Court Opinion

ID: 9388553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 21:00:58.381908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.876512
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085         Doc: 50         Filed: 04/19/2023   Pg: 1 of 30

                                                 PUBLISHED

                                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                  No. 21-1085

        STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
        HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL; SAVANNAH RIVER
        MARITIME COMMISSION; AUGUSTA, GEORGIA,

                                Plaintiffs − Appellees,

                        and

        SAVANNAH RIVERKEEPER, INC.,

                                Intervenor/Plaintiff,

                        v.

        UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; UNITED STATES ARMY
        CORPS OF ENGINEERS SAVANNAH DISTRICT; CHRISTINE WORMUTH, in
        her official capacity as Secretary of the Army; LIEUTENANT GENERAL TODD
        T. SEMONITE, in his official capacity as Commanding General and Chief of
        Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; MAJOR GENERAL DIANA M.
        HOLLAND, in her official capacity as Commanding General, South Atlantic
        Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; COLONEL DANIEL H. HIBNER, in his
        official capacity as District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Savannah
        District,

                                Defendants – Appellants,

                        and

        GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY,

                                Intervenor/Defendant.

        ------------------------------
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        CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF GREATER AUGUSTA,                                 GEORGIA,
        INCORPORATED; PCS NITROGEN FERTILIZER, L.P.,

                            Amici Supporting Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.
        Richard M. Gergel, District Judge. (1:19−cv−03132−RMG)

        Argued: January 27, 2023                                         Decided: April 19, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

        Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in
        which Judge King joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.

        ARGUED: Michael Thomas Gray, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
        Jacksonville, Florida, for Appellants. Chad Nicholas Johnston, BURR & FORMAN LLP,
        Columbia, South Carolina; David Montgomery Moore, EARTH & WATER LAW, LLC,
        Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General,
        Robert P. Stockman, Environment and Natural Resources Division, UNITED STATES
        DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Jacksonville, Florida; Erica Zilioli, Phillip Paradise,
        UNITED STATES CORPS OF ENGINEERS, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
        Randolph R. Lowell, BURR & FORMAN LLP, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees.
        Susan Bodine, EARTH & WATER LAW, Atlanta, Georgia, for Intervenor/Appellee.
        Brian C. Lea, Atlanta, Georgia, Megan Lacy Owen, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for
        Amici Curiae.

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        DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

               The New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam sits on the Savannah River near Augusta,

        Georgia. For over 80 years, the Dam has raised the height of the Savannah River around

        it, creating a “pool” of water at the Augusta riverfront. The Augusta community uses the

        pool for water supply and recreation. Locals dock their boats in the pool and fish from the

        Dam, and crowds converge at the riverfront for an annual triathlon and regatta.

               While popular with humans, the Dam has been less well received by the endangered

        Atlantic and shortnose sturgeon that populate the Savannah River. Because the sturgeon

        can’t pass through or over the dam, they aren’t able to migrate upstream to their historic

        spawning grounds.

               In passing the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (“WIIN Act”),

        Congress directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design a fish-passage structure for

        the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam “that is able to maintain the pool for water supply

        and recreational activities, as in existence on the date of enactment.” The Corps settled on

        a design that would lower the pool of water by about three feet.

               On appeal, we’re asked to interpret that provision of the WIIN Act. The district

        court held that the Corps’ plan didn’t “maintain the pool” since it would lower it from its

        height on the date of the Act’s enactment. But the Corps argues that this reading ignores

        the clause “for water supply and recreational activities,” and that a lowered pool that still

        fulfills these functions would comply with the Act.

               Finding the Corps’ reading more persuasive, we vacate the judgment of the district

        court and remand for further proceedings.

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                                                    I.

                                                   A.

              In 1999, Congress authorized the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project, a billion-

        dollar undertaking to deepen and widen the Savannah River navigation channel. An

        environmental impact study found that the project would adversely impact the ability of

        Atlantic and shortnose sturgeon to reach their spawning grounds. To mitigate these effects

        and bring the Project into compliance with the Endangered Species Act, 1 the federal

        agencies decided to build a fish passage around the Dam that would allow the sturgeon to

        migrate farther upstream.

              But Congress upended the agencies’ plans for the fish-passage structure when it

        passed the WIIN Act—a broad-ranging bill authorizing water projects across the country—

        in 2016. See WIIN Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, § 1319(b)(1)(A), 130 Stat. 1628, 1703

        (2016). The Act gave the Corps only two options for the planned fish-passage structure:

        The Corps could repair the Dam and modify it to allow fish to pass over it.            Id.

        § 1319(c)(1)(A)(i). Or it could construct a fish-passage structure across the Savannah

        River and demolish the Dam. Id. § 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii).

              The Corps chose the latter option after conducting the required environmental

        analyses and evaluating various designs and locations. The Corps’ design envisioned

        removal of the Dam and construction of a 500-foot-wide in-channel rock weir—“a water

              1
                See 16 U.S.C. § 1536, which requires agencies to determine whether their actions
        may adversely impact an endangered or threatened species (and if so, to consult the
        National Marine Fisheries Service about mitigation measures). See also App. 270, 289.

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        damming and control structure that allows water to flow over its top”—in its place.

        Appellants’ Br. at 13. The Corps projected that this structure would lower the pool about

        three feet in normal conditions while allowing fish to pass over it and migrate upstream.

