Court Opinion

ID: 9899689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 16:04:30.359384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.403234
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 P. v. Roberts CA4/1
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081056

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD279579)

 SETH ALAN ROBERTS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eugenia A. Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed.
         David M. McKinney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
A. Mandel and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

         Based on two separate incidents involving different victims, a jury
convicted Seth Alan Roberts of three counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261,
subd. (a)(2)), three counts of forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289,
subd. (a)), and one count of forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)).
As to each of these counts, the jury found true allegations that Roberts used a
deadly weapon and committed offenses against multiple victims such that he
was subject to the One Strike Law. (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subds. (a), (c), &
(e).) The trial court sentenced Roberts to seven consecutive terms of 25 years
to life.
       Roberts makes four claims of error on appeal: (1) his de facto life
without parole sentence was unconstitutionally cruel and/or unusual because
he was only 18 years old at the time of the crimes; (2) the court’s CALCRIM
No. 1190 jury instruction that conviction of a sexual assault crime may be
based only on the testimony of the complaining witness unconstitutionally
lowered the prosecution’s burden by omitting proof beyond a reasonable
doubt language; (3) the court prejudicially erred by failing to perform an
Evidence Code1 section 352 analysis before instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 1191B on propensity to commit sexual offenses; and (4) the
court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury that forcible sexual
penetration is a general intent crime.
       We conclude: (1) under binding precedents of the United States
Supreme Court and California Supreme Court, the reasoning of cases finding
juvenile sentences cruel and/or unusual does not apply to sentences of
offenders who are ages 18 and older, such as Roberts, and therefore does not
render Roberts’s sentence cruel and unusual under existing law; (2) the
court’s CALCRIM No. 1190 instruction did not lower the burden of proof
because the judge separately instructed the jury that evidence must be

1    All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless
otherwise indicated.
                                         2
proved beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the court did not commit any error in
giving CALCRIM No. 1191B because the court had already implicitly
engaged in a pretrial section 352 analysis; and (4) assuming the court erred
by instructing the jury that forcible sexual penetration is a general intent
crime, the error was harmless because the court later instructed the jury as
to the specific intent required. We therefore affirm.
             I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Events
      Roberts’s convictions arose out of two incidents involving different
women that took place within weeks of one another.2 Both incidents began
with Roberts approaching a woman on the street and ended with him
sexually assaulting her under threat of a knife.
      1. Victim B.A.S.
      The first incident occurred on November 17, 2018, when Roberts
approached B.A.S. on the street and began talking with her. B.A.S. was an
au pair from Brazil and did not understand or speak English well. During
the conversation, Roberts invited B.A.S. to meet a female roommate, who he
claimed was Brazilian. B.A.S. agreed and began walking with Roberts,
believing he was leading her to his house.
      Instead, Roberts led B.A.S. to the end of an empty alleyway next to a
house and asked her to kiss him. When she said no, Roberts held a knife to
B.A.S.’s neck, told her to get down, and threatened to kill her if she screamed.
While B.A.S. was on her hands and knees, he touched her breast, pulled
down her pants, put his finger in her anus, and put his penis in her vagina.

2     Roberts was found not guilty of an allegation of forcible rape against a
third victim (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2) [count 3]). That incident is not
relevant to this appeal.
                                       3
During the incident, B.A.S. told Roberts to leave her alone and not to do
anything to her, but she was afraid he would kill her.
      After a car alarm went off, Roberts left, and B.A.S. ran away.
      2. Victim A.S.
      Days later, on November 21, 2018, Roberts approached A.S. at a trolley
station and initiated conversation with her. During the course of the
conversation, Roberts requested her phone number, and A.S. provided it. The
two exchanged text messages over the next few days, and A.S. declined
repeated invitations by Roberts to meet up. A.S. informed Roberts that she
had a boyfriend in the Army who was currently stationed out of the country.
      Late at night on November 24, Roberts asked over text message to
come to A.S.’s house; she agreed to meet him outside the house but told him
he could not come inside. Roberts arrived in the early morning hours of
November 25. After some normal conversation, Roberts got close to A.S.,
making her feel uncomfortable; she asked him to leave. Roberts asked if he
could come inside to charge his phone so he could call a ride, and A.S. agreed.
They entered the house and went to A.S.’s bedroom.
      Inside her bedroom, Roberts kissed A.S. on the lips, but she pulled
away and told him she did not want to get physical because she had a
boyfriend. A.S. told him to leave, but he did not. Roberts pulled out a knife,
put it to A.S.’s throat, and told her she “was going to give him what he
wanted . . . or else.” As Roberts held the knife toward her, he ordered A.S. to
take off her clothes. A.S. told Roberts that she did not want to take off her
clothes, but she did so. As she removed her clothes, A.S. told Roberts he
could leave now, and she would not tell anyone what happened.
      Roberts undressed himself and got on top of A.S. on her bed. During
the incident, A.S. told him “no,” “stop,” and “I don’t want this,” but Roberts

