Court Opinion

ID: 9827614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:42:07.596637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:33.802878
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
,[6] Since appellants’ motion for rehearing was filed a new member of this court has been added to succeed our lamented Chief Justice Key. ■ We have therefore fully and carefully reconsidered the entire record with especial regard to the matter of misconduct of counsel on the trial, complained of by appellants, and stressed in' their motion. This *605reconsideration leads to a somewhat different conclusion on this point, and to a correction of our former opinion, but does not induce us to change our former disposition of the appeal. We have concluded that y¡m erred in our statement that the appellants could have ascertained from the jurors, when they had them before the court on their motion for a new trial, whether or not the improper conduct of counsel complained of did in fact influence them in arriving at their verdict. This they were not authorized to do. Article 2021 of the Revised Statutes authorizes the trial court to hear testimony either of jurors or others, on motion for new trial, as to their verdict, but this is confined entirely to the matters mentioned in this article. And, though it does authorize hearing testimony “because of any communication made to the jury, or because the jury received other testimony,” we think that an improper remark of counsel during the trial, asserting before the jury facts not in the record, cannot be considered as coming within the provisions of the statute, or as being matters upon which the jury could after-wards be interrogated.
Upon a further reconsideration of the conduct of counsel complained of, we are of the opinion that it was perhaps of such a prejudicial character as to bring it within the exceptions to the rule well stated in Vogt v. Guidry (Tex. Civ. App.) 229 S. W. 656, authorizing this court to consider it, notwithstanding no objection was made at the time and no request made to. the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard it. Though the remark of counsel may have been of such character as was calculated to prejudice the jury against the plaintiff Zimri Parker, and perhaps to unduly discredit his testimony, we do not consider the matter to which counsel’s remark referred, or the testimony of Zimri Parker concerning it, vital to the proper disposition of the case. A careful rereading of all the testimony leads us to the conclusion that the great preponderance, if not the overwhelming preponderance, of the evidence- sustains the disposition of the case made by the trial court.
There is practically no testimony to sustain plaintiffs’ case except that of Tom Parker and wife, Catherine, and their son, Zimri Parker, who became a plaintiff after they died. Other than the execution of the various instruments involved," Catherine Parker knew little about the transactions except what her husband, Tom Parker, told her. The testimony of Tom, Catherine, and Zimri Parker was flatly contradicted by that of V. A. Russell, E. M. Miller, and Mrs. F. M. Miller. Zimri Parker knew nothing about the transaction between his father and V. A. Russell. In addition to this, Tom Parker’s reputation for truth and veracity was directly impeached by IS disinterested witnesses. Will Jennings, a disinterested witness, testified that about the time Russell bought the place Tom Parker tried to sell it to him. It is also uncontroverted that in addition to assuming the $3,400 loan against the place Russell had the title examined, paid off a second lien against the place of $486.65-, and executed to Tom Parker three vendor’s lien notes, aggregating $1,000. These notes were later released by Tom Parker. Tom Parker testified that Russell had advanced him various sums thereafter to make a crop, and that he turned over cotton to Russell.
It is also uncontroverted'that, when Russell conveyed the land to Miller, Miller, in addition to assuming the $3,400 loan against the place, which he subsequently paid off, paid Russell $2,600 in money; that at that time he had an attorney examine the title to the land; that Tom and Catherine Parker then made an affidavit that their deed to Russell was a bona fide conveyance, and that they claimed no interest in the land; and also executed a quitclaim deed to Miller and then entered into a written rental contract with Miller for the place. It is also uncontradicted that Tom Parker never thereafter either rendered the land for taxes nor paid any taxes thereon, and that he regularly up to .the time suit was filed deposited rents from the place in the bank to the credit of Miller. Though Tom and Catherine Parker either claimed that they did not remember what was done at the time of the execution of these various instfuments or that same were not explained to them, the witnesses to such instruments and the notary who took their acknowledgments testified that they were fully explained to them at the time. Three disinterested’ witnesses testified that Tom Parker had told them after he had executed the deeds that he had sold his place, and that it was owned by Miller.
A careful rereading of the record also discloses that the testimony of Zimri Parker on the* matter to which the improper remark of counsel was addressed, in addition to being either contradicted or impeached by the witnesses Will Lynch and C. M. Campbell, was also impeached by the testimony of Dr. J. A. Lynch and G. W. Cantrell.
With‘such a preponderance of the evidence against the plaintiffs on the one issue in the case, regardless of what effect the improper conduct of counsel may have had on the jury, we think they could not, in all probability, have decided the issue other than they did decide it. Appellants’ motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.
Motion overruled.