Court Opinion

ID: 9398073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 12:05:05.227634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:30.713648
License: Public Domain

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           DEUTSCHE BANK AG v. SEBASTIAN
               HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL.
                     (SC 20647)
      Robinson, C. J., and D’Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The plaintiff bank sought to enforce a foreign judgment that it had secured
   against the defendant S Co., a corporation organized under the laws of
   Turks and Caicos Islands. The foreign judgment resulted from an action
   previously brought by the plaintiff in England, in which the plaintiff
   recovered money owed in connection with an unpaid margin call on a
   foreign exchange portfolio of S Co., for which the plaintiff served as
   the primary broker. S Co.’s trading had been profitable between 2006
   and the latter part of 2008, and, on October 7, 2008, a representative of
   the plaintiff informed the defendant V, S Co.’s sole shareholder and
   director, that S Co. held nearly $1 billion in its accounts. Nonetheless,
   as the financial and currency markets became increasingly volatile, S
   Co. faced hundreds of millions of dollars in losses. As a result, the
   plaintiff issued a series of margin calls on the portfolio. S Co. paid the
   first five margin calls in full from assets held at the plaintiff bank. The
   plaintiff’s internal records showed, however, that the plaintiff had not
   properly valued and entered S Co.’s trades, which purportedly led to S
   Co.’s accounts being overvalued. Accordingly, on October 22, 2008, the
   plaintiff informed V of the computational errors, that S Co.’s accounts
   were in the red, and that it would seek a sixth margin call. S. Co.
   ultimately failed to pay the sixth margin call. Meanwhile, as a result of
   the plaintiff’s representations regarding the value of S Co.’s accounts
   on October 7, and throughout that month, V caused S Co. to transfer a
   large portion of its assets to various entities associated with V in further-
   ance of V’s plans to execute certain estate planning and to establish a
   trust for the benefit of his children. By the end of October, 2008, S Co.’s
   accounts with the plaintiff and other banks had been depleted, rendering
   S Co. effectively judgment proof. In 2013, the English court rendered
   judgment for the plaintiff and awarded it damages and interest. When
   S Co. failed to pay the foreign judgment, the plaintiff brought the present
   action, seeking, inter alia, to pierce S Co.’s corporate veil, to hold V
   joint and severally liable for the foreign judgment, and to enforce the
   foreign judgment against V personally. The plaintiff alleged that V,
   through his dominion and control of S Co., caused S Co. to fraudulently
   transfer funds to third parties for the purpose of shielding S Co.’s assets
   from the plaintiff. Prior to trial, the plaintiff requested the production
   of certain documents concerning V’s estate planning, and V objected
   on the grounds that the request was overly broad and unduly burden-
   some, and that the material was protected by the attorney-client privi-
   lege. The trial court sustained the objection on the grounds that the
   request was overly broad and unduly burdensome but did so without
   prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to file a narrower request at a later
   point. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a pretrial motion in limine to preclude
   the defendants from offering evidence and testimony that V made the
   October, 2008 transfers for estate planning purposes. The trial court
   granted the motion insofar as it sought to preclude the admission of
   the privileged documents that V had refused to turn over during discov-
   ery, noting that the defendants were not seeking to introduce protected
   documents but, rather, testimony previously given during V’s deposition
   that the October, 2008 transfers were made, in part, for estate planning
   purposes. At trial, V testified that, because S Co.’s accounts with the
   plaintiff held more than $1 billion as of October 7, 2008, he had decided
   to make certain payments and, as part of an ongoing estate planning
   process, to create a trust. The trial court asked V when he decided to
   set up the trust, and V replied that he had seen an email to his lawyers
   indicating that the process had begun on May 7, 2008. The plaintiff’s
   counsel then moved to strike V’s testimony on the ground that it violated
   the court’s earlier ruling on the plaintiff’s motion in limine. The trial
   court, however, declined to strike V’s testimony and, following the con-
    clusion of trial, found that the plaintiff had failed to prove its corporate
    veil piercing claim. In reaching its decision, the court applied the law
    of Turks and Caicos Islands and concluded that, although the evidence
    established that V dominated and controlled S Co. and commingled his
    personal funds with S Co.’s funds, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
    that V initiated the October, 2008 transfers with the specific intent to
    leave S Co. unable to pay its debts to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the
    court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that V should be held personally liable
    for the foreign judgment and rendered judgment for the defendants,
    from which the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that
    the trial court had improperly applied the law of Turks and Caicos
    Islands instead of the law of either Connecticut or New York, under
    which the plaintiff argued it would have prevailed, and that, even if the
    court had correctly determined that the law of Turks and Caicos Islands
    applied, it misinterpreted that law by requiring that the plaintiff demon-
    strate V’s specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of funds. The plaintiff
    also claimed that the trial court had improperly admitted V’s testimony
    that the October, 2008 transfers were executed for estate planning pur-
    poses, either because that testimony was precluded by the court’s earlier
    ruling on the plaintiff’s motion in limine or because it ran afoul of the at
    issue, or implied waiver, exception to the attorney-client privilege. Held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the results of the trial
    would have been different if the trial court had applied New York or
    Connecticut law, or if it had correctly applied the law of Turks and Caicos
    Islands, as the trial court’s factual findings foreclosed the plaintiff’s
    claim under New York, Connecticut, and Turks and Caicos Islands law,
    and any error in the trial court’s choice of law analysis or application
    of Turks and Caicos Islands law was therefore harmless:

   Although the law on corporate veil piercing is not coextensive in Connect-
   icut, New York, and Turks and Caicos Islands, in all three jurisdictions,
   it is an extraordinary remedy that requires, at a minimum, a determination
   that the corporate form was used to promote a wrong or injustice and
   that a fundamental unfairness would result from a failure to disregard
   the corporate form, in none of the jurisdictions is it sufficient to show
   only that the defendant exercised complete domination and control over
   the corporation or commingled assets, but, rather, the party seeking to
   pierce the corporate veil also must show that the corporate form was
   a mere shell that was used primarily as an intermediary to perpetrate
   fraud or to promote injustice.

   In the present case, in absolving V of any wrongdoing with respect to
   the October, 2008 transfers and in rejecting the plaintiff’s assertion that
   leaving S Co.’s corporate veil intact was fundamentally unfair, the trial
   court specifically found that the balance of equities favored V and that
   the plaintiff’s effort to pierce S Co.’s corporate veil was simply an attempt
   to circumvent the negligence and incompetence that the plaintiff exhib-
   ited in failing to obtain a personal guarantee from V and to accurately
   record and value S Co.’s trades.

   After thoroughly reviewing the record, this court concluded that the
   plaintiff failed to satisfy its heavy burden of demonstrating that the trial
   court’s specific equitable findings were clearly erroneous, as the trial
   court reasonably found that S Co. was not a mere shell used by V to
   conceal wrongdoing or to evade liability and that V had every intention
   of paying the margin calls, as evidenced by the large sum of money that
   he left, or reasonably thought he had left, in S Co.’s accounts at the
   plaintiff bank after initiating the transfers, and by the genuine shock
   that he exhibited upon learning of the shortfall in the accounts.

   Moreover, the record also supported the trial court’s findings that the
   sum that V had left in the accounts was not an unreasonable amount,
   given what he knew at the time about S Co.’s potential loss exposure,
   the plaintiff’s losses were largely the result of its own negligence and
   incompetence, insofar as it had agreed to provide back-office services
   for S Co.’s trading when it did not understand and could not accurately
   value S Co.’s trades, and any losses incurred by the plaintiff were the
   direct result of its failure over a two year period to accurately value and
   margin S Co.’s accounts.

2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court had improp-
    erly admitted V’s testimony that some of the October, 2008 transfers
   were executed for estate planning purposes:

  Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, the admission of V’s testimony did
  not violate the trial court’s earlier ruling on the plaintiff’s motion in limine,
  as nothing that occurred at trial contravened the strictures established
  by that ruling, which did not preclude V from testifying as to the timing
  of his decision to set up a trust or from testifying that some of the
  transfers were made for the purpose of funding the trust, no privileged
  documents were introduced by the defendants to establish or corroborate
  any factual claims regarding V’s estate planning, the email that V refer-
  enced during his testimony was not offered into evidence, and the plain-
  tiff’s counsel did not request to view the email after V’s testimony.

  Moreover, there was no merit to the plaintiff’s assertion that the admis-
  sion of V’s testimony implicated the at issue, or implied waiver, exception
  to the attorney-client privilege, which applies to aspects of the attorney-
  client relationship that a party has placed in issue and to which the party
  has impliedly waived the right to confidentiality, as V did not testify that
  he made the transfers on the advice of counsel for estate planning
  purposes but, at most, relied on the timing of the estate planning to
  establish that it predated the events of October, 2008, and, therefore,
  was not a pretextual, after-the-fact rationalization used to justify
  improper conduct.

  Furthermore, the plaintiff could have accomplished its objective of dem-
  onstrating that there was no evidence that V had an estate plan other
  than V’s uncorroborated testimony, while avoiding the privilege issues
  implicated by its broader discovery request, by filing a narrower request
  targeted at establishing the timing of V’s estate planning, the plaintiff’s
  counsel did not request to view the email referenced by V or seek an in
  camera review of it but, instead, moved to strike V’s testimony regarding
  the estate planning in its entirety on the basis of an incorrect perception
  regarding the breadth of the court’s earlier ruling, and the trial court
  was free to believe or disbelieve V’s testimony concerning the timing of
  his decision to set up a trust, just as the plaintiff’s counsel was free to
  argue that the trial court should not believe V’s testimony in the absence
  of corroborating evidence.
