Court Opinion

ID: 9905015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 17:05:12.586115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:13.126540
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Nov 28 2023, 8:59 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Robin R. Craig                                             NIKOLAS A. MCELROY
Evansville, Indiana                                        Jonathan M. Young
                                                           Law Office of
                                                             Jonathan M. Young P.C.
                                                           Newburgh, Indiana
                                                           ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
                                                           DAVID AND ANGELA JACKSON
                                                           Jeff Shoulders
                                                           Bob Zoss Law Office, LLC
                                                           Evansville, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Paternity of L.J. and                            November 28, 2023
L.M. (Minor Children)                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-JP-776
Erin Jackson (Mother),
                                                           Appeal from the
Appellant-Respondent,                                      Vanderburgh Superior Court
        v.                                                 The Honorable
                                                           Mary Margaret Lloyd, Judge
Nikolas A. McElroy (Father),                               Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           82D05-1402-JP-69
Appellee-Petitioner,

        and

David and Angela Jackson,
Appellees-Intervenors

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023                           Page 1 of 23
                                     Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                                       Judge Brown Concurs
                            Judge Bradford dissents with separate opinion.

      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Erin Jackson (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order modifying custody of

      her children to her parents, David and Angela Jackson (“Grandparents”). To

      overcome the natural-parent presumption, the evidence must show (1) present

      unfitness of Mother, (2) long acquiescence in Grandparents’ custody, or (3) past

      abandonment of the children such that the affections of the children and

      Grandparents have become so intertwined that to sever the relationship would

      endanger the children’s future happiness. The court found that Mother

      abandoned the children. While Mother abandoned the children from June 2018

      to December 2019, she retrieved them and had been living with them for two-

      and-a-half years when Grandparents filed for custody. Because the

      abandonment was so far in the past, it does not rebut the parental presumption

      favoring Mother. The court’s judgment to the contrary is clearly erroneous. We

      therefore reverse and remand.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Mother has two children, L.J. (born in January 2011) and L.M. (born in

      October 2012). Paternity for both children was established in Nikolas A.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023    Page 2 of 23
      McElroy (“Father”). See Cause Nos. 82D05-1402-JP-69, 82D05-2003-JP-382.1

      Mother and the children lived at Grandparents’ home from the children’s birth

      until June 2018, when Mother moved out to live with her boyfriend. From June

      2018 to December 2019, Mother did not have consistent parenting time with

      the children. Around this time, she also had substance-abuse issues. The

      children continued living at Grandparents’ home until December 2019, when

      Mother retrieved them and they moved into an “appropriate and safe” home.

      Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 5.

[3]   In March 2020, Grandparents intervened in the paternity cases and sought

      custody of the children as de facto custodians.2 In November, the parties

      participated in mediation and reached an agreement, which the trial court

      approved. Under the agreement, Mother maintained custody of the children,

      who were then nine and eight years old, while Grandparents were awarded

      “grandparent visitation” one overnight per week, one weekend per month, and

      one week during the summer (Father’s parenting time was reserved for a later

      hearing). Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 117. In addition, the children were ordered

      to undergo an evaluation by a counselor at Southwestern Behavioral

      Healthcare, and the parties were ordered to follow the counselor’s

      recommendations. Two months later, the trial court awarded Father

      1
          The trial court later consolidated JP-382 into JP-69. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 38.
      2
        “De facto custodian” means “a person who has been the primary caregiver for, and financial support of, a
      child who has resided with the person for at least: (1) six (6) months if the child is less than three (3) years of
      age; or (2) one (1) year if the child is at least three (3) years of age.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-35.5.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023                                   Page 3 of 23
      unsupervised parenting time with the children in accordance with the Indiana

      Parenting Time Guidelines (Father’s parenting time had previously been

      supervised for six hours every other Sunday).

[4]   In December 2021, Grandparents filed a motion alleging that Mother had not

      taken the children for an evaluation at Southwestern Behavioral Healthcare as

      ordered by the trial court in November 2020 and asking the court to order

      Mother to do so. The court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), who issued a

      report in May 2022. In the report, the GAL noted that Mother hadn’t enrolled

      the children in therapy and didn’t ensure that the children went to parenting

      time with Father. The GAL recommended that Grandparents have primary

      physical custody of the children. Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 7.

