Court Opinion

ID: 9371673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 17:09:39.035819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:29.396627
License: Public Domain

J-S45032-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RAHMAD DALTON-MILES                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1832 EDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 10, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0006115-2016

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RAHMAD DALTON-MILES                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1833 EDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 10, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                 Criminal Division at MC-51-CR-0023477-2020

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2023

        In these consolidated appeals, Rahmad Dalton-Miles (Appellant),

appeals from the judgments of sentence imposed after he entered an open

guilty plea to one count of theft by unlawful taking,1 and firearms not to be

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
J-S45032-22

carried without a license (following revocation of his probation in the firearms

case).2 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the case history as follows:

              On November 16, 2016, [], Appellant] entered into an open
       guilty plea before [the trial c]ourt to one count of firearms not to
       be carried without a license [(Firearms Case).] … On March 30,
       2017, [the trial c]ourt sentenced Appellant to [7] years of
       probation.

              [O]n November 26, 2020, [Thanksgiving Day], while on [the
       trial c]ourt’s probation, Appellant drove a white Chevrolet up to
       the complainant, who was walking with her grandson on the 2500
       block of Frankford Avenue in Philadelphia. Appellant jumped out
       of his vehicle, grabbed the complainant’s purse, and took off
       [(Robbery Case)]. [The Robbery Case is not at issue on appeal.]
       The complainant was able to record the temporary tags on
       [Appellant’s] vehicle. [O]n December 5, 2020, also while on [the
       trial c]ourt’s probation, Appellant committed another crime
       [(Theft Case)]. In this instance, the complainant, who had just
       exited a Target store with her grandchildren, was unloading her
       shopping cart into her car when Appellant walked up and took her
       purse from the cart. Appellant then got into a white Chevrolet
       and fled the scene. As a result of these incidents, Appellant was
       arrested and charged with robbery and related offenses [Robbery
       Case] and theft by unlawful taking and related offenses [Theft
       Case].

              On August [1]0, 2021, Appellant entered into a negotiated
       plea before [the trial court in the Robbery Case] to robbery and
       access device fraud, and was sentenced to [3 - 6] months of
       confinement followed by [2] years of probation for each charge.
       On the same day, he entered into an open guilty plea before [the
       trial court in the Theft Case]. [The trial c]ourt sentenced Appellant
____________________________________________

2 Appellant has complied with the dictates of Commonwealth v. Walker,
185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. 2018) (holding “where a single order resolves issues
arising on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for
each case.”). This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. Order,
10/14/21.

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      to [2½ - 5] years of confinement for theft by unlawful taking. As
      a result of these pleas, [the trial c]ourt found Appellant to be in
      direct violation of its probation [in the Firearms Case]. [The trial
      c]ourt revoked probation and imposed a violation sentence of [3½
      - 7] years of confinement, to run consecutive to the sentence on
      [the Theft Case]. Appellant subsequently filed a Motion for
      Reconsideration of Sentence. At a hearing on August 31, 2021,
      [the trial c]ourt denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant filed a timely
      Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on
      September 8, 2021. On September 30, 2021, [the trial c]ourt
      issued an order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) requiring
      [Appellant] to file a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of
      on Appeal within 21 days. [Appellant] filed a Concise Statement
      on October 20, 2021.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/21 at 1-2 (footnote in omitted).

      Appellant presents one issue for review:

            Did not the [trial] court abuse its discretion and violate the
      Sentencing Code by sentencing [A]ppellant to a manifestly
      excessive sentence of [2½ - 5] years of incarceration … on [the
      Theft Case], and the sentence of [3½ - 7] years of incarceration
      … [in the Firearms Case,] to be served [consecutively], for a total
      aggregate sentence of … [6 – 12 years], where this sentence far
      surpassed what was required to protect the public and account
      [sic] [A]ppellant’s demonstration of remorse, the nonviolent
      nature of his offenses, his rehabilitative needs, mitigating
      circumstances, and the sentencing guidelines?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. There is

no absolute right to challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence on

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013).

To reach the merits of Appellant’s issue, we must determine:

      (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
      his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise
      statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
      respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether

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       the concise statement raises a substantial question that the
       sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329–30 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citation omitted).

       Appellant has preserved his issues in a post-sentence motion, filed a

timely appeal, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief.        See

Appellant’s Brief at 12-16. Accordingly, we determine whether Appellant has

raised a substantial question as to each sentence, and if so, whether the trial

court abused its sentencing discretion. See Edwards, 71 A.3d at 330.

1. Theft Case

       Appellant contends the trial court imposed an “excessive statutory

maximum sentence … despite Appellant’s expression of remorse, and other

mitigating factors presented at sentencing.”3 Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. This

claim raises a substantial question.4 Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d

686, 692 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal denied, 276 A.3d 700 (Pa. 2022).

