Court Opinion

ID: 9839798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 00:00:33.133986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:04.108259
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-10917     Document: 00516894169         Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/13/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                ____________ FILED
                                                                    September 13, 2023
                                  No. 21-10917                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                 Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Larry Ray Lincks,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:20-CV-1603
                  ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:
          Larry Lincks pleaded guilty, then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
   seeking relief from his plea. The district court denied the motion, and Lincks
   appeals.
          This case reveals uncertainty in our caselaw regarding argument for-
   feiture, ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) in guilty pleas, and the
   nature of non-constitutional appeals in § 2255 proceedings.
          After addressing and resolving those uncertainties, we affirm the
   denial of the § 2255 motion. We also clarify that COAs are unnecessary for
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                                           No. 21-10917

   objections to evidentiary rulings in § 2255 proceedings, but on the merits we
   reject Lincks’s evidentiary challenge.

                                                 I.
          Lincks pleaded guilty of possession with intent to distribute a mixture
   or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine 1 and was
   sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to any
   sentence imposed in two unrelated state proceedings, and three years of
   supervised release. We dismissed his appeal, and the Supreme Court denied
   certiorari. Lincks v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2731 (2019).
          Lincks then filed a § 2255 motion, contending, among other things,
   that his attorney rendered IAC because (a) he failed to explain the presen-
   tence report (“PSR”), making the guilty plea unknowing and involuntary;
   (b) he failed to file a motion to suppress and dismiss evidence and failed to
   investigate; (c) he erroneously advised that Lincks’s guideline range would
   be 60 to 72 months 2; and (d) he failed to look at discovery materials, which
   led to a higher guideline range than expected.
          Lincks submitted copies of e-mails between him and his counsel,
   Aaron Wiley, as exhibits. They revealed that shortly before Lincks signed his
   plea agreement, he e-mailed Wiley stating that he was concerned because he
   was facing twenty years of imprisonment and that he “[might] as well” go to
   trial if he was looking at that much time. Wiley responded that the statutory
   maximum was twenty years and had to be included in the plea agreement, but
   Lincks’s sentence would not approach the statutory maximum given the drug
   quantity attributed to him and his criminal history consisting of two prior
          _____________________
          1
              See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).
          2
              Elsewhere, Lincks states that he was told he would receive a sentence of 63 to 78
   months.

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                                    No. 21-10917

   drug convictions.
          About eight months later, following the plea and preparation of the
   PSR, Wiley stated in another e-mail that the guideline range in the PSR was
   “higher than expected” because Lincks had received more criminal history
   points and was held responsible for a higher drug quantity than expected.
   Counsel stated he would try to get a lower guideline range by making objec-
   tions and would discuss the available options with Lincks. Lincks then told
   Wiley that the PSR incorrectly stated he had bought a pound of narcotics
   from a man named Tony; he denied saying that in his interview and asked
   counsel to listen to the taped interview.
          In addition, Lincks filed two motions for discovery, which the magis-
   trate judge denied. The district court denied Lincks’s renewed motion for
   discovery, accepted the magistrate judge’s report, and denied a certificate of
   appealability (“COA”).
          We, however, granted a COA on the issue of whether Lincks’s trial
   counsel was ineffective in advising him about the guideline range, affecting
   his decision to plead guilty. Specifically, we stated, “Lincks has made the
   required showing as to his claim (1)(b) above, namely, that his trial counsel
   was ineffective in advising him about his sentencing guidelines range . . . .”
   But as the order listed Lincks’s claims, claim (1)(b) was Wiley’s “fail[ure] to
   file a motion to suppress and dismiss evidence and fail[ure] to investigate.”
   Claim (1)(c) was the guidelines-advice claim. Apparently because of the dis-
   crepancy, Lincks’s merits briefing focuses almost entirely on his evidentiary
   and failure-to-investigate claims.
          We denied a COA on Linck’s other IAC claims and carried with the
   case his request for a COA on whether the district court abused its discretion
   by denying discovery.

