Court Opinion

ID: 9966254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 16:00:38.524176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:39.479625
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13809    Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 05/06/2024   Page: 1 of 17

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13809
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        SAMUEL ODEKHIRAN,
        a.k.a. Samuel Edeki Odekhiran,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00391-LMM-JKL-1
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13809

                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Samuel Odekhiran appeals his conviction for aiding and
        abetting wire fraud, arguing that (1) the district court abused its
        discretion in admitting evidence that he fled to Canada after he
        learned that the government was filing a criminal complaint
        against him, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
        conviction. After review, we affirm.
                                 I.     Background
               On January 28, 2019, a magistrate judge authorized a
        criminal complaint alleging that Odekhiran sent a wire transfer of
        funds in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, in violation of 18
        U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2. Thereafter, in October 2021, a grand jury
        indicted Odekhiran on one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud,
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2. The indictment alleged that
        the scheme ran from February 2017 to approximately June 2018.
        During this time, Odekhiran registered a company, Davinci
        Trading and Logistics, LLC, with the Georgia Secretary of State
        and opened up at least 13 bank accounts with 12 different financial
        institutions. He received wire transfers totaling more than $3
        million from various persons and entities and then promptly
        transferred the funds out of the business accounts “to destinations
        including an entertainment business in Nigeria as well as unknown
        entities in China.”
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        22-13809              Opinion of the Court                        3

                The indictment further alleged that victims K.L. and M.L.
        sought to sell a condominium they owned off the coast of
        Venezuela, and they hired a management company to manage the
        sale. In June 2017, an agent with the management company, R.G.,
        received a fraudulent email which looked to be from K.L. with
        wiring instructions for the proceeds from the sale of the
        condominium. The instructions directed that the funds be wired
        into an account opened and controlled by Odekhiran. The agent
        followed the instructions and wired $259,312 to this account.
        Odekhiran kept some of the funds for himself and then wired the
        rest to other participants.
               Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine
        seeking to admit evidence of Odekhiran’s pre-trial flight to Canada.
        Specifically, the government explained that it had engaged in
        pre-indictment discussions with Odekhiran and his counsel in
        hopes of obtaining a “pre-indictment resolution.” However, when
        those discussions failed, the government applied for a criminal
        complaint and arrest warrant for Odekhiran in January 2019, and it
        coordinated a voluntary surrender with his attorney. However,
        Odekhiran did not show up for the scheduled surrender. Instead,
        agents discovered that he fled to Canada, and he remained there
        while the government tried to extradite him. The government
        argued that evidence of Odekhiran’s flight should be admitted as
        consciousness of guilt.
              Odekhiran objected to the admission of such evidence. He
        argued that his flight was not probative of his guilt because it was
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13809

        too remote in time from the crime and start of the investigation to
        support an inference of guilt given that he fled months after he
        learned that he was a target of the government’s investigation and
        had been engaged in negotiations with the government about a
        deal. He argued that based on the delayed timing of his flight, there
        were other plausible explanations for his flight other than guilt,
        such as fear of detention, immigration consequences, and a
        wrongful conviction.
               The district court held a hearing on the motion. Following
        extensive arguments by the parties, the district court held that the
        evidence of flight was admissible. The district court rejected
        Odekhiran’s argument that the flight was too remote in time,
        explaining that there was no timing issue once all the facts and
        circumstances were examined because this case involved a
        “ramping up” situation where
              there was an attempt to negotiate a pre-indictment
              resolution, and that fell apart, and then you’ve got the
              arrest warrant and then the voluntary surrender date
              and the ﬂeeing happening so close to the point at
              which this is becoming extremely real, and he’s going
              to have to voluntarily surrender . . . .

