Court Opinion

ID: 9407453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 14:06:39.024877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:37.400423
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 30, 2023; 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0424-MR

JASON STEVENSON, JR.                                                 APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE REBECCA K. PHILLIPS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 19-CI-00190

DAVID GREEN AND KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS                                             APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ECKERLE, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: This is an appeal from the Morgan Circuit Court’s order

dismissing Appellant’s Petition for Declaration of Rights, arising from a prison

violation. Appellees are the Kentucky Department of Correction (DOC), and

David Green, in his official capacity as Warden of Eastern Kentucky Correctional

Complex (EKCC). Appellant Stevenson is a pro se inmate who alleges that his

due process rights were violated in connection with a disciplinary action charging
him with inciting to riot or rioting, while he was housed at Green River

Correctional Complex (GRCC). The underlying incident occurred on March 15,

2019, during which Stevenson was involved in a multiple inmate disturbance

resulting in damage to prison property. The resulting disciplinary report was

investigated by Lieutenant Walter Elam.

                After a hearing on the matter, Adjustment Officer (AO), Michael

Prater, found Stevenson guilty on the charge presented. AO Prater concluded that

Stevenson did not leave the scene of the incident when given that option. His

report cited video and photographic evidence in support. The penalty imposed was

thirty days in restrictive housing with credit for time served, a loss of 720 days of

non-restorable good-time credit, and $1,295.47 in restitution. Stevenson appealed

to Warden Green, who affirmed the decision and punishment. Stevenson

petitioned the Morgan Circuit Court for a declaration of rights pursuant to KRS1

418.040. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted. Stevenson

appeals to this Court as a matter of right. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                “A petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to KRS 418.040 has

become the vehicle, whenever Habeas Corpus proceedings are inappropriate,

whereby inmates may seek review of their disputes with the Corrections

Department.” Smith v. O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Ky. App. 1997) (citation

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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omitted). Although the Appellees filed a motion to dismiss in response to

Stevenson’s petition, rather than a motion for summary judgment, this Court has

held that summary judgment standards and procedures are most appropriate in

these cases. See id., at n.1. Furthermore, Smith details the applicable standard for

addressing prison disciplinary actions as follows:

             [w]here, as here, principles of administrative law and
             appellate procedure bear upon the court’s decision, the
             usual summary judgment analysis must be qualified. The
             problem is to reconcile the requirement under the general
             summary judgment standard to view as favorably to the
             non-moving party as is reasonably possible the facts and
             any inferences drawn therefrom, with a reviewing court’s
             duty to acknowledge an agency’s discretionary authority,
             its expertise, and its superior access to evidence. In these
             circumstances we believe summary judgment for the
             Corrections Department is proper if and only if the
             inmate’s petition and any supporting materials, construed
             in light of the entire agency record (including, if
             submitted, administrators’ affidavits describing the
             context of their acts or decisions), does not raise specific,
             genuine issues of material fact sufficient to overcome the
             presumption of agency propriety, and the Department is
             entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Id. at 356. The ultimate question before us is “whether ‘some evidence’ appearing

in the record supports the finding.” Id.

             In the present case, Stevenson does not raise any specific, genuine

issues of material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption of agency propriety.

His due process claim lacks specificity and he has not filed a reply brief countering

the DOC’s statement of the underlying facts. Having reviewed the relevant

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portions of the record presented, the “some evidence” standard has been satisfied

here. We discern no due process violation. Accordingly, Appellees are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. The judgment of the Morgan Circuit Court is

affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                          BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Jason Stevenson, Jr., pro se                  Richard D. Lilly
Burgin, Kentucky                              Frankfort, Kentucky

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