Court Opinion

ID: 9949273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 09:09:39.90496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:25.141099
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
      Second Appellate District of Texas
               at Fort Worth
            ___________________________
                 No. 02-22-00413-CV
            ___________________________

              SADIE WELDON, Appellant

                            V.

THE LILITH FUND FOR REPRODUCTIVE EQUITY, Appellee

         On Appeal from the 271st District Court
                  Jack County, Texas
              Trial Court No. 22-03-032

        Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.
          Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Before the United States Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade in the summer

of 2022, abortion-assistance group The Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity made it

known that in October 2021 it had deliberately flouted a new Texas law prohibiting

abortion after cardiac activity is detected—the law known as SB 8, or the Heartbeat

Act—by helping at least one pregnant woman obtain an abortion. To gather

information about Lilith Fund’s admitted SB 8 violation, Appellant Sadie Weldon

petitioned for a pre-suit deposition of Appellee Lilith Fund’s deputy director under

Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.1 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.

      While Weldon’s Rule 202 petition was pending, Lilith Fund separately sued

Weldon seeking declaratory judgments that SB 8 is unconstitutional and seeking to

temporarily enjoin Weldon from pursuing any judicial proceedings against it in the

interim and seeking an anti-suit injunction against the Rule 202 proceeding. Weldon

appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss Lilith Fund’s lawsuit under the

Texas Citizens Participation Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.001–

.011; id. § 51.014(a)(12) (allowing appeal from interlocutory order that denies a TCPA

      1
       To the extent that Lilith Fund practically invited a lawsuit, we’re unsure why
Weldon opted to proceed with a Rule 202 petition rather than simply suing, learning
during discovery who else might have been involved, and then joining those people as
additional defendants. As Lilith Fund pointed out in the trial court, there was not “any
debate” that it had “violate[d] the technical terms of SB 8” “at least on one occasion.”

                                           2
motion). Because we conclude that the TCPA does not apply to Lilith Fund’s action,

we will affirm.

                                     Background

      In 2021, the Texas Legislature enacted what has been described as an “unusual”

and “unprecedented” statute, Senate Bill 8, adding Subchapter H to Chapter 171 of

the Texas Health and Safety Code. See Act of May 13, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 62,

2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 125, 125–31 (codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 171.201–

.212); Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2496 (2021) (order

denying injunctive relief) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing SB 8 as “statutory

scheme” that “is not only unusual, but unprecedented” and noting that “[t]he desired

consequence appears to be to insulate the State from responsibility for implementing

and enforcing the regulatory regime”). Referred to as the Heartbeat Act, SB

8 prohibits abortions after fetal cardiac activity is detected within the gestational sac,

effectively banning abortions roughly six weeks following a human’s conception. See

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.204(a).

      But what’s unique is that SB 8 can be enforced only by private citizens through

civil litigation: state officials cannot enforce the law, and those who violate SB 8 are

not subject to criminal sanctions or administrative penalties. Id. §§ 171.207(a) (stating

that Subchapter H is “enforced exclusively through the private civil actions described

                                            3
in Section 171.208”), 171.208 (describing those private civil actions).2 A citizen who

succeeds with an SB 8 claim can recover injunctive relief, statutory damages in an

amount of “not less than $10,000 for each abortion that the defendant performed or

induced [or aided or abetted] in violation of this subchapter,” and costs and attorney’s

fees. Id. § 171.208(b).

       About a year after SB 8’s enactment, Texas abortion providers shuttered their

facilities altogether when—unrelated to SB 8—the United States Supreme Court

decided Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 142 S. Ct.

2228 (2022) (overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), and its

progeny, and returning to the 50 states whether and how to address the abortion issue

on a state-by-state basis). Abortionists have quit doing business in Texas because

       2
        The Heartbeat Act authorizes a civil action against “any person” who
“performs or induces an abortion in violation of this subchapter,” “knowingly
engages in conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion,
including paying for or reimbursing the costs of an abortion through insurance or
otherwise, if the abortion is performed or induced in violation of this subchapter,” or
“intends to engage in” that prohibited conduct. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 171.208(a). This subchapter applies only to abortions performed by a Texas-licensed
physician. See id. §§ 171.203–.205; see also id. § 171.201(4) (defining “physician”).
Groups such as the Lilith Fund are, legally, free to help pregnant women travel
outside Texas for an abortion, and as Weldon’s counsel has recognized in a different
case, the Act does not apply to so-called “self-managed” abortions. See Petitioner’s
Reply to the Van Stean Respondents[’ Response to Petition for Review] at 2, Tex.
Right to Life v. Van Stean, No. 23-0468 (Tex. Nov. 20, 2023) (“[I]llegal self-managed
abortions do not violate SB 8 because the statute applies only to abortions performed
by Texas-licensed physicians.”).

                                           4
elective abortions are now criminalized,3 so SB 8 is mostly a footnote,4 a recent

artifact of a time when abortion was still considered a federal constitutional right and

upon which Texas sought to impose the strictest (and most creative) possible limits

under the Roe, et al. regime. Still, despite SB 8’s reduced utility, at the very least

Weldon and others do have potential claims to pursue because of the statute’s four-

year limitations period. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.208(d).

                Relevant Timeline Surrounding SB 8 and This Case

09/01/21      SB 8 takes effect.

09/09/21      By this date, numerous abortion-facilitating individuals and entities,
              including Lilith Fund, have separately sued Texas Right to Life (TRL)
              and its legislative director, John Seago, challenging SB 8’s
              constitutionality and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; the 14 total
              cases are later assigned to Judge David Peeples, sitting by special
              assignment of the Texas Multi-District Litigation Panel as the judge of
              the pretrial court for the SB 8 MDL (Cause No. D-1-GN-21-004179).5

      With limited exceptions, performing or inducing an abortion is a felony. See
       3

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 170A.001–.007.
       4
        See Howard M. Wasserman & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Solving the
Procedural Puzzles of the Texas Heartbeat Act and Its Imitators: New York Times v. Sullivan As
Historical Analogue, 60 Hous. L. Rev. 93, 97 (2022) (“S.B. 8 used the threat of costly
private litigation and crippling civil liability to chill then-constitutionally protected
reproductive[-]freedom activities. Dobbs obviates the need for such indirect regulation;
states can enforce now-constitutionally valid abortion bans through government-
enforced civil and criminal penalties.”).
       5
        TRL and Seago initiated the MDL process.

                                              5
             See Order of Multidistrict Litig. Panel, In re Tex. Heartbeat Act Litig.,
             No. 21-0782 (Tex. J.P.M.L. Oct. 14, 2021).6

12/09/21     Judge Peeples enters an order denying TRL’s and Seago’s TCPA motion
             and granting a partial summary judgment declaring that SB 8 violates
             both the Texas and federal constitutions. Although Judge Peeples states
             that he will “sign an order of severance and will ensure that the issues
             addressed in this Order are promptly appealable to the appellate courts,”
             TRL and Seago almost immediately file an interlocutory appeal of the
             TCPA-motion denial,7 thus staying further proceedings and delaying
             review of whether SB 8 is or is not constitutional.

01/26/22     Weldon files her Rule 202 petition against Lilith Fund in Jack County
             District Court (Cause No. 22-01-014).

03/15/22     Lilith Fund files its declaratory-judgment and anti-suit-injunction
             petition—this case—also in Jack County District Court (Cause No. 22-
             03-032). 8

05/16/22     Weldon moves to dismiss under the TCPA and Rule 91a of the Texas
             Rules of Civil Procedure and includes a plea in abatement.

08/08/22     In Cause Number 22-01-014, the trial court denies Weldon’s Rule
             202 petition by email.

      6
       TRL was the target defendant in these cases because its website described SB
8 and invited members of the public to submit evidence of statutory violations, thus
causing the pretrial-MDL plaintiffs to complain, in essence, that TRL and Seago were
encouraging people to file SB 8 lawsuits or to provide information to that end.
      7
        Our sister court in Austin affirmed the denial of TRL and Seago’s TCPA
motion several months after Weldon’s case was submitted to our panel. Tex. Right to
Life v. Van Stean, No. 03-21-00650-CV, 2023 WL 3687408, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
May 26, 2023, pet. filed) (mem. op.). We discuss—and agree with—that holding in a
later section of this memorandum opinion.
      8
       The next day, Lilith Fund transferred both its suit and Weldon’s Rule
202 petition as tag-along cases to the MDL pretrial court. In May 2022, Judge Peeples
sent this case (and the Rule 202 petition) back to Jack County after concluding, for
reasons not important here, that they did not qualify as tag-along cases in the MDL
proceeding.