      Argued December 19, 2022—officially released May 30, 2023

                             Procedural History

   Action seeking, inter alia, enforcement of a foreign
judgment, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Stamford-Norwalk and transferred to the
Complex Litigation Docket; thereafter, the court, Gen-
uario, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment, from which the plaintiff and the defendants filed
separate appeals with the Appellate Court, Alvord, Ben-
tivegna and Pellegrino, Js., which affirmed the trial
court’s decision, and the plaintiff and the defendants,
on the granting of certification, filed separate appeals
with this court, which affirmed the Appellate Court’s
judgment; subsequently, the case was tried to the court,
Hon. Charles T. Lee, judge trial referee, who, exercising
the powers of the Superior Court, rendered judgment
for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed.
  David G. Januszewski, with whom were Jennifer
M. Palmer, Sheila C. Ramesh, pro hac vice, and, on the
brief, Thomas D. Goldberg, John W. Ceretta and Sesi
V. Garimella, pro hac vice, for the appellant (plaintiff).
  Richard M. Zaroff, pro hac vice, with whom were
Charles W. Pieterse and, on the brief, Wyatt R. Jansen,
Thomas P. O’Connor and Ira S. Zaroff, pro hac vice,
for the appellees (defendants).
                          Opinion

   ALEXANDER, J. The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG
(Deutsche Bank), brought this action against the defen-
dants, Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (SHI), and Alexander
Vik, SHI’s sole shareholder and director, seeking, inter
alia, to enforce an approximately $243 million foreign
judgment (English judgment) against Vik.1 Following a
five day trial to the court, the trial court denied Deutsche
Bank’s requested relief and rendered judgment in favor
of the defendants. On appeal,2 Deutsche Bank claims that
the trial court improperly declined to pierce SHI’s corpo-
rate veil and to hold Vik jointly and severally liable with
SHI for the English judgment. We disagree and affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
   The trial court’s memorandum of decision sets forth
the following relevant facts and procedural history. Vik,
a citizen of Norway and Monaco, has a residence in
Greenwich, Connecticut. Deutsche Bank is a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of Germany with
branches around the world. Its wholly owned subsid-
iary, Deutsche Bank (Suisse) SA (DBS), is based in
Geneva, Switzerland. Vik founded SHI in 1986 and C.M.
Beatrice, Inc. (Beatrice), in 1988. Both companies are
organized under the laws of Turks and Caicos Islands
(TCI), a British territory. SHI is Vik’s trading company,
and Beatrice is his holding company. SHI did not main-
tain any formal financial statements, general ledger
accounts, or other financial accounting systems. During
the relevant time period, Vik was SHI’s and Beatrice’s
sole shareholder and director, and he made all decisions
concerning their operations. The companies were run
from an office annex attached to Vik’s home in Green-
wich.
   SHI became a client of DBS in 2004. At all times relevant
to this appeal, Thomas Brugelmann was SHI’s ‘‘ ‘rela-
tionship’ manager and contact person at DBS . . . .’’
As such, he was responsible for ensuring a smooth
relationship between SHI and DBS. ‘‘Vik considered
. . . Brugelmann the ‘[chief operating officer]’ of SHI
at DBS and . . . granted [him] ‘extra powers,’ includ-
ing . . . authority to deal with [Deutsche Bank’s] Lon-
don and . . . New York [offices] on SHI’s behalf.’’
   In September, 2006, Vik hired Klaus Said to trade a
small foreign exchange (FX) portfolio on behalf of SHI.
Said, a former global manager of FX at JPMorgan and
Credit Suisse, worked out of Vik’s office annex in Green-
wich. Pursuant to an oral agreement between Vik and
Said, Said would keep 10 percent of the profits resulting
from his trades.
   On November 3, 2006, Deutsche Bank entered into
a FX prime brokerage agreement and various related
agreements with SHI to provide back-office capabilities
for Said’s FX trading, which SHI could not provide for
itself. All of the agreements were drafted by Deutsche
Bank. Deutsche Bank’s basic functions as SHI’s prime
broker included ‘‘(1) credit intermediation, [which] per-
mit[s] the client to trade with many banks through the
prime broker, who serves as the counterparty, (2) back-
office functions [such as] processing and confirming
trades, and (3) risk control and management functions,
including calculating limits, calculating margin require-
ments, [and] calculating exposures.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Through a letter of authority, which
Deutsche Bank also drafted, SHI authorized Said to
trade on its behalf in various FX transactions and cur-
rency options. The letter placed no limitation on the
size of Said’s trades and contained no personal guaran-
tee from Vik. Rather, in a related agreement, SHI pledged
$35 million in assets held in an account at DBS as
collateral for Said’s trading. ‘‘The amount of the deposit
remained unchanged from [November] 2006 until Octo-
ber 13, 2008, when it was increased to $40 million.’’
   ‘‘As SHI’s prime broker, [Deutsche Bank] booked the
trades directed by . . . Said with other banks and
financial institutions, acting as a counterparty. The par-
ties referred to these trades by a variety of names,
including ‘EDTs’ or exotic derivative transactions and
‘TPFs’ or target profit forwards. . . . [The trades] often
involved options or bets on the forward movement of
the currencies involved.’’ Although the trades could be
highly lucrative, they were extremely risky. ‘‘SHI’s prin-
cipal business relationship was with DBS in Geneva
or secondarily with [Deutsche Bank’s] London [office];
[however, Said’s] account was handled by a team in
New York referred to as PBFX. . . . [PBFX] assigned
a newly hired, [twenty-four] year old technical associate
. . . [with] no experience in [TPF or EDT] trades [to
administer the account]. As time passed, [this employee]
gave up accurately tracking the trades and [instead]
approximated their details in [Deutsche Bank’s] com-
puter systems as best he could.’’
  ‘‘At the beginning of 2008, SHI overall was extraordi-
narily successful,’’ perhaps, as Vik testified, ‘‘the most
successful company in Europe at that time.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Between 2006 and 2008,
Said’s trading was so profitable that Vik was able to
withdraw $96 million from Said’s account.
   ‘‘In the summer of 2008, the financial markets became
increasingly volatile and teetered toward crisis. Respected
financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers started to
fail, and [American International Group, Inc.] ‘was on
the edge’ . . . . Nevertheless . . . Said’s trading con-
tinued to be profitable through the summer and early
fall of 2008. As of August, 2008, [Said’s account] was
showing profits of roughly $70 million . . . .’’ On Octo-
ber 3, 2008, Said told Vik that ‘‘he expected to realize
about $20 million in profits over the next twelve to
fourteen trading days.’’
  ‘‘However, throughout 2008, in the lead-up to Octo-
ber, 2008 . . . Said also discussed with . . . Vik his
concerns about the amount of risk in his portfolio, espe-
cially with respect to the impact of volatility on the
derivative trade risk . . . .’’ At the same time, Said reas-
sured Vik that ‘‘he was managing the risk.’’ In an email
dated September 29, 2008, Said advised Vik that cur-
rency markets were ‘‘ ‘all over the place’ . . . .’’ Vik
replied that the situation was ‘‘ ‘scary, unpredictable
and dangerous.’ ’’
   On October 6, 2008, in an early morning email, Said
informed Vik that ‘‘market moves had ‘taken some of
[Said’s positions] to their boundaries’ and ‘these [were]
not just trades [he could] unwind’ . . . .’’ Said stated
that the trades could be ‘‘ ‘very rewarding in anything but
the wildest moves but [did not] have too much liquidity,
and if the market move[d] sharply and stay[ed] down,
they [could be] dangerous.’ ’’ Later that day, Said
advised Vik that his annual profits to date would not
be sufficient if they unwound them, that he was ‘‘ ‘sur-
prised’ ’’ that Deutsche Bank had not asked for more
collateral considering the state of the financial markets,
and that he was sure it would. Vik replied, ‘‘ ‘[i]n that
case, reduce positions as they come off, not a good time
to add more collateral.’ ’’ Later that day, Said informed
Vik that Deutsche Bank had ‘‘ ‘finally woken up’ to the
true extent of . . . Said’s loss exposure and would
likely seek additional collateral. By the end of the day,
[Deutsche Bank] requested that SHI’s collateral be
increased by $5 million to $40 million.’’
   On October 7, 2008, Vik met with Brugelmann and
other bank officials at Deutsche Bank’s London office.
At the meeting, Deutsche Bank’s staff congratulated
Vik on how well SHI was doing in such ‘‘ ‘difficult and
negative’ ’’ financial markets. Vik was also given a report
showing that SHI’s holdings at Deutsche Bank totaled
approximately $974 million, with a cash balance of
approximately $958 million, ‘‘subject to adjustments for
other accounts.’’ Although Vik was aware at the time
that the report did not include Said’s trades, ‘‘neither
he nor [Deutsche Bank] knew the actual financial posi-
tion of . . . Said’s portfolio.’’ As a result, Vik left the
October 7 meeting feeling ‘‘ ‘super happy,’ ’’ believing
that ‘‘ ‘[e]verything was going really well’ ’’ and that SHI
had approximately $974 million, ‘‘ ‘mostly in cash,’ ’’ in
its Deutsche Bank accounts.
   That afternoon, ‘‘Brugelmann wrote in an internal
email that he [had] told . . . Vik . . . that ‘[Said’s]
account was in good order from a margin viewpoint.’
In another internal [email] . . . to Klaus Halfmann,
[Deutsche Bank’s] head of credit risk management . . .
Brugelmann [stated that Vik] ‘is working on the assump-
tion that the risk in the portfolio managed by [Said] is
now captured adequately with the [$40 million] margin
terms.’ In the same email string . . . Halfmann wrote
Michael Spokoyny of PBFX . . . ‘[w]e have recourse
to the borrower and that is good. However, you need
to margin the account in a way that [PBFX] risk feels
comfortable with the collateral and not rely on the
recourse.’ . . . Spokoyny replied, ‘[w]e feel that the
proposed . . . margining requirement . . . closely
captures the margin that we need at the current time
and with the types of trades/currencies we have seen
to date . . . . Overall, we feel that the proposed mar-
gin levels are fair/competitive. However, given that the
portfolio can change with adverse market conditions
like we’ve observed this week, we take comfort in
knowing [that we can] rely on [Vik’s] guarantee if neces-
sary.’ In reality, [Deutsche Bank] had not obtained any
personal guarantee from . . . Vik.’’
