Court Opinion

ID: 9795904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:41:45.584271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:40:33.231219
License: Public Domain

Justice KIDWELL,
Dissenting.
I subscribe to the view that the proper role of courts is to interpret laws, not to rewrite laws, no matter how well Mentioned the result. In this case the result appears to be invalidating legislation and Mtiatives that deviate from the majority’s definition of “slot machine.” Therefore, I dissent.
The majority opinion undertakes to write its own creative and expansive definition of “slot machine.” This acknowledges that the language enacted by the legislature is legally deficient. Unfortunately, however, rather than finding the statute void for vagueness, or narrowly construing the statutory language, the majority has arrived at a definition of their own that supplants the language enacted by the legislature. Courts sometimes assume legislative power when they find a statute legally defective but want to save it for a perceived noble or worthwhile purpose. Ultimately, though, the majority’s broad new definition of “slot machine” creates even more problems than the plain, though somewhat vague, language of the statute.
To demonstrate just how expansive and Mschievous the newly minted definition of “slot machine” is, consider that devices such as personal computers (PC), cellular phones, and personal digital assistants (PDA) fall within the ambit of the majority’s definition. The majority defines “slot machine” as used in I.C. § 18-3810 as:
[1] a gambling device [2] which, upon payment by a player of required consideration in any form, may be played or operated, and which, upon being played or operated, may, solely by chance, deliver or entitle the player to receive something of value, [3] with the outcome being shown by spinning reels or by a video or other representation of reels____
(Bracketed numbering added.) “Gambling device” denotes that “there must be risk— the chance of losing all or part of the consideration paid; and there must be a prize — the chance of obtaining something of greater value than the consideration risked.”
PC, cellular phone, or PDA, are gambling devices under the majority’s definition because using any of these devices, one may “chance ... losing all or part of ... consideration paid” in exchange for “a prize — the chance of obtaining something of greater value than the consideration risked.”
Using one of these “gambling devices,” one may connect to an Internet gambling site. (This is not to say that one who gambles online does so with impunity. I.C. § 18-3802 makes participating in, or knowingly permitting gambling upon one’s property, a misde*466meanor.) Then, “upon payment by a player of required consideration in any form, [the gambling device] may be played or operated, and ... upon being played or operated, may, solely by chance, deliver or entitle the player to receive something of value.” Gambling using a PC, cellular phone, or PDA, the required consideration is generally paid using a credit card. Solely by chance, a video representation of reels may align, thus entitling the player to receive something of value — usually a payment into a customer account that the player may use to gamble further or cash out.
If it were merely illegal to use or operate a slot machine, this would not present a problem. I.C. § 18-3810, however, makes it illegal to “use, possess, operate, keep, sell, or maintain for use or operation or otherwise ... any slot machine of any sort or kind whatsoever.” Thus, because PCs, cellular phones, and PDAs, are sorts or kinds of slot machines under the majority’s definition, they are illegal to possess or keep even though they are not being maintained for use or operation as a slot machine. Obviously, this constitutes an absurd result and I doubt that anyone will be prosecuted for possession of a PC. However, this example demonstrates how perilous it is for courts to overstep their power to interpret law and, instead, enter the legislative arena.
Because the majority’s definition of slot machine includes devices that clearly are not slot machines, it simply goes too far and is unworkable. While I.C. § 18-3810 could arguably be saved by narrowly interpreting the term “slot machine,” it cannot be saved by the majority’s expansive redefinition that, essentially, rewrites I.C. § 18-3810 to suit its perceived objective.