Court Opinion

ID: 9834491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:38:10.697127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:16.399431
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
This is the second motion for rehearing urged by plaintiff in error. Upon the trial Ellerd testified that his contract with Murray was that no commissions would be due until the exchange was consummated and title papers had passed. Murray testified that there was nothing said as to when commissions would be due, and the jury found in accordance with Murray’s testimony. As stated in the former opinion, the only answer filed by Ellerd in the trial court was a' general denial. This writer strongly inclines to the opinion that this testimony was not admissible under the answer, and if the jury had believed that his statement was true, and that he was not to pay commissions until the deal was consummated, it would have resulted in an abatement of the suit upon the ground that the action had been prematurely brought, because the defense of prematurely bringing the suit is one in abatement, and unless the fact appears from the face of the petition it is necessary • for the defendant to plead it in the due order of pleading. Driggers v. Philadelphia Underwriters Agency (Tex. Civ. App.) 240 S. W. 618; Humphrey v. National Fire Insurance Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 231 S. W. 751; Duenkel v. Amarillo Bank & Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 222 S. W. 670; Potter County v. Boesen (Tex. Civ. App.) 191 S. W. 787; Id. (Tex. Com. App.) 221 S. W. 948. If, however, it be conceded that the evidence is admissible, under a general denial, the jury’s finding has settled the issue, and we see no reason for setting it aside.
Ellerd also testified that according to the contract the amount of commission was to be based upon the cash value of his property. He was contradicted upon this issue by Murray, who testified that it was to be based upon the agreed exchange value, and the jury again found with Murray; so that issue is also settled in this court.
At great length and with copious citation of authority, the motion under consideration contends under several propositions that the former opinion is based upon evidence unsupported by pleadings and that the contentions of the defendant in error which we sustained are without any pleadings whatever to support them. Reference to the plaintiff’s petition shows that this contention is without support. In ’his petition plaintiff .alleges that the defendant listed the property with him for sale or exchange; that he promised to pay him 2½ per cent, commission on the value agreed upon by the parties as the exchange value; that plaintiff undertook to find parties who were ready, willing, and able to exchange property for that listed with him, and did find Gilbert, White, and others, who entered into negotiations with Ellerd. The uncontradicted evidence sustains each of these necessary allegations. He further alleged that he brought the parties together who agreed with Ellerd, and that they entered into a “legal and binding contract and agreed upon the exchange value of the defendant’s property.” The written contract between the parties proves these allegations. He further set out the amount of his commissions, demand therefor, and the refusal of plaintiff in error to pay. As we understand the law, these allegations are sufficient to support the judgment, provided they are sustained by competent testimony.
In addition to the necessary allegations of fact, stated above, the plaintiff alleged:
“It being understood and agreed at the time that the owner of such lands, leases, and royalties in Eastland county, Tex., would pay to the plaintiff also 2⅛ per cent, commission on such lands, leases, and royalties by them to be conveyed to the defendant.”
This allegation was certainly not necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover and, viewed from any standpoint, must be considered as surplusage. If plaintiff in error had excepted to it, the trial court would no doubt have sustained the exception. He not only did not except to this allegation, but failed to object to any evidence offered to prove it. Pleadings frequently contain many allegations of this kind, and the rule is that a plaintiff need not prove more than is necessary to his recovery, though mote be alleged. Selman v. G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 101 S. W. 1030; Collins v. Chipman, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 563, 95 S. W. 666. It follows from what has been said that the evidence introduced to sustain an immaterial allegation was itself immaterial. Evidence is not made releyant by being directed to the proof of an immaterial issue. 22 C. J. 161. The Supreme Court said, in Henry v. Phillips, 105 Tex. 459, 151 S. W. 533:
“Such incompetent testimony can never form the basis of a finding of fact in an appellate court, notwithstanding its presence in the record without objection. When the appellate court comes to apply the law to testimony constituting the facts of the case, it can only base its conclusion upon such testimony as is *637under the law competent. That which is not competent testimony should be given no probative force. The admission of such testimony's no talisman to give effect to that which is dr-relevant and incompetent to sustain or deny a material issue in a case.”
For a stronger reason pleadings which present, and evidence tending to sustain, an issue which is wholly immaterial, should he disregarded by the appellate court, even though the one is unexcepted to and the other unob.jected to in the trial court.
Plaintiff in error insists that it was incumbent upon defendant in error to allege and prove that Ellerd’s titles were defective, basing this contention principally upon the case of Brackenridge v. Claridge, 91 Tex. 527, 44 S. W. 819. Neither this ease nor any other case cited applies to the instant case. In the Brackenridge Case only an option contract was entered into, and the court held that, unless the parties had entered into a binding contract to sell and to buy, the broker was not entitled to recover where the sale failed because of the defect in the title and unless he assumed the burden and proved that such defect existed. The contract itself in the instant case is in the statement of facts. In support of the judgment we must presume that the trial court found that it was a binding contract, and, while not required to do so, we have examined it and think that it is valid and binding upon both parties, except for the matters subsequently developed with reference , to the defect in Ellerd’s title. As stated in the former opin-" ion, this would not defeat Murray’s right to recover.
Plaintiff made no allegation whatever with reference to the settlement with Gilbert, White, and others of the commissions due him from them. No such allegation was necessary to entitle him to recover against Ellerd. Without any objection on the part of Ellerd, Murray testified that he had made satisfactory settlement with the other parties. The evidence was clearly inadmissible and irrelevant, and it has not been demonstrated how the evidence in any degree could have affected the verdict. . The amount of commissions, that is, 2½ per cent., was not controverted; the only conflict between El-lerd and Murray being whether this amount should be based upon the cash value or the exchange value. We think it is wholly immaterial for the reasons set out in the former opinion, and which will not be restated here. Murray alleged that the amount of the commissions were to be based upon the exchange value, and the jury found with his contentions. The judgment is therefore supported by both pleadings and evidence in that particular.
The evidence that Murray ma'de satisfactory settlement with Gilbert, White, et al., being immaterial and irrelevant, would not entitle Ellerd to introduce further evidence upon such issue, and its exclusion was proper. McLane v. Paschall, 74 Tex. 20, 11 S. W. 837; Dolson v. De Ganahl, 70 Tex. 620, 8 S. W. 321; Llano Co. v. Moore, 77 Tex. 515, 14 S. W. 152.
Evidence of the oral agreement between the parties with reference to placing! the contracts in escrow in the bank pending the perfection of Ellerd’s titles did not in any way tend to vary or contradict the written contracts. In our opinion it was not necessary for defendant in error to plead or prove that Ellerd’s titles were defective after having alleged that through his efforts a valid binding contract was entered into by the parties, and, although frequently asserted in the motion, it is not a fact that the judgment of this court is based upon the assumption that such titles were defective.
It is true that no fraud is charged in Murray’s pleadings with reference to the condition of Ellerd’s titles, nor has any such charge been made by this court.
Although the case may have been tried and a judgment rendered in the lower court upon an erroneous theory, and although this court may have improperly dis- . cussed that theory, nevertheless, if the case has been correctly decided upon any issue presented in the record, it is the duty of this court to affirm the judgment. Speed v. Sadberry (Tex. Civ. App.) 190 S. W. 781; Calvin v. Neel (Tex. Civ. App.) 191 S. W. 791; Ashley v. Holland (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 635; Bullock v. Crutcher (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 940.
We have concluded that there is no such error as would warrant us in reversing the judgment.
The motion is therefore overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.