Court Opinion

ID: 9399836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 16:11:49.030601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.130884
License: Public Domain

J-S01042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHARLES EDWARD CHANDLER, JR.               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 917 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 1, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001809-2019

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED: JUNE 6, 2023

        Charles Edward Chandler, Jr., pro se, appeals from the order dismissing,

without a hearing, his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief

Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. On appeal, Chandler raises three

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, two directed toward his trial counsel

and one against his PCRA counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we

vacate the order and remand for the appointment of new counsel to file an

amended petition on Chandler’s behalf.

        By way of background, following a jury trial, Chandler was found guilty

of two counts of aggravated assault, and one count each of prohibited

possession of a firearm, simple assault, recklessly endangering another

____________________________________________

   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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person (“REAP”), and harassment.1

       As summarized by this Court in his direct appeal:

              In the early morning hours of June 22, 2019, [Chandler] had
       an argument with his girlfriend, Lynne Feeney (“Lynne”). During
       this argument, [Chandler] threw a full, unopened beer can, which
       struck Lynne in the face. Lynne’s nose bled profusely, and she felt
       pain, hurt, and shock. In addition, she sustained a broken nose
       and two black eyes. After throwing the beer can at Lynne,
       [Chandler] went upstairs to the bedroom. Shortly thereafter, a
       neighbor who witnessed this event called Lynne’s daughter,
       Katelyn Feeney. Katelyn then called her brother, Todd Feeney,
       Lynne’s son, and Katelyn informed Todd that their mother had
       been assaulted. Todd Feeney proceeded to his mother’s home,
       accompanied by Jarred Rebovich, Katelyn’s boyfriend. After
       seeing his mother’s face, Todd asked her what had happened.
       Lynne told him she was attacked. Jarred and Todd went upstairs
       to search for [Chandler]. About ten minutes later, Lynne’s ex-
       husband, Richard Feeney, and Katelyn arrived at her house.
       Richard also went upstairs. [Chandler] was upstairs in Lynne’s
       bed.

              Once upstairs, only Todd entered the bedroom while Richard
       and Jarred remained outside in the hallway. Todd ordered
       [Chandler] to “get out,” and said “it’s time to go.” [Chandler]
       appeared “groggy and confused and kept saying things like ‘what
       time is it’ and ‘what is going on.’” Eventually, Todd pulled
       [Chandler] out of the bed and told him, “It’s time to go.”
       [Chandler], who was naked, got out of bed. At no time during this
       incident did anyone hit or strike [Chandler]. [Chandler] came
       downstairs undressed, followed by Todd, Jarred, and Richard.
       When [Chandler] got downstairs, he put on his pants and shoes.
       During this time, [Chandler] and Richard exchanged words, but
       no physical contact occurred. Ultimately, [Chandler], Richard,
       Jarred, and Todd exited Lynne’s home, and Todd and Richard
       followed [Chandler] to [Chandler’s] car. [Chandler] opened his car
       door, reached inside, and removed a handgun. [Chandler] then
       said, “I will show you.”
____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(4); 6105(a)(1); 2701(a)(1); 2705; and
2709(a)(1), respectively.

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              [Chandler] fired a shot in the direction of Richard and Todd.
       [Chandler] pointed his gun directly at Richard and fired it at him
       twice. Richard, who also had a firearm on him, shot twice at
       [Chandler]. After firing these shots, Richard jumped behind a
       green electrical box, and Todd fell to the ground. [Chandler] fired
       two more shots at Richard while Richard remained behind the
       electrical box. At least one of those bullets struck the box and
       damaged it. [Chandler] chased after Todd until nearby residents
       came out with their own guns and knocked [Chandler] to the
       ground. Subsequently, [Chandler] got into his car and drove
       away.

