Court Opinion

ID: 9465191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:38:27.297354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:01.473448
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge, with whom CHARLES CLARK and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges,
join concurring:
I concur both in the result reached, and in the Court’s decision, when Rule 11 noncompliance has been shown, to distinguish collateral attacks under § 2255 from direct appeals. However, because a major purpose of the Rule, as amended in 1975, was prophylactic, e. g., United States v. Clark, 5 Cir. 1978, 574 F.2d 1357, 1358,1 the validity of a test dependent on the manner in which, or the time when, the transgression is asserted, is not self-evident. I would, therefore, not merely adopt the formula used in considering a collateral attack on a conviction obtained in a trial infected by other kinds of procedural error, and I would define the “prejudice” standard more precisely.
Since McCarthy v. United States, 1969, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, strict compliance with Rule 11 has been exacted on the theory that “prejudice inheres in a failure to comply with Rule 11, for noncompliance deprives the defendant of the Rule’s procedural safeguards that are designed to facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntariness of his plea.” 394 U.S. at 471-72, 89 S.Ct. at 1173, 22 L.Ed.2d at 428. Although McCarthy involved a direct appeal, there is nothing in the language of the decision circumscribing its impact.
The Supreme Court’s later decision in Davis v. United States, 1974, 417 U.S. 333, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109, did not involve Rule 11, but we are not the first to consider its possible effect on the McCarthy doctrine; other circuits that have done so have diverged widely on whether, in Rule 11 cases, Davis requires that some sort of harm or prejudice be shown as a basis for collateral attack under § 2255. The First,2 *115Third,3 Sixth,4 and Ninth5 Circuits seem to set aside a guilty plea even in the absence of any detriment to the petitioner if he shows that the rule was not literally followed, while the Second,6 Fourth,7 Seventh,8 Eighth,9 Tenth,10 and D.C.11 Circuits have each analyzed Davis and made a distinction similar to the one we draw today.
Our opinion properly subordinates the administrative convenience of a per se rule, and requires case-by-case analysis in dealing with Rule 11 problems in the future. In this case, the petitioner has shown no possible injury of any kind as a result of noncompliance, and my brethren have, therefore, concluded that we should not discuss what need be demonstrated in order to prevail. Although I agree that obiter dicta should ordinarily be avoided, I am concerned lest the language we adopt prove more confusing than beneficial to lower courts and, perhaps, even to panels of this court, attempting to understand our decision and apply it in future cases.12 The issue is important and, unfortunately, recurrent. Of necessity, we sit infrequently en banc. Therefore, in the interest of clari*116fying the import of our decision, I would attempt to elucidate what we hold.
The petitioner bore the burden of showing that he was not accorded the benefit of literal compliance with Rule 11. Although literal compliance does not exact a catechism, he demonstrated that there had not been full and strict adherence to each substantive requirement of the Rule, whatever words were used.
Noncompliance in that sense having been shown, the government had the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the dereliction was not likely to have been a material factor affecting the petitioner’s decision to plead guilty.13 This is the kind of “prejudice” that I understand to be significant. The government sustained that burden here for the reasons fully set forth by my brethren. In another case it might carry the day by demonstrating, for example, that, although certain information was not conveyed to the petitioner in open court, its full import was actually made known to the petitioner by his attorney or by someone else, and, therefore, the court’s failure to recite it could not have affected his decision to plead guilty. Or, to take another example, the omission may have been a failure to inquire into plea bargaining; the government may be able to show affirmatively that no plea bargains of any kind occurred, and that inquiry into the subject would have elicited only negative answers.
This suggested formulation is not a procedural straitjacket, promulgated in our supervisory role, but an effort to clarify the meaning of our decision. If followed, it would minimize speculation about what “might have been,” buttressed by self-serving declarations of a § 2255 petitioner, while protecting defendants from judicial oversights that have a serious bearing on the sentencing proceedings. Moreover, it would lessen the uncertainty about what is, and what is not, “prejudicial” and on whom the burden rests of demonstrating detriment or its absence.

. See also United States v. Coronado, 5 Cir. 1977, 554 F.2d 166, 173-74, cert. denied, 1977, 434 U.S. 870, 98 S.Ct. 214, 54 L.Ed.2d 149; United States v. Scharf, 8 Cir. 1977, 551 F.2d 1124, 1129, cert. denied, 1977, 434 U.S. 824, 98 S.Ct. 70, 54 L.Ed.2d 81.

