Court Opinion

ID: 9853625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:51:18.885567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:56.488767
License: Public Domain

Felton, J.,
concurring specially. I concur in the judgment and the opinion but desire to make an additional observation. The motor carrier contends that there was no causal relation between the failure to mark the bus and the injuries because of the provisions of § 68-303 (h). The answer to that contention is that Code § 68-303 (h) and § 68-311 are inconsistent and so much so that § 68-303 (h) must be construed to apply to all passenger-carrying vehicles except those required to be marked as school busses, and if the bus had been marked, the defendant, Henry M. Riley, would have violated Code § 68-310 if he did not stop, instead of § 68-303 (h), because he would *509have then been charged with knowledge of the presence of school children. The two sections cannot apply to' school busses because § 68-310 makes no provision under any circumstances for proceeding past the school bus while standing. So, the petition sets forth a cause of action against the motor carrier for negligence in failing to mark the bus as required by law as there is no presumption that Riley would have failed to stop for the bus because he did not comply with Code § 68-303 (h).