               At trial, Kevin Hall, an FBI agent, testified that he
        investigated business e-mail compromise schemes, which involved
        using legitimate and spoofed e-mail addresses to change wire
        instructions and divert payments to accounts controlled by the
        scammers. In this case, e-mail accounts for K.L. and the
        management company’s agent, R.G., were spoofed to perpetrate a
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        22-13809               Opinion of the Court                         5

        fraud. K.L.’s spoofed e-mail account was traced back to an IP
        address in Nigeria. K.L.’s spoofed e-mail account instructed R.G.
        to send the money from the condominium sale to a SunTrust bank
        account owned by Davinci Trading—which was registered to
        Odekhiran—and not K.L. Indeed, K.L. did not have a bank account
        with SunTrust.
                Davinci Trading was registered to Odekhiran. The business
        address for Davinci Trading was Odekhiran’s residence, and its
        listed purpose was wholesale trading, “specifically other groceries
        and related products.” Odekhiran opened the SunTrust bank
        account and was the only signatory on the account. Between June
        27 and June 28, 2017, $259,312 was deposited into Davinci
        Trading’s SunTrust bank account with the purpose for the transfer
        listed as the sale of “Seaside Apartment 301.”
                Notably, on June 27, 2017, after receiving notification of the
        impending wire, Odekhiran reached out to SunTrust via an online
        customer portal and stated “please return any transfer from the
        attachment herein. I am not expecting any money from them as it
        is a transaction I don’t know.” However, the next day, Odekhiran
        again e-mailed customer care asking the bank to disregard his prior
        message and stating that he had “confirmed the origin and
        purpose” of the transfer and that it came from a customer. A bank
        employee from SunTrust testified that Davinci Trading confirming
        the accuracy of the transaction would have delayed any type of
        fraud investigation by the bank. The next day, $209,000 was
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13809

        transferred from Davinci Trading’s account to an overseas account
        in China.
              When Hall reviewed Odekhiran’s e-mail account, he found
        e-mails tied to the K.L. real estate fraud but none that revealed
        Odekhiran had direct knowledge of the fraud. Hall confirmed that
        there was no evidence that Odekhiran created the spoofed e-mail
        account.
                Odekhiran told Hall during an interview at his home that
        Davinci Trading imported groceries and clothing from Nigeria to
        sell to the local community. Odekhiran told Hall that he obtained
        customers by “word of mouth.” He explained that he sometimes
        shipped goods directly to his customers, and other times, he
        received the goods at his home and then distributed them.
        Odekhiran said that customers sent money to him for goods in
        Nigeria because they were uncomfortable sending money directly
        to Nigeria and then he would forward the money on to Nigeria.
        Upon execution of a search warrant on Odekhiran’s home—which
        again was the registered address of the business—agents found no
        inventory, invoices, customer lists, shipping boxes, or items related
        to running a business.
               Odekhiran told Hall that he was working with a sourcing
        agent in Nigeria, Ethel Ikeji, who split the revenue with him. Hall
        subpoenaed e-mails from Ikeji and discovered that he too was
        “defrauding people.” Hall then obtained an international warrant
        for Ikeji’s arrest.
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        22-13809               Opinion of the Court                        7

               Hall further testified as to details concerning other bank
        accounts at other financial institutions that belonged to Davinci
        Trading on which Odekhiran was the signatory. Large-sum
        suspicious wire transactions were also made into and out of these
        accounts both domestically and internationally. Some of these
        banks contacted Odekhiran and questioned the wire activity. In
        total, Hall discovered 12 bank accounts with $3 million wired into
        them. Yet, there were no tax records for Davinci Trading for 2016
        through 2018. And Odekhiran personally reported $57,521 in
        gross income for him and his wife for 2017.
                Four victims of fraud involving Davinci Trading testified for
        the government. In addition to testimony from K.L. about the
        stolen proceeds from the condominium sale, another victim
        testified that she was scammed by a person she met online claiming
        to be an art dealer. She sent money on multiple occasions to this
        person, and on one of those occasions she wired money into one
        of Davinci Trading’s bank accounts. She never received any goods
        in exchange and she did not know or interact with Odekhiran.
        Another victim was a real estate investor. He purchased an
        investment property and intended to wire approximately $73,000
        to the title company. Prior to the transfer, his company received
        an e-mail purportedly from the title company with new wiring
        instructions. They followed the instructions and wired the money
        into an account belonging to Davinci Trading, not the title
        company. The victim did not know Odekhiran and had never
        done business with him or Davinci Trading. The victim called his
        bank and was able to stop the wire and recoup the money. Another
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        8                        Opinion of the Court               22-13809

