Court Opinion

ID: 9919604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 19:00:59.127476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:22.725751
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50004      Document: 00517036288      Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/18/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________
                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit
                                   No. 23-50004
                                  ____________                           FILED
                                                                   January 18, 2024
   Shambaugh & Son, L.P.,                                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                         Clerk
                                                         Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   Steadfast Insurance Company,

                                             Defendant—Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 1:22-CV-135
                  ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
          This is an insurance coverage dispute in which the core issue is
   whether the insurer, Steadfast Insurance Company (Steadfast), is subject to
   specific personal jurisdiction in Texas. The procurement and enforcement
   of the relevant Policies occurred almost entirely in the Northeast, nowhere
   near Texas. The district court, on recommendation from the magistrate
   judge, dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm because
   Steadfast’s attenuated connections to Texas do not give rise to specific
   personal jurisdiction there.
Case: 23-50004         Document: 00517036288                Page: 2       Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                           No. 23-50004

                                                 I.
           Between 2018 and 2020, Steadfast, an Illinois corporation, issued two
   substantially identical liability insurance policies to EMCOR Group, Inc.
   (EMCOR), a Connecticut-based corporation and a nonparty to this suit. The
   2018–2019 Policy was negotiated in New York, and the 2019–2020 Policy
   was negotiated in Massachusetts; both Policies were issued as Connecticut
   surplus lines policies. Further, all the individuals directly responsible for
   creating the Policies resided in the Northeast. In short, while Steadfast is
   licensed to sell insurance in Texas, these Policies were negotiated outside of
   Texas by non-Texans. 1
           Shambaugh & Son, L.P. (Shambaugh) is a wholly owned indirect
   subsidiary of EMCOR and is covered by the terms of EMCOR’s Policies.
   Shambaugh maintains locations across the nation, particularly including
   Indiana, and is organized as a limited partnership under Texas law. Southstar
   Fire Protection Company d/b/a Northstar Fire Protection of Texas, Inc.
   (Northstar) is a division of Shambaugh, but it is not a separate named party
   in this dispute. Northstar is likewise covered by the Policies, and it maintains
   an office in Austin, Texas.

           _____________________
           1
              Based on email exchanges adduced through discovery in a parallel action in
   Connecticut, Steadfast’s parent company, Zurich American Insurance Company,
   employed a liability director from Addison, Texas, who incidentally reviewed and edited
   the 2019–2020 Policy. The emails reflect limited involvement of the Texas-based liability
   director and are the subject of several recently filed motions in this court and in the district
   court. Because the glancing involvement of a Texas-based liability director is too
   attenuated to alter our analysis, we decline Shambaugh’s request to take judicial notice of
   its post-appeal filings in the district court, and we deny Shambaugh’s motion for a limited
   remand, to supplement the record, and for leave to file a supplemental brief. See, e.g.,
   Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 619 F.3d 373, 379 n.11 (5th Cir. 2010) (denying late
   motion to supplement record that was only “tangentially related” to the case).

                                                  2
Case: 23-50004       Document: 00517036288            Page: 3     Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                       No. 23-50004

          On April 11, 2020, Shambaugh was served with a nonparty subpoena
   that specifically targeted one of its offices in Indiana.            The subpoena
   requested discovery from Shambaugh regarding its use of aqueous film-
   forming foams (AFFF), and it was issued in connection with multidistrict
   litigation pending in South Carolina district court. The plaintiffs in the South
   Carolina litigation allege that AFFF are carcinogenic. Approximately 216 of
   those cases originated in Texas or otherwise involve Texas sites and
   plaintiffs. Shambaugh has spent over $1.7 million to date responding to the
   subpoena.
          After Shambaugh was served with the subpoena, Shambaugh obtained
   local counsel in South Carolina, and an EMCOR executive in Connecticut
   notified Steadfast of Shambaugh’s intent to seek reimbursement under the
   Policies for its discovery expenses. Following that notice, Shambaugh’s and
   Steadfast’s lawyers and employees in Rhode Island, New Jersey, California,
   and Washington, D.C. corresponded on the matter. No one involved in these
   exchanges was based in Texas. Ultimately, Steadfast denied coverage.
          Shambaugh sued to recover its discovery expenses in a Texas federal
   court, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of good faith, various
   state law violations, and declaratory relief. Steadfast moved to dismiss the
   suit for lack of specific personal jurisdiction and for improper venue, or,
   alternatively, sought to transfer the suit to a proper venue. The district court
   referred the motion to the magistrate judge, who recommended dismissal for
   lack of specific personal jurisdiction and, alternatively, dismissal for
   improper venue. One day after the magistrate judge issued his report,
   Steadfast filed a lawsuit in Connecticut district court seeking declaratory
   relief that it is not liable to Shambaugh under the Policies. 2

