Court Opinion

ID: 9689207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:24:40.521225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:27.990962
License: Public Domain

G. A. Drain, J.
(dissenting). Defendant Michael James Morton appeals as of right his conviction for felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277. Defendant was convicted by an Oakland Circuit Court jury on April 1, 1987. On April 23, 1987, the court sentenced defendant to six months in the Oakland County Jail on work-release status, and denied defendant bond pending appeal. Defendant was released from jail on September 22, 1987.
One of the issues raised on appeal is whether the trial court complied with MCR 6.101(C)(3), formerly GCR 1963, 785.4(3), in allowing the defendant to waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and proceed in pro per, and whether the trial court adequately advised the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. I would find that the trial court failed to comply with the court rule and did not adequately advise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
The court rule in question specifically states:
Even though a defendant has waived the assistance of an attorney, the court shall advise the defendant at each subsequent proceeding (e.g., preliminary examination, arraignment, proceedings leading to possible revocation of youthful trainee status, hearings, trial, or sentencing) of the right to an attorney at public expense. Before the court proceeds,
*10(a) the defendant must reaffirm that he or she does not want an attorney’s assistance; or
(b) if the defendant is eligible for and then requests the appointment of an attorney, the court must appoint one; or
(c) if the defendant wants to retain an attorney and has the financial ability to do so, the court must allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to retain an attorney.
If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, the record must affirmatively show at each proceeding that advice on the right to an attorney at public expense was given and that the defendant waived that right. [MCR 6.101(3). Emphasis added.]
In three specific sentences, this court rule sets forth three conditions which must be met before a trial judge may allow a defendant to proceed in pro per.
First, at each subsequent proceeding after the defendant has waived the assistance of counsel, the court must advise defendant of his right to counsel at public expense.
Second, before going forward at that subsequent proceeding, (a) the defendant must reaffirm that he does not want an attorney’s assistance; or (b) if defendant is eligible and requests counsel, the court must appoint one; or (c) if defendant wants to retain an attorney and has the financial ability to do so, the court must allow him a reasonable opportunity to retain an attorney.
Third, and most important, if defendant is not represented by an attorney, the record must affirmatively show at each proceeding that advice on the right to an attorney at public expense was given and that defendant waived that right.
Strict compliance is the standard by which this rule must be applied. When a defendant has *11waived the constitutional right to counsel, the record must show that the court advised defendant of his right to counsel at public expense at each subsequent hearing. The rule is specific and mandatory, and substantial compliance will not suffice. People v Kimber, 133 Mich App 184; 348 NW2d 60 (1984). Moreover, in Kimber the prosecutor tried to correct the record in posttrial proceedings which purported to show compliance with the rule at an in-chambers conference, but the application of strict compliance prevented this effort.
In the instant case the record shows that the following proceedings occurred:
I. February 3, 1987 — Defendant appeared without counsel at a pretrial hearing where he moved to discharge his retained counsel and proceed in pro per. The following dialogue is on the record:
Mr. Halushka [Assistant Prosecutor]: Calling the matter of the People versus Michael Morton, CR 85-71287-FH. This is the date and time set for hearing of defendant’s motion to discharge counsel and proceed in pro per. This matter is scheduled for trial in the next trial docket.
The Court: Good morning.
Mr. Morton: Good morning. How are you?
The Court: Sir, fine. Would you state your name, please.
Mr. Morton: Michael J. Morton.
The Court: Is this the . . .
Mr. Halushka: The defen . . .
Mr. Morton: The defendant, yes, Your Honor.
The Court: And what do you wish to do, sir?
Mr. Morton: Where do I work?
The Court: No, what is your desire? What are you here for this morning?
Mr. Morton: I wish to discharge my counsel and defend myself at trial.
Mr. Halushka: And this is set for the next jury term, Your Honor.
*12The Court: What is the nature of the charge?
Mr. Halushka: It’s Felonious Assault.
The Court: You want to be your own lawyer, is that what you are saying, sir?
Mr. Morton: That’s correct, Your Honor.
Mr. Halushka: At the current time, Jerome Sabbota has been retained.
Mr. Morton: Agreed.
The Court: Is Mr. Sabbota . . .
Mr. Halushka: Mr. Sabbota is aware of this motion. He indicated that he would not be here today, but he is aware of the motion. May I approach the bench, Your Honor?
The Court: You may, sir.
(Short discussion at bench)
The Court: You understand, sir, it’s like you may know a little about medicine, but you wouldn’t take your own appendix out, I wouldn’t think, I don’t know. But it is up to you. You do have that right. Do you understand that, sir? To have counsel if you desire? The law also says that if you feel competent, you can represent yourself. There is nothing wrong with that.
Mr. Morton: I do understand my rights. I do feel competent to represent myself.
The Court: All right, sir. You be here at that time and I will relieve Mr. Sabbota of any further responsibility in the matter, sir.
The appointment of counsel was never mentioned.
II. March 4, 1987 — A hearing was held on defendant’s motion to quash and motion to dismiss the complaint and warrant. The following dialogue is on the record:
The Court: Sir, let me ask you. You’re talking about indictments and so on in this. Where did you come up with some of this information, sir?
Mr. Morton: From the Wayne State Law Library.
The Court: Are you a law student or what?
*13Mr. Morton: No, I’m not.
The Court: Sir, the other day I indicated that, you said you did not want an attorney, you wanted to represent yourself. Do you feel comfortable about doing that, sir?
Mr. Morton: Correct. I did have some information prepared that I would like to deliver to you, Your Honor.
Again, the appointment of counsel was not discussed.
III. March 25, 1987 — Defendant appears in court on his motion and demand for a speedy trial. The record is completely silent regarding defendant’s self-representation. Defendant also informed the trial court, by way of supporting brief, that he was impecunious, and therefore the court should have informed defendant that he was or may have been entitled to legal counsel at public expense.
IV. March 31, 1987 — Trial begins, and again the record is completely silent as to defendant’s right to legal counsel.
The record in this case reveals that the trial judge neglected to comply with MCR 6.101(C)(3) at three separate proceedings, i.e., March 4, March 25, and March 31, 1987. I would find error warranting reversal in the failure to comply with the rule.
In addition to the court rule that must be complied with before a defendant is allowed to proceed in pro per, the developing case law has additional requirements.
Our Supreme Court has held that before a defendant may proceed in pro per, the court must determine three things. First, the request must be unequivocal. Second, the trial court must determine whether defendant is asserting his right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; the court *14must make the defendant aware of the disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record establishes that defendant knows what he is doing and chooses with his eyes open. Third, the court must determine that a defendant’s self-representation will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience, or burden the court. People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361; 247 NW2d 857 (1976); People v Holcomb, 395 Mich 326; 235 NW2d 343 (1975); People v Riley, 156 Mich App 396, 398-399; 401 NW2d 875 (1986), lv den 428 Mich 919 (1987).
Defendant argues that he was not adequately advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
Most defendants who proceed in pro per do so in ignorance of the value of counsel and through failure to recognize their own inadequacies. At the very least, trial courts must communicate to defendants wishing to proceed in pro per that lawyers and attorneys have special skill and training which is necessary to effectively handle a criminal defense, while lay persons generally do not. People v Kimber, supra; People v Anderson, supra; People v Holcomb, supra.
The trial court’s warning that self-representation was analogous to performing surgery on oneself does not comply with the requirement that the defendant be advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. I would therefore hold that defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
When counsel is ineffectively waived at trial because of a failure to comply with a court rule or any other requirements, it can never be deemed harmless error. People v Kimber, supra. In the present case, although the defendant had several attorneys at different stages of the case, at the *15most critical and important stage, the trial, he was not represented. Defendant failed to cross-examine witnesses called by the prosecution, failed to properly examine his character witnesses and was not able to effectively call himself as a witness. The totality of defendant’s self-representation was ineffective and cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.