Court Opinion

ID: 9621590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:01:01.124332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:04.819237
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation. See State v. Wharton, 381 S.C. 209, 214, 672 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2009). “In determining whether the act which caused death was impelled by heat of passion or by malice, all the surrounding circumstances and conditions are to be taken into consideration, including previous relations and conditions connected with the tragedy, as well as those existing at the time of the killing.” See State v. Gardner, 219 S.C. 97, 104, 64 S.E.2d 130, 134 (1951). “To warrant the court in eliminating the offense of manslaughter it should very clearly appear that there is no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.” Wharton, 381 S.C. at 214, 672 S.E.2d at 788.
At trial, the following evidence was presented from which the jury might have determined that Appellant committed manslaughter: testimony that, earlier in the day, Bill ap*604proached Appellant from behind, grabbed his throat, and put a metal object to his head; testimony that Bill said in Appellant’s presence that he was going to take Appellant out on Platt Springs Road “and blow his F’in brains out;” Appellant’s testimony that Bill and Jared were under the influence of methamphetamine on the night in question; and Appellant’s testimony that Bill pointed a gun at Appellant just before Appellant shot him. Additionally, Appellant testified that he “didn’t kill [Bill and Jared] with malice aforethought, with premeditation.... I was scared and I was frightened.”
In my view, given the above evidence, it cannot be said that there was clearly “no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.” The jury could infer from the evidence that Appellant’s fear resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. Compare State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 549, 500 S.E.2d 489, 495 (1998) (holding that judge properly charged jury on voluntary manslaughter where defendant testified he was in fear of the threat of physical assault).
The majority apparently decides that the evidence does not yield an inference that Appellant’s fear resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. This is not an unreasonable conclusion but, as some evidence tending to establish the offense of manslaughter was presented at trial, it is a conclusion that the jury, not this Court, must reach.
I do not suggest that a voluntary manslaughter instruction must be given whenever the defendant testifies that he was in fear. However, in light of all the evidence presented here, Appellant met the standard to warrant the charge. Wharton, 381 S.C. at 214, 672 S.E.2d at 788. I would reverse.