Court Opinion

ID: 9409667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 00:00:42.730587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:52.454983
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-70005      Document: 00516825142         Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/18/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                  No. 22-70005                       FILED
                                                                 July 18, 2023
                                 ____________
                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
   Matthew Johnson,                                                  Clerk

                                                            Petitioner—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   Correctional Institutions Division,

                                             Respondent—Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 3:19-CV-2310
                   ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
          Appellant Matthew Johnson files an application for a certificate of ap-
   pealability and appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to recuse. We
   DENY the application for a certificate of appealability and AFFIRM the
   district court’s denial of the motion to recuse.
                                          I
          The facts underlying Johnson’s conviction are not in dispute. They
   were recorded on a store surveillance camera and played for the jury at
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   Johnson’s capital murder trial. In May 2012, Johnson entered a convenience
   store and poured a bottle of lighter fluid over the head of Nancy Harris, a 76-
   year-old store clerk. He then demanded money from Harris. As Harris at-
   tempted to open the cash register, Johnson stole two cigarette lighters, two
   packages of cigarettes, and a ring from Harris’s finger.
          Once Harris opened the cash register, Johnson took the money and
   then set Harris on fire. As Harris frantically attempted to extinguish herself,
   video recordings showed that Johnson “calmly” walked out of the store. Ex
   parte Johnson, WR-87,574-01, 2019 WL 4317046, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App.
   Sept. 11, 2019). Police officers arrived at the convenience store soon after
   and extinguished the flame. Aided by descriptions given by Harris and neigh-
   borhood residents, the police quickly apprehended Johnson. Because of the
   incident, Harris suffered second-to-fourth degree burns over 40% of her
   body. She died five days later.
          Johnson was indicted for intentionally causing the death of Harris by
   setting her on fire during a robbery. The jury found him guilty of capital mur-
   der as alleged in the indictment. At the punishment stage of his trial, the jury
   unanimously determined that: (1) Johnson presented future danger to soci-
   ety; and (2) there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a life
   imprisonment rather than a death sentence. Accordingly, Johnson was sen-
   tenced to death. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 37.071. The Texas Court of Crim-
   inal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence, Johnson v. State, No. AP-
   77,030, 2015 WL 7354609, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2015), and the
   United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari, Johnson v.
   Texas, 579 U.S. 931 (2016). Johnson challenged the validity of his conviction
   and sentence in a state habeas proceeding, and the Texas Court of Criminal
   Appeals denied relief. Ex parte Johnson, 2019 WL 4317046, at *3.

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          Johnson then petitioned for habeas relief in federal district court. Dur-
   ing the pendency of his federal habeas petition, Johnson filed a motion to
   recuse Judge Ada Brown, alleging that the decisions she made would cause a
   reasonable person to “harbor doubts about [her] impartiality.” Trevino v.
   Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omit-
   ted). The district court denied habeas relief, the motion to recuse, and the
   application for a certificate of appealability.
                                           II
          Before this court, Johnson files an application for a certificate of ap-
   pealability and appeals the district court denial of his motion to recuse.
                                           A
          Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state
   court prisoner must obtain a certificate of appealability before appealing a
   federal district court’s denial of habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To
   obtain a certificate of appealability, the petitioner must demonstrate that
   “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the consti-
   tutional claims debatable or wrong.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338
   (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The determination “requires
   an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of
   their merits” but not “full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced
   in support of the claims.” Id. at 336; see also Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115
   (2017).
          As background, to render a death sentence under Texas law, the State
   has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “there is a probability
   that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would consti-
   tute a continuing threat to society.”             Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
   37.071(2)(b)(1); Druery v. Thaler, 647 F.3d 535, 546 (5th Cir. 2011). If the
   jury finds future dangerousness, it must then consider whether there are suf-

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   ficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment
   rather than a death sentence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071(2)(e)(1).
          At the sentencing stage of Johnson’s trial, several witnesses testified
   regarding Johnson’s criminal history. A police officer and Johnson’s ex-girl-
   friend testified about an incident in which Johnson attempted to break into
   an apartment where his girlfriend and her children were living. When he
   failed to break in, he set the back porch of the apartment on fire. Another
   woman testified about a separate incident where Johnson forced her out from
   her pickup truck, threw her to the ground, and drove off. And several police
   officers testified that Johnson has a history of aggravated assault, theft, and
   evading arrests. After deliberation, the jury answered “yes” to the future
   dangerousness question and “no” to the mitigation question. Thus, it sen-
   tenced Johnson to death.
          In his habeas petition before the district court, Johnson challenged the
   constitutionality of Texas’s future dangerousness and mitigation special is-
   sues. The district court rejected Johnson’s constitutional challenges. Here,
   Johnson contends he is entitled to a certificate of appealability because rea-
   sonable jurists would debate the district court’s determination that Texas’s
   future dangerousness and mitigation issues are constitutional. We address
   each issue in turn.
                                         1
          As to future dangerousness, Johnson contends that he is entitled to
   habeas relief because: the Texas capital sentencing statute’s future danger-
   ousness provision is unconstitutionally vague; jury predictions of future dan-
   gerousness are inherently unreliable; and his jury was wrong when it pre-
   dicted he would be violent in the future.
          First, Johnson contends that Texas’s capital sentencing statute is un-
   constitutionally vague because it fails to define “probability” and “criminal

