Court Opinion

ID: 9897444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:37.973297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:44.084906
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Mar 24 2023, 9:14 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ian D. Mitchell                                            Thomas A. Brodnik
Katherine M. Haire                                         Paul L. Jefferson
Reminger Co., L.P.A.                                       Scott A. Milkey
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      McNeely Law, LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Krieg DeVault LLP,                                         March 24, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-PL-1744
        v.                                                 Interlocutory Appeal from the
                                                           Marion Superior Court
WGT V, LLC,                                                The Honorable Heather A. Welch,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           49D01-1906-PL-26376

                                Opinion by Judge May
                              Judge Weissmann concurs.
                      Judge Crone dissents with a separate opinion.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023                               Page 1 of 22
[1]   Krieg DeVault LLP (“Krieg”) appeals the trial court’s denial of the motion for

      summary judgment that Krieg filed in the lawsuit WGT V LLC (“WGT V”)

      brought against Krieg for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty relating

      to a commercial real estate transaction. On appeal, Krieg argues that the trial

      court erred because:

              (1) no attorney-client relationship existed between Krieg and
              WGT V;

              (2) without an attorney-client relationship, Krieg could not have
              breached any fiduciary duty to WGT V; and

              (3) the applicable two-year statute of limitations bars WGT V’s
              claims against Krieg for actions that occurred in 2003 or 2004.

      Finding genuine issues of material fact exist in the record before us, we affirm

      the trial court’s denial of Krieg’s motion and remand for further proceedings.

                                  Facts and Procedural History
[2]   The relevant facts most favorable to WGT V, the non-moving party, are as

      follows. In the 1960s, William Gerald Throgmartin (“Gerald”) became

      involved in the operation of Gregg Appliances, Inc., which did business as

      H.H. Gregg (“Gregg”), and he eventually became Gregg’s sole owner,

      chairman, and CEO. Around 1990, Gregg began using Krieg’s legal services

      for real estate transactions and the expansion of Gregg’s business. Gerald

      explained that, after Krieg became Gregg’s lawyer, Gregg did not use any other
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023          Page 2 of 22
      law firm during Gerald’s tenure with Gregg. Gerald indicated Krieg helped

      with “every one” of Gregg’s property transactions – “They put the leases

      together. They helped us buy it, close it. And they did every one of them.”

      (App. Vol. IV at 63.) Paul Lindemann, a Krieg attorney, would either record

      the deeds himself or have someone from his office do it, “always.” (Id.)

      Gerald’s son, Jerry, became Gregg’s chairman and CEO in the early 2000s. In

      2005, Gregg was sold to a private equity firm.

[3]   Between the 1990s and 2005, Krieg also provided lawyers to meet the

      Throgmartin family’s personal needs. (Id. at 67.) Krieg’s legal services assisted

      with Gerald’s estate planning and formed several entities – e.g., Dadus III, Inc.;

      Dadus V, Inc.; WGT, LLP – at Gerald’s request to benefit Gerald’s children –

      Jerry Throgmartin, Janice Malone, Monica Adams, Kelli Ball, and Sandra

      Smith. Krieg created prenuptial agreements and wills for various members of

      the family and represented family members with “any legal work within

      Indiana that we required.” (Id. at 87, 92, 97.)

[4]   The bills for services by Krieg would come to the Gregg offices. Gerald would

      know whether line items on the bills were for business or family matters based

      on the initials of the lawyer who performed the work. (Id. at 67.) Assisting

      Gerald with this process was Gregg’s controller, Diane Lutz, who averred she

      was “point person for the Throgmartin Family regarding their financial

      affairs[.]” (App. Vol. V at 214.) In this role, Lutz served as a “conduit”

      between the Throgmartins and their lawyers. (Id.)

