Court Opinion

ID: 9790440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:52:52.373425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.487103
License: Public Domain

GRABER, P. J.
pro tempore, dissenting.
The lead opinion fails to answer the key question: Was there a genuine issue of material fact that the representation on which plaintiff relied was false? Because the record before the trial court revealed no such issue, it properly granted summary judgment for defendant. Therefore, I dissent.
Plaintiff was riding in a car driven by defendant’s insured when it was struck by a car driven by an uninsured motorist. Defendant’s policy afforded plaintiff personal injury protection (PIP) coverage up to $5,000 for one year from the date of the accident, plus uninsured motorist coverage up to $25,000. The release at issue relates only to the uninsured motorist coverage and does not affect the PIP coverage. Plaintiff signed the release a little over two weeks after the accident. At the time, her head hurt and her neck “was hurting a little bit,” but she felt that “it was pain that was going to go away.” According to her affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment motion, she understood that there was $5,000 available to pay further medical bills within a year of the accident but “that $750 was the maximum I could ever get for my pain, suffering or other damages.”
*537The lead opinion correctly notes that plaintiff claims to have relied on Reedy’s representations about the worth of her claim. The lead opinion also correctly notes that the evidence before the trial court would have permitted a jury to find that plaintiff relied on Reedy’s representation about the worth of the claim when she agreed to accept $750. However, what the lead opinion fails to consider adequately is whether Reedy’s representation was false. If $750 was the maximum value, on September 2, 1986, of plaintiff’s claim for pain and suffering, then there was a representation, but no actionable misrepresentation, even if the worth of plaintiffs claim later proved to be greater.
According to her own testimony, plaintiff was suffering from only a little bit of pain. Reedy’s affidavit states that plaintiff “appeared to have minor stiffness in her neck and back area” and that her medical bills for soft tissue injury were $202.85. There is no evidence that $750 undervalued plaintiffs claim for pain and suffering as of September 2, 1986, the date on which she alleges that Reedy made a false representation.
The lead opinion fails to respond coherently to that lack of evidence. None of the testimony quoted in the opinion states or implies that plaintiffs claim for pain and suffering was worth more than $750 on the date of the alleged misrepresentation.
The concurrence relies on plaintiffs affidavit, which recites: “I subsequently found out that Mr. Reedy had been untruthful to me.” That sentence merely restates the allegations of the complaint in a conclusory fashion.
“Plaintiff was required, in order to avoid summary judgment, to show that there were genuine issues of fact. Her expert’s conclusory statement that there was negligence in the particulars stated in the complaint does no more than rest on the allegations of the complaint. That is not permissible in responding to a motion for summary judgment; an affidavit must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue as to any material fact for trial.’ ORCP 47D.” Allen v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 76 Or App 5, 9, 707 P2d 1289 (1985).
Likewise, here, it is not permissible for plaintiff to rely only on *538her own conclusory statement that she learned that Reedy’s representation was false. ORCP 47 requires more.
Plaintiffs only response to the argument that there is no evidence of falsity is to assert that Reedy had “superior knowledge” and “undertook to give plaintiff legal advice” on which she relied. Implicitly, if not explicitly, she is arguing that the insurer had an obligation to tell her to talk to her own attorney or to wait before settling a claim for a soft tissue injury. The lead opinion properly decides that the insurer does not have that duty.1 Although plaintiff asserts that there is a genuine issue as to whether her claim for pain and suffering was worth more than $750 on September 2,1986, she points to no evidence that creates such an issue. Her bare assertion is not enough.

 The lead opinion’s discussion of Holland v. Lentz, 239 Or 332, 345, 397 P2d 787 (1964), might leave a different impression. 102 Or App at 534. Here, plaintiff had “equal * * * means of knowledge.” 239 Or at 345. (Emphasis supplied.) That is, she knew what pain she felt, and she had the means to acquire knowledge of the worth of her claim by seeking legal, as well as medical, advice.