Court Opinion

ID: 9516913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:55:57.675363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:08.264762
License: Public Domain

KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice,
dissenting.
A concerned citizen filed suit against a school district and its superintendent alleging, among other things, various past violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act and the Texas Public Information Act. The citizen alleged that these violations showed a pattern and practice by the school district of violating these two statutes. As to both statutes, the citizen sought a declaratory judgment regarding the past violations that allegedly show a pattern and practice, and the citizen also sought mandamus or injunctive relief requiring the school district to comply with these two statutes in the future. The trial court granted the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of the citizen’s claims. In her opening brief on appeal, the citizen asserts that she seeks a declaratory judgment regarding the past violations of these two statutes, allegedly showing a pattern and practice, and that she seeks mandamus or injunctive relief requiring the school district to comply with these two statutes in the future.
The majority correctly concludes that the citizen’s claims for declaratory relief as to the Texas Open Meetings Act are not moot and that in her request for mandamus or injunctive relief as to this statute the citizen does not seek an advisory opinion. Likewise, the majority correctly concludes that the trial court erred in dismissing the citizen’s Texas Public Information Act claims to the extent they sought to compel disclosure as to unfulfilled requests. However, as to the citizen’s request for declaratory relief regarding requests that were fulfilled in the past, although in a manner that allegedly violated the Texas Public Information Act, the majority incorrectly concludes that these claims are moot because, on appeal, the citizen does not assert that she is seeking declaratory relief to show a pattern and practice that would form a basis for mandamus or injunctive relief. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, in her appellant’s brief, the citizen does state that she is asserting similar declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief under both the Texas Open Meetings Act and the Texas Public Information Act. Therefore, this court should hold that none of the citizen’s claims for declaratory relief regarding violations of the Texas Public Information Act are moot and that in her request for mandamus or injunctive relief regarding this statute the citizen does not seek an advisory opinion. Because it does not, I respectfully dissent.

Allegations in the Citizen’s Live Petition

In her live petition, appellant/plaintiff Nancy Kessling asserts, among other things, similar allegations and requests for relief regarding the Texas Open Meetings Act (“Meetings Act”) and the Texas Public Information Act (“Information Act”). In suing defendants/appellees Friendswood Independent School District (“School District”) and its superintendent Patricia Hanks (collectively the “School District Parties”), Kessling made the following allegations:
The [School District] has a pattern and practice of violating the notice and open *389meeting provisions of the [Meetings Act], as evidenced by the fact that [the School District] has continued to violate the [Meetings Act] prior to and during the pendency of this suit. Kessling seeks a declaratory judgment under the [Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act] that [the School District] has violated the [Meetings Act] through its past actions. Kessling seeks injunctive relief to prevent [the School District] from continuing to violate the [Meetings Act] through these actions.
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Plaintiff Kessling seeks a declaratory judgment regarding each of these violations, and a writ of mandamus and/or injunctive relief to require that the [School District] comply with the procedural requirements of the [Meetings Act] ...
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The [School District] has demonstrated a pattern and practice of failing and refusing to either release public information or to request attorney general decisions to authorize withholding the information. The [School District] has demonstrated a pattern and practice of refusing to release information listed in the [Information Act] as information that should be released without question and without delay. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.022. The [School District] has demonstrated a pattern and practice of delaying the release of information for an inordinately long time, sometimes months, failing to comply with the timeliness requirements of the [Information Act]. Kessling seeks a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment [sic] Act that [the School District] has violated the [Information Act] for each of the alleged incidents that constitute a part of the pattern and practice.
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Plaintiff Kessling seeks a declaratory judgment regarding each of these violations, and a writ of mandamus and/or injunctive relief to require that the [School District] comply with the procedural requirements of the [Information Act] and to compel disclosure of all requested information ...
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Plaintiff respectfully requests that, upon trial of this case, the Court:
1) find that Defendants have violated the requirements of the [Meetings Act] and order that the Defendants comply with the Act ...
2) find that Defendants have violated the requirements of the [Information Act] and order that the Defendants comply with the procedural requirements of the Act ...
As to both the Meetings Act and the Information Act, Kessling sought a declaratory judgment as to past violations of these statutes, which she alleged constituted a pattern and practice. Then, based on these past violations, Kessling sought mandamus or injunctive relief requiring the School District to comply with these two statutes in the future.

The School District Parties’ Motion For Summary Judgment and Plea to the Jurisdiction

The trial court granted the School District Parties’ “Motion for Summary Judgment and Plea to the Jurisdiction.” As to Kessling’s Meetings Act and the Information Act claims, the School District Parties did not specify whether they were asserting a plea to the jurisdiction or a motion for summary judgment. As to both the Meetings Act and the Information Act claims, the School District Parties asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction based on mootness and Kessling’s alleged *390request for an advisory opinion. These arguments constitute an attack on the trial court’s jurisdiction and thus fall within the plea to the jurisdiction. As to the Information Act claims, the School District Parties also asserted that section 552.3215 of the Government Code prohibits Kessling from obtaining the declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief that she seeks in this case. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.3215 (Vernon 2004). This argument constitutes an attack on the merits of Kessling’s claims and is part of the summary-judgment motion.

