Court Opinion

ID: 9750032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:14:22.367961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:01.757179
License: Public Domain

HANING, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—This opinion addresses an application for relief from default for failure to obtain a Penal Code section 1237.5 (hereafter section 1237.5) certificate of probable cause. I agree with the majority that a section 1237.5 certificate is required for appellate review of the issue appellant seeks to raise—the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss a prior conviction allegation.
The majority concedes that good cause may excuse a delay in seeking a section 1237.5 certificate. However, the majority holds that good cause is not present here, even though it necessarily concludes that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a certificate. It is clear that the predominant theme of appellant’s defense was an attack on the validity of his prior conviction. Prior to the entry of appellant’s plea his attorney unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the prior conviction allegation. Appellant’s notice of appeal specifically states his intent to appeal from “the imposition of a prior conviction allegation].” Supporting this application for relief is trial counsel’s declaration that he intended to preserve that issue for appellate review and believed he was not required under these circumstances to obtain a section 1237.5 certificate to do so. This is confirmed by the following discussion during the sentencing hearing:
“[Appellant’s Counsel]: . . . This is a case where we were inclined to have a hearing on the question of the strike. I don’t know if [appellant] *1400admitted it or submitted because there was some litigation involved in the strike which will ultimately be subject to appeal.
“The Court: He admitted it... .
“[Appellant’s Counsel]: I think subject to the validity of the motion to strike, if I’m not mistaken. . . .” (Italics added.)
By holding that a certificate is in fact required, the majority is holding that trial counsel’s understanding of appellate procedure was erroneous, i.e., that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.1 In addition, the majority also faults appointed appellate counsel for delay, and seems to imply that were it not for the delay, the requested relief might be granted. If this is the majority’s position, appellate counsel has also rendered ineffective assistance.
It is undisputed that “a trial court, when sentencing a criminal defendant, may not rely on a prior felony conviction obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.” (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 429 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 981 P.2d 525].) If we follow the majority’s analysis to its logical conclusion, the end result is that an indigent criminal defendant has lost his opportunity to appeal a sentence he contends is unlawful, because both his appointed trial and appellate counsel failed to perform “in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates.” {People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) Under the majority’s view, if appellant’s sentence is in fact unlawfully excessive, the fact that his attorneys may have negligently failed to take the necessary action to correct it does not constitute good cause for relief.
An indigent criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 685-686 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]; In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th *1401813, 832 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391]; People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 421-426), both at trial and on appeal (In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192, 202-203 [90 Cal.Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969]). I do not construe our Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 969 P.2d 146] or People v. Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th 424 as imposing an absolute bar to granting relief for good cause based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We are not being asked to reverse appellant’s sentence, but merely to give him the opportunity to ask the trial court to issue a certificate. I would find the ineffective assistance of counsel to constitute good cause, grant the relief and permit appellant to apply to the trial court for a certificate, rather than wait for the inevitable habeas corpus petition that is sure to follow if this application is denied.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 19, 2000.

In a footnote the majority makes the strange assertion that “we have neither made a finding that counsel’s performance fell below the standard of a reasonably competent attorney nor considered the issue of prejudice . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1398, fn. 10.) Yet the majority holds, and I agree, that a certificate of probable cause was necessary to appeal the only issue actually in contention in this case, and that trial counsel failed to obtain the necessary certificate, erroneously believing that one was not required. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1389-1391.) I submit that the failure to properly preserve for appeal an issue for which counsel is seeking appellate review establishes that “counsel’s performance was deficient when measured against the standard of a reasonably competent attorney . . . .” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 366 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169].) As to prejudice, it is undisputed that the failure to obtain the certificate has resulted in the loss of appellate review. If appellate counsel was not delinquent in his request for relief from default, or if his timing is of no significance, I fail to understand why the majority discusses it.