Court Opinion

ID: 9788962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:23:23.809553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:18.071723
License: Public Domain

OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
¶ 1 Juvenile T.W. appeals from the juvenile court’s order of restitution following an adjudication for unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a class B misdemeanor if committed by a defendant “less than four years older than the minor at the time the sexual activity occurred.” See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-401 (2003). We affirm.
*314BACKGROUND
¶2 On July 2, 2002, two sixteen-year-old juveniles, T.W. and R.Z., engaged in unlawful sexual activity, including “vaginal, anal[,] and oral sex,” with fourteen-year-old K.C. Sometime that night, K.C.’s father called K.C.’s friend and discovered that K.C. was with R.Z. and T.W. When K.C. arrived home between 12:30 a.m. and 1:30 a.m., “[s]he was very emotional” — “she was crying! and] having problems.” K.C.’s father asked K.C. what was wrong, but K.C. said she could not tell him.
¶ 3 Because K.C. refused to speak with her father, he decided to take her to a counselor that she had seen before in the hope that she might speak to someone about the cause of her distress. The next morning, K.C.’s father, unaware of K.C.’s sexual encounter the previous night, took K.C. to Life-Line, a treatment center for troubled teens. K.C. had previously spent ten months at LifeLine and “graduated” from the center in March 2002.
¶ 4 Upon arriving at the center, K.C. met with James Smith, the counselor she had worked with during her prior stay at LifeLine. Smith testified that he believed K.C. was at the center because “she was having difficulty with her parents, following rules in the home.” Smith also testified that “there was some threat to run away from home and it was clear that she was distraught, depressed!, and] angry.”
¶ 5 After further discussions with K.C. during the first day or two of her arrival at Life-Line, Smith learned of K.C.’s sexual encounter with T.W. and R.Z. Smith recommended that K.C. get a morning-after pill and receive testing for sexually transmitted diseases. K.C. remained at Life-Line for approximately two and one-half months. According to Smith, K.C.’s extended stay at Life-Line was “ninety-eight percent” related to her sexual encounter with T.W. and R.Z. Smith also maintained that the reasons for K.C.’s prior stay were unrelated to the reasons for her second stay at Life-Line.
¶ 6 T.W. was ultimately charged with unlawful sexual activity with a minor and unlawful possession of alcohol by a minor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, T.W. admitted to unlawful sexual activity with a minor and the alcohol chai-ge was dismissed. The juvenile court ordered T.W. to pay a fine and to complete the Victim Awareness Program, restricted all contact between T.W. and K.C. and/or R.Z., and ordered T.W. “to pay restitution in an amount determined by the probation department.” At the request of K.C.’s father, and absent an objection from T.W., the case was transferred from Weber County to Davis County for final disposition of the restitution issue. Judge Van Dyke found that KC.’s father was a victim entitled to restitution and ordered T.W. to pay restitution in the amount of $2486.24 — one-half of the cost of K.C.’s stay at Life-Line. T.W. timely appeals the restitution order.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶ 7 T.W. argues that because K.C.’s father is not a victim, the juvenile court erred when it ordered T.W. to pay restitution to K.C.’s father for the post-offense counseling that K.C. received at Life-Line. Although we “will not disturb a trial court’s restitution order unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or [the trial court] otherwise abused its discretion ... we review a trial court’s interpretation of restitution statutes for correctness.” State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ¶ 5, 60 P.3d 582 (quotations and citations omitted).
¶ 8 T.W. further argues that even if we determine that K.C.’s father is in fact a victim, restitution would still be inappropriate because K.C.’s father could not recover damages in a civil suit against T.W. Specifically, T.W. asserts that K.C.’s father could not establish that K.C.’s counseling was a direct result of T.W. and R.Z.’s sexual offense. And, in a related argument, T.W. asserts that the juvenile court erred when it did not allow him to question Smith regarding specific reasons for KC.’s stay at LifeLine. “The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court,” and we therefore review the juvenile court’s finding of privilege for correctness. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quotations and citation omitted).
*315ANALYSIS
¶ 9 In determining that K.C.’s father is entitled to restitution, the juvenile court found that K.C.’s father is a victim under Utah Code section 76-3-201 (the Sentencing Statute). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(e)(i) (2003). T.W. asserts that the juvenile court erred in applying the Sentencing Statute’s definition of victim to K.C.’s father and, instead, should have applied the definition of victim as found in the Victims’ Rights Statute and the Rights of Crime Victims Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37-2(3) (2003), 77-38-2(9) (2003). Although T.W. argued before the juvenile court that K.C.’s father was not a victim entitled to restitution, he never argued that the definition of victim in the Victims’ Rights Statute and the Rights of Crime Victims Act was more appropriate. Therefore, this argument was not preserved for appeal, and we do not address it.
¶ 10 We find that the juvenile court correctly applied the Sentencing Statute’s definition of victim to K.C.’s father. The Sentencing Statute defines victim as “any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal activities.” Utah Code Ann. § 76 — 3—201(l)(e)(i). As K.C.’s father was obligated to pay for K.C.’s treatment, it is clear that the father is “any person” within this definition. See id.