  In addition to the cash and cash equivalents of nearly
$1 billion at Deutsche Bank, SHI also held assets in
cash or cash equivalents approximating $635 million in
accounts at HSBC, Den norske Bank (DnB), Merrill
Lynch, and JPMorgan. As a result, as of October 7, 2008,
Vik reasonably believed that SHI’s assets totaled an
equivalent of $1.6 billion. After meeting with Brugel-
mann, Vik ‘‘decided ‘what to do with all that money.’
This included repaying his father, putting cash into
Beatrice to reduce debt and to execute estate planning,
and paying himself capital distributions for various proj-
ects, while leaving hundreds of millions of dollars in
SHI’s accounts at [Deutsche Bank].’’
   ‘‘[Vik] then flew to Norway and, on October 8 [2008],
directed the transfer of . . . approximately $160 mil-
lion . . . from SHI’s DnB account to VBI [Corporation
(VBI)], [a] company owned by [his] father. . . . On
October 9 . . . Vik traveled from Oslo to New York.
. . . Said sent [him] a lengthy email that [he] reviewed
in the limo[usine] from the airport on his way home to
Greenwich. In that email . . . Said stated that, ‘for the
past year, Deutsche Bank gave us a free ride on these
[trades] because [it] could not value them properly in
[its] system. That was great while it lasted . . . [but
Deutsche Bank has] woken up. We can drag this out
for a bit, but we have to make two decisions,’ i.e.,
unwind all the trades, which would be ‘disastrous,’ or
post substantial collateral, basically, because [Deutsche
Bank] would start evaluating these extended deals on
an interim ‘mark to market’ basis at potentially very
negative levels, rather than wait for them to cash out.’’
   ‘‘[Vik] did not wish to pursue either of . . . Said’s
alternatives and felt it was impossible to face major
losses on a $35 million investment. [It was at this moment
that] . . . ‘the first real alarm bell went off’ [for Vik],
meaning that [he realized that] Said’s losses could
exceed the $35 million collateral that [SHI had pledged
in support of Said’s FX portfolio] . . . and that SHI
could be exposed to substantial losses. . . . His knowl-
edge that . . . Said had exposures beyond the collat-
eral pledged . . . was ‘very worrisome.’ On the other
hand . . . [any] departure from the $35 million collat-
eral ceiling he thought was in place ‘was not really such
a problem’ . . . [and] could be handled [by pledging]
more collateral . . . .’’
   During October, 2008, SHI made thirteen transfers of
assets (October transfers). ‘‘Eight of these were drawn
from SHI’s accounts with [Deutsche Bank] and totaled
$297 million . . . . The other five came from SHI
accounts with HSBC, JPMorgan and DnB . . . [and]
totaled approximately $593 million.’’3
   ‘‘On Friday morning, October 10 [2008] . . . Vik left
Greenwich to attend his thirtieth college reunion at
Harvard [University] . . . . [In an email] Vik . . .
[asked Said to] ‘[p]lease put together a detailed plan
on what we have and how we get out of everything
. . . to get back to a sustainable level without getting
killed.’ . . . At some point between the afternoons of
Friday, October 10, and Saturday, October 11 . . . Said
told [Vik] that Rafael Quezada, [the] head of PBFX, had
told him to expect a margin call on Monday [October
13, in the amount of $30 to $60 million].’’
  ‘‘On October 10 . . . Said [informed Vik] that his
derivative range trades exhibited ‘unlimited downside,’
[and] carried ‘disastrous risk,’ and that, as a result,
exiting them would lock in ‘extraordinarily prohibitive’
and ‘massive losses’ to the tune of ‘several hundred
million [dollars].’ . . . Vik responded . . . ‘I can’t
understand how [it] got so far away from $35 [million].
Have to get out [without] getting killed.’ ’’
   ‘‘On the evening of Saturday, October 11 [2008] . . .
Vik was warned by . . . Said: ‘Let’s not kid ourselves—
[Deutsche Bank] has the details of all the deals, and I
worry that they want even more than what we dis-
cussed’ regarding the pending margin call SHI was told
to expect for Monday, October 13. . . . Said proposed
a detailed plan to reduce exposure, which he said would
leave them in a relatively safe position in a week’s time.
. . . On Sunday, October 12 . . . Vik decided to close
out . . . Said’s trades as best they could. This was an
important decision because terminating certain deals
prior to their end date can trigger substantial premium
payments.’’
   ‘‘During the week of October 13, 2008, [PBFX] scram-
bled to properly calculate the risk on . . . Said’s
trades, which led to . . . massive margin calls during
the week ahead. . . . On Monday afternoon, October
13 . . . [Deutsche Bank] formally issued the first mar-
gin call for approximately $98,879,941 . . . . On Tues-
day, October 14, . . . SHI satisfied the first margin call
from assets held at [Deutsche Bank]. . . . Also, on
October 14 . . . Vik acted to ensure that several of the
October transfers were initiated, moving forward, or
completed.’’ See footnote 3 of this opinion.
  At the end of the day on October 14, Said advised
Vik that a second margin call from Deutsche Bank was
imminent and would be greater than the first. Shortly
thereafter, Deutsche Bank issued a second margin call
for approximately $202 million, which SHI satisfied in
full on October 15. Because Vik had thought that the first
margin call would satisfy SHI’s obligations to Deutsche
Bank, the size of the second margin call came as a ‘‘bad
surprise,’’ and he was admitted to Greenwich Hospital,
where he was diagnosed with severe anxiety and panic
attacks, and prescribed anxiety medication.
   That same day, ‘‘Vik sent . . . Brugelmann an email
saying that he had left him a voice mail but had not
received a call back. In the email . . . Vik said, ‘I am
in utter disbelief and shock of the risks that [Deutsche
Bank] accepted from third parties when all [Said] had
was a capital base of $35 million. This has . . . gener-
ated . . . $300 million in margin calls in two days.
Incredible. I have instructed [Said] to close out all posi-
tions as the opportunities to do that present themselves,
especially positions that have turned into forwards.’’
   After Vik sent the email, Deutsche Bank issued a
third margin call for $124,513,350. On October 16, 2008,
Deutsche Bank issued a fourth margin call for
$175,087,929, which included the amount of the third
margin call. As of that date, Vik had resolved to pay margin
calls by closing out SHI’s positions and had ruled out
the possibility of using alternative funds available to
SHI to pay the margin calls. At trial, Vik stated that, by
October 16, the prospect of SHI’s sending additional
funds to Deutsche Bank in satisfaction of SHI’s obliga-
tions was ‘‘inconceivable.’’
   ‘‘On October 17, [2008] SHI made a partial payment
of $100 million in connection with the third margin call.
. . . On the same day, [Deutsche Bank issued] a fifth
margin call for $34,886,361. [When] Brugelmann called
. . . Vik to apologize . . . Vik was sobbing on the
phone. . . . SHI paid the balance of the fourth margin
call of $75 million on October 20. . . . SHI satisfied
the fifth margin call on October 21 . . . . [Thus, from]
. . . October 13 to October 17, SHI received margin
calls totaling approximately $511 million . . . [which
it] paid in full . . . from assets held at [Deutsche
Bank].’’ After satisfying the fifth margin call, due to the
information provided by Deutsche Bank on October 7
indicating total holdings of approximately $978 million,
‘‘Vik thought SHI had several [hundred million dollars]
left in its [Deutsche Bank accounts] . . . . [At trial,
the defendants’] experts calculated that assets worth
approximately $280 million should have remained in the
[accounts] as of October 21 . . . [a figure that Deutsche
Bank] did not contest . . . .’’
  ‘‘Between October 17, and October 21, [2008, Deutsche
Bank] did not make another margin call, and no evi-
dence at trial suggested that . . . Vik or . . . Said
believed that it would do so. . . . [A Deutsche Bank]
officer stated in [an] internal correspondence that [as
of October 21] minimal SHI trades remained in its sys-
tem, and ‘everything seeme[d] good’ . . . . However,
at the same time, the team responsible for setting the
margins discovered that the SHI cash balance in [its]
system was not reflecting the payments being made
in connection with SHI’s futures trading (the ‘ignored
payments error’).’’4
   ‘‘In an internal . . . teleconference on October 22
. . . [Deutsche Bank] officers realized that, because of
PBFX’s failure to properly evaluate and enter . . .
Said’s trades, SHI’s account balances had been over-
stated by at least . . . $320 million, leaving SHI ‘under
water’ by hundreds of millions of dollars. . . . Brugel-
mann and others on the call agreed to tell . . . Vik
that they had performed a ‘reconciliation’ [that] had
identified a shortfall but not to explain their mistakes.
The call transcript, however, shows that [they] had not
performed a reconciliation; they had [merely] identified
an error in their systems.’’
   ‘‘Later on October 22 [2008] . . . Vik participated
in two high-level telephone calls with [Deutsche Bank
officials] in which he was informed that the correction
of computational errors in SHI’s accounts revealed that
[there] was in fact [a] deficit and that, as a result,
[Deutsche Bank] was seeking a further margin payment
of $300 million to $350 million. . . . The recordings of
the conference calls were played at trial. When
[Deutsche Bank] informed . . . Vik that there was a
deficit of [approximately $300 million to $350 million]
in the accounts . . . Vik exclaimed, ‘[w]hat,’ and was
plainly shocked. When . . . Vik asked how this was
possible, a [Deutsche Bank] officer told him they had
been ‘counting things possibly slightly incorrectly’ but
did not explain the cause of the error. . . . [Vik
informed Deutsche Bank] that SHI had no money to
pay the shortfall.’’
