Court Opinion

ID: 9810547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:53:09.429868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:01.610533
License: Public Domain

*441Hoke, J.,
dissenting: It is accepted doctrine with, ns that tbe easement of light and 'air as appurtenant to tbe ownership of a given piece of property does not arise except by grant or contract, expressed or fairly implied from tbe circumstances of tbe transaction. Such an easement does not exist as an ordinary incident of ownership, nor can it be acquired by prescription or adverse user.
Tbe last decision upholding this position was that of Lindsay v. Bank, 115 N. C., 553. In that case tbe defendant, tbe owner of an adjoining piece of property, bad erected a building which entirely shut off the light from a photograph gallery and rendered the latter entirely unfit for the purpose indicated. Recovery was denied, and Avery, J., delivering the opinion, said: “The easement of light and air cannot be acquired, according to the general current and weight of authority, in this country, even by prescription; and, of course, no right to object to the obstruction of one’s windows by a wall erected on the land of an adjacent owner can be said to exist independently of the English doctrine,” citing the Amer. & Eng. Enc. in support of the position.
In the publication referred to (19 Amer. & Eng. Enc., at p. 118) it is said: “The English doctrine of ancient lights above stated has not been adopted to any extent in the courts of the United States, which are practically unanimous in holding that no right to light and air can be acquired by prescription or adverse user.”
And in this same work (p. 121) it is said: “Even where the right to light and air is recognized, this does not include the right to view or prospect, however much this may contribute to the enjoyment of the estate. And the general rule is that no action can be maintained by one property owner against another for cutting off his view, unless the right of action is given by statute.”
This being the recognized doctrine with us, the present suit can only be maintained, if at all, by reason of the fact that the erection of the fence in question, entirely on the land of the. defendant, was prompted by a malicious motive. The principál .opinion frankly rests its approval of plaintiff’s case on the ground stated, and, that being true, I am constrained to dissent from the position of the Court, believing that such a decision is wrong in principle, unwise in policy and contrary to the great weight of well-considered authority.
In countries like ours, which base their system of .jurisprudence on the principles of the common law, it is very generally *442held that no actionable wrong can arise unless there has been some invasion of another’s right, and without this essential feature a person’s conduct cannot be made the subject of a suit in the municipal courts, though it may have caused damage to another, ánd though it may have been prompted solely by malicious motives. In Broom’s Legal Maxims the author, in treating of “fundamental principles,” thus refers to the question presented : “So a man may lawfully build a wall on his own ground in such a manner as to obstruct the lights of his neighbor, who may not have acquired the right to them by grant or adverse user; so he may obstruct the prospect from his neighbor, etc.,-etc. In this and similar cases the inconvenience caused to his neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground for an action. And, although it may seem to be a hardship upon the party injured to be without a remedy, by that consideration courts of justice ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has been already observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”
And that this principle is not affected by the presence or absence of a malicious motive will be found approved and sustained in Oglesby v. Attrill, 105 U. S., 605; Land Co. v. Commission Co., 138 Mo., 445; Hunt v. Simmons, 19 Mo., 583; Kelly v. Railroad, 93 Iowa, 436-452; Iron Co. v. Uhler, 75 Pa. St., 467; Smith v. Johnson, 76 Pa. St., 196; Phelps v. Walker, 72 N. Y., 45; Ratcliff v. Mayor, 4 N. Y., 200; Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wendell, 261; Piscard v. Collins, 25 Barber, 444-459; Boulier v. McCauley, 91 Ky., 135; McCune v. Gas Co., 30 Conn., 524; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass., 556-564; Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn., 253; Transportation Co. v. Oil Co., 50 W. Va., 611; Lancaster v. Hamberger, 70 Ohio St., 156, reported with annotation in 1st A. & E. Anno. Cases, 249; Bank v. Bank, 21 Vt., 535; Raycroft v. Taintor, 68 Vt., 219; Guarantee Co. v. Horne, 206 Ill., 403, and numerous other decisions of recognized authority.
To make a few citations from the cases mentioned, in Iron Co. v. Uhler, supra, it is held, among other things, “That a lawful act is not actionable, though it proceeded from a malicious motive.”
In McCune v. Gas Co., supra, Sanford, J., delivering the opinion, said: “The allegation that the defendant cut off the supply of gas maliciously and wantonly and with intent to injure the plaintiff is of no importance in the determination of this question. Where a party has a legal right to do a particular act at pleasure, the motive which induced the- doing of the act at the time in question can never affect his legal liability for the act, *443to whatever effect such motive may have upon the quantum of damages when his liability is fixed.”
