Court Opinion

ID: 9916520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 01:09:06.156208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:32.891879
License: Public Domain

Velez v LSG 105 W. 28th, LLC
               2023 NY Slip Op 34537(U)
                   December 27, 2023
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 159202/2018
                  Judge: Paul A. Goetz
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                                                                                                                        INDEX NO. 159202/2018
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 148                                                                                             RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/27/2023

                                   SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                             NEW YORK COUNTY
            PRESENT:             HON. PAUL A. GOETZ                                                 PART                              47
                                                                                      Justice
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X      INDEX NO.          159202/2018
             JOSE LUIS VELEZ,
                                                                                                                       09/26/2022,
                                                         Plaintiff,                                                    09/30/2022,
                                                                                                    MOTION DATE        10/19/2022
                                                 -v-
                                                                                                    MOTION SEQ. NO.    003 004 005
             LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC,FLINTLOCK CONSTRUCTION
             SERVICES, LLC,
                                                                                                      DECISION + ORDER ON
                                                         Defendants.                                        MOTION

            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

             LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC, FLINTLOCK CONSTRUCTION                                                    Third-Party
             SERVICES, LLC                                                                               Index No. 595788/2021

                                                          Plaintiffs,

                                                 -against-

             CONSTRUCTION & REALTY SAFETY GROUP, INC.

                                                          Defendant.
             --------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

            The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
            74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 143, 144
            were read on this motion to/for                                       SUMMARY JUDGMENT(AFTER JOINDER                      .

            The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 106, 107, 108, 109,
            110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 127, 134, 135, 136
            were read on this motion to/for                                       SUMMARY JUDGMENT(AFTER JOINDER                      .

            The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 005) 85, 86, 87, 88, 89,
            90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 123, 124, 125, 128, 137, 138, 139,
            140, 141, 142
            were read on this motion to/for                                                      JUDGMENT - SUMMARY                   .

                      In this Labor Law action, plaintiff, Jose Luis Velez, seeks damages for personal injuries

            he allegedly sustained on May 11, 2017 when he fell from a DOKA form while working at a

            construction site located at 105 West 28th Street (the “Premises”). Plaintiff alleges that

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                                                   Page 1 of 28
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            defendants’ violations of the industrial code and failure to provide him with the necessary safety

            equipment caused his accident.

                      At the time of the accident, the Premises was owned by defendant/third-party plaintiff

            LSG 105 West 28th, LLC (“LSG”), who hired defendant/third-party plaintiff Flintlock

            Construction Services LLC (“Flintlock”) as the construction manager to build a new building

            (the “Project”) at the Premises. Flintlock hired Plaintiff’s employer, non-party Sky Materials

            Corp. (“Sky”) as a subcontractor to perform form and concrete work on the Project. Third-party

            defendant Construction & Realty Safety Group, Inc. (“CRSG”) was the Project’s site safety

            manager.

                      In motion sequence 003, CRSG moves pursuant to CPLR § 3212 for summary judgment

            dismissing all claims, crossclaims, and third-party claims asserted against it.1

                      In motion sequence 004, plaintiff moves for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR §

            3212 in his favor as to liability on his Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 claims as against LSG and

            Flintlock.

                      In motion sequence 005, LSG and Flintlock (the “Moving Defendants”) move for

            summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 dismissing the complaint, all crossclaims and

            counterclaims, and granting summary judgment in their favor on their third-party contractual

            indemnification, common law indemnification, and contribution claims as against CRSG.

            1
              CRSG argues in its memorandum of law (NYSCEF Doc. No. 118) that it is not liable under Labor Law §§ 240,
            241 (6), 200 or common law negligence. There are no claims against CRSG alleging violations of Labor Law §§
            240, 241 (6), 200 or common law negligence. CRSG’s arguments on these points will be considered as they apply
            to the third-party claims asserted against it.
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                                                    BACKGROUND

            Plaintiff’s Deposition Testimony

                   Plaintiff appeared for deposition on June 9, 2021 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 118). At the time

            of the accident, he was employed by Sky, a construction company erecting a superstructure at the

            Premises (Plaintiff tr at 24, 30-31, 44). Plaintiff testified that Flintlock was the contractor for the

            Project (id. at 29). Plaintiff never spoke with anyone from Flintlock and had never heard of LSG

            or CRSG (id. at 29, 30, 92-93).

                   Plaintiff began working on the Project as a laborer and later as a carpenter (id. at 33). His

            foreman was “Elias Riera,” a Sky employee, who was present at the worksite “all the time” (id.

            at 34). Plaintiff testified that his carpentry work included installing DOKA forms, the forms that

            are installed prior to pouring concrete to hold the concrete in place. Co-worker, “Jorge Saula”

            taught plaintiff how to install the DOKA forms (id. at 55, 57-58). Plaintiff further testified that

            Riera was the only person who instructed plaintiff as to carpentry work (id. at 34-36).

                   Plaintiff testified that the DOKA forms ranged in height and that workers did not use

            ladders to work on DOKA forms that were only nine feet high (id. at 279-280). He further

            testified that it was customary for workers to climb the nine-foot high DOKA forms, which were

            made of metal supports and rebar, to reach the top of the forms (id. at 279, 281). Sky employees

            stood on the metal supports and rebar to work on the DOKA forms, and plaintiff learned this

            technique from other Sky employees (id. at 166-168). Plaintiff testified that “[t]he foreman

            [Riera] always saw us do it that way. There wasn’t another way. The foreman always wanted us

            to hurry and that was the way” (id. at 165). Plaintiff testified that Sky had ladders at the worksite

            (id. at 87-89), but “no one ever uses a ladder at that height of nine feet” (id. at 280).

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                    Plaintiff further testified that there were harnesses available at the worksite, located in

            the “shanty” and “laying all over the construction” (id. at 85-88). Plaintiff had worn a harness

            while doing other DOKA form work, working at heights over six feet, and while working on the

            exterior of the building on the Premises (id. at 85). When plaintiff wore a harness (while doing

            form work), it would be anchored to rods and safety lines in the ceiling (id. at 86). Plaintiff

            could not recall whether he ever wore a harness while doing formwork on the fourth floor of the

            building (id. at 87).

