Court Opinion

ID: 9900510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 23:01:41.982075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.907762
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                 Before
                       KISOR, PENNIX, and DALY
                        Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                      v.

                       Brandon R. KERR
               Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps
                             Appellant

                             No. 202200140

                        _________________________

                         Decided: 17 October 2023

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                              Military Judge:
                              John L. Ferriter

 Sentence adjudged 7 April 2022 by a special court-martial convened at
 Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, consisting of a military
 judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: confinement for
 eight months and a bad-conduct discharge. 1

                          For Appellant:
         Lieutenant Commander Leah M. Fontenot, JAGC, USN
                             For Appellee:
          Lieutenant Commander Paul S. LaPlante, JAGC, USN
               Lieutenant Gregory A. Rustico, JAGC, USN

 1 Appellant was credited with having served 140 days of pretrial confinement.
                 United States v. Kerr, NMCCA No. 202200140
                             Opinion of the Court

Judge PENNIX delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Senior Judge
KISOR and Judge DALY joined.

                         _________________________

           This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
                may be cited as persuasive authority under
                 NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                         _________________________

PENNIX, Judge:
    A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted Appellant, con-
sistent with his pleas, of two specifications of larceny in violation of Article 121,
UCMJ. The military judge sentenced Appellant to confinement for eight
months and a bad-conduct discharge consistent with Appellant’s plea agree-
ment. The military judge recommended to the convening authority that the
bad-conduct discharge be suspended for six months. Appellant submitted mat-
ters in clemency, requesting that the bad-conduct discharge be suspended for
a minimum of six months. The convening authority considered the military
judge’s recommendation and Appellant’s request, denied the request, and ap-
proved the sentence as adjudged.
    Appellant asserts one assignment of error: that the bad-conduct discharge
portion of the sentence is inappropriately severe based on the nature of the
offense, Appellant’s prior service, his service-connected trauma, and his sin-
cere remorse. We agree that the bad-conduct discharge is inappropriately se-
vere and take action in our decretal paragraph.

                                I. BACKGROUND

    Appellant pleaded guilty to stealing an explosive flashbang and two gas
canisters (military property), and a fellow Marine’s car. Appellant’s command
had issued Appellant explosive flashbangs and gas canisters to use while de-
ployed. 2 Once the deployment was complete, Appellant was ordered to return
all remaining gear and munitions issued during the deployment. 3 Appellant
withheld one explosive flashbang and two gas canisters, which he intentionally

   2 R. at 37.

   3 Id.

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                    United States v. Kerr, NMCCA No. 202200140
                                Opinion of the Court

concealed until he could store them in his desk in his barracks room, to keep
as “a souvenir, a keepsake.” 4 Sometime later, Appellant found a key fob in the
parking lot near his barracks building on board Camp Pendleton. 5 The next
day he located the car to which the key fob belonged, a grey Lexus sedan, and
stole it. 6 The car belonged to a fellow Marine who had also returned from a
deployment and was in the process of preparing to separate from the Marine
Corps. Appellant caused substantial property damage to the car and loss of the
other Marine’s government-issued gear that the Marine was required to return
as part of his separation out-processing. As a result, the other Marine was re-
quired to repay the Government for the lost property and to pay for alternate
means of transportation to get to his medical appointments, classes, and other
errands. 7
   At trial, the military judge discussed the plea agreement with Appellant to
ensure that he understood all the terms and that he had signed the plea agree-
ment voluntarily. 8 The military judge then found Appellant guilty of the
Charge and Specifications to which he pleaded guilty, finding that Appellant
pleaded guilty to these larceny offenses knowingly, intelligently, consciously,
and voluntarily, and that the pleas were supported by a factual basis. 9

                                 II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review
    We review sentence appropriateness de novo. 10 This Court may only affirm
“the sentence, or such part or amount of the sentence, as the Court finds correct
in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be
approved.” 11 In exercising this function, we seek to ensure that “justice is done
and that the accused gets the punishment he deserves.” 12 The review requires

   4 R. at 42.

   5 R. at 50.

   6 R. at 50-54.

   7 R. at 87-89.

   8 R. at 58-76.

   9 R. at 77.

   10 United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

   11 Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ.

   12 United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 1988).

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                   United States v. Kerr, NMCCA No. 202200140
                               Opinion of the Court

an “individualized consideration of the particular accused on the basis of the
nature and seriousness of the offense and the character of the offender.” 13 In
making this assessment, we analyze the record as a whole. 14

B. Appellant’s character of service prior to the crimes.
    Appellant entered the Marine Corps in August 2017. He excelled in recruit
training and was immediately identified to serve in highly competitive Marine
Corps billets, the first of which was service at the Marine Barracks, Washing-
ton, D.C., where he participated in training for the Presidential Support Pro-
gram. Appellant was then competitively selected to serve in support of the
White House Communications Agency [WHCA].
    In 2021, Appellant was deployed to Kabul, Afghanistan, as a member of the
Fleet Marine Forces, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1), assigned as
security forces working on behalf of the U.S. Department of State to provide
security and crowd control at the Hamid Karzai International Airport as part
of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the associated civilian humani-
tarian evacuation. Appellant was specifically assigned to provide security at
the airport’s Abbey Gate Tower [Abbey Gate] checkpoint located along the pe-
rimeter fence where crowds of Afghans waited to be screened and let into the
airport for departure from Afghanistan.
     The record reveals that Appellant performed with exceptional valor and
calmness throughout the difficult day of the infamous Abbey Gate bombing.
On 26 August 2021, at the Abbey Gate checkpoint, Appellant survived the im-
provised explosive device [IED] suicide bombing that detonated approximately
25 meters away from where he was standing. This IED blast took the lives of
13 U.S. servicemembers, wounded many more, and killed dozens of Afghans.
When the blast went off, Appellant observed, “there’s smoke and there’s blood,
and all of the thousands of people that had been standing there are all gone,
whether they’re dead or laying down or retreating. Everything that was, was
now gone.” 15 Appellant responded immediately. He and another Marine car-
ried a third Marine who died before they could get him to safety. Appellant
assisted a wounded U.S. Army Soldier to reach safety and also helped save the
life of another wounded Marine. 16

