Court Opinion

ID: 9607496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:59:18.111719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:39.251875
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. OCGA § 16-3-25 provides that “[a] person is not guilty of a crime if, by entrapment, his conduct is induced or solicited by a government officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in prosecuting the person for commission of the crime. Entrapment exists where the idea and intention of the commission of the crime originated with a government officer or employee, or with an agent of either, and he, by undue persuasion, incitement, or deceitful means, induced the accused to commit the act which the accused would not have committed except for the conduct of such officer.” See also Emanuel v. State, 195 Ga. App. 302, 305 (393 SE2d 74) (1990) (Pope, J., dissenting), adopted in 260 Ga. 425 (396 SE2d 225) (1990). “After a defendant *794presents a prima facie case of entrapment, the burden is on the state to disprove entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hill v. State, 261 Ga. 377 (405 SE2d 258) (1991). And, as the majority acknowledges, it is not enough for the State merely to impeach the defendant’s evidence making out the entrapment defense. Rather, “[t]he government’s burden is far greater than merely impeaching the accused, it ‘must go further and contradict this witness’ testimony as to the affirmative defense. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Id.
In my opinion the defendant in this case established a prima facie case of entrapment, and the State failed to rebut the defendant’s case beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant testified that the informant was an old female friend of his who repeatedly (forty or fifty times) contacted him over a two-month period and requested that he obtain marijuana to sell. She would sometimes call two or three times a day. The defendant testified that when the informant first contacted him, she told him that she needed to make some money because “her children were doing without”; that at first she did not say what she wanted to do to make money to help her kids, but that she subsequently asked him to help her obtain some marijuana to sell; and that when defendant still did not respond to her requests, she then told him that she feared for her safety because of her inability to obtain drugs on a previous occasion for the people who were looking to buy drugs from her now. The defendant presented evidence that he did not possess marijuana to sell at the time the informant contacted him, that he did not transport the contraband to the arranged buy, and that he told the undercover officer he had to “pound the pavement” to obtain the drugs through the friend of a friend. The informant did not testify at trial, and the undercover officer’s testimony concerning his knowledge of what transpired in setting up the drug deal did not contradict the defendant’s testimony. The undercover officer testified that the informant talked with the defendant an undetermined number of times over a period of several weeks in setting up the deal, that he did not tell the informant specifically what to say to the defendant in order to set up the deal, although he did instruct her to try and get “as much as she could get” and that he did not have a recording of the informant’s conversations with the defendant. Based on the officer’s testimony alone, the State could not rebut the defendant’s claim of entrapment. “ ‘The record is absolutely devoid of evidence . . . that the circumstances surrounding the solicitations by the . . . informant occurred in a way other than that testified to by [the defendant].’ [Cit.]” Emanuel, 195 Ga. App. at 305. “If the informer’s testimony would have disproved the defendant’s testimony, the state should have produced him.” Perry v. State, 143 Ga. App. 227, 228 (1) (237 SE2d 705) (1977). See also Hill v. State, 261 Ga. at 378; Robinson v. State, 145 Ga. App. *79517 (243 SE2d 257) (1978).
Decided December 4, 1996
Frank J. Petrella, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Jefferson B. Blandford, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the majority would affirm defendant’s conviction because of evidence it says shows defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime. Specifically, the majority finds that defendant’s words and actions during the drug sale would allow the inference that defendant had prior experience in drug dealing. But “inferences and suggestion are not sufficient to meet the State’s burden of showing ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [defendant was] predisposed to commit the [offense].’ (Emphasis supplied.) [Cit.]” Emanuel v. State, 195 Ga. App. at 306. The State failed to show that the defendant possessed marijuana prior to the sale, had made drug sales on prior occasions, needed to transact the sale to get money, or any other facts that could create more than an inference of predisposition. See Chambers v. State, 154 Ga. App. 620, 625 (269 SE2d 42) (1980). All the State really showed about defendant’s predisposition was that defendant possessed marijuana in high school. However, a State’s witness testified that the defendant had never distributed marijuana. The defendant’s possession of marijuana approximately 12 years ago when he was in high school does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the predisposition to commit the crime of which he was convicted — possession with the intent to distribute. Emanuel, 195 Ga. App. at 306.
Since the Státe failed to rebut defendant’s testimony that he was entrapped and failed to present any more than an inference of the defendant’s predisposition, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Compare Rutledge v. State, 218 Ga. App. 130, 133 (460 SE2d 551) (1995) (affirming conviction since informant testified that he did not induce defendant into committing the act); Hall v. State, 211 Ga. App. 310, 311 (439 SE2d 67) (1993) (affirming conviction since defendant testified he had sold drugs because he needed the money). Therefore, I would find it unnecessary to reach the defendant’s remaining enumerations of error.
I am authorized to state that Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.