Court Opinion

ID: 9655608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:17:43.841928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:20.638800
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, Justice
(concurring specially)-
The critical issue in this case is whether a new trial should be ordered on the ground that defendant’s right to a fair trial was violated by the admission into evidence of his confession obtained during a custodial police interrogation without the presence of counsel for defendant.
I agree that defendant did not make a clear and unequivocal request for counsel during the initial interrogation on August 23, which preceded the challenged interrogation in the latter part of the morning on August 24. A reading of the typewritten transcript of the taped interrogation of August 23 seemingly indicates such request, but listening to the garbled tape itself discloses nuances of equivocal hesitation and tone of voice that persuade me otherwise.
The particular point of my separate statement of views is that, notwithstanding the pointed language of Justice White in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), forbidding police-initiated interrogation subsequent to a request for counsel, the facts of this case are so distinguishable from those in Edwards as not to foreclose a valid waiver even were it to be held that Howard had made an unequivocal request for counsel.
In Edwards, the defendant during his initial interview at night made an unequivocal request for counsel. On the following morning, at 9:30, the police came to the jail to interrogate him. He again clearly indicated that he did not wish to be interrogated, but the detention officer nonetheless took him to the police, stating that Edwards “had to” talk with the police.
In this case, defendant Howard is in a markedly different posture. Howard was neither unsophisticated nor indigent but was a business man presumably acquainted and accustomed to dealing with lawyers. It appears that he had not used the available opportunity to retain counsel. It is clear from this portion of the trial transcripts that he did not wish counsel:
Q Turning to August 24th, the day that Mr. Rysavy interviewed you, do you admit or do you deny if you were asked by Mr. Rysavy whether or not you wanted an attorney.
A He asked me if I wanted an attorney.
Q Do you admit or deny saying no to him.
A I didn’t think I needed one — no.
The transcript of both police interrogations makes abundantly clear the absence of any coercive atmosphere and, indeed, demonstrates commendable police restraint, bordering on solicitude, in dealing with defendant.
This assessment of the particular facts and circumstances of these interrogations is, except for the aspect of police initiation of the second interrogation, in harmony with the Court’s opinion in Edwards v. Arizona-at least with the understanding of it as articulated in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, in which Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice White, in the majority opinion, wrote in part:
It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including *226the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ [Citations omitted.]
451 U.S. at 482-3, 101 S.Ct. at 1883-84.
[H]owever sound the conclusion of the state courts as to the voluntariness of Edwards’ admission may be, neither the trial court nor the Arizona Supreme Court undertook to focus on whether Edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. * * *
[Although we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation [citation omitted], the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
Id. at 484-5, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85.
Justice Powell concurred in the court’s judgment but did not join in the opinion, “because [he was] not sure what it means” (id. at 488, 101 S.Ct. at 1887),1 writing:
In view of the emphasis placed on ‘initiation’ [citation omitted], I find the Court’s opinion unclear. If read to create a new per se rule, requiring a threshold inquiry as to precisely who opened any conversation between an accused and state officials, I cannot agree. * * *
Perhaps the Court’s opinion can be read as not departing from established doctrine. Accepting the formulation quoted above, two questions are identifiable: (i) was there in fact ‘interrogation’ [citation omitted], and (ii) did the police ‘initiate’ it? Each of these questions is, of course, relevant to the admissibility of a confession. In this case, for example, it is clear that Edwards was taken from his cell against his will and subjected to renewed interrogation. Whether this is described as police-'initiated’ interrogation or in some other way, it clearly was questioning under circumstances incompatible with a voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel.
But few cases will be as clear as this one. * * *
Id. at 489-90, 101 S.Ct. at 1887-88.
Who ‘initiated’ a conversation may be relevant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine qua non to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether there was a free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation commenced.
If the Court’s opinion does nothing more than restate these principles, I am in agreement with it. I hesitate to join the opinion only because of what appears to be an undue, and undefined, emphasis on a single element: ‘initiation.’
Id. at 491, 101 S.Ct. at 1888. The majority opinion did not directly respond to this alternative reading.
My final concern is with this court’s alternative opinion that even if the confession obtained at the second, counsel-less interrogation was constitutionally impermissible, its reception into evidence was, beyond a reasonable doubt, without prejudice. The stated reason is that “[i]n the face of the overwhelming evidence [of defendant’s guilt], the discovery that a pay-off had been mailed [to accomplice Weber] was a minor addition to the state’s case against appellant.” This appears inconsistent with the *227court’s opinion in State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982), in which a new trial was granted the convicted defendant because of inadvertent expert opinion testimony incorrectly identifying a fingerprint as that of the defendant, notwithstanding acknowledgment that it may well be that, upon retrial, the other evidence will prove sufficient to convict him. In my view defendant Howard’s confession directly linking his accomplice, Weber, with the murder and making possible the interception of the pay-off by police authorities, was no less critical than the evidence linking defendant Caldwell with the location of the crime. It may be said here, as it was there, that a jury, absent such evidence, “might” have reached a different result. Id. at 584r-588. The court’s opinion reiterated that “to allow factually strong cases to erode such a basic [due process] right is to deny the existence of the right.” Id. at 592. The grant of a new trial in Caldwell was based only upon this court’s supervisory powers; in the present appeal we are concerned with a more serious issue of constitutional dimension.

. Chief Justice Burger, likewise concurring only in the judgment, based his concurrence on the fact that when Edwards told the officer that he did not wish to speak to the detectives he was told by the officer “that he had to.” “This is enough for me,” Justice Burger said, “and on this record the Supreme Court of Arizona erred in holding that the resumption of interrogation was the product of a voluntary waiver * * 451 U.S. at 488, 101 S.Ct. at 1887.