Court Opinion

ID: 9664910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:33:51.130291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:11.098653
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Perhaps this decision will be of help to the future Devines of the legal world in South Dakota, but it will be of no legal comfort to this Mr. Devine. Lacking a statute, we now create by judicial fiat a bifurcated trial upon (1) the guilt or innocence issue, and (2) the sanity question. Respectable authority exists therefor (even absent statute) and I truly do not quarrel with my colleagues on the creation of this revolutionary procedure in South Dakota. There is theoretical good in the majority’s position on the bifurcated trial concept. It is, in effect, a new procedural wind blowing across our legal prairie, but it is a good wind. It is a device to avoid prejudice at trial. Therefore, I fault it not. We must be mindful, in deciding this case, that De-vine did not have a bifurcated trial. We have created a new theorem in criminal trial practice but Devine’s trial anteceded the theorem. Therefore, the blight sought to be eliminated in the future was not an advantage of which Devine partook. De-vine did not drink from its cup. It would appear axiomatic that Devine should share somehow, someway, in the very case in which he is so deeply involved and has received a sentence to the South Dakota State Penitentiary for a term of 35 years. I confess that I am tremendously troubled by this long-term incarceration because of the facts and circumstances of this specific intent crime, namely, second-degree burglary, and the facts and circumstances which attend this conviction.
Devine was apparently blind drunk, unable to be understood, and was manifesting delusions of total unreality at the “crime” situs, which I shall detail below.
Devine has a long history of mental illness. Due to this, his lawyer moved the court for a psychiatric or psychological evaluation. The order was entered by the trial court and Devine was examined by Dr. Charles Warrender at Pierre, South Dakota. During this interview, Devine related that he had made up symptoms of mental illness so that he might be transferred from a federal penitentiary in Minnesota to a medical center for federal prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. Dr. Warrender testified, before the jury, to this divulgence. Question: Does this evidence so received, work against him on the issue of guilt or a possible verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity”? I say that it does because it addresses a matter of intent and the defense of mental illness thereto. Note that I have stated that Devine had a long history of mental illness. This was so indicated by Dr. Warrender in his testimony which was based upon an extensive history of psychiatric treatment at the Human Services Center in Yankton, South Dakota, and the U.S. Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri. Another doctor, Dr. Kargas, interviewed, observed, and treated Devine during a period of time from August 12, 1982, until March 14, 1983, at the U.S. Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri. Dr. Kar-gas testified that Devine professed a schi-zoaffective disorder. Dr. Kargas prescribed, while Devine was incarcerated, a psychotic medication known as Navane and an antidepressant drug, Norpramin. A startling fact is that Dr. Kargas recommended that Devine, even after discharge from the federal facility at Springfield, Missouri, continue with psychiatric hospitalization upon medication for an indefinite period of time under the supervision of a psychiatrist. If Devine refused medication, Dr. Kargas admonished that it should be forced upon him, if necessary, intramuscu-larly, to prevent relapse. Over strenuous objection, Dr. Kargas testified during the course of this trial that Devine told him *139that he, Devine, “intentionally got into trouble.” Such a statement goes to the innocence or guilt of Devine and cannot be covered up by this Court with the prosecutor’s friend, “harmless error.” The statement amounts to a confession of fact. This statement does not go to the mental condition begged by the statutes of this state as a legitimate source of inquiry. This statement addresses his guilt. This statement was compelled and is contrary to our state statutes, the constitutional restraints of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, nor to mention our own state constitution. Of this, I shall detail below. Dr. Pesce also interviewed Devine for a considerable period of time and on numerous occasions at the said Human Services Center. Throughout numerous interviews, Devine made statements, to which Dr. Pesce testified, that he, Devine, was seeking alternatives from being sent to prison. This all went before the jury and unquestionably influenced the jury in finding Devine not only guilty but sane at the time of the commission of the “crime.” In sum, three psychiatrists were called to the stand and testified and offered testimony to demonstrate Devine’s guilt.
