Court Opinion

ID: 9951356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 20:03:17.102672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:35.699514
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 P. v. Singleton CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

            IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F086263
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. CR-23-000713)
                    v.

    TYLIEK NICHOLAS W. SINGLETON,                                                         OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Nancy A.
Leo, Judge.
         Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kari Ricci Mueller and Paul E. O’Connor,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Smith, J.
       Defendant Tyliek Nicholas W. Singleton appeals from a judgment entered after he
pled no contest to a single count of evading a peace officer. Before defendant entered his
plea, the trial court denied his request for mental health diversion. Defendant argues the
court erred in denying his diversion request because it applied the wrong legal standard in
determining whether he was eligible for diversion. Defendant argues the error was not
harmless, the issue was preserved for appeal, and asks the matter to be remanded for the
court to apply the correct legal standard to his diversion request.
       The People concede the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in denying
defendant’s request for mental health diversion, but argue the court properly denied the
request because defendant did not provide sufficient evidence that he was eligible and
suitable for diversion. In the alternative, the People assert the proper remedy is a remand
to the court for a complete assessment of defendant’s eligibility and suitability for
diversion.
       We agree the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying defendant’s
diversion request. We conditionally reverse defendant’s conviction and sentence, and
remand for the court to consider defendant’s request for mental health diversion under the
correct legal standard. We otherwise affirm the judgment.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On February 21, 2023, the Stanislaus County District Attorney filed an
information charging defendant with a single count of evading a peace officer (Veh.
Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). The information further alleged defendant had suffered a
prior strike conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code,1
§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), which also qualified as a serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (d)). The information alleged two aggravating circumstances

1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                             2.
that defendant’s prior convictions were numerous (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2))
and defendant has served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)).
       The sole charge arose out of an incident on January 23, 2023.2 On that date,
Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Deputy Dalton Gonzalez was assigned to patrol and driving a
marked patrol vehicle. Gonzalez was traveling northbound on Highway 99 when he saw
a vehicle with a registration that had expired in June 2022. Gonzalez activated his
forward-facing red lights to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle. Defendant accelerated
the vehicle away at a speed up to 90 miles per hour, swerving in and out of traffic. At one
point, defendant drove onto the highway’s right shoulder, then turned left, crossed all
three lanes, and continued northbound on Highway 99 until the Whitmore Avenue exit.
Defendant drove onto the right shoulder again due to heavy traffic at the Whitmore
Avenue exit and made a quick left turn in front of other motorists. Defendant lost control
of the vehicle, sending the vehicle in a reverse direction and causing the vehicle to come
to a complete stop and lose its two front wheels. Two motorists on Highway 99 collided
because of defendant losing control of his vehicle. Defendant got out of the vehicle, ran
across the highway, and jumped over the fence. Defendant was subsequently located and
apprehended by the Ceres Police Department.
       On April 3, 2023, defendant filed a motion for mental health diversion pursuant to
section 1001.36. Defendant asserted he had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), alcohol use disorder, and amphetamine use disorder. Defendant
attached two one-page reports to his motion reflecting these diagnoses. The first report
was from Stanislaus County Behavioral Health and Recovery Services (BHRS) and
stated defendant was diagnosed with PTSD. The second report was on the Stanislaus
County alternate public defender’s letterhead. The report stated that defendant was

2      The facts underlying defendant’s conviction are taken from the preliminary
hearing transcript, which the parties stipulated to as the factual basis for defendant’s plea.

