Court Opinion

ID: 9897317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:05.017886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.178642
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                            Aug 11 2023, 8:49 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
      Robert E. Duff                                             Ann C. Coriden
      Indiana Consumer Law Group                                 Ann Coriden Law, LLC
      Fishers, Indiana                                           Columbus, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      L.T. Garrett,                                              August 11, 2023
      Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Plaintiff,                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                 22A-CT-2583
              v.                                                 Appeal from the
                                                                 Bartholomew Circuit Court
      Nissan of Lafayette, LLC,                                  The Honorable
      Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Defendant.                        Kelly S. Benjamin, Judge
                                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                 03C01-1911-CT-6787

                                      Opinion by Judge Foley
                              Chief Judge Altice and Judge May concur.

      Foley, Judge.

[1]   L.T. Garrett (“Garrett”) bought a truck from Nissan of Lafayette, LLC (“the

      Dealership”). He alleges that the Dealership lied to him when it informed him

      that the truck had a replacement engine, and that the replacement engine was

      covered by a two-year warranty issued by the manufacturer. After the engine

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023                           Page 1 of 14
      failed, and the Dealership refused to replace it, Garrett filed a complaint in the

      Bartholomew Circuit Court asserting an array of claims: several types of fraud

      and a violation of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (“IDCSA”). The

      trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Dealership. 1 Garrett

      appeals, and the Dealership filed a cross-appeal contending that the trial court

      erred when it declined to rule that a set of requests for admission should be

      deemed admitted. We reject the cross-appeal and agree with Garrett. The trial

      court is reversed, and the case is remanded for additional proceedings.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Garrett’s accounting of the salient facts—drawn from his complaint and

      affidavit—is as follows: 2 in April of 2018 Garrett noticed a 2008 Ford F-250

      truck for sale and contacted the Dealership to inquire. Over the phone, a

      salesperson indicated that the truck had a replacement engine, and that the

      engine was subject to a warranty issued by the engine manufacturer and good

      for two years. Garrett went to the Dealership the following day, and a

      representative repeated the promises about the warranty for the engine, though

      1
       Though all four counts of the complaint were targeted by the motion, and the trial court ultimately
      dismissed them all, the motion was styled as seeking “partial” summary judgment. Appellant’s App. Vol. II
      p. 70. The Dealership maintains that it believes the question of whether it might recover attorney’s fees from
      Garrett is a live question, though it is not a question before us today. We omit the word “partial” from our
      subsequent discussion.
      2
       We resolve any doubts about facts in favor of the non-moving party when we review a summary judgment.
      See, e.g., Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023                               Page 2 of 14
      the representative knew those claims to be false. 3 The warranty had, in fact,

      expired.

[3]   Garrett was provided with an invoice demonstrating that the engine had been

      replaced, as well as a pamphlet which the Dealership representative informed

      Garrett was a copy of the warranty. In fact, the pamphlet was “a blank

      warranty brochure” which had not been completed and did not indicate that the

      engine was under warranty. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 17–18. Garrett

      bought the truck. Garrett relied upon the representations made by the

      Dealership and later averred that the “engine warranty was important” to him

      and also a “major selling point for” the truck. Id. at 153. Approximately

      fourteen months later, the truck suffered what the record describes only as

      “catastrophic engine failure.” Id. at 21. 4 Garrett sought an engine repair via the

      manufacturer’s warranty but learned that there was no warranty. He asked the

      Dealership to pay for the repairs; it refused.

[4]   On November 28, 2019, 5 Garrett filed his complaint. It asserted four counts: (1)

      fraud via material misrepresentation; (2) fraud via material omission; (3)

      constructive fraud; and (4) violation of the IDCSA. After a failed motion for

      judgment on the pleadings, 6 discovery commenced. The trial court issued a

      3
          The Dealership denies that any such representations were made.
      4
          There do not appear to be any further details available.
      5
          The complaint was amended on March 19, 2020, and we describe it herein with reference to its final form.
      6
          The gravamen of this motion was that the purchase agreement contained a disclaimer of all warranties.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023                              Page 3 of 14
      scheduling order on April 9, 2021, which set the deadline for all discovery as

      November 7, 2021: a Sunday. On October 8, 2021, precisely thirty days before

      the discovery deadline, the Dealership served discovery requests, including

      requests for admission (“RFA”) on Garrett. The Dealership asked Garrett to

      admit: (1) that it made no representations regarding the truck having a

      warranty; 7 (2) that it was unreasonable for Garrett to believe that there was such

      a warranty; (3) that Garrett was offered the option to purchase a warranty; (4)

      that he declined that offer; and (5) that the written purchase agreement

      represented the complete terms of the sale.

