Court Opinion

ID: 9896304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 21:05:27.801023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:41.352814
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/9/23 In re A.G. CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 In re A.G., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN
 SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A168126
 v.
 SARAH K.,                                                              (Sonoma County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. DEP5995-03)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Sarah K. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court order terminating
her parental rights as to her daughter A.G. (Minor). She argues that the
juvenile court erred in concluding that she had not demonstrated that the
beneficial parental relationship exception (Welfare and Institutions Code,
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied in her case to preclude the
termination of parental rights.1 We affirm.

         1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code

unless otherwise stated.

                                                               1
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The parties have adopted our previous summary of the factual and
procedural background of this dependency matter from its beginning through
Mother’s petition for writ relief from the dependency court’s July 2022 order
setting a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. (See Sarah K. v.
Superior Court (A165607, Jan. 17, 2023) [nonpub. opn.] [denying writ
petition].) We do not repeat that background here, except to state that Minor
was 11 months old in September 2019, when the Sonoma County Human
Services Department (the Department) filed a dependency petition on her
behalf alleging risk of serious physical harm (§ 300, subd. (a)) and failure to
protect (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)). (Sarah K., supra.) Minor has been in foster care
since September 2020. (Ibid.)
      While Mother’s writ petition was pending, Mother asked the juvenile
court to authorize a bonding study to evaluate the attachment between
Mother and Minor to assist her in establishing the applicability of the
parental benefit exception to the termination of parental rights under the
guidelines described in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.).2
Minor’s counsel filed an opposition to the request. The juvenile court denied
the request, but permitted Mother’s proposed expert, Dr. Dana Oertel, to
observe two visits between Mother and Minor, and Dr. Oertel did so.3

      2 A parent must demonstrate three elements to show that the parental

benefit exception applies: first, that “the parent has maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625);
second, “that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
the parent” (id. at p. 636); and third, “that terminating that attachment
would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Ibid.)
      3 Mother does not argue on appeal that the juvenile court erred in

denying her request for a bonding study. Also while her writ petition was

                                        2
      On April 28, 2023, our Supreme Court denied Mother’s petition for
review of our denial of her writ petition (S278324). A contested section
366.26 hearing took place over two days in May and June 2023.
A.    The Department’s Evidence
      1.    Reports
      In advance of the section 366.26 hearing, the Department filed a
“366.26 WIC Report” in October 2022 and two addendum reports, one in
January 2023 and one in February 2023, all of which were admitted into
evidence.
      The Department recommended that the court terminate parental rights
and order a permanent plan of adoption. The Department reported that
Minor had been placed with her concurrent substitute care providers in June
2021. The foster family had an approved adoption home study, and were
committed to adopting Minor.
      The Department described Minor as a “bright and active child” who
was “very outgoing and affectionate” in all settings. She lacked awareness of
“stranger danger” and would potentially obey anyone who is friendly to her.
Minor continued to show anxious behaviors and the Department stated that
her previous exposure to emotional abuse, physical neglect, and substance
abuse put her at a higher risk for emotional and cognitive impairment,
adoption of health-risk behaviors, disease, disability, social problems, and
early death. The Department opined that Minor’s “need for stable
attachment and permanence is critical and urgent.”

pending, Mother filed a petition under section 388 asking the court to return
Minor to Mother’s custody, which was heard and denied at the section 366.26
hearing. Mother does not present any argument concerning the juvenile
court’s ruling on her section 388 petition.

                                       3
      The Department addressed at some length the Caden C. factors
relevant to the parental-benefit exception to the termination of parental
rights.
      With respect to regular visitation and contact, the Department
reviewed the history of Mother’s visitation with Minor, stating that Mother
has good attendance; the visits have been routine with predictable beginnings
and ends; Mother and Minor play together, and Minor enjoys the one-on-one
attention; and Mother is “particularly affectionate with [Minor], which
[Minor] accepts.”
      Under the heading, “Does the Child Benefit from Continuing the
Relationship?” the Department primarily addressed the question whether
Minor was “significantly emotionally attached” to Mother, which the
Department viewed as a first step in determining whether there is benefit.
The department opined that Minor was not significantly emotionally
attached to Mother based in part on the fact that Minor was four years old
and as of October 2022 had lived out of Mother’s care for two years, with the
first 10 months of that time spent in an emergency foster home and the rest
in her concurrent foster home. In addition, Minor did not ask about visits
with Mother in between visits, and was happy to see her foster mother at the
end of visits, typically jumping into her arms. Minor looked to her foster
parents “for her basic needs, for comfort and for reassurance.” Minor
appeared to the social worker to be confused about her family situation, and
the social worker believed Minor would “respond well to a decision being
made about her future family.” Minor asked her foster parents “questions
looking for security and answers about her future,” but they “cannot always
say yes to her questions” because of the status of the court proceedings.
Minor was comfortable with Mother, and most of the time she would accept

