Court Opinion

ID: 9393095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 14:05:15.326967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:50.947023
License: Public Domain

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
                        (Memorandum Web Opinion)

                                        STATE V. HICKMAN

  NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
 AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

                                 STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,
                                                V.

                                 DAVID L. HICKMAN, APPELLANT.

                               Filed May 9, 2023.    No. A-22-677.

       Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: ROBERT R. OTTE, Judge. Affirmed.
       Timothy P. Sullivan, of Sullivan Law, for appellant.
       Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Teryn Blessin for appellee.

       PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and MOORE and ARTERBURN, Judges.
       MOORE, Judge.
                                       I. INTRODUCTION
       David L. Hickman appeals his convictions and sentences in the district court for Lancaster
County for assault in the first degree, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and possession of a
firearm by a prohibited person. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling
34 to 58 years. On appeal, Hickman argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions and that the sentences imposed were excessive. Hickman also assigns that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance in several respects. We affirm.
                                  II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
        On October 12, 2021, a complaint was filed in Lancaster County Court charging Hickman
with assault in the first degree in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-308 (Reissue 2016), a Class II
felony; use of a firearm to commit a felony in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1205(1)(c) (Reissue

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2016), a Class IC felony; and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-1206(1)(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2022), a Class ID felony.
       The case was subsequently bound over to district court and an information charging
Hickman with the same counts was filed on January 5, 2022. Hickman plead not guilty to all
charges in the information. A jury trial was held in August 2022. The following evidence was
adduced and additional trial evidence will be discussed in connection with our analysis below.
                                       1. TRIAL EVIDENCE
        Michael Nunn testified that Hickman is his cousin and that in the early hours of October 7,
2021, Hickman shot him in his right leg, left thigh, and left foot. That night, Nunn was with his
girlfriend, Rebecca, and they were on their way to pick up Rebecca’s children from her sister’s
home. Rebecca’s sister, Jessica, was also Hickman’s girlfriend. When the couple arrived at
Jessica’s home, Jessica and Hickman were standing outside. Rebecca exited Nunn’s car from the
passenger side and went inside the home with Jessica through an open garage door to retrieve her
children.
        Nunn stayed in the driver’s seat of the car, playing music and drinking an alcoholic
beverage. Nunn noticed Hickman standing in front of the home, but did not engage him in
conversation. Hickman began walking past the front of Nunn’s car and complimenting the music
Nunn was playing. Nunn then heard the back passenger door open and saw Rebecca place one of
her children into the car. Nunn exited the driver’s seat and waited near the trunk to help Rebecca
load her other children into the car. As Rebecca returned inside the home, Nunn was alone with
Hickman in the driveway.
        Nunn noticed Hickman’s reflection in the car and realized that Hickman was standing on
the other side of the car, opposite to the side Rebecca was using to load her children. Hickman
then said something to Nunn, which Nunn was unable to hear over the music playing from the car.
Nunn suddenly collapsed to the ground and saw Hickman standing over him with a gun pointed at
him. Nunn knew that he had been shot and could not feel his right leg, but was unable to hear the
gunshots over the loud music to determine how many times he had been shot.
        Rebecca returned to the car to remove her child from the backseat as Nunn got into the car
to drive himself to the hospital. On his way to the hospital, Nunn drove on the wrong side of a
divided highway for some blocks. Once Nunn navigated to the correct side of the road, he called
his brother to inform him that Nunn was driving to a hospital and stated “DJ, he just shot me.”
        Nunn’s brother testified consistently with Nunn, confirming that he received a phone call
from Nunn between midnight and 12:15 a.m. on October 7, in which Nunn told his brother that he
was driving himself to the hospital because “DJ just shot me.” Nunn’s brother stated that he knew
of only one DJ, who is his cousin, David Junior. Video footage entered into evidence from
intersection cameras and the emergency room entrance also demonstrate Nunn driving on the
wrong side of the road and arriving at the hospital with a bloody leg.
        A doctor who performed two surgeries to Nunn’s right leg testified to the extent of Nunn’s
injuries. The doctor noted that Nunn’s right leg was shattered and required multiple surgeries to
address the damage. Nunn’s healing process was ongoing at the time of trial, 10 months after the
shooting.

