Court Opinion

ID: 9910929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 20:02:17.58362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:01.563631
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/18/23 In re Theo T. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re Theo T., et al., Persons                                  B327644
 Coming Under the Juvenile Court
 Law.                                                            Los Angeles County
 ______________________________                                  Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00270CD
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 R. T.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Charles Q. Clay III, Judge. Conditionally
affirmed and remanded.
      Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       ____________________
      Mother Ruby T. appeals the juvenile court’s minute order
after a status review hearing finding that the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (the Act) and the
corresponding state code sections do not apply to her son T.T. and
daughter S.W. The Los Angeles County Department of Family
and Child Services failed to comply with the requirements of the
Act. We conditionally affirm the order and remand to allow the
Department and juvenile court to comply with the Act and
related California law. Code citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
      The juvenile court detained the mother’s four children from
her and their respective fathers. The mother submitted to the
court a form stating she might have Cherokee ancestry through
the maternal grandfather and Blackfoot ancestry through her
maternal grandmother and maternal great-grandmother. She
provided the name and possible year of birth for the maternal
great grandmother. The juvenile court ordered the Department
to investigate these claims of Native American ancestry.
      When the social worker contacted the mother, she refused
to provide further information about her relatives, stating the
questions were an invasion of her privacy. The Department did
not ask other relatives with whom it was in contact about Native
American ancestry.
      T.T.’s father and S.W.’s father both stated they had no
Native American ancestry.
      The Department sent notices to the Blackfeet and Cherokee
tribes. The notices identified the children, the mother, the

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maternal grandparents, and maternal great-grandmother. The
notices did not list the places of birth for the fathers or either of
the mother’s parents. The notices did not include any
information about either of the fathers’ parents or the names of
any other known relatives.
      The juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over the children
and found the Act did not apply at the disposition hearing. The
mother appealed the disposition ruling, arguing the Department
and juvenile court had not complied with the Act, in appellate
case number B319395. While that case was pending, the juvenile
court ordered the Department to interview or attempt to
interview all extended family members about possible Native
American ancestry. The Department moved to dismiss the
mother’s appeal based on this order. We granted the motion.
      The Department spoke to a maternal cousin and two
maternal aunts. These relatives reported that the maternal
great-grandmother had Blackfoot ancestry in North Carolina and
provided her name and date of birth, as well as the name and
date of birth of the maternal grandmother. The Department also
spoke to S.W.’s paternal grandmother who reported the paternal
great-great-great-grandmother had said the paternal great-great-
great-great-grandfather was Cherokee, but she did not know his
name or date of birth. T.T.’s paternal grandmother reported the
family had no Native American ancestry.
      The Department reported this information to the juvenile
court in a last minute information before a February 15, 2023
status review hearing. At the hearing, the juvenile court found,
based on that information, that the Act did not apply. The
juvenile court also continued the children’s removal from the
mother and terminated the mother’s reunification services. The

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mother appeals the court’s order, arguing the Department and
the juvenile court again failed to comply with the Act.
       The mother correctly argues the Department failed to
comply with the Act because it did not include the name and date
of birth of maternal great-grandmother in its notice to the
Blackfeet tribe. We remand for the Department to do so.
       The Act requires the Department to ask the parents and
extended family members about possible Native American
ancestry. (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).) Where the initial inquiry
leads to a reason to believe a child is an Indian child, the
Department must make further inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) If
the further inquiry leads to a reason to know a child is an Indian
child, the Act requires formal notice to tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (f).)
        It triggers the Department’s duty to make a further
inquiry when the initial inquiry results in information suggesting
a parent or the child is a member or may be eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The
Department then must communicate with three main
groups: the family, government agencies, and tribes. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e).)
       The Department must interview the parents and extended
family members to obtain as much of the following information as
possible: the child’s name, birthdate, and birthplace; the name of
the tribe in which the child is a member or may be eligible for
membership; the names, addresses, and dates and places of birth
and death of the child’s biological parents, grandparents, and
great-grandparents; and “tribal enrollment information of other
direct lineal ancestors of the child, and any other identifying
information . . . .” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5).) The Department must
contact any identified tribe in which the child may be a member

