Court Opinion

ID: 9850338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:55:40.593803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:35.649474
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize my opinion that the State has created a dangerous precedent by its choice to utilize such a broad and vague definition of “theft” in its charges against Dorsey. By failing to distinguish those acts which undoubtedly do merit criminal charges from those that occur everyday as a matter of fact in almost any public office, the *545State has created the risk that public officers may face selective political prosecutions for minor occurrences.
The evidence unmistakably shows that Dorsey treated the DeKalb County sheriffs office as his own personal fiefdom. Throughout his tenure, Dorsey forced his deputies to foresake their job duties to do his personal bidding, while they were ostensibly working for, and being paid by, the county. Undoubtedly, Dorsey’s efforts to utilize county employees for his own pecuniary gain, such as staffing county deputies at his private security firm while they were being paid by the county, merits criminal prosecution. In its unbridled zeal to convict Dorsey, however, the State failed to provide any cognizable distinction between those actions which would constitute a legitimate “theft of services” and those of a less egregious character, such as mailing Christmas packages during the holiday season. Plainly, there must be some distinction between the two.
I submit that one clear distinction involves the purpose for which the public employee’s efforts are used. Where, as was so often the case under Dorsey’s command, a public employer uses his employees for his personal pecuniary gain, that employer may be prosecuted for a theft of public services.
In addition, where a public employer orders an employee to forsake his employment duties in order to tend to the employer’s personal affairs, that too may in certain cases constitute a theft of public services. But the RICO statute cannot be so broad as to render it a violation anytime a public employee spends a single minute working on a task related to his employer’s personal interest. In that case, it may only constitute a valid theft of services where the employer has so usurped the employee’s time that they are rendered unable to perform the services for which they were hired. In such cases, the scope of the misappropriation of employee time may be the distinguishing feature. As the majority notes, Dorsey’s conduct in this regard was “so far outside the realm of acceptable police behavior” that it obviously warranted criminal prosecution.
I write separately because I believe the State should recognize some limitation, other than prosecutorial discretion, on its ability to prosecute public officers for the use of their employees’ time. Without such limitations, any public officer risks a politically motivated prosecution merely for asking his assistant to help him with a personal task, even if it allows the employer to dedicate himself more completely to his official duties. That kind of disincentive to public service, and potential for prosecutorial abuse, would have nothing but negative consequences to the quality of our public officers. Because of the numerous egregious acts committed by Dorsey, I concur with the majority opinion affirming Dorsey’s convictions.
*546Decided June 30, 2005.
Brian Steel, Garland, Samuel & Loeb, Donald F. Samuel, for appellant.
Gwendolyn R. Keyes, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, John E. Floyd, for appellee.