                                              3.
diagnosed with alcohol use disorder and amphetamine use disorder, and met the criteria
for clinically managed low-intensity residential treatment based on a comprehensive
substance abuse disorder assessment. Neither report identified who made these diagnoses
or assessed defendant.
       On April 4, 2023, the trial court heard defendant’s motion for mental health
diversion. Defense counsel advised the court that defendant was a veteran and there were
additional records from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), but she had been unable
to obtain those records due to time constraints. The prosecutor pointed to a “technical
flaw” that the report from BHRS did not identify who evaluated defendant. The
prosecutor further argued defendant had not met his burden of showing his criminal
behavior was linked to the diagnosis. Defense counsel responded that she did not believe
a mental health expert was required to opine on whether there is a nexus between the
crime and the diagnosis. The court stated in pertinent part: “If I were to grant a motion
like this on anevasion case, the evidence that I would hope to see would be defendant
was—suffered [PTSD] because he was in a situation where there were lights and sirens
and he couldn’t flee and he saw something traumatic and thus was in the same state of
panic. He reports he was in the same state of panic at the time of the incident. [¶] Now,
you’re never going to get a mental health professional to say that the diagnosis caused
this behavior directly, but that it could cause this behavior given the particulars of his
situation. The mere diagnosis of [PTSD], without more to connect it to the incident
involved, it is nexus. I don’t think I can grant the motion. And I understand that if you
were given more time or if [your] client was willing to waive time you could get those
military records and probably be able to link those up. But at this point in time there’s
insufficient evidence to show a nexus between the [PTSD] and the conduct involved
other than my layperson’s opinion, which is, [y]eah, I could, but I don’t know that for a
fact given what I’ve been provided in the motions.” The court denied defendant’s motion
without prejudice.

                                              4.
       On April 12, 2023, defendant entered a plea of no contest to the sole charge of
evading a peace officer, and admitted his prior strike and the aggravating circumstance
that he had numerous prior convictions. The trial court struck the other aggravating
circumstance pled and the prior strike pursuant to the prosecutor’s motion. The court
sentenced defendant to three years.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Defendant argues the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in denying his
diversion request by requiring him to demonstrate a nexus between his mental health
disorder and criminal conduct after section 1001.36 had been amended to presume the
disorder was a significant factor in commission of the charged offense.
 I.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       In 2018, the Legislature enacted section 1001.36, which created a pretrial
diversion program for defendants with certain diagnosed mental health disorders,
including PTSD. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624 (Frahs); § 1001.36,
subds. (a), (b)(1)(A).) Diversion suspends criminal proceedings to allow the defendant to
undergo mental health treatment and, if the defendant successfully completes diversion,
the charges that were the subject of the proceedings must be dismissed. (§ 1001.36,
subds. (f)(1), (f)(1)(C), (h); Frahs, at p. 631.) “The primary purposes of the legislation
are to keep people with mental disorders from entering and reentering the criminal justice
system while protecting public safety, to give counties discretion in developing and
implementing diversion across a continuum of care settings, and to provide mental health
rehabilitative services.” (People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 886;
§ 1001.35, subds. (a)–(c).)
       The defendant bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that he or she
meets all of the threshold eligibility requirements, and the defendant and the offense are
suitable for diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (e); People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791,

                                             5.
814 [the defendant bears the burden of providing evidence in support of the diversion
request].) If the defendant is eligible and suitable for diversion, the trial court must also
be “satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health
treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).)
       “As originally enacted, section 1001.36 provided that a trial court may grant
pretrial diversion if it finds all of the following: (1) the defendant suffers from a
qualifying mental disorder; (2) the disorder played a significant role in the commission of
the charged offense; (3) the defendant’s symptoms will respond to mental health
treatment; (4) the defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her speedy trial right;
(5) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) the defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.” (Frahs, supra,
9 Cal.5th at pp. 626–627; former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)–(6).) The first two criteria
necessitated the court was “satisfied” the defendant suffered from a qualifying mental
health disorder and that disorder played a significant role in committing the offense.
(Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)–(2).) Senate Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
amended the second criterion to require “the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2);
Stats. 2018, ch. 1005, § 1.)
       Effective January 1, 2023, Senate Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) further
amended section 1001.36 to recharacterize the first two criteria as eligibility requirements
and the other four criteria as suitability factors. (§ 1001.36, subds. (a)–(c); Stats. 2022,
ch. 735, § 1.) “More substantively, a defendant’s eligibility no longer turned on findings
to the court’s ‘satisfaction.’ ” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882,
891.) Under the amended statute, a defendant is eligible for diversion if they “ha[ve]
been diagnosed” with a qualifying mental disorder within the last five years by a
qualified mental health expert. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) Amended section 1001.36 also

