Court Opinion

ID: 9748069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:50:56.730691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:31.240006
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
dissenting.
The respondents in this case have consistently asserted that the Supreme Court’s total ban on broadcast media advertising of attorneys’ professional services, DR 2-101(D), is unconstitutional. The present proceedings before this Court seek the meritorious review of these constitutional challenges. Ante at 433. The Court, however, does not deal with these constitutional claims. Rather, it decides only that respondents should be subjected to formal discipline for the violation of DR 2-101(D).
In refusing to deal with the constitutionality of the ban on advertising while at the same time authorizing the imposition of discipline for its violation, the Court acts on the premise that a constitutional determination is unnecessary. It apparently believes that a constitutional adjudication is obviated in light of the replacement of our ban on broadcast media advertising with a new rule that allows such advertising subject to reasonable *449regulations. Ante at 442. The Court also apparently feels that a constitutional adjudication in this case is irrelevant to, and has no bearing on, the propriety of disciplinary action. Ante at 443-446.
If the constitutionality of the total ban were the only issue here, the replacement of the ban with a new rule allowing regulated advertising could justify the avoidance of a constitutional adjudication. The constitutionality of the total ban, however, is not the sole question on this appeal. In view of the Court’s decision — to remand the case to determine whether respondents should be sanctioned for their failure to comply with that ban — the case has been transposed into a disciplinary proceeding.
The constitutionality of the particular disciplinary rule can make a great deal of difference in determining whether discipline is needed or appropriate. E.g., In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646 (1982); In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604 (1982). This is especially true in a case such as this in which discipline trenches upon important constitutional rights that are protected under the First Amendment. Id.; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).
In this case, I have little doubt that the Court’s former total ban on broadcast advertising violated the protections of the First Amendment. In re Professional Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 475, 89 N.J. 74, 97 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), app. dism. sub nom. Jacoby & Meyers v. Supreme Court of N.J., 459 U.S. 962, 103 S.Ct. 285, 74 L.Ed.2d 272 (1982). The unconstitutionally of the rule, in light of the protectable interests of free speech with which it conflicts, is a highly relevant factor in determining whether the imposition of discipline for its violation is a sound and appropriate exercise of our regulatory authority.
By authorizing discipline in this case, the Court confirms the misgivings I expressed in In re Professional Ethics Advisory *450Comm. Op. 475. I was evidently mistaken when I stated that I did not think the Court’s decision in that case constituted “an imprimatur on our current strictures against television advertising.” Id. at 103. I thought that “while our rules are being studied anew, this Court [would not] prohibit reasonable, nondeceptive advertising or deny lawyers the right to contest any adverse restrictions placed upon permissible advertising efforts.” Id. I believed then — and I am convinced now — that our previous rules imposing a total ban on broadcast advertising were unconstitutional and would not be “deserving of a vigorous defense.” Id. at 103-04 (footnote omitted). The point I would emphasize is “that there is nothing inherently deceptive or misleading about television and radio advertising.” Id. at 101 (footnote omitted). Consequently, I do not think these particular rules should be applied now as offensive disciplinary weapons.
We have expended considerable energy on the important task of fleshing out new professional advertising rules, articulating standards with greater realism and understanding, defining guidelines with more clarity and precision, developing an administrative machinery for effective regulation, and creating a climate that will foster compliance serving the interests of both the public and the profession. Committed to these important concerns, we ought not turn our attention backwards to the asserted infractions of respondents consisting of only a few, brief radio commercials — innocuous in the larger scheme of things.
Furthermore, in opting for discipline, we backtrack. In our last case involving commercial speech, In re Professional Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 475, supra, we made clear that we intended to act in our legislative capacity by initiating the promulgation of sound and valid rules governing professional commercial speech. Implicit was the promise of our full consideration and protection of constitutional interests in such speech. Our new rules, while not yet tested, have certainly addressed these constitutional concerns. Today, we shift our sights. Instead of *451interring the ban on broadcast advertising, we resurrect it. Our legislative function is abandoned; an enforcement role is assumed. It is an unwise course. In the context of this case, we ought not as a matter of sound discretion insist upon the enforcement of an unconstitutional regulation. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980).
As a Court, we appreciate the distinction between disciplinary rules that impact upon solemn constitutional interests, such as free speech, and those that do not. In re Rachmeil, supra; In re Hinds, supra. Not all disciplinary rules are of equal importance. When the State’s regulatory arsenal is turned toward conduct that implicates constitutional rights of speech, we should be exceedingly chary before unleashing our disciplinary fire. Id.
We have an enormous range of discretion in the exercise of our disciplinary function. I believe that our discretion would be exercised prudently in this case by dismissing these proceedings without the additional imposition of discipline. All important interests generally to be served by discipline will have been adequately and appropriately addressed by our opinion. Its message is clear and commanding. It is both instructive to the public and hortative to the profession. More, it is a self-executing rebuke, an unmistakable disapproval of respondents for their cavalier attitude toward the disciplinary structure. Little more is to be gained, and much may be lost, by our insistence that formal punishment be meted in this case.
I believe, respectfully, that the decision to impose discipline in this case is an imprudent and mistaken exercise of our discretion. I therefore dissent.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI— 6.
Dissenting — Justice HANDLER — 1.