Court Opinion

ID: 9585139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:56:45.914712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:30.242999
License: Public Domain

CURETON, Judge
(Concurring):
I agree with the majority that South Carolina’s Right to Work Act (Act), S.C.Code Ann. §§ 41-7-10 to -90 (1986), applies to the City of Myrtle Beach.
In general, statutes governing labor relations between employers and employees are construed to apply only to private industry and not to public employment. School Committee of the Town of Easton v. Easton Teachers Association, 398 A.2d 1220 (Maine 1979); Retail Clerks Local 187 AFL-CIO v. University of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884 (Wyo.1975); 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations, § 33 (1967). Public employees have neither the right to strike nor the right to collectively bargain unless such rights are specifically provided by statutory law. State Board of Regents v. United Packing House Food and Allied Workers, Local No. 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970); Retail Clerks Local 187, 531 P.2d 884; see also Bateman v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 298 F.Supp. 999 (D.S.C.1969). South Carolina has no statute authorizing public employees to bargain collectively or to strike. See 1989 Op. S.C. Att’y Gen. No. 121; see also Dennis R. Nolan, Public Employee Unionism in the Southeast: The Legal Parameters, 29 S.C. L.Rev. 235, 287 (1978).
The cases make a distinction between the right of public employees to collectively bargain and strike on the one hand, and their right to organize for their mutual interest on the *582other hand. State Board of Regents, 175 N.W.2d 110. This distinction is amply made in N.J. Turnpike Auth. v. American Federation of State Employees, 83 N.J.Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134, 138 (N.J.Super.Ct. Ch. Div., 1964), wherein the court, with approval quoted from an opinion of the New Jersey Attorney General:
The concept of collective bargaining, as generally understood and applied in the field of private industry, implies bargaining sanctions and weapons not admissible to public employees, such as the right to strike and other incidents of the private employment relationship not appropriate in the public employment field. It also implies two bargaining entities of co-equal status, each with unlimited power to enter into binding commitments. This does not apply in the case of the state in relation to its employees.
Although the Turnpike is not obliged to engage in collective bargaining, it is under an affirmative duty to meet with its employees or their chosen representatives and consider in good faith the grievances and proposals. However, any decision reached must be the result of the independent judgment of Turnpike, taking into consideration, inter alia, the grievances and proposals of its employees.
South Carolina’s Right to Work Act has as its basic purpose the preservation of the state’s employees’ right to exercise freedom in choosing employment without regard to union membership. 14 S.C.Juris. Labor Relations, § 16 (1992). Encompassed within that right is the right of a public employee to belong1 to a labor organization. See 29 S.C.L.Rev. 235, 239. This right stems from the first amendment’s protection of the freedom of association, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. I see no compelling reason why the Act, which as to the provision in issue, codifies this right of association, should not apply to public employees.
The city argues it is obvious the legislature did not intend the Act to apply to the state and its political subdivisions at the time of its adoption in 1954 because the Act includes provisions inconsistent with the public policy and law of this *583state in 1954. Included among these provisions are provisions for actual damages, punitive damages and criminal sanctions enforceable against the culpable employer. It is true that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state or its political subdivisions. Macmurphy v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 295 S.C. 49, 367 S.E.2d 150 (1988). It is also true that criminal sanctions are inapplicable to municipalities. Nevertheless, the Act does contain remedies, such as injunctive relief, restraining orders and actual damages awards which may be appropriate against the state and its political subdivisions.
The Right to Work Act contains a savings clause which validates the remainder of the Act should certain provisions be found invalid. I would therefore respond to the city’s argument regarding the inconsistent provisions of the Act, such as the provision for criminal sanctions and punitive damages, by noting that if these provisions are unenforceable against a municipality, then they may simply be disregarded as unenforceable. In any event, they should not provide a complete shield to the applicability of the Act to public employers.

. I do not suggest in any way that a municipality may not legally prohibit its supervisory employees from joining the same labor organization as its non supervisory employees.