Court Opinion

ID: 9385871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 16:02:40.139255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.220038
License: Public Domain

IN THE
               ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                              DIVISION TWO

                         THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
                                Appellee,

                                    v.

                          GEORGE WILLIE RIOS,
                              Appellant.

                         No. 2 CA-CR 2022-0084
                          Filed April 10, 2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
                         No. CR20195491001
               The Honorable James E. Marner, Judge

                              AFFIRMED

                               COUNSEL

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General
Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals
By Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee

Megan Page, Pima County Public Defender
By David J. Euchner, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
                              STATE v. RIOS
                            Opinion of the Court

                                  OPINION

Judge Sklar authored the opinion of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge
Staring and Judge O’Neil concurred.

S K L A R, Judge:

¶1             George Rios appeals his convictions and sentences for theft of
property, burglary, and theft of a means of transportation. He argues that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress based
on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He further argues that the
Miranda advisory was inadequate because it stated only that he had the
right to “the presence of an attorney to assist you prior to questioning.” It
did not expressly state that his right to counsel continued “during”
questioning. We conclude that the advisory reasonably conveyed Rios’s
rights, such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The “prior to”
language conveyed to Rios when his right to the “presence” of counsel was
triggered. It did not convey any subsequent limitation on that right. We
also reject Rios’s arguments that insufficient evidence supported his
convictions and that the trial court erred in giving certain jury instructions.
We therefore affirm Rios’s convictions and sentences.

           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
jury’s verdicts, and we resolve all inferences against Rios. See State v. Felix,
237 Ariz. 280, ¶ 30 (App. 2015). In October 2019, Rios was doing
construction work at a fitness center in Tucson. M.V. also worked there as
a custodian. On the morning of the offense, M.V. drove her son’s blue 2011
Chevrolet HHR to work and parked in the front of the building. After she
went inside, M.V. retrieved a janitorial cart and hung her lanyard, which
included her car keys, on the cart.

¶3           When her shift ended, M.V. noticed that both her keys and car
were missing. Fitness center staff viewed the facility’s surveillance footage,
which showed a man walking across the parking lot and driving away in
M.V.’s car. The man was wearing a black jacket over a pullover sweatshirt,
a white hard-hat, jeans, and work boots. He was carrying a broom and
shovel. Rios’s employer identified the man as Rios, based on his clothing,
the broom, and the shovel. M.V. identified the car as hers and stated that
she had not given Rios permission to drive it.

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                              STATE v. RIOS
                            Opinion of the Court

¶4           The next day, police officers detained Rios for questioning.
After giving a Miranda advisory, they asked Rios what had happened the
day before. Rios responded that nothing had seemed out of the ordinary.
He denied stealing any vehicles and provided his residential address.

¶5           During a visit to Rios’s home, officers found M.V.’s vehicle on
a neighbor’s property, roughly 300 to 400 feet south. The license plate and
VIN matched the vehicle M.V. had reported stolen. A witness had seen
items being taken from the vehicle and carried into the neighbor’s
residence. Some items from the vehicle were subsequently found in that
residence.

¶6            M.V. had left a purse containing her checkbook,
identification, and $1,572 in cash under the vehicle’s front seat. Those items
were missing when the vehicle was recovered and were never found.

¶7             Rios was indicted on five counts: (1) theft of means of
transportation; (2) burglary in the third degree; (3) theft of property or
services for stealing the keys, purse, and cash; and (4) two drug counts that
were severed before trial. A jury found him guilty of the remaining three
charges, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of
imprisonment totaling 7.5 years. This appeal followed. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and
13-4033(A)(1).

                          MIRANDA ADVISORY

¶8            Rios argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion
to suppress his post-arrest statements and the fruits of those statements
because the arresting officer gave an inadequate Miranda advisory. “We
review the court’s denial of [the] motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Rushing, 243 Ariz. 212, ¶ 56 (2017). But we review de
novo whether Rios received an adequate Miranda advisory. See State v.
Aldana, 252 Ariz. 69, ¶ 10 (App. 2021).

¶9             In reviewing a motion to suppress, we generally consider
“only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Rushing, 243
Ariz. 212, ¶ 56. But in this case no evidentiary hearing was held, and the
trial court decided the matter on the parties’ motions, from which we draw
the relevant and undisputed facts. The undisputed record shows that when
Rios was arrested, an officer gave him the following Miranda advisory
before questioning:

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                              STATE v. RIOS
                            Opinion of the Court

              You have the right to remain silent. Anything
              you say can and will be used against you in a
              court of law. You have the right to the presence
              of an attorney to assist you prior to questioning.
              Um. If you can’t afford one we’ll provide one
              for you. Ok. Do you understand those rights?

