Court Opinion

ID: 9946311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 17:10:46.381604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.449085
License: Public Domain

J-S05042-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 FREDERICK PRYOR                           :
               Appellant                   :
                                           :   No. 608 WDA 2023

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 25, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0013565-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                   FILED: FEBRUARY 29, 2024

      Appellant, Frederick Pryor, appeals from the post-conviction court’s April

25, 2023 order dismissing his timely-filed petition under the Post Conviction

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant raises one claim of

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. After careful review, we affirm.

      The PCRA court set forth the facts of Appellant’s case, as follows:
      On September 23, 2016, … [Appellant] entered Chuong’s Market
      on Arlington Avenue in the Arlington section of the City of
      Pittsburgh. He was wearing a Chicago White Sox hat and his face
      was concealed with some type of a scarf or other clothing. After
      walking briefly around the store, … [Appellant] approached
      PanSun Chuong, who was working the cash register at a small
      desk in the store. … [Appellant] pointed a small handgun at Ms.
      Chuong and demanded that she give him all of the money in the
      cash register. He placed a blue backpack on the counter and
      ordered her to place the money inside the backpack. While Ms.
      Chuong was removing money from the cash register, a customer
      of the store, Madeline Cole, entered the store. Ms. Cole was
      preoccupied with winning lottery tickets. She walked right past …
      [Appellant] and approached the cash register. When Ms. Cole
      realized that a robbery was in progress, … [Appellant] ordered Ms.
      Cole and Ms. Chuong to lie down in the back of the store while
J-S05042-24

     pointing the gun at them. He took the backpack full of money and
     exited the store. He left the scene in a vehicle described as a
     white GMC Yukon SUV. The robbery was captured on video
     surveillance and was played at trial. Ms. Chuong was unable to
     identify … [Appellant] because he had his face covered.

     On October 13, 2016, … [Appellant] entered the Be Nice African
     Braiding establishment in the Sheraden section of the City of
     Pittsburgh.    At the time he entered this establishment, …
     [Appellant’s] face was covered with some sort of cloth and he was
     wearing a Chicago White Sox hat. … [Appellant] again was
     wielding a handgun. Ousamne Diallo, one of the owners of the
     establishment, was in the store with a customer, braiding the
     customer’s hair. Ms. Diallo’s young child was with her in the store.
     … [Appellant] pointed the gun at Ms. Diallo and demanded that
     she give him money. He wanted money from the cash register,
     her person and her purse. … [Appellant] put his hands into Ms.
     Diallo’s pockets. Ms. Diallo complied with his demands, put the
     money into a box and gave the money to … [Appellant]. During
     the robbery, Ms. Diallo’s husband called her. … [Appellant]
     threatened Ms. Diallo to prevent her from answering the phone.
     … [Appellant] then exited the store. She was unable to identify …
     [Appellant] because his face was covered. Ms. Diallo did observe
     that … [Appellant’s] hair appeared to be in dreadlocks. Video
     surveillance of the robbery was played at trial.

     Later that same day, … [Appellant] entered Ann’s Market in the
     Hill District section of the City of Pittsburgh. Wearing the same
     Chicago White Sox hat and a cloth covering his face, … [Appellant]
     pointed a handgun at Tameika Shackleford. Ms. Shackleford was
     working the cash register. … [Appellant] demanded money and he
     also took three packs of Newport cigarettes from the business.
     Ms. Shackleford gave … [Appellant] money from the cash register
     and also from her person. Ms. Shackleford observed that …
     [Appellant’s] hair was braided or in dreadlocks.          After …
     [Appellant] left the business, Ms. Shackleford went to the side
     door of the business and observed … [Appellant] enter a white
     GMC SUV. She obtained the license plate information and called
     911. Surveillance video of the robbery at Ann’s Market was played
     at trial.

