Court Opinion

ID: 9385735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-08 06:12:01.66843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:04.387391
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed April 6, 2023

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                               No. 11-22-00290-CV
                                   __________

                   IN THE INTEREST OF A.O., A CHILD

                      On Appeal from the 326th District Court
                               Taylor County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. 10371-CX

                       MEMORAND UM OPI NI ON
       This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of A.O.’s
mother and father. A.O.’s father appealed. On appeal, he presents three issues in
which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
findings. We reverse and remand.
                  I. Termination Findings and Sufficiency Standards
       After considering the evidence presented at trial, the trial court terminated the
parental rights of both of A.O.’s parents based upon the findings that the trial court
made pursuant to Section 161.001(b) of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West 2022). The trial court found that Appellant had
committed two of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those found in
subsections (D) and (O). Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant had
(1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed A.O. to remain in conditions or
surroundings that endangered A.O.’s physical or emotional well-being and (2) failed
to   comply    with     the   provisions   of   a   court    order   that   specifically
established the actions necessary for Appellant to obtain the return of A.O.
See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (O).       The trial court also found, pursuant to
Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in
A.O.’s best interest.
      To terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that termination is in the best interest of the child.
FAM. § 161.001(b). In three issues on appeal, Appellant challenges the findings
made by the trial court pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1), as well as the trial court’s
best interest finding. He asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support those findings.
      To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case,
we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the
evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine
whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or
conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). In this regard, we note that the trial court is the sole arbiter
of the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex.
2014) (citing In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)).

