Court Opinion

ID: 9427579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:15.102857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:08.208878
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join,
dissenting.
No principle is more firmly established in our system of criminal justice than the presumption of innocence that is accorded to the defendant in every criminal trial. In In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant’s guilt. I believe that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment equally requires the presumption that a defendant is innocent until he has been proved guilty.
Almost 85 years ago, the Court said: “The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 453. Only three years ago the Court reaffirmed that the presumption of innocence “is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501, 503. See also Cool v. United States, 409 U. S. 100, 104. And a fair trial, after all, is what the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment above all else guarantees.
While an instruction on the presumption of innocence in one sense only serves to remind the jury that the prosecutor has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it also has *791a separate and distinct function. Quite apart from considerations of the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence “cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced.” 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2511, p. 407 (3d ed. 1940). And because every defendant, regardless of the totality of the circumstances, is entitled to have his guilt determined only on the basis of the evidence properly introduced against him at trial, I would hold that an instruction on the presumption of innocence is constitutionally required in every case where a timely request has been made.1
There may be cases where the failure to give such an instruction could not have affected the outcome of the trial. If that conclusion can be drawn beyond a reasonable doubt, failure to give the instruction would be harmless error. Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18; Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250. Since the Kentucky Supreme Court did not consider this possibility, I would vacate its judgment and remand the case to that court, but only for consideration of whether the failure to give the instruction in the circumstances presented here was harmless error.2

 At least one Member of the Court understood our opinion in Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478 to hold precisely that. See id., at 490 (Bren-nan, J., concurring).

 On remand, the Kentucky court would of course be free to hold as a matter of state law that it would not consider the question of harmless error in this context. See Watson v. Commonwealth, 579 S. W. 2d 103 (Ky.).