Court Opinion

ID: 9495107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:54:18.62208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:48.630449
License: Public Domain

UNDERHILL, District Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s determination of all issues except the question of sufficiency of the evidence against Dixon. In my view, there was insufficient evidence in the trial record to permit a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixon knew the weight of the drugs found in the car he was operating. Accordingly, under the principles set forth in People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 626 N.E.2d 51, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1993), and its progeny, the State failed to prove an essential element of the offense. I therefore believe that the petition should be granted,1 and must respectfully dissent.

An Inference of Knowledge of the Weight Must Be Reasonable

There is no doubt that a rational juror could find that Dixon possessed the drugs found in the car he was operating. The critical issue to be decided is whether there was sufficient proof that Dixon knew the weight of those drugs. The majority seeks to show that, under New York law, Dixon’s knowledge of the weight of the drugs can be inferred from “Dixon’s prior *89role as a drug dealer,” and from “his link to the packaged drugs found under the seat of the car he was driving.” Maj. Op. at 83. In my view, these bases are not sufficient.
Regarding Dixon’s prior experience as a drug dealer, the majority relies upon: (1) evidence that police officers suspected Dixon was involved in a single, unwitnessed drug transaction; and (2) inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the prosecutor’s closing argument. Such reliance is, in my view, impermissible. Simply put: (1) suspicions are not proof; and (2) a “summation is not evidence.” United States v. Arboleda, 20 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1994); see generally 4 L. Sand, et al., Modem Federal Jury Instructions at 74-3 (2000) (“Arguments by lawyers are not evidence, because the lawyers are not witnesses.”).
Moreover, not all evidence of “prior experience as a drug dealer” would permit a reasonable juror to infer knowledge of the weight of drugs possessed. Such an inference would be reasonable only if the prior experience involved activities of a type that would give rise to familiarity with weights of the drug possessed.2 Even drawing all permissible inferences in favor of the prosecution, the evidence in this case does not permit a reasonable juror to find that Dixon had the type of experiences with heroin from which a reasonable inference could arise that Dixon had knowledge of the weight of the drugs found in the car.
Regarding the prepackaged drugs found in the car, proof of possession — either constructive or actual — is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that Dixon had sufficient contact with the drugs to experience their weight. The New York Court of Appeals has instructed that “[wjhere the inference to be drawn is that of weight — as opposed to the bare fact that the substance possessed was an illegal drug — possession alone does not readily support the conclusion that the defendant was also aware that the drugs possessed were of a certain weight .... [Tjhere generally must be additional evidence from which knowledge of weight in particular can be inferred.” People v. Sanchez, 86 N.Y.2d 27, 33, 652 N.E.2d 925, 928-29, 629 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182-83 (1995). The Court went on to say that there “may be instances where possession combined with other factors — such as the substantial quantity of drugs possessed or the manner in which they are packaged — supports the conclusion that the defendant was aware of the weight of the drugs possessed.” Id. (emphasis added).
The majority holds that a reasonable juror could infer that Dixon had knowledge of the weight of the drugs found in the car. In my view, such an inference is not reasonable under the circumstances of this case, because there is no “additional *90evidence” that Dixon had “sufficient contact with the substance to experience its weight — -to give rise to a probability [he] became aware of the weight of the drugs in his possession.” Sanchez, 86 N.Y.2d at 33, 629 N.Y.S.2d 179, 662 N.E.2d 925.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The majority relies on three bases to show that Dixon had sufficient contact with heroin to experience its weight: (1) Dixon’s prior experience as a drug dealer; (2) the prepackaging of the drugs found in the car; and (3) Dixon’s links to that car. In my view, there was insufficient evidence in the record, whether considering these bases singly or together, to permit a juror to draw a reasonable inference that Dixon knew the weight of the drugs found in the car.
1. Prior Experience As A Drug Dealer
The record evidence that Dixon had “prior experience as a drug dealer” consisted entirely of police testimony that he was suspected of delivering drugs on a single occasion to one John Jones, who later sold them to an undercover officer inside a social club on November 30, 1977. An undercover officer (“Undercover Crawford”) did make a drug purchase inside the social club on that date, but he purchased drugs from Jones, not from Dixon. Even the police witnesses never testified that Dixon sold drugs to the undercover officer. Importantly, there was no evidence whatsoever that Dixon handled any drugs, packaged any drugs, negotiated any drug price, made any hand-to-hand drug sale, or received any cash in a drug transaction. In short, there was no evidence about Dixon’s suspected activities that, if accepted by the jury, would have permitted the jury to infer from the nature of Dixon’s involvement that he knew the weight of the drugs found in the car at a later date.
