Court Opinion

ID: 9763483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:46:41.512013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:44.270133
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
The principal issue raised by this appeal is whether the welfare commissioner abused his discretion in terminating the support of Everett Langs *506on a finding that he was not a “needy child”1 because he had obtained a personal injury recovery. This award compensated him for past and future medical and rehabilitation expenses, for the diminution of his future earning capacity, .and for the pain and suffering resulting from his injury. General Statutes §52-204; Wright, Connecticut Law of Torts (2d Ed.) § 171 (a). The award was not meant to provide for his daily maintenance. In legal contemplation, Everett Langs’ tort recovery merely restored him to his original position. The substitution of money for flesh did not constitute any gain to him.
When a minor child obtains a tort recovery over $5000, the Probate Court is required to appoint a guardian of the estate to assure that the personal injury award is conserved for its proper purposes. General Statutes §45-49. Ordinarily, the parent-guardian cannot resort to such a fund for the minor’s support. 2 Locke & Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice § 705. In this case, the termination of Everett Langs’ welfare benefits results in a misallocation of his personal injury award solely because of his mother’s poverty.
The definition of “dependent child” in § 17-82 does not warrant this result. A child who is “needy” *507prior to a tortious injury remains “needy” despite his money damages. If he is deprived of the proper use of his award, his losses then go uncompensated. I cannot accept the construction placed by the majority on § 17-82 because it is contrary to the existing body of law concerning the nature of a “personal injury award.” I would, therefore, sustain the plaintiff’s appeal.

 General Statutes § 17-82 defined the term “dependent child” to mean “a needy child under the age of eighteen, or who is under the age of twenty-one and in full time attendance in secondary school, or technical sehool or in college, who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother,' grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle or aunt, or any other relative approved by the commissioner in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home.”
Section 17-82 has since been amended in ways not relevant to this appeal.