Court Opinion

ID: 9912228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 21:00:42.488658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:05.357893
License: Public Domain

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                                               UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                 No. 22-1420

        M.D. RUSSELL CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

                     Plaintiff – Appellant,

               v.

        CONSOLIDATED STAFFING, INC.,

                     Defendant – Appellee,

               and

        VERLIANCE, INC., f/k/a Altus Global Recovery, Inc., d/b/a Altus Global Trade
        Solutions; ALTUS RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT, INC., f/k/a Altus GTS Inc.,
        d/b/a Altus Global Trade Solutions,

                     Defendants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (7:19-cv-00221-BO)

        Argued: October 26, 2023                                     Decided: December 20, 2023

        Before GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and Robert S. BALLOU, United States
        District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion in which Judge Gregory
        and Judge Ballou joined.
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        ARGUED: Matthew William Buckmiller, BUCKMILLER, BOYETTE & FROST, PLLC,
        Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Philip Andrew Hinson, LEWIS BRISBOIS
        BISGAARD & SMITH, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Joseph Z.
        Frost, BUCKMILLER, BOYETTE & FROST, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
        Appellant. Kevin V. Parsons, LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP, Charlotte,
        North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        AGEE, Circuit Judge:

               M.D. Russell Construction, Inc. (“Contractor”) appeals the district court’s grant of

        summary judgment to Consolidated Staffing, Inc. (“Staffing Agency”) on Contractor’s

        claims and Staffing Agency’s counterclaims arising from a staffing contract dispute.

        Contractor argues that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis and in its

        application of state law to the claims. For the reasons stated below, we reject Contractor’s

        contentions and affirm the district court.

                                                     I.

               Contractor is a construction company owned by Michael Russell and headquartered

        in Virginia. Staffing Agency is a Tennessee company that provides temporary labor and

        staffing services. Both companies operate in North Carolina.

               In 2018, Contractor contacted Staffing Agency to discuss Staffing Agency’s

        provision of temporary employees to assist with a hurricane remediation project (“River

        Landing Project”) in North Carolina. On September 24, 2018, Staffing Agency’s regional

        manager, Jennifer Creech, sent Contractor a proposal for providing the requested labor,

        which listed a bill rate of $17.55 per hour. In addition, Staffing Agency would pay

               all required payroll taxes, certified payroll for government contracts, social
               security, Medicare contributions, federal and state unemployment taxes,
               workers’ compensation insurance, as well as all administrative costs for
               recruiting employees, maintaining personnel records, including quarterly
               reports and year-end W-2 issuance.

        J.A. 1475. The proposal included other terms and conditions, including:

               • “If the employee does not show the skills needed within two hours of

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                  show up time, call and [Staffing Agency] will pull them and pay them the
                  two hours.”

               • “[Contractor] acknowledges and understands that [Staffing Agency’s]
                 invoices are for labor and therefore agrees to pay such invoices upon
                 receipt.”

               • “If any amount is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection,
                 [Contractor] shall pay attorney fees equal to 20% of the unpaid invoice
                 amount[.]”

               • “[Contractor’s] signature on the time sheet certifies that the hours shown
                 are correct, that the work was performed to the [Contractor’s] satisfaction
                 and authorizes [Staffing Agency] to bill [Contractor] for the hours
                 worked by the named temporary employee. [Contractor] agrees that the
                 representative signing the time sheets is authorized to do so and their
                 signature is binding upon [Contractor][.]”

        J.A. 1476 (emphasis omitted). Creech’s email explained that the bill rate covered “weekly

        payroll, recruiting, background and drug testing if required, and work comp.” J.A. 972.

        Russell signed the proposal that same day.

               However, the next day, Creech emailed Russell and indicated she needed to increase

        the hourly pay to attract more laborers. She provided a new proposal that was exactly the

        same as the September 24 proposal except it provided for a bill rate of $23.50 per hour.

        Russell again signed it the same day. The parties agree that this September 25 contract (the

        “Contract”) governs their relationship and the current dispute.

