Court Opinion

ID: 9954313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 21:11:10.523084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:01.260580
License: Public Domain

Fayod v 24 Second Ave. Corp.
               2024 NY Slip Op 30901(U)
                     March 19, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 159884/2014
                  Judge: Hasa A. Kingo
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
 Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
 State and local government sources, including the New
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                       publication.
                                                                                                                        INDEX NO. 159884/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 318                                                                                             RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/19/2024

                                   SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                             NEW YORK COUNTY
            PRESENT:                            HON. HASA A. KINGO                                  PART                              05M
                                                           Justice
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X      INDEX NO.          159884/2014
             ROBAH FAYOD,
                                                                                                    MOTION DATE         01/05/2023
                                                         Plaintiff,
                                                                                                    MOTION SEQ. NO.         006
                                                 -v-
             24 SECOND AVE. CORP., KALISH & KERNER
             PETROLEUM LLC,BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA,
             INC.,THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SECOND AVENUE
             SERVICE STATION, INC.,MRM AUTO, INC.,JOHN DOE #2
             THROUGH JOHN DOE #5, FICTITIOUS NAMES OF
                                                                                                      DECISION + ORDER ON
             INDIVIDUALS AND/OR INSTITUTIONS THAT MAY IN ANY
             WAY OWN, LEASE, OPERATE, CONTROL, REPAIR,                                                      MOTION
             MANAGE, AND/OR MAINTAIN THE PREMISES WHERE
             THE PLAINTIFF HAD SUSTAINED PERSONAL INJURIES,
             TRUE NAMES BEING UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME,

                                                         Defendant.
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

            The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 006) 220, 221, 222, 223,
            224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244,
            245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 290, 292, 294, 296, 298, 300, 301, 302, 307, 308, 310, 314, 315, 316
            were read on this motion to/for                                                      SUMMARY JUDGMENT                     .

                    With the instant motion, defendant CITY OF NEW YORK (hereinafter, “the City”) moves,
            pursuant to CPLR §3212, for summary judgment and an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint as
            well as any cross-claims asserted against it. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

                                                                   BACKGROUND

                    In this tort matter, plaintiff has lodged allegations against the City, among others,
            pertaining to injuries purportedly sustained during a fall on ice at 24 Second Avenue, situated
            within the city, county, and state of New York, on November 29, 2013, at 9:30 PM. Plaintiff, a
            taxi driver and habitual patron of the gas station located therein, asserts that on the day preceding
            the incident, he observed water emanating from the street onto the premises. Recollecting a
            temperature of 29 degrees Fahrenheit, he contends that while traversing the sidewalk at 9:30 PM,
            the ingress from the roadway to the gas station, plaintiff alleges that he was caused to fall due to a
            1-meter circle of ice on the ground. In support of its motion, the City argues that it has met its
            burden and is entitled to summary judgment as it has established that it is not the owner of the
            abutting premises. Likewise, the City submits that there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of
            law, to conclude that the City was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries by causing or creating
            the defective condition alleged. In opposition, plaintiff does not challenge the City’s ownership

             159884/2014 FAYOD, RABAH vs. 24 SECOND AVE. CORP.                                                          Page 1 of 4
             Motion No. 006

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                                                                                                    INDEX NO. 159884/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 318                                                                       RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/19/2024

            but asserts that the City was responsible for causing or creating the defective condition that led to
            plaintiff’s injuries.

                                                       DISCUSSION

                   In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the proponent must make a prima
            facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, through admissible evidence
            demonstrating the absence of any material issue of fact (see Klein v. City of New York, 89 NY2d
            883 [1996]; Ayotte v. Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062 [1993]). Once the moving party has satisfied these
            standards, the burden shifts to the opponent to rebut that prima facie showing, by producing
            contrary evidence in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material factual issues (Amatulli
            v. Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 NY2d 525 [1999]).

                   Summary judgment is a drastic remedy. Therefore, the court's function on a motion for
            summary judgment is issue finding rather than issue determination (Stillman v Twentieth Century
            Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]). Since summary judgment is a drastic remedy, it should not
            be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue (Rotuba Extruders v
            Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223 [1978]). The burden on the movant is a heavy one, and the facts must be
            viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (Jacobsen v New York City Health &
            Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824 [2014]).

