Court Opinion

ID: 9890762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 11:08:33.226402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:13.558110
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
    ___________________________

         No. 02-22-00271-CR
    ___________________________

SERGIO ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 371st District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 1751244R

  Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Sergio Alejandro Aguilar appeals his jury-trial convictions for assault

on a family member with a previous family-violence conviction (Count Three) and

continuous violence against the family (Count Four).1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§§ 22.01(b)(2)(A), 25.11(a). On appeal, Aguilar argues in four points that (1) his

convictions on both Counts Three and Four violate the double-jeopardy protections

contained in Penal Code Section 25.11(c); (2) the trial court erred by admitting State’s

Exhibit 3, a recording of two 911 calls, in violation of Aguilar’s Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause rights; (3) the evidence is insufficient to show that Aguilar

assaulted the complainant on March 13, 2022, as alleged in Count Four; and (4) the

cumulative effect of the complained-of errors is such that Aguilar should be acquitted

of both counts. For the reasons set forth below, we sustain Aguilar’s first point,2

reverse the trial court’s judgment of conviction on Count Three, and render judgment

of acquittal on that count. But we overrule Aguilar’s remaining points and affirm his

conviction on Count Four.

      Aguilar was also charged with two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly
      1

weapon (Counts One and Two), but he was found not guilty of these charges.

      As discussed more fully below, the State concedes that the two convictions on
      2

Counts Three and Four violate double jeopardy and that one must be vacated.

                                           2
                                  I. BACKGROUND

      Aguilar was charged by indictment with four offenses. The indictment alleged

that Aguilar assaulted his girlfriend, “Renee,” 3 on three separate occasions: April 28,

2021; May 6, 2021; and March 13, 2022. Count Three is based on the April 28, 2021

assault, 4 and the three assaults collectively constitute the predicate offenses

underpinning Count Four.

      Renee was in the Tarrant County Jail at the time of trial and did not testify.

But, as detailed below, the State introduced witness testimony, recordings of 911 calls,

police body-camera video, surveillance video, and medical records to establish that

Aguilar had committed the alleged assaults.

A. The April 28, 2021 Assault

      Yuliana Lopez testified that on April 28, 2021, she was at home with her

mother and her children when a woman, who was later identified as Renee,5 knocked

on her door asking for help.6 Renee was crying and shaking and looked scared.

      3
       To protect the privacy of the complainant, we refer to her by a pseudonym.
      4
       Aguilar stipulated, as alleged in Count Three, that he had previously been
convicted of assault with bodily injury against a member of his family or household or
with whom he had a dating relationship.
      5
       Lopez testified that she did not know Renee and “had never seen her before”
April 28, 2021.
      6
       At trial, Aguilar objected to Lopez’s testimony on the grounds that it
contained hearsay and violated his Confrontation Clause rights and received a running
objection, but he does not complain about Lopez’s testimony on appeal.

                                           3
Renee told Lopez that she needed help because her boyfriend was trying to beat and

kill her. Renee told Lopez that her vehicle was at the house from which she had

escaped—Aguilar’s house, which is several houses down from Lopez’s residence—

but she did not have the keys. Renee also stated that she did not have her phone with

her.7

        Lopez explained that she did not allow Renee inside her house out of concern

for her children because Renee “made [her] scared” and had been “saying that

someone was trying to kill her.” But she continued to talk to Renee on her front

porch and, at one point, went inside to get her phone so that Renee could call 911.

Once Lopez returned to the porch with her phone, Renee asked her to call 911 on her

behalf because she could barely speak.

        Lopez called 911 and spoke to the operator first. During the call, which was

initiated approximately five minutes after Renee arrived at Lopez’s house, Lopez

described Renee as “crying [and] really scared” and explained that Renee was hiding at

her house because her boyfriend was trying to beat her. Renee relayed her address to

the 911 operator through Lopez and then spoke with the 911 operator herself.

        After the 911 operator calmed her down, Renee identified Aguilar as her

attacker and provided his age and date of birth. She also described Aguilar’s clothing

and told the operator that he had brass knuckles and was still at his address. She also

       Later, while talking to the 911 operator, Renee explained that Aguilar had
        7

taken her phone when she had tried to call the police.

