Court Opinion

ID: 9850020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:51:06.961403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.481929
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. The petition in this case does not allege that the owner of the automobile either expressly or impliedly authorized his son to permit another person to operate the automobile which was allegedly furnished to the son for his pleasure and convenience. Golden v. Medford, 189 Ga. 614 (7 S. E. 2d 236). I dissented in the case of Cohen v. Whitman, 75 Ga. App. 286 (43 S. E. 2d 184), supra. I can add nothing substantial to that dissent. However, after the decision in that case, the Supreme Court decided the case of Carter v. Bishop, 209 Ga. 919 (76 S. E. 2d 784) in which it reviewed and reaffirmed the general law of agency which I think controls the principles- governing the family-purpose automobile doctrine. The Supreme Court has not passed upon the main question in this case and until it rules adversely on my contention I am constrained to adhere *6to my position. I feel very strongly that protection should be given to the public in circumstances identical or similar to those in this case, but since the liability of the furnisher of a family-purpose automobile is based solely on the law of agency, I do not think it is in the province of the courts to provide the desired protection so long as the protection given is bottomed on the law of agency.