Court Opinion

ID: 9405229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 20:08:21.497069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:20.322422
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Larr, 2023-Ohio-2128.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                    MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO                                  :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
                                               :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
                          Plaintiff-Appellee   :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                               :
-vs-                                           :
                                               :       Case No. CT2022-0069
MICHAEL L. LARR                                :
                                               :
                     Defendant-Appellant       :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                           Appeal from the Muskingum County Court
                                                   of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2021-0577

JUDGMENT:                                          Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                            June 27, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                             For Defendant-Appellant

RONALD L. WELCH                                    JAMES SWEENEY
Prosecuting Attorney                               285 South Liberty Street
BY: JOHN CONNOR                                    Powell, OH 43065
Assistant Prosecutor
27 North Fifth St., Box 189
Zanesville, OH 43702
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                     2

Gwin, P.J.

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Michael Larr [“Larr”] appeals his conviction and

sentence after a jury trial in the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas.

                                  Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2}   On October 28, 2021, Larr was indicted at the Muskingum County Court of

Common Pleas on two counts of Gross Sexual Imposition, both felonies of the third

degree in violation of R.C.2907.05(A)(4).

       {¶3}   Around the summer of 2019, M.H. lost custody of P.W. (b. 06.30.2016) due

to drug use. M.H.’s grandmother is Marilyn Larr, and her step-grandfather is Larr. Marilyn

and Larr had temporary custody of P.W. and her older sister for approximately three

months, after which their respective fathers received custody. Marilyn and Larr continued

to have visitation with the children. Eventually, the children’s mother regained custody of

the two girls. The Larr’s often babysat P.W. The Larr’s would often have P.W. stay at

their home with them from Sunday till Tuesday.

       {¶4}   On September 17, 2021, M.H. was playing with P.W. when P.W. tried to

tickle her. M.H. testified that P.W. pointed to different parts on her own body to see if her

mother was ticklish there. When P.W. pointed to her vagina, M.H. testified, “And I said,

no, nobody's ticklish there. And that is when she said, yeah huh, I am. And I said, no,

who tickles you there? She said, my pappaw tickles me there. I said, where are you when

pappaw tickles you there? She said the camper." 2T. at 296. M.H. testified that the

Larr’s' have a camper on their property. P.W. would go there, and that "that was her

and her pawpaw's time. They would get special snacks and watch DVD's in there.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                   3

It was like camping." 2T. at 296-297.       No one else was present when P.W. made

these allegations to M.H.

       {¶5}   M.H. telephoned P.W.'s father, who advised her to take the child to the

hospital. After taking P.W. to Genesis (a local hospital) she was advised to take P.W. to

Nationwide Children’s in Columbus. (“CAC”) Afterwards, a no-contact order was put in

place for Marilyn and Larr. P.W. was interviewed at Nationwide Children's on the day

after the allegations were made.

       {¶6}   Ms. Prince testified that she is a medical forensic interviewer who, as part

of a multi-disciplinary team, conducts an interview of a child to assess for allegations of

abuse or neglect. The interview is recorded with Ms. Prince alone in the room with the

child. Other members of the team can watch as the interview is projected onto a screen

in a separate room. Larr objected to the testimony and the video on the grounds that the

statements of the child were hearsay and violated the confrontation clause. 1T. at 246.

The trial judge overruled the objections. Id.

       {¶7}   During the interview P.W. indicated where she would have been touched

by showing on a stuffed animal and by pointing to areas on an anatomical drawing of a

girl without clothing on. State’s Exhibit’s 2 and 3. Through these methods P.W. indicated

that she was tickled in the vaginal area. 1T. at 256. P.W. indicated that this tickling

happened in the camper and in Larr’s bed. 1T. at 259. The video recording of the

interview was played for the jury. State’s Exhibit 1.