¶ 11 T.W. further argues that K.C.’s father could not recover in a civil action arising out of T.W.’s unlawful sexual activities because K.C.’s therapy was not directly related to T.W.’s sexual offense. In support of his argument, T.W. asserts that the juvenile court improperly limited the testimony of K.C.’s counselor, James Smith, thereby making it impossible for the court to determine what role, if any, T.W. and R.Z.’s sexual offense played in KC.’s need for therapy.
¶ 12 In determining whether it was proper for the juvenile court to limit Smith’s testimony, we recognize that Utah courts have “substantial discretion in conducting sentencing hearings.” State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah Ct.App.1997). In its discretion, a court can properly limit, or even disallow, a cross-examination during sentencing “so long as the defendant has the opportunity to refute the evidence presented or challenge its reliability.” Id. at 389 n. 12.
¶ 13 T.W. admits that he was allowed to cross-examine Smith. However, T.W. argues that he did not have the opportunity to challenge Smith’s testimony because the juvenile court improperly limited his testimony under rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 506. “Rule 506 cloaks in privilege confidential communications between a patient and her therapist in matters regarding treatment.” State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 18, 63 P.3d 56. But the privilege afforded to communications between therapists and patients is not absolute. See State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ¶ 29, 982 P.2d 79; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (“Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all circumstances.”). When the patient’s physical, mental, or emotional condition “is an element of any claim or defense,” no privilege exists. Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1); Cardall, 1999 UT 51 at ¶ 29, 982 P.2d 79. T.W. argues that the exception to rule 506 applies in this case because K.C.’s emotional condition is material and relevant to making a finding that K.C.’s counseling at Life-Line was related to her sexual encounter with R.Z. and T.W. We disagree:
¶ 14 In Cardall, the Utah Supreme Court enunciated a test for determining whether an exception to rule 506 applies. See 1999 UT 51 at ¶ 29, 982 P.2d 79. This test was further clarified in Blake. See 2002 UT 113 at ¶ 18, 63 P.3d 56. Under this test, disclosure of protected material is “limited and require[s] a showing ‘with reasonable certainty that [the privileged records contain] exculpatory evidence ... which would be favorable to [a] defense.’ ” Id. at ¶ 19 (quoting Cardall, 1999 UT 51 at ¶ 30, 982 P.2d 79). According to the court, this test is “a stringent test, necessarily requiring some type of extrinsic indication that the evidence within the records exists and will, in fact, be exculpatory.” Id.
*316¶ 15 Although the court acknowledged that it cannot provide a precise definition of “reasonable certainty” as used in this test, it provided some guidance and stated that “mere speculation” that such evidence exists is not enough. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. Instead, “[a]t a minimum, specific facts must be alleged.” Id. at ¶22. These facts could include “references to records of only certain counseling sessions, which are alleged to be relevant, independent allegations made by others that a victim has recanted, or extrinsic evidence of some disorder that might lead to uncertainty regarding a victim’s trustworthiness.” Id. The court acknowledged that “[t]he difficulty in meeting this test is deliberate and prudent in light of the sensitivity of these types of records.” Id. at ¶ 19. It is only when a defendant has overcome this high hurdle and identified this type of reasonably certain extrinsic evidence, that the court can “conduct an in camera review” of the privileged documents to determine whether the evidence is material. Id. at ¶ 23 (emphasis omitted); see also State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ¶ 44, 125 P.3d 878 (holding that defense counsel’s authority to examine a victim’s mental health records “depended on approval of the trial court following an in camera review”).
¶ 16 In juvenile court, T.W. did not present evidence sufficient to meet the “reasonable certainty” requirement set forth in Blake. See 2002 UT 113 at ¶ 19, 63 P.3d 56. T.W. argued that K.C.’s records and communications with Smith would establish that her second stay at Life-Line was not directly related to T.W. and R.Z.’s sexual offense. However, T.W. never identified any specific post-offense counseling sessions — supported by extrinsic evidence — that were directly related to K.C.’s previous stay at Life-Line. Therefore, T.W. failed to meet the reasonable certainty test that would entitle him to an in camera review of KC.’s records.
¶ 17 Finally, the juvenile court, in its discretion, allowed Smith to testify at the restitution hearing. At the hearing, Smith generally discussed what he believed were the reasons for K.C.’s second stay at LifeLine. According to Smith, “ninety-eight percent” of KC.’s second stay at Life-Line was related to T.W. and R.Z.’s sexual offense. Based upon this testimony and other evidence heard at the restitution hearing, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that K.C.’s second stay at Life-Line was directly related to the sexual encounter. Therefore, K.C.’s father could recover damages in a civil action against T.W.
CONCLUSION
¶ 18 Under the Sentencing Statute, we conclude that K.C.’s father is a victim for purposes of restitution. Moreover, K.C.’s father could prevail in a civil suit against T.W. because the juvenile court’s factual findings support the conclusion that K.C.’s post-offense counseling was directly related to T.W. and R.Z.’s sexual offense.
¶ 19 Therefore, we affirm.
¶ 20 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge.