Court Opinion

ID: 9718738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:32:31.294555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:02.149870
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Emmert, J.
The appellant did not specify any provision of the Constitution of Indiana or the Federal Constitution in the trial court that was contravened by the statute, nor are his briefs on appeal any more specific. I think the precedents of this court correctly decide the general rule that a party must charge the particular constitutional provision that has been violated, both in the trial court and on appeal, or he waives the issue.
“When a provision of a constitution is asserted to be violated it should be pointed out with such certainty that the trial court and this court have no difficulty in determining what part of the constitution is violated by it. [Citing cases.]” Prunk v. Indianapolis Redevelopment Comm. (1950), 228 Ind. 579, 586, 93 N. E. 2d 171.
“The rule is well settled in this state that he who challenges the validity of a statute on constitutional grounds must point to the constitutional provision inhibiting such legislative action.” Luttrell v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 116, 121, 183 N. E. 318.
“If, by the reference to local self-government, appellant intended to assail the act because of its *487conflict with some other constitutional provision, express or implied, he has failed to point it out in the brief, and we are not warranted in’ making an independent search of constitutional provisions to discover a cause for holding invalid a legislative act in order to reverse a judgment. As against any constitutional objection urged, the act is valid.” Haun v. State ex rel. Bd. of Comm. of Co. of Carroll (1915), 183 Ind. 153, 155, 108 N. E. 519.
“The first objection, viz., that the act is not a constitutional exercise of legislative authority, is too vague and indefinite to raise any question. The particular provision of the Constitution supposed to be violated should be pointed out.” Levy v. State (1903), 161 Ind. 251, 256, 68 N. E. 172.
See also Jones v. Stawicki (1953), 233 Ind. 273, 111 N. E. 2d 718.
This is not a case where we construe a statute by avoiding a construction that might make it unconstitutional, or where public rights are involved so that there is an exception to the general rule that a constitutional issue must be duly presented to the trial court and on appeal. Even where grave public rights are concerned, a majority of this court refused to consider a constitutional question because not properly asserted in State ex rel. Savery, etc. v. Marion Criminal Court (1955), 234 Ind. 632, 637, 130 N. E. 2d 128, wherein the court held, “A constitutional question will not be decided, where the cause can be properly disposed of otherwise.” But since the statute on inheritance by adopted children is being held constitutional, it becomes necessary to test the act under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and §23 of Article I of the Constitution of Indiana.1
*488Section 208 of the Probate Code of 1953 provides for unequal inheritance, depending on the adopted child being under or over 21 years of age.
“ (a) For the purpose of inheritance to, through and from a child legally adopted during his minority, such child shall be treated the same as if he were the natural child of his adopting parents, and he shall cease to be treated as the child of his natural parents and of any previous adopting parents for purposes of intestate succession: Provided, that if a natural or any previous adopting parent shall have married the adopting parent, the adopted person shall also be considered the child of such natural or previous adopting parent.
“ (b) For the purpose of inheritance to, through and from a child legally adopted when an adult, such child shall be treated as the child of his natural parents for purposes of intestate succession except that he shall in addition be entitled to inherit as a child from the adopting parent or parents.” Section 6-208 (a) and (b), Burns’ 1953 Replacement.
Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor §23 of Article I of the Constitution of Indiana prohibit reasonable classification. This court well laid down the standards for determining what is reasonable in Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler (1927), 199 Ind. 95, 101, 102, 103, 155 N. E. 465, as follows:
“The law requires something more than a mere designation of characteristics which will serve to divide into groups. Arbitrary selection or mere identification cannot be justified by calling it classification. [Citing cases.] The characteristics which can serve as a basis of a valid classification must be such as to show an inherent difference in situation and subject-matter of the subjects placed in different classes which peculiarly requires and necessitates different or exclusive legislation with respect to them. [Citing cases.]
“A proper classification must embrace all who naturally belong to the class — all who possess a *489common disability, attribute or qualification and there must be some natural and substantial difference germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation between those within the class included and those whom it leaves untouched. Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Westby (1910), 178 Fed. 619, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 97; Selvage v. Talbott, supra; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, supra; Kraus v. Lehman (1908), 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714, 84 N. E. 769; Barrett v. Indiana (1913), 229 U. S. 26, 57 L. Ed. 1050; Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers (1907), 207 U. S. 73, 28 Sup. Ct. 28, 52 L. Ed. 108; Maercker v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., supra. The legislature cannot take what might be termed a natural class of persons, split that class in two, and then arbitrarily designate the dissevered factions of the original unit as two classes, and thereupon enact different rules for the government of each. State v. Julow (1895), 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781, 50 Am. St. 443, 129 L. R. A. 257; State v. Miksicek (1910), 225 Mo. 561, 125 S. W. 507, 135 Am. St. 597.”
A reasonable classification embraces more than one which has a reason for the law. The English law of primogeniture, whereby the oldest son inherited all the father’s land, had a reason behind it.2 Reasonableness must be fair, just, conscionab-le, and grant equality within the classification unless there be strong and compelling causes for discrimination within the class.
*490Equality in descent became the American- policy for intestate descent. “After the separation of'’the' American colonies from the mother country another system was introduced. It was equality before the law. Primogeniture was abolished. The elder son ,was no better than his brothers and males no better than females. It is this principle of equality that lies at the foundation of our civil institutions.” Rountree, Administratrix v. Pursell (1895), 11 Ind. App. 522, 536, 39 N. E. 747.
An intestate act which classifies children by reason of race, creed or color would be a denial of equal protection. If an act provided children should inherit equally, but if any be female, she should inherit one-half the estate she would inherit if a male, it would be void. Nor has the law of this state ever said that children should inherit equally, but if any be under. 21 years of age, he or she should inherit one-half the estate he or she would inherit if 21 years of age. The age of a child has nothing to do with what the intestate laws should provide to be fair, just and equitable. An attempt to discriminate between children for descent by reason of their ages is arbitrary, capricious, and not based on any reasonable cause.
A competent testator by will may discriminate between his children, but when the law makes a--will for him by intestate descent, the statute must give equality between the children. Nor is the situation changed when the law makes an individual a child of another by adoption. I fail to see how comfort, security, love and affection in the adopting home have anything to-do with cutting down the estate he may inherit. In fact, a minor child needs more money than an adult for his education, training, and start in life. The law provides *491for a guardian to care for his property until he reaches 21 years.
On oral argument it was suggested that this unequal treatment' might discourage the child from trying to find his natural parent or paying any attention to him. This argument overlooks the fact there is nothing to prevent the natural parent from making a will and his natural child his beneficiary.
Under the present adoption statute, the same person could' adopt two children of the same natural parent. If one be under 21 years when adopted, he would not inherit- from his natural parent, while the other, if over 21 'years when adopted, could inherit from both parents. If this be equal justice under law, I am unable to discover'it. I never understood inequality between children under the law of descent was a modern concept ; the history of the law is otherwise. If this statute be constitutional, then a primogeniture statute for adopted children by which the oldest son would inherit to the exclusion of all other of his adopted brothers and sisters would also be constitutional.
Section 6-2315, Burns’ 1933 [Acts 1899, ch. 99, §2, p. 131; 1901, ch. 240, §1, p. 554],3 which cut down the interest .in real estate inherited by a second or subsequent childless wife where children by a previous wife survive, furnishes no analogy for declaring valid the unjust discrimination in the present inheritance statute for adopted children. It is to be noted that §6-2315, *492Burns’ 1933, applied only to real estate. It was a most common occurrence for a valuable farm to be acquired by the joint effort of the husband, his first wife, and their children. Also, the statute encouraged a second or subsequent wife to have children, which has always been proper for the legislature to encourage. The fact that the husband would not have his interest in the wife’s real estate diminished if there were no children by the second marriage was no arbitrary discrimination. It was his duty to furnish a home and necessary food, clothing, shelter and medical attention according to his status in life, while there was no such duty upon the wife. The present statute, §6-201 (b), Burns’ 1953 Replacement [Acts 1953, ch. 112, §201, p. 295], now gives both the husband and the second childless wife the same interest in the real estate of a survivor. This is equality in classification, to which no constitutional objection could be made, and it still gives legislative encouragement to both to have children. If either statute had attempted to discriminate between the children of the decedent according to their ages at the time of the decedent’s death, or according to whether they were children by a first marriage or by a second marriage of the intestate, the situation would be more analogous, but it would still be impossible to justify such classification on any reasonable basis.
Section 6-208, Burns’ 1953 Replacement, classifies within the class of adopted children on the basis of age when adopted. It is not based on any fair or just philosophy for the inheritance of property. It offends both the Fourteenth Amendment and §23 of Article I of our Constitution. The provisions as to inheritance should be declared void, which would leave in effect the prior statute on equal inheritance by all adopted children.
Note.—Reported in 150 N. E. 2d 740.

