Court Opinion

ID: 9390550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 19:03:06.802608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.358139
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/27/23 Romero v. Los Angeles Rams CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

ENRIQUE ROMERO et al.,                                              B310152

         Plaintiffs and Appellants,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct. No. 18STCV00679)
         v.

LOS ANGELES RAMS et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David J. Cowan, Judge. Affirmed.

       Blair & Ramirez, Oscar Ramirez, Matthew P. Blair and
Kirill Lavinski for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Robert P. Wargo,
Jeffrey M. Lenkov and Steven J. Renick for Defendant and
Respondent Los Angeles Rams.

      Murchison & Cumming, Gina E. Och; Skane Mills and
Heather L. Mills for Defendant and Respondent Contemporary
Services Corporation.

                               _________________________
       Appellant Enrique Romero was injured by fellow fans at
the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (Coliseum) near the end of a
Los Angeles Rams football game. Enrique, his wife and two
daughters (appellants) brought this action against Contemporary
Services Corporation (CSC), the Los Angeles Rams (Rams) and
the University of Southern California (USC), alleging causes of
action for negligence, premises liability and related ancillary
torts. All three defendants obtained summary judgment in their
favor. This appeal involves two of the defendants: CSC and the
Rams.1 CSC is an entity hired to provide crowd management
services at the Coliseum during certain events, including Rams
football games. In granting CSC’s and the Rams’ motions for
summary judgment, the trial court assumed that both defendants
had a duty to protect Enrique and his family and had failed to
take the ameliorative steps proposed by appellants.
Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment on the
ground that these failures, as a matter of law, were not the cause
of the assault.
       Appellants appeal, contending the trial court erred in
finding they had failed to create triable issues of fact concerning
causation. We affirm the judgment.

1      The record in this case reveals that USC filed its motion at
the same time as CSC and the Rams, but that motion was denied
without prejudice on the ground of defective service. We take
judicial notice of the record in case No. B313461, also before this
court on appeal; that record shows that USC subsequently refiled
its motion, which was granted by a different trial court on a
different ground.

                                 2
                        BACKGROUND
       For the 2017–2018 season, the Rams played their home
games at the Coliseum, pursuant to an agreement with USC. For
purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the Rams
conceded they had a duty to protect the fans in the Coliseum.
       Some of the security at the Rams games was provided by
off-duty Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers and Apex
Security Group, Inc. (APEX) security personnel. Some LAPD
officers were hired directly by USC, and others by the Rams.
APEX is a subsidiary of CSC, but the record does not show what
control, if any, CSC had over the deployment of APEX personnel.
       CSC’s contract with USC called for CSC to provide crowd
management services at the Coliseum, and the Rams were
required to use CSC for this purpose. CSC divided its staff into
two categories: event staff and security staff. Event staff are not
authorized to perform any security functions. Security staff are
required to have a security guard card. They perform some
security functions such as gate searches. CSC told both its event
staff and its security staff not to intervene in any verbal or
physical altercations involving fans. Their role was to observe
and, if necessary, refer those matters to LAPD and APEX.
       Kevin Daly, USC’s event manager for Rams’ games,
explained USC’s expectations of the various security providers.
He testified USC expected LAPD to become involved when
someone was breaking the law. In the event of a fight, USC
instructed CSC “to not get hurt and to be the best witness they
can be to a situation. But we do not ask them to intervene where
they might be harmed or suffer injury.” The parties do not
discuss APEX’S role in any detail on appeal, but it appears APEX

                                3
personnel were authorized to intervene in some altercations and
to eject fans from the Coliseum.
       LAPD officers, APEX personnel, and CSC event and
security staff were present inside and outside the Coliseum for
the January 6, 2018, play-off game which Enrique attended with
his wife Karina and his two daughters Alannah and Yasmine.
       Near the end of the game, Enrique and Yasmine walked
from their assigned seats to the section of the Coliseum where
family members of the Rams players were seated (Family
section).2 This section was closer to the field, and Yasmine
wanted to take photographs of the players and greet them. The
only CSC staff assigned to this seating area were two event staff
employees, who were essentially ushers.
       At about this same time, CSC supervisor James Mayhan
was informed by a Rams employee that there was “an issue” in
the Family section near the Romeros. Mayhan went to the
Family section, where another CSC supervisor was already
present. Mayhan observed overcrowding in the aisle and asked
the Romeros and others to return to their seats. The Romeros did
not move out of the aisle and return to their seats. At this point,
a verbal altercation developed between Enrique and some of the
Rams family members.3 Mayhan positioned himself between
Enrique and the row of family members and explained to Enrique

