Court Opinion

ID: 9722324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:25:31.561155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:34.009562
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion outlines the proper law of the case but reaches the wrong conclusion.
There is no evidence in this record which could possibly rise to the level of being corroborative of the victim’s thoroughly impeached testimony. No witness saw appellant, his children or his car at the victim’s trailer near the time of the alleged attempted rape. Even the victim’s children *806who were in the trailer at the time of the incident, including her son Junior who was sleeping in the same bed as the victim, did not testify to -appellant’s presence.
Evidence that the rear bedroom of the victim’s trailer was “messed up ... as though it appeared that someone had been sleeping in there” corroborates only the fact that the bed was not made. The evidence that a young boy was sleeping on the couch in the living room is corroborative of nothing. Finally, the statements of Chastity about “Grandpa” which were made after the victim’s return to the trailer, and where the child admittedly was not awake and a witness to the alleged attempted rape, could only refer to the visit of “Grandpa” some two hours earlier in the evening.
The majority opinion also relies on evidence of a prompt complaint and of the emotional state of the victim as corroboration of the victim’s testimony. The Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Campbell, 217 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Iowa 1974) noted, however, that evidence of prompt complaint and emotional state “alone would not be sufficient [corroboration] since it does not tend to connect defendant with the crime[.]” The court in Campbell found sufficient corroboration of the victim’s story only in light of the discovery of defendant’s shorts in the victim’s bedroom, the defendant’s uncertainty when being questioned about the rape charge, and a telephone conversation in which the victim’s husband was assured that defendant would leave the state if he was left alone. In the case before us, we do not have any corroborative evidence that tends to connect appellant with the crime.
The Iowa Supreme Court has also held that when the record is void of corroborative evidence which places the alleged assailant near the scene of the crime at the time in question, of the assailant’s flight, or of incriminating evidence found on the assailant or at the scene of the crime, then evidence of a prompt complaint and of the emotional state of a victim is insufficient to submit the matter to the jury for consideration. State v. Taylor, 222 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1974). Just as in Taylor, there is no evidence here placing appellant near the victim’s trailer at the time of the crime, no evidence of flight, and no incriminating evidence found at the scene of the crime. In fact, the victim claims to have thrown appellant’s shorts onto the floor during the struggle and even the shorts were not found at the scene of the crime.
All the evidence introduced in this case results from the victim’s own statements or actions. The evidence includes her story of the alleged attempted rape, her emotional distress after the incident, and her prompt report of the incident. Her testimony was impeached by a prior inconsistent statement. Furthermore, she admitted on cross-examination that she had asked appellant to borrow one hundred dollars to purchase a car earlier that evening and he had refused to lend her the money. Without corroborating evidence to connect appellant with the crime, as a matter of law the court should have entered a directed verdict for appellant.
I am authorized to state that Justice FOSHEIM joins in this dissent.