Court Opinion

ID: 9550013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:27:42.255694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:11.090883
License: Public Domain

Talmadge, J.
(concurring) — I concur that a trial on the merits of Patricia Vodopest’s claim of negligence against Rosemary MacGregor is required. However, I write separately because we should take this opportunity to clarify our analysis of pre-injury release agreements.
Analysis
A. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment
Patricia Vodopest agreed to release Rosemary MacGregor from any liability arising out of hazards connected with Vodopest’s participation in a trek to the Himalayas. She did not agree to release Rosemary MacGregor from negligence in diagnosing and treating Vodopest’s medical condition.
The release agreement Vodopest signed states:
RELEASE FROM LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
*863I, PATRICIA VODOPEST, hereby state that I wish to participate in this Everest /Gokyo trek and that I have been informed of all possible hazards that might be encountered. I recognize that all outdoor activity and especially altitude trekking may involve certain dangers, including but not limited to: illness, injuries, accidents, and [sic] but also the hazards of travel, not being in good health or condition, forces of nature and the actions of the participants and other persons. I also understand that the nature of this trek is partially Nepalese in its arrangements and although all precautions are being taken, one can not [sic] guarantee human behavior.
I understand that it is not the function of the leaders of this trek to serve as the guardians of my safety. I also understand that I am to furnish my own personal equipment and I am responsible for its safety and good operating condition regardless of where I obtain it.
In consideration of and as part of this group and my willingness to participate, I hearby [sic] release Rosemary MacGregor from all liability, claims and causes of action arising out of or in any way connected with my participation in this trek (March 5, 1990 - April 10, 1990). I personally assume all risks in connection with all activities, and further agree to indemnify and release Rosemary MacGregor, other group leaders, and all other participants from all liability, claims and causes of action or harm which may befall me arising from my participation in this trek. The terms of this agreement shall serve as a release and indemnity agreement for my heirs, personal representatives, and for all members of my family, including minors.
I further state that I am 18 years of age or older and legally competent to sign this release, that I understand these terms are contractual and not a mere recital, and that I have signed this document as my own free act.
I HAVE FULLY INFORMED MYSELF OF THE COVENANTS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS RELEASE AND INDEMNITY BY READING IT BEFORE I HAVE SIGNED IT.
NAME /s/ Patricia Vodopest DATE 1/14/90
*864Clerk’s Papers at 39. There is no evidence in the record the release was negotiated between Vodopest and MacGregor.
There are two competing characterizations of the cause of Vodopest’s injuries. Vodopest argues the purpose of the trek to the Himalayas was for "medical research” and her injuries arose out of MacGregor’s negligent insistence that Vodopest use her experimental breathing techniques to combat high altitude sickness. Clerk’s Papers at 45-46. MacGregor argues the purpose of the trip was recreational and Vodopest’s injuries arose out of a high-risk mountaineering expedition. Clerk’s Papers at 4.
If Vodopest’s injuries were caused only by mountaineering, summary judgment would be appropriate. Washington case law has frequently upheld pre-injury release agreements for potentially hazardous recreational activities like scuba diving (Hewitt v. Miller, 11 Wn. App. 72, 521 P.2d 244, review denied, 84 Wn.2d 1007 (1974); Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. App. 657, 862 P.2d 592 (1993)); mountain climbing (Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wn. App. 571, 636 P.2d 492 (1981), review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1027 (1982)); automobile demolition derby driving (Conradt v. Four Star Promotions, Inc., 45 Wn. App. 847, 728 P.2d 617 (1986)); and skiing (Scott v. Pacific W. Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d 484, 834 P.2d 6 (1992)).
If, however, Vodopest’s injuries resulted from medical research or treatment, the pre-injury release agreement cannot be enforced. By its terms, the release agreement did not release MacGregor from liability arising out of her negligent diagnosis and treatment of Vodopest’s high altitude sickness on this particular adventure. The record here indicates the trek may have been the locale for MacGregor’s research and treatment of Vodopest, whose injuries resulted from that research and treatment, rather than mountaineering. MacGregor allegedly insisted upon her experimental treatment of high altitude sickness instead of evacuating Vodopest to a lower altitude when Vodopest started to show symptoms of altitude sickness.
*865Summary judgment based on the release agreement was inappropriate.
B. Pre-Injury Release Agreements in Washington
Our prior decisions in Scott, 119 Wn.2d 484, and Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist. 105-157-166J, 110 Wn.2d 845, 758 P.2d 968, 85 A.L.R.4th 311 (1988), give practitioners insufficient guidance for drafting pre-injury release agreements. Trial courts likewise have little guidance for interpreting and enforcing them.
We have ruled on the validity of such agreements in various contexts, identifying general considerations in determining the enforceability of those agreements. In reaching these decisions, we have focused, at times, on the disparity in bargaining power and, at other times, on the importance of the defendant’s activity or service to the public. The rationale for our decisions in which public policy defeats a pre-injury release agreement has not always been particularly clear.
Our cases express an antagonism toward pre-injury release agreements I do not share: if a pre-injury release agreement meets the standard set by this Court, it should be enforced as any other contract is enforced. Washington law should recognize the freedom of parties, under appropriate circumstances, to contract with respect to liability. Parties of equal bargaining power may negotiate and agree to allocate risk between themselves, absent a clear public policy reason to the contrary.5
