Court Opinion

ID: 9666796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:27:43.352764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:40.188178
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
MILLER, Judge.
This is a request for rehearing of this Court’s opinion (See, page 207). On original submission, this Court held that reversible trial error occurred when the trial court permitted the jury to separate after the charge had been read. See Art. 35.23, V.A. C.C.P. We held that the provisions of Art. 35.23, id,., were mandatory, and a presumption of harm attached once appellant established in the record that he had not consented. We then reversed the conviction because the State had failed to rebut this presumption. In its motion for rehearing, the State contends that the record shows that the presumption of harm was rebutted. We will grant the State’s motion for rehearing, overrule that point of error concerning the jury separation issue, and address the remaining points of error not disposed of on original submission. We will affirm the conviction.
With regard to appellant’s first point of error in which he contends that an impermissible jury separation occurred, we substitute the following for the discussion given in the original opinion.
Article 35.23, supra, gives the trial court the discretion to permit the jurors to separate in a felony case until the charge has been given. Afterward, the jury “shall be kept together” until a verdict is rendered or the jury is discharged, or the separation is given by permission of the trial court with consent of the parties.
According to Art. 35.23, supra, reversal of the case is required if, after the charge is given, the jury is allowed to separate without the defendant’s consent. See McDonald v. State, 597 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1010,, 101 S.Ct. 564, 66 L.Ed.2d 467 (1980). See also Skillern v. State, 559 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) and Rhynes v. State, 479 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
The defendant has the burden to make sure that the record reflects that he did not consent to the separation. McDonald, supra, at 367, citing Green v. State, 510 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). See also Taylor v. State, 636 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.App.1982). Once the defendant has established in the record that the separation took place without his consent, Art. 35.23, supra, raises a presumption of harm which the State must rebut. Taylor, id.; Reed v. State, 595 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Decker v. State, 570 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Trevino v. State, 565 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Skillern, supra; and Goodall v. State, 501 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
In the instant case, appellant raised the issue of an invalid jury separation by his motion for mistrial during the trial on the merits. At the hearing on that motion, he showed that neither he nor his attorneys consented to the separation, nor were they given an opportunity to do so. Thus, on this record, appellant made the required showing under Art. 35.23, supra, and the burden shifted to the State to rebut the presumption of harm.
As evidence to rebut this presumption of harm, the record reflects that the trial court judge narrated the following:
1. The trial judge accompanied the jurors as a group from the courthouse to the parking lot.
2. The trial court accompanied the jurors to each of their cars.
*2233. The trial court saw the jurors move their cars en masse from where they were parked to the courthouse.
4. The trial court was “positive that none of the jurors had access to any information or contact with other persons during this process.”
These facts show that the jurors did not make any outside contacts while moving their cars in the presence and view of the trial court.
Thus, under the facts of this case, there is no evidence that the jurors were out of sight of the trial judge, that the jurors had any contact with other persons, nor that appellant was harmed in any way by the separation. Austin v. State, 375 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Cr.App.1964); Smith v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 163, 60 S.W.2d 768 (1933). Thus, the State, through the trial judge’s “testimony,” has met its burden of rebutting the presumption of harm.
Brief pause must be made to distinguish the facts of this case from those presented in Skillem, supra, which at first glance may appear similar. In that case, the bailiff and another witness testified that they had not seen the jurors speak to anyone, but clearly stated they had not had the jurors in sight at all times during the separation. This Court held that the testimony of a person under these conditions merely to the effect that he did not see a juror speak to anyone in a situation where he did not see the juror at all times, standing alone, constituted no evidence that such speaking did not occur. Absent sufficient evidence, the State had failed to sufficiently rebut the presumption of harm.
In the instant case, the trial court did not state that he did not see anyone speak to the jurors. Rather, he “testified” that he was “positive” that none of the jurors had access to adverse information. Also, the trial court did not “testify” that he lost sight of some or one of the jurors at any time during the separation. Rather, he “testified” that he accompanied all of them during the entire separation. None of these statements were refuted. With these distinctions, Skillem, supra, is not strictly applicable to this case.
We therefore find that the State, through the statements of the trial judge, met its burden of refuting the presumption of harm. Appellant’s first point of error is overruled.
On original appeal, appellant brought eleven points of error. In our opinion on original submission, this Court sustained appellant’s first point of error, but overruled his points of error numbers two through six. We adhere to our original disposition of the latter points of error. Next, we will address the remaining five points of error.
In appellant’s seventh and eighth points of error, he contends that the trial court erred by permitting evidence of an inadmissible extraneous offense to be placed before the jury. The record shows that the testimony of Valerie Rencher established that after the murder, appellant and the three others1 left the scene and drove to Waller. Danny Harris parked the truck, and the three men got out. James Manuel had the gun that was found in the deceased’s track. They left the engine running, and were gone for approximately five minutes. They came back, got into the truck, and left at a high rate of speed.
