Court Opinion

ID: 9449650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:17:53.420058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:55.416425
License: Public Domain

KNOCH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Reluctantly I find myself unable to agree with Judge Kiley that guilty pleas take a case out of the scope of “consent judgments” within the meaning of § 5(a) of the Clayton Act. I do not follow the reasoning that a plea of guilty cannot be a “consent” to judgment because it requires no further act by the government and may not be rejected by the court if it is voluntarily made with understanding of the nature of the charges.
A plea of guilty is not a unilateral act taken by the defendant in a legal vacuum. It is a direct response to accusations by the government. The accused accepts those accusations without proof. He agrees to the government’s allegations of fact and consents to whatever judgment the court may impose. There is nothing further for the government to do; the government has prevailed; the government has secured all that the government sought in bringing the charges. It is as though an offer were made and accepted as it stands. Such an acceptance is not a counter-offer requiring the further consent of the offeror to make a contract.
Further, I do not find the legislative history “inconclusive.” My study of it leads me to the conclusion that a primary Congressional purpose was to induce capitulation of defendants to avoid protracted litigation and to impose additional burdens by way of simplifying individual civil suits only against those who exposed the government to extended and expensive unnecessary trials.
As a plea of nolo contendere requires the approval of the court which may or may not be given, the sole way in which a defendant can conclusively consent to judgment is by way of a plea of guilty.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.