Court Opinion

ID: 9687034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:14:12.334532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:23.869076
License: Public Domain

*637Coleman, J.
(concurring). My colleagues focus their attention primarily on the valid and important interests of husbands who deny parenthood in divorce cases such as this, and they conclude that Lord Mansfield’s Rule1 should be abolished. I understand the reasoning behind this departure from long established precedent and, despite adherence to the rule by a majority of our sister states,2 I agree that a change is required. I write separately to highlight the interests of the children who will be affected by the rule’s abolition and to emphasize the continuing strength and validity of the presumption of legitimacy.
It is true that the legal status of children born out of wedlock has improved significantly since the Eighteenth Century when Lord Mansfield first announced what became known as his rule. It is also true that should the husband not be required to pay child support, public assistance benefits may be available for the child’s minimum financial needs, usually in his or her own home.
Despite these enlightened advances, there still are, unfortunately, social distinctions made between the legitimate and illegitimate child which continue to stigmatize the illegitimate child and scar his or her psychological development. We need no learned treatise to know that many children branded as illegitimate suffer painful and sometimes crippling emotional damage at the hands of cruel or thoughtless peers and adults. The word "bastard” has not yet lost its sting to the children against whom it is too often applied. Moreover, feelings of parental rejection and aban*638donment are realities that often continue to plague the illegitimate child. Related neglect and even abuse are not uncommon. It is no accident that many of these children strike back by committing antisocial or criminal acts.
For these reasons, among others, the law long has protected all children born during marriage by the presumption of legitimacy. The presumption speaks for the child whose future is at stake, even though he or she is not a party to the legal proceedings. It is distinct from Lord Mansfield’s Rule and is not affected by today’s decision. My colleagues recognize this and briefly comment on the strength of the presumption, stating that it can only be rebutted by "clear and convincing” evidence. I wish to emphasize how strong the presumption is and clarify the meaning of the words "clear and convincing”.3
The presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest presumptions known to the law. When Michigan first adopted Lord Mansfield’s Rule, in the case of Egbert v Greenwalt, 44 Mich 245; 6 NW 654 (1880), the Court also discussed the presumption and the quantum of proof required to overcome it. The quantum was variously described by the Court as "facts and circumstances of such cogency as to render belief necessary”, "cogent facts and circumstances” and "evidence * * * beyond all reasonable doubt”.4 Then in People v Case, 171 Mich 282, 284; 137 NW 55 (1912), the Court said:
*639"The rule that a child born in lawful wedlock will be presumed to be legitimate is as old as the common law. It is one of the strongest presumptions in the law. The ancient rule made the presumption conclusive, if the husband was within the four seas. The modern one permits the presumption to be overcome, but only upon proof which is very convincing.”
Other jurisdictions have described the presumption in similarly strong terms. Chief Judge Cardozo spoke for the high court of New York. After stating that the quantum of proof required to overcome the presumption had been variously described as "clear and convincing” evidence, "strong and irresistible” evidence and "proof beyond all reasonable doubt”, he concluded that:
"What is meant by these pronouncements, however differently phrased, is this and nothing more, that the presumption will not fail unless common sense and reason are outraged by a holding that it abides.”5
Courts which have rejected Lord Mansfield’s Rule have, at the same time, reiterated the strength of the presumption and the great quantum of evidence required to overcome it.6
The phrase "clear and convincing evidence” used by my colleagues draws its meaning from this background. It obviously does not mean that a mere preponderance of the evidence or a modicum of additional evidentiary weight will be sufficient *640to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. Much more than that is necessary. The proof of illegitimacy must be "very convincing”,7 "of such cogency as to render belief necessary”8 and "beyond all reasonable doubt”9 before a judge can rule that a child is illegitimate. Judges must be careful to apply this stringent standard scrupulously, regardless of their personal view of the evidence, in order to protect the important societal objectives that are the basis for the presumption.
In short, even after today’s decision abolishing Lord Mansfield’s Rule, a very strong presumption of legitimacy will continue to protect the otherwise defenseless child. The husband who seeks to establish that he is not the father of a child born during the marriage still faces a formidable task.
Two other minor aspects of this case deserve some attention. First, the trial judge refused to order a blood test for the purpose of determining whether Mr. Serafín could be the father of the child. Such an order should be granted on remand if Mrs. Serafín continues to allege that Mr. Serafín is the father and if such an order is requested. Second, Mr. Serafin’s military duty records and evidence indicating the weather conditions during the alleged time of access were not admitted at the first trial. These items, if otherwise admissible, should be admitted on remand.
Williams, J., concurred with Coleman, J.

 Lord Mansfield’s Rule prohibited the husband and wife from testifying about nonaccess to prove the husband’s lack of paternity in cases involving a child born during the marriage.

 McCormick on Evidence (2d ed), §67; 49 ALR3d 212; 10 Am Jur 2d, Bastards, § 10, et seq.

 I would prefer to use the words "beyond a reasonable doubt” instead of "clear and convincing”, if for no other reason than the meaning of the former is generally understood and applied daily by trial court judges. However, whichever words are used, the history of the presumption of legitimacy shows that the quantum of proof required to overcome it is extraordinarily high.

 Egbert, supra, 249-250.

 In the Matter of the Estate of Findlay, Deceased, 253 NY 1, 8; 170 NE 471, 473 (1930).

 See, for example Ventresco v Bushey, 159 Me 241; 191 A2d 104 (1963), where the court abolished Lord Mansfield’s Rule but required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. See also Maxwell v Maxwell, 15 Mich App 607; 167 NW2d 114 (1969), where the Court suggested that if the rule were to be abolished, a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be appropriate.

 Case, supra, 284.

 Egbert, supra, 249.

Id, 250.