Court Opinion

ID: 9838611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 06:00:17.005558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:45.713062
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     RITA S. VAZ,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DA-1221-15-0132-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND                       DATE: September 6, 2023
       URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Celine Fernandes, Arlington, Massachusetts, for the appellant.

           Mary C. Merchant and Sakeena Adams, Fort Worth, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     REVERSE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Dallas Regional
     Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         At all times relevant to this appeal, the appellant was employed in the
     agency’s Office of Public Housing, Houston Field Office. Vaz v. Department of
     Housing and Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-15-0132-W-1,
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 10, 19. On February 10, 2014, the appellant
     filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint with the Office of Special Counsel
     (OSC). IAF, Tab19. In her complaint, she alleged that she had disclosed abuses
     of authority, gross mismanagement, and violations of various Federal laws, and in
     retaliation for her disclosures the agency had taken a number of personnel
     actions, including giving her a minimally satisfactory performance appraisal in
     Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 and then placing her on a performance improvement plan
     (PIP) on March 27, 2014.       Id. at 6-15.    She alleged that she had made the
     disclosures beginning in 2006 and “aggressively” since 2013, both “internally” to
     various management officials, and “externally” to a Board administrative judge, 2
     an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) administrative judge,
     and agency attorneys. Id. at 6. The appellant made subsequent amendments to
     that complaint, including an alleged disclosure to the Inspector General (IG) in
     2014, with the final modification taking place on August 14, 2014. See id. at 4,

     2
       The appellant named the administrative judge who adjudicated her previous appeal in
     Vaz v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-
     13-0450-I-1, Initial Decision (Nov. 19, 2013), which was dismissed as withdrawn. On
     August 4, 2014, the appellant filed a second Board appeal, in which she alleged, among
     other things, that the agency had engaged in whistleblower reprisal. The administrative
     judge dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction, partly on the grounds that the
     appellant had not exhausted her remedies with OSC. Vaz v. Department of Housing and
     Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. DA-3443-14-0579-I-1, Initial Decision
     (Sept. 17, 2014). Neither party filed a petition for review of that decision. The same
     administrative judge was initially assigned to the instant appeal.
                                                                                              3

     71-72. On October 28, 2014, OSC notified the appellant that it had closed its
     investigation and advised her of her Board appeal rights. IAF, Tab 20 at 50.
¶3         On December 14, 2014, the appellant filed the instant Board appeal. IAF,
     Tab 1.    The administrative judge to whom the case was initially assigned
     informed the appellant of the requirements for establishing jurisdiction in an IRA
     appeal and ordered her to submit evidence and argument on the jurisdictional
     issue. IAF, Tab 3. In her response to that order, the appellant alleged that she
     made protected disclosures on the following occasions: (1) on June 16, 2008, to
     the Assistant Secretary; (2) on July 24, 2013, to an agency attorney; (3) on
     several dates from 2013 to 2014, to an EEOC administrative judge; and (4) in
     2014, to the IG, the Chief Human Capital Officer, and agency counsel.                 IAF,
     Tab 10 at 13-25.
¶4         The administrative judge advised the parties that the issue of jurisdiction
     still had not been resolved and ordered the appellant to produce a copy of her
     OSC complaint and additional correspondence with OSC. 3 IAF, Tab 17 at 2. In
     response, the appellant provided a copy of her amended OSC complaint form and
     various documents she submitted to OSC in support of the complaint.                   IAF,
     Tab 19. Based on the appellant’s submissions, the administrative judge found

