Court Opinion

ID: 9494019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:26:46.529871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:10.340672
License: Public Domain

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that Officers Shiflett and Simms violated Mr. Park’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure, and that Officer Shiflett used excessive force in effectuating his arrest of Mrs. Park.* I also agree that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the-judgment of liability on the Parks’ claims, as well as the award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the conclusion that the damages awarded to *855Mr. and Mrs. Park were excessive as a matter of law. In my view, the majority has, in contravention of the proper standard of review, substituted its judgment for that of the trial judge as to what is a fair verdict in this case.
I.
I begin with the standard of review applicable to the magistrate judge’s assessment of damages. Historically, we have reviewed an award of compensatory damages imposed by a jury to redress a violation of a federal right only to determine whether the award “is so untoward, inordinate, unreasonable or outrageous as to be a denial of justice to allow it to stand.” Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 959 (4th Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit, at least, would apply the same standard where a judge assesses damages for such a claim in the course of a bench trial:
Because “inadequacy ... of the verdict is basically, and should be, a matter for the trial court which has had the benefit of hearing the testimony and of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and which knows the community and its standards,” Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 447 (8th Cir.1961), we must defer to the district court’s assessment of damages unless there is “ ‘plain injustice’ or a ‘monstrous’ or ‘shocking’ result.” Id. at 448. As a result, we review the district court’s determination of the damage award for abuse of discretion.
St. John v. United States, 240 F.3d 671, 678 (8th Cir.2001).
I too believe that our review for exces-siveness should be the same whether damages are assessed by a jury or a judge, and that our Sevigny standard would be an appropriate one to apply. At a minimum, however, we have recognized that “[t]he trial court, as a fact-finder, possesses considerable discretion in fixing damages, and its decision will be upheld absent clear error.” Little Beaver Enters. v. Humphreys Rys., 719 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir.1983); see also United States ex rel. Maddux Supply Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 86 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.1996) (“The calculation of damages is a finding of fact and therefore is reviewable only for clear error, but to the extent those calculations were influenced by legal error, review is de novo.”); Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238, 243 (4th Cir.1973) (“Ascertainment of damages arising from personal injuries involves questions that are essentially factual, and an award by a district judge will not be upset unless it is clearly erroneous.”). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, on the entire evidence the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Front Royal v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir.1998) (quoting Faulconer v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir.1984)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses”).
Having reviewed the magistrate judge’s findings underlying the damages award to Mr. and Mrs. Park and the evidence supporting those findings, I am satisfied that the magistrate judge’s findings are not clearly erroneous and that, given the egregious nature of the violations and the physical and mental injuries inflicted, the damages awarded are not excessive as a matter of law.
II.
A.
I begin with the award of compensatory damages to Mrs. Park in the amount of *856$450,000. To be sure, this award is not insubstantial, but neither was the egregious treatment she received nor the injuries she sustained at the hands of Officer Shiflett.
According to the evidence found credible by the magistrate judge, Officer Shiflett grabbed Mrs. Park that evening by the arm, twisted her arm behind her back, threw her against the building, sprayed her twice in the eyes with pepper spray at close range (in contravention of the department rules and regulations governing the use of pepper spray and once after pulling away her glasses), haphazardly dumped water over her head in a futile effort to wash away the effects, and then placed her in the confined space of the patrol car in handcuffs where she suffered from additional pain and shortness of breath caused by the spray. During the struggle, she was also pushed to the ground hard enough to “knock her silly.”
After she was released from jail, Mrs. Park was examined by her family physician. In addition to finding Mrs. Park to be upset and withdrawn, the physician noted that Mrs. Park had sustained numerous physical injuries (many confirmed by photographs), including a contusion to her head, swelling over the left eye and cheek, large bruises on her hands, swelling at the base of her fingers on her right hand, incipient bruises on the back and side of her forearm, a “grab injury” on the right upper arm, and abrasions to both knees. Her eyes were blood-shot, with a yellowish tinge. Her right hand was splinted and she was referred to orthopedics. The following day, Mrs. Park called her physician, still very upset and agitated, and was prescribed Valium.
