Court Opinion

ID: 9455334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:19:04.789093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:33.439185
License: Public Domain

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority opinion’s treatment of the third party complaint issue and the issue of possible liability of Amerada under principles related to §§ 413, 416 and 427 of the Restatement of Torts, 2d. However, I respectfully disagree with its holding that in these circumstances as a matter of law recovery is unavailable to the administrator under principles of the duty of a possessor of land where an unreasonable risk of harm to invitees exists.
The District Court stated clearly its view as to why no recovery may be had based on the duty of a possessor of land. Its memorandum opinion rejected this theory of recovery under §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement on the following basis:
“Assuming, as contended by plaintiff, that the death resulted from the gases in the tank, Amerada is not liable. If Amerada had a duty to warn or to make the premises safe, it was relieved of this duty by decedent’s voluntary actions, taken with full knowledge of the presence of poisonous gases. Restatement (Second), Torts, supra §§ 343, 343A, 496, comment d at 570-71; Crenshaw v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra [72 N.M. 84] at 85-86 [380 P.2d 828].”
Thus, it was held that recovery on the basis of a breach of Amerada’s duty as a possessor of land was not permissible because the District Court concluded that the danger involved was known or obvious and Parsons acted voluntarily. See § 343A(1), n. 6, supra. In so holding the District Court concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether Parsons knew of the danger and acted voluntarily with such knowledge. This conclusion was based on the Perchard deposition, other depositions, and circumstances including Parsons’ use of a mask that was furnished.
I cannot agree that summary judgment was proper on such a basis. The conclusion rests in large part on the *618deposition of Perchard. However, where the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of an adverse party and its witnesses,1 summary judgment is not proper and the plaintiff is entitled to have the witnesses’ testimony and demeanor considered by the jury.2 Moreover, on this record it seems to me that the inference that Parsons knew of and appreciated the special danger of lethal concentrations of hydrogen sulfide was not proper for decision as a matter of law by summary judgment.3 For the New Mexico Court holds that “ * * * a person will not be held to have voluntarily assumed a risk where the specific danger which produced the injury is unknown.” 4 The special dangers related to hydrogen sulfide were not disclosed by Amerada to B & M, nor by B & M to Parsons, according to some of the summary judgment papers.5 In short, while various facts developed in the depositions and other papers may argue that Parsons knew of the presence of poisonous gases, to me the ultimate finding that he appreciated the special danger he faced was not one for decision by summary judgment on this record.
The majority opinion agrees with the District Court that there can be no recovery under § 343 principles, but proceeds on a different basis. In dealing with the duty of a possessor of land, the majority opinion states:
“We do not read Bivins to impose liability on the owner of premises for physical harm proximately caused to an employee of a contractor by a latent danger incident to the performance of known dangerous work. If Sections 413, 416 and 427 were applicable here, we would have no difficulty subjecting the employer to liability under these circumstances. And it seems only reasonable and logical to say that if duty and consequent liability are to be imposed on the employer *619for physical harm to an employee of his independent contractor arising out of an unreasonable risk of harm incident to the performance of the work the liability should be lodged in these sections, not in 343 which is intended to impose a duty on the owner of the land to appreciate and warn of a dangerous and latent condition on his premises. It does not seem logical nor reasonable to subject the owner of premises to liability under Section 343 for the peril posed by these circumstances when we are unwilling to do so under Sections 413, 416 and 427. Again until New Mexico speaks on the subject, we agree with the trial court that liability cannot be imposed under Section 343 in situations like this.”
Thus, the majority opinion determines that even though a latent danger be involved, as a matter of law it was “incident to the performance of known dangerous work,” and that no duty or liability may exist under § 343 principles. I cannot agree. The District Court did not find such an exception to § 343 principles under New Mexico law. New Mexico decisions before us do not state such an exception. And to me" the case law relied on by the majority opinion does not go so far as to make such an exception to the principles of § 343.
The majority opinion refers to cases making a distinction between a risk of harm incident to performance of the work, and latent dangers inhering in the premises where recovery within § 343 principles may be had. However, I believe the cases show that the distinction cited refers to risks of harm reasonably known to be incident to the work, and not to risks which are not known and appreciated as dangers of the work.6 And reason calls for such an exception to the duties of the possessor of land to be thus limited to risks of harm reasonably known to be incident to the work of the business invitee. If the danger is not thus known and appreciated as a risk incident to the work, then a contractee who is the possessor of the land where the latent dagger exists still has a duty under § 343 to protect the independent contractor aijtd his employees.
To me Gulf Oil Corporation v. Bivins, supra, does not deny the applicability of § 343 principles here. In fact, the Court there said that proof of the presence of iron sulfide gas at the wellhead would support the jury finding of an inherent, concealed or latent danger unknown to Bivins, and quoted § 343 on the duty of the possessor of land to the independent contractor’s employees, although recovery was denied because the contractor had been warned specifically about the presence of iron sulfide gas. Under § 343 principles recovery may be had where the possessor of land violates his duty to warn the independent contractor’s employees of danger unknown to them, even though the risk might be viewed as a “latent danger incident to the performance of known dangerous work” within the terms of the majority opinion’s exception to § 343 principles.7
New Mexico has adopted the principles of § 343.8 Moreover the definition in § 332 of the business invitees within the protection of § 343 was also em*620braced in the Sandoval case, and the definition covers independent contractors and their employees.9 And in New Mexico there must be an appreciation of the specific dangers involved for there to be an assumption of risk.10 So, I am unable to agree with the majority opinion's view that even if the risk was a latent danger, it was encountered in the performance of “known dangerous work” so that § 343 principles may not apply. Furthermore the record does not negate sufficiently, for summary judgment purposes, possible liability of the possessor of land under § 343A(1) for harm that should be anticipated despite knowledge or obviousness of danger, in view of the characteristics of hydrogen sulfide.
Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the affirmance of the summary judgment by the majority opinion because I feel it does so by an unwarranted constriction of § 343 principles.

