Court Opinion

ID: 9370707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 17:08:27.817841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:23.229656
License: Public Domain

J-S43031-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: K.K., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                 :
                                                 :
    APPEAL OF: E.K., FATHER                      :
                                                 :
                                                 :
                                                 :
                                                 :   No. 1774 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-AP-0000265-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                              FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2023

       Appellant E.K. (Father) appeals from the order granting the petition filed

by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) to involuntarily

terminate Father’s parental rights to K.K. (Child) and changing Child’s

permanency goal to adoption. Father’s counsel, Tracey Chambers Coleman,

Esq.    (Attorney    Coleman)      has   filed   a   petition   to   withdraw   and   an

Anders/Santiago1 brief. After careful review, we deny Counsel’s motion to

withdraw, vacate the trial court’s order, and remand for proceedings

consistent with this memorandum.

____________________________________________

1Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,
978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa.
Super. 1992) (extending Anders to appeals involving the termination of
parental rights).
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       The relevant facts and procedural history are well known to the parties.

Briefly, DHS became involved with Child on December 24, 2019 after receiving

a General Protective Services (GPS) report alleging that W.W. (Mother) had

tested positive for cocaine at the time of Child’s premature birth.2    See N.T.

Hr’g, 7/18/22, at 8; DHS’s Ex. 4 at 21. After testing positive for cocaine and

marijuana shortly after Child’s birth, Mother entered an inpatient drug and

alcohol treatment program. DHS’s Ex. 4 at 2. At that time, DHS learned that

Father did not want to care for Child, that he had refused to provide the

Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) with his address, and that he had refused

to provide any information concerning other family members who could care

for Child Id.

       The trial court conducted a dependency hearing on February 24, 2020.

Ultimately, the trial court deferred adjudication and ordered DHS to obtain an

Order of Protective Custody (OPC) for Child if appropriate.            Id.   After

conducting interviews with Mother and employees at Mother’s treatment

facility, DHS obtained an OPC for Child and placed her in foster care. Id.

       The trial court subsequently lifted the OPC at the February 28, 2020

shelter care hearing, but ordered the temporary commitment to DHS to stand.

The court also referred Mother to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for drug

screenings. Although Mother provided the court with Father’s current address,

____________________________________________

2We note that Mother passed away in July of 2021 and is not a party to this
appeal.

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the extent of Father’s involvement in Child’s care was unknown to DHS at that

time. Id.

     On March 5, 2020, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent and

committed Child to the care and custody of DHS.       At that time, Father’s

objectives were to participate in Family School and sign the appropriate

consent forms for Child.      Father was also referred to the Achieving

Reunification Center (ARC) for appropriate services. Id. at 22.

     On April 29, 2020, a revised (Single Case Plan) SCP was created.

Father’s objectives were to attend an outpatient substance abuse program

and participate in weekly supervised visits with Child. At the May 27, 2020

hearing, Father’s objectives remained the same. Id. at 22-23.

     On September 14, 2020, DHS reported that Father’s compliance with

his SCP objectives had been minimal. Id. at 23. At that time, the trial court

referred Father to ARC for parenting, housing, domestic violence, healthy

relationships, finances, and employment services.    The court also referred

Father to CEU for a drug screen, an assessment, and three random drug

screens to be completed prior to the next court date. Id. At the December

31, 2020 hearing, Father’s objectives were to attend an outpatient substance

abuse program and participate in weekly supervised visits with Child. Id.

     At the hearing on February 4, 2021, the trial court learned that Father

was incarcerated and that he had been minimally compliant with his

permanency plan.    Id.   The court ordered Father to re-engage with ARC

services and referred Father to CEU for a drug screen, a dual diagnosis

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assessment, and three random screens prior to the next court date. Id. The

trial court also found that aggravated circumstances existed as to Mother, and

that DHS would make no further efforts to reunify Child with Mother.3 Id.

