Court Opinion

ID: 9948569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 17:01:22.546655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:30:38.192056
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1250    Document: 010111011592    Date Filed: 03/07/2024   Page: 1
                                                                           FILED
                                                                    United States Court of
                                     PUBLISH                            Appeals
                                                                        Tenth Circuit
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                        March 7, 2024
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
                                                                   Christopher M. Wolpert
                          _________________________________
                                                                       Clerk of Court

  ALEX W., by and through his parents
  and next friends, MARLENE W. and
  WILLIAM W.,

  Plaintiffs - Appellants/Cross-
  Appellees,

  v.                                                Nos. 22-1236 & 22-1250

  POUDRE SCHOOL DISTRICT R-1,

  Defendants - Appellees/Cross-
  Appellants.
                     _________________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the District of Colorado
                    (D.C. No. 19-CV-01270-CMA-SKC)
                     _________________________________

 Jack D. Robinson of Spies Powers & Robinson, P.C., Denver, Colorado for
 Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

 Robert P. Montgomery of Semple, Farrington, Everall & Case, P.C., Denver,
 Colorado (Mary B. Gray and M. Brent Case, Semple, Farrington, Everall &
 Case, P.C., with him on the briefs), for Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellants.
                      _________________________________

 Before ROSSMAN, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
                 _________________________________

 ROSSMAN, Circuit Judge.
Appellate Case: 22-1250   Document: 010111011592       Date Filed: 03/07/2024   Page: 2

       The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et

 seq., guarantees disabled students “a free appropriate public education,” or a

 FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Appellant Alex W. is a student with

 disabilities who attended elementary school from 2014 to 2018 in the Appellee

 Poudre School District R-1 (School District). In 2018, his parents filed a

 complaint with the Colorado Department of Education alleging the School

 District denied Alex a FAPE. The Parents also sought reimbursement from the

 School District for an independent neuropsychological evaluation conducted in

 the summer of 2018. An administrative law judge denied relief but ordered the

 School District to reimburse the Parents for the cost of the independent

 evaluation under 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2). The Parents challenged the ALJ’s

 decision on the FAPE claims in federal district court. The School District

 brought a counterclaim, seeking reversal of the reimbursement order. The

 district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full.

       Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude the School

 District fulfilled its obligations under the IDEA, so we affirm in Appeal No.

 22-1236. But reimbursement was ordered in error, so we reverse in Cross-

 Appeal No. 22-1250.

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                                         I

       We begin by describing the legal, factual, and procedural background

 common to both appeals. We then consider each appeal in turn, analyzing the

 issues raised by the parties and adding context as needed.

                                         A

       Congress passed the IDEA to ensure “children with disabilities receive

 needed special education services.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154,

 157 (2017). The IDEA “requires States receiving federal funding to make a ‘free

 appropriate public education’ available to all children with disabilities residing

 in the State.” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 232

 (2009) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)). A FAPE is considered a “basic floor

 of opportunity” to allow a child with disabilities access to an individually

 designed education. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.,

 Westchester Cnty v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982). At the “core” of the FAPE

 requirement is the “cooperative process . . . between parents and

 schools,” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005), to jointly

 craft an “‘individualized education program,’ or IEP” for each disabled student,

 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 391

 (2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D)).

       An IEP is the “comprehensive plan” by which “special education and

 related services are ‘tailored to the unique needs’ of a particular child.” Endrew

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 F., 580 U.S. at 391 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181). Each IEP is “prepared

 by a child’s ‘IEP Team[,]’ []which includes teachers, school officials, and the

 child’s parents.” Id. An individualized education program “serves as the

 ‘primary vehicle’ for providing each child with the promised FAPE.” Fry, 580

 U.S. at 158 (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)).

       The IDEA requires school districts to conduct an “initial evaluation”

 when a student with a suspected disability is identified. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1).

 School districts also must conduct a “reevaluation” of disabled students at least

 once every three years. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(2)(A)–(B). 1 The IDEA thus

 ensures schools will gather data that may assist in developing a child’s

 individualized education program. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).

       The IDEA also permits parents to seek an independent educational

 evaluation (IEE). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502. An IEE is “an

 evaluation conducted by a qualified examiner who is not employed by the

 public agency responsible for the education of the child in question.” 34 C.F.R.

 § 300.502(a)(3)(i). “A parent is entitled to only one independent educational

 evaluation at public expense each time the public agency conducts an

       1 The IDEA authorizes a parent to request a new evaluation each year.

 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(2)(A)–(B) (stating a “local educational agency shall ensure
 that a reevaluation of each child with a disability is conducted . . . if the child’s
 parents or teacher requests a reevaluation,” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A), but such
 a reevaluation shall not occur “more frequently than once a year, unless the
 parent and the local educational agency agree otherwise”).
                                          4
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 evaluation with which the parent disagrees.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(5). If a

 parent requests such a publicly-funded IEE, a school district “must, without

 unnecessary delay, either . . . [f]ile a due process complaint to request a hearing

 to show that its evaluation is appropriate,” or “[e]nsure that an [IEE] is

 provided at public expense.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2).

       The IDEA establishes dispute resolution procedures to resolve

 disagreements between school districts and parents. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e),

 (f)(1)(B)(i). “If these measures fail to produce accord, the parties may proceed

 to what the [IDEA] calls a ‘due process hearing’ before a state or local

 educational agency.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 391–92 (quoting 20 U.S.C.

 §§ 1415(f)(1)(A), (g)). At the conclusion of the administrative process, “any

 party aggrieved by the findings and decision” may seek redress in state or

 federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

                                             B2

       Alex lives with several disabilities, including down syndrome, autism

 spectrum disorder, and substantial hearing and vision impairments. Vol. 2 at

 515 ¶ 1. Alex was first diagnosed with autism at Children’s Hospital Colorado

       2 We take these facts from the ALJ’s decision. Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist.

 v. Luke P., ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining, in
 the IDEA context, ALJ’s factual findings are considered “prima facie correct”
 on appellate review). For additional background, we supplement with citations
 to the appellate record.
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 in 2011.3 Because of his disabilities, Alex “exhibit[s] behaviors that affect his

 ability to be educated in typical school settings, such as grabbing, kicking,

 pulling hair, undressing himself, and attempting to run away.” Vol. 2 at 515–

 516 ¶ 1. He engages in “perseverative, self-stimulating actions such as rocking,

 and frequently attempts to lick or place his mouth on objects he encounters.”

 Vol. 2 at 516 ¶ 1. Alex is “substantially nonverbal;” he communicates using a

 NovaChat, a touch-screen tablet with icons. Vol. 2 at 516 ¶ 3. He also wears

 bone-anchored hearing aids.

