Court Opinion

ID: 9760237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:43:48.344041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.593850
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I disagree with that part of the majority opinion which denies to the plaintiff the right to introduce evidence of the driving history of an employee where punitive damages against the employer is an issue. The majority opinion purports to follow the majority view “which allows the plaintiff to proceed on only one theory of recovery in cases where liability has been admitted as to one theory of recovery.” But that does not reach the issue of this case at all. That issue was settled, sensibly, in Kyser v. Porter, 261 Ark. 351, 548 S.W. 2d 128 (1977). Butin Kyser, only compensatory damages were sought. Here the plaintiff is claiming punitive damages from the employer, based on allegations of wanton misconduct by the employer, so how can he be denied the opportunity to prove those allegations? Where there is a valid claim against an employer, a parent or other entrustor for punitive damages in the wanton entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality to someone incompetent to justify that trust, the injured party is entitled to have the evidence supporting that theory submitted to the jury, if the evidence is such that reasonable minds could reach differing results. The exact issue presented here was decided affirmatively by United States District Judge Gordon E. Young in a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion which the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld. See Breeding v. Massey, 378 F. 2d 171 (1967). To the same effect see Plummer v. Henry, 7 NC App. 84, 171 S.E. 2d 330 (1969). Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals in Breeding, after reviewing Arkansas decisions in the general fields of negligent entrustment and punitive damages expressed the conviction that the Arkansas Supreme Court would, if presented with the question, permit the issue of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury. We are not bound by those assumptions, of course, but the merit of their reasoning deserves at least the attention of the majority opinion. The result reached here cannot be justified by the argument that a plaintiff cannot complain if he is compensated for all the damages caused by an employee, including punitive damages, for willful and wanton misconduct. The error of that lies in the rationale for punitive damages: such damages are recoverable in appropriate cases not to compensate the injured party but to exemplify the conduct of the wrongdoer. The purpose is to deter others from like conduct. Ray Dodge v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W. 2d 518 (1972); Dunaway v. Troutt, 232 Ark. 615, 339 S.W. 2d 613 (1960). The effect of this decision is that no matter how culpable the conduct of one who entrusts to another the means of injury to third persons, such entrustor cannot incur direct liability for punitive damages and can prevent evidence of wanton misconduct from being considered by the jury by the simple expediency of admitting agency or entrustment. I can see no logic in this holding. Purtle and Dudley, JJ., join.