Court Opinion

ID: 9529306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:49:40.423886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:44.046492
License: Public Domain

NAJAM, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur with the majority on Issues I, II, IV, and V, but respectfully dissent from the majority's determinations on Issue III and the State's cross-appeal. Consistent with the panel in Hardister v. State, 821 N.E.2d 912 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), I would hold that the officers in this case violated the Fourth Amendment when, after the occupants exercised their right not to answer the front door, the officers ran to the back door of the residence in pursuit of those inside. Further, the trial court erred when it sua sponte vacated Kendall's possession of cocaine and a firearm conviction because possession of cocaine and a firearm is not a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to deliver.
Motion to Suppress
The unlawful manufacture, possession, dealing, and use of controlled substances is a scourge upon our society, devastating the lives of individuals and families alike, and placing an enormous burden on law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Recently, the impact of methamphetamine has been especially pernicious. But the epidemic of unlawful drugs also sometimes threatens the Fourth Amendment. This is such a case.
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the Fourth Amendment embodies the centuries-old principal of respect for the privacy of the home. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-10, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Thus, the warrantless search of a person's house carries with it the greatest risk for violation of a person's constitutional right to privacy. In this context, we must be especially vigilant that judicial hairsplitting does not chip away at the constitution. As we said in Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), "Courts should take a very hard line against the search of a person's home without a warrant or consent; and, therefore, [courts should] demand a genuine showing of an emergency before they will excuse the police's failure to obtain a warrant." (Citing United States v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir.1986) cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233, 108 S.Ct. 2897, 101 L.Ed.2d 931 (1988)).
In this case, as the officers stood on the front porch of 407 North Hamilton, the occupants signaled that they did not want to answer the door. The cccupants had no legal duty to answer the door. At that point, there was no contraband in plain view, and there were no exigent circumstances. The officers did not have probable cause to obtain a warrant. Rather, all they had was an uncorroborated anonymous tip.
An uncorroborated anonymous tip has no constitutional significance and is not a license to search the premises. An anonymous tip, by itself, cannot provide the basis for probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 268, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 *457L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In Hardister, we concluded that neither the occupants' refusal to answer the door, nor the occupants' movements inside home, provided probable cause to search this residence. 821 N.E.2d at 920. Based on no more than an uncorroborated anonymous tip, the officers in this case undertook a warrantless search that was unreasonable as a matter of law.
In the end, the officers hit the jackpot, which would be laudable, except that a post hoe justification cannot overcome a Fourth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 185-86 (Ind.1997) (rejecting argument that good faith exception applied to unlawfully issued warrant based solely on uncorroborated hearsay and stating reasonable police officer should know that corroboration of anonymous tip is necessary to obtain a warrant). Kendall had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage surrounding his home. The officers' search of the premises, which occurred following a lawful refusal to answer the door, and was based on no more than an uncorroborated anonymous tip, was per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
As this court explained in Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 495 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied:
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
"It is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"" State v.
Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). A principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement. imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who - seek to enter a residence for purposes of search or arrest. Id. Thus, searches and seizures inside. a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Id. But there are a "'few ... and carefully delineated'" exceptions to the warrant requirement. - Id. (quoting United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 318, 92 S.Ct. 2125).
(Footnote omitted).
One exception to the warrant requirement is when there are exigent cireum-stances. See Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Exigent circumstances which justify a warrantless search have been delineated as the "risk of bodily harm or death, aiding a person in' need of assistance, protecting private property, or actual or imminent destruction or removal of evidence before a search warrant may be obtained." Sloane v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1287, 1293 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied. - Specifically, as our supreme court explained in Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ind.1994):
Exigent cireumstances justifying a war-rantless search exist where the police have an objective and reasonable fear that the evidence is about to be destroyed; the arresting officers must have a reasonable belief that there are people within the premises who are destroying or are about to destroy the evidence. In such cases, the evidence's nature must be evanescent and the officers must fear its imminent destruction. The fact that narcotics are involved does *458not, standing alone, amount to exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search or arrest.
(Citation omitted, emphasis added).