[5]   A few days after the GAL’s report, Grandparents petitioned to modify custody

      of the children. At that point, the children had been living with Mother for two-

      and-a-half years. In the petition to modify, Grandparents alleged that there had

      been a substantial change in circumstances since the November 2020 custody

      order and that it was in the children’s best interests for Grandparents to have

      legal and primary physical custody of the children. Father consented to

      Grandparents having custody. A hearing was held over three days in September

      2022, December 2022, and January 2023. The children were eleven (almost

      twelve) and ten years old at the time.

[6]   The GAL testified that she met with the children four times. She explained that

      the first time she met with the children, in January 2022, they were “happy,”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023      Page 4 of 23
      “talkative,” “forthcoming,” and “open.” Tr. Vol. II p. 240. But the next three

      times the GAL met with the children (April, August, and November), they

      were “very quiet,” “very short,” and “almost teetering on rude.” Id. The GAL

      testified that she had encouraged Mother to ensure the children went to

      parenting time with Father, but Mother said she “wasn’t going to make them

      do something they didn’t want to do.” Id. at 242.

[7]   The GAL also testified that at the time of her first visit with the children,

      Mother hadn’t taken them to Southwestern, although the children were

      working with a school therapist. The GAL said the children’s first counseling

      appointment was in July 2022. When asked if Mother had been “dragging her

      feet” about getting the children into counseling, the GAL said she “couldn’t

      say.” Id. at 246. The GAL repeated her recommendation that Grandparents

      have primary physical custody of the children, citing three reasons: (1) the

      children had lived at Grandparents’ house for a significant portion of their lives,

      (2) Grandparents would ensure that the children went to parenting time with

      Father, and (3) Grandparents would take the children to counseling. Id. at 246-

      47. The GAL acknowledged, however, that Mother had since “remedied” the

      counseling issue and was meeting the children’s mental-health and medical

      needs. Tr. Vol. III p. 2.

[8]   In March 2023, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.

      Specifically, the court found that Grandparents were de facto custodians of the

      children, Mother had abandoned the children (thereby rebutting the

      presumption that she should have custody), and it was in the children’s best

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023       Page 5 of 23
       interests for Grandparents to have custody. Accordingly, the court awarded

       custody of the children to Grandparents, with Mother and Father receiving

       parenting time.

[9]    Mother now appeals.3

       Discussion and Decision
[10]   Mother argues the trial court erred in modifying custody of the children to

       Grandparents. Child-custody determinations fall squarely within the discretion

       of the trial court, and we reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Hurst v.

       Smith, 192 N.E.3d 233, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). When, as here, a trial court

       enters findings and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52, we

       determine (1) whether the evidence supports the findings and (2) whether the

       findings support the judgment. Id. at 242. We do not set aside the findings or

       judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. “We neither reweigh the evidence nor

       assess the credibility of the witnesses but consider only the evidence most

       favorable to the judgment.” Id.

[11]   In a custody dispute between a natural parent and a third party (including a de

       facto custodian), there is a presumption that the natural parent should have

       custody of her child. Id.; In re L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)

       3
        Father has filed an appellee’s brief in which he joins in Grandparents’ argument that the trial court properly
       awarded custody of the children to Grandparents.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023                               Page 6 of 23
       (holding de facto custodian status does not remove the presumption in favor of

       natural parents obtaining or retaining custody of their children), trans. denied.

       This presumption, which is “rooted in the United States Constitution,” provides

       a measure of protection for the rights of the natural parent but, more

       importantly, “embodies innumerable social, psychological, cultural, and

       biological considerations that significantly benefit the child and serve the child’s

       best interests.” L.L., 745 N.E.2d at 229; In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d

       283, 287 (Ind. 2002), reh’g denied. The third party bears the burden of

       overcoming this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. L.L., 745

       N.E.2d at 230; see also B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287.

[12]   Evidence sufficient to overcome the natural-parent presumption includes a

       parent’s (1) present unfitness, (2) long acquiescence in the third party’s custody,

       and (3) past abandonment of the child “such that the affections of the child and

       third party have become so interwoven that to sever them would seriously mar

       and endanger the future happiness of the child.” L.L., 745 N.E.2d at 230-31; see

       also B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287 (stating trial courts are not limited to these three

       factors). If the presumption is rebutted, then the trial court engages in a best-

       interests analysis using the factors in Indiana Code sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-

       14-13-2.5. L.L., 745 N.E.2d at 231.