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         A neighbor of Jessica’s testified that a little after midnight on October 7, she awoke to loud
music booming out of a car stereo. For a time, the stereo quieted and the neighbor could hear
voices, but could not determine what they were saying. The music then grew louder and the
neighbor heard three gunshots in quick succession and called 911.
         Responding Lincoln Police Department (LPD) officers found three shell casings at the
scene, as well as a trail of blood, and a burnout tire mark in the driveway facing away from the
home, indicating that a car had left the driveway quickly. Crime scene photos entered into evidence
show blood and tire marks on a driveway, two shell casings on the concrete, and one shell casing
under a bush.
         Marcus Hefley, an LPD officer, was at the hospital on an unrelated call for service when
Nunn was admitted to the emergency room. Hefley overheard a nurse advise that someone had
driven into the ambulance bay with multiple gunshot wounds and Hefley went to assess the scene,
discovering a significant amount of blood inside and outside of the car. Hefley learned through an
LPD radio transmission that a shooting had been reported in central Lincoln.
         Hefley was also advised by the nurse that the victim’s brother was waiting in the lobby and
Hefley later made contact with Nunn’s brother in the hospital parking lot. During Hefley’s
conversation with Nunn’s brother he was informed that Nunn had recently contacted his brother.
Nunn’s brother also testified to speaking with an LPD officer in the hospital parking lot shortly
after the shooting.
         Investigators at the scene were informed through an LPD radio transmission that a shooting
victim, later identified as Nunn, had arrived by a private vehicle at the hospital. During the
investigation, Hickman was identified as a suspect. Investigators interviewed Jessica and Rebecca
in an effort to locate Hickman and to further investigate the shooting.
         Hickman was located and arrested in the afternoon of October 7. Cole Jennings, an
investigator with the LPD, conducted the first interview with Hickman shortly after his arrest.
Jennings informed Hickman of his Miranda rights, which Hickman waived. A Miranda Warning
and Waiver form dated October 7 and signed by Hickman was entered into evidence. During this
initial interview, Hickman denied shooting Nunn and stated to Jennings that he was not at Jessica’s
home during the time of the shooting.
         Joseph Villamonte, an investigator with the LPD, conducted a second interview with
Hickman at the jail on the evening of October 7, after Hickman requested to speak with law
enforcement. Hickman indicated to Villamonte that he wanted to tell his side of the story and
“come clean about what happened.” Villamonte reminded Hickman that he had previously been
read his Miranda rights and asked if Hickman wanted to waive his rights to make a statement,
which he confirmed he did. Hickman told Villamonte that he had been having conflict with Nunn
for months prior to the incident on October 7. Hickman had previously received a noise complaint
and so told Nunn to turn down the music he was playing at the time of the incident. Nunn appeared
intoxicated to Hickman and told him that he would not lower the volume of the music. Hickman
told Villamonte that he felt disrespected by Nunn denying his request. Nunn exited his car and
walked towards the rear of his car and he then grabbed towards his waistband as though he was
armed, so Hickman shot Nunn with his own gun. Nunn then got back in his car and drove away.
After the shooting, Hickman went to his daughter’s home.

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        During the interview, Hickman stated to Villamonte that if the trigger of his gun is touched
once, it fires three times. When Villamonte asked where law enforcement could recover the gun
used to shoot Nunn, Hickman would not disclose its location, but indicated that the gun would
never be found. Hickman also disclosed to Villamonte that he was a convicted felon at the time of
the shooting. A certified copy of a criminal case from the Iowa District Court for Polk County was
entered into evidence and showed that Hickman had been convicted of felony drug charges in
2002.
        Hickman testified in his own defense, and recanted his previous confession. He stated that
he contacted law enforcement and requested to have an additional interview because Jessica had
informed him that child protective services was attempting to remove her children from the home
because of the shooting. Hickman believed that confessing to the shooting would keep the children
in Jessica’s care.
        Hickman stated that he was supplied the details of the shooting by Jessica and Rebecca.
Hickman testified that he was not present at Jessica’s home when Nunn was shot, as he had been
dropped off at his daughter’s house around 11 p.m. or midnight on October 6 and stayed for 4
hours before Jessica retrieved him. Hickman also testified that he does not own a gun and did not
possess a gun in October 2021.
        Hickman’s daughter testified that Hickman came to her home after midnight on October 7.
She was aware of the time because she checked her phone before getting out of bed to answer the
door and recalled seeing a “12” on the screen. Hickman’s daughter estimated that he stayed at her
home for about 30 minutes. Hickman appeared tired to her, but his appearance was not otherwise
out of the ordinary.
                                  2. VERDICTS AND SENTENCING
       After an hour and 14 minutes of deliberation, the jury found Hickman guilty on all counts.
       A sentencing hearing was held on September 14, 2022. The district court sentenced
Hickman to 8 to 16 years’ imprisonment on count I, assault in the first degree; 14 to 20 years’
imprisonment on count II, use of a firearm to commit a felony; and 12 to 22 years’ imprisonment
on count III, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The sentences were ordered to be
served consecutively and the court granted Hickman credit for 340 days already served.
       Hickman appeals.
                                III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
        Hickman assigns, restated, that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions of assault in the first degree, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and possession of a
firearm by a prohibited person; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to file motions
in limine to prevent the introduction of statements made by witnesses to law enforcement, (b)
failing to object to statements made by witnesses to law enforcement, and (c) failing to request a
continuance to secure the attendance of witnesses necessary to his defense; and (3) the district
court imposed an excessive sentence on all three counts.

