Court Opinion

ID: 9863118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:05:59.198828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:47:14.678867
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the determination by the court as to which documents are privileged. However, I disagree that the privilege has been waived. More importantly, I disagree *650with the majority’s shift of the burden of proof on the waiver issue.
The court mistakenly holds that mere possession of documents by the Grand Jury creates a presumption that those documents were voluntarily disclosed by the real parties at interest — the University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio, Dr. Harrison, and Dr. Dunn (hereinafter called Health Care Providers).1 According to the majority, the record’s silence as to the manner in which the Grand Jury acquired the documents is fatal to the claimed privilege because the parties relying on the privilege did not affirmatively undertake to disprove waiver. 701 S.W.2d 644. However, Health Care Providers have expressly claimed their statutory privilege at all stages of this proceeding. No argument is made that there was any express waiver of the privilege. The majority’s finding of waiver, then, must be “implied” from the Health Care Providers’ actions with respect to the privileged materials. ■
The court’s opinion creates a two prong test for persons asserting a privilege: First, the privilege claimant must establish entitlement to protection within the narrow confines of the privilege; second, the claimant must establish that the privilege has not been waived.
I take issue with the second prong of the court’s analysis. The question of waiver becomes relevant only after the privilege is found to exist. Waiving a privilege is not the same as failing to prove the privilege existed in the first instance. Waiver provides the proponent of the evidence with a justification for admitting the information despite the fact that it is privileged. In this context it is much like a plea in confession and avoidance. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 94.
The party seeking to benefit by the determination of waiver has the burden to obtain a ruling in his favor. See Washington v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 581 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.1979). The court in this case adopts the opposite approach when it states:
If the matter for which a privilege is sought has been disclosed to a third party, thus raising the question of waiver of the privilege, the party asserting the privilege has the burden of proving that no waiver has occurred.
701 S.W.2d at 649. It is not surprising that the court cites no authority for this proposition.
The majority’s approach makes the disclosure of the privileged material an automatic waiver without considering whether the disclosure was voluntary. The mere fact that the Grand Jury in this case acquired the privileged documents does not establish waiver. The relevant question regarding waiver is not whether the Grand Jury had possession of the documents, but how the Grand Jury acquired possession of the documents.
When a specific act of waiver is brought before the court, the privilege claimant may properly have the burden of establishing that there was no waiver. Where, however, as in this case, the claimant is required to disprove the existence of all conceivable acts of waiver — when no act(s) of waiver have been asserted — the privilege claimant should not be required to show “no waiver.” The party that stands to benefit from the finding of waiver can easily indicate to the court the grounds upon which it relies. In fact, in this case, Plaintiffs could have asked the Bexar County District Attorney how he came into possession of the privileged documents. They did not. I will not indulge in the assumption adopted by the court that if a third party has in its possession the privileged documents, the privilege claimant must have voluntarily relinquished control.
*651Other Texas cases have held that the proponent of privileged evidence, as opposed to the privilege claimant, has the burden to show that the privilege has, in fact, been waived. In West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.1978), this court dealt with assertions of waiver raised in a discovery mandamus. The proponents of the privileged evidence asserted three grounds of waiver, all of which were denied by the court because “[b]ased upon the facts and arguments presented to us, the Respondent’s allegations of a waiver of Relator’s attorney/client privilege cannot be supported at this time. Accordingly, Relator was entitled to assert the privilege....” Id. at 244-45. See also Eloise Bauer & Assoc., Inc. v. Electronic Realty Assoc., Inc., 621 S.W.2d 200, 204; Burnett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Chacko v. State, 630 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Cruz v. State, 586 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). Under the court’s new rule, the proponents of the privileged evidence in West would not have had to support their claims of waiver in the trial court. The majority’s approach is clearly contrary to this court’s treatment of the waiver issues in West. Furthermore, the applicable statutory provision for confidentiality of medical committee reports does not require a showing that the privilege has not been waived. See Tex.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 4447d, § 3.
The record is silent as to how the Grand Jury obtained the records in question.2 Some basic policy considerations dictate a finding against waiver. The public policy of vigorous prosecution of those that violate the law should be a factor against a finding of waiver. By holding that the statutory privilege has been waived because of cooperation with the Grand Jury, the court discourages full disclosure by those with knowledge of relevant facts. Persons or institutions will be reluctant to fully provide information because of potential civil liability. In turn, this potential reduction in information will hinder law enforcement officials in bringing future wrongdoers to justice.
Particular reports and documents have different importance in the context of criminal investigations as opposed to civil litigation. Often, as in this case, the requested documents are not the only source of evidence on which a negligence action can be maintained.
Upon a silent record, the court has improperly shifted the burden of proving waiver onto the party asserting the privilege. For the above reasons, I dissent.

. Even though the style of the case indicates that Judge Jordan is the sole relator, he is only a nominal party. The true relators, William Reid McClellan and Patti McClellan, are specified in Relator’s Motion to File and in his Petition for Writ of Mandamus. They are named as parties plaintiff at trial below. The better practice would be for the true relators to also be named in the style of the cause.

. Complying with a grand jury’s subpoena is not a voluntary disclosure relating to a subsequent civil action. See In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 605-06 (N.D.Tex.1981).