Court Opinion

ID: 9852088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:24:08.70751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:21.805523
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTIN
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by granting a noninterference order pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-303. The instant case presents issues of first impression, implicates federal and state constitutional rights, and raises matters of vital importance to the public. To provide guidance when noninterference orders are sought under section 7B-303, I respectfully concur by separate opinion.
The questions presented by the respondent-appellants are:
I. In a case brought pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-303, must the government prove that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has abused or neglected a child?
II. Does the investigation mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-302 and implemented by N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10 § 411.0305 constitute a “search” for constitutional purposes, as Judge Greene argues in his dissent?
III. Is the court-ordered separation of a parent and child for the purpose of unrestricted personal interrogation of the child a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
The parties, petitioner Cleveland County Department of Social Services and respondents James and Mary Ann Stumbo, have thoroughly briefed and argued these legal questions. Amicus curiae briefs *290addressing the important constitutional questions raised by the instant case have been filed by the American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Inc., the National Association of Social Workers and its North Carolina Chapter, and the State of North Carolina.
I.
It is beyond question that we will consider a constitutional question when “strong considerations of public necessity appear.” M. H. Rhodes, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 630, 9 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1940). The procedures for investigating child abuse allegations in North Carolina are a matter of critical public interest. According to the State, DSS received 102,158 reports of alleged abuse, neglect, and dependency during 2001. It is a matter of immense public importance that DSS be able to fulfill its vital mission while simultaneously ensuring that statutory procedures for DSS investigations comport with the Constitution. This case also presents a legal question of first impression — a definitive pronouncement by this Court would provide clarification for child protection workers and for citizens who interact with government actors executing routine investigatory protocols.
In its opinion, the majority analyzes the term “neglect” as used in N.C.G.S. § 7B-302. In my view, the cases cited by the majority, where a court found neglect after a comprehensive investigation, do not provide adequate guidance as to what does and does not “trigger” the investigative requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-302. Indeed, it is not desirable, or perhaps even possible, to attempt a comprehensive identification of the various scenarios that might warrant an initial investigation. Child abuse can be difficult to detect, and DSS faces an infinite variety of circumstances when forming a preliminary assessment as to whether a report of abuse may ultimately be substantiated. The application of DSS’ expertise and discretion is therefore crucial in the initial stages of investigation.
Perhaps most important, this case implicates well-established and closely guarded constitutional rights. See Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992) (stating that the judiciary’s “obligation to protect the fundamental rights of individuals is as old as the State”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985, 121 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1992). The majority’s analysis delays needed resolution of the constitutional questions briefed and argued by the parties. See Rice v. Rigsby, 259 N.C. 506, 511-12, 131 S.E.2d 469, 472-73 (1963) *291(addressing a constitutional issue of “vast public importance,” despite procedural default, where the parties had fully briefed and argued the issue). Put simply, the question of whether the State may lawfully enter a private residence as part of an investigatory protocol in the absence of any fact-specific justification is left unanswered.
As recognized by the majority, the Juvenile Code mandates that directors of county departments of social services “make a prompt and thorough investigation” when a report of child abuse, neglect, or dependency is received. N.C.G.S. § 7B-302(a) (2001). The purpose of the investigation is “to ascertain the facts of the case, the extent of the abuse or neglect, and the risk of harm to the juvenile, in order to determine whether protective services should be provided or the complaint filed as a petition.” Id. The statute further provides that “the investigation and evaluation shall include a visit to the place where the juvenile resides.” Id.
The North Carolina Administrative Code sets out the procedures for directors to follow in carrying out the mandate of chapter 7B of the General Statutes. 10 NCAC 411.0101 (June 2002). Once prompted by a report of neglect, abuse, or dependency, directors “shall make a thorough investigation to assess . . . whether the specific environment in which the child or children is found meets the child’s or children’s need for care and protection.” 10 NCAC 411 .0305(a)(1) (June 2002).
When conducting the evaluation required by section 7B-302 and the corresponding administrative regulations, no person is to obstruct or interfere with a director’s “personal access to the juvenile” or refuse to allow a director to “observe or interview the juvenile in private.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(b) (2001). To ensure that directors are provided access to conduct the investigation, they may seek a “noninterference order.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(a). In the absence of a “lawful excuse,... the court may order the respondent to cease such obstruction or interference.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(c).
The noninterference order envisioned by section 7B-303 is enforceable by civil or criminal contempt. N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(f). Thus, once such an order has been issued, a caregiver is faced with two options: (1) she can consent to the requests of the director, or (2) she can assert her constitutional right to freedom from impermissible searches and seizures as a “lawful excuse” for noncompliance and risk contempt of court. Such a statutory scheme necessarily implicates the Fourth Amendment to the United States *292Constitution and the parallel guarantees of Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution.
