Court Opinion

ID: 197417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2011-02-07 03:29:48+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:06.852537
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                        

No. 96-2082

                     ANNETTE B. DeMAURO,

                    Plaintiff, Appellant,

                             v.

    JOSEPH M. DeMAURO, EDWARD MARTIN, DeMAURO CO., INC.,
NICHOLAS DeMAURO, TRI-AREA DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. and JOAN MARTIN,

                   Defendants, Appellees.

                                        

        APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

       [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]

                                        

                           Before

                    Boudin, Circuit Judge,

                Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,

                  and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

                                        

S. James Boumil for appellant.
Kathleen M.  Morrissey  with  whom  Bernard  A. Dwork,  Roger  T.
Manwaring, Barron & Stadfeld, P.C., Richard L. Fox and Carragher & Fox
were on brief for appellees Edward Martin, DeMauro Co., Inc., Nicholas
DeMauro, Tri-Area Development Co., Inc. and Joan Martin.

                                        

                        June 11, 1997
                                        

     BOUDIN,  Circuit  Judge.   In  this  case,  one  of  the

participants in  a  pending divorce  action has  invoked  the

federal racketeering statute to challenge asset transfers  by

her spouse.   The district court responded by dismissing  the

complaint without prejudice  on abstention grounds.   Because

dismissal  was on  the  pleadings,  we assume  the  truth  of

statements in the complaint, cautioning that they have yet to

be proved.

     Annette and Joseph DeMauro were married in 1979.  Joseph

worked 
                  in 
                     the construction business and, according to Annette,

earned "millions of dollars," promising to share monies  with

Annette.  But  the marriage proved  less successful than  his

business.  The couple separated, and in 1994, Annette--a  New

Hampshire resident--sued for  divorce in New Hampshire  state

court.

     The divorce  action  has  been a  bitter  and  prolonged

contest.  At various times, Joseph has refused to pay spousal

support 
                   orders (which total more than $250,000), has failed to

appear for court proceedings, has resisted discovery requests

concerning his income and property interests by invoking  the

Fifth 
                 Amendment, 
                            and 
                               has 
                                   been held in contempt of court.  After

more than two years, the divorce action remains unresolved.

     In 
                   May 
                       1996, 
                            Annette 
                                    filed the instant suit in the federal

district court in Massachusetts.  The complaint named  Joseph

and 
               five 
                    other defendants:  Joseph's 42-year-old son, Nicholas

                             -2-
                                         -2-

DeMauro; Joseph's sister and brother-in-law, Joan and  Edwar

                       ons allegedly controlled by Joseph and

 icholas--DeM
                        auro Co., Inc. and Tri-Area Development Co., Inc.

Joseph
                                                                        d
            Martin; 
                   and 
                      two 
                          corporati
            N      was alleged  to have a residence in Massachusetts  and

both corporations had offices in the state.

     The 
                    complaint 
                              set 
                                 forth 
                                       a RICO claim for civil conspiracy,

18 U.S.C. S 1961  et seq., specifying predicate  racketeering

acts of (1) mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. S 1341, (2) wire fraud,  18

U.S.C. S  1343,  and (3)  "extortionate threats,"  18  U.S.C.

S 1951.  The complaint also alleged pendent state-law claims1

for intentional infliction  of emotional distress, breach  of

fiduciary 
                     duty, 
                          conspiracy, fraudulent conveyances, and illegal

telephone recordings.

     In 
                   support 
                           of the RICO claim, the complaint charged inter

alia  that  Joseph  and  the  other  defendants  fraudulently

concealed 
                     from 
                         Annette 
                                 separate and marital property to prevent

her 
               from 
                    sharing in these assets.  Annette alleged that Joseph

and the other defendants

     by means of  false pretenses, representations,  and
     devices established bank and investment accounts in
     Switzerland,    [the]    Middle    East,    France,
     Liechtenstein, several states of the United  States
     and 
                    various 
                            and sundry other locations most of which
     accounts 
                         were established under the names of straws,
     sham   trusts,    shell   companies    and    phony

  
              
               
                
                1
                 Diversity 
                          jurisdict
                                   ion was not available because although
Joseph 
                  is 
                     apparently not a New Hampshire resident, Annette and
the Martins are New  Hampshire residents, thus defeating  the
complete 
                    diversity 
                             requirement.  Casas Office Machines, Inc. v.
Mita 
                Copystar America, Inc., 42 F.3d 668, 673 (1st Cir. 1994).

                             -3-
                                         -3-

     "foundations,
                             " all designed to conceal the location,
     extent, and existence of assets from [Annette]  and
     persons with whom [Joseph] did business.

     The  alleged activity  was undertaken  not by  Annette's

husband 
                   alone, 
                          but 
                             also 
                                  by others who comprised an alleged RICO

"enterprise," and it  involves alleged concealments "well  in

excess 
                  of 
                     a 
                       million dollars."  And, allegedly, Joseph not only

threatened to deprive Annette of assets but also boasted that

he had  bribed foreign officials  to secure  himself a  false

identity and foreign passport.

     In June 1996, all the defendants except Joseph moved  to

dismiss 
                   the 
                       suit 
                           on 
                              various grounds, including lack of standing

to 
              bring 
                    RICO claims and failure to plead fraud with requisite

particularity, 
                          Fed. 
                              R. 
                                 Civ. P. 9(b).  Joseph did not join these

motions because he  had not yet been served process,  despite

efforts 
                   by 
                      Annette 
                             to 
                                locate and serve him.  Joseph was finally

served  with process  while  appearing involuntarily  in  New

Hampshire state court, having been arrested and brought there

for a hearing on his failure to pay ordered spousal support.

     On July 26, 1996, the district judge issued a seven-page

order. 
                   
                   He 
                     expressed 
                               doubt whether Annette had shown a property

interest protectible  under the  civil RICO  statute; but  he

ultimately did  not decide this  issue and instead  dismissed

without 
                   prejudice Annette's claims against all the defendants.

The dismissal  was  based  upon the  doctrine  of  abstention

established in Burford v.  Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315  (1943).

                             -4-
                                         -4-

Rather  than  staying  the  federal  proceedings,  the  court

dismissed, noting that Annette could

     replead if and when she can show a "property" right
     which . . . has been denied her by the  defendants'
     allegedly  illegal transfers--that  is,  after  the
     resolution of the divorce action and the  attendant
     allocation of marital assets.

     The  parties  had  not  addressed  the  possibility   of

abstention 
                      in 
                        their 
                              filings.  In August 1996, Annette moved for

reconsideration, arguing that  abstention was not proper  and

that, if it  were proper, the  court should stay  proceedings

rather 
                  than 
                      dismissing 
                                 the action.  The court denied her motion

without comment.  Annette now appeals.

     1.  For reasons that will become evident, we begin  with

the threshold issue bypassed  by the district court,  namely,

whether the plaintiff has made out a claim of "injury" to her

"business 
                     or 
                       property," 
                                  as is required for a civil RICO damages

action.  18 U.S.C. S 1964(c).  This is sometimes described as

a "standing" issue.   There is plainly a case or  controversy

under 
                 Article III; but the statutory precondition of injury to

business or property must  also be met.  Sedima, S.P.R.L.  v.

Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).

     One  might think  it obvious  that a  precondition in  a

federal 
                   statute 
                           would 
                                be 
                                   defined uniformly by federal law.  Cf.

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483  U.S.

143, 147-49 (1987) (civil RICO statute of limitations).  This

is especially so where the same phrase--injury to business or

                             -5-
                                         -5-

property--is also a long-standing requirement under section 4

of  the  Clayton Act,  15  U.S.C. S  15(a).   Yet,  the  RICO

precedents are filled with references to state property  law,

which is  often said to  govern by implicit  cross-reference.

E.g., Doe v. Roe, 958  F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1992)  (citing

cases).

     Some role does exist for state law.  There is no general

federal law of property transfers, so the question who owns a

piece 
                 of 
                    property 
                            is 
                               likely to be settled by state law.  On the

other hand, one might expect federal law to decide whether  a

given 
                 interest, recognized by state law, rises to the level of

"business 
                     or 
                       property," 
                                  or whether "injury" has been done to it

by 
              the 
                  acts 
                       alleged.2  Where to set the "business or property"

threshold  depends on  federal  statutory purpose,  and  that

purpose is  likely to support  a definition  that is  uniform

throughout the country.

     In all events, the assets that Annette ultimately claims

to have been concealed are "property" by any definition:  the

complaint 
                     alleges fraudulent concealment and transfers of real

property 
                    and 
                        bank account funds by Joseph.  One difficulty--so

far as we can tell from the undeveloped record--is that  most

(perhaps all)  of this property may  have been held from  the

  
              
               
                
                2
                 E.g.
                     , 
                       A
                        ssociated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,  529-45
(1983) (examining the meaning of "injury" under section 4  of
the Clayton Act); compare Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d
566, 579-80 n.10 (1st Cir. 1996) (Lynch, J., concurring).

                             -6-
                                         -6-

outset in  Joseph's name  or in the  name of  others such  as

foundations 
                       that he controls.  The complaint also implies that

most 
                (perhaps all) of the underlying assets were the result of

the success of Joseph's construction business.

     New 
                    Hampshire 
                              is 
                                not 
                                    a 
                                      community property state, see Baker

v. 
              Baker
                   , 
                     421 A.2d 998, 1000 (N.H. 1980), and much of the real

property and monies described in the complaint may not yet be

Annette's property.  To  this extent, what Annette has is  an

expectancy:  in the divorce proceedings, some or much of this

property may be awarded  to Annette.  State law provides  for

"equitable division" in divorce actions of "all tangible  and

intangible property and assets  . . . belonging to either  or

both 
                parties, 
                        whether 
                                title to the property is held in the name

of either or both parties."  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 458:16-a.

An equal division is presumptively equitable.  Id. S  458:16-

a(II).

     If the real and other tangible property, or most of  it,

belongs 
                   to 
                      Joseph, 
                             can 
                                 it still be said that Annette's divorce-

suit claim to a share is also "property" protectible by RICO?

Possibly so.  Some precedent, at least under the Clayton Act,

extends 
                   protection 
                             to 
                                intangibles under certain circumstances.3

     3E.g., E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour
Manual 
                  Comm.,
                         467 F.2d 178, 184 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S.  1109  (1973) (contracts  are "property"  under  the
Clayton Act); cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
430-33 
                  (1982) (right to use adjudicatory procedures created by
state 
                 Fair 
                      Employment Practices Act is "property" protected by
the Due Process Clause).

                             -7-
                                         -7-

But even if we assume arguendo that Annette's claim is itself

protected property,  the  question remains  whether  Joseph's

alleged efforts to  conceal what is still his property  (real

property  and cash)  has  "injured" Annette's  property  (her

inchoate claim).

     Certainly, Annette  may  be  worse off  because  of  the

concealment; 
                        but her legal claim remains intact, together with

various 
                   remedies directed at concealment of assets.  (In fact,

she has already obtained attachments in state court totalling

$33 
               million 
                       on property owned partly or solely by Joseph.)  No

one 
               knows 
                     what 
                         Annette 
                                 will be awarded in the divorce action or

whether Joseph's alleged efforts  to conceal will hamper  her

ability to collect.  In sum, any claim of present "injury" to

her 
               claim 
                     is 
                        speculative, so long as we are concerned with the

movement  of real property  or cash that  for now belongs  to

Joseph.

     Pertinent here  is a  decision of  this court  upholding

dismissal of  a civil RICO claim  brought by a plaintiff  who

alleged injury based on a "hypothetical inability to recover"

if it won its pending contract lawsuit against the defendant.

The 
               defendant 
                        had 
                            allegedly made fraudulent transfers of assets

to his wife; but we held that the RICO claim was not ripe for

adjudication because the claimed injury was too  speculative.

                             -8-
                                         -8-

Lincoln  House, Inc. v.  Dupre, 903 F.2d  845, 847 (1st  Cir.

1990).  This and like decisions4 seem directly on point.

     To be sure, there is a certain arbitrariness in  drawing

the line here.   But while RICO  is to be construed  broadly,

Sedima, 473  U.S. at  498,  "injury to  property" is  not  an

infinitely 
                      elastic 
                             concept.  And in cases like this, it is hard

to 
              see 
                  how 
                      a 
                        court would calculate damages now, given the dual

uncertainties of what Annette will be awarded and how it will

be 
              affected 
                       by concealment.  See First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt

Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

115 
               S. 
                  Ct. 
                      728 (1995) ("[A]s a general rule, a cause of action

does 
                not 
                    accrue under RICO until the amount of damages becomes

clear and definite.").