                The Corps also modeled the effects of its design on the riverfront community,

        concluding it wouldn’t adversely impact the water supply, fishing, large events, or the

        “continued general use of boat docks.” App. 185. But a simulation the Corps ran in 2019

        proved disastrous. During the simulation, the Corps drew the water level in the pool down

        several feet, exposing mudflats for miles along the Savannah River. The drawdown test

        ran docks aground and threatened Augusta’s water intake. The Corps ultimately had to

        halt the test. 2

                Undaunted, the Corps pressed ahead with its proposed design.

                                                     B.

                The State of South Carolina and several of its agencies responded by suing the Corps

        and various federal officials. Their complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief,

        alleging that the Corps’ design violated the WIIN Act, the National Environmental Policy

        Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, state law, a previous settlement agreement, and

                2
                 The Corps blames the low water levels on unusual circumstances that day, to
        include a nearby dam undergoing maintenance and high recent rainfall that made the drop
        “appear more dramatic by comparison.” App. 748.

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        certain easements. The City of Augusta intervened as a plaintiff and the Georgia Ports

        Authority intervened as a defendant. 3

               The Corps moved to dismiss almost all the claims, including the WIIN Act claim,

        for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary

        judgment and for a preliminary injunction.

               As relevant here, Plaintiffs charged that the WIIN Act “requires that any repair or

        replacement structure of the [Dam] must maintain the pool at the same elevation as it was

        on December 16, 2016,” when the Act was enacted—specifically, 114.76 feet NGVD29 4

        at the gage immediately upstream of the Dam. 5 App. 59. Plaintiffs claimed that the Corps’

        design would “dramatically lower the water elevation from the conditions that existed” on

        that date. App. 60. And pointing to the failed drawdown test, Plaintiffs argued that the

        “simulation did not maintain the pool for navigation, water supply, and recreational

        activities, as in existence on December 16, 2016.” Id.

               3
                  We refer to Appellees South Carolina, the state agencies, and Augusta as
        “Plaintiffs,” and Appellants the Corps and related federal individual defendants as “the
        Corps.”

               This unit, “National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929,” measures elevation above
               4

        mean sea level.
               5
                 The U.S. Geological Survey operates a network of more than 11,000 gages that
        monitor the water levels of rivers and streams across the country. See Water Resources
        Mission Area, USGS Streamgaging Network, U.S. Geological Surv. (Apr. 27, 2021),
        www.usgs.gov/mission-areas/water-resources/science/usgs-streamgaging-network (last
        visited March 28, 2023). The district court relied on a daily average measurement taken
        at Gage 02196999, which sits just above the Dam.

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               The Corps responded that the WIIN Act didn’t require them to “maintain the pool”

        at a specific level, but to preserve its use “for water supply and recreational activities” as

        it existed on the day of enactment.         Its chosen design satisfied this functionality

        requirement, the Corps argued, because it wouldn’t affect the water supply and would

        provide water sufficient for recreational activities.

               The district court consolidated a hearing on the Corps’ motion to dismiss and

        Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits of Plaintiffs’ WIIN

        Act claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). Following the hearing, the court

        entered judgment for Plaintiffs on their WIIN Act claim.

               The WIIN Act, the court reasoned, “unambiguously requires the agency to construct

        ‘a structure that is able to maintain the pool for water supply and recreational activities’ at

        a very precise level—that level existing on the date of the adoption of the Act.” App. 2592.

        And there was “no dispute” that the Corps design couldn’t maintain that level. Id.

               The court found that the agency’s interpretation read the word “sufficient” into the

        statute: i.e., “a structure that is able to maintain the pool sufficient for water supply and

        recreational activities.” Id. But this concept of “functionality” was nowhere in the statute.

        So the district court held that the Corps’ chosen design had exceeded its statutory authority.

               The court also entered a permanent injunction barring the Corps “from

        implementing [its design] and any other plan involving the removal of the Savannah Bluff

        Lock and Dam if the proposal does not ‘maintain the pool’ that was in existence on the

        date of the Act’s enactment, which was 114.76 feet NGVD29.” App. 2596.

               This appeal followed.

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                                                     II.

               The issue before us is this: Did the district court err in concluding that, as a matter

        of law, the Corps’ chosen design for the Savannah River project wasn’t “able to maintain

        the pool for water supply and recreational activities, as in existence on the date of

        enactment” of the WIIN Act?

               We review questions of statutory interpretation and challenges to an agency’s

        statutory authority de novo. Stone v. Instrumentation Lab’y Co., 591 F.3d 239, 242–43

        (4th Cir. 2009); Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 983 F.3d 671,

        679–80 (4th Cir. 2020). And we conclude that—by focusing solely on the water level in

        the pool—the district court erred.

                                                     A.

               At the outset, the parties dispute how to frame the district court’s order. According

        to the Corps, the district court “concluded that any project that the Corps builds must keep

        the pool at precisely 114.76 feet NGVD29” to avoid violating the WIIN Act. Appellants’

        Br. at 23. But Plaintiffs say this is a strawman. They say that the court didn’t require the

        Corps “to maintain a static pool, frozen at a precise water level”—rather, its references to

        114.76 feet NGVD29 were just a “benchmark” against which to evaluate the Corps’ chosen

        alternative. Appellees’ Br. at 26–27.

