Court Opinion

ID: 9702239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:02:53.310481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:38.116791
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent because I believe the court’s Batson analysis is faulty.1 Sadly, as a result of this decision, the court once again denies full participation in the justice system to one of Minnesota’s nonwhite citizens. See, e.g., William E. Martin & Peter N. Thompson, Removing Bias from the Minnesota Justice System, Bench & Bar, August 2002.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court set forth a three-part test for determining whether a juror has been struck for a constitutionally infirm reason. This test, which was redefined in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), requires, first, that the opponent of a peremptory challenge make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination.2 Id. at 767, *209115 S.Ct. 1769. If the opponent successfully makes out a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for the' strike. Id. Under Purkett, the explanation need not be “persuasive, or even plausible”; the sole issue is the facial validity of the explanation. Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. Once a race-neutral explanation has been offered, the court must decide whether that explanation is a pretext for racial discrimination. Id. At this third step, the persuasiveness of the proposed explanation becomes relevant and the court may disbelieve the explanation if it is “implausible or fantastic.” Id.
Here, the trial court correctly concluded that Taylor made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The prospective juror, an African American woman, was from a racial group capable of being singled out for differential treatment. Moreover, she was one of only three persons of color on the jury panel. In coming forward with its race-neutral explanation for the strike, the prosecutor stated that one reason was that the prospective juror indicated that she was generally “indifferent” toward police officers.3 Additionally, the prosecutor explained that the prospective juror had been hospitalized for depression and that she was on anti-depressant medication. The trial court found the reasons were not race-neutral because they were implausible *210given the record from voir dire.4 The prosecutor also offered four other explanations for the strike, which largely referred to the prospective juror’s experiences with the criminal justice system. The trial court found these reasons to be race-neutral. The trial court found that the prosecutor’s explanations as a whole were not a pretext for racial discrimination and, therefore, that Taylor failed to carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.5
The court, in affirming the trial court’s resolution of Taylor’s Batson challenge, concludes that all the reasons given by the prosecutor for striking the prospective juror are race-neutral and not pretextual. In its discussion of the juror’s indifferent attitude toward police, the court goes on to conclude that striking a potential juror for having an indifferent attitude toward police is race-neutral, although “nonsensical.” However, when examining this nonsensical reason in context of the remaining nondiscriminatory reasons, the court concludes “the absurdity [does not] indicate[ ] an
intent to discriminate.” I believe that this conclusion is erroneous. Indifference towards the police, as explained by the prosecutor as one basis for striking the prospective juror, while race-neutral on its face, on the facts presented here constitutes pretext for racial discrimination.
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const, amends. VI, XIV; Minn. Const, art. 1, §§ 6, 7; State v. Varner, 643 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Minn.2002). The prospective juror stated that police officers “can be there either to help you or to hurt you.” She stated that she would give all police officers the same credibility as other witnesses and that she “would listen to all testimony with an open mind.” These statements evince a clear lack of partiality or bias for or against police officers. Although the court suggests that the prospective juror’s view of police officers was less than indifferent, this was not the prosecutor’s explanation for the strike. Furthermore, the record before us does not support such a conclusion. A review of the *211prospective juror’s voir dire indicates that her attitude toward and general feelings about police officers was indeed indifferent.
“Indifferent” means “[h]aving a neutral or unbiased disposition; * * * [n]ot inclined or affected to one side, party, or cause more than to another; unprejudiced.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1266 (2d ed.1959). Juror indifference toward police officers is necessary to ensure jurors’ impartiality and the criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial. See, e.g., State v. Logan, 535 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Minn.1995) (conviction in double homicide reversed because juror exhibited bias favorable toward police officers, which resulted in denial of due process). When viewed, as we must at the third step of the Batson analysis, I can only conclude that the prosecutor’s explanation for the strike-that the prospective juror was indifferent towards the police — is “fantastic.” Burkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. The problem with the prosecutor’s explanation is that it is inconsistent with the fair administration of justice and Taylor’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. A juror cannot legitimately be struck from service for being qualified to serve — that is, for being impartial and unbiased.6 Thus, the prosecutor’s explanation is clearly pretex-tual; the question left to be determined is pretext for what.
While great deference is given to the trial court’s findings of fact, this court need not blindly accept the trial court’s interpretation of those findings when evaluating the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s explanation. This court can evaluate the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s explanation as a matter of law. See Burkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769. In its analysis of the prosecutor’s reasons for striking juror 25, the trial court discussed how other prospective jurors were not stricken from the jury even though they too expressed indifference towards police officers.7 It appears that the individuals the trial court was referring to were not people of color. As the trial court noted, and the record confirms, juror 25’s statements regarding police were not substantially different from those individuals. Because race appears to be the only distinguishing trait between juror 25 and those jurors who held the same views towards police, but were not stricken, I can only conclude that the prosecutor’s explanation was pretext for discrimination on the basis of race. There can be no other plausible reason for striking this African-American juror based on indifference towards the police, since a trial by impartial jurors is exactly what our Constitution promises to all defendants. Therefore, I conclude that Taylor has carried his burden of persuasion under the third step of Batson. As we said in State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn.1992), “striking of this juror on the basis of [that answer] in effect would allow a prosecutor to strike any fair-minded, reasonable black person from the jury *212panel who expressed” a lack of bias for or against police officers.
Having concluded that the explanation was pretext for racial discrimination, the next question is whether one pretextual reason taints the race-neutral and non-pretextual reasons given for the strike. The answer, I believe, is yes. Defendants have “the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and prospective jurors have the right not to be denied participation in jury service because of race, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 616, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991). What is more, “[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (“Active discrimination by a prosecutor during this process [of jury selection] condones violations of the United States Constitution within the very institution entrusted with its enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law.”). Thus, Batson was crafted to safeguard the jury selection process from racial discrimination, to protect the constitutional rights of defendants and prospective jurors, and to protect public trust and confidence in our system of justice. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct: 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. To excuse a prosecutor’s consideration of discriminatory reasons because there were also nondiscriminatory reasons for striking a juror would frustrate the purposes underlying Batson.
Moreover, it must be acknowledged that, because Batson protects against only the most obvious examples of racial prejudice, it is, from a practical perspective, an imperfect device for ensuring that jurors are “ ‘indifferently chosen.’ ” Id. at 86-87, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citation omitted); see id. at 105-06, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that “defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a prima facie case” and that, “when a defendant can establish a prima facie case, trial courts face the difficult burden of assessing prosecutors’ motives,” which “[a]ny prosecutor can easily assert” and which “trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess”). Thus, I share the viewpoint of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which stated:
To excuse such obvious prejudice because the challenged party can also articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the peremptory strike would erode what little protection Batson provides against discrimination in jury selection. The challenged party should not have an opportunity to convince the judge that he would have struck the juror regardless of the discriminatory reason.
Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1998). '
I would reverse Taylor’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

