Court Opinion

ID: 9906378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 21:02:24.486717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:20.530077
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/1/23 P. v. Partida CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B318164

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. SA097792)
         v.

BRYAN PARTIDA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathryn A. Solorzano, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
      Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Susan S.
Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       I. INTRODUCTION

      A jury convicted defendant Bryan Partida of first degree
murder and first degree robbery and found certain sentencing
allegations to be true. On appeal from his conviction, defendant
contends that: the trial court prejudicially erred by failing, sua
sponte, to instruct the jury on theft as a lesser included offense of
robbery; and counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
request such an instruction. We will modify the abstract of
judgment to correct a clerical error regarding custody credits. As
so modified, we affirm.

                       II. BACKGROUND

A.    Procedural History

      The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an
information charging defendant with the following: murder with
robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances
allegations (Pen. Code1, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17));
first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling house (§ 459); and
first degree robbery in an inhabited dwelling house (§§ 211,
212.5, subd (a)). The information also alleged that defendant
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in connection
with all three crimes. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
       The jury found defendant guilty of murder and first degree
robbery and found that the murder was in the first degree
because it was willful, deliberate, and premeditated and under a
felony murder theory. It also found the deadly and dangerous

1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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weapon allegations and the robbery-murder special circumstance
allegations to be true. It could not, however, reach a verdict on
the burglary count or the burglary-murder special circumstance
allegation. The court therefore declared a mistrial as to the count
and allegation and, on the prosecution’s motion, dismissed them.
       The trial court sentenced defendant for the murder count to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus one year
for the deadly and dangerous weapon enhancement. For the
robbery count, the court sentenced defendant to the upper term of
six years, which was stayed pursuant to section 654.

B.    Trial2

      1.    Prosecution’s Case

      The victim Jeffrey Vezich lived in a two-bedroom
condominium in Playa Del Rey. Vezich’s condominium had three
surveillance cameras installed: one in the living room, one facing
the hallway entrance, and one in the spare bedroom. A fourth
camera faced the exterior patio.
      On April 3, 2018, a police officer discovered Vezich’s body
inside the condominium. The coroner concluded that Vezich died
from blunt force trauma to the head.
      At trial, the prosecution played a video taken from the
surveillance cameras in Vezich’s condominium. The video, dated
March 25, 2018, depicted the following: At around 3:00 p.m.,
defendant entered Vezich’s home. At 3:01 p.m., defendant put a

2     Because defendant does not dispute his conviction for first
degree murder, we will only recite the portions of the record
relevant to this appeal, except as necessary for context.

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small pill on a speaker and Vezich handed him a hammer.
Defendant used the hammer to crush the pill and then switched
to using a smaller item to cut the pill.
       At 3:15 p.m., Vezich handed defendant a drinking glass and
a bottle of beer. At 3:20 p.m., defendant ingested the crushed
pill.
       At around 3:38 p.m., Vezich went towards his office area,
and defendant took the hammer off the speaker and placed it on
a nearby crate. Defendant then paced back and forth and moved
the hammer to the kitchen counter. Vezich walked into his
bedroom and when he came out, he held a bag that he began to
look through. At 3:50 p.m., defendant grabbed the hammer and
used it to strike Vezich at least 75 times.
       At 3:51 p.m., defendant, while still holding the hammer in
his right hand, took a camera from the office area and placed the
strap around his neck. Defendant then struck Vezich in the head
with a dumbbell four times. The video ended at 3:55 p.m.
       A search of defendant’s cell phone records demonstrated
that defendant had attempted to sell Vezich’s items on the
internet. Defendant’s cell phone also contained photographs of
Vezich’s items, dated March 25, 2018, the date of the murder.

     2.    Defense Case

      Defendant testified in his own defense. On March 24, 2018,
defendant met Vezich at Vezich’s home and sold him cocaine and
Xanax. The following day, Vezich contacted defendant and asked
him for more drugs. Defendant arrived at Vezich’s home and
began using cocaine and Xanax with him. Defendant had not
previously ingested the combination of Xanax and cocaine.

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Vezich refused to pay defendant for the drugs at which point
defendant became paranoid and anxious. Defendant believed his
only escape was to kill Vezich. After his initial assault with the
hammer, defendant used a dumbbell to strike Vezich four more
times “[t]o make sure he was dead.”
      Defendant did not decide to take Vezich’s property until
after Vezich was dead.