It is worth setting out the evidence on which the majority relies, which consists almost entirely3 of the hearsay testimony of Officer McGeown, who was not present at the time of the supposed delivery by Dixon or the sale by Jones. McGeown testified as follows:
Q How about November 30th, who was involved in the sale that day according to you?
A John Jones and Larry Dixon.
Tr. at 607 (Mar. 29, 1982). McGeown’s suspicion that Dixon was involved in a drug sale on November 30, 1977, led to his arrest and the later discovery of the drugs in the car.
Q What was [it that caused you to arrest Mr. Dixon]?
A He made a sale of narcotics on November 30th.
Q Where did that take place?
A Inside 185 Reid Avenue.
Q Were you present when that sale took place?
*91A I was not inside.
Id. at 604.
The source of McGeown’s information was a radio transmission from Undercover Crawford. Undercover Crawford provided very little information to McGeown about Dixon over the radio. Indeed, the “buy” itself was not recorded on an audio tape, id. at 640, 674, because the transmission from the undercover officer provided only static interference while the undercover officer was in the club. Id. Even if the buy had been recorded, Dixon would not have been heard during the buy. No one ever claimed that Dixon sold anything to the undercover.4 Instead, the prosecution argued that Dixon went into the social club’s bathroom at the same time as Jones, and that Jones later sold drugs to the undercover. The undercover officer was not present when Dixon was in the bathroom,5 and so could not have recorded any transaction involving Dixon. Moreover, Jones never told the undercover that Dixon had supplied him with drugs, so no such statement could have been on the tape. Thus, although the tape was played for the jury, they heard nothing meaningful other than the undercover’s statements after leaving the social club.6
Neither Undercover Crawford nor any other witness present inside the social club testified at trial, and McGeown could neither hear nor see what happened inside the social club at 185 Reid Avenue. Id. at 674.
Q Everything that happened, tell us, from the moment you heard the undercover saying he was about to go someplace, do something; what was that?
A The undercover advised me he was in the area. As I stated, I was already aware that the van was in place to make observations.
What happened next? <©
The undercover entered the location. I believe I got a radio transmission to that effect, telling me he had entered the location and, from that point on, I could not hear the undercover any further. I got static on the Kel receiver. P>
Q Yes, go on. Tell us everything that happened.
A At a later time- — •
Q When do you mean “later,” sir?
A About ten minutes later, I believe.
Q Okay.
A The undercover exited the location. I was informed of that by radio. I saw him again cross the intersection and a short while after he informed me by radio he was back in his car and he had made a buy from JD John, Little John and JD Larry.
*92Q What does JD mean? Please tell the jury.
A John Doe. It’s in lieu of giving what we consider a permanent identification because many of the people we deal with give us names which are not their own.
Q On this occasion, the undercover said to you and you heard it over the radio, that what had happened?
A That he had made a buy.
Q From?
A From Little John and, I believe, JD Larry.
Q What else, if anything, did you hear the undercover officer say?
A That’s all I recall.
Id. at 640-41.
The police buy report, which was admitted into evidence, stated the undercover’s suspicion that Dixon had supplied Jones with drugs. Nothing in the buy report could provide the factual predicate necessary to show Dixon’s knowledge of the weight of drugs, however, because the undercover officer never observed Dixon package, handle, negotiate over, or sell any drugs. Thus, once again, the buy report is merely evidence of a police suspicion that Dixon delivered drugs on a single, unwit-nessed occasion, but is not evidence of any specific activities of Dixon that would support an inference of Dixon’s familiarity with drug weights.
An exhibit that included four glassine envelopes was also admitted into evidence. The majority treats as substantive evidence the fact that the police wrote on the evidence bag a code indicating that Dixon was a suspect in the transaction. The writing on the evidence bag confirms, but does not expand upon, the police testimony that Dixon was thought to be involved in the sale by Jones. Importantly, evidence that the police suspected Dixon was “involved” in supplying drugs to a seller on November 30, 1977 does not supply the jury with proof of any fact from which they could permissibly infer that Dixon knew the weight of drugs discovered after his arrest on December 8,1977.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the State proved, at most, that Dixon “re-upped” Jones by delivering some unknown quantity of heroin in a single, unwitnessed transfer in the social club bathroom. Even in connection with that possible delivery, however, there was no evidence whatsoever that would permit the jury to infer that Dixon had sufficient contact with the drugs to experience their weight. The jury cannot be permitted to speculate about whether or how those drugs were packaged, how they were transported, and whether or how Dixon ever handled them. “[I]t is not enough that the inferences in the government’s favor are permissible;” inferences must be “sufficiently supported to permit a rational juror to find that the element, like all elements, is established beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir.1995).
