Court Opinion

ID: 9736007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:39:36.255543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.283299
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority which would permit a trial court to consider sup*398plemental posttrial motions which are not timely filed. I also dissent to that portion of the Opinion and finding which would result in a new trial.
As to untimely supplemental post-trial motions, the majority cites the rule in which such motions are deemed to be waived on appeal, Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 Post-Trial Relief:
(b) Post-trial relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor,
(2) are specified in the motion. The motion shall state how the grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings or at trial. Grounds not specified are deemed waived unless leave is granted upon cause shown to specify additional grounds.
(c) Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after
(1) verdict,____
Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(2) and (c)(1). The appellees argue that issues raised in the statement of questions (2), (3), (4) and (6) are waived as they were not raised in timely filed post-trial motions and the court did not give permission to file additional grounds for the motions although it considered the additional reasons for post-trial relief.1 Relying on Supreme Court decisions in Commonwealth v. Sheaff, 518 Pa. 655, 544 A.2d 1342 (1988), modifying Per Curiam, 365 Pa.Super. 613, 530 A.2d 480 (1987), and Kurtas v. Kurtas, 521 Pa. 105, 555 A.2d 804 (1989), the majority finds the Supreme Court grants the trial court latitude to overlook any procedural defect which would not prejudice the rights of a party. A dissent filed by Justice Larsen, joined by Flaherty and Papadakas, JJ., in Kurtas, would find that where the appellate court determines from the record post-*399trial motions were not filed within the ten-day period prescribed by Rule 227.1, all matters raised in the appeal have been waived. Id., 521 Pa. at 111, 555 A.2d at 808.
The majority holds that even when timely post-trial motions have not been filed, if they are subsequently addressed by the trial court, they are reviewable on appeal. Having made this finding, the majority goes on to say that Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 is not meaningless, attempting to salvage the rule by directing the court to exercise its discretion and to consider such issues only where good cause has been shown for non-compliance with the rule. When half of a rule is unenforceable, permitting the court to consider supplemental motions after they are filed but before permission to file is granted upon good cause shown, it turns the clear and specific mandates of an orderly procedure, in which all litigants are treated equally, to one based on whim. The Supreme Court in Sheaff and Kurtas never intended that ignoring Rule 227.1 could be permitted when a party was prejudiced thereby. The majority correctly attempts to provide for that consideration by requiring the trial court to make a specific finding that prejudice does not exist before considering the motions, thereby incorporating the rule of liberal construction, Pa.R.C.P. 126, into the trial court’s consideration.
This case, on the basis of the majority holding, should either be remanded to have the trial court determine the issue of prejudice, or upon the record should find the existence of prejudice and, therefore, not consider the supplemental motions and treat those issues as waived. Whether on the basis of waiver because of prejudice to a party or on the merits, I believe the appellant cannot prevail and judgment should be affirmed. My review of the record and the post-trial proceedings in the trial court indicate issues two, three, four and six are not preserved for failure to include them in post-trial motions as required by Pa.R. C.P. 227.1(b). Claims not raised in post-trial motions are not preserved for appellate review. In re Estate of Hall, 517 Pa. 115, 535 A.2d 47 (1987); Ecksel v. Orleans, 360 *400Pa.Super. 119, 519 A.2d 1021 (1987); sec Pa.R.C.P. 227.-1(b)(2) (“Post-trial relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor ... are specified in the motion”).
Although appellants filed amended or supplemental post-trial motions for new trial raising issues four and six, I would find this amended motion did not preserve the issues for appellate review. Appellants filed their supplemental motions more than four months after the verdict. Parties normally have no more than ten days to file post-trial motions. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c). In Sheaff, supra, the Superior Court held that, despite the fact the court below addressed them on the merits, supplemental post-trial motions in a criminal case would not preserve issues for appellate review, unless permission to file the motions was requested and granted on the record. We note that the Supreme Court in Sheaff found, without elaboration, the Superior Court “erred” in treating the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence as waived. Because the Supreme Court has not specifically overruled any particular holding by this Court in Sheaff, I believe we should continue to treat the holding with validity.
