Court Opinion

ID: 9912343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 06:05:33.619273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:38.064095
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      December 21, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                     No. 361267
                                                                      Wayne Circuit Court
CURTIS JOHNSON,                                                       LC No. 19-004594-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and GARRETT and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b),
first-degree premediated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), armed robbery, MCL 750.529, being a felon
in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, and four counts of possessing a
firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court
sentenced defendant to serve life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for both murder
convictions, but it then vacated the premeditated murder conviction and sentence on double-
jeopardy grounds. Defendant was also sentenced to 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment for armed
robbery, two to five years’ imprisonment for felon-in-possession, and two years’ imprisonment for
each felony-firearm count. We affirm.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        This case arises from the murder of a taxi driver. The victim was shot twice in the head
during the early morning hours of May 25, 2019. He was discovered lying on the ground outside
his taxi, with the pockets of his pants turned inside out. The victim’s wallet was never found,
suggesting that the motive for the shooting was a robbery. Two witnesses saw a person moving
away from the taxi moments after the shooting occurred, but neither could offer more than a
generalized physical description. Defendant became a suspect in the shooting because his address
remained on the taxi’s meter, and records from the taxi company indicated that the victim’s last
run was in response to a request for service at that address. Additionally, at the time of defendant’s
arrest, he was carrying the cell phone that was used to request the taxi service on the night in
question.

                                                 -1-
        The police executed a search warrant at defendant’s residence and discovered a pair of
shoes; the left shoe had what was later confirmed to be drop of blood on it. During his
interrogation, defendant admitted that the shoes belonged to him, but claimed that the drop of
blood was likely left there when he was assaulted earlier in the evening on May 24, 2019.
Defendant insisted that he remained at home all night after the assault and specifically denied any
knowledge regarding the shooting or reason to be in the area where it occurred. Although most of
the evidence submitted for DNA testing contained DNA from too many contributors to allow
comparison, an expert testified that there was very strong support to conclude that the blood on
defendant’s shoe came from the victim.

       Defendant was found guilty as described above, and this appeal followed.

                                        II. SPEEDY TRIAL

        Defendant argues that his convictions should be reversed on the basis of a speedy trial
violation because his jury trial did not commence until nearly 29 months after his May 2019 arrest.
We disagree.

        Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review because he did not make a
formal demand for trial. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 111; 605 NW2d 28 (1999).
Unpreserved claims of constitutional error are reviewed under the plain-error rule.1 People v
Hughes, 506 Mich 512, 523; 958 NW2d 98 (2020). “To establish entitlement to relief under plain-
error review, the defendant must establish that an error occurred, that the error was plain, i.e., clear
or obvious, and that the plain error affected substantial rights.” People v Burkett, 337 Mich App
631, 635; 976 NW2d 864 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “An error affects
substantial rights when it impacts the outcome of the lower-court proceedings.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Moreover, reversal based on an unpreserved error “is warranted only
when the error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings independently of the defendant’s
innocence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

       The right to a speedy trial in criminal prosecutions is guaranteed by both the United States
Constitution and 1963 Michigan Constitution. People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261; 716 NW2d
208 (2006), citing US Const, Am VI, and Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Michigan courts apply the four-

1
  The prosecution seems to suggest that failure to assert the right to a speedy trial before the trial
court should preclude appellate relief even under the more demanding plain-error rule. This
position lacks merit because it is at odds with the test governing speedy trial claims, which
considers “the defendant’s assertion of the right” as one of four relevant factors. See People v
Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261-262; 716 NW2d 208 (2006) (describing four-part test). Indeed, in
establishing the test that continues to govern these issues, the United States Supreme Court
explicitly rejected a proposed rule under which “a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial
forever waives his right.” Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 528; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972).
Although it is certainly prudent to raise this issue before the trial court, failure to do so does not
preclude review under the plain-error rule.

                                                  -2-
part test from Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 530; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972), to determine
whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. Williams, 475 Mich
at 261. Under the Barker test, this Court balances for factors: “(1) the length of delay, (2) the
reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.”
Id. at 261-262. No single factor is “either a necessary or sufficient condition to” a meritorious
speedy-trial claim. Barker, 407 US at 533. Rather, courts must “engage in a difficult and sensitive
balancing process.” Id.

