Court Opinion

ID: 9883472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:43:21.537926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:23.637201
License: Public Domain

BROTHERTON, Justice,
dissenting:
While I agree with most of the majority opinion, I must disagree with their interpretation of Rule 54(c) in Syl. pt. 8 as it applies to default judgments in cases where a party has appeared and the default judgment is issued as a sanction. The rule mandates that “[a] judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment.” (Emphasis added.) The meaning of the phrase is clear and quite apparent: that default judgments shall not exceed the amount prayed for in the demand for judgment. In interpreting *179a rule the Court should follow the same rules as when it is construing a statute. One of the most honored of these rules is that the Court should not read a different meaning into a statute where the plain meaning is clear. See, e.g., Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W.Va. 714, 718, 172 S.E.2d 384, 386-87 (1970). Therefore, whenever a default judgment is entered it should not be allowed to exceed the amount in the demand for judgment. Whether the default judgment was entered as a sanction or whether or not the party appeared is irrelevant.
Because the majority gives an excellent discussion of both views of the interpretation of Rule 54(c), I shall not rehash the matter here. Despite their thorough analysis, however, I feel the majority has reached the wrong conclusion and I, therefore, respectfully note my dissent.