       {¶8}   According to Ms. Prince, the normal process of a forensic interview will

typically "begin with an introduction and rapport building, and then a review of the

guidelines, a narrative event practice of a neutral event, and then getting into the
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                     4

allegations, and then screening." 1T. at 264. In the interview of P.W., Ms. Prince testified,

"because she initiated disclosing early, we did not go through rapport building, interview

guidelines, and the narrative event practice."       Id.   Ms. Prince did not make any

determinations one way or the other if P.W. may have been coached or talked to prior to

the interview. Id

       {¶9}   At Nationwide Children's t h e physical exam of P.W. was conducted,

including an anogenital exam. No physical trauma or any evidence of physical touching

was found. The reports of Ms. Prince and Nurse practitioner Carrie Nease were admitted

into evidence. State’s Exhibit 4. 1T. at 261; 277.

       {¶10} Larr’s wife Marilyn was called as a witness by the state. She testified that

she and Larr were married for eleven years and she never witnessed anything

inappropriate occur between Larr and the girls. Marilyn never saw any inappropriate

conduct during the times she saw Larr and P.W. play the “tickle game.” 2T. at 320; 328.

However, P.W. told Marilyn while being picked-up after the no contact order was put in

place, “Grandma, did you know that Grandpa had touched me down there?” 2T. at 320.

Marilyn testified that when P.W. was smaller, P.W. would sleep in her underwear and Larr

would sleep in his boxers. Id. at 323-324. P.W. would sleep in Larr’s bedroom. 2T. at

323; 329. She further testified, “He just – he said that if [P.W.] wasn’t allowed at – being

with us—or at our house then he wanted a divorce.” 2T. at 337. If P.W. was allowed back,

Larr indicated the couple would not get divorced. Id. at 338.

       {¶11} Larr called Bob Stinson, Ph.D. to testify as an expert witness on memory

formation and memory recall. 2T. at 396. Dr. Stinson is Board certified in forensic
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                     5

psychology as well as having his Juris Doctorate degree. 2T. at 390; 392. The trial judge

qualified Dr. Stinson as an expert witness. Id. at 398.

       {¶12} Dr. Stinson testified concerning false memories in juveniles. Id. at 400. Dr.

Stinson testified that the frequency in which false memories occur in sexual abuse cases

ranges from six per cent to as high as sixty-five percent, depending upon a number of

factors. 2T. at 401; 422. The best research available, according to Dr. Stinson, indicates

that 25-35 per cent of the allegations are false. Id. at 402. The younger the child, the

greater the likelihood of false allegations.     Id. External factors, improper interview

techniques and improper protocols are factors that contribute to false memory or

unreliability of recalled events. Id. at 403-404. Dr. Stinson agreed that if a child were to

tell a parent that something happened, it is appropriate to schedule a forensic interview

of the child as soon as possible. Id. at 432-433. He agreed that an interviewer should

remain neutral and understand different interviewing techniques. Id. at 441. Further, the

interview should be recorded. Id. The interview should occur in a safe and child friendly

environment. Id. The interviewer should build rapport with the child. The interviewer

should use open-ended questions, and allow the child to provide their own responses to

the questions. Id. The interviewer should not interrupt the child and should avoid

suggestive questions. Id. at 442.

       {¶13} Dr. Stinson’s only real concern with the interview conducted by Ms. Prince

was that she did not explore other viable hypotheses. Id. Dr. Stinson believed that she

should have inquired further about the tickling, such as was the tickling in the vaginal area

different in length or intensity than the tickling in the area of the legs or under the arms.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                      6

2T. at 442. Otherwise, Dr. Stinson maintained, you may not get the full picture. Id. at 443.

Dr. Stinson did not see a fair exploration of alternative hypotheses in this case. Id. at 447.

          {¶14} At the conclusion of Dr. Stinson’s testimony, the trial court denied Larr’s

motion to admit his report into evidence. 2T. at 450-455.

          {¶15} At the end of trial, the jury found Larr guilty of both charges. A sentencing

hearing took place on July 25, 2022. At sentencing Larr was ordered to serve sixty

months in prison on each count, to be served consecutively. He was classified as a Tier

II Sex Offender and was awarded a total of two-hundred and sixty-nine days of jail time

credit.

          {¶16} By Judgment Entry filed August 22, 2022, the trial court found Larr to be

indigent and appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. [Docket Entry No. 61].

