Court Opinion

ID: 9904801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 22:00:25.498576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.035928
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                    For the First Circuit

No. 21-1665

                      ROSY KHANAL SINGH,

                          Petitioner,

                              v.

                      MERRICK B. GARLAND,

                          Respondent.

                PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
              OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

                            Before

               Montecalvo, Selya, and Thompson,
                        Circuit Judges.

     Steve Jeffrey Gutherz, for petitioner.
     Yanal H. Yousef, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, with whom Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, and Sheri R. Glaser, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for
respondent.

                       November 27, 2023
           MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge.     Petitioner Rosy Khanal Singh

seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

("BIA") affirming the denial of her applications for asylum and

withholding of removal.      Singh sought these forms of relief based

on claims that she experienced past persecution and had a well-

founded fear of future persecution on account of political opinion

and membership in a particular social group (her nuclear family).

Before us, her challenges are limited to the agency's denial of

her asylum and withholding of removal claims that were premised on

alleged past persecution suffered in 2007 at the hands of Maoist

insurgents in Nepal.    Specifically, Singh contends that the agency

erred in concluding that she failed to establish that the Nepali

government was unwilling or unable to protect her. For the reasons

that follow, we deny the petition.

                              I. Background

           Singh entered the United States in May 2012 on a B-1

temporary visa.      She overstayed her visa, and in February 2016,

the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issued Singh a Notice

to Appear.   Singh conceded removability and applied for asylum,

withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against

Torture   ("CAT"),    and   voluntary   departure.1   Her   asylum   and

     1    The Immigration Judge ruled against Singh on her CAT
claim, and Singh did not challenge this ruling before the BIA or

                                  - 2 -
withholding of removal applications rested on claims of past

persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution at the

hands of the Nepali Maoist party.

             In November 2018, an Immigration Judge ("IJ") convened

a hearing at which Singh testified and submitted documentary

evidence for the IJ's review, including a declaration from her

father-in-law, letters from the Nepali Congress Party ("NCP"), a

police report, and news articles regarding violence in Nepal.                    At

the hearing, the IJ, upon DHS's request and with counsel for

Singh's consent, took judicial notice of the State Department's

2017   Country   Conditions      Report   for    Nepal.        Although   the    IJ

ultimately rejected Singh's asylum and withholding of removal

applications, the IJ deemed Singh's testimony credible.

             Singh's testimony before the IJ included the following

account. In 2007, Singh lived with her husband, son, and husband's

parents in Kapilvastu, Nepal.         Her father-in-law was a prominent

local member of the NCP. In September 2007, individuals associated

with   the   Maoists   --   an   insurgent      group   that    signed    a   peace

agreement with the Nepali government in November 2006 marking the

end of a 10-year civil war -- killed a prominent NCP leader in

before us. As such, her claim for protection under CAT is waived.
See Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2004).

                                    - 3 -
Kapilvastu.     Singh's husband spoke out against the Maoists for the

killing.

              About a month after the killing, a group of Maoists

invaded Singh's home.          The Maoists tied up Singh's in-laws and

beat her husband with the butt of a gun.                As a result, Singh's

husband suffered a broken hand and bled from his head.               During the

attack, one of the perpetrators also pushed Singh into the corner

of a table, and she lost consciousness.

              Luckily,   a   neighbor,   who    also   was   a   former     Nepali

military officer, heard the commotion and notified the army.

Members of the army quickly arrived, and the group of Maoists fled.

Singh   and    her   husband   were   treated    for    their    injuries    at   a

hospital.     Shortly after being discharged, Singh's husband fled to

India, and Singh testified that she had not heard from him since

November 2007.

              About a week after the attack, Maoists kidnapped Singh's

son while he was on his way home from school.                The Maoists held

Singh's son for approximately two weeks.               Singh's father-in-law,

NCP leaders, and a local resident associated with the Maoists

negotiated with the Maoists and reached an agreement to secure her

son's release.       In exchange for her son's release, Singh's family

made two promises: (1) Singh's father-in-law would not express

opposition to the Maoists; and (2) Singh and her family would

                                      - 4 -
remain in the village.    The kidnappers also warned Singh not to

report the incident to the police, and so she did not.