     3
       We note that submission of an OSC complaint is not the only way to establish
     jurisdiction, as further discussed below.          The administrative judge’s earlier
     jurisdictional order appropriately detailed the various ways that the appellant could
     establish exhaustion. IAF, Tab 3 at 7. However, after receipt of the appellant’s
     submissions, the administrative judge advised the parties that the issue of jurisdiction
     had not yet been resolved, and that the record indicated that the appellant had attempted
     to submit a copy of her OSC complaint in a pleading that had been rejected. IAF,
     Tab 17 at 2. Thus, the administrative judge’s order instructed the appellant to resubmit
     the OSC complaint. Id. The administrative judge also properly explained that it was
     not necessary for the appellant to provide a copy of the detailed decision let ter that she
     received from OSC. See Bloom v. Department of the Army, 101 M.S.P.R. 79, ¶ 10
     (2006) (stating that, under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(2)(B), OSC’s written statement
     containing its summary of relevant facts related to the appellant’s complaint is not
     admissible without the consent of the appellant).
                                                                                        4

     that a hearing was warranted and proposed a date for the hearing.               IAF,
     Tabs 21-22.
¶5        Following an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, the appeal was reassigned
     to a second administrative judge. IAF, Tab 34. The new administrative judge
     ordered the appellant to identify and describe her disclosures with sufficient
     specificity such that he could evaluate whether she nonfrivolously alleged that
     she made a protected disclosure. IAF, Tab 39 at 1. The appellant responded.
     IAF, Tabs 40-41.      Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 43, Initial Decision (ID). In particular, he found that the
     appellant failed to establish that she had made protected disclosures of gross
     mismanagement or an abuse of authority, and that the Board did not have
     jurisdiction over her claims regarding equal employment opportunity (EEO)
     matters. ID at 5-6.
¶6        On petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge
     ignored the ruling by the first administrative judge that a hearing was warranted.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 3-4. The appellant further contends that
     the administrative judge failed to address disclosures (2) through (4), as well as
     her claim that the agency retaliated against her for perceived whistleblowing. Id.
     The agency has responded. PFR File, Tab 3.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW 4
¶7        The appellant first challenges the administrative judge’s decision to dismiss
     her appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding a hearing when the first
     administrative judge had previously found that a hearing was warranted. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 3-4. The issue of jurisdiction is always before the Board, however,

     4
      We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
     and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                               5

     and may be raised by either party or sua sponte by the Board at any time during a
     Board proceeding. Simnitt v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 313,
     ¶ 5 (2010). The second administrative judge provided notice to the parties of a
     specific jurisdictional issue that he believed remained unresolved, allowed them
     to make submissions addressing the issue, and then he made his jurisdictional
     determination based upon the record evidence. IAF, Tabs 39-43. Although, as
     explained below, we disagree with certain findings made by the administrative
     judge, as well as his conclusion that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appeal,
     we find that it was within his authority to revisit the issue of jurisdiction after he
     was assigned the appeal, despite the first administrative judge’s apparent finding
     that the Board had jurisdiction over the appeal.
¶8         To establish jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, and the consequent right to a
     hearing, an appellant must show by preponderant evidence that she exhausted her
     administrative remedies before OSC and make nonfrivolous allegations 5 that
     (1) she made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
     engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
     (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing fact or
     in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a
     personnel action as defined under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Salerno v. Department of
     the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3),
     1221(e)(1). For the following reasons, we find that the appellant has established
     jurisdiction over a portion of her retaliation claims, and is therefore entitled to a
     hearing on those particular claims.

     5
       The Board’s regulations define a nonfrivolous allegation as an assertion that, if
     proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). The U.S. Court of
     Appeals for the Federal Circuit has found that, in the context of an IRA appeal, a
     nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
     state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
     979 F.3d 1362, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
                                                                                           6