. “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the. same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Art. I, §23, Indiana Constitution.

. “Benefits therefrom. But when the sovereigns began to create honorary feuds, or titles of nobility, it was found necessary to make them impartible, feuda individua, and in consequence descendible to the eldest son alone. To this was added the inconvenience of splitting estates, vie., the division of military services, the multitude of infant tenants incapable of performing any duty, the consequent weakening of the strength of the kingdom, and the inducing younger sons to adopt an idle life in the country, instead of engaging in mercantile, military, civil or ecclesiastical duties.” Blackstone, Commentaries (Gavit’s Ed.) pp. 353, 354.
“At common law the male issue inherits before the female, and, when there are two or more males of equal degree, the elder alone inherits, while females inherit all together.” 4 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd Ed.), §1116, p. 376.
See also Rountree, Administratrix v. Pursell (1895), 11 Ind. App. 522, 536, 39 N. E. 747.

. “If a man die intestate, leaving surviving a second or other subsequent wife, without children by him, but leaving a child or children or their descendants alive by a previous wife, such surviving childless second or other subsequent wife shall take only a life estate in one-third of the lands of her deceased husband, and the fee thereof shall, at the death of such husband, vest at once in such child or children, or the descendants of such as may be dead, subject only to the life estate of such widow.” Section 6-2315, Burns’ 1933.