Court Opinion

ID: 9909258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 20:02:32.623462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:23.028425
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/12/23 P. v. Jackson CA1/5
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                A164600
          Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.                                                             (Mendocino County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
 JAMESON WOLFGANG JACKSON,
                                                                SCUK-CRCR-2020-35868-1)
          Defendant and Appellant.

        Jameson Wolfgang Jackson (appellant) appeals his convictions,
following a jury trial, for murder and attempted murder. We affirm.
                                             BACKGROUND
Information
        In December 2020, appellant was charged by information with first
degree murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), with allegations that the
murder was perpetrated by firing from a motor vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21))
and that appellant personally used a firearm causing great bodily injury or
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Appellant was further charged with attempted

        1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                        1
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), with an allegation that appellant personally
used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).2
Prosecution Case
      J.S. testified that in the summer of 2000 he borrowed a red Ford F-150
truck from friends.3 On August 16, 2000, the truck was taken from J.S. by
two strangers: appellant, armed with an axe, and Shayla Guerrero, armed
with a knife. The following day, J.S. was with his brother when he saw
appellant and Guerrero driving the red truck. The hood and roof had been
painted black. J.S. and his brother followed them for a few minutes until
they stopped. Appellant and Guerrero began moving items from a car into
the truck. J.S. told his brother to go notify the local police, and J.S. stayed,
telling appellant and Guerrero to return the truck. They refused.
      J.S. called the police, telling the 911 operator, “They stole my car and
they have it here, and they don’t want to give it to me.”4 Appellant and
Guerrero got back inside the red truck, and J.S. placed himself in front of it
to prevent them from leaving. An acquaintance, Joel Mendoza-Gonzalez,
joined J.S. Guerrero, who was driving, accelerated towards J.S. and
Mendoza-Gonzalez and they ran to avoid being hit, with J.S. slightly ahead of
Mendoza-Gonzalez. J.S. saw appellant pointing a gun at him from the
passenger seat, then the truck ran into a nearby post and J.S. heard a
gunshot. J.S. felt blood coming from his ear and saw Mendoza-Gonzalez lying
on the ground. J.S. did not have a gun or any other weapon on the day of the
shooting, and he did not see Mendoza-Gonzalez with a weapon.

      2 A third charge was dismissed by the People before trial.

      3 J.S. testified through an interpreter.

      4 A recording of the 911 call, which was partly in Spanish, was played

for the jury and a transcript with English translation was provided.

                                           2
      A Spanish-speaking law enforcement officer who responded to the
scene interviewed J.S. in Spanish. J.S. told the officer that Guerrero and
appellant refused to return the truck, appellant was carrying a gun, and
appellant and Guerrero drove towards J.S.
      Alfredo M. was working nearby when he heard a car accelerating, a
loud bang, and soon thereafter a shot.5 A minute later, appellant ran by,
firing a gun but the gun was jammed. A red Ford truck with a black top sped
by, stopped near appellant, and then sped off with appellant.
      A tribal police officer testified the red truck nearly collided with his
unmarked patrol vehicle. The truck had damage to the front passenger side
bumper and the front right tire appeared to be locked in place. The officer
activated his vehicle lights and followed the truck. The truck stopped at a
cemetery and Guerrero and appellant got out and fled.
      Mendoza-Gonzalez died from a single gunshot wound to the head, with
an entry wound slightly higher than the exit wound. Law enforcement did
not find any empty casings at the scene of the shooting, but did find a bullet
pushed into a casing, consistent with a gun having jammed. In the cemetery
near the red truck abandoned by Guerrero and appellant, law enforcement
found a magazine that matched the bullet found at the scene of the shooting.
Inside the red truck was a can of black spray paint and the axe appellant was
holding when he stole the truck from J.S.
Defense Case
      Appellant testified in his own defense. In the early morning hours of
August 16, 2020, he was with Guerrero in her car when a truck turned off its
lights and began following them. The truck pulled ahead of them and