                    On the date of the accident, plaintiff was performing formwork with Saula on the fourth

            floor of the building (id. at 58, 71, 77). Plaintiff was climbing a nine-foot-high DOKA form and

            installing rods into hooks and holes on the form (id. at 267-268, 272-273). Immediately prior to

            the accident, plaintiff had installed a rod at a higher level of the DOKA form and was climbing

            down to continue installation on a lower level of the form (id. at 268). Plaintiff saw that the rod

            he had previously installed was not well connected and climbed back up to the higher level to fix

            the issue (id. at 268).

                    The accident occurred as Plaintiff was standing on the metal supports of the DOKA form

            approximately five feet from the ground (id. at 150-151). He was holding a “pick” tool in his

            right hand and holding on to the DOKA form with his left hand for support (id. at 161-162).

            Plaintiff used the pick to hammer the rod into the form when the rod “kicked back” and hit him

            in the face (id. at 177-178). Plaintiff felt his foot slip and he fell backwards off the DOKA form

            (id. at 177-178). He slipped and fell “instantly” after the rod hit his face (id. at 184).

                    Plaintiff testified that working on the DOKA forms required lubricating them with oil (id.

            at 88). He testified that on the date of the accident he had lubricated the DOKA form where the

            accident occurred (id. at 158). He further testified that he saw oil on the floor in the area where

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            he was working prior to the accident (id. at 169-170). Prior to the accident, plaintiff did not

            observe any oil or debris on any of the metal supports or rebar that he was using to climb to the

            top of the DOKA form (id. at 281-282).

            Deposition Testimony of Andrew Stetler, Project Manager for Flintlock

                    Andrew Stetler appeared for deposition on October 26, 2021 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 121).

            At the time of the accident, he was employed by Flintlock as the project manager for the Project

            (Stetler tr at 8-9). LSG was the owner of the Premises, and it hired Flintlock as the construction

            manager for the Project (id. at 10, 12). The Project entailed the new construction of a building to

            be used as a hotel (id. at 9). DOKA forms were used in the construction of the walls and

            columns on all the floors of the building (id. at 48).

                    Stetler testified that Flintlock’s responsibilities included hiring subcontractors and putting

            together a health and safety plan, and that Flintlock had overall authority over the trades working

            on the Project (id. at 13-14, 19). Flintlock was also responsible for making sure that contractors

            followed safety procedures (id. at 40-41). Stetler was Flintlock’s senior representative at the

            worksite (id. at 11). He was at the worksite approximately two to three days a week, while two

            Flintlock employees, a superintendent and assistant superintendent, were on the worksite daily

            (id. at 52).

                    Flintlock hired Sky as a concrete superstructure contractor on the Project, and Sky was

            responsible for erecting the DOKA forms (id. at 29, 48). Stetler testified that there were issues

            with Sky not following general safety procedures (id. at 33-34). He further testified that he

            received reports to this effect from his superintendent, “Lawrence Smith,” and from site safety

            management (id. at 33-34). Stetler testified that it was the subcontractors’ responsibility to

            address any safety deficiencies in their work (id. at 86). He further testified that Sky’s foreman,

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            “Kevin Griffin,” was responsible for ensuring that Sky’s workers had ladders to perform their

            work (id. at 54, 99).

                      At his deposition, Stetler was questioned as to his understanding of DOKA form work.

            He testified that DOKA form work required the use of stepladders and that DOKA forms are not

            designed for climbing (id. at 57-59). He further testified that, based on his OSHA and DOB

            training, it would be unsafe for Sky workers to use a DOKA form as a platform while attaching

            rebar to the top of the form (id. at 58-59, 88-89, 95).

                      Stetler testified that Sky was required to use stepladders for DOKA form work, and that

            he observed Sky having stepladders at the worksite for that purpose (id. at 57-58, 97). He

            further testified that plaintiff “should know better” than to install rebar into the DOKA form

            while on the form, and that plaintiff should know “he’s supposed to be using a stepladder” (id. at

            96).

                      Stetler testified that LSG hired CRSG as the site safety manager for the Project and that

            Tim McNamara was CSRG’s site safety manager (id. at 23-25). McNamara’s duties included

            walking around the worksite on a daily basis, generating a daily safety report, and rectifying any

            safety issues (id. at 26-27). CRSG would notify Flintlock if Sky was not following general

            safety procedures and Flintlock would notify Sky, via email, to correct any unsafe conditions (id.

            at 39, 43-44). It was not CRSG’s responsibility to “physically correct” any unsafe conditions (id.

            at 87).

                      Stetler was informed of the accident by his superintendent, and Stetler prepared an

            incident report of plaintiff’s accident (id. at 22-27, 49, 64).

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            Deposition Testimony of Frank Marino, vice president of CRSG

                   Frank Marino appeared for deposition on January 19, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 99). At

            the time of the accident, he was a vice president of CRSG (Marino tr at 9). Marino testified that

            Flintlock was the general contractor on the Project (id. at 14) and that Sky was a concrete

            subcontractor (id. at 39). CRSG is a safety consulting company that was hired by “Lightstone

            Group” to be the site safety manager for the Project (id. at 10, 12-13). CRSG did not hire any

            subcontractors for the Project (id. at 35).

                   Timothy McNamara was the CRSG site safety manager assigned to the Project on the

            date of the accident (id. at 19). McNamara’s duties as site safety manager included observing the

            workers at the Project (id. at 79). If a site safety manager observed a worker performing tasks in

            an unsafe manner, the safety manager would speak to the worker and “discuss with a competent

            person, their foreman typically” to correct what the worker was doing (id. at 79 82). Marino

            testified that “the competent person is the person who’s actually responsible for the safety of the

            worker” (id. at 80). He further testified that Elias Riera was one of Sky’s two assigned

            “competent persons” (id. at 81).