¶10            Before a custodial interrogation, police must advise suspects
of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. State v. Carlson, 228 Ariz. 343, ¶ 6 (App. 2011). The
advisory must convey the following essential information:

              [1] that he has the right to remain silent,
              [2] that anything he says can be used against
              him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to
              the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he
              cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
              for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010)). Absent such an
advisory, the defendant cannot be deemed to have knowingly waived those
rights even if the defendant chooses to talk to police. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.

¶11           Although every element of the advisory must be conveyed,
courts do not dictate the precise language. Id. ¶ 9. As long as “the sum total
of statements in a Miranda advisory reasonably conveys the essential
information,” the warning is sufficient. Id. Nevertheless, the advisory
“must inform the defendant that the right to counsel exists before and
during interrogation” and “must not convey the message that appointed
counsel cannot be made available until some future time.” State v.
Moorman, 154 Ariz. 578, 585 (1987).

¶12            Rios argues that the advisory was inadequate because the
officer told him he had a right to counsel “prior to” questioning, but not
“during” questioning. We find instructive the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Powell, which concluded that a similar advisory was
sufficient. 559 U.S. at 53, 62-63. There, the officer had advised the suspect
that he had “the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [the
officers’] questions” and that he could invoke this right “at any time . . .
during th[e] interview.” Id. at 53 (alterations in Powell). The Court reasoned
that “in context, the term ‘before’ merely conveyed when [the defendant]’s
right to an attorney became effective” and that “[n]othing in the words used
indicated that counsel’s presence would be restricted after the questioning

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                              STATE v. RIOS
                            Opinion of the Court

commenced.” Id. at 63. It also rejected as “unlikely” a scenario in which a
suspect who has just received a Miranda advisory would lose the right to
counsel once the interview commenced. Id. at 62-63.

¶13            This case is distinguishable from Powell because here, the
officer did not say that Rios could invoke his right to counsel at any time.
He said only that Rios had the “right to the presence of an attorney to assist
[him] prior to questioning.” No Arizona cases have applied Powell to
advisories such as this. Two noteworthy cases from outside Arizona,
however, have done so. In the first case, Rigterink v. State, the defendant
had received an oral and written advisory that stated in relevant part, “I
have the right to have an attorney present prior to questioning.” 66 So. 3d
866, 884 (Fla. 2011) (emphasis omitted). In the second case, United States v.
Clayton, the advisory stated, “You have the right to talk to a lawyer before
we ask you any questions.” 937 F.3d 630, 634 (6th Cir. 2019).

¶14            The courts in both Rigterink and Clayton concluded that the
advisories had reasonably conveyed the essential information about the
defendants’ rights. Like Powell, they concluded that the temporal
language—“prior to questioning” in Rigterink and “before we ask you any
questions” in Clayton—conveyed when the right to counsel was triggered.
Rigterink, 66 So. 3d at 892 (emphasis omitted); Clayton, 937 F.3d at 639. They
rejected the suggestion that the advisory could reasonably be understood
as limiting the right to counsel during interrogation. Id. In doing so, the
Rigterink court emphasized the advisory’s reference to the right to have an
attorney “present.” 66 So. 3d at 892-93. Like the Court in Powell, the
Rigterink court concluded that it would be “indefensible” and “illogical” for
the defendant to believe he “could have counsel present before questioning
began and that, once questioning began, counsel must leave.” Id. at 893
(emphasis added). The court in Clayton also noted that the advisory at issue
was similar to one that the United States Supreme Court had endorsed in
Miranda itself. See 937 F.3d at 639-40 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).

¶15            Rios describes Clayton as an “aberration.” He does not
address Rigterink at all. But he has cited no cases concluding that advisories
like the one he received are insufficient to reasonably convey a defendant’s
rights. We also find Rigterink and Clayton persuasive. Following their logic,
we conclude that the advisory provided to Rios was sufficient. As in those
cases, the officer’s statement that “[y]ou have the right to the presence of an
attorney to assist you prior to questioning” reasonably conveys when the
right to counsel was triggered. The advisory did not suggest that the right
to counsel terminated once questioning began, nor could Rios have
reasonably drawn such an inference. Doing so would involve the scenario

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                              STATE v. RIOS
                            Opinion of the Court

rejected by Powell and Rigterink as “unlikely,” “indefensible,” and
“illogical,” where counsel would be present only until the interrogation
began.

¶16           Rios cites Moorman, 154 Ariz. at 585, to argue that the advisory
was insufficient because it did not inform him that the right to counsel
existed during the interrogation. But as we have explained, the advisory
reasonably conveyed that message. The advisory also did not violate
Moorman’s prohibition on “convey[ing] the message that appointed counsel
cannot be made available until some future time.” See id. Rather, it
expressly stated that Rios had the right to counsel even before the
interrogation.