        On June 14, 2021, Father’s SCP objectives were to attend an outpatient

program, submit a weekly random drug screen from his probation officer to

CUA, make himself available to and actively participate in CUA services, attend

supervised visits with Child at the placement agency, participate in ARC

services to include Healthy Relationships, attend Family School, and sign the

appropriate releases for his probation officer. Father’s objectives were the

same at the hearing on July 15, 2021, at which time DHS reported that there

was only minimal compliance by Father.           Father’s objectives remained the

same at subsequent hearings in October and November of 2021.

        On April 22, 2022, DHS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) and to

change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. At the termination hearing, the

parties stipulated to the facts set forth in DHS’s petition. See N.T. Hr’g at 8.

DHS also presented testimony from case manager Laneesha Cameron, who

stated that she first became involved in Child’s case in February of 2022. Id.

at 9. Ms. Cameron testified that Child had been in care “[s]ince she was a

baby,” which was more than two years ago, and that Child had never lived

with Father. Id. at 10-11.

____________________________________________

3   Mother subsequently passed away on July 9, 2021.

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      Ms. Cameron explained that Father’s permanency objectives were to

attend outpatient programs for substance abuse, comply with ARC and CEU

services, complete parenting school, and participate in weekly supervised

visits with Child. Id. at 11-12. Ms. Cameron stated that Father had not been

involved with Child since he attended a supervised visit in 2021. Id. at 13.

Ms. Cameron indicated that Father had spent time in two separate inpatient

drug treatment facilities, but ultimately failed to complete either program. Id.

at 17-19.     Further, Ms. Cameron stated that Father had only recently

completed an assessment with CEU, which had been an outstanding objective

throughout the life of the case.   Id. at 21.   Ms. Cameron also noted that

although Father contacted ARC, he failed to provide a copy of Child’s birth

certificate, which was required before he could proceed with services. Id. at

22.

      Ms. Cameron testified that Father had not provided any proof of

employment and did not have his own residence. Id. at 23. Further, she

reiterated that although Father had previously attended one visit with Child,

he had failed to attend any visits since Ms. Cameron became his case manager

in 2022. Id. at 24. Ms. Cameron stated that Father’s compliance with his

permanency objectives was “minimum” and explained that “at first it was not

compliant at all[, b]ut because he completed the CEU last week, I would say

minimal.” Id. at 29.

      Ms. Cameron explained that she had ruled out reunification with Father

because “he hasn’t been compliant throughout the life of the case[,]” and Child

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“only knows” her foster mother’s family. Id. Further, Ms. Cameron stated

that Child “has no emotional connection to [Father]. She doesn’t know who

he is.    And at this point in time we just think she needs stability and

permanency.” Id. Additionally, Ms. Cameron noted that because Father had

“no bond” with Child, termination would not have any negative impact. Id.

at 29-30. Finally, Ms. Cameron indicated that Child was in pre-adoptive home,

calls her foster mother “mom,” and has a bond with foster mother’s other

children. Id. at 28. Ms. Cameron explained that her current placement has

been the same throughout the life of the case, that her foster family is “the

only family [Child] knows[,]” and that Child is “well taken care of” by her

foster mother, who has enrolled Child in daycare and consistently attended

Child’s medical appointments. Id. at 32.4

       Ultimately, the trial court concluded that DHS had presented clear and

convincing evidence to support the termination of Father’s parental rights

under Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Id. at 63.

       That same day, although Appellant was still represented by Attorney

Coleman, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal.     Father did not file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. On July 21, 2021, the trial court issued an order

directing Attorney Coleman to file a Rule 1925(b) statement on Father’s
____________________________________________

4 The record reflects that Linda G. Walters, Esq. appeared on Child’s behalf.
At the termination hearing, Attorney Walters indicated that she had concerns
with terminating Father’s parental rights, but when asked to state a position
in her “capacity as counsel for [Child,]” Attorney Walters stated: “Obviously
I’d have to say termination.” Id. at 61-62. However, with respect to goal
change, she stated that “the goal should not be changed to adoption.” Id.

