Court Opinion

ID: 9379230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 06:08:28.238257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.967138
License: Public Domain

VACATE and DISMISS and Opinion Filed March 13, 2023

                                     S   In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 No. 05-21-00647-CV

                     VIJAYALAKSHMI NADAR, Appellant
                                  V.
                        THINAKAR NADAR, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the County Court at Law 3
                             Collin County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 003-02474-2021

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Breedlove

      In a forcible entry and detainer suit, the trial court awarded possession of the

marital home to appellee Thinakar Nadar (“Mr. Nadar”) and ordered appellant

Vijayalakshmi Nadar (“Ms. Nadar”) to vacate the premises. The court also awarded

Mr. Nadar court costs and attorney’s fees. In three issues, Ms. Nadar challenges the

trial court’s jurisdiction and contends the trial court abused its discretion in rendering

judgment for Mr. Nadar. Concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

resolve issues regarding the disposition of marital property which was the subject of

a prior divorce decree, we vacate the trial court’s judgment.
                               I.     BACKGROUND

      Mr. and Ms. Nadar were divorced by final decree in the 469th Judicial District

Court of Collin County (469th Court). Although the 469th Court awarded the

parties’ marital home in Plano to Mr. Nadar, Ms. Nadar and the parties’ daughter

continued to live in the home, as they had since 2013. The 469th Court awarded the

parties’ home in Mumbai, India, to Ms. Nadar. The 469th Court also ordered that

the parties “execute any and all documents necessary and proper to fulfill the

division of property above awarded, and further have any writs, executions and

process, as many and as often as necessary, to fulfill the provisions of this Decree.”

More specifically, the 469th Court ordered Ms. Nadar to sign a special warranty

deed transferring her interest in the Plano home to Mr. Nadar and made a reciprocal

order requiring Mr. Nadar to sign any document required to transfer his interest in

the Mumbai property to Ms. Nadar. The parties did not do so.

      On April 15, 2021, Mr. Nadar filed a forcible entry and detainer suit in the

Justice Court, Precinct 4, of Collin County. At a hearing on June 3, 2021, the court

awarded possession of the marital home in Plano to Mr. Nadar and ordered Ms.

Nadar to vacate the premises. The court’s judgment included awards of attorney’s

fees and costs and set the amount of an appeal bond. Ms. Nadar filed a statement of

inability to pay that Mr. Nadar did not challenge.

      On June 22, 2021, Ms. Nadar appealed the trial court’s ruling to Collin County

Court at Law 3. At a trial on July 20, 2021, the court found in favor of Mr. Nadar

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and awarded possession of the marital home to him along with court costs and

attorney’s fees, and set a supersedeas bond. The court also ordered Ms. Nadar to

vacate and surrender the home.     Ms. Nadar filed a second affidavit of inability to

pay that Mr. Nadar did not challenge.

      Ms. Nadar now appeals. In three issues, she complains that (1) the trial court

abused its discretion in granting possession of disputed marital property in a forcible

entry and detainer suit; (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resolve issues

regarding the marital property which was the subject of a prior divorce decree; and

(3) the trial court abused its discretion in requiring an appeal bond and charging for

an appellate record despite Ms. Nadar’s unchallenged pauper’s affidavit. Because

Ms. Nadar’s second issue is dispositive, we do not reach the remaining two issues.

        II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

      “Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a

case.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993).

Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law that we decide de

novo. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 166

(Tex. 2013).

      Jurisdiction of forcible detainer actions is expressly given to the justice court

of the precinct where the property is located. Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 708

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004 (Vernon

2000); TEX. R. CIV. P. 749 (Vernon 2012, repealed 2013); Home Sav. Ass’n v.

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Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of

a title dispute, the justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment and may be

enjoined from doing so. Id. at 709 (citing Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d 194, 196

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Rodriguez v. Sullivan, 484

S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1972, no writ) (justice court judgment void

when possession depended on whether defendant complied with contract for deed);

Am. Spiritualist Ass’n v. Ravkind, 313 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1958,

writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same)).

      Under the Texas Family Code, the court that rendered a decree of divorce

retains the power to enforce the division of property made in the decree. TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 9.002; In re Marriage of Pyrtle, 433 S.W.3d 152, 160 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2014, pet. denied). A party affected by a divorce decree providing for the

division of property may request enforcement of that decree by filing a suit to

enforce in the court that rendered the decree. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.001; Pyrtle,

433 S.W.3d at 160. Specifically, “the court may render further orders to enforce the

division of property made in the decree of divorce . . . to assist in the implementation

of or to clarify the prior order.” Pyrtle, 433 S.W.3d at 160 (citing DeGroot v.

DeGroot, 369 S.W.3d 918, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 9.006(a).

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                                 III.   DISCUSSION

      In response to Ms. Nadar’s challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction, Mr.

