Court Opinion

ID: 9404608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 16:05:35.199746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.680420
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 220533
                                            No. 1-22-0533
                                            June 23, 2023
                                                                                     Sixth Division
 ______________________________________________________________________________

                                               IN THE
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                          FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 TOTAL STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., an Illinois                   )
 Corporation, and QUALIFIED FOOD STAFFING                      )
 SERVICES, INC., an Illinois Corporation,                      )   Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                               )   of Cook County, Illinois.
          Plaintiffs-Appellants,                               )
                                                               )   No. 2018 CH 04399
     v.                                                        )
                                                               )   The Honorable
 STAFFING, INC., d/b/a Staff Illinois; MARY THERESE            )   Patrick J. Sherlock,
 BRAZIER; THOMAS KELLY; and JOSE SIMENTAL,                     )   Judge, Presiding.
                                                               )
          Defendants-Appellees.                                )
                                                               )

          JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
          Justices Oden Johnson and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                             OPINION

¶1        Plaintiffs Total Staffing Solutions, Inc. (“Total Staffing”), and Qualified Food Staffing

Services, Inc., filed a complaint for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and damages

against defendants Staffing, Inc., d/b/a Staff Illinois, Mary Therese Brazier, Thomas Kelly, and

Jose Simental. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that defendants (1) violated the Illinois Trade

Secrets Act (765 ILCS 1065/2 (West 2018)), (2) violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
No. 1-22-0533

Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2018)), and (3) tortiously interfered with a

prospective economic advantage. After a bench trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of

defendants and against Total Staffing. On appeal, Total Staffing argues that (1) the circuit court’s

judgment on count I claim of a Trade Secrets Act violation should be reversed, (2) the circuit court

abused its discretion in admitting Marty Lally’s hearsay testimony at trial, and (3) the circuit

court’s judgment on count III claim of a Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act

violation and count IV claim of tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage

should be reversed. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment because the court’s conclusions were

not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where the evidence supported a finding that

defendants did not (1) violate the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, (2) violate the Consumer Fraud and

Deceptive Business Practices Act, or (3) tortiously interfere with a prospective economic

advantage. We further hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony that

was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

¶2                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶3     In 1997, Vincent Gallelli, John Falvey, and Craig Kelly formed Total Staffing. Total

Staffing is a staffing agency that provides temporary workers to companies in the Chicagoland

area. As of 2018, Total Staffing had six branch offices located in Illinois. Defendants are former

employees of Total Staffing. Craig, who served as the President of Total Staffing, hired his mother,

Mary Therese Brazier, in 1997. Mary resigned from her position on February 18, 2018. Total

Staffing employed Craig’s younger brother, Thomas Kelly, from 2000 to 2014. Thomas returned

to Total Staffing in 2016 and later resigned on February 16, 2018. Total Staffing hired Jose

Simental in 1999, and he resigned on July 20, 2016. Craig passed away on January 7, 2018. On

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February 19, 2018, Thomas and Mary incorporated Staff Illinois, a staffing agency that provides

temporary staffing services within the Chicagoland area. After a meeting with Thomas and Mary,

Jose agreed to join Staff Illinois on February 24, 2018.

¶4     On April 4, 2018, Total Staffing filed a seven-count complaint for preliminary and

permanent injunctive relief and damages against Staff Illinois, Mary, Thomas, and Jose. On April

15, 2019, Total Staffing filed a first amended complaint raising two additional counts. Defendants

filed a motion to dismiss counts I through IV and VI through IX. On July 6, 2020, the court granted

defendants’ motion to dismiss as to counts II, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. On August 24, 2020, Total

Staffing filed a second amended complaint. Relevant here, under count I of the complaint, Total

Staffing alleged defendants violated the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (765 ILCS 1065/2 (West 2018)).

Under count III, Total Staffing alleged defendants violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive

Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2018)). Under count IV, Total Staffing alleged that

defendants tortiously interfered with a prospective economic advantage when they made

misrepresentations to Marty Lally, an officer of Hometown Bagel, and converted the employment

of Total Staffing’s employees working at Hometown Bagel to Staff Illinois.

¶5     The complaint alleged “the lifeblood of [Total Staffing]” relies on the knowledge of the

identities and characteristics of its customers. This knowledge included

       “the businesses the customers are in, the number of temporary employee placements they

       have historically required, the amount they have to spend, the skill sets and types of

       workers they need, idiosyncratic preferences of their managements from a servicing

       standpoint, the seasonal cycles of their businesses, and their locations in proximity to pools

       of workers who can fill their needs.”

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Total Staffing also relies on the identities and characteristics of its temporary workers. This

includes knowledge of “workers who have been trained in the skill sets particular customers need,

in the quantities those customers need them, and living within close proximity to those customers,

especially workers who fit that description and have a long-standing history working at the

particular customer site.” Total Staffing stores its customer information on two computer

databases, called Ultra 32 and Act!, and stores temporary employee information on the Ultra 32

database. These databases are on a secured server at Total Staffing’s Naperville office.

¶6     Total Staffing claimed defendants were aware of the information in the Ultra 32 and Act!

and used the information to identify and solicit business from seven Total Staffing customers,

including Hometown Bagel, Accurate Partitions, Midland Metal Products, Bevolution, Golden

Country, Scientific Solutions, and Royal Envelope. Total Staffing also asserted defendants used

the information to “find an immediately accessible workforce, how much to pay it, and how much

to charge the customer” to maintain a competitive advantage.

