Court Opinion

ID: 9389173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 19:11:13.171564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:25.586936
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                                                            FILED
                              January 2023 Term
                                                                         April 24, 2023
                                 ____________                               released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                        EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

                                                                        SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                  No. 21-1001
                                                                            OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                 ____________

                           CITY OF WHEELING,
                          Defendant Below, Petitioner

                                       v.

         THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA
                      and THE CITY OF BENWOOD,
                              Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________

           Appeal from the Public Service Commission of West Virginia
                            Case No. 21-0372-S-WI

                               VACATED
________________________________________________________________________

                    Rehearing Granted September 20, 2022.
                  Submitted Upon Rehearing January 10, 2023.
                             Filed April 24, 2023.

Robert R. Rodecker, Esq.                    Jessica M. Lane, Esq.
John R. McGhee, Esq.                        Jeffrey A. Foster, Esq.
KAY CASTO & CHANEY PLLC                     Natalie E. Thomas, Esq.
Charleston, West Virginia                   Public Service Commission of West
Counsel for Petitioner                      Virginia
                                            Charleston, West Virginia
Rosemary Humway-Warmuth, Esq.               Counsel for Respondent
Office of City Solicitor
City of Wheeling
Wheeling, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioner
CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE ARMSTEAD and JUSTICE HUTCHISON dissent and reserve their rights to
file separate opinions.
                              SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “In reviewing a Public Service Commission order, we will first

determine whether the Commission’s order, viewed in light of the relevant facts and of the

Commission’s broad regulatory duties, abused or exceeded its authority. We will examine

the manner in which the Commission has employed the methods of regulation which it has

itself selected, and must decide whether each of the order’s essential elements is supported

by substantial evidence. Finally, we will determine whether the order may reasonably be

expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate

investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection to the

relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable. The court’s responsibility is not to

supplant the Commission’s balance of these interests with one more nearly to its liking, but

instead to assure itself that the Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of

the pertinent factors.” Syllabus Point 2, Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service

Commission of West Virginia, 166 W. Va. 423, 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981).

              2.     “The detailed standard for our review of an order of the Public Service

Commission contained in Syllabus Point 2 of Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service

Commission, 166 W.Va. 423, 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981), may be summarized as follows: (1)

whether the Commission exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there

is adequate evidence to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the

substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.” Syllabus Point 1, Central West

                                              i
Virginia Refuse, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 190 W. Va. 416, 438

S.E.2d 596 (1993).

              3.     “‘In the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, words used

in a statute will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning.’ Syl. pt. 1, Tug

Valley v. Mingo Cty. Comm’n, 164 W.Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979).” Syllabus Point 7,

Wheeling Park Commission v. Dattoli, 237 W. Va. 275, 787 S.E.2d 546 (2016).

              4.     “It is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language

in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a

mandatory connotation.” Syllabus Point 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Public Employees

Service Board, 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982).

              5.     The 120-day dispute resolution period set forth in West Virginia Code

§ 24-2-1(b)(6) (2021) commences on the date a request for investigation is filed with the

Public Service Commission pursuant to that statute.

                                             ii
WALKER, Chief Justice:

             The City of Wheeling sells wholesale sewage treatment service to the City

of Benwood. In April 2021, Wheeling increased the wholesale rate it charges to Benwood

by 45%. Benwood complained to the Public Service Commission about the rate hike in

May 2021 under West Virginia Code § 24-2-1(b)(6) (2021). That statute requires the

Commission to resolve complaints like Benwood’s “within 120 days of filing,” although

that period may be tolled to permit the Commission to gather information.              The

Commission entered the final order resolving Benwood’s complaint in November 2021,

after issuing three tolling orders the prior June, July, and October. Wheeling now asks us

to vacate that final order, arguing that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by

entering that final order more than 120 days after Benwood filed its complaint. We agree

based on the plain language of the statute and so vacate the Commission’s order of

November 12, 2021. 1

                I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             Wheeling contests the November 2021 final order of the Commission on

jurisdictional grounds. Wheeling doesn’t challenge the substance of that order in this

      1
        Wheeling petitioned the Commission to reconsider its November 12, 2021 order
and to stay that order pending appeal. The Commission denied that petition by order
entered December 1, 2021. That order is vacated as well for the reasons discussed below.

