Court Opinion

ID: 9687584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:37:56.731296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:29.006996
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Judge
(concurring specialty)-
Shaw was right wasn’t he? Right to say “Parentage is a very important profession; but no test of fitness for it is ever imposed in the interest of the children.”1 In the present instance, appellant seeks to resist the termination of his parental rights to J.D.L. Nicollet County authorities, proceeding under Minn.Stat. § 260.221, subd. 1(b) (1992), have painstakingly followed legislative directives to reunite this “parent” and this child. The sad facts of this case may be summarized as follows.
Appellant began dating J.D.L.’s mother, T.L., in 1989 when he was fifteen years old. Soon after, the two were living together, and in November 1990, J.D.L. was born. Appellant was not present at J.D.L.’s birth; he went drinking instead. Appellant’s relationship with T.L. became “rocky” and was marred by frequent fighting, including several physical altercations. Appellant often had parties at the family home and drank heavily when J.D.L. was present. Appellant had very little contact with J.D.L. and refused to participate in the child’s care. After appellant and T.L. separated, appellant had little contact with J.D.L. and did not seek any visitation rights from the court.
J.D.L. was placed in foster care in June 1992 after being abandoned by his mother in a roadside ditch. At that time, J.D.L. was rigid, standoffish, and unable to relate to the most fundamental human relations. The physician who treated J.D.L. before his abandonment raised concerns about J.D.L.’s numerous ear infections. Although J.D.L. would be brought in, he was never rechecked. Prescribed medication was found unopened when J.D.L. went to foster care. J.D.L. had no “well-baby” checks and had missed two sets of immunizations.
Despite appellant’s lack of care and concern for J.D.L., appellant petitioned the court for visitation and custody. County social workers supervising the visits noted a number of concerns including a lack of affection and recognition between appellant and J.D.L.; a lack of verbal communication; failure by appellant to respond or inquire when J.D.L. fell down; appellant’s early termination of visits or cancelling visits due to work, leaving the state, and other unexplained reasons; appellant’s failure to change J.D.L.’s diapers after prompts to do so; appellant’s failure to provide snacks or supplies for supervised visits; appellant’s failure to recognize J.D.L.’s developmental limitations; appellant’s failure to show concern for J.D.L.’s medical conditions and needs; appellant’s reliance on his mother to reschedule visitations; appellant’s extended use of the telephone during visitations; and rabbit feces and urine in appellant’s home.
Prior to a visit on May 4, 1993, appellant had no visitation with J.D.L. for a period of 33 days. Prior to a visit on September 15, 1993, appellant went approximately three weeks without visiting J.D.L. Despite the length of time between visits, appellant acted when he arrived for visitations as though nothing had happened and he showed little emotion upon resuming visitation. One social worker who supervised approximately 40 visits, observed no significant progress or improvement in appellant’s care or interaction with J.D.L.
Nicollet County also provided appellant with various psychological examinations. These examinations and other corroborating information show that appellant is exceptionally immature, has an extremely limited understanding of himself and his circumstances, lacks appreciation for his dysfunctional past and his own mistakes, is unable to provide a safe and nurturing home for J.D.L., has repressed anger and frustration which may at times erupt, and is unable to be a responsible *371adult and competent parent. Additionally, appellant has faded to complete high school or obtain a GED and has a sporadic work history.
Due to appellant’s failure to sign and return forms, he has not participated in any parental training or child development educational programs. Appellant was dropped from a violence intervention program due to his sporadic attendance and failure to pay for the cost of the program. Appellant failed to follow through with a chemical dependency follow-up assessment. Additionally, appellant rarely attended case management meetings even though transportation was provided.
In sum, it is clear, and has been clear for some time, that appellant has consistently placed his wants and needs above the needs of J.D.L. and that he is incapable of sustaining a loving, stable and nurturing parental relationship with J.D.L. Despite appellant’s obvious shortcomings as a parent, Nicollet County did not file a petition to terminate his parental rights until September 1993.
How has this tragic circumstance been permitted to persist for so many years? Perhaps a better question is why does the county need to “terminate” parental rights at all? According to Webster, to terminate something means “to bring an end to;” it would of necessity, therefore, require a beginning. Something which is lacking in this ease. The child, J.D.L., has little more relation to this “parent” than the casual occurrence in which he was conceived. Totally unprepared for the consequences, two children engaged in a clandestine, nocturnal assignation and produced a third child, J.D.L. The mother sought to surrender the infant for adoption and later changed her mind.
For some inscrutable reason, the biological “father” resisted termination of his parental rights. For long months, years, the county tried, in vain, to intervene and assist the “father” in parenting. The evidence is clear that all the efforts were to no avail. Appellant never achieved a parental relationship with J.D.L.; but in a cavalier fashion could only treat his “son” as a curiosity. His attention to J.D.L., never steady, was frequently punctuated by long absences and bouts of chemical abuse.
When will we acknowledge that such ruinous conduct is antithetical to human rights? Do the rights of biological parents by virtue of their simple fecundity transcend the right of the newborn child to its life, its liberty, its health, and its happiness?
If we have no collective concern for these children as individuals, can we not as policymakers, legislators, judges and citizens be concerned about the effects such waste has on our own society? Can we afford to waste these lives, these children who might otherwise one day grow to be responsible, loving, and caring members of our community?
Couldn’t one of these babies, given physical and emotional sustenance as children, some day discover a cure for cancer; another design new bridges and towers; still another compose the music that will stir us? Might not one of these children one day look through a telescope to discover and name galaxies we don’t now know exist? Do we not owe it to ourselves as a people to insure that these unique creations achieve their potential?
Every human being, biological parent or not, who has ever held a newborn child knows that with every new child the world may begin again. We owe it to them and to ourselves to maximize their innate potential.'
Are there really no new planets to be discovered?

. George Bernard Shaw, Everybody’s Political What’s What, 1949, chapter 9.