Court Opinion

ID: 9736876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:08:54.218562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:54.675516
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
This is an original action challenging the constitutionality of sec. 757.48(l)(a), Stats., as amended by 1987 Wis. Act 355, which imposes a continuing legal education requirement on attorneys prior to their appointment as guardians ad litem. We conclude that sec. 757.48(1) (a), as amended, improperly intrudes on a regulation of the practice of law that is exclusively within the province of the judiciary. Accordingly, we hold the statute void as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
The facts are stipulated. On April 14, 1987, Assembly Amendment 1 to 1987 Assembly Bill 205 was offered in the legislature. The amendment included a provision that read: "In order to be appointed as a guardian ad litem under s. 767.045, an attorney shall have completed three hours of approved continuing legal education relating to the functions and duties of a guardian ad litem under ch. 767." After further amendments in the assembly and senate, the bill was passed by the legislature, signed by the governor, and published as 1987 Wis. Act 355 on May 2, 1988. The bill as enacted appears as sec. 757.48(1)(a), Stats.
Petitioners sought a declaratory ruling on the constitutionality of the enactment, and a petition for leave to commence an original action with a brief in support of the petition were filed with this court on April 21, 1989. On April 26, 1989, the court issued an administrative directive instructing the circuit judges of Wisconsin to refrain from implementing the continuing legal education requirements of sec. 757.48(l)(a), Stats. On the same date, the court ordered a response to the petition, which was filed on May 9,1989. The respondents stated *99that they did not oppose the request that the court exercise original jurisdiction. By order of May 10, 1989, this court granted the petition for leave to commence the action.
The petitioners request a judgment declaring sec. 757.48(1)(a), Stats., as amended by 1987 Wisconsin Act 355, unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine. The petitioners further contend that the amendment to sec. 757.48(1) (a) is devoid of any standard for implementation and is therefore unconstitutionally vague. Both parties agree this is a proper case for declaratory relief. State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976).
We conclude that while the legislature may prescribe minimum standards for the eligibility of persons desiring to practice law, it is the province of the judiciary ultimately to decide the fitness of those who practice before it and to regulate their activities following their admission to practice. A concomitant of this authority is the power to decide whether special training for a particular area is appropriate. Because the amendment to sec. 757.48(l)(a), Stats., interferes with this authority, we hold it void under the separation of powers doctrine.
In State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982), we discussed the separation of powers doctrine at great length. We stated:
The Wisconsin constitution creates three separate coordinate branches of government, no branch subordinate to the other, no branch to arrogate to itself control over the other except as is provided by the constitution, and no branch to exercise the power committed by the constitution to another. Id. at 42.
We recognized that although the three governmental branches are coordinate and separate, each deriving *100its power from the constitution, the constitution does not explicitly define legislative, executive, or judicial power. Id. Thus, it is neither possible nor practicable " 'to classify accurately all the various governmental powers and to say that this power belongs exclusively to one department and that power belongs exclusively to another.' " Id. at 42-43 (quoting Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 45, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943)).
The separation of powers doctrine therefore does not require an absolute division of power without overlap. Rather, the doctrine envisions a government of separated branches sharing certain powers. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 43. Where the legislative and judicial powers overlap, the legislature's power to act in the area of shared authority is not unchecked. The legislature is prohibited from unreasonably burdening or substantially interfering with the judicial branch. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 360, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989).
However, the separation of powers doctrine does not render every power conferred upon one branch of government a power which may be shared by another branch. There are zones of authority constitutionally established for each branch of government upon which any other branch of government is prohibited from intruding. As to these areas of authority, the unreasonable burden or substantial interference test does not apply: any exercise of authority by another branch of government is unconstitutional. In Matter of Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 776, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984).1
*101The respondents correctly assert that the judiciary and the legislature share authority to prescribe qualifications for admission to the practice of law. The judiciary is concerned with the qualifications of attorneys in the exercise of its inherent power to regulate the bar. See Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 45, and cases cited at n.ll. The legislature is concerned with the qualifications of attorneys pursuant to its power to promote the general welfare. As we stated in In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 396, 240 N.W. 441 (1932):
We think the separation of sovereign power by which the constitution assigns the legislative power to the legislature and the judicial power to the courts, with the purpose of making each department supreme and independent in its respective field, accords to the legislature the power of exacting of those who shall be admitted to the practice of the law such qualifications as the legislature shall deem sufficient to protect the public from the evils and mis-chiefs resulting from incompetent and characterless attorneys, which qualifications so prescribed must be respected by the courts. The courts cannot and should not license any as attorneys at law who do not *102possess the qualifications deemed by the legislature necessary for the protection of the public interest.
This language establishes that the legislature may prescribe minimum qualifications for persons desiring to be admitted to practice law in the state as an incident to its general power to protect the public. Once admitted, however, it does not follow that the legislature shares with the judiciary the authority to establish minimum qualifications in specific areas of law.
To the contrary, we made it clear in the subsequent case of State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 206, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961), that no rule or practice, however venerable, would preempt the exclusive authority of the judicial branch to define and regulate the activities of those who have been admitted. We stated:
[T]he regulation of the practice of the law is a judicial power and is vested exclusively in the supreme court; that the practitioner in or out of court, licensed lawyer or layman, is subject to such regulation; that whenever the court's view of the public interest requires it, the court has the power to make appropriate regulations concerning the practice of law in the interest of the administration of justice, and to modify or declare void any such rule, law, or regulation by whomever promulgated, which appears to the court to interfere with the court's control of such practice for such ends.
