Court Opinion

ID: 9948713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 19:01:36.805799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.613781
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30460   Document: 61-1   Page: 1       Date Filed: 03/07/2024

       United States Court of Appeals
            for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                        ____________                                FILED
                                                                March 7, 2024
                         No. 23-30460                          Lyle W. Cayce
                        ____________                                Clerk

Harry F. Marsh; Cynthia Joy Marsh, Surviving heir of
Harry F. Marsh,
                                     Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                             versus

Chas Kurz & Company, Incorporated; Chiquita Brands
International, Incorporated, individually and as successor in
interest to United Fruit Company; Farrell Lines, individually
and as successor in interest to American Export Lines,
Incorporated; National Bulk Carriers, Incorporated,

                                                 Defendants—Appellees,

______________________________

Cynthia Marsh, as Administrator for the Estate of
Harry F. Marsh

                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                             versus

Chas Kurz & Company, Incorporated; Chiquita Brands
International, Incorporated, individually and as successor in
interest to United Fruit Company; Farrell Lines, individually
and as successor in interest to American Export Lines,
Incorporated; National Bulk Carriers, Incorporated,

                                      Third Party Defendants—Appellees.
    Case: 23-30460         Document: 61-1          Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/07/2024

                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                     USDC Nos. 2:19-CV-9339, 2:21-CV-2185
                    ______________________________

Before Stewart, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
          After contracting mesothelioma, retired merchant mariner Harry
Marsh sued the owner of every vessel he had worked on over a lengthy
career—including appellees Chas Kurz & Co., Inc., Chiquita Brands
International, Inc., Farrell Lines, individually and as successor in interest to
American Export Lines, Inc., and National Bulk Carriers, Inc. Marsh alleged
his illness was caused by asbestos on their vessels. Appellees moved to
exclude Marsh’s expert reports and for summary judgment, arguing there
was no evidence that they had exposed Marsh to asbestos. The district court
granted both motions. We affirm.
                                              I.
          Marsh sailed as a merchant mariner from 1944 to 1992. During his
lengthy career, he worked in various roles on many different vessels. Those
vessels, in turn, belonged to many different owners, including appellees. In
2018, decades after he retired, Marsh was diagnosed with mesothelioma.
Marsh sued the owners of all the vessels he had worked on (as well as other
related parties) under the Jones Act, claiming each had caused his illness by
exposing him to asbestos. In total, Marsh sued around 60 different entities.
Sadly, Marsh died in 2019 at the age of 92. But his lawsuit continued, with
his heir and estate taking over.

          _____________________
*
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

                                              2
 Case: 23-30460          Document: 61-1            Page: 3     Date Filed: 03/07/2024

                                       No. 23-30460

        Many defendants settled. Among them was Lykes Bros. Steamship
Co., Inc., the shipping company Marsh had worked for continuously from
1960 to 1992—most of his career. In contrast, Marsh had worked relatively
little for appellees. His employment with them was confined to the 1940s and
1950s, totaling only several hundred days combined. Nonetheless,
appellants’ experts concluded that exposure to asbestos on appellees’ vessels
contributed to Marsh’s developing mesothelioma.
        Appellees moved to exclude those expert reports and for summary
judgment. They argued that no evidence showed Marsh was exposed to
asbestos aboard their vessels and, given that lack of evidence, the experts’
conclusions were unsupported. The district court evidently agreed, granting
both motions. 1 This appeal followed.
                                            II.
        We review the exclusion of expert testimony for abuse of discretion.
Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2007). We
review a summary judgment de novo. Patel v. Tex. Tech Univ., 941 F.3d 743,
747 (5th Cir. 2019); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
                                            III.
        “The Jones Act provides a cause of action in negligence for ‘any
seaman’ injured ‘in the course of his employment.’” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,
515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30104). Although the Jones
Act reduces the burden to prove a toxic substance caused a seaman’s illness,
        _____________________
        1
          The district court did not explain why it granted the motions but stated it would
supply reasons later. To date, it has not done so. While district courts should provide their
reasons for granting or denying summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), failure to
do so is not necessarily grounds for reversal “if we can ourselves determine whether
summary judgment [wa]s appropriate.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Axon
Pressure Prod. Inc., 951 F.3d 248, 273 (5th Cir. 2020).