2. Prepackaging of the Drugs
In the decisions applying New York law cited by the majority, the courts almost uniformly inferred a defendant’s knowledge of the weight of drugs possessed only by relying on evidence that the defendant actually handled drugs.7 See, e.g., Cruz v. *93Greiner, 1999 WL 1043961 at *29 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (“The manner in which the drugs were packaged, in addition to Cruz’s handling of the drugs,” supports an inference of knowledge of the weight of the drugs possessed.); People v. Diaz, 228 A.D.2d 368, 368, 645 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1st Dep’t.) (“the evidence that defendant actually handled the drugs at issue, ... along with the fact that the drugs were packaged in two separate bags ... was sufficient to support the inference”), appeal denied, 89 N.Y.2d 921, 677 N.E.2d 295, 654 NY.S.2d 723 (1996); People v. Hardy, 226 A.D.2d 652, 653, 641 N.Y.S.2d 366 (2d Dep’t.) (“evidence that the defendant handled the controlled substance, together with other circumstantial evidence, may give rise to an inference that the defendant knew the weight of the controlled substance in his or her possession;” defendant was observed holding bag containing drugs) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 88 N.Y.2d 936, 670 N.E.2d 454, 647 NY.S.2d 170 (1996). New York courts have also held that mere possession of packaged drugs, without evidence of handling, is insufficient to infer knowledge of the weight of the drugs possessed, at least where, as here, the weight possessed is close to the statutory threshold. People v. Pitterson, 234 A.D.2d 79, 79, 650 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1st Dep’t.1996) (possession in travel bag of three ounces of cocaine, packaged in 506 mini ziploek bags, “insufficient to establish that defendant was aware that he possessed at least two or more ounces” of cocaine). The total weight of the drugs found in the car Dixon was driving, two and five-eighths ounces, was even closer to the statutory threshold of two ounces than in the Pitterson case.
The New York Court of Appeals itself has expressly cautioned that presumptions of knowledge of the weight are particularly troublesome where, as here, the amount of drugs at issue is so close to the statutory requisite.8
When one is charged with discerning minuscule variations in weight ... presumptions break down.... Presuming the defendant knew the weight of the drugs was just above — as opposed to just below — the statutory threshold is problematic. Possession alone could rarely be enough in such a close case.”
Sanchez, 86 NY.2d at 33-34, 629 N.Y.S.2d 179, 652 N.E.2d 925. See also People v. Sanchez, 86 N.Y.2d 27, 34, 652 N.E.2d 925, 629 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1995) (police recovered a plastic bag containing 3 1/4 ounces and 3 grains of cocaine from the defendant’s car, yet Court of Appeals held that “possession alone [was] not enough to establish weight because the amount possessed was so close to the statutory limit of two ounces, and no other circumstances indicated familiarity with drugs that might lead to knowledge of the weight.”).
The majority’s holding, that possession of an amount of prepackaged heroin close to the statutory threshold — without evidence of handling of the drugs by the defendant — gives rise to a reasonable inference of knowledge of the weight possessed, is inconsistent with the New York decisions cited above, including Sanchez itself. In my view, absent evidence that Dixon ever handled drugs, an inference that Dixon knew the weight of drugs merely because they were prepackaged is not reasonable.
3. Evidence Linking Dixon to the Drugs
The majority’s efforts to link Dixon to the car in which the drugs were found, *94although successful from an evidentiary standpoint, do not cure the problems of proof at trial. To the extent that Dixon’s possession of the drugs was a matter of statutory presumption and thus merely constructive, the failure of proof is complete. Constructive possession alone provides no evidence that Dixon had any actual knowledge that the drugs existed, much less that he had sufficient contact with the drugs “from which knowledge of the weight in particular can be inferred.” Sanchez, 86 N.Y.2d at 33, 629 N.Y.S.2d 179, 652 N.E.2d 925. Dixon’s link to the car is intended to show his link to the drugs, but evidence of his use or even ownership of the car provides no evidence of the handling of the drugs found in the ear.
Even assuming that a “link” between Dixon and the car could be found from the fact that Dixon drove the car three times and picked it up from the police, that evidence at most proves possession of the drugs; it does not constitute “additional evidence from which knowledge of weight in particular can be inferred.” Sanchez, 86 N.Y.2d at 33, 629 N.Y.S.2d 179, 652 N.E.2d 925. There is no evidence in the record to prove anything beyond mere possession, and neither the District Court nor the State pointed to any when requested to do so on remand. Neither a jury nor this Court, therefore, should speculate whether or not Dixon had “sufficient contact” with the drugs in the car “to give rise to a probability [that Dixon] became aware of the weight of the drugs in his possession.” Id. In the absence of evidence beyond mere possession of drugs, even drugs prepackaged for sale, there simply is no permissible basis for an inference regarding Dixon’s knowledge of the weight of the drugs, especially because the weight of the drugs found was so close to the statutory requirement of two ounces.