     On the same day, … [Appellant] returned to Chuong’s Market. He
     walked directly to the area where Ms. Chuong was sitting and
     pointed the gun at Ms. Chuong. He again demanded the money.
     Ms. Chuong recognized the Chicago White Sox hat and the gun

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     and literally asked … [Appellant], “you come back?” … [Appellant]
     nodded “yes.” Ms. Chuong pressed an alarm, gave … [Appellant]
     some money and … [Appellant] left the store. Again, Ms. Chuong
     was unable to identify … [Appellant] because he had his face
     covered.

     At the time of the robberies, detectives had been conducting an
     investigation into a rash of robberies in the City of Pittsburgh. On
     October 13, 2016, officers had developed a suspect vehicle
     because of the report that a white GMC SUV with a license plate
     of JZG-3310 had been observed driving away from the scene of
     the Ann’s Market robbery. The vehicle and its license plate had
     also been captured on a street surveillance camera. Officers
     learned that the registered owner of the vehicle was …
     [Appellant’s] girlfriend. Officers had also developed an address to
     which the suspect vehicle was registered, 104 Minooka Street.
     There had been a previous hit-and-run incident involving that
     vehicle and … [Appellant] had been driving the vehicle during the
     hit-and-run. Immediately after the report of the robbery at Ann’s
     Market, officers travelled to 104 Minooka Street to conduct
     surveillance on that residence. While parked near 104 Minooka
     Street, officers learned over the radio of the second robbery at
     Chuong’s Market. Shortly after learning of the Chuong’s Market
     robbery, officers observed the white GMC SUV pull up in front of
     104 Minooka Street and park. Officer Justin Simoni was one of
     the officers conducting surveillance in that area in an unmarked
     police vehicle. The emergency lights of the unmarked vehicle
     were activated and Officer Simoni’s vehicle pulled up behind the
     white GMC SUV. As Officer Simoni approached the vehicle, the
     front driver’s side door of the white GMC SUV opened. …
     [Appellant] exited the vehicle and Officer Simoni immediately
     ordered … [Appellant] to the ground. … [Appellant] did not comply
     with the order and Officer Simoni physically grabbed …
     [Appellant], placed him on the ground and handcuffed him. …
     [Appellant] was quickly brought to his feet and patted down. He
     was then transported to Pittsburgh Police Headquarters and the
     white GMC SUV was towed from the scene. It was not searched
     at the scene.

     Officers also compared surveillance video to photographs of …
     [Appellant].      … [Appellant] shared the same physical
     characteristics of the person observed in the security video of the
     robberies.

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       While at the police station, officers read … [Appellant] his
       Miranda[1] rights. … [Appellant] initially denied any involvement
       in the robberies. Officers then left the interview room to apply for
       a search warrant for the white GMC SUV. Upon their return to the
       interview room, … [Appellant] agreed to speak to the officers. His
       Miranda rights were read to him again. Officers informed him
       that they applied for a search warrant. … [Appellant] did not
       request an attorney and he did not ask for the interview to stop.
       … [Appellant] then admitted to committing all four robberies
       described above.

       The white GMC SUV was searched pursuant to a search warrant.
       A black Chicago White Sox hat, a handgun, a blue backpack, latex
       gloves and $200 in small bills were found in the vehicle. The
       parties stipulated that … [Appellant] had a prior conviction for
       robbery of a motor vehicle. … [Appellant] also had a prior
       conviction for robbery of a motor vehicle and he did not have a
       license to possess or carry a firearm.

       Additionally, germane to the instant issue, testimony was
       presented during trial that fingerprints were recovered from the
       driver’s side and the passenger side of the GMC SUV. A fingerprint
       examiner specifically testified that the fingerprint recovered from
       the driver’s side was not usable for comparison purposes. The
       fingerprint recovered from the passenger side was not a
       fingerprint of [Appellant].

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 6/26/23, at 2-5 (footnote omitted and some

formatting altered).

