Court Opinion

ID: 9412641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 07:00:22.311083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:20.507980
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     HENRY SEARCY, JR.,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-1221-20-0455-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: July 31, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Henry Searcy, Jr., Bowie, Maryland, pro se.

           Stephanie J. Mitchell, Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review ,
     REVERSE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Washington
     Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant filed an appeal with the Board alleging that the agency had
     (1) issued him an “[u]nconstitutional [a]dmonishment” and (2) restructured
     certain agency components in a manner contrary to legislative intent.         Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 3, 5.      With his initial appeal form, the appellant
     provided a lengthy narrative statement.        Id. at 9-37.   In this statement, the
     appellant made numerous allegations; however, the ostensible underlying thrust
     of these allegations was that, in 2017, the agency underwent significant
     restructuring and, as a result, his position became part of a different agency
     component. Id. at 9. The appellant was apparently led to believe that, despite
     this restructuring, he would be able to continue performing various outreach
     functions on behalf of the agency; however, agency personnel allegedly
     unlawfully failed to allocate the requisite funding and began to mistreat him. Id.
     at 9-37. The appellant requested a hearing on the matter. Id. at 2.
¶3         With his appeal, the appellant provided two letters from the Office of
     Special Counsel (OSC).      Id. at 7-8, 38.    The letters indicated that OSC was
     terminating its investigation into the following claims:        (1) that an agency
     director had “arbitrarily abuse[d] the Departmental Regulation 4070 -735-001 to
     conduct management inquiries on employees in order to solicit inform ation not
     based on personal knowledge”; (2) that an agency manager had “wasted
     thousands of dollars on banners that were printed without the appropriate [equal
     employment opportunity] Clause”; and (3) that the agency had conducted
     investigations into the appellant. Id. at 7.
¶4         The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order wherein he explained
     the circumstances under which the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate IRA
     appeals, and he ordered the appellant to file specific evidence and argument
     regarding jurisdiction within 10 days of his order. IAF, Tab 3 at 2 -8. He also
     indicated that the agency could file a response within 20 days of the order. Id.
     at 8. The appellant did not respond to the jurisdictional order; instead, 17 days
                                                                                            3

     after the issuance of the same, he filed a motion to suspend the processing of his
     appeal for 30 days. IAF, Tab 6 at 4-5. The agency filed a response wherein it
     (1) contended that the administrative judge should deny the appellant’s
     suspension request and (2) argued that the appellant had failed to establish Board
     jurisdiction over his appeal. IAF, Tab 7 at 5-9.
¶5         Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.          IAF,
     Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 6. The administrative judge concluded that,
     insofar as the issue of jurisdiction was “well defined and ripe for a conclusive
     determination,”    the   30-day    suspension    sought    by     the   appellant   was
     “unnecessary.” ID at 5. He also found that the appellant had failed to make a
     nonfrivolous allegation of a personnel action.       ID at 5-6.     In so finding, the
     administrative judge indicated that the OSC documentation provided by the
     appellant identified his claimed personnel action as an agency investigation;
     however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had recently found
     that retaliatory investigations, in and of themselves, do not constitute personnel
     actions. ID at 5-6 (citing in Sistek v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 955 F.3d
     948, 954-55 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).       The administrative judge also indicated via
     footnote that, despite the appellant’s submission of a 20-page narrative statement,
     he “could find no event that described a protected disclosure of information.” ID
     at 3 n.3.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a
     response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 10. 2 In his petition for review,
     the appellant alleges, among other things, that the administrative judge erred in

     2
       The appellant also has filed a “completed petition for review” containing additional
     argument, PFR File, Tab 3, voluminous documentation in support of his petition(s) for
     review, PFR File, Tabs 4-8, a reply to the agency’s response, PFR File, Tab 12, and two
     motions for leave to file additional pleadings, PFR File, Tabs 14, 16. These filings,
     however, are not material to the outcome of the jurisdictional issue .
                                                                                         4

     finding that he failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of a personnel action.
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-14.
                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         To establish jurisdiction in a typical IRA appeal, an appellant must show by
     preponderant evidence 3 that he exhausted his remedies before OSC and make
     nonfrivolous allegations of the following:     (1) he made a disclosure described
     under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in a protected activity described under
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected
     activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
     personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Corthell v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016). A nonfrivolous allegation is
     an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue.          5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.4(s). The Federal Circuit has found that, in the context of an IRA appeal,
     a nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
     true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Hessami v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Any doubt or
     ambiguity as to whether the appellant made nonfrivolous jurisdictional
     allegations should be resolved in favor of affording the appellant a hearing .
     Grimes v. Department of the Navy, 96 M.S.P.R. 595, ¶ 12 (2004).
¶8         For the following reasons, we find that the administrative judge ’s
     conclusion that the appellant failed to make nonfrivolous allegation of a
     personnel action was erroneous, we find jurisdiction, and we remand the appeal
     for adjudication of the merits.
¶9         Here, the appellant alleged that agency management had: (1) changed both
     his position description and his job duties; (2) required him, on several occasions,
     to relocate to less favorable office space; (3) falsely accused him of being absent

