Court Opinion

ID: 9965840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 15:06:55.244212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:45.470585
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 126,122

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                           BRENT J. CARTER,
                                              Appellant,

                                                       v.

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; WILLIAM S. WOOLLEY, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed May 3, 2024. Affirmed.

        Kristen B. Patty, of Wichita, for appellant.

        Chelsea Anderson, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W.
Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before HILL, P.J., SCHROEDER, J., and MARY E. CHRISTOPHER, S.J.

        PER CURIAM: Brent J. Carter appeals the district court's denial of his K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion. The court dismissed his motion after appointing counsel for Carter and
conducting a preliminary hearing. Carter contends the court erred. In his view, the court
should not have ruled his motion was untimely and the court should have allowed him to
present evidence that his lawyer was incompetent.

                                                       1
The details of Carter's convictions are complicated.

       After a gang-related double homicide, the State charged four individuals—Brent
Carter, Quincy Carter, Jamion Wimbley, and Johnathan Carter—with various serious
felony crimes. See State v. [Johnathan] Carter, 316 Kan. 427, 519 P.3d 608 (2022); State
v. Wimbley, 313 Kan. 1029, 493 P.3d 951 (2021); State v. [Quincy] Carter, 312 Kan. 526,
477 P.3d 1004 (2020); State v. [Brent] Carter, 311 Kan. 783, 466 P.3d 1180 (2020).

       Brent Carter was originally charged with two counts of first-degree murder for the
murders of Brenton Oliver and Betty Holloman, off-grid person felonies; two counts of
criminal discharge of a firearm, severity level 7 person felonies; and aggravated robbery,
a severity level 3 person felony.

       This case consists of two prosecutions consolidated for jury trial on the original
five charges along with a separate incident charging Carter with two domestic battery
offenses—aggravated battery, a severity level 7 person felony; and criminal threat, a
severity level 9 person felony. Before trial, the State dismissed the aggravated robbery
charge. After the eight-day jury trial in which 38 witnesses testified, the jury returned a
guilty verdict on all charges. Carter received two consecutive hard 25 to life sentences
plus 27 months.

       Carter appealed his convictions, which were affirmed by the Kansas Supreme
Court. The mandate was filed on August 11, 2020. See Carter, 311 Kan. 783. A detailed
recitation of the facts about his crimes can be found in that opinion. 311 Kan. at 784-88.

Carter commences a collateral attack on his convictions.

       In the month following the mandate—September 2020—Carter filed a pro se
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. He raised three issues: (1) his appellate lawyer failed to raise

                                              2
issues; (2) his trial lawyer failed to object to discrepancies in witness testimonies; and (3)
his trial lawyer failed to object to an alleged ex parte communication by the judge. One
month later, Carter moved to amend his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, supplementing
additional information for the same general complaints in the first motion. Following this
motion, Carter made several requests for an appointed lawyer.

Carter amends his motion a second time.

       About eight months later, Carter filed another pro se motion to amend his motion.
In the motion, Carter made four claims: (1) the prosecutor and his lawyer violated his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) ex parte communication between the judge
and prosecutor effectively tainted the case and violated his rights; (3) there was
insufficient evidence to convict him; and (4) the prosecutor made false statements. As
support for his second claim, Carter attached an email sent in August 2019 from his trial
counsel, Nika Cummings, to his appellate counsel, Ryan Eddinger. This email supports
Carter's claim in the amended petition that an ex parte communication occurred between
the judge and prosecutor.