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023       Page 3 of 22
[5]   In April 2003, Gregg purchased property in Georgia and was represented by

      Krieg attorney Brian Fritts in the transaction. In July 2003, Krieg attorney Paul

      Lindemann wrote a memorandum to Jerry outlining a plan for reorganizing

      Dadus V, Inc., and its limited liability partner, WGT, LLP, into a single limited

      liability company, WGT V, in which each of Gerald’s children would own a

      20% interest. In September 2003, Krieg attorney Matthew Carr drafted

      documents to accomplish that goal and filed WGT V’s articles of organization

      with the Indiana Secretary of State’s office. WGT V’s operating agreement

      stated that its primary purposes were to “(i) acquire and finance the acquisition

      of real property either directly or indirectly, (ii) thereafter own, develop,

      rehabilitate, renovate, improve, finance, refinance, lease, operate, manage and

      sell or otherwise deal with real property, and (iii) engage in any lawful business,

      whether or not related or incidental to the foregoing.” (App. Vol. IV at 141.)

      Jerry, who at the time was Gregg’s chairman and CEO, was designated as

      WGT V’s manager and registered agent.

[6]   In October 2003, Gregg’s COO, Dennis May, spoke with Fritts regarding a

      potential transaction in which Gregg would sell its Georgia property and a

      property in Ohio to WGT V, which would then lease the properties back to

      Gregg. At May’s request, Fritts prepared conveyance documents for the

      transactions. In a November 2003 letter to May, Fritts stated that he had

      drafted a lease agreement, a limited warranty deed, and other documents, but

      that he needed additional information from May to finalize the documents for

      closing. In October 2003, WGT V wired $3.5 million to Gregg to purchase the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023          Page 4 of 22
      Georgia property, and in November 2003, Gregg began paying $30,000 each

      month to WGT V to lease the Georgia property.

[7]   Fritts claims May never responded to his November 2003 letter or provided any

      of the requested information to finalize the documents. However, in June 2004,

      WGT V and Gregg executed a lease agreement for the Georgia property, and

      an invoice from Krieg indicates someone at Krieg revised that lease the month

      it was signed based on input from May and Jack Esselman, a commercial real

      estate broker who did work for both Gregg and the Throgmartin family. 1 (App.

      Vol. V at 81.) Jerry signed the lease on WGT V’s behalf, and May signed on

      Gregg’s behalf. Pursuant to the agreement, Gregg continued paying WGT V

      monthly rent of $30,000. There is no indication that any purchase agreement

      was ever executed or that any deed was ever executed or recorded for the

      transaction. 2

[8]   In 2005, Gregg was sold to a private equity firm. Jerry passed away in 2012. In

      2017, Gregg filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and rejected its lease with WGT V.

      In January 2018, while negotiating a sale of the Georgia property, WGT V

      learned that Gregg remained the record title holder of the Georgia property. In

      July 2018, the property was sold for $2.8 million. Pursuant to a settlement

      1
          The invoice from Krieg was sent to Gregg corporate office “c/o Jerry Throgmartin[.]” (App. Vol. V at 81.)
      2
       In an affidavit, WGT’s current CFO David Mennel stated that he “could not locate a copy” of those
      documents in WGT’s files. (App. Vol. V at 5.)

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023                               Page 5 of 22
       agreement, Gregg’s bankruptcy creditors received $2.7 million, and WGT V

       received $100,000.

[9]    In June 2019, WGT V filed a complaint against Krieg, which was later

       amended, alleging that Krieg engaged in negligent conduct, i.e., committed

       legal malpractice, by “fail[ing] to obtain from Gregg the necessary executed

       documents to effect the sale” of the Georgia property and failing to record a

       deed “documenting the transfer of the” property. (App. Vol. II at 224.) WGT

       V also alleged Krieg breached a fiduciary duty by failing to disclose to WGT V

       that it was representing only Gregg in the Georgia transaction. In December

       2021, Krieg filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that WGT V’s

       claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, that no

       attorney-client relationship was ever formed between Krieg and WGT V, and

       that Krieg did not breach a fiduciary duty. WGT V filed a response and

       designated evidence from affidavits and transcribed depositions. Krieg filed a

       reply. In April 2022, after determining genuine issues of material fact existed,

       the trial court denied Krieg’s motion. Krieg requested the trial court certify its

       decision for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court did, and we accepted

       jurisdiction over the appeal.

