Court Opinion

ID: 9901932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 18:08:10.617781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:41.657980
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Mills v. Walnut Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2023-Ohio-4234.]

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 PICKAWAY COUNTY

RONALD MILLS,                                     :
                                                  :       Case No. 22CA14
        Appellant-Appellant,                      :
                                                  :
                                                  :
        v.                                        :       DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                                  :       ENTRY
WALNUT TOWNSHIP BOARD                             :
OF ZONING APPEALS,                                :
                                                  :
        Appellee-Appellee.                        :       RELEASED: 11/16/2023
                                                  :

                                       APPEARANCES:

Abigail N. Dalesandro and Kristin E. Rosan, Madison & Rosan, LLP, Columbus,
Ohio, for Appellant.

Judy C. Wolford Pickaway County Prosecutor and Robert A. Chamberlain
Assistant Pickaway County Prosecutor, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.

Wilkin, J.

        {¶1} Appellant, Ronald Mills (“Mills”), is appealing a Pickaway County

Court of Common Pleas judgment entry that affirmed the appellee’s, Walnut

Township Board of Zoning Appeals,’ (“BZA”) decision denying Mills’ application

for a zoning variance. Mills argues that the trial court’s judgment is not supported

by the evidence and the zoning ordinance is unconstitutional. After reviewing the

parties’ arguments, the record, and applicable law we find that the trial court’s

judgment is supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial

evidence and his constitutional claim has been waived. Therefore, we affirm its

judgment.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                               2

                             I.     INTRODUCTION

       {¶2} Mills purchased approximately 80 acres of property in Walnut

Township, Pickaway County, Ohio for $599,000.00 from Roger Schneider. Mills

planned to divide the property into three approximate 23-acre lots and build a

house on each lot with two of the houses sharing a single driveway. However,

Walnut Township zoning code section 13:05:02 required every house to have

200 feet of continuous road frontage. Because of the unique “horseshoe” shape

of his property, Mills could build only one house that would comply with the 200-

foot-road-frontage requirement with the other two houses on a lot with 100 feet of

road frontage and a shared driveway. Consequently, he filed an application for a

variance with the BZA that would allow one of the houses to have only 100 feet

of road frontage, instead of the 200 feet that zoning required. The BZA denied

the variance. The BZA denied his application.

       {¶3} Mills filed a R.C. Chapter 2506 appeal of the BZA’s denial to the

Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas. At the appeal hearing before the trial

court, Mills testified that prior to his purchase he “looked every where [for

possible zoning restrictions],” but found none. However, Mills also admitted that

he never reached out to the Walnut Township trustees in an attempt to learn of

any restrictions.

       {¶4} Mills testified that he did not learn of the road-frontage restriction until

June 4th (the day that he closed on the property), or June 5th, while having a

discussion with Walnut Township Trustees Warren Spangler and Roger Cook.

Mills claimed that he also received a call from Kevin Archer that day, who was
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                             3

the Walnut Township zoning inspector. Archer also informed Mills of the zoning

restriction problem.

       {¶5} Archer testified that Spangler contacted him and informed him of his

discussion with Mills about Mills’ plan to build three houses on his property.

Archer immediately called Mills and told him of the road-frontage restrictions.

Archer testified that Mills’ responded: “I’m buying 79 acres and I think I can do

with it whatever I want.” Archer stated that he could not remember the date of

the call, but it was “somewhere in late summer early fall.”

       {¶6} Archer further testified that it was his understanding that in 2009,

Walnut Township zoning was amended increasing the road-frontage requirement

for a house from 150 feet to 200 feet. Archer stated that during his time as

inspector, there had been no variances to the 200-foot frontage requirement

granted.

       {¶7} The next witness was Walnut Township Trustee Warren Spangler,

who had been a trustee for more than 20 years and was familiar with Mills’

property. He was also aware of the road-frontage requirement. Spangler

testified that he had a discussion with Mills to make him aware of the frontage

requirement. During their conversation, Mills told Spangler that he was “getting

ready to close on [the property].”

       {¶8} Spangler also testified that previously the road-frontage requirement

per house was 150 feet, but the zoning was amended to 200 feet because “a lot

of homes were being built, and still are for that matter, getting a lot of homes built

that might preserve some of the farm ground and agricultural ground and spread
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                              4

out some houses a little more.” He claimed that granting a variance that would

change the road-frontage requirement from 200 feet to 100 feet was significant.

