Court Opinion

ID: 8212048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-10-05 20:07:44.386889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:07.511790
License: Public Domain

Allen v Dolores (2022 NY Slip Op 05513)

Allen v Dolores

2022 NY Slip Op 05513

Decided on October 5, 2022

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on October 5, 2022
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

BETSY BARROS, J.P.
ROBERT J. MILLER
LARA J. GENOVESI
HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.

2021-02167
 (Index No. 708330/18)

[*1]Crystal Allen, appellant, 
vCarmen Dolores, et al., respondents.

Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky (Mitchell Dranow, Sea Cliff, NY, of counsel), for appellant.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Janice A. Taylor, J.), entered March 19, 2021. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on October 8, 2017. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. In an order entered March 19, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the cervical region of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219).
Since the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the plaintiff's spine was not caused by the accident, the burden never shifted to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact regarding causation or to explain any gap in treatment (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572; Torres v Rettaliata, 171 AD3d 829, 830).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for [*2]summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
BARROS, J.P., MILLER, GENOVESI and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Maria T. Fasulo
Clerk of the Court