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      With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied).
But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not
limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the
child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now
and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the
programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the
child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or
omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship
is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best
interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
                           II. Evidence Presented at Trial
      Three witnesses testified at the termination hearing: a permanency case
manager, Appellant, and A.O.’s friend’s mother. According to the case manager and
Appellant, A.O. went to live with Appellant sometime after an intake regarding
A.O.’s mother, with whom A.O. had been living. The intake involved an allegation
of sexual abuse of A.O. by a sibling and methamphetamine use by A.O.’s mother.
A.O. was eleven years old at the time. Before the Department allowed A.O. to be
placed with Appellant, the Department required Appellant to pass a drug test, which
he did. Additionally, the Department conducted a walk-through and approved
Appellant’s then-home.
      Unfortunately, less than one month after he became A.O.’s primary caretaker,
Appellant was arrested for driving while intoxicated with a child passenger—A.O.
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A.O. was removed from her parents’ care after Appellant was arrested. A.O.’s
mother was incarcerated at that time.
      Appellant’s DWI offense was charged as a felony because a child was in the
vehicle. Appellant pled guilty to the felony DWI and was placed on probation.
Appellant testified that, at the time of the termination hearing, he was in compliance
with all of the terms and conditions of his probation, and there is nothing in the
record before us to indicate otherwise. The Department did not present any evidence
as to the circumstances surrounding the DWI (other than that A.O. was a passenger),
nor did it present any evidence as to whether Appellant had any previous DWI
convictions or other criminal history. Appellant acknowledged that alcohol was his
“vice,” and he testified that he got arrested for the DWI after being pulled over for
speeding—driving “45 in a 35.” Appellant said that he had not had a drink since the
date of his arrest for DWI, which was one and one-half years prior to the termination
hearing. While this case was pending below, Appellant did not test positive for
drugs. He obtained and maintained stable employment, earning minimum wage.
Appellant, however, failed to obtain stable housing. Appellant also failed to strictly
comply with other provisions of his family service plan, which had been made an
order of the court. The record indicates that there was some confusion between
Appellant and the Department regarding the requirements and, perhaps, some
failures on the part of the Department’s case managers that may have been a reason
for some, but not all, of Appellant’s noncompliance.
      Appellant continued to visit and to maintain a relationship with A.O. while
this case was pending below. By all accounts, their relationship was loving and
appropriate, and they had a special bond. For almost the entirety of the case, A.O.
wished to be returned to her father’s care. However, at the time of trial, A.O.
expressed a desire to be adopted by her friend’s parents, even though she loved
Appellant “very much” and wanted to maintain a relationship with him.
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      A.O. initially had trouble adjusting to foster care; it was “very emotionally
difficult for her.” A.O. did not do well in her first foster home and was later placed
in a different foster home, where she had been for about one year at the time of trial
and was “doing great.” A.O. attended counseling weekly and was on medication
prescribed by a psychiatrist. While in the latter foster home, A.O. was involved in
various extracurricular activities and made a friend with whom she spent a lot of
time. A.O. not only spent time at the friend’s house, she regularly went to church
with the friend and her family, and she also went on vacation with them. The friend’s
parents had previously adopted other children and, at the time of trial, were in the
process of becoming a licensed foster home again so that A.O. could be placed with
them. The Department’s plans were for A.O. to eventually be adopted by her friend’s
parents.
                                    III. Analysis
      As we stated above, the termination of one’s parental rights must be supported
by clear and convincing evidence. FAM. § 161.001(b). We carefully scrutinize
termination proceedings, and we strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in
the parent’s favor. In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012).
      A. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the findings under (D) and (O).
      In his first and second issues on appeal, Appellant challenges the legal
and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings under
Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (O).       Because of our holding with respect to
Appellant’s third issue, we need address only the legal sufficiency challenge to the
trial court’s findings under Section 161.001(b)(1), which could potentially result in
a rendition rather than a remand. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002);
see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
      With respect to subsection (D), the record shows that Appellant knowingly
placed A.O. in, or allowed her to remain in, conditions or surroundings that
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endangered A.O.’s physical or emotional well-being when he caused her to be a
passenger in a vehicle, that was being driven by Appellant while he was intoxicated.
Under subsection (D), the focus is on the child’s environment. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d
726, 749 (Tex. 2022). “The suitability of a child’s living conditions and the conduct
of parents or others in the home are relevant to a Subsection (D) inquiry.” Id.; (citing
In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 108–09 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.)). In
J.W., the supreme court considered the termination of the father’s parental rights
under subsection (D) and indicated that the mother’s use of a controlled substance
while pregnant was part of the child’s “environment” before the child was born—an
environment for which the father may or may not bear responsibility, depending on
the circumstances. Id.
      In this case, the evidence shows that Appellant bore responsibility for A.O.’s
environment when he drove while intoxicated with A.O. in the vehicle. Thus,
Appellant placed A.O. in a dangerous environment when he allowed her to be a
passenger in a vehicle that was being driven by a drunk driver. Furthermore,
Appellant acknowledged during his testimony in the case before us that he “put
[A.O.] in a position which endangered her well-being on that day.” Viewing all of
the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding
under subsection (D), we hold that a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm
belief or conviction that its finding was true. See J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue to the extent that it relates to the
legal sufficiency of the evidence.
      With respect to subsection (O), the record shows that Appellant failed to fully
comply with the provisions of his court-ordered family service plan. A permanency
case manager for the Department testified regarding Appellant’s noncompliance,
especially his failure to obtain a safe and stable home. Additionally, Appellant
acknowledged at trial that he was not fully compliant with his family service plan;
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he testified that he was compliant “[f]or the most part.” Viewing all of the evidence
presented at trial in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding under
subsection (O), we hold that a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief
or conviction that its finding was true. See J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Accordingly,
we overrule Appellant’s second issue to the extent that it relates to the legal
sufficiency of the evidence.
      B. The evidence is factually insufficient as to best interest.
      In his third issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his
parental rights would be in the best interest of A.O. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(2). There
is a “strong presumption” in Texas that the best interest of a child is served by
keeping the child with a parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Giving
due regard to that presumption, the evidence presented at trial, and the Holley
factors, we hold, as explained below, that the evidence is legally sufficient, but
factually insufficient, to support the trial court’s finding that termination of
Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of A.O. See Holley, 544
S.W.2d at 371–72.
      With respect to A.O.’s best interest, the evidence shows that, at the time of
trial, A.O. wished to be adopted by her friend’s parents. A.O. feared the potential
for instability and a return to foster care in the future if she were returned to
Appellant’s care, but she loved Appellant “very much” and wanted to maintain a
relationship with him. The friend’s parents had a safe, stable home and were in the
process of renewing their license to be a foster home so that they could eventually
adopt A.O. A.O. had some medical needs, and the friend’s parents were able to meet
her needs. Although Appellant had stable employment, he did not have stable
housing or a valid driver’s license. Furthermore, he was still on probation at the time

