Court Opinion

ID: 9643676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:37:10.798167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:56.509015
License: Public Domain

Murphy, C.J.,

dissenting:

The Court today adopts a strained interpretation of Maryland’s death penalty statute and thereby nullifies the death penalty imposed on Martin Francis Scott by a sentencing jury of his peers. There are at least three reasons why the introduction of Scott’s confessions to (and other probative evidence of his participation in) the murders of two other persons was not improper. First, in Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982), we decided the precise issue raised here in favor of admissibility, and that case should be accorded controlling precedential significance. Second, the language of the statute is clear and fully supports the admission of this evidence. There is absolutely no *254ambiguity in the statute that would justify the Court’s futile search for legislative history to support its statutory interpretation. Finally, the evidence was properly admitted to assist the jury in evaluating the force of a concededly mitigating circumstance raised by the appellant, i.e., that he had not previously been convicted of a crime of violence.1 For these reasons, I most emphatically dissent.
I.
The Court’s decision today flatly contradicts our Johnson decision in both letter and spirit. That case extended the established principle in non-capital cases that the sentencer may view reliable evidence of criminal conduct for which a person has not yet been tried:
"There is no reason in principle why this concept of sentencing should not apply in a section 413 death penalty proceeding even though the sentencing authority can, by election of the defendant, be reposed in either judge or jury. We observe nothing in the enactment which in any way contradicts this view, and in fact, a fair reading of the statute, particularly section 413 (c), embraces it.” 292 Md. at 442, 439 A.2d at 563.
Beyond the absence of conflict within the statute itself, positive reasons were given for extending the rule:
"In our view, part (v) in unambiguous terms authorizes the trial court to admit into evidence before the sentencing jury identical information concerning a defendant’s criminal conduct as would normally be considered by the judge if he were imposing sentence in a non-death penalty case. As is true in all other criminal causes, the sentencing *255authority in a death penalty case should be presented with a full range of relevant information so as to fashion a particular penalty in accord with 'the prevalent modern penal philosophy of individualized punishment.’ Logan v. State, [289 Md. 460, 481, 425 A.2d 632, 643 (1981)]. The task that the sentencer must perform in this regard is thus basically no different from that carried out daily by trial judges in other types of cases. Therefore, evidence of a convicted person’s confession to prior criminal conduct, voluntarily made, may be admitted at sentencing pursuant to section 413 (c) (v) if the court deems it to be of probative value and relevant to sentence, 'provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements’ and challenge their voluntariness. Those jurisdictions which have addressed the question here presented are in substantial accord with this view.” 292 Md. at 442-43, 439 A.2d at 563.
As we noted in Johnson, the Supreme Court has endorsed these principles in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 941 (1976) ("What is essential is that the [sentencing] jury [in a death penalty case] have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.”); 2 and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976) ("[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”).
*256Although the Court notes that the question presented here is virtually identical to that decided in Johnson, it does not find that case dispositive, characterizing the discussion of the issue there as "dicta.” Such a characterization is misleading at best. Where a point has been raised or argued by the parties, and the court decides the question with a view to settle the law, what is said is not dicta. All that is necessary to render a decision of this Court authoritative on any point decided is to show that there was an application of the judicial mind to the precise question adjudged. Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, 488-89 (1854). Accord, McGraw v. Merryman, 133 Md. 247, 257, 104 A. 540, 543-44 (1918); Carstairs v. Cochran, 95 Md. 488, 499-500, 52 A. 601 (1902), aff'd 193 U.S. 11 (1904); Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239, 261 (1867). It does not lessen the authority of the opinion if the case was decided on another ground, U. Rwys. & E. Co. v. M. & C.C. of Balto., 121 Md. 552, 558, 88 A. 617, 620 (1913); Carstairs v. Cochran, supra, or if the opinion was for the guidance of the trial court on retrial, as in Johnson. See State Roads Comm. v. Johnson, 222 Md. 493, 499, 161 A.2d 444, 448 (1960). It is not necessary for the point to have been directly presented or fully argued in the former case, as long as it was at least indirectly raised or was directly involved in the issues argued. State Roads Comm. v. Johnson, supra; Michael v. Morey, supra. Thus, the Court’s distinction that the precise formulation of the argument here was not presented in Johnson is simply not relevant, since the critical inquiry is whether the issue was raised and decided in the earlier case, not whether argument on the issue covered the same points. In Johnson, we held that nothing in the statute (necessarily including § 413 (c) (1) (i) and (iii)) contradicts the position that probative evidence of criminal activity short of criminal conviction may be made available to the sentencing jury. By failing to acknowledge the authority of Johnson, the Court avoids the necessity of showing that that case was incorrectly decided. Rather than overruling Johnson, the Court simply ignores it and treats the issue as one of first impression. The trial court’s careful jury instructions here complied fully with Johnson in *257directing the proper use of this evidence by the jury. When we have so recently and clearly interpreted a statute, and the interpretation has been relied on by the trial courts of Maryland, it is inappropriate and detrimental to the public perception of the judicial process to engage in such a sudden reversal of position, absent some compelling need not here present.
The Court notes that some jurisdictions considering "similar questions under varying circumstances and for varying reasons” have reached the same result as the majority does here. The Court’s qualifying phrases are well advised. Two of the cases relied upon excluded evidence of "pending charges,” rather than evidence of confessions and/or eyewitness testimony, as in the present case and in Johnson. See Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251 (Ala. 1979); Perry v. State, 395 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1980). The remaining case found a constitutional basis for refusing to allow evidence of criminal activity to serve as a statutory aggravating circumstance to support imposition of the death penalty. See State v. McCormick, 397 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1979) (statutory aggravating circumstance violates Due Process). The Court here does not base its decision on constitutional grounds, nor has the challenged evidence been used to prove the existence of an aggravating circumstance. Cf. Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1981). In short, the cases cited by the majority are at best weakly relevant. The support is further undercut and offset by cases holding to the contrary, cases consistent with the result reached in Johnson. See, e.g., People v. Easley, 33 Cal.3d 65, 654 P.2d 1272, 187 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1982); People v. Harris, 28 Cal.3d 935, 623 P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981); Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 (1981); Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902 (1981); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc). See also United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711, 452 P.2d 607, 76 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969) *258(en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58 (1971) (pre-Furman cases).
II.