The State asserts, and the majority agrees, that the officers' entry into the home is justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. - But while exigent circumstances justify dispensing with a search warrant, they do not eliminate the need for probable cause. Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. "In validating a warrantless search based on the existence of an emergency, as with any other situation falling within the exigent cireumstances exception, the Government must demonstrate both exigency and probable cause." Id. (citing United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161, 123 S.Ct. 966, 154 L.Ed.2d 897 (2003)). Here, just as in Cudworth, the State failed to demonstrate either exigent circumstances or probable cause required to support a lawful warrantless search. See id. at 141. The threshold and dispositive issue is whether Officers Tindall and Lawrence violated the Fourth Amendment when, after two occupants acknowledged the officers but refused to open the front door, the officers proceeded to run along the sidewalk toward the back of the house hoping that they would catch the occupants exiting the house through the back door.
It is well established that "[It is not unreasonable for police officers, in the pursuit of criminal investigations, to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses at their homes[.]" 1 Wang R. LaFave, Search amp § 2.3(b) at 476 (8d ed.1996) (citing State v. Crider, 341 A.2d 1 (Me.1975)). But it is also well established that persons have the right under the Fourth Amendment to refuse to consent to a warrantless entry of their home. See Camara v. Mun. Court of City & County of San Fracisco, 387 U.S. 523, 540, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (concluding appellant had constitutional right to insist that municipal inspectors obtain warrant before entering his home); see also Robinson v. State, 814 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (acknowledging right to reasonably resist unlawful entry of police officer into person's home). Implicit in the right to refuse entry is the right to refuse to answer the door. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 696 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ind.1998) ("There is no question that police are required by the federal constitution to obtain a warrant to arrest a suspect who hunkers down inside his home and refuses to leave or answer the door."). In addition, a person's assertion of that right cannot be a crime. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 540, 87 S.Ct. 1727 {concluding appellant could not be convict, ed for refusing to consent to warrantless inspection of home).
Kendall characterizes the "initial police contact" in this case as a "knock and talk." Brief of Appellant at 18. We explained knock and talk investigations in Hayes as follows:
A knock and talk investigation "involves officers knocking on the door of a house, identifying themselves as officers, asking. to talk to the occupant about a erimi-nal complaint, and eventually requesting permission to search the house." "If successful, it allows police officers who lack probable cause to gain access to a house and conduct a search." Both federal and state appellate courts which have considered the question, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cireuit, have concluded that the knock and talk procedure does not per se violate the Fourth Amendment. "Though the 'knock and tall procedure is not automatically violative of the Fourth Amendment, it can become so." *459The constitutional analysis begins with the knock on the door. The prevailing rule is that, absent a clear expression by the owner to the contrary, police officers, in the course of their official business, are permitted to approach one's dwelling and seek permission to question an occupant.
794 N.E.2d at 496 (citations omitted).
Officers Tindall and Lawrence went to 407 North Hamilton to investigate an anonymous tip that someone was inside the house "cooking drugs." Transcript at 272. Without attempting to corroborate that tip, however, the officers went directly to that address and knocked on the door. They did so without probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion. See Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 184 (concluding anonymous tip insufficient to support issuance of warrant); see also Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (concluding anonymous tip insufficient to justify investigatory detention), trans. denied.13 The officers' reason for going to the home and knocking on the door was legitimate, namely, to investigate an anonymous tip, but at the time they knocked on the door the officers had no constitutionally significant grounds for believing that anything illegal was going on inside the home.
After the officers knocked on the door, two occupants, at two different times, came to the front window next to the door and pulled back the curtain to see who was there. Officer Tindall testified that he shined his flashlight on his badge and said, "Police Department." Transeript at 278. After making eye contact with the officers at the front door, the occupants refused to answer and, instead, headed toward the back of the house.
To the extent that the majority questions whether the occupants' actions constituted a refusal, the evidence clearly shows that the occupants communicated to the officers that they would not open the door. Again, a person is under no obligation to answer or open his door when police have no warrant or probable cause. Here, the occupants exercised their Fourth Amendment right not to answer or open the front door. Thus, the question is whether, given the occupants' refusal, it was reasonable for the officers to run to the back of the home to see whether the occupants were leaving through the back door. It was not.
As this court explained in Divello v. State, 782 N.E.2d 433, 437-38 (Ind.Ct.App.20083), trans. denied:
When police enter onto private property in order to conduct an investigation or for another legitimate purpose and restrict their entry to places that other visitors would be expected to go, such as walkways, driveways, or porches, any observation made from these areas is permissible under the United States Constitution and the Fourth Amendment thereto. Accordingly, an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to things or activities within a residence that may be observed by persons using their natural senses from places impliedly open to a visitor's entry. In general, this means that if police utilize normal means of access to and egress from the house for some legitimate purpose, such as to *460make inquiries of the occupant. ..., i is not a Fourth Amendment search for the police to see or hear or smell from that vantage point what is happening inside the dwelling. The implied invitation, however, extends only to those with legitimate business, and applies only to routes reasonable under the circumstances.
