Court Opinion

ID: 9810598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:54:00.775424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:04.386246
License: Public Domain

GILDEA, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Although the good-faith exception articulated in Davis v. United States, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), applies under the United States Constitution when a search is conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, I would not adopt the exception under the Minnesota Constitution. In my view, our court’s repeated refusal to recognize the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, together with Minn.Stat. § 626.21 (2014), establish a Minnesota “tradition” that is not consistent with the application of the good-faith exception in this case. See State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Minn.2015) (discussing principles we use to decide when to extend broader protections under the Minnesota Constitution). I agree with Justice Page’s dissent that the majority’s decision is inconsistent with our history of declining to adopt the good-faith exception, and I join that aspect of his dissent. I also agree with Justice Lil-lehaug’s analysis that MinmStat. § 626.21 is a statutory codification of the exclusionary rule that prevents the application of the good-faith exception in Minnesota, and I join that portion of his dissent.1 See, e.g., Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 640 (Minn.2001) (concluding that “the good faith of the police cannot cure the absence of particularized circumstances in the warrant application”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception, despite not questioning “the good faith of the police”). But I do not join either dissent to the extent the dissents argue that the good-faith exception violates the remedies clause under Minn. Const, art. I, § 8.2

. The State does not argue that Minn.Stat. § 626.21 violates separation of powers and so we have no occasion to address that question here.

. The State argues that the exclusionary rule does not violate the remedies clause because citizens are able to file a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Because I conclude that the good-faith exception does not apply under Minnesota law, I need not decide whether a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is sufficient to satisfy Minn. Const, art. I, § 8. The State also argues that the search was constitutional under the exigency exception. I would not reach that issue because it was not presented to the district court. See State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Minn.1989) (declining to rule on the validity of a warrantless seizure because it was not raised at the district court, and there was "insufficient information in the trial court record” on the issue).