Court Opinion

ID: 9514163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:44:59.556637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:13.020673
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 26] I concur in part II of the majority opinion which concludes the district court did not err in denying Nygaard’s motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. I dissent to part III of the majority opinion, particularly that portion of paragraph 22 which concludes the trial court’s findings “are sparse, but are adequate to understand the basis for its decision.”
[¶ 27] I appreciate the need for brevity and the use of preprinted forms in which the trial judge merely checks the appropriate box. These “findings” are more in the nature of conclusions and result in this Court reviewing the record to determine whether there was evidence to support the “findings.” That is our normal procedure where the issue on appeal is whether or not the findings are clearly erroneous, ie., whether or not there is evidence to support the findings. But, when the findings are more in the nature of conclusions, this Court, rather than the trial court, can too easily become the real fact finder. To the extent the contention is made that this Court on occasion retries the case when the standard of review is not de novo but rather whether or not the findings of the court are clearly erroneous as required by N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), these “sparse” findings lend credence to that contention.
[¶ 28] Having said that, I have authored and participated in opinions which have concluded that although the findings of the trial court are less than desired, they are nevertheless adequate to understand the reasons for its decision. My concern in this case, however, is the interplay between sections II and III of the majority opinion. In section II, at paragraph 11, the majority concludes that the trial court’s dismissal of the first petition “operates as an adjudication on the merits of the allegations raised in that claim under the language of N.D.R.Civ.P. 41(b).” In paragraph 14, the majority notes that some of the allegations in the second petition are the same general allegations that are in the first petition but the second petition also includes allegations that were not contained in the first petition and concludes:
*126Here, some of the allegations in Hanne-man’s second petition occurred after her first petition was filed, including some different factual circumstances that reflect credible assertions of continuing abusive conduct by Nygaard toward Hanneman. Under these circumstances and on this record, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Ny-gaard’s motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
[¶ 29] But, I cannot determine from the “sparse findings” whether the trial court relied on those allegations in the second petition which were also contained in the first petition and which we conclude were adjudicated on the merits in the dismissal of the first petition under N.D.R.Civ.P. 41(b) or whether the trial court relied on the new allegations contained in the second petition. Under these circumstances I would reverse and remand for further findings of fact sufficient to enable us to understand the factual determinations made by the trial court and the basis for its conclusions of law.
[¶ 30] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J.