[13]   Here, the trial court found that Mother “abandoned” the children, thereby

       rebutting the presumption that she should have custody. Appellant’s App. Vol.

       II pp. 39, 47. Mother first denies that she abandoned the children. In the

       alternative, Mother argues that if she abandoned the children, it was from June

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023       Page 7 of 23
       2018 to December 2019, which was before the November 2020 custody

       proceedings in which Grandparents agreed that Mother would continue to have

       custody of the children. As such, Mother claims the abandonment cannot

       “serve as a basis for modifying after” November 2020 and therefore “the trial

       court’s [c]onclusion that [Grandparents] rebutted the presumption is clearly

       erroneous.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 44, 46. We must agree.

[14]   It is undisputed that the children lived with Mother at Grandparents’ house

       from their birth in 2011 and 2012 until June 2018 and then with Mother at her

       house from December 2019 until the trial court’s order in March 2023.

       Accepting as true the court’s finding that Mother left the children with

       Grandparents from June 2018 to December 2019, which we must under our

       standard of review, Mother retrieved the children in December 2019 and moved

       them into her “appropriate and safe” home. The children lived with Mother

       until November 2020 when Grandparents agreed—and the trial court ordered—

       that Mother would continue to have custody of the children and Grandparents

       would have visitation. By the time Grandparents sought to modify custody of

       the children in May 2022, the children had lived with Mother for two-and-a-

       half years. Although Mother abandoned the children from June 2018 to

       December 2019, it was so far in the past that it can’t be relied on to rebut the

       parental presumption favoring Mother. See In re Adoption of W.K., 163 N.E.3d

       370, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (in an adoption case without parental consent

       based on failure to communicate, holding it would “defy logic to allow a long-

       past, one-year period of poor communication to overcome a lengthy period of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023       Page 8 of 23
       significant communication that immediately precedes the adoption petition”),

       trans. denied; id. at 375 (in an adoption case without parental consent based on

       failure to support, holding it would “defy logic to allow Father’s alleged one-

       year period of not supporting the children in 2013 and 2014 to overcome his

       more recent support of the children, including from 2014 to 2019”). In short,

       third parties should not be allowed to “bank” long-past periods of poor

       parenting to be wielded against parents after circumstances have improved

       significantly. Because Grandparents did not rebut the natural-parent

       presumption by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court’s judgment is

       clearly erroneous.

[15]   The dissent concludes that Mother is unfit, thereby rebutting the parental

       presumption favoring her. But in its order, the trial court did not find that

       Mother is unfit. And neither Grandparents nor Father claim that Mother is

       unfit. In any event, other than facts showing that Grandparents are fit (such as

       that Grandparents’ home was the children’s home base and Grandparents

       enrolled the children in extracurricular activities), the dissent cites Mother’s

       tardiness in seeking counseling for the children, which she has since remedied,

       and thwarting Father’s parenting time. Both of these noncompliance issues

       should be dealt with through the trial court’s contempt powers. See Montgomery

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023       Page 9 of 23
       v. Montgomery, 59 N.E.3d 343, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. In fact, in

       this proceeding, the trial court denied Father’s petition for contempt. 4

[16]   Because the trial court erroneously concluded that the natural-parent

       presumption was rebutted, we reverse the trial court and remand this case with

       instructions to award Mother custody of the children and reinstate the prior

       orders giving Grandparents visitation and Father parenting time.5

[17]   Reversed and remanded.

       Brown, J., concurs.

       Bradford, J., dissents with opinion.

       4
         The dissent also notes that the trial court found that Mother “facilitated L.M.’s relationship with a sex
       offender.” Slip op. ¶27. Some context is in order. Mother testified that L.M.’s biological father is Jonathon
       Johnson, who has a conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor, and that L.M. has seen Johnson through
       the years believing him to be his real father. There is no evidence of any impropriety between L.M. and
       Johnson.
       5
        Mother also argues the trial court erred in modifying custody to Grandparents because it did not “designate
       any substantial change in any of the statutory factors since the last custody order” in November 2020.
       Appellant’s Br. p. 25. Given our holding above, we need not address this issue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023                            Page 10 of 23
       Bradford, J., dissents with opinion.

