Court Opinion

ID: 9549960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:26:59.496706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:05.703502
License: Public Domain

UNIS, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
The majority misreads well-established First Amendment1 precedent used to determine the free speech rights of public employees. In so doing, the majority misconstrues the class of speech on which public employees may speak out without fear of retaliation. The majority’s opinion has the potential to discourage disclosures of the sort of information that the public employee is particularly, and often uniquely, able to provide. Thus, the majority’s opinion may deprive the public of valuable information with which to evaluate the performance of elected officials.
Plaintiff, a wastewater mechanic for the City of Portland (city), was discharged after he circulated a petition within his agency protesting a work safety policy.2 The city’s *432Civil Service Board found that, in violation of the city’s charter, the “discharge decision was not made in good faith for the purpose of improving public service,” and ordered that plaintiff be reinstated with back pay. The majority concludes that the dismissal of plaintiffs 42 USC § 19833 claim did not violate plaintiffs free speech rights under the First Amendment, because the petition did not address a matter that, in the majority’s view, is of public concern.4
It is beyond dispute that speech by a public employee which discloses information on matters of public health and safety is of public concern.5 Because all but the first two sentences of plaintiffs petition address matters of public health and safety and because there is no evidence in the record that the circulation of the petition adversely affected the operations of the city, interfered with plaintiffs working relationship with his fellow employees, or impaired workplace discipline, I dissent from the majority’s holding that denies plaintiff the right to proceed under § 1983.1 concur, however, in the majority’s decision concerning plaintiffs common law claim for wrongful discharge.
Plaintiffs action under § 1983 is based on his claim that his employment had been terminated wrongfully in retaliation for exercising his right to free speech under the First Amendment. At his jury trial, after plaintiff rested his case, the trial court directed a verdict on the § 1983 claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence of causation, i.e., that there was “no evidence to indicate that [plaintiff] was *433terminated as a result of the circulation of the petition.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence of causation, that plaintiffs speech was a matter of public concern, and that plaintiffs petition was protected speech under the First Amendment. Shockey v. City of Portland, 100 Or App 166, 785 P2d 776 (1990). Defendants then petitioned this court for review, which we allowed. 310 Or 195, 795 P2d 554 (1990). The issue presented to this court as to plaintiffs § 1983 claim is whether it was proper for the trial court to direct a verdict for defendants at the conclusion of plaintiffs case in chief.
I. 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM
A. Jurisdiction
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, a successor of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,6 was enacted in response to a perceived unwillingness by states to protect their citizens’ rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 US 167, 180, 81 S Ct 473, 5 L Ed 2d 492 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 US 658, 98 S Ct 2018, 56 L Ed 2d 611 (1978). “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole,_US_,_, 112 SCt 1827, 1830, 118 L Ed 2d 504 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 US 247, 254-55, 98 S Ct 1042, 55 L Ed 2d 252 (1978)). Thus, § 1983 provides direct access to a judicial forum to all individuals who claim that their constitutional or other federal rights have been violated by persons acting under color of state law. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas,_US_, 112 S Ct 1061, 1066, 117 L Ed 2d 261 (1992); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 US 42, 50, 104 S Ct 2924, 82 L Ed 2d 36 (1984). “State courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983 actions.” Nutbrown v. Munn, 311 Or 328, 337, 811 P2d 131 (1991) (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 100 S Ct 2502, 65 L Ed 2d 555 (1980)).
B. Background
As relevant to this case, § 1983 provides a remedy to a public employee who is discharged for exercising his or her *434free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 US 378, 383, 107 S Ct 2891, 97 L Ed 2d 315 (1987) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 US 593, 597, 92 S Ct 2694, 33 L Ed 2d 570 (1972)). The question then is whether a public employee’s speech (here, plaintiffs petition) is protected by the First Amendment.