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                                      No. 21-10917

                                           II.
          In an appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion, this court reviews the
   district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear
   error. United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). Claims of
   IAC are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Scott, 11 F.4th 364, 368 (5th
   Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 827 (2022). As for discovery, “[t]he dis-
   trict court’s decision regarding [its] availability . . . is . . . committed to the
   sound discretion of the district court[] and is reviewed under the abuse of
   discretion standard.” United States v. Fields, 761 F.3d 443, 478 (5th Cir.
   2014) (second ellipsis in original) (quoting Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760,
   765–66 (5th Cir. 2000)).

                                          III.
          There are three issues. First, whether Lincks forfeited his argument
   that Wiley was ineffective in advising him about his guideline range. The
   answer is no. Second, assuming that we reach the merits of Lincks’s claim,
   whether he can prevail on it. Again, no. And third, whether Lincks is entitled
   to a COA on whether the district court abused its discretion by denying
   discovery. We reframe that last question to clarify our circuit’s jurispru-
   dence and answer it, as the others, in the negative.

                                           A.
          The government argues that Lincks forfeited the only issue for which
   we granted a COA, i.e., his guidelines-advice claim. Specifically, it points to
   his opening brief’s conclusory statement that “he was given ‘faulty and
   erroneous advice’ at the plea stage.” As noted, Lincks’s briefing strategy
   was apparently the result of a typographical error in this court’s grant of a
   COA: Our order referred to Lincks’s “claim (1)(b)” rather than to “claim
   (1)(c).” Given the unusual circumstances of the case, we find no forfeiture.
          “[P]ro se litigants, like all other parties, must abide by the Federal

                                           4
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                                     No. 21-10917

   Rules of Appellate Procedure.” United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th
   Cir. 1994) (per curiam). “[W]hen [a criminal] appellant fails to . . . comply
   with the rules of the court, the clerk must dismiss the appeal for want of pro-
   secution.” 5th Cir. R. 42.3.2. Our rules require an appellant to specify
   his arguments and support them “with citations to the authorities and parts
   of the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8);
   5th Cir. R. 28.3(i). “Failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 28 as to a
   particular issue ordinarily constitutes abandonment of the issue.” United
   States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.
   Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 1992)).
          On the other hand, “pro se briefs are afforded liberal construction.”
   McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing
   Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (per curiam)), as revised
   (Oct. 9, 2013). And “we must liberally construe briefs in determining what
   issues have been presented for appeal. Miranda, 248 F.3d at 444 (citing SEC
   v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093 (5th Cir. 1993)).
          Applying those legal principles to the facts here, there is no forfeiture.
   Lincks’s confusion, which appears genuine and persists through his reply
   brief, stems from our order’s inaccuracy in referring to Lincks’s
   “claim (1)(b)” rather than the intended “claim (1)(c).” We will not punish
   Lincks for that, especially remembering that the rules of appellate procedure
   are meant to “promote the interest of justice.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b).
          But even if Lincks had forfeited his argument, we would still consider
   it. “[T]he issues-not-briefed-are-[forfeited] rule is a prudential construct
   that requires the exercise of discretion.” Miranda, 248 F.3d at 243. That
   discretion is appropriate here: Any forfeiture is at least partly attributable to
   this court’s imprecision. We therefore proceed to the merits of Lincks’s

                                           5
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                                           No. 21-10917

   guidelines-advice claim. 3

                                                 B.
           Lincks asserts that Wiley provided IAC by erroneously underesti-
   mating his guideline range, making his guilty plea unknowing or involuntary.
           To demonstrate IAC, Lincks must show (i) that his counsel’s perfor-
   mance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
   ness and (ii) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strick-
   land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689–94 (1984). A failure to establish either
   prong defeats the claim. Id. at 697. We resolve the claim against Lincks on
   the first prong and therefore do not address the second.
           To demonstrate deficiency, Lincks must show that “counsel made
   errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed
   the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. The alleged error here
   is inaccurate advice concerning Lincks’s exposure under the sentencing
   guidelines, which may have vitiated his knowledge of the consequences of the
   plea. In particular, for a guilty plea to be knowing, the defendant must have
   a “full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.”
   Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969). At a minimum, a guilty plea’s
   sentencing consequences include the maximum sentence for the offense
   charged. United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 255–56 (5th Cir. 2000)
   (per curiam).
           We digress briefly to note that, at least under our caselaw, the “know-

