Court Opinion

ID: 9457043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:10:48.123199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:11.897357
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, Circuit Judge,
(dissenting).
If the record indicated that the postal inspector had deliberately volunteered a comment on the defendant’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege, a mistrial should have been granted. Even if the comment was not deliberate, this court’s decision may be justified as a safeguard against such improper behavior by government agents who must appear frequently as prosecution witnesses. As I interpret the record, however, the mistake was a relatively unimportant inadvertence; its significance was magnified by the manner in which defense counsel objected, but I would not charge the prosecution with the consequences of a defense objection.
This case does not involve any police misconduct. The postal inspector advised Matos of his right to counsel before asking him to empty his pockets. The deterrent purpose underlying the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, is, therefore, inapplicable. Nor is this a case in which the jury was asked to draw an inference of guilt from the defendant’s assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106. The government did not even claim that defendant’s silence at the time of his arrest impeached his testimony at the trial. Cf. Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969); compare Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1. Thus, there was neither prosecu-torial nor police misconduct.1
The testimony before the jury did not disclose that Matos had refused to sign a waiver of rights or that he had asked for a lawyer at the time of his arrest.2 Nor was there any testimony that he asserted his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. There was, however, repeated testimony that the defendant remained silent at times when he would have spoken if, as he testified, he had intended to give the watch to the proper authorities as soon as feasible. The most significant testimony was received without objection.
Thus, on cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that after he “found” the watch and before he was arrested, he did not show it to another employee who was with him 3 or to his supervisor when he told him to go to lunch.4 Moreover, In*1076spector Mott testified, without objection, that when he accosted the defendant, identified himself, and told him that he wanted to ask him some questions, the defendant did not say anything.3 Mott then testified that he brought the defendant to Bottker's office where the defendant was asked to empty his pockets.5
6
Before Bottker testified, Inspector Mesics confirmed Mott’s testimony which disclosed that the defendant had been placed under arrest, that upon request he had voluntarily emptied his pockets, and that the watch had been found wrapped in a dirty white cloth.7 No reference was made in either Mott’s or Mesics' testimony, on either direct or cross-examination, to any comment by the defendant.
Thus, apart from Bottker’s testimony, the uncontradicted evidence established *1077that the defendant had had three opportunities to return the watch before it was found wrapped in a soiled cloth in his pocket, and that on each occasion he had remained silent. The comment by Bottker, which is the basis for reversal, was in the nature of cumulative evidence with respect to the third occasion on which defendant remained silent. In my judgment, it was not sufficiently different from the other two occasions, to warrant reversal.
.In expressing this opinion I do not purport to declare a belief that no juror could have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt if the comment had not been made.8 I merely conclude that the error here is less significant than the error in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, or Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171; that the evidence of guilt, apart from the error, is as strong, if not stronger (and conversely the basis for a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt is as weak, or weaker) than in any of those cases. Regardless of the proper verbalization of the rule, I am, therefore, persuaded that Bottker’s comment was “harmless” within the holdings of those cases.

. Unless, of course, one infers that the “inadvertence” was contrived between prosecutor and witness; I am satisfied that such an inference is not warranted by the record.

. These facts were brought out during the voir dire hearing to consider defendant’s objection that the request to empty his pockets violated his constitutional rights because his arrest was without a warrant.

. “Q About 11:00 o’clock. Was there anyone around? You testified there were other employees. Were they around at the time you found the watch?
“A (In English) Yes, one guy.
“Q One man?
“A (In English) Yes.
“Q Did you show him the watch?
“A (In English) No.”

. “Q After you found the watch, that was about 11:00 o’clock, is that right?
“A (In English) Yes.
“Q What time did you go to lunch?
“A (In English) 11:00.
*1076“Q 11:00 o’clock.
Who told you to go to lunch?
“A (In English) Supervisor.
“Q Do you know his name?
“A (In English) Yes.
“Q What is his name?
“A (In English) Shack.
“Q Shack? Did you talk to your supervisor at that time?
“A (In English) No.
* * * * *
“Q Did you tell your supervisor that you found a watch?
“A (In English) No, sir.
* * * sjs *
‘■Q The watch was in your pocket, was it not, at this time?
“A (In English) No. When he told me to go to lunch, and I don’t put it in my pocket.
“Q Did 5’ou have the watch out in your hand all this time?
“A (In English) When he told me to go to lunch?
“Q Yes.
“A (In English) Yes, in my hand with my glove.
“Q All you had to do is open your hand like this (indicating) and say, T found this’. You did not do that, did you ?
“A (In English) No, I don’t do it.”

. “Did you have a conversation with him?
“A Yes, I walked up to him and I told him I was from the Inspector’s Office and that we would like to ask him some questions.
“Q What did he say to you?
“A He didn’t say anything at that time.
“Q Then what did you do?
“A The defendant and I went down the stairwell again and when we got downstairs he asked me what this was all about, and I told him that this was an official investigation and that when we got to the Inspector’s Office we would have • an interpreter there so that he would understand what was going on, and I asked him, ‘Comprendo’, and he said yes.
“Q You asked him, ‘Comprende’ in Spanish, right?
“A Yes.
“Q How did he respond?
“A He said yes in English.”

. “Q Now, did Agent Bottger [sic] have a conversation with the defendant?
“A Yes. He told the defendant he was under arrest and asked him to empty his pockets, if he would.
“Q Now, just prior to this, were you in communication with Agent Bottger at the time that you were proceeding over to the office?
“A We were in radio communication with him.
“Q Now, after the defendant was told he was under arrest and to remove the contents of his pockets, what happened, if anything?
“MR. ALWIN: Objection, your Hon-
or.
“THE COURT: Objection overruled.
You may have a standing objection.
“BY MR. SIAVELIS:
“Q What happened, sir?
“A The defendant started to take the articles out of his front pockets and then Mr. Mesics asked him to remove the items out of his rear pockets also, and the defendant removed a dirty wash cloth from his left rear pocket and put it on the table also.
“Q Then what happened?
“A Mr. Mesics told him to unwrap the wash cloth, or asked him to open it up —it was rolled up — and inside the wash cloth was a watch.”

. “Q You are in the office now, Agent Mesics. Did Agent Bottger have a conversation with the defendant?
“A When I came into the office Bott-ger was in the process of telling the—
*1077“Q Excuse me. Did he place the defendant under arrest?
“A He was telling him he was under arrest, yes, sir.
“Q Did he also say anything else?
“A He asked him to empty his pockets.
“Q What happened then?
“MR. ALWIX: I object, your Honor. May I have a continuing objection?
“THE COURT: You may have a continuing objection. Objection overruled. “BY MR. SIAWELIS:
“Q What happened?
“A The defendant emptied his front pockets first, removed some coins and some other articles, and from his back pockets he removed — the one pocket, I believe it was the left rear pocket, he removed what looked like a wash cloth, it was dirty, white, and he set this on the table.
“Q Then what happened?
“A Then this wash cloth — the watch was found wrapped up.”

. Such a declaration is inappropriate.
“It is argued that we must reverse if we can imagine a single juror whose mind might have been made up because of Cooper’s and Bosby’s confessions and who otherwise would have remained in doubt and unconvinced. We of course do not know the jurors who sat. Our judgment must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to to have been the probable impact of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury.” Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284.