                                       Discussion and Decision
[10]   “The purpose of summary judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 56 is to terminate

       litigation about which there can be no factual dispute and which may be

       determined as a matter of law.” Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. N. Vernon Drop

       Forge, Inc., 917 N.E.2d 1258, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. “Even
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023        Page 6 of 22
       though Indiana Trial Rule 56 is nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil

       Procedure 56, we have long recognized that ‘Indiana’s summary judgment

       procedure . . . diverges from federal summary judgment practice.’” Hughley v.

       State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (alteration in Hughley) (quoting Jarboe v.

       Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994)). “In

       particular, while federal practice permits the moving party to merely show that

       the party carrying the burden of proof lacks evidence on a necessary element,

       we impose a more onerous burden: to affirmatively ‘negate an opponent’s

       claim.’” Id. (quoting Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 123). “Indiana consciously errs on

       the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk

       short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Id. at 1004.

[11]   For the trial court to properly grant summary judgment, the moving party must

       have made a prima facie showing that its designated evidence negated an

       element of the non-moving party’s claim, and, in response, the non-moving

       party must have failed to designate evidence to establish a genuine issue of

       material fact. Cox v. Mayerstein-Burnell Co., 19 N.E.3d 799, 804 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2014). “Only after the moving party carries its burden is the non-moving party .

       . . required to present evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of

       material fact.” Morris v. Crain, 71 N.E.3d 871, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The

       non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings, “but must set forth specific

       facts which show the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Perkins v. Fillio, 119

       N.E.3d 1106, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “Mere speculation is insufficient to

       create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.” Schon v.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023         Page 7 of 22
       Frantz, 156 N.E.3d 692, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Biedron v. Anonymous

       Physician 1, 106 N.E.3d 1079, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). “In

       deciding whether summary judgment is proper, we consider only the evidence

       the parties specifically designated to the trial court.” Bertucci v. Bertucci, 177

       N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C), (H)).

[12]   We review a trial court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Mann v. Arnos,

       186 N.E.3d 105, 114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. We neither reweigh

       evidence nor judge witness credibility, but we accept as true those facts

       established by the designated evidence favoring the non-moving party. Id. at

       115. Any doubts as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom must be

       resolved in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. “[W]e are not bound by the trial

       court’s findings of fact and conclusions thereon, but they aid our review by

       providing the reasons for the trial court’s decision.” Id. “The party that lost in

       the trial court bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court erred.” Id.

[13]   “In a negligence action, a plaintiff must show a duty owed by the defendant to

       the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and damages to the plaintiff proximately

       caused by the breach.” Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 955 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1991), trans. denied. “In the context of an action for attorney malpractice, this

       requires a plaintiff to show employment of the attorney (the duty), the

       attorney’s failure to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge (the breach), and

       damages to the plaintiff proximately resulting from that failure.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023           Page 8 of 22
                                       1. Attorney-Client Relationship

[14]   An attorney-client relationship “need not be express; it may be implied from the

       conduct of the parties.” Id. “Creation of an attorney-client relationship is not

       dependent upon the formal signing of an employment agreement or upon the

       payment of attorney fees.” Matter of Anonymous, 655 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind. 1995).

       “Attorney-client relationships have been implied where a person seeks advice or

       assistance from an attorney, where the advice sought pertains to matters within

       the attorney’s professional competence, and where the attorney gives the

       desired advice or assistance.” Id. “The relationship is consensual, existing only

       after both attorney and client have consented to its formation.” Hacker, 570

       N.E.2d at 955. “A would-be client’s unilateral belief cannot create an attorney-

       client relationship.” Id.

[15]   In his deposition, Gerald testified that the lawyer for WGT V was Krieg

       attorney Paul Lindemann and that Krieg had represented Gregg, every other

       entity Gerald created, and every person in his family. Three of Gerald’s

       daughters submitted affidavits regarding their relationships with Krieg between

       the early 1990s and the present. Sandra’s affidavit provided in relevant part:

               2.  At all times since its organization in 2003, I have been a
               member of WGT V, LLC (“WGT V”).

               3.     I had also previously been a partner of WGT V Limited
               Partnership as well as a shareholder of Dadus V, Inc since the
               time those entities were created in the early 1990s.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023       Page 9 of 22
        4.    WGT V was originally formed in 2003 for multiple
        purposes, among which were estate and succession planning for
        my father W. Gerald Throgmartin, as well as for acquiring
        commercial real estate which it would subsequently lease to
        tenants, including Gregg Appliances, Inc. (“Gregg”).