               Consistent with the Contract, Staffing Agency provided employees to assist with

        the River Landing Project. Staffing Agency invoiced Contractor for the employees’

        labor—including time-and-a-half pay for overtime—and Contractor received and promptly

        paid the invoices. Russell stated in his deposition that he paid the invoices promptly

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        “knowing that at the final billing we would go back through and hash out everything we

        needed to hash out.” J.A. 2753.

               However, the parties’ relationship began to deteriorate, leading Russell to examine

        the invoices. He identified three purported concerns with both paid and unpaid invoices:

        (1) temporary employees Staffing Agency provided for the River Landing Project

        performed subpar work that Contractor had to redo; (2) certain employee timesheets on

        which invoices were based were either not signed by Contractor’s supervisor or the

        supervisor’s signature was forged; and (3) certain invoices charged Contractor for

        overtime, but that overtime was supposed to be incorporated into the bill rate. Russell

        therefore refused to pay Staffing Agency’s final batch of invoices for $38,810.37, and he

        also challenged the invoices he already paid.

               After repeated attempts to get Contractor to pay the final invoices, Staffing Agency

        sued Contractor in state court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment (the

        “Collections Lawsuit”). Staffing Agency later voluntarily dismissed that Lawsuit.

               Contractor then filed a state-court complaint against Staffing Agency, bringing

        claims for breach of contract, fraud, violations of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive

        Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”), conversion, abuse of process, negligence, negligent

        misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. The complaint alleged that Staffing Agency

        improperly billed Contractor for overtime, temporary employees’ defective labor, and

        unsigned and forged timesheets. Staffing Agency removed the lawsuit to federal court

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        based on diversity jurisdiction and filed a motion to dismiss. 1 The district court denied the

        motion, and Staffing Agency subsequently counterclaimed for breach of contract and

        unjust enrichment based on the allegations from the Collections Lawsuit. Staffing Agency

        sought damages for the unpaid invoices plus 20% of that balance as attorneys’ fees.

               Contractor moved for summary judgment on Staffing Agency’s counterclaims and

        partial summary judgment on liability for its claims (excluding unjust enrichment). Staffing

        Agency moved for summary judgment on all the claims and counterclaims. The district

        court denied Contractor’s motion and granted Staffing Agency’s motion. M.D. Russell

        Constr., Inc. v. Consol. Staffing, Inc., No. 7:19-CV-221-BO, 2022 WL 875993 (E.D.N.C.

        Mar. 23, 2022).

               The district court first applied North Carolina choice-of-law rules to determine the

        substantive law governing the parties’ claims. The court concluded that North Carolina law

        governed the contract claims based on the Contract’s place of performance. The court next

        determined that Virginia law governed Contractor’s claims for fraud, UDTPA violations,

        negligence, and negligent misrepresentation because—applying North Carolina’s lex loci

        delicti test 2— Contractor suffered its alleged injury when it paid Staffing Agency for faulty

        invoices from its bank accounts in Virginia. The court applied Tennessee law to

               1
                In its motion-to-dismiss briefing, Staffing Agency relied on substantive North
        Carolina law to support dismissal and did not raise any choice-of-law issues.
               2
                  Under the lex loci delicti test (“lex loci”), North Carolina courts apply the law of
        the state where the injury occurred. SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 838 S.E.2d 334, 340 (N.C. 2020).
        An injury “occurred” “where the last act . . . giving rise to” it took place. Harco Nat’l Ins.
        Co. v. Grant Thornton LLP, 698 S.E.2d 719, 724 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted).