                       III. DISCUSSION

A.    Lesser Included Offense Instruction

     Defendant contends that the trial court prejudicially erred
when it failed to instruct the jury that theft was a lesser included
offense of robbery.3 According to defendant, there was

3      While the court instructed the jury on the elements of theft,
it did so only in the context of explaining the elements of
burglary. Specifically, the court instructed: “The defendant is
charged in Count 2 with burglary in violation of . . . section 459.
[¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant entered a structure; [¶]
AND [¶] 2. When he entered the structure, he intended to
commit theft. [¶] To decide whether the defendant intended to
commit theft, please refer to the separate instructions that I will
give you on that crime—see CALCRIM 1800. [¶] A burglary was
committed if the defendant entered with the intent to commit
theft. The defendant does not need to have actually committed
theft as long as he entered with the intent to do so. The People
do not have to prove that the defendant actually committed
theft.” (CALCRIM No. 1700.)
       “To prove the crime of larceny by theft, the People must
prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant took possession of property

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substantial evidence that he did not form the intent to steal
Vezich’s property until after Vezich’s death and, thus, a
reasonable probability that a properly instructed jury would have
convicted him of theft, not robbery. Defendant therefore seeks to
vacate his conviction for robbery and the robbery-murder special
circumstances allegation.
       “‘A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have
his or her jury determine “every material issue presented by the
evidence” and this includes the right, where appropriate, to have
the jury instructed on lesser included offenses.’ (People v. Abilez
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 513 (Abilez).) ‘Theft is a lesser included
offense of robbery.’ (Id. at p. 514.) Accordingly, even in the
absence of a request, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery if the
evidence has raised ‘a question as to whether all of the elements
of robbery were present and if there was evidence that would
have justified a conviction of the lesser offense.’ (Ibid.)” (People
v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 51.) “We review de novo a trial
court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense [citation],
and in doing so we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the defendant.” (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th
1122, 1137 (Millbrook).)
       Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the
possession of another from his or her person or immediate

owned by someone else; [¶] 2. The defendant took the property
without the owner’s consent; [¶] 3. When the defendant took the
property he intended to deprive the owner of it permanently; [¶]
AND [¶] 4. The defendant moved the property, even a small
distance, and kept it for any period of time, however brief. [¶]
For theft, the property taken can be of any value, no matter how
slight.” (CALCRIM No. 1800.)

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presence, and against his or her will, accomplished by means of
force or fear. (§ 211.) “‘[I]t is settled that a victim of robbery may
be unconscious or even dead when the property is taken, so long
as the defendant used force against the victim to take the
property.’” (Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 507.) Theft is the
criminal taking of property without force or fear. (People v.
Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 254; see § 484, subd. (a).) Thus, if
the victim is already dead when the intent to steal is formed,
there can be no use of force on the victim, and no robbery. (See
People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 216 [“‘[i]f [the] intent to
steal arose after the victim was assaulted, the robbery element of
stealing by force or fear is absent’ [citation], and the offense is
theft [citation]”]; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 499
[“one cannot rob a person who is already dead” but “one can
certainly rob a living person by killing that person and then
taking his or her property”].)
       We agree with defendant that on this record, the trial court
erred when it failed to instruct the jury that theft was a lesser
included offense of robbery.4 (People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d

4      Because the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on
theft, we need not address defendant’s argument that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to request the
instruction. (Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136, fn. 7.)
Even if we were to consider the merits of defendant’s argument,
we would reject it because, as we will explain below, it is not
reasonably probable that defendant was prejudiced by any
deficient performance by counsel. (See People v. Thompson
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 69, 90 [“Regarding prejudice, a ‘defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability’—meaning ‘a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’—

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668, 690 (Turner).) Such an error, however, “is harmless if
defendant[] cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
jury would have—without the error—reached a different result.”
(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 191 (Gonzalez).) “The
prejudice arising from the failure to give such instructions is the
risk that the jury ignored its instructions and convicted the
defendant of an offense . . . for which the prosecution did not
carry its burden. The jury might have been convinced that the
defendant was guilty of some lesser included offense and, as a
result, tempted to convict of a greater offense rather than acquit.”
(Id. at p. 200.) Accordingly, we consider whether defendant was
prejudiced by the court’s error.
       Our Supreme Court’s opinion in Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d
668 is instructive. In Turner, the defendant sought to reverse a
first degree murder conviction (under a felony murder theory), a
robbery conviction, and a true finding on a robbery-murder
special circumstance allegation, on the grounds that the trial
court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct on the lesser
included offense of theft. (Id. at p. 690.) The defendant argued
there was sufficient evidence that he had formed the intent to
steal after killing the victim. (Ibid.)
       Our Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred.
(Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 690.) It found, however, that
defendant was not prejudiced by the error because “the jury was
given special instructions [highlighting] the issue of ‘after-formed
intent.’ After reciting the elements of robbery, including the
element that the ‘taking be accomplished’ by force or fear, the
court admonished: ‘An act of force accompanied by a theft does

‘that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different’”].)

