Court Opinion

ID: 9900321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:10:58.846638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.357621
License: Public Domain

No. 568              November 1, 2023                  813

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                      GREG WASSON,
               an elector of the City of Salem,
                          Petitioner,
                               v.
                     SHEMIA FAGAN,
          Secretary of State of the State of Oregon,
                         Respondent.
                     Secretary of State
                           A179573

  Submitted September 1, 2023.
  Greg Wasson filed the briefs pro se.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  KAMINS, J.
  OAR 165-014-0005(3) held valid.
814                                          Wasson v. Fagan

        KAMINS, J.
         In this rule challenge under ORS 183.400, petitioner
challenges the validity of a provision of the Secretary of
State’s “County, City, and District Initiative and Referendum
Manual,” adopted by OAR 165-014-0005(3), that sets forth
the statutorily mandated signature requirements for cer-
tain areas. See ORS 255.165 (establishing different signa-
ture requirements for different geographic areas). We hold
OAR 165-014-0005(3) valid.
          The challenged rule sets forth requirements for fil-
ing prospective initiative and referendum petitions in Oregon
counties, cities, districts, and metro districts. See OAR
165-014-0005(3) (designating the “County, City, and District
Initiative and Referendum Manual revised 02/2022 and
associated forms as the procedures * * * and forms to be used
for the local initiative and referendum process”); Elections
Division, Oregon Secretary of State, County, City, and District
Initiative and Referendum Manual 5 (Feb 2022). As relevant
to this appeal, the manual specifies the number of signatures
needed to file prospective petitions in each of those locations
(signature requirement distinction), with signature require-
ments based on percentages of votes cast for governor in the
most recent general election in the relevant city, county, or
district. Id. The signature requirement distinction imposes
a higher signature percentage on Oregon districts (districts)
(15 percent for initiative petitions and 10 percent for refer-
endum petitions) than on “Portland, a metropolitan service
district organized under ORS chapter 268, a school district
with more than 40,000 pupils, or a mass transit district in
a metropolitan statistical area with a population exceeding
400,000” (metro districts) (six percent for initiative petitions
and four percent for referendum petitions). Petitioner is con-
cerned that this distinction violates the principle of one per-
son, one vote derived from the state and federal constitutions,
see In re Oregon Tunnel Dist. No. 1, 120 Or 594, 598-600, 253
P 1 (1927), by inflating initiative power in metro districts.
         We may invalidate a rule only if the agency’s adop-
tion of the rule violates the constitution, exceeds its statu-
tory authority, or failed to comply with applicable rulemak-
ing procedures. ORS 183.400(4). Here, petitioner asserts
Cite as 328 Or App 813 (2023)                                           815

that the signature requirement distinction violates a consti-
tutional provision and exceeds the statutory authority of the
Secretary of State (the Secretary).
         Turning first to petitioner’s statutory authority
challenge, we conclude that OAR 165-014-0005(3) comports
with Oregon constitutional and statutory requirements.
Petitioner first asserts a violation of ORS 246.150,1 the stat-
ute authorizing the Secretary to enact election rules, and
second, he contends that the Secretary exceeded her statu-
tory authority because the signature requirement distinc-
tion violates the Oregon Constitution. As we understand
petitioner’s first argument, petitioner asserts that the chal-
lenged provision was not within the Secretary’s authority to
enact because, in petitioner’s view, the provision violates the
mandates of ORS 246.150. However, while petitioner insists
that the signature requirement distinction is neither correct
nor impartial, he fails to identify how the signature require-
ment falls outside the scope of the Secretary’s authority.
Therefore, petitioner has not met his burden to show that
the rule is inconsistent with the principles embodied in the
Oregon Constitution and statutes. See Or Const, Art IV, § 1
(granting the legislature the authority to set requirements
for local initiatives and referenda, including for different
categories of geographical regions); Or Const, Art XI, § 14
(requiring metropolitan service districts to have the same
signature threshold requirements as home rule counties);
ORS 255.165 (setting forth the signature requirements for
districts and metro districts, consistent with the foregoing
constitutional authorities, and as the Secretary of State iden-
tified in the manual); Adamson v. Oregon Health Authority,
289 Or App 501, 505-506, 412 P3d 1193 (2017) (holding that,
where the challenged rule is within the scope of the promul-
gating agency’s authority and the petitioner fails to identify
any authority that suggests that the legislature intended to
preclude the agency from administering the rule, the rule is
valid).

   1
      ORS 246.150 provides:
       “The Secretary of State may adopt rules the secretary considers nec-
   essary to facilitate and assist in achieving and maintaining a maximum
   degree of correctness, impartiality and efficiency in administration of the
   election laws.”
816                                         Wasson v. Fagan

         Turning next to petitioner’s constitutional
challenge, the Equal Privileges Clause of the Oregon
Constitution—Article I, section 20—guarantees that “[n]o
law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citi-
zens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms,
shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Assuming the cat-
egories of voters identified in OAR 165-014-0005(5) amount
to “classes,” they are distinguished by geographical location
and are not “suspect classes.” Therefore, we review to deter-
mine whether there is a rational basis for the distinction.
See Cox v. State of Oregon, 191 Or App 1, 4, 80 P3d 514 (2003)
(explaining that a class based on geographic residence is
not suspect, and that non-suspect classes are reviewed for
rational basis).
         Under a rational basis standard, “laws are pre-
sumed to be valid,” Qwest Corp. v. Public Utility Commission,
205 Or App 370, 385, 135 P3d 321 (2006), and “will satisfy
Article I, section 20, as long as the classification bears some
rational relationship to a legitimate end,” Gunn v. Lane
County, 173 Or App 97, 104, 20 P3d 247 (2001) (internal
quotation marks, omission, and brackets omitted). To show
that the classification bears no rational relationship to a
legitimate end, the burden falls “on the one attacking the
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it * * *.” Qwest Corp., 205 Or App at
385 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the sig-
nature requirement distinction could serve the legitimate
state goal of managing the volume of initiatives or referen-
dums by requiring higher signature percentage thresholds
in districts with fewer voters. Therefore, we conclude that
the portion of OAR 165-014-0005(3) identified by petitioner
withstands a rational basis review as applied to petitioner’s
argument.
        OAR 165-014-0005(3) held valid.