Court Opinion

ID: 9892342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:05:01.188291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:17.953120
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/20/23 In re Ril.S. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re RIL.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF                                                                 F086303
 SOCIAL SERVICES,
                                                                           (Super. Ct. Nos. 21CEJ300081-1,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       21CEJ300081-2, 21CEJ300081-3,
                                                                                   21CEJ300081-4)
                    v.

 ADRIANA L.,                                                                              OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kimberly
J. Nystrom-Geist, Judge.
         Jacques Alexander Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Ashley N. McGuire, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                     INTRODUCTION
         Adriana L. (mother) appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to her
minor children, Ril.S. and Ric.S. (the twins), and D.D. and J.D. (the boys) pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother argues the court erred when it did
not apply the beneficial parent-child relationship to termination of her parental rights as
to the twins. Mother further argues that her due process rights were violated when the
court suspended her visitation with the boys and subsequently terminated her parental
rights based on the absence of a relationship.
         We conclude the court did not err when it found the beneficial parent-child
relationship did not apply to the twins. We further find mother forfeited her challenge to
the suspension of visits with the boys when she failed to allege the argument in her
petition for extraordinary writ.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         The Twins
         On March 5, 2021, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (the
department) filed an application for a protective custody warrant, pursuant to sections
300, subdivision (b), and 340, subdivision (a), to remove the twins from mother’s care.
The department alleged mother used inappropriate discipline including yelling, cursing,
and threatening to “ ‘beat the fuck out of’ ” the twins who were 10 months old at the
time. It was further alleged mother and the twins’ father exposed the children to ongoing
domestic violence.
         At the initial detention hearing on March 11, 2021, the court detained the twins
from mother and their father. The twins were ordered to have supervised visitation with
mother twice per week. On June 30, 2021, the court sustained the section 300 petition,

         1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
noted.

                                              2.
and ordered reunification services for mother and their father. Mother was further
ordered to participate in parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, drug testing,
mental health treatment, and domestic violence treatment.
       On October 11, 2022, at the contested 12-month review hearing for all four
children, reunification services for all four children were terminated. Mother’s
supervised visits with the twins were reduced to twice per month for one hour, due to
mother being late to most of the visits and missing many visits. The court noted mother’s
failure to be on time to visits and mother’s cancellations or skipped visits did cause stress
and harm to the children. A section 366.26 hearing was scheduled and mother was
advised of her writ rights.
       Mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ on January 4, 2023. This court filed
an opinion denying the writ petition on January 27, 2023. (Adriana L. v. Superior Court
(Jan. 27, 2023, F085126 [nonpub. opn.].)
       A contested section 366.26 hearing was held on May 8, 2023. A social worker for
the department testified about her observations of mother’s visits with the twins. She
testified that during mother’s remote visitation in November 2022, the children initially
did not appear to recognize mother, although one of the twins did call mother “mama”
once. During in-person visits, the social worker testified that the twins gave mother hugs
and kisses and mother interacted with the twins in a positive manner.
       The social worker also testified that although mother was consistent with her visits
at first, her visits had become inconsistent, and she missed her visitation on April 4 and
April 18, 2023. There were also times the twins would keep playing with their toys and
not respond to mother’s hugs and kisses.
       Mother testified that the twins recognized her during the visits. She testified that
one twin would be excited when the visits ended, but the other would get sad and
emotional. The twins would run to her and give her hugs, and call her “mom.” At their

                                             3.
most recent visit, the twins were excited to see her and ran to give her hugs. At the end
of the visit, mother told the twins “I’ll see you later” and they hugged and kissed.
       The court ultimately terminated mother’s parental rights as to all four children. As
to the twins, the court found:

       “[T]he Court agrees with the Department’s conclusion. [The twins] have
       been out of their mother’s care for two-thirds of their life. All of their
       significant development has taken place separate from their mother. Their
       mother does visit them as permitted by court orders. Those visits go well.
       Other than that the children recognize her now, early on they were confused
       and it is not clear that they always recognize her in visits, but they do
       recognize her now. They call her by a maternal name, as they do their care
       provider. The visits go well. The evidence supports only that the mother is
       a friendly visitor for the children. While there may be a benefit to the
       children in the positive visits, it is an incidental benefit and not the
       significant benefit that it would be in the mother’s burden to demonstrate.