Spangler claimed that if Mills’ variance was granted, others will seek the same

variance.

       {¶9} Last to testify was Walnut Township Trustee Roger Cook, who had

been a trustee for 12 years. He stated that he was familiar with Mills’ property.

He also claimed that he was present with Spangler during the conversation that

informed Mills of the 200-foot-road-frontage requirement. Cook believed that this

discussion occurred prior to Mills closing on his property without further

elaboration.

       {¶10} The court then questioned Cook.

Court: “Do you think [Mills’ property] would sell? Could he get his money back if

he could only have two lots there and they were able if he sells those two lots, in

your opinion”

Cook: “I don’t - - I’m not for sure about that, but I don’t know if he could or not

with the current prices. Possibly.”

Court: “Do you know what Schneider sold those other lots off there for? Didn’t

Dr. Bolender buy one?”

Cook: “Well, they were different sizes. My son lives up there right next to a

couple of them.”

Court: “Do you know what he was getting?”

Cook: “The one gentleman said that he had like five acres or possibly around

three, he paid about between fifty/sixty thousand.”
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                             5

Court: “About $10,000 an acre.”

Cook: “Yeah Um-hum.”

       {¶11} In resolving Mills’ appeal, the trial court relied on Duncan v.

Middlefield, 23 Ohio St. 3d 83, 491 N.E.2d 692 (1986), which sets out seven

factors to be considered and weighed in determining whether a property owner

seeking an area variance will encounter “practical difficulties” in the use of his

property. They include:

         (1) whether the property in question will yield a reasonable return
         or whether there can be any beneficial use of the property without
         the variance; (2) whether the variance is substantial; (3) whether
         the essential character of the neighborhood would be substantially
         altered or whether adjoining properties would suffer a substantial
         detriment as a result of the variance; (4) whether the variance
         would adversely affect the delivery of governmental services (e.g.,
         water, sewer, garbage); (5) whether the property owner
         purchased the property with knowledge of the zoning restriction;
         (6) whether the property owner's predicament feasibly can be
         obviated through some method other than a variance; (7) whether
         the spirit and intent behind the zoning requirement would be
         observed and substantial justice done by granting the variance.

Id., syllabus.

       {¶12} The trial court issued a judgment entry that reviewed all

seven factors, and, with the exception of the fourth factor (delivery of

government services), it found the remaining six factors weighed in favor

of the BZA. Therefore, the court affirmed the BZA’s denial of Mills’

application for the variance.

                          II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE TOWNSHIP’S DENIAL
       OF OWNER’S VARIANCE REQUEST BECAUSE SUCH DENIAL WAS
       ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNSUPPORTED BY A
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                                 6

       PREPONDERENCE OF RELIABLE, PROBATIVE, AND SUBSTANTIAL
       EVIDENCE

II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE TOWNSHIP’S DENIAL
       OF OWNER’S VARIANCE REQUEST BECAUSE THE ZONING
       ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND ITS CONTINUED
       APPLICATION DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY SERVE ANY LEGITIMATE
       GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST

                          III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       {¶13} Mills argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that

six of the seven Duncan factors weighed in favor of affirming the BZA’s denial of

his requested variance.

                                    A. Duncan Factors

          1. Whether the property in question will yield a reasonable return or
            whether there can be any beneficial use of the property without the
                                        variance

       {¶14} Under the first Duncan factor, Mills claims the trial court erred in

finding that his property could be sold for a reasonable return. The trial court

erroneously relied on the testimony of Cook in finding that other properties in the

area had sold for $10,000 per acre. Instead, Mills claims that the court

improperly based this estimate on its own knowledge of “differently sized lots.”

       {¶15} Mills also argues that there was no beneficial use of the property

without the variance because he would be “one house short of his plan for his

family to all reside together [in three homes].” Mills maintains that his plan could

not be accomplished without the variance.

