Court Opinion

ID: 9443401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:19:22.68554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:28.628836
License: Public Domain

PICKETT, Grcuit Judge,
dissenting.
It is my view that the R. F. C. brought this action at law for money had and received under its general power to sue and be sued. As a basis for its complaint the R. F. C. alleged that the defendant had been paid by the Defense Supplies Corporation $134,252.00 as subsidy on oil which had been used as fuel oil by the defendant in the operation of its pipe line system and for which a subsidy was not allowable. Issue was joined on these allegations. That issue and no other was presented to the trial court and judgment was entered accordingly.
Prior to the commencement of the action, the only information which the defendant had concerning the claim of the R. F. C. was a letter from it dated October 18, 1946, disallowing a claim for a subsidy payment due on purchased crude oil and requesting the defendant to refund all sums previously claimed and paid to it for the purchase of like oil. So far as the record is concerned, the letter did not refer to any specific action of the R. F. C. relating to the refund. It did not refer to any specific subsidy payments and did not state the amount which it requested to be refunded. Not until the case arrived in this court did the R. F. C. or anyone else consider the letter as an order which would become final, in effect a judgment, because an administrative remedy therefrom had not been pursued and proceedings to review the same had not been instituted in the Emergency Court of Appeals within the statutory time. The letter which is now said to constitute a final order depriving the District Court of jurisdiction to consider the facts alleged in the complaint, was not pleaded as a final order and was not even introduced in evidence. The only reference to it in the entire record is in one paragraph of the complaint as above mentioned. It is not referred to in the stipulated facts. The jurisdictional' question now raised is clearly an ingenious afterthought attempting to rescue a lawsuit which was lost on its merits. If the letter requesting the refund should be considered a final order upon which an action could be maintained, it would not be unlike a suit on a foreign judgment and the same rules of pleading and proof would apply. No attempt was made to comply with these *780rules. 31 Amjur., Judgments, Sec. 853, et seq.
The request of the R. F. C. that this court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with instructions to enter a judgment for it in the amount prayed for, upon the grounds that the District Court was without jurisdiction to determine the issues presented to it, and that the demand of the R. F. C. is final, is a complete departure from the pleadings and the evidence and the theory upon which the case was tried and decided. Only in exceptional cases should an appellate court consider questions which have not been presented to and passed upon by the trial court. It should adhere to the factual theory upon which the case was tried in the District Court. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 298 U.S. 170, 56 S.Ct. 687, 80 L.Ed. 1130; Duignan v. Uniled States, 274 U.S. 195, 200, 47 S.Ct. 566, 71 L.Ed. 996; Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 U.S. 8, 33 S.Ct. 202, 57 L.Ed. 393; C. E. Warner, Trustee, v. Jerome Dworsky, 8 Cir., 194 F.2d 277; Lyons v. United States, 6 Cir., 123 F.2d 507; Valley Shoe Corp. v. Stout, 8 Cir., 98 F.2d 514; United States to Use of Merchants and Manufacturers Securities Co. v. Johnson, 8 Cir., 98 F.2d 462; Parrott Estate Company v. McLaughlin, 9 Cir., 89 F.2d 188.
The R. F. C. is in the anomalous position of asking us to declare that the District Court had no jurisdiction to consider the issue which it presented to that court, and at the same time requesting that we direct-the entry of a judgment in its favor upon facts and upon a theory other than those which it submitted to the trial court and of which it offered no proof. The result in sustaining this position will permit the entry of a judgment against the defendant without any proof that the action of the R. F. C. was an order within the meaning of the statute and without giving the defendant an opportunity to defend upon that issue. Assuming that the jurisdictional claim of the R. F. C. is correct, it should not recover in this case because it has wholly failed to allege and prove the necessary facts upon which a judgment could be sustained except on the merits of its claim.
Under the statute as interpreted by the authorities, the Emergency Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction “to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under Section 2” of the Act, and no other court has “jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of such regulation, order or price schedule.” The statutory definition of the regulations and orders referred to are those which are of general application and effect. Sec. 2(a), 56 Stat. 24. Thus it is clear to me that if the validity of a regulation or order of general application is at issue, exclusive jurisdiction is in the Emergency Court of Appeals. It is equally clear to me that every act or decision or conclusion of the R. F. C. which may relate to the administration of the Act is not a final order the correctness of which may be determined only by the Emergency Court of Appeals.
If a subsidy has been wrongfully claimed and collected the R. F. C. should and does ■have authority to sue and recover the same. Of necessity to determine that there has 'been an unlawful subsidy payment and to ascertain the amount thereof, an investigation must be made and a conclusion reached on the part of the R. F. C. It would follow as a matter of course that the R. F. C. would then notify the person against whom the claim is to be made and demand a refund, usually by letter. This is exactly what was done in the case before us and no more. Now it is said that the demand for refund is such an order that it becomes final and binding unless set aside on a protest hearing or by the Emergency Court of Appeals. The net effect of this is that every citizen who has had dealings with the United States, under the provisions of this Act, against whom a claim for refund is made, regardless of where he lives or the amount involved, will find himself in the Emergency Court of Appeals if he disagrees with the R. F. C. and refuses to comply with the demand. If the Emergency Court of Appeals upholds the action as an order, then the R. F. C. will be required to bring another action in the fed*781eral court of the district where the defendant lives, in the nature of an action on a final judgment, before it may proceed by execution. This creates the strange situation in our system of jurisprudence which I am certain was never intended, and I do not believe that the cited cases so hold. Not one of these cases was brought by the R. F. C. to recover on a claim growing out of the wrongful collection of government funds under the Act.
Here the issue presented to the trial court did not involve the construction, interpretation or validity of any order or regulation promulgated under the Act. It was not contended that crude oil purchased for fuel oil was entitled to a subsidy. The question presented to and determined by the court was whether, under the facts, the purchased oil was fuel oil which would exclude it from the provisions of the subsidy regulations.
Although I do not agree that the record here shows that there was any action on the part of the R. F. C. which would constitute an order within the meaning of the Emergency Price Control Act, I do agree that if the action of the R. F. C. is to be so considered then the defendant should not be deprived of its right to object to the validity of the order in the Emergency Court of Appeals under Sec. 204(e), as amended. I have no doubt that the condition of the pleadings and the record in this case are such that the defendant has not lost this right.