The confusion in our law originates in the failure to differentiate between the bargaining process for the preinjury release agreement and the substance of the agreement. In Scott, we held release agreements are enforceable *866unless (1) they violate public policy, or (2) the negligent act falls greatly below the standard established by law for protection of others, or (3) they are inconspicuous. Scott, 119 Wn.2d at 492. Plainly, these concepts involve both the process by which the agreement was negotiated and the substance of the agreement. In Wagenblast, we adopted a six-part test for determining whether release agreements violated public policy, one part of the test in Scott. Of the six parts, at least two pertain to the bargaining process for the release agreement, discussing the bargaining strength of the parties in the economic setting of the negotiations, and the presence of a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation that makes no provision for a party to decline the release for consideration. The other four Wagenblast factors address the substance of the release agreement. Wagenblast, 110 Wn.2d at 851-56 (citing Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963)).
Separating the substantive aspects of a pre-injury release agreement from the defects in the bargaining process will help clarify the analysis. The Uniform Commercial Code employs this approach with respect to unconscionability. Nelson v. McGoldrick, 127 Wn.2d 124, 896 P.2d 1258 (1995); Yakima County (W. Valley) Fire Protection Dist. 12 v. City of Yakima, 122 Wn.2d 371, 391, 858 P.2d 245 (1993); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wn.2d 256, 259-60, 544 P.2d 20 (1975); Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code — The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 487 (1967); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 931, 932 (1969). This approach applies in other settings. See, e.g., RCW 4.24.115 (indemnification agreements in the construction industry).
1. Procedural Fairness
Pre-injury release agreements should be enforced only if the bargaining process was fair. In considering procedural unconscionability, the Nelson court looked to the manner in which the agreement was entered, whether the *867parties had a reasonable opportunity to understand the contract terms, and whether the terms were hidden in a maze of fine print. Procedural defects during the bargaining process may lead to "the lack of a meaningful choice.” Nelson, 127 Wn.2d at 131.
In assessing whether the bargaining process for a preinjury release agreement is fair, several similar criteria may be employed. First, the release agreement must be conspicuous in the overall contractual arrangement between the parties. Scott, 119 Wn.2d at 492. Second, the rights of children may not be negotiated away in a preinjury release agreement. Scott, 119 Wn.2d at 492-95. Third, parties of relatively equal bargaining power must negotiate the agreement, for which there is consideration. Wagenblast, 110 Wn.2d at 854-55. A party should be allowed to decline the release for consideration. Wagenblast, 110 Wn.2d at 855. The agreement must not be a contract of adhesion.6 No single one of these factors alone should be determinative of fairness in the bargaining process.
2. Substance of the Agreement
Once the court determines the parties fairly negotiated the agreement, the court should consider the substance of the pre-injury release agreements and assess whether the agreement is consistent with public policy. Washington law has recognized that public policy may outweigh the traditional freedom to contract in a pre-injury release agreement. For example, we have indicated the invalidity of pre-injury release agreements imposed on employees by employers (Wagenblast, 110 Wn.2d at 850 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B, cmt. f (1965))); on bailors by public bailees (Althoff v. System Garages, Inc., 59 Wn.2d 860, 371 P.2d 48 (1962); Sporsem v. First Nat’l Bank, 133 Wash. 199, 233 P. 641, 40 A.L.R. 854 (1925)); on customers *868by public utilities (Reeder v. Western Gas & Power Co., 42 Wn.2d 542, 256 P.2d 825 (1953)); on customers by common carriers (Carstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 58 Wash. 239, 108 P. 613 (1910); S.S. Kresge Co. v. Port of Longview, 18 Wn. App. 805, 573 P.2d 1336 (1977)); on students by public schools (Wagenblast, 110 Wn.2d at 856-59); and on tenants by landlords (Thomas v. Housing Auth., 71 Wn.2d 69, 426 P.2d 836 (1967); McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wn.2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971)).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 (1981) discusses public policy grounds for invalidating pre-injury release agreements and states:7
(1) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.
(2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if
(a) the term exempts an employer from liability to an employee for injury in the course of his employment;
(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach of that duty; or
(c) the other party is similarly a member of a class protected against the class to which the first party belongs.
(3) A term exempting a seller of a product from his special tort liability for physical harm to a user or consumer is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the term is fairly bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying that liability.
The Restatement criteria are sound and fair, and generally comport with Washington law. We should adopt the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195, and the persua*869sive authority arising under it, for the analysis of public policy in the context of pre-injury release agreements.
Conclusion
While I concur in the majority’s disposition of this case, pre-injury release agreements should be enforced if they are procedurally fair and appropriate on substantive grounds. The separation of procedural and substantive facets of the enforcement of pre-injury release agreements, as well as a more careful delineation of the public policy grounds for defeating such agreements, would provide a much-needed, improved analytical framework for assessing the enforceability of release agreements.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B (1965) states:
A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant’s negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.

"The factors considered in the determining whether a contract is an adhesion contract are (1) whether the contract is a standard form printed contract, (2) whether it was 'prepared by one party and submitted to the other on a "take it or leave it” basis’, and (3) whether there was 'no true equality of bargaining power’ between the parties. Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir. 1965)[.]” Yakima County, 122 Wn.2d at 393.

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(1) (1981) forbids the release of reckless conduct, where the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B (1965) does not.