Court Opinion

ID: 9950946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 13:02:32.583215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:32.245150
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-0324
                  LT Case No. 2019-CA-000171
                 _____________________________

TEKI WILLIAMS,

    Appellant,

    v.

JOHN WEAVER,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Nassau County.
Eric C. Roberson, Judge

Brian J. Lee, of Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Kansas R. Gooden, Miami, and Lara Edelstein, Boca Raton, of
Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., for Appellee.

                         March 15, 2024

BOATWRIGHT, J.

      Appellant, Teki Williams (“Williams”), appeals the trial
court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Appellee, John
Weaver (“Weaver”). Williams argues the trial court’s entry of final
summary judgment was improper due to the existence of a genuine
dispute of material facts. We agree and therefore reverse the entry
of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
                                  I.

       Williams, at all times material to this analysis, was an
employee of Royal Green Lawn & Ornamental Services, Inc.
("Royal Green"). Weaver hired Royal Green to spray the grass at
his home with fertilizer and weed herbicide (“lawn services”). On
November 3, 2017, Williams, in his capacity as an employee of
Royal Green, arrived at Weaver’s home to perform the lawn
services and parked in the street in front of Weaver’s house. Prior
to the start of any lawn services, Williams began walking through
the lawn to Weaver’s front door to drop off job-related paperwork.
In the course of traversing Weaver’s lawn, Williams walked onto a
deck located on the front lawn, which was at ground level. When
Williams stepped on the deck, he slipped on a dark colored area
covered in algae and fell. He injured his back as a result of the fall.

      In his deposition, Williams testified that the grass on
Weaver’s lawn was wet, as it was early in the morning. When he
approached the deck, he noticed that the wood looked old and dark
in color; however, it did not appear to be wet. Williams believed
the deck was safe to walk upon. Williams’ observation that the
deck seemed to be a safe walking surface was based both on the
general appearance of the deck, and that the deck had a bench and
decorations on it, thus indicating the deck’s usability. After he
slipped and fell, he noticed that the dark coloration was, in fact, a
greenish algae that was all over the deck. He did not notice the
algae prior to falling.

      Weaver stated in his deposition that he annually cleaned the
deck but that it had not been cleaned for a few months preceding
Williams’ fall. He stated he walked by the deck every day, but he
did not notice the deck was slippery. He stated he did not think the
deck was slippery at the time of Williams’ fall, but he
acknowledged that it could have been slippery. Finally, after
viewing a picture of the deck taken at the time of the incident,
Weaver agreed that the deck needed to be cleaned at the time of the
fall and that the portion of the deck with the algae on it was
unsuitable for walking.

                                  2
      The picture, which is contained in the record on appeal,
depicts a wood deck that is almost completely dark in color. The
picture additionally shows that the deck has a bench on it and
some decorative pumpkins and potted plants.

       Following a hearing on Weaver’s motion for summary
judgment, the trial court ruled that there was no genuine dispute
as to the material facts and granted summary judgment in favor
of Weaver. In particular, the trial court found that Williams was
an employee of an independent contractor who was injured in the
course and scope of performing his contractual duties. Further, the
trial court found, based on the parties’ testimony and the picture
of the deck, that no reasonable jury could find that the green algae
on the deck was anything but open and obvious. The court
postulated that because the grass was wet, and the deck’s
condition of having algae was apparent, it was “common sense”
that one could fall on the deck. The court concluded that if
Williams had been paying attention, the fall would not have
happened. This appeal follows.

                                 II.

      A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is
subject to a de novo standard of review. Baxter v. Northrup, 128
So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (citing Volusia Cnty. v.
Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)).
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must
show that (1) ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’
and (2) ‘the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 357 So. 3d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)
(quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)). When determining if there is a
genuine dispute of material fact, “[t]he court views the evidence in
a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and a genuine
dispute occurs when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for that party.” Id. (citing Baum v. Becker &
Poliakoff, P.A., 351 So. 3d 185, 189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)).

      A primary purpose of Florida’s summary judgment rule “is
to ‘isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or
defenses.’” Olsen v. First Team Ford, Ltd., 359 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla.
5th DCA 2023) (quoting In re: Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc.

                                 3
1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 194 (Fla. 2020)). The Florida Supreme Court,
however, noted that in adopting this amendment, they reaffirmed
“the bedrock principle that summary judgment is not a substitute
for the trial of disputed fact issues.” Id. “As the [United States]
Supreme Court itself has emphasized, the summary judgment rule
must be implemented ‘with due regard . . . for the rights of persons
asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to
have those claims and defenses tried to a jury.’” Id. (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)).

                                 A.

       Generally, property owners must maintain their premises in
a reasonably safe condition for business invitees, including
employees of independent contractors. Pertl v. Exit Info. Guide,
Inc., 708 So. 2d 956, 957–58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). However, a
property owner who employs an independent contractor to perform
work on his property will not be held liable for injuries sustained
by the employee of an independent contractor during the
performance of that work. Phillips v. Republic Fin. Corp., 157 So.
3d 320, 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).

