Court Opinion

ID: 9491477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:15:09.507556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:40.866139
License: Public Domain

PAUL KELLY, JR., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The court determines that Mr. Anderson has standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from Room 222. I disagree that Mr. Anderson has standing with respect to Room 222 or any corporate com*1235mon areas. Mere possession of videotapes in an unlocked room that Mr. Anderson neither worked in, nor used regularly, is not sufficient to confer standing. Although the factors the court relies upon are relevant to the inquiry, see United States v. Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir.1998), they cannot alone support standing for a workplace search in these circumstances absent a demonstrated “nexus between the area searched and the work space of the defendant,” United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825, 96 S.Ct. 40, 46 L.Ed.2d 42 (1975). Such a nexus is nonexistent in this case. It is telling that the corn! cites no case involving a workplace where standing was found in the absence of such a nexus.1 Merely because work-related documents are not involved in this case does not mean that we can overlook the nature of the area searched.
Although “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the facts concerning the relationship between the person and the place searched are important in determining whether the person has met his or her burden of demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130-31 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate for Fourth Amendment purposes depends upon “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). In deciding this issue, the Court considers location — whether a person or his possessions are in a home, ear, curtilage, open field or office. Without question, the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches on commercial premises, see Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967), however, commercial premises differ from personal residences in nature and use, and therefore Fourth Amendment protection is more limited. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981). Where commercial premises are not open to the public, “the reasonable expectation of privacy depends upon the particular nature and circumstances surrounding the place to be searched.” United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 536 (10th Cir.1994); see See, 387 U.S. at 545, 87 S.Ct. 1737.
The district court found that Mr. Anderson was present during a holiday and had taken steps to maintain his privacy in Room 222 by closing the door, shutting the blinds and curtains, and by placing a towel over one of the windows. See Aplt. App. at 75. This court extends the analysis by focusing on one of the items found in the search of the room, the videotapes in Mr. Anderson’s possession, and holds that Mr. Anderson has standing to challenge the search and statements made in connection with it. Under the court’s analysis, Mr. Anderson would have standing to challenge a search anywhere in the building provided the item seized was owned and controlled by him, and he had taken steps to maintain privacy. This analysis relies too heavily on Mr. Anderson’s possession of the seized videotapes when the primary question must be whether Mr. Anderson had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, an objective inquiry. See United *1236States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) (“We simply decline to use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.”); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980) (“Had petitioner placed his drugs in plain view, he still would have owned them, but he could not claim any legitimate expectation of privacy-”); United States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1418 (10th Cir.1987) (“Whether a person has standing to contest a search on fourth amendment grounds turns on whether the person had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, not merely in the items seized.”). In deciding standing issues, we must consider all of the circumstances, Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152, 99 S.Ct. 421 (Powell, J., concurring), including Mr. Anderson’s relationship with the area searched.
Numerous circumstances in this case show the complete absence of any nexus between Room 222 and Mr. Anderson’s work space, let alone a nexus between Mr. Anderson and the entire building. Room 222 was not Mr. Anderson’s office, and no evidence before us suggests that he ever used the room prior to the incident. It was located far from his office, near several common areas (a reception area, restrooms, a conference room and a hallway). The room was vacant, containing no desk, files, or even telephone. It had no particular function, and was accessible by all employees. Mr. Anderson was found, pants undone, in the room, with a blank tape in the VCR. Contrary to the court’s assertion, no evidence before us suggests that Mr. Anderson had the right to exclude anyone fi-om the room; one does not gain such right merely by closing the door and covering a window.
The steps that Mr. Anderson took to ensure privacy may be consistent with a subjective expectation of privacy, but that is not enough, no matter how earnestly the steps were taken. In these circumstances, consistent with Mr. Anderson’s burden to prove standing, I would hold that he lacked standing and reverse. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104 (1st Cir.1993), is not to the contrary. In that case, the defendant mayor had standing to challenge a search of the town's archive attic, located above the mayor's office, and seizure of his 1987 appointment calendar which contained entries of both a personal and public nature. The attic contained boxes of town records, as well as a box labeled “Mayor's Appointment Books.” The court emphasized the physical relationship between the mayor’s office and the archive attic, as well as the direction and control that the mayor, who had the position for nineteen years, exercised over access. Mancini 8 F.3d at 110. This court is mistaken that “there was no indication the mayor had ever ... regularly used the attic before the evidence was seized....” Ct. Op. at 1230, n.2. To the contrary, the certificates of occupancy that the mayor allegedly issued in exchange for a $2,000 payment were stored in boxes of building department records located in the attic, Mancini, 8 F.3d at 106, and the mayor also stored boxes containing his files and appointment calendars, id. at 110. Mancini simply is not a case where there is no connection between the employee's work space and the area searched.