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   acts of violence.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1). No reasonable
   jurist would debate the correctness of the district court’s determination on
   this issue. Buck, 580 U.S. at 115–16. The Supreme Court has held that
   Texas’s capital punishment scheme that asks “‘whether there is a probability
   that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would consti-
   tute a continuing threat to society’ is not unconstitutionally vague.” Tuilaepa
   v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 974 (1994) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
   274–76 (1976)). Likewise, in Woods v. Johnson, this court applied the Su-
   preme Court’s holding in Jurek that “reject[ed] the contention that the [fu-
   ture dangerousness] issue is impermissibly vague.” 75 F.3d 1017, 1034 (5th
   Cir. 1996). Since then, we have repeatedly re-affirmed the same holding. See,
   e.g., Sprouse v. Stephens, 748 F.3d 609, 622 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Texas does not
   run afoul of [Supreme Court precedent] by not expressly defining these
   terms.”) (citation omitted); Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 553 (5th Cir. 2005)
   (listing numerous Fifth Circuit opinions rejecting similar arguments).
          Next, Johnson argues that jury prediction of future dangerousness is
   inherently unreliable, and so capital-punishment schemes that rely on such
   predictions are arbitrary and thus unconstitutional. Johnson contends that
   even though the Supreme Court explicitly upheld Texas’s future dangerous-
   ness question in Jurek and Barefoot, the reasoning of those decisions “[has]
   been entirely eroded” in light of new social science research showing the in-
   accuracy of jury predictions. Jurek, 428 U.S. 262; Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
   880 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
          In Jurek, the Supreme Court observed that although determining fu-
   ture dangerousness is “difficult,” it “does not mean that it cannot be
   [done].” Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274–75. Highlighting the prevalence of similar
   determinations, the Court noted that jury prediction of future dangerousness
   is “no different from the task performed countless times each day throughout
   the American system of criminal justice.” Id. at 276. For example, the Court

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   observed that similar predictions are made when government officials decide
   whether to admit a defendant to bail or whether a prisoner should be released
   on parole. Id. at 275. Consequently, the Court rejected the petitioner’s ar-
   gument and held that “Texas’ capital-sentencing procedures . . . do not vio-
   late the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 276. As Johnson him-
   self conceded, seven years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in
   Jurek that Texas’s future dangerousness issue does not violate the Eighth
   Amendment. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899. Johnson contends, however, that
   the “factual and theoretical foundations” of Jurek and Barefoot “have been
   entirely eroded” by subsequent social science research, which demonstrated
   that jury predictions of future dangerousness are entirely unreliable.
          But this argument is plainly foreclosed by our decision in Buntion v.
   Lumpkin, 982 F.3d 945 (5th Cir. 2020). In Buntion, we considered the same
   arguments on this issue that were made by the same lawyers. We addressed
   the argument that the Texas Code is “unconstitutional because several stud-
   ies indicate that juries’ dangerousness predictions usually prove untrue,”
   and concluded that the argument was “substantively meritless” because
   “the Supreme Court has twice upheld the exact same provision.” Id. at 948–
   50. Faced with unfavorable Supreme Court cases, Buntion (like Johnson)
   argued that new social science studies “entirely undermine[d] the factual
   predicate” underlying those cases, and so he invited the court to “ignore”
   those precedents. Id. at 950. The Buntion panel correctly refused to do so,
   noting that only the Supreme Court alone can overrule one of its precedents.
   Id. (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)). Given our holding in
   Buntion controls this issue, no “reasonable jurists would find the district
   court’s assessment” on this issue “debatable or wrong.” Miller-El, 537 U.S.
   at 338; Buck, 580 U.S. at 115–16.
          Finally, Johnson argues that his sentence should be vacated because
   the jury was wrong when it predicted that he would be violent in the future.