2    There is contradictory evidence about exactly when
Enrique and his daughter went to the Family seating section.
We discuss this in more detail in section D.4, post.
3     Mayhan did not describe an ongoing verbal altercation
when he arrived, but his testimony did not rule out that a verbal
altercation started before he arrived.

                                4
that he, Mayhan, needed to escort the family members out of the
section.
       Enrique and his daughter began to walk up the aisle.
Mayhan moved to allow the family members out of their row, and
they began to walk up the aisle as well, with Mayhan behind one
or more of the family members.4 The verbal altercation
continued as Enrique and the Rams family members walked up
the aisle.
       At some point, Enrique walked into a row of seats and
stood about four to five seats into the row. As the Rams family
members walked by Enrique, he waved good-bye to a specific
female family member with whom he had been having the verbal
altercation. Mayhan heard someone say the word “bitch.” The
female family member turned and ran into the row where
Enrique was standing and slapped him. Mayhan began
scrambling to get between the woman and Enrique and was able
to get over a seat and position himself between the two. Mayhan
was immediately hit in the back of the head and knocked to the
ground for about five to seven seconds. When Mayhan stood up,
he saw that Enrique had a gash over his eye.
       Although there had been crowding in the Family section at
the end of previous games, this was the first known fight in that
area.
       Enrique’s gash required stitches and he was advised to
have a titanium plate implanted in the area next to his eye socket
to prevent further/future damage to his eye. He testified at his
deposition that he did have such a plate.

4   According to Enrique, Mayhan was in front of all the family
members.

                                5
      Appellants initially brought this claim against the Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission, the City of Los Angeles,
the County of Los Angeles, the State of California, and an
individual named Jada Woolfolk, as well as CSC, the Rams and
USC. Appellants subsequently dismissed the governmental
defendants and Woolfolk.
                         DISCUSSION
       “ ‘On review of an order granting or denying summary
judgment, we examine the facts presented to the trial court and
determine their effect as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] We review
the entire record, ‘considering all the evidence set forth in the
moving and opposition papers except that to which objections
have been made and sustained.’ [Citation.] Evidence presented
in opposition to summary judgment is liberally construed, with
any doubts about the evidence resolved in favor of the party
opposing the motion.” (Regents of University of California v.
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 (Regents).) We consider
evidentiary facts, not conclusions or “ultimate” facts. (See, e.g.
Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
      Summary judgment is appropriate only where no triable
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. A defendant seeking summary
judgment must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least
one element of the cause of action. (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 618.) The elements of a negligence cause of action are 1) the
existence of a duty, 2) a breach of that duty, 3) injury to the
plaintiff caused by the defendant’s breach, and 4) actual
damages. (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.)

                                6
A.     Trial court proceedings
       The trial court granted CSC’s and the Rams’ motions on the
ground that appellants could not show causation. Causation is
ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be resolved by
summary judgment. Causation may be decided as a question of
law if under the undisputed facts, “there is no room for a
reasonable difference of opinion.” (Nichols v. Keller (1993)
15 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1687.)
       CSC moved for summary judgment on two grounds: it had
no duty to protect appellants and appellants were unable to prove
that it was more probable than not that the additional security
precautions they proposed would have prevented the attack. The
trial court summarized appellants’ arguments in opposition to
CSC’s motion for summary judgment as 1) CSC had a duty to
protect them from the criminal acts of third parties, and 2) CSC
“was negligent in providing inadequate security personnel in
terms of numbers, training and equipment (specifically
communications equipment).”
       Appellants contended CSC should have taken these
specific measures: (1) authorize staff members in the seating
bowl to enforce the Fan Code of Conduct, including ejection of
fans; (2) provide radios to CSC employees deployed in the lower
bowl; (3) provide radios capable of direct communication with
LAPD or APEX to CSC employees deployed in the seating bowl;
(4) inform CSC employees deployed in the seating bowl about
LAPD and APEX deployments; (5) timely call LAPD and/or APEX
to the verbal altercation involving Mr. Romero; and (6) keep Mr.
Romero and his assailants physically separated until LAPD
and/or APEX arrived on scene.