                   Marino further testified that McNamara’s duties extended to fall protection. If

            McNamara saw a worker engaged in unsafe work, such as failing to tie off their harness, he

            would speak to the worker and “share the information with the entire team, including the client”

            (id. at 135-136). McNamara did not have the authority to stop work on the Project (id. at 82).

                   Marino testified that CRSG did not inspect the DOKA forms. Typically, the DOKA

            forms would be inspected by an engineer hired by Sky (id. at 59).

                   Finally, Marino testified that he was not familiar with plaintiff’s accident (id. at 35).

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            Deposition Testimony of Timothy McNamara, non-party witness

                      Timothy McNamara, appeared for deposition on July 27, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 122).

            At the time of the accident, he was employed by CRSG as the site safety manager over the

            Project (id. at 12, 15-17). He testified that Flintlock was the general contractor on the Project

            and that Sky was performing excavation and superstructure work (id. at 36-37).

                      McNamara responsibilities included observing the worksite for any safety issues (id. at

            12-13). If he noticed as safety issue, he would notify the superintendent, who would in turn

            notify the foreman (id. at 12-13). McNamara was present on the worksite for the entire workday,

            at least five days a week (id. at 18).

                      McNamara testified that Sky was responsible for their “own safety” and that he was not

            Sky’s designated “competent person” (id. at 40-41). Sky had its own foreman and/or safety

            personnel, who were responsible for their employee’s safety (id. at 42). Once McNamara

            notified one of Sky’s “competent persons” of a safety issue, it was upon Sky to address the issue

            (id. at 91).

                      McNamara testified that on multiple occasions he had seen Sky workers climbing on the

            DOKA forms to reach different heights and that he did not recall seeing them using ladders (id.

            at 77-78). He further testified that climbing was a part of formwork and that workers would

            wrap themselves in “gooseneck chains” (clipped to the form) to prevent falls. McNamara

            testified that climbing on DOKA forms without some form of tethering was a safe practice (id. at

            78-81).

            Affidavit of Jorge Saula, dated September 24, 2022

                      Jorge Saula signed an affidavit (NYSCEF Doc. No. 119), wherein he states that he was

            employed by Sky as plaintiff’s co-worker on the Project (Saula affidavit at ¶ 4, 16). He further

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                              Page 8 of 28
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            states that Riera was his foreman and that the Sky workers only took orders from Riera (id. at ¶

            4, 7).

                     Saula states that Riera told the Sky workers to climb the DOKA forms in order to reach

            the required work height (id. at ¶ 11). He further states that reaching the top work area of a nine-

            foot high DOKA form required standing on the DOKA form, approximately five feet above the

            floor (id. at ¶ 12). He further states that “[b]ecause we were not working over six feet above the

            deck… our foreman did not instruct us to use our personal protection equipment” (id. at ¶ 9).

                     Saula states that on the date of the accident he and plaintiff were installing DOKA forms

            on the fourth floor of the building at the worksite (id. at ¶ 18). Saula was on the floor, cutting

            rods approximately ten feet away from the plaintiff, while plaintiff was climbing the DOKA

            form (id. at ¶ 19, 20). Saula states that workers were not given ladders to work on the DOKA

            forms located on the fourth floor and that climbing DOKA forms was “the way we did it at this

            project” (id. at ¶ 14).

                     Immediately prior to the accident, Saula saw plaintiff standing on the DOKA form,

            approximately five feet above the ground (id. at ¶ 21). Saula did not witness the accident but

            heard a loud noise and turned to see that plaintiff had fallen from the DOKA form (id. at ¶ 22).

            Affidavit of William Hickman, Senior Property Manager for The Light Stone Group, dated
            October 28, 2021

                     William Hickman signed an affidavit (NYSCEF Doc. No. 120), wherein he states that he

            is a senior property manager for the Light Stone Group LLC (“Light Stone”) (Hickman affidavit

            at ¶ 2). Light Stone is the managing agent for the Premises, which is owned by LSG (id. at ¶ 5).

                     He states that LSG retained Flintlock as the construction manager over the Project

            pursuant to an agreement dated March 30, 2016 (the “Construction Management Agreement”)

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                               Page 9 of 28
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            (id. at ¶ 7). Hickman further states that CRSG was the site safety manager at the time of the

            accident (id. at ¶ 17).

                    As construction manager, Flintlock contracted with contractors (id. at ¶ 13). LSG did not

            select contractors, determine the scope of the construction work, nor supervise any of the work

            being done on the Project at the time of the accident (id. at ¶ 15) and he has no personal

            knowledge of plaintiff’s accident (id. at ¶ 9).

                                                        DISCUSSION

                    “It is well settled that ‘the proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima

            facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to

            demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact’” (Pullman v Silverman, 28 NY3d 1060,

            1062 [2016], quoting Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). “Failure to make

            such showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers”

            (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). “Once such a prima facie

            showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce

            evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to raise material issues of fact which require a

            trial of the action” (Cabrera v Rodriguez, 72 AD3d 553, 553-54 [1st Dept 2010]). “The court’s

            function on a motion for summary judgment is merely to determine if any triable issues exist, not

            to determine the merits of any such issues or to assess credibility” (Meridian Mgt. Corp. v Cristi

            Cleaning Serv. Corp., 70 AD3d 508, 510-11 [1st Dept 2010] [internal citations omitted]). The

            evidence presented in a summary judgment motion must be examined “in the light most

            favorable to the non-moving party” (Schmidt v One New York Plaza Co. LLC, 153 AD3d 427,

            428 [1st Dept 2017], quoting Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 339 [2011]) and bare

            allegations or conclusory assertions are insufficient to create genuine issues of fact (Rotuba

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            Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]). If there is any doubt as to the existence of a

            triable fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied (id.).

