Court Opinion

ID: 9471183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:26:28.023945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:18.074277
License: Public Domain

CUMMINGS, Chief Judge.
Kraft, Inc. (“Kraft”) appeals from a district court decision and order granting to Henri’s Food Products Co., Inc. (“Henri’s”) a declaratory judgment that its trademark Yogowhip used on spoonable salad dressing does not infringe Kraft’s registered trademark Miracle Whip or the word Whip, and denying Kraft’s trademark infringement counterclaim. The district court also denied Kraft’s counterclaim for injunctive relief against the mislabeling by Henri’s of a yogurt product as salad dressing, and refused to declare void and order cancellation of Henri’s trademark application for registration of a yogurt product as salad dressing.
In 1933 Kraft began marketing Miraole Whip Salad Dressing, a spoonable dressing. In the same year, Kraft was granted United States Trademark Registration 308,260 for the trademark Miraole Whip for salad dressing. In that application for registra*354tion, and in several later filings Kraft disclaimed any rights in the word Whip alone apart from the composite mark Miraole Whip as shown. The trademark Miraole Whip is incontestable under 15 U.S.C. § 1065. Not until 1978, after the commencement of this action, did Kraft use the word Whip alone on salad dressing.
Kraft began using “Miracle Whip” in the early 1930’s in connection with a new machine and method for the continuous production of mayonnaise. The machine was referred to as the Miracle Whip Machine, which performed “miracles in mayonnaise blending” (App. 3). In 1933 Kraft introduced Miracle Whip Salad Dressing, created in its Miracle Whip Machine. Advertisements indicated that Miraole Whip Salad Dressing was creamy, silky smooth and fluffy light.
In 1973 and 1974 Henri’s developed a successful line of pourable dressings made with yogurt. In 1976 Henri’s decided to enter the spoonable salad dressing and the mayonnaise markets with two new products made with yogurt: YOGONAISE and YOGO-WHIP. These products are sold primarily in the midwest. Henri’s attempted to sell its Yogowhip and Yogonaise products with the same marketing approach used for its pourable dressings made with yogurt: the yogurt dressings taste good but are lower in fat than the leading competitors in the marketplace. Since 1958 Henri’s has had a registered trademark for the logo, referred to as the “Frenchman,” which has been used or affixed in labeling and advertising for Henri’s Yogowhip product. Since 1968 Henri’s has had a registered trademark for the word “Henri’s” which has also been used or affixed in labeling and advertising for Henri’s Yogowhip product. In July of 1976 Henri’s filed an application to register Yogowhip for salad dressing; that application has been stayed pending resolution of this case. In August 1981, just before trial, Henri’s filed an application to register Yo-gowhip as a reduced calorie dressing for salads.
The central issue in this appeal is whether Henri’s Yogowhip infringes on Kraft’s Miracle Whip trademark. The test for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), is “likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake on the part of the consuming public.” James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir.1976). The key question therefore is whether it is likely that the consuming public will be confused into believing that Henri’s Yogowhip comes from the same source as Miracle Whip Salad Dressing. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381 (7th Cir.1976), certiorari denied, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 91, 50 L.Ed.2d 94. After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding no likelihood of confusion.

Infringement

In determining whether likelihood of confusion exists, this Circuit considers such factors as distinctiveness of the trademark in issue, similarity of the marks, similarity of the products, similarity in the channels of distribution, identity of advertising media utilized, the intent of the alleged infringer, and evidence of actual confusion. Union Carbide, supra, 531 F.2d at 381-382. The district court’s findings as to likelihood of confusion are findings of fact, and are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 857 (7th Cir.1982), though to the extent the determination is predicated on the similarity of the marks themselves, this Court is in as good a position as the trial judge to determine likelihood of confusion. Union Carbide, supra, 531 F.2d at 383. Kraft argues, and Henri’s does not really dispute, that several of the above factors weigh on the infringement side of the balance. The district court found, and Kraft emphasizes, that Miracle Whip is an “extremely strong trademark” (App. 14). Both Miraole Whip and Yogowhip are sold through the same channels of distribution and are found in the same section of the supermarket. The products are advertised in the same media. The products themselves are similar in that both are spoonable salad dressings, though *355Yogowhip contains yogurt and is a low fat dressing. On the more important factors— similarity of the marks, evidence of confusion, and intent of the alleged infringer— Kraft and Henri’s part company.