After this testimony was elicited, appellant’s counsel objected on the basis that the facts constituted an inadmissible extraneous offense since:
“It would take not only a blind man but a deaf man not to understand the implication of three people getting out of the truck with a shotgun, and being gone for five minutes, and coming back, driving back to Bryan ninety miles an hour. It’s clearly indicative of an extraneous offense.”
Appellant’s eighth point of error concerns testimony elicited from Barbara Gilmore which appellant contends also contained reference to an inadmissible extraneous offense. The record shows that Gilmore was an assistant manager of a U-Totem convenience store located in Waller. *224On the night of the murder, December 11, 1978, three men came into the store, one of whom carried a shotgun. At trial, Gilmore identified the shotgun found in the deceased’s car as similar to the shotgun carried into the store. No additional facts were related, and Gilmore was excused from the stand.
Later in the trial, the State recalled Gilmore. She identified appellant as one of the men who entered the store on December 11, 1978. When questioned as to her certainty of the identification, Gilmore stated that the men had been in the store approximately fifteen minutes, that on the night they entered the store, appellant had stood an arm’s length away from her, and that she would never forget his face.
Initially, evidence of an extraneous offense must necessarily involve evidence of prior criminal conduct. McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). If the evidence fails to show that an offense was committed or that the defendant was connected to the offense, then evidence of an extraneous offense is not established. Id. See also Roach v. State, 586 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), citing Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
In the case at bar, the testimony elicited from Rencher shows, at most, that Danny Harris committed the offense of driving at a speed in excess of the established speed limit. Since appellant was not operating the vehicle at the time, he was not connected with that particular offense. Thus, Rencher’s testimony contained no reference to an inadmissible extraneous offense.
Gilmore’s testimony shows that at most, appellant accompanied two other men into the store, one of whom carried a shotgun. There was absolutely no mention of a robbery. Since appellant did not carry the shotgun, he was not connected with a specific offense. Thus, no inadmissible extraneous offense was introduced.
In his brief, appellant contends that the preceding evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that a robbery was committed. We note that while there was certainly no clear evidence that appellant robbed Gilmore after he and the others entered the store, the invitation for the jury to speculate as to the occurrence of a robbery is quite tempting.
Even if we speculate, however, that the jury may have deduced from the preceding facts that a robbery had occurred, we find that admission of such an offense was supported by the record. Initially, evidence of an extraneous offense is admissible if the transaction is relevant to a material issue in the case, and also, if the relevancy value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
In the case before us, the testimony elicited from the two witnesses was relevant since it connected appellant, at a point very close in time to the commission of the offense, with the shotgun, which had been taken from the deceased’s truck, and with the other perpetrators of the offense. Also, no overt references were made to a robbery, that is, the State did not overkill and proffered only enough evidence to establish this relevancy. The trial court also gave extensive limiting instructions regarding extraneous offenses.
In the case at bar, appellant and the other two men murdered the deceased, and were seen in the store with the deceased’s shotgun only two hours after the murder. We find that the probative value of the facts regarding appellant’s entry into the store was greater than any prejudicial effect. Thus, the trial court did not err by admitting the evidence. Appellant’s seventh and eighth points of error are overruled.
In his ninth point of error, appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s affirmative response to Special Issue Number 2, regarding whether appellant would constitute a continuing threat of violence to society. See Art. 37.071(b)(2), V.A.C.C.P. In order to address this issue, we must summarize the evidence presented by the State at the punishment phase of trial.
*225The State called several witnesses who testified that appellant’s reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding was bad. The State then called Gilmore back to the stand. She testified as to the specific facts concerning the night appellant and the others entered the store.
She testified that at approximately eleven o’clock in the evening on December 11, 1978, she was stocking the beer cases. Three men entered the store, one of whom was armed with a shotgun. When they entered the store, the armed man told her to “get the money.” He then shoved her behind the counter. After Gilmore opened the cash register, appellant grabbed the money. Appellant also took a change bottle which contained donations for the Multiple Sclerosis Society. The armed man then hit her in the face with the gun, and reached over and took a gun that was under the register counter. Appellant then watched at the door to the store to see that no one was coming, while the armed man stole other items in the store. After the robbery, the men left.
The facts of the offense are also relevant to the jury’s finding on the second punishment issue. DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), at 661, citing Branch v. State, 445 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). Although the facts of the offense have already been set forth in the original opinion, we will repeat the facts relevant to this point of error.