A week later, Mrs. Park was reevaluated by her family physician. At that time, she was found to be suffering from headaches and continued irritation of the lateral side of the left eye. Both hands were sore and she was having pain in the lower back and hip. In addition, she continued to have psychological effects from the incident, including difficulty sleeping, nightmares, and severe panic attacks. She was eventually diagnosed with moderate to severe Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and referred to a psychiatrist and psychologist for further treatment, which was continuing at the time of trial.
Based upon this and other unrefuted evidence, the magistrate judge found that Mrs. Park suffers from PTSD as a result of Officer Shiflett’s actions. At the time of trial, Mrs. Park had sustained approximately $7,800 in out-of-pocket expenses and was expected to incur between $200,000 and $300,000 in future medical expenses — thus establishing virtually uncontested compensatory damages of over $250,000 solely for past and future medical expenses associated with her physical and mental injuries.
I am unprepared to conclude, as a matter of law, that the additional $200,000 in compensatory damages which the magistrate judge awarded was excessive, or that the findings supporting the award were clearly erroneous. Cf. Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 164-65 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that compensatory damage awards of $65,000 and $90,000 were not excessive despite the fact that plaintiffs only proved $3,500 in out-of-pocket expenses: “We will not disturb the district court’s discretionary ruling merely because the compensatory award considerably exceeded [plaintiffs’] out-of-pocket losses”), oveiruled in part by Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994); Sevigny, 846 F.2d at 959 (holding that an award of $112,000 in compensatory damages for violation of plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights was not excessive even though plaintiff only proved $3,680 in spe-*857eial damages because “[tjhere was also substantial evidence .. .• from which the jury could, and presumably did, find that [she] suffered extreme emotional distress”); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1400 (4th Cir.1987) (holding that a compensatory damage award of $900,000 was not excessive, even though the medical expenses for physical injuries were only $2,041).
.Mrs. Park’s damages are clearly not limited to her out-of-pocket expenses, nor to the medical costs that she is projected to incur in the future. Rather, Mrs. Park sustained significant, visible physical injuries as a direct result of the excessive force brought to bear upon her that night, considerable pain and suffering during her physical recuperation, and severe emotional injuries, including humiliation, mental anguish, emotional trauma, and nightmares. These injuries were documented by her treating physicians and therapists, and the magistrate judge personally questioned the witnesses regarding them to ensure their validity. Defendants have pointed to no authority which would limit Mrs. Park’s recovery of compensatory damages to her out-of-pocket and expected future medical costs, and I am aware of none. Cf. Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1233 (4th Cir.1970) (reversing and remanding district court’s award of compensatory damages for violation of plaintiffs civil rights as inadequate because the court limited plaintiffs recovery to his out-of-pocket expenses and took no account of, among other things, the plaintiffs pain and suffering).
B.
I likewise believe that the magistrate judge’s compensatory award of $50,000 to Mr. Park is supported by findings which are not clearly erroneous.
Unlike Mrs. Park, Mr. Park sustained only minor physical injuries associated with his detention and unlawful arrest when Officer Shiflett pressed his face against the wall and kicked his feet out. However, the magistrate judge reasonably found that Mr. Park had also suffered considerable indignity, embarrassment, and humiliation associated with the treatment he received, all while he was forced to witness helplessly the physical assault inflicted upon his wife by an out-of-control police officer.
Because the majority believes there was no such evidence of damages, it surmises that the magistrate judge’s award was really punitive in nature and eliminates Mr. Park’s compensatory award in its entirety. While I agree that an award of punitive damages would have been inappropriate because they were not pursued by the plaintiffs (indeed, the magistrate judge noted as much), I find no basis in the record to support a conclusion that the magistrate judge abandoned his duty and awarded punitive damages under the guise of “compensatory damages.” In my view, the magistrate judge’s findings regarding the damages sustained by Mr. Park are not clearly erroneous and his assessment of damages not excessive for the physical and emotional injuries he sustained.
III.
To summarize, I believe it is error for this-court to arbitrarily substitute its view of an appropriate amount of damages for that ascertained and awarded by a magistrate judge in a nonjury trial who, unlike us, has had the benefit of hearing the testimony and observing the demeanor of the witnesses. Because the findings supporting the award of compensatory damages to Mr. and Mrs. Park are not clearly erroneous and the amounts not excessive *858as a matter of law, I would affirm all aspects of the magistrate judge’s decision.

 I noLe, however, that the record reveals that Mrs. Park was indeed charged by Deputy Shi-Oett with disorderly conduct, obstruction of a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties, and public drunkenness. And, she was held overnight in jail. The charges were eventually nolle prossed by the Commonwealth’s attorney and dismissed.