Court Opinion

ID: 9628856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:33:19.629436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:12.609202
License: Public Domain

CAROL M. HANSEN, Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 1 The majority fails to quote 12 O.S. 1991 § 2410. That statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. It provides, in relevant part:
A. ... evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea ...: (Emphasis added).
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2. a plea of nolo contendere;1
¶2 The majority ignores the plain language of this statute and instead relies on the Sixth Circuit’s flawed reasoning in Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138 (6th Cir.1988)(Walker). In my view this reliance is ill-founded. I therefore dissent.
¶ 3 State’s contention before the trial court was that it was entitled to summary judgment because Delong’s “plea of nolo contendere supports the probable cause that existed at the time of the arrest and defeats her claim of ‘false arrest’.”2 The trial court granted summary judgment for State, basing its decision on the legal arguments and reasoning in State’s brief. The court found Delong was estopped by her pleas from asserting in this action that the arresting officer acted without probable cause in her arrest. I find that conclusion to be unsupported by a fair reading of our law.
¶ 4 In its brief, State conceded evidence of a plea of nolo contendere is not generally admissible in a later civil trial against one who entered the plea, citing as authority 12 O.S.1991 § 2410 and 22 O.S.1991 § 513. State argued, however, that such evidence may be used as a defense where the one who entered the plea is the plaintiff, rather than defendant, in a later civil action arising from the same facts. State relied in this argument on the Court of Appeals’ holding in Irwin v. SWO Acquisition Corp., 1992 OK CIV APP 48, 830 P.2d 587.
¶ 5 In Irwin, the Court of Appeals found the plaintiff Irwin had not preserved for appellate review his contention the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his plea of nolo contendere to a larceny of merchandise charge. The Irwin Court nonetheless, in a form of dictum, discussed Irwin’s contention, and in that regard adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Walker.
¶ 6 In Walker, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Rule 410 (FRE 410), Federal Rules of Evidence, which, except for immaterial alterations, is identical to 12 O.S 1991 § 2410. With facts similar to the matter now before this Court, the Sixth Circuit found pleas of nolo contendere to charges of disorderly conduct and reckless driving did *940“estop plaintiffs from ... asserting in federal court that the defendant police officers acted without probable cause” in arresting the plaintiffs. The Walker court held this conclusion was not barred by FRE 410. The court reasoned:
... This case does not present the kind of situation contemplated by Rule 410: the use of a nolo contendere plea against the pleader in a subsequent civil or criminal action in which he is the defendant.... Accordingly, use of the no-contest plea for estoppel purposes is not “against the defendant” within the meaning of Fed. R.Evid. 410. The use would be more accurately characterized as “for” the benefit of the “new” civil defendants, the police officers .... We decline to interpret the rule so as to allow the former defendants to use the plea offensively, in order to obtain damages, after having admitted facts which would indicate no civil liability on the part of the arresting police.
¶7 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Irwin recognized the Walker decision was not binding authority, but, like the majority here, found the Sixth Circuit Court’s reasoning persuasive. While I am not unsympathetic to the Sixth Circuit Court’s underlying rationale — that one should not be allowed to profit from his wrongdoing — I am unpersuaded by its ultimate legal conclusion on this question, a question of statutory construction.
¶ 8 Because § 2410 is clearly unambiguous, the requisite plain language reading can lead to no other conclusion than that § 2410 precludes admission of evidence of a nolo contendere plea for any purpose, even when the one entering the plea is the plaintiff in a later civil action. The majority erroneously interprets § 2410 to give it a meaning which is in conflict with what the statute clearly dictates. This Court may only construe a statute if the intent of the Legislature is not clear. Cox v. Dawson, 1996 OK 11, 911 P.2d 272. In that § 2410 is unambiguous, this Court has no basis to inquire into the Legislative intent, and, more to the point, has no business amending a Legislative enactment because it does not like the result.
¶ 9 I find nothing in a plain meaning reading of § 2410 which leads me to the conclusion the Walker court reached in construing the same language in FRE 410. That language in clear terms bars use of a plea of nob contendere against the defendant who made the plea. If admission of such a plea into evidence acts to block the one who made the plea from proceeding in an action, as the trial court determined here, such evidence is, ipso facto, admitted against the party who made the plea. Whether the evidence is for the adversarial party is of no consequence.
¶ 10 With the exception of the Irwin court, and even though the language of FRE 410 has been widely adopted, I can find no other court that concurs in the interpretation given FRE 410 in Walker. In Levin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 735 F.Supp. 236 (E.D.Mich.1990), the federal district court did follow Walker because it was prece-dentially bound, but in doing so expressly disagreed with the Sixth Circuit Court’s interpretation of FRE 410. In Levin, the plaintiff, who entered a nolo contendere plea to arson, sued for insurance proceeds for the fire damage to his house.
