Court Opinion

ID: 9905899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:11:08.499325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:58.035296
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Cleveland v. Traylor, 2023-Ohio-4314.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF CLEVELAND,                                :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                              No. 112530
                 v.                               :

LE’MYKA TRAYLOR,                                  :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 30, 2023

                      Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
                                 Case No. 2022-CRB-007941

                                            Appearances:

                 Mark Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and Matthew
                 Bezbatchenko, Assistant Director of Law, for appellee.

                 John H. Lawson, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

                   Defendant-appellant, Le’Myka Traylor (“Traylor”), appeals his

convictions for aggravated menacing and telephone harassment. He raises the

following assignments of error for review:

        Assignment of Error I: The trial court erred in permitting [plaintiff-
        appellee, City of Cleveland (“City”)] to introduce evidence of other acts
        pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B).
      Assignment of Error II: [Traylor]’s right to effective assistance of
      counsel was violated when counsel failed to demand or receive a bill of
      particulars and challenge admissibility of other acts pursuant to
      Evid.R. 404(B).

      Assignment of Error III: The trial court erred by failing to apply
      Evid.R. 404(B) in not inquiring as to whether or not defense counsel
      received reasonable notice of the general nature of the evidence [the
      City] intended to introduce at trial and failed to determine if one of the
      exceptions in [Evid.R.] 404(B) was applicable.

                For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Traylor’s convictions.

I. Facts and Procedural History

                We initially note that Traylor filed a notice of appeal from Case No.

2022-CRB-007941, where he was charged with aggravated menacing in violation of

Cleveland Codified Ordinances (“C.C.O.”) 621.06 and telecommunications

harassment in violation of C.C.O. 621.10. These charges arise from allegations that,

in September 2022, Traylor sent two threatening messages to Florine Lee (“Lee”)

via Cash App.

                Traylor also challenges his aggravated menacing conviction in Case

No. 2002-CRB-008980 for allegations that, in October 2022, he drove by Lee’s

home and threatened to kill her. App.R. 3(D) provides that a notice of appeal “shall

designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from[.]” This court has held

that it is “without jurisdiction to review a judgment or order which is not designated

in appellant’s notice of appeal.” State v. Wright, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95634,

2011-Ohio-3583, citing Parks v. Baltimore & Ohio RR., 77 Ohio App.3d 426, 428,

602 N.E.2d 674 (8th Dist.1991), citing Schloss v. McGinness, 16 Ohio App.3d 96, 97-

98, 474 N.E.2d 666 (8th Dist.1984). While both cases were tried together in the
matter before us, we decline to address any issues concerning Traylor’s aggravated

menacing conviction in Case No. 2002-CRB-008980 because Traylor failed to

include this case in the notice of appeal and did not provide this court with the full

record of that case. Therefore, our discussion will solely address the issues Traylor

raises in Case No. 2022-CRB-007941.

               The following evidence was adduced at the bench trial relevant to the

aggravated menacing and telecommunications harassment charges in Case No.

2022-CRB-007941.1

               Cleveland Police Officer Torres (“Officer Torres”) testified that on

September 14, 2022, she and her partner responded by telephone to a call from Lee

who advised that Traylor was threatening Lee via Cash App. Officer Torres testified

that there was a prior history of domestic violence between Traylor and Lee. Officer

Torres further testified that Lee stated that she moved to get away from Traylor and

blocked him on her phone.

               Lee testified that Traylor is her ex-boyfriend and the father of two of

her children. Lee testified that she met Traylor in 2010, which was when she was 18

years old, and they started dating around her 21st birthday. When describing their

relationship, Lee stated that she enjoyed it at first, but it had been terrible recently.

The relationship started to change after the birth of their first child in 2017. She felt

that Traylor was jealous of the attention she gave their new child. Traylor quit his

      1 Prior to trial, the court issued an ex parte temporary protection order against

Traylor for Lee and her children.
job, which also put a strain on the relationship. Lee testified that she left Traylor

when their son was three months old.

               The City asked Lee whether there was any abuse in the relationship.

Lee answered that prior to the birth of their child, Traylor, on one occasion, punched

her in the eye causing her to sustain an orbital fracture. Lee did not call police for

that incident because she felt like she had been argumentative. Lee also testified

that there had been past incidents of Traylor choking her. Defense counsel objected,

and the objection was sustained.

               With regard to the Cash App messages, the City introduced two

exhibits, which were two separate Cash App messages sent from Traylor to Lee. Lee

testified that they communicated this way because she blocked his calls. Traylor

requested one dollar from Lee accompanied by a message stating, “I got something

for you miserable b*****.” (Tr. 28.) Lee testified that this was sent on September

14, 2022, at 8:09 a.m. Lee testified that she did not know how to take this message

because “this is the person who’s kicked my door down, attacked me[.]” (Tr. 28.)

She testified that it was not normal for her to get messages like this. With the second

message, Lee testified that Traylor requested one dollar and said, “for try[ing] to be

bigger person[.]” (Tr. 28.) Lee testified that the message was followed by a fire emoji

and a bridge or structure emoji. This message was sent at 8:24 a.m. After receiving

these messages, Lee called the police as well as children and family services.

