Court Opinion

ID: 9954204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:03:20.18396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.928737
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 P. v. Carabajal CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publi-
cation or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or-
dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

    THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                         A166741
    v.
    JOHNNY BO CARABAJAL,                                                 (Solano County
                                                                          Super. Ct. No. FCR343307)
           Defendant and Defendant.

          Defendant Johnny Bo Carabajal appeals from a judgment entered after
the trial court denied both of his motions to withdraw his plea of no contest.
He contends this was an abuse of discretion under Penal Code section 1018.1
We affirm.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          A. The Underlying Crimes
          Defendant was charged with five felonies: forcible lewd act upon a
child, A.C. (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); count 1); attempted lewd act upon a child, A.C.
(§§ 288, subd. (a), 664; count 2); two counts of contacting or communicating

1         Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
      We incorporate by reference our decision in Carabajal’s prior appeal,
People v. Carabajal (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1 (Carabajal).

                                                                1
with a minor, E.M., with the intent to commit a sex offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a);
counts 3 & 4); and contacting or communicating with a minor, M.J., with the
intent to commit a sex offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a); count 5).
      The offenses involving E.M. and M.J.—counts 3 through 5—were
severed from the two offenses involving A.C. and proceeded to trial. In early
2020, a jury convicted defendant of these three charges. Defendant was
sentenced to two years and two months in prison. We affirmed. (Carabajal,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1.)
      During the pendency of that appeal, trial was set for the two remaining
counts involving A.C., counts 1 and 2. At a pretrial conference in late June
2021, the trial court indicated it understood there was a viable plea deal.
Accordingly, it granted a one-week continuance for defendant “to think about
the offer.”
      B. No Contest Plea for Offenses Involving A.C.
      Trial was scheduled to begin on July 7, 2021. That morning, with
defendant present, the trial court stated that “for everyone’s information and
so [defendant] hears this, [the] offer is going to be off the table today since the
jury trial is going to go forward.” Before moving forward, the court inquired
whether defendant was “aware of what the offer is,” which the prosecutor
explained required a no contest plea to count 1 in exchange for dismissing
count 2 with a Harvey waiver2 and resentencing defendant’s previous
convictions for counts 3–5 to run concurrently with the newly imposed
sentence for a total of five years. And the court asked if defendant knew
“what [his] maximum exposure is.” Then—based on defense counsel’s
representation that defendant “already served over two [years]” and “had

2    A Harvey waiver allows the court to consider dismissed charges for
purposes of sentencing. (Cf. People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758–759.)
                                        2
about a year remaining”—the court estimated that defendant had “about a
year actual time if, in fact, he would accept the offer.” Defense counsel
verified that was “[c]orrect.” Defendant affirmed that he understood the plea
offer.
         Even so, defendant rejected the offer. The trial court restated the offer
was “off the table” because “our [jury] panel will be coming in at 1:30.” The
prosecutor confirmed the offer was revoked.
         Shortly thereafter, defense counsel requested a sidebar to revisit the
plea offer. Following the sidebar, the trial court again addressed defendant
to “make sure that [he understood] what [was] taking place.” The court
recapped defendant’s maximum exposure, the terms of the offer, and the
approximate amount of “actual time” defendant would serve. The court
further said it did not oppose defendant entering a plea without admitting to
the underlying factual basis pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595.
         Following an exposition of a West plea and the approximate sentencing
subject to credit calculation, the trial court gave defendant additional time to
consider the offer and review the rights waiver form with counsel. After the
recess, defendant agreed to resolve the case, reiterating he only did so on the
condition that he did not admit to the underlying facts of the plea and
because he “want[ed] desperately to get back to his minor children.”
         During the plea colloquy, the trial court confirmed that defendant had
adequate time to review the written waiver of his constitutional rights. The
court then walked through defendant’s waived rights as well as the general
structure of the plea.
         Finally, before accepting the plea, the trial court addressed a separate
concern regarding a dependency case involving defendant’s son, which was
being handled by a different court. The court asked defendant if he

