Court Opinion

ID: 9671076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:30:42.930843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.085422
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 55. {concurring). I join the mandate in this case, since I agree with the majority that the exclusion of the evidence of a prior sexual assault of the victim violated Dodson's right to a fair trial. Accordingly, I agree that Dodson's convictions for first-degree sexual assault based on sexual intercourse and sexual contact with a child should be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. I concur because I do not agree that the modified version of Wis JI — Criminal 255 "so misled and confused the jury as to taint its verdict." Majority op. at 88. Rather, I conclude that any error committed by the circuit court judge in giving the modified jury instruction was harmless.
¶ 56. Dodson challenges the jury instruction on two grounds: (1) that Wis JI — Criminal 255 should not have been given under the facts presented in this case; and (2) that the modified version of Wis JI — Criminal 255 falsely stated the law, was internally inconsistent, and misled the jury. Where a defendant challenges a jury instruction, claiming that it constitutes an erroneous statement of the law, an appellate court must apply *93a "harmless error analysis to determine whether reversal is required." State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 192, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996)(citing State v. Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d 34, 387 N.W.2d 55 (1986); State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985); State v. Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 315 N.W.2d 350 (1982)).
¶ 57. In Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 540, this court concluded that when a jury instruction is given in error, a reviewing court must "consider whether the error was harmless." The harmless error test as defined by this court in Dyess is "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction." Id. at 543.1 If the record does not support a reasonable *94possibility that the error contributed to the defendant's conviction, the error is harmless, and the judgment of conviction should be affirmed. Id.
¶ 58. Where a judgment of conviction is challenged based upon an allegedly erroneous jury instruction, the jury instruction and its effect on the jury should not be viewed in isolation, but within the context of the trial as a whole:
[A] judgment of conviction is commonly the culmination of a trial which includes testimony of witnesses, argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits in evidence, and instruction of the jury by the judge. Thus not only is the challenged instruction but one of many such instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several components of the trial which may result in the judgment of conviction.
Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d at 49 (citations omitted).
¶ 59. The Information in this case stated that each of the charged offenses allegedly occurred at some *95time between February 29,1992, and August 31,1992. The modifications to the standard jury instruction, Wis JI — Criminal 255, and the record from the instructions conference suggest that the circuit court was attempting to tailor the instruction to fit the evidence presented by the State: that there were four separate charged offenses, each of which allegedly occurred between February 29,1992, and August 31,1992.
¶ 60. At the instructions conference, Dodson objected to the giving of Wis JI — Criminal 255, citing his previous motion to make the time of the alleged acts in the Information more certain. See Record on appeal 23:99. However, he did not object to the jury instruction, as modified, because it would potentially confuse the jury regarding the specific dates upon which the alleged acts occurred, or because of the apparent inconsistency in the instruction. Further, Dodson's counsel stated that he was "not concerned about the Jensen v. State case. . ." Record on appeal 23:101. In fact, the modifications to the jury instruction occurred at the suggestion of Dodson's attorney.2
*96¶ 61. At the trial, the victim's testimony was uncertain regarding the specific dates upon which the alleged acts occurred, and Dodson did not present an alibi defense for any particular dates. In the circuit court judge's charge to the jury, the jurors were informed that they were to consider the instructions as a whole. See Record on appeal 23:127; see also Wis JI — Criminal 200. In all, the jury was given approximately 27 instructions, both on procedural and substantive aspects of the law applicable to this case. As part of its charge, the circuit court recited each of the four counts set forth in the Information, stating *97that each offense allegedly occurred between February 29, 1992, and August 31, 1992. No member of the jury expressed confusion or requested further instruction after hearing the modified version of Wis JI — Criminal 255.
¶ 62. The circuit court submitted, in writing, several of the instructions for the jury to consider during deliberations. However, in accord with Wis. Stat. § 972.10, the instructions submitted in writing were only those relating to the burden of proof/presumption of innocence and applicable substantive law.3 The modified version of Wis JI — Criminal 255 was not submitted to the jury in writing. See Record on appeal 29:1-12. Thus, there was no written instruction that could have arguably led to confusion. In addition, during deliberation, the jury did not ask for further clarification of the modified jury instruction as given orally by the circuit court judge.
¶ 63. The record does not reflect a reasonable possibility that the modified jury instruction, considered within the context of the trial as a whole, contributed to Dodson's convictions for first-degree sexual assault. Therefore, assuming the circuit court erred in giving the modified jury instruction, any error by the circuit court was harmless.
¶ 64. In summary, I conclude that the modified jury instruction must be viewed within the context of the trial as a whole. As such, this court should consider the testimony received at the circuit court trial, the recitation by the circuit court judge regarding the dates upon which the offenses allegedly occurred, the lack of *98any expression of confusion or request for further instruction by the jury, and the fact that the modified jury instruction was not submitted to the jury in writing. Based upon these facts, I conclude that there is no reasonable possibility, see Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544, i.e., probability, see Strickland, 487 U.S. at 695, that the modified jury instruction confused or mislead the jury. Any error committed by the circuit court judge in giving the modified version of Wis JI — Criminal 255 was, therefore, harmless.
¶ 65. For these reasons, I concur.
¶ 66. I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this concurrence.