             [Chandler] did not have a license to carry a firearm.
       [Chandler] testified in his own defense that he only tossed Lynne
       a beer, and he did not think it would hit her. [Chandler] stated
       that three individuals attacked him while he slept. [Chandler]
       claimed that one of the attackers put a pistol in his face and
       threatened him. [Chandler] averred that as he approached his car
       he was struck in the back of the head. [Chandler] admitted that
       he removed his handgun from inside his car, and he does not
       remember who fired first. According to [Chandler], he only fired
       his gun in self-defense because he feared for his life.

            On July 8, 2020, a jury convicted [Chandler] of the above-
       mentioned crimes. The court sentenced [Chandler] on July 14,
       2020, to an aggregate of 72-144 months’ incarceration.

Commonwealth v. Chandler, 826 WDA 2020 at *1-4 (Pa. Super., filed Aug.

12, 2021) (record citations omitted).2 Ultimately, we affirmed Chandler’s

judgment of sentence, and Chandler sought no further relief from our

Supreme Court.

       Thereafter, on March 24, 2022, Chandler, pro se, filed the present,

____________________________________________

2The prohibited possession of a firearm charge sentence, amounting to 72 to
144 months of incarceration, was ordered to run concurrently with the
sentences that were imposed at three other counts.

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timely PCRA petition. Several weeks later, the court appointed PCRA counsel

for Chandler.

       On June 16, 2022, PCRA counsel filed with the lower court a motion to

withdraw     from     representation      and    “no-merit”   letter,   pursuant   to

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). Chandler filed a

response to this motion/”no-merit” letter on June 24, 2022. Prior to deciding

counsel’s motion, the court dismissed, without a hearing, Chandler’s PCRA

petition on August 1, 2022.3 From this dismissal, Chandler filed a timely pro

se notice of appeal on August 15, 2022.4 On August 23, 2022, Chandler was

directed to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal within

thirty days. At this juncture, despite the lower court having failed to rule on

counsel’s motion to withdraw, Chandler filed a pro se statement on September

____________________________________________

3 The court, on June 21, 2022, provided Chandler with notice of its intention
to dismiss pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, giving
Chandler the opportunity to respond, to which Chandler filed a pro se response
on July 8, 2022.

4 Under normal circumstances, this Commonwealth does not permit hybrid
representation. Stated differently, this Court will not accept pro se filings while
an appellant is still represented by counsel. See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016). However, because it protects
a constitutional right, the filing of a pro se notice of appeal while represented
by counsel is distinguishable from other filings. See id., at 624. Therefore, a
pro se notice of appeal will be docketed even where a pro se appellant is still
technically represented by counsel. See id., at 623.

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1, 2022.5

       On September 13, 2022, the lower court granted PCRA counsel’s motion

to withdraw. A few weeks later, this Court, per curiam, issued an order

excusing PCRA counsel from representing Chandler before this Court and, too,

advising Chandler that he was now proceeding pro se in the present appeal.6

Correspondingly, Chandler filed an appellant’s brief, and the lower court issued

a statement in lieu of an opinion, referencing and expounding upon its prior

adjudication of Chandler’s PCRA issues in its August 1, 2022, opinion. As such,

this appeal is ripe for review.

       On appeal, Chandler presents three questions:

       1. Did Chandler sufficiently allege that his trial counsel was
          ineffective for failing to procure certain photographic medical
          evidence that would have undermined the reliability of the
          witnesses who testified against him and bolstered his own
          testimony?

       2. Was Chandler’s trial counsel ineffective for failing to cross-
          examine four witnesses?

       3. Was    Chandler’s     PCRA     counsel   ineffective   for   failing   to
____________________________________________

5  Notably, the court’s directive for Chandler to file a concise statement
provides no indication that Chandler’s counsel received notice of this order. In
fact, on the distribution line for “ATTY,” implying Chandler’s counsel, the
corresponding line is left blank. See Order, 8/23/22. We conclude that
because Chandler was still represented by counsel at that point, this exclusion
is an administrative breakdown on the part of the lower court. As such, and
in seeing no benefit to remand for Chandler to file another pro se statement
nunc pro tunc, we decline to preclude Chandler from appellate review. See
e.g., Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79 (Pa. Super. 2015).