                                          3
understood that entering a West plea in this case “may or may not have an
effect on what happens in dependency court?” Defendant answered “Yes.”
      Accordingly, the plea was accepted, and sentencing was scheduled
several months out to allow for a “credit calculation.”
      C. Defendant’s Motions to Withdraw his Plea
      In February 2022, before the sentencing hearing, defendant moved to
withdraw his no contest plea. He asserted that “but for his belief that he
would be able to reunify with his minor son and re-establish their bond
within approximately a year from the date of sentencing, he would not have
entered the plea.” The only evidence proffered in support of the claim was a
declaration by trial counsel, who vouched for defendant’s claims solely on her
own information and belief.3
      In late May 2022, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. First, the
court concluded defendant failed to present “clear and convincing evidence” of
any mistake, prejudicial or otherwise, that overcame his exercise of free
judgment. Second, the court found defendant failed to show he was not
properly advised of either the direct or collateral consequences of his plea.
      In late September 2022, defendant, represented by new counsel, filed a
second motion to withdraw his no contest plea, asserting good cause based on
his mistaken belief that his daughter, S.C., had been planning to testify that
he had committed offenses against her.4 Defendant made no mention of this

3     Prior to the motion being heard, the public defender’s office moved to
challenge the trial court judge for cause. The claims underlying the motion
were unrelated to defendant’s case, but the motion alleged the judge was
disqualified from adjudicating public defender cases, including this one. In
March 2022, a different superior court judge denied the motion, and this
matter proceeded.
4     Defendant was appointed new counsel because a conflict arose for the
public defender originally assigned to the case. The trial court permitted the
                                       4
claim in his previous motion to withdraw his plea. But like his previous
motion, the statement of facts was based solely on a declaration of counsel,
which asserted the sincerity of defendant’s beliefs but offered no facts or
explanation as to the source of defendant’s misinformation.
      In October 2022, the trial court denied the second motion to withdraw
and sentenced defendant to five years in prison, which with credits meant he
was required to serve one year and three months of actual prison time upon
entering the plea. The court did not give credence to defendant’s new alleged
mistaken belief because there was no mention of S.C. at any time during the
first trial—involving the offenses against other minors—or the pretrial
conferences in this case. Moreover, because defendant offered no facts or
evidence indicating how he came to be misinformed about testimony of S.C.,
the court rejected the assertion of good cause.
      Defendant timely appealed and obtained a certificate of probable cause.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Section 1018 allows a no contest plea to be withdrawn before judgment
for “good cause shown.” To show good cause, the defendant must present
“clear and convincing evidence” of mistake or ignorance “overcoming the
exercise of free judgment.” (People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 894
(Patterson).) “[C]lear and convincing evidence denotes proof that is clear,
explicit, and unequivocal and leaves no substantial doubt.” (People v.
Yovanov (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 392, 402, questioned on other grounds in
People v. Mabini (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.) “The defendant must also
show prejudice in that he or she would not have accepted the plea bargain
had it not been for the mistake.” (People v. Breslin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th

second motion because it had allowed the original counsel time to file a
motion for reconsideration of the court’s ruling, which she failed to do.