        victim was scammed by a man she met through a dating app. She
        sent the man money for medical bills and legal fees. She wired the
        money to an account owned by Davinci Trading. She did not
        know Odekhiran and did not do any business with Davinci
        Trading.
               The district court then read a stipulation from the parties
        including the following facts. In 2019, the government charged
        Odekhiran with aiding and abetting wire fraud, and Odekhiran was
        told by his counsel to voluntarily surrender to authorities on
        February 7, 2019, at the courthouse. Odekhiran did not surrender
        to authorities and was later found in Canada. He crossed over into
        Canada on or about February 7 or 8, 2019.
               Odekhiran called one witness—his sister. She testified that
        Ikeji was Odekhiran’s childhood friend. She offered her opinion
        that her brother was a law-abiding, honest, and truthful person.
               At the close of the government’s evidence, Odekhiran
        moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence,
        arguing that the government failed to prove that he “knowingly
        joined” a wire fraud offense. He argued that he was “duped” by
        Ikeji and that there was no evidence that he knew that criminal
        conduct was occurring, and that he made an informed choice to
        participate. 1
               The district court denied Odekhiran’s motion and stated
        that there was sufficient evidence of knowledge and intent to

        1 Odekhiran later renewed this motion.
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        22-13809               Opinion of the Court                          9

        submit the case to the jury. The court stated that as to the K.L.
        wire in question, there was evidence that Odekhiran’s
        communications with SunTrust Bank about that wire and its origin
        delayed any investigation, and that Odekhiran lied to the bank
        about talking with the customer for that transaction.
                Prior to closing arguments, the court instructed the jury that
        intentional flight “immediately after a crime has been committed
        or after [the defendant] is accused of a crime” was not by itself
        sufficient to show guilt but could be considered during the overall
        determination of guilt. Further, the court instructed the jury that
        whether or not Odekhiran’s conduct constituted flight or showed
        a consciousness of guilt was exclusively for the jury to determine.
        And, in making these determinations, the jury should “consider
        that there may be reasons for [the defendant’s conduct] which are
        fully consistent with innocence,” including “fear of being
        apprehended, unwillingness to confront the police, or reluctance
        to confront the witness.” Moreover, the court cautioned that “a
        feeling of guilt does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of a crime.”
                With regard to the knowledge element of the offense, the
        district court instructed the jury that knowledge could also be
        proven by showing that Odekhiran deliberately avoided learning
        that he was part of a fraud but that “negligence, carelessness, or
        foolishness” was not enough to show knowledge.
              The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Odekhiran was
        subsequently sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment to be
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13809

        followed by three years’ supervised release.          Odekhiran now
        appeals his conviction.
                                    II.    Discussion
                             A. Admission of the evidence of flight
                Odekhiran argues that the district court abused its discretion
        when it admitted the allegedly highly prejudicial evidence of his
        flight to Canada. He maintains that he knew for nine months prior
        to his flight that he was the suspect of an investigation, and,
        therefore, his flight was too far removed from the criminal activity
        and the initial investigation to support an inference of
        consciousness of guilt.
                We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence of
        a defendant’s flight for abuse of discretion, and that decision will
        not be overturned “absent a showing of clear abuse.” United States
        v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
        Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he deference that
        is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review[] requires that we not
        reverse an evidentiary decision of a district court unless the ruling
        is manifestly erroneous.” (quotations and internal citation
        omitted)). Moreover, “even an abuse of discretion will not warrant
        reversal where the resulting error was harmless. We will not
        overturn an evidentiary ruling and order a new trial unless the
        objecting party has shown a substantial prejudicial effect from the
        ruling.” United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1330–31 (11th Cir.
        2018) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Al-Sadawi, 432
        F.3d 419, 424–25 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying harmless error standard
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        22-13809               Opinion of the Court                         11

