Court Opinion

ID: 9573242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:50:42.842076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:57.105746
License: Public Domain

Hamilton, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. The majority, in overruling those portions of State v. O’Neal, 147 Wash. 169, 265 Pac. 175 (1928), In re McClintock v. Rhay, 52 Wn.2d 615, 328 P.2d 369 (1958), and State v. Shannon, 60 Wn.2d 883, 376 P.2d 646 (1962), which inferentially or directly characterize imposition of criminal judgment and sentence as part of a criminal prosecution, have taken, in my view, an unwarranted, unjustified and unrealistic step backward in the administration of justice. They do this at a time and in an era when constitutional rights and due process concepts are receiving increasing and expanding attention. And, by so doing, they open the door to and invite continued and increasing federal court disapproval and supervision of state court criminal procedures. We have gone through this in connection with search, arraignment, appointment of counsel, and confession procedures. Fortunately, in this state, we have been able to adapt to new concepts without undue inconvenience, principally because our procedures have been administered in the most part with befitting and uniform regard to fundamental fairness in the treatment of individuals before our criminal tribunals. When, however, we depart from fundamentally fair judicial processes, and cavalierly authorize discrimination in the right to counsel between one whose judgment and sentence is imposed immediately following conviction or plea of guilty and one whose judgment and sentence may be imposed anywhere from a few months to several years later, we are inviting probation and revocation procedures which can well lead to questionable and potentially voidable institutional commitments. Given no requirements for representation by counsel, it is inevitable that revocation procedures will vary from defendant to defendant, from county to county, and from trial judge to trial judge. Such a sitúa*894tion may be acceptable in some administrative contexts, but it can hardly be said to comport with the dignity of the judicial process or the traditional role of courts in criminal proceedings. Neither does it lend itself to the efficient administration of justice, for to short change an individual of any due process protections at the trial court level, when and where they can in the first instance be most effectively, efficiently and economically provided, is simply not good judicial policy. Disparity of standards among the courts in the search, confession and right to counsel cases has long since proven the unwisdom and inefficiency of such a course.
I have no quarrel with the majority’s thesis that an errant individual who has been released from official custody by way of an order of deferred sentence remains, technically speaking, in “semi-custody” by virtue of probationary regulations. Neither do I differ with the theory that deferred sentences and probation are rehabilitative measures which descend upon the deserving miscreant “by the grace” of the sentencing judge. But, I find little realistic support for the majority’s denial of the right to counsel either at the time of hearing or of final judgment and sentence arising out of these fine phrases. It is one thing to say that there is no constitutional or due process right to the chancellor’s “grace,” but quite another thing to say there are no due process rights at such a critical stage of a criminal prosecution as the revocation of probation and the imposition of final judgment and sentence. The two simply do not go hand in hand.
It cannot be gainsaid that the recipient of the “grace” of an order of deferred sentence is the beneficiary of some very real and substantial advantages which do not flow to one who is sentenced to a custodial facility, or who is otherwise subjected to a final judgment and sentence. The individual with the order of deferred sentence in his hand is ordinarily permitted to return to his community, his family and his job, subject only to the behaviorial restrictions and conditions arising out of his probationary status. In a very realistic sense he is free, for his personal liberty is but *895slightly restricted. And, of significant importance, he is accorded the right, after a successful probationary period, of coming before the court and petitioning for a negation of his conviction and a dismissal of the charges. He may thus clear his record and remove outstanding penalties and disabilities. This latter privilege, even if unaccompanied by the other benefits, is a matter of considerable importance in our society today. It is clearly distinguishable from a procedural right. It amounts to a substantial right which is afforded by legislative enactment. RCW 9.95.240. Fundamental fairness and the dignity of the judicial process dictate that this right, to say nothing of the sacred right of personal liberty, should not be subject to nullification by the whim of peremptory “quasi-administrative” proceedings which do not even afford the right to be represented by counsel at the time of entering the nullifying judgment and sentence.
