Court Opinion

ID: 9906305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 17:10:06.146096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:14.803732
License: Public Domain

J-S29042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARK M. RING                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1324 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 19, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0004097-2006

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                           FILED DECEMBER 01, 2023

       Appellant, Mark M. Ring, appeals from the denial of a motion alleging

that the Commonwealth breached his 2007 plea agreement by making

negative parole recommendations in 2018, 2019, and 2021. Upon review, we

agree that the plea enforcement motion could be reviewed in part as a motion

seeking specific performance that was cognizable beyond the ambit of the

statutory limitations applicable to petitions for collateral review under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq.        We affirm the

denial of Appellant’s motion on the basis that the plea agreement was silent

as to Appellant’s parole eligibility and thus the Commonwealth’s negative

parole recommendations could not provide Appellant any basis for relief as a

matter of contract law.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S29042-23

       On July 6, 2006, fifty-three-year-old Joseph Tarreto was exiting his

backyard in the unit block of West Charles Street in Plains Township,

Pennsylvania, to take his dog for a walk when Appellant confronted him. N.T.

3/15/07, 12-13. A fight ensued during which Mr. Tarreto’s fiancée, Elizabeth

Powell, tried to get between the two men. Id. at 13. Ms. Powell retreated

into her home to call 9-1-1 when she heard Mr. Tarreto yell before several

gun shots were fired. Responding police officers found Mr. Tarreto, then dead,

in a grassy area about twenty feet from his backyard.          Id.   Ms. Powell

identified Appellant as the “person who was involved in the attack” on her

fiancé and directed the police to his residence. Id. Appellant returned to his

own home after the shooting and admitted to his girlfriend that he had shot

Mr. Tarreto. Id. at 14. Police recovered a 38-caliber gun from Appellant’s

basement that was later determined to have been used in the shooting. Id.

       On March 15, 2007, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to murder

of the third degree.1       N.T. 3/15/07, 2-18.   In exchange for the plea, the

Commonwealth agreed to recommend a sentence of twelve to twenty-four

years’ imprisonment and stipulated that Appellant was entitled to credit for

time served, starting on July 4, 2006. Id. at 2-4; Plea Agreement, 3/15/07,

1-2.   After sentencing was deferred for the preparation of a pre-sentence

investigation report, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon term of

imprisonment.       Plea Agreement, 3/15/07, 1; N.T. 3/15/07, 4, 18-19;

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c).

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Sentencing Order, 4/26/07, 1; N.T. 4/26/07, 22. Appellant did not file post-

sentence motions or an appeal.

       Appellant timely filed a pro se first PCRA petition alleging that ineffective

assistance of his prior counsel caused him to enter a guilty plea that was not

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Pro Se PCRA Petition, 4/9/08,

§ 5(A). Counsel was appointed. No amended petition was filed. The PCRA

court dismissed the pro se petition after a hearing, during which the court

heard testimony from Appellant and both of his trial attorneys, and the court

found no merit to his ineffective assistance claim. N.T. 5/28/08, 49-50; Order,

5/28/08, 1. This Court affirmed the dismissal, and our Supreme Court denied

a subsequent petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Ring, 996

A.2d 554 (Pa. Super. 2010) (table) (1118 MDA 2008), allocatur denied, 5

A.3d 819 (Pa. 2010) (table) (305 MAL 3010).

       While Appellant’s appeal from the dismissal of his first PCRA petition was

pending with this Court, he filed a pro se second PCRA petition. Because of

Appellant’s pending appeal, the PCRA court did not rule on the new petition.