[5]   Garrett’s counsel sent an email to the Dealership’s counsel on the day the

      discovery requests were served. The email read in pertinent part:

                 Also, the written discovery you served today is untimely because
                 it is due after the discovery completion date. I haven’t decided
                 how Plaintiff[ 8] intends to respond to it—Plaintiff might be
                 willing to agree to respond if Defendant[ 9] agrees to respond to
                 additional written discovery from Defendant—but Plaintiff
                 reserves the right to object to it on the basis it is not timely.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 114. The email did not indicate why Garrett’s

      counsel believed the requests to be untimely despite the fact that he had thirty

      7
       Below, Garrett was careful to draw the distinction between a warranty applying to the truck and a separate
      warranty applying only to the engine. Appellant’s Br. p. 6.
      8
          Garrett was the plaintiff below.
      9
          The Dealership was the defendant below.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023                             Page 4 of 14
      days within which to respond, and the final day was precisely the deadline

      imposed for discovery exchange by the trial court.

[6]   The Dealership’s response came three days later via email from its counsel:

      “The parties do not share in the opinion as to whether the written discovery

      was timely served by Defendant. If your client does not intend to respond to it,

      we should probably discuss how best to address that issue.” Id. at 115. Garrett

      never responded to the discovery requests. At a telephonic conference on

      November 22, 2021, attorneys for both parties apparently discussed the

      discovery requests but reached no resolution.

[7]   Then, approximately eight months later, on June 8, 2022, the Dealership filed

      its motion for summary judgment, 10 designating the pleadings and a copy of the

      RFA. The motion relied significantly upon the RFA, with the Dealership

      treating the requests as being deemed admitted by operation of rule. In

      response, Garrett filed a “Verified Motion to Declare Requests for Admission

      Untimely, Answered[,] or, in the Alternative, to Withdraw the Admissions.”

      Id. at 112.

[8]   The trial court ruled that the email sent by Garrett’s counsel on the date of

      service of the discovery requests constituted a timely objection, and, therefore,

      the RFA were not deemed admitted. Four days later, on August 15, 2022, the

      trial court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The trial court

      10
           Relying on the admissions, the motion sought judgment on the three fraud counts.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023                     Page 5 of 14
granted summary judgment to the Dealership on all of Garrett’s claims.

Crucial to its decision were the following findings:

           8. In regard to the fraud claims, it is not reasonable that Garrett
           relied solely on a statement made by Lidester[ 11] to him regarding
           a Jasper[ 12] warranty. Garrett was also given documentation on
           April 5 regarding both when the Jasper long block engine was put
           in the F-250 (February 2, 2017), and an “unfilled out” document
           regarding a Jasper Limited Nationwide Transferable Warranty.
           Garrett purchased the F-250 on April 6 and had at least one full
           day to review those documents, which are not lengthy. There is
           no indication within the Jasper Warranty document that
           identifies an F-250 with a Jasper long block engine will be
           covered by a two-year unlimited mileage warranty. In addition,
           at a minimum under the "Important Product, Warranty
           Information,” the “mileage at which installed" (pertaining to the
           engine) is blank as is the stock and production numbers. There is
           nothing in writing to indicate that the F-250 was covered under
           any warranty. There is nothing in the designated evidence in this
           case to suggest the engine was actually covered by a warranty.
           There was nothing written in the Jasper Warranty document to
           induce someone to believe that an actual engine was covered. It’s
           a blank document. It’s unclear whether Garrett even read the
           document before purchasing the F-250, but he did have a full day
           to review it and inquire about it, if he had so chosen.

           9. “The person relying on the representations is bound to use
           ordinary care and diligence to guard against fraud; however, the
           requirement of reasonable prudence in business transactions is
           not carried to the extent that the law will ignore an intentional
           fraud practiced on the unwary. A person has a right to rely upon

11
     “Lidester” refers to the Dealership employee who sold Garrett the truck.
12
     “Jasper” refers to the engine manufacturer.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023             Page 6 of 14
              representations where the exercise of reasonable prudence does not dictate
              otherwise. Plymale v Upright, 419 N.E.2d 756, 762–63 (Ind. Ct.
              App. 1981) [ ] [(]citing [ ]Voorhees v. Cragun (1916), 61 Ind. App.
              690, 112 N.E. 826. [ ] ([e]mphasis added [ ])[.] Garrett did not
              exercise reasonable prudence in this situation.

