Court Opinion

ID: 9726744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:06:11.842061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:30.240145
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REINHARD, specially concurring: The judgment of the circuit court should be reversed but upon a different basis than the analysis contained in the majority opinion. Plaintiff’s cause of action in the amended complaint sought recovery in count I on a strict liability in tort theory and in count III on a breach of the implied contractual warranty of merchantability theory. The implied-warranty count was based on section 2 — 314 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 26, par. 2 — 314) and sought property damages and recovery for loss of use of real estate and personal property resulting from a fire. It is apparent from a reading of the implied-warranty count that plaintiff sought recovery against defendant as the manufacturer of the extension cord and not as the immediate seller of the extension cord to its subrogor. In the trial court, defendant filed a motion to dismiss count III on the basis that there was no privity of contract between plaintiff (who at the time was the subrogor) and defendant. The motion was denied in the trial court. This issue has not been raised by defendant on appeal. Nevertheless, because it is the responsibility of the reviewing court for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent, this court may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system and decide a case on a ground not raised by the parties. (Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 223, 224-25; see also Schutzenhofer v. Granite City Steel Co. (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 208, 210-11; Champaign National Bank v. Landers Seed Co. (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1022-25.) In the case at bar, the issue is one of law, and the precedent is clearly established by a decision of our supreme court. I, therefore, believe this is one of those cases where the waiver rule should be relaxed, although normally I agree the waiver rule should apply where the parties have not briefed an issue which the reviewing court could find dispositive of the appeal. Should defendant wish to challenge the legal basis on which I would decide the case, it may do so in a petition for rehearing. In Board of Education v. A, C & S, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 428, the court held that, where the complaint alleges only that there has been property damage in a contract action based upon breach of implied warranties, plaintiffs must allege privity of contract with the defendant to state a cause of action. (131 Ill. 2d at 461-62.) It is evident from the pleadings and the proofs at trial that plaintiff is not in privity with the defendant herein, which is the manufacturer of the extension cord. Thus, this is the proper basis on which this appeal should be decided. As no cause of action in contract for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability lies, the judgment of the circuit court on this count must be reversed. The error in proceeding on this improper count is compounded by this court’s failure properly to separate the strict liability count and the implied warranty of contract count in reviewing the use of the special interrogatory. The special interrogatory is clearly one which, by its language, is applicable only to the strict liability count. It reads as follows: “[d]id a defect or defects exist in the extension cord when it left the manufacturer’s control which made the extension cord unreasonably dangerous?” Consequently, in applying the answer to the special interrogatory as well to the verdict for plaintiff in the implied warranty contract action, the majority has blurred the distinction in the issues and elements to be proved in a contract action based on implied warranty of merchantability and a tort action in strict liability. The majority cites one line of cases to establish the proposition that the “ ‘strict liability theory is essentially the liability of implied warranty divested of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer and notice.’ ” (Nave v. Rainbo Tire Service, Inc. (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 585, 592-93, quoting Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Manufacturing Co. (1967), 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 333, aff’d (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 339; Livingston Service Co. v. Big Wheels, Inc. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 591.) From this, the majority concludes that a plaintiff must prove that a “defect” exists in a product before recovery can be had under either theory. The line of cases emanating from Dunham, however, does not deal with the precise question of whether a condition which renders a product unmerchantable is legally identical to a condition which would render a product unreasonably dangerous. While strict liability in tort may closely resemble its ancestor, the common-law implied warranty, it is different from the entirely contractual implied warranties recognized today under the UCC. See Board of Education v. A, C & S, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 428, 439-51, 460-63. The majority rejects the conclusion of the court in Malawy v. Richards Manufacturing Co. (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 549, 560, that “a ‘defect’ in a product is not required to be established to sustain liability for the breach of an implied warranty.” Although the majority rejects Malawy, it commits the same error displayed in that case when it attempts to ascribe inherent legal meaning to the term “defect.” Malawy states that the “theory of strict liability in tort imposes liability upon the manufacturer of goods only if there was a ‘defect’ when they left the manufacturer’s control.” (Malawy, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 559.) In point of fact, proving just the existence of a “defect” in a product is not sufficient for recovery under either strict liability or breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. While a product might, under either theory, be termed “defective” in a generic sense, this is not a term of art giving rise to legal equivalency between the causes of action merely because both deal with “defective” products. The comments to section 402A state that the rule of strict liability “applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.” (Emphasis added.) (Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, comment i, at 352 (1965).) Thus, a product might be termed “defective” and still not rise to the level of being unreasonably dangerous. See McCracken v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 26, 30 (defect breaches a strict liability duty only if users of the product are exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm). Similarly, section 2 — 314 of the UCC (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 26, par. 2 — 314), which establishes the implied warranty of merchantability on which plaintiff’s contract claim is based, does not define a breach in terms of whether a product is “defective.” Instead, section 2 — 314(2) sets out six separate tests of merchantability, including the requirement that goods be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 26, par. 2 — 314(2)(c).) Thus, Malawy is correct, in part, in holding that an alleged breach of the implied warranty of merchantability must be examined not by the term “defect,” but by whether the product fails to meet one of the criteria set out in section 2 — 314(2). Malawy, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 560. Accordingly, I believe that the majority incorrectly determined that the negative response to the special interrogatory precludes recovery based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. However, because I believe that the absence of privity between the parties defeats any recovery for breach of the implied warranty, I concur in the result reached by the majority.