* k ck
Under most cireumstances, uninvited visitors are ... expected to leave by the same route after knocking on the front door and receiving no response. Of course, the nature of the cireumstances surrounding the visit can also affect the scope of the property open by implication. For example, persons previously invited to access a residence by alternate entryways, or those coming on tru'ly pressing or emergency matters could reasonably be expected to seek out residents through areas other than the front door.
(Citations omitted, emphases added).
The officers in Divello knocked on the door of two residences owned by the defendant to investigate an anonymous tip of drug activity. We determined in part that after the officers received no answer at the second residence, "they should have left, as the purpose for their visit to that property terminated due to the lack of any response from any occupant. Otherwise, the well-established right of citizens to refuse to answer their door would be illusory." Id. at 439 (citation omitted).
The facts in this case are even more compelling than those in Divello. The officers here walked along the sidewalk en route to the north and back sides of the house because they thought the occupants "were going to run out the back door." Transcript at 28. But at that point, the occupants had already exercised their Fourth Amendment right not to answer the front door. Not only were the officers uninvited, but the occupants communicated to the officers that they were not welcome on the property. The State presented no evidence to show that uninvited visitors commonly used the back door to 407 North Hamilton to seek out residents. And while the officers had information that may have suggested illegal activity, that information did not rise to the level necessary to justify anything more than a visit along the most obvious and direct route to the residence. See Trimble v. State, 816 N.E.2d 83, 90 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Simply put, once the police had encountered the occupants and were turned away, they should have left the premises by the same route upon which they had arrived.
As this court warned in Hayes, 794 N.E.2d at 497, while a "knock and talk" procedure is not per se unlawful, it " 'pushes the envelope' and can easily be misused." We further stated in Hayes, "knock and talk might more aptly be named ' "knock and enter," because it is usually the officer's goal not to merely talk but to conduct a warrantless search of the premises." Id. Again, while the "knock and talk" procedure is not necessarily unlawful, it is a dangerous short-cut around the bedrock requirement that police have probable cause to enter a home.
The officers in this case, however, were able to complete only one half of the "knock and talk" procedure, namely, they knocked, but the occupants refused to talk. And the officers had not observed anything that corroborated the anonymous tip between the time they knocked on the door and when the occupants twice looked at them through the front window. Rather, the officers merely heard the two occupants, and saw their silhouettes, move toward the back of the house. And because this was an encounter between police and *461the occupants at a private home, the fact that the occupants were moving about inside the house did not justify the officers' continued pursuit. Cf. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25, 120 S.Ct. 673 (holding officer had reasonable suspicion to perform investigatory stop of person in high crime area who ran away upon seeing law enforce ment approach).
Further, the officers' concern that the occupants "were going to run out the back door" did not amount to probable cause or exigent cireumstances that would justify pursuit of the occupants while still inside their home. Transcript at 28. Indeed, the State's argument in this regard is understandably weak. The State's entire argument regarding the reasonableness of the officers' actions is as follows:
Officer Tindall ran to the rear of the house, hoping to intercept anybody fleeing out the back, which was a reasonable response under the cireumstances. See [Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Ind.Ct.App.1984)] (noting that in so-called "open-view" cases where contraband is observed by an officer, in determining whether the officer has entered constitutionally protected space, "the question is not whether a ”ﬁrespass has oceurred but whether the police officer's actions were reasonable under the circumstances").
Brief of Appellee at 11-12. But the occupants were free to leave their home by the back door. And even if they had exited, the officers could not have detained them because an anonymous tip is insufficient to justify an investigative detention. See Washington, 740 N.E.2d at 1246.
Finally, this is not a case in which the officers knocked on the door, received no response, and then decided to try the back door hoping to make contact with someone inside the house. My research has revealed cases involving such factual scenarios. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir.1977) (concluding federal agents' actions of walking to back yard were reasonable where their knock at front door went unanswered and agents saw a light on inside house and heard dog barking); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1100 (4th Cir.1974) (concluding officer acted reasonably when he walked around to back door after receiving no response at front door when officer had reason to believe suspect was home), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895, 95 S.Ct. 173, 42 L.Ed.2d 139 (1974); State v. Seagull, 95 Wash.2d 898, 632 P.2d 44, 48-49 (1981) (concluding officer acted reasonably when he first knocked at one door, and then after remembering from previous visit that former occupants could not hear knock at that door, walked to another door). Here, after Officér Tindall knocked on the front door, two occupants came to the front window but did not open the door. As a result, the officers knew people were inside. Unlike in the cases cited above, there was no need for the officers in this case to go to the back door to ascertain whether someone was at home.