                                       5
1409, 1416 (Breslin).) When evaluating such a claim, the trial court does not
need to accept the defendant’s self-serving statements. (People v. Fairbank
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1253–1254 (Fairbank).) We review an order denying
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under section 1018 for abuse of discretion.
(Patterson, at p. 894.)
      On appeal, defendant appears to advance four allegations undergirding
his motions to withdraw. We address each claim and find all without merit.
      1. Alleged Mistake Regarding Impact on Dependency Matter
      First, defendant claims he should have been permitted to withdraw his
plea because he “erroneously believed that the plea would not impact the case
regarding custody and visitation with his 10-year-old son.” But defendant
fails to show an abuse of discretion. (Cf. Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 894.) In this regard, the record is bereft of facts supporting the basis for
defendant’s belief, and the trial court was free to discredit the declaration of
defendant’s attorney asserting summarily that defendant’s belief was
genuine.5 (Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 1253–1254.)
      Just as the record lacks any explanation or corroboration of defendant’s
mistaken belief, he makes no showing that his plea actually or necessarily
affected the outcome of the dependency matter. Indeed, defendant had
already been convicted of three sex offenses involving two other minors.
      Nor is there any factual merit to defendant’s charge that the trial court
misrepresented the potential impact of the plea to the dependency matter
involving his son. To the contrary, the court explained to defendant that the
plea “may or may not have an effect on what happens in dependency court.”

5    The prosecution argues these declarations are inadmissible hearsay.
But no objection was made in the trial court, so this argument was forfeited.
(Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 725.)

                                        6
Moreover, any perceived deficiency or mistake in the trial court’s advising on
this point was at most a matter involving a “ ‘collateral’ ” or “ ‘indirect’ ”
consequence of defendant’s plea, which does not compel a reversal. (People v.
Moore (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 626, 630.) The court’s obligation to advise
extends only to “ ‘penal’ ” or “ ‘direct consequences of conviction,’ ” which are
those that have “ ‘a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the
range of the defendant’s punishment.’ ” (Ibid., emphasis added; see id. [the
possibility of probation revocation in another case is a “ ‘collateral’ ”
consequence].) Defendant makes no claim that the resolution of the
dependency case had an impact on his punishment; nor has he cited any
authority establishing that his plea would in some way be dispositive in the
dependency proceedings. This distinguishes the instant facts from those in
Patterson, where the defendant presented evidence that the conviction
subjected him to mandatory deportation. (Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 898.)
      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this claim.
      2. Alleged Mistake Regarding Length of Sentence
      Next, defendant contends a reversal is required because he erroneously
believed he would be out of custody “within one year” of entering his plea.
But again, defendant does not substantiate this claim with any supporting
facts or evidence. Defendant’s post-plea dissatisfaction with his sentence “is
not sufficient to compel the exercise of judicial discretion to permit
withdrawal of the plea.” (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 104.)
      In advancing this claim, defendant asserts “it is uncontested that both
the court and counsel represented” he would be released from custody “within

                                         7
a year” of entering the plea.6 The plea transcript, however, belies this
contention. Specifically, the record shows the trial court repeatedly stated
defendant’s resentencing would result in a term of imprisonment of “about”
one year but made clear that “sentencing probably would not take place today
because we need some additional information” for credit calculation.
Defendant does not contest the correctness of the calculation that he was
required to serve one year and three months of actual prison time upon
entering the plea.
      Moreover, to the extent defendant apparently miscalculated his credits,
such miscalculation is not good cause for withdrawal. (Breslin, supra, 205
Cal.App.4th at p. 1417 [“ ‘ “The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to
be valid does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the
defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering his [or her]
decision” ’ ”].) Defendant also fails to establish that he would not have
accepted the plea bargain had he correctly calculated his credits. This is
independently fatal to his quest for relief.
      3. Alleged Mistake Regarding Additional Testimony
      Defendant also argues he entered his plea because he was informed
incorrectly that his other daughter, S.C., would testify against him. Though
first raised in defendant’s second motion, it lacked any supporting facts or
explanation, despite months-long delays allowing for defendant’s newly
assigned counsel time to investigate the basis of a second motion to
withdraw.

