Court Opinion

ID: 9731756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:57:20.381202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.980472
License: Public Domain

CROSBY, J., Concurring.

There are few principles of human affairs more self-evident than this: The unverified story of an untested informer is of no more moment than a fairy tale on the lips of a child, and the same tale from an anonymous tattler is worth much, much less.

This warrant was issued without probable cause; the affidavit merely reported anonymous tips uncorroborated in any meaningful way. Before Proposition 8 abolished this state’s exclusionary rule (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); see In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744]), our Constitution would have required suppression of the evidence. (People v. Campa (1984) 36 Cal.3d 870, 884 [206 Cal.Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634]; People v. Kershaw (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 750, 756-757 [195 Cal.Rptr. 311].)
Even under the amorphous “totality of the circumstances” standard announced in Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [76 L.Ed.2d 527, 103 S.Ct. 2317] just a few months before the warrant was issued, it would also have failed federal scrutiny. The affidavit there, although originating in anonymous information, disclosed far more detailed facts and much greater investigative corroboration than the pitiful recitation in this case.1 Nevertheless, despite the patent illegality of the warrant under article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, suppression of its gleanings is permitted only if currently required by the federal exclusionary rule. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).)
We have recognized that the exclusionary rule does not necessarily apply in every instance in which the Fourth Amendment is violated. (E.g., Gordon J. v. Santa Ana Unified School Dist. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 530, 542-543 [208 Cal.Rptr. 657].) And the number of exceptions is expanding apace: The most recent addition to the list? Searches conducted in good faith reli*947anee on improvidently issued warrants. (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [82 L.Ed.2d 677, 104 S.Ct. 3405].) Thus, the question of whether suppression is now required under federal law is considerably more difficult than it would have been on the day of the search in this case.
In Leon, the United States Supreme Court eliminated automatic exclusion for evidence obtained by warrants executed in good faith but without probable cause. Although the warrant in Leon almost certainly could—and would—have been upheld under the Gates test, the court chose instead to strike at the exclusionary rule itself. (Id., at p. 906 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 687].) A warrant’s validity is no longer the sole inquiry at a suppression hearing, merely a first step in the analysis. Suppression is available, with certain exceptions noted below, only where the warrant is both invalid and served in bad faith; and, as to pending cases, we are told Leon is retroactive. (People v. MacAvoy (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 746, 760 [209 Cal.Rptr. 34]; People v. Helmquist (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 609, 616 [207 Cal.Rptr. 718], mod. 162 Cal.App.3d 202e.)
The momentous nature of the Leon decision can be appreciated by reference to Justice Brennan’s bitter dissent: “It now appears that the Court’s victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete. That today’s decision represents the piece de resistance of the Court’s past efforts cannot be doubted, for today the Court sanctions the use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief of illegally obtained evidence against the individual whose rights have been violated—a result that had previously been thought to be foreclosed.” (United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 929 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 702] (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).)
As expressed in the majority opinion, the rationale of the new rule is as follows: “[T]he marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial cost of exclusion. We do not suggest, however, that exclusion is always inappropriate in cases where an officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms. . . . ‘[A] warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish’ that a law enforcement officer has ‘acted in good faith in conducting the search.’ [Citation.] Nevertheless, the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable [citation], and it is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.” (Id., at pp. 922-923 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 698], fns. omitted.)
The court then listed a narrow range of circumstances in which suppression will be available in searches conducted pursuant to warrant. First, the *948rule of Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674] survives: Where “the magistrate ... in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. [Citation.]” (United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 923 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 698-699].) Next, Leon “will also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant.” (United States v. Leon, supra, at p. 923 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 699].) The third instance is both the heart of the holding—and startling in its ramifications—but more of it below: “Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) The court concluded its brief list with the following: “Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, at 998-991.” (Ibid.)
The last of the exceptions is not remarkable, but the holding of the cited case is. Sheppard is a companion to Leon; and although the warrant there was clearly “facially deficient,” the search was nonetheless upheld. The affidavit in Sheppard related probable cause to conduct a search for evidence in a murder investigation, but the form warrant authorized only a search for controlled substances. Despite this rather grotesque deficiency, the court created a good faith exception within its own exception: “[T]he police conduct in this case clearly was objectively reasonable and largely error-free. An error of constitutional dimensions may have been committed with respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it was the judge, not the police officers, who made the critical mistake. ‘[T]he exclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges. ’ [Citation.] Suppressing evidence because the judge failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections despite his assurances that such changes would be made will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve.” (Massachusetts v. Sheppard (1984) 468 U.S. 981, 990-991 [82 L.Ed.2d 737, 745, 104 S.Ct. 3424].) Thus, it appears the Leon exceptions themselves will be narrowly applied. (See in addition to Sheppard, People v. MacAvoy, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d 746.)
Nevertheless, I agree the writ sought here must issue—even after Leon— but not for the reason offered by Justice Sonenshine. It seems illogical to concede Leon is retroactive (see lead opn., at pp. 941, 945, relying on *949People v. MacAvoy, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d 746, 760 and People v. Helmquist, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d 609, 616), while at the same time holding the prosecution to a level of prescience in anticipating its rule any horseplayer would surely envy. Astute observers could have predicted reversal in Leon after Gates, but few would have anticipated the rationale of the opinion.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe the prosecution argued good faith in the trial court in either MacAvoy or Helmquist, the California cases applying Leon retroactively. And, while the government did urge good faith in the district court in Leon itself, on appeal it did not, relying only upon Gates.
The cases cited by Justice Sonenshine which reject new legal theories on appeal are not similar to this one. None involved a change in the law, as Leon did, i.e., the virtual elimination of the exclusionary rule in cases involving search warrants. In each the new theory was not a novel legal argument, but a familiar and established doctrine not raised in the initial trial court proceedings.
In People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 219 [101 Cal.Rptr. 860, 496 P.2d 1228], the prosecution justified the search of the defendant’s vehicle, and subsequently its contents, based on the need for safekeeping of his equipment after he had been arrested on traffic warrants. On appeal it sought to add the argument that the search was reasonable in any event, contending the officers had probable cause to arrest Miller for possession of stolen property as well. The Supreme Court rejected the argument on the merits and because it was raised for the first time on appeal. Reinert v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 36 [82 Cal.Rptr. 263] was similar; there an arrest and search were defended in the trial court on the ground Reinert was drunk in public (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (f)). The prosecution was not permitted to shift to a new justification for the arrest in the Court of Appeal.
Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626 [108 Cal.Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33] presented a somewhat different slant. Anticipating a cool reception in the Supreme Court to the justification for a warrantless search accepted in the trial court, the prosecution requested a remand in order to present evidence to establish inevitable discovery. The court refused: “If the People had other theories to support their contention that the evidence was not the product of illegal police conduct the proper place to argue those theories was on the trial level at the suppression hearing. The People offered no such argument at that hearing and may not do so for the first time on appeal. To allow a reopening of the question on the basis of new legal theories to support or contest the admissibility of the evidence, would defeat the purpose of Penal Code section 1538.5 and discourage parties from pre*950senting all arguments relative to the question when the issue of admissibility of evidence is initially raised. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 640, fn. omitted.)
People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835 [120 Cal.Rptr. 83, 533 P.2d 211] is legally similar. There the prosecution originally disavowed the argument that a police occupation of a residence while a warrant was sought could be supported on the ground the defendant was under lawful arrest at the time. Instead, it suggested the conduct was required by exigent circumstances. The Court of Appeal rejected that contention and remanded for a determination as to whether the evidence was obtained as a fruit of the illegality (Shuey v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 535 [106 Cal.Rptr. 452]). The district attorney then attempted to shift to the lawful arrest theory; and the Supreme Court, following Lorenzana, rejected the effort.
These cases are readily distinguishable from the present: No change in the law precipitated the prosecution’s attempt to add a new theory in any of them. Search incident to lawful arrest and inevitable discovery were tried and true prosecution pitches; it was entirely reasonable to reject belated attempts to deliver them after the original suppression hearing.
The revolutionary holding of Leon presents an altogether different situation, however. As here, “good faith” will not have been raised previously in most cases pending on appeal. Thus, the effect of the lead opinion’s rationale would be to reduce the proclaimed retroactivity of Leon to those rare instances where good faith was argued at the trial level. I believe this to be a poor practice for a number of reasons, not the least of which is a belief that similar lawsuits ought to be treated similarly. And I do not view a fortuitous and previously unsupportable argument made in the trial court before Leon to be a very sensible means of distinguishing otherwise identical cases.
Also, basing a decision on the failure to anticipate Leon will not promote judicial economy. It will instead encourage prosecutors to squander public funds and scarce judicial resources in desperate and generally spurious attacks on well-settled precedent merely to preserve an appellate position which may some day gain favor. For example, many have surmised the United States Supreme Court will next extend the good faith exception to warrantless searches. If the lead opinion is correct, the prosecution should be offering evidence of good faith in every suppression motion brought in relation to a warrantless search—not a happy prospect for overworked trial judges, who under current law can only yawn and say, “So what?”
Finally, the direction to suppress the evidence with no clear holding as to the validity of the search will trigger dismissal but may not bar refiling, *951assuming this matter has not previously been dismissed (Pen. Code, § 1387). A new round of litigation will present a very difficult law of the case problem for several reasons. (See, e.g., People v. Shuey, supra, 13 Cal.3d 835.)
Our decision will be the law of the case with respect to whether the warrant was issued with probable cause, for on that we agree. But since a negative answer to that question no longer compels automatic suppression of the evidence, the prosecution, wrapping itself in Leon and its proclaimed retroactivity, might claim the validity of the search on the good faith standard is still open, despite Justice Wallin’s view that the affidavit is so weak, even good faith cannot save the search.
There is a relatively simple solution to all of this, however. Despite my colleague’s understandable reluctance to address good faith at this time, that is the most expeditious course in my view. We can apply the Leon standard of objective reasonableness as well as a trial court, at least on these facts.
What evidence could be produced at a hearing which could possibly assist the prosecution? Could the affiant be heard to claim his selection of this issuing magistrate was based on his high regard for the latter’s intelligence, rather than the other way round? Could the district attorney offer evidence of the judge’s good track record at suppression hearings and prove the officer had taken that into account? Indeed, I am troubled by the whole notion of police nullification of a magistrate’s command to execute a search warrant: Leon has not just changed the rules; it has turned the system on its head.
Although I have located none which has been remanded for that purpose, I concede some recent cases seem to support the notion evidence might be appropriately offered on the subject of good faith: E.g., “There is no evidence indicating that Officer White or the other officers who accompanied him were acting in bad faith, and we therefore find the search was conducted with a good faith belief in its validity. [1] The next (and more important) question is whether the good faith belief in the validity of the warrant was objectively reasonable.” (People v. MacAvoy, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 763; see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, supra, 468 U.S. 981, 990-991 [82 L.Ed.2d 737, 745].)
As the preceding language indicates, however, MacAvoy also supports the proposition that an appellate court may apply the objective reasonableness standard in the first instance. (See also People v. Helmquist, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 618.) I see no reason not to do so here. It would, hopefully, resolve a case which should be concluded now and give some guid*952anee to the trial courts as to what an objectively reasonable search is—or is not. For, while I am aware this warrant was signed by one magistrate, upheld by another at the preliminary hearing, and approved again in the superior court, no properly trained officer aware of the new power of police nullification conferred in Leon could have served it in good faith,2 particularly an officer who has “worked narcotic enforement [sic] for a total of ten years return and . . . [has] participated in hundred [sz'c] of arrests of person [szc] for violations of controlled substance laws at the Community College level [szc] and . . . attended numerous formal courses in this field at the state and federal level.”3 Any rookie officer knows uncorroborated, unknown tipsters cannot provide probable cause for an arrest or search warrant.

There are few principles of human affairs more self-evident than this: The unverified story of an untested informer is of no more moment than a fairy tale on the lips of a child, and the same tale from an anonymous tattler is worth much, much less.

The Gates affidavit contained, in my view, enough detailed corroboration to satisfy the standards of Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. 410 [21 L.Ed.2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584] and Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 84 S.Ct. 1509], the majestic cases Gates overruled.

Since the determination of the officer is what counts after Leon, there is no need to comment as to what the judges could have been thinking.

This apparent mishmash of two pieces of cut-and-paste boilerplate appears in the original.

I agree with Justice Crosby and disagree with Justice Sonenshine on the question of whether the People may argue the Leon rule for the first time on appeal. Leon is retroactive. It surely follows that it can be raised for the first time on appeal. Prosecutors are not required to be prescient or lengthen trial court proceedings by asserting every hopeless argument in order to take advantage of a subsequent new decision. Accordingly I, like Justice Crosby, view this case as though Leon applies.

Both Justice Sonenshine and Justice Crosby emphasize the unreliability of anonymous sources and I am in complete agreement with their views.