Court Opinion

ID: 9767680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:23:39.655786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.380734
License: Public Domain

Sam Robinson, Associate Justice, dissenting. One of the most important parts of a jury trial is the selection of the jury. This is especially true where a ciminal case has received wide publicity and a great number of citizens are likely to have some feeling in the matter, one way or the other, although such opinion or belief by a particular venireman is not sufficient to challenge for cause. For instance, a venireman states on his voir dire examination that he has read accounts of the alleged offense in the newspapers; that he has heard the case discussed and has formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, but has not talked to anyone that purported to have personal knowledge of the facts; and that he can put aside any opinion he has formed and try the case according to the law and the evidence. According to many decisions of this Court such a venireman is qualified to serve as a jurón. Very likely in a case of this kind the defendant is compelled to exercise a peremptory challenge unless he feels to a moral certainty that the opinion the venireman has is in his favor. When all things are taken into consideration, the 12 peremptory challenges allowed the defendant in a capital case are not excessive by any means; in fact, prior to the adoption of the Criminal Reform Act in 1936 the defense could exercise 20 peremptory challenges. Usually by the time 12 jurors are accepted the defendant has exhausted all 12 of his peremptory challenges, and then at that stage of the proceedings to allow the State to challenge jurors that have already been accepted, without giving any reason whatever, is contrary to the statutes and contrary to fair play. If the prosecuting attorney can challenge one juror in such circumstances, why should he not be allowed to challenge all 12? Is it because challenging one would be a little error and challenging 12 would be a big error ? One is naive indeed who does not think that both the prosecution and the defense take full advantage of every angle of the law to get on the jury people they believe will be most likely to see their side of the case. The statutes of this State pertaining to the selection of a jury are clear as to every detail. But for some reason the majority have completely ignored the statutes. In my opinion the very issue involved is regulated by statute. In the first place, Ark. Stat. § 43-1903 provides: “Felonies, selection in. — In a prosecution for felony, the clerk, under the direction of the court, shall draw from the jury box the names of twelve petit jurors, who shall be sworn to make true and perfect answers to such questions as may be asked them touching their qualifications as jurors in the case on trial, and each juror may be examined by the State and cross-examined by the defendant, touching his qualifications. If the court decide he is competent, the State may challenge him .peremptorily or accept him, then the defendant may peremptorily challenge or accept him. . . .” [Emphasis supplied] It will be noticed that after the court decides a venireman is competent the State must first challenge him peremptorily or accept him. It is clear from the statute that the defendant has to accept or challenge only after the State has first done so. This statute does not provide that both the prosecution and the defense can accept a venireman as a juror and then the prosecuting attorney change his mind and exercise a peremptory challenge, after the defendant has exhausted his challenges. If such action is permitted, the above statute is nullified, and that appears to be what the majority have approved. Ark. Stat. § 43-1910 provides: ‘ ‘ Challenge defined.— A challenge is an objection to the trial jurors and is of two kinds: “First. To the panel. “Second, To the individual juror.” § 43-1913: “Individual juror, challenge to. — The challenge to the individual juror is: “First. For cause. “Second. Peremptory.” § 43-1914: “When challenge taken. — It must be taken before he is sworn in chief, but the court, for a good cause, may permit it to be made at any time before the jury is completed. ’ ’ Surely the majority must think this section means something; the statute in effect says that the court can permit a juror to be excused, after once being accepted, only for a good cause. I just don’t see how this statute can be construed as having any other effect, and yet it is completely ignored. The prosecution was permitted to challenge the juror without stating any cause, good or otherwise. § 43-1915: 1‘ Challenge for cause. — The challenge for cause may be taken either by the State or by the defendant.” § 43-1916: “General or particular. — It may be general, that the juror is disqualified in serving in any case, or particular, that he is disqualified from serving in the case on trial.” § 43-1917: ‘ ‘ Cause of general challenge. — Causes, of general challenge are: “First. A want of the qualifications prescribed by law. ■ “Second. A conviction for a felony. ¡ (Unsoundness of mind, or such defect in the faculties of the mind, or organs of the body, as renders him incapable of properly performing the duties of a juror. ’ ’ § 43-1918. “Particular causes. — Particular causes of challenge are actual and implied bias. ’ ’ § 43-1924. “Order of challenges.- — The challenge to the juror shall first be made by the State and then by the defendant, and the State must exhaust her challenges to each particular juror before such juror is passed to the defendant for challenge or acceptance.” [Emphasis supplied] No effect can be given to this statute and permit the State to challenge a juror previously accepted, after the defendant has exhausted his challenges. Of course, the court can excuse a juror for cause after he has been accepted by both sides. But it must be remembered that in the case at bar the juror was peremptorily challenged; no cause or reason was given. In an uninterrupted line of cases extending over a period of nearly a hundred years, this Court has consistently held that it was error to allow the prosecution to peremptorily challenge a juror previously accepted, after the defendant had exhausted his challenges. Williams v. State, 63 Ark. 527, 39 S. W. 709; McGough v. State, 113 Ark. 301, 167 S. W. 857; Ruloff and Berger v. State, 142 Ark. 477, 219 S. W. 781; Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S. W. 582; Hanna v. State, 183 Ark. 810, 38 S. W. 2d 1090; Bevis v. State, 90 Ark. 586, 119 S. W. 1131. The majority specifically overrule the Williams case, decided in 1897, but fail to mention Temple v. State, 126 Ark. 290, 189 S. W. 855, decided in 1916. There the Court said: “It was held in some of these cases that the court, in its discretion, might permit