Court Opinion

ID: 9402487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 20:00:33.957182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.236444
License: Public Domain

In the

       United States Court of Appeals
                     For the Seventh Circuit
                         ____________________
No. 21‐2986
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                         Plaintiff‐Appellee,
                                       v.

JAMES E. SNYDER,
                                                     Defendant‐Appellant.
                         ____________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court for the
            Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
         No. 2:16‐cr‐00160‐MFK‐2 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.*
                         ____________________

       ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2023 — DECIDED JUNE 15, 2023
                  ____________________

   Before HAMILTON, JACKSON‐AKIWUMI, and LEE, Circuit
Judges.
    HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Appellant James Snyder is a for‐
mer mayor of Portage, Indiana. He was convicted of federal
funds bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for solic‐
iting and accepting $13,000 in connection with the city’s

   *   Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2                                                    No. 21‐2986

purchases of garbage trucks. Snyder was also convicted of ob‐
structing the administration of federal revenue laws in viola‐
tion of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) for concealing assets and income
from the IRS. Snyder was sentenced to 21 months in prison
and one year of supervised release. Snyder has appealed,
challenging his convictions on several grounds. We aﬃrm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
    A. Purchases of Garbage Trucks by the City
    We begin with a summary of the facts, adding more details
below as relevant for each of Snyder’s challenges. Snyder was
elected mayor of Portage, Indiana and took oﬃce in January
2012. In December 2012 and November 2013, his administra‐
tion announced that it would purchase garbage trucks for the
city through public bidding. Both contracts were awarded to
Great Lakes Peterbilt (GLPB), a Portage truck dealer owned
by two brothers, Robert and Stephen Buha. The mayor put his
longtime friend Randy Reeder in charge of the bidding pro‐
cess. Reeder testified at trial that he drafted the bid specifica‐
tions to favor GLPB. Evidence at trial also showed that Mayor
Snyder was in frequent contact with the Buha brothers—but
no other bidders—during the bidding process. Less than three
weeks after the second contract was awarded, GLPB paid
Snyder $13,000.
    B. Snyder’s Dealings with the IRS
    Years before Snyder was elected mayor, his business, First
Financial Trust Mortgage, failed to pay its payroll taxes in full
for 2007, 2008, and 2009. The IRS then levied its bank ac‐
counts. Shortly after the levy, Snyder made an arrangement
with another mortgage company, GVC Mortgage, whereby
Snyder would manage and operate First Financial Trust
No. 21‐2986                                                    3

Mortgage as a division of GVC Mortgage. Snyder sent in‐
voices to GVC Mortgage for costs ostensibly incurred in op‐
erating First Financial Trust Mortgage. But rather than having
GVC Mortgage reimburse First Financial Trust Mortgage,
Snyder had GVC Mortgage send reimbursements to a diﬀer‐
ent company that Snyder had created called SRC Properties.
If the reimbursement checks had been deposited into First Fi‐
nancial Trust Mortgage’s bank account, they would have been
subject to the IRS levy.
    Snyder was also behind in paying his personal taxes, and
in December 2010 and February 2011, the IRS levied his per‐
sonal bank accounts. In trying to negotiate a settlement or in‐
stallment plan with the IRS on his personal taxes, Snyder sub‐
mitted three Form 433‐As. In each, he purported to disclose
fully his assets and liabilities under penalty of perjury. On all
three forms, Snyder failed to report that he owned SRC Prop‐
erties, and on two of the forms, he omitted his employment
with GVC Mortgage.
   C. District Court Proceedings
    In November 2016, a federal grand jury indicted Snyder
for federal funds bribery and obstructing the IRS. He went to
trial in January and February 2019. The jury convicted on one
count of federal funds bribery and one count of obstructing
the IRS and acquitted Snyder on a separate bribery charge in‐
volving the city’s towing contracts. Snyder then moved for a
judgment of acquittal or a new trial on the counts of convic‐
tion. The district court denied the motion for acquittal but
granted Snyder a new trial on the bribery charge. Snyder was
4                                                            No. 21‐2986

retried on the bribery charge in March 2021, and the jury
again returned a verdict of guilty.1
    Snyder now appeals, challenging decisions on motions to
dismiss, jury instructions, and suﬃciency of the evidence. We
have organized Snyder’s challenges into three parts. Part II
addresses Snyder’s argument that the district court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment or disqualify
the prosecution team after the government, pursuant to a
search warrant, seized communications between Snyder and
his attorney. Part III considers two challenges specific to the
IRS obstruction count: his statute of limitations defense and
the suﬃciency of the evidence. Finally, in Part IV, we address
speedy trial, jury instruction, and suﬃciency‐of‐the‐evidence
challenges to Snyder’s federal funds bribery conviction.

    1  Snyder’s case was initially assigned to the late Judge Lozano before
being reassigned in September 2017 to Judge Van Bokkelen, who presided
over Snyder’s first trial and who granted his motion for a new trial. In
November 2020, the case was reassigned to Judge Kennelly of the North‐
ern District of Illinois, sitting by designation, who presided over Snyder’s
second trial and imposed the sentence. Snyder’s attorney from July 2014
until October 2017 had been Thomas L. Kirsch II, who took office on Oc‐
tober 10, 2017 as United States Attorney for the prosecuting district, the
Northern District of Indiana. On December 17, 2020, he took office as a
United States Circuit Judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
When Judge Kirsch took office as United States Attorney, responsibility
for the prosecution shifted from the Northern District of Indiana to the
Northern District of Illinois, and all personnel in the Northern District of
Indiana were recused except for two trial attorneys and support staff who
had already been working on the case. Attorneys for the Northern District
of Illinois have also handled this appeal.
No. 21‐2986                                                    5

II. Challenges to the Seizure of Snyder’s Emails
    First, Snyder argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss the indictment or disqualify the prose‐
cution team on the theory that the government intruded on
his attorney‐client relationship. Snyder contends that his
Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when,
pursuant to an overbroad warrant, the government seized
communications between him and his attorney and then em‐
ployed a filter process to screen for privileged communica‐
tions without oversight by a court or defense counsel.
   A. Background
    In September 2015, the government obtained a search war‐
rant for Snyder’s personal and City of Portage email accounts.
At that time, Snyder had not yet been indicted, but he knew
he was under investigation and had retained counsel. The
government was aware that Snyder had retained counsel, so
it developed a filter process to prevent the prosecution team
from receiving privileged communications among Snyder’s
emails seized under the warrant.
    At an evidentiary hearing in the district court, the lead FBI
agent testified that after he received data from Snyder’s email
providers, he arranged for the data to be copied, secured the
original hard drive, and then sent the copied data to the FBI’s
Investigative Data Management System. The agent provided
a list of search terms to identify potentially privileged com‐
munications, which the computer applied to “quarantine”
roughly 8,600 of 109,000 emails. A team of FBI employees who
were not otherwise involved in Snyder’s case then examined
the quarantined documents. Those employees were not attor‐
neys but were instructed on criteria for privileged attorney‐
6                                                 No. 21‐2986

client communications and were advised to err on the side of
caution. Of the roughly 8,600 emails sent to the team, they
identified 900 as potentially privileged. Those 900 emails were
then sent to an Assistant U.S. Attorney for a final review. The
reviewing attorney worked in the same oﬃce as the prosecu‐
tion team but was not otherwise involved in Snyder’s case.
She identified roughly 300 emails as privileged, which were
not provided to the prosecution team.
   Snyder was indicted in November 2016. In February 2018,
he moved to dismiss the indictment, or, in the alternative, to
disqualify the prosecution team. He argued that members of
the prosecution team intruded on his attorney‐client relation‐
ship by reviewing privileged communications with his attor‐
ney in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Snyder identified
roughly forty emails that he argued were privileged but had
been shared with the prosecution team. Snyder also argued
that the search warrant was overbroad, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
    Judge Van Bokkelen denied Snyder’s motion. United States
v. Snyder, No. 2:16‐CR‐160 JVB, 2018 WL 4637253, at *9 (N.D.
Ind. Sept. 27, 2018). The court began by analyzing whether
any of the forty‐some emails Snyder identified were indeed
privileged. The court identified three exhibits that should not
have been shared with the prosecution team. Two were emails
regarding consulting contracts, but they were not related to
this case. The third was a compilation of emails containing
Quickbooks financial data that Snyder had generated upon
his attorney’s request. The government already had access to
at least some of the Quickbooks data, but the court found that
Snyder suﬀered some prejudice by the disclosure because the
Quickbooks emails made it easier for the government to
No. 21‐2986                                                      7