        to evidence of flight). “Substantial prejudice goes to the outcome
        of the trial; where an error had no substantial influence on the
        outcome, and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the
        verdict, reversal is not warranted.” Barton, 909 F.3d at 1331
        (quotations omitted).
               “Evidence of flight is admissible to demonstrate
        consciousness of guilt and thereby guilt.” United States v. Williams,
        541 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). We have
        explained that the probative value of flight evidence as
        circumstantial evidence of guilt
               depends upon the degree of conﬁdence with which
               four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the
               defendant’s behavior to ﬂight; (2) from ﬂight to
               consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of
               guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime
               charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt
               concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the
               crime charged.
        United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting
        United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977)).
        However, the probative value of flight evidence “is diminished . . .
        if there has been a significant time delay between the commission
        of the crime or the point at which the accused has become aware
        that he is the subject of a criminal investigation, to the time of
        flight.” Williams, 541 F.3d at 1089 (quotations omitted).
               Odekhiran’s argument that the district court abused its
        discretion in admitting the flight evidence because it was too
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-13809

        removed from his commission of the crime or the point at which
        he became aware that he was the subject of investigation is
        unpersuasive. In this case, there was sufficient circumstantial
        evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that a jury could
        reasonably infer consciousness of guilt of the crime charged from
        Odekhiran’s flight. Although the flight was remote in time to when
        the crime occurred and when Odekhiran first learned of the initial
        investigation, it was proximate in time to the filing of the formal
        criminal complaint against him and the scheduled date of his
        voluntary surrender. Given the totality of the circumstances, it was
        within the court’s broad discretion to conclude that there was no
        “immediacy” problem with the flight evidence, and Odekhiran has
        not shown that the district court’s decision was “manifestly
        erroneous.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1258. Furthermore, we have
        upheld admission of flight evidence under similar circumstances.
        See, e.g., Blakey, 960 F.2d at 1000–01 (upholding admission of
        evidence of flight where “[t]he flight occurred three years after the
        [crime]” and where “there was some evidence that [the defendant]
        knew than an indictment had been issued against him or at least
        that he was under investigation”); United States v. Ramon-Perez, 703
        F.2d 1231, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding flight evidence
        admissible as consciousness of guilt where defendant fled within
        several weeks of his formal arrest and release on bond and a few
        days before a scheduled hearing).
               Moreover, even assuming that the district court abused its
        discretion in admitting this evidence, any error was harmless in
        light of the court’s limiting instruction on the flight evidence and
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        22-13809               Opinion of the Court                         13

        the other overwhelming evidence against Odekhiran. Barton, 909
        F.3d at 1331; Al-Sadawi, 432 F.3d at 425. Accordingly, Odekhiran is
        not entitled to relief on this claim.
                                B. Sufficiency of the evidence
               Odekhiran argues that the evidence was not sufficient to
        prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about and intended
        to aid a scheme to defraud at the time of the wire transfer in June
        2017 related to the K.L. property.
                “We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
        conviction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
        to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and
        credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v.
        Taylor, 480 F.3d 1025, 1026 (11th Cir. 2007). “[W]e will not disturb
        a guilty verdict unless, given the evidence in the record, no trier of
        fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
        States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations
        omitted). “[T]he evidence need not be inconsistent with every
        reasonable hypothesis except guilt, and the jury is free to choose
        between or among the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from
        the evidence presented at trial.” United States v. Watts, 896 F.3d
        1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). Notably, “[t]he
        test for sufficiency of the evidence is identical regardless of whether
        the evidence is direct or circumstantial, and no distinction is to be
        made between the weight given to either direct or circumstantial
        evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted).
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13809

               Odekhiran was convicted of aiding and abetting wire fraud
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2. “In order to prove that the
        defendant aided and abetted an offense, the government must
        establish that: (1) someone else committed [wire fraud]; (2) the
        defendant committed an act that contributed to and furthered the
        offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid in the commission of
        the offense.” United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th
        Cir. 2016). Wire fraud requires that the government prove beyond
        a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly “(1) participated
        in a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) with intent to defraud; and
        (3) used, or caused the use of, interstate wire transmissions for the
        purpose of executing the scheme or artifice to defraud.” United
        States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1082–83 (11th Cir. 2018)
        (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282,
        1299 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that mail and wire fraud require
        the government to prove that the defendant “knew of and willfully
        joined in the unlawful scheme to defraud”).
               Here, Odekhiran argues that the evidence was insufficient
        to show that he knowingly participated in a scheme or artifice to
        defraud and that he knowingly acted with an intent to defraud. A
        defendant acts knowingly when he acts with actual knowledge or
        deliberate ignorance. United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1570–
        71 (11th Cir. 1991). Deliberate ignorance means that the defendant
        had “his suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make
        further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance.” Id.
        at 1570; see also United States v. Hristov, 466 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir.
        2006) (“We have long recognized that the knowledge element of a
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        22-13809                  Opinion of the Court                               15