                                       4
affectionate touches from Mother or participate in the affection during the
visits, but Minor was comfortable with other adults as well. Minor saw
Mother as “ ‘mommy’ and a fun person to visit and play with” but continued
to thrive without Mother as part of her daily life. The Department observed
that Minor “seems to enjoy her visitation, which shows there is some benefit
to her relationship with” Mother.
      Under the heading, “Would Termination of Parental Rights Be
Detrimental to the Child due to the Relationship?” the Department opined
that if parental rights were terminated and Minor had no further contact
with Mother, Minor would not experience detriment. Minor needed security
and stability, and given Minor’s attachment to her foster family and a
“comparatively weaker relationship with” Mother, the Department opined
that Minor “would not only be fine, but . . . would continue to thrive if
parental rights were terminated.” The Department opined that adoption
would bring Minor stability and solidify her sense of permanence and well-
being, and that Minor’s relationship with Mother was “not so strong that it
would be detrimental to legally remove [Mother’s] parental rights.” The
Department concluded that although interaction between Mother and Minor
“could have some incidental benefit, such benefit does not outweigh the
benefit that will be gained through the permanence of adoption,” and that the
termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to Minor.
      The Department also addressed Minor’s relationship to the prospective
adoptive parents and the effect on Minor if parental rights were not
terminated and she were not adopted. The Department reported that Minor
“actively seeks connection” to the foster parents, and during a recent home
visit asked the foster mother to join her on the couch for “cuddles.” The
Department reported that Minor had been embraced as part of her foster

                                        5
family, which included two daughters a few years older than Minor; that the
family has “attended to all her physical and emotional needs” since she was
placed with them in June 2021; that she appeared happy in the home and
“very settled in the family”; and that she was “developing substantial
emotional ties” to the foster parents.4 The Department opined that removing
Minor from the foster parents would be detrimental to her wellbeing. The
Department also opined that a legal guardianship, as an alternative to
adoption, would allow “the option for [Minor] to be uprooted once again in the
future, which would not be in her best interest at this young and vulnerable
age.”
        2.   Social Worker Testimony
        Social worker Ashley Kirkland, the author of the three reports that
were admitted into evidence, was designated without objection as an expert
in social work, specifically with respect to adoption and permanency
planning, and testified about her work on Minor’s case since being assigned
to the matter in August 2022.

        4 Minor’s foster parents filed four Caregiver Information Forms

(Judicial Council forms JV-290) during the court of the dependency.
According to their most recent report, filed in October 2022, Minor, then four
years old, continued to exhibit some behavioral and emotional problems after
her supervised visits with Mother, including appearing anxious, not listening
and acting out with her gymnastics teacher, and demonstrating regressive
behavior. They also informed the court that Minor expressed eagerness to
attend elementary school with her foster sisters and that Minor’s preschool
teacher reported that Minor was doing well. They stated that Minor was
fully integrated into their family, “idolizes her two big sisters,” was close to
both foster parents, and had “no conscious memory of living with any person
or family other than ours,” and that they were “eager to be able to provide her
with real permanency.”

                                        6
      Kirkland testified that she had observed Mother’s monthly visits with
Minor in February, March, and April 2023, which occurred after her most
recent written reports had been submitted to the court. There were no
notable differences between the visits, which lasted from 50 minutes to an
hour. The visits would start with the foster mother bringing Minor, who was
usually in her arms. Sometimes Minor was shy at first and did not want to
get out of the foster mother’s arms, but other days she would jump out of her
arms. Minor and Mother would then embrace or walk to the visit without
incident. In all the visits Minor talked about her foster family. And in all the
visits, Mother was appropriate. At the end of the visits, Minor would go to
the foster mother, jump back in her arms, and would typically have a quick
goodbye, although sometimes Minor was not engaged in a goodbye—she
would be moving quickly to be on her way to the foster parent, to go to the car
and go somewhere else.
      Kirkland testified that between visits, Minor does not ask to see
Mother or ask for more visitation time with mother. One time, at the end of
the most recent visit, when Minor was told it was time to clean up, she yelled
“no,” but then the clean-up proceeded and Minor left without incident.
Kirkland believed that Minor cried out “no,” because “she was running
around the room at that time and then in the moment and enjoying herself.”
Kirkland testified that during visits, Minor and Mother are affectionate
toward each other, and Minor calls Mother “mommy.” Kirkland testified that
nothing she observed in the visits caused her to change the opinion stated in
the written report that there was not a significant emotional attachment
between Minor and Mother.
      Kirkland testified that she had observed Minor in the foster home
about seven times, for at least an hour each time. Minor seemed comfortable

