Court Opinion

ID: 9883973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:29:28.542223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:34.034069
License: Public Domain

*100PARKER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the accident did arise out of the operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, and would affirm.
This court has previously stated that “[a]ctive accessory does not mean that [the] vehicle actively caused the damage, but that the accident happened because the vehicle’s use was actively connected with the injury.” Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. of Connecticut v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 352 N.W.2d 798, 799 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). When determining whether the motor vehicle was an “active accessory” in bringing about an injury, the court must look at the circumstances from beginning to end. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hoekman, 359 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). Such an analysis in this case leads to the conclusion that Joseph Ture’s automobile was actively connected with Diane Edwards’ rape and murder.
Ture was using his automobile to find a victim from the time he left his home on the night of the murder. He first used the car as an active accessory in terrorizing Tomi Willems by following her as she drove away from a local convenience store, bumping her car from behind to “get her attention,” and attempting to force his way into her car. When Ture later spotted Diane Edwards standing on the sidewalk, he used his car to block her path. He then forced her into the car, where he confined her with the use of a rope and towel that were inside. Ture transported Edwards some 60 miles in his ear. When asked why he drove to the distant, secluded area, Ture responded, “[s]o I could have sex with Diane.” This illustrates that Ture would not have raped and killed his victim had he not first been able to transport her to a secluded area.
Once he reached his destination, Ture raped Diane Edwards and killed her with a knife that had been stored inside the car. Both the rape and the murder occurred inside the car. After leaving her body in the woods, Ture used his car to leave the scene of the murder. Because he could have been incriminated by the blood in the car, Ture subsequently had the car destroyed at a junkyard.
Given these facts, it seems thoroughly established that the station wagon was an active, indeed necessary, accessory to Diane Edwards’ abduction, rape and murder. Ture’s own statements indicate that he would not have committed the crimes without the vehicle. Looking at the circumstances from beginning to end, as required under Hoekman, the murder of Diane Edwards was merely the tragic culmination of a continuous series of crimes that Joseph Ture perpetrated that night, and Ture’s car played an active role in those crimes.
The majority cites Classified Insurance Co. v. Vodinelich, 368 N.W.2d 921 (Minn.1985), for the proposition that coverage should exist only for risks “associated with motoring.” This reliance is misplaced. In Vodinelich, auto liability insurance coverage was at issue, whereas the coverage at issue here is no-fault and uninsured motorist benefits. Automobile liability insurance, essentially designed to indemnify the tortfeasor for liability caused by his own fault, may well be intended to cover only those risks associated with motoring; however, the same is not true of no-fault or uninsured coverage, which are based on a statute mandating broad first-party coverage. See Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1984).
If no-fault coverage were limited to risks associated with motoring, the supreme court would not have granted coverage in Nadeau v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., 350 N.W.2d 368 (Minn.1984). In that case a pedestrian was injured when she slipped while avoiding an oncoming car that was “fishtailing” down an icy road. The pedestrian was not “motoring” at the time of the accident; in fact, she did not even have any contact with the vehicle at issue. The court nevertheless found coverage, holding that the use of the vehicle was a “necessary and contributing cause” of the victim’s injury. Id. at 371. Nadeau indicates that no-fault recovery may be found when the damage is caused by risks associated *101with “anyone’s motoring,” not necessarily the claimant’s motoring, as the majority here implies.
We must keep in mind the purpose of no-fault automobile insurance, which is to provide broad coverage. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.42(1) (1984) (the No-Fault Act was adopted to “relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of automobile accidents”). Thus, the courts have not hesitated to strike down policy exclusions which attempt to limit coverage in derogation of the purposes of the No-Fault Act. See Safeco Insurance Cos. v. Diaz, 385 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (exclusions from coverage may be inconsistent with the purposes of the No-Fault Act); Maher v. All Nation Insurance Co., 340 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn.Ct.App.1983) (“Policy exclusions which attempt to prevent the coverage from following the person are inconsistent with the purposes of the Minnesota No Fault Act”). Similar policy considerations apply to uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance. See Maher, 340 N.W.2d at 680.
Finally, Wieneke is distinguishable from this case. In Wieneke there was an act of intervening independent significance. The tortfeasor left his car, walked over to the victim, committed the assault, and then returned to his car. The assault was completely independent of the tortfeasor’s use of the auto, and therefore the case was controlled by Holm v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co., 261 N.W.2d 598 (Minn.1977) (automobile liability insurance coverage not found where tortfeasor left his car and subsequently injured claimant in unrelated act). In contrast, the injuries here could not have occurred had Ture not had access to and use of his automobile. I would find coverage in this case.