     This conclusion--that Annette has not adequately alleged

injury to her  property--applies only to the extent that  the

concealed  property currently  belongs  solely to  Joseph  or

others.  However, the complaint also asserts that Joseph  has

sought to conceal  "marital" or "separate" property.  To  the

extent that Annette is claiming a present ownership interest,

she appears to be asserting injury to her property within the

terms 
                 of 
                    the 
                       RICO 
                            statute.  Cf. Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506,

     4See  Barnett v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 977 n.4 (7th  Cir.
1990); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1106  (2d
Cir. 1988), cert.  denied, 490 U.S.  1007 (1989); Capasso  v.
Cigna Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

                             -9-
                                         -9-

516-17 
                  (9th 
                       Cir.), 
                             cert. 
                                   granted, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996), cert.

dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).

     Admittedly,  Annette's  allegations  of  ownership   are

confusing 
                     and 
                         in 
                           certain 
                                   respects lack supporting detail.  They

certainly could be explored through inquiry and discovery and

could be tested,  if doubtful, by a  motion to dismiss or  by

summary  judgment.   Still,  on  the  present  pleadings  the

possibility remains  that Annette  already owns  some of  the

property allegedly concealed  by Joseph and others.  On  that

premise, we turn to the issue of abstention.

     2. 
                    
                    We 
                       note 
                           at 
                              the 
                                  start 
                                        that the district court's remedy-

-dismissal 
                      on 
                        abstention 
                                   grounds--is not permissible.  Just two

months 
                  before 
                        the 
                            district court issued its ruling, the Supreme

Court 
                 held 
                      that abstention, under Burford or otherwise, may be

appropriate 
                       in 
                          suits 
                               for 
                                   damages.  Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.

Co.
              , 
                116 
                    S. 
                       Ct. 1712, 1728 (1996).  But the Court further held

that in a damages action, the district court may only order a

stay 
                pending 
                        resolution of state proceedings; it cannot invoke

abstention to dismiss the suit altogether.  Id.

     The rationale of  Quackenbush is  that damages  actions,

unlike suits for equitable relief, do not invoke the  court's

equitable 
                     discretion.  Id. at 1727.  This rule may seem rather

wooden, 
                   given 
                         the 
                            merger 
                                   of law and equity, but the Court means

what 
                it 
                   says: 
                          
                         Quackenbus
                                   h held that the dismissal of a damages

action  on Burford  grounds  was  reversible  error,  without

                            -10-
                                        -10-

deciding whether "a more limited abstention-based stay  order

would have been warranted on the facts of this case."  Id. at

1728.  There  is no question that  the present RICO claim  is

primarily a damages action.  See complaint, qq 62-67.  It  is

uncertain 
                     whether 
                            equitable relief is even available to private

plaintiffs under civil RICO.  Lincoln House, 903 F.2d at 848.

     The  question remains  whether  the district  court  has

authority 
                     at 
                        least 
                             to 
                                stay Annette's federal suit on abstention

grounds,  pending resolution  of  the New  Hampshire  divorce

proceeding.    In that  proceeding,  the  state  court  might

determine what property  is currently owned by Annette.   See

N.H. 
                Rev. 
                     Stat. Ann. S 458:16-a(II).  For this reason, another

district court--cited by the district court in this case--has

abstained 
                     from adjudicating a federal RICO action brought by a

spouse involved  in pending divorce  proceedings.  Farkas  v.

D'Oca, 857  F. Supp. 300, 303-04  (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  See  also

Dibbs v. Gonsalves, 921 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.P.R. 1996).

     This 
                     is 
                        not 
                           a 
                             wholly 
                                    persuasive reason given New Hampshire

law's stress  on an equitable  division of  all the  parties'

property. 
                      
                      The 
                         New 
                             Hampshire decree may just as well not decide

who owned specific property  prior to the divorce:  its  main

concern 
                   is 
                      with who will own what after the divorce.  And, the

Supreme Court has discouraged abstention based solely on  the

ground that a related state court action may address  similar

issues,  Colorado River  Water Conservation  Dist. v.  United

                            -11-
                                        -11-

States
                 , 
                   424 
                      U.S. 
                           800, 
                                817 (1976), with only limited exceptions,

e.g., Railroad Comm'n of  Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.  496

(1941). 

     A more  plausible basis for  abstention is the  possible

interference 
                        that a civil RICO action at this time might cause

to the state court's decision as to how to divide property in

the divorce.  The so-called domestic relations exception does

not preclude federal  courts from  adjudicating tort  actions

merely 
                  because the parties were married and are in the process

of 
              divorce. 
                        
                        Ankenbrandt
                                   
                                   v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992).

But this  case is  not just a  tort action between  divorcing

parties: 
                     
                     the 
                        civil 
                              RICO 
                                   claim is directed to the same property

that is going to be allocated between the parties as a result

of the decree.  Cf. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819.

     In 
                   this 
                        instance, 
                                 the 
                                     state court may be unlikely to award

Joseph any interest in property now owned solely by  Annette,

but that  is hardly so clear  with respect to property  owned

jointly.  Suppose  Annette were awarded  the value (or  three

times 
                 the 
                     value) 
                           of 
                              disputed jointly owned property in the RICO

case 
                and 
                    the 
                       state 
                             court 
                                   then determined that the same property

ought to be allocated to Joseph.  At the very least, there is

a    possibility     of    conflict    between     judgments,

      requiring one of them to be modified to take account of

the other.   Otherwise, the  state divorce decree's  intended

allocation of property could easily be frustrated.

                            -12-
                                        -12-

     Another 
                        potential 
                                 conflict is Annette's expressed interest

in 
              seeking 
                     interim 
                             relief from the federal court, presumably by

way 
               of 
                 provisional 
                             attachments or other ad litem remedies.  Cf.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 64; Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797  F.2d

43, 53 (1st Cir. 1986).  The federal court's ability to reach

and freeze out-of-state property may well be greater than the

New Hampshire  divorce court's.   At the  same time,  interim

allocations of property are standard fare for divorce courts,

and the obvious potential for interference with this function

is an extremely serious matter.

     Our 
                    case, 
                          and those kinds of threatened interference, are

not a  perfect fit  with the  Burford doctrine.   There,  the

Supreme Court  approved abstention to  avoid conflict with  a

comprehensive  state regime  of  business regulation.5    But

abstention 
                      doctrines are not "rigid pigeonholes," Pennzoil Co.

v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S.  1, 11 n.9 (1987), and the  ultimate

question is whether there are "exceptional circumstances"  in

which  abstention "would  clearly serve  an important  . .  .

interest." 
                       
                       Colorado 
                               Rive
                                   r, 424 U.S. at 813 (citation omitted).

Such an interest is potentially present here.  See also Minot

v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F.3d 590, 593-95 (2d Cir. 1994).

      5Burford, 319  U.S. at 326 (allocation of oil  drilling
rights). 
                     
                     See
                         also Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry.
Co.
              , 
                341 
                    U.S. 341, 346-48 (1951) (scheduling of local railroad
service); 
                     All
                        state Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228, 229 (1st
Cir. 1979) (setting of automobile insurance rates).

                            -13-
                                        -13-

     Not 
                    only 
                         divorce, but the allocation of property incident

to a  divorce, are longstanding  local functions governed  by

state  law.    Ankenbrandt,  while  curtailing  the  domestic

relations 
                     exception, 
                               nevertheless made clear the priority given

the state resolution of family law issues, including  alimony

determinations.  504 U.S. at  704, 706.  See also Friends  of

Children, Inc.  v. Matava, 766 F.2d  35, 37 (1st Cir.  1985).

Divorces 
                    are 
                       frequently 
                                  accompanied by disputes about property,

including 
                     both 
                         interim 
                                 and final allocations.  Such state court

authority 
                     would be threatened if civil RICO actions become the

shadow proceeding for policing such disputes.

     We conclude  that abstention  by use  of a  stay may  be

permissible 
                       where 
                             a 
                              RICO 
                                   action is directed against concealment

or transfer of property that is the very subject of a pending

divorce 
                   proceeding. 
                                
