Court Opinion

ID: 9905119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 20:01:53.756313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:03.632585
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 JOHN PETERNEL,

                         Plaintiff,

                         v.                            Civil Action No. 23-670 (BAH)

 PETE BUTTIGIEG, SECRETARY, U.S.                       Judge Beryl A. Howell
 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
 IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

                         Defendant.

                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

         Plaintiff John Peternel initiated this suit against defendant Pete Buttigieg, Secretary of the

U.S. Department of Transportation (“DOT”), in his official capacity, alleging one count of

retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 9. Defendant now seeks

partial dismissal of the retaliation claims that pre-date plaintiff’s protected activity as well as

those relying on allegedly retaliatory actions that are not objectively materially adverse. See

Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 11. For the reasons discussed

below, defendant’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I.       BACKGROUND

         The factual background and procedural history of the instant matter are summarized

below.

         A.     Factual Background

         Plaintiff, a 51-year-old man, has been employed since November 2015 as an Industry

Economist in the Regulatory and Grant Economic Division of the Federal Railroad

                                                   1
Administration (“FRA”) within the DOT. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 11. In November 2016, plaintiff

was promoted from the GS-12 to the GS-13 level, but has obtained no promotions to higher

levels, despite being eligible for the GS-14 level as of November 2017. Id. ¶¶ 11–12, 15.

         Marc Fuller, a 44-year-old Staff Director, became plaintiff’s direct supervisor in June

2017, and has allegedly subjected plaintiff to “increasing levels of scrutiny” and has repeatedly

refused to promote him to the GS-14 level. Id. ¶¶ 13–15.1 Fuller allegedly informed plaintiff

that, to be promoted, he would have to take a rulemaking from beginning to end, but “[e]ach time

Plaintiff took a rulemaking from beginning to end, [] Fuller manufactured a reason why that

rulemaking did not count towards Plaintiff’s promotion.” Id. ¶ 19.

         Economists in plaintiff’s position are subject to yearly performance appraisals that affect

their annual bonuses and may receive one of four final ratings: Unacceptable; Achieved Results;

Exceeded Expectations; or Outstanding. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22. These final ratings are based on four job

elements, which are, in turn, determined by whether an economist meets certain performance

targets. Id. ¶ 21. For the 2017–2018 year, plaintiff received an Exceeded Expectations rating,

but in the following 2018–2019 year, he received a lower Achieved Results rating. Id. ¶¶ 23–24.

On July 11, 2019, plaintiff met with Fuller to discuss his Achieved Results rating and possible

paths to promotion. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Fuller allegedly had “no meaningful explanation” for

plaintiff’s rating and informed plaintiff that his current rulemaking was “too simple” to count

towards his promotion path, that plaintiff was “not assigned any work that would allow him to

show his ability to work” at the GS-14 level, and that plaintiff “for the foreseeable future would

not be assigned any such work.” Id. Dissatisfied with this discussion, plaintiff challenged his

1
        Since Fuller took over as Staff Director, he has allegedly supervised plaintiff and eight other economists.
Am. Compl. ¶ 16. Of the eight other economists—none of whom have allegedly engaged in EEO activity—four
were promoted by Fuller from the GS-13 to the GS-14 level, and the remaining four had already been promoted to
the GS-14 level by the time Fuller took over as Staff Director. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.

                                                          2
Achieved Results rating through FRA’s formal grievance and appeal process, and his rating was

bumped up one level to Exceeded Expectations. Id. ¶ 25.

         On July 15, 2019, plaintiff met with Karl Alexy, plaintiff’s second-line supervisor, to

share and discuss his feelings that “Fuller was intentionally suppressing his ability” to be

promoted because plaintiff is “old.” Id. ¶ 29. The next day, Fuller assigned plaintiff a

rulemaking named “Brakes III.” Id. ¶ 30. Although plaintiff successfully completed the

rulemaking, Fuller denied plaintiff a promotion because he allegedly delegated the “most

important” work to another economist—a characterization plaintiff disputes. Id. On August 2,

2019, plaintiff emailed Alexy to reiterate his concerns about age discrimination by Fuller, and on

August 4, 2019, plaintiff filed an informal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint

of age discrimination with FRA’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”). Id. ¶¶ 31–32.

         Plaintiff enumerates several allegedly adverse actions occurring in 2019 post-dating his

first EEO complaint, including:

    •    On August 16, 2019, Fuller identified a minor error “that had first appeared seven weeks
         prior” in plaintiff’s Economics Weekly Update report, a performance target used to
         determine one of the job elements that affects an employee’s final job rating, and
         retroactively rated plaintiff’s work for these seven weeks “No.” Id. ¶¶ 33–34.2
    •    On August 17, 2019, Fuller gave plaintiff a time off award instead of a cash award, even
         though plaintiff specifically asked for a cash award and every other economist received a
         cash award. Id. ¶ 39.
    •    On December 30, 2019, Fuller gave plaintiff an Achieved Results rating for his midterm
         evaluation for the 2019–2020 year, resulting in a final rating of Achieved Results for the
         full 2019–2020 year and reducing plaintiff’s bonus award. Id. ¶¶ 44, 50.3

2
        Economists are rated on these weekly reports on a “Yes” or “No” grading scale; they receive a “Yes” if
they submit their report “on time with correct numbers,” and are otherwise “supposed to receive a ‘No.’” Am.
Compl. ¶ 35. Despite these rules, several economists allegedly did not receive a “No” for similar minor errors,
much less a retroactive changing of their grade for the week to a “No.” Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
3
          The Amended Complaint states that plaintiff received a rating of “Achieved Expectations,” Am. Compl.
¶ 50, but this is, presumably, a typographical error, since according to plaintiff, no such rating exists, id. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff further alleges that Fuller altered his 2019–2020 final rating without his knowledge or consent in June and
July 2020 but does not explain how the rating changed or why plaintiff’s consent would be necessary. Id. ¶ 53.

