Court Opinion

ID: 9847279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:57:04.441807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:05.533168
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I join in my colleagues’ analysis of the federal constitutional speedy trial right. (Maj. opn., ante, Part III.) However, I would not be so quick to conclude that the state constitutional guarantee offers any less protection to California citizens. {Id., Part II.)
For many years, this court held that the California speedy trial right “ ‘reflects the letter and spirit of’ the Sixth Amendment to the United States *265Constitution” (People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 144, fn. 2 [32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452], quoting Harris v. Municipal Court (1930) 209 Cal. 55, 60 [285 P. 699].) When this court chose to reject the letter and spirit of the federal Constitution, it did so to hold that the state speedy trial right was more protective, attaching at an earlier stage of the proceedings than did the Sixth Amendment. (People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 604-608 [138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203]; compare United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307 [30 L.Ed.2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455].) Yet, the majority now find that the state Constitution, as interpreted in Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493 [149 Cal.Rptr. 597, 585 P.2d 219], places on the accused who claims a violation of his right to a speedy trial an initial burden of showing prejudice, a burden which the federal Constitution does not impose.
I agree that the language of Scherling and its predecessors suggests that an accused must demonstrate that his defense has been prejudiced by a delay before any inquiry need be made into the length or causes of that delay. However, I strongly doubt that this court ever consciously chose to construe the state speedy trial provision to provide less protection against governmental abuse than does the federal Constitution.
On the contrary, the Scherling language appears to have evolved from earlier cases in which the speedy trial right did not apply and in which the due process clause alone was applicable. Those cases incorporated the threshold prejudice requirement into speedy trial claims without considering whether this constituted a step backward from the development of federal law. Nor did they expressly consider whether such a requirement was logically relevant to a claimed speedy trial violation. I would urge my colleagues to reconsider the decision to establish it as a fixed feature of the California constitutional guarantee.
A.
The idea that an accused must in all cases affirmatively show prejudice before a trial court may dismiss the charges for violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial is apparently traceable to Jones v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 734, 740 [91 Cal.Rptr. 578, 478 P.2d 10]. Before Jones, an unreasonable or oppressive delay in bringing an accused .to trial could result in dismissal of the charges regardless of actual prejudice. “When there has been an extended delay in bringing a defendant to trial, ‘it is not necessary that the party accused affirmatively show prejudice. . . . It is enough for the defendant to show that the prosecution has been unreasonably delayed. It will not be presumed that good cause for the delay in fact existed. If there was any good cause it was for the prosecution to show *266it.’ (Harris v. Municipal Court, supra, 209 Cal. 55, 64[.])” (Barker v. Municipal Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 806, 812 [51 Cal.Rptr. 921, 415 P.2d 809], italics added; see also McCullar v. Superior Court (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [70 Cal.Rptr. 21]; Zimmerman v. Superior Court (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 56, 61 [56 Cal.Rptr. 226]; Rost v. Municipal Court (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 507, 512-513 [7 Cal.Rptr. 869].)
In People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal.3d 615 [91 Cal.Rptr. 397, 477 P.2d 421], this court considered what rules should apply when an accused claims there has been an unreasonable delay in arresting and charging him. Archerd held that the speedy trial right had no application to such a claim. “One does not become an accused until the filing of a complaint. The provisions of the Sixth Amendment contemplate a pending charge, not the mere possibility of a criminal charge.” (Id., at p. 639.) However, Archerd did find that due process could be violated by a preaccusatory delay—if the delay were purposeful, oppressive, and prejudicial to the accused’s ability to defend himself. (Id., at p. 640.) Thus, Archerd established prejudice as an essential element of a due process claim.
Jones was filed a few weeks after Archerd. Addressing a postcomplaint delay to which the speedy trial right was applicable (3 Cal.3d at pp. 738-740), Jones held that to determine whether that right was violated “[t]he prejudicial effect of the delay on petitioner must be weighed against any justification for the delay.” (Id., at p. 740.) In a footnote which appears to be the root source of the. majority’s holding, Jones linked the speedy trial test to Archerd’s preaccusatory due process test: “[A] claimed denial of due process would be decided by the same approach, namely, balancing the effect of the delay on the defendant against any justification for the delay.” (Id., at p. 741, fn. 1.)