                               7
       The trial court recognized that, in contrast to CSC, the
Rams conceded for purposes of summary judgment that they had
“some” duty to provide security at the Coliseum during games.
They contended, however, that in the absence of prior incidents
in the Family section, they had no duty to provide additional
security personnel in that section.
       Appellants contended that overcrowding in the Family
section made an altercation there foreseeable. Appellants also
contended the Rams should have: (1) provided enough LAPD
officers in the seating bowl to “maintain order, deter violent
fights among the massive crowd of attendees, ensure the safety of
attendees and discourage overconsumption of alcohol”;
(2) implemented “adequate security measures”; (3) ensured that
security personnel in the seating bowl were aware of LAPD and
APEX deployments; (4) ensured that CSC staff members could
directly communicate with LAPD and/or APEX; and (5) provided
additional security personnel to the Family section in light of
prior complaints.
       The trial court separately analyzed each defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, but for both motions stated it
would assume for the sake of the motion that the defendant
should have taken the measures identified by appellants, and
had failed to do so. The trial court then granted both motions,
finding appellants did not show that CSC’s and the Rams’ failure
to take ameliorative steps was a substantial factor in causing the
assault.

B.    Duty
      On appeal, appellants argue CSC and the Rams had a duty
to take reasonable steps to protect them against the foreseeable
criminal acts of third parties. Like the trial court, we will

                                8
assume both CSC and the Rams had such a duty. The scope of
that duty to protect is a question of law for the court. (Castaneda
v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1214 (Olsher).)
        The duty analysis developed by the California Supreme
Court “requires the court in each case (whether trial or appellate)
to identify the specific action or actions the plaintiff claims the
defendant had a duty to undertake. . . . ‘This frames the issue for
the court’s determination by defining the scope of the duty under
consideration.’ ” (Olsher, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) Only
after the scope of the duty under consideration is defined may a
court meaningfully undertake the balancing analysis of the risks
and burdens present in a given case to determine whether the
specific obligations should or should not be imposed on the
landlord. (Ibid.)
        Here the trial court largely accepted the ameliorative steps
proposed by appellants, with two exceptions. The trial court
found no evidence that CSC could control the deployment of
APEX or LAPD personnel and no evidence that the Rams could
control or increase the number of LAPD personnel. Thus, the
court declined to impose the duty identified in the ameliorative
steps related to the number and deployment of LAPD and APEX
personnel. The accepted steps then defined the scope of CSC’s
and the Rams’ duty.
        On appeal, appellants do not contend the trial court erred
in modifying the scope of CSC’s and the Rams’ duty to exclude
ameliorative measures related to LAPD and APEX. In discussing
ameliorative measures on appeal, however, appellants omit the
list of measures they identified in opposition to the Rams’ motion.
They attempt to aggregate CSC and the Rams, contending they
identified six ameliorative measures “respondents” should have

                                 9
taken to prevent Enrique’s injuries. These measures were
“(1) providing staff members in the seating bowl that were
authorized to enforce the Fan Code of Conduct, including the
ejection of fans; (2) providing CSC employees deployed in the
lower bowl with radios; (3) providing CSC employees deployed in
the seating bowl with radios capable of direct communication
with LAPD or [APEX]; (4) providing CSC employees in the
seating bowl with information about LAPD and/or [APEX]
deployments; (5) timely escalating the verbal altercation
involving Mr. Romero to LAPD and/or [APEX]; and (6) keeping
Mr. Romero and the Assailants physically separated until LAPD
and/or [APEX] arrived on-scene.” As the record citation reveals,
these are the steps appellants identified in opposition to CSC’s
motion for summary judgment.
       In the trial court, as discussed above, appellants identified
a somewhat different set of measures which they claimed the
Rams should have taken.5 Appellants do not repeat their
contention that the Rams should have taken these previously
identified measures, but do argue that the Rams “owed the
Romeros a nondelegable duty to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition. [Citation.] The Rams cannot,
therefore, escape liability for the negligent handling of the
incident by CSC staff, who failed to take a number of reasonable

