Court Opinion

ID: 9401304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 18:01:05.725997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.937122
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12832    Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 06/12/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12832
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       TORY LENARD TROUP,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant,

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00214-SCJ-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12832         Document: 33-1        Date Filed: 06/12/2023         Page: 2 of 5

       2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12832

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Tory Troup appeals his total sentence after being convicted
       of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, in vi-
       olation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846; and conspiracy to commit
       money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Specifically,
       Mr. Troup challenges the enforceability of his appeal waiver as ap-
       plied to the district court’s order of forfeiture, and he argues that
       the district court abused its discretion in reaching that decision.
       The government now moves to dismiss the appeal as barred by
       Troup’s appeal waiver. 1
              Ordinarily, “[t]he voluntariness of a guilty plea is a question
       of law reviewed de novo.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343,
       1352 (11th Cir. 1993). But, where the defendant neither objects to
       the plea proceedings nor moves to withdraw the plea, we review
       the district court’s compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 only for
       plain error. See United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th
       Cir. 2003); United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir.
       2005). Moreover, issues not raised in an initial brief are forfeited
       and generally deemed abandoned. See United States v. Campbell,
       26 F.4th 860, 871-72 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95
       (2022). An appellant fails to brief a claim when he does not “plainly

       1 We note that, although the district court also denied certain motions filed by
       Mr. Troup in 2023, he did not file a new notice of appeal thereafter and, in any
       event, does not expressly challenge that ruling now on appeal.
USCA11 Case: 22-12832      Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 06/12/2023     Page: 3 of 5

       22-12832               Opinion of the Court                         3

       and prominently” raise it, such as by devoting a discrete section of
       his argument to the claim. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739
       F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
              We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.
       See United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A
       sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly
       and voluntarily. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351
       (11th Cir. 1993).
               To establish that a waiver was made knowingly and volun-
       tarily, the government must show either that: (1) the district court
       specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the
       plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant oth-
       erwise understood the full significance of the waiver. See id. The
       government cannot show that an appeal waiver was knowing and
       voluntary from an examination of the text alone. See id. at 1352. A
       waiver is enforceable if the defendant claimed to understand it dur-
       ing the plea colloquy, confirmed that he had read the plea agree-
       ment and knew it was binding, and entered into the plea agreement
       freely and voluntarily. See United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320,
       1323-24, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a waiver is valid where
       it was “referenced” at the Rule 11 hearing and where the district
       court established that the defendant had read and understood
       “every page and every word” of the plea agreement). Criminal for-
       feiture constitutes a part of a defendant’s sentence. See Libretti v.
       United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39 (1995).
USCA11 Case: 22-12832      Document: 33-1       Date Filed: 06/12/2023      Page: 4 of 5

       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12832

               Here, Mr. Troup waived his right to appeal his total sen-
       tence, including the forfeiture of property, by knowingly and vol-
       untarily entering an appeal waiver as part of his plea agreement.
       See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. Specifically, the plea agreement
       signed by him contained an explicit sentence appeal waiver in
       which he waived the right to appeal except in certain specified sce-
       narios. The district court then ensured that he understood that he
       was waiving the right to appeal his total sentence except in the
       specified situations by having the government read out the terms
       of the waiver and by questioning him about the waiver. Bushert,
       997 F.2d at 1351. His argument that his acceptance of the waiver
       was not knowing and voluntary due to the court’s failure to explic-
       itly discuss forfeiture is without merit, as it is settled law that crim-
       inal forfeiture is included under the umbrella of a defendant’s sen-
       tence. See Libretti, 516 U.S. at 39. Further, his plea agreement,
       which he testified that he read, understood, and discussed with his
       attorney, expressly stated that he waived the right to appeal a for-
       feiture determination, though not in the appeal waiver section. See
       Weaver, 275 F.3d at 1323-24, 1333.
              In sum, Mr. Troup knowingly and voluntarily gave up his
       right to appeal the district court’s forfeiture determinations. Addi-
       tionally, none of the exceptions to the waiver apply to this case.
       Specifically: (i) the district court did not depart or vary upward
       from the applicable guideline range (292-365 months’ incarcera-
       tion) before sentencing Mr. Troup; (ii) he does not argue that his
       attorney was constitutionally ineffective below; and (iii) the gov-
       ernment did not file a cross-appeal.
USCA11 Case: 22-12832   Document: 33-1   Date Filed: 06/12/2023   Page: 5 of 5

       22-12832           Opinion of the Court                     5

             Accordingly, the government’s motion is GRANTED, and
       Mr. Troup’s appeal is DISMISSED.

             APPEAL DISMISSED.