               The Corps’ view finds some support in the district court’s order. The court found

        as a fact that the Corps’ chosen design “does not maintain the pool that existed on

        December 16, 2016, 114.76 feet NGVD29.” App. 2591. And the injunction the court

        entered bars the Corps from adopting any proposal that doesn’t “‘maintain the pool’ that

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        was in existence on the date of the Act’s enactment, which was 114.76 feet NGVD29.”

        App. 2596. Even still, we decline to read this language literally, for such an order would

        be absurd. (As our dissenting colleague notes, even Plaintiffs don’t advance this reading.

        See Dissent at 29.)

               Ultimately, however, the dispute is auxiliary. The Corps hangs its hat on the

        argument that “any interpretation of the WIIN Act that focuses on water elevations

        inevitably leads to absurd results and cannot be correct, whether the elevation is a static

        requirement or a malleable ‘benchmark.’” Reply Br. at 9. And the Corps admits that

        “under normal conditions,” its design “would reduce the elevation of the pool by about

        three feet immediately upstream of the Dam.” Appellants’ Br. at 1. So our inquiry is: Did

        the district court err in finding that the Corps’ design violated the WIIN Act because it

        doesn’t “meet the 114.76 standard . . . by at least 3 feet”? App. 2588 n.2. In other words,

        should the court have looked instead at whether the pool would be maintained “for water

        supply and recreational activities,” its precise elevation notwithstanding?

                                                      B.

               To answer that question, the parties offer competing readings of the statutory text:

        “a structure that is able to maintain the pool for water supply and recreational activities, as

        in existence on the date of enactment of this Act.” WIIN Act § 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii). The

        Corps contends that the clause beginning “as in existence” applies to “water supply and

        recreational activities,” so the Corps “must maintain the pool for those purposes as they

        existed when Congress passed the WIIN Act.” Appellants’ Br. at 32. Plaintiffs respond

        that the statute “clearly requires that the pool itself be ‘maintain[ed]’ as in existence on the

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        date of the enactment,” and that the Corps’ interpretation imports a “functionality”

        requirement not found in the statute. Appellees’ Br. at 31 (emphasis added). We think the

        Corps has the better reading.

               Before explaining why, we address a preliminary issue. The parties disagree

        whether the Corps’ interpretation is entitled to Skidmore deference. See Skidmore v. Swift

        & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (explaining that courts will give weight to an agency’s

        interpretation “depend[ing] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity

        of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors

        which give it power to persuade”). Because we find that Congress’s intent in the WIIN

        Act was plain, however, we “need not explore that issue”; “If the intent of Congress is

        clear, that is the end of the matter.” Power Fuels, LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev.

        Comm’n, 777 F.3d 214, 221 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

                                                      1.

               With Skidmore behind us, we turn to the text. To interpret a statute, “we look first

        to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.” Dwoskin v. Bank of Am.,

        N.A., 888 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “We are [loath] to contradict the

        established principle that statutes must be interpreted to give each word some operative

        effect.” Crespo v. Holder, 631 F.3d 130, 135 (4th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).

               The district court found that the statute’s plain meaning was unambiguous: It

        required the Corps to construct “a structure that is able to maintain the pool for water supply

        and recreational activities” at “that level existing on the date of the adoption of the Act.”

        App. 2592. But the Corps offers several reasons why we should doubt that reading.

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               First, the Corps invokes the canon against surplusage, which prescribes that “[a]

        statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,

        sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

        167, 174 (2001) (cleaned up). As the Corps argues, the clause “for water supply and

        recreational activities” is doing no work in the district court’s reading: The statute could

        simply read “maintain the pool at that level existing on the date of the adoption of the Act”

        and have the same meaning.

               The Corps also points out that Congress phrased the other project option slightly

        differently. If the Corps chose to repair and modify the existing Dam, the modified

        structure would have “to maintain the pool for navigation, water supply, and recreational

        activities, as in existence on the date of enactment of this Act.”               WIIN Act

        § 1319(c)(1)(A)(i)(I) (emphasis added). The district court’s reading would ignore this

        distinction—again, only the resulting height of the pool would matter.

               Plaintiffs respond (and our friend in dissent agrees) that “for navigation, water

        supply, and recreational activities” is a prepositional phrase whose only function is to

        “add[] project purposes.” Appellees’ Br. at 33–34. In other words, the phrases in the

        statute are merely “descriptive.”      Id. at 40.      But that verges on making them

        “insignificant”—the statute would have “precisely the same content” if they were struck.

        See Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174. In the Corps’ reading, the prepositional phrases do real work.

               The Corps would also have us apply the “rule of the last antecedent,” under which

        “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or

        phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). The

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        Corps argues the limiting clause “as in existence on the date of enactment of this Act”

        immediately follows “water supply and recreational activities”—indicating that Congress

        meant for the Corps to preserve the existing water supply and recreational functions.

        Appellants’ Br. at 32–33. Or in the alternative, the Corps argues, the limiting clause

        modifies the entire phrase “the pool for water supply and recreational activities.”

               We find that the Corps’ alternative reading best aligns with Supreme Court

        precedent. The rule of the last antecedent typically applies when a modifier is asked to

        qualify “a remote or otherwise disconnected phrase,” so it would take “more than a little

        mental energy” to stretch the modifier back. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund,

        138 S. Ct. 1061, 1077 (2018) (cleaned up). But when a modifier “directly follows a concise

        and ‘integrated’ clause,” the Supreme Court has more often declined to apply the rule. Id.

