Court Opinion

ID: 9881450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-02 18:03:31.699652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:50.908044
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/2/23 P. v. Newman CA2/1
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                        B326024

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct. No. BA502478)
           v.

 CHARLES NEWMAN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, James R. Dabney, Judge. Affirmed.
      Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                           ________________________________
       Defendant Charles Newman appeals from his conviction by
plea to one count of driving with a .08 percent blood alcohol content
within 10 years after being convicted of felony driving under the
influence. (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550.5, subd. (a).)
His appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), identifying no issues on
appeal and requesting that we independently review the record
to determine whether there are any arguable issues. Defendant
submitted a supplemental brief raising numerous contentions,
which we address below. We reject defendant’s contentions and,
after independently reviewing the record, find no arguable issues.
We therefore affirm the judgment.

           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       On August 19, 2020, defendant was driving a vehicle that
collided with another vehicle in a grocery store parking lot. Calvin
King is the owner of the other vehicle. King called the police
because he believed that defendant was under the influence of
alcohol. Responding officers observed that defendant slurred his
speech, had bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol. Defendant had
difficulty keeping his balance and fell twice, which caused injuries
to his face and head when he hit the pavement. The officers
arrested defendant and had an ambulance transport him to Good
Samaritan Hospital.
       At the hospital, a police officer directed a nurse to obtain a
blood sample from defendant while defendant was sedated and
unable to consent to the blood draw. The blood draw was taken,
given to a police officer, and later tested to show that defendant had
a blood-alcohol content of 0.31 percent. Because of the dubiousness
of the admissibility of this evidence, the police (at the request of a
prosecutor) obtained a search warrant to Good Samaritan Hospital

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for the hospital’s medical records concerning defendant’s treatment
on the day of the incident.
      The medical records obtained pursuant to the search warrant
revealed evidence of a blood draw taken independent of the draw
performed at the police officer’s direction. The hospital’s testing
of that blood draw indicated that defendant had a blood-alcohol
content of 0.32 percent.
      On April 29, 2022, the district attorney filed an information
charging defendant with: driving under the influence of alcohol
within 10 years after being convicted of felony driving under
the influence (count 1; Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5,
subd. (a)); driving with a .08 percent blood-alcohol content within
10 years after being convicted of felony driving under the influence
(count 2; Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550.5, subd. (a)); and
driving after having his license suspended or revoked as a result of
being convicted of driving under the influence, a misdemeanor
(count 3; Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)). The information further
alleged that during the commission of the crime alleged in count 2,
defendant had a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.20 percent or
more. (Veh. Code, § 23538, subd. (b)(2).)
      On April 29, 2022, defendant, representing himself, filed a
motion to suppress evidence of his blood-alcohol content pursuant
to Penal Code section 1538.5. He asserted that his detention and
arrest in the grocery store parking lot was unlawful because he was
on private property. He further asserted that there were no exigent
circumstances that required the taking of a blood sample without
obtaining a warrant.
      The district attorney filed an opposition to the motion based
in part on the fact that the evidence of defendant’s blood-alcohol
content the prosecution would rely upon was acquired from the
hospital pursuant to a search warrant, and that defendant had not
challenged the validity of the warrant.

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       Prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant
filed a motion challenging the validity of the search warrant and
requesting an evidentiary hearing on the issue pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 (Franks).1
       On October 12, 2022, the court held a hearing on the motion
to suppress, and denied the motion. The court also found that there
was insufficient evidence to hold a Franks hearing and denied that
request.
       On June 30, 2022, while his motion to suppress was pending,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground
that the one-year statute of limitations generally applicable to
misdemeanors (Pen. Code, § 802, subd. (a)) bars prosecution of
the counts alleged against him. After a hearing held on August 12,
2022, the court denied the motion as to counts 1 and 2, and granted
the motion as to count 3.
       On October 28, 2022, defendant pleaded no contest to count 2
and stipulated to a factual basis based on the allegations in the
information. The court accepted the plea, found defendant guilty as
charged on count 2, dismissed the remaining count and allegations,
and sentenced defendant to prison for 16 months. The court also
imposed a restitution fine and certain assessments.
       Defendant timely appealed. Our record does not indicate that
he sought or obtained a certificate of probable cause under Penal
Code section 1237.5.

      1 Under Franks, “where the defendant makes a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included
by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false
statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s
request.” (Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155–156.)

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                            DISCUSSION
      A.    Compliance with Wende
     Pursuant to Wende, we have reviewed the record to determine
whether there is any arguable issue and conclude that defendant’s
counsel has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no
arguable appellate issues exist. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.)
     We now turn to the contentions defendant asserts in his
supplemental brief. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 124.)

      B.    Statute of Limitations
       Defendant contends that the court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss counts 1 and 2 of the information on the ground
that the counts were barred by the one-year statute of limitations
under Penal Code section 802, subdivision (a). Defendant did not
request or obtain a certificate of probable cause under Penal Code
section 1237.5. He cannot, therefore, challenge his conviction on
statute of limitations grounds. (See People v. Smith (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 997, 1001.) Even if the argument is cognizable on
appeal, it is without merit.
       With some exceptions not applicable here, Penal Code
section 802, subdivision (a) provides a one-year limitations period
for offenses that are “not punishable by death or imprisonment
in the state prison or pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170
[of the Penal Code].” For offenses that are “punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison or pursuant to subdivision (h)
of Section 1170 [of the Penal Code],” the statute of limitations
is, generally, three years. (Pen. Code, § 801.) For purposes of
determining the applicable statute of limitations, an “offense
is deemed punishable by the maximum punishment prescribed
by statute for the offense, regardless of the punishment actually
sought or imposed.” (Pen. Code, § 805, subd. (a).)