A. Similarity of the marks
An examination of MiRacle Whip and Yogowhip for similarity of “sound, sight and meaning,” Plough, Inc. v. Kreis Laboratories, 314 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir.1963); 1 J. Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice § 5.02 (1979), reveals the following: Miracle Whip is two words and each word appears on a separate line. Yogowhip is one word and naturally appears on the same line. This distinction was given weight by the court in Plough, supra, 314 F.2d at 638, in comparing Coca Tan and Coca Tint to Coppertone. Miracle Whip has four syllables and Yogowhip has only three. The word Miracle is fanciful, revealing nothing about the product. The prefix Yogo on the other hand is descriptive, indicating a yogurt product. Miracle Whip and Yogowhip have the final syllable, Whip, in common, though as noted above it stands as a separate word in Miracle Whip.
Looking at the marks as a whole, Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea and Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293, 1295 (Cust. & Pat.App.1974), we agree with the district court that the differences outweigh the similarities. This is not to say that two trademarks having a final syllable in common can never be sufficiently similar to lead to a likelihood of confusion (Kraft Br. 29). To the contrary, this Circuit in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 265 F.2d 385, 387 (1959), held that Bonamine infringed Dramamine. In comparing the marks, the Court found that they
contain the same number of syllables; they have the same stress pattern, with primary accent on the first syllable and secondary accent on the third; the last two syllables of Dramamine and Bona-mine are identical. The initial sounds of Dramamine and Bonamine (“d” and “b”) are both what are known as “voiced plosives” and are acoustically similar; the consonants “m” and “n” are nasal sounds and are acoustically similar.
See also id. at 388-389 and cases cited therein. However, the Court also noted that reference to decisions as to other trademarks is not of great help because each case is dependent on its own facts, id. at 389. A comparison of the marks in this ease shows far less similarity than in G.D. Searle, supra. The marks must be so similar that it is likely or probable, not just possible, that consumers, when presented with the marks singly, rather than side-by-side, would confuse Henri’s Yogowhip with the source of Miracle Whip. See James Burrough, supra, 540 F.2d at 275. Based on our examination of the marks, we think that a purchaser, even a supermarket shopper who will make a selection quickly and without careful examination, is likely to differentiate between the products.
This finding is further supported by the differences in the products’ labels. Despite Kraft’s objection to the district court’s analysis of the labels (Br. 32-34), there is authority for the proposition that a comparison of the labels rather than simply the trademarks is appropriate. See McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133 (2d Cir.1979); Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Sunaid Food Prods., Inc., 356 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir.1966); John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 314, 317 (7th Cir.1961); Ye Olde Tavern Cheese Prods., Inc. v. Planters Peanuts Div., 261 F.Supp. 200, 206 (N.D.Ill.1966), affirmed, 394 F.2d 833 (7th Cir.1967). When a prospective purchaser goes to the supermarket to buy salad dressing, it is the label that the purchaser sees. Sun-Maid, supra, 356 F.2d at 469. Kraft is of course correct in stating that in various fact situations the presence of a newcomer’s housemark may enhance rather than lessen the likelihood of confusion. See W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir.1970); A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir.1972). Yet even Kraft agrees that a prominent housemark may also tend to lessen confusion. (Br.33). Here, though the “Henri’s” trademark is in smaller type than the word Yogowhip, it *356appears in thick, bold, black print under the “Frenchman” trademark on the Yogowhip label. In addition, the district court found the Yogowhip label distinct from the Miracle Whip label because of the green colored border, as opposed to the blue, scalloped Miraole Whip border, and the addition on the Yogowhip label of the phrases “made with non-fat yogurt” and “70% fat free” (App. 14). While a comparison of labels is not conclusive, the district court did not err in considering them, and the differences between the marks and the labels are factors weighing against infringement.
