Court Opinion

ID: 9908715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:10:18.477469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:27.599985
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued December 5, 2023

                                  In The

                           Court of Appeals
                                  For The

                       First District of Texas
                         ————————————
                           NO. 01-22-00593-CV
                        ———————————
                      LORETT CUADRA, Appellant
                                    V.
           DECLARATION TITLE COMPANY, LLC, Appellee

             On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 2
                          Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 1144465

                              OPINION

     In her suit against her former employer—appellee Declaration Title

Company, LLC (DTC)—appellant Lorett Cuadra alleged a cause of action for

retaliation under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). In her

administrative complaint to the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) and her
petition in the trial court, Cuadra alleged that DTC fired her in retaliation for

reporting an incident of sexual harassment. At trial, she submitted two claims of

retaliation to the jury—one based on her report of sexual harassment and a second

based on her expressed intention to file a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The jury rejected her claim based on the report

of sexual harassment but found in her favor on the second claim based on her

intention to file a complaint with the EEOC.

      DTC moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing, in

relevant part, that the trial court should disregard the jury’s finding on Cuadra’s

second retaliation claim because (1) Cuadra failed to include that claim in her

charge filed with the TWC, thereby failing to exhaust her administrative remedies

on that claim; (2) Cuadra failed to plead that claim in her petition in the trial court;

and (3) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding. The trial

court granted the JNOV and rendered a take-nothing judgment on Cuadra’s claims.

      In her sole appellate issue, Cuadra argues that the trial court erred in

granting DTC’s motion for JNOV. We conclude that Cuadra failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies with regard to the only claim on which the jury found in

her favor, and so we affirm.

                                           2
                                    Background

      DTC is a title company owned by Rick Heil and Julio Fernandez. Heil and

Fernandez hired Cuadra and eventually promoted her to manager of DTC’s

Memorial branch. On November 29, 2018, another DTC employee, Lani

Almaguer, reported to Cuadra as her manager that she had an uncomfortable

interaction with the janitor. Almaguer testified about the incident with the janitor:

      I was going to leave the office and he grabbed my hands and was
      holding them tight and was talking about going to this restaurant bar
      across the street but not telling any of the other employees. And I
      asked why and he said because they might want to go. And I kept
      trying to pull my hand away and I kept saying I need to go, I need to
      go. And then finally I was able to get my hand free and then I left.

Cuadra in turn reported the janitor to Fernandez for sexual harassment. DTC fired

the janitor on December 3, 2018.

      Cuadra asserts that Heil and Fernandez began retaliating against her on

December 4, 2018, when Heil told her she was performing poorly. Cuadra testified

that this was the first time either Heil or Fernandez had ever told her that there was

a problem with her performance. Cuadra asserted that DTC increased its scrutiny

on her work and began criticizing her performance.

      On December 13, 2018, Cuadra complained to DTC’s vice president, Mai

Tran, that she believed that the additional training and scrutiny of her work was

retaliation for reporting the janitor’s sexual harassment of Almaguer.

                                          3
      On January 7, 2019, Cuadra emailed Heil explaining that she felt the work

environment was “altered and strained” after she reported the janitor’s actions, and

the increased scrutiny of her work was “demeaning and stressful.” Cuadra took

medical leave on the advice of her doctor, and the doctor extended her medical

leave through January 28, 2019. Cuadra did not return to work on January 28,

2019, but remained on medical leave through the first half of February. Other

employees of DTC were required to cover Cuadra’s responsibilities.

      On February 15, 2019, Cuadra again emailed Heil. She told DTC that she

had not “abandoned her position with the company” and that she would be

returning to work on February 18, 2019. She stated that she was seeking

“reasonable accommodations and assurances from the company that I would be

able to work in an environment free from harassment.” Finally, Cuadra stated,

“Also, please know that since you have not properly corrected my past concerns, I

will be filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission so

that they can investigate my issues and provide you with guidance on how to

protect employees.”

