Court Opinion

ID: 9808814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:51:50.109221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:12.503745
License: Public Domain

Clark, O. J.,
dissenting. In a proceeding duly constituted in a court of competent jurisdiction, and in which the defendant G. Dallas Allred was defendant, the jury found that Nancy Allred was without sufficient mental capacity to execute the deed to G. Dallas Allred covering the land in question, and the Court adjudged that said deed “from Nancy Allred to G. Dallas Allred is void and of no effect. And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said deed be delivered up and cancelled of record ” with further judgment that the decree should be certified to the Register of Deeds, to be recorded in his office. The deed being-adjudged “void and of no effect,” the title of the grantee thereunder absolutely ceased (The Code, sections 426, 428) as fully as if a reconveyance had been executed and recorded. The proceeding was in the nature of an action to remove a cloud from the title, and the judgment, acting upon title to property, adjudging the conveyance to the defendant to the action to be null and void, and directing its cancellation and the registration of the decree in the register’s office, where the conveyance to the defendant had been recorded, such proceeding has been held “though not strictly proceedings in rem, * * * yet they are regarded as proceedings in rem sub modo.” Hence the judgment cancelling the defendant’s title rendered it invalid as to all the world, as is the case with all judgments in rem. The matter stands therefore as if the conveyance to G. Dallas Allred had never been made. He certainly is bound by the judgment. The decree renders the deed void ah initio, and, if void, it is void as to every one, especially as to the plaintiffs who claim under Nancy Allred. The decree having directed the cancellation *456of the deed, and the registration of the decree in the register’s office, there is, in contemplation of law, no such conveyance in existence. The registration of the decree of cancellation was directed, that purchasers from G. D. Allred should have notice that he could convey no title. lie cannot now set up a title when a purchaser from him could not acquire title from him.
It matters not at whose instance, as plaintiff, such decree was rendered, or that it was at the instance of only one of several co-tenants. It was rendered against the defendant; it binds him. Its effect was to declare that the title has never proceeded out of Nancy Allred and to cancel the conveyance and to strike the registration thereof off the register’s books. It is not open therefore to the grantee in such deed to set it up as valid in this proceeding to partition the land, especially against the plaintiffs, who have acquired by descent all of Nancy Allred’s title, save the share which has descended to him. He holds that share by descent, the same title by which the plaintiffs hold theirs, and not under the void deed.
If in the proceeding to declare the deed void it had been held valid, this would have been a judgment in personam against Willie Allred, the plaintiff therein, and would not bind the other plaintiffs herein because they do not claim under Willie Allred. But the judgment declaring the deed void and directing its cancellation acts quasi in rem sub modo upon the title which it sets aside, and is binding upon G. I). Allred, who is the same defendant, and who in this action attempts to set up the same title which, as against him, has been declared void. Further, being a decree quasi in rem sub modo, it is binding upon all who might claim under G. D. Allred. The decree of cancellation, registered as decreed, is notice to all the world. The Code, sections 426, 428.
*457Closely analagous is the case wherein an application of a railroad company to acquire the right to use the track of another company for purposes of its business, the applicant was held concluded by a former adjudication against its corporate existence, rendered in a former proceeding by the same plaintiff for the same purpose against another railroad company. (In re Brooklyn Railroad, 19 Hun, 314), and a determination that a creditor is entitled to share in a fund. Eppright v. Kauffman,, 90 Mo., 25. The adjudication here that the deed is void is a judgment upon the rem, upon the status of the title, denying G. D. Allred’s interest thereunder, and is conclusive upon him whenever and wherever thereafter he sets up title in himself under the deed which has been adjudged void and directed to be cancelled. The principle is res judicata and not strictly matter in estop-pel. 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. (2 Ed.), 712. The judgment setting aside the deed to G. E. Allred, as void, enured to the benefit of the other plaintiffs, as co-tenants, who became thereupon beneficiaries under and privies to the decree which cancelled the deed. The legal consequence of the judgment, declaring the deed void as to G. D. Allred, can be availed of by strangers to the action. 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. (2 Ed.), 391.
The judgment is also admissible, even if between strangers, as a link in the plaintiffs’ title, since it cancels the cloud cast upon it by the deed from Nancy Allred to G. D. Allred. 24 Am. & Eng. Ency., 757. Especially when, as here, the decree is a decree in chancery. Ibid., 758, and cases cited in note 2.
It was error certainly to render final judgment upon overruling the demurrer, unless it was found that'the demurrer had not been “interposed in good faith.” The Code, section 272; Moore v. Hobbs, 77 N. C., 65; Bronson v. Ins. Co., 85 N. C., 411.
*458The deed was voidable, i. e., valid till declared void by the Court. Odom v. Riddick, 104 N. C., 515. But when adjudged void and directed to be cancelled, it ceased to be voidable and became absolutely void. No conveyance bad been made to third parties by G. D. Allred prior' to such decree. A conveyance by him thereafter would be void, and certainly no title remained in him when he could convey none.