Court Opinion

ID: 9635920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:10:21.164468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:38.915448
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
I join Judge Campbell’s well written dissent but write separately to expose a further flaw in the majority’s reasoning.
There is no question in my mind that the majority is correct in its assertion that, “... [njone of the cases requires a particular jury, or an individual juror, to answer the second special issue affirmatively solely on the facts of that particular offense.” But as the majority also notes, the law clearly permits it.
Under the majority’s rationale, no juror would ever be subject to a challenge for cause since no juror is ever required to render a particular verdict based on a given law. For example, no juror is required to grant probation in a given case, but if he cannot consider the full range of punishment, and if probation is available, he is unfit to sit on the panel. Hernandez v. State, 643 S.W.2d 397 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
Similarly, no juror is required to convict upon the testimony of a single eyewitness, or upon the testimony of a child, or upon the testimony of a corroborated accomplice witness, or upon circumstantial evidence, but if a venireman states that he would never even consider a conviction based upon such testimony, then he has a bias against the law upon which the State is entitled to rely and is subject to challenge for cause.
To such a departure from established precedent, I vigorously dissent.