¶7     The case proceeded to a bench trial. Deandra Huerta testified she began working as the

office manager at Total Staffing in 2003 and was later promoted to business manager. Thomas,

Mary, and Jose also worked at Total Staffing. According to Deandra, Mary was a sales manager

and “dealt with clients, she worked with the branches and the manager at the branch to make sure

that the clients were being taken care of and their needs were being met.” Thomas “oversaw the

safety workers’ compensation, unemployment at the organization.” Thomas left Total Staffing in

2014 but returned in 2016. When he returned, Thomas continued to “manag[e] our work comp

claims.” Deandra explained “we would all kind of go to [Thomas] for issues or concerns or things

that we needed that he had access to in our database that Craig Kelly had, so that if he wasn’t there,

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we would go to him and ask questions or things that we needed.” Jose was the branch manager of

the Chicago office. The branch managers “saw the day to day operations of their branches. They

handled the job orders, the client needs, the client communication, they went on client visits,

making sure that the job orders got filled, making sure that, you know, everything was getting done

at the branch.”

¶8     Deandra testified that customers regularly using temporary workers were critical to the

Total Staffing’s survival, and these types of customers were difficult to find. To acquire new

customers, Total Staffing “did a lot of different things,” like receive leads from its employment

coordinators and talk with temporary associations to get potential customer names. The process of

identifying customers took time because “you didn’t know who the contact or the decision maker

was right off the bat, you had to sometimes call and call and call until you got that right person.”

To determine a potential customer’s staffing needs, costs, and rates “requires having a phone

conversation or a face to face meeting with clients.” Total Staffing also collected information about

its temporary employees, including “their full name, address, social, phone numbers, skill set, drug

screens, [and] background checks.” This type of information is not readily obtainable to the public.

Deandra stated that “[i]t took us years and years to gather and store that information,” and Total

Staffing considered this information confidential. The information was stored in the Act! and Ultra

32 databases. An employee needed a username and password to access the databases. Employees

had limited access to the databases based on their territory. However, Craig, Mary, and Deandra

had full access to the databases. Thomas had full access to Ultra 32, and Jose had access to a

portion of Ultra 32. Deandra testified that she was familiar with the seven businesses that left Total

Staffing and began receiving staffing services from Staff Illinois. These businesses had worked

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with Total Staffing for a “long time” and even some years before their departure. Aside from

Midland Metals, none of the businesses made significant complaints about Total Staffing. Deandra

explained that, as it pertained to Midland Metals, “there were always some complaints. That was

a relatively difficult client.” In March 2018, Hometown Bagel contacted Total Staffing, requesting

a list of employee names, pay rates, and bill rates. Deandra curated the list, and a Total Staffing

employee gave the list to Hometown Bagel.

¶9     Joseph Gallelli, son of Total Staffing owner Vincent Gallelli and current president of Total

Staffing, testified that Total Staffing searches for prospective clients by using several databases

providing different organizations that the agency may want to target for business. Total Staffing

then obtains the prospective organization’s contact information and “start[s] doing business

development” such as phone calls and office visits to the organization. Joseph explained that the

process is “certainly a—a grind to get, you know clients.” When Joseph was the vice president of

Total Staffing, he wanted to join the customer meetings to introduce himself, get to know the

customers, and learn about their business and how to service them. He did not join the meetings to

“pick on” Mary.

¶ 10   Vincent Gallini, an owner of Total Staffing, testified that he and John Flavey were the

original owners at the inception of Total Staffing. Shortly thereafter, Craig became the third owner

of Total Staffing and hired Mary to work for the agency. In Total Staffing’s early years, Vincent

had a conversation with Craig and Mary after he learned they started a similar staffing agency.

Craig and Mary admitted they were starting an agency but would stop their efforts. Vincent was

concerned and considered whether Craig and Mary would continue to work for Total Staffing.

However, Vincent decided to take “[Craig] at his word and [Mary] at her word that things were

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No. 1-22-0533

going to be better. And all this stuff was going to be behind us, and we were going to go forward.”

Vincent informed Craig and Mary that they had to sign noncompetition agreements. Vincent

allowed Craig to handle the noncompetition agreement because “he was the partner. I took him at

his word. I wanted to make sure that he knew I trusted him.” Vincent never followed up to ensure

Craig and Mary signed noncompetition agreements.

¶ 11   Paul Flavey, son of Total Staffing owner John Flavey, testified that, after Craig’s death, he

worked at Total Staffing “to kind of sort things out there and just make sure we could still keep

the ship running.” The day after Craig’s death, Deandra informed Paul that she was having lunch

with Thomas and Mary. Paul thought the lunch meeting was unusual because he remembered

having a conversation with his father years ago that “[Craig] and [Mary] had gone and tried to or

were in the process of starting some other type of staffing firm.” After learning about the lunch,

Total Staffing negotiated and executed a new employment contract with Deandra.

¶ 12   Thomas Kelly, the CEO and president of Staff Illinois, testified that he began working at

Total Staffing in 2000 and signed a noncompetition agreement on September 25, 2000. During his

employment, Thomas handled workers compensation and unemployment claims. He also did other

tasks such as plumbing, electrician, and other handywork at the office. Thomas signed a non-

competition agreement on September 25, 2000, but never discussed signing a non-competition

agreement when he returned to Total Staffing in 2016. Thomas knew that Total Staffing stored

information about its customers and employees in the Ultra 32 and Act! databases. During

Thomas’s first term of employment between 2000 and 2014, he had unrestricted access to Ultra

32. When Thomas returned to Total Staffing in 2016, he did not have a computer to access Ultra

32 but would use Deandra’s computer to access the database to help employees update their

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passwords. Thomas never recorded or stored Deandra’s login information. Thomas never had

access to the Act! database. Thomas never copied, printed, or otherwise took any information from

the two databases. On the day of Craig’s passing, Thomas took two laptop computers from Craig’s

house and took them to Mary’s house. The next day, Thomas and Mary went to the Naperville

branch office and met with Deandra. A few days later, Thomas returned and went through Craig’s

office. Thomas looked through “two file boxes where they pulled his personal belongings” and

took some file documents from the office.

¶ 13   Thomas stated Staff Illinois’s first customer was Hometown Bagel. Marty Lally, an officer

of Hometown Bagel, and Craig were best friends, and “the Lally family and our family, we have

cottages on the same lake in Michigan. We hang out most weekends.” Shortly after Thomas left

Total Staffing, Thomas informed Marty that Thomas and Mary were starting a staffing agency.