This court has held in State v. Farmer, 39 Wn.2d 675, 237 P.2d 734 (1951), that the recipient of an order of deferred sentence is not entitled to an appeal from his conviction until entry of final judgment and sentence.2 Thus, the majority’s view that due process concepts are fulfilled by affording counsel at the time of entry of the order deferring sentence, and that such concepts do not contemplate the right to counsel at any time thereafter to and including the time of entry of final judgment and sentence following a revocation proceeding is somewhat anomalous. In effect, the majority isolates this particular judgment and sentence from the context and concept of the ordinary criminal prosecution and says to the individual, you may now appeal for the first time in this prosecution; but, because you initially received a deferment of sentence, you are not now entitled to counsel to advise you of this right or to assist you in determining that a proper sentence is *896imposed. The reason for this legalistic tightrope walking is obscure to me, particularly when considered with the fact that the final judgment and sentence, whether entered with or without an intervening order of deferred sentence, bodes well to deprive an individual of his personal liberty and to forever nullify any opportunity of clearing his record of the conviction.
The majority seek sustenance for their position in the statute dealing with revocation of suspended or deferred sentences. They quote with emphasis RCW 9.95.220, which provides in part that the superior court may, in its discretion, without notice, revoke and terminate probation. It may be granted that the statute purports to dispense with formal notice as a prerequisite to revocation; however, I find little in the statutory language or in any reasonable concept of fundamental fairness that dispenses with the necessity for some type of hearing or the right to be represented by counsel. On the contrary, by providing that the probationer should be brought before the court, after rearrest for cause, i.e., violating his probation, it is fair to assume the legislature anticipated that a judicious judicial proceeding would ensue, during the course of which the fundamental rights of society as well as those of the probationer would be respected. Certainly, the legislature did not intend that the courts should, at this stage of the prosecution, shed their traditional concern for fair play and due process concepts and assume a swashbuckling “quasi-administrative” attitude toward a defendant. At this point, it should be observed in passing that the legislature, in enacting standards for revocation of parole, provided that a parolee charged with a violation of his parole, short of conviction of another crime, would be entitled (a) to a fair and impartial hearing before the parole board, (b) to be represented by counsel at such hearing, and (c) to defend and present evidence on his own behalf. RCW 9.95.120. Thus, we have the incongruent situation of a convicted, incarcerated and paroled person possessed of more fundamental rights before an administrative board than this court is willing to afford to a probationer in a court of law.
*897Again, it seems to me, it is one thing to say that there is no legislative, constitutional or due process requirement of formal notice of a projected probation revocation, but quite a different thing to say there is no legal requirement for holding a hearing, assessing the reason for revocation, or affording counsel, if not at the hearing, at least at the time of entry of an appealable judgment and sentence.
The majority also appear to proceed upon the premise that once a person stands convicted of a crime and qualifies for and partakes of the conditional liberty afforded by an order of deferred sentence, he is immediately shorn of constitutional safeguards which otherwise surround a criminal prosecution. In short, the majority cast such a trespasser into the role of a second class citizen, despite the fact that his past history suggests the probability of reformation and warrants the grace of probation. It may be conceded that such a person, by virtue of the criminal conviction, waives or forfeits the benefits of some constitutional rights, e.g., the right to further trial by jury. But, there seems to be little reason or justification to suppose that such a person waives or forfeits such basic and traditional safeguards as the right to be present at a judicial proceeding designed to revoke his probation, the right to be advised of the nature of the alleged probation violation, the right to present explanatory or mitigating evidence, or the right to be represented by counsel either at the hearing or at the time of imposition and entry of the appealable final judgment and sentence. While these rights as to probationers may not be fully spelled out in the federal and state constitutions, it would seem reasonable to conclude that they inhere in those documents, if in no other way than through the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. Certainly, there can be little doubt that the right to personal liberty is as valuable and sacred to one who has been convicted of a crime as to one who has not. I find nothing in our constitutions that indicates a contrary belief. Neither can it be seriously questioned that the strength of our constitutional form of government lies *898in the protection afforded to the weak- and unfortunate against injustice or arbitrary and capricious action. And, if this be so, it ill behooves us to sap this strength by isolating, with surgeon-like precision, various phases of a criminal prosecution for the purpose of parceling out, with Scrooge-like finesse, due process protections. Thus, it seems incompatible to say to a defendant that he is entitled to constitutional safeguards in all the usual facets of a criminal prosecution, including the right to counsel at all stages of the proceeding, unless and until he is granted probation, whereupon due process concepts and society’s interest in the preservation of fair standards of justic vanish in the mystical clouds of judicial grace. Instinctively one shrinks from this autocratic approach, for instinctively one feels that any person is entitled to be properly heard when a court of law undertakes to deprive that person of his personal liberty, conditional though that liberty might be.
