Court Opinion

ID: 9490253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:37:42.650169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:58.559637
License: Public Domain

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
The Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) appeals from an order of the District Court denying the OIC’s motion to compel the production of documents subpoenaed by a federal grand jury. We reverse and remand.
I.
The task assigned to Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr is to investigate and prosecute matters “relating in any way to James B. McDougal’s, President William Jefferson Clinton’s, or Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton’s relationships with Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association, Whitewater Development Corporation, or Capital Management Services, Inc.” In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, Div. No. 94-1, Order at 1-2 (D.C.Cir.Sp.Div. Aug. 5, 1994). Mr. Starr also is charged with the duty of pursuing evidence of other violations of the law developed during and connected with or arising out of his primary investigation, known generally as ‘Whitewater.” See id. See generally United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 76, 136 L.Ed.2d 35 (1996).
On June 21, 1996, as part of its investigation, the OIC directed to the White House a grand jury subpoena that required production of “[a]ll documents created during meetings attended by any attorney from the Office of Counsel to the President and Hillary Rodham Clinton (regardless whether any other person was present)” pertaining to several Whitewater-related subjects. Subpoena Rider at 1. The White House identified nine sets of notes responsive to the subpoena but refused to produce them, citing executive *914privilege, attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work product doctrine.
On August 19,1996, the OIC filed a motion before the District Court to compel production of two of the nine sets of documents identified by the White House. The first set of documents comprises notes taken by Associate Counsel to the President Miriam Nemetz on July 11, 1995, at a meeting attended by Mrs. Clinton, Special Counsel to the President Jane Sherburne, and Mrs. Clinton’s personal attorney, David Kendall. The subject of this meeting was Mrs. Clinton’s activities following the death of Deputy Counsel to the President Vincent W. Foster, Jr. The documents in the second collection are notes taken by Ms. Sherburne on January 26,1996, during meetings attended by Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Kendall, Nicole Seligman (a partner of Mr. Kendall’s), and, at times, John Quinn, Counsel to the President. These meetings, which took place during breaks in and immediately after Mrs. Clinton’s testimony before a federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., concerned primarily the discovery of certain billing records from the Rose Law Firm in the residence area of the White House.
The White House abandoned its claim of executive privilege before the District Court, relying solely on the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Mrs. Clinton also entered a personal appearance through counsel in the District Court and asserted her personal attorney-client privilege. The District Court found it unnecessary to reach the broadest question presented by the OIC, whether a federal governmental entity may assert the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine in response to a subpoena by a federal grand jury. Instead, the court concluded that because Mrs. Clinton and the White House had a “genuine and reasonable (whether or not mistaken)” belief that the conversations at issue were privileged, the attorney-client privilege applied. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 20. In addition, the court held that the work product doctrine prevented disclosure of the notes to the grand jury. See id. at 22.
The OIC appealed, and we granted expedited review. Mrs. Clinton moved to intervene formally, and we granted her motion. The case was submitted following oral arguments in a closed session. The District Court did not find it necessary to examine the disputed materials in camera, see id. at 18 n. 10, and neither do we.2
At the request of the White House, and in order to preserve the secrecy of the grand jury’s proceedings, we filed our opinion under seal on April 9,1997, intending to publish a redacted opinion shortly thereafter. Since we filed our opinion, however, press reports have related some of the substance of our decision. Believing that these disclosures have portrayed the White House in an unfairly negative light, the White House and Mrs. Clinton moved this Court to publish its opinion and to unseal the briefs and appendices filed in this Court, and the OIC joined in the motion. The motion is granted. Accordingly, this opinion, as amended, together with Judge Kopfs dissent, is released for publication, and the briefs and appendices are ordered unsealed.
II.
We first consider our jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. An order of a district court denying a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena — that is, an order requiring compliance with the subpoena — is not immediately appealable. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327-28, 60 S.Ct. 540, 542-43, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691-92, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3099-3100, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (determining that, in unique context of case, President could appeal without first being cited for contempt). This case presents the opposite situation: an order refusing to require compliance with a subpoena. An order granting a motion to quash a subpoena is an appeal-able order, either under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1994) (permitting government to appeal from an order “excluding evidence ... in a criminal proceeding”), or under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (permitting appeals from “all *915final decisions of the district courts”). See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Kent), 646 F.2d 963, 967-68 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981); In re Grand Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 1978 (Colucci), 597 F.2d 851, 854-58 (3d Cir.1979). It makes no practical difference that the instant case involves the denial of a motion to enforce a subpoena rather than the grant of a motion to quash a subpoena. We conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
Although this case is a dispute between two entities of the federal government, i.e., the White House and the OIC, it presents a justiciable controversy. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 697, 94 S.Ct. at 3102.
III.
We will address first the issue that the District Court found it unnecessary to decide: .whether an entity of the federal government may use the attorney-client privilege to avoid complying with a subpoena by a federal grand jury. Before we confront the merits of this question, however, we believe it is important to identify what is not at issue in this case. The OIC does not seek to invade the attorney-client relationship existing between Mrs. Clinton, in her personal capacity, and Mr. Kendall, her personal lawyer. The privilege set up by the White House is strictly a governmental privilege, with the White House (or the Office of the President, alternatively) as client and Ms. Sherburne and Ms. Nemetz as attorneys. Accordingly, the White House is the real party in interest in this case, although Mrs. Clinton presents arguments similar to those of the White House in her capacity as an intervenor.