   13 United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
   14 Healy, 26 M.J. at 395-97.

   15 R. at 228.

   16 R. at 227-29.

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                United States v. Kerr, NMCCA No. 202200140
                            Opinion of the Court

C. Appellant’s return to Camp Pendleton.
   Appellant and his fellow Marines left Afghanistan just five days later, on
31 August 2021, travelling to Kuwait, then to Saudi Arabia, and back to Camp
Pendleton, California. When he returned to Camp Pendleton, Appellant began
having nightmares and experiencing vivid flashbacks of the concussive blast
from the IED. He unsuccessfully attempted to cope with his symptoms but did
not seek professional medical treatment for his symptoms.

D. The crimes and the sentence in this case.
   Shortly after his return from Afghanistan, on 17 November 2021, Appellant
was arrested for stealing another Marine’s car. A subsequent investigation re-
vealed his theft of the explosive flashbang and two gas canisters.
    This Court has significant discretion in determining sentence appropriate-
ness but may not engage in acts of clemency.17 This Court must ensure that
justice and the law are upheld, and that this court-martial results in punish-
ment that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to promote and main-
tain good order and discipline. 18
    In giving individualized consideration to the nature and seriousness of
these crimes of larceny and the character of Appellant, we note the many facts
and circumstances that have been established in the record to support Appel-
lant’s claim that the bad-conduct discharge portion of his sentence is inappro-
priately severe. They include: Appellant’s exceptional performance in training
and high-visibility assignment to the WHCA; Appellant’s specific acts of hero-
ism in Afghanistan and his life-saving actions taken for his fellow Marines, an
Army Soldier, and an Afghan woman and her children; the mental stress and
traumas that Appellant incurred in the Marine Corps; 19 Appellant’s otherwise
stellar record of service; the numerous and highly laudatory character state-
ments from command members and colleagues who served with him; and evi-
dence of Appellant’s then-untreated symptoms that were noted as consistent

   17 United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

   18 Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 1002(f).

   19 R. at 177; Appellant was witness to and tried to prevent suicide attempts of two

fellow Marines and witnessed a negligent homicide of a third Marine—while stationed
at a Marine Corps barracks, prior to his deployment to Afghanistan.

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                 United States v. Kerr, NMCCA No. 202200140
                             Opinion of the Court

with a clinical psychiatric diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD]. 20
In addition, Appellant presented testimony from a 28-year licensed profes-
sional counselor who testified that Appellant scored “very high” on the evalu-
ation tests that were conducted prior to his court-martial and after his return
from Afghanistan—for both traumatic brain injury [TBI] and PTSD. 21
   A sentence limited only to the eight months of confinement awarded ade-
quately reflects the seriousness of the offenses committed, promotes respect for
the law, provides just punishment for the offenses, promotes adequate deter-
rence of misconduct, protects others from further crimes by Appellant, and
serves to rehabilitate Appellant. 22
   In conducting a de novo review, we find the sentence to be inappropriately
severe insofar as it includes a bad-conduct discharge. We agree with the mili-
tary judge that it is not appropriate because of the matters presented in exten-
uation and mitigation. 23 The military judge could have, and should have,
simply rejected the plea agreement in its entirety. 24 Given the current plea
agreement process, where minimum and maximum punishments are often the

   20 Defense Ex. F, 706 Board Report by CDR John M. Woo, MC, USN, Lead Forensic

Psychiatrist, Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton, stating “At the time of the alleged crim-
inal conduct, the accused did report symptoms consistent with clinical psychiatric di-
agnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).” Appellant’s experience in Kabul
was not the only tragedy he experienced while serving in the Marine Corps. See R. at
177.
   21 R. at 198-200 (citing testimony of licensed professional counselor, Reverend John

Kerr).
   22 R.C.M. 1002(f)(3)(A)-(F).

   23 R. at 281-92. See also Military Judge’s Addendum to Statement of Trial Results.

We recognize that Appellant’s plea agreement required the military judge to adjudge
a bad-conduct discharge. But we agree with the military judge that a bad-conduct dis-
charge was inappropriate in this case.
   24 See United States v. Alkazahg, 81 M.J. 764, 797 n.129 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.

2021); see also United States v. Raines, 82 M.J. 608 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2022.)

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                 United States v. Kerr, NMCCA No. 202200140
                             Opinion of the Court

same, the role of trial judges (and appellate judges) as ultimate assessors of
sentence appropriateness has become all the more important.

                                III. CONCLUSION

    We AFFIRM the findings of guilty for the crimes of larceny to which Ap-
pellant pleaded guilty.
    The portion of the sentence that provides for eight months of confinement
is AFFIRMED. The bad-conduct discharge portion of the sentence is SET
ASIDE as being inappropriately severe. All rights, privileges, and property, of
which Appellant has been deprived by virtue of the portion of the sentence set
aside by this decision, are ordered restored. 25

                                   FOR THE COURT:

                                   MARK K. JAMISON
                                   Clerk of Court

   25 See Articles 58a(b), 58b(c), 75(a), UCMJ.

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