            CRSG’s late reply papers (motion sequence 003)

                   By stipulation dated October 21, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126), the parties and third

            parties agreed to a motion schedule requiring that all reply papers (on all of the motion

            sequences) would be served and filed on or before November 25, 2022. CRSG did not

            electronically filed its reply papers to motion sequence 003 until November 29, 2022 (NYSCEF

            Doc. No. 143). On November 30, 2022, LSG electronically filed a letter, addressed to CRSG’s

            attorneys, indicating that LSG was rejecting CRSG’s reply papers as untimely (NYSCEF Doc.

            No. 144).

                   “Parties are afforded great latitude in charting their procedural course through the courts,

            by stipulation or otherwise” (See Katz v Robinson Silverman Pearce Aronsohn & Berman,

            L.L.P., 277 AD2d 70, 73 [1st Dept 2000] [internal citation omitted]; see also Powell v Kasper, 84

            AD3d 915, 917 [2nd Dept 2011] [summary judgment motion filed beyond deadline set forth in

            parties' stipulation denied as untimely]).

                   Here, CRSG did not electronically file its reply papers until November 29, 2022 (see 22

            NYCRR §202.5-b (f) (2) (ii)). As such, CRSG’s untimely reply papers on motion sequence 003

            will not be considered.

            Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim against LSG (motion sequence 004, 005)

                   Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claims

            against LSG. Moving Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

                   Labor Law § 240 (1), also known as the Scaffold Law provides, in relevant part:

                   All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one and two-family
                   dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection,

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                   demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or
                   structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the
                   performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers,
                   blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so
                   constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so
                   employed.

                   “[T]he Labor Law imposes absolute liability on owners and general contractors for

            injuries that are proximately caused by the failure to provide appropriate safety devices to

            workers subject to gravity-related risks” (Ladd v Thor 680 Madison Ave LLC, 212 AD3d 107,

            111 [1st Dept 2022]). To prevail on a Labor Law § 240 (1) claim, plaintiff must show that the

            statute was violated, and that this violation was a proximate cause of his injuries (See Blake v

            Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 287 [2003]). “[T]he single decisive

            question is whether plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide

            adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential”

            (Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 603 [2009]).

                   The legislative intent behind the statute is to place “ultimate responsibility for safety

            practices at building construction jobs where such responsibility actually belongs, on the owner

            and general contractor, instead of on workers, who are scarcely in a position to protect

            themselves from accident” (Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 520

            [1985], rearg denied 65 NY2d 1054 [1985] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

            Therefore, the statute should be liberally construed to achieve the purpose for which it was

            framed (Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 513 [1991]).

                   Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as the accident occurred while he

            was working at an elevated height and that the accident was due to defendants’ failure to provide

            him with appropriate safety devices. Specifically, plaintiff was working on a DOKA form,

            approximately five feet from the ground, when he was struck in the face causing him to fall from

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            the form. Plaintiff argues that the defendants’ failure to provide him with a ladder and/or harness

            was the proximate cause of the accident.

                   Moving Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed as plaintiff’s choice

            to climb the DOKA form without proper safety equipment (i.e. a harness and/or ladder) was the

            sole proximate cause of his accident. They argue that ladders and harnesses were made available

            to plaintiff, but that he instead chose to climb the DOKA form without safety equipment.

            Moving Defendants further argue that no one ordered plaintiff to climb the DOKA form. They

            argue that there are issues of fact as to whether plaintiff was provided with a harness and/or

            ladder and whether said safety equipment would have prevented the accident.

                   Initially, there is no dispute that LSG was the owner of the Premises at the time of the

            accident and is therefore a proper Labor Law defendant. Further, there is no dispute that plaintiff

            fell from a DOKA form while working approximately 5 feet above the ground.

                   Saula, the Sky employee who worked with plaintiff on the date of the accident, states that

            Sky’s foreman told Sky workers to climb the DOKA forms in order to reach the required work

            heights (Saula affidavit at ¶ 11). He also states that the foreman did not instruct the workers to

            wear protective equipment, nor were the workers provided with ladders to work on the fourth

            floor DOKA form (id. at ¶ 9, 14). Saula’s statements are consistent with plaintiff’s testimony

            that the foreman had “always seen us [Sky workers] do it that way [climbing DOKA forms]”

            (Plaintiff tr at 165-168). His statements are also consistent with plaintiff’s testimony that the

            fourth floor DOKA form was nine feet high and that Sky workers did not use ladders for forms

            of that height (id. at 71, 161-162, 272-273, 276-277, 280).

                   Consequently, the record establishes that plaintiff was subject to an elevation related risk

            and that his foreman directed him to climb the subject DOKA form (See e.g. Caba v 587-91

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                              Page 13 of 28
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            Third Owner, LLC, 213 AD3d 520, 521 [1st Dept 2023] [“Because plaintiff’s foreman directed

            him to work on an elevated work platform… defendants were required to provide plaintiff with

            an adequate safety device”]; Auriemma v Biltmore Theatre, LLC, 82 AD3d 1, 9 [1st Dept 2011]

            [plaintiff entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim where his foreman

            directed him to descend from one elevation to another, resulting in plaintiff’s injury]; Harris v

            City of New York, 83 AD3d 104, 110 [1st Dept 2011] [plaintiff entitled to summary judgment on

            his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim where foreman directed him to stand on top of the piece of wood

            that shattered beneath him due to a falling slab]); Caban v Plaza Constr. Corp., 153 AD3d 488,

            490 [2nd Dept 2017] [plaintiff met prima facie burden on Labor Law §240 (1) where his foreman

            directed him to work on a scaffold without assistance] [citations omitted]).

                   As such, plaintiff has met his prima facie burden on his section 240 (1) claim against

            LSG.

                   Further, Moving Defendants have failed to establish prima facie that no one directed

            plaintiff to climb the DOKA form, nor have they created an issue of fact on this point. Moving

            Defendants have not submitted any evidence to rebut plaintiff’s testimony that the foreman

            routinely saw Sky workers climbing DOKA forms nor Saula’s statement that the foreman

            directed Sky workers to climb DOKA forms.

                   Further, Moving Defendants have failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff

            was a recalcitrant worker.