       {¶16} Therefore, Mills claims that the trial court’s decision finding the first

Duncan factor in favor of the BZA was not supported by the evidence.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                            7

       {¶17} The BZA argues that Mills’ property could be sold for a profit, and

can otherwise be used in a beneficial manner without the variance. There was

testimony that Mills could get $10,000 per acre, which would have resulted in a

sale price of $800,000 - a $200,000 profit. Alternatively, the BZA argues that

Mills could build two houses and rent the rest of the land.

       {¶18} Thus, the trial court’s finding that Mills' property could provide a

reasonable return or have a beneficial use without the variance is supported by

the evidence.

                          2. Whether the variance is substantial

       {¶19} Under the second Duncan factor, Mills claims there was no

evidence to support the BZA’s decision that the variance was substantial. Mills

argues that the determination of whether a variance is “substantial is not a rote

recitation or comparison of percentages but a determination of substantive

factors[,]” relying on Carrolls v. BZA City of Willoughby, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-

L-110, 2006-Ohio-3411. Mills maintains that the evidence shows that there were

nearby lots with less than 200 feet of road frontage. He also claims that the

BZA’s witnesses – Spangler, Cook, and Archer – offered no support for the

proposition that the variance was substantial. Therefore, Mills asserts that the

trial court “failed to weigh many substantial factors as in Carrolls.”

       {¶18} Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding the second Duncan factor

in favor of the BZA.

       {¶19} The BZA claims that the variance is substantial. The zoning

requires 200 feet of road frontage for every house built on a property. The
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                              8

requested variance would reduce the road frontage by half to 100 feet. Further,

all three witnesses – Archer, Spangler, and Cook - testified that the variance was

substantial based on their experience and knowledge. Spangler also testified

that if the variance is granted it would expose the township to similar variance

requests when new houses are built. Thus, under the second Duncan factor, the

evidence supports that the requested variance is “substantial.”

              3. Whether the essential character of the neighborhood would be
               substantially altered or whether adjoining properties would suffer a
                        substantial detriment as a result of the variance

        {¶20} Under the third Duncan factor, Mills maintains that a variance would

not change the essential character of the neighborhood and the adjoining

property owners would not suffer a substantial detriment. Mills claims that the

trial court relied on speculative and unsubstantiated testimony that the variance

would be a substantial detriment to the adjoining landowners.

        {¶21} Mills also claims that his neighbors were “excited” and “happy with

what [Mills] is doing.” Mills argues that his plan to build three houses with the

variance still complies with the purpose of the zoning, which is to “spread houses

out a little bit.”

        {¶22} Therefore, Mills maintains that the trial court erred in finding the third

Duncan factor in favor of the BZA.

        {¶23} The BZA argues that granting the variance will substantially alter the

essential character of the neighborhood and the adjoining properties will suffer a

detrimental result. Spangler testified that in 2009, Walnut Township zoning was

amended from requiring 150 feet of road frontage to 200 feet because many
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                               9

homes were being built in the area so the increase in frontage was necessary to

preserve some of the agricultural ground and to spread out the houses. The BZA

acknowledges that although there are some lots with homes that have less than

200 feet of road frontage, Spangler testified that these homes were built prior to

the 2009 zoning change.

       {¶24} Therefore, the BZA maintains that the evidence supports that

granting a variance will substantially alter the essential character of the

neighborhood.

             4. Whether the variance would adversely affect the delivery of
                  governmental services (e.g., water, sewer, garbage)

       ¶25} Both parties agree that granting the variance would not affect the

delivery of government services.

       5. Whether the property owner purchased the property with knowledge of
                                 the zoning restriction

       {¶26} Under the fifth Duncan factor, Mills claims that there was no

evidence to support that he purchased the property with knowledge of the zoning

restriction requiring each home to have 200 feet of road frontage. Mills claims he

did not become aware of the restriction until June 4th (the day that he closed on

the property) or 5th after having a discussion with trustees Cook and Spangler.

       {¶27} Mills’ argues that the trial court’s reliance on Archer’s testimony

supporting that he (Mills) knew of the zoning restriction before he purchased the

property is misplaced. Mills points out Archer testified that he informed Mills of

the zoning restriction in late “summer or early fall.” Mills claims that June 4th or

5th is not late summer or early fall.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                               10

       {¶28} Mills also maintains that the court’s reliance on Spangler and

Archer’s testimony that he knew of the restriction before he purchased the

property conflicts with Mills’ testimony that he was unaware of the restriction

before he purchased the property. Therefore, he claims that the court’s decision

finding the fifth Duncan factor in favor of the BZA is not supported by the

evidence.

