Court Opinion

ID: 9384193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-01 00:01:30.322639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:51.266345
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARLOS N. ANTUNEZ CRUZ, et
al.,

          Plaintiffs,

v.                                    No. 20-1978 (EGS)
JIMENEZ CONSTRUCTION LLC, et
al.,

          Defendants.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Carlos N. Antunez Cruz (“Mr. Cruz”) and Ruth Nicolle Lopez

Villalta (“Ms. Villalta”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring

this action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,

29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”); the District of Columbia

Minimum Wage Revision Act, D.C. Code § 32-1001 et seq.

(“DCMWRA”); and the District of Columbia Wage Payment and Wage

Collection Law, D.C. Code §§ 32-1301 et seq. (“DCWPWCL”). See

generally Compl., ECF No. 1. They have sued two groups of

defendants to recover unpaid wages and for damages: Jimenez

Construction LLC, Arian Jimenez, Dennise Vasquez-Martinez

(collectively, the “Jiminez Defendants”); and Mid-Atlantic

Military Family Communities LLC and Mid-Atlantic San Diego LLC

(collectively, the “Mid-Atlantic Defendants”). See id. The Court

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refers to the Jiminez Defendants and the Mid-Atlantic Defendants

collectively as the “Defendants.”

     Pending before the Court is the Mid-Atlantic Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, see Mot. Dismiss Pls.’

Compl., ECF No. 10; to which the Jimenez Construction Defendants

“consent”, see Co-Defendants’ Response, ECF No. 12. Upon careful

consideration of the motion, the opposition, and reply thereto,

the applicable law, the entire record herein, and for the

reasons explained below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND

DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

I.   Background

     A. Factual

     The Court assumes the following facts alleged in the

complaint to be true for the purposes of deciding the Motion to

Dismiss and construes them in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Baird v.

Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs

allege that they were hired by Defendants to work on projects

that were covered by the Davis-Bacon Act (“DBA”), 40 U.S.C. §

3141, et seq. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 12. Mr. Cruz alleges that

he was hired to be a “Painter” and that he also performed duties

of a “Carpenter,” but that Defendants never paid him the DBA

wages for a “Painter” or for a “Carpenter.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. Ms.

Villalta alleges that when she worked for Defendants, she

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performed work as a janitor or a “Painter,” but that Defendants

never paid her the DBA wages for a “Painter.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.

     Aside from the allegations regarding Defendants’ failure to

pay applicable DBA wages, Plaintiffs also allege the non-DBA

hourly rates they were actually paid. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. With regard

to the non-DBA rates, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated

the FLSA, the DCMWRA, and the DCWPWCL by failing to pay them all

the overtime they were owed and failing to pay them for all of

the hours they worked. Id. ¶¶ 29, 36, 42.

     B. Relevant Statutes

          1. Davis-Bacon Act

     The Davis-Bacon Act is “a minimum wage law designed for the

benefit of construction workers.” United States v. Binghamton

Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 178 (1954). It “was ‘designed to

protect local wage standards by preventing contractors from

basing their bids on wages lower than those prevailing in the

area.’” Univs. Rsch. Ass’n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 773

(1981) (quoting H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., Legislative History of

the Davis-Bacon Act, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (Comm. Print

1962)). Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary of Labor sets

“prevailing” minimum wage rates for various classes of workers,

which contractors must pay on federally- and District of

Columbia-funded contracts in excess of $2,000. 40 U.S.C. §§

3142(a)-(b). The DBA authorizes the Department of Labor (“DOL”)

                               3
to withhold accrued payments to contractors as “necessary to pay

to laborers and mechanics employed by the contractor or any

subcontractor on the work the difference between the rates of

wages required by the contract to be paid . . . and the rates of

wages received.” Id. § 3142(c)(3). DOL regulations set forth an

administrative process through which workers may obtain unpaid

wages and damages, see 29 C.F.R. § 5.11; and the statute

provides a right of action for workers “if the accrued payments

withheld under the terms of the contract are insufficient to

reimburse” them, 40 U.S.C. § 3144(a)(2).

          2.   Fair Labor Standards Act

     The FLSA provides, among other things, that “no employer

shall employ any of his [covered] employees ... for a workweek

longer than forty hours unless such employee receives

compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above

specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the

regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). An

employee's “regular rate” is “deemed to include all remuneration

for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee, but shall

not be deemed to include” various items such as gifts, vacation

and sick pay, various insurance payments, and certain other

exempted items. Id. § 207(e). Employers who violate §§

206 and 207 are liable “in the amount of [the employee's] unpaid

minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation,

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as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as

liquidated damages.” Id. § 216(b). Finally, the FLSA authorizes

a private right of action for aggrieved employees: “An

action to recover the liability prescribed in the preceding

sentences may be maintained against any employer (including

a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent

jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf

of himself or themselves and other employees similarly

situated.” Id.