                                        4
disregarded her protest. He told her to be quiet, and he slid the non-sharp
part of the knife along her body from her neck toward her vagina. A.S.
believed he was going to insert the knife into her vagina, but he did not.
      Roberts inserted his finger or fingers into A.S.’s vagina. He then
inserted his finger or fingers and then his penis into her anus. A.S. was
crying; she attempted to crawl away and continued pleading with Roberts to
stop. He pulled her back and repeatedly told her to shut up. Despite A.S.
continuing to try to crawl away and push him away, Roberts inserted his
penis into her vagina and ejaculated onto her back. He then left the house.
B. Relevant Proceedings
      1. Motions in Limine
      The People charged Roberts with forcible rape of B.A.S. (Pen. Code,
§ 261, subd. (a)(2) [count 1]), forcible sexual penetration of B.A.S. (Pen. Code,
§ 289, subd. (a) [count 2]), two counts of forcible sexual penetration of A.S.
(Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a) [counts 4 and 6]), two counts of forcible rape of
A.S. (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2) [counts 5 and 7]), and forcible sodomy
committed against A.S. (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A) [count 8]). The
People further alleged that Roberts committed each of these Penal Code
section 667.61, subdivision (c) offenses under two circumstances described by
Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (e): the use of a deadly weapon (Pen.
Code, § 667.61, subd. (e)(3)) and the commission of subdivision (c) offenses
against more than one victim (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (e)(4)).
      Before trial, the People brought a motion in limine under section 1108,
subdivision (a) to permit the use of the testimony of each victim as propensity
evidence to establish Roberts’s guilt as to the other victim. The People
argued that under section 352, each incident had substantial probative value
as to the other in that the offenses involved similar acts and occurred within

                                        5
a short period of time, and that the probative value was unlikely to be
substantially outweighed by a substantial risk of undue prejudice, confusing
the issues, or misleading the jury.
      On the other hand, the defense brought a motion to sever the charges
against Roberts as to each victim, arguing that the danger of prejudice would
be substantial if the jury heard evidence of rape against multiple victims.
The defense argued, “Even if the court believed evidence of the other
incidents satisfied Evidence Code § 1108, the evidence fails the admissibility
test of Evidence Code §352. . . . Here, if evidence of all three incidents are
heard in one trial, it is very likely to create a substantial danger of undue
prejudice against Mr. Roberts, confusion of the issues as to the separate
incidents, and misleading the jury.”
      The trial court held a hearing on the motions in limine, including the
People’s propensity evidence motion and the defense’s severance motion,
which the court considered together. Defense counsel acknowledged, “I
understand that all of these charges are the same class, and typically, they’re
all tried together,” but argued that “there is substantial danger of the spill-
over effect.” In particular, counsel noted that DNA evidence existed linking
Roberts to B.A.S. but not to A.S., leading to a concern that the jury could
convict Roberts of the charges as to victim A.S. based on the DNA evidence
related to B.A.S.
      The People responded that the incidents were similar forcible sex
crimes that “would all be heard as 1108 evidence as well . . . and there’s
nothing that is prejudicial . . . .” Defense counsel later agreed, “We also
acknowledge that 1108 would -- there would be cross admissibility for all of
these things,” but nevertheless argued for severance. After argument, the

                                        6
trial court denied the motion to sever the charges, determining that “all of
the same evidence would come in if we had three separate trials.”
      2. Jury Instructions and Verdict
      After the close of evidence, the court discussed jury instructions with
the parties. As is relevant here, both the People and the defense requested
instructions CALCRIM Nos. 220 (the requirement that the People prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt), 1190 (conviction of a sexual
assault crime using only the testimony of the complaining witness), and
1191B (consideration of evidence that the defendant committed one sexual
offense as propensity evidence to conclude that the defendant committed
another sexual offense). The court instructed the jury consistent with these
requests. The court also instructed the jury as to general intent crimes,
including in that list sexual penetration by force as charged in counts 2, 4,
and 6. The court later instructed, however, that sexual penetration must be
“for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.”
      The jury convicted Roberts of counts 1, 2, and 4 through 8. As to each
of these counts, the jury also found true the allegations that Roberts
committed a Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (c) offense under the two
Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (e) circumstances alleged.
      3. Sentencing
      At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that Penal Code section
667.61, subdivision (a) required sentences of 25 years to life because each
offense is included in Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (c), and the jury
found true the two Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (e) allegations.
(Pen. Code, § 667.61, subds. (a), (c), & (e)).3 The parties further agreed that

3     Penal Code section 667.61 provides in relevant part:

                                        7
two of the sentences must run consecutively under Penal Code section 667.61,
subdivision (i). However, the parties disagreed whether the remaining
sentences should run consecutively under Penal Code section 667.6,
subdivision (d).