        For example, in the phrase “The woman dressed to the nines carrying an umbrella, as

        shown in the picture,” few would assume that only the umbrella is pictured. Id.

               Here, we likewise find that the “as in existence” clause modifies the entire integrated

        phrase “the pool for water supply and recreational activities.” This reading gives effect to

        every word in the statute.

               The district court found the Corps’ interpretation flawed because it added the word

        “sufficient”—i.e., the Corps must build a structure “able to maintain the pool [sufficient]

        for water supply and recreational activities.” App. 2592. But “sufficient” is suggested by

        the word “for,” which Merriam-Webster defines as “a function word to indicate purpose”

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        or an “intended goal.” 6 The purpose of “maintain[ing] the pool” was “for” the water supply

        and recreational activities. Implicit in the word “for” is that the maintenance of the pool

        will be “sufficient” to meet these purposes.

               We conclude that the “as in existence” clause modifies “the pool for water supply

        and recreational activities.” And to give effect to the “for” clause, the benchmark for

        whether the Corps has “maintain[ed]” the pool is whether the pool supports the water-

        supply and recreational uses in existence when Congress enacted the Act.

                                                       2.

               There’s still more to commend the Corps’ reading of the Act. Because statutory

        language “cannot be construed in a vacuum[,] [i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory

        construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to

        their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93,

        101 (2012) (cleaned up). Reasoning from context, the Corps makes a persuasive case that

        the district court’s water level-based interpretation is unlikely and unworkable.

               First, the Corps argues, Congress opted not to specify a water level in the text,

        despite mentioning specific water levels in at least two other provisions of the WIIN Act.

        See WIIN Act § 1307(a) (flowage easements at another project are “extinguished above

        elevation 82.2 feet (NGVD29), the ordinary high water line”); id. § 3608(b)(11) (defining

        “conservation storage capacity” at another project with a range of surface elevations). And

               6
                   For, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/for
        (last visited March 28, 2023).

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        in other statutes, Congress has ordered the Corps to maintain specific water levels. See,

        e.g., Water Resources Development Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-676, § 21(a) (directing the

        Secretary of the Army to “maintain water levels in the Mississippi River headwaters

        reservoirs within [specific] operating limits[.]”). We think it reasonable to infer that, had

        Congress intended to require a specific water level for the pool, it would have “used

        language similar to what it used” in other parts of the WIIN Act and other statutes.

        Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 777 (2008).

               Plaintiffs respond that each Corps project requires its own Congressional

        authorization, so there’s “no overall statutory scheme” for us to examine. Appellees’ Br.

        at 28. But as the Corps argues, it’s at least “relevant that in authorizing thousands of

        projects nationwide in Water Resources Development Acts and similar Acts passed every

        couple of years for more than a century, Congress has never done anything like what the

        Plaintiffs argue it did here.” Reply Br. at 8.

               We also agree with the Corps that pinning the required pool height to the “arbitrary

        and unknowable-to-Congress date that the President signed the legislation” leads to

        “absurd results.” Reply Br. at 9. Had the elevation of the pool been exceptionally low or

        high on December 16, 2016, the district court’s interpretation would have held the Corps

        to that level regardless. In response, Plaintiffs suggest that the statute only obligates the

        Corps to maintain the pool at its “normal operating range.” Appellees’ Br. at 27. But

        neither the statute nor the district court’s order makes clear this permissible “range.”

               Finally, the Corps argues that requiring it to maintain the water level at 114.76

        NGVD29 at the gage above the existing Dam undermines its ability to construct the fish-

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        passage structure “at an appropriate location” of its choosing.                     WIIN Act

        § 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii). Had the Corps opted to build the structure a few miles upstream

        (instead of at the site of the existing dam), it argues, the resulting “pool” would inevitably

        have a different size and other characteristics—so “the pool” as it then existed wouldn’t be

        “maintain[ed].”    Reply Br. at 10–11. Plaintiffs respond that the Corps could “pick a

        different location, as long as the project is able to maintain the pool as it existed on the date

        of enactment.” Appellees’ Br. at 41.

               But any location other than the current Dam site will change some physical aspect

        of the pool, “with the size of the pool being most obvious.” Reply Br. at 11. Looking to

        the pool’s ability to support its water-supply and recreation functions—instead of narrowly

        focusing on its physical characteristics—best avoids making “at an appropriate location”

        surplusage.

                                                      III.

               Our friend in dissent would affirm the district court, finding that the Corps’

        proposed weir “would not be able to maintain the pool at the level as it existed” when the

        WIIN Act was enacted. Dissent at 30. In his view, the Corps’ “rationalization that the

        weir would nonetheless serve the statutory purposes of the pool” doesn’t absolve its

        “noncompliance.” Id.

               First, the dissent suggests that our interpretation “ignores entirely the historical and

        statutory context of the WIIN Act.” Id. at 20. Of course, we don’t “resort to legislative

        history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–

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        48 (1994). But even if the WIIN Act isn’t pellucid, general “historical context” about the

        Savannah River Dam doesn’t settle the debate. It’s true that the Corps has at times

        “describe[d] the pool in terms of its elevation in feet NGVD29.” Dissent at 23. But the

        Corps doesn’t contend that the water level is irrelevant—only that the WIIN Act doesn’t

        pin them to a specific water level (or range of levels).

               Moreover, the post-drawdown concerns of area legislators three years after the Act’s

        passage don’t shed much light on Congressional intent. Id.; see Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis,

        442 U.S. 397, 412 n.11 (1979) (“[I]solated statements by individual Members of

        Congress . . . , all made after the enactment of the statute under consideration, cannot

        substitute for a clear expression of legislative intent at the time of enactment.”). And even

        if we did weigh these comments, they arguably support the Corps’ interpretation: The

        legislators were alarmed about the pool “becoming useless for recreational activities,” after

        all. Dissent at 23.

               Our colleague claims that measuring the pool by its elevation is “a rational

        approach, if not the necessary one,” because a pool’s depth can change with the

        “aggregation of silt or the removal of silt from dredging.” Dissent at 24. But insistence

        upon a specific water level at the expense of other considerations could lead to unintended

        results. If the Corps largely filled in the pool with silt but left a foot of water on top, for

        example, the elevation of the pool might technically be “maintained.” But surely Plaintiffs

        wouldn’t be satisfied with that result.

               Next, our dissenting colleague suggests that our interpretation of the WIIN Act

        “sidesteps the natural reading of the statutory text based on grammar and word usage.” Id.

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        at 20. In his view, the comma in the text stands for a suppressed “and,” so the statute really

        reads “for water supply and recreational activities and as in existence . . . .” See id. at 26–

        27.

               But we don’t typically read so much into a comma. Nor is it clear how our colleague

        divines what word the comma supplants—that is, why the comma (as used here) is a stand-

        in for “and,” not “but” or “or.” According to the Government Publishing Office manual

        our colleague cites, “omission of a word” is just one of sixteen potential uses of a comma.

        See U.S. Government Publishing Office, Style Manual, 130 (2000) (offering the example

        “Then we had much; now, nothing.”). Our reading, in which a comma sets off a modifying

        clause, follows familiar drafting conventions and requires far less guesswork. See, e.g.,

        Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 206 n.10 (2010); Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.

        Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021).

                                                     IV.

               In all, we are persuaded by the Corps’ interpretation of the WIIN Act. We therefore

        vacate the district court’s judgment for Plaintiffs on their WIIN Act claim, as well as the

        resulting permanent injunction against the Corps. We leave it to the district court to decide

        whether the Corps’ chosen design can maintain the pool’s then-extant water-supply and

        recreational purposes.

                                                                      VACATED AND REMANDED

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        NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

               In connection with its authorization to deepen the harbor at the Port of Savannah,

        Georgia, Congress directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to either repair or replace,

        at the Corps’ election, the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam (“the Savannah River

        Dam”), which is upriver from the Port, in a manner that would allow shortnose and Atlantic

        sturgeon swimming upriver from the Port to bypass the dam. The Army Corps elected to

        replace the dam with a rock weir that would function as a dam but have no lock and that

        would allow the sturgeon to pass over it.

               This case presents the question of whether the Army Corps’ proposed weir satisfies

        Congress’s authorization, as contained in the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the

        Nation (“WIIN”) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, § 1319, 130 Stat. 1628, 1703 (2016).

        Particularly with respect to the construction of a replacement structure, Congress required

        that it “[be] able to maintain the pool for water supply and recreational activities, as in

        existence on the date of enactment of this Act.” Id. § 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis

        added). The inclusion of this language was the product of years of engagement between

        the State of South Carolina, the City of Augusta, Georgia, and the Georgia Ports Authority

        (hereinafter “the States”) and the Army Corps, effectively amounting to a resolution of

        their differences, especially over the potential disturbance of the existing water supply and

        recreational activities.

               The record shows that the Army Corps’ proposed weir will undisputedly be unable

        to maintain the pool behind the weir at the levels that existed when the WIIN Act was

        enacted. But the Corps argues that, under its posited interpretation of the Act, the water

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        level of the pool is irrelevant to the requirement to maintain a pool as in existence at the

        Act’s enactment because the proposed structure would still allow “for water supply and

        recreational activities” as they existed at the time of the Act’s enactment. As the Corps

        contends:

               It makes no difference textually if “the pool” is a slightly lower water
               elevation after Alternative 2-6d [the weir]; it remains “the pool” because it is
               still “a body of water forming above a dam” serving the same functions. A
               pool remains a pool when it continues to serve the same functions. . . .

               The States contend that the correct reading of the applicable provisions of the WIIN

        Act requires that the Army Corps maintain the pool as it existed on December 16, 2016,

        when the Act was enacted, and that such a pool was historically defined and understood by

        both the Army Corps and the States to be one maintained within the range of 114.5 to 115

        feet NGVD29 and that, in fact, the pool level on the Act’s enactment date was within that

        range at 114.76 feet NGVD29. (“NGVD29” refers to the “National Geodetic Vertical

        Datum of 1929,” which uses the “mean sea level” datum of 1929 as a constant reference

        point.) The States note that it is undisputed by the parties that the pool that would be

        created by the proposed weir could not achieve those levels but would be approximately

        3.5 feet lower. They contend that, for a pool that is 15 feet at its deepest, such a drop in

        water level would have a materially adverse effect on water supply and recreational

        activities upriver from the weir.

               The district court, in ruling on the States’ motion for an injunction, found as fact

        that the Army Corps’ proposed weir would not be able to maintain the pool as it existed on

        December 16, 2016, when the WIIN Act was enacted. Accordingly, the court entered a

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        permanent injunction prohibiting the Army Corps from “implementing Alternative 2-6d

        [the weir] . . . if the proposal does not ‘maintain the pool’ that was in existence [on] the

        date of the Act’s enactment, which was 114.76 feet NGVD29.”

