Court Opinion

ID: 9900892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 18:00:43.873836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.077562
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IDAHO CONSERVATION                                No. 22-35978
LEAGUE,
                                               D.C. No. 1:18-cv-
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             00353-REP
    v.

SHANNON POE,                                        OPINION

                 Defendant-Appellant.

     Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Idaho
Raymond Edward Patricco, Jr., Magistrate Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted October 5, 2023
                    Seattle, Washington

                   Filed November 20, 2023

     Before: KIM McLANE WARDLAW and MILAN D.
    SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges, and ROBERT L. HINKLE, *
                        District Judge.

            Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

*
 The Honorable Robert L. Hinkle, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
2               IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE

                          SUMMARY **

                      Environmental Law

   The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Idaho Conservation League in the
League’s action under the Clean Water Act against Shannon
Poe, who engaged in instream suction dredge mining, a
method of placer mining, in Idaho’s South Fork Clearwater
River without a National Pollutant Discharge Eliminating
System permit.
    The panel held that to establish a violation of the Clean
Water Act’s NPDES requirements, also referred to as
Section 402 permitting, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant (1) discharged, i.e., added (2) a pollutant (3) to
navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source. As to the first
element, the panel held that Poe’s suction dredge mining
“added” a pollutant to the South Fork. The panel followed
Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990), which
upheld Environmental Protection Agency regulations
interpreting the Clean Water Act as prohibiting discharges
from placer mining sluice boxes unless done in compliance
with a Section 402 permit. In two subsequent cases, S. Fla
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S.
95 (2004), and L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. V. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 568 U.S. 78 (2013), the Supreme Court
held that the transfer of polluted water from one location to
another within the same waterbody did not constitute an
“addition” of pollutants. Here, by contrast, Poe excavated

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
              IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE               3

from the riverbed materials that were not already suspended
in the water. The panel concluded that Rybachek was not
“clearly irreconcilable” with L.A. County or Miccosukee
Tribe’s holdings, and it therefore was still good law.
    The panel further held that the processed material
discharged from Poe’s suction dredge mining was a
pollutant, not dredged or fill material, and therefore required
an NPDES permit under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act,
rather than a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers under
Section 404. Because the meaning of the Act and its
implementing regulations was ambiguous, the panel
deferred to the official joint conclusion of the EPA and the
Corps.

                         COUNSEL

Frank D. Garrison IV (argued), Pacific Legal Foundation,
Arlington, Virginia; Damien M. Schiff, Pacific Legal
Foundation, Sacramento, California; Danielle Bettencourt,
Fairfield and Woods PC, Denver, Colorado; for Defendant-
Appellant.
Bryan Hurlbutt (argued) and Laurence J. Lucas, Advocates
for the West, Boise, Idaho, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
4             IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE

                         OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

    This appeal raises questions of statutory interpretation
concerning the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a). For several years, Shannon Poe engaged in
instream suction dredge mining in Idaho’s South Fork
Clearwater River (the South Fork) without a National
Pollutant Discharge Eliminating System (NPDES) permit.
Plaintiff Idaho Conservation League (ICL) sued Poe,
arguing that he violated the CWA each time he operated a
suction dredge on the South Fork without an NPDES permit.
Poe countered that (1) his suction dredge mining did not add
pollutants to the South Fork and therefore did not require an
NPDES permit, and (2) even if his suction dredge mining did
add pollutants, those pollutants are “dredged” or “fill”
material regulated exclusively pursuant to Section 404, not
Section 402, of the CWA. The district court granted
summary judgment to ICL. Poe appeals the judgment as to
liability. We affirm.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
      Congress enacted the CWA “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The CWA “categorically
prohibits any discharge of a pollutant from a point source
without a permit.” Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. E.
Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1993).
“[D]ischarge of a pollutant” is defined as the “addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source
. . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). The CWA defines “pollutant”
broadly to include “dredged spoil,” “solid waste,” “rock,”
“sand,” and “industrial . . . waste discharged into water.” 33
              IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE               5

