Court Opinion

ID: 9797311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:18:10.438377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:23.619367
License: Public Domain

*960DAVIS, Judge
(concurring in the result):
( 23 I disagree with the majority's analysis in this case.
124 First, I disagree with the majority that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction with respect to the marijuana merely because no witness testified to seeing defendant hide the marijuana during the pursuit or stop. Defendant bears a heavy burden to overcome the jury verdict on grounds of insufficient evidence and we will reverse on this basis only when the evidence is so "'"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime."'" See State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citations omitted); accord State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). Defendant has not met this burden.
125 "It is well settled in this state that 'a conviction can be based on sufficient cireum-stantial evidence'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997)). - Moreover, " '[elireumstantial evidence need not be regarded as inferior evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and is sufficient to sustain a conviction." Id. (quoting State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986)); see also State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332-33 (Utah 1991) (holding that although "case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence," evidence was sufficient to support the conviction). The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, showed that defendant was the owner of the marijuana; he was in the back seat of the car; the marijuana was found under the back seat; the seat cushion was detached; the marijuana could have been hidden under the bench seat although another person was sitting on it; at least one of the car's occupants spotted the police before they were pulled over and hid the gun in the glove compartment; and another person owned the car, limiting defendant's ability to later retrieve any items. This evidence is sufficient for the jury to reasonably infer that defendant possessed the marijuana either at the time defendant's cohort spotted the police or when the police stopped the car and defendant believed an investigation into the shooting had commenced or was imminent, that with this belief there arose an incentive for defendant to hide contraband, and that as a result defendant quickly stashed his marijuana under the back seat to avoid its detection. Consequently, I conclude the evidence was sufficient.
4 26 Nonetheless, I would still reverse defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence (the marijuana) because such conduct is clearly not contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999). In construing a statute, "we look first to [the statute's] plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's intent and purpose in passing the statute." Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 344, ¶ 6, 994 P.2d 206 (first alteration omitted; alteration in original); see also Hebertson v. Bank One, Utah, N.A., 1999 UT App. 342, ¶ 8, 995 P.2d 7 ("'In matters of statutory construction, "[the best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] Act is the plain language of the Act.""'") (citations omitted; alterations in original).
127 Although the majority cites case law for the proposition that it must look first to the plain language of the statute, it ignores such language in holding that "[tlhe statute does not limit the purpose of the investigation to the original one or even to one investigation, nor does it require that the evidence be connected to the police purpose for the original investigation." Supra, at 115. The tampering with evidence statute provides: "A person commits a felony of the second degree if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: (1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation...." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999) (emphasis added). The first part of the statute provides the intent element: that defendant "believie]l that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted." Id. The majority correctly concludes that the plain language in this first part of the statute does not limit the *961type of proceeding or investigation that may satisfy the intent element and, hence, the chase and stop of the car here, part of the shooting investigation, invoked the statute.
1 28 The second part of the statute, however, provides for criminal liability only if the defendant "[allters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation." - Id. § 76-8-510(1) {emphasis added). Hence, the statute uses a definite article "the," instead of the general term "an" as in the first part of the section. For purposes of statutory construction, the "definite article 'the' particularizes the subject which it precedes and is [a] word of limitation as opposed to indefinite or generalizing foree 'a' or 'an'" Black's Law Dictionary 1477 (6th ed.1990). By using "the," the statute requires that the proceeding or investigation in the second part be the same as that in the first part-ie., the defendant must intend to impair the verity or availability of evidence in the same proceeding or investigation as that which he believes is pending or about to be instituted.1 See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1208 (1977) (stating that "the" is "used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is a unique or a particular member of its class"); see also State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 796 (Utah 1977) (affirming tampering with evidence conviction when "there was an official investigation under way; ... the defendant ... took possession of evidence relating to it; and ... nothing further was seen or heard of it until fifteen months later") (emphasis added). Although the majority purports to embrace the proposition that the investigation or proceeding in both parts of the statute must be the same, see supra, T 15 n. 2, it simply fails to apply that interpretation. If the investigation or proceeding in both parts of the statute must be the same, then defendant is criminally liable under the statute only if either (1) the marijuana had some relation to the shooting investigation-of which the chase and stop was part-that implicated section 76-8-510 and defendant hid it to impede that investigation;2 or (2) the State shows there was a marijuana investigation in which the defendant sought to impair the verity or availability of the marijuana. Neither scenario applies here.3
¶ 29 The majority does not recognize that "'statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and ... interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted; omission in original). Under the majority's interpretation, the requirements in the first part of section 76-8-510-that defendant "believ[e] that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted"-apply in limitless situations and thus become meaningless. Without a tie to the proceeding or investigation a defendant seeks to hinder as described in subsection (1), knowledge of vir*962tually any proceeding or investigation which may or may not occur will suffice to invoke the statute.
130 Particularly troubling about the majority's interpretation is that it provides no meaningful distinction between actions taken to complete a separate crime that, depending on whether the crime is later discovered, may or may not lead to an official proceeding or investigation, and those separate actions taken by a defendant to interfere with an investigation that is continuing or imminent. That is, because a defendant's conduct in committing a crime nearly always involves some element of avoiding detection, the majority's holding that such conduct can constitute tampering with evidence effectively and impermissibly transforms nearly every crime into a second degree felony. CJ Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999) ("[When the same act of a defendant under a single eriminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision.. .."). Defendant is left with little option but to take the stand to testify that although he committed a crime unrelated to an ongoing investigation or imminent investigation which may or may not occur, his actions were not designed to hinder the same. As we have previously stated:
It is no answer to suggest that the [defendant] could take the stand and establish her innocence.... In our justice system, the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the defendant need not prove innocence. And the defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is privileged to remain silent, An inference that springs from thin air lessens the prosecution's burden while chilling the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege.
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App. 289, ¶ 10 n. 5, 988 P.2d 949. The majority position thus has the effect of defeating the presumption of innocence, shifting the burden of proof to defendant, and requiring defendant to forfeit his right to silence, essentially creating strict liability offenses. See eg., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1970, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (stating that the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt "prohibits the State from using eviden-tiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) ("The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure [and] provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatie and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our eriminal law.'") (citation omitted); State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983) ("[Wle have ... cautioned that the act itself does not raise the presumption that it was done with the specific intent required to prove the offense."); State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 777-78 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (stating that if statute shifted to defendant the burden to disprove an element of the crime, it "would violate the Due Process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions").
31 The majority asserts that the statute is limited because it requires an "intent to hinder an investigation," supra, at 115, stating that had defendant merely had the marijuana in his pocket he could not be convicted of tampering. Yet under its analysis, if defendant selected that particular pocket, not just for a convenient carrying place, but because it also hid the marijuana from plain view, the defendant could be convicted of tampering with evidence by concealment. Defendant would have to explain (1) that he did or did not believe an investigation into the as yet undetected crime would be commenced, and (2) that he did or did not place the evidence with a purpose to impair its availability to that investigation. The possibilities of ratcheting virtually any minor, undetected offense into a second degree felony are virtually limitless, especially where the evidence is contraband.
132 For example, if an eighteen-year-old in possession of tobacco places the same under the seat of his car upon being stopped for an investigation of a traffic violation, he would be guilty of second degree felony tam*963pering with evidence of the crime of illegal possession of tobacco in addition to the class C misdemeanor for possession of tobacco by an eighteen-year-old. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-105(1) (1999). In the instant case, the marijuana may or may not have been discovered, and an investigation may or may not have commenced focusing on defendant.4
$33 In sum, I believe the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for tampering with evidence regarding the marijuana, as the majority reads the statute. However, I disagree with the majority's interpretation. The plain language of section 76-8-510 requires that the defendant intend to hinder the same investigation that he believes is ongoing or imminent, not one that may or may not occur, and especially where the evidence is the crime. Here defendant lacked such intent with regard to the investigation of the shooting and the statute simply does not allow for criminal liability for defendant hiding the marijuana. Accordingly, I would reverse on that basis.