The discussion that follows can be summed up rather simply. We need not decide whether a governmental attorney-client privilege exists in other contexts, for it is enough to conclude that even if it does, the White House may not use the privilege to withhold potentially relevant information from a federal grand jury.
A.
“[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof [is] governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.” Fed.R.Evid. 501. We must therefore apply the federal common law of attorney-client privilege to the situation presented by this case. See In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir.1994).
The OIC and the White House have taken strikingly different rhetorical approaches to the question presented here. The OIC argues that recognizing an attorney-client privilege in these circumstances would be tantamount to establishing a new privilege, which courts ordinarily undertake with great reluctance. The White House, in contrast, argues that the attorney-client privilege is already the best-established of the common-law privileges and that, furthermore, it is an absolute privilege. The White House is correct, of course, in its assertion that the attorney-client privilege is the oldest known to the common law. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). But the lengthy roots of the privilege do not necessarily mean that it must apply in this dispute within the federal government, especially because the privilege has not previously been so applied. Nor does the White House advance its case significantly by arguing that the attorney-client privilege is absolute, in the sense that it cannot be overcome by a showing of need. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493-94 (9th Cir. 1989). This argument merely begs the true question, whether a governmental attorney-' client privilege exists at all in the context of a federal criminal investigation.
We address this question by beginning with Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503, which we have described as “a useful starting place” for an examination of the federal common law of attorney-client privilege. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d at 935. As promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1972, Proposed Rule 503 would have defined “client” to include “a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or private.” Proposed Fed.R.Evid. 503(a)(1), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 235 (1972). The, commentary *916makes it clear that “[t]he definition of ‘client’ includes governmental bodies.” Id. advisory committee’s note. But neither the proposed rule nor the commentary has anything to say about the particular situation before us in this case; they represent only the broad proposition that a governmental body may be a client for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.3
Other compilations of the general law have taken similar approaches. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 124 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,1996) [hereinafter Restatement] (“[T]he attorney-client privilege extends to a communication of a governmental organization.”);4 Unif.R.Evid. 502(a)(1) (defining “client” in terms similar to Proposed Fed.R.Evid. 503). Each of these authorities, however, expresses at least some concern about applying the privilege broadly to governmental entities. Uniform Rule 502 limits the governmental privilege to situations involving a pending investigation or litigation and requires a finding by the court that disclosure will “seriously impair” the agency’s pursuit of the investigation or litigation. See Unif.R.Evid. 502(d)(6).5 Language in the Restatement addresses even more directly the concerns relevant in the instant ease:
More particularized rules may be necessary where one agency of government claims the privilege in resisting a demand for information by another. Such rules should take account of the complex considerations of governmental structure, tradition, and regulation that are involved.
Restatement § 124 cmt. b. We agree with this language from the Restatement and accordingly look to the case law for further guidance.
The White House has located only two eases involving a clash between a grand jury and a claim of governmental attorney-client privilege. In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Farber), 241 N.J.Super. 18, 574 A.2d 449 (App.Div.1989), a New Jersey intermediate appellate court considered two subpoenas issued by a county grand jury to private lawyers who had been retained to represent a county agency. The court concluded that “the privilege is fully applicable to communications between a public body and an attorney retained to represent it,” id. 574 A.2d at 454, but reversed the lower court’s order quashing the subpoenas because the attorneys should have been required to appear before the grand jury and invoke the privilege in response to specific questions, see id. at 458. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 886 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.1989), the Sixth Circuit considered a subpoena issued by a federal grand jury to the city of Detroit. The court vacated the district court’s finding that the city council was not the client of the city’s corporation counsel but concluded that the application of the attorney-client privilege depended on the confidentiality of the communications, which in turn depended on the proper application of the state open-meetings law. See id,, at 138. The court remanded the case to allow the district court to resolve that issue. See id. at 139.
*917For several reasons, we do not find these cases particularly persuasive. First, neither court actually applied a governmental attorney-client privilege to'block a grand jury’s investigation; both found it necessary to remand for further proceedings. We hesitate to ignore judicial pronouncements too readily as mere dicta, however, for we must find guidance somewhere in the parties’ proffered authorities, none of which is directly in point. Several significant factual distinctions between the aforementioned eases and the case at bar are therefore also relevant. The New Jersey case involved the interaction between a county grand jury and a county agency, a subject which is undoubtedly of considerable importance to the state of New Jersey but does not bear directly on the relationship of a federal grand jury to a federal entity. In addition, that case involved private attorneys hired as special counsel to the-county agency, and the court recognized that the private lawyers were not subject to a state statute requiring all public employees to testify before any grand jury in exchange for use immunity. See In re Grand Jury (Farber), 574 A.2d at 455. It is, of course, impossible for us to determine how the New Jersey court would have harmonized this statute with the asserted governmental attorney-client privilege if the attorney involved had been a public employee. The Sixth Circuit case, involving a standoff between a federal grand jury and a city government, implicates potentially serious federalism concerns not present in the case before us. The court’s brief opinion is also rather unpersuasive legally, as it contains no acknowledgment that to extend the privilege to a .governmental body where individuals within the government are being scrutinized by a grand jury for criminal activity poses anything but a routine concern. (The court cited only two privilege cases, neither of which had anything to do with government lawyers.)
