Court Opinion

ID: 9383215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 20:03:27.660676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:44.473165
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211496-U
                                            No. 1-21-1496
                                     Order filed March 29, 2023
                                                                                      Third Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                               IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                          FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )   Appeal from the
                                                               )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 )   Cook County.
                                                               )
     v.                                                        )   No. 18 CR 14349
                                                               )
 DEANDRE ADAMS,                                                )   Honorable
                                                               )   Michael R. Clancy,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice McBride and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a
                felon over his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he constructively
                possessed the firearm.

¶2        Following a bench trial, defendant Deandre Adams was found guilty of two counts of

unlawful use or possession of a firearm by a felon (UUWF), four counts of aggravated unlawful

use of a weapon (AUUW), and one count of violating the Firearm Owners Identification (FOID)

Card Act. At sentencing, the trial court merged all counts into count I for UUWF (720 ILCS 5/24-
No. 1-21-1496

1.1(a) (West 2018)), and sentenced defendant to three years in prison. On appeal, defendant

contends that he was not proven guilty of UUWF beyond a reasonable doubt when a police

officer’s testimony detailing suspicious movement in a vehicle was “belied” by a video recording

and nothing, other than the firearm’s location under defendant’s seat, connected the firearm to him.

We affirm.

¶3     At trial, Chicago Police Officer Khaled Hasan testified that around 6:22 p.m. on September

8, 2018, he and Officer Tohatan were on patrol in a marked squad car. 1 Hasan sat in the front

passenger seat. At the intersection of Albany Avenue and Polk Street, he observed a black Chevy

Malibu fail to stop at a stop sign. The officers curbed the vehicle. At this point, Hasan was directly

behind the Chevy, which had “slightly” tinted rear windows and two occupants. Hasan observed

the occupants “kneeling forward” with their shoulder blades at a downward angle and their upper

bodies bent down.

¶4     Tohatan said, “hands up,” and the officers approached the vehicle. Hasan was on the

passenger side of the Chevy, and observed defendant, whom he identified in court, in the driver’s

seat. He also detected a strong odor of cannabis coming from the vehicle. Defendant complied

with Tohatan’s requests to lower the vehicle’s windows, raise his hands, and exit the vehicle.

Defendant was taken to the front of the squad car. At the same time, Hasan asked the passenger,

later identified as Anthony White, to exit. White handed Hasan a bag containing suspected

cannabis, and Hasan took White into custody.

¶5     Once the Chevy was empty, Hasan searched it. He recovered a black steel Glock 22 from

underneath the front passenger seat, and a two-tone 9-milimeter Smith & Wesson from underneath

       1
           The transcript does not contain Officer Tohatan’s given name.

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No. 1-21-1496

the driver’s seat. The Smith & Wesson, which was loaded and measured six or seven inches, was

within arm’s reach of where defendant was seated. It was not in a container or secured, and would

have been able to shift about the vehicle. Hasan asked defendant whether he had a FOID card or

concealed carry license (CCL), but defendant did not present either one.

¶6     Hasan wore a body camera during the incident. The State admitted and published the

footage, which is included in the record on appeal and has been viewed by this court. The first 29

seconds of the video depict the dashboard of the squad car, the sky, and the upper levels of

buildings. The weather is overcast, but there is ambient light and good visibility. At the 30-second

mark, the squad car stops. The first view of a black vehicle is at 39 seconds. The officers exit their

vehicle and approach the black vehicle at a measured pace. As Hasan approaches the passenger

side, a voice states, “all the windows down.” Tohatan approaches the driver’s side shining a

flashlight inside. The windows lower, and an arm in a black sleeve emerges from the passenger

side window.

¶7     As Hasan stands next to the vehicle, the footage depicts the occupants’ hands and laps, and

a flashlight beam on defendant’s lap. The occupants and officers speak, but most of the

conversation is inaudible due to the volume of Hasan’s police radio. However, a voice says

“barbershop” and Hasan says, “smell” and “don’t know *** is coming.” Defendant exits the

vehicle. Hasan asks White to place his phone on the dash and whether he has “anything on ya.”

White hands Hasan something that crinkles. White is taken into custody and placed at the front of

the squad car with defendant and Tohatan while Hasan returns to the Chevy.

¶8     Hasan first searches the passenger side. He states, “it’s a Glock hanging out,” and moves

his body camera to reveal a firearm under the passenger seat with its butt facing the camera. Hasan

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No. 1-21-1496

takes the firearm and removes the clip. He asks whether there is “anything else,” and mutters,

“gonna play the dumb game.” Next, Hasan searches the glove box and center console. He asks for

a FOID card or CCL, but neither is produced. Hasan then moves to the driver’s side of the Chevy,

kneels, sighs, and says, “get the f*** outta here” and “got another piece.” He sighs again, removes

his body camera, and uses a flashlight to illuminate a firearm and water bottle under the seat. He

identifies the firearm as a Smith & Wesson. He pushes his hand underneath the seat, catching his

watch briefly against the bottom of the seat, to retrieve the firearm. Hasan asks, “what the f*** are

you guys doing?” and searches the backseat. He then asks, “you usually carry like this when you

go to the barber shop?” and states that there are “two guns, bro.”

¶9     At trial, Hasan explained that the body camera footage did not depict the movements that

he observed inside the Chevy prior to exiting the squad car because the camera’s position on his

chest provided a different vantage point than his head. He recovered the firearm from the same

location that he observed defendant making movements.

¶ 10   During cross-examination, Hasan acknowledged that defendant pulled over immediately,

and that Hasan was 5 to 10 feet away when he saw movement inside the Chevy. Trial counsel then

asked Hasan to review the body camera footage and asked him to define “slight tint.” Hasan replied

that, “the camera show[ed] it differently, based on reflection,” but that “out there it was much

lighter than that.” He agreed that the back window’s tint was darker than a “normal vehicle” and

that the weather was cloudy on the day of the incident. However, there was “some sort of sunlight.”

While speaking with defendant and White, Hasan did not discuss the movements that he observed

them making.

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No. 1-21-1496

¶ 11   While Hasan stood next to the Chevy prior to ordering its occupants out, he did not see

defendant fidgeting or making further movements. Hasan never saw anything in defendant’s hand.

The firearm under the driver’s seat was located in an open space. There was also an empty water

bottle and gum wrappers. Defendant provided a driver’s license and proof of insurance. Hasan

acknowledged that his arrest report did not include information that defendant moved toward the

area from which the firearm was recovered. He explained that arrest reports require the author to

state which elements of an offense took place or the offense that a defendant will be charged with,

but that the case incident report was “more descriptive.”

¶ 12   During redirect, Hasan testified that he searched the vehicle, beginning on the passenger

side, due to the smell of cannabis. He first searched the area where he saw the passenger make

furtive movements, then did the same on the driver’s side. He documented the movements in the

case incident report and reiterated that not every detail is included in an arrest report. After

observing the firearm under the driver’s seat, he removed his body camera to film a “clearer

image.”

¶ 13   The State admitted certified abstracts from the Illinois State Police Firearms Services

Bureau that showed that defendant did not have a valid FOID card or CCL prior to October 25,

2018. The State also admitted certified copies of defendant’s convictions for residential burglary

in case numbers 09 CF 1335 and 09 CF 2193.

¶ 14   In closing argument, the State asserted that the evidence established that defendant, a

convicted felon without a FOID card or CCL, constructively possessed the firearm recovered from

under his seat. Hasan observed defendant making a forward motion toward defendant’s feet, and

while the body camera footage did not capture these movements, cameras are “not used to replace

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No. 1-21-1496

the eyes.” The defense replied that there was no testimony as to the Chevy’s owner, the windows

were tinted, and the movements were not dispositive. According to counsel, Hasan “maybe” saw

shadows, but “who knows” exactly what defendant “was doing when his shoulders moved.” The

defense further argued that the firearm under the driver’s seat was not “right there” and the State

had not established that defendant knew “exactly what” was under the seat.