Counsel filed a Notice of Appeal in this case on September 7, 2022. [Docket Entry No.

65].

          {¶17} On January 27, 2023, Larr filed a pro se brief in this Court. [Docket Entry

No. 13]. On February 16, 2023, Larr’s attorney filed an appellate brief in this Court.

[Docket Entry No. 15]. On February 22, 2023, Larr, pro se, sent a letter to this Court

requesting copies of the record and transcript to enable him to file an appeal brief.

[Docket Entry No. 16].

          {¶18} On March 10, 2023, Larr, pro se, filed an appellant brief. [Docket Entry No.

19]. On March 27, 2023, Larr, pro se, filed another appellant brief. [Docket Entry No.

20]. On March 28, 2023, Larr, pro se, filed his “Final Written Brief of Information” with the

clerk of courts. [Docket Entry No. 22].
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                        7

       {¶19} On April 10, 2023, Larr filed, pro se, a document titled, “Appeal” which

appears to be yet another appellant brief. [Docket Entry No. 23]. On May 1, 2023, Larr

sent a letter to the Court indicating that he misunderstood the appellate rules and did not

realize he was supposed to wait until after his attorney filed his appellate brief before filing

his own brief. [Docket Entry No. 34]. Larr indicated that another inmate suggest he

apologize to his appointed counsel for getting ahead of things, and that his attorney may

surprise him and do a good job.

       {¶20} Larr raises four Assignments of Error,

       {¶21} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENTERED A JUDGMENT

AGAINST THE APPELLANT WHEN THE JUDGMENT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

       {¶22} “II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT THE

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL AS THE GUILTY VERDICT AT THE TRIAL

COURT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

       {¶23} “III.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED HEARSAY

STATEMENTS PURSUANT TO EVIDENCE RULE 807, DENYING APPELLANT'S

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSER.

       {¶24} “IV.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED TESTIMONY

CONCERNING PRIVILEGED MARITAL STATEMENTS.”

                                Hybrid Representation on Appeal

       {¶25} There is no “constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from

a criminal conviction.” Martinez v. California, 528 U.S. 152, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d

597 (2000) (denying the appellant’s pro se motion to represent himself and to waive the
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                    8

appointment of counsel on appeal). Furthermore, “[a] defendant has no right to a ‘hybrid’

form of representation wherein he is represented by counsel, but also acts simultaneously

as his own counsel.” State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 138, 689 N.E.2d 929(1998),

citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122(1984);

State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 451, 2006-Ohio-2987, 849 N.E.2d 1, ¶10; State v.

Ferguson, 108 Ohio St.3d 451, 2006-Ohio-1502, 844 N.E.2d 806, ¶97.

       {¶26} Having reviewed the pro se filings, we find that Larr is arguing that his

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence; the jury should have found

P.W. was coached; there was no physical evidence, no witnesses to the acts; and the

jury should have believed Dr. Stinson. These issues have been raised by appointed

counsel in his appellate brief.

       {¶27} Since Larr does not have the right to represent himself or to act as co-

counsel with appointed counsel on his appeal, we do not consider his pro se filings.

                                                I.

       {¶28} In his First Assignment of Error, Larr maintains that his convictions for gross

sexual imposition are against the manifest weight of the evidence.          In his Second

Assignment of Error, Larr argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his

convictions for gross sexual imposition.

                Standard of Appellate Review– Sufficiency of the Evidence.

       {¶29} The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, in

conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each of the material elements of

a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                     9

U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013); Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92,

136 S.Ct. 616, 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). The test for the sufficiency of the evidence

involves a question of law for resolution by the appellate court. State v. Walker, 150 Ohio

St.3d 409, 2016-Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶30. “This naturally entails a review of the

elements of the charged offense and a review of the state's evidence.”              State v.

Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶13.

       {¶30} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not

ask whether the evidence should be believed. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574

N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional

amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4,

684 N.E.2d 668 (1997); Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶30. “The relevant inquiry is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. State v. Poutney, 153 Ohio St.3d 474,

2018-Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶19. Thus, “on review for evidentiary sufficiency we do

not second-guess the jury's credibility determinations; rather, we ask whether, ‘if believed,

[the evidence] would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001),

quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus; Walker 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶31. We will

not “disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds unless ‘reasonable minds could

not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d

70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 94, quoting State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421,
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                      10

430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997); State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-

5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶74.

