Court Opinion

ID: 9671226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:33:09.105138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.830673
License: Public Domain

STOVER, Justice,
concurring.
Query: Did the trial court err in allowing Trooper Young to testify as an expert witness concerning causation? I concur with the majority in finding that the trial court did not err. In so doing, I emphasize that the qualification of a witness as an expert is within the trial court’s discretion.
In their treatment of admissibility of expert witness testimony, Texas courts have consistently employed the abuse of discretion standard. United Blood Services v. Longoria, 938 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.1997); Hernandez v. H.S. Anderson Trucking Co., 370 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1963, writ refd n.r.e.). Guiding principles of case law and the Texas Rules of Evidence are applied to the issue on a case by case basis. For example, in a line of eases where the trial court excluded the officer’s testimony, no abuse of discretion was shown, because the officer was not offered as an expert or was not shown to be qualified to testify as such. Hooper v. Torres, 790 S.W.2d 757 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied); St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. King, 817 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1991, no writ). Likewise, no abuse of discretion occurred in Trailways, Inc. v. Clark, 794 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied), when the trial court admitted the officer’s testimony regarding his estimate of vehicular speed based upon skid marks at the scene of the accident. The officer’s testimony was admissible, because he was shown to be qualified to offer an opinion in that area of accident investigation. Id. at 483.
In my judgment, the decision regarding whether an officer has sufficient expertise to testify should remain within the purview of the trial court’s discretion. There should be no “bright line rule” allowing or disallowing officer expert testimony. In the instant case, the record shows Trooper Young had been to accident reconstruction school and knew more about the subject matter than the jury. The officer was not giving his opinion based upon his review of a report prepared by another; on the contrary, his opinion was based upon his own investigation and the facts gathered at the scene — information which would assist the jury in its function. As noted in Louder v. DeLeon, 754 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.1988), “Jurors realize that they are the final triers to decide the issues. They may accept or reject an expert’s view. Thus there is little danger in an expert’s answer to an all-embracing question on a mixed question of law and fact.”
The people of the State of Texas employ the members of the Texas Highway Patrol and train them to investigate accidents. In many automobile accidents the officers are qualified to testify to their opinions. Once a party establishes a witness is qualified to give an opinion on the matter at issue, the witness should be permitted to do so. The factual basis on which he arrives at his opinion may then be tested by vigorous cross-examination. The weakness or strength of the facts in support of the expert’s opinion goes to the weight of his testimony rather than its admissibility. Onwuteaka v. Gill, 908 S.W.2d 276, 283 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
“Abuse of discretion” was and is the standard, as well as the precedent, governing the admissibility of expert testimony. See United Blood Services, 938 S.W.2d at 30; Hernandez, 370 S.W.2d at 911. That precedent should be applied on a case by case basis, as has been done in the majority opinion.