Court Opinion

ID: 9911171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 17:03:35.959012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:20.406209
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Dec 19 2023, 8:54 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Bryan L. Ciyou                                            Thomas B. Roberts
Ciyou & Associates, P.C.                                  Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Maria del Carmen Casimiro                                 December 19, 2023
Murietta,                                                 Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Petitioner,                                     23A-DC-193
                                                          Appeal from the Marion Superior
        v.                                                Court
                                                          The Honorable Joel A. Schneider,
Guillermo Fernandez Romero,                               Magistrate
Appellee-Respondent.                                      Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D16-2112-DC-10561

                              Opinion by Judge Bradford
                                 Judge Vaidik concurs.
                       Judge Brown dissents with separate opinion.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023                            Page 1 of 17
      Case Summary
[1]   Maria del Carmen Casimiro Murietta (“Maria”) and Guillermo Fernandez

      Romero (“Guillermo”) were married and are the parents of three children.

      Maria and Guillermo separated in January of 2021, and, in December of that

      year, Maria filed for divorce. Maria appeared pro se at the evidentiary hearing,

      during which she referred to the parties’ prenuptial agreement (“the

      Agreement”), in which the parties had agreed that all property owned by Maria

      prior to the parties’ marriage shall remain Maria’s separate property in the event

      of a divorce. Although Maria had referred to the Agreement, due to her limited

      understanding of the proceedings and her erroneous belief that the Agreement

      had been submitted to the trial court by her prior counsel and was therefore a

      part of the record, she did not seek to have it admitted into evidence during her

      case-in-chief. Maria did, however, seek to have the Agreement admitted into

      evidence at the end of the hearing. The trial court denied Maria’s attempt to

      submit the Agreement into evidence. In dividing the marital estate, the trial

      court included the property that was subject to the Agreement. Maria filed a

      motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. On appeal, we conclude

      that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Maria’s motion to correct

      error. As such, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new

      trial wherein the Agreement can be presented for consideration assuming a

      proper foundation for its admission can be met.

      Facts and Procedural History
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023     Page 2 of 17
[2]   In January of 2016, Maria and Guillermo were married. They had had two

      children together prior to their marriage and had one child together during their

      marriage. Prior to their marriage, Maria and Guillermo had entered into the

      Agreement, which indicated that all property owned by Maria prior to the

      parties’ marriage would not be considered part of the marital estate and would

      be considered Maria’s sole property in the event of divorce. On January 20,

      2021, the parties separated, and on December 9, 2021, Maria filed for divorce.

[3]   Maria was initially represented by counsel who was forced to withdraw her

      representation after being suspended from the practice of law. Maria claims to

      have provided counsel with numerous documents, including the Agreement.

      Maria was then represented by subsequent counsel, who filed a motion to

      withdraw from representation prior to the evidentiary hearing, citing a

      breakdown of attorney-client communication.

[4]   On October 3, 2022, the trial court held a virtual evidentiary hearing. Maria

      appeared at the evidentiary hearing pro se. Guillermo appeared and was

      represented by counsel. A translator was present given Maria’s and

      Guillermo’s limited capabilities to speak English.

[5]   While Maria indicated that she was ready to proceed, it is clear from her

      statements to the court that she was unfamiliar with the legal process and the

      terminology used by the court. She did not seem to understand basic trial

      tenets, such as what evidence is or what she was expected to present to the

      court. See Tr. Vol. II p. 36. She also did not appear to have understood that

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023      Page 3 of 17
      presenting relevant documents, namely the Agreement, to her attorney was not

      sufficient to ensure judicial review of the document. See Tr. Vol. II p. 53. Once

      it became clear to Maria that submitting the Agreement to her counsel had not

      been sufficient to ensure that it would be submitted for the trial court’s

      consideration, Maria attempted to submit the Agreement into evidence. The

      trial court did not accept the Agreement into evidence.

[6]   The trial court issued a decree of dissolution on November 18, 2022, in which it

      included property that had been owned by Maria prior to the parties’ marriage

      and ordered an equal division of the marital estate. On December 13, 2022,

      Maria filed a motion to correct error in which she alleged as follows:

              3. Petitioner was previously represented by counsel and
              presented her prior counsel with a copy of the Premarital
              Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit A, which was executed by
              the parties on January 14, 2016. This agreement set forth the
              division of assets and debts in the case of a dissolution of
              marriage.

