Court Opinion

ID: 9712980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:04:20.384356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:15.597645
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While I concur in the majority’s conclusion in Section I of the opinion that the definition of “insured” contained in Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 5 (1982) applies to the determination of the existence of uninsured automobile insurance coverage, I disagree with its conclusion that after April 12, 1980 the definition applies to the determination of the existence of underinsured coverage.
Clearly, the legislature can mandate coverage provisions that must appear in insurance policies. Indeed, it has done so with respect to automobile insurance. Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subds. 1, 2, 3 and 4 (1982).1 But if the legislature has not mandated that certain definite insurance coverages must appear in policies, or that certain exclusions may not be inserted in policies, the insured and the insurer may enter into any insurance contract to which they mutually agree. “Parties to insurance contracts, as in other contracts, absent legal prohibition or restriction, are free to contract as they see fit, and the extent of liability of an insurer is governed by the contract they enter into.” Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960) (footnote omitted); see also Forcier *633v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 310 N.W.2d 124, 126-28 (Minn.1981) (supplemental automobile liability insurance).
Since April 12, 1980, the effective date of repeal of Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 6 (1978), the legislature has not mandated the compulsory offer of underinsured motorist coverage in automobile insurance policies. From 1974 to that date, the statute did mandate the offer of such coverage. Although conceding that it does not necessarily follow that the statutory definition of “insured” for uninsured motorist coverage should also apply to underinsured coverage, the majority discerns from the legislative history a legislative intent that the definition of “insured” as found in section 65B.43, subd. 5 govern underinsured coverage. I have difficulty in ascertaining such legislative intent merely because in 1974 the legislature repealed Minn.Stat. § 65B.24, subd. 4 (1971), the section defining “insured” as applicable to underinsured motorists. It seems to me that was logical inasmuch as in 1974 the legislature was mandating, as part of a comprehensive reorganization of the automobile liability insurance scheme — the No-Fault Act — , that underinsured motorist coverage be offered as well as the other coverages mandated in section 65B.49. It just made sense to have the same definition of “insured” apply to all of the mandated coverages — what the majority has labeled “definitional consistency.” Where I part with the majority is that I cannot take the next step which holds that, notwithstanding the fact that the legislature has repealed the mandatory offer of underinsured motorist coverage, nonetheless the section 65B.43, subd. 5 definition of “insured” was intended by the legislature to apply to “other benefits and coverages” (Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 7) — in this instance, underinsured motorist coverage.
I find nothing in the history of the legislative action with respect to underinsured motorist coverage to demonstrate that it intended that the definition of “insured” for optional underinsured coverage should be co-extensive with the statutory definition of “insured” for the mandatory coverages contained in that chapter.
Mary Jo Burgraff, a relative of the named insured, resided in the same household as the named insured, owned a private passenger automobile, and was identified by name in another contract for a plan of reparation security complying with Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41 to 65B.71 (1982) as an insured. Thus, she would be excluded from her father’s policy coverage for underin-sured motorists under the statute. Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 5 (1982). Nevertheless, the majority concludes she is entitled to such coverage merely because the insurer failed to print in the policy exclusion the statutory words is “identified by name in any other contract for a plan of reparation security complying with sections 65B.41 to 65B.71 as an insured,” Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 5 (1982), although, in fact, that was the case and although she was required by law to have such a plan of reparation security. Minn.Stat. § 65B.48 (1982).
In doing so, the majority relies upon Rosenberger v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 309 N.W.2d 305 (Minn.1981), as being dispositive. I disagree. The two cases are dissimilar. The main issue in Rosenberger related to whether Jean Ro-senberger was a resident in the named insured’s home for the purpose of collecting uninsured motorist benefits. A bare majority of the court affirmed a trial court determination that she was. Although she owned her own automobile, she did not come within the statutory exclusion because she was not identified by name in any other contract for a plan of reparation. Therefore, to have applied the policy exclusion attempting to exclude a resident who owns an automobile would have defeated the policy of the No-Fault Act.2 In the *634present case that is not true. By statutory definition, Mary Jo Burgraff is not an insured — no matter what language of exclusion was used in the policy. The perceived public policy of the requirement of the No-Fault Act for underinsured liability insurance is satisfied. See Anderson v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 269 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Minn.1978). Accordingly, I would reverse.
AMDAHL, Chief Justice. I join in the dissent of Justice Kelley.
PETERSON, Justice. I join in the dissent of Justice Kelley.
COYNE, Justice. I join in the dissent of Justice Kelley.

. Historically, it has done so with respect to other types of insurance contracts. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 61A.24 (1982) (life insurance); Minn.Stat. § 62A.03 (1982) (accident and health insurance); Minn.Stat. § 62B.06 (1982) (credit life and accident and health insurance).

. As authority for this holding, the court cited Anderson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 702 (Minn.1978). Anderson, however, was decided under Minn.Stat. § 65B.23, subd. 1 (repealed 1974), which prohibited an exclusion of liability solely because the injured person was a member of the household or related to the named insured. In Anderson, however, we *634noted that the no-fault statute, Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 5 (1982), had altered the definition of relative to exclude as relatives persons insured under another policy of insurance. We there intimated that the restriction in the no-fault law "may be explained by the requirement of universal liability insurance.” Id. at 705.