       In February 2014, the Parents enrolled Alex in the School District for

 first grade. The School District then performed an initial evaluation. The

 Parents and the School District agreed Alex would attend Werner Elementary

 School and participate in the Integrated Learning Supports (ILS) program.

       3 The Parents suggest the School District did not review the 2011 report

 but only reviewed a later report prepared by Children’s Hospital in 2014. The
 Parents appear to argue the School District could not have evaluated Alex’s
 autism-related needs without reviewing the 2011 report. The Parents correctly
 identify uncertainty in the record about whether the School District reviewed
 the 2011 report, but that does not affect our disposition or analysis.

       There are some differences between the two reports. For example, the
 2011 report describes assessments performed to diagnose Alex’s autism and
 general recommendations for supporting children with autism. See Vol. 4 at
 850–58. The 2014 report discusses Alex’s autism diagnosis, while the
 recommendations focus more on Alex’s speech-language and motor skills. Vol.
 4 at 996–1001. But there is no question the School District knew Alex had been
 diagnosed with autism before he enrolled in 2014. Opening Br. at 9 n.5. And,
 as we explain, the School District provided services to address Alex’s autism-
 related needs.
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 The ILS program “implemented aspects of Applied Behavior Analysis,” a

 “research-based system of measures commonly used in educating students

 with ASD,” or autism spectrum disorder. Vol. 2 at 516 ¶ 6.

       Alex was supported by his IEP Team at Werner. The IEP Team included

 Alex’s parents, his general education teacher, his special education teacher,

 and the School District’s speech-language and occupational therapists. Alex’s

 IEP Team met annually to discuss his progress and update his goals. 4

       In August 2017, the School District conducted a triennial reevaluation of

 Alex (the 2017 Reevaluation). The 2017 Reevaluation reassessed Alex’s vision

 and hearing, general intelligence, cognitive and adaptive functioning,

 academic performance, and social and emotional abilities. Alex was observed

 in various school settings, and the School District also gathered information

 from Alex’s parents and teachers. The 2017 Reevaluation acknowledged Alex

 continued to struggle with behavioral challenges and that his progress on the

 NovaChat had “plateaued.” Vol. 3 at 649.

       The results of the 2017 Reevaluation informed the development of Alex’s

 2017 IEP. As relevant here, the School District changed how Alex received

 speech-language and occupational therapy services. Alex would receive “fewer

       4 Alex’s IEP Team developed individualized education programs for him

 for each academic year. As we explain, this appeal ultimately concerns Alex’s
 IEPs for the 2016-2017 school year (the 2016 IEP) and the 2017-2018 school
 year (the 2017 IEP).
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 minutes of direct services per week” under the School District’s new approach,

 but Alex’s specialists and his instructors would consult more frequently on how

 to best assist him. Vol. 2 at 523–24 ¶ 37.

       The Parents challenged the results of the 2017 Reevaluation. In

 particular, they disagreed with the conclusions concerning speech-language

 and occupational therapy, and in February 2018, requested an independent

 educational evaluation in those areas at public expense under 34 C.F.R. §

 300.502(b). The School District funded the IEE and worked with the Parents

 to identify providers to perform it. Alex’s IEP Team met in April 2018 to discuss

 the results of that independent evaluation. In the summer of 2018, the Parents

 continued to challenge the results of the 2017 Reevaluation and requested Alex

 undergo another publicly-funded IEE—this one in the area of neuropsychology.

 Vol. 2 at 535 ¶ 86. The School District refused, maintaining the Parents were

 not entitled to a second IEE at public expense to challenge the same school

 district evaluation. The Parents then paid $5,500 for the independent

 neuropsychological evaluation.

       Between April and May 2018, the School District performed a functional

 behavioral analysis (FBA) at the Parents’ request. An FBA is a tool used to

 “understand why/when/where behaviors are occurring and to learn how to

 reduce [their] number, frequency, and intensity.” Vol. 2 at 517 ¶ 10. Depending

 on what the FBA reveals, a School District can develop a behavior intervention

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 plan (BIP) to help a student manage “maladaptive behavior.” Vol. 2 at 517–18

 ¶ 11. The Parents also requested an independent FBA, which the School

 District funded.

       In September 2018, Alex withdrew from the School District.

                                       C

       On July 10, 2018, the Parents filed a due process complaint with the

 Colorado Department of Education alleging Alex was denied a FAPE from 2014

 to 2018. They claimed Alex did not make progress under his IEPs because the

 School District inadequately assessed and addressed Alex’s behavioral issues,

 improperly reduced his speech-language and occupational therapy services,

 denied him extended school year services, and failed to evaluate all areas of

 Alex’s disability. The Parents sought reimbursement for the independent

 neuropsychological evaluation the School District refused to fund in June 2018.

       The School District moved for partial dismissal, contending the claims

 about the 2014 and 2015 academic years were barred under the IDEA’s two-

 year statute of limitations. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B); 20 U.S.C. §

 1415(f)(3)(C). The ALJ granted the motion. Vol. 6 at 1517:2–9.

       The case proceeded as to the 2016 and 2017 school years. After a five-day

 evidentiary hearing, the ALJ concluded the School District had provided Alex

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  a FAPE. Vol. 2 at 545–46. 5 The ALJ also ordered the School District to

  reimburse the Parents for the cost of the independent neuropsychological

  evaluation. Id. According to the ALJ, the School District “should have

  undertaken its own neuropsychological assessment of [Alex] in 2017.” Id. at

  543. After the Parents requested the neuropsychological IEE in June 2018, the

  ALJ reasoned, the School District had two options under 34 C.F.R.

  § 300.502(b)(2): “comply with the request or file for due process without undue

  delay” to defend its evaluation. Id. at 543. The School District simply denied

  the request, so the ALJ found the Parents were entitled to reimbursement.

        The Parents then sued the School District in federal district court in

  Colorado. The Parents reprised most of the arguments made to the ALJ. They

  did not challenge the ALJ’s decision to dismiss on statute of limitations

  grounds their claims relating to the 2015 and 2016 school years. The School

  District counterclaimed, contending the ALJ erroneously ordered the School

  District to pay for the neuropsychological IEE. Vol. 1 at 29, 32. According to

  the School District, it “had already met its legal obligation to fund an IEE

        5  At the due process hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from nearly
  twenty witnesses. The Parents testified, along with other members of Alex’s
  IEP Team, including his special education teacher, school psychologist,
  speech-language pathologist, and occupational therapist. The parties’ experts
  also testified. For example, the ALJ heard from specialists who conducted
  Alex’s independent educational evaluations and his independent functional
  behavioral analysis. A private behavioral specialist hired by the Parents also
  testified. The ALJ received thousands of pages of documentary evidence.
                                        10
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  related to the 2017 evaluation, at public expense, as required by 34 C.F.R.

  § 300.502(b)(5).” Vol. 1 at 31 ¶ 22.

        No party asked for a hearing or submitted additional evidence, and the

  case was submitted for decision on the administrative record. The district court

  affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full and entered final judgment.

        These timely appeals followed.

                                         II

        We have a “somewhat unique standard of review” in IDEA cases.

  Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th

  Cir. 2008). “Unlike the deferential review typically afforded to administrative

  adjudication of statutory claims, Congress requires district courts to apply a

  modified de novo standard when reviewing agency disposition in the IDEA

  context.” Id. (quoting Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 520 F.3d

  1116, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008)); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). “Specifically,

  the district court must (1) receive the record of the administrative proceedings,

  (2) hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and (3) base its decision

  on the preponderance of evidence.” Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1149–50. “At the

  same time, though the statute specifies that review is de novo, the Supreme

  Court has interpreted the requirement that the district court receive the

  administrative record to mean that due weight must be given to the

  administrative proceedings, the fact findings of which are considered prima

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  facie correct.” Id. at 1150 (quoting Garcia, 520 F.3d at 1125) (internal

  quotation marks omitted). And on appeal, “[w]e apply these very same

  principles in our own review of the district court’s judgment.” Id. 6 “We review

  any legal conclusions, however, under our usual de novo standard.” O’Toole ex

  rel. O’Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 699

  (10th Cir. 1998).

        With these principles in mind, we turn first to the Parents’ appeal.

                                             A

        We begin by briefly describing the Parents’ appellate contentions

  concerning the applicability of the IDEA’s statute of limitations. We do not

  reach the merits on this issue because it is waived.

        The IDEA did not always include a statute of limitations. See 20 U.S.C.

  § 1415(b)(6) (1999). In 2004, Congress added a two-year limitations period,

  codified in two separate sections of that statute: § 1415(b)(6)(B) and

        6 We have recognized our interpretation of the modified de novo standard

  of review “represents the distinct minority position among circuit courts” and
  “runs counter to the general standard of review suggested in Fed. R. Civ. P.
  52(a).” D.T. ex rel. Yasiris T. v. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. No. 5, 55 F.4th 1268,
  1273 n.5 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1150 n.6). And thus,
  “[e]n banc reconsideration of our standard of review may well be appropriate
  at some point.” Id. No party suggests the standard of review affects the
  outcome in this appeal.
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  § 1415(f)(3)(C). 7 The IDEA permits parents of children with disabilities to

  present a due process complaint “which sets forth an alleged violation that

  occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or public agency

  knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis for

  the complaint.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B). A party bringing an IDEA claim

  “shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the

  parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that

  forms the basis of the complaint.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). 8

        7 We have not yet had occasion to interpret how these two statutory

  provisions should be read together, and we need not do so in this appeal. Some
  of our sister circuits have considered the matter, however. G.L. v. Ligonier
  Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 626 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding
  § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) reflect the same two-year limitations
  period, and therefore “parents have two years from the date they knew or
  should have known of the violation to request a due process hearing through
  the filing of an administrative complaint,” absent one of the two statutory
  exceptions found in § 1415(f)(3)(D)); Avila v. Spokane Sch. Dist. 81, 852 F.3d
  936, 937, 939–44 (9th Cir. 2017) (adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning to hold
  “the IDEA’s statute of limitations requires courts to bar only claims brought
  more than two years after the parents or local educational agency ‘knew or
  should have known’ about the actions forming the basis of the complaint”); Ms.
  S. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 72, 916 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 2019) (same).
        8 The IDEA’s statute of limitations tolls under certain circumstances. 20

  U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (explaining “if the parent was prevented from requesting
  the hearing due to – (i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational
  agency that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint; or
  (ii) the local educational agency’s withholding of information from the parent
  that was required under this subchapter to be provided to the parent[,]” the
  IDEA’s two-year “timeline” shall not apply). The Parents have never argued
  these tolling provisions apply here.
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        On appeal, the Parents seem to challenge the dismissal of their 2014 and

  2015 claims by contending the IDEA’s statute of limitations is not a cap on the

  remedies that can be awarded when the harm to a student is ongoing. In their

  reply brief, the Parents make a different argument, suggesting for the first

  time their 2014 and 2015 claims are not time barred because “the scope and

  nature” of the School District’s actions remained unknown to them until 2017

  and 2018. Parents’ Reply at 4. Neither argument is properly before us.

        Recall, in the administrative proceeding, the School District filed a

  motion to dismiss the Parents’ 2014 and 2015 claims as barred under the

  IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations. The School District argued the “Parents

  knew or should have known of any alleged deficiencies or denials of FAPE

  related to [Alex’s] 2014-15 and 2015-16 IEPs during the corresponding school

  years.” Vol. 2 at 344. Because the Parents “fail[ed] to plead any facts to support

  a conclusion that their knowledge arose at a later date,” the School District

  contended dismissal was required. Id.

        In response, the Parents did not dispute an IDEA claim accrues on the

  date a party “knew or should have known” about the alleged action that forms

  the basis of the complaint. Vol. 2 at 389. Nor did the Parents deny knowing

  about the alleged deficiencies in Alex’s IEPs during the 2014 and 2015 school

  years. They argued only the IDEA’s “statute of limitations is not a limitation

  on the time frame for recovery of damages.” Vol. 2 at 389.

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        The ALJ granted the School District’s partial motion to dismiss,

  concluding claims accruing before July 2016 “are outside the statute of

  limitations.” Vol. 6 at 1516:13–18. 9 The ALJ then gave the Parents’ counsel an

  opportunity “to make a record on that ruling.” Vol. 6 at 1517:17–19. Counsel

  declined, responding, “[n]o, Your Honor. I understand.” Vol. 6 at 1517:19.

        In the district court, the Parents continued to allege the School District

  failed to provide Alex a FAPE from 2014 to 2018. The Parents did not, however,

  challenge the ALJ’s dismissal of their 2014 and 2015 claims as time barred.

  Vol. 1 at 40–79. Indeed, the Parents did not mention the IDEA’s statute of

  limitations. As the School District explained in its district court briefing, the

  Parents made “no arguments about why the ALJ erred in his ruling about the

  statute of limitations and did not choose to make a record of” any objection

  when the ALJ granted the partial motion to dismiss. Vol. 1 at 109.

        The district court endorsed the ALJ’s decision to dismiss the Parents’

  claims challenging Alex’s 2015 and 2016 IEPs. According to the district court,

  the Parents’ due process complaint was filed “more than two years after the

  completion of the 2014 and 2015 IEPs.” Vol. 11 at 2917 (discussing 20 U.S.C.

