Court Opinion

ID: 9519854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:26:08.845868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:58.928877
License: Public Domain

Mulroney, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent.
I. We start with the proposition that applications for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are not favored. In Eller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 1255, 1260, 300 N.W. 535, 538, Avhere Ave reversed the trial- court’s order granting a new trial on the ground of newly -discoArered evidence, we said:
“It is frequently said that courts do not favor the granting of a neAV trial because of newly discovered evidence. The rule is stated in 20 R. C. L. 289, 290, section 72, as follows;
“ ‘While newly discovered evidence, material to. the party applying, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, is ground for a new trial, applications on this ground are not favored by the courts, and # * should always be subjected to the closest scrutiny.’ ” ;
II. We next reach the general rule barring the granting of a new trial on evidence that is merely cumulative. The reason for this rule is obvious. New trials are ordinarily granted to hear new evidence, not to hear new witnesses present the same or similar evidence as was heard in the- original trial. This from Eller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., supra, at page 1262:
“It is well settled that a new trial Avill not be granted for newly discovered evidence which is merely cumulative. Larson v. Meyer & Meyer, 227 Iowa 512, 518, 288 N.W. 663; Smart v. Liddle, 229 Iowa 599, 600, 294 N.W. 886; Simons v. Harris, 215 Iowa 479; 245 N.W. 875.”
. III. I accept, as being established by much precedent, that the trial court does have discretion to relax- the- general rule that *509newly discovered evidence, cumulative in character, will not justify the grant of retrial. Some courts hold the rule can be relaxed when the new evidencé confirms or corroborates the testimony given only by a party or other interested witness. See annotation 158 A. L. R. 1253. Broadly stated, I think the rule is the trial court is authorized to relax the rule and grant a new trial though the newly discovered evidence is cumulative, when it fairly appears the new evidence is of such high probative value' that a new trial with the new evidence will probably produce a different result. This is probably what is meant by the statement in the general rule that newly discovered evidence that is merely cumulative will not authorize the granting of a new trial.
The following statement from 66 C. J. S., New. Trial, section 201(8), page 505, correctly states the general rule as to cumulative evidence as a ground for new trial and the trial court’s discretion : “* * * there is no discretion on the part of the court to grant a new trial where it appears clearly, and without doubt or qxiestion, that the new evidence is cumulative * * #. The rule that the new evidence must not be merely cumulative has been said not to be inflexible, and the court may, in its discretion, relax the rule and grant a new trial in a particular case in the interests of justice.”
The statement that the trial court is authorized to relax the rule as to newly discovered cumulative testimony “in the interests, of justice” means there must be something about the new evidence that enables him to determine a new trial will probably result in a different verdict. His determination that the new evidence will probably prodrice a different result must be based on something more than the fact that the losing litigant will have more witnesses tell the same or similar story on retrial. The majority agree the newly discovered testimony is cumulative in character. So the first question in this ease is, as I see it, whether the newly discovered testimony is merely cumulative or there is something about it which fairly indicates it was of such superior probative Aralue to the evidence it corroborates as to allow the trial court to exercise his discretion and hold a new trial might probably result in a different verdict. If the newly discovered evidence has no more probative value than the evidence the jury has heard and rejected it is merely cumulative and the trial court *510is bound by the rule. It is not a question of abuse of discretion. The trial court has no discretion to allow the new trial to let' in merely cumulative evidence or evidence that rises no higher in probative value than the evidence heard by the jury in the original trial.
IY. To my mind this case presents the most usual instance of merely cumulative evidence. A traffic accident occurs. Besides the drivers of the two vehicles there are disinterested eyewitnesses. The whole question in the case is whether the streetcar made a sudden stop when plaintiff was following in his truck about 25 or 30 feet away. Plaintiff had no disinterested eyewitness. His evidence consists of his own testimony. As opposed to this the defendant had two disinterested eyeAvitnesses and their superintendent of transportation. Defendant did not bother to have the testimony of the motorman, who Avas the employee of defendant-company charged with negligence in plaintiff’s petition which was on file for two years before the case was tried. The superintendent said he had left their employ and was some-Avhere in Virginia, but there is no showing his testimony was unavailable. The company probably felt the motorman Avould, so far as he was able, merely corroborate the testimony of its other witnesses.
The superintendent testified as to1 the company rule providing that streetcar operators stop at this place to insure their having the car under control as they start down the incline of the bridge. The fair inference from all the testimony is that the streetcar came to a momentary stop. There was no evidence of any signal by the operator of the streetcar and he aauis not there to tell the jury whether he made a sudden or slackening-stop. Mr. Griffith, a passenger on the streetcar, said the streetcar stopped and then started up again and was immediately hit. Evidently he did not see plaintiff’s truck. But Mr. Helms, another passenger on the streetcar, saw the truck. He too said the streetcar had stopped and had just started forward again AAdien the truck hit. He saw the truck when it was 100 feet back of the streetcar when the streetcar was just about at a complete stop. He said the truck came straight on, just about in the streetcar tracks, about 40 to 45 miles per hour without any change of speed until the crash occurred.
*511The most that can be said for the newly discovered evidence is that it will give defendant two more disinterested witnesses (who, according to their identical affidavits, will testify as one) who saw and observed everything from some considerable distance from the crash. They judge the speed of plaintiff’s truck at 50 miles an hour. They will contradict defendant’s other witnesses as to the length of time the streetcar was stopped. They will testify the streetcar was stopped when plaintiff was a block or a block and a half behind it and that it remained stopped until pushed forward by the crash of plaintiff’s truck into the rear of the streetcar.
