Court Opinion

ID: 9463255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:01:57.094924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:00.418149
License: Public Domain

ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Appellant argues that under Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972), she has the right to refuse to satisfy the inquiries of the grand jury since, in her opinion, they are based upon the product of illegal wiretaps, and that, concomitant with this right, she may refuse to comply with the demands of the grand jury so long as the Government does not, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a), affirm or deny the existence of these wiretaps. Where it is clear that the demands of the grand jury are predicated on evidence obtained by the Government independently of any illegal wiretaps, I agree that a witness has no standing to invoke the Gelbard rule or to insist that the Government affirm or deny under section 3504(a). Because the grand jury demands were undoubtedly supported by legitimate independent grounds, which the most cursory surveillance of Whitnack’s whereabouts could verify, I concur in the judgment of the court.
I cannot agree, however, with the suggestion that simply because the grand jury demanded nontestimonial evidence, the Government need not respond as required by section 3504 to allegations of illegal wiretapping. Such nontestimonial evidence, as well as testimonial evidence, may be “evidence derived” from illegally intercepted communications within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2515. In enacting the wiretap legislation comprising sections 2515 and 3504, Congress intended to provide safeguards against violations of the privacy interests guaranteed by the fourth amendment. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. at 50-53, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179. The manifest purpose of section 3504 is to provide procedures that insure that the Government fully complies with the mandate of section 2515, which proscribes the use in any official proceeding of evidence that is the product of illegally intercepted communications. While the testimonial nature of the evidence sought may be critical in analyzing cases involving the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the nature of the evidence is immaterial in a case like this, where the primary consideration is whether the demands of the grand jury are tainted on fourth amendment grounds.