                   To raise a triable issue of fact as to whether a plaintiff was the sole proximate
                   cause of an accident, the defendant must produce evidence that adequate safety
                   devices were available, that the plaintiff knew that they were available and was
                   expected to use them, and that the plaintiff unreasonably chose not to do so,
                   causing the injury sustained.

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                             Page 14 of 28
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            (Nacewicz v Roman Catholic Church of the Holy Cross, 105 AD3d 402, 402-403 [1st Dept

            2013]).

                      Recalcitrance “is not established merely by showing that the worker failed to comply

            with an employer’s instruction to avoid using unsafe equipment or engaging in unsafe practices,

            or to use a particular safety device.” (Powers v Del Zotto & Son Bldrs., 266 AD2d 668, 669 [3rd

            Dept 1999]). Rather, the defendant must show that plaintiff deliberately refused to obey a direct

            and immediate instruction to use an available safety device (See Vitucci v Durst Pyramid LLC,

            205 AD3d 441, 444 [1st Dept 2022], citing Saavedra v 89 Park Ave. LLC, 143 AD3d 615 [1st

            Dept 2016]; see also Santo v Scro, 43 AD3d 897, 898-899 [2nd Dept 2007]).

                      Saula’s affidavit and plaintiff’s testimony establish that plaintiff was not directed to wear

            a harness and/or use a ladder while working on the fourth floor DOKA form. They also establish

            that safety equipment was not made available to plaintiff immediately prior to working on the

            fourth floor DOKA form. Saula states in his affidavit that the foreman did not instruct Sky

            workers to use personal protection equipment when working on the fourth floor DOKA forms,

            nor were the workers provided with ladders to work on the forms (Saula Affidavit at ¶ 9, 14).

            This is consistent with plaintiff’s testimony that Sky workers did not use ladders to work on

            nine-foot-high DOKA forms, such as the fourth floor DOKA forms, and that the foreman

            routinely saw Sky workers climbing such forms (Plaintiff tr at 183, 279-281).

                      Further, there is nothing from the record to suggest that anyone directed plaintiff to use a

            harness and/or ladder prior to his work on the fourth floor DOKA form. Multiple witnesses

            testified that it was unsafe to work on a DOKA form without a ladder, however, none of them

            testified that anyone immediately directed plaintiff to use a ladder or harness before working on

            the fourth floor DOKA form.

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                                Page 15 of 28
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                      Accordingly, since Moving Defendants have failed to establish that plaintiff was

            recalcitrant and/or the sole proximate cause of the accident, plaintiff is entitled to summary

            judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim against LSG.

            Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim against Flintlock (motion sequence 004, 005)

                      Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1)

            claims against Flintlock.

                      Plaintiff argues that Flintlock is LSG’s statutory agent based upon the agreement between

            LSG and Flintlock (NYSEF Doc. No. 117) (the “LSG-Flintlock Agreement”), and as such

            Flintlock is a proper Labor Law defendant (see Lind v Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y., 180 AD3d

            505, 505 [1st Dept 2020]). Neither Flintlock nor LSG oppose plaintiff’s arguments, and the

            record sufficiently supports plaintiff’s unopposed argument.

                      Accordingly, since Flintlock is a proper Labor Law defendant, and for the reasons stated

            above, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim

            against Flintlock.

            Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) claims against LSG and Flintlock (motion sequence 004, 005)

                      Plaintiff moves for summary judgment in his favor on his Labor Law § 241 (6) claims

            against LSG and Flintlock, and Moving Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the

            claims.

                      Labor Law §241 (6) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

                             All contractors and owners and their agents, . . . when constructing
                             or demolishing buildings or doing any excavation in connection
                             therewith, shall comply with the following requirements:

                      ...

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                                Page 16 of 28
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                            6. All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being
                            performed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged,
                            operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection
                            and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such
                            places. The commissioner may make rules to carry into effect the provisions
                            of this subdivision, and the owners and contractors and their agents for such
                            work, except owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but
                            do not direct or control the work, shall comply therewith.

                   “Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to provide

            reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers and to comply with the specific safety

            rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor” (Toussaint

            v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 38 NY3d 89, 93 [2022] [internal quotations marks and citations

            omitted]). The non-delegable duty is absolute and “imposes liability upon a general contractor

            for the negligence of a subcontractor, even in the absence of control or supervision of the

            worksite” (Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 348-349 [1998], citing Ross v

            Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 502 [1993] [emphasis omitted]).

                   “To establish liability under Labor Law § 241 (6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or

            her injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision ‘mandating

            compliance with concrete specifications’” (Ennis v Noble Constr. Group, LLC, 207 AD3d 703,

            704 [2nd Dept 2022], quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d at 505).

                   Plaintiff only opposes dismissal of his Labor Law § 241 (6) claim based upon Moving

            Defendants’ alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d), and only moves for relief with respect to

            the same. As such, plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) claims based upon any other statutory

            violations are deemed abandoned, and are dismissed (see Kempisty v. 246 Spring St., LLC, 92

            AD3d 474, 475 [1st Dept 2012] [“Where a defendant so moves, it is appropriate to find that a

            plaintiff who fails to respond to allegations that a certain section is inapplicable or was not

            violated be deemed to abandon reliance on that particular Industrial Code section.”]).

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                               Page 17 of 28
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                   Plaintiff’s remaining Labor Law § 241 (6) claim is based upon Moving Defendants’

            alleged violation 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d).

            Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d)

                   Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) is sufficiently specific to form a basis for liability

            pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6) (See Potenzo v City of New York, 189 AD3d 705, 705 [1st Dept

            2020]) and reads as follows:

                   Protection from general hazards

                   (d) Slipping hazards. Employers shall not suffer or permit any employee to use a
                   floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface
                   which is in a slippery condition. Ice, snow, water, grease and any other foreign
                   substance which may cause slippery footing shall be removed, sanded or covered
                   to provide safe footing.