        9 The ALJ emphasized his ruling did not mean “all evidence is cut off at

  July 2016 because, in many cases, the history of the child’s education and the
  history of his disability . . . is relevant outside of the strict limitations period.”
  Vol. 6 at 1517:10–13. The district court likewise “consider[ed] the contents of
  the 2014 and 2015 IEPs as evidence to the extent they are relevant to the other
  claims and defenses in this case.” Vol. 11 at 2918.
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  § 1415(b)(6)(B)). The district court recognized the Parents had not pursued the

  statute of limitations issue in their federal action, observing “Alex’s parents do

  not dispute . . . that this Complaint was filed outside the two-year period.” Id.

  at 2918. 10

        The Parents spend much of their appellate briefing arguing the IDEA’s

  statute of limitations does not “in any respect alter[] the courts’ broad

  power . . . to provide a complete remedy for the violation of a child’s right to a

  free appropriate public education.” Opening Br. at 29 (quoting G.L. v. Ligonier

  Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 605 (3d Cir. 2015)). This was the focus of

  their statute of limitations arguments before the ALJ. But in the district court,

  the Parents did not raise that argument or otherwise challenge the dismissal

  of claims that predate July 2016. We thus have no trouble concluding the

  Parents forfeited on appeal any argument concerning the applicability of the

  IDEA’s statute of limitations. Havens v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 897 F.3d 1250,

  1259 (10th Cir. 2018) (“We ordinarily deem arguments that litigants fail to

        10 While the district court stated the Parents’ “Complaint was filed
  outside the two-year period,” Vol. 11 at 2917–18 (emphasis added), the district
  court dismissed only the “challenges to the 2014 and 2015 IEPs [as] time
  barred,” id. at 2918.

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  present before the district court but then subsequently urge on appeal to be

  forfeited.”). 11

         “[W]e will reverse a district court’s judgment on the basis of a forfeited

  theory only if failing to do so would entrench a plainly erroneous result.”

  Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011). “If an

  appellant does not explain how its forfeited arguments survive the plain error

  standard, it effectively waives those arguments on appeal.” In re Rumsey Land

  Co., LLC, 944 F.3d 1259, 1271 (10th Cir. 2019); see also Richison, 634 F.3d at

  1131 (“[T]he failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal . . .

  surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first

  presented to the district court.”). The Parents do not mention the plain error

  standard, let alone attempt to satisfy it.

         Nor will we entertain the new argument the Parents summarily assert

  in their reply brief. The Parents seem to contend, without elaboration, their

  2014 and 2015 claims are timely because they did not discover “the scope and

         11 We apply traditional forfeiture and waiver rules when reviewing a

  district court’s order in IDEA cases. L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379
  F.3d 966, 975 n.12 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Although Appellants raised the issue of
  [hearing officer’s] alleged bias at the district court, they did not present to the
  district court any arguments regarding the other purported procedural
  violations of the IDEA. For that reason, this court declines to address
  Appellants’ other procedural arguments.” (citing Lyons v. Jefferson Bank &
  Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721 (10th Cir. 1993))).

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  nature” of the School District’s violations until 2017 and 2018. Parents’ Reply

  at 4. This argument is also waived.

        As the School District persuasively argues, the “Parents did not present

  any evidence or give testimony in the underlying due process hearing or before

  the district court that they discovered the alleged injuries from [the] 2014-2015

  and 2015-2016 school years at a time that would relieve them of their

  obligation to file a complaint within two years [of the 2014 and 2015 IEPs].”

  Resp. Br. at 22. We do not consider “late-blooming” arguments raised for the

  first time in a reply brief. GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Behunin, 38 F.4th 1183, 1207

  (10th Cir. 2022); Anderson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 422 F.3d 1155, 1174 (10th

  Cir. 2005) (“The failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that

  issue.”).

        We now turn to the Parents’ main arguments concerning the 2016 and

  2017 school years.

                                         B

         The Parents claim Alex was denied a FAPE because the School District

  violated its obligations under the IDEA. In support, the Parents argue (1) the

  behavioral components of Alex’s disabilities were not properly addressed by

  the School District; (2) Alex did not make progress under his IEPs; (3) Alex’s

  speech-language and occupational therapy were improperly reduced during

  the 2017 school year; (4) the School District mistakenly concluded Alex was not

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  eligible for extended school year services; and (5) the School District did not

  evaluate Alex in all areas of suspected disabilities. Opening Br. at 29–35, 38,

  43. We discern no reversible error on this record.

                 1. The School District Appropriately Identified and
                          Addressed Alex’s Behavioral Needs.

        The Parents contend Alex’s 2016 and 2017 IEPs were legally inadequate

  because the School District failed to identify and address “the functioning” of

  Alex’s behavior—meaning the behavioral aspects of his disabilities. Opening

  Br. at 32; Vol. 2 at 517 ¶ 10. The ALJ rejected this argument, as did the district

  court. The district court concluded Alex’s 2016 and 2017 IEPs “reflect[ed] a

  thoughtful consideration of Alex’s behavioral strengths and weaknesses, as

  well as the most appropriate behavioral interventions for Alex’s unique

  circumstances.” Vol. 11 at 2927. We agree.

        On appeal, the Parents contend the School District was required to

  conduct a functional behavioral analysis and develop a behavior intervention

  plan to craft Alex’s IEPs in 2016 and 2017. There is no support in the law for

  this position. “FBAs and BIPs are just examples of the types of tools and

  strategies that an IEP Team might recommend in a situation where a child’s

  behavior interferes with classroom learning.” D.S. ex rel. M.S. v. Trumbull Bd.

  of Educ., 975 F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2020). The IDEA only requires a school

  district to conduct an FBA and implement a BIP if a student is subject to

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  certain disciplinary actions at school. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(k)(1)(E)–(F) (when

  student’s educational placement is changed because of “code of student

  conduct” violations stemming from “conduct [that] was a manifestation of the

  child’s disability, the IEP Team shall . . . conduct a functional behavior

  assessment, and implement a behavioral intervention plan”); Trumbull, 975

  F.3d at 164 (“Only where a child is seriously disciplined for behavior that is a

  manifestation of their disability is a school required to conduct an FBA and

  implement or review the child’s BIP.” (citing §§ 1415(k)(1)(E)–(F))). The record

  confirms Alex was not disciplined. Thus, as the Parents appear to acknowledge,

  the School District had no obligation to conduct a functional behavioral

  analysis or implement a behavioral intervention plan for Alex. 12

        Still, the Parents insist the School District could not appropriately

  address the behavioral aspects of Alex’s disabilities without first using these

  tools. In support, the Parents rely on 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i), which states

  an “IEP Team shall . . . [i]n the case of a child whose behavior impedes the

  child’s learning or that of others, consider the use of positive behavioral

  interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior.”

        12 See Oral Argument at 4:44–5:31 (Appellants’ counsel agreeing that,

  under the IDEA, a functional behavioral analysis is required only “when the
  child is removed from class for disciplinary reasons”).
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  See Opening Br. at 29. That section does not advance the Parents’ argument,

  however.

        The record shows the School District, before developing Alex’s 2016 and

  2017 IEPs, did consider—but rejected—conducting an FBA. For example, the

  School District considered an FBA as part of the 2017 Reevaluation but decided

  it was unnecessary because “the functions of [Alex’s] behaviors were well

  understood.” Vol. 2 at 523 ¶ 32. The IEP Team also “unanimously concluded

  that a separate plan was not needed [for the 2017 school year] because

  behavioral strategies . . . embedded in multiple sections of the IEP were

  permitting [Alex] to make progress.” Vol. 2 at 525 ¶ 41. And Alex’s special

  education teacher testified that, in 2016, the IEP Team “felt confident helping

  [Alex] regulate his behavior” without a behavioral intervention plan and “knew

  what worked for him.” Vol. 9 at 2246:23, 2247:7–8. Because of that, the School

  District “didn’t feel that [an FBA] was necessary,” especially since one “had

  never been requested.” Vol. 9 at 2246:23–25. 13

        13 The Parents acknowledge the School District ultimately performed an

  FBA in 2018, and then funded an independent FBA at the Parents’ request
  that same year. Notably, the results of the two FBAs confirmed the School
  District’s understanding of the functions of Alex’s behavior in 2016 and 2017.
  Vol 9 at 2447:12–23 (special education teacher testified the results of the 2018
  FBA were “consistent with [her] understanding [of the functions of Alex’s
  behaviors] as well as documentation that [the School District] had seen from
  outside behavior therapists prior to the FBA.”); Vol. 10 at 2653:6–2654:4

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         Under these circumstances, the School District met its obligations to

  Alex under the IDEA. See Elizabeth B. ex rel. Donald B. v. El Paso Cnty. Sch.

  Dist. 11, 841 F. App’x 40, 42–43 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding school district

  provided a FAPE because it “considered” an FBA and a BIP but “found them

  unnecessary”); 14 Lessard v. Wilton Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18,

  26 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding school district provided a FAPE when a student’s

  IEP Team “mulled the matter and determined that a behavioral plan was not

  necessary” to provide a FAPE, reasoning “[n]o more was exigible.”).

        The decision not “to conduct an FBA . . . does not render an IEP legally

  inadequate under the IDEA so long as the IEP adequately identifies a student’s

  behavioral impediments and implements strategies to address that behavior.”

  M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir.

  2013). As the Parents admit, the School District “perform[ed] a number of

  assessments of Alex and, through those assessments, [it] identified several

  behaviors that impeded Alex’s ability to access learning.” Opening Br. at 31–

  32. The record confirms as much. Alex’s 2016 and 2017 IEPs also included

  specific goals to address his behavioral challenges. We thus cannot say the

  (school psychologist testified School District did not learn anything new about
  Alex’s behaviors from the independent FBA requested by the Parents).
        14 We rely on unpublished decisions in our analysis only for their
  persuasive value. See, e.g., United States v. Engles, 779 F.3d 1161, 1162 n.1
  (10th Cir. 2015).

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  School District failed to identify and address the behavioral aspects of Alex’s

  disabilities. In arguing otherwise, the Parents essentially ask us to choose “the

  best methodology” to address Alex’s educational needs, but that “is precisely

  the kind of issue which is properly resolved by local educators and experts,”

  not an appellate court. O’Toole, 144 F.3d at 709 (emphasis added).

            2. Alex’s IEPs Were Reasonably Calculated to Allow Him to
                                  Make Progress.

        The ALJ concluded Alex’s 2016 IEP “included adequate goals, services,

  supports, accommodations, and modifications to allow him to make

  appropriate educational progress.” Vol. 2 at 542. As to the 2017 IEP, the ALJ

  found it also “include[d] the necessary services and supports to permit [Alex]

  to make meaningful progress in areas of demonstrated need.” Id. at 544. The

  district court reached the same conclusion. On appeal, the Parents maintain

  Alex was denied a FAPE because he failed to make appropriate progress under

  his IEPs. We are not persuaded.

        The Parents’ arguments appear to focus on whether Alex progressed

  generally under his IEPs, but that is not the dispositive question. Instead, we

  must ask—as the ALJ and district court correctly did—whether the IEPs were

  “reasonably calculated to enable [Alex] to make progress appropriate in light

  of [his] circumstances.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added); accord

  Garcia, 520 F.3d at 1125 (“[T]he special education services provided to the

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  student [must be] reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive

  educational benefits[.]”). The “question is whether [an] IEP is reasonable, not

  whether the court regards it as ideal.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 399. “[T]he

  burden of proof in these matters rests with the party attacking the child’s”

  IEP—here, the Parents. Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4 of

  Bixby, Tulsa Cnty., Okl., 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).

        Considered under this standard, the Parents’ contentions do not support

  reversal. The Parents first suggest Alex’s 2016 IEP did not sufficiently address

  the behavioral components of his disabilities because he still had behavioral

  issues in 2017. But the ALJ correctly determined Alex’s 2016 IEP included

  goals, supports, and accommodations to address his behavioral needs. And we

  must evaluate IEPs prospectively. An IEP “is not guaranteed to produce any

  particular outcome.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. So “the measure and adequacy

  of an IEP can only be determined as of the time it is offered to the student.”

  O’Toole, 144 F.3d at 701–02 (quoting Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520,

  534 (3d Cir. 1995)). It does not follow that the 2016 IEP was legally inadequate

  because Alex’s behavioral challenges persisted into the 2017 school year.

  Indeed, the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that it is “possible for [Alex]

  to progress on his goals even while problem behaviors are still an issue.” Vol.

  2 at 538 ¶ 98.

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        As to Alex’s 2017 IEP, the Parents fault the School District for not

  sufficiently responding to the behavioral challenges identified in the 2017

  Reevaluation. Of course, a school district cannot “ignore the fact that an IEP

  is clearly failing, nor can it continue to implement year after year, without

  change, an IEP which fails to confer educational benefits on the student.”