Thomas, Mary, and Jose subsequently had a meeting with Marty and his sister, Kathy Lally, on

March 21, 2018. During the meeting, Thomas stated that Paul and Joe, the children of Total

Staffing owners Vincent and John, “stabbed [Mary] in the back”; Mary felt betrayed because the

employees were instructed not to schedule client meetings for her; Thomas and Mary planned to

start a competing staffing agency after she quit; and Paul and Joe were treating Craig’s children

unfairly. After the meeting, Hometown Bagel agreed to work with Staff Illinois. The temporary

workers were given an opportunity to become employees of Staff Illinois or stay with their current

staffing agency and obtain another assignment. This process occurred because “a temporary

employee is an employee of the staffing agency, not the client.” Hometown Bagel informed Staff

Illinois of the workers’ pay rates and determined the bill rate, i.e., the “percentage that [Staff

Illinois] charge over the pay rate.” Thomas never asked Hometown Bagel to obtain any

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information from Total Staffing. Regarding the other six customers, Thomas explained that these

customers also provided the bill rate, stating, “It’s basically, this is what it is, take it or leave it.

And if we want the business, we will meet it. If we don’t want the business, we don’t.” Staff Illinois

never based the bill rate on information obtained from Total Staffing.

¶ 14    Thomas testified that Staff Illinois obtains temporary workers by posting “a lot of fliers

everywhere we can. Job boards, word-of-mouth referrals. Talk to employees. Hit the streets.

Hustle.” Staff Illinois obtains customers by contacting temporary employees’ previous employers

because “most of the time, if they’re a temporary worker coming to work for us, they were a

temporary worker at their other location.” This method is “100 percent our process right now. We

have no salespeople.” Thomas admitted that he contacted Jose before he resigned from Total

Staffing but Thomas’s conversation with Jose concerned Craig’s passing. Thomas also admitted

he informed a senior customer service executive for the Chicago Blackhawks, a nonclient of Total

Staffing, that Total Staffing was changing its name to Staffing, Inc. and the agency was moving

locations. Thomas explained that Craig personally paid for and owned the Blackhawks tickets.

¶ 15    Terra Kelly Gibbons, Craig’s daughter, testified that she went to Craig’s house on the day

of his passing. She became upset with her uncle, Thomas, because he was “taking a lot of personal

calls” and had removed personal belongings like a flash drive, “a leather bag that was filled with

a bunch of papers,” and two laptop computers. The laptops belonged to Craig and, according to

Terra, were taken “to whoever Total Staffing uses for IT.” The next day, Thomas changed the

locks at Craig’s home and informed Terra that “nobody was going to have access to the house

except for [Mary].”

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¶ 16   Mary Brazier testified that she began working at Total Staffing in 1997. Mary never signed

a noncompetition agreement. In her employment role, Mary “contacted businesses and tried to get

them to be clients of Total Staffing.” Throughout her employment, Mary developed an

understanding of various customers’ business needs, and Total Staffing encouraged their

employees to establish relationships with customers. Mary was familiar with the Ultra 32 and Act!

databases. She used Ultra 32 “occasionally” and used Act! to keep track of Total Staffing’s

customers. Mary was also an administrator of Act! and would give employees passwords to the

database. Mary never copied, printed, or otherwise took any information from Ultra 32 or Act!

Shortly before Mary resigned from Total Staffing, she received an e-mail from Joseph, stating that

Joseph wanted to be informed and included in all client meetings and phone calls. Mary stated that

she was “really surprised to hear this because I never had to bring anybody with me before, other

than the branch managers” and that she felt “[v]ery angry.” When Hometown Bagel joined Staff

Illinois, Mary told Jose to inform the temporary employees that Hometown Bagel was switching

staffing agencies. Mary testified that she also conducted the same conversion process during her

employment with Total Staffing several times.

¶ 17   Leticia Noriega, Total Staffing’s branch manager at the Brookfield office, testified that she

and Mary met with Reynaldo Salvador, plant manager of Accurate Partitions, on February 8, 2018.

Before Reynaldo arrived, Mary complained to Leticia that the new management was “bad people”

and “bastards.” During the meeting, Mary only discussed Total Staffing business and did not say

anything negative about Total Staffing. A week later, Mary came to the Brookfield office “looking

at papers we have in the front, which were applications and some policies.” Leticia thought Mary’s

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actions were “weird because she never got it—she never got involved with those papers.” Mary

did not make copies of or take any of the documents when she left.

¶ 18   Jose Simental testified that he began working at Total Staffing in September 1999 and

signed a noncompetition agreement on August 21, 2000. The agreement contained an 18-month

noncompetition provision, which ended on January 20, 2018, based on Jose’s resignation date of

July 2016. Jose was familiar with and used the Ultra 32 database and knew the database contained

information about Total Staffing’s customers and temporary employees. Jose did not take any

information with him when he left the agency, and his first contact with Thomas and Mary after

he left Total Staffing was on February 10, 2018. He was hired by Staff Illinois on March 21, 2018.

During his employment with Staff Illinois, Jose contacted and obtained business from Science

Solution, Bevolution, Evans Food, and Royal Envelope. Mary obtained business from Midland

Metals and Accurate Partition. These companies were Total Staffing’s former customers, and Jose

first learned of these companies while working at Total Staffing. After Staff Illinois obtained

Hometown Bagel as a customer, Jose had a meeting with the Total Staffing employees who worked

at Hometown Bagel. He informed the employees that (1) Hometown Bagel was switching staffing

agencies, (2) the workers who wanted to continue working for Hometown Bagel had to complete

a Staff Illinois application, and (3) the workers who wanted to stay employed with Total Staffing

needed to seek another work assignment.