       {¶29} The BZA claims that testimony from Spangler, Cook, and Archer

support the conclusion that Mills had knowledge of the zoning restriction prior to

his purchase. Archer testified that he had a discussion with Mills and mentioned

the 200-foot-frontage requirement. Regarding that discussion, Archer testified

that Mills said, “I’m buying it and I think I can do with it whatever I want to do.”

Further, Spangler and Cook testified that they had a discussion with Mills about

the zoning restriction five to seven days before Mills closed on the property.

Specifically, Spangler claimed that during his discussion with Mills, he (Mills)

“stated that he was closing in, I can’t remember, five, seven days after this

conversation, he was getting ready to close on it.”

       {¶30} Thus, the BZA maintains that the evidence supports the conclusion

that Mills was aware of the 200-foot road-frontage requirement before he

purchased the property.

         6. Whether the property owner's predicament feasibly can be obviated
                       through some method other than a variance

       {¶31} Under the sixth Duncan factor, Mills argues that whether his

predicament feasibly can be obviated through some method other than a

variance is not supported by the evidence. He claims that if the court can rely on
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                             11

the alternatives it relied upon in resolving the first Duncan factor (e.g., selling the

property or building two homes and renting the rest of the land), then this factor

will never be found in favor of the property owner. Thus, Mills contends that the

trial court’s decision in favor of the BZA on the sixth Duncan factor is

unsupported by the evidence.

       {¶32} The BZA claims that Mills’ predicament can be obviated through

methods other than a variance. One option would be for Mills to build two homes

and rent the remaining land. The second is that Mills could sell the property for a

profit and purchase a different property where he could build three homes within

the zoning requirements.

       {¶33} Therefore, the BZA claims that the evidence supports that Mills’

predicament can be obviated without a variance.

          7. Whether the spirit and intent behind zoning requirement would be
              observed and substantial justice done by granting the variance

        {¶34} Finally, Mills claims that the spirit and intent of the zoning variance

as set forth in the seventh factor of the Duncan test would be served by granting

the variance. Mills argues that it is unclear how a road frontage requirement is

directly related to preserving farmland and spreading houses. Mills stated that

one of his homes would not even be visible from the road. Thus, Mills argues

that granting his requested variance of 100 feet of road frontage will not affect the

spirit and intent behind the zoning requirement.

       {¶35} The BZA maintains that granting the variance will violate the spirit

and intent of the restriction requiring 200 feet of road frontage for a home.

Spangler testified that many new homes were being built in the area and the
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                            12

zoning restriction “might preserve some of the farm ground, agricultural ground

and spread out the homes a little.” Therefore, the BZA argues that Mills' own

plans for building a home with only 100 feet of road frontage violates the spirit

and intent of keeping some farm ground and spreading out homes.

       {¶36} Thus, the BZA argues that the trial court’s decision affirming the

BZA’s denial of Mills’ variance is supported by the evidence.

                                       B. Law

                    1. Duncan v. Middlefield, 23 Ohio St.3d 83

       {¶37} Both parties and the trial court rely on Duncan as setting out the

proper test to evaluate the denial of an area variance to zoning enacted by a

township. 23 Ohio St.3d 83, 85-86, 491 N.E.2d 692 (1986). However, this court

has never cited Duncan, let alone applied it in a zoning appeal. Therefore, we

begin recitation of the law by considering the applicability of Duncan in this case.