                                       7
in the home and was “part of a threesome” with her two older foster sisters.
She observed that Minor was very close to the sisters, looked up to them,
mentioned them frequently when she was not with them, including during
her visits with Mother, and appeared to be developing her own identity with
them in mind. She observed that Minor was physically affectionate toward
her foster parents and sought their attention. Kirkland testified that Minor
frequently mentioned all the members of the foster family when she was not
with them, and talked about them in a way that suggested to Kirkland that
Minor was developing a sense of identity through that family. Minor did not
talk about Mother in the same way. When Minor was shown photographs of
herself with a former foster family, she did not remember those people or why
she was with them.
      Kirkland testified that at one point, she asked Minor to draw a picture
of her family. The picture included Minor’s foster family and Mother, with
Mother drawn “differently” from the rest of the people. Kirkland testified
that she had been told that Minor sometimes refers to Mother as her “belly
mommy”; and that with respect to the drawing, Minor called Mother “the
belly,” presumably reflecting Minor’s understanding that at some point she
was in Mother’s belly.
      Kirkland opined that there was not a substantial positive relationship
between Mother and Minor “as defined by Caden C.,” based on her
observation that Minor left visits with Mother without crying, went about her
daily life “without bringing mother up,” and did not ask for more visits.
Kirkland stated that her opinion concerned the relationship between Mother
and Minor, regardless of the relationship between Minor and her foster
parents, and rested on Kirkland’s having come to know Minor and observing
her in different situations. Kirkland testified that Minor was outgoing and

                                       8
affectionate in all settings, and did not “have a lot of boundaries with other
people,” including teachers and friends she had met for the first time with the
foster family. Minor wanted to sit on people’s laps quickly, and wanted hugs
and kisses from people she just met. Kirkland testified that Minor was
affectionate with other adults with whom she was comfortable in the same
way as she was affectionate with Mother, and thought that Minor viewed
Mother as a “friendly visitor,” much as she viewed others with whom she was
comfortable, including her preschool teacher’s aide, her previous social
worker, visitation supervisors whose names she had learned, and Kirkland
herself. Kirkland opined that these friendly and affectionate interactions did
not amount to a significant emotional attachment.
      Kirkland also opined that although Minor enjoyed her visits with
Mother, if visits between Minor and Mother were to stop, Minor would not
experience any detriment, because Minor did not ask about Mother between
visits and all Minor’s needs were being met in her current placement.
Kirkland further opined that it would be detrimental to remove Minor from
her foster home, based on Kirkland’s assessment of how Minor sees her life
and who she is most closely connected to. She felt that disruption of the bond
between Minor and her foster family would have serious long-term emotional
consequences for Minor. And Kirkland opined that adoption would be the
best permanent plan for Minor, because it would be the most stable from a
legal perspective. Kirkland stated that in her view the disruptions in Minor’s
life before she was placed with her foster family made it important for Minor
to have the permanency of adoption.

                                       9
B.    Mother’s Evidence
      1.    Documents
      Mother offered eight exhibits that were admitted into evidence: Dr.
Oertel’s notes from observing two visits between Minor and Mother in
November and December 2022; a photograph of a hair follicle test result from
March 2023 showing negative results except for THC metabolite; a copy of
Mother’s December 2022 section 388 petition, including her supporting
declaration; and five photographs of Minor, most of which showed Minor with
Mother.
      Dr. Oertel observed that Minor transitioned easily from her foster
mother to Mother and then back again at the end of the visits, without
engaging in any “goodbyes” with Mother. Mother and Minor were
affectionate with each other, and engaged physical play and in activities such
as puzzles, drawing, and coloring. Mother was encouraging and supportive of
Minor’s efforts, and redirected Minor and set boundaries when Minor
engaged in mild misbehavior. Minor referred to Mother as “mom” during the
first visit, and referred to foster Mother as “mommy” and “mom” during the
second. During the first of the visits, both Minor and Mother initiated
snuggling and physical affection, with Minor sometimes reciprocating
Mother’s affection and sometimes indifferent to it; during the second visit
Mother initiated hugging and kissing, and Minor did not reciprocate as much
as at the previous visit.
      In her declaration, Mother stated her visits with Minor went well; that
they played together and were affectionate; that Minor called her “mama”;
that they had a bond; and that during their visits Minor talked to her about
things they did on past visits.

