Court Opinion

ID: 9750530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:05:05.20034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:11.846237
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion the majority has adopted an anachronistic position and I would allow this case to proceed to trial.
In considering preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, we must consider whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Bartanus v. Lis, 332 Pa.Super. 48, 52, 480 A.2d 1178, 1180 (1984) (per Rowley, J.) A demurrer admits all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the complaint, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Id. A demurrer may be sustained only where a case is free from doubt. Id. Accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the instant complaint, it is sufficient to sustain an action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
An action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has been recognized in Pennsylvania. See Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 (1970); Bartanus v. Lis, 332 Pa.Super. 48, 480 A.2d 1178 (1984); Jones v. Nissenbaum, Rudolph, and Seidner, 244 Pa.Super. 377, 368 A.2d 770 (1976); see also Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271 (3d Cir.1985). In Papieves, our Supreme Court, relying in part on Section 46 of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, held that an individual is entitled to protection from mental distress directly caused *365by wanton and outrageous conduct. 437 Pa. at 378, 263 A.2d at 121. Comment d to Section 46 explains:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!”
Other jurisdictions have allowed a cause of action to go forward in situations involving racial epithets. In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216 (1970), the Supreme Court of California, en banc, permitted recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress against an employer whose superintendant directed racial slurs against a Black employee. The Court stated:
Although the slang epithet “nigger” may once have been in common usage, along with such other racial characterizations as “wop,” “chink,” “jap,” “bohunk,” or “shanty Irish,” the former expression has become particularly abusive and insulting in light of recent developments in the civil rights movement as it pertains to the American Negro.
88 Cal.Rptr. at 91, n. 4, 468 P.2d at 219, n. 4.
The majority would distinguish Alcorn on the basis that the plaintiff was accorded a protected status by virtue of his relationship as an employee of the defendant. Yet in the case sub judice, appellant was a business invitee of Zayre’s Department Store, owed a heightened standard of care by the store. Treadway v. Ebert Motor Co., 292 Pa.Super. 41, 436 A.2d 994 (1982) (business invitee may rely on duty of owner to keep premises safe and to warn of potential hidden perils).
In Papieves, our Supreme Court recognized that the intentional infliction of emotional distress is an evolving tort *366and its scope has not yet been clearly defined. However, the principles cited above compel the conclusion that if appellee did engage in the conduct described in appellant’s complaint, they could be held liable for emotional and mental distress suffered by appellant. This particular racial epithet is ripe with hundreds of years of meaning: its use in certain contexts is repugnant to contemporary social values. Simply put, it is an ugly reminder of man’s inhumanity to man.
Our Supreme Court wrote:
We recognize that any extension of legal liability to acts which cause emotional distress is not without its problems. We also recognize that the law cannot serve to guarantee all men’s peace of mind; as the late Judge MAGRUDER remarked, “Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.” (Magruder, “Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts”, 49 Harv.L.R. 1033 (1936)).
But this case is not in that category. There can be little doubt that mental or emotional disorders brought on by conduct such as that set forth in the complaint at bar may be every bit as real, every bit as debilitating as ailments which have more obviously physical causes. For this reason, the obvious and inherent difficulties of the proof, or disproof, of emotional distress and the measurement of damages for such injury are not adequate cause, standing alone, to deny recovery ...
It goes without saying that in order to recover, a plaintiff asserting such a cause of action must be able to prove all the elements of his case by proper evidentiary standards.
The majority is incorrect in its statement that no other jurisdiction has recognized a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of racial *367slurs. See generally Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F.Supp. 127 (N.D.Iowa 1953) (black excluded from ballroom for racial reasons — cause of action for intentional infliction of emotion distress allowed to proceed); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., (Tex.), 424 S.W.2d 627 (1963) (damages permitted for mental suffering); Ruiz v. Bertolotti, 37 Misc.2d 1067, 236 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1962) (threats against “colored people”- — damages for distress and emotional shock); Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959) (damages for hurt feelings and embarrassment); Odom v. East Avenue Corp., 178 Misc. 363, 34 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1942) (mental suffering due to restaurant’s refusal to serve black patrons).1 Further, contrary to the majority’s opinion, Alcorn makes no suggestion that the court might not have allowed a cause of action to progress in a non-employer-employee context.
The development of the tort of the intentional infliction of emotional distress in Pennsylvania convinces me that appellant’s claim should proceed to trial by a jury of her peers. In a case similar to this, the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, allowed recovery for a party’s emotional distress upon an accusation of theft by a store security officer. Kahle v. Glosser Bros., Inc., 462 F.2d 815 (3d Cir.1972). Should not the jury in this case be permitted to consider whether being publicly called a “nigger” is equally outrageous conduct? Pennsylvania has long recognized humiliation as compensible harm. Connor v. Yellow Cab Co., 72 F.Supp. 442 (E.D.Pa.1947); Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.Super. 8, 481 A.2d 1194 (1984).
In short, I am unable to conclude that a jury would not find appellee’s conduct outrageous, atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. The case should be remanded for trial on the merits. See Denenberg v. American Family Corp., 566 F.Supp. 1242 (E.D.Pa.1983).

. In regard to the susceptibility of blacks to severe emotional distress, see Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising Out of Violations of Civil Rights (1965-66) 17 Hast.LJ. 189, 201.