Court Opinion

ID: 9955800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 15:04:52.212508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:21.943913
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 126,344

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                           STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellant,

                                                    v.

                                     BRANDON JOSEPH PERRY,
                                           Appellee.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Johnson District Court; ERICA K. SCHOENIG, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed March 29, 2024. Reversed and remanded with directions.

        Jacob M. Gontesky, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Kris W.
Kobach, attorney general, for appellant.

        John A. DeMarco, of Fairbanks DeMarco, LLC, of Overland Park, for appellee.

Before SCHROEDER, P.J., ISHERWOOD and PICKERING, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: The State charged Brandon Joseph Perry with multiple crimes
based on his alleged actions with the victim, K.E. Prior to trial, and because of K.E.'s
refusal to appear at any of the proceedings, the State moved to admit the testimony of the
forensic nurse who examined K.E. when she went to the emergency room. At a hearing
requested by the State, the district court found all the forensic nurse's testimony was
inadmissible as violative of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The State filed this interlocutory appeal, challenging the

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district court's denial of the nurse's testimony as inadmissible hearsay. For the reasons
explained below, we reverse and remand with directions.

                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On August 9, 2021, the State charged Perry with one count of aggravated burglary,
one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated domestic battery in
relation to alleged events between Perry and K.E., his ex-girlfriend, several days before.
According to an affidavit written by a law enforcement officer, K.E. alleged Perry broke
into her home and attacked her while she was sleeping. The specific facts of the event are
not required for us to resolve the issue presented in the State's interlocutory appeal.

       Sometime shortly after the event, K.E. went to the hospital. Jamie Parks, a forensic
nurse who specializes in treating patients who are victims of assault, was called into the
emergency room to evaluate K.E. According to Parks, her duties in forensic nursing
included speaking to the patient, offering evidentiary collection, taking photographs, and
putting the patient in contact with the appropriate resources, such as law enforcement.
Parks later testified K.E. consented to a forensic examination and photographs during her
emergency room visit. Those photos were admitted as evidence at the preliminary
hearing.

       As the case has progressed, K.E. has been an uncooperative witness for the State
despite being ordered to appear. K.E. did not appear for the initial preliminary hearing.
After she failed to appear, the district court issued an order to appear and show cause.
K.E. appeared in response to this order on May 18, 2022. And while she was there, the
district court ordered her to appear at the rescheduled preliminary hearing the next month.
K.E. did not appear.

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        When K.E. failed to appear at the rescheduled preliminary hearing, the State relied
on the testimony of the responding officer and Parks, including the fact Parks took
samples for DNA analysis. However, Perry's defense counsel objected to key parts of
Parks' testimony during the preliminary hearing as hearsay based on the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment and K.E.'s absence from the proceeding. In response, the
State argued her testimony was admissible under the medical treatment exception to the
hearsay rule. The district court agreed and found the statements were admissible under
the medical treatment exception, among others.

        Defense counsel renewed his objection to the hearsay statements from Parks at the
end of the preliminary hearing. Nevertheless, the district court found the State presented
sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding to bind Perry over on all counts
for trial.

        After the preliminary hearing, the State filed a "Motion to Determine
Admissibility of Witness's Statements to Law Enforcement and Medical Staff." In its
motion, the State posed a policy argument and contended the Confrontation Clause is not
implicated by Parks' testimony about K.E.'s statements because K.E.'s statements were
nontestimonial in nature. In response, Perry "renew[ed] the Motion to Dismiss the
Preliminary Hearing," which is not in the record on appeal.

        On April 13, 2023, the district court held a hearing on the State's motion. Parks
again testified and provided some background on her experience and her process for
conducting a forensic examination. In addition, Parks testified that all the questions she
poses during examinations have a medical purpose and admitted that a patient may seek a
forensic examination without alerting law enforcement.

        The State renewed its argument, claiming the statements made to medical
professionals for the sole purpose of medical treatment, or a dual purpose which includes

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treatment, may be admissible because the statements may not be testimonial. In response,
defense counsel agued the issue should be addressed before trial and alternatively argued
counsel had a right to confront K.E. about her statements to Parks. Interestingly, defense
counsel also alleged K.E. sent an email to the prosecutor where she "completely
recanted" her story.