              4. Petitioner was unaware that counsel failed to present a copy of
              the premarital agreement to the Court and did not know the
              same was not in fact provided to the Court until such time as she
              sought alternate counsel to review the final Decree of Dissolution
              of Marriage.

              5. Petitioner was pro se at the final hearing and had a translator
              present to assist her given that English is her second language.
              Nonetheless, Petitioner continued to advise the Court that there
              were no assets or liabilities to be divided, based on her belief that
              the Court had a copy of the Premarital Agreement which in fact
              would have required the Court to divide the assets and liabilities
              as Petitioner was requesting.
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023         Page 4 of 17
              ****

              7. Had Petitioner not mistakenly believed that her prior counsel
              had submitted a copy of the Premarital Agreement to the Court,
              she would have ensured she provided the same herself. Had the
              Court been provided with a copy of the parties’ Premarital
              Agreement in advance of the hearing, it would have been
              required to distribute funds in accordance with the agreement,
              which have resulted in Petitioner not being required to pay a cash
              equalization payment to Respondent.

              8. Petitioner has demonstrated a meritorious defense and mistake
              such that the Court should set aside the property settlement
              provisions of the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage.

              9. Petitioner is respectfully requesting this Court set aside the
              property division set forth in the Decree of Dissolution of
              Marriage and for all other relief just and proper in the premises.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 50–52 (emphasis added). The trial court denied

      Maria’s motion to correct error on January 17, 2023.

      Discussion and Decision1
[7]   While the parties largely focus their arguments on the question of whether

      Maria was entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B), they acknowledge, and the

      record demonstrates, that Maria appeals following a denial of her motion to

      1
        Guillermo has filed a motion to strike certain documents, including the Agreement, from Maria’s
      appendix. In a separate order handed down simultaneously with this opinion, we deny Guillermo’s motion.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023                        Page 5 of 17
      correct error. While there may be some overlap between a Trial Rule 60(B)

      motion for relief from judgment and a Trial Rule 59 motion to correct error, the

      trial rules discuss the two separately and provide two different potential avenues

      for relief. Given that Maria filed a motion to correct error (and only

      alternatively argued that she was entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)) and

      the trial court denied that motion, the question on appeal is most appropriately

      framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Maria’s

      motion to correct error.

[8]   It is well established that

              [t]he trial court is permitted to alter, amend, or modify its
              judgment without limitation “up to and including the ruling on a
              motion to correct error.” Rohrer v. Rohrer, 734 N.E.2d 1077, 1081
              (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d
              1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). A trial court is vested with
              broad discretion to determine whether it will grant or deny a
              motion to correct error. Volunteers of America v. Premier Auto
              Acceptance Corp., 755 N.E.2d 656, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). A
              trial court has abused its discretion only if its decision is clearly
              against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before
              the court or the reasonable inferences therefrom. Id.

      Jones v. Jones, 866 N.E.2d 812, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In reviewing a denial

      of a party’s motion to correct error, “we look at the record to determine if (a)

      the trial court abused its judicial discretion; (b) a flagrant injustice has been

      done to the appellant; or (c) a very strong case for relief has been made by the

      appellant.” Id.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023         Page 6 of 17
[9]    While evidence must be offered during the course of a trial, the trial court has

       the discretion to “permit a party to present additional evidence or testimony

       once the party has rested, once both parties have rested, or after the close of all

       of the evidence.” In re Paternity of Seifert, 605 N.E.2d 1202, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1993), trans. denied. Moreover, “Indiana courts have long had both statutory

       and inherent equitable powers to set aside or modify erroneous or inequitable

       judgments.” Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds, 171 Ind. App. 515, 518, 358 N.E.2d 146,

       148 (1976). In this case, the record reveals that Maria’s motion made a very

       strong case that she was entitled to relief because the trial court’s judgment had

       resulted in a flagrant injustice to her. As such, we conclude that the trial court

       abused its discretion in denying Maria’s motion to correct error.