          3.     District of Columbia Minimum Wage Revision Act

     The DCMWRA mirrors the FLSA. Subject to certain exemptions,

the DCMWRA prohibits any employer from “employ[ing] any employee

for a workweek that is longer than 40 hours, unless the employee

receives compensation for employment in excess of 40 hours at a

rate not less than 1 ½ times the regular rate at which the

employee is employed.” D.C. Code § 32-1003(c). Violators are

subject to steep penalties: “[A]ny employer who pays any

employee less than the wage to which that employee is entitled

under this subchapter shall be liable to that employee in the

amount of the unpaid wages, statutory penalties, and an

additional amount as liquidated damages equal to treble the

amount of unpaid wages.” Id. § 32-1012(b)(1). The DCMWRA also

creates a private right of action for aggrieved employees. See

id. §§ 32-1012(a), 32-1308.

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          4.   District of Columbia    Wage   Payment     and   Wage
               Collection Law

     The DCWPWCL requires employers to pay employees “all wages

earned” on regular paydays. D.C. Code § 32-1302. It defines

“wages” as “all monetary compensation after lawful deductions,

owed by an employer, whether the amount owed is determined on a

time, task, piece, commission, or other basis of calculation.”

Id. § 32-1301(3). “Wages” include “[o]ther remuneration promised

or owed ... [p]ursuant to District or federal law,” as well as

pursuant to “a contract for employment, whether written or oral”

or “a contract between an employer and another person or

entity.” Id. § 32-1301(3)(E); see also id. § 32-1301(3)(A)–(D)

(further defining wages to include bonuses, commissions,

fringe benefits paid in cash, and overtime premiums). The

DCWPCL provides that, “[i]n enforcing the provisions of this

chapter, the remuneration promised by an employer to an

employee shall be presumed to be at least the amount required

by federal law, including federal law requiring the payment

of prevailing wages, or by District law.” Id. § 32-1305. The

DCWPCL authorizes a private right of action and, like the

DCMWA, there are steep consequences for violations, including

treble damages. Id. § 32-1308.

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            C. Procedural

      On September 9, 2020, the Mid-Atlantic Defendants moved to

dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See generally Mot. Dismiss

Pls.’ Compl., ECF No. 10; Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss

Pls.’ Compl. Failure State Claim (“MTD”), ECF No. 10-1. The

Jimenez Defendants consented to the Motion to Dismiss. See Co-

Defs.’ Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Pls.’ Compl., ECF No. 12.

Plaintiffs filed their opposition, see Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to

Mid-Atlantic Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Compl. (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 14;

and the Mid-Atlantic Defendants thereafter filed a reply, see

Reply in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Pls.’ Compl. Failure State

Claim (“Reply”), ECF No. 15. The motion is ripe and ready for

adjudication.

II.   Legal Standard

      A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A

complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

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     Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining

whether a complaint fails to state a claim, [the Court] may

consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents

either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters

of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St.

Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (citation omitted). A claim is facially plausible when the

facts pled in the complaint allow the court to “draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

The standard does not amount to a “probability requirement,” but

it does require more than a “sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

     “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss [pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the

factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v.

D.C. Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition,

the court must give the plaintiff the “benefit of all inferences

                               8
that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI

Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citation

omitted).

III. Analysis

       A. Plaintiffs Cannot Bypass the DBA By Recasting Their
          DBA Claims Under the FLSA, DCMWRA, or the DCWPWCL

     Plaintiffs allege violations of three different laws based

on Defendants’ alleged failure to pay them the applicable DBA

rates: (1) failure to pay overtime rates equal to one and one-

half times the applicable DBA rates in violation of the FLSA,

Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 30; (2) failure to pay overtime rates and

failure to pay them for all the hours works at the applicable

DBA rate in violation of the DCMWRA, id. ¶ 37; (3) Failure to

pay Plaintiffs (a) anything for some of their hours of work, and

(b) failure to pay the applicable DBA rates in violation of the

DCWPWCL, id. ¶ 42.

     Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims “because they

require the Court to determine whether Plaintiffs were assigned

the proper labor categories and entitled to DBA wages, a task

delegated by Congress exclusively to the [U.S.] Department of

Labor.” MTD, ECF No. 10-1 at 8. Defendants argue that: (1) “all

of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred because they may not bring a

private cause of action to recover [DBA] Wages” and Plaintiffs

cannot circumvent the lack of a private cause of action “by

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recasting the alleged violation of the DBA as a statutory

violation under the FLSA, [DCWPWCL] or the [DCMWA], id. at 9,

11-12. 1

     As an initial matter, the Parties agree, for the sake of

this motion, that the DBA does not confer a private right of

action on plaintiffs who have claims for back wages under DBA

contracts. See MTD, ECF No. 10-1 at 9; Opp’n, ECF No. 14 at 1.

Therefore, the Court will assume, without deciding, that the DBA

does not confer a private right of action. See, e.g., Johnson v.

Prospect Waterproofing Co., 813 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9 (D.D.C. 2011).

     The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

(“D.C. Circuit”) has not settled question of “the interaction

between the DBA and other federal or state wage laws, and there

is a division of authority among the circuits.” Garcia v.

Skanska USA Building, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 3d 76, 80 (D.D.C.

2018). Plaintiffs urge the Court to adopt the reasoning of the

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit”),

which in Amaya v. Power Design, Inc., concluded that “Congress

intended the FLSA to apply broadly notwithstanding any overlap

with other labor statutes.” 833 F.3d 440, 445 (4th Cir. 2016).

1 In the alternative, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs’ DCMWRA
claim fails to the extent they seek overtime based on minimum
wages established by the DBA. MTD, ECF No. 10-1 at 12-13. In
view of the Court’s dismissal of the DBA claims based on
Defendants’ lead argument, the Court need not reach this
argument.
                               10
Accordingly, it allowed FLSA claims to go forward and further,

it interpreted the “regular rate” under FLSA as referring to the

“prevailing rate” under the DBA. Id. at 447 (citing 40 U.S.C. §

3142(e)). In making that determination, the Fourth Circuit found

instructive the Supreme Court’s determination in Powell v. U.S.

Cartridge Co. that employees could pursue FLSA actions for

unpaid overtime under a contract subject to the Walsh-Healey Act

(“WHA”). 339 U.S. 497, 519-520 (1950). 2

     The Court, however, is persuaded by authority in this

District that relies on authority from the Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit (“Second Circuit”). In Johnson v. Prospect

Waterproofing Co., as here, the plaintiffs brought claims for

violations of the DCWPWCL and the District of Columbia Minimum

Wage Act (“DCMWA”). Johnson, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 5. Still, the

court held that each of the claims was founded exclusively on

the DBA because the Complaint alleged that defendants had

violated the DCWPWCL and DCMWA by “failing to compensate

according to the prevailing [DBA] rate.” Id. at 10. In so

2 Plaintiffs’ assertion that Powell “conclusively establish[es]
that the DBA does not preclude a civil action for DBA-mandated
rates under FLSA’s overtime provisions,” Opp’n, ECF No. 14 at 4;
is clearly an overstatement since Powell does not concern the
DBA. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ assertion that the WHA is
“identical to the DBA in all significant respects” is neither
explained in sufficient detail nor clearly supported by the
caselaw cited. Id. at 4-5.
                                11
holding, the court explained that it adopted the reasoning in

Grochowski v. Phoenix Const., 318 F.3d 80 (2003):

            “At bottom, the plaintiffs' state-law claims
            are indirect attempts at privately enforcing
            the prevailing wage schedules contained in the
            DBA. To allow a third-party private contract
            action aimed at enforcing those wage schedules
            would be inconsistent with the underlying
            purpose of the legislative scheme and would
            interfere with the implementation of that
            scheme to the same extent as would a cause of
            action directly under the statute.”

Johnson, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (quoting Grochowski, 318 F.3d at

86 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the Johnson

court “conclude[d] that plaintiffs' claims ‘are clearly an

impermissible end run around’ the [DBA].” Johnson, 813 F. Supp.

2d at 10 (quoting Grochowski, 318 F.3d at 86). “As other courts

have held, if plaintiffs could bring such an action directly in

this Court, it would severely undermine the specific remedial

scheme established by Congress.” Id.

       Similarly, in Ibrahim v. Mid-Atl. Air of D.C., LLC, the

Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the Defendant had

failed to pay him the required DBA rate. Ibrahim, 802 F. Supp.

2d 73 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, No. 11-7150, 2012 WL 3068460 (D.C.

Cir. July 19, 2012). The court dismissed the complaint on the

ground that the claim is “‘clearly an impermissible end run

around’” the DBA. Id. at 76 (quoting Grochowski, 318 F.3d at

86).

