Court Opinion

ID: 9958459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 14:13:47.349991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:22.868300
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Raphael and Senior Judge Petty
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Richmond, Virginia

              DAVID ALEXANDER HARRIS
                                                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1653-22-2                                  JUDGE STUART A. RAPHAEL
                                                                                 APRIL 9, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
                                               L. A. Harris, Jr., Judge

                               Stephen A. Mutnick (Winslow, McCurry & MacCormac, PLLC, on
                               brief), for appellant.

                               Ken J. Baldassari, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                               Attorney General; Lucille M. Wall, Assistant Attorney General, on
                               brief), for appellee.

                     David Alexander Harris was convicted of multiple counts of possession of controlled

              substances; two counts of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II controlled

              substance, third offense, possession of more than one ounce of marijuana, possession of a

              Schedule III controlled substance, and two firearms charges. Harris asserts that the trial court

              erred in admitting incoming text messages recovered from his two cellphones and in declining to

              admit his co-defendant’s guilty plea. He also claims that the evidence failed to support his

              convictions. We find that these claims lack merit. Clear Virginia precedent permits the

              admission of statements made to a defendant to provide context for his responses. The

              co-defendant’s guilty plea did not fall into one of the few exceptions to the general rule that a

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
co-defendant’s guilty plea is inadmissible. And the evidence sufficed to sustain Harris’s

convictions. So we affirm the judgment.

                                           BACKGROUND1

       On May 28, 2021, Detective Ritchie of the Henrico County Police Department was

surveilling a local hotel as part of a drug interdiction task force. Observing the hotel from an

adjacent gas station, Ritchie watched an individual enter and exit several rooms and then walk to

the gas station, where he briefly entered the back seat of a car before moving to the front seat.

The vehicle left the gas station, and Ritchie radioed another officer to stop it.

       Officer Chapman of the Henrico County Police Department stopped the vehicle for

failing to display a front license plate. Harris was the driver, and Erica Hughes sat in the

passenger seat. While writing a citation for Harris, Chapman saw both Harris and Hughes on

their cellphones and noted that Harris had two phones, one red and the other dark orange.

Ritchie and another officer joined Chapman at the traffic stop, and Ritchie observed that Hughes

was “suspiciously manipulating her groin area and her crotch . . . like she was making a motion

of placing something into it.”

       A Richmond Police Department K-9 unit arrived and conducted a check of the vehicle

while Harris and Hughes were still inside. The dog alerted on the “open door on the passenger

side to the center console of the vehicle,” as well as on “the driver’s side rear passenger door and

underneath the vehicle.” The police directed Harris to exit the car and placed him in handcuffs.

When asked whether he had “anything illegal” in the vehicle, Harris replied “just weed.” In the

car’s center console, Chapman found a brown bag containing 41 suboxone strips,2 30 grams of

       1
         We review the evidence “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the
prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)).
       2
           Suboxone is a Schedule III controlled substance. Code § 54.1-3450.
                                                -2-
cocaine, and 42 grams (or 1.5 ounces) of marijuana. Under the bag, police found a “firearm and

then a folded lottery ticket with a small amount of marijuana” and another bag of marijuana

labeled “sour diesel.” The officers recovered a black digital scale and a stack of blank “lotto

tickets” from the driver’s side door, as well as three cellphones from the center console, two of

which belonged to Harris.

       During a consent search of Harris’s person, officers found $3,160 in cash, “folded over

and wrapped in a rubber band,” stowed in a “little satchel.” After being removed from the

vehicle, Hughes took out and turned over to police three “baggies” of powder that she had been

hiding in “[h]er crotch area, inside her pants.” One baggy had 25 grams of cocaine, another had

17 grams of cocaine, and the third had 20 grams of heroin and fentanyl.3

       A forensic examination of the suboxone strips found one latent fingerprint belonging to

Harris and three belonging to Hughes. The Department of Forensic Science analyzed Harris’s

cellphones, finding various text messages and a photograph of a handgun. In one text, a number

associated with “Aaron” texted Harris, “Ya I’ll do 40 worth 25 and 15 powder.” Harris

responded, “Ok 20min.” In another exchange, Harris asked a person identified as “Tiffany,”

“Did u like the smoke”? Tiffany replied “yesss that shit was gasss” and later texted Harris, “i

need some weeed,” to which Harris responded, “How much money u got”?

       Hughes pleaded guilty to possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance and

possession of a firearm while in possession of a controlled substance.

