Court Opinion

ID: 9738391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:51:46.151186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.737127
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s recognition of this newly found constitutional right for the reasons stated in Justice Miller’s dissent. I write separately today, however, to focus on an equally important issue that has been overlooked by my colleagues: What standard for relief should apply to a post-conviction petitioner raising a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence? Without any analysis, the majority applies the standard applicable to a defendant’s post-trial motion for a new trial: i.e., the newly discovered evidence must be "new, material, noncumulative and *** ' "of such conclusive character” ’ as would ' "probably change the result on retrial.” ’ ” 171 Ill. 2d at 489. The majority then awards the defendant a new trial in which he can present his newly discovered evidence, the testimony of Jacqueline Martin. This standard is not appropriate for analyzing post-conviction petitioners’ claims of actual innocence for many reasons. The standard (1) does not comport with the rationale underlying the majority’s recognition of this due process right; (2) wrongly cloaks the already-convicted defendant with a new presumption of innocence; (3) gives no consideration to the need for finality in criminal proceedings; and (4) inappropriately requires a new trial, which may take place decades after the crime and original trial. Also, the standard is not consistent with that applied in other jurisdictions. The majority relies extensively on Justice Black-mun’s dissent in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), in recognizing this due process right, yet inexplicably fails to adopt his recommended standard for relief. The majority explains the rationale underlying its holding as follows: "The [United States] Supreme Court rejected substantive due process as means to recognize freestanding innocence claims because of the idea that a person convicted in a constitutionally fair trial must be viewed as guilty. That made it impossible for such a person to claim that he, an innocent person, was unfairly convicted. We think that the Court overlooked that a 'truly persuasive demonstration of innocence’ would, in hindsight, undermine the legal construct precluding a substantive due process analysis. The stronger the claim — the more likely it is that a convicted person is actually innocent — the weaker is the legal construct dictating that the person be viewed as guilty. A 'truly persuasive demonstration of innocence’ would effectively reduce the idea to legal fiction. At the point where the construct falls apart, application of substantive due process principles, as Justice Blackmun favored, is invited.” 171 Ill. 2d at 488. Like Justice Blackmun, the majority states that a " 'truly persuasive demonstration of innocence’ ” is required to overcome the strong presumption that the conviction obtained in the first trial is valid. 171 Ill. 2d at 488, quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 441, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 243,113 S. Ct. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.). Unlike Justice Blackmun, however, the majority applies a standard that does not require the defendant to make a truly persuasive demonstration of innocence. The majority’s standard entitles the defendant to a new trial if the newly discovered evidence of innocence merely will "probably change the result on retrial.” 171 Ill. 2d at 489. Consequently, the majority’s standard is wholly inconsistent with the rationale underlying its opinion. Justice Blackmun recommended a consistent standard. He would place the burden of proof on the defendant to make a truly persuasive demonstration of his actual innocence. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 442-43, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 243-44, 113 S. Ct. at 882-83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.). Justice Black-mun explicitly rejected, as too lenient, standards even more stringent than the majority’s standard. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 442-43, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 234-44, 113 S. Ct. at 882-83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.). In doing so, he explained: "I think the standard for relief on the merits of an actual-innocence claim must be higher ***. I would hold that, to obtain relief on a claim of actual innocence, the petitioner must show that he probably is innocent. This standard is supported by several considerations. First, new evidence of innocence may be discovered long after the defendant’s conviction. Given the passage of time, it may be difficult for the State to retry a defendant who obtains relief from his conviction or sentence on an actual-innocence claim. The actual-innocence proceeding thus may constitute the final word on whether the defendant may be punished. In light of this fact, an otherwise constitutionally valid conviction or sentence should not be set aside lightly. Second, conviction after a constitutionally adequate trial strips the defendant of the presumption of innocence. The government bears the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt [citations], but once the government has done so, the burden of proving innocence must shift to the convicted defendant. *** When a defendant seeks to challenge the determination of guilt after he has been validly convicted and sentenced, it is fair to place on him the burden of proving his innocence, not just raising doubt about his guilt.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 442-43, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 244, 113 S. Ct. at 882-83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.). Justice Blackmun therefore recognized that a proper standard for relief would be consistent with the rationale underlying this due process right. Unfortunately, the majority’s standard fails this most basic test. The second problem with the majority’s standard is that it allows the presumption of innocence to survive a constitutionally valid conviction. This happens because the defendant is awarded a new trial in which the State will again bear the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This result is not acceptable. An appropriate standard would recognize that a valid conviction strips the defendant of the presumption of innocence. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 443, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 244, 113 S. Ct. at 882-83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.). Accordingly, the defendant should bear the burden of proving his actual innocence. Third, the majority’s standard fails to give due consideration to society’s interests in the finality of criminal proceedings. An appropriate standard would take into account the passage of time and would recognize that it becomes substantially more difficult for the State to obtain convictions once memories have faded and evidence has disappeared. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 442-43, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 244,113 S. Ct. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.). Finally, the majority’s standard incorrectly relies on a retrial to determine whether the defendant is innocent. This procedure is seriously flawed. Awarding a new trial in this context unjustly places the burden of proof on the State to show, all over again, that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Couple this with the advantage a defendant will gain by being retried many years after the crime and original trial (here, 16 years) and the defendant’s enviable position becomes apparent. Although once validly convicted, the defendant now need only raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt in order to be released. Actually guilty defendants may succeed in gaining their freedom under the majority’s too-lenient standard. Justice Blackmun suggested a better procedure than retrying the defendant. He would hold an actual-innocence hearing, in which the deciding court would weigh the newly discovered evidence of actual innocence in favor of the defendant against the evidence of his guilt as presented at the original trial. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 443-44, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 244-45, 113 S. Ct. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.). As compared to new trials held decades later, such a procedure would produce a highly reliable result. It would also save the judicial system the expense of a new trial. Given the many serious problems with the majority’s standard, it is not surprising that other jurisdictions have explicitly rejected it. See Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 299 Conn. 397, 429, 641 A.2d 1356, 1372 (1994) (explaining in great detail why the "wholesale transplanting of the petition for new trial standard to a habeas petition based on a claim of actual innocence would not give due respect to [society’s interests]”); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 798 n.33, 855 P.2d 729, 761 n.33, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 541 n.33 (1993); State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 399 (Tex. Grim. App. 1994) (adopting a threshold standard in addition to the standard recommended by Justice White in his concurrence). This court should not have adopted it either. I urge my fellow justices to rectify this grave error as quickly as possible. JUSTICE MILLER joins in this dissent.