          _____________________
          2
            Shambaugh has repeatedly moved this court to take judicial notice of the
   Connecticut action. We grant Shambaugh’s request and take notice that a parallel case,

                                             3
Case: 23-50004         Document: 00517036288              Page: 4       Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                          No. 23-50004

           In its objections to the magistrate judge’s report, Shambaugh raised
   several arguments for the first time. Regardless, the district court adopted
   the magistrate judge’s report and concluded that it could not exercise specific
   personal jurisdiction over Steadfast.               The district court’s judgment
   dismissing the case did not address venue. Shambaugh now appeals.
                                               II.
           “Absent any dispute as to the relevant facts, whether personal
   jurisdiction can be exercised over a defendant is a question of law and subject
   to de novo review.” In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig.,
   742 F.3d 576, 584 (5th Cir. 2014). “When a court rules on a motion to
   dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary
   hearing, it must accept as true the uncontroverted allegations in the
   complaint and resolve in favor of the plaintiff any factual conflicts posed by
   the affidavits.” Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999). In
   such a situation, “[t]he plaintiff has the burden to make a prima facie showing
   that personal jurisdiction is proper.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768
   F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added); see also E. Concrete Materials,
   Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 948 F.3d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 2020) (applying the
   same standard of review).
                                              III.
           Shambaugh advances six arguments for specific personal jurisdiction
   on appeal.       Three are forfeited, and the remaining three lack merit.
   Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss this action for
           _____________________
   Steadfast Insurance Company v. Shambaugh & Son, L.P. et al., case number 3:22-cv-01306-
   SRU, has been filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.
   However, that action was filed after the magistrate judge issued his report in this case, and
   the district court did not mention the Connecticut action in its decision, so the parallel
   Connecticut action has no bearing on the issues before this court.

                                                4
Case: 23-50004         Document: 00517036288              Page: 5       Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                          No. 23-50004

   lack of specific personal jurisdiction. Based on this determination, we do not
   reach Shambaugh’s other arguments regarding venue and transfer.
                                               A.
           We begin with forfeiture. 3              Steadfast contends that several of
   Shambaugh’s arguments are forfeited because Shambaugh failed to raise
   them before the magistrate judge.                 True enough, this court considers
   arguments forfeited if they are not raised before a magistrate judge, even if
   they are subsequently raised before the reviewing district court in objections
   to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See, e.g., Field v.
   Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 35 F.4th 1013, 1019 n.3 (5th Cir. 2022); Cupit v.
   Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d
   626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992). Against this principle, we unpack Steadfast’s
   forfeiture arguments.
                                                1.
           Steadfast asserts that Shambaugh has forfeited four of its arguments,
   namely those based on: (1) Steadfast’s alleged Texas state law violations,
   (2) the absence of a jurisdiction or venue provision in the Policies, (3) article
   21.42 of the Texas Insurance Code, and (4) the nationwide coverage
   provisions of the Policies. Steadfast is correct that the first three arguments
   were not initially presented to the magistrate judge and are thus forfeited, but

           _____________________
           3
             The parties use the terminology of waiver rather than forfeiture in their briefing.
   “The terms waiver and forfeiture—though often used interchangeably by jurists and
   litigants—are not synonymous.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17,
   20 n.1 (2017). “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,
   waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” United States
   v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); see
   Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (discussing the distinction
   between waiver and forfeiture). The issues raised by Steadfast implicate questions of
   forfeiture, not waiver.

