Court Opinion

ID: 9746022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:51:12.448271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:07.896555
License: Public Domain

McINTYRE, J.,
I concur with the majority that the City of San Diego’s (City) writ petition should be granted. The majority holds both that the evidence fails to establish a dangerous condition of public property and that there is no triable issue on whether any such condition proximately caused the auto accident, injuries and deaths.
On the “dangerous condition” issue, I agree that the fact the City knew that vehicles frequently raced along this stretch of Imperial Avenue is not a sufficient basis to impose liability. However, there was also a great deal of evidence that lighting conditions were poor and made it difficult for drivers attempting a left turn at the intersection where the accident occurred to see vehicles approaching and to determine their distance and speed. From this, a rational trier of fact might infer that the street lighting could contribute or create a dangerous condition of public property at dusk or after dark.
While a public municipal entity is ordinarily immune from liability for failure to light its streets, a duty to light, and the consequent liability for failure to do so, may arise from some peculiar condition rendering lighting necessary to make the streets safe for travel. (Anterior v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 477, 483 [220 Cal.Rptr. 181].) Plaintiffs contend this case involved just such a condition and offered sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact on this issue. Thus, I would not grant the petition based on the failure of plaintiffs to establish a dangerous condition.
However, in my view, the analysis of the California Supreme Court in Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171] applies here. There is insufficient evidence of a causal connection or nexus between the general lighting of the area and this accident. The vehicle operated by the plaintiffs’ decedent made a left turn to cross two lanes of oncoming traffic. Her vehicle cleared the first lane (the lane in which one racing vehicle had its lights on) before being struck by the unlit racing vehicle in the outside lane. Its speed at impact was estimated at 75 miles per hour plus after braking from approximately 85 miles per hour (in a 50 mph zone). Since the driver was killed, we do not know what she did or did not observe before making the left turn. To implicate street lighting as a proximate *33cause of the collision is to speculate, not draw a reasonable inference. Plaintiffs have not shown facts for which a causal relationship between the collision and street lighting can be inferred by a trier of fact. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
The petition of real parties in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 14, 2006, S142577. Kennard, J., and Werdegar, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.