                                            1
appeal, so the following discussion is limited. We first outline the context of this dispute,

then detail pertinent procedural events before the Commission.

                Wheeling is what is known as a “locally rate-regulated” utility (LRR). LRRs

are “political subdivisions of this state providing separate or combined water and/or sewer

services and having at least 4,500 customers and annual combined gross revenues of $3

million . . . .” 2 In 2015, the Legislature circumscribed the Commission’s jurisdiction over

LRRs, specifically finding that they “are most fairly and effectively regulated by the local

governing body with respect to rates, borrowing and capital projects.” 3 The Legislature

detailed the Commission’s jurisdiction over LRRs in West Virginia Code § 24-2-1. In this

case, we are concerned with § 24-2-1(b)(6) (2021), which we discuss in detail, below.

                Wheeling sells sewer service to Benwood. On April 6, 2021, Wheeling

raised the rate charged to Benwood for that service by 45%, effective May 21, 2021.

Wheeling filed that ordinance with the Commission on April 14, 2021. On May 3, 2021,

Benwood filed a complaint with the Commission under § 24-2-1(b)(6). Benwood asserted

that the increased rate was “unfair, unreasonable, [and] discriminatory . . . .” 4 Benwood

       2
           W. Va. Code § 24-2-1(b) (2021).
       3
           W. Va. Code § 24-1-1(j) (2015).
       4
         Benwood labelled its initial filing as a “Formal Complaint,” although
§ 24-2-1(b)(6) refers to a “request for an investigation” as the filing that kicks off a
proceeding under that statute. The parties appear to agree that Benwood’s Formal

                                              2
also alleged that the increased rate—adopted by Wheeling to fund capital projects—was

not based on Benwood’s proportionate share of the project’s scope of work.

              Wheeling sent a letter to the Commission on May 27, 2021 (24 days after

Benwood filed its complaint).       In that letter, Wheeling acknowledged Benwood’s

complaint and suggested that, as of May 27, the Commission had issued neither an order

to investigate Benwood’s complaint nor an order requiring Wheeling to answer the

complaint. 5 Wheeling included its answer to Benwood’s complaint with the May 27 letter.

The Commission entered an order noting Wheeling’s May 27 answer on June 2, 2021 (30

days after Benwood filed its complaint). There, the Commission concluded that Wheeling

“ha[s] not filed sufficient support for the rates, fees and charges in its municipal ordinance

to facilitate Commission evaluation” of Benwood’s complaint.               The Commission

concluded that § 24-2-1(b)(6) empowered it to “toll the running of the statutory period for

resolution of Benwood’s complaint pending the filing of necessary supporting information

of a municipal ordinance.” It then ordered Wheeling to file the requested information—

including a class cost of study (CCOS)—no later than 30 days from the order date. The

Commission then tolled the “running of the statutory period of resolution of the complaint

Complaint equates to a request for investigation under § 24-2-1(b)(6), so we use the terms
interchangeably in this Opinion.
       5
         Cf. W. Va. Code R. § 150-1-6.2.5 (2019) (“Upon the filing of a formal complaint
and the issuance of an order to investigate, the Commission will require that a copy of the
complaint be served on each defendant, together with a copy of an order requiring each
defendant to satisfy or answer the complaint within ten (10) days.”).

                                              3
for a period of 45 days, resulting in a statutory decision due date of Friday, October 15,

2021.”

