Court Opinion

ID: 9953528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:19:03.821604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:14.242655
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 15, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0374-MR

TINA L. BURRIS                                                      APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE KENNETH H. GOFF, II, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-00097

LHC GROUP, INC AND
CARETENDERS VS OF LINCOLN
TRAIL, LLC                                                           APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Tina Burris appeals from an order of the Meade Circuit Court

dismissing her civil action against her former employers, LHC Group, Inc. and

Caretenders VS of Lincoln Trail, LLC (collectively “LHC”) pursuant to Kentucky

Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 41.02. After careful review of the record, briefs,

and applicable law, we affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             Burris filed a complaint against LHC on April 3, 2019, alleging

wrongful termination and libel/slander by LHC. Burris was previously employed

as a registered nurse at LHC and alleged she could not find employment after her

termination due to LHC’s “groundless reports of deficient job performance.”

             LHC propounded its first set of interrogatories and request for

production of documents on or about July 2, 2020. On August 4, 2020, Burris filed

a motion requesting an extension of time to respond to discovery. LHC did not

object. On August 27, 2020, the trial court entered an order giving Burris until

September 3, 2020, to respond. The record before us indicates Burris did submit

her answers on or about September 3, 2020; however, they were largely

unresponsive. Burris objected to each interrogatory and provided no substantive

responses other than stating she had been unemployed since April 2019. She also

failed to produce any documents.

             On November 3, 2020, counsel for LHC sent a letter to Burris’s

attorney detailing the ways it deemed her discovery responses insufficient. Burris

did not respond. LHC sent a follow-up letter dated May 28, 2021, that stated if

Burris did not provide substantive discovery responses on or before June 14, 2021,

LHC would file a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. On September 17,

2021, LHC filed a motion to dismiss the action pursuant to CR 41.02. On

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September 28, 2021, the trial court entered an order giving Burris thirty (30) days

to answer all discovery. However, Burris filed two subsequent motions requesting

more time to respond. In each instance, the trial court granted Burris an extension.

On September 13, 2022, the trial court again entered an order that gave Burris

ninety (90) days to comply with all discovery requirements. Burris then sought

another extension, which was granted by the trial court. On November 17, 2022,

LHC filed its second motion to dismiss for failure of Burris to prosecute her case.

Although Burris finally supplied supplemental responses on November 29, 2022,

her answers were still deficient. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order

granting LHC’s motion and dismissing the action. Burris filed a motion to alter,

amend, or vacate, which was denied. This appeal followed. Further facts will be

developed as necessary.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             We review an appeal for dismissal pursuant to CR 41.02 for abuse of

discretion. Jaroszewski v. Flege, 297 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Ky. 2009). “In Kentucky,

the test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Jackson v.

Ghayoumi, 419 S.W.3d 40, 43 (Ky. App. 2012) (citation omitted).

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                                     ANALYSIS

             On appeal, Burris argues the trial court failed to enter specific findings

of fact and conclusions of law in its order dismissing her case against LHC. She

also asserts the trial court failed to follow precedent in its decision. We disagree.

             CR 41.02(1) provides, in relevant part, “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to

prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, a defendant may

move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.” The Kentucky

Supreme Court has clarified that to prosecute a case means “actually working to

get the case resolved – not just keeping it on a court’s docket or occasionally

working on the file without actively attempting to resolve matters in dispute.”

Jaroszewski, 297 S.W.3d at 32. Further, prosecution of a case “involves, not only

preparing one’s own case, but also reasonably cooperating with the opponent’s

active attempts to prepare its case, such as responding timely to discovery

requests.” Id.

             We turn to Burris’s assertion that the trial court failed to make

sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. Burris argues the trial court did

not consider the factors listed in Ward v. Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. App.

1991), for dismissal of an action under CR 41.02. To wit,

             1) the extent of [Burris’s] personal responsibility;

             2) the history of dilatoriness;

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             3) whether the attorney’s conduct was willful and in bad
             faith;

             4) meritoriousness of the claim;

             5) prejudice to [LHC], and

             6) alternative sanctions.