Appellant filed a pro se amended second PCRA petition with a brief on

November 14, 2011.2          No action was taken on the second petition until
____________________________________________

2 The claim raised in the second petition was based on “corruption” in the
Luzerne County Court System and alluded to the scandal called “Kids-for-
Cash,” that involved former Judges Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan, and
which first came to light in 2008. Pro Se Second PCRA Petition, 3/30/09, §
5(A); Pro Se Amended Second PCRA Petition, 11/14/11, 3; Commonwealth
v. Ring, 2015 WL 7721930, *2 & n.2 (Pa. Super., filed Jan. 15, 2015)
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellant filed a pro se “Motion for Disposition” on October 8, 2013, in which

he requested a ruling on the second petition. Counsel was appointed and later

filed a Finley “no-merit” letter along with a petition to withdraw as counsel.3

The PCRA court issued a dismissal notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, in

which the      court found that the second petition was untimely and

jurisdictionally   time-barred      and   Appellant’s   new   claims   of   ineffective

assistance of counsel and an unlawfully induced plea were previously litigated.

Rule 907 Notice, 1/24/14, 1-2.            Appellant filed a pro se objection and a

supplement to his petition, following the grant of his counsel’s withdrawal

motion. The PCRA court dismissed the second PCRA petition on March 18,

2014. This Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Ring, 118 A.3d 444 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (table) (718 MDA 2014).

       While the second PCRA appeal was pending, Appellant filed a motion for

post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. In the motion,

Appellant sought “touch DNA” testing of a wooden spindle to advance a self-

defense claim. Motion for DNA Testing, 4/14/14, ¶¶ 9-10. After the second

PCRA appeal concluded, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 dismissal notice
____________________________________________

(memorandum opinion). In that scheme Judges Ciavarella and Conahan
accepted money from the builders of for-profit juvenile detention centers in
exchange for imposing overly harsh adjudications on offenders who would be
housed in those facilities. Appellant’s only allegation of the former judges’
involvement in his case was that, in June 2008, Judge Ciavarella appointed
counsel to represent him in connection with his appeal from the dismissal of
his first PCRA petition. Pro Se Amended Second PCRA Petition, 11/14/11, 6;
Ring, 2015 WL 7721930, *3 n.6.

3 Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

                                           -4-
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with respect to the motion requesting DNA testing. Rule 907 Notice, 3/12/15,

1-2. After Appellant filed objections and an amended motion for DNA testing,

the Commonwealth filed an ordered response and the PCRA court denied the

motion. Dismissal Order, 6/17/15, 1. This Court affirmed. Commonwealth

v. Ring, 145 A.3d 796 (Pa. Super. 2016) (table) (1238 MDA 2015).

      On February 7, 2022, Appellant filed a petition that is the subject of this

appeal and which Appellant styled as a “motion to vacate and resentence.” In

the motion, Appellant asserted that the Commonwealth failed to honor “the

exact terms” of his plea agreement. Plea Enforcement Motion, 2/7/22, 1. In

particular, he claimed that the Commonwealth was not complying with his

plea agreement because it submitted negative parole recommendations for

him in 2018, 2019, and 2021. Id. at ¶ 7; Memorandum in Support of Plea

Enforcement Motion, 3/9/22, 2. Appellant characterized the Commonwealth’s

actions as a breach of his plea agreement while admitting that the agreement

was silent on the subject of parole decisions: “Although there were no

[e]ssential terms in the [p]lea [a]greement precluding the [District Attorney’s]

office from taking a negative position on [Appellant’s] parole decisions, there

was no [e]ssential term in the [p]lea [a]greement allowing the [District

Attorney’s] office to do so, under [c]ontract law.” Memorandum in Support of

Plea Enforcement Motion, 3/9/22, 1-2.       As a result of a supposed breach in

those respects, Appellant requested resentencing to “time served” or any

remedy deemed necessary by the plea court. Id. at 5.

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       The Commonwealth filed a response in which it argued that Appellant’s

motion should be treated as an untimely PCRA petition and, in any event,

Appellant’s breach claim was meritless because the plea agreement did not

guarantee parole or that the Commonwealth would refrain from making any

negative parole recommendations. Commonwealth’s Response, 5/25/22, 3-

4. Appellant subsequently responded that his motion was not a PCRA petition

and alleged that the Commonwealth committed intentional misrepresentation,

and thus unlawfully induced his plea, by not revealing at his plea hearing a

supposed plan to later recommend against his parole. Appellant’s Answer,

6/22/22, 1-3.       On August 18, 2022, the lower court denied Appellant’s

motion.4 Order, 8/18/22, 1. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and a

court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).5       Notice of Appeal, 9/16/22, 1; Rule 1925(b) Order,

9/19/22, 1; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/11/22, 1-2.

       Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

____________________________________________

4 We note that the jurist who denied the instant motion was not the judge who

presided over Appellant’s plea hearing. See Lower Court Opinion, 12/14/22,
1 n.2.

5 Even without consideration of the prisoner mailbox rule, the 21-day deadline

for the filing the Rule 1925(b) statement would have been extended to 22-
days in this instance where the 21st day of the filing period fell on an observed
court holiday. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (“Whenever the last day of any such
period shall fall … on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this
Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the
computation.”); see also In re Schedule of Holidays, No. 544 Judicial
Administration Docket (Pa., filed Aug. 30, 2021) (identifying October 10, 2022
as an observed holiday).

                                           -6-
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      I.     Under contract law and [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 590(B)(2), did the
             negotiated plea agreement’s min[imum]/max[imum] years
             and exact terms create an objectively reasonable
             expectation to [Appellant], that as long as he was in
             compliance with the terms, he would be considered for
             parole by the parole board at his minimum sentence
             completion    without    negative     recommendations    or
             objections by any of the parties to the agreement or to any
             future or subsequent parole decisions?

      II.    Under contract law and negotiated plea agreements, did the
             [District Attorney’s] Office, by remaining silent about their
             intentions to submit negative recommendations to the
             parole board, intentionally misrepresent and secure a
             fraudulently induced plea agreement?

      III.   Did the lower court commit error by representing
             [Appellant]’s motion to vacate and resentence as a PCRA
             petition?

      IV.    Did the lower court err by not issuing a ruling of estoppel to
             enjoin the [District Attorney’s] Office from submitting
             further negative recommendations to the Parole Board?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (original in all caps; suggested answers and lower court

determinations omitted).

                                       I.

      In his first issue, Appellant asserts that he entered his plea agreement

with the “understanding that, as long as he was in compliance with the exact

terms set forth in the agreement, he would be considered for parole by the

parole board upon reaching his minimum term of 12 years WITHOUT

objections or negative recommendations by the parties to the plea agreement

and those represented by the [District Attorney’s] office.” Appellant’s Brief at

8 (emphasis in original).     He implies that the Commonwealth needed to

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bargain for the power to later make negative parole recommendations and, in

the absence of such a bargain, the Commonwealth breached the plea

agreement by making the parole recommendations. Id. (“The court did not

include any terms that the [C]ommonwealth would have the power to issue

negative recommendations to the parole board.”). Appellant characterizes his

underlying substantive claim as one seeking specific performance as a matter

of contract law: “Ring is challenging the [C]ommonwealth’s actions for going

outside the plea agreement and submitting negative recommendations to the

parole board as a breach of contract action.” Id. at 15.

      The lower court advises us that it found no basis for a contractual breach

of the plea agreement because the agreement was silent on issues concerning

parole and parole-related recommendations:

      The   [plea]    agreement      here    is  silent regarding     the
      Commonwealth’s ability to file negative recommendations with the
      Parole Board, a fact that [Appellant] concedes. Nor does the
      agreement indicate that [Appellant] would be guaranteed parole.
      Further, [Appellant] does not argue that the Commonwealth made
      any oral representations to him or to the court regarding
      recommendations to the Parole Board or otherwise. Accordingly,
      [Appellant’s] guilty plea here clearly does not rest on the promise
      or agreement of the [District Attorney] not to make a negative
      recommendation regarding parole. As a result, there was no
      breach of the plea agreement.

Lower Court Opinion, 12/14/22, 10 (record citation omitted). As the record

supports the lower court’s interpretation of the plea agreement, we agree that

Appellant has failed to demonstrate a breach entitling him to a remedy as a

matter of contract law.

                                     -8-
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        “[E]ven though a plea agreement arises in a criminal context, it remains

contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under contract law standards.”

Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444, 449 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc)    (citation   and    internal    quotation   marks   omitted).   “Contract

interpretation is a question of law, so [o]ur standard of review over questions

is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220 A.3d 607, 612 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

and internal quotations omitted).

        This Court has explained:

        Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill, when the
        parties enter the agreement and the court accepts and approves
        the plea, then the parties and the court must abide by the terms
        of the agreement. Specific enforcement of valid plea bargains is
        a matter of fundamental fairness. …

Kerns, 220 A.3d at 612 (citation omitted).            “Whether a particular plea

agreement has been breached depends on what the parties to the agreement

reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” Id. at 613 (citation

omitted).     Additionally, the terms of a negotiated plea agreement shall

generally be stated on the record, in open court.6 Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(B)(1).

____________________________________________

6 Rule 590(B)(1) also permits the trial court to order, for good cause and with

both parties’ consent, “that specific conditions in the agreement be placed on
the record in camera and the record sealed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(B)(1). Neither
the record, nor the arguments of the parties suggest that additional terms for
the plea agreement in this case needed to be reserved for an in camera
conference.

                                           -9-
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      With regard to plea agreements, “it is critical that [they] are enforced

to   avoid   any   possible   perversion   of   the   plea   bargaining   system.”

Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 449 (citation and internal quotations marks

omitted).

      Plea bargains which are entered knowingly and voluntarily are
      viewed with favor in this Commonwealth. If a trial court accepts
      a plea bargain, the defendant who has given up his constitutional
      right to trial by jury must be afforded the benefit of all promises
      made by the district attorney. Specific enforcement of valid plea
      bargains is a matter of fundamental fairness.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “disputes over

any particular term of a plea agreement must be resolved by objective

standards.    A determination of exactly what promises constitute the plea

bargain must be based upon the totality of the surrounding circumstances and

involves a case-by-case adjudication.”        Kerns, 220 A.3d at 612 (citation

omitted).    “Any ambiguities in the terms of the plea agreement will be

construed against the Government.          Nevertheless, the agreement itself

controls where its language sets out the terms of the bargain with specificity.”

Id. (citation omitted).

      In this case, the lower court is correct that the plea agreement makes

no reference to any promises concerning the Commonwealth’s ability to later

make negative parole recommendations. The terms of the plea agreement,

which were reduced to a written agreement and accepted by the parties at

the plea hearing, included the following terms:

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      1.    The Defendant, Mark M. Ring, knowingly, intelligently, and
            voluntarily agrees to plead guilty to Murder of the Third
            Degree, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §[ ]2502(c), a felony of the first
            degree (F1).

      2.    There is an agreement between the parties as to sentencing.
            The Commonwealth and Defense agree on a sentence of a
            minimum of twelve (12) years to a maximum of twenty-four
            (24) years[’] incarceration.

      3.    The Commonwealth and Defense agree that a pre-sentence
            investigation shall be ordered by the Court prior to
            sentencing.

      4.    The Defendant shall pay restitution to be determined by the
            Luzerne County Adult Probation & Parole Department.

      5.    The Defendant shall pay the normal and customary costs of
            prosecution.

      6.    The Defendant shall submit a DNA sample.

      7.    The Defendant will have no contact, either directly or
            indirectly, with the victim’s family, including the victim’s
            former fiancée, Elizabeth Powell.

      8.    The Defendant is legally entitled to credit for time served
            from July 4, 2006[,] until the date of sentencing.

Plea Agreement, 3/15/07, 1-2; N.T. 3/15/07, 2-6.

      The terms favorable to Appellant – and enforceable through specific

performance – were “an agreement … as to sentencing” and an agreement

that Appellant was entitled to a credit for time served starting on the date of

his arrest. A simple review of the stated terms, under an objective review,

does not support the conclusion that Appellant reasonably understood that the

Commonwealth would be hindered from making any recommendations

concerning subsequent parole decisions. Eligibility for parole consideration is

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a function of an imprisonment term, but a parole recommendation made years

after sentencing is not part of an agreed-upon state sentence imposed by a

trial court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lee, 876 A.2d 408, 412 (Pa. Super.

2005) (“Inasmuch as the decision to grant parole rests exclusively with the

[Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole], the issue of parole is not a

fundamental norm underling the sentencing process.”).       Accordingly, the

“agreement … as to sentencing” in this case had no bearing on the

Commonwealth’s ability to make a negative parole recommendation when

Appellant satisfied his minimum imprisonment term.7

       The Commonwealth committed no breach of the plea agreement in this

case by making negative parole recommendations.          The fact that the

Commonwealth later made negative parole recommendations did not

constitute an addition to the imprisonment term that Appellant was promised.

Appellant still received exactly what he was promised: a prison term with a

minimum term of twelve years and a maximum term of twenty-four years

____________________________________________

7 While the parties do not point to any caselaw addressing plea agreements

that contemplate parole recommendations, and our research fails to uncover
any prior opinions addressing similar fact patterns, we find no reasons why
that could not have been a bargained-for term that could have been made
part of another hypothetical plea agreement. We note that we have previously
enforced plea bargain terms requiring a prosecutor to remain silent as to any
sentencing recommendation in cases where the parties could not reach an
agreement as to a recommended sentence.            See Commonwealth v.
Martinez, 539 A.2d 399, 403-04 & n.2 (Pa. Super. 1988) (remanding for
resentencing by another judge where a prosecutor breached an agreement to
make no recommendation as to sentencing and the defendant did not raise a
challenge to the validity of his guilty plea).

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with credit for time served from the date of his arrest. There being no breach

of the plea agreement, Appellant’s first issue fails for lack of merit.

                                       II.

      In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth

committed an intentional misrepresentation by not informing him at the time

of his plea of its supposed intention to submit negative recommendations for

parole (after the service of his minimum twelve-year imprisonment term) and,

as a result, the Commonwealth fraudulently induced the entry of his plea.

Appellant’s Brief at 16-19. This claim is unreviewable where it could only be

pursued through a timely-filed PCRA petition or an untimely-filed PCRA

petition in which Appellant pleaded and offered to prove the applicability of an

exception to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar. Even assuming that we could

address the claim on the merits, Appellant would not be entitled to relief

because the Commonwealth had no burden to address his parole eligibility at

the plea hearing and Appellant’s lack of knowledge concerning the parole

process had no bearing on the voluntariness of his plea.

      Appellant appears to base the instant claim on a contract law theory by

citing, inter alia, the second restatement of contracts for the elements of a

fraudulent misrepresentation claim.          Appellant’s Brief at 19; see also

Appellant’s Answer, 6/22/22, 2-3. This claim in unreviewable for our purposes

because our Supreme Court has stated that “claims that could be brought

under the PCRA must be brought under that Act.            No other statutory or

common law remedy ‘for the same purpose’ is intended to be available;

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instead, such remedies are explicitly ‘encompassed’ within the PCRA.”

Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis in

original); see also Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa.

1998) (stating the PCRA shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief

and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same

purpose). A claim of unlawful inducement of Appellant’s plea could only be

raised in a PCRA petition as a claim of that nature is specifically recognized as

cognizable under the PCRA.      See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iii) (among the

claims cognizable under the PCRA are allegations of “[a] plea of guilty

unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the

inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is

innocent”).

      Appellant both argues for and against the application of the PCRA and

its jurisdictional time-bar as follows:

      One possibility for the lower court’s other jurisdiction would be
      through Title 42 Pa.C.S. §[ ]9545(b)[(1)](ii) where the facts were
      unknown to [Appellant] and could not have been ascertained by
      due diligence.     The Comm[onwealth] raises 42 Pa.C.S. §[
      ]9543(a)(2)(iii) and suggests that [Appellant’s] issue is cognizable
      but [Appellant] is not claiming            innocence so [the]
      Comm[onwealth’s] rationale fails.

Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3.     Appellant’s attempt to assert the time-bar

exception at § 9545(b)(1)(ii) in passing is unavailing where Appellant failed

to make any time-bar exception arguments before the lower court. Appellant

waived any time-bar exception arguments by not preserving them in a PCRA

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petition filed with the lower court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised

in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.”); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super.

