Court Opinion

ID: 9687537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:34:24.541613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:28.503526
License: Public Domain

BLOODWORTH, Justice.
The facts and issues raised on this appeal are well stated in the dissenting opinion to which we refer the reader for an understanding thereof.
At the outset it should be noted that those who concur in' the majority opinion agree with the dissenting opinion to the extent that we hold that all the assignments of error are related and that arguing them together does not preclude *123consideration of one assignment, even though others may be without merit.
As to the merits, on this appeal, we affirm the trial court which held the railroad (L&N) is not entitled to indemnity from the industry (Harris Transfer) for the alleged injuries to the railroad’s employee (under FELA) suffered as a result of being pinned between an oversized boxcar and the industry’s building where the clearance between the building and center-line of the spur track was less than eight feet, the required clearance in the sidetrack agreement.
By the terms of paragraph 12 of the side-track agreement, the industry agreed it would not construct, place or permit structures within eight feet of the center-line of the track. At the place where the employee alleges to have been injured, the clearance is less than eight feet.
By the terms of paragraph 14 of the side-track agreement, the railroad assumed all -liability for injuries to its employees unless the injury resulted directly or indirectly from the industry’s breach of the provision in paragraph 12 concerning clearances.
Thus, the determinative issue is whether or not the industry breached its agreement not to construct, place, or permit any structure within eight feet of the centerline of the spur track.
The trial court found, inter alia, that the railroad itself built the side track with less than the required clearance between the centerline of the track and the warehouse which was constructed before the track was laid.
This Court has long been committed to the rule that when a chancellor hears evidence ore tenus (as the chancellor did here) his findings of fact have the weight of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust and there is no credible evidence to support his findings. Morris v. Morris, 290 Ala. 41, 273 So.2d 203 (1973). We cannot say the chancellor’s findings were plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust. To the contrary, these findings, in our judgment, are supported by credible evidence.
We consider that the following evidence supports the chancellor’s findings :
(1) The letter of February 8, 1929, from the industry’s attorney to the industry which contains a legal opinion concerning the “proposed contract” . . . which speaks of “force you to execute the agreement” . . . “compel the Railroad to build and operate the spur track” . . . “terms of the contract must be agreed upon between you” “it can agree to construct it” . all of which looks to the future execution of the contract. We think that the letter permits the inference that the contract had not been signed by February 8;
(2) The letter of February 13, 1929, from the railroad’s assistant superintendent to the industry implies, according to our view, not that “the work of surveying, setting out stakes,” etc. had already been done and that the contract had been executed, but rather that the railroad assistant superintendent had not yet commenced to do anything towards constructing the track, the physical fact at 'issue. The letter specifically states “advise when you desire this work started.”;
(3) The ledger sheets clearly admit of the interpretation that the track was constructed subsequent to the building;
(4) The Internal Revenue Service Audit clearly implies that the track was constructed subsequent to the building since the federal government allowed only six months depreciation for the spur track but allowed seven and one-half months for the warehouse building;
(5) The direct testimony by witness Edwards who worked for the industry at that time and who testified in part, as follows:
*124“Q. Were you employed by the Harris Transfer Company at the time they moved into that building in 1929 ?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Were you involved in the transfer of goods from the previous place of business of the Harris Transfer Company into the new warehouse ?
“A. I was..
“Q. Was that sometime during the summer of 1929?
“A. We started moving the first part of June.
“Q. I see.
“THE COURT: 1929?
“THE WITNESS: Right.
“THE COURT: All right.
“Q. (By MR. WOOD :) Do you remember when the railroad siding behind that building was constructed relative to the date that you were moving in, or that Harris was moving in ?
“A. It was while we were moving in.
“Q. Do you remember the construction of the railroad siding behind the building during the time that you were moving in?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Is there anything in particular that points this fact out this many years ago in your mind?
“A. Well, most of them in here are not old enough to remember, but back in those days they had, the gang had one colored man who chanted a tune and the men worked in unison with his chant, and that just sticks in my mind. I don’t think I will ever forget that.
“Q. I see. So, it is your testimony that Harris Transfer Company building which is adjacent to the spur track was completed before the spur track was constructed ?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And this is the building that is immediately adjacent to that spur track?
“A. Right.”
(Our emphasis.)
When one considers this direct testimony (which is uncontroverted), along with the other indirect testimony, it seems to us, one has to conclude there was credible evidence to support the trial judge’s findings of fact.
It is thus that we must conclude to affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HAR-WOOD, MADDOX and JONES, JJ., concur.
COLEMAN, McCALL and FAULKNER, JJ., dissent.