Court Opinion

ID: 9426938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:18.152879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:03.929910
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Parts I-III of the Court’s opinion. I fully agree that the minimum-contacts analysis developed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), represents a far more sensible construct for the exercise of state-court jurisdiction than the patchwork of legal and factual fictions that has been generated from the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878). It is precisely because *220the inquiry into minimum contacts is now of such overriding importance, however, that I must respectfully dissent from Part IV of the Court’s opinion.
I
The primary teaching of Parts I-III of today’s decision is that a State, in seeking to assert jurisdiction over a person located outside its borders, may only do so on the basis of minimum contacts among the parties, the contested transaction, and the forum State. The Delaware Supreme Court could not have- made plainer, however, that its sequestration statute, Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 366 (1975), does not operate on this basis, but instead is strictly an embodiment of quasi in rem jurisdiction, a jurisdictional predicate no longer constitutionally viable:
“[Jjurisdiction under § 366 remains . . . quasi in rem founded on the presence of capital stock here, not on prior contact by defendants with this forum.” Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A. 2d 225, 229 (1976).
This state-court ruling obviously comports with the understanding of the parties, for the issue of the existence of minimum contacts was never pleaded by appellee, made the subject of discovery, or ruled upon by the Delaware courts. These facts notwithstanding, the Court in Part IV reaches the minimum-contacts question and finds such contacts lacking as applied to appellants. Succinctly stated, once having properly and persuasively decided that the quasi in rem statute that Delaware admits to having enacted is invalid, the Court then proceeds to find that a minimum-contacts law that Delaware expressly denies having enacted also could not be constitutionally applied in this case.
In my view, a purer example of an advisory opinion is not to be found. True, appellants do not deny having received actual notice of the action in question. Ante, at 213 n. 40. *221However, notice is but one ingredient of a proper assertion of state-court jurisdiction. The other is a statute authorizing the exercise of the State’s judicial power along constitutionally permissible grounds — which henceforth means minimum contacts. As of today, § 366 is not such a law.1 Recognizing that today’s decision fundamentally alters the relevant jurisdictional ground rules, I certainly would not want to rule out the possibility that Delaware’s courts might decide that the legislature’s overriding purpose of securing the personal appearance in state courts of defendants would best be served by reinterpreting its statute to permit state jurisdiction on the basis of constitutionally permissible contacts rather than stock ownership. Were the state courts to take this step, it would then become necessary to address the question of whether minimum contacts exist here. But in the present posture of this case, the Court’s decision of this important issue is purely an abstract ruling.
My concern with the inappropriateness of the Court’s action is highlighted by two other considerations. First, an inquiry into minimum contacts inevitably is highly dependent on creating a proper factual foundation detailing the contacts between the forum State and the controversy in question. Because neither the plaintiff-appellee nor the state courts viewed such an inquiry as germane in this instance, the Court today is unable to draw upon a proper factual record in reaching its conclusion; moreover, its disposition denies appellee the normal opportunity to seek discovery on the contacts issue. Second, it must be remembered, that the Court’s ruling is a constitutional one and necessarily *222will affect the reach of the jurisdictional laws of all 50 States. Ordinarily this would counsel restraint in constitutional pronouncements. Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring). Certainly it should have cautioned the Court against reaching out to decide a question that, as here, has yet to emerge from the state courts ripened for review on the federal issue.
II
Nonetheless, because the Court rules on the minimum-contacts question, I feel impelled to express my view. While evidence derived through discovery might satisfy me that minimum contacts are lacking in a given case, I am convinced that as a general rule a state forum has jurisdiction to adjudicate a shareholder derivative action centering on the conduct and policies of the directors and officers of a corporation chartered by that State. Unlike the Court, I therefore would not foreclose Delaware from asserting jurisdiction over appellants were it persuaded to do so on the basis of minimum contacts.
It is well settled that a derivative lawsuit as presented here does not inure primarily to the benefit of the named plaintiff. Rather j the primary beneficiaries are the corporation and its owners,'the shareholders. “The cause of action which such a plaintiff brings before the court is not his own but the corporation’s. . . . Such a plaintiff often may represent an important public and stockholder interest in bringing faithless managers to book.” Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 522, 524 (1947).
Viewed in this light, the chartering State has an unusually powerful interest in insuring the availability of a convenient forum for litigating claims involving a possible multiplicity of defendant fiduciaries and for vindicating the State’s substantive policies regarding the management of its domestic corporations. I believe that our cases fairly establish that *223the State’s valid substantive interests are important considerations in assessing whether it constitutionally may claim jurisdiction over a given cause of action.
In this instance, Delaware can point to at least three interrelated public policies that are furthered by its assertion of jurisdiction. First, the State has a substantial interest in providing restitution for its local corporations that allegedly have been victimized by fiduciary misconduct, even if the managerial decisions occurred outside the State. The importance of this general state interest in assuring restitution for its own residents previously found expression in cases that went outside the then-prevailing due process framework to authorize state-court jurisdiction over nonresident motorists who injure others within the State. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927); see Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338, 341 (1953). More recently, it has led States to seek and to acquire jurisdiction over nonresident tortfeasors whose purely out-of-state activities produce domestic consequences. E. g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N. E. 2d 761 (1961). Second, state courts have legitimately read their jurisdiction expansively when a cause of action centers in an area in which the forum State possesses a manifest regulatory interest. E. g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220 (1957) (insurance regulation); Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643 (1950) (blue sky laws). Only this Term we reiterated that the conduct of corporate fiduciaries is just such a matter in which the policies and interests of the domestic forum are ordinarily presumed to be paramount. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 478-480 (1977); see Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 81-85 (1975). Finally, a State like Delaware has a recognized interest in affording a convenient forum for supervising and overseeing the affairs of an entity that is purely the creation of that State’s law. For example, even following our decision in *224International Shoe, New York courts were permitted to exercise complete judicial authority over nonresident beneficiaries of a trust created under state law, even though, unlike appellants here, the beneficiaries personally entered into no association whatsoever with New York. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950);2 cf. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U. S. 662, 671 (1915) (litigation concerning management of mortuary fund operated by locally chartered corporation rests in court of that State); Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 533 (1907) (state courts can oversee liquidation of state-chartered corporation). I, of course, am not suggesting that Delaware’s varied interests would justify its acceptance of jurisdiction over any transaction touching upon the affairs of its domestic corporations. But a derivative action which raises allegations of abuses of the basic management of an institution whose existence is created by the State and whose powers and duties are defined by state law fundamentally implicates the public policies of that forum.
To be sure, the Court is not blind to these considerations. It notes that the State’s interests “may support the application of Delaware law to resolve any controversy over appellants’ actions in their capacities as officers and directors.” Ante, at 215. But this, the Court argues, pertains to choice of law, not jurisdiction. I recognize that the jurisdictional and choice-of-law inquiries are not identical. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 254 (1958). But I would not compartmentalize thinking in this area quite so rigidly as it seems to me the Court does today, for both inquiries “are *225often closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar considerations.” Id., at 258 (Black, J., dissenting). In either case an important linchpin is the extent of contacts between the controversy, the parties, and the forum State. While constitutional limitations on the choice of law are by no means settled, see, e. g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930), important considerations certainly include the expectancies of the parties and the fairness of governing the defendants’ acts and behavior by rules of conduct created by a given jurisdiction. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971) (hereafter Restatement). These same factors bear upon the propriety of a State’s exercising jurisdiction over a legal dispute. At the minimum, the decision that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State’s laws'and rules should prove to be highly relevant to the fairness of permitting that same State to accept jurisdiction for adjudicating the controversy.
Furthermore, I believe that practical considerations argue in favor of seeking to bridge the distance between the choice-of-law and jurisdictional inquiries. Even when a court would apply the law of a different forum,3 as a general rule • it will feel less knowledgeable and comfortable in interpretation, and less interested in fostering the policies of that foreign jurisdiction, than would the courts established by the State that provides the applicable law. See, e. g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 509 (1947); Restatement § 313, p. 347; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657, 664 (1959). Obviously, such choice-of-law problems cannot entirely be avoided in a diverse legal system such as our own. Nonetheless, when a suitor *226seeks to lodge a suit in a State with a substantial interest in seeing its own law applied to the transaction in question, we could wisely act to minimize conflicts, confusion, and uncertainty by adopting a liberal view of jurisdiction, unless considerations of fairness or efficiency strongly point in the opposite direction.
This case is not one where, in my judgment, this preference for jurisdiction is adequately answered. Certainly nothing said by the Court persuades me that it would be unfair to subject appellants to suit in Delaware. The fact that the record does not reveal whether they “set foot” or committed “act[s] related to [the] cause of action” in Delaware, ante, at 213, is not decisive, for jurisdiction can be based strictly on out-of-state acts having foreseeable effects in the forum State. E. g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra; Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra; Restatement § 37. I have little difficulty in applying this principle to nonresident fiduciaries whose alleged breaches of trust are said to have substantial damaging effect on the financial posture of a resident corporation.4 Further, I cannot understand how the existence of minimum contacts in a constitutional sense is at all affected by Delaware’s failure statutorily to express an interest in controlling corporate fiduciaries. Ante, at 214. To me this simply demonstrates that Delaware *227did not elect to assert jurisdiction to the extent the Constitution would allow.5 Nor would I view as controlling or even especially meaningful Delaware’s failure to exact from appellants their consent to be sued. Ante, at 216. Once we have rejected the jurisdictional framework created in Pennoyer v. Neff, I see no reason to rest jurisdiction on a fictional outgrowth of that system such as the existence of a consent statute, expressed or implied.6
I, therefore, would approach the minimum-contacts analysis differently than does the Court. Crucial to me is the fact that appellants7 voluntarily associated themselves with the *228State of Delaware, “invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S., at 253; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S., at 319, by entering into a long-term and fragile relationship with one of its domestic corporations. They thereby elected to assume powers and to undertake responsibilities wholly derived from that State's rules and regulations, and to become eligible for those benefits that Delaware law makes available to its corporations’ officials. E. g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 143 (1975) (interest-free logns); § 145 (1975 ed. and Supp. 1976) (indemnification). While it is possible that countervailing issues of judicial efficiency and the like might. clearly favor a different forum, they do not appear on the meager record before us;8 and, of course, we are concerned solely with “minimum” contacts, not the “best” contacts. I thus do not believe that it is unfair to insist that appellants make themselves available to suit in a competent forum that Delaware might create for vindication of its important public policies directly pertaining to appellants’ fiduciary associations with the State.