              “Having considered the requirements of Caden C.[2] and the statute,
       the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to find a compelling
       reason not to terminate parental rights under either the beneficial
       parent/child relationship or the sibling bond relationship.”
       The Boys
       On June 4, 2021, the department filed an application for a protective custody
warrant, pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), to remove the boys from the care of
their legal guardian, their great-grandmother. The department alleged the great-
grandmother suffered from bipolar disorder and was hospitalized pursuant to section
5150. The department also alleged the great-grandmother had hit one of the boys in the
face, and continued to allow mother unsupervised contact with the boys despite mother’s
own anger issues, domestic violence, and inappropriate discipline with the boys.
       At the detention hearing on June 15, 2021, the court found a prima facie showing
that continuance of the boys in the home of the great-grandmother was contrary to the
children’s welfare. Mother was offered supervised visits with the boys and services.

       2 In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.).

                                             4.
       At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on November 4, 2021, the court
found the allegations in the June 8, 2021 petition true and terminated the guardianship of
the boys. Mother was ordered reunification services including parenting classes,
substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence evaluations, and was
recommended treatment and random drug tests.
       During the reunification period, since April 13, 2022, both of the boys refused to
attend visits with their mother because they did not feel safe. Mother was observed to
struggle with boundaries and respecting the boys’ space. She would continue to kiss and
hug the boys without asking, causing them to have meltdowns and feel uncomfortable.
During one visit, mother told the boys they needed to stop talking to the social worker
because it was making it hard on her to get the boys back.
       The court held a combined 12-month review hearing for the twins and the boys on
October 11, 2022. In preparation for the hearing, the boys provided answers to written
questions in lieu of live oral testimony. Both boys said they were not visiting with
mother because they did not want to.
       The court terminated reunification services for all four children. As to the boys,
the court found:

       “[The boys] are afraid of their mother. They are unwilling to be in the
       same room with her. They are barely willing to see a building where she
       may be. They are unwilling to speak to her. They will not visit with her in
       any way. The mother has not progressed in her relationship with [the boys]
       and in many ways have regressed from the point where there were visits. I
       will address the reasonableness of visits at the time when I get to the next
       prong of the analysis. But certainly for these two boys . . . who are too
       frightened even to hear their mother’s voice, to see her, to see a toy that
       reminds them of her, who act out around the time that visits were going to
       take place, . . . act out to the point of self-harm, are reduced to—for one of
       the children full trauma mode. There is a tremendous risk of detriment to
       their safety, protection, physical or emotional well-being.”

                                             5.
       Mother’s visitation with the boys was suspended based on the evidence presented,
and the court found visits between the boys and mother to be detrimental. A section
366.26 hearing was scheduled, and mother was advised of her writ rights.
       Mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ on January 4, 2023. This court filed
an opinion denying the writ petition on January 27, 2023. (Adriana L. v. Superior Court,
supra, F085126.) In her petition, the mother argued there was insufficient evidence that
returning the boys and twins to her care would create a substantial risk of harm to them,
that the department failed to provide reasonable services, and that the juvenile court erred
in finding clear and convincing evidence that it would be in the best interests of the
children to proceed with a section 366.26 hearing. (Adriana L. v. Superior Court, supra,
F085126.)
       A contested section 366.26 hearing was held on May 8, 2023. Mother testified
that her visits with the boys, when they would see her, were happy. The maternal
grandmother testified that mother would spend time with the boys when they were in the
custody of the great-grandmother and the boys were happy to spend time with their
mother. On cross-examination, maternal grandmother admitted that she had not seen the
mother interact with the boys for at least a year.
       The court ultimately terminated mother’s parental rights as to all four children. As
to the boys, the court found:

               “Regarding [the boys], the Court will analyze as to [the boys] as
       though the mother had been exercising visits regularly, because she has
       made attempts to maintain that relationship to the extent permitted by Court
       order. So the limitations in the mother’s visits are the reality of the orders
       of the Court and not that the mother has simply ceased visits or does not
       show up or does not express an interest. In fact, the evidence is quite the
       contrary. The mother has consistently asked social worker if she can have
       visits, asked when she can have visits. And it is the Court order that has
       limited the mother’s contact with [the boys].

             “[The boys] are adamant that they do not want a relationship with
       the mother. They do not wish to see her. They refuse to see her. Her visits

                                              6.
       were limited by a Court order after evidence was produced which caused
       the Court to conclude that contact with the mother is detrimental to the
       children. There has been no evidence presented today that would cause the
       Court to reach a different conclusion. It is clear that the mother cares very
       much about [the boys] and that she would like a relationship with them.
       And that for her it is a positive relationship, and despite any compassions
       that arise for the mother’s loss and the mother’s needs, the law requires this
       Court to concentrate and focus solely on the children. The question is not
       whether the mother cares for the children or whether the mother will suffer
       the loss of the children. The evidence is overwhelming that [the boys] are
       negatively impacted by contact with the mother. The mother’s
       participation and even visitation with them is detrimental rather than
       beneficial. Therefore as to [the boys], acknowledging that the mother has
       utilized time as permitted by the Court orders, her participation with them
       is detrimental rather than beneficial. And the Court must conclude that the
       beneficial parent/child relationship does not apply to the mother as to [the
       boys].”
       Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on May 23, 2023, appealing from the
findings and order regarding the termination of parental rights.
                                      DISCUSSION