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of trial, and he had endangered A.O. by driving while intoxicated with A.O. in the
vehicle.
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s best
interest finding, and considering the record as it relates to the desires of the child,
the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future, the parental abilities of those
involved, the initial reason for A.O.’s removal from Appellant’s care, Appellant’s
lack of a stable home, and the plans for the child by the parties involved, we hold
that a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. See id.; see also J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Thus, the evidence is
legally sufficient. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s third issue to the extent that
it relates to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
      However, based upon our review of the entire record, without viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s best interest finding but still
giving due deference to that finding, we hold that the trial court could not reasonably
have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of the parent–child
relationship between Appellant and A.O. was in A.O.’s best interest. See Holley, 544
S.W.2d at 371–72; see also C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25–26. The trial court itself, when
pronouncing his ruling regarding A.O.’s best interest, “recognize[d] the importance
of [A.O.’s] continued relationship with [Appellant].” Upon terminating Appellant’s
parental rights, the trial court stated that it did so “with a hope and a prayer that that
relationship, but not an order, that that relationship continue.” The trial court’s
recognition of the importance of the continued relationship between Appellant and
A.O. is supported by evidence that Appellant and A.O. had a good relationship, that
their visits were appropriate, that they were bonded and loved each other, and that
A.O.’s desire from the time of removal until not long before trial was to be returned
to Appellant’s care.
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      Appellant had stable employment but earned only minimum wage. Because
of Appellant’s credit history and his inability to afford his own home or apartment
while paying probation-related fees, Appellant lived with a friend. Appellant
acknowledged that this living arrangement was not suitable for A.O. because she
needed her own room; therefore, he did not request to be appointed as a managing
conservator of A.O.      Instead, Appellant merely wished to be appointed as a
possessory conservator and to be allowed more time to try to obtain stable housing.
While stability was shown to be important to A.O. and to be a concern for the trial
court when considering A.O.’s best interest, the trial court had the option under the
Family Code to severely restrict Appellant’s possessory rights, without terminating
them, in order to protect A.O.’s best interest. See In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 223
(Tex. 2021) (stating that the Family Code “does not require termination when a
severe restriction or limitation on access can also be in the best interest of the child
while preserving the possibility that the parent and child may continue to have a
relationship in the future”). The record shows that A.O.’s friend’s parents had
indicated that they would not only be willing to adopt A.O., but would also be willing
to be a permanent placement for A.O. Based upon our review of the record, we hold
that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that
termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of A.O. See Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
      While we commend the potential foster/adoptive parents for all that they have
done and all that they may continue to do for A.O., we cannot hold in this case that
the trial court’s finding as to best interest is supported by factually sufficient
evidence under the clear and convincing evidentiary standard. Accordingly, we
sustain Appellant’s third issue on appeal insofar as he challenges the factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that it would be in
A.O.’s best interest to terminate Appellant’s parental rights.
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      C. Other Matters Not Dispositive of Appeal
      Because we have held that the evidence in this case is factually insufficient to
support the finding made by the trial court pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), we
need not address the factual sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the trial
court’s findings under Section 161.001(b)(1). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. Further, we
note that Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s appointment of the
Department as A.O.’s permanent managing conservator. Accordingly, this court’s
opinion and judgment are not to be read to alter the trial court’s appointment of the
Department as the managing conservator of A.O. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611,
615–17 (Tex. 2007) (holding that a parent’s appellate challenge to parental
termination did not encompass a challenge to the appointment of managing
conservator).
                                IV. This Court’s Ruling
       We reverse the trial court’s termination order insofar as it terminated the
 parental rights of A.O.’s father, and we affirm the order of the trial court in all other
 respects. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings. Any
 proceeding on remand must be commenced within 180 days of this court’s
 mandate. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4(c).

                                                 W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                 JUSTICE

April 6, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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