Court Opinion

ID: 9628967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:35:07.056014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:13.821344
License: Public Domain

LA PRADE, Justice
(dissenting).
*80I cannot agree with the construction placed upon Section 16-701, A.C.A.1939, by the majority of the court.
This section reads as follows:
“Annexation by petition of property-owners.—Any city may extend and increase its corporate limits in the manner following: On presentation of a petition in writing, signed by the owners of not less than one-half in value of the property in any territory contiguous to the city, as shown by the last assessment of said property, and not embraced within its limits, the common .council .of said city may, by ordinance, annex such territory to said city, upon filing and recording a copy of such ordinance, with an accurate map of the territory annexed, certified by the mayor of said city, in the office of the county recorder, in the county where the annexed territory is situated.”
This section, if its terms are given their natural and reasonable meaning, provides that at least 50% of the owners by assessed valuation, in a territory shall request the city to annex that territory. The city’s jurisdiction to act is dependent upon and limited to the request contained in the petition. The request contained in the petitions here involved is that “All the real property owned by us (the petitioners) be annexed”. The only request to the city is that it annex the property of those persons signing the petition. By the petitioners’ own admissions the signatures on the petitions amount to only 60.81% in assessed valuation of the area the city is attempting to annex. Yet it attempts to annex 100% of the area fixed by it—an action obviously exceeding the requests of those who signed the petitions.
The statute under which this annexation was sought to be accomplished provides, in substance, that the city may act upon petition to annex a particular area. The jurisdiction of the city to annex depends upon compliance with the statute. It is therefore necessary to analyze the requirements of the statute.
Obviously, a petition must be presented to the city before it may act. And the word “petition” can only be defined as a request that a certain thing be done. Under the terms of Section 16-701 it is not contemplated that the required number of persons within a territory may request the city merely to “annex”—they are limited to requesting annexation of the described territory in which their property is situated.
That this was the intent of the legislature-is further borne out by this court’s decision in Gorman v. City of Phoenix, 70 Ariz. 59, at page 64, 216 P.2d 400, 404:
“* * * The determination by the city commission of whether the petition is signed by 'the owners of not less than one-half in value of the property in the territory’ sought to be annexed by petitioners is a judicial function and therefore subject to review by the court. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)
*81Implicit in the language “territory’ sought to be annexed by petitioners” is the proposition that it is the property owners, and not the city, who determine, in the first instance, the territory to be annexed, even though the city in acting on the petition may reject all or part of the designated area, and those petitioners cannot request the annexation of a “territory” without describing one.
The fact that it was never contemplated that the city should have the right to initially determine the territory to be annexed is shown by the enactment of Section 16-702, A.C.A.1939:
“When any city shall desire to annex any contiguous territory * * * • and the same shall not have been petitioned for, as provided for in the preceding section, the legislative body of such city may * * * authorize the mayor * * * to petition the superior court * =K * ”
This statute was originally enacted, along with Section 16-701, in 1893 and titled “An Act Authorizing Incorporated Cities to Extend and Enlarge their Limits.” Laws 1893, p. 91. The language of this Act is substantially the same as the present statutes. In order to determine the intent of the legislature, it is necessary to view this Act as a whole. The applicable rule of construction is as follows:
“In the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, a statute must, or should, be read or construed as a whole, or in its entirety, and, with respect to the construction of a statute, its division into sections is a purely artificial and unessential arrangement. Likewise, according to the decisions on the question, a section or a provision of a statute must be construed as a whole. A statute should also be construed with respect to the subject matter to which it applies and the particular topic under which the language in question is found.
“All parts, provisions, or sections of a statute or section, must be read, considered, or construed together, and each must be considered with respect to, or in the light of, all the other provisions or sections, and construed in connection, or harmony, with the whole.” 82 C.J.S. Statutes, § 345, p. 691.
Section 16-702 was intended to provide the vehicle for annexation where the city desired to be the moving party. It provided a means for the city to annex a "contiguous territory” where "the same shall not have been petitioned for, as provided for in the preceding section”. The very language in Section 16-702, emphasized above, means that under Section 16-701 the property owners are to petition for the annexation of a "contiguous territory” and they can only do so by describing, in the petition, the contiguous territory which they wish the city to annex. Also, Section 16-705, A.C.A. 1939, provides a method whereby the voters or owners in a tract could petition the court for annexation. Certainly it was not intended that these owners could petition for *82annexation without describing the area to be annexed.
The use of the word “territory” in all these sections of the statutes indicates clearly that the legislature had in mind a defined area.
