Court Opinion

ID: 9712753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:59:19.91968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.233867
License: Public Domain

*34Concurring Opinion
Sullivan, J.
The result reached is, in my view, correct. It is reached, however, in derogation of the traditional view of the indeterminate sentence law. The thrust of the majority opinion emphasizes the minimum time to be served under an indeterminate sentence and accordingly places significance upon that minimum period of incarceration vis a vis the legislative intent inferred from the amendment of IC 35-13-4-3.
Binding case precedent does not permit us to consider an indeterminate sentence in terms of the minimum period of incarceration. We are compelled to view an indeterminate sentence as a sentence for the maximum period. Moore v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 584, 276 N.E.2d 840; Hobbs v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 195, 252 N.E.2d 498.
This precedential compulsion, however, does not preclude by concurrence. I concur because the statutory amendment here involved does not, in context, provide such ameliorative effect as to require us to say, as a matter of law, that Wolfe is entitled to a two year determinate sentence, whether pursuant to IC 35-8-5-1, or otherwise.
Note. — Reported at 362 N.E.2d 188.