Court Opinion

ID: 9776767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:44:27.647527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:20.768619
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority opinion affirming this case. I think it should be reversed and remanded for a new trial for reasons which will be set out below. The majority dealt with the argument relating to alleged erroneous instructions. For example, plaintiffs’ requested instruction No. 19 (AMI 2201) was deleted in the following manner: (1) The reasonable expense of any necessary medical care, treatment and services received, and the-prcscnt value of such expenses reasonably certain to be required in the future? Plaintiffs’ instruction No. 18 (AMI 2201) was also modified by the court as follows: First, the nature, extent, and duration and pcrmaneney of any injury, and whether it is temporary or permanent. (2202(c). In this regard you should consider the full extent of any injury sustained, even though the degree of injury is found by you to have proximately resulted from the aggravation of a condition that already existed and that predisposed Brenda Waterfield to injury to a greater extent than another any^person. (2203) Second, any pain and suffering, and mental anguish, experienced in the past and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future. (2205) Third, the value of any earnings lost. (2-206) Fourth, the present value of any loss of ability to cam in-the future. (2207) Fifth, any disfigurement and visible results of her injury. Testimony by more than one physician was to the effect that appellant, Brenda P. Waterfield, would not be recommended for work involving bending, stooping, twisting and lifting. One orthopedic surgeon testified her injuries would preclude her from doing heavy manual labor. She was given a 10% permanent partial rating to the body as a whole by at least one doctor. In view of this medical testimony, I am positive that it was error for the court to delete that portion of the instruction relating to the permanency, as well as the loss of ability to earn in the future. The appellant testified she lost at least one day of work and that she had to stay in a stooped or bent position after sitting for any length of time. I think this is evidence from which the jury could have found she had lost wages and that she had visible results of her injury. Also, I think it was error for the court to delete that portion of the instruction relating to the present value of medical expenses reasonably certain to be required in the future. More than one doctor unequivocally stated she probably would have to take medication for the rest of her life. The majority held that it was not error or the verdict was not invalid because no damages were awarded to the husband. At least the testimony was amgibuous as to which of the parties had paid medical expenses incurred. Certainly, the husband had the duty to pay this and he would, no doubt, have the duty to pay future medical expenses. Although we have not previously ruled on the matter of the invalidity of a verdict when a pecuniary award for loss was made to the injured spouse and denied to the one not receiving personal injury, I think we should have taken the other course and held such verdict to be invalid. The majority held, in accordance with our prior cases, that an affidavit from a juror could not be introduced on anything except whether outside influence or extraneous prejudicial information was brought to the jury’s attention. I think our prior rulings, including this one, are too restrictive in this manner. For example, one juror stated the husband was probably out at the time of the accident conducting himself in a manner not appropriate for a married man. I am sure this was not presented as proper evidence. Therefore, at least one j uror considered extraneous prejudicial information. For the above reasons I would reverse and remand for another trial.