Carter files a third amended K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

       The district court granted Carter's request for appointment of counsel, citing that
both parties agreed to the appointment on the "limited issue regarding the claim of ex
parte communication." Carter also filed a motion for a change of judge reasoning that his
current judge, Judge Syrios, was implicated in the alleged ex parte communication. Judge
Syrios granted the motion, noting "this court may be called as a witness regarding
movant's allegation of ex parte communication" and a new judge was appointed to
oversee the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

                                              3
       About a year after receiving counsel, Carter filed his third amended K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion. In the motion, Carter raised five claims:

       • (4A) Ex parte contact: the same general claim that Carter made pro se,
         adding that the fact that Carter's lawyer was called during the
         conversation does not negate the violation of Carter's rights.
       • (4B) Ineffective assistance of counsel – failing to preserve the ex parte
         contact.
       • (4C) Ineffective assistance of counsel – failing to file a motion to
         dismiss based on an intervening act. Carter alleges the confession made
         by a co-defendant constituted an intervening act that may have "saved
         him on one of the felony murder charges."
       • (4D) Ineffective assistance of counsel – failing to request a continuance
         because trial counsel was "extremely ill." Carter claims that "[b]eing as
         ill as Ms. Cummings described, her illness may have affected her ability
         to defend [Carter] appropriately at trial."
       • (4E) Ineffective assistance of counsel – failing to adequately cross-
         examine the witnesses.

       Carter subsequently filed a corrected amended K.S.A. 60-1507 motion a month
later, adding more analysis under 4C—relying on Cummings' email where she was "in
effect admitting that she should have filed a motion that by her analysis was appropriate
to file, should have been filed and had a reasonable chance of success."

An email sent by Cummings sparks Carter's claims.

       Carter's trial lawyer emailed his appellate lawyer in August 2019. Carter relies on
this email as the basis for most of his claims.

       Failure to request a continuance claim

       The first section of Cummings' email pertains to Carter's claim that Cummings'

                                              4
representation was deficient for failing to request a continuance for Carter's jury trial:

       "Dear Mr. Eddinger,
       I just received your letter asking about Brent's trial. I have dates written somewhere, and
       will need to get emails written to the judge, but I did get sick right before the trial, and
       initially I made the court aware that I was not well. I went and got the Tamiflu
       prescription. I had swollen glands throughout the trial. There were so many witnesses for
       this trial and the trial had been continued many times because nobody wanted to be the
       first defendant to go to trial. There is an attitude in Sedgwick County that you just work
       through it. I have heard so many stories of defense attorneys throwing up in the bathroom
       because of being sick during trial and just getting through it. Or, there are stories of
       coming to court with a fever and just dealing with it. If I'm not mistaken, the prosecutor on
       this case told a story of how she prosecuted a case being sick. If you send an email to the
       public defender's office, I am sure that the consensus will be the same. I bet you could
       accumulate hundreds of stories from current public defenders and past public defenders in
       Sedgwick County who have defended clients while sick because when it is set for court, it
       is set for court. Sedgwick County is a hard place to practice criminal law. Now that I have
       had experience in other counties, I see that Sedgwick County is much different than
       surrounding counties."

       The record shows that Cummings was ill during the week leading up to and
during the trial. On the morning the jury trial was set to commence, both parties
were present to address pretrial matters with the trial court. During this hearing,
Cummings stated to the court that she was feeling better and was ready for trial.
Later in this hearing, Cummings orally requested two continuances based on
evidentiary reasons. Both were denied.

       Motion to dismiss claim

       The next section relates to Carter's claim that Cummings' representation was
deficient because she failed to move to dismiss based on an intervening act.

                                                      5
       "The one thing that I missed in Brent's case is filing a motion to dismiss based on an
       intervening act. When I did the research on it, it appeared that Brent's facts weren't as
       strong as a case where this was granted. I saw this as a losing issue. In Brent's case,
       Jonathan Carter came in a separate car and admits to killing the male victim [Brenton
       Oliver]. In Brent's trial, there wasn't much evidence, if I remember correctly, of evidence
       linking a connection between the people in Jamion Wimbley's [a co-defendant] car
       (where Brent was) and Jonathan's car, although the police reports indicated he had been
       contacted by Jamion. Perhaps this may have saved him on one of the felony murder
       charges."

       Carter argues that the email shows that Cummings considered "her own conduct to
be both deficient and prejudicial." In his third amended motion, Carter claims that
Cummings admitted that "she should have filed a motion that by her analysis was
appropriate to file, should have been filed and had a reasonable chance of success."