              10. Looking to the Deceptive Consumer Sale Act claim,
              Defendant disclaimed any and all warranties in the purchase
              agreement, told Garrett that the engine on the ten-year-old F-250
              had been rebuilt, gave Garrett documentation regarding the
              rebuilt engine, and included a blank warranty brochure.
              Assuming Lidester informed Garrett that there was a two-year
              unlimited Jasper warranty from date of sale, there’s no
              designation of evidence to show the statement was made as part
              of a scheme or to defraud or mislead. Lidester also gave Garrett
              all the information he had regarding the engine and Jasper
              warranty information, with nothing to show that the F-250
              engine was actually covered by a Jasper warranty. It was not
              reasonable for Garrett to rely on Lidester’s representations about
              the Jasper third-party warranty as a matter of law.

              11. With all the information given to Garrett before he purchased
              the F-250, and his ability to review the information prior to the
              purchase, there was no reliance by Garrett, on a material
              misrepresentation or scheme of intent to defraud or mislead.

      Id. at 17–18. The parties now appeal.

      Discussion and Decision
      A. Cross-Appeal - Requests for Admission

[9]   We address the dealership’s cross-appeal first. The Dealership seeks to reverse

      the trial court’s order regarding the RFA, thereby reintroducing as factors the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023              Page 7 of 14
       admissions of material elements adverse to Garrett’s claims. “A party may

       serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of

       the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule

       26(B) set forth in the request, including the genuineness of any documents

       described in the request.” Ind. Trial Rule 36. Failure to respond to requests for

       admission can have a severe consequence. “The matter is admitted unless,

       within a period designated in the request . . . the party to whom the request is

       directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or

       objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney.” T.R.

       36(A).

[10]   “Matters admitted are deemed conclusively established, unless the trial court

       permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” Harkins v. Westmeyer, 116

       N.E.3d 461, 472–73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing T.R. 36(B); Gen. Motors Corp.,

       Chevrolet Motor Div. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 573 N.E.2d 885, 888–89 (Ind.

       1991)). “When a party fails to timely answer requests for admission and the

       result of such failure is the admission of all facts material to the lawsuit, nothing

       remains to litigate, and the requesting party is entitled to summary judgment.”

       Id. (citing Bryant v. Cnty. Council of Lake Cnty., 720 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1999), trans. denied).

[11]   Because the penalty for a failure to respond to RFA is so severe, and because

       every trial lawyer knows, or certainly should, of the risk of that penalty, Garrett

       here should have availed himself of one of several options. He should have

       arrived at a consensus with respect to the timeliness of the requests. If no

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023        Page 8 of 14
       consensus could be reached, he should have sought a ruling from the trial court.

       In any event, he had nothing to lose by simply drawing up denials of the RFA

       and serving them on the Dealership—thereby ensuring that his client’s interests

       were protected—regardless of whether he believed he was under an obligation

       to do so. Garrett’s counsel admits as much:

               Of course, the prudent thing to have done was to submit either a
               formal objection or to answer the requests for admission within
               thirty days. Counsel for Plaintiff was going through a personal
               crisis, not of his own making, at the time the response was due
               that drastically limited his ability to work and attend to
               professional duties and he unfortunately did not do so.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 117.

[12]   Nevertheless, we are reluctant to intrude upon the trial court’s discretion,

       especially as it pertains to discovery disputes. Such disputes are, unfortunately,

       common. Our rules convey a preference that they be resolved informally, or at

       least, that attempts to do so must be made before involving the trial court. T.R.

       26(F). If the trial court does become involved, it enjoys “broad discretion with

       regard to rulings on discovery matters based upon its duties to promote

       discovery of the truth and to guide and control the proceedings.” State v.

       McKinney, 82 N.E.3d 290, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Miller v. State, 825

       N.E.2d 884, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied) (emphasis added).

       “‘Therefore, such rulings will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion. An

       abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and

       effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.’” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023        Page 9 of 14
[13]   “An important purpose of [Rule 36] is to more quickly and efficiently reach a

       resolution based on the actual facts[.]” Costello v. Zavodnik, 55 N.E.3d 348, 353

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing St. Mary v. Superior Ct., 223 Cal. App. 4th 762, 783

       (2014) (“The purpose of the RFA procedure is to expedite trials and to

       eliminate the need for proof when matters are not legitimately contested. The

       RFA device is not intended to provide a windfall to litigants. Nor is the RFA

       procedure a ‘gotcha’ device [.]”)); see also Fairland Recreational Club, Inc. v.

       Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 818 N.E.2d 100, 101–02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing

       Georgetown Steel Corp. v. Chaffee, 519 N.E.2d 574, 575–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988),

       trans. denied) (“Unlike other discovery techniques, the essential purpose of a

       request for admission is to obviate the need for time-consuming proof at trial by

       establishing undisputed facts, instead of attempting to ‘discover’ essentially

       unknown facts by deposition or interrogatory.”)