. See United States v. Yazbeck, 1 Cir. 1975, 524 F.2d 641, 643 (“we are not disposed to find the error [of the trial judge in failing to ascertain that the defendant understood the possible punishment] harmless”); but see United States v. Tursi, 1 Cir. 1978, 576 F.2d 396, 399 (failure to advise defendant that he was waiving the privilege against self-incrimination “does not *115rise to the level of prejudicial error”). Neither case discusses the impact of Davis.

. See Roberts v. United States, 3 Cir. 1974, 491 F.2d 1236 (granting § 2255 relief without mentioning Davis or McCarthy).

. Timmreck v. United States, 6 Cir. 1978, 577 F.2d 372, 377 (“a Rule 11 violation is per se prejudicial”). This is the only case to reject explicitly the Davis approach in Rule 11 cases.

. See Yothers v. United States, 9 Cir. 1978, 572 F.2d 1326; Bunker v. Wise, 9 Cir. 1977, 550 F.2d 1155. Cf. United States v. Harris, 9 Cir. 1976, 534 F.2d 141 (failure to advise defendant of special parole term constitutes “manifest injustice” under F.R.Cr.P. 32(d) warranting withdrawal of guilty plea). But cf. Sanchez v. United States, 9 Cir. 1977, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (revocation of parole is a “collateral”, not a “direct” consequence of guilty plea, and need not be discussed by judge under Rule 11(c)(1)). Davis was not discussed in any of these opinions.

. Del Vecchio v. United States, 2 Cir. 1977, 556 F.2d 106, 111 (“a defendant must at least show prejudice affecting the fairness of the proceedings or the voluntariness of the plea in order to succeed in a collateral attack”).

. United States v. White, 4 Cir. 1978, 572 F.2d 1007, 1009, quoting Davis and Hill (“ ‘the appropriate inquiry was whether the claimed error of law was a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice” ’ ”).

. Bachner v. United States, 7 Cir. 1975, 517 F.2d 589, 592-3 (“the court must determine . whether the error was of sufficient magnitude to amount to ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice’ and ‘presentís] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent’ ”). Accord, United States ex rel. v. United States Dept. of Probation and Parole, 7 Cir. 1976, 536 F.2d 179.

. McRae v. United States, 8 Cir. 1976, 540 F.2d 943, 947, cert. denied, 1977, 429 U.S. 1045, 97 S.Ct. 750, 50 L.Ed.2d 759 (“was there a fundamental defect in the proceedings which inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice and presented exceptional circumstances that justify collateral relief?”). Accord, Schriever v. United States, 8 Cir. 1977, 553 F.2d 1152; United States v. Kattou, 8 Cir. 1977, 548 F.2d 760; United States v. Ortiz, 8 Cir. 1976, 545 F.2d 1122; United States v. Rodrigue, 8 Cir. 1976, 545 F.2d 75. Cf. United States v. Turner, 8 Cir. 1978, 572 F.2d 1284, 1285 (failure to advise defendant of special parole term does not constitute “manifest injustice” under F.R. Cr.P. 32(d) warranting withdrawal of guilty plea).

. United States v. Hamilton, 10 Cir. 1977, 553 F.2d 63, 66, cert. denied, 1977, 434 U.S. 834, 98 S.Ct. 122, 54 L.Ed.2d 96 (error “did not inherently result in a miscarriage of justice or present exceptional circumstances justifying collateral relief’).

. United States v. Watson, 1977, 179 U.S.App. D.C. 103, 548 F.2d 1058 (failure to explain special parole term requires remand to determine whether there was “manifest injustice” under F.R.Cr.P. 32(d) warranting withdrawal of guilty plea).

. The majority uses the terms “prejudice,” “fundamental defect which inherently results in the miscarriage of justice,” and “omission inconsistent with the demands of fair procedure” apparently interchangeably and without explaining whether they are cumulative, alternative, or equivalent. If, unlike some of the other circuits making this distinction, we are not to adopt the unadorned language of Davis, I think we should light some candle of explanation to guide the interpretation of our standard.

. The procedure is similar to that required in cases of constitutional error. Once the transgression is demonstrated, the burden of proving that it was harmless is on the government. Chapman v. California, 1967, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. Because-the purpose of Rule 11 is salutary — and it is, at least in part, procedural, not a formulation of constitutional requirements — I propose that the test used be “not likely to have been a material factor affecting the petitioner’s decision” rather than “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”. Obviously, if the Rule 11 transgression was so serious as to amount to a deprivation of a constitutional right, the Chapman test would be applicable.