Court Opinion

ID: 9470946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:21:32.16543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:12.266999
License: Public Domain

SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, because I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority nor with the result it reaches.
This is a simple case, although both the Board (MSPB) and the majority have by their opinions made it appear to be complicated. The sole issue is whether the Board has jurisdiction of the case. The majority recognizes this to be true, but proceeds to disregard the issue and, like the Board, devotes its opinion to a complicated discussion of whether the application of the time-in-grade regulation of the OPM by the Army is an employment practice. As shown below, whether the application of this regulation is an employment practice is *725wholly immaterial and irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue in the case.
The jurisdictional requirements for the appeal of this case to the Board is set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a), which provides as follows:
Employment practices. A candidate who believes that an employment practice which was applied to him or her by the Office of Personnel Management violates a basic requirement in § 300.103 is entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board * * *. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, to be an appealable action, it must meet the requirements of this regulation. The petitioner must show that these requirements have been met before the Board can consider his case. He has wholly failed to carry this burden.
The petitioner has failed to show that the OPM applied the time-in-grade regulation to him either directly or indirectly. It did not do so directly, because no official or person connected with the OPM did anything or took any action to apply the regulation to the petitioner. Everything that was done was by the action of the Army. It cannot be successfully argued that the OPM indirectly applied the time-in-grade restriction to the petitioner by including it in the OPM regulations, as it is agreed by all parties that the regulation does not apply to the petitioner because he is in the excepted service.
It is clear that since the Army wrongfully applied the regulation to the petitioner in denying him the job he seeks, and the OPM did nothing whatsoever, the Board has no jurisdiction of the case under 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a). The majority indicates in footnote 8 of its opinion that the OPM has not raised nor briefed these defenses. In this, the majority is mistaken. These defenses were raised and briefed repeatedly before the Board. For instance, in OPM’s initial response to petitioner’s appeal, it stated:
Hence, appellant has no standing to bring this appeal since he has not shown that he has been injured by any action of OPM as required under 5 C.F.R. § 300.-104(a) before the Board’s appellate jurisdiction may attach. Woolery v. OPM, MSPB Docket No. AT030009002, November 19, 1980. (Joint Appendix, P. 52) (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it [Time-in-grade restriction] is not an employment practice “applied by OPM” as required by 5 C.F.R. § 300.-104(a). We, therefore, respectfully urge that the Board lacks the jurisdiction to hear this matter under 5 C.F.R. Part 300 and that the appeal be denied. (Joint Appendix, P. 56) (Emphasis supplied)
These defenses were again raised by OPM before the Board in its Response to Petitioner's Petition for Review as follows:
NO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE WAS APPLIED BY OPM
There are two irrebuttable reasons why MSPB lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Dowd’s appeal. The first reason, as stated by OPM in its initial response to the Washington Area Office presiding official, is that MSPB only has jurisdiction over Part 300 appeals from employment practices applied by OPM. In this instance, the Department of the Army applied OPM’s time-in-grade restrictions to Mr. Dowd and excluded him from consideration for a position. OPM took no action with regard to Mr. Dowd. (Joint Appendix, P. 91) (Emphasis supplied)
* sf: * * *
OPM submits that in this case, MSPB could, under no theory, have jurisdiction over the Department of the Army, because appellant was not subject to an employment practice administered by OPM. Accordingly, OPM contends that for various reasons, MSPB does not now have, nor did it ever have, jurisdiction over Mr. Dowd’s Part 300 appeal. (Joint Appendix, P. 92) (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is clear that these jurisdictional issues were clearly and positively presented to the Board, as shown by these record references which we are reviewing. It is *726immaterial whether these defenses are raised and discussed in briefs of OPM in the appeal to this court, because they involve the question of jurisdiction that can be raised by any party, or by the court on its own motion, at any stage of the proceedings.
Jurisdiction is always open to inquiry upon the court’s own motion. Pacific Towboat & Salvage Co. v. I.C.C., 620 F.2d 727 (9 Cir.1980). It is always the obligation of a federal court to determine jurisdiction. State of Alabama Ex Rel. Baxley v. Woody, 473 F.2d 10 (5 Cir.1973). Federal courts may raise jurisdictional questions even if the parties fail to do so. Rowe v. United States, 633 F.2d 799, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970, 101 S.Ct. 2047, 68 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981). The threshold inquiry in every ease is the issue of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties nor ignored by the court. Starobin v. United States, 662 F.2d 747 (Ct.Cl.1981); Reid v. Ford, Bacon and Davis Construction Corp., 405 F.2d 861 (8 Cir.1969). These principles apply whether the court is considering its own jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of an Administrative Board in a case appealed from the Board to the court, as in the instant case. Accordingly, it is proper for the court to consider the jurisdictional issues in the case before us whether or not they are raised and briefed by the parties. In fact, it is the duty of the court to do so.
The majority, as well as the Board, devoted considerable time and space to the question of whether the application of the time-in-grade restriction was an employment practice, and, in fact, based their decisions on their determinations of this issue, the Board saying it was not such a practice and the majority holding that it was. Actually, such a determination was wholly immaterial to the question of the Board’s jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a), because in neither case did the OPM apply the regulation to the petitioner, which is required to confer jurisdiction on the Board.
The majority is sending the case back to the Board for another hearing but has provided no guidelines or instructions for the guidance of the Board. One wonders what the Board can do on such a re-hearing in view of the facts in the case and the limited authority and jurisdiction of the Board. In my opinion, the only decision that the Board can make is to find and hold that it does not have jurisdiction of petitioner’s case under 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a), because the time-in-grade regulation is not applicable to him and because OPM did not apply it to him. It appears to be an exercise in futility to remand the case to the Board for the sole purpose of allowing the Board to give the correct reason for its lack of jurisdiction instead of the wrong reason it gave on the prior hearing.
The facts and the law show that the petitioner is in the wrong forum. If he has any claim, it is against the Army. He should be seeking relief by way of mandamus or otherwise in a district court instead of pursuing this appeal.
I would hold that the Board lacks jurisdiction of this case for the reasons stated herein, and would order the case dismissed.