[18]   Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its

       discretion in awarding custody of the Children to Grandparents, I respectfully

       dissent. Even if one disregards Mother’s abandonment of the Children entirely,

       there is more than enough left to rebut the presumption of parental custody and

       support findings of a substantial change in at least one of the relevant statutory

       factors and that a change of custody is in the Children’s best interests. In order

       to adequately explain my position, I feel it necessary to relate some additional

       facts.

[19]   Guardian ad litem Kelly Ferguson (“GAL Ferguson”) was appointed on

       January 5, 2022, and issued a report on May 5, 2022, after meeting with

       Grandparents, L.J. and L.M. (collectively, “the Children”), Mother, Father,

       and Hannah Langford of the Department of Child Services. Mother told GAL

       Ferguson on February 13, 2022, that “she was not going to make the boys go

       over [to Father’s] if they did not want to” and that her attorney advised her that

       “she has to take them to the meeting place, and make the boys go to [Father’s]

       car and tell them they don’t want to come, and then she can’t be the one that

       leaves first, and it won’t come back on her.” Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 4.

       GAL Ferguson reported that she had emailed Mother several times regarding

       visitation but that Mother “continues to say ‘I encourage them to go, but I’m

       not going to let them not get back in my car’.” Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 5.

[20]   GAL Ferguson met with L.J. on January 25 and April 1, 2022, and reported

       after the second meeting that his “demeanor was VERY different from the first
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023     Page 11 of 23
       school visit” and that “[h]e appeared angry and shut down.” Grandparents’

       App. Vol. II p. 6. L.J. indicated that he was not going to Father’s anymore

       “because [Father’s wife had] put her hands on him and [thrown] him on the

       couch” and that this had “happened maybe 4-5 times total.” Grandparents’

       App. Vol. II p. 6. Later that day, however, Langford told GAL Ferguson that

       she “would be unsubstantiating the physical abuse allegations regarding [L.J.].”

       Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 7. L.J. told GAL Ferguson that “he [would] not

       follow any court order that [was] made, and neither [would Mother].”

       Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 6.

[21]   GAL Ferguson also met with L.M. on January 25 and April 1, 2022. GAL

       Ferguson’s May 5, 2022, report related the following regarding the first of those

       meetings:

               [L.M.] stated he was given the choice to go to [Father’s] and
               chose not to go. He kept repeating the same thing, despite it
               being non-responsive to any question asked. He kept stating
               “they don’t really care about me over there. They don’t treat me
               the same. They don’t love me anymore”. This line of responses
               led to concern that these answers appeared to be coached and/or
               influenced in some way for some reason. [L.M.] stated that he
               used to go over there and liked it, but now they don’t care about
               him.

       Grandparents’ App. Vol. II pp. 6–7. On April 1, 2022, L.M. told GAL

       Ferguson that he had not been to Father’s house since his January meeting with

       her.

[22]   The summary to GAL Ferguson’s May 5, 2022, report read as follows:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023   Page 12 of 23
               Parties have been unable to co-parent effectively, and this GAL
               believes changes need to be made to ensure everyone has a
               positive, healthy relationship with the children. Mother has
               shown that she has not, will not, and has no plans to enforce the
               court order for parenting time for [Father]. She told this GAL, on
               numerous occasions, that she does not care what the order says,
               she will not force her boys to go somewhere they do not want to
               go. This GAL has implored her [to] comply, and she has
               continued to refuse. She has also failed to get them enrolled in
               therapy, per the order. It has been over 4 months, and she has not
               had an appointment set up for them, despite allegedly “trying”.
               She has shown a blatant disrespect for this Court and Your
               Honor’s rulings. She has also coached the children, or
               inadvertently steered the children towards their “feelings”
               towards [Father].

       Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 7. GAL Ferguson recommended, inter alia, that

       custody of the Children be granted to Grandparents.

[23]   GAL Ferguson later met separately with L.J. and L.M. on August 26 and

       November 17, 2022, and reported on November 18, 2022, that not much had

       changed in the previous six months. L.J. stated that he had visited Father only

       once between April and August of 2022 and that he had not liked it and did not

       want to return. L.J. told GAL Ferguson that he would go to Father’s house if

       the trial court “‘made’” him. Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 10. In November of

       2022, L.J. told GAL Ferguson that he had not visited with Father since August.

