Court Opinion

ID: 9411174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 21:02:16.148428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:05.107807
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10554   Document: 27-1    Date Filed: 07/25/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-10554
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       RICHARD R. FINCH,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       EMI CONSORTIUM SONGS, INC.,
       a New York corporation,
       d.b.a. EMI Longitude Music,

                                                          Defendant,

       HARRY WAYNE CASEY,
       an individual,
       HARRICK MUSIC, INC.,
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       2                        Opinion of the Court               23-10554

       a Florida corporation,

                                                     Defendants-Appellees,

       MATTHEW NELLES, et al.,

                                                              Respondents.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-20144-DPG
                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              There’s a lot of history in this case, but only a small part of
       it matters. In 1983, Richard Finch transferred his copyright and
       royalty rights to bandmate Harry Casey. Some legal back-and-
       forth occurred in the interim, but we’ll jump ahead. In 2015, Casey
       sent Finch a letter asserting that Finch was never an “author” under
       the terms of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 203, and thus didn’t
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       23-10554                  Opinion of the Court                               3

       retain any termination rights. 1 Four years later, in 2019, Finch sent
       Casey a notice of termination under § 203.
              This litigation began in 2022, when Finch filed suit against
       Casey and others requesting declaratory judgment that his § 203
       termination rights were valid. Casey asserted multiple defenses in
       response, including that Finch’s claim was barred by the copyright
       law’s three-year statute of limitations. See id. § 507(b) (copyright
       claims must be “commenced within three years after the claim ac-
       crued.”).
               The district court granted summary judgment for Casey on
       the ground that Finch’s claims were time-barred. 2 Copyright-
       based claims that turn on ownership or authorship accrue on the
       date that the “plaintiff learns, or should as a reasonable person have
       learned, that the defendant was violating his ownership rights.”
       See, e.g., Webster v. Dean Guitars, 955 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir.
       2020). An express assertion of sole authorship or ownership—like
       Casey’s letter—triggers the accrual of an ownership claim. Id. at
       1276–77. Accordingly, the district court held, the clock began to

       1 Finch allegedly also sent a termination letter to Casey in 2012.The parties
       dispute whether Casey ever received the letter, but that doesn’t matter for
       purposes of this appeal. The relevant events begin with the 2015 letter.
       2 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing

       the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
       to the nonmoving party.” Salinero v. Johnson & Johnson, 995 F.3d 959, 964 (11th
       Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10554

       run on Finch’s § 203 claim when Casey expressly repudiated
       Finch’s authorship in May 2015.
              Notwithstanding the district court’s straightforward ruling,
       Finch raises one narrow issue on appeal: whether Casey could raise
       the statute of limitations as a defense at all. To be clear, Finch
       doesn’t challenge the statute of limitations’ application; rather, he
       challenges the availability of the defense. Finch attempts to paint
       Casey’s statute-of-limitations defense as a time-barred authorship
       counterclaim—limited by the same three-year statute of limita-
       tions that hinders Finch here.
                Despite his efforts, the two defenses are distinct. Statutes of
       limitations are affirmative defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); see also Day
       v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 1012, 1015 (11th Cir. 1997) (per
       curiam) (“A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense.”
       (citation omitted)). The Sixth Circuit case on which Finch so heav-
       ily relies to argue otherwise, Garza v. Everly, concerned “a defend-
       ant . . . seeking affirmative relief packaged within a defense and . . .
       attempting to dodge a statute of limitations.” 59 F.4th 876, 884 (6th
       Cir. 2023). The Sixth Circuit concluded that such a defendant
       couldn’t leverage an affirmative defense into affirmative relief. Id.
               This case is different. Casey does not seek any affirmative
       relief, nor does he attempt to dodge a statute of limitations. If an-
       ything—ironically—Finch is the one “packag[ing]” claims and de-
       fenses to get around a statute of limitations. Casey raised an affirm-
       ative defense distinct from any authorship claim. Because the stat-
       ute of limitations argument is dispositive, we need not consider the
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       23-10554                Opinion of the Court                            5

       sole-authorship debate. The district court was correct to grant
       summary judgment.
              As a final bit of housekeeping, we address Casey’s “Motion
       for Damages and Costs Pursuant to Rule 38.” Rule 38 sanctions are
       appropriately imposed against appellants who raise “clearly frivo-
       lous claims in the face of established law and clear facts.” Farese v.
       Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (internal
       quotation marks omitted). For purposes of Rule 38, a claim is
       clearly frivolous if it is “utterly devoid of merit.” Bonfiglio v. Nugent,
       986 F.2d 1391, 1393 (11th Cir. 1993). Although Finch’s appeal
       pushes the boundary, we will exercise our discretion to DENY Ca-
       sey’s motion here.
              AFFIRMED.