  O’Toole, 144 F.3d at 702. But that did not happen here. The record shows the

  2017 IEP included additional goals for Alex responsive to the results of the

  2017 Reevaluation.

             3. The School District Provided a FAPE Even Though Alex’s
                         Direct Therapy Hours Were Reduced.

        In   the   2017   IEP,   the   School   District   reduced   Alex’s   direct

  speech-language and occupational therapy hours and increased the number of

  indirect therapy hours. Direct therapy is “delivered in a one-on-one or small-

  group setting.” Vol. 11 at 2940. Indirect therapy refers to time “in which [Alex’s

  therapists] consulted with his teachers to help them apply speech-language [or

  occupational therapy] strategies in the classroom beyond Alex’s one-on-one

  therapy time.” Vol. 11 at 2940–41.

        The ALJ concluded the School District’s new “collaborative” service

  model “increase[d] the amount of instructional time . . . over and above what

  would have been possible under the previous IEP.” Vol. 2 at 543–44. The

  change “was effective and appropriate,” the ALJ reasoned, because “[d]irect

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  service minutes were reduced and indirect minutes were increased to foster a

  more consultative model where special service providers . . . embed[ded]

  [Alex’s] skills training throughout the instructional day.” Id. at 543. The

  district court similarly concluded the School District “provided ample evidence

  to support its position that the change in Alex’s speech-language and

  occupational therapy time was reasonably calculated to help Alex make

  progress.” Vol. 11 at 2943.

        On appeal, the Parents contend Alex was denied a FAPE because of the

  restructuring of speech-language and occupational therapy services in the

  2017 IEP. We disagree. There is no question Alex had substantial speech-

  language and occupational therapy needs. But we discern no error in the

  determination by the ALJ and district court that the School District’s

  “collaborative” approach was reasonably calculated to meet those needs.

        The Parents also contend the School District’s decision to change the

  quantity of direct-therapy hours was motivated by a general policy for students

  transitioning to middle school and thus not tailored to Alex’s unique

  educational needs, as the IDEA requires. The record does not support this

  assertion. The 2017 IEP explained the shift was to support “Alex generalizing

  his skills across multiple environments” and so the collaborative model would

  “still provide for the specialized instruction necessary for Alex to make

  progress on his IEP goals and objectives.” Vol. 3 at 689. We thus affirm the

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  district court’s conclusion that, even with the reduced direct therapy hours,

  Alex’s 2017 IEP complied with the IDEA.

             4. The School District Provided a FAPE Even Though Alex
                     Was Not Provided An Extended School Year.

        Extended school year (ESY) services are “special-education and related

  services” provided “[b]eyond the normal school year” at no cost to a child’s

  parents. 34 C.F.R. § 300.106(b). The ALJ found the School District had no

  obligation to provide ESY services to Alex since the Parents “asserted their

  opposition to ESY on the basis of home therapies they would provide.” Vol. 2

  at 543 n.17. The district court agreed. On appeal, the Parents contend ESY

  services were necessary to provide Alex a FAPE and thus should have been

  offered, even if the Parents would have rejected the offer. This argument is

  unavailing.

        “Extended school year services must be provided only if a child’s IEP

  Team determines, on an individual basis, . . . that the services are necessary

  for the provision of FAPE to the child.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.106(a)(2). These services

  are “necessary” when “the benefits accrued to the child during the regular

  school year will be significantly jeopardized if he is not provided an educational

  program” beyond the normal school year. Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1028 (quoting

  Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th

  Cir. 1986)). To determine if ESY services are necessary, school districts “should

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  [consider] not only retrospective data, such as past regression and rate of

  recoupment, but also . . . predictive data, based on the opinion of professionals

  in consultation with the child’s parents as well as circumstantial

  considerations of the child’s individual situation at home and in his or her

  neighborhood and community.” Id.

        The record supports the conclusion that the School District provided Alex

  a FAPE without offering ESY services. Both the 2016 and 2017 IEPs explained

  Alex did not experience severe regression of learned skills, any regression he

  did experience was remedied within two weeks, and predictive factors

  indicated Alex would not regress over any breaks. The Parents maintain Alex’s

  lack of regression during the summer was attributable only to services and

  therapies they funded privately, so he still needed no-cost ESY services. This

  argument misunderstands the law. The IEP Team, in determining whether

  ESY services were necessary, was obligated to consider any “alternative

  resources” available to the family—including factoring in “the ability of the

  child’s parents to provide the educational structure at home.” Johnson, 921

  F.2d at 1030, n.9; see also Elizabeth B., 841 F. App’x at 44 (rejecting argument

  that IDEA required school district “to provide no-cost ESY services without

  regard for whether [parents] planned to pay for” their own because school

  district must consider “the availability of alternative resources” when

  determining whether a student needs ESY services). The record shows the IEP

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  Team did just that. We thus see no reason to disturb the district court’s

  conclusion that ESY services were not necessary to provide Alex a FAPE.

             5. The School District Appropriately Evaluated Alex In All
                                  Areas of Disability.

        The Parents contend Alex was denied a FAPE because, in crafting Alex’s

  IEPs, the School District did not appropriately evaluate Alex’s autism. 15 The

  Parents also argue the School District did not determine how best to instruct

  Alex to communicate using his NovaChat. The ALJ and district court rejected

  these arguments, and so do we.

        When conducting an evaluation or reevaluation, a school district must

  “use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional,

  developmental, and academic information [about a child], including

  information provided by the parent, that may assist in determining” whether

        15 To the extent the Parents suggest the School District was obligated to

  determine whether Alex was a student with autism, we disagree on this record.
  There is no question the School District knew about Alex’s autism when he
  enrolled. The Parents do not say otherwise. The record confirms that as early
  as his initial school district evaluation in 2014, the School District considered
  Alex’s autism diagnosis. At the administrative hearing, Alex’s special
  education teacher testified “it wasn’t ever a question of whether [Alex] had
  autism . . . so [the School District] didn’t feel that it was necessary to perform
  a diagnostic assessment.” Vol. 9 at 2257:13–2258:3. Alex already “had [the]
  diagnosis of autism,” and the School District “saw characteristics of autism,”
  so no one “felt that [it] was an incorrect disability category for him at that
  time.” Id. at 2258:1–3. And the 2017 Reevaluation reaffirmed Alex “continue[d]
  to display . . . behaviors associated with an Autism Spectrum Disorders
  diagnosis.” Vol. 3 at 646.
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  a child has a disability and the content of a child’s IEP. 20 U.S.C.