 I.    The Juvenile Court Did Not Err Finding That the Beneficial Parent-child
       Relationship Does Not Apply to the Twins

       Mother argues that the twins had a significant and positive attachment to her,
developed and maintained through her visitation, would have benefited from continuing a
positive relationship with her, and it was detrimental to the twins to terminate her
parental rights. We find the court did not err in declining to apply the exception.

       A.     Legal Standard
       The avowed goal of dependency law is to protect children who are physically,
sexually or emotionally abused, neglected or exploited. (§ 300.) “Adoption, where
possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) Thus, pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1),
“[i]f the court determines, based on the assessment provided as ordered . . . and any other

                                             7.
relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be
adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.”
       There are several statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights in these
circumstances. At issue in this case is the beneficial child-parent relationship exception,
which applies where “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that
termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following
circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with
the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).)
       “In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by the Legislature, we
interpret the ‘benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ exception to mean
the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the
well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.”
(Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) “If severing the natural parent/child
relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such
that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the
natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (Ibid.)
       This exception consists of three elements. “(1) [R]egular visitation and contact,
and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 631, italics omitted.)
       As to the first element, regular visitation asks only whether the “ ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ [Citation.]”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) As to the second element, “courts assess whether
‘the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
Again here, the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of
factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s

                                               8.
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and
the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) As to the final element, courts need to
determine “how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect,
what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s
life.” (Id. at p. 633.)
       On appeal, this court reviews the first two elements for substantial evidence, and
the third element for abuse of discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.)
“On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the
prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in
support of the order.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) To show an abuse
of discretion, the juvenile court must have “ ‘ “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (In re
Ray M. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1050–1051.)
       B.      Analysis
       Mother argues the evidence does not support the court declining to apply the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights. The
department concedes that substantial evidence supports the first element of the exception,
that the mother maintained regular visitation with the twins, but argues evidence does not
support the second two elements.
       Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that mother did not have a
relationship with the twins other than that of a “friendly visitor.” At the time of the
hearing, the twins were three years old, and had spent two-thirds of their lives out of their
mother’s care. They were removed from mother in part because she was threatening to
“ ‘beat the fuck’ ” out of them and exposed them to domestic violence. And while the
twins would be upset when mother was late or missed visits during the reunification
period, when visits began in November of 2022, the twins initially did not recognize or

                                              9.
respond to her. They also called both her and their care provider by a maternal name.
Finally, at least one of the twins was not distressed by the visits ending.
       “Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental
benefit to the child.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Such incidental
benefit is not the “substantial, positive emotional attachment” necessary to satisfy
mother’s burden to prove the parent-child relationship exception. (Ibid.)
       Mother then argues it is particularly detrimental to deprive the twins of a
beneficial relationship with their mother, who has dedicated herself to becoming clean,
sober, and a better mother for her children. Mother relies on In re S.B. (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 289 to support her argument.
       In In re S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 289, the father was the minor’s primary
caregiver for three years. When the minor was removed from the father’s care, the father
immediately recognized that his drug use was untenable, started services, maintained his
sobriety, sought medical and psychological services, and maintained consistent and
regular visitation with the minor, complying with every aspect of his case plan. (Id. at
p. 298.) Likewise, for the first year after the minor was removed from the father’s
custody, the minor displayed a strong attachment to him. She was unhappy when visits
ended and tried to leave with the father. She would tell the father, “ ‘I love you,’ ” and
when the father started to leave she stated, “ ‘I’ll miss you,’ ” and said, “ ‘I wish I lived
with you and Mommy and Nana.’ ” (Ibid.)
       The court found “[the father] maintained a parental relationship with [the minor]
through consistent contact and visitation. His devotion to [the minor] was constant, as
evinced by his full compliance with his case plan and continued efforts to regain his
physical and psychological health. The record shows [the minor] loved her father,
wanted their relationship to continue and derived some measure of benefit from his visits.
Based on this record, the only reasonable inference is that [the minor] would be greatly

