Court Opinion

ID: 9896331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 21:09:26.04148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:44.145987
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                              COURT OF APPEAL

                                FIRST CIRCUIT

                               NO. 2023 KA 0164

                           STATE OF LOUISIANA
  V
                                    VERSUS

                     THOMAS CHRISTOPHER RIDER

                                                    Judgment Rendered:
                                                                         NOV Q g 2023

                               Appealed from the
                          22nd Judicial District Court
                    In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
                               State of Louisiana
                              Case No. 1651- F- 2021

               The Honorable Scott Gardner, Judge Presiding

Warren L. Montgomery                        Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney                           State of Louisiana
Matthew Caplan
Assistant District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana

Katherine M. Franks                         Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Madisonville, Louisiana                     Thomas Christopher Rider

           BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.
LANIER, J.

         The    defendant,        Thomas        Christopher        Rider,     was     charged       by    bill   of

information with possession of a Schedule III CDS ( buprenorphine), a violation of

La. R.S. 40. 968( C),        and initially pled not guilty.              Thereafter, pursuant to a plea

agreement, he withdrew his initial plea and pled guilty as charged. Subsequently,

the State filed a habitual offender bill of information against the defendant alleging

he was a fourth -felony habitual offender.' The defendant moved to withdraw his

guilty plea, but the motion was denied. Following a hearing, he was adjudged a

fourth -felony habitual offender and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment at

hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The

defendant now appeals contending the State breached the plea agreement, the State

failed to prove his identity as the person previously convicted in predicate number

3,   and the trial court erred in overruling his objection to testimony offered to

establish that the cleansing period had not elapsed between predicate numbers 1

and 2.     For the following reasons, we set aside the conviction, habitual offender

adjudication,       and sentence and remand for further proceedings, allowing the

defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

                               BREACH OF PLEA AGREEMENT

         In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends the trial court

erred in failing to order specific performance of the plea agreement or, in the

alternative,
                 failed to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because the State' s

 failure to appear" edict was not part of the plea agreement.

         A criminal plea agreement is analogous to a civil compromise.                                   State v.

O' Conner,        2411- 1696 ( La.         App.      1   Cir.    9121112),      2012     WL      4335425, *      4

 Predicate number I was set forth as the defendant' s September 3, 2015 conviction, under Twenty -Fourth Judicial
District Court docket number t5- 2394, for simple burglary. Predicate number 2 was set forth as the defendant' s
August 18, 2008 conviction, under Twenty -Fourth Judicial District Court docket number 07- 6759, for burglary of an
inhabited dwelling. Predicate number 3 was set forth as the defendant's February 13, 2003 conviction, under
Twenty -Fourth Judicial District Court docket number 02- 5120, for burglary of an inhabited dwelling.

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unpublished),        writ denied, 2012- 2163 ( La. 411113),                    110 So. 3d 138; see La. Civ.

Code arts. 3071- 3083.            The four elements of a valid contract are: 1)                 the parties'

capacity to contract; 2)            the parties' mutual consent that is freely given; 3)                the

existence of a certain, lawful object for the contract; and 4) the existence of a

lawful purpose, or cause, of the contract. O' Conner, 2012 WL 4335425 at * 4; see

La. Civ. Code arts. 1918, 1927, 1966, & 1971.

          Upon motion of the defendant and after a contradictory hearing, which may

be waived by the State in writing, the court may permit a plea of guilty to be

withdrawn at any time before sentence. La. Code Crim. P. art. 559( A). Under this

Article, a defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a previously entered plea of

guilty.     The trial court's decision is discretionary, subject to reversal only if that

discretion is abused or arbitrarily exercised. State v. Carmouche, 589 So.2d 53,

55 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1991).

          Pursuant to La. R.S. 15: 529. 1( D)( 3), the trial court filed written reasons for

the habitual offender adjudication.                 The court noted that in November 2021, the

State and the defendant agreed the defendant would enter guilty pleas in exchange

for the State withholding filing a habitual offender bill of information against him.

The State and the defendant further agreed to a sentence of thirty months to be

imposed in January 2022.                   The court noted, "[ t] he State made clear that if

 d] efendant did not appear for sentencing, it would not be bound by its agreement

as to the sentence and the filing of a habitual offender bill."                             Thereafter, the

defendant failed to appear for sentencing in January 2022, and the State filed a

habitual offender bill of information against him, alleging he was a fourth -felony

habitual offender.

          The transcript of the Boykin' hearing indicates that at the beginning of the

hearing, defense counsel set forth the defendant would withdraw his previous not

z Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274 ( 1969).