       Evidence at trial as it relates to earlier claims

       The next portion of the email does not directly relate to claims found in Carter's
third amended K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Rather, the section relates to the evidence at trial
and an earlier claim in Carter's second amended K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

       "I think of Brent often because I drive by the penitentiary several times a month. Brent is
       my first client in 30 years that received a worse outcome than the initial offer after a trial.
       Other cases that were lost, came back on appeal or were sentenced to a better sentence
       than the offer before trial. Because this was filed as a felony murder and there were two
       dead people after shots were fired from Jamion's car, and numerous witnesses placed
       Brent out of the car shooting a gun, there wasn't a good defense. What is perplexing is
       that I could have sworn that the shotgun was used in the preliminary hearing as the
       weapon that was identified and used, and I thought the prosecutor had it either in the
       courtroom or a picture of it, but then when I reviewed the transcript, there was no
       mention of it except in my cross-examination. In other words, throughout the reports it

                                                      6
       made it appear that Brent was using the gun that couldn't shoot, but in trial they placed a
       different gun in his hand."

       Carter does not rely on this portion of the email in any of his claims. But this
section does relate to his previous claim involving insufficient evidence and that the "trial
court placed a different weapon" in Carter's hands.

       Ex parte communications claim

       The last part of the email relates to Carter's claim that he was prejudiced by ex
parte communications between the judge and the prosecutor both by the communications
themselves and because Cummings failed to object or make a record of the improper
communications.

       "What I do specifically remember is Trinity Muth [the prosecutor] being in Judge Syrios'
       office where they were discussing a last minute issue. I am thinking this may have been
       the Wednesday before trial. They were reading me this motion over the phone and asking
       if I objected. I hadn't even read the motion yet. On that particular phone call, I told Judge
       Syrios that I would have to read the motion. It was that morning that I had started with
       the fever, and that afternoon that I went to get the medication. We ended up having a last
       minute hearing on either Thursday or Friday or maybe even the following Monday with
       two co-defendants in the courtroom. When I asked for the preliminary hearing transcript,
       I was not given the arraignment part of it. Apparently, the State ordered it and there was
       an issue with how Brent and another defendant were bound over. I confronted Trinity
       about the ex parte contact that he had with Judge Syrios which was totally inappropriate.
       Had one of defense counsel gone in to talk about a motion, we would be disbarred. It's a
       different standard for the prosecution."

       Carter relies on this section of the email more than the other sections. He claims
that because his lawyer was called into the conversation between the trial judge and the
prosecutor, any communications preceding the phone call were improper. He also argues

                                                     7
that because his lawyer failed to object or make any record of the communications, her
performance was deficient, thereby prejudicing him in his defense.

The district court denies Carter's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

       The district court discussed each claim raised in Carter's third amended K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion and concluded that Carter did not show a reasonable probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome of his trial. Accordingly, the district court denied
Carter's motion. Carter moved pro se to object, reconsider, and amend the ruling by the
district court. The court denied relief and Carter timely appealed.

The rules that guide us are well established.

       When presented with a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, a district court has three options:
(1) determine that the motion, files, and case records conclusively show the movant is
entitled to no relief and summarily deny the motion; (2) determine from the motion, files,
and records that a potentially substantial issue exists and hold a preliminary hearing. If
after a preliminary hearing the court determines that there is no substantial issue, the
court may deny the motion; or (3) if the court determines that a substantial issue exists,
the court may conduct a full hearing. State v. Adams, 311 Kan. 569, 577-78, 465 P.3d 176
(2020). Depending on which avenue the district court takes, the standard of review varies.
311 Kan. at 578.

       When the district court denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion after a preliminary,
nonevidentiary hearing, the standard of review is de novo. Bogguess v. State, 306 Kan.
574, 583, 395 P.3d 447 (2017). In other words, we are in the same position as the district
court. A movant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.
To do so, their contentions must be more than conclusory and either set forth an

                                                8
evidentiary basis to support those contentions or the basis must be evident from the
record. Thuko v. State, 310 Kan. 74, 80, 444 P.3d 927 (2019).

