Court Opinion

ID: 9444058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:39:36.941583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:41.624960
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
My colleagues say that the conclusion they reach is “inescapable,” and that any other interpretation of the statute “is ridiculous.” My doubts are too strong to allow me to join in such strong language. These doubts do not stem from petitioner’s attempt at a thoroughgoing semicolonization of § 318; for punctuation should play a small role in statutory construction.1 My doubts are provoked by the following:
*86Section 318 specifically mentions § 405(b) as the sole part of § 405 which is to be inoperative when it clashes with § 318. This reference to clause (b) discloses a selective purpose, i. e., not to refer to § 405(a). Moreover, § 405(a) by its express terms provides, “Nothing contained in this Act, unless otherwise specifically provided 'therein, shall be construed * * * to affect any * * * right in process of acquisition. * * *; but as to all such * ■ * * rights * * * the statutes or parts of statutes repealed by this Act are, unless otherwise specifically provided therein, hereby continued in force and effect, •x- -x- * » 2 it would seem, then, that to apply § 318 to “rights in process of acquisition” is exactly what both §§ 318 and 405(a) deliberately said we must not do, since such an application not only (1) disregards the explicit and selective reference in § 318 to § 405(b) but also (2) , in reading § 318 into § 405(a) by mere implication, disregards the words in § 405(a) “unless specifically provided therein”. It is noteworthy, too, that the phrase “a right in the process of acquisition” in § 405(a) is new; it was not in the savings clause of the 1949 Act; it' thus appears that Congress intended to broaden this savings provision. See Petition of Menasche, D.C., 115 F.Supp. 434, 436.2
3 And § 330(b),4 a limited savings clause, contains striking evidence that, when Congress meant to have § 318 apply retroactively — -i. e., to naturalization petitions pending at the time the 1952 Act became effective — Congress plainly said so and did not rely upon mere implication.
Despite these doubts, I concur, but with much hesitation. I concur only because I think the well-known dominant purpose of the chief sponsors of the Act was to ensure the deportation of persons like petitioner.

. Emphasis added.

. That naturalization is a “right,” see Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578, 46 S.Ct. 425, 70 L.Ed. 738.

. It reads as follows: “Any person who was excepted from certain requirements of the naturalization laws under section 325 of the Nationality Act of 1940 prior to its amendment by the Act of September 23, 1950, and had filed a petition for naturalization under section 325 of the Nationality Act of 1940, may, if such petition was pending on September 23, 1950, and is still pending on the effective date of this Act, be naturalized upon compliance with the applicable’;provisions of the naturalization laws in effect upon the date such petition was filed: Provided, That any such person shall be subject to the provisions of section 313' and to those provisions of section 318 which relate to the prohibition against the naturalization of a person against whom there is outstanding a’ final finding of deportability pursuant to ,a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this or any other Act, or which relate to the prohibition against the final hearing on a petition for naturalization if there is pending against the- . petitioner a deportation proceeding pursuant to a'warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this or any other Act.”