       Appellant was arrested and proceeded to a jury trial in April of 2019, at

the close of which he was convicted of four counts of robbery, three counts of

recklessly endangering another person, one count of carrying a firearm

without a license, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a person

prohibited. On July 30, 2019, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

term of 30 to 60 years’ incarceration, followed by five years’ probation. He
____________________________________________

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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filed a timely direct appeal, and this Court affirmed on April 21, 2021. See

Commonwealth v. Pryor, 253 A.3d 299 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished

memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with

our Supreme Court.

      Instead, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition on May 4, 2022.

Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on February 1, 2023.

Therein, Appellant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for not

objecting and requesting a mistrial when testimony offered by Commonwealth

witnesses revealed that the Commonwealth had violated Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose, during pretrial discovery, forensic

results and a forensic report. Specifically, Appellant averred:

      Prior to trial, [Appellant] filed a comprehensive motion for
      [d]iscovery. The discovery provided by the Commonwealth did
      not contain any forensic reports. During the Jury Trial, Detective
      Paul Becker (Becker) of the Mobile Crime Unit testified that he
      processed the vehicle [Appellant] was driving for DNA and
      fingerprints. As a result, two fingerprints were recovered from
      inside the vehicle. While testifying, Becker could not recall where
      the prints were lifted in the vehicle. However, he refreshed his
      recollection by reviewing his report. That report revealed that one
      print came from the passenger side, and the other from the
      driver’s side. Moreover, two DNA swabs were done: one on the
      drivers [sic] side of the steering wheel, and the other on the gear
      shift. Becker did not know to whom the prints belonged, nor did
      he know the results of the DNA swabs.

      Detective John Adams of the Mobile Crime Unit also testified. In
      that capacity, he reviewed the two fingerprints recovered from the
      GMC. One of the two prints was not usable for comparison
      purposes. The other print, which had been lifted from the
      passenger side, did not match [Appellant].

      When these witnesses testified, [Appellant] discussed with [his
      trial counsel] the fact that they hadn’t received any DNA or

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      fingerprint reports in response to their discovery request.
      [Appellant] urged [counsel] to object and to request a mistrial
      because he felt the Commonwealth purposely withheld this
      information and committed a Brady violation. [Appellant] now
      argues that [his counsel] was ineffective for failing to object
      during trial to preserve the claim, and then to raise the issue on
      direct appeal.

Amended PCRA Petition, 2/1/23, at 11-12.

      On April 4, 2023, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its

intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. On April 24, 2023,

the court issued an order dismissing his petition. However, that same day,

the court issued an order vacating its order dismissing Appellant’s petition,

presumably because Appellant had filed a response to the Rule 907 notice that

same day.     On April 25, 2023, the court issued another order dismissing

Appellant’s petition.

      On May 19, 2023, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, stating that he is

appealing from the PCRA court’s “[o]rder entered April 24, 2023, which denied

the PCRA petition.” Notice of Appeal, 5/19/23, at 1 (unnumbered). Although

Appellant’s notice of appeal purports to appeal from an order that was

vacated, our review of the record reveals that Appellant intended to appeal

from the court’s April 25, 2023 order denying his PCRA petition. A defective

notice of appeal, listing an incorrect order date, does not prevent us from

reviewing this appeal. See Commonwealth v. One 1988 Ford Coupe VIN

No. 1FABP41A9JF143651, 574 A.2d 631, 633 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1990)

(finding that an error in a notice of appeal stating an incorrect date on which

the order was entered was harmless). Apart from listing an incorrect date,

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Appellant’s notice of appeal was timely because he filed it within 30 days of

the date the April 25, 2023 order was entered.             See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a)

(directing that a notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of

order from which appeal taken). Accordingly, this Court amended our docket

to reflect that his appeal is properly from the April 25, 2023 order.

      The PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal, and he timely complied. The

court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on June 26, 2023. Herein, Appellant raises

one issue for our review:

      I.     The PCRA [c]ourt erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
             was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
             at trial and on appeal where prior counsel failed to object
             and to request a mistrial for a Brady violation when it was
             revealed during the [j]ury [t]rial that forensic results and a
             forensic report were not provided to the defense prior to
             trial.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      “This Court’s standard of review from the grant or denial of post-

conviction   relief   is   limited   to   examining   whether   the   lower   court’s

determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of

legal error.” Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. 1997)

(citing Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n.4 (Pa. 1995)).

