Court Opinion

ID: 9665828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:58:00.052762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:19.338741
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Judge
(dissenting).
On this appeal, defendant contends (1) that the ordinance under which he was prosecuted bears no reasonable relationship to public health, welfare or safety and is an invalid and unconstitutional exercise of the police power and (2) that even if the ordinance is valid, its application to defendant’s properties results in an unconstitutional taking of property without due process when the cost to defendant is compared to the object to be attained.
The principal opinion concludes that it is not necessary to rule on the validity of the ordinance generally but upholds defendant’s contention that the ordinance as applied to defendant’s two properties is unreasonable, arbitrary, and confiscatory and, consequently, is a deprivation of property without due process.
I would hold against defendant on both of his contentions and would affirm the judgment of the trial court. Hence, I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion.
At the outset it should be noted that the rule is well settled that private rights are subject to valid exercise of the police power; that the propriety, wisdom and expediency of legislation enacted pursuant to police power is for legislative rather than judicial determination; that there is a presumption of validity of such acts which one attacking has the burden to overcome; *478and that such an act will be declared invalid only if it is clearly shown to be unreasonable and arbitrary. This rule is well expressed in Poole and Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1133, 1146, 125 S.W.2d 23, 30 (Mo.1938) as follows:
“It is argued by appellant that the legislature in enacting the sections of the statute in question exceeded its constitutional power in that said sections 'are not a proper exercise of the police power, having no relation to the preservation of the health, morals, safety or welfare of the public.’ The police power, as we have said, is to be exercised within wide limits of legislative discretion. It has been said to be the most essential of powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable ,of the powers of government. The statute in question is referable to that power and it will be presumed to be valid unless invalidity is clearly made to appear, as we have shown. It is assailed as having no relation to the public health or to the prevention of fraud and deceit. Primarily the determination of whether or not the public health may be injuriously affected or whether the public may be defrauded or deceived by the manufacture and sale of an article is for the legislature. It is the duty of the court to sustain the law unless it clearly appears to be arbitrary and unreasonable or passed for some ulterior purpose and not in the interest of the general welfare, or to have no relation in fact to the purported legislative purpose. These propositions are well established. If the situation is such that a fairly debatable question is presented, then it is for the legislature to determine, and the court should not interfere, even if, in its opinion, the conclusion of the legislature is an erroneous one.”
See also Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. banc 1962); Passler v. Johnson, 304 S.W.2d 903 (Mo.1957).
This court previously has held that the City of St. Louis has authority to adopt and enforce ordinances relating to building requirements which were designed to protect public health, welfare and safety. In City of St. Louis v. Hoevel Real Estate & Building Co., 59 S.W.2d 617 (Mo.1933) the court upheld the prosecution of defendant for operating three tenement buildings with facilities for 25 families but in which the defendant, instead of providing a “water closet” connected to the sewer for each unit as required by ordinance, simply maintained three privy vaults connected with the sewer. The defendant contended that the ordinance requirement violated certain state and federal constitutional rights and was therefore invalid. In overruling that contention this court said, 59 S.W.2d l.c. 618:
“ * * * The section was formerly section 1786 of the Revised Code 1914, and its constitutionality was under consideration in St. Louis v. Nash (Mo.Sup.), 260 S.W. 985, 986. In that case, as in this case, the defendant was charged with a violation of the section. In ruling the question we held that the enactment was a valid exercise of the police power, and that the section was not in conflict with the State and Federal Constitutions. Furthermore, we held that ‘in the exercise of police power of the state, a municipality may lawfully require a property owner to alter or reconstruct an existing building without compensation, when such alteration or reconstruction is reasonably necessary to insure the public safety or to protect the public health.’ We adhere to our ruling in that case.”
Subsequently, in the case of Kalbfell v. City of St. Louis, 357 Mo. 986, 211 S.W.2d 911 (1948) the court dealt with an ordinance requirement with respect to buildings used for motion picture theaters. Defendant’s theater was closed by municipal officials because continued occupancy of the structure for that purpose conflicted with the city building code requirements intended to safeguard the public against such hazards as fire and panic. On appeal *479this court upheld the action of the trial court in closing the structure for occupancy as a moving picture theater but reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment which ordered demolition of the building for the reason that other uses of the building were possible within the terms of the building ordinance. The court not only upheld the validity of the ordinance as a proper exercise of the police power but held that it could apply to existing as well as newly erected structures. In so holding the court said, 211 S.W.2d l.c. 917:
“We need not detail existing charter provisions. It is sufficient to state that the City of St. Louis is vested with ample authority to define and abate businesses detrimental to the health or welfare of the citizens and all nuisances and causes thereof, and to enact proper police regulations, including specific authority to regulate the construction and materials of buildings and structures, inspect the same, and when necessary prevent the use thereof and require alterations to make them safe.”
I do not understand that the defendant questions the foregoing decisions. Rather his position is that the ordinance here involved which required that dwellings have a tub or shower properly connected to hot and cold water is not reasonably necessary to protect the public health, welfare and safety and hence is not a proper exercise of the police power.
As noted in the principal opinion, there was evidence on behalf of the defendant that a tub or shower connected to hot water is not essential to public health. The doctor who was a witness for defendant testified that while bathing and cleanliness are necessary to prevent infection and disease, they can be accomplished in unconnected tubs into which heated water is poured or by sponge bathing as is done in hospitals. In further support of his position, defendant testified to the fact that his father and mother lived to the ages of 87 and 85 respectively without ever having in their home any baths connected to hot and cold water pipes and that the defendant himself, who was now 72 years of age, had no such baths until he was 21.
On the other hand the doctor who is commissioner of health for the City of St. Louis testified on behalf of the City that such a properly connected tub or shower in every dwelling is essential for proper bathing of the public; that the lack thereof is detrimental to public health; and that the absence of such facilities is conducive to the spread of disease and infection, because without them people probably will not bathe adequately by some alternative means.