       The district court found Parks' testimony regarding the statements K.E. made to
her during the forensic examination was inadmissible because the testimony implicated
the Confrontation Clause. After noting the law permits statements by nurses for a
nontestimonial purpose, the district court refused to extend the hearsay exception to
admit Parks' testimony, finding, "I can't make that stretch. I just can't under the Sixth
Amendment." The district court reasoned it refused to apply the hearsay exception
because the State's only proffered evidence came from Parks' hearsay testimony. The
district court found the State offered "no other evidence other than a victim's statements
to a forensic nurse for everything in the case," and the district court refused to find any
"exemption to admissibility here in light of Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124
S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004),] and [its] progeny because this is the only
evidence."

                                          ANALYSIS

       This timely interlocutory appeal by the State presents one issue for us to resolve:
Did the district court err when it found K.E.'s statements to the forensic nurse were
inadmissible as violative of the Confrontation Clause? After establishing its statutory
authority for this interlocutory appeal, the State asserts the district court erred because
K.E.'s statements to Parks were nontestimonial in nature, an exception to the hearsay rule,
and did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. In response, Perry argues the district
court did not err because K.E.'s statements to Parks were testimonial and admission of

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those statements, without the opportunity to cross-examine K.E., would violate his right
to confront her under the Confrontation Clause.

The State preserved this issue for interlocutory appeal.

       "In Kansas, the right to appeal is entirely statutory." State v. McCroy, 313 Kan.
531, 534, 486 P.3d 618 (2021). Here, the State has the statutory authority to bring this
appeal under K.S.A. 22-3603:

               "When a judge of the district court, prior to the commencement of trial of a
       criminal action, makes an order . . . suppressing evidence . . . an appeal may be taken by
       the prosecution from such order if notice of appeal is filed within 14 days after entry of
       the order."

       Our Supreme Court has interpreted K.S.A. 22-3603 to find the prosecution can
also appeal from "rulings of a trial court which exclude [S]tate's evidence so as to
substantially impair the [S]tate's ability to prosecute the case." State v. Newman, 235 Kan.
29, 34, 680 P.2d 257 (1984); see also State v. Mitchell, 285 Kan. 1070, 1080, 179 P.3d
394 (2008) (Court found no jurisdiction over State's appeal, holding: "If the exclusion of
evidence does not substantially impair the State's ability to prosecute the case, the State
cannot raise the issue as an interlocutory appeal.").

       Perry does not challenge whether the State can bring this interlocutory appeal
under K.S.A. 22-3603, and we agree we have jurisdiction to resolve this appeal as the
State's ability to prosecute the case is impaired by the district court's order finding all of
Parks' testimony inadmissible at trial. The State's motion to determine admissibility
broadly contends all the statements K.E. made to Parks during the forensic examination
are admissible. The motion concluded: "All of [K.E.'s] statements were for medical

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treatment and therefore fall under the hearsay exception for Statements for Medical
Treatment."

       The State acknowledges it is limited to presenting most of the evidence through
Parks because K.E. has refused to appear at any proceeding. The reporting officer who
testified at the preliminary hearing could not testify to any of the information K.E.
provided him because K.E. did not appear. His testimony was limited to providing the
reason for the dispatch, the location of K.E.'s home, and the other people in the home
when he arrived. Thus, absent Parks' testimony, the State lacks any evidence identifying
Perry or supporting its charges against Perry. And because the absence of Parks'
testimony "may be determinative of the case," we have jurisdiction to review the State's
appeal under K.S.A. 22-3603. See Newman, 235 Kan. at 35.

Not all of the statements made by K.E. to the treating nurse were testimonial.

       When the trial court denies the admission of evidence under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, we exercise de novo review. State v. Miller, 293 Kan.
535, 555, 264 P.3d 461 (2011); State v. Bennington, 293 Kan. 503, 507, 264 P.3d 440
(2011). Similarly, we apply de novo review when an appellant challenges "the adequacy
of the legal basis on which the district court decided to admit or exclude evidence." State
v. Barney, 39 Kan. App. 2d 540, 545, 185 P.3d 277 (2007).

       The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides in all prosecutions
the accused "shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court found the Confrontation
Clause prohibits "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at
trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination." Kansas also provides an extra right under the Kansas

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Constitution Bill of Rights, § 10—the defendant has the right "'to meet the witness face to
face.'" Bennington, 293 Kan. at 507-08. But if the statements are nontestimonial, the
guarantees of the Confrontation Clause are not implicated. 541 U.S. at 68; see Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. 305, 309, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009);
State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1055, 221 P.3d 525 (2009); State v. Davis, 283 Kan.
569, 574-75, 158 P.3d 317 (2006). As a result, "[p]ost-Crawford, the threshold question
in any Confrontation Clause analysis is whether the hearsay statement at issue is
testimonial in nature." Appleby, 289 Kan. at 1055.

