Court Opinion

ID: 9891377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 15:01:10.613519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:04.887437
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 23-1694
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                                 Allen Brooks, Jr.

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
               for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau
                                  ____________

                           Submitted: August 21, 2023
                             Filed: October 18, 2023
                                  [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                         ____________

PER CURIAM

       Allen Brooks, Jr., was charged with violating the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3), after he failed to notify
local law enforcement in Missouri within three days of moving into the jurisdiction.
Brooks entered a conditional guilty plea, and the district court 1 sentenced him to 33
months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a 20-year term of supervised release.

       Prior to pleading guilty, Brooks moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
(1) SORNA impermissibly delegates legislative authority to the Attorney General
when it authorizes him to decide whether the statute applies to individuals convicted
of a sex offense prior to its enactment; and, (2) SORNA is an improper exercise of
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1 (Legislative Power
Vested in Congress); id. at § 8, cl. 3 (Regulation of Commerce). Brooks concedes
that his arguments are barred by existing precedent and the district court denied the
motion. Brooks appeals raising the same grounds, which we review de novo. See
United States v. Anderson, 771 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2014) (we review de
novo a defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of a statute and the denial of a
motion to dismiss the indictment).

       In Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019), a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that SORNA’s limited delegation of authority
as applied to pre-Act offenders was not impermissible. See also United States v.
Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2013) (“We conclude that SORNA provides the
Attorney General with an intelligible principle, and is a valid delegation of
legislative authority.”). In United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 921-22 (8th Cir.
2008), we held SORNA’s criminal penalties are a valid exercise of the Commerce
Clause. See also Anderson, 771 F.3d at 1069-71.

      We are bound by these precedents, and we affirm.
                     ______________________________

      1
       The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Missouri.
                                   -2-