Court Opinion

ID: 9616656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:48:34.193887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:59.633458
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J.
I concur in the affirmance of the judgments as to Massie but dissent from the reversal of the judgments as to Vetter.
In my opinion the procedural requirements in People v. Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518 [43 Cal.Rptr.], do not apply to a case such as the present one, which was tried before the decision was rendered in Aranda (see concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. Charles, ante, pp. 330, 345-347 [57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 425 P.2d 545]). I believe that the trial court’s failure to take the steps subsequently required by the Aranda rules and his asserted failure to exercise his discretion under the pre-Aranda rules was not prejudicial (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]).
This was a nonjury case tried by an experienced trial judge who presumably was able to exclude from his consideration in determining Vetter’s guilt evidence admitted solely against Massie and to determine Vetter’s guilt on the basis of the evidence rather than suspicions arising from Vetter’s association with Massie. Although at a separate trial Vetter might have obtained exonerating testimony of Massie, it is likewise possible that Vetter would, not have called Massie as a witness or that Massie, if called, would not have given exonerating testimony. Even had Massie been called and given such testimony he could have been impeached by his extrajudicial statements accusing Vetter of being the driver of the getaway car. In my opinion it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Vetter would have been reached in the *925absence of the asserted errors, and I would affirm the judgments as to Vetter as well as to Massie.
McComb, J., and Mosk, J., concurred.
The petition of appellant Massie for a rehearing was denied July 19, 1967.