              Wheeling filed the information requested by the Commission in the June 2

order, including the CCOS, on July 2, 2021. On July 14, Commission staff notified

Wheeling of an error in the CCOS. Wheeling submitted a revised CCOS the next day, July

15. On July 19, Commission staff moved the Commission to “exercise its statutory

authority under Code §24-2-1(b)(6) and toll [the Benwood-Wheeling dispute] for an

additional thirteen (13) days from October 15, 2021, or until October 28, 2021” to put staff

“in the posture that [they] should have been in on July 2, 2021, but for the flawed [s]tudy

filed by Wheeling.” The Commission granted that motion on July 22, finding that (1) the

then-current statutory deadline was October 15, 2021, (2) it was “reasonable to toll the

running of the statutory deadline . . . and Staff Report due dates for 13 days,” and (3)

“ORDERED that the running of the statutory deadline is tolled until September 28, 2021.”

              The administrative law judge issued a recommended decision on September

13, 2021, in which he recommended that the Commission adopt the rate passed by

Wheeling the prior April.     Benwood and Commission staff filed exceptions to the

                                             4
recommended decision in late September. 6         Wheeling replied to Benwood and the

Commission in early October.

              The Commission filed a third order tolling the statutory, 120-day deadline to

resolve the Benwood-Wheeling dispute on October 26. In that order, the Commission

stated that

                     [g]iven the complexity of this case and need for
              additional time for Commission consideration and review, the
              Commission will invoke its authority under W. Va. Code § 24-
              2-1(b)(6) to toll the statutory period 120 days from the date
              Wheeling filed a Revised [CCOS], being July 15, 2021. The
              statutory deadline in this case should be extended to November
              12, 2021.

              ....

                     IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the running of the
              statutory period for resolution of this matter is tolled 120 days
              from July 15, 2021, resulting in a statutory decision due date
              of Friday, November 12, 2021.

              The Commission entered its final decision on November 12, 2021, declining

to adopt the administrative law judge’s recommended decision. 7 Ten days later, Wheeling

petitioned the Commission to reconsider its November 12 order. Wheeling contended that

       6
        The West Virginia Water Development Authority (WDA) participated in the
proceedings before the Commission as amicus curiae. The WDA responded to
Commission staff’s exceptions and advocated adoption of the administrative law judge’s
proposed order.
       7
         The Commission ordered Wheeling to adopt a recalculated wholesale sewer rate
effective that day.

                                             5
the Commission had exceeded its authority under the plain and unambiguous language of

§ 24-2-1(b)(6) when, in its October 26 order, it restarted the 120-day dispute resolution

clock from July 15, 2021 to allow it additional time to consider the Wheeling-Benwood

dispute. 8 Wheeling argued that, because the October 26 order was issued outside the

Commission’s authority, the dispute resolution deadline remained October 28, 2021, i.e.,

the recalculated deadline set in the tolling order of July 22. Wheeling also argued that the

October 26 order was erroneous because it calculated the 120-day resolution deadline from

the date it provided the revised CCOS (July 15) rather than the date Benwood filed its

complaint (May 3). 9

              The Commission denied Wheeling’s petition for reconsideration on

December 1, 2021.      The Commission reasoned that, “W. Va. Code § 24-2-1(b)(6)

authorizes the Commission to toll the 120-day period for resolution of rate disputes

between a[n LLR] and its customer until the necessary information showing the basis of

the rates, fees, and charges or other information the Commission deems necessary is filed.”

       8
          Wheeling did not object to the dispute resolution deadline set by the Commission
in the October 26, 2021 order at the time of its entry. Instead, it waited to raise the issue
until after the Commission issued a final order adverse to Wheeling’s interests. While “the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time,” State ex rel. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 239 W. Va. 338, 345, 801 S.E.2d 216, 223 (2017), that
principle is not an invitation to gamesmanship. We strongly encourage litigants to raise
credible concerns with subject matter jurisdiction as early as possible in a proceeding.
       9
        Wheeling also moved the Commission to stay the November 12, 2021 order
pending its appeal. In its December 1, 2021 order, the Commission denied Wheeling’s
motion to stay the November 12 order.

