Court Opinion

ID: 9448652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:42:21.963743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:31.266105
License: Public Domain

KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Winston v. U. S., 305 F.2d 258 (2nd Cir. 1962), decided this day.
As I noted there, the claims made by Muniz will subject the actions taken by the prison authorities to far-reaching judicial review; and the decision in this case will force the lower courts to substitute their judgment of what constitutes “reasonable” behavior in the delicate area of prison administration for that of the persons charged by statute with the duty of running our correctional system.
The issue is not as the majority would frame it — whether the duty of the Bureau of Prisons is to be immune from judicial review. It is whether Congress intended such review to result as a byproduct of the application of the Federal Tort Claims Act. If I am correct in concluding that Congress did not expect that Act to apply to prisoner claims, it is irrelevant that Congress, if faced with the problem at a later date, might decide that such review is desirable or at least tolerable.
Likewise it is not for this Court to judge whether Congressional intent is “harsh”; and assertions by the majority to the effect that this is a “liberal” statute must be considered in connection with the conflicting maxim that statutes waiving sovereign immunity ought to be narrowly construed. See Panella v. U. S., 216 F.2d 622, 624, n. 3 (2nd Cir. 1954) (Harlan, J.).
Therefore, I would affirm in this case also.