Court Opinion

ID: 9752585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:17:35.852964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:58.263047
License: Public Domain

RIDGELY, Justice,
dissenting, with HOLLAND, Justice, joining:
The majority opinion excludes evidence obtained from an administrative search of a probationer triggered by an inconclusive tip from a police officer notwithstanding an alternative reasonable basis for the search upon independent grounds. Probation officers had independent evidence that Cul-ver was using illegal drugs and had violat*16ed his curfew. Because the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that the probation officers’ decision to conduct the search of Culver’s residence was reasonable, we would affirm the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from that search. We would also affirm the denial of Culver’s motion to suppress his statements.
An administrative search requires both substantial compliance and reasonableness
This Court has recognized that “probationers do not have the same liberties as ordinary citizens” and has held that “administrative searches of probationer homes require only reasonable grounds, even if the probation officers do not satisfy each technical requirement of the search and seizure regulations of the Department of Correction.”22 The special nature of probationary supervision justifies a departure from the usual warrant requirement.23
Delaware law puts probationers under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, whose probation officers “shall attempt in each case to effect a satisfactory adjustment between the individual and the individual’s needs and the demands of society.”24 By statute, probation officers “may conduct searches of individuals under probation and parole supervision in accordance with Departmental Procedures .... ”25 The purpose of the Department of Corrections’ procedures governing searches of probationers “is to ensure that the Department has sufficient grounds before undertaking a search.”26 We do not require the probation officers to satisfy “each technical requirement of the search regulations” before conducting an administrative search of a probationer.27 Rather, we require only substantial compliance28 because under federal law29 an administra*17tive search of a probationer’s home requires only reasonable grounds.30
There was substantial compliance with Procedure 7.19
Procedure 7.19 of State of Delaware Department of Correction Bureau of Community Corrections Probation and Parole (“Procedure 7.19”) provides the guidelines and procedures for probation officers to apply when making an arrest or search of a probationer,31 and “will be used in the decision-making process for all planned searches” absent exigent circumstances.32 There are five factors calling for a review of the “yes” or “no” responses before conducting an administrative search: (1) whether the probation officer has sufficient reason to believe the offender possesses contraband; (2) whether the probation officer has sufficient reason to believe the offender is in violation of his probation; (3) whether information from a reliable informant indicates that the offender possesses contraband or is violating the law;33 (4) whether information from the informant is corroborated; or (5) whether approval is obtained from the supervisor, manager, or director.34
Procedure 7.19 provides alternative grounds for an administrative search
The majority focuses on the third and fourth factors, which involve the sufficiency of tips (anonymous or otherwise), as dispositive of the “substantially complied” prong of the analysis. We agree with the majority’s analysis that the tip was insufficient under LeGrande.35 Regardless, there still must be consideration of the remainder of the checklist guidelines in Procedure 7.19, which the probation officers testified that they went through in making their decision to conduct an administrative search. According to Robert’s testimony during the suppression hearing, “Any one of those questions answered yes *18establishes sufficiency under 7.19 to conduct an administrative search.”
Procedure 7.19 does not require information from a reliable informant as the sine qua non for a valid administrative search. To the extent that the probation office receives an anonymous tip, this Court’s opinion in LeGrande explains why corroboration of the concealed criminal activity in the tip needs more than just the confirmation of facts tending to identify a determinate person.36 Those requirements do not change when the tip comes indirectly from the police.37
The majority recognizes this point, but further interprets Procedure 7.19 to require police officers to “provide probation officers with sufficient facts so that the probation officers can independently and objectively assess the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the caller’s tip.”38 Nothing in Procedure 7.19 requires this sharing of information and it is unnecessary given the well-established standards for evaluating the credibility of tips. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning for not creating such a requirement is persuasive: “[P]olice may be unwilling to disclose their confidential sources to probation personnel.”39 Further, “[i]n some cases — especially those involving drugs or illegal weapons — the probation agency must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or society.”40
More importantly, the tip provided to the probation office — which was undisput-edly and conceded by the State as insufficient to generate either reasonable suspicion or probable cause — was but one reason for the administrative search in this case. After concluding that the tip provided here should have resulted in a negative response to the third and fourth factors of Procedure 7.19’s checklist requirement, the majority acknowledges that it still must evaluate the other reasons given by the probation office and whether they provide a reasonable basis for the probation officer to conduct an administrative search. The majority states “[wjithout Lt. Ogden’s call, we must conclude that the probation officers making this inquiry under the Department of Corrections mandated framework for an analysis would not have concluded there was a reasonable basis to conduct this search.”41 We disagree.
