Court Opinion

ID: 9526998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:26:37.957149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:23.161669
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that the Immigration and Nationality Act permitted the INS to proceed against respondent in an exclusion *38proceeding. The question then remains whether the exclusion proceeding held in this case satisfied the minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause. While I agree that the Court need not decide the precise contours of the process that would be constitutionally sufficient, I would not hesitate to decide that the process accorded Plasencia was insufficient.1
The Court has already set out the standards to be applied in resolving the question. Therefore, rather than just remand, I would first hold that respondent was denied due process because she was not given adequate and timely notice of the charges against her and of her right to retain counsel and to present a defense.2
While the type of hearing required by due process depends upon a balancing of the competing interests at stake, due process requires “at a minimum . . . that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). See, e. g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542 (1971). Permanent resident aliens who are detained upon reentry into this country clearly are entitled to adequate notice in advance of an exclusion proceeding.
*39To satisfy due process, notice must “clarify what the charges are” in a manner adequate to apprise the individual of the basis for the government’s proposed action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 564 (1974). Notice must be provided sufficiently in advance of the hearing to “give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his defense.” Id., at 563, 564 (prisoners charged with disciplinary violations must be given “advance written notice of the claimed violation”). See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 267-268 (1970) (welfare recipients must be given “timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination”); In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 33 (1967) (juvenile must be given notice of “the specific charge or factual allegations” to be considered at delinquency hearing “at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation”).
Respondent was not given notice sufficient to afford her a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that she was not excludable. The Immigration Judge’s decision to exclude respondent was handed down less than 24 hours after she was detained at the border on the night of June 29,1975. By notice in English dated June 30, 1975, she was informed that a hearing would be conducted at 11 o’clock on the morning of that same day, and that the Government would seek to exclude her on the ground that she had “wilfully and knowingly aided and abetted the entry of illegal aliens into the United States in violation of the law and for gain.”3 It was not until the commencement of the hearing that she was given notice in her native language of the charges against her and of her right to retain counsel and to present evidence.
The charges against Plasencia were also inadequately explained at the hearing itself.4 The Immigration Judge did not explain to her that she would be entitled to remain in the *40country if she could demonstrate that she had not agreed to receive compensation from the aliens whom she had driven across the border.5 Nor did the judge inform respondent that the meaningfulness of her departure was an issue at the hearing.
These procedures deprived Plasencia of a fair opportunity to show that she was not excludable under the standards set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Because Pla-sencia was not given adequate notice of the standards for exclusion or of her right to retain counsel and present a defense, she had neither time nor opportunity to prepare a response to *41the Government’s case. The procedures employed here virtually assured that the Government attorney would present his case without factual or legal opposition.
When a permanent resident alien’s substantial interest in remaining in this country is at stake, the Due Process Clause forbids the Government to stack the deck in this fashion. Only a compelling need for truly summary action could justify this one-sided proceeding. In fact, the Government’s haste in proceeding against Plasencia could be explained only by its desire to avoid the minimal administrative and financial burden of providing her adequate notice and an opportunity to prepare for the hearing. Although the various other Government interests identified by the Court may be served by the exclusion of those who fail to meet the eligibility requirements set out in the Immigration and Nationality Act, they are not served by procedures that deny a permanent resident alien a fair opportunity to demonstrate that she meets those eligibility requirements.
I would therefore hold that respondent was denied due process.

 Because the due process question was squarely addressed in the briefs and at oral argument, there is no doubt that the Court may now decide the issue. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258-259, n. 5 (1980), and cases cited therein. In fact, the Court has reached the threshold of deciding the constitutional question. It has identified the deficiencies in the exclusion hearing afforded Plasencia, and it has set forth the standards that it would apply to determine whether the procedures, as described, denied Plasencia due process. I do not see any interest to be served in declining to take the final step of applying these due process standards to the record before us, as the Court of Appeals would otherwise be required to do on remand.

 Because Plasencia did not receive constitutionally sufficient notice, I find it unnecessary to address the other constitutional deficiencies she asserts.

 It is unclear from the record whether respondent received the notice prior to the commencement of the hearing.

 The exclusion hearing was conducted with the aid of an interpreter.

 The principal issue of fact at the hearing was whether Plasencia had transported the six aliens “for gain.” Plasencia, who was called as the Government’s first witness, denied repeatedly that any of the aliens had agreed to pay her for driving them into this country. The Government’s trial attorney then called three of the six aliens as witnesses. One witness, Jose Alfredo Santillana, stated unequivocally that he was picked up by the Plasencias while hitchhiking and that, without making any mention of money, they agreed to drive him to Los Angeles. A second witness, Luis Polio-Medina, testified that there had not been any talk with Plasen-cia at any time about payment for transportation to Los Angeles, though there “was kind of an understanding” that “some people in Los Angeles” whom he “was going to look for” would pay her a “normal amount” on his behalf. Only the third witness, Eugenia Linares-Moreno, testified that she had an agreement to pay Plasencia for transportation into the country.
Given the weakness of the Government’s evidence, Plasencia may well have been prejudiced by her inability to prepare for the hearing and to obtain counsel. The three aliens who did not testify at the hearing might have supported Plasencia’s claim that she did not expect to receive financial compensation. The Immigration Judge’s finding that Plasencia transported the aliens for gain must have depended on his acceptance of the testimony given by Linares-Moreno and Polio-Medina. The motives of these Government witnesses in testifying against Plasencia were open to question, since they were subject to criminal prosecution in this country. The credibility of Linares-Moreno, the Government’s key witness, might also have been challenged on the grounds that she had contradicted herself on at least one key question during the course of her examination and that she had concededly lied to an INS officer by giving a false name. Vigorous cross-examination by a competent attorney might well have led the Immigration Judge to resolve the disputed issue of fact in Plasencia’s favor.