In Walker v. Cronin, supra, Wells, J., delivering the opinion, and in reference to the question we are discussing, said: “One may dig upon his own land for water or any other purpose, although he thereby cuts off the supply of water from his neighbor’s well (citing Greenlee v. Francis, 18 Pickering, 117): It is intimated in this case that such acts might be actionable if done maliciously, but the rights of the owner of the land being absolute therein, and the adjoining proprietor having no legal right to a supply of water from the lands of another, the superior right must prevail. Accordingly, it is generally held that no action will lie against one for acts done upon his own_land in the exercise of his rights of ownership, whatever the motive, if they merely deprive another of advantages or cause a loss to him without violating any legal right.”
And in Transportation Co. v. Oil Co., supra, it was held: “A legal right must be invaded in order that an action for tort may be maintained. The mere fact that the complainant may have suffered damage of a kind recognized by law is not sufficient, as there must also be a violation of a duty which the law recognizes.”
In regard to buildings and other superstructures affecting light and air, I find no American decisions in opposition to the principle sustained by these authorities, except those in the Supreme Court of Michigan. A contrary doctrine seems to have been engrafted upon the jurisprudence of that State, though it was originally established by a divided court in Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich., p. 380. In that case two of the judges, Campbell and Champlin, dissented. Judge Campbell filed a forcible and learned opinion, and Judge Ohamplin, qoncurring with Judge Gampbell, thus tersely states his position: “The decisions have been quite uniform to the effect that the motive of a party in doing a legal act cannot form the basis upon which to found a remedy against such party. Under these circumstances, it should be left to the Legislature to define and prohibit the act and declare a remedy, as has been recently done in Massachusetts, Termont and some of the other States.”
In the case of Sanky v. Academy, 8 Montana, 265, sometimes cited as being in accord with the Michigan decisions, it will be found that the defendant had constructed a fence on the plaintiff’s side of a common alley, and the decision was made to rest upon the fact that there, had been a wrongful invasion of plaintiff’s right.
*444And several of the other citations made and relied upon in the opinion of the Court not only fail to give it support, but are directly contrary to the position maintained. Some of them, as in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S., 194, were actions upon statutes affecting the question, and the fact that legislation wag enacted on the subject gives indication that such action was required, and that without it no suit would lie. Others, as in Wheatley v. Ball, 25 Pa. St., 528, were suits for injuries caused by interrupting the flow of underground water having a well-defined channel and in which the owner of the servient tenement has some legal rights not- to be interfered with, except in the reasonable user of the dominant tenement; and the case of Chestley v. King, 74 Me., may also be upheld upon the same principle. See Gould on Waters (3d Ed.), sec. 290, where the case of Greenleaf v. Frances, also relied upon in the principal opinion, is said to have been overruled on the question presented by the subsequent case of Walker v. Cronin, supra, and the •author says that the doctrine announced in this last case is a settled law as to percolating water.
And in the citation to 1st Cyc., 789, in the opinion of the Court, the entire section is as follows: “If an erection which deprives the adjoining owner of light and air is lawful, it is not per se a nuisance, and the law will not inquire into the motive with which the erection was made. It has been held, however, that obstruction by one owner with intent to injure his neighbor, and without any advantage to himself, is unlawful.” The last clause being predicated upon the Michigan decision, above adverted to.
And in 12 A. & E., also referred to in the principal opinion, the statement is as follows: “According to the recent view of the common law, the ejection of a fence upon one’s own. land is not an actionable injury to one’s neighbor, although the erection may deprive him of light and air and may be dictated by motives of ill will. Special liability may, however, arise where title to the interrupted enjoyment of light and air has been acquired by contract; and in England, and perhaps one or “two American jurisprudences by prolonged user, under the doctrine of ancient lights. There are some authorities of the United States which support a contrary rule with which malice makes that actionable which would otherwise not be so, and a doctrine, has been declared that a fence erected maliciously and with no other purpose than to shut out the light and air from a neighbor’s window is a nuisance,” citing for the last position the Michigan decisions and the Montana case, above referred to.