¶ 15   In finding defendant guilty, the trial court found Hasan credible and straightforward. The

court noted that while Hasan did not include details about the movement in the arrest report, he

included them in the case incident report. The court stated that its review of the footage

demonstrated that visibility through the windows depended on the angle. Moreover, the officers’

actions comported with seeing the movements Hasan described. Specifically, the officers did not

approach the Chevy until all the windows were lowered, which was consistent with a concern that

the vehicle’s occupants might be armed. In other words, the officers were on “high alert.” The

court found that defendant had exclusive control over the firearm that was directly below him, and

that the “furtive movement” led to the reasonable inference that defendant was secreting a firearm

because the police were behind him.

¶ 16    Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, or, in the alternative for a new trial, arguing in

pertinent part that the window tint rendered Hasan’s testimony that he saw the movements

“impossible.” The trial court denied the motion, as the body camera footage showed that the

officers believed that defendant hid a weapon, and that the location from which the firearm was

recovered led to the reasonable inference that the movements were, in fact, defendant hiding it.

¶ 17   After argument, the trial court merged all counts into count I for UUWF and sentenced

defendant to three years in prison. Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider sentence.

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No. 1-21-1496

¶ 18     On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he

possessed a firearm when Hasan’s “claims” of suspicious movement were belied by the body

camera footage and the only connection between defendant and the firearm was its location,

“buried deeply” under his seat.

¶ 19     In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have

found the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cline, 2022 IL

126383, ¶ 25. The trier of fact is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the

evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from the facts presented at trial. People v. McLaurin,

2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22. “In reviewing the evidence, this court will not retry the defendant, nor will

we substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.” Id. A defendant’s conviction will be

reversed only when the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a

reasonable doubt of his guilt. People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 24.

¶ 20     Here, defendant was charged with UUWF in that he knowingly possessed a firearm after

having previously been convicted of a felony (count I). See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018).

Thus, the State was required to prove defendant’s possession of the firearm beyond a reasonable

doubt.

¶ 21     A defendant’s possession of contraband is a factual issue, and we will not disturb the

findings of the trial court unless the evidence is so unbelievable that it creates a reasonable doubt

as to his guilt. People v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 27. Possession of contraband may be

actual or constructive. Id. Here, because defendant was not found in actual possession of the

firearm, the State was required to prove that he constructively possessed it.

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No. 1-21-1496

¶ 22   To establish constructive possession, the State must prove that the defendant had

knowledge of the contraband and exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where

the contraband was found. People v. Wise, 2021 IL 125392, ¶ 25; see also People v. Givens, 237

Ill. 2d 311, 335-36 (2010) (the presence of other people does not diminish a defendant’s exclusive

dominion and control). Constructive possession is often proven entirely by circumstantial

evidence. People v. McCarter, 339 Ill. App. 3d 876, 879 (2003). “Knowledge may be shown by

evidence of a defendant’s acts, declarations, or conduct from which it can be inferred that he knew

the contraband existed in the place where it was found.” People v. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st)

102094, ¶ 17. Knowledge may also be demonstrated by a defendant’s statements or conduct upon

encountering the police. People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 162791, ¶ 27. “Control is established

when a person has the ‘intent and capability to maintain control and dominion’ over an item, even

if he lacks personal present dominion over it.” Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17 (quoting

People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 361 (1992)). Here, defendant’s sole contention on appeal is

that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he constructively possessed the firearm

recovered from underneath the driver’s seat of the Chevy.

¶ 23   A defendant’s presence in a vehicle is not alone sufficient evidence that he knows a weapon

is therein. People v. Bailey, 333 Ill. App. 3d 888, 891 (2002). Factors relevant to a defendant’s

knowledge include (1) whether the weapon was visible to the defendant, (2) the time in which the

defendant would have been able to observe the weapon, (3) whether the defendant made any

gestures indicating an effort to hide or retrieve the weapon, (4) the weapon’s size, and (5) whether

the defendant had a possessory or ownership interest in the vehicle or the weapon found inside.

