Court Opinion

ID: 9426168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:17:01.151347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:59.397079
License: Public Domain

*478Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
I
I believe that petitioners are entitled to trial by jury under 18 XJ. S. C. § 3692, which provides that, with certain exceptions not here material:
“In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury . . . .”
In enacting this language in 1948, Congress reaffirmed the purpose originally expressed in § 11 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 72, 29 U. S. C. § 111 (1946 ed.). That Act was intended to shield the organized labor movement from the intervention of a federal judiciary perceived by some as hostile to labor. The Act severely constrained the power of a federal court to issue an injunction against any person “participating or interested in a labor dispute.” Section 11 provided for trial by jury in “all cases arising under this Act in which a person shall be charged with contempt.” In the context of the case now before us, I view this section as affording, at the very least, a jury trial in any criminal contempt proceeding involving an alleged violation of an injunction issued against a participant in a “labor dispute.” Any such injunction issued by a federal court was one “arising under” the Act, for it could have been issued only in accordance with the Act’s prescriptions.1 The evident congressional intent was to provide *479for the interposition of a jury when disobedience of such an injunction was alleged.2
For the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Stewart, post, at 485-486, I am persuaded that §§10 (h) and 10 (l) of the National Labor Relations Act made inapplicable only the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and did not disturb § 11. The broad mandate of § 11, to afford trial by jury in a contempt proceeding involving an injunction issued in a labor dispute, was thus continued in § 3692.3 See Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165, 217 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
II
1 would reverse the judgment against Local 70 on constitutional grounds.4 Article III, § 2, of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except *480in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . And the Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . (Emphasis added.)
The Court fails to give effect to this language when it declares that a $10,000 fine is not “of such magnitude that a jury should have been interposed to guard against bias or mistake.” Ante, at 477. I have previously protested this Court’s refusal to recognize a right to jury trial in cases where it deems an offense to be “petty.” 5 But even the “petty offense” exception cannot justify today’s result, for it is impossible fairly to characterize either the offense or its penalty as “petty.” 6 Disobedience of an injunction obtained by the Board is hardly a transgression trivial by its nature; and the imposition of a $10,000 fine is not a matter most locals would take lightly. In any event, the Constitution deprives us of the power to grant or withhold trial by jury depending upon our assessment of the substantiality of the penalty. To the argument that the Framers could not have intended to provide trial by jury in cases involving only *481“small” fines and imprisonment, the response of Justices McReynolds and Butler in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 633-634 (1937) (separate opinion), is apt:
“In a suit at common law to recover above $20.00, a jury trial is assured. And to us, it seems improbable that while providing for this protection in such a trifling matter the framers of the Constitution intended that it might be denied where imprisonment for a considerable time or liability for fifteen times $20.00 confronts the accused.”
I would follow the clear command of Art. Ill and the Sixth Amendment and reverse the judgment as to Local 70.

 As initially enacted by the Senate, § 11 contained no “arising under” language and would have applied in all criminal contempt proceedings, whether or not involving an injunction issued in a *479labor dispute. See S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4510-4511, 4757-4761 (1932). The “arising under” language was added by the House-Senate conferees to restrict the scope of § 11 to labor disputes. See id.., at 6336-6337, 6450.

 This construction is consistent with the remark in United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 298 (1947), that “§ 11 is not operative here, for it applies only to cases ‘arising under this Act/ and we have already held that the restriction upon injunctions imposed by the Act do [sic] not govern this case.” As the entire sentence makes clear, § 11 was “not operative” because the Court had found that the underlying dispute between the Government and the Mine Workers was not the kind of “labor dispute” to which the NorrisLaGuardia Act had been addressed. See 330 U. S., at 274-280. See also id., at 328-330 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring and dissenting).

 We deal here with criminal contempt proceedings. Whether § 3692 affords trial by jury in civil contempt proceedings is a question not presented here and on which, accordingly, I express no opinion.

 Petitioner Muniz apparently decided not to raise the constitutional issue in this Court; our grant of certiorari on the issue thus extended only to Local 70. 419 U. S. 992 (1974).

 E. g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 7A-76 (1970) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring in judgment); Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147, 159-160 (1969) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Johnson v. Nebraska, 419 U. S. 949 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

 As noted in my dissenting opinion in Chef¡ v. Schnackenberg, 384 U. S. 373, 386-391 (1966), the “petty offense” doctrine began as an effort to identify offenses that were by their nature “petty,” and the punishment prescribed or imposed was one factor to be considered in characterizing the offense. Under the Court’s current formulation, the penalty is of controlling significance. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506, 512 (1974).