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guilty pleas and enter guilty pleas " as per our pretrial discussions."        Thereafter, the

defendant was advised of and waived his rights, and defense counsel advised the

court that sentencing was set for January 5,             2022.     After the defendant was

questioned by the court and entered his guilty pleas, the State put on the record that

should the defendant fail to appear for sentencing, it would file a multiple offender

bill of information against him. Defense counsel stated, "[ u] nderstood."

         In determining the validity of plea bargain agreements, Louisiana courts

generally refer to rules of contract law, while recognizing at the same time that a

criminal defendant' s constitutional right to fairness may be broader than his or her

rights under contract law.       A plea bargain agreement requires the consent of the

State and the defendant.      State v. Porche, 2020- 0246 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 30/ 20),

318 So3d 184, 187- 188; see also La. Civ. Code art. 1927. Error, fraud, or duress

may vitiate consent. La. Civ. Code art. 1948. Where the plea agreement calls for a

legal sentence and the trial court agrees, the trial court is bound by the terms of the

agreement.     Under substantive criminal law, there are two alternative remedies

available for a breach of a plea bargain: ( 1) specific performance of the agreement,

or ( 2) nullification or withdrawal of the plea. Porche, 318 So. 3d at 187- 188. The

party demanding performance of a plea bargain agreement has the burden of

proving its existence and the terms thereof.         Porche, 318 So. 3d at 188.           In this

case,    the State demanded specific performance of the amended plea bargain

agreement.

         The State argues in brief that defense counsel,           acting as the defendant's

agent,    accepted   the   State' s   plea   agreement   offer (   including   the    additional

requirement of appearing for sentencing)            and the defendant' s inaction and/ or

failure to ask questions was indicative of his consent thereto.            Defense counsel

cannot consent to a guilty plea on his client's behalf, nor can a defendant's tacit

acquiescence in the decision to plead guilty render the plea valid.                  Instead, the

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jurisprudence requires the trial court to conduct a colloquy with the defendant, on

the    record,   to determine the guilty plea is entered with the defendant's full

knowledge of its consequences.         See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U. S. 175, 187- 188,

125 S. Ct. 551, 560, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 ( 2004); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,

243- 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709,       1712- 1713, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 ( 1969); United States v.

Guyton, 37 F. Supp.3d 840, 853 ( E.D. La. 2014). There is no colloquy in this case

indicating       the   defendant   himself    either   consented   to   or    understood   the

consequences of the additional condition the State attempted to impose after the

defendant had already pled guilty.

        The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to

withdraw his guilty plea. The plea agreement signed by the defendant specifically

provided:

         8.   I further declare my plea of guilty is free and voluntary, that no
         additional      understandings,     promises,   or conditions       have been
         entered       into other than that contained in the plea colloquy
         conducted in open court on the record. [ Emphasis added.]

         At no point during the plea colloquy conducted in open court did the

defendant agree to be charged as a habitual offender should he fail to appear for

sentencing.      To the contrary, according to the trial court, the defendant pled guilty

to avoid being charged as a habitual offender. The record indicates the court asked

the defendant if he had been promised or offered anything in return for his guilty

plea, either by defense counsel, by the State, or by anyone else, and the defendant

answered negatively.        Thus, no additional conditions, including the condition that

the defendant's failure to appear for sentencing would result in the filing of a

habitual offender bill of information against him, were set forth in the plea

colloquy.      The State only added that the agreement not to file a habitual offender

bill   was conditioned on the defendant' s appearance at sentencing after the

defendant entered his guilty plea. Thus, the State unilaterally changed the terms of

                                                R
the plea agreement after the plea had been entered. A plea agreement requires the

freely given mutual consent of the State and the defendant.                            See La. Civ. Code art.

1927; O' Conner, 2012 WL 4335425 at * 4.                          The defendant performed his part of

the plea agreement by pleading guilty to the instant offense; the State did not.

         The record is devoid of evidence that the defendant agreed to the filing of a

habitual offender bill of information against him if he failed to appear for

sentencing.       Because there was no existing plea agreement providing for the filing

of a habitual offender bill, there was no plea agreement for which to demand

specific     performance.           The trial court should have allowed the defendant to

withdraw        his    guilty     plea.         Accordingly,       the     conviction,       habitual       offender

adjudication,         and   sentence      are   set   aside,   and the case is remanded for further

proceedings, allowing the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

         This assignment of error has merit.'

CONVICTION,                  HABITUAL                 OFFENDER                ADJUDICATION,                     AND
SENTENCE SET ASIDE; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA.

3 Our disposition of this assignment of error causes us to pretermit consideration of assignment of error number two,
which challenges the sufficiency of the State' s proof of the defendant' s identity as the person convicted in predicate
number 3 under Twenty -Fourth Judicial District Court docket number 02- 5120, and assignment of error number
three, which challenges the overruling of the defendant' s objection to Officer Wall's testimony concerning whether
the cleansing period between predicate numbers I and 2 had elapsed.

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