Kraft argues that the district court erroneously dissected the marks when comparing them and unjustifiably found the word Miracle to be the dominant portion of the trademark Miracle Whip. However, this Circuit has recognized the rule that if one word or feature of a composite trademark is the salient portion of the mark, it may be given greater weight than the surrounding elements. Union Carbide, supra, 531 F.2d at 383; Independent Nail & Packing Co., Inc. v. Stronghold Screw Prods., Inc., 205 F.2d 921, 924 (7th Cir.1953). See also 1 J. Gilson, supra, § 5.03. When one portion of a composite mark is a descriptive or generic word, that feature of the mark may be of less significance in designating a source of origin. See American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir.1970) (Tan Life does not infringe Fashion Tan or After Tan); Fleetwood Co. v. Hazel Bishop, Inc., 352 F.2d 841, 844 (7th Cir.1965) (Tintstik does not infringe Tintz Stick). The district court held that Whip was a merely descriptive term that had not achieved secondary meaning as a source indicator (App. 8-13), and apparently relied on that holding to conclude that Miracle was the dominant or salient portion of the mark (App. 14-15). Kraft essentially objects to the characterization of Whip as the weak portion of the mark in the face of evidence of secondary meaning.
It is not necessary to decide whether the district court was clearly erroneous in its finding of no secondary meaning because this Court has itself re-examined the trademarks de novo to determine the extent of similarity.1 A finding of secondary meaning in the word Whip would have no impact on our comparison of the marks, regardless of whether or not it infected the district court’s comparison. After comparing the trademarks and the labels, we conclude that their dissimilarity must be counted as weighing against infringement.
B. Evidence of confusion
Kraft presented no evidence of actual confusion. Kraft did, however, rely on surveys taken by Henri’s to show likelihood of confusion. Henri’s through its counsel commissioned Market Facts, Inc. to conduct two confusion surveys and two secondary meaning surveys. The first confusion survey, the Bendikas survey, was conducted for Henri’s attorneys in order to help plan the overall strategy for the case. Mr. Bendikas testified that the preliminary survey was designed to be biased in favor of Kraft (Tr. 1242-1245), and Kraft’s survey expert agreed that the first survey was biased against Henri’s (Tr. 1261). The survey was biased in the following way: respondents were asked inter alia
3. When thinking about food products, what does the word “whip” mean to you? Miracle Whip 13%
4. What kinds of food products do you think of in connection with the word “whip?” Miracle Whip 16%
5. When thinking about mayonnaise-type spoonable salad dressings, what does the word “whip” mean to you? Miracle Whip 38%
Prior to asking the sixth question on the Bendikas survey, respondents were shown a jar with a label identifying Henri’s Yogowhip for about five seconds and asked “who *357do you believe makes this product?” According to Mr. Bendikas (Tr. 1248), if he had “wanted to measure the confusion purely, [Question Six] should not be preceded by a sequence of questions that would give the respondent a chance to take the exam over and over again up to that point.” The only way to elicit objective responses to Question Six “would be not to contaminate the respondent’s mind or witness to give answers by preceding questions” (Tr. 1245). Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Insur. Co., 246 F.2d 161, 171-172 (5th Cir.1957). Despite this bias toward Kraft, only 11% of the respondents answered Kraft or Miracle Whip to Question Six.
The second confusion survey, the Hardin survey, was conducted in 1980 by face-to-face interviews with 1,068 female respondents at shopping malls in Milwaukee, Minneapolis and Grand Rapids. These areas were chosen because both Kraft’s Miracle Whip Salad Dressing and Henri’s Yogowhip have been sold in these markets. Respondents were shown a jar of Henri’s Yogow-hip and asked, “Who puts out this product?” 72.4% of the respondents identified Henri’s as the company that puts out the Yogowhip product. 18.3% said they did not know who puts out the product. 7% thought that Kraft, Miracle Whip or Kraft Miracle Whip put out the product. The remaining 2.3% named other brands, including Hellman’s. The 93% of the respondents who did not answer Kraft or Miracle Whip to the first question were then asked, “What other products, if any, are put out by the company that puts out this product?” An additional .6% of the respondents named Miracle Whip as such a product. Thus 7.6% of the respondents believed that Henri’s Yo-gowhip was produced by Kraft or the same company that produced Miracle Whip Salad Dressing.
