Court Opinion

ID: 9748849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:15:30.365133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:39.982600
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that a larcenous intent, which is a requisite for conviction of common *648law robbery, is not negated by the fact of full payment for goods held out for sale.
It is firmly established that larceny is an essential element of the common law crime of robbery. Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612, 583 A.2d 1056 (1991); State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 298 A.2d 378 (1973); Hadder v. State, 238 Md. 341, 209 A.2d 70 (1965). Moreover, this Court has not eliminated the intent requirement of common law larceny. In Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984), and Canton Bank v. Am. Bonding Co., 111 Md. 41, 45, 73 A. 684, 685 (1909), we held that the intent requirement of larceny need not include an intent to derive a personal profit. The State, however, still must establish that the defendant’s intent in committing the larceny was animus ferandi, which means an intent to steal or to deprive. As the authorities reviewed below all hold, an intent to pay for the goods, with a present ability to do so, negates that required criminal intent.
Although the majority attempts to cloud the matter somewhat, it is clear as a common law principle, applicable in this State under Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, that one who forces a sale of goods, which are held out for sale, is not guilty of robbery because there is no underlying larceny. See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 8.5(c) (1986) (if property taken is offered for sale, intent to pay or otherwise restore the equivalent, with such an ability, constitutes a defense to larceny); Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law, 345 (3d ed. 1982) (it is not a robbery when a merchant is compelled by force to sell to one with whom he prefers not to deal, if the property is held for sale and he receives the full price); Model Penal Code, § 223.1(3) (1980) (it is a defense to theft that defendant “took property exposed for sale, intending to purchase and pay for it promptly”); 2 Russell on Crime, 1167 (Turner 10th ed. 1950) (“it has been considered that if the owner has the goods on sale, but refuses to sell them to a particular *649person, it would not be felony if the latter took them, even by force, provided he throws to the owner the full price”); 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 243 (Lewis 1897) (“it is doubted whether forcing a higgler ... to sell his wares, and giving him the full value of them, amounts to ... robbery”); 1 William Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, Ch. 19, § 13 at 215 (Curwood 8th ed. 1824) (the opinion that “a man meeting another going with his goods to market in order to sell them, compel him to sell them to him against his will, he is guilty of robbery” is too severe, because the wrongdoer lacks a felonious intent); 2 East, Pleas of the Crown, Ch. 16, § 98 (1806) (referring to the Fisherman’s Case, “[t]he felonious intent being as essential to constitute the offence of robbery as of larceny, it follows that if such intent be wanting ... it will only amount to a trespass”). As the authorities make clear, when the goods involved are generally held out for sale, when the defendant is willing to pay the full price for the goods, and when the defendant has the present ability to pay the full price, the “intent to steal” element of larceny is missing and the transaction is not a robbery.
The cases which have addressed this issue also support the view that one who is willing and able to purchase goods offered for sale is not guilty of larceny or robbery.
For example, in Mason v. The State, 32 Ark. 238, 239 (1877), three men, after eleven o’clock in the evening, went to a house where beer was kept for sale and called for some beer. The proprietor, Dixon, who was asleep in the room adjacent to the store area, refused to get up and sell the men beer. The next day, Dixon discovered that a window had been forced open, and a keg of beer had been taken out and placed on the porch. A gallon of beer, worth approximately thirty cents, had been taken. The men then returned, admitted they had taken the beer, and offered to pay Dixon $3.00 for the beer. Dixon refused to accept the payment, and thereafter the men were charged with larceny. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that there was no larceny, stating (32 Ark. at 239-240):
*650“A felonious or criminal intent, is an essential constituent of larceny. It must always be averred in the charge, and is as necessary to be proven as the taking and carrying away____
“The beer was taken on Saturday night; on Monday morning, before any complaint was made, the parties went to the owner and told him they had taken the beer, and offered to pay him for it____ Dixon kept beer for sale____
“Where is the evidence of a design to fraudulently deprive Dixon of his property, or of an intention to take it without giving him a quid pro quo of equal value? If they intended to pay for the beer, how did they intend to defraud him?”
Similarly in Lee v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 233, 105 S.E.2d 152 (1958), the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed a conviction for larceny based upon the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that Lee was entitled to an acquittal if the jury found that the defendant intended to pay and if fact did pay for the item, in this case a tire. The court stated (200 Va. at 236-237, 105 S.E.2d at 154):
“The issue in this case was a narrow one. The intent of Lee at the time he took the tire was the essence of the offense charged. If he took the tire with the intent to steal it, then he was guilty. If, on the other hand, he took the tire with the intent to pay and did pay the Pearce corporation therefor, he was not guilty.”
In Pylee v. State, 62 Tex.Crim. 49, 136 S.W. 464 (1911), the defendant had taken oats from a field to feed the horses pulling his buggy. The defendant testified that he intended to pay for them and was heading toward the oat owner’s house when he was apprehended. The defendant requested that the trial judge instruct the jury “that if appellant, when he took the oats, had no fraudulent intent, but took them with a view of paying for the same, and the jury so believed, he was entitled to an acquittal.” The trial court refused to give the instruction, and the appellate court *651reversed the conviction, stating (62 Tex.Crim. at 50, 136 S.W. at 464-465):
“The case is submitted to this court on the theory that these charges should have been given. We are of the opinion that his contention is correct. It is not all takings of property that is theft. The fraudulent intent must exist at the time of taking, and if this did not exist at that time the taker would not be guilty of theft. Appellant, we think, had the legal right to have this phase of the testimony submitted to the jury under the instructions requested.”