        5.     From the time that WGT V was originally formed in 2003,
        Krieg DeVault, LLP (“Krieg DeVault”) provided WGT V with
        legal representation on a wide variety of corporate issues,
        including its original creation as an Indiana limited liability
        company, and issues relating to the acquisition and leasing of real
        estate to Gregg.

        6.     Specifically, in 2003, I, along with my siblings . . . met
        with one or more Krieg DeVault attorneys, on one or more
        occasions, who discussed the purposes for creating WGT V. At
        that time, Krieg DeVault offered to answer any questions that we
        may have about WGT V, and never indicated that it was not
        providing representation to WGT V.

        7.    Prior to 2003, Krieg DeVault held similar meetings with
        my siblings and I with respect to both WGT Limited Partnership
        and Dadus V, Inc.

        8.      I am not a sophisticated real estate investor, and therefore
        relied upon Krieg DeVault, both in my personal capacity as well
        as my capacity as a member of WGT V, for all real estate legal
        advice, including any and all legal requirements, to ensure that
        all legal requirements were met, and that all legal documents
        were completed, filed, and effective.

        9.     Prior to the filing of the above captioned lawsuit, I was
        never told by Krieg DeVault that it did not consider WGT V,
        WGT Limited Partnership, or Dadus V, Inc. to be clients of
        Krieg DeVault.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023         Page 10 of 22
        10. Beyond the legal work Krieg DeVault performed for WGT
        V, it also provided all legal services which I required between
        1990 and 2004.

        11. Those legal services included, but are not necessarily
        limited to, providing me with counsel for legal work related to
        my partnership interest in WGT Limited Partnership and my
        shareholder interest in Dadus V, Inc.

        12. I have also relied upon Krieg DeVault for legal services on
        multiple occasions since 2004 including, but not necessarily
        limited to, the preparation of a pre-nuptial agreement in 2005,
        trust & estate legal services which I requested and received in
        2006, and representation in a civil tort matter in 2012.

        13. At all times relevant to the above captioned matter, I have
        considered Krieg DeVault to be not only the attorney for WGT
        V, but also the “family attorney” for my family with respect to
        any legal work within Indiana that we required.

(App. Vol. IV at 85-87.) Affidavits from Kelli and Monica differed only as to

paragraphs 11 & 12. Kelli’s affidavit provided:

        11. Those legal services included, but are not necessarily
        limited to, providing me with counsel for legal work related to
        my partnership interest in WGT Limited Partnership and my
        shareholder interest in Dadus V, Inc. Additionally, in or about
        1993, Krieg DeVault represented me in the preparation of a
        certain First Amendment to Buy-Sell Agreement that was
        executed by and between myself, my brother Jerry Throgmartin,
        my father W. Gerald Throgmartin, and Gregg Appliances, Inc.
        Finally, Krieg DeVault represented me in the preparation of
        estate work and a pre-nuptial agreement, both of which were
        performed prior to 2004.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023        Page 11 of 22
               12. I have also relied upon Krieg DeVault for legal services on
               multiple occasions since 2004 including, but not necessarily
               limited to, trust & estate legal services which I requested and
               received in or around 2007, corporate formation services in or
               around 2007, and estate & succession planning services in 2014.

       (Id. at 91-92.) Monica’s affidavit provided:

               11. Those legal services included, but were not necessarily
               limited to, providing me with counsel for legal work related to
               my partnership interest in WGT Limited Partnership and my
               shareholder interest in Dadus V, Inc.

               12. I have also relied upon Krieg DeVault for legal services on
               multiple occasions since 2004 including, but not necessarily
               limited to, trust & estate legal services which I requested and
               received in 2007 and 2012.

       (Id. at 96.)

[16]   Paul Lindemann testified Krieg formed WGT V in 2003 and he would have

       represented WGT V for “several years after that, I would guess.” (Id. at 109.)

