Court Opinion

ID: 9605022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:29:34.708145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:40.938038
License: Public Domain

*788BAKES, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part;
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the court below erred in entering judgment against the appellants without providing a jury trial. I also concur with the majority’s holding with respect to the attempted disqualification of the trial judge. However, I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the order setting the date for trial was properly served on the appellants.
I.R.C.P. 5(b) states that “service upon ... a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his last known address, or if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court.” (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that the appellants notified the court that their address was Box 111, Missionary Training Center, Provo, Utah 84601. That was clearly the appellants’ “last known address.” The order setting the date for trial was not sent to that last known address, but was sent to P.O. Box 111, Provo, Utah 84601.
The majority first justifies its position by stating that “it is not clear that this address, without the words ‘Missionary Training Center,’ was so deficient that it could not be their ‘last known address.’ ” Implicit in that statement, however, is the fact that it is also not clear that the address without the words “Missionary Training Center” was sufficient to state the “last known address” of the appellants. Certainly, it is very possible that Box 111 referred to a box at the Missionary Training Center rather than a Post Office Box 111 at the post office. Also, the Beckstrands did not give their address as “P.O. Box 111,” but rather as simply ‘Box 111,” further increasing the probability that there were two different Box Ill’s. That such was in fact the case is manifest by the affidavit of Brenda Wilkinson, a mailroom employee of the Missionary Training Center, Provo, Utah. In her affidavit she stated the following:
“If the address contained the words ‘Missionary Training Center’, or ‘MTC’, or our street address of ‘2005 North 900 East’, or even ‘Brigham Young University’ with the title of elder or sister preceding the person’s name, the letter would be delivered to us. We would not receive letters addressed to a box number in Provo, Utah, unless the address also somehow connected the box number to the Missionary Training Center." (Emphasis added.)
Statutes setting forth methods of serving notice must be strictly complied with, and no deviation can be excused. Smith v. D.R.G., Inc., 331 N.E.2d 614, 621 (Ill.App. 1975); In re Harris, 273 N.C. 20, 159 S.E.2d 539, 543 (1968); Cowl v. Wentz, 107 N.W.2d 697 (N.D.1961); McAnulty v. Snohomish School Dist. No. 201, 9 Wash.App. 834, 515 P.2d 523, 525 (1973). Recently, in Omega Alpha House Corp. v. Molander Associates, 102 Idaho 361, 630 P.2d 153 (1981), we vacated a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a default judgment because notice of an attorney withdrawal did not strictly comply with the rule authorizing withdrawal. In Wasden v. Foell, 63 Idaho 83, 87-88, 117 P.2d 465, 467 (1941), this Court stated, “Where service of notice by registered mail is expressly authorized by statute, as is the situation here, it has generally been held that service is effected when the notice is properly addressed, registered and mailed.” (Emphasis added.) The burden is thus on the serving party to clearly establish that proper service has been made. Here, I.R. C.P. 5(b) permits service by mail; however, there is no doubt that the notice was not addressed with the address provided by the Beckstrands. The fact that it is unclear whether P.O. Box 111, Provo, Utah 84601, was the equivalent of Box 111, Missionary Training Center, Provo, Utah 84601, means that the respondent failed to establish that the notice was sent to the Beckstrands’ last known address.
The majority notes that the Beckstrands had previously received one communication which had been sent to P.O. Box 111, Provo, Utah 84601. However, the record in fact indicates that the received communication was very likely properly addressed to the Missionary Training Center. As pointed *789out by the majority, the particular communication received by the Beckstrands contained a note of issue, request for trial setting, and a motion for partial summary judgment. Apparently, the note of issue and request for trial setting were prepared before the motion for partial summary judgment. An affidavit of mailing states that the note of issue and request for trial setting were mailed on January 5, 1979, to P.O. Box 111, Provo, Utah 84601. Nevertheless, even from copies of the originals, it appears that a different date had been whited out and the 5th of January, 1979, typed in. Furthermore, there is also an affidavit of mailing for the motion for partial summary judgment. That affidavit shows that the motion was also mailed on January 5,1979, and was addressed to “P.O. Box 111, Language Training Center, Provo, Utah.” (Emphasis added.) It is clear from the record that the note of issue, request for trial setting and motion for partial summary judgment were all mailed together. Thus, due to the conflict in affidavits, both made by the same person, there is at least a 50% chance that the envelope containing the documents bore the address of the Language Training Center which, according to the affidavit of Brenda Wilkinson, would have been a sufficient designation to permit delivery of the documents. Certainly, considering the apparent changes made to the date of mailing on the affidavit of mailing for the note of issue and request for trial setting, the probability is much more than 50% that those documents and the motion for partial summary judgment were sufficiently addressed to permit delivery to the Beckstrands as shown by the affidavit of mailing for the motion for partial summary judgment. Consequently, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that the Beckstrands actually received mail addressed simply to P.O. Box 111, Provo, Utah 84601.
However, even if those documents had been addressed simply with P.O. Box 111, Provo, Utah 84601, and the Beckstrands received those documents despite the incorrect address, still such by itself is not sufficient to establish that that address was equivalent to Box 111, Missionary Training Center, Provo, Utah 84601. Mis-addressed letters and packages often find their way to the intended party, despite the incorrect address, simply because of a particular postal worker’s familiarity with facts and circumstances which enable him to recognize the mistake and make a correct delivery. Nevertheless, just because such may have happened once does not mean that it will happen again. Unless the serving party shows that an incorrect address was in fact the equivalent of the correct address, i.e., in this case that there was only one Box 111 in Provo, Utah 84601, then service cannot be said to have been established. Respondents made no such showing, and therefore their assertion of proper service must fail.
The majority also concludes that the Beckstrands disavowed their address, thus permitting service on the Clerk of the court, because no address was known. The Beckstrands wrote that “[w]e have no idea what our address from this day on for a period of undetermined length.” Characterization of that statement as a “disavowal” is unfounded. The Beckstrands neither disavowed the Missionary Training Center address, nor stated that letters would not be forwarded. They simply stated that they did not know their future address and could not say when such address would be known to them. It is common practice for people to relocate without first having a new address. In such situations, the postal authorities are instructed to hold incoming mail at the old address until they are notified of a new address to which mail should be forwarded. The statement by appellants reflects nothing more than the fact that they did not know their future address and were uncertain as to when they would know.
Depositing notice with the clerk of the court is a last resort and effectively is no notice at all. That method of service is reserved for situations where there is no last known address. Clearly, the respondents here did possess the “last known address” of the appellants, and proper service required that notice be sent to that last *790known address. Such was not done, and therefore the 60(b) motion to set aside the default should have been granted.