Nadar argues that “[t]he district court that granted the divorce did not limit the

enforcement of its orders to that court only, nor by statute could it restrict [Mr.

Nadar] from seeking possession of the real property awarded to him by filing suit in

the justice court.” Mr. Nadar correctly argues that “[t]he justice court has by statute

original jurisdiction of forcible entry and detainer suits and eviction suits.”

However, the case before us is no typical eviction suit—instead, the nature of the

dispute unambiguously requires the court to review, interpret, and enforce the 469th

Court’s divorce decree. The County Court itself recognized this distinction at the

trial when Ms. Nadar attempted to explain how the transfer of title to the Plano

property was related to the transfer of title to the Mumbai property, responding,

“that’s all divorce stuff, and we don’t do divorces down here.”

      Under Section 9.001(a) of the Texas Family Code, a party affected by a decree

of divorce providing for a division of property “may request enforcement of that

decree by filing suit to enforce as provided in this chapter in the court that rendered

the decree.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.001(a) (emphasis added). The Code further

provides that the “court that rendered the decree of divorce or annulment retains the

power to enforce the property division . . . .” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.002.

Although other courts may have jurisdiction over ancillary matters that do not

require the enforcement of a divorce decree, cases that involve an enforcement action

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like the one brought in this case belong in the court that rendered the divorce decree.

See Griffith v. Reyes, 653 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.)

(holding that the court that renders the divorce decree has exclusive jurisdiction in

suits to enforce the decree).

      In Griffith, the parties filed for divorce in the Medina County Court of Law,

and that court rendered the final divorce decree. Eight years later, the ex-husband

filed suit in the 216th Judicial District Court of Gillespie County, alleging his ex-

wife had failed to discharge certain debts she was required to discharge under the

divorce decree. Id. at 752. The ex-wife argued that pursuant to Chapter 9 of the

Texas Family Code, only the court that rendered the final divorce decree had

authority to enforce said decree. Id. at 748. The trial court agreed and dismissed the

case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. On appeal, the court held that because the 216th

Court was not the court that rendered the divorce decree, it did not have subject

matter jurisdiction over an action to enforce the terms of the decree. Id. at 747.

      Like Griffith, the central issue in this case is a party’s failure to take an action

required by the divorce decree. Neither party has offered any evidence to show that

they complied with the divorce decree’s directive to “execute any and all documents

necessary and proper to fulfill the division of property” awarded by the 469th Court.

It is undisputed that although the divorce decree awarded the Plano home to Mr.

Nadar, the parties never transferred title to the property as the decree required them

to do. “A judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is a determination

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only of the right to immediate possession of the premises and does not determine the

ultimate rights of the parties to any other issue in controversy relating to the realty

in question.” Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 710 (quoting Martinez v. Beasley, 572 S.W.2d 83,

85 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, no writ). Because the parties have not yet

taken the necessary steps to modify title to the marital home, eviction is not the

appropriate remedy for Mr. Nadar. Id. (internal citations omitted).

      Further, the divorce made reciprocal awards, including awarding the Mumbai

property to Ms. Nadar, and required that the parties execute and deliver any

documents necessary to effectuate the provisions of the divorce decree. Ms. Nadar

asserts in this appeal, and Mr. Nadar does not challenge, that Mr. Nadar has failed

to deliver the necessary documents or transfer title to the Mumbai property to Ms.

Nadar, despite her requests. Ms. Nadar also asserts, and Mr. Nadar does not dispute,

material changes in the status of the properties since the divorce decree, numerous

potential ambiguities regarding the relationship between the properties awarded

under the divorce decree, as well as unforeseen barriers to effectuating the court’s

order. The remedy for these complaints is to seek clarification and enforcement of

the divorce decree. Pyrtle, 433 S.W.3d at 160. Under the Family Code, the power

to clarify and enforce a divorce decree belongs to the court that rendered the decree,

which, in this case, is the 469th District Court. Griffith, 653 S.W.3d at 751 (citing

Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011)).

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      Because we conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Nadar’s

claims, we sustain Ms. Nadar’s second issue. Given this disposition, we need not

discuss her remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

                               IV.    CONCLUSION

      We vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss this appeal.

                                          /Maricela Breedlove/
                                          MARICELA BREEDLOVE
                                          JUSTICE
210647F.P05

                                       –8–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

VIJAYALAKSHMI NADAR,                           On Appeal from the County Court at
Appellant                                      Law No. 3, Collin County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. 003-02474-
No. 05-21-00647-CV           V.                2021.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice
THINAKAR NADAR, Appellee                       Breedlove. Justices Molberg and
                                               Reichek participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is VACATED and this appeal is DISMISSED.

       It is ORDERED that appellant VIJAYALAKSHMI NADAR recover her
costs of this appeal from appellee THINAKAR NADAR.

Judgment entered this 13th day of March 2023.

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