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        Contractor’s conversion claim because Tennessee was the location of Staffing Agency’s

        bank account holding the allegedly converted funds. Finally, the district court relied on the

        parties’ agreement that the abuse-of-process claim was governed by North Carolina law. 3

               Applying the relevant state law, the court found no breach of contract by Staffing

        Agency because the Contract did not require Staffing Agency to pay overtime or provide

        skilled workers, and parol evidence could not be used to vary the Contract’s terms. The

        court rejected Contractor’s fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims based on the lack

        of evidence of Staffing Agency’s intent to defraud. The court also granted Staffing Agency

        summary judgment on Contractor’s UDTPA claim because (1) it was brought under a

        North Carolina statute, but Virginia law applied, and (2) Contractor failed to point to

        substantial aggravating circumstances surrounding the alleged breach of contract. 4 Finally,

        the district court granted Staffing Agency summary judgment on its breach-of-contract

        counterclaim based on Contractor’s failure to pay the final invoices. The court awarded

        Staffing Agency attorneys’ fees of 20% of the invoice amount, as provided for in the

        Contract.

               3
                  The district court did not explicitly determine the law governing the unjust-
        enrichment claim and counterclaim, but that is irrelevant because the parties don’t contest
        the district court’s decision on the merits of those claims on appeal.
               4
                 The district court also granted summary judgment to Staffing Agency on
        Contractor’s claims for abuse of process and unjust enrichment, but Contractor does not
        take issue with that decision on appeal. Therefore, we do not discuss those claims below.

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               Contractor timely appealed. It argues that the district court erred in its choice-of-

        law analysis and in granting summary judgment to Staffing Agency. This Court has

        jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

                                                   II.

               This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo and applies the same

        standard as the district court. Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 2013). We

        may affirm a grant of summary judgment only when there is no genuine dispute of material

        fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 310–11. And when

        reviewing a district court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court

        applies these same principles and reviews the motions separately “on [their] own merits to

        determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol

        v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).

                                                   III.

               Contractor first contends that the district court erred in its application of choice-of-

        law principles. We disagree.

                                                   A.

               Preliminarily, Contractor argues that Staffing Agency waived its contention that

        another states’ law applies by relying on North Carolina law in its motion to dismiss and

        not raising the choice-of-law issue until the summary-judgment stage. The district court

        rejected this argument, and we conclude that the district court did not err in so holding.
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               It is undoubtedly true that choice of law can be waived by failure to timely raise the

        issue. See, e.g., Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 774, 781 (4th Cir. 2023)

        (finding waiver when one party “litigated th[e] entire case under the substantive law of

        North Carolina,” including using or assuming that North Carolina law applied in its

        “answer, motion for summary judgment, trial brief, proposed jury instructions, and post-

        trial motion”); Bilancia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 538 F.2d 621, 623 (4th Cir. 1976) (per

        curiam) (finding waiver of the argument that New Jersey law applied because the plaintiffs

        did not make that argument during trial).

               However, determining what law applies to a particular claim is often a fact-intensive

        undertaking. See, e.g., Kenney v. Indep. Order of Foresters, 744 F.3d 901, 907–08 (4th Cir.

        2014) (stating that “the proper choice-of-law approach” is a “fact-intensive area”). Parties

        therefore may not be able to make appropriate and persuasive choice-of-law arguments

        without the benefit of discovery. District courts in this Circuit thus regularly defer choice-

        of-law issues until after the parties have completed discovery. See, e.g., Morris v. Bank of

        Am., 3:18-cv-00157-RJC-DSC, 2019 WL 1421166, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2019)

        (declining to decide choice-of-law issue until record was developed); Anderson Gustafsson

        Advokatbyra, KB v. eScrub Sys., Inc., Civil Action No. 1:10-cv-632, 2011 WL 677053, at

        *2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011) (“The Court finds that the choice of law for tort and contract

        based claims should be determined with the benefit of a more complete record pending

        discovery.”); Malinowski v. Lichter Grp., LLC, Civil No. WDQ-14-917, 2015 WL

        1129522, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2015) (declining to resolve choice-of-law issue at motion-

        to-dismiss stage because its “fact-intensive” and “context specific” inquiry made it

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        appropriate to defer “until after the parties have engaged in discovery” (citation omitted)).

        We agree that this approach will often be the best course and Contractor cites neither

        binding nor persuasive precedent to the contrary. 5 We thus conclude that the district court

        did not err in determining that Staffing Agency did not waive the choice-of-law issue by

        failing to raise it in its motion to dismiss.