       There are two noteworthy exceptions to this rule. An owner
can be held liable for damages sustained by an employee of an
independent contractor where either (1) the property owner
actively participates in or exercises direct control over the work; or
(2) the property owner negligently creates or negligently approves
a dangerous condition. Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla.
1973). This rule and its exceptions, however, apply only if the
independent contractor or employee is injured in the course of the
work he was hired to perform. Strickland v. Timco Aviation Servs.,
Inc., 66 So. 3d 1002, 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding that if the
employee is injured not in the course of the work the contractor
was hired to perform, but rather while the employee is attempting
to access the premises to perform that work, the independent
contractor standard does not apply). Thus, when an employee of
an independent contractor is injured outside the scope of the
contracted duties, courts will analyze the duty of the property
owner to the employee under the separate framework applied to
business visitors or invitees. Id.

                                  4
       In this case, Weaver contracted with Royal Green to spray
his lawn with fertilizer and weed herbicide. Williams had not yet
begun spraying the lawn at the time he was injured on Weaver’s
premises. He was merely entering the property to perform the
contracted work on the lawn. As such, his injuries were not
sustained in the course of performing the work under the contract,
i.e., spraying the lawn. Thus, Weaver’s duty to Williams at the
time of his injury should be analyzed under the separate
framework governing a landowner’s duty to business invitees.

                                B.

      As stated previously, property owners must maintain their
premises in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees. A
landowner ordinarily “owes an invitee two independent duties: (1)
to give warning of concealed perils which are known or should be
known to the owner, but which are not known to the invitee[;] and
(2) to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition.” Frazier v. Panera, LLC, 367 So. 3d 565, 567 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2023).

       Regarding the duty to warn of any concealed dangers, “[t]he
obvious danger doctrine provides that an owner or possessor of
land is not liable for injuries to an invitee caused by a dangerous
condition on the premises when the danger is known or obvious to
the injured party, unless the owner or possessor should anticipate
the harm despite the fact that the dangerous condition is open and
obvious.” Aaron v. Palatka Mall, L.L.C., 908 So. 2d 574, 576–77
(Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course,
Inc., 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986)). The “obvious danger” doctrine
“rests upon the generally accepted notion that owners and
possessors of real property should be legally permitted to assume
that those entering their premises will perceive conditions that are
open and obvious to them upon the ordinary use of their
senses.” Id. at 577. However, the test “is not whether the object
itself is obvious, but [rather] whether the dangerous condition of
the object is obvious.” Conrad v. Boat House of Cape Coral, LLC,
331 So. 3d 857, 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting Pratus v.
Marzucco’s Constr. & Coatings, Inc., 310 So. 3d 146, 149 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2021)). To determine whether the doctrine applies in a given
case, courts are required to consider all of the facts and

                                 5
“circumstances surrounding the accident and the               alleged
dangerous condition.” Id.

       Although it was undisputed that the deck itself was open
and obvious, whether the dangerous condition of the deck was
obvious was in dispute at the time the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Weaver. In particular, although the deck
appeared dark, Williams testified that it did not look wet, and the
slippery condition was not known to him until he stepped on the
deck. It was not until he fell that he noticed the dark area was
algae, which was slippery in nature. This was confirmed by
Weaver, who had admitted that although he walked by the deck
daily, he did not think it was slippery at the time when Williams
fell but stated that it could have been slippery. This clearly showed
that even Weaver was uncertain about the dangerous condition of
the deck, i.e., its slipperiness. As a result, this raises a genuine
dispute of material fact regarding whether the dangerous
condition of the deck was open and obvious. See Pratus, 310 So. 3d
at 150 (finding that where an employee of a subcontractor stepped
into an uncovered drain on a construction site and was injured,
though the drain itself was obvious, genuine issues of material fact
existed regarding whether “the uncovered drain presented an open
and obvious danger”); see also Smile v. Fla. POP, LLC, No. 20-
14141, 2022 WL 18956202 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2022) (finding that
where a patron of a restaurant slipped and fell while stepping into
a puddle of water in the parking lot, summary judgment was not
appropriate because even though the puddle was open and
obvious, the dangerousness of the puddle, i.e. its slippery nature,
was not open and obvious).

       Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis regarding whether
the dangerous condition of the deck was open and obvious, Weaver
had a separate and distinct duty to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition. While the fact that a danger is obvious
discharges a landowner’s duty to warn, it does not discharge the
landowner’s duty to maintain his property in a reasonably safe
condition. See Marriott Int’l, Inc. v. Perez-Melendez, 855 So. 2d 624,
631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Despite a hazard being open and obvious,
a property owner has a duty to maintain the property in a
reasonably safe condition by repairing conditions that they foresee
will cause harm. Middleton v. Don Asher & Assoc. Inc., 262 So. 3d

                                  6
870, 872 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). As a result, “[w]hen an injured party
alleges that the owner or possessor breached the duty to keep the
premises in a reasonably safe condition, an issue of fact is
generally raised as to whether the condition was dangerous and
whether the owner or possessor should have anticipated that the
dangerous condition would cause injury despite the fact it was
open and obvious.” Aaron, 908 So. 2d at 578.

