Court Opinion

ID: 9730073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:00:21.640406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:03.948360
License: Public Domain

KINGSLEY, J.
I dissent.
We deal here with the relations between an executive agency specifically and solely charged with the administration of a special and relatively technical law and one of the intended beneficiaries of that law. The law deals with a class of persons for whom the Legislature has expressed a particular concern1 and with a class of persons who are highly unlikely to be skilled either in law or in semantics and, thus, particularly dependent on the administrative agency to help them in securing the benefits that the law provides.2
Petitioner has been deprived of a hearing on his claim by reason of the formalistic application of a rule which, so far as I can discover, has neither statutory nor administrative sanction.3 The official who first dealt with *67petitioner’s claim apparently made up, for himself and without any direction from either his superiors or the statute, an arbitrary rule that an employee who belonged to a union which operated a hiring hall must, as a matter of law and without regard to his other efforts,4 utilize the hiring hall as a means of seeking work. Whether or not such a rule would have validity as a rebut-table presumption, or whether or not it could lawfully have been adopted by the agency itself under its rule-making power, has never been passed on by anyone. The referee and the Board rejected his appeal, not because it was unfounded either in fact or in law, but solely because it had not been filed within the 10-day period.5
If, in fact, petitioner was misled by the legal conclusions set forth in the notices given to him, I think that he is entitled to a review of his claim, on its merits.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to determine whether or not petitioner did reasonably rely on the legal conclusions set forth in the notices given to him on January 5, 1967, and, if so, whether or not such reliance was the cause of his delay in attempting to appeal the determinations adverse to him. If such issues are determined in favor of petitioner, a writ should issue directing the department to afford petitioner a review of their decisions, such review to include both the legal validity of the departmental position as set forth in its notices and the factual issues relating to petitioner’s efforts to secure employment.

Section 100 of the Unemployment Insurance Code reads as follows:
“Public policy. As a guide to the interpretation and application of this division the public policy of this State is declared as follows:
“Experience has shown that large numbers of the population of California do not enjoy permanent employment by reason of which their purchasing power is unstable. This is detrimental to the interests of the people of California as a whole.
“The benefit to all persons resulting from public and private enterprise is realized in the final consumption of goods and services. It is contrary to public policy to permit the supply of consumption goods and services at prices which do not provide against that harm to the population consequent upon periods of unemployment of those who contribute to the production and distribution of such goods and services.
“Experience has shown that private charity and local relief cannot alone prevent the effects of unemployment. Experience has shown that if the State awaits the coming of excessive unemployment it can neither create immediately the organization necessary to orderly, economical • and effective relief nor bear the financial burden of relief without disrupting its whole system of ordinary revenues and without jeopardizing its credit.
“The Legislature therefore declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of -the State require the enactment of this measure under the police power of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of funds to be used for a system of unemployment insurance providing benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to a minimum.
“It is the intent of the Legislature that unemployed persons claiming unemployment insurance benefits shall be required to make all reasonable effort to secure employment on their own behalf.”

Compare the following language from Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 308 [61 Cal.Rptr. 661, 431 P.2d 245]: “Thus it is significant if . . . the claimant is one who purports to have no knowledge or training which would aid him in determining his rights and the public agency purports to be informed and knowledgeable in these matters. . . .”

At oral argument, the Attorney General conceded that, so far as that office knew, *67no such rule had been adopted by the agency' under Unemployment Insurance Code sections 306-310, and that," if petitioner was allowed to prosecute his appeal, the legal validity of the ruling would be open for review.

There are indications in the record that the agency did not contest the fact that petitioner had made honest efforts to find work apart from resort to his union.
I note that there is, in the record, some confusion as to whether petitioner had consulted his union at all or had not done so for the full period and a similar confusion as to whether his factual statements in his original claim were 100 percent accurate. Since his appeal was denied on the pure procedural ground, these matters remain undetermined; if his appeal is permitted they may, of course, be decided by the proper administrative tribunal.

Under the rule laid down in Conti v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1969) 1 Cal.3d 351 [82 Cal.Rptr. 337, 461 P.2d 617], petitioner is not subject to a defense of laches for the five-month delay in seeking relief; he is barred, if at all, solely by the 10-day limitation; as I have said above, I do not think that that limitation bars him here.