                                      A. LENGTH OF DELAY

        When determining the length of the delay for purposes of the first Barker factor, the
relevant time period begins at the time of the defendant’s arrest. Williams, 475 Mich at 261.
Prejudice is presumed after “a delay of eighteen months or more.” Id. at 262. Defendant was
arrested on May 29, 2019, and his trial began on October 20, 2021, just shy of 29 months later. A
delay of this length is presumptively prejudicial and requires this Court to consider the remaining
Barker factors. Id. at 262. The first factor weighs in defendant’s favor.

                                     B. REASON FOR DELAY

        While the pandemic played a role in the length of the delay, the delay is primarily
attributable to the prosecution; therefore, this factor weighs in defendant’s favor.

       When “assessing the reasons for the delay, this Court must examine whether each period
of delay is attributable to the defendant or the prosecution.” People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App
634, 666; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). Delays that are unexplained should be attributed to the
prosecution, as well as delays caused by docket congestion. Id. With respect to the latter category,
however, “delays inherent in the court system . . . are given a neutral tint and are assigned only
minimal weight in determining whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial.” Williams, 475
Mich at 263 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

        Before addressing the history of and reason for the various delays in this case, we note that
the delays involving pandemic-related closures are not a matter of record. Defendant repeatedly
cites press releases from the trial court and other news articles, but defendant is not allowed to
expand the record on appeal, People v Morrison, 328 Mich App 647, 655; 939 NW2d 728 (2019),
and this Court has previously indicated that newspaper articles are not an appropriate subject of
judicial notice because of hearsay concerns, People v McKinney, 258 Mich App 157, 161 n 4; 670
NW2d 254 (2003). As such, we cannot rely on any dates identified in defendant’s proffered news
articles to decide this issue. Conversely, we will take judicial notice of the trial court’s press
releases pursuant to MRE 201 which permits a court to take judicial notice of an “adjudicative
fact,” MRE 201(a), as long as it is “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” MRE
201(b). That the court system experienced significant operating difficulties occasioned by the
COVID-19 pandemic is generally known throughout Michigan, and the periods during which the
trial court was not holding criminal trials can be accurately determined from the court’s own press
releases, at least to the extent those periods were reported by the trial court. Moreover, we note

                                                  -3-
that this will not be the first time an appellate court takes judicial notice of matters involving court
operations. See, e.g., People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 589-591; 194 NW2d 314 (1972) (rejecting
challenge to appellate court’s reliance on affidavit regarding disposition of all cases in a single
court over 26-month period when same data could have been “judicially noticed under the ‘one
court of justice’ doctrine”); In re Henry, 369 Mich 347, 363; 119 NW2d 671 (1963) (taking
judicial notice that trial court had multiple judges).

        Although there does not to be any binding caselaw addressing how pandemic-related
delays affect speedy-trial issues, this Court has considered the matter in the context of the related
180-day rule set forth in MCL 780.131. People v Witkoski, 341 Mich App 54; 988 NW2d 790
(2022). In Witkoski, this Court noted that much of the delay in prosecuting the defendant was
caused by the suspension of jury trials during the pandemic, which it deemed analogous to the
delay caused by a change in docketing system at issue in People v Schinzel (On Remand), 97 Mich
App 508, 512; 296 NW2d 85 (1980),2 another case involving the 180-day rule. Id. at 63. The
significance of this observation and the Witkoski Court’s adoption of the Schinzel Court’s
reasoning is more apparent upon examination of the opinion in Schinzel. In that case, trial delays
arose when the trial court adopted a central docketing system for several months only to return to
its previous system when the new system proved ineffective. Schinzel, 97 Mich App at 512. This
Court explained that delays from chronic docket congestion are ordinarily treated as inexcusable,
while “[a] delay which results from short-term docket congestion, attributable to exceptional
circumstances which hamper the normally efficient functioning of the trial court, constitutes an
excusable delay.” Id. at 511-512. Because the change in docketing system was an exceptional
and unavoidable circumstance, the Court held that it was excusable and did not violate the 180-
day rule. Id. at 512-513. By citing Schinzel as persuasive authority, this Court implicitly cast the
pandemic-related delays as an exceptional circumstance that should be treated as excusable for
purposes of the 180-day rule. Witkoski, 341 Mich App at 63. Characterization of pandemic-related
delays as excusable is significant in the context of a speedy-trial claim as well because valid,
justifiable reasons for a delay are not to be attributed to the government. Barker, 407 US at 531.
See also United States v Loud Hawk, 474 US 302, 316; 106 S Ct 648; 88 L Ed 2d 640 (1986)
(reasoning that a prosecutorial appeal advancing a strong and ultimately successful claim of error
should not be given “effective weight” in a speedy trial claim). In accord with Witkoski and
Schinzel, we likewise view the delay caused by the pandemic-related restrictions on court
operations as excusable and decline to include that period in our calculation of the length of delay
attributable to the prosecution.3

