Court Opinion

ID: 9707598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:16:27.75576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:49.758391
License: Public Domain

*280Bronson, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. It is true that § 23 of the amended statute, MCL 431.83(3); MSA 18.966(53)(3), contains a broadened definition of the term "drug”. However, I do not believe that the definition set forth in that section must be read as conflicting with, or having superseded, that previously established by administrative regulation.
Under regulations promulgated pursuant to the Racing Law of 1959, substances which are neither stimulants nor depressants were excluded from the definition of impermissible "drugs”. The permissibility of administering certain non-narcotic medications similar to those involved here, methenamine and phenothiazine, has been well established. 1979 AC, R 431.62(2)(b). The amended § 23 defines the term "drug” to include substances other than stimulants or depressants, but under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) the broadened definition does not automatically apply to existing regulations, nor does it necessarily supersede those regulations:
"Definitions of words and phrases * * * prescribed in any statute, and which are made applicable to all statutes of this state, also apply to rules unless clearly indicated to the contrary.” MCL 24.232(1); MSA 3.560(132)(1). (Emphasis added.)
The prerequisites have not been met for applying a statutory definition to administrative rules. The definition in question, that of the word "drug”, is clearly not "applicable to all statutes of this state”, as required above. In fact, it is not even applicable to all sections of the amended Racing Law of 1980, but instead is specifically limited to §23:
*281”As used in this section, 'drug’ means any of the following * * MCL 431.83(3); MSA 18.966(53)(3). (Emphasis added.)
It is apparent that under the APA, the broadened definition applies only to the section itself, and not to the pre-existing rules.
Defendant relies heavily on a different section of the APA:
"A rule may be amended or rescinded by another rule which constitutes the whole or a part of a filing of rules or as a result of an act of the legislature.” MCL 24.231(5); MSA 3.560(131)(5).
According to defendant, the Legislature’s adoption of a broadened definition of "drug” in § 23 manifested an intention to amend or supersede existing rules defining that term. I disagree.
This Court has clearly held that if a statute is intended to amend a previously promulgated rule, it must do so explicitly. See Henderson v Memphis Community School Dist, 57 Mich App 770, 775; 226 NW2d 725 (1975). In my opinion, the existing rules governing the use of medications (and defining the term "drug”) continue in effect until expressly amended or rescinded, either by statute or subsequent regulation. MCL 24.231(2); MSA 3.560(131X2).
I find it difficult to believe that the Legislature intended the result which follows from the majority’s decision to read § 23 as having superseded preexisting regulations. Under the majority’s reading of the section, the use of all substances "other than food” which could "affect * * * any function of * * *” a horse (including medications whose acceptability has long been established) was abruptly prohibited, as of the effective date of the *282statute. The status of such non-narcotic substances as those involved in the present appeal has been thrown completely into limbo, until such time that defendant sees fit to promulgate detailed new rules governing the use of all conceivable substances which could fall within the foregoing broad definition of "drug”.
Under the majority’s interpretation of the new section, this state’s racing industry is faced with a whole new array of uncertainties: not only the question of which substances will be rendered permissible under newly promulgated rules, but the more fundamental question of whether (let alone when) defendant may see fit to promulgate new rules.
The horse racing industry now faces a potential for arbitrary and capricious administration of discipline for "violations” of the amended section. This follows from the fact that if existing regulations have been superseded without having been re-promulgated, there are no standards to guide defendant in determining (1) which substances constitute impermissible "drugs”, and (2) which penalties are appropriate for each substance.
I believe that the amended section should be read as an effort to affirm defendant’s jurisdiction to regulate the use of substances which are not stimulants or depressants, but which could nonetheless have some effect on the structure or bodily functions of race horses. The amendment served to eliminate any doubt that the Legislature intended to confer upon defendant the authority to regulate such non-narcotic substances, should defendant see fit to do so, by means of supplementary regulations. The Legislature thereby made it clear that it had delegated additional regulatory authority; it did not manifest any intention to exercise that *283authority directly, by means of any statutory amendment of pre-existing rules.
Absent some express statement indicating an intention to amend or rescind defendant’s existing rules, I find no basis for any conclusion that those rules have been impaired by passage of the amended section. Henderson, supra. I would hold that the rules previously promulgated by defendant remain in force, and I would issue an order reversing the trial court’s decision and directing defendant to apply those rules in determining whether plaintiffs acted properly in administering the substances in question to their respective horses.