                                                5
Case: 23-50004      Document: 00517036288          Page: 6   Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                    No. 23-50004

   Shambaugh is correct that the nationwide coverage argument was raised and
   has therefore not been forfeited. We address each argument in turn.
          First, Shambaugh contends that by refusing to reimburse its discovery
   costs, Steadfast committed various wrongs—such as breach of the duty of
   good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Texas Insurance Code, and
   violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act—that are cognizable
   under Texas state law independent of Shambaugh’s breach of contract claim.
   And because Steadfast perpetrated these civil violations against Shambaugh
   in Texas, Shambaugh reasons that they give rise to specific personal
   jurisdiction over the perpetrator, Steadfast.
          But this argument appears nowhere in Shambaugh’s briefing before
   the magistrate judge; therefore, it is not preserved. Undeterred, Shambaugh
   points to this court’s decision in Lampton v. Diaz to contend that forfeiture
   should not apply. 639 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2011). Lampton stated that forfeiture
   “generally will not apply ‘when [an issue] fairly appears in the record as
   having been raised or decided.’” Id. at 227 n.14 (alteration in original)
   (quoting 19 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal
   Practice § 205.05[1] (3d ed. 2011)). Shambaugh asserts that it fairly
   raised its argument about violations of state law before the magistrate judge
   because those state law claims appear in its complaint. Shambaugh also
   contends that Steadfast’s briefing before the magistrate judge contains a
   reply to the argument about violations of state law. Neither the record nor
   the law supports Shambaugh’s assertions.
          As for the record, Steadfast’s reply brief before the magistrate judge
   makes a one-line reference to “which state’s law governs Plaintiff’s tort and
   statutory claims.” In context, this choice of law statement is nested within a
   broader discussion about forum shopping. While this line might prove that
   Steadfast read Shambaugh’s complaint, it is far from a substantive argument

                                          6
Case: 23-50004      Document: 00517036288           Page: 7    Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                     No. 23-50004

   that “addressed the issue of Shambaugh’s tort claims” as Shambaugh
   asserts.
          On the law, Lampton specifically notes that forfeiture “exists to
   prevent an appellate court from ‘[analyzing] the facts of a particular [issue]
   without the benefit of a full record or lower court determination.’” Id.
   (citation omitted); cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 538 (1992)
   (“Prudence also dictates awaiting a case in which the issue was fully litigated
   below, so that we will have the benefit of developed arguments on both sides
   and lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.” (citing Lytle v.
   Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552 n.3 (1990))). In Lampton, this hurdle
   was cleared because the district court addressed the debatably forfeited
   arguments in its decision. 639 F.3d at 277 n.14. But here, the district court
   did not do so. Instead, Shambaugh contends that its complaint fairly
   presented, and thus preserved, the specific personal jurisdiction argument
   based on state law that it now seeks to make. Shambaugh is incorrect.
   Indeed, if complaint allegations alone prevented subsequent forfeiture, then
   it is difficult to imagine when any claim or argument could ever be forfeited.
   Because Shambaugh’s specific personal jurisdiction argument based on state
   law was not sufficiently raised before the magistrate judge, it is forfeited, and
   we do not consider it further.
          Shambaugh next asserts that Steadfast should be subject to specific
   personal jurisdiction in Texas because Steadfast failed to include a
   jurisdiction or venue provision in the Policies that specified, or otherwise
   limited, where it could be sued. Notwithstanding the circular nature of this
   argument, the trouble is—once again—this argument does not appear in
   Shambaugh’s briefing before the magistrate judge.
          Arguing against forfeiture, Shambaugh asserts that the Policies were
   attached as an exhibit to its complaint. But if including a claim in a complaint

                                          7
Case: 23-50004      Document: 00517036288           Page: 8    Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                     No. 23-50004

