Court Opinion

ID: 4348983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2018-12-10 19:28:24.948574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:48:53.289969
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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                                                 No. 76938-3-1                   CO
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                               Respondent,                                       rn          0-11.11
                                                 DIVISION ONE
               V.                                                                 o           T.-13fn
                                                                                              155 P.3d 125

(2007). "An abuse of discretion exists l[w]hen a trial court's exercise of its

discretion is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or

    2 The jury found Angasan guilty under the first alternative (while under the Influence of
Intoxicating liquor or any drug).

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No. 76938-3-1/7

reasons.'" State v. Quaale, 182 Wash. 2d 191, 197, 340 P.3d 213(2014)(citing

State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 668, 701,940 P.2d 1239(1997)).

      Witnesses typically may not directly or indirectly testify in the form of an

opinion as to the guilt or credibility of a defendant. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 927;

Quaale, 182 Wn.2d at 199. "Such testimony is unfairly prejudicial to the

defendant because it invades the exclusive province of the jury." Kirkman, 159

Wn.2d at 927. Courts, however, will not exclude expert testimony just because it

covers an issue the jury must decide. Kirkman 159 Wn.2d at 929.

      To determine whether a statement constitutes impermissible opinion

testimony, courts consider "'(1) the type of witness involved,(2)the specific

nature of the testimony,(3)the nature of the charges,(4)the type of defense,

and (5)the other evidence before the trier of fact.'" Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 928

(citing Demerv, 144 Wn.2d at 759 (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

Testimony on the defendant's guilt, however, is "clearly inappropriate for opinion

testimony in criminal trials." Quaale, 182 Wn.2d at 200. Courts use these same

standards for excluding evidence, such as reports, that inadmissibly opine on

guilt. See State v. Demerv, 144 Wn.2d 753,760--61, 30 P.3d 1278(2001).

       Here, the autopsy report identified Thomas as the unrestrained passenger

In the vehicle. This statement provided a conclusive opinion about the only

disputed element whether Angasan had been driving. See Quaale, 182 Wn.2d

at 200. Additionally, the report described Thomas as the passenger and stated

the at-fault driver was intoxicated. Because Thomas and Angasan were the only

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No. 76938-3-1/8

people in the car, these comments indicated Angasan was the at-fault,

Intoxicated driver. As a result, the autopsy report provided an opinion on

Angasan's guilt and invaded the province of the jury.

       Furthermore, Dr. Goldfogel's opinion on who had been driving was

couched within his expert testimony at trial. On cross-examination, Dr. Goldfogel

admitted that the determinations came from other reports and that he had no

independent knowledge of who was driving the car. However, he also testified

that, based on his review of the crash scene reports, he believed it is "much less

likely" that Thomas had been driving. The testimony therefore further Indicated

Dr. Goldfogel believed Angasan was the intoxicated "at fault driver referenced in

the report.

       The State argues the admission of the autopsy report constituted

harmless error because it provided only cumulative evidence.3 Improper opinion

testimony violates a defendant's constitutional right to have the jury decide facts

critical to his or her guilt. Quaale, 182 Wn.2d at 201-02. "Constitutional error is

harmless only if the State establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that any

reasonable jury would have reached the same result absent the error." Quaale,

182 Wn.2d at 202.

   'On appeal, Angasan challenged the admissibility of his statement to Nurse Dalton that he
was the *unbelted driver on privilege grounds. Because we conclude that, even assuming the
court properly admitted the statement to Nurse Dalton, the error In admitting the autopsy report
was not harmless, we do not address Angasan's argument

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No. 76938-3-1/9

       Trooper Sletten testified that he "felt comfortable" saying that Angasan

had been driving but did not respond to the scene and relied on information

provided by other detectives and a sergeant in his investigative unit. The other

testifying witnesses could only repeat conflicting statements Angasan had made

as to whether he had been driving. The court also admitted the recording of his

calls with Buchanan. Yet at trial, Angasan testified that he did not remember the

inculpatory statements and that he had not been driving when the accident

occurred. An expert testified Angasan's statements were unreliable because he

suffered a serious concussion in the accident that could have caused confusion

and memory loss for weeks.

       Moreover, the statements in the report indicating Angasan had been

driving while intoxicated were more significant because it came from a

government official. See State v. Thompson, 90 Wn. App.41,46, 950 P.2d 977

(1998)("an opinion as to the defendant's guilt is particularly prejudicial when it is

expressed by a government official"). Additionally, the State called Dr. Goldfogel

as an expert. During his expert testimony and in his expert report, Dr. Goldfogel

stated Thomas was the passenger, casting "an aura of scientific certainty" over

his opinion, and "significantly increasing the weight the jury likely attached to it."

Quaale 182 Wn.2d at 202.

       Angasan's defense focused on his assertion he was not driving.

Witnesses presented conflicting evidence on the issue. The State has not met its

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No. 76938-3-1/10

burden to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a reasonable jury would

have reached the same result absent the error.4

        We reverse and remand for a new trial.

                                                             C44.4.te, 9.

WE CONCUR:

  '   Because we find this error warrants reversal, we do not address Angasan's claims of
Ineffective assistance of counsel, error as to admission of two blood tests, cumulative error, or
Improper sentencing.

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