Court Opinion

ID: 9857430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:34:11.661134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:21.775027
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
I wholeheartedly agree and concur in the result reached by the majority in reversing *468the conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, and using the test for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, which has been the law of this state at least, since the decision of Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503, 514 (1855).
Under this test, every circumstantial evidence case must necessarily be tested by its own facts to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Earnhart v. State, 575 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Stogsdill v. State, 552 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Moore v. State, 532 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Higgins v. State, 515 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Indo v. State, 502 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). A conviction on circumstantial evidence, however, cannot be sustained if the circumstances proved do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused and proof amounting to only strong suspicion or mere probability is insufficient. This was forcefully pointed out in Flanagan v. State, 620 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), an opinion for the court by Judge Tom Davis. See also Flores v. State, 489 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Kinkle v. State, 474 S.W.2d 704 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Culmore v. State, 447 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Brock v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 339, 285 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Cr.App.1956).
Judge W.C. Davis, speaking for the court, in Bonds v. State, 573 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), wrote:
“This court has a duty of insuring that no one is convicted of a crime except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt and, in a circumstantial evidence case, upon proof excluding all other hypotheses except appellant’s guilt. Easley v. State, 529 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).”
Having re-affirmed the long-standing test for the sufficiency of the evidence, the majority correctly rejects the cases relied upon by the State Prosecuting Attorney in his brief and properly cites Sewell v. State, 578 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), which recognizes the standard of appellate review in circumstantial evidence cases. The majority, in my opinion, however, falls short of making an adequate explanation of this standard since there exists some confusion about such standard.
The general rule as to appellate review of the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction is that the evidence must be viewed by the appellate court in the light of the jury’s verdict or the court’s judgment depending upon whom the trier of the facts happens to be. See Bowers v. State, 570 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Ransonette v. State, 550 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). See also Darrington v. State, 623 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Vaughn v. State, 607 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Ahearn v. State, 588 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Nixon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); 13A Tex.Digest, Crim.Law Key 1144.13(2). This general rule is not to be applied in reviewing on appeal the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction. Nevertheless, published opinions of this court and the Courts of Appeals can be found which erroneously apply the general rule in circumstantial evidence cases. This confusion should be avoided.
In Sewell v. State, supra, a panel of this court wrote:
“The general rule for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is that it will be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. Bowers v. State, 570 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). However, this court has applied a different test when the verdict is based on circumstantial evidence; the evidence is insufficient if the the circumstances do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused. Stogsdill v. State, 552 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). As was stated in Culmore v. State, 447 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Cr.App.1969):
“ ‘In ascertaining whether guilt of the accused has been established to a moral certainty, the appellate court will review evidence in light of the presumption that the accused is innocent. The Court will not presume any acts against the accused that are not shown to have been committed by him. Furthermore, a conviction *469will not be sustained on appeal if the evidence does not sufficiently establish all material elements of the offense charged.’ ”
The rule stated in Sewell is well established. See, e.g., Earnhart v. State, 575 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Stogsdill v. State, 552 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Suff v. State, 531 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Davis v. State, 516 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Ysasaga v. State, 444 S.W.2d 305, 308-309 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Hollingsworth v. State, 419 S.W.2d 854 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); King v. State, 396 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Ramirez v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 109, 289 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.Cr.App.1956). See also 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 742, p. 422; 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 821, p. 262.
In applying the general rule to the instant case and citing Ysasaga v. State, 444 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), in support thereof, the Court of Appeals was in error. Ysasaga gives a more detailed description of the standard to be applied in circumstantial evidence than does Sewell.
Since the majority reiterates the long-established test for the sufficiency of evidence in circumstantial evidence cases and the proper standard for appellant review in such cases, I again call to the majority’s attention my recent dissent in Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). In Hankins the majority abolished the 127-year-old rule requiring a cautionary jury instruction on the law of circumstantial evidence where the case rests wholly upon circumstantial evidence. Such cautionary instruction recognized the need to protect the accused in a criminal prosecution from jury conjecture and speculation, and was designed to guard the jury from basing their verdict upon mere surmises. Myers v. State, 6 Tex.Cr.R. 1 (1879).
In dissenting this writer, inter alia, noted:
“Now that the majority abolishes the requirement for the cautionary charge on the law of circumstantial evidence, what is to be the legal formula for testing the sufficiency of the evidence in a case based wholly on circumstantial evidence? Is it to remain the same test approved by the Supreme Court of Texas in 1855 in Henderson and followed consistently since that time? See footnote # 4. The majority does not tell us, and with a studied stubbornness, chooses to ignore the question. If the test is to remain the same, then the jury is entitled to a charge on the law of circumstantial evidence as has been given in the past. See Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.13 It would be the height of absurdity to keep the jury in the dark about the requirements of the law regarding the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and then apply the test required by law to any guilty verdict rendered. If the test is to be changed, now is the time to. do it, not later after much confusion as to what test is to be applied. If there is to be a new and different test, it should be clearly delineated, the reasons for its adoption set forth, as well as the reasons for the demise of the former rule. It should be remembered that not only will the appellate court be dealing with sufficiency questions, but so will the trial courts when passing on motions for instructed verdicts and motions for new trials. Guidelines are needed now in an area which has been churned by today’s decision. The majority owes this much to the bench and the bar, and if you, please, the people of Texas.
Since the test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is to remain the same, the majority may wish to let the jurors know the law by which their guilty verdict will be tested.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the result reached in the instant case.

 Article 36.14, supra, provides in part:
‘Subject to the provisions of Article 36.07 in each felony case and in each misdemeanor case tried in a court of record the judge shall, before the argument begins, deliver to the jury, except in pleas of guilty where a jury has been waived, a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case; .... ’ (Emphasis supplied.)”