Court Opinion

ID: 2963911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:17:20.132758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:48.378225
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          March 7, 1996         [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

          No. 95-2009

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                PATRICIA C. HARRISON,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                           ______________

                                _____________________

               Samuel  J. Buffone, with whom  Brian S. Chilton  and Ropes &
               __________________             ________________      _______
          Gray were on brief for appellant.
          ____
               Carolyn  Stafford Stein,  Assistant United  States Attorney,
               _______________________
          with whom Donald K.  Stern, United States Attorney, was  on brief
                    ________________
          for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.   Defendant-Appellant  Patricia
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
                               ___________

          C.  Harrison  appeals from  the sentence imposed  by the district

          court  after her plea of  guilty to seventy-seven  counts of bank

          fraud in  violation of  18 U.S.C.     1344.1   Appellant, who  is

          currently serving her prison sentence, requests that her sentence

          be vacated and that we remand for resentencing.   For the reasons

          stated below, we affirm the district court's sentence.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    On December 17, 1991, a  federal grand jury returned an

          indictment against  Patricia C. Harrison and  her husband Stephen

          G.  Harrison, charging them with one hundred counts of bank fraud

          in violation of 18 U.S.C.   1344 and with one count of bankruptcy

          fraud  in  violation of  18 U.S.C.     152.   Appellant  moved to

          dismiss  the indictment on  May 18, 1992, on  the ground that the

          bank fraud  counts were  multiplicitous.   Six  months later,  on

          November 16,  1992, the district court  denied Appellant's motion

          and  on  January 12,  1993,  a  federal  grand  jury  returned  a

          superseding indictment, which  merged a number of  the bank fraud

          counts  from  the original  indictment  into a  lesser  number of

          counts.    The  superseding  indictment  alleged  three  separate
                              
          ____________________

          1  This section provides, in pertinent part:

                      Whoever knowingly executes . . . a scheme
                      or artifice -- (1) to defraud a financial
                      institution;  or (2) to obtain any of the
                      moneys   .   .   .   [of]   a   financial
                      institution,   by   means  of   false  or
                      fraudulent  pretenses .  .  .  [shall  be
                      guilty of a crime].

          18 U.S.C.   1344 (1988) & Supp. II (1990).

                                         -2-

          schemes by which  Appellant and her  husband defrauded the  banks

          involved.  On  April 10, 1995, Appellant pled  guilty to seventy-

          seven of the  seventy-nine counts  of bank fraud  charged in  the

          superseding indictment.  

                    In the plea agreement, Appellant acknowledged that  she

          was  subject  to  separate  punishments  of  up  to  five  years'

          imprisonment  on each  of the counts  but one, for  which she was

          subject to  a maximum penalty of  up to thirty years.   Appellant

          also agreed  to pay a  special assessment of  $50 on each  of the

          seventy-seven counts to which she pled guilty.  The  pre-sentence

          report ("PSR") calculated Appellant's offense level in accordance

          with the plea agreement,  with two exceptions, only one  of which

          is relevant to this  appeal.  The PSR calculated  the appropriate

          loss  range  under  U.S.S.G.    2F1.1(b)(1)(K)  to  be  more than

          $5,000,000 because the victim  bank lost principal in the  amount

          of $10,998,072.67.  This differed from  the plea agreement, which

          provided for a loss of between $2-$5 million.  In her pre-hearing

          sentencing memorandum,  Appellant  asked the  district  court  to

          depart  from the applicable guideline range for two reasons:  (i)

          the amount of loss overstated the seriousness of her offense; and

          (ii)  her  husband's  illness.     Apart  from  these  arguments,

          Appellant did not object to the PSR's amount of loss or guideline

          calculation, or to any of the offense conduct detailed in the PSR

          that was the basis for those findings.

