Court Opinion

ID: 9603002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:02:25.150198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:07.756256
License: Public Domain

Ingram, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent to the majority opinion. It reverses the trial court’s judgment as a result of Act No. 203 of the 1977 General Assembly, approved by the Governor on March 11,1977, and, by its terms, effective on that date. This Act, as stated in the majority opinion, amends Code § 27-418 but I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that it "places the [exclusive] authority to accept sureties in felony cases in the office of the sheriff and not in the superior court.” The interpretation given this statute by *216the majority opinion renders meaningless that portion of the statute which provides that "this Act shall not abrogate or repeal the common law authority of the judge having jurisdiction.”
The judge having jurisdiction of felony cases is the superior court judge. In my view, the superior court judge has a good deal of common law authority and the present order, reversed by the majority opinion, is well within it with respect to felony matters. See Corbett v. State, 24 Ga. 391 (1858) for a good (and, I think, correct) statement by Justice Lumpkin on the common law authority of superior court judges regarding bail in felony cases. In my opinion, this court ought not to interfere with a superior court judge’s discretion in handling these matters unless the local judge is clearly wrong. That has not been shown in this case and, therefore, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hall joins in this dissent.