                                                          3
       Based on this alleged conduct in 2019, plaintiff filed, on February 3, 2020, a second

informal complaint with FRA’s OCR based on age discrimination, id. ¶ 45, but the alleged

adverse actions continue throughout that year, including, for example:

   •   On February 27, 2020, Fuller issued a Letter of Counseling (“February 2020 Letter”)
       addressing plaintiff’s “discourteous conduct while discussing work-related issues” and
       advising that plaintiff’s “failure to correct his conduct may subject him to severe
       disciplinary or adverse action, including removal from Federal service.” Id. ¶ 46.
   •   In March 2020, Fuller reassigned plaintiff to spend 20% of his time on Paperwork
       Reduction Act duties. Id. ¶ 47.
   •   In mid-September 2020, Fuller reprimanded plaintiff for raising his allegations of
       discrimination at a staff meeting and encouraged plaintiff to take a poor communicator
       class. Id. ¶ 54.
   •   On September 23, 2020, FRA’s HR Director Mark Atkisson denied plaintiff’s “request
       for a lateral transfer and advised him to apply for positions with lower promotional
       potential than his current position, or to seek employment elsewhere.” Id. ¶ 56.
   •   On October 9, 2020, Fuller issued a Letter of Reprimand (“October 2020 Letter”) in
       response to plaintiff’s efforts to discuss and raise his EEO concerns with his coworkers,
       which stated: “I am placing you on notice that you[r] behavior needs to change
       immediately and I expect you will take appropriate corrective action to ensure there is
       improvement and another incident does not occur. Your failure to follow these
       instructions, may subject you to more severe disciplinary or adverse action, up to and
       including removal from Federal service.” Id. ¶¶ 58–59.
   •   Beginning in October 2020 and continuing through November 18, 2020, Fuller sent
       plaintiff “emails documenting the results of their weekly meetings, which he [did] not
       send to other similarly situated” economists. Id. ¶ 60.
   •   On November 18, 2020, Fuller instructed plaintiff to “learn[] a complex process . . . that
       was unrelated to Plaintiff’s primary job duties” and “spoke to Plaintiff in a demeaning
       manner” when accusing him “of learning the process too slowly.” Id. ¶ 63.
   •   On November 20, 2020, Fuller informed plaintiff that disclosing his October 2020 Letter
       and forwarding emails about his EEO activity to coworkers was “unprofessional.” Id.
       ¶ 64.
   •   On November 20, 2020, Fuller told plaintiff to find another job in response to his request
       for a job transfer and denied plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to complete an
       assignment. Id. ¶¶ 65–66.

       The allegedly adverse conduct reached its climax on December 4, 2020, when Fuller

“threatened to demote and terminate Plaintiff, and stated [in an email], ‘you are responsible for

your actions and the chain of events that may follow,’ in response to Plaintiff asking whether he

could engage in EEO activity.” Id. ¶ 67. Upon receiving the email, plaintiff “had a complete

                                                 4
mental breakdown” and “requested and received a job detail.” Id. ¶ 68. When time for

plaintiff’s mid-year performance evaluation for the 2020–2021 year arrived, Fuller issued “a

false and unfavorable” evaluation and stated that plaintiff “needed to improve on

communication, prioritizing projects, and working effectively with others.” Id. ¶ 70.

         In sum, plaintiff alleges that Fuller generally “treated younger employees, female

employees, and employees who have not participated in EEO activity more favorably with

regard to work assignments, their ability to voice opinions regarding assignments, and due

dates,” in violation of the ADEA and Title VII. Id. ¶ 61.

         B.       Procedural Background

         Plaintiff has filed two EEO complaints, which DOT’s OCR has since consolidated. Id.

¶ 10.4 He filed his first informal complaint of age discrimination with FRA’s OCR on August 4,

2019. Id. ¶ 32. FRA’s OCR issued a Notice of Right to File a Discrimination Complaint on

November 7, 2019, and plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination with DOT’s OCR,

alleging retaliation based on age and sex, on November 21, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 10(a), 41–42.

         Plaintiff then filed his second informal complaint of age discrimination on February 3,

2020. Id. ¶ 45. A Notice of Right to File a Discrimination Complaint was issued on May 6,

2019, and plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination with DOT’s OCR, alleging that

DOT discriminated against him in violation of Title VII and the ADEA, on May 18, 2020. Id.

¶¶ 10(b), 48–49.5

4
        The dates and details of these EEO complaints are inconsistently described within the Amended Complaint.
Compare id. ¶ 42 (alleging that plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination with DOT’s OCR on November
19, 2019), with id. ¶ 10(a) (alleging that plaintiff filed the formal complaint on November 21, 2019).
5
         Plaintiff’s allegation that he filed a formal complaint of discrimination against DOT pursuant to Title VII
and the ADEA, Am. Compl. ¶ 49, is the first time the Amended Complaint makes any reference to Title VII in the
context of outlining the facts that form the basis of plaintiff’s retaliation claim. The Amended Complaint, in
addition, alleges that plaintiff’s second formal complaint of discrimination comprised of twenty-eight claims, id.
¶ 71, but does not explain what these twenty-eight claims are.