*445Tbe doctrine as established in England will be found to accord with what I consider the overwhelming weight of American authority, as above indicated. See Chastmore v. Richards, 7 House of Lords, p. 349 and 388; Allen v. Flood, Appeal Cases 98, p. 1. In this last case My Lord Watson, in his opinion, thus states what is to my mind the correct principle, as follows: “Although the rule may be otherwise with regard to crimes, the law of England does not, according to my apprehension, take into account motive as constituting an element of civil wrong. Any invasion of the civil rights of another person is itself a legal wrong, carrying with it liability to repair its necessary and natural consequence, in so far as these are injurious to the person whose right is infringed, whether the motive which prompted it be good, bad or indifferent. But the existence of a bad motive in the case of an act which is in itself hot illegal will not convert that act into a civil wrong for which reparation is due.”
A like doctrine prevails in Canada, as announced in Perrault v. Gauthier, 28 Can., 241. And text writers of approved excellence are to like effect. Thus, in Cooley on Torts, p. 1503, marginal p. 830, the author says: “In the course of the preceding pages it has been made very manifest that when the question at issue is whether one person has suffered legal wrong at the hands of another the good or bad motive which influenced the action complained of is generally of no importance whatever. What was said in the opening chapter of the work, that the exercise by one man of his legal right cannot be a legal wrong to another, has been abundantly shown to be justified by the authorities, even if it were not in itself a mere truism. ‘An act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it is done with a bad intent.’ ‘Any transaction which would be lawful and proper if the parties were friends cannot be made the foundation of an action merely because they happened to be enemies. As long as a man keeps himself within the law by doing no act which violates it, we must leave his motives to Him who searches the heart.’ To state the point in a few words, whatever one has a right to do, another can have no right to complain of.”
And Jaggart on Torts, p. 55, says: “A"mere intent to do wrong, or mere malice not resulting in conduct which violates a right or duty, is not actionable.” See, also, Pollock on Torts, p. 152.
There are no decisions more pronounced than our own in maintaining the doctrine that malice will not of itself constitute an action where there has been no invasion of another’s rights.
*446Thus, in White v. Kincaid, 149 N. C., 415, in the opinion, at p. 419, the Court.said: “It is a principle well established that when a person, corporation or individual is doing a lawful thing in a lawful way, his conduct is not actionable, though it may result in damage to another; for, though the damage done is undoubted, no legal right of another is invaded, and hence it is said to be damnum absque injuria. Thomason v. Railroad, 142 N. C., 318; Dewey v. Railroad, 142 N. C., 392.”
And in Biscoe v. Lighting Co., 148 N. C., 404, Connor, J., delivering the opinion, said: “In such cases the'maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, is in no sense infringed. In its just sense it means ‘So use your own property as not to injure the rights of another.’ When no right has been invaded, although one may have injured another, no liability has been incurred.'”
And in the case of Richardson v. Railroad, 126 N. C., p. 100, it was expressly held that “Malice, disconnected with the infringement of a legal right, is not actionable.”
In the presence of this vast array of adverse authority, fortified and upheld by the opinions of judges eminent for their wis■dom, learning and piety, the statement that a contrary view is in accord with both good law and good morals would seem to be somewhat self-sufficing. Nor is the reference in the principal opinion to the moral aspects of the question any more illuminating. We are all, I trust, striving, at times somewhat blindly, to attain to the perfect righteousness of the great Teacher as well, as Saviour of men; but in the present stage of our development, and with our limited human ken, it has been found best to confine litigation in our civil courts to the enforcement of rights and the redress of wrongs growing out of an invasion of those rights, done or threatened, and not allow causes of action to be based upon motive alone. For here we enter upon the domain of taste and temperament, involving questions entirely too complex, varied and at times fanciful for satisfactory inquiry- and determination by municipal courts. In a case so near the border line as to divide this Court on a fundamental question as to rights of property.it is well to recur to the facts.
The plaintiff, a chief of police and owner of a house and lot, on complaint made, has caused the defendant to remove his stable from an adjoining piece of property. The defendant, smarting under a sense of defeat, makes some hasty and ill-considered expressions, erects a fence on his own land and in the protection of his own property.' He is now brought into court on the charge that the fence has been constructed from malicious motives; that it is too high, the planks are rough and undressed, and the house *447of plaintiff, presumably one room of it, has been rendered so dark that he cannot see how to shave. If plaintiff can succeed in this, the next grievance will very likely be found in the shape of the roof or the color of the paint; and the defendant, who had supposed that he was the owner of a piece of property, no doubt descended to him from his fathers, will find that in the evolution of things modern he is only an occupant, holding subject to the capricious whims of some supersensitive and overly aesthetic but influential neighbor.
I am of opinion that no cause of action has been stated in tbe complaint or -in the evidence, and that the judgment of nonsuit should be sustained.
Manning, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.