                                                        B.

               Having resolved that threshold issue, we now turn to the substantive choice-of-law

        arguments made by the parties. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the court

        did not err in its determination of the state law governing the claims for conversion, fraud,

        negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and UDTPA violations. 6

               5
                  None of the out-of-circuit cases on which Contractor relies persuade us to adopt
        its position and all are substantially distinguishable. See Lott v. Levitt, 556 F.3d 564, 567–
        68 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding plaintiff waived choice-of-law argument by expressly
        stating in response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss that he agreed that Illinois law
        governed the dispute and then, months later, arguing for the first time that Virginia law
        should have governed when asking the court to reconsider its ruling); Kabbash v. Jewelry
        Channel, Inc. USA, No. A-16-CA-212-SS, 2017 WL 2473262, at *5 n.8 (W.D. Tex. June
        7, 2017) (declining to find waiver based on defendant’s prior reliance on California law to
        support its motion to dismiss and instead holding only that “the application of California
        law will, at the very least, not frustrate the parties’ expectations”); CMFG Life Ins. Co. v.
        RBS Sec. Inc., No. 12-cv-037-wmc, 2014 WL 3696233, at *3–4 (W.D. Wis. July 23, 2014),
        rev’d in part on other grounds by 799 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015) (refusing to allow a renewed
        motion to dismiss based on the application of a different state’s law mentioned in newly
        produced documents because the defendant had drafted those documents such that the
        defendant should have been aware that they contained a choice-of-law provision that could
        have been invoked earlier in the litigation).

               The parties do not dispute the state law applicable to the breach-of-contract claim
               6

        and counterclaim.

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               A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction—as is the case here—applies the

        choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM

        Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581, 599–600 (4th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the district court properly

        applied North Carolina’s choice-of-law rules to determine which state’s substantive law

        governs Contractor’s claims.

               The choice-of-law rule relevant to this appeal is North Carolina’s lex loci test. 7 This

        rule applies to “tort or tort-like claims” and provides that the law of the state where the

        injury occurred governs. SciGrip, 838 S.E.2d at 343. An injury is “sustained . . . where the

        last act occurred giving rise to the injury.” Harco Nat’l, 698 S.E.2d at 724 (cleaned up).

        Therefore, applying lex loci involves identifying where the last act giving rise to the

        purported injury occurred.

               7
                 The parties also disagree on whether lex loci applies to the UDTPA claim at all.
        Some courts have applied lex loci to UDTPA claims, see United Va. Bank v. Air-Lift
        Assocs., 339 S.E.2d 90, 93 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), whereas other courts have applied the
        most significant relationship test to such claims, see Andrew Jackson Sales v. Bi-Lo Stores,
        Inc., 314 S.E.2d 797, 799 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), under which courts identify the state with
        the predominant connection to the case based on a number of factors, see SciGrip, 838
        S.E.2d at 343. Relying on this split of authority, Contractor argues that the most significant
        relationship test should govern its UDTPA claim. However, Contractor forfeited its
        argument for the application of the most significant relationship test by failing to raise it
        before the district court. In Contractor’s brief in opposition to Staffing Agency’s motion
        for summary judgment, Contractor never argued that the most significant relationship test
        applied. See Contractor's Memorandum in Opposition at 12, No. 7:19-cv-00221-BO, ECF
        No. 71 (“Lex loci . . . determines which state’s law applies in tort actions.”). Because “[i]n
        this circuit, issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally not considered absent
        exceptional circumstances,” Holly Hill Farm Corp. v. United States, 447 F.3d 258, 267
        (4th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up), we will not consider Contractor’s belated argument that the
        most significant relationship test governs and will instead apply lex loci to this claim.

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               The “last act” causing injury for most of Contractor’s tort claims arose in Virginia.