         Issue for Appellate Review: Whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

    most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, if believed, would convince the

     average mind that Larr was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Gross Sexual

                          Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05.

       {¶31} Larr argues that the only direct evidence presented was the testimony of

the alleged victim. The victim had no physical injuries, there was no confession by Larr

and no proof that the touching was done for sexual gratification. Larr further points out

that he voluntarily spoke to the police during the investigation.

       {¶32} R.C. 2907.05, Gross Sexual Imposition provides,

              (A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse

       of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have

       sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to

       have sexual contact when any of the following applies:

                                                 ***

              (4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than thirteen

       years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.

                                                 ***

       {¶33} “‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of an erogenous zone of another,

including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a

female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C.

2907.01(B).
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                   11

       {¶34} Whether touching is done for the purpose of sexual gratification is a

question of fact to be inferred from the type, nature, and circumstances surrounding the

contact. State v. Cochran, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 03–CA–01, 2003–Ohio–6863, ¶ 15,

citing State v. Mundy, 99 Ohio App.3d 275, 289, 650 N.E.2d 502(1994). We have held

that the testimony of one witness, if believed by the factfinder, is enough to support a

conviction. See, State v. Dunn, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008-CA-00137, 2009-Ohio-1688, ¶

133. The weight to be given the evidence introduced at trial and the credibility of the

witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact to determine. State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d

79, 434 N.E.2d 1356 (1982), syllabus.

       {¶35} A conviction for rape or gross sexual imposition does not require proof of

trauma or physical injury. See State v. Campbell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100246 and

100247, 2014–Ohio–2181, ¶ 44, citing State v. Leonard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98626,

2013–Ohio–1446, ¶ 46; State v. Schrock, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-191, 2008-Ohio-

3745, ¶ 23 (“The qualitative nature of these charges does not necessitate any specific

physical injury or trauma to the genital area.”); Cf. State v. Hines, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-

04-1234, 2006-Ohio-322, ¶ 20 (“Nevertheless, we find that it is the incidents of sexual

abuse, not the actual physical injury to the victim's hymen, that the state must prove to

establish rape.”).

       {¶36} In the case at bar, P.W. told her mother that Larr had tickled her vagina.

P.W. told Larr’s wife that Larr touched her “down there.” P.W. told Celeste Prince that

Larr tickled her vagina.    She further showed on diagrams where the touching had

occurred. The jury was able to see the forensic interview as it happened in real time via
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                  12

the video recording. P.W. indicated that the touching occurred in the camper and in Larr’s

bedroom.

       {¶37} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we

conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Larr

engaged in sexual contact with P.W. who was five years old at the time. We hold,

therefore, that the state met its burden of production regarding each element of the crime

and, accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support Larr’s convictions for gross

sexual imposition.

                      Standard of Appellate Review – Manifest Weight

       {¶38} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a

manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even though the

evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387,

678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as

stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997–Ohio–355; State v.

Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001).

       {¶39} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.

State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541(1997), State v.

Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶83. When a court of

appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the

weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with

the fact finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d

541, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652(1982)
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                      13

(quotation marks omitted); State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865

N.E.2d 1244, ¶25, citing Thompkins.

         {¶40} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may

not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “‘the jury clearly lost

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be

reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist.

1983).     The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized: “‘[I]n determining whether the

judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable

intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment

and the finding of facts. * * *.’” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 334, 972 N.E.

2d 517, 2012-Ohio-2179, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77,

80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review,

Section 603, at 191–192 (1978).       Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is

reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the

conviction.” Id.

         Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost their way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be reversed and a new

                                        trial ordered.

         {¶41} We find that this is not an “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Based upon

the entire record in this matter we find Larr’s convictions are not against the sufficiency
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                   14

or the manifest weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the jury appears to have fairly

and impartially decided the matters before them. The jury heard the witnesses, evaluated

the evidence, and was convinced of Larr’s guilt.