   fails to preserve that claim, as previously discussed, then a fortiori attaching
   an exhibit to a pleading does not insulate arguments derived from that exhibit
   against forfeiture.
          Next, article 21.42 of the Texas Insurance Code requires insurance
   contracts payable to citizens or inhabitants of Texas to be governed by Texas
   law. Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.42. And as Shambaugh now contends,
   Steadfast should be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas because
   article 21.42 subjects the Policies to Texas law. However, Shambaugh made
   no reference to article 21.42 in its briefing before the magistrate judge, nor
   even in its complaint.
          Nevertheless, Shambaugh contends that its article 21.42 argument
   was incorporated within its broader argument about Steadfast’s minimum
   contacts with Texas. Shambaugh further asserts that the magistrate judge
   ruled on its article 21.42 argument by ruling on Shambaugh’s minimum
   contacts. Despite Shambaugh’s assertion to the contrary, its article 21.42
   argument is narrower and conceptually distinct from its other minimum
   contacts arguments. Accordingly, the article 21.42 argument is forfeited,
   even if its remaining minimum contacts arguments are not.
          Finally, Shambaugh contends that the nationwide scope of the Policies
   subjects Steadfast to specific personal jurisdiction in any and all of the fifty
   states. Steadfast suggests this argument was untimely presented, without
   offering any further explanation for its alleged forfeiture. But Shambaugh
   raised this point in its briefing before the magistrate judge, and the magistrate
   judge substantively decided it. Therefore, unlike the foregoing three issues,
   Shambaugh’s nationwide coverage argument is preserved.
                                          2.
          More generally, Shambaugh advances two broad rationales against
   forfeiture of its unpreserved arguments. First, Shambaugh contends that an

                                          8
Case: 23-50004      Document: 00517036288          Page: 9    Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                    No. 23-50004

   opposing party cannot be prejudiced by the consideration of otherwise
   forfeited arguments when that party has a chance to address those arguments
   in briefing on appeal. Second, Shambaugh asserts that purely legal arguments
   cannot be forfeited. Neither helps Shambaugh.
          Shambaugh’s first contention is based on a misreading of Lampton.
   639 F.3d at 227 n.14. True, this court noted in Lampton that “there [was] no
   prejudice, because [the appellee] . . . had an opportunity to respond to [an]
   argument on appeal.” Id. But that statement was based on the fact that the
   district court in Lampton had already resolved the potentially forfeited
   argument. Id. In that context, it would have been bizarre to deem a portion
   of the district court’s decision off-limits for purposes of appeal.          By
   comparison, the record here is not developed on the forfeited issues that
   Shambaugh now seeks to advance. While Shambaugh raised some of its
   forfeited arguments in its objections to the magistrate judge’s report, the
   district court did not address those new arguments. And though Steadfast
   has had the opportunity to respond to Shambaugh’s new arguments on
   appeal, that is no sound basis for reviving forfeited issues. Indeed, allowing
   forfeited arguments to be cured by appellate briefing would contradict our
   well-established precedent on issue preservation, and it would undermine the
   core purpose of our forfeiture rules by opening the door for appellate review
   of un- or underdeveloped records. See, e.g., Field, 35 F.4th at 1019 n.3; Cupit,
   28 F.3d at 535; Armstrong, 951 F.2d at 630. Shambaugh’s reasoning on this
   point is, therefore, unpersuasive.
          Shambaugh’s second point—that purely legal arguments cannot be
   waived—overreads the court’s language in Rollins v. Home Depot USA. 8
   F.4th 393, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2021). While in Rollins, we observed that an issue
   might be addressed for the first time on appeal if “it is a purely legal matter
   and failure to consider the issue will result in a miscarriage of justice,” the
   court went on to find “no principled basis for addressing [the] forfeited

                                          9
Case: 23-50004      Document: 00517036288              Page: 10    Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                        No. 23-50004

   argument” at issue there.        Id. at 398 (citation omitted).       Same here:
   Shambaugh similarly fails to articulate why we should exercise our discretion
   to consider its otherwise forfeited legal arguments. Accordingly, Shambaugh
   has not met the standard articulated in Rollins, and we decline to reach its
   forfeited arguments. Id. at 398–99.
                                            B.
          We now consider the merits of Shambaugh’s preserved arguments for
   why Steadfast should be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas.
   We conclude they are all unavailing.
                                            1.
          “A ‘federal court sitting in diversity may assert jurisdiction if (1) the
   state’s long-arm statute’ allows it; and (2) exercising jurisdiction would not
   violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Halliburton
   Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., 921 F.3d 522, 539 (5th Cir.
   2019) (quoting Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc., 889 F.2d 612, 616 (5th Cir.
   1989)). “Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of federal
   due process, the two-step inquiry reduces to only the federal due process
   analysis.” Id.
          There are two types of personal jurisdiction under federal law: general
   and specific.    Id.   General personal jurisdiction applies “only when a
   defendant is ‘essentially at home,’” and any and all claims may be brought
   against a defendant wherever it is subject to such jurisdiction. Ford Motor Co.
   v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (quoting Goodyear
   Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). By
   comparison, specific personal jurisdiction is narrower and attaches only when
   there is a sufficient connection between a defendant’s forum-related contacts
   and a plaintiff’s causes of action.           Id. at 1024–25.   General personal
   jurisdiction is not at issue here.

