Court Opinion

ID: 9928446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 19:03:26.319959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:49:16.552433
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

PATRICK J. CONNELL,                        )
                                           )
             Petitioner,                   )
                                           )
      v.                                   )    C.A. No. 2021-0119-BWD
                                           )
CHRISTINA KLEBART,                         )
                                           )
            Respondent.                    )

                                 FINAL REPORT

                           Final Report: January 31, 2024
                           Draft Report: January 16, 2024
                           Date Submitted: January 2, 2024

Patrick J. Connell, Pueblo, Colorado; Petitioner.

Christina Klebart, Camden, Delaware; Respondent.

DAVID, M.
         This is an action to partition real property in Dover, Delaware. After some

bumps in the road, the property was sold at public auction in March 2023. I am now

tasked with dividing the proceeds from that sale. My final report on distribution

follows.1

I.       BACKGROUND 2

         A.      The Parties and the Property
         This action concerns a residence located at 2048 Generals Way in Dover,

Delaware (the “Property”). 3        Petitioner Patrick J. Connell (“Petitioner”) and

respondent Christina Klebart (“Respondent”) inherited the Property from their

father, Patrick Francis Connell (“Decedent”), under his Last Will and Testament (the

“Will”).4

1
  On January 16, 2024, I issued a draft report addressing distribution of the partition
proceeds (the “January 16 Draft Report”). The parties did not file exceptions to the January
16 Draft Report. Accordingly, this final report is substantively identical to the January 16
Draft Report.
2
  The facts set forth in this final report reflect my findings based on the record developed
at a one-day evidentiary hearing on January 2, 2024. The hearing transcript is cited as “Tr.
at __”. I take judicial notice of filings in a related matter before the Kent County Register
of Wills captioned In re Est. of Patrick Francis Connell, Case No. 16289. See Arot v.
Lardani, 2018 WL 5430297, at *1 n.6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2018) (“Because the Register of
Wills is a Clerk of the Court of Chancery, filings with the Register of Wills are subject to
judicial notice.” (citations omitted)). The docket in that action is cited as “ROW Dkt. __”.
3
    Dkt. 1, Ex. 1 at 1.
4
    ROW Dkt. 2 at 2.
                                             1
         Respondent and her son moved into the Property with Decedent in 2015.5

Decedent passed away on March 25, 2018, leaving the Property to Petitioner and

Respondent.6 Shortly after Decedent’s passing, Petitioner contacted Respondent and

asked to stay at the Property, but Respondent refused, insisting that Petitioner stay

at a hotel instead.7 When Petitioner returned to Dover for Decedent’s burial, he

requested a key to the Property, but Respondent would not provide one.8 Petitioner

then visited the Property, but Respondent demanded that he leave and called the

police. 9 Respondent then changed the locks on the Property.10

         B.      The Estate Exceptions

         On April 11, 2018, the Will was admitted to probate and Respondent was

appointed Personal Representative of Decedent’s estate (the “Estate”).11

         On April 9, 2019, Respondent filed a First and Final Accounting in her

capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate, docketed in Kent County Register

5
    Tr. at 13:18-21.
6
    ROW Dkt. 1.
7
    Tr. at 5:9-15.
8
    Id. at 5:22-23.
9
    Id. at 17:17-18:11.
10
  Id. at 6:16, 42:3-7. At the hearing, Respondent admitted she did not permit Petitioner to
visit the Property because she did not trust him. Id. at 14:17-18.
11
     ROW Dkt. 2.
                                            2
of Wills Case No. 16289 (the “ROW Action”). 12 On March 17, 2019, Petitioner

filed exceptions to the First and Final Accounting, contesting Respondent’s claims

for reimbursement of administrative costs (including costs associated with a

locksmith, utilities at the Property after Decedent’s passing, a DMV title transfer,

and Xfinity bills) and expenses (including E-ZPass and funeral expenses), and

Respondent’s inventory and accounting of other Estate property (including a 2015

Nissan Altima, an antique lamp, tools, a riding mower, jewelry, a gun, and a dog). 13

Petitioner also sought an order requiring Respondent to pay rent for living at the

