Court Opinion

ID: 9470064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:56:24.618972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:42.945723
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the court’s disposition of this appeal; but I write separately to express the following concern.1 I believe the majority has misapplied Sykes by deciding on the merits the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test. The majority recognizes that Sullivan has failed to allege or prove any cause for his procedural defaults in state court. The majority also realizes that the petitioner has the burden of proving cause. Nevertheless, the majority decides the cause issue on the merits.
We should not address the merits of the cause issue because resolution of that issue requires a factual determination, i.e., why did counsel fail to raise his claims timely in state court. This court cannot engage in this factual inquiry and has no business speculating on it. The majority treats the question of cause as purely one of law, and asks the abstract question whether counsel should have been aware of his “relatively novel” constitutional claims. I submit that it is irrelevant what this court thinks about the novelty of petitioner’s claims. To reiterate, the question is why petitioner’s counsel did not raise these issues in state court when he should have. We cannot answer this question because we are not a trial court, and we cannot ascertain facts not patent from the record. The majority appears to realize that, but nevertheless decides to speculate why there was a procedural default. Such speculation is obviously not part of our appellate function. Therefore, I cannot join with the majority in engaging in it. I would hold that Sullivan has failed to prove cause and thus Sykes bars those claims on which there has been a state procedural default.2

. I also note, consistent with the majority opinion, that in arguing that the trial sentencer impermissibly considered a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, Sullivan does not also attack the Florida Supreme Court’s affirmance of his allegedly invalid sentence. Therefore, we need not address such an attack.

. I do not mean to imply that the prejudice prong of the Sykes test does not involve a factual determination. The factual inquiry under this prong can be determined, however, from the record of the state court trial alone. Thus, an appellate court may engage in this inquiry without the benefit of additional evidence. In determining cause, however, the record usually will not reflect the reasons for a procedural default. When the record is unhelpful, as in this case, appellate courts should not engage in hypothetical discussions of cause.