. I do not disagree, however, with the court's analysis and conclusions on issues one and three.

. To make out a prima facie case, the opponent initially must show that he or she is a member of a racial group capable of being singled out for differential treatment. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The opponent may then show that "the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Id.

. Upon asking the prospective juror in question about her general feelings toward police officers, the following discussion took place:
Q. You mentioned — there was a question that said "What are your general feelings about police officers,” and there was a positive, negative and other, and you checked "other”, and you said your feelings were indifferent. You said, "They can be there to help you or to hurt you.”
A. Uh-hum.
Q. Tell me a little bit more about that answer.
A. I believe it was just basically because of all of the things that you hear off of TV, the Rodney King incident and just the beatings, and so I think I was going off of that. Me personally, I’ve never, I’ve only had contact with one officer other than being pulled over once for a crack in my windshield, but it's basically they're either there to help you, you know, to serve justice or do what they have to do, otherwise they can turn, and you hear all these stories about how some police officers, you know, tamper evidence and stuff like that, and I believe that my answer came from just hearing things over the years about police officers.
Q. Okay. In the next question you were asked whether you would give police officers more credibility, less credibility or the same credibility as any other witness, and you said you’d give them the same credibility.
A. Uh-hum.
Q. And you said, "I would listen to all testimony with an open mind.”
A. Uh-hum.
Q. It sounds as though your personal experiences with police officers have been good or positive?
A. The one or two, yeah.
Q. Okay. Fortunately your contacts have been limited, but you are certainly aware of situations where the police have not acted appropriately—
A. Yes.
Q. —but it sounds as though you would listen to police testimony in this case with an open mind and decide what to make of it; is that fair to say?
A. I would have to say yes because I would listen to everybody the same. I wouldn't form any opinions. I'm not the type of person to form opinion, and so I would listen with an open mind, and it's just basically I go off of logic or my intuition.
Q. So you don’t come in here with any baggage about police officers doing bad things, you come in here with your knowledge of what goes on in the community and you're prepared to keep an open mind and listen to what they have to say?
A. Yes.

. In determining that the explanations regarding the prospective juror’s depression and indifference toward police officers were race neutral, the trial court stated:
I do say, however, that the record is not clear that Ms. Hartman is currently on medication or when she was hospitalized and I do not accept that reason as a race-neutral basis for having struck her without any questioning at all.
It’s true that her treatment may have been more significant than others, but we don’t know that. It may also have been equally as significant as others. We just don't know.
In the same respect, a number of individuals have indicated in different words an indifference to police officers because in their opinion they can either help you or hurt you and I’m paraphrasing the words that have been used by the jurors, I’m not quoting them, and I apologize if I’m mis-characterizing any of their comments, but those reasons, at least as far as I can tell, would not be, on this record, enough to have said that the reason is race neutral.

. In determining that Taylor failed to carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination, the trial court stated:
With regard to the tampering of evidence, the DNA evidence, the uncle who had been killed, the boyfriends in prison and specific comment made about the one boyfriend and the length of his sentence, and the age of the potential juror, who is 19, those are race neutral, and in the context of this jury selection process given [the prosecutor's] prior actions with other jurors as well as the reasons stated specifically for [the prospective juror] and the rationale, I find that they are race neutral and that they are not a pretext for discriminatory removal.
Accordingly, I find that the defendant has not carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination, and I deny [the defense counsel’s] challenge to [the prosecutor’s] peremptory challenge.

. With respect to jurors from racial groups capable of being singled out for discrimination, if they can be stricken because they are impartial, I suspect they would have little chance, if any, of serving on juries. Because, on its face, the explanation here is neutral, prosecutors could hide behind the prospective juror's impartiality as it relates to any juror, irrespective of color and, consequently, make it virtually impossible to identify racial discrimination in the jury selection process.

. It is important to note that the trial court's review of the record also indicates no distinction between juror 25’s depression and those other prospective jurors with depression who were not stricken. As such, this further substantiates a finding that juror 25 was stricken because of her race.