Court Opinion

ID: 9855987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:35:48.872663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:24.008710
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice
(concurring specially)
In addition to the reasons expressed in the majority opinion for reversing the trial court, in my view the trial court was also in error in applying I.C. § 9-505(5) 1 to determine that the listing contract in question was not valid and therefore that it had no jurisdiction over the respondent. The listing agreement was not a contract purporting to give the appellant Tandy & Wood authority to sell the property and transfer title, which would have required compliance with I.C. § 9-505(5), but was a contract for personal services, i. e., for the procurement of a purchaser for the property. When appellant Tandy & Wood, Inc., procured a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to purchase upon the terms of the listing agreement, it had performed its portion of the contract. The listing agreement did not purport to give authority to the real estate agent Tandy & Wood to bind the respondent Munnell to a contract, nor did it purport to give the real estate agent Tandy & Wood authority to transfer the property by deed. Therefore, I.C. § 9-505(5) was not applicable.
The applicable section of the Idaho Code is § 9-508 2 which requires real estate commission contracts to “be in writing, signed by the owner of such real estate, or his legal, appointed and duly qualified representative.” While this section requires the commission contract itself to be in writing, signed by the owner or his “representative,” nothing in the section requires the representative’s agency to be in writing. One may be a legal, appointed and duly qualified representative, i. e., an agent, with authority to bind one’s principal without a written agreement of agency. See, e. g., Simplot Soilbuilders, Inc. v. Leavitt, 96 Idaho 17, 523 P.2d 1363 (1974); Killinger v. Iest, 91 Idaho 571, 428 P.2d 490 (1967). Thus, unless the “representative” of the owner attempts to bind the owner to a contract or deed purporting to sell or transfer the land, as distinguished from a contract to procure a purchaser of the land, there is no statutory requirement that the “representative’s” agency be in writing. Cf. Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi, 60 Cal.2d 834, 36 Cal.Rptr. 741, 389 P.2d 133 (1964). The general rule of agency is that an agent’s authority need not be in writing unless required by statute. Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi, supra; see, Sharpe Sign Co. v. Parrish, 33 Wash.2d 883, 207 P.2d 758 (1949). This listing contract, to procure a purchaser, did not come within I.C. § 9-505, and therefore the alleged agency of Bill Clevenger would not have to be in writing in order to allow him to enter into a contract satisfying the requirements of 1.C. § 9-508.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.

. “9-505. Certain agreements to be in writ-wig. — In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence therefore, of the agreement can not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:
“5. An agreement for the leasing, for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of real property, or of an interest therein, and such agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent be in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.”

. “9-508. Real estate commission contracts to be in writing. — No contract for the payment of any sum of money or thing of value, as and for a commission or reward for the finding or procuring by one person of a purchaser of real estate of another shall be valid unless the same shall be in writing, signed by the owner of such real estate, or his legal, appointed and duly qualified representative.”