¶17            Nor are we persuaded by Rios’s citation to Carlson, 228 Ariz.
343, ¶¶ 13, 14. Unlike this case, the defendant in Carlson attempted to recite
the Miranda advisory himself when the officer began to do so. Id. ¶ 3.
However, the defendant did so incorrectly. Id. ¶ 10. He said he knew an
“attorney will be appointed to represent [him] if [he] cannot afford one,”
but he did not suggest he knew that the right to counsel existed before and
during questioning. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. Nor did the officer supply this
information. Id. ¶ 3. Here, by contrast, the officer advised Rios that he had
the right to the presence of counsel before questioning, rather than at some
future “unspecific stage in the criminal proceedings.” Id. ¶ 12.

¶18            We acknowledge that Carlson refers repeatedly to the right to
counsel before and during questioning. 228 Ariz. 343, ¶¶ 10, 13-14. Those
comments made sense in the context of Carlson, where the defendant’s
statement evidenced no understanding of when the right to counsel
attaches or applies. Id. ¶ 12. Here, by contrast, the officer advised Rios of
that information. Moreover, the defendant in Carlson said nothing about
counsel’s presence. Id. ¶ 3. In this case, the officer told Rios that he had the
right to the “presence” of an attorney. As we have explained, that
statement, coupled with the “prior to questioning” language, conveyed to
Ruiz that the right to counsel was triggered before questioning. It logically
continued through questioning. We therefore conclude that the trial court
did not err in denying Rios’s motion to suppress. However, we emphasize
while the Miranda advisory reasonably conveyed Rios’s rights, the better
practice is to explicitly state that defendants have the right to counsel’s
presence both before and during the interrogation.

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                               STATE v. RIOS
                             Opinion of the Court

                    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

¶19           Rios also argues that we must vacate his convictions because
the state presented insufficient evidence to support them. After the close of
evidence, Rios moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court
denied. He renewed his motion after the verdict, asserting additional
failures in the state’s evidence. He also filed a motion for a new trial,
arguing that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The
court denied each motion.

                             Standard of review

¶20            A defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal if “there is
no substantial evidence to support a conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a).
Substantial evidence is more than a “mere scintilla.” State v. Hughes, 189
Ariz. 62, 73 (1997) (quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67 (1990)). It
requires “such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt,” State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16 (2011) (quoting Mathers, 165 Ariz.
at 67). However, where “reasonable minds may differ on inferences drawn
from the facts, the case must be submitted to the jury,” as the court may not
“re-weigh the facts or disregard inferences that might reasonably be drawn
from the evidence.” Id. ¶ 18 (quoting State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603 (1997)).
Furthermore, when considering whether substantial evidence exists, we
resolve conflicts in the evidence against the defendant and view the facts in
the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz.
277, ¶ 5 (2014).

¶21            Substantial evidence must support each element of the crime
charged. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16. Additionally, while a defendant’s
mental state is often challenging to prove, absent an outright admission, it
may be properly “ascertained by inference from all relevant surrounding
circumstances.” In re William G., 192 Ariz. 208, 213 (App. 1997); see also State
v. Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163, ¶ 16 (2009) (“Criminal intent, being a state of mind,
is shown by circumstantial evidence.”).

¶22           Rios does not clearly argue that the trial court improperly
denied his motion for a new trial, so we do not consider that ruling apart
from his claims related to the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Bolton,
182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995) (“Failure to argue a claim on appeal constitutes
waiver of that claim.”); cf. also State v. Clark, 249 Ariz. 528, ¶ 18 (App. 2020)
(“A conviction based on insufficient evidence is fundamental error whether
a defendant expressly argues fundamental error or not.”). We review Rios’s

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                              STATE v. RIOS
                            Opinion of the Court

sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument claim de novo. See State v. Fuentes,
247 Ariz. 516, ¶ 36 (App. 2019).

                     Theft of means of transportation

¶23           We first address Rios’s conviction for theft of a means of
transportation. Under the two theories the state argued at trial, a person is
guilty of theft of means of transportation if the person knowingly and
without lawful authority controls another person’s vehicle either with the
intent to permanently deprive them of it or while knowing or having reason
to know that the vehicle was stolen. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1814(A)(1), (5),
13-1801(A)(9).

¶24           Substantial evidence supported Rios’s conviction. M.V. and
her son filled out a stolen-vehicle affidavit. The surveillance footage
showed a man identified as Rios driving away in M.V.’s car. Additionally,
given that the vehicle had been found very near Rios’s home, the jury could
reasonably conclude that he was the person in the video. From those
circumstances, as well as M.V.’s missing keys and Rios’s opportunity to
steal them, the jury could also infer that Rios had knowingly taken the
vehicle. Also, as more than two weeks had passed before the vehicle was
found, the jury could conclude that Rios intended to permanently deprive
M.V. of the vehicle, or at a minimum, that he knew the vehicle was stolen.

