Court Opinion

ID: 9833046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:23:56.232572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:58.490368
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing and to Certify.
Appellee has filed a motion for rehearing in which he vigorously contends we erred in our holding to the effect that William H. Pierson, individually and as administrator, Walter C. Pierson, guardian, Howard Pier-son, and Alice Thomas and her husband, Harvey Thomas, were not necessary parties to the suit as contemplated by Sub. 29a of Art. 1995, R.C.-S.-, Vernon’s Ann.Civ. St. art. 1995, subd.' 29a. He alleges that we are in conflict with the recent cases of Pioneer Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Gray, 125 S.W.2d 284, by the Commission of Appeals, and Hamilton et al. v. Federal Land Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 125 S.W.2d 1088, and Smith v. Dozier Const. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 66 S.W.2d 744.
The difference in the facts presented marks the distinction between the holdings of the courts in those cases and our holding in the instant case. In each of the cited cases the parties asserting their privilege to be sued in the counties of their residence had acquired an interest in the. corpus of the property involved. They had to that extent stepped into the shoes of the original mortgagors and, for that reason, the mortgages could not be effectively foreclosed without their presence before the court. In the instant case no such condition exists. It is not claimed any of the parties who here claim their privilege had acquired any interest in the property upon which appellee seeks to foreclose his deed of trust. They are lien holders only and in no sense connected with the transaction primarily involved in the suit.
Prior to the enactment of Sub. 29a of Art. 1995 (Acts 1927) our courts had held that a second lien holder was only a proper, as distinguished from a necessary, party to a suit to foreclose a prior lien. Ewell v. Anderson, 49 Tex. 697; Gamble v. Martin et al., Tex.Civ.App., 151 S.W. 327; Tug River Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel et al., 6 Cir., 86 F. 818; Wiltsie on Mortgage Foreclosure (4th Ed.), par. 373; Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.), par. 1813.
They had also held that one in possession, or having a right of possession under conveyances or conditions which arose subsequent to the execution of the mortgage or deed of trust sought to be foreclosed was a necessary party to the foreclosure proceeding. Bradford v. Knowles, 86 Tex. 505, 25 S.W. 1117.
The decisions prior to the enactment of Sub. 29a, as well as since its enactment, have been consistent in their adherence to the rule that all subsequent en-cumbrancers of whose claims notice is given before the filing of the suit, either by possession or registration, must be made parties or they are not affected by the foreclosure. Byler v. Johnson, 45 Tex. 509; Delespine v. Campbell, 45 Tex. 628; Davis v. Rankin & Whitworth, 50 Tex. 279; Anderson v. Ward, Tex.Com.App., 4 S.W.2d 32; Johnson v. First Nat’l Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 870. That does not mean, however, that no effective judgment of foreclosure can be had without their presence in the suit. It means only that, if the plaintiff wishes to shut off their equity of redemption, he must make them parties.
It was in the light of these holdings of the courts that the Legislature enacted Sub. 29a of Art. 1995 and limited defendants who may be forced out of the counties of their residence to litigate causes of action in counties where none of the defendants reside to those who are “necessary parties” to the suit; In First Nat’l Bank v. Pierce, 123 Tex. 186, 69 S.W.2d 756, our Supreme Court, in the definition quoted in our original opinion, has very definitely, and we think quite correctly, stated what was meant by the Legislature when it enacted the subdivision and used the term “necessary parties.”
Certainly it cannot be maintained that appellee could not foreclose his deed of trust lien against -those who are liable upon the indebtedness to secure which the deed of trust was given, and who still *114own the property covered by it, without the presence in court of the second lien holders. We think it is clear under the holdings of our courts prior to the enactment of the subdivision in question that the correct and proper interpretation of its language has been made by the Supreme Court in the case above cited and that, under its terms, second lien holders are not “necessary parties” to a foreclosure suit upon a prior lien in the sense contemplated by the subdivision. It may be that the rigid restriction results in hardships and inconvenience. If so, it is not a matter with which the courts are concerned. Their duties are confined to the interpretation of the law as it is written and in no sense to modify or expand it by judicial interpretation.
We have carefully considered the motion for rehearing and, believing that, in the original opinion, we correctly disposed of the questions involved, the motion for rehearing and the motion to certify the question to the Supreme Court will be overruled.