Court Opinion

ID: 9538178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:31:44.187594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:36.689679
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J., Dissenting.
Candor requires we correct the mistake of Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320 [85 Cal.Rptr. 129, 466 P.2d 673],
“'Prudhomme put this court on record as being considerably more solicitous of the privilege against self-incrimination than federal law currently requires.’ ” (Ante, p. 525, quoting Reynolds v. Superior Court *534(1974) 12 Cal.3d 834, 843 [117 Cal.Rptr. 437, 528 P.2d 45].) Granted. But that was not its intent. This court clearly intended to conform to the federal constitutional standard it expected the United States Supreme Court to announce in a case then pending before the high court. (Prudhomme v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 323-325.) This expectation was, of course, disappointed; the high court upheld Florida’s notice-of-alibi statute against the claim that it violated the accused’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 90 S.Ct. 1893].) Lack of prescience is forgivable; persistence in error is not. By reaffirming Prudhomme the majority put this court on record as being more solicitous of the privilege against self-incrimination than the California Constitution—let alone federal law—requires. (See Jones v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 56 [22 Cal.Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213].)
The petitioner in Prudhomme sought to enjoin enforcement of a discovery order compelling her attorney to disclose to the People the names, addresses and expected testimony of the witnesses she intended to call at trial. She contended enforcement of the order would violate, inter alia, her privilege against self-incrimination. The People responded that the order was proper under this court’s decisions in Jones v. Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.2d 56 and People v. Pike (1969) 71 Cal.2d 595 [78 Cal.Rptr. 672, 455 P.2d 776],
In Jones a defendant charged with rape successfully moved for a continuance on the ground that he would present a defense of impotence and wished to marshal supporting evidence. The court then granted the People’s motion for discovery of the names and addresses of all medical witnesses who would testify for the defendant and of all doctors who had treated the defendant prior to trial, the reports of these doctors bearing on his claim of impotence, and the X-rays of the injuries alleged to have caused his impotency. The Fifth Amendment not yet having been made applicable to the states by Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct. 1489], the defendant’s constitutional attack on the discovery order was based on the privilege against self-incrimination set forth in article I, section 13 (now § 15) of the California Constitution. The discovery order was upheld to the extent that it required the defendant to disclose the names and addresses of the witnesses he intended to call, and the medical reports and X-rays he intended to introduce, in support of his defense of impotence. The order compelling the defendant to *535disclose this information did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination, this court reasoned, because “[i]t simply requires petitioner to disclose information that he will shortly reveal anyway” at trial. (58 Cal.2d at p. 62.)
The “intent to disclose at trial” rationale articulated in Jones later led this court to approve a pretrial discovery order which was unrelated to any particular affirmative defense such as impotence or alibi and which required disclosure of the identities and expected testimony of all defense witnesses—the same information sought in Prudhomme. (People v. Pike (1969) 71 Cal.2d 595, 605 [78 Cal.Rptr. 672, 455 P.2d 776].)1
Why then did this court in Prudhomme restrain enforcement of the same sort of discovery order it had approved in Pike less than a year before? The answer is that this court, incorrectly, as it turned out, read “certain significant developments in the law since Jones” as indicating that discovery orders of the sort involved in Pike and Prudhomme were violative of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Prudhomme v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 323-325.)
Four “significant developments in the law,” all of them federal, were given as grounds for this court’s change of heart. First, “[t]he privilege [against self-incrimination] is now an element of due process protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, and federal standards goverti in state proceedings (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct. 1489]).” Second, the United States Supreme Court, by promulgating rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1966 under its rule-making power, provided for limited prosecution discovery of physical evidence, but did not see fit to authorize disclosure *536of the names, addresses or expected testimony of defense witnesses. Third, “recent cases in the area of criminal discovery demonstrate increased concern that an accused’s Fifth Amendment rights be not overlooked,” the one case cited being Cantillon v. Superior Court (C.D. Cal. 1969) 305 F.Supp. 304 in which the federal district court granted habeas corpus to annul a discovery order for the names of alibi witnesses the defendant intended to call at trial. Fourth, “the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Williams v. Florida (Fla. App.) 224 So.2d 406, which had upheld Florida’s alibi statute against the claim that it violated the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights.” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 323-325.)