To determine whether a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment, we must consider a series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States which collectively suggest a method of analysis. I will discuss the relevant law in those decisions and the suggested methodology. I then will apply that methodology to this case.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 605-06, 87 S Ct 675, 17 L Ed 2d 629 (1967), the Supreme Court held that a public employer may not condition public employment on the relinquishment of First Amendment rights. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 US 563, 88 S Ct 1731, 20 L Ed 2d 811 (1968), the Court qualified that holding by stating that, although a public employee does not surrender First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment, “the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” Id. at 568.
In Pickering, the Court imposed two important limitations ori a public employee’s free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. First, the Court suggested that false statements knowingly or recklessly made would not be protected. Id. at 574 and n 6. There is no contention asserted in this case that this limitation applies to plaintiffs statements in this case. Second, the Court articulated a balancing test to determine whether the speech rights asserted by public employees are protected by the First Amendment. “The problem in any case[,]” said the Court, “is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id. at 568.
*435In Connick v. Myers, 461 US 138, 103 S Ct 1684, 75 L Ed 2d 708 (1983), the Court fine-tuned its holding in Pickering. In Connick, the public concern test made its debut in the area of public employee speech. There, the Court held that First Amendment protection afforded to a public employee under Pickering extends only to speech addressed to matters of “public concern” and that unless the employee’s speech involves a “matter of public concern,” “it is unnecessary for [courts] to scrutinize the reasons for * * * discharge.” Id. at 146. Stated slightly differently, only when the public employee engages in speech addressed to matters of “public concern” is the First Amendment implicated.7 “[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest,” the First Amendment does not protect that employee from termination. Id. at 147.
C. Analytical Framework to Determine Whether Public Employee Speech is Constitutionally Protected
The Supreme Court has framed a two-prong test to determine whether a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment. First, the employee’s speech must involve a matter of public concern. Second, the employee’s First Amendment rights in commenting on a matter of public concern must not be outweighed by the public employer’s interest in providing public services efficiently. Each of these requirements must be satisfied before the employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment.
1. Threshold Public Concern Test
An employee’s expression may be fairly characterized as constituting expression on a matter of public *436concern when it “relat[es] to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” id. at 146, as “determined by the content, form, and context of [that expression] as revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 147-48. In answering the question whether the employee’s speech involves a matter of public concern, the court must examine for itself the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they are made to see whether they are of a character that the First Amendment protects. Rankin v. McPherson, supra, 483 US at 386; Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 US at 150 n 10. “The inappropriate or controversial character” of the expression is irrelevant to the inquiry. Rankin v. McPherson, supra, 483 US at 387. Whether speech concerns a matter of “public concern” is a question of law, not fact, for the Court. Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 US at 148 n 7.
2. Pickering Balancing Test
Even if the public employee’s speech involves a matter of public concern and, therefore, passes the threshold public concern test introduced in Connick and, accordingly, the First Amendment is implicated, a retaliatory discharge nevertheless may not offend the First Amendment. As previously stated, the determination whether a public employer has properly discharged an employee for engaging in speech of public concern requires an application of the Pickering balancing test, i.e., a balance between the interests of the employee as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern, and the interest of the governmental body as an employer, in providing public services efficiently. Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 US at 146; Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, 391 US at 568. Relevant to the balancing analysis is the manner, time, and place in which the expression is made. Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 US at 152. Impairment of work-place discipline and creation of disharmony with coworkers are factors to be weighed in the balance. Rankin v. McPherson, supra, 483 US at 388; Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 US at 152-53; Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, 391 US at 570-73. In applying the Pickering balancing test, a wide degree of deference will be given to the employer’s assessment of such disruption, at least in situations where “close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public *437responsibilities.”8 Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 US at 151-52. If the public employer’s interest in efficiency outweighs the employee’s right to freedom of expression, the employee’s expression is not protected by the First Amendment.9 If the employer’s interest in efficiency does not outweigh the employee’s right to freedom of expression, the expression is protected. Rankin v. McPherson, supra, 483 US at 392. Whether the employee’s speech enjoys the protected status is a question of law for the court. Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 US at 148 n 7.
D. Causation
If the public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected, the public employee has the burden to show causation, i.e., that his or her speech was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the discharge decision, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 US 274, 287, 97 S Ct 568, 50 L Ed 2d 471 (1977), i.e., that one of the reasons for the discharge decision was the employee’s protected speech. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 US 228, 250, 109 S Ct 1775, 104 L Ed 2d 268 (1989) (same standard in suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). If the public employee carries that burden, the burden shifts to the public employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it had other adequate grounds for dismissal, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, supra, 429 US at 287, i.e., that the same adverse decision as to the public employee’s employment would have been reached even in the absence of the protected speech.10 See Price Waterhouse v. *438Hopkins, supra, 490 US at 244-45 (opinion of Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) (same standard in suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 276-77 (O’Con-nor, J., concurring in the judgment). Whether the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to terminate employment is a question of fact. Stever v. Independent School Dist. No. 625, 943 F2d 845, 851 (8th Cir 1991).11 If the public employer “fails to purge its [discharge] decision of the ‘taint’ of unconstitutional motivation, tbat decision cannot stand.” Tribe, American Constitutional Law 816 (2d ed 1988) (citing Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, supra).
E. Discussion of Key Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court’s discussions in Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, Connick v. Myers, supra, and Rankin v. McPherson, supra, provide a useful background for evaluating plaintiffs claim. In Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, a public high school teacher was dismissed for writing a letter to a local newspaper, criticizing the way in which the Board of Education had handled bond issue proposals and its subsequent allocation of financial resources between the school’s educational and athletic programs. The teacher’s letter also openly criticized the superintendent of schools for attempting to prevent teachers in the district from opposing or criticizing the proposed bond issue. 391 US at 566. The Court held that the dismissal of the school teacher was an impermissible infringement on the teacher’s protected speech, rejecting the notion “that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on *439matters of public interest.” 391 US at 568. The Court framed the proper inquiry as “arriv[ing] at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” 391 US at 568. The statements in the letter, the Court said, addressed “issues then currently the subject of public attention, which are critical of [the teacher’s] ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.” 391 US at 572-73 (footnote omitted). The Court held that, “absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made'by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.” 391 US at 574 (footnote omitted). Because no such showing had been made regarding the teacher’s letter, the Pickering court held that the teacher’s dismissal was impermissible under the First Amendment. Id. at 574-75.