[24]   In his August 26, 2022, meeting with GAL Ferguson, L.M. indicated that he

       had visited with Father once between April and August of 2022 and that it “was

       really good.” Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 10. At the second meeting in

       November, L.M. told GAL Ferguson that he had not visited with Father since
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023    Page 13 of 23
       August and that Mother was still telling him “‘I’m not making you go, but you

       can’ in regards to visits with [Father].” Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 10. L.M.

       told GAL Ferguson that he “would go if [Mother] made him go.”

       Grandparents’ App. Vol. II p. 10. GAL Ferguson’s recommendations,

       including that Grandparents be given custody of the Children, remained as they

       had been in her first report.

       I.      Rebuttal of the Parental-Custody Presumption
[25]   Evidence sufficient to overcome the parental-custody presumption can include

       a parent’s (1) present unfitness, (2) long acquiescence in the third party’s

       custody, and (3) past abandonment of the child “such that the affections of the

       child and third party have become so interwoven that to sever them would

       seriously mar and endanger the future happiness of the child.” In re

       Guardianship of L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 230–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

       That said, the list in L.L. is non-exclusive. See In re Guardianship of B.H., 770

       N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind. 2002) (noting that trial courts are not limited to the three

       factors mentioned in L.L.). If the presumption is rebutted (and the trial court

       finds that a de facto guardian exists), then the trial court engages in a best-

       interests analysis using the factors in Indiana Code sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-

       14-13-2.5. L.L., 745 N.E.2d at 231. I conclude that the record contains more

       than enough evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that the parental-

       custody presumption was rebutted.

[26]   As an initial matter, it seems to me that the trial court was far less concerned by

       Mother’s abandonment than it was by her failure to obtain mental-health care

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023       Page 14 of 23
for the Children, her refusal to abide by court orders regarding visitation, and

her other alienating behavior. This is reflected in the trial court’s order, in

which it identified the following evidence as rebutting the parental-custody

presumption:

             • Since birth, the [Grandparents’] residence was considered
               the minor children’s “home base.”
             • In June of 2018, [Mother] abandoned the children when
               she moved out of her parents’ home to move in with her
               boyfriend[.] She left both the minor children in
               [Grandparents’] care for more one (1) year and did not
               consistently have any parenting time with the children or
               offer any real justification for abandoning the children.
             • More than one (1) year passed before [Mother] retrieved
               the children from their school and regained custody in
               December of 2019 without discussing the change of
               residence with [Grandparents]. [Mother] sent the Maternal
               Grandmother an email advising her that the boys would
               now be living with [Mother].
             • When residing with [Grandparents], the boys were
               provided a stable home. [Grandparents] were involved for
               the whole of the minor children’s lives, and enrolled them
               into Vogel Elementary School. The Maternal Grandfather
               got [L.J.] set up on 504 plan and an IEP with the school.
             • The Maternal Grandfather further got [L.J.] into therapy
               with Southwestern Behavioral Healthcare. [Grandparents]
               got the children involved in basketball, baseball, fishing,
               Cub Scouts, and hiking. The first Guardian Ad Litem
               report by Amy Brandsasse on November 2, 2020 reported
               that [Grandparents provided] a “stable home” for the
               children. The Maternal Grandmother reported that []they
               taught the boys the value of money by giving them the
               chance to earn money by doing chores.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023       Page 15 of 23
                    • Respondent/Mother failed to obtain therapy for the
                      children for approximately nineteen (19) months despite
                      adding to the children’s issues by informing each child that
                      he had multiple fathers and evidence of continuing
                      problems at the children’s schools.
                    • [Mother] thwarted [Father’s] parenting time, and advised
                      the children that they could choose whether to attend
                      parenting time with [Father]. At the same time, she
                      facilitated [L.M.]’s relationship with a registered sex
                      offender at every turn.
       Order p. 12.

[27]   Even if the abandonment is taken off of the table, we are left with findings,

       supported by evidence, that Grandparents’ residence is considered the

       Children’s “home base”; Maternal Grandfather saw to it that L.J. received the

       therapy he requires; Grandparents enrolled the Children in school and got them

       involved in basketball, baseball, fishing, Cub Scouts, and hiking; and

       Grandparents provided Children with a stable home. In contrast, when the

       Children resided with Mother, she failed to obtain therapy for them for

       approximately nineteen months, told both of them that Father was not their

       “real” father, thwarted Father’s visitation with them, and facilitated L.M.’s

       relationship with a registered sex offender.

