Court Opinion

ID: 9661110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:29:23.278523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:25.592734
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
ONION, Judge.
I concur in the results reached by the majority, but feel compelled to express my own views since the majority has not discussed or mentioned the essential “waiver” requirement of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, as to the right to counsel and the *744privilege against self-incrimination.1 See discussion of such “waiver” requirement in this writer’s dissent in Charles v. State, (No. 40,608 — not yet reported).
Even though the confession was taken on March 26, 1966, Miranda v. Arizona, supra, is applicable as the trial in the case at bar commenced after June 13, 1966. Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882.
In trials commencing after June 13, 1966, as the case at bar (Oct. 12, 1966), the prosecution, prior to the introduction of a statement resulting from custodial interrogation, has the burden of not only showing that the Miranda warnings were given, but the burden also of initially coming forward and proving that after such warnings the accused effected a “voluntary, knowing and intelligent” waiver of his rights. The Chief Justice stated in the majority opinion of Miranda: “But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” (emphasis supplied)
It appears that the “waiver” referred to may be defined as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461.
Even though it can be concluded that the warnings given the appellant were comparable to the Miranda warnings, or were at least as effective in apprising the appellant of his right to silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, we must consider whether “waiver” is reflected by the record before us. Such waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record.
It is observed in the appellant’s confession the following appears: “I, Hilario Rodriguez Torres, * * * do hereby make the following voluntary statement. I have also been advised by the person taking this statement of my right to consult an attorney before making this statement, but I do not wish to do so.” Initials “H.R.T.”
Such statement in the confession is a factor to be considered in determining if the accused affirmatively stated he desired to relinquish and waive his rights, but it is not determinative thereof.
At the top of Miranda’s statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and “with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.” In rejecting the validity of the alleged “waiver” contained in Miranda’s written statement, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had ‘full knowledge’ of his ‘legal rights’ does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.” Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. at p. 492, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1637, 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 734. (emphasis supplied) See also People v. Keesler, 53 Misc.2d 268, 278 N.Y.S.2d 423; Charles v. State (dissenting opinion), supra.
While Miranda was not as explicit as it might have been regarding what constitutes an acceptable waiver, the majority opinion did say: “An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”
*745At the time of the confession the appellant was a 25-year-old Mexican national, reared near the United States border, who had prior experience with the police. He had been twice previously convicted of burglary in El Paso County and each time committed to the Texas Department of Corrections. It appears he was also convicted in the United States District Court on an immigration violation. Shortly after his arrest the appellant was taken at approximately 4:28 a. m. before Judge Mejia who gave him the warning required by Article 15.17, V.A.C.C.P., then in effect. Such warning was given to the appellant in Spanish since he did not appear to speak the English language. Testifying in his own behalf at the hearing on the voluntariness and admissibility'of his statement, appellant acknowledged that he had received such warning.
After the magistrate’s warning the appellant was taken to the city jail where he remained in a cell until 9:15 a. m. when Detective Nava began his interrogation of the appellant in Spanish. After determining from the appellant that he had been taken before a magistrate and given the warning required by Article 15.17, supra, Officer Nava then gave such warning again as well as the warning required by Article 38.22, V.A.C.C.P., then in effect, and also informed the appellant of his right to consult with an attorney before making any statement. Nava related that thereafter appellant stated he did not want an attorney. In order to clearly indicate that he had been properly warned and advised of his right to counsel and understood such rights and was free to exercise his rights and privileges at that time Nava requested the appellant to initial the portion of his statement relating to such warnings, which he did. It further appears that during the taking of the statement appellant corrected the Officer’s spelling of his street address in Juarez.
After the completion of the statement and before appellant signed the same, Detective Ignacio L. Garcia was called in to interpret the statement to him in the Spanish language. Officer Garcia testified that he explained to appellant the warnings contained in the statement and his right to counsel and appellant stated that he understood the same. As to the body of the confession Garcia related that he carefully went over each word with the appellant to insure that the Spanish he was using did not differ from the Spanish of appellant’s locale (Juarez) and that he understood the same. Thereafter the confession was signed in the presence of Nava, Garcia and two other witnesses.
The interrogation and the taking of the statement was completed within 45 minutes. After the warnings were given appellant expressly stated he did not want an attorney and understood the warnings and this was closely followed by his written statement under the circumstances here described. The record reflects that the warnings were given at the time of the interrogation and appellant was aware that he was free to exercise his rights and privilege against self-incrimination at that point in time. There is no showing of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration which would mitigate against the finding of a valid waiver.
Appellant’s testimony as to the involuntariness of his confession was contradicted by the testimony of other witnesses and the trial judge’s findings following the conclusion of the hearing on the admissibility and voluntariness of the confession is supported by the evidence.
Nothing therein would support a finding that this appellant was threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver.
Being satisfied that the State has discharged its burden of proof and that the evidence demonstrates a clear-cut affirmative waiver as required by Miranda, I concur. Judge MORRISON joins me in this concurrence.

. It is observed that effective August 28, 1967, Article 38.22, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., was amended to provide: “The defendant must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive these rights prior to and during the making of the statement.” Acts 1967, 60th Leg., Oh. 659, Sec. 23, p. 1740.