       {¶42} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable

inferences as a thirteenth juror, including considering the credibility of witnesses, we

cannot reach the conclusion that the trier of facts lost its way and created a manifest

miscarriage of justice. We do not find the jury erred when it found Larr guilty. Taken as

a whole, the testimony and record contain ample evidence of Larr’s responsibility for the

alleged crimes. The fact that the jury chose not to believe the testimony of Larr’s expert

does not, in and of itself, render his convictions against the manifest weight of the

evidence.   While Larr is certainly free to argue that the forensic interview was not

conducted correctly and that the hospital did not conduct a fair exploration of alternative

hypotheses properly, on a full review of the record we cannot say that the jury clearly lost

its way or created a manifest injustice by choosing to believe the testimony of the state’s

witnesses. The jury was able to observe the forensic interview in real time as it took place

as well as hear Dr. Stinson subject to cross-examination.

       {¶43} The state presented testimony and evidence from which the jury could have

found all the essential elements of the offenses proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The

fact that the state may have relied on circumstantial evidence in proving Larr’s guilt does

not make his convictions any less sound.

       {¶44} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that

there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the

crimes for which Larr was convicted.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                        15

       {¶45} Larr’s First and Second Assignments of Error are overruled.

                                                  III.

       {¶46} In his Third Assignment of Error, Larr contends the trial court erred when it

permitted the out of court hearsay statements of P.W. to be admitted through the

testimony of several witnesses and by the playing of her interview at CAC. Further

because P.W. did not testify during his jury trial, the admission of P.W.’s statements

violated his confrontation rights.

                                  Standard of Appellate Review

       {¶47} “[A] trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility

of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the

rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d

1056 (1991).     “However, we review de novo evidentiary rulings that implicate the

Confrontation Clause. United States v. Henderson, 626 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 2010).”

State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶97.

       {¶48} We note that any error will be deemed harmless if it did not affect the

accused’s “substantial rights.” Before constitutional error can be considered harmless, we

must be able to “declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Chapman v. State of Cal., 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

       {¶49} In Ohio, Evid.R. 807 provides an exception to the general inadmissibility of

hearsay uttered by a child under the age of 12 that describes any sexual act performed

by, with, or on the child. This exception applies if (1) the court finds that the totality of the

circumstances around the making of the statement provides a particularized guaranty of

trustworthiness comparable at least to Evid.R. 803 and 804; (2) the child's testimony is
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                     16

not reasonably obtainable by the proponent of the statement; (3) there is “independent

proof” of the sexual act; and (4) the proponent of the statement has notified all other

parties of the content of the statement at least ten days before the trial or hearing. Evid.R.

807(A)(1)-(4).    The rule is stated in the conjunctive.      In order for the out-of-court

statements to be admitted under the rule, the proponent must demonstrate all of the

above. In re T.W., 8th Dist. No. 106231, 2018-Ohio-3275, 112 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 7.

       {¶50} Larr did not object to the child’s statements as testified to by the child’s

mother (2T. at 296) or his wife (2T. at 320). Thus, the trial court was never called upon

to determine whether the statements were inadmissible hearsay or admissible pursuant

to Evid.R. 807.

       {¶51} Normally, an appellate court need not consider error that was not called to

the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been avoided or

corrected by the trial court. State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117, 364 N.E.2d 1364

(1977). Accordingly, a claim of error in such a situation is usually deemed to be waived

absent plain error. See Crim.R. 52(B). Larr did not raise plain error with respect to any of

the child’s statements, in general and with the child’s statements to her mother and

grandmother, in particular. Because he does not claim plain error on appeal, we need

not consider it. See, State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19

N.E.3d 900, ¶ 17–20 (appellate court need not consider plain error where appellant fails

to timely raise plain-error claim); State v. Gavin, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 13CA3592, 2015-

Ohio-2996, 2015 WL 4549872, ¶ 25, citing Wright v. Ohio Dept. of Jobs & Family Servs.,

9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010264, 2013-Ohio-2260, 2013 WL 2407158, ¶ 22 (“when a

claim is forfeited on appeal and the appellant does not raise plain error, the appellate
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                     17

court will not create an argument on his behalf”); State v. Carbaugh, 5th Dist. Muskingum

No. CT2022-0050, 2023-Ohio-1269, ¶67; State v. Fitts, 6th Dist. Wood Nos. WD18-092,

WD18-093, 2020-Ohio-1154, ¶21; Simon v. Larreategui, 2nd Dist. Miami No. 2021-CA-41,

2022-Ohio-1881, ¶41.