                                            10
Case: 23-50004     Document: 00517036288            Page: 11    Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                     No. 23-50004

          This circuit applies a three-step test for determining specific personal
   jurisdiction:
          (1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the
          forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities
          toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the
          privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the
          plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or results from the
          defendant’s forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the
          exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.

   E. Concrete Materials, 948 F.3d at 296 (quoting Monkton, 768 F.3d at 433).
   “If a plaintiff establishes the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the
   defendant to show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unfair
   or unreasonable.” Id.
          The guiding principle of specific personal jurisdiction is whether “the
   defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
   should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide
   Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). “The Supreme
   Court has long held that ‘an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party
   alone [cannot] automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the
   other party’s home forum.’” Halliburton, 921 F.3d at 544 (emphasis and
   alteration original) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478
   (1985)). Further, the Court “long ago rejected the notion that personal
   jurisdiction might turn on mechanical tests, or on conceptualistic . . . theories
   of the place of contracting or of performance.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478–
   79 (ellipsis original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
   Instead, when specific personal jurisdiction is grounded on contractual
   relations, lower courts must evaluate “prior negotiations and contemplated
   future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’

                                          11
Case: 23-50004     Document: 00517036288            Page: 12   Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                     No. 23-50004

   actual course of dealing” to determine “whether the defendant purposefully
   established minimum contacts within the forum.” Id. at 479.
          The tangential involvement of multidistrict litigation does not amend
   these jurisdictional rules. “Every federal court to have considered the issue
   has affirmed that ‘the transferee court can exercise personal jurisdiction to
   the same extent that the transferor court could.’” In re Delta Dental Antitrust
   Litig., 509 F. Supp. 3d 1377, 1379 (U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2020) (quoting
   In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 297 n.11 (3d Cir.
   2004)). While no Fifth Circuit case was cited in Delta Dental, we have
   previously expressed our agreement with that articulation of the law. See In
   re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prod. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 529–50 (5th
   Cir. 2014) (implicitly following the same rationale).
                                          2.
          Shambaugh advances three arguments for why Steadfast’s forum-
   related contacts warrant specific personal jurisdiction in Texas: (a) that the
   Policies themselves give rise to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas;
   (b) that the national scope of the Policies gives rise to specific personal
   jurisdiction in any state; and (c) that Steadfast is subject to specific personal
   jurisdiction in Texas because of its participation in other Texas lawsuits.
   Walking through each argument, none proves sufficient.
                                          a.
          The facts surrounding the “procurement and enforcement” of the
   Policies do not establish specific personal jurisdiction in Texas. E. Concrete
   Materials, 948 F.3d at 298. The Policies were issued by Steadfast, an Illinois
   corporation, to EMCOR, a Connecticut corporation. The 2018–19 Policy
   was negotiated in New York, and the 2019–20 Policy was negotiated in
   Massachusetts. The disputed discovery expenses resulted from a subpoena
   served in connection with multidistrict litigation pending in South Carolina.

                                          12
Case: 23-50004     Document: 00517036288            Page: 13    Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                     No. 23-50004

