Court Opinion

ID: 9447084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:24:47.838791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:53.366141
License: Public Domain

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge
[concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree that Mrs. Sinlao’s suit was barred by limitation insofar as it sought to recover on the insurance claim and I concur to that extent in the court’s opinion. But I dissent with respect to the compensation feature.
The widow of a soldier killed in action, who has not remarried,1 is entitled to compensation at specified monthly rates. 38 U.S.C. § 321. The Administrator found the appellant to be such a widow, allowed her claim for compensation, and for some time issued monthly checks therefor. Later he terminated payments under the award because of his mistaken notion that, by her immoral conduct, the widow was “estopped to deny remarriage,” although he admitted remarriage had not in fact occurred. Common law marriage is not recognized in the Philippines where Mrs. Sinlao lived.
This court affirms the District Court’s denial of jurisdiction to review the Administrator’s action in stopping the payments because of the provision in 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) that “the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments” shall be final, conclusive and unreviewable.
The majority speak of “The Administrator’s rejection of appellant’s compensation claim.” Strictly speaking, there was no rejection. The Administrator’s allowance of the appellant’s compensation claim placed upon him the duty of issuing a cheek to her each month as long as she did not remarry. In effect, the statute so provides. As I have pointed out, the Administrator stopped issuing the checks because of his idea that she was estopped to deny remarriage, although he knew no sort of remarriage had in fact occurred. This erroneous conception furnished no basis for terminating compensation payments, so the Administrator’s action was an arbitrary and capricious refusal to perform a plain statutory duty.
When Mrs. Sinlao requested the Administrator to continue sending the monthly checks, she was not asserting an original claim for benefits or payments, concerning which his decision is unreviewable. She was claiming the monthly checks which should be issued automatically under an allowed compensation claim. Her petition that the District Court review his arbitrary action should therefore have been treated as an application for a mandatory injunction requiring the Administrator to do his clear statutory duty, as to which he has no discretion. It was not a petition to review the Administrator’s denial of a *849claim to compensation. His previous award and payment of compensation had been statutorily required by the conditions which existed, and those conditions admittedly had not changed: Mrs. Sin-lao was still a widow who had not remarried. In these circumstances, I think the Administrator’s termination of the payments because of immoral conduct— which is not a statutory ground of forfeiture — is not insulated from judicial review by the finality provision of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a). The distinction is a close one, but I think it is valid; the finality statute should be liberally construed in favor of the appellant. I cannot believe Congress intended that provision to prevent review of the Administrator’s unwarranted action in terminating payments of compensation which he had correctly allowed.

. 38 U.S.C. § 101(3).