                                             6
Because Wheeling had not filed the revised CCOS until July 15, the Commission

concluded that § 24-2-1(b)(6) authorized it to “toll” the 120-day dispute resolution period

from that date. As to its earlier calculations of the dispute resolution deadline, the

Commission stated that it had not

             invoke[d] its full authority to toll the decision due date by 120
             days from the date Wheeling filed its Revised [CCOS].
             Instead, [it] granted Staff’s request to toll the decision due date
             only 13 days from the then-established statutory decision due
             date of October 15, 2021. The Commission recognized and
             corrected this oversight when it issued its October 26, 2021,
             Order that tolled the decision due date of this dispute 120 days
             from July 15, 2021.

             The Commission did not address Wheeling’s argument that it lacked

jurisdiction under § 24-2-1(b)(6) to toll the dispute resolution deadline to allow it more

time to consider complex cases.

             Wheeling appealed the Commission’s orders of November 12 and December

1. This Court affirmed those orders in an Opinion issued on April 26, 2022. We then

granted Wheeling’s petition to reconsider that decision. The matter was submitted to the

Court again following oral argument on January 10, 2023. This Opinion follows.

                            II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Well-established standards govern our review of the Commission’s orders of

November 12, 2021, and December 1, 2021. Over forty years ago, this Court held that,

                                             7
                     In reviewing a Public Service Commission order, we
             will first determine whether the Commission’s order, viewed
             in light of the relevant facts and of the Commission’s broad
             regulatory duties, abused or exceeded its authority. We will
             examine the manner in which the Commission has employed
             the methods of regulation which it has itself selected, and must
             decide whether each of the order’s essential elements is
             supported by substantial evidence. Finally, we will determine
             whether the order may reasonably be expected to maintain
             financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly
             compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet
             provide appropriate protection to the relevant public interests,
             both existing and foreseeable. The court’s responsibility is not
             to supplant the Commission’s balance of these interests with
             one more nearly to its liking, but instead to assure itself that the
             Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of the
             pertinent factors.[10]

             We restated that standard more succinctly in 1993:

                    The detailed standard for our review of an order of the
             Public Service Commission contained in Syllabus Point 2 of
             Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 166
             W.Va. 423, 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981), may be summarized as
             follows: (1) whether the Commission exceeded its statutory
             jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there is adequate evidence
             to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the
             substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.[11]

      10
         Syl. Pt. 2, Monongahela Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 166 W. Va.
423, 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981).
      11
         Syl. Pt. 1, Cent. W. Va. Refuse, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 190 W. Va.
416, 438 S.E.2d 596 (1993).

                                              8
                  We are concerned in this case with (1): “whether the Commission exceeded

its statutory jurisdiction and powers.” 12 To resolve this dispute, we are called upon to

examine the language of § 24-2-1(b)(6), raising a question of law which this Court reviews

de novo. 13

                                        III. ANALYSIS

                  The substance of the Commission’s November 12, 2021 order is not the issue

in this case. Rather, we decide whether the Commission acted within its statutory authority

when it elected to start the jurisdictional, 120-day clock on the date it contends it received

sufficient information from Wheeling to resolve the Benwood-Wheeling dispute—July 15,

2021. The plain language of § 24-2-1(b)(6) controls that decision.

                  West Virginia Code § 24-2-1(b)(6) states that:

       12
            Id.
       13
          See Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415
(1995) (“Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or
involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.”). The
Commission suggests that its interpretation of § 24-2-1(b)(6) is entitled to deference under
Syllabus Point 1 of Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Department as a permissible
construction of an ambiguous statute. Id., 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995). As we
conclude below, the operative language of § 24-2-1(b)(6) is plain and the Commission’s
position is contrary to that statute. So, if Syllabus Point 1 of Appalachian Power is relevant
here, it does not require this Court to afford deference to the Commission’s view of
§ 24-2-1(b)(6) because where “the intention of the Legislature is clear, that is the end of
the matter . . . .” Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Appalachian Power Co., 195 W. Va. at 573, 466 S.E.2d
at 424.