      5 Alfredo M. testified through an interpreter.

                                        3
reversed, slamming into the front of their car. Guerrero was able to drive
away, but when they stopped the car it would not start again. They stayed in
the car that night.
      The next day, a red and black Ford F-150 truck pulled onto the
property where their car was stopped. J.S., whom appellant did not know,
got out. Appellant and Guerrero approached J.S. and arranged to borrow his
truck for 68 dollars, plus an additional 120 dollars later. They drove off in
the borrowed truck. They returned the following morning, intending to move
Guerrero’s belongings from her car to the truck, take them to her mother’s
house, and then return the truck. J.S. and two other men, including
Mendoza-Gonzalez, got out of a nearby white truck. While appellant moved
Guerrero’s belongings, Guerrero and J.S. began arguing.
      The white truck was blocking the exit from the property. Appellant
grew scared and he and Guerrero got into the red truck, with Guerrero
driving. They were trying to find an alternate way off the property when
appellant heard shots fired. As they continued to try to drive away, Guerrero
ran into a post and the white truck that was blocking the exit. Appellant got
out of the red truck, taking a loaded pistol he had found in the truck, and
started to run. As he ran, the white truck pulled forward and hit him.
Appellant fell into a fence, and as he got up he fired a shot into the
windshield of the white truck because he was afraid for his life. He
accidentally fired a second shot as he ran away, but then the gun jammed.
      Guerrero picked up appellant in the red truck and they drove off. As
they turned into a cemetery, a car followed them. Appellant thought the
people in the car were intending to harm them, so when the red truck stopped
appellant ran and hid in bushes. After his arrest, appellant told police he did

                                        4
not have a gun on the day of the shooting. Appellant lied to the police
because he did not want to get in trouble.
Prosecution Rebuttal
      On rebuttal, the People called Guerrero. Guerrero was in custody and
had her attorney present. Guerrero had entered into a plea agreement with
the district attorney’s office, whereby she pled guilty to unlawfully taking the
truck and being an accessory after the fact, in exchange for her honest and
truthful testimony.
      On August 16, 2020, she and appellant took a Ford F-150 truck from
J.S. Guerrero had a knife and appellant had an axe. The truck was red
when they took it but later that day appellant spray painted parts of it black.
On the morning of the following day, Guerrero and appellant returned to the
location where they had taken the truck from J.S., to move Guerrero’s
belongings from her car into the truck. J.S. and others were there, but
Guerrero did not see anyone with a firearm at that point. The others were
arguing and had blocked the exit from the property. No one did anything
threatening to Guerrero or appellant.
      As Guerrero and appellant tried to drive the truck off the property, she
saw appellant had a firearm. J.S. and two others were hiding behind a tree.
Guerrero drove into a pole and then appellant fired two shots from inside the
truck. One of the men lay on the ground and another ran while holding his
hand against his head. Appellant got out of the truck and began running
away. Guerrero drove after him and picked him up. As they drove away,
Guerrero almost ran into another vehicle. She recognized the driver as a
tribal police officer. She turned into a cemetery, and the officer followed
them with his lights flashing. The red truck died and Guerrero and appellant
fled on foot.

                                        5
      The People also presented evidence that appellant made a phone call
during the trial in which appellant said his attorney was “talking about some
self defense” strategy but he would “not say[] I shot anybody. You know?
Cause I didn’t.”6
Verdict and Sentence
      The jury found appellant guilty as charged and found true all
allegations. The trial court sentenced appellant to life without parole, with
an additional aggregate term of 32 years to life.
                                 DISCUSSION
I.    Marsden7 Motion
      Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying a
posttrial Marsden motion. We reject the contention.
      A.    Additional Factual Background
      At a September 2021 posttrial hearing set for sentencing, appellant
made a Marsden motion. At the Marsden hearing, appellant identified a
number of concerns with trial counsel, including that she failed to obtain
medical records which he claimed would have supported his self-defense
claim.8 Trial counsel stated she was aware of the records and intended to
obtain them, but they “slipped my mind.” She further stated, “the jurors had
indicated after the trial that they would have liked to have seen the medical
records to—to corroborate what [appellant] said about having been hit by the
truck,” and because “I missed what I now believe to be a rather important

      6 An audio recording of the call was played for the jury and a transcript

was provided.
      7 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).

      8 At trial, appellant testified that after his arrest, he was sent to the

hospital and had a CT scan and x-rays.

