Court Opinion

ID: 9771536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:46:51.16683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:32.704385
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the principal opinion in its affirmance of the order denying defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment for irregularity. Further, I agree with the reversal of the circuit court order sustaining defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment of Default on equitable grounds and I am satisfied the majority opinion is correct in treating defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment of Default as a petition in equity. However, I feel it is unnecessary that there be further proceedings and believe there can be rever*891sal of the order setting aside the default judgment on equitable grounds without the necessity of a hearing in the trial court. But though inclined to direct that the original judgment be reinstated as a final judgment in the case, I nevertheless concur for the reasons hereinafter discussed.
The suit commenced by petition filed in the circuit court on December 27, 1984, and there is no dispute that defendant was personally served on January 11, 1985, and that defendant delivered the summons with petition attached to its liability insurance company. The insurance company delivered the same to a law firm of its choice and on January 31, 1985, a partner in the firm dictated an entry of appearance and request for a thirty-day extension of time to plead. We further learn from the record that on February 1, 1985, a secretary typed the documents and delivered them to the partner for signature. Defendant asserts that on that day the documents were returned to the secretary who, instead of mailing them to the clerk of the circuit court, mistakenly mailed the original documents to the insurance company together with the photocopies. The insurance company allegedly received these items on February 4 but neither the clerk of the circuit court nor plaintiffs attorneys received any “entry of appearance” nor a “request for extension of time to plead.” More than thirty days following service, the circuit court on February 28 entered an interlocutory judgment of default against the defendant and eleven days later, on March 11, the circuit court conducted a hearing to consider the issue of damages. At that hearing, plaintiff presented testimony that his injuries included severe compression of the tenth and eleventh thoracic vertebrae, torn ligaments in his right knee and a hairline fracture in his back. A Harrington rod spinal fusion in which two rods were inserted alongside the spine was performed on the plaintiff’s back and an arthrotomy was undertaken to repair tom ligaments in the right knee. Detailed evidence concerning hospitalization, surgery, loss of work and other special damages was presented and after the March 11 hearing, final judgment of default in the amount of $1,500,000 was entered. Defendant’s counsel was informed by plaintiff’s counsel on April 22 that a final judgment had been entered on the date set out above. On May 3 defendant filed two motions attacking the judgment whereupon the court entered the following order:
Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment for Irregularity overruled. Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on Equitable Grounds sustained. Default Judgment previously granted plaintiff set aside and held for naught. Defendant has shown that it had a good excuse for being in default, had a meritorious defense, and plaintiff will not be substantially harmed by the delay resulting from setting aside the default, and therefore is entitled to have this cause decided on the merits. Murray v. Sanders, 667 S.W.2d 426, 428 [ (Mo.App.1984) ].
In an affidavit of defendant’s attorney’s secretary which accompanied defendant's motions of May 3 the secretary claimed to have no “knowledge or recollection” of what happened to the documents after she delivered them to the partner for his signature. Defendant asserts that the partner returned the documents to the secretary for mailing, but instead of mailing them to the clerk of the circuit court she “apparently” mistakenly mailed the originals to the insurance company. Whatever the events may have been, neither the clerk of the circuit court nor plaintiff’s attorney received defendant’s entry of appearance nor its request for extension of time to plead.
It was the “custom and practice” of the insurance company, and defendant’s counsel, that counsel transmit two copies of all pertinent documents to the insurance company and send originals thereof to the clerk of the circuit court for filing. Nonetheless, the insurance company neglected to note that it had received the original and one copy of each document or if it so observed it failed to communicate this fact to its *892attorney. By such action, in theory, it could be argued that the insurer successfully “concealed” this fact from its chosen attorney for it was only after the attorney inspected the insurance company’s file that he discovered the documents in that file were the originals and copies rather than the photocopies which he intended should be there. From this we are not told where the service copy (if any) intended for delivery to plaintiffs counsel finally found repose.