In sum, I agree with the Hardister panel that after the occupants refused to answer the door, the officers were no longer on the property for legitimate business. See Hardister, 821 N.E.2d at 920; Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 439. Also at that point, any implied invitation the officers may have had to use the sidewalks or other common areas was extinguished. See Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 437. Therefore, after the occupants exercised their right to refuse to answer the door in response to Officer Tindall's knocks, the officers had no further legitimate business on the premises and were required to leave by the same route by which they entered onto the property. See Hardister, 821 N.E.2d at 920; Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 438.
*462As noted above, our supreme court has stated that "[the fact that narcotics are involved does not, standing alone, amount to exigent circumstances justifying a war-rantless search or arrest." - Esquerdo, 640 N.E.2d at 1027. The critical and controlling fact here is that the officers had no more than an uncorroborated anonymous tip that drug activity was occurring inside the home. And the fact that the officers heard and observed the occupants who had looked through the front window move toward the back of the house after they refused to open the door did not, in itself, justify the officers' continued presence on the property. When the officers ran along the sidewalk to pursue the persons who had lawfully refused to answer the door, the officers entered constitutionally protected space without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and in so doing violated the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion is consistent with the most basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, namely, to secure the right of pergons to be left alone in the privacy of their own homes. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).14
Further, the Fourth Amendment violation in this case, and the admission of the evidence seized subsequent to that violation, is not harmless. Admissions of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis. Smock, 766 N.E.2d at 407. Harmless error occurs when the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt which satisfies the reviewing court that there is no likelihood that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction. Id. Violations of the Fourth Amendment must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We must find that there is no substantial likelihood the error contributed to the verdict, or, in other words, that the error was unimportant in relation to everything else before the jury on the issue in question. Id.
Here, Kendall asserts that not only must the officers' testimony regarding what they saw through the side and back windows of the home be suppressed, but all evidence later recovered from the home must also be suppressed, even though the police eventually obtained a search warrant. I agree. As this court explained in Sanchez v. State, 803 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied:
[Elvidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search or seizure has to be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. "When applied, the fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine operates to bar not only evidence directly obtained, but also evidence derivatively gained as a result of information learned or leads obtained during the unlawful search or seizure." Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has refused to adopt a "but for" rule, making inadmissible any and all evidence which *463comes to light through a chain of events beginning with an illegal stop or arrest. Rather, the Court stated, "the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Evidence may be purged of the primary taint if the causal connection between the illegal police conduct and the procurement of the evidence is "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the illegal action."
(Citations omitted).
In this case, the evidence recovered from the home pursuant to the search warrant has a causal relationship to the initial illegal police activity. Indeed, had the officers not run along the sidewalk in pursuit of the occupants who, according to Officer Tindall, may have planned to exit out the back door, Officer Tindall would not have seen Hardister pouring cocaine down the drain. It was that observation that, ultimately, provided both the exigent cireumstances and probable cause to enter the home without a warrant. And the officers did not obtain a search warrant until after they had entered the home and secured the occupants.
Still, the State maintains that because Kendall exited the house through the see-ond-story window and threw what appeared to be two bags of cocaine, he abandoned that property. Kendall responds that the State's abandonment argument must fail because the initial police action caused the abandonment. Again, I agree with Kendall. Abandoned property is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Swanson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 205, 210 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). However, if the decision to discard property was caused by improper police conduct, the abandonment is not considered truly voluntary, and the evidence is not admissible. See id. The testimony during the hearing on Kendall's motion to suppress shows that back-up officers observed Kendall and his two brothers exiting the second-story window after Officers Tindall and Lawrence ran to the side and back of the house. Officer Tindall explained that after he saw Hardis-ter dumping what appeared to be cocaine down the sink, he ran back toward the front of the house and heard other officers yelling at persons on the roof. Based on that evidence, Kendall's decision to exit out the second-story window and throw the bags of cocaine was caused by the initial, unlawful police action and, therefore, such evidence was inadmissible.