[10]   The record demonstrates that Maria, a pro-se litigant with a language barrier to

       the court, did not understand the proceedings or what the court was asking of

       her. Maria only proceeded pro se after both her first and second attorneys had

       been granted permission to withdraw their representation. Maria’s first

       attorney, to whom she claims to have given numerous documents including the

       Agreement, withdrew after being suspended from the practice of law. Her

       second attorney withdrew following a breakdown of attorney-client

       communication and trust. While Maria may be partially responsible for her

       second counsel’s withdrawal, she bore no responsibility for the fact that her first

       attorney, with whom she seemed to have some level of comfort, had to

       withdraw from the case.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023       Page 7 of 17
[11]   The record is also clear that Maria was unfamiliar with the legal process and the

       terminology used by the court. She did not seem to understand basic trial

       tenets, such as what evidence is or what she was expected to present to the

       court. See Tr. Vol. II p. 36. She also does not appear to have understood that

       presenting relevant documents, namely the Agreement, to her attorney was not

       sufficient to ensure judicial review. See Tr. Vol. II p. 53. While she did not

       tender the Agreement as evidence during her case-in-chief, Maria made

       multiple references to it. She also attempted to tender the Agreement at the end

       of the hearing once she apparently came to understand that it had not

       previously been submitted to the court. At this point, the trial court simply

       denied her attempt to submit the Agreement with no further inquiry.

[12]   We agree with Maria that “[i]gnoring such a document due to a procedural

       oversight can have life-altering financial and personal implications for the

       parties involved.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 5. Furthermore, while pro-se

       litigants are generally held to the same standard as an attorney, the Indiana

       Supreme Court has indicated that a trial court may, under some circumstances,

       take steps necessary to prevent a good faith pro-se litigant, like Maria, from

       being placed at an unfair disadvantage. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259,

       266 (Ind. 2014) (“Even if a court may take reasonable steps to prevent a good

       faith pro se litigant from being placed at an unfair disadvantage, an abusive

       litigant can expect no latitude.”) The Indiana Supreme Court has further

       indicated that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023      Page 8 of 17
                a court should not blindly adhere to all of its rules. “Although
                our procedural rules are extremely important, it must be kept in
                mind that they are merely a means for achieving the ultimate end
                of orderly and speedy justice. We must examine our technical
                rules closely when it appears that invoking them would defeat
                justice; otherwise we become slaves to the technicalities
                themselves and they acquire the position of being the ends
                instead of the means.” [Am. States Ins. Co. v. State, 258 Ind. 637,
                640, 283 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1972)].

       Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Ind. 1997) (internal quotation

       omitted). While Maria had rested her case when she ultimately attempted to

       submit the Agreement, the evidentiary hearing had not concluded, and the trial

       court easily could have allowed limited questions relating to the Agreement.

       Based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that

       the trial court abused its discretion by failing to admit the Agreement into

       evidence when tendered to the court by Maria. 2

[13]   In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that prenuptial agreements “are

       favored by the law as promoting domestic happiness and adjusting property

       questions that otherwise would often be the source of litigation.” Boetsma v.

       Boetsma, 768 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. These

       agreements “are legal contracts by which parties entering into a marriage

       relationship attempt to settle the interest of each in the property of the other

       2
         While we are cognizant of the challenges facing trial judges with respect to pro-se litigants, we are troubled
       by the trial court’s apparent “move the case along approach” in this case, especially considering the fact that
       the evidentiary hearing was conducted remotely, causing more confusion for a pro-se litigant who already was
       at a disadvantage due to a language barrier with the court.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023                               Page 9 of 17
       during the course of the marriage and upon its termination by death or other

       means.” In re Marriage of Boren, 475 N.E.2d 690, 693 (Ind. 1985). The Indiana

       Supreme Court “has consistently held that [prenuptial] agreements, so long as

       they are entered into freely and without fraud, duress, or misrepresentation and

       are not, under the particular circumstances of the case, unconscionable, are

       valid and binding.” Id. Such agreements “will be liberally construed to effect,

       so far as possible, the parties’ intentions.” Boetsma, 768 N.E.2d at 1024.

[14]   It is undisputed that Maria owned all the property listed in the Agreement prior

       to the parties’ marriage and that Guillermo had contributed nothing to its

       acquisition. In addition, the authenticity of the Agreement is not disputed.

       During her case-in-chief, Maria made repeated references to the Agreement.