[14]   Rule 36 is part of an overarching preference of our court system: when possible,

       to resolve cases on the merits. The rule seeks to streamline the process by

       allowing parties to essentially stipulate to matters which are not seriously in

       dispute: things like the authenticity of an exhibit.

[15]   But that is not what the Dealership’s RFA were used for. It, rather, employed

       an increasingly frequent tactic entirely at odds with the spirit of the rule: “he

       sent them because he hoped [the opposing party] would not respond, rendering

       the matters admitted by operation of Rule 36.” Costello, 55 N.E.3d at 353. Far

       from streamlining the process of arriving at a final judgment on the merits, the

       admissions sought here were basically an invitation for Garrett to plead himself

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023          Page 10 of 14
       out of court. These considerations, as well as the balancing of the equities of

       the situation, place the trial court’s granting of Garrett’s motion regarding the

       RFA firmly within the trial court’s discretion. We do not disturb its ruling.

       B. Summary Judgment - Reasonable Reliance

[16]   Our analysis does not conclude there, however. Despite taking the admissions

       off the table, the trial court still granted the Dealership’s motion for summary

       judgment. “‘When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for

       summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.’” Minser v. DeKalb

       Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Burton

       v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020)). “Summary judgment is

       appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine

       issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

       as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 128 N.E.3d

       450, 452 (Ind. 2019)); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

[17]   The summary judgment movant invokes the burden of making a prima facie

       showing that there is no issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment

       as a matter of law. Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 851. The burden shifts to the non-

       moving party which must then show the existence of a genuine issue of material

       fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts or

       inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

[18]   We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo,

       and we take “care to ensure that no party is denied his day in court.” Schoettmer

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023      Page 11 of 14
       v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). “We limit our review to the

       materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res.,

       90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied. Because the trial court entered

       findings of fact and conclusions of law, we also reiterate that findings of fact

       and conclusions of law entered by the trial court aid our review, but they do not

       bind us. In re Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d 634, 637 (Ind. 2018).

[19]   The trial court’s analysis with respect to the partial summary judgment motion

       boils down to the idea that Garrett should have taken a close look at the

       paperwork he was handed. If he had done so, or if any reasonable person had

       done so, he would have concluded that the statements regarding the warranty

       were untrue, and, thus, it would be unreasonable to rely upon them. The trial

       court correctly observes that “[t]here is nothing in the designated evidence to

       suggest the engine was actually covered by warranty.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II

       p. 17. There is, however, designated evidence supporting the claim that the

       Dealership represented to Garrett that there was such a warranty. The Dealership,

       of course, denies that fact, so there is no doubt that there is a genuine issue of

       material fact thereto. The question then becomes whether it was reasonable for

       Garrett to rely upon those representations, assuming they were made. This is a

       question for the jury. The trial court at once holds that there is no evidence

       either way with respect to whether Garrett examined the paperwork or merely

       relied upon the Dealership’s characterizations of that paperwork, but also that

       Garrett “did not exercise reasonable prudence” by failing to discover the

       absence of a warranty. Id. at 18.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023         Page 12 of 14
[20]   The designated evidence raises more questions than it answers, and many of

       those questions are factual in nature. Thus, they are questions suited to the

       functions of a jury. The designated evidence is simply insufficient to allow the

       trial court to conclude that Garrett’s reliance on the verbal representations of

       the dealership was unreasonable as a matter of law. 13 “As a general proposition

       . . . the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ reliance is usually a question for the trier

       of fact.” Allen v. Great Am. Rsrv. Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 1157, 1164 (Ind. 2002)

       (citing Unlimited Servs., Inc. v. Macklen Enters., Inc., 401 S.E.2d 153, 155 (S.C.

       1991); Biberstine v. N.Y. Blower Co., 625 N.E.2d 1308, 1316 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1993)). Our Supreme Court has determined that—in the context of summary

       judgment—one party may reasonably rely upon the representations of another

       even when those representations are contradicted or called into question by an

       informed reading of the policy or other documentation related to those

       representations. Id. This may well be an example of those circumstances, and,

       thus, summary judgment is not appropriate.

[21]   We reverse the trial court’s granting of the Dealership’s motion for partial

       summary judgment, order the trial court to vacate that judgment, and remand

       for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

       13
          For clarity’s sake, we also note that, to the extent the trial court suggests that Garrett designates no
       evidence that the misrepresentations were intentionally made as a part of a scheme to defraud him as it
       relates to the IDCSA, Garrett designated evidence that there were representations that there was a warranty,
       that the Dealership knew that the warranty had expired, and that it made the representations anyway. If the
       Dealership contests any of those propositions, it merely concedes that there are genuine issues of material
       fact.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023                            Page 13 of 14
[22]   Reversed and remanded.

       Altice, C.J., and May, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2583 | August 11, 2023   Page 14 of 14