         “(a) . . . [A] person who is convicted of an offense specified in
      subdivision (c) . . . under two or more of the circumstances
      specified in subdivision (e) shall be punished by imprisonment in
      the state prison for 25 years to life.
         “[¶] . . . [¶]
          “(c) This section shall apply to any of the following offenses:
          (1) Rape, in violation of paragraph (2) or (6) of subdivision (a)
      of Section 261.
          [¶] . . . [¶]
          (5) Sexual penetration, in violation of subdivision (a) of Section
      289.
          (6) Sodomy, in violation of paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision
      (c), or subdivision (d), of Section 286. . . .
         “[¶] . . . [¶]
         “(e) The following circumstances shall apply to the offenses
      specified in subdivision (c):
         [¶] . . . [¶]
         (2) The defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly
      weapon or a firearm in the commission of the present offense in
      violation of Section 12022, 12022.3, 12022.5, or 12022.53.
         [¶] . . . [¶]
         (4) The defendant has been convicted in the present case or
      cases of committing an offense specified in subdivision (c) against
      more than one victim. . . .
         “[¶] . . . [¶]
          “(i) For any offense specified in paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive,
      of subdivision (c), or in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of
      subdivision (n), the court shall impose a consecutive sentence for
      each offense that results in a conviction under this section if the
      crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on
      separate occasions as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 667.6.”
                                         8
      The People sought the maximum term of 175 years to life, with the
sentence for each count running consecutively under Penal Code section
667.6, subdivisions (c) (discretionary consecutive terms for crimes involving
the same victim on the same occasion) and (d) (mandatory consecutive terms
for crimes involving separate victims or occasions).
      The defense, on the other hand, sought a term of 50 years to life, based
on the two sentences required to run consecutively and the remaining
sentences running concurrently. Defense counsel argued:
         I understand what the facts of the case were. I understand
         the impact on the victims in this case and many other
         people, but 50 years to life is a significant, severe, and
         substantial sentence. The penalty for first degree murder
         is 25 years to life. On this case, I’m asking the court to
         impose a sentence double that of 50 years to life, given the
         circumstances of Mr. Roberts and of this case. The defense
         believes that is a sufficient punishment for him.

      The trial court exercised its discretion under Penal Code section 667.6,
subdivision (c) to run each sentence of 25 years to life consecutively, for a
total of 175 years to life, based on the aggravating factors in the case as
described in the People’s sentencing brief. Those circumstances in
aggravation included: (1) great bodily harm and highly cruel and vicious acts

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1))4 through forcible, prolonged sexual
assault, without using protection, under threat of a knife; (2) young female
victims who were particularly vulnerable (Rule 4.421(a)(3)); (3) planning and
sophistication (Rule 4.421(a)(8)) in bringing the knife and tricking the women
into trusting him and being alone with him; (4) gaining and taking advantage

4    Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court unless
otherwise indicated.

                                        9
of a position of trust or confidence (Rule 4.421(a)(11)) by acting charming and
friendly; and (5) violent conduct suggesting Roberts is a serious danger to
society (Rule 4.421(b)(1)).
                               II. DISCUSSION
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
      Roberts acknowledges that the offenses of which he was convicted are
“heinous and horrific offense[s], causing tragic and life-long scarring on its
victims” and states that he “could not, and will not, make any attempt to
minimize the seriousness of the offenses involved in this case.” Nonetheless,
he asserts that his de facto life without parole sentence5 was constitutionally
cruel and unusual due to his youthful, though not juvenile, age of 18 years
when the offenses occurred. In support, he cites a series of United States
Supreme Court cases finding sentences of juveniles cruel and unusual,
contending that the reasoning of these cases should equally apply to young
adult offenders such as himself. He notes that California, in particular, has
begun to recognize that brain development continues into the late teens and
early twenties, resulting in reduced culpability and increased likelihood of
rehabilitation for these young adults.
      The People argue that: (1) Roberts forfeited this claim by failing to
make it at sentencing, and (2) there is a bright line between juveniles and
adults that prevents the application of the juvenile sentencing cases to
adults.

