Court Opinion

ID: 9553515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:30:47.341924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:27.246073
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a contract case in which the trial court granted partial summary judgment. We first address whether the trial court properly certified the partial summary judgment as a final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). We conclude that the certification was proper. The primary issue presented is whether the admissible evidence submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment was sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact concerning the defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel. We conclude the evidence was not sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings on the remaining claims.
I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.
Hecla Mining Company (Hecla) and Bunker Limited Partnership (Bunker) each owned an undivided interest in the Star-Morning Mine (the mine). (Hecla and Bunker will be referred to as Hecla unless otherwise indicated). In 1984, Star-Morning Mining Company (Star) entered lease and rental agreements (the 1984 lease) with Hecla to lease the mine. In 1985, the parties amended the 1984 lease to provide that Hecla could terminate the lease by written notice if operations were suspended for twelve consecutive months.
Star began operating the mine, but was unable to meet the lease payments. The mine was shut down in the fall of 1985. The parties negotiated to continue operations. During August 1987, Hecla sent a proposed modified lease (the 1987 draft) to Star. On September 16, 1988, Hecla notified Star that the 1984 lease was terminated. Star signed the 1987 draft in December 1988. Hecla then declined Star’s request to sign the 1987 draft.
Hecla filed this lawsuit in 1989, seeking: (1) declaratory judgment that the 1984 lease was terminated, (2) $527,841.80 in past-due lease payments, (3) declaratory judgment that the 1987 draft was not in effect, (4) quiet title against Star’s claims, and (5) damages resulting from the loss of the sale of the mine.
Star asserted the parties had modified the 1984 lease with the 1987 draft. Among other things, the 1987 draft rescheduled the lease payments Star owed Hecla under the 1984 lease. Star also asserted that Hecla’s statements and conduct caused Star justifiably to rely on the 1987 draft to its detriment. Star contended that Hecla’s statements and conduct constituted waiver of Hecla’s right to timely lease payments under the 1984 lease and estopped Hecla from denying the effectiveness of the 1987 *781draft. Star counterclaimed seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the 1987 draft was in effect, (2) $20,000 for Hecla’s wrongful termination of the 1984 lease, and (3) $550,000 damages because of Hecla's failure to produce a buyer for Star’s ore as was required by the parties’ marketing agreement.
Hecla moved for partial summary judgment seeking declaratory judgment that the 1984 lease was properly terminated and the 1987 draft was not in effect.
Star submitted an affidavit by Jay Layman, Star’s operations manager, opposing Hecla’s motion for summary judgment. During oral argument on the summary judgment motion, Hecla’s attorney objected “to some of the evidence asserted [in the affidavit of Jay Layman] on the grounds that it’s conclusory and no foundation.” Hecla’s attorney then gave an example and asked the court to consider carefully the Jay Layman affidavit because it contained some incompetent evidence.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Hecla, stating that affidavits submitted by the parties were conclusory and lacked the specificity required by I.R.C.P. 56(e). On the basis of facts the trial court said were undisputed, the trial court decided: (1) Hecla properly terminated the 1984 lease, (2) Hecla did not accept the terms of the 1987 draft, and (3) Star had no leasehold interest in the mine. Star moved for an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certification that the partial judgment was final, which the court granted.
II.
THE I.R.C.P. 54(b) CERTIFICATION WAS PROPER.
Although the parties did not present on appeal the issue of whether the trial court properly certified the partial judgment as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b), the Court questioned the propriety of the certification at oral argument. Because this is a jurisdictional question, we first must resolve our concerns about the certification.
I.R.C.P. 54(b) states, in part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of the judgment.
We recently addressed the applicability of an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certification in Thorn Creek Cattle Ass’n v. Bonz, 122 Idaho 42, 830 P.2d 1180 (1992). In Thorn Creek, the Court held that in a foreclosure action, the liability and deficiency were aspects of the same claim and that an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certification was improper. Id. at 45, 830 P.2d at 1183.
This case is distinguishable from Thorn Creek. The claim for past-due lease payments is separate from Hecla’s claims that Star did not have a leasehold interest in the mine based on either the 1984 lease or the 1987 draft. Star owed the delinquent lease payments to Hecla, regardless of whether the 1984 lease had been terminated. Although the 1987 draft rescheduled the payment of the delinquent lease payments, the liability for the delinquent payments arose out of the 1984 lease, not the 1987 draft. As to Hecla’s quiet title claim, the declaration that Star did not have a leasehold interest in the mine, in effect, quieted title against Star as to any interest in the mine.
Hecla also requested damages due to the loss of a sale of the mine. If this were merely a request for damages as a coincident part of the declaration of the termination of the 1984 lease and the ineffectiveness of the 1987 draft, an award would have been within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Sweeney v. American Nat’l Bank, 62 Idaho 544, 550-51, 115 P.2d 109, 111 (1941). In that event, we would have concluded that there had not been a full adjudication of the declaratory judgment claims, and we would have concluded that the certification of final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) was improper.
