Court Opinion

ID: 9540253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:14:05.416956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:47.512121
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion MORAN, J. I cannot believe that the legislature intended that a probationary teacher’s employment could be terminated by a school board for the nebulous reason given the appellant. Section 24-11 of chapter 122, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1961, provides that the probationary teacher is entitled to a specific reason for his dismissal. A reason that is not specific is equivalent to no reason. The reason given for appellant’s discharge, in my opinion, was not only not specific but was vague, uncertain and indistinct. I challenge anyone reading this record or the majority opinion to know why appellant was discharged. He was told by letter that his certificate did not “meet the requirements of the school board for the fulfillment of your present position.” One could not know the reason appellant was being discharged unless he knew what the requirements of the school district were for appellant’s present position. Were the requirements in writing? Were there few or many? If there were many, should not the school board be required to point out which of their many requirements his certificate did not comply with? In Donahoo v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 303, 413 Ill 422, 109 NE2d 787, our Supreme Court said at 426: “. . . It is our opinion that the provision for the giving of the specific reason for dismissal in said section 24-2 is mandatory and that such notice, containing no reason, fails to comply with the statute. “In this case, while the notice was in the negative, ‘your school contract . . . will not be renewed,’ it must be construed as a dismissal, but it is entirely devoid of any reason therefor, specific or otherwise. There are many reasons why the legislature included the provision in section 24-2 providing for reasons for dismissal in writing. A board would not so readily dismiss when its reasons therefor will be submitted to the bar of public opinion. Such a statement would give the teacher a chance to know his weaknesses and try to correct. Arbitrary dismissal without a reason assigned therefor might tend to undermine morale of the other members of the teaching staff. “The notice of dismissal was insufficient in that no specific reason therefor was assigned, as required by the statute, and upon the completion of the second term plaintiff acquired contractual continued service.” In my opinion, the language of Donahoo is pertinent to the present case because the reason given for appellant’s discharge was so vague and indefinite as to constitute no reason. In Hutchison v. Board of Education of Greenfield Community Unit School Dist. No. 10, 32 Ill App2d 247, 177 NE2d 420, the teacher was served a statement that he was being discharged for “failure to effectively perform and carry out your instructional duties.” The court in that case said at page 250: “. . . We think such a vague accusation was wholly insufficient to qualify as a specific charge within the meaning of the Tenure Law. If plaintiff was being dismissed because he refused or neglected to perform certain duties, then he had a right to be informed specifically as to the particular duties alleged to have been breached. Furthermore, if the charges related to a cause which was remediable, then plaintiff should have been given an opportunity to remedy such cause. If plaintiff was not entitled to specific information as to wherein he had failed as a teacher, then the provisions concerning remediable causes would be meaningless.” In my opinion, the notice given in Hutchison was more specific than that given to Wade. Assuming that there was a requirement of the school board which Wade’s certificate did not comply with, what if that requirement was as vague as “failure to effectively perform and carry out your instructional duties?”