                     When confronted with a summary judgment motion, it is the court’s responsibility to search
            the record for triable issues of fact without determining the strength of either parties' case (Cross
            v. Cross, 112 AD2d 62 [1st Dept 1985]). In doing so, the court must search evidentiary facts
            sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The mere existence of a material issue of fact
            should lead to the denial of the motion (see Downing v. Schreiver, 176 AD2d 781 [2d Dept 1991]).
            It is also firmly acknowledged that matters concerning negligence seldom find facile resolution
            through summary judgment proceedings (Ugarizza v. Schmieder, 46 NY2d 471 [1979]).
            Indeed, the pivotal inquiry as to whether a defendant’s actions constitute negligence is inherently
            entwined with questions of fact that properly belong within the purview of a jury (Rivers v. Atomic
            Exterminating Corp., 210 AD2d 134 [1st Dept 1994]).

                     It has been held that “to prevail on a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability
            in an action alleging negligence, a [moving party] has the burden of establishing, prima facie, not
            only that the [other party] was negligent, but that the [moving party] was free from comparative
            fault, since there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident” (Ramos v. Bartis, 112
            AD3d 804 [2d Dept 2013]; Thoma v. Ronai, 82 NY2d 736 [1993]). It has also held that there can
            be more than one proximate cause of an accident, and the issue of comparative negligence is
            generally a question for a jury to decide (Cox v. Weil, 86 AD3d 620 [2d Dept 2011]; Wilson v.
            Rosedom, 82 AD3d 970 [2d Dept 2011]).

                    Here, City has established, prima facie, that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
            of law because: (1) City has established that it was not the owner of the abutting property located
            at 24 Second Avenue, New York, New York and therefore was not responsible for the maintenance
            and repair of the subject sidewalk pursuant to New York City Administrative code §7-210; and (2)
            because the City has demonstrated through admissible evidence that did not cause or create the
            alleged black ice patch on the sidewalk because a catch basin down the block, across the street and
             159884/2014 FAYOD, RABAH vs. 24 SECOND AVE. CORP.                                      Page 2 of 4
             Motion No. 006

                                                           2 of 4
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                                                                                                      INDEX NO. 159884/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 318                                                                        RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/19/2024

            across the avenue did not cause the black ice condition, and therefore the City was not the
            proximate cause of the incident because plaintiff testified that he saw ice coming from the abutting
            gas station and the owner of the gas station, Harris Kalish, testified that his staff hoses down the
            area where the gas pumps are located every evening.

                   As to the former prima facie showing, this court previously determined that on the date of
            incident, it was undisputed that the City did not own the abutting property, located at 24 Second
            Avenue, New York, NY. Since it is undisputed that the City is not the owner of the abutting
            property, it is therefore not responsible for repair and maintenance of the subject sidewalk,
            pursuant to New York City Administrative Code §7-210.

                     Considering the foregoing, only issue left to resolve was plaintiff s cause and create theory
            of liability as to whether any flooding caused by the alleged defective catch basin on the southwest
            corner (across the street and avenue from the BP gas station) resulted in pooling of water on the
            subject sidewalk. On that latter issue, the testimony and exhibits proffered highlight that the
            incident at issue occurred on the sidewalk and northeast side at East 1st Street between Second
            Avenue and First Avenue. Notably, there is no catch basin located on the northeast or southeast
            corners of the subject intersection. Rather, the alleged defective catch basin is located across East
            1st Street and across Second Avenue, located on the southwest corner of the intersection. The City
            therefore has proffered, prima facie, that plaintiff s theory of liability that the catch basin resulted
            in flooding and caused water to pool up and across the East 1st Street and across Second Avenue
            is speculative and unsupported by admissible evidence within the record, even when affording
            plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference.

                    In opposition, plaintiff fails to create a question of material fact as to the
            City’s liability. Indeed, plaintiff does not provide any evidence in admissible form to rebut the
            City’s proof that liability has shifted to the abutting property owner, nor does plaintiff provide
            evidence in admissible form that the City caused or created the alleged icy sidewalk condition.
            Indeed, plaintiff ignores the fact that ownership of the abutting subject property is not in dispute,
            and there is no issue of fact.