       {¶38} The Ohio Supreme Court has defined two standards of review

depending on the type of variance at issue: (1) the “practical difficulties” standard

for granting a variance that relates only to area requirements and (2) the

“unnecessary hardship” standard for granting a variance that relates to a use

variance. Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 32–33, 465 N.E.2d 848 (1983);

Duncan, at 85-86, 491 N.E.2d 692 (1986). However, “[Ohio] [a]ppellate districts

are not consistent as to whether townships must apply the separate standards for

use and area variances because Kisil and Duncan involved municipalities not

townships.” Jones v. Hubbard Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 11th Dist. Trumbull

No. 2014-T-0041, 2015-Ohio-2300, ¶ 11.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                          13

.     {¶39} “One view holds ‘that the General Assembly has limited the power

of townships to grant a variance to only those cases in which the zoning

resolution causes unnecessary hardship to the landowner.’ ” Id., quoting Dsuban

v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 140 Ohio App.3d 602, 607, 748 N.E.2d 597

(12th Dist.2000). “This approach does not distinguish between an area and a

use variance. That is because R.C. 519.14, which outlines the powers of a

township board of zoning appeals, permits variances only where ‘literal

enforcement of the resolution will result in unnecessary hardship.’ ” (Citation

omitted) Id., quoting Dsuban at 607. This approach is followed by a minority of

Ohio’s appellate districts. See Cole v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals for Marion Twp., 39

Ohio App.2d 177, 317 N.E.2d 65 (3d Dist.1973), paragraph two of the syllabus;

Zickefoose v. Green Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 99-COA-

01307, 2000 WL 1289429 (Sept. 7, 2000), and Dsuban.

        {¶40} “The other approach applies the separate standards for use and

area variances to townships.” Jones 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0041, 2015-

Ohio-2300 at ¶ 12, citing Hebeler v. Colerain Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 116

Ohio App.3d 182, 186-87, 687 N.E.2d 324 (1st Dist.1997). In adopting this

approach, the Eleven District Court of Appeals reasoned:

      “Although both Kisil and Duncan involved municipalities rather than
      townships, this court believes that the Supreme Court intended a
      unified standard of review in area variance cases notwithstanding the
      language contained in R.C. 519.14. This belief is based upon the fact
      that the underlying character type of an ‘area variance or ‘use’
      variance does not change depending upon whether application is
      made to a municipal or township authority. Regardless of the
      distinctions between municipalities and townships, one simple fact
      remains the same: area variances do not alter the character of the
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                           14

       zoning district and neighborhood considerations are less significant
       than in use variance cases.” (Emphasis sic.)

Id. quoting Zangara v. Twp. Trustees of Chester Twp., 77 Ohio App.3d 56, 59,
601 N.E.2d 77 (11th Dist.1991).

A majority of Ohio appellate districts have adopted this approach. See Hebeler,

116 Ohio App. 3d at 186, 687 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1st Dist.1997); Stickelman v.

Harrison Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2002-Ohio-2785, 772 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 13 (2d

Dist.); Whiteco Outdoor Advert. v. Violet Twp., Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 5th Dist.

Fairfield No. 96CA70, 1997 WL 219159, *2 (March 16, 1997); Butz v. Danbury

Twp., 2010-Ohio-179, 926 N.E.2d 319, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.); James v. Austintown

Twp. Zoning Appeals Bd., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13MA179, 2015-Ohio-2330, ¶

20; In re Liverpool Twp. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 9th Dist. Medina No. 2657-M,

2657-M, 1997 WL 760704, *6 (Nov. 19, 1997); and Jones, 11th Dist. Trumbull

No. 2014-T-0041, 2015-Ohio-2300, ¶ 13.

       {¶41} We agree with the reasoning in Jones and find that the latter

approach adopted by a majority of Ohio appellate districts applicable herein.

Consequently, we find that the parties and trial court properly relied on Duncan in

analyzing Mills’ appeal.

                              2. Standard of Review

       {¶42} A decision by a board of zoning appeals may be appealed to a court

of common pleas pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506. Cleveland Clinic Found. v.

Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 141 Ohio St. 3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23

N.E.3d 1161, ¶ 14.

       R.C. Chapter 2506 confers on the common pleas courts the power
       to examine the whole record, make factual and legal determinations,
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                            15

       and reverse the board's decision if it is not supported by a
       preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.
       Although a hearing before a common pleas court pursuant to R.C.
       2506.01 is not a de novo review, “it often in fact resembles a de novo
       proceeding.” (Citation omitted)

Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Cincinnati Bell v. Glendale, 42 Ohio St.2d 368, 370, 328
N.E.2d 808 (1975).

