Court Opinion

ID: 9720978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:45:55.959162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.607339
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). The trial judge’s statements explaining his decision to grant the defendant post-verdict relief do not, as a matter of Michigan procedural law, change the nature of the order which he entered — as a matter of Michigan law he ordered a new trial and did not direct a verdict.1
I agree with my colleagues that a trial judge is authorized, although there is, prima facie, sufficient evidence to present a question for the jury, to grant a new trial "for any cause for which by law *375a new trial may be granted, or when it shall appear to the court that justice has not been done”, MCL 770.1; MSA 28.1098. Unless such authority is abused,2 an order granting a new trial because the judge regards the verdict as contrary to the great weight of the evidence3 or not in accord with a just result does not invade the province of the jury.
I agree with the Chief Justice that the judge did not in this case abuse his discretion in granting a new trial. In so concluding, I have considered the judge’s statements before entry of the order which, although not material in deciding what he did, are pertinent in deciding whether what he did was justified.
1 cannot sign the Chief Justice’s opinion, however, because there is no need to consider the standard for directing a verdict in a case where, as a matter of Michigan procedural law, no verdict was directed. For the same reason I cannot sign Justice Ryan’s opinion.
Although, as appears from Justice Ryan’s opinion, Hampton may have a substantial double jeopardy claim,4 it is not before us. This appeal was brought by the prosecutor. The only issue on which leave was granted was "whether * * * the trial court invaded the province of the jury when he granted the defendant’s motion for directed *376verdict after the jury had returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty”.
It now appears that the judge did not direct a verdict, but simply ordered a new trial, and that the case should be disposed of on that basis. Our misapprehension of the issue when we granted leave to appeal does not expand the scope of the grant to an issue not necessarily implicated by the limited grant of leave to appeal. No double jeopardy issue was raised by the prosecutor.5 Nor was such an issue raised by Hampton, who did not seek leave to cross appeal and has made no argument in that regard. It is therefore inappropriate, without briefing or argument, to reach a double jeopardy issue. Similarly, since Hampton did not seek leave to cross appeal the implicit denial of his motion for directed verdict and has made no argument that the judge erred in failing to direct a verdict, we cannot properly decide whether Hampton is entitled to affirmative relief on the ground that the failure to direct a verdict was error.
Although the judge did not, as a matter of Michigan procedural law, direct a verdict, he may have done so, as Justice Ryan writes, as a matter of Federal double jeopardy law. This is still another reason why I cannot sign the Chief Justice’s opinion as some of her observations may be read as bearing on whether the judge directed a verdict as a matter of Federal double jeopardy law.
*377I would affirm the Court of Appeals, remanding for a new trial without prejudice to Hampton raising a double jeopardy issue.
Williams, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Courts speak through their judgments and orders, not their oral statements or written opinions. Tiedman v Tiedman, 400 Mich 571, 576; 255 NW2d 632 (1977).

 See People v Nick, 360 Mich 219, 224; 103 NW2d 435 (1960).

 See GCR 1963, 527.1(5).

 In Burks v United States, 437 US 1; 98 S Ct 2141; 57 L Ed 2d 1 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial following a reviewing court’s reversal of a defendant’s conviction in a prior trial solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. A companion case, Greene v Massey, 437 US 19, 24; 98 S Ct 2151; 57 L Ed 2d 15 (1978), declared that the Burks standard applied to state proceedings as part of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. See Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784; 89 S Ct 2056; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969).

 The prosecutor’s brief adverted to several double jeopardy decisions of the United States Supreme Court, but only to argue that United States v Martin Linen Supply Co, 430 US 564, 570; 97 S Ct 1349; 51 L Ed 2d 642 (1977), was distinguishable and the trial judge’s ruling was appealable because a successful appeal would result in reinstatement of the guilty verdict rather than a further trial or proceeding "devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged”. Therefore, the prosecutor’s brief did not anticipate that we might find a retrial constitutionally forbidden. The disposition which we believe to be correct makes it unnecessary to consider whether, if the judge had directed a verdict, it would be appealable consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause.