Court Opinion

ID: 9686362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:44:55.287871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:18.454838
License: Public Domain

PAGE, J.,
concurring and concurring specially.
I agree that the evidence in this case was properly suppressed, but I reach this result taking a different path. Since 1925, the United States Supreme Court has required probable cause before officers may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). We have likewise consistently required probable cause to search a car without a warrant. See, e.g., State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Minn.1983); State v. Coy, 294 Minn. 281, 286-87, 200 N.W.2d 40, 44 (1972).
The federal courts and this court avoid the force of this long-standing precedent by concluding that a dog sniff of a car is not a search. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). The Court rationalizes the holding on the basis that “a sniff by a dog that simply walks around a car is ‘much less intrusive than a typical search.’ ” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40, 121 S.Ct. 447 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637). I believe that the level of intrusion resulting from a dog sniff is significant and requires probable cause before the intrusion in permissible.
Common sense would lead one to conclude that privacy has been invaded when a drug-sniffing dog has been directed to search a person, her purse, or her vehicle. As a dissenting Ninth Circuit judge puts it:
When using dogs to ferret out contraband, the police are not simply walking around hoping to come across evidence of a crime. Instead, they are investigating. They are trying to find something. They are seeking evidence in hidden places. If this activity does not qualify as a “search,” then I am not sure what does.
*138United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.1984) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). The dog is detecting something about the person that is not otherwise apparent on observation. As a consequence, privacy is invaded and the constitution demands protection.
The level of intrusiveness analysis used by the U.S. Supreme Court in dog-sniff cases is troublesome in another respect. Through technological advances, of which we have likely only scratched the surface, an officer can conduct a search that detects only criminal activity. The Court uses this fact to support the conclusion that no search requiring probable cause occurred in Place and Edmond, but I fail to see how what is detected makes the search any more or less reasonable. The Court stated recently in Kyllo, “The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.” 533 U.S. at 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038. I do not see how the search of a car or a person should be any different. An innocent person who has been subjected to a dog sniff has been searched and can take little comfort in the fact that the dog did not alert — the intrusion is complete regardless of what the dog smelled.
In Edmond, the Court also relied on the absence of physical intrusion into the car in a dog sniff. 531 U.S. at 40, 121 S.Ct. 447. However, the Court rejected the same lack of physical intrusion argument in Kyllo, where a search using infrared technology did not physically intrude into a home. 533 U.S. at 37-38, 121 S.Ct. 2038. The Court noted that, if the Court was guided by the lack of actual physical intrusion, the eavesdropping prohibited in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), would be permissible, along with many other kinds of intrusions. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35,121 S.Ct. 2038. Indeed, the Court rejected the laek-of-physical-intrusion argument as a “mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Applying that same analysis here, the fact that a dog sniff does not physically intrude into the item being sniffed does not mean that it is not intrusive.
In the context of law enforcement techniques that enhance the senses, the Court also stated in Kyllo, “We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search — at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.” 533 U.S. at 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (quotation and citation omitted). In this case, the sense-enhancing dog sniff, not in general public use, obtained information regarding the interior of the vehicle that could not have been obtained without physical intrusion — a physical intrusion that would otherwise require probable cause. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (holding search of automobile in absence of a warrant requires probable cause). Thus, if police could not physically intrude behind the insulation on the underside of the hood given the absence of suspicion of narcotics activity, they should not be allowed to employ a dog to accomplish the same objective.
I do not see a distinction between sense-enhancemenUby-technology and sense-enhancement-by-canine. The U.S. Supreme Court dismisses the intrusiveness of a dog search by labeling it “sui generis.” Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637. This is convenient, but lacks any persuasive force given that the dog is used to detect the very thing the officers would look for themselves if the Fourth Amendment did *139not limit their ability to do so. The Court’s approach to the intrusiveness of sense-enhanced searches is inconsistent, at best.
In addition, as the court recognizes, an automobile is an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the constitutional standard of reasonableness applies to searches and seizures of automobiles. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 438, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); see also State v. Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Minn.1977). While we may expect preeminent privacy in the home, automobiles cannot be far behind on the continuum of privacy interests. For the very poor, a car often serves as a temporary or permanent home; for a majority of people, a car is a place where a portion of everyday life is spent. People carry on private phone and in-person conversations in cars. All cars have locks, and car burglar alarms proliferate. Cars are used to transport not only persons, but the many “effects” also encompassed within Fourth Amendment protection. Thus, distinct from luggage in an airport, about which little expectation of privacy remains (Place, 462 U.S. at 710, 103 S.Ct. 2637), a car should trigger significant protections against the invasion of privacy by the government conducting an investigation.1
Given the privacy interests inherent in an automobile and what I perceive to be a lack of consistency in approach in U.S. Supreme Court cases, I would find adequate and independent grounds under the Minnesota Constitution to hold that privacy interests in an automobile require probable cause to suspect drug-related activity before a dog sniff may be conducted around the exterior of a vehicle. As the court notes, in two previous cases this court has concluded that Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection from unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. See Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Minn. 1994); In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn.1993). In addition, other states have departed from the U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the federal constitution by holding that a dog sniff constitutes a search requiring reasonable suspicion under their state constitutions. See State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 580 A.2d 710 (1990) (affirming conviction because investigative stop of vehicle was based on suspicion of controlled substances); People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (1990) (involving use of drug-sniffing dog in apartment building). Because, as set forth above, I believe there are reasonable expectations of privacy in an automobile, and that a dog sniff is an intrusive search, I would hold that an officer must have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains narcotics before using a drug-sniffing dog to search the vehicle.
The effect of the majority’s conclusion that a dog sniff is not so intrusive as to amount to a search requiring probable cause is to strip from Terry v. Ohio, 392 *140U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), its limitations on the permissible methods of investigation. I agree with the majority that an investigation pursuant to a Terry stop must be limited in its purpose to investigating either the reason the vehicle was stopped or whether the stop poses a threat to officer safety. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (holding that, not only must the scope of an investigatory detention “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” but also, and separately, the stop “must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (holding search “must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer”). In this case, the dog sniff would not help the officers investigate further either the burned-out headlight or the presence of weapons. Thus, the court correctly holds that the investigation in this case was outside the permissible scope of an investigation pursuant to a Terry stop.
However, an investigation pursuant to a Terry stop must also be limited in its methods. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “the investigative methods employed [in a Terry stop] should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (emphasis added). Therefore, by concluding that a dog sniff is not intrusive, the court allows law enforcement to use this method of investigation in & Terry stop even though less-intrusive means might verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion. To preserve the limited nature of methods of investigation pursuant to Terry, the court should reject the temptation to simply conclude that a search is not a search.2
For this reason, I concur specially only in the judgment of reversal.