Property after Decedent’s death.14

          Petitioner’s exceptions in the ROW Action were assigned to Magistrate

Griffin. On November 19, 2019, after an evidentiary hearing, Magistrate Griffin

issued an Order (the “November 19, 2019 Order”) resolving the exceptions as

follows:

          • “The exceptions concerning estate administrative expenses for A1
            Locksmith Company ($68.50) and DMV title Transfer ($40.00) are
            approved, and [Respondent] . . . must reimburse the Estate for those
            expenses.”15

12
     ROW Dkt. 6.
13
     ROW Dkt. 12 at 1-3.
14
     Id. at 1.
15
     ROW Dkt. 20 ¶ 1.
                                         3
          • “[Respondent] is ordered to pay the Estate $11,096.00, for the full value
            of the car.” 16

          • “[Respondent] shall reimburse the Estate the cost of the gun, or $318.00.”17

          • “The exception requesting that [Respondent] pay rent for living in the
            Decedent’s . . . property since the Decedent’s death was denied, with the
            Court noting that as co-owners of the Decedent’s real property, [the
            property] passes to them as beneficiaries under the residuary clause of the
            Decedent’s Will[.] [Respondent] and/or [Petitioner] may address the issue,
            or other payments towards or benefits received from the property, if a
            partition action is pursued.”18

          On December 3, 2019, Chancellor Bouchard entered an order adopting the

November 19, 2019 Order. 19

          C.    The First Sale
          On February 9, 2021, Petitioner initiated this action through the filing of a

Petition for [Partition] and Related Relief. 20

          At a June 15, 2021 hearing before Magistrate Griffin, Respondent failed to

show cause why the Court should not order partition of the Property.21 The same

day, Magistrate Griffin entered an Order for Appointment of Trustee and for

Partition Sale of Real Property by Trustee, appointing Dennis L. Schrader, Esquire

16
     Id. ¶ 4.
17
     Id. ¶ 6.
18
     Id. ¶ 3.
19
     ROW Dkt. 21.
20
     Dkt. 1.
21
     Dkt. 9.
                                             4
of Morris James LLP (the “First Trustee”) as trustee to sell the Property at public

vendue to the highest bidder in accordance with Court of Chancery Rule 183(c), with

the sale subject to confirmation by the Court.22

          On March 14, 2022, the First Trustee filed a Return of Sale, reporting that on

October 15, 2021, the Property was sold at public auction to Respondent and her

husband for $70,000 (the “First Sale”).23 Respondent executed a Contract of Sale

with the First Trustee (the “Contract”) and paid a $5,000 deposit, but could not pay

the balance due under the Contract. 24 The First Trustee’s Return of Sale further

explained that Respondent had failed to cooperate with the sale of the Property by

denying the First Trustee and potential purchasers the opportunity to view or inspect

the Property, removing the sale sign posted on the Property, and disrupting the

auction sale by telling prospective purchasers that there were deficiencies in the

Property’s condition.25

          On May 25, 2022, Magistrate Griffin held a hearing to address the First

Trustee’s Return of Sale.26 Following that hearing, Magistrate Griffin entered an

Order (the “May 25, 2022 Order”), finding that “[b]efore and during the Auction,

22
     Dkt. 8.
23
     Dkt. 18.
24
     Id. ¶¶ 7-11.
25
     Id. ¶ 14(a)-(c).
26
     Dkt. 24.
                                             5
the actions of [Respondent] and her husband affected the [First] [S]ale negatively”;

“[Respondent] or her husband removed the auction sign on the Property and refused

to allow potential bidders to view the Property”; and “[d]uring the Auction,

[Respondent]’s husband created a negative atmosphere among the potential bidders

by yelling at prospective purchasers, using profanity and making negative comments

about the Property.”27 The May 25, 2022 Order “declared [Respondent] in default

of the Contract”; permitted the First Trustee to retain Respondent’s $5,000 deposit

to pay expenses from the First Sale, with the payment to be “credited toward the

amount paid by Petitioner Patrick Connell”; and provided that “[t]he remaining

$4,021.00 in partition sale expenses incurred by the [First] Trustee is entered as a

judgment against the Property . . . .” 28 The May 25, 2022 Order also discharged the