                                        6
piece of evidence that I should have brought, I do think he has a colorable
issue for a motion for a new trial based on my failure to bring in that piece of
evidence.” The trial court granted the Marsden motion and appointed
substitute counsel, finding that, with respect to the medical records,
appellant “was not properly represented and it is a colorable issue for a
motion for a new trial.”
      In February 2022, at the new sentencing hearing, appellant again
made a Marsden motion. At the Marsden hearing, appellant stated
substitute counsel failed to obtain his medical records. Substitute counsel
explained he had reviewed the trial transcripts, evidence, and discovery
materials he received from trial counsel and had determined, “based on what
I have reviewed,” that a new trial motion would not be granted.
      The trial court denied the motion. The court began, “Your trial
testimony was that you were outside the vehicle at the time of the shooting
and fired shots when the vehicle was trying to strike you. And those medical
records would have corroborated your testimony that you were struck by a
vehicle.” The court then discussed evidence contradicting appellant’s trial
testimony, including Guerrero’s testimony “that the gun was fired from inside
the cab when she was in the vehicle with you” and that “the trajectory of the
bullet” killing Mendoza-Gonzalez was “front to back, higher in the front,
lower in the back, indicating that the shooter was hire [sic] than the victim at
the time the victim was shot. Your version of events could not have produced
that result with that gun.” The court concluded, “I’m relying on [substitute
counsel], his legal opinion is that even with those medical records, there was
not a sufficient legal basis for a new trial motion. And the only . . . argument
for incompetence is that he didn’t review records that he believed were not
going to change the outcome of any new trial motion. [¶] And so for those

                                       7
reasons, I don’t find that [substitute counsel] has fallen below any
constitutional standard of representation in this matter . . . .” The court
added that appellant had “not only appellate remedies but also habeas
remedies. And those may be the proper remedy if you’re looking for that kind
of a remedy.”
      B.    Legal Background
      “ ‘When, after trial, a defendant asks the trial court to appoint new
counsel to prepare and present a motion for new trial on the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must conduct a hearing to explore
the reasons underlying the request. [Citations.] If the claim of inadequacy
relates to courtroom events that the trial court observed, the court will
generally be able to resolve the new trial motion without appointing new
counsel for the defendant. [Citation.] If, on the other hand, the defendant’s
claim of inadequacy relates to matters that occurred outside the courtroom,
and the defendant makes a “colorable claim” of inadequacy of counsel, then
the trial court may, in its discretion, appoint new counsel to assist the
defendant in moving for a new trial.’ ” (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684,
692–693 (Smith).)
      “A defendant is entitled to competent representation at all times,
including presentation of a new trial motion or motion to withdraw a plea. . . .
[J]ustice is expedited when the issue of counsel’s effectiveness can be resolved
promptly at the trial level. In those cases in which counsel was ineffective,
this is best determined early. Thus, when a defendant satisfies the trial
court that adequate grounds exist, substitute counsel should be appointed.
Substitute counsel could then investigate a possible motion to withdraw the
plea or a motion for new trial based upon alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel. Whether, after such appointment, any particular motion should

                                        8
actually be made will, of course, be determined by the new attorney. [¶] We
stress equally, however, that new counsel should not be appointed without a
proper showing. A series of attorneys presenting groundless claims of
incompetence at public expense, often causing delays to allow substitute
counsel to become acquainted with the case, benefits no one. The court
should deny a request for new counsel at any stage unless it is satisfied that
the defendant has made the required showing. This lies within the exercise
of the trial court’s discretion, which will not be overturned on appeal absent a
clear abuse of that discretion.” (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 695–696.)
“ ‘Denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has
shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would “substantially
impair” the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.’ ” (Id. at pp. 690–691.)
      C.    Analysis
      Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding
substitute counsel provided adequate representation despite not obtaining
appellant’s medical records. Appellant contends substitute counsel’s “failure
to obtain the medical records is no different from trial counsel’s initial failure
to obtain the medical records,” and since the trial court found the latter was
inadequate representation, the former must also be. Appellant seeks a
remand for new “appointed counsel to obtain the medical records, perform
whatever necessary follow-up investigation those records suggest, and reach
an informed decision as to whether to bring a new trial motion.” Appellant
argues the availability of habeas remedies are an insufficient alternative
because he is indigent and has no right to appointed habeas counsel unless
and until a prima facie case has been established.
      The trial court did not abuse its discretion. First, appellant fails to cite
authority supporting his implicit assertion that we are bound by the trial