. Particularly telling of the majority's variance from the statute's plain language is its characterization of the intent element. The majority trades the statute's definitive wording "the" for the general in stating "the intent element requires that the defendant intend to hinder an investigation or proceeding." Supra, 111 (emphasis added). I see no need for the Legislature to "clarify" the statute's scope. The statute is clear and when its plain language is properly applied the absurd results demonstrated by the instant case do not occur.

. Stated alternatively, because the marijuana had no probative value relevant to the shooting investigation, defendant's concealment-or even destruction-of it could not "impair its verity or availability in tke proceeding or investigation." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510(1) (1999) (emphasis added).

. - By concluding that section 76-8-510 applies to tampered-with evidence unrelated to the actual investigation, the majority detours from existing case law. See, eg., State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (alteration of breathalyzer test results in investigation of driving while under the influence); Helm, 563 P.2d at 795-96 (taking officer's notes and recording of officer's conversation with suspect to prevent prosecution of the charge suspected); State v. Harley, 1999 UT App. 197, ¶¶ 7, 12, 982 P.2d 1145 (gun used in robbery was thrown from window of vehicle when signaled to stop by officer investigating the robbery), cert. denied, 1999 Utah LEXIS 256, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah Dec. 20, 1999); State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651-52 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (defendant moved drug paraphernalia to impede investigation of death caused by drugs).

. I am not persuaded by the argument of counsel for the State that such instances will not lead to a prison sentence because the tampering with evidence statute will be only selectively prosecuted. Even if selective prosecution should be encouraged, see Utah Const. art. I, § 24 ("All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."), the instant case demonstrates why such decisions should not be left to the prosecutor's unbridled discretion.