Court Opinion

ID: 9895971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 23:04:07.445088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:10.669408
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 P. v. Patterson CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
 CALIFORNIA,                                                            A167784
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        (Alameda County Super. Ct.
 v.                                                                     No. H56262A)
 AYODELE PATTERSON,
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         After a jury trial in 2016, appellant Ayodele Patterson was found guilty
of the first-degree murder of 80-year-old Carolyn June Pavon during a home
invasion robbery in June 2010. Patterson was 17 years old at the time of the
crime. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) in
November 2018. We subsequently affirmed Patterson’s convictions on
appeal. (People v. Patterson (Sept. 8, 2020, A156047) [nonpub. opn.].)
         On January 31, 2023, Patterson filed a pro per motion in the trial court
requesting a “Franklin hearing”—i.e., a proceeding where youthful offenders
can make a record to preserve evidence for an eventual parole hearing.

         1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California

Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. All statutory references
are to the Penal Code.

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(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin); People v. Delgado (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 95, 98–99, fn.1.) Patterson submitted a declaration that he
was born in August 1992,2 and that he had never been afforded the
opportunity to place youth-related sentencing factors on the record, either at
his November 2018 sentencing hearing or thereafter. On March 2, 2023, the
trial court denied the request, reasoning that Franklin proceedings are not
available to defendants like Patterson, whose sentences foreclose the
possibility of parole. Patterson timely appealed.
      As the Attorney General concedes, the trial court was mistaken. The
Supreme Court held in Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, that the 16-year-old
offender—who was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 50 years to
life—was entitled under newly enacted sections 3051 and 4081 to a parole
hearing during his 25th year in prison. (Franklin, at p. 276.) Under the
circumstances, the Supreme Court remanded the matter, holding that if
Franklin had not previously been given the “opportunity to make a record of
information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing,” he
should be allowed to “place on the record any documents, evaluations, or
testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant” to such a
hearing. (Franklin, at p. 284.) The proper procedure for requesting a
Franklin proceeding after a judgment of conviction is final is to file a motion
in the superior court under the same caption and case number, citing the
authority of section 1203.1 and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook). (See
People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150 (Howard).)
      Pursuant to section 3051: “A person who was convicted of a controlling
offense that was committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and

      2  Since the murder occurred in June 2010, Patterson was 17 at the
time of the crime.

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for which the sentence is life without the possibility of parole shall be eligible
for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s
25th year of incarceration. The youth parole eligible date for a person eligible
for a youth offender parole hearing under this paragraph shall be the first
day of the person’s 25th year of incarceration.” (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4), italics
added.) Thus, Patterson’s Franklin motion was legally sufficient under the
plain language of the statute.3
      In remanding the case, we note that “[a] legally sufficient Franklin
motion does not automatically guarantee a defendant the right to [place
additional information in the record. Rather, such a motion only initiates the
process for a Franklin proceeding. Based solely on the motion, the trial court
may immediately find a Franklin proceeding is warranted. However, the
trial court may also ‘ “exercise its discretion to conduct this process
efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant,
noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes,
and regulations.” [Citation.] The court may, for example, require an offer of
proof regarding the evidence the offender seeks to present, so that it can
determine whether such evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and
meaningfully adds to the already available record. It may also determine
whether testimony is “appropriate” [citation], or if other types of evidentiary

      3 Patterson’s reference in his Franklin hearing request to People v.

Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, review granted Jan. 11, 2023, S277487 is
not relevant. Hardin involved whether an offender between the ages of 18
and 25 sentenced to LWOP should also be entitled to a youth offender parole
hearing on equal protection grounds. (Hardin, at pp. 277–278.) The Second
District in Hardin answered this questions in the affirmative. (Id. at
pp. 284–291.) In People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 199–200, the
Fourth District reached the opposite result. Neither case impacts this appeal
as Patterson was 17 at the time of his offense.

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submissions will suffice.’ [Citation.] After allowing a defendant an
opportunity of this nature, the court may deny further proceedings if it finds
they are unlikely ‘to produce fruitful evidence.’ ” (Howard, 74 Cal.App.5th at
p. 152, italics omitted.) Finally, during the Franklin hearing, the prosecution
may also “put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile
offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the
influence of youth-related factors.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458–459.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s order denying Patterson’s request for a Franklin
hearing is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

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                                         GETTY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MARGULIES, ACTING P.J.

BANKE, J.

A167784


 Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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