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not constitute robbery unless the act of force was motivated by an
intent to steal. If the intent to steal does not arise until after force
has been used against the victim, no robbery has taken place. [¶]
If an individual kills for reasons unrelated to theft, for example,
because of anger, fear, or revenge, and then decides to take
advantage of the situation by stealing some object from the
person of the decedent, the taking will constitute at most a theft
and not a robbery.’ (Italics added.) Thus, the jury was told
explicitly that it could not find a robbery if it accepted
defendant’s claim of ‘after-formed intent.’
       “Next, the felony-murder instructions advised that the
killing must have occurred ‘as a result of the commission of or
attempt to commit the crime of robbery, and where there was in
the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit such
crime . . . . The specific intent to commit robbery and the
commission or attempt to commit such crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Italics added.)
       “Finally, in defining the special circumstance of robbery-
murder, the court told the jury it must find, among other things,
‘that the murder was committed in order to carry out or advance
the commission of the crime of robbery or to facilitate the escape
therefrom or to avoid detection. [¶] In other words, the special
circumstance . . . is not established if the attempted robbery was
merely incidental to the commission of the murder.’ (Italics
added.)” (Id. at p. 691.)
       Our Supreme Court concluded: “These instructions made
clear beyond doubt that defendant was not guilty of robbery, first
degree felony murder, or the sole special circumstance charged, if
his intent to steal arose only after the fatal assault. In finding for
the prosecution on all robbery issues, the jury thus necessarily

                                   9
concluded that he decided to steal before assaulting [the victim].”
(Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 691.)
       Here, the trial court instructed the jury that it needed to
resolve the question of when defendant formed the intent to steal
in deciding whether defendant was guilty of robbery, first degree
murder under a felony murder theory, and the robbery-murder
special circumstance allegation. Regarding the robbery count,
the court instructed the jury that “[t]he defendant’s intent to take
the property must have been formed before or during the time he
used force or fear. If the defendant did not form this required
intent until after using the force or fear, then he did not commit
robbery.” (Italics added; CALCRIM No. 1600.) And, as to the
robbery-murder special circumstance allegation, the court
instructed the jury that “[t]he defendant must have intended to
commit the felon[y] of . . . robbery before or at the time of the act
causing death.” (Italics added; CALCRIM No. 730.) Finally, the
court instructed the jury that in order for defendant to be guilty
of first degree murder under a felony murder theory, “[t]he
defendant must have intended to commit the felon[y] of . . .
robbery before or at the time that he caused the death.” (Italics
added; CALCRIM No. 540A.)
       Based on the instructions that the trial court did deliver,
the jury could not have convicted defendant of robbery, first
degree murder under a felony murder theory, and the robbery-
murder special circumstance, unless it concluded that defendant
formed the intent to steal before or while he killed Vezich.5 (See

5     Indeed, that the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
burglary count and the burglary-murder special circumstance
allegation demonstrates that the jury was cognizant of the
importance of the timing of defendant’s intent to steal. The court

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Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 691; see also People v. Chhoun
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30 [jury presumed to follow instructions];
Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 191 [“[a] jury’s other findings . . .
may render the error harmless by resolving factual issues . . .
against the defendant”].) Accordingly, the court’s error in failing
to instruct the jury on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery
was harmless.

B.    Abstract of Judgment

      At sentencing, the trial court awarded defendant 1,385
days of actual time custody credits. (See §§ 2900.5 [actual time
credit], 2933.2 [person convicted of murder does not accrue any
worktime credit].) The abstract of judgment, however, does not
include any custody credits. We therefore will order the abstract
of judgment modified to correct this clerical error. (People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)

instructed the jury that for burglary, the prosecution must prove,
among other things, that “[w]hen [defendant] entered the
structure, he intended to commit theft.” (CALCRIM No. 1700.)
Thus, while some jurors must have concluded that defendant did
not intend to steal when he first entered Vezich’s home, all jurors
necessarily found that he later formed such an intent before or
during the murder.

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                      IV. DISPOSITION

      The matter is remanded with directions for the trial court
to modify the abstract of judgment to reflect that defendant
received 1,385 days of actual custody credit. The clerk of the
superior court is directed to send an amended abstract of
judgment reflecting this modification to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. As so modified, the judgment of
conviction is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

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