In Connick v. Myers, supra, Myers, an assistant district attorney in New Orleans, was informed by Connick, the district attorney, that she would be transferred to prosecute cases in a different section of the criminal court. Myers objected to the transfer and, in this context, circulated a questionnaire to other employees. 461 US at 140-41. The questionnaire consisted of fourteen entries and is reprinted in the appendix to the opinion, id. at 155-56. Questions 1 through 5 asked employees to describe their work experience with office transfers. Questions 6 through 9 asked employees about the existence of a rumor mill and its effect on office morale. Question 10 asked for an assessment of their confidence in certain named supervisors. Question 11 asked whether employees felt pressure to work in political campaigns supported by the district attorney. Questions 12 through 14 asked whether a grievance committee was needed, whether morale in the office was good, and whether any other issues of concern to the employees needed to be addressed. Id. Connick accused Myers of “creating a ‘mini-insurrection,’ ” considered the questionnaire an act of insubordination, and discharged Myers. Myers filed suit under 42 *440USC § 1983, contending that her employment was wrongfully terminated because she exercised her First Amendment right of free speech. Id. at 141. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that only one entry, Question 11 — asking whether fellow staff members felt pressured to work on political campaigns on behalf of office-supported candidates — touched on a matter of public concern. Id. at 149. The other questions were “mere extensions of Myers’ dispute over her transfer.” Id. at 148. These questions did not concern the office’s performance of its prosecutorial functions, nor did they allege any fraud or wrongdoing. According to the Court:
“While discipline and morale in the workplace are related to an agency’s efficient performance of its duties, the focus of Myers’ questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors. These questions reflect one employee’s dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause celebre.”
Id. at 148. “[As such, these questions did] not fall under the rubric of matters of ‘public concern.’ ” Id.
With respect to Question 11, the only entry that did relate to a matter of public concern — the question concerning whether staff members felt pressured to work on political campaigns — the Court applied the Pickering balancing test and struck the balance for the public employer. Id. at 149. That is, the isolated statement (Question 11) was afforded protection to the point of requiring the Pickering balancing, even though the statement was only one of 14 entries and could arguably be called a pretext for and motivated by the basically personal grievance. According to the Court, despite the “limited First Amendment interest involved,” Myers’ supervisor was justified in discharging Myers based on speech that he “reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships[,]” id. at 154, even absent any evidence of actual disruption. Myers’ discharge did not, therefore, offend the First Amendment. Id.
In Rankin v. McPherson, supra, the firing of a data-entry employee (deputy county constable) for privately *441remarking to a co-worker (who happened to be her boyfriend), after hearing of an assassination attempt on President Reagan, “if they go for him again, I hope they get him,” 483 US at 381, was held to violate the employee’s right of free speech under the First Amendment to the federal constitution. The Court held that the data-entry employee’s remark, taken in context, constituted a matter of public concern, since it was made in the course of a conversation concerning the policies of the President’s administration and came on the heels of a news bulletin regarding a matter of heightened public attention, and was protected by the First Amendment.12 Id. at 386. The Court stated that the constable did not demonstrate that the state interest justified firing the data-entry employee: she had purely clerical duties and no law enforcement duties; the statement was made privately in a room not readily accessible to the public; and there was no evidence that the employee’s statement had discredited her office or interfered with its efficient functioning. Id. at 388-89, 392.
F. Application of Analytical Framework to This Case
1. Threshold Public Concern Inquiry
Turning to the first requirement of the two-prong test to determine whether a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment, I agree with the Court of Appeals that plaintiffs petition does involve a matter of public concern. As previously stated, speech that can fairly be considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community is constitutionally protected, Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 US at 146, as determined by the content, form and context of that expression as revealed by the whole record. Id. at 147-48.
a. Content
Except for the first two sentences of plaintiffs petition, the content of plaintiffs petition addresses issues involving public health and safety. Omitting the first two sentences, plaintiffs petition reads:
