Court Opinion

ID: 9916316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 18:03:49.965466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:59.176392
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/9/24 P. v. Moreno CA4/1
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D082204

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. RIF105634)
 ALFREDO MORENO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Timothy F. Freer, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
         Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, Andrew Mestman, and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
         Alfredo Moreno appeals from an order denying his request for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, now section 1172.6,
following an evidentiary hearing.1 Moreno asserts the order must be
reversed because the trial court’s findings do not support liability for murder
under the current law, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). It is undisputed that Moreno was not the actual
shooter, but the trial court found that the evidence showed that Moreno must
have known that his co-defendant planned to kill the victim. Among other
assertions, Moreno argues that, because the trial court expressly repudiated
his testimony that he believed they were going to commit a robbery, he could
not be convicted as “a major participant in the underlying felony [who] acted
with reckless indifference to human life” under section 189, subdivision
(e)(1)(3). We agree. And because the trial court did not make sufficient
findings to support any other now-viable theory of murder, we conclude that
the order must be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
           I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    The Underlying Crime and Conviction
      As is often the case in appeals from petitions under section 1172.6, the

facts of the underlying crime were set forth in detail in a prior direct appeal.2
(See People v. Ocegueda (Sept. 18, 2007, E038856) [unpub. opinion].) Because

1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Assembly Bill
No. 200 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10) renumbered section 1170.95 to 1172.6,
effective June 30, 2022. We cite to the current statute herein.

2     Like the trial court, we have reviewed and rely upon the transcripts
from the underlying trial in our own analysis. (See People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292 [“[T]he Legislature has decided trial judges should
not rely on the factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions when
a section [1172.6] petition reaches the stage of a full-fledged evidentiary
hearing.”]; accord, People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 400, fn. 9;
People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 979–980.)

                                        2
the present appeal turns primarily on the alignment between the trial court’s
findings at the conclusion of the section 1172.6, subdivision (d) evidentiary
hearing, and the elements necessary to prove the still-available theories for
accomplice murder liability, we provide only a brief summary of the
underlying crime.
      Moreno was convicted of second-degree murder in April 2003 for his
role in the death of Daniell Alonzo. It is undisputed that Moreno was not the
actual killer, and that any liability was based solely on his role as an
accomplice. The actual killer was Arturo Ocegueda. Moreno first met
Ocegueda sometime around 1990, when Ocegueda began dating Moreno’s
older sister. Ocegueda and Moreno’s sister had two children together before
they eventually separated. Moreno was a child himself at the time, and
Ocegueda would often play with him. Moreno continued to have a
relationship with Ocegueda after the separation and would talk with
Ocegueda when Ocegueda came to the house to visit his children. At the time
of the murder, in June 2002, Moreno was approximately 21 years old and
Ocegueda was approximately 28.
      Ocegueda began dating the victim, Alonzo, in the summer of 2001, but
Alonzo broke up with Ocegueda in May 2002 and asked him to move out of
their shared apartment. Ocegueda made several threats to Alonzo that June.
Despite being concerned by those threats, Alonzo agreed to go with Ocegueda
to look at a car on the evening of the murder because she was having trouble
with hers and needed a new one.
      At around 8:00 p.m. on June 14, 2002, Ocegueda drove Alonzo, in her
own car, to a remote location, under the pretext of looking at the new car, and
shot her twice in the head at close range, causing her death. It is undisputed
that Ocegueda left the scene after the killing and, at some point, Moreno

                                        3
attempted to dispose of Alonzo’s vehicle, but the precise details of Moreno’s
involvement at and around the time of the killing have changed over time.
        The evidence at trial established that Moreno appeared at a cement
plant in the area at around 9:00 p.m. on the night of the murder and asked
an employee to call him a cab. The cab driver was ultimately unable to locate
the cement plant so Moreno returned approximately 20 minutes later and
asked to use the phone again, this time to call his mother. The cement plant
employee noted that Moreno was wearing a jacket over a white T-shirt and
that the T-shirt had what appeared to be a fresh blood stain on the back.
        Alonzo’s body was found in a field near the plant several days later, on
June 17, 2002. The police identified Moreno as the individual who had
appeared at the cement plant on the evening of the murder and arrested him
on September 9, 2002. After being read his rights, Moreno agreed to speak to
the police.
        Moreno initially said that he got stranded by the cement plant when a
girl that he was with got mad and kicked him out of her car. When the
investigator told Moreno that the employee at the cement plant reported
seeing a bloodstain on his clothing, Moreno said that he just happened to see
an abandoned car in the area. He sat down in it, thinking about whether he
should steal it, and quickly realized the seat was wet with blood so he decided
to just walk away. The investigator continued to question Moreno’s story
and, eventually, Moreno said that “a guy” called and asked him to “get this
car . . . and just get rid of it.” The “guy” told Moreno where the car was and
said that it would be open and running, and all he had to do was drive it
away.
        The People charged Moreno and Ocegueda with willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, and further alleged as to each that they committed the

