Court Opinion

ID: 9926890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 21:00:36.6324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:05.333522
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4674

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        LACHARLES ANTHONY CLARK, a/k/a LaCharles Anthonyo Clark,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

                                               No. 22-4675

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        LACHARLES ANTHONY CLARK,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:21-cr-00112-TDS-1; 1:08-cr-
        00351-TDS-1)

        Submitted: January 11, 2024                                    Decided: January 24, 2024
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        Before WYNN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Leslie C. Rawls, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J.
        Hairston, United States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina for
        Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               In these consolidated appeals, LaCharles Anthony Clark appeals his convictions of

        conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846, and

        distribution of heroin and fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Clark

        also challenges the district court’s decision to sentence him to 96 months of imprisonment,

        and to revoke his supervised release and sentence him to an additional 24 months of

        imprisonment. For the reasons below, we affirm.

               First, Clark asserts that the district court plainly erred by permitting a witness to

        give hearsay testimony about Clark’s drug dealing with her son. Because Clark did not

        object to the testimony below, our review is for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);

        United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993). We will reverse only if (1) the

        district court committed an error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affects the

        defendant’s substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. An error ‘affects the defendant’s

        substantial rights’ if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of

        the proceeding. United States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4th 1091, 1113 (4th Cir. 2021). Even if

        these prerequisites are met, however, “Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the

        forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of appeals, and the court should not

        exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public

        reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

               While a hearsay statement is generally inadmissible, it may be admitted when the

        government shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed of which

        the defendant and the declarant were members, and that the declarant’s statement was made

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        during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Squillacote,

        221 F.3d 542, 563 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 904–05 (4th Cir.

        1996). We need not decide whether the testimony at issue qualified as an admissible co-

        conspirator’s statement made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, because we

        conclude that even if there was an error, it had no effect on Clark’s substantial rights. The

        witness’ testimony, which the district court found credible, about Clark being the only

        person to sell her son drugs during the period at issue was based primarily on her personal

        knowledge. Therefore, the admission of the statement did not affect the outcome of the

        proceeding.

               Second, Clark contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.

        In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, construing the evidence

        in the light most favorable to the government, there is substantial evidence to support the

        verdict. United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 384 (4th Cir. 2019). Substantial evidence

        is that which “a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support

        a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States

        v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 525 (4th Cir. 2014)). In this analysis, we are “‘not entitled to

        assess witness credibility’ and must ‘assume that the jury resolved any conflicting evidence

        in the prosecution’s favor.’” United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 404 (4th Cir. 2022)

        (quoting United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018)). “We consider both

        circumstantial and direct evidence, and allow the government all reasonable inferences that

        could be drawn in its favor.” United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008).

        The defendant “bears a heavy burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient

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        evidence is confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Savage, 885 F.3d

        at 219 (quoting United States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations,

        alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted)). We have reviewed the record and

        conclude that the convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.

               Third, Clark contends that the upward variant sentence imposed by the district court

        based on its assessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors is substantively

        unreasonable. “In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we ‘examine[]

        the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion

        in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).’”

        United States v. McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 292 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v.

        Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010)). While this court considers the

        extent of the variance, the fact that we “might reasonably have concluded that a different

        sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall v.

        United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). And variant sentences are generally reasonable

        when “the reasons justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United

        States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        But the greater the variance, the reasons cited by the court must be more compelling. Id.

        at 220. We conclude that the court properly evaluated the seriousness of Clark’s criminal

        conduct, the need for deterrence given Clark’s long criminal history, and the need to protect

        the public. We find no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the sentence.

               Lastly, Clark contends that the 24-month revocation sentence for violating his

        conditions of supervised release by engaging in the criminal conduct at issue here should

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        be vacated, because the two underlying convictions are unsustainable. But because we

        have determined that Clark’s convictions are supported by substantial evidence, there is no

        merit to Clark’s argument.

               For all these reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentence and the judgment and

        commitment order.      We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

        contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

        not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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