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   He noted that he “has committed no violent acts while incarcerated,” and
   “[h]is impeccable disciplinary record demonstrates that he poses no threat
   to guards or fellow inmates.” As legal authority, he cites the Supreme Court
   case in Johnson v. Mississippi for the proposition that a death sentence should
   be vacated when it was “predicated, in part, on a . . . judgment that is not
   valid now, and was not valid when it was entered.” 486 U.S. 578, 585 n.6
   (1988). Because his sentence was predicated on the future dangerousness
   assessment, which he says has been proven wrong by his peaceful behavior in
   prison, he contends that his sentence should be vacated in accordance with
   Johnson v. Mississippi.
          This argument is likewise not debatable for the same reasons seen in
   Buntion. See Buck, 580 U.S. at 115–16. Like Johnson, Buntion argued that his
   sentence should be vacated because Johnson v. Mississippi “stands for the
   proposition that any sentence based on a factual inaccuracy must be vacated”
   and his peaceful behavior in prison evinced that factual inaccuracy. Buntion,
   982 F.3d at 950–51. We rejected that argument in Buntion for two independ-
   ent reasons. First, we observed that the petitioner misinterpreted Johnson v.
   Mississippi because “‘[t]he Supreme Court has never intimated that the fac-
   tual correctness of the jury’s prediction on the issue of future dangerousness
   . . . bears upon the constitutionality’ of a death sentence.” Id. (alterations in
   original) (quoting Lincecum v. Collins, 958 F.2d 1271, 1281 (5th Cir. 1992)).
   Second, we noted that the sentence imposed was not based on factual inac-
   curacy because the jury was not asked to determine whether Buntion “would
   in fact engage in future violence.” Id. at 951. Rather, the jury was asked
   whether “there is a probability” that he would commit criminal acts of vio-
   lence. Id. (quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.0711 § 3(b)(2)). Conse-
   quently, “the fact that Buntion [] behaved peacefully while in prison did not
   disprove the jury’s probability calculation.” Id.

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          Even assuming arguendo that reasonable jurists could debate the merit
   of Johnson’s argument, it is not debatable that the argument is barred by
   Teague’s non-retroactivity doctrine. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
   Under Teague, “a new rule of law [should] not be applied on collateral review
   to cases that became final prior to the announcement of the new rule.” Bur-
   dine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 342 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Teague,
   489 U.S. at 310). Here, Johnson is advocating for a new extension of Johnson
   v. Mississippi. As the district court observed, Johnson did not identify any
   courts that have adopted his broad reading of that case. To the contrary,
   controlling caselaw from the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court has re-
   jected his argument and upheld the constitutionality of the Texas Code’s fu-
   ture dangerousness provision.
          Thus, given the multiple on-point precedents and Teague’s non-retro-
   activity bar, no reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the district
   court’s determination on this issue. See Sprouse, 748 F.3d at 609; Buntion,
   982 F.3d 945; Buck, 580 U.S. at 115–16.
                                          2
          In addition to challenging the future dangerousness issue, Johnson
   also challenges the constitutionality of Texas’s mitigation issue. Before im-
   posing a death sentence, the Texas Code requires the jury to determine
   whether there were sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant lowering
   the punishment to a life sentence. Johnson contends that Texas’s failure to
   impose the burden of proof on the State to show that there were insufficient
   mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt violates the Supreme
   Court’s holding in Apprendi and Ring. The Supreme Court in Apprendi held
   that “any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum pen-
   alty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
   proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,

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   476 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Ring v. Arizona,
   536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (“If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s au-
   thorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter
   how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
   doubt.”). Johnson argues that because the insufficient-mitigating-circum-
   stances finding is necessary for the death sentence, the prosecution should
   be required to prove that finding beyond reasonable doubt.
          A “general assessment” of this argument, however, indicates that it
   is foreclosed by several circuit precedents. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. In Row-
   ell v. Dretke, for example, we noted the “important distinction between ‘facts
   in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation.’” 398 F.3d 370, 378
   (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16). The State needs to
   prove facts in aggravation beyond reasonable doubt. As to facts in mitigation,
   however, “no Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit authority requires the State to
   prove the absence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.”
   Id. at 378. In addition, “[n]o Supreme Court or Circuit precedent constitu-
   tionally requires that Texas’s mitigation special issue be assigned a burden of
   proof.” Id.; see also Scheanette v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 815, 828 (5th Cir.
   2007) (“We have specifically held that the Texas death penalty scheme did
   not violate either Apprendi or Ring by failing to require the state to prove be-
   yond a reasonable doubt the absence of mitigating circumstances.”);
   Sprouse, 748 F.3d at 623 (quoting Scheanette v. Quarterman and affirming the
   same holding).
          Each of Johnson’s arguments for the issuance of a certificate of ap-
   pealability is foreclosed by on-point binding precedent that “fits like a
   glove.” Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 672 (2011). Accordingly, no
   “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the consti-
   tutional claims debatable or wrong.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338; Buck, 580
   U.S. at 115–16.

