Court Opinion

ID: 9666170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:07:00.509082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:24.426865
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice, dissenting. This court should require the prompt trial of criminal cases. The majority opinion refuses to do so, and therefore, I dissent. In the 1960’s, when an accused was charged with a crime, he was often released on bond, and remained free until he was tried; many times that was two (2) years later, sometimes three (3) years later, and on rare occasions, even longer. The accused usually was pleased with such a system. However, sometimes an accused did want a prompt trial in order to assure attendance of his witnesses, or to ensure the preservation of his records or other evidence, or to avoid a longer conditional release. Clearly, however, the public and the victim never did approve of such a system. A reform movement began. Its purpose was to ensure prompt trial of criminal cases. In 1968 the American Bar Association approved a draft of the Standards Relating To Speedy Trial. In 1971, this court created the Arkansas Criminal Code Revision Commission, and a part of its task was to implement standards relating to speedy trial. In 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down the now famous case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) which enunciated the present constitutional criteria for determining an accused’s right to a speedy trial. In 1975 this court adopted the Criminal Code Revision Commission’s recommendations as the Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure. Article VIII of those rules is entitled “Speedy Trial.” The commentary to that article provides in part: “[T]he concern here is with how the interest of defendants and the public in prompt trial should be determined and protected.” (Emphasis added.) The Commission studied the American Bar Association’s standards. A part of that commentary provides: The principles underlying most of the standards in ■ this report deal primarily with protection of the defendant, who otherwise would not be in a position to force a prompt trial. The interest of the public in the prompt disposition of criminal cases, however, must also be recognized. Speedy trial may be of concern to the defendant, as he may want to preserve the means of proving his defense, to avoid a long period of pretrial imprisonment or conditional release, and to avoid a long period of anxiety and public suspicion arising out of the accusation. From the point of view of the public, a speedy trial is necessary to preserve the means of proving the charge, to maximize the deterrent effect of prosecution and conviction, and to avoid, in some cases, an extended period of pretrial freedom by the defendant during which time he may flee, commit other crimes, or intimidate witnesses. Wayne R. LaFave, Standards with Commentary, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial 5-6 (A.B.A. 1967) (emphasis added). Similarly, we have written that one purpose of the speedy trial rule is to protect the accused, but that it is also to protect the victim of the crime and, perhaps above all, to serve the interests of the public. See, e.g., Chandler v. State, 284 Ark. 560, 683 S. W.2d 928 (1985). The concept of the prompt and speedy trial is based upon sound public policy. The only meaningful way to ensure that the public policy is effectuated is to discharge an accused who is not promptly tried. A prosecutor or a judge who allows many accused persons to be discharged will not long remain in office. In this way prompt criminal trials are assured. The majority opinion amounts to an erosion of the speedy trial rule, and its precedent will set us back to the practices of twenty years ago. The accused will suffer, the victims will suffer, the witnesses will suffer, and the public will suffer. In this case, the appellant was charged with four (4) felonies on September 12, 1989. Trial was set for June 18, 1990, well within the allowable twelve (12) months. On June 11,1990, the appellant moved to sever the four (4) charges and have separate trials. On June 12, the trial court granted the motion to sever the charges and set one of the felonies for trial on the scheduled trial date, June 18. The trial court did not enter findings at that time, but later concluded that the remaining three (3) cases could be tried at a later time, possibly in later years, because the motion for a severance necessarily implies a motion for a continuance. The majority opinion adopts such reasoning and provides that a continuance on three (3) of the four (4) counts was clearly necessitated by appellant’s motion to sever the offenses and is an excludable period. The majority opinion cites no authority for such a proposition because there is none. The majority opinion’s holding implies that, as a matter of law, an accused cannot be tried for two different crimes before the same panel of jurors. There is no such statute or case law, and the majority opinion is wrong in so holding. Once a defendant is tried for one crime, a judge can recall the panel and select a fair and impartial petit jury from those members of the panel who did not hear the first trial. At times, a third petit jury can be selected. Under the majority opinion, the trial judge must now wait until the next term of court and provide the accused with a complete new panel. If the county in which the charges arise is like most counties, there are only two (2) terms of court each year. If the trials proceed as the one now before us has, the first count will be tried at or around the end of the first year; the second will be tried six months later, the third in the next term, or six (6) more months, and the fourth even six (6) months later. The intent and purpose of the speedy trial rule is obviously thwarted, and we are back to the practices of the 1960’s. Therefore, I dissent.