Court Opinion

ID: 9776740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:43:32.720206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:42.153704
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge
(dissenting).
The majority holds that the word “did” is no longer an essential word in an indictment alleging murder with malice aforethought when charging the acts which constituted the crime involved. The majority appears to conclude the word may be supplied by argument or intendment, and is necessary only if the pleader wants to be “more grammatically correct.” In so holding, the majority expressly overrules Edmondson v. State, 41 Tex. 496 (1874), and other cases in conflict, thereby abrogating a general rule of pleading in criminal cases that has existed in this jurisdiction for over one hundred years.
In support of his contention that the indictment was fatally defective, the appellant relies upon Article 21.02(7), Vernon’s Ann. C. C.P. (requisites), which requires that the “offense must be set forth in plain and intelligible language,” and upon Articles 21.03 and 21.04, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. These articles respectively read, as follows :
“Everything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.”
And
“The certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution for the same offense.”
It has long been established that it must be alleged in plain and intelligible words that the accused did things which constituted the offense. See Article 21.02, supra, note 37, and authorities there cited. And, “[fjacts must be alleged by direct, certain, and positive averments, and not by way of *806argument and inference.” 1 Branch’s Ann.P.C., 2d ed., § 513, pp. 495-496.
In State v. Hutchinson, 26 Tex. 111 (1861) (concerning a prosecution for unlawfully killing an animal coming within the meaning of an estray), the court said:
“. . . The omission of so important a word (did), a word indispensable to make sense, in charging the offense, ought not to be supplied by intendment.”
State v. Daugherty, 30 Tex. 360 (1867) (unlawful interference with private property or private rights), held that where an indictment omits a material word, although it be but a preposition or a helping verb, the court will not, from a knowledge of the language, supply the missing word so as to supply the probable intention of the grand jury. The court, thus, sustained a judgment quashing an indictment on the basis of the omission of the word “did”, the State then having the right to appeal.
And, in Edmondson v. State, 41 Tex. 496 (1874) (a murder prosecution), where the offense was alleged to have been done with “express malice aforethought,” the court said:
“. . . [T]he averment, as to injuries inflicted with a stick, not only lacks the proper specification of time and place, but omits the word ‘did’ in a connection where it was material — an omission which has been repeatedly held good ground for quashing an indictment.”
In 1876, the Court of Appeals in Ewing v. State, 1 Tex.App. 362 (1876) (a prosecution for abortion), cited with approval the foregoing cases, and said:
“The indictment in this case is fatally defective because it fails to allege that the defendant ‘did’ the acts charged as constituting the crime. This word is indispensable, and cannot be supplied by intendment.”
To the same effect are the holdings in Tompkins v. State, 4 Tex.App. 161 (1878) (keeping a disorderly house for the purpose of public prostitution), and Moore v. State, 7 Tex.App. 42 (1879). And Walker v. State, 9 Tex.App. 177 (1880), noted that the omission of the word “did” in the pleadings had been “uniformly adjudged substantial.”
In Jester v. State, 26 Tex.App. 369, 9 S.W. 616 (1888) (involving a burglary prosecution), the Court of Appeals said:
“. . . In the indictment, as it appears in the record, there is a fatal defect, in so far as it undertakes to charge burglary. It alleges that the defendant ‘then and there, by force, break and enter a house,’ etc.; omitting the essential word ‘did’. If such omission be in the original indictment, a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained upon it. Moore v. State, 7 Tex.App. 42; Valesco v. State, 9 Tex.App. [76], 77. . . .”
In Barfield v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 342, 45 S.W. 1015 (1898) (a prosecution for unlawfully carrying a pistol), it was noted that the omission of the word “did” in charging the acts committed, in an unbroken line of decisions, has been held to invalidate the complaint, information or indictment as the case may be. A reversal was ordered.
This court in Ivey v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 548, 247 S.W.2d 105 (preventing another from engaging in a lawful vocation), recognized the general rule involved but held the words “in doing so” to be sufficient in the indictment.
And, as late as 1971, this court in Mesa v. State, 462 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), stated:
“It is true that ‘[t]he word “did” is an essential word in indictments, informa-tions and complaints, where the acts which constitute the offense are being set forth.’ 1 Branch’s Ann.P.C., 2d ed., Sec. 512, p. 495 and cases there cited. Further, ‘[i]f the word omitted is essential to the certainty necessary in the de*807scription of the offense it cannot be supplied by intendment, and of consequence such omission is fatal to the validity of the indictment.’ Id.”1
See also 30 Tex.Jur.2d Indictment and Information § 22, pp. 571-572 and 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law & Procedure § 1761, p. 555 (1957).
In the instant case, the appellant, prior to trial, made a written motion to quash the indictment on the very ground now urged on appeal citing cases in support of the general rule discussed. The motion was overruled.
It is difficult to imagine that, when the indictment was so challenged, the prosecutor did not seek a new one eliminating the question from the case. See Barfield v. State, supra; Mesa v. State, supra. He did not, and now the majority, in order to affirm the conviction, abolishes the general rule which has prevailed for so long without establishing another. The majority does not make clear whether this holding will apply only to murder with malice cases or will have application to all cases where malice aforethought is not alleged, or whether there is one rule for murder cases and another for other cases.
I cannot agree to such action. In my opinion, the omission of the word “did” was fatal for the offense was not charged in plain and intelligible language. As this court said in Moore v. State, 473 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Cr.App.1971),
“It is, of course, not sufficient to say that the accused knew with what offense he was charged, but the inquiry must be whether the charge in writing furnished that information in plain and intelligible language. . . . ”
I dissent.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissent.

. In Mesa, supra, an aggravated assault case, the court held that the failure to use the word “did” for a third time in the pleading was not reversible error under the circumstances.