¶ 19   Esmeralda Chavez, a former temporary employee for Total Staffing, testified that she

worked at Hometown Bagel for two or three years. During her second year, Jose told Esmeralda

and other Total Staffing employees that he was the owner of Staff Illinois, that Total Staffing “was

gonna shut down,” and that he wanted the employees to “switch over.” Elvira Melendez, another

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former temporary employee for Total Staffing, testified that the owner of Hometown Bagel, Kathy

Lally, informed workers that Hometown Bagel decided to change staffing agencies and the

workers had to decide whether they wanted to work for the new staffing agency or seek work

reassignment with Total Staffing. Jose then discussed Staff Illinois with the workers and provided

applications. Elvira decided to join Staff Illinois because she wanted to continue working at

Hometown Bagel.

¶ 20    Marty Lally, an officer of Hometown Bagel, testified that Total Staffing provided

temporary employees to Hometown Bagel. Marty knew Craig as Total Staffing’s president and

CEO. Marty and Craig were also friends, and Marty knew Thomas. Marty explained Hometown

Bagel had issues with Total Staffing’s services, such as “orders going unfilled, people not showing

up when they said people were gonna show up, and also some unqualified workers where they

would show up and they were not fit for the job, and then we’d—you know, just kind of a turnstile

at the door.” When Hometown Bagel came across a problem, Sam, Hometown Bagel’s production

manager, would handle the issue, and Marty would receive information about any problems from

Sam. Despite the issues, Hometown Bagel never changed staffing agencies “because of Craig.”

Hometown Bagel switched to Staff Illinois because “Craig was no longer.” Hometown Bagel did

not inform Total Staffing that it was switching to Staff Illinois because “[w]e weren’t happy with

the services to begin with, and like everything else, we do change suppliers from time to time.”

Marty testified that Hometown Bagel set the pay rate for the temporary employees. Hometown

Bagel provided a list of its temporary employees’ pay rates and bill rates to Staff Illinois in March

2018.

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¶ 21   Reynaldo Salvador testified that he worked at Accurate Partitions from 2011 to 2019.

Reynaldo first met Mary when he worked for a company called Marietta Corporation. At the time,

Mary worked with Total Staffing and had helped Reynaldo “out of a couple of different difficult

situations.” During Reynaldo’s employment with Accurate Partitions, Total Staffing was Accurate

Partitions’ sole provider of temporary labor. Toward the end of their business relationship,

Accurate Partitions “had recurring service issues with Total Staffing.” Reynaldo called Mary

because he knew Mary “would talk to the Total Staffing team. She would give them a nudge, I

guess so to speak, so that they could get me the people that I needed.” Mary informed Reynaldo

that she was working for another staffing agency, and Reynaldo asked if Mary’s agency could help

Accurate Partitions. Reynaldo stated that Mary never said anything negative about Total Staffing.

Accurate Partitions maintained its relationship with Total Staffing and used multiple staffing

companies after it obtained temporary workers from Staff Illinois. Reynaldo explained, “I have

always believed in the world that I live in in [sic] manufacturing, you never put your eggs just in

one basket. So, I made sure that I kept the relationship with Total as well as with Illinois.”

¶ 22   At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of defendants and

against Total Staffing on all remaining counts. Regarding count I, the court held defendants did

not violate the Illinois Trade Secrets Act because (1) Total Staffing’s list of customers was known

to others outside of the agency including temporary employees, (2) there was no evidence that

defendants accessed the Ultra 32 and Act! Databases, and (3) “while plaintiff claims that it is

difficult to find users of temporary labor, defendants testified to the contrary.” Regarding count

III, the court held defendants did not violate the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business

Practices Act where there was no evidence that defendants misrepresented any information to

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Hometown Bagel; defendants informed Total Staffing employees working at Hometown that Staff

Illinois was not associated with Total Staffing; and Total Staffing did not change its name.

Defendants also required Total Staffing employees to submit employment applications to join Staff

Illinois. Regarding count IV, the court held defendants did not tortiously interfere with Total

Staffing’s business relationship with Hometown Bagel but, instead, engaged in lawful competition.

The court found, “Hometown was not happy with the quality of service provided by Total Staffing

(according to Marty Lally) and Hometown also had a close familial reason to switch from Total

Staffing to Staff Illinois.” This appeal follows.

¶ 23                                       II. JURISDICTION

¶ 24    On August 24, 2020, Total Staffing filed a second amended complaint for preliminary and

permanent injunctive relief and damages. The circuit court entered its judgment on March 18,

2022. Total Staffing filed a notice of appeal on Monday, April 18, 2022. 1 We have jurisdiction

over this appeal, pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.

VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 25                                         III. ANALYSIS

¶ 26    On appeal, Total Staffing argues that (1) the circuit court’s judgment on count I claim of a

Trade Secrets Act violation should be reversed, (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in

admitting Marty Lally’s hearsay testimony at trial, and (3) the circuit court’s judgment on count

III claim of a Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act violation and count IV claim

        1
         Because plaintiffs’ notice of appeal was due on April 17, 2022, which fell on a Sunday, the
notice of appeal filed on Monday, April 18, 2022, was timely. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. July 1, 2017)
(notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after final judgment); 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2022)
(providing how to compute time within which to file notice of appeal when the final day is a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday); In re Estate of Malloy, 96 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1025 (1981) (notice of appeal filed 32
days after final judgment was timely, as preceding days were Sunday and a holiday).

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of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage should be reversed. We review each

issue respectively.

¶ 27                                A. Illinois Trade Secrets Act

¶ 28   The Illinois Trade Secrets Act allows recovery of damages for the misappropriation of

trade secrets. 765 ILCS 1065/4 (West 2018); Multimedia Sales & Marketing, Inc. v. Marzullo,

2020 IL App (1st) 191790, ¶ 17. “ ‘To set forth a cause of action for violation of the Act, a plaintiff

must allege facts that the information at issue was: (1) a trade secret; (2) misappropriated; and

(3) used in the defendant’s business.’ ” Multimedia Sales & Marketing, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st)

191790, ¶ 17 (quoting Strata Marketing, Inc. v. Murphy, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1068 (2000)).