I point out that prior to the Supreme Court’s disposition of Sheaff, we applied Sheaff s holding that permission of record must be granted for the filing of post-trial motions in Commonwealth v. Pyett, 372 Pa.Super. 291, 539 A.2d 444 (1988), and Commonwealth v. MacSherry, 371 Pa.Super. 164, 537 A.2d 871 (1988), without comment or action by the Supreme Court. More importantly, the Supreme Court denied allocatur in the case of Commonwealth v. Kelly, 365 Pa.Super. 28, 528 A.2d 1346 (1987), allocatur denied, 517 Pa. 598, 535 A.2d 1057 (1987), upon which Sheaff relied, in which we held that certain evidentiary issues were not preserved for failure to receive trial court approval to file supplemental post-trial motions in which the issues were presented nunc pro tunc. In Commonwealth v. Mistretta, 364 Pa.Super. 332, 334 n. 2, 528 A.2d 184, 185 n. 2 (1987), the proposition that issues are waived if raised in untimely supplemental post-trial motions without approval by the *401trial court was also advanced without later action by the Supreme Court.
A panel of this Court in Commonwealth v. Hewett, 380 Pa.Super. 334, 551 A.2d 1080 (1988), “inferred” that the Supreme Court’s finding the issue in Sheaff was preserved meant such issues are preserved when the trial court elects to address the issue on its merits. More recently, in Kurtas, supra, the Supreme Court held such action is acceptable in cases wherein the court had continuing jurisdiction and no prejudice was shown. Kurtas can be easily distinguished from the instant case. In reversing our Court’s holding in Kurtas v. Kurtas, 368 Pa.Super. 648, 531 A.2d 39 (1987), the Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision (with one justice of the majority concurring in the result) held that untimely filed post-trial motions, if timeliness is not raised or objected to by the opposition or the trial court, may not be found to be waived by the Superior Court. The Court cited Pa.R.C.P. 126 wherein the trial court was granted “latitude to overlook any procedural defect which does not prejudice the rights of a party.” Kurtas at 109, 555 A.2d at 806. The difference in the case sub judice is that here we are dealing with supplemental post-trial motions filed more than four months after the judgment in question, admission to which was objected to by counsel, whereas in Kurtas the delay in filing supplemental motions was slightly over one month after a change in counsel, and without objection. The late filing of original post-trial motions does not appear to present as great an opportunity for mischief as does late filing of supplemental post-trial motions, without review or permission of the court. There is inherent prejudice to the trial court and the opposing party in not knowing when, if ever, supplemental post-trial motions will be filed. I, therefore, believe the Supreme Court’s decision in Kurtas applies only to instances where post-trial motions are untimely filed without objection by the trial court or the other party and the court thereafter rules on the merits. Such is not the case here as the time period was excessive and appellee *402vigorously protested the filing of the unapproved supplemental motions.
This same requirement of obtaining approval of a request to file supplemental motions applies to criminal cases too. The similarity in the ten-day time period of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a), the criminal rule of procedure for filing of post-trial motions applied in Sheaff, and Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c), the civil rule of procedure for post-trial relief applicable here, is evident; like the criminal rules, nothing in the civil rules allows for unilateral extension of time to file post-trial motions. To permit the filing of post-trial motions beyond the period set by the rules, without trial court approval, circumvents the timely administration of the case. Without formal allowance of supplemental post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc, the ten-day requirement of Rule 227.1(c) is meaningless. This is particularly so when, as here, an extended period of time elapsed before the motion was filed. Must the court be indefinitely held at bay in finally ruling on post-trial motions at the election of one of the parties? I think not. A better solution, which is sometimes suggested, is to eliminate post-trial motions entirely with the appeal to follow immediately from the judgment.
This Court has applied fundamental procedural principles first set forth in criminal cases to civil cases in the past. In Carnicelli v. Bartram, 289 Pa.Super. 424, 433 A.2d 878 (1981), we considered the degree of specificity required in post-verdict motions in a civil case in light of the Supreme Court’s Opinions in Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974), and Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371, 426 A.2d 595 (1981), and the Supreme Court’s express disapproval of boilerplate post-trial motions in criminal cases, Commonwealth v. Waters, 477 Pa. 430, 384 A.2d 234 (1978), to conclude that the same disapproval of boilerplate motions or general assignments of error should be extended to civil cases. Likewise, I would extend the principle to civil cases, holding that permission must be requested and granted on the record before supplemental post-trial motions may be filed. Rule 227.1(c)’s silence on amending or supplementing requests for post-trial relief mandates this procedure. Accordingly, I would find appel*403lants’ fourth and sixth issues are not preserved for appeal and are therefore waived. My review of the record, however, leads me to conclude appellant’s arguments concerning those motions are without merit and the trial court’s disposition thereof is correct.
