Court Opinion

ID: 9819368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:23:41.826802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:57.892672
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, specially concurring: While I agree with the ultimate result of the majority, reversal and remand, my reasoning is different from that of my colleagues. In my view, the question posed by the instant appeal concerns the fundamental difference between a stipulated bench trial and a plea of guilty. My conclusion is that while the proceedings in this case were labeled by all of the participants as a stipulated bench trial, the essence of the proceeding was, in effect, a plea of guilty without necessary admonitions for a plea. While hybrids are legitimate in agriculture, they can cause chaos in a judicial system. The rule in Illinois is that a stipulated bench trial is not tantamount to a guilty plea if the defendant presented and preserved a defense. See People v. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 20, 570 N.E.2d 320, 324 (1991). A stipulated bench trial is normally used to evade waiver of issues inherent in a guilty plea. See Horton, 143 Ill. 2d at 22, 570 N.E.2d at 325; People v. Leckner, 149 Ill. App. 3d 314, 318, 500 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1986). A guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects or defenses. See People v. Jackson, 47 Ill. 2d 344, 348, 265 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1970). In the instant case, defendant moved during the first trial to suppress her statements. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. Also during the first trial, defense counsel cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented the testimony of Dr. Cuneo, and unsuccessfully argued that defendant was at worst guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Thus, at a minimum, after the first trial, defendant had viable arguments for review concerning both the admissibility of her three statements made to police and the sufficiency of the evidence against her to support a verdict of first-degree murder. However, those issues were not addressed in our first review of this matter, except to the extent that we noted, for purposes of double jeopardy, that it appeared the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. Instead, our review concentrated only upon the trial court’s failure to conduct a fitness hearing after learning that defendant was taking psychotropic medication. After we reversed and remanded for a new trial, defendant offered neither any new evidence nor any additional arguments. The trial court candidly told defendant that, without more, her guilt was but a foregone conclusion. After judgment was entered, defendant failed to file a posttrial motion. Section 116 — 1(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 mandates that a defendant file a posttrial motion in order to preserve issues for appeal. 725 ILCS 5/116 — 1(b) (West 1996). A written post-trial motion is mandatory to preserve issues for appeal after either a jury trial or a bench trial. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). The purpose of a posttrial motion is: (1) to alert the trial court to trial errors and (2) to limit the issues reviewable on appeal that otherwise would be unduly burdensome and open-ended. See People v. Johnson, 214 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 574 N.E.2d 225 (1991). Here, defendant failed to file a posttrial motion after the stipulated bench trial; thus, any factual or legal issues resulting from the first trial were not properly preserved for appeal. Accordingly, since a defense was not preserved, the stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea. See Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 570 N.E.2d 320. When a stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea, the trial court must admonish the defendant of the consequences of her actions as though the proceeding were formally that of a guilty plea. See People v. Stepheny, 56 Ill. 2d 237, 306 N.E.2d 872 (1974). I have reviewed the transcript of the proceedings in which defendant agreed to the stipulated bench trial and, while the trial court attempted to ensure that the process was knowing and voluntary, I cannot say that defendant was properly admonished pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402. For example, the trial court failed to tell defendant she was giving up her right to a jury trial if she proceeded in this manner. The instant case presents a unique factual basis. A borderline mentally retarded woman with a 75 IQ, who suffers clinical depression and has auditory hallucinations, was charged with and convicted of the first-degree murder of her infant son. While we previously decided, for purposes of double jeopardy, that the evidence at the first trial supported a finding of guilt on the charge of first-degree murder, another trier of fact could determine that defendant did not have the requisite state of mind to support a conviction for first-degree murder and find instead that defendant is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record, I agree with defendant that what transpired after remand was not a stipulated bench trial but, rather, a guilty plea in which defendant’s valid defenses were not preserved. Accordingly, defendant was entitled to full Rule 402 admonitions. Since the participants were operating under the assumption that the proceeding was a stipulated bench trial, those admonitions were not given. On this basis, I agree with my colleagues that a reversal and remand is in order for the purpose of having a proceeding that fits into one of several clear categories: either a trial (bench or jury), a stipulated bench trial with effective preservation of claimed errors, or a guilty plea with appropriate admonitions to defendant. I therefore agree with the ultimate disposition of the majority — reversal and remand for further and appropriate proceedings, but I consider that we need not reach the issues upon which my colleagues base their decision.