   ‘‘Vik also expressed shock that SHI [even] had a short-
fall [given that Brugelmann had told him in early Octo-
ber] that . . . ‘there was, like [five] or [six] billion kro-
ners in . . . [SHI’s accounts].’ . . . When . . . Vik
asked for an explanation . . . Brugelmann said that
the account[s] had been ‘depleted’ in ‘an unforeseen
way.’ ’’
  ‘‘Vik was visibly distraught upon learning the amount
of SHI’s exposure. . . . Vik testified that he was sitting
in his chair . . . [with] his head . . . literally under
the table [during the calls]. [A] colleague [who was with
him], Per Johansson, observed . . . Vik sliding down
off his chair during [one of the calls], crouching over,
and saying, ‘[t]here’s no more money.’ . . . Following
the telephone calls . . . [Deutsche Bank] notified . . .
Vik [via email] of a sixth margin call in [the amount of
approximately] $309 million . . . . SHI did not satisfy
the sixth margin call.’’
   ‘‘By the end of October, all of SHI’s accounts at [Deutsche
Bank], HSBC, DnB, Merrill Lynch, and JPMorgan had
been reduced to nominal amounts, so that SHI was
effectively judgment proof. . . . On October 30, 2008,
the CSCSNE Trust was created for the benefit of . . .
Vik’s children. . . . Vik transferred into the trust his
ownership interest [in] Beatrice, whose assets included
the $699 million [or more] that [he] had . . . trans-
ferred from SHI . . . earlier [in the month] and [all the
shares in Confirmit AS (Confirmit) . . . .’’ See footnote
3 of this opinion.
   ‘‘On January 21, 2009, [Deutsche Bank] commenced
an action [English action] against SHI [in the Queen’s
Bench Division of the High Court of Justice of England
and Wales (English court)] to collect the amounts owed
pursuant to the unpaid margin call, as well as interest
and costs. SHI asserted counterclaims . . . seeking
over $8 billion in damages from [Deutsche Bank]. Spe-
cifically, SHI alleged that [Deutsche Bank] had ‘breached
duties and contractual obligations to SHI, which resulted
in funds not being available to SHI from which it could
have minimized its losses.’ SHI also raised numerous
defenses to [Deutsche Bank’s] claim, including that
. . . Vik had SHI pay earlier margin calls under duress
and that SHI was not obligated to pay the amounts due
under the governing contracts because [Deutsche Bank]
breached those written contracts, as well as various
. . . oral agreements between the parties.’’
  ‘‘On November 8, 2013, the English court issued [a]
431 page [decision in which it found] in favor of [Deutsche
Bank] on its claims for damages and reject[ed] SHI’s
counterclaims. In an accompanying order, the English
court [rendered] judgment in favor of [Deutsche Bank]
and against SHI in the amount of $243,023,089, including
interest up to the time of judgment, plus postjudgment
interest and costs.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)
   On December 20, 2013, after SHI failed to pay the
English judgment, Deutsche Bank commenced the pres-
ent action against the defendants. In its complaint,
Deutsche Bank alleged, inter alia, that, ‘‘[t]hrough his
domination and control of SHI, Vik caused SHI to
breach its contractual obligations to Deutsche Bank
and to fraudulently convey funds to third parties for
the inequitable purpose of shielding SHI’s assets and
defrauding Deutsche Bank out of [money] owed.’’ The
two count complaint sought a declaratory judgment
piercing SHI’s corporate veil and holding Vik jointly
and severally liable with SHI for the English judgment.
It also sought to enforce the English judgment against
Vik under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Rec-
ognition Act, General Statutes § 50a-30 et seq.
   On November 7, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to
strike Deutsche Bank’s complaint, in which they argued
that the substantive law of TCI applied to Deutsche
Bank’s claims and that the allegations of the complaint
were insufficient to state a cause of action thereunder.
In response, Deutsche Bank argued that Connecticut’s
choice of law rules required the application of New
York or Connecticut law to its claims because they
were the jurisdictions with the most significant relation-
ship to the parties’ dispute. It also argued that, even if
TCI law applied, the allegations of the complaint were
sufficient to withstand a motion to strike. Although the
trial court, Genuario, J., agreed with the defendants
that TCI law applied to the parties’ dispute, it disagreed
that the complaint failed to state a claim thereunder
and, accordingly, denied the defendants’ motion to
strike. On the basis of the parties’ extensive briefing
on the subject, the court determined that TCI law is ‘‘a
mixture of English common law, some English statutes,
some local ordinances, as well as a number of interna-
tional treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party’’
and that ‘‘a corporate veil can be pierced [under TCI
law] only if there is some ‘impropriety and that such
impropriety [is] linked to the use of the [company’s]
structure to avoid or conceal liability.’ . . . [T]he plain-
tiff [must] show both control of the company by wrong-
doers and an impropriety that constitutes a misuse of
the company by them as a device or facade to conceal
their wrongdoing.’’5
   Thereafter, the defendants and Deutsche Bank ‘‘both
moved for summary judgment. In the defendants’
motion, they argued that res judicata barred the present
action because [Deutsche Bank’s] claim seeking to
pierce the corporate veil should have been raised in the
English action. [Deutsche Bank], by contrast, argued
in its motion that all questions of material fact with
respect to its veil piercing claim previously had been
decided by the English court and that Vik was collater-
ally estopped from denying that he is the ‘alter ego’ of
[SHI] and personally liable for the English judgment.
On October 22, 2015, by way of written memorandum
of decision, the trial court denied both . . . motions
for summary judgment.
   ‘‘With respect to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the [trial] court concluded that [Deutsche
Bank’s] veil piercing claim was not barred by the doc-
trine of res judicata because that claim was sufficiently
different in nature from the breach of contract claims
in the English action. With respect to [Deutsche Bank’s]
motion for summary judgment, the court concluded
that Vik was not collaterally estopped from denying
liability for [SHI’s] debt because the issue was not actu-
ally or necessarily decided in the English action.’’
Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., 174
Conn. App. 573, 578, 166 A.3d 716 (2017). The Appellate
Court thereafter affirmed the trial court’s rulings; id.,
592; and this court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed
the Appellate Court’s judgment. See Deutsche Bank AG
v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., 331 Conn. 379, 381, 204
A.3d 664 (2019).
   The case then proceeded to trial before the trial court,
Hon. Charles T. Lee, judge trial referee. The court heard
testimony from Vik, Vik’s wife, Carrie Vik, Johansson,
and two forensic accounting experts. The parties also
submitted hundreds of pages of testimony from more
than 20 witnesses and 450 exhibits. At the conclusion
of the trial, the court issued a comprehensive memoran-
dum of decision in which it rejected Deutsche Bank’s
claim that Vik should be held personally liable for the
English judgment. In reaching its determination, the
court accepted as the law of the case Judge Genuario’s
articulation of TCI law that, ‘‘in order to pierce a veil,
it is necessary that the plaintiff show both control of
the company by wrongdoers and an impropriety that
constitutes a misuse of the company by them as a device
or facade to conceal their wrongdoing.’’6 (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) To do this, the court explained,
the plaintiff must demonstrate three things: (1) domina-
tion and control of the corporation by the alleged
wrongdoer, (2) commingling of the corporation’s assets
with those of the wrongdoer or with entities controlled
by him, and (3) specific intent by the wrongdoer to
leave the corporation unable to pay its debts.
   Applying this standard to the evidence adduced at
trial, the trial court concluded that Deutsche Bank had
met the first two prongs of the test. The court found
that the evidence established unequivocally that ‘‘SHI
had no separate mind of its own’’ from Vik and that
‘‘Vik completely dominated and controlled’’ SHI. The
court also found that the evidence established that Vik
‘‘regularly used SHI funds for personal expenses and
pet projects’’ and ‘‘regularly transferred massive funds
between [SHI]’’ and his other companies ‘‘without any
formality at all, as if transferring money from one
pocket to another.’’ ‘‘In fairness’’ to Vik, however, the
court also found that Vik’s ‘‘companies normally con-
ducted internal transfers without documentation and
that this lack of record keeping was not a product of
stealth during the October transfers.’’
   With respect to the third prong—whether Vik acted
with the specific intent to leave SHI unable to pay its
debts to Deutsche Bank—the trial court concluded that
Deutsche Bank had failed to demonstrate that the Octo-
ber transfers constituted such an effort by Vik. To the
contrary, the court found that Vik had every intention
of paying the October margin calls and credibly believed
that SHI had sufficient funds in its Deutsche Bank
account to do so up until the moment that Deutsche
Bank informed Vik of its failure to accurately value
Said’s trades.
  The trial court determined that there was no evidence
that SHI was a ‘‘mere shell’’ or that it was ever used
by Vik ‘‘as a device or facade to conceal his alleged
wrongdoing.’’ The court found, rather, that, throughout
its eighteen year existence, SHI was a highly successful
corporation ‘‘through which . . . Vik conducted most
of his substantial business [dealings] . . . .’’ The court
further found that, ‘‘[a]lthough SHI failed to keep any
conventional business records, [Deutsche Bank] ha[d]
not shown that such failure contributed to its loss.’’
   Having had ‘‘ample opportunity to observe [Vik’s]
testimony and [to] evaluate his credibility,’’ the trial
court concluded that Vik never sought to avoid paying
SHI’s debt to Deutsche Bank and ‘‘credibly testified that
he had believed [that] his exposure to losses from . . .
Said’s derivative trading was limited to the initial $35
million collateral . . . (increased to $40 million on
October 6 [2008]).’’ The court further found that Vik’s
belief concerning his potential loss exposure, though
incorrect under the brokerage agreements that he had
signed, ‘‘was not a rationalization constructed after the
commencement of litigation’’ but, rather, a view Vik
‘‘consistently’’ expressed in emails and in meetings with
Deutsche Bank officials ‘‘throughout the summer and
fall of 2008.’’7
   The trial court also found that, during the week of
October 13, 2008, ‘‘Vik authorized the payment of $511
million to [Deutsche Bank] in five margin calls because
his lawyer told him [that] he owed the money. After
the fifth payment, [Vik] could reasonably have believed
that SHI still had as much as $280 million remaining in
[its Deutsche Bank] accounts.’’
