Court Opinion

ID: 9374900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 16:08:17.842516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:53.910241
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Megan Elizabeth Rickell,                        :
                 Appellant                      :
            v.                                  :    No. 1034 C.D. 2020
                                                :    Submitted: May 27, 2022
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                   :
Department of Transportation,                   :
Bureau of Driver Licensing                      :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                    FILED: February 24, 2023
               Megan Elizabeth Rickell (Licensee) appeals from the order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Adams County (trial court), which dismissed Licensee’s appeal
of the 12-month suspension of her operating privilege imposed by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth), Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT). Upon careful review, we reverse.
                                    I. BACKGROUND1
               On March 8, 2019, Licensee was arrested and charged with two
ungraded misdemeanor counts of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or a
Controlled Substance (DUI).2 On September 17, 2019, Licensee was accepted into
an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) Program,3 but prior to completion,

       1
         Unless stated otherwise, we derive this background from the decision of the trial court,
which is supported by the record. See Trial Ct. Op., 12/15/20.
       2
         75 Pa. C.S. § 3802.
       3
         ARD is a pretrial disposition for a stay of prosecution of charges for an agreed-upon time
period in exchange for a defendant’s successful participation in a rehabilitative program.
Commonwealth v. Lutz, 495 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 1985). If a defendant completes the ARD program
successfully, the original charges against him will be dismissed. Id. However, if a defendant does
not complete the ARD program, he or she may be prosecuted on the original charges. Id.
her ARD was revoked for new criminal charges. Thereafter, on May 11, 2020,
Licensee pleaded guilty to a single count of DUI as a first offense under Section
3802(a)(1).
               On May 22, 2020, via mailed notice, PennDOT suspended Licensee’s
operating privilege for 12 months pursuant to Section 3804(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle
Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(i). Licensee appealed to the trial court, which held a
hearing de novo. Initially, the trial court granted Licensee’s appeal and rescinded
her license suspension pursuant to Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa.
Super. 2020), overruled by Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super.
2022).4
               However, upon reconsideration, the trial court declined to apply
Chichkin, finding its application limited to criminal proceedings. Rather, the trial
court determined that Licensee’s acceptance into the ARD program was a “prior

       4
          Chichkin held that Section 3806(a), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a), which equated ARD acceptance
to a “prior offense” for purposes of criminal penalties, was unconstitutional. Chichkin, 232 A.3d
at 968-69. The parties disputed its impact. Licensee contends that Chichkin was controlling and
applicable in civil license suspension proceedings insofar as ARD could not be regarded as a “prior
offense.” See Appellant’s Br. at 16-18. PennDOT contends that Chichkin merely held that a
criminal defendant’s previous acceptance of ARD for a DUI violation could not be used as an
enhanced sentencing factor when the defendant is convicted of, and sentenced for, a subsequent
DUI violation. Appellee’s Br. at 22. PennDOT argued that Chichkin did not impact the sections
of the Vehicle Code that treated ARD as a fact for purposes of implementation of civil provisions
of the Code, including license suspensions. See id. at 24-25. The trial court ultimately decided
that Chichkin did not apply to civil license suspensions under Section 3806. See Trial Ct. Op. at
7. The parties renew these arguments before this Court. See Appellant’s Br. at 16-18; Appellee’s
Br. at 22-25.
        Subsequently, this Court determined that Chichkin was irrelevant to civil proceedings.
Ferguson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 267 A.3d 628 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2021), appeal granted, (Pa., No. 28 MAL 2022, June 22, 2022), transferred to & stay of
suspension granted, (Pa., No. 73 MAP 2022, filed July 7, 2022) (finding that Chichkin’s holding
does not apply to civil license suspension proceedings). Moreover, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court has since overruled Chichkin. Moroz, 284 A.3d at 227. Therefore, we decline to address
the parties’ Chichkin-related arguments.
                                                2
offense” for civil suspension purposes pursuant to the plain language of Section
3806. In further support of its decision, the trial court cited Diveglia v. Department
of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 220 A.3d 1167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019),
in which this Court clarified that the term “prior offense” in civil proceedings
included convictions as well as preliminary dispositions such as ARD.
               Accordingly, the trial court sustained the 12-month suspension of
Licensee’s operating privilege. Licensee timely appealed to this Court.5
                                          II. ISSUE
               Licensee contends that the trial court erred in concluding that her ARD
acceptance constituted a prior offense under Section 3806(a). Appellant’s Br. at 11-
16.6 According to Licensee, her single DUI offense impermissibly served as the
underlying offense both for her ARD acceptance and for her conviction and
sentencing following her ARD revocation. Id. at 13. Licensee avers that she is
exempt from the 12-month suspension under Section 3804(e)(2)(iii) because there
is only one offense at issue in this case, and thus, no “prior offense” exists. Id. at
10-11. She argues that her ARD acceptance, its subsequent revocation, and later
conviction for a singular DUI offense “did not morph into two separate and distinct
incidents or offenses for license suspension purposes.” Id. at 12-13. Licensee
highlights that Section 3806(a)’s language, i.e., “sentencing on the present
violation,” reflects the need for both a “prior offense” and “present violation” or two
specific offenses rather than a single criminal matter. Id. at 14.

       5
          Pending disposition of this appeal, the trial court stayed the suspension. See Trial Ct.
Order, 10/19/20. By order dated September 17, 2021, we held Licensee’s appeal in abeyance
pending the disposition of Ferguson, 267 A.3d at 628. Thus, the parties did not have the benefit
of this Court’s analysis in Ferguson when preparing their briefs in this case. Although Ferguson
is currently on appeal before our Supreme Court, it remains good law at this time.
        6
          Because Licensee’s brief is not paginated, citations to her brief reflect electronic
pagination.
                                                3
               PennDOT responds that the General Assembly has not defined “prior
offense” to require two distinct violations. Appellee’s Br. at 13. Rather, according
to PennDOT, the General Assembly sought to encourage the successful completion
of ARD and, conversely, dissuade ARD participants from conduct that could result
in removal from the program. Id. at 13-14. Therefore, PennDOT suggests, the
General Assembly intended an ARD acceptance to constitute a “prior offense” for
those participants who fail to complete ARD successfully and are subsequently
convicted for that singular violation of Section 3802(a)(1). See Appellee’s Br. at 13-
14.
               Relying on this interpretation of Section 3806(a), PennDOT argues that
Licensee’s ARD acceptance constituted a “prior offense” because it occurred before
her sentencing on May 11, 2020. Id. at 11-12. PennDOT further contends that
Licensee’s ARD acceptance meets the timing parameters set forth in Section
3806(b)(1)(i)-(ii), in that her “prior offense” occurred “after the date of the offense
for which” she was sentenced. See id. at 12-13.
                                     III. DISCUSSION7
                                       A. Introduction
               DUI convictions impose both criminal and civil consequences, such as
license suspensions, which are at issue here. Section 3804(e)(1) of the Vehicle Code
obligates PennDOT to suspend a licensee’s operating privilege following a
conviction for an offense under Section 3802.                 75 Pa. C.S. § 3804(e)(1)(i).

       7
         “Our review is to determine whether the factual findings of the trial court are supported
by [substantial] evidence and whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its
discretion.” Renfroe v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 179 A.3d 644, 648 n.3 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2018).
                                                4
Following a conviction for an ungraded misdemeanor, PennDOT must impose a 12-
month license suspension. 75 Pa. C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(i).
             However, licensees subject to suspensions may be eligible for a limited
exception. Section 3804(e)(2)(iii) of the Vehicle Code provides that “[t]here shall
be no suspension for an ungraded misdemeanor under [S]ection 3802(a) where the
person is subject to the penalties provided in subsection (a) and the person has no
prior offense.” 75 Pa. C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(iii). Thus, this exception only applies if the
following conditions are satisfied: the licensee (1) is convicted of an ungraded
misdemeanor under Section 3802(a)(1); (2) is subject to penalties under Section
3804(a); and (3) does not have a “prior offense” as defined in Section 3806. Becker
v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 186 A.3d 1036, 1037-38 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2018).
             Here, the parties do not dispute that Licensee satisfies the first two
conditions. Therefore, our focus on appeal involves the remaining condition,
namely, whether Licensee’s ARD acceptance for her DUI constituted a “prior
offense” to her subsequent conviction for the same DUI.
                       B. “Prior offense” under Section 3806
             Instantly, we note that “when engaging in statutory construction, a
court’s duty is to give effect to the legislature’s intent and to give effect to all of a
statute’s provisions.” Crown Castle NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 234 A.3d
665, 674 (Pa. 2020) (citing 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a)). The best indication of legislative
intent is “the plain language of the statute.” See id. (citation omitted). When
determining the plain meaning of the statute, we “consider the statutory language in
context and give words and phrases their ‘common and approved usage.’” See id.
Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must “give effect to the words of