                               The 
                                   divorce proceedings might or might not

resolve  the   federal  dispute--there   are  many   possible

permutations and plenty of  unanswered legal questions.   But

staying  the federal  RICO  claim  will reduce  the  risk  of

interfering  with interim  state allocations  and permit  the

federal court to  tailor any final federal judgment to  avoid

undermining the divorce court's allocation of property.  

     3.  While  abstention may be  permissible, it cannot  be

automatic in  a case  of this kind.   A  decision to  abstain

requires not only that certain preconditions be met, but also

that 
                the 
                    district 
                            court 
                                  reasonably find that such abstention is

                            -14-
                                        -14-

appropriate in the case at hand.6  Of course, this may not be

much of an issue when the particular abstention rubric itself

 resumes 
                    stro

defendant  seeks a  federal  injunction interfering  with  an

ongoing state criminal trial.  Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 54.

     Cases 
                      like 
                           the 
                              present 
                                      one differ markedly from situations

like Younger.  Not only  do we have far less experience  with
            p           ngly in favor of abstention--for example, where a

civil  RICO actions  that  overlap divorce  proceedings,  but

extreme 
                   variations can be imagined both as to underlying facts

and equitable concerns.  Certainly in some instances a  civil

RICO claim  might be  so plausible  and so  distinct from  an

ordinary divorce action property dispute as to undermine  any

argument for a  stay; or even if  a trial were stayed,  there

might be a compelling argument for interim relief to  protect

the plaintiff's right to ultimate relief in the RICO action.

     In  sum,  abstention  here is  a  possible,  but  not  a

mechanical 
                      answer. 
                               
                              The 
                                  district court's judgment cannot stand,

simply 
                  because it conflicts with Quackenbush.  Nor do we think

that  the  dismissal on  abstention  grounds  can  simply  be

transformed into  a stay;  such a stay  might in  the end  be

equitably justifiable, but not  without giving the parties  a

     6See Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. at 1726-28; Colorado River,
424 U.S. at 818; Younger  v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54  (1971);
Bath 
                Memorial Hosp. v. Maine Health Care Fin. Comm'n, 853 F.2d
1007, 
                 1015 
                      (1st 
                          Cir. 
                               1988); Friends of Children, Inc., 766 F.2d
at 37.

                            -15-
                                        -15-

chance to address the matter and not without an appraisal  by

the court that goes beyond the possible overlap in issues.

     In 
                   making 
                          such 
                              an 
                                 appraisal, the district court is free to

consider the  plausibility  of this  civil  RICO claim  as  a

freestanding cause of action, the actual threat in this  case

for 
               conflict 
                        between such a suit and the pending state divorce

action, any threat of immediate harm associated with  alleged

ongoing  civil RICO  violations,  and other  consequences  or

concerns 
                    that make it equitably reasonable to accelerate or to

defer consideration  of federal relief.   Once the  pertinent

factors  are mustered  and  assessed,  the  district  court's

exercise of  judgment  is  normally respected.    Friends  of

Children, Inc., 766 F.2d at 37.

     The district  court  has  no obligation  to  pursue  the

abstention issue at all if the matter can be disposed of more

appropriately on other grounds.  Motions to dismiss have been

made for  lack of standing  (an issue  discussed above),  for

failure to  plead  fraud with  particularity, and  for  other

reasons.   Possibly,  further  exploration will  reveal  that

Annette 
                   has 
                       no standing as to any of the property in question.

In all  events, the order  in which to  consider issues is  a

matter for the district judge.

     The treatment  of the pendent  state claims depends,  in

turn, on the outcome of the inquiries just described.  If the

district  court finds  no  basis for  a  claim of  injury  to

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property, 
                     presumably 
                               it 
                                  will dismiss the pendent claims without

prejudice.  See 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3).  If it determines  to

stay the  civil RICO claim  on abstention  grounds, then  the

treatment of the  pendent claims is  less clear-cut, see  id.

S 1367(c)(4), but the parties have not addressed that  issue,

and we express no view upon it.

     The judgment of  the district court  is vacated and  the

matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with  this

decision.

     It is so ordered.

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