      On February 19, 2019, Cuadra provided DTC with a letter from her doctor

that included certain restrictions on her working conditions, including that she

always have a third party present during meetings and that she not be required to

drive to other locations. Heil testified that these restrictions made it impossible for

                                          4
Cuadra to do her work as the branch manager, and he decided to move forward

with his decision to terminate her. DTC sent an email and letter terminating

Cuadra’s employment with DTC on February 19, 2019.

      On February 22, 2019, Cuadra filed a charge of discrimination with the

TWC complaining of retaliation. In the charge, she recounted the facts surrounding

her report to DTC regarding the janitor’s actions toward Almaguer. She then

asserted that, a few days after making her report, she had a meeting with Heil to

“discuss annual profits and losses at the Memorial branch” and was “told that the

branch was not profitable and could not continue to lose money.” She stated that,

prior to this meeting, she had not been told that DTC was dissatisfied with her

performance, nor had she received any verbal or written warnings. Cuadra stated in

her TWC complaint that DTC required additional training for her branch, that

another DTC employee was assigned to give additional “scrutiny” to her work, and

that she eventually went on medical leave “due to the overwhelming anxiety

caused by DTC’s retaliation and harassment.” She asserted:

      On February 15, 2019, I informed Mr. Heil that I was returning to
      work as I could no longer afford for DTC to withhold business
      expenses and commissions owed to me. Per DTC’s request, I provided
      a note from my physician to DTC on February 19, 2019, releasing me
      to resume work on February 20, 2019. I was terminated by Mr. Heil
      within hours of providing the work release note from my physician.

She asserted that “DTC’s actions constitute[d] retaliation for reporting sexual

harassment, in violation of Title VII and Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code.”

                                        5
      The TWC dismissed Cuadra’s complaint and issued a right-to-sue letter. The

TWC investigator recounted in his report the relevant facts, including Cuadra’s

report of the janitor’s conduct, the subsequent increased training and scrutiny of

Cuadra’s work, and her medical leave. The investigator noted that Cuadra

informed DTC she was returning to work on February 15, 2019, she provided DTC

a note from her physician on February 19, 2019, and DTC discharged her on

February 19.

      Cuadra filed suit against DTC on October 31, 2019. She alleged a cause of

action for retaliation pursuant to the TCHRA. In her petition, she alleged facts

relevant to that claim, asserting that DTC was initially pleased with her work. Then

she reported the sexual harassment incident with the janitor, and Heil and

Fernandez began treating her differently. She detailed the increased scrutiny her

work received from other DTC personnel, and the necessity of taking medical

leave. Cuadra alleged that, on February 15, 2019, she informed Heil “that she

wished to return to work in an environment free from harassment and retaliation

and requested reasonable accommodations to attend doctor’s appointments.” She

asserted that she “provided a doctor’s work release as requested by DTC on the

afternoon of February 19, 2019” and “was terminated within hours of submitting

the work release despite not having any documented disciplinary or performance

issues.” She asserted that DTC terminated her “in retaliation for reporting sexual

                                         6
harassment,” in violation of the TCHRA and that she suffered damages as a result

of that retaliation.

       During the pre-trial hearing, Cuadra sought to pre-admit evidence that she

engaged in an additional protected activity, referencing the February 15 email in

which stated her intention to make an EEOC complaint. DTC objected to this

evidence, and it argued that Cuadra had not exhausted her administrative remedies

on that claim. The trial court overruled DTC’s objection and eventually granted a

running objection to that line of evidence. DTC likewise raised a complaint

regarding Cuadra’s efforts to litigate that claim in a motion for directed verdict,

which the trial court denied.

       The trial court submitted two jury questions on Cuadra’s claims of

retaliation. In question one, the charge asked, “Did Declaration Title Company fire

Lorett Cuadra because she opposed a discriminatory practice, because she reported

that a janitor harassed an employee of Declaration Title Company?” The jury

answered “No.” In question two, the charge asked, “Did Declaration Title

Company fire Lorett Cuadra because she opposed a discriminatory practice,

because she told Declaration Title Company she would file a charge of

discrimination?” The jury answered “Yes.” The jury also made findings on

damages based on its answer to question two, determining that Cuadra was entitled

to $100,000 in backpay and $50,000 in future compensatory damages.

