Court Opinion

ID: 9862331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:07:02.59971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:05.137591
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER, dissenting: Mr. Chief Justice Underwood, Mr. Justice Ward and I are of the opinion that it is necessary to consider only one of the numerous issues raised by the appellant. We think that that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the forfeiture of the automobile involved in this case. It is undisputed that Woody Robinson, the owner, was held in the Cook County jail, in the custody of the sheriff of that county, from June 16, 1970, to October 6, 1970. Jurisdiction in the forfeiture proceeding, which was begun and terminated during that period, is predicated upon notice mailed by the sheriff to Robinson at 6819 South Green, Chicago, Illinois 60621, his address as listed in the records of the Secretary of State. But the mailing of notice to that address was a meaningless gesture in this case, because the sheriff was himself making it impossible for Robinson to receive mail so addressed by holding him in jail. It is not enough to say that the action was in rem, and therefore substituted service was permissible. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. (1949), 339 U.S. 306, 94 L.Ed. 865, 70 S.Ct. 652, after commenting on the vagueness of the classifications “in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more indefinitely still, ‘in the nature of a proceeding in rem,’ ” Mr. Justice Jackson said: “But in any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to state. *** An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 339 U.S. at 312, 314, 94 L.Ed. at 872, 873. In the present case the sheriff knew that Robinson was not at the address to which the notice was mailed and knew also that he could not get to that address because the sheriff was holding him in jail. It cannot be said, therefore, that there was any notice in this case which was reasonably calculated to apprise Robinson of the pendency of the proceeding, and the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed. UNDERWOOD, C.J., and WARD, J., join in this dissent.