Court Opinion

ID: 9672384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:53:50.428607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.729112
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
WOODLEY, Judge.
It has been the statutory law of this state since the Original Code that where a defendant in a felony case persists in pleading guilty, and the punishment is not absolutely fixed by law, a jury shall be impaneled to assess the punishment and evidence may be heard to enable them to decide thereupon. O.C. 476, Art. 502 C.C.P.1925, Art. 26.14 C.C.P.
As early as 1885 the Court of Appeals held that such provision was mandatory and said:
“It is not a provision, insofar as it requires evidence to be submitted, which is intended solely for the benefit of the de*34fendant. It is intended, also, and more especially, to protect the interests of the State, by preventing aggravated cases of crime to be covered up by the plea of guilty, so as to allow the criminal to escape with the minimum punishment fixed by law.” (Harwell v. State, 19 Tex.App. 423)
In view of the state’s concern as to the effect of the majority opinion in future trials, before the Legislature has the opportunity to amend the admittedly ambiguous statutes, it is deemed proper that we express our views as to the effect of the separate paragraph found in Art. 37.07, Sec. 2(b), which reads:
“Regardless of whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the State and the defendant' as to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character.”
The prior decisions of this court have been that a jury called to assess the punishment upon the defendant’s plea of guilty to the crime charged may not receive or consider evidence of other offenses unless admissible under the usual rules applicable to criminal prosecution where the plea is not guilty. Carroll v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 365 S.W.2d 786; Salinas v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 358, 175 S.W.2d 253; Williams v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 215 S.W.2d 627; Beard v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 96, 171 S.W.2d 869; Hopkins v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 68 S.W. 986.
The decisions mentioned do not appear to follow the majority view. 96 A.L.R.2d 815.
Unlike eases where evidence as to extraneous offenses may deprive a defendant of his right to a fair trial on the issue of guilt, no constitutional question or statutory construction was involved in the Texas cases above cited. The reason assigned was that such evidence was not legitimate or was not competent.
Since the enactment of the above quoted portion of Art. 37.07, Sec. 2(b) C.C.P., our prior opinions holding that similar evidence is not legitimate, competent or admissible before a jury impaneled under Art. 26.14 to assess the punishment are no longer applicable or controlling.
The Legislature has not seen fit to adopt the procedure used in most jurisdictions whereby the judge, after pre-sentence investigation and report, assesses the punishment, but has through Articles 26.14 and 37.07, in a large measure, accomplished their purpose and intent “to take the blindfold off” of the jury that has the responsibility of assessing the punishment.
1. Art. 1.13 furnishes a procedure whereby the punishment must be assessed by the court without the benefit of evidence such as provided for in Art. 37.07, Sec. 2(b). (This is so because Art. 1.15 requires that the evidence introduced showing the guilt of the defendant be accepted by the court as the basis of its judgment.)
Without the consent and approval of the court and the attorney representing the state, the defendant may not waive a jury under Art. 1.13.
2. The alternate procedure provided for in Art. 37.07, Sec. 2, C.C.P., whereby: “the issue as to guilt or innocence of the defendant is first submitted to the jury without authorizing the jury to pass upon the punishment to be imposed,” is not applicable where the case is submitted to the jury on .a plea of guilty, or in a capital case where the state is seeking the death penalty, and the punishment in such cases must be assessed by the jury and not by the judge.
3. Art. 26.14, as construed in the majority opinion on original submission, furnishes the only procedure whereby the attorney representing the state may require that the punishment be assessed by a jury. It applies where the defendant *35persists in pleading guilty to a felony and the jury is instructed to find him guilty.
4. In view of the provision of Art. 37.07, Sec. 2(b), evidence may now be offered before a jury impaneled to assess the punishment “as to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character,” whether such jury is impaneled pursuant to Art. 26.14 or after the jury verdict of guilty has been returned.
5. A conviction for the misdemeanor offense of drunk driving other than that alleged in the indictment is admissible at either such trial as a part of the defendant’s prior criminal record.
In further support of our holding that the trial court erred in declining to submit to the jury the question of the punishment to be assessed, we point out that some of the provisions of Art. 36.01 cited by the state cannot be followed in a trial on a plea of guilty where the jury is impaneled to assess the punishment.
Section 5 of said Article provides:
“The nature of the defenses relied upon and the facts expected to be proved in their support shall be stated by defendant’s counsel.”
Section 5 could not apply to a trial on a plea of guilty. If a defense was offered at such a trial it would be the duty of the court to withdraw the plea of guilty.
Section 8 provides:
“In the event of a finding of guilty, Ae trial shall then proceed as set forth in Article 37.07.”
This provision is consistent with the express provisions of Art. 37.07 applicable to trials where the plea is not guilty.
If it was the intention of the Legislature that the alternate procedure provided in Art. 37.07 should apply where the plea is guilty, why did they not say so in said Article instead of saying “and where the nlea is not guilty * * .” ?
The state’s motion for rehearing is overruled.