                                      10
      2.    Mother’s Testimony
      Mother testified about her current circumstances, stating that she had
obtained safe, stable housing; was studying for an associate’s degree; saw a
psychiatrist once a month and took medication to treat her mental health
issues; was no longer using methamphetamine; was attending meetings to
support her sobriety; and that her recent tests were positive for THC because
she was using cannabis with oversight from her psychiatrist.
      Mother testified that her most recent visit with Minor was fun, and
that Minor came right to her. Mother testified that sometimes when Minor
has not seen her for a month, the transition can be more difficult, but things
go well after the transition. Mother testified that usually during the visits
they do puzzles or make up a game, and that Minor likes Mother to give her
piggy-back rides and run around. Mother corrects Minor when she does
something she shouldn’t, and Minor responds well to that. At the most recent
visit, Minor did not want the visit to end.
      Mother testified that during the visits, Minor shows affection for her by
sitting on her lap and asking for nose kisses or back rubs. Minor testified
that during the visits Minor talks about her foster sisters, foster mother, and
foster father, and agreed that Minor was close to them. She recognized that
Minor had “built a bond” with the foster family, and that the foster family
were “special people to her.” As to her own bond with Minor, Mother testified
that there was a “substantial bond” between them because “I am her mother.
She grew in my body. She has my blood flowing through her veins.” Mother
concluded her testimony by saying that she thought it was in Minor’s best
interest to be returned to her.

                                       11
C.    Rebuttal Evidence and Argument
      On the second day of the hearing, held about three weeks after the first
day, at which Mother had testified, the Department called social worker
Kirkland as a rebuttal witness. She testified that she had reviewed Dr.
Oertel’s notes, which had been introduced into evidence at the previous
session, and they did not change her opinion. She also testified that Minor
was not negatively affected when visits with Mother did not occur, although
she had never directly asked Minor how she feels when visits are cancelled.
Kirkland described a visit between Mother and Minor that occurred the
previous week. Mother, Minor, and Kirkland went to a park, where Mother
and Minor played and then sat at a picnic table and ate. Minor sat on
Mother’s lap while they were eating. Kirkland observed them to be
affectionate toward one another, as was typical for them. At the end of the
visit, as they walked to the parking lot, Minor saw her foster Mother’s car,
and exclaimed, “that’s my mom’s car,” and began running toward the car.
She was redirected to the lobby where the foster mother was waiting, greeted
her foster mother, and the visit ended without any issues.
      After the evidence was presented, the juvenile court heard argument.
The attorneys representing the Department and Minor argued that the court
should terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan.
Mother’s attorney argued that because of the bond between Mother and
Minor, the parental benefit exception to the statutory preference for adoption
applied to this case, and therefore, the court should order a guardianship and
not terminate parental rights.
D.    Findings and Orders
      The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was
likely Minor would be adopted.

                                      12
      The court addressed the parental benefit exception to the statutory
preference for termination of parental rights and adoption, and concluded
that Mother had not met her burden to demonstrate the three elements set
forth in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614.
      The court began, “So the issues, then, that I have to address are[,] have
there been regular consistent visits? Yes. In the last two years there have
been regular and consistent visits. The visits are good.”
      The court then turned to the second and third elements. The court
observed that in evaluating whether Minor had “a substantial positive
emotional attachment to” Mother, the court was conducting the analysis that
was required by case law, and made clear that a finding of no such
attachment would not be finding that Minor did not like Mother. The court
stated that in evaluating Minor’s attachment, it considered Minor’s age,
which was four years and nine months, and that Minor had been removed
from Mother’s care at the age of two, in September 2020, and therefore had
been out of Mother’s care for almost three years. Minor had been in her
existing, concurrent placement for two years, since June 2021, and had some
recognition that she had a “belly mom” as well as the foster mother with
whom she lived. Minor was outgoing and affectionate, including to Mother,
with whom she had positive visits—Mother and Minor loved each other. The
court found that Mother was “a friendly, positive part of the household,”
based on the social worker’s opinion that Minor experienced Mother as a
friendly visitor or extended family member and based on Minor’s drawing of
her family that included Mother, the foster parents, and the foster sisters.
      The court found that Minor was attached to Mother and “also is very
attached to her foster family.” She looked to them to meet her needs,
transitioned easily back to them after visits, and was emotionally attached to

                                      13
them. The court concluded that “because of the time that’s elapsed and the
nature of the relationship that [Minor] has with the foster family . . . it would
be detrimental to [Minor] to disrupt her attachment” to the foster family.
The court went on, “[T]aking her away from them would be devastating to
her, I believe.”
      The court summed up by saying, “I don’t find that the Caden C. factors
are met. [¶] I don’t find that her relationship . . . with [Mother] . . . is such an
attached substantial nature that it would be detrimental to terminate
parental rights. And I think it’s very important for her, at this stage of her
life and all of the things that she’s been through, . . . only a few of which I’ve
mentioned right now, but that she needs to have permanence. She needs to
have her place solidified in the family where she’s securely attached so that
she can grow up to be a healthy, secure adult. So that’s—I don’t find that the
parental benefits exception applies.”
      The court terminated the parental rights of Mother and any known or
unknown fathers, and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.5
      Mother timely appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      We summarized the applicable law in In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
1061 (Eli B.):
      “The beneficial relationship test is an exception to the presumptive rule
of terminating parental rights after reunification efforts have failed, in order

      5 Minor’s father (Father), whose status was never elevated beyond that

of a biological father, is not a party to this appeal. At the section 366.26
hearing, his counsel informed the court that Father supported Mother’s
opposition to the termination of parental rights.

                                        14
to free a child for adoption. (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 852 (J.D.).)
. . . [T]he Supreme Court has recently explained its scope and proper
application. (See generally Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614.)
      “As clarified by the Supreme Court, ‘ “the parent asserting the parental
benefit exception must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, three
things. The parent must show regular visitation and contact with the child,
taking into account the extent of visitation permitted. Moreover, the parent
must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship. And the parent must show that
terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. When
the parent has met that burden, the parental-benefit exception applies such
that it would not be in the best interest of the child to terminate parental
rights, and the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption.” ’
(J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 852, quoting Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 636-637.)
      “We review the juvenile court’s ruling on the first two elements for
substantial evidence. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 853.) We review its
ruling on the third element under a hybrid standard, reviewing its factual
determinations concerning the detriment analysis for substantial evidence
but its ultimate weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating
parental rights for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)” (Eli B., supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1067-1068.)
      Under the substantial evidence standard “we inquire whether the
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s determination.
We resolve all conflicts in support of the determination, indulge in all

                                       15
legitimate inferences to uphold the findings and may not substitute our
deductions for those of the juvenile court.” (Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 865.) We do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate
the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) We uphold the juvenile court’s findings if they
are “ ‘supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to
the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different
result had it believed other evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) In reviewing for abuse of
discretion, we reverse “only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of
legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
      Although a juvenile court’s statement of its findings or explanation of
the reasons for its decisions may help in conducting appellate review, there is
no requirement that the juvenile court, if it finds the parental-benefit
exception does not apply, must recite specific findings as to “any or all of the
three elements of the exception.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131,
1156 (A.L.).) We “ ‘ “indulge in every presumption to uphold a judgment.” ’ ”
(id. at p. 1161), including that the court “considered all the pertinent matters
presented to it and ruled in favor of the prevailing party.” (Lydig
Construction, Inc. v. Martinez Steel Corp. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 937, 945.)
B.    Analysis
      The first element of the parental benefit exception is not in dispute:
the trial court found, and the parties agree, that Mother demonstrated that
she had regular visitation and contact with Minor. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 632.)
      Mother’s argument on appeal focuses on the second element of the
Caden C. analysis, which requires the parent to show “a substantial, positive,

                                         16
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) In assessing the relationship, courts must focus on the
child and may consider “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or
“negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
particular needs.’ ” (Id. at p. 632.) Mother contends that the Department’s
report “was silent as to any benefits” to Minor of maintaining a relationship
with Mother, and argues that the trial court was required to, but did not,
consider whether Minor would benefit from continuing her relationship with
Mother before finding that the parental benefit exception did not apply. We
disagree with Mother’s characterization of the record.
      Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the Department recognized in its report
that Minor’s enjoyment of her visits with Mother “shows there is some benefit
to her relationship,” and acknowledged “some incidental benefit” to continued
interaction between Minor and Mother.6

