Court Opinion

ID: 9374935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 17:04:34.078913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.281139
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                              COURT OF APPEAL

                                FIRST CIRCUIT

                                  2022 CA 0859

                               CRAIG R. SHORT

                                    VERSUS

      RACETRAC PETROLEUM, INC. INDIVIDUALLY AND D/ B/ A
  RACETRAC JOHN DOE, DEF INSURANCE COMPANY, JOHN DOE,
                   INC. AND DEF INSURANCE COMPANY

                                                Judgment Re" dered:
                                                                      FEB 2 4 20

                 Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Court
                       In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
                                State of Louisiana
                               Case No. 2016- 12077

               The Honorable Vincent J. Lobello, Judge Presiding

Michael C. Ginart, Jr.                Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Joyce D. Young                        Craig Short
Nicholas N. S. Cusimano
John C. Ginart
Chalmette, Louisiana

Troy L. Bell                          Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr.              RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc.
Elizabeth R. R. Showalter
New Orleans, Louisiana

Charles J. Duhe, Jr.                  Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee
Sarah M. Kalis                        Tri-State Parking Lot Maintenance, LLC
New Orleans, Louisiana

               BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ. /

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                                       ce-...       Girp LLa -   w•
LANIER, J.

       In this personal injury action, the district court granted the defendants'

motions to exclude the testimony and report of plaintiffs expert based upon the

failure to meet the admissibility standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 ( 1993),

and La. Code Evid. art. 702, and further found that, absent the excluded testimony,

the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm.

                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The facts of this case are largely undisputed. It arises from a slip and fall

that occurred on June 29, 2015, at the RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc. convenience store

  RaceTrac") located in Covington, Louisiana.       On that date, plaintiff, Craig Short,

had just finished pumping gasoline into his vehicle, when he and his son proceeded

to walk towards the store to get snacks.     Although it had been raining " very hard"

earlier in the morning, it had slowed to a " light drizzle" by the time they decided to

walk to the store from the pumps.        As Mr. Short and his son walked toward the

store, Mr. Short slipped and fell when he stepped on the painted surface of the

handicap parking space directly in front of the doors.     When Mr. Short was asked

during his deposition whether he knew what caused him to slip, he replied "[         t] he

ground was wet."        He denied seeing any other substances on the ground such as

wet paint, oil, or any chemical substances.

       On May 19, 2016, Mr. Short filed a petition for damages against RaceTrac,

John Doe, John Doe, Inc.,      and DEF Insurance Company, seeking damages for his

injuries.   Mr. Short alleged he sustained personal injuries to his right hip and right

shoulder, as well as multiple contusions and other painful and personal injuries as a

result of his fall.   He further asserted, among other things, that RaceTrac created an

inherently dangerous condition. by failing to use a non -slip paint and/ or paint

                                             2
additive in the handicap parking area and that RaceTrac failed to property remedy
the defect when it knew or should have known of the condition. RaceTrac filed an

answer, generally denying the allegations of the petition, and filed a Notice of

Removal to federal court.

         Mr. Short subsequently filed a first supplemental and amending petition in

federal court naming Samantha Pritchett and Janiqua Jackson,                  employees   of

RaceTrac, and Tri- State Parking Lot Maintenance, LLC (" Tri- State").            Mr. Short

alleged that Pritchett and Jackson were responsible for the contracting for the

painting and maintenance of the handicap parking space and further that Tri-State

had painted and/ or applied the handicap stripes and signage to the area in question.

Mr. Short also filed a " Motion to Remand for Lack of Federal Court Jurisdiction."

On December 6, 2017, the matter was remanded to                      state court for further

proceedings.

