Court Opinion

ID: 9753494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:15:44.884607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:40.575485
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
Concurring.
I join the majority opinion, but write separately to further address appellant’s allegations that his former PCRA counsel was ineffective.
*339Appellant was represented in the PCRA proceeding below by appointed counsel, specifically, an assistant public defender in Montgomery County. PCRA counsel raised a number of claims in his PCRA petition, represented appellant at the evidentiary hearing below and, after relief was denied, filed a notice of appeal. PCRA counsel then filed a statement of matters complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), raising four claims to be pursued on appeal. The PCRA court filed an opinion addressing those four claims.
At some point thereafter, present counsel, who are employed by the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Court Division of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, apparently volunteered their services for this state court appeal.1 The appellate brief filed by the federal defender raises twenty separate arguments; obviously, the vast majority of these claims were never raised in the PCRA proceeding below. Appellant’s very first argument consists of an assertion that none of the claims are waived because they were either raised below or, if not, then former PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise them. In addition, even as to the claims that appellant’s former PCRA counsel in fact raised below, appellant now claims that counsel was ineffective to the extent he failed to “adequately” raise and litigate them. Finally, appellant’s nineteenth claim consists of a one paragraph argument that “all prior counsel” were ineffective for failing to “properly investigate and present each of the issues presented in this appeal.” Initial Brief of Appellant at 85. It thus appears that all of appellant’s substantive claims, in fact, are raised through the guise of former PCRA counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.
The majority properly analyzes appellant’s substantive claims as claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 212-13 (2001). I would emphasize in this regard that these claims do not implicate federal constitutional precepts. This is so because *340the right to counsel underlying a claim that PCRA counsel was ineffective does not derive from or implicate the Sixth Amendment, there being no federal right to counsel upon state collateral review. Instead, that right to counsel arises from the Pennsylvania. Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Pa. R.Crim. P. 904 (formerly Rule 1504), which we have held to confer an enforceable right to the effective assistance of PCRA counsel. Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780, 787 (2000); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 699-700 (1998). In light of the Rules-based conferral of a right to PCRA counsel, this Court has not decided whether there is a state constitutional right to counsel upon PCRA review. Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 699 & n. 6; Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 552 Pa. 364, 715 A.2d 420, 421-22 (1998).
In evaluating appellant’s state law claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness, the majority cites to the settled Pennsylvania three-prong test for counsel ineffectiveness. The majority then examines each of the underlying claims and, because it determines those claims to be lacking in merit, summarily concludes that PCRA counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue the meritless claim at all, or-failing to pursue it differently. I agree that the majority’s legal conclusions in this regard are correct, since counsel, including PCRA counsel, cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 538 Pa. 455, 649 A.2d 121, 128 (1994), cert. denied, Peterkin v. Pennsylvania, 515 U.S. 1137, 115 S.Ct. 2569, 132 L.Ed.2d 821 (1995); Commonwealth v. Tarver, 491 Pa. 253, 420 A.2d 438, 438 (1980).
By focusing on the lack of merit in the underlying claims, the majority avoids inquiring into the other prongs of the ineffectiveness test, and also avoids focusing oh the actual performance of former PCRA counsel. It is worth noting, however, that appellant’s claims independently fail on the merits for the further reason that his argument as to PCRA counsel’s actual performance fails to address the presumption that counsel acted reasonably. Instead, appellant’s argument *341respecting PCRA counsel is based upon a per se approach to the ineffectiveness standard: i.e., appellant essentially argues that, because he believes each claim has merit, PCRA counsel was obliged to discover and raise that claim, and counsel was ineffective for not raising it. But appellant makes no proffc1’ as to what investigation PCRA counsel actually undertook, what his client told him, what claims he discovered, considered, and elected not to pursue, etc. Indeed, although appellant attaches a dozen affidavits/declarations to his brief in support of his underlying claims, it is notable that there is no affidavit from PCRA counsel, even though it is PCRA counsel’s performance which is primarily at issue on this appeal. Appellant’s per se approach to ineffectiveness fails to establish that PCRA counsel acted unreasonably in failing to discover, develop, and raise the claims he is now faulted for failing to pursue in hindsight instead of, or in addition to, the multiple claims that counsel actually pursued below. See Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir.1986) (“Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.”), quoted with approval in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000); Commonwealth v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 536 (Pa.2001) (Castille, J., concurring).
The majority’s focus on the lack of arguable merit in the underlying claims, rather than upon the actual performance of PCRA counsel, is an appropriate, though not a required, manner of deciding this appeal. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that a court is not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any particular order of priority; instead, if a claim fails under any necessary element of the test, the court may proceed to that element first. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n. 14, 120 S.Ct. 746, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 701. I write simply to add that appellant’s claims also fail because he has not demonstrated that PCRA counsel’s failure to pursue these claims lacked a reasonable basis.

. Appellant's briel states that "[u]ndersigned counsel was contacted by [appellant.]'' and that former PCRA counsel then withdrew from the appeal. Initial Brief of Appellant at 4.

. Since, the critical facts were known to Appellant, this claim also could not have been styled as involving after-discovered evidence.