Court Opinion

ID: 9700517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:33:33.46485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:10.209268
License: Public Domain

Lanphier, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff’s petition states that the defendants, the City of Omaha and Officer R. Green, were negligent in “failing ... to protect Plaintiff from her assailant after having affirmatively assured her that he would protect her and in failing ... to be available to provide protection to Plaintiff after having assured her” that he would. The petition further alleges she stayed at home in reliance on the representation. The majority determines that the petition “relies on bare legal conclusions and... lacks any allegations of specific acts” and therefore “failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”
This is incorrect for two reasons.
First, plaintiff’s petition states exactly what her action is premised upon: defendant Green’s failure to protect plaintiff after assuring her that he would be in the immediate area to do so. These are not legal conclusions, but specific acts which, if proved, establish negligence.
Second, the majority raises the historic standard for applying *265a demurrer to a petition. It is well established that the “general allegation of negligence is good against a demurrer” where no motion to make more definite and certain has been filed. Crawford v. Ham, 209 Neb. 802, 805, 311 N.W.2d 896, 898 (1981). See, also, Bunselmeyer v. Hill, 179 Neb. 140, 137 N.W.2d 354 (1965); Behrens v. Gottula, 160 Neb. 103, 69 N.W.2d 384 (1955); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. O’Donnell, 72 Neb. 900, 101 N.W. 1009 (1904). The petition at issue meets this standard. Also, in considering a demurrer, a court must assume the facts pled in the petition are true as alleged and must give the pleading the benefit of any reasonable inference from the facts alleged. See, Lewis v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 242 Neb. 744, 497 N.W.2d 33 (1993); LaPan v. Myers, 241 Neb. 790, 491 N.W.2d 46 (1992). The judgment of the lower court sustaining defendants’ demurrer should be reversed.
There are additional reasons defendants’ demurrer should have been overruled. The majority cites Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, 133 Pa. Commw. 121, 574 A.2d 1205 (1990), to illustrate that the plaintiff in the instant case had not established a relationship with defendant Green which would impose liability. Thomas requires that the police (1) be aware of an individual’s particular situation, (2) be aware of the potential for the particular harm which was suffered, and (3) assume the duty to protect that individual from that precise harm. Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983), also cited by the majority, further narrows the circumstances required for a cause of action by requiring the establishment of a “special relationship” between the victim and the police. A special relationship is formed when the police “affirmatively act to protect a specific individual... from harm, in such a way as to engender particularized and justifiable reliance.” Id. at 1313-14. Additionally, the majority notes that the Morgan court emphasized that the existence of a duty, if any, to an individual is determined by police actions rather than representations. However, the majority opinion fails to recognize that Officer Green’s visit to the plaintiff, together with the representation to protect, constitutes “action.” These facts establish misfeasance rather than mere nonfeasance as apparently found by the majority. See Tarasoff v. Regents of *266University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). In light of these criteria, defendant Green did have a duty to protect plaintiff.
The pled facts demonstrate that (1) Officer Green was aware of plaintiff’s particular situation because he discussed it with her at her home; (2) Officer Green had knowledge of the potential for the particular harm plaintiff suffered, due to events which occurred earlier that evening; (3) Officer Green voluntarily assumed, in light of this knowledge, to protect plaintiff from the precise harm to which plaintiff was subjected. Plaintiff, in reliance on these representations, did not seek shelter elsewhere, but remained in what she perceived to be the safety of her home. Fifteen minutes later, plaintiff’s former husband broke down plaintiff’s door, chased her across the street, and beat her with a tire iron. These circumstances plainly meet the special relationship requirement of Morgan and the relationship requirement of Thomas.
If recovery is denied when an officer explicitly assures a victim of domestic or other violence that he or she may remain at home and be protected, and fails to do so, then when can liability be established? To permit defendants to escape liability without even a trial in such circumstances would prevent citizens from ever recovering due to clear negligence of the police following a promise of protection which a hapless victim relies on.
For the reasons cited, I would reverse the judgment of the district court.
White and Caporale, J J., join in this dissent.