The record shows that on the night of the offense, appellant, two other men, and Rencher [appellant’s girlfriend] were driving around in a car. They went to a friends’s house, and Rencher got our of the car and knocked on the door. When no one answered, she returned to the car. Danny Harris could not start the car. Appellant and the other men then began tearing up the interior of the car, and kicking and cursing the car. As the four walked away from the stalled car, Danny Harris flagged down a truck, stopped the driver, and asked if he had any booster cables. The driver, soon to be the deceased, pulled his truck in front of the stalled car and got his cables out. They attempted to start the car but were unsuccessful. The deceased said that the car was not going to start and suggested that the others seek help elsewhere. As the deceased was attempting to remove the cables, Danny Harris said “We’re going to drive this man.” Appellant then went around to the back of the truck with a tire jack. Danny Harris pushed the man to the ground, and pinned him down. Appellant then hit the deceased with the tire jack at least six times. Several of the strikes were described as “real hard.” After appellant stopped hitting the deceased, James Manuel went and took the deceased’s wallet. The men left the deceased in a ditch, got into the truck, where Rencher was already seated, and found the deceased’s shotgun. They drove to appellant’s parents’ house. On the way, they discussed getting rid of the tire jack. James Manuel stated that he needed some money.
After they arrived at the house, and changed clothes, they got back into the truck, drove toward Navasota, and ended up in Waller. They then committed the robbery at the U-Totem, as described by witness Gilmore. Later, they disposed of the deceased’s truck.
When considering the sufficiency of evidence presented to support a jury’s finding that a defendant will constitute a continuing threat to society, each case must be decided on its own facts. Santana v. State, 714 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), at 8, citing Cannon v. State, 691 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). In some instances, the facts of the offense itself will support an affirmative finding, Santana, supra, and certainly those circumstances may provide greater probative evidence than any other evidence presented at the punishment phase of trial. Kunkle v. State (Tex.Cr.App. No. 69, 501, delivered June 18, 1986), and Fierro v. State, 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). In other cases, the facts presented at both phases of trial are considered together. See Goodman v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Gr.App.1985).
When we view the facts, we must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable *226to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have made the finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Kun-kle, supra, and Fierro, supra.
In the case before us, it is clear that the murder was totally unprovoked, c.f., Horne v. State, 607 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Cr.App.1980), Warren v. State, 562 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Rather, appellant and the others preyed upon the good intentions of a person who had stopped to help them. Appellant murdered the deceased in a violent and brutal way, c.f. Roney v. State, 632 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), Home, supra, and Warren, supra, similar to the facts presented in Kunkle, supra. Then, after leaving the body of the deceased in a ditch, appellant and the others committed an armed robbery, which resulted in physical injury to the victim robbed. We find that on the facts presented at both the guilt and punishment stages of trial, that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant would constitute a continuing threat of violence to society. Cf. Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Appellant’s ninth point of error is overruled.
In his last two points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in excusing two prospective jurors who were never sworn by the trial court prior to voir dire examination. Appellant made no objection on this issue at the time the two prospective jurors were examined during voir dire. Also, prior to trial, appellant’s counsel stated that he had no objections to the jury list.
There is nothing in the record to show affirmatively that they were not sworn. Rather, the record shows that the jury panel was sworn as a group, and is silent as to whether the two specific prospective jurors were sworn.
In Clay v. State, 505 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), at 884-5, this Court stated:
“This Court must presume the jury was properly empaneled and sworn, unless such matter was made an issue in the trial court, or it otherwise affirmatively appears to the contrary from the record. Article 44.24, V.A.C.C.P.M2 We find no objection by appellants in the record to a failure to administer the oath to the jury panel. They raise the point for the first time on appeal. Moreover, the record does not affirmatively show that the oath required by Article 35.02, V.A.C.C.P. was not given. This ground presents no error and is overruled.”
“Appellant made no objection to the proceedings or the jurors at any time during the course of the trial. Neither does the record in this cause affirmatively reflect that the prospective jurors were not properly sworn before each was examined during the voir dire; the record is silent on this matter. Therefore, the statute [Art. 44.24(a), V.A.C.C.P.] mandates a presumption that the jury in the instant case was properly impaneled.”
In the instant case, appellant made no objection to the failure of the trial court to swear in any prospective jurors. Moreover, the record is silent on the matter as to the two specific jurors mentioned in appellant’s point of error. The record does reflect that the jury was sworn in as a group. Based upon this record, we find that the presumption that the jurors were sworn applies to the instant case. Appellant’s tenth and eleventh points of error are overruled.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted, and finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
DUNCAN, J., concurs in the result.
CLINTON, J., dissents.

. Valerie Rencher, Danny Ray Harris [appellant’s brother], and James Manuel.

. Article 44.24, supra, was repealed, effective September 1, 1986, and was carried forward as Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 80(d). Similarly, in Duffy v. State, 567 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), the Court stated at 200: