Court Opinion

ID: 9483656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:27:57.674113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:45.724072
License: Public Domain

WALD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the majority that an American court owes great deference, as a matter of international comity, to the determination of a foreign court that a fugitive within its jurisdiction is extraditable to the United States. See Majority Opinion (“Maj. Op.”) at 1477. However, I do not believe that this venerable principle, announced by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 27 S.Ct. 539, 51 L.Ed. 816 (1907), necessarily leads to the conclusion that an American detained in a foreign country on the basis of an alleged misrepresentation made by the United States Department of State in seeking his extradition has no recourse in the courts of his native land. The Johnson decision itself only states that “[wjhether the crime came within the provision of the treaty was a matter for the decision of the [Canadian] authorities_” 205 U.S. at 316, 27 S.Ct. at 540 (emphasis added). Thus, the Third Circuit has pointed out that “[t]he holding of Johnson v. Browne ... precludes any review of the [foreign] court’s decision as to the extraditable nature of the offense.” McGann v. United States Bd. of Parole, 488 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir.1973) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958, 94 S.Ct. 1974, 40 L.Ed.2d 309 (1974); see also United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir.1987) (“We agree with the Third Circuit’s reading of Johnson”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 773, 98 L.Ed.2d 859 (1988). In other words, we must refrain from inquiring into whether the “dual criminality” principle, which requires that the offenses for which Casey was sought by the United States government also constitute crimes in Costa Rica, has been satisfied. In my view, however, Casey’s complaint does not require such an inquiry and therefore the district court properly ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case.
Casey alleged in his complaint that his arrest by Costa Rican officials in 1988 and subsequent detention pending extradition were the result of deliberate misinformation planted by the United States government in Diplomatic Note 215 (“Note 215”). Passing on the narrow issue of whether Casey’s four years of detention in the Cos-ta Rican prisons was the result of United States misconduct would not sacrifice international comity, because this court would not be second-guessing the Costa Rican courts’ conclusion that Casey is extraditable under its own law. More specifically, it would not be necessary to disturb the Cos-ta Rican courts’ finding that the RICO offense either does or does not satisfy the dual criminality requirement. On the one hand, if the Costa Rican courts concluded that RICO offenses were crimes in that country, we would necessarily accept that determination under Johnson, 205 U.S. at 316, 27 S.Ct. at 540, and therefore conclude that the misrepresentation in Note 215 could not possibly have caused Casey to be found extraditable.
On the other hand, if the Costa Rican courts decided that their country’s criminal code did not contain an offense sufficiently analogous to RICO but nevertheless decided that Casey was extraditable because he was “charged” with narcotics offenses which Costa Rica did recognize as criminal, we might then be able to conclude that the misstatement in Note 215 did lead to Casey’s detention.1 Even then, the remedy sought by Casey would not be to find Casey nonextraditable and thereby upset the Costa Rican courts’ legal conclusion, but to enjoin the United States government from continuing to pursue extradition on the basis of the misrepresentation.2
*1480In neither scenario would this court decide that the foreign court’s dual criminality analysis was correct or incorrect. The sole question for review would be whether the statement in Note 215 describing the superseding indictment against Casey as “charging him with” narcotics offenses was the proximate cause of his detention and pending extradition. The district court’s decision dismissing Casey’s complaint adopted this approach in holding:
[NJothing in the opinions of the Costa Rican courts suggests that their analysis was affected, or indeed could have been affected, by the alleged misrepresentation in Diplomatic Note 215. Apparently applying the principle of double criminality, the Costa Rican courts found Casey extraditable because the conduct for which he is charged is punishable by Costa Rica_ Nothing in their opinions suggest that their analysis would have been affected by the formal charges pending against Casey. As a consequence, whether or not the Costa Rican courts believed that there were two RICO counts pending against Casey or that those two counts were joined by charges of importing and possessing cocaine, the Costa Rican courts would have found Casey extraditable.
Casey v. Department of State, Civil Action No. 90-3077, Memorandum Opinion (“Mem. Op.”) at 9 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 1991).
The doctrine of international comity does not prohibit this court from reading the decisions of the Costa Rican courts for evidence that United States government misconduct resulted in injury to a United States citizen, but only prevents this court from challenging a decision properly vested in the foreign court, namely whether offenses satisfy the dual criminality requirement. See Johnson, 205 U.S. at 316, 27 S.Ct. at 540; Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d at 429; McGann, 488 F.2d at 40. In fact, American courts have in the past considered the scope and reasoning of foreign court extradition decisions. In Johnson, for instance, the defendant was extradited from Canada for one offense but imprisoned in the United States for a different offense which Canada had previously determined was not an extraditable offense. Johnson, 205 U.S. at 316, 27 S.Ct. at 540. While the Court believed that “[wjhether the crime came within the provision of the treaty was a matter for the decision of the [Canadian] authorities,” it continued that “it is still our duty to determine the