   That subpoena was issued to Shambaugh’s office in Indiana, and Shambaugh
   retained counsel in South Carolina to respond to it. From Connecticut,
   Shambaugh’s parent EMCOR then notified Steadfast about a potential claim
   under the Policies. Following that notice, Shambaugh’s and Steadfast’s
   lawyers and employees—all outside of Texas—corresponded on the matter.
          Granted, a few facts suggest that specific personal jurisdiction might
   be appropriate in Texas. The Policies insure Shambaugh, a Texas resident,
   Steadfast is licensed to sell insurance in Texas, and the Policies extend to
   cover Northstar, an Austin, Texas “division” of Shambaugh. But these facts
   are less relevant than they might appear at first blush. After all, this court has
   held that an insurer’s securing an insurance contract with a Texas resident
   “does not, on its own, establish minimum contacts between [the insurer] and
   Texas.” Halliburton, 921 F.3d at 544. And, “Texas’s decision to regulate
   the lines insurance market has nothing to do with [an insurer’s] minimum
   contacts with Texas.” Id.
          Further, the Austin address of Northstar establishes an attenuated
   connection to Texas at best. That address appears nowhere in the four
   corners of the Policies. Northstar’s location is only covered by the 2019–20
   Policy because it was mentioned in EMCOR’s application for that Policy,
   which was subsequently incorporated by reference. And while business
   records from Northstar’s Austin office were turned over as part of
   Shambaugh’s response to the subpoena, the subpoena itself does not mention
   Northstar, EMCOR’s notice of potential claim to Steadfast does not mention
   Northstar, Shambaugh’s complaint does not mention Northstar, and
   Northstar is not an independent party in this action. To be sure, the Austin
   address makes specific personal jurisdiction somewhat more plausible here
   than in Halliburton, where the insurance contract at issue lacked such a
   feature. Id. Nevertheless, the many other facts pointing away from Texas
   preclude the Policies from being “distinctively Texan” as was the insurance

                                           13
Case: 23-50004     Document: 00517036288            Page: 14   Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                     No. 23-50004

   contract in Eastern Concrete Materials, where the court found specific
   personal jurisdiction proper. 948 F.3d at 298.
          For these reasons, the circumstances surrounding the procurement
   and enforcement of the Policies do not establish sufficient minimum contacts
   to warrant exercising specific personal jurisdiction in this action.
                                          b.
          Shambaugh’s nationwide coverage argument is likewise unpersuasive.
   According to Shambaugh, “promising to provide nationwide coverage makes
   it reasonably foreseeable that the insurer could be haled into any state’s
   courts where a covered accident occurred.” But, as Shambaugh concedes,
   this court has never espoused such a theory. To the contrary, over twenty
   years ago, we held (albeit in an unpublished opinion) that specific personal
   jurisdiction could not be secured against an insurer based on “worldwide
   coverage language in the policy.” Perez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 96-
   20241, 1996 WL 511748, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 1996) (unpublished).
          This case is no different. Accepting Shambaugh’s argument would
   allow for specific personal jurisdiction against nationwide insurers virtually
   anywhere. Such “would offend the traditional notions of fair play and
   substantial justice” by disregarding decades of well-developed law grounded
   in the Due Process Clause. Id.; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. It would
   also overstep the careful boundaries of specific personal jurisdiction recently
   articulated by the Supreme Court in Ford. See 141 S. Ct. at 1024–32
   (eschewing a causation requirement for specific personal jurisdiction, while
   reiterating the well-established standard for purposeful availment).
   Shambaugh offers no viable reason to break such tenuous new ground in this
   case; Steadfast is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas based
   on the Policies’ nationwide scope alone.

                                          14
Case: 23-50004     Document: 00517036288            Page: 15   Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                     No. 23-50004

                                          c.
          Steadfast’s involvement in other Texas lawsuits likewise provides no
   basis for specific personal jurisdiction. The mere fact that a defendant has
   participated in state court lawsuits in the putative forum, without more,
   cannot meet this court’s standard for specific personal jurisdiction.
   Halliburton, 921 F.3d at 540–43. But rather than proving up any connection
   between Steadfast’s other suits and this one, Shambaugh concedes that they
   are not related. Assuming arguendo then that Steadfast’s involvement in
   other Texas lawsuits passes the minimum contacts threshold, today’s case
   could not “arise out of or relate to” those admittedly unrelated lawsuits.
   Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of
   Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)). Accordingly, the record before us does not
   support a finding that Steadfast is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in
   Texas based on its unrelated litigation contacts with that forum.
          The possibility of specific personal jurisdiction over Steadfast because
   of the underlying AFFF litigation similarly proves insufficient. True enough,
   the AFFF litigation is necessarily related to this action because it triggered
   the instant dispute over Shambaugh’s discovery expenses. According to
   Shambaugh, there were approximately 755 lawsuits consolidated in the
   AFFF litigation as of August 2020, and 3,988 lawsuits as of February 2023.
   Among these cases, Shambaugh represents that over 200 complaints identify
   specific sites in Texas, and 39 AFFF actions were initially filed in the district
   court that generated this appeal. Additionally, Shambaugh asserts that its
   response to the nonparty subpoena included business records from its
   activities in Texas, records that are maintained in Northstar’s Austin office.
   However, by the admission of Shambaugh’s own senior vice president, “the
   majority of AFFF litigation . . . pertain[s] to the Upper Midwest with respect
   to Shambaugh.” Moreover, Shambaugh does not contend, and the record
   does not indicate, that Shambaugh or Northstar is party to any of the AFFF