       Returning to the second Barker factor, defendant’s trial was originally scheduled for
October 7, 2019, 131 days after his arrest. While this is not an unusual delay, it must be attributed
to the prosecution, but only given minimal weight. Williams, 475 Mich at 263. At a final

2
  Opinions from the Court published before November 1, 1990, are not binding but “are entitled
to deference under traditional principles of stare decisis and should not be lightly disregarded.”
People v Haynes, 338 Mich App 392, 414 n 1; 980 NW2d 66 (2021).
3
  Although defendant suggests that the postpandemic resumption of jury trials in the trial court
took an unreasonable length of time in comparison to other circuit courts throughout the state,
there is no record evidence to support such a conclusion.

                                                  -4-
conference on September 26, 2019, the trial court agreed to change the October 7, 2019 trial date
to a pretrial conference. Two reasons for the trial adjournment are identified in the record: (1) the
prosecution had a scheduling conflict and (2) the police needed to vet information defendant had
provided that might affect the outcome of the proceedings. Although the nature of that information
was not identified on the record at the conference, a later document explained that defendant
provided a proffer statement implicating someone else in the murder shortly before the initial trial
date. When the parties appeared for the October 7, 2019 pretrial, the prosecution advised the court
that it had yet to resolve the issue discussed at the previous hearing, i.e., the proffer statement.
Moreover, the prosecution had learned that necessary DNA testing had not yet begun because the
crime laboratory was unaware of the original trial date, and it would take approximately 60 days
to complete the testing. As such, the case could not proceed to trial before the beginning of
December 2019. The trial court proposed that trial begin on December 4, 2019, but the prosecution
was not available on that date. The prosecution proposed that the trial begin December 16, 2019,
but defense counsel was not available then. With those dates eliminated, the trial court indicated
that the trial could not take place until January 2020, and it was agreed that trial would begin
January 27, 2020. The period between the original October 7, 2019 trial date and the new trial
date first proposed by the prosecution was 70 days. Inasmuch as the adjournment was requested
by the prosecution on the basis of scheduling conflicts and unresolved investigative issues, it
should be attributed to the prosecution. The 42-day period from December 16, 2019, until the first
available trial date in January 2020, however, was caused by defense counsel’s unavailability and
should be attributed to defendant. The register of actions indicates that a pretrial was conducted
on January 14, 2020, but no transcript of that proceeding is available because the proceeding
apparently went unrecorded. While there is no evidence of what occurred on January 14, 2020,
this Court can infer that the trial was adjourned on that date, as it clearly did not take place on
January 27, 2020. Instead, the trial next appears on the register of actions as being scheduled for
April 27, 2020. Because the reason for this 91-day delay is unexplained, it must be attributed to
the prosecution. Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 666.

        At this point, analysis of defendant’s speedy-trial claim becomes complicated by the
COVID-19 pandemic and the poor recordkeeping that arose in the wake of the state of emergency
declared by Michigan’s governor on March 10, 2020. Notably, our Supreme Court entered an
administrative order on March 18, 2020, formally halting all jury trials until after April 3, 2020.
Administrative Order No. 2020-2, 505 Mich cii (2020). The date on which jury trials could resume
was extended through a series of subsequent orders, with the final order requiring the suspension
of jury trials until further order.4

        Defendant’s April 27, 2020 trial plainly could not take place as scheduled, through no fault
of the parties. Jury trials apparently resumed in the trial court the week of September 21, 2020, so

4
 See Administrative Order No. 2020-5, 505 Mich cxxx (2020) (extending until April 14, 2020);
Administrative Order No. 2020-7, 505 Mich cxxxiv (2020) (extending until April 30, 2020);
Administrative Order No. 2020-12, 505 Mich cxlii (2020) (extending until further order). See also
Administrative Order No. 2020-10, 505 Mich cxxxix (2020) (halting jury trials until the later of
June 22, 2020, or a deadline imposed by local order).

