Court Opinion

ID: 9951401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 22:02:43.695109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:00.989854
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 P. v. Girdner CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081498

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD280537)

 MARTIN LEE GIRDNER,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lisa R. Rodriguez, Judge. Affirmed.
         Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                               INTRODUCTION
         On a rainy Valentine’s Day in 2019, Appellant Martin Lee Girdner’s
girlfriend called 911 because he was acting strangely. After he fired a rifle
from his front yard, numerous uniformed police officers arrived. When the
officers announced themselves, Girdner ran into the backyard.
      After hearing a gunshot from the backyard, the officers called in the
SWAT team to take over. Once SWAT officers arrived, they set up a
perimeter around the home. Two officers on the right side of the house near
the backyard saw Girdner come into view and told him to show his hands.
When Girdner instead pointed a gun at them, they exchanged gunfire.
Girdner then returned to the house. About 30 minutes later, Girdner
reappeared and pointed a handgun toward where the officers had been
hiding, at which point two snipers shot Girdner. He was then taken into
custody.
      A jury found Girdner guilty of four counts of assault on a peace officer

with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (d)(2); counts 1–4),
one count of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3,
subd. (a); count 5), and one count of drawing or exhibiting a firearm (§ 417,
subd. (a)(2); count 6). It returned true findings on thirteen firearm
allegations. The trial court sentenced Girdner to nine years and eight
months in state prison.
      Girdner contends on appeal that the record lacks legally sufficient
evidence to support his convictions under counts 1 through 4 of assault on a
peace officer with a semi-automatic firearm. Specifically, he argues the
prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the individuals at whom he pointed a
firearm were peace officers lawfully performing their duties.
      We disagree and therefore affirm the judgment.

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
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              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Girdner and his girlfriend, Rebecca L., had lived together for
approximately 20 years. Starting in late 2018, Rebecca suspected Girdner
had started using methamphetamine because “he wasn’t himself.”
      On February 14, 2019, Rebecca was rushing out the door for a morning
meeting when Girdner walked in after having been gone with no explanation
for two days. When she returned a couple hours later, the house had a strong
chemical smell and a bag that looked like a rifle case was sitting near the
kitchen. Girdner announced that he was going to marry April that night,
which shocked Rebecca because April was her daughter-in-law. She walked
into another room and quietly texted her son and April to get out of their
house because she said Girdner “is crazy” and “[h]e’s got his guns.” She then
left the house again because she did not know what Girdner might do.
      Rebecca drove to a nearby park and called the police. Her son also

called the police.2 The next-door neighbor subsequently heard two shots and
saw Girdner walking back and forth from the front yard to the backyard with
an 18-inch-long gun. When Rebecca’s brother drove by looking for her,
Girdner pointed a rifle at his car.
      San Diego Police Officer Corey Stasch, a member of the SWAT team’s
special response K-9 team, received a call for service for a 5150 involving
someone who had possibly used methamphetamine at Girdner’s home. He
described a 5150 as a call to speak with a person suspected of being a danger

2     At trial, Rebecca’s son testified that Girdner had admitted to having
started using methamphetamine about six months prior. He also explained
that Girdner was very paranoid and had long thought the police and the
government were evil and were out to get him. Girdner had also expressed
his belief that bad things happened to law enforcement officers as retribution
from God for times the police had hassled him.
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to themselves or others, or who is gravely disabled. Just over a dozen
responding officers met a few blocks away at a staging area to come up with a
plan before approaching Girdner.
      As Officer Stasch and another officer approached the front of the house
on foot, Officer Stasch made eye contact with Girdner and then saw him run
from the front of the house, through a gate, to the backyard. Officer Stasch
was wearing a black K-9 unit uniform with his name embroidered in gold and
San Diego Police Department badges on both shoulders, but he said the other
officers there were wearing blue uniforms with name plates and the same
police badges on their shoulders.
      Within two minutes of approaching the house, he heard a gunshot from
the back of the house. Officer Stasch told the supervisors behind him to call
in a SWAT response because it appeared they were dealing with an armed
and barricaded subject. Several officers then called out to Girdner by name
(saying “Martin”) and said they were from the San Diego Police Department.
In total, Officer Stasch believed the police identified themselves by voice or
over a public announcement (PA) system over 20 times.
      Sometime later, SWAT officers arrived and established a perimeter
around the house. One officer saw Girdner come through the gate with what
appeared to be an ammunition can. The officer called out to him to stop, but
Girdner returned to the backyard.
      An officer flying overhead in a police helicopter notified the dispatcher
that Girdner was “in the two-story structure in the back.” Girdner then ran
out of the building, under some trees, to the doorway of the house. He was
carrying a firearm.
      SWAT Officers Timothy Arreola and Juan Ponce had been dispatched
to cover the right side of the house and were standing in the backyard of the