Moving somewhat further afield, the White House cites a number of cases in which courts have applied a governmental attorney-client privilege in civil actions. These cases, all of which involved either the sui generis jurisprudence of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994))6 or a situation in which the party seeking information was a private litigant adversarial to the government,7 are not particularly persuasive in the circumstances of this case. Even if we were to conclude that the governmental attorney-client privilege ordinarily applies in civil litigation pitting the federal government against private parties, a question that we need not and do not decide, we believe the criminal *918context of the instant case, in which an entity of the federal government seeks to withhold information from a federal criminal investigation, presents a rather different issue. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712 n. 19, 94 S.Ct. at 3109 n. 19 (suggesting that executive privilege may apply differently in criminal and civil eases); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 n. 9 (8th Cir.1972) (recognizing that reporter’s privilege may apply differently in criminal and civil eases), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125, 93 S.Ct. 939, 35 L.Ed.2d 257 (1973); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C.Cir.1981) (same).
Lacking persuasive direction in the ease law, we turn to general principles.
“For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwieke) has a right to every man’s evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.”
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950) (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)). Privileges, as exceptions to the general rule, “are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710, 94 S.Ct. at 3108. It is appropriate to recognize a privilege “ ‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.’ ” Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 912, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1454, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
Federal common law recognizes a privilege only in rare situations. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1931, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (adopting psychotherapist-patient privilege); University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189, 110 S.Ct. 577, 582, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (rejecting academic peer review privilege); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817, 104 S.Ct. 1495, 1502-03, 79 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984) (rejecting work product immunity for accountants); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390, 397, 101 S.Ct. at 683, 686 (assuming, and effectively deciding, that corporation may assert attorney-client privilege); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373, 100 S.Ct. 1185, 1193-94, 63 L.Ed.2d 454 (1980) (rejecting speeeh-or-debate privilege for state legislators); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51-53, 100 S.Ct. at 912-14 (rejecting privilege against adverse spousal testimony, but continuing to recognize privilege for confidential marital communications); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705-13, 94 S.Ct. at 3106-10 (recognizing qualified executive privilege); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335, 93 S.Ct. 611, 619, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (rejecting accountant-client privilege); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2661, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (rejecting news reporter’s privilege);8 In re Grand Jury (Virgin Islands), 103 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (3d Cir.1997) (rejecting, like eight other circuits, parent-child privilege); Petersen v. Douglas County Bank & Trust Co., 967 F.2d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir.1992) (rejecting insurer-insured confidentiality privilege); United States v. Holmes, 594 F.2d 1167, 1171 (8th Cir.) (rejecting probation officer-parolee privilege), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 873, 100 S.Ct. 154, 62 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979).
The White House does not dispute that a grand jury has broad investigatory powers.9 As the Supreme Court has reeog*919nized, the principle that the public is entitled to “every man’s evidence” is “particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings.” Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688, 92 S.Ct. at 2660. “[0]ur historic commitment to the rule of law,” and particularly to the twin goals of criminal justice “ ‘that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer,’ ” are strong factors weighing against the applicability of a privilege. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-09, 94 S.Ct. at 3108 (citation omitted).
In essence, the parties’ arguments center on two eases, neither of which is directly analogous to this case, but each of which has relevance to our decision: Nixon and Upjohn. In Nixon, a special prosecutor directed a subpoena duces tecum to President Nixon, seeking tapes and other materials for use in the criminal trial of seven defendants, including former White House officials. The President refused to comply with the subpoena, claiming executive privilege. After concluding that the special prosecutor had made the showing required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) for a trial subpoena, see id. at 700, 94 S.Ct. at 3103-04, the Supreme Court considered the President’s claim of privilege. The Court recognized that the need for confidential presidential communication “can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties,” id. at 705, 94 S.Ct. at 3106, and that the privilege for presidential communications “is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution,” id. at 708, 94 S.Ct. at 3107. Despite the strong constitutional foundations of the privilege, however, the Court concluded that it had to give way to the special prosecutor’s subpoena:
A President’s acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President’s broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
Id. at 712-13, 94 S.Ct. at 3110.'
The OIC argues that under the logic of Nixon, the White House’s claim of privilege must give way here, for if the governmental attorney-client privilege exists at all, it is certainly not constitutionally based. It is true, as the White House responds, that the President did not assert an attorney-client privilege in Nixon, and so the case is not directly controlling. We agree with the OIC, however, that Nixon is indicative of the general principle that the government’s need for confidentiality may be subordinated to the needs of the government’s own criminal justice processes.
The White House counters by pointing out that Nixon itself recognized the importance of common-law privileges, including the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 709-10, 94 S.Ct. at 3108-09. No one, the White House argues, would suppose that the special prosecutor could compel the production of notes made by a private , lawyer concerning a conversation with a private client about even the most routine traffic ticket. Why then, the argument continues, should the benefit of this important privilege not be available to the White House?
