Court Opinion

ID: 9846596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:44:06.93727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:39.649235
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The illegal nature of Detective-Sergeant Mansfield’s testimony, as recited in the majority opinion, is not in issue here since even the State has admitted that the introduction of the challenged testimony was error of constitutional dimension. The issue here, rather, is whether appellant’s motion to strike Mansfield’s testimony constituted a proper method of objecting to this illegal evidence. The majority holds that appellant’s motion to strike was not proper, concluding that when a defendant fails to object to challenged evidence at the moment it is introduced, the defendant has waived all objections and cannot subsequently utilize a motion to strike the illegal evidence to preserve those objections.
I disagree with the majority because its conclusion is contrary to the controlling authority of Supreme Court opinions and because the majority neither distinguishes nor overrules opinions of this court, which reach the opposite conclusion. In Blount v. Beall, 95 Ga. 182 (4) (22 SE 52) (1894), the Supreme Court held that “[although testimony may have been admitted without objection, it is the privilege of the party against whom such evidence bears to afterwards move to rule it out for irrelevancy.” In Graham v. Clark, 114 Ga. App. 825, 828-829 (152 SE2d 789) (1966), the appellee made the same argument now endorsed by the majority that the appellant therein had failed to preserve his objection to testimony when he made a motion to strike after the witness had been excused, because the “general rule” is that an objection is waived when the party fails to object during the examination of a witness. Id. at 828. This court rejected that argument and held that “by allowing evidence to be introduced without objection, a party does not lose the right to move to have the evidence excluded at any time before the case goes to the jury. [Cits.] ‘A motion to rule out testimony illegally admitted even without objection is never too late until the cause i[s] finally submitted to the jury. If the testimony is illegal, it should not be considered by the jury, and if it is not to be *754considered by the jury, it should not be admitted for their consideration.’ [Cit.]” Id. at 828-829. For other cases applying this principle, see McCalman v. State, 121 Ga. 491, 496-497 (5) (49 SE 609) (1904); Patton v. Bank of LaFayette, 124 Ga. 965, 974 (53 SE 664) (1905); Smith v. State, 123 Ga. App. 269, 271 (1) (b) (180 SE2d 556) (1971). For cases acknowledging this principle but distinguishing it on other grounds, see Fluker v. State, 184 Ga. 809 (4) (193 SE 749) (1937); Rushin v. State, 63 Ga. App. 646, 647 (1) (11 SE2d 844) (1940); Harrison v. State, 83 Ga. App. 367, 368 (64 SE2d 83) (1951); Mark Inn v. Dept. of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 420, 421 (1) (330 SE2d 134) (1985).
Decided November 6, 1990
Rehearing denied November 28, 1990
Mark. G. Pitts, for appellant.
John R. Parks, District Attorney, R. Rucker Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Our courts have long acknowledged that when illegal evidence is admitted without objection but is subsequently ruled out on a defendant’s motion to strike, any error in the introduction of that evidence is cured. E.g., Christian v. State, 86 Ga. 430, 431 (3) (12 SE 645) (1890). Since any error in admitting Mansfield’s testimony would have been cured had the trial court granted appellant’s motion to strike (the method appellant chose to challenge that evidence), I cannot agree with Judge Beasley’s special concurrence that this court can justify the denial of that motion merely because it may not have been the most effective way to offset the prejudicial effect on the jury of the admission of that evidence.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Carley and Judge Cooper join in this dissent.