       {¶43} In a R.C. 2506.04 appeal, “the trial court [is] required * * * to assess

the credibility of the witnesses as well as the probative character of the evidence,

and to determine the weight to be given to that evidence.” Fulmer v. W. Licking

Joint Fire Dist., 5th Licking No. 13-CA-36, 2014-Ohio-82, ¶ 16; Orange Barrel

Media v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-447, 2012-Ohio-6205, ¶ 8.

       {¶44} “The court may find that the order, adjudication, or decision is

unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by

the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole

record.” R.C. 2506.04. “Consistent with its findings, the court of common pleas

may then “affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the order, adjudication, or decision,

or remand the cause to the officer or body appealed from with instructions to

enter an order, adjudication, or decision consistent with the findings or opinion of

the court.” Id.

       {¶45} An appellate court’s review of a R.C. Chapter 2506 is “more limited

in scope than the court of common pleas.” Smith v. Nelsonville, 2023-Ohio-2844,

__ N.E.2d __ , ¶ 11 ( 4th Dist.), citing Three Wide Entertainment v. Athens Bd. of

Zoning Appeals, 2011-Ohio-2304, 954 N.E.2d 191, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.). “ ‘The court of

appeals reviews the common pleas court's judgment only on questions of law

and does not have the same extensive authority to weigh the evidence.’ ” Devol
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                             16

v. Logan, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 21CA4, 2021-Ohio-4164, ¶ 14, quoting

Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive, 142 Ohio St.3d 125,

2014-Ohio-4650, 28 N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 14, citing Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of

Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147, 735 N.E.2d 433 (2000). “ ‘Within the

ambit of questions of law for appellate-court review is whether the common pleas

court abused its discretion [and] [t]he court of appeals must affirm unless it finds,

as a matter of law, that the trial court's decision is not supported by a

preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.’ ” (Brackets sic.)

Id., quoting Independence at ¶ 13. “ ‘In this context, a reversal ‘as a matter of

law’ can occur only when, having viewed the evidence most favorably to the

decision, there are no facts to support’ the trial court's decision.” Austin v.

Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107247, 2019-Ohio-636,

¶ 23, quoting Kurutz v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105899, 2018-Ohio-

2398, ¶ 8. As the Supreme Court stated in Cleveland Clinic Found. v Bd. of

Zoning Appeals, “the standard of review for courts of appeals in administrative

appeals is designed to strongly favor affirmance. It permits reversal only when

the common pleas court errs in its application or interpretation of the law or its

decision is unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence as a matter of law.”

141 Ohio St. 3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161at ¶ 30.

                           3. Variances from Township Zoning

       {¶46} A variance permits a property owner to use his or her property in a

manner that is prohibited by zoning regulations. Nunamaker v. Jerusalem Twp.

Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2 Ohio St.3d 115, 118, 443 N.E.2d 172 (1982). There are
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                          17

two types of variances, area variances and use variances. Schomaeker v. First

Nat. Bank of Ottawa, 66 Ohio St. 2d 304, 306, 421 N.E.2d 530 (1981).

        A use variance permits land uses for purposes other than those
        permitted in the district as prescribed in the relevant regulation.
        An example of a use variance is a commercial use in a residential
        district. Area variances do not involve uses, but rather structural
        or lot restrictions. An example of an area variance is relaxation of
        setback lines or height restrictions.

Id. at 307.

The instant case involves an area variance because it seeks a “relaxation” in the

length of the 200-foot road-frontage restriction.

       {¶47} In Kisil, the Court “held that the standard for granting a variance for

area requirements is a lesser standard than when a use variance is at stake: the

applicant need only show practical difficulties rather than unnecessary hardship.”

12 Ohio St.3d 30, 465 N.E.2d 848 at syllabus. “[A] property owner encounters

‘practical difficulties’ whenever the area zoning requirement unreasonably

deprives the property owner of a permitted use of the property.” Hebeler, 116

Ohio App. 3d at 187, 687 N.E.2d 324 (1st Dist.1997), citing Duncan, 23 Ohio St.

