Court Opinion

ID: 6544438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-19 22:18:26.126364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:55:55.155037
License: Public Domain

BiddioK, J., (after stating the facts). This is an action for damages alleged to have been caused the plaintiff by being ejected from one of defendant’s passenger trains. Our statute provides that “if any passenger shall refuse to pay his fare or toll, it shall be lawful for the conductor of the train and the servants of the corporation to put him out of the cars at any usual stopping place the conductor shall select.” Sand. & H. Dig., § 6192. Counsel for the defendant company contend that this statute does not apply here, for the reason that the plaintiff knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known, that the train which he entered did not stop at Milner, and that, as he refused to pay his fare to any station at which the train did stop, he was not a passenger. It is doubtless true that one who enters a railway train, and afterwards wrongfully and persistently refuses to pay his fare, is not entitled to the high degree of care which the law exacts of railroads for the protection of passengers. Within the meaning of the rules requiring such care, it has been often held that such a person is not a passenger. Condran v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 522; 2 Wood, Railroads (Minor’s Ed.), 1213; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), 496, and cases cited. We do not controvert the soundness of these decisions, but it is evident that the reasons upon which they are based do not apply here; for the object of this statute was to prevent railroad companies from ejecting a passenger for refusal to pay fare at other than a usual stopping place. If those refusing to pay fare are not passengers, within the meaning of this act, then the statute can have no application, and is meaningless. It is therefore very evident, we think, that the refusal to pay by one traveling on a train does, not within the meaning of this statute, show that he is not a passenger. It majr, of course, be doubted whether one who enters a train, intending not to pay his fare and to defraud the company, would be protected by this statute; but we need not determine that question, for the evidence here, we think, does not show such a state of facts. The plaintiif carelessly entered a train which he should have known did not stop at Milner, but he did so, hoping that it would stop either at Milner or at a water tank near there, and thus afford him the opportunity to reach his destination. He had a ticket to Milner, which he gave to the conductor, but the ticket was returned, and the plaintiff ejected, because he refused to pay the additional fare to the first regular stopping place for that train. The company could have excluded him from the train, or ejected him at the place he entered, but, having carried him away from that point, was, under the statute, required to carry him to some other usual stopping place before ejecting him. The plaintiff may not have desired to go to Stephens, the next stopping place, but, as he had carelessly entered a train that was not required to stop before reaching that place, he could have been carried there whether he wished to go or not; for the company in such a case was not required to stop the train sooner for his own convenience. As the place at which he was ejected was not a usual stopping place for trains, and as he was not given! the option of being carried to Stephens, instead of being put off there, the ejection was unlawful. The injury to plaintiff was small, but it was night, a slight rain was falling, and plaintiff was suffering some from fever. He was put off a mile or two from a station. Hnder these circumstances the sum for which the court gave judgment was not excessive. Affirmed.