Court Opinion

ID: 9386420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:05:06.310433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.346751
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-0843
                               Filed April 12, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BOBBY FITZGERALD HUNT JR.,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Jeffrey D. Bert, Judge.

      Bobby Hunt Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences on two counts of

homicide by vehicle.       AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
                                           2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

         Bobby Hunt Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences on two counts of

homicide by vehicle: one involving operating under the influence and the other

involving reckless driving. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing

he committed homicide by vehicle by operating under the influence and contends

the district court improperly sentenced him on both counts. Because substantial

evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we affirm Hunt’s conviction of homicide by

vehicle by operating under the influence. But based on the “one homicide” rule,

we vacate the judgment and sentence entered on his conviction of homicide by

reckless driving. We remand for the entry of a corrected judgment and sentencing

order.

         I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

         A jury found Hunt guilty of homicide by vehicle for causing the death of Alex

Marietta in June 2021. At around 3:00 p.m., Hunt was driving a red SUV on East

Kimberly Road in Davenport. Other motorists observed the SUV travelling at a

high rate of speed. One driver watched Hunt pass her on a gravel shoulder before

cutting across two lanes of traffic. His driving was so notable that the driver took

a photo of the SUV while stopped at a red light.

         Hunt was heading west in the northernmost lane of traffic as he approached

the traffic control at the intersection of East Kimberly Road and Davenport Avenue.

The light for the traffic on Kimberly changed to red well before Hunt reached the

intersection. One witness described the light as “deep red” when Hunt drove

through, meaning it was red long enough that several vehicles traveling on

Davenport Avenue had entered the intersection.
                                           3

         Marietta was bicycling south on Davenport Avenue on his way home from

work. As Marietta reached the north side of the intersection, Hunt’s vehicle shot

in front of him. Hunt never slowed and was traveling at seventy-one miles per

hour.1 With no time to react, Marietta’s bicycle struck the passenger side of the

SUV. The force of the collision broke the front tire in half and upended the bicycle.

Despite wearing a helmet, Marietta suffered extensive head trauma and died

instantly.

         Although the force of the collision shattered the rear passenger-side window

and damaged the body of the SUV significantly, Hunt did not stop. He instead

drove to his apartment and called 911 about fifteen minutes later. During the call,

he acknowledged that a bicyclist was badly injured. But Hunt claimed he could not

stop at the scene because he needed to get his child somewhere and was in the

middle of traffic.

         Corporal Erin Pape was the first law enforcement officer to question Hunt

outside his apartment building. Hunt told her that the traffic light was yellow at the

time of collision and again claimed he could not stop after because of heavy traffic.

Hunt also claimed that he stopped in a parking lot to call 911 but his phone battery

was dead. While they spoke, Hunt took two sips from a bottle of brandy before

Corporal Pape confiscated it.

         At trial, Corporal Pape testified about her observations of Hunt during the

interview.    She told the jury that she immediately noticed Hunt’s eyes were

bloodshot and watery, which could result from intoxication or crying. Because she

1   The speed limit was forty-five miles per hour.
                                         4

was sick and using mentholated cough drops, Corporal Pape could not detect any

odor on his breath. Over time, she noted other behaviors that showed Hunt could

have been intoxicated:

      He couldn’t seem to stay on one topic very long. There was a lot of
      bouncing around, a lot of elevation and emotion, and at some points,
      he was getting very close to my face, to where it made me
      uncomfortable, and so, that behavior seemed to become more
      prominent and more aggressive as the incident went on.

      Officer Luke Figie, a traffic investigator, arrived at the apartment complex to

take over the investigation.   Officer Figie testified he could smell an odor of

alcoholic beverage emitting from Hunt, which got stronger as Hunt drew closer.

When asked, Hunt stated the only thing he had to drink after the collision was the

“two or three” sips of brandy that he took in front of Corporal Pape. Officer Figie

also observed Hunt display a “rash of emotions up and down” during the

conversation. The change in Hunt’s demeanor became most apparent when

Officer Figie informed him that he was requesting a warrant to test Hunt’s blood.

Hunt became increasingly agitated before fleeing on foot. The ensuing chase

lasted about ten minutes before Hunt surrendered.

      A sample of Hunt’s blood was drawn three and one-half hours after the

collision. Testing showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.131 and the presence

of cocaine and marijuana metabolites. At trial, a criminalist explained a method

used to extrapolate a person’s blood alcohol concentration at an earlier time.

Using this method, he estimated that Hunt’s blood alcohol concentration would

have been between 0.166 and 0.210 at the time of the collision if Hunt had

consumed no alcohol after.     He also extrapolated what Hunt’s blood alcohol

concentration would have been at the time of the collision if Hunt drank three-
                                         5

fourths of the bottle of brandy after, estimating it would have been between 0.106

and 0.150.