               The majority opinion, however, reverses the district court and agrees with the

        Corps’ interpretation of the Act — that the Act does not require the maintenance of a

        specific pool, but rather authorizes any pool that functions to support the water supply and

        recreational activities as they existed at the time of the WIIN Act’s enactment. It also

        concludes that “had Congress intended to require a specific water level for the pool,” it

        would have done so, as it had in other parts of the WIIN Act and in other statutes. Supra

        at 14. Thus, the majority concludes, even though the weir would be unable to achieve the

        level of the pool that existed on the Act’s date of enactment, the weir nonetheless could

        comply with the Act’s requirements if it would still “support” the water supply and

        recreational activities.

               I submit that the majority’s interpretation ignores entirely the historical and statutory

        context of the WIIN Act, which makes clear what “maintain[ing] the pool” means.

        Moreover, the majority’s interpretation also sidesteps the natural reading of the statutory

        text based on grammar and word usage.

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                                                      I

               The historical, judicial, and legislative context of the WIIN Act is important to a

        proper understanding of its meaning and purpose. See Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,

        566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012). This is because the WIIN Act was the culmination of a long

        process of litigation, negotiations, and legislation among the States, the Army Corps, the

        relevant communities, and Congress.

               In 1932, South Carolina created the Savannah River Navigation Commission and

        empowered it to secure the land and easement rights for the United States’ construction of

        the Savannah River Dam. And as stated in the language of the easements that the

        Commission obtained, the rights received to erect and operate the Savannah River Dam

        defined the dam “with crest control gates so operated as to maintain a pool elevation at said

        dam of 114.5 feet mean sea level.”        (In 1973, the “mean sea level” data set was

        redenominated NGVD29.) After the Commission obtained those easements, it conveyed

        them to the United States by means of recorded deeds, each of which included the pool

        elevation requirements. Accordingly, when the Army Corps took title to the lands for the

        construction of the Savannah River Dam, it did so subject to the express condition that the

        pool be at 114.5 feet NGVD29.

               Then, in 1937, the Army Corps constructed the Savannah River Dam, which

        contained both a lock to enable navigation and gates to maintain the pool at the level

        specified. Over the years, the Army Corps maintained the pool by adjusting the gates

        throughout each day to keep the pool within its normal operating range, targeted to be

        between 114.5 and 115 feet NGVD29. While there were periods of water shortage when

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        the pool level fell to 113.2 feet or lower, those periods occurred less than 5 percent of the

        time during a sample period of four years from March 2015 to March 2019. And it is

        undisputed that the pool level was targeted at 114.5 to 115 feet NGVD29 and that the pool

        level on the date of the WIIN Act’s enactment was within that range, at 114.76 feet

        NGVD29.

               The WIIN Act was the product of a long period of negotiations and legal

        proceedings. Initially, in 2000, the Army Corps proposed removing the Savannah River

        Dam altogether, which provoked litigation initiated by the States.         But in the final

        Environmental Impact Statement for that proposal, the Corps stated that removing the dam

        was “infeasible” and “unacceptable due to the development that now occurs upstream

        along the pool created by the dam.” Thereafter, the Corps and the States entered into a

        settlement agreement that provided that the dam would remain in place, and that agreement

        was incorporated into the court’s order dismissing the case and ending the litigation.

               Thereafter, Congress enacted the Water Resources Reform and Development Act

        of 2014, which implemented the settlement, retaining the dam and authorizing a fish

        passage around the dam. But two years later, it enacted the WIIN Act, providing the Army

        Corps with authority to either repair or replace the dam, so long as the existing pool was

        maintained, which had been the States’ concern from the beginning.

               Moreover, during the Army Corps’ development of a plan to implement the WIIN

        Act by either repairing or replacing the Savannah River Dam, the pool was one of the main

        concerns, and it was always defined in terms of the water level, expressed in feet NGVD29,

        i.e., the level above mean sea level. Virtually all of the Corps’ documents relating to the

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        Savannah River Dam, the Corps’ maintenance of it, and the Corps’ adoption of the weir

        proposal describe the pool in terms of its elevation in feet NGVD29. For example, in its

        notice of the decision to implement Alternative 2-6d, the weir proposal, the Army Corps

        described the structure as “a 500 foot width weir with an average crest elevation of . . .

        109.0 feet NGVD29.” And in the Army Corps’ Supplemental Environmental Assessment,

        which the Corps recommended that the district court view as the “primary document in the

        administrative record that should guide the Court’s review and analysis of these claims,”

        the Army Corps acknowledged that “currently, under normal project operations, the pool

        upstream of [the Savannah River Dam] is maintained by Corps personnel between

        elevations 112.5 and 114.5 ft NGVD29 by adjusting the gate settings as specified in the

        1996 Savannah River Basin Water Control Manual. Typically, under low and average flow

        conditions, the target pool elevation is between 114 and 114.5 ft NGVD29 . . . .” The

        document explained that the pool was “managed by adjusting the gates at the dam . . .

        throughout the day to keep the pool within its normal operating range.” And when a test

        that was conducted to simulate the pool that would be created by the proposed weir failed,

        the U.S. Senators from South Carolina and Georgia wrote the Corps complaining about the

        proposed pool, referring to its level. The letter noted, “On February 15, 2019, the Corps

        halted the drawdown simulation after effects of the river drawdown resulted in instability

        of the Georgia riverbank in the residential neighborhood of Goodale Landing. In addition,

        the simulation resulted in numerous docks becoming useless for recreational activities

        while they sat in the mud given the reduced pool level. Clearly, these results do not reflect

        the intent of Congress.” (Emphasis added). The letter went on to note that “the Corps must

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        maintain the river conditions that were in place on the date of enactment” and that “the

        recent drawdown test has proven [that] Alternative 2-6d [the weir] does not appear to meet

        the requirement of the plain text of the legislation or the intent of Congress when it passed

        the WIIN Act.”