. B & M Service Company is contesting the third party complaint by which Amerada seeks recovery over against B & M for any liability to Parsons’ Administrator. Under the circumstances, B & M must be viewed realistically as an interested party and adverse to recovery by the administrator.

. See Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967; Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753. 757-759 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883, 76 S.Ct. 136, 100 L.Ed. 779; Alvado v. General Motors Comporation, 229 F.2d 408, 411-412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 983, 76 S.Ct. 1050, 100 L.Ed. 1497, and Alabama Groat Southern R.R. Co. v. Louisville R.R. Co., 224 F.2d 1, 5, 50 A.L.R. 2d 1302 (5th Cir.).

. See Sullivan v. Shell Oil Co., 234 F.2d 733, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 925, 77 S.Ct. 221, 1 L.Ed.2d 160.

. Tapia v. Panhandle Stool Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625, 631.

. Mr. Shirley, Amerada’s farm boss, testified by deposition that in his contracts with B & M he had not at any time instructed them as to proper equipment to use and warned them of dangerous gases. He called B & M to clean this tank and gave no such information. Mr. Dunn, the B & M field superintendent, testified by deposition that he hired Parsons the day of the accident and did not inquire about his prior experience on tank cleaning, nor instruct him on precautions to be taken. Parsons had worked for another oil company for three summers and attended safety meetings where masks were discussed. There was no sign on the tank about poisonous gases.
Mr. Perchard, a B & M employee, stated that he had told Parsons there was dangerous gas there, and to stay downwind (sic) and not to stand in the gas and breath it. There was no proof that Perchard knew of or discussed with Parsons the characteristics of hydrogen sulfide, such as its being colorless, odorless and quickly lethal in heavy concentration, and heavier than air. Perchard said that after pumping out sediment from the tank, they rested about fifteen minutes to let the tank air out.
There is data in the record on such characteristics of hydrogen sulfide showing that it is colorless, and that in heavy concentration it deadens the sense of smell and may kill quickly. The gas is heavier than air, which is significant in view of the cone-shaped bottom of the tank. The record shows knowledge by Amerada that crude oil from the Abo Formation was generally thought to contain hydrogen sulfide.

. See e. g., Wolczak v. National Electric Products Corp., 66 N.J.Super. 64, 168 A.2d 412, 417.

. See Sullivan v. Shell Oil Co., supra (reversing a directed verdict for defendant and remanding for trial where a column in a tank being dismantled collapsed) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wright, 236 F.2d 46, 62 (ordering a retrial to determine possible liability where the contractor’s employee was apparently killed by poisonous gas while cleaning pits*); Haefeli v. Woodrich Engineering Co., 255 N.Y. 442, 175 N.E. 123 (sustaining recovery where a cesspool scavenger’s death was caused by the collapsing roof of the pool); and Hall v. Henry Thayer & Co., 225 Mass. 151, 113 N.E. 644 (sustaining recovery for death of an independent contractor’s employee repairing a water tank when a pier gave way and the tank fell).

. See Crenshaw v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., supra, and Sandoval v. Board of Regents of New Mexico State University, supra.

. § 332 of the Restatement of Torts, 2d, provides:
“A business visitor is a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them.”

. See Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., supra, 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d at 631, and data on some characteristics of hydrogen sulfide, n. 5, supra.