         Carter made five claims in his third amended K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. His first
claim relates to the first deficient representation claim—an alleged improper ex parte
communication between the trial judge and the prosecutor prejudiced Carter's trial. In his
next four claims, Carter contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He
claims that his lawyer was deficient for the following:

         • failing to object to alleged ex parte contact between the prosecutor and
           the trial judge;
         • failing to file a motion to dismiss based on the intervening act that co-
           defendant Johnathan Carter came in a separate car and admitted to
           killing one of the victims;
         • failing to request a continuance due to Carter's lawyer's illness; and
         • failing to adequately cross-examine the witnesses at trial.

         The district court denied Carter's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion finding Carter failed to
show a reasonable probability that would undermine confidence in the outcome of his
trial.

We define two important terms.

         Carter's claim presents issues relating to the ineffective assistance of counsel. In
resolving such claims we look in the record for two things. Was there evidence of
deficient performance? And, if there is such evidence, what prejudice to the accused
resulted from that deficient performance?

         In Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 656-57, 694 P.2d 468 (1985), the court
directed that a defendant must first show their lawyer's representation fell below an

                                                9
objective standard of reasonableness. Judicial scrutiny of a lawyer's representation must
be highly deferential, and any fair assessment of that representation requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstruct the
circumstances of the challenged conduct, and evaluate from counsel's perspective at the
time. Khalil-Alsalaami v. State, 313 Kan. 472, 485-86, 486 P.3d 1216 (2021).

       Proceeding to the next step, if deficient representation is found, a defendant must
then establish prejudice by showing with reasonable probability that the deficient
performance affected the outcome of the proceedings. Reasonable probability means a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Reviewing courts must
consider the evidence before the fact-finder. Khalil-Alsalaami, 313 Kan. at 485-86.

Carter has failed to show any improper ex parte communication occurred.

       Carter argues that an email sent by his trial lawyer, Nika Cummings, to the lawyer
who handled his direct appeal, Ryan Eddinger, is evidence that improper ex parte
communications between the trial judge and the prosecutor had occurred. In the email,
Cummings discussed an incident where she received a phone call from the trial judge to
address a last-minute motion before trial. Cummings claimed that she did not receive
notice of the motion and requested time to review it. She then discussed a confrontation
with the prosecutor about the alleged ex parte communications and characterized the
communications as "totally inappropriate." Cummings concluded that "[h]ad one of
defense counsel come in to talk about a motion, we would be disbarred. It's a different
standard for the prosecution." We first question the significance of this claim.

       Black's Law Dictionary defines ex parte communication "between counsel or a
party and the court when opposing counsel or party is not present. Such communications
are ordinarily prohibited." Black's Law Dictionary 348 (11th ed. 2019). Under Canon 2 of
the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct, "[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex

                                             10
parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the
presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter . . . ."
Supreme Court Rule 601B, Canon 2, Rule 2.9 (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 497). Nothing of
substance is pled here.

       Also, there appears to be no Kansas case which addresses relief for an improper ex
parte communication between a judge and prosecutor. Our courts have, however,
addressed situations where a trial judge had ex parte communications with jurors. See
State v. Walker, 308 Kan. 409, 421 P.3d 700 (2018); State v. Rayton, 268 Kan. 711, 1
P.3d 854 (2000); State v. McGinnes, 266 Kan. 121, 967 P.2d 763 (1998).

       Some federal cases have addressed communications between a judge and opposing
counsel. The federal courts have only minimally addressed this issue, but the courts
employ the same standard that our courts applied to situations involving ex parte
communication between a judge and jury. See McKenzie v. Risley, 915 F.2d 1396, 1398
(9th Cir. 1990); Walker, 308 Kan. 409; Rayton, 268 Kan. 711. Under that standard, the
movant bears the burden to establish an improper ex parte communication occurred and
that the communication could have influenced the judge. See Whisenhant v. Allen, 556
F.3d 1198, 1209 (11th Cir. 2009); McKenzie, 915 F.2d at 1398.

