Court Opinion

ID: 9688252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:41:45.160712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:36.904332
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the result reached by the majority but I do not join the majority opinion for I believe it blurs the two-step analysis we have heretofore espoused as the necessary procedure in considering a request to modify a custody award. For example, in Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 666 (N.D.1981), we stated that a request to modify a custody award requires the determination of two issues: the threshold issue of whether or not there has been a significant change of circumstances since the original divorce decree and custody award; and, only if the court has determined there has been such change, whether or not those changed circumstances are such that *439the best interests of the child would be served by a change in custody. That has been a constant requirement through all our decisions on changes in custody.
This case was presented to us by the appellant on the basis that the trial court did not reach the issue of the best interests of the children because it found there was not a significant change of circumstances. There are also indications in the record that the trial court, if it had determined there had been a change of circumstances, would have found that the best interests of the children would be served by a change in custody. Although we are not obliged to accept appellant’s explication of the trial court’s decision, that issue is not clearly addressed in the majority opinion; rather, the majority opinion concludes there is substantial evidence “to support the trial court’s finding that there has not been a significant change of circumstances since the original custody award that warrants a change of custody at this time.” I agree that the change in circumstances must be a change that affects the children’s best interests, but I am not convinced that was the finding of the trial court. There is little or nothing in the trial court’s findings to indicate that it reached the issue of the best interests of the children although there is, as the majority opinion discusses, substantial evidence in the record on that issue.
My concern is that a blurring of the two-step process, which we have heretofore required, will result in only token adherence to the analysis and that the threshold issue of whether or not there is a change in circumstances will be subsumed by the issue of the best interests of the children which will, in turn, determine whether or not a change of circumstances has occurred in the first instance. This would turn the analysis on its head and in every instance the court will determine whether or not the best interests of the children are served by a change of custody. If that is found to be the result in a given case we can assume the court will find a change in circumstances to justify the change. Cynics might believe that is now the process and others may believe that a motion for a change in custody should be driven by the best interests of the children without concern to whether or not there has been a change in circumstances. There are substantial reasons for the requirement that a change in circumstances exist before a consideration of the best interests of the children are considered, not the least of which is a brake on the number of motions to change custody.
I concur in the result because I am not convinced there was a change of circumstances that justified the trial court in reaching the second prong of the analysis, i.e., the children’s best interests. If we are to reach the second prong, although I do not believe the trial court did so, I do not believe the evidence is sufficient to indicate that the children’s best interests would necessarily be served by a change in custody.