The majority next point out that deferred sentences and probation are comparatively modern, flexible, sensitive and potent innovations in the field of criminology. From this they then posit that courts should be slow to translate into constitutional terms the theory that the “privilege” of probation is a matter of “grace,” and that revocation is a matter of “discretion.” The majority, however, distort the probation concept and attach too much significance to the above quoted words when they characterize the revocation procedure as a quasi-administrative function, and thus seek to carry it beyond constitutional dimensions and beyond the normal range of the judicial process.
The adjudication of criminal guilt and the meting out of statutory punishment is distinctively, traditionally and constitutionally a judicial function. It is no more an administrative function than granting, denying or modifying a divorce decree, and it does not partake of an administrative function simply because there are alternative solutions available in a given case. With but relatively few statutory exceptions, the administrative function in the field of penology basically begins and ends with the supervision of the convicted offender. Because both the judge and the admin*899istrator may be interested and concerned with reformation of the offender does not mean that their functions become indiscernibly commingled, and, because a judge may accept, reject, or modify a recommendation of probation or revocation by an administrator does not mean that the judiciary is disruptively invading a peculiarly administrative province.
The bare and unvarnished truth is that the courts should and do stand as a bulwark between the individual and the possibility of mistaken, prejudiced, whimsical or arbitrary administrative action. And, when the courts obeisantly hesitate to surround any facet of their proceedings and any individual involved therein with adequate, even though minimal, constitutional safeguards they are abdicating their responsibility.
The majority appear willing to concede that, while the granting of probation in the first instance is not a matter of right, a defendant is constitutionally entitled to be represented by counsel at that point. The stakes then are the defendant’s liberty, his reputation and future record, and his appellate remedies. The state is represented by the prosecuting attorney. If the defendant receives a deferment of sentence and probation and subsequently stands before the same court accused by an administrative officer of a probation violation, the stakes are identical. The state is again represented by the prosecuting attorney and to some degree by the administrative officer. The defendant, however, now stands barren of a right to the assistance of counsel. I find no purpose, reason or fairness in this situation. ■
The fear that the presence of counsel would tend to convert such proceedings into protracted hearings is without merit and is nothing more than a red herring. If there is a valid factual issue as to the alleged probation violation, the defendant is not only entitled to a fair hearing, but as a matter of practical necessity he should have the assistance of counsel in evaluating his defense, assembling his evidence, subpoenaing and interrogating his witnesses, and cross-examining opposing witnesses. The average defendant is otherwise virtually helpless, and it is only in this way that *900the court can be fully, intelligently and efficiently advised. In the vast majority of cases, however, there is no dispute as to the. probation violation. The only issue is the nature and extent of the punishment, a matter of vital concern to both the defendant and the court. Here again counsel, with his knowledge of court procedures, the defendant’s background, and the alternative solutions available can be of inestimable assistance to the defendant and of substantially more help than hindrance to the court. At the very minimum, the presence of counsel would assure the court that the defendant was advised of his situation, and remove the lurking feeling of unfairness that surrounds sending an unrepresented person to a penal institution.