       Lindemann acknowledged representing WGT V on other real estate

       transactions in Ohio and Illinois in 2004 and 2005. As to the Georgia

       transaction at issue, Lindemann testified he was not involved, but he also

       testified he does not “remember back that far.” (Id.) In preparation for his

       deposition, Lindemann reviewed the “entire file for WGT[,]” which he

       described as a “large” file. (Id. at 106.) During his deposition, the following

       was revealed:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023        Page 12 of 22
               Q.     . . . But when you were in charge of forming entities, how
               did you generally navigate that? Specifically, I guess, my
               question is, is would you represent the entity or one of the
               individual owners in the formation, as a general practice?

               A.       In the formation of it?

               Q.       Yeah.

               A.    I mean, generally speaking, you’re forming an entity
               because somebody told you they needed one. Right? So, you
               know, the question is, does that – does that new entity
               automatically become the client at that point and how do you
               navigate any potential conflicts of interest with – with the people
               who told you to form it. Right?

               Q.       Yeah. That’s what I’m trying to understand.

               A.     Yeah. In the Throgmartin’s case, as a general proposition,
               I’m not sure we thought too much about that, because WGT was
               an – in my mind, anyway, just an extension of WGT, Limited
               Partnership. It was the same entity, in a new form. So I’m not
               sure that we would have necessarily done an engagement letter
               for a new client, at that point.

       (Id. at 112.)

[17]   WGT V also designated an affidavit from Diane Lutz, who averred:

               7.    In this role serving as the point person for the Throgmartin
               Family regarding their financial affairs, I exchanged
               communications on multiple occasions with Matthew Carr and
               Paul Lindemann, both attorneys at Krieg DeVault, regarding
               work that Krieg DeVault was performing on behalf of WGT V,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023        Page 13 of 22
               LLC, WGT Limited Partnership, and Dadus V, Inc., all of which
               were owned by the Throgmartin Family.

               8.     To the extent either Matthew Carr and/or Paul
               Lindemann sent correspondence to my attention regarding WGT
               V, LLC, WGT Limited Partnership, and Dadus V, Inc., it was
               not in my role as Gregg’s controller, but was instead in my role
               as the point person for the Throgmartin Family’s affairs. Krieg
               DeVault, including Paul Lindemann, was aware of my role as
               the point person for the Throgmartin Family.

               9.     In my capacity of assisting Gerald Throgmartin, Jerry
               Throgmartin, and other members of the Throgmartin Family
               with their financial affairs, I cannot recall any attorneys from
               Krieg DeVault ever asking me to tell one or more members of the
               Throgmartin Family that they should obtain their own separate
               legal counsel due to the fact that Krieg DeVault was only
               representing Gregg in a real estate transaction that also involved
               the Throgmartin Family.

       (App. Vol. V at 213-14.)

[18]   In sum, the facts most favorable to WGT V reveal that, in 2003 and 2004,

       WGT V and Gregg were both owned by the Throgmartin family, led by Jerry

       Throgmartin, and represented by Krieg. While there are genuine issues of

       material fact about whether Krieg represented WGT V for the Georgia property

       transaction in particular, the evidence reveals Krieg represented WGT V, its

       predecessor entities, and individual members of the Throgmartin family during

       this same timeframe. In fact, during the same year that the botched Georgia

       transaction was to have occurred, Krieg assisted the Throgmartin family with

       the transfer of real property from WGT LLP into WGT V and assisted WGT V

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023      Page 14 of 22
       with the acquisition of another Gregg property in Ohio. Moreover, in June

       2004, Krieg revised the lease agreement for the Georgia property based on input

       from Gregg’s May and from Esselman, a real estate broker who sometimes

       assisted Gregg and sometimes assisted the Throgmartin family, and Krieg sent

       the invoice for those revisions to Jerry Throgmartin, who was both Chairman of

       Gregg and manager of WGT V. 3 Thus, the designated evidence creates a

       genuine issue of material fact about whether Krieg was the lawyer for both

       Gregg and WGT V during the ultimately unconsummated Georgia transaction.

