Court Opinion

ID: 9892398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 18:10:38.491058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:14.150233
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Prophet, 2023-Ohio-3833.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   SANDUSKY COUNTY

State of Ohio                                      Court of Appeals No. S-22-024

       Appellee                                    Trial Court No. 21CR85

v.

Malcolm Prophet                                    DECISION AND JUDGMENT

       Appellant                                   Decided: October 20, 2023

                                               *****

       Beth A. Tischler, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and
       Alexis M. Otero, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

       Tyler Naud Jechura, for appellant.

                                               *****

       OSOWIK, J.

       {¶ 1} This is an appeal from an October 17, 2022 judgment of the Sandusky

County Court of Common Pleas, finding appellant guilty on one count of attempted gross

sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05 and 2923.02, a felony of the fourth

degree. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.
         {¶ 2} Appellant, Malcolm Prophet, sets forth the following two assignments of

error:

                I. [APPELLANT] RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

         COUNSEL WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL FORGOT TO SUBPOENA A

         CRITICAL WITNESS FOR TRIAL.

                II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, AFTER LEARNING OF

         DEFENSE COUNSEL[’]S CONDUCT, IT FAILED TO GRANT A

         MISTRIAL.

         {¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On December 17,

2020, appellant joined his cousin’s family for dinner at their residence in Clyde, Ohio.

Following dinner, appellant’s cousin and his fiancée were in the kitchen, performing

cleanup duties, while appellant was in the adjacent living room, alone with the couple’s

three-year-old daughter.

         {¶ 4} Upon looking out into the living room to check on their daughter, her

parents observed appellant seated immediately adjacent to her, his pants pulled down, his

penis exposed, actively engaged in masturbation. In response, the girl’s mother ran into

the living room, screamed at appellant, scooped up her daughter, and took her out of the

room. Appellant said nothing and quickly pulled up his pants.

         {¶ 5} The victim’s mother then yelled to her fiancé, the victim’s father, that she

wanted appellant out of their home at once. Thereafter, they drove appellant, who did not

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have an automobile, back to the residence in Sandusky where he was staying at the time

of this incident. After transporting appellant back to Sandusky, they drove back to Clyde,

went directly to the Clyde police department, and reported the incident to the police.

       {¶ 6} Several days after the victim’s parents reported the incident to the police,

thereby triggering a police investigation, appellant called the victim’s father. When he

declined to answer appellant’s call, appellant then messaged him on Facebook messenger

and accused him of causing him to lose his job as a consequence of the incident being

reported and triggering an investigation.

       {¶ 7} In response to being blamed for appellant losing his job, the victim’s father

messaged appellant, “How could I [be responsible for appellant losing his job] when you

were the one who pulled your dick out in front of my daughter[?]” (Emphasis added).

       {¶ 8} In turn, appellant messaged back an acknowledgement of the incident,

stating, “I can technically marry her [his cousin’s three-year-old niece] * * * that’s the

only reason I did that [masturbated in front of her] wtf [cousin].” (Emphasis added).

       {¶ 9} On February 5, 2021, following the police investigation, appellant was

indicted on one count of gross sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05, a felony of

the third degree. R.C. 2907.05 (A)(4) establishes that, “No person shall have sexual

contact with another, not the spouse of the offender * * * when * * * the other person * *

* is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that

person.”

 3.
       {¶ 10} On October 11, 2022, the case proceeded to a jury trial. During the course

of the trial, appellee presented the testimony of Officer Baur (“Baur”), the investigating

police officer, and the eyewitness testimony of the victim’s parents. Baur testified that

the victim’s father had reported to the officer that he had observed, “[Appellant] kneeling

down with his pants down, his penis in his hand while he was masturbating, and he said

that he had his hand on the back of [the victim’s] right thigh.”

       {¶ 11} The officer further elaborated that his investigation uncovered no evidence

that appellant had ejaculated or that the victim had been raped or sexually assaulted. The

officer testified that the victim’s father had provided him with a copy of appellant’s

Facebook messages to him following the incident, including the above-quoted

acknowledgement by appellant of committing the action underlying the offense.

       {¶ 12} The trial court next heard testimony from Aariona Sims (“Sims”), the

victim’s mother. Sims testified that on the night of the incident appellant seemed, “Off *

* * not like he usually was.” In describing the basis of her perception that something

struck her as amiss with appellant prior to the incident, she testified that, “[Appellant]

was following [the victim] around     * * * He was going up to her room, trying to get into

her bed.”