                   Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor on his Labor

            Law § 241 (6) claims because defendants’ violation of section 23-1.7(d) was a proximate

            cause of his accident. Plaintiff argues that at the time of the accident there was oil on the

            DOKA form, creating a slipping hazard that was a proximate cause of the accident.

                   Moving Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed as there is

            no basis to conclude that plaintiff slipped upon any material on the DOKA form. They

            argue that the evidence instead establishes that plaintiff was struck in the face while

            climbing the DOKA form, which caused him to fall.

                   Here, Moving Defendants have established prima facie that section 23-1.7 (d) is

            not applicable to the circumstances of plaintiff’s accident. Further, plaintiff has failed to

            establish prima facie that a violation of section 23-1.7 (d) was a proximate cause of his

            accident and/or created an issue of fact on this point. There is nothing from the record to

            indicate that plaintiff’s accident occurred due to a slippery condition caused by oil.

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                                 Page 18 of 28
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                   The record establishes that plaintiff’s accident occurred when a rod hit him in the

            face, causing him to fall off the DOKA form (Plaintiff tr at 150-151). Plaintiff testified

            that he fell “instantly” after the rod hit him in the face (id. at 184). Further, although

            plaintiff testified that he had lubricated the DOKA form prior to working on it, he did not

            recall seeing any oil on the metal supports that he used to climb the form (Plaintiff tr at

            158, 281-282). In addition, there is nothing from the record to suggest that plaintiff

            slipped on oil immediately prior to falling from the DOKA form.

                   Accordingly, Moving Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing

            plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) claims in their entirety, and plaintiff is not entitled to

            summary judgment in his favor on this claim.

            Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims against LSG and
            Flintlock (motion sequence 005)

                   Moving Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common

            law negligence claims.

                   Labor Law § 200 (1) states, in pertinent part, as follows:

                   All places to which this chapter applies shall be so constructed, equipped,
                   arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate
                   protection to the lives, health and safety of all persons employed therein or
                   lawfully frequenting such places. All machinery, equipment, and devices in such
                   places shall be so placed, operated, guarded, and lighted as to provide reasonable
                   and adequate protection to all such persons.

                   Labor Law § 200 “codifies an owner’s or general contractor’s common-law duties of

            care, there are ‘two broad categories’ of personal injury claims: ‘those arising from an alleged

            defect or dangerous condition existing on the premises and those arising from the manner in

            which the work was performed.’” (Rosa v 47 E. 34th St. (NY), L.P., 208 AD3d 1075, 1081 [1st

            Dept 2022], quoting Cappabianca v Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 99 AD3d 139, 144 [1st Dept

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                                Page 19 of 28
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            2012]). Neither common law negligence nor Labor Law § 200 makes an owner or contractor

            vicariously liable for the negligence of a downstream subcontractor (See DeMaria v RBNB 20

            Owner, LLC, 129 AD3d 623, 625 [1st Dept 2015], citing Burkoski v Structure Tone, Inc., 40

            AD3d 378, 381 [1st Dept 2007]).

                   Where an existing defect or dangerous condition caused the injury, liability
                   attaches if the owner or general contractor created the condition or had actual or
                   constructive notice of it. Where the injury was caused by the manner and means
                   [means and methods] of the work, including the equipment used, the owner or
                   general contractor is liable if it actually exercised supervisory control over the
                   injury-producing work.

            (Cappabianca v Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 99 AD3d at 144 [internal citations omitted]; see also

            Toussaint v Port Auth. of N.Y. & NY, 38 NY3d at 94 [to recover under Labor Law § 200 “a

            plaintiff must show that an owner or general contractor exercised some supervisory control over

            the operation”]).

                   Moving Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment dismissing these

            claims as they did not supervise nor control plaintiff’s work leading to the accident.

                   Plaintiff argues in opposition that there are issues of fact as to whether Moving

            Defendants lacked actual or constructive notice of unsafe work practices and whether they

            controlled the means and methods of the injury producing work. Plaintiff argues that the Moving

            Defendants knew or should have known that Sky’s employees were climbing DOKA forms and

            that Flintlock’s onsite staff was ultimately responsible for ensuring that Sky followed correct

            safety procedures.

                   In addition, plaintiff argues that oil on the DOKA forms constituted a dangerous site

            condition and was a proximate cause of his accident. He argues that there is an issue of fact as to

            whether Moving Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the oil condition.

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                             Page 20 of 28
             Motion No. 003 004 005

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                   Here, plaintiff’s accident arose from the means and methods of his work, i.e. climbing the

            DOKA form in order to reach an elevated height. As previously stated, the accident did not arise

            from plaintiff slipping on an oily surface, nor is there any basis to suggest that the accident arose

            from any inherent defect.

                   Neither LSG nor Flintlock supervised nor controlled the injury producing work. Plaintiff

            testified that his foreman (a Sky employee) was the only person who instructed him on his

            carpentry work, and that Saula (a Sky employee) taught plaintiff how to work on the DOKA

            forms (Plaintiff tr at 34 36, 55, 57 58). In addition, Stetler (the project manager for Flintlock)

            testified that Sky was responsible for its employee’s safety (Statler tr at 55, 86, 99). There is

            nothing in the record to indicate that any entity other than Sky exercised any supervision or

            control over plaintiff’s work on the DOKA form.

                   Accordingly, Moving Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s

            Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims, and plaintiff is not entitled to summary

            judgment in his favor on said claims.

            LSG’s contractual indemnification claim against CRSG (motion sequence 003, 005)

                   Moving Defendants move for summary judgment in favor of LSG on its third-party

            contractual indemnification claim against CRSG. CRSG moves for summary judgment

            dismissing the claim.