          After these two incidents -- and despite her promise to

remain in the village -- Singh and her son moved to live with her

parents about one day's bus ride away from the village.          Singh

remained there until she moved to the United States five years

later on a B-1 visa.   About three years after that, her son joined

her in the United States on a student visa.      Singh and her son had

no further run-ins with the Maoists after they left Kapilvastu and

moved in with her parents in Biratnagar.         However, Singh heard

that the Maoists were still looking for them.      Singh's father-in-

law remained politically active in Kapilvastu, and since 2007, he

and Singh's mother-in-law have not experienced further harm.

          The   IJ   granted   Singh's    application   for   voluntary

departure but denied her claims for asylum, withholding of removal,

and protection under the CAT.    The IJ denied the claims for asylum

and withholding of removal on the basis that Singh failed to

establish that she had experienced past persecution or had a well-

founded fear of future persecution.      The IJ rejected Singh's claim

of past persecution for two independent reasons.        First, the IJ

found that the two October 2007 incidents -- the attack and the

kidnapping -- "d[id] not rise above a series of isolated events"

to the level of persecution.    Second, the IJ concluded that Singh

                                - 5 -
had not adduced sufficient evidence to establish that any harm was

the result of the Nepali government's action or inaction.           On this

second point, the IJ stressed that the Nepali army responded

promptly to the home invasion and Singh never notified the police

of the kidnapping.       As for Singh's claims premised on future

persecution, the IJ found that Singh lacked the required well-

founded fear because neither Singh nor her family had experienced

any harm at the hands of the Maoists after 2007.

            Singh appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA, which

affirmed the IJ's decision.     Regarding Singh's claims premised on

past persecution, the BIA declined to reach the issue of whether

the harm Singh suffered during October 2007 rose to the level of

persecution and rested its affirmance solely on Singh's failure to

establish that any persecution was by individuals that "the Nepali

government was unable or unwilling to control."            The BIA also

identified no clear error in the IJ's implicit finding that Singh

"suffered and fears harm from private actors, as opposed to

government officials."      And the BIA agreed with the IJ that Singh

had   not   independently   shown    a   well-founded   fear   of   future

persecution.    Accordingly, the BIA affirmed the denial of Singh's

asylum and withholding of removal applications and reinstated the

period of voluntary departure.

            Singh timely filed the present petition for review.

                                    - 6 -
                           II. Standard of Review

           We review the "BIA's decision . . . as the agency's final

decision and look to the IJ's decision only 'to the extent that

the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ's reasoning.'"                Mendez v.

Garland, 67 F.4th 474, 481 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Chavez v.

Garland, 51 F.4th 424, 429 (1st Cir. 2022)); see also Bonilla v.

Mukasey, 539 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2008).              In doing so, "[w]e

examine   the   agency's    findings   of   fact    under   the   substantial

evidence standard, upholding its factual findings so long as they

are 'supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence

on the record considered as a whole.'" Murillo Morocho v. Garland,

80 F.4th 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Sanabria Morales v. Barr,

967 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2020)).           In other words, the agency's

factual findings must "be upheld unless a 'reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'"                  Orelien v.

Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Bocova v.

Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir. 2004)).           On the other hand,

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.           Mendez, 67 F.4th at 481.

           In our review, "[w]e confine ourselves to the reasoning

relied on by the agency and will not affirm on other bases."

Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th at 65.            And " we limit our review to

those issues properly exhausted before the agency."               Id.

                                   - 7 -
                                 III. Discussion

            To qualify for asylum, an applicant "must demonstrate

either     past    persecution     or    a    well-founded      fear    of   future

persecution       on   account    of    her   race,     religion,      nationality,

political opinion, or membership in a particular social group."

Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)

(stating that establishment of past persecution on account of a

protected ground creates a rebuttable presumption of well-founded

fear of future persecution); Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 857 F.3d

130, 134 (1st Cir. 2017) (explaining that a non-citizen "who has

suffered past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear

of persecution and thus to be entitled to a grant of asylum"

(citing Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2016))).                    "Where

a private actor, rather than the government itself, is alleged to

be   the    persecutor,      the       applicant      must   demonstrate        'some

connection'       between   the    actions      of     the   private    actor    and

'governmental action or inaction.'"2                 Rosales Justo v. Sessions,

     2    The IJ determined that Singh failed to show that any
alleged persecution "was the direct result of [g]overnment action,
[g]overnment   supported    action[,]   or    the   [g]overnment's
unwillingness or inability to control private conduct." Although
the IJ did not explicitly find that the Maoists who harmed Singh
were private actors, rather than government actors, the BIA
expressly upheld the IJ's "finding that [Singh] suffered and fears
harm from private actors, as opposed to government officials" as

                                        - 8 -
895 F.3d 154, 162 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Ortiz-Araniba, 505 F.3d

at 41).   Specifically, Singh had the burden of establishing "that

the government was either 'unable or unwilling' to protect [her]

from persecution."   Id. (quoting Burbiene v. Holder, 568 F.3d 251,

255 (1st Cir. 2009)).    For withholding of removal, an applicant

must show the same requirements, but the burden of proof is even

higher: she must prove "that it is more likely than not that she

would face persecution on account of a protected ground if returned

not clearly erroneous.     In so doing, the BIA cited Singh's
testimony before the IJ regarding who attacked her and her family.
In that cited portion of the testimony, Singh agreed that the
people who attacked her "[were not] members of the [g]overnment."
Before us, Singh does not argue that the IJ did not actually find
that her attackers were private actors and that the BIA thus
engaged in improper factfinding. Nor does she argue that the BIA
erred in upholding the IJ's finding that the Maoists who attacked
her were private actors, rather than government actors.        Any
argument that the IJ or BIA erred in treating her attackers as
private actors rather than government actors is therefore waived.
See Morales-Morales, 857 F.3d at 135 (explaining that "we may
fairly deem [undeveloped] claim[s] abandoned" or waived).
          To be sure, Singh makes several arguments regarding the
Maoist party's control of the government in Nepal around the time
of the 2007 incidents. But she makes those arguments under the
theory that the government was "unable or unwilling" to control
the private actors. In other words, those arguments are tied to
Singh's contention that even though her attackers themselves may
not have been government actors, the government was full of Maoists
who embraced violence and thus was unable to protect her -- even
if some members of the government affiliated with other parties
may have been willing to protect her. Those arguments are thus
separate from any argument for treating her attackers as government
actors themselves -- the waived argument described above.

                               - 9 -
to her country."    Pojoy-De León v. Barr, 984 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir.

2020).

          Singh's primary contention of error before us concerns

the   agency's     determination    regarding      her   claims   of   past

persecution and the government's willingness or ability to protect

her at that time.3       Specifically, she argues that substantial

evidence does not support the agency's findings that the harm Singh

experienced was not perpetrated by actors whom the government was

"unwilling or unable" to control.           In so doing, she asserts that

the IJ should have taken judicial notice of the United States

Department of State 2007 Human Rights Report for Nepal ("the 2007

Report") and that if the IJ had done so, the IJ would have been

compelled to find that the Nepali government was unwilling or

unable to protect her against Maoist insurgents.         Relatedly, Singh

      3   Singh also argues that the harm she experienced in
October 2007 did rise to the level of persecution (contrary to the
IJ's decision that it did not). But, as Singh recognizes elsewhere
in her brief, this argument is not properly before us because the
BIA did not consider this aspect of the IJ's decision. See Chavez,
51 F.4th at 433 ("When the BIA does not consider an IJ's
alternative ground for denying relief, that ground is not before
us." (quoting Bonilla, 539 F.3d at 81-82)).
          Additionally, Singh makes no argument in her briefing
contesting the BIA's determination (agreeing with the IJ) that she
failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution
independent from any presumption based on past persecution. Thus,
we deem that claim waived and do not address it.      See Morales-
Morales, 857 F.3d at 135.

