Court Opinion

ID: 9382611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 14:06:06.691052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:40.359298
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-763

               ADOPTION OF RAMSEY (and a companion case1).

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The mother appeals from decrees by a judge of the Juvenile

 Court terminating her parental rights to her son, Ramsey, and

 her daughter, Amy.2      She does not challenge the judge's finding

 of unfitness, nor does she contest the termination of her

 parental rights.      She argues only that the judge abused her

 discretion in not ordering posttermination and postadoption

 visitation, and that some of the judge's findings of fact on

 this point were clearly erroneous.          We affirm.

       Background.     We summarize only those facts relevant to the

 issue presented on appeal.        In January 2020, after several

 months of involvement with the mother and father stemming from,

 among other things, incidences of domestic violence within the

 family and concerns about the mother's mental health and

 1 Adoption of Amy. The children's names are pseudonyms.
 2 The father did not join in the mother's appeal and is not a
 party to these proceedings.
substance misuse, the Department of Children and Families

(department) obtained emergency custody of Ramsey and Amy.      The

following day, the department filed a care and protection

petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, on behalf of both

children.   Ramsey was sixteen months old, and Amy was one month

old at that time.   The department was awarded temporary custody

and retained custody through trial.

    Initially, the department, intending to unify the children

with the mother, provided the mother with weekly visitation.

From January 2020 through March 12, 2020, the visits went well

with the mother, who brought the necessary supplies and

appropriate snacks.   The visits were virtual from March through

July 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.   When in-person

visits resumed on July 28, 2020, mother continued to be engaged.

Visitation was expanded to include unsupervised visits in

November of 2020, and then to overnight visits in December of

2020.   These visits went relatively well, but in April 2021,

visitation was decreased to one-hour supervised weekly visits

due to recurring incidents of domestic violence resulting in

mother's arrest on several occasions.   In addition, the mother

failed to participate in mental health services as required by

her action plan.    From July 2021 until the date of trial, the

mother cancelled approximately one-half of her scheduled visits.

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    A trial was held on November 4, 2021.    The mother, who had

an outstanding warrant for assault and battery on a family or

household member, did not appear, and the judge drew a negative

inference against her.   At the conclusion of the trial, the

judge found that the children were in need of care and

protection, terminated the mother and the father's parental

rights, and dispensed with the need for parental consent to

adoption.   The judge also found that posttermination or

postadoption visitation or contact would not be in the

children's best interests because there was no significant,

existing bond between them and the mother.   Specifically, the

judge explained:

    "[Ramsey] was one and a half years old when he was removed
    from Mother's care. [Amy] was only three weeks old at the
    time of removal. Both children have now spent more time
    living apart from Mother than with her. Despite consistent
    visitation between Mother and the children for much of this
    case, Mother continues to engage in behaviors including
    domestic violence and substance use that inhibit the
    formation of a healthy bond with the subject children.
    Prior to July 2020, Mother was engaged with the children
    during the visits. After July 2020, there is nothing to
    demonstrate to show that she did anything beyond merely
    attending the visits. Mother did not testify and did not
    submit evidence indicating positive interactions during the
    visits. Mother did not offer, for example, anything to
    indicate [that] she and the children have a bond."

In reaching her conclusion, the judge also considered the fact

that there was nothing to suggest that the children's foster

parents, with whom they had spent the majority of their lives,

would not facilitate visitation between the children and mother.

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    Discussion.   The mother argues that the judge abused her

discretion by not ordering posttermination and postadoption

visitation.   She asserts that the judge's finding that there was

no evidence of a significant bond between her and the children

was clearly erroneous, that the judge erred in finding that her

behaviors inhibited the formation of a healthy bond with the

children, and that the judge's consideration of the foster

family's willingness to facilitate visitation was clear error.

    As an initial matter, the department and the children argue

that the mother has waived the issue of posttermination and

postadoption visitation because she failed to request such

visitation at trial.    In response, the mother claims that the

entry of an order for posttermination and postadoption

visitation is always within the court's equitable authority, and

therefore no additional notice is required to preserve the issue

for appeal.   Although we are inclined to agree with the

department and the children that the issue is waived, see

Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 129 (2001), we need not

resolve this issue because we discern no abuse of discretion in

the judge's decision.