analyze his finances. The court prohibited the prosecution
team from using the Quickbooks data or evidence stemming
from it at trial. Id. at *8.
    The court then evaluated the government’s filter process.
The court commented that the process had a “semblance of
the fox guarding the hen house,” but the court concluded that
participation by a magistrate judge or Snyder’s attorney was
not required. Snyder, 2018 WL 4637253, at *6. The court cred‐
ited the FBI agent’s testimony that he sent Snyder’s emails for
computerized review without examining them. More gener‐
ally, the court found that the “Chinese wall” between the filter
team and the prosecution had not been breached. Id. The court
also found no evidence indicating that the three privileged ex‐
hibits shared with the prosecution were disclosed intention‐
ally.
    Turning to the constitutional arguments, the court found
no violation of the Sixth Amendment. The emails had been
seized and the filter process completed before Snyder was in‐
dicted in November 2016, and only at that time did his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attach. Snyder, 2018 WL 4637253,
at *7. The court also concluded that seizure of Snyder’s emails
under the warrant did not violate the particularity require‐
ment of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at *8.
   B. Analysis
    We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear er‐
ror and its legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Pace,
48 F.4th 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Arceo, 535 F.3d
679, 684 (7th Cir. 2008).
8                                                   No. 21‐2986

       1. Fourth Amendment
   On appeal, Snyder argues that the government’s warrant
was overbroad because it sought “all information” associated
with his email accounts and was not limited by date or time.
Snyder notes that the warrant aﬃdavit focused on events that
occurred from 2011 through 2014, and he suggests that the
warrant should have been limited to that time frame.
    The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants be sup‐
ported by probable cause and that they “particularly de‐
scrib[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The particularity require‐
ment is intended to prevent “the issuance of a warrant that
permits a ‘general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s be‐
longings,’” and “thereby ensures that the scope of a search
will be confined to evidence relating to a specific crime that is
supported by probable cause.” United States v. Vitek Supply
Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1998), quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). “Warrants that are over‐
broad, that is, that allow oﬃcers to search for items that are
unlikely to yield evidence of the crime, violate the Fourth
Amendment.” United States v. Vizcarra‐Millan, 15 F.4th 473,
502 (7th Cir. 2021).
   Even if we assume that the warrant might have been over‐
broad in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the district
court did not err in denying Snyder’s motion to dismiss. The
remedy for such Fourth Amendment violations in a criminal
proceeding is suppression of the evidence, not dismissal of
the indictment or disqualification of the prosecution team.
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366 (1981) (remedy for
searches and seizures contrary to Fourth Amendment in
No. 21‐2986                                                              9

criminal proceeding “is limited to denying the prosecution
the fruits of its transgression”). We deny this challenge.2
        2. Sixth Amendment
    Snyder next argues that the district court erred in finding
no violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. He insists that the
government’s filter process was deficient because it was con‐
ducted solely by government agents, without court oversight
or participation by Snyder’s counsel. Snyder characterizes the
seizure of emails and the challenged filter process as an inten‐
tional intrusion into his attorney‐client relationship for which
dismissal of the indictment was an appropriate remedy.
    The Sixth Amendment guarantees assistance of counsel to
the “accused” in “all criminal prosecutions.” U.S. Const.
amend. VI. The right “is limited by its terms” and “‘does not
attach until a prosecution is commenced.’” Rothgery v. Gillespie
County, 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2007), quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin,
501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). More specifically, the right to counsel
attaches upon “the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Id., quot‐
ing United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984).
    The attorney‐client privilege, by contrast, is not a constitu‐
tional right but an evidentiary privilege. Lange v. Young, 869
F.2d 1008, 1012 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989). It applies in criminal and
civil proceedings to protect confidential communications be‐
tween attorney and client made for the purpose of seeking or
providing legal advice. United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492

    2 If Snyder’s challenge had come to us as an appeal from a denial of a
motion to suppress, we expect that we would have had to consider other
issues, including whether the officers relied on the warrant in good faith.
10                                                    No. 21‐2986

F.3d 806, 815 (7th Cir. 2007). A violation of the attorney‐client
privilege is not a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Nevertheless, a government intrusion into the attorney‐client
relationship can in some circumstances violate the Sixth
Amendment. See, e.g., Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132,
1134–36, 1138 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that Haworth’s Sixth
Amendment rights were violated when deputy sheriﬀ, who
was present at meetings between Haworth and his attorney,
disclosed defense’s trial strategy to the prosecution, who used
that information to impeach Haworth at trial); Bishop v. Rose,
701 F.2d 1150, 1151, 1155 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding Sixth Amend‐
ment violated where defendant’s handwritten statement, pre‐
pared at his attorney’s request, was discovered by prison
guards, sent to the prosecutor, and used to impeach defend‐
ant’s credibility at trial).
    The seizure and filtering of Snyder’s emails did not violate
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the right had
not yet attached. The government seized Snyder’s emails in
September 2015 and completed its filter process in early 2016,
well before Snyder was indicted in November 2016. Because
Snyder’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached,
the conduct he complains of could not violate that right. It
makes no diﬀerence for purposes of the Sixth Amendment
that Snyder had already retained counsel, who was represent‐
ing him in negotiations with the government regarding crim‐
inal charges. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986) (“[I]t
makes little sense to say that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches at diﬀerent times depending on the fortuity
of whether the suspect or his family happens to have retained
counsel prior to interrogation.”); United States ex rel. Shiflet v.
Lane, 815 F.2d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 1987) (defendant “cannot
claim the protection of the sixth amendment merely because
No. 21‐2986                                                   11

he retained counsel prior to the filing of charges against
him”).
    Snyder nevertheless argues that even if the seizure and fil‐
ter process occurred before he was indicted, those supposed
violations unconstitutionally interfered with his post‐indict‐
ment attorney‐client relationship. He oﬀers no controlling au‐
thority to support his expansive view of the Sixth Amend‐
ment. Even if the right had attached when the government
seized Snyder’s emails, the district court did not err in declin‐
ing to dismiss the indictment. Although the filter process used
here did not operate perfectly, we find no violation of the
Sixth Amendment and no grounds for dismissing the case.
    In Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), the Supreme
Court considered whether the presence of an undercover
agent at a meeting between a defendant awaiting trial and his
attorney violated the Sixth Amendment. The Court rejected
the per se rule proposed by the defendant. Id. at 550–51. In‐
stead, the Court found that under the facts before it, the Sixth
Amendment was not violated. Id. at 558. The Court observed
that the agent did not disclose the details of the conversation
to the government, none of the state’s evidence originated in
the conversation, the agent did not testify about the conversa‐
tion at trial, and, in short, the conversation was not “used in
any other way to the substantial detriment” of the defendant.
Id. at 554. The Court also stressed that the agent was invited
to the meeting by the defendant. It was not a “situation where
the State’s purpose was to learn what it could about the de‐
fendant’s defense plans.” Id. at 557. Because there was “no
tainted evidence in [the] case, no communication of defense
strategy to the prosecution, and no purposeful intrusion” by
12                                                 No. 21‐2986

the agent, the defendant’s right to eﬀective assistance of coun‐
sel was not violated. Id. at 558.
    Here, the seizure and filtering of Snyder’s emails resulted
in three privileged documents being shared with the prosecu‐
tion team. Two documents concerned consulting contracts
unrelated to the case against Snyder, so their disclosure
caused no prejudice to Snyder in this case. The only disclosure
that was possibly detrimental, the Quickbooks data, had al‐
ready been shared in part with the government, and the dis‐
trict court ordered the government not to use the data or any
evidence derived from it at trial. Moreover, after an eviden‐
tiary hearing, the district court found that there was “no evi‐
dence, or even suggestion,” that the privileged files were
shared with the prosecution team with the intent that they be
used to prosecute Snyder. 2018 WL 4637253, at *6. As in Weath‐
erford, there was here no intentional intrusion by the govern‐
ment, no tainted evidence from the few improper disclosures,
and no communication of defense strategy. Under these cir‐
cumstances, we find no violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
   Still, Snyder argues that the filter process used in his case
was deficient and that similar protocols have been rejected by
the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. We disagree.
As an initial matter, in none of the cases Snyder cites did the
court find that a defective filter process violated the Sixth
Amendment or required the indictment to be dismissed, as
Snyder argues here.
   Each case is distinguishable from Snyder’s in other ways
as well. The Eleventh Circuit in In re Sealed Search Warrant &
Application, 11 F.4th 1235, 1252 (11th Cir. 2021), actually ap‐
proved of the government’s filter process. In re Grand Jury
No. 21‐2986                                                     13

Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2006), concerned subpoenas,
not a search warrant. Though the Sixth Circuit rejected the
government’s request to conduct a privilege review of docu‐
ments subpoenaed from a third party, that rejection was
based in part on the fact that the documents were not yet in
the government’s possession. Id. at 523. The court observed
that government taint teams are primarily used in cases—like
Snyder’s—where the government has already gained control
of the potentially privileged documents through a search war‐
rant. Id. at 522–23. In those cases, the court explained, “the use
of the taint team to sift the wheat from the chaﬀ constitutes an
action respectful of, rather than injurious to, the protection of
privilege.” Id.
   Next, Snyder cites In re Search of Electronic Communications,
802 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2015), for the proposition that non‐law‐
yer federal agents may not make privilege determinations.
While this may be sound policy, the Third Circuit’s order was
not a constitutional holding but a prospective, cautionary
measure designed to protect a privilege holder’s rights. Id. at
530. The court did not find that review by non‐attorney fed‐
eral agents necessarily violated the attorney‐client privilege,
much less the Sixth Amendment.
    Snyder’s strongest support comes from In re: Search War‐
rant Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2019), but it too
is readily distinguishable. As part of its investigation into
“Lawyer A,” an attorney at a Baltimore law firm suspected of
aiding the crimes of “Client A,” the government searched the
law firm and seized “voluminous materials,” including all of
Lawyer A’s email correspondence. Id. at 165–66. Only 0.2% of
the seized emails were sent to or from Client A or contained
his surname. Id. at 172. An “extensive” portion of the seized
14                                                  No. 21‐2986

emails concerned other firm clients, some of whom were also
being investigated or prosecuted by the same U.S. Attorney’s
Oﬃce. Id. at 167. Invoking the attorney‐client privilege, the
law firm sought an injunction to stop the filter team of gov‐
ernment employees from reviewing the seized communica‐
tions. Id. at 168. The district court denied the firm’s request,
but the Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered that the magis‐
trate judge conduct the privilege review. Id. at 170. The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the firm would be irreparably harmed if
the government were permitted to view communications re‐
garding its other clients. Id. at 172. The court also concluded
that the firm was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim
because the filter protocol approved by the magistrate judge
impermissibly assigned judicial functions to the executive
branch. Id. at 176.
   Snyder’s case is distinguishable. To start, In re: Search War‐
rant concerned the seizure of an attorney’s email correspond‐
ence, not that of a client, and the Fourth Circuit was focused
on the harm posed to clients other than Client A, the target of
the government’s investigation. The court also emphasized
that the vast majority of seized emails—99.8%—were appar‐
ently unrelated to the government’s investigation.
    Despite these distinguishing facts, Snyder encourages us
to read In re: Search Warrant as holding that all privilege re‐
views in criminal investigations must be performed by a judi‐
cial oﬃcer. We are not persuaded. The Fourth Circuit criti‐
cized the magistrate judge’s approval of the filter protocol—
which occurred before the law firm invoked privilege—on the
grounds that resolution of privilege “disputes” is a judicial
function. 942 F.3d at 176 (Once “a dispute arises as to
whether” communications are privileged, “the resolution of
No. 21‐2986                                                   15

that dispute is a judicial function.”). If the Fourth Circuit
meant that once a claim of privilege is made, a court may not
delegate its responsibility to resolve that dispute to the exec‐
utive branch, then we agree. The district court in Snyder’s case
made no such error because Snyder asserted privilege after
the government’s filter process was complete. If, however, the
Fourth Circuit meant what Snyder argues, that district courts
must act as legal advisers to investigators or that resolving le‐
gal questions—before any claim of privilege is made or any
concrete dispute arises—is a non‐delegable judicial function,
then we would need to disagree based on the limits of the ju‐
dicial function. See E.F.L. v. Prim, 986 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir.
2021) (“The Constitution limits our jurisdiction to resolving
live ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ rather than issuing advisory
opinions.”), quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
    To be sure, where law enforcement has reason to expect
that a search (electronic or otherwise) will sweep up privi‐
leged communications, it should take appropriate measures
to avoid intruding on attorney‐client relationships. We are not
convinced, however, that the filter process used here would
have been rejected by other circuits, nor do we agree that the
Constitution required earlier participation of defense counsel
or oversight by the district court.
    In sum, Snyder’s Sixth Amendment rights were not vio‐
lated by the seizure and subsequent filtering of his emails be‐
cause the right had not yet attached. Even if the right had at‐
tached, the filter process would not have violated his Sixth
Amendment rights where there is no indication that the gov‐
ernment purposefully intruded on the attorney‐client rela‐
tionship or that privileged materials were disclosed to
16                                                  No. 21‐2986

Snyder’s detriment. The district court did not err in denying
his motion to dismiss on this basis.
III. Snyder’s Conviction for Obstructing the IRS
    Next, we turn to Snyder’s arguments challenging his con‐
viction for obstructing the IRS. Snyder challenges this convic‐
tion on two grounds. First, he argues the prosecution was
barred by the statute of limitations. Second, he insists that his
conviction was not supported by suﬃcient evidence.
     A. Background
    Before he was elected mayor, Snyder owned and operated
First Financial Trust Mortgage in Portage. After First Finan‐
cial Trust Mortgage failed to pay its 2007, 2008, and 2009 pay‐
roll taxes in full, the IRS notified the company that its bank
accounts would be levied in July 2009. By the end of 2009,
First Financial Trust Mortgage owed nearly $100,000 in pay‐
roll taxes.
    In January 2010, Snyder agreed with GVC Mortgage that
Snyder would operate First Financial Trust Mortgage (under
the same name and at the same location) as a division of GVC
Mortgage. Soon after reaching this agreement with GVC
Mortgage, Snyder opened a bank account in the name of SRC
Properties. Snyder then created invoices on SRC letterhead
billing First Financial Trust Mortgage for services. He for‐
warded the invoices to GVC Mortgage, which paid SRC Prop‐
erties directly. The government argued that by routing pay‐
ments directly to SRC Properties, Snyder was able to conceal
assets from the IRS, which had levied First Financial Trust
Mortgage’s bank account.
   During this time, Snyder was also behind in paying his
personal taxes. In 2009, the IRS completed a civil audit of
No. 21‐2986                                                   17