                                   - 10 -
further   asserts     that      the   IJ   erroneously   relied      on   a   later

Department of State 2017 Human Rights Report for Nepal ("the 2017

Report"), rather than the 2007 Report properly corresponding to

the   year    of    the    alleged     past    persecution,    in    making      the

determination on the past persecution "unwilling or unable" issue.

             We    start   by   considering     the   latter   two    assertions

regarding the Department of State reports.               Contrary to Singh's

counsel's contentions otherwise at oral argument, Singh never

argued to the BIA that the IJ committed error by either (1) failing

to take judicial notice of the 2007 Report, or (2) allegedly

considering the 2017 Report (in place of the 2007 Report) when

assessing the claims related to past persecution. Under principles

of administrative exhaustion, "we consistently have held that

arguments not made before the BIA may not make their debut in a

petition for judicial review of the BIA's final order."                       Gomez-

Abrego v. Garland, 26 F.4th 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 97

(1st Cir. 2010)).          Thus, because Singh did not properly exhaust

her arguments about the IJ's alleged error regarding the 2007 and

2017 Reports, we do not rule on those arguments here.4

      4   Even if these issues were properly presented to us
following administrative exhaustion, we would reject Singh's
contention that the IJ committed error in either of these ways.
Singh did not file the 2007 Report before the IJ or at any time

                                      - 11 -
            Though she did not raise the arguments described above

before the BIA, Singh filed an excerpt of the 2007 Report for the

first time in her appeal to the BIA and suggested that the excerpt

was   relevant   to   the   analysis   of   the   government's   action   or

inaction.    Noting that the excerpt was not in "the record as

constituted at the time of her hearing," the BIA nevertheless

considered the excerpt and held it "does not demonstrate that the

harm [Singh] described was perpetuated by either the government or

by individuals or groups that the government is unable or unwilling

to control."     Because the BIA's consideration of the excerpt was

proper5 and our review is focused on the BIA's decision (reviewing

request that the IJ take judicial notice of that Report. Thus,
the IJ did not err in failing to take judicial notice of the 2007
Report when it was never put before the IJ.
          We would also reject the contention that the IJ committed
error in the IJ's use of the 2017 Report. The IJ did take judicial
notice of the 2017 Report, upon DHS's request at the hearing before
the IJ and with counsel for Singh's consent. However, the IJ's
decision only references the 2017 Report in its analysis of whether
Singh had a well-founded fear of future persecution independent of
any presumption based on past persecution. There is no indication
in the IJ's decision that the IJ relied on the 2017 Report at all
in assessing the past persecution claims regarding the 2007 events.
      5   The BIA's consideration of the 2007 Report excerpt
despite its absence from the record before the IJ was permitted,
though not required, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A). See
Yang Zhao-Cheng v. Holder, 721 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2013)
("[A]lthough the BIA is empowered to take administrative notice of
commonly known facts such as current events or the contents of
official documents, it is not compelled to do so." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kaihua Huang v. Holder, 312 F.
App'x 420, 422 (2d Cir. 2009))); Jinbei Zhao v. Barr, 824 F. App'x

                                  - 12 -
portions of the IJ's decision only to the extent that the BIA

deferred to or adopted the IJ's reasoning), see Chavez, 51 F.4th

at 429, we will consider the 2007 Report excerpt and the BIA's use

of it in our analysis of the agency's "unwilling or unable"

findings below.

