Court Opinion

ID: 9954932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 14:08:56.301693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:06.536761
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1890-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

         Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

HUMPHREY COHEN,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted on March 6, 2024 – Decided March 27, 2024

                   Before Judges Susswein and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 83-03-
                   1433.

                   Humphrey Cohen, appellant pro se.

                   Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Matthew E. Hanley, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Humphrey Cohen is serving a life sentence in prison for murder

and robbery convictions. We consider defendant's appeal of a December 21,

2022 order denying his third motion to correct an illegal sentence. After careful

review of defendant's arguments, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth

in Judge Christopher S. Romanyshyn's well-reasoned written decision

accompanying the December 21, 2022 order.

                                        I.

      The salient facts and procedural history were previously recounted in our

decisions on defendant's direct appeal, State v. Cohen (Cohen I), 211 N.J. Super.

544 (App. Div. 1986), and on defendant's second motion to correct an illegal

sentence, State v. Cohen (Cohen III), No. A-0832-19 (App. Div. Feb. 4, 2021).

We briefly set forth the facts material to disposition of the appeal before us.

      On January 26, 1983, defendant and his co-defendants confronted Otha

Thompson as he crossed the street. Defendant kicked Thompson, knocked him

to the ground, and fired a bullet into his chest. Defendant shot Thompson a

second time and he and his accomplices took Thompson's wallet before fleeing.

They later divided up the money from Thompson's wallet. Thompson was

subsequently taken to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. Defendant was

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arrested and confessed to shooting Thompson during the robbery. See Cohen I,

211 N.J. at 548-49.

      Defendant was found guilty of felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)

(count one); purposeful and knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2) (count

two); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(count three); and unlawful

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count four). See Cohen III, slip

op. at 2. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with thirty years of

parole ineligibility on count two and fifteen years with seven years and six

months of parole ineligibility on count three. Ibid. The sentences were to run

consecutively for an aggregate sentence of life in prison with thirty -seven years

and six months of parole ineligibility. Ibid. The felony murder charge was

merged with the purposeful and knowing murder charge for sentencing

purposes. Ibid. Defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon

was merged with his first-degree robbery conviction. Id. at 2-3.

      We affirmed defendant's sentence and conviction on direct appeal. Cohen

I, 211 N.J. at 554. Defendant then filed the first of eight petitions for post-

conviction relief (PCR), all of which were denied by the trial court and affirmed

by us on appeal. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification as to all

eight petitions. Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States

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for a writ of certiorari as to one of his petitions, which the Court denied. Cohen

v. New Jersey, 565 U.S. 1238 (2012).

      Defendant also filed two prior motions to correct an illegal sentence which

were denied by the trial court and affirmed by us on appeal. State v. Cohen

(Cohen II), No. A-2599-16 (App. Div. Mar. 9, 2018) (slip op. at 3) and Cohen

III, slip op at 19. Defendant's federal habeas corpus petition was also denied.

Cohen v. Morton, No. 94-3257, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56149 (D.N.J. Apr. 17,

2014).

      In July 2022, defendant filed a third motion to correct an illegal sentence

arguing as follows: defendant's murder sentence is now subject to the No Early

Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, which requires his life term with

thirty years of parole ineligibility to be recalculated so that his thirty-year term

represents eighty-five percent of his overall sentence; defendant's sentence is

illegal because the sentencing court imposed a maximum sentence without

considering aggravating and mitigating factors; and defendant must be

resentenced based on the Court's ruling in State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021).

Judge Romanyshyn denied defendant's motion in the December 21, 2022 order

accompanied by a written decision.

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      In denying defendant's motion, Judge Romanyshyn rejected the argument

that defendant's murder conviction is subject to NERA. Applying the holding

in State v. Parolin, 171 N.J. 223, 233 (2002), Judge Romanyshyn concluded the

amendments to NERA, which added murder as a NERA-applicable offense, are

prospective and, therefore, do not apply to defendant's sentence, which predated

the statutory amendments. Moreover, the judge found defendant cited no legal

authority for his contention that NERA requires mandatory parole release dates.

      Judge Romanyshyn was unconvinced by defendant's argument that his

sentence was illegal because the sentencing court imposed the maximum

sentence without considering aggravating or mitigating factors.            Judge

Romanyshyn found this claim both procedurally improper on a motion to correct

an illegal sentence and substantively without merit. Applying the definition of

an illegal sentence as set forth in State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246-47 (2000),

Judge Romanyshyn found defendant did not state a cognizable claim under Rule

3:21-10(b)(5). See State v. Chambers, 377 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (App. Div.

2005).

      Judge Romanyshyn distinguished an excessive sentence from an illegal

sentence, and concluded a challenge to an excessive sentence for an improper

weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors should be argued on direct

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appeal.   See State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 47 (2011).       The judge found

defendant failed to raise this issue on direct appeal, but did so on a previous

motion to correct an illegal sentence where we found that the sentencing court

properly considered the aggravating and mitigating factors. Cohen III, slip op.

at 17-19. Accordingly, Judge Romanyshyn found defendant was barred from

reasserting this claim under Rule 3:22-5, which states, "[a] prior adjudication

upon the merits of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made in the

proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding

brought pursuant to this rule or prior to the adoption thereof, or in any appeal

taken from such proceedings."

      Finally, Judge Romanyshyn rejected defendant's claim that Torres

articulated a new legal standard for imposing consecutive sentences. First,

Judge Romanyshyn found this claim to be procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5

because we previously addressed defendant's argument.          Nonetheless, he

addressed defendant's substantive argument under Torres, finding defendant's

claim to be meritless. Judge Romanyshyn reasoned that Torres did not create a

new rule of law but, instead, emphasized sentencing courts must assess fairness

when imposing consecutive sentences, using the Yarbough sentencing

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guidelines as a framework. State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985). After

careful consideration, Judge Romanyshyn rejected all of defendant's claims.

