Court Opinion

ID: 9543422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:45:30.132972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:20.020377
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — The majority improperly concludes that the informant was reliable and did not act as an agent of the police. Majority opinion, at 662. This conclusion must be based upon the affidavit supplied to obtain the search warrant. The affidavit fails to provide sufficient information to form the basis for an independent opinion as to the reliability of the informant under the 2-part test set forth in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964); and State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). The fruits of the Wood Lane search are therefore inadmissible.
Even if the majority's conclusion that the informant's reliability is established, the trial court's findings of fact are nonetheless insufficient to support the majority's conclusion that the informant was not an agent of the State. For these reasons, this case must be remanded to determine whether the informant acted under the direction, control, instigation and encouragement of law enforcement officials when obtaining information about activities at the Wood Lane property. State v. Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 830, 700 P.2d 319 (1985).
The test in Washington for determining whether information provided by an informant establishes probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant is whether the affidavit establishes the reliability of the informant by setting forth facts that establish the informant's basis of knowledge and veracity. State v. Jackson, supra at 435. The Wood Lane affidavit fails to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong.
"The basis of knowledge prong requires the affidavit to recite the manner in which the informant gathered his information." State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 70-71, 720 *673P.2d 808 (1986) (citing State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 709, 630 P.2d 427 (1981); State v. Smith, 28 Wn. App. 387, 391, 624 P.2d 191 (1981)). "To satisfy the 'basis of knowledge' prong, the informant must declare that he personally has seen the facts asserted and is passing on firsthand information." Jackson, at 437. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 425 (White, J., concurring).
The Wood Lane affidavit fails to show how the informant reached the conclusion "that the marijuana plants and Hal-lide lights are still present and that the plants are still under cultivation." The raw facts upon which the informant based his conclusion, how the informant obtained those facts, and what precisely did he see or hear or smell or touch firsthand must be established. State v. Smith, supra; Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 531, 313 A.2d 847 (1974). These are the questions a magistrate must ask when determining whether Aguilar-SpinellVs basis of knowledge prong has been satisfied if he "is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 85 S. Ct. 741 (1965).
The affidavit's recitation that "informant . . . observed the marijuana plants in December 1983 and was on the property on January 26, 1984" fails to show the raw facts upon which informant based his conclusion, much less how the informant obtained those facts. Based on the affidavit, which was the only information before the judge who signed the search warrant for 40 Wood Lane, it is pure conjecture to conclude that the informant personally observed marijuana on his January 26 visit to the property. ”[A]n informant's assertion that drugs were present in premises where he had recently been does not show he actually saw the drugs." 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(d), at 662 (2d ed. 1987). One could assume the informant based his conclusions on his sense of smell, an overheard conversation, or ESP. Based upon the information contained in the affidavit, it is impossible for a magistrate to "independently evaluate the reliability of the manner in *674which the informant acquired his information" as required by Const, art. 1, § 7. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 435. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 413. The basis of knowledge prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is not satisfied. Thus, there was insufficient showing of probable cause to justify issuance of a search warrant.
Moreover, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient to resolve the issue whether the informant was a government agent when he visited the Wood Lane property on January 26, 1984. "Direction and control" are not the only tests of agency in these cases. It is sufficient to establish agency that the police officers "instigated or encouraged" the conduct in question. Wolken, at 830.
The trial court found that the informant had suggested to Detective Morrison that the informant could go onto the Wood Lane property to check the roofing he had previously done there. It also found that Morrison told the informant he could not go onto the Wood Lane property without a legitimate reason and could not trespass. These findings do not address the issue of whether the police encouraged the informant to go on the roof by stating they had been unable to come up with sufficient evidence to obtain a search warrant. To suggest that the informant's reason for going on the roof late at night was to check the roofing stretches credulity. If the police instigated or encouraged this conduct then the search was illegal. There must be specific findings on this issue and I would remand for this purpose.
Pearson, C.J., and Brachtenbach, J., concur with Utter, J.
Reconsideration denied September 14, 1988.