Court Opinion

ID: 9399101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 21:00:46.836313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:38.833649
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4703   Doc: 32        Filed: 05/31/2023   Pg: 1 of 5

                                         UNPUBLISHED

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                           No. 21-4703

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                         Plaintiff - Appellee,

                   v.

        MONROE KENNETH JACKSON,

                         Defendant - Appellant.

                                           No. 22-4108

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                         Plaintiff - Appellee,

                   v.

        VERNTIRELL JERWON DUKES, a/k/a Ventrell Dukes, a/k/a Verntrell Dukes,

                         Defendant - Appellant.

                                           No. 22-4111

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                         Plaintiff - Appellee,
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4703      Doc: 32         Filed: 05/31/2023    Pg: 2 of 5

                     v.

        VERNTIRELL JERWON DUKES, a/k/a Ventrell Dukes, a/k/a Verntrell Dukes,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, Chief District Judge. (4:21-cr-00111-RBH-1; 4:21-cr-00111-
        RBH-2; 4:18-cr-00221-RBH-1)

        Submitted: April 27, 2023                                         Decided: May 31, 2023

        Before DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: John M. Ervin, III, ERVIN LAW OFFICE, Darlington, South Carolina, for
        Appellant Monroe Jackson. W. James Hoffmeyer, LAW OFFICE OF W. JAMES
        HOFFMEYER, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant Verntirell Dukes. Corey F. Ellis,
        United States Attorney, Lauren L. Hummel, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
        THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               Monroe Kenneth Jackson pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

        being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and possession with intent to distribute heroin, methamphetamine,

        and fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (No. 21-4703). Jackson’s

        codefendant, Verntirell Jerwon Dukes, pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea

        agreement, to possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl, in violation of 21

        U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (C) (No. 22-4108). In their plea agreements, both Jackson

        and Dukes reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of their motions to

        suppress and to dismiss the charges against them. * Prior to entering their conditional guilty

        pleas, Jackson and Dukes moved to suppress evidence that police recovered during the

        execution of a search warrant at 604 Hammond Drive and to dismiss the charges against

        them because officers did not activate their body-worn cameras before conducting the

        search. We affirm.

               “In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review legal

        determinations de novo and factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Small, 944

               *
                 Dukes filed a notice of appeal from both his final judgment of conviction and a
        separate judgment revoking his supervised release, and his appeals were docketed as
        Nos. 22-4108 and 22-4111, respectively. These two cases, along with Jackson’s appeal
        from his final judgment of conviction in No. 21-4703, were consolidated on appeal.
        Jackson and Dukes have filed a joint opening brief, in which they challenge only the district
        court’s denials of their motions to suppress and to dismiss. Because the brief does not
        challenge the judgment revoking Dukes’ supervised release, Dukes has forfeited any
        challenge to this issue on appeal. See Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307,
        316 (4th Cir. 2017).

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        F.3d 490, 502 (4th Cir. 2019). When, as here, the district court has denied a defendant’s

        suppression motion, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the

        Government and “give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges

        and law enforcement officers.” United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing factual findings for clear error, we

        particularly defer to a district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role of the

        district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to

        suppress.” United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 653 (4th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “A

        factual finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the

        reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

        mistake has been committed.” Walsh v. Vinoskey, 19 F.4th 672, 677 (4th Cir. 2021)

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable searches” and

        provides that “no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or

        affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things

        to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. An affidavit supporting a warrant that authorizes

        a search must provide a judicial officer “with a substantial basis for determining the

        existence of probable cause” in light of the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates,

        462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983). Probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial

        chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity,” and is therefore “not a

        high bar.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (internal quotation

        marks omitted).

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               Our review of the record reveals no error in the district court’s determination that

        probable cause existed to support the search of the residence at 604 Hammond Drive.

        Given the totality of the circumstances, which included a confidential informant’s

        controlled purchase of narcotics at the residence as well as evidence of a drug overdose

        occurring there the next day, the court did not clearly err by finding a reasonable probability

        that drugs were being sold and used at the residence. We further discern no error in the

        district court’s conclusions that the warrant was sufficiently particular in describing the

        location to be searched, see, e.g., United States v. Blakeney, 949 F.3d 851, 861-62

        (4th Cir. 2020), and that the probable cause backing the search warrant was not stale when

        there was only a six-day delay in executing the warrant and the crime was for ongoing

        distribution of narcotics, see, e.g., United States v. Ebert, 61 F.4th 394, 401 (4th Cir. 2023).

        Finally, we reject Jackson’s and Dukes’ arguments related to the officers’ failure to activate

        their body-worn cameras during the execution of the search because Jackson and Dukes

        proffer no supporting legal authority connecting a violation of law enforcement’s body-

        worn camera policy, standing alone, with the remedy of suppression of evidence or

        dismissal of the charges.

               Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgments. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                          AFFIRMED

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