Court Opinion

ID: 9513293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:33:54.226359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:48.696480
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
[¶ 38] I concur in part 1 and all but ¶ 25 of part 2 of the majority opinion. Because I am not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made, I dissent from ¶ 25 of part 2 and from parts 3 and 4. See ¶ 27; Linrud v. Linrud, 552 N.W.2d 342, 345 (N.D. 1996).
[¶39] The majority’s parts 3 and 4 lack internal coherence, and are perhaps best understood by remembering: “A camel is a horse designed by a committee.” At ¶ 27, the majority writes: “Here, we are definitely and firmly convinced that it was a mistake to keep these former spouses together in a business relationship that will inevitably lead to more litigation.” The majority then proceeds to contradict its professed “definite and firm conviction” the trial court erred by failing to disentangle when it split the stock ownership. At ¶ 35, it says “the trial court should reconsider its split of the stock ownership” (emphasis added). At ¶36, “we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the split of stock ownership,” “[i]f it can be done”; “[o]n the other hand, if disentanglement is precluded” and “why disentanglement is not fairly possible” (emphasis added). A “nagging concern” an error may or may not have been made is not a ground for reversal.
[¶ 40] I would affirm.
[¶ 41] Dale V. Sandstrom