5      In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268, the California
Supreme Court established that “a term of years with a parole eligibility date
that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy” is a “de
facto” life without parole sentence.
                                         10
      1. Forfeiture
      As a preliminary matter, we address the People’s argument that
because Roberts, admittedly, did not raise the cruel and unusual punishment
argument below, he has forfeited the argument on appeal. The People cite
five cases stating that an appellant has forfeited a claim of cruel and unusual
punishment if he or she did not raise the issue to the trial court. (People v.
Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 (Baker); People v. Speight (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247–1248; People v. Vallejo (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
1033, 1045; People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229; and People v.
Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 583.) Yet in all five cases, the Courts of
Appeal addressed the merits of the cruel and unusual punishment claim for
various reasons. (Baker, at p. 720, Speight, at p. 1248, and Norman, at p. 230
[all addressing the merits on an existing or potential ineffective assistance of
counsel ground]; Vallejo, at p. 1045, and Kelley, at p. 583 [both addressing the
merits as an alternative conclusion].)
      Likewise, the court in People v. Demirdjian (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 10,
14 explained “appellant’s forfeiture [by failing to make a cruel and/or unusual
punishment objection], if his inaction amounted to that, does not preclude an
appellate court from reaching the issue.” (See also People v. Avila (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1145–1146, fn. 12 [“Avila’s counsel did not object that
the sentence was cruel and/or unusual punishment, thereby forfeiting the
claim on appeal. However, we have the discretion to address the merits.”].)
The People concede we have discretion to reach the issue.
      Our Supreme Court has gone further explaining, “[A]s to many claims
defendants allege for the first time that the error complained of violated their
federal constitutional rights. To the extent that in doing so defendants have
raised only a new constitutional ‘gloss’ on claims preserved below, that new

                                         11
aspect of the claims is not forfeited.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364 (Bryant).) In this context, giving such a liberal
interpretation to a defendant’s objections below is consistent with our high
court’s description of a court’s “imperative task . . . to condemn any violation
of th[e] prohibition” against cruel or unusual punishment as our “duty” and
“responsibility.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414–415 (Lynch).)
      Here, Roberts’s trial counsel argued to the trial court that the
requested sentence of “50 years to life is a significant, severe, and substantial
sentence.” Counsel further supported that request by comparing this
sentence to the penalty for first degree murder; as we later discuss, the
comparison to punishments for more severe crimes is one factor in the cruel
or unusual punishment analysis. (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 426 [“The
second technique used by the courts is to compare the challenged penalty
with the punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for different
offenses which, by the same test, must be deemed more serious.”].) He also
referenced “the circumstances of Mr. Roberts,” which included his age,
Roberts’s main contention in making his cruel and unusual punishment
argument on appeal. We conclude that Roberts’s cruel or unusual
punishment argument is not forfeited because it is a “constitutional ‘gloss’ ”
(Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 364) on trial counsel’s arguments at
sentencing. And even if he did not preserve his argument, we would exercise
our discretion to examine the merits, as courts have before us.
      2. Constitutionality of Roberts’s Sentence
      Roberts does not argue that the trial court committed any statutory
error by imposing the sentence of 175 years to life, but rather that his
sentence violates both the federal and state constitutions under the

                                       12
circumstances of his case. We review de novo claims of unconstitutionally
cruel and/or unusual punishment. (Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 722.)
      The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The
California Constitution bars cruel or unusual punishment, which provides
greater protection to defendants than the federal language. (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 17; People v. Haller (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092.) A
punishment is cruel or unusual in California “if, although not cruel or
unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is
inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
human dignity.” (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424.) California courts
examine three factors when determining whether a sentence is
constitutionally disproportionate: (1) “the nature of the offense and/or the
offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to
society”; (2) how the challenged penalty compares to “the punishments
prescribed in the same jurisdiction for different offenses which, by the same
test, must be deemed more serious”; and (3) how the challenged penalty
compares to “the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other
jurisdictions having an identical or similar constitutional provision.” (Id. at
pp. 425–427.)
      Roberts bases his argument solely on the “nature of the offender” part
of the first Lynch factor, and specifically his age of 18 at the time of the
offenses, in arguing that his sentence was cruel and/or unusual. Rather than
claiming the sentencing scheme is facially unconstitutional, he contends the
sentence he received was unconstitutional as applied to him. (People v.
Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 480–481.)