The Juvenile Code, chapter 7B of the General Statutes, appears to recognize the important constitutional issues at stake in emergency child protection situations, yet includes no textual provision to ensure compliance with constitutional guarantees in non-emergency or routine investigatory situations. According to N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(d), there must be “probable cause to believe .. . the juvenile is at risk of immediate harm” for issuance of an ex parte emergency order. As recognized by Judge Greene in his dissenting opinion at the Court of Appeals, this provision was “an obvious recognition by our Legislature of the need to protect the privacy interest of the person to be investigated in the face of a report of abuse/neglect of a child.” Stumbo, 143 N.C. App. at 386 n.5, 547 S.E.2d at 458 n.5 (Greene, J., dissenting). If the government must show probable cause as a prerequisite to removal of a child in an emergency, it would seem imperative for this Court to consider the constitutional standard applicable to home entry and nonconsensual interviews during non-emergency investigatory protocols conducted by the government.
It is important to resolve this issue in light of the statutory obligation of directors to “make an immediate oral and subsequent written report” of their findings of abuse or neglect to the district attorney and the “appropriate local law enforcement agency.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-307(a) (2001). Significantly, the district attorney, after receipt of this report, is required to initiate a criminal investigation and determine whether criminal prosecution of the parent or other caregiver is appropriate. Id. In light of these considerations, this Court should determine whether our child protection statutes may be construed in a constitutional manner. See In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642, 231 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1977) (discussing a court’s duty to construe a statute in a constitutional manner, if possible).
Thus, the central issue in this case is whether, when conducting a routine, non-emergency investigation, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution allow a director to secure a noninterference order without particularized allegations of abuse or neglect supported by corroborative evidence.
At the outset, it should be noted that the Juvenile Code places the burden of proof on the government, the party seeking the noninterference order. N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(c). Moreover, the trial court is *293required to utilize a heightened burden of proof for such proceedings. The trial court must find by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent, without lawful excuse, has obstructed or interfered with an investigation required by G.S. § 7B-302.” Id. (emphasis added).
Against this backdrop, the petition in the present case alleged only that DSS “received a report alleging neglect of the above named children.” The petition did not mention the nature of the actual allegations that were reported. As noted by the majority, the trial court did not allow evidence regarding the relevant circumstances and events surrounding the reported allegation. Instead, the trial court determined that such evidence did not relate to whether the Stumbos had a “lawful excuse” for refusing to cooperate with the investigation and that the purpose of the hearing was to determine only whether there was any interference in the investigation regardless of (1) whether the initiation of the investigation was justified, or (2) whether any of the Stumbos’ constitutional rights were implicated by the government’s investigatory protocol.
II.
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....” U.S. Const, amend. IV. This right is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and has “been applied to the conduct of government officials in various civil activities.” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714, 721 (1987) (plurality opinion). A similar right is afforded by the North Carolina Constitution: “General warrants, whereby any officer or other person may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and shall not be granted.” N.C. Const, art. I, § 20. “[A] governmental search and seizure of private property unaccompanied by prior judicial approval in the form of a warrant is per se unreasonable unless the search falls within a well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement involving exigent circumstances.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 135, 291 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1982). We have called this tenet a “ ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law.’ ” State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 798, 488 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1997) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 651 (1980)). Of the many privileges of living in a free society, few are val*294ued more than the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable warrantless searches in one’s private residence.
I pause to observe that the trial court apparently concluded DSS was not a government actor for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. This is legally incorrect. The United States Supreme Court has “never limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures as restraints imposed upon ‘governmental action’ — that is, ‘upon the activities of sovereign authority.’ ” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 730 (1985) (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 65 L. Ed. 1048, 1051 (1921)) (emphasis added). Federal courts which have considered this question arising under the United States Constitution have concluded, either explicitly or implicitly, that constitutional limitations apply to government officials who investigate child abuse. See Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 n.14 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098, 146 L. Ed. 2d 776 (2000); Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1999); Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 788-90 (10th Cir. 1993); Wildauer v. Frederick Cty., 993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993); Good v. Dauphin Cty. Social Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092-97 (3d Cir. 1989); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 919-20 (2d Cir. 1987); White v. Pierce Cty., 797 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1986). State appellate courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., H.R. v. State Dept. of Human Res., 612 So.2d 477, 479 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992); Germaine v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1125, 1130-31 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer denied, 726 N.E.2d 316 (Ind. 1999); C.R. v. State, 937 P.2d 1037, 1040-41 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), aff’d, 982 P.2d 73 (Utah 1999).