Our discussion of the White House’s primary argument, revolving around Upjohn, should demonstrate why we believe the private-attorney analogy is inapposite. The White House proffers Upjohn as emblematic *920of the wide sweep of the attorney-client privilege, and we agree with that characterization, to a point. In Upjohn, the IRS attempted to subpoena records of an internal investigation conducted by Upjohn’s general counsel. The court of appeals rejected Upjohn’s claim of privilege to the extent that the communications at issue involved lower-level employees outside the so-called “control group.” The Supreme Court rejected the “control group” test as unnecessarily restrictive, recognizing that if the attorney-client privilege is to have any value, it must encompass communications between attorneys and lower-level employees possessing relevant information:
In the case of the individual client the provider of information and the person who acts on the lawyer’s advice are one and the same. In the corporate, context, however, it will frequently be employees beyond the control group as defined by the court below — ‘officers and agents ... responsible for directing [the company’s] actions in response to legal advice’ — who will possess the information needed by the corporation’s lawyers. Middle-level — and inr deed lower-level — employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the relevant information needed by‘corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391, 101 S.Ct. at 683 (alterations by Supreme Court). The Court did not specify the precise extent of the privilege but specifically rejected the “control group” test. Id. at 396-97, 101 S.Ct. at 686.
As the White House points out, Upjohn contains strong language about the importance of the attorney-client privilege in encouraging the full and frank presentation of legal advice to corporations, which helps to insure that corporations will act within the law. See id. at 389, 392, 101 S.Ct. at 682, 684. And the Court recognized that “if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.” Id. at 393,101 S.Ct. at 684. Nevertheless, we believe that important differences between the government and nongovernmental organizations such as business corporations weigh against the application of the principles of Upjohn in this ease. First, the actions of White House personnel, whatever their capacity, cannot expose the White House as an entity to criminal liability. (No one suggests that any of the conduct under investigation by the OIC could expose the White House to civil liability.) A corporation, in contrast, may be subject to both civil and criminal liability for the actions of its agents, and corporate attorneys therefore have a compelling interest in ferreting out any misconduct by employees. The White House simply has no such interest with respect to the actions of Mrs. Clinton.
We also find it significant that executive branch employees, including attorneys, are under a statutory duty to report criminal wrongdoing by other employees to the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994). Even more importantly, however, the general duty of public service calls upon government employees and agencies to favor disclosure over concealment. The difference between the public interest and the private interest is perhaps, by itself, reason enough to find Upjohn unpersuasive in this case. The importance of the public interest in questions of disclosure versus privilege is not unique to this case, for it was a key reason the Supreme Court rejected the concept of work product immunity for accountants:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This ‘public watchdog’ function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant’s interpretations of the client’s financial statements would be to ignore the significance of the accoun*921tant’s role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations.
Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817-18, 104 S.Ct. at 1503. The public responsibilities of the White House are, of course, far greater than those of a private accountant performing a service with public implications. We believe the strong public interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public officials. We also believe that to allow any part of the federal government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield against the production of information relevant to a federal criminal investigation would represent a gross misuse of public assets. See also Jupiter Painting, 87 F.R.D. at 598 (recognizing the “pernicious potential” of a governmental attorney-client privilege “in a government top-heavy with lawyers”).10
We recognize the White House’s concern that “[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393, 101 S.Ct. at 684. Our first response is that the White House assumes that the attorney-client privilege is more predictable ex ante than it actually is. A client discussing an issue with a lawyer cannot know, for example, whether a bankruptcy trustee will later waive the privilege, see Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 358, 105 S.Ct. 1986, 1995-96, 85 L.Ed.2d 372 (1985), or whether the lawyer’s assistance will later become an issue in a proceeding, see Restatement § 130(1), or whether the lawyer and client will later become involved in a dispute, see Restatement § 133, any of which may result in disclosure of the conversation. Even so, we believe our holding in this case does not make the duties of government attorneys significantly more difficult. Assuming arguendo that there is a governmental attorney-client privilege in other circumstances, confidentiality will suffer only in those situations that a grand jury might later see fit to investigate. Because agencies and entities of the government are not themselves subject to criminal liability, a government attorney is free to discuss anything with a government official — except for potential criminal wrongdoing by that official — without fearing later revelation of the conversation. An official who fears he or she may have violated the criminal law and wishes to speak with an attorney in confidence should speak with a private attorney, not a government attorney.
Nor do we foresee any likely effect of our decision on the ability of a government lawyer to advise an official who is contemplating a future course of conduct. If the attorney explains the law accurately and the official follows that advice, no harm can come from later disclosure of the advice, which would be unlikely anyway. Like the Nixon Court, “we cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712, 94 S.Ct. at 3109. The White House’s “chilling effect” argument is no more persuasive in this case than it was in Nixon.
B.
Before we can conclude that the White House may not use the attorney-client privilege to thwart the grand jury’s subpoena, we *922must consider the assertion, made by both the White House and Mrs. Clinton, that the presence of Mr. Kendall, Mrs. Clinton’s private attorney, during her meetings with the White House attorneys affects the .calculus in this case. We disagree.
The White House ánd Mrs. Clinton rely on the common-interest doctrine, which expands the coverage of the attorney-client privilege in certain situations:
