Court Opinion

ID: 9658432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:59:36.973943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:55.055375
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Justice
(dissenting).
Giving Instruction 17 was prejudicial error. The information charged the defend*781ant with stealing a horse trailer in North Dakota on or about March 17, 1979, and bringing it into South Dakota on or about March 19, 1979. • The State’s case in chief showed March 17,1979 as the date of theft. This was the record confronting the defendant when he presented his defense.
The defendant then produced substantial evidence that on March 17, 1979, he was in* Miller, South Dakota.
Instruction 17 read:
The Information charges that the offense was committed ‘on or about’ a certain- date and time. The proof need not establish with certainty the exact date or time of the offense alleged. It is sufficient if the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed on a date or time reasonably near the date or time alleged in the information.
The majority opinion is correct that “[w]here time is not of the essence or gist of the offense, the precise time at which the offense is charged to have been committed is not material.” 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indictments and Informations, § 115 (1968); State v. McDonald, 16 S.D. 78, 91 N.W. 447 (1902); SDCL 23-32-17.1 The indictment or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed prior to the time of its filing, and within the time prescribed by the statutes of limitation. State v. Carmel, 36 S.D. 293, 154 N.W. 808 (1915); SDCL 23-32-12(5).2 The words “on or about” are sur-plusage. McDonald, supra; 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indictments and Informations, § 119. But surplusage will not vitiate an indictment or information which, without regard to the surplusage, certainly and definitely alleges matter, sufficient to charge the offense.3 See McDonald, supra. Since an “on or about” allegation makes no difference in the proof required, it cannot prejudice the accused. 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indictments and Informations, § 119.
To this point I have no disagreement with the majority opinion. The issue, however, involves an instruction — not the allegation.
It was necessary for the State to establish the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime. “Alibi evidence must show that the accused could not have committed the alleged crime, because at the time of its commission he was at a place other than where such offense was committed.” State v. Reiman, 284 N.W.2d 860, 871 (S.D.1979). Corroborated alibi evidence met that test, after which the accomplice expressed uncertainty about, and hedged on, the March 17 date. She then indicated the theft could have occurred at a different time.
That testimony was followed by Instruction 17 which is South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction 1 — 11—5. The comments to that instruction read in pertinent part:
Nor should this instruction be given when defendant has presented evidence of an alibi and the time alleged in the information does not exactly correspond to the time of commission of the offense as shown by the State’s evidence.
*782This instruction is the progeny of what is now California Jury Instruction Criminal (4th ed.) No. 4.71. The comment to CAL-JIC No. 4.71 states that the instruction is inappropriate when the defendant has presented alibi evidence for the time the people’s evidence fixed the commission of the crime.
In People v. Jones, 9 Cal.3d 546, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705 (1973), a police officer testified that the final purchase of marijuana from the defendant was made on March 24, 1970. The defendant offered alibi evidence that he had been in Texas on that date. There was no time discrepancy between allegation and proof. The Supreme Court of California nevertheless held it was error under such circumstances to give the “on or about” CALJIC No. 4.71 because the March 24 date was crucial to the alibi defense.
It follows that when an alibi defense is interposed, what was surplusage in the allegation is no longer irrelevant and time may be of “decisive importance.” State v. Clark, 509 S.W.2d 740 (Mo.App.1974). That importance is indicated by our alibi notice statute, SDCL 23A — 9-1.4 Contrary to the indications in footnote 2 of the majority opinion, the fact that SDCL 23A — 9-1 was not utilized, did not affect the defendant’s right to present an alibi defense. This statute is a discovery tool for use at the option of the State. While its procedures are prosecution initiated, it also operates to provide the defendant with the specific time, date and place claimed by the prosecution. See Fed.Rules Cr.Proc. rule 12.1, 18 U.S.C.A., Historical Note and Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
When the defendant is committed to an alibi time and place, unfairness occurs if the time frame is then shifted or expanded in the minds of the jury. The defendant is trapped and an “on or about” instruction in effect nullifies his alibi defense. State v. Siems, 535 S.W.2d 261 (Mo.App.1976); State v. Bowles, 360 S.W.2d 706 (Mo.1962); State v. Chittim, 261 S.W.2d 79 (Mo.1953).
The situation is comparable to a game of cards with deuces wild. After it is discovered one player holds all the deuces, the rules are changed to make one eyed jacks and aces also wild. I would accordingly reverse.

. At the time the information was filed SDCL 23-32-17 read:
The precise time at which the offense was committed need not be stated in the indictment or information, but it may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the filing thereof, except when the time is a material ingredient of the offense.
Repealed by SL 1978, ch. 178, § 577; replaced, effective July 1, 1979, by SL 1978, ch. 178, § 71 (SDCL 23A-6-9).

. At the time the information was filed SDCL 23-32-12(5) read:
The indictment or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom:

(5) That the offense was committed prior to the time of filing the indictment or information [.]
Repealed by SL 1978, ch. 178, § 577; replaced, effective July 1, 1979, by SL 1978, ch. 178, § 67 (SDCL 23A-6-7).

.Accord State v. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 21 P. 213 (1889); Adams Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 160, 92 S.W. 932 (1906), revd. on another point 206 U.S. 138, 27 S.Ct. 608, 51 L.Ed. 992 (1907); Tingue v. State, 90 Ohio St. 368, 108 N.E. 222 (1914); State v. Franks, 21 Okl.Cr. 213, 206 P. 258 (1922); State v. Moore, 36 Utah 521, 105 P. 293 (1909); Patrick v. State, 17 Wyo. 260, 98 P. 588 (1908).

. SDCL 23A-9-1 (Rule 12.1(a)) reads:
Within the time specified in § 23A-8-4 for pretrial motions, upon written demand of the prosecuting attorney stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, a defendant shall serve within ten days, or at such different time as the court may direct, upon the prosecuting attorney a written notice of his intention to offer a defense of alibi. The notice shall state the specific place or places where the defendant claims he was at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi.