Court Opinion

ID: 9775254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:51:56.847813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:24.031212
License: Public Domain

Supplemental Opinion on Petition for Rehearing delivered December 7, 1981 Robert H. Dudley, Justice. Susan Warren has filed a petition for rehearing with two contentions. One simply reargues interpretation of statutes, but on rehearing we do not consider such repetition. Rule 20 (g). The other concerns the impoundment of funds. We deny the petition for rehearing but desire to explicate that issue. Susan Warren argues that she asked for a lien on James Warren’s property for future child support. We have no statute authorizing a lien for future support and courts of equity have no inherent authority to grant one. Some states have held that statutory language to make “provision for ... support and education of the minor children of the marriage” gives the implied authority to declare a lien in limited circumstances on specific items of property. Jones v. Jones, 294 P. 2d 304 (Okla.), 59 ALR 2d 651 (1956). This appears to be the majority view. Annotation: Decree for Periodical Payments for Support or Alimony as a Lien on the Subject of a Declaration of Lien, 59 ALR 2d 656, §4. While Ark. Stat. Ann. §34-1211 (Supp. 1981) is comparable to the Oklahoma statute, we have never adopted the majority view. As early as 1881 we held that there was no lien on a husband’s land for future alimony payments. Kurtz v. Kurtz, 38 Ark. 119 (1881). By 1921 this concept was held to have become a rule of property Whitmore v. Brown, 147 Ark. 147, 227 S.W. 34 (1921). In Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W. 2d 940 (1957) we held that the cases involving future alimony were applicable to cases involving future child support and affirmed that a decree for future child support is not a final decree upon which execution may issue or which creates a lien on real estate. The reason stated was that an award of child support is not a final decree as to future payments because it can be prospectively modified. Petitioner Susan Warren is not entitled to prevail under her theory of enforcing a lien for future child support. However, this holding is not applicable to the situation where one has reduced past due child support to judgment, for in that case the judgment lien statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 29-130 (Repl. 1979), is operative. The petitioner alternatively contends that even if she is not entitled to a lien on all of James Warren’s property for future child support, she is entitled to have the property impounded as a bond pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1211 (Supp. 1981). This court has long recognized that a chancery court has the inherent power to require a bond for payment of child support. Zeddy v. Zeddy, 180 Ark. 235, 21 S.W. 2d 157 (1929). The inherent power to order a bond could only be exercised when the obligor had defaulted or was about to leave the state. Clay, Act 56-Bond for Child Support, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 360 (1951). We have held that the obligor can be committed to jail for refusing to make such a bond. Ex parte Caple, 81 Ark. 504, 99 S.W. 830 (1907); Ex parte Coulter, 160 Ark. 550, 255 S.W. 15 (1923). The General Assembly broadened the chancellors’ inherent power by statutorily authorizing a bond when there is any reason to believe the obligor might not pay. Ark. Stat. Ann. §34-1211 (A) (Supp. 1981). We recognize the public policy embraced in the statute and desire to give it a broad interpretation. Even so, we find no language in the statute which authorizes the seizure of one’s property without limitation under the guise of a bond. The statute authorizing a requirement of security, and the bonds by inherent equitable authority, both contemplate notice to the recalcitrant obligor that he or she will be required, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to make a bond in some specific amount necessary to secure future payments. The bond is to be conditioned upon compliance with the order and shall be in such form and have such sureties as the court shall direct. In the case at bar James Warren was never ordered to make a bond, was not given the opportunity to make a bond and never attempted to make a bond. No conditions were made or met and no conditional pledges of property or sureties were allowed. There simply was no bond. While there was no bond, there could have been a valid sequestration for the chancery court has the authority to impound property to insure future payment of child support. The general rule is that a court of equity is without the inherent power to impound property to secure the future payment of support. Ring v. Ring, 185 Va. 269, 38 S.E. 2d 471, 165 ALR 1237 (1946). Annotation: Inherent Power of Court to Secure Future Payment of Alimony and Support Money, 165 ALR 1243. However, for a century we have held that our courts of equity have the statutory authority to sequester the obligor’s property to secure future payments in proper cases. In Casteel v. Casteel, 38 Ark. 477 (1882), this court held that while future alimony could not create a lien upon the obligor’s land, payment might be secured pursuant to Gantt’s Digest, § 2205. The case of Rowell v. Rowell, 184 Ark. 643, 43 S.W. 2d 243 (1931), held that § 3509, Crawford & Moses Digest, provided for sequestration. The statute cited in both of those cases was slightly modified in 1941 and is now codified as Ark. Stat. Ann. §34-1212 (Supp. 1981). It continues to provide for sequestration and we have held that, in its present form, it grants to the chancery court the authority to sequester an obligor’s property to secure future payments. Harbour v. Harbour, 230 Ark. 627, 324 S.W. 2d 115 (1950). However, a sequestration of the obligor’s property cannot be had without notice to the obligor. That notice should give the reason sequestration is being sought; for example, the defendant is able to pay but refuses to do so or the defendant is about to leave the state. See Ex parte Caple, supra. The order must show the nature and amount of property sought for sequestration, Rowell v. Rowell, supra, and it must provide the conditions upon which the property is to be returned to the obligor or transferred to the obligee or transferred to a third party. It ought to provide for the care, maintenance and reinvestment of the proceeds of the property. In the case before us this due process was not affordable to James Warren. This amounted to an arbitrary action. Rowell v. Rowell, supra. In summation, while we do not recognize a lien on the obligor’s real estate to insure the future payment of child support, we do have a statutory provision for sequestration of the obligor’s property to insure the payment of future support. A sequestration of property requires notice of the reason for sequestration and the order must provide the nature and amount of property to be sequestered and the conditions of sequestration. In addition, we have statutory bonds as well as bonds by the inherent authority of equity courts to secure future payment of child support. There are other proceedings for enforcement of child support orders, not material to this opinion, such as injunctions and restraining orders, contempt proceedings, judgment lien proceedings and proceedings to sell real or personal property of the obligor pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-2448 (Supp. 1981). The petition for rehearing is denied.