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behalf. See Trial Ct. Order, 7/21/22. Although Attorney Coleman filed an

amended notice of appeal, she did not file a Rule 1925(b) statement. See

Amended Notice of Appeal, 8/26/22.

      In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court issued an order referring

this Court to the record from the termination hearing. See Trial Ct. 1925(a)

Order, 8/17/22.

      On September 8, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause order

directing Attorney Coleman to address her failure to file a court-ordered Rule

1925(b) statement. See Rule to Show Cause Order, 9/8/22. In her response,

Attorney Coleman explained that she had told Father that “it was unlikely that

the decision would be reversed because he did not complete any of his single

case planning objectives.” Counsel’s Answer to Rule to Show Cause, 9/19/22.

Further, Attorney Coleman stated that although she instructed Father to

contact her if he wanted to file an appeal, he filed a notice of appeal pro se,

and never contacted Counsel about any further filings.           Id. This Court

subsequently discharged the rule to show cause order on September 21, 2022.

      As noted above, Attorney Coleman has filed a petition to withdraw and

an Anders/Santiago brief that identifies the following issue: “Did the trial

court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by involuntarily

terminating Father’s parental rights?” Anders/Santiago Brief at 2.

      When faced with an Anders/Santiago brief, this Court may not review

the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel’s

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request to withdraw. See In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014). As

this Court has stated:

      To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:

         1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
         making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel
         has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2)
         furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and
         3) advise the [appellant] that he or she has the right to
         retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the
         [appellant] deems worthy of the court’s attention.

      With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel
      inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s
      withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must “attach to their
      petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client
      advising him or her of their rights.”

In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).

      Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the following

requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record;

      (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
      supports the appeal;

      (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

      (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
      frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
      controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
      conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d 1217, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

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      “After an appellate court receives an Anders brief and is satisfied that

counsel has complied with the aforementioned requirements, the Court then

must undertake an independent examination of the record to determine

whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237

(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Our independent review is not limited

to the issue discussed by counsel, but extends to “additional, non-frivolous

issues” that may have been overlooked by counsel. J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 908

(citation omitted). An appeal is frivolous when it lacks any basis in law or

fact. See M.C.F., 230 A.3d at 1220; accord Santiago, 978 A.2d at 356.

      Instantly, Attorney Coleman has filed a petition to withdraw that states

that she conscientiously reviewed the record and determined that the appeal

is frivolous.   She has also provided this Court with a certified mail receipt

demonstrating that she served Father with a copy of her motion to withdraw

and a letter advising Father of his right to proceed pro se or raise any

additional points that Father deemed worthy of consideration. Additionally,

Attorney Coleman’s Anders/Santiago brief provides a summary of the

essential facts and procedural history of the case. Counsel also sets forth her

reasons for concluding that Father’s appeal is frivolous.

      However, before reaching the issues identified in the Anders/Santiago

brief or raised in Attorney Coleman’s motion to withdraw her representation

of Father, we must review sua sponte whether, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §

2313(a), the trial court appointed legal counsel to represent Child during the

contested involuntary termination proceeding.       See In re Adoption of

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K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020). Our Supreme Court has interpreted

Section 2313(a) “as requiring ‘that the common pleas court appoint an

attorney to represent the child’s legal interest, i.e. the child’s preferred

outcome.’”    Id. (citation omitted).   Additionally, the failure to appoint a

“‘separate attorney to represent the child’s legal interests constitutes

structural error, meaning it is not subject to a harmless-error analysis.’” Id.

(citations omitted).