Where, as here, a petitioner claims that he or she received ineffective

assistance of counsel, our Supreme Court has directed that the following

standards apply:

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     [A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by
     a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
     resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the
     circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
     determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
     innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
     “Counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption,
     the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance
     was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.”
     [Commonwealth v.] Colavita, … 993 A.2d [874,] 886 [(Pa.
     2010)] (citing Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ...
     (1984)]). In Pennsylvania, we have refined the Strickland
     performance and prejudice test into a three-part inquiry. See
     [Commonwealth v.] Pierce, [527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987)]. Thus,
     to prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must show that: (1)
     his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
     reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner
     suffered actual prejudice as a result. Commonwealth v. Ali, …
     10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010). “If a petitioner fails to prove any of
     these prongs, his claim fails.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, …
     66 A.3d 253, 260 ( [Pa.] 2013) (citation omitted). Generally,
     counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he
     chose a particular course of conduct that had some reasonable
     basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. See Ali, supra.
     Where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, “a finding
     that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted
     unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered
     a potential for success substantially greater than the course
     actually pursued.” Colavita, … 993 A.2d at 887 (quotation and
     quotation marks omitted).         To demonstrate prejudice, the
     petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that,
     but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
     proceedings would have been different.” Commonwealth v.
     King, … 57 A.3d 607, 613 ([Pa.] 2012) (quotation, quotation
     marks, and citation omitted). “‘[A] reasonable probability is a
     probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the
     outcome of the proceeding.’” Ali, … 10 A.3d at 291 (quoting
     Commonwealth v. Collins, … 957 A.2d 237, 244 ([Pa.] 2008)
     (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694….)).

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (Pa. 2014).

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      Here, Appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not

objecting, and requesting a mistrial, when it became apparent that the

Commonwealth committed a purported Brady violation by not turning over,

during pretrial discovery, forensic reports relating to fingerprint and DNA

testing that was conducted in this case.

      Under Brady and subsequent decisional law, a prosecutor has an
      obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material to the
      guilt or punishment of an accused, including evidence of an
      impeachment nature. To establish a Brady violation, an appellant
      must prove three elements:

         (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the accused,
         either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2)
         the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either
         willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued.

      The burden rests with the appellant to prove, by reference to the
      record, that evidence was withheld or suppressed by the
      prosecution. The evidence at issue must have been material
      evidence that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Favorable
      evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its
      suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable
      probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
      the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
      reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
      confidence in the outcome.

      Brady does not require the disclosure of information that is not
      exculpatory but might merely form the groundwork for possible
      arguments or defenses, nor does Brady require the prosecution
      to disclose every fruitless lead considered during a criminal
      investigation.

Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 607–08 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

      Instantly, Appellant contends that he has satisfied the three prongs of

establishing a Brady violation.    First, he insists that the Commonwealth

withheld the forensic reports concerning the fingerprint and DNA testing, and

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that he “did not know of the results until the middle of his [j]ury [t]rial.”

Appellant’s Brief at 18.   Second, Appellant argues that the reports were

“favorable evidence” because they showed that “the usable fingerprint did not

match [Appellant],” and “the evidence of someone else’s prints inside the

vehicle tend to establish [Appellant’s] innocence by demonstrating that other

people had access to the vehicle.”      Id.   Third, Appellant claims he was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to pursue this “successful Brady claim,” id.,

because, “had counsel objected and requested a mistrial, the trial court would

have granted the motion. If the court would have denied the motion, the

issue would have been preserved for direct appeal where [Appellant] believes

the Superior Court would have vacated the judgment and convicted and

remanded for a new trial.” Id. at 19-20. Appellant also contends that, had

the Commonwealth turned over the at-issue forensic fingerprint report prior

to trial, “then [Appellant’s] trial strategy would have incorporated its

existence” and “[t]he defense would have capitalized on a forensic report

which established that prints found on the vehicle did not belong to

[Appellant].” Id. at 21. Thus, Appellant stresses that his “entire case was

prejudiced because he did not have this report[,]” and had this Brady

violation not occurred, “it certainly would have produced a different outcome.”