               Following the conclusion of trial, the court found Traylor guilty of

both counts. The court explained that it found Lee’s testimony to be credible. The
court also explained it believed that Traylor only sent the Cash App messages for the

purpose of communicating a threat. The court sentenced Traylor to one year active

probation, which included anger management. The court issued a fine of $1,000 on

each count, with $800 of each fine suspended, and waived costs. The court also

terminated the protection order and issued a no-contact order. Traylor now appeals

his convictions.

II. Law and Analysis

                Within Traylor’s three assigned errors, Traylor argues that the court

erred by permitting Lee to testify about the prior times Traylor physically assaulted

and threatened her. Traylor further argues defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to: (1) object to this evidence; (2) raise the issue that he was not provided

reasonable notice of these other acts as required by Evid.R. 404(B); and (3) demand

a bill of particulars.2

       A. Lee’s Testimony

                During Lee’s direct examination, she testified that Traylor was her ex-

boyfriend and the father of two of her children. After the birth of their first child,

their relationship started to change. The prosecutor asked Lee if there was any abuse

in their relationship, the following exchange then took place:

       2 In the third assignment of error, Traylor also appears to be raising a sufficiency-

of-the-evidence argument through ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel’s
failure to inquire if Cash App is a communication device under C.C.O. 621.06 —
Telecommunications Harassment. We decline to address this portion of his argument
because Traylor fails to support it with any relevant legal authority as required under
App.R. 12 and 16.
      [LEE]: Prior to having our [first child] we had got into an argument, a
      fight and he had punched me in the eye. I got an orbital fracture. I
      didn’t call the Police because I felt like because I was being
      argumentative in that fight so I kind of waived that red flag off. But
      then after that there were incidents where he had choked me[.]

      [CITY]: Okay.

      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would object to this. There’s no evidence
      that’s noted not (inaudible) prior to —

      [LEE]: We went to Court for one of them —

      [CITY]: Miss Lee, Miss Lee, please. Thank you.

      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — prior to (inaudible).

      [CITY]: I’m about to move on, your Honor.

      [COURT]: All right. I’m still thinking about whether or not to overrule
      or sustain the objection. It’s also personal history, however. All right.
      So, I’ll sustain the objection and you can move on, please.

      [CITY]: Yes, your Honor.

(Tr. 24-25.)

               Then when describing how she felt after receiving the first Cash App

message from Traylor, Lee stated that she “really didn’t know how to take that. Like

this is the person who’s kicked my door down, attacked me[.]” (Tr. 28). Defense

counsel did not object to this portion of Lee’s testimony.

      B. The Trial Court and Evid.R. 404(B)

               Traylor argues that the trial court failed to apply Evid.R. 404(B) and

failed to make any determination that the City provided reasonable notice prior to

trial of its intent to use other acts evidence. Traylor further argues that by failing to
examine if Lee’s testimony created any exceptions in Evid.R. 404(B), the trial court

allowed prejudicial evidence into the record.

              The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court. State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 180, 510 N.E.2d 343

(1987). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an

unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.”

Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

As the gatekeeper of the evidence, the trial court “must be cognizant of the evidence

the state is attempting to admit into evidence. If the state fails to comport with the

basic requirements under the law, the trial court is obligated to exclude such

evidence, even if no objection is raised.” State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 110741, 2022-Ohio-1238, ¶ 32.

              Traylor contends the court failed to apply Evid.R. 404(B) to the above

testimony. Evid.R. 404(B) provides:

      (1) Prohibited uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong or act is not
      admissible to prove the person’s character in order to show that on a
      particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

      (2) Permitted uses; notice. This evidence may, be admissible for
      another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
      preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
      accident. The proponent of evidence to be offered under this rule shall:

             (a) provide reasonable notice of any such evidence the proponent
             intends to introduce at trial so that an opposing party may have
             a fair opportunity to meet it;

             (b) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the
             proponent intends to offer the evidence, and the reasoning that
             supports the purpose; and
             (c) do so in writing in advance of trial, or in any form during trial
             if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

              In the instant case, Traylor was convicted of aggravated menacing

under C.C.O. 621.06(a), which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause

another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person

or property of such other person or member of his or her immediate family” and

telecommunications harassment under C.C.O. 621.10(a)(3), which provides that

“[n]o person shall knowingly make or cause to be made a telecommunication, or

knowingly permit a telecommunication to be made from a telecommunications

device under the person’s control, to another, if the caller * * * [d]uring the

telecommunication, violates Section 621.06[.]”

              We note that trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to the

first part of the above testimony. As a result, we summarily overrule any portions of

Traylor’s assigned errors relating to this testimony because the court sustained the

objection. State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864,

¶ 162, citing Viox v. Weinberg, 169 Ohio App.3d 79, 2006-Ohio-5075, 861 N.E.2d

909, ¶ 36 (1st Dist.) (“An appellant cannot predicate error on objections the trial

court sustained.”); see also State v. Gibson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103958, 2016-

Ohio-7778, ¶ 23.