3d at 86, 491 N.E.2d 692 (1986). In an apparent effort to elaborate the “practical

difficulties” test, shortly after Kisil was decided, the Court authored Duncan,

which, as we recognized infra, set out seven

        factors to be considered and weighed in determining whether a
        property owner seeking an area variance has encountered
        practical difficulties in the use of his property include, but are not
        limited to: (1) whether the property in question will yield a
        reasonable return or whether there can be any beneficial use of
        the property without the variance; (2) whether the variance is
        substantial; (3) whether the essential character of the
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                             18

          neighborhood would be substantially altered or whether adjoining
          properties would suffer a substantial detriment as a result of the
          variance; (4) whether the variance would adversely affect the
          delivery of governmental services (e.g., water, sewer, garbage);
          (5) whether the property owner purchased the property with
          knowledge of the zoning restriction; (6) whether the property
          owner's predicament feasibly can be obviated through some
          method other than a variance; (7) whether the spirit and intent
          behind the zoning requirement would be observed and substantial
          justice done by granting the variance.

23 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 491 N.E.2d 692 (1986), citing, 3 Anderson, American Law
of Zoning (2 Ed.1977), Variances, Section 18.47 et seq.; Wachsberger v.
Michalis (1959), 19 Misc.2d 909, 191 N.Y.S.2d 621.

         {¶48} “These factors are to be weighed to determine whether the existing

area zoning requirement at issue, i.e., the frontage requirement, as applied to the

property owner in question, is reasonable and, thus, whether a variance should

be granted. No single factor is determinative.” Baker v. Mad River Twp. Bd. of

Zoning Appeals, 2d Champaign No. 2008 CA 16, 2009-Ohio-3121, ¶ 63, citing

Duncan at ¶ 86; Winfield v. Painesville, 11th Dist. Lake No.2004-L-053, 2005-

Ohio-3778, ¶ 28. (There is no “requirement that the Duncan factors be applied

mathematically.”). “Different facts will require that different questions be asked

and different factors to be considered, sometimes more, sometimes fewer, but in

no two cases must the factors considered necessarily be the same.” Trent v.

German Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 144 Ohio App.3d 7, 18, 759 N.E.2d 421 (2d

2001).

                                      C. Analysis

         {¶49} In analyzing the first factor under Duncan, the trial court found that

Mills could get a “reasonable return” or had an alternate “beneficial use” for his
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                              19

property. The court determined that Mills could sell his property for a “significant

profit” and buy another property to build his three houses. Alternatively, the court

found that Mills could build two houses on his property and rent the remaining

land. We conclude that these findings are supported by the testimony of Walnut

Township Trustee Roger Cook, who offered his opinion regarding the sale price

of other properties in the area that had sold. Similarly, in analyzing the sixth

factor, the trial court further found these options also supported that Mills could

“obviate” his “predicament” by taking advantage of one of the alternatives.

       {¶50} In considering the second factor, the trial court also found that Mills’

variance was “substantial” because it sought to reduce the road-frontage

requirement in half, from 200 feet to 100 feet. The court’s conclusion here is also

supported by the testimony of Spangler who opined that Mills’ variance was

substantial and subjected other properties to the same reduction. Further, of the

nine lots discussed by Mills at the hearing that had less than the 200-foot-

frontage-requirement, none had as little as 100 feet of road frontage, which is the

road frontage Mills’ variance was seeking. Of these lots, the one having the least

amount of road frontage measured 151.2 feet, which was still almost 50 feet

more than the frontage that Mills was seeking in his variance.

        {¶51} In considering the third factor, the trial court found that the variance

would substantially alter the essential character of the neighborhood. Noting that

variances “run” with the land, the court found that in the future nothing would

prevent the owner of the 100-foot frontage property from installing a driveway

even though there are no homes in the area with 100 feet of road frontage that
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                               20

have a driveway, which “would be a first “[in the neighborhood].” The court also

pointed out that of the lots that Mills identified that had less than 200 feet of road

frontage, there was no evidence that those houses were built after 2009 when

the road frontage requirement increased from 150 feet to 200 feet. Finally,

Spangler testified that the purpose of the 200-foot-road-frontage requirement was

to preserve agricultural/farmland and spread out the houses, and zoning

inspector Archer testified that under the current zoning, no variances had been

granted.

        {¶52} In regard to the fourth factor, the trial court noted that the parties

agreed that the proposed variance would not adversely affect the delivery of

governmental services.