                                        9
court’s inadequacy findings on the first posttrial Marsden motion when
reviewing the court’s denial of the second posttrial Marsden motion. Second,
even so assuming, at the first Marsden motion, trial counsel opined that her
failure to obtain the medical records could be a basis for a motion for new
trial. At the second Marsden motion, substitute counsel opined, after
reviewing the trial transcript, exhibits, and discovery, that whatever the
medical records showed, a new trial motion would not be warranted. The
trial court considered the evidence presented at trial—specifically, the
significant evidence contradicting appellant’s self-defense claim—and
concluded that substitute counsel did not provide inadequate representation.
The record before the trial court on the second Marsden motion was different
than on the first motion, and the court did not abuse its discretion in
reaching a different conclusion.
      Finally, the trial court relied in part on the availability of appellate and
habeas remedies. “Our cases explain that, in appropriate circumstances, the
trial court should consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a
motion for new trial, because ‘justice is expedited when the issue of counsel's
effectiveness can be resolved promptly at the trial level.’ ” (People v. Cornwell
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 101, disapproved of on another ground by People v.
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 & fn. 22.) However, trial courts may
reasonably conclude that “justice would not be expedited by entertaining [a]
defendant’s [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim in a motion for new trial.”
(Cornwell at p. 101; see also id. at p. 102 [trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Marsden motion on this ground].) Appellant’s
proceedings had already been delayed for nearly five months to allow
substitute counsel time to review the records and determine whether grounds
for a new trial motion were present. The court’s determination that

                                        10
proceedings should not be delayed for an additional five (or more) months to
allow yet another attorney to conduct such a review, when appellate counsel
would be reviewing the record in any event, was not an abuse of discretion.
      We reject appellant’s contention that his habeas remedies are
insufficient because of his indigency. Appellant cites no authority that his
lack of a right to appointed counsel to investigate a possible habeas petition
renders that remedy unavailable. In any event, while appellant lacks the
right to appointed counsel for such purposes, appointed counsel may
nonetheless be available. “The courts of appeal have different policies on
whether an appellate appointment includes filing a habeas petition.” (Cal.
Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2023) § 42.57.) “The
agency which operates in this District is the First District Appellate Project
(FDAP).” (People v. Hackett (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1311.) We take
judicial notice of the following language on the FDAP website: “In the First
Appellate District, the scope of a Court of Appeal appointment includes—if
warranted—conducting a habeas investigation and filing a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal.” (Panel Attorney Policies &
Procedures, FDAP <https://www.fdap.org/panel-attorneys/
policies-procedures/> [as of Dec. 12, 2023], italics added.) Notably,
appellant’s appellate counsel, appointed through FDAP, has not filed such a
petition.
      Appellant has failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his second posttrial Marsden motion.9

      9 We need not decide whether appellant’s Marsden motion was also

untimely, as the People contend.

                                       11
II.   CALCRIM No. 337
      Appellant argues the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the
jury, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 337, “When Shayla Guerrero testified, she
was in custody. The fact that a witness is in custody does not by itself make
a witness more or less believable. Evaluate the witness’s testimony according
to the instructions I have given you.” Appellant does not argue the
instruction is a misstatement of law, but instead contends it precluded the
jury from considering his defense theory that Guerrero was lying to gain
favor with the district attorney, because her custodial status was part of her
motivation.
      “In reviewing a claim of instructional error, the court must consider
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions
caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution.
[Citations.] The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the
instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible
manner.’ ” (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
      The jury was instructed on evaluating witness credibility, pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 226, to consider factors including, “Was the witness’s
testimony influenced by . . . a personal interest in how the case is decided?”
and “Was the witness promised leniency in exchange for his or her
testimony?” The jury was also instructed, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 316, “If
you find that a witness has committed a crime or other misconduct, you may
consider that fact only in evaluating the credibility of the witness’s
testimony.” Moreover, “CALCRIM No. 337 expressly limits its application to
the jury’s consideration of the custodial status of a witness, without reference
to the conduct underlying the custody.” (People v. Mackey (2015)