         RaceTrac and Tri- State each responded by filing motions for summary
judgment.    In opposition, Mr. Short submitted, among other documents, the resume

and affidavit of his expert, James Danner, a civil engineer who opined that "[         a] t a

minimum, the painted walkway should have an abrasive additive as recommended

in the    Sherwin- Williams   data sheet,   cross   cut    grooving,     texturing or other

appropriate means to render the surface slip resistant." Both motions were initially

denied in a judgment signed September 12, 2019. Following additional discovery,

including the deposition of Mr.     Danner, Tri- State filed a Daubert motion to

exclude Mr. Danner's testimony and report, and re -urged its motion for summary

judgment.     Likewise, RaceTrac filed a motion in limine to exclude Mr. Danner's

testimony and also re -urged its motion for summary judgment. In seeking to

exclude Mr. Danner's testimony, defendants argued. (            1)   Mr. Danner' s opinions

were not supported by any codes or standards; (           2)   the slip resistance standard

relied upon by Mr. Danner was not adopted by Louisiana; ( 3)              the measurements

                                            3
obtained by Mr. Danner through testing were unreliable because they were not

performed under the same conditions present when Mr. Short allegedly fell; ( 4)

Mr.   Danner did not know exactly where Mr.                Short fell; ( 5)     Mr. Danner's

conclusions were unsupported by his testing results; (          6) Mr. Danner relied on

inaccurate and minimal facts to draw his conclusions;              and (   7)   Mr. Danner's

methodology was unreliable.

        After a hearing on defendants' motions, the district court took the matter

under   advisement.     On March 30, 2022, the court issued written reasons for

judgment, granting all of the motions before it and dismissing Mr. Short' s claims

against RaceTrac and Tri- State.     The court signed a judgment in accordance with

its findings on April 18, 2022,      dismissing,   with    prejudice,   Mr. Short' s claims

against RaceTrac and Tri- State.     This appeal by Mr. Short followed, wherein he

alleges the district court erred in excluding Mr. Danner's testimony and in granting

the motions for summary judgment filed by RaceTrac and Tri-State.

                               LAW AND ANALYSIS

Daubert Motion/Motion in Limine

        In his first assignment of error, Mr. Short alleges that the district court erred

by excluding all of Mr. Danner's testimony. While acknowledging that the test Mr.

Danner performed " may      not be relevant or reliable"    in his case, Mr. Short argues

that Mr. Danner's "   technical, specialized knowledge and experience will help the

trier of fact to understand the evidence and determine a fact in issue."

        The standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony was

established by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert, and is now codified in

La. Code Evid. art. 702, which provides, in part:

        A. A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
        experience, training,
                              or education may testify in the form of an
        opinion or otherwise if

                                            0
            1)     The expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
        will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
        fact in issue;

            2) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

            3)    The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
        and

            4) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
        facts of the case.

        To ensure reliability,              Daubert requires that the          expert' s   opinions   be

grounded in methods and procedures of science, rather than subjective belief or

unsupported speculation.
                                        Thus, before expert testimony is admitted, the court must

make a preliminary assessment that the reasoning or methodology underlying the

testimony is scientifically valid and can be applied to the facts at issue.                  Daubert,

509 U.S. at 589- 593, 113 S. Ct. at 2795- 2797; Devall v. Baton Rouge Fire Dept.,

2007- 0156 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11 /2/ 07),           979 So. 2d 500, 502.

        The following illustrative considerations may be used to determine whether

the reasoning and methodology underlying expert testimony is scientifically valid

and can properly be applied to the facts at issue: (              1)   whether the expert' s theory or

technique can be and has been tested; ( 2)                whether the theory or technique has been

subjected to peer review and publication; ( 3)               whether there is a known or potential

rate   of        error;   and (   4)   whether the methodology is generally accepted in the

scientific community. Daubert, 509 U. S. at 593- 594, 113 S. Ct. at 2796- 2797.

        However, the ultimate determination of the admissibility of expert testimony

under Article 702 " turns upon whether it would assist the trier of fact to understand

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Cheairs v. State ex rel. Department

of Transp. and Development, 2003- 0680 ( La. 12/ 3/ 03), 861 So. 2d 536, 541- 542.

The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is within the sound discretion of

the district court, and its judgment will not be disturbed by an appellate court

unless it is clearly erroneous.            Devall, 979 So.2d at 503.