        For the fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims, Contractor alleges that Staffing

        Agency misrepresented that the contractual bill rate would include overtime and that each

        line item on the invoices was supported by a signed and accurate time sheet. Similarly, on

        its negligence claim, Contractor asserts that Staffing Agency was negligent in, inter alia,

        failing to ensure temporary workers had the necessary skills and failing to correct billing

        errors. And finally, for its UDTPA claim, Contractor alleges that Staffing Agency’s

        fraudulent representations regarding the quality of its workers and the bill rate constitute

        deceptive trade practices. Contractor argues that these misrepresentations and negligence

        caused it to pay Staffing Agency’s faulty invoices. See, e.g., J.A. 52 (alleging that “[b]ased

        upon the representations that were made by [Staffing Agency], . . . [Contractor] entered

        into the contract, continued to pay invoices as submitted by [Staffing Agency], resulting in

        tendering the Total Amount Paid to [Staffing Agency]”); J.A. 56 (alleging that Contractor

        suffered damages “including all or a substantial portion of the Total Amount Paid under

        the invoices” based on Staffing Agency’s unfair practices). Contractor paid the invoices

        from its bank account located in Virginia; therefore, the district court correctly determined

        that Contractor’s injury related to each of these claims occurred in Virginia and that

        Virginia law governs them. See Harco Nat’l, 698 S.E.2d at 726 (“[P]laintiff’s causes of

        actions accrued when the North Carolina Department of Insurance seized plaintiff’s funds

        that were held in a North Carolina trust account by a North Carolina bank . . . . At that time,

        plaintiff involuntarily parted with tangible property located in North Carolina, constituting

        the injury necessary to create causes of action against defendant for negligence and

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        negligent misrepresentation. . . . [I]t is the location of the funds in North Carolina at the

        time of the seizure and not the location where the funds were received that is dispositive.”).

               Contractor counters that it suffered other injuries in the form of lost revenue and

        reputational harm related to the River Landing Project; expenses when it was forced to

        redo Staffing Agency employees’ sub-par work; and the filing of the Collections Lawsuit,

        all of which occurred in North Carolina. But there is insufficient evidence that these injuries

        actually occurred such that the district court did not err in applying Virginia law—the law

        of the place where the last demonstrated injury occurred—to Contractor’s negligence,

        negligent-misrepresentation, fraud, and UDTPA claims.

               At summary judgment, “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely

        disputed must support the assertion by” “citing to particular parts of materials in the

        record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). But Contractor has not pointed to evidence supporting its

        claimed injuries and thus failed to carry its burden at summary judgment. See, e.g.,

        Cybernet, LLC v. David, 954 F.3d 162, 172–73 (4th Cir. 2020) (affirming grant of summary

        judgment when the nonmoving party failed to point to evidence supporting its claimed

        damages).

               For example, to support its claim of lost revenue, Contractor cites three invoices it

        sent to homeowners but nothing indicating that those homeowners declined to retain

        Contractor or that the invoices were not paid. Contractor does not point to anything specific

        in the record supporting either the determination or amount of claimed damages, and its

        conclusory statements of damages—such as Russell’s deposition testimony in which he

        claimed deficiencies in temporary employees’ performance of certain tasks but “c[ouldn’t]

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        give . . . the specifics,” J.A. 2836—alone are insufficient to survive a motion for summary

        judgment. See, e.g., Dash, 731 F.3d at 311 (stating that at summary judgment, a nonmoving

        party must rely on “more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of

        one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence”); McKenny v.

        United States, 973 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2020) (agreeing that conclusory

        interrogatory responses lack probative value sufficient to defeat summary judgment

        because they asserted an amount of tax liability with no explanation or detail as to how that

        amount was calculated); Amoah v. McKinney, 875 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2017) (determining

        that conclusory interrogatory responses provided no basis for deciding that the district court

        erred in its summary-judgment decision). Therefore, because there is insufficient evidence

        supporting the claimed injuries that could change the choice-of-law analysis, the district

        court did not err in applying Virginia law.

               Lastly, the district court did not err in determining that Tennessee law governs

        Contractor’s conversion claim. As it relates to conversion, Contractor’s complaint alleges

        that Staffing Agency exercised control over funds paid by Contractor and that properly

        belonged to Contractor, without Contractor’s permission. See Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v.

        Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 723 S.E.2d 744, 747 (N.C. 2012) (explaining that the

        two essential elements of a conversion claim are plaintiff’s ownership and defendant’s

        wrongful possession). The injury thus occurred in the state where Staffing Agency

        unlawfully retained Contractor’s money, and Contractor does not dispute that Staffing

        Agency retained the money in its bank account in Tennessee. Therefore, Tennessee law

        governs the conversion claim under lex loci.

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               In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in its choice-of-law analysis

        because (1) Staffing Agency did not waive its choice-of-law argument, and (2) the district

        court correctly determined the law governing each of Contractor’s claims. 8

                                                  IV.

               Contractor next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment

        to Staffing Agency on Contractor’s breach-of-contract, UDTPA, fraud, and negligent-

        misrepresentation claims and on Staffing Agency’s counterclaim for breach of contract. 9

        But Contractor waived or failed to preserve five of its arguments, and we disagree with its

        other contentions of error. We address the waived and forfeited arguments first and then

        turn to the preserved issues.

                                                  A.

               First, Contractor’s UDTPA argument under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 can be readily

        disposed of. As explained above, Virginia law governs this claim, but Contractor has not

               8
                  Further, assuming arguendo that the district court should have applied North
        Carolina law to Contractor’s claims, Contractor never explains how the application of
        North Carolina law—which is very similar to the relevant Virginia and Tennessee law—
        would have led to a different result. In fact, the district court did evaluate Contractor’s
        claims under North Carolina law and found that the claims would still fail under that state’s
        law. As an alternative basis for our holding, we also conclude that any error made by the
        district court in its choice-of-law analysis was therefore harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61
        (“At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do
        not affect any party’s substantial rights.”).
               9
                 Although Contractor challenges the district court’s choice-of-law analysis related
        to its negligence and conversion claims, it doesn’t challenge the court’s decision on the
        merits of those claims.

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        asserted that Virginia has a comparable statute to North Carolina’s UDTPA or that it is

        alleging unfair trade practices under Virginia law—in spite of the fact that the district court

        granted summary judgment to Staffing Agency on this basis. M.D. Russell Constr., 2022

        WL 875993, at *9 (“At the outset, the Court has determined that Virginia law applies to

        plaintiff’s tort claims, and thus the Court would not apply a North Carolina statute.”).

        Contractor has thus waived any challenge to the district court’s rejection of this claim. See

        Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an

        argument by . . . failing to develop its argument––even if its [opening] brief takes a passing

        shot at the issue.” (cleaned up)).

               Second, on Contractor’s negligent-misrepresentation claim, Contractor cites North

        Carolina law instead of the applicable Virginia law. Therefore, it has waived this challenge

        by failing to assert it under the proper state’s law when it was on notice that Virginia law

        would apply if we agreed with the district court’s choice-of-law determination. See id.

               Third, Contractor argues that Staffing Agency breached the Contract by collecting

        payments based on unsigned and fraudulent timesheets. But Contractor failed to raise this

        issue before the district court and thus forfeited it. See Holly Hill, 447 F.3d at 267 (“[I]n

        this circuit, issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally not considered absent

        exceptional circumstances.” (cleaned up)). Although in its summary-judgment briefing

        before the district court, Contractor conclusively stated that Staffing Agency “breached the

        provisions of the September 25 Agreement . . . by charging and collecting from

        [Contractor] amounts that related to invalid, unverified, uncertified, inaccurate, and false

        timesheets that had been submitted by temporary employees,” Contractor’s Memorandum

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        in Opposition at 15, No. 7:19-CV-221-BO, ECF No. 71; Contractor’s Memorandum in

        Support at 5, No. 7:19-CV-221-BO, ECF No. 86, it did not elaborate or provide any

        citations to the record or argument on this point. And in response to Staffing Agency’s

        forfeiture argument on appeal, Contractor cites only its response to Staffing Agency’s

        statement of undisputed material facts, exhibits attached thereto, and Russell’s deposition

        testimony. It does not point this Court to any briefing that shows that it adequately made

        this argument before the district court. Moreover, in its summary-judgment decision, the

        district court did not discuss any claim of breach based on unsigned or fraudulent

        timesheets, further supporting the conclusion that Contractor failed to adequately make this

        argument before the district court. See M.D. Russell Constr., 2022 WL 875993, at *6–7.