U.S.C. § 1362(6). A point source is “any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance . . . .”          33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14). Navigable waters are defined as “the waters of
the United States . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The CWA
does not define what constitutes the “addition” of a pollutant.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362.
    Before discharging any pollutant, one must obtain a
permit from either the Environmental Protection Agency
(the EPA) or the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps). See
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1344. The NPDES permitting
program (also referred to as Section 402 permitting)
authorizes the EPA to issue permits “for the discharge of any
pollutant, or combination of pollutants,” on the condition
that the discharge will otherwise comply with the CWA. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the
Corps to issue permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill
material . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). When a discharge
requires a Section 404 permit, it does not require a Section
402 permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1); 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.3(b). The CWA does not define “discharge of dredged
material” or “dredged material.” See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342,
1362.
  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
     Suction dredge mining is a method of placer mining that
uses a floating watercraft device with a pump to suck water,
riverbed sands, and minerals through a nozzle. The water
and riverbed material are run through a “sluice box,” where
gold and other heavy metals are separated out. Water, sand,
and minerals are then discharged back into the river, along
with sediments and other pollutants. Dredging creates
tailing piles behind the dredge, where larger and heavier
processed riverbed materials are discarded and settle to the
6             IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE

river bottom nearby. Tailing piles can rise to the surface
level of the river and can span most of the river’s width.
    Dredging overburden and bedrock involves dismantling
the riverbed by dislodging and moving rocks and boulders,
and breaking up tightly bound sediments using the miner’s
hands, the dredge nozzle, and other tools, like crowbars. The
resulting holes can be several feet deep under the riverbed.
    During the 2014, 2015, and 2018 dredge seasons, Poe
suction dredge mined forty-two days on the South Fork, a
navigable water located in north-central Idaho. Poe never
obtained an NPDES permit pursuant to Section 402 of the
CWA.
    On August 10, 2018, ICL sued Poe, alleging that Poe was
violating the CWA by failing to obtain an NPDES permit
while dredging and discharging sediment and other
pollutants in the South Fork. On December 21, 2018, Poe
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that (1) the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because, in part, ICL’s
2017 and 2018 notice letters were not sent via certified mail
as required by the CWA and its implementing regulations;
and (2) ICL lacked standing to the bring the suit in the first
instance. The district court denied the motion.
    ICL then moved for summary judgment on liability. Poe
cross-moved for summary judgment. On June 4, 2021, the
district court granted summary judgment to ICL, concluding
that (1) Poe’s suction dredge mining added pollutants to the
South Fork, thereby requiring an NPDES permit under
Section 402 of the CWA; and (2) the processed material
discharged from Poe’s suction dredge mining was a
pollutant, not dredged or fill material, requiring an NPDES
permit under Section 402 of the CWA rather than a permit
under Section 404. The court thereafter enjoined Poe from
              IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE               7

suction dredge mining in the South Fork without a valid
CWA Section 402 permit and imposed a $150,000 civil
penalty. Poe appeals the judgment as to liability.
   JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc). We “must determine whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the
district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.”
Id. Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
                        ANALYSIS
I. Dumping Suction Dredge Mining Waste into the
   South Fork Is an “Addition” of Pollutants Pursuant
   to the CWA.
    To establish a violation of the CWA’s NPDES
requirements, “a plaintiff must prove that defendant[] (1)
discharged, i.e., added (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters
(4) from (5) a point source.” Comm. to Save Mokelumne
River, 13 F.3d at 308. The parties dispute the first element—
whether Poe’s suction dredge mining “added” a pollutant to
the South Fork.
    What amounts to the “addition” of a pollutant is not
defined under the CWA. “It is well settled that the starting
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute
itself.” Olympic Forest Coal. v. Coast Seafoods Co., 884
F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gwaltney of
8             IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE

Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 56 (1987)). “When interpreting a statute, we first use the
‘traditional tools of statutory construction,’ to determine
whether Congress directly addressed the ‘precise question at
issue.’” Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). “If the precise
question at issue is addressed, then the ‘unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress controls.’” Id. (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). Where a statute is ambiguous,
courts defer to the reasonable interpretation of the agency
charged with administering that statute. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844.
    Since the 1970s, the EPA has interpreted the CWA as
prohibiting discharges from placer mining sluice boxes
unless done in compliance with a Section 402 permit. See
Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 552–53 (9th Cir.
1984) (reviewing the EPA’s issuance of Section 402 permits
to gold placer miners in 1976 and 1977). In 1988, the EPA
adopted industry-wide regulations setting effluent
limitations for Section 402 permits for gold placer miners,
including gold mining from floating dredges. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 440.140.
     In Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990),
miners challenged these regulations, arguing that placer
mining does not cause the “addition” of a pollutant. We
rejected that argument. We noted that “resuspension” of
streambed materials “may be interpreted to be an addition of
a pollutant under the Act,” and we deferred to the EPA’s
reasonable interpretation that such activity constitutes the
“addition” of a pollutant under the CWA. Id. at 1285–86
(first citing Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh,
715 F.2d 897, 923 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he word
‘addition,’ as used in the definition of the term ‘discharge,’
              IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE               9