[28]   Almost all of the above is plainly relevant to the question of Mother’s present

       fitness as a parent. See L.L., 745 N.E.2d at 230–31 (courts may consider parental

       fitness in determining whether the parental-custody presumption has been

       rebutted). At the very least, after many months of prodding and reminders that

       she was subject to a court order regarding visitation (the continuing violation of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023     Page 16 of 23
       which could have resulted in a contempt citation and incarceration), Mother

       was still telling the Children that they did not have to visit Father if they did not

       want to.

[29]   To the extent that any of the circumstances identified by the trial court do not

       directly relate to Mother’s current fitness, they are nonetheless relevant because

       they establish Mother’s history of failing to provide mental-health care to the

       Children and thwarting Father’s visitation, among other alienating behaviors.

       Because “[p]ast behavior is a valid predictor for future conduct[,]” Arms v. Arms,

       803 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), the trial court was fully entitled to

       take Mother’s history into account. The record contains more than enough

       evidence to rebut the presumption that Mother should have custody of the

       Children.

       II. Grandparents’ Custody of the Children
[30]   Because I have concluded that the parental-custody presumption has been

       rebutted in this case, I would reach the question of the trial court’s

       determination that Grandparents should have custody of the Children. I

       conclude that the record also supports the trial court’s grant of custody to

       Grandparents. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-14-13-6, a court may only

       modify a child custody order if it finds that:

                    (1) modification is in the best interests of the minor child; and

                    (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the
                        factors that the court may consider under section 2 and, if
                        applicable, section 2.5 of this chapter.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023        Page 17 of 23
[31]   The factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-14-13-2 include:

               (1) The age and sex of the child.

               (2) The wishes of the child’s parents.

               (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
                   child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

               (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

                    (a) The child’s parents

                    (b) The child’s siblings; and

                    (c) Any other person who may significantly affect the child’s
                        best interest.

               (5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.

               (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

               (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
                   parent.

               (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
                   custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
                   consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter.

       Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023         Page 18 of 23
[32]   As the majority agrees, the trial court found that Grandparents were de facto

       custodians of the Children. Should a child or children be found to have de facto

       custodians, the following also applies in a custody proceeding:

               (b) In addition to the factors listed in section 2 of this chapter, the
                   court shall consider the following factors in determining
                   custody:

                    (1) The wishes of the child’s de facto custodian.

                    (2) The extent to which the child has been cared for, nurtured,
                        and supported by the de facto custodian.

                    (3) The intent of the child’s parent in placing the child with
                        the de facto custodian.

                    (4) The circumstances under which the child was allowed to
                        remain in the custody of the de facto custodian, including
                        whether the child was placed with the de facto custodian
                        to allow the parent seeking custody to:

                        (A) seek employment;

                        (B) work; or

                        (C) attend school.

               (c) If a court determines that a child is in the custody of a de facto
                   custodian, the court shall make the de facto custodian a party
                   to the proceeding.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023          Page 19 of 23
               (d) The court shall award custody of the child to the child’s de
                   facto custodian if the court determines that it is in the best
                   interests of the child.

               (e) If the court awards custody of the child to the child’s de facto
                   custodian, the de facto custodian is considered to have legal
                   custody of the child under Indiana law.

       Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.5.

       A.      Substantial Change
[33]   Since the agreed order of November 12, 2020, in which all agreed that the

       Children would be evaluated by L.J.’s counselor at Southwestern Behavioral

       Healthcare and would follow any treatment recommendations, Mother has

       failed to pursue the specified mental-health treatment for the Children. Given

       that all agreed that the Children were in need of therapy that Mother has not

       provided, this is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of a substantial change

       relating to the mental health of the children pursuant to Indiana Code section

       31-14-13-2(6), which relates to “[t]he mental and physical health of all

       individuals involved.” Moreover, there is ample evidence that, due to Mother’s

       interference with Father’s parenting time and other alienating behavior, the

       Children’s relationship with Father has significantly deteriorated. See Ind. Code

       § 31-14-13-2(4)(a) (providing that one of the statutory factors is “[t]he

       interaction and interrelationship of the child with [] the child’s parents”).