      This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following arguments for our

review:

            POINT I

            THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED ERROR BY
            NOT MAKING A GOOD CAUSE ANALYSIS TO
            DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT'S LIFE
            SENTENCE WITH A THIRTY (30) YEAR[] PAROLE
            INELIGIBILITY SHOULD BE CHANGED UNDER
            NERA TO 35.1 YEARS WITH AN EIGHTY-FIVE
            PERCENT PAROLE INELIGIBILITY.

            POINT II

            THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED ERROR IN
            REJECTING APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT HE
            RECEIVED AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE AND WAS
            DENIED   DUE    PROCESS      AND     EQUAL
            TREATMENT UNDER THE LAW WHEN THE
            SENTENCING COURT IMPOSED THE MAXIMUM
            SENTENCE     FOR    MURDER         WITHOUT
            CONSIDERING AND/OR IDENTIFYING ANY
            AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
            ENUMERATED IN N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) AND (b) TO
            SHOW DEFENDANT SHOULD:              (1) BE
            SENTENCED TO THE MINIMUM SENTENCE, AND
            (2) NOT BE SENTENCED TO A SENTENCE
            LESSER THAN THE MAXIMUM LIFE SENTENCE.

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            POINT III

            THE ILLEGAL SENTENC[ING] . . . COURT
            COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
            CLAIM THAT HIS PREVIOUSLY REJECTED
            ARGUMENT THAT HIS CONVICTIONS FOR
            MURDER, FELONY MURDER AND ROBBERY
            WAS ONE CRIME/ABERRANT ACT AND SHOULD
            HAVE RESULTED IN ONE SENTENCE IS NOW
            MERITORIOUS UNDER THE STATE SUPREME
            COURT'S DECISION IN TORRES.

            POINT IV

            SAID PRIOR ILLEGAL SENTENC[ING] COURT
            HAD ALSO REJECTED APPELLANT'S CLAIM
            THAT AFTER THE JURY REJECTED THE DEATH
            PENALTY, HE WAS ENTITLED TO A SECOND
            AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING HEARING AT
            SENTENCING. THIS CLAIM NOW ALSO HAS
            MERIT VIA A DECISION ISSUED BY THE
            APPELLATE DIVISION. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

                                      II.

      We review the disposition of a motion to correct an illegal sentence de

novo. State v. Drake, 444 N.J. Super. 265, 271 (App. Div. 2016). "There are

two categories of illegal sentences: those that exceed the penalties authorized

for a particular offense, and those that are not authorized by law." State v.

Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 145 (2019) (citing State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 308

(2012)). "[S]entences that disregard controlling case law or rest on an abuse of

discretion by the sentencing court are legal so long as they impose penalties

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authorized by statute for a particular offense and include a disposition that is

authorized by law." Id. at 146.

      Defendant argues his sentence is illegal because murder is now subject to

NERA and, therefore, his current sentence for murder and robbery should

include a mandatory parole release date. We disagree.

      Defendant's sentence was not subject to NERA, since murder was not

added as a NERA-applicable offense until 2001 and that amendment to NERA

is not retroactive. Parolin, 171 N.J. at 233. Nonetheless, even if NERA were to

apply to defendant's sentence, the statute does not require a mandatory parole

release date.   Instead, NERA mandates "[a] court imposing a sentence of

incarceration for a crime . . . shall fix a minimum term of 85% of the sentence

imposed, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole." N.J.S.A

2C:43-7.2(a). We reject defendant's argument that the sentencing court failed

to set a mandatory date for his release from prison on parole.

                                      III.

      We also reject defendant's previously-asserted argument that his sentence

is illegal because the sentencing court failed to consider aggravating and

mitigating factors. In Cohen III, we addressed defendant's contention that he

was entitled to a second "aggravating and mitigating factors" sentencing

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hearing. Cohen III, slip op. at 17. After a careful review of the record, we found

the sentencing court considered all of the aggravating and mitigating factors.

Ibid. On this appeal, defendant does not present any new evidence for our

review. Accordingly, we reject defendant's previously-asserted argument that

he was entitled to a second "aggravating and mitigating" sentencing hearing

pursuant to Rule 3:22-5. Cohen III, slip op. at 19.

                                       IV.

      Defendant also contends we should find his sentence is illegal based on

the Court's decision in Torres, 246 N.J. at 268. Defendant's application is

precluded since a prior adjudication on the merits bars a litigant from seeking

any further grounds for relief. R. 3:22-5.

      We also conclude that defendant's application lacks merit since Torres

does not constitute new law. In Torres, the Court specified "[a]n explicit

statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant

for multiple offenses in a single proceeding or in multiple sentencing

proceedings, is essential to a proper Yarbough sentencing assessment." Torres,

246 N.J. at 268.

      We are convinced that the sentencing court considered the fairness of the

consecutive sentence as required under Torres. The sentencing court considered

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the fairness of depriving defendant of his life by way of imposing consecutive

sentences. The sentencing court heard argument from defense counsel regarding

defendant's intelligence, family history, and substance abuse issues.         The

sentencing court also considered that the victim was a complete stranger to

defendant and defendant took the victim's life without any provocation

whatsoever. Based on our review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing, we

conclude the sentencing judge properly considered the fairness of the

consecutive sentence and that the interests of justice do not warrant resentencing

post-Torres.

      Affirmed.

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