Court Opinion

ID: 9609844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:32:22.800878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:16.863389
License: Public Domain

Young, J.,
with whom Springer, C. J., joins,
dissenting:
The record before this court in this case is troubling. It is inadequate to repel all of Hurd’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Even more troubling is that the majority, instead of remanding for an evidentiary hearing to confirm or disprove these allegations, has chosen to overlook the inadequate record, disregard the relevant standard of review, and base its affirmance on inferences and unsupported allegations rather than established facts.
The state declares in its brief to this court that it cannot provide “a statement of the facts in the traditional sense” because no preliminary hearing, no trial, and no evidentiary hearing were ever held in this case. It goes on to tell us that the “only avenue available” for it to provide a statement of the facts “is to allude to the police reports and Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) hearing” which Hurd referred to in his statement of facts. “With all necessary apologies to this Court, the State offers the following recitation which contains no citations, as there is nothing to cite to.” The state then lays forth more than two pages of allegations without identifying how they can be verified. Many of the allegations are based on hearsay, and it is unclear which, if any, were known to Hurd’s trial counsel or presented to the district court.
The state complains that it has nothing to cite to, as if it is a victim of circumstance. The state, however, is responsible for requesting necessary transcripts and appending file-stamped copies of relevant papers to its brief to this court. NRAP 3C(d)(4) and (f)(2). Apologies and allusions do not suffice for failing to meet this responsibility.
Thus, the state’s brief is based largely on “facts” which are not in the record. This court cannot consider facts outside the record, and facts in the briefs of counsel do not compensate for deficiencies in the record. Jernigan v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 387, 469 P.2d 64 (1970). The majority cites this rule of law, notes that evidence allegedly presented at the DCFS hearing is not in the record, and declares that such evidence “cannot be considered.” In the next breath, the majority nevertheless decides that “[t]he inference can certainly be drawn that both Hurd and his attorney were aware of evidence of some kind of child abuse at that hearing.” No, it cannot. This court cannot consider facts outside the record. Even less can it rely on inferences drawn from facts outside the record.
The majority refers to “numerous admissions” by Hurd and “the admission of Hurd’s wife that she knew Hurd was molesting *191the children.” These “facts” are also not in the record. Again, the state asserts in its brief that Hurd and his wife made admissions, but it provides no basis to verify the assertion, and the content and circumstances of the alleged admissions are not even clearly alleged.
Hurd alleges that his daughters never made any statements which incriminated him, and the state admitted at the fast track hearing on this case that it knew of no such statements. Hurd therefore argues that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to investigate the children before advising him to plead guilty. The majority dispenses with this argument by proclaiming that “in light of their young ages, it is questionable whether [the daughters’] testimony would have been determinative.” Yes, this matter is questionable — and such questions require an evidentiary hearing in the district court, not speculation by this court.
Hurd also alleges that his trial attorney advised him to plead guilty before receiving medical reports on Hurd’s daughters. These reports showed no evidence of sexual assault. The majority concludes that “the fact that the medical records did not prove sexual penetration is irrelevant” because Hurd “pleaded guilty to child abuse and lewdness with a minor, not sexual assault.” This reasoning is specious. It overlooks the fact that Hurd faced two counts of sexual assault when he agreed to plead guilty to the lesser offenses; therefore, medical reports which failed to support sexual assault would have been highly relevant to those plea negotiations.
Relying on assertions unsupported by the record, speculation, and unsound reasoning, the majority concludes that the advice of Hurd’s counsel to plead guilty was appropriate.
The proper standard for this court’s review is set forth in Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 686 P.2d 222 (1984). A person seeking post-conviction relief must support any claims with specific factual allegations that if true would entitle him or her to relief. Id. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. The person is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the factual allegations are belied or repelled by the record. Id. at 503, 686 P.2d at 225.
Hurd has made two claims which are specific and not repelled by the record. Hurd asserts that before he entered his guilty plea, his trial counsel failed to obtain medical reports which showed that his daughters exhibited no physical evidence of sexual abuse. Hurd also claims that his counsel failed to investigate his children, neither of whom made any statements of wrongdoing on his part. If true, such failures may fall below an objective standard of reasonable performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and may have prejudiced Hurd because — in the record before this court — there is little evidence that Hurd com*192mitted the offenses. Absent such evidence, advice by counsel to plead guilty appears unreasonable.
The state’s slipshod work in drafting the charges set forth in the amended information and plea memorandum and the district court’s cursory canvass of Hurd regarding the factual basis for the charges only reinforce the need to remand this case. The district court’s denial of Hurd’s petition without a hearing and without explanation provides no basis for this court to assume that Hurd’s claims have been properly considered.
Therefore, we should remand this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Hurd’s claims have any merit.