Henri’s introduced the Hardin survey to show that there was no likelihood of confusion; Kraft introduced the Bendikas survey to show that there was likelihood of confusion. Kraft also caused its own survey to be done, but did not introduce it into evidence. The district court did not mention the Bendikas survey, evidently giving it no weight, but concluded that the Hardin survey supported a finding that the trademark Yogowhip does not cause confusion in consumers’ minds.
After reviewing the survey evidence, we conclude that the district court was correct in discrediting the Bendikas survey. The undisputed testimony indicates that the preliminary survey was biased against Henri’s and in favor of Kraft on the question of likelihood of confusion. On the other hand, we do not think the district court erred in giving some weight to the Hardin survey, as corroborating the finding of no confusion. Kraft points to several flaws in the survey which caution against giving it too much weight; we cannot conclude, however, that the survey should be ignored.
Kraft’s expert criticized the survey because the sites selected for interviews contained supermarkets in which Henri’s products were visible to the shopper before the interview. He also criticized as unrealistic the fact that respondents were shown the Henri’s Yogowhip jar for five seconds, testifying that the average person would take less time to purchase a product off the supermarket shelf (Tr. 1261-1263). Kraft argues that the survey should have been conducted using a ,jar bearing 'the word Yogowhip alone, rather than an actual jar reading “Henri’s Yogowhip.” Finally, Kraft claims that the question: “Who puts out this product?” is misleading because respondents who answered “Henri’s” could have been referring to Henri’s as a licensee of Kraft.
These criticisms are certainly not without merit. However, Kraft had the opportunity to conduct and introduce its own survey to remedy the timing and site selection inadequacies, but chose not to do so. With respect to the survey question, this Court in Union Carbide, supra, 531 F.2d at 385-386, found the trial court clearly erred by not crediting a survey posing similar questions: “Who do you think puts out the lamp shown here?” and “Please name any other products put out by the same concern which puts out the lamp shown here.” Although
*358this phraseology may not be the best way to ask the question, it does not mandate rejection of the survey. Neither does the fact that respondents were shown a jar marked “Henri’s Yogowhip.” In McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Weed Eater, Inc., 208 U.S. P.Q. 676, 684-685 (T.T.A.B.1981), relied on by Kraft, the introduction of features other than the marks was just one of a long line of factors the Board noted when it concluded that the survey was of no use.
In interpreting the survey, the district court correctly discounted the “don’t knows” and found that only 7.6% of those interviewed confused the source of Yogowhip with the source of Miraole Whip. In Union Carbide, supra, 531 F.2d at 387-388, this Court counted those who did not know who put out the product shown, but who named other products put out by the same concern in response to a later question. The Court held that it was not necessary to name “Union Carbide” to indicate likelihood of confusion; associating the products with a single though anonymous source was sufficient. The survey in this case allowed not only the “don’t knows” but all respondents who did not answer Kraft or Miracle Whip to the first question an opportunity to indicate association with a single anonymous source by asking them to name other products put out by the same company that puts out Yogowhip. In fact, an additional .6% named Miracle Whip.2
The remaining question is whether the district court was correct in holding that a 7.6% confusion finding weighs against infringement. We hold that it was. Kraft has pointed to no case in which a 7.6% figure constituted likelihood of confusion. See James Burrough, supra, 540 F.2d at 279 n. 23 (referring to a prior case showing 11%); Union Carbide, supra, 531 F.2d at 386 (referring to a prior case showing 11.4%); McDonough, supra, 208 U.S.P.Q. at 685 (11%); Jockey Internat’l, Inc. v. Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q. 201, 205 (S.D.Cal.1975) (11.4%). In Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F.Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y.1973), affirmed, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir.1975), the court held as strong evidence of likelihood of confusion a survey showing that 8.5% of the people interviewed confused the names Steinway and Grotrian-Steinweg, and 7.7% perceived a business connection between the two companies; it is not clear whether or not the figures were combined. In James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc. (Beefeater II), 572 F.2d 574, 578 (7th Cir.1978), this Court credited a survey showing that 10% of the respondents confronted with a Sign of the Beefeater restaurant sign mentioned that liquor came to mind; only 6% mentioned Beefeater specifically as a liquor that came to mind (Kraft Reply Br. B-14). Again, it is not clear which figures the Court deemed sufficient to evidence likelihood of confusion. In contrast, Henri’s points to Wuv’s Internat’l, Inc. v. Love’s Enterprises, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. 736, 756 (D.Colo.1980), where the court found 9% to be a “questionable amount of confusion” and in combination with other factors found no infringement; and S.S. Kresge Co. v. United Factory Outlet, Inc., 598 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir.1979), where the court found it unconvincing that 7.2% of the respondents believed that “The Mart” and “K-Mart” were owned by the same people, though the 7.2% figure was discredited because 5.7% of the respondents *359reached the same conclusion with respect to “The Mart” and “Kings Department Store.”
