Court Opinion

ID: 9374824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 07:00:16.614039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:53.342619
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                            MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     LORI HOFFMAN,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                             Appellant,              SF-1221-17-0331-W-1

                     v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: February 23, 2023
                 Agency.

                     THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Lori Hoffman, Pinehurst, North Carolina, pro se.

           James L. Paul, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, for the agency.

           Winston D.M. Ling, Esquire, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                  Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                          REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision,
     which dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction.        For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the
     regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant has alleged the following. She previously served as a civilian
     employee at the agency’s Fort Shafter, Hawaii base. Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 1 at 1. In January 2015, she decided to move her family from Hawaii to the
     continental United States for financial reasons, and she discus sed her intent with
     her first- and second-level supervisors. IAF, Tab 8 at 4. In June 2015, after
     being unable to find a suitable Federal Government position that paid relocation
     expenses, she accepted a private-sector position with a defense contractor in
     North Carolina with a start date of July 13, 2015. Id.; IAF, Tab 14 at 6-7. On or
     about July 1, 2015, her second-level supervisor denied her request to be placed
     in leave without pay (LWOP) status for 1 year while she simultaneously worked
     for the defense contractor. IAF, Tab 1 at 8-10. She resigned from her Federal
     position effective July 11, 2015, citing concerns that she would be considered
     absent without leave thereafter given the denial of her LWOP request. Id. at 7-8.
¶3        On May 20, 2016, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC). Id. at 11-12. By letter dated February 28, 2017, OSC informed
     the appellant that it was closing its file regarding her complaint and that she may
     have a right to seek corrective active from the Board.          Id. at 13.    OSC
     summarized the appellant’s complaint as follows: her LWOP request was denied
     (forcing her to resign) as reprisal for disclosures that she made in September
     2013 during an internal investigation and for disclosures that she ma de to the
     Office of Inspector General (OIG) on June 2, 2015. Id.
¶4        The appellant filed this IRA appeal and requested a hearing. Id. at 2-5. The
     administrative judge notified the appellant of what she must do to establish that
     her appeal was within the Board’s jurisdiction and ordered her to file a
     statement, accompanied by evidence, on the jurisdictional elements of an IRA
                                                                                        3

     appeal.   IAF, Tab 3.     In response, she submitted a pleading identifying the
     matters explicitly mentioned in OSC’s close-out letter as well as additional
     alleged OIG activity on May 7, 2015, and an additional allegedly retaliatory
     agency action regarding interference with her defense cont ractor position.
     IAF, Tab 5 at 4-6. Following a conference with the parties, the administrative
     judge docketed the appellant’s involuntary resignation claim as a separate appeal
     in    Hoffman     v.   Department      of   the   Army,     MSPB      Docket     No.
     SF-0752-17-0432-I-1. 2 IAF, Tab 16.
¶5        Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued
     an initial decision dismissing the IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
     IAF, Tab 18, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 15. The administrative judge found that
     the appellant had exhausted her administrative remedies with OSC regarding her
     September 2013 disclosure and June 2, 2015 activity, but that she did not exhaust
     her alleged May 7, 2015 disclosure to OIG or her allegation that the agency
     subjected her to a personnel action when it allegedly contacted her private -sector
     employer. ID at 6-7. The administrative judge found that the appellant made a
     nonfrivolous allegation that she made one protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) concerning a potential violation of agency policy against dishonest
     and fraudulent conduct to an agency investigator in September 2013 and engaged
     in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) when she filed a complaint
     with the OIG in June 2015.        ID at 11-12.    The administrative judge found,

     2
       Although an appellant may pursue an involuntary resignation claim as a personnel
     action in an IRA appeal, we find that the appellant has not been prejudiced by the
     separate docketing of this claim. See Colbert v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 12 & n.5 (2014) (overruling Covarrubias v. Social Security
     Administration, 113 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶ 9 n.2 (2010)). In either case, one aspect of the
     appellant’s jurisdictional burden would be to make at least a nonfrivolous allegation
     that her resignation was tantamount to a constructive removal. IAF, Tab 7 at 2; see
     Mintzmyer v. Department of the Interior, 84 F.3d 419, 423 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Comito v.
     Department of the Army, 90 M.S.P.R. 58, ¶ 13 (2001). As explained in our separate
     Final Order resolving the constructive removal appeal, we affirm the administrative
     judge’s determination that the appellant failed to make such an allegation.
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     however, that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that the protected
     disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s denial of her
     LWOP request. ID at 12-15.
¶6        The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has filed a
     response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. For the reasons set forth
     herein, we find that the appellant established jurisdiction over her IRA appeal
     and we remand this appeal to the regional office for a hearing on the merits.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7        The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has
     exhausted her administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfriv olous
     allegations that (1) she made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity
     was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
     personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).        See Chambers v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 11, 14. The question of
     whether the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation at the jurisdictional
     stage is based on whether the employee alleged sufficient factual matter, accepted
     as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s); see
     Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir.
     2020).