Under the testimony in this case it is at least fairly debatable that the requirement of a properly connected tub or shower in each dwelling is reasonably related to public health, welfare and safety. This being true, the rule announced in Poole and Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, supra, that when the situation is fairly debatable “it is for the legislature to determine, and the court should not interfere, even if, in its opinion, the conclusion of the legislature is an erroneous one” is applicable. Accordingly, I would hold valid Sec. 391.040 of the St: Louis ordinance prescribing minimum housing standards.
The view that a building code provision requiring dwellings to have bathing facilities properly connected to hot as well as cold water is a reasonable exercise of the, police power is supported by a majority of the appellate court decisions in other states which have passed upon this question. A number of these are referred to in the summarization of cases in the principal opinion. These include Givner v. Commissioner of Health, 207 Md. 184, 113 A.2d 899 (1955); Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959); Wheat v. Ramsey, 284 Ala. 295, 224 So.2d 649 (1969); City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky.1960); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955) and Apple v. City and Coun*480ty of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (banc 1964). The case of Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So.2d 8 (Fla.App.1970), referred to in the principal opinion as expressing a contrary view, contains dictum to the effect that to hold that such facilities are essential to health does violence to the early history of our county when people got along without bathing facilities of this character, but that was not the basis on which the court decided the case.1 An analysis of the decision shows that the parties stipulated that the question of whether alleged violations charged against plaintiffs in any manner materially jeopardized or adversely affected the health and safety of any tenant should be submitted to the jury and that the court held that since the jury resolved those questions against the City, it was bound thereby and could no longer contend that the defects found constituted violations of the code. The other case cited in the principal opinion as holding such an ordinance unconstitutional is Dente v. City of Mount Vernon, 50 Misc.2d 983, 272 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1966). This is simply a reported decision of a trial court and is not an appellate decision by the State of New York on this subject.
Defendant next contends that even if the ordinance is valid, its application to these properties results in taking his property without due process of law. This contention is asserted on the basis that his buildings are in a rundown, vandalized neighborhood; that he now collects only $32-35 per month per apartment; that it would cost approximately $1,200 per unit to make the installations required by the ordinance; that his buildings have no market value now and that these expenditures would not be recoverable by sale of the property; that to recover his investment he would have to charge $60 per month, but he could not collect this larger sum; and that the result would be that his building would become vacant and would be vandalized and he then would lose his investment.
In essence, what defendant is saying is that even though this ordinance imposes standards of construction found to be essential to the protection of the public health and safety and even though dangerously adverse effects on the health of some of the public could result from nonenforcement of these standards, still such requirements should not be enforced when the condition of a building is so bad that it is economically unfeasible for the owner to make the changes required by the ordinance. It seems to me that the mere statement of this proposition furnishes its own answer. Clearly this would not be the case if we were dealing with replacing outside privies with inside toilets. Elimination of the hazard to public health in such an instance would not yield to the economic plea of the property owner. The same should be true of other requirements reasonably necessary to protect the public health and safety. It follows that if it be decided that a particular building requirement is not arbitrary and unreasonable and is a proper exercise of the police power to protect the public health and safety, its enforcement should not depend upon the economic situation of or the economic results to the owner of the property. To hold to the contrary means that the worst housing is exempted from public health and safety requirements and that the hands of the City are tied when it attempts to require that tenements be brought to minimum standards.
The Supreme Court of Colorado addressed this question thus in Apple v. City and County of Denver, supra, 390 P.2d l. c. 94:
“To hold that existing buildings are exempt from ordinances which impose *481standards designed to protect the safety and welfare of the public would in effect permit those whose actions are dangerous to the health and safety of the community to continue their deleterious conduct unchecked. We cannot agree that it is beyond the police power to reach such conduct.”
One of the landmark cases relating to the validity of building codes designed to protect the public health and safety is Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 254, 7 N.E.2d 120, 122, 124 (1937) in which that court stated:
“ * * * [T]here has come a general recognition that dwellings which are unsafe or unsanitary or which fail to provide the amenities essential to decent living may work injury not only to those who live there, but to the general welfare. * * * At the point where economic self-interest ceases to be a sufficiently potent force for the promotion of the general welfare, * * * the Legislature may intervene and require that buildings intended for use as tenement houses or multiple dwellings shall conform to minimum standards which may reasonably be regarded as essential for safe, decent, and sanitary dwelling places.

“ * * * The power of the State to place reasonable restrictions upon the use of property for the promotion of the general welfare is no longer subject to challenge and regulations governing the erection or use of buildings as multiple dwellings which are reasonably calculated to safeguard the public health and safety constitute a proper exercise of that power.

“The imposition of the cost of the required alterations as a condition of the continued use of antiquated buildings for multiple dwellings may cause hardship to the plaintiff and other owners of ‘old law tenements’ but, in a proper case, the Legislature has the power to enact provisions reasonably calculated to promote the common good even though the result be hardship to the individual.”
I find nothing in the record to show that the requirement by the City with respect to properly connected bathing facilities is arbitrary or unreasonable and I would overrule defendant’s second contention.

. Furthermore, to hold that such a building code requirement is not reasonable police power regulation because people got along with such facilities in earlier days and because some lived to a ripe old age overlooks the fact that the general life expectancy was much lower then, than now and that the tremendous increase in urban concentration has created a need for much more emphasis on establishing required standards in order to protect the public health, welfare and safety.