Court Opinion

ID: 9711046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:23:23.957028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.864728
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the admission of evidence concerning the uncounseled lineup was not harmless error. I agree that Hatcher was entitled to counsel at the lineup, that he did not waive his right to counsel," and, therefore, that evidence of that pretrial lineup identification should not have been admitted at trial. The majority, however, soft-pedals the questions of “independent origin” and the relation of that issue to the question of harmless error. Thus, the majority has failed to properly complete the necessary analysis to be made in resolving this question, and, as a result, fails to elucidate the guidelines which trial courts and this Court must follow in future cases of this type. A full and proper analysis of the law and the facts of this case leads me to conclude that the error was harmless in nature.
After determining that evidence of the witnesses’ lineup identification should not have been admitted, we must examine the nature of the witnesses’ in-court identification. The purpose of conducting this analysis is clear: the witnesses also should not have been allowed to make an in-court identification of Hatcher unless those identifications had origins independent of the illegal lineup. United States v. Wade, (1967) 388 U.S. 226, 241-42, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1939-40, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1165-66; Morgan v. State, (1980) Ind., 400 N.E.2d 111, 113; Love v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 577, 581, 365 N.E.2d 771, 773.
The factors to be considered in determining the existence of an independent basis may be divided into two sets: those dealing with the witness’ opportunity to observe the offender, and those relating to the reliability of his recollection of his original observation of the offender. Morgan v. State, supra; Love v. State, supra. Specific factors in the first group include: the duration for which the observer can observe the perpetrator; the distance separating them; the lighting conditions; and circumstances affecting the amount of attention the witness can devote to observing the guilty party. Parker v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 595, 599, 358 N.E.2d 110, 112. Factors in the second set include: the witness’ prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act; the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description; any pre-lineup identification of another person; the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup; failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and the lapse of time between the *568alleged act and the lineup. Swope v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 148, 157, 325 N.E.2d 193,197, quoting United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. at 241, 87 S.Ct. at 1940, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1165. “It is also relevant to consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.” Id. See Morgan v. State, supra; Love v. State, supra.
Concerning witness Sherrie Seybert in the case before us, the record reveals that she was unable to pick appellant’s picture from the photographic display conducted prior to the lineup. However, the description she gave shortly after the crime to Officer Gillespie closely matched Hatcher’s actual description. At no time did she misidentify another person. • Moreover, only about six weeks elapsed between the commission of the crime and her identification of appellant in the lineup.
In addition, Seybert had a good opportunity to observe the perpetrators at the time this crime was committed. This robbery occurred in the middle of the afternoon, and appellant and his cohort were inside the restaurant for approximately five minutes. Seybert testified she had a clear view of appellant’s face as he left the restaurant. Further, she engaged in a brief conversation with the two men before they pulled their guns and announced the robbery. Thus, in light of these facts, I believe there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could determine that Seybert’s identification of appellant had a basis independent of the illegal lineup. Therefore, in my view, the court did not err in admitting her in-court identification.
Witness George Doyle also had independent grounds for making an in-court identification of Hatcher. Like Seybert, Doyle was able to give a description of the perpetrators which matched Hatcher’s description. Moreover, Doyle did identify Hatcher from the photographic display conducted prior to the lineup, and also he never failed to identify Hatcher on a prior occasion. He testified that Hatcher approached him in the back part of the restaurant and, at one point, their faces were only about one foot apart. Thus, Doyle had an even greater opportunity than Seybert to observe the perpetrator during the robbery. Therefore, I think the trial court did not err in allowing Doyle to make an in-court identification of Hatcher. See Johnson v. State, (1972) 257 Ind. 682, 278 N.E.2d 577.
The majority opinion apparently accepts in a limited sense the proposition that the in-court identifications of Hatcher by Sey-bert and Doyle had an independent origin and were not the product of the uncoun-seled lineup. However, the majority then attempts to compare this case to Moore v. Illinois, (1977) 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424. The Moore case has no bearing on the issue of the independent basis of the witnesses’ in-court identifications. The United States Supreme Court stated in Moore:
“[T]he prosecution cannot buttress its case-in-chief by introducing evidence of a pretrial confrontation made in violation of the accused’s Sixth Amendment rights even if it can prove that the pretrial identification had an independent source.”
Id. at 231, 98 S.Ct. at 466, 54 L.Ed.2d at 435-36, citing Gilbert v. California, (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 273, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1186 (emphasis added).
