Court Opinion

ID: 9761936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:00:28.635276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:27.860640
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Jones:
Although I was able to concur in the result in Com. v. Anderson, 441 Pa. 483, 272 A. 2d 877 (1971), I am unwilling to grant retroactive application to that opinion.' It is my view that the majority ignores the practical effect of its decision.
The decision to grant retrospective effect to new constitutional rules is a function of three variables: “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). Despite the fact that, “[fjoremost among these factors is the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule [footnote omitted],” Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969), it is my position that the majority opinion under-estimates the weight of the second and third factors in the equation. Until the date of our opinion in Anderson the bench and bar of this Commonwealth were under no affirmative duty to ensuré stenographic reporting of criminal trials.
Indeed, prior to Anderson, the Superior Court had ruled on at least seven occasions that, in the absence of any request from the defendant, the failure to have notes of testimony taken at the trial does not constitute a denial of due process. Com. ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 204 Pa. Superior Ct. 316, 204 A. 2d 487 (1964) ; Com. ex rel. Clawson v. Maroney, 201 Pa. Superior Ct. *387126, 191 A. 2d 689 (1963); Com. v. Kimble, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 490, 144 A. 2d 598 (1958); Com. ex rel. Koffel v. Myers, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 270, 133 A. 2d 570 (1957); Com. ex rel. Shultz v. Myers, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 431, 128 A. 2d 103 (1956); Com. ex rel. McCurdy v. Burke, 175 Pa. Superior Ct. 482, 106 A. 2d 684 (1954) ; Com. ex rel. Turk v. Ashe, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 323, 74 A. 2d 656 (1950). Although it is a matter of speculation, it is my belief that a substantial percentage of pre-Anderson criminal cases were tried in the absence of a court reporter and that there is no “equivalent ‘picture’ ” of these proceedings. If 1 correctly interpret the majority’s opinion, every one of these criminals must be awarded a new trial.
The only analogous decision in this area by the United States Supreme Court, Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963), reflects my position that the majority opinion ignores the realities of the situation. In Norvell, the court reporter died before his shorthand notes taken fifteen years earlier could be transcribed; the failure to transcribe these notes immediately after trial was principally due to the accused’s indigency. The Supreme Court concluded that no equal protection violation occurred. Although this Court distinguished Morrell on its facts in Anderson, Morrell did note that practical accommodations must be made in this type of situation. It is no coincidence that Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, quoted Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913) : “The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be and unscientific. . . . What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned.” Such practical considerations underline our decisions in Com. ex rel. Goldsmith v. Myers, 430 Pa. 385, 243 A. 2d 429 (1968), and Com. v. *388Banks, 428 Pa. 571, 237 A. 2d 339 (1968). Notwithstanding the primacy of the purpose to be served by the Anderson rule, I am of the opinion that the exigencies of the situation prohibit retroactive application of Anderson.
'Moreover, granting retrospective effect to Anderson places our Court in an anomalous position vis-a-vis guilty pleas. After careful deliberation and reargument, we ruled in Com. v. McBride, 440 Pa. 81, 269 A. 2d 737 (1970), that a defendant who enters a guilty plea in a “silent record” case tried before Com. ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A. 2d 196 (1968), must bear the burden of proving that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. In light of the fact that a guilty plea has the same effect as a jury’s verdict, any distinction between “silent record” guilty pleas and non-existent, full-scale trial records is unwarranted ; and yet such a distinction is implicit in the majority opinion. An appellate court can no more determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea where the record is silent than it can review a conviction for trial errors where no record was made. Indeed, appellant was indicted along with two others who pled guilty to the same offenses. If the others were to now seek post-conviction relief, any court in this Commonwealth would be justified in placing on them the burden of proving the involuntariness of their guilty pleas under McBride whereas appellant is awarded a new trial.
I dissent.
Mr. Justice Pomeroy joins in this dissent.