        Therefore, we conclude that Contractor failed to preserve its argument that Staffing Agency

        breached the Contract by collecting payment for unsigned and fraudulent timesheets.

               Fourth, also related to Contractor’s breach-of-contract claim, Contractor argues that

        Staffing Agency breached the Contract by charging amounts in excess of the contractual

        bill rate, including overtime. Contractor contends that parol evidence could be used to show

        that “bill rate” was meant to include overtime because this term is ambiguous. See

        Galloway v. Snell, 885 S.E.2d 834, 836 (N.C. 2023) (“If a written contract is ambiguous,

        the contract’s meaning and effect is a factual question for the jury and parol evidence may

        be introduced not to contradict, but to show and make certain what was the real agreement

        between the parties.” (cleaned up)). But Contractor failed to raise this ambiguity argument

        before the district court and therefore forfeited it. More to the point, Contractor argued the

        exact opposite below, contending “bill rate” was not ambiguous. It cannot now make a

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        completely contradictory argument on appeal to that which it presented to the district court.

        See M.D. Russell Constr., 2022 WL 875993, at *6 (“[T]he terms of the River Landing

        contract are not ambiguous and [Contractor] does not argue that they are.”). As a result, we

        treat the Contract as unambiguous—meaning we “construe[] and enforce[] [it] according

        to [its] terms,” Galloway, 885 S.E.2d at 836 (citation omitted)—and the terms simply do

        not require Staffing Agency to pay overtime. Therefore, this claim of breach fails.

               Fifth, on Staffing Agency’s counterclaim, Contractor asserts that the district court

        erred in finding Staffing Agency entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees of 20% of the

        balance Contractor owed Staffing Agency for the unpaid final invoices. Contractor

        contends that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.2 provides a statutory cap on attorneys’ fees at 15%

        of the balance owed and a mandatory notice requirement and that the district court failed

        to enforce compliance with those provisions. Contractor admits that it did not raise this

        statutory argument before the district court, but claims that it failed to do so because

        Staffing Agency did not request that the court award 20% attorneys’ fees in its motion for

        summary judgment. That is blatantly wrong; in its summary-judgment motion, Staffing

        Agency stated: “[Staffing Agency] brings a counterclaim to recover attorneys’ fees owed

        and provided for under the Contract (20% of the invoice amount).” Staffing Agency’s

        Memorandum in Support at 28, No. 7:19-cv-221-BO, ECF No. 55. Therefore, Contractor

        was on notice that 20% attorneys’ fees were at issue and had an obligation to make its N.C.

        Gen. Stat. § 6-21.2 argument before the district court. It has thus forfeited this argument

        on appeal.

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                                                  B.

               We now turn to the arguments Contractor has properly preserved, which relate to:

        (1) Contractor’s breach-of-contract claim, (2) its claim of fraud, and (3) Staffing Agency’s

        counterclaim for breach of contract.

               First, Contractor asserts that Staffing Agency breached the Contract based on

        temporary employees’ unsatisfactory work that Contractor had to redo. But the Contract

        places the burden of monitoring the employees on Contractor. See J.A. 1479 (“[Staffing

        Agency] do[es] allow a two hour skilled work guarantee. If the employee does not show

        the skills needed within two hours of show up time, call and [Staffing Agency] will pull

        them and pay them the two hours.”). If Contractor felt certain employees did not have the

        necessary skills, it should have raised that issue as provided in the Contract rather than

        waiting until long after the employees performed the labor, Staffing Agency invoiced for

        that labor, and Contractor paid the invoices. See Am. Nat’l Elec. Corp. v. Poythress Com.