legality of the succeeding imprisonment, which depends upon the treaty_” Id. at 316-17, 27 S.Ct. at 540-41. The Court found: *1481Id.3', see also United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371, 373 (8th Cir.1983) (based on review of Costa Rican court’s decision, “it is clear that Costa Rica would not object to appellants’ trial on the conspiracy counts”); Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059, 93 S.Ct. 552, 34 L.Ed.2d 511 (1972); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir.1962). This case admittedly presents different facts and a different claim from those just cited but the rule that American courts have jurisdiction to consider the United States government’s role in the extradition process seems just as reasonable and equitable in these circumstances. Courts have often reiterated that even in the area of foreign relations, “unquestionably, it is the province of the judiciary to adjudicate claims that governmental conduct is in violation of the Constitution.” Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 349 (4th Cir.1983). After being detained by Costa Rican officials, and certainly after four years of imprisonment in Cos-ta Rica, Casey should at least have the opportunity to raise the claim in an American court that his rights were violated because authorities in the extraditing state were misled by inaccurate statements by United States officials about charges made in the United States.4
*1480We can readily conceive that if the [Canadian] authorities, after the [Canadian court] had decided that the crime of which respondent had been convicted and for which extradition had been asked was not extraditable, and the request for extradition had, therefore, been refused, had been informed on the subsequent proceeding for extradition on the other indictment that it was not the intention of this Government to try respondent on that indictment, but that having secured his extradition on that charge, it was the intention of this Government to imprison him on the judgment of conviction, they would have said that such imprisonment would not be according to the terms of the treaty, and they would have refused to direct his extradition for the purpose stated.
*1481It seems an inadequate response to say that after all Costa Rican proceedings are complete and Casey is extradited to the United States he may then “test the limits on our judicial review of the issues determined by the Costa Rican courts.” See Maj.Op. at 1478. Indeed, it is hard to see how this could be so under the rationale of the majority opinion — that the basis of a foreign court’s finding that a fugitive is extraditable is in all circumstances unre-viewable — which applies with equal force whether Casey is in Costa Rica or the United States. Presumably, if Casey were to raise his claim again in the United States, the majority would again conclude that it does not have jurisdiction to review the Costa Rican courts’ decisions for an indica*1482tion that the misrepresentation in Note 215 led to Casey’s detention and extradition.
However, although I disagree with my colleagues on the district court’s jurisdiction to entertain Casey’s claim, I would nevertheless conclude that his complaint was properly dismissed because it is clear from the evidence before the district court that the misrepresentation in Note 215 did not proximately cause Casey to be found extraditable. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 264-66 (5th ed. 1984). Most importantly, in response to the treaty requirement that a country transmit documentation to support a request for extradition, see Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Nov. 10, 1922, U.S.-Costa Rica, art. XI, 43 Stat. 1621, the United States government sent Diplomatic Note 260 (“Note 260”) which included an affidavit from the prosecutor, the original indictment, the superseding indictment, an arrest warrant for Casey, the affidavits of two of Casey’s alleged co-conspirators, and copies of the relevant portions of the United States Code. None of these materials repeated the alleged misstatement in Note 215 that Casey was charged with narcotics offenses. Given the fact that Casey’s alleged participation in narcotics trafficking constituted the predicate acts supporting his indictment on RICO charges, it is not at all clear that the statement in Note 215 constituted an actual misrepresentation. But even if I assume, as the district court did, see Casey, Mem.Op. at 4 n. 11, that the government’s description of the superseding indictment amounted to a misrepresentation, I find it implausible that the Costa Rican courts would give great weight to the single word “charging” in Note 215 and ignore their treaty obligation to consider the documentation supporting the extradition request. A review of the decisions of the Costa Rican courts, again, not for the purpose of challenging the finding of extraditability but only to assess the impact of the government’s misstatement, confirms the conclusion that even if Note 215 had been entirely accurate, Casey would still have been detained and found extraditable.
Neither the Second Criminal Court of San Jose nor the appellate tribunal, the Second Superior Penal Court, based its conclusion that Casey could be extradited on the mistaken belief that Casey was charged in the superseding indictment with narcotics offenses. Instead, after discussing the RICO offense, the documentation submitted with Note 260 and Costa Rican law, the Second Criminal Court concluded that Casey could be extradited on the basis of the RICO charges. Casey based his appeal “on the fact that the violation of the RICO Statute is not considered a crime autonomous to [Costa Rica],” but the appellate court expressly rejected this contention and affirmed the lower court. The inaccuracy of Note 215 was therefore immaterial.
In sum, I believe the district court was correct in concluding that it had jurisdiction to hear Casey’s claim that his rights were violated by misstatements made by the United States government in seeking his extradition from Costa Rica but that Casey’s complaint should be dismissed because the evidence clearly indicated that the misstatement was not the proximate cause of his detention and pending extradition.

