Court Opinion

ID: 9676323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:21:54.857601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:47.619981
License: Public Domain

*204Griffin, J.
(dissenting). Although I was not a member of this Court when Hyde v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223; 393 NW2d 847 (1986), was decided, I find it difficult to believe that a majority of the Hyde Court would have intended this result.
The Court’s holding today penalizes these defendants because, prior to Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), they did not anticipate the decisions in Ross and Hyde, nor did they divine the interpretation handed down today as to the meaning of Hyde. These defendants lose because they did not have the clairvoyance prior to Ross to move for summary disposition or raise immunity as an affirmative defense.
I find this particularly disturbing in light of the acknowledgment by the Ross Court itself that "[sovereign and governmental immunity are not affirmative defenses, but characteristics of government which prevent imposition of tort liability upon the governmental agency.” Further, in order to state a cause of action against a governmental agency, "plaintiffs must plead facts in their complaint in avoidance of immunity . . . .” 420 Mich 621, n 34.
The same point was reiterated by the Hyde Court, which recognized:
Unlike other claims of immunity, sovereign and governmental immunity are not affirmative defenses, but characteristics of government which prevent imposition of tort liability. Ross, supra; Galli [v Kirkeby, 398 Mich 527, 541, n 5; 248 NW2d 149 (1976)]; McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65, 77, n 1; 247 NW2d 521 (1976). Compare MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a). [426 Mich 261, n 35.]
*205Earlier, in McCann, Justice Ryan had provided this explanation:
At first impression, it may appear appropriate to characterize governmental immunity as an affirmative defense. However, a careful analysis of the doctrine as construed by this Court indicates that, to plead a cause of action against the state or its agencies, the plaintiff must plead and prove facts in avoidance of immunity. In McNair v State Hwy Dep’t, 305 Mich 181, 187; 9 NW2d 52 (1943), for instance, we held that the state’s failure to plead sovereign immunity will not constitute a waiver because "failure to plead the defense of sovereign immunity cannot create a cause of action where none existed before.” In Penix v City of St Johns, 354 Mich 259; 92 NW2d 332 (1958), we held that a complaint which contained no averment that the defendant was engaging in a proprietary function, and which in fact alleged activity to which governmental immunity applied, stated no cause of action against the municipality. Thus, although we have on occasion referred to governmental immunity as a defense, see McNair v State Hwy Dep’t; Martinson v Alpena, 328 Mich 595, 599; 44 NW2d 148 (1950), our past treatment of the doctrine indicates that its inapplicability is an element of a plaintiffs case against the state. [398 Mich 77, n 1.]
Moreover, this Court has held that the authority to waive a governmental body’s sovereign or governmental immunity rests only with the Legislature. Benson v State Hosp Comm, 316 Mich 66; 25 NW2d 112 (1946).1 See also McNair v State Hwy Dep’t, 305 Mich 181, 187; 9 NW2d 52 (1943), wherein we said,
If, as we hold, such defense [governmental immunity] can only be waived by legislative action, then it necessarily follows that the attorney general, an officer of the State of Michigan, may not *206waive such defense. Moreover, the failure to plead the defense of sovereign immunity cannot create a cause of action where none existed before. [Emphasis added.]
It might be argued that pleading requirements were changed by a court rule amendment effective March 1, 1985, which added "immunity granted by law” to the list of affirmative defenses. MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a). However, that amendment merely clarified that an individual who claims immunity must plead it as an affirmative defense. Appellate court decisions issued subsequent to adoption of the amendment have indicated that pleading requirements with respect to a governmental entity remain unaffected. See Hyde, supra, 426 Mich 261 (which specifically refers to the 1985 amendment). See also Hoffman v Genesee Co, 157 Mich App 1, 7-8; 403 NW2d 485 (1987), lv den 428 Mich 902 (1987), and Canon v Thumudo, 430 Mich 326, 344, n 10; 422 NW2d 688 (1988), wherein a majority of this Court recently said:
Unlike a claim of individual immunity, sovereign and governmental immunity are not affirmative defenses, but characteristics of government which prevent imposition of tort liability. A plaintiff therefore bears the burden of pleading facts in the complaint which show that the action is not barred by the governmental immunity act. MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq. This may be accomplished by pleading facts which show that the tort occurred during the exercise of a nongovernmental or proprietary function or by stating a claim which fits within one of the statutory exceptions. Hyde, supra, p 261, n 35; Ross, supra, p 621, n 34; Galli v Kirkeby, 398 Mich 527, 541; 248 NW2d 149 (1976); McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65, 77, n 1; 247 NW2d 521 (1976).
*207As I read the postamendment appellate decisions, a plaintiff still is required to allege facts in avoidance of immunity in order to plead a cause of action against the state or its agencies, and a governmental entity cloaked with immunity still is not required to plead immunity as an affirmative defense.
It is ironic and unjust that similarly situated plaintiffs who filed defective pleadings prior to Ross will benefit by the majority’s decision today, while plaintiffs who followed the rules and pleaded facts in avoidance of immunity will be penalized. This stands the law of governmental immunity on its head.
The phrase "raised and preserved” employed in Hyde contemplates an appellate court review of the record made in a trial court. I see nothing in this Court’s opinions in Ross or Hyde which should necessarily preclude the timely preservation of issues for appeal.
Reliance by parties on the state of the law should be a very important factor in determining the prospective-retroactive application of a law-changing decision. Plaintiffs in both of the cases before us relied on Parker and did not plead facts in avoidance of governmental immunity. The defendants in both cases also relied on Parker and did not file what at the time would have been a frivolous motion for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity. Within a short time after Ross was decided, both defendants moved for summary disposition on immunity grounds. Under the circumstances, I conclude that the immunity issue was timely raised and preserved in the only way that made any sense at the time.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in Stein, and I would reverse its decision in Rifkin.

 In view of the status and powers conferred by article 8 of the 1963 Constitution upon certain public universities, including the Univer*206sity of Michigan, a party defendant in one of the cases consolidated in this appeal, the argument is available that immunity could be waived in the case of such a university by its governing board.