Despite the survey’s flaws, we conclude that the district court did not err in considering it, and the court correctly found that the 7.6% finding is a factor weighing against infringement.
C. Intent
A finding of fraudulent intent or bad faith is not essential to prove infringement where likelihood of confusion already exists. Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 613 (7th Cir.1965). One can readily infer likelihood of confusion, however, when there is proof of intentional copying because then “the adoption itself indicates that defendants expected that likelihood to their profit.” Id. See also Processed Plastic, supra, 675 F.2d at 857; American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 563 (2d Cir.1953). Kraft argues that the evidence presented at trial supports a finding of intentional copying.
The district court found that while there was “an intent to compete” on the part of Henri’s, there was no intentional and deliberate copying of the Miracle Whip mark, no intent “to compete by misleading the consuming public” (App. 16). For various characterizations of the intentional copying standard, see McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:33 (1973) (“intent to get a free ride”); Tisch Hotels, supra, 350 F.2d at 613 (adoption of the senior user’s name “deliberately with a view to obtaining some advantage from [the senior user’s] investments in promotion and advertising”); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 157 (9th Cir.1963) (adoption with the purpose of “capitalizing] upon the popularity of the name chosen”), certiorari denied, 374 U.S. 830, 83 S.Ct. 1870, 10 L.Ed.2d 1053. The evidence indicates that Les O’Rourke, Executive Vice President of Henri’s, selected the names Yogonaise and Yogowhip. At the time he chose the name Yogowhip, he was aware of the leading position of Miracle Whip on the market; he also chose the name long before production began with no specific idea how the product would be made. O’Rourke testified, however, that he chose the name because he thought it would describe the product: Yogo for yogurt, and “salad dressing is a whipped dressing” (Tr. 855). He further testified that he had always heard spoonable salad dressings referred to as whipped products, and that was why he chose the word “whip.” Despite Kraft’s characterization of this rationale as implausible (Br. 42), the district court evidently credited it. Kraft also points to Henri’s desire to put its Yogowhip product next to Kraft’s Miracle Whip product on the supermarket shelf as evidence of an intent to get a “free ride.” There was testimony, however, indicating that it is common practice in the food industry for a company to desire placement near the leading brand (Tr. 971). Finally, Henri’s distinguished Yogowhip by advertising it as an alternative to the high fat products in the marketplace: it contains yogurt, is low in fat, and tastes good (Tr. 857, 913-914). Henri’s also took special care to design a label that did not resemble Kraft’s (Tr. 856-857; 886-888).
On this record we cannot hold the district court clearly erroneous in its finding against Kraft on the issue of intentional copying. Though, as noted above, a finding of wrongful intent is not necessary to an ultimate finding of infringement, our evaluation of the record does mean that wrongful intent should not be counted as a factor in favor of infringement in this case.
Finally, Kraft asks this Court to consider that it has been the exclusive user of the term Whip in the midwest for almost fifty years. In its rejection of secondary meaning, the district court explained the fact of exclusivity by inferring that most users “got scared” when Kraft made moves to stop their use of Whip (App. 12). This record indicates that, for whatever reasons, the word Whip has not been in use, though derivatives of the word do appear. Even taking exclusivity of use into account, however, we think the scales dip against infringement. The marks are not confusingly *360similar; the survey evidence supports a finding of no likelihood of confusion and there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of intentional copying. The district court was therefore not clearly erroneous in finding no likelihood of confusion.