      The appellant exhausted her remedies with OSC regarding disclosures (1)
      through (4), but not her claim of reprisal for perceived whistleblowing.
¶9          Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an employee is required to seek corrective
      action from OSC before seeking corrective action from the Board through an IRA
      appeal. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to matters raised before OSC. Coufal
      v. Department of Justice, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶¶ 14, 18 (2004).          The substantive
      requirements of exhaustion are met when an appellant has provided OSC with
      sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. Chambers v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. An appellant may demonstrate exhaustion of her
      OSC remedies through her initial OSC complaint or other written correspondence
      to and from OSC concerning her allegations.         Benton-Flores v. Department of
      Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 6 (2014). In the alternative, exhaustion may be
      proved through other sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or
      declaration attesting that the appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts
      in the MSPB appeal.        The appellant must prove exhaustion with OSC by
      preponderant evidence, not just present nonfrivolous allegations of exhaustion.
      5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(3); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(1).
¶10         Based on our review of the appellant’s OSC complaint and subsequent
      correspondence, see IAF, Tab 19, we find that the appellant exhausted her
      remedies with OSC with respect to disclosures (1) through (4). 6 To the extent the
      administrative judge limited his attention to disclosure (1) only, without
      addressing disclosures (2) through (4), we agree with the appellant that this was
      error. See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589
      (1980).
¶11         However, we find that the appellant has not shown that she alleged before
      OSC that the agency retaliated against her as a perceived whistleblower.           We

      6
        The appellant’s correspondence with OSC describes other alleged disclosures to
      agency management, but the appellant has not otherwise referred to those disclosures in
      her pleadings before the Board.
                                                                                        7

      therefore lack jurisdiction over that claim. See El v. Department of Commerce,
      123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 12 (2015) (finding that, even if the Board considered the
      appellant’s claim that he was a perceived whistleblower, he failed to establish
      jurisdiction over his claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative
      remedy), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2016).        While the administrative
      judge erred in failing to address the appellant’s claim of retaliation for perceived
      whistleblowing, which she also raised in the proceedings below, see IAF, Tab 41
      at 6, his error did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights. See Panter v.
      Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (holding that an
      adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides
      no basis for reversal of an initial decision).

      The appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that a portion of disclosure (2)
      was protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
¶12         We next consider whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her
      disclosures were protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).         In conducting this
      inquiry, the test is whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the
      essential facts known to or readily ascertainable by the employee could
      reasonably conclude that the actions of the agency evidenced a violation of law,
      rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
      authority, or substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. Lachance
      v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1379-81 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

            Disclosure 1
¶13         Regarding disclosure (1), which the appellant describes as her “internal”
      disclosure, the appellant alleges that in June 2008, she informed the Assistant
      Secretary verbally and by email that her then-supervisor was deliberately
      mistreating and neglecting the housing authorities in her portfolio and abusing his
      authority as a supervisor.     IAF, Tab 10 at 13-17, Tab 19 at 14.        The OSC
      correspondence includes several emails, which the appellant forwarded to the
      Assistant Secretary, purportedly showing that her supervisor at that time engaged
                                                                                           8

      in gross mismanagement by deliberately placing her on a PIP when she had
      timely completed her assignment, and abused his authority by failing to correct an
      assignment log and by not similarly penalizing other employees in the same or
      similar manner. IAF, Tab 19 at 14-20. In describing disclosure (1), the appellant
      further alleged that in 2006 and 2007, she verbally notified another agency
      manager that her supervisor failed to rescind the PIP even after admitting that the
      system used to log and close her cases was flawed. Id. at 15.
¶14         The   appellant’s   disagreement    with   how    agency    officials   managed
      performance issues or provided her assignments does not constitute a
      nonfrivolous allegation of gross mismanagement. See Cassidy v. Department of
      Justice, 118 M.S.P.R. 74, ¶ 8 (2012) (explaining that gross mismanagement is a
      management action or inaction that creates a substantial risk of significa nt
      adverse impact on the agency’s ability to accomplish its mission). To the extent
      the appellant alleged gross mismanagement regarding the supervisor’s oversight
      of housing authorities, the information she described under disclosure (1) is too
      vague to qualify for protection under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 7
¶15         Similarly, the appellant has provided scant information regarding her
      supervisor’s alleged failure to correct an assignment log, nor has she provided
      sufficient detail regarding the performance of other employees she alleges should
      also have been penalized for deficiencies around the time she was placed on a
      PIP. As a result, we find that the appellant has failed to make a nonfrivolous
      allegation that she disclosed an abuse of authority. See Wheeler v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 88 M.S.P.R. 236, 241, ¶ 13 (2001) (holding that an abuse of
      authority occurs when there is an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a
      Federal official or employee that adversely affects the rights of any person or that

      7
        As discussed below, we reach a different conclusion regarding similar allegations set
      forth in disclosure (2).
                                                                                           9

      results in personal gain or advantage to himself or to preferred other persons).
      Accordingly, we find that disclosure (1) is not protected.

