Court Opinion

ID: 9726244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:38:53.224971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:24.523242
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
“[Cjourts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process * ⅜ * [and] must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Minn.1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In Bowles, we stated that jury anonymity is not inherently prejudicial, as jurors “need not” take it as a sign that the defendant is guilty or especially dangerous, which would burden the defendant’s presumption of innocence and undermine his or her right to a fair trial. Id. at 529-30. We explained that jurors are “as likely to” conclude that anonymity is employed to shield them from pressure from the media or the public. Id. Implied, but unstated in our explanation, is the fact that there is also “some likelihood” that the empanelling of an anonymous jury will result in jurors taking it as a sign that the defendant is guilty and/or not only dangerous but dangerous to the jurors. Thus, even though we require courts to take certain precautions to lessen the potential for prejudice-, id. at 531, and even though the practice is not inherently prejudicial, the potential for prejudice will always exist whenever an anonymous jury is used.
Because of this potential for prejudice, we have held that trial courts may use an anonymous jury only when it is adequately justified, i.e., when “there is strong reason to believe that the jury needs protection from external threats to its members’ safety or impartiality * * ⅝.” Id. at 530-31 (emphasis added). Without a “strong reason” to justify its use, the empanelling of an anonymous jury needlessly exposes the defendant to the risk of prejudice and an unfair trial. In each of our previous cases involving the use of anonymous juries, we held that there was “strong reason” to believe that the jury needed protection. See State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 220-21 (Minn.1995); State v. Flournoy, 535 N.W.2d 354, 362 (Minn.1995); State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 220 (Minn.1995); Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 531. In those cases, we held on the facts presented that, because there were strong reasons to believe that the jury needed protection, jury anonymity was justified and therefore review would be for actual prejudice. See Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 530 (“[Ojur review *397of the use of anonymous juries shall be for actual prejudice to the defendant”).
This case is different. In this case, as the court acknowledges, there was no strong reason to believe that the jury needed protection. Consequently, Wren was exposed to the risk of prejudice for no reason. When there is a strong reason to empanel an anonymous jury and when the proper precautions are taken, the risk of prejudice is balanced by the need for jury anonymity, and review for actual prejudice is appropriate. However, in a case such as this, when there is no strong reason for exposing the defendant to the risk of prejudice that accompanies jury anonymity, I would place the burden on the state to show that the defendant was not prejudiced instead of requiring the defendant to show actual prejudice in order to obtain relief.