 In State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985), this court relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to set forth the harmless error test. In Strickland, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a conviction must be reversed if:
".. .there is a reasonable probability that, but for.. .[the] errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
".. .[T]he question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt____Taking the [findings unaffected by error] as a given, and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if.. .the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors."
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96).
The U.S. Supreme Court used the term "reasonableprobability" in Strickland', however, this court in Dyess stated that the "reasonable possibility" test for harmless error under Wisconsin law "is substantively the same." Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544. Although *94this court concluded in Dyess that the appropriate standard for a harmless error analysis is one of "reasonable possibility," several Wisconsin courts have applied the harmless error test using a "reasonable probability" standard. See, e.g., State v. A.H., 211 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 566 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Joseph P., 200 Wis. 2d 227, 237, 546 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1996).
In reviewing erroneous jury instructions in the civil context, this court has stated that "a new trial is not warranted unless the error is prejudicial." Nowatske v. Osterloh, 198 Wis. 2d 419, 429, 543 N.W.2d 265 (1996) (emphasis supplied). I note that the majority relies upon a civil case for its review of the allegedly erroneous jury instruction in this criminal case. See Majority op. at 87 (quoting Runjo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 594, 603, 541 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1995)).

 With regard to the first sentence of the instruction, the following colloquy occurred between the circuit court judge and Dodson's counsel:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And what I would suggest here, Judge, is between the dates alleged in the Information—
THE COURT: [Asst. District Attorney], I guess what he's [defense counsel's] asking is the first sentence, if you find the offense committed by the defendant, it is not necessary that the State shall have proved that the offenses were committed between the dates — as between the precise dates.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.
Record on appeal 23:96.
With regard to the second sentence of the instruction, the following colloquy occurred:
*96THE COURT: All right. Just so that — So the State is conceding that the language on the second sentence as the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the offenses were committed on a date during the time period alleged, that is sufficient.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: The only thing — I'm satisfied as the modification you don't have to use mine. If you simply add during the time period alleged in the Information.
THE COURT: That is for the first sentence.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. Down there at the bottom where we do have the same thing, don't we?
ASST. D.A.: Yes, we did.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: On the last sentence where he has stricken out near it says during.
THE COURT: The time period alleged.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: During the time period alleged in the Information?
THE COURT: Do you have an objection?
ASST. D.A.: No.
Record on appeal 23:100. Although I do not decide the issue, this colloquy may support an argument that Dodson has waived his right to object to the modified jury instruction, at least to the extent he argues that the modified instruction confused and misled the jury. Cf State v. Ambuehl, 145 Wis. 2d 343, 361, 425 N.W.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1988) ("A defendant waives the right to claim error when the trial court instructs the jury in the manner defendant requested.").

 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.10(5) states, in part:
The court shall provide the jury with one complete set of written instructions providing the burden of proof and the substantive law to be applied to the case to be decided.