     The appellant exhausted some of her claims with OSC.
¶8        An appellant in an IRA appeal must exhaust her administrative remedies by
     seeking corrective action from OSC before seeking corrective action from the
     Board. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. The substantive
     requirements of exhaustion are met when an appellant provided OSC with a
     sufficient basis to pursue an investigation; however, an appellant may give a more
     detailed account of her whistleblowing activity before the Board than she did to
                                                                                      5

      OSC. Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. An appellant may demonstrate exhaustion
      through her initial OSC complaint, correspondence with OSC, or other
      sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration attesting that
      she raised with OSC the substance of the facts in the MSPB appeal. Id., ¶ 11.
      Exhaustion must be proved by preponderant evidence.               Id.; 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.57(c)(1).
¶9         In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant
      exhausted her claims that she made a protected disclosure during a September
      2013 investigation and that she engaged in protected activity in June 2015 by
      filing an OIG complaint.    ID at 6.   The administrative judge found that the
      appellant failed to prove that she exhausted her allegations that (1) she made a
      protected disclosure to the OIG in May 2015 and (2) the agency retaliated against
      her by contacting her private-sector employer. Id.
¶10        The parties have not challenged the administrative judge’s findings that the
      appellant exhausted her September 2013 protected disclosure and her June 2015
      protected activity, and we find no reason to disturb those findings. However,
      we disagree with the administrative judge’s finding regarding the appellant’s
      May 2015 correspondence with the OIG. Id. Although the administrative judge
      correctly notes that OSC’s close-out letter did not explicitly identify the
      May 2015 email, we find that it had a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation
      of the correspondence. See Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. The subject matter of
      the May 2015 email overlaps with the June 2015 complaint, which was explicitly
      raised with OSC, and the May 2015 correspondence occurred just 1 month before
      the appellant filed her complaint. IAF, Tab 5 at 11-13, 23-30, 55. Based on the
      overlap of the subject matter and the close temporal proximity between the
      May 2015 email and the June 2015 complaint, we find that OSC had a sufficient
      basis to pursue an investigation of the May 2015 email, and it is therefore
      exhausted.
                                                                                               6

¶11         We agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to
      prove exhaustion over her allegation that the agency retaliated agains t her by
      contacting her private-sector employer. ID at 6. OSC’s close-out letter did not
      reference this allegation and the appellant did not assert before the administrative
      judge that she raised the claim with OSC, nor did she submit a copy of her OSC
      complaint or her communications with OSC. IAF, Tab 1 at 13, Tab 5 at 4-6.
      Although the appellant asserts on review that she raised this issue with OSC,
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, she has failed to show that any evidence on this matter was
      unavailable prior to the close of the record before the administrative judge, and
      we therefore do not consider her assertion. 3 See Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service,
      3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980) (holding that, under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board
      generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with a petition
      for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed
      despite the party’s due diligence); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).

      The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her protected activity                   was a
      contributing factor in the agency’s denial of her request for LWOP.
¶12         The administrative judge found that the appellant made one protected
      disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) during a September 2013
      investigation 4 and that she engaged in protected activity pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

      3
        In any event, the appellant has provided no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      finding that, even if exhausted, the alleged incident does not constitute a personnel
      action covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). ID at 6 n.5; see Pasley v. Department of
      the Treasury, 109 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶¶ 6-10 (2008) (affirming the dismissal for lack of
      jurisdiction of the appellant’s claim that a private-sector employer terminated his
      employment based on statements by his former Federal employer).
      4
        The administrative judge found that only one disclosure in the appellant’s September
      2013 statement was protected. ID at 7-12. We believe that the statement may have
      included additional disclosures. For example, the appellant’s disclosure that an agency
      official was “accused of, and investigated for, physically assaulting” a U.S. Army
      officer is sufficient to evidence a nonfrivolous allegation of a violation of law, rule, or
      regulation. IAF, Tab 5 at 9; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); Baldwin v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶¶ 16-21 (2010). However, because we find that
      the appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that the September 2013 statement was a
                                                                                             7

