Court Opinion

ID: 9573212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:49:54.827089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:07.060916
License: Public Domain

*598Springer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that part of the majority opinion which holds that Martin has not complied with NRAP 35(a) when he failed to file the required “certificate of attorney.” This, however, is a minor procedural irregularity which can be easily cured merely by allowing Martin to comply with this procedural requirement.
The majority justices state that they are “not convinced that McKenna has demonstrated that Justice Rose has a disqualifying personal bias against him.” The problem with the majority opinion is that one of the majority justices is Justice Rose, who, again, is not only sitting in judgment of his own qualifications, he is the deciding or “swing vote” in making the decision. (For other cases in which Justice Rose has recently insisted upon sitting in judgment on cases involving factual and legal disputes relating to his qualifications, see, for example, Hogan v. Warden, 112 Nev. 553, 916 P.2d 805 (1996); Snyder v. Viani, 112 Nev. 568, 916 P.2d 170 (1996); Allum v. Valley Bank of Nevada, 112 Nev. 591, 915 P.2d 895 (1996).
I am not prepared to discuss the question of whether Justice Rose’s pursuing1 of criminal charges against appellant’s attorney, while his appeal was pending, is sufficient to disqualify Justice Rose. I know that I would feel very uncomfortable if I were a lawyer arguing a case before the supreme court, if one of the deciding justices was at the time pressing criminal charges against me. It is not necessary to decide this question now, however, when it is so clear that Justice Rose should not hear and decide this motion challenging his qualifications. If Justice Rose had decided to remove himself from the decision-making process in the pending motion to disqualify him, I would have been pleased to deliberate matters relating to his qualifications with the remaining majority and to express my views in the appropriate manner. I am concerned now only with the propriety of Justice Rose sitting in judgment of himself2; therefore, I will *599simply dissent only on the ground that Justice Rose is not qualified to sit in judgment of his own qualifications.

Justice Rose did not actually file a criminal complaint against Mr. McKenna, but, according to Justice Rose, he merely “reported to law enforcement authorities” incriminating information about Mr. McKenna that he had received from one of his campaign managers.

I deeply regret that Justice Rose in his concurring opinion has reduced himself to name-calling, accusing me of being “hypocritical” when I object to his participation in the motion to disqualify him. As in other recent cases, Justice Rose does not seem to realize that disputed factual and legal issues relating to his impartiality should be resolved by some person other than himself. With regard to Justice Rose’s suggestion that I have ruled in matters relating to my own qualifications, this is simply not true; and even if it were, it would not justify Justice Rose in acting as his own judge. In the case mentioned by Justice Rose in his concurring opinion, I withdrew from participating in the decision on the motion to disqualify me. The motion was *599denied (four times) by Justice Shearing, Senior Justice Zenoff and District Judge Guy. I did not participate in these decisions. In the Whitehead opinion, I did join in ruling that, once the motions challenging my qualifications had been finally decided by an impartial panel, the moving party was not entitled to a hearing on the matter. Whitehead has no relevance of any kind to the present case.