorney of his own choosing and at his own expense (Supplemental *197Transcript: p. 2, line 18, p. 3, line 3; p. 17, line 10, p. 18, line 22; p. 22, lines 18-21; p. 29, lines 2-12;).
A case very similar to the instant case is the California case of People v. Courts, 37 Cal.3d 784, 210 Cal.Rptr. 193, 693 P.2d 778 (1985).
The California Supreme Court stated that there were several well established principles to guide its determination, whether the trial court’s failure to grant a continuance constituted an abuse of discretion and then went on to set forth the following principles, to-wit:
The right to the effective assistance of counsel “encompasses the right to retain counsel of one’s own choosing. [Citations.]” (People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 86, 151 Cal.Rptr. 625, 588 P.2d 765.) Underlying this right is the premise that “chosen representation is the preferred representation. Defendant’s confidence in his lawyer is vital to his defense. His right to decide for himself who best can conduct the case must be respected wherever feasible.” (Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982), 30 Cal.3d 606, 615, fn. omitted, 180 Cal.Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248.)
Protection of this right furthers other values important to our criminal justice system. The right to employ counsel of one’s own choosing “is based on a value additional to that insuring reliability of the guilt-determining process. Here we are concerned not only with the state’s duty to insure ‘fairness’ in the trial but also with the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference With the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.” (People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 206, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868.)
Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have emphasized that trial courts have the responsibility to protect a financially able individual’s right to appear and defend with counsel of his own choosing. “A necessary corollary (of the right) is that a defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel, otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of little worth. ([Citations.])” (Chandler v. Fretag (1954) 348 U.S. 3, 10 75 S.Ct. 1, 5, 99 L.Ed. 4; People v. Holland, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 87, fn. 10, 151 Cal.Rptr. 625, 588 P.2d 765.) In addition, counsel, “once retained, [must be] given a reasonable time in which to prepare the defense.” (People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 852, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) Failure to respect these rights constitutes a denial of due process. (Chandler v. Fretag, supra, 348 U.S. at p. 10, 75 S.Ct. at p. 5; People v. Byoune (1966) 65 Cal.2d 345, 348, 54 Cal.Rptr. 749, 420 P.2d 221). 693 P.2d at 78-781.
The California Supreme Court then went on to set forth the following principles balancing the defendant’s request for a continuance against the description of the orderly process of justice.
Any limitations on the right to counsel of one’s choosing are carefully circumscribed. Thus, the right “can constitutionally be forced to yield only when it will result in significant prejudice to the defendant himself or in a disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case.” (People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2 at p. 208, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868, italics added: Maxwell v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 613-614, 180 Cal.Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248.) The right to such counsel “must be carefully weighed against other values of substantial importance, such as that seeking to ensure orderly and expeditious judicial administration, with a view toward an accommodation reasonable under the facts of the particular case.” (People v. Byoune, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 346, 54 Cal.Rptr. 749, 420 P.2d 221.)
However, “a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defendant with counsel an empty formality.” (Ungar v. Sarafite, supra [1964] 376 U.S. [575] at p. 589, 84 S.Ct. [841] at p. 849 [11 L.Ed.2d 921].) For this reason, trial courts should accommodate such requests — when they *198are linked to an assertion of the right to retained counsel — “to the fullest extent consistent with effective judicial administration.” (People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 209, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868.)
In deciding whether the denial of a continuance was so arbitrary as to violate due process, the reviewing court looks to the circumstances of each case. “ ‘particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request [was] denied.’ ” (Id., at p. 207, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868, quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, supra, 376 U.S. at p. 589, 84 S.Ct. at p. 850..... 693 P.2d at 781.)
An accused’s timely assertion of his right to retained counsel may in some instances cause some disruption in a trial court’s calendar. However, the frequency of such occurrences should not be overstated, for the number of indigents who become financially able to retain private counsel before trial is relatively small. Crovedi's requirement that trial courts exercise “resourceful diligence” in protecting the right to chosen counsel (65 Cal.2d at p. 209, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868) must be respected, even when a byproduct of a concrete and timely assertion of that right is some disruption in the process.10 693 P.2d at 785.
After analyzing all of the relevant factors the court in Courts, supra, determined that:
Appellant was diligent in his efforts (1) to secure counsel of his own choosing before the date of trial, and (2) to apprise the court of his wishes at the earliest possible time. The trial court’s failure to respect appellant’s right to chosen counsel and to grant the requested continuance constituted error.
Deprivation of appellant’s right to counsel of his choice “requires reversal regardless of whether in fact he had a fair trial.” (People v. Gzikowski, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 589, 186 Cal.Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145; accord Reynolds v. Cochran (1961) 365 U.S. 525, 531, 81 S.Ct. 723, 726, 5 L.Ed.2d 754; People v. Byoune, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 346, 54 Cal.Rptr. 749, 420 P.2d 221; People v. Crovedi, supra 65 Cal.2d at p. 205, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 969.)” 693 P.2d at 785.
Based upon the facts of the instant case and the applicable law it was apparent that the trial court’s failure to grant the defendant’s request for a continuance so he could obtain private counsel constituted a violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. This is especially true in light of the fact that defendant’s private attorney indicated his willingness to proceed if a continuance were obtained and the lack of any evidence of an attempt by defendant to delay the proceeding or a showing of significant inconvenience to the court or the parties.
This case involves a policy issue relating to just how far the district court should go in restricting a defendant’s choice of attorney under the guise of judicial economy and orderly administration of the courts. Here the defendant actually had funds to hire a private attorney and so technically was not indigent, as is the usual case with appointed counsel. Obviously, the public defender could have moved to be released from the case, but it is likely such a request would have been denied, given the court’s statements concerning the request for a continuance. Further, this may have operated to deprive the defendant of any representation at all, a situation which no ethical lawyer would wish to create.
A motion to withdraw would also have a detrimental effect upon any future attorney-client relations as the client would have doubts about his attorney’s zeal in representing him. Thus, appointed counsel’s only realistic option to facilitate the client’s desire to hire a private attorney was to move to continue.
A further consequence of the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case is that district court judges may use the decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw by an attorney to force defendants to accept attorneys as dictated by the court. This would happen where an attorney who had problems with a particular defendant would not be able to withdraw because the court refused to allow a continuance to get a new lawyer *199on line. This will have a “chilling” effect upon the free choice of representation by attorneys and clients.
Also a lawyer may be able to “force” compliance by a client by threatening to withdraw, leaving the client with representation by a public defender, who may not refuse an appointment. This situation works an injustice upon the client, the appointed attorney and ultimately each attorney who practices law in the state.
CONCLUSION
The failure of the Court of Appeals to reverse this case constitutes manifest injustice and the case should be reviewed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of October, 1988.
/s/August H. Cahill
AUGUST H. CAHILL
Attorney for Appellant

. I would be inclined to that view if Justice Huntley were the officer in charge of administration, but he is not. Instead that office is under the domination and direction of an administrative director. Most information coming to me is that the director is wholly in charge. I cannot remember any meetings of the Court in recent years where the agenda included the making of decisions as to supervising and guiding the director.