5     There is some overlap with the CSC measures. Appellants
contended the Rams should have “ensured” that security
personnel in the seating bowl were aware of LAPD and APEX
deployments; and that CSC staff members could directly
communicate with LAPD and/or APEX. They also contended,
vaguely, that the Rams should have provided “additional security
personnel to the Family [s]ection in light of prior complaints."

                                 10
ameliorative measures discussed below.” We will assume solely
for purposes of this appeal that the Rams would be liable for
CSC’s negligence. We will treat appellants’ omission on appeal of
the ameliorative measures they identified for the Rams in the
trial court as a concession that there were no ameliorative
measures which the Rams should have taken to prevent
Enrique’s injuries.
       We note that well after specifying and discussing the
ameliorative measures which they claim CSC should have taken,
and under a heading indicating its subject was breach of duty,
appellants contend “triable issues of fact exist as to whether,
among other things, Respondents failed to properly coordinate
security responsibilities between the Rams, USC, CSC, [APEX],
and LAPD; whether they failed to properly train and authorize
CSC employees to handle fan altercations; and whether CSC’s
employees were negligent in failing to keep the Assailants
physically separated from the Romeros.” This Columbo-like
briefing of adding “just one more thing” is not a helpful way for
appellants to structure their arguments; nor is indirectly
identifying additional ameliorative steps by negative implication
in a list of breaches rather than in the list of duties. Further,
appellants may not propose new ameliorative steps for the first
time on appeal.
       Turning to the substance of these failures, only physical
separation is clearly included in appellant’s list of ameliorative
measures. In the trial court, appellants used the phrase
“coordinate security” to refer to steps 2 through 5 collectively, and
we will treat it as having the same meaning on appeal. We will
similarly treat the failure to train claim as equivalent to the

                                 11
ameliorative measure previously identified in the trial court as
providing personnel trained to enforce the Code of Conduct.

C.    Breach
      The trial court assumed for purposes of the summary
judgment motion that CSC had a duty to take the suggested
ameliorative measures, and that CSC had failed to do so. We will
do the same.

D.     Causation
       Having assumed duty and breach, the trial court decided
the summary judgment motion on the basis of no causation. The
trial court found that none of the breaches were a substantial
factor in causing Enrique’s injuries, specifically that it was not
more probable than not that the ameliorative measures proposed
by appellants would have prevented the attack.
       Appellants contend that the trial court applied the wrong
standard for causation. They acknowledge they were required to
show that CSC’s acts or omissions were a “substantial factor” in
causing Enrique’s injury. They contend the substantial factor
standard “is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the
contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or
theoretical.” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th
953, 978 (Rutherford).) According to appellants, “a very minor
force that does cause harm is a substantial factor.” (Bockrath v.
31 Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 79.)
       While these quotes are accurate, they are taken out of
context. Both cases are discussing comparative negligence in
product liability cases where multiple defendants have
manufactured the defective product. In this context, the
contribution of an individual defendant’s product to the plaintiff’s

                                12
injury need only be “more than negligible or theoretical” for the
defendant to be liable. (Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 978.)
This standard applies once there is proof that the product caused
the plaintiff’s injury and looks at an individual defendant’s share
of liability. To show that the product caused the injury, “the
standard of proof” ordinarily required is “ ‘a reasonable medical
probability based upon competent expert testimony that the
defendant's conduct contributed to [the] plaintiff's injury.’ ”
(Id. at p. 976, fn. 11.)
       As the California Supreme Court has put in a non-medical
context: “ ‘On the issue of the fact of causation, as on other issues
essential to the cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff, in
general, has the burden of proof. The plaintiff must introduce
evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that
it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a
cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is
not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure
speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly
balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for
the defendant.’ ” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200,
1205–1206.) More specifically, in a case like the one before us,
the plaintiff is required “to prove it was ‘more probable than not’
that additional security precautions would have prevented the
attack.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th
763, 776 (Saelzler).)