If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or non-litigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged ... that relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons. Any such client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made the communication.
Restatement § 126(1); see also Proposed Fed.R.Evid. 503(b)(3), 56 F.R.D. at 236. This doctrine softens the ordinary requirement that lawyer-client communications must be made in confidence in order to be protected by the privilege. See Restatement § 121; John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A, United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 555-56 (8th Cir.1990) (applying the doctrine), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 905, 111 S.Ct. 1683, 114 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991).
One possible interpretation of the meetings at issue here is that they involved Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity, her personal attorney, Mrs. Clinton as a representative of the White House (which we assume for the sake of argument would put her there in an official capacity), and the White House’s official attorneys, in a type of four-sided conference. We will assume this scenario as a factual framework for the possible application of the common-interest doctrine. We conclude that the doctrine is inapplicable, for two distinct reasons.
First, as our discussion in Part III-A, supra, demonstrates, the White House’s assumption that communications made by Mrs. Clinton to Ms. Sherburne and Ms. Nemetz “otherwise qualif[y] as privileged,” Restatement § 126(1), begs the question we are called upon to decide. In addition, there is lacking in this situation the requisite common interest between the clients, who are Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity and the White House. Mrs. Clinton’s interest in the OIC’s investigation is, naturally, avoiding prosecution, or else minimizing the consequences if the OIC decides to pursue charges against her. . One searches in vain for any interest of the White House which corresponds to Mrs. Clinton’s personal interest. The common interest may be “either legal, factual, or strategic in character,” id. cmt. e, but no legitimate interest offered by the White House meets even this loose standard. Most of the interests put forward by the White House are summed up in this excerpt from its brief:
Both [the White House and Mrs. Clinton] needed a full and accurate understanding of the facts surrounding the various incidents under investigation and of the legal consequences of those facts; both had an interest in ensuring that there was no distortion of these events by political and legal adversaries, and no misunderstanding of them by the public.
Br. of White House at 27. In addition, the White House and Mrs. Clinton cite the need for allocation of responsibility between personal and public attorneys, the desire to determine whether any White House policies need to be altered to prevent future difficulties, the fact that the OIC is investigating “official misconduct,” and the ongoing Whitewater-related investigations by the RTC, FDIC, and Congress as factors creating a common interest between them.
We have no doubt that the White House and Mrs. Clinton are concerned with understanding fully the facts involved in the OIC’s investigation, nor that dividing responsibility between the personal attorneys and White House counsel can be a difficult task. And surely the multiplicity of investigating authorities only complicates the lives of these attorneys. But these justifications amount to no more than an assertion that “we all want to obey the law.” We do not believe the common-interest doctrine stretches that far.
As for the suggestion that the OIC is investigating “official misconduct,” thus trig*923gering the interest of the White House, we believe there is a difference between “official misconduct” — whatever that may be — and “misconduct of officials.” The OIC is actually investigating the actions of individuals, some of whom hold positions in the White House. The OIC’s investigation can have no legal, factual, or even strategic effect on the White House as an institution. Certainly action by the OIC may occupy the time of White House staff members, may vacate positions in the White House if any of its personnel are indicted, and may harm the President and Mrs. Clinton politically. But even if we assume that it is proper for the White House to press political concerns upon us, we do not believe that any of these incidental effects on the White House are sufficient to place that governmental institution in the same canoe as Mrs. Clinton, whose personal liberty is potentially at stake.
The White House argues that it must be permitted to invoke the attorney-client privilege “ ‘not for the benefit of the President as an individual, but for the benefit of the Republic.’ ” Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2793, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) (quoting the Solicitor General’s brief filed in that case). Because, however, the White House and Mrs. Clinton have failed to establish that the interests of the Republic coincide with her personal interests, the attempt must fail.
C.
We next confront the conclusion of the District Court that Mrs. Clinton’s reasonable belief that her conversations with White House lawyers were privileged is sufficient to prevent their disclosure. Because we conclude that this issue is irrelevant to the inquiry at hand, we need not examine whether Mrs. Clinton’s belief was reasonable.
In some aspects of the law of attorney-client privilege, the client’s reasonable beliefs may be relevant. For example, courts have found the privilege applicable where the client reasonably believed that a poseur was in fact a lawyer,11 reasonably believed that a lawyer represented the client rather than another party,12 or reasonably believed that a conversation with a lawyer was confidential, in the sense that its substance would not be overheard by or reported to anyone else.13 All these situations involve, in essence, reasonable mistakes of fact, none of which is applicable here. Because Mrs. Clinton does not claim that she believed that the White House lawyers represented her personally, her argument must be that she believed that the law sweeps broadly enough to cloak these conversations within the attorney-client privilege.14 But we know of no authority, and Mrs. Clinton has cited none, holding that a client’s beliefs, subjective or objective, about the law of privilege can transform an otherwise unprivileged conversation into a privileged one.
As the OIC notes, only rarely does the law take account of an actor’s beliefs about the law at the time he or she took action: the doctrine of qualified immunity, the non-applicability of new rules of constitutional law to federal habeas petitions brought by state prisoners, and the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement are perhaps the best examples. Without delving into the *924policy reasons behind these exceptional legal doctrines, we are satisfied that there is no compelling reason that a reasonable-mistake-of-law rule should apply in the realm of privileges. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53, 100 S.Ct. at 913-14 (overruling earlier case that had upheld privilege against adverse spousal testimony and affirming defendant’s conviction, despite possible reliance on prior law).
D.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the White House may not use the attorney-client privilege to avoid complying with the subpoena issued in this case by a federal grand jury calling for the notes in question of Ms. Nemetz and Ms. Sherburne.