    Once it is established that a parent is unfit, the decision

whether to grant posttermination or postadoption visitation is

left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.    See Adoption

of John, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 431, 439 (2001).    The decision must

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be grounded in the best interests of the child.    See Adoption of

Terrance, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 832, 839 (2003).    An order for

posttermination or postadoption visitation is not warranted in

the absence of a finding that a significant bond exists between

the child and a biological parent and that continued contact is

currently in the best interests of the child.     See Adoption of

Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 563-564 (2000).

    The judge did not abuse her discretion or rely on clearly

erroneous findings to reach her conclusion.     As the judge noted,

at the time of trial Ramsey had not lived with the mother since

he was sixteen months old, and Amy had not lived with the mother

since she was three weeks old.   Although many of the visits

between the mother and the children were successful at first,

later, as the judge observed, "Mother continue[d] to engage in

behaviors including domestic violence and substance use," and

"there is nothing to demonstrate . . . that she did anything

beyond merely attending the visits" after July 2020.

    The mother argues that the judge's finding that there was

no evidence of positive engagement by the mother during visits

after July 2020 was arbitrary and clearly erroneous.    At oral

argument, counsel for the children conceded that this date may

have been a scrivener's error and that the judge may have

intended to write "July 2021."   This may be so, but any

potential error in the date is not dispositive.    Contrary to the

                                 5
mother's assertion, the record fully supports the judge's

finding that at the time of trial there was no evidence of

positive engagement.   As previously noted, by April 2021, the

mother's visits were significantly reduced because she had

disengaged from all services and had been arrested for assault

and battery on a family member and malicious destruction of

property.

    The mother also argues that the judge erred in finding that

her "behaviors," including domestic violence and substance use,

were inhibiting the formation of a healthy bond with her

children.   She argues that it was improper for the judge to

consider the impact of these behaviors on the bond between her

and the children absent any expert testimony or other

corroborating evidence.

    We are not persuaded.    The judge could properly consider,

as she did, the effects of domestic violence and the mother's

substance use on her ability to form a bond with the children.

For example, in April 2021, the mother's visits were decreased

from overnight visitation to one-hour supervised visitation "due

to Mother's continued involvement in domestic disputes with

Father, due to Mother's medication issues, and her discharge

from all mental health services."    Then, from July 2021 to the

date of trial, the mother cancelled eight of her seventeen

scheduled visits.   On the basis of these facts, it was

                                 6
reasonable to conclude that the mother's behavior was preventing

her from establishing a positive relationship with her children.

See Vito, 431 Mass. at 562 (orders for postadoption visitation

are "based on emotional bonding and other circumstances of the

actual personal relationship of the child and the biological

parent").

    Finally, the mother argues that the judge erred in

considering the foster parents' willingness to facilitate

posttermination visitation.   The judge found that the "[m]other

likewise presented no evidence to indicate that the current

foster home is unable or unwilling to facilitate visits in the

best interests of the subject children such that they should not

be given discretion to determine post-termination contact."     The

mother argues that, since the foster parents were not designated

as a preadoptive resource, the judge should not have considered

their position on visitation.

    In support of her position, the mother cites Adoption of

Rico, 453 Mass. 749, 754 (2009), in which the Supreme Judicial

Court stated that "an order for postadoption contact is more

likely 'where no preadoptive family has yet been identified, and

where a principal, if not the only parent-child relationship in

the child's life remains with the biological parent.'"   Id.,

quoting Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. at 564.   However, Adoption

of Rico states only that postadoption visitation is more likely

                                 7
where there is no identified preadoptive family, not that it is

mandatory.    Adoption of Rico, supra.   Here, the judge's decision

was grounded in the best interests of the children, and her

consideration of the foster parents' position was only one

factor in the calculus.    We discern no error in these

circumstances.

                                      Decrees affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Vuono,
                                        Sullivan & Singh, JJ.3),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    March 28, 2023.

3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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