Court Opinion

ID: 9893494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 14:07:34.666901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:19.021572
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  21-P-1019

                                       E.K.

                                       vs.

                      C.T., 1 personal representative. 2

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       This contempt matter arises from a divorce judgment that

 entered in 2008 (divorce judgment).           The plaintiff in contempt

 is the special personal representative (SPR) of the estate of

 the husband, who died in 2017.         The SPR initiated this

 proceeding in 2019, alleging that the wife had failed to

 transfer shares of DuPont stock to the husband in 2008, as

 required by the divorce judgment, and that the wife also had

 improperly continued to receive and retain DuPont dividends

 since that date.      After an evidentiary hearing, the judge found

 the wife "not guilty" of contempt, because the SPR failed to

 show both (1) "a clear and unequivocal order," and (2) "clear

 1 As successor special personal representative, appointed after
 the death of M.R., special personal representative of the estate
 of J.K., who died on October 24, 2022.
 2 Of the estate of J.K.
disobedience" by the wife.    Smith v. Smith, 93 Mass. App. Ct.

361, 363 (2018).   Among other things, the judge found that the

wife had complied with an order requiring delivery of the DuPont

stock certificates to the husband's attorney in 2008, but that

thereafter, the husband "never took steps to transfer the

stock."   The judge further declined to order the wife to pay the

estate the dividends she had received and retained.

     For the reasons that follow, we affirm the finding of no

contempt.   However, we conclude that the divorce judgment was

sufficiently clear that once it entered, the DuPont stock and

any dividends thereon would be the property of the husband.     We

accordingly remand this matter for further consideration of the

estate's claim to reimbursement of the amount of the dividends

received by the wife.

     Background.   1.   The divorce judgment.   Husband and wife

were married in 1968 and divorced in 2008 after contentious

litigation and a trial.    The 2008 divorce judgment divided the

marital assets and stated among other things that "Husband shall

retain as his individual property" "2340 shares of DuPont."     The

judge's rationale, which accompanied the divorce judgment,

further stated:

     "[The parties] . . . jointly acquired DuPont stock in 1968
     . . . The Wife has received all of the dividend income
     from this stock since the parties['] separation. The
     Husband shall receive this stock in the division of assets
     in order to equalize the parties['] assets so this income

                                  2
     shall no longer be included in the Wife's income stream and
     $66.53 per week shall be added to his income."

     One month after the divorce judgment entered, in April of

2008, the parties agreed to an amendment to the divorce judgment

(April 2008 amendment), as follows:

     "Husband and Wife hereby stipulate that Wife shall deliver
     to Husband's counsel by Friday, April 18, 2008 by 4:00 P.M.
     the [DuPont] stock certificates. . ."

     The wife delivered the DuPont certificates to husband's

counsel, as directed by the April 2008 amendment.       The DuPont

shares, however, were never transferred into the husband's name

prior to his death in 2017. 3    The wife accordingly continued to

receive dividends from the shares by "direct deposit," as she

had during the marriage.

     2.   The contempt proceeding.      In the contempt complaint,

the SPR claimed that the wife had violated the 2008 divorce

judgment by "never transferring" the DuPont stock, and by

continuing to receive and to deposit the dividend checks.       The

judge held a hearing on the contempt complaint in 2020, at which

the wife and the family's investment advisor testified.       The

judge found that the wife had delivered the stock certificates

to the husband's attorney, as directed by the April 2008

amendment to the judgment.      The judge further found that the

3 The DuPont shares were apparently transferred to the estate
after the husband's death, although this fact is not
specifically included in the judge's findings.

                                    3
wife "made efforts to perfect the [stock] transaction to the

best of her ability," in particular by conferring with the

husband's counsel and with a special master assigned to the

matter, both of whom advised her to "wait until the [husband]

transferred the stock."

     The judge concluded (1) that the divorce judgment did not

clearly state that the wife could "not collect the dividends"

(emphasis in original), and (2) that in any event, the wife's

actions did not constitute clear disobedience.    Having found no

contempt, the judge went on to consider whether the wife should

pay to the husband's estate any dividends she had received after

the husband's death; the judge concluded, however, that she did

not have sufficient evidence to fashion such an order.

     Discussion.   To prove civil contempt a plaintiff must show

two separate elements -- "(1) clear disobedience of (2) a clear

and unequivocal command."    Smith, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 363.

Here the judge ruled that the divorce judgment did not contain a

"clear and unequivocal command" as to what the wife must do to

effect a transfer of the DuPont shares, but we do not rest our

affirmance on that ground.    While it is true that neither the

divorce judgment nor the April 2008 amendment directed the wife

to do more than deliver over the stock certificates (which the

wife did), we nevertheless conclude that when read together with

the rationale (as is reasonable), the judgment plainly directed

                                  4
that the DuPont shares were to be the husband's property, and

that all dividends would belong to him.      The rationale made this

clear:   "The Wife has received all of the dividend income from

this stock since the parties['] separation.      The Husband shall

receive this stock in the division of assets . . . so this

income shall no longer be included in the Wife's income"

(emphasis added).   Under the divorce judgment, the husband was

entitled to receive the dividends. 4

     That is not the end of the matter, however, because to

demonstrate contempt, the plaintiff also was required to show

"clear disobedience" by the wife.      "The case law demonstrates

that not every violation of a clear order will constitute

contempt, and thus that the requirement to prove 'clear

disobedience' has teeth."   Smith, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 363-364.