            Disclosure 2
¶16         The appellant states that in a July 24, 2013 email to agency counsel, she
      disclosed abuse of supervisory authority, gross mismanagemen t, and gross waste
      of funds on the part of her then-supervisor.        IAF, Tab 10 at 18-19, Tab 19
      at 66-70. The email includes allegations that the supervisor discriminated against
      her on the basis of color and national origin, slandered her, and subjected her to
      “emotional gang rape.” IAF, Tab 19 at 67-69. The appellant also alleged that the
      supervisor was negligent in his oversight of the housing authorities in the
      appellant’s portfolio, in particular the Harris County Public Housing Autho rity
      (PHA). Id. at 68-69. The email includes excerpts from and links to a July 9,
      2013 news article describing the results of a recent IG audit that uncovered
      millions of dollars in fraudulent and wasteful expenditures by the Harris County
      PHA, and a July 16, 2013 letter of concern from U.S. Senator Charles Grassley
      regarding the results of that audit.     Id.; Jon Cassidy, IG says Texas housing
      authority is auditors’ nightmare, Washington Examiner (July 9, 2013),
      https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ig-says-texas-housing-authority-is-
      auditors-nightmare (last accessed Sept. 6, 2023); Letter from U.S. Senator Chuck
      Grassley, Committee on the Judiciary (July 16, 2013), https://blog.chron.com/texa
      spolitics/files/2013/07/Grassley-to-HUD-7-16-2013.pdf (last accessed Sept. 6,
      2023) (Grassley Letter). 8 In that letter, Senator Grassley quoted with disapproval
      the supervisor’s previous assurances that the practices in the Houston field office
      were “some of the best throughout the region,” a nd his subsequent statement that

      8
        Although the appellant does not appear to have submitted the Washington Examiner
      article or Grassley Letter in any of her submissions to the Board, we have accessed the
      links she provided and confirmed that the excerpts she included in her submission are
      accurate. We take official notice of the article and the letter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.64.
                                                                                             10

      “we didn’t expect anything was actually going on here of concern.” Grassley
      Letter at 1.
¶17         The appellant’s disclosures concerning alleged discrimination, harassment,
      and the creation of a hostile work environment in violation of antidiscrimination
      statutes do not constitute protected whistleblowing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)
      or protected activity under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). See Edwards v. Department
      of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 10-17, 21-25 (explaining that disclosures pertaining
      to matters covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A), even if made outside of the
      grievance or EEO process, do not constitute protected whistleblowing activity
      under section 2302(b)(8) or section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i)), aff’d, No. 2022-1967,
      2023 WL 4398002 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2023).               Furthermore, while we have
      considered that harassment by a supervisor may constitute an abuse of authority,
      see Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 14 (2015), we find that
      the appellant’s vague allegations of harassment do not rise to this level. 9

