Court Opinion

ID: 9559985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:40:18.081002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:57.251784
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
¶ 58 I fully concur with the majority in holding that appellant grandmother has no standing to appeal the order terminating D.M.’s parental rights. I dissent, however, from that portion of the opinion concluding that the juvenile court erred in dismissing appellant’s adoption petition.
¶59 The majority opinion states: “It is clear under Utah law that persons with a special relationship to a child have a right to a hearing on adoption or custody matters.” Indeed, the cited eases squarely stand for that proposition. See, e.g., In re J.W.F., 799 *128P.2d 710, 714 (Utah 1990); Summers v. Wulffenstein, 571 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1977); Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., Region Two, 554 P.2d 227, 231 (Utah 1976). In each of the cited cases, the juvenile court had summarily dismissed a petition for custody without any hearing or determination on the merits.
¶ 60 The case at bar is easily distinguished. Here, the juvenile court provided appellant a full evidentiary hearing on her motion for custody in August 1997. After considering all the testimony and evidence presented, the juvenile court entered detailed findings, which included the following:
9. The March 15, 1997, visit [with appellant] was supervised by Jennifer E. Ford-ham, Ph.D. psychologist. All three children regressed and deteriorated during and after the visit. During the visit, [appellant] inappropriately responded to the emotional needs of the children and didn’t demonstrate appropriate levels of concern for the children. [M.] “shutdown” emotionally and [J.] withdrew from his grandmother during the course of the visit;
[[Image here]]
15. [D.M.] has a history of domestic problems with males that has negatively impacted the children. [Appellant] knew or should have known of the problems yet did nothing to intervene;
16. At a June 3, 1997, hearing, the grandmother was ordered by this Court to contact appropriate treatment resources in her community that would be available for the children should they be placed with her. She was ordered to provide the information to the assigned Utah caseworker who was directed to assess the appropriateness of the services. It wasn’t until August 20, 1997, two days before the hearing [on] the grandmother’s motion for custody that [she] provided the requested information. The information provided consisted of resumes of two psychologists] and flyers about available programs[,] many of which were not appropriate for the needs of the children;
17. The grandmother does not appreciate the nature and severity of the neglect and abuse her grandchildren have experienced. She discounts and minimizes the children's] problems and has never expressed any empathy for her grandchildren to the caseworker;
18. The children have stated that they do not feel safe in their grandmother’s home. The children are apprehensive about living with [appellant’s husband] who would be their primary caretaker during the work week as [appellant] is employed full time;
19. It is likely that the grandmother would allow the mother unauthorized access to the children if they were placed with her, since she doesn’t appear to understand the gravity of the neglect and abuse the children have suffered;
[[Image here]]
21. Any placement or therapeutic disruptions would be detrimental to the children. [J.] is in need of long term treatment and any interruption of his therapeutic relationships would be detrimental to him. It would likely take at least six months for the children to form a therapeutic relationship with another therapist.
22. [Appellant] loves her grandchildren and has a strong desire to assume custody of them but the children do not appear to share an emotional attachment with then-grandmother.
The court then concluded,
Placement of the above-named children with the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather would not be in the children's] best interest for the following reasons:
a) The children are not comfortable with [appellant and her husband];
b) [Appellant] does not recognize the parents’] history of abuse of the children;
c) [Appellant] is not strong enough or committed enough to resist inappropriate requests by their mother for access to the children in accordance with the Court orders;
d) [Appellant] is not committed to providing the proper therapeutic care for the children.
¶ 61 After entering these findings of fact and conclusions of law, the juvenile court *129ordered that temporary custody and guardianship of the children remain with DCFS. See Summers v. Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1980) (“The Court showed, in our opinion, a high degree of sensitivity to the desire of the appellant to raise her grandchildren, but in deciding what would be in the best interest of the children involved — which was the Court’s paramount duty — decided that custody should remain with DFS (footnote omitted). Consequently, at the August hearing the court clearly made, “a temporary disposition of custody while making a final determination regarding the allegations in [appellant’s] underlying petition.” In re T.H., 860 P.2d 370, 374 (Utah Ct.App.1993). Appellant did not contest the court’s ruling.
¶ 62 Instead of challenging the juvenile court’s custody determination, appellant filed a verified petition alleging that the children were dependent, and requesting that the court grant her permanent custody. At the December 3, 1997 hearing on this petition, appellant’s counsel argued the dependency and custody issues to the juvenile court. After this hearing, the court found that the same parties participated in the August hearing, which adjudicated the same issues now raised in this petition. More importantly, the court found appellant’s petition “legally insufficient on its face; the children are not dependant, they are in State’s care.” The court therefore properly dismissed the deficient petition.