Snyder’s 2005, 2006, and 2007 personal tax returns. He was
assessed roughly $30,000 in taxes, penalties, and interest. In
December 2010 and February 2011, the IRS levied Snyder’s
personal bank accounts.
    As part of his eﬀorts to settle his personal tax debt and ne‐
gotiate an installment plan with the IRS, Snyder submitted
three 433‐A forms: one in March 2010, one in January 2011,
and one in April 2013. Each document required him to dis‐
close fully his assets and liabilities under penalty of perjury.
On all three forms, Snyder failed to report that he owned SRC
Properties, and on the 2010 and 2013 forms, he omitted his
employment with GVC Mortgage. In March 2011, Snyder
agreed with the IRS to pay $112 per month. He paid oﬀ his
personal tax debt in full in early 2016, six months before his
indictment.
   B. Statute of Limitations
    In the district court, Snyder moved under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 7(d) to strike paragraphs 1‒20 of Count 4
of the indictment as irrelevant and immaterial surplusage.
Those paragraphs describe Snyder’s failure to pay payroll
taxes in 2007, 2008, and 2009, his partnership with GVC Mort‐
gage, his creation of SRC Properties, and his eﬀorts to direct
payments from GVC Mortgage to SRC Properties. Snyder ar‐
gued that the paragraphs described conduct that occurred be‐
fore November 17, 2010, outside the six‐year statute of limita‐
tions period for violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). See 26 U.S.C.
§ 6531(6). He also insisted that the challenged paragraphs had
no bearing on his alleged obstruction of the IRS on his per‐
sonal taxes.
18                                                  No. 21‐2986

    The district court denied the motion. The court reasoned
that the paragraphs were necessary to understand the alleged
scheme and contained facts the government would need to
prove at trial. The court recognized that the conduct alleged
in the challenged paragraphs occurred outside the statute of
limitations period, but it concluded that the alleged past con‐
duct was “intertwined” with acts within the statute of limita‐
tions, “making the earlier acts relevant and proper to this
case.”
    On appeal, Snyder argues that the district court erred in
failing to dismiss the § 7212(a) charge on statute of limitations
grounds. Specifically, he asserts that the district court erred
by treating the scheme to obstruct the collection of payroll
taxes as intertwined with the scheme to obstruct the collection
of his personal taxes, which improperly brought the former
within the statute of limitations period.
    We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. United States v.
O’Brien, 953 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, however,
Snyder did not seek dismissal of the tax obstruction count. He
moved only to strike paragraphs 1‒20 of the tax count—which
describe his eﬀorts to impede collection of his payroll but not
his personal taxes—as surplusage. We review a district court’s
denial of that motion for abuse of discretion. United States v.
O’Connor, 656 F.3d 630, 645 (7th Cir. 2011). Regardless of how
Snyder’s challenge is characterized, we find no error.
   The six‐year statute of limitations clock for a violation of
§ 7212(a) begins to run on the date of the last corrupt act.
United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 1997). To
defeat a motion to dismiss the indictment in Snyder’s case, the
government needed to allege that Snyder engaged in an
No. 21‐2986                                                                19

aﬃrmative act to obstruct the IRS on or after November 17,
2010. It did so with respect to both personal and payroll taxes.
The indictment alleged that, from 2010 to 2013, Snyder im‐
peded the collection of his company’s payroll taxes by divert‐
ing payments from GVC Mortgage to SRC, which the IRS did
not know about. With regard to his personal taxes, the indict‐
ment alleged that Snyder concealed the existence of SRC in
433‐A forms he filed in March 2010, January 2011, and April
2013.
    Snyder’s insistence that the district court erroneously in‐
tertwined his payroll tax and personal tax conduct misreads
the district court’s order. The court simply recognized that,
although paragraphs 1‒20 did not describe conduct that oc‐
curred within the statute of limitations period, those para‐
graphs were essential to understand the government’s allega‐
tions that Snyder impeded the collection of payroll taxes by
diverting payments to SRC after November 17, 2010. The dis‐
trict court did not err.3
    C. Suﬃciency of the Evidence
   Snyder next argues that there was insuﬃcient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict on the tax count. We will overturn
a conviction only if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, “no rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

    3 Before he was indicted, Snyder signed three agreements waiving his

right to be indicted within the statute of limitations period. On appeal, he
stresses that he was indicted forty‐five days after the third and final agree‐
ment expired. Because we find that the indictment alleged affirmative acts
within the six‐year limitations period, we need not consider these agree‐
ments.
20                                                    No. 21‐2986

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Maldonado, 893 F.3d 480,
484 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d
993, 1005 (7th Cir. 2013). While this is a high hurdle for de‐
fendants to clear, the “height of the hurdle depends directly
on the strength of the government’s evidence,” and a
“properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even
when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Moreno, 922 F.3d
787, 793 (7th Cir. 2019), quoting United States v. Garcia, 919
F.3d 489, 496–97 (7th Cir. 2019), quoting in turn United States
v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013), and Jackson v. Vir‐
ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979).
    A person violates the so‐called “omnibus clause” of 26
U.S.C. § 7212(a) when he “corruptly or by force or threats of
force … obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or im‐
pede, the due administration of [the Internal Revenue Code].”
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a); see Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
1101, 1104–05 (2018) (explaining that § 7212(a) has an “Oﬃcer
Clause” and an “Omnibus Clause”). To act “corruptly” means
“to act with the intent to secure an unlawful advantage or
benefit either for one’s self or for another.” United States v.
Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 1998). By “due administration”
of the Internal Revenue Code, the statute refers to “targeted
governmental tax‐related proceedings, such as a particular in‐
vestigation or audit,” not the “routine administrative proce‐
dures that are near‐universally applied to all taxpayers, such
as the ordinary processing of income tax returns.” Marinello,
138 S. Ct. at 1104. The administrative proceeding must have
been pending or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant
when he engaged in the obstructive conduct, and there must
have been a nexus—a “relationship in time, causation, or
logic”—between the defendant’s obstructive conduct and the
No. 21‐2986                                                   21

proceeding. Id. at 1109–10, quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515
U.S. 593, 599 (1995).
    The evidence here was suﬃcient to support the jury’s ver‐
dict. Evidence at trial established that Snyder owed personal
and payroll taxes and that the IRS had taken “specific, tar‐
geted” steps to collect by levying Snyder’s personal and busi‐
ness bank accounts. See Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1106. The jury
could conclude that Snyder impeded or attempted to impede
the IRS’s collection of owed taxes in two ways. First, with re‐
spect to his payroll tax debt, he diverted reimbursement pay‐
ments from GVC Mortgage directly to SRC Properties,
thereby evading the IRS’s levy on First Financial Trust Mort‐
gage’s bank account. Second, with respect to his personal
taxes, Snyder failed to report his ownership of SRC Properties
and his employment with GVC Mortgage on 433‐A forms he
submitted to the IRS. The jury could reasonably conclude that
misrepresenting assets and income in settlement and install‐
ment‐plan negotiations with the IRS could have the eﬀect of
impeding the IRS’s collection eﬀorts. Finally, the jury could
conclude that Snyder acted with the intent to gain an unlaw‐
ful advantage. The evidence established multiple omissions
on his 433‐A forms. It also established that he opened the SRC
bank account soon after he started working for GVC Mort‐
gage and that he directed payments to SRC over several years,
all while concealing his ownership of SRC from the IRS. View‐
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the govern‐
ment, we find suﬃcient support for the jury’s verdict.
   Snyder’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. He
notes that his personal taxes were paid in full before he was
indicted, and he insists that paying via an installment plan,
which the IRS permits, is not obstructive and did not give him
22                                                 No. 21‐2986

any unlawful benefit. Snyder also disputes that he omitted in‐
formation on the 433‐A forms. In his accountant’s copy of the
433‐A form submitted in 2013, his ownership of SRC was re‐
ported on a page that is missing from the IRS’s copy. He sug‐
gests that pages or attachments might also be missing from
the 2010 and 2011 forms that reported his employment with
GVC Mortgage and his ownership of SRC. Snyder further ar‐
gues that he did not report income from SRC because the com‐
pany made little or no money in the relevant years and that,
in any case, his failure to report income from SRC could not
have impeded the IRS. He also claims that, although he did
not list GVC Mortgage as an employer on his 2013 433‐A
form, he accurately reported his gross wages on that form.
With regard to his payroll tax debt, Snyder argues that First
Financial Trust Mortgage dissolved on June 14, 2010, and that
he did not own GVC Mortgage, so any income earned by First
Financial Trust Mortgage after that date could not be levied
to pay its payroll taxes.
    Snyder’s arguments were appropriate before the trial jury,
but they do not entitle him to acquittal as a matter of law. The
fact that he eventually paid his personal taxes on an install‐
ment plan did not prevent the jury from finding that he con‐
cealed income sources and assets from the IRS earlier in the
process to try to obtain a favorable settlement. There is of
course nothing per se obstructive about settling with the IRS
or paying overdue taxes in installments. But evidence at trial
showed that the IRS seeks to obtain a complete picture of a
taxpayer’s income and assets so it can make a “fair assess‐
ment” when deciding whether to agree to a settlement or in‐
stallment plan. A reasonable jury could conclude that Snyder
omitted income and asset information on his 433‐A forms in
hopes of receiving a more favorable deal with the IRS.
No. 21‐2986                                                 23

