Court Opinion

ID: 9629432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:42:41.462892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:16.394098
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — Once again we have a demonstration of the maxim that the answer you get depends upon the question you ask. The majority looks upon this as a "literal truth" case, and it correctly cites the rule that a perjury charge cannot be maintained where the testimony of the accused was literally, technically or legally true (69 A.L.R.3d 993 (1976)), even if the answer was evasive and was intended to be misleading. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 34 L. Ed. 2d 568, 93 S. Ct. 595 (1973). I have no quarrel with the majority's view on this issue. But that is not the issue before the court.
The Court of Appeals (State v. Olson, 19 Wn. App. 885, 578 P.2d 866 (1978)), correctly states the two issues: (1) Was there sufficient evidence that the answer of defendant was false? and (2) Was there sufficient evidence that the answer of defendant was made with the knowledge of its falsity? The Court of Appeals also gives the correct answers.
Although the majority mentions these questions, it then proceeds to ignore them and moves off to announce the irrelevant legal proposition governing a "literal truth" case. This case involves questions of fact. With regard to the first issue, in the words of the Court of Appeals, "Granting all reasonable inferences to the State, we find substantial evidence in the record that Spane was called Spane Mill, or that it was in fact a mill regardless of its name. Therefore *142the question of the truth or falsity of Olson's statement should have been submitted to the jury." Olson, at 891. I agree.
As to the second issue, the Court of Appeals also provides the correct answer:
Applying this rule, we find substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could determine Olson's knowledge of falsity in two respects. The Spane Mill was one of several names by which the Spane Building Company in Stanwood was known. Olson had lived in Stan-wood for some time, had worked for Spane and had in fact delivered timbers to Spane while a member of the bridge crew. There was testimony that other bridge crew employees knew the business as Spane Mill. All this supports a reasonable inference that Olson knew that "the Spane Mill" meant the Spane Building Company, and that with this knowledge he falsely denied taking timbers there.
Furthermore, there was evidence that Spane had some of the characteristic equipment of a saw mill and could be considered as such. Because Olson once worked there and had delivered there more recently, it is a reasonable inference that he knew a question concerning "the Spane Mill" referred to the mill operation at the Spane Building Company, regardless of its proper name.
Olson, at 892.
There is substantial evidence that defendant both gave a false answer and knew he was giving a false answer. He is entitled to a trial by jury to make a factual determination of these issues. We should not deprive defendant of this right.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Utter, C.J., and Brachtenbach and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.