    Because ‘‘the financial world was in an unparalleled
crisis [in October, 2008],’’ with many financial institu-
tions ‘‘on the brink of collapse,’’ the trial court found
that ‘‘the most credible explanation of the October
transfers [was] the simplest . . . Vik was trying to pre-
serve his wealth for the benefit of his family, primarily
by funding a trust with hundreds of millions of dollars.
. . . However, one salient fact stands out . . . . Vik
left more than $500 million in SHI’s accounts at
[Deutsche Bank]. In fact, he could have credibly
believed that he had retained as much as $780 million
in SHI’s accounts at [Deutsche Bank]. SHI used this
money to cover the first five margin calls during the
week of October 13. . . . [Deutsche Bank’s] con-
tention that . . . Vik drained SHI’s assets with the spe-
cific intent of rendering [SHI] unable to pay its margin
calls is undermined by this salient fact, which [Deutsche
Bank] chooses to ignore.’’ The court concluded that,
‘‘[i]f . . . Vik had specifically intended to prevent pay-
ment of SHI’s debts to [Deutsche Bank], he went about
it in a remarkably incompetent way, and . . . Vik did
not strike the court as financially incompetent.’’
   The trial court further found that ‘‘Vik had no reason
to think that the margin calls would exceed the nominal
$780 million remaining in SHI’s accounts at [Deutsche
Bank]. The defendants’ forensic accountant, Will Davies,
said that ‘[i]t took an army of quants’ to calculate the
final balance of . . . Said’s derivative trades and that
it was unlikely . . . Vik could have calculated it.’’ The
court concluded, therefore, that Deutsche Bank ‘‘[could
not] successfully contend that . . . Vik acted with spe-
cific intent to deprive it of funds when he initiated
the October transfers at a time when neither he nor
[Deutsche Bank] knew the extent of the losses that
were eventually calculated.’’
   The court determined that, ‘‘[u]ltimately . . . Vik’s
purpose in directing the October transfers [was] irrele-
vant to the decisive issue in this case, considering that
he actually reserved [more than one-half] billion dollars
to cover SHI’s unspecified debts to [Deutsche Bank],
if not as much as $780 million. This was not an unreason-
able action given what he knew at the time. . . . The
court [did] not find fraud or deceit or illicit conduct in
what . . . Vik did, i.e., distributing approximately $900
million of SHI’s assets when he credibly believed [that]
they totaled at least $1.65 billion and had no reason to
believe [that] the remainder of approximately $750 mil-
lion would be inadequate to cover any debt to [Deutsche
Bank]. . . . In fact, the $250 to $280 million [that] . . .
Vik had reason to believe would be left in [SHI’s Deutsche
Bank] accounts, after payment of the $511 million in
margin calls, compares favorably to the amount of $234
million found owing by the English court.’’ (Citations
omitted.) The court further observed that Deutsche Bank’s
‘‘extraordinary’’ ‘‘negligence and incompetence in cal-
culating and reporting the status of . . . Said’s trades’’
clearly ‘‘contributed to the harm it suffered.’’
    Finally, because the concept of piercing the corporate
veil is equitable in nature, the trial court made several
additional findings concerning the equities and con-
cluded that they favored Vik. In this regard, the trial
court observed that ‘‘[Deutsche Bank’s] contracts with
SHI did not contain a personal guarantee by . . . Vik,’’
a practice ‘‘so common’’ in the financial services indus-
try that many Deutsche Bank personnel ‘‘incorrectly
thought [that] there was one in place.’’ According to
the court, Deutsche Bank’s ‘‘effort to pierce SHI’s veil’’
was simply ‘‘an attempt to circumvent the lack of a
[personal] guarantee.’’ The court also emphasized that
all ‘‘transfers out of SHI’s [Deutsche Bank] accounts
. . . were handled by [Deutsche Bank] itself’’ and that,
‘‘[f]ar from draining all of SHI’s funds at [Deutsche
Bank] . . . Vik left available in SHI’s accounts at
[Deutsche Bank] at least $511 million and paid them
[upon] request.’’ The court concluded that, ‘‘[b]ut for
[Deutsche Bank’s] error in calculation . . . Vik [rea-
sonably] could . . . have believed that $250 million to
$280 million remained in SHI’s accounts at [Deutsche
Bank], even after paying the $511 million,’’ which
‘‘exceeded the amount of the ultimate shortfall.’’
Accordingly, the trial court denied Deutsche Bank’s
request for a declaratory judgment and rendered judg-
ment for the defendants.
   On appeal, Deutsche Bank claims that the trial court
erred in applying TCI law to its veil piercing claim. It
argues that, under Connecticut’s choice of law rules,
the trial court should have applied New York or Con-
necticut law because they are the jurisdictions with the
most significant relationship to the parties’ dispute. It
further argues that, had the trial court applied New York
or Connecticut law, it would have prevailed because
the trial court’s findings compel the conclusion that
SHI’s corporate veil should be pierced under either
state’s law. Alternatively, Deutsche Bank asserts that,
even if the trial court correctly determined that TCI
law applied, it ‘‘misinterpreted and misapplied the rele-
vant TCI legal standard’’ by requiring Deutsche Bank
to prove that, when Vik initiated the October transfers,
he acted with ‘‘specific intent’’ to deprive Deutsche
Bank of funds. Deutsche Bank argues that, under TCI
law, it was not required to prove that Vik acted with
the heightened standard of specific intent, which is a
criminal law standard, only that Vik ‘‘intended to move
the funds out of [Deutsche Bank’s] reach.’’ Finally,
Deutsche Bank argues that the trial court improperly
admitted Vik’s testimony that the October transfers
were executed for estate planning purposes, in contra-
vention of an earlier ruling granting Deutsche Bank’s
motion in limine to exclude testimony that the transfers
were made in furtherance of preexisting estate planning
goals. Deutsche Bank contends that this error was ‘‘not
only . . . prejudicial but likely . . . outcome determi-
native given the trial court’s prominent citation to . . .
the testimony in its finding that [Deutsche Bank had]
failed to meet its burden of proof . . . .’’
   The defendants respond, inter alia, that this court
need not decide whether New York or Connecticut law
applies to Deutsche Bank’s claim because the trial
court’s determination that Vik did nothing wrong
defeats the claim no matter which jurisdiction’s law
applies, including the law of TCI. The defendants further
contend that Vik’s testimony that some of the October
transfers were executed for estate planning purposes
did not violate the trial court’s ruling on Deutsche
Bank’s motion in limine, but, even if it did, the error
was harmless.
                            I
  We begin with Deutsche Bank’s claim that the trial
court erred in applying TCI law and that, had it applied
New York or Connecticut law, Deutsche Bank would
have prevailed. We also address Deutsche Bank’s claim
that, even if TCI law applies, the trial court incorrectly
interpreted it as requiring Deutsche Bank to prove that
Vik acted with specific intent and that, had the trial
court applied the correct standard under TCI law,
Deutsche Bank would have prevailed. We disagree with
both claims.
   ‘‘Whether the circumstances of a particular case jus-
tify the piercing of the corporate veil presents a question
of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Naples v.
Keystone Building & Development Corp., 295 Conn.
214, 234, 990 A.2d 326 (2010). Accordingly, we review
the trial court’s decision whether to pierce SHI’s corpo-
rate veil under the clearly erroneous standard of review.
See id. ‘‘A court’s determination is clearly erroneous
only in cases in which the record contains no evidence
to support it, or in cases in which there is evidence,
but the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Levine v. Sterling, 300 Conn.
521, 535, 16 A.3d 664 (2011).
   Under New York law, ‘‘[t]he party seeking to pierce
the corporate veil bears the heavy burden of showing
that: (1) the owners exercised complete domination of
the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked;
and (2) that such domination was used to commit a
fraud or wrong against the plaintiff [that] resulted in
[the] plaintiff’s injury . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Skanska USA Building,
Inc. v. Atlantic Yards B2 Owner, LLC, 146 App. Div.
3d 1, 12, 40 N.Y.S.3d 46 (2016), aff’d, 31 N.Y.3d 1002,
98 N.E.3d 720, 74 N.Y.S.3d 805 (2018). ‘‘[Although] com-
plete domination of the corporation is the key to pierc-
ing the corporate veil, especially when the owners use
the corporation as a mere device to further their per-
sonal rather than the corporate business . . . such
domination, standing alone, is not enough; some show-
ing of a wrongful or unjust act toward [the] plaintiff is
required . . . .’’(Citations omitted.) In re Morris v.
New York State Dept. of Taxation & Finance, 82 N.Y.2d
135, 141–42, 623 N.E.2d 1157, 603 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1993).
   In Connecticut, courts recognize two theories under
which the corporate veil may be pierced, namely, the
instrumentality rule and the identity rule.8 See, e.g.,
Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Construction & Paving,
Inc., 187 Conn. 544, 552–54, 447 A.2d 406 (1982). Under
either rule, ‘‘veil piercing is not lightly imposed. [C]orpo-
rate veils exist for a reason and should be pierced only
reluctantly and cautiously. The law permits the incorpo-
ration of businesses for the very purpose of isolating
liabilities among separate entities. . . . Accordingly,
the corporate veil is pierced only under exceptional
circumstances, for example, [when] the corporation is
a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose, and used
primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or [to]
promote injustice.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Commissioner of Environmental
Protection v. State Five Industrial Park, Inc., 304 Conn.
128, 139, 37 A.3d 724 (2012). ‘‘The improper use of the
corporate form is the key to the inquiry, as [i]t is true
that courts will disregard legal fictions, including that
of a separate corporate entity, when they are used for
fraudulent or illegal purposes. Unless something of the
kind is proven, however, to do so is to act in opposition
to the public policy of the state as expressed in legisla-
tion concerning the formation and regulation of corpo-
rations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Naples v.