    Likewise, while the jury might have credited Snyder’s as‐
sertions that he reported his ownership of SRC Properties on
pages or attachments that were missing from the IRS’s files,
the jury was not required to draw that conclusion. The reve‐
nue agent testified that Snyder should have reported his own‐
ership of SRC Properties at several places on the 433‐A form
he submitted in 2013, not just on the page missing from the
IRS’s copy. The jury might also have rejected Snyder’s argu‐
ment given that he failed to report his ownership of SRC Prop‐
erties on the 433‐A forms he filed in 2010 and 2011 as well.
    We are similarly unpersuaded by Snyder’s argument that
his failure to report his modest income from SRC Properties
could not have obstructed the IRS. The jury heard that thou‐
sands of dollars were deposited into and then withdrawn
from SRC’s bank account each month. While this might have
left Snyder with only modest net income each month, the jury
could have reasonably credited the revenue agent’s testimony
that Snyder’s ownership of SRC Properties would have been
important to the IRS in assessing his ability to pay.
    Nor are we convinced that Snyder is entitled to an acquit‐
tal because, as he argues, he reported his wages from GVC
Mortgage on the 433‐A form he submitted in 2013 even
though he failed to list GVC Mortgage as his employer on that
form. First, while the revenue agent testified that it was pos‐
sible, no evidence at trial established that Snyder’s GVC Mort‐
gage wages were included in the aggregate wage amount
listed on the 2013 form. Second, the jury was not required to
credit Snyder’s argument given evidence of his other omis‐
sions on the 433‐A forms, including his failure to report his
employment with GVC Mortgage or any wages on the 433‐A
form he filed in 2010.
24                                                         No. 21‐2986

    Finally, the jury could reasonably conclude that Snyder di‐
verted payments from GVC Mortgage to SRC to avoid the
IRS’s levy on First Financial Trust Mortgage’s bank account
and thereby to impede the IRS. While Snyder’s mortgage
company was administratively dissolved in June 2010, the
jury heard evidence that the IRS continued its attempts to col‐
lect and sent levy notices to First Financial Trust Mortgage in
August 2011. The jury could reasonably conclude that routing
payments to SRC obstructed, or had the potential to obstruct,
the IRS’s eﬀorts to collect First Financial Trust Mortgage’s
payroll taxes. Suﬃcient evidence supported the jury’s ver‐
dict.4
IV. Challenges to Snyder’s Conviction for Federal Funds Bribery
    Last, we consider several challenges to Snyder’s convic‐
tion for federal funds bribery. First, Snyder argues that his
statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were vio‐
lated by the delay between his first and second trials. Second,
he insists that 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) applies to bribes but not
to gratuities and therefore does not apply to his case. He con‐
tends that the district court erred when it rejected his statu‐
tory argument, which he presented in a motion to dismiss, a
proposed jury instruction, and a motion for judgment of ac‐
quittal. Finally, Snyder argues that the evidence was not suf‐
ficient at either trial to support a guilty verdict.

     4Snyder also argues that the district court erred in admitting emails
from a friend regarding Snyder’s financial records. He insists that the
emails were unfairly prejudicial. Framed as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence rather than as an evidentiary error, we find no reversible
error. The emails were properly admitted and supported the jury’s ver‐
dict.
No. 21‐2986                                                  25

   A. Background
    Snyder took oﬃce as mayor of Portage in January 2012. In
January 2013 and December 2013, Portage awarded two con‐
tracts worth a total of $1.125 million to Great Lakes Peterbilt
(GLPB), the trucking company owned by Robert and Stephen
Buha. As state law required, the contracts were awarded
through public bidding overseen by the City of Portage Board
of Works and Public Safety. The Board was composed of
Mayor Snyder and two of his appointees. Snyder put his long‐
time friend, Randy Reeder, in charge of the bidding process,
even though Reeder had no experience administering public
bids.
    On December 13, 2012, the city issued the first invitation
to bid. The invitation sought bids to sell three garbage trucks.
It specified that the trucks must be unused and the manufac‐
turer’s current production model. At trial, the government
presented evidence that Reeder tailored the bid specifications
to favor GLPB. Reeder testified that he based the chassis spec‐
ifications on a Peterbilt chassis, which naturally favored the
Buhas’ Peterbilt dealership. Reeder also specified that the
trucks must be delivered within 150 days, a deadline that was
suggested to him by GLPB, but was an unusually fast turna‐
round for a new garbage truck.
    Roughly two weeks before the Board of Works was sched‐
uled to meet to award the first contract, Reeder circulated a
chart summarizing the bids. He highlighted GLPB’s bid and
calculated the diﬀerence between its bid and every other bid.
At the Board of Works meeting on January 28, 2013, the Board
was informed that only GLPB’s bid was fully responsive to
the invitation’s specifications, including the 150‐day delivery
26                                                 No. 21‐2986

deadline. Mayor Snyder’s appointee moved to award the con‐
tract to GLPB, and the Board voted in favor.
   That same month, the manager of GLPB approached
Reeder to see whether the city wanted to purchase an unused,
2012 model truck that had been sitting on GLPB’s lot for two
years. Mayor Snyder first tried to purchase the truck outright,
but he was informed by the city attorney that the truck was
too expensive to be purchased without going through the
public bidding process.
    The Board of Works then announced a second bid for two
garbage trucks on November 15, 2013. Again, the bid invita‐
tion specified that the trucks should be unused and the man‐
ufacturer’s current production model. The invitation to bid
sought two trucks, but it specified a smaller engine and trans‐
mission for one of the trucks. Reeder testified that he adjusted
those specifications to match the truck sitting on GLPB’s lot.
A mechanic for the city testified that, from a maintenance
standpoint, it made little sense to purchase trucks with diﬀer‐
ent specifications.
    GLPB was the lowest responsive, responsible bidder, and
it was awarded the second contract at a Board of Works meet‐
ing on December 23, 2013. Neither Reeder nor Mayor Snyder
informed the Board that one of the trucks it was purchasing
from GLPB was a 2012 model, so it did not meet the bid spec‐
ifications.
    Evidence at trial showed that Snyder was in frequent con‐
tact with the Buha brothers around the time of the second‐
round bid. Mayor Snyder’s calendar showed a scheduled
lunch with Robert Buha on December 12, 2013, one day before
the second‐round bids were due. Phone records revealed
No. 21‐2986                                                 27

twenty‐nine phone calls or text exchanges between the mayor
and the Buha brothers in the four weeks between the an‐
nouncement of the second‐round bid and the date the bids
were due. Records showed an additional eighteen phone calls
or text messages between Snyder and the Buhas in the ten
days after bids were due until the contract was awarded.
Mayor Snyder did not have phone contacts with any other
bidders during that time.
    Robert Buha testified that shortly after GLPB was awarded
the second‐round bid, Snyder visited the Buha brothers at the
GLPB dealership to ask for $15,000. He told the Buhas that he
needed the money to pay oﬀ his tax debt and to cover holiday
expenses. Buha testified that the brothers agreed to pay
Snyder $13,000 up front supposedly for consulting services he
intended to provide.
    On January 10, 2014, GLPB issued a $13,000 check to
Snyder. GLPB’s controller, who issued the check at Robert
Buha’s direction, testified that Buha told him they were pay‐
ing Mayor Snyder for his influence. When the FBI later ques‐
tioned Snyder about the check, he insisted it was payment for
health insurance and information technology consulting he
had provided to GLPB. But Mayor Snyder had also told
Reeder that the $13,000 check was for payroll and telephone
consulting he performed for GLPB. And Mayor Snyder had
told someone else, a city planning consultant, yet another
story: that GLPB paid him to lobby the state legislature on its
behalf.
    Robert Buha testified that he had conversations with
Snyder about his employees’ health insurance and IT up‐
grades, but that in his opinion, Snyder’s services did not jus‐
tify $13,000. GLPB employees, including the controller,
28                                                    No. 21‐2986