                                                          5
       The two complaints were consolidated for administrative review on June 23, 2022. Id.

¶ 10(d). On November 3, 2022, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative

Judge granted DOT’s motion for summary judgment, which became the agency’s final decision

on December 13, 2022. Id. ¶ 10(f)–(g).

       Plaintiff then filed, on March 10, 2023, the complaint initiating this action. See Compl.,

ECF No. 1. As amended, the complaint alleges one count of retaliation in violation of Title VII

and the ADEA based on plaintiff being “subjected to increased scrutiny, receiv[ing] negative

Performance Appraisals[] [and] lower bonus awards[,] and [being] denied promotional

opportunities.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 74. Defendants, in turn, have moved for partial dismissal of

the Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

II.    LEGAL STANDARD

       To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “the complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Wood v.

Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757–58 (2014) (citation omitted). A claim is facially plausible when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that is more than “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability”

and “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)); see also Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d

1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Plausibility requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” (citation omitted)).

       In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must consider the whole complaint,

accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and construing

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Atchley v.

                                                   6
AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 22 F.4th 204, 210 (D.C. Cir. 2022). A court, however, does not “accept

inferences drawn by a plaintiff if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the

complaint.” Nurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (alterations in original

accepted and citation omitted).

        In general, a court must treat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 56 motion for summary

judgment if it considers “matters outside the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). This conversion

rule is not triggered, however, when a court considers “any documents either attached to or

incorporated in the complaint and matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” N. Am.

Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alterations in original accepted

and citation omitted). This rule is also not triggered when a court considers documents attached

to motions to dismiss that are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim,

even when the documents are produced by the defendant. See, e.g., Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F.

Supp. 2d 91, 98 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that “the various letters and materials produced in the

course of plaintiff’s discharge proceedings . . . fall under this exception and may be considered”),

aff’d, 38 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Saunders v. Mills, 842 F. Supp. 2d 284, 293 n.2 (D.D.C.

2012) (considering “Letter of Counseling,” which was attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss,

“repeatedly referenced in the Complaint,” and central to plaintiff’s claim that the letter was

retaliatory, “without converting the motion to one for summary judgment”); Pearson v. District

of Columbia, 644 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 n.1 (D.D.C. 2009) (considering, on motion to dismiss,

several exhibits, including memoranda, emails, and letters, attached to defendant’s motion and

mentioned at least once in the complaint), aff’d, 377 F. App’x 34 (D.C. Cir. 2010).6

6
          For this reason, the following documents, which are attached as Exhibits 4 and 5 to defendant’s motion and
are referenced and quoted as central to plaintiff’s claims in the Amended Complaint, may be considered: the
February 2020 Letter of Counseling (Exhibit 4), see Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 4 (“Ex. 4”), ECF No. 11-5; and the
October 2020 Letter of Reprimand (Exhibit 5), see Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 5 (“Ex. 5”), ECF No. 11-6. Plaintiff

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III.    DISCUSSION

        Both Title VII and the ADEA prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee

who has engaged in protected activity by complaining of employment discrimination. Jones v.

Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Whereas Title VII prohibits discrimination based

on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), the ADEA prohibits

discrimination “based on age,” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).

        Whether brought under Title VII or the ADEA, retaliation claims trigger the familiar

McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. Jones, 557 F.3d at 677 (citing McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); see also Tomasello v. Rubin, 167 F.3d 612, 619

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he test for determining retaliation under the ADEA and Title VII is

identical.”). Under this framework, “a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

retaliation by showing (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that he suffered a

materially adverse action by his employer; and (3) that a causal link connects the two.” Jones,

557 F.3d at 677. Although the plaintiff’s burden at the prima facie stage “is not great,” a

plaintiff must still “establish facts adequate to permit an inference of a retaliatory motive.”

Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting McKenna v. Weinberger, 729

F.2d 783, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

        A.       The Scope of the Dispute

        Plaintiff brings one combined count of retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA, but his

Amended Complaint confusingly fails to identify what conduct is alleged to be protected activity

and what employment action is alleged to be retaliatory. For this reason, defendant addresses

does not appear to object to their consideration. Cf. Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 4, ECF
No. 12 (citing Exhibit 2). Whether Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 may be considered need not be resolved since neither party
relies on these three exhibits in their briefing. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, ECF No. 11-2; Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, Ex. 2 (“Ex. 2”), ECF No. 11-3; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 3, ECF No. 11-4.

                                                         8
most, if not all, of the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint, even those that clearly do

not constitute protected activity or a materially adverse employment action. See, e.g., Def.’s

Mot. at 8 (arguing that plaintiff’s July 11, 2019, grievance complaint, which did not allege any

discrimination, much less discrimination based on plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, national

origin, or age, was not a protected activity under Title VII or the ADEA).