                                                      5
          On appeal, Mr.    Short concedes that the testing done in this case by Mr.

Danner was not designed for use on wet surfaces and that the ground was in fact

wet when Mr. Short slipped. Although Mr. Short acknowledges that Mr. Danner's

testing may not be relevant or reliable to this case, he asserts that Mr. Danner's

technical,       specialized    knowledge        and   experience   with   respect     to

pedestrian/ walkway safety is relevant and will help the trier of fact better
understand the evidence.
                               Mr. Short points to Mr. Danner's membership in ASTM

F13—Pedestrian/ Walkway Safety and Footwear (" ASTM Committee").              Mr. Short

argues that Mr. Danner should have been allowed to testify regarding the static

coefficient of friction and how paint additives affect same.         He notes that Mr.

Danner can educate the jury concerning the data sheet of the paint used and explain

the safety precautions contained therein.

          With regard to Mr. Danner's membership on the ASTM Committee, Mr.

Danner stated that the committee is made up of about eight subcommittees.           He is

on the Walkway and Safety subcommittee and the Traction subcommittee.                Mr.

Danner testified that he considers himself an expert on walkway surfaces.

          According to the record evidence, Mr. Danner's inspections of the accident

site took place approximately one year after Mr. Short' s fall. In fact, during his site

visit,    Mr.   Danner was actually performing testing in connection with another

incident that had occurred at the RaceTrac in August 2016.           Mr. Danner never

performed a site inspection or testing in direct response to Mr. Short's fall.    As part

of his testing, Mr. Danner randomly tested six areas of the painted symbol in which

Mr.      Short had reportedly fallen using a Whiteley Slipmaster Horizontal Pull

Slipmeter.      A series of eight tests were made in the six test areas, four were taken

in the direction of travel and four were taken perpendicular to that direction.

          Mr. Danner testified that he used the Whiteley Slipmaster Horizontal Pull

Slipmeter and that the area was " tested in accordance with equipment and protocol

                                             6
detailed in ASTM F 609- 05 ( Reapproved 2013), "             Standard Test Method Using a

Horizontal Pull Slipmeter (       TIPS)"."     Mr.   Danner explained that the Whiteley

Slipmaster is used to determine the coefficient of friction, which in turn is used to

determine the slip resistance of a surface.           He acknowledged, however, that the

protocol for the Whiteley Slipmaster was " only valid for doing dry static tests."

Mr. Danner further added that he was not aware of any Louisiana statute or

regulation "
                 that defines slip resistance as a level of the dry static coefficient of

friction."      Mr. Danner indicated that he did not know the exact location of where

Mr. Short fell, but that he had a " general idea." Mr. Danner noted in his report that

 the exact location where Mr. Short stepped was not tested and the coefficient of

friction at that spot cannot be confirmed."

            Mr. Danner was also asked about standards and codes he reviewed in

connection with this case.      He referred to the " National Fire Protection Association

Life Safety Code 100-         2009 Edition; Article 7. 1. 6. 4 Means of Egress,         Walking

Surfaces,"      noting that it had been adopted in the fire marshal' s law " quite          a few

years ago."'       Concerning the ASTM standard he reviewed, " ASTM                International

F1637- 10; Standard Practice of Safe Walking Surfaces, Walkway Surfaces; Article

5. 1. 3,"    Mr. Danner acknowledged that this standard had not been adopted by any

Louisiana statute or regulation.'

            Concerning the results of his testing, Mr. Danner found that five of the six

areas tested were " slip resistant"    and one was "
                                                         marginally slip resistant."     Despite

1 This code provides, " Walking surfaces shall be slip resistant under foreseeable conditions. The
walking surface of each element in the means of egress shall be uniformly slip resistant along the
natural path of travel."

2 This ASTM standard provides, " Walkway surfaces shall be slip resistant under expected
environmental conditions and use.    Painted walkways shall contain an abrasive additive, cross
cut grooving, texturing or other appropriate means to render the surface slip resistant where wet
conditions may be reasonably foreseeable." Even Mr. Danner admitted in his deposition
testimony that while using " abrasive additive, cross cut grooving, texturing or other appropriate
means" may make a surface more slip resistant when it is wet, slip and fall accidents could still
occur under some circumstances.

                                                7
these findings, Mr. Danner concluded that "[ b] ased on the [ surveillance] video and

testing, the walkway surface of the painted parking space where Mr. Short slipped

was likely not slip resistant when wet."         When asked what led him to the

conclusion that the area where Mr. Short slipped was likely not slip resistant, Mr.