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                                  IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
        In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether the
evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate
court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh
the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miranda, 313 Neb.
358, 984 N.W.2d 261 (2023). In an appeal of a criminal conviction, an appellate court reviews the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id.
        Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be determined on direct appeal is
a question of law. Id. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, an
appellate court decides only whether the undisputed facts contained within the record are sufficient
to conclusively determine whether counsel did or did not provide effective assistance and whether
the defendant was or was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance. Id.
        An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits absent an
abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Lierman, 305 Neb. 289, 940 N.W.2d 529 (2020).
                                          V. ANALYSIS
                                   1. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
         Hickman assigns that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty of assault
in the first degree, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited
person.
         Before addressing Hickman’s arguments, we summarize the essential elements of his
charges. A person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if he intentionally or knowingly
causes serious bodily injury to another person. See § 28-308. Any person who uses a firearm . . .
to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of this state commits the offense of use
of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. § 28-1205(1)(a). A person commits the offense of
possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person if he possesses a firearm . . . and he has
previously been convicted of a felony. See § 28-1206(1)(a)(i).
         At trial, Nunn testified that Hickman shot him in the right leg, left thigh, and left foot in
the driveway of Jessica’s home while Nunn was waiting to help Rebecca load her children into his
car. While Nunn did not see Hickman pull the trigger, he did see Hickman standing over him with
a pointed gun after Nunn had collapsed to the ground. Nunn also testified that he and Hickman
were the only individuals outside of Jessica’s home at the time of the shooting, aside from
Rebecca’s sleeping child in the backseat of the car. Nunn called his brother on the way to hospital
and identified Hickman as the shooter. Nunn’s brother testified consistently to the phone call.
Nunn’s surgeon testified to Nunn’s extensive injuries to his right leg.
         While investigating the shooting, LPD officers found a burnout tire mark in Jessica’s
driveway, indicating that a car had quickly left the home, a trail of blood, and three shell casings
nearby. A neighbor who called 911 to report the shooting testified to hearing three gunshots.
         In Hickman’s interview with Villamonte, he confessed to shooting Nunn and stated that
once the trigger of his gun was pulled, it fired three times. Hickman also disclosed that he was a

