Court Opinion

ID: 9856820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:59:35.247956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:46.909502
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion in Part V that “[sjection 8B-9 of the MUTCD is ... manifestly inconsistent with the mandatory stop sign provision of former I.C. § 49-672.” Ante at 84, 831 P.2d at 551. Our prior cases instruct that whenever possible this Court must construe potentially conflicting provisions in harmony. Sampson v. Layton, 86 Idaho 453, 387 P.2d 883 (1963). In this case, I.C. § 49-672 and I.C. § 49-584, which directed the adoption of § 8B-9 of the MUTCD, can indeed be construed consistently.
I.C. § 49-672 specifically provides that stop signs must be placed at all railroad crossings except when state or local highway authorities determine that such stop *86signs “would constitute a greater hazard than their absence____” However, another statute, I.C. § 49-5844 requires the Board to adopt “a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with ..., and so far as possible, conformpng] to ... the manual on uniform traffic control devices for streets and highways and other standards issued or endorsed by the federal highway administrator.” Based upon I.C. § 49-584, the Board adopted the MUTCD which “conform[s] to the system ... issued or endorsed by the federal highway administrator.” The standards set out in the MUTCD were apparently based upon the conclusion that there are more accidents at railroad crossings caused by cars which stop and then stall on the tracks, than there are accidents by cars which do not stop at railroad crossings. Pursuant to I.C. § 49-584, the Board adopted the manual which, in Section 8B-9, reads:
8B-9 STOP Signs at Grade Crossings (Rl-1, W3-1)
The use of the STOP signs at railroad-highway grade crossings shall be limited to those grade crossings selected after need is established by a detailed traffic engineering study. Such crossings should have the following characteristics:
1. Highway should be secondary in character with low traffic counts.
2. Train traffic should be substantial.
3. Line of sight to an approaching train is restricted by physical features such that approaching traffic is required to reduce speed to 10 miles per hour or less in order to stop safely.
4. At the stop bar, there must be sufficient sight distance down the track to afford ample time for a vehicle to cross the track before the arrival of the train.
The engineering study may determine other compelling reasons for the need to install a STOP sign, however, this should only be an interim measure until active traffic control signals can be installed. STOP signs shall not be used on primary through highways or at grade crossings with active traffic control devices.
Whenever a STOP sign is installed at a grade crossing, a Stop Ahead sign shall be installed in advance of the STOP sign.
Clearly, then, as the result of I.C. § 49-584, § 8B-9 of the MUTCD is not inconsistent with I.C. § 49-672, because it falls directly within its exception, as the legislature no doubt intended.
Ironically, it is the majority’s decision today that creates an inconsistency in Idaho law. This Court recently stated in Bingham v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 117 Idaho 147, 151, 786 P.2d 538, 542 (1990), that “[i]f plaintiffs show at trial that the manual [MUTCD] was not followed by the Department, Jorstad [v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 456 P.2d 766 (1969) ] suggests that plaintiffs may be entitled to judgment because the failure of the Department to follow its manual is negligence per se.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, the Board acted pursuant to legislative directive in I.C. § 49-584 by enacting and following MUTCD requirements, and, pursuant to Bingham, it would have been found negligent per se for failing to do so. However, today, in direct contradiction to Bingham, the majority concludes that the Board is negligent per se precisely because it adhered to the legislature’s mandate in I.C. § 49-584 by adopting and following MUTCD standards. Regardless of whether the Board follows the directive of this Court in Bingham or in this case, two opposite directives, the Board will be guilty *87of negligence per se. This result is both unfair and inconsistent.
Accordingly, I believe the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the highway district’s failure to install a stop sign at the railroad crossing was negligence per se. This instruction was clearly contrary to the MUTCD and our Bingham case, and was prejudicial error. The case should be remanded for a new trial free of that error.

. I.C. § 49-584, recodified as I.C. § 49-201(3), reads:
49-201. Duties of board. — ____
(3) The board shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions of this title for use upon highways within the state. The uniform system shall correlate with, and so far as possible, conform to the system set forth in the most recent edition of the manual on uniform traffic control devices for streets and highways and other standards issued or endorsed by the federal highway administrator.