Court Opinion

ID: 9545932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:22:21.449926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:46.925482
License: Public Domain

IBÁÑEZ, J.*
I respectfully dissent. The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing failed to establish reasonable or probable cause that murder (Pen. Code, § 187) was committed. Moreover, that same evidence made impermissible tandem charges of vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 3(a)) and murder (Pen. Code, § 187) under the rule that a specific statute preempts a general statute. (In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654 [276 P.2d 593]; People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494 [170 Cal.Rptr. 1, 620 P.2d 587].) Also, a reasonable interpretation of these two statutes, the history of their enactments, as well as their relationship to each other and to the statutory scheme, indicate that the Legislature did not intend such tandem charges as have been approved by the majority.
*308The majority acknowledges the rule in Williamson but murder (§ 187), it emphasizes, has one element not present in vehicular manslaughter (§ 192), namely, malice. Hence, the majority concludes, the rule in Williamson is inapplicable. This asserted difference, in the context of the evidence before us, is more apparent than real. The definitional boundary line separating the two is illusory, inadequate as a guideline for making critical or even gross distinctions. Justice Blease, for a unanimous court which affirmed the order below, wrote, “The People seek to convert this offense [the elements of an offense supported by the evidence presented] into second degree murder by ... verbal similarities between the element of gross negligence [involving a vehicle] in the offense of vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 3(a)), and the element of implied malice (Pen. Code, § 188) in the offense of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 189.)” The majority opinion, on the other hand, underscores the dissimilarities in the language of the two statutes and thereby concludes that discrete differences exist between them making the preemption rule inapplicable.
The majority concludes that “If the facts surrounding the offense support a finding of ‘implied malice,’ second degree murder may be charged; if the facts demonstrate only ‘gross negligence’, a vehicular manslaughter charge may be sustained.” (Maj. opn., at p. 294.) There is a similarity between implied malice and gross negligence in that both require, as an element of the offense, an awareness of the risk involved. But there is also a difference. Implied malice requires a higher degree of awareness states the majority. In determining whether the greater or the lesser offense has been committed by the defendant motorist, the degree as well as the nature of his awareness of the risk involved must be resolved by the finder of fact. For a finding of implied malice, the “actually knows” or subjective test is to be applied, i.e., Did the defendant motorist actually foresee the dangerous consequences? Did he actually appreciate the risk involved? (People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 588 [51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353].) The majority further points out implied malice involves an element of wantonness1 which is absent in gross negligence (citing Pen. Code, § 188; Kastel v. Steiber (1932) 215 Cal. 37, 46 [8 P.2d 474]). (Maj. opn., at p. 296.) The offenses based upon “gross negligence” are to be determined by the *309“should know” or objective test, namely: Would a reasonable person, in the position of the defendant have foreseen the dangerous consequences? The majority notes that if a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have been aware of the risk involved then the defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness. (Citing Weber v. Pinyan (1937) 9 Cal.2d 226, 230-231 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407].)
“[T]he objective test has been criticized as establishing a harsh and unjustifiable doctrine of ‘negligent murder.’ (See 49 Cal.L.Rev. 254 . .. and see 13 Stanf.L.Rev. 255, suggesting statutory revision to clarify the law.)” (1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes, § 327, pp. 300-301.)
It appears from the foregoing recital of the guidelines to be applied in differentiating second degree murder and vehicular manslaughter, as announced by the majority, that certain consequences follow: Initially, the prosecutor must decide, in a given case, whether to charge or not to charge both murder and vehicular manslaughter. From a wide range of culpability on the part of the defendant motorist, the prosecutor must determine what charges are appropriate.2 Neither he, nor ultimately the trier of facts will have clear guidelines. In this connection the guidelines for determining manslaughter are a contrast in specificity to the guidelines offered by the majority. Manslaughter, as defined, can be a felony if it is based upon a finding of gross negligence or upon a finding of intoxication; it can be a misdemeanor if it is based upon negligence. (See Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 3(a); Veh. Code, § 23101; CALJIC Nos. 8.90-8.97; Fricke-Alarcon, Cal. Criminal Law (11th ed.) pp. 166-169.)
Facing this court is not the question of whether the sanctions under the general law of murder should not be imposed where the culpability in the operation of a vehicle is extreme and it proximately causes the death of a human being. This is a policy decision for the Legislature and not for this court to make.3
*310By an interplay of words the majority has created an amorphous definitional boundary line separating gross negligence on one side and implied malice on the other. This is the basis for the new crime created by the majority. This makes murder out of an unintentional killing of a human being proximately resulting from extreme culpability on the part of a defendant motorist in the operation of a vehicle. Admittedly, all deaths caused by a vehicle are not necessarily manslaughter. A vehicle, like a gun, a knife, a club, can be used to inflict injury and from the manner in which it is used an inference can be made that the party intended the consequences of his act. (See Annot., Murder—Homicide by Automobile (1968) 21 A.L.R.3d 116-163.)
The definitional classification of the offenses, their respective punishment, the consequences resulting from a failure to keep them separate, as has been noted above, compels the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to permit tandem charges of murder and vehicular manslaughter under facts such as are now before the court.
The legislative history of vehicular manslaughter also makes clear the legislative intent.
In 1935, as part of its first Vehicle Code, California enacted section 500, a specific vehicular homicide statute.4
In 1941, section 500 was amended to make clear that it supplanted the Penal Code provisions relating to involuntary manslaughter in all cases where a homicide was “caused by the driving of any vehicle.”5
*311In 1943, Vehicle Code section 500 was repealed and, in the same chapter, Penal Code section 193, prescribing the punishment for manslaughter, was amended to include the following language: “[A] violation of subdivision 2 of Section 192 of this code [i.e., involuntary manslaughter] resulting from the operation of a vehicle is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or in the State Prison for not more than five years.” (Stats. 1943, ch. 421, § 2, p. 1959.) By including the repeal of Vehicle Code section 500 and the amendment of Penal Code section 193 as the only two items in a single bill, the Legislature’s intent to reintegrate the “wilful indifference” standard into Penal Code section 192 governing manslaughter is manifest.
In the following legislative session (1945), this intent was embodied in the . adoption of the present vehicular manslaughter statute—Penal Code section 192, subdivision 3. (Stats. 1945, ch. 1006, § 1, p. 1943.)
Finally, I agree with the views expressed by Chief Justice Bird and respectfully join in her dissent.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 30, 1981. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