may reasonably be understood to include ‘redeposit’”); and
then citing United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d
1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985) (action of digging up sediment
and redepositing it on sea bottom by boat propellers
constitutes an addition of pollutants), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987)). We further
explained: “Because the EPA has been charged with
administering the [CWA], we must show great deference to
the Agency’s interpretation of the Act. We especially defer
where the Agency’s decision on the meaning or reach of the
[CWA] involves reconciling conflicting policies committed
to the Agency’s care and expertise under the Act.” Id. at
1284 (citation omitted).
    Poe’s mining activities fall squarely within the scope of
Rybachek. Undisputed evidence in the record, including
photos and descriptions of Poe’s dredge operating on the
South Fork, shows that he “excavate[d] the dirt and gravel”
in the river using a high-pressure blaster nozzle, “extract[ed]
any gold” and other heavy metals, and “discharge[d] the dirt
and other non-[heavy metal] materials into the water.” See
id. at 1285. That is, Poe engaged in placer mining “subject
to regulation under the [CWA].” Id. Poe, therefore, “added”
pollutants to the South Fork. See id. (“[W]e will not strike
down the EPA’s finding that placer mining discharges
pollutants within the meaning of the Act.”); see also Borden
Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 261 F.3d
810, 814 (9th Cir. 2001) (reaffirming Rybachek, which “held
that removing material from a stream bed, sifting out the
gold, and returning the material to the stream bed was an
‘addition’ of a pollutant’”), aff’d, 537 U.S. 99 (2002).
    In response, Poe argues that (1) Rybachek is no longer
good law in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions or,
in the alternative, (2) the court should not apply Chevron
10            IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE

deference and overrule Rybachek.        Neither argument is
persuasive.
    Poe suggests that the Supreme Court has, since
Rybachek,      twice    confirmed      the    “commonsense
interpretation” of the CWA—i.e., that a person does not
illegally discharge a pollutant unless he or she adds new
material from the outside world. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004);
L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 568 U.S. 78 (2013). That is, according to Poe,
Miccosukee Tribe and L.A. County eviscerate the logic of
Rybachek. But these cases are both distinguishable from
Rybachek and inapposite here. In Miccosukee Tribe,
polluted water was removed from a canal, transported
through a pump station, and deposited into a reservoir a short
distance away. See 541 U.S. at 98–99. The Court held that
pumping polluted water from, and back into, the same body
of water, without more, “cannot constitute an ‘addition’ of
pollutants.” Id. at 109–10 (“As the Second Circuit put it in
Trout Unlimited, if one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts
it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has not
‘added’ soup or anything else to the pot.” (citing Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of N.Y.,
273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001) (cleaned up)). In L.A.
County, the Court held that “the flow of water from an
improved portion of a navigable waterway into an
unimproved portion of the very same waterway does not
qualify as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA.” 568
U.S. at 83. In both cases, polluted water was transferred
from one location to another within the same waterbody.
    Here, by contrast, Poe excavated rocks, gravel, sand,
sediment, and silt from the riverbed. Poe punched holes in
the riverbed by excavating through layers of riverbed down
              IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE            11

to the bedrock. Poe then processed the materials by running
them through the sluice on his dredge, and then discarded the
waste material into the water. This added a plume of turbid
wastewater to the South Fork. These materials were not
already suspended in the water; they were previously
deposited in the riverbed. Poe’s dredging was therefore not
simple water transfer.
   As the district court correctly observed,

       Poe’s reliance on [L.A. County and
       Miccosukee Tribe] misses the point. Suction
       dredge mining does not simply transfer water
       (what the above cases address); to the
       contrary, it excavates rock, gravel, sand, and
       sediment from the riverbed and then adds
       those materials back to the river—this time,
       in suspended form.