Taking these factors in reverse order: to this court’s evident surprise, Florida’s notice-of-alibi rule was upheld. (Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 90 S.Ct. 1893].) Noting the then unbroken line of decisions upholding notice-of-alibi procedures (id. at p. 83 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 450-451]), and stressing the petitioner’s concession that there would be no constitutional bar to the prosecution’s being granted a continuance following the unanticipated presentation of alibi evidence, which continuance would allow the prosecution to seek out evidence in rebuttal to the alibi evidence presented (id. at pp. 85-86 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 452-453]), the high court concluded that the state could constitutionally avoid the necessity of such disruption by requiring pretrial disclosure of an alibi defense and the identities of alibi witnesses. Noting that the majority cited Jones, in addition to notice-of-alibi cases, Justice Black in dissent charged that the court had “adopt[ed] in its entirety” the “theory” of Jones. (Id. at p. 114 [26 L.Ed.2d at p. 484].)
Following the high court’s decision in Williams, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded Cantillon to the district court in light of that case. (Cantillon v. Superior Court (9th Cir. 1971) 442 F.2d 1338.)
Then, in 1975, rule 12.1, a notice-of-alibi provision, was added to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Prudhomme’s remaining ground—that “[t]he privilege [against self-incrimination] is now an element of due process protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, and federal standards govern in state proceedings”—can now be seen to require overruling that decision. (See Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714, 719 [43 L.Ed.2d 570, 575, 95 S.Ct. 1215].)
*537In case after case, the majority of this court, disappointed by what they perceive to be the increasing conservatism of the United States Supreme. Court, have shifted ground from the federal to the California Constitution. (See People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 553-558 [119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099] (Burke, J., dissenting); People v. Norman (1975) 14 Cal.3d 929, 940-942 [123 Cal.Rptr. 109, 538 P.2d 237] (Clark, J., dissenting); People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 952 [123 Cal.Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753] (Clark, J., dissenting); People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 117, 118-121 [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272] (Richardson, J., dissenting); People v. Maher (1976) 17 Cal.3d 196, 204-205 [130 Cal.Rptr. 508, 550 P.2d 1044] (Clark, J., dissenting); see also Gee v. Brown (1975) 14 Cal.3d 571, 576-577 [122 Cal.Rptr. 231, 536 P.2d 1017] (Clark, J., dissenting); United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 902, 914-915 [122 Cal.Rptr. 877, 537 P.2d 1237] (Richardson, J., concurring); People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 277-281 [127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333] (Clark, J., dissenting).) Previously, this court, like other state courts, rarely considered the state Constitution when a case could be decided under a parallel provision of the federal Constitution. Therefore, the majority have been able to write their “new states’ rights”2 decisions on a relatively clean slate. If their interpretations of the California Constitution find no support in our cases, neither are they contradicted by them. However, in Jones, because the Fifth Amendment had not yet been held applicable to the states, the propriety of prosecution discovery was considered under the parallel provision of the California Constitution. (58 Cal.2d at p. 60.) By reaffirming Prudhomme in the face of not only Williams, but also Jones, the majority reveal that their “solicitude” for the privilege against self-incrimination is based on personal conviction, not constitutional principle.
I would deny the writ.
McComb, J., concurred.

The Prudhomme court found neither Jones nor Pike “directly controlling.” “Jones did not state that a defendant-could be required to disclose the names and addresses of all defense "witnesses, without regard to the subject matter and possible incriminatory nature of their testimony; nor did Jones involve an order seeking disclosure of the ‘expected testimony’ of defense witnesses. Pike, in finding no prejudicial error in the discovery order involved therein, did not purport to extend permissible discovery beyond the limits previously established in Jones, upon which Pike exclusively relied.” (2 Cal.3d at p. 323.)
The query in Pike was stated in terms of prejudiciál error. “Was it prejudicial error to require defense counsel to supply names and addresses and expected testimony of defense witnesses?” (71 Cal.2d at p. 605.) However, distinguishing Pike on the ground that it found no prejudicial error in the order involved therein appears to imply that the order was found to be harmlessly erroneous or, at least, that that question was left open. The contrary appears to be the case. The court stated, without qualification, “Disclosing this information does not interfere with the defendant’s right to privacy, freedom from self-incrimination, or the lawyer-client relationship.” (Id.)

Mosk, The New States’ Rights (1976) 10 J.Cal.L. Enforcement 81.