Court Opinion

ID: 9691987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:34:38.667834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:29.616566
License: Public Domain

DUGGAN, J,
dissenting. Because I would conclude that the plain language of RSA 651-B:6, III subjects the defendant to lifetime registration as a sexual offender, I would reverse the order of the superior court.
We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Brown, 155 N.H. 590, 591 (2007). ‘When construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine the language found in the statute and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 643 (1999) (quotation omitted). “When a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond [it] for further indications of legislative intent.” State v. Comeau, 142 N.H. 84, 86 (1997) (quotation omitted). “Courts can neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include.” Appeal of Astro Spectacular, 138 N.H. 298, 300 (1994) (quotation omitted).
RSA 651-B:1, III (2007) defines a sexual offender as “a person who is required to register as a result of any violation or attempted violation of’ specified statutory offenses, including sexual assault. (Emphasis added.) A person is “required to register” if he “was charged with an offense... listed in this chapter that resulted in . . . conviction.” RSA 651-B:1, VII(a). Pursuant to RSA 651-B:6, III, “any sexual offender . .. who is required to register as a result of a violation of more than one offense listed in RSA 651-B:1, III.. . shall be registered for life.”
The State argues that by its plain language, RSA 651-B:6, III applies to the defendant because each violation of RSA 632-A:4 gives rise to an obligation to register as a sexual offender. The defendant argues that the trial court correctly ruled that the language and history of the statute evince a legislative intent that two or more convictions arising out of a single criminal episode do not trigger the lifetime registration requirement.
Specifically, the defendant argues that the use of the word “offense” demonstrates the legislature’s intent that the law apply to repeat offenders, citing Petition of State of New Hampshire, 152 N.H. 185 (2005), and State v. Gordon, 148 N.H. 710 (2002). In Petition, we considered whether the phrase “previously convicted of 2 or more offenses” in RSA 632-A:10-a, III required the imposition of a mandatory life sentence where the defendant received three convictions in the same adjudication. Petition, 152 N.H. at *439188. We held it did not. Id. at 191. Similarly, in Gordon, we held that “previously convicted of two or more offenses” required that prior convictions stem from separate criminal episodes. Gordon, 148 N.H. at 716.
Neither of those analyses applies here. Unlike the statute in Petition, RSA 651-B:6, III does not contain any language comparable to “previously convicted” that would require the qualifying offenses to be sequential or separated in time. The language also does not suggest that the offenses must arise from different criminal episodes like the statute in Gordon. The phrase “more than one offense” does not imply the need for the violations to occur sequentially as the word “previously” did in those cases. I agree with the State that, as used in RSA 651-B :1, III, “offense” refers to the list of specific crimes in the statute and that a “violation” or conviction of more than one of these specific crimes triggers the lifetime registration requirement.
RSA 651-B:12 (2007) does not change this result. It provides: ‘Whenever possible, the provisions of this chapter shall be interpreted and applied consistent with the provisions of the federal Jacob Wetterling Act, as amended.” Under the Act, as amended, lifetime registration is required if the person “has 1 or more prior convictions for [a qualifying] offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B)(i) (2006). By its reference to “prior convictions,” the federal act is similar to the “previously convicted” language in the statutes we interpreted in both Gordon and Petition where we held that the qualifying offenses must be in sequence.
RSA 651-B:12 requires us to interpret RSA chapter 651-B, Registration of Sexual Offenders, consistently with the federal act only “[w]henever possible.” Here, because the legislature has chosen to use language markedly different from that in Gordon, Petition and the federal statute, it is not possible to interpret RSA 651-B :6, III to require that one conviction temporally precede another without adding words to the statute, which we are not permitted to do.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.