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neighboring house to the east behind a brown lattice fence. From this
vantage point, they could see into Girdner’s backyard through the fence and
Officer Arreola, who was standing, could see over the fence. Officer Arreola
saw Girdner walking from the direction of the house to the shed and said,

“Let me see your hands.”3 He said Girdner turned and pointed a chrome
handgun in his direction while taking a shooting stance. He and Officer
Ponce both thought Girdner fired at them, and Officer Ponce said he felt a

round go by the left side of his face, so they fired back.4 Neither struck
Girdner. Girdner then fell, got back up, disappeared from view, and then

reappeared and headed toward the house.5
      A recording from the helicopter shows Girdner later coming out from
under an awning with his right hand pointing a firearm toward where the
officers were hiding next door. Officer Castillo also saw Girdner pointing his
gun at the officers and fired two rounds at him but missed.
      Two snipers and another SWAT officer were positioned on a hill behind
the house. After about 30 minutes, one sniper saw Girdner walking inside
the house toward the back doors with a black gun in his hand. He said it

3     Officer Arreola recalled saying, “Let me see your hands,” but Officer
Ponce’s body worn camera reflects Officer Arreola saying “Hey, put your
hands up” and then Officer Ponce saying, “Let me see your han—” before
being cut off. The transcript from Officer Arreola’s body worn camera
attributes both statements to Officer Arreola.

4      Officer Jacob Castillo, who was stationed in the backyard, also testified
that he heard gunfire from a handgun in addition to rifle fire from the
officers’ rifles.

5    Pursuant to SWAT protocol following a shooting, Officers Arreola and
Ponce were then replaced by Officers Timothy Vollmar and Christopher
Bernard.
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appeared Girdner was trying to aim in the direction of Officers Vollmar and
Bernard, who were now hiding behind the lattice fence. The sniper fired one
shot at Girdner’s upper torso. Girdner dropped to all fours on the outside of
the house. The other sniper saw him raise up his arm and point his gun in
the direction of the officers behind the lattice fence, so he fired one shot and
struck Girdner.
      At that point, one of the officers on the hill reported that Girdner was
lying in the backyard and appeared to be injured. Officers sent in a robot to
ensure he was not armed and then took him into custody.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Girder contends substantial evidence does not support the jury’s
finding that he knew, or reasonably should have known, that the four
individuals at whom he pointed the firearm (Officers Arreola and Ponce who
were then relieved by Officers Vollmar and Bernard) were peace officers
lawfully performing their duties. As a result, he argues there was
insufficient evidence to support his convictions on counts 1 through 4. Absent
substantial evidence, he submits these convictions violated his state and
federal constitutional right to due process of law. We disagree.
A.    Legal Principals and Standard of Review
      In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we must
‘examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—that would support a rational trier of
fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v.
San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657–658 (San Nicolas).) We do not
substitute our own factual determinations for the factfinder’s (People v.
Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1078) as “ ‘[r]esolution of conflicts and

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inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.’ ”
(People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106 (Brown).)
      “The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence
of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.]
The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on
circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit a
defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the
jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably
justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding
does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053–1054.)
B.    Analysis
      The jury convicted Girdner under section 245, subdivision (d)(2) of four
counts of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm. This
subdivision provides that “[a]ny person who commits an assault upon the
person of a peace officer or firefighter with a semiautomatic firearm and who
knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer or
firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties, when the peace
officer or firefighter is engaged in the performance of his or her duties, shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for five, seven, or nine