                                          4
confirmed that she was at her neighbor’s house, not Aguilar’s, and explained that she

did not have her phone because Aguilar had taken it when she had tried to call the

police.

          Because the police had not arrived after about thirty minutes, Renee asked

Lopez to call 911 again, and she complied. When asked why she made the second

call, Lopez explained that she did so “because [Renee] was shaking more . . . [a]nd it

was making [Lopez] scared.” According to Lopez, “[Renee] was more freaked out,

like any little noise and she was freaking out,” and she “kept saying, [‘]I want to go. I

want to go. They need to come. They need to come.[’]” Given Renee’s “freaked

out” state, Lopez acquiesced to her request to call 911 again because she did not know

what else to do.

          During the second call, only Lopez spoke to the 911 operator. She expressed

that (1) she and Renee had called earlier, but the police had not yet arrived; (2) “the

guy” was still a few houses down the street; and (3) Renee was hiding at her house.

Lopez reiterated that Renee was really nervous because “she [did] not want [Aguilar]

to come out and look for her” and told the operator that Renee was really scared,

could not stop shaking, and was covered in bruises. Lopez also conveyed that Renee

had said that Aguilar had told her that he wanted to kill her, that they were outside,

and that she felt that they were all in danger.

                                             5
      Officer Taylor Hazelwood was one of the police officers who responded to the

call.8 He testified that Renee appeared visibly scared; her voice was quivering; and she

kept looking around. He also observed that she had bruises on her arms and back

and behind her ear. Renee identified herself to him and confirmed that she lived at

Aguilar’s house with him. She told him that Aguilar had beaten her with his fists and

a golf club, had held a knife to her throat, and had threatened her with brass

knuckles. 9 According to Renee, this assaultive conduct began around 9:00 a.m. and

continued until she was able to escape with the help of Aguilar’s mother.

      Because the officers were unable to locate Aguilar, he was not interrogated or

taken into custody. Instead, the officers made an online report that was forwarded to

a detective and took Renee to a safe location.

B. The May 6, 2021 Assault

      In the early morning hours of May 6, 2021, Renee, who was bleeding from her

mouth and had her hands tied behind her back, woke up three residents whose

houses are located near Aguilar’s residence by knocking on their doors, ringing their

doorbells, and begging for help. Each of them called 911, but Renee did not stay at

any of the houses to wait for the police to arrive. Home surveillance videos of

      8
       The video recorded from Officer Hazelwood’s body camera during his
response to the 911 call was admitted into evidence at trial.
      9
       The trial court overruled Aguilar’s hearsay objection to this testimony, but
Aguilar does not complain about that ruling on appeal.

                                           6
Renee’s desperate attempts to get help were admitted into evidence and shown to the

jury.

        Police were dispatched to the area to investigate the residents’ reports of a

woman with a bloody face and her hands tied behind her back ringing doorbells.

After a search, an officer found a woman sitting on the ground with her head down

and her hands tied behind her back with ratchet straps.10 The woman was “[v]ery

afraid, crying, scared.” Her face was bloody, and she had blood in her hair.

        MedStar was contacted to send an ambulance to render aid to the woman, who

identified herself as Renee. Through nonverbal communication,11 Renee conveyed to

MedStar personnel that she had been struck in the head, jaw, and legs with the

perpetrator’s fist, knees, and feet. Later at the hospital, Renee told a detective that

Aguilar was the one who had injured her.

C. The March 13, 2022 Assault

        On March 13, 2022, Megan Arnold, who lived in an apartment complex near

Aguilar’s residence, heard a knock at her door, but she did not answer it because she

was pregnant and did not recognize the woman knocking. Shortly thereafter, Arnold

received a call from her boyfriend, who was in the parking lot of their apartment

        The officer’s interaction with the woman was captured on his body camera,
        10

and this body-camera recording was admitted into evidence and viewed by the jury.

        Because of the nature and extent of Renee’s injuries, including a broken jaw,
        11

she was unable to talk.

                                           7
complex on his way to work. He told Arnold that a woman had asked to use his

phone and that Arnold should help her because she seemed to be in trouble.