                    At  the sentencing hearing,  and after hearing argument

          from  the  parties regarding  the  appropriate  loss amount,  the

                                         -3-

          district  court found  the loss  for  purposes of    2F1.1  to be

          between $2-5 million.  In addition, the district court found that

          the total  offense level was  18, with a  corresponding guideline

          sentencing   range  of   twenty-seven  to   thirty-three  months'

          imprisonment.   The  district court  made a  three-level downward

          departure,  on the  basis  of circumstances  surrounding the  ill

          health  of  Appellant's  husband,  bringing the  total  to  level

          fifteen, with  a corresponding  range of eighteen  to twenty-four

          months.  Appellant's total  offense level of fifteen was  made up

          of  the following elements:  a base  offense level of six under  

          2F1.1(a); a ten-level enhancement under   2F1.1(b)(1)  to reflect

          the  amount of loss,  found to be  between $2-$5 million;  a two-

          level  enhancement  for  more   than  minimal  planning  under   

          2F1.1(b)(2)(A); a two-level enhancement for supervising others in

          the commission of the offense under   3B1.1(c); and a three-level

          downward  departure  based  on  the  ill  health  of  Appellant's

          husband.   Combined  with  a  criminal  history  category  of  I,

          Appellant's resulting total offense level was fifteen.  

                    On  August  7,  1995,  the  district  court   sentenced

          Appellant  to  24  months  in  prison  and  ordered  her  to  pay

          restitution  in the amount of $10,998,072.67,  the amount lost by

          the victim bank as  found in the PSR by the  district court.  The

          district  court also imposed  a three  year period  of supervised

          release and a special assessment of $3,850.  

                    This appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to

          18 U.S.C.   3742(a) (1994).

                                         -4-

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW
                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW
                                  __________________

                    We  review   for  clear  error  factbound   matters  in

          sentencing,  mindful  that such  factual  findings  need only  be

          supported  by a preponderance of the evidence, and review de novo
                                                                    _______

          questions  of  law, including  the  applicability  of a  relevant

          guideline.   United  States v.  Mart nez-Mart nez, 69  F.3d 1215,
                       ______________     _________________

          1224 (1st Cir. 1995).

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                    Appellant entered into an unconditional plea agreement,

          whereby she agreed to plead guilty to the seventy-seven counts of

          bank  fraud, to subject herself to separate punishment on each of

          these counts, and to  pay a special  assessment on each of  those

          counts.  Appellant does not challenge her conviction but, rather,

          challenges the sentence imposed by the district court.  Appellant

          contends that the seventy-seven counts of bank fraud are facially

          multiplicitous  because the  superseding indictment  supports, at

          most, only three counts of bank fraud.  See,  e.g., United States
                                                  ___   ____  _____________

          v. Broce,  488 U.S. 563,  574 (1989) (establishing  the principle
             _____

          that  a  defendant who  pleads guilty  to  a criminal  charge may

          subsequently assert  a claim of multiple  punishment in violation

          of the Double Jeopardy  Clause only if the violation  is apparent

          on  the face of the  indictment itself); United  States v. Lilly,
                                                   ______________    _____

          983  F.2d 300, 302-04 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that an indictment

          for bank fraud is multiplicitous when it charges a defendant with

          multiple counts for each "single execution of a unitary scheme").

          Because  the seventy-seven counts  were multiplicitous, Appellant

                                         -5-

          argues,  she was prejudiced in  the view of  the sentencing court

          and her sentence violates Double Jeopardy principles. 

                    While our review  of the  district court's  application

          and  interpretation  of  the  Sentencing  Guidelines is  plenary,

          Mart nez-Mart nez, 69 F.3d at  1224, "[w]e have repeatedly stated
          _________________

          in the sentencing context, as well as in other areas, that issues

          not presented to the district court will not be addressed for the

          first time  on appeal."  United States v. Haggert, 980 F.2d 8, 10
                                   _____________    _______

          (1st  Cir.  1992).   We have  also  stated that  "[a]rguments not

          raised below will  be entertained on  appeal only in  'horrendous

          cases where a gross  miscarriage of justice would occur'  and, in

          addition, where  the newly asserted  ground 'is so  compelling as

          virtually to insure appellant's success.'"  Id. (quoting Johnston
                                                      ___          ________

          v. Holiday Inns, 595 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1979)).  Here, these
             ____________

          straightforward rules  leave Appellant's  sails flapping  idly in

          the wind.