       Here, Carter claims that the alleged ex parte communication between the
prosecutor and the trial judge violated his due process rights and denied him a fair trial.
In support, Carter falls back on his motions which contain conclusory statements alleging
ex parte communication.

       Carter's jury trial began January 29, 2018. So, based on Cummings' email, the
alleged ex parte incident likely occurred on January 24. The record reveals that
Cummings filed several motions about 10 days before trial and the State filed one motion
to endorse a witness 7 days before trial. Nothing in the record reveals the contents or

                                             11
subject of the motion that was allegedly discussed during the alleged improper ex parte
communication.

       In the order denying Carter's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the district court noted that
Carter failed to establish what was allegedly discussed beyond an unidentified motion
during the communication between the trial judge and the prosecutor. And the court
noted that Carter had "four opportunities to investigate and properly plead this issue."
The district court concluded that Carter failed to sufficiently plead or show a "reasonable
probability that, but for Cummings's failure to file or record any issue regarding the
alleged improper ex parte contact, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."

       In rebuttal, Carter argues that "he can not offer complete details of a conversation
that, by definition, occurred outside of his and his trial counsel's presence, and he had
provided all of the details known to him." He claims that the only way to resolve this
issue is to take testimony from the trial judge and the prosecutor to "establish which
motion was at issue and the conversations that occurred before Cummings was
telephoned, as well as from Cummings to establish why she failed to preserve the issue."
Given the practical impossibility for Carter to provide details of the communication,
Carter argues that he sufficiently pled "facts not appearing in the original record which, if
true, would support a claim for relief, warranting an evidentiary hearing, and accordingly,
the district court must be reversed."

The district court correctly denied Carter's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion based on alleged ex
parte communication.

       The district court correctly concluded that Carter failed to establish that the alleged
ex parte communication prejudiced him or deprived him of a fair trial. Nothing in the
record or Carter's brief and motions establishes improper ex parte communication

                                             12
between the trial judge and the prosecutor. The State argues that Cummings' email
"merely states the prosecutor was there to discuss a last-minute issue, not that one was
actually discussed prior to getting Cummings on the phone." The State claims that "[a]
conversation between the parties and the judge when one party is present via telephone is
not ex parte communication." A collateral investigation also concluded "that no ex parte
communication did occur."

       Even if we find that Cummings' representation was deficient for failing to make a
record of the alleged ex parte communications, Carter has failed to establish how the
communication or Cummings' failure to object prejudiced him at trial. Thus, the district
court did not err by summarily denying Carter's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Was Carter's lawyer's performance deficient because she failed to pursue an intervening
act defense?

       Carter next claims that his lawyer was deficient because she failed to move to
dismiss based on an intervening act. The district court concluded that Carter's motion—
along with the attached email—did "not state or specify what acts would serve to meet
the standard to be considered material intervening acts for purposes of this claim."

       In the email, Cummings states that when she researched this issue, "it appeared
that Brent's facts weren't as strong as a case where [a motion to dismiss based on an
intervening act] was granted." Cummings admits that she saw "this as a losing issue."

       Actions result in consequences. Some criminal statutes recognize that certain
crimes can be committed while another crime is being committed. The conviction that
Cummings refers to in this issue is the two felony murder convictions. Felony murder is
defined under our statutes as the killing of a human being "in the commission of, attempt
to commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous felony." K.S.A. 21-5402(a)(2). The

                                            13
State needed to prove that the killing occurred while Carter committed the underlying
felony of criminal discharge of a firearm, which our Legislature included in the list of
qualifying inherently dangerous felonies. K.S.A. 21-5402(c)(1)(O); see also [Johnathan]
Carter, 316 Kan. at 436.

