Court Opinion

ID: 9678052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:09:42.628479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:01.600049
License: Public Domain

Melvin Mayfield, Judge, dissenting. I cannot agree with the result of the majority opinion because I think the trial court should have allowed the appellant either to amend to plead the set-off disclosed in his answers to the interrogatories, or to grant him a continuance so that he could amend to allege the set-off. The majority opinion concedes that ARCP 15(a) allows a party to amend its pleadings at any time unless the court “determines that prejudice would result or the disposition of the cause unduly delayed because of the filing of the amendment.” It is difficult to believe the appellee would have been prejudiced by the amendment proffered by the appellant since the answers to the interrogatories had been filed over 20 months before the day the matter came on for trial. Nevertheless, the appellee claimed it was not prepared to defend against the amendment because it had no witness present except its president and he was prepared only to submit the verified account. Assuming the appellee would have been prejudiced by the filing of the amendment on the day of the trial, why would the court not allow the appellant a continuance so he could amend to plead the set-off without prejudice to the appellee? Of course, ARCP 15(a) provides that an amendment to a pleading may not be allowed if the court determines that it will unduly delay the disposition of the case, but the trial judge made no mention of any undue delay. Actually what troubled the judge, and he so stated, was the fact that a j ury was present and the j udge did not want to tell them to “go home without doing anything.” I agree that this is a proper concern, but for many years what is now Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-1404 (Repl. 1979) has provided that continuances may be granted upon the condition that the party obtaining the continuance pay the cost due for the term in which the continuance is granted. See also Boone v. Skinner, 85 Ark. 200, 107 S.W. 673 (1908). I think the court should have granted appellant’s motion for continuance but should have conditioned it upon an agreement that appellant pay the cost of the jury for the day. In Baldwin v. Baldwin, 266 Ark. 892, 587 S.W.2d 592 (Ark. App. 1979), this court allowed a petition for a set-off for child support to be filed after a decree for partition had been entered and the property had been sold. And in the early case of Turner v. Tapscott, 30 Ark. 312, 527 (1875), the court said: The Code practice is liberal with regard to amendments when the object is to obviate an omission, either in pleading or evidence, if amended or allowed, which would tend to facilitate the final disposition of the case upon its merits. It would have been in keeping with the spirit of our procedure, both present and past, to allow the appellant to amend to allege his set-off. I would reverse and remand this case for that purpose on the condition set out above. Cooper, J. joins in this dissent.