Conclusion

In People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235, 626 N.E.2d 51 (1993), the New York Court of Appeals cautioned that “we cannot simply read the knowledge requirement out of the statute 82 N.Y.2d at 505, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235, 626 N.E.2d 51; see also Sanchez, 86 N.Y.2d at 34, 629 N.Y.S.2d 179, 652 N.E.2d 925 (“[T]here may be instances where it is indeed difficult to show defendant’s knowledge of the weight, but we cannot simply read the knowledge requirement out of the statute.”). I respectfully believe that the majority does precisely that by holding that Dixon’s knowledge of the weight of the drugs he constructively possessed could have been inferred, despite the absence of evidence of his familiarity with or handling of drugs sufficient to permit such an inference.
Because I cannot find in the record any evidence to support a reasonable inference that Dixon knew the weight of the drugs he possessed, I must conclude that the State failed to carry its burden of proof of an essential element of the crime for which Dixon was convicted. Accordingly, I would grant the petition and must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm.

. If Dixon was convicted on legally insufficient evidence, then his petition raises a federal constitutional violation warranting relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. "States are free to define the elements of, and defenses to, crimes. Once states have promulgated laws to define criminal conduct, however, federal due process protects a defendant from conviction unless he is shown in a fair proceeding to have violated those laws.” Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir.2001) (citations omitted).

. For example, even extensive evidence of pri- or, repeated, hand-to-hand sales of ecstacy, although clear evidence of "prior experience as a drug dealer," would not provide a factual basis for inferring that a defendant knew the weight of heroin he possessed. Similarly, evidence that a defendant repeatedly received mailed packages containing quantities of heroin (whether or not packaged for sale) that were hidden in items of clothing would unquestionably be evidence of prior experience as a drug dealer, yet that evidence alone would not provide a factual basis for inferring that the defendant knew the weight of the heroin, as opposed to the total weight of the mailed packages, he possessed. Thus, it is not enough simply to say that there was evidence of Dixon's "prior experience as a drug dealer;” there must have been evidence of the nature of His activities as a drug dealer that would permit a reasonable inference that he knew the weight of the drugs found in the car. Usually such evidence consists of testimony that the defendant handled drugs. It is that evidence that is missing from the record -in this case.

. The majority also relies on: (1) the tape recording made of the transmission from the undercover officer’s transmitter, discussed below; (2) a police buy report that is not part of the record available to this Court for review, but as to which nothing in the transcript of the trial suggests that it contains any additional information about the specific involvement of Dixon; and (3) a police laboratory report on which the police did not write Dixon's name, but did write code numbers indi-eating that Dixon was a "subject," i.e., a suspect, in the purchase made from Jones in the social club.
The majority also cites, with apparent approval, the prosecutor's argument that other evidence that Dixon was a “professional drug dealer” included his use of a “driver’s license listing an alias” and "a car registered in someone else’s name,” and Dixon's supposed refusal to sell drugs to the undercover officer. Maj. Op. at 85.

. Nor is there evidentiary support for the statement in the prosecutor's closing argument, relied upon by the majority as demonstrating that Dixon had prior experience as a drug dealer, Maj. Op. at 85, that Dixon refused to sell to the undercover officer.

. Even the prosecutor admitted this much in closing argument. "That’s why they went into the bathroom, so Crawford couldn’t see anything.” Maj. Op. at 85 (quoting Tr. 1614 (April 7, 1982)).

. Again, the prosecutor in closing argument acknowledged that: "You must realize, of course, that this tape is made after the fact .... By after the fact, I mean it is not a conversation between the undercover police officer and John Jones or Littlejohn or Dixon, it is a conversation where [Undercover Crawford] is already out [of the social club], completed the sale and he is radioing the team.” Maj. Op. at 84 (quoting Tr. 1589-90 (April 7, 1982)).

. In Sanchez, the New York Court of Appeals noted that “handling” of drugs "is not limited to instances where the defendant manipulates the substance in the process of manufacture and packaging of drugs. It merely connotes sufficient contact with the substance to experience its weight — to give rise to a probability defendant became aware of the weight of the drugs in his possession.” 86 N.Y.2d at 33, 629 N.Y.S.2d 179, 652 N.E.2d 925.

. The majority acknowledges this proposition of New York law, Maj. Op. at 82, but never seems to apply it to the facts of this case.