        violation of a criminal statute can be proved by demonstrating
        either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance.” (quotations
        omitted)). Additionally, a jury may infer intent from the
        defendant’s conduct and circumstantial evidence. Maxwell, 579
        F.3d at 1299.
               Odekhiran’s argument that there was insufficient evidence
        to prove his knowledge and intent to defraud at the time of the
        June 28, 2017, wire transfer involving K.L.’s condominium sale is
        premised on the idea that in determining knowledge and intent,
        the jury was limited to considering only evidence that occurred
        prior to the June 28, 2017, transaction. In other words, according
        to Odekhiran, the jury could not look to the evidence concerning
        transactions that occurred after that date to determine Odekhiran’s
        knowledge and intent. His argument is misplaced. Here, it was
        necessary for the government to prove that the Odekhiran
        intentionally aided and abetted a scheme and artifice to defraud.
        And it is well-established that “[o]ther transactions connected with
        the offenses charged have long been used to show a general
        pattern, the necessary criminal intent, or the guilty knowledge of
        the defendant.” United States v. Muscatell, 42 F.3d 627, 631 (11th Cir.
        1995); United States v. Martinez, 466 F.2d 679, 683–84 (5th Cir. 1972) 2
        (“When intent and knowledge are essential elements of the crime

        2 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)

        (holding that all decisions from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued prior
        to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in the
        Eleventh Circuit).
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13809

        for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of other
        transactions, even though criminal in nature, is admissible to prove
        the necessary criminal intent or guilty knowledge, if the
        transactions are so connected with the offense charged that they
        serve to show a general pattern.” (quotations omitted)); Gilstrap v.
        United States, 389 F.2d 6, 9 (5th Cir. 1968) (“Evidence that similar or
        related offenses were committed over a period of time tends to
        show a consistent pattern of conduct highly relevant to the issue of
        intent.”).
               Regardless, even setting aside the evidence of fraudulent
        activity that occurred with Davinci Trading’s bank accounts after
        the June 28, 2017, transaction, we conclude that there was ample
        evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
        that Odekhiran was deliberately ignorant of his role in the scheme.
        For instance, the government presented evidence that Odekhiran
        registered Davinci Trading with the Georgia Secretary of State in
        February 2017 as a wholesale trading company operated out of his
        residence. But there was no evidence that the company ever
        engaged in any legitimate business activity—there was no record
        of any goods received or shipped or any sales and Davinci did not
        file taxes for 2017. Yet, between March 2017 and June 2017,
        Odekhiran opened multiple business bank accounts in the name of
        the company at different financial institutions and was the sole
        signatory. He then received and sent several large sum domestic
        and international wire transfers from each of the accounts between
        March and June 2017 despite no indication of legitimate business
        activity. Furthermore, although he initially flagged the K.L.
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        22-13809              Opinion of the Court                       17

        transaction and requested that SunTrust return the funds, he
        retracted his request the next day, stating that he had confirmed
        the origin and purpose of the transfer and that it came from a
        customer—and it is undisputed that this was a false statement.
               Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the
        jury could have reasonably inferred from the above stated evidence
        that Odekhiran was deliberately ignorant. In other words, it was
        entirely reasonable for the jury to conclude that, after Odekhiran
        received no goods and had no orders for goods but was receiving
        wire transfers for large sums, his suspicions should have been
        aroused and he deliberately declined to inquire into the true nature
        of Davinci Trading. See Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1570; Hristov, 466 F.3d
        at 952. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the
        knowledge and intent element and to sustain his conviction for
        aiding and abetting wire fraud.
                                  III.   Conclusion
              For the above reasons, we affirm Odekhiran’s conviction.
              AFFIRMED.