Court Opinion

ID: 2926768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-11 22:38:11.175905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:27.820954
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-08-00071-CR
                           NUMBER 13-08-00075-CR

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                 THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                   CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

PHILLIP BROWN,                                                              Appellant,

                                          v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                          Appellee.

   On appeal from the 24th District Court of Refugio County, Texas.

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Benavides
            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

      In 1998, Phillip Brown was indicted for sexual assault of a child. TEX . PENAL CODE

ANN . § 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 2008). He pleaded guilty and was placed on two years of
deferred adjudication community supervision. The term of community supervision was

extended for an additional eight years, in lieu of an adjudication of guilt based upon a new

indictment for possession of a controlled substance.

        In 1999, Brown was indicted for possession of a controlled substance. TEX . HEALTH

& SAFETY CODE ANN . § 481.115(d) (Vernon 2003). He pleaded guilty and was placed on

deferred adjudication community supervision for ten years.

        In August 2007, the State of Texas filed a motion to revoke community supervision

for failure to comply with the terms of supervision for each offense.1 A hearing was held,

and the trial court found that Brown had violated his community supervision and

adjudicated him guilty on both offenses.                 After the sentencing hearing, Brown was

sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for

each count, to run concurrently. Brown’s appellate counsel, concluding that "there are no

arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal," filed an Anders brief in which he reviewed

the merits, or lack thereof, of the appeal. We affirm.

                                             I. DISCUSSION

A.      Compliance with Anders v. California

        Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), appellant’s

court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, stating that his review

of the record yielded no grounds or error upon which an appeal can be predicated.

Although counsel’s brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present

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          The State had filed previous m otions to adjudicate guilt and petitions for revocation of probated
sentence, which resulted in the addition of conditions to appellant’s com m unity supervision.
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a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds

to be advanced on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of

error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and

procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112
S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813
S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

        In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]

1978), appellant's counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there

are no errors in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he has:

(1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) served

a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on appellant, and (3) informed

appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response within thirty days.2

See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman,
252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and appellant

has not filed a pro se response. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

                                        II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

        Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
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           The Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not com ply with the
rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court
those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case
presents any m eritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W .3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim . App. 2008) (quoting
W ilson v. State, 955 S.W .2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.–W aco 1997, no pet.)).
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75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief and have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

                                          III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

         In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for permission

to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex.

App.–Dallas 1995, no pet.) (noting that “[i]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he

must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the

appellate court that the appeal is frivolous”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion

to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send

a copy of the opinion and judgment to appellant and to advise appellant of his right to file

a petition for discretionary review.3 See TEX . R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252

         3
            No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
by the Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals, he m ust either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review m ust be filed within
thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last tim ely m otion for rehearing that was overruled by this
Court. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review m ust be filed with this Court, after which
it will be forwarded to the Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 68.3; 68.7. Any petition for
4
S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

                                                               __________________________
                                                               GINA M. BENAVIDES,
                                                               Justice
Do not publish.
See TEX . R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and
filed this the 2nd day of July, 2009.

discretionary review should com ply with the requirem ents of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 68.4.

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