                                               9
                       (b)    The jurisdiction of the commission over political
                subdivisions of this state providing separate or combined water
                and/or sewer services and having at least 4,500 customers and
                annual combined gross revenues of $3 million or more that are
                political subdivisions of the state is limited to:

                ....

                        (6)    Investigation and resolution of disputes between
                a political subdivision of the state providing wholesale water
                and/or wastewater treatment or other services, whether by
                contract or through a tariff, and its customer or customers,
                including, but not limited to, rates, fees, and charges, service
                areas and contested utility combinations: Provided, That any
                request for an investigation related to such a dispute that is
                based on the act or omission of the political subdivision shall
                be filed within 30 days of the act or omission of the political
                subdivision and the commission shall resolve the dispute
                within 120 days of filing. The 120-day period for resolution of
                the dispute may be tolled by the commission until the
                necessary information showing the basis of the rates, fees, and
                charges or other information required by the commission is
                filed: Provided, however, That the disputed rates, fees, and
                charges fixed by the political subdivision providing separate or
                combined water and/or sewer services shall remain in full force
                and effect until set aside, altered or, amended by the
                commission in an order to be followed in the future.[14]

                Wheeling posits that the italicized language starts the 120-day clock on the

date the customer of an LRR files a complaint under § 24-2-1(b)(6). In this case, that is

May 3, 2021. According to the Commission, the “‘may be tolled’ proviso of [§ 24-2-

1(b)(6)] means that if [it] does not have all the necessary information before it at [filing]

then [it] has authority to determine that the 120-day review period begins on the date the

       14
            W. Va. Code § 24-2-1(b)(6) (emphases added).

                                              10
utility files the necessary information.” In other words, Wheeling relies on the italicized

language above, while the Commission’s argument hangs on the underlined language.

                “Generally the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar

significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use.” 15

Likewise, “‘[i]n the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, words used in a

statute will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning.’” 16 Those principles

direct us to the common, ordinary meaning of the verb “toll”: “to stop the running of; to

abate.” 17 Similarly, a “tolling statute” is defined as “[a] law that interrupts the running of

a statute of limitations in certain situations . . . .” 18 Courts have recognized that tolling

“operates to suspend or interrupt [a statute of limitation’s] running while certain activity

        Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Gen. Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars,
       15

144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).
       16
         Syl. Pt. 7, Wheeling Park Comm’n v. Dattoli, 237 W. Va. 275, 787 S.E.2d 546
(2016) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Tug Valley Recovery Ctr., Inc. v. Mingo Cnty. Comm’n, 164 W.
Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979)); see also Syl. Pt. 4, W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Weaver,
222 W. Va. 668, 671 S.E.2d 673 (2008) (“‘In the absence of any definition of the intended
meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they will, in the interpretation
of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning in the connection in
which they are used.’ Syllabus point 1, Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637,
17 S.E.2d 810 (1941), overruled on other grounds by Lee–Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 170
W.Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477 (1982).”).
       17
            Toll, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1791 (11th ed. 2019).
       18
            Tolling statute, id. (emphasis added).

                                               11
takes place.” 19 And in the context of equitable tolling, the Supreme Court of the United

States has commented that “[p]rinciples of equitable tolling usually dictate that when a

time bar has been suspended and then begins to run again upon a later event, the time

remaining on the clock is calculated by subtracting from the full limitations period

whatever time ran before the clock was stopped.” 20 While § 24-2-1(b)(6) is not a statute

of limitations per se, the operative concept of the definition of a “tolling statute” is readily

transferable to § 24-2-1(b)(6): the Commission may suspend or interrupt the running of

the 120-day clock once it has begun, but it may not postpone its commencement.

