Court Opinion

ID: 9832420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:53:48.680935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:46.642470
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In reversing the judgment in this case, we concluded that the evidence established the fact that John R. Choate, under whom the appellant claims, had occupied the land in controversy for more than three years prior to his death, claiming under deeds emanating from a patent issued by the state to the heirs of Archibald Smith. We still adhere to that conclusion. We also concluded that it had not been shown that Susan Hailey, the mother of two of the appellees, was under disability during that time, and for that reason her heirs were barred. The proof showed that Susan Hailey attained her majority in 1864. Coverture alone would exempt her from the operation of the statute of limitations after its revival in 1870. The evidence does not inform us whether or not she was a married woman from that time till Choate’s death in 1874. It is shown that she married some time during her life; but the evidence fails to disclose the date of her marriage or the period of her coverture. We therefore see no reason for changing our conclusions as to that issue.
[6] It is urgently insisted, however, that we are in error in holding that the three years’ statute of limitation is applicable under the facts of this case. It is argued that the appellant failed to connect itself with the sovereignty of the soil; that the legal effect of the patent issued in 1849 to “the heirs of Archibald Smith” was to vest the legal title to the Smith survey in the heirs of Mark Hailey by reason of the previous assignment of the certificate under which the land was granted. The principle invoked is that enunciated and adopted in a number of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of this state, among which may be found the following; Baldwin v. Root, 90 Tex. 547, 40 S. W. 3; Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339; Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166. While in the original opinion there was no reference to any of the above eases, and no attempt was made to distinguish them from the facts hfere under consideration, they were neither overlooked nor disregarded. We thought then, as we think now, that the rule there announced is inapplicable to the facts here involved. If we are mistaken in this view, then the contention of appellees is correct, and the judgment in this case should not have been reversed.
In Baldwin v. Root, supra, a land certificate for an unlocated balance had .been issued to the heirs of Jonas Harrison. Prior to the location of this balance, those heirs transferred an interest in the certificate to Turner. After the location, a patent for the entire tract was issued to “the heirs of Jonas Harrison.” The Supreme Court held that to the extent of the interest previously *701assigned to Turner tlae issuance of the patent to those heirs vested in the holders of that interest the legal title, applying the rule stated in Barroum v. Culmell, 90 Tex. 93, 37 S. W. 313. In that case the court said: “In this class of cases the patent, when is-sued, inures to the benefit of the assignee. He acquires the legal title by estoppel.”
It will be observed that in all of the cases ■before referred to the patents had been issued to the parties who had themselves previously sold the certificates, and that the sales of the certificates had been accompanied by express or implied warranties from the grantors. Here we have a case where the evidence of the assignment of the ■certificate rests upon circumstances alone, with notning to indicate whether it was by parol or in writing, or that any character of warranty accompanied the transfer. It is «.Iso an instance where the assignment is made by a party different from the named grantees in the patent. There being no evidence of any express warranty attending this transfer of the certificate, or such as would be implied in a written conveyance made in «ceordanee with our statute, it is doubtful whether an estoppel could be invoked against :Smith, or his heirs, had the patent been issued to him during his lifetime, and the contest-one in which the heirs were undertaking to recover an inherited title. Howard v. Stubblefield, 79 Tex. 1, 14 S. W. 1044. But, resolving tfiat doubt in favor of the estop-pel, does it follow that the same legal effect should be given to a patent issued after his death to his heirs at law? To be more explicit, are those heirs now estopped to assert title to this land merely because their ancestor, during his lifetime, sold the certificate by virtue of which the land was located? The general rule is that estoppels bin'd parties and their privies. Applying that rule, it may be said that Smith’s heirs would be estopped to assert a title to this land which is derived from their ancestor, and must be traced through him to the state. That situation would make them privies of Smith. The estoppel attaches to the title taken as a heritage. But it does not neces.sarily follow that the heirs would be estop-ped to set up a title to the land acquired from another and different source — one which •does not descend to them from Smith. For, in asserting that kind of a claim, they would not. depend upon any succession from the ancestor, Smith. It is the presence of the ■covenant of warranty, either expressed or implied, in a conveyance which imparts to the instrument its continuous effect and operates to instantly transfer an after-acquir•ed title from the grantor to the grantee. An heir is not personally bound by the covenants ■of his ancestor; nor is he personally liable for the damages which may result from their ¡breach. A creditor holding such a claim merely has the right to resort to property descended from the estate of the ancestor while in the hands of the heir for the satisfaction of his debt. Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 604, 46 S. W. 787, 48 S. W. 571, 50 S. W. 931. The heir is not estopped to set up against the grantee of his ancestor a prior title, unless it be shown that a consideration had been paid by such grantee, and that the heir has received property from his ancestor equal to that consideration. Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 32 S. W. 520; Foote v. Clark, 102 Mo. 394, 14 S. W. 981, 11 L. R. A. 861; 16 Cyc. 718, and notes. When Archibald Smith transferred his certificate to Hailey, he parted with all the interest he had in that instrument and the land to be thereafter located by its authority. As to this property, nothing remained to pass by descent upon his death to his heirs. There is no evidence that Smith left any other property to be inherited by them. Hence, in asserting title under the patent, they would be claiming by purchase direct from the state, and not by descent from their ancestor. There can be no inheritance where there is no heritage. It is true they were designated as “the heirs of Archibald Smith,” but that language was descriptive of the persons to whom the conveyance was made, and not of the estate conveyed. They were words of purchase and not of limitation, and had the effect of vesting whatever was conveyed in those individuals who at that time were the heirs at law of Archibald Smith. Grigsby v. May, 84 Tex. 254, 19 S. W. 343. It is immaterial that this conveyance from the state vested no beneficial interest in the grantees. “The officer who issued the patent, having the power to issue it, it is title, and the fact that there may have been a superior equity cannot make it less.” League v. Rogan, 59 Tex. 427. Such a title loses none of its potency as a basis for an acquisition of the property by adverse possession, except in the hands of those whom the law estops to assert it. It therefore logically follows that if the heirs of Archibald Smith are not subject to the estoppel invoked the chain of title is complete.
It is also insisted by appellees, in the motion for rehearing, that John E. Choate did not acquire title from all of the heirs of Archibald Smith, and for that reason did not perfect a title by limitation to the entire interest. That may be true, and if so it only affects the extent of tie interest recoverable by the heirs of Susan Hailey. The extent of their loss will, of course, be determined by the connection which Choate had with the heirs of Smith at the time of his adverse occupancy. That is a matter which may be ascertained and adjusted upon another trial.
The motion is overruled.