Court Opinion

ID: 9856910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:06:23.380796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:32.112655
License: Public Domain

Eberhaedt, Judge,
concurring specially. I am in full accord with the result reached in this case. For the reasons stated in my special concurrence in Zayre of Atlanta, Inc. v. Sharpton, ante, I think we are in a hopeless position of conflict in our decisions (following those of the Supreme Court) holding that a corporation cannot be held for a slander uttered by one of its agents, though in the interest of the employer and in the course of the performance of his duties, unless the slander be commanded or ratified, and others (also following those of the Supreme Court) in which we hold a corporate employer liable for “tortious misconduct” of an employee which amounts to slander, without reference to whether it was commanded or ratified. We avoid the conflict now only because it is concluded that the words spoken did not, even by innuendo, amount to an accusation of theft.
I may say that if liability for the “tortious misconduct” by *596an employee is to rest upon the invitee relationship it must follow that there can be no liability for that kind of conduct committed after the relationship has ended. It is hard to conceive of a situation in which it does not end when the customer has voluntarily left the premises.