Court Opinion

ID: 9777364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:08:10.113455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:52.968105
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The appellant contends under his first ground of error that the confession admitted into evidence before the jury is “the fruit of an illegal detention,” 1 proscribed by V.T.C.A. Family Code, § 52.02(a). The majority disposes of his contention by saying nothing is presented for review because, among his many objections to the confession, such alleged illegal detention was not voiced.2 The reason is apparent from the briefs of the parties — even now neither has traced the odyssey of appellant beginning at the residence of his kin about midnight. *53I address the contention in the interest of justice.
Officer J. R. Owens, an officer in the radio patrol division, was directed to go to that residence and to arrest appellant, presumably because of his familiarity with the neighborhood and past acquaintance with appellant, himself. Arriving there, he found appellant in a state of undress, and accompanied him into a bedroom. Having seen the motion picture film of actions of the figures shown, Owens knew that the one thought to be appellant was wearing a sweater with a distinctive design. Remarking to appellant that “it was fairly cold outside and he might need to get a coat,” Owens watched as appellant extracted from a pile of clothing in a nearby chair the sweater, and donned it. They then drove to the Public Safety and Courts Building at 1000 Throckmorton, which also housed the Fort Worth Police Department.
Assigned to assist in the investigation of the robbery, Detective D. R. Thompson had viewed the film with Officer Owens. When he first saw appellant at “the police station” appellant was wearing a sweater. Since it appeared to be the same sweater shown in the film, Detective Thompson gave the instructions to take the sweater from appellant, telling the officers “when they did take him to the Juvenile Detention Center, they take [all] clothing ... to retain it for evidence purposes.” Officer Owens took appellant to the center “somewhere about 12:30 or 1:00” — some thirty minutes after arresting him and escorting him to “the police station.” Appellant was taken to the center “where he changed clothes,” and was then brought back to Detective Thompson; the clothes were tagged and placed in the crime lab as evidence.3
Every written statement, two of them, and the confession ultimately admitted in evidence came thereafter.
V.T.C.A. Family Code, Title 3, Delinquent Children and Children in Need of Supervision, is to be construed to effectuate the public policies set forth in § 51.01. Section 52.02(a) provides:
“A person taking a child into custody, without unnecessary delay and without first taking the child elsewhere, shall do one of the following:
******
(3) bring the child to a detention facility designated by the juvenile court...”
Section 52.02(b) mandates that such person “shall promptly give notice of his action and a statement of the reason for taking the child into custody” to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian and the office or official designated by the juvenile court.
The record is not too clear as to the precise place within the Public Safety and Courts Building Owens first took appellant4 — except that he definitely was not confined in a tank, holdover or other cell. But we can be certain that interrogation that formally began after 1:25 a. m., took place in a room of the Homicide Office in the police department; it resulted in two statements, the last being completed at 3:33 a. m., followed by a magistrate’s warning at 3:47 a. m. Then appellant was returned to the Juvenile Detention Center.
I believe it cannot fairly be found that what occurred here during the early morning hours of February 16, 1977, effectuated the public policies prescribed in Title 3 of the Family Code; I further agree with the opinion expressed in Matter of D.M.G.H., 553 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1977, no writ history) in similar circumstances, that applicable provisions of § 52.-02 were not complied with in the handling of appellant, this delinquent juvenile.5
*54However, his confession aside, appellant is starkly shown on film committing the offense for which he was convicted. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

. All emphasis is mine unless otherwise indicated.

. The confession finally admitted in evidence is the third statement shown to have been made from the time of his arrest shortly before midnight February 15 until he appeared in the office of Municipal Court Judge Pro Tern Bowen about midday February 16, 1977. Although there was much testimony about them during the hearing on motion to suppress, the State did not tender the first two statements to the jury.

. The above recitation is drawn from the record testimony of Officer Owens and Detective Thompson, e.g., at pages 77-78, 180, 181, 183.

. Owens believed it was the crime lab area.

. The State of Texas began to struggle with problems in dealing with delinquent children vis a vis its criminal justice system as early as Acts 1907, 30th Leg., ch. 65, p. 137, and reported cases reveal continuing tensions between the thrust of advocates for more “rights” for juvenile offenders and the parry by advocates of “rights” of society. See, e.g., complaints of *54inadequacies advanced in Gordon v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 228 S.W. 1095, 1096 (1920, 1921) and some aspects of the historical record traced in Ex parte Morgan, 595 S.W.2d 128, 133-134 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Dissenting Opinion) and in Ex parte Trahan, 591 S.W.2d 837 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). The last major legislative effort was made in 1973, when Title 3 was added to the Family Code, and its public purposes were stated in § 51.01, supra. So long as the Legislature prescribes constitutional procedures pertaining to these matters “the State must adhere to its requirements,” Matter of H. S., Jr., 564 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo 1978), and, it has been said, “Police officers, courts and others involved in the handling of juveniles are bound to comply with the detailed and explicit procedures enacted by the Legislature in that [Family] Code,” Matter of D.M.G.H., supra, at 828. Still, not every failure of compliance revealed in a subsequent criminal prosecution will necessarily constitute such an infringement as to warrant a new trial.