6  The order also indicated that Chandler “may retain private counsel.” Order,
filed 10/21/22.

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         investigate the claims asserted in his PCRA petition?

See Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

      As background, for appeals that are taken from a PCRA petition’s

dismissal: “[w]e review a ruling by the PCRA court to determine whether it is

supported by the record and is free of legal error. Our standard of review of a

PCRA court’s legal conclusions is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154

A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will

not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified

record.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 266 A.3d 56, 62 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation omitted).

      Under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, a PCRA court may,

after proper notice and an opportunity to respond, dismiss a PCRA petition if

“the judge is satisfied from … review [of the petition] that there are no genuine

issues concerning any material fact and that the defendant is not entitled to

post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served by any

further proceedings[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).

      Here, in its notice of intention to dismiss, the court concluded that there

was “no reasonable probability that the outcome of [Chandler’s] trial would

have been different had the jury learned of the physical injuries that

[Chandler] asserts he sustained at the hands of his victims.” Notice of

Intention to Dismiss, 6/21/22. It its subsequent order dismissing Chandler’s

petition, the court wrote that because he was found guilty of possessing a

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firearm as a prohibited person, Chandler defending himself had nothing to do

with his possession of that instrument. See PCRA Opinion and Order, 8/1/22,

at 6. Additionally, the court found Chandler’s desire to cross-examine his

victims in a way that “would have exposed inconsistencies in their stories and

made them less credible” to be “equally meritless[.]” Id. The court’s

corresponding statement that it issued in lieu of an opinion materially reaches

the same set of conclusions. See, e.g., Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 9/7/22,

at 2 (“[W]hether or not [Chandler] was defending himself when he used it has

nothing to do with the fact that he possessed [a firearm].”).

      Since it is controlling, we address Chandler’s third issue, which contends

that his PCRA counsel was ineffective for not investigating or developing the

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims asserted in Chandler’s pro se

PCRA petition. Given that Chandler’s first filing after the granting of PCRA

counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation appears to be his appellate

brief before this Court, Chandler’s first opportunity to raise an ineffective

assistance    of   PCRA    claim   was    at   this   juncture.   As   such,   under

Commonwealth v. Bradley. 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), Chandler was

permitted to raise such a claim. See id. at 405 (allowing for “a petitioner to

raise claims of ineffective PCRA counsel at the first opportunity, even if on

appeal[]”).

      For claims arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, we utilize a well-

settled set of precepts:

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      We presume counsel’s effectiveness, and an appellant bears the
      burden of proving otherwise. To establish ineffectiveness of
      counsel, a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove: [(1)] his
      underlying legal claim has arguable merit; [(2)] counsel’s actions
      lacked any reasonable basis; and [(3)] counsel’s actions
      prejudiced him. Failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness
      test requires dismissal of the claim. Arguable merit exists when
      the factual statements are accurate and could establish cause for
      relief. Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a
      legal determination.

Commonwealth v. Urwin, 219 A.3d 167, 172 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted) (brackets added). Our Supreme Court

has defined prejudice as follows: “a defendant raising a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is required to show actual prejudice; that is, that

counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it could have reasonably

had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings.” Commonwealth

v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 315 (Pa. 2014) (citations, brackets, and internal

quotation marks omitted).

      Chandler’s contention focuses on PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness when

counsel failed to raise ineffective assistance claims as to trial counsel. “In

determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether

the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render

ineffective assistance of counsel. If that attorney was effective, then

subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the

underlying issue.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.

Super. 2010). Chandler believes that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance when counsel: (1) failed to procure and utilize medical records and

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photographic evidence of his injuries in a way that could have been useful in

a self-defense claim or to cast doubt on the credibility of several of the victims;

and   (2)   declined   to   cross-examine    several   of   the   witnesses   about

inconsistencies between statements initially given to the police and their later

testimony at trial.