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No. 1-21-1496

Bailey, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 891-92. Generally, knowledge and possession are factual questions to

be resolved by the trier of fact. People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 132176, ¶ 25.

¶ 24   Here, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact

could have found that defendant constructively possessed the firearm recovered from beneath the

driver’s seat. The evidence at trial established that, while directly behind the Chevy, Hasan

observed the occupants “kneeling forward” with their shoulder blades pointed in a downward angle

and their upper bodies bent down. Hasan acknowledged that the Chevy’s windows were tinted,

but asserted that the “slightly” tinted windows did not prevent him from seeing movement inside

the vehicle and that his line of sight had a different vantage point than the body camera. Defendant

argues that the body camera footage “belies” Hasan’s testimony regarding the movement that

Hasan observed, but the footage does not capture the moments when the movement was allegedly

seen and therefore is not in conflict with the testimony. The footage, filmed on the camera resting

at Hasan’s chest level, depicts the inside of the squad car, the sky, and buildings. Body camera

footage does depict defendant in the Chevy’s driver’s seat, defendant exiting the vehicle, and the

recovery of a firearm from underneath that seat.

¶ 25   Accordingly, the circumstantial evidence showed defendant’s “intent and capability” to

exercise dominion over the area where the firearm was found. See People v. Jackson, 2019 IL App

(1st) 161745, ¶ 27. “[D]irect evidence of a defendant driving a vehicle is surely sufficient evidence

of control.” People v. Bogan, 2017 IL App (3d) 150156, ¶ 42. Here, defendant drove the vehicle,

demonstrating he had control over the area where the firearm was recovered. Id. Moreover, the

firearm was loose under the driver’s seat, within reach of the person in that seat. The body camera

footage depicted the firearm and a water bottle under the seat, and Hasan could reach under the

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No. 1-21-1496

seat, from outside the vehicle, to retrieve it. When the firearm was loose under the seat in which

defendant sat, a trier of fact could reasonably infer the firearm was in his immediate and exclusive

control. See People v. Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d 792, 799 (2003) (“Because of the location of the gun

at the time it was recovered, we can certainly infer that defendant had knowledge of the gun and

that the gun was within his immediate and exclusive control.”). Moreover, defendant’s actions of

moving his body downward while the Chevy was being curbed by police officers supports the

inference that he had knowledge of the firearm underneath this seat. See Thomas, 2019 IL App

(1st) 162791, ¶ 27 (knowledge may be inferred from the defendant’s statements or conduct upon

encountering the police).

¶ 26   We are unpersuaded by defendant’s reliance on Bailey. In that case, the defendant was

sitting in the front passenger seat of a vehicle being driven by someone else. Bailey, 333 Ill. App.

3d at 889. Officers stopped the vehicle and, after observing an open container of alcohol, ordered

the occupants out. Id. at 889-90. Following a search, the police recovered a firearm from under the

front passenger seat of the vehicle. Id. at 890. The firearm was not visible until police looked under

the seat. Id. The defendant was ultimately convicted of AUUW. Id.

¶ 27   On appeal, however, the court found no “affirmative evidence, either circumstantial or

direct,” to establish that the defendant had knowledge of the firearm under his seat. Id. at 892. The

firearm was under the seat and not visible, the defendant did not own the vehicle, officers did not

see the defendant make gestures indicating he was trying to retrieve the firearm, and there was no

connection between the owners of the vehicle and firearm and the defendant. Id.

¶ 28   We find Bailey distinguishable. While defendant is correct that his mere presence in the

Chevy, without more, is not evidence that he had knowledge of the firearm (id. at 891), as

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No. 1-21-1496

discussed, the circumstantial evidence here was sufficient to establish his constructive possession.

Unlike the defendant in Bailey, who was a passenger in a vehicle with another person driving and

a firearm was recovered from under Bailey’s seat, here, defendant was driving and the firearm was

recovered from under his seat. Moreover, unlike the Bailey defendant, when defendant came into

contact with police officers, he was observed angling his body downward.

