Court Opinion

ID: 9637290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:02:35.604884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:55.192240
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Musmanno:
I concur in the order entered by the majority of this Court. I believe that a person who asserts his *25innocence of a crime of which he stands accused is entitled to examine prosecution exhibits which are reasonably associated with the theory of guilt and of which he probably may be unaware. However, where an exhibit is one of which the accused is entirely cognizant and already knows whether it could or could not be an item of incrimination against him, he is not entitled to its inspection if such inspection would hamper the Commonwealth in proceeding with its case.
The Commonwealth here has in its possession a 32 calibre revolver which, it avers, was the weapon used in the killing of Max Kravitz. The accused, Mrs. Ethel Kravitz, petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County to be allowed to inspect. this weapon, as well as to study the photographs of fingerprints, if any, found on the weapon at the time it was discovered in a culvert along a route admittedly followed by the accused after the killing of Max Kravitz. The lower Court ordered the District Attorney to allow inspection, of the revolver and the photographs of any markings on the weapon when recovered.
•We have affirmed the action of the -lower Court with regard to inspection of the weapon, but have refused to the defendant an inspection of the photographs of fingerprints, if any. I believe this action to be eminently just and in no way handicaps the defendant in the preparation of her case. She is one person who knows whether she used the weapon or not and, therefore, she is not being denied anything which she needs in the ascertainment of truth.
.For the Commonwealth to be required to submit to the accused evidence of possible markings on the revolver could quite possibly trammel the prosecution. I endorse heartily the quotation in. Chief Justice Jones' concurring opinion from the case of State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, namely, “There are cases in which *26it would be clearly unjust to deny such an application [for inspection of evidence] and on the other hand, cases are conceivable in which it might improperly hamper the prosecution to grant such an application.”
I believe the prosecution here might find itself impeded in preparing for trial if it were required to announce to the world what it found on the 38 calibre revolver discovered in the culvert. It would appear that Max Kravitz’ death was the result of criminal aggression, and all law-enforcing agencies should be aided rather than restricted in attempts made to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, if there is one, and to bring that person to justice.
The scales of justice are weighted in favor of the accused, as they should be, because nothing can be more destructive of faith in the law than the conviction of an innocent man. This does not mean, however, that the prosecution should bé manacled in its honest endeavor to uphold the law and safeguard society from violence. Such a fettering is not to adjust the scales of justice but to destroy them.
The Attorney General of the Commonwealth, arguing in support of the decision of the court below, asserted, inter alia, that an accused is entitled to examine everything that the Commonwealth may have gathered in preparing its case against the defendant. If such a rule were to govern in every case, society could suffer in its efforts to reduce crime and prevent violence.
While the Attorney General, in my belief, went too far in asserting what the accused is entitled to, as against the rights of society in a legitimate and vigorous prosecution of crime, I am constrained to say, with every deference, that my brother Bell travels an equally unwarranted distance in the opposite direction. Tn his dissenting opinion he says: “The present order goes further than this Court or, we believe, the Su*27preme Court of tlie United States, has ever gone. It permits fishing expeditions by a defendant; it sets a precedent which will make fabrication of defenses easy, and consequently (although of course unintentionally), it will make the protection of society and the conviction of dangerous criminals far more difficult than ever before.”
This paints a picture too dusky, dismal, and dreary for my eyes. It carries a pigmentation of too much alarm and foreboding, not justified by the decision of the Court. It is true that persons accused of crime have the possibility of fabricating evidence, as Justice Bell points out, but this, unfortunately, is always within the realm of possibility, regardless of what a district attorney may or may not do, with or without specific authorization by a court. In painting his picture, I fear that my brother employs a brush too heavy for the objects he intends to depict. As a consequence, in his descriptive picture, the accused person before trial and the accused person after conviction merge into one amorphous concept. But an indicted person does not become a criminal until and unless the jury finds him guilty. Thus, to say that the action of this Court today will make “the conviction of dangerous criminals far more difficult than ever before” is to place effect before cause and sequence in front of prelude.
As against brother Beli/s lurid canvas, I would like to invite interest in a much more gratifying scene, that of a courtroom with trial judges learned in the law and experienced in the ways of life, listening attentively to what is being said, weighing carefully what is being presented, and then impartially deciding whether an accused is entitled under the. Constitution, to certain privileges for which he makes a formal request, after due notice to the officials charged with *28prosecution. With such a procedure, society will be protected, the accused’s rights will be safeguarded, and the law will assert itself with dignity, majesty, and propriety. ■
■ I am satisfied from a reading of the record that the judges of Montgomery County did not move impetuously, nor did they act without thorough consideration of all-features of the case. I am also, satisfied that the decision reached by them coincides with the highest standards of absolute impartiality. That I -do not agree with one of their conclusions, as already stated, in no Avay detracts from my spontaneous and wholehearted commendation of their courageous and deliberate action in the proceedings.