                The Commission asserts that this phrase—“[t]he 120-day period for

resolution of the dispute may be tolled by the commission”—empowers it to determine

when the 120-day jurisdictional clock begins to run. But the language that precedes that

phrase— “shall” and “of filing”—belies the Commission’s argument. Regarding “shall,”

“[i]t is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language in the statute

showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory

connotation.” 21 In the context of § 24-2-1(b)(6), the combination of “shall” and “of filing”

       19
            Flannery v. Singer Asset Fin. Co., LLC, 94 A.3d 553, 569 (Conn. 2014) (citations
omitted).
       20
            United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1991) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
       21
         Syl. Pt. 1, Nelson v. W. Va. Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd., 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86
(1982). We see no indication in § 24-2-1(b)(6) that the Legislature intended “shall” to be
anything less than mandatory.

                                              12
communicates the Legislature’s clear intent to start the 120-day clock to resolve disputes

under § 24-2-1(b)(6) when an LLR customer files its complaint. Had the Legislature

intended to empower the Commission to delay the commencement of the 120-day clock as

it did in this case, the Legislature would have said that the Commission must resolve a

request for investigation filed under § 24-2-1(b)(6) within 120 days of the filing of

“information showing the basis of the rates, fees, and charges or other information required

by the commission with the Commission.” In view of the plain language of the statute, we

now hold that the 120-day dispute resolution period set forth in West Virginia Code § 24-

2-1(b)(6) (2021) commences on the date a request for investigation is filed with the Public

Service Commission pursuant to that statute. 22

              Applying that holding to the facts of this case, we conclude that the

Commission erroneously commenced the 120-day dispute resolution period on July 15,

2021, rather than the date Benwood filed its complaint, May 3, 2021. Due to that error, the

Commission erroneously calculated the deadline to resolve the Benwood-Wheeling dispute

as November 12, 2021. Section 24-2-1(b)(6) required the Commission to resolve the

       22
          We note the Commission’s argument that the Legislature cannot have intended
the 120-day clock to start before the Commission has received the information necessary
to resolve a dispute filed under § 24-2-1(b)(6). According to the Commission, that reading
of § 24-2-1(b)(6) puts the LLR in “control over when it provides the Commission with
necessary information.” But § 24-2-1(b)(6) empowers the Commission to toll the running
of the 120-day period once it commences. Practically, the Commission imposed deadlines
on Wheeling to respond to the Commission’s information requests which, presumably, the
Commission would have enforced had Wheeling failed to supply information requested by
the Commission on time.

                                            13
Benwood-Wheeling dispute on or before October 28, 2021, that is May 3, 2021 + 120 days

+ 45 days (June 2 order) + 13 days (July 22 order). 23 The final order in this case (as well

as the order denying Wheeling’s motion to reconsider) was entered after October 28, 2021.

Because the Commission did not have jurisdiction over the Benwood-Wheeling dispute

after October 28, 2021, its November 12 and December 1, 2021 orders are void and we

now vacate them. 24

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

              For the reasons discussed above, the Commission lacked jurisdiction over

this matter when it entered its orders of November 12 and December 1, 2021. Accordingly,

we now vacate those orders.

                                                                                  Vacated.

       23
           As noted in section I., in its June 2, 2021, order, the Commission directed
Wheeling to file the requested information within 30 days of the order. Yet, the
Commission tolled the 120-day dispute resolution period by 45 days, without explanation.
The July 22 order is similarly flawed. There, the Commission tolled the 120-day period
by 13 days to “put staff in the posture that [they] would have been in on July 2, 2021, but
for the flawed [CCOS] filed by Wheeling,” rather than to allow Wheeling to file additional
information requested by the Commission. That said, we utilize 45 days and 13 days to
calculate the various dispute resolution dates for the sake of simplicity and because their
use does not affect the outcome of Wheeling’s appeal.
       24
          Because we have vacated the Commission’s orders of November 12, 2021 and
December 1, 2021, it is not necessary to address Wheeling’s challenge to the Commission’s
denial of its motion to stay those orders.

                                            14