               Thus, over the years, the pool behind the Savannah River Dam has consistently been

        at the center of discussion, and all involved parties have always described the pool by its

        NGVD29 level.

               This is certainly a rational approach, if not the necessary one, when describing a

        pool. The level of a pool determines the area that it covers and thus its impact on its

        surroundings. Moreover, a measurement by reference to the NGVD29 level is based on a

        constant. The other most obvious way to describe a pool would be to describe it by its

        depth, as would be relevant for navigation. But the depth of a pool would not be as practical

        a measure for defining it, as that measurement might not remain constant. The bottom of

        a pool could change because of the aggregation of silt or the removal of silt from dredging.

        Thus, it is not surprising that the pool behind the Savannah River Dam has, over the years,

        consistently been defined by the elevation of its surface. And, more importantly, it has

        never been defined by its purpose or its impact on its surroundings.

               Not only is this context of the pool’s definition important to understanding whether

        a proposed replacement structure would “maintain” the pool within the meaning of the

        WIIN Act, but it also serves to show how the pool effects the Act’s purposes, whether they

        be navigation, power, water supply, or recreation. Lowering the pool level by only a few

        feet can materially alter the pool’s usefulness for those purposes. This was indeed

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        demonstrated in this case when the Army Corps conducted a test in February 2019 to

        simulate the effects of reducing the pool level to that which its proposed weir would create.

        The States claim that the test showed that reducing the pool level by only a few feet would

        be incompatible with the continued functioning of existing facilities for water supply and

        opportunities for recreational activities. As they describe the test:

               On or about February 9, 2019, the Corps began a simulated drawdown test
               in order to demonstrate the effects of Weir Alt 2-6d on pool level. The
               drawdown test was an unmitigated failure, and the Corps was forced to halt
               the drawdown simulation on February 15, 2019. The field test left hundreds
               of feet of shoreline for the 17-mile long pool dry, recreational facilities such
               as docks, rowing facilities, marina, boat houses were on mudflats and without
               water, and the drawdown threatened Augusta’s N. Max Hicks water intake.
               Pool levels during the field test were so low that subsidence of property and
               damage to structures was observed.

        The States support that description with numerous photographs taken by the Army Corps

        of the conditions created. The amici describe the situation similarly, noting that the

        simulation “so reduced the pool level as to expose mudflats and to cause a retaining wall

        to buckle in the absence of water holding it in place.”

               These observations confirm that evaluating whether the Army Corps’ proposed plan

        complies with the WIIN Act’s directive that the Army Corps maintain the pool as it existed

        on the date of the Act’s enactment necessitates reference to the pool’s NGVD29 level.

               In this context, the district court found as fact that, with the construction of the

        proposed weir, the pool behind the Savannah River Dam would not be maintained as it

        existed on December 16, 2016. That finding should end the debate. But unfortunately it

        hasn’t because the majority has ignored the relevant context.

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                                                      II
               Without reference to the WIIN Act’s context, the majority opinion concludes that

        the WIIN Act requires only a pool sufficient to serve as a water supply and for recreational

        activities, regardless of the pool’s level. It reaches this conclusion by two methods. First,

        it construes the text of the Act contrary to some basic principles of grammar and usage.

        Second, it characterizes the States’ position inaccurately, enabling it to conclude that their

        position would lead to absurdity. Neither method, however, is sound or fair.

               The operative language of the Act permits a replacement structure so long as it “is

        able to maintain the pool for water supply and recreational activities, as in existence on the

        date of enactment of this Act.” WIIN Act § 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I). Thus, the proposed weir

        must maintain “the pool,” which in turn is modified by two elements of the sentence: (1)

        the prepositional phrase “for water supply and recreational activities,” and (2) the clause

        “as in existence on the date of enactment of this Act.” The phrase “for water supply and

        recreational activities” describes the purpose of the pool, which is indicated by the

        preposition “for.” And the “as in existence” clause refers back to the pool that must be

        maintained. The fact that a comma precedes the “as in existence” clause indicates that the

        clause relates to an earlier element in the sentence, rather than to its immediate antecedent,

        which is the prepositional phrase. Grammatically, the comma here indicates omission, see

        U.S. Government Printing Office, Style Manual, 130 (2000) (noting the use of commas

        “[t]o indicate the omission of a word or words”), and thus supplants the suppressed

        conjunctive “and,” which, if included, would obviate the need for the comma and also

        relate back to “the pool.” To be sure, if the comma were omitted without including the

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        suppressed “and,” then the “as in existence” clause would modify the nearest antecedent,

        the prepositional phrase “for water supply and recreational activities.” This is the approach

        taken by the majority. But the grammatical function of the comma in the text here is instead

        very similar to that recognized by the Supreme Court in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County

        Employees Retirement Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1077 (2018), where the Court noted that the

        phrase, “The woman dressed to the nines carrying an umbrella, as shown in the picture,”

        means that “the picture” would be referring to “the woman” and not “an umbrella.” See

        also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts

        161 (2012).