                                                   2. Fiduciary Duty

[19]   “‘A claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three elements: (1) the

       existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of the duty owed by the

       fiduciary to the beneficiary; and (3) harm to the beneficiary.’” West v. J. Greg

       Allen Builder, Inc., 92 N.E.3d 634, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Farmers

       Elevator Co. of Oakville v. Hamilton, 926 N.E.2d 68, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.

       denied), trans. denied. In its amended complaint, WGT V asserted:

                  90. Krieg DeVault, in its role as WGT’s counsel, or based
                  upon WGT’s status as a third party beneficiary of the Legal
                  Services Contract, owed WGT a fiduciary duty to act in good
                  faith and in WGT’s best interest during the course of the
                  attorney-client relationship.

       3
           The record does not disclose why the failed transfer of the property was not uncovered during this process.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023                                 Page 15 of 22
               91. Krieg DeVault, in its fiduciary capacity, was required to
               make truthful and complete disclosures to WGT.

               92. Krieg DeVault failed to provide WGT with truthful and
               complete disclosures to WGT including (among other things)
               that Krieg DeVault was representing only Gregg and not both
               Gregg and WGT with respect to the commercial real estate
               transaction involving the [Georgia] Property, and/or that Krieg
               DeVault was not acting in WGT’s interests as a third-party
               beneficiary.

       (App. Vol. II at 226.)

[20]   On appeal, Krieg asserts the trial court erred by not granting summary

       judgment on WGT V’s fiduciary-duty claim because Krieg “never owed any

       such duty.” (Appellant’s Br. at 32.) In support, Krieg asserts: “While the

       relationship between an attorney and client is of a confidential and fiduciary

       nature, there can be no breach of a fiduciary duty here because, as discussed

       above, the threshold requirement of an attorney-client relationship between

       Krieg DeVault and WGT is absent[.]” (Id.) Because there are genuine issues of

       material fact about whether Krieg was WGT’s lawyer, genuine issues of

       material fact also exist about whether Krieg had a fiduciary duty to WGT that it

       could have breached. Because Krieg did not demonstrate summary judgment

       was appropriate on the underlying claim, it could not be entitled on that ground

       to summary judgment on the claim that derived therefrom. Cf. Miller v. Central

       Indiana Cmty. Foundation, Inc., 11 N.E.3d 944, (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (where

       summary judgment was appropriate on all of husband’s underlying tort claims,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023        Page 16 of 22
       summary judgment was also appropriate on wife’s loss of consortium claim, as

       it was derivative of from husband’s tort claims), reh’g denied.

                                           3. Statute of Limitations

[21]   “Statutes of limitations are legislative judgments and serve important

       purposes.” Miller v. Patel, 174 N.E.3d 1061, 1066-67 (Ind. 2021). By

       encouraging prompt presentation of claims, statutes of limitation “spare the

       courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his

       defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and

       evidence has been lost.” Perryman v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 683, 689

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)

               Statute of limitations defenses are particularly appropriate for
               summary judgment determination. The party asserting it must
               make a prima facie showing that the action was commenced
               outside the statutory period by identifying (1) the nature of the
               plaintiff’s action, so that the relevant statute of limitations period
               may be identified; (2) the date the plaintiff’s cause of action
               accrued; and (3) the date the cause of action was brought, being
               beyond the relevant statutory period. If the moving party
               demonstrates these matters properly, the burden shifts to the
               opponent to establish facts in avoidance of the statute of
               limitations defense.

       City of Marion v. London Witte Group, LLC, 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind. 2021)

       (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023          Page 17 of 22
[22]   The parties agree the two-year statute of limitations provided by Indiana Code

       section 34-11-2-4 4 is applicable to WGT V’s claims of attorney malpractice and

       breach of fiduciary duty. (See Appellant’s Br. at 19 & Appellee’s Br. at 32.) And

       see Estate of Spry v. Batey, 804 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The

       statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is two years.”), reh’g denied,

       trans. denied. Krieg notes the Georgia transaction occurred in 2003 or 2004, but

       WGT V’s claim was not filed until 2019, which was well past the two-year

       statute of limitations. In response, WGT V argues the limitations period did

       not expire before its claim was filed because of the discovery rule.

