Court Opinion

ID: 9721820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:10:22.742944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:28.815794
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I believe the majority is seriously mistaken. The majority suggests that since Trevor Pearce renewed the insurance policy in April, 1975, ipso facto the youthful-driver endorsement was renewed as part of the policy. In support of this position, the majority points out that the renewal certificate contained the form number of the endorsement in question. They conclude, therefore, that there is nothing to indicate that the endorsement was not intended to be a part of the renewed policy. This is simply not true. The majority sets forth condition 14 of the policy and then ignores its plain language in order to reach the result which it does. That section of the contract mandates that the terms of the policy cannot be changed or waived “except by endorsement issued to form a part of this policy 0 * The youthful-driver endorsement, Form CE-90, was signed by Trevor L. Pearce, co-signed by an authorized representative of Economy, and made effective April 19, 1974. The expiring date was listed as April 18, 1975. Therefore, the endorsement was an effective part of the policy only until April 18, 1975. The majority denies that the April 18,1975, date has any importance with respect to the duration of the endorsement. However, this date must be read in light of the following language contained in the endorsement: “Effective Date. Unless an effective date is entered below, the endorsement shall be effective as of the beginning of the policy period stated in (1) the declaration of the policy or (2) a Continuation Certificate (or Automobile Premium Notice).” (Emphasis added.) Since an effective date was entered on the endorsement as well as an expiring one, the language of the endorsement itself precludes the effective date from beginning on the policy period of a renewal certificate. This clear and unambiguous language cannot be read out of the endorsement. The majority simply avoids it. However, it is clear that in order for the endorsement to “form a part of this [renewed] policy,” in accordance with condition 14 and the aforesaid “Effective Date” clause of the endorsement, it had to be re-executed. The majority cites “the general rule that when a policy renewal is made, unless provided otherwise, the terms of the original policy become part of the renewal contract of insurance.” (Emphasis added.) It cites two cases for this proposition. One is Palmer v. Bull Dog Auto Insurance Association (1920), 294 Ill. 287. That case involved an application for new insurance and is inapposite here. The other is Rivota v. Kaplan (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 910, 364 N.E.2d 337. After the First District cited the aforesaid general rule, it went on to distinguish it on facts very close to those here. In that case, a similar endorsement was neither re-executed nor were copies attached to the subsequent renewal policies. The court considered a policy condition almost identical to condition 14 of the policy before us and concluded: “Such language is unambiguous, and applying its ordinary meaning leads us to conclude that the exclusion endorsement was not one of the terms of the insurance policy in effect when the accident occurred. It was not written into the policy, nor was it attached as an endorsement.” (49 Ill. App. 3d 910, 918.) Given this holding, the majority’s reliance on this case is evidence of the weakness of its position. Notwithstanding the clarity of the contract language embodied in condition 14 and the youthful-driver endorsement, I am further compelled to find that the endorsement did not form a part of the renewed policy because it was not clear that the reference to “CE-90” contained on the certificate referred to the youthful-driver endorsement, and Trevor Pearce denies that he either received or accepted the renewal certificate prior to April 17, 1975. The bottom line of the renewal certificate simply read: “CE-191 CE-139 CE-182 CE-90 CE-5 ARE FORM NUMBERS OF PRINTED ENDORSEMENTS ATTACHED TO POLICY.” On the bottom left-hand comer of the youthful-driver endorsement appeared the following: “CE-90 50M 12/72.” These hieroglyphics are so cryptic, in my opinion, to the average insurance consumer that it cannot be said that Trevor Pearce could have understood their meaning or importance without the endorsement being attached to the certificate. “Insurance policies should be construed strongly against the draftsman and any exceptions to the general area of protection must be stated in such language and bold type as to warrant the conclusion that the insured must have understood and accepted them. Forest City Ins. Co. v. Hardesty, 182 Ill. 39, 55 NE 139; McAllister v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 68 Ill App2d 222, 215 NE2d 477; Maretti v. Midland Nat. Ins. Co., 42 Ill App2d 17, 190 NE2d 597.” (Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Hoover Bros. (1968), 96 Ill. App. 2d 238, 246, 237 N.E.2d 754.) The facts in this case preclude a finding that Trevor Pearce comprehended and accepted a continuation of the endorsement, especially since he contends he never received the renewal certificate. Even if he had received the certificate, the sole reference to a “CE-90” endorsement is ambiguous and equivocal. That being the case, “the construction most strongly against the insurer would be imposed » 6 (Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Norris. (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 95, 98, 303 N.E.2d 504), and exclusions from coverage would be constmed narrowly (Grahame v. Mitchell (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 334, 341, 329 N.E.2d 17). This is because the insurance company wrote the policy, and in cases such as the present one, the company seeks a declaration based on its interpretation of the policy. After all, the company argues, it wrote the contract, so surely it knows what the terms mean. Even if Mr. Pearce had received and looked at the renewal policy and understood the reference to “CE-90” and reviewed the youthful-driver endorsement, he would have seen that it would have expired on April 18, 1975. For all the foregoing reasons, the holding of the majority contravenes the long-standing “judicial policy favoring a liberal interpretation of insurance coverage * ° e aimed to assure the compensation of victims of injuries which result from traffic or automobile accidents.” (Thomas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 363, 365-66, 328 N.E.2d 374; Rivota v. Kaplan (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 910, 918.) Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Richland County.