      9
         To the extent the appellant is alleging that the agency retaliated against her for
      protected disclosures made in her two prior Board appeals, we find that the Board lacks
      jurisdiction to address those allegations in this appeal. The appellant’s 2013 appeal
      concerned a 7-day furlough issued by the agency, but the appellant did not allege in that
      appeal that the action was taken in retaliation for her whistleblowing. Vaz v.
      Department of Housing and Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-13-0450-
      I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 28 (Summary of Telephonic Prehearing Conference). Thus,
      a claim of retaliation for filing that prior appeal falls under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), since it was “other than with regard to remedying a violation ” of
      section 2302(b)(8), and it is therefore outside the Board’s jurisdiction in this case. See
      Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7 (2013) (stating that the
      Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 extends IRA jurisdiction to claims
      arising under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), but not section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii)). The
      appellant did allege whistleblowing retaliation in her second appeal, but that appeal was
      filed on August 4, 2014, which was after the two personnel actions at issue in this case
      had already been taken and after the PIP had been extended. Vaz v. Department of
      Housing and Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. DA-3443-14-0579-I-1.
      Accordingly, the personnel actions could not have been taken in retaliation for her
      attempt to remedy whistleblower retaliation in that appeal. See Orr v. Department of
      the Treasury, 83 M.S.P.R. 117, 124 (1999) (holding that when the personnel action
      occurred before the protected disclosures the disclosures could not have been a
                                                                                      11

¶18        We find, however, that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she
      disclosed gross mismanagement by her supervisor regarding the office’s oversight
      of the Harris County PHA.          Accordingly, we find that this portion of
      disclosure (2) is protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).

            Disclosure 3
¶19        Regarding disclosure (3), the appellant asserts that on several occasions
      between September 2013 and March 2014, she notified an EEOC administrative
      judge of retaliatory harassment and violations of the ADA and other
      antidiscrimination laws. IAF, Tab 10 at 20-24, Tab 11, Tab 19 at 6. As noted
      above, such disclosures are not protected under section 2302(b)(8).

            Disclosure 4
¶20        The appellant alleges that in a June 13, 2014 email to multiple ag ency
      officials, including the IG, the Chief Financial Officer, and agency counsel, she
      disclosed an abuse of authority, gross mismanagement, and violations of law and
      regulation including “multiple infractions of EEO laws, federal regulations, the
      negotiated Union contract, [and] HUD’s core values.”       IAF, Tab 10 at 24 -25,
      Tab 19 at 71. This email, titled “Multiple Violations of EEO laws, Federal laws,”
      includes a copy of the appellant’s rebuttal to the results of a management inquiry
      into her allegations of ongoing harassment by management.             IAF, Tab 19
      at 72-140.   The attachment describes the appellant’s concerns with the EEO
      process and includes documentation about her placement on a PIP, discussions
      about a reasonable accommodation, and alleged harassment by her former
      supervisor, including, among things, the appellant’s allegation that her supervisor
      “pinched” his nipples around her. Id. The appellant also cites a February 5, 2014
      email addressed to her second-line supervisor, who had proposed placing the

      contributing factor in the action), aff’d per curiam, 232 F.3d 912 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
      (Table).
                                                                                            12

      appellant on a PIP in a January 29, 2014 email, and the appellant’s email was
      copied to the IG. IAF, Tab 10 at 24, Tab 19 at 71-72. In the February 5, 2014
      email, the appellant contests the proposal to place her on a PIP based on the
      performance appraisal issued by her former supervisor, who had since left the
      agency. Id. Both emails are included in full in the appellant’s submissions to
      OSC. 10 IAF, Tab 19 at 71-140.
¶21         As previously noted, the appellant’s disclosures of alleged EEO violations
      are not protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Although the appellant alleges
      that she also disclosed violations of other laws, rules, or regulations, she has not
      identified any specific provisions. Nor do her allegations clearly implicate an
      identifiable law, rule, or regulation separate from her EEO claims. See Baldwin
      v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 12 (2010) (stating that the
      Whistleblower Protection Act does not require an employee to identify the
      particular statutory or regulatory provision that the agency allegedly violated
      when her statements and the circumstances of those statements clearly implicate
      an identifiable law, rule, or regulation).       Furthermore, for the same reasons
      discussed above under disclosure (1), supra ¶ 15, we find that the appellant failed
      to make a nonfrivolous allegation that her February 5 and June 13, 2014 emails
      disclosed gross mismanagement or an abuse of authority by her former
      supervisor.   Accordingly, we find that disclosure (4) is not protected under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).