. Given the long-standing precedent establishing a privacy interest in automobiles, the conclusion that the dog sniff in this case requires probable cause is not based on "subjective perceptions of the intrusiveness of the investigative technique,” as suggested by the court. My conclusion reflects the fact that in the privacy area, judges cannot blindly follow precedent, but must make a judgment of what is reasonable based on assessments of societal expectations. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn.1998) (recognizing for the first time a tort for invasion of privacy). This is the first opportunity this court has had to address the intrusiveness of a dog sniff of a car stopped for an equipment violation, and the assessment of societal expectations in this context is thus one of first impression.

. Indeed, it seems that even the most limber legal reasoning cannot avoid what is obvious to most people, including the state. This point is demonstrated by a brief recently submitted by the state in State v. Litzau, No C3-00-2099, 2001 WL 1464306, (Minn.App.), rev. granted (Minn. Jan. 29, 2002). In this brief, the state repeatedly referred to the use of a German Shepherd to sniff a car as "a search”:
Chief Schmidt arrived just as [Officer] Abbott was asking appellant if they could search his car. Chief Schmidt brought his partner Max, a 90-lb. German Shepherd trained in the detection of narcotics. Chief Schmidt and Max began their search at the rear of appellant's vehicle and moved toward the front.
Brief for Respondent at 6, Litzau, No C3-00-2099, 2001 WL 1464306, (Minn.App.), rev. granted (Minn. Jan. 29, 2002) (emphasis added). Thus, the court’s decision today is reminiscent of the make-believe world of Alice in Wonderland. As she said, "If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. Nothing would be what it is, because everything would be what it isn’t. And contrariwise, what it is, it wouldn't be, .and what it wouldn't be, it would.” Alice in Wonderland (Walt Disney Pictures 1951).