       The State obtained several recordings of Hunt’s SUV traveling on Kimberly

Road and showed them at trial. One recording was taken by a camera mounted

on a city transit bus that Hunt passed shortly before the intersection. It shows

Hunt’s speed relative to the bus, which was traveling at thirty-eight miles per hour.

The bus recording also shows few vehicles on the road near Hunt after the

collision, contradicting statements Hunt made during the 911 call and his interview

with Corporal Pape. Another recording was taken by a dashboard camera installed

in a vehicle heading east on Kimberly Road that was stopped at the intersection

when the collision occurred. The traffic light is red when the recording begins, and

it shows Hunt’s vehicle entering the intersection about six seconds later. Video

taken by a traffic camera mounted on the intersection of Brady Street and Kimberly

Road shows Hunt’s vehicle running a red light shortly after the collision with

Marietta.

       A jury found Hunt guilty of homicide by vehicle by operating under the

influence, operating under the influence, homicide by vehicle by reckless driving,

and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. The district court merged

the conviction for operating under the influence with the conviction for homicide by

vehicle by operating under the influence and sentenced Hunt to incarceration for

a term not to exceed twenty-five years. It sentenced Hunt to incarceration for terms

of fifteen years each for homicide by vehicle by reckless driving and leaving the

scene of an accident resulting in death. The court ordered Hunt to serve the three

sentences consecutively, and Hunt appealed.
                                             6

       II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

       Hunt first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction for homicide by vehicle by operating under the influence. We review

this claim for correction of errors at law. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339

(Iowa 2021). In doing so, we view the evidence and any reasonable inferences

drawn from it in the light most favorable to the State. Id. If substantial evidence

supports the verdict, we affirm. Id.

       The State charged Hunt with two counts of homicide by vehicle. One count

was based on Hunt operating under the influence, see Iowa Code § 707.6A(1)

(2021), and the other was based on reckless driving, see id. § 707.6A(2). Hunt

does not dispute the verdict based on reckless driving but argues there is

insufficient evidence to show his intoxication caused Marietta’s death.

       The trial court instructed the jury that it could find Hunt guilty of the charge

if the State proved:

               1. On or about June 3, 2021, the defendant:
               a. operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of
       alcohol or a drug or a combination of such substances; or
               b. operated a motor vehicle while having a concentration of
       .08 or more; or
               c. operated a motor vehicle while any amount of a controlled
       substance is present in his system as measured in the defendant’s
       blood or urine.
               It is not necessary for all jurors to agree to just (a) or (b) or (c).
       It is only necessary that each juror agrees to at least one of these
       three alternatives.
               2. The defendant’s act or acts set out in Element 1
       unintentionally caused the death of Alex Marietta.
               Cause is established if the defendant’s act or acts set out in
       Element 1 were a substantial factor in bringing about the death of
       Alex Marietta, and the death of Alex Marietta would not have
       happened except for those acts.
                                          7

The State presented evidence showing Hunt’s blood alcohol concentration was

more than .08 at the time of the collision and he tested positive for both cocaine

and marijuana, establishing the first element of the charge. But Hunt challenges

the second of element, arguing the evidence does not show he “was feeling the

effects of alcohol and drugs immediately after the accident.”

       Substantial evidence shows Hunt’s intoxication caused Marietta’s death.

Although Hunt seemed composed while talking to law enforcement at first, his

composure in the face of what occurred could result from his intoxication. But over

time, Hunt showed more erratic behavior with Corporal Pape noticing he changed

topics and bounced around. After Officer Figie told Hunt that he was requesting a

warrant to draw Hunt’s blood, Hunt became agitated and uncooperative before

fleeing. One can reasonably conclude that running from law enforcement shows

Hunt’s decision making was impaired by intoxication. That same poor decision

making could have led to Hunt’s excessive speeding, as well as his inability to

perceive2 or judge the changing light, which led to him running the light at least six

seconds after it changed to red. Hunt argues that it was this reckless driving that

caused Marietta’s death without acknowledging that reckless driving can result

from intoxication.   Because sufficient evidence supports a finding that Hunt’s

intoxication caused Marietta’s death, we affirm his conviction for homicide by

vehicle by operating under the influence.

2 Hunt’s statement that the light was yellow at the time of the collision suggests
that his perception was impaired.
                                       8

       III. Sentence.

       Hunt also contends the sentences imposed on his convictions for homicide

by vehicle by operating under the influence and homicide by vehicle by reckless

driving violate the one-homicide rule. See State v. Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d 88, 96

(Iowa 2015) (noting the trial court is prohibited from entering judgments and

imposing sentences for multiple homicide offenses when a defendant is convicted

of killing only one person). The State agrees. We therefore vacate the judgment

and sentence entered on Hunt’s conviction of homicide by vehicle by reckless

driving, and we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment and sentencing order

consistent with this opinion.

       AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.