Keystone Building & Development Corp., supra, 295
Conn. 233–34; see also DeMartino v. Monroe Little
League, Inc., 192 Conn. 271, 275, 471 A.2d 638 (1984)
(‘‘[w]hen the statutory privilege of doing business in the
corporate form is employed as a cloak for the evasion
of obligations, as a mask behind which to do injustice,
or invoked to subvert equity, the separate personality of
the corporation will be disregarded’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
   Finally, under TCI law, the party seeking to pierce
the corporate veil ‘‘[must] show both control of the
company by wrongdoers and an impropriety that consti-
tutes a misuse of the company by them as a device or
facade to conceal their wrongdoing. . . . [A] company
can be a facade even though it was not originally incor-
porated with any deceptive intent. . . . [T]he question
is whether it is being used as a facade at the time of a
relevant transaction. If so, the court may pierce the veil
only so far as it is necessary to provide a remedy for the
particular wrong [that] those controlling the company
have done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche
Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., supra, 174 Conn.
App. 584.
    We conclude that the trial court’s factual findings
foreclose Deutsche Bank’s claim under New York, Con-
necticut, and TCI law, and, therefore, any error in the
trial court’s choice of law analysis or application of TCI
law was harmless. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 328 Conn.
444, 529, 180 A.3d 882 (2018) (‘‘[b]ecause we conclude
that the defendant cannot prevail under either standard,
it is not necessary for us to resolve which one applies’’).
Although the law on veil piercing is not coextensive in
Connecticut, New York, and TCI, in all three jurisdic-
tions, it is an extraordinary remedy that requires, at a
minimum, a determination by the court that the corpo-
rate form was used to promote a wrong or injustice,
and that a fundamental unfairness would result from a
failure to disregard the corporate form. See 1 Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations (2022) § 41.25
(‘‘Because the corporate veil piercing doctrine is one
of equity, [when] no fraud is shown, a plaintiff must
show that an inequitable result involving fundamental
unfairness would result from a failure to disregard the
corporate form. In other words, although corporate
existence can be disregarded without a specific show-
ing of fraud, it is necessary to show that an injustice
would result if the corporate form were left intact.’’
(Footnotes omitted.)). In none of the jurisdictions is it
sufficient only to show that the defendant exercised
complete domination and control over the corporation
or commingled assets. See, e.g., Naples v. Keystone
Building & Development Corp., supra, 295 Conn. 237.
The party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must also
show that the corporate form was ‘‘a mere shell . . .
used primarily as an intermediary to perpetrate fraud
or [to] promote injustice.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id.
    In the present case, the trial court unequivocally
absolved Vik of any wrongdoing vis-à-vis SHI’s business
dealings with Deutsche Bank and rejected Deutsche
Bank’s assertion that there was anything fundamentally
unfair about leaving SHI’s corporate veil intact. Indeed,
the trial court found that ‘‘the balance of equities’’
favored Vik and that Deutsche Bank’s effort to pierce
SHI’s veil was simply an attempt to ‘‘circumvent’’ the
‘‘extraordinary’’ ‘‘negligence and incompetence’’ Deutsche
Bank exhibited in not obtaining a personal guarantee
from Vik and in failing to accurately record and value
Said’s trades. See, e.g., Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor
Construction & Paving, Inc., supra, 187 Conn. 560–61
(‘‘[T]his court does not and cannot rescue a party from
its own unfavorable or unwise business dealings. A hard
bargain is not enough to energize the equitable power
to disregard the corporate form.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)). Deutsche Bank does not address these
specific equitable findings in its appellate brief, but they
are fatal to its claim under New York, Connecticut, and
TCI law unless it can demonstrate that they are clearly
erroneous. Having undertaken a thorough review of the
record, we conclude that Deutsche Bank has not met
its heavy burden.9
   The trial court reasonably found, and the record sup-
ports, that SHI was never a mere shell or a device used
by Vik to conceal wrongdoing or to evade liability. The
trial court also found that Vik had every intention of
paying the October margin calls, as evidenced by,
among other things, the $780 million that he left—or
reasonably thought he had left—in SHI’s accounts at
Deutsche Bank after initiating the October transfers,
and the genuine ‘‘shock’’ he exhibited on October 22,
2008, upon learning of the shortfall in the accounts.
There was also ample evidence supporting the trial
court’s finding that $780 million was not an unreason-
able amount for Vik to leave in the accounts given what
he knew at the time about SHI’s potential loss exposure,
which, even in the worst case scenario described in
Said’s emails, would not have exceeded $780 million
and, in fact, did not exceed that amount. The record
also supports the trial court’s findings that Deutsche
Bank’s losses were largely the result of its own negli-
gence and incompetence in agreeing to provide back-
office services for Said’s trading when it did not under-
stand and could not accurately value the trades. Any
losses incurred by Deutsche Bank are the direct result
of its failure over a two year period to accurately value
and margin Said’s account. Accordingly, Deutsche Bank
cannot prevail on its claim that the results of the trial
would have been different if the trial court had applied
New York or Connecticut law, or if it had correctly
applied TCI law.10
                              II
   We next address Deutsche Bank’s claim that the trial
court improperly admitted Vik’s testimony that some of
the October transfers were executed for estate planning
purposes. Deutsche Bank argues that, ‘‘[a]t trial, there
was no evidence other than Vik’s uncorroborated testi-
mony that he in fact had an estate plan, and the details
and purpose of any such plan were never disclosed.’’
Deutsche Bank contends that the admission of this testi-
mony violated an earlier ruling by the trial court grant-
ing its motion in limine to exclude the testimony on
the basis of Vik’s refusal to turn over documents related
to his estate planning, which Vik claimed were pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. Deutsche Bank
argues that ‘‘Vik placed any privileged communications
concerning his purported estate planning justification
for [the] asset transfers at issue by claiming that they
proved his innocent intent’’ and that the trial court’s
admission of Vik’s estate planning testimony ‘‘ran afoul
of the ‘at issue’ or ‘implied’ waiver [exception]’’ set forth
in Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP,
305 Conn. 750, 780–81, 48 A.3d 16 (2012). The defen-
dants disagree that Vik’s testimony was inconsistent
with the trial court’s ruling on Deutsche Bank’s motion
in limine or that it implicates the ‘‘at issue’’ or ‘‘implied’’
waiver exception. We agree with the defendants.
  The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. On October 31,
2014, Deutsche Bank filed a discovery request for pro-
duction of all documents concerning the estate planning
that Vik had described in his testimony in the English
action, ‘‘including but not limited to correspondence with,
documents received from, or documents sent to [his]
advisors [at] Cummings & Lockwood, LLC, in Connecti-
cut or Withers [LLP] in London . . . .’’ Vik objected to
the request on various grounds, including that it was
overly broad, unduly burdensome, and sought ‘‘docu-
ments and information protected by the attorney-client
privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine.’’
   At a May 1, 2015 discovery conference before Judge
Genuario, the parties discussed Vik’s objection to
Deutsche Bank’s discovery request and Carrie Vik’s
motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum seeking the
same discovery. Judge Genuario observed that the motion
to quash presented ‘‘an interesting issue because, gener-
ally, in a fraudulent conveyance action or a piercing a
corporate veil action, the issue of estate planning is
usually raised by the defendant to say, this was not
conduct that is consistent with piercing the corporate
veil; this was good faith estate planning. . . . I would
be inclined to sustain an objection to documents con-
cerning the Viks’ estate planning, particularly, insofar
as it is addressed to . . . Carrie Vik. However, if that
objection is pressed and I sustain [it], then I don’t expect
to hear from Carrie Vik on the [witness] stand that we
did this because of estate planning because that would
deprive [Deutsche Bank] of material that might be use-
ful in cross-examination of Carrie Vik. So, those are my
preliminary thoughts.’’
   The defendants’ counsel, Richard M. Zaroff, responded
that the court was getting ahead of itself and that it
was too early for him to know if he would interpose
any such objection. Zaroff observed that the requested
documents were voluminous, extremely sensitive, and
may not even be relevant if the defendants prevailed
on their claim regarding the correct legal standard to
apply under TCI law. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
Zaroff further argued that there were alternatives to
turning the documents over to Deutsche Bank. He sug-
gested, for example, that the court could conduct an
in camera review of the documents to ascertain whether
they supported Vik’s testimony concerning the timing
of his decision to set up a family trust. Mark R. Carta,
counsel for Carrie Vik, then sought to clarify for the
record that the documents in question were ‘‘attorney-
client and spousal immunity privileged materials . . .
on [their] face.’’ Judge Genuario responded that this
was ‘‘one of the reasons why [he was] inclined to sustain
the objection.’’ He added, however, that, ‘‘if Carrie Vik
objects to disclosing these documents because they’re
privileged and then wants to come in and . . . say,
look, this document shows this was legitimate estate
planning, I think [Deutsche Bank] may or may not have
a legitimate objection to that testimony, which I might
[be] inclined to sustain. Now, those aren’t rulings. I’m
[just] putting everybody [on] notice, if you will.’’ There-
after, in a written order, Judge Genuario sustained Vik’s
objection to Deutsche Bank’s request for production of
the estate planning documents on the grounds that the
request was ‘‘overly broad and unduly burdensome
. . . .’’ He did so, however, ‘‘without prejudice to
[Deutsche Bank’s] right to refile a narrower request.’’
   On October 22, 2019, shortly before the start of trial,
Deutsche Bank filed a motion in limine to preclude
evidence or arguments ‘‘supporting a claim that certain
[October] transfers . . . were undertaken for the pur-
pose of . . . Vik’s estate planning.’’ The trial court, Lee,
J., granted the motion but only insofar as it sought
to preclude the admission of attorney-client privileged
documents that Vik had refused to turn over during
discovery. Specifically, Judge Lee ruled: ‘‘[Deutsche
Bank’s] motion in limine . . . seeks to preclude the
defendants from offering testimony that . . . Vik’s
transfers in October, 2008, were made for estate plan-
ning purposes, when . . . Vik invoked the attorney-
client privilege at [his] deposition as to what estate
advice he received. . . . Vik identified the law firm and
lawyer with whom he consulted, but [Deutsche Bank]
did not seek [third-party] discovery from that lawyer.
