Court Opinion

ID: 9681262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:47:02.098183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:32.903478
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Article 3264, Vernon’s Revised Civil Statutes of Texas authorizes and requires a city to make or to attempt to make, unless it is futile to do so, a private agreement with the owner of real estate prior to the filing of condemnation proceedings. It is particularly urged in appellants’ motion for rehearing that a city has the right to purchase property proposed to be condemned by private agreement with the owner, and to pay therefor in cash or in land owned 'by the city, and that such authority of the city to make a private trade constitutes an exception to and relieves the city from the necessity of complying with its charter provision requiring notice and hearing of intention to sell its land. We know of no reason why such an exception should be made to the requirements of the charter provision. There is no question but that the city of Abilene had the inherent and paramount right to take property needed for public purposes and authority to make a private agreement with the owner, compensating him for the land taken. Such right and authority to make a private trade with appellants concerning the compensation to be paid them did not, however, empower the city to pay appellants for their land by conveying to them land which belonged to the city without complying with the city’s charter regulating the sale of its land. The conveyance was in fact a “sale” of the land belonging to the city. Since it is agreed that the charter provision requiring notice and hearing of the sale was not complied with, the conveyance was void. This point is controlling.
The case of City of San Antonio v. Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430, 41 S.W. 477 is not, in our opinion, authority for the contention urged by appellants. The holding of the Supreme Court in that case was that since the taking of land for public use is not dependent upon the consent of the owner, that compliance with the requirements as to conveyances by married women is unnecessary; that a married woman may, with the consent of her husband, waive the invalidity of a condemnation of her separate property by accepting the compensation awarded. The amount of compensation to which she was entitled was the only matter covered by their agreement. The cited case deals with the power of a married woman, with the consent of her husband, to agree upon the amount of compensation she shall receive for land taken from her for public use without necessity of her consent. Since her consent was not required, compliance with statutory provisions concerning conveyance by her was not necessary. The case does not indicate or imply that a city may compensate the land owner for property so taken by a conveyance of land belonging to the city in violation of its charter provision. The consent of the city to such a conveyance of its land is necessary. It is also necessary that the conveyance shall comply with the city charter. The motion for rehearing is overruled.