                    Although "a defendant's unconditional guilty  plea does

          not automatically waive  the right to appeal  matters incident to

          sentencing  as opposed  to guilt," United  States v.  Cordero, 42
                                             ______________     _______

          F.3d 697,  699 (1st Cir.  1994), we nonetheless  find Appellant's

          multiplicity  argument waived.  Even though  she only raises this

          argument  as to her sentencing, we find controlling the fact that

          Appellant had ample opportunity to challenge the sentence imposed

          and raise her multiplicity  argument as to sentencing before  the

          district court.  

                                         -6-

                    The record before us clearly shows that Appellant never

          objected  on  grounds of  multiplicity  or  raised this  argument

          during the  change of plea  hearing, in her  pre-hearing sentence

          memorandum, or during the sentencing hearing.  The PSR calculated

          Appellant's  offense level to  be twenty-one.   Appellant did not

          file  any objections to the PSR.  In her pre-sentence memorandum,

          Appellant argued on  two grounds that  the district court  depart

          from the  applicable guideline  sentencing range, but  neither of

          them concerned the  multiplicity of the counts.   Indeed, besides

          supporting a finding of Appellant's failure to object, the record

          shows  that  the  district  court  specifically drew  Appellant's

          attention  to  the  government's  evidence  regarding  the counts

          charged, pointed out the portion of the agreement identifying the

          maximum  penalties to which  defendant could  be subject  on each

          count,  and   notified  Appellant  of  the   possibility  of  the

          imposition of restitution.  

                    Appellant insists, however, that  she did not waive her

          multiplicity challenge, arguing that  it was preserved for appeal

          because she  challenged the original  indictment on  multiplicity

          grounds.    Appellant  relies  on two  cases,  United  States  v.
                                                         ______________

          Molinaro, 11 F.3d 853, 858 n.9 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115
          ________                                        ____________

          S. Ct. 668  (1994), and United States  v. Fuesting, 845 F.2d  664
                                  _____________     ________

          (7th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that she was not required to

          challenge the superseding indictment  after her motion to dismiss

          the  original indictment was  denied.   We need  not rule  on the

          merit  of   Appellant's  argument,  because   what  controls   is

                                         -7-

          Appellant's  subsequent  act  of  voluntarily  and  intelligently

          pleading  guilty to  all seventy-seven  counts, coupled  with her

          failure  to make any objection to  the superseding indictment, to

          the seventy-seven counts, to the offense conduct contained in the

          PSR, or  to the sentence imposed.   Thus, we decline  to consider

          this argument.2  

                    Appellant also argues that  the district court's  fraud

          loss  calculation was  erroneous under    2F1.1(b)(1)(K),   which

          increases  the level  of punishment  according to  the amount  of

          "loss" caused by  the fraud.   We find,  however, that  Appellant

          waived  any claim  of error  in the  court's calculation  of loss

          under   2F1.1,  because no objection was made  to the accuracy of

          the facts set forth in the offense conduct section of the PSR, to

          the amount  of  loss found  by  the  district court,  or  to  the

          district court's guideline calculation.  Because Appellant failed

          to  object to the district court's determination as to the amount

          of loss  for purposes of   2F1.1, her sentence can be reversed on

          this basis  only upon a  showing of "plain  error."  See  Fed. R.
                                                               ___

          Crim. P.  52(b).3  To  meet the  plain error standard  there must
                              
          ____________________

          2   We note that  even if the  counts were multiplicitous, remand
          for  resentencing would not be an  appropriate remedy.  Appellant
          received identical sentences on each of the seventy-seven counts,
          and it is undisputed that all of the offense conduct that was the
          basis  for   those  sentences   would  be  equally   relevant  to
          resentencing on the remaining  counts.  Accordingly, remand would
          be an  empty and needless exercise.   See Lilly, 983  F.2d at 305
                                                ___ _____
          n.11. 

