Court Opinion

ID: 9746529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:20:51.274685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:14.390053
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I respectfully dissent and would rule that the ordinance is preempted by state law.
“Truancy has long been a concern of the state. . . .” (In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 290 [243 Cal.Rptr. 224, 747 P.2d 1152].) California has enacted compulsory education statutes that establish a comprehensive mechanism for dealing with student absenteeism. (Ed. Code, § 48260 et seq.) Those statutes define a truant as a student “who is absent from school without valid excuse three full days in one school year or tardy or absent for more than any 30-minute period during the schoolday without a valid excuse on three occasions in one school year, or any combination thereof.” (Ed. Code, § 48260, subd. (a).)
*772The state truancy scheme provides discipline for students’ failure to attend school, starting with a written warning and escalating for repeated absences—from additional school time and a truancy mediation program up to jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Ed. Code, § 48264.5, subds. (a)-(d).) If made a ward of the court, the truant is subject to terms of public service, fines, mandatory completion of a truancy prevention program, and the revocation of driving privileges. (Ed. Code, § 48264.5, subd. (d).) The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he most important overall change [in truancy law] was to require referral of truants to school attendance review boards before juvenile court intervention.” (In re Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 290.) In addition, there are measures, including penal sanctions, against parents of truants. (Ed. Code, § 48290 et seq.)
The City of Monrovia’s (Monrovia) ordinance conflicts with the state’s comprehensive system for dealing with truancy. The ordinance provides that, with some exceptions, any student subject to California’s compulsory education laws who is found at specified places outside school during certain school hours on school days may be cited. Citations require the students to appear in court before a traffic referee. Students are fined in amounts up to $500 per citation and may also be required to perform community service. Thus, contrary to the state scheme, Monrovia has, in effect, criminalized truancy from its inception. Monrovia’s solution of imposing financial penalties and community service on children may interfere with the state’s remedy of compelling the student to be in school, including after school and school weekend programs.
The California Supreme Court has stated in connection with truancy that “[t]he Legislature’s move towards utilizing the school attendance review boards as a condition precedent to the juvenile court’s intervention is understandable and in keeping with legal commentary calling for greater participation of school and social welfare professionals, even to the exclusion of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. [Fn. omitted.]” (In re Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 290.) Monrovia’s ordinance refers absentee students to the judicial system without the state-mandated program for “participation of school and social welfare professionals.” (Ibid)
Monrovia’s ordinance imposes different and more severe sanctions than does state law for the same behavior. Because the law conflicts with the state’s general law regulating truancy, it is preempted. (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 898 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534] [“local legislation is ‘contradictory’ to general law when it is inimical thereto’]; Mobilepark West Homeowners Assn. v. Esconaido Mobilepark West (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 32, 47 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 393] [local *773ordinance imposing a longer period of notice of rental rate increases conflicts with state law and is preempted; “where a statute has set the amount of notice required, the municipality may not impose further requirements of additional notice”]; Tri County Apartment Assn. v. City of Mountain View (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1283, 1298 [242 Cal.Rptr. 438] [municipal ordinance requiring longer period of notice for rent increases than state law required “conflicts with the legislative scheme” and is preempted]; Ex parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 647 [192 P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172] [local ordinance setting speed limit lower than that set by state law conflicts with state law and is preempted].)
I recognize that the Monrovia ordinance may be an effective method to combat the problem of truancy. Yet, “education is a statewide concern and ... the Legislature is vested by the Constitution with the ultimate control over school matters.” (Patton v. Governing Board (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 495, 501 [143 Cal.Rptr. 593].) Here the Legislature has promulgated a system that it believes is the best way to deal with truancy. Monrovia, and other cities, however well-intentioned, should not, without appropriate legislative blessing, be able to impose methods inconsistent with those of the state to handle truants.
Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 19, 2003.