Court Opinion

ID: 9688206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:38:46.241853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:36.224383
License: Public Domain

Hendry, C.J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The doctrine of assumption of risk applies a subjective standard, geared to the individual plaintiff and his or her actual comprehension and appreciation of the nature of the danger he or she confronts. The standard to be applied in determining whether a plaintiff has assumed the risk of injury is a subjective one based upon the particular facts and circumstances of the event. Jay v. Moog Automotive, 264 Neb. 875, 652 N.W.2d 872 (2002). Whether the plaintiff assumed a risk usually presents a question of fact. See id.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496 D, comment e. at 575 (1965), is in accord:
Whether the plaintiff knows of the existence of the risk, or whether he understands and appreciates its magnitude and its unreasonable character, is a question of fact, usually to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. The court may itself determine the issue only where reasonable men could not differ as to the conclusion.
See, also, Mandery v. Chronical Broadcasting Co., 228 Neb. 391, 399, 423 N.W.2d 115, 120 (1988) (“‘[e]xcept where he expressly so agrees, a plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm arising from the defendant’s conduct unless he then knows of *25the existence of the risk and appreciates its unreasonable character, or the danger involved, including the magnitude thereof, and voluntarily accepts the risk’ ”); NJI2d Civ. 2.02B (defendant has burden to show that “the plaintiff knew of and understood the specific danger” (emphasis supplied)).
As the majority notes, shortly after Burke realized he had drawn horse No. 18 at the Madison rodeo, he talked to Saner, a coparticipant. Saner told Burke that he had observed horse No. 18 at another rodeo and that it had “bucked straight out” without any trouble and did not go over backward onto its rider. This evidence is uncontroverted. Based on Saner’s statement, Burke concluded that the O’Neill incident, which occurred approximately 1 year earlier, was a “one-time deal with [the rider in O’Neill] . .. and [the horse] would buck fine.” Burke stated that after talking to Saner, he did not have any apprehensions about riding the horse and that he also believed McKay would bring suitable livestock to a high school rodeo.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Burke, and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences as we must do, see Sherrets, Smith v. MJ Optical, Inc., 259 Neb. 424, 610 N.W.2d 413 (2000) (where reasonable minds differ as to whether inference supporting ultimate conclusion can be drawn, summary judgment should not be granted), I am of the view that Burke’s conclusion based on Saner’s observation creates a genuine issue of fact as to Burke’s subjective appreciation and understanding of the specific risk, to wit: that the horse would not buck normally, but would instead rear up and flip over backward. Whether Burke was negligent in reaching that conclusion is not the issue presented by this appeal.
Because I do not believe it is appropriate for Burke’s assumption of the risk to be decided as a matter of law, I would reverse the granting of summary judgment on this basis and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings.
Connolly and Gerrard, JJ., join in this dissent.