Court Opinion

ID: 9742269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:09:46.083206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:30.430266
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached by my colleagues, but I do not agree with all of the reasoning which supports such result. My disagreement with the opinion of the majority relates to its observations regarding the absence of recordation and transcription of the final arguments. I believe the absence of a transcript of the final arguments of counsel was the result of error but not reversible error. According to the majority: (1), the court reporter is under no statutory duty to record or transcribe final arguments and the recordation of final arguments must be requested by an attorney; (2), if recordation is not specifically requested it is waived; (3), waiver of final arguments is frequently waived by skilled and competent attorneys and hence waiver is not evidence of incompetence or ineffectiveness of counsel, and (4), a bystander’s report is a satisfactory substitute for a verbatim transcript. Probably one of the more basic elements of our present review procedure is the necessity for a full and complete written record of the trial court proceeding under review. In aid of this requirement the development and evolution of methods of verbatim recording of testimony and other oral portions of a trial proceeding have greatly enhanced the quality of the written record which we are asked to review. Without an adequate record or without an acceptable alternative litigants are in a poor position, if not an impossible one, to avail themselves of redress through a review process. Fundamentally then, recordation of all that transpires at trial and transcription of so much that is relevant on review is our starting point in considering the fairness of our appellate procedure. With reference to the claim by the majority that there is no statutory duty on the part of a court reporter to record the final arguments of counsel, the majority has not referred to any statute which describes and sets forth the duties of a court reporter, and consequently there is no support for any conclusion as to what the statutory duties of a court reporter are or are not. However, section 5 of the Court Reporter’s Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 655) states: * ° make a full reporting by means of stenographic hand or machine notes, or a combination thereof, of the evidence and such other proceedings in trials and judicial proceedings to which he is assigned by the chief judge, and the court reporter may use an electronic instrument as a supplementary device. * * * The court reporter shall furnish forthwith one transcript of the evidence and proceedings in a trial or other judicial proceeding correctly made to any party to the trial or proceeding upon the request of such party or his attorney.” Since the final arguments of counsel are part of the proceedings (People v. Ring (1967), 89 Ill. App. 2d 161, 232 N.E.2d 23), I find no support for a conclusion that the statutory duties of the court reporter do not include recording the final arguments of counsel. Both the letter and intent of the statute are that the reporter record the entire trial, and there is nothing in the rule which suggests it is incumbent on counsel to request that the reporter take this portion of the trial or that portion of the trial. No case has been called to our attention, and I have found none, which interprets or applies the foregoing statute as requiring a request by counsel before the final arguments need be recorded by a reporter. In People v. Smith (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 479, 248 N.E.2d 68, the court observed that recording the final arguments of counsel was not requested. However, in Smith neither the statute nor any statutory duty nor waiver are discussed, and since a portion of the prosecutor’s final argument was recorded and transcribed it well may be inferred the entire argument was recorded but only partially transcribed because counsel believed that was all that was necessary. People v. Edwards (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 1, 383 N.E.2d 944, is another partial transcription case where initially stenographic recording was waived and only part of the machine recording was transcribed. Thus I find no support for the majority’s major premise that the reporter is under no duty to record the final arguments unless and only unless requested to do so. As will be noted later there is, so far as I know, absolutely no benefit to the defendant not to have the final arguments recorded and consequently there is no reason for not recording the final arguments as a matter of course rather than only upon request. According to the majority, if recordation is not requested it is waived. As I have indicated earlier I believe the court reporter is under an affirmative duty to record the final arguments of counsel rather than the contrary opinion of the majority that the duty arises only when requested. Even were a request necessary, I believe the record should demonstrate, as this one does not, that counsel for both parties affirmatively waived the recording of final arguments. Waiver ought not to be implied from a silent record. Final arguments are an important element of a jury trial, and errors which may occur during this portion of the trial may well contribute to the fairness of the proceeding to the extent that at a bare minimum the record should reflect the deliberate decision of trial counsel on such an important subject. In an effort to minimize the effect of or justify the absence of a transcript of the final arguments, the majority suggests there is “8 8 8 the common practice of trial courts and attorneys in often ignoring the transcription of final arguments.” Although this practice is attributed to “8 8 8 seasoned trial counsel and able trial judges 8 8 8,” the only explanation or justification for the practice is * 'to save judicial cost and manpower.” Nowhere in the opinion of the majority is there even an intimation of how the absence of recording and transcription of the final arguments is or can be of any benefit to the defendant, how there is any tactical advantage to such a practice, or, finally, why the practice may not, as it has in this case, result in serious disadvantage to the defendant. While we are all interested in the efficient use of manpower, where a practice can be only disadvantageous to the defendant and of advantage to the People, I doubt that it is a practice utilized by seasoned or competent attorneys. Since the transcript of final arguments is for all practical purposes an essential element for proper appeal if errors are based on the final arguments, I believe that waiver of recording would be evidence of unprofes-sionalism of trial counsel as a matter of law. However, since I fail to find any justification, either legal, practical or tactical, for waiving the recording of final arguments in a criminal case, I think it would behoove defense counsel, trial judges and court reporters to see that the final arguments are recorded. This involves no “sandbagging” of the trial judge or the trial system but is rather a plain recognition that the rights of the defendant and particularly his right of appeal ought not to be limited or impaired by the unjustified conduct of his trial counsel. Finally, the majority suggests that the alternative of a bystander’s report furnishes an adequate alternative to a verbatim transcript, and, indeed, People v. Edwards (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 1, 383 N.E.2d 944, does make this assertion. However, the life-saving potential of a bystander’s report is more apparent than real, and it is unlikely that as a saving device it is much more than a hope. I doubt that any two lawyers and a judge could agree on a bystander’s report made within several hours after the final arguments were delivered, let alone the prospective agreement after days, weeks or months had elapsed. Thus I conclude that the remote possibility of a bystander’s report is not a procedure that satisfactorily takes the place of recording and transcribing final arguments. People v. Edwards (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 1, 383 N.E.2d 944, seems to hold that negligence of defense counsel in preservation of the record of final arguments is not ineffective assistance of counsel, and for that reason I conclude that the absence of a written transcript is not reversible error.