Court Opinion

ID: 9945741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:09:38.952873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.029867
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3631-21

NATALIE TICE,

          Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

     Respondent.
____________________________

                   Submitted January 17, 2024 – Decided February 28, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
                   Corrections.

                   Natalie Tice, appellant pro se.

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney
                   General, of counsel; Leo Boerstoel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Natalie Tice is imprisoned in Edna Mahan Correctional Facility, part of

the State's correctional system. She appeals, pro se, from a June 8, 2022 final

agency decision of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), upholding

restitution imposed for her conviction of prohibited act, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-

4.1(a)(4)(i) *.152.1 We affirm.

      We derive the facts from the record. Tice objected to a search at the Edna

Mahan Correctional Facility. She was handcuffed and placed into a temporary

cell. Tice "banged" her handcuffs on the cell door until the handcuffs broke.

She then used the broken handcuffs to break the inner glass of the door. Further,

"using her body weight," she "repeatedly rammed the door . . . causing damage

[to] the [door's] locking mechanism."

      Tice was charged with prohibited act *152 ("destroying, altering or

damaging government property, or the property of another person"), for the

damage to the door and the window. The charges were referred to a hearing

1
    Tice does not appeal the discipline stemming from N.J.A.C. 10A:4-
4.1(a)(2)(xix) *.306 ("conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security of
orderly running of the correctional facility"); N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(2)(xxii)
*.708 "(refusal to submit to a search"); or N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(i) *.152
("destroying, altering or damaging government property, or the property of
another person") as it relates to the destruction of the cell window or handcuffs
or the imposition of restitution of $32.99 for the destruction of the handcuffs or
$250 for the destruction of the window.
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officer. Tice was granted a counsel substitute and was offered but declined the

opportunity to call witnesses or submit documents.

      The hearing officer found Tice guilty and referred her to a separate

restitution hearing.   At the restitution hearing, the Department presented

photographs of the damage to the door and an estimate of $856 for the

replacements to the door. Tice accepted responsibility for breaking the window

but asserted the door was malfunctioning before her placement. The hearing

officer determined Tice was responsible to pay the full replacement costs. Tice

appealed the hearing officer's decision, which was affirmed. The restitution

assessment was upheld after reconsideration.

      Tice challenges the restitution finding only as to the door. She raises the

following arguments for our consideration:

            POINT ONE

            THERE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
            SUSTAIN THE AGENCY FINAL DECISION THAT
            [TICE] WAS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
            DAMAGE,      NOT   TO     CONT[]RADICT
            APPELLANT'S   CONTENTION   THAT    PRE-
            EXISTING    DAMAGE    MITIGATE     HER
            RESPONSIBILITY.

            POINT TWO

            DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED DURING THE
            HEARING PROCESS BECAUSE [TICE] WAS

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                                       3
            DENIED ACCESS TO VITAL DOCUMENTARY
            EVIDENCE THAT WAS EXCULPATORY AND
            WHICH SHE NEEDED TO DEFEND HERSELF.

      More particularly, under point one, Tice argues "there was not substantial

evidence to support the agency decision that her actions inflicted the entire

extent of (if any) damage to the door as opposed to inmates and/or staff on

previous occasions." She contends there was no evidence that: (1) the hearing

officer visited the scene of the damaged door and inspected it herself; (2) the

hearing officer could "rule out damage [was] inflicted by staff or other inmates

over the years leading up to this incident"; and (3) the maintenance department

estimates "apportion[ed] the damage" between herself and others.

      In addition, as to her second argument, Tice contends "no attempt was

apparently made to investigate reports of previous incidents where the inmates

were given disciplinary charges for damaging this same door/door frame and the

amount of restitution (if any) assessed on each inmate[]."

      Our review of a final administrative decision is limited. Malacow v. N.J.

Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018). "We will disturb an

agency's adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the decision is 'arbitrary,

capricious or unreasonable,' or is unsupported 'by substantial credible evidence

in the record as a whole.'" Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231,

                                                                             A-3631-21
                                        4
237-38 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571,

579-80 (1980)). "Substantial evidence has been defined alternatively as 'such

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,'

and 'evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action.'" Id. at 238

(quoting Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div.

2010)).

      Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the

full spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply. Avant v.

Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). However, when reviewing a determination of

the DOC in a matter involving prisoner discipline, we consider not only whether

there is substantial credible evidence that the inmate committed the prohibited

act, but also whether, in making its decision, the DOC followed regulations

adopted to afford inmates procedural due process. See McDonald v. Pinchak,

139 N.J. 188, 194-96 (1995).

      We find no merit to Tice's arguments. Initially, she admits to committing

the prohibited acts. Moreover, the Department's restitution decision was based

upon substantial evidence, including pictures of the damage and the maintenance

estimates. This evidence was unrefuted.

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                                        5
      Further, Tice was provided with her full due process rights. In accord

with N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(a), Tice was " allowed to call a fact witness(es) . . .

and present documentary evidence in [her] defense. . . . [and] provided the

opportunity to call and question in person a fact witness(es)." She was afforded

notice; granted substitute counsel; had the hearing conducted by an impartial

tribunal; and was given an opportunity, which she declined, to present witness

testimony and request and present documents. Avant, 67 N.J. 525-33.

      Affirmed.

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