                                        7
      DTC then moved for JNOV, arguing in relevant part that (1) the trial court

lacked jurisdiction over any claim that DTC fired Cuadra in retaliation for

threatening to file an EEOC complaint because Cuadra failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies with regard to that claim; (2) the trial court should not

have submitted the jury question about retaliation over Cuadra’s threat to file an

EEOC complaint because the judgment must conform to the pleadings, and Cuadra

failed to plead the claim; and (3) the evidence was legally insufficient to support

the jury’s finding that DTC retaliated against Cuadra for threatening to file an

EEOC complaint.

      The trial court granted DTC’s motion for JNOV. It rendered a final

judgment that Cuadra take nothing on her claims against DTC. This appeal

followed.

                    Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

      In her sole issue, Cuadra argues that the trial court erred in granting DTC’s

motion for JNOV based, in relevant part, on DTC’s argument that Cuadra failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies. DTC asserted that Cuadra did not allege in

her TWC complaint or in her trial court pleadings that DTC retaliated against her

for threatening to make an EEOC complaint. Because she did not include those

allegations or supporting facts in her TWC complaint, she did not exhaust her

                                        8
administrative remedies, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over that claim,

making JNOV proper.

A.    Standard of Review of JNOV

      A trial court may disregard a jury verdict and render a JNOV if no evidence

supports the jury finding on an issue necessary to liability or if a directed verdict

would have been proper. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d

709, 713 (Tex. 2003); Jetall Companies, Inc. v. Plummer, No. 01-18-01091-CV,

2020 WL 5900577, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 6, 2020, no pet.)

(mem. op.). A directed verdict is proper (1) when the evidence conclusively

establishes the movant’s right to judgment or negates the opponent’s right or

(2) when the evidence is insufficient to raise a material fact issue. Prudential Ins.

Co. of Am. v. Fin. Rev. Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000); Jetall

Companies, 2020 WL 5900577, at *2. The trial court should grant a JNOV “when

the evidence is conclusive and one party is entitled to recover as a matter of law or

when a legal principle precludes recovery.” Jetall Companies, Inc., 2020 WL

5900577, at *2 (quoting B & W Supply Inc. v. Beckman, 305 S.W.3d 10, 15 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)).

      We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for JNOV under a legal-

sufficiency standard. Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 289 S.W.3d 828, 830

(Tex. 2009); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823–24 (Tex. 2005); B & W

                                         9
Supply, 305 S.W.3d at 21. We may sustain a legal sufficiency challenge only when

(1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) the court

is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence

offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no

more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite

of a vital fact. Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 444 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Tex. 2014).

B.    Scope of TWC Charge

      Here, DTC argues that the trial court’s grant of JNOV was proper because

Cuadra failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with regard to her claim of

retaliation for threatening to file an EEOC complaint, thereby depriving the trial

court of jurisdiction over that claim.

      A person claiming a violation of the TCHRA must first exhaust her

administrative remedies prior to bringing a civil action. Waffle House, Inc. v.

Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex. 2010); Lopez v. Tex. State Univ., 368 S.W.3d

695, 701 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. denied) (“The exhaustion of

administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to file suit for unlawful

employment practices.”) (citing Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933

S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1996)); Santi v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 312 S.W.3d

800, 804 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Failure to timely file an

administrative   complaint     deprives   Texas   trial   courts   of   subject-matter

                                          10
jurisdiction”). To exhaust administrative remedies under the TCHRA, a plaintiff

must (1) file a complaint with the TWC within 180 days of the alleged

discriminatory act; (2) allow the TWC 180 days to dismiss or resolve the

complaint; and (3) file suit in district court within 60 days of receiving a right-to-

sue letter from the TWC and no later than two years after the complaint was filed.

See TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.202, .208, .254, .256. “The purposes underlying the

administrative-complaint requirement include giving the charged party notice of

the claim, narrowing the issues for speedier and more effective adjudication and

decision, and giving the administrative agency and the employer an opportunity to

resolve the dispute.” Lopez, 368 S.W.3d at 701 (citing Pacheco v. Mineta, 448

F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2006); Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874,

878–79 (5th Cir. 2003)).

      It is undisputed that Cuadra filed a timely complaint with the TWC. The

central issue is whether her claim for retaliation in response to her threat to file an

EEOC complaint falls within the scope of the administrative charge she filed with

the TWC. “It is well settled that the scope of Title VII and TCHRA litigation is

limited to claims that were included in the administrative charge of discrimination

and to factually related claims that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the

                                          11
agency’s investigation of the claims stated in the charge.”1 Id. (citing Pacheco, 448

F.3d at 789; Univ. of Tex. v. Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d 798, 810 (Tex. App.—Austin

2009, no pet.); Thomas v. Clayton Williams Energy, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 734, 738 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)); see Santi, 312 S.W.3d at 805 (“A

lawsuit under the [TCHRA] is limited to claims made in the charge or complaint

filed with the EECO or [TWC] and factually related claims that can reasonably be

expected to grow out of the commission’s investigation.”) (citing Bartosh v. Sam

Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d 317, 321 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet.

denied)).

      Courts construe the administrative complaint liberally and “look slightly

beyond its four corners, to its substance rather than its label” to determine the

scope of the administrative investigation “which can reasonably be expected to

grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788–89 & n.9;

City of Sugar Land v. Kaplan, 449 S.W.3d 577, 581–82 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The Fifth Circuit has described the appropriate review

as “a fact-specific inquiry” into what investigations the administrative charge “can

reasonably be expected to trigger.” Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 792. Although courts

1
      “Because the TCHRA was enacted in part to ‘provide for the execution of the
      policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its subsequent
      amendments,’ we look to relevant federal law for guidance when the relevant
      provisions of Title VII are analogous.” San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461
      S.W.3d 131, 136–37 (Tex. 2015) (citing TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.001(1); AutoZone,
      Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam)).
                                         12
construe complaints filed under the TCHRA liberally, the charge “must contain a

sufficient factual basis to put the employer on notice of the existence and nature of

the charges.” Williams-Pyro, Inc. v. Barbour, 408 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2013, pet. denied); Santi, 312 S.W.3d at 805; Bartosh, 259 S.W.3d at 321.

“The crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual statement

contained” in the administrative complaint. Santi, 312 S.W.3d at 805 (quoting

Bartosh, 259 S.W.3d at 321). Courts will not construe the charge to include facts

that were initially omitted. Sw. Convenience Stores, LLC v. Mora, 560 S.W.3d 392,

401 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); Cnty. of Travis ex rel. Hamilton v.

Manion, No. 03–11–00533–CV, 2012 WL 1839399, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin

May 17, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Harris v. David McDavid Honda, 213 F.

App’x 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (not for publication)).

C.    Analysis

      Cuadra’s claims against DTC are based on retaliation. The TCHRA prohibits

employers from engaging in retaliatory action against an employee for opposing a

discriminatory practice. See TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.051, 055(1). To establish a

violation, the employee must show that (1) she engaged in an activity protected by

the TCHRA, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there exists a

causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Evans v. City of

Hous., 246 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 2001); Gonzalez v. Champion Techs., Inc., 384

                                         13
S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). An employee

engages in a protected activity when she “opposes a discriminatory practice,”

“makes or files a charge,” “files a complaint,” or “testifies, assists, or participates

in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” TEX. LAB. CODE

§ 21.055.