                                           5
the statute and not disregard the text to implement its objective.” See id. (citing 1
Pa. C.S. § 1921(b)).
                “Only if the statute is ambiguous, and not explicit, do we resort to other
means of discerning legislative intent.” Id.; see, e.g., 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c)
(enumerating further considerations). For example, we may presume that the
legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or
unreasonable. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285 A.3d 599, 605 (Pa. 2022); 1 Pa. C.S.
§ 1922(1). A statute is ambiguous if there are two or more reasonable interpretations
of the statutory language. Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Givner),
39 A.3d 287, 294 (Pa. 2012).
                Section 3806 of the Vehicle Code defines “prior offense” for DUI
purposes and is divided into two subsections.8 Subsection (a) serves as a general

      8
          Section 3806 provides:
                (a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (b), the term
                “prior offense” as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction for
                which judgment of sentence has been imposed, adjudication of
                delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of Accelerated
                Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of preliminary disposition
                before the sentencing on the present violation for any of the
                following:
                        (1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under
                        influence of alcohol or controlled substance);
                        (2) an offense under former section 3731;
                        (3) an offense substantially similar to an offense under
                        paragraph (1) or (2) in another jurisdiction; or
                        (4) any combination of the offenses set forth in paragraph
                        (1), (2) or (3).
                (b) Timing.--
                        (1) For purposes of sections 1553(d.2) (relating to
                        occupational limited license), 1556 (relating to ignition
                        interlock limited license), 3803 (relating to grading), 3804
                        (relating to penalties) and 3805 (relating to ignition
                        interlock), the prior offense must have occurred:

                                                 6
rule, which is subject to certain temporal exceptions set forth in subsection (b). In
relevant part, subsection (a) defines a “prior offense” as “any conviction” or
“acceptance of [ARD]” that occurs “before the sentencing on the present violation.”
75 Pa. C.S. § 3806(a)(1). Subsection (b) places limitations on this definition, stating
that a “prior offense” must have occurred either “(i) within 10 years prior to the date
of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced” or “(ii) on or after the
date of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.” 75 Pa. C.S. §
3806(b)(1)(i)-(ii).9 However, for purposes of the instant appeal, we focus on the
language of Subsection (a). Accordingly, we examine the definition of the term
“prior offense.”
               There are three aspects of the definition of “prior offense.” As used in
the chapter, it means a conviction or acceptance of ARD or other alternative
disposition that occurs before sentencing on the present violation, i.e., one of
several enumerated offenses under Section 3802 relating to DUI. See 75 Pa. C.S. §
3806(a)(1) (emphasis added).

                                (i) within 10 years prior to the date of the offense for
                                which the defendant is being sentenced; or
                                (ii) on or after the date of the offense for which the
                                defendant is being sentenced.
                       (2) The court shall calculate the number of prior offenses, if
                       any, at the time of sentencing.
                       (3) If the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses in
                       the same day, the offenses shall be considered prior offenses
                       within the meaning of this subsection.
75 Pa. C.S. § 3806.
        9
          Recently, our Supreme Court interpreted the interplay between subsections 3806(a) and
(b) in Commonwealth v. Mock, 219 A.3d 1155 (Pa. 2019), and determined that the 10-year
lookback period for DUI offenses ran from the occurrence date of the present offense to the
conviction date of the earlier DUI offense. See id. at 1164. Mock is not relevant to our discussion,
infra, but did note that a “prior offense” cannot occur after a subsequent offense. See id. at 1162.
                                                  7
              First, as noted supra, ARD is a pretrial disposition for a stay of
prosecution of charges, for an agreed upon time, in exchange for a defendant’s
successful participation in a rehabilitative program. Lutz, 495 A.2d at 931. When
the defendant completes the program successfully, the charges are dismissed; if the
defendant does not complete the program, he or she may be prosecuted for the
original charges. Id. As a result of these conditional requirements, Pennsylvania
courts have held that acceptance of ARD constitutes a “non-final proceeding” in
which the resolution of the criminal prosecution is “merely held in abeyance.”
Commonwealth v. Getz, 598 A.2d 1309, 1310 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citation omitted).10
Therefore, acceptance of ARD is considered “an interlocutory matter.” See id.
Further, by its definition, ARD itself is not a charge or an offense; it is a disposition.
Lutz, 495 A.2d at 931. In the context of Section 3806(a), ARD is a consequence or
punishment for a DUI offense and constitutes the triggering factor for which the DUI
offense may be considered a prior offense under the statute. See, e.g., 75 Pa. C.S. §
3806(a)(1).
              Next, the statute requires that the prior offense occur before sentencing
on the present violation, which can be any of four enumerated offenses relating to
DUI. See 75 Pa. C.S. § 3806(a)(1)-(4). The definition of “before” is “at an earlier
time.” Before, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020). The
definition of “present” is “now existing or in progress;” “being in view or at hand;”
“existing in something mentioned or under consideration;” and “constituting the one
actually involved, at hand or being considered.”             Present, Merriam-Webster’s