  § 1414(b)(2)(A). The record shows Alex’s IEPs relied on autism-related

  assessments and tools. For example, the School District conducted an

  Assessment of Basic Language and Learning Skills-Revised (ABLLS-R) as part

  of the 2017 Reevaluation, which is a tool used with children with autism to

  identify gaps in skill development. Alex’s special education teacher explained

  it is “typical for students with autism to have splintered skills,” so while a

  typical student’s skills would consistently progress, “kids with autism tend to

  have more gaps.” Vol. 9 at 2260:25–2261:8. The results of the ABLLS-R can

  then inform the educational goals used to “fill in those gaps.” Id. The School

  District also administered the Verbal Behavior Milestones and Placement

  Program (“VB-MAPP”), including during the 2017 Reevaluation. The VB-

  MAPP is a “criterion-referenced assessment tool, curriculum guide, and skill

  tracking system that is designed for children with autism.” Vol. 2 at 549. The

  evidence before the ALJ also showed it was important for the School District

  to consider how Alex’s other disabilities worked together with his autism to

  impact his educational needs.

        As the ALJ explained, Alex’s 2016 IEP was “based on an accurate

  understanding of [his] unique needs,” Vol. 2 at 541–42, and the 2017 IEP

  “include[d] the necessary services and supports to permit [Alex] to make

  meaningful progress in areas of demonstrated need,” id. at 544. The district

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  court agreed, finding the School District “provided Alex with special education

  and related services specifically targeting Alex’s autism.” Vol. 11 at 2940. After

  reviewing the record, and giving “due weight” to the administrative

  proceedings—just as the district court did—we see no basis to hold otherwise.

  Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1150.

        The Parents next argue Alex was denied a FAPE because the School

  District did not properly address Alex’s functional communication needs.

  Because the 2017 Reevaluation showed Alex struggled to use his NovaChat,

  the Parents insist the School District was required to conduct an assistive

  technology assessment. 16 The ALJ found no evidence to support the Parents’

  assertion. Vol. 2 at 519 n.6. The district court agreed, finding Alex’s IEPs

  appropriately addressed his speech-language needs. Vol. 11 at 2940. Again, we

  discern no error.

        The record shows Alex worked with a speech-language therapist trained

  to use the NovaChat, and that therapist instructed Alex’s special education

  teacher and paraprofessionals to use the device. Alex’s speech-language

        16 In support, the Parents point to 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(1)(ii), which

  mandates school districts “[u]se a variety of assessment tools and strategies to
  gather relevant . . . information . . . that may assist in determining . . . [t]he
  content of the child’s IEP.” The Parents also rely on 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(7),
  which requires school districts to use “[a]ssessment tools and strategies that
  provide relevant information that directly assists persons in determining the
  educational needs of the child are provided.” Opening Br. at 40.
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  therapist also coordinated with the School District’s specialists in assistive

  technology—the SWAAAC 17 Team—to address Alex’s communication needs.

  The SWAAAC Team’s expertise informed the specific goals and support

  systems used to develop Alex’s NovaChat skills. This strategy worked, because,

  as the ALJ correctly found, Alex became more proficient with his NovaChat.

  Vol. 2 at 525 ¶¶ 42–43, 544. 18

        Still, the Parents fault the School District for failing to assess “[h]ow best

  to use [the NovaChat] device, how Alex should be instructed in learning to use

  the device, [and] how staff should be trained in using the device.” Opening Br.

  at 40. As the Parents explain, the 2017 Reevaluation observed “Alex’s

  expressive skills have not consistently progressed . . . but rather [have]

  plateaued.” Vol. 3 at 649. We do not question the reality of these challenges,

  but the law does not demand an “ideal” IEP—only one “reasonably” calculated

  to allow Alex to make progress. Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 399. The Parents have

        17“SWAAAC” means Statewide Assistive Technology, Augmentative,
  and Alternative Communication. Vol. 2 at 519 ¶ 16 n.6.

        18 We reiterate the adequacy of an IEP is not determined by reference to

  the particular results it produces. O’Toole, 144 F.3d at 701–02. We note Alex’s
  progress here only to make clear this is not a situation where the School
  District had to take action because Alex’s IEPs were “clearly failing” to address
  his functional communication needs. Id. at 702. The Parents do not argue
  otherwise.
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  not shown the School District’s strategies to improve Alex’s functional

  communication skills using his NovaChat failed to meet this standard.

                                    ***
        In sum, in Appeal No. 22-1236 we AFFIRM the district court’s

  determination that the School District complied with the IDEA by providing

  Alex a FAPE.

                                         III

        We now turn to the School District’s cross appeal, which presents an

  issue of first impression in our circuit under 34 C.F.R. § 300.502. That

  regulation was promulgated to implement §§ 1415(b)(1) and (d)(2)(a) of the

  IDEA, requiring school districts to provide parents “an opportunity . . . to

  obtain an independent educational evaluation” of a disabled child. See 20

  U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1). Section 300.502 governs a parent’s right to request an IEE

  at public expense and a school district’s obligation to respond to such a request.

  The ALJ and district court determined the School District was required under

  § 300.502(b)(2) to reimburse the Parents for the cost of an independent

  neuropsychological evaluation conducted in June 2018. The School District

  contends this ruling was erroneous, and we agree.

                                          A

        Independent educational evaluations, or IEEs, play a critical role in the

  IDEA framework. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, school districts

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  “have a ‘natural advantage’ in information and expertise” compared to parents.

  Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t. of Ed. of

  Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985)). The IDEA counterbalances this advantage by

  providing parents with the right to an IEE at public expense. Id. A publicly-

  funded independent evaluation ensures parents “are not left to challenge the

  government . . . without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition.”

  Id. at 61.

        Section 300.502(b)(1) states that a parent has “the right to an

  independent educational evaluation at public expense if the parent disagrees

  with an evaluation obtained by the public agency.” When parents exercise that

  right, a school district has an obligation under § 300.502(b)(2) either to provide

  the requested IEE or “[f]ile a due process complaint to request a hearing to

  show that its evaluation is appropriate.” Subsection 300.502(b)(5) provides a

  parent “is entitled to only one independent educational evaluation at public

  expense each time [a] public agency conducts an evaluation with which the

  parent disagrees.”

        In August 2017—three years after his initial evaluation—the School

  District reevaluated Alex as required by the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C.

  § 1414(a)(2)(B). The Parents disagreed with the results of the 2017

  Reevaluation. To that end, in February 2018, the Parents requested an IEE at

  public expense under § 300.502(b)(1), “in the areas of speech and language[]

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  and occupational therapy.” Vol. 2 at 526 ¶ 48. The School District funded this

  IEE, thereby complying with § 300.502(b)(2). A few months later, in June 2018,

  the Parents requested another IEE at public expense—this time in

  neuropsychology—to challenge a different aspect of the same 2017

  Reevaluation. The School District refused to fund it, insisting the Parents had

  no right to an additional independent educational evaluation at public

  expense.