testified that to the best of their knowledge, Snyder did not
perform any consulting work for the company.
     B. Speedy Trial Rights
    After a jury found Mayor Snyder guilty of federal funds
bribery, the district court granted his motion for a new trial
on that count on November 27, 2019. On November 19, 2020,
Snyder moved to dismiss the bribery count, arguing that his
retrial would fall outside the 70‐day period permitted by the
Speedy Trial Act and would violate his Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion.
United States v. Snyder, No. 2:16‐cr‐160, 2021 WL 369674, at *1
(N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2021). We address Snyder’s statutory argu‐
ment and then his constitutional argument.
        1. Speedy Trial Act
    When a defendant is to be retried after an order for a new
trial, the Speedy Trial Act requires that the second trial com‐
mence within 70 days “from the date the action occasioning
the retrial becomes final.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e). The Act allows
certain periods of delay, identified in § 3161(h), to be excluded
from consideration in calculating the 70‐day period.
    Relevant here, § 3161(h)(7)(A) provides that any period of
delay resulting from a continuance will be excluded “if the
judge granted [the] continuance on the basis of his findings
that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh
the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial.” The Act requires the court to “se[t] forth, in the record
of the case, either orally or in writing” these findings. Id. If the
court fails to do so, the time shall not be excluded. Id. Section
3161(h)(7)(B) provides a non‐exclusive list of factors the court
shall consider in deciding whether to grant a continuance.
No. 21‐2986                                                   29

    The statutory issue in this appeal boils down to whether
one specific 45‐day continuance from December 7, 2019 to Jan‐
uary 20, 2020, granted on the government’s motion, should be
excluded under the Act. At a hearing nine days after Snyder’s
motion for a new trial was granted, the government explained
that the U.S. Attorney’s Oﬃce for the Northern District of Illi‐
nois, which was supervising Snyder’s prosecution due to
recusals by attorneys in the Northern District of Indiana, had
not decided whether to retry Snyder. The government re‐
quested a 45‐day continuance so that supervisors in Chicago
could review the trial transcripts and make an “informed de‐
cision” regarding retrial. The government also asked that the
“45‐day time period be excluded in the interests of justice.”
    Judge Van Bokkelen asked defense counsel if they had
“any problem with that?” Counsel replied, “I don’t think so.”
Judge Van Bokkelen then asked, “By don’t think so, is that go‐
ing to change?” Counsel replied it would not and said specif‐
ically that Snyder did “not object on a speedy trial basis.”
Judge Van Bokkelen granted the motion and ordered that the
docket entry note that the delay was excluded under the
Speedy Trial Act in the interests of justice.
    Snyder contends that the 45 days should not have been ex‐
cluded because Judge Van Bokkelen failed to state suﬃciently
on the record his findings that the continuance was in the in‐
terests of justice. Snyder argues further that it was an abuse of
discretion to exclude the 45 days because the case was not suf‐
ficiently complex to merit the continuance.
    The district court, which denied Snyder’s motion to dis‐
miss under the Speedy Trial Act, excluded the 45 days from
its calculation. Snyder, 2021 WL 369674, at *4. Among other
reasons, the court found that Snyder had forfeited or waived
30                                                     No. 21‐2986

the issue of that particular continuance by failing to develop
it in his initial brief. In his initial motion to dismiss in the dis‐
trict court, Snyder presented his Speedy Trial Act calculation
in a chart that listed periods of time and designated each as
excluded or not excluded. He designated the 45‐day continu‐
ance as excluded, with the notation that the days were
“waived pursuant to Mr. Snyder’s agreement … but see fn. 3.”
In that footnote 3, Snyder asserted, without explanation, that
the continuance was not supported by an “ends of justice”
finding, and he questioned whether his waiver could eﬀec‐
tively exclude the time. He then wrote that, “For purposes of
the record only,” his position was that the 45 days were not
excluded. But because he believed the government had ex‐
ceeded the allowed 70 days even excluding the 45‐day contin‐
uance, he said he would “not push the point.”
    As we see the situation, the district court tried to make a
clear record on the defense response to the continuance.
When counsel hedged at first (“I don’t think so”), the judge
rightly pressed for a more definitive position and got it: coun‐
sel said Snyder would not object on a speedy trial basis. And
when Snyder and his counsel later briefed the speedy trial
motion, they hedged more, but their clearest signal was that
they would not “push the point” of the particular 45‐day con‐
tinuance.
    The deliberately ambiguous dance around this 45‐day
continuance came very close to inviting error, which would
certainly foreclose appellate review. Whether invited or not,
Snyder certainly waived the issue by telling the district court
he was not going to “push the point,” so appellate review is
also foreclosed on that basis. See United States v. Cook, 406 F.3d
485, 487 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A forfeiture is basically an oversight;
No. 21‐2986                                                     31

a waiver is a deliberate decision not to present a ground for
relief that might be available in the law.”). Even if Snyder had
not expressly declined to press the argument, the footnote’s
“skeletal” argument, which was “really nothing more than an
assertion,” was insuﬃcient to preserve his claim. United States
v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Crespo v.
Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016) (“perfunctory and un‐
developed arguments, and arguments that are unsupported
by pertinent authority, are waived”), quoting United States v.
Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991). Although Snyder
developed the argument in his reply brief in the district court,
that was “too little, too late, for ‘[a]rguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief are [also] waived.’” Harper v. Vigilant
Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2005), quoting James v. Shea‐
han, 137 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 1998); see also United States
v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding waiver
where defendant did not develop issue in initial brief and
raised it “in a meaningful way only in his reply brief”).
    While we have some discretion to consider waived argu‐
ments for compelling reasons, we see no reason to exercise
such discretion here. Snyder agreed to exclude the 45 days,
and the continuance furthered the interests of justice by giv‐
ing supervisors overseeing Snyder’s prosecution time to re‐
view transcripts and to make a considered choice regarding
his retrial.
       2. Sixth Amendment
    We consider four factors in deciding whether a defend‐
ant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been vio‐
lated: “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay,
(3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial,
and (4) any prejudice the defendant suﬀered by the delay.”
32                                                   No. 21‐2986

Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 596 (7th Cir. 2015), citing Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
   The district court found no violation of Snyder’s Sixth
Amendment rights. Snyder, 2021 WL 369674, at *8. Because
more than one year had passed since the order was issued
granting Snyder a retrial, the court recognized that the delay
was presumptively prejudicial. Id. at *7. The court, however,
found that other factors weighed against finding a Sixth
Amendment violation.
    The court observed that the delay in Snyder’s case was
caused largely by the global pandemic, which made holding
trials unsafe for jurors, parties, and court staﬀ. The court said
this delay was justifiable and could not be attributed to the
prosecution.
    The court also noted that some of the delay resulted from
consideration of motions Snyder filed and was therefore at‐
tributable to him. Snyder asserted his speedy trial right on
November 2, 2020, but the court reasoned that this factor did
not weigh strongly in his favor because he asserted his right
after the delays of which he complained. Id.
    Finally, the court concluded that Snyder—who was not in
pre‐trial detention, did not complain of undue anxiety or con‐
cern while awaiting trial, and did not argue that his defense
was hampered in any way—was not prejudiced by the delay.
Id. at *8. Weighing these factors together, the court concluded
that Snyder’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not vi‐
olated. Id. We review a district court’s denial of a constitu‐
tional speedy trial claim de novo and its findings of fact for
clear error. United States v. Bell, 925 F.3d 362, 375–76 (7th Cir.
2019).
No. 21‐2986                                                             33