. Although I conclude that the district court properly heard Casey’s claim because Casey suffers a present and ongoing injury as the result of his detention in Costa Rica, it would not have been inappropriate for the district court to hold the case in abeyance pending resolution of what the majority describes as Casey’s "habeas corpus” petition before the Costa Rican Supreme Court. See Maj.Op. at 1474. Casey’s counsel agreed at oral argument that this would have been an acceptable result.

. Because I would conclude, infra at 1475-76, that even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Casey, he has failed to demon*1480strate that the misstatement in Note 215 proximately caused him to be detained for extradition by Costa Rican officials, I would not reach the subsequent question of whether any government claim of absolute prosecutorial discretion would preclude the relief he seeks. See Maj.Op. at 1478 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 426-27, 96 S.Ct. 984, 993, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), in which Supreme Court held that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damage claims arising from initiation and presentation of government’s case). It is worth noting, however, that prosecutorial discretion is not limitless and that courts do retain the equitable power to enjoin bad faith prosecutions which are brought to discourage or prevent the exercise of constitutionally-protected rights. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-86, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1120-21, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965); Lewellen v. Raff, 843 F.2d 1103 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1171, 103 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989).

. As the majority points out, see Maj.Op. at 1476 n. 5, it was a relatively simple exercise for the Supreme Court in Johnson to decide that the Canadian court would not have extradited the fugitive to the United States if it had known that the United States’ intention was to imprison the fugitive for an offense for which the Canadian court had previously refused extradition. Under the majority’s reasoning, however, even if the present case were as straightforward as Johnson, e.g., the State Department intentionally misrepresented that Casey was charged with murder and the Costa Rican court issued a one-sentence order that "Casey is being extradited for murder,” the American court could not hear his claim because it would require evaluating the Costa Rican decision in light of extrinsic evidence and hypothesizing that a Costa Rican court fully informed of the State Department malfeasance would not have found Casey extraditable. In my view, the probability that the inquiry into the factual predicate for a foreign court’s decision may prove more complex than in Johnson (or in my hypothetical) does not invalidate the principle I derive from Johnson that domestic courts may engage in such determinations. Obviously, our courts conduct "but for" analyses, simple and complex, of the decisions of other courts and agencies all the time in other areas of the law as an intrinsic part of their reviewing function.

. My colleagues assert that because an inquiry by an American court into the prejudicial effect of American prosecutorial abuse may involve parsing a foreign court’s opinion, it violates the principle of international comity. See Maj.Op. at 1477-78. Certainly, determining whether the misstatement in Note 215 caused Casey to be incarcerated in Costa Rica could, like many causation questions, be complex. That, however, does not mean that the American court, in determining whether the State Department’s alleged misstatement led Costa Rica to detain Casey, would be second-guessing, i.e., challenging as incorrect, the Costa Rican “court’s decision as to the extraditable nature of [RICO or narcotics] offense[s]." See McGann, 488 F.2d at 40. There is a clear difference between determining the factual predicate for a decision and concluding that a foreign court’s legal analysis is faulty. Of course, even after a careful study of the Costa Rican courts' decisions, it might be impossible for an American court to tell whether the misrepresentation played any role in Casey’s detention. In that case, the court must conclude that the burden of proving causation had not been met. If, however, the causation is clear (e.g., the Costa Rican courts state that the RICO charge does not satisfy the dual criminality requirement but the substantive narcotics offenses referred to in Note 215 do), the court would conclude not that the Costa Rican courts’ analysis of its law or United States law was mistaken, but only that the United States government injured Casey by misleading Costa Ri-can officials.