Court Opinion

ID: 9772647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:24:37.591731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:46.466389
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR

A pro-se petition to rehear has been filed contending the court erred in its judgment on petitioners application for post conviction relief.
For issue petitioner reiterates the claim raised in his post conviction petition of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and for the first time in these proceedings says the trial court committed reversible error by failing to place him on the witness stand to inform him of his constitutional right to testify or to ascertain whether or not he desired to testify and present evidence in his own behalf.
We have previously ruled on petitioners initial contentions and again find them to be without merit. As to the claim that the trial judge failed to advise him of his right to testify at his original trial, we observe that on the appeal from his conviction it was insisted that the trial court erred in failing to tell the jury that they were not to consider his silence as evidence against him in the sentencing phase of the trial. He was obviously advised of his right to testify or remain silent.
The pro-se petition to rehear is denied.
A second petition to rehear has been filed by volunteer, pro bono counsel. This petition recounts all of the rather extensive proceedings in this case involving the post conviction review and ultimately reaches the erroneous conclusion that “The Court apparently recognized that Porterfield had potentially meritorious claims arising out of the denial of his post conviction petition on the issue of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel by granting Porterfield’s pro se Application for Permission To Appeal.”
To the contrary, the Application for Permission to Appeal was granted by this Court, exercising an abundance of caution in its capacity as the ultimate State authority to review death sentences (T.C.A. § 39-13-206), to further exercise that authority by granting post conviction review to assure that there had not been any failure in the trial or appellate process which may have abrogated defendant’s right to a fair trial.
It is regrettable that the majority of authorities cited in the petition to rehear are not on point with the issues argued. They *680deal primarily with the right to counsel on direct appeal and not with collateral proceedings. The rule continually asserted in each of the cited cases is the exact antithesis of defendant’s position that post conviction counsel some how failed to effectively challenge the purported constitutional violations which he asserts led to his conviction.
After a thorough examination of the record in each instance, this Court has found that defendant was properly and adequately represented by appointed counsel at trial and on direct appeal.
It is equally clear that the principle, if not the only basis for the dispute between defendant and his post conviction counsel is defendant’s insistence on asserting a plethora of complaints on appellate review which counsel did not deem advisable or appropriate. The applicable rule is succinctly stated in Jones v. Barnes, 468 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983):
Defense counsel assigned to prosecute an appeal from a criminal conviction does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant. The accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding his ease, including the decision whether to take an appeal; and, with some limitations, he may elect to act as his own advocate. However, an indigent defendant has no constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those points.
There is no right to free counsel beyond the first appeal as of right. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974).
The court adheres to the judgment set forth in its original opinion. The petitions to rehear are denied at appellant’s cost.
ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA and REID, JJ., concur.
BIRCH, J., not participating.