    We agree that the first factor favors Snyder. The delay was
“presumptively prejudicial” because more than one year
passed between the order for a new trial in November 2019
and Snyder’s second trial in March 2021. O’Connor, 656 F.3d
at 643. Snyder timely asserted his speedy trial right on No‐
vember 2, 2020, so we also weigh the third factor in his favor.
    When assessing the second factor, we ask “whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for
[the] delay.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992).
The district court found that the delay between Snyder’s first
and second trials was principally due to the Covid‐19 pan‐
demic. We agree with the district court that the pandemic‐re‐
lated delays in Snyder’s case were justifiable and cannot fairly
be attributed to the government. See United States v. Keith, 61
F.4th 839, 853 (10th Cir. 2023) (treating pandemic‐related de‐
lays as a “neutral” factor favoring neither side). On appeal,
Snyder does not challenge the district court’s determination
that the delay was also caused by motions he filed. We there‐
fore weigh this factor against Snyder.5
    We also weigh the fourth factor against Snyder. We assess
prejudice “in light of the interests the Sixth Amendment seeks
to protect,” namely, preventing oppressive pretrial incarcera‐
tion, minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused, and lim‐
iting the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Bell,

    5 In his opening brief, Snyder agreed with the district court’s finding
that the delay between his first and second trials was largely due to the
pandemic. In his reply, he challenged the district court’s determination as
error. Because he conceded the point in his opening brief, any challenge
to the district court’s determination is waived.
34                                                 No. 21‐2986

925 F.3d at 376, quoting United States v. Harmon, 721 F.3d 877,
883 (7th Cir. 2013). Snyder was not held in pre‐trial detention.
    Snyder argues that his defense was prejudiced by the fad‐
ing memories of four witnesses who would have otherwise
exonerated him. We are not convinced. Two of those wit‐
nesses, Reeder and Joseph Searle, claimed not to remember
certain facts on the stand, but both had testified at Snyder’s
first trial. The fact that Reeder’s and Searle’s previous testi‐
mony was available to refresh their memories or to impeach
their later testimony belies Snyder’s contention that, if he had
been tried earlier, Reeder and Searle could have exonerated
him.
    Snyder also claims he was prejudiced by Robert Buha’s in‐
ability to remember the consulting work Snyder had suppos‐
edly performed for GLPB. In fact, Buha testified that Snyder
consulted on healthcare and information technology issues
faced by GLPB. In any case, Buha was questioned about
GLPB’s supposed consulting agreement with Snyder well be‐
fore the second trial. The parties had the benefit of his state‐
ments to the FBI and his grand jury testimony on the matter,
which were used to refresh his memory on the stand.
    Finally, Snyder complains that John Beck, the city me‐
chanic, had forgotten that he, not Snyder, was the source of
the 150‐day deadline in the first‐round bid. Snyder bases this
assertion on an FBI agent’s notes from an interview with Beck
in 2015 indicating that Beck suggested the 150‐day deadline.
Snyder used the agent’s notes to impeach Beck’s testimony.
Confronted with the agent’s report, Beck insisted that the
agent had misunderstood him and that he had corrected the
misunderstanding with the FBI soon after the interview. We
No. 21‐2986                                                    35

cannot see how an earlier trial would have changed Beck’s
testimony or its impact on the trial.
    In sum, although the delay in Snyder’s case was presump‐
tively prejudicial and he asserted his speedy trial right, he is
more to blame for the delay than the government, and he has
not shown prejudice from the delay. The district court did not
err in rejecting his Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenge.
   C. The Scope of 18 U.S.C. § 666—Bribes and Gratuities?
    Next, Snyder contends that 18 U.S.C. § 666 does not apply
to the facts here. Recall that the payment to Mayor Snyder was
made after both of the city’s truck purchases. Snyder argues
that the evidence showed at worst a gratuity rather than a
bribe. Here’s the diﬀerence. A bribe requires a quid pro quo—
an agreement to exchange this for that, to exchange money or
something else of value for influence in the future. A gratuity
is paid “as a reward for actions the payee has already taken
or is already committed to take.” United States v. Agostino, 132
F.3d 1183, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997). Snyder insists that the evidence
does not support a finding that he and the Buhas agreed to
exchange money for the truck contracts before they were
awarded. Without a prior quid pro quo agreement, he argues,
§ 666 cannot apply.
    Snyder pressed this argument at several points in the dis‐
trict court. Before trial, he moved to dismiss the count from
the indictment. At trial, he proposed a jury instruction that
would have defined bribe, reward, and gratuity and in‐
structed the jury to acquit if the government proved that he
solicited or accepted only a gratuity, agreed to and paid only
after the fact. After trial, he again argued in his motion for ac‐
quittal that the evidence did not support a finding that he and
36                                                           No. 21‐2986

the Buhas had entered into an agreement before the contracts
were awarded as, he argued, the statute requires. The district
court denied each of these challenges, citing precedent from
this court holding that § 666 applies to gratuities as well as
bribes.
     The district court correctly rejected Snyder’s proposed
reading of § 666. We start with the statutory text. In relevant
part, § 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a crime for an agent of a state or
local government receiving federal funds to “corruptly so‐
licit[ ] or demand[ ] for the benefit of any person, or accept[ ]
or agree[ ] to accept, anything of value from any person, in‐
tending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with” any
government business or transaction worth $5,000 or more.
18 U.S.C. § 666(a) & (b). The governing statutory language
does not use the terms “bribe” or “gratuity.” The statutory
language “influenced or rewarded” easily reaches both bribes
and gratuities.6
    This circuit has repeatedly held that § 666(a)(1)(B) “forbids
taking gratuities as well as taking bribes.” United States v.
Hawkins, 777 F.3d 880, 881 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. John‐
son, 874 F.3d 990, 1001 (7th Cir. 2017). That is, we have refused
to “import an additional, specific quid pro quo requirement
into the elements” of § 666. Agostino, 132 F.3d at 1190; United
States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Boender, 649 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Mul‐
lins, 800 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2015). Many other circuits have

     6The title of the codified § 666 refers to “Theft or bribery concerning
programs receiving Federal funds,” without mentioning gratuities, but
the same is true of 18 U.S.C. § 201, “Bribery of public officials and wit‐
nesses,” which all agree covers both bribes paid to federal officials in
§ 201(b) and gratuities paid to them in § 201(c).
No. 21‐2986                                                   37

taken the same position. See, e.g., United States v. Ganim, 510
F.3d 134, 150 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Porter, 886 F.3d
562, 565 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Zimmermann, 509 F.3d
920, 927 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152,
1188 (11th Cir. 2010).
    Snyder asks us to reconsider our precedent in light of con‐
trary decisions by the First and Fifth Circuits in United States
v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), and United States v.
Hamilton, 46 F.4th 389 (5th Cir. 2022). Both cases held that
§ 666 does not apply to gratuities.
    The First and Fifth Circuits relied on similarities between
the language of § 666 and that of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), which
criminalizes bribery of federal oﬃcials. (A diﬀerent subsec‐
tion, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), criminalizes gratuities paid to or re‐
ceived by federal oﬃcials.) Specifically, the courts interpreted
the words “corruptly” and “influence” in § 666 as evidence
that the statute requires a prior quid pro quo agreement. Fer‐
nandez, 722 F.3d at 22; Hamilton, 46 F.4th at 397.
    The First and Fifth Circuits also compared the punish‐
ments imposed by § 666 to those imposed by § 201(b) and
§ 201(c). Violations of § 201(c), the federal gratuity provision,
are punishable by up to two years in prison, far less than the
possible ten‐year sentence for violations of § 666. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201(c) & 666. The First and Fifth Circuits reasoned that the
ten‐year maximum imposed by § 666 was more in line with
the fifteen‐year maximum sentence for violations of § 201(b),
the federal bribery provision. Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 24; Ham‐
ilton, 46 F.4th at 398; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201(b).
   Fernandez and Hamilton do not persuade us to overrule our
precedents on this statute. “We do not lightly overturn circuit
38                                                   No. 21‐2986