It is worse than what I have portrayed above. Yes, worse. Dr. Warrender testified that Devine possessed an antisocial personality based upon his previous brushes with the law and that antisocial personality types are characterized by repeated acts of vandalism, theft, and incarceration. Bear in mind, that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment is that, basically, an accused should not be forced to produce evidence and be convicted from that which issues out of his own mouth. Rather, the government must produce evidence against an accused by its own independent labors. Tekan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414, 86 S.Ct. 459, 464, 15 L.Ed.2d 453, 458-59 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 659 (1964). Dr. Pesce was permitted to testify that Devine “told me that he had committed a crime, that he wanted to go to evaluation to be able to come up with a better solution for the problem, I mean he was talking about going to trial and maybe prison.” Oh, how far did the trial court stray from its original purpose to secure a psychiatric or psychological evluation? Here, we have evidence going before the jury about Devine’s intentions to have an evaluation. True, counsel for Devine asked for a psychiatric evaluation. Well that he should have done so, for Devine’s long history of mental illness had to weigh heavily upon him. But it was the trial court who ordered that a psychiatric/psychological evaluation take place. Therefore, Devine’s statements to these three psychiatrists were compelled under the law.
[I]t is fundamentally unfair to use defendant’s incriminating admissions to a psychiatrist during a psychiatric examination as part of the prosecution’s case to establish his guilt. It is immaterial in this regard whether the court ordered examination was at the request of defendant or the prosecution or whether it was to determine his capacity to aid in his own defense or his mental condition at the time of the crime.
Collins v. Auger, 428 F.Supp. 1079, 1082 (S.D.Iowa 1977), reasoning approved, 577 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133, 99 S.Ct. 1057, 59 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979). Dr. Kargas was permitted to testify that Devine “intentionally got [himself] into trouble on November 6, 1983,” that he was turned down for jobs “because of his prison record,” and “[w]ent to his Aunt’s place and broke up the place.” This is how far the trial court went in permitting testimony in this case. When all of this compelled testimony was plastered before the jury by professionals, Devine’s chances for a fair trial were nihil. Out of the mouth of Dr. Kargas came the infectious testimony of Devine’s “prison record,” which had been compelled out of the mouth of Devine via court order. Surely, had Devine’s lawyer known that all of this evidence would have come before the jury, he would never have moved for a court order for psychiatric examination and evaluation.
*140I can well understand that the fruits of the accused’s compelled disclosures may be used in determining his competency to stand trial, but surely it cannot be used against him at the trial itself. I subscribe to the rationale in United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1042 (3rd Cir.1975), which states:
This circuit is committed to the position that use at trial of statements exacted by the compulsion of a court ordered psychiatric examination, at least where any statement elicited in the examination tends to establish the fact of the offense or the voluntariness of other statements by the accused, is a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. (Citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Yeager, 451 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir.1971), affirming 336 F.Supp. 1287, 1305 (D.N.J.1971)).
This case has been cited with approval in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996, 99 S.Ct. 597, 58 L.Ed.2d 669 (1978); United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 339, 78 L.Ed.2d 307 (1983); Collins v. Auger, 428 F.Supp. 1079; and United States v. J.D., 517 F.Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.1981). There can be no doubt that Devine was entitled to raise his mental condition at the time of the “crime” as a defense. Perforce, he is likewise entitled to an examination to determine his competency to stand trial and a psychiatric examination which addresses the proofs of his mental condition. Devine should not be compelled to choose between exercising his Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate himself and his due process right to seek out available defenses. The majority opinion recognizes this concept, as established in Collins v. Auger, 428 F.Supp. 1079, but then artfully attempts to avoid the demands of the constitutional concept. In United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1034 n. 1 (8th Cir.1976), that Court admonished:
We emphasize that admission of psychiatric testimony on the issue of sanity at the time of the offense which included statements of the accused relating to guilt would raise serious self-incrimination questions.
As the majority opinion recognizes, incriminating statements made to a psychiatrist are inadmissible on the issue of guilt because such a practice violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d at 78, and the cases cited therein. Such a practice also violates South Dakota Constitution Article VI, § 9, and SDCL 23A-10-4.
South Dakota Constitution Article VI, § 9, provides that criminal defendants shall not be compelled to give evidence against themselves. As noted in my concurrence in part and dissent in part in State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 431 (S.D.1984), there is a pertinent difference between our constitutional protection and that afforded by the Fifth Amendment. Our constitution provides a broader protection and SDCL 23A-10-4 incorporates this protection when it provides, inter alia:
No statement made by an accused in the course of any examination provided for by this section, whether the examination was with or without the consent of the accused, shall be admitted in evidence against him on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding except for the purpose of impeaching the defendant.