                                          15
Case: 23-50004      Document: 00517036288             Page: 16      Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                       No. 23-50004

   suits. 4 In short, none of the AFFF actions purport to hold Shambaugh
   responsible for any of its conduct, much less any of its conduct in Texas. The
   only AFFF connection between Shambaugh and Texas is the fact that
   Shambaugh stored some responsive documents in Austin.
          And regardless of Shambaugh’s involvement with these AFFF
   actions, Steadfast has no discernible connection to the AFFF litigation aside
   from its insurance contract with Shambaugh. A plaintiff cannot manufacture
   specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant by relying on the plaintiff’s
   own conduct. The Supreme Court has been clear that the proper inquiry for
   specific personal jurisdiction must consider the defendant’s contacts to
   determine whether that defendant could “reasonably anticipate” being haled
   into court in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1027 (quoting
   Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984)). Steadfast could not
   have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Texas simply because
   Shambaugh’s records were kept in an office (in Austin) maintained by a
   division (Northstar) of a subsidiary (Shambaugh) belonging to the original
   Connecticut-based contracting party (EMCOR).
          Steadfast’s contacts with Texas, incident to unrelated litigation or the
   AFFF cases arising in Texas, are too attenuated to warrant exercising specific
   personal jurisdiction. This conclusion mirrors Halliburton, where the court
   held that an out-of-state insurer’s involvement in Texas litigation did not give
   rise to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas.             921 F.3d at 540–43.
   Accordingly, Steadfast is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas

          _____________________
          4
            Indeed, part of the reason Steadfast denied insurance coverage to Shambaugh is
   that Shambaugh was not a defendant in any AFFF action when it incurred the costs of
   responding to the nonparty subpoena.

                                             16
Case: 23-50004     Document: 00517036288              Page: 17    Date Filed: 01/18/2024

                                       No. 23-50004

   based on its participation in unrelated Texas lawsuits, or because of the
   AFFF litigation.
                                   *        *         *
          Shambaugh fails to establish that Steadfast has sufficient minimum
   contacts with Texas that give rise to, or relate to, this dispute. See Ford, 141
   S. Ct. at 1026 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U.S. at 262). Because
   Shambaugh cannot hurdle the first two steps of the specific personal
   jurisdiction inquiry, this court need not consider whether the exercise of
   specific personal jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable. E. Concrete
   Materials, 948 F.3d at 296 (quoting Monkton, 768 F.3d at 433).
                                          IV.
          Plaintiffs may “forum-shop” to the extent they may choose the forum
   in which they sue. However, that privilege is not absolute, as it has always
   been limited by the principles of general and specific personal jurisdiction.
   Halliburton, 921 F.3d at 539. Here, Shambaugh has attempted to stretch our
   law on specific personal jurisdiction too far by bringing this action—about
   two Connecticut surplus lines insurance policies—in Texas, a forum with
   scant relation to the issues it seeks to litigate.            The inadequacy of
   Shambaugh’s chosen forum is made even more apparent by the existence of
   the Connecticut action, where the parties are actively litigating their
   disagreements over the Policies. This action does not belong in Texas.
          Three of Shambaugh’s arguments in favor of specific personal
   jurisdiction are forfeited, and the remaining arguments fail on the merits. We
   do not reach the questions of improper venue and transfer of venue presented
   in this appeal. Because the district court correctly concluded that it lacked
   specific personal jurisdiction over Steadfast, its judgment dismissing this
   action is AFFIRMED. The pending motions Shambaugh has filed in this
   court are DENIED, except as otherwise stated herein.

                                            17