precedent, and we give ‘considerable weight to prior deci‐
sions of this court unless and until they have been overruled
or undermined by the decisions of a higher court, or other su‐
pervening developments.’” Wesbrook v. Ulrich, 840 F.3d 388,
399 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d
886, 891 (7th Cir. 2006). We understand the reasoning of the
First and Fifth Circuits, and in particular the odd diﬀerence in
possible sentences for illegal gratuities paid to federal oﬃcials
and those paid to state and local oﬃcials. Still, for several rea‐
sons in addition to stare decisis, we are not persuaded to over‐
rule our decisions holding that § 666 applies to gratuities.
    First, as we have explained, the word “rewarded” in
§ 666—which is not found in the federal bribery provision—
is a strong indication that § 666 covers gratuities as well as
bribes. Johnson, 874 F.3d at 1001; see also United States v. Sun‐
Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 405 (1999) (defin‐
ing an illegal gratuity under § 201(c) as “a reward for some fu‐
ture act that the public oﬃcial will take (and may already
have determined to take), or for a past act that he has already
taken”) (emphasis added). Second, while we recognize the dis‐
parate penalties imposed for gratuities paid to local oﬃcials
compared to those paid to federal oﬃcials, that diﬀerence is
mitigated by the additional requirement in § 666 that the re‐
ward be paid or received “corruptly,” i.e., with the knowledge
that giving or receiving the reward is forbidden. Hawkins, 777
F.3d at 882. Third, the approach of the First and Fifth Circuits
produces its own disparity of a diﬀerent sort: gratuities paid
to federal oﬃcials are criminalized, whereas gratuities paid to
state and local oﬃcials are not under federal law.
   Accordingly, we follow here our precedents holding that
18 U.S.C. § 666 applies to gratuities and does not require
No. 21‐2986                                                   39

evidence of a prior quid pro quo agreement. The district court
did not err when it refused to dismiss the count from the in‐
dictment, when it declined to give Snyder’s proposed jury in‐
struction, or when it denied his motion for judgment of ac‐
quittal.
   D. Suﬃciency of the Evidence
    Last, Snyder argues that even if § 666(a)(1)(B) applies to
gratuities, the evidence was not suﬃcient at either of his trials
to convict. Again, we will overturn a conviction for insuﬃ‐
cient evidence only if, viewing all evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could
have found the defendant guilty. E.g., Maldonado, 893 F.3d at
484; see also Moreno, 922 F.3d at 793; Garcia, 919 F.3d at 496‒
97.
    To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), the gov‐
ernment must show that a public agent “corruptly” solicited
or accepted something of value “intending to be influenced or
rewarded” in connection with a transaction of $5,000 or more.
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B); see Mullins, 800 F.3d at 870. A public
agent acts “corruptly” when “he understands that the pay‐
ment given is a bribe, reward, or gratuity.” Id. The parties
agree that the truck contracts were worth at least $5,000 and
that Mayor Snyder was an agent of Portage, which received
enough federal funding to be covered by § 666. His argument
on appeal is that the evidence was insuﬃcient at either trial
for a reasonable jury to find that he solicited the $13,000 check
intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with the
two contracts awarded to GLPB.
    Snyder challenges the suﬃciency of the evidence at both
trials, so we must consider the evidence presented to both
40                                                    No. 21‐2986

juries. (If the evidence at the first trial had been legally insuf‐
ficient to convict, the Double Jeopardy Clause would have
barred the second trial. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
18 (1978); Webster v. Duckworth, 767 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir.
1985).) Viewing the evidence in each trial in the light most fa‐
vorable to the government, we find ample support for the ju‐
ries’ verdicts. Mayor Snyder put his good friend Reeder in
charge of the bidding process even though Reeder had no ex‐
perience administering public bids. Reeder then tailored both
bid requirements to favor GLPB. In the first‐round invitation,
Reeder based the chassis specifications on a Peterbilt chassis,
and after GLPB told Reeder it could deliver trucks in 150 days,
Reeder included a 150‐day deadline. In the second round,
Reeder tailored the bid specifications to match the truck that
had been sitting on GLPB’s lot even though the truck was not
the manufacturer’s current model. The second invitation to
bid was issued after Mayor Snyder tried unsuccessfully to
purchase the GLPB truck outright. Evidence at both trials es‐
tablished that Snyder communicated with the Buhas around
the time of the second‐round bid.
    Less than three weeks after the second contract was
awarded to GLPB, the Buhas had GLPB pay Snyder $13,000.
When questioned by the FBI, Snyder claimed the $13,000
check was payment for healthcare and information‐technol‐
ogy consulting he performed for GLPB. When pressed for
specifics, Snyder could not identify any work product he pro‐
vided GLPB. He said that he went to meetings and “discussed
things.” Although Snyder claimed to have advised GLPB on
healthcare options after passage of the Aﬀordable Care Act,
he could not recall what decision GLPB made regarding its
employees’ insurance coverage. The government subpoenaed
GLPB and Snyder for all documentation, correspondence,
No. 21‐2986                                                    41

work product, and billing records related to Snyder’s consult‐
ing work for GLPB. No such evidence was produced.
   Given irregularities in the bidding process, Snyder’s con‐
temporaneous contacts with the Buhas (unique among bid‐
ders), the timing of the $13,000 payment, the dubious expla‐
nations oﬀered for the payment, and the lack of corroborating
evidence for Snyder’s claim that he was paid for consulting, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Snyder accepted the
check as a bribe or gratuity for steering the contracts to GLPB.
    Snyder’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. He
argues that the evidence at his first trial was insuﬃcient be‐
cause the government did not provide direct evidence that he
intended to be influenced or rewarded when he accepted the
$13,000. This argument is a nonstarter. A verdict may be ra‐
tional even if it relies on circumstantial evidence, especially of
the defendant’s state of mind. United States v. Lawrence, 788
F.3d 234, 242 (7th Cir. 2015).
    Next, Snyder contends that he is entitled to a judgment of
acquittal because the government failed to show that the
$13,000 check was a bribe or gratuity in connection with both
rounds of bidding, as opposed to only the second round. This
is incorrect as a matter of both law and fact. As a point of law,
evidence at trial need not exactly match allegations made in
the indictment. See generally United States v. Miller, 471 U.S.
130, 136 (1985). As a point of fact, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, evidence at trial showed
that Reeder—whom Snyder put in charge of the bidding pro‐
cess—drafted the chassis and deadline specifications in the
first round to favor GLPB.
42                                                              No. 21‐2986

    Finally, Snyder insists that a rational jury would have to
conclude that he performed some work for GLPB, which
would make the $13,000 check bona fide income, not a bribe
or gratuity. We disagree. A reasonable jury could conclude
that even if Snyder spoke with the Buhas and on occasion of‐
fered his advice, the $13,000 check was not paid for consulting
services. In response to the government’s subpoenas, neither
Snyder nor the Buhas could produce a contract, billing rec‐
ords, work product, or any other documentation showing
that Snyder worked for GLPB. This, as well as evidence that
Reeder crafted both bids to favor GLPB, the timing of the pay‐
ment, and Snyder’s contemporaneous communication with
the Buhas, permitted a reasonable jury to conclude that the
$13,000 check was not payment for consulting services. The
evidence was suﬃcient to support both juries’ verdicts.7
     The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

     7 Snyder also argues that the reasoning of the district court, which de‐

nied his motions for acquittal after both trials, was flawed in several re‐
spects. He asks this court to find the evidence insufficient based on what
he characterizes as unreasonable inferences drawn by the district court.
On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not defer to the
district court’s reasoning. United States v. Harris, 51 F.4th 705, 714 (7th Cir.
2022). Rather, our focus is on the evidence presented at trial and whether,
viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any
rational trier of fact could find Snyder guilty. We therefore need not ad‐
dress or defend every inference drawn by the district court.