Court Opinion

ID: 9717907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:12:36.777317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.024666
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: For the same reasons set forth by the majority, I concur in: (1) affirming the dismissal of count I against the city; (2) affirming the dismissal of count II against Datacom; (3) reversing the trial court’s holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint was barred under the collateral attack doctrine; and (4) reversing the dismissal of count I against Cook County. I write separately only to register my dissent from affirming the dismissal of count I against Datacom. In addition to its erroneous application of the collateral attack doctrine, the trial court also found that the plaintiffs could not prove that Datacom received and retained the $3 fees which are the subject of this litigation, or that it was unjustly enriched and, as a consequence, dismissed count I of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint against Datacom. In affirming the dismissal of count I against Datacom, the majority holds that the plaintiffs failed to allege that Datacom "received and retained a percentage of the $3 [court cost or mailing fee], which is the subject of this lawsuit.” 267 Ill. App. 3d at 509. As it relates to count I of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint against Datacom, this case comes to this court on review from a dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 — 615). In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2 — 615, the court must take all well-pied facts as true (Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634; Miner v. Gillette Co. (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478), and must draw all reasonable inferences from those facts which are favorable to the pleader (Your Style Publications, Inc. v. Mid Town Bank & Trust Co. (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 421, 501 N.E.2d 805). The only question presented to the court on such a motion is whether the challenged pleading alleges facts which state a cause of action. The motion has nothing to do with whether the plaintiffs can prove those allegations. I disagree with the majority’s reading of count I of the complaint. In paragraph six, the plaintiffs allege that Datacom sent the notices which demanded payment of the past-due parking tickets along with the $3 fee; in paragraph eight, the plaintiffs allege that they and approximately 330,000 others paid the sums demanded; in paragraph 27, they allege that the notices resulted in the collection of more than $2.7 million attributable to the $3 fees; and in paragraph 29, the plaintiffs allege that Datacom received a percentage of the money that it collected. From my reading of count I of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts pied is that Datacom received a percentage of both the fines and $3 fees collected. To arrive at its conclusion that the plaintiffs could not prove Datacom received or retained the $3 fees, the trial court, responding to an argument made by Datacom and the decision in People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp. (1991), 146 Ill. 2d 1, 585 N.E.2d 51, found that Datacom only received up to 42% of the parking fines and not a percentage of the fees at issue. Whatever the source of the information upon which the trial court relied, suffice it to say that it was dehors the face of the complaint under attack and should not have been considered in ruling on Datacom’s section 2 — 615 motion (Mutual Tobacco Co. v. Halpin (1953), 414 Ill. 226, 111 N.E.2d 155; Louis v. Barenfanger (1966), 81 Ill. App. 2d 104, 226 N.E.2d 85, aff’d (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 445, 236 N.E.2d 724). In my view, when all of the well-pied facts alleged by the plaintiffs in count I of their amended complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences favorable to the plaintiffs are drawn from those facts, count I states a good and sufficient cause of action for unjust enrichment against Datacom. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the dismissal of count I against Datacom.