       {¶52} The only objection raised by Larr in the trial court was to the child’s

statements to Celeste Prince and the video of her interview at CAC with the child. 1T. at

246.

          Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial court violated Larr’s right to

 confrontation by allowing the state to introduce the forensic interview of the child when

                               the child did not testify at trial

       {¶53} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the

witnesses against him.”

       {¶54} In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177

(2004), the Supreme Court of the United States held that out-of-court statements that are

testimonial are barred, under the Confrontation Clause, unless the witness is unavailable

and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of

whether the statements are deemed reliable by the trial court. The Court defined these

“testimonial” statements to include “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-

that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the

defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants

would reasonably expect to be used “prosecutorially” and “extrajudicial statements * * *

contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                 18

testimony, or confessions,” and “statements that were made under circumstances which

would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be

available for use at a later trial.” 541 U.S. at 51-52.

       {¶55} Thus, as to “testimonial evidence,” “the Sixth Amendment demands what

the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”

541 U.S. at 68. “To trigger a violation of the Confrontation Clause, an admitted statement

must be testimonial in nature, and must be hearsay.” United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d

672, 683 (6th Cir. 2009). A statement is testimonial where a reasonable person would

anticipate that his or her statement would be used “against the accused in investigating

and prosecuting the crime.” United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004).

See also State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d 834, at

paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶56} Evid.R. 803(4) provides that the following are not excluded by the hearsay

rule: “Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing

medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or

general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent

to diagnosis or treatment.”

       {¶57} In State v. Arnold, 126 Ohio St.3d 290, 2010-Ohio-2742, 933 N.E.2d 775,

the Ohio Supreme Court considered the admissibility of statements made during

interviews at child-advocacy centers. Arnold involved a Confrontation Clause challenge

rather than Evid.R. 803(4), but the pertinent analysis is similar in many respects. The

issue in Arnold was whether a child’s statements during an interview were for medical

diagnosis or treatment, making them “non-testimonial,” or whether they primarily served
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                    19

a forensic or investigative purpose, making them “testimonial” in violation of the

defendant’s confrontation rights.

       {¶58} The Supreme Court first noted that child-advocacy centers are unique

insofar as a single interview with a child serves “dual purposes,” which are: “(1) to gather

forensic information to investigate and potentially prosecute a defendant for the offense

and (2) to elicit information necessary for medical diagnosis and treatment of the victim.”

Arnold at ¶ 33. The majority then turned to the substance of the child’s interview. It

reasoned that some of the child’s statements primarily had a forensic or investigative

purpose. They included the child’s assertion that the defendant had “shut and locked the

bedroom door before raping her; her descriptions of where her mother and brother were

while she was in the bedroom with Arnold, of Arnold’s boxer shorts, of him removing them,

and of what Arnold’s ‘pee-pee’ looked like; and her statement that Arnold removed her

underwear.” Id. at ¶ 34. The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]hese statements likely

were not necessary for medical diagnosis or treatment. Rather, they related primarily to

the state’s investigation.” Id.