           _____________________
           3
              Although we give Lincks leeway given uncertainty in the order, we construe it
   accurately for our purposes: We granted a COA on Lincks’s guidelines-advice claim, not
   on his claim that Wiley failed to file particular evidentiary motions and failed to investigate.
   We therefore cannot consider Lincks’s arguments regarding the latter. See 28 U.S.C.
   § 2253(c)(3); United States v. Daniels, 588 F.3d 835, 836 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

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                                        No. 21-10917

   ing” and “voluntary” requirements “embody different concepts.” Id.
   at 255 n.3. Volition in guilty pleas comes into doubt when the plea is induced
   by threats, improper coercion, false or empty promises, and the like. 4 On the
   other hand, as we have just noted, “knowledge” generally implicates a fac-
   tual understanding of the essential components and consequences of a guilty
   plea. 5 Under the most favorable reading of his arguments, Lincks alleges that
   his plea was not “knowing.”
           Having erected the legal framework and assembled the record evi-
   dence favorable to Lincks, we find no constitutional deficiency in Wiley’s
   representation. Wiley informed Lincks via e-mail that “twenty years is the
   statutory maximum for [his] alleged offense”; “[t]he [statutory maximum
   language] is included in the plea agreement . . . in order for an accused to
   make an informed decision about entering a plea of guilty”; and—again—
   that the statutory maximum was “twenty years.”
           Admittedly, there are contrary indicia. Wiley noted in an e-mail that
   Lincks’s sentence would not “approach the statutory maximum” given the
   amount of narcotics involved and his criminal history. 6 Lincks also asserts

           _____________________
           4
            See, e.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489–93 (1962); Matthew v.
   Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases); 1A Charles Alan
   Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 179,
   Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2023).
           5
             And, to complicate things further, a defendant’s mental competence is distinct
   from his knowledge and volition; competence is “the ability to understand the proceed-
   ings.” See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 & n.12 (1993) (discussing the distinction
   between the competency inquiry and the knowledge-and-volition inquiry); Mullis v. Lump-
   kin, 70 F.4th 907, 912 n.6 (5th Cir. 2023). Lincks does not allege mental incompetence.
           6
             Lincks’s sentence of 188 months was approximately 78% of the statutory maxi-
   mum of 240 months. Lincks presents no argument that a sentence totaling four-fifths of
   the statutory maximum “approach[ed]” the statutory maximum. Out of an abundance of
   judiciary caution, we assume that it did.

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                                           No. 21-10917

   that Wiley predicted a sentence between 60 and 72 months; we accept
   arguendo that factual claim as true.
           Nevertheless, Wiley provided constitutionally sufficient perfor-
   mance. In addition to the e-mail representations, Lincks’s plea agreement
   contained unequivocal and unambiguous statements about his possible sen-
   tence and Wiley’s representations. Among the most salient in his plea agree-
   ment were these statements:

       • “The maximum [applicable] penalties . . . include . . . impris-
         onment for a period of not more than twenty years . . . .”
       • “Lincks understands that the sentence in this case will be im-
         posed by the [c]ourt after consideration of the United States
         Sentencing Guidelines. The guidelines are not binding on the
         [c]ourt[] but are advisory only. Lincks has reviewed the guide-
         lines with his attorney, but understands no one can predict with
         certainty the outcome of the [c]ourt’s consideration of the
         guidelines in this case. Lincks understands that he will not be
         allowed to withdraw his plea if the applicable advisory guide-
         line range is higher than expected, or if the [c]ourt departs from
         the applicable advisory guideline range. Lincks will not be al-
         lowed to withdraw his plea if his sentence is higher than ex-
         pected. Lincks fully understands the actual sentence imposed
         (so long as it is within the statutory maximum) is solely left to
         the discretion of the [c]ourt.”
       • “There have been no guarantees or promises from anyone as
         to what sentence the [c]ourt will impose.” 7
       • “[The plea agreement] is a complete statement of the parties’

           _____________________
           7
              As noted, promises can implicate voluntariness. The quoted portion of the plea
   agreement falls under the “Voluntary Plea” section, which states that the plea is “freely
   and voluntarily made and is not the result of force or threats, or of promises part from those
   set forth in this plea agreement.”

