Court Opinion

ID: 9381007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 19:00:50.351531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.981795
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 21 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DUSHAN STEPHAN NICKOLICH, II,                   No. 22-15152

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01702-ROS-JFM

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
SHANDA PAYNE, Administrative Director;
DAVE YOUNG, Health Program Manager
III; ALMA MANCILLA, Resident Program
Specialist II,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                    Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 14, 2023**

Before:      SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Arizona civil detainee Dushan Stephan Nickolich, II, appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due

process violation in connection with an incident report. We have jurisdiction under

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.

2012). We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Nickolich’s action because Nickolich

failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate an injury in fact. See Lujan v. Defs.

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (explaining that constitutional standing

requires an “injury in fact,” causation, and redressability; “injury in fact” refers to

“an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized

. . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

      We reject as unsupported by the record Nickolich’s contention that the

district court mischaracterized him as a prisoner and prejudiced him in future cases

by describing him as a “frequent litigant.”

      We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      AFFIRMED.

                                           2                                       22-15152