          In opposition, plaintiff clarifies that he first engaged in ADEA-protected activity on July

15, 2019, when he told Alexy that Fuller was discriminating against him due to his age, and that

he first engaged in Title VII-protected activity on November 21, 2019, when he filed his EEO

complaint with DOT’s OCR alleging age and gender discrimination. See Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s

Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 5, ECF No. 12.7

        Plaintiff’s opposition, read most generously, further clarifies that he alleges only the

following employment actions by Fuller (and, for the denial of a lateral transfer, by Atkisson) to

be materially adverse: (1) assigning the “most important” work on the Brakes III rulemaking to

another economist and reducing plaintiff’s responsibilities, id. at 5–6; (2) retroactively changing,

on August 16, 2019, plaintiff’s grade for seven Economics Weekly Update reports from “Yes” to

“No,” id. at 6; (3) issuing, on December 30, 2019, an Achieved Results midterm rating to

plaintiff for the 2019–2020 year, which resulted in an Achieved Results final rating for the same

year, id.; (4) assigning plaintiff, in March 2020, to spend 20% of his time on Paperwork

Reduction Act duties, id. at 7; (5) requiring plaintiff, on November 18, 2020, to “learn[] a

complex process . . . that was unrelated to Plaintiff’s job duties,” id.; (6) issuing the February

7
         In opposition, plaintiff, citing paragraph 42 of the Amended Complaint and the EEO Complaint attached as
Exhibit 2 to defendant’s motion, provides November 19, 2019, as the date when he filed his formal complaint of
discrimination with OCR. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4; see also id. at 5. The date on the EEO Complaint, however, is
November 21, 2019, see Ex. 2 at 1, and paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint states that “[o]n or around
November 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint of discrimination against DOT, alleging DOT discriminated against
him in violation of Title VII and the ADEA,” Am. Compl. ¶ 10. In any case, this two-day difference is immaterial
since no alleged adverse employment decision is said to have occurred between November 19 and 21.

                                                        9
2020 Letter of Counseling, id.; (7) telling plaintiff, in September 2020, to take a poor

communicators class, id. at 8; (8) denying, on September 23, 2020, plaintiff’s request for a lateral

transfer, id.; (9) issuing the October 2020 Letter of Reprimand, id.; (10) emailing plaintiff recaps

of their weekly meetings, id.; (11) instructing plaintiff that telling his coworkers about his EEO

allegations was “unprofessional,” id.; (12) telling plaintiff, on November 20, 2022, to find

another job in response to his request for a job transfer, id.; and (13) denying plaintiff’s request

for an extension on an assignment, id.8 The other employment actions referenced in his

Amended Complaint are described as merely providing “context.” Id. at 5 (criticizing defendant

for “focus[ing] on the context Plaintiff provides”).9

         The parties’ briefing thus reveals that they agree on two crucial points that narrow the

issues in dispute. First, the parties agree that plaintiff (1) first engaged in activity protected by

the ADEA on July 15, 2019, when he told Alexy that Fuller was discriminating against him

8
          Plaintiff has arguably conceded that six of these thirteen actions are not materially adverse and merely
provide “context” for the February and October 2020 Letters. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7–8; CSX Transp., Inc. v. Com.
Union Ins. Co., 82 F.3d 478, 482–83 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that when a party fails to respond to an argument
raised by another party, or even when the response is “somewhat half-hearted,” the party has “waived the issue”).
These contextual allegations include the following actions: (1) telling plaintiff to take a poor communicators class;
(2) denying plaintiff’s request for a lateral transfer; (3) recapping in email his weekly meetings with plaintiff;
(4) informing plaintiff that forwarding emails about his EEO allegations to coworkers was “unprofessional”;
(5) telling plaintiff to find another job in response to his request for a job transfer; and (6) denying plaintiff an
extension on an assignment before Thanksgiving. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7–8 (explaining that “Fuller’s materially
adverse actions against Plaintiff are brought into full relief when shown in the context of the other adverse actions he
was taking against Plaintiff during this time,” and listing Fuller asking plaintiff to take a poor communicators class
and Atkisson denying plaintiff’s request for a lateral transfer as examples of such “context”); id. at 8 (explaining that
“[v]iewed in th[e] context” of these allegations, “it is clear that Plaintiff’s February 27 Letter of Counseling and
October 9 Letter of Reprimand were materially adverse actions”). Yet, given the ambiguity in plaintiff’s pleadings
and briefing, the retaliation claims based on these six employment actions are not dismissed as conceded. Defendant
has neither argued that plaintiff has conceded these claims nor moved to dismiss the retaliation claims based on
Atkisson’s denial of a lateral transfer. See Def.’s Mot. at 16. Nonetheless, the claims based on Fuller telling
plaintiff to take a poor communicators class, recapping their weekly meetings, criticizing plaintiff about his
“unprofessional” communications, and denying plaintiff an extension are dismissed on the merits, as discussed more
fully below. See infra section III.B.
9
         Plaintiff has waived any retaliation claim based on the alleged threats of demotion and termination on
December 4, 2020, see Am. Compl. ¶ 67, and based on his 2020–2021 mid-year performance evaluation, see id.
¶ 70, because plaintiff’s opposition makes no mention of these allegations, despite defendant moving to dismiss
these claims, Def.’s Mot. at 13. See CSX Transp., 82 F.3d at 482–83.

                                                          10
based on his age, and (2) first engaged in activity protected by Title VII on November 21, 2019,

when he filed his EEO complaint alleging age and gender discrimination with DOT’s OCR. See

Pl.’s Opp’n at 3–4; Def.’s Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Reply”) at 2, ECF No. 14.

Defendant argues that any Title VII or ADEA retaliation claim based on employment actions that

occurred before these dates should thus be dismissed. See Def.’s Mot. at 6.10

         Defendant is correct. As plaintiff recognizes, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must say that “the Government retaliated against me because I engaged in protected activity.”

Pl.’s Opp’n at 9 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). He is

unable to say this when the alleged retaliation occurred before the alleged protected activity.