      § 2302(b)(9)(C) in June 2015 by filing an OIG complaint. ID at 11-12. We also
      find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she engaged in protected
      activity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) when she corresponded with the
      OIG in May 2015. 5         IAF, Tab 5 at 11-13.         Finally, we agree with the
      administrative judge’s implicit finding that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged
      that the agency subjected her to a personnel action pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2) when it denied her request for LWOP on or about July 1, 2015.
      ID at 13; see Lewis v. Department of Defense, 123 M.S.P.R. 255, ¶ 13 (2016).
¶13         In order to meet the contributing factor jurisdictional element, an appellant
      may raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact of, or content of, the protected
      whistleblowing was one factor that tended to affect the personnel action in any
      way. Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 22 (2010).
      One way that the appellant may do this is through the knowledge/timing test, by
      nonfrivolously alleging that the official taking the personnel action knew of the
      whistleblowing and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time
      such that a reasonable person could conclude that the whistleblowing was a
      contributing factor in the personnel action.          5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).        The
      knowledge/timing test is not the only way to demonstrate the contributing factor
      element. Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012). The
      Board will also consider other evidence, such as evidence pertaining to the
      strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action,
      whether the whistleblowing was personally directed towards the official taking

      contributing factor in the agency’s decision to deny her LWOP request, as set forth in
      ¶ 15, any error is harmless, and we decline to further examine the particular disclosures
      contained in the statement. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R.
      281, 282 (1984).
      5
        The administrative judge referred to the appellant’s May 7, 2015 correspondence with
      the OIG as an alleged protected disclosure. ID at 6. Because we find that the
      correspondence is protected activity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C), we need not
      determine whether it is also a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
                                                                                            8

      the action, or whether these individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against
      the appellant. Id., ¶ 15.
¶14           In the appellant’s response to the jurisdictional order, she stated that the
      individuals who denied her request for LWOP were aware of her May 2015 OIG
      activity because they were copied on the email. IAF, Tab 5 at 4, 11-13. In that
      email, the appellant stated that she would be following up with the OIG regar ding
      her concerns listed therein, which she did by filing her June 2015 complaint.
      Id. at 11-13. Accordingly, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that
      the responsible management officials were aware of both the May and June 2015
      OIG activity.     We further find that the close temporal proximity between the
      protected activity, occurring in May and June 2015, and the denial of the
      appellant’s LWOP request on July 1, 2015, is sufficient to satisfy the timing
      element of the knowledge/timing test, and therefore the appellant has
      nonfrivolously alleged that her protected activity was a contributing factor in the
      personnel action. See Easterbrook v. Department of Justice, 85 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶ 10
      (2000) (finding that a personnel action that was taken within 7 months of the
      protected disclosure satisfied the knowledge/timing test).
¶15           On review, the appellant does not contest the administrative judge’s finding
      that she did not allege that any agency official who made the decision to deny her
      LWOP request had actual or constructive knowledge of her September 2013
      protected disclosure. ID at 13; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. The appellant has not
      alleged, either before the administrative judge or on review, that the
      September 2013 disclosure was directed toward the officials who denied her
      LWOP request or that those individuals had a motive to r etaliate against her
      based on the 2013 disclosure, nor has she directed the Board’s attention to any
      other    circumstantial     evidence   that   would   support   a   finding   that   the
      September 2013 disclosure was a contributing factor in the denial of her LWOP
      request.    See Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15 (setting forth factors to be
      considered in determining whether the appellant has met the contr ibuting factor
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      element if she has not met the knowledge/timing test). Accordingly, we affirm
      the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant did not nonfrivolously allege
      that her September 2013 disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s
      denial of her LWOP request.

      The appellant is precluded from raising a discovery issue for the first time on
      review.

¶16        In her petition for review, the appellant asserts that the agency failed
      to comply with her discovery requests.        PFR File, Tab 1 at 4.        The agency
      has responded    that   the   appellant’s    discovery   requests   were     untimely.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 6.    Because the appellant did not file a motion to compel
      before the administrative judge, she is precluded from raising this discovery
      issue for the first time on review.          See Szejner v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 99 M.S.P.R. 275, ¶ 5 (2005), aff’d, 167 F. App’x 217 (Fed. Cir.
      2006). To the extent the appellant seeks to waive or extend a discovery deadline,
      she may file a motion with the administrative judge on remand.
¶17        Based on the foregoing, we remand this appeal to the regional office for a
      hearing on the merits of the appellant’s claim that the agency denied her request
      for LWOP in retaliation for her protected OIG activity in May and June 2015.

                                           ORDER
¶18        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                      /s/ for
                                                  Jennifer Everling
                                                  Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.