       When Arnold found the woman, she was still knocking on doors in the

breezeway of the next building over from Arnold’s. She was crying hysterically and

had dried blood on her lips. The woman told Arnold that her ex-boyfriend had held

her captive for hours.

       Arnold immediately called 911. At the 911 operator’s request, Arnold took the

woman into her apartment. After Arnold gave her some Excedrin and something to

drink, the woman fell asleep in a recliner.

       Officer Anita Simms responded to Arnold’s 911 call. When she walked into

Arnold’s apartment, she found the woman, who was identified as Renee, asleep in the

recliner.   Officer Simms observed that Renee was “[v]ery, very, tiny” and “just

mangled” with bruises and blood “everywhere.” She seemed scared and disoriented.

Due to the extent of Renee’s injuries, Officer Simms called MedStar and requested

medical assistance.

D. Arrest and Trial

       Near the end of March 2022, Officer Simms helped serve a warrant on Aguilar,

whom she identified at trial. Aguilar resisted arrest but was ultimately subdued and

taken into custody.

       In October 2022, a jury convicted Aguilar of two of the offenses alleged in a

four-count indictment: assault on a family member with a previous conviction, see

                                              8
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2)(A), and continuous violence against the family, see

id. § 25.11(a), as alleged in Counts Three and Four. The jury assessed Aguilar’s

punishment at fifty years in prison for each offense. The trial court sentenced him

accordingly and ordered that the sentences are to run concurrently. This appeal

followed.

                                   II. DISCUSSION

A. Double Jeopardy

      In his first point, Aguilar argues that his convictions and separate punishments

for Counts Three and Four violate the double-jeopardy protections contained in Penal

Code Section 25.11(c). We agree. 12

      The Double Jeopardy Clause, contained within the Fifth Amendment and

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects an accused

against a second prosecution for the same offense. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV;

Littrell v. State, 271 S.W.3d 273, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In addition to protecting

against multiple prosecutions, this provision also protects against multiple

punishments for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S. Ct. 2221,

      12
        Generally, to preserve the error for appellate review, a defendant must raise a
double-jeopardy claim in the trial court. Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643–46 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000). Aguilar failed to do so, but this is not fatal to his double-jeopardy
claim. Such a claim “may be raised for the first time on appeal when (1) the
undisputed facts show the double-jeopardy violation is clearly apparent from the face
of the record, and (2) enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default serves no
legitimate state interest.” Garfias v. State, 424 S.W.3d 54, 57–58 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014). We agree with the parties that both prongs of this test have been satisfied in
the present case.

                                           9
2225 (1977); Ex parte Adams, 586 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); Speights v. State,

464 S.W.3d 719, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

       In a multiple-punishments double-jeopardy case, the relevant inquiry is always

whether the legislature intended to permit multiple punishments. Loving v. State, 401

S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Thus, in such a case, we must assess

whether an appellant has been “convicted of more offenses than the legislature

intended.” Ex parte Milner, 394 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting

Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)); see Ball v. United States, 470

U.S. 856, 861, 105 S. Ct. 1668, 1671–72 (1985).

       Penal Code Section 25.11, the continuous-violence-against-the-family statute,

expressly provides that unless certain statutory conditions are met, “[a] defendant may

not be convicted in the same criminal action of another offense the victim of which is

an alleged victim of the [continuous-violence offense] and an element of which is any

conduct that is alleged as an element of the [continuous-violence offense].” Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 25.11(c). By including this provision, “the legislature indicated its

clear intent: a person cannot be convicted in the same criminal action of continuous

violence against a victim and also be convicted of additional, discrete instances of

bodily-injury assault against that same victim if those discrete assaults could have been

charged as part of the continuous count.” Birdo v. State, No. 02-22-00142-CR, 2023

WL 4630627, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 20, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (first citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.11(c); then citing

                                            10
Ellison v. State, 425 S.W.3d 637, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.);

and then citing Soliz v. State, 353 S.W.3d 850, 851–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).

However, “the State may charge the additional, discrete acts alternatively or as lesser-

included offenses.” Id. (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.11(c)).

