Court Opinion

ID: 9716873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:52:58.138416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:49.585543
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion misses the mark in several respects. First, it views the fact of appellant’s ownership of a sawed-off shotgun as a fact or circumstance relevant to whether appellant’s communication to Officer Fish may be “objectively viewed as a true threat”, citing Judge Sullivan’s dissenting opinion for the Court of Appeals, citing State v. Abu-Isba (1984), 235 Kan. 851, 685 P.2d 856, when such fact has no such bearing. Second, it views the same fact of appellant’s ownership of the sawed-*475off shotgun as also relevant to whether he intended at the time of his communication that Officer Fish engage in conduct against his will. Third, it wrongly considers evidence in support of the intimidation conviction.
Resolution of the first relevancy question calls for consideration of an actor and an observer. The actor, here appellant, makes a verbal and physical statement. The observer, here Officer Fish, receives the statement. That which would aid the observer in arriving at an objective view of the statement would include what was known by him and what was perceived by him through the senses. Prior statements and conduct of the actor known to the observer would aid at arriving at a judgment. The content of the alleged statement, the manner in which it was made and the scene in which it was made would also be useful. However, the actor’s ownership of a gun, as distinguished from what the observer had been told about a gun, could not have aided the observer in forming an objective view or judgment of whether appellant’s conduct was a true threat or not. Such fact was irrelevant for that purpose.
Resolution of the second relevancy question focuses upon the actor’s state of mind at the time of his communication. The question presented is whether at the time of the communication, the actor intended to then and at that point compel the observer to alter his course against his will. The fact that the actor owned a gun would not tend to prove that he had the intent that the observer engage in conduct against his will. There is no connection between appellant’s ownership of a gun and this alleged crime of intimidation. Glover v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 536, 255 N.E.2d 657. It was therefore irrelevant.
Finally, the majority considers appellant’s conduct in running into the house and locking the door as constituting evidence of a prior intimidation. I disagree. That conduct was no more nor less than a response to Fish’s announcement of the arrest and use of handcuffs. In any event, and without doubt, the evidence of guilt was not so substantial as to warrant holding the erroneous admission of the evidence of appellant’s ownership of a gun harmless. I agree with the Court of Appeals majority that error occurred at the trial warranting a new trial. I therefore respectfully dissent.