years.”6 (§ 245, subd. (d)(2).) Girdner does not challenge the findings that he

6     The language in the jury instruction was phrased in the past tense:
“When the defendant acted, he knew, or reasonably should have known, that
the person assaulted was a peace officer who was performing his duties.”
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used a semiautomatic firearm or that the officers were lawfully engaged in
the performance of their duties. His only argument on appeal is that the
prosecution did not present sufficient evidence that he knew, or reasonably
should have known, the four individuals behind the lattice fence were police
officers.
      In analyzing other penal statutes using the language “knew or
reasonably should have known,” appellate courts have confirmed that
whether a defendant actually knew the required information is a subjective
question, whereas “reasonably should have known” is an objective standard.
(See, e.g., People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 230 [construing
section 189, subdivision (f)]; People v. Linwood (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 59,
71–72 [interpreting section 261, subdivision (a)(3)].) Under the objective
standard, “[i]f a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have
been aware of the facts at issue, the defendant is presumed to have such
knowledge.” (Sifuentes, at p. 230.) Thus, the jury here could have found
Girdner guilty if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt either
that he knew the individuals behind the fence were police officers or that a
reasonable person in Girdner’s position would have known they were police
officers.
      In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence here, Girdner argues
there was no evidence he knew the SWAT team was coming or had
surrounded his house. He points out that he could not visually identify the
officers behind the fence because they were not wearing traditional blue
uniforms and the fence and rain obscured his view. He also highlights Officer
Ponce’s testimony that Girdner looked surprised when Officer Arreola yelled
as evidence that he did not know officers were in the backyard. However, as
noted above, the jury was not required to conclude Girdner subjectively knew

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he was assaulting a police officer, so this evidence alone does not undermine
the verdict.
      Turning to the objective test, Girdner suggests the notion that he
should have assumed a coordinated effort was taking place was purely
speculative in a such a high-stress situation, and that the law should not
place the burden on civilians to assume the identity of individuals who have
not properly identified themselves. It is true that “[s]peculation or conjecture
alone is not substantial evidence.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44
Cal.App.4th 634, 651; see also People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 365
[“a jury may not rely upon unreasonable inferences,” and “ ‘[a]n inference is
not reasonable if it is based only on speculation’ ”].) But as Girdner concedes,
nothing in the statute expressly requires all officers to identify themselves.
      Furthermore, in examining the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 657–658), we find
nothing speculative or unreasonable about the jury inferring that Girdner
should have known the men behind the fence were police officers. Girdner
does not dispute that San Diego Police Department officers were in front of
his house, that they saw him with a gun, that they called to him by name and
identified themselves as San Diego police officers over the PA system, or that
when he saw them, he ran to the back of his house. He further acknowledges
evidence showing he brought ammunition to the front of his house. And,
even after officers heard a gunshot from the backyard, Girdner did not heed
instructions by the officers in the front yard to come to the front of the house
with his hands up. Under these circumstances, the jury could fairly conclude
that a reasonable person would infer that if the police knew he was armed,
likely had fired a gun in a residential neighborhood, and was not obeying
police commands, officers would not simply wait in front of the house

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indefinitely or leave. Rather, they would take action to protect the neighbors
or to apprehend the suspect.
      Additionally, the evidence clearly showed that a police helicopter was
circling over his home during most of the events in question. This
demonstrated both that the police were continuing to monitor him and that
they felt it appropriate to monitor the back, as well as the front, of the home.
Within this context, when Officers Arreola and Ponce said, “[h]ey, put your
hands up” and “[l]et me see your hands,” a reasonable person would logically
infer it was police officers speaking to him. This is particularly true given
that the officers addressing him over the loudspeaker had repeatedly
referenced showing them his hands. The transcript from Officer Stasch’s
body worn camera alone reflects Officer Stasch and the officer on the PA
system instructing Girdner a total of 16 times to come out with his hands up
and free of weapons, including identical orders of “put your hands up” and
“[l]et me see your hands.” “We ‘must accept logical inferences that the jury
might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence’ ” (People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357) and affirm the judgment where, as here, the
circumstances reasonably justified the jury’s findings. (Kraft, supra,
23 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)
      At best, Girdner’s implausible argument that he had no reason to know
it was peace officers, as opposed to other random armed individuals
coincidentally hiding behind the fence at the same time that a police standoff
was underway, asks us to reweigh the evidence and make different
inferences. This is not our role in a substantial evidence review. (Brown,
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 106.) Reversal is warranted only if “it appears ‘that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to

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support [the conviction]’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331), and
that is not the case here.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                       HUFFMAN, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

KELETY, J.

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