Court Opinion

ID: 9423631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:08:32.125744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:45.153678
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting.
It is established law, as the Court apparently recognizes in its opinion, that an interstate company challenging a state apportionment of the company’s property taxable in the State has the heavy burden of proving by “clear and cogent evidence” that the apportionment is grossly and flagrantly excessive. See, e. g., Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U. S. 434, 444, and cases cited. I agree with the Supreme Court of Missouri that appellant railroad failed to meet that burden and would therefore affirm its judgment. See its opinion at 426 S. W. 2d 362.
It is true that most of the cars used in Missouri by N & W were owned by the Wabash Railroad and that before transfer to N & W they had been assessed at $9,177,683 as against the assessment here of $19,981,757. But this, of course, does not prove that the higher assessment was too much. For, as the Supreme Court of Missouri pointed out, this Court has held that “a mere increase in the assessment does not prove that the last assessment is wrong. Something more is necessary before it can be adjudged that the assessment is illegal and excessive . . . .” Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 432. The court below held, and this Court agrees, that in pricing the value of the rolling stock the Commission was authorized to consider *331intangible values, such as goodwill and values added because of the enhancement to the property in Missouri brought about by being merged into the entire N & W system. This consideration of enhanced value is not new (see, e. g., Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330, 338), and, as the Court points out, it is because of this intangible factor of enhancement that States are allowed wide discretion in determining the value of tangible property located within their borders. Thus, mileage formulas, such as the one used here, have generally been upheld. As this Court said in Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, “In basing its apportionment on mileage, the Tennessee Commission adopted a familiar and frequently sanctioned formula [cases cited].” 310 U. S., at 365.' It has never been contended that mileage formulas are completely accurate, but because States must consider such intangibles as enhancement value, these formulas are allowed except where the taxpayer can show, as the Court puts it, “that application of the mileage method in its case has resulted in such gross overreaching, beyond the values represented by the intrastate assets purported to be taxed, as to violate the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.” I do not believe that appellants have made such a showing here. The fatal flaw with the appellants’ case is that they have not proved that the tax is excessive when possible enhancement of value due to the merger is considered. The Court’s opinion admits as much when it says that “the record is totally barren of any evidence relating to enhancement or to going-concern or intangible value, or to any other factor .. . .” Where I differ with the Court is that I believe the burden of proof is on the railroad to show that the tax is excessive under all considerations rather than on the Commission to show sufficient enhancement of value to justify the tax.
*332This Court has recognized before, and indeed the majority pays lip service to the fact today, that it is impossible for a State to develop tax statutes with mathematical perfection. Indeed, as was stated in International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416: “Unless a palpably disproportionate result comes from an apportionment, a result which makes it patent that the tax is levied upon interstate commerce rather than upon an intrastate privilege, this Court has not been willing to nullify honest state efforts to make apportionments.” 329 U. S., at 422-423. And the “burden is on the taxpayer to make oppression manifest by clear and cogent evidence.” Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. North Carolina, 297 U. S. 682, 688. Since appellants here did not prove that the enhanced value* of the rolling stock was less than the tax assessment, or that the State was imposing on N&W taxes that were exorbitant on the full value of all its property, cf. Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U. S. 642, I would affirm the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court.

This is a familiar principle of valuation in such tax cases. See Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 499; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 225; United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 347; Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 282.