      Bradley establishes that, depending on the circumstances of a case,

remand may be appropriate:

      In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
      sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
      ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
      court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
      development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
      claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to
      advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to
      provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s
      ineffectiveness; however, where there are material facts at issue
      concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is
      not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be
      afforded.

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402 (cleaned up). By way of further elucidation,

“appellate courts will have the ability to grant or deny relief on straightforward

claims, as well as the power to remand to the PCRA court for the development

of the record.” Id. at 403.

      Generally, “a lawyer should not be held ineffective without first having

an opportunity to address the accusation in some fashion.” Commonwealth

v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 895 (Pa. 2010), overruled on other grounds by

Bradley, supra. Moreover, it is the PCRA court, not the appellate court, that

is the appropriate forum for evidentiary and factual development. See

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Commonwealth v. Shaw, 247 A.3d 1008, 1017 (Pa. 2021) (citations

omitted).

      As the first layer of his ineffective assistance claim, Chandler contends

that his trial counsel failed “to investigate and present evidence of the injuries

[he] sustained at the hands of the Feeney’s posse prior to [him] shooting his

gun in Richard Feeney’s direction.” Appellant’s Brief, at 13. “Specifically,

counsel failed to obtain intake reports and photographs that documented [his]

injuries.” Id., at 13-14 (broadly describing his “Uniontown Hospital medical

records and the photographs taken by the [Pennsylvania] State Police shortly

after his arrest[]”). As Chandler testified on his own behalf, these photographs

would have bolstered his version of events, which demonstrated that “he was

legitimately fearful that … people were going to try to kill him for what they

believed he’d done to Lynne Feeney.” Id., at 14 (record citation omitted).

      In looking at his initial filing, Chandler alleges in his pro se PCRA petition

that trial counsel failed to obtain and admit into evidence certain photographs

and medical records. See PCRA Petition, 3/24/22, at 2. Expounded upon in

the certification appended to that petition, Chandler wrote that he told his trial

counsel “that medical intake records from the Fayette County Hospital would

prove [him] right when [he] said that [he] was beaten up badly and in fear

for [his] life before he used the gun in self-defense[.]” Id., at 4. Moreover,

“[t]he medical records would also undermine the Commonwealth’s case

because their witnesses were saying [he had] shot the gun unprovoked.

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[Chandler] also told [trial counsel about] the [Pennsylvania State Police]

photographs … that were taken shortly after [he] was arrested.” Id.

      As illuminated, supra, the lower court concluded that Chandler’s

“argument that evidence of his alleged injuries would have shown that he had

been beaten by his victims has no merit at all: [Chandler] was found guilty of

[possessing a firearm as a prohibited person, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1)];

whether or not he was defending himself when he used it has nothing to do

with the fact that he possessed it.” PCRA Court Opinion and Order, 8/1/22, at

6. While we agree that because Section 6105 criminalizes mere possession or

use of a firearm, a potential self-defense claim has no relevance to the

question of whether Chandler committed that crime, Chandler was convicted

of other offenses where self-defense could have been relevant, such as

aggravated assault. Indeed, in its jury instructions, the court referenced

Chandler’s assertion of self-defense, specifically in the context of the

aggravated assault and REAP charges. See N.T., 7/9/20, at 48-49. Moreover,

notwithstanding the concurrent nature of Chandler’s sentence, i.e., the

sentence imposed at his firearms offense and aggregate sentence being the

same duration of time, these other crimes carry with them potential collateral

consequences and are capable of being vacated.

      In PCRA counsel’s “no-merit” letter, it states that Chandler, in both his

testimony and PCRA submissions, has not demonstrated that he suffered from

any serious bodily injuries during his altercation with several of the victims.

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See No-Merit Letter Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 6/10/22, at 10

(unpaginated). Even if the records or photographs did show that he sustained

“more severe injuries than did [several of the victims], it would not likely have

any impact on … credibility.” Id. PCRA counsel then speculates, without any

direct knowledge, why trial counsel omitted evidence of Chandler’s physical

condition. PCRA counsel then concludes that Chandler’s alleged physical

condition would have been immaterial at trial and that it did not have any

effect on the victims’ credibility. See id., at 13 (unpaginated).