In sum, all of the evidence the State presented to secure Kendall's convictions, from Officer Tindall's testimony regarding what he observed through the back window to the cocaine, guns, and money recovered from the home, should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. Without that evidence, the State presented little if no evidence to support Kendall's convictions, and, therefore, the error in the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Smock, 766 N.E.2d at 407. Accordingly, I would reverse and order the trial court to vacate Kendall's convictions.
Double Jeopardy
I agree with the State that Kendall's convictions for possession of cocaine and a firearm and possession with intent to deliver violate neither the statutory elements test. nor the actual evidence test under the Indiana Constitution. or more offenses are the 'same offense' in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged. crimes or *464the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense." Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind.1999). Under the statutory elements test, each offense must contain at least one element that is separate and distinct from the other offense so that the same evidence is not necessary to convict for both offenses. Id. at 52. The actual evidence test, however, "prohibits multiple convictions if there is 'a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense."" Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ind.2002) (citing Richardson, TI7 N.E.2d at 58). For convictions to violate the actual evidence test, the defendant must show that the evidentiary facts establishing the elements of one offense also establish all of the elements of the second offense. See Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 8338 (Ind.2002). Thus, even if "each charge utilizes the same factual event," no constitutional violation will be found if the second offense "requires additional eviden-tiary facts establishing the essential elements." Davis, 770 N.E.2d at 824.
Kendall's convictions for dealing in cocaine and possession of cocaine and a firearm do not violate the statutory elements test because each crime contains an element of proof the other does not. The dealing charge required proof of Kendall's possession of three or more grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver, see Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C) and (b)(1), and the possession of cocaine and a firearm charge required proof that he possessed a firearm. - See Ind.Code § 35-48-4-6(b)(1)(B).
Regarding the actual evidence test, even if the jury used the same cocaine to convict Kendall of dealing and possession of cocaine and a firearm, no constitutional violation occurred. Our supreme court has made clear that "the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evi-dentiary facts establishing the essential elements of a one offense also establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential elements of a second offense." Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 8838. The evidence that Kendall possessed cocaine establishes only one, but not all, of the essential elements of possession of cocaine and a firearm.15
The majority is correct that "(elven where no constitutional violation has occurred, multiple convictions may nevertheless violate the 'rules of statutory construction and common law that are often described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in [Richardson v. State, TIT N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999)]'" Vandergriff v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. These rules fall under broader categories set forth by Justice Sullivan in his concurring opinion in Rick-ardson and include the following: (1) "Conviction and punishment for a crime which is a lesser-included offense of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished"; (2) "Conviction *465and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished"; (8) "Conviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as an element of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished"; (4) "Conviction and punishment for an enhancement of a crime where the enhancement is imposed for the very same behavior or harm as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished"; and (5) "Conviction and punishment for the crime of conspiracy where the overt act that constitutes an element of the conspiracy charge is the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished." Id. (citing Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55-56 (Sullivan, J., concurring)).
These categories were applied by a majority of our supreme court in Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind.2002), to determine if a defendant's convictions for murder and carrying a handgun without a license violated double jeopardy principles. In reciting the five categories, the majority in Guyton noted that only one, lesser-included offenses, "presumably covered constitutional - Double - Jeopardy," thereby implying that the remaining categories addressed common law violations. Id. In addition, in his concurring opinion, Justice Boehm explained in relevant part: "The first Sullivan rule is the statutory elements test, identical to federal double jeopardy under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)." Id. at 1149-50 (Boehm, J., concurring); see also Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 50 n. 41 (stating statutory elements test is similar to Blockburger "same elements" test). Thus, contrary to the majority's suggestion, Justice Sullivan's first category, namely, conviction and punishment for a crime which is a lesser-included offense of another crime, is a constitutional double jeopardy violation, not a common law violation. Additionally, the analysis applied to determine whether one crime is a lesser-included offense of another is identical to the statutory elements test under Article I, Section 13 and similar to the same elements test under Blockburger. See id.
Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-6 establishes that a trial court may not enter judgment of conviction and sentence a defendant on both a greater and lesser-included offense. An offense may either be inherently included or factually included. Carroll v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trams. denied. An offense is inherently included in another offense if the lesser offense may be established "by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements" 'defining the "greater" offense charged. Id. at 1282 (citation omitted). An offense is factually included in another offense when the charging information alleges the "means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense." Id. (citation omitted). >
As the majorﬁiy acknowledges, it is well settled that the possession of cocaine is a lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver when the same cocaine is used to prove both crimes. See Reynolds/Herr v. State, 582 N.E.2d 833, 839 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (stating where evidence shows only one possession of cocaine by defendant, which is material element of dealing, defendant cannot be convicted of both possession and dealing). But, again, not all of the elements of possession of cocaine and a firearm are included within the crime of possession with intent to deliver, and contrary to the majority's suggestion, possession of cocaine and a firearm, unlike possession of co*466caine, is neither a factually nor inherently included offense of possession with intent to deliver.