An administrative search based upon either drug possession or drug consumption by a probationer stands on its own under either the first and second factors of Procedure 7.19 to justify an administrative search. As conceded by the majority, the officers answered “yes” to these factors and explained that two of the three reasons why they conducted the search were that (1) Culver had failed drug tests during probation and (2) that he had missed *19one curfew. The first reason supports answering “yes” to the first and second factors; the second reason supports answering “yes” to the second factor. Procedure 7.19 authorized an administrative search for either reason notwithstanding the police officer’s “tip” and the majority’s analysis of factors three and four. The officers testified that these were also reasons in addition to the tip that provided a sufficient basis for conducting the search and the Superior Court accepted their testimony. There is no dispute that the search itself was conducted properly. We find no abuse of discretion by Superior Court in concluding that the probation officers substantially complied with the procedural requirements for the administrative search.
The administrative search was reasonable
Even with substantial compliance with Department of Corrections procedures, there still needs to be a reasonable basis to conduct the administrative search to pass constitutional muster.42 A search of a probationer must be reasonable to be constitutionally sufficient.43 “Reasonableness is a flexible concept which must be considered with regard to the totality of the circumstances and with particular regard to the balancing of the needs of effective and reasonable law enforcement with the rights of privacy of the individual.”44 To address how we should review the reasonableness of an administrative search, we need look no further than how reasonableness is measured in every other Fourth Amendment context.
In analyzing the issue under the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of a seizure,45 pat down search,46 a warrantless arrest,47 an arrest warrant,48 or search *20warrant,49 the reviewing court does not focus on the subjective motivations or intent of the particular person, but instead makes an objective determination of whether the totality of the circumstances support what is required under the law. Whether it was reasonable for probation officers to conduct an administrative search should be analyzed no differently.
There is no dispute regarding the information within Culver’s file when the probation officers examined it. Culver’s probation started September 5, 2006. His first drug test, administered on September 7 to establish a baseline for his drug levels, tested positive for cocaine (approximately 457 out of a 1000 point scale) and “over 100” for marijuana.50 Roberts testified that results “over 100” indicated that Cul-ver was “smoking in large quantities and usually at approximately a daily rate” and “actively smoking, if not on a daily basis, close to it.” Culver again registered “over 100” on his second drug test, administered on September 28, a result which Roberts testified indicated to her that the marijuana levels in his system “stayed exactly the same.”51 The third drug test was on October 12 and Culver registered at 73. Roberts testified that this result demonstrated Culver was “probably smoking less frequently, but still pretty heavily” and that he was “actively smoking if [the result is] still greater than 50.” On October 14, Culver missed his curfew, and on October 16, the probation office, prompted by the phone call by Lt. Ogden, examined Cul-ver’s file. The record also indicates that there was a fourth drug test which registered “negative,” but a date for this test does not appear in the record. Because the search was on October 16, presumably this test was done during that four-day interval.52
The majority agrees that under the ordinary totality of the circumstances approach, the question facing a trial court (and this Court on appeal) is whether an objective probation officer, examining these facts, would have had a reasonable basis to conduct the search that day. Instead of applying this objective analysis, *21the majority concludes that these officers did not have a reasonable basis to do so because they “would not have searched on October 16, but for Lt. Ogden’s call.” “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”53 Nor do subjective intentions play a role under an ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis of an administrative search of a probationer by probation officers.54
In our view, the question is not what these particular officers did or did not choose to do before October 16; the question is whether it would have been reasonable for a probation officer, after examining Culver’s file (and ignoring the tip from the police), to have decided to conduct an administrative search. We find it is objectively reasonable for probation officers to conduct an administrative search of the home of a probationer whose drug tests are positive for more than a month and which show him “actively smoking” just four days before. The subsequent drop from 73 to “negative” in the four-day interval between the third test and the search provides further reasonable support because of the probation officers’ experience with drug detoxification kits. Culver also missed his curfew. The totality of these circumstances provided reasonable grounds to conclude that Culver possessed contraband and was in violation of his probation.
Notwithstanding Culver’s claim that the test results were consistent with the residual effect of past and not current drug use, the trial judge accepted the probation officer’s testimony concerning Culver’s continuing drug use while on probation. Neither Culver nor the majority have demonstrated that these findings were clearly erroneous.55 Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s denial of Culver’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the administrative search.56
*22The statements Culver made were admissible
Because we find there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to suppress, we must also address Culver’s argument that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective Kline upon the presentment of the warrant for his arrest on the weapon charge. We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to suppress after an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.57 To the extent that the claims of error implicate questions of law, our review is de novo.58
Culver argues that the statement should have been suppressed because the officer did not advise Culver of his Miranda59 rights before presenting him with the warrant. The State does not dispute that Culver was in custody, however it argues that the officer did not engage in the functional equivalent of interrogation, so Miranda warnings were not needed. We agree. The trial judge accepted the officer’s testimony and found that his intention was not to question Culver, who made the statement voluntarily and not in response to any question, in order to exculpate himself. Culver’s unforeseeable statement was admissible against him.60 Accordingly, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Culver’s motion to suppress this statement.
We find no merit to Culver’s arguments and would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects. We respectfully dissent.

. Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 319 (Del.2006). See generally Fuller v. State, 844 A.2d 290, 291 (Del.2004) ("To the extent that the officers departed from departmental guidelines, the departure did not render the search unconstitutional because of the curtailed rights of a probationer as compared with an ordinary citizen.”).

. Donald, 903 A.2d at 319 ("The special nature of probationary supervision justifies a departure from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements for searches, but a search of a probationer’s home must be reasonable”).

. 11 Del. C. § 4321(b)(2). See also 11 Del. C. § 4301 ("[Wjhenever it appears desirable in the light of the needs of public safety and their own welfare, [a probationer] shall be dealt with, at restricted liberty in the community, by a uniformly organized system of constructive rehabilitation, under probation or parole supervision instead of in a correctional institution.”).

. 11 Del. C. § 4321(d).

. Fuller, 844 A.2d at 292.

. Id.

. See Donald, 903 A.2d at 319; Bunting v. State, 907 A.2d 145, 2006 WL 2587074, at *5 (Del.Supr.).

. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) ("We hold that the balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s house. The degree of individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of when there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable.”); id. ("When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.”); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878-80, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987).

. Majority Op., ibid.; Donald, 903 A.2d at 319; Fuller, 844 A.2d at 292; accord Word v. State, 782 A.2d 268, 2001 WL 762854, at *3 n. 8 (Del.Supr.) ("We also note the United States Supreme Court’s ruling that probation supervision, including administrative searches of a probationer’s property, permits a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.”) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)).

. The Superior Court has analyzed and quoted provisions from an older version of these guidelines, which were also labeled Procedure 7.19 in State v. Harris, 734 A.2d 629, 633-34 (Del.Super.1998). See also Everett v. State, 930 A.2d 928, 2007 WL 1850906, at *1 (Del.Supr.) (quoting from Harris a section from Procedure 7.19). In his appendix, defense counsel provided us with the State of Delaware Department of Correction Bureau of Community Corrections Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 ("Procedure”), which have an effective date of June 5, 2001. Cul-ver was subject to these procedures.

. Procedure 7.19(VI)(E).

. In evaluating this third factor, the guidelines provide four additional factors for the probation officer to consider: (1) whether, if the offender was observed by another officer, that officer had past experience with the offender, or a similar type circumstance; (2) whether the information provided by the informant was reliable based on its detail, consistency, and past proven reliability, and after considering the reason why the informant is supplying the information; (3) whether the offender’s activity indicates he may possess contraband, which may be supportive of the informant’s information; or (4) whether there were prior seizures of contraband from an offender, prior violations of probation, and a conviction pattern. Procedure 7.19(VI)(E)(3).

. Procedure 7.19(VI)(A)(6)(a). There is no dispute that this fifth factor was met.

. See LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103 (Del.2008).

. Id. at 1111.

. In this case, the police called and basically said to the probation officers "your probationer is on our radar even though we just conducted a search that turned up empty.” The probation officers then looked at Culver’s file to determine the history of his supervision and whether they had a reasonable basis to conduct an administrative search. Cronin testified that the decision to initiate the search was made by himself and Roberts, and he confirmed that nobody from the State Police had asked them to conduct the search.

. Majority Op., supra, at 12-13.

. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879-80, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987).

. Id. at 879, 107 S.Ct. 3164.

. Majority Op., supra, at 15.

. See Fuller, 844 A.2d at 292 ("Even if the officers did not follow each technical requirement of the search regulations before searching [the probationer], they did satisfy those that affect the reasonable inquiry required under the United States and Delaware Constitutions.”).

. See Majority Op., ibid.; Fuller, 844 A.2d at 292; Donald, 903 A.2d at 319. See also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878-880, 107 S.Ct. 3164.

. Williams v. State, 331 A.2d 380, 382 (Del.1975). See also Purnell v. State, 832 A.2d 714, 719 (Del.2003) (“Reasonable and articu-lable suspicion is a less stringent standard than the probable cause standard and requires a quantum of proof that is less than preponderance of the evidence.”).

. E.g., Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 863 (Del.1999) (recognizing that under California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), a Fourth Amendment seizure "does not occur until the officer uses physical force or the defendant submits to the authority of the officer”). See also id. at 869 ("In our view, the question presented by Jones of when a seizure has occurred under Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution requires focusing upon the police officer’s actions to determine when a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police presence.”).

