Court Opinion

ID: 9460062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:39:39.972074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:27.353846
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I regret that I must dissent.
I am convinced beyond any shadow of a reasonable doubt that this Court stands, starkly, without jurisdiction of this appeal.
The chronology of the matter is that:
On May 3, 1972, the District Court entered an order which determined with finality that a preliminary injunction would be denied and a stay of the suit would be granted.
The petitioners sought leave to appeal from this interlocutory order, 28 U.S.C., § 1292(b). On June 5, 1972, a panel of this Court [Judges Bell, Dyer, and Clark] denied the requested leave.
Apparently, however, the panel was under the impression that petitioners had filed notice of appeal from the denial of the preliminary injunction, 28 U. S.C. § 1292(a). Accordingly, the panel further ordered that “this cause be docketed pursuant to 28 U.S.C., § 1292(a)”.
The fatal difficulty is that no such notice had been attempted, much less filed. While the Judges did not know this, the petitioners certainly did.
Under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the petitioners could as a matter of right have filed the required notice on or before June 3. Upon a showing of excusable neglect, an extension could have been sought at any time prior to July 2. This they made no effort to do.
In the absence of a notice of appeal the panel was without jurisdiction to order the ease docketed under § 1292(a). A petition for leave to appeal is an entirely different animal from a notice of appeal taken as a matter of right.
While the answer to this can never be known, I doubt seriously that the panel would have entered the order to docket under § 1292(a) if it had been made aware that an indispensable jurisdictional prerequisite was entirely non-existent.
In any event, these petitioners had from June 3 to July 2, almost thirty days, in which to have sought the extension allowed by the Rule.
Despite all this, my Brethren hold that we have jurisdiction. This is done, apparently, on the theory that since the panel, in an administrative order, directed the transfer the petitioners ought to be allowed to rely on it. In the oft used words of our late Brother Hutcheson, “This will not do”. Courts cannot confer jurisdiction upon themselves simply by ordering it. Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction except that conferred upon them by constitution or statute. Most assuredly, they cannot exercise jurisdiction in contravention of an express statute.
This is not a criminal prosecution and notice of appeal has not been frustrated or delayed by imprisonment, fraud, or other factors beyond the control of the appellant. In the absence of such complications, most certainly in a civil ease, the lack of a notice of appeal within thirty days, or a permissible extension of time Rule 4(a) F.R.A.P., the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction.
For some of our most recent cases so holding, see Lawrence v. Wainwright, 5 *51Cir., 1968, 401 F.2d 177; Gann v. Smith, 5 Cir., 1971, 443 F.2d 352; Jackson v. Decker, 5 Cir., 1971, 451 F.2d 348; Smith v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 5 Cir., 1972, 460 F.2d 279; Gulf-Tampa Drydock Co. v. Vessel Virginia Trader, 5 Cir., 1970, 435 F.2d 150.
The opinion of the Court says that “Courts of appeals have discretion, when the interests of substantive justice require it, to disregard irregularities in the form or procedure for filing a notice of appeal”, but this case involves no irregularity. There was no notice of appeal, whatever, even though there was a Petition for Leave to Appeal under an entirely different subsection of the applicable statute. I must confess that I am considerably alarmed by subsequent language of the opinion which would lead both the unwary and the subtle to believe that the plainly written, clearly understandable requirements for the attachment of appellate jurisdiction are easily to be circumvented, if a Court should be of the mind to permit it.
I must also point to my disagreement with the “finding of fact” [Page 46 of the Opinion] that the “plaintiffs’ failure to file a notice in the district court was a good faith error, resulting from the plaintiffs’ reliance on this Court’s order directing the appeal under § 1292(a)(1)”. We, of course, are not a fact finding tribunal. If we were, I would point out that the thirty day period for filing the required notice of appeal expired before the entry of the Transfer Order in this Court. If appellants could act in good faith on an occurrence that had not yet taken place they must be congratulated upon the possession of a prescience rarely encountered in human experience.
After all, this appeal is from an interlocutory order and a final hearing on the merits, with the subsequent right of appeal, is yet in the wings.
I would dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.