        The ALJ ordered reimbursement, reasoning the School District failed to

  comply with § 300.502(b)(2). The district court agreed. Neither the ALJ nor the

  district court considered how § 300.502(b)(5) impacted the School District’s

  obligations as to the June 2018 IEE.

                                         B

        On appeal, the School District argues the ALJ and district court erred as

  a matter of law because 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 only requires a school district to

  fund one independent educational evaluation each time a public agency

  conducts an evaluation with which the parent disagrees. Reimbursement for

  the June 2018 IEE was ordered in error, the School District contends, because

  the School District had already funded an IEE earlier that year concerning the

  same school district evaluation. We agree.

        The plain text of the regulation supports the School District’s position.

  Jake’s Fireworks Inc. v. Acosta, 893 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2018) (“The

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  plainness or ambiguity of [regulatory] language is determined by reference to

  the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the

  broader context of the [regulation] as a whole.” (quoting Nat’l Credit Admin.

  Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 964 F.3d 1199, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014))).

  Subsection 300.502(b)(1) speaks of “an independent educational evaluation at

  public expense.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (emphasis added). With respect to

  the 2017 Reevaluation, the Parents requested and received such a publicly

  funded IEE in February 2018. The June 2018 IEE was the second request

  concerning the 2017 Reevaluation.19 And § 300.502(b)(5) by its terms makes

        19 The Parents seem to suggest the June 2018 IEE was not a request for

  a second IEE, but only a request for a “psycho-educational assessment.”
  Parents’ Reply at 25–26 (emphasis added); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.15 (defining
  an evaluation as “procedures used . . . to determine whether a child has a
  disability and the nature and extent of the special education and related
  services that the child needs.”); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b) (defining assessments as
  tools used during an evaluation or re-evaluation to ensure a child is evaluated
  in “all areas of suspected disability” and to determine “an appropriate
  educational program for the child.”); T.P. ex rel. T.P. v. Bryan Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
  792 F.3d 1284, 1291 n.13 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The IDEA specifies that the term
  ‘evaluation’ is a process during which assessments occur.”).

        There is no support in the record for this contention. The ALJ concluded
  the Parents requested two separate IEEs challenging the same 2017
  Reevaluation. First, the ALJ found the Parents, in February 2018, requested
  an IEE “in the areas of speech and language, and occupational therapy.” Vol.
  2 at 526 ¶ 48. The February 2018 IEE contained multiple assessments
  designed to gather information about Alex’s speech and language abilities.
  Second, the ALJ found, in June 2018, the Parents requested an “IEE in
  neuropsychology.” Vol. 2 at 535 ¶ 86; Vol. 2 at 543. The neuropsychological
  IEE, the ALJ explained, likewise included assessment in multiple areas, such

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  clear the Parents were entitled to “only one” IEE at public expense per school

  district evaluation. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(5). Under these circumstances,

  where the Parents had no right to request or receive a second IEE at public

  expense under § 300.502(b)(1), the School District had no obligation to respond

  to the request under § 300.502(b)(2) either by bearing the cost or filing a due

  process complaint. The contrary conclusion reached by the ALJ and district

  court does not account for § 300.502(b)(5), and thus cannot be squared with

  what 34 C.F.R. § 300.502, in its entirety, plainly provides. See Time Warner

  Ent. Co., L.P. v. Everest Midwest Licensee, L.L.C., 381 F.3d 1039, 1053 (10th

  Cir. 2004) (“[W]e interpret the language of regulations as we construe the

  language of statutes; accordingly, we must read the regulations such that every

  word is operative.”); United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391, 392 (10th Cir. 1993)

  (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute

  must be read together.’” (quoting United States v. Gordon, 961 F.2d 426, 431

  (3rd Cir. 1992))); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 643 (2006) (“[W]e

  do not read statutes in little bites.”).

        The    regulatory     history    amplifies   our   conclusion.   Subsection

  300.502(b)(5) was added to “clarify that a parent is entitled to only one IEE

  each time the public agency conducts an evaluation with which the parent

  as “cognition, academic achievement, attention and memory, language, and
  social/emotional needs.” Id. at 535 ¶ 87.
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  disagrees.” Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities

  and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 FR 46540 at 46690

  (2006) (emphasis added). This clarification reaffirmed “a parent’s statutory

  right to an IEE at public expense, while recognizing that public agencies should

  not be required to bear the cost of more than one IEE when a parent disagrees

  with an evaluation conducted or obtained by the public agency.” Id. As the

  regulatory history indicates, it was not originally clear parents were only

  entitled to one publicly-funded IEE per school district evaluation. But the

  addition of § 300.502(b)(5)—which the ALJ and district court may have

  inadvertently overlooked—leaves no doubt our reading of the regulation is

  correct.

        Thus, we hold the IDEA and its implementing regulations imposed no

  duty on the School District to fund the Parents’ request for a second IEE in

  response to the 2017 Reevaluation or file a due process complaint to resist that

  request. Though we have not encountered much case law on this issue,

  persuasive authority from our sister circuits further supports our view. See

  T.P. ex rel. T.P. v. Bryan Cnty. Sch. Dist., 792 F.3d 1284, 1291 n.13 (11th Cir.

  2015) (explaining, under § 300.502(b)(5), a parent may obtain “an IEE at public

  expense, singular, not IEEs, plural” in response to each school district

  evaluation); M.S. v. Hillsborough Twp. Pub. Sch. Dist., 793 F. App’x 91, 94 (3d

  Cir. 2019) (finding, under § 300.502(b)(1), a parent’s “right to request a publicly

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  funded IEE never arose” so the school district “had no duty to request a due

  process hearing” to challenge a parent’s request for one); Hudson ex rel. Tyree

  v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 1059, 1065–66 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting argument that a

  school district must reimburse a student’s family for multiple IEEs because,

  “§ 300.503(b) in terms limits reimbursement to a single evaluation”). 20

        Accordingly, in Cross-Appeal No. 22-1250 we REVERSE the district

  court’s order requiring the School District to reimburse the Parents for the

  second IEE requested in June 2018.

                                             IV

        In sum, in Appeal No. 22-1236 we AFFIRM the district court in full. The

  Parents waived any challenge to the dismissal of their claims challenging

  Alex’s 2014 and 2015 IEPs. And we agree the School District fulfilled its

  obligations under the IDEA by providing Alex a FAPE during the 2016 and

  2017 school years. In Cross-Appeal No. 22-1250, we conclude the district court

  erred by requiring the School District to reimburse the Parents for the

  neuropsychological IEE in June 2018. We therefore REVERSE the district

  court’s reimbursement order.

        20 Hudson predates the addition of § 300.502(b)(5). We nevertheless find

  it persuasive.
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