Court Opinion

ID: 9696994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:03:05.699353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:28.435251
License: Public Domain

Rogosheske, Justice
(dissenting).
The only point of my disagreement is the conclusion that defendant Barnard’s negligence is a superseding cause as a matter of law, thus insulating any negligence of defendant Gabrielson occasioning the first impact with the Barnard vehicle. Mindful of the almost insurmountable task of conveying to a jury the concept of causation in this type of case, I believe that it was error not to submit the issue to the jury. Even though it may be arguable, I cannot agree that this case, in the posture it comes before us for review, can be classified as one where a superseding cause appears as a matter of law.
For the purpose of analysis we must assume that defendant Gabrielson was negligent in scraping defendant Barnard’s vehicle and *350that defendant Barnard was thereafter negligent in violating provisions of the Highway Traffic Regulation Act. Our prior decisions, I believe, declare that before an intervening act can be found' to be a superseding cause, all of the following elements must be present: (1) The harmful effects of the second actor’s negligence must have occurred after the negligence of the first actor; (2) the second actor’s negligence must be independent of the first actor’s negligence in the sense that it must not have been brought about by the negligence of the first actor;1 (3) the second actor’s negligence must actively work to bring about a result which would not otherwise have followed from the negligence of the first actor; and (4) the second actor’s negligence must not have been reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer.2 Applying the foregoing principles, it certainly can be said that defendant Barnard’s negligence was a superseding cause if the evidence conclusively established that such negligence was independent of the negligence of defendant Gabrielson. Since I believe the evidence and the inferences therefrom on this issue were regarded by the trial court as disputed, the jury should have been permitted to determine whether the negligence of defendant Gabrielson was a concurring cause or was superseded by the negligence of defendant Barnard. The trial court concluded that defendant Barnard’s negligence was a jury question. If that is correct, it logically follows that the only justification for her conduct must be found by considering the factors provoking such conduct. If pursuing defendant Gabrielson in the manner she did can be justified, defendant Gabrielson’s original negligence could then only be disregarded if it is declared to have played no part in causing the accident and is, therefore, not a legal cause thereof.
As suggested by the trial court, the facts more readily support a hold*351ing that defendant Barnard was negligent as a matter of law because, as the majority reasons, she exercised a conscious rather than an instinctive choice in attempting to stop defendant Gabrielson. If such were our holding, it would logically follow that such negligence of defendant Barnard was not brought about by the original negligence of defendant Gabrielson. As a matter of law, therefore, her negligence would be a superseding cause. Approaching it another way, withdrawing the issue of causation occasioned by the original negligence of defendant Gabrielson could also be justified on the ground that, even though as a fact it provoked the chain of events, as a matter of law it was not a legal cause because it played no part in bringing about the accident. Under this view the only remaining jury issue concerning defendant Gabrielson’s liability would be the claim that he was also negligent after he observed, or should have observed, defendant Barnard'; and that such negligence was a concurring cause of the accident.
If we support the trial court in holding that defendant Barnard’s negligence was an issue for the jury, it seems inescapable to me that the trial court should have also submitted to the jury the issue of whether or not defendant Barnard’s negligence was a superseding cause of the accident.
I believe we must grant a new trial.

Henjum v. Bok, 261 Minn. 74, 110 N. W. (2d) 461.

Robinson v. Butler, 226 Minn. 491, 33 N. W. (2d) 821, 4 A.L.R. (2d) 143; Medved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 19 N. W. (2d) 788; Restatement, Torts, § 442 (the Robinson case is cited in the 1954 supplement); Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 185; Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19. See also the instruction on superseding cause proposed by District Judges Association Committee on Jury Instruction Guides.