Court Opinion

ID: 9629330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:40:49.447849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:17.981723
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, J.,
dissenting.
The owner of a domestic animal such as a dog can be liable to persons injured by the dog upon several different bases. An owner who knows or has reason to know of “vicious propensities” in his animal is strictly liable. Section 509, 3 Restatement 19, Torts, states as follows:
“Except as stated in § 517, a possessor of a domestic animal which he has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm caused thereby to others, except trespassers on his land, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the harm.”
This section provides that the owner is liable regardless of the exercise of utmost care to prevent harm. The propensity is not necessarily only viciousness. “The rule is also applicable where the animal is not vicious but has a dangerous tendency which is unusual and not necessary for the purposes for which such animals are usually kept.” Comment c., 3 Restatement, Torts, 20. This is the basis for liability that requires scienter on the part of the owner.
Another basis for liability is negligence, rather than strict liability. An owner of a domestic animal, *330not known to be abnormally dangerous, can be liable if the animal inflicts the type of harm which is normal for this class of animals and the owner has been negligent in confining or controlling the animal. Section 518, Restatement, Torts, provides:
“(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) and §§ 504-5, one who possesses or harbors a domestic animal, which he does not have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous but which is likely to do harm unless controlled, is subject to liability for harm done by such animal if, but only if,
“(a) he fails to exercise reasonable care to confine or otherwise control it, and
“(b) the harm is of a sort which it is normal for animals of its class to do.” 3 Restatement 37.
“* * * If there is not notice of the ferocious nature of the animal, the owner may, of course, still be liable for negligent keeping, but the basis of liability in the two cases must be sharply distinguished.” 2 Harper and James, Torts, 833-834, § 14.11 (1956).
In my opinion this basis of liability against owners is what Prosser referred to in the quotation of Prosser by the majority. Prosser did not intend to state that negligence is only a basis for liability against occupiers and controllers of premises on which there are animals. Negligence is also a basis of liability against owners of animals.
In this category of liability, whether or not the owner knows or has reason to know of the propensities of the particular animal is irrelevant. Knowledge of the characteristics of the class is required of the owner or conclusively imputed to the owner. For example, “* * * the keeper of an ordinarily gentle bitch or cat is required to know that while caring for her puppies or kittens she is likely to attack other *331animals and human beings.” 3 Restatement 39, Torts § 518, Comment g. Or, “even a well-broken mare or gelding which had never shown a propensity to bite or kick may do so when running loose.” 3 Restatement 38, Torts § 518, Comment d. It is no defense to an action based upon this theory that the animal had never before acted like this. If there is any evidence from which the trier of fact can find that what the animal did under the circumstances is normal or a likelihood for this class of animals under these circumstances the question of liability is for the jury.
This latter theory of liability, — negligence, was the basis for this action. The expert called by plaintiff testified that it was foreseeable that this particular dog under these particular circumstances would lunge. While the questions to the expert were framed in the language of what was foreseeable for this particular dog, an examination of the entire testimony makes it evident that the expert was in effect stating that it was normal for this class of dog under these circumstances to lunge.
The charges of negligence against the owners were:
“(1) In failing to warn plaintiff of the presence of said dog.
“ * * * * *.
“(3) In failing to keep dog adequately confined so as to prevent it from leaping at plaintiff.”
The verdict of the jury finding the defendant owners not liable must, therefore, have been a finding either that the lunging of the dog under these circumstances was not normal for dogs of this kind under these circumstances or that the owners were not negligent in their confinement of the dog and that for either of these reasons there was no duty to warn.
*332The next inquiry is whether the verdict for the owner is inconsistent with the verdict against Singling Bros.
Two bases for liability against Singling Bros, are advanced: one, vicarious because of the owners’ negligence. As the majority states, that avenue is foreclosed by the verdict for the owners. The other is on the basis of negligence by an occupier in failing to protect a business invitee against an injury that could be expected from animals permitted upon the premises. This basis for liability is stated in § 344, 2 Restatement (Second), 223-224, Torts, and plaintiff at trial and in this court urged that § 344 applied. Section 344 states :
“A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
“(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
“(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.” (Emphasis added.)
The charge of negligence against Singling Bros, was in failing to inspect to determine if the premises were safe for plaintiff.
Paraphrasing the above-quoted section, Singling would be liable if it failed to use reasonable care to discover that the dog was “likely” to lunge or, if it was “likely” to lunge at people, if they failed to warn plaintiff against this danger, or otherwise protect her. *333The sustaining of liability against Singling would require that the jury find that a normal characteristic of dogs such as the boxer in this case, under these circumstances, would lunge at people. The jury, in finding for the defendant owners necessarily found it was not a normal characteristic. For this reason I am of the opinion that the verdict was inconsistent and the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
The majority states that the jury could find “that he [the owner] was not negligent in tying the dog to the back of the trader. On the other hand, the jury could have concluded that Singling Bros., as an experienced circus operator, created a dangerous condition when it directed the caravans containing dogs, chimpanzees, and sea lions to park near the area where the customers were going to the circus, and that it was negligent in fading to place warning signs or barricades between the travel area and the circus caravans.”
In my opinion these statements are inconsistent. As stated, the jury necessarily found, in rendering a verdict for the owners, either that the dog was not likely to lunge even though chained in proximity to an area in which customers going to the circus would walk or peer into the cages, or that despite this likelihood the dog was reasonably confined. Either finding is a finding that a dangerous condition was not present.
This is not an instance in which a commercial occupier has a higher duty than an animal owner or a noncommercial occupier to make premises safe. See § 12, 1 Sestatement 22, Torts. Liability is not based upon knowing or “should have known” of dangerous propensities. Liabdity of both the owner and Sing*334ling Bros, is based upon whether or not it is a normal characteristic of this type of dog under these circumstances to leap at a person approaching them. If it is normal, it is completely immaterial whether either defendant knew or should have known of this characteristic.