       But there must be a direct causal connection between the killing and the
commission of the felony for a proper felony murder conviction. State v. LaMae, 268
Kan. 544, 555, 998 P.2d 106 (2000). This is proven by showing that the acts related to the
criminal discharge of a firearm and the killing were "close enough in time, close enough
in distance, and close enough in causal relationship to 'form, in reality, a part of the
occurrence.'" [Johnathan] Carter, 316 Kan. at 434 (citing State v. Cameron, 300 Kan.
384, 396, 329 P.3d 1158 [2014]).

       Once established, the only way to break a direct causal connection is if an
extraordinary intervening event superseded the defendant's acts to become the sole legal
cause of the killing. State v. Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 941, 287 P.3d 245 (2012). The
extraordinary event must cut off the foreseeability of the death to sever the direct causal
connection; an intervening event is not extraordinary if foreseeable. State v. Wilson, 308
Kan. 516, 525, 421 P.3d 742 (2018). In essence, this is the intervening act defense.

       The statute does not require proof that the defendant specifically fired the shots
that killed the victims for a felony murder conviction. No matter who fired the fatal shot,
all codefendants are just as guilty of felony murder. State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 377, 393,
373 P.3d 811 (2016).

Carter fails to show prejudice.

       Had Cummings filed such a motion, Carter fails to show the motion would have
affected the outcome of his trial. The intervening act appears to be Carter's codefendant,

                                              14
Johnathan Carter, admitted to killing Oliver. This, however, was contrary to the evidence
presented at all four codefendants' trials. See Carter, 311 Kan. at 784-87; [Johnathan]
Carter, 316 Kan. at 428-29; [Quincy] Carter, 312 Kan. at 527-28; Wimbley, 313 Kan. at
1030. In an interview, Johnathan Carter admitted firing at Oliver but did not expressly
admit to killing him. [Johnathan] Carter, 316 Kan. at 429.

       Nothing in the record reveals an extraordinary intervening event which would
sever the chain of events that resulted in Carter's liability for felony murder. Even if
Cummings filed the motion, Carter fails to show a reasonable probability that the failure
to file the motion affected the outcome of his trial. Therefore, the district court did not err
by rejecting Carter's claim that he was prejudiced by deficient representation because his
lawyer failed to move to dismiss.

We examine the claims of failing to cross-examine seven witnesses.

       Carter claims that his trial lawyer's performance was deficient for failing to
adequately cross-examine 7 of the 38 witnesses called at trial:

       • Officer Charles Byers
       • Lieutenant Todd Ojile
       • Officer Jeff Walters
       • Officer Bryan Knowles
       • Officer Jason Cooley
       • Manitoba Presley
       • Gladys Figures

       These seven witnesses' testimonies generally discussed the two vehicles associated
with the four suspects, the firearms found in the vehicles, and how the investigation
proceeded. None of Carter's allegations about deficient performance for failing to cross-
examine these witnesses is supported in the record.

                                              15
       Officer Charles Byers

       Carter claims this officer could have offered exculpatory evidence that Carter was
not the driver of the suspect's car. The testimony that Carter refers to is the interview
Byers conducted with Leslie Tolbert, who lived near the crime scene. Tolbert testified at
trial about the car and the possible driver of that car involved in the shooting. Cummings
cross-examined Tolbert about his description of the driver.

       Therefore, Cummings cross-examined the witness that could have offered the
evidence Carter complains that his lawyer failed to question Byers about. Because
Cummings did question the eyewitness on this subject, the district court was correct to
conclude Carter failed to show deficient representation and prejudice.

      Lieutenant Todd Ojile and Officers Jeff Walters, Bryan Knowles, and Jason
Cooley

       Carter claims these witnesses could have offered testimony that Carter did not
possess the guns found during their investigations. Even so, the specific gun that Carter
possessed is irrelevant to the charges. As mentioned above in Carter's failure to move to
dismiss based on intervening acts, whether Carter fired the gun that killed the victims is
irrelevant to proving felony murder. The State only had to prove that Carter, or another
for whose conduct he is criminally responsible, discharged a firearm at a motor vehicle
and an occupied dwelling which resulted in two murders. Therefore, it was irrelevant
which gun was the one Carter possessed and used in the homicides.

