Court Opinion

ID: 9638924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:58:40.289302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:10.622065
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
OSBORN, Justice.
On August 1, 1984, this Court reversed the judgment in this cause and remanded it to the trial court due to errors in the penalty phase and in the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized under a defective warrant affidavit.
The State has filed a motion for rehearing contending that Appellant relied solely upon federal constitutional authority in his suppression ground of error and that United States v. Leon, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) sanctions introduction of the illegally seized evidence in this case. Contrary to the State’s blanket assertion of Appellant’s reliance on federal authority, Appellant did, in his motion to suppress (R I, 31-32), invoke Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution as well as Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1979). Appellant phrased his ground of error without restriction as to federal or state protections, but did rely exclusively upon Supreme Court authority in his discussion. Thus, there is some justification for the State’s rehearing position that the suppression issue should be analyzed exclusively from a federal standpoint.
Having reconsidered the seizure and introduction of the evidence in light of Leon, we still conclude that the evidence should have been suppressed. That case and the present facts are similar in that the defects in the affidavits appear in the probable cause substance presented to the magistrates. We are not confronted with merely a procedural error in seeking and obtaining a warrant. There the similarity ends.
Leon stands for the proposition that “objective good faith reliance” by a police officer upon the acceptance of his affidavit by a detached neutral magistrate will avoid application of the exclusionary rule in the event that the magistrate’s assessment is later found to be in error. The Supreme Court recognized three circumstances in which the exclusionary rule had been previously applied: (1) knowing or reckless falsity of an affidavit; (2) “rubber stamp” review by the magistrate; (3) magistrate error in concluding that the affidavit presented probable cause. At-, 104 S.Ct. at 3417. Leon leaves the exclusionary rule intact with regard to the first two types of situations. The change is with regard to the third category, and the difficulty to be faced by trial and appellate courts is in being able to distinguish those magistrate errors which are the product of a “rubber stamp” attitude from those which are neutral and detached judicial errors.
The solution is tentatively provided in Leon itself. Just as the burden is upon the State to demonstrate exigent circumstances for lack of a warrant, the State must also bear the burden of establishing the officer’s objective good faith reliance upon the erroneous issuance of a warrant. At-, 104 S.Ct. at 3422.
Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”
In Leon, upon State request, the trial court specifically found that the officer relied in good faith. There was no such finding in this case. Nor can such good faith be *610presumed from the mere fact that the officer resorted to a magistrate since the key-focus in Leon is upon defective warrant situations and leaves at least three warrant situations subject to the exclusionary rule.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated: Officer Rombach’s application for a warrant clearly was supported by much more than a “bare bones” affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause.
At-, 104 S.Ct. at 3423. The affidavit in our case is clearly “bare bones.” While we earlier concluded that the probable cause available to the officers would have satisfied the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, as well as that of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527. (1983), the information provided in the affidavit did not begin to satisfy either. The events in this case occurred prior to the decisions in Gates and Leon. The Aguilar-Spinelli standard was established between 1964 and 1969. While we may not hold police officers, in a good faith test, to the standards of legal expertise expected of attorneys and magistrates, we think it not unreasonable to expect an awareness of a thirteen to eighteen-year-old standard for presenting probable cause for a search warrant. The extent of the discrepancy between this affidavit and the long-standing standard precludes a finding of objective good faith reliance. Consequently, we conclude that the analysis presented in Leon still necessitates suppression.
The State’s second position on rehearing reurges adoption of a per se exigent circumstances rule whenever a motor vehicle is the target of the search. We adhere to our original conclusion on this issue, as we do with regard to the other grounds of error presented on appeal.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.