Court Opinion

ID: 9908667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:01:11.501545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:25.783469
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14164    Document: 34-1     Date Filed: 12/11/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14164
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JOSE ANGEL ANDUJAR,
       a.k.a. Zay,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cr-00220-WFJ-MRM-2
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14164

                            ____________________

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges
       PER CURIAM:
               Jose Andujar appeals his sentence of 152 months’ imprison-
       ment for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distrib-
       ute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, which was reached by an
       upward variance from the guideline range of 87 to 108 months’
       imprisonment. Andujar argues that his sentence is substantively
       unreasonable because the district court gave insuﬃcient reasons
       under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for applying the upward variance. He
       also asserts that the district court abused its discretion by compar-
       ing his sentence to his dissimilarly situated codefendants and by cre-
       ating an unwarranted sentencing disparity between himself and
       similarly situated future defendants who will be eligible for
       safety-valve relief under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(18) once the U.S. Sen-
       tencing Commission synchronizes it with the amended
       safety-valve provision at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f )(1).
              We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under
       the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
       552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The party challenging the sentence has the
       burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable based on the
       facts of the case, the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference
       owed to the sentencing court. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789
       F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
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       22-14164                Opinion of the Court                           3

               A court can abuse its discretion in three ways: (1) by failing
       to consider relevant factors, (2) by considering improper factors, or
       (3) by committing a clear error in judgment in its assessment of the
       relevant factors. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
       2010) (en banc). The proper factors are listed in § 3553(a) and in-
       clude the seriousness of the oﬀense, the history and characteristics
       of the defendant, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect
       the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). The
       district court holds signiﬁcant discretion in deciding how to weigh
       the § 3553(a) factors, and we cannot substitute our own judgment
       on review. United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir.
       2014). However, a sentencing court must ensure that it avoids un-
       warranted disparities in sentences between similarly situated de-
       fendants. United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir.
       2009); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
               We may not presume that a sentence outside of the calcu-
       lated guideline range is unreasonable, but we do take into account
       the extent of the variance in our analysis. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187. We
       have aﬃrmed many sentences varying above the guideline range as
       substantively reasonable based primarily on criminal history and
       risk of recidivism. See, e.g., Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1253, 1256-57
       (aﬃrming as substantively reasonable a sentence of 87 months’ im-
       prisonment, which included a 60-month upward variance based on
       the appellant’s criminal history); United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219,
       1221-23 (11th Cir. 2012) (aﬃrming as substantively reasonable a
       sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment, which included an upward
       variance from the guideline range of 78 to 97 months based on the
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14164

       appellant’s criminal history); United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230,
       1235-36, 1239-41 (11th Cir. 2009) (aﬃrming as substantively reason-
       able a statutory maximum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment,
       which was an upward variance from the guideline range of 30 to
       37 months based on the appellant’s criminal history and risk of re-
       cidivism). One sign of reasonableness is that the variance sentence
       is “well below the statutory maximum.” United States v. Riley, 995
       F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021).
               Here, Andujar’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable
       because the district court, in applying the upward variance, only
       considered proper factors under § 3553(a) and did not give them an
       inappropriate amount of weight in light of the deference it is owed.
       Additionally, the court did not create an unwarranted sentencing
       disparity between Andujar and future defendants who will be eligi-
       ble for guideline safety-valve relief, and it was not improper to com-
       pare his sentence to those of his codefendants.
              The court’s concern that Andujar recently had been con-
       victed based on participation in a cocaine distribution conspiracy,
       received a lenient sentence, and very soon after had perpetrated
       substantially the same criminal conduct informed its judgment that
       Andujar was at a high risk of recidivism and required individual
       deterrence. Its consideration of the harsher sentences that
       Andujar’s co-conspirators had received was based on both the need
       to avoid disparity in sentencing out of fairness and the need to take
       account of Andujar’s high-level role within the conspiracy as the
       cocaine supplier for those co-conspirators. Finally, its discussion of
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       22-14164                Opinion of the Court                          5