____________________________________________

3 Appellant also claims the trial court erred by not submitting “a written
statement to the [sentencing] commission[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 15. It is
well-settled that a trial court “can meet the requirement of a contemporaneous
written statement by placing its reasons for departure on the record during
sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 383 (Pa. Super.
2008). As the trial court placed its reasons on the record, this claim lacks
merit. See N.T., 8/10/21, at 28-31.

4 Appellant also challenges as excessive the imposition of consecutive
sentences.    Appellant’s Brief at 19-22.    However, “the imposition of
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences lies within the sound discretion
of the sentencing court, and a challenge to the imposition of consecutive
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       We recognize:

       Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
       sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
       absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
       of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
       the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
       sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
       judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
       arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

       With respect to a sentence outside of the recommended guidelines:

              When evaluating a challenge to the discretionary
              aspects of sentence ... it is important to remember
              that the sentencing guidelines are advisory in
              nature.     If the sentencing court deems it
              appropriate to sentence outside of the
              guidelines, it may do so as long as it offers
              reasons for this determination. [O]ur Supreme
              Court has indicated that if the sentencing court
              proffers reasons indicating that its decision to
              depart from the guidelines is not unreasonable,
              we must affirm a sentence that falls outside those
              guidelines.

       A sentencing court, therefore, in carrying out its duty to impose
       an individualized sentence, may depart from the guidelines when
       it properly identifies a particular factual basis and specific reasons
       which compelled [it] to deviate from the guideline range.

Commonwealth v. Shull, 148 A.3d 820, 836 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations

omitted, some emphasis in original, some emphasis added).

____________________________________________

sentences simply does not raise a substantial question.” Commonwealth v.
Lloyd, 878 A.2d 867, 873 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted).

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      Here, the trial court did not have the benefit of a pre-sentence

investigation report (PSI) at sentencing. The trial court began to schedule

sentencing for another date based on the preparation of a PSI, but Appellant’s

counsel indicated otherwise. See N.T., 8/10/21, at 6-7. (“THE COURT: We’ll

get a date and order a [PSI] and mental health report. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

Judge, it’s a negotiated guilty plea.”).    The trial court thus proceeded to

sentence Appellant, stating:

            Well, I have considered the sentencing guidelines. I have
      considered the arguments of counsel.           I have taken into
      consideration the fact that [Appellant] entered into a guilty plea.

            I have taken into consideration the statement of the victim
      who came here today. I understand that the other victim who
      was robbed in a parking lot with her grandchildren could not be
      here today.

            I have taken into consideration [] the lapse of time between
      the time I put [Appellant] on probation and the time these crimes
      were committed.

            I am sentencing him for the protection of the public because
      two victims who [sic] have been robbed. The public must be
      protected.

            I have taken into consideration that the one woman who is
      not here is a senior citizen. I consider a senior citizen anyone who
      is 60 years and older. She could not come here today. She was
      a senior citizen and she had her grandchildren. So I must take
      into consideration she is a senior citizen.

N.T., 8/10/21, at 28-29 (some paragraphs altered).

      The trial court further explained:

      Appellant’s prior record score is one. The OGS [offense gravity
      score] is three. As such, the Guidelines call for a sentence of
      restorative sanctions to six months of incarceration, plus or minus

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      three months for aggravating or mitigating factors. [204 PA ADC
      § 303.16(a).] [The trial c]ourt took the Guidelines into account,
      and decided to deviate from them based on the serious nature of
      the offense, the pattern of criminal conduct engaged in by
      Appellant, and the fact that Appellant was on [] probation for a
      firearms offense at the time he committed the [Theft] offense. In
      making this decision, [the trial c]ourt properly considered all
      relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. [It] considered the
      testimony from Appellant’s family, as well as his own statements
      at the time of sentencing. [The c]ourt also took into consideration
      that Appellant has a history of substance abuse, and was, like
      many, under particular strain in late 2020. However, [the c]ourt
      was particularly troubled by the fact that, as noted by the
      Commonwealth, Appellant appeared to be targeting older women
      accompanied by younger children for his crimes. This offense was
      Appellant’s second in an eight day period. In both cases the
      victims were grandmothers accompanied by their grandchildren.
      [The c]ourt cannot abide by the deliberate targeting of vulnerable
      members of society. Moreover, Appellant committed his crimes
      during the holiday season, when they were likely to put extreme
      financial stress on his victims.       [The c]ourt also took into
      consideration that the victim in this case, although unable to come
      to court, indicated that she was traumatized by the event. … More
      than adequate testimony was given by Appellant, his family, and
      trial counsel with respect to Appellant’s background.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/21, at 4.

      The record shows the trial court considered mitigating factors; the court

heard defense counsel’s argument, testimony from Appellant’s mother and

girlfriend, and Appellant’s allocution. See N.T., 8/10/21, at 17-26. The court

further acknowledged Appellant’s drug addiction, his prior record score, and

the years that passed between Appellant’s 2017 probation sentence and his

crimes committed in 2020. Id. at 7, 29.

      Upon review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

sentencing Appellant to the statutory maximum of 2½ to 5 years of

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confinement. The trial court stated on the record its concern for public safety,

emphasizing its concern for particularly vulnerable victims, i.e., the elderly,

given that Appellant had targeted grandmothers shopping with their

grandchildren. See Shull, 148 A.3d at 836 (in duty to impose individualized

sentence, court may depart from guidelines if it “identifies a particular factual

basis and specific reasons which compelled [it] to deviate from the

guideline[s].”).   As the trial court identified particular facts and specific

reasons Appellant’s aggravated-range sentence, his issue does not merit

relief. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 966-68 (Pa. 2007) (no

abuse of discretion where individualized sentence was reasonable).

2. The Firearms Case

      Appellant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him in the

aggravated range to the statutory maximum of 3½ to 7 years of confinement

in the Firearms Case, “based only on the fact that [A]ppellant was convicted

of another crime.” Appellant’s Brief at 24. A claim that the imposition of the

statutory maximum was disproportionate and manifestly excessive following

revocation of probation raises a substantial question.     Commonwealth v.

Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. 2000).

      In reviewing a sentence imposed after the violation of probation,

      a trial court has broad discretion in sentencing a defendant, and
      concomitantly, the appellate courts utilize a deferential standard
      of appellate review in determining whether the trial court abused
      its discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence. The reason
      for this broad discretion and deferential standard of appellate
      review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to

                                      -8-
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     measure various factors and determine the proper penalty for a
     particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual
     circumstances before it. Simply stated, the sentencing court
     sentences flesh-and-blood defendants and the nuances of
     sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript
     used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court
     enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to
     its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should
     not be lightly disturbed.

                                    ***

     Upon revoking probation, “the sentencing alternatives available to
     the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial
     sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent
     serving the order of probation.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). Thus,
     upon revoking probation, the trial court is limited only by the
     maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally at the
     time of the probationary sentence, although once probation has
     been revoked, the court shall not impose a sentence of total
     confinement unless it finds that:

           (1) the defendant has been convicted of another
           crime; or

           (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is
           likely that he will commit another crime if he is not
           imprisoned; or

           (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the
           authority of the court.

     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c).

                                    ***

     [A] trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in imposing
     a seemingly harsher post-revocation sentence where the
     defendant received a lenient sentence and then failed to adhere
     to the conditions imposed on him. In point of fact, where the
     revocation sentence was adequately considered and sufficiently
     explained on the record by the revocation judge, in light of the
     judge’s experience with the defendant and awareness of the
     circumstances of the probation violation, under the appropriate

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      deferential standard of review, the sentence, if within the
      statutory bounds, is peculiarly within the judge’s discretion.

Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 27–29 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted).

       Here, Appellant pled guilty to committing crimes and thus violating his

probation. He was also in technical violation because he failed 21 drug tests.

N.T., 8/10/21, at 9-10. The trial court explained:

      Appellant satisfied all three of the conditions of § 9771(c). He was
      convicted of multiple new crimes. More importantly, his conduct
      indicates that it is extremely likely that he will commit another
      crime if not imprisoned. Appellant committed two similar crimes
      within an eight[-]day period. A sentence of total confinement is
      also necessary to vindicate the [trial c]ourt’s authority. Appellant
      chose to commit multiple new crimes while on [the trial court’s]
      probation for a firearms offense. It is clear from his conduct that
      he does not appreciate the seriousness of his original offense or
      respect the terms of his probation or the authority of [the trial
      c]ourt. Based on the specific nature of Appellant’s conduct, [the
      trial c]ourt determine[d] a significant sentence was necessary. …
      [B]oth of Appellant’s victims were grandmothers accompanied by
      their grandchildren. It is clear from this that Appellant was
      targeting older women with young children. He committed these
      crimes in broad daylight and in busy areas. He went so far as to
      pull his car over to rob one of the victims. That victim gave a
      lengthy impact statement at the time of sentencing, detailing how
      Appellant’s actions have changed her life. She was terrified for
      months after the robbery that Appellant would return, and that he
      might steal her car. She testified that she is still afraid when
      walking her dog around her neighborhood. She was unable to
      prepare a first Thanksgiving meal for her grandson, or to go
      Christmas shopping. When Appellant stole her car keys, he also
      stole her specially made urn keychain, which contained some of
      her mother’s ashes. This is, of course, irreplaceable. Due to the
      impact to his victims, his disregard for the terms of his probation,
      and the fact that he engaged in a pattern of criminal conduct in
      which he targeted vulnerable members of the population, [the trial
      c]ourt determined that a lengthy state sentence was necessary

                                     - 10 -
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      for public safety as well as for any possible rehabilitation of
      Appellant.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/21, at 6 (emphasis in original).

      We have reviewed the record and discern no abuse of discretion.

Pasture, supra at 29. Appellant’s issue challenging the discretionary aspects

of his sentence in the Firearms Case does not merit relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/16/2023

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