Court Opinion

ID: 9640352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:04:08.363676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:29.296389
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

I agree with the majority that there is no evidence of negligence on the part of Mrs. Spampinato, and that a directed verdict should have been granted as to her. However, in my view jury questions were presented as to the primary negligence of Mrs. Horak in allegedly signalling Miss Dix to cross the street in front of her bus and as to the contributory negligence of Miss Dix in relying upon the hand signal to assume that her passage was clear.
As the majority points out, a pedestrian who leaves a position of safety for a position of peril between street crossings has often been held to be contributorily negligent. Reid v. Pegg, 256 Md. 289, 260 A. 2d 38 (1969); Vokroy, Adm’r v. Johnson, 233 Md. 269, 273-274, 196 A. 2d 451 (1964); Leonard v. Hanson, 225 Md. 76, 79, 169 A. 2d 459 (1961). But the mere fact that a pedestrian crosses between intersections does not alone create a presumption of negligence on his part. Whether a pedestrian is negligent in crossing a street at a place other than a crosswalk may, depending upon the circumstances, be for the jury. As the Court stated in Ebert Ice Cream Co. v. Eaton, 171 Md. 30, 37, 187 A. 865 (1936):
“It has been held by this Court, contrary to some text-writers, that it is not prim,a facie evidence of *40negligence for a pedestrian to cross a street between intersections, but that ‘the question is one of ordinary care only, entirely for the jury.’ ”
See Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185, 206, 249 A. 2d 112 (1967); MacKenzie v. Reesey, 235 Md. 381, 386, 201 A. 2d 848 (1964); Nance v. Kalkman, 223 Md. 564, 569, 165 A. 2d 757 (1960); Henderson v. Brown, 214 Md. 463, 468, 135 A. 2d 881 (1957).
In the instant case, Miss Dix produced evidence that Mrs. Horak, the operator of the Volkswagen bus, stopped her vehicle in front of Miss Dix, who was then standing in the center line of the street, and signalled her to cross the street in front of the bus. Miss Dix, who' is 5 feet 3 inches in height, testified that her vision of oncoming vehicles was blocked by Mrs. Horak’s bus. It is apparent therefore that Mrs. Horak may have been in a better position to observe the traffic than was Miss Dix. While Mrs. Horak was under no duty to direct Miss Dix to cross the street, having attempted to do so she was bound to exercise ordinary care. Haralson v. Jones Truck Line, 223 Ark. 813, 270 S.W.2d 892, 895, 48 A.L.R.2d 248 (1954); Wulf v. Rebbun, 25 Wis. 2d 499, 131 N.W.2d 303, 306 (1964). See Penna. R.R. Co. v. Yingling, 148 Md. 169, 176-177, 129 A. 36 (1925). As Judge Cardozo stated in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, 276, 23 A.L.R. 1425 (1922), “It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.”
I would adopt, under the circumstances of this case, the view of the majority of jurisdictions which have held that the intended meaning of a driver’s signal to cross a street and. the significance such a signal might reasonably convey to a pedestrian are jury questions. See, e.g., Spagnola v. New Method Laundry Co., 112 Conn. 399, 152 A. 403 (1930); Gamet v. Jenks, 38 Mich. App. 719, 197 N.W,2d 160, 164 (1972); Sweet v. Ringwelski, 362 Mich. 138, 106 N.W.2d 742 (1961); Riley v. Board of Education, Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 15 App. Div. 2d 303, 223 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1962); Armstead v. *41Holbert, 146 W. Va. 582, 122 S.E.2d 43 (1961); Wulf v. Rebbun, supra.
Judge Levine authorizes me to state that he concurs in the views expressed herein.