The majority's analysis suggests that the possession of a firearm element under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6(b)(1)(B) is not an "essential element" of the crime of possession of cocaine and a firearm. I disagree. Although the crimes listed under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6(b) may be variations on what the majority refers to as the "base" offense of possession of cocaine, op. at 454, each is a separate crime with distinct elements of proof. In other words, even though the factors listed under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6(b) enhance Class D felony possession of cocaine to a Class C, B, or A felony, those factors, i.e., possession of three or more grams of cocaine, possession of a firearm, or possession within one thousand feet of a school or park, are all statutory elements that the State must prove to obtain a conviction.16 Thus, the existence of the firearm element matters for purposes of any double jeopardy analysis. See, e.g., Whitt v. State, 659 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Ind.1995) (concluding convictions for possession of cocaine within one thousand feet of school property and failing to pay controlled substance excise tax ("CSET") did not violate federal double jeopardy because to convict defendant of first offense, State had to prove possession within one thousand feet of school property and to convict of second offense, State had to prove possession without having paid the CSET); 17 see also Davis, 770 N.E.2d at 324 (explaining even if each charge utilizes same factual event, no constitutional violation occurs if second offense requires additional facts establishing essential elements).
Finally, I acknowledge that I authored the opinion in Jones v. State, 807 N.E.2d 58, 67 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), a decision on which the majority relies. But in Jones, the State conceded the double jeopardy violation, and the issue presented on appeal was the appropriate remedy on remand. Thus, Jones does not control the issue here, namely, whether the statutory requirement that the State prove possession of a firearm to convict a defendant under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6(b)(1)(B) may be ignored for double jeopardy purposes. In sum, I would conclude that Kendall's convictions for possession of cocaine and a firearm and possession with intent to deliver do not violate double jeopardy under Indiana law.

. To be clear, the reasonable suspicion analysis first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), does not apply to this case. Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court explained in Ilinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), the Terry analysis applies to cases involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a, police officer on a public street. The encounter between the officers and Kendall occurred at Kendall's private home. ~

. Fourth Amendment issues are inherently fact-sensitive. Indeed, there may be circumstances in which an officer's decision to further investigate an anonymous tip may be reasonable. For example, recently this same panel decided Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214 (Ind.Ct.App. Feb.9, 2005), trans. pending, which involved an anonymous tip that someone inside the residence had been shot. Although the defendant in that case did not challenge the officers' actions of walking along the side of the house, nor did he assert that there was a refusal to answer the door, it was reasonable, given the nature of the anonymous tip, for the police in that case to investigate further. But where, as here, the anonymous tip concerns drug activity inside a home, and the occupants exercise their constitutional right not to answer the door, the officers may not thereafter remain on the property in an attempt to talk with the occupants. See Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 439,

. Since Spivey, this court has determined that "the Richardson actual evidence test, as applied by our [slupreme [clourt, has found double jeopardy to be violated where the evi- . dentiary fact(s) establishing one or more elements of one challenged offense establish all of the elements of the second challenged offense." Alexander v. State, 772 NE.2d 476, 478 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. But Kendall's convictions for possession of cocaine and a firearm and dealing do not violate that articulation of the actual evidence test either. Again, the evidence that Kendall possessed cocaine proves only one of the two essential elements of possession of cocaine and a firearm.

. The issue in this case is whether possession of cocaine and a firearm is a lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. There may be situations in which convictions for both of those crimes violate the actual evidence test. Further, there may be cases in which dual convictions for possession of cocaine within one thousand feet of school property, for example, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver violate the actual evidence test. Again, I only conclude today that possession of cocaine and a firearm is not a lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Nor do those two convictions violate the actual evidence test in this case.

. Even though Whitt involved federal double jeopardy, our courts have recognized that Indiana's statutory elements test is essentially the same as the federal test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 50 n. 41 (stating Indiana's statutory elements test is analogous to Block-burger "same elements" test). The point is that under federal or state double jeopardy law, the element that Kendall possess a firearm is significant.