                                         4
murder while lying in wait, within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(15). They were tried together in 2005. At the conclusion of the evidence,
the trial court instructed the jury with the standard instructions for murder,
the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, and on the aiding and
abetting theory of murder liability. Although the People did not charge
either defendant with robbery or conspiracy, the trial court also instructed
the jury that a defendant could be guilty of murder if they were part of a
conspiracy to commit one crime, and the charged crime of murder “was
perpetrated by a co-conspirator in furtherance of that conspiracy and was a
natural and probable consequence of the agreed upon criminal objective of
that conspiracy.”
      During deliberations, the jury expressed confusion as to the definition
of a “conspiracy” and whether they needed to find that the defendants agreed
to commit murder. The court then gave a more complete instruction as to
conspiracy, including that “[a] member of the conspiracy is not only guilty of
the particular crime that to his or her knowledge his or her confederates
agreed to and did commit but also is liable for the natural and probable
consequences of any crime act of any coconspirator to further the object of the
conspiracy, even though that crime act was not intended as a part of the
agreed-upon objective and even though he had or she was not present at the
time of the commission of that crime act.”
      The jury convicted Ocegueda of first-degree murder and found the
lying-in-wait special allegation true as to him. It found Moreno guilty of the
lesser included offense of second-degree murder, and found the lying-in-wait
allegation not true as to him. The trial court sentenced Moreno to 15 years-
to-life in prison.

                                       5
B.    Moreno’s Parole Hearing Testimony
      On September 27, 2016, Moreno testified at a parole eligibility hearing.
Moreno said that he met Ocegueda when he was about 11 years old. They
would hang out and play basketball together when Moreno was younger, but
after Ocegueda and Moreno’s sister broke up, Moreno would only see
Ocegueda about once a week. Moreno knew that Ocegueda was a drug
dealer, and “every so often,” Ocegueda would give him drugs to sell.
      On the night of the murder, Ocegueda stopped by Moreno’s mother’s
house and “start[ed] telling [Moreno] a story about a woman that he sold
drugs with who set him up to be robbed. [Ocegueda] said he wanted to get
her back. If [Moreno] would help him to get rid of her car.” Moreno testified
that he thought “get her back” meant that Ocegueda wanted to rob her, like
she had done to him. Moreno explained that he “looked up to” Ocegueda and
did not ask many questions. Moreno got in the car with Ocegueda and
Ocegueda took him to a neighborhood where he said he wanted Moreno to be
and told him that he would call him later.
      Later, Ocegueda called Moreno and told him to go to Ocegueda’s house.
When Moreno got to Ocegueda’s house, Alonzo pulled up and Ocegueda got in
her car. Moreno followed in his own car to a dirt road. Ocegueda showed
Moreno where to park, down a side road. Moreno got out of his car and
started walking towards Alonzo’s car. As he was walking, Moreno saw two
gun flashes and heard two gunshots. When he got to Alonzo’s car, Ocegueda
was pulling Alonzo out of the car. Moreno was in shock. Ocegueda told
Moreno to give him the keys to his car and Moreno did. Ocegueda then told
Moreno to get rid of the car. Moreno jumped in the car and drove down the
road, but he got lost and got the car stuck. That is when he walked to the
cement plant to use the phone.

                                      6
      Moreno was unable to get a ride, so he walked into town and called his
house again from a payphone. Ocegueda was at his house by then and came
to pick him up. Ocegueda was upset that Moreno got the car stuck, and
Moreno was upset that Ocegueda involved him in a murder. He did not call
the police because he was a criminal and also in a gang.
      The parole board denied Moreno’s request for parole, and set the next
parole suitability hearing in five years.
C.    Moreno’s Petition for Resentencing
      In March 2021, Moreno filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. He alleged that he was convicted of second degree murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory and that he could not now
be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes made to
sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. The People stipulated that
Moreno had made a prima facie showing and the trial court issued an order
to show cause why Moreno should not be sentenced and set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
      In pre-hearing briefing, the People asserted Moreno’s petition should be
denied because Moreno remained guilty of murder under current section 189,
subdivision (e)(3) as a major participant in the robbery with reckless
indifference to Alonzo’s life. They argued that Moreno helped plan the
robbery, which involved luring Alonzo to an isolated area at night and that he
did a “dry run” with Ocegueda. The People conceded there was no direct
evidence that Moreno knew that Ocegueda had a gun, but asserted there was
circumstantial evidence to support such an inference since Moreno knew that
Ocegueda was a drug dealer, that he wanted to “get back” at Alonzo for
ripping him off, and that drug dealers often resort to violence. Thus, the
People asserted, Moreno knew the robbery plan posed a danger to Alonzo.