Thus, without question, the per se exclusionary rule of Gilbert v. California, as applied by Moore v. Illinois, operates in this case to render inadmissible evidence of the witnesses’ pretrial lineup identification. However, at this stage of the analysis, we are past that point; accepting that conclusion, we should be focusing on whether the in-court identification had an independent origin, and, if so, whether the trial court’s error in admitting evidence of the lineup identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Moore v. Illinois addresses an entirely different issue, and should not be used to confuse or suspend our analysis of the in-court identification evidence.
My assessment of the facts of this case, as set out above, leads me to conclude — and the majority appears to agree — that the *569witnesses’ in-court identifications had origins independent of the uncounseled lineup. Therefore, in my view, the trial court did not err in admitting the victims’ in-court identification on testimony. We must next determine whether the admission of the improper evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Clearly, the United States Supreme Court has contemplated and even required the application of the harmless error doctrine to cases of this exact type. Moore v. Illinois, (1977) 434 U.S. 220, 226, 98 S.Ct. 458, 463, 54 L.Ed.2d 424, 436; Gilbert v. California, (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 274, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1187; United States v. Wade, (1967) 388 U.S. 226, 242, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1940, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1166.
The majority seems to be ill at ease with the idea that the victims’ positive in-court identifications could help render the error in question harmless. In my view, the strength of these identifications — and the clearly independent bases for them — are crucial to a proper solution of the harmless error question. It is illogical and unfair to recognize the admissibility of the witness’ in-court identifications, and, hence, their independent origins, but then to refuse to consider those identifications in deciding whether the error as to the lineup testimony was harmless. The majority asserts that, to permit such an analysis “would be to permit the ‘exploitation of the primary illegality’ and would obviate the requirement that identification procedures be kept free of state-induced suggestivity.” However, to refuse in all cases to consider the in-court identification in applying the harmless error rule would, for purposes of our review, completely undercut the finding that the in-court identification was admissible. I do not believe the exclusionary rule of Gilbert v. California and the harmless error rule logically or legally require this approach. In fact, such an approach would, in many cases, probably frustrate and twist the otherwise completely proper application of the harmless error rule.
The two victims here, Doyle and Seybert, both unequivocally identified Hatcher at trial as one of the perpetrators of the robbery. In addition, Doyle picked Hatchers picture from a photographic display which was conducted before the illegal lineup. Evidence of Doyle’s selection was also presented to the jury. Also, as noted above, the circumstances surrounding the crime, including the witnesses’ close visual contact with Hatcher, unquestionably made their in-court identifications of him very convincing. Moreover, there was no evidence presented to the jury that either Sey-bert or Doyle ever misidentified another person as the perpetrator, nor that Doyle ever failed to identify Hatcher on a prior occasion. In addition, both witnesses’ initial description of one of the perpetrators closely matched Hatcher’s actual description. All of these facts, which were fully available for the jury’s consideration, lead me to conclude that the admission of evidence of the uneounseled lineup could not have affected the jury’s verdict. The testimony regarding the victims’ pretrial identifications added little to their positive identifications at trial. See United States ex rel. Moore v. Illinois, (7th Cir. 1978) 577 F.2d 411 (on remand from 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424), cert. denied, (1979) 440 U.S. 919, 99 S.Ct. 1242, 59 L.Ed.2d 471.
Finally, the majority has chosen to remand this case for a new trial. At that new trial, evidence of the uncounseled lineup identification will clearly not be admissible. The question remains, however, as to whether the victims will be permitted to make an in-court identification. That question, of course, turns on whether their identifications have independent origins. The majority, at two points, assumes for the sake of argument that such origins exist. However, the majority, in fact never directly applies the appropriate guidelines and decides this question. I think this Court should give some guidance to the parties and the trial court concerning this important question, because, judging from the record before us, a finding that the in-court identifications were also improper might, as a practical matter, determine for the prosecutor whether he will pursue this case further. In addition, I also believe the majori*570ty should address the issue of the State’s alleged failure to disclose all witnesses. Whatever merit this issue has now, it will also have upon retrial and on any subsequent appeal.
I would hold that the admission of evidence of the uncounseled lineup was, in this case, harmless error, and would therefore proceed to consider the other issues raised on this appeal.
GIVAN, C. J., concurs.