                                             16
       Manitoba Presley

       Carter claims this witness "saw Jonathan Carter drive and park a car that was
suspected to have been involved in the homicides on the day of the incident, and did not
establish any connection to Carter in her testimony."

       Presley is Johnathan Carter's mother and testified about her son's whereabouts on
the day of the homicides. There was no testimony that she could have offered regarding
Brent Carter's involvement in the homicides. Therefore, Carter's claim based on this
witness does not establish prejudice.

       Gladys Figures

       Carter claims this witness "found a car at her home that she did not recognize, later
established as being involved in the homicides, and did not establish any connection to
Carter in her testimony."

       Figures testified about a car that she did not recognize—a grey Dodge Magnum.
This car was one of two cars suspected in the homicides. Carter's claim that Figures'
testimony did not establish any connection to Carter directly does not mean Cummings'
decision not to cross-examine this witness means her representation was deficient. Carter
further does not show how the failure to cross-examine this witness prejudiced the
outcome of his trial.

Carter fails to show prejudice based on his lawyer's failure to cross-examine seven
witnesses.

                                            17
        A trial lawyer's decision to not cross-examine certain witnesses does not amount to
deficient representation because it falls within the "wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Because Cummings' decision to not cross-
examine these witnesses falls under that wide range, Carter fails to show how Cummings'
representation was deficient or how he was prejudiced by her representation. Therefore,
the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.

Claims about Carter's lawyer's illness before trial are insignificant.

        Carter alleges that he was prejudiced because his lawyer failed to request a
continuance due to her illness. He claims that is deficient representation. He argues that
the severity of the charges against him, along with the length of trial (eight days), is
"strenuous and time-consuming and requires trial counsel to call upon a great reserve of
physical and mental stamina."

        Cummings got sick shortly before Carter's trial. She stated in the email to Carter's
appellate lawyer that she first informed the court that she was ill and got a "Tamiflu
prescription." She also stated that she suffered swollen glands throughout the trial. The
district court presumed that Cummings was ill before and during the trial and stated that
"[o]n its face, Cummings should have requested a continuance if she believed she was too
ill to go to trial."

        As noted in the State's brief, Cummings made an oral motion to continue the jury
trial 10 days before it was set to commence. Ten days later, on the morning of the jury
trial, the trial court took up several pretrial motions with both parties present. During this
hearing, the trial court addressed Cummings' illness. The court noted that the parties
attempted to have the hearing the week before but were unable to because Cummings was
ill. The court then stated that the parties and the court were in communication over the
weekend where they monitored Cummings' health condition, and she "was very good to

                                              18
keep [the court and parties] up on things." The court also referenced email
correspondences which indicated Cummings "had at least started to turn the corner." To
conclude this colloquy, Cummings told the trial court that she was doing better and ready
to go forward with trial.

       During the same hearing, Cummings renewed her oral motion to continue the jury
trial two times. In these two renewed requests, Cummings first claimed she needed a
continuance to obtain transcripts and then renewed the motion because she claimed that
she did not have Giglio information on a law enforcement officer. The trial court denied
both motions.

       Had Cummings motioned to continue the jury trial due to her illness, the
likelihood of success was slim. The trial court denied two renewed continuance motions
and was aware of her illness. Given the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, Carter failed to show a reasonable probability that a motion to continue his jury
trial due to his lawyer's illness would have been successful or affected the outcome of his
trial. Carter also fails to show how Cummings' representation was deficient because of
her illness, let alone how his outcome would have been different had a continuance been
granted. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Carter's final claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for Cummings' failure to request a continuance due to her own
illness.

None of Carter's allegations show a reasonable probability that the claims affected the
outcome of his trial.

       We agree with the district court that Cummings had several options. She could
have objected to the alleged ex parte communication. Or counsel could have moved for
some appropriate relief. Also, counsel could have cross-examined witnesses if necessary
or requested a trial continuance. Carter failed to show us a reasonable probability that any

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of his claims affected the outcome of his trial. Therefore, the district court did not err in
denying Carter's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

       Affirmed.

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