      Here, Aguilar’s continuous-violence count (Count Four) was predicated on

three assaults against Renee, including the one that occurred on April 28, 2021. The

same April 28, 2021 assault also formed the basis of the assault-on-a-family-member

offense alleged in Count Three.13 Thus, having been convicted—and punished—for

both Counts Three and Four, Aguilar suffered a violation of his right against multiple

punishments. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 25.11(c); Birdo, 2023 WL 4630627, at *5.

      The State concedes that the trial court’s imposition of concurrent fifty-year

sentences for Counts Three and Four violated Penal Code Section 25.11(c), but it

disagrees with Aguilar regarding the appropriate remedy. Aguilar argues that we

should vacate his conviction for Count Four, which he asserts is the conviction that

subjected him to double jeopardy. However, the State contends that Aguilar’s case

should be remanded to the trial court so that the State may elect which count should

       Counts Three and Four were not charged as alternatives, nor was Count
      13

Three submitted to the jury as a lesser-included offense of Count Four. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 25.11(c).

                                          11
be vacated. 14 Because we conclude that Count Four is the more serious offense, we

will vacate Aguilar’s Count Three conviction.

      “The remedy for impermissible multiple convictions and punishments is to

retain the most serious offense and vacate the other, the more serious offense

ordinarily being defined as the offense for which the greatest sentence was assessed.”

Littrell, 271 S.W.3d at 279 n.34.      When the sentences are the same for both

convictions, we may look to other distinguishing factors, such as the degree of each

      14
         The State cites Bien v. State, 550 S.W.3d 180, 188–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018),
in support of its contention that the case should be remanded so that the State can
elect the count to be vacated. However, Bien does not require remand and is
distinguishable from the present case. In Bien, the Court of Criminal Appeals, facing a
situation in which no tiebreaker could resolve the question of which offense was more
serious in the double-jeopardy context, elected to defer to the State’s discretion and
retain the conviction that it had requested. Id. at 189. However, the court recognized
the existence of other tiebreakers used by courts in such situations and did not
proscribe their use. See id. at 188–89. Significantly, in Bien—unlike the present case—
the State had informed the Court of Criminal Appeals which offense it preferred to
retain, meaning that remand was not required. See id. at 189.

        If the State wanted to have a say as to which of Aguilar’s two convictions is
vacated, it could have expressed its preference in its briefing. However, the State’s
failure to avail itself of this opportunity does not provide sufficient grounds for
remanding this case rather than rendering judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.3; see also
Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that when a
multiple-punishment double-jeopardy violation occurs, “the remedy is to affirm the
conviction for the most serious offense and vacate the other convictions”); cf. Ash v.
State, 533 S.W.3d 878, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (rejecting appellant’s request to
remand matter because the Court of Criminal Appeals could decide the issue and
thereby “conserve scarce judicial resources”); Beedy v. State, 250 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008) (noting that decision to allow appellate courts to reform a judgment
to remove an unlawful cumulation order rather than remanding for a new sentencing
hearing was “reinforced” by the court’s “interest in fostering judicial economy and
conserving scarce judicial resources”).

                                          12
offense or an affirmative deadly weapon finding. Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 373 (degree of

felony); Villanueva v. State, 227 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (affirmative

deadly weapon finding).

      Here, the punishments imposed for Counts Three and Four are identical: for

each offense, Aguilar was sentenced to fifty years in prison; no fines were assessed;

and no restitution was ordered. Further, both offenses are third-degree felonies, and

neither included a deadly weapon finding.

      But, as noted above, a discrete act of bodily-injury assault—as alleged in Count

Three—may be charged as a lesser-included offense of a continuous-violence offense

such as Count Four. Birdo, 2023 WL 4630627, at *5 (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 25.11(c)). Given that characterization, we conclude that Aguilar’s conviction for

continuous violence against the family as alleged in Count Four is the more serious

offense. See Weber v. State, 536 S.W.3d 31, 37–38 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. ref’d)

(concluding that appellant’s continuous-sexual-abuse conviction was a more serious

offense than his discrete aggravated-sexual-assault convictions despite the offenses’

identical sentences because the individual acts of abuse are lesser-included offenses of

the greater offense of continuous sexual abuse (citing Carmichael v. State, 505 S.W.3d

95, 101 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. ref’d))). Accordingly, the proper remedy

is to vacate Aguilar’s Count Three conviction and to uphold his Count Four

continuous-violence conviction.