*442“[I]f everyone on site is to be available in a chlorine emergency, the questions of fit, maintenance and hygiene of the respirators, the supplying of respirators for those who wear glasses, training of all employees in their use, hazard pay, and the availability of respirators for office staff, contractors’ employees and visitors must be answered. The aforementioned proposed rules do not take into account the use of respirators by the last three mentioned groups.
“It would be far more practical to have a volunteer crew, specially trained and outfitted to deal with chlorine in emergency and non-emergency situations.”
How the majority concludes that this language does not involve a matter of public concern13 bewilders me.
The thrust of all but the first two sentences of plaintiffs petition addresses the practicability and adequacy of the proposed governmental work safety rules and regulations in protecting employees and other members of the public who could be exposed to a chlorine gas leak. In particular, the petition states that the proposed rules did not address the “fit, maintenance and hygiene of the respirators,” “training of all employees in their use,” and whether “office staff, contractors’ employees and visitors” would be required to wear respirators. The petition suggested an alternate solution for dealing with chlorine gas, a lethal substance, in emergency and non-emergency situations. The content of the speech in plaintiffs petition, therefore, went beyond plaintiffs personal employment concern (his desire to retain his beard), and expressed concern about health and safety in the work place and particularly about the protection afforded to employees and other members of the public from a chlorine gas leak. Plaintiffs petition, in essence, states that the proposed city rule for dealing with a lethal substance on city property was inadequate to protect large groups of employees and other members of the general public.
Speech by a public employee about public health and safety is clearly speech on a matter of public concern. In Caldwell v. City of Elwood, Ind., 959 F2d 670, 672 (7th Cir 1992), a firefighter’s statements to the mayor at the mayor’s *443home discussing his (firefighter’s) safety and employer’s concerns regarding the fire department’s use of ambulances are, the court said, “certainly a matter of public concern.” In Burgess v. Pierce County, 918 F2d 104, 105-06 (9th Cir 1990), a county fire marshall’s statements to county officials and members of the public that passage and enforcement of county ordinances would conflict with state fire flow and private road standards, threaten life and property, and expose the county to potential tort liability were held to be a matter of public concern. In Considine v. Board of County Com’rs, 910 F2d 695, 700 (10th Cir 1990), a county employee’s statements that alleged that numerous statutory and regulatory public health and safety violations were occurring on projects that were sponsored by the county and under the direction of the county’s elected officials and administrative staff were held to involve a matter of public concern and were entitled to First Amendment protection. In Morfin v. Albuquerque Public Schools, 906 F2d 1434, 1437-38 (10th Cir 1990), a public school teacher’s criticism of a superior’s disciplinary philosophy was recognized as speech on a matter of public concern because “[generally, speech by a public school employee about a policy or practice which can substantially and detrimentally affect the welfare of the children attending the school constitutes speech on a matter of public concern.” In Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F2d 1497, 1502 (11th Cir 1989), the court held that a police chiefs “[wjarning [to the city council] that closing a public road would create a safety hazard is speech on a matter of public concern.” In Price v. Brittain, 874 F2d 252, 258 (5th Cir 1989), a state mental health facility social worker’s statements to patients regarding their right to outside legal counsel and to prosecute civil actions against officials within the facility who were mistreating them were held to be a matter of public concern. In Frazier v. King, 873 F2d 820, 825-26 (5th Cir 1989), a nurse’s report to superiors of violations of nursing practices in the prison infirmary which endangered the prisoners was held to be a matter of public concern. In Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F2d 1194, 1197-98 (9th Cir 1989), a firefighter’s comments to his supervisor and other city workers criticizing the behavior of other firefighters and police officers in their handling of a drug overdose case were held to be speech about a matter of public concern. In Teeters v. Scott, 733 F Supp 1279, 1281-83 (ED Ark 1990), a nurse’s comments to a *444mother of a patient that the patient was occasionally deprived of meals and bathroom privileges, and that hospital personnel were being mean to the patient, were a matter of public concern because they concerned the standard of care given a patient at a public institution. In Brown v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 656 F Supp 517 (EDNY 1987), aff’d without opinion, 867 F2d 1424 (2d Cir 