Court Opinion

ID: 2657211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-03-19 17:17:26.875321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:21.963598
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                   Docket Nos. 41053/41061

STATE OF IDAHO,                                 )     2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 418
                                                )
       Plaintiff-Respondent,                    )     Filed: March 19, 2014
                                                )
v.                                              )     Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
                                                )
FERNANDO JOSE SANTOS,                           )     THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
                                                )     OPINION AND SHALL NOT
       Defendant-Appellant.                     )     BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
                                                )

       Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
       County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.

       Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified seven-year sentence
       with two-year determinate term for burglary, affirmed.

       Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
       Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

       Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
       Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
                 ________________________________________________

                     Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;
                                 and GRATTON, Judge

PER CURIAM
       These cases are consolidated on appeal. In Docket No. 41061, Fernando Jose Santos was
convicted of burglary, Idaho Code § 18-1401. The district court imposed a unified seven-year
sentence with a two-year determinate term to run concurrently with a sentence in a separate
pending case, suspended the sentence, and placed Santos on probation. Following a report of
probation violation, the district court revoked probation and ordered execution of the original
sentence, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence and returned Santos
to probation.   Subsequently, Santos admitted to violating several terms of the probation by
incurring a robbery charge, I.C. §§ 18-6501, 18-6502, in Docket No. 41053. The district court

                                               1
consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentence in Docket
No. 41061 and imposed a unified ten-year sentence with a four-year determinate term in Docket
No. 41053, to run concurrently with the burglary sentence. Santos filed Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motions for reduction of his sentences, which the district court denied.         Santos appeals,
contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation on his burglary
sentence, that the sentences in both cases are excessive, and that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his Rule 35 motions.
       It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122
Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772
P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.
1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation
has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the
court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at
325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989).
The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158,
162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal
only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the
conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho
618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly
made part of the record on appeal. Id.
       Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review
and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well
established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822
P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-
73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).

                                                2
When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
       When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. Id. Thus, this Court will
consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record
on appeal and are relevant to the defendant’s contention that the trial court should have reduced
the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. Morgan, 153 Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at
838.
       Next, we review whether the district court erred in denying Santos’s Rule 35 motions. A
motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006);
State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting a Rule 35
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion.          State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In conducting our review of the grant
or denial of a Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for
determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 22, 740
P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987); Lopez, 106 Idaho at 449-51, 680 P.2d at 871-73.
       Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, in ordering execution of
Santos’s original sentence for burglary without modification, in imposing sentence for robbery,
or in denying Santos’s Rule 35 motions. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing
execution of Santos’s previously suspended burglary sentence, the judgment of conviction and
sentence for robbery, and the order denying Santos’s I.C.R. 35 motions are affirmed.

                                                 3