                                            13
      In light of the foregoing, we sustain Aguilar’s first point and render a judgment

of acquittal on Count Three.

B. Admission of State’s Exhibit 3

      In his second point, Aguilar argues that the trial court erred by admitting State’s

Exhibit 3, a recording of the two 911 calls Lopez initiated on Renee’s behalf after the

April 28, 2021 assault. Specifically, Aguilar contends that because Exhibit 3 contains

testimonial hearsay, its admission violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation

Clause. We disagree.

      1. Standard of Review

      Generally, a trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed under an abuse-

of-discretion standard. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

However, if the admission of evidence involves a constitutional legal ruling, such as

whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, the appellate court gives almost

total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts but reviews de

novo the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. See Langham v. State, 305

S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Wall, 184 S.W.3d at 742 (applying hybrid

standard of review to issue of whether statement was testimonial).

      2. Applicable Law

      The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, applicable to the states through

the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Crawford v.

                                           14
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1357, 1359 (2004); Langham, 305 S.W.3d

at 575 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI). “[T]he most important instances in which the

[Confrontation] Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are those

in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness

to obtain evidence for trial.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358, 131 S. Ct. 1143,

1155 (2011). Once a defendant raises a Confrontation Clause objection, the burden

shifts to the State to prove either (1) that the proposed statement does not contain

testimonial hearsay and thus does not implicate the Confrontation Clause or (2) that

the statement does contain testimonial hearsay but is nevertheless admissible. See

De La Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Crawford,

541 U.S. at 68, 124 S. Ct. at 1374).

       To determine whether the admission of the recording of the 911 calls violated

the Confrontation Clause, we must first determine whether the statements on the

recordings are testimonial. In Davis v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court

explained the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements:

       Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
       interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
       purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
       ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
       objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency[] and that
       the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
       events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

                                          15
547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273–74 (2006). A court considers the totality of

the circumstances in determining whether a statement is testimonial. Clark v. State,

282 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. ref’d).

      “Statements made to police during contact initiated by a witness at the

beginning of an investigation are generally not considered testimonial.” Cook v. State,

199 S.W.3d 495, 498 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). For this reason,

911 calls initiated to summon police assistance are generally nontestimonial because

they are “a cry for help” or “the provision of information enabling officers to end a

threatening situation.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 832, 126 S. Ct. at 2279; Cook, 199 S.W.3d at

498; see also Rodgers v. State, No. 09-09-00359-CR, 2010 WL 3043705, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Aug. 4, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(listing cases in which courts concluded that similar 911 calls were nontestimonial).

Similarly, responses to preliminary questions by police at the scene of a crime while

police are assessing and securing the scene are not testimonial. See Spencer v. State, 162

S.W.3d 877, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).

      In Davis, the Court addressed whether statements made by a victim of domestic

violence to a 911 operator were testimonial in nature. See 547 U.S. at 826–27, 126

S. Ct. at 2276–77. In determining that the caller’s statements were nontestimonial and

thus admissible, the Davis court considered the following factors: (1) the caller was

describing events as they were actually happening rather than past events; (2) any

reasonable listener would recognize that the caller was facing an ongoing emergency;

                                           16
(3) when viewed objectively, the nature of what was asked and answered was such that

the elicited statements were necessary to resolve the present emergency, rather than

simply to learn what had happened in the past; and (4) the caller was frantically

answering the 911 emergency operator’s questions over the phone in an environment

that was not tranquil or even safe. See id. at 826–27, 126 S. Ct. at 2276–77. The Davis

court concluded that the caller was “seeking aid, not telling a story about the past.”

See id. at 831, 126 S. Ct. at 2279.

       In addition, the following principles are useful in determining whether

particular statements are testimonial: (1) testimonial statements are official and formal

in nature, (2) interaction with the police initiated by a witness or the victim is less

likely to result in testimonial statements than if initiated by the police, (3) spontaneous

statements to the police are not testimonial, and (4) responses to preliminary

questions by police at the scene of the crime while police are assessing and securing

the scene are not testimonial. Amador v. State, 376 S.W.3d 339, 342–43 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d).