Any ADEA retaliation claim that predated July 15, 2019, and any Title VII retaliation claim that

predated November 21, 2019, are therefore dismissed. See Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 522

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (concluding that a retaliation claim could not be based on evaluations

“conducted after [plaintiff] engaged in protected activity”); Clemmons v. Acad. for Educ. Dev.,

107 F. Supp. 3d 100, 132 (D.D.C. 2015) (explaining that retaliation claims fail when the

allegedly retaliatory events “pre-date” the protected activity).

         Second, defendant is not seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA retaliation

claims predicated on the following allegations: (1) Fuller lowering plaintiff’s performance

appraisal from the 2019–2020 performance year; (2) Fuller reassigning plaintiff to Paperwork

Reduction Act duties in March 2020; (3) Atkisson denying plaintiff’s request for a lateral

10
          Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s July 11, 2019 meeting with Fuller and Alexy was not a protected
activity under Title VII or the ADEA, and that plaintiff’s July 15, 2019 complaint to Alexy, his August 2, 2019
email to Alexy, and his August 4, 2019 informal EEO complaint are not protected activities under Title VII. See
Def.’s Mot. at 8–9. Plaintiff concedes each of these points and agrees that plaintiff first engaged in ADEA-protected
activity on July 15, 2019, and in Title VII-protected activity on November 21, 2019. See Pl’s Opp’n at 3–4
(explaining that the Amended Complaint’s reference to the July 11, 2019 meeting was to provide context for the
July 15, 2019 meeting; and acknowledging that in the July 15, 2019 meeting, August 2, 2019 email, and August 4,
2019 informal EEO complaint, he alleged only age discrimination).

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transfer on September 23, 2020; and (4) Fuller denying plaintiff a GS-14 promotion since

November 21, 2019, nor the ADEA retaliation claims predicated on Fuller allegedly:

(5) providing a time-off award instead of a cash award on August 17, 2019; and (6) denying

plaintiff a GS-14 promotion between July 15, 2019, and November 21, 2019, including the

events regarding the Brakes III rulemaking. Def.’s Mot. at 10, 16. Each of these claims thus

remains pending.

       In sum, concessions from each side leave retaliation claims based on the following

allegedly adverse actions at issue: Fuller (1) retroactively changing plaintiff’s grade for seven

Economics Weekly Update reports from “Yes” to “No” on August 16, 2019; (2) requiring

plaintiff to “learn[] a complex process from [another] employee that was unrelated to Plaintiff’s

job duties” on November 18, 2020; (3) issuing the February 2020 Letter; (4) telling plaintiff to

take a poor communicators class in September 2020; (5) issuing the October 2020 Letter;

(6) emailing plaintiff recaps of their weekly meetings; (7) instructing plaintiff not to disclose his

Letter of Reprimand to his coworkers and telling plaintiff that forwarding emails about his EEO

allegations to his coworkers was “unprofessional”; (8) telling plaintiff to find another job in

response to his request for a job transfer on November 20, 2022; and (9) denying plaintiff’s

request for an extension on an assignment.

       B.      Material Adverse Action

       Actional adverse actions in Title VII and ADEA claims must be “materially adverse” in

an “objective” sense. Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (en

banc); see also Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196–97 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.)

(treating Title VII and ADEA alike for determining whether employment action is materially

adverse). “A materially adverse action is one that ‘could well dissuade a reasonable worker from

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making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)). “The

antiretaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that

produces an injury or harm.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 67.

       The purpose of the “material” requirement is “to separate significant from trivial harms.”

Id. at 68. Discrimination laws do not “set forth a general civility code for the American

workplace,” and “[a]n employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize

that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that

all employees experience.” Id. (citation omitted). “Typically, a materially adverse action in the

workplace involves a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to

promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing

significant change in benefits,” Bridgeforth v. Jewell, 721 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

(citation omitted), but whether an employment action is objectively materially adverse “often

depend[s] upon the particular circumstances,” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69.

       As summarized above, see supra section III.A, retaliation claims based on the following

nine employment actions by Fuller remain in dispute: (1) changing plaintiff’s seven Economics

Weekly Update reports grades; (2) requiring plaintiff to learn a new complex process and telling

him off for being slow; (3) the February 2020 Letter; (4) telling plaintiff to take a poor

communicators class; (5) the October 2020 Letter; (6) emailing plaintiff recaps of their weekly

meetings; (7) telling plaintiff that talking to his coworkers about his EEO allegations was

“unprofessional”; (8) telling plaintiff to find another job in response to his request for a job

transfer; and (9) denying plaintiff’s request for an extension for an assignment. Defendant

organizes these allegations into three categories: (1) the February and October 2020 Letters;

                                                  13
(2) informal criticisms; and (3) the denial of plaintiff’s request for an extension, and argues that

none constitute materially adverse employment actions. See Def.’s Mot. at 11. For simplicity,

these categories are adopted here and addressed seriatim.