                                        7
Finally, they asserted that Moreno did nothing to stop Ocegueda from going
through with the plan and nothing to aid Alonzo after the shooting. The
People did not assert that Moreno directly aided and abetted the murder.
      In response, Moreno asserted that his statements at his parole hearing
should be excluded as unreliable and that the evidence in the record of
conviction was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a
major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to

human life.3 He asserted that his mere agreement to participate in the crime
by getting rid of the car was not sufficient to establish that he was a major
participant, and that there was no evidence he knew that Ocegueda had a
gun or a propensity for violence. Moreno argued further that he was not in
the vehicle when the shooting occurred, that the victim was already deceased
when he arrived on the scene, and that he had no real means to intervene to
prevent the shooting or to render aid to Alonzo after it had occurred.
      Neither party presented any additional testimony or evidence—beyond
the record from the original trial and the transcript from the 2016 parole
hearing—at the evidentiary hearing. After hearing additional argument
from both sides, the trial court denied the petition. The trial court stated its
reasoning on the record. It explained, in relevant part:
      “The Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant
      acted with reckless indifference to the victim, [Alonzo].

      “The Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt he was not
      only acting with reckless indifference with respect to the
      decedent’s life, but he also was a major participant.

3     As we discuss in more detail, post, the trial court did consider Moreno’s
statements to the parole board at the evidentiary hearing and Moreno does
not raise the issue on appeal.

                                        8
      “The Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that while the
      Defendant Moreno may not have originated the plan or
      formulated the plan or had the primary motive with respect to
      the killing of [Alonzo], that he willingly participated in the
      murder of [Alonzo].”

The trial court continued:

      “The Court does not think it is likely or reasonable for individuals
      who have some criminal background and some criminal history,
      that the way to get back at another individual would be to
      commit a robbery where they can both—one or both be identified,
      and the item, the physical item of the robbery, would in fact be
      subsequently identified.

      “If the motive for killing [Alonzo] was because she set up
      [Ocegueda], it would not be logical for any person—it doesn’t
      require a great deal of education to infer that ‘get back’ means to
      kill, because if it was to commit a robbery, that makes no sense.
      That puts them in a vulnerable position that [Alonzo] could call
      law enforcement, could call individuals, call her confederates to
      identify [Ocegueda] or Defendant Moreno. That makes no sense
      to the Court.

      “The only alternative, and logical alternative, was, after being set
      up, [Ocegueda], needing assistance to dispose of a vehicle, would
      logically need assistance, and that would be coming from
      someone that he could trust. One typically does not commit the
      crime of murder, does not execute another individual without
      having another trusted individual nearby.

      “[¶] . . . [¶]

      “So it makes no sense to the Court that [Ocegueda] and
      Defendant Moreno would be talking and inferring that ‘get back’
      at somebody who set [Ocegueda] up would logically be that they
      were talking about getting back by committing a robbery.”

(Italics added.)

      After reciting extensively from the transcript of Moreno’s parole board
hearing, the trial court concluded: “In this particular case, after a thorough

                                       9
review of all the applicable case law and the evidence that was provided
before it, this Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt [Moreno] was a
major participant in the murder of [Alonzo] and the act of [sic] reckless
indifference to her life.” (Italics added.)
      Moreno filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                II.    DISCUSSION
      Although he approaches it in several different ways, Moreno’s primary
argument on appeal is that the trial court’s factual findings do not support a
conviction under the current state of the law. Accordingly, he asserts that
the trial court erred by denying his request for resentencing under section
1172.6 and the order must be reversed.
A.    Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
      In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1427 and “made significant
changes to the scope of murder liability for those who were neither the actual
killers nor intended to kill anyone, including certain individuals formerly
subject to punishment on a felony-murder theory.” (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707 (Strong).) “Senate Bill 1437 significantly limited the
scope of the felony-murder rule to effectuate the Legislature’s declared intent
‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant
in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
(Strong, at pp. 707–708.)
      More specifically, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 189 to add
subdivision (e), which provides:
         “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
         of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is
         liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:

         “(1) The person was the actual killer.

                                         10
         “(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent
         to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
         solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
         commission of murder in the first degree.