            We turn now to Singh's broader argument that the agency's

"unwilling or unable" findings were not supported by substantial

evidence.   In order to demonstrate the required connection between

the   actions   of   the   alleged    private   actor   persecutors   and

governmental action or inaction, Singh "had the burden of proving

that the government was either 'unwilling or unable' to protect

[her] from persecution."     Rosales Justo, 895 F.3d at 162 (citing

Burbiene, 568 F.3d at 255).     Though Singh had the burden to "prove

either unwillingness or inability," she was not required to prove

both to succeed on her claim.        Id. at 163.   As we have previously

explained, "unwillingness and inability are distinct issues" and

13, 14 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that the "BIA properly took
administrative notice of the U.S. State Department's 2004 Profile
of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions" under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) after the petitioner "submitted only limited
evidence of country conditions at the time of her merits hearing"
before the IJ).   This regulation provides: "The [BIA] will not
engage in factfinding in the course of deciding cases, except that
the [BIA] may take administrative notice of facts that are not
reasonably subject to dispute, such as . . . (2) The contents of
official documents outside the record . . . ."            8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A).

                                 - 13 -
the "inquiry into whether there is a government nexus must include

separate consideration of the evidence of unwillingness and the

evidence of inability."       Id. at 163, 164 n.8.

            Here,     the    BIA's     finding     (upholding        the   IJ's

determination below) that Singh "did not carry her burden to

establish past persecution by individuals or groups the Nepali

government was unable or unwilling to control" was supported by

substantial evidence.         In making this finding, the BIA first

referenced the two facts cited by the IJ in this analysis: (1)

that the Nepali army responded when a neighbor alerted them to the

home invasion, and the Maoists fled; and (2) that Singh did not

report the kidnapping incident to the police because she believed

that "the consequences would not be good."                Noting that "[o]n

appeal, [Singh] does not challenge the Immigration Judge's finding

regarding the government's ability or willingness to protect her

from the Maoists based on the record as constituted at the time of

her hearing," the BIA proceeded to consider the 2007 Report excerpt

that Singh filed for the first time in her appeal to the BIA.               The

excerpt states that in 2007, Nepal was "operating under an interim

political   system:    a    parliamentary     democracy   with   a    powerless

constitutional monarchy.       Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala has

a multiparty coalition government, which includes members of the

Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M)."            U.S. Dep't of State,

                                     - 14 -
Bureau of Democracy, H.R. & Lab., Nepal 2007 (2008).             The excerpt

also describes ongoing severe violence by Maoists in 2007 despite

the peace agreement in 2006 and states that "[l]acking politica[l]

backing,    police   were   often   reluctant   to   intervene    [in   armed

attacks], particularly against the Maoists or . . . members [of

the Maoists' subsidiary organization, YCL]." Id. It also explains

that generally in Nepal in 2007, "[i]mpunity for human rights

violators . . . [was a] serious problem[]."            Id.   The BIA found

simply, without elaborating on its reasoning, that the 2007 Report

excerpt "does not demonstrate that the harm [Singh] described was

perpetuated by either the government or by individuals or groups

that the government is unable or unwilling to control."

            In addition to the 2007 Report, before us, Singh points

to a 2012 New York Times article that was part of her original

evidentiary filing before the IJ in support of her argument that

the government was unwilling or unable to protect her from her

persecutors.   That article describes conditions generally in Nepal

following    the     2006   peace    agreement,      including   government

corruption and Maoists' and other groups' "street tactics" for

inciting political protest involving violent acts.           Seyom Brown &

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Nepal, on the Brink of Collapse, N.Y. Times

(June 5, 2012).

                                    - 15 -
            On this record, substantial evidence supports the BIA's

findings as to both the "unwilling" and "unable" analyses.             The

Nepali army's prompt response to the attack on Singh and her family

in their home reasonably supports the government's willingness to

take action to protect Singh from her Maoist persecutors under our

prior caselaw.     See, e.g., Ortiz-Araniba, 505 F.3d at 42 ("In

determining whether a government is willing and able to control

persecutors, we have explained that a prompt response by local

authorities to prior incidents is 'the most telling datum.'"

(quoting Harutyunyan      v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir.