                                        13
      In support of his age argument, Roberts cites a series of United States
Supreme Court cases finding juvenile sentences unconstitutional. (Roper v.
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 575 (Roper) [holding the Eighth Amendment
prohibits death penalty sentences for juveniles]; Graham v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48, 74 (Graham) [holding cruel and unusual sentences of life
without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders]; Miller v. Alabama (2012)
567 U.S. 460, 474 (Miller) [holding unconstitutional statutes that mandated
life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders]; and
Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 213 (Montgomery) [explaining
that Miller established a retroactively applicable substantive rule] (together,
the Roper cases).)
      In essence, these cases reason that juveniles must be treated differently
than adults for sentencing purposes because “children” have “ ‘diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform.’ ” (Montgomery, supra, 577 U.S.
at p. 206–207.) Miller compiled factors that distinguished children from
adults (the Miller factors): First, children have a “ ‘ “lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” ’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity,
and heedless risk-taking. [Citation.] Second, children ‘are more
vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from
their family and peers; they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own
environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-
producing settings. [Citation.] And third, a child’s character is not as ‘well
formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be
‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’ ” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471.)
      Though recognizing that the line is not so bright in real life, Roper
established a bright legal line separating the cruel and unusual punishment
analysis for those under 18 and those over 18: “The qualities that distinguish

                                         14
juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the
same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some
adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line
must be drawn. . . . The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line
for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the
age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.” (Roper, supra,
543 U.S. at p. 574.) Graham, Miller, and Montgomery operated within the
bounds of that line.
      Nonetheless, Roberts contends that the rationale of the series of United
States Supreme Court cruel and unusual punishment cases should be
extended to defendants up to the age of 25 given California’s recognition and
resulting legislative changes in other contexts based on recent studies that
the brain continues to develop into a person’s 20s, California’s broader cruel
or unusual standard than that of the federal constitution, and California’s
sentencing goals of rehabilitation and restoration in addition to punishment.
      By arguing that the court must consider here the same qualities of
juveniles and reasoning as the Roper cases, Roberts in essence seeks to shift
the line for all young adults. In multiple recent decisions, however, our
Supreme Court has rejected such requests to modify the Roper bright line in
the death penalty context. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234
(Tran) [“Tran was 20 years old when he committed these crimes, and he
argues that imposing the death penalty on persons for crimes committed
while they were 18 to 20 years old violates the state and federal
Constitutions because it is cruel and unusual punishment . . . . In support of
this claim, he cites Roper and related decisions. [¶] We have recently rejected
these arguments and decline to revisit them today.”]; People v. Flores (2020)
9 Cal.5th 371, 429 (Flores) [“Defendant asks us to expand Roper to reach

                                       15
those ages 18 to 21, arguing that research shows that young adults suffer
from many of the same cognitive and developmental deficiencies as
adolescents. We have previously rejected similar arguments, most recently
just two years ago in People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191. . . . [¶]
Defendant makes no persuasive argument for reconsidering this precedent
here.”].)
      While there may come a day when the United States or California
Supreme Court instructs us otherwise, we are bound by current precedent
limiting the reasoning of Roper and subsequent cases to juveniles. (People v.
Windfield (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 496, 525–526 [“Windfield contends that
scientific literature shows that the features of juveniles discussed in Miller
extend to 18 year old’s. However, we are bound by precedent and there is no
precedent for us to declare that Miller applies to 18 year old’s.”]; People v.
Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1032 [“Montelongo argues the line
the United States Supreme Court created in Roper between juvenile and
adult offenders is arbitrary and, at a minimum, should be extended to 19 or
older, as ‘[s]cience determines.’ But that is not our call to make.”]; People v.
Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 617 [“Our nation’s, and our state’s, highest
court have concluded 18 years old is the bright-line rule and we are bound by
their holdings.”].) We likewise follow that binding authority.
      Roberts’s citation to amendments of Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (a) and Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (a) does not alter
our constitutional analysis. Amended section 1170, subdivision (a) states
that “the purpose of sentencing is public safety achieved through
punishment, rehabilitation, and restorative justice.” The Legislature’s stated
purpose does not, however, dictate constitutional bounds, nor does it alter the
bright line established by the Roper cases or Lynch’s direction that courts

                                        16
consider the nature of the offense and the offender “with particular regard to
the degree of danger both present to society.” (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at
p. 425.)
      In Tran and Flores, the Court specifically addressed and rejected the
argument that California’s amendment of Penal Code section 3051,
subdivision (a), increasing the eligible age for youth offender parole hearings
to 25 years old from the prior maximum age of 17, supports a constitutional
requirement that courts consider brain development past the age of 18. The
Court concluded that such legislative developments “ ‘do not establish the
‘national consensus’ necessary to justify a categorical bar” on a particular
sentence for young adults. (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1235; Flores, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 429.) Furthermore, Roberts’s citation to the legislative history
of Penal Code section 3051 is unpersuasive to demonstrate that a de facto life
without parole sentence for an 18-year-old establishes a basis in California to
extend the principles of Roper to him—because the Legislature chose to
exclude Penal Code section 667.61 offenders from that section despite
accepting scientific research on brain development past the age of 17. (Pen.
Code, § 3051, subd. (h);6 Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 1308 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 30, 2017, pp. 2–3.)
      In sum, Roberts was convicted of two admittedly “heinous and horrific”
sexual assaults with a deadly weapon. Roberts has conceded the severity of
the crimes involved and the existence the bright line rule established by the