Danner replied, "    Essentially because he did slip and fall." He continued noting

that he made similar findings in other cases where there was traffic paint used

without an additive to make the paint slip resistant. Mr. Danner concluded in his

report as follows:

      Based on the layout of the islands and the store doorway,               it is
      reasonable and foreseeable that a pedestrian would take a direct route
      from the fuel islands to and from the store entrances when the marked
      accessible parking space in front of the door is vacant. As such, that
      area would be better used as a dedicated pedestrian walkway from the
      islands to the store without large area of painted concrete in its center.
      At a minimum, the painted walkway should have an abrasive additive
      as recommended in the         Sherwin- Williams data sheet,     cross    cut

      grooving, texturing, or other appropriate means to render the surface
      slip resistant as wet conditions at this location are to be expected. It is
      apparent that none of these modifications were done.

      After considering Mr. Danner's deposition testimony and report, as well as

argument of the parties, the district court excluded Mr. Danner from testifying or

offering any opinion in the case and further ruled that Mr. Danner's expert report

was inadmissible.     After careful review, we find no error or abuse of discretion by

the district court in excluding Mr. Danner's testimony and expert report.      While we

acknowledge Mr. Danner's experience as a civil engineer, we agree with the

district court that his testimony and report are inadmissible in this matter.         W.

Danner's opinions are not based on sufficient facts or data; his opinions are neither

reliable nor the product of reliable principles and methods; and Mr. Danner has not

reasonably applied the principles and methods to the facts of this specific case as

required by Daubert and Article 702. We further agree that there is no evidence in

the record that Mr. Danner is qualified to testify as an expert regarding whether

                                           8
additives should have been added to the paint used in the area where Mr. Short fell.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

       After an opportunity for adequate discovery,            a   motion     for summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents

show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966( A)( 3).           In reviewing a

district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts review

evidence    de   novo using the     same   criteria   that   govern   the    district   court' s

determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate.                   Georgia- Pacific

Consumer Operations, LLC v. City of Baton Rouge, 2017- 1553 ( La. App.                        1

Cir. 7/ 18/ 18), 255 So. 3d 16, 22, writ denied, 2018- 1397 ( La. 12/ 3/ 18), 257 So. 3d

194.

       The Code of Civil Procedure places the initial burden of proof on the party

filing the motion for summary judgment. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966( D)( 1).               If

the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the

court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover need only point out to the

court, through its supporting documents, the absence of factual support for one or

more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.          La. Code

Civ. P. art. 966( D)( 1).   Once the motion for summary judgment has been properly

supported by the moving party, i.e., the mover has established the material facts

through its supporting documents and the mover has made a prima facie showing

that the motion should be granted, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party

to produce factual support, through the use of supporting documents in opposition

to the motion, of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover

is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966( D)( 1).         See

also La. Code Civ. P. art. 966, Comments -      2015, Comment 0). If the non-moving

                                           01
party fails to produce sufficient factual support in its opposition that proves the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact, Article 966(D)( 1)              mandates the

granting of the motion for summary judgment.                     See Babin v. Winn- Dixie

Louisiana, Inc., 2000- 0078 ( La. 6/ 30/ 00), 764 So. 2d 37, 40 ( per curiam); Jenkins

v. Hernandez, 2019- 0874 ( La.      App.     1    Cir. 6/ 3/ 20), 305 So.3d 365, 371,      writ

denied, 2020- 00835 ( La. 10120/ 20), 303 So. 3d 315.

      In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court's role is not to

evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but

instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Janney v.

Pearce, 2009- 2103 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 7/ 10), 40 So. 3d 285, 289, writ denied, 2010-

1356 ( La. 9/ 24/ 10), 45 So. 3d 1078.   Because it is the applicable substantive law

that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be

seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Georgia- Pacific

Consumer Operations, LLC, 255 So. 3d at 22.

      As to Mr. Short's claims against RaceTrac, the applicable substantive law is

found in La. R.S. 9: 2800. 6, which provides, in pertinent part:

            B. In a negligence claim brought against a merchant by a person
      lawfully on the merchant's premises for damages as a result of an
      injury, death, or loss sustained because of a fall due to a condition
      existing in or on a merchant's premises, the claimant shall have the
      burden of proving, in addition to all other elements of his cause of
      action, all of the following:

              1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the

      claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.