¶ 11 Similar facts were before the Supreme Court of Michigan in Lichon v. American Universal Insurance Co., 435 Mich. 408, 459 N.W.2d 288 (1990). The Supreme Court in Lichon also expressly disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of FRE 410 and declined to follow it. The trial court in Li-chon had ruled Lichon was estopped by his nob contendere plea and conviction from disclaiming responsibility for fires that burned his store. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding Lichon was not estopped, relying in large measure on Michigan’s counterpart to our § 2410.
¶ 12 The Michigan Supreme Court notes a nob contendere plea does not admit guilt, and that its primary purpose is to avoid potential future repercussions which could be caused by an admission of liability, particularly repercussions in potential future civil litigation. The Court further notes, by allowing a criminal defendant to enter a plea that is not admissible against him in a future criminal or civil action, the rules facilitate *941plea bargaining and the concomitant speedy resolution of criminal cases.
¶ 13 The rule construed by the Michigan Supreme Court in Lichon, MRE 410, is substantially the same as FRE 410 prior to its amendment in 1980, and § 2410, prior to its amendment in 1991.3 The Michigan rule provided that evidence of, inter alia, a plea of nolo contendere, was not admissible “in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea”. (Emphasis added). The Lichon Court, noting MRE 410 was based on FRE 410, found its interpretation was supported by the history of the federal rule. In its review of that history, the Michigan Supreme Court also found the advisory committee notes to the 1980 amendment to FRE 410:
... thus make it clear that the original language of FRE 410 was not intended to qualify the admission of a nolo contendere plea upon the type of proceeding in which it is offered, but, rather, on the purpose for which that evidence is offered.
¶ 14 The Michigan Court then concluded that both the pre-amendment and postam-endment versions of FRE 410 were applicable to bar use of a nolo contendere plea regardless of the nature of the proceeding. Having reached that conclusion, the Michigan Supreme Court declined to follow Walker, concluding its holding could lead to illogical results.
¶ 15 As an example, the Lichon Court posited the following possible scenario, [1] the insurer paid the insured, [2] the insured then entered his plea of nolo contendere, and [3] the insurer brought an action for restitution of the policy proceeds, making the insured the defendant. Under Walker, the insurer in this scenario would not be able to use the plea against the insured because he would be a defendant, but that offered use would be indistinguishable from the use the trial court made of Lichon’s plea where he was the plaintiff. The Lichon Court suggests, and I agree, the more logical distinction made in MRE 410, and in § 2410, is one based on the use a party makes of the nolo contendere plea, not on the status of the pleader in a subsequent litigation.
¶ 16 My view of the limits on use of nolo contendere pleas is further supported by 22 O.S.1991 § 513, which sets forth the pleas allowed in our criminal procedure, including:
... Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the court. The legal effect of such plea shall be the same as that of a plea of guilty, but the plea may not he used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution is based_ (Emphasis added).4
¶ 17 Section 513 places an even more restrictive use on nolo contendere pleas than § 2410. In the matter now before this Court, the trial eourt allowed the use of Delong’s plea as an admission that State had probable cause in her arrest. I find that use contrary to the § 513 prohibition on use of a nolo contendere plea against the criminal defendant. Section 513 was amended in 1976 to first recognize the use of nolo contendere pleas in a criminal proceeding. If the Legislature had intended to restrict use of such pleas only where the criminal defendant was also a defendant in a later civil action, it would have been simple to do so. There is no ambiguity regarding what the Legislature intended in either § 2410 or § 513.
¶ 18 If public policy demands that evidence of a nolo contendere plea should be allowed where the criminal defendant becomes a civil plaintiff, that is a matter for our Legislature to determine. I note the Michigan Legislature did amend MRE 410 in 1991, subsequent to the Lichon decision. The amended language comports to the present FRE 410, except MRE 410 allows, to the extent that evidence of a guilty plea would be admissible, evidence of a plea of nolo conten-dere to be admitted in a civil proceeding to support a defense against a claim asserted by the person who entered the plea.
*942¶ 19 Delong does not attempt to use her plea to prove State’s liability. She argues only that the nolo contendere pleas may not be used against her to defeat her claim. I would hold that under our present statutes they may not. The trial court erred in its legal conclusion that Delong admitted the propriety of her arrest when she entered pleas of nolo contendere and that by such pleas she waived any irregularity in her arrest. Evidence of Delong’s pleas is not admissible against her, and may not be used against her as an admission against interest.
¶20 Summary judgment is appropriate only where it appears there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact, and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. First State Bank v. Diamond Plastics, 1995 OK 21, 891 P.2d 1262. Having found the trial court erred in its determination based on the only theory propounded by State, I can find no remaining basis for summary judgment. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

. Prior to amendment of § 2410 in 1991, it provided evidence of nolo contendere pleas was not admissible in any “proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer". (Emphasis added).

. Probable cause is requisite to a valid arrest. Overall v. Dept. of Public Safety, 1995 OK CIV APP 107, 910 P.2d 1087.

. See, note 2.

. Also see, 12 O.S.1991 § 2803(22), (evidence of a final felony conviction is not excluded by the hearsay rule, except where the judgment is entered upon a plea of nolo contendere.)