Clearly this evidence was cumulative. It was evidence of the same kind and character — disinterested eyewitness testimony. It was to the same point: the speed, movement and stopping of the two vehicles involved during the period just before the crash. In Eller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., supra, 230 Iowa at page 1263, we defined cumulative testimony as “evidence of the same kind to the same point.” This evidence answers that description. It would seem to me this is the most usual kind of cumulative testimony. As stated in many accident cases there are frequently- a number of eyeivitnesses. When some testify and others are discovered after verdict, a new trial should not be granted to let the after-discovered witnesses give their version unless from the showing made their evidence will have such strong probative value that a different verdict will probably result on-retrial.
It is quite evident the jury did not believe the disinterested witness Helms who sat in the streetcar and said he watched the truck as it traveled the last 100 feet toward him, traveling at the rate of 40 to 45 miles an hour, and crashed into the streetcar just after it had stopped and started forward. Is it at all likely on the retrial the jury will believe DeVore and Freestone who sat in their convertible a block to a block and a half away? What is there about the new testimony which would possibly lead one to believe the result would have been different if the jury had heard it.? True, the new witnesses say plaintiff was traveling five miles faster than Helms testified, but “speed” testimony is the opinion or estimate of the witness. The new witnesses occupied no superior place in the accident scene which would make *512tlieir testimony worth more than that of Helms. They certainly could not see what occurred better than Helms-who was, you might say, right on top of the crash. They were certainly no more disinterested than Helms. If the rule that cumulative testimony will not justify a new trial is to be abrogated on such a record as is here presented, then I submit it vanishes entirely and the trial court’s discretion is absolute. I think the new evidence was plainly cumulative and of such insufficient probative value that the trial court was not warranted in reláxing the rule; that he had no discretion to grant a new trial.
V. Rule 244(g), Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the new trial may be granted for the newly discovered material evidence “which could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial.” The defendant had the burden to show such diligence. Eller v. Paid Revere Life Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 1255, 300 N.W. 535, and cases cited. The rule which we approved in early cases is summed up in Danner v. Cooper, 215 Iowa 1354, 1361, 246 N.W. 223, 226, as follows:
“The burden is upon the appellants to show such due diligence. The affidavits must contain more than the mere conclusions of the movants and their attorneys that they have made diligent effort to obtain the evidence, or that they have exercised due diligence in that respect. The affidavits must show what was done in order to discover and produce the evidence. See First State Bank of Riverside v. Tobin, 204 Iowa 456, 215 N.W. 767; Smith v. Wagaman, 58 Iowa 11, 11 N.W. 713.”.
The above language was approved in Moran v. Kean, 225 Iowa 329, 338, 280 N.W. 543.
Here also the question is not whether the trial'court abused his discretion. He just -has no- discretion to grant a new trial, even if he believed the new evidence would change the result, if the movant fails to sustain the burden of due diligence to discover and produce the testimony.
In Shepherd v. Brenton, 15 Iowa 84, at page 90, this court held: “* * * if it appeared in this case, that a new trial was granted * * * to introduce testimony to obtain which no sufficient diligence had been used, we should have no hesitation in reversing such order, for in such a case the court would liave no discretion.'”
*513What, is the showing here ? The defendant states in its brief: “The diligence of the defendant1 in attempting to present all of the evidence obtainable for.-the consideration.-of the jury prior to trial is shown in the aforementioned affidavits” (of. De-Vore and Freestone). These áffidavits state the affiants did not give their names to anyone at the scene of the accident and told no one connected with the lawsuit that they witnessed the accident, until after the verdict. There is no showing at all of what defendant did in its effort to discover or produce this testimony. These new witnesses did play a part in' the accident scene in that they drove'to the McGrevey Taxicab Company 'station about four blocks away and stopped and'ihformed them of the accident and requested that they send an ambulance. The defendant knew somebody had ordered the áínbülance, and that fact would suggest there was someone who possibly knew something about the accident. For all that appears in the record the new witnesses might have given their names to the taxi eompány at the time they informed the employees of the taxi company of the accident, and ordered the ambulance. If they did, a mere telephone call would have disclosed their identity. At least the defendant should have assumed there was testimony in existence because someone who knew something about the accident called the ambulance. Reasonable diligence would seem to require some effort to discover evidence which a party must have known existed. The record here is barren of any showing of diligence' on the part of defendant. It is plainly evident the defendant did not want to bother too much about this lawsuit. It did not want to bother abo.ut having the motorman, their ex-employee,- return for the trial, or his deposition taken, yet he was the employee who’was charged with negligence.
The affidavits, which defendant argues show its diligence in attempting to present- all Of the evidence obtainable, show what the affiants did. They do not show what defendant did in order to discover and produce the evidence. With no showing of reasonable diligence to discover and produce the testimony, the motion for new trial should have been overruled.
I would reverse on the ground defendant failed to sustain its burden of showing reasonable diligence to discover .and pro*514duce the evidence before trial. And I would hold in any event the newly discovered evidence was merely cumulative and the trial court had no discretion to grant a new trial.
Bliss, Oliver and IIays, JJ., join in this dissent.