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                                             No. 21-10917

           agreement . . . .”
   Lincks does not argue that Wiley misled or misinformed 8 him about any of
   those provisions.
           In summary, we assume arguendo that Wiley suggested a particular
   and inaccurate guidelines range to Lincks. But Lincks also, in the most ex-
   press terms possible, disclaimed any reliance on that specific suggestion,
   acknowledged that he had discussed the guidelines with Wiley and under-
   stood that the district judge had complete discretion over his sentencing
   regardless of the guidelines range, 9 denied that Wiley had promised or guar-
   anteed any particular sentence, and admitted knowledge of the maximum
   possible sentence, which Wiley indisputably communicated to Lincks over
   e-mail, even labeling it Lincks’s “exposure.”
           Wiley’s representation of Lincks was not perfect. But not every attor-
   ney error is constitutionally fatal: “[T]he Sixth Amendment entitles a crim-
   inal defendant to reasonable, but not perfect, representation of counsel.”
   United States v. Valdez, 973 F.3d 396, 404 (5th Cir. 2020). Taking all of
   Wiley’s representations and counsel together, there is no IAC. See id. (find-
   ing no constitutionally deficient performance and no prejudice on materially
   indistinguishable facts). 10

           _____________________
           8
             If voluntariness were in doubt, we advert to the following exchange between
   Lincks and the court during his plea colloquy: “[O]ther than the written plea agreement
   [and supplement], has anyone made any promise or assurance to you of any kind in an effort
   to induce you to plead guilty?” “No.” “[H]as anyone mentally, physically, or in any other
   way attempted to force you to plead guilty in this case?” “No, ma’am.” Lincks also does
   not independently allege any mental, physical, or other coercion.
           9
              “[T]he application of the [g]uidelines to a sentence is discretionary, and the court
   is entitled to impose a variance outside the [g]uidelines range.” Id. (citing Gall v. United
   States, 552 U.S. 38, 46–51 (2007)).
           10
                We are more likely to find that counsel was constitutionally ineffective where, in

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                                           No. 21-10917

                                                 C.
           Lincks asserts the district court abused its discretion in denying his
   discovery motions seeking production of certain communications he had
   with Wiley. We take this opportunity to clarify our circuit’s law on the need
   vel non for a COA on non-merits claims.
           Defendants seeking relief under § 2255 generally must obtain a COA.
   See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. COAs “may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a
   substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2).
   But that statutory provision does not address evidentiary and other collateral
   rulings by the district court—do they require a COA for appealability?
           Despite uncertainty in our precedent, 11 our answer is no, at least as to
           _____________________
   the context of providing guidelines advice, there is no plea agreement formalizing and ex-
   plaining the representations made to a defendant regarding the maximum statutory sen-
   tence and the discretionary nature of the guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera,
   412 F.3d 577, 579–81 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Grammas, 376 F.3d 433, 435–37 (5th
   Cir. 2004). That situation arises most frequently when defendants plead not guilty and
   subsequently claim that they would have pleaded guilty but for IAC.
            But even assuming that Wiley’s counsel was constitutionally deficient, much of the
   same evidence we have discussed supports finding no prejudice. See Valdez, 973 F.3d
   at 405–06 (“Furthermore, Valdez was clearly aware that the maximum possible prison
   term was 120 months, even though he and his attorney were operating with the understand-
   ing that the Guidelines with a plea would suggest a significantly lower sentence.”). Lincks
   was incontrovertibly aware of the maximum statutory sentence and repeatedly and ex-
   pressly disclaimed reliance on any predictions or representations of counsel. The evidence
   supporting no prejudice therefore outweighs his statement over e-mail that he “[might] as
   well just take” his case to trial if he were “looking at 20 years.”
           11
                See United States v. Guzman, No. 19-10783, 2021 WL 4610124, at *4 n.1 (5th Cir.
   Oct. 6, 2021) (unpublished) (comparing Young v. Stephens, 795 F.3d 484, 494 (5th Cir.
   2015) (“A COA is not required to review the district court’s ruling on a non-merits issue
   . . . .”)), and Smith v. Kelly, 301 F. App’x 375, 376 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (stating that
   a COA is unnecessary to appeal the denial of a request for discovery), with Fields, 761 F.3d
   at 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e deny a COA on Fields’s claim concerning his entitlement to
   discovery . . . .”), and Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that
   the court granted a COA as to “whether Reed is entitled to additional discovery”)).

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                                         No. 21-10917

   evidentiary rulings. Instead, they are appealable as needed to resolve consti-
   tutional claims subject to COAs under § 2253. In other words, although a
   defendant need not obtain a COA for an evidentiary ruling, that ruling is sub-
   ject to direct appellate review only insofar as it relates to a claim for which a
   COA is sought or has been granted. 12 Thus, “a petition challenging an evi-
   dentiary ruling may only be entertained as corollary to a constitutional viola-
   tion.” 13 At a practical level, a § 2255 petitioner seeking appellate review of
   an evidentiary decision must explain why review of that decision is necessary
   or helpful in resolving a constitutional claim for which he is seeking (or has
   obtained) a COA.
           Treating Lincks’s request for a COA as a direct appeal, the district
   court did not abuse its discretion. A § 2255 movant is not entitled to discov-
   ery, but discovery may be authorized for good cause under Rule 6(a) of the
   Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings. See Fields, 761 F.3d at 478. A movant
   “demonstrates ‘good cause’ under Rule 6(a) ‘where specific allegations
   before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts
   are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.’”
   Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908–09
   (1997)).
           The district court acted within its discretion in finding that Lincks
   failed to meet that standard. As the court noted, his arguments on his
   guidelines-advice claim are conclusory. And his request for discovery was
   based on a bare assertion that the requested material “will establish the valid-

           _____________________
           12
             See Norman v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 2016); Young v. Stephens,
   795 F.3d 484, 494 (5th Cir. 2015); Dunn v. Cockrell, 302 F.3d 491, 492 (5th Cir. 2002) (per
   curiam).
           13
             Norman, 817 F.3d at 234 (quoting Alix v. Quarterman, 309 F. App’x 875, 878 (5th
   Cir. 2009) (per curiam)).

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                                     No. 21-10917

   ity of” his constitutional claim. Moreover, we have now rejected Lincks’s
   guidelines-advice claim, and there is no indication either in his briefing or in
   the record (which arguendo we interpret liberally in his favor) that the discov-
   ery he seeks would conceivably produce a different result. See id. (“We have
   noted that Rule 6 . . . ‘does not authorize fishing expeditions.’” (Ward v.
   Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1367 (5th Cir. 1994))).
                                    * * * * *
          The denial of Lincks’s § 2255 motion is AFFIRMED. Lincks also
   requested a COA as to whether the district court erred in denying his dis-
   covery requests. In the interests of justice and to ensure conformity with our
   precedent, we construe that request as a direct appeal and AFFIRM the
   denial of Lincks’s discovery requests.

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                                     No. 21-10917

   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge, concurring:
          I agree in full with the panel’s analysis regarding Lincks’s preservation
   of his claim and the appealability of his discovery issue. I also agree that,
   under our court’s case law, Lincks’s claim for ineffective assistance of
   counsel (“IAC”) fails on the deficiency prong. I write separately to explain
   why I have concerns about that case law and its approach to assessing
   sentencing-advice errors that result in guilty pleas.
          Perhaps the most important decision a criminal defendant makes is
   whether to proceed to trial or to plead guilty. It is, therefore, of paramount
   importance that defense counsel advise their clients on all aspects and
   consequences of entering a guilty plea. One year after the Supreme Court
   established its two-part test for assessing IAC claims in Strickland v.
   Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court held that the same test applies to
   IAC-based attacks on guilty pleas. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
   Under that test, a defendant challenging his guilty plea on the ground of IAC
   “must show that counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard
   of reasonableness’ and that he was prejudiced as a result.” Lee v. United
   States, 582 U.S. 357, 363 (2017) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
          Here, Larry Lincks contends that his guilty plea is constitutionally
   infirm because his plea counsel underestimated his prison-sentence exposure
   by almost ten years. Our panel concludes that Lincks’s claim fails on the
   deficiency prong, primarily citing our court’s recent decision in United States
   v. Valdez, 973 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2020).
          In Valdez, after a jury was empaneled for his trial, the defendant
   pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Id. at 399. But
   Valdez’s lawyer failed to tell him that his offense level under the Sentencing
   Guidelines would be determined by a cross-reference to a homicide offense.
   Id. at 400-02. Counsel estimated that Valdez’s Guidelines range would be

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                                    No. 21-10917

   between twenty-four and thirty-three months. Id. at 399. But, with the cross-
   reference, his range was actually 324 to 405 months. Id. at 401. The district
   court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of ten years. Id. Valdez filed
   a § 2255 petition seeking to vacate his conviction, alleging that counsel’s
   error prejudiced him in his decision to enter a guilty plea. Id. at 399. Our
   court concluded that there was no Strickland deficiency. In relevant part, we
   explained:
          [A]lthough Valdez’s counsel’s estimate of what he “hoped”
          Valdez’s sentence would be was well below the 120 months to
          which Valdez was ultimately sentenced, counsel properly
          apprised Valdez, prior to his pleading guilty, of the maximum
          penalty the court could impose. And counsel also made
          abundantly clear to Valdez that no estimation he offered was a
          guarantee or a promise. [There] is no doubt that counsel’s
          estimated sentencing range was far lower than Valdez’s actual
          sentence. Nevertheless, we do not find any deficiency in
          counsel’s estimation to be unreasonable.
   Id. at 404.
          As the panel observes, that analysis appears to resolve the instant case.
   See ante, at 9 (citing Valdez as finding no deficient performance on
   “materially indistinguishable facts”). Here, Lincks’s lawyer told him that
   the statutory maximum under his guilty plea was twenty years. And although
   counsel allegedly estimated that the sentence would be many years lower
   than that, Lincks, who is pro se, does not contend that this prediction was a
   “guarantee or promise.” Unable to convincingly distinguish Valdez, I am
   compelled to conclude that Lincks’s counsel was not Strickland ineffective
   under circuit law.

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           But I am apprehensive if this is the Strickland bar for plea counsel.
   Under this doctrine, it would seem 1 that counsel advising a client on whether
   to enter a guilty plea discharges his constitutional duty as it pertains to
   sentencing exposure so long as he tells his client the statutory maximum and
   refrains from making any “guarantee[s]” or “promise[s].” Valdez, 973 F.3d
   at 404. But as Judge Wiener observed in dissent in Valdez, other federal
   courts of appeals require plea counsel to avoid making gross
   mischaracterizations of the Guidelines estimations for their clients. Id. at
   407-08 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (citing cases).                Unreasonably incorrect
   Guidelines calculations may well amount to Strickland deficiency, or at least
   trigger an obligation of further inquiry. See United States v. Brooks, No. 22-
   30369, __ F.4th __, 2023 WL 5163315, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 11, 2023) (noting
   that the defendant’s postconviction allegations of deficient performance by
   plea counsel “may warrant factual inquiry” in § 2255 proceedings).
           Critically, under the permissive Valdez standard, neither the nature,
   cause, nor magnitude of counsel’s mistake appears to matter. 2 In Valdez,
   counsel failed to notice a Guidelines cross-reference to homicide offenses in
   a case where the defendant, pleading guilty to unlawful gun possession, used
   that gun on the night in question to shoot and kill someone outside his home.
   And counsel’s estimation of the Guidelines range was more than ten times
   lower than the defendant’s properly calculated range. But neither of these

           _____________________
           1
             Regrettably, this important issue comes to us as presented by a pro se inmate
   who, as we acknowledge, was misled by our inadvertent COA error. Notably, the
   Government did not identify, much less analyze, Valdez, so we have no adversarial
   treatment of that decision.
           2
             Again, without adversarial briefing, it is unclear whether Valdez’s conclusion that
   counsel there was “abundantly clear” that his estimation was not “a guarantee or a
   promise” offers a meaningful limit on the decision’s plea-counsel deficiency holding. 973
   F.3d at 404.

