Court Opinion

ID: 9567816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:07.689481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:44.410266
License: Public Domain

Koontz, C.J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I do not disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the nature and scope of the collateral estoppel doctrine. While the record in this case is woefully inadequate, I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that Slagle has not specifically argued in the trial court or on appeal that the final divorce decree, which determined that he was the father of the child in question and ordered him to pay child support, was entered as a result of fraud perpetrated on that court. In my view, however, the issue of fraud on the trial court is both implicit and palpable in the proceedings below and on appeal. Accordingly, I would invoke the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 and remand this appeal for a determination of the issue of whether fraud bars the application of estoppel on the facts of this case.
It is undisputed that Slagle is not the biological father of the child in question. We may assume the trial court would not have ordered him to pay child support had that court been made aware of that fact prior to the entry of the divorce decree. This is not a case of a husband who promised to treat his wife’s child by another as his son, thereby agreeing to assume the child support obligation of the biological father. See T. . . v. T. . ., 216 Va. 867, 224 S.E.2d 148 (1976). This is a case of a child born out of wedlock under circumstances in which Slagle had reason to believe that he was the biological father, and the mother throughout the subsequent marriage and the subsequent divorce proceeding assured him that he was. Regardless of these assurances, we know from the record that the mother permitted the trial court to make a determination that Slagle was the child’s biological father when in fact he was not.
It is reasonable to assume, even to presume, that had Slagle known or had reason to know that he was not the biological father *350he would have taken the necessary steps to make that fact known to the trial court prior to the entry of the final decree. It is equally as reasonable to assume that Slagle’s wife and the child’s mother has always had reason to question Slagle’s paternity. Moreover, nothing in the limited record before us indicates that she has not always known that Slagle is not the biological father.
An unjust result is patent in this case. I find no solace in the majority’s conclusions that Slagle could have discovered through due diligence that he was not the biological father and that he had ample opportunity to establish or deny his paternity through use of genetic testing prior to the entry of the final decree. These conclusions ignore the fact that there is nothing in the record to indicate that Slagle had any reason to question his paternity at that time. Rather, based upon his relationship with the mother of the child he had every reason to believe that he was the biological father until after the entry of the final decree. When he had reason to question this paternity, he filed the petition in the juvenile court. In my view, the results of the genetic test obtained pursuant to that petition clearly establish a potential fraud on the divorce court.
Human experience is consistent with Slagle’s failure to challenge his paternity until he had reason to do so. Generally, a husband or a biologically potential father has no reason to question paternity when assured by his mate that he is the father of a particular child. Contrary knowledge is uniquely within the purview of the mother. Where, as here, however, a biologically potential father is given reason to believe he is not the biological father and he secures the genetic testing which proves that he is not the biological father, the trial court should determine whether a prior decree erroneously adjudicating paternity was procurred by fraud. In such a case, if fraud is established, collateral estoppel is not applicable and the prior decree should be vacated.
In the present case, the majority concludes that without a specific allegation of fraud Slagle is estopped. Had such an allegation been specifically made, I have no doubt the majority would reach a different conclusion. In my view, the allegation of fraud is implicit. It cries out for resolution. Accordingly, I would remand this appeal for a determination of that issue and if a fraud was perpetrated on the trial court, the court should vacate its prior decree of child support.
*351Finally, I am at a loss to understand the basis for the trial court’s refusal to vacate or reduce its prior order of child support even if estoppel applies to the issue of Slagle’s paternity. The trial court retains the authority to adjust a prior award of child support until the child reaches majority. The fact that Slagle is not the biological father, even though he remains the judicially adjudicated father, is a factor which should warrant consideration of a reduction in child support.