      At trial, Chandler testified that he awoke to “three guys on top of [him]

trying to wake [him] up, hitting [him].” N.T., 7/9/20, at 27. One of those men

“put his pistol in [his] face.” Id. They pushed him out of the house he had

been sleeping in and “followed [him] to [his] car.” Id. Then, when Chandler

opened up the door to his vehicle, he “got hit in the back of the head.” Id.

Chandler also indicated that these men were racially abusing him. See id., at

28. Upon reaching his vehicle and after being struck in the back of the head,

Chandler “reached down under [his car] seat and pull[ed] out a pistol.” Id.

Chandler grabbed the pistol because he “was in fear for [his] life. [He] knew

one of them had a gun.” Id. Although gunfire was exchanged thereafter,

Chandler did not remember who fired the first shot. See id. Chandler also

indicated that, prior to leaving in his car, he was “punched one time behind

him” after the shooting occurred. See id., at 29.

      When one employs deadly force, as Chandler did, the elements of a self-

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defense claim are that the individual: (1) reasonably believed that force was

necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily injury; (2) was

free from fault in provoking the use of force against him; and (3) did not

violate any duty to retreat. See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738,

740 (Pa. 2012); see also 18 Pa.C.S § 505(b)(2).

      At this point, we are compelled to find that the record has not been

sufficiently developed to allow for our review of this claim. Assuming that the

medical records or photographs documenting Chandler’s injuries exist, it is

arguable that they could have assisted in supplementing his self-defense claim

that had, at trial, solely been predicated on his own testimony and in

undermining the victims’ narratives. As self-defense was a relevant

consideration to at least two of the crimes Chandler was found guilty of

committing,   without   having   access   to   the   complained-of   records   or

photographs or any record of trial counsel’s involvement in or knowledge of

these items, we are unable to ascertain whether Chandler’s underlying claim

lacks merit or to what extent the omission of the records or photographs could

have prejudiced him at trial.

      Despite there having been some level of review of this issue in the “no

merit” letter, PCRA counsel did not sufficiently address the impact that the

medical records or photographic evidence would have had in bolstering

Chandler’s self-defense claim or rebutting the victims’ testimony. Therefore,

we cannot conclude that PCRA counsel adequately discharged his duties under

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Turner and Finley. As explained above, we are likewise unpersuaded by the

PCRA court’s analysis, which focuses on the impact of the photographs on

Chandler’s possessing a firearm as a prohibited person conviction, rather than

his aggravated assault and REAP convictions.

      Given the unclear nature of this claim and in tandem with Chandler

asserting more than a boilerplate argument of trial and PCRA counsel

ineffectiveness, we remand this claim to the PCRA court for further

consideration. Upon remand, the PCRA court shall appoint new counsel to

more fully explore this issue. The court may benefit from an amended PCRA

petition, and it may conduct an evidentiary hearing if warranted.

      In his other ineffective assistance of trial counsel allegation, Chandler

contends that there was a failure to explore inconsistencies, via cross-

examination, between the statements the witnesses gave in police reports

contemporaneous with Chandler’s criminal activity and the testimony those

same witnesses gave at trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17-18.

      Despite mentioning these apparent inconsistencies, Chandler does not

cite, much less allude to, any actual inconsistent statement made by any of

the witnesses. Instead, Chandler baldly asserts that “the witnesses had

collaborated with one another to concoct a story that lessened their culpability

and increased … Chandler’s.” Id., at 20. Based on Chandler’s total failure to

illuminate any contradiction between the witnesses’ initial police statements

and their trial testimony, he failed to prove that his underlying claim has merit.

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Accordingly, because relief is “plainly unavailable as a matter of law,”

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402, Chandler has not demonstrated that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel because of counsel’s failure to cross-examine

these witnesses, and we need not remand to the PCRA court for further

consideration of this claim.

      Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/6/2023

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