Court Opinion

ID: 9535156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:46:05.250838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:10.861405
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ADAIR,
(specially concurring.)
I agree that this court’s opinion and decision in the case of Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 115 Mont. 469, 146 Pac. (2d) 151, is here controlling and that in the instant case the trial court properly denied the motion of the defendant, Mon-O-Co Oil Corporation, for change of the place of trial from Fallon County to Yellowstone County.
International Travelers’ Ass’n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630, 631, 632, was a suit by a surviving wife to recover on her deceased husband’s policy of insurance insuring him against accidental death. The application for the policy sued on, the policy itself and the insurance association’s bylaws contained a stipulation that all causes of action on the policy should be brought in Dallas County, Texas, where the association’s home office was located. The association contended, under the above stipulation in its policy, the venue lay exclusively in Dallas County. In denying such contention the Supreme Court of Texas said:
“So the real question presented * * * is whether a statute giving a plaintiff the right to sue in several counties can be overridden by a contract undertaking to deprive him of that right. In the early case of Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.) 174, it is announced in an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw that—
“ ‘The rules to determine in what courts and counties actions may be brought are fixed, upon considerations of general convenience and expediency, by general law; to allow them to be changed by the agreement of parties would disturb the *63symmetry of the law, and interfere with sneh convenience.’
“In the recent case of Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 678, L.R.A. 1916 D, 691, the court says with reference to the Ñute Case:
“ ‘That case, as has been pointed out, states a general principle which has been adopted and prevails in all federal courts, by reason-of the binding decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 22 L. Ed. 365, and Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 24 L. Ed. 148. The same rule prevails generally in all states where the question has arisen.’
“The note on pages 696 to 702 in L.R.A. 1916D fully supports the court’s statement. The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that there was no sound principle on which agreements like that before us could be upheld, saying:
“ ‘Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him. A man may not barter away his life, or his freedom, or his substantial rights. In a criminal case, he cannot, as was held in Cancemi’s Case, 18 N.Y. 128, be tried in any other manner than by a jury of 12 men, although he consent in open court to be tried by a jury of 11 men. In a civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or to the decision of a single judge. So he may omit to exercise his right to remove his suit to a federal tribunal, as often as he thinks fit, in each recurring case. In these aspects any citizen may no doubt waive the rights to which he may be entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.’ Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. [445] 451, 22 L. Ed. 365.
“The United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, in Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass’n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 F. [508] 510, 27 C.C.A. [212] 214, per Judge Lurton, said:
*64“ ‘Any stipulation between contracting- parties distinguishing between the different courts of the country is contrary to public policy, and should not be enforced.’
“We are convinced that it is utterly against public policy to permit bargaining in this state about depriving courts of jurisdiction, expressly conferred by statute, over particular causes of action and defenses. Eaton v. International Travelers’ Ass’n of Dallas, Tex. Civ. App., 136 S.W. 817. It follows that the stipulation for exclusive venue in Dallas county will not be enforced, and that the court did not err in overruling the plea asserting the privilege to be sued in that county alone. ’ ’
In Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. Green & Romans, Tex. Civ. App., S.W. (2d) 749, at pages 752, 753, it is said:
“Second group of assigned errors contend there was error in overruling the plea of privilege because of the provisions in the contract to the effect that all actions growing out of the contract should be had in Dallas County and further there was no jury finding that any part of plaintiffs’ cause of action arose in Tarrant County. It is obvious from the facts in the record that defendant contracted with plaintiffs to construct a cold storage locker plant at Mansfield, Texas; and that Mansfield is in Tarrant County. The contract and obligation could not have been performed anywhere else. The written instrument called the ‘Proposal’ made by defendant begins with these words.- ‘Name and location of Job: Cold Storage Locker plant in the Green Grocery Store located at Mansfield, Texas.’ There is a conflict in the evidence as to where the different instruments were actually signed by the parties, but we think this of no consequence.
“Exception 23 to Article 1995 [Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St.], in so far as applicable here, provides that actions against a corporation may be maintained in any county in which the cause of action or any part thereof arose. If it is shown that the contract was to be performed in Tarrant County, and it was breached in that county, it falls within this exception to *65exclusive venue. [Citing cases.] The provision in the contract to the effect that any action thereon shall be filed in Dallas County is not available to defendant to defeat venue in this case. In a venue hearing, where a similar provision in the contract was reviewed, the Supreme Court held that such a provision is against public policy and would not be enforced. International Travelers’ Association v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630.”
In Duque v. Duque, Cal. App., 317 Pac. (2d) 63, at page 64, the appellate court said: “It would be against public policy to permit parties by private agreement to deprive a court of jurisdiction which is conferred upon it by statute. 12 Cal. Jur. (2d) page 295, section 95; 13 Cal. Jur. (2d) page 603, section 91.” Compare Electrical Products Consolidated v. Goldstein, 97 Mont. 581, 36 Pac. (2d) 1033, and dissent in Electrical Products Consolidated v. Bodell 132 Mont. 243, 316 Pac. (2d) 788, at pages 791, 792.