        Contractors, Inc., 604 S.E.2d 315, 317 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that when a

        contract contains a notice provision with which a party fails to comply, that party’s breach-

        of-contract claim fails under a plain application of the contract’s language). Further, while

        Contractor claims it intended to review the timesheets after the River Landing Project was

        complete to determine if there were issues, Contractor failed to identify any factual basis

        for its purported right to unilaterally modify the Contract by “communicat[ing] its intent,

        at the conclusion of the engagement, to review and discuss any discrepancies and problems

        that arose with respect to . . . temporary employees.” Opening Br. 11. Nor is there any basis

        in law for such a right. See NRC Golf Course, LLC v. JMR Golf, LLC, 731 S.E.2d 474, 480

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        (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that a contract modification must be supported by

        consideration). Therefore, Staffing Agency did not breach the Contract by billing for labor

        that Contractor deemed inadequate after the fact.

               Second, proceeding to Contractor’s fraud claim, and applying Virginia law pursuant

        to the discussion above, to establish fraud, a plaintiff must identify evidence of an intent to

        mislead. See Prospect Dev. Co. v. Bershader, 515 S.E.2d 291, 297 (Va. 1999). Contractor

        points to a statement allegedly made by Creech during a conversation with Russell that the

        increased bill rate of $23.50 would cover any overtime charges such that Contractor would

        not be separately billed for overtime. But Contractor identified no evidence suggesting that

        Creech intended to mislead Contractor when she made this statement. Contractor claims

        that the Court should “infer” from Creech’s “lack of authority within [Staffing Agency]”

        that her statement regarding the bill rate including overtime “was made with the intention

        that it would never be performed or honored by [Staffing Agency].” Opening Br. 45. But

        Contractor’s citations to the record on this point have nothing to do with Creech’s authority

        (or lack thereof) within Staffing Agency. And even assuming Creech lacked authority to

        set the bill rate on her own, that simply does not reasonably lead to the inference that she

        made a promise about the bill rate with intent to mislead Contractor. See Robinson v.

        Priority Auto. Huntersville, Inc., 70 F.4th 776, 780 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that courts

        must draw reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor at the summary-judgment

        stage). Therefore, the district court properly granted Staffing Agency summary judgment

        on this claim.

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               Third, turning to Staffing Agency’s counterclaim for breach of contract, Contractor

        argues that the district court should not have granted Staffing Agency summary judgment

        because “[Staffing Agency], through an internal audit and investigation, established that

        the amount sought in the counterclaim, $38,810.37, relates to inaccurate, false, fraudulent,

        unverified, and invalid time sheets.” Opening Br. 50. The “audit” to which Contractor

        refers is an internal email between Staffing Agency employees breaking down the unpaid

        invoices by hours that were approved or verified by a supervisor’s signature and hours for

        which there was no supervisor’s signature on the timesheet. See J.A. 2239–40. But the

        email is insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to the counterclaim.

        Contractor doesn’t give any specifics regarding which hours on the unpaid invoices it is

        challenging. And assuming for the sake of argument that the “audit” establishes that some

        portion of the unpaid invoices was unverified by the requisite signatures and that

        Contractor shouldn’t have to pay for those unverified hours, Contractor does not indicate

        how much it was billed for that labor such that some amount could be taken out of the

        $38,810.37 total of the unpaid invoices. Finally, Staffing Agency’s “audit” does not

        indicate anything about fraudulent timesheets, and the temporary employee who allegedly

        forged his timesheets is not listed in the email as being included on the unpaid invoices, so

        Contractor simply has no valid argument that the unpaid invoices include any fraudulently

        billed time. In sum, Contractor has not pointed to any evidence raising a genuine dispute

        of material fact on Staffing Agency’s entitlement to payment for the unpaid invoices, and

        the district court properly granted Staffing Agency summary judgment on its counterclaim.

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                                                  V.

              In conclusion, we find that the district court did not err in its choice-of-law analysis

        or its summary-judgment determinations. We therefore

                                                                                           AFFIRM.

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