[23]   Legal malpractice claims “are subject to the ‘discovery rule[.]’” Dickes v. Felger,

       981 N.E.2d 559, (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “Under the discovery rule, the statute of

       limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of

       ordinary diligence could have discovered, that it has been injured from tortious

       conduct.” City of Marion, 169 N.E.3d at 390. “For a cause of action to accrue,

       it is not necessary that the full extent of damage be known or even

       ascertainable, but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred.” Estate of

       Spry, 804 N.E.2d at 253. The diligence expected is “simply that an injured

       party must act with some promptness where the acts and circumstances of an

       injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that

       some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party

       4
        This code section provides, in pertinent part: “An action for: (1) injury to person or character; (2) injury to
       personal property; or (3) a forfeiture of penalty given by statute; must be commenced within two (2) years
       after the cause of action accrues.” Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023                                  Page 18 of 22
       might exist.” Perryman v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 683, 689 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2006) (quoting Mitchell v. Holler, 429 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1993)).

[24]   Here, the facts most favorable to WGT V indicate that, in the fall of 2003,

       WGT V paid Gregg $3.5 million for the Georgia property and Gregg thereafter

       remitted $30,000 per month in rent to WGT V. Gregg did not refuse to

       continue paying on the lease until 2017, and, even then, it was because Gregg

       was in dire financial circumstances, not because Gregg still owned the property

       it was paying to lease from WGT V. WGT V learned that Gregg was the title

       holder of record on the Georgia property in 2018, when WGT V was

       negotiating the sale of the Georgia property with a third party. While Krieg

       cites facts that it insists should have put WGT on notice that the deed had not

       been transferred, nearly all of those facts involved Gregg’s COO May, who was

       not a member of WGT V. Where, as here, there is no definitive proof that

       WGT V had knowledge of the failed property transfer prior to 2017,

       “application of the discovery rule necessarily involves questions of fact.” Lyons

       v. Richmond Cmty. Sch. Corp., 19 N.E.3d 254, 262 (Ind. 2014). The trial court

       properly denied summary judgment on Krieg’s summary judgment based on

       the statute of limitations because genuine issues of material fact exist about

       “when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have

       discovered that an injury had been sustained[.]” Wehling v. Citizens Nat. Bank,

       586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind. 1992) (holding genuine issues of material fact

       precluded summary judgment on statute of limitations defense where presumed

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023       Page 19 of 22
       landowners claimed they did not know of Bank’s negligence until they

       attempted to sell property and found it already belonged to someone else).

                                                  Conclusion
[25]   For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court denial of Krieg’s motion for

       summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

[26]   Affirmed and remanded.

       Weissmann, J., concurs.

       Crone, J., dissents with a separate opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023       Page 20 of 22
       Crone, Judge, dissenting.

[27]   I respectfully dissent. The designated evidence indicates that WGT V did not

       ask Krieg to draft or record a deed for the Georgia property and did not ask

       Krieg to conduct a closing. Thus, the designated evidence establishes as a

       matter of law that any damages suffered by WGT V as a result of the botched

       Georgia transaction were not proximately caused by Krieg. In sum, Krieg

       cannot be liable for not doing something that its alleged client did not ask it to

       do. An attorney-client relationship exists for specific functions and only those

       requested by the client.

[28]   The designated evidence also establishes as a matter of law that WGT V, in the

       exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that it was damaged by

       the Georgia transaction back in 2003 at the latest, and thus its claims are barred

       by the two-year statute of limitations. See Biomet, Inc. v. Barnes & Thornburg, 791

       N.E.2d 760, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added) (noting that “legal

       malpractice actions are subject to the ‘discovery rule,’ which provides that the

       statute of limitations does not begin to run until such time as the plaintiff

       knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, that he had

       sustained an injury as the result of the tortious act of another”), trans. denied.

       WGT V was a sophisticated entity, and it simply defies credulity that a

       competent corporate officer of such an entity would pay $3.5 million for a

       property without executing a purchase agreement or receiving a deed.

       Consequently, I would reverse and remand with instructions to enter summary

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023         Page 21 of 22
judgment for Krieg on WGT V’s claims for legal malpractice and breach of

fiduciary duty.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1744 | March 24, 2023   Page 22 of 22