¶ 29   Total Staffing argues that we should reverse the trial court’s judgment on the trade secret

claim for three reasons. First, the circuit court misapplied the Trade Secrets Act when it held that

a trade secret requires a person to sign a confidentiality agreement or agree to absolute secrecy to

constitute “sufficiently secret” information under the Trade Secrets Act. Second, the circuit court

erred in holding that misappropriation under the Trade Secrets Act requires a physical

downloading or copying of the trade secret information. Third, the circuit court’s finding that it

was “not difficult to find users of temporary labor” was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 30   Defendants assert the circuit court’s finding that defendants did not violate the Trade

Secrets Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, defendants claim

Total Staffing’s customer and employee information was not a trade secret because (1) the

information was easily obtainable from temporary employees and customers and (2) there was no

evidence that defendants accessed Total Staffing’s databases that contained the customer and

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employee information. Furthermore, defendants allege there was no evidence that they

misappropriated the customer and employee information. Lastly, defendants argue the circuit

court’s finding that it was “not difficult to find users of temporary labor” was a proper credibility

determination.

¶ 31   Generally, the standard of review after a bench trial is whether the order or judgment is

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL

111871, ¶ 12. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite

conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on

the evidence. Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 252 (2002). When the issue is whether the circuit

court applied the correct legal test to the evidence presented, then the issue is a question of law,

which is reviewed de novo. Reliable Fire Equipment, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 13.

¶ 32   Preliminarily, we address the parties’ dispute regarding the standard of review for Total

Staffing’s first two arguments. Total Staffing argues that the court misapplied the law to the

undisputed facts and we should review the issues de novo. Defendants argue such issues are

reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard because the circuit court applied the

proper test to weigh the trial evidence. We disagree with Total Staffing’s contention that these

issues are reviewed de novo. In its brief, Total Staffing argues that the trial court misapplied the

provisions of the Trade Secrets Act because the law neither requires a person to sign a

confidentiality agreement or agree to absolute secrecy for the information to be “sufficiently

secret,” nor requires a physical downloading or copying of the information to constitute a trade

secret. In doing so, Total Staffing does not challenge the circuit court’s application of the proper

legal test, as it agrees that the Trade Secrets Act is applicable here. Rather, Total Staffing asserts

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No. 1-22-0533

that the court misapplied the provision of the Trade Secrets Act to the relevant facts in this case.

Thus, the questions presented here are factual in nature, and the appropriate standard of review for

these issues is the manifest weight of the evidence standard. See Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal

Church, 2014 IL App (4th) 130901, ¶ 39.

¶ 33                                       1. Trade Secret

¶ 34   A “trade secret” is

       “information, including but not limited to, technical or non-technical data, a formula,

       pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing, process, financial data,

       or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers, that:

                (1) is sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential, from not

       being generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure

       or use; and

                (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain

       its secrecy or confidentiality.” 765 ILCS 1065/2 (West 2018).

A “trade secret” must be

       “defined in terms of the facts of a particular case, with the following factors to be

       considered: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer’s

       business; (2) the extent to which information is known by employees and others involved

       in the business; (3) the extent of the measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy

       of the information; (4) the value of the information to the employer and his competitors;

       (5) the effort or money expended by the employer in developing the information; and

       (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or

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       duplicated by others.” Smith Oil Corp. v. Viking Chemical Co., 127 Ill. App. 3d 423, 427

       (1984).

¶ 35   Whether the information constitutes a trade secret focuses fundamentally on its secrecy.

Multimedia Sales & Marketing, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 191790, ¶ 17. Thus, to show that

information falls within the Trade Secrets Act’s purview, the plaintiff must show that the

information was sufficiently secret to give plaintiff a competitive advantage and plaintiff took

affirmative measures to prevent others from acquiring or using the information. Id. Under the

Trade Secrets Act, information is not sufficiently secret to qualify for protection when it is “within

the realm of general skills and knowledge” in the relevant industry. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) REXA, Inc. v. Chester, 42 F.4th 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2022).

¶ 36   The Second District’s decision in Smith Oil Corp., 127 Ill. App. 3d at 427, provides

guidance on this issue. There, the court reviewed whether an employer’s customer information

was protected as a trade secret. Id. In finding that the information in its case was not a trade secret,

the court stated:

                 “The manifest weight of the evidence adduced at the hearing supports the

       conclusion that the customer sales reports were not trade secrets. There was evidence that

       the defendants did not need the plaintiffs’ sales report because the customer would give the

       salesman the price he was paying previously in order to get a competitive price; that

       product and pricing information was routinely given out by Smith order clerks to customers

       over the phone; that the customer lists were not under lock and key and were available to

       any clerk or employee; that computer sales reports were not restricted as to access nor

       locked up; that the defendants knew who the major customers in the industry were from

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No. 1-22-0533

       general experience and merely had to ask the customer to give him a copy of the blanket

       orders, price structure and names of the products he was buying in order to compete; and

       that customers commonly dealt with more than one supplier, depending on who made the

       best bid. While it is undisputed that knowing who the customers are and what their needs

       are is valuable business information, the trial court’s conclusion that the salesman’s

       knowledge comes under the category of general knowledge and not under the category of

       a protectable trade secret is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. at 428.

¶ 37   Similarly, the evidence here supports a finding that Total Staffing’s customer and employee

information were not “sufficiently secret” to gain a competitive advantage. The evidence shows

some of the alleged information, such as pay and bill rates, was determined by and obtained from

the customers. The information was also easily obtainable from Total Staffing. When requested,

Total Staffing gave Hometown Bagel a list of employee names, pay rate, and bill rate information.

