Court Opinion

ID: 9927299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 19:00:45.299476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:14.209525
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JAN 26 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DOE,                                       No. 22-1824

              Petitioner,                       Agency No.      A072-927-538

  v.
                                                ORDER
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

Before: CHRISTEN and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN, *
Judge.

       On January 18, 2024, following the original issuance of this

memorandum disposition, Petitioner moved to amend the caption of this case to

remove Petitioner’s real name. According to Petitioner, public disclosure of his

real name could expose him to harm upon his removal to Mexico. The panel

amends the memorandum and its associated caption to remove all references to

Petitioner’s real name.

       *
             The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JAN 26 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DOE,                                        No. 22-1824

              Petitioner,                        Agency No.      A072-927-538

  v.
                                                 AMENDED MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted January 8, 2024**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: CHRISTEN and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,***
Judge.

       John Doe (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding

the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his claims for withholding of removal

       *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
       ***
             The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We lack

jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s petition insofar as it relates to his eligibility

for withholding of removal, and we dismiss that component of the petition. We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to consider Petitioner’s petition insofar

as it relates to his eligibility for CAT relief, and we deny that component of the

petition.

       1. We lack jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s challenge to the BIA’s

denial of his appeal from the IJ’s order denying his application for withholding

of removal. The BIA upheld the IJ’s determination that the robbery offense of

which Petitioner was convicted in 2019 constitutes a “particularly serious

crime,” thus rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3). Our jurisdiction to review particularly-serious-crime

determinations is limited to circumstances where a petitioner raises a

constitutional or legal question, such as whether the BIA applied the correct

legal standard. Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation

omitted); Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2019); see also

Benedicto v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1049, 1062 (9th Cir. 2021) (contrasting

challenges that raise constitutional or legal questions with those that merely

request “a re-weighing of the factors” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

       Although he purports to argue that the BIA applied the wrong legal

standard, Doe does not raise such a question in his brief. The sole substantive

                                           2                                     22-1824
argument he lays out is that the BIA erred in failing to consider certain

extenuating facts about his participation in the 2019 robbery. But this is not an

argument that the BIA somehow failed to apply the appropriate set of factors,

which the BIA first outlined in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA

1982). See also Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 2010)

(explaining that the four so-called “Frentescu factors” constitute, with certain

regulatory modifications, “the applicable legal standard for determining whether

a particularly serious crime has been committed”). Under Frentescu the BIA is

to consult, inter alia, “the circumstances and underlying facts of the

conviction.” 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247. That is precisely what the BIA did here.

Accordingly, much as Petitioner might disagree with the BIA’s assignment of

weight to certain “underlying facts,” that disagreement does not amount to an

argument that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard altogether. Properly

characterized, Petitioner’s argument is a request for re-weighing that does not

suffice to invoke our jurisdiction. See Benedicto, 12 F.4th at 1062.

      We therefore dismiss the petition as it pertains to Petitioner’s application

for withholding of removal.

      2. We deny Petitioner’s petition as it pertains to his application for

deferral of removal under the CAT. To qualify for CAT protection Petitioner

must demonstrate a “particularized threat of torture” and establish that he will

more likely than not be tortured upon his removal to Mexico. Dhital v.

Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The BIA

                                        3                                      22-1824
determined the threats on which Petitioner based his CAT application to be

overly speculative and insufficiently particularized; we review that

determination for substantial evidence. Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944

(9th Cir. 2007). Under this standard, we “uphold[] the BIA’s determination

unless the evidence in the record compels a contrary conclusion.” Id.

      The record does not so compel. Petitioner argues that the BIA erred in

disregarding his fear of torture at the hands of persons associated with the

Jalisco New Generation and Sinaloa cartels. With respect to the Jalisco cartel,

he contends that the BIA erred in ignoring his specific citations to record

evidence—including testimony that the brother-in-law of a Jalisco cartel

member negatively perceives Petitioner to be an informant—that together

established a particularized threat of torture. But this argument, as briefed, is

unsupported by any description of how the BIA committed legal error in finding

Petitioner’s citations to testimonial and documentary evidence insufficient. A

petitioner must “specifically and distinctly raise an argument and support it with

citations to the record to raise it on appeal.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69

F.4th 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Instead, Petitioner merely summarizes the BIA’s decision,

recapitulates parts of his own testimony and subsequent arguments before the

BIA, and states a conclusion that the BIA’s determination is in error. This

series of assertions—which lacks any explanation of how the BIA specifically

erred in rejecting Petitioner’s presentation of a particularized risk of torture by

                                         4                                     22-1824
members of the Jalisco cartel or their associates—can be no basis for disturbing

the BIA’s determination.

      Regarding the threat posed by the Sinaloa cartel, Petitioner’s argument

rests on a misreading of the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. The IJ and the BIA

referenced the presence of Petitioner’s family members in Michoacán, Mexico,

as support for the conclusion that Petitioner’s “general” fear of Mexican

cartels—as distinct from his specific fear of the Jalisco and Sinaloa cartels—

constitutes insufficient evidence that Petitioner will more likely than not be

tortured upon removal. Petitioner does not challenge that conclusion in this

petition for review. Instead, he appears to assert that the BIA improperly

referenced the living situation of his family members as a basis for disregarding

his specific fear of the Sinaloa cartel. But the IJ and the BIA relied on other

grounds entirely in determining that Petitioner’s fear of the Sinaloa cartel does

not establish a particularized threat of torture. The IJ explained, and the BIA

agreed, that the Sinaloa cartel does not pose such a threat because its members

have not attempted to threaten or harm Petitioner since their last alleged threat

(at Petitioner’s mother’s California home) in 2015. This explanation, which

Petitioner does not properly challenge, does not rely on the improper inference

that he purports to identify.

      We accordingly deny Petitioner’s petition for review as it pertains to his

application for deferral of removal under the CAT.

      PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

                                         5                                   22-1824