2007) (“exceptions to the time bar must be pled in the PCRA petition, and

may not be raised for the first time on appeal”).

      To the extent that Appellant argues that his plea inducement claim is

not cognizable under the PCRA and thus he is not subject to the PCRA’s

timeliness requirements on account of his decision to omit a claim of innocence

for purposes of review under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iii), he fails to account

for prior decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court which have treated

claims of plea inducement caused by breached plea bargains as cognizable

claims for collateral review under the PCRA and its pre-cursor act, the Post

Conviction Hearing Act. See Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441, 443

n.1 (Pa. 1976) (post-conviction petition under the PCHA raised a cognizable

claim where defendant contended that his guilty plea was involuntary because

of a breached plea bargain); Commonwealth v. Kroh, 654 A.2d 1168, 1171

n.1 (Pa. Super. 1995) (explaining that a claim that defendant’s guilty plea was

unlawfully induced where the Commonwealth breached a plea agreement is

cognizable under the PCRA). Where similar claims have been reviewed under

our post-conviction collateral review statutory schemes – without specific

reference to adjoining claims of innocence – we will not accept Appellant’s

baldly-stated assertion that his plea inducement claim is not cognizable under

the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (The PCRA “shall be the sole means of

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obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and

statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes

effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.”).

      Even if we had jurisdiction to address a claim that the Commonwealth

unlawfully induced Appellant’s plea by not apprising him of a future intention

to make negative parole recommendations (assuming that the Commonwealth

was contemplating Appellant’s parole eligibility at the time of the 2007 plea

hearing), Appellant’s theory for inducement fails due to our holding that there

was no breach in response to his first claim presented. If there was no term

of the plea agreement that was related to parole or future parole

recommendations, the Commonwealth had no burden to make any expression

to   Appellant   concerning   his   future   parole   eligibility.   In   turn,   the

Commonwealth’s silence at the plea hearing concerning future parole

recommendations had no bearing on the voluntariness of the plea. See Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (there is no constitutional or statutory

requirement that a federal court advise a defendant about parole eligibility in

order for the defendant’s plea to qualify as voluntary); Commonwealth v.

Stark, 698 A.2d 1327, 1331-32 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding that courts need

not inform defendants of parole eligibility circumstances at guilty plea

hearings, and relatedly only need to inform defendants, among other

necessary elements for a voluntary plea colloquy, of the permissible range of

sentences and the maximum punishment that might be imposed; treating a

defendant’s eligibility for parole as a “collateral consequence” of a guilty plea);

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id. at 1332 (“we hold that the court need not advise a pleading defendant of

the release rules of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole or his

chances for parole, even assuming the court could predict such an

administrative procedure.”).

      As we will address infra in section III, Appellant could present a specific

performance claim based on a contract law theory outside the confines of a

proceeding controlled by the PCRA. At the same time, Appellant could not use

a plea enforcement motion as a mechanism for seeking review of a plea

inducement claim that needed to be raised consistent with the PCRA. Hall,

771 A.2d at 1235.      The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional

requisite. Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 148 A.3d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 2016).

A judgment of sentence, for the PCRA’s purposes, becomes final at the

conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42

Pa.C.S. § 9543(b)(3). A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the

date the judgment becomed final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The exceptions

to the PCRA time-bar allow for very limited circumstances under which the

late filing of a petition will be excused; a petitioner asserting an exception

must file a petition within one year of the date the time-bar exception claim

could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)-(2). Here, the judgment

of sentence has long since been final by more than a decade and the instant

plea inducement claim was never raised in a timely PCRA petition or a PCRA

petition in which Appellant even attempted to plead and offer to prove the

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applicability of a PCRA time-bar exception.8 In these circumstances, we have

no jurisdiction to address Appellant’s plea inducement claim based on a

contractual misrepresentation theory. See Commonwealth v. Derrickson,

923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[i]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither

this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition.     Without

jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the

substantive claims.’”) (citation omitted).

                                           III.