      In her complaint filed with the TWC, Cuadra related facts to support her

claim that she engaged in a protected activity when she reported the sexual

harassment incident between the janitor and Almaguer. She alleged facts

supporting her claim that DTC retaliated against her following this report,

including that DTC increased scrutiny over her work, required additional training,

and began criticizing her work for the first time. She alleged that she was

ultimately fired in retaliation for making the report of sexual harassment.

      Cuadra did not, however, include any allegation or supporting facts

indicating that she engaged in any additional protected activities or that DTC acted

in retaliation after she related her intention to file an EEOC complaint. In her

complaint to the TWC, Cuadra did not make any reference to the statement in her

February 15 email that she intended to file an EEOC complaint, nor did she allege

any facts supporting a causal connection between that statement and her

subsequent termination. The TWC investigator did not reference that basis for

retaliation in his report, and instead indicated that the investigation addressed

                                          14
Cuadra’s allegation that DTC retaliated against her for reporting the sexual

harassment incident.

      Accordingly, we conclude that Cuadra’s subsequent argument at trial—that

DTC retaliated against her in response to her statement that she intended to file an

EEOC complaint—falls outside the scope of her TWC complaint, and, thus, that

retaliation claim was not properly before the trial court. See Sw. Convenience

Stores, 560 S.W.3d at 401 (holding that courts will not “construe the

[administrative] charge to include facts that were initially omitted”).

      Cuadra argues on appeal that we must construe her TWC complaint and her

original petition liberally, and she argues that her complaint was clear in alleging

retaliation against DTC because DTC fired her. She argues, “Charging parties

alleging retaliation in the form of a single adverse action are not required to spell

out each and every time they engaged in a protected activity that led to the

retaliation.” We disagree.

      Establishing retaliation under the TCHRA requires more than identifying an

adverse employment action—the specific protected activity and a causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action are

likewise essential elements of a retaliation claim. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 384 S.W.3d

at 472 (setting out elements of TCHRA retaliation claim). Cuadra’s claim that

DTC fired her in retaliation for her report of the sexual harassment incident and her

                                          15
claim that DTC fired her in retaliation for threatening to make an EEOC complaint

involve materially different protected activities. Those two activities implicate the

actions of different DTC employees and a different causal connection between the

protected activity and the ultimate adverse employment action.

      Cuadra argues that DTC “has always known that the February 15 email

would be an important part of [her retaliation] claim.” She points to the fact that

DTC’s lawyer questioned her about the email during her deposition, and she argues

that she “should not be punished for DTC’s failure to further explore Cuadra’s

threat to file an EEOC charge during her deposition or throughout the course of

written discovery.” We observe, however, that the TWC complaint and pleadings

identify only the February 15 email as the method by which she informed DTC

that she intended to return to work. Nothing in Cuadra’s TWC complaint put either

DTC or the TWC investigator on notice that the February 15 email was relevant as

proof that she engaged in the protected activity of making an EEOC complaint. See

Lopez, 368 S.W.3d at 701 (providing that purposes underlying administrative-

complaint requirement include “giving the charged party notice of the claim” and

“giving the administrative agency and the employer an opportunity to resolve the

dispute”).

      Cuadra attempts to distinguish several of the cases relied upon by DTC,

arguing that they are distinguishable on the facts. See, e.g., Manion, 2012 WL

                                         16
1839399, at *4–5 (considering case in which plaintiff filed suit alleging gender

discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation for complaining of

discriminatory treatment, but EEOC charge did not contain any factual allegations

of discrimination or hostile work environment based on gender); Sw. Convenience

Stores, 560 S.W.3d at 403–04 (concluding that plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies on retaliation claim where EEOC charge contained no

factual allegations based on retaliation, and concluding that plaintiff could not rely

on exception that excuses exhaustion requirement for retaliation claim when it

grows out of previously-filed EEOC complaint because alleged retaliation occurred

before plaintiff filed EEOC complaint); ATI Enters., Inc. v. Din, 413 S.W.3d 247,

