Court Opinion

ID: 9750352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:52:51.482726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:50.074596
License: Public Domain

COLLINS, Justice,
dissenting.
In my view, Maine’s uninsured motorist statute, 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902(1) (1990), allows an insured to recover against underin-sured motorist coverage where the driver responsible for the accident has adequate “paper” liability coverage, but the amount actually available for recovery is depleted by multiple claims. Because I find no support anywhere in the statute or its legislative history for the contrary interpretation applied by the Court, I respectfully dissent.
“ ‘[Ujnderinsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle for which coverage is provided, but in amounts ... less than the limits of the injured party’s uninsured vehicle coverage.” 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902(1) (1990). Is the tortfeasor’s liability “coverage” simply the coverage limit on the face of the policy, as the Court concludes, or the coverage actually provided to the injured party? The question is one of first impression in Maine.3
The Superior Court read section 2902(1) to require a direct comparison between the coverage limits under the negligent party’s liability policy and the total of the policy limits of the underinsured-motorist coverage available to the injured party. In reading “coverage” to mean “limits of coverage,” the Superior Court stated that it was giving the statutory definition its “common and ordinary meaning,” citing Hewett v. Kennebec Valley Mental Health Ass’n, 557 A.2d 622, 624 (Me.1989). Unlike the Court, I find this analysis unconvincing.
The Superior Court used various terms synonymously with “coverage” — the amount “available under” the policy, the “proceeds” of the policy, the “limit.” We have already recognized that section 2902(1) is ambiguous with regard to the meaning of the terms “limits” and “coverage.” Connolly v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 932, 934 (Me.1983). The definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” compares “coverage ... provided” with “limits of ... coverage.” 24-A M.R.S.A. 2902(1) (1990) (emphasis added). Contrary to the Court’s opinion, the plain meaning rule does not definitively settle this issue.4 “Coverage” is an undefined term in the statute, and the Court’s resort to an asserted “plain meaning” fails, in my view, to meet our responsibility to construe it consistently with the purpose of the Legislature.
“Terms in a statute must be construed in light of the subject matter, purpose of the statute, and the consequences of a particular interpretation.” Church v. McKee, 387 A.2d 754, 756 (Me.1978). We strive to give effect to the legislative purpose, even where the “common and ordinary meaning” of the words of the statute obscures that purpose. See State v. Niles, 585 A.2d 181, 182 (Me.1990).
We have previously expressed our understanding of the legislative policies underlying this statute. In Wescott v. Allstate Ins., 397 A.2d 156 (Me.1979), we held that *1279the statute preempted certain contract provisions that tended to diminish coverage. We relied on the Legislature’s “strong public policy in favor of the just compensation of accident victims,” id. at 167, and stated, “The legislative intent is to benefit all insured motorists by throwing the burden of compensating for injuries which would otherwise go without redress from the individual victim to the insurance industry for a premium.” Id. at 166. I infer from our opinion in Wescott that this statute is remedial legislation that should be construed liberally to accomplish its intent, which is “to protect an insured to the extent of his actual loss.” See id. at 167, 170.
We again applied our understanding of the statute as remedial legislation in Lanzo v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 524 A.2d 47 (Me.1987). In Lanzo, the question was whether the “hit-and-run” language in the statute required physical contact, an issue that (like the multiple-claims issue in the present case) has divided other jurisdictions. Id. at 49. Noting that “the legislative focus in enacting section 2902(1) was to provide recovery for injuries caused by financially irresponsible drivers,” we construed the statute so as to avoid the “anomalous result that victims of an uninsured or underinsured driver could recover in the absence of contact but the victim of an unknown driver could not.” Id. at 50. See also Young v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 535 A.2d 417, 419-20 (Me.1987) (refusing to exclude claims due to damage caused by government vehicles from uninsured-motorist coverage). Thus, we have assumed that section 2902(1) has a broad remedial purpose, and have declined to construe it in ways that would lead to anomalies in conflict with that broad purpose.
The result of the Court’s decision is such an anomaly. Under the Court’s construction of the statute, Mullen would have been nine times better off if Boody had been completely uninsured, because she then could have recovered the full $45,000 in uninsured-motorist coverage.5 Because I see no reason to presume that the Legislature intended this anomalous result, which is not required by the statutory language, I would decline to impose it.
The Court suggests that facilitating early determination whether underinsured motorist coverage applies is a “legitimate legislative objective.” That argument might carry more weight if the Legislature had ever given the slightest indication that such was its object. However, neither the statute nor the legislative history even hints at such a legislative purpose.
Even if the Legislature had favored early determination whether underinsured motorist coverage applies, however, the Court does not explain why a simple limits-to-limits comparison better accomplishes that purpose than does awaiting the final outcome of the litigation concerning the underlying incident. Because the injured party must establish a legal entitlement to recovery to be eligible for underinsured-motorist coverage, a simple limits-to-limits test for underinsured-motorist coverage produces no earlier determination of eligibility. Jurisdictions that look to the actual amount available for recovery must, of course, routinely determine the actual recovery; this process does not appear to cause undue delay in those states. See, e.g., Findling & Germano, Underinsurance in Indiana: An Illusion of Coverage?, 21 Ind.L.Rev. 205, 214 (1988).
Not finding the Court’s construction of the statute to be one required by the common and ordinary meaning of the words, and considering it both inconsistent with *1280the intent of the Legislature and unnecessary to the presumed public policy goal of quick settlement, I would vacate the court’s grant of summary judgment.

. We were asked to decide this issue in Bazinet v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 513 A.2d 279 (Me.1986), but declined to do so, finding the question premature on the procedural posture of that case. See id., 513 A.2d at 282.
This question has been a prolific source of litigation nationwide. See generally Stott, Underinsured Motorist Coverage: Working Out the Bugs, 36 Fed’n Ins. Corp. Couns. J. 121 (1986), reprinted in 1 Ins.L.Anthol. 289 (1987); Anno., Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage: Recoverability, Under Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Coverage, of Deficiencies in Compensation Afforded Injured Party by Tort-feasor’s Liability Coverage, 24 A.L.R.4th 13 (1983); 2 A. Widiss, Uninsured and Underin-sured Motorist Coverage § 32.1 at 11-12 (1985 & Supp.1990).

. Moreover, even if the term "coverage” did signify a limits-to-limits comparison, the statute would not necessarily dictate the result reached by the Court. Courts even in states with statutes explicitly requiring a limits-to-limits comparison have held that underinsured-motorist coverage was still applicable, where the available recovery was reduced due to multiple claims. See, e.g., Phillips, Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Mississippi, 3 Miss.Coll.L.Rev. 65, 82-83 (1982).

. Most courts that have considered the multiple-claims issue have taken note of this anomaly. See, e.g., Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 106 Ariz. 274, 475 P.2d 258, 262-63 (1970); Williams v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 382 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.1980); Gorton v. Reliance Ins. Co., 77 NJ. 563, 391 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1978); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 332 So.2d 623, 625 (Fla.App.1976); Knudson v. Grange Mut. Companies, 31 Ohio App.3d 20, 507 N.E.2d 1155, 1157-58 (1986). Other states are split, however, on whether to allow the anomaly to stand. Compare Gardner v. American Ins. Co., 95 Nev. 271, 593 P.2d 465 (1979) (statute creates anomaly, but solution is for legislature) with Palisbo v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty Co., 57 Hawaii 10, 547 P.2d 1350 (1976) (refusing to allow anomaly; purpose, rather than literal reading, of statute controls).