       The Crawford Court did not define testimonial statements, but it did define types
of statements that may qualify as testimonial:

               "Various formulations of this core class of 'testimonial' statements exist: 'ex parte
       in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits,
       custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine,
       or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
       prosecutorially,' . . . 'extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial
       materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,' 'statements that
       were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
       believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.' [Citations omitted.]"
       541 U.S. at 51-52.

       Later, our Supreme Court applied the holdings in Crawford and its progeny to
establish four factors to be considered when determining whether the hearsay statements
are testimonial:

               "(1) Would an objective witness reasonably believe such a statement would later
       be available for use in the prosecution of a crime?
               "(2) Was the statement made to a law enforcement officer or to another
       government official?

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               "(3) Was proof of facts potentially relevant to a later prosecution of a crime the
       primary purpose of the interview when viewed from an objective totality of the
       circumstances, including circumstances of whether
               (a) the declarant was speaking about events as they were actually happening,
       instead of describing past events;
               (b) the statement was made while the declarant was in immediate danger, i.e.,
       during an ongoing emergency;
               (c) the statement was made in order to resolve an emergency or simply to learn
       what had happened in the past; and
               (d) the interview was part of a governmental investigation; and
               "(4) Was the level of formality of the statement sufficient to make it inherently
       testimonial; e.g., was the statement made in response to questions, was the statement
       recorded, was the declarant removed from third parties, or was the interview conducted in
       a formal setting such as in a governmental building?" State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, 291,
       173 P.3d 612 (2007).

       More recently, our Supreme Court disapproved of the Brown multifactor test "as
the exclusive or all-encompassing template for determining whether a statement made by
an absent declarant qualifies as testimonial under the Sixth Amendment." State v.
Williams, 306 Kan. 175, 197, 392 P.3d 1267 (2017). Because testimonial statements can
be "broader than formal statements made to police during an interrogation[,]" the
Williams court warned against a "purely mechanical application of its factors . . . .
Instead, the inquiry should generally seek to identify statements that are by nature
substituting for trial testimony." 306 Kan. at 197. The Williams court nevertheless went
on to apply the factor test to find the statements made by an informant—which identified
the defendant and the illegal drug—were testimonial. 306 Kan. at 202.

       In Miller, our Supreme Court considered whether statements made by a sexual
assault victim to medical professionals were testimonial and reviewed several cases from
other jurisdictions. The Miller court also reviewed more recent Supreme Court decisions
and noted: "What seems consistent in nearly all cases is the courts' use of case-specific

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analysis of the challenged statements based on the totality of the underlying
circumstances to determine the testimonial or nontestimonial nature of the statements."
293 Kan. at 567.

       The Miller court applied some of the factors from Brown to consider whether a
sexual assault victim's statements to a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) were
testimonial and violative of the Confrontation Clause. Notably, when considering
whether the nurse was an agent of the State, the Miller court opined there "can be two
purposes" when a nurse examines a victim and poses questions: "one for medical
diagnosis and treatment and the second for collecting evidence for use in a later future
criminal prosecution." 293 Kan. at 576. And the court opined a victim's statements to a
nurse may transition from nontestimonial to testimonial depending on the circumstances
of the case. 293 Kan. at 577. As a result, the Miller court directed "trial courts in future
cases [to] analyze which statements were made in response to questions posed for each
purpose. Often this will require examination of individual questions and responses." 293
Kan. at 576.

       This direction from the Miller court is relevant to the State's argument and the
district court's findings and order, because the State requests one blanket decision for all
the statements K.E. made to Parks during the forensic examination. As noted, the State's
motion argued "[a]ll of [K.E.'s] statements were for medical treatment." The district
court's order "suppressed statements made by K.E., the listed victim, made to medical
staff." And when making its findings from the bench, the district court specifically found:
"[T]he forensic nurse cannot testify as far as the victim's statements. Any of them,
because they go to the entire case." On appeal, the State similarly asks us to "reverse the
district court's ruling [and] find the statements are admissible."

       The State proffers no argument suggesting some of K.E.'s statements were
admissible, while others may have transitioned into testimonial. And based on Miller, it

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seems ill-advised to issue a blanket order finding all of K.E.'s statements to Parks are
inadmissible at trial because each challenged statement often "require[s] examination of
individual questions and responses." See 293 Kan. at 576. But while the State's all-
encompassing argument is not persuasive, the district court erred for the same reason—
the district court did not examine each statement and conclude which may be testimonial
or nontestimonial.

