Court Opinion

ID: 9850961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:04:59.122595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.138715
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s rulings concerning the admission of victim impact statements, and jury instructions regarding such statements. I write separately, however, to stress the importance of the majority’s finding that neither of the impact statements in this case emphasized the victim’s social status, and to caution trial courts against permitting any such emphasis in impact statements in future cases.
*218The Georgia Constitution’s prohibition against legislation with “the social status of a citizen” as its subject18 is based upon the principle that an individual’s standing in society is irrelevant to the evenhanded administration of justice.19 Consistent with this principle, it is established that a jury may not recommend capital sentencing based upon a victim’s class or wealth.20 This is so because, under our justice system, all victims are held in equal esteem, and accorded the same degree of reverence, no matter if they are rich or poor, loved or unloved, celebrated or anonymous. In other words, if we are to fulfill our obligation to ensure equal protection of the law, no victim can be valued over any other victim.
Otherwise, it is likely that juror passion (or dispassion), rather than clear and reasoned deliberation, might be allowed to dictate a criminal defendant’s fate. To illustrate, consider the scenario where a homeless individual, a recent immigrant from Haiti suffering from alcoholism, is viciously attacked and murdered. Despite the heinous nature of the crime, it is possible that, due to certain prejudices, some jurors might be less sympathetic toward this victim than they would be toward, for example, a local kindergarten teacher and mother, who is subjected to a similar attack. However, the devastating impact of the attacks felt by both victims and their survivors cannot be distinguished along cultural, racial, or class lines, and any attempt to draw such distinctions during the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution would, I believe, run afoul of the Constitution.
In a system based upon equal protection under the law, it is impermissible to infect the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution wdth class-based distinctions, as they can only inject irrelevant, and sometimes inflammatory, considerations into the sentencing process. The basic premise of our free and democratic society, which the judicial branch is sworn to uphold, requires us to remain cognizant that every life has value. Moreover, permitting victim impact evidence to touch upon the victim’s class, race, or social standing would, I believe, be an obvious violation of the prohibition against criminal sentencing based upon “passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.” 21
*219Decided July 14, 1997.
Hurl R. Taylor, Jr., for appellant.
Cheryl F. Custer, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, H. Maddox Kilgore, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
For these reasons, it is imperative that trial courts, when admitting victim impact statements, ensure that the statements do not seek the jurors’ consideration of the victim’s social status, wealth, class, race, or any other similar distinction. Only then can the legislature’s provision for the admission of victim impact statements, and this Court’s sanctioning thereof, be reconciled with the constitutional mandate of fairness before the bar of justice.

 Ga. Const. (1983), Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXV.

 Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 404, n. 5 (444 SE2d 748) (1994); see Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324-327 (1869). Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXV was added to the Georgia Constitution in 1868 to ensure equality in the eyes of the law, despite any racial or class-based societal distinctions. See McElreath, The Constitution of Georgia, §§ 107-116.

 Livingston, supra; Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 634 (323 SE2d 801) (1984).

 OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (1); Livingston, supra. In the hypothetical discussed above, many people could be substituted for the immigrant victim — for example, people who do not work, or are elderly, or quite young, or a member of a minority group, or ignorant, or sick, or who are simply disenfranchised from societal norms.