The Court’s disregard for the authority of Johnson would be somewhat mitigated if the result it reached was supported by sound reasoning. It is not. In examining the language of § 413, the Court begins with an unsupported assumption about the purpose of the statute, and then proceeds to use that assumption to interpret the statute in a way that supports the original assumption. The bootstrapping process begins with the assertion that § 413 (c) (1) "establishes a statutory scheme designed to delimit and circumscribe the type of evidence admissible in sentencing proceedings in death penalty cases.” After identifying the categories of evidence made admissible by § 413 (c) (1) (i) through (iv), the Court proclaims: "The language of these provisions collectively unambiguously restricts the type of evidence admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case to something less inclusive than what generally is admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a nondeath penalty case.” The obvious flaw in the Court’s reasoning is that this analysis excludes § 413 (c) (1) (v), the very provision at issue here. By dismembering the statute and ignoring the provision nominally being construed, the Court finds that § 413 (c) (1) strictly limits admissible evidence to narrow, enumerated categories. Therefore, since (1) § 413 (c) (1) (i) makes evidence relating to a mitigating circumstance admissible, (2) one of the mitigating circumstances, § 413 (g) (1) is the absence of a conviction of a crime of violence, and (3) evidence of a crime of violence short of that listed in the mitigating circumstance might tend to "wipe out” the weight given to the mitigating circumstance, the Court concludes that such evidence is inadmissible as not being within the "limits” of § 413 (g) (1) and § 413(c)(1) (i). Using similar logic, § 413 (c) (1) (iii) is interpreted as "restrict[ing] the type of evidence relating to other crimes that is admissible to evidence of other crimes for which there has been a conviction.”
*259Only after examining the "context” of the statute being construed in isolation and drawing its conclusions, does the Court turn to the statute itself. Although acknowledging that the plain and unambiguous language of § 413 (c) (1) (v) provides that under certain circumstances "any other evidence” is admissible, the Court nonetheless finds that if evidence short of a conviction is admitted, § 413 (c) (1) (i) and (iii), as interpreted, "would be surplusage or meaningless.” Although the Court does not acknowledge it, the rationale used to reach its conclusion would in fact render § 413 (c) (1) (v) "surplusage or meaningless,” since no evidence outside the narrow categories created in § 413 (c) (1) (i) through (iv) would be admissible.
The Court’s reasoning is a textbook illustration why a statute must be construed in context rather than isolated as the Court does here, and the provisions harmonized rather than needlessly set in conflict. When the full text of § 413 (c) (1) is examined,3 it is patently evident that § 413 (c) (1) (i) through (iv) delineates categories of evidence that are to be admissible per se in a sentencing hearing. Section 413 (c) (1) (v) completes the picture by providing for the admissibility of other evidence, but only if the court finds that it has probative value and is relevant to sentence, and further that *260the defendant has been accorded a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence. As with other proffers of evidence, if the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, the court may in its discretion exclude it. Thus, the subsections of § 413 (c) (1) define types of evidence which are or may be admissible, and provide standards to guide that process. With one exception, § 413 (c) (1) does not exclude evidence. That exception is § 413 (c) (1) (iv), which explicitly excludes sentence recommendations contained in admissible presentence investigation reports. The basis for the exclusion is apparently the accepted principle that opinions of other persons as to the ultimate decision before the sentencer should not be received in evidence. Indeed, the language of § 413 (c) (1) (v) stands in open rebuttal to the Court’s assumption as to the purpose of the section. By supplementing the specifically enumerated categories of admissible evidence, § 413 (c) (1) (v) assures that all possible relevant information will be before the sentencer. Thus construed, there is no ambiguity or conflict within the statute.4
*261Having created a spurious ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court seeks support for its view in the legislative history of the Act, citing language of bills rejected by the Legislature or vetoed by the Governor. The only arguably relevant history cited is a letter from the Governor’s Chief Legislative Officer to the General Assembly concerning the bill which eventually was enacted. In a discussion of the scope of a mitigating circumstance (§ 413 (g) (1)), the letter notes that, rather than limiting the mitigating circumstance to a defendant with no significant history of prior criminal activity, "the draft limits the type of past criminal activity [which would preclude finding the mitigating circumstance] to that which is relevant to the decision in a murder case [i.e. a crime of violence].” In other words, in the absence of a conviction of a crime of violence, the defendant must be accorded the benefit of the mitigating circumstance listed in § 413 (g) (1). As we held in Johnson, supra, this is so even where there is reliable evidence of a crime of violence committed by the defendant for which he has not yet been convicted. However, there is, very simply, nothing in the legislative history of the death penalty statute to indicate that the legislature intended to exclude this type of evidence from the sentencing authority’s consideration.
III.
Aside from questions of stare decisis or the proper interpretation of § 413 (c) (1), the challenged evidence was properly admitted as relating to a mitigating circumstance advanced by the defendant — the absence of a conviction for a crime of violence. The State conceded, as it had to, that the defendant had not, as of the trial date, been convicted of such a crime. However, the State was entitled to present evidence relating to the mitigating circumstance to aid the sentencing jury in interpreting and evaluating the circum*262stance in its decision-making process. See, e.g., Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972). The mitigating value of the circumstances derives from the inference that the murder was an isolated event rather than the culmination of a series of other violent crimes committed by the defendant. Here, reliable evidence of two other murders, one before and one after the instant crime, is of obvious value in properly weighing the mitigating circumstance. That the evidence may convince the sentencer that the circumstance should be afforded little mitigating weight does not render it inadmissible; indeed, that is the purpose for its introduction. The sentencing authority must be guided by the aggravating and mitigating factors, but may not be limited to an uninformed or arithmetic balancing of these factors. The Supreme Court recently considered a challenge to a death sentence based in part on the sentencer’s use of personal experiences in weighing the statutory factors. In upholding the sentence, the Court opined:
"We have never suggested that the United States Constitution requires that the sentencing process should be transformed into a rigid and mechanical parsing of statutory aggravating factors. But to attempt to separate the sentencer’s decision from his experiences would inevitably do precisely that. It is entirely fitting for the moral, factual, and legal judgment of judges and juries to play a meaningful role in sentencing. We expect that sentencers will exercise their discretion in their own way and to the best of their ability. As long as that discretion is guided in a constitutionally adequate way, see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976), and as long as the decision is not so wholly arbitrary as to offend the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment cannot and should not demand more.” Barclay v. Florida, U.S. [33 Crim. L. Rptr. 3292, 3295 (filed July 6, 1983)].
The Court today unwisely places a set of blinders on the sentencing authority which severely limits its access to *263relevant and probative evidence so vitally necessary in discharging its sentencing function. For the reasons stated, I cannot subscribe to the Court’s decision in this case.
Judges Smith and Rodowsky have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein.