1988), a lieutenant in the security force assigned to JFK Airport was disciplined following his writing a memo to his superiors and his union in which he expressed the view that airport security was not sufficient to repel terrorist activity. Although the memo addressed plaintiffs personal safety concerns, noted the court, the memo essentially concerned the ability of the airport to respond to a matter of utmost public concern — terrorism. Id. at 521. In Woodruff v. Bd. of Tru. of Cabell Huntington, 319 SE2d 372, 378-379 (W Va 1984), hospital employees’ distribution near the hospital of leaflets disclosing a labor dispute with the hospital and the effects of job eliminations on the level of public health care was held to be speech on a matter of public concern.
Additionally, the Oregon Legislative Assembly has recognized that speech which discloses information on matters of public health and safety is of public import. ORS 659.510(l)(b)(B) prohibits a public employer from taking or threatening to take disciplinary action against an employee for the disclosure of any information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of “substantial and specific danger to public health and safety resulting from action of the state, agency or political subdivision.” One purpose of the Oregon Safe Employment Act, ORS 654.001 to 654.295, ORS 654.750 to 654.780, and ORS 654.991, is to “assure as far as possible safe and healthful working conditions for every working man and woman in Oregon.” ORS 654.003. To accomplish that purpose, the Legislative Assembly provides a procedure that “[e]ncourage[s] employers and employees to reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards and to institute new programs and improve existing programs for providing safe and healthful working conditions.” ORS 654.003(1). Under ORS 654.062(5)(a), it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to bar or discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate against any employee or prospective employee” who “opposed any *445practice forbidden by [health and safety laws] ’ ’ or who ‘ ‘made any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under [the health and safety laws].”
b. Form
As to the form of plaintiffs expression, plaintiffs petition was “posted on the company bulletin board,” given to the city commissioner in charge of the Bureau of Environmental Services, and circulated among employees affected by the policy. The fact that plaintiffs speech was not directed to the public at large, to inform it of the perceived problems, is not determinative to the inquiry whether the speech involves a matter of public concern. See Rankin v. McPherson, supra, 483 US at 386 n 11 (“The private nature of the [public employee’s] statement does not * * * vitiate the status of the statement as addressing a matter of public concern.”); see also McGowan and Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 Cal L Rev 825, 855 (1991) (“Rankin demonstrates that the concept of public speech has a very strong content base — the speech at issue was not distributed in anything remotely resembling a public fashion.”); Gillette v. Delmore, supra, 886 F2d at 1198 (a public employee’s speech was held to involve a matter of public concern, even though made to employee’s supervisor and other city workers and not to the public at large).
c. Context
Taken in context, I will assume that plaintiffs petition arose because of plaintiffs personal dissatisfaction with the proposed work safety policy. A motive of personal concern behind a public employee’s speech is not, however, dispositive on the issue whether the employee’s speech involves a matter of public concern. Breuer v. Hart, 909 F2d 1035, 1038-39 (7th Cir 1990); Belk v. Town of Minocqua, 858 F2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir 1988). Content, not context as stated by the majority,14 is *446the most important factor in the inquiry whether the public employee’s speech passes the threshold public concern test. Breuer v. Hart, supra, 909 F2d at 1039; Belk v. Town of Minocqua, supra, 858 F2d at 1264; Berg v. Hunter, 854 F2d 238, 242-43 (7th Cir 1988), cert den 489 US 1053, 109 S Ct 1314, 103 L Ed 2d 583 (1989); Bodensteiner and Levinson, 1 State & Local Government Civil Rights Liability 77, § 1:08.50 (1987); McGowan and Tangri, supra, 79 Cal L Rev at 855.
In Connick v. Myers, supra, the Supreme Court considered one of Myers’ thirteen questions — the question regarding pressure to work in political campaigns — to be of public concern, even though the Court found that Myers’ grievances were fairly rooted in a personal dispute over her transfer. The fact that a “speaker was motivated by narrow self-interest” does not automatically mean that the issue is not of public concern. Breuer v. Hart, supra, 909 F2d at 1038-39; Bodens-teiner and Levinson, supra. Connick makes clear that a public employee’s statements motivated, triggered, or predominated by a personal grievance, dissatisfaction, or narrow self-interests may nevertheless involve matters of public concern necessitating inquiry as to whether the employee’s (plaintiffs) speech passes the second requirement of the two-prong test to determine whether the speech is protected by the First Amendment, namely, the Pickering balancing test. The fact that plaintiffs speech arose in the context of what began as a personal dispute does not, therefore, in itself disqualify that speech from constitutional protection.