      1.    Train CSC staff to enforce Fan Code of Conduct
      Appellants contend that CSC should have provided staff in
the seating area who were trained to enforce the Fan Code of

                                 13
Conduct including ejecting fans.6 This is in effect a claim that
CSC should have provided additional security personnel. As the
trial court correctly noted, the bare claim that more security
personnel could have prevented a criminal attack shows only
“abstract negligence.” (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
There must be direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the
assailant took advantage of the defendant’s lapse or omission “in
the course of committing his attack, and that the omission was a
substantial factor in causing the injury.” (Id. at p. 779.) When
the claimed lapse or omission is insufficient security personnel,
this can be a difficult burden to meet because “ ‘[n]o one can
reasonably contend that even a significant increase in police
personnel will prevent all crime or any particular crime.’ ” (Id. at
p. 777 quoting Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. (1985)
168 Cal.App.3d 912, 918.) “[A]ssaults and other crimes can occur
despite the maintenance of the highest level of security.”
(Saelzler, at p. 777.)
       On appeal, appellants contend that if security personnel
who were authorized to eject fans pursuant to the Code of
Conduct had been present in the seating area, they could have
ejected the family members, and perhaps Enrique himself, while
the altercation was still verbal, and before it escalated to physical

6      We note appellants claim this would not necessarily require
more security personnel, just better training of the existing CSC
staff assigned to the seating area and so the burden would be
minimal. The burden of a measure is relevant to the scope of
duty, not causation. (See Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th
1205, 1214.) We note, however, that appellants have not
provided evidence showing that the burden of such training
would be minimal. We strongly question whether it would be.

                                 14
assault. Put differently, appellants are contending that the
family members took advantage of CSC’s failure to eject them,
and that this failure was a substantial factor in Enrique’s injury.
This does not appear to be an argument which was developed in
the trial court. The record shows, however, that Mayhan began
the process of removing Enrique and the family members from
the family seating area while the altercation was still verbal.
       Mayhan directed Enrique to clear the aisle in the family
seating area, and it is undisputed that Enrique began walking up
the aisle. Mayhan then began to walk up the aisle with the
female family member and her companions. Although neither of
these actions were a formal “ejection,” they would have
accomplished the same result as an ejection: the departure of the
female family member from the Coliseum and Enrique from the
seating area before the verbal altercation had become physical.7
Thus, CSC was doing what appellants contend it should have
done to prevent an assault, but the assault still occurred. It is
hard to imagine a clearer example of no causation. There is no
room for a reasonable difference of opinion here.

7      The family members’ departure had many of the hallmarks
of a formal ejection. Mayhan stated he tried to “guide” and
“direct” the female family member. Enrique described the female
family member’s departure as being “escorted out by security.”
and agreed with the characterization that she “broke apart from
the security guard” and ran into the row to slap him. Appellants
have not shown that a formal ejection of an apparently compliant
fan should have been conducted differently, apart perhaps from
their claim that common sense required physical separation,
which we discuss separately.

                                15
       2.    Maintain physical separation
       On appeal, appellants repeat the ameliorative measure of
“keeping Mr. Romero and the Assailants physically separated
until LAPD and/or [APEX] arrived on-scene.” Generally, in the
trial court, when appellants discussed physical separation, they
were referring to CSC personnel positioning themselves in
between the parties. When they discuss this measure on appeal,
however, they also contend that CSC should not have attempted
to escort the family members “directly past the Romeros in
contravention of the commonsense measure to keep parties in a
verbal altercation physically apart from each other and thus
preclude escalation into physical violence.”8 They then contend
there is a triable issue of fact concerning whether Mayhan’s
decision “to escort the Assailants within arm’s reach of Mr.
Romero, with who[m] they had been feuding verbally, was a
substantial factor in causing the assault.”
       “Directly past” is a vague term, and “within arm’s reach” an
even vaguer one, but the record does not show Mayhan escorted
the family members so close to Enrique that they could reach him
while they were in the aisle walking past him. Enrique himself
testified that he moved four or five seats into a row to let the
family members pass. Both Enrique’s and Mayhan’s description
of the assault showed that the female member had to turn, leave
the aisle, enter the row where Enrique was standing and then
move into the row to reach Enrique. Put differently, she did not
slap him while she was standing in the aisle. The male family
members were behind the female and Mayhan and so were even

8     Thus, appellants essentially abandoned the “until LAPD
and/or APEX arrived” aspect of this step in the trial court.

