Court Opinion

ID: 9540382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:15:29.623959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:30.846856
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, J.
(dissenting). It is to be remembered that this is a law action and not one of equitable cognizance.
The question for determination is, Does the petition state a clear cause of action? I think not. The petition is rather lengthy, but it does not allege or refer to a single condition contained in the bond which has been breached. The essential provision of the bond is as follows:
“Now, therefore, we hereby undertake to the said plaintiff, the penial sum of $1858, that said defendant shall duly prosecute said action and pay all costs and damages which may be awarded against them; and if said property be delivered to them, the said defendant, that they will return the said property to the plaintiff after a writ thereof be adjudged.” (Emphasis mine.)
The bond is conditioned that defendants will duly prosecute the action and pay all damages that may be assessed against them, and that if the property be delivered to the defendants, they will return the same to plaintiff if a writ thereof be adjudged.
It is not alleged that the action was not duly prosecuted nor that damages were awarded against the defendants in the case at bar, nor is it alleged that it was adjudged by the court that the property taken by these defendants under the writ be returned to the plaintiff. It is essential, in order to state a cause of action in a case of this *446character, for the petition to allege that the judgment in the replevin action ordered and directed that the property be returned to the plaintiff. The judgment is attached to the petition as an exhibit, and speaks for itself. It provides as follows:
“It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the said plaintiff, Tommy Rostykus, have and recover of the defendant, A. C. Holden, the sum of $471.15 and that the plaintiff, Tommy Rostykus, deliver to the defendant, A. C. Holden, one 1941 Dodge Tudor Sedan, Motor No. D19133936.
“It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the note and mortgage given for the purchase of said automobile and now in the hands of Fidelity Finance Company, a corporation, is cancelled and held for naught and of no further force and effect.
“It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the Cross-Petition of Fidelity Finance Company, a corporation, is hereby denied and the Fidelity Finance Company, a corporation, is to take nothing by reason of said Cross-Petition.”
The judgment does not order and direct defendants to return the property to the plaintiff. It is ordered and adjudged that the defendants take nothing by their cross-petition; that the plaintiff have and recover from defendant A. C. Holden the amount advanced by him as a down payment on the automobile; and that the automobile be delivered to A. C. Holden. The meaning of the judgment can be determined only from its contents, as nothing else is before us. The petition on which the judgment was based is not made a part of the petition here.
The surety on the replevin bond, like a surety on other bonds, cannot be held liable beyond the obligation assumed by him under the terms of the bond.
In 46 Am. Jur. 80, §149, it is said:
“In accordance with the general principles of suretyship, the liability of sureties on replevin and redelivery bonds is coextensive with and limited to the terms of the bond or contract
And at page 84, §156, it is stated:
“. . . It is well established that the surety on a replevin bond conditioned for the return of the replevied property, in case a return thereof is adjudged by the court, is not liable for the failure of the parties against whom judgment is rendered to return the property where the judgment does not direct a return thereof. This is generally held true, even though the court or jury finds that at the commencement of the action the defendant was entitled to immediate possession of the property.”
In 65 A.L.R. 1302, the author states:
“The sureties on a replevin bond, conditioned for the return of the replevied property in case a return thereof is adjudged by the court, are not liable for the failure of the party against whom judgment is rendered to return the property, where the judgment does not direct a return thereof.”
Numerous cases appearing in the annotations support the above statement.
The majority opinion takes the position that the judgment of the court in the prior action, wherein it holds that defendants take nothing by their cross-petition and that the plaintiff return the automobile to Holden, can be interpreted only as meaning that the automobile was to be delivered to the plaintiff. I cannot agree. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Rosen v. United States Rubber Co., 167 N. E. 655, held a judgment for the defendant not ordering the return of goods to him nor assessing damages does not carry any implication for the return of the property or for the payment of damages, and that defendant was not entitled to recover on the replevin bond of the plaintiff. Other cases appearing in the annotations above referred to reach the same conclusion. As a matter of fact, plaintiff was ask*447ing that the sale be set aside, and •could not ask that the car be returned to him.
I challenge the correctness of the statement made in the majority opinion that the defendant Finance Company failed to perform as directed and converted the automobile by chattel mortgage sale. The man whom the judgment directed to receive the car did receive it. This is not a suit for conversion, but if it were the plaintiff could not recover. In order for him to recover in an action in conversion it would be necessary that he be the owner of or entitled to the possession of the property alleged to have been converted at the time of its conversion (Shelton v. Jones, 66 Okla. 83, 167 P. 458; McCracken v. Cline, 55 Okla. 37, 154 P. 1174), and this he was not.
The petition does not state a cause of action on any theory, and the demurrer was properly sustained.
I dissent.