Hometown subsequently gave the information to defendants. Thomas testified he never asked

Hometown Bagel to obtain the information from Total Staffing. Although access to the Ultra 32

and Act! databases were restricted, based on an employee’s position and branch territory,

defendants testified that any information used to obtain the seven former Total Staffing costumers

did not come from these databases. Rather, defendants knew the customers by developing personal

relationships with the decision-makers and gathered information, such as the pay and bill rates,

from the customers. Like Smith Oil, the evidence supports the conclusion that defendants used

their general skill and knowledge, rather than “confidential particularized plans or processes

developed by the employer,” to obtain its customers. See id. at 427 (“Generally, an employee

whose employment has terminated may not take ‘confidential particularized plans or processes

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No. 1-22-0533

developed by his employer,’ but may take ‘general skills and knowledge acquired during his tenure

with the former employer’ ” (quoting Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 387 (1965))).

¶ 38    Total Staffing claims that the Second District’s decision in The Agency, Inc. v. Grove, 362

Ill. App. 3d 206 (2005), is analogous to this case. There, the issue before the court was whether

the provisions of a covenant not to compete were enforceable. Id. at 209. In reviewing the issue,

the court had to determine whether “the employee gained confidential information through his

employment that he attempted to use for his own benefit.” Id. at 214. The court stated an employee

“may not take confidential particularized information disclosed to him during the time the

employer-employee relationship existed which are unknown to others in the industry and which

give the employer advantage over his competitors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 216.

The court found that the computerized client profiles containing client identities, client business

cycles, expiration dates, and personnel preferences gave defendant and her subsequent employer

an unfair competitive advantage. Id. at 217-18. The court also found that the information was

relatively unknown where plaintiff took measures to guard its client information from the public.

Id. at 219.

¶ 39    The court held, based on these facts, that the information was confidential, and thus, the

circuit court erred in finding the covenant was unenforceable. Id. The court explained that its

holding was “limited to the enforceability of the confidentiality provisions of the Covenant” and

remanded the case for the circuit court to consider “whether a preliminary injunction should issue

under the Trade Secrets Act.” Id. at 220.

¶ 40    Here, the issue before us is whether the alleged information constitutes a trade secret under

the Trade Secrets Act and involves a different legal framework and procedural posture than those

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No. 1-22-0533

presented in Agency. See id. at 216 (considering whether the confidentiality provisions of the

covenant were enforceable and “the question of whether a covenant is enforceable under the facts

is a legal question subject to de novo review”). Therefore, we find Agency distinguishable from

this case. Here, Total Staffing did not treat the information as confidential and secret because Total

Staffing gave Hometown Bagel a list of employee names, pay rate, and bill rate information. Also,

some customers conducted business with multiple entities, such that their identities were known.

Accordingly, we hold the circuit court’s finding that the customer and employee information were

not protectable trade secrets was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 41                                     2. Misappropriation

¶ 42   Total Staffing argues that the circuit court erred as a matter of law by concluding there was

no misappropriation. We find that there can be no misappropriation of a trade secret where there

is no trade secret. Because we find that the circuit court’s ruling that Total Staffing failed to

establish a protectable trade secret was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the

question of whether defendants misappropriated trade secrets is moot.

¶ 43                           3. Factual Finding (Temporary Labor)

¶ 44   In its ruling, the circuit court found “while plaintiff claims that it was difficult to find users

of temporary labor, defendants testified to the contrary. The [c]ourt finds that defendants’

testimony is more credible than plaintiff’s testimony.” The trial evidence supports the circuit

court’s finding, as the evidence infers that customers were available and accessible. Thomas

testified that Staff Illinois obtained customers from its temporary employees’ employment history.

The witnesses testified that it was common for customers to use multiple staffing companies at

one time, especially when one staffing company could not provide enough temporary employees

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No. 1-22-0533

to fulfill labor demands. Reynaldo testified that Accurate Partitions used multiple staffing

companies after it obtained business from Staff Illinois and that it maintained a relationship with

both Total Staffing and Staff Illinois. The circuit court found this testimony more credible than the

testimony of other witnesses, who testified that finding users of temporary labor was difficult.

“Under the manifest weight standard, we give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact

because it is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses.”

Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006). Therefore, we hold that the circuit court’s finding

regarding temporary labor was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 45                                   B. Hearsay Testimony

¶ 46    Total Staffing argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting Marty Lally’s

hearsay testimony that Sam, Hometown Bagel’s production manager, informed Marty that Total

Staffing was not performing well. Total Staffing claims Marty’s testimony was material to the

court’s decision on the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act claim. Defendants contend

Marty’s testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted

but, rather, to elicit the reason why Marty decided to terminate Total Staffing’s services.

Defendants further claim that the issue is waived because Total Staffing failed to object “until well

after [Marty] made his statements.” Illinois courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when

reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of hearsay. In re Jovan A., 2014 IL App

(1st) 103835, ¶ 20. An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is

arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by

the trial court. Id.

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No. 1-22-0533

¶ 47   We first address the defendants’ waiver argument. To preserve an issue for appellate

review, a party must make a timely objection. Sinclair v. Berlin, 325 Ill. App. 3d 458, 467 (2001).

Generally, timeliness requires that objections to evidence be made at the time the evidence is

offered or as soon as the grounds for the objection become apparent. Id. During examination of

Marty Lally, the following exchange occurred:

       “[DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: Do you recall any issues with Total Staffing services to

       Hometown Bagel?

       A. Yeah, there were issues of not fulfilling orders and (inaudible).

       [DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: I can’t hear you.

       A. There were issues of orders going unfilled, people not showing up when they said people

       were gonna show up, and also some unqualified workers where they would show up and

       they were not fit for the job, and then we’d—you know, just kind of a turnstile at the door.

                                              ***

       [DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: Mr. Lally, when there was a problem with an employee

       of Total Staffing, who dealt with it, you or Sam, the production manager?

       A. Mostly Sam.

       [DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: So, anything that you knew or think you knew about the

       problems came from Sam, correct?

       A. Correct.

       [PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I ask his prior testimony about the problems

       be stricken as hearsay.

       [DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, he said most of, he didn’t say all of.

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No. 1-22-0533

       THE COURT: The request to strike the testimony is denied.”

