Court Opinion

ID: 9681421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:50:01.608546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:33.907703
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
Appellee in his motion for rehearing asserts that the question of whether a confidential relationship existed between appellants and appellee is one of law and not of fact. On viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, we concluded that a fact issue was raised as to the existence vel non of a confidential relationship between the parties, and that there were also other fact issues raised by the evidence necessitating the reversal and remand of the case.
A confidential relation may exist as a matter of law in certain recognized fiduciary relations, such as that of trustee and cestui que trust, attorney and client, guardian and ward, principal and agent or surety, and husband and wife. It may also exist as a matter of fact wherever one person has reposed a special confidence in another to the extent that the parties do not deal with each other on equal terms, either because of an overmastering dominance on the one side, or weakness, dependence or justifiable trust, on the other. Ringer v. Finfrock, 1941, 340 Pa. 458, 17 A.2d 348. It is our view that in the instant case the question of whether a confidential relationship existed is one of ultimate fact to be determined by the jury under proper instructions as to what would constitute a confidential relationship.
We do not mean to say that the court may not find as a matter of law whether there is a confidential relation existing in certain cases not falling within those here-inabove mentioned. In MacDonald v. Follett, 142 Tex. 616, 180 S.W.2d 334, our Supreme Court, speaking through Hickman, Commissioner, stated that the Court would experience no difficulty in concluding that the facts related by Follett, if found to be true, establish a relation of trust and confidence between him and MacDonald. In that case, however, the court also significantly stated: “Our question then is whether the facts above recited, viewed in the light most favorable to Follett’s contention, raised an issue for the jury on the question of the existence of a relation of trust and confidence.”
In Schiller v. Elick, 1951, 150 Tex. 363, 240 S.W.2d 997, the court clearly stated that whether or not a fiduciary relationship exists is a question of fact. The court also said:
*256“Once the trial court finds as a fact the confidential relationship continuing through to the sale, Elick’s breach of duty becomes clear. * * * We are required to presume in support of the trial court’s judgment that this issue of fact — the existence of a fiduciary relationship giving rise to the duty to disclose — was found by the trial court against defendant Elick. The evidence in this record will support a finding either way.”
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that in some cases the existence of a confidential relation is a conclusion of law, in others it is a question of fact to be established by the evidence. In re: Thompson’s Estate, 387 Pa. 82, 126 A.2d 740, and cases cited. In Taylor v. Shields, Ohio App. 1951, 111 N.E.2d 595, the court stated: “What constitutes a confidential relationship between parties is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of each case.”
On this appeal we are not called upon to determine whether a finding by the jury of a confidential relationship would be unsupported by clear and convincing evidence, hut merely whether there is some evidence requiring submission of the question. Sanders v. Harder, Tex.Sup.1950, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206. See McCormick on Evidence, Ch. 36, p. 680, Footnote 10, where it is stated: “The trial judge, moreover, may not direct a verdict if he considers the evidence not ‘clear and convincing,’ but he may use the test, in appropriate cases, to set aside a verdict.” As stated in the Texas Law Review, Note, Vol. 28, p. 988, the reasoning of the decisions in this State may seem anomalous and illogical in requiring the use of the “preponderance” test by the jury when the “clear and convincing” standard is applied by the court upon motion for new trial. It insures, however, trial by jury since a jury verdict may not be set aside more than two times.
The appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.