Id. Consequently, he concludes that his “prior counsel rendered ineffective

assistance for failing to object and to preserve this issue for appeal.” Id.

      We disagree.    Initially, as both the PCRA court and Commonwealth

emphasize, the jury heard that Appellant’s fingerprints did not match the

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usable fingerprint recovered from the vehicle. See PCO at 7 (“The fingerprint

examiner did, in fact, explain to the jury that the fingerprints could not be

attributed to [Appellant].”); Commonwealth’s Brief at 12-15 (detailing the

testimony that revealed that Appellant’s fingerprints did not match the usable

print found). Specifically, Detective Becker testified that two fingerprints were

recovered from the vehicle, one from the passenger side and one from the

driver side. See N.T. Trial, 4/22/19-4/25/19, at 140, 141. Detective Adams,

a fingerprint examiner, testified that the driver side fingerprint was “not usable

for comparison purposes.”     Id. at 148, 149. The lift that came “from the

passenger door handle of the vehicle” was “usable[,]” meaning “[i]t did

contain sufficient information to be used for comparison purposes.” Id. at

148, 149. However, Detective Adams testified that he when compared “the

fingerprint to known fingerprints of [Appellant,]” the detective found “[t]hey

were not his.” Id. at 149.

      Given that the jury heard that no fingerprints found in the vehicle were

able to be matched Appellant’s fingerprints, he has failed to demonstrate the

prejudice prong of the test for establishing a Brady violation.         Although

Appellant insists that, had he received the forensic report prior to trial, he

“would have capitalized” on it, and “incorporated its existence” into his “trial

strategy[,]” he offers no elaboration on these generic and undeveloped claims.

Appellant’s Brief at 21.

      Moreover, as the PCRA court and the Commonwealth stress, Appellant

confessed to committing the crimes. See PCO at 7; Commonwealth’s Brief at

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15.   In addition, “his physical appearance is consistent with that of the

perpetrator; the car [A]ppellant was driving matched the license plate number

provided by one of the victims; [A]ppellant was apprehended in that car

shortly after one of the robberies had occurred; and items consistent with

those used in the robberies were found in [A]ppellant’s car.” Commonwealth’s

Brief at 15-16 (citations to the record omitted).             We agree with the

Commonwealth that, “[b]ased on this evidence, it is not reasonably probable

that the outcome of [A]ppellant’s trial would have been different had the

results of the fingerprint reports been disclosed prior to trial. Appellant cannot

establish that he suffered prejudice under Brady….” Id. at 16. Accordingly,

because   Appellant   has   not   proven   that   prejudice    ensued   from    the

Commonwealth’s alleged Brady violation, his claim that his trial counsel acted

ineffectively for failing to raise this Brady violation lacks arguable merit.

      Finally, we mention that, although Appellant claimed in his PCRA petition

that the Commonwealth also violated Brady for failing to disclose DNA test

results prior to trial, he does not meaningfully develop any argument

regarding this evidence, other than to point out that Detective Becker testified

that “two DNA swabs were done” and the detective did not know the results

of those swabs. Appellant’s Brief at 16 (citing N.T. Trial at 142, 143). Thus,

we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant “failed to show that the

Commonwealth possessed favorable evidence regarding DNA[,]” as he “does

not attempt to establish that DNA results exist” and he failed to “request

discovery” before the PCRA court “to find out if such results exist.”

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Commonwealth’s Brief at 16, 17. Accordingly, no relief is due on this claim,

either.

      Order affirmed.

DATE: 2/29/2024

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