       {¶ 13} Sims testified that, as she was cleaning up the kitchen, she became

concerned about the victim being alone with appellant in the living room given that

appellant had been acting strangely during his visit that day. Accordingly, Sims decided

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to look out into the living room to check on her daughter. Sims testified that upon doing

so, she observed appellant seated next to her daughter, with his pants pulled down, his

penis exposed, and, “He was stroking his -- like, [he was] masturbating * * * he was

rubbing her legs.” In response to seeing this, Sims testified that she ran out into the

room, screamed at appellant, grabbed her daughter, and carried her out of the room.

Appellant said nothing to Sims and quickly pulled his pants up. Sims then testified that

after she and her fiancé drove appellant back to Sandusky, they promptly returned to

Clyde and filed a police report.

       {¶ 14} Jeremiah Steel (“Steel”), Sims’ fiancé and the victim’s father, next

testified. Steel testified that appellant is his cousin and that, prior to this incident, they

had been on close terms. The two of them had previously worked construction jobs

together. Steel testified that on the day of the incident he had offered to pick appellant up

and bring him back to his residence in Clyde to join his family for dinner. Steel testified

that as he and Sims were cleaning up in the kitchen after dinner, they looked out into the

living room to check on their daughter. Steel testified that he observed appellant, “[O]n

his hands and knees with * * * [his] scrotum out in his hands * * * [the victim] sitting in

front of him, [appellant] sitting back and tugging on himself in front of my daughter * * *

masturbating.”

 5.
       {¶ 15} On the issue of physical contact, Steel was asked, “Was [appellant]

touching your daughter?” Steel replied, “He was starting – getting ready to.” (Emphasis

added). Following Steel’s testimony, appellee rested the presentation of their case.

       {¶ 16} At this juncture, appellant requested, and was granted, a one-day

continuance in order to attempt to secure an investigator, who appellant had not

subpoenaed, but who he now decided that he wished to have testify to rebut the trial

testimony of Sims on the issue of physical touching between appellant and the victim.

       {¶ 17} The express purpose of the desired rebuttal testimony of the investigator

was to confirm a telephone conversation between Sims and the investigator during which

Sims indicated that although she had observed appellant masturbating next to her

daughter, she did not see appellant physically touch her daughter, as opposed to her trial

testimony incongruously stating that appellant was rubbing her daughter’s legs while he

was masturbating. In addition to being granted the continuance, appellant was also

granted leave to recall Sims to the stand to directly cross-examine her regarding the

above-described discrepancy.

       {¶ 18} The following day, appellant began the presentation of the defense of the

case. Appellant first called Malina James (“James”), appellant’s mother, as a witness for

the defense. James testified that she now lives in Pennsylvania. Unexpectedly for the

defense, James testified that appellant’s reputation among family members is one of

“manipulation.” James then testified that appellant, “lies to get what he wants.” Despite

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being reminded of the consequences of perjury, James remained unwavering in her

testimony adverse to appellant, her son.

       {¶ 19} At the conclusion of the adverse testimony of his mother, a witness that he

had called, appellant requested a second continuance, in order to again attempt to secure

the voluntary testimony of the above-discussed investigator, who had declined to appear

voluntarily after being contacted by appellant following the first continuance.

       {¶ 20} The trial court denied a second continuance, but it permitted appellant to

recall Sims to undergo cross-examination regarding the above-discussed telephone

conversation between the investigator and Sims, in which Sims denied seeing appellant

touch her daughter while he was masturbating in front of her.

       {¶ 21} Under recross, Sims directly conceded telling the investigator during their

telephone conversation that while she observed appellant masturbating next to her

daughter, she did not recall seeing appellant touch her daughter.

       {¶ 22} In elaborating on the discrepancy with her direct examination trial

testimony on the issue of physical contact, in which she stated that she had observed

appellant rubbing her daughter’s legs while he was masturbating, Sims explained, “I told

[the investigator] I don’t remember * * * I don’t really recall * * * that’s what I told him

* * * I didn’t know who this person was. He called me out of the blue.”

 7.
       {¶ 23} Upon redirect, Sims explained that the investigator telephoned her out of

the blue, he did not clearly identify himself, and that she felt uncomfortable discussing

the case with him.

