Court Opinion

ID: 9566926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:44:59.166206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:36.424406
License: Public Domain

Johnson, Judge,
dissenting.
The parol evidence offered by defendant/appellee McCollum at trial should not have been allowed to defeat the unambiguous language of the contract for advertising admittedly signed by him. The Directory Advertising Order specifically provided that publication of the advertising would continue until canceled in writing, as well as a merger clause which stated that “This order, if accepted by us, and any associated printing orders are our entire agreement with you.” The accompanying printing order also contained McCollum’s signature under the statement “As an authorized representative of the above named firm, I have reviewed the advertising copy shown and find it to be correct. I understand that this printing order is subject to *446the Terms & Conditions of the associated Directory Advertising Order. . . .’’As this court recently held, “ ‘Parol evidence is inadmissible to add to, take from, or vary a written contract.’ OCGA § 13-2-2 (1). Even if consideration of circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement creates an ambiguity, ‘(w)here the contract is complete on its face and the evidence offered to explain the ambiguity contradicts the terms of the written instrument, it should not be admitted. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Loveless v. Sun Steel, 206 Ga. App. 247, 248-249 (424 SE2d 887) (1992). The advertising was published and Mc-Collum received the benefit of that advertising. I believe that the trial court erred in considering the parol evidence and in excusing McCollum from performance of his obligations under the contract. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court.
Decided July 13, 1993.
Strongwater & Cherniak, Jay L. Strongwater, Leeza R. Cherniak, for appellant.
Robinson & Harbert, John E. Robinson, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.