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convicted felon at the time of the shooting and a certified copy of his 2002 felony conviction in
Iowa was entered into evidence. Viewing the record before us in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational fact finder could have found Hickman guilty of assault in the first degree,
use of a firearm to commit a felony, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. See State
v. Miranda, 313 Neb. 358, 984 N.W.2d 261, (2023).
        Hickman argues that Nunn was a convicted felon who initially refused to cooperate with
law enforcement’s investigation into the shooting, and so his testimony lacked credibility. He
additionally contends that the jury should have discounted his confession to Villamonte, as he
explained at trial that he confessed based on a “misguided belief” that child protective services
would remove Jessica’s children from her home. Brief for appellant at 25.
        While Hickman asks us to review the credibility of his and Nunn’s trial testimony, we
decline to do so. As precedent makes clear, reviewing the credibility of testimony is not the
province of this court. See State v. Miranda, supra (appellate court does not resolve conflicts in
evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, or reweigh evidence; such matters are for finder of fact).
In finding Hickman guilty of all three counts, the jury clearly understood Nunn’s testimony to be
more credible than Hickman’s and we do not disturb this finding of fact on appeal.
        Hickman also argues that the case was based upon circumstantial evidence, as no witnesses,
including Nunn, testified to seeing Hickman shoot Nunn. We are not persuaded by this argument.
A fact proved by circumstantial evidence is nonetheless a proven fact. State v. Olbricht, 294 Neb.
974, 885 N.W.2d 699 (2016). Circumstantial evidence is not inherently less probative than direct
evidence. Id. Although no witnesses testified to seeing Hickman shoot Nunn, based on the
cumulative circumstantial evidence presented at trial, the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s determination that Hickman committed the offenses of assault in the first degree, use of a
firearm to commit a felony, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. This assignment
of error fails.
                              2. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
        Hickman assigns three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. An ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal when the claim alleges deficient performance
with enough particularity for (1) an appellate court to make a determination of whether the claim
can be decided upon the trial record and (2) a district court later reviewing a petition for
postconviction relief to recognize whether the claim was brought before the appellate court. State
v. Miranda, 313 Neb. 358, 984 N.W.2d 261, (2023). When a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is raised in a direct appeal, the appellant is not required to allege prejudice; however, an
appellant must make specific allegations of the conduct that he or she claims constitutes deficient
performance by trial counsel. Id.
        Once raised, an appellate court will determine whether the record on appeal is sufficient to
review the merits of the ineffective performance claims. The record is sufficient if it establishes
either that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, that the appellant will not be able to
establish prejudice as a matter of law, or that trial counsel’s actions could not be justified as a part
of any plausible trial strategy. Id.
        When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his or her counsel on direct appeal, as
Hickman’s is here, the defendant must raise on direct appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective

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performance which is known to the defendant or is apparent from the record; otherwise, the issue
will be procedurally barred in a subsequent postconviction proceeding. Id.
        To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that his or her
counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the
defendant’s defense. State v. Miranda, supra. To show that counsel’s performance was deficient,
the defendant must show counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary
training and skill in criminal law. To show prejudice under the prejudice component of Strickland,
the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for his or her counsel’s deficient
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
        The necessary specificity of allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct
appeal for purposes of avoiding waiver requires, at a minimum, allegations of deficient
performance described with enough particularity for an appellate court to make a determination of
whether the claim can be decided upon the trial record and also for a district court later reviewing
a potential petition for postconviction relief to be able to recognize whether the claim was brought
before the appellate court. State v. Drake, 311 Neb. 219, 971 N.W.2d 759 (2022).
        With these governing principles in mind, we turn now to address Hickman’s three
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.
                               (a) Failure to File Motions in Limine
        Hickman first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file motions in
limine to prevent the introduction of statements made by witnesses to law enforcement officers,
thus denying Hickman’s due process right of confrontation. Hickman argues that both Villamonte
and Jennings “testified in a very indirect way about Rebecca . . . saying something to them that
caused them to seek Mr. Hickman.” Brief for appellant 28-29.
        Neither Villamonte nor Jennings testified to an actual statement made by Rebecca.
Hickman notes that Villamonte testified to asking Rebecca during the initial investigation to clarify
where the shooting took place and where Nunn had parked his car, and that Rebecca did a
reenactment at the scene of what she observed during the shooting. However, Villamonte did not
repeat Rebecca’s observations or statements made to him. Hickman also points to Jennings’
testimony that he contacted Hickman’s father at his residence after speaking with Rebecca.
Jennings likewise did not repeat any specific statement made by Rebecca to him.
        Hickman fails to allege what statements by Rebecca would have been limited or excluded
had a motion in limine been made, and on what grounds. Allegations on direct appeal of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to make a motion under some broad category without more
detail as to the subject of and grounds for the motion, are, like claims for failing to investigate or
call “witnesses,” mere placeholders. State v. Blake, 310 Neb. 769, 969 N.W.2d 399 (2022).
Because Hickman fails to explain with sufficient particularity the subject of the motions in limine
he asserts trial counsel ought to have made or why there would have been grounds for filing the
motions, he has failed to sufficiently allege deficient performance.

