Court Opinion

ID: 9718664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:29:25.390148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:01.271119
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of appellant’s death sentence and order remanding for a new penalty hearing on the grounds that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at the penalty hearing. It is well established that in order to prevail on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course chosen by counsel did not have any reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests; and (3) counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced appellant. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 535 Pa. 210, 237, 634 A.2d 1078, 1092 (1993), citing, Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (1987).
Counsel is presumed to have acted in his clients’s best interest; thus, it is appellant’s burden to prove otherwise. Commonwealth v. Hancharik, 534 Pa. 435, 633 A.2d 1074 (1993); Commonwealth v. Miller, 494 Pa. 229, 233, 431 A.2d 233, 235 (1981). The majority concludes that trial counsel was ineffective in the present case because he failed to obtain mitigating evidence which may have existed. However, appellant does not even specifically allege that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of mental state as a mitigating factor during the penalty phase of trial. In his brief, appellant merely alleges that trial counsel failed to present sufficient, proper evidence of mitigation. Although appellant lists the mitigating factors listed in the death penalty statute,1 he does not focus on any specific mitigating factor, nor does he identify any evidence which would support any particular mitigating factor. By identifying appellant’s mental state as the mitigating factor which counsel should have pursued, the majority has performed appellant’s job for him. *250However, the burden is upon appellant and not upon this Court to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Jones, 539 Pa. 222, 236-37, 651 A.2d 1101, 1109 (1994), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 113, 133 L.Ed.2d 65 (1995).
Moreover, as the majority acknowledges, appellant’s “mental state” was one of the two mitigating factors found to exist by the jury during the penalty phase.2 The majority further notes that trial counsel was aware prior to the penalty phase that appellant had suffered from mental problems in the past. The majority concludes that, given these two factors, trial counsel’s failure to pursue additional evidence of appellant’s so-called mental problems constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel because of the possibility that such a search may have revealed additional evidence which may have led the jury to weigh the mitigating factor of appellant’s mental state more heavily, thereby resulting in a determination that the mitigating circumstances may have outweighed the aggravating circumstances, which in turn may have resulted in a different sentence.
The speculative analysis engaged in by the majority ignores the fundamental fact that it is always appellant’s burden to demonstrate at the hearing on trial counsel's ineffectiveness that the evidence in question actually existed and would have been helpful to his case. Jones, supra; Commonwealth v. Baker, 531 Pa. 541, 562, 614 A.2d 663, 674 (1992); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 521 Pa. 482, 486, 556 A.2d 370, 372 (1989); Commonwealth v. Hentosh, 520 Pa. 325, 334, 554 A.2d 20, 25 (1989); Commonwealth v. McNeil, 506 Pa. 607, 615-16, 487 A.2d 802, 806 (1985); Commonwealth v. Pettus, 492 Pa. 558, 563, 424 A.2d 1332,1335 (1981). As the majority candidly admits, appellant failed to present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing which would establish the existence of evidence of appellant’s mental state which trial counsel supposedly should have discovered prior to the penalty phase. Absent such a showing, appellant has failed to meet his burden of *251establishing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present such evidence at the penalty phase, as appellant has failed to demonstrate that any such evidence exists. By holding otherwise, the majority is analyzing appellant’s claim in a vacuum an is engaging in nothing more that speculation in overturning the considered verdict rendered by those twelve jurors. McNeil, supra; Pettus, supra. I therefore respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of sentence of death.
NIX, C.J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e).

. The other mitigating factor found by the jury was that appellant had shown remorse for his crime.