2005))).    In the face of this specific evidence of the army's

willingness to intervene (and its actual intervention) to protect

Singh, the more general contrary evidence from the 2007 Report's

reference   to   Nepali   police's   reluctance    to   intervene   against

Maoist violence is insufficient to compel a different result than

that reached by the BIA and the IJ on the willingness issue.

            As to the separate analysis of the government's ability

to offer protection, we have explained that prior efforts by the

government to protect an asylum applicant from persecution that

"proved fruitful" can support a finding that the government is

able to offer an applicant protection.            See Rosales Justo, 895

F.3d at 163-64 (first citing Khattak v. Holder, 704 F.3d 197, 206

(1st Cir. 2013); then citing Khan, 727 F.3d at 7-8; and then citing

                                 - 16 -
Ortiz-Araniba,      505   F.3d   at   42-43)      (explaining    that    where    a

government's "willing efforts to protect its citizens fall short,"

an applicant may be able to prove inability without proving

unwillingness, whereas in cases where evidence shows government

efforts "proved fruitful," courts have found such evidence to

support   both      government    willingness       and   ability       to   offer

protection).        Here, the fact that the Maoist persecutors who

invaded Singh's home fled when the army was called demonstrates

"fruitful" action to protect Singh by the Nepali government.

          Singh's failure to report the kidnapping incident to the

police was also a proper consideration for the BIA and the IJ to

raise in this analysis.          The failure of a petitioner to report

persecution    to    authorities      "is   not    necessarily    fatal      to   a

petitioner's case if the petitioner can demonstrate that reporting

private abuse to government authorities would have been futile."

Morales-Morales, 857 F.3d at 135 (first citing Pavlova v. INS, 441

F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2006); and then citing Ornelas-Chavez v.

Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Ornelas-

Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1058 (explaining that an applicant "need not

have reported . . . persecution to the authorities if [they] can

convincingly establish that doing so would have been futile or

have subjected [them] to further abuse").              Singh argues that she

did not report the kidnapping because she and her family were told

                                      - 17 -
that if they did so, "the consequences would not be good."                       Yet

without more, the record below did not compel a conclusion that

seeking government assistance would have been futile or subjected

her to further abuse.

              The 2007 Report excerpt's discussion of the Maoists'

role     in   the    government,     Maoist       violence   and    human     rights

violations, and impunity for human rights violations does weigh in

Singh's favor. These points raise questions about the government's

ability to offer protection against Maoist persecutors.                     And to a

lesser    extent,      the    suggestion   of     ongoing    violence   post-2006

related to Maoist activities in the 2012 New York Times article

offers    some      support   to   this   point    as   well.      However,    under

substantial evidence review, we cannot say that this evidence so

overwhelms the direct evidence of the government's ability to

respond effectually on behalf of Singh and her family against their

Maoist persecutors -- causing the persecutors to flee during the

home invasion -- that a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled

to conclude that the government was unable to protect Singh.                     See

Ortiz-Araniba, 505 F.3d at 43 (finding that documentary evidence

showing government inability to control the gang at issue "d[id]

not compel a contrary conclusion" to the BIA's determination of

government willingness and ability where the BIA considered and

ruled based on "countervailing evidence [of] the government's

                                      - 18 -
willingness and ability to prosecute and incarcerate particular

gang members").    Thus, because substantial evidence supported the

agency's findings that Singh failed to show that the government

was either unwilling or unable to protect her from persecution,

her challenge to the BIA's determination on her asylum claim fails.

           Singh separately challenges the BIA's order denying her

claim for withholding of removal.             "But that claim not only

requires the petitioners to satisfy the 'unwilling or unable'

standard but also to do so under 'the even-more-demanding clear-

probability test.'"       Vila-Castro v. Garland, 77 F.4th 10, 15 (1st

Cir.   2023)   (quoting    Morales-Morales,    857   F.3d   at   136).   This

challenge therefore fails for the same reasons as her asylum

challenge.

                              IV. Conclusion

           For the reasons stated above, we deny the petition for

review.

                                  - 19 -