That Section 16-702 was held to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the judiciary, Udall v. Severn, 52 Ariz. 65, 79 P.2d 347, does not detract from its force as an indication of the legislative intent. In summary that intent was that the' territory to be annexed is to be determined initially by -the petitioners and described in the petition.
In City of Phoenix v. State ex rel. Harless, 60 Ariz. 369, 137 P.2d 783, 787, 146 A.L.R. 1255, this court dealt with the question among others, of the validity of a particular consent to annexation. It was there stated that the
“ * * * fact that they (the petitioners) authorized the circulator of the petition to change, if he saw fit, the boundaries of the property to be annexed before submitting the petition, does not change the fact that they wanted annexation to prevail.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitions in that case did describe an area to be annexed although the circulator was empowered to change the boundaries before submitting the petitions. In the instant case, the petitions have already been filed and still no area is defined therein. Furthermore, the word “change” implies the existence of somé initial boundaries which' may be altered. The cited case is not authority for the city to initially determine the area. It does support the view that the petitions must describe the territory sought by the signers to be annexed.
If Section 16-701 is given its reasonable meaning when read in the light of the Gorman and Harless cases and in the light of the legislative intent evidenced by Section 16-702, the conclusion is inescapable that the petitions for annexation must describe the territory sought to be annexed.
It is a general rule of interpretation that where the language of a statute is obscure or of doubtful meaning (which I think does not exist in this statute) the court in construing such statute may with propriety refer to the history of the times when it was passed. 50 Am.Jur. Statutes, § 295. In this behalf it is interesting to me to note that this statute was first adopted in 1893, at a time when the population for the entire state was 59,620 (1890 census). Tucson was the largest city in the state with a population of 5150, Phoenix had a population of 3152, the cities of Yuma, Prescott and Bis-bee had populations under 1800 and the cities of Douglas and Ajo did not exist. The railroad from Ash Fork to Phoenix did not exist and legislators and citizens living in northern Arizona desiring to go to the capítol city had to take the Sante Fe railroad into Los Angeles and ride back over the Southern Pacific, changing at Maricopa to the Maricopa and Phoenix railroad which had been completed six years previously. It is inconceivable to me at this *83late date to impugn to the legislature of 1893 an intention such as now has been attributed to it, under the theory that the construction arrived at gives expression to then legislative intent. I am confident that the legislature of 1893 never had any such intent. The Act taken as a whole contradicts any such intention.
The 1893 Act presented three methods looking toward annexation, as I have pointed out above. All three methods contemplated a petition with delineations. The fundamental concept of government upon which this Nation was founded is the right of the people to have notice of and the opportunity.- to be heard on all matters affecting their persons or property “ * * * the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances”. The denial of these fundamental rights resulted in the Declaration of Independence. Throughout the body of our constitutional and statutory law the principle of “due process” both with respect to personal and property rights is carefully guarded and protected. Where a statute is susceptible of different interpretations the court should follow the one which accords with the contempt of due process rather than the one which denies it.
In the companion case of City of Phoenix v. Struckmeyer, decided this date on authority of the Tucson case, the same want of due process is denied as is astonishingly demonstrated by the fact that on the morning .of December 23, 1953, some 8000 persons living in an area comprising almost three square miles adjacent to the City of Phoenix, discovered in the morning paper that on the previous night said area had been annexed to the City of Phoenix and made subject to City of Phoenix ad valorem taxes, city sales tax, building restrictions, building ordinances and zoning ordinances then prevailing in the city, all without an inkling of notice that any such scheme was being clandestinely contrived.
After reading the majority opinion I think it evidences the philosophy that no restraints should be placed on the cities of Phoenix and Tucson to grow big—ruthlessly if necessary. The majority have lost sight of the fact a new meaning may not be given to the words of an old statute in consequence of changed conditions. The fact that events probably not foreseen by the legislature of 1893 have occurred, does not permit the court to undertake to enact new law. State v. National Baseball Ass’n, 141 Tenn. 456, 211 S.W. 357, 4 A.L.R. 368.
The majority opinion states that “The legislature may give to municipalities the power to annex territory upon any condition it chooses to impose, either with or without the wishes of'the inhabitants of the territory involved, either with or without notice to anyone, with or without the right of objecting inhabitants to "protest.” I recognize that the legislature has the plenary powers suggested but my answer is that the legislature in this instance has not granted any such dictatorial powers.
*84I think that the cities involved were without jurisdiction in the premises to enact the ordinances, and that the alternative writs should be quashed.