Court Opinion

ID: 9674628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:32:12.48285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.648207
License: Public Domain

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING.
PER CURIAM.
In an application for a rehearing the prosecuting attorney contends, inter alia, that “it seems apparent” from a reading of the majority opinion that the Court was primarily concerned with the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This is not a correct statement. The opinion plainly discloses that we were giving a résumé of the irreconcilable evidence so that we might “ * * * properly evaluate and dispose of the errors alleged to have been committed, particularly those forming the basis of Bills of Exceptions Nos. 2, 9 and 15”.
A reading of the opinion also reveals that, while we expressed disapproval of several rulings of the judge,1 we did not hold that any of these rulings or omissions constituted reversible error.
Indeed, as clearly stated in the opinion, the most serious error committed in the case, on which our reversal of the conviction was primarily based, occurred when the judge virtually permitted the juror, Wolf, to recuse himself because he, the *619juror, felt that there was a conflict of interest which might affect his verdict in the case. The rationale of our ruling on this bill of exception (No. 8) was that LSA-R.S. 15:362 requires the judge himself to ascertain from the facts whether there is cause which warrants the discharge of a juror while he is participating in the trial of the case; the judge may not accept the juror’s conclusion that he is unable or disqualified to perform his duty, particularly (as in this case) where there has been no disclosure of the facts on which the juror’s decision is based.
In the application for rehearing it is stressed that, even if error was committed by the judge in acting on the mere opinion of the juror, defendant was not prejudiced thereby because he was not entitled to be tried by a jury composed of any particular individuals. To support this argument, much reliance is placed upon certain dictum of the Supreme Court of California in People v. Abbott, 47 Cal.2d 362, 303 P.2d 730, which is quoted from at length in the dissenting opinion in the case at bar.
 It is, of course, true that an accused is not entitled to be tried by a jury composed of any particular individuals. But this simply means that the accused may not demand, in the selection of a jury, a particular individual or individuals whom he believes might be favorable to him. The situation is not the same after the jury has been selected and the case is on trial. For when jeopardy attaches we think it manifest that the accused has a right to have the particular jurors selected to try him decide his fate, save in cases of death, illness or any other cause which renders a juror unfit or disqualified to perform his duty as prescribed by LSA-R.S. 15:362. We regard this right of the accused to be a substantial one, the improper deprivation of which is prejudicial. Hence, Article 557 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (LSA-R.S. 15 :557), which deals with harmless error, is inapplicable.
With due respect to the contrary dictum contained in People v. Abbott, supra, it suffices to say that we do not subscribe thereto.
The application for rehearing is denied.
HAWTHORNE, J., thinks a rehearing should be granted.

. Specifically, anent the propriety of some of the statements made by the district attorney in his opening statement to the jury (Bill of Exceptions No. 2); his failure to instruct the jury to disregard the statement of the district attorney (in interrogatory form) that the ball peen hammer, which he (the district attorney) was exhibiting to the jury, “Wouldn’t take much for it to be a sledge hammer, would it?” (Bill of Exceptions No. 5); his refusal to grant defendant's request that the jury be permitted to return to the airfield so that they could again view the plane after they had heard the testimony of the prosecuting witness and defendant (Bill of Exceptions No. 9); his use of an illustration of a child and a man in stressing in his general charge the force necessary for a valid plea of self defense (Bill No. 13) and Ms failure to grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence (Bill No. 15).