6     Roberts has not made an equal protection argument here. Our
Supreme Court has granted review to decide whether Penal Code section
3051, subdivision (h) violates equal protection by excluding violent sexual
offenders from youth offender parole consideration. (People v. Williams
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475, review granted July 22, 2020, S262229.) We do
not decide this issue because it has not been raised.
                                       17
Roper cases. He received the undoubtedly severe sentence of 175 years to
life. We have determined that the trial court was not, under existing law,
constitutionally required to apply the Miller factors and reasoning based on
his age of 18 years at the time of the offenses. Roberts has not argued any
other bases under Lynch to establish gross disproportionality. As the law
stands today, we must conclude that Roberts’s sentence is not cruel and/or
unusual punishment under either the United States or California
Constitution.
B. CALCRIM No. 1190
      Roberts next argues that the trial court’s instruction in accordance with
CALCRIM No. 1190 was unconstitutional because the court did not include
the language “beyond a reasonable doubt” in instructing the jury that:
“Conviction of a sexual assault crime may be based on the testimony of a
complaining witness alone.” He contends that the absence of this qualifier
lowered the prosecution’s burden.
      We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Posey (2004)
32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) Rather than examine a single jury instruction in
isolation, we must view the claim of error by examining the jury instructions
as a whole. (People v. Serrano (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 909)
      1. Invited Error
      The People contend that Roberts forfeited this claim of error by failing
to request a modification to the standard instruction.
      The California Supreme Court has explained that the invited error
doctrine bars a claim of instructional error on appeal only “ ‘[w]hen a defense
attorney makes a “conscious, deliberate tactical choice” to [request or] forego
a particular instruction . . . .’ ” (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610,
675.) “The invited error doctrine will not preclude appellate review if the

                                       18
record fails to show counsel had a tactical reason for requesting or
acquiescing in the instruction.” (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 28.) The
Court has also applied this principle to a defendant’s failure to request a
modification of standard jury instructions: “Trial counsel’s failure to detect in
the standard instructions the flaw appellate counsel perceives and to request
a modification does not demonstrate a tactical intent to induce the error now
claimed.” (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 410 (Moore).)
      We conclude that the invited error doctrine does not preclude review of
this claim because the record does not demonstrate counsel had a tactical
reason for requesting the standard CALCRIM No. 1190 without modification.
Rather, as in Moore, there is no indication to suggest anything other than
that trial counsel simply had a different perception than appellate counsel as
to whether the standard instruction was erroneous without modification.
      2. Instructional Error Claim
      We likewise have a different perception from Roberts’s appellate
counsel. We conclude that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury
in accordance with the standard CALCRIM No. 1190 instruction, a conclusion
required by our high court’s decision in People v. Gammage (1992) 2 Cal.4th
693, 700–701 (Gammage).
      Roberts accepts that a court may instruct the jury that the testimony of
a sexual assault victim need not be corroborated by other evidence to convict
a defendant under Gammage. In Gammage, the Court approved of former
CALJIC No. 10.21, which read: “ ‘It is not essential to a conviction of a
charge of rape that the testimony of the witness with whom sexual
intercourse is alleged to have been committed be corroborated by other
evidence.’ ” (Gammage, at pp. 696–697 [citing former CALJIC No. 10.21 (4th
ed. 1970 rev.), later numbered CALJIC No. 10.60 (5th ed.)].) But Roberts

                                       19
contends that the effect of the absence of reasonable doubt language in the
non-corroboration instruction has not previously been considered.
      Contrary to Roberts’s argument, the Gammage Court specifically stated
that the non-corroboration instruction does not “ ‘dilute[ ] the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard.’ ” (Gammage, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 701.)
Further, the Court explained, “The jury is instructed that the prosecution
must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This places a heavy burden
of persuasion on a complaining witness whose testimony is uncorroborated.
CALJIC No. 10.60 does not affect this instruction . . . .” (Ibid.)
      Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury as to reasonable doubt

under CALCRIM No. 220,7 including the statement: “Unless the evidence
proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an
acquittal and you must find him not guilty. Evidence is the sworn testimony
of witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else I told you
to consider as evidence.” As determined in Gammage, CALCRIM No. 1190
does not alter that heavy burden.