       Guillermo did not object to these references or allege at the close of evidence

       that no such agreement existed. Given the favor granted to prenuptial

       agreements combined with the facts and circumstances of this case, we

       conclude that the trial court’s order will result in an unjustified windfall for

       Guillermo and an inequitable and flagrant injustice to Maria because, in order

       to retain her property, she would be required to compensate Guillermo for the

       property in contradiction of the Agreement. As such, based on the record

       before us, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying Maria’s

       motion to correct error.

[15]   The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter remanded for a new

       trial wherein the Agreement can be presented for consideration assuming a

       proper foundation for its admission can be met.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023       Page 10 of 17
Vaidik, J., concurs.
Brown, J., dissents with separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023   Page 11 of 17
       Brown, Judge, dissents.

[16]   I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court. To the extent the

       majority considers Maria’s December 13, 2022 motion to be a motion to correct

       error, in her motion she requested that the court “Correct Errors from the

       Decree of Dissolution of Marriage,” did not indicate any errors committed by

       the trial court, stated that “[h]ad [she] not mistakenly believed that her prior

       counsel had submitted a copy of the Premarital Agreement to the Court, she

       would have ensured she provided the same herself,” and stated she was

       “respectfully requesting this Court set aside the property division set forth in the

       Decree of Dissolution of Marriage and for all other relief just and proper in the

       premises.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 51-52. At the January 9, 2023

       hearing on her motion, Maria’s counsel did not mention Ind. Trial Rule 59, and

       discussed only Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) in arguing “the mistake is that my client

       was under the impression that her attorney had filed a copy of the prenuptial

       agreement with the court” and “we’re requesting the Court set aside the Court’s

       final order with regard to the property division and the division of assets and

       debts, and to proceed with having a hearing and issuing an order that is in

       agreement with the terms of the prenuptial agreement.” Transcript Volume II

       at 60-61. Maria’s counsel later clarified: “What my client’s asking is this Court

       to set aside the decree based off of the fact that she was under the mistaken

       belief that this Court had a copy of the prenuptial agreement. This clearly falls

       under the mistake and excusable neglect provision in Trial Rule 60.” Id. at 64.

       In her appellant’s brief and reply brief, the only error she asserts is that she

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023       Page 12 of 17
       believed her prior attorney had submitted the marital agreement. I would find

       that Maria’s motion was a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Ind.

       Trial Rule 60(B)(1), and the erroneous belief that her prior attorney had

       presented the agreement did not constitute mistake or excusable neglect.

[17]   Even if Maria’s motion were a motion to correct error, it did not comply with

       Ind. Trial Rule 59(H)(1), which provides that a motion to correct error based on

       evidence outside the record “shall be supported by affidavits showing the truth

       of the grounds set out in the motion and the affidavits shall be served with the

       motion.” A party may not offer by affidavit, in connection with his or her

       motion to correct errors, evidence which he or she neglected to present at the

       prior proceeding. Collins v. Dunifon, 323 N.E.2d 264, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).

       “Rather, the provision provides the basis for disclosing on the record matters

       constituting a basis for correction of error which occurred during the prior

       proceedings, but were not reflected in the record.” Id. Maria did not attach any

       affidavit to her motion to correct error as required, never offered the agreement

       into evidence, and the agreement was never properly before the trial court.

[18]   Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) affords relief in extraordinary circumstances which are not

       the result of any fault or negligence on the part of the movant. Wagler v. West

       Boggs Sewer Dist., Inc., 980 N.E.2d 363, 371-372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g

       denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 952 (2014). To the extent the

       majority considers the trial court’s judgment a flagrant injustice, before the final

       dissolution hearing on October 3, 2022, Maria did not move for the

       appointment of an interpreter, the court provided an interpreter at the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023       Page 13 of 17
       dissolution hearing pursuant to Guillermo’s request, and Maria did not indicate

       she could not understand the interpreter or could not communicate to present

       her case. The court swore in two interpreters at the start of the hearing and had

       the first introduce herself to both parties to “make sure they understand [her],”

       the interpreter and parties conferred, and the interpreter stated: “We understand

       each other.” Transcript Volume II at 4-5. Throughout the hearing, the

       interpreter made clarifications as necessary.

[19]   The court questioned Maria as to whether she was ready to proceed multiple

       times, and the following exchanges occurred:

               THE COURT: We are set for a half-day final hearing in this
               matter. Are the parties ready to proceed?