               To avoid this grammatically grounded construction of the WIIN Act, the majority

        finds it necessary to add words to support its own construction. Under its construction, the

        Act means that the Corps must maintain the pool that supports water supply and

        recreational activities that were in existence on the date of the enactment. Supra at 12–13.

        This reading changes the obvious meaning of the statutory text by failing to recognize that

        the definite article in “the pool” anticipates a clause introduced by a restrictive term such

        as “that” or “as” — thus, “the pool that” or “the pool as in existence” on December 16,

        2016. To convert the text to one that supports its desired outcome, the majority adds “that

        supports” before “water supply and recreational activities” in order to change that clause

        from one that is descriptive to one that is restrictive. The word “for” in the text indicates

        description — “the pool for water supply and recreational activities” — whereas the phrase

        “that supports” converts description to a restriction of the meaning of “the pool.” That is

        a material change. Without such editing, the statutory text defines “the pool” as the one

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        “in existence” at enactment. Thus, both my reading and the majority’s treat the meaning

        of “pool” to be restricted. But whereas my reading adheres to the text of the statute as

        written, such that “the pool” that must be maintained is the pool as in existence at the Act’s

        enactment (i.e., having a certain water level), the majority refuses to take the text as is, and

        instead adds words to derive an entirely different meaning — that the Corps is obliged

        merely to maintain a pool that supports use as a water supply and recreational area. This

        is an unnatural twisting of the meaning of the statute, effected only by adding words to the

        language that Congress chose to express its intent.

               The majority also argues that if the “as in existence” clause modifies “the pool,”

        then the prepositional phrase “for water supply and recreational activities” would provide

        no service and would be mere surplusage. This conclusion, however, overlooks the natural

        descriptive function of the prepositional phrase that distinguishes the function of “the pool”

        in this subsection from the function of “the pool” in the previous subsection. If the

        Army Corps had elected to “repair” the Savannah River Dam, as authorized by

        § 1319(c)(1)(A)(i), it would have had to maintain the pool “for navigation, water supply,

        and recreational activities” (emphasis added), which would indicate that “the pool” should

        be maintained not only at the level as in existence when the Act was enacted but perhaps

        also at a depth that would be consistent with “navigation.” But in electing to replace the

        Savannah River Dam, the Army Corps was not required to consider navigational uses, but

        only water supply and recreational activities.

               The prepositional phrase in each alternative thus describes the purpose of the pool,

        but not its existential properties. The language describing its existential properties requires

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        that the structure be able to maintain the pool as it existed on the date of the Act’s

        enactment.

               In addition to sidestepping applicable rules of grammar and word usage, the

        majority also attacks the States’ interpretation by attributing to both the district court and

        the States an argument that it finds absurd — that the WIIN Act requires that the Army

        Corps maintain the pool at “precisely” 114.76 feet NGVD29, the level that existed on the

        date of the WIIN Act’s enactment. But this attribution is unfair. First, the district court

        prohibited construction of the weir because it did “not ‘maintain the pool’ that was in

        existence on the date of the Act’s enactment, which was 114.76 feet NGVD29.” The level

        identified in the order was descriptive of the level at the time of enactment and fell within

        the targeted range at which the Army Corps was maintaining the pool. Indeed, the Corps

        was quite precise in seeking to adjust the pool’s level throughout each day, targeting 114.5

        to 115 feet NGVD29. Consistent with this, the court’s directive was to maintain the pool

        as it was in existence earlier, not at a level defined to the hundredth of a foot.

               Moreover, it is clear that the States do not advocate reading the WIIN Act in the

        way that the majority attributes to them — that the Act mandates the maintenance of a

        precise, unachievable level of 114.76 feet NGVD29.            Indeed, the States call this a

        “strategically-set up strawman” argument attributed to it by the Corps. They note that the

        word “precisely” is not in the statute. Rather, they argue that the pool had to be maintained

        as the Corps had maintained it over the years, including on the date of the WIIN Act’s

        enactment. And it was undisputed that the Corps maintained the pool by targeting 114.5

        to 115 feet NGVD29 and that the level at the date of enactment fell within that range.

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               Finally, the States note that the statutory text requires a “structure” “that is able to

        maintain” the pool as it existed on the WIIN Act’s enactment date. In short, they point out

        that the structure must have the capacity to achieve the 114.76 foot NGVD29 level, as the

        statute requires, not that the pool be maintained at the precise level. By itself, this

        observation by the States fully responds to the majority’s absurdity argument.

                                               *      *       *

               In sum, the weir proposed by the Army Corps would not be able to maintain the

        pool at the level as it existed under the Army Corps’ own maintenance of the Savannah

        River Dam on the date that the WIIN Act was enacted, and the Corps concedes this.

        Therefore, the weir would not comply with the Act’s clear requirement. The Corps’

        defense is a rationalization that the weir would nonetheless serve the statutory purposes of

        the pool. This argument, however, does not absolve the Corps’ noncompliance.

               Also, I would note that at oral argument, the Army Corps did not dispute that it

        could modify the plans of the proposed weir so that the pool would remain at the preexisting

        level, and I believe that it should do so. Much anxiety and future litigation could thereby

        be avoided.

               I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

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