Court Opinion

ID: 9586150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:07:48.192013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:21.523718
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(concurring in result):
¶ 17 I am willing to recognize the medical emergency exception to the warrant requirement. I would limit it, however, to its intended and accepted scope, i.e., a search of the individual with the medical need.
¶ 18 In attempting to expand the scope of the exception to allow for searches of third parties, the main opinion replaces the word “the” with the word “a” in the following-quotation, thereby changing its intended meaning: “The medical emergency exception will support a warrantless search of a person or personal effects when the person is found in an unconscious or semiconscious condition....” Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Lawfulness of Search of Person or Personal Effects Under Medical Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement, 11 A.L.R. 5th 52, § 2[a] (1993) (emphasis added). The unaltered quotation indicates that the exception limits the search to the person and personal effects of “the” person in need of aid. It does not permit searches of third parties present at the scene.
¶ 19 The other secondary authority relied upon by the main opinion similarly recognizes that the exception is limited to searching only the person affected. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave Search and Seizure § 5.4(c) (1996) (stating that “if the police find a person unconscious or so seriously injured that questioning of him is impractical or unproductive, then it is reasonable for the police to search that person ”) (emphasis added). The main opinion, however, attempts to bootstrap its argument for extending the exception to third parties by citing LaFave for the proposition that it is permissible to search “one individual ... for the purpose of facilitating efforts to tend to the possible health needs of others.” Id. The main opinion fails to point out that this quotation immediately precedes a disclosure that such an aberration is found in only four states and that those states have extended the doctrine by way of a statute requiring that a person charged with sexual assault be tested for AIDS.1 We do not have such a statute in Utah and, in any event, these statutes do not allow the search of third parties present at the scene of an apparent drug overdose.
¶ 20 I am aware of no other appellate court in the land that has ever expanded or applied the exception to third parties in situations like the instant case. This is confirmed by the dissent’s concession that there are “no cases from other jurisdictions which extend the emergency aid exception to searches of persons who do not need assistance.”
¶ 21 Furthermore, in urging the adoption of the medical emergency exception in general, the dissent “recognize[s] that this exception would have to be strictly construed so as to keep the warrantless intrusion as limited as possible.” However, instead of limiting the scope of the search to the person in need, which is the universally accepted practice, the dissent contends that this case warrants the unprecedented expansion of the exception “to areas and persons immediately connected with the person in need of emergency assistance.” Expanding the scope of the ex*1289ception to allow searches of third parties in this way will logically lead to unconstitutional searches of all persons present at the scene of an apparent drug overdose or other similar medical emergency.
¶ 22 In sum, the medical emergency exception allows only for the search of the person and personal effects of the one in need of aid. It does not permit the search of third parties present at the scene. The trial court therefore erroneously applied the exception in this case, and that is the only basis urged for affirmance. I therefore agree that defendant’s conviction must be reversed.

. See Cal.Penal Code § 1524.1 (West Supp.1990); Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18-3-415 (West Supp. 1989); Ga.Code Ann. § 17-10-15(b) (Supp. 1996); Tex.Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 21.31. (West 1989).