Court Opinion

ID: 9598671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:10:36.67456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:38.140248
License: Public Domain

Justice MEYER
dissenting.
Pursuant to defendant’s plea arrangement, the trial court imposed a sentence of seven years but suspended the sentence for five years subject to certain probation conditions. Defendant violated the conditions of his probation, and on 31 May 1991, he was placed on special probation with an active sentence of ninety days. Defendant served these ninety days. After serving this sentence, he again violated the terms of his probation, and the trial court activated the seven-year sentence to which defendant was subject, as it had been imposed upon him as a result of his original plea arrangement.
Defendant’s time of incarceration pursuant to the imposition of special probation was properly accounted for by the reduction *557of his sentence by three months. This three-month reduction of sentence is not a credit for time served for the attainment of prison privileges as contemplated in N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1.
N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1 was designed to ensure that prisoners are credited with time served prior to the resolution of the State’s charges, not only against the service of the sentence, but also for the purpose of attaining prison privileges. The “credit” intended to be secured by N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1 has a dual effect:
Time creditable under this section shall reduce the minimum and maximum term of a sentence; and, irrespective of sentence, shall reduce the time required to attain privileges made available to inmates in the custody of the State Department of Correction which are dependent, in whole or in part, upon the passage of a specific length of time in custody, including parole consideration by the State Board of Paroles.
N.C.G.S. § 15-196.3 (1983). Because a defendant has spent time in custody as a result of a mere “charge,” as opposed to a determination of guilt, the legislature has given him the benefit of the doubt by crediting that period of incarceration for the purpose of attaining prison privileges. If a defendant returns to custody subsequent to a period spent in special probation, this is a strong indication that he is not entitled to the dual credit enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1, entitled “Credits against the Service of Sentences and for Attainment of Prison Privileges.” That is why special probation is not listed as a source of such credit.
The periods of incarceration that a prisoner is entitled to have credited both against his sentence and for the attainment of prison privileges are listed in N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1. They include time spent in custody “as a result of the charge”:
(1) pending trial,
(2) pending trial de novo,
(3) pending appeal,
(4) pending retrial,
(5) pending a parole hearing, and
(6) pending a probation revocation hearing.
*558See N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1 (1983). All of these periods occur prior to a final resolution of charges against the prisoner. The majority adds a new source of credit to this list, that is, “credit for time he was incarcerated as a condition of special probation when his probation was revoked and the suspended sentence activated.”
This added source of credit occurs not so much “as a result of the charge” as required by statute, but as a part of the resolution of the charges, that is, the sentence imposed. The situations listed in N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1 appear to encompass periods of incarceration endured by a defendant pending the final resolution of the State’s grievance against him. A period of incarceration pursuant to special probation appears to be the payment of the penalty imposed subsequent to the resolution of the State’s case. I do not believe the legislature intended that time served as a condition of special probation be treated as those periods of custody listed in N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1, which speaks in terms of periods of incarceration spent “as a result of” a “charge.” Special probation is a period of incarceration spent pursuant to a conviction.
My reading of the applicable statutory sections indicates that the legislature meant to differentiate between time served pursuant to special probation and “time a defendant has spent . . . as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence.” N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1. In the statute governing the imposition of special probation, trial courts are directed that they “may credit any time spent committed or confined, as a result of the charge, to either the suspended sentence or to the imprisonment required for special probation.” See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1351(a) (1988). This directive indicates to me that a period of special probation was not meant to be included as one of the enumerated situations listed by the legislature. Instead, a period of special probation is a period of custody to which those enumerated situations might apply.
In summary, a reduction in sentence for time served on the special probation portion of a split sentence and a “credit” pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1 are two entirely different matters. Although a defendant may be entitled to a reduction in the length of his sentence for the amount of time served in a period of special probation, he should not receive a “credit” in the dual nature contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 15-196.1, that is, that time should not serve as credit towards the attainment of prison privileges.
*559I believe the trial court reached the correct result. Accordingly, I vote to reverse the Court of Appeals.