First Trustee upon the appointment of a successor trustee, ordered a second partition

sale by public auction, and ordered Respondent, her husband, and any guests to

vacate the Property within sixty days.29

          Respondent filed exceptions to the May 25, 2022 Order, which Vice

Chancellor Zurn denied on July 19, 2022. 30

27
     Dkt. 22 ¶ C.
28
     Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
29
     Id. ¶¶ 4-7.
30
     Dkt. 30.
                                           6
         D.      The Second Sale

         On October 25, 2022, Magistrate Griffin entered an Order for Appointment of

Trustees and for Partition Sale of Real Property by Trustees, appointing David N.

Rutt, Esquire and Ryan T. Adams, Esquire of Moore & Rutt P.A. (the “Second

Trustees”) as trustees to sell the Property at public vendue to the highest bidder in

accordance with Court of Chancery Rule 183(c), with the sale subject to

confirmation by the Court.31

         This action was reassigned to me on January 10, 2023.32 On April 24, 2023,

the Second Trustees filed a Return of Sale, reporting that on March 11, 2023, the

Property was sold at public auction to a third party for $115,000 (the “Second

Sale”).33 On May 10, 2023, I entered an Order approving the Second Trustees’

Return of Sale, ordering the disbursement of $7,186.65 for reimbursement of fees

and expenses incurred in connection with the Second Sale and directing the parties

to submit a proposed decree of distribution. 34

         The parties, each appearing pro se, did not submit proposed decrees of

distribution, but on June 7, 2023, Petitioner filed a submission raising arguments

31
     Dkt. 35.
32
     Dkt. 36.
33
     Dkt. 37 ¶ 10.
34
     Dkt. 39 ¶ 4(a)-(b).
                                          7
concerning distribution of the proceeds.35 Respondent opposed Petitioner’s position

on distribution at a December 8, 2023 status conference. 36 On January 2, 2024, I

held an evidentiary hearing by Zoom to address the distribution of proceeds from

the Second Sale. 37

II.      ANALYSIS

         “The last stage of a partition proceeding involves the distribution of proceeds

from the sale of the partitioned property.” In re Real Est. of Hunsucker, 2019 WL

1984242, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2019). After $7,186.65 in expenses is subtracted

from $102,523.14 in sale proceeds, $95,336.49 remains for distribution. Under the

Will, Petitioner and Respondent inherited equal interests in the Property, so

allocation of the remaining sale proceeds begins with each party receiving fifty

percent of the proceeds ($47,668.24 each). Petitioner and Respondent each seek

adjustments to that allocation. The party seeking the adjustment bears the burden of

proof. Id. at *2.

         First, Petitioner asks the Court to reduce Respondent’s share of the proceeds

by $11,522.50, the amount Respondent was directed to reimburse the Estate under

35
     Dkt. 40.
36
     Dkt. 45.
37
     Dkt. 48.
                                            8
the November 19, 2019 Order in the ROW Action. 38 “The accounting in a partition

action is confined to matters relating to the common land . . . .” Est. of Davis, 2023

WL 4482223, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also In re Smith’s Est., 93 A.2d 314, 315 (Orphans’ Ct. 1952) (“[W]hen

the subject matter of the controversy does not arise out of the property partitioned,

[the] Court should refuse to assume jurisdiction.”).               “Issues related to the

[d]ecedent’s estate, including the distribution of estate funds, are not properly

addressed through [a] partition action.” Hunsucker, 2019 WL 1984242, *2 n.9. I

therefore decline to enforce the November 19, 2019 Order in the ROW Action by

adjusting distributions in this partition action.

       Second, Petitioner asserts that Respondent should be responsible for paying

all expenses incurred in connection with the sale of the Property.39 Magistrate

38
   Dkt. 40 at 1-2. At the hearing, the parties introduced evidence concerning issues that
were resolved in the November 19, 2019 Order. See, e.g., Tr. at 8:16-11:5; id. at 16:17-
21; id. at 22:1-23:10; id. at 49:9-17. The Court is bound by Magistrate Griffin’s findings
in that order. See Thomas & Agnes Carvel Found. v. Carvel, 2008 WL 4482703, at *15
(Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2008) (“‘[W]here a question of fact essential to the judgment is litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the
same parties in a subsequent case on a different cause of action.’” (quoting Columbia Cas.
Co. v. Playtex FP, Inc., 584 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Del.1991))), aff’d, 970 A.2d 256 (Del. 2009).
39
  Petitioner’s June 7, 2023 submission seeks an adjustment for “all expenses” incurred in
connection with the sale of the Property. See Dkt. 40 at 1 (“The petitioner is requesting
that Christina Klebart . . . be ORDERED to pay all expenses that are acquired during the
sale of Patrick Francis Connell’s REAL ESTATE . . . .”); id. (“The petitioner request[s]
that the Respondent is ORDERED to pay all fee[s] that were acquired to sell the REAL
ESTATE, and any other fees that were acquired for all sales of the REAL ESTATE . . . .”).
Testimony at the hearing, however, focused solely on Respondent’s conduct during the
First Sale. See, e.g., Tr. at 7:17-24 (“Mr. and Mrs. Klebart should be responsible for . . .
                                              9
Griffin’s May 25, 2022 Order addressed the payment of expenses from the First Sale,

directing that Respondent’s $5,000 deposit would be “credited toward the amount

paid by Petitioner,” with “[t]he remaining $4,021.00 in partition sale expenses . . .

entered as a judgment against the Property.” 40 Respondent filed exceptions to the

May 25, 2022 Order, which were denied on July 29, 2022. Accordingly, the final

distribution must be adjusted as directed in the May 25, 2022 Order.

         Third, Petitioner contends that Respondent owes him rent for the period

during which she had exclusive possession of the Property. Generally, “[a] co-tenant

living on property has no obligation to pay rent unless the co-tenants agreed that rent

would be paid.” Hunsucker, 2019 WL 1984242, at *3. “However, if a co-tenant

ousts another co-tenant, then rental value for the benefit received by the co-tenant in

exclusive possession may be set off against payments made by the co-tenant in

exclusive possession.” Id.

         Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, I find that Respondent ousted

Petitioner and had exclusive possession of the Property for fifty months, from March

and ordered to pay $4,021 from their pockets and not from the estate due to the fact that
the Klebarts disrupted the sale to the point that no one else would bid on the property
according to Mr. Schrader’s testimony during the return of sale on May 25, 2022.”); id. at
10:18-11:5 (“I don’t want the $4,021 included in what comes out of the estate or what’s
distributed from the estate. Because she messed that sale up.”). There is no basis in the
record to shift expenses incurred in the Second Sale onto Respondent.
40
     Dkt. 22 ¶¶ 1-3.
                                           10
25, 2018, when Decedent died, through May 25, 2022, when Respondent was

ordered to vacate the Property. During that period, Petitioner asked to stay at the

Property but Respondent refused; Petitioner requested a key but Respondent would

not provide one; and when Petitioner attempted to access the Property, Respondent

demanded that he leave, called the police, and changed the locks on the Property.41

Because Respondent ousted Petitioner from the Property for fifty months, Petitioner

is entitled to one half of the rental value for that period. Hunsucker, 2019 WL

1984242, at *3.

         The record on rental value is thin. Petitioner testified that he and another

sibling “called around rental agencies” and, based on their investigation, determined

“that rental property in that area at the time” could be rented for $1,200 per month.42

“Although it would have been preferable to have more evidence concerning

comparable rental values in the area during the relevant time period, I find it

reasonable, under the circumstances, to use the lay testimony provided as the basis

for rental value in this case.” Id. at *4 (“In an ordinary case, the owner of a leasehold

should be permitted to testify as to the value of his leasehold.”). Petitioner’s fifty

percent share of the rental value during the fifty-month period amounts to $30,000.

41
     Tr. at 5:9-6:16, 17:17-18:11.
42
     Tr. at 9:13-15.
                                           11
Petitioner’s share of the proceeds should be increased, and Respondent’s share of

the proceeds should be decreased, by that amount.