the State to use a peremptory challenge on a juror who had been accepted by both sides where the defendant had not exhausted all of his peremptory challenges ; but in all the cases in which it was held not to have been error to permit this action, the defendant had not exhausted his peremptory challenges. The test seems to be whether the defendant has remaining as many challenges as the State is permitted to exercise, and upon the authority of these cases, the judgment of the court must be reversed”. To sustain its opinion the majority have cited Green v. State, 223 Ark. 761, 270 S. W. 2d 895. But that case is not in point with the case at bar. There a juror was excused by the court on its own motion, the court being of the opinion that the juror was disqualified because of having rendered jury service within the past two years and that the defendant could not waive such disqualification. The court’s action was not arbitrary. The juror was excused because the court thought it would be error not to excuse him. Such action on the part of the trial court is not analogous to the situation in the case at bar, where the prosecuting attorney, after the defendant had exhausted his challenges, was permitted to peremptorily excuse a juror who had been accepted by both sides. The statute provides that “for a good cause” a challenge may be exercised at any time before the jury is completed. Here the prosecuting attorney stated no cause and gave no reason for challenging the juror, and certainly this court does not know the reason for such action, but it could have been that at that stage of the proceedings the prosecuting attorney knew the identity of the next venire1 man to be called and decided he would be a better juror from the standpoint of the State than the juror previously accepted. The majority say that the defense should always reserve some challenges to meet such a contingency. The least that can be said is that the suggestion does not show a realistic concept of the problem of selecting a jury. In a capital case the defense has only 12 challenges. Of course, the personnel of the jury is of the utmost importance. Frequently whether a case is won or lost depends on the judgment exercised by counsel in using his peremptory challenges. In many instances the 12 challenges allowed are a great deal less than the number counsel feels he should have to get a fair and impartial jury, and to say that a defense lawyer should use only 7 or 8 peremptory challenges during the selection of the 12 jurors, out of perhaps dozens or even hundreds of veniremen that are examined, because after the 12 had been selected the prosecution may excuse 4 or 5 of those already accepted by both sides, deprives the defendant of the right to select a jury as provided by statute. The majority say “a litigant is not entitled to a particular juror.” Of course, this assertion is good law, but in the case at bar that principle of law is not followed, because here the State was allowed to have a particular juror, the prosecution challenged one previously accepted, without giving anv reason, and selected another juror after the defendant had exhausted his challenges. Thus the State was allowed to select a particular juror. To support tlieir views, after a most diligent, exhaustive and careful search the majority have been able to cite only two cases from any of the state or federal courts over the whole United States, and neither case is in point. First, the Green case [223 Ark. 761, 270 S. W. 2d 895], heretofore discussed, which is shown to be not in point; and, second, the Michigan case of People v. Rich, 237 Mich. 481. Upon careful investigation it will be seen that neither does this Michigan case support the majority. In Arkansas the statutes, as heretofore pointed out, clearly govern and control the order of challenge of the respective parties in the selection of a jury. In the Michigan case of Hamper’s Appeal, 51 Mich. 71, the court said: ‘ ‘ The question of order of challenge is one of practice and discretionary with the trial court. Peremptory challenge, so far as it extends, is a right secured by statute, of which neither party can be deprived until the jury are sworn.” But our statute, § 43-1914, provides that only a challenge for cause may be made after a juror has been selected. Moreover, the Michigan statute, 3 Mich. C. L. 1948, § 769.26, requires that the judgment be affirmed regardless of error unless it affirmatively appears that the error.' resulted in prejudice. That is not the law in Arkansas. Here it is presumed that an error is prejudicial unless it isaffirmatively appears to the contrary. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Crabtree, 69 Ark. 134, 62 S. W. 64; Neal v. Brandon 70 Ark. 79, 66 S. W. 200; St. Louis, I.M. & S. R. Co. v. Steed, 105 Ark. 205, 151 S. W. 257. Certainly there is no Showing in this record that the prosecution’s action in challenging a juror already accepted and substituting anotíier was not prejudicial to the defendant. This Court said in Willamsv. State, 63 Ark. 527, 39 S. cannot certainly say just how 0>| -$kqsqnjpj:ymen was prejudicial to the f^efWWíPot be able to say positively th^J^.t0^^.S3,p^Tj^^4i}qi,a]0t.<xIjiusirat all; but at the same time ■^^^^np^-jh^yrth^^b^sboot detrimental to him, and in fac^jjfe rKffit was. But this uncertainty j.tH^li^a^tr«n^a<i?g^jnent against the propriety of such a procedure.” Moreover, in the Michigan case of People v. Rich, 237 Mich. 481, the court was equally divided. Apparently according to Michigan law under such circumstances judgments are affirmed. In the other Michigan case of People v. Mullane, 256 Mich. 54, cited by the majority, the court points out that the jurors were excused for cause. And, incidentally, the earlier case of People v. Rich is not even mentioned in the Mullane case. In my opinion it boils down to the proposition that there is no authority to sustain the majority in holding that the prosecuting attorney can peremptorily challenge a juror previously accepted, after the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. In fact, all the law of this State, both statutory and case law, is to the contrary. The Green case [223 Ark. 761, 270 S. W. 2d 895] cited by the majority, is not in point, because there the court excused the juror on its own motion, thinking the juror was disqualified; and the Michigan case of People v. Rich is not in point because the order of exercising challenges is not regulated by statute in Michigan, but is discretionary with the trial court, whereas in Arkansas such order of challenge is specifically regulated by statute. In criminal cases especially a statute prescribing the manner in which challenges shall be exercised is mandatory. State v. Jones, 191 Pac. 1075. Por the reasons set out herein, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Johnson joins in this dissent.