      It is well settled that “a single attorney cannot represent a child’s best

interests and legal interests if those interests conflict.” Id. at 1236 (citation

omitted). As such, our Supreme Court has held that before appointing an

individual to serve as both guardian ad litem (GAL) and legal counsel for a

child, the trial court “must determine whether counsel can represent the dual

interests . . .” Id. Further, where the trial court appoints one attorney “to

represent both the child’s best interests and legal interests, appellate courts

should review sua sponte whether the [trial] court made a determination that

those interests did not conflict.” Id. at 1235.

      Here, as noted previously, Attorney Walters appeared on Child’s behalf

at the termination hearing. See N.T. Hr’g at 60-61. However, it is unclear

whether Attorney Walters was appointed as Child’s legal counsel, Child’s GAL,

or whether she served in a dual capacity. It is also unclear whether the trial

court made a determination as to whether a conflict existed between Child’s

legal interests and best interests. Indeed, when the trial court asked Attorney

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Walters to make a recommendation at the termination hearing, the following

exchange occurred:

     [Attorney Walters:] I’ll defer to Your Honor. But I do have
     concerns when there is a breakdown in communication with CUA
     and -- not this -- necessarily this CUA worker, but with Father. It
     really distresses me when a father or mother reaches out to CUA
     trying. Like Mr. –

     [The trial court:] I’m just asking. What is your position in your
     capacity as the attorney for the child on this case?

     [Attorney Walters:] -- I have concerns. And I think it’s premature.
     I think CUA should have given him more guidance in what to do.
     Even a simple thing like a birth certificate --

     [The trial court:] And what do you think would be in the child’s
     best interest today, your client?

     [Attorney Walters:] -- that’s why I said I’ll defer to you. But I
     think --

     [The trial court:] Well I’m asking. You are attorney for the child.
     I’m asking you. You are not the attorney for Father.

     [Attorney Walters:] -- yeah.

     [The trial court:] I’m asking you your position in your capacity as
     counsel for the child.

     [Attorney Walters:] Okay.

     [The trial court:] And just reminding you who your client is and
     asking –

     [Attorney Walters:] Yeah.

     [The trial court:] -- you your position in this case.

     [Attorney Walters:] Obviously I’d have to say termination. But I
     have concerns, and that’s why I preface it. I’ll defer to you,
     because I don’t -- I think --

     [The trial court:] So you’re taking no position on behalf of the
     child?

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       [Attorney Walters:] -- I think the goal change should not be -- the
       goal should not changed to adoption.

N.T. Hr’g at 61-62.

       On this record, and in light of the fact that the trial court did not issue

a Rule 1925(a) opinion, we are unable to discern whether the trial court

addressed whether there was a conflict between Child’s legal interests and

best interests.5 See K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1236. For these reasons, we are

constrained     to   deny     Attorney     Coleman’s   motion   to   withdraw    her

representation of Father, vacate the involuntary termination decree, and

remand for further proceedings. See id; see also Interest of A.J.R.O., 270

A.3d 563, 570-71 (Pa. Super. 2022) (reiterating that “appellate review of this

question does not involve second–guessing whether GAL/[legal c]ounsel in

fact had a conflict but solely whether the [trial] court made the determination

in the first instance” (citation omitted)).

       On remand, we direct the trial court within thirty days to fulfill its Section

2313(a) duty as articulated in K.M.G. and determine whether Attorney

Walters may represent both the best interests and legal interests of Child. If

the trial court determines that no conflict exists between Child’s dual interests,

then the court shall re-enter the termination order as to Father. If the trial

court determines that there is a conflict between Child’s best interests and

____________________________________________

5 Additionally, the trial court did not determine, nor did counsel indicate on
the record, whether Child was too young to articulate a preference as to the
outcome of the proceedings, such that no conflict could exist. See In re T.S.,
192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018).

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legal interests, then the court shall appoint separate legal counsel for Child

and conduct a new involuntary termination hearing as to Father to provide

Child’s legal counsel an opportunity to advocate on behalf of Child’s legal

interests pursuant to K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1235.

        Order vacated. Petition to withdraw as counsel denied. Case remanded

with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

        Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2023

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