See also EPA, 2018 Response to Comments Idaho Small
Suction Dredge General Permit (GP) (“If, during suction
dredging, only water was picked up and placed back within
the same waterbody . . . , no permit would be necessary.
However, in suction dredging, bed material is also picked up
with water. Picking up the bed material is in fact the very
purpose of suction dredging—the bed material is processed
to produce gold. This process is an intervening use that
causes the addition of pollutants [rock and sand, see CWA
§ 502(6)] to be discharged to waters of the United States. As
a result . . . an NPDES permit is required for the discharge
from this activity.”     (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)). Thus, Miccosukee Tribe and L.A. County do not
disturb our holding in Rybachek, which remains good law.
12            IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE

    In addition, or in the alternative, Poe asks us not to apply
Chevron deference and to overrule Rybachek. Specifically,
Poe argues that (1) the ordinary meaning of “addition” under
the CWA is clear, making Chevron deference inappropriate,
(2) Chevron should not be applied where a statute may
subject individuals to criminal penalties, and (3) Chevron
should not be applied where the EPA has taken inconsistent
positions on the meaning of “addition” under the CWA.
Adopting any of these theories would require us to depart
from our ruling in Rybachek. A three-judge panel may
depart from controlling circuit precedent only if “our prior
circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning
or theory of intervening higher authority.” Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
“[T]he ‘clearly irreconcilable’ requirement ‘is a high
standard.’” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Consumer Def., LLC,
926 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Rodriguez v.
AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir.
2013)). “[I]f we can apply our precedent consistently with
that of the higher authority, we must do so.” Id.
    As explained above, Rybachek’s holding regarding
placer mining is not irreconcilable, let alone “clearly
irreconcilable,” with L.A. County or Miccosukee Tribe’s
holdings regarding the transfer of water within a single
waterbody. We therefore follow Rybachek on the issues
raised by Poe and hold that Poe’s instream suction dredge
mining constitutes the “addition” of a pollutant under the
CWA.
                IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE                     13

II. The Processed Material Discharged from Instream
    Suction Dredge Mining is a Pollutant that Requires a
    Section 402 Permit.
    Poe also argues that, even if his suction dredge mining
adds pollutants to the South Fork, the waste discharged from
his operation constitutes “dredged” or “fill material” over
which the Corps has exclusive permitting authority. 1 Poe
makes this argument pursuant to (1) the ordinary meaning of
“dredged material” under the CWA and (2) the ordinary
meaning of the Corps’ own regulatory definition of “dredged
material.” Neither argument is persuasive.
    Under the CWA, pollution discharges require a Section
402 permit from the EPA, unless the discharge is “dredged
or fill material” requiring a Section 404 permit from the
Corps. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344; 40 C.F.R. § 122.3;
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557
U.S. 261, 274 (2009). The terms “dredged material” and
“discharge of dredged material” are not defined under the
CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362; Olympic Forest Coal., 884
F.3d at 905 (“It is well settled that the starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.”).
Nor does the statute define whether material that is dredged
from navigable water remains “dredged material” after it has
been processed. That is, nothing in the CWA says that once
a material has been dredged, it remains a dredged material
forever. If, as the district court explained (citing EOMA, 445

1
  The Oregon Supreme Court recently addressed this issue. See E. Or.
Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 445 P.3d 251, 274 (2019)
(EOMA) (deferring to the “EPA’s and the Corps’ reasonable conclusion
that the EPA (or its state delegate) has the authority to issue a permit
under section 402 for all the processed waste discharged as a result of
suction dredge mining”). We find EOMA well-reasoned and persuasive
and substantially follow its analysis, as did the district court.
14              IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE

P.3d 251, 257 (2019)), processing dredged material can
change its character, the text of the statute does not identify
the point at which the processed material becomes a
pollutant other than dredged material that is subject to the
EPA’s rather than the Corps’ permitting authority. The
CWA therefore does not, in plain terms, address the question
presented here.
    We next look to the regulations promulgated to
implement the Act. See Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 277–78
(explaining that, if the text of the CWA is ambiguous, courts
look to the agencies’ implementing regulations and, if those
regulations are ambiguous, to the agencies’ interpretation
and application of their regulations to determine what the
CWA means)). The CWA regulations define “dredged
material” as “material that is excavated and dredged from
waters of the United States,” but offer no further explanation
of the term. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c). Like the CWA, the
regulations do not specifically address the question of which
agency has the authority to permit the discharge of dredged
material that has been processed, such as the leftover waste
material that is discharged during suction dredge mining.
    Absent clear direction from either the CWA or the
regulations promulgated thereunder, we look to the
agencies’ interpretation and application of those regulations.
See Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 277–78; Kisor v. Wilkie, 139
S. Ct. 2400, 2415–18 (2019). The EPA and Corps have long
agreed that when materials are dredged from a waterbody
and are subsequently processed, they are no longer dredged
materials and have become industrial waste, rock, sand, or
other CWA pollutants regulated under Section 402. 2 For