*782In the complaint, however, Hecla alleged that in December 1988, when Star signed and returned the 1987 draft, Hecla intended to sell the mine to a purchaser. Hecla alleged that the purchaser had plans to commence mining operations at the mine, but that the purchaser was not able to obtain financing, which was a condition of the sale, “because of the claims by [Star] to an interest in the [mine].”
This request for damages was apparently based on a slander of title claim. See Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 760, 572 P.2d 861, 863 (1977). There is further evidence in the record that the damages requested were based on slander of title. A letter from Star’s secretary and treasurer to Bunker dated January 5, 1989, which is attached to the affidavit of Hecla’s secretary in support of the motion for summary judgment, states:
Hecla Mining Co. has advised us it does not wish to continue as a lessor of the Star Morning Mine and mill because it hopes to sell its interest in the Mine to your group. As we have advised Hecla we believe we retain rights as a lessee and our position is that any sale of all or a portion of the mine would be subject to our rights as lessee. We have no objection to the sale of Hecla’s interest in the property to you so long as our rights are respected.
Because it appears that the request for damages was based on a separate slander of title claim, and not as damages incident to the declaratory judgment, we conclude that this was a separate claim. Therefore, we conclude that the certification of final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) was proper.
III.
THE AFFIDAVIT OF JAY LAYMAN IN OPPOSITION TO HECLA’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION DID NOT RAISE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT CONCERNING WAIVER OR EQUITABLE ESTOP-PEL.
Star asserts that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment because the affidavit of Jay Layman and documents submitted by Star in opposition to Hecla’s motion contain admissible evidence that raise genuine issues of material fact concerning: (1) whether Hecla waived its right to rely on the 1984 lease, and (2) whether Hecla is equitably estopped from terminating the 1984 lease. We disagree with Star’s assertions.
In Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646 (1956), the Court defined waiver:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party’s] option have demanded and insisted upon.
Id. at 368, 304 P.2d at 649 (citations omitted).
A party asserting waiver must have acted in reliance upon the waiver and altered the party’s position. Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981).
Waiver is an equitable doctrine based upon fairness and justice. The existence of waiver ordinarily is a question of fact and is foremost a question of intent. In order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly appear, although it may be established by conduct. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518, 520, 650 P.2d 657, 660, 662 (1982).
Equitable estoppel arises when a party makes a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; it is made with the intent that it be relied upon; the party asserting estoppel does not know or could not discover the truth; and the party asserting estoppel relies on it to the party’s prejudice. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22, 644 P.2d 341, 344 (1982).
Star first argues that the trial court should not have refused to consider portions of Jay Layman’s affidavit without a motion to strike by Hecla. There is no authority in this state that requires a mo*783tion to strike or an objection before a trial court may exclude or not consider evidence offered by a party. Absent plain or fundamental error, some form of objection is ordinarily necessary, however, to preserve the right to challenge on appeal the admission or consideration of evidence. I.R.E. 103(a)(1) (Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected and a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection.)
I.R.C.P. 56(e) states:
Rule 56(e). Form of Affidavits— Further testimony — Defense required. — Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but [the party’s] response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If [the adverse party] does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against [the party].
In this case, Hecla objected to the consideration of some of the evidence presented in Jay Layman’s affidavit. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Hecla’s attorney told the trial court:
We don’t dispute the facts set forth in [Star’s] affidavits so far as the facts asserted represent competent evidence. And we object, however, to some of the evidence asserted on the grounds that it’s conclusory and no foundation. An example is in a couple of places in the affidavit there is a declaration that we agreed, referring to, apparently [Star] and [Hecla and Bunker], we agreed to something. And there's no evidence of when the agreement was made, what it was, who was present, and who said what to whom. Otherwise, essentially, we see this case as an application of law to the facts. Really we haven’t quibbled, we haven’t filed [any] counter affidavits quibbling with their factual assertions nor have they with ours.
If the court please. One point on the matter of facts is we simply would urge the court to consider carefully the affidavit of Jay Layman for the reason that I just mentioned, that I think there is some incompetent evidence there and also because if you compare the facts set forth in their key affidavit with their brief, we contend they do not jibe. That is, assertions are made in the brief that are not backed up by the affidavit. But the court will — that will be evident to the court when you study that.
In Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 960, 112 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1991), the Court applied I.R.C.P. 56(e) in upholding the trial court’s rejection of an affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment by the defendants in a wrongful death case. The affidavit was by a surviving husband, who was not a physician, stating his belief that his wife’s death was proximately caused by the actions of the defendants. The trial court rejected the affidavit as “ ‘inadmissible evidence,’ because it was ‘not valid medical testimony.’ ” Id. at 212, 796 P.2d at 89.
