Court Opinion

ID: 9584594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:50:28.129027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:16.340943
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for the State Highway Department in their motion for rehearing quote from an act of the General Assembly approved March 7, 1955 (Ga. L. 1955, pp. 559-564), entitled, "Limited-Access Highways,” a provision from § 3 wherein it is provided that any limited-access highway may be accepted as a part of the “State Highway System.” Counsel then quote from § 5 of that act as follows: “The State Highway Department of Georgia and the highway authorities of the counties or municipalities in the State may acquire private or public property and property rights for limited-access facilities and service roads, including rights of access, air, view and light through gift, devise, purchase or condemnation in the same manner as such governmental units are now or may hereafter be authorized by law to acquire such property or property rights in connection with highways and streets within their respective jurisdictions.” The argument is made that: “. . . it becomes clear that it was the purpose and intention of the State Highway Department and the State Highway Board te> condemn the subject property for a limited access highway and which was to be a part of the State Aid Road System, and this they were authorized to do by the plain provisions of these Code sections [the sections referred to being from the act of 1955 as herein set forth].”
This argument fails to' take into account the rule heretofore stated that the power to condemn will be strictly construed and will not be permitted except where affirmatively granted. Under the act of the General Assembly of 1961 (Ga. L. 1961, pp. 517-529), the authority to condemn in the manner therein provided was affirmatively granted only as to “State-aid” roads. “State-aid” roads are defined, as heretofore shown, by the law of this *305State. Pursuant to the provisions of Code Ann. Ch. 95-16, and more particularly §§ 95-1609, 95-1611, 95-1615, 95-1616, from the act of 1951 (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 31-39) and Ga. L. 1960, pp. 1109-1110, there are many roads and bridges in the “State Highway System of Georgia” which do not come within the classification of a “State-aid” road as defined by the General Assembly.
“One legislature can not lawfully provide that whenever a subsequent legislature enacts a statute with reference to a given subject, such statute shall embrace certain specified provisions. It can not tie the hands of its successors, or impose upon them conditions, with reference to subjects upon which they have equal power to legislate.” Walker v. McNelly, 121 Ga. 114, 120 (48 SE 718). See also Hamrick v. Rouse, 17 Ga. 56, 60; Daly v. Harris, 33 Ga. Supp. 38, 50; State v. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co., 54 Ga. 423, 426; Pierce v. Powell, 188 Ga. 481, 484 (4 SE2d 192); State Ports Authority v. Arnall, 201 Ga. 713, 728 (41 SE2d 246).
It is significant that the act of 1961 is the only one of a number of acts (Code Chs. 36-2, 36-11; Ga. L. 1957, pp. 387-397, Code Ann. Supp. Ch. 36-6a) conferring upon the State Highway Department the power to condemn for road purposes that limits the power to condemn to a particular type of road. It is further significant that the 1961 act as introduced in the General Assembly was without limitation as to what roads it would apply, and that the limitation to “State-aid” roads was imposed by committee substitute, as heretofore shown in our opinion. The limitation imposed by the act of 1961 to “State-aid” roads is a limitation within the legislative powers of the General Assembly, and one which this court is without authority to vacate or set aside.