Judicial recognition that DSS and its employees are government actors is simply an acknowledgment that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 1637 (1943) (emphasis added). DSS is engaged in the noble duty of protecting children: “There is no more worthy object of the public’s concern.” Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318, 27 L. Ed. 2d 408, 414 (1971). Despite the beneficial public purpose underlying this and perhaps every other governmental initiative in a free society, it is nonetheless a truism that the Bill of Rights exists “to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation ... at the hand of an intolerant society.” McIntyre v. Ohio *295Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426, 446 (1995). Unfounded allegations of child abuse unfairly stigmatize individuals, clearly making them “unpopular” within their local community. Thus, it is critical that the government bring forward particularized allegations supported by at least some evidence before carrying out the more intrusive aspects of its investigatory protocol.
The government argues that requiring a warrant prior to entering a private residence would be unduly burdensome and would frustrate the child abuse investigatory process. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that requiring a state actor, in certain situations, to procure a warrant prior to a search would unduly burden the government in light of the special circumstances presented. For instance, the United States Supreme Court has opined that a teacher need not obtain a warrant before searching a student because requiring a warrant “would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733. The Supreme Court has reached a similar conclusion when evaluating the warrant requirement’s applicability to other special circumstances. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 721-22 (1987) (warrantless searches of probationer’s home allowed when there were reasonable grounds to believe the search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, because the supervisory arrangement of probation justified a departure from the traditional requirements of a warrant and probable cause); O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724-25, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 727-28 (public employer hospital’s search of doctor’s desk reasonable without a warrant because of the special need to ensure that public agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 582 (1995); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678-79, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, 710-11 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 670 (1989).
The dissenting judge at the Court of Appeals, a recognized authority on children’s law in North Carolina, aptly described the tension between child protection laws and constitutional principles:
Because of the substantial governmental interest in protecting children and the need to act quickly, as well as the additional time likely required to gather evidence in support of probable cause, it would be ill advised to utilize the probable cause standard. . . . *296[However,] due to the sanctity of private dwellings and the potential for criminal investigation/ prosecution arising from the section 7B-302 investigation, a total suspension of the probable cause standard is not appropriate. A total suspension would permit entry into a home and interviews with the reported victim child, based simply on a totally unsubstantiated report....
Stumbo, 143 N.C. App. at 386, 547 S.E.2d at 457-58 (Greene, J., dissenting).
For these reasons, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution required the trial court to determine that there existed reasonable grounds for suspecting the Stumbos had neglected their daughter before issuing a noninterference order pursuant to section 7B-302. The trial court should have considered the nature, circumstances, and veracity of the allegations, as well as any underlying facts and surrounding circumstances the reporter may have provided. Because the reasonable grounds standard is less demanding than probable cause, it necessarily raises the possibility, however remote, that an aberrant government official, detached from the moorings of the warrant and probable cause requirements, might be tempted to cloak a criminal investigation under the shroud of a child abuse inquiry. Nonetheless, the reasonable grounds standard accommodates the government’s noble efforts to reduce the incidence of. child abuse and neglect without wholly abrogating the constitutional rights of children and caregivers.
Child abuse investigators can “effectively protect children without being excused from ‘whenever practicable, obtaining advance judicial approval of searches and seizures.’ ” Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 604 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 (1968)). As recognized by the Seventh Circuit, DSS is not unduly burdened by securing judicial approval before entering a home precisely because judicial approval is not required in exigent circumstances where the director deems immediate action necessary to protect the safety or welfare of a child. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 517 n.20 (7th Cir.), amended, -F.3d-, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 9353 (7th Cir. 2003). Even the most benign motive, however, “cannot justify a departure from Fourth Amendment protections.” Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205, 221 (2001).
The government concedes that “[i]n approximately 99% of the child protection investigations conducted by a county department of *297social services, Investigative Social Workers enter the homes with the consent of the parents, guardians, or caretakers.” Yet the government argues that even the less-stringent reasonable grounds standard for the remaining 1% of these cases will leave “many North Carolina children ... at risk of suffering grave harm.” Nonetheless, permitting government actors “to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed” and to enter homes where an “offense is not particularly described” is tantamount to issuing a general warrant expressly prohibited by the North Carolina Constitution. N.C. Const, art. I, § 20. The United States Constitution similarly commands that a warrant must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 669-70, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 584-85 (describing the framers’ distaste for general warrants); Payton, 445 U.S. at 583-84, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 650 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (same). Thus, to the extent DSS investigations must comply with the Fourth Amendment, it suffices to say that this is a legal constraint imposed by the people through their Constitution.
