Court Opinion

ID: 9883267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:39:19.119541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:22.146663
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. Although plaintiff alleged that the gas pipes, 39 inches below the surface of the public road, were under the exclusive control of defendant and a pre-trial order so concluded, plaintiff nonetheless offered evidence of that fact, which apparently failed to substantiate it, causing the trial court to determine, after hearing the evidence, that such fact was not shown. The court consequently concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply, as a matter of law.
I know of no rule that would prevent a trial court that has stated a fact at pretrial which a plaintiff could rely on, is precluded from arriving at a different conclusion, if plaintiff in presenting evidence at the trial, himself disproved the fact he might not have had to prove.
It is significant that after the court finally concluded there was no substantial evidence of control in defendant, plaintiff, in asking that the case be re-opened, made a proffer of proof of facts which could have been presented at the trial before the case finally was submitted, to show the defendant did have control. If the facts adduced by plaintiff at the trial are inconsistent with a pre-trial order, I take it that such order is not controlling in determining the true facts of the case.
The trial court obviously does not share the conclusion of the main opinion that “The maintenance, repairs and inspection were under the exclusive control of the company,” since the court concluded that the evidence did not substantiate this gratuity.
*14I am of the opinion that the trial court, after weighing the facts adduced by plaintiff, propeidy applied,-and the main opinion has misconceived the law as stated in Musolino Le Conte Co. v. Boston Gas Co.,1 which seems to be almost identical factually with the case here, in which it was said:
“[T]he law of this Commonwealth does not go so far as to permit an inference of negligence in such a case as this. * * * [T]here have been a number of cases against gas companies founded upon negligence in allowing the escape of gas from street mains; but in all of them * * * there was evidence of negligence in addition to the mere facts of the break and escape of gas, and all of them were treated as cases involving the question of negligence upon all the evidence without attaching peculiar significance to the mere facts of a break and a leak. * * * The company has control of its pipes only in a limited sense. They are buried, often under thick pavement, in miles of streets of which the company does not have control. They cannot be continually dug up for inspection.”
It occurs to this writer that to conclude as does the main opinion here, under the facts of this case, would impose absolute liability on a gas company whose control of transmission facilities is not plenary, 'but Completely subordinate and subservient tp government control of the terrain where such facility is permitted to be placed, and secondarily subject to either partial control or interference by other public utilities operating water systems, telephone lines, storm sewers, drainage facilities, telegraph cables and the like. To conclude otherwise would be' unreasonable and would ignore completely the fundamental principle that one, to be negligent in operation of an erstwhile efficient mechanism, at least must have reasonable notice of and an opportunity to rectify the difficulty.

. (1953) 330 Mass. 161, 112 N.E.2d 250.