Court Opinion

ID: 9587153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:18:26.175449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:03.314954
License: Public Domain

Felton, C. J.,
dissenting.  I think the court erred in admitting the testimony of one of the defendants, Mrs. Mable Laverne Henderson, to the effect that she entered a plea of guilty to the charge of “reckless driving.” The evidence was introduced as an admission against interest but it is clear to me that the plaintiff’s motive and purpose in introducing the testimony was to show a legal plea of guilty, which meant that there was a charge' against the witness and that she entered a legal plea before a judge authorized to receive it. When it was developed from the evidence that there was no such plea of guilty the plaintiff did not seek to show what was said or written in such purported plea of guilty, but insisted on the admissibility of the testimony that the witness entered a plea of guilty and the court admitted the testimony as an admission against the witness’s interest. This was error for the reason that the highest and best evidence of what the charge was and to what charge the witness pleaded would have been a certified copy of the charge and the plea. There was no attempt made to introduce evidence as to what the witness actually admitted doing. It is true she stated that she intended to plead guilty to reckless driving but there is no such offense and her admitting guilt of such an offense means nothing and the admission of such evidence was erroneous and harmful, as originally held unanimously by the second division of this court. For authority that a certified copy of the record is the highest and best evidence of a plea of guilty see the recent case of Webb v. May, 91 Ga. App. 437 (85 S. E. 2d *75641). It will be seen from that case that if the plaintiff had abandoned the idea of introducing the evidence as a plea of guilty and had sought to introduce evidence of what the plea included, the original of the actual plea would have been the highest and best evidence; but the defendants had no opportunity to object to the testimony on that ground and it was not necessary because the intention was to prove a plea of guilty, and the defendants offered a valid objection to that evidence. The ruling in Roper v. Scott, 77 Ga. App. 120 (48 S. E. 2d 118), is not authority for the ruling in this case holding the evidence admissible. In Ground 4 of the amended motion in the Roper case complaint was made of the admission by Mr. Roper that he pleaded guilty in a police court to operating under-the influence of whisky. The ground stated that the question was objected to on the ground that the same was irrelevant and illustrated no issue to be tried in the case. In Ground 6 of the amended motion in the Roper case complaint was made -of the asking the question whether Mr. Roper pleaded guilty to a charge that he was drunk on the street. This ground stated that the defendant objected to the question on the ground that the same was irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial,' and objected particularly t.o the form of the question “on which a sentence was suspended” on the ground that the record would be the highest and best evidence of the act sought to be proved. In assigning error on the allowance of such question the movant restricted his assignment of error thereon. He contended (1) that the question sought to bring out irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial matter, and permitting it to be answered was hurtful and prejudicial to movant because it permitted the jury, considering a civil action for damages, to consider the fact that a criminal prosecution involving the same transaction had been determined adversely to defendant; and (2) he made the contention that the form of the question presupposed before the answer was given that a conviction was obtained and a sentence imposed instead of proving such an allegation by the highest and best evidence. In Ground 7 of the amended motion- in the Roper case the complaint to the admission by Mr. Roper that he pleaded guilty to being drunk on the street was confined to the point that the evidence was irrelevant and its admission was *76hurtful and prejudicial to movant because it permitted the jury, trying a civil action for damages, to consider the facts surrounding a trial-in another tribunal and the judgment of such other tribunal, adverse to the defendant, in its deliberations concerning-the same transaction in a civil action for damages. Not a single one of the grounds of the amended motion in the Roper ca'sfe. properly raised the question whether a certified copy of the recoid in the criminal case in which the plea was contended to have been entered was the highest and best evidence of the charge made against the defendant in such case and the plea of guilty entered to such charge.