         At the outset, plaintiff notably offers no individualized responses to defendant’s

arguments, taking the position, instead, that an individualized analysis of whether every alleged

employment action is materially adverse is not necessary and criticizing defendant for

“attempt[ing] to parse various factual allegations from the Amended Complaint into different

retaliation ‘claims,’” where plaintiff brings “a singular claim for retaliation under Title VII and

the ADEA.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–3.11 In plaintiff’s view, all the alleged adverse actions should be

considered to determine whether, taken together, they would dissuade an employee from

engaging in protected activity. Id. Plaintiff cites no legal authority for this position, which runs

contrary to well-settled law that “each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a

separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002); see also id. at 122 (distinguishing “discrete discriminatory or

retaliatory acts” from claims of a hostile work environment, which can comprise of acts that “are

part of the same unlawful employment action”). When analyzing retaliation claims, a court must

thus “analyze each alleged adverse action, individually, to determine whether it constitutes an

action that may be the basis for . . . a retaliation claim in the circumstances of this case.” Jones

11
          By failing to address each adverse employment action and focusing on them collectively, plaintiff has
arguably conceded that each action, considered individually, does not constitute a materially adverse action
sufficient to sustain a retaliation claim. At the same time, however, defendant, while meaningfully arguing that the
February 2020 and October 2020 Letters, and the denial of plaintiff’s request for an extension for an assignment are
not actionable adverse actions, see Def.’s Mot. at 11–15, fails to do the same for the other employment actions by
lumping them together as “other instances of informal criticisms or threats of demotion or termination,” and
referencing the allegations that constitute these “informal criticisms” only in passing by including a string cite to the
relevant paragraphs of the Amended Complaint in a parenthetical, without offering analysis specific to the facts of
this case, id. at 13. Thus, rather than conclude that plaintiff has conceded that each of these actions, standing alone,
are not actionable, they are considered on their merits.

                                                           14
v. Castro, 168 F. Supp. 3d 169, 179 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Burlington, 548 U.S. at 54 (referring

to a single “challenged action” as the subject of a retaliation claim).

               1.      The February and October 2020 Letters

       “A reprimand letter setting forth allegations of deficient work performance is not a

materially adverse action absent a showing that the letter would have dissuaded a reasonable

employee from engaging in protected activity.” Durant v. Dist. of Columbia Gov’t, 875 F.3d

685, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199 (explaining that letters of

counseling, letters of reprimand, and unsatisfactory performance reviews are not materially

adverse actions when they “contain[] no abusive language, but rather job-related constructive

criticism, which can prompt an employee to improve her performance” (citation omitted)). For

this reason, “[a] letter of counseling, written reprimand, or unsatisfactory performance review, if

not abusive in tone or language or a predicate for a more tangible form of adverse action, will

rarely constitute [a] materially adverse action.” Hyson v. Architect of Capitol, 802 F. Supp. 2d

84, 102 (D.D.C. 2011).

       Neither the February 2020 Letter nor the October 2020 Letter, therefore, are materially

adverse actions. The only allegation in the Amended Complaint about the February 2020 Letter

is that “Fuller issued Plaintiff a Letter of Counseling regarding Plaintiff’s alleged discourteous

conduct while discussing work-related issues” and “advised Plaintiff that Plaintiff’s failure to

correct his conduct may subject him to severe disciplinary or adverse action, including removal

from Federal service.” Am. Compl. ¶ 46. Plaintiff does not allege that the letter contains any

abusive language or that any change in grade, salary, or other benefit accompanied the letter.

Rather, plaintiff seems to concede that the letter provided job-related constructive criticism about

plaintiff’s “alleged discourteous conduct will discussing work-related issues.”

                                                 15
       Plaintiff also fails to show how, if at all, the February 2020 Letter predicated some other

more serious and tangible retaliatory action. Rather, the letter stated that plaintiff’s “failure to

correct his conduct may subject him to severe disciplinary or adverse action,” id. (emphasis

added), making clear that “disciplinary action was not forthcoming as a result of its issuance,”

Hyson, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 102. “[M]ere speculation that a letter of reprimand may lead to future

punishment is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action.” Hyson, 802 F. Supp. 2d

at 102 (citation omitted); see also Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 819–20 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

(“[A]n unrealized risk of future adverse action, even if formalized, is too ephemeral to constitute

an adverse employment action.”); Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199 (concluding that proposed

suspensions not actually served were not adverse actions). Put differently, the mere existence of

such warning does not transform an otherwise appropriate feedback letter into a materially

adverse action. See, e.g., Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199 (concluding that letter of reprimand warning

plaintiff that “future repetitions of this conduct or other misconduct could lead to a proposal of

more severe disciplinary actions against you up to and including removal from your employment

with the Bureau of Indian Affairs,” ECF No. 20-15, was not a materially adverse employment

decision); Toomer v. Carter, No. 11-cv-2216, 2016 WL 9344023, at *25 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2016)

(concluding that letter of reprimand that warned plaintiff that future violations of the policies

might subject her to more discipline was not an adverse action), aff’d, No. 20-5184, 2022 WL

301561 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2022); Hyson, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (concluding that a letter of

counseling that warned “if this happens again, we will take the appropriate action” was not an

adverse action because “the memorandum itself made clear that disciplinary action was not

forthcoming” (alteration in original accepted)); Herbert v. Architect of Capitol, 766 F. Supp. 2d

59, 75 (D.D.C. 2011) (concluding that letter of reprimand addressing employee’s “failure to

                                                  16
follow a supervisor’s directive, and unprofessional and discourteous conduct” was not materially

adverse (alteration in original accepted)).12 In fact, when plaintiff continued his allegedly

discourteous conduct, Fuller merely issued the October 2020 Letter. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58–59.

