Court Opinion

ID: 9672017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:47:20.270464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.440865
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge,
concurring.
On October 29, 1980, George Clifton Gilmore killed Clarence and Lottie Williams in St. Louis County, Missouri. He was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to death. He appealed to this Court where, on May 31, 1983, the indictments were found defective and the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for new trial. State v. Gilmore, 650 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. banc 1983).
On August 24, 1979, George Clifton Gilmore killed Mary Luetta Watters in Franklin County, Missouri. He was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to death. He appealed to this Court, where on November 22, 1983, the judgment was affirmed. State v. Gilmore, 661 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. banc 1983).
On October 8, 1980, George Clifton Gilmore killed Woodrow Wilson Elliott in St. Louis County, Missouri. He was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He appealed to this Court where, on December 18, 1984, the judgment was affirmed. State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. banc 1984).
On re-trial for the crimes which occurred on October 29, 1980, George Clifton Gilmore was again convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. This direct appeal followed.
In Point V of his brief, Gilmore makes the following assertion:
The trial court erred by overruling appellant’s motions challenging death qualification voir dire questions and by striking on the state’s challenges for cause jurors who opposed capital punishment and therefore would not impose the death penalty, but could fairly try the issue of guilt, because appellant was thereby denied a fair and impartial jury and a jury representative of a fair cross-section of the community under the sixth amendment and the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth *177amendment. When jurors who could not assess the death penalty but could impartially try the issue of guilt or innocence are systematically excluded, the resulting jury is partial to the state, unrepresentative of a distinctive and constitutionally significant segment of the population, and underrepresentative of black and female citizens.
The record on this appeal discloses that five venirepersons who indicated they would refuse to consider capital punishment were excluded for cause.
On January 30, 1985, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, held “that a defendant’s sixth amendment right to have a jury that reflects a representational cross-section of the community is violated when at voir dire those persons who would refuse to consider capital punishment are excluded for cause.” Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 243 (8th Cir.1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
In this circumstance, it would seem appropriate to postpone review in this Court and to give Gilmore the opportunity to proceed immediately to the remedy of habeas corpus provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See State v. Harvey, 692 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Mo. banc 1985) (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
However, “I no longer believe that it serves any useful purpose to reiterate * * [my Harvey position].” Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U.Chi.L.Rev. 211, 219 (1957).
I concur.