Court Opinion

ID: 9682389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:10:35.269945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:00.589500
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Though not precisely developed as a factual matter in the record, it is apparent that a major aspect of appellant’s job involved the collection of motor vehicle sales tax (which is to be collected at the time application is made to the county tax assessor-collector for vehicle registration or for a certificate of title, see V.T.C.A. Tax Code, § 152.041(a) and (b)), and various motor vehicle registration fees (see V.A.C.S., Article 6675a-l, et seq.).
In March of 1982 an audit of appellant’s “drawer” revealed a shortage of $7,311.06, the amount alleged to have been appropriated from the Falls County Treasurer. This figure constitutes the amount by which the total of the receipts for sales tax and registration fees in appellant’s drawer, see V.T.C.A. Tax Code, § 152.064(a)(3), exceeded the cash and checks reflected as payment in those receipts. Appellant testified that she had indeed engaged in a practice of “lapping,” i.e., of holding out receipts from week to week to cover up cash shortages in her drawer, but she insisted the shortages themselves were not of her doing. The State produced circumstantial evidence to the effect that appellant was responsible for taking the money from her drawer.
In her brief to the court of appeals appellant complained that as a matter of law the county treasurer, the alleged owner, could not have had a greater right to possession of all of the $7,311.06 taken from her drawer. This is so, she contended, because at the point in time at which the monies and receipts were in her drawer, some proportion of the revenue was earmarked for State rather than county coffers, by statute. See V.T.C.A. Tax Code, § 152.121;1 V.A.C.S., Article 6675a-10.2 To these reve*453nues she contended the Falls County Treasurer had no right to possession or claim of ownership whatsoever; therefore the treasurer could not have had a greater right to possession than appellant to the full $7,311.06 allegedly taken.
Concluded appellant:
“The State failed to prove which portion of the missing funds would ultimately belong to Falls County, that-emy of the funds would ultimately belong to Falls County and that at least $200.00 of the funds would ultimately belong to Falls County. The State’s failure to prove the jurisdictional amount is fatal and is grounds for reversal.” [Emphasis in original.]
The court of appeals disposed of appellant’s contention, summarily, and in my view, erroneously, thus:
“The record reflects that appellant’s office fiscally accounted to and channeled funds to the treasurer. See also Tex.Civ.Stat. Art. 1709.
Right to possession means right to actual care, custody, control or management. TPC Sec. 1.07(a)(28); Compton v. State, Ct.Crim.Appls, 607 S.W.2d 246, cert. denied [450 U.S. 997] 101 S.Ct. 1701 [68 L.Ed.2d 197]. Proof of right to exclusive ownership is not necessary to establish ownership. Turner v. State, Ct. Crim.Appls, 636 S.W.2d 189; Compton, supra. The evidence is sufficient to support a finding on ownership.”
The abstract principles relied on by the court of appeals simply have no bearing on appellant’s contention. Appellant does not argue a failure by the State to prove exclusive possession of at least $200.00, the jurisdictional amount. Rather, she asserts that the State’s proof failed to establish any ownership interest by the county in at least $200.00 of the money missing from her drawer.
The majority disposes of this claim in a footnote, (at 450, n. 5). Using the breakdown of paid receipts contained in the summary of the auditor’s report, which was in evidence, the majority applies the statutory schemes, see nn. 1 and 2, ante, to conclude that at least $212.65 of the monies taken from appellant’s drawer belonged to the county. I have no quarrel with the Court’s methodology or arithmetic in arriving at this amount. I would merely point out that while the raw data for this ingenious calculation was contained in the record, and before the jury, the statutes were not. Simply put, the factfinder was in no position to perform the calculation the Court now finds dispositive.
What was before the jury on the question of ownership is the testimony of the alleged owner, Mrs. Ejem, the Falls County Treasurer. The entirety of her testimony relative to her “ownership” of the missing funds was:
“Q: And what is the major function of your office, Mrs. Ejem?
A: I receive all the money belonging to Falls County and deposit in the County Depository.
Q: And who all do you receive money from?
A: All the different offices in the County makes a report at the end of each month and turns the money over to me.
Q: And does [appellant’s employer,] the Falls County Tax Office also turn its monies over to you that it collects?
A: The Tax Office — each office has an account of their own and they deposit the money in their account and at the end of the month make *454the report, write checks back to me to cover those reports.
Q: So you are the one next higher up on the scale, is that right?
A: Yes.” [Emphasis supplied.]
Ejem went on to testify that she gave no one permission to take $7,311.06 from Falls County on or about March 3, 1982. On crossexamination the following exchange occurred:
“Q: Okay. Do you of your own personal knowledge know where that $7311.06 came from, for instance, do you know whether the alleged missing money came from a cash drawer or from a bank account, do you know that from your personal knowledge?
A: Only what I would read in the paper or hear, that is all.
Q: So of your own personal knowledge you wouldn’t know that?
A: No, sir.
Q: So you don’t know what particular group of money we are even talking about, is that a fair statement—
A: Yes, sir.
Q: —of your own personal knowledge?
A: Yes, sir.”
That the Falls County Treasurer was “the one next higher up on the scale” in terms of channelling monies “belonging to Falls County” does nothing to establish what proportion of the $7,311.06 taken from the possession of the tax assessor-collector would ultimately go to the county treasurer for deposit in the county depository. It is clear that Ejem did not know where the monies came from, much less by what specific statutory authority the missing amount was collected. In fact she did not testify that any of the $7,311.06 belonged to Falls County. Thus, while arguably a competent witness to testify she gave no one permission to take whatever portion of the missing funds was earmarked for Falls County,3 Ejem was not asked, nor is it likely she could have supplied, what that portion was.
For these reasons I am compelled to agree with appellant’s contention that the State failed in its burden of proving Ejem was the special owner by virtue of her office as county treasurer of at least $200.00 of the money taken from appellant’s drawer. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause for entry of an order of acquittal.
TEAGUE and MILLER, JJ., join.

