Court Opinion

ID: 9956886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 13:07:48.564286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.748599
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hayes, 2024-Ohio-1254.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                           HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                             :     APPEAL NO.     C-230437
                                                  TRIAL NO.      B-2200211
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                  :

   vs.                                      :       O P I N I O N.

 RACHEL HAYES,                              :

      Defendant-Appellee.                   :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 3, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R.
Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, Judge.

       {¶1}    The state appeals from the trial court’s order granting defendant-

appellee Rachel Hayes’s motion to suppress evidence collected by police while she was

a patient at Bethesda North Hospital. For the following reasons, based on the authority

of United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), we

reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.

                        I. Factual and Procedural History

       {¶2}    In October 2021, Hayes was admitted to Bethesda North Hospital for

COVID-19. During a routine inventory of Hayes’s belongings, a nurse found a baggie

that she believed contained illegal drugs. The nurse alerted hospital security, who

called the police. A police officer conducted a warrantless search of Hayes’s belongings

and found the baggie. Hayes was subsequently indicted for aggravated trafficking in

drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and aggravated possession of drugs in

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). Both offenses are second-degree felonies. Hayes filed a

motion to suppress, which the trial court granted following a hearing.

       {¶3}    At the suppression hearing, the police officer who conducted the search

testified that the security guard handed the officer a clutch purse and said either, “This

is the drugs,” or “This is the meth.” The officer testified that he looked inside the purse

and saw that “there was clearly methamphetamine, based on my training and

experience.”

       {¶4}    The trial court found the following facts:

       An admitting nurse went through Ms. Hayes’[s] belongings to find her

       phone and take inventory of her items. The nurse testified that this

       practice is a routine admitting practice at the hospital to avoid liability

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       for lost items. During inventory, the nurse found a clear baggy

       containing a white substance, which the nurse thought was drugs. After

       finding the baggy in Ms. Hayes[’s] belongings, the nurse immediately

       called hospital security and handed security Ms. Hayes’s backpack.

       Before giving security the backpack, the nurse returned the items she

       found and put them in the backpack.

       Hospital security notified Montgomery Police, and a police officer

       arrived at the hospital. Once the officer arrived, hospital security turned

       over Ms. Hayes’s belongings to the police who then searched the purse

       and discovered the above-mentioned items [the drugs, clear plastic

       bags, a lid from a digital scale, and $847 in cash]. The officer testified

       that the security officer handed the officer a clutch purse. The officer

       then looked inside the purse and pulled out a baggy of drugs. Security

       also told the officer that he found cash in Ms. Hayes’s belongings which

       he put back in the backpack. Officers never obtained a warrant to search

       Ms. Hayes’[s] purse, nor did they obtain her consent to search.

       {¶5}   At the suppression hearing, the state conceded that the police had not

obtained a search warrant for Hayes’s purse or backpack. The state argued that the

warrantless search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the original

violation of Hayes’s privacy was conducted by private actors, the nurse and security

guard, and the subsequent governmental search did not exceed the scope of the private

search. The trial court rejected the state’s argument and held that “the scope of the

search was unlawful when the officer searched the property of Ms. Hayes, as it went

above and beyond the original scope of the search [of the nurse and security guard].”

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

The state timely appealed.

                                     II. Analysis

       {¶6}     In its sole assignment of error, the state contends that the trial court

erred in granting Hayes’s motion to suppress the evidence collected from her purse

and backpack during her stay at the hospital.

       {¶7}     In accordance with the Fourth Amendment’s protections against

unreasonable searches and seizures, the state must establish by the preponderance of

the evidence that a defendant’s property was not subject to illegal search or seizure.

State v. LaRosa, 165 Ohio St.3d 346, 2021-Ohio-4060, 179 N.E.3d 89, ¶ 16. “Appellate

review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. at ¶ 17,

citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. “The

reviewing court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by

competent, credible evidence, and the court reviews the trial court’s legal conclusions

de novo.” Id.

       {¶8}     At the suppression hearing, the state argued that the initial search was

conducted by the hospital staff and thus was a private search, which cannot be a Fourth

Amendment violation. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85,

quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410

(1980) (“This Court has also consistently construed [the Fourth Amendment’s]

protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a

search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting

as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any

governmental official.’ ”). The state argued that the subsequent police search did not

go beyond that which was conducted by the private party, and therefore did not violate

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 116, quoting Walter at 657 (“[T]he Government may

not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an

independent search.”).

       {¶9}       In Jacobsen, the Court upheld the search of a package that had been in

transit through Federal Express, a private freight carrier. Jacobsen at 111. During

shipment, the package was damaged, and Federal Express employees opened the

package to examine its contents, pursuant to a company policy regarding such

occurrences. Id. The package consisted of a cardboard box, and inside the box, the

employees found a ten-inch tube made of silver tape. Id. Inside the tube, the employees

found four plastic bags containing white powder. Id. The employees then contacted

the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). Id. Before any DEA agents arrived,

the Federal Express employees replaced the bags into the tube and returned the tube

to the box. Id.

       {¶10} When the first DEA agent arrived, the box had been placed on a desk.

Id. The agent could see that a hole had been punched in the side of the box, and the

top was open. Id. The agent removed the tube from the box, saw that the tube had been

slit open, and removed the plastic bags from the tube. Id. The agent then opened the

bags and removed a trace amount of the white powder with a knife blade. Id. at 111-

112. A field test showed that the white powder was cocaine. Id. at 112.

       {¶11} The Jacobsen Court held first that the private action of the Federal

Express employees did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 115. The Court

went on to hold, “The additional invasions of respondents’ privacy by the Government

agent must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private

search.” Id. As the Court went on to describe, the federal agent’s inspection of the

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

contents of the package “enabled the agent to learn nothing that had not previously

been learned during the private search.” Id. at 120. The Court’s analysis indicates that

a mere reexamination by the government agent of that which was already inspected

by the private actor does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 119-121. “The

package itself, which had previously been opened, remained unsealed, and the Federal

Express employees had invited the agents to examine its contents. Under these

circumstances, the package could no longer support any expectation of privacy * * *.”

Id. at 121.

        {¶12} The present circumstances are highly analogous. Pursuant to hospital

policy, the nurse conducted an inventory of the contents of Hayes’s backpack. After

discovering contraband, the nurse gave the backpack to hospital security, who

summoned the police.

        {¶13} While it is unclear from the trial court’s findings of fact whether the

contraband was in plain view or whether the police officer had to open the backpack

and/or the purse to view the contraband, it ultimately does not matter. Pursuant to

Jacobsen, if the police search does not exceed the scope of the private search, then

there is no Fourth Amendment violation. Here the private search had already exposed

the contents of Hayes’s purse. The security guard informed the police officer of the

incriminating nature of the contents of the purse, and it was reasonable for the officer

to confirm the guard’s assessment—without exceeding the scope of the private search.

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (“The agent’s viewing of

what a private party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate the

Fourth Amendment.”).

        {¶14} Because the police search of Hayes’s purse did not exceed the scope of

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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the private search, the warrantless search by the police was reasonable and did not

violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court

and remand the cause for further proceedings.

                                               Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

ZAYAS, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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