                                          6
09/06/22     The trial court holds a hearing on Weldon’s TCPA and Rule 91a
             motions and her plea in abatement, but never enters any orders.9

10/07/22     Weldon’s TCPA motion is overruled by operation of law. See Tex. Civ.
             Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.008(a) (providing that if trial court doesn’t
             rule within 30 days of the hearing, “the motion is considered to have
             been denied by operation of law and the moving party may appeal”).

10/25/22     Weldon timely appeals the TCPA-motion denial.

                                    Issues Presented

      Weldon raises six issues, which we paraphrase and give short answers to:

   1. Does the TCPA apply to Lilith Fund’s case? That is, did Lilith Fund file this

      action based on or in response to Weldon’s exercise of the rights of free

      speech, to petition, or of association? No; the TCPA does not apply.

   2. Should Lilith Fund’s declaratory-judgment action be dismissed because the

      constitutional issues it raised could have been adjudicated in Weldon’s then-

      pending Rule 202 proceeding? We do not reach this issue because it is not necessary to

      final disposition of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring appellate court to

      hand down written opinion disposing of every issue necessary to final

      disposition of appeal); Newstream Hotels & Resorts, LLC v. Abdou,

      No. 02-21-00343-CV, 2022 WL 1496537, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May

      9
       At the hearing, Weldon’s counsel stated, “Now, we understand your Honor
has denied the request for depositions under Rule 202, but the appellate proceedings
have not yet concluded and a denial of the Rule 202 petition can be subject to
mandamus in the Court of Appeals. Ms. Weldon has not yet exhausted her appellate
options on the Rule 202.” Although Weldon made this point well over a year ago, she
never sought mandamus relief from us.

                                             7
      12, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (declining to reach other appellate issues after

      holding that TCPA did not apply to plaintiff’s claims).

   3. Has Lilith Fund, through this declaratory-judgment action, wrongly tried to

      deprive Weldon, the “real plaintiff,” of her right to choose the time and place

      of suit? We do not reach this issue because it is not necessary to final disposition of this

      appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Newstream, 2022 WL 1496537, at *4.

   4. Should the trial court have abated Lilith Fund’s suit in deference to Weldon’s

      first-filed Rule 202 petition, under principles of dominant jurisdiction? We do

      not reach this issue because it is not necessary to final disposition of this appeal, see Tex. R.

      App. P. 47.1; Newstream, 2022 WL 1496537, at *4, and because the trial court never

      ruled on Weldon’s plea in abatement. 10

   5. Does Lilith Fund’s request for an anti-suit injunction satisfy any of the four

      circumstances laid out in Golden Rule Insurance Co. v. Harper, 925 S.W.2d 649,

      651 (Tex. 1996)? We do not reach this issue because it is not necessary to final disposition

      of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Newstream, 2022 WL 1496537, at *4.

      10
        In any event, “[a]n abatement order is not one of the specific types of
interlocutory orders that the legislature has designated as appealable.” State v. BFI
Waste Servs. of Tex., LP, No. 03-10-00504-CV, 2011 WL 1086585, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Austin Mar. 23, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.). But an interlocutory order denying a
plea in abatement can be appealed by permissive appeal, see Lee v. GST Transp. Sys.,
LP, 334 S.W.3d 16, 17–18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (noting that appeal
reached appellate court through mechanisms of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 51.014(d))—a situation we don’t have here.

                                                 8
   6. Has Lilith Fund produced clear and specific evidence of a prima facie case for

      any of its constitutional attacks on SB 8? Based on our answer to Issue One, we need

      not reach this issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Newstream, 2022 WL 1496537, at *4.

                                      Discussion

      Despite the wide-ranging nature of Weldon’s issues, we keep front of mind that

they reach us only in the context of a TCPA motion’s denial: if we do not conclude in

the first instance that Lilith Fund’s legal proceeding was “based on or [was] in

response to [Weldon’s] exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right

of association,” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003(a), we have no legal

anchor from which to paddle out and explore anything else. See id. § 51.014(a)(12)

(allowing appeal from interlocutory order denying TCPA motion).

      Before explaining why the TCPA does not apply—a conclusion that compels

an affirmance—we do note Lilith Fund’s appellate about-face. In the trial court, it

argued both in its briefing and at the TCPA hearing for the conclusion we reach.

Now, though, it assumes that the TCPA applies: “Although Lilith Fund argued in the

trial court that the TCPA does not apply to its claims, for the limited purpose of this

appeal it assumes that the TCPA applies and the trial court determined that Ms.

Weldon met her Step One Burden.”

      Appellate concessions on legal matters do not bind us. Reid v. UDR Tex. Props.

LLC, No. 02-15-00108-CV, 2016 WL 7448362, at *3 n.9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Dec. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g) (noting that court was not bound by

                                           9
concession that counterclaim was time-barred but “must independently determine as a

matter of law whether the judgment contained reversible error”); Haas v. Voigt,

940 S.W.2d 198, 201 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (noting that

“parties cannot concede a question of law necessary to the proper disposition of a

point of error”). We will thus decide the TCPA’s applicability for ourselves.

      Standard of review; TCPA’s purpose and framework

      Whether the TCPA applies in a given case is an issue of statutory construction

that we review de novo. Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018); see also

Adams v. Starside Custom Builders LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 897 (Tex. 2018) (noting that

court “[has] decided whether communications are matters of public concern under a

de novo standard of review, suggesting that the determination is one of law”).

      As its language tells us, the TCPA’s purpose is to “encourage and safeguard the

constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and

otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at

the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for

demonstrable injury.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.002; ExxonMobil Pipeline

Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. 2017). To fully effectuate this purpose and

intent, we must construe the TCPA “liberally.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 27.011(b). To that end, through a motion-to-dismiss procedure, a defendant who

claims that a plaintiff has filed a meritless suit “in response to the defendant’s proper

exercise of a constitutionally protected right [may] seek dismissal of the underlying

                                           10
action, attorneys’ fees, and sanctions at an early stage in the litigation.” Dolcefino v.

Cypress Creek EMS, 540 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no

pet.) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003(a)). The TCPA cautions,

though, that it “does not abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or

privilege available under other constitutional, statutory, case, or common law or rule

provisions,” such as the declaratory-judgment act. Id. at 200–01 (quoting Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.011); see also Gilani v. Rigney, No. 02-21-00314-CV,

2022 WL 714700, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 10, 2022, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (“The TCPA does not create a right for a TCPA movant to usurp the UDJA

protections, which are given to anyone whose own rights are affected by a statute.”).

      We take up to three analytical steps when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a

TCPA motion:

      1. the movant (here, Weldon) must show that the TCPA properly applies to
         the legal action against her—that is, that the action “is based on or is in
         response to” her exercise of protected rights;

      2. if the movant satisfies that burden, the nonmovant (Lilith Fund) must
         establish “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential
         element” of its claim; and

      3. assuming that the nonmovant satisfied step two, the movant can then try to
         establish “an affirmative defense or other grounds” on which she is
         “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(b), (c), (d). Self-evidently, our inquiry

ends if a TCPA movant cannot meet the first-step burden. See TotalGen Servs., LLC v.

Thomassen Amcot Int’l, LLC, No. 02-20-00015-CV, 2021 WL 210845, at *2 n.3 (Tex.

                                           11
App.—Fort Worth Jan. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that “because we

conclude that TotalGen failed to meet its burden on the first step, we do not reach”

the next one (citing Tex. R. App. P. 47.1)).

      We examine the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, see

NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. United Dev. Funding IV, 674 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2023, pets. filed), “favoring the conclusion that the [nonmovant’s] claims

are not predicated on protected expression,” Newstream, 2022 WL 1496537, at

*2 (citing Beving v. Beadles, 563 S.W.3d 399, 407 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet.

denied)); see Dolcefino, 540 S.W.3d at 199. “Implicit in this analysis is that we do not

blindly accept” a movant’s attempts to characterize the nonmovant’s claims as

implicating protected expression. Sloat v. Rathbun, 513 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2015, pet. dism’d).

      Weldon’s TCPA motion falters at Step One

      Weldon argues that Lilith Fund’s lawsuit was a direct response to her Rule

202 petition and thus was a legal action that “is based on or is in response to” her

“exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003(a). We disagree.

      In a similar case from our sister court in Austin on appeal from Judge Peeples’s

December 2021 order denying their TCPA motion, TRL and Seago argued that

Planned Parenthood and the Van Stean appellees had filed their lawsuits for

declaratory and injunctive relief based on and in response to TRL’s “publication of a

                                           12
website that describes SB 8 and invites members of the public to submit evidence of

statutory violations.” Van Stean, 2023 WL 3687408, at *4. TRL argued that dismissal

was warranted because its publishing the website in question was an activity covered

by the TCPA’s broadly defined exercise of the rights of free speech, to petition, and

of association. Id.

         That argument failed. The Austin court noted that the abortion providers’ and

assisters’ suits were filed

         to challenge the constitutionality of SB 8 and to enjoin Texas Right to
         Life from enforcing an unconstitutional statute, not to stop Texas Right
         to Life from any lawful activity that is protected by the TCPA. They
         assert that even if speech or political opinions are incidentally involved
         in the underlying factual allegations in their petitions, “the TCPA offers
         no protection for an unlawful scheme to deprive others of their
         constitutional rights.”

Id. at *5. Agreeing with the appellees, the court took its reasoning from two Houston

decisions, Dolcefino and Choudhri v. Lee, No. 01-20-00098-CV, 2020 WL 4689204 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.), with which we also

agree.

         In Choudhri, the declaratory-judgment plaintiff, Lee, sought a declaration

construing the parties’ alternative-dispute-resolution agreement after they kept

engaging in recurrent litigation over their business dealings. Id. at *1–2. Choudhri

moved to dismiss under the TCPA, arguing that Lee’s declaratory-judgment action

was based on or in response to Choudhri’s exercise of his right to petition. Id. at *2.

Rejecting that position, the court of appeals held that the TCPA did not apply because

                                            13
Lee’s action sought “a determination of the legal principles that the parties should

apply in resolving their various legal disputes” and did not seek to limit Choudhri’s

right to petition or otherwise participate in government. Id. at *3. Moreover,

“Choudhri’s argument that the TCPA is implicated because Lee’s claim affects his

legal rights is a non sequitur—all claims filed in court seek to affect a party’s legal

rights.” Id.

       Similar reasoning appeared in Dolcefino, in which a nonprofit ambulance service

sought declarations that the Texas Business Organizations Code did not require it to

produce certain financial information to Dolcefino, a dogged investigative reporter

who had subjected the ambulance service to repeated document requests under the

Code. 540 S.W.3d at 196–97. Dolcefino filed a TCPA dismissal motion in which he

claimed that the ambulance service’s suit “sought to curtail his constitutional right to

free speech.” Id. at 197. But the court of appeals disagreed: “CCEMS’s pleadings

sought a declaration from the trial court concerning its own conduct, i.e., what its

duties and obligations were upon its receipt of requests for information made

pursuant to Business Organizations Code section 22.353. The relief sought by

CCEMS did not seek to prohibit any conduct or speech by Dolcefino.” Id. at 200.

Furthermore, the court was persuaded that adopting Dolcefino’s view of the TCPA as

“essentially forbidding CCEMS from seeking a declaration of its duties and

obligations” “would likewise undermine the clear directive that the TCPA ‘does not

abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under

                                          14
other constitutional, statutory, case, or common law or rule provisions,’ such as the

Declaratory Judgment Act.” Id. at 200–01 (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 27.011). Concluding that the ambulance service’s declaratory-judgment suit did not

implicate the TCPA, the court noted that it “address[ed] a genuine controversy that

[could] legitimately be resolved by the suit that CCEMS brought.” Id. at 201.

      With this backdrop, the Van Stean court agreed that “the declarations and

injunctive relief that the appellees seek do not implicate Texas Right to Life’s exercise

of the rights protected by the TCPA” because “[t]he appellees seek declarations that

SB 8 violates the Texas Constitution and that their own conduct cannot be the basis

for liability under that statute.” 2023 WL 3687408, at *5. As for the requested

injunctive relief, the appellees sought to permanently enjoin only “any efforts to

enforce SB 8 against them if SB 8 is declared unconstitutional.” 11 Id. As the Austin

court explained, the Van Stean and Planned Parenthood appellees were thus not

seeking to limit TRL’s “constitutional rights . . . to petition, speak freely, associate

freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law.”

Id. (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.002); see also Grant v. Finecy,

No. 02-23-00310-CV, 2023 WL 8940395, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 28,

2023, no pet. h.) (recognizing that “the TCPA’s broad definitions concerning the

      11
         Here, Lilith Fund pleaded for essentially the same thing, asking for a
“temporary injunction . . . enjoining [Weldon], and any of her agents and any person
or entity acting in concert with her from instituting lawsuits pursuant to SB 8 against
Lilith Fund until or unless this case comes to a conclusion.” [Emphasis added.]

                                           15
exercise of protected rights are necessarily restricted by the statute’s expressly stated

purpose ‘to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition,

speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the

maximum extent permitted by law’” and concluding that the TCPA did not apply to

plaintiff’s stalking claim predicated on conduct not protected by the First Amendment

(quoting Sanchez v. Striever, 614 S.W.3d 233, 245 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2020, no pet.))).

       The TCPA’s plain language also supported the first-step analysis in Van Stean

because of the TCPA’s purpose to protect not only a party’s constitutional rights but

also, as a counterbalance, to “protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for

demonstrable injury.” 2023 WL 3687408 at *6 (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

Ann. § 27.002). In the court’s view, if the TCPA were interpreted to forbid the

appellees from seeking an answer to SB 8’s constitutionality, that interpretation would

“undermine the [Legislature’s] clear directive that the TCPA ‘does not abrogate or

lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under other

constitutional, statutory, case, or common law or rule provisions,’ such as the

Declaratory Judgment Act.” Id. (quoting Dolcefino, 540 S.W.3d at 200–01); see also

Gilani, 2022 WL 714700, at *4 (same). Particularly because the declaratory-judgment

act is meant “to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect

to rights, status, and other legal relations” and “is to be liberally construed and

administered,” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.002(b), the Austin court easily

                                             16
separated the declarations that the appellees sought from the alleged protected

conduct to which TRL pointed. The long and the short of it was that “[t]he TCPA

does not allow Texas Right to Life ‘to bypass the protections accorded by the UDJA

to anyone whose own rights are affected by a statute,’” such as the appellees who

“assert[ed] that they have rights that are affected by SB 8.” Van Stean,

2023 WL 3687408, at *6 (quoting Dolcefino, 540 S.W.3d at 201–02).

      We can see no reason to disagree with our sister court. Although Van Stean did

not involve an earlier-filed Rule 202 petition, as this case does, we do not consider

that procedural difference significant enough to warrant a different outcome. 12 TRL

put up a website and Weldon filed a Rule 202 petition, but the consequent

declaratory-judgment actions filed by the Van Stean parties and Lilith Fund,

respectively, were not based on or in response to TRL’s or Weldon’s protected

conduct within the TCPA’s meaning.13

      We conclude and hold that the TCPA does not apply to Lilith Fund’s suit and

overrule Weldon’s first issue.

      12
         Choudhri, for example, involved a declaratory-judgment action filed after
Choudhri had initiated actual lawsuits, and the appellate court still held that the TCPA
did not apply because Lee’s declaratory-judgment action did not implicate Choudhri’s
right to petition. See 2020 WL 4689204, at *1–2.
      13
        The parties should not take our holding as suggesting that the TCPA would
never apply to declaratory-judgment claims, only that in a situation like this, where
Lilith Fund’s requested relief does not seek to prohibit Weldon from engaging in
constitutionally protected activity, the declaratory-judgment claim is of a type that is
properly protected from dismissal. See Gilani, 2022 WL 714700, at *4.

                                          17
      Remaining Issues

      Weldon’s sixth issue deals with whether Lilith Fund met its second-step TCPA

burden to establish a prima facie case for each element of its claims, an issue we need

not reach. See, e.g., TotalGen Servs., 2021 WL 210845, at *2 n.3. Her second through

fifth issues ask questions that do not involve a TCPA dismissal motion and that are

therefore beyond the scope of this narrow interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(12). Rule 47.1 of our procedural rules, properly

understood, acts as a brake to keep us from opining on unnecessary things, so we will

not. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

                                     Conclusion

      Having overruled Weldon’s dispositive first issue, and thus not needing to

reach her remaining issues, we affirm the trial court’s denial of her TCPA motion to

dismiss.

                                                     /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                                     Elizabeth Kerr
                                                     Justice

Delivered: March 7, 2024

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