       In his third issue, Appellant addresses the lower court’s response to the

claim raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement in which he alleged that lower court

erred by treating his plea enforcement motion as a PCRA petition.            He

concedes that the claim is moot because the lower court agreed in its opinion

that the motion was not a PCRA petition. Appellant’s Brief at 20, citing Lower

Court Opinion, 12/14/22, 12. This claim requires no response, but we use the

occasion to note that we agree that the petition at the focus of this appeal was

a reviewable petition that intended to enforce the terms of the parties’ plea

agreement via a claim of specific performance. While we ultimately do not
____________________________________________

8 Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 28, 2007, the first

weekday after the thirty-day deadline for filing a direct appeal expired where
Appellant chose not to file any timely post-sentence motions.
Commonwealth v. Ring, 2015 WL 7721930 at *3 (noting that Appellant’s
judgment of sentence became final in May 2007); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (“a
judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review … or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review”); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (“Whenever the
last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, … such day shall
be omitted form the computation.”).

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find that any contract breach occurred necessitating the grant of relief to

ensure specific performance, we concur that the lower court properly reviewed

Appellant’s breach claim without resorting to application of the PCRA.9 See

Kerns, 220 A.3d at 611-12 (“a collateral petition to enforce a plea agreement

is regularly treated as outside the ambit of the PCRA and under the contractual

theory of specific performance”).

                                               IV.

       In his last issue, Appellant asserts that the lower court erred “by not

offering   promissory      estoppel     as      a    possible   remedy   to   enjoin   the

[C]ommonwealth from continuing to submit negative recommendations to the

parole board.” Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. This claim is waived as the record

does not reflect that Appellant made any request seeking to enjoin future

parole recommendations by the Commonwealth based on a theory of

promissory estoppel in his filings before the lower court. Appellant’s argument

only refers to the claim being raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement and our

independent review fails to uncover any reference to estoppel in either

Appellant’s plea enforcement motion or his answer to the Commonwealth’s

response to his motion. Appellant is unable to raise an estoppel issue for the

first time on appeal and thus this claim is unreviewable for purposes of this

____________________________________________

9 As addressed supra in section II, we hold otherwise that the plea inducement

claim that was raised in the Appellant’s answer to the Commonwealth’s reply
to his plea enforcement motion was cognizable under the PCRA and could not
be reviewed where it was not presented in a PCRA petition that raised any
arguments for the application of a statutory time-bar exception.

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appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see, e.g., Walton v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank,

545 A.2d 1383, 1385 (Pa. Super. 1988) (“We find no evidence in the record

that appellants ever raised a claim of estoppel in the court below.             We

therefore find this contention waived.”).10

       We affirm the denial of Appellant’s plea enforcement motion where there

was    no   term    in   the   plea    agreement   concerning   parole   or   parole

recommendations and thus the Commonwealth did not breach the agreement

by making negative parole recommendations. We conclude that Appellant’s

claim that the Commonwealth unlawfully induced his plea was cognizable

under the PCRA and is unreviewable where Appellant included it in a plea

enforcement motion, rather than a PCRA petition, and never advanced any

arguments for an applicable exception to the PCRA’s time-bar in his filings

____________________________________________

10 Even assuming arguendo that this claim based on promissory estoppel were

not waived, it would be meritless because the Commonwealth did not promise
to refrain from making any parole recommendations as part of the plea
agreement in this case. Where Appellant failed to broach any bargained-for
term concerning parole recommendations in his plea negotiation, there would
be no basis under estoppel to enjoin the Commonwealth from making any
future negative parole recommendations.         The lower court properly
appreciated this in its Rule 1925(a) opinion:

       [T]he [District Attorney] made no promise with regard to making
       recommendations to the Parole Board. Because this court finds
       that the [District Attorney’s O]ffice did not break their agreement
       with [Appellant] – nor make any promise to [Appellant] regarding
       his eventual parole consideration by the Parole Board – there was
       no reason to consider promissory estoppel as a remedy.

Lower Court Opinion, 12/14/22, 12.

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before the lower court. Appellant’s promissory estoppel claim is waived for

our purposes where it is raised for the first time on appeal.

     Plea enforcement motion denial affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/01/2023

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