       With these considerations in mind, we now examine the complained-of

statements in the 911 recording to determine whether they were testimonial.

       3. Analysis

       Here, the State carried its burden to show that the recording of the 911 calls

did not contain testimonial hearsay.

                                            17
      With regard to the first Davis factor, although Renee was describing past events

to the 911 operator, these events were in the immediate past and their description was

necessary for the police to determine the type of emergency with which they were

dealing. See Guzman v. State, No. 02-18-00332-CR, 2019 WL 2223213, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth May 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(concluding that the first Davis factor weighed against the testimonial nature of a 911

caller’s statements describing past events because the events described “were in the

immediate past, and the caller’s statements . . . were necessary for the police to form

an idea about the type of emergency with which they were dealing” (citing Hernandez v.

State, 562 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017), vacated on other

grounds, No. PD-0036-19, 2020 WL 220021, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 15, 2020) (not

designated for publication))); Santacruz v. State, 237 S.W.3d 822, 828 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g) (concluding that domestic abuse

victim’s statements to 911 operator were nontestimonial even though they described

events that had occurred ten to fifteen minutes earlier).

      As to the second Davis factor, any reasonable listener would recognize that

Renee and Lopez were facing an ongoing emergency. Renee had just escaped from

Aguilar, and he had not yet been apprehended. Because Lopez was afraid to take

Renee inside her house where her children were, they remained outside on Lopez’s

front porch only a few houses down from where Renee believed Aguilar to be.

Renee’s initial interactions with the 911 operator made it clear that she was afraid as

                                           18
she frantically urged him to send help and had to be calmed down before she could

answer the operator’s questions.      See Duchesneau v. State, Nos. 02-18-00321-CR,

02-18-00322-CR, 2019 WL 2455619, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 13, 2019,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that “any reasonable

listener would recognize that [the 911 caller] was facing an ongoing emergency based

on her initial plea for help and her screams”). Thus, the second Davis factor supports

the conclusion that the statements were nontestimonial. 15

      With respect to the third Davis factor, the nature of what was asked and

answered during the two calls—when viewed objectively—was such that the elicited

statements were necessary to resolve the present emergency rather than simply to

learn what had happened in the past. See id.; Guzman, 2019 WL 2223213, at *3. The

information Renee and Lopez provided to the 911 operator—including identifying

Aguilar as Renee’s attacker; providing Aguilar’s age and date of birth; describing his

clothing; notifying the 911 operator that Aguilar had brass knuckles; confirming his

      15
        Aguilar points to Lopez’s statement during the second 911 call that “there is
nothing going on right now” as evidence that Renee and Lopez were not facing an
ongoing emergency. However, when the 911 operator initially asked Lopez if
“anything [was] going on right now,” Lopez responded, “No, but . . . [Renee’s]
afraid.” And Lopez testified that the reason that she made the second 911 call was
that Renee was “making [Lopez] scared” because she was “shaking more” and
“freaking out.” She also recalled that Renee “kept saying that he was coming, he was
coming” and that “[h]e is coming for me [and] is going to hurt me.” Thus, even
though “nothing [was] going on” at the time of the second call in the sense that
Aguilar was not currently trying to attack Renee, it is clear that Renee was afraid that
Aguilar was coming for her; that both Renee and Lopez believed that they were facing
an ongoing emergency; and that the purpose of the second 911 call was to seek aid.
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826–27, 126 S. Ct. at 2276–77.

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location; and conveying that Aguilar had told Renee that he wanted to kill her, that

Renee and Lopez were still outside, and that Lopez believed that they were in

danger—was “necessary to resolve the responding officers’ need for information

about ‘whom they [were] dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to

their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.’” Guzman, 2019 WL

2223213, at *3 (quoting Hernandez, 562 S.W.3d at 506)); cf. Colbert v. State, No. 03-17-

00558-CR, 2019 WL 1065889, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 7, 2019, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that the questions asked by the

911 operator and the answers given by the caller were of the kind necessary to supply

responding officers with the information needed to locate the victims, possibly

apprehend the assailants, and respond appropriately to the potential threat to safety);

Dixon v. State, 244 S.W.3d 472, 484–85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.

ref’d) (concluding that the primary purpose of the 911 operator’s questions “was to

determine if [complainant] was physically injured,” if she needed medical assistance,

and if there was “the potential for a continuing threat to [her] safety or the safety of

the responding officer”).

