Court Opinion

ID: 9711844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:40:25.726834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.895101
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE DOWNING specially concurring: 6  I concur that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed. In my opinion I think there is, as a matter of law, sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict of the jury. Cf. People v. Ricketson (2nd Dist. 1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 365, 379-80, 264 N.E.2d 220. The evidence as carefully and thoroughly set forth in this opinion by Justice Hayes, in my opinion, provides a sufficient basis upon which the jury could conclude that the conduct of the defendant in operating the automobile was reckless and that such recklessness caused the death of Sharon. The evidence presented by the State placed the defendant in the automobile on Huron Street, and placed the deceased in the street near and about the automobile. Under these circumstances that evidence, together with the strong, unrebutted scientific and technical evidence concerning the condition of the defendant’s car, in my opinion, supports the jury’s verdict of reckless homicide. It is to be noted that the defendant failed to contradict or impeach the strong scientific and technical evidence of the State. In addition, the jury had before it the testimony of the defendant which was contradicted on a number of points. To mention a few conflicts for example: whether Sharon was in the street near the car, whether Sharon and the defendant had been arguing about her keys, and whether Sharon’s key case, identified by the deceased’s parents as having been given to them by the defendant at the hospital, was, in fact, so given them. It is for the jury to resolve conflicting testimony, to determine what weight to give to particular testimony, and to resolve the question of the credibility of witnesses. Here the jury was perfectly justified in completely rejecting the testimony of the defendant. It should also be noted that with all the witnesses who observed various parts of the incident, not one witness clearly and definitely placed a second car on Huron Street at the time of the incident. State witness Harrington saw a light-colored intermediate car but did not know whether it was a hardtop or convertible. Defendant’s witness Kannapes offered no descriptive testimony as to tire car that hit the deceased in the street except that it was a heavy car. Thus the jury could have concluded that it was the defendant’s car that caused the death of Sharon. As said by our supreme court in People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill.2d 348, 365-66, 263 N.E.2d 840: “It is the province of the jury to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused and its verdict will not be set aside on review, unless it is palpably contrary to tire weight of the evidence or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of guilt. (People v. Nicholls, 42 Ill.2d 91; People v. Peto, 38 Ill.2d 45.)” In my opinion the verdict of the jury meets the aforesaid test.   At the time of the oral argument of this case, Justice Ulysses S. Schwartz sat with Justices Leighton and Hayes. Subsequently Justice Schwartz died. Since that time Justice Downing was designated the third member of the panel and has listened to the tape of the oral arguments and has read the briefs, abstract and record in this case.