Court Opinion

ID: 9756881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:06:10.582735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:32.551896
License: Public Domain

BARRY, Senior Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree that the Norberts failed to plead sufficient facts to meet the threshold test under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a). As to the *516Turnpike Commission, the Norberts allege that the Commission was aware that the tire and wheel were lying upon the roadway yet failed to remove them. I believe those allegations are sufficient to require a denial of the Commission’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424, 562 A.2d 307 (1989), the Supreme Court specifically stated that immunity had been waived “where it is alleged that the artificial condition or defect of the land itself causes an injury to occur.” Id., 522 Pa. at 434-35, 562 A.2d at 312 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Debris from an accident is no doubt an “artificial condition”. The Norberts have alleged that the accident was caused when their car struck the debris. No more need be alleged.
The majority seems to draw a distinction between an artificial condition on the highway as opposed to an artificial condition of the highway. Snyder does not require such a distinction because that case dealt with an injury that happened off the Commonwealth real estate and therefore has nothing to do with artificial conditions. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never held that such a distinction was crucial in cases involving artificial conditions.1
Suppose that a boulder fell onto the Turnpike from adjoining land not owned by the Commission and further suppose that it fell at such a point on the road that a motorist traveling at the speed limit would be incapable of stopping before colliding with the boulder. The reasoning of the majority would allow the Commission to do absolutely nothing forever, i.e., either remove the boulder or warn of the impending danger, and yet escape liability for any injuries caused by a collision. The law should not allow, nor could the Legislature have intended such a result. The Legislature could have decided that, the Commission was absolutely immune for any dangerous condition but it did not. To draw a distinction between a dangerous artificial condition on the highway and a *517dangerous artificial condition of the highway for immunity purposes is specious. Had that been the intention of the Legislature, I believe it was required to clearly draw such a distinction which it did not do. I believe, in any event, that a tire lying upon a highway, is a dangerous condition of the highway.
For all of these reasons, I would vacate that portion of the trial court’s order that granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Commission and remand for further proceedings.

. In Snyder, the court used language, relied upon by the majority in this case, that the Legislature’s use of the word "of” was critical. Because the injury in Snyder occurred on real estate that was not Commonwealth real estate, that language was dicta.