7     The court’s full instruction on the reasonable doubt standard was as
follows: “A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This
presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I
mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the
charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because
everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. [¶] In deciding
whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received
throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence proved the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must find
him not guilty. Evidence is the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits
admitted into evidence, and anything else I told you to consider as evidence.”
                                       20
      Moreover, this is a logical conclusion given the language connecting
CALCRIM No. 1190 and CALCRIM No. 220. CALCRIM No. 1190 refers to
“testimony of a . . . witness,” the same terms CALCRIM No. 220 uses to
define “evidence.” CALCRIM No. 220 further requires evidence to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, otherwise the defendant must be acquitted.
Considering the instructions as a whole, any reasonable juror would have
understood that the testimony of the complaining witness alone was
sufficient only if it satisfied the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
      Similarly, the California Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the
absence of a “beyond a reasonable doubt” qualifier relating to the CALJIC
No. 2.27 instruction. (People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 41
(Famalaro).) That instruction read: “ ‘You should give the testimony of a
single witness whatever weight you think it deserves. Testimony by one
witness which you believe concerning any fact is sufficient for the proof of that
fact. You should carefully review all the evidence upon which the proof of
that facts depends.’ (Italics added.)” (Ibid.) Despite using the term “believe”
without clarifying that the belief must be beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Court upheld the instruction:
         The instruction at issue, CALJIC No. 2.27, does not
         undermine the prosecution’s burden of proof when, as here,
         other instructions have “made clear that the prosecution
         had the burden of proving every element of any criminal
         offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] Here the
         jury was specifically told that the prosecution bore the
         burden of proving any other criminal activity “beyond a
         reasonable doubt.” (See CALJIC No. 2.90.) The record
         before us has no indication that the jury misunderstood the
         now challenged instruction or was otherwise misled about
         the prosecution’s burden of proof. There was no error and,
         accordingly, we reject defendant’s contention that the
         instruction violated his due process rights.
         (Famalaro, at p. 42.)

                                       21
      Similarly, in this case, the trial court provided a separate reasonable
doubt instruction, and there is no indication in the record of any actual
confusion on the part of the jury. And here, the absence of error is even more
clear because the instruction does not purport to instruct on the jury’s belief
in the evidence, but rather “declares a substantive rule of law, that the
testimony of the complaining witness need not be corroborated.” (Gammage,
supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 700–701.)
C. CALCRIM No. 1191B
      We turn to Roberts’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to
engage in a section 352 analysis before instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1191B.8 Roberts maintains that trial counsel’s lack of objection does not
waive this claim on appeal because the court’s failure to perform the section
352 analysis impinges on his constitutional rights.
      The People argue that Roberts forfeited this argument by failing to
raise it below, and regardless there is no error because the trial court

8     CALCRIM No. 1191B, as given here, states:
      “The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the
crimes of Forcible Rape, Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear or Threats, and
Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats as charged in Counts One through Eight.
      “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are not
required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or
inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude
that the defendant was likely to commit and did commit the other sex
offenses charged in this case.
      “If you find that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes,
that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other
evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of
another crime. The People must still prove each charge and allegation
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
                                        22
implicitly engaged in a 352 analysis during the pretrial hearing on section
1108 and the severance motion.
      As with CALCRIM No. 1190, Roberts’s trial counsel requested this
instruction, potentially implicating the invited error doctrine. We
nevertheless choose to consider it on the merits.
      We conclude no error occurred because the parties and the trial court
addressed section 352 in relation to the People’s motion in limine seeking to
permit each victim’s testimony as propensity evidence under section 1108.
Roberts’s counsel opposed that motion and sought bifurcation of the charges.
Both parties argued section 352 in their papers and at the hearing. Based on
the parties’ briefing and argument, the trial court implicitly considered
section 352 in determining that the evidence of each incident would be
admissible as to the other incidents if tried separately. We may “ ‘infer an
implicit weighing by the trial court on the basis of record indications well
short of an express statement,’ ” including inferring section 352 weighing
based on argument of counsel. (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152,
1168 (Villatoro); People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 924 [“The
prosecution stated in its pretrial brief that an Evidence Code section 352
weighing was required as a condition of admitting the evidence and, although
not the strongest of reeds, defense counsel in his oral argument on the point
took the position that what he referred to as the ‘extreme prejudice’ likely to
follow on the admission of such evidence should bar its use. This use of the
talismanic word ‘prejudice,’ together with the prosecution’s discussion of the
weighing process in its pretrial brief on the point, are a sufficient
assurance . . . to signal that counsel and the trial court had in mind the
appropriate analytic framework for passing on the admissibility of the