However, it submitted relevant document requests to
. . . Vik, to which he objected and sought a protective
order. [Deutsche Bank] also served a subpoena duces
tecum on [Carrie] Vik, to which she [responded by fil-
ing] a motion to quash. Judge Genuario indicated that
he was inclined to grant the motion to quash but cau-
tioned . . . the defendants [against] subsequently
seeking to introduce evidence they had claimed was
privileged . . . . Now, the defendants are not seeking
to introduce protected documents. They are seeking to
repeat testimony previously given in [Vik’s] deposition
[that the October transfers were undertaken, in part,
for estate planning purposes]. The court will not, a
priori, exclude such testimony, but it will consider the
strength of corroborating evidence in assessing its cred-
ibility.’’ (Emphasis added.)
   During the trial, in response to questioning by Deutsche
Bank’s counsel, Vik testified that, as of October 7, 2008,
‘‘there was . . . basically [one] billion dollars worth of
cash equivalence [in SHI’s accounts] at [Deutsche Bank],
actually even more. And, so, at that point, we just said,
okay, we are going to pay out various amounts to vari-
ous parties. We . . . also had this estate planning pro-
cess going where we were going to create a trust, and
we were going to move Beatrice into that trust. And, so,
we wanted to have more free assets in that company.’’
Thereafter, Judge Lee asked Vik when he decided to
set up the trust. When Vik responded that the process
began on May 7, 2008, Judge Lee asked him how he
remembered that date. Vik replied, ‘‘[b]ecause I’ve seen
an email . . . for the lawyer . . . .’’ Judge Lee then ask,
‘‘so you have something from May, which shows you
. . . decide[d] . . . [to] look into it?’’ Vik responded,
‘‘[w]e had been working for some time on how to do
estate planning. And then, this was Cummings & Lock-
wood, [LLC]. . . . They . . . [then] sent us to Withers
[LLP] in London to organize the trust.’’ Judge Lee
replied, ‘‘[o]kay, all right, yeah, I mean, it takes time to
put these things together.’’
   When Judge Lee finished questioning Vik, Deutsche
Bank’s counsel moved to strike Vik’s testimony ‘‘con-
cerning the estate planning basis for any of [the trans-
fers], based on the withholding of documents.’’ He
argued that Judge Genuario had ‘‘warned’’ the defen-
dants in 2015 that he did not want to see them ‘‘coming
in here [at trial] talking about estate planning.’’ Although
he acknowledged that he may be ‘‘overstating’’ Judge
Genuario’s warning, he argued that ‘‘it was [the] subject
of an in limine motion [that Judge Genuario granted].’’
Judge Lee responded that it was he who had ruled on the
motion in limine and that he did not recall precluding
questions about the timing of when Vik decided to set up
a trust, only substantive attorney-client conversations
involving ‘‘legal advice . . . .’’ Judge Lee advised
Deutsche Bank’s counsel to look at the ruling and, if it
turned out that his recollection of it was incorrect, he
should ‘‘feel free’’ to move to strike the testimony. No
such motion was ever made. With this background in
mind, we turn to Deutsche Bank’s evidentiary claim.
   The applicable standard of review is well established.
‘‘The trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence
is entitled to great deference. . . . The trial court’s rul-
ing on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon
a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.
. . . We will make every reasonable presumption in
favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset
it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . Moreover,
evidentiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only
[when] there was an abuse of discretion and a showing
. . . of substantial prejudice or injustice.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tony M., 332 Conn.
810, 831, 213 A.3d 1128 (2019).
   Contrary to Deutsche Bank’s assertion, it is apparent
from the record that the trial court’s ruling on Deutsche
Bank’s motion in limine did not preclude Vik from testi-
fying as to the timing of his decision to set up a family
trust; nor did it preclude him from testifying that some
of the October transfers were made for the purpose
of funding the trust. The ruling precluded Vik from
introducing documentary evidence that he previously
had claimed was privileged to bolster his testimony.
Nothing that occurred at trial contravened the strictures
established by the trial court’s ruling because no privi-
leged documents were introduced by the defendants to
establish or corroborate any factual claims regarding
estate planning. In direct response to a question from
the court about when the decision was made to set up
the trust, Vik noted that he had seen an email to his
lawyers indicating that the process began on May 7,
2008. The email was not offered into evidence, and
Deutsche Bank’s counsel made no request to view it
after hearing Vik’s testimony. See Conn. Code Evid. § 6-
9.11 We see no violation of any court order on this record.
   Equally unavailing is Deutsche Bank’s assertion that
the admission of Vik’s testimony implicates the at issue
or implied waiver exception. Deutsche Bank contends
that the ‘‘[d]efendants . . . were able to rely [on] Vik’s
testimony that he made transfers on [the] advice of
counsel for estate planning purposes, while success-
fully resisting disclosure of the legal advice on which
Vik purportedly relied.’’ We previously have explained
that ‘‘the at issue, or implied waiver, exception is
invoked . . . when . . . a party specifically pleads
reliance on an attorney’s advice as an element of a
claim or defense, voluntarily testifies regarding portions
of the attorney-client communication, or specifically
places at issue, in some other manner, the attorney-
client relationship. In those instances, the party has
waived the right to confidentiality by placing the con-
tent of the attorney’s advice directly at issue because
the issue cannot be determined without an examination
of that advice. If the information is actually required
for a truthful resolution of the issue . . . the party must
either waive the attorney-client privilege as to that infor-
mation or it should be prevented from using the privi-
leged information to establish the elements of the case.’’
(Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52–53, 730 A.2d
51 (1999). However, ‘‘[m]erely because the communica-
tions are relevant does not place them at issue.’’ Id.,
54. ‘‘[T]he attorney-client privilege, like all other eviden-
tiary privileges, may obstruct a party’s access to the
truth. Although it may be inequitable that information
contained in privileged materials is available to only
one side in a dispute, a determination that communica-
tions or materials are privileged is simply a choice to
protect the communication and relationship against claims
of competing interests. Any inequity in terms of access
to information is the price [that it paid] to maintain the
integrity of the privilege. An unavailability exception
is, therefore, inconsistent with the nature and purpose
of the privilege.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hutchinson v. Farm Family Casualty
Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 33, 40 n.3, 867 A.2d 1 (2005).
   In the present case, Vik did not testify that ‘‘he made
transfers on [the] advice of counsel for estate planning
purposes,’’ as Deutsche Bank asserts. Indeed, Vik places
no reliance whatsoever on the substance or correctness
of any legal advice; at most, he relies on the timing of
the estate planning to establish that it predated, by
months, the events of October, 2008, and, therefore,
was not a pretextual, after-the-fact rationalization used
to justify improper conduct. He testified that, as of
October 7, 2008, SHI’s accounts at Deutsche Bank held
more than $1 billion in cash, that he decided ‘‘to pay
out various amounts to various parties,’’ and that they
‘‘had this estate planning process going where [they]
were going to create a trust and . . . move Beatrice
into that trust . . . so [they] wanted to have more free
assets in that company.’’ When the trial court inter-
rupted Vik to ask when he decided to set up the trust,
Vik responded, ‘‘May 7, 2008,’’ at which point the court
asked him how he was able to recall the date. Vik
responded that he saw an email to one of his attorneys.
Deutsche Bank’s assertion that Vik testified ‘‘that he
made transfers on [the] advice of counsel’’ is inaccurate
and appears to represent an effort by Deutsche Bank
to bring this case within the purview of the at issue or
implied waiver exception, which is not implicated on
this record.
  Finally, we note that the trial court sustained Vik’s
objection to Deutsche Bank’s request for production
on the grounds that the request was ‘‘overly broad and
unduly burdensome . . . .’’ The court’s ruling stated
that Deutsche Bank should refile a narrower request,
but it never did so. A revised request targeted at estab-
lishing the timing of the estate planning would have
accomplished Deutsche Bank’s central objective while
largely or entirely avoiding the privilege issues impli-
cated by the broader request.12 Even when Vik men-
tioned the May 7, 2008 email during his testimony at
trial, Deutsche Bank did not ask to see that email or
request an in camera review of it. See Conn. Code Evid.
§ 6-9. Instead, Deutsche Bank’s counsel moved to strike
Vik’s estate planning testimony in its entirety on the
ground that it violated the court’s earlier ruling on
Deutsche Bank’s motion in limine, which counsel incor-
rectly argued precluded Vik from testifying that some
of the October transfers were undertaken for the pur-
pose of funding a family trust. At that time, the trial
court directed Deutsche Bank’s counsel to review the
court’s ruling on the motion in limine and to renew
the motion to strike if the testimony was in any way
inconsistent with it, which counsel never did. On the
basis of the record before us, we cannot conclude that
the trial court erred in allowing Vik to testify as he
did. Ultimately, the trial court was free to believe or
disbelieve Vik’s testimony concerning the timing of his
decision to set up a trust, just as Deutsche Bank was
free to argue that the trial court should not believe his
testimony in the absence of corroborating evidence.13
In light of the foregoing, Deutsche Bank cannot prevail
on its claim that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing Vik’s testimony, either because it was pre-
cluded by the court’s ruling on Deutsche Bank’s motion
in limine or because it ran afoul of the at issue or implied
waiver exception.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
      The English judgment was rendered by the Queen’s Bench Division of
the High Court of Justice of England and Wales in an action brought by
Deutsche Bank against SHI that resulted in a $243,023,089 judgment, plus
interest, against SHI. Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., 174
Conn. App. 573, 576–77, 166 A.3d 716 (2017), aff’d, 331 Conn. 379, 204 A.3d
664 (2019).