Furthermore, the competence of an attorney to represent a client in a particular area is at present governed by SCR 20:1.1, which requires competent representation through application of the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation necessary for the *103representation. To the extent an attorney fails to meet the level of competence necessary for effective representation, the attorney is subjected to an action for legal malpractice, and to disciplinary action undertaken pursuant to the judiciary's inherent authority to discipline members of the bar. See Rubin v. State, 194 Wis. 207, 214-15, 216 N.W. 513 (1927).
The issue of an attorney's competence to practice in a particular area is therefore currently left to the attorney's professional judgment bounded solely by the judiciary's inherent power to regulate the bar. This court has never in the past authorized the legislature to adopt rules or enact legislation attempting to establish a threshold level of competency to practice in a particular area. In fact, this court has specifically prohibited attorneys from holding themselves out as having special expertise in a particular field of law. See SCR 20:7.4.
We therefore conclude that once an attorney has been determined to have met the legislative and judicial threshold requirements and is admitted to practice law, he or she is subject to the judiciary's inherent and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. A necessary attribute of the court's regulatory authority is the power to determine the quantum of competence necessary to perform legal tasks and the authority to discipline those practitioners who fail to represent their clients competently. See In re Cannon, 206 Wis. at 397-98. Because the amendment to sec. 757.48(1)(a), Stats., intrudes upon that area of exclusive authority, it unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers doctrine.
In urging a contrary result, the respondents draw an analogy to the rules governing appointment of private practitioners to serve as public defenders. The respon*104dents argue that before an attorney can be certified, they are required to complete seven hours of continuing legal education each calendar year in courses approved by the state public defender. See Wis. Admin. Code, Sec. SPD 1.04(9). Furthermore, the public defender board was created by the legislature under sec. 15.78, Stats., and the board members are appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate, pursuant to sec. 15.07(1). Therefore, the respondents insist that if sec. 757.48(l)(a) is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, then so too must be the public defender requirements for appointment to represent indigent clients.
We are unpersuaded. Section SPD 1.04(9) does not constitute an example of the legislature intruding on the discretion of the circuit courts in deciding whom to appoint. The rule relates to attorneys who are eligible to represent indigent clients on behalf of the state public defender. The rule does not purport to prohibit circuit courts from appointing attorneys other than those certified by the state public defender who the court may see fit to serve as the legal representative of an indigent criminal defendant. There is nothing in the implementing legislation to suggest that any attorney licensed to practice could not, if he or she were willing, be appointed to represent an indigent defendant even though the practitioner did not meet the requirement of sec. SPD 1.04(9). Unlike the public defender regulations, the amendment under challenge here intervenes in a court's decision concerning whom to appoint as a guardian ad litem and imposes a standard that displaces the adjudicative function.
Nor does the decision in Witter v. Cook County Com'rs et. al., 100 N.E. 148 (Ill. 1912), support the *105respondent's position. That case involved a statute creating the position of probation officer in the juvenile court. The situation is more closely analogous to the Wisconsin public defender rule requiring private attorneys to take certain continuing legal education as a precondition to eligibility for employment. Thus, Witter is not authority for the proposition that the legislature may intervene in a court's decision concerning whom to appoint as guardian ad litem.
Finally, the respondents suggest that even if the amendment to sec. 757.48(l)(a), Stats., falls within the court's exclusive authority, the statute is valid as an aid to the court's power, much as the practice of real estate brokers to use legal forms was allowed to continue in Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d at 206. However, unlike the matter before the court in Reynolds, this is not a situation where the court is called upon to review a practice that has been engaged in by laypersons, tacitly permitted over a substantial period of time, and determined to function "reasonably well." Id. at 206. The amendment to sec. 757.48(1) (a) imposes practical impediments to the court's discharge of its substantive decisionmak-ing authority, and usurps the uniquely judicial function of determining the qualifications of those seeking to represent a minor litigant's interest. Accordingly, sec. 757.48(1)(a), as amended by 1987 Wis. Act 355, is unconstitutional.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not question the legislature's laudable purpose in establishing a level of competence for persons appointed to serve as guardians ad litem, thereby also promoting efficiency in the adjudication of minors' rights. However, these qualifications can only be established by the judicial branch pursuant *106to its authority conferred by Art. VII of the Wisconsin Constitution.
Accordingly, we conclude that it is the province of the judiciary to decide whether special training for a particular area of the law is appropriate. The amendment to sec. 757.48(l)(a), Stats., interferes with this court's power in that regard, and therefore violates the separation of powers. Because of our conclusion in this regard, we need not reach the issue whether sec. 757.48(1) (a) is impermissibly vague.
By the Court. — Rights Declared.

 For examples of recognized areas of authority exclusive to the judicial and therefore free from intrusion by another branch *101of government, see, e.g., In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874) (an attempt to remove and replace a court employee); In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109 (1912) (an attempt to dictate the physical facilities in which a court was to exercise its judicial functions); Thoe v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 181 Wis. 456 (1923) (an attempt to legislate what constitutes the legal sufficiency of evidence); Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501 (1931) (an attempt to regulate trials in the conduct of court business); see also, cases cited in G. Currie & W. Resh, The Separation of Powers Control of Courts and Lawyers, 47 Wis. Bar Bull. 7, 11 (Dec. 1974).