And as to her finding of no "clear disobedience," the judge's

4 At one point, the judge's order on the complaint for contempt
suggests that the rationale may not be important in evaluating
whether there has been a contempt; the judge states that "[a]
rationale is an explanation of an order or judgment; it is not a
court order." The judge's comment came in the context of
evaluating whether the divorce judgment was "clear and
unequivocal," but we do not understand the judge to be saying
that the rationale is not relevant. To the contrary, although
the rationale may not itself be an order, the rationale can be
highly relevant in construing the meaning of a court order, to
the extent the order is less than clear. See, e.g., Poras v.
Pauling, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 535, 543, 546 (2007) (looking to
judge's contemporaneous and subsequent statements in construing
contempt judgment). We consult the rationale for that purpose
here.

                                 5
ruling is on very solid ground.     As noted, the wife complied

with the specific direction in the April 2008 amendment.

Nothing in that amendment said anything about the dividends, and

one can infer that the parties were satisfied that once the wife

delivered the certificates, the husband would take the

appropriate steps to place the stock in his name and thereby

receive the dividends.     The husband, however, did not take any

additional steps to place the stock certificates in his name.

Moreover, the judge found that the wife -- knowing that she was

still receiving the dividends -- took steps to determine what to

do, by consulting with both the husband's lawyer and the special

master.   The judge found that the wife then followed the advice

that she received, which was to wait until the husband effected

the transfer.   As the judge found, none of this conduct amounted

to clear disobedience. 5

     The SPR argues, however, that the wife failed to take the

necessary steps to actually effect the transfer, because there

was additional paperwork that the wife needed to fill out, as

the stock certificates were held jointly.     The SPR further

argues that the wife knew that she needed to fill out this

5 We acknowledge that the wife could have, and likely should
have, held the dividends separately while awaiting further
instruction. There was no evidence that she was ordered (or
even advised) to do so, however, and her actions may have been
influenced because, apparently, the husband was not paying
alimony for at least some of the time in question.

                                   6
additional paperwork to complete the transfer, pointing to

actions that the wife took in 2017, after the husband died.

     We are not persuaded.    As of 2008, the stock certificates

were physically with the husband's lawyer.     There was no

evidence presented that the husband or his agents ever requested

any additional actions by the wife after she delivered the

certificates.   The husband did not request that the wife fill

out additional paperwork, and he did not ask the wife to forward

the dividends even though the wife told husband's counsel she

was still receiving them.    Moreover, and tellingly, the

husband's financial advisor testified that he repeatedly asked

the husband for the DuPont certificates so that the financial

advisor could complete the transfer, but the husband did not

provide them.   The judge credited this testimony as well.    We

review the judge's finding of no contempt for abuse of

discretion or other error of law.     Department of Revenue Child

Support Enforcement v. Grullon, 485 Mass. 129, 134 (2020).

There was no abuse of discretion here.

     2.   The request for repayment.    Finally, we must address

the SPR's request for an order that the wife repay the dividends

she received.   We think a claim for those dividends is fairly

subsumed in the estate's contempt complaint, even where the wife

was found not guilty of contempt.     See Smith, 93 Mass. App. Ct.

at 362, 364-365; Wooters v. Wooters, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 839, 840,

                                  7
844 (2009).   As discussed above, any dividends the wife received

after the divorce judgment entered should have been paid to the

husband.   The fact that the wife was found not guilty of

contempt does not alter this underlying legal obligation, as we

explained in Wooters, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 844, and Smith, 93

Mass. App. Ct. at 364, 366-367.   Here we have no doubt that had

the husband timely requested the dividends (or brought a lawsuit

or contempt proceeding), the husband would have been entitled to

those dividends.   Moreover, at the contempt hearing, the SPR

entered into evidence various documents regarding the dividends

the wife received, as shown on her tax returns from 2008 through

2017.

     The judge addressed the estate's claim for dividends the

wife received after the husband's death in 2017, finding that

the estate's proof as to those dividends was not sufficient.

The judge's order does not, however, address whether the estate

is entitled to recover dividends that the wife received between

2008 and the husband's death.

     On appeal the wife raises potential defenses of waiver and

unclean hands.   The SPR responds that neither of those defenses

were previously pleaded or raised during the contempt hearing.

The wife also suggests that the husband's estate owes her

substantial unpaid amounts of, among other things, alimony,

which might be an offset against any claim for the dividends.

                                  8
While we rule today that the husband was entitled to the

dividends under the divorce judgment, in the circumstances a

remand is appropriate so that the judge may address the estate's

claim in the first instance.      On remand the judge may consider

whatever defenses he or she determines are properly raised to

the estate's claim in this case.        We accordingly affirm the

portion of the judgment finding the wife not in contempt, but

vacate the remainder of the judgment insofar as it addresses

whether the wife should pay money to the husband's estate, and

remand that issue for further consideration in light of this

decision. 6

                                         So ordered.

                                         By the Court (Vuono, Singh &
                                           Englander, JJ. 7),

                                         Clerk

Entered:      October 27, 2023.

6 The parties' requests for appellate attorney's fees and costs
are denied.
7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                    9