The time for responsive pleading under Rule 75.01 had expired prior to the filing of defendant’s motions and because the trial court lost jurisdiction to entertain the motion, only a new petition in equity could provide the basis for the trial court to proceed. In this connection, I agree with the majority in its determination to treat defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment on equitable grounds as an independent suit in equity (provided the motions sufficiently pleaded grounds for equitable relief) however, a strong showing has been made indicating the original judgment for plaintiff should be reinstated. Arguing the equities, defendant suggests that plaintiff or his attorney had a duty to inform the defendant of the default after it had occurred. It is urged that plaintiff’s “conscious” decision not to inform the defendant of the default judgment serves as ground for reversal. However, from the record, the only official notice to the plaintiff that defendant was represented by counsel was defendant’s answer apparently filed on March 23, 1985, or the discovery motions filed on March 28, 1985, seventeen days after final default judgment had been rendered. In this regard it should be emphasized that during all of the time between December 27, 1984, when the case was filed and March 23 or 28,1985, defendant’s insurer knew, or by any reasonable conduct on its part could have known, that the papers in its file (received on February 4,1985) were the original document and yet the insurance company did nothing. If it did not fully understand the significance of these facts, the claims department of the liability insurance company, whose regular business it is to deal with such matters, should have made some inquiry with its attorney to resolve questions concerning the same.
Thus it was in the control of defendant’s insurer to discover the mistake but it compounded that mistake during February and March by failing to examine the records in its hands. While it is incorrect to characterize the action of the insurance company as “concealment” it certainly points up the fact that it comes in bad grace and dilutes defendant’s “equitable” argument that in all this it was somehow plaintiffs attorney’s burden to inform the defendant of the default.1 From the record the only notice to plaintiff showing defendant was represented by counsel was the answer and defendant’s discovery motions, filed after final default judgment had been entered.
Another important question immediately comes to mind: what action, if any, had been taken by the defendant’s insurance company or defendant’s counsel concerning the “request for extension of time to plead?” The record shows no extension of time was granted. Defendant who mistakenly assumed its time had been enlarged by thirty days is certainly charged with knowing that the “additional” thirty-day period was ending, yet took no effective action to secure any additional time. And after the second thirty-day period elapsed still no action was taken. If defendant had made the most cursory check of the record in the clerk’s office it would immediately have ascertained it was in default on both the original answering period and the hoped for thirty-day extension and would have learned that the motion for extension of time and the entry of appearance had gone astray. Yet for seventy days (January 11 through March 22) it made no such inquiry *893and filed no responsive pleading. In sum nothing was done, no extension of time was granted and no effort on behalf of defendant was taken to followup or ascertain these facts. This weakens the equitable argument which the liability insurance company and the defendant now make and by which they seek to shift the responsibility onto plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel, arguing that local custom and courtesy require an attorney to inform his adversary of a default. Against this the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “[a] lawyer shall not intentionally” “[f]ail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules.” Rule 4 DR 7-101(A)(l). The well settled interpretation of this rule is that a lawyer owes a duty to his client to represent him zealously within the bounds of the law. See Rule 4 EC 7-1. It appears that to require an attorney to inform his adversary of a default stands athwart the attorney’s duty to zealously represent his client. Furthermore, we learn from the record that the plaintiff and his attorney discussed the possibility of communicating with the defendant, but plaintiff instructed his attorney not to communicate with defendant until final default judgment had been obtained. The basic rule is that when an attorney is specifically instructed by the client the attorney must follow these instructions, if lawful, with reasonable care and promptness or risk possible liability for damages proximately caused by the attorney’s failure.
Assuming arguendo, plaintiff’s attorney was obligated to contact defendant’s attorney after receiving the answer and motions for discovery, the only effect which defendant can claim such contact would have had is that defendant then could have timely moved to set aside the default judgment in the trial court within the thirteen days remaining under Rule 75.01. The Court has considered and ruled defendant’s claim of “irregularity” and today has granted defendant the hearing which it claims it was “unfairly denied.” It is therefore incorrect to suggest that any actions or omissions on plaintiff’s attorney’s part can be said to be any longer relevant to the question of a hearing on the equitable issues.
Additionally, it is noteworthy that defendant did not file answer until March 23, 1985. Defendant argues that it reasonably believed it had an extra thirty days to answer plaintiff’s petition beyond the normal thirty days. Defendant was personally served on January 11 and sixty days expired March 12. Defendant did not mail its answer for filing until March 21 and it is not clear how defendant calculates that its motion for a thirty-day extension would have given it until March 21 to file such answer.
The majority has determined that a further hearing to investigate the equities and the question of excusable neglect is required, and with the reservations enunciated above, I concur.

. Just as it is inaccurate to characterize the action of the insurance company as "concealment,” it is equally inappropriate to speak of plaintiff and his attorneys action as "concealment” as Welliver, J., does in his separate opinion.