          3  This rule provides, in pertinent part, that "[p]lain errors or
          defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they
          were not brought to the  attention of the court."  Fed.  R. Crim.
          P. 52(b).

                                         -8-

          be:  (i) a reviewable error (ii) that is "clear" or "obvious" and

          (iii) affects  "substantial rights."  United  States v. Benjamin,
                                                ______________    ________

          30 F.3d 196,  197 (1st Cir. 1994).  We  retain the discretion not

          to correct an  error, however plain, unless the error "'seriously

          affect[s]  the  fairness,  integrity  or  public  reputation   of

          judicial proceedings.'"   United States  v. Olano, ___  U.S. ___,
                                    _____________     _____

          ___,  113  S. Ct.  1770, 1779  (1993)  (quoting United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          Atkinson, 297  U.S.  157,  160  (1936));  see  United  States  v.
          ________                                  ___  ______________

          Olivier-D az,  13  F.3d  1,  5  (1st  Cir.  1993)  (quoting  same
          ____________

          language). 

                    Far from constituting plain error, the district court's

          finding  as to  the  amount of  loss attributable  to Appellant's

          conduct under   2F1.1(b)(1)(K) was fully supported by the record.

          The PSR  found  that the  actual  loss  to the  victim  bank  was

          $10,998,072.67  in principal  and  $7,858,292.69  in interest  on

          Appellant's  loan.    At the  hearing,  the  court was  therefore

          prepared  to adopt the PSR's determination that loss for purposes

          of   2F1.1 was more than $5,000,000.  According to the transcript

          of the  sentencing hearing, the district court  adopted the lower

          $2,000,000  to $5,000,000  loss range  "in light  of the  need to

          calibrate  the loss  attributable to  [Appellant's]  actions more

          fairly."  Contrary to Appellant's claim, nowhere in our review of

          the  record do  we find  any evidence  that the  district court's

          finding  was based  on  "speculation."    We  note  further  that

          Appellant fully conceded  the accuracy  of these  figures at  her
                              
          ____________________

          

                                         -9-

          change of plea hearing  and at sentencing.  Accordingly,  we find

          no "clear"  or "obvious" error by the district court.  Even if we

          were  to find any,  there is no  evidence that  the alleged error

          affected her "substantial rights" or her sentence. 

                    Finally, Appellant argues that the district court erred

          in ordering restitution under 18 U.S.C.   3664, which establishes

          the factors to be considered by the court in determining an order

          of restitution,  in  excess  of  $10  million,  an  amount  which

          exceeded the loss range  used by the district court  for purposes

          of   2F1.1.   We find, however,  that Appellant waived  her claim

          regarding the restitution  order because she failed  to object to

          the  PSR's  calculation  of  the  victim  bank's  actual loss  as

          $10,998,072.67  in  principal, to  the  PSR's determination  that

          restitution  in that amount  was appropriate, or  to the district

          court's  order of restitution in that amount.  As with the amount

          of  loss, we  can reverse  the restitution  order only  for plain

          error.  Olivier-D az, 13 F.3d at 5.  Appellant conceded below and
                  ____________

          does  not deny  on  appeal  that the  actual  amount of  loss  in

          principal  to the  victim  bank was  in  excess of  $10  million.

          Accordingly, the  district court's  order of restitution  in that

          amount was fully appropriate, and, because it is  fully supported

          by the  record, it does not  constitute plain error.   We find no

          evidence  of  harm to  Appellant's  "substantial  rights" by  the

          district court's  decision to hold Appellant  responsible for the

          entire loss resulting from her fraud.  

                                         -10-

                    For the foregoing reasons,  the sentence imposed by the

          district court is Affirmed.
                            ________

                                         -11-