                   “A party is entitled to full contractual indemnification provided that the intention to

            indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the

            surrounding facts and circumstances” (Karwowski v 1407 Broadway Real Estate, LLC, 160

            AD3d 82, 87-88 [1st Dept 2018] quoting Drzewinski v Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co., 70 NY2d

            774, 777 [1987]). Further, “a party seeking contractual indemnification must prove itself free

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                              Page 21 of 28
             Motion No. 003 004 005

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            from negligence, because to the extent its negligence contributed to the accident, it cannot be

            indemnified therefor” (De Souza v Empire Tr. Mix, Inc., 155 AD3d 605, 606 [2nd Dept 2017]

            [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see e.g. Hong-Bao Ren v Gioia St. Marks, LLC,

            163 AD3d 494, 494 [1st Dept 2018]).

                   Moving Defendants argue that LSG is entitled to contractual indemnification by CRSG

            pursuant to the written agreement, whereby LSG retained CRSG as the safety manager for the

            Project (NYSCEF Doc. No. 115) (the “LSG-CRSG Agreement”). Moving Defendants argue that

            the LSG-CRSG Agreement includes an indemnification provision obligating CRSG to indemnify

            LSG as to plaintiff’s accident. Moving Defendants further argue that they were not negligent as

            to the accident.

                   CRSG argues that Moving Defendants’ contractual indemnification claim should be

            dismissed as contractual indemnification is contingent upon CRSG’s negligence, and CRSG was

            not negligent as to plaintiff’s accident. CRSG further argues that it met its obligations under the

            LSG-CRSG Agreement and did not actually supervise nor control plaintiff’s work.

                   The LSG-CRSG Agreement requires in relevant part that CRSG:

                   Provide a Licensed Site Safety Manager/CSFSM [Construction Site Fire Safely
                   Manger Combo] for this project for the purposes of identifying hazards, and non-
                   compliant conditions that violate the standards of OSHA CFR 1926, chapter 33 of
                   the New York City Building Code and FDNY rules and regulations. These
                   inspections will involve visual observations, photographs, and a written narrative
                   report that will be delivered within one business day.

            (LSG-CRSG Agreement, Proposal, page 2)

                   Further, the LSG-CRSG Agreement only requires that CRSG indemnify LSG for claims

            “arising out of or as a result or consequence of the negligent acts, errors or omissions of the

            Consultant, its employees, consultants and sub-consultants in the performance of the professional

            services under this Agreement” (LSG-CRSG Agreement at 2, Section II).

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                              Page 22 of 28
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                   Here, Plaintiff’s accident did not arise from CRSG’s performance of its duties under the

            agreement, nor is there any basis to conclude that the accident occurred due to any negligence,

            errors, or omissions by CRSG in the performance of its duties. CRSG’s duties under the LSG-

            CRSG Agreement were advisory and CRSG had neither the “obligation nor authority to correct

            work hazards” (Dejesus v Downtown Re Holdings LLC, 217 AD3d 524, 527 [1st Dept

            2023][dismissing contractual indemnification claim against site safety manager based upon

            limited scope of contractual responsibilities]). These duties did not include directing any of the

            sub-contractors’ work or otherwise enforcing safe practices on the jobsite. As such, plaintiff’s

            accident did not arise from CRSG’s duties under the LSG-CRSG Agreement.

                   In addition, the record establishes that CRSG did not actually direct nor control the injury

            producing work. Plaintiff testified that his foreman was the only person who directed his work

            (Plaintiff tr at 34 36). Frank Marino (the president of CRSG) and Timothy McNamara (the site

            safety manager employed by CRSG) both testified that if the site safety manager saw any

            subcontractors engaged in unsafe practices, the site safety manger was required to inform a

            “competent person” as designated by the subcontractor (Marino tr at 79; McNamara tr at 91).

            McNamara also testified that Sky was responsible for the safety of its own employees and that

            Sky had its own safety personnel (McNamara tr at 42). Marino further testified that McNamara

            did not have the authority to stop work on the Project (Marino tr at 82).

                   Accordingly, CRSG is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Moving Defendants’

            third-party contractual indemnification claim as to LSG, and Moving Defendants are not entitled

            to summary judgment in LSG’s favor on its claim.

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                             Page 23 of 28
             Motion No. 003 004 005

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            Flintlock’s contractual indemnification claims against CRSG (motion sequence 003, 005)

                   Moving Defendants also move for summary judgment in favor of Flintlock on its third-

            party contractual indemnification claim against CRSG. CRSG moves for summary judgment

            dismissing the claim.

                   For the reasons previously stated, plaintiff’s accident did not arise from CRSG’s

            performance of its contractual duties nor from any negligence on the part of CRSG.

                   In addition, Flintlock was not a party to the LSG-CRSG Agreement, nor does the LSG-

            CRSG Agreement include Flintlock as one of the “Consultant Indemnified Parties” entitled to

            indemnification under the terms of the agreement (LSG-CRSG Agreement at 2, Section II; 9,

            Exhibit B, Section II) (See Collyer v LaVigne, 202 AD3d 1335, 1341 [3rd Dept 2022], quoting

            Arroyo v Central Islip UFSD, 173 AD3d 814, 816 [2nd Dept 2019] [“One cannot be held liable

            under a contract to which he or she is not a party”]). Flintlock does not argue that it is a third-

            party beneficiary to the LSG-CRSG Agreement for the purposes of indemnification.

                   Accordingly, CRSG is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Moving Defendants’

            third-party contractual indemnification claim as to Flintlock, and Moving Defendants are not

            entitled to summary judgment in Flintlock’s favor on this claim.

            LSG and Flintlock’s common law indemnification and contribution claims against CRSG
            (motion sequence 003, 005)

                   Moving Defendants move for summary judgment in their favor on their common law

            indemnification and contribution claims against CRSG. CRSG moves for summary judgment

            dismissing these claims.

                   “To be entitled to common-law indemnification, a party must show (1) that it has been

            held vicariously liable without proof of any negligence or actual supervision on its part; and (2)

            that the proposed indemnitor was either negligent or exercised actual supervision or control over

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                               Page 24 of 28
             Motion No. 003 004 005

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            the injury-producing work” (Naughton v City of New York, 94 AD3d 1, 10 [1st Dept 2012], citing

            McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369, 377-378 [2011]; Reilly v Digiacomo & Son, 261

            AD2d 318 [1st Dept 1999]). “Thus, a party moving for summary judgment dismissing a

            common-law indemnification claim can meet its prima facie burden by establishing that the

            plaintiff's accident was not due to its own negligence” (Cando v Ajay Gen. Contr. Co. Inc., 200

            AD3d 750, 752 [2nd Dept 2021] [citations omitted])

                   Moving Defendants argue that CRSG made no effort to stop plaintiff from climbing the

            DOKA form on the date of the accident nor did CRSG enforce the use of available ladders.

