Court Opinion

ID: 9856749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:57:03.360856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:32.027840
License: Public Domain

BakNiiill, J.,
concurring: Tbe Act as amended, now General Statutes Cb. 90, Art. 9, wbicb is at least indirectly tbe subject matter of tbis action, created two administrative agencies: (1) a board of nurse examiners and (2) a joint committee on standardization. These two agencies, together with tbe individual members thereof, are defendants herein. For tbe sake of brevity and convenience of discussion I shall hereinafter refer to them as tbe Board and tbe Joint Committee.
• Tbe Legislature is tbe policy-making agency of tbe State government. Tbe law-making function is assigned exclusively to it, and it alone can prescribe standards of conduct wbicb have the force and effect of law. Tbis function, except when expressly authorized by tbe Constitution- — -as is tbe case in respect to counties, cities, and towns — cannot be delegated to any other authority or body. Motsinger v. Perryman, 218 N.C. 15; S. v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746.
While tbe Legislature may not delegate tbe power to make tbe law, it ■may create an administrative agency and authorize it to make rules and regulations to effect the operation and enforcement of a law within tbe general scope and expressed general purpose of tbe statute. This authority, when granted, must be limited to tbe right “to fill in tbe details” in respect to procedural and administrative matters. It cannot lawfully include tbe power to make tbe law, for neither urgency of necessity nor gravity of situation arising from economic or social conditions allows tbe Legislature to abdicate, transfer, or delegate its constitutional authority or duty to an administrative agency. Hence, an administrative agency has no power to create a duty where tbe law creates none. Motsinger v. Perryman, supra.
Tbe Legislature has tbe authority to regulate tbe practice of tbe professions. Tbis includes tbe authority to establish minimum requirements to be observed by tbe schools wbicb undertake to prepare applicants for license to practice such professions. It may likewise create administrative agencies to administer and enforce such laws. But standards of conduct to be observed can be prescribed only by tbe law-making branch of tbe government. Therefore, an act, tbe purpose of wbicb is to regulate a profession or school, must establish tbe standards and minimum requirements; that is, standards of conduct must be prescribed by tbe Legislature. Only tbe power to enforce standards thus established may be delegated to a governmental agency. Motsinger v. Perryman, supra. This-rule is inflexible.
There is no direct attack — on constitutional grounds — upon tbe statute-under wbicb defendants acted or purported to act. Even so, it is alleged *685that the defendants, in withdrawing from plaintiff accreditation as a hospital school of nursing and refusing to place its name on the list of accredited schools for the year beginning 1 July 1951, was arbitrary and contrary to law. Therefore, if the Act prescribes no standards or minimum requirements for hospital schools of nursing in respect of the “deficiencies of Hamlet Hospital School of Nursing” listed by defendants as justification for their action in ordering “that the Hamlet Hospital School of Nursing not be listed on the said accredited list for the year beginning July 1, 1951, and ending July 30th, 1952,” then their action was in fact arbitrary and contrary to law as alleged. This necessitates an examination of the statute to ascertain what standards, if any, are prescribed so as to determine whether said order of defendants is pursuant to and in furtherance of the enforcement of standards lawfully established. If not, the order is without force or effect and the restraining order was properly continued in force.
The Board is created by G.S. 90-158 and is empowered to give examinations to applicants for license to practice nursing, G.S. 90-162, on certain specified subjects, G.S. 90-163. The “prerequisites for applicants” are listed in G.S. 90-162. One of the requirements is that the applicant “shall have graduated from a school of nursing connected with a general hospital giving a three years’ course of practical and theoretical instruction, which said hospital meets the minimum requirements and standards for the conduct of schools of nursing which may have been set up and established by the joint committee on standardization provided for in sec. 90-159.”