In sum, as determined by the content, form, and context of plaintiffs expression as revealed by the whole record, I conclude that, despite whatever self-interests motivated or triggered plaintiff to circulate the petition, all but the first two sentences of plaintiff’s petition concerns a matter of public concern.
2. Application of Pickering Balancing Test
Having determined that the speech in plaintiffs petition involves a matter of public concern, the court must *447balance plaintiffs First Amendment interest in commenting on a matter of public concern against the interest of the city, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Rankin v. McPherson, supra, 483 US at 388-91. At the time that the trial court directed the verdict for defendants, the record did not support a finding that a legitimate city interest justified firing plaintiff. I find no evidence in the record that plaintiff s petition interfered with the city’s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public. Nothing in the record indicates that the circulation of plaintiffs petition impaired work-place discipline or created disharmony with co-workers. Nor does the record disclose any evidence that plaintiffs superiors reasonably believed that plaintiffs speech would disrupt the operation of the wastewa-ter treatment plant where plaintiff worked, undermine his superior’s authority, or destroy close working relationships. Like Rankin v. McPherson, supra, there was no evidence that plaintiffs statements had discredited the city or interfered with its efficient functioning.15 Similarly, there is no evidence that plaintiffs petition was circulated in an inappropriate time, place or manner. Absent any particularized evidence of defendants’ interests in this case, I must conclude that, based on the record the trial court had before it when it directed the verdict, the employer’s (city’s) interest in efficiency does not outweigh the employee’s (plaintiffs) freedom of expression. Without such a showing, plaintiffs First Amendment rights predominate. I conclude, therefore, that defendants were not entitled to a directed verdict on the issue whether plaintiff s petition is protected speech under the First Amendment to the federal constitution.
G. Causation Determination
Having determined that defendants were not entitled to a directed verdict with respect to the question of *448whether plaintiffs petition is protected by the First Amendment, I review the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient on the causation issue. If so, the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict for defendants. If there was insufficient evidence to establish causation, the trial court correctly granted the defendants’ motion for directed verdict. In determining the propriety of the trial court’s directing the verdict, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (in this case, plaintiff), who is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence. Foster v. Schnell Refrigeration Co., 280 Or 411, 414, 571 P2d 497 (1977).
The evidence would permit a trier of fact to find that plaintiffs supervisors, Irvin and Lang, were hostile toward plaintiffs attempt to receive an exemption from the challenged policy. Other employees testified that management retaliated against employees who spoke out against management practices or on safety issues by firing them. Lang admitted that plaintiffs petition made him angry and caused him some anxiety. Irvin admitted that he did not help plaintiff find other comparable city employment before terminating him, although he had assisted other employees who did not comply with the facial hair policy.16 While plaintiff had no proof to spare, the foregoing evidence, when combined with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, was sufficient to allow a trier of fact to conclude that plaintiffs speech was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in defendants’ discharge decision. There is no evidence in the record to show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants had other adequate grounds for dismissal, i.e., that the same adverse decision to plaintiffs employment would have been reached even in the absence of the protected speech. It was error, therefore, for the trial court to grant defendants’ motion for directed verdict on plaintiffs § 1983 claim.
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I would remand this case *449to the circuit court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.17
Van Hoomissen and Fadeley, JJ. Join in this opinion.