            CRSG argues that it is entitled to dismissal of Moving Defendants’ common law indemnification

            and contribution claims as it did not supervise nor control plaintiff’s work.

                   As previously discussed, CRSG did not have a contractual duty to control any

            subcontractors’ work nor the authority to stop work on the Project (See Dejesus v Downtown Re

            Holdings LLC, 217 AD3d at 526). Similarly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that CRSG

            actually controlled or supervised the injury producing work.

                   Accordingly, CRSG is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Moving Defendants’

            third-party common law indemnification and contribution claims, and Moving Defendants are

            not entitled to summary judgment in their favor on these claims (See Cando v Ajay Gen. Contr.

            Co. Inc., 200 AD3d at 753; see also Padron v Granite Broadway Dev. LLC, 209 AD3d 536, 537

            [1st Dept 2022] [Court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing contribution claims, as

            the record demonstrated that movant was free from negligence]).

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                             Page 25 of 28
             Motion No. 003 004 005

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            CRSG’s claims against LSG and Flintlock for common law indemnification and contribution
            (motion sequence 005)

                   Moving Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing all cross-claims and

            counterclaims for contribution and common law indemnification as asserted against them.

            Neither plaintiff nor CRSG oppose the Moving Party’s motion as to these claims.

                   For the reasons previously stated, there is no basis to conclude that the Moving

            Defendants were negligent as to plaintiff’s accident.

                   Accordingly, Moving Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing CRSG’s

            common law indemnification and contribution claims as against them (See Cando, 200 AD3d at

            753; see also Padron, 209 AD3d at 537).

            LSG and Flintlock’s breach of contract claim against CRSG for failure to obtain insurance
            (motion sequence 003)

                   CRSG moves for summary judgment dismissing LSG and Flintlock’s breach of contract

            claims based upon CRSG’s alleged failure to procure insurance.

                   The LSG-CRSG Agreement requires that CRSG obtain insurance naming LSG as an

            additional insured (LSG-CRSG Agreement at 5, Section IV). “An agreement to indemnify is

            separate and distinct from an agreement to procure insurance.” (Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v American

            States Ins. Co., 139 AD3d 497, 498 [1st Dept 2016]). Therefore, LSG and Flintlock’s breach of

            contract claims against CRSG, based upon CRSG’s alleged failure to obtain insurance, are

            separate and apart from their claims for contractual indemnification against CRSG (which were

            dismissed for the previously stated reasons).

                   CRSG’s arguments for dismissal of LSG and Flintlock’s breach of contract claims

            address general breach of contract principles, i.e. that CRSG’s site safety manager adequately

            performed his contractual under the LSG-CRSG Agreement. However, LSG and Flintlock’s

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                           Page 26 of 28
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            breach of contract claims against CRSG are based solely upon the specific allegation that CRSG

            failed to obtain insurance as required by the LSG-CRSG Agreement.

                    Here, CRSG fails to attach any insurance policy relevant to the LSG-CRSG Agreement

            (See Public Adm'r of Queens County v 124 Ridge LLC, 203 AD3d 493, 495 [1st Dept

            2022][movant “failed to establish, as a matter of law, that it procured the insurance it was

            contractually obliged to purchase, since it failed to submit the insurance policy”]).

                    Accordingly, CRSG is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing LSG and Flintlock’s

            third-party claims for breach of contract for failure to procure insurance as required by the LSG-

            CRSG Agreement.

                    The parties’ remaining arguments have been considered and are unavailing.

                                           CONCLUSION AND ORDER

                    For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

                    ORDERED that plaintiff, Jose Luis Velez’s, motion for summary judgment pursuant to

            CPLR § 3212 as to liability in his favor on his Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 (6) claims (motion

            sequence 004) as against LSG 105 West 28th, LLC (“LSG”) and Flintlock Construction Services

            LLC (“Flintlock”) is granted as to the section 240 (1) claim only, and is otherwise denied; and it

            is further

                    ORDERED that defendants, LSG and Flintlock’s, motion for summary judgment

            pursuant to CPLR 3212 dismissing the complaint, all cross-claims, and counterclaims as against

            them and for summary judgment on their third party contractual indemnification claims against

            Construction & Realty Safety Group, Inc.’s (“CRSG”) (motion sequence 005) is granted to the

            extent that plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) as well as his Labor Law § 200 and common law

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                                Page 27 of 28
             Motion No. 003 004 005

                                                           27 of 28
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                                                                                                      INDEX NO. 159202/2018
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 148                                                                           RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/27/2023

            negligence claims and CRSG’s common law indemnification and contribution claims as against

            LSG and Flintlock are hereby dismissed and the motion is otherwise denied; and it is further

                    ORDERED that CRSG’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212

            dismissing all claims, cross-claims, and counterclaims as against it (motion sequence 003) is

            granted to the extent that LSG and Flintlock’s third party contractual indemnification, common

            law indemnification, and contributions claims against CRSG are hereby dismissed and the

            motion is otherwise denied.

                    12/27/2023
                      DATE                                                           PAUL A. GOETZ, J.S.C.
             CHECK ONE:                   CASE DISPOSED                 X   NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                          GRANTED              DENIED   X   GRANTED IN PART             OTHER

             APPLICATION:                 SETTLE ORDER                      SUBMIT ORDER

             CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:        INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN        FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT       REFERENCE

             159202/2018 VELEZ, JOSE LUIS vs. LSG 105 WEST 28TH, LLC                                 Page 28 of 28
             Motion No. 003 004 005

                                                           28 of 28
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