. Sections 152.121(a) and (b) have been amended, see Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 456, ch. 93, § 13, effective September 1, 1983; Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 1360, ch. 280, § 1, effective September 1, 1983, but as of March 3, 1982, the date alleged in the indictment, they read:
"(a) On the 10th day of each month, the county tax assessor-collector shall send 95 percent of the money collected from taxes imposed by this Chapter [Motor Sales Vehicle Tax] to the Comptroller.
(b) the county tax assessor-collector shall retain 5 percent of the taxes collected under this Chapter as fees of office or to be paid into the officers’ salary fund of the county as provided by general law.”

. Article 6675a-10 has also been amended since March 3, 1982, see Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 473, ch. 203, § 1, effective July 1, 1982; Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 2185, ch. 405, § 3, effective September 1, 1983. At the time the offense was committed, however, the provision read, in relevant part:
"On Monday of each week each County Tax Collector shall deposit in the County Depository of his County to the credit of the County Road and Bridge Fund an amount equal to one hundred percent (100%) of net collections [of license fees for motor vehicle registration] during the preceding week until the amount so deposited for the current calendar year shall have reached a total sum of Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.).
Thereafter, and until the amount so deposited for the year shall have reached a total of One Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00) he shall deposit to the credit of said Fund on Monday of each week an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of collections made hereunder during the preceding week.
*453Thereafter he shall make no further deposits to the credit of said Fund during that calendar year. All collections made during any week under the provisions of this Act in excess of the amounts required to be deposited to the credit of the Road and Bridge Fund of his county shall be remitted by each County Tax Collector on each Monday of the succeeding week to the State Highway Department together with carbon copies of each license receipt issued hereunder during the preceding week.”
See also V.A.C.S., Article 6702-1, § 4.202, formerly ARticle 6675a-ll, which provides the county tax assessor-collector compensation for services relating to vehicle registration.

. Whether her testimony would suffice to establish Ejem, the county treasurer, as a "special owner" of monies located in the county tax assessor-collector's office seems doubtful in light of Judge Teague’s opinion in Dingler v. State, (Tex.Cr.App., No. 1086-83, delivered September 19, 1984) (Motion for rehearing pending). Appellant does not urge a Dingier analysis, however.