Court Opinion

ID: 9663198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:31:27.956677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:46.557457
License: Public Domain

Beasley, P.J.
(dissenting). With most of Judge Mackenzie’s splendid opinion, I am in accord.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a public trial.1 While the right of the accused to a public trial is absolute, the accused does not possess a corresponding right to compel a private trial.2 I would interpret the federal and state constitutions to require public criminal trials.
The open-court, open-trial concept is not only for the benefit of the public, but is basic to our concept of a free and open society. Great as the constitutional rights of individual defendants are, I would hold that any interest a defendant may have in a private, secret trial must give way to the interests of society in seeing, hearing and knowing what goes on in the criminal courts.3 Buttressing these propositions, but secondary to Sixth Amendment consideration, are plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.4 Under my analysis, it is unnecessary to decide whether application of the statute in question would constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on publication.
There remains consideration of the nature of a preliminary examination in criminal proceedings. *65In People v Bellanca,5 the Supreme Court spelled out that a preliminary examination is an adversary judicial proceeding, that both the federal and state constitutions6 afford the accused the right to be confronted by witnesses and to be represented by counsel at the preliminary examination,7 and that it is a critical stage of the criminal process.
The preliminary examination is conducted in a courtroom. I am satisfied that it has become an essential, integral part of the criminal procedure and, as such, it is part of the trial and should be open to the public.
Concluding that the press and public are entitled to access and attendance at a preliminary examination, I see no basis for constitutionally suppressing the naming of the victim and actor and details of the alleged offense. I would hold that the statute, that is, MCL 750.520k; MSA 28.788(11), is unconstitutional as a violation of Article 1, § 20 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Since I would hold the statute unconstitutional, it is unnecessary to ground the decision upon the proposition that the statute becomes a prior restraint upon the freedom of the press, in violation of Article 1, § 5 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution and of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In conclusion, I would vacate the suppression orders entered by the district judge._

 US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.

 Detroit Free Press v Recorder’s Court Judge, 409 Mich 365, 383; 294 NW2d 827 (1980), Singer v United States, 380 US 24, 35; 85 S Ct 783; 13 L Ed 2d 630 (1965).

 Detroit Free Press v Recorder’s Court Judge, supra.

 Id., particularly, see concurring and dissenting opinions.

 386 Mich 708; 194 NW2d 863 (1972).

 US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.

 People v Bellanca, supra.