      Concerning the fourth factor, as discussed above, Lopez expressed to the 911

operator that she felt that Renee and she were in danger. When Renee first spoke to

the 911 operator, she pleaded over and over for him to hurry. The 911 operator had

to calm Renee down before she could even answer his questions. Lopez described

Renee as “crying [and] really scared,” “freaked out,” and unable to stop shaking.

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Thus, Renee and Lopez clearly felt that they were “in an environment that was not

tranquil, or even safe,” Davis, 547 U.S. at 814, 126 S. Ct. at 2269, and this indicates

that their statements were nontestimonial, see Guzman, 2019 WL 2223213, at *4

(determining caller’s statements to 911 dispatcher were nontestimonial where the

recording reflected “that the caller was scared; her voice was initially shaky and

sounded as if she was out of breath, she then proceeded to breathe rapidly and heavily

during the majority of the call, and she specifically stated that she was scared to go

‘out there’”); see also Hernandez v. State, No. 01-16-00755-CR, 2020 WL 4210495, at *5

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (holding that caller’s statements to 911 operator were nontestimonial

because she “was upset, her voice was shaking, and she was breathing heavily”).

      Considering all of the Davis factors, we conclude that the complained-of

statements in the 911 recording, when viewed objectively, were made informally

under circumstances indicating that the interrogation’s primary purpose was to enable

the police to meet an ongoing emergency rather than to establish or prove past events

potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct.

at 2273–74. Because the complained-of statements are nontestimonial, the trial court

did not err by admitting State’s Exhibit 3. See Hernandez, 2020 WL 4210495, at *5.

      We overrule Aguilar’s second point.

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C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Concerning the March 13, 2022 Assault

      In his third point, Aguilar asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to

show that he assaulted Renee on March 13, 2022, as alleged in Count Four. However,

because we overruled Aguilar’s second point, his third point is moot.

      Count Four of the indictment alleged that Aguilar committed three assaults,

including the March 13, 2022 assault, but to convict Aguilar under Penal Code Section

25.11(a), the jury only had to find that Aguilar assaulted Renee at least twice within a

twelve-month period. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.11(a). Aguilar did not challenge

the sufficiency of the evidence to show that he committed the May 6, 2021 assault,

and his evidentiary-sufficiency challenge regarding the April 28, 2021 assault was

predicated on his second point—his contention that the trial court erred by admitting

State’s Exhibit 3. Because we overruled Aguilar’s second point, Aguilar’s argument

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence of the April 28, 2021 assault fails. Therefore,

regardless of whether we were to sustain Aguilar’s third point, there is sufficient

evidence to show that Aguilar assaulted Renee at least twice within a twelve-month

period and, thus, to sustain his conviction on Count Four. See id.

      Accordingly, we overrule Aguilar’s third point as moot. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

D. Cumulative Error

      In his fourth point, Aguilar contends that the cumulative effect of the trial

court’s errors is such that he must be acquitted of both Counts Three and Four.

Having concluded that Aguilar’s conviction on Count Three should be vacated on

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double-jeopardy grounds, we overrule as moot his fourth point as it pertains to this

count. See id. With respect to Count Four, Aguilar argues that his conviction should

be reversed on evidentiary-insufficiency grounds. But, as noted above, his argument

is premised on his second and third points. Having overruled Aguilar’s second and

third points, we likewise overrule the remainder of his fourth point.

                                  III. CONCLUSION

        Having sustained Aguilar’s first point and having overruled his remaining

points, we reverse the trial court’s judgment of conviction on Count Three and render

judgment of acquittal on that count, but we affirm the trial court’s judgment on Count

Four.

                                                      /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                      Dabney Bassel
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: October 12, 2023

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