                                16
farther away. Since there is no evidence that Mayhan escorted
the family members “directly past” or “within arm’s reach” of
Enrique, there is no triable issue of fact concerning whether such
an act was a substantial factor in causing Enrique’s injuries.
       As for appellants’ trial court argument that CSC should
have “physically separated” the parties by having a CSC
employee stand between the parties, the trial court found there
was no evidence that “keeping Romero and the assailant
‘physically separated’ would ‘more likely than not’ have prevented
the (post-slap) attack which caused a gash above Romero's eye.”
The court specifically found that Mayhan was able to physically
place himself between Romero and the female family member
after the slap. The evidence shows that Mayhan was then also
between the male family members, as they knocked him down to
get at Enrique. The court found there was no evidence that
another CSC employee would have been able to separate the
parties without being attacked or that Mayhan's attempt to
separate the parties was deficient. Put differently, the
undisputed evidence showed that the physical presence of a CSC
employee did not prevent the attack from occurring. There is no
room for a reasonable difference of opinion here.

      3.    Better communications
      Appellants contend the trial court erred in finding that
LAPD and APEX would not have arrived before the assault
occurred even if CSC had called them as soon as it had notice of
overcrowding in the family section. The trial court stated “CSC
only had notice of overcrowding in the [F]amily section with less
than five minutes remaining in the Rams game” and since the
average response times of APEX and LAPD were over eight and

                                17
nine minutes respectively, they would have arrived after the
assault.
       Appellants contend the trial court wrongly equated five
minutes remaining in the game with five minutes in real time.
They contend that football games had timeouts, commercial
breaks and two minute warnings at the end of the game that
multiply the actual duration of the last few minutes of each
game. Appellants do not provide a record citation to support this
contention. Even if we were to take judicial notice of the common
fact that the clock may be stopped in a timed game by various
occurrences, there is nothing in the record on appeal to show that
such stoppages actually occurred in this game or how long any
stoppages were. We cannot simply guess at what the “real time”
was. Put differently, we have no basis to find that time left to
play did not equate to real time and so no basis to find error on
the part of the trial court.9
       Appellants further contend the better communication
measures of steps 2 through 5 would have resulted in a faster
response time by APEX and LAPD, who were better trained to
prevent assaults. They contend there is triable issue of fact as to
whether respondents’ failure to take those steps was a
substantial factor in causing the assault.

9     We note that in his deposition, Enrique estimated that
about two to four minutes elapsed between his arrival in the
family section and the assault, which is not consistent with his
claim on appeal that substantially more than five minutes
elapsed. To the extent that Enrique attempted to contradict his
deposition testimony and provide a longer time estimate in his
declaration in opposition to summary judgment, we disregard
that declaration. (Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087.)

                                18
      There is evidence that CSC staff, even supervisors such as
Mayhan, could not communicate directly with LAPD or APEX via
radio. They would contact CSC command, who would in turn
contact LAPD or APEX. They could contact LAPD or APEX
directly if those personnel were in the area.
      Appellants do not provide any record citation showing how
response time was measured. Appellants seem to assume that
response time is measured from when a CSC employee first
decides to seek assistance from APEX or LAPD to the time APEX
or LAPD personnel arrives, but we cannot simply assume that is
what it measures. It is equally, if not more, likely that response
time is measured from when APEX or LAPD receive the request
for assistance from CSC command. If the latter were true,
improved communications by CSC staff would not improve APEX
or LAPD response time. (Such communications could only reduce
the unknown time it took for a request to travel from a CSC
employee to the CSC command center.)
      In the absence of the above-described evidentiary fact,
appellants have not created a triable issue of fact concerning
whether improving CSC communications would have prevented
the assault.

                               19
                          DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Appellants to bear costs on
appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                        STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

                              20