Court Opinion

ID: 9571134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:16.095861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:27.759294
License: Public Domain

REES, Justice
(dissenting).
I must dissent.
I. The record in this matter indicates the lot at the point of the peninsula belonging to defendant Johann, and the lots to the north, the property of the State of Iowa, were platted as a part of an addition to the Town of Wahpeton. The plat makes reference to a public way along the westerly side of the peninsula embracing virtually the same lands Johann seeks to condemn as a means of ingress to and egress from his landlocked lot.
The record before us does not establish how and in what manner the lands now owned by the State were acquired, so that we have no way of determining upon what basis the State claims the ownership of the platted public way along the westerly side *26of the peninsula. We may assume, of course, the platted roadway was never dedicated by the proprietor of the plat to a public purpose, and that the proprietor of the plat either sold the public way shown on the plat to the State, or that the State acquired it for public use by condemnation. Tf it had previously been dedicated to a public use, it was not the proper subject of condemnation. Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161; Town of Alvord v. Great Northern Railway Company, 179 Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 467.
I incline to the view there are too many imponderables which the record before us does not reflect or establish for this court at this time to make a knowledgeable determination of the controversy between Johann and the State as to Johann’s right to secure a way of ingress and egress to his property which is admittedly accessible to him only by water, unless it be made to appear the platted roadway along the westerly side of the peninsula is available to him as a means of access to his lot.
We are in effect asked here to render an advisory or directory opinion, as the above question and other questions have never been presented to nor passed upon by any court of original jurisdiction. The rendition of advisory or directory opinions is beyond the scope of our duties or of our authority. Nitta v. Kuda, 249 Iowa 853, 89 N.W.2d 149, 151; Redfield v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 252 Iowa 1256, 110 N.W.2d 397, 403; Blizek v. Eagle Signal Co., 164 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Iowa 1969).
To adopt the view of the majority that a literal reading of the statute, section 471.-4(2), The Code, precludes the condemnation of any lands other than private lands without permitting Johann to explore and inquire into the seizin of the State in the lots to the north of the Johann property, clearly deprives Johann of his day in court to determine whether or not the claimed ownership of the platted public way terminating at his lot on the south, extending northerly along the westerly side of the peninsula to a public road on the north, is free, clear and unencumbered by the rights of Johann to traverse the same. I would annul the writ and permit defendant Johann to secure a judicial determination of the above question.
II. I am not convinced the action of the chief judge, in appointing the condemnation appraisers, entailed the exercise by the judge of a judicial function. If it were not a judicial function, clearly a writ of certiorari will not lie to test the legality of his action. Rule 306, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: “A writ of certiorari shall only be granted when specifically authorized by statute; or where an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, is alleged to have exceeded its, or his, proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.” (emphasis supplied).
When the application for condemnation of right-of-way easement was presented to Judge Cooper, he was not permitted any latitude or discretion in selecting appraisers ; he was bound to appoint appraisers from a list submitted to him by the Board of Supervisors of Dickinson County, and he was required to make a selection by lot of six appraisers from a roster of not less than 28 residents of the county. Section 472.4, The Code, 1971.
Irrespective of the fact the appointment of commissioners was made by a judge (in this case more particularly by the chief judge of the judicial district as it was then organized), I do not feel it can be fairly said the action of Judge Cooper in this regard was anything more than ministerial. Certainly, in so appointing condemnation commissioners Judge Cooper was not acting illegally, nor was he acting in excess of his jurisdiction. He was following the plain, unequivocal dictates of a statutory direction. He was not at that time called upon to pass upon the other questions suggested by plaintiffs and by the majority: that is, whether or not Johann, a private individual, could condemn a right-of-way over property belonging to the State, or whether, having access to his lands by wa*27ter, he did not have available to him the right to condemn a right-of-way over other lands. Judge Cooper was not required to determine these questions sua sponte as they had not even been suggested to him at the time he was presented with the application of Johann for the entry of an order appointing condemnation commissioners.
Certiorari will not lie to review acts not done in the exercise of judicial power or authority, but which are strictly ministerial or executive in their character, it being immaterial whether such acts be performed by a court, officer, or other tribunal. Likewise, an act that is clerical rather than judicial is not reviewable. 14 C.J.S. Cer-tiorari § 18, p. 147.
In Phinney v. Montgomery, 218 Iowa 1240, 1245, 257 N.W. 208, 210, this court said, in defining a ministerial act (quoting from First National Bank v. Hayes, 186 Iowa 892, 901, 171 N.W. 715, 718):
“A ministerial act has been defined as ‘one which a person or board performs upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in observance of the mandate of legal authority and without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done.’ * * * The ‘distinction between merely ministerial and judicial or other official acts seems to be that, where the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial, but where the act to be done involves exercise of discretion or judgment, it is not to be deemed merely ministerial. Discretion may be defined, when applied to public functionaries, as the power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.’ ”
I do not agree with the majority that our condemnation statutes involved in this case are dissimilar to those involved in the case of Central Electric & Gas Co. v. City of Stromsburg, D.C., 192 F.Supp. 280, 295, aff’d., 289 F.2d 217 (8 Cir. 1961). In the case last cited, the federal court held that the selection of a condemnation court by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in connection with the municipal acquisition of utility property, was a “ministerial act” and not a “judicial act”, that the condemnation commission was merely a board of appraisers rather than a court, and federal injunction against further proceedings in such matters was not precluded by statute forbidding executions to stay proceedings in state courts.
I am convinced the action of Judge Cooper was nothing more than ministerial, and that certiorari is not available to test it.
I would annul the writ and dismiss plaintiff’s petition.
MASON, RAWLINGS and HARRIS, J J., join this dissent.