          Fourth, the parties’ distributions should be adjusted to account for

Respondent’s payment of taxes on the Property. “Generally, co-tenants share the

cost of taxes on the property equally, because those costs benefit all of the co-

tenants.” Ponder v. Willey, 2020 WL 6735715, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2020), R&R

adopted, 2020 WL 7043627 (Del. Ch.). “[A] cotenant not in possession . . . has a

duty to contribute to the cotenant in possession as to any payments . . . for taxes.”

Est. of Davis, 2023 WL 4482223, at *3 (alteration in original) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). At the hearing, Respondent testified that from March 25,

2018 through May 25, 2022, she paid $5,000 in taxes on the Property.43 Because

Respondent paid those taxes without contribution from Petitioner, Respondent’s

share of the proceeds should be increased, and Petitioner’s share of the proceeds

should be decreased, by half of that amount.44

43
     Id. at 20:1-8.
44
  In his June 7, 2023 submission, Petitioner asks that “the unpaid taxes be deducted from
the Respondent’s portion of the proceeds from the sale,” Dkt. 40 at 1, but at the hearing,
Petitioner clarified that he does not seek an adjustment for any unpaid taxes. Tr. at 10:4-
11:17.
                                            12
         Finally, Petitioner asks the Court to deduct $461.40 in filing fees from

Respondent’s share of the proceeds. 45 “‘Under the American Rule and Delaware

law, litigants are normally responsible for paying their own litigation costs[]’ . . . .”

Ponder, 2020 WL 6735715, at *6 (citation omitted). “Equitable exceptions to the

American Rule include the bad faith exception, as well as the ‘common fund

doctrine’ and the related ‘common benefit doctrine,’ which are based ‘on the

equitable principle that those who have profited from a litigation should share its

costs.’” Id. (citation and footnote omitted). Petitioner does not specify a basis for

shifting costs. To the extent Petitioner contends that Respondent’s conduct during

the First Sale supports cost-shifting, Magistrate Griffin’s May 25, 2022 Order

already remedied the harm from such conduct. And to the extent Petitioner seeks

costs under the common benefit doctrine, this action did not work a benefit that

would support cost-shifting. See In re the Real Prop.: Tax Parcel No. 26-012.20-

080 generally known as 2300 W. Seventeenth St., Wilmington DE 19807, 2021 WL

4999114, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2021) (explaining that “in a typical partition action,

neither party produces a benefit that does not already exist”). I therefore recommend

that the Court exercise its discretion to deny Petitioner’s request for filing fees.

45
     Dkt. 40 at 2.
                                           13
III.   CONCLUSION

       Based on the analysis above, Petitioner is entitled to $78,157.74 and

Respondent is entitled to $13,157.74 from the proceeds of the partition sale. The

following tables summarize the calculations. This is a final report under Court of

Chancery Rule 144(a). Any exceptions to this report must be filed within eleven

days.46

 Proceeds From Second Sale                                                       $95,336.49
 Remaining Expenses From First Sale                                              ($4,021.00)
 Proceeds Remaining for Distribution                                             $91,315.49

       Petitioner Patrick J. Connell                 Respondent Christina Klebart

 50% Interest                    $45,657.74 50% Interest                         $45,657.74
 Credit for                        $5,000.00 Debit for                           ($5,000.00)
 Expenses From                               Expenses From
 First Sale                                  First Sale
 Credit for Rent                 $30,000.00 Debit for Rent                     ($30,000.00)
 Debit for Taxes                 ($2,500.00) Credit for Taxes                     $2,500.00
 Distribution to                 $78,157.74 Distribution to                      $13,157.74
 Petitioner:                                 Respondent:

46
   See Ct. Ch. R. 144(d)(1) (“In actions that are not summary in nature or in which the
Court has not ordered expedited proceedings, any party taking exception shall file a notice
of exceptions within eleven days of the date of the report.”). Pursuant to Court of Chancery
Rule 144(c), “[i]f the Magistrate in Chancery files a draft report, then the only exceptions
that a party may take to a final report are (i) exceptions to the draft report that were timely
filed and disallowed and (ii) exceptions to any differences between the draft report and the
final report.” Ct. Ch. R. 144(c). I note that the parties did not file exceptions to the January
16 Draft Report and there are no substantive differences between the January 16 Draft
Report and this final report.
                                              14