                                              10.
harmed by the loss of her significant, positive relationship with [the father.]” (In re S.B.,
supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 300–301.)
       In this case, no comparable evidence of detriment was presented. When the twins
were removed from mother’s care, mother struggled with complying with her case plan,
maintaining sobriety, and visiting the twins regularly and on time. This resulted in the
termination of reunification services on October 11, 2022, and the reduction of mother’s
visits with the twins. Although mother’s subsequent sobriety and efforts are laudable, by
October of 2022 the twins had been out of her care for over one year, and for most of
their lives. The only detriment proven was that one of the twins would become sad when
the visits with mother ended. Mother’s circumstances and relationship with the twins is
not comparable to the circumstances and relationship between the father and the minor in
In re S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 289. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion
insofar as it found the twins would not be greatly harmed by terminating mother’s
parental rights.
       The mother argues that the standard is “whether the children would benefit from
mother’s presence in their lives, not whether they could eventually be happy without
mother.” Mother is incorrect. The standard is whether the beneficial relationship
“promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the
child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., supra,
27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Here, the court did not err in finding that the incidental benefit
provided by mother’s friendly relationship with the twins was outweighed by the benefit
of a permanent home with the caregiver the twins had known for two-thirds of their lives.

II.    Mother Forfeited Her Argument That Suspension of Her Visits With the
       Boys Violated Her Due Process Rights
       Mother argues her due process rights were violated when the court suspended her
visitation with the boys at the 12-month contested review hearing, because lack of
visitation and a relationship with the boys resulted in the termination of her parental

                                             11.
rights. The department argues mother forfeited her right to appeal the issue of suspension
of visitation when she failed to argue the issue in her petition for extraordinary writ,
pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (l)(2). We find mother forfeited her due process
argument when she failed to bring the argument in her petition for extraordinary writ.
       A.     Legal Standard
       Appeals from section 366.26 hearings are limited by statute. Section 366.26,
subdivision (l) provides the following:

       “(1) An order by the court that a hearing pursuant to this section be held is
       not appealable at any time unless all of the following apply:

              “(A) A petition for extraordinary writ review was filed in a timely
              manner.

              “(B) The petition substantively addressed the specific issues to be
              challenged and supported that challenge by an adequate record.

              “(C) The petition for extraordinary writ review was summarily
              denied or otherwise not decided on the merits.

       “(2) Failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ review within the
       period specified by rule, to substantively address the specific issues
       challenged, or to support that challenge by an adequate record shall
       preclude subsequent review by appeal of the findings and orders made
       pursuant to this section.” (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)–(2).)
       Under section 366.26, subdivision (l), “[a]ll court orders, regardless of their
nature, made at a hearing in which a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing is set
must be challenged by a petition for extraordinary writ.” (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 235, 247.) “The purpose of the statute is to provide for immediate writ
review of meritorious issues subsumed within the order setting a section 366.26 hearing
to ensure that the hearing is not infected with reversible error even before it commences.”
(Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1512.)

                                             12.
       B.     Analysis
       In this case, mother did timely file a petition for extraordinary writ review
pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (l)(1). However, the petition did not challenge,
and mother does not argue that the petition challenged, the court’s finding that visitation
was detrimental to the boys, and the court’s order suspending visitation. Section 366.26,
subdivision (l)(2) is clear—because this issue was not specifically challenged in mother’s
petition for extraordinary writ, she is precluded from subsequent review by appeal.
       Mother requests this court to exercise its discretion to excuse forfeiture where an
important legal issue is raised, citing In re Stuart S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 203, and In
re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236. However, both of these cases are unhelpful—
they dealt with waiver pursuant to the general rule that “[i]n dependency litigation,
nonjurisdictional issues must be the subject of objection or appropriate motions in the
juvenile court; otherwise those arguments have been waived and may not be raised for
the first time on appeal.” (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558.)
       Courts have declined to apply the waiver rule pursuant to section 366.26,
subdivision (l) in two circumstances. First, “the waiver rule will be enforced unless due
process forbids it.” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208.) There must be
“some defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that the parent
would have been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections afforded by the
scheme as a whole.” (Ibid.) Second, “the courts have found good cause to address the
merits of a challenge to orders made at the setting hearing in an appeal from the order
terminating parental rights when the juvenile court did not adequately inform the parent
of their right to file a writ petition.” (In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1240.)
       Mother does not allege either circumstance. Mother was adequately informed of
her right to file a writ petition and did in fact file such a petition. Likewise, mother has
not alleged that some defect undermined her ability to avail herself to the protections
afforded by the statutory scheme. She was well aware of the order suspending visitation

                                             13.
and was able to challenge the suspension in her petition for extraordinary writ had she
chosen to do so.
      In the absence of an exception to the waiver rule, section 366.26, subdivision (l)(2)
bars mother from challenging the order suspending her visitation with the boys.
                                     DISPOSITION
      The orders terminating parental rights as to all four children are affirmed.

                                                                       LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

SNAUFFER, J.

                                           14.