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                            (b) Failure to Object to Hearsay Statements
        Next, Hickman assigns that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
statements made by witnesses to law enforcement officers, denying Hickman’s right of
confrontation. Hickman argues that trial counsel did not object to Villamonte’s or Jennings’
testimony which contained hearsay statements by Rebecca. Hickman does not argue any other
basis for an objection to the investigators’ testimony.
        Again, Hickman does not point to any specific statement made by Rebecca to investigators.
Our review of the record reveals that the investigators made references to conversations with
Rebecca, but did not repeat out-of-court statements made by Rebecca during their testimony.
Because the investigators’ testimony did not contain hearsay statements by Rebecca, we cannot
say that trial counsel was deficient for failing to make hearsay objections during trial. See Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 27-801(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022) (defining hearsay as a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted). This claim fails.
                                 (c) Failure to Request Continuance
        Hickman also assigns that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
continuance to secure the attendance of witnesses necessary to his defense. Hickman argues that
Rebecca and Jessica were necessary to his defense and that neither one appeared at trial. Hickman
concedes that both his trial counsel and the State made several attempts to subpoena both
witnesses, without success, and his trial counsel filed a notice of alibi defense prior to trial.
Hickman does not allege how a continuance would have facilitated in serving a subpoena on both
witnesses, particularly when the witnesses had not been located for service. As such, Hickman has
failed to show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and this claim fails.
                      (d) Failure to Raise Impairment in Suppression Hearing
        Lastly, Hickman argues that he was impaired when he gave his statements to law
enforcement, but the issue was not raised by trial counsel at the suppression hearing. Hickman did
not specifically allege this deficient performance in his assignments of errors. An alleged error
must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the
error to be considered by an appellate court. State v. Fernandez, 313 Neb. 745, 986 N.W.2d 53
(2023). Thus, Hickman has failed to raise the claim on direct appeal and we do not address it
further. See State v. Miranda, 313 Neb. 358, 984 N.W.2d 261 (2023).
                                      3. EXCESSIVE SENTENCES
       Hickman assigns that the sentences imposed were excessive and an abuse of discretion.
       Where a sentence imposed within the statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive,
the appellate court must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion in considering
and applying the relevant factors as well as any applicable legal principles in determining the
sentence to be imposed. State v. Stack, 307 Neb. 773, 950 N.W.2d 611 (2020). When imposing a
sentence, a sentencing judge should consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education
and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of
law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense,

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and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime. See State v. Lierman, 305
Neb. 289, 940 N.W.2d 529 (2020). The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective
judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and
attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. Id.
         Hickman was convicted of a Class IC felony (use of a firearm to commit a felony), a Class
ID felony (possession of a firearm by a prohibited person), and a Class II felony (assault in the
first degree); all of which are punishable by a maximum of 50 years’ imprisonment. Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28-105(1) (Cum. Supp. 2022). A Class IC felony has a mandatory minimum five years’
imprisonment and a Class ID has a mandatory minimum three years’ imprisonment. Id. Using a
firearm to commit a felony is a separate and distinct offense from the felony being committed, and
sentences imposed for using a firearm to commit a felony shall be consecutive to any other
sentence imposed. See § 28-1205(3). Hickman was sentenced to consecutive terms of 14 to 20
years’ imprisonment on the Class IC felony charge, 12 to 22 years’ imprisonment on the Class ID
felony charge, and 8 to 16 years’ imprisonment on the Class II felony charge. Thus, his sentences
were within the statutory range.
         Hickman argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider all of the relevant statutory
factors; in particular, his “history, character and condition.” Brief for appellant at 31. Hickman
points to his mental health issues, including his PTSD diagnosis and efforts to manage his panic
attacks, and his need for medication and counseling. He also notes that he has obtained his GED
and a framing certificate, and has owned a detailing business for the last several years.
         The presentence investigation report (PSI) is over 500 pages long and shows that
Hickman’s criminal history includes several convictions in Iowa; including for possession with
intent, criminal mischief in the fourth degree (three charges), domestic abuse assault without intent
causing injury (two charges), and a controlled substance violation. In Nebraska, Hickman was
convicted in 2014 of injure or destroy property of another, for which he was fined $250; in 2016
of having no proof of ownership or of financial responsibility, and driving on a suspended license,
for which he was fined a total of $375; and in 2020 of disturbing the peace by fighting and injure
or destroy property of another, for which he was sentenced to 30 days’ house arrest and 30 days’
imprisonment. On the Level of Service/Case Management Inventory assessment, Hickman scored
in the very high risk to reoffend overall.
         At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge indicated that he had read and reviewed the
lengthy PSI and considered Hickman’s assertion of innocence. The judge indicated that he had
considered all of the relevant factors, including Hickman’s age, mentality, background, history,
family situation, education, and record of any mental health or addiction issues. Due to the
“difficult” nature of the case, the judge found imprisonment to be necessary.
         In our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in the
sentences imposed.
                                         VI. CONCLUSION
       For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Hickman’s convictions and sentences.
                                                                                    AFFIRMED.

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