              2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive
      notice of the condition       which        caused the damage, prior to the
      occurrence.

              3)   The   merchant   failed       to   exercise   reasonable   care.   In

      determining reasonable care, the absence of a written or verbal
      uniform cleanup or safety procedure is insufficient, alone, to prove
      failure to exercise reasonable care.

                                             10
          In order to prove that a merchant is liable for damages sustained as a result

of a fall due to a condition that existed in or on the merchant's premises, a plaintiff

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, through direct or circumstantial

evidence: (    1)   the existence of a condition that presented an unreasonable risk of

harm that was reasonably foreseeable, (        2) the merchant' s actual or constructive

notice of the condition, and ( 3) the merchant' s failure to exercise reasonable care.

Williams v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 2016- 0996 ( La. App.                  1

Cir. 3113117), 217 So. 3d 421, 424, writ denied, 2017- 0624 ( La. 6/ 5/ 17), 219 So. 3d

338.    Failure to prove any one of the foregoing requirements is fatal to a plaintiffs

case.   Id.

          A merchant owes a duty to persons using his premises to exercise reasonable

care to keep such premises in a reasonably safe condition.        La. R.S. 9: 2800. 6( A).

The absence of an unreasonably dangerous condition implies the absence of a duty

on the part of the defendant.          Williams, 217 So. 3d at 424 (    citing Oster v.

Department of Transp. and Development, State of La., 582 So. 2d 1285,                  1288

La. 1991)).         A hazardous condition is one that creates an unreasonable risk of

harm to customers under the circumstances. Pena v. Delchamps, Inc., 2006- 0364

La.     App.   1 Cir. 3128107),   960 So. 2d 988, 991,    writ denied, 2007- 0875 ( La.

6122107), 959 So. 2d 498.       However, merchants are not insurers of their patrons'

safety,    and a customer is under a duty to use ordinary care to avoid injury.

Primeaux v. Best Western            Plus Houma Inn, 2018- 0841 ( La.       App.    1   Cir.

2128119), 274 So. 3d 20, 28.      Accordingly, a merchant is not absolutely liable every

time an accident happens. Williams, 217 So. 3d at 424.

        As previously noted, Mr. Short indicated that he did not see anything on the

ground at the time of his fall other than rainwater. When asked what caused him to

fall, Mr. Short stated, "[ t]he ground was wet."      Although Mr. Short points to the

surveillance videos in an effort to prove causation, a review of the videos merely

                                             11
reveals the general location of Mr. Short's fall, not what actually caused the fall.

Moreover, there is video evidence showing several other patrons of RaceTrac

traversing the same area, without incident, just after Mr. Short's fall. As noted by

the district court, Mr. Short presented no evidence to " substantiate that the cause of

 his] fall was anything other than a surface wet from rain, i.e.,   an open and obvious

condition."

         We agree with the district court that the record is void of any competent

summary judgment evidence to prove that the area where Mr. Short fell presented

an unreasonable risk of harm.      Mr. Short's inability to satisfy this essential element

of La. R.S. 9: 2800.6( B) is fatal to his claim against RaceTrac.           Accordingly,

summary judgment in favor of RaceTrac was appropriate.

         Similarly, we find that summary judgment in favor of Tri-State was properly
granted.     Mr. Short's claim against Tri- State was based on negligence. Mr. Short

alleged that Tri- State failed to use the proper paint and/ or a paint additive when

painting the handicap parking area so as not to create an inherently dangerous

condition.
               To defeat the motion for summary judgment filed by Tri- State, Mr.

Short was required to come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue for

trial.   See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 966 ( D)( 1) and 967( B).

         Tri- State was the company hired by RaceTrac to restripe the parking lot

approximately three months prior to Mr. Short' s slip and fall.     However, Mr. Short

could not meet his burden on the summary judgment without submitting factual

support to show that the area where he fell had a condition that created an

unreasonable risk of harm and that the unreasonably dangerous condition was the

cause -in -fact of his injuries.