The need to investigate reports of neglect and abuse is paramount, but so is the degree of intrusion allegedly sought by the director here. “[A] person’s home is his castle.” State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 512, 173 S.E.2d 897, 906 (1970) (citing Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1604), and State v. Mooring, 115 N.C. 709, 711, 20 S.E. 182, 182 (1894)). Indeed, “[t]he sanctity of the home is a revered tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence.” State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 231, 358 S.E.2d 1, 34, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987). As such, child protection investigators must establish reasonable grounds that child abuse or neglect is present before searching a private home. If DSS is not required to produce a case-specific justification prior to its search, it in essence possesses the equivalent of an unconstitutional general warrant. Such unilateral and unbridled authority opens the door to the possibility that arbitrary, insincere, and unsubstantiated reports of neglect or abuse would provide an adequate basis for governmental intrusion into a private home, even in the face of a proper assertion of constitutional rights.
III.
The Court of Appeals majority concluded that a private interview conducted pursuant to a child abuse or neglect investigation did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Stumbo, 143 N.C. App. at 382, 547 S.E.2d at 455.
*298A noninterference order may issue if a parent refuses to allow the director “personal access to the juvenile,” or refuses to “allow the director to observe or interview the juvenile in private.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(b). “A ‘seizure’ triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs . . . when government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority,... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ ” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 455 n.10 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 20 L. Ed. 2d. at 905 n.16). Whether a citizen has been so restrained depends upon the circumstances of each case and whether, under those circumstances, “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980). Once the noninterference order was issued in the present case, with its attendant contempt sanctions for noncompliance, neither the juvenile nor any reasonable person would have felt at liberty to leave or to refuse to submit to the government’s demand for a private interview.
Not surprisingly, federal appellate courts have concluded that a government actor’s sequestration of a juvenile constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit recently concluded that a child who was “physically carried out of his home, placed in a car, and driven away from his family” by government actors, without the consent of his parents, had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has stated:
Officials may remove a child from the custody of its parent without prior judicial authorization only if the information they possess at the time of the seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury.
Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138 (emphasis added). In Tenenbaum, the Second Circuit concluded that a five-year-old was seized when she was taken from her school by a government official and was transported to a hospital where she was required to remain for several hours before being examined and returned to her parents. 193 F.3d at 602. Similarly, in J.B. v. Washington Cty., 127 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 1997), the appellate court approved a lower court ruling that temporary removal of a child from her home was a seizure implicating Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 928.
*299The government has attempted to distinguish these cases on the basis that they involved the physical removal of a child, while the investigator here sought only an interview. Admittedly, in the present case it is difficult to ascertain the precise scope of the proposed interview. Nonetheless, the government has cited no authority in support of its proposition that we should reach a different result simply because physical removal of a child has not occurred. Under the North Carolina Constitution, any seizure is unlawful when justification for that seizure is “not particularly described and supported by evidence.” N.C. Const, art. I, § 20. Similarly, physical restraint or removal is not a prerequisite to the occurrence of a seizure under the United States Constitution. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (listing several examples of a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
Even when performing the important role of protecting children from abuse and neglect, government action must still comport with the Constitution. Certainly, these protections are not implicated in every case; however, the Constitution protects citizens from the more egregious and aberrational departures from acceptable behavior. See, e.g., Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1007. At a minimum, the government must establish reasonable grounds to believe that child abuse or neglect is present before obtaining a noninterference order permitting a private interview pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(b).
To clarify for purposes of future proceedings under chapter 7B, the statutory phrase “without lawful excuse” has ascertainable meaning and is not mere surplusage. See State v. Buckner, 351 N.C. 401, 408, 527 S.E.2d 307, 311 (2000) (when interpreting a statute, courts must give meaning to all of the statute’s provisions). N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(c) requires a trial court to find by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent, without lawful excuse, has obstructed or interfered with an investigation required by G.S. § 7B-302. ” N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(c) (emphasis added). As government officials, directors must demonstrate more than a parent or caregiver’s refusal to comply with unsupported governmental demands: They must provide the trial court with particularized allegations supported by evidence. N.C. Const, art. I, § 20. When such allegations are anonymous, the trial court should carefully scrutinize DSS’ proffered justification for search or seizure. See generally Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 260 (2000) (“anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity” absent suitable corroboration).
*300In the present case, the trial court should have made inquiry into the objections raised by the Stumbos. Once the Stumbos raised a constitutional objection, the director had the onus of demonstrating that a 7B-303 order should issue. Indeed, the statute makes clear that “[t]he burden of proof shall be on [the government].” N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(c). The trial court never considered the Stumbos’ objection, thus ignoring the “lawful excuse” language of the statute and the Stumbos’ properly raised constitutional objection. The trial court should have considered the allegations directed against the Stumbos as well as any evidence tending to show that such allegations were unfounded in determining whether the government should be permitted to enter a private home over the objections of its owner, or to interview the children in private without the consent of their parents.
I agree with the majority that the trial court erred by granting a noninterference order under the facts and circumstances of the instant case and therefore concur in the result reached by the majority opinion.
Chief Justice LAKE and Justice BRADY join in this concurring opinion.