       {¶59} The Arnold Court also found, however, that “other statements provided

information that was necessary to diagnose and medically treat” the child victim. Id. at ¶

37. It noted that “[t]he history obtained during the interview is important for the doctor or

nurse practitioner to make an accurate diagnosis and to determine what evaluation and

treatment are necessary. For example, the nurse practitioner conducts a ‘head to toe’

examination of all children, but only examines the genital area of patients who disclose

sexual abuse. That portion of the exam is to identify any trauma or injury sustained during

the alleged abuse.” Id. In particular, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the following
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                  20

statements by the victim during the interview were necessary for medical diagnosis or

treatment: “statements that described the acts that Arnold performed, including that

Arnold touched her ‘pee-pee,’ that Arnold’s ‘pee-pee’ went inside her ‘pee-pee,’ that

Arnold’s ‘pee-pee’ touched her ‘butt,’ that Arnold’s hand touched her ‘pee-pee,’ and that

Arnold’s mouth touched her ‘pee-pee.’ ” Id. at ¶ 38. The fact that the victim already had

undergone a “rape-kit examination” did not dissuade the majority from finding that the

foregoing statements were necessary for subsequent medical diagnosis or treatment. Id.

at ¶ 39. The majority also found nothing objectionable about considering the child’s

statements individually to determine which ones were for medical diagnosis or treatment

and to exclude those that were not. Id. at ¶ 42. Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court found

nothing objectionable about the fact that police watched the interview or the fact that

information obtained for medical purposes ultimately was used to prosecute the

defendant. These considerations did “not change the fact” that some of the child’s

statements “were made for medical diagnosis and treatment.” Id. at ¶ 43.

       {¶60} As in Arnold, a portion of P.W.’s statements described the sexual acts Larr

performed on her and were thus relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment and, hence,

admissible. As to young children, the identity of the perpetrator of abuse is a treatment

issue. This is an exception to the general rule that the identity of the perpetrator is not

relevant to diagnosis/treatment. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 247–48, 192 L.Ed.2d 306,

135 S.Ct. 2173, 2182 (“Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate

the Confrontation Clause.”); United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993)

(citing cases from the 4th, 8th and 9th Circuits).
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                   21

       {¶61} We find under the facts of this case that the statements made by P.W. to

Celeste Price an interviewer at the child-advocacy center were made for medical

diagnosis and treatment, and therefore admissible under Evid.R. 803(4). The statements

are therefore nontestimonial and are admissible without offending the Confrontation

Clause.

       {¶62} Larr’s Third Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                IV.

       {¶63} In his Fourth Assignment of Error, Larr argues that the trial court erred in

admitting statements made during the testimony of his wife that were barred by the

spousal privilege. Larr points specifically to just one statement, his statement to his wife

that if P.W. could not come over anymore, that he wanted a divorce. [Appellant’s brief at

9].

              Standard of Appellate Review - Spousal Privilege R.C. 2945.42

       {¶64} R.C. 2945.42 creates a privilege for spousal acts and communications:

              * * * Husband or wife shall not testify concerning a communication

       made by one to the other, or act done by either in the presence of the other,

       during coverture, unless the communication was made or act done in the

       known presence or hearing of a third party competent to be a witness * * *.

       {¶65} Error involving privilege is not a constitutional violation. State v. Webb, 70

Ohio St.3d 325, 334, 1994-Ohio-425, 638 N.E.2d 1023. In Webb, the Court noted,

              Non-constitutional error is harmless if there is substantial other

       evidence to support the guilty verdict. See State v. Davis (1975), 44 Ohio

       App.2d 335, 346–348, 73 O.O.2d 395, 401–402, 338 N.E.2d 793, 802–803,
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                  22

       citing State v. Cowans (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 96, 104, 39 O.O.2d 97, 103,

       227 N.E.2d 201, 207. See, also, State v. Diehl (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 389,

       399, 21 O.O.3d 244, 251, 423 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (Stephenson, J.,

       dissenting); State v. Nichols (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 65, 73, 619 N.E.2d 80,

       86, fn. 6.

70 Ohio St.3d at 335, 1994-Ohio-425, 638 N.E.2d 1023.

         Issue for Appellate Review: Whether Larr invited the error of which he now

                                        complains

       {¶66} We note the record indicates that Marilyn voluntarily testified against Larr.

See, Evid.R. 601(B).

       {¶67} The R.C. 2945.42 privilege belongs to the non-testifying spouse. State v.

Savage 30 Ohio St.3d 1, 2, 506 N.E.2d 196(1987). Thus, “[s]pousal privilege cannot be

waived unilaterally and allows a defendant to prevent his or her spouse from testifying [as

to a privileged communication] unless one of the statute’s exceptions applies.” State v.

Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 55, fn. 3. On its face, the

statute does no more than preclude a spouse from testifying to the other spouse’s

statements. State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, 920 N.E.2d 104, ¶

113. Thus, a spouse can testify to other facts. Accordingly, there is no requirement that

a spouse raise the assertion of the spousal privilege in advance of the spouse testifying.

“The existence of the marital privilege turns on the specific circumstances surrounding

each allegedly privileged communication, e.g., whether a third party was present. Thus,

appellant had to object specifically so the circumstances could be determined.” State v.

Henness, 79 Ohio St.3d 53, 59, 1997-Ohio-405, 679 N.E.2d 686.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                       23

       {¶68} Larr cites to nowhere in the record where he either asserted the spousal

privilege or objected to his wife’s testimony.

       {¶69} Under the doctrine of “invited error,” it is well settled that “a party will not be

permitted to take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced the trial court

to make.” State ex rel. Smith v. O’Connor, 71 Ohio St.3d 660, 663, 646 N.E.2d

1115(1995), citing State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith, 68 Ohio St.3d 357, 359, 626 N.E.2d

950(1994). See, also, Lester v. Leuck, 142 Ohio St. 91, 50 N.E.2d 145(1943), paragraph

one of the syllabus. As the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated:

              The law imposes upon every litigant the duty of vigilance in the trial

       of a case, and even where the trial court commits an error to his prejudice,

       he is required then and there to challenge the attention of the court to that

       error, by excepting thereto, and upon failure of the court to correct the same

       to cause his exceptions to be noted. It follows, therefore, that, for much

       graver reasons, a litigant cannot be permitted, either intentionally or

       unintentionally, to induce or mislead a court into the commission of an error

       and then procure a reversal of the judgment for an error for which he was

       actively responsible.

Lester at 92-93, 50 N.E.2d 145, quoting State v. Kollar, 142 Ohio St. 89, 91, 49 N.E.2d

952(1915).

       {¶70} This is more than a simple failure to object to his wife’s testimony. There is

no doubt that the spousal privilege belongs to Larr and that it is his privilege, not the trial

court’s, to assert. Cf. State v. Brunson, Slip Op. No. 2022-Ohio-4299 (Dec. 5, 2022), ¶48
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                      24

(attorney-client privilege) citing United States v. Rainone, 32 F.3d 1203, 1206 (7th Cir.

1994).

         {¶71} Marilyn testified to a number of facts that could be perceived as beneficial

to Larr’s defense, raising at least a possibility that his failure to object or raise the issue

of spousal privilege was a calculated strategy on his part. For example, Marilyn testified

that she never observed any inappropriate conduct between Larr and P.W. Further,

Marilyn never saw any inappropriate conduct during the times she saw Larr and P.W.

play the “tickle game.” 2T. at 320; 328. Marilyn testified that she did not observe anything

inappropriate about the sleeping arrangements or clothing worn.

         {¶72} So, to the extent that Larr now claims his wife should not have been

permitted to testify, the error was invited. Id. at ¶50. Larr may not, either intentionally or

unintentionally, induce or mislead the trial court into permitting the testimony of his wife

without asserting the privilege and objecting to the testimony and then claim error on

appeal.

         {¶73} Larr’s Fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                25

      {¶74} The judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

By Gwin, P.J.,

Hoffman, J., and

Baldwin, J., concur
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0069                                                     26

Hoffman, J., concurring

       {¶75} I concur in the majority's analysis and disposition of Appellant's first and

second assignments of error.

       {¶76} I also concur in the majority's analysis and disposition of Appellant's third

assignment of error. However, I would also find the child/victim's statement to Celeste

Prince was non-testimonial because the child/victim would not reasonably anticipate her

statement would be used against the Appellant in investigating and prosecuting the crime.

       {¶77} I further agree with the majority's disposition of Appellant's fourth

assignment of error. However, I do so for a different reason.

       {¶78} I do not believe the invited error doctrine applies in this case. Nonetheless,

the admission of Appellant's wife's statement does not rise to the level of plain error.