As correctly argued by appellee, appellants’ first and seventh issues on appeal are not preserved because appellants’ post-trial motions presented these in a boilerplate fashion contrary to the requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b). Jackson v. Spagnola, 349 Pa.Super. 471, 503 A.2d 944 (1986); Carnicelli, supra.2 Additionally, appellants’ failure to include issue seven in their statement of questions involved on appeal violates the mandatory precepts of Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), which states that “ordinarily no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of questions involved or suggested thereby.”
Because appellants’ fifth claim on appeal, concerning an alleged error by the trial court in allowing appellee’s expert witness Dr. Robert Schreckengaust to testify beyond the fair scope of his report in contravention of Pa.R.C.P. 4003.-5(c), is properly presented in appellants’ post-trial motions, I would address the issue on the merits. Without citation to case law, appellants argue the testimony by Dr. Schreckengaust was beyond the fair scope of the report submitted by him when he was asked to express an opinion as to whether an abnormally large ovary should be removed, the likelihood of such an ovary becoming cancerous, and whether or not there was a risk in a patient like appellant from taking premarin as a hormone replacement after her last ovary was removed.
“The relevant inquiry in any case involving the interpretation of Rule 4003.5, ... is whether there has been surprise or prejudice to the party which is opposing the proffered testimony of the expert, based upon any alleged deviation between the matters disclosed during discovery, and the testimony of such expert at trial.” Trent v. Trotman, 352 Pa.Super. 490, 502, 508 A.2d 580, 587 (1986); Augustine v. *404Delgado, 332 Pa.Super. 194, 481 A.2d 319 (1984). As we explained in Wilkes-Barre Iron v. Pargas of Wilkes-Barre, 348 Pa.Super. 285, 290, 502 A.2d 210, 212-13 (1985):
[I]n deciding whether an expert’s trial testimony is within the fair scope of his report, the accent is on the word “fair.” The question to be answered is whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the discrepancy between the expert’s pretrial report and his trial testimony is of a nature which would prevent the adversary from preparing a meaningful response, or which would mislead the adversary as to the nature of the appropriate response.
“Fair scope” contemplates a reasonable explanation and even an enlargement of the expert’s written words.
An expert’s report is adequate to allow examination on a particular issue at trial when the report provides sufficient notice of the expert’s theory to enable the opposing party to prepare a rebuttal witness. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corporation, 322 Pa.Super. 348, 469 A.2d 655 (1983).
Reviewing the testimony, expert’s report and appellees’ answers to interrogatories, I find no undue surprise or prejudice in the line of questioning objected to by appellants. Dr. Schreckengaust repeatedly expressed the opinions in his report that removal of the remaining ovary was proper under the circumstances and that his review of the pathology report confirmed Dr. Nagle’s diagnosis that the ovary was abnormal and would “certainly” have required removal sometime in the future. Elaboration of a reasonable explanation for the removal of the ovary, i.e. cancer, was permissible at trial and within the fair scope of information obtained through discovery. Lastly, Dr. Schreckengaust’s report clearly details the possible risks of artificial replacement hormones or estrogen and, thus, any objection to that testimony is without merit. The jury was, therefore, presented with appropriate expert testimony from which it could fairly decide that the operating physician performed within a reasonable degree of medical competence, exercising proper judgment in the removal of the *405ovary. Not all possible exigencies can be predicted or discussed prior to an operation and doctors must be permitted to exercise sound medical judgment in dealing with such contingencies, lest there be greater danger to the patient or the need to conduct additional surgical procedures that could have been avoided. To rule otherwise is to invite a greater likelihood of medical malpractice actions for failure to exercise sound medical procedures when they are clearly warranted.
I would find issues two and three waived for appellant’s failure to preserve them in original post-trial motions, and issues four and six waived for failure to request permission to file supplemental post-trial motions. This is especially true in view of the fact appellee objected to their filing. Issues one and seven are waived due to their presentation in a boilerplate fashion.
Having carefully reviewed all of the issues, however, I would affirm the judgment entered in the trial court.

 Only by searching throughout appellant’s post-trial motions and attempting to interpret their meaning in light of the above statements of questions involved can we assume appellant raised some of the issues in the timely filed original post-trial motions. Points 10, 11 and 12 are not specific enough to alert the court to objections now raised in statements of questions 2 and 3.

. I believe Judge Johnson improperly ignores the boilerplate nature of the motion for judgment n.o.v. when he reaches the merits of the issue in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.