¶ 48   Here, the grounds for objection became apparent when Marty identified that the

information regarding Total Staffing’s performance did not come from himself but from Sam, the

production manager. At that moment, the plaintiffs’ attorney objected to Marty’s prior statement.

Thus, we find plaintiffs’ objection timely, and the issue was preserved for appellate review. As

such, we consider whether the circuit court improperly allowed Marty’s alleged hearsay statement.

¶ 49   Hearsay is a statement, other than a statement made by the declarant while testifying at the

trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ill. R. Evid. 801(c)

(eff. Oct. 15, 2015); McIntyre v. Balagani, 2019 IL App (3d) 140543, ¶ 92. An out-of-court

statement offered as evidence for some purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted

is not hearsay. McIntyre, 2019 IL App (3d) 140543, ¶ 92.

¶ 50   Here, Marty’s statement about Total Staffing’s performance was not offered to prove the

truth of the matter asserted—namely, that Sam stated there were issues with unfulfilled orders.

Rather, the statements were offered to show what occurred before Hometown Bagel transferred its

business to Staff Illinois. Marty’s statement does not constitute hearsay and, therefore, was

admissible at trial. Accordingly, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

Marty’s statement about Total Staffing’s performance.

¶ 51                  C. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act

¶ 52   Total Staffing claims defendants engaged in deceptive acts and practices in violation of the

Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act when they made misrepresentations to

Marty Lally, an officer of Hometown Bagel, about Total Staffing’s treatment of Craig’s children

and mother and converted the employment of Total Staffing’s employees working at Hometown

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No. 1-22-0533

Bagel to Staff Illinois. Defendants assert the circuit court’s finding that Hometown Bagel did not

rely on any alleged fraud or deception when it transferred to Staff Illinois was consistent with the

manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 53   To state a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices

Act, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deceptive act or practice was committed by the defendant, (2) the

defendants intended that the plaintiff rely on the deception, and (3) the deception occurred during

conduct involving trade and commerce. Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank of Fox Valley, N.A.,

186 Ill. 2d 472, 492 (1999). The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act defines

“unfair or deceptive acts or practices” to include

       “the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise,

       misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with

       intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact,

       or the use or employment of any practice described in Section 2 of the ‘Uniform Deceptive

       Trade Practices Act.’ ” 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2018).

¶ 54   Here, Total Staffing claims defendants misrepresented information to Hometown Bagel.

“Where the deception is based on a misrepresentation, that misrepresentation must be material and

must relate to a matter upon which the plaintiff could be expected to rely in determining whether

to engage in the conduct in question.” Smith v. Prime Cable of Chicago, 276 Ill. App. 3d 843, 857

(1995). A representation known to be false or made in culpable ignorance of its truth or falsity is

fraudulent. Crowder v. Bob Oberling Enterprises, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 313, 316 (1986). Even a

negligent or innocent misrepresentation may be actionable under the Consumer Fraud and

Deceptive Business Practices Act. Aliano v. Ferriss, 2013 IL App (1st) 120242, ¶ 12. As a general

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No. 1-22-0533

rule, the expression of an opinion does not support an action under the Consumer Fraud and

Deceptive Business Practices Act. In re Estate of Albergo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 439, 451 (1995). “A

representation is one of opinion rather than fact if it only expresses the speaker’s belief, without

certainty, as to the existence of a fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antonacci v. Seyfarth

Shaw, LLP, 2015 IL App (1st) 142372, ¶ 35.

¶ 55   The evidence supports a finding that the statements Thomas made to Marty did not

constitute misrepresentations. On March 21, 2018, during the meeting with Marty and Kathy Lally,

Thomas told Marty that Paul and Joe “stabbed [Mary] in the back” and that Mary felt betrayed

because the Total Staffing employees were instructed not to schedule client meetings for Mary and

Thomas. Thomas also stated that Mary planned to start a competing staffing agency after she quit.

Mary confirmed in her testimony that she was “[v]ery angry” by the decision that she could not

attend client meetings alone. These statements are further supported by Joseph’s testimony that he

created a new policy that he had to attend all customer meetings when he became vice president

of Total Staffing and that he did not “pick on” Mary when he made that decision. Thus, the

statements Thomas made to Marty about Mary were not misrepresentations, but truthful statements

supported by testimony. Also, during the 2018 meeting, Thomas told Marty that Paul and Joe were

treating Craig’s children unfairly. Thomas explained he felt this way because Total Staffing

       “just were not giving them, I guess, a seat at the table for my brother’s shares. They were

       giving them a run around. And I didn’t feel that it was fair, you know, that this company

       that basically has a state, they were doing whatever they were doing. I don’t know.”

Given the context of his statement, the belief of Thomas that Craig’s children were treated unfairly

speaks to his opinion rather than a misrepresentation.

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No. 1-22-0533

¶ 56   Furthermore, the evidence also supports a finding that defendants did not misrepresent any

information regarding Total Staffing when Staff Illinois converted the temporary employees who

worked at Hometown Bagel from Total Staffing to Staff Illinois. Mary testified that, when

Hometown Bagel joined Staff Illinois, she told Jose to inform the temporary employees that

Hometown Bagel was switching staffing agencies. Mary testified that she also conducted the same

conversion process during her employment with Total Staffing several times. Jose testified he

informed the employees that Hometown Bagel was switching staffing agencies and that the

workers who wanted to continue working for Hometown Bagel had to complete a Staff Illinois

application. He also told the employees that the workers who wanted to stay employed with Total

Staffing needed to seek another work assignment. Elvira testified that the owner of Hometown

Bagel, Kathy Lally, informed workers that Hometown Bagel decided to change staffing agencies

and that the workers had to decide whether they wanted to work for the new staffing agency or

seek work reassignment with Total Staffing. Jose then discussed Staff Illinois with the workers

and provided applications. Although Esmeralda testified that Jose told the temporary employees

that Total Staffing “was gonna shut down,” her testimony was contradicted by Mary, Jose, and

Elvira’s testimony, and we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings based on that testimony.