                    Furthermore, the plaintiff's opposition demonstrates a misinterpretation of a fundamental
            principle of municipal law: the transfer of liability from the City to the property owner pursuant to
            §7-210, particularly in cases where there exists no duty owed by the City. Additionally, the standard
            of prior written acknowledgment, which plaintiff erroneously asserts, is not applicable in this
            instance.

                    Plaintiff's opposition further misrepresents the positioning of the catch basin concerning
            the accident site. Plaintiff inaccurately asserts that “the clogged catch basin located at the East First
            Street and Second Avenue in Manhattan was causing ‘ongoing problem [sic] with street flooding’
            at the location of the plaintiff’s accident.” It is important to clarify that the southwest corner of
            Second Avenue and East 1st Street does not coincide with the site of plaintiff's accident, which
            occurred east of the northeast corner of Second Avenue and East 1st Street. The purportedly faulty
            catch basin is situated across two roadways from the location of plaintiff's accident.

             159884/2014 FAYOD, RABAH vs. 24 SECOND AVE. CORP.                                        Page 3 of 4
             Motion No. 006

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 318                                                                           RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/19/2024

                     Attached to the City’s reply papers is a photograph sourced from Google Maps depicting
            the catch basin situated on the southwest corner of Second Avenue and East 1st Street. In this
            image, the catch basin in question occupies the lower right-hand quadrant, while the gas station
            under scrutiny is positioned in the center-to-upper left-hand quadrant. Furthermore, Exhibit T-a
            accompanying the City’s motion illustrates the precise location where plaintiff claims to have
            fallen. A cursory examination of Exhibit T-a (NYSCEF Doc. No. 244) and Exhibit A (NYSCEF
            Doc. No. 316), reveals that the purportedly faulty catch basin bears no proximate connection to
            the site of plaintiff's accident. As established in the City’s motion, the water from a catch basin at
            the southwest corner of the intersection would be contained to that corner – it would not cross both
            Second Avenue and East 1st Street (and travel down East 1st Street to where plaintiff fell) due to
            crowns in the middle of the roadways which prevent the water from going across the street.

                    Insofar as plaintiff contests the Google Maps photos presented in the reply, it is pertinent
            to note that such photographs are admissible forms of evidence in accordance with CPLR 4532-b.
            Additionally, the submission of new evidence in a reply is permissible when it serves to address
            arguments raised in opposition or to elucidate arguments or evidence presented in the initial motion
            papers. This principle is underscored in decisions such as Dias v. City of NY, 110 AD3d 577, 578
            (1st Dept 2013), wherein it was held that “The evidence plaintiff offered on reply was properly
            submitted in response to the evidence submitted and the arguments made by defendants in their
            opposition papers,” and Galdamez v. Biordi Constr. Corp., 50 AD3d 357, 358 (1st Dept 2008),
            which affirmed that “[T]he court properly considered affidavits from several members of the
            proposed class submitted on reply since the affidavits were in response to matters raised in
            defendants' opposition.”

                    Nor does plaintiff refute that Administrative Code §7-210 shifts liability
            to the abutting property owner – including for snow and ice conditions (Klotz v. City of New York,
            9 AD3d 393 [2d Dept 2004)]. Accordingly, it is hereby

                    ORDERED that the City’s motion is granted in its entirety; and it is further

                    ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly, and shall
            transfer this matter to the inventory of a non-City part.

                    This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

                    3/19/2024
                      DATE                                                           HASA A. KINGO, J.S.C.
             CHECK ONE:                   CASE DISPOSED                X    NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                      X   GRANTED             DENIED        GRANTED IN PART             OTHER

             APPLICATION:                 SETTLE ORDER                      SUBMIT ORDER

             CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:    X   INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN        FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT       REFERENCE

             159884/2014 FAYOD, RABAH vs. 24 SECOND AVE. CORP.                                        Page 4 of 4
             Motion No. 006

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