IV.
The District Court held that the work product doctrine also, applied in this case to protect the White House attorneys’ notes from disclosure. We disagree.
The work product doctrine sharply limits the access of an opponent to materials “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511, 67 S.Ct. 385, 394, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) (“materials obtained or prepared by an adversary’s counsel with an eye toward litigation”); Restatement § 136(1) (material “prepared by a lawyer for litigation then in progress or in reasonable anticipation of future litigation”). The White House’s claim of work product immunity founders on the “anticipation of litigation” requirement of the doctrine.
Courts have applied work product immunity in a variety of legal contexts. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513-14, 67 S.Ct. at 394-95 (civil case); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2170, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (criminal ease); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 846-47 (8th Cir.1973) (grand jury investigation). The essential element of each case, however, is that the attorney was preparing for or anticipating some sort of adversarial proceeding involving his or her client.15 The White House’s argument that its lawyers were preparing for the OIC’s investigation is simply unpersuasive; as we have stated previously, the OIC is not investigating the White House, nor could it do so. White House officials may be under investigation on account of their individual acts, but we know of no authority allowing a client such as the White House to claim work product immunity for materials merely because they were prepared while some other person, such as Mrs. Clinton, was anticipating litigation.16 Cf. In re California Public Utils. Comm’n, 892 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir.1989) (concluding that non-party to litigation may not assert work product doctrine).
As a fall-back- position, the White House suggests that anticipated congressional hearings will suffice as well as anticipated litigation. The Restatement seems to agree with the White House. See Restatement § 136 cmt. h (stating that litigation “includes a proceeding such as a grand jury or a coroner’s inquiry or an investigative legislative hearing”). Neither the White House, Mrs. Clinton, nor the Restatement cites any authority for this proposition, however, and we have discovered none. Cf. P. & B. Marina, Ltd. Partnership v. Logrande, 136 F.R.D. 50, 58-59 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (finding letters from lobbyist to client not protected work product), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (table). Even if it could be said that the White House anticipated a congressional investigation of the White House itself, rather than merely of individuals who work at the White House, and even if we consider a congressional investigation to be an adversarial proceeding, the only harm that could come to the White House as a result of such an investigation is political harm. As in our discussion of the common-interest doctrine, we decline to endorse the position of the *925White House where it is based on nothing more than political concerns.
The White House bears the burden of establishing the elements of work product immunity. See Restatement § 139(2). Based on the showing the White House has made here, we cannot conclude that the work product of its attorneys may be kept from the OIC.
V.
At oral argument, we raised sua sponte the possibility that we could decide the questions of law presented in this appeal without necessarily applying them to this case. After further consideration, we have concluded that our decision must be applied to the parties now before us.
In Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), the Supreme Court settled one major question of the retroactivity of decisions:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule____ In both civil and criminal cases, we can scarcely permit ‘the substantive law to shift and spring’ according to ‘the particular equities of individual parties’ claims’ of actual reliance on an old rule and of harm from a retroactive application of the new rule.
Id. at 97, 113 S.Ct. at 2517 (citation and alterations omitted); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23, 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-13, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (adopting same rule for criminal eases).
The Court’s recent decisions have not forced it to contend with the permissibility of “pure prospectivity,” that is, the practice of announcing a new rule but applying it neither to the parties involved in the watershed ease nor to others similarly situated. The Court has on occasion resorted to purely prospective decisionmaking, see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2443-44, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J.) (citing eases), but language in the Court’s recent opinions convinces us that purely prospective adjudication is at least unwise and most likely beyond our power. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97, 113 S.Ct. at 2517-18 (citing “ ‘basic norms of constitutional adjudication’ ” (quoting Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322, 107 S.Ct. at 713)); id. at 106, 113 S.Ct. at 2522-23 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“prospective decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power”).
The most relevant precedent also suggests that it is appropriate to apply our decision in this case. In Trammel, the Supreme Court considered the well-established common law privilege against adverse spousal testimony. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 43-46, 100 S.Ct. at 908-10 (describing history of privilege). The Court had specifically affirmed the vitality of the. privilege in Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-79, 79 S.Ct. 136, 138-39, 3 L.Ed.2d 125 (1958), and the Proposed Rules of Evidence had recommended continuation of the privilege. See Proposed Fed.R.Evid. 505(a), 56 F.R.D. at 244. Nevertheless, the district court permitted Trammel’s wife to testify against him over his objection, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42-43, 100 S.Ct. at 908-09. The Supreme Court, by a unanimous vote, took the privilege away from the defendant-spouse, leaving it to the witness-spouse to decide whether to testify. See id. at 53,100 S.Ct. at 913-14. Despite this clear overruling of its earlier precedent, the Court applied the new rule to Trammel’s ease and affirmed his conviction. We believe the same treatment is appropriate in this case, which involves no such drastic change in the law; in fact, because this is a case of first impression, our decision involves no change in the law at all.
In short, a purely prospective decision is little more — perhaps nothing more^-than an advisory opinion. We decline to render such an opinion and conclude that our holding necessarily applies to the White House in this case.
VI.
To sum up, we hold that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the attorney work *926product doctrine is available to the White House in the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the order of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for the entry of an order granting the OIC’s motion to compel.

. We wish to commend the parties on the quality of their briefs and oral arguments despite the expedited appeal process.

.Judge Kopf's dissent relies too heavily, we believe, on the precise wording of Proposed Rule 503. Although we have found the proposed rule accurate in other cases that have come before us, see In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d at 935, it bears repeating that we are instructed by Rule 501 to interpret the attorney-client privilege “in light of reason and experience” and not solely in light of the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1972. Even the Court itself at times has interpreted privileges differently from the rules it proposed. See Jaffee v. Redmond, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1931, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (concluding that psychotherapist-patient privilege encompasses communications to social workers, contrary to Proposed Rule 504); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51-53, 100 S.Ct. 906, 912-14, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (recognizing marital privilege entirely different from Proposed Rule 505).

. The American Law Institute has approved the chapter of Proposed Final Draft No. 1 of the Restatement governing the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. See 64 U.S.L.W. 2739 (May 28, 1996).

. The White House correctly points out that a number of the states adopting the Uniform Rules have omitted the limitation in Rule 502(d)(6). See, e.g., Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-503(4) (1995). These omissions, however, prove no more than does the lack of specific language in Proposed Federal Rule 503.

. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252-53 (D.C.Cir. 1977); Covington & Burling v. Food & Nutrition Serv., 744 F.Supp. 314, 323 (D.D.C.1990); Badran v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 652 F.Supp. 1437, 1440 (N.D.Ill.1987); Green v. IRS, 556 F.Supp. 79, 85-86 (N.D.Ind.1982), aff'd, 734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.1984) (table); cf. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 1518, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (concluding that work product doctrine applies in FOIA cases); Wright v. OSHA, 822 F.2d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that FOIA exemption for records compiled for law enforcement purposes incorporates attorney-client privilege); Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal.App.2d 41, 69 Cal.Rptr. 480, 489 (1968) .(noting, in action under state public meeting act, that California cases have assumed that public agencies may assert privilege). But cf. City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 468 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla.1985) (ruling that state public records act does not exempt communications between attorneys and governmental clients, except during pendency of litigation); News & Observer Publ’g Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465, 412 S.E.2d 7, 17 (1992) (holding that state public records act exempts only written communications from attorney to governmental client, and only for three years).