See Chicago’s Pizza, Inc. v. Chicago’s Pizza Franchise Ltd. USA, 384 Ill. App. 3d 849, 859 (2008).

Therefore, we hold the circuit court’s conclusion on the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business

Practices Act claim was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 57            D. Tortious Interference With a Prospective Economic Advantage

¶ 58   Total Staffing claims defendants tortiously interfered with a prospective economic

advantage when they misrepresented to Marty Lally, an officer of Hometown Bagel, that Total

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No. 1-22-0533

Staffing treated Craig’s children and mother unfairly and converted the employment of Total

Staffing’s employees working at Hometown Bagel to Staff Illinois. Total Staffing acknowledges

the exception of lawful competition; however, it claims the exception is inapplicable here, where

defendants engaged in unfair means of competing. Defendants contend they used lawful means to

obtain Hometown Bagel’s business and, therefore, did not tortiously interfere with a prospective

economic advantage.

¶ 59   Under a claim of tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff

must prove (1) a reasonable expectation of entering a valid business relationship, (2) the

defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s expectancy, (3) purposeful interference by the defendant

that prevents the plaintiff’s legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship,

and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from such interference. Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142

Ill. 2d 495, 511 (1991). This court recognizes the privilege of lawful competition. See Soderlund

Brothers, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 278 Ill. App. 3d 606, 615 (1995). “The privilege to engage in

business and to compete allows one to divert business from one’s competitors generally as well as

from one’s particular competitors provided one’s intent is, at least in part, to further one’s business

and is not solely motivated by spite or ill will.” Id. This court has relied on the guidance of section

768 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which sets forth the elements for lawful competition.

Section 768 states:

                “(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective

       contractual relation with another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing

       contract terminable at will does not interfere improperly with the other’s relation if

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No. 1-22-0533

                        (a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the

                 actor and the other and

                        (b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and

                        (c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and

                        (d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with

                 the other.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 (1979).

¶ 60      The comments in the Restatement (Second) of Torts further explain each element.

Specifically, discussing wrongful means, comment e provides, “The predatory means discussed in

§ 767, Comment c, physical violence, fraud, civil suits and criminal prosecutions, are all wrongful

in the situation covered by this Section. On the other hand, the actor may use persuasion and he

may exert limited economic pressure.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768, cmt. e (1979).

Dealing with unlawful restraint of trade, comment f explains, “One who refuses to deal with

another *** to establish or maintain an illegal monopoly is subject to liability to the other.

Obviously, he is subject to liability if for the same purpose he intentionally causes third persons

not to deal with the other.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768, cmt. f (1979). Addressing one’s

interest in competition, comment g states, “if his conduct is directed solely to the satisfaction of

his spite or ill will and not at all to the advancement of his competitive interests over the person

harmed, his interference is held to be improper.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768, cmt. g

(1979).

¶ 61      Considering these factors, the evidence supports a finding that defendants engaged in

lawful competition. As to subsection (a), Total Staffing and Staff Illinois are engaged in the same

business of providing temporary labor to businesses. As to subsection (b), Mary and Jose testified

                                                - 29 -
No. 1-22-0533

they reached out to the businesses at issue only to inform them of their new agency, and these

businesses transferred their labor to Staff Illinois because they were experiencing issues with Total

Staffing’s services or had developed a positive relationship with Mary. Marty testified Hometown

Bagel was experiencing staffing problems before it transitioned to Staff Illinois. Reynaldo testified

that Accurate Partitions “had recurring service issues with Total Staffing.” The evidence supports

a finding that none of defendants’ actions reach the level of wrongful means anticipated by section

768 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. At most, the evidence demonstrates defendants’ actions

were acceptable uses of persuasion in their business practices.

¶ 62   As to subsection (c), the witnesses testified that it was common for customers to use

multiple staffing companies at one time, especially when one staffing company could not provide

enough temporary employees to fulfil labor demands. For instance, Reynaldo testified that

Accurate Partitions maintained its relationship with Total Staffing and used multiple staffing

companies after it obtained business from Staff Illinois. Reynaldo explained, “I have always

believed in the world that I live in in [sic] manufacturing, you never put your eggs just in one

basket. So, I made sure that I kept the relationship with Total as well as with Illinois.” Thus, the

evidence supports a finding that defendants’ actions allowed for freedom of trade between the

staffing agencies. As to subsection (d), the evidence shows that defendants recruited and obtained

business by other means outside of the seven businesses at issue. Thomas testified that Staff Illinois

obtains customers by referring to temporary employees’ previous employer because “most of the

time, if they’re a temporary worker coming to work for us, they were a temporary worker at their

other location.” This method is “100 percent our process right now. We have no salespeople.”

Thomas also stated that Staff Illinois obtains temporary workers by posting “a lot of fliers

                                                - 30 -
No. 1-22-0533

everywhere we can: job boards, word-of-month referrals, talk to employees, hit the streets, hustle.”

There is no evidence that defendants’ only agenda was to seek Hometown Bagel’s business out of

spite or ill will. Therefore, the circuit court’s finding on the tortious interference with a prospective

economic advantage claim was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 63                                     IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 64    Pursuant to our deferential standard, the circuit court’s findings in favor of defendants and

against plaintiffs on counts I, III, and IV of the second amended complaint for preliminary and

permanent injunctive relief and damages were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 65    Affirmed.

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No. 1-22-0533

         Total Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Staffing, Inc., 2023 IL App (1st) 220533

Decision Under Review:        Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2018-CH-
                              04399; the Hon. Patrick J. Sherlock, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                     Alan W. Nicgorski, of Hansen Reynolds LLC, and Gregg
for                           Minkow, of Minkow & Bergman, LLC, both of Chicago, for
Appellant:                    appellants.

Attorneys                     Gregory J. Jordan and Mark R. Zito, of Jordan & Zito LLC, of
for                           Chicago, for appellees.
Appellee:

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