Court Opinion

ID: 9940440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 16:01:19.462384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:51.732573
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 23-1790
                        ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                     James W. Fithen, Jr., also known as Boss

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                      Appeal from United States District Court
                 for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
                                  ____________

                          Submitted: December 11, 2023
                            Filed: February 14, 2024
                                 [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before ERICKSON, MELLOY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Defendant James W. Fithen, Jr., pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 50
grams or more of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting the attempted
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A),
846, 851, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. He also consented to a $3.6 million forfeiture. He now
appeals his 336-month sentence. We affirm.

       The statutory sentencing range for Mr. Fithen’s offenses was fifteen years to
life imprisonment. He challenged the Presentence Investigation Report’s (PSR)
drug-quantity recommendation as relevant to establishing his base offense level
under United States Sentencing Guideline § 2D1.1(c). He also challenged the
application of several enhancements as follows: two levels for the possession of a
firearm in connection with the conspiracy, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); two levels for
the use of violence, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2); two levels for the importation of drugs,
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5); and four levels for his role as an organizer or leader,
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).

       The district court1 found the relevant drug quantity to be greater than 4.5 kg
resulting in a base offense level of 38.2 The district court also rejected Mr. Fithen’s
challenges to the enhancements, resulting in an adjusted offense level greater than
43. As such, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5.A. cmt. n.2, Mr. Fithen’s offense level was
43. At Criminal History Category III, his advisory Guidelines “range” was life
imprisonment. The government argued for a 480-month sentence, and Mr. Fithen
argued for 240 months. The district court rejected both suggestions, varied
downward, and imposed a sentence of 336 months. The district court discussed the
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Mr. Fithen’s and his co-conspirators’ roles in the
conspiracy, and the other conspirators’ sentences.

     Mr. Fithen now argues that the district court erred regarding two of the
Guideline enhancements he challenged at the district court because the district court

      1
         The Honorable Beth Phillips, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri.
       2
         At sentencing, when discussing the drug quantity determination, the district
court referenced a base offense level of 38 and stated its quantity conclusion, but
later referenced a base offense level of 35. Reading the transcript as a whole, the
isolated reference to a base offense level of 35 was just an isolated misstatement.

                                         -2-
relied upon select public records—his co-conspirators’ plea agreements and
stipulations—without providing advance notice it would do so. As to this narrow,
notice-based evidentiary challenge, we note Mr. Fithen stipulated in the district court
that, if called to testify, officers would testify consistently with statements and
materials contained in an appendix to the government’s sentencing brief, including
statements from co-conspirators. Accordingly, Mr. Fithen expressly waived
evidentiary challenges he might otherwise assert regarding reliance on the contents
of the appendix. See United States v. Chavarria-Ortiz, 828 F.3d 668, 670–71 (8th
Cir. 2016) (“A waiver . . . is ‘the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right,’ whereas forfeiture is ‘the failure to make the timely assertion of a
right.’” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993))). “Waiver
precludes appellate review, while forfeiture limits consideration to a rigorous plain-
error standard.” Id.3 Regarding the district court’s reliance on public materials from
the files of his co-conspirators not found in the stipulated appendix, Mr. Fithen made
no objection. As such, we review his notice-based challenge to the district court’s
reliance on such records only for plain error. Id.

      Plain error review permits us to grant relief if we find an error that was (1)
plain or “obvious” under existing law at the time the error occurred and (2)
negatively affected the appellant’s “substantial rights.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 733–34.
Even when these conditions are met, relief is discretionary. Id. at 736 (“The Court
of Appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the
error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.’” (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936))). The
appellant bears the burden of proving plain error. See United States v. Pirani, 406
F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 2005).

      Here, even assuming a notice-based evidentiary error occurred that might be
described as plain or obvious, there has been no showing that it affected Mr. Fithen’s
substantial rights, and we find nothing to impugn the integrity of the court. He does

      3
          In fact, he expressly concedes this point in his reply brief.

                                            -3-
not articulate precisely what information from his co-conspirators’ plea agreements
and stipulations was both used by the district court and absent from the appendix to
which he consented. Further, he has not articulated how advance notice of possible
reliance on any such public materials would have altered his case. He argues
generally that the district court relied on the plea agreements and stipulations to
assess his co-conspirators’ veracity. But he does not indicate how any specific
records affected his rights.         Rather, he asserts that with greater notice,
“he might have considered calling the co-defendants as witnesses” or “he might have
sought other admissible evidence challenging their veracity.” Finally, we note that
Mr. Fithen’s defense had access to these related case materials below and referenced
his co-conspirators’ records at sentencing when making arguments comparing his
situation to that of his co-conspirators. This is not an appropriate case for plain-error
relief.

      Turning to his Guidelines arguments, we review the district court’s factual
determinations for clear error and its interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. See
United States v. Hernandez Lopez, 24 F.4th 1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 2022). Mr. Fithen
argues the relevant drug quantity should have been 2.5 kg of methamphetamine
based on a quantity discovered by officers during their investigation. We reject his
argument. The district court permissibly approximated the quantity to be greater
than 4.5 kg based in part on Mr. Fithen’s own statements. He stated that he owed
suppliers $80,000 and the 2.5 kg of methamphetamine alone cost $25,000. By any
conservative measure of conversion, the district court did not clearly err in finding
the additional money represented at least an additional 2 kg of methamphetamine.
See United States v. Padilla-Pena, 129 F.3d 457, 467–68 (8th Cir. 1997) (“In
determining base offense levels, the district court may rely on evidence including
drug prices and organizational capabilities to approximate total drug quantities
beyond the amount of drugs actually seized.”).

      Mr. Fithen also challenges the firearm enhancement. During the conspiracy,
an officer saw Mr. Fithen point a firearm at another co-conspirator, Mr. Fithen

                                          -4-
entered an Alford plea 4 to a firearm charge, and Mr. Fithen called the sheriff’s
department to ask about the return of his gun after officers confiscated a gun from
his ex-wife’s home. Courts may infer the requisite connection between a firearm
and drug dealing based on a logical or spatial nexus when facts do not otherwise
show a connection is “improbable.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) cmt. n.11(A) (“The
enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”); see also United
States v. Peroceski, 520 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2008) (the government must “show
that it is not clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the drug offense”).
Here, especially in light of the fact that an officer saw Mr. Fithen point a firearm at
a co-conspirator, we find no clear error.

      We affirm the judgment of the district court.
                      ______________________________

      4
        North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (permitting guilty plea
without admission of guilt based on concession that evidence is sufficient to prove
guilt).

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