Court Opinion

ID: 9752589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:18:12.98976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:18.265397
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 9. dissenting in part. Because I believe the state DNA-sampling statute violates the Vermont Constitution, I respectfully dissent. While I recognize that this ease differs from State v. Martin to the extent that defendant here is a violent offender, my analysis in dissent to Martin applies nonetheless. 2008 VT 53, ¶ 36, 184 Vt. 23, 955 A.2d 1144 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Like the DNA sampling of nonviolent felons, DNA sampling of violent felons without individualized suspicion or a warrant violates Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. To overcome this constitutional infirmity, even with respect to violent offenders, it is necessary for the State to satisfy the first prong of the special-needs analysis —whether there is a special need beyond normal law-enforcement needs. See id. ¶¶ 41-42. The analysis is identical regardless of the type of crime committed by the felon. Thus, it is unnecessary to discuss the distinctions between violent and nonviolent offenders that might militate in favor of sampling violent offenders under the second prong of the test — whether the State’s special need outweighs the individuals’ privacy interests. As I argued in Martin, the State cannot make a credible argument that there is a special need to collect DNA from all felons beyond general crime control, and thus the second prong of the analysis is not triggered. Id. ¶¶ 45-54.
¶ 10. With regard to the second issue, defendant did not raise the right to counsel as a constitutional matter, and therefore I would not reach that issue. I agree with the majority, however, that defendant did not have a statutory right to appointed counsel under the Public Defender Act.