Court Opinion

ID: 9716386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:37:12.024428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:44.992926
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE DOWNING, specially concurring: I concur with the result in this case except with the reasoning of my colleagues in reaching their result in denying plaintiff’s motion to dismiss this appeal. The majority state that “* * * under Supreme Court Rule 272, we hold that when the trial judge does not require the submission of a written judgment order, a judgment is entered of record when it is recorded in the law record book.” I do not think that is what the rule says or means, or if it does, then I submit that the portion of Rule 272 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 171, ch. 110A, par. 272) applicable to the occasion when written judgment orders are not filed should be re-examined. In this particular case we are dealing with a judgment entered orally by the trial court upon a verdict rendered by a jury in a civil case involving a personal injury. Section 68 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 68) provides: “(1) It is sufficient for the jury to pronounce their verdict by their foreman in open court, without reducing it to writing, if it is a general verdict. The clerk shall enter it in form, under the direction of the court. (2) Promptly upon the return of a verdict, the court shall enter judgment thereon.” As provided in Supreme Court Rule 2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, par. 2), “‘Judgment’ also includes decree, determination, decision, order, or portion thereof.” It is clear to me from the foregoing, a judgment must and can be entered only by the trial court. In this case there is no dispute that promptly upon the return of the jury verdict on May 24, 1972 at approximately 5 P.M., the trial judge in open court, with a deputy clerk present, pronounced judgment on the verdict. In Cook County it is the custom for the deputy clerk to memorialize the judgments in a minute book maintained for each courtroom. In this case the minute book record contains a stamped entry of May 24 and a manual longhand entry of May 25. As provided in section 68(2) of the Civil Practice Act, the trial court promptly entered judgment. This was the judicial act necessary to give effect to the meaning of the term “Judgment” as defined in Supreme Court Rule 2. But, as I understand the majority opinion, it holds that it is not the date of the judicial act which controls, rather it is the actual date the ministerial act is performed by the clerk in transcribing that judgment to the law record book which controls. This removes the control for the entry of a judgment from the trial judge to the clerk and opens the door to possible error or abuse — which can be brought about either by neglect or mischief. The statutory duties of the clerk of a circuit court as set forth in section 14 of “An Act * * * in relation to clerks of courts” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 25, par. 14), so far as pertinent, are as follows: “They shall enter of record all judgments, decrees and orders of their respective courts, as soon after the rendition or making thereof as practicable.” The characterization of the clerk’s act in entering or recording a judgment as “ministerial” and the distinction between that act and the judicial act of rendering a judgment has been a basic concept recognized since the common law. (See The Governor v. Dodd (1876), 81 Ill. 162; Smyth v. Fargo (1923), 307 Ill. 300, 306, 138 N.E. 610.) In fact the clerks of court for many years have been held liable to any party suffering injury thereby for any failure to perform an official duty. (See The Governor v. Dodd, supra.) Thus, in the instant case, if, as the result of the cleric’s ministerial act of recording erroneously tire date of judgment, a party is denied the right of appeal, the remedy may well be for an action for damages, if any, against the clerk; and, in fact, might well subject the clerk to the penalty provided in section 15 of “An Act * * * in relation to clerks of courts.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 25, par. 15. The case of Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp (1950), 406 Ill. 295, 94 N.E.2d 139, cited by the majority, concerned the question of the effective date of a written judgment order mailed by the trial judge, located in one city, to the clerk at tire county seat with an accompanying letter with directions that the order be filed “ * the next day there is oourt in Louisville the appropriate docket entries can be made.’” (406 Ill. 295, 297.) In Freeport the order was dated and mailed June 15, 1948, received by the clerk on June 16, 1948, and entered by the presiding judge on June 24, 1948. The supreme court went on to say, at page 299: “It is equally clear that a judgment exists in this State from the time the court acts even though it may not have been formally written on the record by the clerk. [Citations.] And there is a well-recognized distinction between rendering a judgment and entering a judgment. The former is the judicial act * * * the latter is the ministerial act of the clerk * * *. The terms are used antithetically, each in its distinctive correct legal sense.” The court further added, at page 300: “[A] judgment is rendered when the judge acts, as a duly constituted court, in declaring his decision of law and pronouncing judgment thereon in open court.” (Emphasis supplied.) Applying those principles in the instant case, the record clearly establishes that the trial judge, acting as a duly constituted court with a deputy clerk present, pronounced in open court the judgment in this case on May 24, 1972. The clerk should have recorded the judgment in the law record book as of May 24, 1972. In People ex rel. Schwartz v. Fagerholm (1959), 17 Ill.2d 131, 137, 161 N.E.2d 20, our supreme court considered the question of when does a judgment become effective. There the court held that at law a judgment becomes effective at the time it is pronounced. So far as my research is concerned, I have been unable to find a reported case on all fours with the instant case, either before or after the effective date for Rule 272. In Cook County there are many cases, both civil and criminal, for which a written judgment is not filed. When there is no written judgment, I can find nothing in the wording of Rule 272 or the “Committee Comments” which was intended to emasculate the distinction between “judicial” and “ministerial acts.” Many of the cases that preceded Rule 272 arose, as did Freeport and Fagerholm, out of situations created by a judge preparing an order on one date and at one location, then forwarding the said order to the clerk to be filed of record on a different date and location. The problem in the instant case was caused by the clerical or ministerial processing of a judgment on May 25, pronounced in open court on May 24. So far as this record is concerned, the judgment was entered May 24, 1972, and should have been so recorded. However, in the practical application of the majority holding, hereafter a clerk may not enter the judgment in the law record for a period of time longer than one day. I doubt this was intended by Rule 272. If so, then some thought should be given both by the practicing bar and trial courts of requiring written orders, or in the alternative, there should be a re-examination of the wording of the last sentence of Rule 272.