    2
      Deutsche Bank appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate
Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
    3
      The October transfers consist of the following transactions. On October
8, 2008, Vik transferred a certified deposit worth approximately $160 million
from SHI’s DnB account to VBI. On October 9, he directed Brugelmann to
transfer 9 million shares of Confirmit AS (Confirmit) stock from SHI’s
Deutsche Bank accounts to an SHI account at DnB that held additional
Confirmit shares. Also on October 9, Vik directed an assistant to initiate
the transfer of 1.5 billion Norweigan kroner (approximately $240 million)
from SHI’s Deutsche Bank accounts to SHI’s HSBC account. On October
12, Vik emailed Carin Thoren, his assistant in Monaco, instructing her to
‘‘ ‘draft first thing wires request to send money’ ’’ from SHI’s Deutsche Bank
accounts to the following recipients: $10 million to a Uruguayan law firm;
$10 million to Vik-Millahue Agricola y Viñedos Ltda., an entity associated
with a Chilean vineyard that Vik owned; $10 million to an SHI account at
JPMorgan; and approximately $6.8 million to Vik’s personal account at
Barclays Bank. On October 13, Vik transferred approximately $236 million
in fiduciary deposits from SHI’s HSBC account to Beatrice’s HSBC account
and approximately $230 million in Norwegian treasury bills from SHI’s HSBC
account to Beatrice’s HSBC account. On October 14, Vik transferred $20
million from SHI’s Deutsche Bank accounts to the HSBC account of Vik
Beteiligung und Verwaltung GmbH, a company in which Vik held a 50 percent
ownership interest. On October 15, Vik directed the transfer of all Confirmit
shares from SHI’s account at DnB to his personal account at DnB. On
October 22, Vik transferred $2 million from SHI’s Merrill Lynch account to
XCelera, a communications company that he owned. On October 30, Vik
transferred to the CSCSNE Trust, a revocable inter vivos trust created for
the benefit of his children, his ownership interest in Beatrice, whose assets
included the Confirmit shares and $699 million of funds he had transferred
from various SHI accounts earlier in the month.
   4
     At trial, the defendants’ forensic economist explained the ignored pay-
ments error as follows: ‘‘ ‘[T]he risk system, called DBAGX, was not reconcil-
ing properly with [the cash reporting] system. So, monies were being liqui-
dated . . . from . . . a futures account, but money wasn’t taken out in the
DBAGX system . . . . So, the cash, as [far as] the margining team could
see, was overstated against what the actual correct figure was.’ ’’
   5
     At trial, the parties agreed that English law applied to Deutsche Bank’s
veil piercing claim under TCI law.
   6
     Prior to trial, in various motions and memoranda of law, the defendants
argued that Judge Genuario’s articulation of TCI law was not an accurate
statement of the law and should not be applied. The defendants argued that
more recent English case law ‘‘strongly disfavors veil piercing . . . and
recognizes only one method to pierce the corporate veil, the so-called ‘eva-
sion’ principle. That formulation requires that [Deutsche Bank] prove that
. . . Vik interposed a corporation to defeat a preexisting, personal legal
obligation, which the parties agree[d] [Deutsche Bank could not do] because
[its] agreements were always with SHI and not . . . Vik.’’ The trial court
was not persuaded, concluding that, because the legal standard articulated
by Judge Genuario was cited with approval in the Appellate Court’s decision
affirming the trial court’s denial of the parties’ motions for summary judg-
ment; see Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., supra, 174 Conn.
App. 584; it constituted the law of the case. The trial court further concluded
that, even if ‘‘an appellate court were to disagree that Judge Genuario’s
formulation should be considered the law of the case . . . the outcome of
this case would not change’’ because, under English law, the evasion princi-
ple on which the defendants relied applies only to reverse veil piercing
claims, and the present case did not involve such a claim.
   7
     Deutsche Bank argues that the trial court’s finding that Vik credibly
believed that SHI’s exposure was limited to $35 million violated an earlier
order by the trial court giving preclusive effect to the ‘‘holdings in paragraph
1426 (i)–(viii) of the English judgment . . . to the extent that they relate
to identical issues in this case.’’ We have read paragraph 1426 of the English
judgment, which addresses SHI’s counterclaims in the English action. We
disagree that it precluded the trial court’s finding regarding Vik’s belief
concerning the $35 million. Of relevance here is the English court’s holding
in subparagraph (vii) that, in October, 2008, Said and Vik were aware of
Deutsche Bank’s inability to accurately value Said’s trades, and, therefore,
Vik could not claim to have been ‘‘deceived’’ by Deutsche Bank’s failure to
disclose this information to him. Deutsche Bank does not explain how Vik’s
awareness of its inability to accurately value and to margin Said’s portfolio
is preclusive of the issue of whether Vik genuinely, albeit mistakenly,
believed that SHI’s risk exposure was limited to $35 million.
   8
     ‘‘The instrumentality rule requires, in any case but an express agency,
proof of three elements: (1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock
control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or
existence of its own; (2) that such control must have been used by the
defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory
or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention
of [the] plaintiff’s legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and breach
of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
. . . The identity rule, on the other hand, has been expressed as follows:
If [the] plaintiff can show that there was such a unity of interest and owner-
ship that the independence of the corporation had in effect ceased or had
never begun, an adherence to the fiction of separate identity would serve
only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the economic entity to escape
liability arising out of an operation conducted by one corporation for the
benefit of the whole enterprise.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Saphir v. Neustadt, 177 Conn. 191, 210, 413
A.2d 843 (1979).
   9
     In arguing to the contrary, Deutsche Bank asserts that the trial court
should have drawn different inferences from the evidence or not credited
certain aspects of Vik’s testimony. It points to what it believes are internal
inconsistences in the trial court’s decision. For example, it argues that the
trial court’s finding that the October transfers were not intended to render
SHI unable to pay the October margin calls conflicts with the court’s rejection
of certain of Vik’s explanations for some of the transfers, which the trial
court concluded were post hoc justifications constructed in anticipation of
litigation. Deutsche Bank also contends that the trial court’s finding that
‘‘the most credible explanation of the October transfers is [that] . . . Vik
was trying to preserve his wealth for the benefit of his family, primarily by
funding a trust with hundreds of millions of dollars,’’ is antithetical to its
finding that the October transfers were not undertaken to avoid payment
of the October margin calls. We are not persuaded by these or Deutsche
Bank’s other arguments, all of which mischaracterize and/or take out of
context the trial court’s findings and ignore the applicable legal principles,
including the standard of review. They also rest on a theory of the case that
the trial court rejected, namely, that Vik knew the full extent of SHI’s loss
exposure by early October, 2008, and immediately began to execute the
October transfers to render SHI unable to satisfy its debt to Deutsche Bank.
Deutsche Bank contends that it should have been obvious to the trial court
that Vik’s payment of the first $511 million in margin calls was simply the
result of his inability to execute the October transfers fast enough, not
evidence of his intent to pay the margin calls, as Vik claimed. Deutsche
Bank’s contention is unavailing. It is axiomatic that this court will not
substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial court. ‘‘[The trial]
court, as the trier of fact and thus the sole arbiter of credibility, was free
to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either
party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Remillard v. Remillard, 297
Conn. 345, 357, 999 A.2d 713 (2010). ‘‘Questions of whether to believe or to
disbelieve a competent witness are beyond our review.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Frank v. Dept. of Children & Families, 312 Conn. 393, 412,
94 A.3d 588 (2014).
   10
      As previously indicated in this opinion, Deutsche Bank argues that, even
if the trial court correctly determined that TCI law applied, it incorrectly
required Deutsche Bank to prove that, when Vik initiated the October trans-
fers, he knew the extent of Said’s trading losses and ‘‘acted with specific
intent’’ to deprive Deutsche Bank of the funds to cover them. Deutsche
Bank contends that, under TCI law, it needed to prove only that ‘‘Vik intended
to move the funds out of [its] reach.’’ Even if the specific intent standard
applied by the trial court was incorrect, it is clear from the court’s memoran-
dum of decision that the result of the trial would have been the same.
   11
      Section 6-9 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘(a) While
Testifying. Any object or writing may be used by a witness to refresh the
witness’ memory while testifying. If, while a witness is testifying, an object
or writing is used by the witness to refresh the witness’ memory, any party
may inspect the object or writing and cross-examine the witness on it. Any
party may introduce the object or writing in evidence if it is otherwise
admissible under the Code.
   ‘‘(b) Before Testifying. If a witness, before testifying, uses an object or
writing to refresh the witness’ memory for the purpose of testifying, the
object or writing need not be produced for inspection unless the court, in
its discretion, so orders. Any party may introduce the object or writing in
evidence if it is otherwise admissible under the Code.
   12
      Deutsche Bank argues in its appellate brief: ‘‘At trial, there was no
evidence other than Vik’s uncorroborated testimony that he in fact had
an estate plan, and the details and purpose of any such plan were never
disclosed.’’
   13
      Deutsche Bank further argues that the trial court’s reliance on Vik’s
estate planning testimony failed to comply with the court’s ruling on the
motion in limine because there was no evidence corroborating the testimony,
and the ruling stated that the court would ‘‘consider the strength of corrobo-
rating evidence in assessing [the] credibility [of Vik’s testimony].’’ We have no
reason to believe that the court did not consider the strength of corroborating
evidence in assessing Vik’s testimony, as the court indicated it would do.
We also disagree that there was no corroborating evidence. The CSCSNE
Trust documents themselves were in evidence. The court reasonably could
have inferred from them that a trust of its size and complexity could not
have been conceived and executed in the span of three weeks but, rather,
as the trial court stated, that it ‘‘takes time to put . . . together.’’ It is also
clear from the court’s memorandum of decision that it found Vik to be a
credible witness. The court was ultimately persuaded that there was ‘‘[no]
fraud or deceit or illicit conduct [of any kind] in what . . . Vik did, i.e.,
distributing approximately $900 million of SHI’s assets when he credibly
believed [that] they totaled at least $1.65 billion and had no reason to believe
[that] the remainder of approximately $750 million would be inadequate to
cover any debt to [Deutsche Bank].’’