Likewise without merit is the fear that providing constitutional safeguards at the revocation stage would weaken the rehabilitative purposes of probation. Retribution, however swift, should always be accompanied by fundamental fairness, particularly when administered by and through a court of law. In fairness to any probationer, the procedures utilized should be designed to avoid the possibility, however remote, of revocations founded on accusations arising out of mistake, prejudice and caprice. The threat of arbitrary or whimsical commitment does not tend to encourage either cooperation or successful rehabilitation. Reformation can best be accomplished by fair, consistent, and straightforward treatment of the individual. No doubt it was this thought, in part at least, which prompted the drafters of the Model Penal Code for The American Law Institute to provide, in Tent. Drafts Nos. 2 (1954) and 4 (1955), § 301.4, as follows:
The Court shall not revoke a suspension or probation or increase the requirements, imposed thereby on the defendant except after, a hearing upon written notice to the defendant of the grounds on which such action is proposed. .The defendant shall have the right to hear and controvert the evidence against him, to offer evidence in his defense and to be represented by counsel.
Finally, and perhaps fatally, the denial of counsel to a defendant at the revocation stage of probation could well *901raise serious constitutional questions of discrimination between affluent and indigent probationers. As the majority opinion inferentially points out, in all instances a probationer appearing before the superior court in a revocation proceeding will ordinarily be given an opportunity to be heard. As a practical and realistic matter, those probationers who can afford counsel will be accorded the opportunity of having counsel at their side throughout the proceeding. It would, indeed, be the rare superior court judge who would deny them such a privilege. Yet the majority would deny this right to indigents, thereby projecting discrimination between probationers who can afford counsel and those who cannot. Due process and equal protection prohibit the accident of economic ability from being a criterion for right to counsel. See Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 Sup. Ct. 814 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 100 L. Ed. 891, 76 Sup. Ct. 585, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1956).
Turning then from the general to the specific, the majority opinion, as it relates to petitioner, in effect concludes that petitioner by accepting a deferred sentence knowledgeably waived any and all rights to due process of law at the time of any subsequent revocation proceeding. Aside from the fact that it is extremely doubtful that any such theory of waiver was fully explained to petitioner at the time of the entry of the order of deferred sentence, the harshness and rigidity of the position taken by the majority is but emphasized by the facts appearing in this case. It is conceded by the attorney general, and supported by the record, that at the time of the offense, the arraignment proceedings and the revocation, all in 1959, petitioner was but 17 years of age. The record further indicates that petitioner had not completed the eighth grade, and that since 1956 he had progressed through a variety of state institutions including Green Hill Academy, Eastern State Hospital, the Diagnostic Center at Fort Worden, Western State Hospital, and again Eastern State Hospital with a conflict of opinion between the latter two facilities as to whether he was a psychopathic delinquent. His migrations through these various institutions were under the aegis of the juvenile court. His first *902appearance in superior court arose out of the offense for which he is presently in custody.
Against this background, even the attorney general expresses some doubt as to petitioner’s ability to fully comprehend the nature of his situation at the time of the revocation hearing. And, under the circumstances, it would be somewhat of a strain, to say the least, to assume that he fully appreciated all ramifications of the order of deferred sentence and at the time of entry of that order knowingly, intelligently and competently waived all constitutional rights with respect to subsequent proceedings. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019, 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938).
In summary and in conclusion, I would
(1) Reaffirm the right to counsel at the time of imposition of sentence as established in the O’Neal, McClintock and Shannon cases, supra;
(2) Prospectively overrule that portion of In re Jaime v. Rhay, 59 Wn.2d 58, 365 P.2d 772 (1961), which holds that a probationer is not entitled to counsel at the revocation hearing, and afford such right at all future revocation hearings; and
(3) Grant the writ of habeas corpus and remand petitioner to the sentencing court for rehearing and resentencing with counsel present.
Donworth and Weaver, JJ., concur in the result of the dissent.

Of course, it is understood that the right of appeal following a plea of guilty is very limited. However, the deferred sentence statute permits entry of such orders following either a plea of guilty or a verdict of guilty. Hence, the right to counsel at the time of revocation must be considered in the context of either form of conviction.