Court Opinion

ID: 9710480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:10:32.708502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.038961
License: Public Domain

J. X. Theiler, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in part and dissent in part to Judge Hood’s opinion. The insurance policy involved contains these relevant provisions entitled "Coverage X, Family Liability Protection” under part 1:
Losses we cover. We will pay all sums arising from the same loss which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage covered by this part of the policy.
We may investigate or settle any claim or suit for covered damages against an insured person. If an insured person is sued for these damages, we will provide a defense with counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are not true. We are not obligated to pay any claim or judgment or defend any suit if we have already exhausted the limit of liability by paying judgments or settlements.
Exclusions — Losses We Do Not Cover. 1 We do not cover any bodily injury or property damages which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or which is in fact intended by an insured person.
The policy clearly imposes two obligations upon the insurance company. One is to provide representation for an insured person who is being sued. The second obligation is to pay for losses which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay as damages. These obligations, while interconnected, are clearly two separate obligations.
The trial court determined that neither obliga*360tion was applicable to Alonda Freeman. For the reasons developed by Judge Hood in his opinion, I concur in that determination. As to the determination that the plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company, has no obligation to Marshall Freeman, either to provide coverage or a defense, I dissent.
The trial court and Judge Hood conclude that, since there is no obligation to provide coverage for the damages caused by Alonda Freeman’s tortious act, there is no obligation to defend her. Likewise, it is concluded that, since coverage for the claim is excluded, the obligation to provide representation to- Marshall Freeman is also excluded. I believe that this interpretation of the insurance policy would be clearly contrary to the reasonable expectation of the insured, Marshall Freeman.
Marshall Freeman and Alonda Freeman are husband and wife and were living together. They were both covered by the provisions of the so-called "Homeowner’s Policy.” We are not furnished with all of the contract provisions, but only with what the parties construed to be relevant portions. Accordingly, I limit my interpretation of the contract to those provisions cited as controlling and relevant.
I disagree with the conclusion that the claim against Marshall Freeman is a simple derivative claim and should not be covered because it may be categorized as a negligent entrustment claim. The husband is certainly not liable because of any statutory provision such as those which impose liability for the actions of others on the owners of motor vehicles, MCL 257.401; MSA 9.2101, or parents, MCL 318.253; MSA 13.1064(3), MCL 600.2913; MSA 27A.2913. Nor is he liable due to common-law concepts, such as respondeat superior or principal-agent. He is liable only if he acted negligently, the results of the subsequent acts by *361Alonda Freeman are proximately related to his negligence, and the subsequent acts could have been reasonably anticipated to occur.
There is no claim set forth that Marshall Freeman handed the gun to his wife or participated in any way in her taking and using the gun, other than having it present in his home. Whether such possession was negligent or not, or even if it was, whether it had a direct causal connection to his wife’s tort has not been pled, much less established. Even if there is no coverage for the injury, I see no reason why the exclusion provision should be applicable to the duty to defend. Had it been a child or a stranger who was negligently entrusted with the gun, Marshall Freeman would be entitled to a defense and to coverage for the damages. It is not a theory of derivative liability which determines the plaintiffs obligation, but solely the provision of the policy.
In deciding whether plaintiff assured Marshall Freeman that he was insured, or would be covered or provided with representation, it should be noted that the policy stated: "We will provide a defense with counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are not true.” Even if it is ultimately determined that the claim will not be paid because of a subsequently stated exclusion, does that automatically determine that the exclusion is likewise applicable to the duty to defend? Such meaning certainly is not clearly stated, but is ambiguous and would defeat the reasonable expectations of Marshall Freeman as to how he would be protected in the event that suit was brought against him.1_
*362I believe that the insurer is being permitted an exclusion of coverage that would defeat the reasonable expectation of the insured. Since such exclu*363sion was not clearly and unambiguously stated, it should not be permitted.
The crux of the matter is whether "an insured” is clear enough to be readily understood to mean "any insured” or is ambiguous because it can be reasonably construed to mean "that insured” or "the insured.” Further, even if there is no technical ambiguity, does that construction defeat the reasonable expectation of the purchaser of the policy?
1 now recognize, after dictionary perusal, that "an” is the indefinite article sometimes used in place of "a.” Further, "an” is in contrast to "the” and denotes a thing or person not previously noted or recognized.2 Such distinction would not be clearly recognized in ordinary context. It becomes significant here only after a close, detailed and technical analysis of the policy. It is akin to trying to catch and recognize the distinction between "a” and "the” when read in defining proximate cause concepts. Such fine distinctions may satisfy the law, but leave much to be desired in the art of communication.
We have the benefit of a recent pronouncement of our Supreme Court in Powers v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 427 Mich 602; 398 NW2d 411 (1986). While the Powers case involves no-fault auto insurance, the principles developed are applicable to other fields of insurance. The policy under consideration here is as much a policy of adhesion as is an auto insurance policy. Id. at 608. I will not succumb to the temptation to quote extensively from the opinion. Chief Justice Williams points out that it is the insurance company that writes the policy without any input from the purchaser and that few, if any, read the *364entire policy nor would they understand it if they did. Id. Here, as there, there is no public policy that the insurance policy cannot be written to provide an exclusion such as the one contended for by the plaintiff and as construed by the trial court and Judge Hood. However, it still remains to be determined whether such an exclusion is stated in such a manner as to be effective.3
After consideration of a number of pertinent cases, Justice Williams concludes at 427 Mich 627: "The implication of this rule is not only that ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer, but that the insurer has a positive and affirmative duty to 'make clear’ any exclusion.” He also stated that an "insurer may not 'escape liability (through) . . . forced construction of the language in a policy’ (Hooper) or '[technical constructions’ (Peitrantonio)” and further that " 'the courts have no patience with attempts by a paid insurer to escape liability by taking advantage of an ambiguity, a hidden meaning, or a forced construction of the language in a policy, when all questions might have been avoided by a more generous or plainer use of words.’ ” Powers, 628-629, quoting Hooper v State Mutual Life Assurance Co, 318 Mich 384; 28 NW2d 331 (1947).
If a simple "y” had been added to "an” to give us "any insured,” I would have little basis to dissent. Since this was not done, I would hold, as did Justice Williams in Powers, that, by using proper rules of construction, the stated exclusion should not be applicable to Marshall Freeman.
*365Even more persuasive is the adjunct to the rule of construction, the rule of "reasonable expectations.” Powers, p 631. This does not require an ambiguity. As developed by Justice Williams and by Justice Levin in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Ruuska, 412 Mich 321; 314 NW2d 184 (1982),4 which Justice Williams relies upon, the coverage provided is to be that which an insured person would reasonably expect to be provided, and "[i]f the insurer intends to exclude such coverage ... it is simple enough to say so.” Powers, p 633.
*366I would reverse as to Marshall Freeman and require plaintiff to provide a defense. A determination of whether plaintiff is also required to cover any claim against Mr. Freeman should be deferred until after trial.