       Mother has told both Children that Father is not their “real” father and allowed

       them to decide whether they will have visitation with him, all while apparently

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023         Page 20 of 23
       mounting a campaign to malign him and turn the Children against him.

       According to Father, he has “lost a huge relationship with the kids [who] hardly

       even acknowledge me as a Dad.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 11–12. In short, the record

       indicates that Mother has gone to great lengths to destroy whatever relationship

       Father had with the Children and, unfortunately, appears to be succeeding.

       There is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that there has

       been a significant change in one or more of the statutory factors.

       B.      Best Interests of the Children
[34]   It is well-settled that

               [a] child custody determination falls within the sound discretion
               of the trial court, and its determination will not be disturbed on
               appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. In Re
               Guardianship of R.B., 619 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
               We are reluctant to reverse a trial court’s determination
               concerning child custody unless the determination is clearly
               erroneous and contrary to the logic and effect of the evidence. Id.
               We do not reweigh evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and
               we consider only the evidence which supports the trial court’s
               decision. Wallin v. Wallin, 668 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. Ct. App.
               1996).

       Spencer v. Spencer, 684 N.E.2d 500, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “[A]ppellate courts

       are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record and conclude that

       the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and

       scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly

       understand the significance of the evidence.” B.L. v. J.S., 59 N.E.3d 253, 259

       (Ind. App. 2016) (citations and internal quotations omitted), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023       Page 21 of 23
[35]   The trial court, unlike this court, evaluated the evidence and observed the

       witnesses first-hand before concluding that it was in the Children’s best interests

       to award custody of them to Grandparents. As mentioned, among the evidence

       heard by the trial court was evidence of Mother’s reluctance to see to it that the

       Children received the mental-health treatment they required, her thwarting of

       Father’s visitation, and her other alienating behaviors.

[36]   Moreover, the trial court read the reports and heard the testimony of GAL

       Ferguson, who first recommended granting custody to Grandparents on May 5,

       2022, and reiterated that recommendation on November 18, 2022. Moreover,

       GAL Ferguson testified that she had first met with the Children in January of

       2022 and that they had been “very [] happy and talkative and forthcoming and

       open” during that first meeting but had been “very quiet, very short, almost

       teetering on rude” and “just very shut off [and] angry” during subsequent visits.

       Tr. Vol. II pp. 240, 241. GAL Ferguson indicated that the Children had been

       visiting regularly with Father prior to January of 2022; visitation had essentially

       ceased after that; and, when confronted, Mother had repeatedly replied “that

       she [had] encourage[d] the kids to go but she wasn’t going to make them do

       something they didn’t want to do.” Tr. Vol. II p. 242. When GAL Ferguson

       was appointed, the Children were not in therapy, despite the agreed order of

       November 12, 2020, providing that they be evaluated and follow all

       recommendations. GAL Ferguson had pressed Mother repeatedly about

       therapy, but therapy did not actually start until July of 2022, nineteen months

       after the agreed order.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JP-776 | November 28, 2023     Page 22 of 23
[37]   When asked why she believed that granting custody of the Children to

       Grandparents was in the Children’s best interests, GAL Ferguson replied,

               I believe that number one, they’re safe there and comfortable
               there. They’ve been there a significant period of their life. That is
               the home that used Vogel as the home school. Vogel’s right
               across from where they live. They visit with them frequently.
               And I believe that [Grandparents] would make sure that the
               Court orders are followed. [….] I believe that they would ensure
               that the kids go to [Father and his wife] for their visits. I believe
               that they would ensure that the kids go to therapy when they’re
               supposed to. They would meet all of their needs.

       Tr. Vol. II pp. 246–47. When asked in what way Mother had failed to meet the

       Children’s needs, GAL Ferguson replied, “In a way that Mother has blatantly

       disregarded the Court order for the last year and a half.” Tr. Vol. II p. 247.

       After hearing this evidence, the trial court was justified in concluding that the

       best way to ensure that the Children receive the mental-health care they need

       and reestablish a relationship with Father is to award custody to Grandparents.

       Because I would vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court, I respectfully

       dissent.

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