       Harris pleaded not guilty to the charges. In the jury trial that followed, Harris was

convicted of

       3
        Heroin is a Schedule I controlled substance. Code § 54.1-3446. Cocaine and fentanyl
are Schedule II controlled substances. Code § 54.1-3448.
                                              -3-
       •       two counts of possessing with the intent to distribute a Schedule I or II controlled
               substance, third offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C) (one each for
               possession of cocaine and heroin);

       •       one count of possession of a Schedule III controlled substance, suboxone, in
               violation of Code § 18.2-250;

       •       one count of possession of more than one ounce but less than five pounds of
               marijuana, in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1;

       •       one count of possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance while
               possessing a firearm on or about his person, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(B);
               and

       •       one count of possession of a firearm after being convicted of a non-violent felony
               within the past ten years, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.

The trial court sentenced Harris to 90 years and 6 months of incarceration with 66 years and 6

months suspended, for an active sentence of 24 years. Harris noted a timely appeal.

                                             ANALYSIS

       Harris asserts that the trial court erred by admitting the incoming text messages and by

refusing to admit Hughes’s guilty plea for the charges arising from the same incident. He also

claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession of the cocaine, heroin, and firearm. We

consider these claims in turn.

        A. Text Messages (Assignment of Error I)

       Harris concedes that his responses to the incoming text messages were admissible as

party admissions. See Va. R. Evid. 2:803(0)(A). But he argues that the trial court should have

excluded the incoming text messages themselves as hearsay. “The admissibility of evidence is

within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the

absence of an abuse of discretion.” Barnes v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 619, 626 (2000)

(quoting Crews v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 115, 118 (1994)). But “[t]he abuse-of-discretion

standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal

                                                -4-
conclusions.” Helmick Fam. Farm, LLC v. Comm’r of Highways, 297 Va. 777, 794 (2019)

(quoting Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260 (2008)).

        Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial

or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Va. R. Evid. 2:801(c).

“Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls within an exception.” Chenevert v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 47, 54 (2020). But “[i]f a statement is offered for any purpose

other than to prove the truth or falsity of the contents of the statement, . . . it is not objectionable

as hearsay.” Hamm v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 150, 156 (1993).

        The text messages at issue were displayed in 188 PowerPoint slides in Commonwealth’s

Exhibit 12. Before trial, Harris objected to the admission of all incoming text messages, arguing

that they were all hearsay. The Commonwealth countered that the messages were not hearsay

because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to show Harris’s

“intent.” Harris responded that the messages were all being offered for their truth. The trial

court overruled his objection and admitted the incoming text messages.

        We have squarely held that out-of-court statements are not hearsay when offered to

provide context for the defendant’s admissions in response. Jones v. Commonwealth, 71

Va. App. 597, 608 (2020). In Jones, the trial court admitted the recording of a conversation

between the victim, the victim’s mother, and the defendant. Id. at 602. During the recording, the

victim told the defendant that “[y]ou was like kissing on me and stuff . . . and like pulled down

my shirt and stuff and like messed with my privates.” Id. at 603. In response, the defendant

explained his version of events but “acknowledged that his conduct went ‘too far,’ and he

apologized repeatedly.” Id. at 604. We held that the victim’s statements on the recording were

not hearsay because they were offered not for their truth but as “[a] statement offered to provide

                                                  -5-
context to an admission.” Id. at 605 (quoting Swain v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 555, 560

(1998)).

        Similarly, we held in Bennett v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 475 (2018), that the audio

recording of the defendant’s telephone call with a confidential informant was admissible to show

how the defendant reacted when the informant said he wanted to buy “funny sticks,” and “a

whole 3.5,” or an “eight ball” of cocaine. Id. at 490. “[T]he informant’s statements were not

offered for the literal truth of whether he wanted the specified drugs,” so they were not hearsay.

Id. at 490-91. And in Swain, we held that a witness’s response to the defendant’s asking “what

do you want” was not admitted for the literal truth that she wanted “a twenty” of cocaine, but to

provide context that the defendant’s inquiry was an offer to sell drugs. 28 Va. App. at 559.

“[W]ords offered solely to give context to party admissions are not hearsay and are admissible.”

Id. at 560.

        Likewise, the incoming text messages to Harris’s phone were admissible to provide

context for his admissions. Without the incoming messages, Harris’s outgoing messages would

lack context and be incomprehensible. As the Commonwealth aptly notes, “[i]t is immaterial

whether ‘Aaron’ wanted to purchase drugs when he messaged Harris on May 26, 2021, nor is

Harris charged with providing ‘Aaron’ drugs on that date.” Instead, “Aaron’s” message shows

Harris’s reply, “Ok how you want it,” for what it is—an offer to sell drugs. Thus, the trial court

did not err in admitting the text messages.4

        Harris argues that he did not respond to several of the incoming text messages, so they

could not have provided context for any response. He also argues that each conversation should

        4
         Because Jones, Bennett, and Swain control the question presented here, we decline
Harris’s invitation to follow authorities in other jurisdictions that concluded that incoming text
messages were hearsay because they were offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
                                                 -6-
be analyzed “individually” to determine whether it involved hearsay. Both points resonate with

us.

