Court Opinion

ID: 9759704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:25:50.58281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:59.009231
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).1 The circumstances under which the State may conduct a search are very narrow. The power to search is limited to searches authorized by a warrant which sets out the scope and limitations of the search, or without a warrant when exigent circumstances permit. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57, 88 S.Ct. at 514. Nevertheless, an individual must have standing to contest the admissibility of the fruits of a search.
I. Standing
Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court. Black’s Law DICTIONARY 1405 (6th ed.1990). To challenge the alleged unlawful conduct, an individual must have a legally protected right. In the context of searches, the legally protected right is the expectation of privacy. Whether one has a legitimate expectation of privacy involves a two-prong inquiry. The first inquiry asks whether the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched. If the answer to the first inquiry is yes, then we proceed to the second inquiry which asks whether society recognizes the defendant’s expectation of privacy as reasonable. Chapa v. State, 729 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987).2 See also, Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring); and, Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990).
A. Subjective Expectation of Privacy
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), the Supreme Court considered whether an individual had standing to challenge the search of a house that was not his home. The defendant was staying in the home of a friend when the police searched the home and found narcotics. The Court held the issue of standing was determined by whether the individual arrested was a “person aggrieved” by the search. Jones, 362 U.S. at 265, 80 S.Ct. at 733. The Court found it dispositive that at the time of the arrest the defendant had permission to stay in the home, had personal possessions located in the home and pos*151sessed a key for his personal use. The Court held:
... No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him.
Id., 362 U.S. at 267, 80 S.Ct. at 734.3 Therefore, the Supreme Court has recognized an individual’s right to contest a search conducted at a home not his own.
In Katz, the Court re-examined the holding of Jones. The Court held the government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording an individual’s conversation in a public telephone booth violated the individual’s expectation of privacy and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court stated:
... the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52, 88 S.Ct. at 511 (internal cites omitted). The Court determined the defendant justifiably relied upon the privacy of the telephone booth to exclude the “uninvited ear.” Id., 389 U.S. at 352, 88 S.Ct. at 511.4 Thus in Katz, the Supreme Court determined the defendant’s subjective intent was crucial to the determination of reasonable expectation of privacy. Ibid.
When considering the subjective prong, it is important to remember that the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are personal. In other words, the defendant must assert his own legal rights rather than base his claim for relief upon the rights of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 428, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1979).
B. Objective Recognition of a Privacy Interest
It is not enough that an individual desired or anticipated that he would be free from government intrusion. Rather, for an individual to receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the expectation of privacy must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), the defendant was suspected of being the driver of a getaway car. Id. at 93, 110 S.Ct. at 1686. The police surrounded the home where the defendant was suspected to be hiding. Id. at 94, 110 S.Ct. at 1687. The police entered the home without a warrant or permission of the home owner and arrested the defendant. Id. at 94, 110 S.Ct. at 1687. The defendant was an overnight guest in the home at the time of the arrest. Id. at 93-94, 110 S.Ct. at 1686. The Court stated:
To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home merely recognizes the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share.
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... we think that society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home.
Olson, 495 U.S. at 98, 110 S.Ct. at 1689. The Court examined the surrounding circumstances and the defendant’s attempts to secure his privacy in determining whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. Id. 495 U.S. at 97, 110 S.Ct. at 1688. The Court noted that an overnight guest’s expectation of privacy is rooted in “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Id. 495 U.S. at 100, 110 S.Ct. at 1690; citing, Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144, n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 431, n. 12.
In Crosby v. State, 750 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), we held the search of the de*152fendant’s dressing room on the premises of a nightclub was unlawful. The defendant was in his dressing room, which was set apart from the stage area and screened from prying eyes by a drawn curtain. Id. at 771, 773. A sentry was placed in front of the curtain to keep unwanted individuals from entering the dressing room. Ibid. The police, in conducting an administrative search of the establishment, entered the dressing room and observed the defendant in possession of drug paraphernalia and arrested him.5 Id. at 771. Using the test from Chapa and Rakas, we held the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy in the confines of the dressing room was the kind of privacy expectation that society recognized as reasonable. Crosby, 750 S.W.2d at 778.
II. The Instant Case
A. The Trial Court
Appellant was arrested without a warrant in the home of Gary Rick Varner. The police received an anonymous tip describing appellant and two other individuals and detailing their involvement in a drug transaction to be conducted at this home. The police drove past Varner’s home and observed a vehicle which matched the description given by the informant. The police left and returned later that evening, at which time they observed the vehicle was no longer at the scene. Appellant and two others returned in the vehicle, unloaded bags and walked toward the home. The police identified themselves, confronted appellant and the others outside of the Varner home and asked them to stop. However, appellant and the two other individuals entered the home and locked the door. The police attempted to enter the home and, after being refused entry, forcibly opened the door. The subsequent search of the Varner home resulted in appellant being arrested and charged with the instant offense.
B. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held appellant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy and, therefore, had no standing to challenge the search of the Varner home. Villarreal v. State, 893 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals stated:
An individual who has no possessory or propriety interest in the premises, but is a guest, has no clothes in the house, or other belongings, has no legitimate privacy interest in the premises searched. Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Additionally, an individual has no valid expectation of privacy in a home where he is simply a guest and does not control entrances or exits from the premises. Black v. State, 776 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd).
We have found no precedent that would impute an expectation of privacy for the purposes of standing to an invited guest who is not an overnight guest. We recognize that Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1689, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) found that an overnight guest had the legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence in which he spent the night. United States v. Wilson, 36 F.3d 1298, 1302 (5th Cir.) We decline to extend this expectation to the more casual visitor such as appellant.
Villarreal, 893 S.W.2d at 561.
We granted review to determine the correctness of that holding. The issue, therefore, is whether a non-overnight guest may have legitimate expectation of privacy, i.e., standing to challenge the search of a home not his own.6
I differ with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in at least three respects. First, there is no requirement that the guest have the legal authority to determine who may or may not enter the household. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99, 110 S.Ct. at 1689. Accordingly, that portion *153of the third factor of Calloway, supra, is no longer relevant.
Second, I find the case of Rose v. United States, 629 A.2d 526 (D.C.App.1993) persuasive. The Rose Court stated:
In Martin [u United States, 567 A.2d 896] at 902-03 [(D.C.App.1989) ], we concluded that a part-time resident of his grandparents’ home had a protected privacy interest in that home. More recently, the Supreme Court held in Olson that an overnight guest had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises, sufficient to give him standing to challenge a war-rantless entry and arrest. We did not intend our ruling in Martin, nor do we understand the Supreme Court’s holding in Olson to mean that overnight guests status, at the very least, is a sine qua non of standing to challenge a search or seizure in a residence other than one’s own home. It remains true, of course, that in order to establish standing to challenge a search or seizure, a visitor in another’s home bears the burden of showing that the visitor had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that home. See Prophet v. United States, 602 A.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C.App.1992). But being an overnight guest is not the sole means by which a guest may satisfy that burden.
Rose, 629 A.2d at 530-31.
Third, I agree with the majority’s holding: “the evidence established conclusively that appellant did in fact exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy in the Varner residence.” Ante, 935 S.W.2d at 138.
III. This Court’s Lead Opinion
The majority holds: “[T]he evidence did not establish that appellant’s subjective expectation of privacy was one that society was prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Ante at 138. The majority does not cite a single ease for this holding. Indeed, there is no authority to support this conclusion.7
When considering whether a guest has an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable, the Olson Court observed:
... The houseguest is there with the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his guest. It is unlikely that the guest will be confined to a restricted area of the house; and when the host is away or asleep, the guest will have a measure of control over the premises. The host may admit or exclude from the house as he prefers, but it is unlikely that he will admit someone who wants to see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest.... The point is that hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests of then-guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal authority to determine who may or may not enter the household.
Olson, 495 U.S. at 99, 110 S.Ct. at 1689. Undoubtedly, the same can be said of a non-overnight guest. To hold otherwise is to create an artificial distinction. From a privacy standpoint there should be no difference between an overnight guest and a guest who is invited to have dinner or to watch a television program. In short, the length of the stay should not be the determinative factor of whether society recognizes the defendant’s expectation of privacy as reasonable. This is certainly true when we consider that telephone calls from a public telephone booth are usually very short in duration, rides in taxicabs typically last only minutes, and stays in dressing rooms are not overnight. See, Katz, Chapa and Crosby, supra. For these reasons, I would hold society is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable a non-overnight guest’s subjective expectation of privacy. Accordingly, I would hold a non-over*154night guest may have standing to challenge the legality of the search of the home not his own.8
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that Court to determine the legality of the instant search. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
OVERSTREET, J., joins this opinion.

