Court Opinion

ID: 9772153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:08:50.35265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:26.478859
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Judge,
concurring.
Given the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court as cited in the opin*884ion of the court the decision herein is mandated and correct. Pickett was more than an “ear” in defendant’s cell, he was also “a voice in the cell to encourage conversation for the ‘ear’ to record.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (Burger, Concurring). We are bound by our oaths of office to apply the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. That oath does not preclude us from expressing our disagreement with the law we must apply.
The test of a confession’s admissibility has traditionally been its voluntariness. Voluntariness in turn has been determined by freedom from coercion which could cause an involuntary and therefore non-credible confession. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the court established certain guidelines to insure that a suspect was fully advised of his rights thereby presumably removing coercion from police interrogation. One of the rights that a suspect has to be advised of is his right to counsel. If he invokes that right the interrogation must cease until counsel is obtained. This is to allow him to be fully informed of his rights and legal position before making any further statement. It does not necessarily follow that counsel must thereafter be present whenever police discuss the case with the suspect for presumably the advice of counsel would be not to discuss the case with anyone. From this Miranda right has arisen a “right to counsel” under the Fifth Amendment not explicitly referred to therein. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). That right of counsel and that explicitedly stated in the Sixth Amendment have served to move the focus of examination of confessions from voluntariness into the realm of whether the confession was “elicited” by the police or prosecution. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); U.S. v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra. No longer is the reliability or vol-untariness of the confession or statement the keystone to admissibility, but rather whether the police and prosecutor have conducted themselves in a “sporting” fashion. Apprehension and conviction of felons who prey upon law abiding citizens is not a game nor an athletic contest. It is a deadly serious battle to prevent a social cancer which threatens the very quality of life so treasured in a free society. The utilization of ruses, trickery, and deception, while possibly “unsporting”, is not unwarranted in such a battle unless it transgresses a clearly defined constitutional right.
Defendant here was in no way coerced into giving the statement which has been suppressed. He did so voluntarily in apparent disregard or ignorance of the ancient adage that there is no honor among thieves. Nor was he denied the right of counsel. He simply disregarded or ignored counsel’s advice to keep his mouth shut. Until the advent of the cases cited above I had not believed that the right to counsel was intended to protect suspects who ignore their counsel’s advice through cupidity, stupidity, boastfulness, or remorse. Sheriff Nelson was investigating a murder, the most serious denial of constitutional rights imaginable. He in no way mistreated the defendant, or coerced him into confessing, or subjected him to custodial interrogation designed to break his will or override his mind. Defendant had consulted with his lawyer and had presumably received advice sufficient to protect himself which is the purpose, in my opinion, of the right to counsel. He did not do so. It is one thing to utilize the Fifth and Sixth Amendment to prevent the police and prosecution from compelling a defendant to incriminate himself; it is something entirely different to utilize those amendments to prevent them from permitting such incrimination.
I reluctantly concur.