. Another mitigating circumstance upon which such evidence may impact is set forth in § 413 (g) (7), viz, that "[i]t is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”

. Jurek is instructive as to the scope of relevant information properly admissible in the sentencing proceeding. In that case, the Supreme Court quoted with approval from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion to the effect that the jury "could consider the range and severity of [the defendant’s] prior criminal conduct” in addition to "whether [he] had a significant criminal record.” 428 U.S. at 272-73.

. "(c) Evidence; argument; instructions. — (1) The following type of evidence is admissible in this proceeding:
(i) Evidence relating to any mitigating circumstance listed in subsection (g);
(ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating circumstance listed in subsection (d) of which the State had notified the defendant pursuant to § 412 (b);
(iii) Evidence of any prior criminal convictions, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, or the absence of such prior convictions or pleas, to the same extent admissible in other sentencing procedures;
(iv) Any presentence investigation report. However, any recommendation as to sentence contained in the report is not admissible; and
(v) Any other evidence that the Court deems of probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements.”
Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 413 (c) (1).

. The provisions of the Maryland statute are somewhat more detailed than those contained in the Model Penal Code’s death penalty provisions, but similar broad language is used for the admissibility of other types of evidence:
"In addition, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant’s character, background, history, mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. Any such evidence, not legally privileged, which the Court deems to have probative force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant’s counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence.”
Model Penal Code, § 210.6 (2), 10 Uniform Laws Annotated (1974).
"In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendants character, background, history, mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. Any such evidence, not legally privileged, which the Court deems to have probative force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant’s counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence.”
*261Id. (alternative § 210.6 (2)).
See generally, id. (1983 Supp.), Model Sentencing and Convictions Act, § 3-109 (1) ("If appropriate for the offense, aggravating factors, if not themselves necessary elements of the offense, may include ... the defendant has a recent history of convictions or criminal behavior.”).