Court Opinion

ID: 9481302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:14:20.129936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:12.990174
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I agree fully with the majority’s interpretation of the Guidelines, I write separately to point out what seem to me anomalies and pitfalls inherent in their application here.
Eske’s sentence seems inconsistent with the important balance struck by the Sentencing Commission between its basic “charge offense” sentencing philosophy and a contrasting “real offense” philosophy. Thus, the Guidelines provide for sentencing in accord with charged offenses, with the exception that certain characteristics of the crime may enhance the sentence to reflect the defendant’s background or circumstances surrounding the crime. United States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294, 1302 (7th Cir.1989); Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofs-tra L.Rev. 1, 8-12 (1988); U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A, introduction 4(a), at 1.4-1.5 (Nov. 1990). The Commission recognized that its approach potentially afforded prosecutors discretion to affect the length of a sentence by adding counts to an indictment. U.S. S.G., ch. 1, pt. A, introduction 4(a), at 1.5 (Nov. 1990). Eske’s case presents a considerably more problematic opening for prose-cutorial expedients. True, Eske admitted that he committed the uncharged offenses. He “pleaded guilty” to them in an informal way. But it may not be clear that he understood the full consequences of his action. A stipulation of this sort to offenses more serious than the crimes charged (and pleaded to) may have a potential for misleading a defendant with respect to the consequences of a guilty plea.
Defendant Eske no doubt believed that there was a quid pro quo in the plea bargain. The plea agreement provided that, “The government-agrees not to charge but the court will consider for determining the appropriate sentencing guideline range the following [Social Security number violations].” Plea Agreement at 5, reproduced in Appellant’s Br. at 14. Eske may not have been fully aware that the stipulated, uncharged offenses carried a base offense level greater than the charged offenses. There is room for doubt that a defendant could fully comprehend this unusual state of affairs before receipt of the Presentence Report. Hope for comprehension of this bizarre problem, in view of the Guidelines’ complexity, may be misplaced.
In addition, the cases and example cited in support of today’s outcome and discussed in the government’s brief do not neatly fit Eske’s circumstances. Thus, the example in Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. section 1B1.2 (defendant pleading to three counts of robbery even though he was convicted for only one should be treated as having committed three robberies) involves crimes that may be closely related and for which the base offense level would likely be the same as that of the charged offense. In United States v. Collar, 904 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.1990), the court adjusted the offense level on the basis of two dismissed, less serious counts following the defen*209dant’s plea to four others. Moreover, the prosecution in Collar had charged all six offenses and then dropped two in exchange for the plea. United States v. Williams, 879 F.2d 454 (8th Cir.1989), similarly stands for the proposition that dismissed charged offenses can be used at sentencing and does not speak to uncharged offenses. In our own circuit, United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.1989), and United States v. Salva, 894 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.1990), involved uncharged conduct that was part of the activity or course of conduct forming the basis for the charged offenses:
It is now the clear rule in this circuit that a court may consider activity of which the defendant has not been charged or convicted in determining the appropriate Guidelines sentence, so long as that activity is “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.”
894 F.2d at 230 (citing U.S.S.G. section 1B1.3(a)(2), White, and United States v. Vopravil, 891 F.2d 155, 157-78 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1989) (employing “clearly related conduct” test)). Eske’s case, on the other hand, involves a set of unrelated and uncharged offenses that carry a higher base offense level. This is a situation I do not believe the Sentencing Commission fully envisaged.
Another potentially severe cost of “bootstrapping” more serious charges onto a less severe, charged offense may be that defendants are discouraged from pleading. Faced with the prospect of being sentenced for uncharged offenses that may result not in a marginal enhancement of a sentence but in a higher base offense level, what rational defendant would choose to plead? The value of the plea agreement to our justice system is apparent, and prosecutors will have to think carefully about the possible long-term effects of “bootstrapped” stipulations if the uncharged offenses carry a higher base offense level.
The Sentencing Commission has indicated that it “will closely monitor charging and plea agreement practices and will make appropriate adjustments should they become necessary.” U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A, introduction 4(a), at 1.5 (Nov. 1990). In the same paragraph the Commission states that “One of the most important [drawbacks of the charge offense system] is the potential it affords prosecutors to influence sentences by increasing or decreasing the number of counts in an indictment.” It is not clear whether the Commission considered the similar situation of unrelated, stipulated offenses affecting a sentence in the way illustrated by this case. Attention by the Commission may be in order.