       But Harris defaulted those arguments by failing to raise them below when opposing the

admission of the text messages. The contemporaneous-objection requirement demands that the

party asserting error state the objection “with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling.”

Rule 5A:18. “Not just any objection will do. It must be both specific and timely — so that the

trial judge would know the particular point being made in time to do something about it.”

Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019) (quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58

Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)).

               When making an objection, “the parties must inform the [trial]
               court of the precise points of objection in the minds of counsel,”
               and make the objection “at a point in the proceeding when the trial
               court is in a position . . . to consider the asserted error [and] rectify
               the effect of the asserted error.”

Moison v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Oct. 19, 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting

Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 258, 265 (2014)). By failing to raise those particular points

below, Harris has forfeited them.

        B. Hughes’s Guilty Plea (Assignment of Error II)

       Harris next assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to admit evidence of Hughes’s guilty

plea. While acknowledging that possession of controlled substances can be joint, Harris argues

that Hughes’s guilty plea was relevant to show that Hughes had exclusive possession of the

drugs found on her person.

       “[T]he admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and we will not

reject the decision of the trial court unless we find an abuse of discretion.” Chenevert, 72

Va. App. at 53 (alteration in original) (quoting Alvarez Saucedo v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App.

31, 44 (2019)). When reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we do not substitute our judgment

                                                 -7-
for the trial court’s but consider “only whether the record fairly supports the trial court’s action.”

Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009).

       Generally, “evidence . . . that an accomplice has pleaded guilty is inadmissible.” Lewis v.

Commonwealth, 211 Va. 80, 82 (1970). Harris argues that a co-defendant’s guilty plea is

admissible when the defendant himself seeks to introduce it. He relies on Parker v.

Commonwealth, No. 1548-94-1, 1995 Va. App. LEXIS 833 (Nov. 14, 1995),5 but Parker does

not stand for the broad rule that Harris advocates.

       The panel in Parker held simply that questions about two other defendants’ guilty pleas

were relevant to the credibility of the witness—the defendant’s accomplice in the robbery at

issue. Id., slip op. at 3-5, 1995 Va. App. LEXIS 833, at *4-5. The defendant had

cross-examined the accomplice about his plea agreement “to show that [the accomplice] had a

reason to lie, thereby challenging his credibility.” Id. at 4, 1995 Va. App. LEXIS 833, at *5.

That line of questioning suggested that the accomplice “was testifying on behalf of the

Commonwealth as a part of a deal . . . [to] avoid a possible death sentence.” Id. We said that the

trial court properly allowed the Commonwealth to rehabilitate the accomplice by questioning

him about a guilty plea by the gunman in the same robbery. Id. at 3-5, 1995 Va. App. LEXIS

833, at *4-5. Those questions were intended to show that “the gunman[] already had been

convicted of the charge of capital murder and, therefore, the plea agreement obtained by [the

accomplice] was not an inducement for [him] to testify against [the defendant].” Id. at 4, 1995

Va. App. LEXIS 833, at *5. The limited exception at issue in Parker has no bearing here

because Hughes’s guilty plea was not offered to impeach or rehabilitate any witness.

       5
         Unpublished opinions may be cited “as informative, but will not be received as binding
authority.” Rule 5A:1(f).
                                             -8-
       To be sure, limited exceptions exist to the rule barring the admission of a co-defendant’s

confession. See United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Admissibility of

the plea turns on the purpose for which it is offered. When that purpose is to further the jury’s

difficult task of evaluating credibility, it is relevant and admissible without reference to the

identity of the offering party.”). For instance, “evidence that a crime was actually committed by

someone other than the accused is admissible for the purpose of generating a reasonable doubt of

the guilt of the accused.” Oliva v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 523, 526 (1995) (quoting Weller

v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 886, 890 (1993)).

       But Hughes’s pleading guilty to possession did not exonerate Harris because “[w]e have

[long] held that possession of a drug need not be exclusive, but may instead be joint.” Archer v.

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 416, 418 (1983). Here, Harris texted Hughes during the traffic stop to

“[f]igure out how to put it into [her] psnts [sic].” Hughes was then found with baggies of drugs

in her pants. Those facts supported a finding that Harris and Hughes jointly possessed the drugs.

The fact that Harris pleaded guilty did not make it “more probable,” Va. R. Evid. 2:401, that her

possession was exclusive, rather than joint. So the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

concluding that Hughes’s guilty plea was not relevant, id., and therefore “not admissible,” Va. R.

