Court Opinion

ID: 9547994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:56:02.85298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:20.628187
License: Public Domain

Zenoff, J.,
dissenting:
I dissent. This court ruled in Lundberg v. Koontz, 82 Nev. 360, 418 P.2d 808 (1966), that departures from legislative requirements where public petitions are involved should be given hypertechnical application. In that case which concerned petitions for a certain constitutional amendment, the majority of this court said, and I dissented, that “We must demand strict adherence to the authentication requirements of the constitution governing an initiative petition.” It was my opinion then that people should have easy avenue to their government.
However, once a rule is established we should not make *810different rules for similar situations. To do so reduces stability-in the law. Because the majority of the court in Lundberg v. Koontz, supra, imposed the requirement of strict interpretation which in that case had the effect of depriving thousands of signatories from the right to petition their government, then the same rule of strict applicability should also be applied in this case. The statute requires that the addresses of the signatories accompany the signatures. Certainly the addresses should be sufficiently complete so as to make the location of the signer readily ascertainable.
Reasons for requiring an address alongside the signatories are that the signatures can be readily verified for authenticity and that possibilities of fraud be reduced as much as possible. In the pressures of limited time, such as we faced in this case, it is not reasonable to allow “any old address.” Instead, the address should be precise and commensurate with the particular community, all to the end that the person who signs his name be immediately available for verification in the event of a contest. I would uphold the trial court.