¶ 63 Subsequently, appellant filed a petition for adoption. In this petition, appellant reasserted the same facts that the juvenile court had addressed at the August hearing. Once again, appellant wholly failed to assert any new or changed circumstances. The juvenile court had already adjudicated and resolved these facts at the full evidentiary hearing in August 1997. Because these findings remained unchallenged, they became the law of the case and are binding in subsequent proceedings. See In re T.S., 927 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Utah Ct.App.1996); see also Richardson v. Grand Cent. Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977) (stating purpose of law of the case doctrine is “to avoid the delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings upon the same proposition in the same case”); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (“The law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable when ... a subsequent motion fails to present the case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is introduced.”).
¶ 64 Appellant contends that the juvenile court’s previous temporary custody determination cannot be applied to the adoption petition relating to permanent custody. At the August hearing, however, the juvenile court adjudicated the very same issues presented in the adoption petition. The court’s ruling on the underlying issues raised in appellant’s first petition was a final determination on the merits as applied to appellant. See In re T.H., 860 P.2d at 374. Thus, because appellant failed to assert any change of circumstances on her part, there was no need for the juvenile court to conduct another full evidentiary hearing on the same issues it had previously adjudicated.1 Without changed circumstances, adoption placement with appellant would not be in the children’s best interests. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-1.5 (1996) (“ít is the intent and desire of the Legislature that in every adoption the best interest of the child should govern and be of foremost concern in the court’s determination.”). This is especially true, in light of the fact that “[a] final decree of adoption may not be entered until the child has lived in the home of the adoptive parent or parents for six months.” Id. § 78-30-14(7) (1996). Therefore, the juvenile court could not grant appellant the relief she requested in her adoption petition because she never had custody of the children.
¶ 65 Additionally, at the October 15, 1998 hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss appellant’s adoption petition, the court found, “The State of Utah is the current custodian and guardian of the children and the State opposes the adoption by the grandparents. The State’s consent is necessary pursuant to [section] 78-30-4.14(l)(g) inasmuch as DCFS is the licensed child placing agency for the *130children.” The court then properly dismissed the petition because appellant made no showing that she obtained the statutorily required consent for adoption from DCFS. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(l)(g) (1996) (providing consent to adoption is required from “the licensed child-placing agency ... that is placing the child for adoption”); see also Kasper v. Nordfelt, 815 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding court did not err in dismissing grandparents’ adoption petition because without consent of child placement agency, their adoption petition was merit-less).
¶ 66 It is true that custody decisions are not forever set in stone and remain subject to modification “on the ground that a change of circumstances has occurred.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-903(l) (Supp.1998); see also Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 722 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (noting when modifying custody order “[t]he court’s obligation is to evaluate whether a particular change in circumstances justifies upsetting the status quo in order to achieve what is in the best interests of the children.”). Appellant has never petitioned the juvenile court to modify its custody orders based on a change of circumstances. Although appellant attempts to assert changed circumstances to this court on appeal, she failed to ever make that argument to the juvenile court. “ ‘The appellate courts of this state have consistently refused to address issues ... that are raised for the first time on appeal. This principle applies equally to proceedings originating before the juvenile courts.’ ” In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 563 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quoting In re E.D., 876 P.2d 397, 401 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (citations omitted)). We are therefore precluded from addressing these issues on appeal.
¶ 67 It should be further noted that although appellant contends she was denied temporary custody because out-of-state placement of the children would have interfered with parental reunification services, the juvenile court made no such finding. The juvenile court made no indication in its findings of fact or conclusions of law that this was a factor in denying appellant temporary custody. To the contrary, the court’s findings indicate its genuine concern about appellant permitting “the mother unauthorized access to the children if they were placed with her, since she doesn’t appear to understand the gravity of the neglect and abuse the children have suffered.” See Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir.1995) (“Also, we note that grandparents sometimes may be unsuitable adoptive parents precisely because of their blood relationship, especially in cases of abuse such as this in which there may be a well founded fear that the grandparents will be unable to protect the children from future parental contact and abuse.”).
CONCLUSION
¶ 68 I agree that certain people, because of their special relationship to a child, are entitled to a hearing and “a determination as to whether it would be in the best interests of the child for them to have custody.” In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 714 (citing Wilson, 554 P.2d at 230). In this case, however, appellant received a full and fair hearing on her motion for custody. After careful consideration, and based on the children’s best interests, the juvenile court denied the motion. Appellant never directly challenged the court’s ruling by appeal or through a petition to modify the custody order. Therefore, the juvenile court’s ruling on the custody issue became the law of the ease when appellant raised the same issue in subsequent petitions.
¶ 69 Accordingly, I would affirm the juvenile court, and hold that it properly dismissed appellant’s adoption petition.

. Although the children’s circumstances may have changed, appellant must show how her circumstances have changed since the court entered its findings regarding custody.