Court Opinion

ID: 9719005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:40:14.713937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.011501
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the opinion as it disposes of the counts charging perjury under section 32—2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 32—2(a)). I dissent as to the disposition of the two counts charging perjury as provided in section 32—2(b). Defendant testified under oath before a grand jury upon matters material to the consideration of that body. Thereafter in a proceeding authorized by the circuit court he testified under oath upon the same matters. It is agreed that the testimony as to such matters was contradictory. Within the terms of section 32—2(b) the prosecution is not required to prove which “statement is false,” or as stated in section 32—2(a), the prosecution is not required to prove which of the statements “he does not believe to be true.” Such statutory provision is constitutional. People v. Ricker (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 562, 262 N.E.2d 456. In Ricker, the court stated that by definition each of the contradictory statements cannot be true and that the effect of the statute is to place upon the defendant a burden of going forward with the evidence to show whether or not the conflict in the contradictory statements arose because of excusable mistake or some other valid reason. This the defendant did not undertake to do. In the absence of such explanation, it may be concluded that the testimony before the grand jury was false. See People v. Mitchell (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 399, 357 N.E.2d 862. I would affirm the convictions upon the counts alleging perjury under section 32—2(b).