Court Opinion

ID: 9831265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:58:39.044568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:33.301676
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In its motion for a rehearing, appellant alleges that the finding of this court, that Coth-ran was its local agent in Grayson county, is not supported by evidence, and contends that the undiputed evidence shows that Coth-ran’s sole business as an employee was restricted to collecting indebtedness due the Marshall Hardware Company, whose assets appellant had taken over.
The purchase of the assets of the Marshall Hardware Company was made on June 26, 1930. The undisputed evidence is that Coth-ran was placed in charge of these purchased assets; that he shipped a majority of the stock, under appellant’s direction, to his place of business in the city of Paris; that there was considerable merchandise unshipped and remaining in Whitesboro, together with a great many notes and other indebtedness, all of which were turned over to Cothran as agent for appellant; that he was to sell the un-shipped merchandise, and the notes and accounts he was to try to collect; that h& disposed of all the merchandise to dealers in Whitesboro during the time from June 26, 1930, until “up in the fall.” This is shown by the evidence of Cothran on cross-examination, and, as to the fact of the selling of the merchandise, by the evidence of Pox on cross-examination, and by the evidence of Will Marshall on direct examination. We held that this evidence showed appellant was doing business in Grayson county from June 26, 1930, through Cothran as agent, when citation was served.
Appellant also contends that the finding, that $1,457.20 was collected on the $6,347.75, the aggregate amount of the security notes securing appellant and John Marshall in the payment of the $2,000 advanced, has no evidence to sustain it. A small typographical error appears in this amount; i. e., the record shows the amount to be $1,457.24, and the original opinion will 'be corrected accordingly. C. D. Marshall testified that he audited, in May, the payments made on these security notes, and that the aggregate amount paid was the sum of $1,457.24. There was introduced in evidence the entire list of the security notes, with the credits marked thereon, and these credits amount to $1,457.24.
In paragraph 4 of appellant’s motion for a rehearing, complaint is made that the original opinion held that, because the president, E. C. Pox, knew of the suit and received a copy of the citation, appellant was estopped to complain of the judgment by default against it. The motion then concludes that “such holding is tantamount to a holding that, if a party defendant receives a citation,'he is thereby brought into court, regardless of the person on whom it was served, or the manner in which he received it.” No such conclusion is warranted by anything said in the original opinion. The paragraph of the *149opinion to which appellant alludes reads: “We therefore hold that, appellant was duly served with citation, as recited in the judgment of December 10, 1930, and as appellant, through its president, timely received a copy of this citation, it cannot complain that judgment by default was taken against it.” In other words, this court held that appellant was legally served with citation and that there existed no legal excuse for not obeying the summons.
We have again carefully examined the record and find no reason for changing our views, as expressed in the original opinion. The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.