Court Opinion

ID: 9696654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:53:57.080068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:24.896375
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
dissenting.
The condemnee in this case was permitted to testify, over objection, to the purchase price of the property more than 11 years prior to the commencement of the condemnation proceeding. The majority opinion holds that “we cannot say that this was an abuse of discretion.” I dissent from this holding.
In a case where the measure of recovery is the market value of the property taken, the price paid for the property is wholly immaterial. It has no relation whatever to the market price of the property on the date of the *625taking. Can it be said that the purchase price is material where it was purchased for little or nothing at a tax sale? Or during an economic period when values were depressed? Or if the property was acquired by prescription or accretion? On the other hand, can it be said that the purchase price is material when it was purchased at an exorbitant price and, for one reason or another, had become a “white elephant”? Or where it had been purchased at a high price for a special purpose which did materialize? The answers to these questions are obvious. The purchase price has no relation whatever to the market value at a subsequent time and the evidence should have been excluded as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.
In the early case of Dietrichs v. Lincoln & Northwestern R. R. Co., 12 Neb. 225, 10 N. W. 718, this court said: “The price at which the lots in question were sold, according to the record read by counsel for the railroad company, was ridiculously small in 1877, but had it been the fair value of the lots then, that fact would furnish no criterion of their value in 1880, and the admission in evidence — substantially of the record, showing that the whole of the real property in question was once sold for a dollar and a half, was only calculated to belittle, and cast ridicule upon the claim of the claimant, and shed no intelligent light upon the question being tried.” The opinion further stated: “The price at which such lots were sold but a few years ago would not furnish the slightest evidence of their market value now.”
In Omaha Southern Ry. Co. v. Todd, 39 Neb. 818, 58 N. W. 289, this court said: “On the trial of an appeal from an award made by commissioners appointed to assess the damages sustained by a land-owner by reason of the appropriation of a part of his land for railroad purposes, evidence as to what such land-owner paid for the land is incompetent.” See, also, Hamilton v. Allen, 86 Neb. 401, 125 N. W. 610, 28 L. R. A. N. S. 723; Raapke & Katz Co. v. Schmoller & Mueller Piano Co., 82 Neb. *626716, 118 N. W. 652; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Griffith, 44 Neb. 690, 62 N. W. 868.
The foregoing holdings have never been departed, from by this court so far as I have been able to determine. Their reasoning is sound, and in my judgment, they should be adhered to. The rule is supported by the following cases from other jurisdictions. Levinson v. Commonwealth, 395 Pa. 613, 151 A. 2d 453; Ringer v. Wilkin, 32 Idaho 330, 183 P. 986; Martell v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 P. 862, 255 P. 3; Stanton v. St. Michell, 130 Wash. 449, 227 P. 737; Thompson v. Boydstun, 189 Okl. 530, 118 P. 2d 236.
There is a second reason why the evidence is inadmissible. The evidence was clearly too remote in point of time. Even in those jurisdictions which permit evidence of purchase price to be shown, the rule is limited. It must, among other limitations, have occurred relevant-, ly in point of time. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3rd ed.), § 21.2, p. 410. See, also, Raapke & Katz Co. v. Schmoller & Mueller Piano Co., supra.
The evidence as to the price paid for the property by the condemnee more than 11 years prior to the taking was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and the objection made thereto should have been sustained. The majority opinion summarily disposes of the matter by the bland statement that “we cannot say that this was an abuse of discretion.” I submit that the trial court is not invested with discretion to admit incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial evidence. In all my experience I have never even heard a contention for such a rule. I quite agree that the amount of damages sustained by a landowner in a condemnation proceeding is peculiarly of local nature to be determined by a jury. It is important, however, that such determination be made from competent, relevant, and material evidence, otherwise the verdict may be improperly influenced by evidence, not material, relevant, or competent, that tends to create a bias or prejudice for or against one of *627the parties. I submit that the trial court erred in failing to-sustain the objections to the evidence as to the amount paid for the property more than 11 years previous to the taking, and that the disposition of the question in the majority opinion is incorrect and is offensive to fundamental rules of evidence.
Brower, J., concurs in this dissent.