This holding does not necessarily conflict with the holdings of other courts that have considered similar challenges. In Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp. v. Goldfarb, 7 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.Cal.1934), the court held Wonder Whip infringed Miracle Whip, and in Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp. v. R.E. Robertson, Inc., 9 F.Supp. 125 (E.D.Mich.1934), the court held Wonder Mix infringed Miracle Whip; both marks bore greater similarity to Miracle Whip than the mark in this case because of the similarity in meaning of the words Wonder and Miracle. In Kraft Cheese Co. v. Leston Co., 43 F.Supp. 782, 783 (E.D.Mo.1941), the court held that Kraft was entitled to the exclusive use of both Miracle Whip and Whip, and that Leston’s Salad Whip infringed Kraft’s rights. The court in that case was either presented with more convincing evidence than the district court in this case; or what is more likely, based on the transcript of that court’s remarks at the close of the case (included in the record by Kraft), is that after finding that Whip had acquired secondary meaning, the court found likelihood of confusion as a matter of law, without requiring evidence to prove that the use of the word Whip in Leston’s Salad Whip would generate source confusion with Miracle Whip. In this case it is plain that Yogowhip does not generate source confusion with Miraole Whip regardless of whether Whip has secondary meaning. See Union Carbide, supra, 531 F.2d at 381; National Football League v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, 532 F.Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash.1982). The Leston case is not the final word on the subject; in National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Parman-Kendall Corp., 122 U.S.P.Q. 332 (T.T.A.B.1959), a trademark was successfully obtained for Avo-Whip salad dressing over Kraft’s opposition. According to an official of Parman-Kendall, the company “got scared” and signed a consent decree before the case was litigated (App. 12). On the facts of this case, and the law as applied in this Circuit, we affirm the district court’s finding of no infringement.

Mislabeling and Fraud

The district court refused to enjoin Henri’s from making certain representations on the labels of its yogurt products. Among other things, Kraft objects to Henri’s representation that Yogowhip is a salad dressing despite the fact that, according to Kraft, the Federal Standard of Identity for salad dressing does not permit yogurt as an ingredient, 21 C.F.R. §§ 130.8(a), 169.150. Because “the alleged improprieties have stopped,” the district court saw no need to either “evaluate the practices,” or “in the exercise of discretion,” enter an injunction (App. 23). Kraft has not convinced us that this refusal was an abuse of discretion.
In addition, Kraft argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to declare void and order cancellation of Henri’s July 7, 1976 trademark application for federal registration of Yogowhip as salad dressing. That application has been stayed pending resolution of this case. In August of 1981 Henri’s filed another application to register Yogowhip as a reduced calorie dressing, for which there is no Standard of Identity, and in which yogurt is therefore a permitted ingredient. Kraft has shown no irreparable injury from Henri’s July 7 filing of the trademark application that would necessitate an injunction; if the application is for some reason granted despite the presence of yogurt in the product, Kraft can object to it at that time.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

. It is also not necessary to review the district court’s finding that Whip is a descriptive word. Regardless of whether it is generic (as argued by Henri’s), descriptive (as found by the district court), or suggestive (as argued by Kraft), there is insufficient evidence of likelihood of confusion between Yogowhip and Miracle Whip or Whip to constitute infringement, see infra.

. In Union Carbide, supra, 531 F.2d at 387, the Court counted those respondents who first said that they did not know who put out the product shown, which was an Ever-Ready lamp or mini-bulb, but who named “batteries or flashlights” when asked to name other products put out by the same concern that put out the lamp or mini-bulb. Because both Union Carbide and the alleged infringer Ever-Ready Inc. put out flashlights, those respondents who answered “flashlights” alone, rather than “batteries and/or flashlights” should not have been counted as confused; such a response does not indicate that the interviewee has associated the producer of the lamp or mini-bulb with a “single anonymous source” such as Union Carbide, because both Union Carbide and Ever-Ready make flashlights. It is not clear from the Court’s opinion whether or to what extent the Court relied on the answer “flashlights” alone. Because both Henri’s and Kraft make salad dressing, those who named salad dressing as another product put out by the company that puts out Yogowhip cannot be counted as associating Yogowhip with a single, anonymous source, i.e., Kraft.