                                  4
or eligible for membership and share information that the tribe
says is necessary to make a membership or eligibility
determination, as well as information on the current status of the
child and the case. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
       Here, the mother’s statements that she may have Cherokee
ancestry through her maternal grandfather and Blackfoot
ancestry through her maternal great-grandmother and
grandmother gave the Department reason to believe the children
may be eligible for tribal membership. Thus, the Act required the
Department to inquire of available extended family members for
further information. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The Department did so
and obtained additional relevant information. However, when
the Department made its further inquiry of the tribes, it did not
provide all of this relevant information. Specifically, it did not
provide the name and date of birth of a direct, lineal ancestor
who was reportedly a member of the Blackfoot tribe. The Act
required the Department to provide this information, and this
omission rendered its further inquiry insufficient.
       The Department argues its duty of further inquiry was
never triggered both because the great-great-grandmother was
too distantly related, and the Blackfoot tribe is not federally
registered. These arguments err.
       The Department claims information regarding the great-
great-grandmother was too remote to trigger a duty of further
inquiry. Without information foreclosing a claim of tribal
membership based on such familial association, however, the
Department’s claim is meritless. (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 1376, 1386-1387 [information about great-great-
great-grandparents suggested possible tribal membership where
no information provided that such familial association could not

                                5
lead to membership].) Information about a direct, lineal ancestor
with tribal heritage gives the Department reason to believe the
child may be an Indian child.
       The Blackfeet tribe is federally registered. (In re L.S.
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198.) The Blackfoot tribe is a
Canadian tribe and is not federally registered. (Ibid.) However,
the two tribes are understandably frequently
confused. (Ibid.) Where a parent or relative claims Blackfoot
heritage, the Department should clarify whether Blackfoot or
Blackfeet is meant. (Ibid.) The Department here admirably
initially sent notice to the Blackfeet tribe, presumably out of an
abundance of caution. The Department now attempts to avoid a
finding that its further inquiry was insufficient by emphasizing
that Blackfoot, not Blackfeet, heritage was claimed. If the
Department chose not to confirm which was meant, it cannot use
its failure to evade its duty of further inquiry. Here, where the
Department did not seek to clarify and the information suggested
the tribe meant was in the United States, we will not find the
duty of further inquiry was not triggered. (In re S.R. (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 303, 315 [“information that is far less conclusive
than what would trigger formal notice may trigger the obligation
to conduct further inquiry”].)
       The Department next argues that if its duty of further
inquiry was triggered, it met its statutory obligations. This
contention is incorrect.
       The Department claims that, because the mother’s
information triggered only a duty of further inquiry and not the
duty for formal notice, any deficiencies in the notices are legally
irrelevant. While the Department is right that the requirements
for informal notice to the tribes are not the same as those for

                                 6
formal notice, it failed to meet the requirements for informal
notice. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The Department must provide the
tribe any information the tribe needs to determine if the child is
eligible for membership. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The Department
does not explain why information about the ancestor who was
reportedly a member in the tribe would not fall into this
category. Here, the Department omitted relevant information in
its possession that the law required it to include. (In re E.H.
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1069 [information regarding great-
great grandparents must be provided if it may be relevant in
establishing whether the child may be an Indian child].) Thus,
the Department’s notice was deficient. As noted, we reject the
Department’s argument that the maternal great-grandmother’s
information was irrelevant because relatives stated she had
Blackfoot rather than Blackfeet ancestry.
       The Department erroneously argues that any challenge to
its failure to meet its duty of further inquiry has been forfeited
because the mother did not object in the juvenile court. (In re
A.G. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1400 [parents’ failure to object
to ICWA finding does not preclude appeal because it is the tribes’
interest that is at stake].)
                           DISPOSITION
       We conditionally affirm the juvenile court’s order and
remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to comply
with the further inquiry provisions of Welfare and Institutions
Code section 224.2. The juvenile court shall order that, within 30
days of the remittitur, the Department send informal notice to
the tribes containing all relevant information in its possession.
In the event the further inquiry leads to reason to know T.T. and
S.W. are Indian children, the juvenile court and Department

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shall proceed accordingly under the Act and related California
law. In the event the further inquiry does not lead to reason to
know T.T. and S.W. are Indian children, the juvenile court’s order
shall remain in effect.

                                          WILEY, J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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