              With regard to the remaining portion of Lee’s testimony, we find that

the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this testimony even though the

City did not afford Traylor any notice of using “other acts” evidence. This court has
previously held that “[i]n aggravated menacing cases where the victim’s subjective

belief that the offender will cause the victim physical harm is an element of the

offense, ‘evidence of a defendant’s violent character is admissible to prove that the

victim believed that the defendant would cause physical harm.’” Cleveland v.

Reynolds, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105546, 2018-Ohio-97, ¶ 12, quoting Cleveland v.

McCoy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103276, 2016-Ohio-3451, ¶ 4. Even if this evidence

is admissible, the court must still “‘consider whether the probative value of the other

acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”’ McCoy

at ¶ 5, quoting State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d

1278, ¶ 20, citing Evid.R. 403.

               Here, in sustaining defense counsel’s objection to the first portion of

Lee’s testimony, the court noted that it is “also personal history.” (Tr. 24.) Traylor’s

previous acts of physical violence were relevant to proving Lee’s subjective belief

that Traylor would cause her physical harm when he sent her the following

messages: “I got something for you miserable b*****” and “for try[ing] to be bigger

person” with a fire emoji and a bridge emoji. (Tr. 28.) Importantly, Lee’s testimony

that Traylor “is the person who’s kicked my door down, attacked me” does not

encompass acts committed by Traylor that had no direct relevance to proving Lee’s

subjective belief that he would harm her. On this basis, we find that the court did

not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony. Reynolds at ¶ 14.

               Nonetheless, it does not appear from the record that the court gave

much weight to this one sentence. The court stated that it found Lee’s testimony to
be credible. The court did not believe that the Cash App messages were sent for the

purpose of sending Lee one dollar. Rather, the court believed that the messages

were sent for the purpose of communicating a threat. The court did not mention the

“kicking my door down” other acts evidence when announcing its verdict. That

single reference was far from being the sole basis of the court’s verdict, and

therefore, it was not so prejudicial that its admission into evidence denied Traylor a

fair trial. Reynolds at ¶ 16.

      C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Bill of Particulars, and
         Evid.R. 404(B)

               Traylor next contends that defense counsel’s failure to demand or

receive a bill of particulars, coupled with the failure to raise the reasonable notice

issue under Evid.R. 404(B) and the failure to object to the other acts evidence,

resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.

               To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Traylor must

demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial. State v.

Trimble, 122 Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-2961, 911 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 98, citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

(1984). The failure to prove either prong of this two-part test makes it unnecessary

for a court to consider the other prong. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389,

721 N.E.2d 52 (2000), citing Strickland at 697.
               Crim.R. 7(E) provides that “[w]hen the defendant makes a written

request within twenty-one days after arraignment but not later than seven days

before trial, or upon court order, the prosecuting attorney shall furnish the

defendant with a bill of particulars setting up specifically the nature of the offense

charge and of the conduct of the defendant alleged to constitute the offense.” The

bill of particulars issue raised by Traylor ultimately turns on the question of whether

his “lack of knowledge concerning the specific facts a bill of particulars would have

provided him actually prejudiced him in his ability to fairly defend himself.” State

v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 569, 709 N.E.2d 1166 (1999).

               Here, the lack of a bill of particulars did not prejudice Traylor in his

ability to effectively present his defense. A review of the record reveals that Traylor

was adequately put on notice of the nature of the offenses charged and of the alleged

conduct constituting the offenses via the indictment. Furthermore, defense counsel

requested discovery at a pretrial on November 21, 2022. Traylor was on notice of

the particular allegations against him and was prepared to proceed to a bench trial

for both incidents in one trial. (Tr. 4.) Traylor is unable to demonstrate that the

failure to request a bill of particulars actually prejudiced him in his ability to fairly

defend himself. Therefore, we find his argument unpersuasive.

               With regard to the other acts evidence, Traylor contends that defense

counsel’s failure to object to Lee’s testimony prejudiced him because the above

testimony insinuates that he commits felonies. Traylor further contends that he was

prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to raise the issue of reasonable notice as
required by Evid.R. 404(B). For the same reasons that we found the trial court’s

admission of the other acts was not an abuse of discretion, we likewise find that

defense counsel was not ineffective. Traylor has not demonstrated that the failure

to raise the reasonable notice issue under Evid.R. 404(B) and the failure to object to

the other acts evidence prejudiced Traylor so as to deprive him of a fair trial.

                Accordingly, the first, second, and third assignments of error are

overruled.

III. Conclusion

                The court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony that

Traylor “is the person who’s kicked my door down, attacked me” even though the

City did not afford him any notice of using “other acts” evidence. Traylor’s previous

acts of physical violence were relevant to proving Lee’s subjective belief that Traylor

would cause her physical harm when he sent her the Cash App messages. Defense

counsel was not ineffective because Traylor is unable to demonstrate that the lack of

a bill of particulars, the failure to raise the reasonable notice issue under Evid.R.

404(B), and the failure to object to the other acts evidence prejudiced Traylor’s

ability to receive a fair trial.

                Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

       It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

       The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_______________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR