Court Opinion

ID: 9464940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:47:01.283463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:53.609040
License: Public Domain

BARRETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In my view the district court’s order granting DiGiacomo’s motion to suppress a confession and evidence obtained incident to unlawful questioning is clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
The only witnesses called at the suppression hearing were the four Secret Service agents involved in the ongoing counterfeit currency investigation. The activities complained of occurred on July 26 and 27, 1976. The first incident, which took place on July 26, involved the parking lot contract made by two of the Secret Service agents with DiGiaeomo and his girlfriend. The parking lot was adjacent to a restaurant. In my view, this encounter was such that the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that the ensuing interrogation of DiGiaeomo was “custodial” within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), in light of the facts and circumstances related in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). In Mathiason the defendant responded voluntarily to a police officer’s request that he report to the police station at a particular time for questioning about a burglary. The defendant had been singled out to the police officer as having committed the offense. The Court observed that even though the police officer informed Mathiason upon his arrival at the police station that he was not under arrest, nevertheless, Mathiason was believed to be the party who had committed the burglary. The police officer then falsely informed Mathiason that his fingerprints had been found at the scene. The Supreme Court held that these facts and circumstances did not render the ensuing one-half hour interrogation “custodial” in nature. The defendant’s confession was not deemed inadmissible in evidence because there “. is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way.” Significantly, the Supreme Court rejected the holdings of the lower courts that the interrogation took place in a “coercive environment” which deprived the defendant of “freedom of action in any significant way.” The Supreme Court said:
Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda ap*1217plies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a “coercive environment.” Any interview, of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.”
429 U.S., at p. 495, 97 S.Ct., at p. 714.
It is clear to me that the facts of the instant case fit within the “four corners” of Oregon v. Mathiason, supra. There is no evidence in the record before us that the Secret Service agents, who suspected DiGia-como of passing two counterfeit $100.00 bills, did other than request that he remain in the parking lot until the other two agents arrived to talk to him about some counterfeit money. The agents who first approached DiGiacomo testified that DiGia-como was not questioned until the other two agents arrived on the scene about five minutes later. Thus, there is nothing in the record evidencing that DiGiacomo was “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” And any reliance on “coercive environment” is dispelled by Mathia-son. This approach applies with equal force to DiGiacomo’s presence in the Secret Service agents’ office on the morning of July 27.
Turning now to trial court’s finding that the Miranda advisements given DiGiacomo were improper and inadequate, thus rendering his confession and the fruits thereof inadmissible, I must conclude that the finding is clearly erroneous.
The record reflects that all of the Miranda warnings and/or advisements were given, with the possible exception that DiGia-como was entitled to appointed counsel if he could not afford to employ counsel of his choice. The remarks of the agents made to DiGiacomo that it would be to his advantage to tell the whole truth, that they could arrest him and take him to jail that night and that he could make it easier on himself by cooperating and answering questions came after the Miranda advisements. Certainly, within the factual setting of Mathia-son, supra, this questioning could not be classified as “coercive” or “overbearing.”
In my view, the proper rule to be applied in the challenge to the admissibility of a confession or other inculpatory statement is that enacted by the Congress of the United States, incorporated in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501.1 This court has recognized *1218the applicability of § 3501. In United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975) , we stated that § 3501, commonly referred to as the “Post Miranda Act,” was enacted for the purpose of offsetting the “harmful” effects of certain court decisions relating to the admissibility of confessions, including the Miranda decision. In United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976) , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100, 97 S.Ct. 1122, 51 L.Ed.2d 549 (1977); United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927, 93 S.Ct. 1361, 35 L.Ed.2d 588 (1973); United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1972) and United States v. Davis, 456 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1972), this court held — consistent with § 3501, supra, — that the inquiry in all such cases goes to the voluntariness of the confession and that the test of voluntariness is whether the incriminating statements were in any way coerced so as not to be the product of the free, independent will of the confessor.
The Congress and this court, in my view, have properly recognized the applicability of § 3501, supra, as being in the overriding interest of effective administration of the criminal justice system in meeting the needs of society. See: Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). We have realistically recognized, as has the Congress, that if incriminating statements are made by a defendant voluntarily and without coercion, they are thus obtained without violating the covenants of the Fifth Amendment. The simple violation of one of the mechanical Miranda admonishments — as here — is no warrant for automatic suppression. Rather, the measure in making the voluntariness conclusion must be that of considering aII of the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of admissions or confessions. United States v. Tafoya, supra at 426.
Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court in Lego v. Twom-ey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), favorably referred to 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) relating to the test of voluntariness of a confession in federal criminal prosecutions. In Michigan v. Tucker, supra, Tucker was arrested for rape and questioned after being advised of his Miranda rights, except his right to appointment of counsel if he was indigent. The Court held that the police conduct, although failing to afford Tucker the full measure of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda, did not deprive Tucker of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Pointedly, we believe, the Court referred to the Miranda rules as “a set of specific protective guidelines ” and as “a series of recommended ‘procedural safeguards’ ” and further that they were not intended “to create a constitutional straitjacket but rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.” 417 U.S. at 441, 443 & 444, 94 S.Ct. at 2363, 2364. And in a concurring opinion in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, Mr. Justice White, after speculating that in the final analysis the majority of the Court would adopt voluntariness as the standard by which to judge the waiver of the right to silence by a properly informed defendant, observed:
The majority seems to say that a statement obtained within some unspecified time after an assertion by an individual of his ‘right to silence’ is always inadmissible, even if it was the result of an informed and voluntary decision — following, for example, a disclosure to such an individual of a piece of information bearing on his waived decision which the police had failed to give him prior to his assertion of the privilege but which they gave him immediately thereafter . I do not think the majority’s conclusion is compelled by Miranda ... I suspect that in the final analysis the majority will adopt voluntariness as the standard to judge the waiver .
423 U.S., at 107, 108.
*1219The Supreme Court has not been called upon to rule on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b). To be sure, the Supreme Court is the final and ultimate arbiter of any constitutional issue raised involving its applicability. That, however, is no reason for this court to “bury its head in the sand” in avoidance of the provisions of § 3501, supra.
The Congress, in obvious recognition of society’s needs in the area of effective administration of the criminal justice system, enacted § 3501, supra, in order to vitalize the “totality of the circumstances” rule which, in my judgment, is both common sensed and fair. It does not abolish the Miranda guidelines, but instead it places them in proper focus based upon the totality of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession or admission against one’s Fifth Amendment interest. It avoids a mechanical, unrealistic application of Miranda.
In the instant case there is no dispute that DiGiacomo was advised of his right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, and that he had a right to an attorney at that time or any future time. Two of the Secret Service agents testified that he was advised of his right to appointed counsel if he could not afford an attorney and if he wanted one. DiGiacomo stated that he understood these rights.
I submit that the right to an attorney clearly conveys just what it says: One has a right to an attorney if he so desires. Nothing in the record indicates that the defendant did not understand this. I, therefore, agree with this language employed by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977):
This, in cases where incriminating disclosures are voluntarily made without coercion, and hence not violative of the Fifth Amendment, but are obtained in violation of one of the Miranda prophylaxes, suppression is no longer automatic. Rather, we weigh the deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct, together with the normative Fifth Amendment justifications for suppression, against “the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce. . . .We also ‘must consider society’s interest in the effective prosecution of criminals. . . .’” Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 417 U.S. at 450, 94 S.Ct. 2357. This individualized consideration or balancing process with respect to the exclusionary sanction is possible in this case.....
430 U.S., at 424, 97 S.Ct., at 1252.
I submit that the “individualized consideration or balancing process” with respect to the exclusionary sanctions weighs heavily in favor of the admissibility of the DiGia-como incriminating disclosures and the evidence obtained incident thereto.
In my opinion the advisements given DiGiacomo were, under the totality of the facts and circumstances of the encounters involved, such as to adequately protect his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.

. § 3501. Admissibility of confessions
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was *1218without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession. (Emphasis supplied.)