                                              6.
“creates a presumption that the defendant’s diagnosed mental disorder was a significant
factor in the commission of the charged crime.” (Sarmiento, at p. 891; People v. Doron
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Doron) [the Legislature simplified the process for a
defendant to request diversion by presuming the disorder is connected to the offense and
“permit the court to deny diversion if the People rebutted the presumption”].)
Specifically, section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2) as amended provides that the court
“shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission
of the charged offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a
motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in
the alleged offense.”
       If the defendant meets the eligibility requirements under the amended
section 1001.36, the “court must consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial
diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) Even if the defendant is eligible and suitable for
mental health diversion, the trial court retains the discretion to deny the request. (People
v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 588–589 (Oneal); Doron, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 9 [“a diversion order is expressly discretionary with the court, even when all of the
criteria are met”].)
       A trial court’s denial of a request for mental health diversion is reviewed for abuse
of discretion.3 (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448–449; § 1001.36,
subd. (a) [the court “may, in its discretion,” grant pretrial diversion].) “A trial court’s
factual findings under section 1001.36 must be supported by substantial evidence.”
(Negron v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1016.) “A court abuses its

3      The trial court’s denial of defendant’s diversion motion is appealable. (People v.
Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 887–888.) Defendant’s timely notice of
appeal and receipt of a certificate of probable cause preserved the issue for appellate
review. (Id. at p. 887; § 1237.5.) The People do not argue the trial court’s ruling is not
appealable.

                                               7.
discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal
standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are
not supported by substantial evidence.” (Moine, at p. 449; People v. Armstrong (2019)
6 Cal.5th 735, 756.)
II.    Analysis
       Under the version of section 1001.36 effective when defendant requested
diversion, the trial court was obligated to find defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in commission of the charged offense in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Instead, the court focused on the sufficiency of the
evidence provided by defendant of a connection between defendant’s diagnosis of PTSD
and the offense. The court initially stated “the evidence [it] would hope to see” would
show defendant suffered PTSD “because he was in a situation where there were lights
and sirens and he couldn’t flee and he saw something traumatic and thus was in the same
state of panic.” The court noted defendant’s “mere diagnosis” of PTSD “without more to
connect it to the incident.” The court conceded that with more time, defendant could
obtain his “military records and probably be able to link” his PTSD with the offense. The
court ultimately concluded in denying defendant’s diversion request there was
“insufficient evidence to show a nexus between the [PTSD] and the conduct involved.”
The record thus shows the court incorrectly believed defendant was still required to prove
his mental disorder was a significant factor in commission of the offense to be eligible for
diversion under section 1001.36.
       “An abuse of discretion is shown when the trial court applies the wrong legal
standard.” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733.)
Defendant “was entitled to the court’s informed discretion on his motion for mental
health diversion.” (Doron, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 10, italics omitted.) Under these
circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to remand unless the record clearly indicates
that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion. (See People v. Jefferson

                                              8.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 399, 407–409 [remand would be futile where the record clearly
indicated the trial court would not have found the defendant eligible for diversion]; see
also People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [remand for resentencing is
required where the trial court was unaware of its sentencing discretion unless record
clearly indicates the court would have reached the same conclusion if it had been aware
of its discretion].)
       The People argue the trial court reached the correct result in denying defendant’s
request because the evidence in support of defendant’s diversion motion was insufficient
as a matter of law. The People primarily focus on the adequacy of the documentation
regarding defendant’s mental health diagnoses. They argue the assessments attached to
defendant’s motion were not signed by a qualified mental health expert, do not state
whether defendant was diagnosed within the last five years, and contain no opinion on
whether defendant was amenable to treatment or would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if he were treated in the community. Defendant acknowledges the
assessments attached to his motion were not signed by a qualified mental health expert
but argues the court made a finding that defendant suffered from PTSD. Defendant
further argues his records from the VA obtained after the diversion hearing show he is
eligible for mental health diversion and request the matter be remanded for the court to
consider his request.4 The People agree the proper remedy if the court’s ruling is
reversed is to remand for the court to conduct a complete assessment of defendant that
complies with section 1001.36.