2
  The district court included a more detailed account of the regulatory
history, which Poe does not contest on appeal.
              IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE              15

example, in their 1986 memorandum of agreement, the EPA
and the Corps agreed that “placer mining wastes” were the
type of “pollutant” discharged in “liquid, semi-liquid, or
suspended form” subject to Section 402, not Section 404.
Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Regulation of
Discharge of Solid Waste Under the Clean Water Act, 51
Fed. Reg. 8871, 8872 (March 14, 1986). A 1990 Regulatory
Guidance Letter from the Corps states that once “dredged
material” is “subsequently processed to remove desired
elements, its nature has been changed” and “it is no longer
dredged material” regulated under Section 404. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Regulation of Waste Disposal from In-
Stream Place Mining, Regulatory Guidance Letter 88-10
(July                       28,                         1990),
https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16
021coll9/id/1386; see also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Regulatory                 Guidance                    Letters,
https://www.usace.army.mil/Missions/Civil-
Works/Regulatory-Program-and-Permits/Guidance-Letters
(noting that, “unless superseded by specific provisions of
subsequently issued regulations or guidance, the content
provided in [Regulatory Guidance Letters] generally
remains valid after the expiration date”). The Corps
explained: “The raw materials associated with placer mining
operations are not being excavated simply to change their
locations as in a normal dredging operation, but rather to
obtain materials for processing, and the residue of this
processing should be considered waste.”
    As the district court noted, “whatever patchwork of
permitting authority has existed over time, from at least
2013 (via the general permitting process, initiated in 2010
and after notice and comment), it is the EPA that has required
a Section 402 permit for suction dredge mining.” “This fact,
16            IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE

coupled with the overall approach to and assignment and
acceptance of responsibilities under the EPA’s and the
Corps’ interpretation of the applicable regulations to suction
dredge mining . . . , confirms that the agencies have taken an
official position and made a fair and considered judgment,
based on its substantive expertise, that the operation of a
suction dredge results in the discharge of processed wastes,
thus requiring Section 402 permits.” We therefore defer to
the agencies’ reasonable interpretation of the CWA and
implementing regulations that the processed material
discharged from Poe’s suction dredge mining is a pollutant,
not a dredged or fill material, and requires an NPDES permit
under Section 402 of the CWA. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400.
     Poe’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
Principally, citing the dissent in EOMA, Poe argues that (1)
the text of Section 404 itself is enough to settle the case:
suction dredge mining does “dredge” material, and, in a
literal sense, that material is then “discharged” into the
water, and (2) the Corps’ regulation defining “dredged
material” is not genuinely ambiguous as to the question over
whether instream suction dredge mining is regulated under
Section 404 once ordinary interpretive methods have been
applied. However, as explained above, even if the material
starts as dredged material, that fact does not settle the issue
of whether material that was dredged remains “dredged
material” after it has been processed. Poe processed the
materials dredged from the riverbed when he ran them
through the sluice on his dredge, extracted heavy metals and
other materials, and discharged the remaining waste and
sediments into the South Fork.
    In any event, the meaning of the CWA and implementing
regulations remains sufficiently ambiguous that deference to
the agencies’ official joint conclusion is appropriate. See
              IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. POE            17

Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 277–78. As the Oregon Supreme
Court noted, “[b]oth the statutes and the regulations are
genuinely ambiguous on [this] question.” EOMA, 445 P.3d
at 270. The concern here “is not with the navigability of the
water body, a concern that falls within the Corps’ expertise;
rather, the concern is with the health of the water body, a
concern that lies at the heart of the EPA’s expertise. The
Corps and the EPA reasonably could conclude that the EPA
was better suited than the Corps to make th[e]se types of
water quality decisions.” Id. at 272.
                     CONCLUSION
   For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to ICL is AFFIRMED.