         “(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
         felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
         described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”

      In addition, “Senate Bill 1437 imposed a new requirement that, except
in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) ‘Malice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’
(Ibid.) One effect of this requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as
an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449 (Curiel).) Thus, as the law now
stands, “[o]utside of the felony-murder rule, ‘a conviction for murder requires
that a person act with malice aforethought. A person’s culpability for murder
must be premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.’ ”
(Id. at p. 448.)
      Senate Bill 1437 also enacted current section 1172.6, which permits
defendants “convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” to
file a petition requesting that their conviction be vacated on the grounds that
they “could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) If the defendant makes the requisite prima facie
showing, the trial court shall issue an order to show cause why the relief
should not be granted and shall hold an evidentiary hearing to determine

                                       11
whether to vacate the conviction at issue and resentence the defendant on
any remaining counts. (Id., subds. (c), (d)(1).)
      At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. The admission
of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except
that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court
may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in any prior
appellate opinion. . . . The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new
or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens. A finding that there
is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the prosecution fails to sustain its
burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements
attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
      Where, as here, the trial court finds that the prosecution has met its
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant could have
been convicted under the current law, we review the trial court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence and review the court’s application of those
facts de novo. (People v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1017 ; People v.
Wilson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 903, 916.) We review the record in the light
most favorable to the judgment, and consider whether there is sufficient
evidence of reasonable, credible, and solid value from which a reasonable

                                        12
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Henley, supra, at p. 1017.) However, to the extent that our analysis turns on
the application of the facts as found by the trial court to the law, our review is
de novo. (Ibid.; Wilson, supra, at p. 916.) Thus, “where there is an issue as to
whether the trial court misunderstood the elements of the applicable offense,
the case presents a question of law which we review independently.” (People
v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
B.    The Trial Court’s Factual Findings Do Not Support an
      Available Theory of Murder

      There is no dispute here that Moreno was not the actual perpetrator, or
that it was Ocegueda that shot the victim, causing her death. Thus, Moreno
cannot be convicted as the actual killer and, under section 188, subdivision
(a)(3), as amended by Senate Bill 1437, malice cannot be imputed to Moreno
based solely on his participation in the crime. That leaves three remaining
theories under which Moreno’s conviction can be maintained. To meet their
burden under 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), the prosecution had to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt either that Moreno was guilty as a major participant in
an underlying felony that acted with reckless indifference to human life; that
he was guilty as a direct perpetrator of implied malice murder; or that he
directly aided and abetted the murder with a shared intent to kill. (See
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449; Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 987–988;
§ 189, subds. (e)(2), (3).)
      1.     The Trial Court’s Finding That Moreno Knew That
             Ocegueda Intended to Murder Alonzo Precludes a Felony
             Murder Theory of Liability

      The prosecution pursued the first theory and argued that Moreno was a
major participant in the robbery that acted with reckless indifference to
human life. At the hearing, the prosecutor explained: “I believe the Court

                                       13
understands the People’s position as it relates to the evidence in this case as
we sit here for this hearing. Specifically, that Mr. Moreno essentially has
admitted everything the Court needs in order to find that he was a major
participant in a robbery and acted with reckless indifference to [Alonzo’s]
life.”
         However, as Moreno correctly points out, the trial court’s findings do
not support a finding of guilty under the felony-murder theory of accomplice
liability. This is because the trial court expressly repudiated Moreno’s
testimony that he believed that Ocegueda intended to commit robbery. The
trial court repeatedly stated that it made “no sense” that Moreno would infer
that Ocegueda intended to commit a robbery to “get back” at Alonzo. Rather,
the court found that the only “logical alternative” was that Ocegueda needed
“assistance to dispose of a vehicle” after committing an execution style
murder.
         Like most crimes, the crime of robbery requires the “union of act and
either wrongful intent or criminal negligence.” (People v. Anderson (2011) 51
Cal.4th 989, 994.) “The intent required for robbery has been described as the
specific intent to deprive the victim of the property permanently.” (Ibid.)
“Thus, ‘the act of force or intimidation by which the taking is accomplished in
robbery must be motivated by the intent to steal.’ ” (Ibid.) An individual
that commits a murder with the intent to steal is guilty of robbery, but where
the perpetrator intends to kill the victim and the taking of property is merely
incidental to the killing, the crime of robbery has not been committed. (See
People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34–35 [overturning a robbery
conviction where the defendant did not murder the victim for the purpose of
obtaining the stolen item].)