 Indeed the Court’s decision to proceed to the minimum-contacts issue treats Delaware’s sequestration statute as if it were the equivalent of Rhode Island’s long-arm law, which specifically authorizes its courts to assume jurisdiction to the limit permitted by the Constitution, R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. §9-5-33 (1970), thereby necessitating judicial consideration of the frontiers of minimum contacts in every case arising under that statute.

 The Mullane Court held: “[T]he interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard.” 339 U. S., at 313.

 In this case the record does not inform us whether an actual conflict is likely to arise between Delaware law and that of the likely alternative forum. Pursuant to the general rule, I assume that Delaware law probably would obtain in the foreign court. Restatement § 309.

 1 recognize, of course, that identifying a corporation as a resident of the chartering State is to build upon a legal fiction. In many respects, however, the law acts as if state chartering of a corporation has meaning. E. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (c) (for diversity purposes, a corporation is a citizen of the State of incorporation). And, if anything, the propriety of treating a corporation as a resident of the incorporating State seems to me particularly appropriate in the context of a shareholder derivative suit, for the State realistically may perceive itself as having a direct interest in guaranteeing the enforcement of its corporate laws, in assuring the solvency and fair management of its domestic corporations, and in protecting from fraud those shareholders who placed their faith in that state-created institution.

 In fact, it is quite plausible that the Delaware Legislature never felt the need to assert direct jurisdiction over corporate managers precisely because the sequestration statute heretofore has served as a somewhat awkward but effective basis for achieving such personal jurisdiction. See, e. g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 290 A. 2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1972): “Sequestration is most frequently resorted to in suits by stockholders against corporate directors in which recoveries are sought for the benefit of the corporation on the ground of claimed breaches of fiduciary duty on the part of directors.”

 Admittedly, when one consents to suit in a forum, his expectation is enhanced that he may be haled into that State’s courts. To this extent, I agree that consent may have bearing on the fairness of accepting jurisdiction. But whatever is the degree of personal expectation that is necessary to warrant jurisdiction should not depend on the formality of establishing a consent law. Indeed, if one’s expectations are to carry such weight, then appellants here might be fairly charged with the understanding that Delaware would decide to protect its substantial interests through its own courts, for they certainly realized that in the past the sequestration law has been employed primarily as a means of securing the appearance of corporate officials in the State’s courts. N. 5, supra. Even in the absence of such a statute, however, the close and special association between a state corporation and its managers should apprise the latter that the State may seek to offer a convenient forum for addressing claims of fiduciary breach of trust.

 Whether the directors of the out-of-state subsidiary should be amenable to suit in Delaware may raise additional questions. It may well require further investigation into such factors as the degree of independ*228ence in the operations of the two corporations, the interrelationship of the managers of parent and subsidiary in the actual conduct under challenge, and the reasonable expectations of the subsidiary directors that the parent State would take an interest in their behavior. Cf. United States v. First Nat. City Bank, 379 U. S. 378, 384 (1965). While the present record is not illuminating on these matters, it appears that all appellants acted largely in concert with respect to the alleged fiduciary misconduct, suggesting that overall jurisdiction might fairly rest in Delaware.

 And, of course, if a preferable forum exists elsewhere, a State that is constitutionally entitled to accept jurisdiction nonetheless remains free to arrange for the transfer of the litigation under the doctrine of jorum non conveniens. See, e. g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 643 (1935); Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 504 (1947).