      10
        In her response to the Board’s first jurisdictional order, the appellant also describes
      two verbal communications with the IG in September 2014. IAF, Tab 10 at 25.
      However, the appellant did not refer to those communications in her OSC complaint or
      subsequent correspondence with OSC.
                                                                                        13

      The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her disclosure of gross mismanagement
      regarding the Harris County PHA was a contributing factor in her supervisor’s
      issuance of an unfavorable performance appraisal.
¶22         The appellant alleges that her July 24, 2013 disclosure regarding her
      supervisor’s alleged gross mismanagement of the Harris County PHA was a
      contributing factor in the issuance of a minimally satisfactory performance
      appraisal,   which      constitutes   a   personnel   action    under    5    U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(viii). One way an appellant may satisfy the contributing factor
      element at the jurisdictional stage is by making nonfrivolous allegations that the
      official taking the personnel action knew of the protected activity and that the
      personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person
      could conclude that the activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action.
      See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 7 (2014).
¶23         Here, the appellant alleged before OSC that the agency attorney to whom
      she made the disclosure immediately shared the email with unspecified agency
      officials, and that her supervisor retaliated for t hat disclosure by giving her a
      minimally satisfactory performance appraisal for FY 2013. IAF, Tab 19 at 67.
      While the appellant did not specify the names of the agency officials with whom
      the agency attorney shared the July 24, 2013 email, her allegations would imply
      that the supervisor either received a copy of the email himself or else learned of it
      by other means. The appellant further asserts that the supervisor, who has since
      left the agency, issued the appraisal in November 2013, approximately 4 months
      after the disclosure.   Id.   These events are close enough in time to support a
      conclusion that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action.
      See Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 25 (2016)
      (observing that a personnel action that takes place within 2 years of a disclosure
      satisfies the knowledge component of the knowledge/timing test). Accordingly,
      we find that the appellant is entitled to a hearing regarding her claim that the
                                                                                          14

      agency issued her an unfavorable performance evaluation in retaliation for her
      protected disclosure.

      Although disclosure (4) is not protected under section 2302(b)(8), the appellant’s
      communications     with    the    IG    constitute   protected   activity   under
      section 2302(b)(9)(C).
¶24        While we have found that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous
      allegation that disclosure (4) was protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), the
      record reflects that the February emails at issue were sent to the IG. Under the
      broadly worded provision of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C), disclosing information to
      an agency’s IG or to OSC is protected regardless of the content of the appellant’s
      complaints, as long as such disclosures are made “in accordance with applicable
      provisions of law.”      Hence, we find that the appellant has made at least a
      nonfrivolous allegation that she engaged in protected activity for purposes of an
      IRA appeal.

      The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her protected activity was a
      contributing factor in her placement on a PIP.
¶25        We    also   find   that   the   appellant   nonfrivolously   alleged   that   her
      communications with the IG were a contributing factor in a personnel action.
      Specifically, the appellant alleged before OSC that the agency retaliated against
      her for those communications by placing her on a PIP. IAF, Tab 19 at 9 (OSC
      complaint form). In this regard, the record includes a screenshot of a March 27,
      2014 email from the Acting Director of the Houston Field Office, notifying the
      appellant of her placement on a PIP. IAF, Tab 40 at 118-19. The screenshot
      shows that the PIP was attached to the email, but the PIP document does not
      appear to have been submitted to the Board by either party. Id. at 118. The
      appellant further asserts that on July 28, 2014, her second-line supervisor—who
      had first referenced the possibility of placing her on a PIP and who was also the
      recipient of the February 5, 2014 email discussed above—notified her that the PIP
      was being extended. See IAF, Tab 10 at 9. The agency submitted a copy of the
                                                                                            15