                                             3
Case: 23-30460         Document: 61-1        Page: 4     Date Filed: 03/07/2024

                                   No. 23-30460

“summary judgment is nevertheless warranted when there is a complete
absence of proof of an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case.” In
re Cooper/T. Smith, 929 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1991). If a seaman cannot
show he was exposed to a substance aboard a vessel, by definition he cannot
show it caused his illness. See, e.g., Schindler v. Dravo Basic Materials Co., Inc.,
790 F. App’x 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2019).
       Appellants failed to make that threshold showing. They point to no
evidence showing that Marsh was exposed to asbestos aboard appellees’
vessels. Indeed, in a deposition taken before he died, Marsh admitted he had
no memory of working on those vessels or of anything happening onboard
that would have exposed him to asbestos. Further, he admitted that he did
not know whether asbestos was even present in the areas where he had
worked. He only “assum[ed]” it “probably” was. This assumption, he
explained, was based on asbestos’s widespread use on ships in that period.
       The only other evidence of exposure appellants point to are various
government documents suggesting the general presence of asbestos aboard
vessels at the time. Those documents themselves illustrate the weakness of
appellants’ position. For instance, one Coast Guard circular from 1980 (long
after Marsh’s service aboard appellees’ vessels had ended) states that “[a]ll
vessels have some asbestos insulation material on board.” Appellants seize
on this statement. But the circular’s next sentence explains that “the amount
and type of asbestos can vary from very little to significant amounts.” So, the
circular suggests nothing about Marsh’s risk of asbestos exposure aboard any
particular vessel. Appellants point to no evidence specific to appellees’ vessels,
such as inspection reports, construction or maintenance documents, or
testimony from other seaman who worked onboard.
       Given the dearth of evidence specific to the appellees’ vessels, no
“fair-minded” reasonable jury could conclude that Marsh was exposed to

                                         4
Case: 23-30460          Document: 61-1       Page: 5   Date Filed: 03/07/2024

                                 No. 23-30460

asbestos on them. Bartel v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., No. 2:10-37528-ER, 2014 WL
8392369, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2014) (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co.,
352 U.S. 500, 510 (1957)). Appellants were required to prove more than that
many merchant mariners on many ships were exposed to asbestos during the
years Marsh sailed. Ibid. Rather, they had to prove that Marsh himself was
exposed to asbestos on appellees’ vessels during specific periods of
employment. See ibid. They lack the evidence of that. See ibid; Schindler, 790
F. App’x at 625; Jackson v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., 622 F. Supp. 2d 641, 644
(N.D. Ohio 2009) (citing Stark v. Armstrong World Indus., 21 F. App’x 371,
376 (6th Cir. 2001)).
       Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding appellants’ expert reports. A “[p]laintiff cannot shore up
inadequate exposure evidence with unsupported expert testimony.” Jackson,
622 F. Supp. 2d at 647. See also Schindler, 790 F. App’x at 625. The experts’
conclusions were predicated entirely on the general use of asbestos aboard
ships at the time and on Marsh’s corresponding assumption that he was
“probably” exposed to asbestos while working for appellees. “[A] district
court has broad discretion to determine whether a body of evidence relied
upon by an expert is sufficient to support that expert’s opinion.” Knight, 482
F.3d at 354 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
and Fed. R. Evid. 702). The district court did not abuse that discretion by
excluding reports that were not supported by evidence of exposure aboard
appellees’ vessels. See Schindler, 790 F. App’x at 625 (concluding same in
similar Jones Act asbestos case).
       For similar reasons, the district court did not err by granting summary
judgment for appellees. With no evidence of asbestos exposure aboard
appellees’ vessels and their expert reports on causation excluded, appellants
could not establish the elements of their claim. See In re Cooper/T. Smith, 929
F.2d at 1077; Schindler, 790 F. App’x at 625 (explaining that we have “held

                                         5
Case: 23-30460      Document: 61-1       Page: 6   Date Filed: 03/07/2024

                              No. 23-30460

that toxic-tort cases—even under the Jones Act—require expert testimony
to prove causation”).
                                                           AFFIRMED.

                                     6