253–54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (concluding that plaintiff failed to

exhaust administrative remedies on retaliation claim where EEOC charge

contained only allegation of discrimination based on national origin). But our

review of this case requires a “fact-specific inquiry” into what investigations the

administrative charge “can reasonably be expected to trigger.” See Pacheco, 448

F.3d at 792. All of the cases cited above stand for the proposition that, while courts

must construe the administrative complaint with utmost liberality, the complaint

must nevertheless contain sufficient factual allegations to put the administrative

agency and the employer on notice of the existence and nature of the charges. See,

e.g., Sw. Convenience Stores, 560 S.W.3d at 400–01 (recognizing that courts

                                         17
construe initial charge liberally but “will not construe the charge to include facts

that were initially omitted,” and charge “must contain an adequate factual basis to

put the employer on notice of the existence and nature of the claims against it”).

      We find the Austin Court of Appeals’ opinion in Lopez to be instructive

here. See 368 S.W.3d at 701–04. In that case, the court looked to the specific facts

asserted in the administrative charge to determine which, if any, retaliation claims

asserted at trial fell within the scope of the administrative charge. Id. at 701–02.

The court observed that the employee’s “factual statement referred only obliquely

to retaliatory conduct by [the employer’s] agents based on her decision to

terminate [a subordinate’s] employment,” but, nevertheless, the allegation “would

reasonably give rise to an administrative investigation of retaliation on that basis.”

Id. at 703. Thus, the employee “exhausted her administrative remedies as to her

allegation that [the employer] retaliated against her for firing [her subordinate].”

Id. at 703–04. The court further concluded, however, that “[t]he same cannot be

said of the other alleged claims of retaliation” because they were “not mentioned in

the charge and are not factually related to any of the claims stated in the charge.”

Id. at 704.

      We reach a similar conclusion here. Cuadra’s TWC charge did not mention

her statement to DTC that she intended to file an EEOC complaint, nor did she

allege any facts supporting a causal connection between her intention to make an

                                         18
EEOC complaint and her subsequent termination. The only protected activity she

identified was her reporting of the sexual harassment incident. She alleged that

DTC began criticizing her performance and increased scrutiny over her work

immediately following its firing of the janitor, requiring her to take an extended

medical leave, and then it ultimately fired her in retaliation for reporting the sexual

harassment. We will not construe Cuadra’s TWC complaint to include facts that

were omitted. See Sw. Convenience Stores, 560 S.W.3d at 401; see also Pacheco,

448 F.3d at 792 (holding that courts review scope of administrative complaint was

“fact-specific” to determine what investigation that complaint “can reasonably be

expected to trigger”). Cuadra’s TWC complaint cannot reasonably be construed to

have triggered an investigation into or provided notice of her retaliation claim

against DTC based on her statement that she intended to file an EEOC complaint.

She did not make any reference to that claim or supporting facts prior to the

proceedings in the trial court. See Lopez, 368 S.W.3d at 703–04; see also Phillips

v. Caris Life Sciences, Inc., 715 F. App’x 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)

(not for publication) (holding that employee failed to exhaust her administrative

remedy for claim of sex-based discrimination when she complained to EEOC that

she was fired for reporting sexual harassment, but did not allege that she was fired

for being woman); Thomas v. Atmos Energy Corp., 223 F. App’x 369, 376 (5th

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (not for publication) (holding, where charge listed only

                                          19
facts related to sexual conduct, that EEOC’s investigation could not reasonably be

expected to encompass employer’s work assignment practices).

      Because her claim of retaliation based on her statement that she would make

an EEOC complaint falls outside the scope of her TWC complaint, Cuadra failed

to exhaust her administrative remedies as to that claim. See Santi, 312 S.W.3d at

804–05. We conclude that the trial court properly disregarded the jury’s finding on

that claim. See Jetall Companies, 2020 WL 5900577, at *2 (holding that JNOV is

proper when legal principle precludes recovery).

      We overrule Cuadra’s sole appellate issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s take-nothing judgment on Cuadra’s claims

against DTC.

                                             Richard Hightower
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

                                        20