The Citizen’s Opening Brief on Appeal

In pertinent part, Kessling makes the following statements in her opening brief on appeal:
Kessling seeks a declaration that [the School District] has violated the [Information Act], [the Meetings Act], and Education Code in a specific manner, and an order requiring that [the School District] comply with these laws in the future to avoid these violations ...
Kessling filed this action, alleging a pattern and practice of [Meetings Act], [Information Act], and Education Code violations ...
Kessling asserted that her public information requests remain unfulfilled to this day, and she sought both mandamus and declaratory relief to cure [the School District’s] past and ongoing violations of the [Information Act] ... In paragraph 6.17 of her petition, Kess-ling seeks a declaratory judgment on each of the alleged violations and a writ of mandamus and/or an injunction to “require that the [School District] comply with the procedural requirements of the [Information Act] and to compel disclosure of all requested information.” Kessling sought the same relief in her general prayer.
(emphasis in original). The Supreme Court of Texas has stressed that appellate courts must construe an appellant’s brief “reasonably, yet liberally” so as to “reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.” Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex.2008); see also Ditta v. Conte, 298 S.W.3d. 187, 189-90 (Tex. 2009) (construing petitioner’s brief liberally to contain argument that it did not expressly contain because it contained similar and related arguments). Under this construction, Kessling, in her opening brief, asserts that she seeks declaratory relief as to past violations of the Information Act, including violations of the procedural requirements of the statute in cases in which the School District already has provided the requested information.1 Kessling also asserts in her opening brief that, based on these past violations, she seeks mandamus or declaratory relief to order the School District to comply with the Information Act in the future. Therefore, the majority incorrectly concludes that Kessling has failed to sufficiently brief that she seeks declaratory relief as to past procedural violations of the Information Act and that she seeks mandamus or in-junctive relief to prevent future violations of this statute.2 See ante at p. 384.

*391
The Effect of the Citizen’s Adequate Briefing

Because Kessling adequately briefed the relief that she sought regarding the past procedural violations of the Information Act, this court should conclude, as it does for the claims regarding the Meetings Act, that Kessling’s declaratory judgment claims are not moot and her claims for injunctive or mandamus relief do not contain a request for an advisory opinion. In adjudicating the jurisdictional challenges to the Meetings Act claims, the majority concludes that the trial court has jurisdiction because Kessling seeks to use the alleged pattern and practice of past violations as a basis for showing her entitlement to mandamus or injunctive relief as to future violations. See ante at p. 381. As to the Meetings Act claims, the majority correctly notes that a decision that the claims are not moot or unripe does not speak to the merits of these claims. See ante at p. 381; Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554-55 (Tex.2000) (stating that courts may not reach the merits of the parties’ claims in deciding jurisdictional issues); In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 920 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding [mand. denied] ) (refusing to consider arguments attacking the merits of the claims in deciding whether trial court clearly abused its discretion by denying plea to the jurisdiction). Instead of finding briefing waiver, the majority should apply the same analysis to the Information Act claims as to fulfilled requests that the majority applies to the Meetings Act claims.
However, in discussing the same jurisdictional issues as to the Information Act claims, the majority incorrectly states that the merits of these claims are at issue on appeal.3 The majority states that Kessling has not argued on appeal that the Information Act affords the mandamus or in-junctive relief that she seeks. See ante at p. 384. The majority further asserts that Kessling has not briefed “the issue of whether the [Information Act] affords her the right to seek mandamus or injunctive relief instructing [the School District Parties] to follow the [Information Act] in the future.” Id. at p. 384, n. 9 (emphasis added). The majority concludes that Kessling has not argued on appeal that she is seeking mandamus or injunctive relief as to the fulfilled Information Act requests. See id. at p. 384-85. In addition, the majority suggests that, even if Kessling’s appellate briefing were sufficient, this court would analyze the mootness and advisory-opinion issues differently as to the Information Act claims because of differences in the merits of those claims. See id. However, the relief Kessling seeks as to the alleged Information Act violations regarding fulfilled requests is substantially similar to the relief she seeks as to the alleged Meetings Act violations. Presuming for the sake of argument that Kess-ling’s claims for mandamus or injunctive relief as to the alleged Meetings Act violations have merit but that, under the applicable statutes and equitable principles, *392Kessling is not entitled to mandamus or injunctive relief as to the Information Act claims, these issues regarding the merits would not affect the jurisdictional analysis in the instant appeal. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 554-55; In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d at 920.
Therefore, this court should sustain the first issue in its entirety, reverse the trial court’s judgment as to all of Kessling’s claims regarding the Meetings Act and the Information Act, and remand for further proceedings. To the extent it does not do so, I respectfully dissent.

. Kessling alleges that the School District has a pattern and practice of violating certain procedural requirements of the Information Act, for example the requirement that “[a]n officer for public information of a governmental body shall promptly produce public information for inspection, duplication, or both on application by any person to the officer.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann § 552.221(a) (Vernon 2004) (emphasis added).

. According to the majority, Kessling does not argue on appeal “that she is entitled to seek *391mandamus or injunctive relief, as she did in connection with her [Meetings Act] claims, instructing appellees to follow the law in the future.” Ante at p. 384. The majority then states that Kessling "neither argues that [the Information Act] allows for such relief nor seeks any other injunctive or other affirmative relief as [to] her requests [that] have been fulfilled.” Id.

. The merits of the Information Act claims were challenged by the summary-judgment ground based on section 552.3215 of the Government Code. However, the majority correctly concludes that this ground lacks merit, and the School District Parties did not attack the Information Act claims on any other basis. See ante at p. 382-83.