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     Here too, Plaintiffs’ relevant claims are founded on the

DBA. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated: (1) the FLSA by

failing to pay Plaintiffs the applicable DBA rates, Compl., ECF

No. 1 at 11 ¶ 30; (2) the DCMWRA by failing to pay Plaintiffs

the applicable DBA rates, id. at 12 ¶ 37; and (3) the DCWPWCL by

failing to pay Plaintiffs the applicable DBA rates, id. at 13 ¶

42. Accordingly, the resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims depends on

what the DBA rates are. “[A]s courts in this circuit and

elsewhere have concluded, plaintiffs cannot get around the

administrative prerequisites of the [DBA] simply by dressing up

their claim in new language and asserting that it arises under

state law.” Johnson, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 9.

     Plaintiffs point to other persuasive authority in this

District, but the cases are easily distinguishable. In Garcia v.

Skanska USA Building, Inc., the Plaintiff sued under the FLSA,

DCMWA, and the DCWPWCL, and the Defendants moved to dismiss

based on arguments similar to those being made here. Garcia, 324

F. Supp. 3d 76, 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2018). The Garcia court permitted

those claims to proceed, reasoning as follows:

          Garcia's claims, by contrast, would not
          short-circuit   the    DBA's   administrative
          process or embroil the Court in legal
          determinations    Congress    intended    the
          Department of Labor to resolve. First,
          Garcia's complaint could be construed—and so,
          on a motion to dismiss, must be construed—to
          avoid the DBA entirely. Garcia alleges that

                               13
          the employers here agreed to hire and pay him
          “as a carpenter” and that “he understood from
          this that he would be paid at least the legal
          prevailing wage for a carpenter.” Compl. ¶¶
          21–22. That the DBA may have provided the
          basis     for    the     parties'     alleged
          “underst[anding]” does not transform the
          agreement into anything other than an
          ordinary contract; on this reading, Garcia is
          not suing for the DBA-mandated rates per se,
          but rather for the rates his employers agreed
          to pay him.

Garcia, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 84. Here, however, there is no way to

“avoid” the DBA for Plaintiffs’ claims that are based on the

failure to pay DBA rates. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 30, 37, 42.

Accordingly, here the Plaintiffs are suing for “the DBA-mandated

rates per se.”

     Similarly, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Perez v. C.R. Calderon

Construction, Inc., is misplaced. Plaintiffs point to the

Court’s conclusion “that no matter how DOL would classify the

plaintiffs' correct wage rate, they are entitled to the wage

rate that they were promised upon being hired and that they

reasonably expected applied over the duration of their work

on the Project.” Perez, 221 F. Supp. 3d. 115, 150 (D.D.C. 2016).

However, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that regarding this

conclusion, the Court stated that it “need not resolve whether

it has jurisdiction to determine the correctness of the

plaintiffs' classification as carpenters, since the prevailing

wage rate for carpenters under the Davis–Bacon Act would

                               14
nonetheless apply here,” Id. at 150 n.24; or that the DBA rate

was set forth in a pretrial Settlement Agreement between the

Defendant in Perez and the Department of Labor for violations of

the DBA, but for persons other than the Plaintiffs in Perez.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Perez for the proposition

that this Court can resolve DBA classification issues in this

case is entirely unpersuasive.

       B. Plaintiffs’ FLSA, DCMWRA and DCWPWCL Claims That Are
          Not Based on DBA Wages May Proceed

      Plaintiffs argue that even if the Court determines that

Plaintiffs cannot bring claims for DBA wages under the FLSA,

DCMWRA, and DCWPWCL, their claims under these statutes based on

the rates Defendants actually paid them should not be dismissed.

Opp’n, ECF No. 14 at 11-12. Defendants did not address these

claims in the Motion to Dismiss, see generally MTD, ECF No. 10-

1; and do not respond to Plaintiffs’ argument in their Reply

briefing, see generally Reply, ECF No. 15. Defendants have

therefore conceded it. Cf. Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. Of

Global Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2002) (“It

is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files

an opposition to a motion ... addressing only certain arguments

raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that

the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”). The Court notes

that in Grochowski, the Court affirmed the District Court’s

                                 15
decision to “limit[] the plaintiffs’ claims under the FLSA for

unpaid overtime compensation to one-and-a-half times the hourly

rates actually paid.” Grochowski, 318 F.3d at 87.

IV.   Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND

DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10.

Plaintiffs’ claims based on the failure to pay DBA wages are

DISMISSED and Plaintiffs’ claims based on non-DBA wages may

proceed.

      An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

      SO ORDERED.

Signed:    Emmet G. Sullivan
           United States District Judge
           March 31, 2023

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