6     The attorney declarations attached to the two motions to withdraw did
not assert that counsel erroneously advised defendant. We do not understand
defendant as additionally asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
                                        8
      Again, the only evidence defendant submitted was his newly assigned
attorney’s declaration. This declaration provided no information regarding
the source of defendant’s misinformation. Nor did the declaration
substantiate prejudice. Given the absence of clear and convincing evidence
demonstrating mistake or prejudice, the court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to grant the second motion to withdraw. (Cf. Patterson, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 894.)
      4. Allegations of Undue Judicial Pressure and Bias
      Beyond the foregoing contentions articulated in defendants’ two
motions to withdraw, defendant’s appellate briefing raises concerns of
judicial coercion and bias. These issues were not raised below, but “ ‘ “[t]he
fact that a party, by failing to raise an issue below, may forfeit the right to
raise the issue on appeal does not mean that an appellate court is precluded
from considering the issue.” ’ ” (In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176,
184.) Given the gravity of potential judicial impropriety, we elect to address
these allegations. Nonetheless, we find them unfounded.
      First, defendant suggests “the ongoing dispute between the Judge and
the public defender’s office regarding the Judge’s bias” may have
“complicat[ed]” his plea. We note this assertion lacks a separate heading and
is conclusorily made without supporting argument. (People v. Dain (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 399, *819–820 [raising a point without a separate heading or
subheading and supported by argument violates Cal. Rule of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B)].)
      Second, there appears no merit to defendant’s assertion that the trial
court either coerced defendant to enter the plea or stated it “would allow the
plea to be made pursuant to People v. West to dissuade [defendant] from
believing that his plea would be held against him during the proceedings

                                        9
involving his son.” The record shows that, following a sidebar requested by
defense counsel to revisit the previously-rejected plea offer, the court
addressed defendant “to make sure that [he] underst[ood] what it is that
[was] taking place.” Specifically, the court explained to defendant that the
function of a West plea was to allow him to avoid an express admission of
guilt and merely consent to be punished due to the risk of harsher sentence
following a conviction by a jury. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th
1229, 1374.)
      Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the trial court did not
inappropriately “pressure” him into accepting the plea offer. As the record
reflects, the court was simply cautioning defendant that the offer would
expire upon the start of the trial. Moreover, these circumstances do not
detract from the fact that defendant already had a week to consider the offer,
and additionally, was afforded a recess to further consider the deal. On this
record, defendant’s pretrial hesitation in entering the plea was not sufficient
to demonstrate it was involuntary. (See People v. Hunt, supra, 174
Cal.App.3d at p. 103.)
      Defendant’s reliance on People v. Weaver (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 131
(Weaver) and People v. Sandoval (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 111 (Sandoval) is
unavailing. In Weaver, judicial coercion was evidenced by a litany of
improper remarks made by the court after discussing images found on the
appellant’s computer, including: “ ‘off the cuff’ it appeared appellant was a
pedophile”; once “a jury saw the victims ‘and we take all this ugliness and put
it out on the table and put it out there it’s a lot different than right now’ ”;
and “ ‘[a]s soon as the first little girl in the pink dress sits down, you know,
then you’re going to see the real victim. You’ll see the real impact.’ ”
(Weaver, at pp. 135–136.) Those comments, along with many others which

                                        10
were more inappropriate, led the appellate court to conclude the trial court
“abandon[ed] its judicial role and thrust[] itself to the center of the
negotiation process and [made] repeated comments that suggest a less-than-
neutral attitude about the case or the defendant,” thus resulting in “great
pressure” for the appellant “to accede to the court’s wishes” for a plea. (Id. at
p. 150.) In Sandoval, a co-defendant admitted that he threatened to kill the
defendant if he did not take the plea. (Sandoval, at pp. 121–122.)
      Nothing in this record comes close to such remarks or physical threats.
Even if it can be said the trial court intended to encourage a plea bargain,
that alone is insufficient. (See Weaver, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 146–
149.) Here there is no evidence of coercion or involuntariness. Accordingly,
we see no basis for requiring withdrawal of the plea on this basis.
      In sum, defendant’s motions to withdraw his plea failed to present clear
and convincing evidence in support of any of his contentions. Thus,
defendant has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motions.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                        11
                                _________________________
                                Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

People v. Carabajal (A166741)

                                 12