Court Opinion

ID: 9545554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:15:36.053174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:07.370910
License: Public Domain

Justice ROVIRA
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I agree with the majority that communications between spouses made during the marriage are privileged, even in a child custody proceeding, I disagree that David Brady’s (husband) testimony concerning his observations of his wife’s activities is also precluded. Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
This court has held that the spousal privilege statute must be strictly construed because of the privilege’s tendency to obstruct full disclosure of the truth. Petro-Lewis Corp. v. District Court, 727 P.2d 41 (Colo.1986); Keeler v. Russum, 68 Colo. 196, 189 P. 255 (1920). I believe that the spousal privilege, at least as to a husband’s observations of his wife’s activities, does not apply in a child custody case because such a proceeding is not one in which the husband is testifying “for or against his wife.” I have arrived at this conclusion after examining the pertinent portions of section 13-90-107(l)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987). The language concerning privileged communications between the spouses is quite broad, and no exception for child custody hearings may be read into the plain language of the statute. The protection for a spouse’s observations, however, is modified by the requirement that the testimony be “for or against” the spouse. Because a child custody proceeding is not adversary in nature, but is a proceeding to determine and protect the child’s best interests, I would hold that the spousal privilege as to observations does not apply in this case.
In Sabon v. People, 142 Colo. 323, 350 P.2d 576 (1960), this court held that the spousal privilege statute did not apply to an adjudication of mental illness because the proceeding was not adversarial in nature, and thus the wife’s testimony was neither for nor against her husband. We emphasized that the mental illness inquiry was a special statutory proceeding by the state for the protection and benefit of an incompetent individual. The state’s interest in protecting, supervising, and caring for the incompetent in a mental health proceeding is comparable to the state’s interest, as parens patriae, in protecting the welfare of a child in a custody proceeding.
The state, as parens patriae, has a continuing responsibility to provide for the protection of children within its borders, in order to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child. E.P. v. District Court, 696 P.2d 254 (Colo.1985); McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945). “[T]he initiation of any proceedings in a court in which the rights, status and welfare of an infant may be affected immediately establishes the infant’s relation to the court as that of its ward.” Smith v. Welfare Dep’t, 144 Colo. 103, 355 P.2d 317 (1960). When a custody proceeding is initiated, the state’s parens patriae role is implicated, just as the state’s protection is invoked in a mental illness adjudication. The only criteria to be utilized in a custody proceeding are those of the welfare and best interests of the child. §§ 14-10-131, 14-10-124, 6B C.R.S. (1987); In re Mar*1353riage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310 (Colo.1985). A child is not a piece of property to be won or lost based on the merits of a particular parent’s claim. Thus, a child custody hearing is not an adversarial proceeding pitting the father against the mother, but rather, it is a hearing to determine what placement of the child will be in the child’s best interests. Rayer v. Rayer, 32 Colo.App. 400, 512 P.2d 637 (1973).
In a custody proceeding the court does not proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action against the other, or indeed against anyone. [The court] acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child. [It] is not adjudicating a controversy between adversary parties, to compose their private differences. [It] is not determining rights as between a parent and child, or as between one parent and another.
Leigh v. Aiken, 54 Ala.App. 620, 311 So.2d 444 (1975) (quoting Cleckley v. Cleckley, 250 Ala. 78, 33 So.2d 338 (1948)). In a custody proceeding, a court does not determine that a particular parent has a right to custody of his child, but whether the child’s best interests will be served by placing the child in the custody of a particular parent. Thus, any testimony concerning the child, including his living conditions and possible child abuse, is not testimony “for or against” the spouse. Rather, the testimony is necessary in order to aid the state in its role of protecting the best interests of the child.
Other jurisdictions have held that a custody proceeding is non-adversarial in nature. See Leigh v. Aiken, 54 Ala.App. 620, 311 So.2d 444 (1975); Oakes v. Oakes, 45 Ill.App.2d 387, 195 N.E.2d 840 (1964); see also Rayer v. Rayer, 32 Colo.App. 400, 512 P.2d 637 (1973). Further, several jurisdictions have held that child neglect proceedings, which also involve a custody determination, are non-adversarial in nature. See, e.g., In Interest of Brooks, 63 Ill.App.3d 328, 379 N.E.2d 872 (1978).
In determining whether the spousal privilege applies in a custody proceeding, it is instructive to look at other proceedings in which the state exercises its role as parens patriae. There are at least three types of proceedings, for the benefit of a child, in which the spousal privilege does not apply. See § 14-5-123, 6B C.R.S. (1987) (privilege inapplicable in proceeding to enforce support obligation); § 19-10-112, 8B C.R.S. (1986) (privilege inapplicable in child abuse proceeding); § 19-3-311, 8B C.R.S. (1988) (privilege inapplicable in dependency and neglect proceeding). These exceptions indicate an overall legislative scheme to treat proceedings in which the state exercises its protective role over a child differently from other proceedings. In such instances, the spousal privilege does not apply so as to impede the court’s truth seeking functions. In order to be consistent, I believe that child custody proceedings should be treated in the same manner.
Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.