Court Opinion

ID: 9481690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:28:41.827735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:30.917760
License: Public Domain

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I do not believe that the obstruction of justice guideline encompasses actions such as flight or resisting arrest, regardless of the danger posed by such actions, and therefore I would remand for resentencing with instructions to exclude the two-level increase in John’s offense level.
I agree with the majority that the proper starting point in our analysis is the language of the guideline itself. I am not willing, however, to ascribe to this language the breadth of meaning that the *649majority so readily finds there. The majority correctly notes that the non-inclusion of resistance to arrest in the application notes to § 3C1.1 is not dispositive. What is included, however, is persuasive evidence that the drafters of § 3C1.1 contemplated conduct of a wholly different character. Of the six enumerated examples of included conduct, two involve the concealment of evidence and four the misleading of authorities via perjury, subornation, or intimidation of jurors — in sum, conduct intended to adversely affect the truth-seeking functions of the criminal justice system. U.S. S.G. § 3C1.1, comment, (n. 1) (Nov. 1989). Resisting arrest, regardless of the intensity of resistance or potential for injury, is qualitatively dissimilar.
Commentary to the version of § 3C1.1 under which John was sentenced states that the section was intended to cover “conduct calculated to mislead or deceive authorities or those involved in a judicial proceeding, or otherwise to wilfully interfere with the disposition of criminal charges.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (Nov. 1989). This explanation reinforces my belief that § 3C1.1 is limited to conduct that obstructs only the truth-seeking functions of the criminal justice system, and the majority implicitly concedes as much when it notes that “this explanatory statement cannot trump the plain language of the provision which it is intended to illuminate.” Op. at 647, n. 3. But the language of the guideline itself does not “plainly” include the conduct to which it was applied in this case. The majority states elsewhere, albeit in the context of a different argument, that “[i]t is, of course, an elementary canon of statutory construction that the specific provision controls the general.” Op. at 647. Again I concur in the canon of statutory construction selected by the majority, yet I come to the opposite conclusion when this canon is applied to the issue before us. The “specific provisions” are the enumerated examples in the Application Notes, and the “general” language is “willfully impeded or obstructed ... the administration of justice.... ” The general language is indeed trumped by the specific language of the examples given.
Further evidence of the drafters’ intent can be found in the amendments. Effective November 1, 1990, § 3C1.1 explicitly excludes “avoiding or fleeing from ar-rest_” U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 347. The amendment also added a new § 3C1.2 to cover situations in which a “defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer....” The creation of a new section, rather than merely amending the Application Notes to § 3C1.1 to add reckless endangerment to the list of enumerated examples of covered conduct, indicates to me that the drafters did not consider endangerment of others as fitting into the concept of “obstruction of the administration of justice.”
Effective November 1, 1989, § 3A1.3 was amended to provide for a three-level increase for a defendant who, “... during the course of an offense or immediate flight therefrom, ... assaulted [a law enforcement] officer in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 247. This appears to clearly cover the conduct for which John received a two-level increase under § 3C1.1. Consistent with the majority’s conclusion that § 3C1.1 included an assault component, it would follow that the further refinement of § 3A1.3 would trigger a concomitant refinement of § 3C1.1 to exclude such conduct. Yet the only 1989 amendment to § 3C1.1 corrected what amounted to a typographical error. U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 251. I find this amendatory process to be indicative of the drafters’ separation of “obstructive” conduct into two basic groups: § 3C1.1 and Chapter 2, Part J, dealing with the truth-seeking aspect of the criminal justice system, and § 3A1.2 and §§ 2A2.2-2A2.4, applicable to conduct involving physical endangerment.
In the Application Notes to the pertinent version of § 3C1.1 (Nov. 1989), the drafters were careful to cross-reference those provisions in Chapter 2 that pertained to “offenses involving the administration of justice,” in order to insure that the § 3C1.1 adjustment would not be applied to a defen*650dant whose offense of conviction involved the same type of conduct covered by the adjustment provision. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 comment., (n. 4) (Nov. 1989). The absence of any reference to one of the assault-related provisions in Chapter 2A is a further indication that § 3C1.1 was simply not intended to cover resistance to arrest.
Finally, I am unable to accept the reasoning that the degree of danger presented by a resisting defendant is determinative of whether he had obstructed the administration of justice. The Tellez, Valencia, and Franco-Torres opinions cited by the majority contain neither analysis nor citation to authority regarding the issue of the applicability of § 3C1.1 to flight that endangers others. The White opinion contains the most extensive treatment of the issue, but at its core says little more than “common sense” supports the use of the § 3C1.1 adjustment when lives are endangered. My common sense tells me that defendants who endanger others while resisting arrest and fleeing from police deserve an enhancement of their sentence; try as I might, however, I am unable to accept an interpretation of § 3C1.1 that would accomplish this end.
I realize that I am swimming against the tide here. Nevertheless, I believe that the majority’s view that “extraordinary interference with or endangerment of law enforcement officials or bystanders” can come within § 3Cl.l’s ambit stretches the concept of obstruction of proceedings to almost meaningless proportions. In a sense, everything done by a criminal to avoid detection or evade apprehension is a willful attempt to obstruct or impede “the administration of justice.” The words of the guideline itself, the similar quality of the enumerated examples, the 1989 amendment of § 3A1.2 (to include assaultive con-duet against a police officer) without a contemporaneous change in § 3C1.1, the cross-references in the Application Notes to the provisions in Chapter 2-Part J, and the 1990 amendment specifically excluding flight from § 3C1.1, all serve to persuade me that resisting arrest was simply not intended by the drafters as a form of obstruction of the administration of justice. Accordingly, I would vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing without the inclusion of the two-level increase in the offense level under § 3C1.1.6

. It is still an open question in this circuit whether, on resentencing, the district court should apply the guideline in effect at the time of the original sentence or the amended guideline in effect on the date of resentencing. United States v. Rogers, 897 F.2d 134, 138 n. 9 (4th Cir.1990). Under the 1990 amendments, § 3C1.1 is clearly not applicable, and I believe it is at least arguable that § 3C1.2 does not reach resistance to arrest that does not blossom into actual flight. The majority has limited the inquiry on remand to the factual issue of the degree of danger presented by John’s resistance; the legal inquiry into what version of Chapter 3 should apply has been foreclosed. Op. at 647-48. I believe the latter issue is still an open one, and if John would fare better under the 1990 amendments, it is also an open question whether he should get the benefit of the more lenient provisions.