      6 Mother also contends that the Department’s report “engaged in an

impermissible comparison of [Minor’s] attachment to her birth mother and
her foster mother.” She cites no authority to support her contention that
such a comparison in the Department’s report would be improper. And in
any event, the Department was required by statute to include in the
assessment it prepared for the section 366.26 hearing discussion of “[t]he
relationship of the child to any identified prospective adoptive parent . . ., the
duration and character of the relationship, [and] the degree of attachment of
the child to the prospective . . . adoptive parent.” (§ 366.25, subd. (b)(1)(E).)
Notably, neither the Department nor the court “compar[ed] the parent’s
attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive
parent(s),” which would not be an appropriate consideration in weighing
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634 [“the section 366.26 hearing is
decidedly not a contest of who would be the better custodial caregiver”].)

                                        17
      And we see no basis for Mother’s contention that the trial court failed
to consider whether there was any benefit to Minor of continuing her
relationship with Mother. The trial court was not required to state on the
record that there would be some benefit to Minor in continuing her
relationship with Mother, or make any statement qualifying or quantifying
any such benefit. (A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156.) The record shows
that, contrary to Mother’s assertion, the juvenile court considered whether
Minor would benefit from continuing the relationship: the court impliedly
recognized some benefit to Minor in continuing the relationship, when it
concluded that, as the Department had opined, Minor thought of Mother as
an extended family member, or a friendly, positive part of the household.
      Here, the juvenile court summed up its findings on the second and
third elements by stating that Minor’s relationship with Mother was not of
“such an attached substantial nature that it would be detrimental to
terminate parental rights.” The court stated that in light of Minor’s
experiences, Minor needed permanence and “to have her place solidified in
the family where she’s securely attached”; that the parental benefit exception
did not apply; and that adoption would be Minor’s permanent plan. In
reaching its conclusions, the juvenile court necessarily considered whether
continuing Mother’s relationship with Minor would benefit Minor to such an
extent that the relationship should preclude the permanency and stability of
adoption. Although the juvenile court impliedly found that there would be
some benefit to Minor in continuing the relationship with Mother, the court
nevertheless determined that the benefit was outweighed by the benefits to
Minor of adoption.7

      7 In her opening brief, Mother suggests that under Caden C. a

conclusion by the juvenile court that the parental benefit exception does not

                                      18
      Mother contends that instead of evaluating Minor’s relationship with
Mother, the juvenile court’s “primary focus” was on whether Minor would
benefit from continuing her relationship with the foster family. We disagree.
It is true that in explaining its ruling, the juvenile court discussed not only
Minor’s attachment to Mother, but also Minor’s attachment to her foster
family, and found that although it would not be detrimental to Minor to
disrupt her attachment to Mother, it would be detrimental to disrupt her
attachment to the foster family. Discussion of Minor’s attachment to the
foster family does not negate or undercut the trial court’s conclusion that
Minor’s relationship with Mother was not of “such an attached substantial
nature that it would be detrimental to terminate parental rights.” (See
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640 [in determining whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental, “[t]he court must . . . determine, for the
particular child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even
counterbalance those harms” and must “assess[ ]what the child’s life would
be like in an adoptive home without the parent in his life”].)
      At the time of the section 366.26 hearing Minor was almost five years
old, and she had been out of Mother’s custody for almost three years, since
she was almost two. There was undisputed evidence that Minor had positive
visits with Mother, and viewed Mother as a friendly part of her extended
family. But there was also undisputed evidence that Minor transitioned back
to her foster family without incident after her monthly visits with Mother,
and that between the visits Minor did not ask to see Mother or ask for more
visitation time with her.

apply requires a finding by the juvenile court “that continuation of the
relationship [with Mother] would not benefit” Minor. That is not the law.

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     There was undisputed evidence that in light of her past, Minor had a
need for stable attachment and permanency, which adoption could provide.
The Department reported that Minor was at risk for “insecure attachment”
but was nevertheless “open to new attachments, attention and parenting
from new people,” and “able to develop a secure attachment to her foster
parents.” And the Department opined that Minor’s “need for stable
attachment and permanency is critical and urgent.”
     Against this background, Mother points to no evidence that
terminating her parental rights would be detrimental to Minor. In these
circumstances, Mother has not shown any error in the juvenile court’s
determination that any benefit to Minor in continuing her relationship with
Mother was outweighed by the benefit to Minor of the permanence and
security of a new adoptive home.
                              DISPOSITION
     The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.

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                                      _________________________
                                      Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

A168126, Sonoma County Human Services Department v. Sarah K.

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