Intent. It is so important here. Devine is accused of second-degree burglary which requires an intent to commit a crime. Specifically, he was convicted of SDCL 22-32-3, which provides:
Any person who enters or remains in an occupied structure with intent to commit any crime therein under circumstances not amounting to first degree burglary, is guilty of second degree burglary. Second degree burglary is a Class 3 felony.
The psychiatrists’ testimony, concerning divulgences made to them by Devine, probed and proved on intent. South Dakota had to prove that Devine had an intent to commit a crime when he entered or remained in his *141Aunt’s apartment. The State used the statement of Dr. Kargas to prove intent, for Dr. Kargas, during trial, to which I alluded above, testified that Mr. Devine told him that he, Devine, “intentionally got into trouble.” Devine’s mental illness, combined with his blind drunkenness, bears directly on the intent element. Yet, the trial court permitted this to be stripped away by permitting the psychiatrists to testify as to statements elicited during the course of their examinations which bore directly on his intent. Numerous objections by defense counsel protesting this type of testimony on the basis that prejudice would flow to Devine were overruled by the trial court; the trial court consistently took the position that Devine placed his sanity at issue during the course of the trial and had thus waived the physician-patient relationship created by SDCL 19-13-7 and SDCL 19-13-11. This was error. Twelve hours prior to this “crime,” per testimony of Devine’s sister, Devine stopped and saw her. Devine asked if he could see his brother Wayne who had not been in the Pierre area for over a year and told her to tell him hello in case he would come back; her testimony was also that Devine was asking about his Grandmother and wanted to see her but in truth and in fact, she had been dead for four years. His sister testified that he was irrational and “didn’t really know what he was saying.” Devine’s sister further testified that the Aunt had stopped in a few days before this incident and told her that he, Devine, should come up to the apartment and see and visit her. An officer testified at a preliminary hearing, which was confirmed at trial, as follows:
Q. Did he say anything?
A. No, he was — appeared to be intoxicated, and he didn’t say anything.
* * * * * *
Q. Did he look real drunk, in fact?
A. Yes, sir.
My point is this: The intent of Devine was very much in issue and the words from his mouth, as testified to by the psychiatrists, did more to convict him than any testimony in the entire trial. When the hotel manager found the door open to the Aunt’s apartment, in broad daylight at 1:00 p.m., he testified that Devine was simply standing amidst a disheveled apartment. When the hotel manager asked him where his Aunt was, Devine muttered: “I don’t know.” The police officer asked the same question when he arrived, and received the same answer, “I don’t know.”
The majority opinion, however, avoids the personal protections provided by the constitutional provisions and the statute by finding the admission of the evidence here in question to not constitute prejudicial error. When constitutional safeguards have been violated, enter, you see, the prosecutor’s friend. That friend is “harmless error.” It can be sprinkled like a potion out of an old-time medicine bag with ardent hope of producing a legal cure. It often works. It should not serve as a bromide for those who serve appellate justice. Enter, occasionally, an antidote. This is called “prejudicial error.” Friend of those seeking to advocate constitutional guarantees and those who would ring the Liberty Bell. “Prejudicial error” is not vacuous, vague, or vaporous. It has a well-settled meaning in this state. “Prejudicial error” is‘that which in all probability must have produced some effect upon the final result and affected rights of the party assigning it. See K & E Land & Cattle, Inc. v. Mayer, 330 N.W.2d 529 (S.D.1983); State v. Tribitt, 327 N.W.2d 132 (S.D.1982); Matter of M.B., 288 N.W.2d 773 (S.D.1980); State Highway Comm’n v. Beets, 88 S.D. 536, 224 N.W.2d 567 (1974); State v. Reddington, 80 S.D. 390, 125 N.W.2d 58 (1963); and State v. Pirkey, 24 S.D. 533, 124 N.W. 713 (1910).
These three psychiatrists testified to De-vine’s statements that he committed burglary and “intentionally got into trouble.” This testimony had to have produced an effect upon the final result and surely affected his substantive rights. Therefore, the error, which I understand the majority inferentially concedes, is prejudicial error as distinguished from harmless error. The *142jury received no separate instructions in this unitary trial as suggested by the obiter dicta herein. The winds of bifurcation blow across the prairie of South Dakota, but not upon the breast of Devine, who is weighted with a sentence of 35 years behind prison bars.
Therefore, I would reverse this conviction and remand for a bifurcated trial, which is the wave of the future in South Dakota. Thereby, Devine would be the first recipient thereof. Pair and impartial trials have always been the pride and glory of the American court system. So let it be. For Devine, too.