Court Opinion

ID: 9712584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:56:41.473186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.952179
License: Public Domain

Edwards, J.
(concurring in reversal). We deal herein with the appeal of a State employee who was discharged from her employment at the Lapeer State Home and Training School. The discharge was subsequently twice affirmed by the State civil service commission.
The previously existing untrammeled right of the State of Michigan and its executive branches to hire and discharge State employees was qualified in 1940 by the civil service amendment to the Constitution (1908), art 6, § 22. The provisions of this amendment which are applicable to our present case follow:
“The commission shall classify all positions in the State civil service according to their respective duties and responsibilities, fix rates of compensation for all classes of positions, approve or disapprove disbursements for all personal services, determine by competitive performance exclusively on the basis of merit, efficiency and fitness the qualifications of all candidates for positions in the State civil service, make rules and regulations covering all personnel transactions, and regulate all conditions of employment in the State civil service. No person shall be *22appointed to or promoted in the State civil service who has not been certified as so qualified for such appointment or promotion by the commission. No removals from or demotions in the State civil service shall be made for partisan, racial, or religious considerations. * * *
“After August 1, 1941, no payment for personal services shall be made or authorized until the provisions of this amendment have been complied with in every particular. Violation of any of the provisions hereof may be restrained or observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the State.”
Following adoption of the constitutional amendment, the civil service commission adopted rules of procedure as authorized. One of these rules which was in effect at the time of the discharge with which we deal in this field was Rule 38, entitled “Removal”:
“Any employee in the State civil service failing to carry out the duties and obligations imposed upon him by these rules, or whose conduct is unbecoming that of a State employee, or whose service rating is unsatisfactory, shall be subject to removal by the appointing authority upon notification to the State personnel director, except that the commission alone shall have the power to remove the State personnel director.
“A. Procedure for removal. — Whenever an appointing authority considers it necessary to remove an employee he shall notify the employee on the prescribed form, giving specific reasons for the removal. Prior or concurrent notice of such removal shall be given to the State personnel director in the prescribed manner.”
On the form CS-301 Rev 1057, entitled “Report of Separation,” which was served upon appellant Dillon in this case, following the printed words “Reason for Separation. Fairly apprise employee of full *23specific reason,” was the following in typewritten form:
“Mrs. Dillon dismissed for conduct unbecoming a State employee.”
In our view, nothing could be more obvious than that the report of separation complained of did not comply with the regulations of the civil service commission. The Constitution vested in the commission the power to “make rules and regulations covering all personnel transactions, and regulate all conditions of employment in the State civil service.” It seems clear that such a broad grant authorized the rule we have quoted which required an appointing authority in removing an employee to notify the •employee, “giving specific reasons for the removal.” The general phrase quoted from the rule pertaining to removal, “conduct * * '* unbecoming that of a State employee,” is anything but a specific reason. It is, in fact, a conclusion which must be based upon some specific dereliction.
Kaplan, The Law of Civil Service, pp 225, 228, discusses the requirement of notice:
“Where the statute requires that the notice merely set forth in general terms the reasons for the discharge, no specific detailed charges need be furnished. A general statement of reasons, assuming the reasons are on their face such as to give the employee what would be recognized as reasonably plausible grounds, is all that is necessary. A general statement so obscure as ‘neglect of duty,’ ‘political activity’ or similar generalities would be insufficient.”
Obviously, a generality such as our instant “conduct unbecoming a State employee” would be insufficient if only a general statement of reasons were required. It is meaningless in the face of our Rule 58 requiring “specific reasons.”
*24The United States supreme court has held that where an authority’s discretion to remove employees is unbridled by law, the authority is nonetheless bound to follow the procedures it establishes for the removal of employees for security reasons. Service v. Dulles, 354 US 363 (77 S Ct 1152, 1 L ed 2d 1403); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 US 535 (79 S Ct 968, 3 L ed 2d 1012).
The same reasoning would be applicable to our case. "With the exception of the prohibition of removal for partisan, racial, or religious considerations, article 6, §.22, of our Constitution leaves the commission unhampered as to reasons or procedures for removal. However, our commission has adopted a set of rules which sets forth the procedure to be followed. It seems beyond doubt to us that Mrs. Dillon’s original discharge was not carried out under the mandate of Rule 38 and hence was invalid.
Having said so, however, this by no means disposes of the present appeal. For, subsequent to Mrs. Dillon’s filing an application for leave to appeal to this Court from the civil service commission’s action upholding her original discharge, a rehearing was granted by the commission and the application for leave to appeal was withdrawn without prejudice— presumably to correct the deficiency in the original discharge procedure.
Prior to the rehearing, a supplemental report of separation was served upon Mrs. Dillon which we quote in full: "
“May 29, 1959
“Mrs. Lottie Dillon 2496 Imlay City Road Lapeer, Michigan

“Dear Mrs. Dillon:

“The report of separation, dated October 31,1958, in regard to your dismissal from State service is supplemented as follows:
*25“You have been discharged for conduct unbecoming a State employee in that:
“1. You have taken and converted to your own use State and personal patient property from the Lapeer State Home and Training School. This property was taken over a period extending from on or about March 20, 1948, to on or about October 29, 1958, and included, among other items:
“(a) A number of patient’s cotton dresses and noats;
“(b) A number of institutional towels and bed linens;
“(c) Institutional kitchen ware;
“(d) Institutional cleaning supplies;
“(e) Miscellaneous food stuff;
“(f) Personal patient belongings.
“2. You have utilized State facilities for personal purposes contrary to specific orders in that you have used State laundry facilities and supplies for laundering your own and your family’s clothing.
“Very truly yours,
“A. T. Rehn, M.D. “Superintendent
“LLW/s
cc: Mr. Arthur G-. Rasch
cc: Mr. Kenneth Smith
cc: Mr. Cassius E. Street, Jr.
cc: Mr. Leon S. Cohan”
It is to be noted that, under item 1, Mrs. Dillon is charged in this letter with theft of an undetermined number of institutional items of a very general nature. Whatever “miscellaneous food stuff” or “institutional cleaning supplies” lacks in specificity, the dates of the alleged thefts as set forth in this letter are even more deficient. “A period extending from on or about March 20, 1948, to on or about October 29, 1958,” covers more than 10 years. This is perhaps a quarter of the working life of an average individual. ■ ■ • ■
*26Theft from the State is not an attitude or a condition. It is either an event or a series of events which happen at specific times and places in relation to specific items. The civil service commission has seen fit to require that specific reasons he given for discharge. We must presume the reason for this provision is to extend to the employee the opportunity to know the nature of the complaint in order for him to muster adequate proofs of innocence, if any there be. Beyond observing that the Constitution plainly contemplates placing both rule-making power and fact-finding power concerning alleged violations of those rules in the hands of the civil service commission, and that the test of employee honesty is not the value of the article alleged to have been taken, we do not pass upon the fact questions presented by this record. The discharge must be held invalid for failure on the part of the administrative agency to conform in its May 29, 1959, supplement to the same rule requiring specificity which we have previously held to have invalidated the original report of separation.
In a case involving somewhat similar problems pertaining to Federal employees, Justice Frankfurter said:
“An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. See Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 US 80, 87, 88 (63 S Ct 454, 87 L ed 626). Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. See Service v. Dulles, 354 US 363. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so.” Vitarelli v. Seaton, supra, pp 546, 547.
*27Reversed. No costs, public questions being involved.
Talbot Smith and Souris, JJ., concurred with Edwards, J.