Court Opinion

ID: 9627907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:58:42.636985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:54.201014
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
dissenting.
When a criminal defendant is sentenced in a felony case, he is entitled to procedural safeguards embodied in Rules 32 and 33, I.C.R. These safeguards include the assistance of counsel, the right to defend against adverse information and an opportunity to submit favorable information. Under current Idaho case law, the defendant’s rights are significantly diminished if a court retains jurisdiction and authorizes an evaluation under I.C. § 19-2601(4). The evaluation occurs in an administrative setting where there is no right to counsel and no right to call witnesses other than staff members and employees of the North Idaho Correctional Institution. See State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 728 (1978). Neither is the defendant entitled to a judicial hearing after the administrative process is completed. E.g., State v. White, 107 Idaho 941, 694 P.2d 890 (1985); State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472, 567 P.2d 17 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1284, 55 L.Ed.2d 793 (1978). Thus, if a material issue in sentencing is not addressed by the court, outside the administrative process, the defendant will lose the benefit of his rights under Rules 32 and 33. That, I think, has happened in the present case.
The apparent rationale for creating two different sets of rights is found in Wolfe and Ditmars. There the Supreme Court adopted the view that a sentence is fully imposed when the judge pronounces it— even though the judge retains jurisdiction. Any subsequent grant of probation is treated as a detached act of judicial grace, not as a continuing part of an integrated sentencing process. I respectfully question this view. In many (if not most) cases, jurisdiction is retained because the judge is genuinely undecided about the final sentence and seeks further information. Our Court has noted that “retaining jurisdiction has come to be regarded as a means of extending the time to evaluate a defendant’s suitability for probation.” State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct.App.1982).
Even if I accepted the proposition that a defendant’s evaluation during retained jurisdiction is somehow separable from the entire sentencing process, I still would be concerned about the defendant’s loss of rights when a material issue in sentencing is left to the administrative process. In this case, the central issue in sentencing was the defendant’s psychological condition. Charles Hall committed a sex offense against a minor. The offense and the background related to it need not be detailed here. It suffices to say that the need for a psychological evaluation was manifest. Rule 32(b)(10), I.C.R., provides that a presentence report “should include a complete summary of the presentence investigator’s view of the psychological factors surrounding the commission of the crime or regarding the defendant individually which the investigator discovered.” The presentence report in this case contained no such “summary” of “psychological factors.” Indeed, the presentence investigator’s sole comment on Hall’s mental health was as follows: “Defendant advised that he has never been involved in mental health/psychological treatment or counseling.” No psychological evaluation was recommended. Neither did the district judge exercise his discretionary authority to order such an evaluation as part of the presentence process. See I.C.R. 32(d).
*930Rather, the judge pronounced sentence and retained jurisdiction, expressing his expectation that the defendant would receive an evaluation in the sex offenders’ program at the NICI. This approach, though undoubtedly well-intended, had the practical effect of shifting development of a material issue from a judicial proceeding, where procedural safeguards are provided by rule, to an administrative proceeding where, under Ditmars and Wolfe, procedural rights are greatly diminished.
The evaluation at the NICI turned upon the psychological examination conducted there. The examiner was a clinical psychologist engaged in private practice, with whom the NICI had contracted for professional services. After the examiner submitted his report, Hall was notified of the evaluation committee’s intent to recommend that jurisdiction be “dropped.” This notice gave the following reason:
As far as your deportment and work habits were concerned, all staff were very complimentary. There was no problem in this area. The psychological report however indicates there is some very serious concern that you are a high risk to reoffend____ [Y]our contention that you do not remember actually committing the offense and your dependency upon women along with long term alcohol abuse are all prime ingredients making future sexual abuse likely. A secondary problem also indicated, lack of insight[,] is your projection of blame on to your wife.
The psychologist’s report may well have been perfectly accurate. But it was not tested by the scrutiny it would have received if submitted to the court during the presentence phase. At a judicial proceeding Hall would have been afforded the assistance of counsel in reviewing the report, in confronting the psychologist and in presenting any evidence that would shed a more favorable light upon his mental condition. At the NICI, Hall was on his own. He had no attorney nor any right to request one. He even lacked a right to call the psychologist as a witness, and to ask him questions, because the psychologist was neither a member of the staff nor an “employee” of the institution.
In sum, shifting the psychological examination from the presentence phase to an administrative proceeding removed the central issue in sentencing from a disciplined, two-sided inquiry contemplated by Rules 32 and 33. Deferring an examination until Hall was at the NICI meant not only that the examination would be conducted at a different place, but also that it would be subject to no meaningful challenge. The unchallenged psychological report led to an administrative recommendation which, in turn, led to a judicial decision, without a hearing, to relinquish jurisdiction.
This result was not inevitable and is not immutable. Although a judicial hearing is not required when jurisdiction is relinquished, a court may hold such a hearing. In my view, the court should do so in unusual cases like this one, where a material issue is developed for the first time in an administrative forum where rights secured by Rules 32 and 33 are not recognized. Accordingly, I would vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court for a hearing.