Court Opinion

ID: 9838202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 17:01:30.058878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:13.680206
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 5 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALLEN HIRATSUKA,                                No.    22-35180

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No.
                                                3:21-cv-00018-SLG-MMS
 v.

EARL HOUSER, State of Alaska Dept of            MEMORANDUM*
Cor. Superintendent III,

                Respondent-Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Alaska
                Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted August 17, 2023**
                               Anchorage, Alaska

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and PAEZ and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner-Appellant Allen Hiratsuka appeals the district court’s denial of his

pretrial habeas petition on Younger abstention grounds. Hiratsuka contends that

the two-and-half-year delay of his pretrial proceedings since he was charged and

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
indicted with one count of second-degree sexual assault violates his Sixth

Amendment right to a speedy trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2241(c)(3), 2253(a), and 1291, and we affirm.

      Because the Alaska appellate courts have not yet had the opportunity to

examine the merits of Hiratsuka’s constitutional claims, the Supreme Court’s

decision in Younger v. Harris mandates that we abstain from intervening in the

ongoing state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. 401 U.S.

37, 45 (1971). And Hiratsuka has failed to show any “special circumstances”

warranting federal intervention. Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83–84 (9th Cir.

1980).

      First, although Hiratsuka’s attorney did not raise the speedy-trial issue in the

trial court, Alaska appellate courts are not precluded from considering the issue on

appeal. Indeed, for at least fifty years, the Alaska Supreme Court has been willing

to “consider errors involving deprivation of fundamental rights of [an] appellant

for the first time on appeal,” including those involving speedy-trial violations.

Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923, 930−31 (Alaska 1973) (considering an unpreserved

speedy-trial claim).

      Second, while Hiratsuka argues that the state trial court refused to allow him

to file pro se pleadings while represented by counsel and refused to allow him to

represent himself, he has not shown that he would be unable to challenge these

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decisions on appeal. In response to Hiratsuka’s pro se motions and requests to

represent himself, the court clerk rejected the pro se filings and the trial court held

several representations hearings, ultimately denying Hiratsuka’s requests to

represent himself. Hiratsuka therefore properly preserved the trial court’s refusal

to allow him to file pro se motions or represent himself and may challenge those

decisions on direct appeal. See Hinshaw v. State, 515 P.3d 129, 131 (Alaska Ct.

App. 2022) (reversing conviction because trial court erred in refusing to allow the

defendant to represent himself).

      Third, Hiratsuka’s futility argument is misplaced. Hiratsuka contends that it

is “futil[e]” to “pursu[e] the state court appellate process” because he believes that

he would be precluded from appealing his speedy-trial claim. He therefore argues

this court should make an exception to the requirement that he fully exhaust his

remedies in state court. But Hiratsuka has not shown that state court remedies

would be unavailable to him (as discussed above) and, moreover, does not cite any

authority supporting a futility exception to Younger abstention. In fact, Supreme

Court precedent suggests that such an exception does not exist. The Supreme

Court has made clear that “a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party

wishing to contest in federal court the judgment of a state judicial tribunal must

exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court.”

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989)

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(cleaned up). Hiratsuka has yet to exhaust his state appellate remedies and has not

shown that a futility exception exists.

      AFFIRMED.

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