         For substantially the same reasons, the October 2020 Letter does not constitute a

materially adverse action. The only allegation in the Amended Complaint about the October

2020 Letter quotes the letter as stating, in part, “I am placing you on notice that you[r] behavior

needs to change immediately and I expect you will take appropriate corrective action to ensure

there is improvement and another incident does not occur. Your failure to follow these

instructions, may subject you to more severe disciplinary or adverse action, up to and including

removal from Federal service.” Id. ¶ 59.13 Plaintiff does not allege that the October 2020 Letter

contained any abusive language or resulted in financial harm, or otherwise explain how the letter

would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. That the letter

informed plaintiff that his “behavior needs to change immediately,” and that “failure to follow

these instructions may” lead to “more severe disciplinary or adverse action,” id., is insufficient,

as explained above, to transform this routine and professional letter that “merely informed

12
          Plaintiff’s retaliation claim based on the February 2020 Letter may be dismissed on the pleadings alone, but
review of the letter, attached to defendant’s motion as Exhibit 4, reinforces this conclusion. The text of the February
2020 Letter explains that plaintiff’s “recent discourteous conduct” prompted the letter for the purpose of
“reaffirm[ing] [Fuller’s] expectations regarding [plaintiff’s] conduct while on duty” and makes clear that the letter
“is not a disciplinary action” and “will not be placed in [his] official personnel file.” Ex. 4 at 1. Then, in a
professional and reasonable tone, the letter describes plaintiff’s recent conduct, puts plaintiff “on notice that [his]
behavior needs to change,” and cautions plaintiff that “failure to follow these instructions and/or correct [his]
conduct may subject [him] to more severe disciplinary or adverse action.” Id. at 1–2. This February 2020 Letter,
which is significantly less harsh than the one at issue in Baloch, does not rise to the level of a materially adverse
employment action sufficient to sustain a retaliation claim.
13
          Similarly, review of the October 2020 Letter, attached to defendant’s motion at Exhibit 5, reinforces the
conclusion that it is not a materially adverse action. The letter simply summarizes plaintiff’s conduct and explains
why Fuller believes such conduct to be inappropriate and discourteous. See Ex. 5 at 1. Then, again, the letter puts
plaintiff “on notice that [his] behavior needs to change immediately” and that “failure to follow these instructions,
may subject [him] to more severe disciplinary or adverse action.” Id. at 2. Although the October 2020 Letter was
placed in plaintiff’s personnel folder for one year, this fact alone is insufficient to make it a materially adverse
action. See, e.g., Herbert, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (citing Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199).

                                                          17
[plaintiff] of ‘specific deficiencies regarding his conduct’ . . . and warned him that future

violations would result in corrective or adverse action,” Durant, 875 F.3d at 698 (alterations in

original accepted and citation omitted), into a materially adverse action. See Saunders, 842 F.

Supp. 2d at 293–94 (cataloguing cases and concluding that letter of counseling that warned

plaintiff that her conduct “will not be tolerated in the future” was not materially adverse).

                2.      Informal Criticisms and Minor Annoyances

        The antiretaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADEA protects neither “the ordinary

tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, . . . jokes, and

occasional teasing,” “petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all

employees experience,” nor “personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy and snubbing

by supervisors and co-workers.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (citations omitted). Defendant

correctly identifies several instances as merely informal criticisms and minor annoyances rather

than materially adverse actions, including Fuller (1) telling plaintiff off for learning “a complex

process” unrelated to plaintiff’s job too slowly, id. ¶ 63; (2) criticizing plaintiff for being a poor

communicator, id. ¶¶ 54, 62; (3) emailing plaintiff recaps of their weekly meetings, id. ¶ 60; and

(4) informing plaintiff that telling his coworkers about his EEO activity was “unprofessional,” id.

¶ 64. These amount to “petty slights” and do not constitute “reason[s] for th[e] [C]ourt to engage

in judicial micromanagement of business practices by second-guessing employers’ decisions.”

Kline v. Berry, 404 F. App’x 505, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Taylor v. Mills, 892 F. Supp. 2d

124, 147 (D.D.C. 2012) (cataloguing cases, and concluding that “criticism of the plaintiff’s job

performance,” delivered by “conference call,” did not “qualify as an adverse employment action”

because “[e]mployers are generally able to provide constructive criticism of their employees

without running afoul of Title VII”); Harris v. Mayorkas, No. 21-cv-1083, 2022 WL 3452316, at

                                                  18
*11 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2022) (cataloguing cases concluding that “[y]elling, rude comments,

disparaging remarks, and statements that embarrass a claimant in front of coworkers are, even

though uncivil and objectionable, not actional bases for Title VII retaliation claims”). Plaintiff

offers no reason why these seemingly petty slights, while perhaps offensive to him, rise to the

level of materially adverse actions. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (explaining that “normally

petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not” “deter victims of

discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and their employers” (citation

omitted)). He does not, for example, allege that he was deterred from engaging in EEO activity,

or that any of this criticism produced (or could have produced) any tangible injury or harm.

         Two of the employment decisions that defendant characterizes, in passing and with little

to no reasoning, as “informal constructive criticisms,” however, could, at the motion to dismiss

stage, constitute materially adverse employment actions. First, Fuller’s retroactive changing of

plaintiff’s grade for seven Economics Weekly Update reports from “Yes” to “No” could

constitute a materially adverse action. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33–36.14 An unfavorable performance

review can rise to the level of a materially adverse action if it affects an employee’s “position,

grade level, salary or promotion opportunities.” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199; see also Weber v.

Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding that “a lower overall performance

rating in 1999 than in past years” was an adverse action). Plaintiff alleges that the grades that an

economist receives for these weekly reports are used to determine one of the four job elements

that affects an employee’s final job rating. Am. Comp. ¶ 34. Specifically, “[a]t years end, the

number of ‘Yes’s and ‘No’s that an Economist received are added up and divided by the weeks

14
          For the reasons explained, see supra section III.A, any Title VII claim based on this alleged retroactive
changing of plaintiff’s grades is dismissed because these events allegedly occurred on August 16, 2019, i.e., before
plaintiff first engaged in activity protected by Title VII.

