Court Opinion

ID: 9782843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:24:02.567067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:15.142019
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s resolution of Cartwright’s Batson claim. I believe the trial court was warranted in finding no purposeful discrimination in the State’s exercise of its peremptory strike. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling as well as its judgment of conviction.
The panelist at issue was questioned in pertinent part:
BY THE COURT: ... Okay, anyone else? Sir, in the back?
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[PANELIST]: I have a frequent problem of going to the restroom.
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BY THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right. Do ... do you need a break now, or will you let me know when you need a break?
[PANELIST]: Oh, yes, definitely.
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[STATE]: [W]as there anything that you heard, any of the questions that you heard earlier that you wanted to respond to?
[PANELIST]: Well, you asked if you want to serve on the jury, and that would be no.
[STATE]: And we appreciate your honesty. You realize you don’t get to make that choice.
[PANELIST]: Yes.
[STATE]: The Judge gets the final say, but if you had the opportunity, you would rather not serve, that’s what you’re saying?
[PANELIST]: (Nods yes).
[STATE]: And you also have a health issue that requires you to have to go to the bathroom quite often?
[PANELIST]: Take a diuretic in the morning, a water pill as it’s commonly known.
[STATE]: Now does the medicine that you’re taking does that cause you any problems listening or concentrating?
[PANELIST]: No. No. Now, I do have a problem of ... I’m not a good listener, but ... but that’s from all my life even school.
[STATE]: I guess that’s true. Would you try to listen to the evidence in this case?
*815[PANELIST]: Well, yes, but you know. Another thing, I’m getting old too, 67.
[STATE]: So if you had your choice you would not serve?
[PANELIST]: No.
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[DEFENSE]: [F]rom what you said, you indicated you weren’t a good listener, and that your school records bear that out. Would you be able to sit in judgment in this case?
[PANELIST]: Well, I’m not sure. I ... I would try my best, but, you know, my best may not be good enough.
Tr. p. 31, 32, 126-27, 133. The panelist also indicated on a written questionnaire that one of his immediate family members had either been charged with or convicted of criminal conversion. Appellant’s App. p. 118.
Incidentally, two other venire-members indicated during voir dire that they had medical conditions which might make jury service difficult. The first had sciatica for which he took pain pills and muscle relaxers. He initially stated that “[a]s long as I take my medicine I’m all right” but later said that he “would rather not serve because of the problems I have and being medicated.” Id. at 29, 45. A second panelist suffered from anxiety disorder which made her uncomfortable and interfered with her ability to listen and process information. Id,, at 138. She stated, “If I had had my choice I would not serve.” Id. at 127. Both jurors were stricken for cause. Id. at 89,139.
The State peremptorily struck the subject black panelist. Cartwright raised a Batson challenge, and the State proffered, inter alia, the following justifications for its strike: the panelist had health issues, had trouble listening, did not wish to serve, and had a family member who had either been charged with or convicted of a crime.
I agree with the majority that Cartwright made a satisfactory prima facie showing of discrimination and that the State tendered race-neutral explanations for striking the panelist. At issue is the third and final step of the Batson challenge, in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995).
The trial court’s decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact accorded great deference on appeal and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Miller El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). Deference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well-positioned as the trial court to evaluate the peremptory challenger’s credibility. Id. In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. Id. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province. Id.
Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029. The court may also *816consider whether the justification for the exercise of the peremptory challenge corresponds to a valid challenge for cause. United States v. Stephens, 514 F.Sd 703, 711 (7th Cir.2008). While the reason offered for a peremptory strike need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause, the fact that it corresponds to a valid for-cause challenge will demonstrate its race-neutral character. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362-63, 111 S.Ct. 1859.
In line with the foregoing, I would conclude that the trial court was warranted in crediting the State’s race-neutral explanations for striking the subject panelist. The State’s justifications all find basis in the record. In particular, the panelist indicated that he had a health issue that could hinder service and that he had ongoing problems with attentiveness. Noteworthy is that these were the very grounds on which two other ve-nire-members were stricken for cause. These explanations thus become especially persuasive reasons justifying the State’s peremptory challenge. See also Ross v. State, 665 N.E.2d 599, 602 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (finding no Batson violation where one juror was struck due to urinary problems and another due to difficulty listening). As for the black panelist’s disinclination to serve as a juror, the majority maintains that several other non-black panelists expressed similar reluctance. In fact, only two other venire-members expressed a desire not to serve — and both were the above-mentioned panelists already stricken for cause. Finally, the majority stresses that the State posed no follow-up questions about the black panelist’s family member who had been either charged with or convicted of conversion. I agree that, if the State’s only race-neutral explanation were that the panelist’s relative had experience in the criminal justice system, additional information would have been helpful in establishing that explanation’s legitimacy. But I believe that the family member’s prior charge or conviction — along with the panelist’s health issues, difficulty paying attention, and desire not to serve — all together support a finding of no discriminatory intent by the State.
In short, I cannot conclude on this cold record that the State’s reasons for striking the panelist were baseless, pretextual, and the result of purposeful discrimination. I believe the trial court’s ruling deserves much greater deference, and I would therefore find no Batson violation on appeal. For these reasons I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.