                                                -5-
jury trials could not be conducted during that 127-day period when they had been halted. Trials
had to be stopped again effective November 3, 2020, because of a reemergence of high rates of
COVID-19 infections.5 Because the record has no explanation for why defendant’s trial was not
conducted during this 63-day period when trials resumed, this delay is attributed to the prosecution.
We have not been able to determine precisely when jury trials resumed again in the trial court, but
the case was designated as trial ready in the register of actions on June 28, 2021—237 days after
they were again halted. We attribute these 237 days to the pandemic because, even when doing
so, the prosecution overwhelming bears responsibility for the bulk of the delays. Defendant’s trial
did not begin until October 20, 2021, 114 days after the case was deemed ready for trial in the
register of actions; this unexplained delay is attributed to the prosecution.

        In sum, 875 days elapsed between defendant’s arrest and his trial: 469 days (53.6%) were
attributable to the prosecution, 364 days (41.6%) were attributable to the pandemic, and 42 days
(4.8%) were attributable to the defense. Because the majority of the delay could be attributed to
the prosecution, this factor does weigh in defendant’s favor.

                       C. DEFENDANT’S ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT

         The third Barker factor, on the other hand, weighs heavily against defendant because he
did not raise the right to a speedy trial in the circuit court. Williams, 475 Mich at 263 (concluding
that trial court did not clearly err by weighing this factor heavily against a defendant who did not
assert the right until the day before trial). See also Barker, 407 US at 532 (“We emphasize that
failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy
trial.”). In fact, he was conspicuously silent on the matter on both occasions that it was mentioned,
albeit in passing, by the trial court.

                                          D. PREJUDICE

        This factor weighs heavily against defendant because, while the emotional toll of a lengthy
pretrial detention is undeniable, there is nothing in the record suggesting that his defense was in
any way impacted by the delay.

        Turning to the final Barker factor, Michigan recognizes “two types of prejudice which a
defendant may experience, that is, prejudice to his person and prejudice to the defense.” Williams,
475 Mich at 264 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Prejudice to the person occurs from
“pretrial incarceration leading to anxiety and concern.” People v Collins, 388 Mich 680, 694; 202
NW2d 769 (1972). Defendant emphasizes that the personal prejudice an accused individual
normally experiences during pretrial incarceration was exacerbated by the pandemic and the
heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 in a jail setting. The prosecution opines that increased
anxiety during the pandemic was not unique to prisoners, but does not seriously dispute that the

5
  Wayne Circuit Court, Hitting the Pause Button on Jury Trials, Bench Trials, and Evidentiary
Hearings                                                        <https://www.3rdcc.org/press-
releases/2020/11/03/PR_HittingthePauseButtononJuryTrialsBenchTrialsEvidentiaryHearings>
(accessed October 5, 2023).

                                                 -6-
pandemic conditions likely increased the personal prejudice typically experienced during a lengthy
pretrial incarceration. At any rate, prejudice is presumed when the pretrial delay exceeds 18
months, and the burden shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate a lack of prejudice. Id. at 695.
Moreover, given the commonly-known inability of one to isolate oneself while incarcerated, it is
hard to dispute that the anxiety of pretrial detention was heightened by the pandemic.

        Nevertheless, it is well settled that prejudice to the defense is the more serious form of
prejudice with respect to the final Barker factor. Barker, 407 US at 532; Williams, 475 Mich at
264. The reason for this understanding is straightforward: when pretrial delays inhibit a
defendant’s defense, it “skews the fairness of the entire system.” Barker, 407 US at 532; Williams,
475 Mich at 264 (quotation marks and citation omitted). By way of example, the defense may be
impaired by the death or disappearance of a witness or the fading of memory that naturally occurs
over time. Barker, 407 US at 532.