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                                           B
          Next, we address the district court’s denial of Johnson’s motion to
   recuse. A district judge’s refusal to recuse is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
   Trevino, 168 F.3d at 178. “Any . . . judge . . . shall disqualify [her]self in any
   proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28
   U.S.C. § 455(a). The relevant inquiry is whether a “reasonable man, were
   he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge’s im-
   partiality.” Trevino, 168 F.3d at 178 (quoting Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.
   v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks
   omitted). A “reasonable person standard in the recusal context contem-
   plates a ‘well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the
   hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.’” Id. at 179 (quoting United
   States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks
   omitted).
          Here, Johnson alleges that Judge Ada Brown’s decisions “would
   cause a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, to harbor doubts
   about the district court’s impartiality.” To support his allegation, Johnson
   points to two specific examples of her bias based upon her legal rulings.
          First, Johnson contends that Judge Brown impermissibly “trun-
   cate[d]” the time his counsel had to investigate and prepare legal arguments.
   Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to
   an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to
   the judgment of a State court.” Because Johnson’s state habeas petition was
   denied on September 11, 2019, his 1-year period of limitation ended on Sep-
   tember 11, 2020.
          Shortly after the denial of his state habeas petition, Johnson’s state
   habeas counsel filed a motion to the federal district court, requesting federal
   habeas counsel. On October 23, 2019, the court issued an order appointing

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   the present counsel to represent Johnson. In that same order, the court in-
   structed Johnson to file his habeas petition by May 1, 2020. That deadline,
   Johnson alleges, contradicts 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) because it was “four-and-
   a-half months earlier than the applicable deadline,” and “[t]he language of
   the federal statute does not permit a federal court to shorten” that deadline.
   Based on Judge Brown’s reluctance to extend his filing deadline to Septem-
   ber 11, 2020 (i.e., the full period allowed by the statute), Johnson contends
   that Judge Brown is biased.
          But Johnson cited no governing legal authority recognizing the right
   to delay his briefing until the final day of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limi-
   tations. To the contrary, it is firmly established that a district court has “the
   inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view to-
   ward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579
   U.S. 40, 47 (2016). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that “judicial
   rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality mo-
   tion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Accordingly, we
   hold that “a reasonable person” who knows “all the circumstances” would
   not “harbor doubts about the district court’s impartiality” on this basis. Tre-
   vino, 168 F.3d at 178; Buck, 580 U.S. at 115–16.
          Johnson also argues that the district court showed bias when it ordered
   his attorneys to explain why they should not be sanctioned for making argu-
   ments that have been “consistently rejected by the Fifth Circuit for dec-
   ades.” In response to that order, Johnson asserted that his attorneys “have
   a duty to raise all meritorious claims in [his] federal habeas petition even if
   the Supreme Court or [the Fifth Circuit] has yet to articulate a legal basis for
   those claims.” (citing United States v. Garza-De La Cruz, 16 F.4th 1213, 1215
   (5th Cir. 2021) (“But preserving one’s rights just in case is not just reasona-
   ble. Failure to do so risks forfeiting the right altogether.”)). Because Johnson
   believes that the court’s order was unwarranted, he asserts that Judge

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   Brown’s “threatening to sanction [his] attorneys for raising a meritorious
   claim suggest the district court harbored animus toward Johnson” and “in-
   tended to pressure Counsel to withdraw the second claim in Johnson’s Peti-
   tion.”
            In its order, the district court explained that even though it is generally
   acceptable for counsel to preserve claims, they nonetheless should
   acknowledge adverse on-point circuit precedent. In failing to do so, the dis-
   trict court noted that Johnson’s counsel might be acting contrary to Rule
   11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires counsel to
   certify that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
   by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
   reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Given the district court’s
   explanation, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
   denying Johnson’s motion to recuse. These do not debatably give rise to a
   claim for relief. Buck, 580 U.S. at 115–16.

                                     *        *         *
            Because an “overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a gen-
   eral assessment of their merits” indicates that no “reasonable jurists would
   find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
   wrong,” we DENY Johnson’s application for a certificate of appealability.
   Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 338; Buck, 580 U.S. at 115–16.
            As to the motion for recusal, no reasonable person who knows “all the
   circumstances” would “harbor doubts about [the district court’s] impartial-
   ity.” Trevino, 168 F.3d at 178. Thus, we hold that the district court did not
   abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s motion to recuse. AFFIRMED.

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