Court Opinion

ID: 9718919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:37:50.218586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:03.424074
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARTMAN, dissenting: The record in this case compels this dissent from the majority decision, for the reasons that follow. The record reveals that the undertaking of demolition and construction services by Fieldcrest for the Antonuccis was troubled, difficult, badly investigated and poorly planned by the Antonuccis and their consultants, ab initio. No fewer than three plan sets were required before this project ever got off the ground and, even then, numerous modifications to the plans had to be prepared. There were deficiencies in the drawings prepared by the Antonuccis’ architects and engineers, including missing and inaccurate dimensions, concerns over structural supports for which Antonuccis’ people gave Fieldcrest inaccurate information and, for a significant period of time, inattention by the Antonuccis to owner-selection responsibilities. One of the structural people working for the Antonuccis on engineering specifications and drawings was not even licensed to do the work he purported to do, and which had to be redone by Fieldcrest, and yet the Antonuccis relied upon his opinions with regard to alleged construction defects. In addition, the Antonuccis obligated themselves to secure insurance coverage, some of which might have covered part of the losses experienced by the Antonuccis, which the latter failed to procure. These were the foundations of the ongoing problems, obstacles and causes of delay facing Fieldcrest as it embarked and worked upon the project. In addition, the record demonstrates the continuing interference, in practically every phase of the demolition and construction process, by Malo to the extent that the circuit judge was forced to concede in his conclusions of law: “She was not a mere bystander, friend, financier, and facilitator. She was in fact intimately involved as agent, as bid solicitor, as bank, as a party who entered contracts, as one who directed bank action, prepared contractor statements, and received and transmitted funds. On the trial record, her involvement exceeded that of either Antonucci. Had she been more truthful about the nature and extent of her role, she may have avoided the extent of her participation. Having chosen to mislead plaintiff and the Court, her complaints [about the unfairness of the action against her] *** all ring hollow. She has herself to blame.” Having thus concluded, the court nevertheless finds that Fieldcrest was not entitled to plead intentional interference by Malo, inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy because Fieldcrest breached the contract. That Fieldcrest sought discovery with respect to making Malo a third-party defendant throughout this protracted litigation, and was obstructed from doing so until nearly the end of the trial proceedings, is fully borne out by the record. Lack of diligence in seeking third-party defendant status for Malo was not attributable solely to Field-crest, which should have been allowed to do so under section 2 — 616 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 616 (West 1994)). Field-crest was entitled to attempt proof of its theory, that its breach of any material aspect of the contract with the Antonuccis, if any, was caused by the conduct of Malo, and Antonucci under Malo’s direction and control. Malo’s alleged conduct, of which Fieldcrest complained, was not just run-of-the-mill petty annoyances, but serious obstruction and intervention. For example, after the Antonuccis entered into a construction loan trust and disbursing agreement with Chicago Title & Trust Co. and closed their construction loan with Harris Bank of Glencoe, Fieldcrest submitted to the Antonuccis draw request No. 1, for which the Antonuccis swore completeness of the work to July 16, 1994, and Fieldcrest was credited with the requested amount. Structural problems thereafter developed, based upon improper assumptions made by the Antonúccis’ experts. Unforeseen structural supports had to be placed by Fieldcrest, which representatives of Harris Bank inspected and found “consistent with the draw request,” and noted further that “extensive demolition of the existing structure has been completed at this point [and] framing and concrete work for new portions of the building have begun.” There were no objections by the Antonuccis to this finding. Nevertheless, Malo, claiming to represent the Antonuccis’ interests, instructed the Harris bank to withhold $10,000 from the first draw, which Fieldcrest claims represented the Antonuccis’ earnest money deposit required under the contract. Fieldcrest submitted its draw request No. 2. The Harris Bank funded this draw request and wire transferred the money at the Antonuccis’ direction; however, this draw request was never paid when Malo specifically instructed the bank not to release the funds to Field-crest. Malo thereafter entered the jobsite and presented Fieldcrest with yet additional architectural drawings, calling for complete redesign of the first two sheets of drawings with respect to the front entry, revisions to window heights and structural steel supports for the entire front entry. Thereafter, Malo met with Dakis of Fieldcrest and the Antonuccis on August 20, 1994, who sought to have Fieldcrest sign an agreement to terminate the construction and demolition contract, which Field-crest refused to do. The Antonuccis on that date then unilaterally terminated the contract, although Fieldcrest sought to finish its obligations under the agreement. The contract provided that the Antonuccis would have the right to terminate the contract if Fieldcrest failed to complete the work satisfactorily prior to March 1, 1995. The Antonuccis submitted no evidence that Fieldcrest could not have met the March 1 completion date. Significantly, the Village of Glenview never cited the project for any violations or fines, nor did it shut down the job or issue stop work orders. No complaints or other claims of problems appear in the village building department files. Malo allegedly was not through with the project. She thereupon instructed the bank that the second draw submitted by Fieldcrest was not to be honored, purportedly acting on behalf of the Antonuccis. She further notified the bank that the Fieldcrest contract was being terminated unilaterally by the Antonuccis and that arbitration “is being sought with litigation probably being pursued as a means of remedy.” Malo then advised the bank that “Roxanne Malo will, with the assistance of the architect, act as the general contractor until such time as a contract may be signed with a new builder to correct the structural deficiencies and complete the project.” Fieldcrest’s draw request No. 3 was submitted thereafter for the balance due and owing from the Antonuccis, which also was not honored. There was evidence that Malo, either individually or doing business as Concepts by Mauro, entered into subcontracts as agent or on behalf of the Antonuccis to complete work on the project with seven different companies or suppliers. Further, she was alleged to have received direct payments from draws No. 2 and No. 3, exceeding amounts paid by her to subcontractors. It is clear from the foregoing that considerable ventilation of the allegations should be undertaken at a trial on the issues raised in the proposed third-party complaint. Accordingly, I dissent from the disposition presented by the majority and would reverse the denial of Fieldcrest’s motion for reconsideration and leave to file an amended complaint against Malo which, if sustained by further evidence, could well affect the decision to deny the mechanic’s lien to which Fielderest appears to be entitled, as well as appropriate relief against Malo.