Court Opinion

ID: 9642683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:06:16.704577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:50.984146
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because the majority fails to recognize that the statement upon which the Court of Appeals based its reversal of appellant’s conviction, Kay Barnhill’s oral statement incriminating both herself and the appellant, was solicited by defense counsel on cross-examination. Therefore, any error in its admission was waived. Adams v. State, 685 S.W.2d 661, 668-69 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Recognition of two different statements1, one written and one oral, is clearly shown by the facts.
At the police station, Kay Barnhill made an oral statement to Tx-ooper Neubauer that she *958had smoked crack cocaine with the appellant immediately before the arresting officers arrived. She later gave a written statement indicating that she had taken “one hit off of the pipe before the police came up.” In order to alleviate the confusion regarding the statements given by Kay Barnhill the following relevant exchange of questions during direct examination between Fox, the prosecutor, and Trooper Neubauer is helpful:
“Q. When you made that stop, Trooper Castro and yourself made the stop, either of the individuals in the car make any comments to you as to why they were there?
“A. No sir. Not at that time. Later Kay Barnhill gave us a statement.
“Q. What was her statement, sir?
“A. Her statement, it was a very short statement at the time. It was stated after we found this, had patted down Miss Kay Barnhill and found this in the pocket of her jacket—
“Mr. Nix: We object on grounds of hearsay.
“The Court: I’ll overrule the objection. Are we talking about the last statement?
“Mr. Nix: No. The statement he’s about to give. Mrs. Barnhill’s statement given to him.
“Mr. Fox: It’s well known the rules of exception against penal interest if she made this statement.
“The Court: Overruled.
“Q. Continue.
“A. She gave a written statement to a narcotics officer, Officer Kohn with DPS. She stated the jacket she was wearing wasn’t hers and she didn’t know this rock of cocaine was in it but they2 were smoking cocaine out of this pipe just prior to (sic) we drove up. That was about the short of the statement she gave us. It was about a three-line statement. I don’t have it here with me.” (Emphasis added).
It is clear that the statement to which defense counsel objected, on hearsay grounds, was the written statement given by Kay Barnhill.
The oral statement of which the appellant complained on appeal was solicited later on cross-examination by Mr. Nix, the defense attorney. This is clearly shown by the following exchange between Nix and Trooper Neubauer:
“Mr. Nix: Your Honor, I request that the State produce Ms. Barnhill’s Statement.
(DISTRICT ATTORNEY TENDERS DOCUMENT TO DEFENSE LAWYER)
“Q. I believe you testified just now that Ms. Barnhill made a statement that her and the defendant were smoking cocaine before you came up?
“A. That’s ivhat she told me at Dickinson PD. Then later on DPS Agent Kohn took a statement from Miss Barnhill, a short little paragraph stating — I don’t have it with me — stating what she actually told Trooper Kohn. But somewhere along the lines, it was the same thing she stated to me.
“Q. She told you that they were smoking cocaine?
“A. Yes, sir. While we was there waiting for the DPS narcotics agent to arrive at Dickinson PD.”
The defense attorney then had Trooper Neu-bauer read Kay Barnhill’s written statement into evidence and entered the written statement into evidence as defendant’s exhibit number two3.
The oral statement made by Kay Barnhill, upon which the Court of Appeals based its *959reversal of appellant’s conviction, was solicited by defense counsel without objection. Therefore, any error in admitting the oral statement was waived. Adams, 685 S.W.2d at 668-69. Appellant’s claim to the Court of Appeals that Kay Barnhill’s oral statement was admitted over his hearsay objection is erroneous. The record clearly shows that defense counsel’s hearsay objection, however he may now claim on appeal was directed, referred to Kay Barnhill’s written statement to which Trooper Neubauer testified immediately following the objection being overruled.
The written statement was properly admitted as an exception to the prohibition against hearsay because it is a “Statement Against Interest.” Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 803(24). The rule requires that the statement exposing the declarant to criminal liability be corroborated to clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Although the Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence to corroborate that appellant and Kay Barnhill were smoking the cocaine together, they did find that there was sufficient evidence to indicate that Barnhill alone was smoking the cocaine. Cofield v. State, 857 S.W.2d at 805.
Since the Court of Appeals found sufficient corroborating evidence to indicate that Kay Barnhill, alone, was smoking the crack cocaine and the written statement incriminated only her, the written statement satisfies the requirements of and was properly admitted under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 803(24). The hearsay objection was therefore properly overruled and the contents of the written statement were properly admitted.
It is interesting to note that the majority attempts to get around the waiver problem in a number of ways, none of which make any sense. The majority first says that we now make “an argument that the State did not make at trial, nor on appeal before the Court of Appeals, nor on appeal before this Court”.4 They go on to say that our “basis for such does not comport with the parties’ and the trial court’s apparent understanding of the objection at trial.” (Emphasis added). However, if appellant had made a specific objection as to the sufficiency of the corroborating facts5 as Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) requires, we would not have to speculate on appeal as to what the parties or the trial court “apparently” thought.
In trying to further justify them rationale, the majority also states that “[t]he objection was to hearsay, and the witness answered more broadly than he was questioned.” Un-doubtably, if the witness answered “more broadly than he was questioned” then the correct objection was to responsiveness, not hearsay.
In a last ditch effort, the majority claims that “appellant’s cross-examination was an effort to meet, rebut, destroy, deny or explain the improperly admitted evidence per Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), which does not waive the previously objected-to error.” This argument begs the question by assuming that the written statement was “improperly admitted evidence.”
Finding no error in the admission of Kay Barnhill’s oral or written statement, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. *960Because the majority persists in fighting the facts, I dissent.
WHITE and MEYERS, JJ., join this dissent.

. The majority states in its response to the dissent that "[i]n the absence of an exception, hearsay testimony is objectionable and whether it is oral or written is not a distinguishing factor". While this is a true statement, it adds nothing to the fact that in the case before us there were two different statements made, one oral and one written.

. Although Trooper Neubauer mischaracterized Kay Barnhill's written statement as stating that "they” were smoking cocaine, it is clear from reading the record that the officer is referring to the written statement in his answer.

. The pertinent portion of defendant's exhibit number two reads as follows:
"I borrowed the jacket from a girlfriend. The rock was inside of the pocket, but I did not *959know it was there. I took one hit off of the pipe before the police came up. I can read and write the English language.”

. Appellant's argument on appeal to the Court of Appeals was that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the introduction of a statement made by Barnhill to Trooper Neubauer. The complained of statement is indisputably the oral statement. The Court of Appeals reversed finding insufficient corroboration of the oral statement to meet the hearsay exception. However, the Court of Appeals failed to realize that the statement on which they based their reversal was actually the written statement. The majority would have us close our eyes to this fact so that they may address the question of law on whether the oral statement was sufficiently corroborated. This legal question is not properly before us as the facts do not present it.

. In question one on discretionary review the State asks, “Pursuant to Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, Rule 803(24), is appellant required to state a specific objection regarding the State’s alleged failure to introduce sufficient corroborating facts?”.