. U.S. Const, amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment is applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949) (application of Fourth Amendment to States); and, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (application of the exclusionary rule to the States).
The Texas Constitution contains a similar restriction upon the power of the State to search its citizens. Art. I, § 9 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

. In Chapa, 729 S.W.2d at 727, we stated:
... The litmus for determining existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy as to a particular accused is twofold: first, did he exhibit by his conduct "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy;” and second, if he did, was that subjective expectation "one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ "

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. The Court listed other cases where an individual has a justifiable expectation of privacy. Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920) (expectation of privacy in a business office): and, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960) (expectation of privacy in taxicab). See also, Chapa, 729 S.W.2d at 727 (same).

. T.A.B.C. § 101.04 authorizes administrative inspections of any premises that sell alcohol beverages. T.A.B.C. § 104.01(9) imposes a duly to insure no licensee possesses a narcotic or any equipment used or designed for the administering of a narcotic.

. Specifically, appellant’s ground for review contends: "The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petitioner did not have standing to contest an illegal intrusion and search of a residence in which he was an invited guest."

. The majority states: "If the court of appeals meant to suggest that a non-overnight guest can never have standing, then it was probably incorrect." Ante at 137, n. 4 [emphasis in original]. This statement is curious because that same footnote cites Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). If Arcila stands for anything, it is that we are not the arbiter of individual applications of the law. Arcila, 834 S.W.2d at 360. Nevertheless, the majority defies Arcila and makes a case specific holding in this case.

. The Rakas Court rejected a bright line rule stating that anyone legitimately on the premises has standing because such fine lines cannot be drawn in Fourth Amendment cases. Id. 439 U.S. at 147-48, 99 S.Ct. at 432-33.