Court Opinion

ID: 5105710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-10-02 03:57:40.29705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:55.848484
License: Public Domain

Case Number: 05-03-01678-CV 01/28/2005 Case stored in record room 01/24/2005 Certified cys of cost bill sent to attys of record 01/14/2005 Miscellaneous motion disposed. See Remarks. Filing dismissed as moot 01/14/2005 Motion for Rehearing - Disposed Denied with Justice not sitting. 01/12/2005 Supplement to Reply 01/11/2005 Reply filed 01/07/2005 Miscellaneous motion filed. 01/07/2005 Notice requesting filing fee 01/07/2005 Phone call from Clerk's Office 01/04/2005 Case forwarded to Court 01/04/2005 Motion for Rehearing - Filed 12/17/2004 MANDAMUS GRANT - 52.8 12/17/2004 Petition for Writ of Mandamus disposed petition granted TRAP 52.8(c) 12/17/2004 Motion to Stay Disposed proceeding denied 12/17/2004 Miscellaneous motion disposed. See Remarks. proceeding denied 12/17/2004 Opinion issued conditionally granted 12/16/2004 Call received 12/02/2004 Call received 09/09/2004 Letter Received 08/09/2004 Response to Motion 07/21/2004 Brief filed. 07/21/2004 Notice requesting filing fee 07/21/2004 Miscellaneous motion filed. 07/02/2004 Waiver notice for brief on the merits 06/04/2004 Brief on the Merits Requested 04/23/2004 Case Record Filed 04/23/2004 response to petition for writ of mandamus 04/12/2004 Amicus Curiae Brief received 04/08/2004 Supreme Court of Texas Requested Response; mailbox rule does not apply 03/30/2004 Case forwarded to Court 03/26/2004 Response to Motion 03/22/2004 Document received (See Remarks) 03/17/2004 Call received 03/16/2004 Phone call from Clerk's Office 03/16/2004 Appendix Filed 03/16/2004 petition for writ of mandamus filed 03/16/2004 Motion to Stay Filed
 MEMORANDUM OPINION
In her petition for writ of mandamus, relator contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to disqualify opposing counsel because opposing counsel is a material fact witness. We agree and conditionally grant the writ.
Joyce Sanders and Bill Sanders are parties to a pending divorce and child custody suit. Bill Sanders works evenings and some weekends as a carpenter for his counsel in the divorce proceeding, Mary McKnight, to pay his legal fees. Joyce moved to disqualify McKnight from representing Bill alleging McKnight is a material fact witness for Bill in the custody case because she is his employer. After a hearing, the associate judge recommended the motion be denied. The parties agreed to allow the trial court to decide the matter de novo based on the record of the hearing before the associate judge. The trial court denied the motion to disqualify. Joyce then filed this original proceeding asserting McKnight is a fact witness on the contested issues of child custody and support. Bill responds that Joyce's motion is untimely, is a tactical weapon, and counsel's testimony does not go to an essential fact in the case.
In order to obtain a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish (1) that she does not have an adequate remedy at law and (2) the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-44 (Tex. 1992) (orig.proceeding). There is no adequate remedy at law for an order on a *Page 212 
motion to disqualify counsel and relief by mandamus is an available remedy. In re Epic Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 54
(Tex. 1998) (orig.proceeding). We review the record presented to determine if the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify.
We look to disciplinary rule of professional conduct 3.08 for guidance in determining disqualification of counsel. AndersonProducing, Inc. v. Koch Oil Co., 929 S.W.2d 416, 421-22 (Tex. 1996) (citing Ayres v. Canales, 790 S.W.2d 554, 556 n. 2 (Tex. 1990) and Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654,656 (Tex. 1990)). Rule 3.08 provides that
 (a) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment as an advocate before a tribunal in a contemplated or pending adjudicatory proceeding if the lawyer knows or believes that the lawyer is or may be a witness necessary to establish an essential fact on behalf of the lawyer's client, unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
 (2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony;
 (3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case;
 (4) the lawyer is a party to the action and is appearing pro se;
 (5) the lawyer has promptly notified opposing counsel that the lawyer expects to testify in the matter and disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.08 reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 1998) (TEX. STATE BAR R art. X § 9).
After reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify McKnight from acting as trial counsel for Bill. McKnight's testimony as an employer relating to Bill's abilities to care for the minor child or pay child support, and her possibly adverse testimony about when the employment began leads us to conclude a fact finder may be confused or mislead by McKnight's dual roles. McKnight may continue to act as counsel for Bill on pretrial matters and, if the requirements of 3.08(c) are met, other attorneys with McKnight's firm may act as advocate for Bill in any adjudicatory proceeding in this case. Anderson, 929 S.W.2d at 422-23; In reBahn, 13 S.W.3d 865, 873; Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 3.08(c).
Accordingly, the Court conditionally GRANTS the writ of mandamus. The trial court is ORDERED to vacate its order denying relator's motion to disqualify counsel and to enter an order disqualifying Mary McKnight from acting as an advocate for Bill Sanders before any tribunal in the case styled In thematter of the marriage of Joyce Elizabeth Sanders and Bill MartinSanders and in the interest of Gracie Claire Sanders, a minorchild, number 02-15189, within thirty days of the date of this opinion and judgment. Should the trial court fail to do so, the writ will issue. The trial court is ORDERED to file a certified copy of its order in compliance with this opinion and judgment with this Court within thirty days of the date of this opinion and judgment.
WHITTINGTON, J., dissenting.