         Louisiana courts have adopted a duty -risk analysis in determining whether to

impose liability under the general negligence principles as set forth in the Civil

Code.     See La. Civ. Code art. 2315; Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 2009-

                                             12
1408 ( La. 3/ 16/ 10), 35 So. 3d 230, 240.            In order for liability to attach under the

duty -risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove five separate elements: (               1) the defendant

had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard of care ( or the defendant

owed a duty of care to the plaintiff) (the duty element); ( 2) the defendant failed to

conform his conduct to the appropriate standard (              or breached the requisite duty)

the breach element); ( 3) the defendant' s substandard conduct was a cause -in -fact

of the harm or the plaintiffs injuries ( the cause -in -fact element); ( 4)                the risk of

harm was within the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached ( the scope

of the duty, scope of protection, or legal cause element);               and (   5) actual damages

damages element).            Landers v. USIC Locating Services, Inc.,               2020- 0890 ( La.

App.   1 Cir. 4/ 26/ 21), 324 So. 3d 1070, 1073.             A negative answer to any of the

inquiries of the duty -risk analysis results in a determination of no liability.              Id. The

plaintiff has the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant by a

preponderance of the          evidence.    Lewis v.       Safeway Insurance Company of

Louisiana, 2020- 0999 ( La.         App.   1   Cir. 4/ 16121),      324 So. 3d 121,        126, citing,

Hanks v. Entergy Corp., 2006- 477 ( La.           12/ 18/ 06), 944 So. 2d 564, 578.

       As support for his argument that Tri-State was negligent in failing to use the

proper paint and/ or paint additive when painting the RaceTrac parking lot, Mr.

Short points to the "   Safety Precautions" found in the Sherwin- Williams data sheet

for the Pro -Park Waterborne Traffic Marking Paint,                   B97 Series (" Pro -Park"),

which provide as follows:

       Refer   to      the     Safety   Data    Sheets ...          before   use.          FOR
       PROFESSIONAL              USE    ONLY.           Published    technical      data    and

       instructions are subject to change without notice.    Contact your
       Sherwin- Williams representative for additional technical data and
       instructions.    Painted surfaces can become slippery when wet.                     Zone

       Marking paints are not intended for use as floor paints, and should not
       be used to paint large areas subject to pedestrian traffic. For instance,
       painting an entire traffic stall is not recommended. Slip Resistance -
       Some surfaces may require a slip resistance additive for safety. Add
       H& G SharkGrip Slip Resistant Additive to the final coat applied

       following label directions. Sand may also be broadcast onto the wet

                                                 13
       paint or incorporated in the final coat. Those additives should not be
       used in place of a non- skid finish.

       According to the deposition testimony of David Hurst, the owner of Tri-

State, RaceTrac sent Tri- State a work order for the work to be done at the

Covington location. The work was described as "           OUTSIDE BUILDING/Parking

Lot/Parking Spaces/ Needs Painting/Please stripe parking lot."                Mr. Hurst stated

that Pro -Park paint is used by his company for all parking lot jobs.             He indicated

that Pro -Park is a paint used specifically for parking lots and that nothing has to be

added to the paint prior to use.       Mr. Hurst further testified that Pro -Park paint is

used by his company because it is " the best [ he] could buy."          When asked if Pro -

Park paint is "   industry standard" or " top of the line paint" for painting parking lot

spaces, Mr. Hurst replied, "    This is my industry standard, top of the line paint.          I

can buy paint for $ 10     a gallon.   I pay 20 -something dollars a gallon to have the

best paint to put on a parking lot because I deal in repeat business."

       Based on our thorough review of the record, we find no evidence to support

Mr. Short's claim that the handicap parking area where he fell required a paint

additive.   The mere allegation that "[ s] ome surfaces may require a slip resistance

additive for safety," is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Mr. Short has

failed to meet his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, any

negligence on the part of Tri- State.      Thus, we find no error in the district court' s

judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Tri- State.

                                          DECREE

       For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's April 18,

2022   judgment      and   assess   all   costs    associated   with   this    appeal   against

plaintiff/appellant, Craig Short.