                                         14
      Here, the trial court found made no findings establishing that either
Ocegueda or Moreno intended to commit a robbery, or that they did so by
killing Alonzo. Rather, the court found “beyond a reasonable doubt [that
Moreno] was a major participant in the murder of [Alonzo] and the act of [sic]
reckless indifference to her life.” Murder is not an enumerated underlying
felony for felony murder. And without an underlying felony, Moreno could
not be liable for murder based on a felony-murder theory.
      2.    The Trial Court Did Not Make Adequate Findings as to Any
            Other Still Valid Theory of Liability

      The conclusion that the trial court’s findings do not support a felony
murder theory of murder liability does not end our inquiry. The trial court
also found, albeit in summary fashion, that Moreno “willingly participated in
the murder of [Alonzo].” Accordingly, we consider whether the trial court’s
findings are sufficient to support a conviction under either an implied malice
murder theory or a direct aiding and abetting theory. We conclude that they
are not, primarily because the trial court did not make the requisite findings,
either express or implied, under either theory.
      As our high court recently explained, “[m]urder is committed with
implied malice when ‘the killing is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the
natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers
the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ”
[Citation.] “ ‘ “To be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the
defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the
result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical.” ’ ” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 988.)
      The trial court’s findings do not support an implied malice theory of
murder liability as to Moreno. The trial court made no specific findings as to

                                        15
any act undertaken by Moreno, and the evidence established only that he
followed Ocegueda to a remote area and attempted to dispose of Alonzo’s car
after the murder occurred. There is no evidence, or finding, that Moreno
“precipitated or provoked the shooting,” that his act of following Ocegueda or
disposing of the car was a proximate cause or substantial contributing factor
to Alonzo’s death, or that the murder would not have occurred if Moreno had
not agreed to do the same. (See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.) To the
contrary, there was at least some evidence that Ocegueda had already asked
at least one other individual to assist him, and thus, it is entirely feasible
that he would have simply asked someone else if Moreno had refused.
Regardless, there is no suggestion in the record before us that the trial court
expressly considered this theory of liability.
      Finally, we consider whether the trial court made adequate findings to
support the conviction under a theory of aiding and abetting. “ ‘[D]irect
aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the participants
and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea.’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 990–991.) “[A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime [in this
case, murder] when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice
that aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.”
(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 295–296, italics added.)
Thus, as the People acknowledge, liability for an accomplice under an aiding
and abetting theory requires both knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s
unlawful intent and an intent to assist the perpetrator in achieving his or her
unlawful purpose. (See Ibid.; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843.)

                                        16
      “ ‘In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the
perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider
and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the
commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied
malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid
the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The
mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor,
is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid
the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is
dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.”
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991 (italics omitted), quoting People v. Powell
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 712–713.) This theory differs from the now
defunct natural and probable consequences theory because the latter “did not
require that the aider and abettor intend to aid the perpetrator in committing
a life-endangering act.” (Reyes, at p. 991.)
      “[A]ssuming the life-endangering act was the shooting, the trial court
should have asked whether [Moreno] knew that [Ocegueda] intended to shoot
at the victim, intended to aid him in the shooting, knew that the shooting
was dangerous to life, and acted in conscious disregard for life.” (Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992.)
      The trial court did not ask those question or make those findings here.
Although its finding that Moreno “willingly participated in the murder of
[Alonzo]” does at least suggest that he may have had been culpable under
such a theory, the trial court did not go so far as to make the requisite
findings as to Moreno’s mens reus or actus reus. Rather, the court made
findings that Moreno was an active participant that acted with reckless
indifference to human life, consistent with the robbery felony murder theory

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of liability that the People relied upon. The People now assert, somewhat
summarily, that substantial evidence supports “that [Moreno] knew
Ocegueda intended to kill the victim, [Moreno] intended to assist Ocegueda,
and then [Moreno] took action to promote that end,” but they did not argue
that position below, and they do not point to any findings by the trial court
establishing the same.
      Because it is “ ‘uncertain whether the trial court would have reached
the same result using correct legal standards,’ ” we conclude that it is
appropriate to remand the matter for a new hearing to determine whether
the prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty
under any of these alternative permissible theories. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th

at p. 992; People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 391.)4

4      The parties disagree as to whether the trial court could have found
Moreno guilty under a first-degree murder theory of liability, given that the
jury found him guilty of only the lesser included offense of second-degree
murder. Because we find that the trial court’s findings do not support a
conviction under any theory, we need not and expressly do not address this
issue in the present appeal.

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                             III.   DISPOSITION
      The order denying Moreno’s petition for resentencing under section
1172.6 is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with
instructions to vacate the prior order denying the petition for resentencing
and conduct a new hearing consistent with this opinion.

                                                                   KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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