Numerous cases involving charges of shoplifting also represent applications of the principle that, if one intends to pay the seller of goods the full purchase price of the goods, there can be no conviction for larceny. Intent to pay is frequently the disputed issue in shoplifting cases. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 31 Md.App. 25, 354 A.2d 499 (1976); Hugo v. City of Fairbanks, 658 P.2d 155, 161 (Alaska App.1983); People v. Jaso, 4 Cal.App.3d 767, 84 Cal.Rptr. 567 (1970). In fact, because intent not to pay for items in a store is often difficult to prove in a shoplifting case, several states have rewritten the law of shoplifting to change the intent element from a larcenous intent to an intent to conceal. See Hugo v. City of Fairbanks, supra. This change was accomplished by statute, and in these states, shoplifting is different from the common law crime of larceny.
The treatises and cases reviewed above establish that a required element of the common law crime of larceny is an intent to steal or to defraud. If the defendant intends to pay for the goods, and they are goods held out for sale to the general public, then the intent element of larceny is absent.
The majority concludes, however, that a statutory regulation aimed at the seller, prohibiting him from selling alcohol to an intoxicated purchaser, alters this settled principle. Thus, the majority holds that where goods are held out for sale, and where a purchaser pays for the goods, but where a regulatory statute would preclude the vendor from selling *652the goods under the particular circumstances, then the purchaser who takes and pays for the goods without the vendor’s acquiescence commits a larceny. If force is used, the purchaser also commits robbery.
The majority does not even attempt to explain how, under this scenario, the purchaser's intent becomes different, or how the presence of the regulatory statute aimed at the vendor supplies an intent to steal on the part of the purchaser. The majority simply states that “[cjourts rarely explain how removing the defense in robbery cases is consistent with the mens rea for the included crime of larceny.” (opinion at 645-646). The majority goes on to indicate that such modification of the elements of the crime of robbery is good “public policy” (id. at 646) and is “reasonable” (id. at 647). In the past where this Court has changed the common law applicable to criminal cases so as to benefit the prosecution, we have made the changes entirely prospective, and not even applicable to the case before the Court. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 161, 486 A.2d 184, 188-189 (1985); Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 219-220, 438 A.2d 1301, 1310 (1981); Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 713, 716, 404 A.2d 1073, 1077, 1079 (1979) (“to now modify the common law rule and apply such change retroactively to validate the defendant’s ... trial ... may, in our view, impinge upon basic fairness”).
Furthermore, if the majority intends to change the mens rea element of larceny only under certain circumstances where a regulatory statute is involved and where the defendant purchaser takes and pays for goods without the seller’s acquiescence, the majority fails to set forth any guiding and logical principles for identifying those circumstances where the “intent to steal” element is abrogated. On the other hand, if the majority contemplates the abrogation of the element of larcenous intent whenever a regulatory statute would proscribe the particular sale, the ramifications of its holding may be quite substantial. For example, suppose an underage youth enters an convenience store which sells alcohol, and the clerk on duty is away from the *653counter. The youth picks up a six pack of beer, which costs $5.15. He brings it to the counter, waits a few minutes, and then, leaving $6.00 on the counter, leaves the store. Apparently under the majority’s view, because the clerk would have been statutorily prohibited from making the sale, the youth is guilty of larceny.
A major flaw with the majority’s approach is its focus upon the status of defendant instead of upon the intent of the defendant. Under well-settled legal principles, if goods are held for sale to the public, and the defendant forces a sale, the defendant is not guilty of the larceny or of robbery because of the absence of a larcenous intent. In the majority’s view, however, if the goods are available for sale to the public, but due to the defendant’s status are not available for sale to him, and the defendant forces a sale, the defendant is guilty of robbery. There is no support in reason or authority for this distinction based on the defendant’s status. The majority does not cite a single case which, on the facts here, would hold that the defendant is guilty of robbery.
Although I would reverse the robbery conviction, I note that the defendant in this case was properly found guilty of a serious crime, namely assault. There is no need to distort the common law of larcenous intent beyond recognition in order to respond severely to the dangerousness of the defendant’s act. Under Maryland law, the maximum term of imprisonment for assault is greater than the ten year sentence which was imposed in the instant case for robbery. As summarized in Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 714, 421 A.2d 957, 958 (1980),
“[i]n Maryland, assault is a common law crime for which the Legislature has not prescribed a penalty. Consequently, the only limitation upon the number of years of imprisonment to which one may be sentenced for assault is, ordinarily, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Gleaton v. State, 235 *654Md. 271, 277-278, 201 A.2d 353 (1964); Duff v. State, 229 Md. 126, 127, 182 A.2d 349, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 898, 83 S.Ct. 199, 9 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962); Burley v. State, 226 Md. 94, 96-97, 172 A.2d 394 (1961).”
Sentences equal to or greater than the ten year robbery sentence received by the defendant here have been imposed for assault. See, e.g., Roberts v. Warden, 242 Md. 459, 219 A.2d 254 (1966); Austin v. Director, 237 Md. 314, 316-317, 206 A.2d 145, 147 (1965); Gleaton v. State, 201 Md. 353, 201 A.2d 353 (1964); Adair v. State, 231 Md. 255, 189 A.2d 618 (1963). Consequently, it is wholly unnecessary to confuse the law of robbery so that this defendant can be punished severely for his unlawful actions.
I would vacate the robbery convictions and direct that the case be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence on the assault conviction.
Judge ROBERT M. BELL has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein.