Court Opinion

ID: 9459153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:11:55.321873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:02.477836
License: Public Domain

ALBERT V. BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I would affirm. The majority today looks to Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4 Cir. 1970), as justification for reversal. Actually, for me that decision does not touch the instant case; rather its determinant completely divorces it from consideration here. There, appellant was already before the court, and the court, not the prosecutor, was called upon to decide the most appropriate forum for the trial. The question was purely judicial and counsel was required to develop defendant’s most advantageous course.
Just the opposite obtained here. Unlike Kemplen, the accused was not before the court. No court was making a decision as to his welfare. Appellant com*345plains rather of an act of the Attorney-General — a step both inherently within the exclusive prerogative of the Executive branch of Government and explicitly authorized by Congress.
The Judiciary cannot trespass upon the legitimate province of the Executive. Which cases, if any, are to be prosecuted, and where, are questions exclusively within the latter’s domain. Even after an indictment is returned, the court cannot force it to trial against the Government’s decision not to prosecute at all. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 1767, 14 L.Ed.2d 700 (1965).
If the Attorney General elects to proceed against a juvenile as an adult, that is an Executive determination. No authority is cited by appellant suggesting that the Executive’s preference may be exercised only after a consultation or hearing is accorded the accused to ascertain if the Government’s determination is justifiable. If that were required, the Attorney General or the United States Attorney would be always obliged to inquire, by conference or hearing, whether a defendant’s case should take its lawful course: for example, whether to present it to a grand jury, whether to prosecute it as murder or manslaughter, or as a misdemeanor or a felony. Obviously, such a requirement would be harmful to the public interest as an undue encumbrance upon the performance of the Executive’s duties.
With regard to the potential disposition of this ease under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq., I see no fatal procedural omission by the District Court. In my judgment “find”, appearing in § 5010(b), (c), and (d), does not demand formal declarations by the court upon the existence of the conditions stated in those sections. However, assuming without agreeing, that these formalities are required, as indicated in United States v. Ward, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 149, 454 F.2d 992, 994 (1971) and United States v. Waters, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 289, 437 F.2d 722, 725-726 (1970), those decisions acknowledge that their exactions may be satisfied “implicitly”. Here, the sentence of the District Court by demonstration conclusively implies a “finding” that the defendant “will not derive benefit from treatment” under the Act.
The majority interjects that the District Judge, in his § 2255 memorandum opinion of February 16, 1971, stated that “[he] made no finding that Petitioner would not benefit from treatment under the Act”. On the day of sentence —July 30, 1968 some two years and 7 months earlier — the judge rejected counsel’s specific request for consideration of the utilization of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, the attorney pleading:
“I firmly believe that if this boy is sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, that it will be in the best interest not only of this boy, but of society in general. He is a very bright boy. If he could be directed toward a gainful path, it would be a very fine thing.”
“The Court: Yes, I was interested in knowing that he scored an IQ of 132 and the principal of the school indicated that he was far too mature for a junior high school student.”
After hearing other matters, the District Judge inquired in extenso of the defendant as to his comprehension of his plea of guilty and its possible consequences. After this, he sentenced the defendant to 15-years imprisonment. Surely this was, beyond cavil, a finding —indeed a pronouncement — that he was not entitled to FYCA treatment. The judge’s statement in the later § 2255 opinion obviously was referring to a formal finding.
It would, indeed, be captious to reverse this case under either Act for lack of formalism. If the punishment laid upon Earl French Cox, Jr. be thought excessive, that would not dictate recourse to either the Juvenile Delinquency Act or the Federal Youth Corrections Act. The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.