       Andujar’s persistence in continuing participation in the conspiracy,
       despite having already been stopped by police while in possession
       of cocaine, was relevant both to the seriousness of the oﬀense and
       to Andujar’s risk of recidivism. The court’s general concern with
       Andujar’s risk of recidivism, the need for deterrence, and his high-
       level role in the conspiracy all relate to the court’s expression of the
       need to protect the public from this type of behavior. All of these
       factors were within the scope of § 3553(a), and the court did not
       consider any other factors that fell outside of that scope. See Irey,
       612 F.3d at 1189.
              Further, there was nothing unreasonable in the way that the
       court disagreed with the sentencing calculation and placed more
       weight on the factors than was reﬂected in the guideline range.
       Andujar is incorrect to aver that simply because the probation of-
       ﬁcer incorporated his criminal history and the facts of his criminal
       conduct into the guideline calculation, the judge is unable to give
       them any further thought or disagree with how they should be
       weighed in determining the sentence. Id. at 1212. The upward var-
       iance from the advisory guideline range is substantial, but the ﬁnal
       152-month sentence is well below the maximum penalty of life im-
       prisonment, which itself is an indicator of reasonableness. Riley,
       995 F.3d at 1278. The 152-month sentence is supported by the facts
       of the case and Andujar’s criminal history. It was reasonable for
       the court to decide that all of the factors it had assessed indicated
       that Andujar had a high likelihood of recidivism and posed a threat
       to public safety, and so deserved the extent of the variance above
       the guideline range. This Court in the past has aﬃrmed similarly
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14164

       large upward variances primarily based on criminal history and the
       danger to society posed by the appellant. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d
       at 1256-57; Early, 686 F.3d at 1221-23; Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1239-41.
              Andujar’s claims that his sentence is unduly disproportion-
       ate compared to similarly situated future defendants who will be
       given safety-valve credit under the Guidelines, and that he should
       not be compared with his dissimilarly situated codefendants, are
       also unavailing. The sentencing judge expressly stated that, even if
       Andujar was eligible for a two-level downward departure under the
       guideline safety-valve provision, it still would have varied upward
       to the same sentence it imposed. Andujar has not shown that there
       are any similarly situated defendants who, given a recent history of
       drug distribution and high-level role in a multi-party conspiracy as
       a supplier like him, would have received a disproportionately
       lighter sentence than he did. Just because he is eligible for safety-
       valve relief does not necessarily mean that he is entirely similarly
       situated to all other defendants who are also eligible. Andujar’s
       safety valve-relief eligibility is only one aspect of his case, and the
       court discussed multiple speciﬁc ways in which he could be distin-
       guished from other defendants who also possess such eligibility.
       Thus, it was within the court’s discretion not to rely solely on the
       safety valve’s applicability in deciding the sentence and to focus in-
       stead on the factors of deterrence, public safety, and the seriousness
       of the oﬀense, even if it resulted in a substantial upward variance.
              It was also not outside of the court’s discretion to give sub-
       stantial weight to Andujar’s central role as a cocaine supplier when
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       22-14164               Opinion of the Court                          7

       determining his sentence in relation to his co-defendants. Contrary
       to Andujar’s claims, the district court did not compare his sentence
       with his co-conspirators because it had thought that they were sim-
       ilarly situated, but rather because it thought that Andujar was more
       culpable than the others due to his role as their supplier, noting that
       Andujar was “the source of all this.” The sentencing court instead
       compared Andujar’s sentence to those of his co-defendants in order
       to avoid a signiﬁcant disparity where a high-level supplier would
       receive a more-lenient sentence than those beneath him in the
       chain of distribution. That judgment is within its discretion accord-
       ing to the principle of fairness underlying the § 3553(a) factors and
       the sentencing system as a whole. It also ﬁts squarely within the
       judge’s discretion in giving great weight to the factors of the seri-
       ousness of the oﬀense and Andujar’s role in the conspiracy.
       Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1361.
              Therefore, because the district court considered only proper
       factors and gave them an appropriate amount of weight to which
       this Court must aﬀord deference, it did not abuse its discretion in
       imposing an upward-variance sentence of 152 months.
              AFFIRMED.