     3
       Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
     considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
     fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                           5

      without leave (AWOL); (4) admonished him; (5) surveilled him; and (6) sent him
      “a series of abusive/pervasive” emails regarding his time and attendance and his
      alleged refusal to relocate his office space. IAF, Tab 1 at 9-37. As relevant to
      these allegations, the definition of “personnel action” includes “any . . .
      significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions.” 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). The Board has found that, although “significant change”
      should be interpreted broadly to include harassment and discrimination that could
      have a chilling effect on whistleblowing or otherwise undermine the merit system,
      only agency actions that, individually or collectively, have pr actical consequence
      for   an   appellant      constitute   a   personnel   action   covered   by   section
      2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17,
      ¶¶ 15-16. To this end, the agency actions must have a significant effect on the
      overall nature and quality of the appellant’s working conditions, duties, or
      responsibilities.   Id.    We find that the aforementioned allegations meet this
      threshold. See id., ¶ 18 (concluding that the appellant’s allegations that agency
      personnel harassed him, subjected him to a hostile work environment, subjected
      him to multiple investigations, accused him of “fabricating data” and of a Privacy
      Act violation, refused his request for a review of his position for possible
      upgrade, yelled at him, and failed to provide him the support and guidance needed
      to successfully perform his duties amounted to a nonfrivolous allegation of a
      significant change in his working conditions); see also Covarrubias v. Social
      Security Administration, 113 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶¶ 8, 15 n.4 (2010) (finding that the
      appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of a significant change in working
      conditions when she alleged, among other things, that her supervisors harassed
      her about personal telephone calls and closely monitored her whereabouts, to
      include following her to the bathroom), overruled on other grounds by Colbert v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 12 n.5 (2014).
¶10         We also find that the appellant exhausted this personnel action with OSC.
      Indeed, the appellant provided two letters from OSC evincing that he had filed a
                                                                                           6

      complaint contending that the agency had both investigated him and conducted
      “inquiries on employees in order to solicit information not based on personal
      knowledge.”     IAF, Tab 1 at 7-8, 38.        We find that these contentions are
      synonymous with the appellant’s allegations that the agency surveilled him and
      monitored his time and attendance after falsely accusing him of being AWOL
      and/or refusing to relocate his office space.         See id. at 12-13, 16, 34-35.
      Although retaliatory investigations are not personnel actions in and of
      themselves, Sistek, 955 F.3d at 955; Spivey v. Department of Justice, 2022 MSPB
      24, ¶ 10, such investigations may contribute towards “a significant change in
      working conditions,” Sistek, 955 F.3d at 955. Thus, we find that the appellant
      raised the subject personnel action in his OSC complaint. IAF, Tab 1 at 7; see
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). Moreover, on review, the appellant provides an
      additional letter evincing that he also explicitly alleged before OSC that “the
      [a]gency [had] changed [his] job duties, [his] position description, and [his]
      physical location within the [agency] facility.” PFR File, Tab 6 at 33. 4
¶11         We conclude that the appellant           also has satisfied the remaining
      jurisdictional criteria.   To this end, he made numerous allegations regarding
      illegalities and improprieties regarding agency budgetary decisions, e.g., IAF,
      Tab 1 at 11-12, and one of the letters that he provided to the administrative judge
      evinced that he had alleged before OSC that the agency management had “wasted
      thousands of dollars” on printed banners, id. at 7; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(i)-(ii)
      (defining as a protected disclosure any disclosure of information by an appellant
      that the appellant reasonably believes evidences either “any violation of any law,

      4
       Although the Board generally does not consider evidence submitted for the first time
      on review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the close of the record
      despite the party’s due diligence, see Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211,
      214 (1980), insofar as the issue of jurisdiction is always before the Board, we have
      considered the subject letter, see Simnitt v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      113 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶¶ 5, 9 (2010) (remanding an appeal for adjudication when the
      appellant provided new evidence on review that indicated, for the first time, that she
      had filed a complaint with OSC).
                                                                                       7

      rule, or regulation” or “a gross waste of funds”); see also Horton v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 106 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶¶ 15, 17 (2007) (explaining that an
      appellant need not prove that his disclosures actually established a violation of
      law, rule, or regulation or a gross waste of funds; rather, he must show that the
      matter disclosed was one that a reasonable person in his position would believe
      evidenced one of those conditions and concluding that the appellant made
      allegations sufficient to warrant a hearing). Moreover, insofar as the appellant
      alleged a close temporal proximity between his purported disclosures and his
      altered working conditions, we find that he has satisfied the contributing factor
      jurisdictional criterion. E.g., IAF, Tab 1 at 11-13; see Dorney v. Department of
      the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012).
¶12        Accordingly, we find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that
      his protected disclosures contributed to a significant change in his duties and
      working conditions and, therefore, he is entitled to his requested hearing and a
      decision on the merits of his appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 2; see Salerno v. Department
      of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016). Prior to conducting a hearing, the
      administrative judge shall afford the parties a reasonable opportun ity to complete
      discovery and order the parties to submit any other evidence that he deems
      necessary to adjudicate the merits of this appeal.       Lewis v. Department of
      Defense, 123 M.S.P.R. 255, ¶ 14 (2016).
                                                                                       8

                                          ORDER
¶13        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.