       {¶ 24} Following the additional recross testimony of Sims, appellant rested their

defense of the case and made a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal on the basis of the

conflicting statements by Sims regarding whether or not appellant had physically touched

the victim while masturbating next to her. Appellee argued in opposition that the recross-

examination of Sims entailed her direct acknowledgment of the discrepancy, irrespective

of the investigator not appearing voluntarily to confirm same, and that it constituted a

witness credibility issue proper for the jury to weigh and consider, as related to the issue

of whether physical contact occurred between appellant and the victim during the

incident. The trial court concurred. The motion for acquittal was denied and the case

was submitted to the jury. In addition, the jury was instructed, given the above-detailed

facts and circumstances presented at trial, to also consider the lesser included offense of

attempted gross sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05 and 2923.02.

       {¶ 25} R.C. 2923.02 (A)-(B) establishes that, “No person, purposely or knowingly

* * * shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense

* * * It is no defense to a charge that, in retrospect, commission of the offense * * * was

either factually or legally impossible under the attendant circumstances.”

 8.
       {¶ 26} The jury deliberated and declined to find appellant guilt of gross sexual

imposition, but rather, the jury found appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of

attempted gross sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05 and 2923.02, a felony of

the fourth degree.

       {¶ 27} On October 19, 2022, appellant was sentenced. At sentencing, the trial

court noted that appellant’s relationship with the victim facilitated the offense, and that

appellant showed no remorse for the offense. Appellant was sentenced to an 18-month

term of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

       {¶ 28} In his first assignment of error, Prophet alleges that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel based upon the claim that defense counsel “forgot” to subpoena the

investigator who had spoken to Sims about the incident.

       {¶ 29} As this court recently held in State v. Lofton, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-

1111, 2023-Ohio-2796, ¶ 8,

              To overcome her trial counsel’s presumption of competence,

       appellant has the burden to show both: (1) deficient performance by her

       trial counsel below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and

       (2) a reasonable probability of prejudice that but-for her trial counsel's

       errors, the outcome would have been different. If appellant fails to meet

       either prong of the Strickland test, it is not necessary for us to engage in an

 9.
       analysis of the other prong. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143, 538

       N.E.2d 373 (1989), citing Strickland at 697.

              Further, as held by this court in State v. Jackson, 6th Dist. Sandusky

       No. S-20-036, 2021-Ohio-4619, ¶ 17, ‘[A] properly licensed attorney in

       Ohio is presumed competent.’ State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 524

       N.E.2d 476 (1988). Tactical, strategic decisions do not constitute a

       meritorious basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v.

       Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995).

       {¶ 30} Appellate courts must be highly deferential and retain a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance when

reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. State v. Bender, 6th Dist. Ottawa No.

OT-22-019, 2023-Ohio-486 ¶ 16, quoting Strickland, at 689.

       {¶ 31} In conjunction with the above, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed in State v.

Cepec, 149 Ohio St.3d 438, 2016-Ohio-8076, 75 N.E.2d 1185, ¶ 123, “Counsel’s

decision whether to call a witness falls within the rubric of trial strategy and will not be

second-guessed by a reviewing court. State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 739 N.E.2d

749 (2001).” (Emphasis added).

       {¶ 32} In the first assignment of error, appellant unilaterally characterizes the fact

that the investigator was not subpoenaed as something done in error, as something that

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trial counsel had decided and intended to do, but nevertheless, “forgot” to do. The record

is devoid of evidence demonstrative of this characterization.

       {¶ 33} Contrary to the characterization of the matter upon appeal, in

contemporaneously explaining the issue to the trial court when requesting the first

continuance, trial counsel for appellant stated, “I am [now] seeking to have the

appearance of investigator Jim Meadows [“Meadows”] to testify about his interview of *

* * Sims. I did not subpoena him * * * [H]is testimony would be in the form of that

Sims[,] in the course of the interview[,] stated that she did not see any [physical] contact

by [appellant] against the [victim].”

       {¶ 34} From the record of evidence, it can only be discerned that appellant first

elected to not subpoena Meadows as a witness to testify at trial, but subsequently

determined, after hearing Sims’ incongruous trial testimony on the subject of physical

contact, that he now wished to have trial testimony from the investigator to rebut Sims’

trial testimony on the issue of physical contact. Such a scenario constitutes a tactical

decision, and falls with the rubric of trial strategy.