 How can we determine if something is ambiguous? That is determined primarily on the basis of whether it is subject to two possible constructions. Even more difficult, how do we determine what is the reasonable expectation of an "insured”? We submit the following as a fictional scenario of what might occur:
*362Insured: "Mr. Insurance Man, when you sold me this insurance policy, on which I have been paying the premiums, you said it would provide me with protection, that if anybody claimed I had done something wrong, it would provide me with an attorney who would make them prove that I had done something wrong. Further, if I did make a mistake, I would be protected against that claim.
Now I’m in trouble and I would like to have you take care of it.
Agent: What is your problem?
Insured: My wife is being sued and they claim I also acted improperly and am responsible for what she did.
Agent: Oh, yes, we know about that, and unfortunately, you are not covered.
Insured: Not covered? What does that mean?
Agent: It means you are now not protected; it is out of our hands. It leaves you between a rock and a hard place.
• Insured: But the policy says I am covered, right here under "Family Liability Protection.”
Agent: Yes, but in the section down below there are exclusions.
Insured: Exclusions? What are those?
Agent: Those are the things that we list that we do not cover. It says right here that the claim is for the kind of wrongful acts that the policy does not cover.
Insured: But those are wrongful acts of my wife, they are not my wrongful acts.
Agent: Oh, yes. But the policy says that we don’t cover if there are wrongful acts on the part of an insured.
Insured: But it says "intentional or criminal acts of an insured”, and I did not commit any such acts.
Agent: But your wife did, and she is an insured.
Insured: But an “insured” means me, and I did no wrongful acts of that kind. Therefore, that "exclusion” as you call it, doesn’t apply to me.
Agent: If we had meant that it would only apply to acts by an insured who’s being sued, we would have said the insured, but here we say an insured.
Insured: Well, if you mean that why did you not say it? Why did you not say that an insured is not covered for an insured’s intentional acts, or criminal acts, or the acts of any other insured of that nature?
Agent: Well, that is what an insured means.
Uninsured: Well, I think that is ambiguous, not fair, and (expletives deleted).

 Dictionary definitions, such as Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary.

 Among those cited by Justice Williams, we find the following especially relevant: State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Ruuska, 412 Mich 321; 314 NW2d 184 (1982); Pietrantonio v Travelers Ins Co, 282 Mich 111; 275 NW 786 (1937); Hooper v State Mutual Life Assurance Co, 318 Mich 384; 28 NW2d 331 (1947); Boesky Bros Corp v USF&G Co, 267 Mich 628; 255 NW 307 (1934); Francis v Scheper, 326 Mich 441; 40 NW2d 214 (Í949); DeLand v Fidelity Health & Accident Mutual Ins Co, 325 Mich 9; 37 NW2d 693 (1949).

 See also the Court of Appeals decision therein affirmed, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Ruuska, 90 Mich App 767, 777-778; 282 NW2d 472 (1979), as follows:
In addressing this issue, we are guided by some general rules. Insurance policies must be construed in accord with the ordinary and popular sense of the language used therein. Michigan Mutual Liability Co v Mesner, 2 Mich App 350, 353; 139 NW2d 913 (1966). Insurance policies drafted by the insurer must also be construed in favor of the insured to uphold coverage. Shepard Marine Construction Co v Maryland Casualty Co, 73 Mich App 62, 64; 250 NW2d 541 (1976). This same rule applies to exclusion provisions in the policy. Kalamazoo Aviation, Inc v Royal Glove Ins Co, 70 Mich App 267, 270; 245 NW2d 754 (1976). To be given full effect, an insurer has a duty to clearly express the limitations in its policy. Francis v Seheper, 326 Mich 441, 447-448; 40 NW2d 214 (1949), Union Investment Co v Fidelity & Deposit Co of Maryland, 549 F2d 1107, 1110 (CA 6, 1977), and Ornamental Iron & Stair Co v General Accident & Life Assurance Corp, Ltd, 68 Mich App 259, 263; 242 NW2d 544 (1976). A technical construction of policy language which would defeat a reasonable expectation of coverage is not favored. Crowell v Federal Life & Casualty Co, 397 Mich 614, 623; 247 NW2d 503 (1976).
Justice Levin’s opinion in Powers, supra, p 645 states: "A policy of automobile insurance is not an ordinary contract. It is the classic contract of adhesion.”