                                                         19
worked to calculate a percentage score,” and any economist who receives fewer than a certain

percentage of “Yes” ratings receives an “Unacceptable” grade for one of the job elements. Id.

¶ 35. Receiving an “Unacceptable” on one job element could have detrimental effects on the

final rating, which in turn could affect an economist’s annual bonus and may “serve as a basis for

adverse actions including suspensions, demotion, or termination.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 36. Fuller’s

decision to change seven of plaintiff’s grades from “Yes” to “No” could have thus affected

plaintiff’s position, salary, or promotion opportunities.

       Second, Fuller telling plaintiff to find another job in response to his request for a job

transfer on November 20, 2022, could constitute a materially adverse action. Id. ¶ 65. The

denial of transfer may, in certain circumstances, constitute a materially adverse action, such as

when plaintiff suffers a decrease in pay, benefits, or some other tangible injury. See Roebuck v.

Washington, 408 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 (listing

“denial of transfer” as an example of a “[d]iscrete act” that may constitute an “actionable

unlawful employment practice” (internal marks omitted)). Here, plaintiff alleges that Fuller

denied his job transfer and, instead, told him to find another job. To dismiss plaintiff’s

retaliation claims based on this denial without the benefit of discovery would be premature.

               3.      Denial of Extension on Assignment

       Fuller’s single instance of denying plaintiff an extension of a deadline for an assignment

does not constitute a materially adverse action. To be sure, “frequently tightening deadlines”

can, in some circumstances, be considered materially adverse. Allen v. Napolitano, 774 F. Supp.

2d 186, 203 (D.D.C. 2011); see Morales v. Gotbaum, 42 F. Supp. 3d 175, 198 (D.D.C. 2014)

(“[T]he shortened deadlines or increased work must be frequent or particularly onerous to be

material; otherwise they are de minimis and ‘trivial.’”). Here, however, plaintiff does not allege

                                                 20
that Fuller repeatedly denied extensions on assignments to plaintiff or explain why the deadlines

at issue were unreasonable. See, e.g., Harris, 2022 WL 3452316, at *12 (granting defendant’s

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s allegations that supervisor gave her unreasonable and impossible

deadlines where there was “only one, specific day on which Plaintiff alleges she was given such

assignments”); Allen, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 203 (dismissing retaliation claim based on allegation

that plaintiff “received unreasonable deadlines for completing time-sensitive assignments”

because plaintiff alleged only “a few instances” of unreasonable deadlines and did not “allege[]

that meeting her deadlines was often impossible, that her workload increased dramatically or that

she was buried in work”). One instance of denying an extension is barely a slight and certainly

does not rise to the level of a materially adverse action sufficient to sustain a retaliation claim.

IV.    CONCLUSION

       To summarize, defendant’s partial motion to dismiss the ADEA retaliation claims

predicated on alleged conduct that predated July 15, 2019, and the Title VII retaliation claims

predicated on alleged conduct that predated November 21, 2019, is granted. In addition,

defendant’s partial motion to dismiss the Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims that relate to the

following alleged employment actions, which are not materially adverse, is granted: (1) the

criticisms of plaintiff’s slow learning of a complex process unrelated to his duties, see Am.

Compl. ¶ 63; (2) the February 2020 Letter, see id. ¶ 46; (3) the criticism of plaintiff’s

communication skills, see id. ¶¶ 54, 62; (4) the October 2020 Letter, see id. ¶¶ 58–59; (5) the

emailing of recaps of Fuller and plaintiff’s weekly meetings to plaintiff, see id. ¶ 60; (6) the

criticism of plaintiff as “unprofessional” for forwarding emails about his EEO allegations to his

coworkers, see id. ¶ 64; and (7) the denial of plaintiff’s request for an extension on an

assignment, see id. ¶ 66. Finally, defendant’s partial motion to dismiss the Title VII and ADEA

                                                  21
retaliation claims based on the alleged threats made, on December 4, 2020, of demotion and

termination, see id. ¶ 67, and plaintiff’s 2020–2021 mid-year performance evaluation, see id.

¶ 70, is granted, as waived by plaintiff, who failed to address either allegation in opposition.

       Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss is otherwise denied, with the result that plaintiff’s

Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims based on Fuller’s denial of plaintiff’s request for a job

transfer on November 20, 2022, see id. ¶ 65, and the ADEA retaliation claim based on Fuller’s

alleged retroactive changing of plaintiff’s grade for seven Economics Weekly Update reports

from “Yes” to “No,” id. ¶¶ 33–36, may proceed.

       For clarity, defendant has not sought dismissal of the Title VII and ADEA retaliation

claims relating to (1) plaintiff’s lowered performance appraisal from the 2019–2020 performance

year; (2) his reassignment to Paperwork Reduction Act duties in March 2020; (3) the denial of

his request of a lateral transfer on September 23, 2020; and (4) any denial of a GS-14 promotion

since November 21, 2019, nor the ADEA retaliation claims based on (5) the provision of a time-

off award instead of a cash award on August 17, 2019; and (6) any denial of a GS-14 promotion

between July 15, 2019, and November 21, 2019, including the events regarding the Brakes III

rulemaking. See Def.’s Mot. at 10, 16. Each of these claims thus also remains pending.

       Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No.

11, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

       An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be filed contemporaneously.

       Date: November 28, 2023

                                                      __________________________
                                                      BERYL A. HOWELL
                                                      United States District Judge

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