LV":    u    1

                                              14
      CRAIG R. SHORT                                         NUMBER: 2022 CA 0859

                                                             FIRST CIRCUIT

      VERSUS
                                                             COURT OF APPEAL
      RACETRAC PETROLEUM, INC.
      INDIVIDUALLY AND DB/ A RACETRAC
      JOHN DOE, DEF INSURANCE COMPANY
      JOHN DOE, INC. AND DEF INSURANCE
      COMPANY                                                STATE OF LOUISIANA

AZA   WELCH, J.,        concurring in part and dissenting in part.

              I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion in

      this matter.   First and foremost, on the motion in limine/Daubert motion, I believe

      that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motions and in excluding

      the expert testimony and report of Mr. Danner, a civil engineer.             Notably,     the

      defendants neither proved nor presented any evidence— expert           or   otherwise—     to

      establish that Mr. Danner' s methods or opinions in this case were unreliable.           See

      Robertson v.       Doug Ashy Bldg. Materials,     Inc., 2010- 1552 (   La. App.    1`    Cir.

      10/ 4/ 11), 77 So. 3d 339, 359, writs denied, 2011- 2433, 2011- 2432 ( La. 1/ 13/ 12), 77

      So. 3d 973, 974 ( on a defendant' s motion to exclude plaintiffs expert' s opinion on

      causation under Daubert, the defendant must prove that the expert' s opinion is

      unreliable).   Instead, the defendants relied on Mr. Danner' s testimony itself and the

      video surveillance footage and argued that Mr. Danner' s opinions were not reliable

      or   supported.     Although the defendants utilized the necessary "        buzzwords" in

      making their argument, they failed to set forth any actual proof of their arguments.

      Essentially, all of the objections that the defendants had with respect to Mr.

      Danner' s testimony did not concern the validity of his methodology, but rather,

      went to the weight of the evidence, which does not bring Daubert into play.              See

                                                                                         15`
      MSOF      Corporation      v.   Exxon   Corporation,   2004- 0988 ( La.     App.         Cir,

      12/ 22/ 05), 934 So.2d 708, 718, writ denied, 2006- 1669 ( La. 1016106), 938 So -2d
78.   Based on my review of Mr. Danner' s testimony, there was a sufficient and

reliable basis for his opinions and conclusions based on the Sherwin- Williams data

sheet that Mr. Danner utilized and the video surveillance footage, which he viewed

and depicted the area where the plaintiff fell.      It is well-settled that an expert may

provide testimony based on information obtained from others, and the character of

the evidence upon which an expert bases an opinion affects only the weight to be

afforded the     expert' s conclusions— not      its admissibility under Daubert.     See

MSOF Corporation, 934 So. 2d at 718. Furthermore, I believe that Mr. Danner' s

specialized knowledge and experience with respect to pedestrian/ walkway safety

and surfaces is relevant and will help the trier of fact understand the evidence.

Therefore, I would reverse those portions of the judgment of the trial court

granting the motion in limine/ Daubert motion and excluding the expert testimony

and/ or expert report of Mr. Danner.

         When the expert opinion of Mr. Danner that was wrongfully excluded by the

trial court is considered in reviewing the defendants' motions for summary

judgment, the plaintiff met his burden of producing factual support sufficient to

establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the failure

to use an abrasive additive to the paint that was used in a reasonably foreseeable

pedestrian walkway, where wet conditions are expected, presented an unreasonable

risk of harm and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.

         With respect to Racetrac, however, there was a lack of evidence establishing

a genuine issue of material fact that it either created or had actual or constructive

notice    of that   condition;   therefore,   summary judgment in favor of Racetrac,

dismissing the plaintiff' s claims,      was   proper,   and I agree that portion of the

judgment should be affirmed.        4n the other hand, as to Tri- State, based on my Mr.

Danner' s expert report and testimony, as well as the testimony of Mr. Hurst, there

are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Tri- State created an unreasonable
risk of harm and caused the plaintiffs injuries when it failed to comply with the slip
prevention directions set forth in the Sherwin- Williams data sheet.       Therefore,

summary judgment as to Tri- State was improper and 1 would reverse that portion

of the judgment of the trial court.

      Thus, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.