4      On December 6, 2023, defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed an
application to expand her appointment to include preparation and filing of a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, mandate, or prohibition in this court. Counsel wished to include
mental health records obtained from the VA with a writ of habeas corpus. This request
was deferred on December 12, 2023, pending consideration of the appeal on its merits.
Because defendant’s case is being remanded to reconsider his diversion request and
defendant may submit these records in support of his request, counsel’s application is
denied as moot.

                                             9.
       We conclude a conditional limited remand is appropriate because the trial court
applied the incorrect legal standard to defendant’s diversion request and the record
indicates defendant may suffer from PTSD, a qualifying mental disorder. (See Frahs,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 640–641 [conditional limited remand is appropriate where the
defendant appears to suffer from a qualifying mental health disorder].) While the court
did not expressly find defendant had PTSD, the record indicates the court presumed he
suffered from this disorder in evaluating whether there was sufficient evidence to show a
nexus between the PTSD and the offense. Because the court erroneously concluded
defendant was ineligible for diversion without a showing his PTSD was a significant
factor in the commission of the offense, the court did not specifically address whether
defendant met his burden of showing a qualifying mental disorder diagnosed by a
qualified mental health expert within five years. Based on the record before us,
defendant may be able to show he is eligible for diversion, and he is entitled to the court’s
informed discretion in determining same. Whether defendant can show he was diagnosed
with PTSD within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert, or the People
can rebut the presumption defendant’s PTSD was a significant factor in the charged
offense, involve “quintessential factfinding” best left to the court’s sound discretion in the
first instance. (Oneal, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.)
       The People do not argue the record clearly indicates the trial court would have
found defendant unsuitable for diversion, and nor could they because the court did not
comment on whether defendant was suitable for diversion. Once the court concluded
defendant was ineligible for diversion, the court could have rationally concluded there
was no reason to address suitability.5 (See, e.g., People v. Bunas (2022)

5      A trial court’s denial of a diversion request may be upheld if the court correctly
concluded defendant did not meet one of the statutory criteria. (See, e.g., Oneal, supra,
64 Cal.App.5th at p. 593 [the trial court’s finding the defendant was ineligible for
diversion independently supported denial of diversion request even assuming the court’s
finding of dangerousness was not supported by substantial evidence; People v. Gerson

                                             10.
79 Cal.App.5th 840, 859–860 [the trial court may deny a diversion request based on the
defendant’s failure to show either eligibility or suitability].) Even under the amended
section 1001.36, the court was only required to consider suitability if defendant met the
criteria for eligibility. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) If on remand the court finds defendant is
eligible for diversion, the court must then consider whether defendant is suitable for
diversion.
       The matter must be remanded for the trial court to determine defendant’s
eligibility for mental health diversion under the correct legal standard pursuant to
amended section 1001.36. Nothing in this opinion precludes the court from considering
any subsequent evidence that comes to light regarding defendant’s eligibility or
suitability for diversion. We express no view regarding whether defendant is eligible or
suitable for diversion, or how the court should exercise its discretion in determining
whether to grant diversion.
                                      DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s conviction and sentence are conditionally reversed, and the matter is
remanded for the trial court to consider defendant’s eligibility for mental health diversion
under amended section 1001.36. If the court finds that defendant is eligible for mental
health diversion, the court shall consider whether defendant is suitable for diversion
under the criteria in section 1001.36. If defendant is eligible and suitable for diversion
under section 1001.36, then the court may grant diversion. If defendant successfully
completes diversion, the court shall dismiss the sole charge. If the court determines that
mental health diversion is not appropriate, or if the court grants diversion and defendant
does not successfully complete diversion, then defendant’s conviction and judgment shall
be reinstated.

(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1086, fn. 15 [the appellate court was not obligated to
consider the defendant’s arguments regarding suitability where the evidence supported
the trial court’s conclusion he did not suffer from a qualifying mental disorder].)

                                             11.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                     12.