      July 28, 2014 memorandum extending the PIP for an additional 60 days. IAF,
      Tab 8 at 55-64. Based on all of the above, we find that the appellant has made a
      nonfrivolous allegation that the agency placed her on a PIP on March 27, 2014 .
      Moreover, it is well settled that a PIP is considered a personnel a ction for
      purposes of an IRA appeal. See, e.g., Hudson v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      104 M.S.P.R. 283, ¶ 15 (2006).
¶26         While it is unclear which official made the final decision to impos e a PIP,
      the record indicates that the managers who received the February 5 and June 13
      emails, which were also addressed to the IG, were involved either in
      implementing the PIP or considering the appellant’s response after the possibility
      of placing the appellant on a PIP had been raised. IAF, Tab 19 at 71-73, Tab 40
      at 118-19. Moreover, the March 27 and July 28, 2014 notifications regarding the
      PIP and its extension were both issued within a few weeks or months after the
      emails in question. Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant has a
      made a nonfrivolous allegation that she engaged in protected activity under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) that was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
      to place her on a PIP. 11 The appellant has therefore established jurisdiction and is
      entitled to a hearing on that claim.

      11
         The appellant is also alleging that the agency repeatedly threatened to place her on a
      PIP, including in a January 29, 2014 email and during a conference call held on the
      same date. IAF, Tab 1 at 4-5, 15-17, 50-52. To the extent she is claiming that
      communications regarding placing her on a PIP constituted threatened personnel
      actions, from our review of the record we find that she has failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that any agency statements in this regard rose to the level of
      threats to take personnel actions, as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2). Further, while
      the appellant questions whether the March 27, 2014 PIP was ever implemented, it
      appears that she may actually be arguing that the agency violated various procedures
      when it notified her of the PIP, and that this casts doubt on the validity of the action.
      IAF, Tab 10 at 8-10; IAF, Tab 40 at 117-19. On remand, the administrative judge
      should determine if there is a dispute regarding whether the PIP ever went into effect,
      and if so, he should accept evidence and argument on the issue and make findings as
      necessary.
                                                                                         16

      The appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that her July 24, 2013 disclosure was a
      contributing factor in her placement on the March 27, 2014 PIP.
¶27         As discussed above, we have found that the appellant made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that the supervisor who gave her the minimally satisfactory
      performance appraisal for FY 2013 either received a copy of the appellant’s
      July 24, 2013 email (disclosure 2) or otherwise learned of the email.          The
      appellant admits that the supervisor who gave her that appraisal was no longer a
      Federal employee as of January 6, 2014; however, she asserts that her second-line
      supervisor and the Acting Director of the Houston Field Office used the appraisal
      to put her on the PIP.      IAF, Tab 19 at 9.      Record evidence supports her
      contention, as the Acting Director sent the March 27, 2014 email notifying the
      appellant that she was being placed on a PIP, he attached a copy of her final
      FY 13 performance rating along with the PIP, and he stated that the PIP was
      “required as a result of your marginally successful rating.” IAF, Tab 40 at 118.
¶28         Even assuming the individuals who placed the appellant on the PIP were
      unaware of the appellant’s July 24, 2013 disclosure, because we have found that
      the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that this disclosure was a
      contributing factor in the FY 13 performance appraisal and the appraisal led
      directly to the appellant being placed on a PIP approximately 8 months later, we
      find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that the disclosure was
      a contributing factor in the PIP. See Marano v. Department of Justice, 2 F.3d
      1137, 1143 (Fed. Cir.1993) (finding that the contributing factor standard is met if
      an employee can demonstrate “that the fact of, or the conten t of, the protected
      disclosure was one of the factors that tended to affect in any way the personnel
      action”).

      Conclusion
¶29         We find that the appellant has made nonfrivolous allegations that the part of
      the July 24, 2013 email regarding her supervisor’s alleged gross mismanagement
      concerning the Harris County PHA was a protected disclosure and was a
                                                                                   17

      contributing factor in the FY 13 performance appraisal and the March 27, 2014
      PIP, and she has further nonfrivolously alleged that the February 5 and June 13,
      2014 emails to the OIG were protected activity and were a contributing factor in
      the PIP.

                                          ORDER
¶30        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Dallas Regional
      Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.