       The Miller court examined Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 131 S. Ct. 1143,
179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011), to emphasize a statement may transition from nontestimonial to
testimonial. For example, the Bryant Court considered the emergency exception to the
hearsay rule to find what starts as an emergency may transition into a nonemergency,
resulting in some statements being admissible while others are not.

       "As we recognized in Davis, 'a conversation which begins as an interrogation to
       determine the need for emergency assistance' can 'evolve into testimonial statements.'
       This evolution may occur if, for example, a declarant provides police with information
       that makes clear that what appeared to be an emergency is not or is no longer an
       emergency or that what appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute. It
       could also occur if a perpetrator is disarmed, surrenders, is apprehended, or, as in Davis,
       flees with little prospect of posing a threat to the public. Trial courts can determine in the
       first instance when any transition from nontestimonial to testimonial occurs, and exclude
       'the portions of any statement that have become testimonial, as they do, for example, with
       unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence.' [Citations omitted.]"
       Bryant, 562 U.S. at 365-66.

       Generally, it appears these issues are raised by a defendant on direct appeal, not by
the State on interlocutory appeal. See Miller, 293 Kan. at 555. We have found only two
cases addressing the Confrontation Clause on interlocutory appeal under K.S.A. 22-3603.
See State v. Myers, 229 Kan. 168, 171, 625 P.2d 1111 (1981) ("In determining the
admissibility of hearsay evidence under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, a trial

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court must also consider the application of the confrontation clauses . . . ."); State v.
Martinez-Diaz, 63 Kan. App. 2d 363, 379-80, 528 P.3d 1042 (2023) (finding evidence
admissible when defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine unavailable witness).
The Martinez-Diaz panel reversed the district court's admissibility holding and remanded
"with directions that if [the witness] again refuses to give immunized testimony at
Martinez-Diaz' trial, then the district court must, subject to any applicable evidentiary
rules Martinez-Diaz invokes, allow use of [the unavailable witness'] prior testimony." 63
Kan. App. 2d at 380.

       Unlike Martinez-Diaz, we have no clear direction for disposing of the State's
claim. Unlike cases that have already proceeded to trial, we do not have the benefit of
reviewing actual challenged testimony to determine whether its admittance was error.
Instead, we are asked to preemptively decide whether all of the nurse's proposed
testimony should be suppressed because it runs afoul of the Confrontation Clause. But
again, under Bryant and Miller, it would appear to be error to do so because portions of
Parks' testimony may be nontestimonial, while other testimony may be testimonial.

       In State v. Jones, 295 Kan. 1050, 1056-57, 288 P.3d 140 (2012), our Supreme
Court found Jones' failure to raise a Confrontation Clause claim at trial regarding
challenged hearsay testimony prevented the court from addressing the defendant's claim
on appeal. Relevant to the State's claim here, the Jones court found the victim's hospital
visit "accomplished dual purposes" but noted it was "unclear at what point the SANE's
activities might have transitioned from medical treatment to law enforcement purposes."
295 Kan. at 1057. Our Supreme Court then concluded it was "handcuffed" without the
proper findings below and affirmed the panel's conclusion the nurse's testimony was not
testimonial in nature. 295 Kan. at 1057-58; see State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 161, 199
P.3d 1265 (2009) (regardless of whether record contains sufficient evidence to make
factual findings, that is not role of appellate courts).

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       The State proffers no argument as to how each of K.E.'s statements to Parks
should be analyzed. We believe the instruction from Miller controls, and the district court
"must analyze which statements were made in response to questions posed for each
purpose." 293 Kan. at 576. Our Supreme Court provided a similar instruction in
Bennington, 293 Kan. at 521.

       Given the district court's lack of specific findings and our guiding caselaw, we
observe the district court erred by issuing a blanket ruling finding all of K.E.'s statements
to Parks were inadmissible. Because Perry has the right to confrontation—meet the
witness face to face— we remand the case for the district court to conduct a hearing to
determine what statements are testimonial and what statements are nontestimonial in
accordance with Miller, 293 Kan. at 567. Our remand gives the district court, as the fact-
finder, the opportunity to analyze the purpose of each statement K.E. made in response to
Parks' questions.

       Reversed and remanded with directions.

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