. E.g., Caldwell v. State, 770 A.2d 522, 531-32 (Del.2001) (explaining that a Terry pat down search must be "founded upon a ‘reasonable suspicion’ ” and while deference is given to an officer's experience and knowledge, "the facts which form the basis of the reasonable suspicion must 'be capable of measurement against an objective standard’ ”).

. E.g., Coleman v. State, 562 A.2d 1171, 1177 (Del.1989) ("The requisite analysis in determining the sufficiency of probable cause for a warrantless arrest is determined according to a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”) (quoting Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del.1988)). See also O’Neil v. State, 691 A.2d 50, 54 (Del.1997) ("[P]robable cause is measured by the totality of the circumstances through a case by case review of 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.’ ”) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting State v. *20Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 928 (Del.1993)); Bennefield v. State, 59 A.2d 227, 1995 WL 13425, at *1 (Del.Supr.) ("The existence of probable cause is determined by a review of the totality of the circumstances and the specific facts known to the police officers at the time of the arrest.”).

. E.g., Thomas v. State, 467 A.2d 954, 956 (Del.1983) ("For an arrest warrant to be valid, the issuing judicial officer must be presented with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause for the warrant exists.”).

. E.g., LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103, 1107 (Del.2008) ("An affidavit in support of a search warrant must, within the four-corners of the affidavit, set forth facts adequate for a judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and the property to be seized will be found in a particular place.”) (quoting Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del.2006)).

. Roberts testified that the marijuana scale only measured up to 100.

. Roberts testified that the purpose for the second drug test at the end of the month was to determine "whether he is using less frequently or using more....”

. Thus, in four days or less, Culver’s test result did not just decline (as it had slowly done between drug tests two and three); it dropped from 73 to zero, or "negative.” Roberts explained that the results "would obviously be at zero, if he had nothing in his system,” but also testified that use of a detoxification kit "can clean his system and make his urine screens come up negative for any illegal substance.” "Actively smoking" to "negative” in four days objectively supported an inference that Culver may have used a detoxification kit to mask personal drug use. While a search is never justified by what is found, we note that a detoxification kit was discovered during the administrative search.

. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). See also State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1364 (Del.1978) ("[Bjurdening a criminal defendant with the task of proving that a police officer acted with an illegal subjective intent would as a practical matter emasculate any limited rule concerning random stopping procedures, and in turn, emasculate Fourth Amendment rights.”); id. (“We hold, therefore, that a random stop of a motorist in the absence of specific articulable facts which justify the stop by indicating a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law has occurred is constitutionally impermissible and violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”) (emphasis added).

. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (“Because our holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis that considers all the circumstances of a search, there is no basis for examining official purpose.”); see also id. at 122-23, 122 S.Ct. 587 (Souter, J., concurring) ("We now hold that law-enforcement searches of probationers who have been informed of a search condition are permissible upon individualized suspicion of criminal behavior committed during the probationary period, thus removing any issue of the subjective intention of the investigating officers from the case.”).

. See Chavous v. State, 953 A.2d 282, 2008 WL 2527344, at *3 n. 15 ("To the extent the trial judge’s decision is based on factual findings, we review for whether the trial judge abused his discretion in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings and whether those findings were clearly erroneous.”).

. Culver’s federal constitutional argument— often referred to as the "stalking horse” argument because it asserts that the probation officer is acting as an agent (a "stalking horse”) of the police in order to circumvent the warrant requirement under the ruse of an administrative search — has been rejected as a matter of federal law. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (holding that the offi*22cial purpose of probation officers is not part of the Fourth Amendment analysis of the validity of an administrative search); accord United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir.2005); South Dakota v. Kottman, 707 N.W.2d 114, 120 (S.D.2005); Riley v. Kentucky, 120 S.W.3d 622, 628 (Ky.2003). Cul-ver’s argument under the Delaware Constitution has been waived because he has made only a conclusory claim before the Superior Court and this Court. See Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 291 n. 4 (Del.2005).

. Ares v. State, 937 A.2d 127, 130 (Del.2007); Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 318 (Del.2006); Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d 757, 762 (Del.2003); Virdin v. State, 780 A.2d 1024, 1030 (Del.2001).

. Ares, 937 A.2d at 130; Donald, 903 A.2d at 318. See also McDonald v. State, 947 A.2d 1073, 2008 WL 1915174, at *8 (Del.2008) (Noble, V.C., dissenting) ("Although it is said that this Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard, more accurately, the trial court’s findings of historical fact are reviewed under the deferential clearly erroneous standard, but its conclusion as to probable cause, or more specifically its application of the law of search and seizure to those historical facts, is considered de novo.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. See Tolson v. State, 900 A.2d 639, 644 (Del.2006) (”[A]n officer cannot be held responsible for an unforeseeable statement by the suspect. An interrogation only encompasses actions or words by the officer that he or she should have known would elicit an incriminating response.”) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)).