Court Opinion

ID: 9728097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:58:39.545483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:45.525183
License: Public Domain

Beilfuss, J.
{concurring). I agree that judgment should be reversed and remanded for judgment on the verdict for *538damages as found by the jury in favor of the plaintiff and against all defendants.
It is my conclusion that plaintiff was not negligent as a matter of law.
The author of the A.L.R. annotation referred to in the majority opinion 1 states as follows:
“The main question raised by the cases contained in the present annotation is whether the extension of a hand, arm, or other portion of the body from a motor vehicle constitutes contributory negligence. The majority of cases have taken the view that this is a question for the jury, and the courts have generally sustained the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff, although a few have taken the view that under the circumstances of the particular case the plaintiff’s position constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law.
“Every case, of course, turns upon its individual fact situation, . .
I emphatically agree with this general statement. In most instances it is a jury question as to whether the extension or protrusion of part of the body from a moving vehicle is negligence. I likewise agree there may be situations where risk of injury is so imminent or apparent that the conduct should be held to be negligence as a matter of law. The question before us now, however, is— Do the facts of this case compel a ruling that the plaintiff’s conduct was not negligent as a matter of law ?
In view of the fact that the jury found the plaintiff negligent and the trial court approved the finding, we must start our consideration of the problem with the limitation reiterated in Cheetham v. Piggly Wiggly Madison Co. (1964), 24 Wis. (2d) 286, 290, 128 N. W. (2d) 400:
“When a jury verdict is attacked we inquire only whether there is any credible evidence that, under any reasonable *539view, supports the verdict. This is especially so when the verdict has the trial court’s approval. [Cases cited.] ”
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
“Now what do we mean by the word ‘negligence’ as it is used in these instructions? Negligence, as that term is used in these instructions and in this verdict, has the same meaning as the phrase ‘failure to exercise ordinary care.’ A person is negligent when he fails to exercise ordinary care. I will state that last sentence again: A person is negligent when he fails to exercise ordinary care. Ordinary care is that degree of care which the great mass of mankind ordinarily exercises under the same or simliar circumstances. A person fails to exercise ordinary care when, without intending to do any wrong, he does an act or omits a precaution under circumstances in which a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to foresee that such act or omission will subject the person or property of himself or another to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage.
“In addition to this general definition of negligence there are several rules of law as well as statutes enacted by the legislature for the safe operation of motor vehicles on the highways. A person who fails to comply with such rules or statutes is negligent as that term is used in the verdict and in the Court’s instructions. . . .
“Now Question 3 inquires as to whether Fred Schilling was negligent in caring for his own safety with respect to the position of his left arm. It is a rule of law that every person under all circumstances and whether on business or pleasure must exercise ordinary care for his own safety. This duty of self-preservation applied to Fred Schilling as he drove along Highway 11 on April 21, 1960. The exercise of such care includes such efficient use of one’s eyes, faculties and opportunities for observation as an ordinarily prudent person would use under like circumstances. It is for you to determine under all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence whether Fred Schilling was or was not negligent in caring for his own safety with respect to the position of his left arm at the time and place of this accident.”
*540This instruction is substantially taken from Wisconsin Jury Instructions.2 It is based upon the definition of negligence as announced in Osborne v. Montgomery (1931), 203 Wis. 223, 234 N. W. 372. This definition, with minor variations, has been adhered to by this court since its pronouncement and is used daily by the trial courts of this state in the multitude of negligence cases coming before them.
To sustain the finding that the plaintiff was negligent, the record must contain some credible evidence to support either that he (1) failed to exercise ordinary care,, or (2) that he was negligent per se.
The undisputed facts insofar as the plaintiff’s negligence is concerned are that he was proceeding along a standard 20-foot hard-surfaced highway with adjacent shoulders, on a clear, dry but windy April day, at a speed of 25 miles per hour, with left front window open and his left arm resting on the windowsill so as to protrude beyond the windowsill. Approaching from the opposite direction at a speed of 25 miles per hour was the small pickup-type vehicle driven by the defendant Stockel. Both vehicles were on their own right hand side of the highway with'ample clearance space between them. A§. the two vehicles were meeting, the large box in the rear of defendant Stockel’s vehicle flew off, struck the left front of the plaintiff’s vehicle and then struck his arm at or near the elbow. The plaintiff was unaware of what struck him and the defendant did not know the box struck the plaintiff or his vehicle until after the accident.
The only evidence as to the position of the plaintiff’s arm was his testimony to the effect that his arm was resting on the windowsill with both his hands on the steering wheel and his elbow within the outer limits of the area of the vehicle (because of the curve of the body of the car). The burden to *541prove plaintiff s negligence was upon defendants. The only-evidence offered and relied upon by them, in addition to plaintiff’s evidence, was the statement of the defendant Stockel that plaintiff told him after the accident that he had his arm out of the window and it was struck. There was no testimony on the part of the defendants as to how far the plaintiff’s arm was out of the window. Any belief that his arm was farther out than he testified is speculation or conjecture.
The plaintiff had the duty to exercise ordinary care for his own safety as to lookout, management and control, and observance of the statutory rules of the road as instructed by the trial court. The plaintiff was entitled to assume that the defendant would operate his vehicle exercising ordinary care, and that he would not violate the statutory rules of the road, including sec. 348.10 (2), Stats., pertaining to the safe loading of vehicles to be operated upon the highway.3
The degree of care plaintiff was required to exercise to come up to the standard of ordinary care was the care that would be exercised by the great mass of mankind under the same or similar circumstances. He was not required to exercise extraordinary care 4 or that of a very cautious person, but the same care as would have been exercised by an ordinarily prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.