 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
“Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech * *

 Plaintiffs petition stated:
“We, the undersigned, find the proposed rules demanding that beards be shaved before a respirator test can even be taken to be arbitrary and discriminatory. The wearing or not wearing of beards was not a condition of employment and any hazards that exist now existed at that time. Furthermore, if everyone on site is to be available in a chlorine emergency, the questions of fit, maintenance and hygiene of the respirators, the supplying of respirators for those who wear glasses, training of all employees in their use, hazard pay, and the availability of respirators for office staff, contractors’ employees and visitors must be answered. The aforementioned proposed rules do not take into account the use of respirators by the last three mentioned groups.
*432“It would be far more practical to have a volunteer crew, specially trained and outfitted to deal with chlorine in emergency and non-emergency situations. ’ ’ (Emphasis in original.)

 42 USC § 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulations, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. * * *”

 Remarkably, the majority recognizes that plaintiffs petition relates to public policy. 313 Or at 431. Nonetheless, the majority holds that plaintiffs petition does not touch upon a matter of public concern.

 See discussion, infra.

 Act of Apr. 20,1871, ch 22, § 1,17 Stat 13 (codified at 42 USC § 1983 (1982)).

 See Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 US 274, 283-84, 97 S Ct 568, 50 L Ed 2d 471 (1977) (although untenured teacher can be dismissed for “no reason whatever,” he cannot be fired for exercise of First Amendment rights).
“ ‘Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.’ Mills v. Alabama, 384 US [214, 218, 86 S Ct 1434, 16 L Ed 2d 484 (1966)]. ‘For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.’ Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 US 64, 74-75[, 85 S Ct 209, 13 L Ed 2d 125] (1964).”
Burson v. Freeman,_US_,_, 112 S Ct 1846, 1850, 119 L Ed 2d 5 (1992).

 For public employee speech that touches on matters of public concern in only a most limited sense, the public employer’s disciplinary action will be upheld when the employer “reasonably believe[s that the speech] would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships.” Connick v. Myers, 461 US 138, 154, 103 S Ct 1684, 75 L Ed 2d 708 (1983). While the test is cast in objective terms, its reasoning entails a large amount of subjectivity, as the public employer may take action based on his view of a potential for disruption. Id.

 Justice Scalia, joined by three other justices in Rankin v. McPherson, 483 US 378, 399, 107 S Ct 2891, 97 L Ed 2d 315 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting), couched the issue as whether the employer’s interest in preventing the expression of such statements outweighed the public employee’s First Amendment interest in making the statement.

 The public employer “must show that it would have terminated him, not that it could have.” Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir 1989) (emphasis in original).
*438“[T]he employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 US 228, 246, 109 S Ct 1775, 104 L Ed 2d 268 (1989) (discussion of burden of proof in suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

 The sufficiency of the evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury is, of course, solely a question of law. Stever v. Independent School Dist. No. 625, 943 F2d 845, 851 (8th Cir 1991). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict on insufficiency of proof, an appellate court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Foster v. Schnell Refrigeration Co., 280 Or 411, 414, 571 P2d 497 (1977).

 In contrast, an actual threat to kill the President would not be protected, the Court said. Rankin v. McPherson, supra, 483 US at 386-87.

 313 Or at 429-31.

 The majority’s analysis is premised on the notion that context is the most important factor and, in this case, the determinative factor, in determining whether something is a matter of public concern. 313 Or at 428-29. The majority admits that plaintiffs petition relates to public policy, 313 Or at 430-31, but refuses to consider it a matter of public concern because of the context in which it was presented. This analysis is fundamentally flawed. In Connick, the context was clearly stated by the Court to be apersonal grievance, i.e., “one employee’s [Myers’l dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause celebre.” 461 US at 148. *446If context was the most important factor in determining whether the speech was a matter of public concern, what caused the Court to conclude that Question 11 was a matter of public concern? Even though Question 11 was presented in the context of thirteen other entries relating to a private grievance, it was found to be a matter of public concern because, notwithstanding its context (personal grievance) and form (circulated only to other employees), its content established it to be so.

 In fact, the city made no claim that plaintiffs petition disrupted the wastewater treatment plant, destroyed close working relationships with supervisors or fellow employees, or constituted insubordination.
As previously stated, the city’s Civil Service Board found that, in violation of the city’s charter, the decision to discharge plaintiff was not made in good faith for the purpose of improving public service. Defendants did not challenge the propriety of that finding.

 Contrary to defendants’ assertions, defendants did not object to the testimony supporting the foregoing summary, and the evidence was not excluded by the circuit court.

 The Court of Appeals concluded that “[p]laintiff s petition was constitutionally protected.” Shockey v. City of Portland, 100 Or App 166, 170, 785 P2d 776 (1990). To the extent that that conclusion forecloses defendants from demonstrating to the trial court that plaintiffs petition is not protected by the First Amendment as a result of the application of the Pickering balancing test, I disagree.