In affirming the trial court’s rejection of the affidavit in Evans, the Court said:
Under Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the affidavits supporting and opposing summary judgment “shall be made on personal knowledge, and shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence____” The district court held that [the husband’s] affidavit *784containing his lay opinion that the events on April 15, 1987, caused [his wife’s] death eleven months later was not admissible evidence.
Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence Rules 701 and 702, and the decisions of this Court, the trial court has discretion in determining whether to allow a lay witness to express an opinion relating to causation.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the lay opinion of [the husband] that his wife’s death by cardiac arrest was caused by the events of April 15, 1987, was not admissible under I.R.E. 701 and the prior decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, if there was a wrongful death claim pled, the trial court did not err in dismissing it.
Id. at 213-14, 796 P.2d at 90-91.
The fact that the evidence presented in support of or in opposition to motions for summary judgment must be admissible evidence, does not affect the rule that the trial court, and this Court on review, should liberally construe the facts in the record in favor of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Hoene v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752, 756, 828 P.2d 315, 319 (1992); Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 338, 757 P.2d 197, 201 (1988); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 469-70, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241-42 (1986). The question of admissibility is a threshold question to be answered before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to the admissible evidence.
In this case, the trial court said in its opinion granting Hecla’s motion for summary judgment:
The affidavits of William J. Grismer and Frank J. Breidt submitted by Hecla in support of its motion and the affidavit of Jay S. Layman submitted by [Star] in opposition to Hecla’s motion are generalized, conclusory, and lack the specificity required by IRCP 56(e). The affidavits do not reflect when a conversation took place, who was present, nor who said what.
At the best, the Breidt affidavit indicates that he individually did not make any statement to [Star] or its agents that the July 19, 1984 Lease Agreement would not be terminated. Grismer makes the same statement and additionally indicates in his position as Secretary of Hecla that Art Brown was the person, “who was responsible at Hecla for making any final agreement.” Grismer additionally states “I did not intend that any modification be made whatsoever without the consent and approval of Bunker Limited.”
Jay S. Layman’s affidavit contains few direct statements, instead it relies upon the uninformative and conclusory use of phrases such as “we participated in negotiations with the plaintiffs ...”; “Hecla represented ...”; “[Star] immediately communicated orally to plaintiffs ... ”; “We agreed ... ”; “All parties were aware ... ”; “based upon representations by representatives of plaintiff that ...”; and “Hecla indicated ...” None of these statements provide the kind of specific, admissible facts which will either support or prevent the entry of summary judgment.
The trial court then concluded that, in effect, Hecla and Star had presented the motion based upon the documents, specific facts recited by the trial court in the introduction to its opinion, and four “specific, undisputed, material facts.” The specific facts recited by the trial court in the introduction to its opinion were taken virtually verbatim from Hecla’s brief in support of its motion for summary judgment. The one additional fact stated by the trial court in the introduction to its opinion was that in the fall of 1986, Star performed some ditching and changed the water flow in the mine. This fact appears to have been taken from Jay Layman's affidavit.
The following four additional “specific, undisputed, material facts” were recited by the trial court:
1. Jay Layman had numerous meetings with representatives of Hecla re*785garding Environmental Protection Act problems.
2. In the summer of 1988, Hank Walde of Hecla specifically informed Jay Layman that there had been no discussion or involvement with Bunker concerning entering into a lease or operating the mine. Based on Walde’s representations, Star entered into settlement negotiations with Acme Trading, a creditor.
3. Jay Layman told Frank Breidt at Bunker of each of his conversations with someone in the marketplace.
4. Frank Breidt represented to Jay Layman that by combining the concentrates of Bunker and Star they would have more marketing power.
Essentially, Star does not dispute the facts recited by the trial court in its opinion. Star contends that in addition to these facts the trial court should have considered the contents of Jay Layman’s affidavit and other documents submitted to the trial court in determining whether there were genuine issues of material fact.
Star contends that Jay Layman’s affidavit establishes:
1. There were numerous agreements between Star, which included Jay Layman, and Hecla regarding problems with the 1984 lease and the development of the 1987 draft.
2. There were continuing agreements between Star and Hecla regarding sale of concentrates and possible markets for the concentrates.
Star also contends that Jay Layman’s affidavit and other documents submitted to the trial court establish that Hecla represented that Hecla did not intend to deny Star the right to proceed with operating the mine.
Star’s waiver theory is that Hecla’s action, silence, and inaction operated as acceptance of the 1987 draft and waived Hecla’s right to rely on the 1984 lease. Star argues that Hecla drafted the 1987 draft and initiated a course of conduct demonstrating that the parties had agreed to the new lease terms. Star contends that whether Hecla was silent as to the 1987 draft after submitting it to Star is a question of material fact that needs to be determined by the trial court.