         Defendant argues that his defense was severely prejudiced because Terren Smith did not
testify. Smith called 911 after the taxi crashed and told the operator that she saw a man walking
away from the taxi after the crash. She indicated that the person was tall, dark-skinned, slim, and
was wearing a black jacket and black hat. She also noted that someone else might be in the taxi
still, as people outside were yelling for someone to call 911. The recording of Smith’s 911 call
was played at the trial, but she did not appear in court to testify despite having been given a
subpoena. Defendant argues that if Smith had testified she would have been impeached regarding
the fact that she could not identify defendant as the person who left the vehicle, and she could have
been impeached regarding variations between her description and the descriptions offered by the
other eyewitness.6

         There are multiple problems with defendant’s argument. Nothing in the record supports
his contention that the delay played any role in Smith’s failure to testify. Detective Drew Smith
testified about Terren Smith’s willingness to cooperate:

              Q. On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest, 10 being the highest, how
       would you gauge Ms. Smith’s level of cooperation?

              A. I would gauge it probably a 3. In the beginning, she was cooperative.
       As the case started going and court started coming up, she was uncooperative.

If anything, Detective Smith’s testimony that Terren Smith ceased cooperating when “the case
started going” and when “court started coming up” suggests that her reluctance began early in the
process, before a significant time elapsed with defendant’s trial beginning.

6
  Defendant also makes a remark in his brief asserting that he and Smith had a “longstanding
relationship,” so the fact that she did not identify him was of great importance. However, there is
nothing in the record suggesting that these two knew each other, defendant’s offhand remark
regarding their “longstanding relationship” included no citations to the record or other sources,
and there was no expansion upon the nature of their alleged relationship. Therefore, we pay this
statement no regard.

                                                -7-
        Moreover, we are not persuaded that Smith’s failure to testify caused defendant any harm;
the fact that Smith could not identify defendant and that her description did not perfectly align
with that of the other eyewitness could be established with the 911 call. Defendant emphasizes
the fact that the jury would have been confronted with the fact that Smith could not make an in-
court identification if she had testified. However, the 911 call indicates that Smith saw through
her window after 1:00 a.m. that a man exited the taxi and walked away from it, and she did not
give a particularly detailed description of the man. Therefore, the jury could likely surmise on its
own that Smith could not have identified defendant as the man she saw if she had testified.
Moreover, the other eyewitness, who did testify, was unable to identify defendant as the man he
saw, but the jury nevertheless found defendant guilty. The primary evidence tying defendant to
the crime was not the eyewitness testimony but the fact that defendant was in possession of the
phone that had summoned the taxi and the fact that the police found a drop of the victim’s blood
on defendant’s shoe. Defendant had no apparent connection with the victim, such that his
involvement in the murder was the only likely explanation for the victim’s blood appearing on
defendant’s shoe. This key evidence was available less than seven months after defendant’s arrest
and would likely have been decisive in any trial occurring after that point. There is no indication
that the passage of time prevented defendant from somehow undermining this evidence.

        In sum, although the delay certainly caused mental and emotional distress to defendant,
this factor weighs heavily against him because the delay did not cause any harm to his defense.

                                E. BALANCING THE FACTORS

          Balancing the sum total of these factors, defendant has not demonstrated that he is entitled
to appellate relief, particularly when viewed within the framework of plain error. Some of the
Barker factors do favor defendant to some extent, but they simply do not demonstrate a clear or
obvious deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Burkett, 337 Mich App at 635. Even if a plain
error could be discerned on this record, defendant’s speedy-trial claim undoubtedly fails on the
prejudice prong of the plain-error rule. As discussed in detail in the preceding section, defendant
has presented no basis upon which to conclude that his trial would have been in any way different
if the trial had promptly proceeded. With these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the lengthy
delay in this case affected the outcome of the proceedings as is required to obtain plain-error relief.
Id.

       In conclusion, defendant has failed to establish that he is entitled to reversal of his
convictions based on a speedy-trial violation.

                             III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

       Defendant raises three distinct claims of prosecutorial misconduct, each of which are
without merit.

                                                 -8-
        Defendant did not preserve his claims of prosecutorial misconduct for review by lodging a
contemporaneous objection and requesting a curative instruction.7 People v Isrow, 339 Mich App
522, 529; 984 NW2d 528 (2021). We review unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct
under the same plain-error rule described in Part II of this opinion. “Curative instructions are
sufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of most inappropriate prosecutorial statements and jurors
are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d
272 (2008) (citation omitted). Unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct do not warrant
reversal unless a curative instruction would have been insufficient to alleviate the harm caused by
the misconduct. Id.

