Court Opinion

ID: 9789118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:28:17.657909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:19.659931
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
specially concurring.
The water court concluded that the conditional decree in this case was non-speculative and met the "can and will" requirement, but did not make findings to support its conclusions. Maj. op. at 310. In my view, we should simply remand the case to the water *322court to make such findings. Because the majority goes beyond a simple remand-instead giving a "narrow construction" to our governing precedent of City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo.1996), and imposing a de facto fifty year cap on water planning efforts in Colorado-I respectfully concur in the result it reaches.
Under the anti-speculation doctrine, the "applicant must establish an intent to appropriate water for application to beneficial use," id. at 36, and "no appropriation of water ... shall be held to occur when the proposed appropriation is based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights to persons not parties to the proposed appropriation ...." § 37-92-108@8)(a), C.R.S. (2007) (emphasis added). Such speculation may be evidenced by the fact that "[the purported appropriator of record does not have either a legally vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such interest in the lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation, unless such appropriator is a governmental agency 2." § 87-92-108@8)(a)(D) (emphasis added). In Bijou, we held that while the statutory language does not entirely immunize governmental entities from speculation challenges, it does reflect the fact that "municipalities require sufficient flexibility within the anti-speculation doctrine to allow them to plan for future water needs." 926 P.2d at 38-89.
We recognized a similar flexibility with regard to the "can and will" requirement, section 37-92-305(9)(b), C.R.S. (2007), which is closely related to the anti-speculation doe-trine. In Bijou, we concluded that in order to satisfy the "can and will" requirement, an applicant for a conditional decree must "establish that there is a substantial probability that within a reasonable time the facilities necessary to effect the appropriation can and will be completed with diligence, and that as a result waters will be applied to a beneficial use." 926 P.2d at 42-43. Thus, under the anti-speculation doctrine, the governmental entity must show that it intends to use the water to serve a growing population. Under the "can and will" requirement, the governmental entity must show that there is a substantial probability that it will actually be able to build the water projects necessary to serve that growing population. Id. We concluded in Bijou that "the 'can and will' requirement should not be applied rigidly to prevent beneficial uses where an applicant otherwise satisfies the legal standard of establishing a nonspeculative intent to appropriate for a beneficial use." Id. at 43.
We have long recognized this need for flexibility in water planning by governmental entities. In City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 202, 96 P.2d 836, 841 (1939), for example, we upheld a water plan by the City and County of Denver against a speculation challenge, noting that "it is not speculation but the highest prudence on the part of the city to obtain appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs resulting from a normal increase in population within a reasonable period of time." See also Amicus Curiae Brief of the City & County of Denver acting by and through its Board of Water Commissioners at 2 (urging us to preserve such flexibility because "it allows decisions about the most fundamental needs of citizens to be determined in a participatory process"); Amici Curiae Brief of the City of Colorado Springs and the Southwestern Water Conservation District at 7 (same).
The need for flexibility, of course, does not relieve a governmental entity from demonstrating that the conditional decree it seeks is non-speculative and meets the "can and will" requirement. Bijou, 926 P.2d at 38-43. In this case, the water court concluded that the conditional appropriation was non-speculative and met the "can and will" requirement, but made no findings to supports its conclusions. In my view, the solution to this lack of findings is a simple remand for entry of findings in accordance with the framework we set out in Bijou.
Instead, the majority instructs the water court on remand that our decision in Bijou "stands for a narrow construction." Maj. op. at 317. As part of that "narrow construction," the majority concludes that "(allthough the fifty year planning period we approved in Bijou is not a fixed upper limit, and each case depends on its own facts, the water court should closely serutinize a governmental agency's claim for a planning period that *323exceeds fifty years" Id. at 317 (emphasis added). This standard of "close serutiny" imposes, in my view, a de facto fifty year cap on water planning in the state.
The majority's fifty year de facto cap is supported neither by the evidence adduced before the water court nor by Bijou. What a reasonable planning period would be in this case was not an issue fully developed in the water court, as the majority recognizes. Maj. op. at 318. And while we approved the plan in Bijou that used a fifty year planning horizon, we did not suggest that governmental entities could not adopt planning horizons in excess of fifty years. 926 P.2d at 40-42 (discussing the water court's ruling on the anti-speculation doctrine). The majority's transformation of Bijou's fifty year planning horizon into a de facto cap on water planning in Colorado is contrary to our longstanding recognition of the need for flexibility in this area.
At some point, it may be necessary for us to modify our decision in Bijou. But no one has urged us to do so here today. In my view, the better course of action would be to allow the water court, in the first instance, to consider this case in light of Bijou, and for us to later consider-or reconsider-the Bijouw framework. Whether Bijou should be given a "narrow construction," maj. op. at 317, is an issue better left for another day. For this reason, I respectfully concur in the majority's judgment.
I am authorized to say that Justice RICE joins in this concurrence.