Court Opinion

ID: 9424898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:13:03.803986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:52.650689
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Blackmun,
with whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.
Because our grant of certiorari was limited, 404 U. S. 1037 (1972), the customarily presented issues of patent validity and infringement are not before us in this case. I necessarily accept, therefore, the conclusion that the Laitram patents are valid and that the Deepsouth de-veining machine, when manufactured and assembled in the United States, is an infringement. The Court so concedes. The Court, however, denies Laitram patent law protection against Deepsouth’s manufacture and assembly when the mere assembly is effected abroad. It does so on the theory that there then is no “making” of the patented invention in the United States even though every part is made here and Deepsouth ships all the parts in response to an order from abroad.
With all respect, this seems to me to be too narrow a reading of 35 U. S. C. §§ 154 and 271 (a). In addition, the result is unduly to reward the artful com*533petitor who uses another’s invention in its entirety and who seeks to profit thereby. Deepsouth may be admis-sive and candid or, as the Court describes it, ante, at 523 n. 5, “straightforward,” in its “sales rhetoric,” ante, at 527, but for me that rhetoric reveals the very iniquitous and evasive nature of Deepsouth’s operations. I do not see how one can escape the conclusion that the Deepsouth machine was made in the United States, within the meaning of the protective language of §§ 154 and 271 (a). The situation, perhaps, would be different were parts, or even only one vital part, manufactured abroad. Here everything was accomplished in this country except putting the pieces together as directed (an operation that, as Deepsouth represented to its Brazilian prospect, would take “less than one hour”), all much as the fond father does with his little daughter’s doll house on Christmas Eve. To say that such assembly, accomplished abroad, is not the prohibited combination and that it avoids the restrictions of our patent law, is a bit too much for me. The Court has opened the way to deny the holder of the United States combination patent the benefits of his invention with respect to sales to foreign purchasers.
I also suspect the Court substantially overstates when it describes Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F. 2d 626 (CA2 1935), as a “leading case,” ante, at 529, and when it imputes to Congress, in drafting the 1952 statute, an awareness of Andrea’s “prevailing law,” ante, at 530. Andrea was seriously undermined only two years after its promulgation, when the Court of Appeals modified its decree on a second review. Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 90 F. 2d 612 (CA2 1937). Its author, Judge Swan himself, dissenting in part from the 1937 decision, somewhat ruefully allowed that his court was overruling the earlier decision. Id., at 615. I therefore would follow the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in the *534present case, 443 F. 2d 936 (1971), and would reject the reasoning in the older and weakened Andrea opinion and in the Third and Seventh Circuit opinions that merely follow it.
By a process of only the most rigid construction, the Court, by its decision today, fulfills what Judge Clark, in his able opinion for the Fifth Circuit, distressingly forecast:
“To hold otherwise [as the Court does today] would subvert the Constitutional scheme of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’ U. S. Const., art. I § 8 Cl. 8. It would allow an infringer to set up shop next door to a patent-protected inventor whose product enjoys a substantial foreign market and deprive him of this valuable business. If this Constitutional protection is to be fully effectuated, it must extend to an infringer who manufactures in the United States and then captures the foreign markets from the patentee. The Constitutional mandate cannot be limited to just manufacturing and selling within the United States. The in-fringer would then be allowed to reap the fruits of the American economy — technology, labor, materials, etc. — but would not be subject to the responsibilities of the American patent laws. We cannot permit an infringer to enjoy these benefits and then be allowed to strip away a portion of the patentee’s protection.” 443 F. 2d, at 939.
I share the Fifth Circuit’s concern and I therefore dissent.