Court Opinion

ID: 9520075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:31:00.9176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:30.536583
License: Public Domain

Brodkey, J.,
concurring.
Obviously I agree with the conclusions of the majority opinion, so far as it goes. In the majority opinion, however, the court chose to ignore, and did not comment upon, the contention of the relator that the amendment in question is void for the reason that the resolution for such amendment, adopted by the Legislature at a special session convened by the Governor, was not included in the Governor’s proclamation calling the Legislature into session. I am in full agreement with the parties to this action, and believe that the matter should be forthrightly discussed. It cannot be ignored.
*141It has long been recognized in this state that the self-imposed limitations on the power of the people to amend their fundamental law should not be so construed as to defeat the will of the people, plainly expressed, on account of a slight and unimportant failure to comply literally with such limitations, if the requirements are substantially observed. State v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, 110 N. W. 1113 (1907). That proposition notwithstanding, it is also true that where the Constitution prescribes certain procedures with regard to the amendment of that document, there must be substantial compliance with those requirements in order to effect either a valid submission or adoption of the attempted amendmerit. State, ex rel. Hall v. Cline, 118 Neb. 150, 224 N. W. 6 (1929).
Relator contends that the amendment was not submitted to the voters in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Constitution. Specifically, relator claims that the amendment was not within the purposes for which the Legislature was convened in special session. In support of this position, he directed the attention of this court to Article IV, section 8, of the Constitution, which provides: “The Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the Legislature by proclamation, stating therein the purpose for which they are convened, and the Legislature shall enter upon no business except that for which they were called together.’’
The two purposes for which the special session of the Legislature was called were: (1) To extend the operative date of the criminal code; and (2) to enact spending limitations on government budgets. That the scope of LR 1 is not within the purpose of extending the operative date óf the criminal code is clear. I likewise do not believe that the substance of LR 1 can fall within the purview of enacting spending limitations.
*142“It is well established that the Legislature while in special session can transact no business except that for which it was called together. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Wolfe, 61 Neb. 502, 86 N. W. 441. The proclamation may state the purpose for which the Legislature is convened in broad, general terms or it may limit the consideration to a specified phase of a general subject. The Legislature is free to determine in what manner the purpose shall be accomplished, but it must confine itself to the matters submitted to it by the proclamation.” Arrow Club, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 177 Neb. 686, 131 N. W. 2d 134 (1964).
Respondents contend that the preamble to LR 1 would cause it to fall within the second announced purpose for calling the special session of the Legislature, that of enacting spending limitations on government budgets. The language to which they refer undoubtedly is: “Whereas, to insure that the budget of any political subdivision which has multicounty assessment is not excessive and does not provide undue fluctuation, * * *.” I do not believe that this general language causes LR 1 to come within the scope of the call.
“Legislative construction of a statutory or constitutional provision, although not conclusive on the courts, when deliberately made is entitled to great weight.” Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N. W. 2d 893 (1974). See, also, Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N. W. 2d 236 (1972). The expressed purpose for the amendment was “to recognize that political subdivisions which cross county lines may result in property tax inequities if reappraisals are not accomplished in a consistent and timely manner in the counties where such a situation exists.” In explaining the purpose of the resolution, Senator Warner, the introducer of LR 1, stated: “Now, the purpose of LR 1 is to address the problem of inaction by the Board of Equali*143zation now for nearly nine years; and it suggests that unusual means may be needed to work out the themes which we find ourselves in the state because of lack of the State Board of Equalization in that responsibility that they have both by statute and by the Constitution.” Senator Warner also stated: ‘‘The constitutional amendment is aimed at a single problem and that single problem is the inequity, the injustice that occurs when counties reappraise at different times and multi-county taxing districts are involved. It’s all that’s aimed at addressing and is intended to be only for this interim period, which we all, I think, recognize we’re going to be going through until that job is completed.” It is clear from the above that the purpose of LR 1 was to force the State Board of Equalization and Assessment to promote and provide equality in taxation of property in multicounty districts. I do not believe that requiring the State Board of Equalization and Assessment to equalize taxation by the adjustment of levies in multicounty districts is sufficiently similar to enacting spending limitations on government budgets. While it is possible that the items may be tangentially related, it is clear that they deal with separate and distinct subjects in this case. I am firmly convinced that the subject matter of LR 1 does not fall within the scope of the call of the Governor.
However, the inquiry cannot be limited solely to Article IV, section 8, of the Nebraska Constitution. Respondents contend that the Legislature has the power to propose constitutional amendments at all sessions, regardless of whether the session is a special session or a general session. Article XVI, section 1, must be considered in connection with this contention. It provides as follows: ‘‘The Legislature may propose amendments to this Constitution. * * *” In this connection see, also, § 49-201, R. R. S. 1943. We have recognized that each and every clause *144of the Constitution has been inserted for some useful purpose. Constitutional provisions should receive even broader and more liberal construction than statutes, and constitutions are not subject to the rules of strict construction. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N. W. 2d 322 (1967); School Dist. of Seward Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N. W. 2d 752 (1972). The two provisions of the Constitution referred to must, therefore, be read together and must be liberally construed to reach a harmonious result, if possible. It is clear that such a reading is possible.
It is clear that the drafters of our Constitution only meant to allow the Legislature to transact that business for which it was called into special session and no other. This is made obvious by the remarks of Delegate Robinson during the debate on this particular provision of the Constitution at the 1871 Constitutional Convention. He stated: “It is well known that a Constitutional provision of this kind acts as an indication of the powers of the Legislature; and if the Constitution provides that no business of a certain character shall be transacted, it means what it says; and if business is transacted, it is treated as no business, whatever.’’ 1 Nebraska Constitutional Conventions 190 (1906). I do not believe that the constitutional amendment in question is “alike, closely allied, or related to’’ the stated purposes of the call. Lost Creek Drainage Dist. v. Kring, 193 Neb. 450, 227 N. W. 2d 421 (1975). Not being germane to the call, it necessarily follows that Legislative Resolution 1 was not business before the Legislature, and thus was not properly submitted to the electorate. The general rule is stated in 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, § 9, p. 51, as follows: “It has been stated generally that a legislature may propose amendments at either a regular or special session. However, under constitutional provisions to the effect that the legislature, when convened in a special *145or extra session, shall have no power to legislate on subjects not named in the call, amendments may be proposed at a special session if proposals for amendments to the constitution have been included in the proclamation of the governor calling the special session, but not otherwise(Emphasis supplied.) See, also, People v. Curry, 130 Cal. 82, 62 P. 516 (1900); State v. Schoonover, 146 W. Va. 1036, 124 S. E. 2d 340 (1962). Counsel for respondents relies on the case of Sweeney v. King, 289 Pa. 92, 137 A. 178 (1927), apparently holding to the contrary. However, a reading of that decision discloses a call of a special session of the Legislature by the Governor was not involved in any of the cases cited in that opinion. While it is true that a constitutional amendment may be proposed by the Legislature convened in a special session, I am firmly convinced that under our constitutional provisions, the subject matter of the amendment to be proposed must fall within the express purposes announced by the Governor in his proclamation calling the Legislature into special session. In my opinion this constitutes a valid additional ground for finding the amendment in question to be unconstitutional and that the contention of the Attorney General to this effect was absolutely correct.