                                        23
evidence, that the court was therefore aware of the need to weigh the
evidence under section 352, and thus that it must have done so.”].)
      We disagree with Roberts’s contention that the law requires a second
section 352 analysis after the parties have argued and the court has
determined the admissibility of evidence under section 1108, subdivision (a).
CALCRIM NO. 1191 merely explains how the jury may consider the evidence
once it has been determined to be admissible. (See People v. Gonzales (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 494, 501 [“Given that the evidence is admissible for such
purpose, CALCRIM No. 1191 correctly instructs the jury.”].) As the
California Supreme Court explained in Villatoro: “Pursuant to Evidence
Code section 1108, pattern jury instruction CALCRIM No. 1191 explains to a
jury that it may consider a defendant’s uncharged sexual offense as evidence
of his or her propensity to commit a charged sexual offense.” (Villatoro,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1156.) If the court has already engaged in a section
352 analysis explicitly or implicitly in determining admissibility or cross-
admissibility, there is no need for it to do so again before giving CALCRIM
No. 1191.
      In Villatoro, the Court implied that a section 352 analysis was required
before giving the CALCRIM No. 1191 instruction, but it did not require a
second section 352 analysis if the court has already conducted one. There,
five victims testified regarding sexual offenses committed by the defendant,
and the trial court, without objection, instructed the jury with a modified
version of CALCRIM No. 1191. (Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1156–
1158.) However, there is no suggestion that the lower court had previously
engaged in a section 352 analysis in considering a section 1108 motion in
limine or a motion to sever. Thus, Villatoro is not on point here.

                                       24
D. General Intent Instruction for Forcible Sexual Penetration
      Lastly, Roberts asserts that the trial court erred by instructing the jury
that the offense of forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code § 289, subd. (a)) is a
general intent crime (CALCRIM No. 252).9 Despite noting that “courts
universally find a trial court’s error in instructing as to section 289,
subdivision (a) to be harmless” and “ha[ving] no answer to th[e] question”
what other intent the defendant might have had besides sexual arousal,
gratification, or abuse, Roberts insists that we ascertain one because the
Legislature must have had one. We decline to do so.
      The People concede that the general intent instruction was likely error.
They argue, however, the error was harmless because the trial court later
properly defined sexual penetration as penetration “for the purpose of sexual
abuse, arousal, or gratification” as provided in CALCRIM No. 1045. We
agree that any error was harmless.
      “Courts have differed concerning the proper standard for assessing
prejudice with respect to this type of error. (Compare People v. Ngo [(2014)]
225 Cal.App.4th [126,] 162–163 [suggesting ‘ “reasonable likelihood” ’
standard is appropriate] with People v. ZarateCastillo, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1168–1169 [applying beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24]; see People v. Lee

9     The court instructed the jury on the requisite intent for each count as
follows: “The following crimes and allegations require general criminal
intent. Those crimes are forcible rape as charged in Counts 1, 3, 5, and 7;
sexual penetration by use of force, which is charged in Counts 2, 4, and 6; and
sodomy by the use of force in Count 8. For you to find a person guilty of these
crimes, that person must not only commit the prohibited act but must do so
with a wrongful intent. A person acts with a wrongful intent when he or she
intentionally does a prohibited act; however, it is not required that he or she
intended to break the law. The act required is explained in the instruction
for that crime.”
                                        25
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 668–669 [applying Chapman standard to giving of
contradictory and partially inaccurate instructions regarding intent-to-kill
element of attempted murder]; Ho v. Carey (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592
[‘ “reasonable likelihood” ’ standard employed for ambiguous instruction
inappropriate where disputed instruction erroneous on face].)” (People v.
Saavedra (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 605, 615 (Saavedra).) As in Saavedra, we
decline to choose a side, concluding “the error was harmless even under
Chapman’s more stringent standard.” (Ibid.)
      Under Chapman v. California, an erroneous instruction is harmless
when the “ ‘reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . the
jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.’ ” (Saavedra, supra,
24 Cal.App.5th at p. 615 [citing Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 17].)
Here, the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt first
because the trial court later instructed the jury as to the required purpose of
the penetration. (People v. ZarateCastillo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1169
[“[T]here is simply no reason to believe that the jury would have disregarded
the explicit direction of the later instructions because of, at best, a mere
implication arising from the earlier instructions.”].) Second, the record in
this case “contains no evidence that could rationally lead to a finding the act
of penetration . . . was committed for a purpose other than sexual arousal,
gratification, or abuse.” (Saavedra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 616; ZarateCastillo,
244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169 [“Nor is there any basis for believing that the jury
could have, under any circumstances, rationally found that defendant
penetrated the victim’s vagina for any purpose other than sexual abuse,
arousal, or gratification.”].) Accordingly, any error was harmless.

                                       26
                             DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                           BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

                                 27