               [Maria]: Yes.

               [Guillermo’s counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

                                                     *****

               THE COURT: Okay. So, Ms. Del Carmen, it’s -- I guess that’s
               a question. The question that I have -- you’ve previously
               indicated that you’re ready to proceed. I was ask -- I was just
               asking, before we get into evidence today, if there are any
               stipulations, so anything that you and Mr. Roberts have agreed
               to prior to this hearing or if there’s any pre-trial motions. And
               the Court’s not hearing anything to that effect.

               [Maria]: The lawyer that I had before, I told her that I didn’t
               want her services anymore, and that’s why I’m here today.

               THE COURT: Okay. So you are -- since you -- I granted – I
               granted the motion for your previous attorney to withdraw. So at
               this point, you are representing yourself, Ms. Del Carmen, which

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023      Page 14 of 17
        you’re entitled to do. And you have previously indicated that
        you are ready to proceed this afternoon. So I’m going to confirm
        that again, that you are ready to proceed.

        [Maria]: I am ready, not because I want to, because things were
        not being done the way that I thought they should have been
        done, and that’s why I don’t have a lawyer today.

        THE COURT: Okay. So I will indicate that the parties are
        ready to proceed with their final hearing then. Okay.

Id. at 5-6. The record reveals that Maria’s second attorney emailed her on

August 30, 2022, telling Maria that “you seem to want to go to court,” “[i]f you

want to do that, you will have to hire another attorney,” and “[i]f you just want

to go to court for the sake of going to court, then I will withdraw from your

case. There is no reason to waste your time and mine if you want to meet with

me just to tell me you want to go to court.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at

30. On September 2, 2022, her former attorney emailed her stating that her

final dissolution hearing was scheduled for October 3, 2022, attaching a copy of

her Motion for Leave to Withdraw Appearance, noting that she would file the

motion ten days from September 2nd, notifying Maria that “failure to obtain

counsel to represent [her] in this action could result in the Court entering a

judgment against [her] or dismissing [her] case,” and stating that her hearing

would “proceed as scheduled regardless of whether or not [she] hire[d] another

attorney.” Id. at 31. On September 12, 2022, the court granted the motion, and

on October 3rd, approximately twenty-one days later, the final dissolution

hearing was held. The record does not indicate that Maria sought the services

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023     Page 15 of 17
       of other counsel after her second attorney withdrew, requested a continuance,

       or indicated that she was not ready to proceed.

[20]   It is well settled that a pro se litigant is held to the same legal standards as a

       licensed attorney. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). A pro se

       litigant “is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-

       represented.” Id. Pro se litigants are required to follow procedural rules, Evans

       v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, and “must be

       prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri,

       58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. This Court will “not

       become an advocate for a party . . . . Id. at 984 (internal quotation marks

       omitted). Ind. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.2 provides that “[a] judge

       shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office

       fairly and impartially.” A judge’s role as an impartial decision maker does not

       permit offering legal advice to pro se litigants. See Reinoehl v. St. Joseph Cnty.

       Health Dep’t, 181 N.E.3d 341, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that “[t]he

       court did not err by holding the Reinoehls,” pro se, to the standard of a trained

       attorney when “dismissing their Amended Complaint without first giving them

       the opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint”).

[21]   Maria acknowledges that she “undoubtedly shares some fault in failing to

       ensure that her former attorney had produced the Agreement in discovery and

       in assuming the risk of representing herself at the dissolution hearing.”

       Appellant’s Brief at 18. She did not mention the agreement throughout

       questioning about child custody and support, whether she and Guillermo

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023         Page 16 of 17
       owned real estate together, her business, a financial declaration form detailing

       her assets, and her bank accounts, or while cross-examining Guillermo. The

       court provided her with ample opportunities to present additional information.

       After “about two-and-a-half hours of evidence,” and closing arguments, Maria

       referenced an agreement but did not state that she had the agreement with her,

       explicitly ask the court to admit the agreement, or make an offer of proof

       regarding the terms of the agreement. Transcript Volume II at 52.

[22]   In light of it being well-settled that we hold pro se parties to the same standard as

       attorneys and we expect counsel to know and follow the trial rules, I would

       affirm the trial court’s denial of Maria’s motion for relief from judgment.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-193 | December 19, 2023      Page 17 of 17