Court Opinion

ID: 6433665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 12:10:31.708945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:52:17.915226
License: Public Domain

Rugg, C. J.
One of the' clauses in the original location granted by the selectmen of the town of Arlington in 1897 to the Arlington and Winchester Street Railway Company, to whose rights, privileges and obligations the defendant has succeeded, was to the effect that “The rate of fare shall not exceed 5 cents from any point in Arlington to any point in Arlington or Winchester, or from any point in Winchester to any point in Arlington, on all lines now or in the future controlled or operated by said Company or by any Company or system of which said road may in the future form a part.” The defendant, under the authority of St. 1913, c. 784, §§ 17, 19-22, 29, proposes to raise the rate of fare above five cents, subject to the approval of the public service commission. This suit in equity is brought to enjoin such action by the railway company.
The location here in question having been an original location granted by the selectmen and accepted by the directors of the street railway company before St. 1898, c. 578, took effect, the regulation of fares by agreement as a condition in the grant of the location was within the power conferred by the then existing statute upon the selectmen, and bound the street railway company to the same extent as if inserted in a special charter of incorporation. Selectmen of Clinton v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway, 199 Mass. 279. Selectmen of Westwood v. Dedham & Franklin *469Street Railway, 209 Mass. 213. In granting locations for street railways, boards of, selectmen and boards of aldermen are public officers and not agents of their respective towns and cities. The State exerts its sovereign power through them as its instruments. Flood v. Leahy, 183 Mass. 232. The Legislature has the power, so far as concerns these public officers and the municipalities by whom they were elected, to change or abrogate the terms of such locations. Although phrased in the form of a contract and securing valuable financial obligations to the cities and towns, the power of the Legislature to modify to their loss such locations has been settled after great consideration and vigorous protest from the interested municipalities. Springfield v. Springfield Street Railway, 182 Mass. 41. Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway, 182 Mass. 49; S. C. affirmed in 196 U. S. 539. See also Southern Wisconsin Railway v. Madison, 240 U. S. 457. Regulation of fares in this respect stands on no higher ground than requirements as to paving of streets. The paramount power of the Legislature over the subject of fares was recognized expressly in Selectmen of Clinton v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway, 199 Mass. 279, at page 288.
The question, therefore, is reduced to one of statutory interpretation. It is whether the general control over fares has been vested in the public service commission by St. 1913, c. 784. That act marked a radical change in the policy of the Legislature in the regulation of street railways. It conferred upon the public service commission far greater powers over the operation and accommodations to be provided by such common carriers than had been vested in any board by earlier acts. Summarily stated, it clothed the commission with full power to require safe, reasonable and adequate service to the public from all common carriers. The authority of the commission as to supervision and regulation in other respects is ample. It is manifest that such broad powers justly cannot be exercised to the extent conferred by the words used except when joined either with equally full power to regulate charges, rates and fares, or with freedom of action by the carrier in these respects, so as to enable the carrier to receive a fair return for the service required. This power expressly is conferred by § 22, which after subjecting the rates and fares actually charged or demanded to their supervision, enacts that whenever the commis*470sion is of opinion “that the rates, fares or charges or any of them chargeable by any such common carrier are insufficient to yield reasonable compensation for the service rendered and are unjust and unreasonable, the"' commission shall determine the just and reasonable rates, fares and charges to be charged” and shall fix the same by order binding upon the carrier. That these words were intended to be interpreted according to their full natural scope is obvious from the provision of § 29, to the effect that, “This act shall be deemed and construed as a remedial act and in enlargement and extension of all previous acts and existing laws conferring upon or vesting in the commission any jurisdiction, powers or discretion with respect to any subject or matter treated in this act. Except as above provided all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with any provision of this act, and all acts and parts of acts which would in any way limit or prevent the exercise to the fullest extent of any of the jurisdiction, powers, authority or discretion delegated herein to the commission are hereby repealed.” It is impossible to give the act a narrow or constricted construction as to the subject of fares.
There is no room for the binding force of stipulations as to fares in original grants of locations by local boards in the face of these sweeping provisions. Such stipulations are extinguished so far as inconsistent with the terms of St. 1913, c. 784. The plain purpose of the Legislature, in recognition of the fact that many street railways operate miles of tracks extending through numerous cities and towns, was to prescribe for the regulation of fares throughout the Commonwealth by a single public board, which may be expected to act with a broad and unbiased view for the promotion of the common good of all the conflicting interests involved and not under the influence of purely local considerations. The statute is a legislative determination that it is unwise and inexpedient longer to permit the full development of interurban transportation by street railways to be hampered by conditions as to fares contained in locations granted by the public officers of different municipalities. This conclusion is confirmed by the provisions of § 19, to the effect that “The commission shall not be prevented from taking such action as it may deem proper by any commitment or agreement of a common carrier entered into by reason of any requirement or recommendation of any board or public *471officers acting under delegated authority from the General Court prior to the enactment hereof.” See Keefe v. Lexington & Boston Street Railway, 185 Mass. 183.
It is not necessary to determine what would be the effect of a reduction of fares against the protest of the street railway company below the rate fixed in the location.
This record simply presents a case where the original act of the State performed by the selectmen in granting a location to the street railway company has been modified in respect of fares by the State speaking through the paramount power of the Legislature, and that modification has been accepted by the street railway company. No one else can complain.
No question of estoppel arises on this record. The State acting through its Legislature in enacting the statute has waived in this respect, in view of the adoption of its present policy as to fares, whatever conditions the State acting through the selectmen had imposed in the public interests in the original location. Hence cases like Rutherford v. Hudson River Traction Co. 44 Vroom, 227, and People v. Suburban Railway, 178 Ill. 594, upon which dependence is placed by the plaintiffs, have no application.
The plaintiffs rely strongly on Detroit v. Detroit Citizens’ Street Railway, 184 U. S. 368. The irrelevancy of that decision to the facts here presented is demonstrated by Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway, 196 U. S. 539.
While the public policy and statutory history of other States may be so different from that of this Commonwealth that decisions of other jurisdictions are by no means controlling, the conclusion here reached is in harmony with the reasoning of numerous cases. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 238 U. S. 174. Duluth Street Railway v. Railroad Commission, 161 Wis. 245. Benwood v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 127. Public Service Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 2 Gummere, 128.
It follows that the subject of fares (with express and possible exceptions not here material) has been placed under the control of the public service commission. Its power is not restrained on the facts here disclosed by the condition in the original grant of location.

Bill dismissed.