Of course, if the defendant, Mrs. Henderson, had in her testimony admitted any of the acts charged against her in this civil proceeding, such as failing to yield the right of way, any similar extra-judicial admissions to the same or like effect would have been harmless. She, however, never made such an admission in the presence .of the jury. To have done so she would have to have admitted on the stand that she failed to yield the right of way under circumstances which would have made her failure to do so negligence as to- the driver of the car with which she collided and as to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. I submit that she made no such admission on the stand. The following is the testimony of the defendant, Mrs. Henderson, on the subject: “Q. Do you recognize that intersection and undergrowth and trees on the light there? A. Yes, sir. Q. I will ask you whether the view of one approaching that intersection is blocked on the right by trees and undergrowth? A. Yes, sir. Q. That is a dirt road? A. Yes, sir. Q. Which direction did you intend to turn, if any, when you entered the intersection? A. I intended to go-left but I went right by. Q. Ma’am? A. I intended to turn to the right—to the left but I just ran on by the road. Q. I didn’t understand you—you said you intended to turn left and what? A. I intended to turn left but we were talking and it slipped my mind and I went on across. Q. You didn’t turn right? A. No, sir. Q. Did you ever see that car on the right? A. I may have glanced it but we were nearly together. Q. You were practically together when you saw it? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you have any idea about how fast you were traveling? A. *7730 or 35 miles. Q. Of course, you didn’t look at the speedometer? A. No. Q. Did you keep your head to the left, did you ever turn your head to the right? A. No, sir, I know I didn’t or I would have seen the car. Q. Ma’am? A. I know I didn’t turn my head to the right or I would have seen the car. Q. You didn’t or you would have seen the car? A. Yes. Q. I will ask you if this is a picture of the car you were driving after the collision? A. Yes. Q. Is that a correct picture of the car you were driving? A. Yes. Q. What type car were you driving? A. A ’53 Chevrolet. Q. I believe you were proceeding from the west toward the east on the Vickers Road? A. That’s right. Q. And the other car was proceeding from the south toward the north? A. That’s right. Q. And it was proceeding on the Fussell Road? A. That’s right. Q. You intended, after you got in the intersection you were going to turn and go north? A. Yes. Q. You never did turn? A. No. Q. As I understand it you went beyond the intersection and never did turn? A. No. Q. You were beyond the intersection when you hit the car? A. Yes. Q. You were on your right-hand side? A. Yes. Q. Do you know what car got in the intersection first? A. No, sir, I don’t. Q. Would you or would you not say you approached the intersection about the same time—you and the other car? A. We could have but I don’t know. Q. You don’t know? A. No, I don’t know. Q. You didn’t put on any brakes? A. No, sir. Q. Did you attempt to put on any brakes? A. No, sir. Q. Was your mother-in-law hurt? A. Yes, sir. Q. I think I asked you but I just want to be sure,—this is a correct picture of the trees over on the right-hand side as you approached ? A. The trees were to my left—these would be to my right and these here are on the left. Q. That’s right—these over here were to your left? A. Yes. Q. And these trees here were over on the right-hand side? A. No. I was coming this way and he was coming this way— this is the tree on the right. Q. These are the trees on the right? A. Yes, these are the trees on the right. Q. These are the trees on the right? A. Yes.” At most this testimony shows that this defendant did not look to the right and did not stop or apply brakes. That alone does not show that she was *78negligent as to plaintiff or that her negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. It could have been possible, under the flimsy evidence, that the defendant Mrs. Henderson had the right of way despite her failure to look to tire right, etc. It is very doubtful whether the evidence would have authorized a verdict for the plaintiff without the inference from the harmful and illegal evidence that the defendant Mrs. Henderson admitted that she failed to yield the right of way. It will be noted in the statement of facts that when the defendant Mrs. Henderson stated that she pleaded guilty to failing to yield the right of way (assuming that what she said means that she did so) the jury was out of the room and such a statement is not evidence in the case. The majority opinion is not based on this evidence, but, in reading the case, the fact that the jury was out at the time this testimony was given may not be observed by a casual reader. I am authorized to say that Carlisle, J., concurs in this dissent.