       10
           Although Superior Court cases are not binding on this Court, such cases may offer
persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues. Commonwealth v. Monsanto Co., 269
A.3d 623, 679 n.20 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). The Superior Court cases cited herein are relied on for
their persuasive value.
                                              8
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020). Thus, by the plain language of the statute,
the prior offense must occur at an earlier time than the offense presently mentioned
or under consideration. The most logical inference from the temporal language
employed by the legislature is that there must be two separate and distinct offenses.
Crown Castle NG E. LLC, 234 A.3d at 674; 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b).
             Here, however, Licensee had a single DUI offense for which she had
accepted ARD, and for which ARD was later revoked for new criminal charges
unrelated to any of the enumerated offenses of Section 3806. Cf. Moroz, 284 A.3d
at 232-33; see also 75 Pa. C.S. § 3806(a)(1). Stated differently, Licensee accepted
ARD for her singular DUI offense, had her ARD revoked for her singular DUI
offense, and, ultimately, entered a guilty plea to her singular DUI offense. This did
not constitute two separate offenses under the statute; rather, it constituted one
offense, and, ultimately, one disposition. Lutz, 495 A.2d at 931.
             Our review has uncovered no prior case that would support PennDOT’s
construction.   To the contrary, cases discussing the exception at Section
3804(e)(2)(iii) invariably involve multiple criminal episodes. See, e.g., Moroz, 284
A.3d at 232 (defendant involved in a July 2019 DUI and August 2019 DUI);
Ferguson, 267 A.3d at 630 (defendant involved in 2012 DUI and a July 2020 DUI);
Vellon v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 263 A.3d 679 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021) (defendant convicted of two separate instances of DUI committed on the same
day and for purposes of the exception, this counted as a prior offense for purpose of
license suspension), appeal granted, (Pa., No. 555 MAL 2021, Mar. 16, 2022).
             To the extent that the language in Section 3806(a) is ambiguous, we
turn to further principles of statutory construction, namely, that the General
Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. See Coleman, 285

                                         9
A.3d at 605. PennDOT urges this Court (1) to find Licensee is not exempt from the
12-month license suspension because Licensee’s ARD acceptance for a DUI
occurred after she committed that DUI and (2) to conclude that she meets the time
limits in subsection (b)(1)(ii). However, in doing so, PennDOT ignores the equally
obvious fact that Licensee committed a singular DUI offense in this case.
PennDOT’s tortured construction of the statute as applied to the facts here is
unreasonable, as it effectively treats Licensee’s acceptance of ARD as an offense
separate from the DUI. This is an absurd result that would result in Licensee
receiving an increased suspension for a singular offense.
              Based on the above, we reject PennDOT’s argument that this is what
the General Assembly intended when it enacted the most recent version of the
statute. See Coleman, 285 A.3d at 605. Accordingly, the trial court committed an
error of law when it denied Licensee’s statutory appeal. See, e.g., Renfroe, 179 A.3d
at 648 n.3.
                                IV. CONCLUSION
              Based on the foregoing, we hold that Section 3806’s plain language
requires two separate and distinct offenses in order to establish that a licensee has a
prior offense. Further, absent two separate and distinct offenses, a licensee remains
eligible for the exception to suspension consequences defined at Section 3804(e)(2).
Finally, to the extent Section 3806 is ambiguous, we conclude that the legislature
did not intend for a licensee in the circumstances present here to be considered a
second-time DUI offender for purposes of the license suspension provisions of the
Vehicle Code. Accordingly, for these reasons, the trial court’s order is reversed.

                                               ______________________________
                                               LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

                                          10
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Megan Elizabeth Rickell,             :
                 Appellant           :
            v.                       :   No. 1034 C.D. 2020
                                     :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,        :
Department of Transportation,        :
Bureau of Driver Licensing           :

                                 ORDER

           AND NOW, this 24th day of February, 2023, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Adams County, entered September 21, 2020, in the above-
captioned matter, is REVERSED.

                                     ______________________________
                                     LORI A. DUMAS, Judge