¶25            Rios argues that several weaknesses in the evidence rendered
it insufficient. Specifically, he argues that: (1) the surveillance video was
low quality and his employer might have mistakenly identified him;
(2) Rios and his manager provided conflicting testimony about when Rios
had left work; (3) no physical evidence connected him to the stolen vehicle
or its contents; (4) no evidence showed that he had an opportunity to steal
M.V.’s keys; and (5) the police investigation was insufficiently thorough.

¶26           We agree with Rios that a reasonable jury could have weighed
the evidence differently. But we may not reverse a conviction for
insufficiency of the evidence simply because another jury might have
reached a different verdict. See State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, ¶6 (2004).
Nor is the lack of physical evidence connecting Rios to the crime
dispositive. State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 442, ¶ 49 (2003) (“[P]hysical evidence is
not required to sustain a conviction if the totality of the circumstances
demonstrates guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

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                             STATE v. RIOS
                           Opinion of the Court

                                 Burglary

¶27           A person commits burglary in the third degree by entering or
remaining unlawfully in a vehicle with the intent to commit any theft or
felony therein. A.R.S. § 13-1506(A)(1); see also § 13-1501(12) (defining
“structure” to include vehicles). Sufficient evidence also supported Rios’s
burglary conviction. The surveillance footage, the identification, and the
location of the stolen vehicle allowed the jury to conclude that Rios had
unlawfully entered M.V.’s vehicle. The evidence likewise supported the
conclusion that Rios had an intent to commit a felony within the vehicle,
namely, theft of a means of transportation.

                                   Theft

¶28          A person commits theft if, without lawful authority, the
person knowingly controls the property of another with the intent to
deprive that person of it or while knowing or having reason to know that
the property was stolen. See A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(1), (5).

¶29            Rios was charged with theft of property valued between
$1,000 and $2,000 for stealing M.V.’s cash, purse, and keys. See A.R.S.
§ 13-1802(A), (G). Sufficient evidence also supported this conviction. M.V.
testified that her purse had contained $1,572 to pay wages to the employees
she was supervising. She also testified that she had left the purse hidden
under the vehicle’s front seat, which was moved forward. However, when
the vehicle was recovered, the front seat had been moved back, which
would have exposed the purse. The purse, including the cash and keys,
were missing and never recovered.

¶30           From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that
Rios had exposed the purse when he moved the seat back, then
intentionally removed the purse and its contents. Although no evidence
corroborated the existence of the purse and the cash, corroboration would
not necessarily be expected given the nature of the stolen items, nor was it
required. See State v. Munoz, 114 Ariz. 466, 469 (App. 1976) (“conviction
may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim unless the
story is physically impossible or so incredible that no reasonable person
could believe it”). M.V. credibly explained the presence and amount of the
cash—she was using it to pay employees. And as the evidence supported
the other theft and burglary convictions, it also provided a sufficient basis
for the jury to reasonably conclude that Rios had known the purse was
stolen.

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                              STATE v. RIOS
                            Opinion of the Court

                           JURY INSTRUCTION

¶31           Finally, Rios argues that the trial court improperly instructed
the jury on theories of theft and theft of means of transportation. Those
instructions allowed the jury to convict Rios based on a finding that he had
knowingly controlled the stolen property. He argues that the instructions
were improper because they invited the jury to speculate and find guilt
when unsupported by the evidence.

¶32            We review the trial court’s decision to give a jury instruction
for abuse of discretion, and we will only reverse if “the instructions, when
taken as a whole, would mislead the jurors.” See Leon v. Marner, 244 Ariz.
465, ¶ 11 (App. 2018) (quoting State v. Rutledge, 197 Ariz. 389, ¶ 15 (App.
2000)). A party is entitled to a jury instruction on any theory that is
reasonably supported by the evidence. State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, ¶ 16
(1998). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent
of the instruction. State v. Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 9 (App. 2015). The court
may not weigh or resolve conflicts in the evidence, but must decide only
whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Id. The “slightest
evidence” is sufficient to support a jury instruction. Id. (quoting State v.
King, 225 Ariz. 87, ¶ 14 (2010)).

¶33            We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
providing the instruction. Sufficient evidence supported the theory that
Rios had knowingly controlled the stolen vehicle and other property, given
the surveillance video and the vehicle being found close to his home. We
reject Rios’s argument that this theory presumes that he must have been
caught in possession of the property. The jury could reasonably infer from
those circumstances that Rios had knowingly controlled the property.

¶34           Rios also notes that the state did not request an optional
instruction under A.R.S. § 13-2305 that allows jurors to infer from certain
types of evidence that a defendant controlled stolen property. But Rios has
pointed to nothing to suggest that the jury is precluded from making the
same inference based on other evidence. Nor does A.R.S. § 13-2305 contain
such a suggestion.

                               DISPOSITION

¶35           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Rios’s convictions and
sentences.

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