It should be pointed out that Jones itself did not treat the prejudice factor as a threshold requirement. It found that the delay was both unreasonable and prejudicial to the accused and that dismissal of the charge was therefore required. (Jones, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 740-741.) It did not consider whether dismissal would be required if only an unreasonable delay had been established. It certainly did not purport to overrule such earlier cases as Harris v. Municipal Court, supra, 209 Cal. 55 which, as the majority note, recognized a presumption of prejudice from an unreasonable delay. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 253-254.)
A year and a half after Jones, the United States Supreme Court decided Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 [33 L.Ed.2d 101, 92 S.Ct. 2182]. Barker expressly did not require a threshold showing of prejudice in order to establish a speedy trial violation. On the contrary, it adopted a balancing *267test in which actual prejudice was only the fourth (and final) factor to weigh. (Id., at pp. 530-533 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 116-119].)
Under Barker, a court must first inquire into the length of the delay and the reasons for it. A sufficiently long delay, Barker held, may be presumptively prejudicial. A sufficiently long delay caused by improper or oppressive governmental motives might in itself be grounds for dismissal. (Ibid.) As the United States Supreme Court would later explain, “Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial[.]” (Moore v. Arizona (1973) 414 U.S. 25, 26 [38 L.Ed.2d 183, 185, 94 S.Ct. 188].)
This court’s first post-Barker case was Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83 [106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90],1 Sykes declined to apply Barker’s balancing test to a delay which was covered by the state constitutional guarantee but not by the statutory speedy trial provision. (Id., at pp. 90-92; see Pen. Code, § 1382.) However, Sykes extended the statutory 60-day rule to cover the case at bench and bottomed its decision on the equal protection clause. (9 Cal.3d at p. 92.) Application of the statute, of course, meant that the case had to be dismissed regardless of prejudice. (Id., at pp. 88-89; People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 151.)2 Sykes left open the possibility that the Barker test or a similar one would apply where there was no applicable statute. In fact, Sykes noted that the balancing test used in Jones reached the same result as Barker. (9 Cal.3d at p. 93.)
The first case to acknowledge that a threshold prejudice requirement was inconsistent with Barker v. Wingo was Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 433 [121 Cal.Rptr. 457, 535 P.2d 321]. Crockett found that where charges once dismissed under Penal Code section 1381 were refiled as permitted by section 1387, the accused was entitled to a second dismissal only if his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. (Id., at p. 440.) Crockett then found that a state constitutional claim must rest on an initial showing of prejudice, and that no such showing had been made in the case at bench. However, in a footnote the court noted the possibility that a federal constitutional claim under Barker v. Wingo might prevail. (Ibid., fn. 8.) Justices Mosk and Tobriner, dissenting, would have required dismissal without any showing of prejudice where the delay is extended (citing Barker *268v. Municipal Court, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 812) or where it exceeds applicable statutory time periods (citing Sykes, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 89). (Crockett, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 445-446.)
Next came People v. Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d 588, which addressed another aspect of the speedy trial right: when does it attach? Hannon found that under federal law (United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. 307) the right did not attach in a felony prosecution at the time the complaint was filed.3 Hannon rejected this as an interpretation of the California guarantee. It noted that California had historically extended the protection of the speedy trial right to the prearrest stage in cases where a complaint has been filed charging a felony. (Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 607.) It declined to retreat from this position simply to follow the federal rule: “ ‘[Ojur first referent is California law and the full panoply of rights Californians have come to expect as their due. . . .' [¶] . . . We continue to adhere to that higher standard of protection against the abuses of pretrial delay.” (Id., at pp. 606-608, fn. omitted, italics added.)
However, in analyzing the claim of speedy trial violation in the case before it, Hannon applied the old balancing test of Jones. It found the right had not been violated by a seven-month delay between complaint and arrest, since there was neither prejudice to the accused nor unreasonable behavior by the police. (Id., at pp. 608-610.)
Finally, there was Scherling v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.3d 493. Scherling, like Archerd, involved a precomplaint, prearrest delay to which the speedy trial right was inapplicable. {Id., at p. 505.) Turning to the due process claim, Scherling considered the accused’s proffered showing of prejudice, as required by Archerd. Finding that no prejudice had been established, Scherling declined to inquire into the justification for the delay. (Id., at pp. 506-507.) Though Scherling noted that a speedy trial claim would be reviewed in the same manner (id., at p. 505), it made no mention of whether such review would be appropriate under Barker v. Wingo.
