Court Opinion

ID: 9678180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:13:38.380784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:02.389782
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice
(concurring specially).
I cannot agree with the majority opinion on the issue of jury sequestration but under the facts of this case I do not reach a different result.
The effect of the court’s ruling in this case is to change the plain meaning of Minn.R.Crim.P. 26.03, subd. 5, greatly limiting the protection of the right to a fair trial this rule affords to criminal defendants. Rule 26.03 requires criminal juries to be sequestered while they deliberate unless the defendant consents to their separation.
In this state, it is a long-standing precedent that sequestration of jurors during deliberation is necessary to protect defendants against even the possibility of outside influence or jury tampering. Where the jury is allowed to separate, it was inferred defendant was harmed “unless it clearly and affirmatively appears that no prejudice has resulted.” State v. Georgian, 124 Minn. 515, 145 N.W. 385 (1914). Today, the majority opinion overrules Georgian and shifts to the defendant the burden of showing that prejudice resulted from admittedly improper jury separation by holding “mere separation of the jury in violation of Minn. R.Crim.P. 26.03, subd. 5, without more, does not raise a presumption of prejudice * * * * pr]rejU(3ice wj]] presumed upon a showing of any private communication or contact or any other circumstance suggestive of improper influence or jury tampering, direct or indirect ****’’ (17).
This new rule might be all the protection of the right to a fair trial required by the federal constitution under Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). Minnesota, however, has chosen more affirmative protection of the right to fair trial as a matter of judicial policy in Minn.R.Crim.P. 26.03 and legislatively in Minn.Stat. § 631.09 which this rule amends. Section 631.09 mandates jury sequestration during deliberation without the possibility of waiver. These provisions are based on the reasonable assumption that jurors are especially open to prejudicial influence during deliberation. No further evidence, arguments or instructions will be presented to dissipate the prejudice of outside influence. The morally responsible juror may quite understandably be deeply concerned about the responsibility in fulfilling his or her role and anxious for guidance in reaching the right verdict. Often, the outside influence is not overt, such as a bribe, but subtle and may not even be within the awareness of the juror.
“[I]t is usually impossible to determine whether such influences actually prejudice a juror against the defendant in a particular ease. The juror himself may well be unaware of the subtle influences *208which affect his decision. For this reason, admonition and instruction of the jury is probably ineffective in ameliorating the prejudicial effects of separation during the deliberations.”
State v. Smalls, 99 Wash.2d 755, 665 P.2d 384, 391 (1983) (reaffirming rule that jury separation over defendant’s objection is presumptively prejudicial).
These considerations, in addition to federal and state constitutional concerns to ensure defendant a fair trial by an impartial jury and a defendant’s right to confront all the witnesses and evidence used to convict him or her, recommend the Court of Appeals rule in this case. In its ruling in this case, and in an earlier decision, State v. Holly, 350 N.W.2d 387 (Minn.App.1984), the appeals court held that jury separation without defendant’s consent was presumptively prejudicial. Holly, 350 N.W.2d at 389; Sanders, 355 N.W.2d at 204.1 In Holly, the court suggested that this presumption could, nonetheless, be overcome if the trial court questioned the jury about any outside influence when they returned to deliberation after a separation. Holly, 350 N.W.2d at 389-90.2 Even if such influence is found, the trial court should not automatically order a new trial, but should estimate the likely effect of the influence on an average juror to determine if it is so minimal as to overcome the presumption of prejudice. Id.
The practicality of this procedure was apparent to the majority; its opinion suggests a similar procedure, but only after defendant has carried the burden of showing outside influence, misconduct or tampering. 206-207 and fn. 9. Holly would automatically trigger such examination after any jury separation in violation of Rule 26.03, subd. 5. The difference in the burden placed on the trial court by the Holly rule and the majority rule in this case is minimal; the difference in protection of defendant’s right to a fair trial by an unbiased jury is significant.
It is my view that Georgian should not be overruled. I would hold that a jury separation in violation of Minn.R.Crim.P. 26.03 is presumptively prejudicial, and that the voir dire procedure suggested in Holly should be used by the trial court as a means of determining whether the presumption of prejudice has been overcome in any particular case. However, because this trial was conducted before the appeals court decided Holly, the trial court did not have the benefit of Holly’s suggested procedure to rebut the presumption of prejudice raised when it permitted the jury to separate in violation of Rule 26.03. As the majority opinion sets out, the record reflects no circumstances suggesting improper influence on the jury. I, therefore, find the presumption of prejudice in this case rebutted.

. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin has recently held a presumption of prejudice arises when a trial court violates a statute which require jury sequestration after the jury has retired by allowing the jury to separate after its deliberations have started. State v. Halmo, 125 Wis.2d 369, 371 N.W.2d 424 (Wis.App.1985).

. The South Dakota Supreme Court and the Washington Court of Appeals have also held that jury separation during deliberations in violation of rule or statute is a presumptively prejudicial error. These courts held, however, a voir dire of each juror by the trial court with participation of counsel on return to deliberation after separation may rebut the presumption of prejudice if no outside influence on the jurors is clearly shown in findings by the trial court. State v. McComsey, 323 N.W.2d 889 (S.D.1982); State v. Bookman, 37 Wash.App. 474, 682 P.2d 925 (Wash.App.1984).