       {¶53} In considering the fifth factor, the trial court found that Mills knew of

the road-frontage restriction prior to purchasing the property based upon zoning

inspector Archer’s testimony, who stated that when he informed Mills about the

restriction, Mills replied: “I’m buying the property and I think I can do with it

whatever I want to do.” Further, Spangler testified that when he was talking to

Mills about the restriction, Mills told him that he was “getting ready to close on

[the property].” (Emphasis added).

       {¶54} Finally, in considering the seventh factor, the court found that the

“spirit and intent” of the 200-foot road frontage restriction would not be observed

if the variance was granted. This finding was supported by Spangler who

testified that a lot of homes are being built in the township and the zoning might

preserve some of the farm ground and spread out houses a little.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                               21

       {¶55} Having reviewed the record, we find that the trial court’s resolution

that six of the seven Duncan factors weighed in favor of the BZA is supported by

a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Therefore, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment that upheld the denial of Mills’ application for a

variance. Accordingly, we overrule Mills’ first assignment of error.

                          IV. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       {¶56} Mills claims that the 200-foot road frontage zoning requirement

herein violates due process when applied to his property. Mills claims that there

are nine properties near his that have road frontages that are less than 200 feet.

He also argues that the character of the surrounding properties is similar to the

character of his property that would result if his variance was granted. For

example, his plan for 23-acre lots would preserve the agricultural nature of the

land and spread out the houses. Under these circumstances, Mills claims that

the BZA was acting in a discriminatory fashion imposing the 200-foot restriction

on his property rather than granting the variance. Therefore, Mills claims the

BZA violated his constitutional rights by denying his application for a variance.

       {¶57} The BZA first argues that because Mills did not raise the

constitutionality of the zoning at the hearing on Mills’ variance, the argument is

waived. Even if the issue is not waived, the BZA claims that the zoning here is

constitutional. While the nature of the surrounding properties are important,

townships have authority to determine zoning regulations. Here the township

amended its zoning years ago to maintain the agricultural integrity of the

township.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                           22

                                       A. Law

       {¶58} Generally speaking, “[a] litigant who fails to raise an argument

before the trial court forfeits the right to raise that issue on appeal.” New Holland

v. Murphy, 2021-Ohio-2671, 1176 N.E.3d 309, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing

Independence, 142 Ohio St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, 28 N.E.3d 1182at ¶ 30

(stating that “an appellant generally may not raise an argument on appeal that

the appellant has not raised in the lower courts”). Nevertheless, a court of

appeals “may * * * consider a forfeited argument using a plain-error analysis.” Id

at ¶ 23, citing Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Nat. Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife, 144

Ohio St.3d 278, 2015-Ohio-3731, 42 N.E.3d 718, ¶ 27 (“stating that reviewing

court has discretion to consider forfeited constitutional challenges”).

       {¶59} However, an appellate court “ ‘must proceed with the utmost

caution’ when applying the plain error doctrine in civil cases.” Id., citing Goldfuss

v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). “ ‘The plain error

doctrine should never be applied to reverse a civil judgment * * * to allow litigation

of issues which could easily have been raised and determined in the initial trial.’ ”

[Brackets removed, ellipses sic.] Id. quoting Goldfuss at 122, 679 N.E.2d 1099.

“The issue of the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance cannot be

administratively determined but can be raised by a landowner who appeals an

adverse administrative decision to the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R. C.

Chapter 2506.” Moss v. The Austintown Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeal, 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 76 C.A. 89, 1976 WL 188649, *2 (Dec. 20, 1976), citing Mobil Oil
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                         23

Corp. v. Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23, 26, 309 N.E.2d 900 (1974).

                                     B. Analysis

       {¶60} Mills could have raised an as-applied constitutional challenge to the

zoning at issue in his R.C. 2506 appeal to the common pleas court, but did not.

Consequently, in exercising our discretion, we decline to consider whether Mills’

failure to raise his constitutional claims in the trial court was plain error.

Therefore, we find that Mills has waived his constitutional claim. Accordingly, we

overrule Mills’ second assignment of error.

                             V. CONCLUSION

       {¶61} We overrule both of Mills' assignments of error. Accordingly, the

judgment of the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                             JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA14                                                           24

                               JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay
the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

       Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the
date of this entry.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                      For the Court,

                                   BY: ____________________________
                                      Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL
      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.