                                       12
233 Cal.App.4th 32, 115 [rejecting claim that instruction patterned on
CALCRIM No. 337 precluded jury from considering defense theory that in-
custody accomplice’s testimony was not credible].) “Under these
circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury understood
CALCRIM No. 337 to prevent or restrict it from applying CALCRIM No. 316”
(Mackey, at p. 116) or CALCRIM No. 226 to consider Guerrero’s agreement
with the prosecution in evaluating her testimony.10
III.   Self-Defense Instruction
       The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 505. Appellant argues the trial court erred in including the
following portion of the instruction: “Defendant’s belief [that there was an
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to himself] must have been
reasonable and he must have acted only because of that belief.” Appellant
contends that, contrary to the instruction, when a defendant acts in self-
defense in resisting an active attempt to murder or to do great bodily injury,
the defendant’s act can permissibly have been motivated by both fear and
other reasons. (See People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1046 [“We note
that defendant did not argue in the trial court, nor has he argued on appeal,
that the jury should have been instructed that acting based on mixed motives
is permissible so long as reasonable fear was the but-for cause of his decision
to kill. We therefore have no occasion to consider whether such a rule would
be consistent with section 198 as interpreted in [prior cases].”].)
       We need not decide whether the instruction was error because any
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant argues he was
prejudiced because the jury could have found “(1) [appellant] was indeed

       10 We therefore need not decide whether appellant forfeited the

contention by failing to raise it below, as the People argue.

                                       13
resisting an attempt to cause him great bodily injury, (2) he shot while that
attempt was taking place but (3) [appellant’s] decision to use deadly force was
in some small part influenced by something other than fear,” and rejected
self-defense based on finding (3), even though under proper instructions
“findings (1) and (2) should have been enough to rely on self-defense.”
Appellant’s prejudice argument fails because a separate verdict shows the
jury necessarily rejected findings (1) and (2).
      The only evidence that appellant was resisting an attempt to cause him
great bodily injury and shot while that attempt was taking place was
appellant’s testimony that he was outside the red Ford truck when J.S. and
others drove into him, and he fired as he got up from his subsequent fall.
However, the jury found true the drive-by special circumstance (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(21)), which required a finding that appellant “[shot] a firearm from
a motor vehicle” when he killed Mendoza-Gonzalez. (See CALCRIM No. 735.)
Thus, the jury necessarily found that appellant was inside a vehicle when he
fired the shot that killed Mendoza-Gonzalez, and therefore could not have
found that he was resisting an attempt to cause him great bodily injury at
the time he shot Mendoza-Gonzalez. Any error in the self-defense instruction
as to mixed motives was harmless.
IV.   Juvenile Adjudication
      After appellant testified in his own defense, the parties stipulated to
the facts of prior misconduct committed when appellant was 15 years old, to
wit, an armed robbery with an accomplice, during which a victim was killed,
resulting in a juvenile adjudication.
      Appellant argues the use of a juvenile adjudication to impeach his
testimony violated his constitutional rights. As appellant concedes,
California caselaw is to the contrary. (People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th

                                        14
1724, 1740 [“the prosecution may introduce prior conduct evincing moral
turpitude even if such conduct was the subject of a juvenile adjudication,
subject, of course, to the restrictions imposed under Evidence Code
section 352 and other applicable evidentiary limitations”].) We need not
decide whether, as appellant contends, United States Supreme Court cases
require a different result, because appellant’s stipulation to the evidence bars
the challenge. “ ‘A binding stipulation admitting evidence may be made, even
if such evidence is otherwise inadmissible.’ ” (People v. Elder (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 123, 134.) “Having voluntarily entered into the stipulation,
the doctrine of invited error precludes” a challenge on appeal. (Ibid.; see also
People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 821–822
[“ ‘Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct
induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the
judgment should be reversed because of that error.’ ”].) Accordingly, we reject
the challenge.
V.    Drive-By Special Circumstance
      Appellant argues the drive-by special circumstance statute (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(21)) violates the Eighth Amendment because it applies to every
conviction for drive-by murder (§ 189, subd. (a)).
      “The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
prohibits the infliction of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ imposes various
restrictions on the use of the death penalty as a punishment for crime. One
such restriction is that any legislative scheme defining criminal conduct for
which death is the prescribed penalty must include some narrowing principle
that channels jury discretion and provides a principled way to distinguish
those cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not. A death-eligibility criterion that fails to meet this standard is

