Court Opinion

ID: 9709626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:52:24.995447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.554548
License: Public Domain

Gerrard, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion for the reason that the juvenile court had personal jurisdiction over the mother; thus, the court had the statutory power to order her to pay support in the postdisposition proceeding.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-290 (Reissue 1993) allows the support obligation of a parent whose child is in the care or custody of another to be determined in a proceeding separate from the proceeding at which placement is determined. “At such proceeding, after summons to the parent of the time and place of hearing served, as provided in sections 43-262 to 43-267, the court may order and decree that the parent shall pay ... a reasonable sum that will cover in whole or part the support . . . of the juvenile . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) § 43-290.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that a separate summons is required when a hearing on a motion for support is subsequent to the initial hearing for which a summons was *936served. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-267 (Reissue 1993) provides, once service has been perfected to a parent for a prior hearing, that notice of “any juvenile court hearing subsequent to the initial hearing, for which a summons or notice has been served or waived, shall be given to all parties either in court, by mail, or in such other manner as the court may direct. ”
In the instant case, the mother was personally served with a summons and a copy of the initial petition. Prior to the hearing for support, notice of a hearing concerning a motion for support was mailed to the mother’s counsel.
The hearing at which the mother contested personal jurisdiction concerned the separate motion for support, for which the mother had received adequate notice, and the court had previously obtained personal jurisdiction. I would affirm the order of the juvenile court.
Wright, J., joins in this dissent.