       {¶ 35} However, regardless of our conclusion that Meadows was not present due

to a tactical decision to not subpoena him, untimely reconsidered after appellee’s case

was presented, the record reflects that the trial court nevertheless gave appellant a

continuance to secure the witness, and when the witness did not voluntarily appear, the

 11.
trial court granted appellant leave to recall Sims to address the discrepancy directly with

her upon her recross-examination.

       {¶ 36} The record reflects that during recross, Sims directly conceded her

divergent statement on the issue of physical contact with the victim to Meadows,

enabling the jury to weigh and consider the discrepancy, and related witness credibility

implications, during the course of their deliberations, just as would have been done had

the discrepancy been revealed by the investigator.

       {¶ 37} On consideration of the foregoing, we find that appellant has failed to

establish the first prong of Strickland. The record contains no convincing evidence that

Meadows not receiving a subpoena to testify at trial was anything other than a tactical

decision of counsel. The claim upon appeal that trial counsel had decided to subpoena

the investigator, but forgot to do so, has no basis in the record of evidence.

       {¶ 38} However, even assuming arguendo that we were satisfied that appellant

established the first prong of Strickland, we would nevertheless find that appellant could

not satisfy the second prong of Strickland. Appellant has not established a reasonable

probability of prejudice that but-for her trial counsel's errors, the outcome would have

been different. The record definitively demonstrates that the recross of Sims procured a

direct concession of the very testimonial disparity on the issue of physical contact that

would have otherwise been sought by the testimony of Meadows. Under these

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circumstances, appellant cannot demonstrate that the outcome of the matter would have

been different. Wherefore, we find appellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 39} In appellant’s second assignment of error, appellant similarly contends that

the trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to grant appellant’s Crim.R. 29

motion for a mistrial.

       {¶ 40} Prophet presents no new or additional arguments in support of this assigned

error. He presents the same arguments as those he presented in support of his first

assignment of error. Namely, the absence of trial testimony from Meadows on the issue

of what Sims stated to him regarding physical contact between appellant and the victim.

       {¶ 41} However, appellant urges this court to review this assignment as plain error

under Crim.R. 52(B). That rule states:

       (B) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be

       noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.

       {¶ 42} In this case, appellant moved the trial court to declare a mistrial based upon

the absence of witness Meadows. That motion was denied.

       {¶ 43} Therefore, the trial court was directly confronted with the issue that is now

raised before this court. Appellant has put forth no argument or supportive authority that

would warrant a plain error standard of review under these circumstances. Typically,

plain error review occurs if a party forfeits an objection in the trial court. State v. Jones,

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6th Dist. Wood No. WD-18-063, 2019-Ohio-3704, ¶ 20, 143 N.E.3d 1170, quoting State

v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 15.

       {¶ 44} As held by this court in State v. Durst, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-18-019,

2020-Ohio-607, ¶ 46, “Review of the trial court’s decision denying motion for mistrial

ordinarily falls under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Rossbach, 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-09-1300, 2011-Ohio-281, ¶ 39, citing State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d

343 (1987). Abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Accordingly, we will review appellant’s second

assignment of error pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard of review.

       {¶ 45} The Ohio Supreme Court has declared that a mistrial should not be ordered

in a cause simply because some error has intervened. Moreover, mistrials need be

declared only when the ends of justice so require and a fair trial is no longer possible.

State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991). An appellate court

should only take notice of plain error under exceptional circumstances and only to

prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 559

N.E.2d 710 (1990).

       {¶ 46} In this instance, the trial court granted appellant a continuance in order to

secure the appearance of Meadows. Meadows again did not appear. Regardless, the trial

court granted appellant leave to recall Sims to conduct a recross-examination, during

which Sims directly conceded the very point which was going to be sought through the

 14.
testimony of Meadows. Thus, the jury was aware of the discrepancy in Sims’ testimony

on the issue of physical contact by her own admission, and thereafter was able to weigh

same in the course of their deliberations.

         {¶ 47} Based upon these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that the trial

court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion for a mistrial was unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Wherefore, we find appellant’s second assignment of error not well-

taken.

         {¶ 48} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Sandusky County Court of

Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal

pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                        Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                            ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                                ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                   JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE

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      This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
 Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
      version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
               http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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