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                                     No. 21-10917

   facts appeared to undermine our court’s conclusion that “any deficiency in
   counsel’s estimation [was not] unreasonable.” Id. at 404.
          Notably, this permissive deficiency standard in guilty-plea cases
   stands in contrast to our treatment of similar errors in the context of guilty
   pleas forgone. In that context, as we acknowledge, our case law recognizes
   that, when a defendant declines to enter a guilty plea and instead proceeds to
   trial, counsel performs deficiently by overestimating the sentence that would
   result from the guilty plea, e.g., United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 678 F.3d 353,
   355, 357-59 (5th Cir. 2012), or by underestimating the sentence that would
   result from a conviction at trial, e.g., United States v. Grammas, 376 F.3d 433,
   436-37 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 579, 581 (5th
   Cir. 2005). We have said, quite plainly, that “[b]y grossly underestimating
   the defendant’s sentencing exposure, counsel breaches his duty as a defense
   lawyer in a criminal case to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea
   to a charge appears desirable.” Grammas, 376 F.3d at 436-37 (cleaned up)
   (citations omitted).
          Contrastingly, in Valdez, our court held that plea counsel performed
   adequately even when he grossly underestimated the sentence the defendant
   would receive from his guilty plea. See 973 F.3d at 404. The apparent logic
   for why the “go-to-trial” deficiency does not apply with equal force to the
   “don’t-go-to-trial” scenario may turn on defendants’ Rule 11 Boykin
   colloquy statements, made under oath, disclaiming reliance on Guidelines
   “promises,” see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), as well as the reality that
   defendants can seek to withdraw their guilty pleas after having seen
   Guidelines calculations in their presentence reports, see id. 11(d). But
   without adversarial briefing, I am unsure whether either of these features of
   guilty-plea cases speaks to whether counsel performed deficiently in the first
   place by grossly underestimating his client’s sentencing range before the plea
   was entered.

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                                      No. 21-10917

          Here, Lincks has alleged that counsel advised him that his Guidelines
   range would be five to six years’ imprisonment. That estimation missed the
   mark by almost ten years. And while the record lacks direct evidence of
   counsel’s numerical estimation, correspondence between Lincks and his
   lawyer tends to corroborate Lincks’s claim. Before entering his guilty plea,
   Lincks emailed his lawyer to express concern about the twenty-year
   maximum. He said that most of the men in prison with him who “had a cap”
   “got the cap.” Counsel responded, also by email: “[G]iven the amount of
   narcotics attributed to you . . . and your criminal history (two prior drug
   convictions) – you won’t approach the statutory maximum.” At sentencing, the
   two reasons counsel had given for his low prediction—drug quantity and
   criminal history—served not to limit Lincks’s sentencing exposure but
   instead to increase Lincks’s Guidelines range substantially. Namely, Lincks
   was held accountable for over 500 grams of methamphetamine, elevating his
   base offense level to thirty. And his criminal history consisted of far more
   than “two prior drug convictions.” Lincks received criminal-history points
   for six prior convictions, including three drug convictions and three
   convictions relating to hiding fugitives or obstructing justice.
          Perhaps there were circumstances making counsel’s (mis)advice
   reasonable. For example, counsel may have reasonably believed that Lincks
   would not be held accountable for the over 500 grams of methamphetamine
   that ultimately found its way into the presentence report. Or, for example,
   there may have been conversations between Lincks and his lawyer where
   these risks and possibilities were carefully discussed. But given the evidence
   of error on the limited record we have, but for our court’s case law, I would
   hold that Lincks is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to allow the district court
   to confirm whether plea counsel’s underestimation amounted to Strickland
   deficiency.

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                                        No. 21-10917

          Of course, to obtain relief under § 2255, deficient performance alone
   is not enough. Lincks must also show that he was prejudiced by the
   deficiency. The Supreme Court has instructed that the prejudice inquiry in
   the guilty-plea context asks whether there is “a reasonable probability that,
   but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and
   would have insisted on going to trial.” Lee, 582 U.S. at 364-65 (quoting Hill,
   474 U.S. at 59). Here, too, the record before us warrants further factual
   development. Before his guilty plea, Lincks wrote in an email to his lawyer,
   “It[’]s just[,] if I[’]m looking at 20 years, I mi[ght] as well just take it to trial.”
   It is difficult to imagine a clearer example of “contemporaneous evidence
   [that] substantiate[s] a defendant’s expressed preferences” to proceed to
   trial. Id. at 369.
          As explained, though, Valdez’s deficiency holding forecloses Lincks’s
   claim. For that reason, I concur in the affirmance of the district court’s
   dismissal of Lincks’s § 2255 petition.

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