¶ 29   Defendant contends that the tinted windows “blocked” the officers’ view of the occupants,

since the officers required that the windows be lowered before approaching the Chevy. He argues

that it would have been “extremely difficult, if not impossible” for Hasan to observe any movement

by the Chevy’s occupants and argues that the lack of discussion about the furtive movements on

the body camera footage means that no such movement took place. He likens Hasan’s recitation

of events to so-called “dropsy” testimony, where an officer is alleged to have fabricated evidence

that a defendant dropped contraband in plain view in order to avoid the exclusion of improperly

obtained evidence. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 2019 IL App (1st) 161640, ¶ 20.

¶ 30   Here, Hasan acknowledged that the Chevy’s windows were tinted, but asserted that the tint

was slight and there was enough sunlight to see the occupants’ movements. Although defendant

posits that the tint motivated the officers to approach slowly, another reasonable inference is a

concern, based upon the movements Hasan observed, that the occupants of the Chevy had hidden

contraband under the seats. The body camera footage depicts the officers approach the Chevy at a

measured pace from the sides, moving closer once the windows were down. While there is no

explicit discussion of the movements on the body camera footage, Hasan testified that he included

this information in the case incident report.

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No. 1-21-1496

¶ 31   Defendant’s allegation that police officers frequently fabricate “dropsy” testimony does

not show that the evidence in this case (i.e., that Hasan observed the Chevy’s occupants move their

bodies at a downward angle toward their seats, and that firearms were later recovered from under

those seats) was so improbable or incredible that it created a reasonable doubt of his guilt. See

People v. Henderson, 33 Ill. 2d 225, 229 (1965) (“Far from being contrary to human experience,

cases which have come to this court show it to be a common behavior pattern for individuals

[possessing contraband] to attempt to dispose of [it] when suddenly confronted by authorities.”).

¶ 32   Defendant further argues that no physical evidence, such as DNA or fingerprints, linked

him to the firearm, no evidence established that he owned the Chevy, and he did not make a written

or videotaped statement. However, as previously noted, circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient

to sustain a conviction. See McCarter, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 879 (a defendant’s constructive

possession of contraband is often proven entirely by circumstantial evidence). “Physical evidence

linking defendant with the firearm is not required to establish that he committed the offense.”

People v. Bobo, 2020 IL App (1st) 182628, ¶ 43.

¶ 33   In the case at bar, defendant was initially observed making movements toward the area

under the driver’s seat and a firearm was later recovered from under that seat. These facts support

a reasonable inference that defendant knew a firearm was underneath his seat. While defendant is

correct that no evidence at trial established the Chevy’s ownership, he relies on no authority

requiring the State to establish that he owned the vehicle in order to prove his possession of

contraband found therein. The fact that the Chevy’s owner was not identified at trial was not fatal

to the State’s case when defendant was driving the Chevy at the time of the traffic stop. See Bogan,

2017 IL App (3d) 150156, ¶ 42 (“direct evidence of a defendant driving a vehicle is surely

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No. 1-21-1496

sufficient evidence of control”). The fact that the record does not establish whether defendant

owned the Chevy does not negate his control over the area where the firearm was found, directly

under his seat. See People v. Chavez, 327 Ill App. 3d 18, 26 (2001) (when contraband is found in

a vehicle, “it is control of the vehicle rather than ownership of the vehicle which is pertinent to

proof of control of the area” where the contraband is located).

¶ 34   Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we cannot say

that no rational trier of fact could have concluded that the evidence established that defendant

constructively possessed the firearm recovered from underneath the driver’s seat of the Chevy, the

seat in which he was sitting. We reverse a defendant’s conviction only when the evidence is so

unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that reasonable doubt of his guilt remains (Newton,

2018 IL 122958, ¶ 24); this is not one of those cases. Defendant’s conviction for UUWF is

therefore affirmed.

¶ 35   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 36   Affirmed.

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