The Act contains no specific standard to be observed or minimum requirement to be met by a hospital school of nursing. Instead, there is an attempt to delegate this law-making power to the Joint Committee. G.S. 90-159. It is there provided that “The joint committee on standardization shall advise with the Board of Nurse Examiners herein created in the adoption of regulations governing the education of nurses, and shall jointly with the North Carolina Board of Nurse Examiners have power to establish standards and provide minimum requirements for the conduct of schools of nursing of which applicants for examination for nurse’s license under this chapter must be graduates before taking such examination.” This does not serve to establish standards or to vest, valid authority in the Joint Committee to do so.
However, the Act, in my opinion, does establish, by necessary implication, two standards or requirements for the conduct of hospital schools, of nursing.
The applicant for license must have graduated from a school of nursing-giving a three-year course of practical and theoretical instruction, G.S. 90-162, in specified subjects, G.S. 90-163. It would seem to follow by *686necessary implication that the school must furnish a three-year course of instruction in the specified subjects. It may be the additional requirement that the school shall have a library containing approved reference books on the prescribed subjects of study and adequate laboratory facilities is likewise necessarily implied.
But the Act does not, either directly or indirectly, establish any standards or minimum requirements for the conduct of hospital schools of nursing in respect of the “récords,” “personal practices of nurses,” absence on account of vacation or illness, hours of practical training, system of bookkeeping, reception room and bath tub facilities, or time for giving theoretical instruction, in respect to all of which it is charged plaintiff was deficient. No doubt the Legislature considered that these matters are best left to the hospitals themselves. The attempted delegation of authority to establish such requirements is without legal effect and any standards established by defendants in respect of such “deficiencies” are void. Any attempted enforcement thereof is of necessity arbitrary and in disregard of law. Therefore, the only course open to the court below was to continue the restraining order in full force and effect.
The objective of the law is to provide for a minimum standard of training for those who seek license as trained nurses and to ascertain by examination that such applicants possess the required degree of proficiency before being granted a license.
The duty of the defendant boards is to regulate, not eliminate — to enforce, not to establish- — standards for the conduct of schools of nursing. And they must confine their activities to the enforcement of the standards established by the Legislature. Where there is no standard, they have no power to act.
No doubt the defendants have acted in absolute good faith. The statute purports to delegate to them the power to establish minimum requirements and standards for the conduct of hospital schools of nursing. This they undertook to do, believing no doubt, they had ample legal authority for their action. Even so, if some of the listed “deficiencies” of plaintiff are a fair indication of the “standards” prescribed by them, they have passed from the field of regulation into the hunting ground of unauthorized intermeddling. This is true notwithstanding their absolute good faith. The hours of active duty, the time for theoretical instruction, the personal conduct of trainee nurses while in school, and facilities for their ■entertainment are matters for the several schools to regulate, certainly in the absence of specific legislation to the contrary.
Likewise, in my opinion, the requirement that hospital schools of nursing must approach defendants each year, with hat in hand, and beg leave to be accredited once again for the ensuing year is arbitrary and unreasonable. As already noted, such schools must provide a three-year *687course of training. Therefore, when the name of a school is once placed on the accredited list — granting for the present that defendants have the right to require accreditation — its name should not be removed from such list except after notice and full opportunity to be heard.
The enforcement of regulations such as those herein indicated will inevitably culminate in the elimination of many of the smaller schools of nursing and centralize the training of student nurses in a few large institutions. Such is not the purpose and intent of the Act. Small colleges and professional training schools play a vital role in the life of our State and, within reasonable bounds, their continued existence must be fostered and encouraged.
So long as defendants direct their efforts to enforcement of standards adopted by the Legislature to give assurance that student nurses shall receive adequate training in their chosen profession they are rendering a fine and useful service for which they should be commended. In seeking to accomplish this objective, however, they should always keep in mind the fact’ that this statute was not enacted for the benefit of nurses or to create a guild having the legal right to limit or proscribe competition, either of nurses or of hospital schools of nursing. It was enacted to promote the good health and general welfare of the people at large. Benefits accruing to nurses and schools are purely incidental. The Act can be justified and sustained on no other grounds. S. v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764.
I concur in the direction that this cause be sent back to the Joint Committee to ascertain, upon hearing, whether plaintiff has now complied with the requirements of the Board which come within their legitimate field of action.