 “Wantonness’’ is defined as follows: “Conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty with knowledge of existing conditions and consciousness that, from the act or omission, injury will result to another....” (Black’s Law Dict. (4th rev. ed. 1968) p. 1753.)

“[V]ague statutory language also creates the danger that police, prosecutors, judges and juries will lack sufficient standards to reach their decisions, thus opening the door to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the law.” (Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 252 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636]; see also In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 156, fn. 15 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].)

“Writing more than 20 years ago, Justice Peters pointed out that for more than the preceding 20 years the established rule holds that drunk driving does not warrant punitive award, and that if radical change in policy is to be accomplished, ‘it should be accomplished by the Legislature not by the courts.’ (Gombos v. Ashe, supra, 158 Cal.App.2d at p. 528 [322 P.2d 933].) While fully cognizant of the grave problem of *310drunk driving, the Legislature has not accepted the court’s invitation to change the law. The Legislature may choose to respond as it did in repudiating this court’s last foray to enlarge liability for drunk driving. (Stats. 1978, ch. 929 amending Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25602 and repudiating Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 [145 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669].)” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 910 [157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854].)

“When the death of any person ensues within one year as the proximate result of injuries caused by the driving of any vehicle in a negligent manner or in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide, a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or in the State prison for not more than three years.” (Stats. 1935, ch. 27, § 500, pp. 173-174.)

The amendments are emphasized. “When the death of any person ensues within one year as the proximate result of injuries caused by the driving of any vehicle with reckless disregard of, or wilful indifference to, the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide, a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or in the State prison for not more than three years. Hereafter, the provisions of the Penal *311Code, defining involuntary manslaughter, shall not apply to homicide caused by the driving of any vehicle.” (Italics added.) (Stats. 1941, ch. 279, § 1, p. 1414; see generally People v. Mitchell (1946) 27 Cal.2d 678, 684-685 [166 P.2d 10].)
The amendments also reveal that the Legislature sought to remove from the jurisdiction of the Penal Code all conduct involving the driving of any vehicle “with reckless disregard of, or wilful indifference to, the safety of others.”