Court Opinion

ID: 9544195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:53:06.146557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:20.916064
License: Public Domain

HOLOHAN, Justice
(dissenting).
Prior to the decision of the Court today the law in Arizona was well settled that the failure to file a claim within one year after the injury occurred or became apparent barred a claim for industrial compensation. A.R.S. § 23-1061. The Court of Appeals felt that the law was so clear that they issued their ruling by a memorandum decision.
Prior to today’s decision, Arizona, along with a number of other states, adopted the position that the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law requiring the filing of a claim within a specified period of time was mandatory and jurisdictional. 100 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation § 468(2) (1958); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission, 43 Ariz. 50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934); McCormick v. Industrial Commission, 96 Ariz. 88, 392 P.2d 299 (1964); Collins v. Industrial Commission, 102 Ariz. 509, 433 P.2d 801 *91(1967). Since the matter was jurisdictional it could not be waived. Collins v. Industrial Commission, supra.
The Court overrules Collins, but in so doing it in effect overrules the clear legislative intent in A.R.S. § 23-1061. The legislature, in 1969, some two years after Collins, substantially revised the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The legislature saw fit to retain substantially the same language of A.R.S. § 23-1061 which had been construed in Collins. It seems obvious to me that if the legislature had wished to change the rule in Collins it could have easily done so, but the legislature did not make the change, and under the elementary rules of statutory construction, the Court must presume that the intent of the legislature was to continue the interpretation placed by the courts on the statute.
In State v. Superior Court of Pima County, 104 Ariz. 440, 454 P.2d 982 (1969) on the subject of legislative intent the Court stated:
“We do not assume the Legislature was unaware of our holdings and, therefore, by re-enacting the statute in substantially the same language intended to carry the construction of the former act into the present law:” 104 Ariz. at 442, 454 P.2d at 984.
In Madrigal v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ariz. 138, 210 P.2d 967 (1949) this Court stated the rule of construction to be:
“But there is even more convincing evidence that the holding in the Melendez case is not a variance with the results intended by the legislature. Both Secs. 56-928 and 56-929, supra, which deal with the exclusion of certain agricultural laborers, have been expressly considered by the legislature since the decision in the Melendez case, and both of said sections have been amended in other respects, but the specific language in each section which was construed by the court was reenacted without any change in substance. * * * It is universally the rule that where a statute which has been construed by a court of last resort is reenacted in the same or substantially the same terms, the legislature is presumed to have placed its approval on the judicial interpretation given and to have adopted such construction and made it a part of the reenacted statute.” 69 Ariz. at 144, 210 P.2d at 971.
It is also most noteworthy that the Court in Madrigal also cautioned:
“We are not impressed with petitioner’s plea for a more liberal interpretation in this matter, as for us to so enlarge the coverage of the act would not be a liberal interpretation but would amount to nothing short of judicial extension.” 6Ariz. at 144, 210 P.2d at 971.
In the revision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, A.R.S. § 23-1061 continued to provide that the only two exceptions to the time limit within which a claim was to be filed were those set forth in subsection B, neither of which apply to the case at issue. In view of the legislative history and the long uniform interpretation on the meaning of the words it appears that the majority has frustrated the clear meaning of the statute and frustrated the purpose intended by the legislature.
In addition to overruling the prior case law and defeating the plain language of the statute the majority opinion also introduces for the first time the concept that the Industrial Commission has somehow become a creation of the Arizona Constitution and that the Industrial Commission has “inherent powers.” Needless to say, no authority is suggested for this novel position in which a statutory agency becomes endowed with inherent constitutional powers. Until today’s decision this Court on a number of occasions had held that the Industrial Commission was a statutory agency whose powers, rights and duties depended upon the provisions of the statute, and the agency created had no powers other than those that were specifically or impliedly delegated by statute. Industrial Commission v. Arizona Power Co., 37 *92Ariz. 425, 295 P. 305 (1931); Sims v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486, 19 P.2d 679 (1933); Pressley v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 22, 236 P.2d 1011 (1951).
Lastly, the Court’s extension of the statute leaves the Commission with no real standard. The Court holds that the Commission may relieve a workman of a failure to file a timely application for compensation when the ends of justice dictate. In the spirit of the federal supreme court we will decide on a case-by-case basis what is meant by the “ends of justice.” Do we mean that excusable neglect is part of the ends of justice? Is the concept to be limited to conduct by the employer or insurer which would constitute fraud, coercion, or estoppel? The “judicial intent” which has been substituted for the legislative intent remains obscure under the majority opinion. In amending a statute by interpretation the least the Court could do is be clear in what it means.
HAYS, C. J., concurs.