There was nothing in the surrounding circumstances such as a vehicle in or deviating toward the plaintiff’s line of travel, a vehicle with a wide load or protruding object, nor a narrow, rough, or slippery highway, nor was his vision obstructed by weather, darkness, or otherwise. Any of these or *542other circumstances could well increase the hazard or probability of harm which would have required commensurate increased vigilance to meet the standard of ordinary care. He could not be required by his duty to exercise an efficient lookout to know the nature of the defendant Stockel’s load nor the manner in which the pickup was loaded. If he had been following the Stockel vehicle, or even been overtaken by him, he might have had notice of the defendant’s load. Instead he was meeting the defendant Stockel in an apparently uneventful manner, with no notice of any hazard emanating from the defendant.
Would a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence foresee an unreasonable risk of harm under the circumstances described herein ?
In recent cases dealing with negligence and foreseeability, we have stated:
“Ordinary care is such care as persons of ordinary prudence ordinarily exercise under like circumstances. The existing circumstances necessarily dictate what constitutes ordinary care in each instance. When the circumstances give rise to reasonable anticipation of injury, ordinary care includes the duty to act in accordance with that knowledge. As Mr. Justice Fowler pointed out in Hamus v. Weber (1929), 199 Wis. 320, 325, 226 N. W. 392, ordinary care and the element of reasonable anticipation are the same. Negligence exists when the harm could have been reasonably foreseen as probable by a person of ordinary prudence under like circumstances.” Mondl v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 571, 573, 107 N. W. (2d) 472.
“Defendant in constructing the road was under the duty to use ordinary care which must be determined in the light of existing circumstances. Mondl v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 571, 107 N. W. (2d) 472. The possibility of harm to the plaintiff’s tower was foreseen by the defendant but the foreseeability of possible harm is not enough to constitute negligence. Harm must be reasonably foreseen as probable by a person of ordinary prudence under *543like circumstances. Mondl v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra; Osborne v. Montgomery (1931), 203 Wis. 223, 234 N. W. 372; Barnes v. Murray (1943), 243 Wis. 297, 10 N. W. (2d) 123. To constitute negligence, not only must the act involve a risk which the actor realizes or should realize but the risk must be unreasonable.” Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia County (1962), 18 Wis. (2d) 39, 42, 117 N. W. (2d) 597.
“It is well established that harm must be reasonably foreseen as probable by a person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances, if conduct resulting in such harm is to constitute negligence.” Alsteen v. Gehl (1963), 21 Wis. (2d) 349, 362, 124 N. W. (2d) 312.
The foreseeability required by the rule of the cases set forth above is that there must be a reasonable probability of harm, the mere possibility of harm is not enough. There must be a foreseeable unreasonable risk of harm.
Although I conclude that the conduct must be such that a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence can reasonably see probability of harm, he need not foresee the specific harm that is accomplished. It is only necessary that he foresee the reasonable probability of some harm in view of the existing circumstances. Without resort to speculation or conjecture, the evidence does not reveal any harm which could reasonably be anticipated or appear reasonably probable.
Foreseeability is foresight, not hindsight. Plaintiff’s conduct must be judged at the time of or just before the accident and not what afterthought or hindsight would reveal to be a safer course of action in view of the results. As facetiously stated, “Almost anyone can exercise 20/20 hindsight.”
Foreseeability required to constitute negligence is not to be confused with foreseeability insofar as it applies to causation in those instances wherein the court rules as a matter of judicial policy that liability is not to attach. Excepting *544judicial-policy cases, if negligence is established foreseeability is not an element in cause of the injury.5
We are dealing here with negligence and not causation. Foreseeability is a necessary element to establish negligence. In this instance where the surrounding circumstances were such as to indicate to the plaintiff nothing but an uneventful meeting of two vehicles, it cannot be said that a person of ordinary intelligence or prudence could or should have foreseen a reasonable probability of any harm to himself.
The only other basis upon which the plaintiff could be found to be negligent is if his conduct was negligence per se.
In Osborne v. Montgomery, supra, page 240, it is stated:
“We come now to a consideration of that class of cases where foreseeability is not an element of negligence, — a more accurate statement would be to that class of cases where the defendant is foreclosed or concluded upon the question of foreseeability. In all those cases where it is said that, the performance of the wrongful act being admitted, the defendant is guilty of negligence as a matter of law or that the act is negligent per se, the case is one which admits of no question as to reasonable anticipation or foreseeability. These cases are those in the main where the act amounts to a violation of a standard of care fixed by statute (ordinance) or previous decision.”
We have no statutory rule of the road that prohibits a person from resting his arm on the adjacent windowsill while operating a vehicle upon a highway, although the practice is not uncommon and has existed for many years. Nor has this practice been declared by court rule to be so inherently dangerous as to be declared to be negligence under all circumstances. If this conduct was inherently dangerous it is highly probable that among the multitude of reported *545cases of this court dealing with automobile accidents the problem would have presented itself heretofore.
The record has been reviewed in detail with care. I conclude the plaintiff was not negligent per se. I also conclude that there is not sufficient evidence in the record, nor reasonable inferences therefrom, which sustain the jury finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
I would therefore reverse upon the ground that under the facts of this case the plaintiff was not negligent as a matter of law.

 40 A. L. R. (2d) 233, 235.

 Civil, Part I, 1005.

 DeKeyser v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co. (1941), 236 Wis, 419, 295 N. W. 755; Grover v. Sherman (1934), 214 Wis. 152, 252 N. W. 680; Wis J I-Civil, Part I, 1030, and cases cited.

 Hamus v. Weber (1929), 199 Wis. 320, 325, 226 N. W. 392.

 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc. (1952), 262 Wis. 229, 55 N. W. (2d) 29, and Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co. (1956), 273 Wis. 176, 77 N. W. (2d) 397, define causation and eliminate foreseeability as an element of causation.