Evid. 2:402(a).

        C. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Assignments of Error III, IV, and V)

       Finally, Harris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. In

conducting a sufficiency review, we presume that the trial court’s judgment is correct and will

not set it aside unless that judgment is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”

McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth,

296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “The relevant issue on appeal is, ‘upon review of the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

                                                 -9-
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Lambert v. Commonwealth, 298

Va. 510, 515 (2020) (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)).

               1. Possession of cocaine and heroin

       Harris was convicted of two violations of Code § 18.2-248(C), which prohibits the

possession of a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute it.

Harris conceded at trial that the Commonwealth had offered enough circumstantial evidence to

show his intent to distribute. On appeal he argues only that the trial court erred when it found

“evidence sufficient to show possession” of cocaine and heroin. (Emphasis added.) So we

examine only whether the evidence sufficed to prove Harris’s possession of those drugs.

       We held in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 92 (2022), that a “‘conviction for the

unlawful possession of [contraband] can be supported exclusively by evidence of constructive

possession,’ whether sole or joint.” Id. at 102 (alteration in original) (quoting Smallwood v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 625, 630 (2009)). “Constructive possession may be established by

‘evidence of acts, statements, or conduct by the defendant or other facts and circumstances

proving that the defendant was aware of the presence and character of the [contraband] and that

the [contraband] was subject to his dominion and control.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting

Smallwood, 278 Va. at 630).

       The record contains ample evidence from which the jury could find that Harris

constructively possessed the controlled substances found in his vehicle and on Hughes’s person.

The substances were present in the vehicle that belonged to Harris and that he was driving at the

time of the stop. Police found 30 grams of cocaine in the vehicle’s center console. The cocaine

was mixed in with property belonging to Harris, including the marijuana that he told police was

in the vehicle. And Harris’s fingerprint was on one of the suboxone strips that was also found in

the center console.

                                                - 10 -
       As for the heroin and cocaine that Hughes was hiding in her pants, we disagree with

Harris’s claim that those drugs “were in the exclusive, actual possession of Hughes.” (Emphasis

added.) As already noted, “criminal drug possession” can be “either sole or joint.” Bagley v.

Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 27 (2021) (citing Smallwood, 278 Va. at 629-30). The evidence

supported the jury’s finding that Harris constructively possessed the drugs surrendered by

Hughes. During the traffic stop, Harris texted Hughes to stash the drugs in her pants and she

obliged. Police then observed Hughes moving as if putting something in her pants. She was

then found to have concealed the drugs there. As a result, the jury could properly conclude that

Harris knew of the drugs in Hughes’s possession, understood their nature, and exercised

dominion and control over them despite their being in Hughes’s physical custody.

               2. Possession of the firearm

       Harris was also convicted of (i) possessing a firearm while possessing a controlled

substance, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(B), and (ii) possessing a firearm after having

previously been convicted of a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. Code § 18.2-308.4(B)

“requires the simultaneous actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance and actual

or constructive possession of a firearm on or about the person.” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56

Va. App. 50, 64 (2010). To sustain a conviction under § 18.2-308.4(B), the Commonwealth

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed controlled substances and

either “actually possessed the firearm ‘on . . . his person’; or that the defendant was aware of

both the presence and character of the firearm, that the firearm was within the accused’s

dominion and control, and that the firearm was readily accessible for prompt and immediate

use.” Id. at 64-65 (quoting Code § 18.2-308.4(B)). Code § 18.2-308.2 “only requires the

Commonwealth to prove, as elements of the crime, that the accused is a convicted felon and that

he or she possessed an object which was made with the purpose to expel a projectile by

                                               - 11 -
gunpowder or other explosion.” Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 312, 322 (2001) (en

banc), aff’d 263 Va. 573 (2002).

       The record amply established that Harris knowingly possessed a firearm after being

convicted of a felony. Harris stipulated to his prior felony drug distribution convictions, and the

trial court admitted into evidence a certificate of analysis showing that the handgun recovered

from the vehicle was a functional firearm. The firearm was found in the center console next to

Harris. Also present in the center console alongside the handgun were Harris’s two cellphones

and the marijuana that he admitted was his. The same firearm was also seen in photographs

recovered from Harris’s phone. And Harris had sent the photographs to another person,

admitting that the gun was a “Beretta nine.” Thus, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that

Harris was aware of the character and the presence of the firearm in his vehicle, exercised

dominion and control over it, and had ready access to it.

                                           CONCLUSION

       In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when rendering its evidentiary rulings,

and the evidence supported Harris’s multiple convictions.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

                                               - 12 -