. See Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F.Supp. 489, 498-500 (E.D.Pa.) (Magistrate Judge) (dicta), aff'd, 943 F.Supp. 501 (E.D.Pa. 1996); Donovan v. Teamsters Union Local 25, 103 F.R.D. 550, 552-53 (D.Mass. 1984); SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 92 F.R.D. 65, 66-67 (N.D.Ga.1981); Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 598 (E.D.Pa.1980); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133, 138-39 (E.D.Wis.1972); Detroit Screwmatic Co. v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 77, 78 (S.D.N.Y.1970); United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 522-23 (D.Colo.1963); cf. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 600 n. 8 (4th Cir.1997) (noting that private party did not challenge applicability of privilege to government agency); Mitzner v. Sobol, 136 F.R.D. 359, 360-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (suggesting that state agency may assert privilege) (dicta); Bruce v. Christian, 113 F.R.D. 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (holding that city agency may assert privilege); State ex rel. Babbitt v. Arnold, 26 Ariz.App. 333, 548 P.2d 426, 428 (1976) (holding that county may assert privilege).

. Some courts have interpreted Branzburg as establishing a qualified news reporter’s privilege. See Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 & n. 5 (9th Cir.1993). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Storer), 810 F.2d 580, 583-86 (6th Cir.1987) (rejecting this theory). Although the Ninth Circuit in Shoen cited our opinion in Cervantes for support, we believe this question is an open one in this Circuit.

. The White House does suggest that the OIC has not shown a "demonstrated, specific need” for the materials subpoenaed by the grand jury, citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713, 94 S.Ct. at 3110. We doubt that this language from Nixon constitutes *919the proper need threshold even on the facts of that case, as it appears in a general discussion, rather than in the Court’s specific analysis of Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c). See id. at 700, 94 S.Ct. at 3103-04. In a grand jury case, the burden is on the subpoenaed party to demonstrate "that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.” United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301, 111 S.Ct. 722, 728, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Cheetham), 791 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing that no showing of need for information is required). The White House’s own descriptions of the notes at issue in this case are sufficient to demonstrate their relevance to the QIC’s investigation.

. Judge Kopf cites several opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel for support. See post at 930-32. We find each of these opinions unpersuasive in the context of this case. Theodore Olson’s 1982 opinion concerning the confidentiality of communications between the President and the Attorney General relies significantly on Freedom of Information Act cases and Upjohn, which we believe are not helpful to the White House in this case, and does not purport to address the viability of the privilege in the face of a grand juiy subpoena. See Memorandum for the Attorney General re: Confidentiality of the Attorney General's Communications in Counseling the President, 6 Op.Off. Legal Counsel 481, 490-97 (1982). Each of the other opinions cited by the White House involves a government attorney representing a government official sued in his or her individual capacity in a Bivens action. In such a case, the government attorney enters into a personal attorney-client relationship with the individual defendant, and the usual privilege applies. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(3) (1996). No such personal attorney-client relationship exists between Mrs. Clinton and the White House attorneys.

. See United States v. Mullen & Co., 776 F.Supp. 620, 621 (D.Mass.1991) (dicta); United States v. Tyler, 745 F.Supp. 423, 425-26 (W.D.Mich.1990); United States v. Boffa, 513 F.Supp. 517, 523 (D.Del.1981) (dicta). See generally Restatement § 122(1).

. See United States v. Hart, No. Crim.A. 92-219, 1992 WL 348425, at *1-2 (E.D.La. Nov. 16, 1992); cf. Wylie v. Marley Co., 891 F.2d 1463, 1471-72 (10th Cir.1989) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court’s application of privilege where relationship of employee to employer's attorney was confusing).

. See United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 752 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211, 111 S.Ct. 2812, 115 L.Ed.2d 984 (1991); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 694-95 (C.D.Cal.1995). See generally Restatement § 121.

.Mrs. Clinton bases her argument in part on the confidentiality obligations of attorneys licensed in the District of Columbia. See D.C. Rules cf Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996). The commentary to that very rule, however, states that it is not intended to govern the scope of the attorney-client privilege, see id. cmt. 5, and we have previously held that ethical rules do not alter the privilege. See United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1995).

. Work product immunity’may be asserted by either the client or the attorney. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 & n. 56 (D.C.Cir. 1982).

. Even if there is a common-interest work product doctrine, see United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299-1300 (D.C.Cir. 1980), our earlier holding that the White House and Mrs. Clinton share no relevant common interest makes the doctrine inapplicable here.