B.
The logical flaw in imposing a threshold prejudice requirement is that it takes too narrow a view of the interests which the speedy trial right protects. Those interests are not limited to the ability to defend against the charges. *269They include as well preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration and minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused. (Barker v. Municipal Court, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 813; Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532 [33 L.Ed.2d at p. 118]; United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 320: “[T]he major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s defense. To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.” See also United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 7-8 [71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703-704, 102 S.Ct. 1497].)
Another purpose of the speedy trial right is to protect against oppressive or negligent governmental delay in bringing cases to trial. Underlying this right is the belief that once charges have been filed, governmental delay must be justified by necessity. “The government cannot take property from the meanest inhabitant, without just compensation paid or tendered in advance; but it takes his liberty, which it has been justly said is to some extent to take his life, upon a mere charge of crime. This is necessary, that society may be protected. But necessity is the only excuse, and to imprison beyond what is absolutely necessary is tyrannous and oppressive. And that is precisely what the state has covenanted with each inhabitant that it will not do.” (In re Begerow (1901) 133 Cal. 349, 352 [65 P. 828].) Thus, charges have been ordered dismissed when the delay is lengthy and unjustified, regardless of its actual effect on the defense at trial. (Barker v. Municipal Court, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 812; Harris v. Municipal Court, supra, 209 Cal. at pp. 62-63.)
These purposes are distinct from those protected by the prearrest due process right. Were they not, there would be no point in determining the point at which the speedy trial right attaches. (See Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 603-608.)
The due process right protects the fairness of the trial itself. (United States v. MacDonald, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 8 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 704]; see United States v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783, 790 [52 L.Ed.2d 752, 759, 97 S.Ct. 2044], rehg. den., 434 U.S. 881 [54 L.Ed.2d 164, 98 S.Ct. 242].) The harm to the accused from extended pretrial delays has been compared to the harm from governmental suppression of material witnesses or evidence. (United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 324 [30 L.Ed.2d at pp. 480-481]; see also People v. Alvarado (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 756 [66 Cal.Rptr. 41].) Thus, it is logical to require a showing of actual prejudice *270concerning the ability to defend, in order to trigger an inquiry into whether a governmental delay in initiating prosecution has made a trial unfair.
Furthermore, at the preaccusatory stage courts are reluctant to scrutinize whether a delay was really necessary. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized the difficulty of trying to second guess the pace at which law enforcement investigation should proceed or the moment at which the decision to file charges should be made. (Archerd, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 640; United States v. Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 790-796 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 759-763].) The threshold prejudice requirement ensures that this inquiry need be made only in those select cases where the accused has suffered harm.
Once charges are brought, however, the interests at stake are different. The state’s need to investigate is presumably satisfied once it has filed charges. At this stage an inquiry into the reasons for delay does not involve judicial interference with law enforcement. At the same time, the state has tolled the statute of limitations, which is the accused’s primary protection against the prejudice inherent in defending against a stale charge. (United States v. MacDonald, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 8; Archerd, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 639.) Moreover, the other interests protected by the speedy trial right come into play, as does “the duty of all courts and judicial officers and of all counsel, both the prosecution and the defense, to expedite . . . proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice.” (Pen. Code, § 1050; see Sykes, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 88.)
At this stage, it makes no sense to set up a threshold requirement that the accused show prejudice to his ability to defend before there can be an inquiry into the length of and reasons for the state’s delay. The federal Constitution contains no such requirement, and I would not read one into the California Constitution.

People v. Mitchell (1972) 8 Cal.3d 164 [104 Cal.Rptr. 348, 501 P.2d 916], filed a few months after Barker, simply affirmed a lower court’s dismissal on speedy trial grounds without discussion of Archerd, Jones, or Barker.

Barker had expressly approved the idea that the states could adopt by statute reasonable time periods which would define when the speedy trial right was violated. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 523 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 112-113].)

Marion's requirement that there be “actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge” before the Sixth Amendment came into play (404 U.S. at p. 320 [30 L.Ed.2d at p. 479]) meant that the federal right did not attach in California at least until a magistrate ordered the accused bound over for trial following a preliminary examination. (Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 588.)