        “During a criminal trial, prosecutors serve truth and justice first. The job isn’t just to win,
but to win fairly, staying well within the rules.” People v Evans, 335 Mich App 76, 89; 966 NW2d
402 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Given that a prosecutor’s role and
responsibility is to seek justice and not merely convict, the test for prosecutorial misconduct is
whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63;
732 NW2d 546 (2007). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct “are decided case by case, and this
Court must examine the entire record and evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks in context.” Id. at 64.
“A prosecutor’s comments are to be evaluated in light of defense arguments and the relationship
the comments bear to the evidence admitted at trial.” Id. Indeed, a comment that could be
construed as improper when viewed in isolation might not warrant appellate relief if it is responsive
to arguments raised by defense counsel. Id. “The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the
defendant was deprived of a fair trial.” People v Orlewicz, 293 Mich App 96, 106; 809 NW2d 194
(2011).

                            A. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF

      Defendant argues that two statement the prosecutor made during rebuttal arguments
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. We disagree.

        It is improper for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s failure to present evidence
because doing so can have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. People v
Fyda, 288 Mich App 446, 463-464; 793 NW2d 712 (2010). Defendant argues that the prosecution
did just that when it made the following rebuttal argument:

               You heard criticism that not enough stuff was tested by the Michigan State
       Police. They should have sent more stuff to get tested.

                Well, hum, that’s interesting, because first of all you heard Detective Dew
       testify this evidence is available for independent testing.

7
  Defense counsel did raise an objection at the outset of one of the allegedly inappropriate
statements, but the grounds for the objection were never put on the record. Regardless, because
we conclude that the comments in question were proper, it is ultimately immaterial if the issue is
preserved or not.

                                                 -9-
               You heard him testify there was no request for that type of testing in this
       case.

The prosecution opined that defendant did not actually want additional testing conducted because
“[t]he more work that was done in this case would have given us more of the same, evidence of
his culpability and that’s it.”

         The defendant in People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 330; 662 NW2d 501 (2003), raised
the same burden-shifting argument after the prosecutor indicated that blood evidence was available
to the defendant for independent testing. This Court rejected the defendant’s argument, concluding
that the prosecutor’s comment was appropriate because the defendant had theorized at trial that
there was a mistake in the custody or testing of that evidence. Id. at 331. The same reasoning
applies here. The defense strategy was to focus on the possibility of reasonable doubt. To that
end, defense counsel spent much of the trial questioning the details of the investigation and
eliciting testimony from which the jury could infer that the investigation was deficient. In his
cross-examination of Detective Dew, in particular, defense counsel explored why certain evidence
had not been submitted for forensic testing. Defense counsel returned to this point during closing
arguments, reminding the jury that the police chose to test only certain pieces of evidence that
were subjectively deemed “important.” Defense counsel opined that if evidence had any bearing
on the credibility of the prosecution’s case, it should be tested. He also suggested that the police
should not be allowed to recognize the possible evidentiary value of a piece of property then
unilaterally decide that the jury “will never see it.” The prosecution’s rebuttal argument regarding
the availability of independent testing was clearly responsive to defense counsel’s closing and is
more properly viewed as an attack on defense counsel’s argument than an impermissible attempt
to shift the burden of proof by implying that defendant had an obligation to prove something. Id.
Indeed, defense counsel went so far as to say that the police and prosecution decided “to rob” the
jury of its opportunity to assess the importance of the evidence. The prosecution’s remarks
regarding the availability of independent testing directly refuted this argument raised by the
defense and did not shift the burden of proof.