Alternatively, Star asserts that Hecla is equitably estopped from terminating the 1984 lease. Star argues that Hecla’s denial to Jay Layman of any dealings with Bunker regarding leasing the mine to Bunker was clearly a false representation upon which Star relied and about which Star could not discover the truth. Star contends that from Hecla’s actions it is clear Hecla intended that Star rely on Hecla’s denial of dealing with Bunker regarding the mine. Star states that it did rely to its detriment and changed its position particularly with regard to its entering settlement negotiations with its creditors.
We find much of the contents of Jay Layman’s affidavit to be properly characterized as this Court characterized the evidence offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 930, 719 P.2d 1185, 1190, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct. 645, 93 L.Ed.2d 701 (1986).
I.R.C.P. 56(e) requires that “supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” (Emphasis added.) The matters referred to by Gardner, and upon which the plaintiffs rely, do not satisfy either the requirement of admissibility or competency under Rule 56(e). Most are opinions or conclusions of Gardner, which are ... inadmissible.”
We note that in Gardner neither the Court’s opinion nor the record indicates that there was objection to the trial court’s consideration of the matters to which Gardner referred. As we have indicated above, some form of objection in the trial court is necessary to preserve the right to challenge on appeal the admission or consideration of evidence, unless the error is plain or fundamental. To this extent, we now restrict our review of the admissibility of evidence under I.R.C.P. 56(e) more strictly than Gardner did.
*786The affidavit of Jay Layman describes in general terms the course of negotiations between Star and Hecla from October 1985 through August 1987. Although some of the statements made in the affidavit concerning these negotiations are not supported by a foundation that would establish their admissibility, we conclude that this is not consequential. Mere negotiations for a new lease do not establish that Hecla waived its right to rely on the 1984 lease.
More critical are the following assertions by Jay Layman in his affidavit:
1. Hecla represented to Star that it had authority to lease the mine because Bunker was in default in its agreement with Hecla concerning the mine.
2. When Star received a letter from Hecla’s general counsel dated August 25, 1987, forwarding the 1987 draft and stating that he would “like to finalize [the draft] such that all parties will be prepared to sign them once the Comineo strike is settled,” Star immediately communicated orally to Hecla that Star accepted the terms and agreed that the draft would be signed upon obtaining a marketing agreement.
3. Hecla and Star agreed that the 1987 draft contained all the terms and was the new lease existing between the parties.
4. It was Star’s understanding with Hecla that Star and Hecla would sign the 1987 draft, and start production and shipping to Comineo, as soon as the Comineo strike was terminated.
5. In the first week of September 1988, Star entered into litigation with creditors, based upon representations by representatives of Hecla that Star would be able to commence production in the near future. Approximately $40,000 was spent in participation in this litigation. This expense would not have occurred had Hecla indicated there were problems with Hecla recognizing Star’s lease.
6. From September through November 1988, Star continued discussions with Comineo and Hecla about market possibilities. Comineo finally offered a contract. Star received a contract for shipment in December 1988 for both lead and zinc.
7. Pursuant to Star’s understanding with Hecla, Star signed the 1987 draft and sent a copy of the shipping agreement to Hecla.
8. Hecla improperly seized equipment of Star located at the mine. This equipment remained at the mine site as a result of an understanding that Star was to reopen the mine upon obtaining a contract from Comineo.
We agree with the trial court that these statements are conclusory and do not provide the kind of specific, admissible facts that will either support or prevent the entry of summary judgment. As the Court said in Gardner, these statements “do not satisfy either the requirement of admissibility or competency under Rule 56(e).” 110 Idaho at 930, 719 P.2d at 1190.
Excluding the inadmissible assertions contained in Jay Layman’s affidavit, there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning Hecla’s alleged waiver of its right to rely on the 1984 lease. The 1987 draft states that all parties must sign before it is effective, and it is undisputed that Hecla did not sign. In addition, most of the actions that Star argues it took in reliance on the draft were taken before Hecla submitted the 1987 draft to Star. Star’s decisions to maintain the mine and to meet government regulations during the negotiation period do not show reliance because these actions were appropriate under the existing 1984 lease.
Likewise, there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning Hecla being equitably estopped from terminating the 1984 lease. There is no evidence to support Star’s argument that Hecla was dealing with Bunker regarding leasing the mine to Bunker. The only evidence is that Hecla may have been considering selling its interest in the mine to Bunker. In that event, whatever leasehold interest Star had in the mine would not have been affected. Also, without the inadmissible assertions in *787the affidavit of Jay Layman there is no evidence of Star’s reliance on any allegedly false representation by Hecla.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
We affirm the summary judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
We award costs on appeal to respondents.
BAKES, C.J., McDEVITT, J., and TROUT, J., Pro Tern, concur.