                                        15
deemed impermissibly vague under the Eighth Amendment.” (People v.
Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 462 (Bacigalupo).)
      Under the drive-by special circumstance, if the jury finds a first degree
murder “was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm
from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside the
vehicle with the intent to inflict death,” the penalty “is death or
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.”
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21).) First degree drive-by murder is “murder that is
perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death . . . .” (§ 189, subd. (a).) Appellant argues that, because every drive-by
murder is death-eligible under the drive-by special circumstance, the special
circumstance is unconstitutional.
      As appellant concedes, the argument was rejected in People v.
Rodriguez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 157, 164, which relied on Lowenfield v.
Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231. Lowenfield rejected an argument that a death
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because “the sole aggravating
circumstance found by the jury at the sentencing phase was identical to an
element of the capital crime of which [the defendant] was convicted.”
(Lowenfield, at p. 241.) Appellant contends Lowenfield is inapplicable
because the statutory scheme at issue in that case narrowed death-eligible
cases at a sentencing phase rather than at the guilt phase. (See Bacigalupo,
supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 465–466 [“Typically, death penalty statutes satisfy the
‘narrowing function’ in one of two ways. [Citation.] Some states narrowly
define capital offenses so that the jury’s finding of guilt reflects the
‘narrowing function.’ [Citation.] Other states define capital offenses more
broadly and provide for narrowing ‘by jury findings of aggravating

                                        16
circumstances at the penalty phase.’ ”].) Appellant fails to explain why the
distinction is a material one here.
      In any event, our Supreme Court has squarely held “first degree
murder liability and special circumstance findings may be based upon
common elements without offending the Eighth Amendment.” (People v.
Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 158; accord, People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th
600, 636 [“this court’s decisions resolving Eighth Amendment challenges to
other special circumstance provisions support the conclusion that the
amended lying-in-wait special circumstance would satisfy federal
constitutional requirements for death eligibility even were the amendment to
have made the special circumstance identical to lying-in-wait first degree
murder”].) We reject appellant’s challenge.
VI.   Unanimity
      The jury was instructed on two theories of first degree murder:
premeditation and deliberation, and murder by shooting a firearm from a
vehicle. The jury was further instructed they did not have to agree on the
same theory of first degree murder.
      Appellant argues the failure to instruct the jury that its verdict must
be unanimous as to the theory of first degree murder violated his
constitutional right to a jury trial. He contends earlier United States
Supreme Court and California Supreme Court cases to the contrary have
been “[u]ndercut” by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and Ring v.
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584. Our Supreme Court has rejected this argument:
“ ‘As for defendant’s claim that a unanimity instruction should have been
given, our cases have repeatedly rejected this contention, holding that the
jurors need not unanimously agree on a theory of first degree murder as
either felony murder or murder with premeditation and deliberation.

                                      17
[Citations.] [¶] We are not persuaded otherwise by Apprendi v. New Jersey
[(2000)] 530 U.S. 466 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435]. There, the United
States Supreme Court found a constitutional requirement that any fact that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime, other than a prior conviction,
must be formally charged, submitted to the fact finder, treated as a criminal
element, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We see nothing
in Apprendi that would require a unanimous jury verdict as to the particular
theory justifying a finding of first degree murder. (See also Ring v. Arizona
(2002) 536 U.S. 584, 610 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443–2444]
[requiring jury finding beyond reasonable doubt as to facts essential to
punishment].)’ ” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1023–1024.)
      We follow our Supreme Court, as we must (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), and reject appellant’s challenge.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                      18
                         SIMONS, J.

WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.

BURNS, J.

A164600
People v. Jackson

                    19