Id. at 719. However, we note that the Kentucky Supreme Court has rejected

             a formulaic approach where certain listed factors must
             always be discussed, and other relevant factors may not
             be discussed. Since the issue of whether a case must be
             dismissed for lack of prosecution is inherently fact-
             specific, demanding that a rigid list of factors must be
             addressed by the trial court in each case is inconsistent
             with the traditional “totality of the circumstances”
             approach.

Jaroszewski, 297 S.W.3d at 33.

            The record before us demonstrates that the trial court considered the

totality of circumstances. The order of dismissal enumerated each of the five

extensions of time requested by Burris to answer discovery and each order granting

her motions. It further found that Burris failed to prosecute her case with any

diligence. Review of the record before us indicates the reasons given by counsel

when requesting extensions were because he was “very busy dealing with

numerous other cases” or he was involved in “litigation of numerous other

matters,” and other similar reasons. When Burris did reply to discovery, her

answers were largely unresponsive. For example, Burris was asked to identify

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“each and every document you have in your possession . . . that supports or negates

in any fashion any of the allegations in your Complaint or any of the defenses in

[LHC’s] Answer.” Burris responded that it was “not possible to determine . . .

what the meaning of the word ‘identify’ is in this Interrogatory as propounded.”1

She provided the same response to other interrogatories that used the word

“identify.” All other answers were similarly unresponsive. Further, the only

document produced by Burris in over two years was a printout from CourtNet that

indicated other litigation in which Burris was a party. For all other documentation

requested by LHC, Burris continually responded that it was “available for

inspection and copying at the offices of the Plaintiff’s undersigned Counsel, by

appointment, during regular business hours Monday through Friday[.]” Burris

refused to send documents electronically or by mail. However, counsel for LHC

argued that requests to retrieve documents from Burris were never acknowledged.

Finally, the record before us indicates Burris never scheduled depositions,

propounded discovery requests on LHC, or otherwise actively prosecuted her case.

               Burris also implies that the order dismissing was improper because

LHC never filed a motion to compel discovery under CR 37.01. However, Burris

1
  “Identify” means, in relevant part, “1. To prove the identity of (a person or thing) <the witness
identified the weapon>. 2. To look on as being associated (with) <the plaintiff was identified
with the environmental movement>.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 894 (11th ed. 2019).

                                                -6-
cites no law that requires a party to file a motion under CR 37.01 before seeking

dismissal under CR 41.02. In essence, Burris contends the trial court failed to

consider alternative sanctions and make findings to that end. Ward, 809 S.W.2d at

719. We are unpersuaded. The trial court held a status conference upon motion of

LHC, not Burris. Afterward, the trial court entered two separate orders, both dated

September 13, 2022. The first was a “Civil Pre-Trial Order” that set a jury trial for

July 12-14, 2023, and set various deadlines. The second order explicitly gave

Burris ninety (90) days to respond to all discovery requests. This was followed by

Burris’s fourth motion for an extension of time, which was also granted. Again, in

its order dismissing the action, the trial court specifically laid out a timeline related

to motions for extensions of time by Burris, its orders granting said motions, and

Burris’s repeated failure to provide substantive responses to discovery.

             “[T]he propriety of an order dismissing a case under CR 41.02(1) for

lack of prosecution depends upon whether the trial court abused its discretion

under all relevant facts and circumstances, not on whether the trial court recited the

six factors listed in Ward.” Jaroszewski, 297 S.W.3d at 37. In the case at bar, it is

not just that Burris’s discovery responses were repeatedly insufficient, but she also

simply failed to prosecute her case at all. As a result, LHC was unable to prepare a

defense. Burris has never offered an explanation for her repeated failure to

respond to discovery and/or her repeatedly deficient responses, instead arguing she

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should be permitted more time at every turn. Her complaint against LHC was filed

on April 3, 2020; the trial court did not dismiss the action until January 27, 2023,

after repeatedly giving her extensions of time. Burris was provided ample

opportunity to prosecute her case and failed to do so. The trial court did not abuse

its discretion in dismissing the action.

                                   CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Meade Circuit Court is

affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

 Harry B. O’Donnell IV                      Ryan M. Martin
 Louisville, Kentucky                       Trevor M. Nichols
                                            Cincinnati, Ohio

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