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       Counts 1 and 2 of the information filed against defendant
allege violations of section 23550.5 of the Vehicle Code, which
are “punishable by imprisonment in the state prison” or by
“confinement in a county jail for not more than one year” and a
fine. (Veh. Code, § 23550.5, subd. (a).) Because the maximum
punishment prescribed for these offenses is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison, the three-year limitations
period provided in Penal Code section 801 applies, not the one-
year limitations period provided in Penal Code section 802.
       Defendant argues, however, that the punishment
prescribed in Penal Code section 23550.5 is an enhancement
to the punishment for the misdemeanor crime of driving under
the influence; as such, it should not be considered as punishment
for purposes of determining the statute of limitations. (See
Pen. Code, § 805, subd. (a) [“[a]ny enhancement of punishment
prescribed by statute shall be disregarded in determining the
maximum punishment prescribed by statute for an offense”].)
Penal Code section 23550.5, however, defines “a public offense”
and prescribes the punishment for that offense; it does not
describe an enhancement to the punishment of any other offense.2

      2 Penal Code section 23550.5 provides:     “A person is guilty
of a public offense, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
or confinement in a county jail for not more than one year and by a
fine of not less than three hundred ninety dollars ($390) nor more
than one thousand dollars ($1,000) if that person is convicted of a
violation of Section 23152 or 23153, and the offense occurred within
10 years of any of the following: [¶] (1) A separate violation of
Section 23152 that was punished as a felony under Section 23550
or this section, or both, or under former Section 23175 or
former Section 23175.5, or both. [¶] (2) A separate violation of
Section 23153 that was punished as a felony. [¶] (3) A separate
violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 192 of the
Penal Code that was punished as a felony.”

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      C.    Hearsay and Confrontation Rights at Defendant’s
            Motion to Suppress Hearing
       Defendant next contends that the court erred in allowing
the arresting officer to testify during the hearing on his motion
to suppress as to statements the victim, Calvin King, made to the
officer at the scene of the parking lot collision. Such statements,
he contends, are inadmissible hearsay and their admission into
evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation
under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. We disagree.
The testifying officer’s statements as to what King told him were
not offered to prove the truth of King’s statements, but rather to
determine whether King’s statements—regardless of their truth—
together with other facts, provided the responding officers with
probable cause to arrest defendant. The statements, therefore, are
not hearsay and did not implicate the confrontation clause. (See
People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 541–542.)

      D.    Denial of Request for Evidentiary Hearing under
            Franks
       Defendant next contends that the court erred in denying his
request for an evidentiary hearing under Franks, supra, 438 U.S.
154. We disagree. Under Franks, a defendant is entitled to a
hearing to determine the veracity of a search warrant affidavit if
“the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing” that
(1) the affidavit includes a “false statement” made “knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,” and (2) “the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable
cause.” (Id. at pp. 155–156.) The defendant’s challenge to the
affidavit “must be more than conclusory and must be supported
by more than a mere desire to cross-examine [the affiant]. There
must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard
for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an

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offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the
warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be
accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits
or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be
furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. . . . Finally,
if these requirements are met, and if, when material that is the
subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side,
there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support
a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required.” (Id. at pp. 171–
172; accord, People v. Lee (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 161, 171.)
       Here, in support of his request for a Franks hearing,
defendant points to the following statements or omissions made
by the search warrant affiant. First, the affiant stated that
defendant was “arrested” on August 19, 2020, for driving under the
influence. According to defendant, however, he was not arrested
on that day because he was not transported to a police station,
“booked for (DUI),” fingerprinted, or subjected to other incidents
of being arrested.
       Second, the affiant stated that defendant “admitted to
driving” and was “identified as operating” a vehicle; that defendant
“collided into the witness’[s] parked vehicle in a parking lot”; and
“[d]ue to his impairment,” defendant fell “upon exiting his vehicle
and struck his head on the pavement prior to police arrival.”
Defendant contends that these statements are false because he
was standing in the parking lot and approached the police officer
when he fell on the pavement.
       Third, defendant asserts that the affiant stated that
defendant “was transported by ambulance to Good Samaritan
Hospital where [a nurse] obtained [defendant’s] blood sample,”
but the affiant omitted that defendant was sedated during the
blood draw and does not indicate the reason for the blood draw.

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      Lastly, defendant points to the affiant’s statement that “the
arrest report was not clear on whether [defendant] consented to the
blood draw,” even though the arrest report states that defendant
“was sedated while at Good Samaritan Hospital and was therefore
unable to provide consent to take a blood sample.”
      Defendant’s assertions are insufficient to support an
evidentiary hearing under Franks. Defendant has not established
that any of the statements or omissions he points to constitutes
a knowing and intentional falsehood or were made with reckless
disregard for the truth. Even if this requirement was met,
defendant has failed to show that if the offending statements were
excluded and the omissions cured, that the affidavit was insufficient
to support a finding of probable cause. (See Franks, supra, 438 U.S.
at pp. 171–172.)

      E.    Search Warrant for Misdemeanor Offense
       Defendant further contends that a search warrant cannot be
issued for a misdemeanor offense. The search warrant in this case,
however, was issued on the ground that the property it sought from
Good Samaritan Hospital includes “evidence that tends to show
a felony has been committed, or tends to show that a particular
person has committed a felony”—a ground authorized by Penal
Code, section 1524, subdivision (a)(4). The fact that the police
initially investigated the matter as a misdemeanor does not prevent
law enforcement from thereafter pursuing the matter as a felony.

      F.    Physician-Patient Privilege
      Lastly, defendant contends that the search warrant is invalid
because his medical records are protected from disclosure under a
physician-patient privilege. California’s physician-patient privilege,
however, does not apply in criminal proceedings. (Evid. Code,
§ 998.)

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                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                  ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                CHANEY, J.

                BENDIX, J.

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