       Here, Weaver acknowledged that the deck needed to be
maintained during the year. He also acknowledged that it needed
to be cleaned at the time of Williams’ fall. Based on this, he also
agreed that the portion of the deck with the algae on it should not
have been walked upon. This raises a genuine dispute of material
fact concerning whether Weaver had properly maintained the deck
in a reasonably safe condition and whether he should have
anticipated that the dangerous condition would cause injury.

                               III.

       Because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding
Weaver’s duties to warn and to maintain his premises, we reverse
the order granting the motion for summary judgment and remand
for further proceedings.

      REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

JAY, J., concurs.
MACIVER, J., dissents, with opinion.
                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

                                7
                                              Case No. 5D23-0324
                                     LT. Case No. 2019-CA-000171

MACIVER, J., dissenting.

      I agree with the court below that no reasonable jury could
find that a prudent person walking in rubber boots across a wet
lawn could fail to know that crossing a wooden discolored deck may
pose a slipping hazard.

      This observation embodies two important concepts. First,
the concept that a property owner is not liable for the least common
denominator of care exercised by visitors to his or her property.
Second, that not every conceivable factual question must be
determined by a jury—only those that pose a genuine dispute of a
material fact.

      The majority here has found two questions appropriate for
jury consideration. First, whether the slippery nature of the
wooden deck was open and obvious. Next, whether Appellee,
Weaver, exercised reasonable care in maintaining his private
property. I disagree on both counts and would affirm the court
below.

      The bulk of torts jurisprudence is still a matter of common
law. The political power of the people to decide these rules has not
been exercised by their legislative representatives. Rather, the
courts have attempted to observe common societal behaviors and
deduce what the otherwise informalized rule would be. Because
common-law rules are formed from our observations of common
behavior, they must be grounded in a common sense
understanding of that behavior.

       The courts’ observations become precedent to be followed in
later cases. The precedents also become the formalized rule that
informs future parties what their rights and obligations are under
the common law. If the decision tree on whether a legal duty exists
has become so complex that judges have difficulty determining the
legal duties of the homeowner, what does that say about the clarity
of the law for the parties that are supposed to be bound by it?

                                 8
      Finally, while factual questions about whether the rules
have been violated in individual circumstances are left to the jury,
the question of what is the common law rule always remains the
province of the court itself.

               Open and obvious nature of the hazard

      The majority has found that there is a genuine dispute of
material fact regarding whether the dangerous condition of the
deck was open and obvious. Specifically, the majority notes that
although the deck appeared dark, Williams testified that it did not
look wet, and the slippery condition was not known to him until he
stepped on the deck. However, as the court below noted it was
Williams who, while wearing rubber boots, walked across the wet
lawn before stepping onto the deck. Williams—by his own
testimony—introduced an element of the dangerous condition.

       Turning back to common sense understanding of societal
expectations and behaviors, we can again observe that a property
owner is not expected to be liable to the least amount of care that
can be exercised by someone on their property. The fact that the
discolored deck could be slippery if the person walking across it got
it wet is an obvious fact. It is just as clear and obvious to the visitor
as it would be to a homeowner. Stated more simply, no reasonable
jury could find that a prudent person walking in rubber boots
across a wet lawn could fail to know that crossing a wooden
discolored deck may pose a slipping hazard.

     Duty to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition

      The majority also finds a genuine dispute of material fact
concerning whether Weaver had properly maintained the deck in
a reasonably safe condition and whether he should have
anticipated that the dangerous condition would cause injury. I
disagree.

      The majority notes, “[w]hen an injured party alleges that the
owner or possessor breached the duty to keep the premises in a
reasonably safe condition, an issue of fact is generally raised as to
whether the condition was dangerous and whether the owner or
possessor should have anticipated that the dangerous condition

                                   9
would cause injury despite the fact it was open and obvious.”
Aaron, 908 So. 2d at 578. Here, though, there is no allegation that
the deck alone was dangerous. Rather, based upon the testimony
of both parties, the deck became slippery when Williams crossed it
wearing wet rubber boots. In other words, while Weaver may have
had a duty to maintain his property in such a manner so as not to
create a dangerous condition, that principle cannot logically be
extended to require him to foresee and accommodate a lack of
someone else’s care that exacerbates a condition of his property.
Because I would not find that Weaver’s duty extended so far, there
is no material question regarding the reasonableness of his level of
maintenance the property.

      Based upon the foregoing, I must respectfully dissent.

                                10