         Defendant raises the same complaint concerning the prosecution’s observation that there
was no evidence that blood had been planted on defendant’s shoe. This comment was appropriate
for the same reason. Defense counsel criticized the failure to photograph the bottom of defendant’s
shoes and urged the jury to consider how the blood got on the shoes, and he even suggested that
the blood may have been “placed on the shoe by somebody else,” while recognizing that this
suggestion appear “far fetch[ed].” Defense counsel bolstered this argument by asserting that the
police officers involved with this case “have no problem lying to individuals.”8 Responding to
this argument, the prosecution said: “Where is the evidence of that? There was nothing presented
on that issue.” Because the defense made serious accusations and insinuations regarding the
investigation of this case, it would have been questionable for the prosecution not to somehow
respond. Highlighting the fact that defendant’s theory lacked evidentiary support was a logical

8
  This comment appears to have been in reference to testimony from Detectives regarding a
strategy they used during the interrogation of defendant in which they lied about inculpatory
evidence having been found in the hopes that this would manipulate him into confessing.

                                               -10-
response to defendant’s argument. Given the clear correlation between defense counsel’s closing
argument and this portion of the prosecution’s rebuttal, we do not construe the challenged remark
as an improper shifting of the burden of proof. See Dobek, 274 Mich App at 64 (“Otherwise
improper prosecutorial conduct or remarks might not require reversal if they address issues raised
by defense counsel.”); Callon, 256 Mich App at 331 (concluding that an attack on the credibility
of a defense theory does not shift the burden of proof).

                                  B. APPEAL TO SYMPATHY

       Defendant argues that the prosecution made a statement during rebuttal that improperly
appealed to the jury for sympathy. We disagree.

       Defendant takes issue with the final portion of the prosecution’s rebuttal argument, during
which the prosecution said:

       [T]here is a voice that we hear in a way throughout this trial, again, it is not a voice
       that was able to get up on that witness stand, but it is the voice of [the victim], and
       he speaks to us in the only voice that he can speak with us.

               He speaks through his blood. The blood that was taken from his body at
       Collingwood and Second Street on May 25th of 2019. And what that blood is
       telling us, it’s telling us that he did it.

              And I’m asking you to listen to that voice. And I am asking you to hold
       him accountable.

        Defendant is correct that prosecutors may not “invite[] jurors to suspend their powers of
judgment and decide the case on the basis of sympathy.” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 66;
862 NW2d 446 (2014). However, the quoted argument did not violate this restriction because it
is directly traceable to evidence admitted during the trial. A pair of shoes was seized from
defendant’s residence with what appeared to be a spot of blood on the left shoe. The stain was
swabbed for possible DNA evidence and confirmed to be blood. An expert testified that the DNA
extracted from the blood was approximately 33 nonillion times more likely to have originated from
the victim than an unknown, unrelated person. Defendant admitted that the shoes belonged to him,
and his contention that the blood must have appeared on the shoe when he was assaulted was
undermined by expert testimony excluding the possibility that the DNA came from defendant. A
prosecutor is not required to “confine argument to the blandest possible terms.” Dobek, 274 Mich
App at 66. The prosecution’s comment was founded on record evidence and reasonable inferences
from the evidence, and it was not improper merely because the prosecution chose to artfully
characterize the DNA evidence as the victim’s metaphorical voice.9

9
 Relative to his prosecutorial misconduct arguments, defendant also contends that the cumulative
effect of the prosecution’s improper remarks was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial
because the overall rebuttal suggested that defendant’s defense was inadequate and that he was

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       In conclusion, defendant has failed to establish any form of prosecutorial misconduct.10

                                       IV. CONCLUSION

       Defendant failed to establish that he is entitled to reversal based on a violation of his
speedy-trial right. Defendant likewise failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct with respect to
the comments made during rebuttal arguments. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to any
appellate relief.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                             /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
                                                             /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

responsible for providing exculpatory evidence. See id. at 106 (“The cumulative effect of several
errors can constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal even when any one of the errors alone
would not merit reversal . . . .”). Because defendant has not established that any error in the
challenged remarks, “there can be no cumulative effect of errors meriting reversal.” Dobek, 274
Mich App at 58.
10
  We can easily dispense with defendant’s argument that his trial counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance when he failed to object to these instances of prosecutorial misconduct. “To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must, at a minimum, show that (1)
counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for trial
counsel’s errors.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 539; 917 NW2d 752 (2018) (quotation
marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Defense counsel did not err by failing to object to these
arguments because, the arguments being proper, any objection would have been futile, and defense
counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection. People v Goodin, 257 Mich App
425, 433; 668 NW2d 392 (2003).

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