Court Opinion

ID: 9587862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:27:16.976081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:28.911050
License: Public Domain

*365Bussey, Justice
(dissenting) :
Finding myself unable to agree with the majority opinion and the result reached in this case, I feel impelled to set forth as concisely as possible my views thereabout.
The pivotal issue in this case is, not whether the City of Greenville has the right to amend its zoning ordinance, but whether here the city acted in contravention of the enabling statute, and in excess of the powers granted, in adopting the particular ordinance. The ordinance, of course, carries a presumption of validity, but voluminous evidence, both oral and documentary, tending to overcome the presumption of validity was offered on behalf of the appellant, and evidence, both documentary and oral, was offered by the respondents tending to support the validity of the particular ordinance.
The exhibits offered by the parties, not all of which were brought before us, were in excess of thirty. Much of the evidence, both oral and documentary, offered by the respective parties was objected to as being either irrelevant or incompetent or both. The Master complied with Section 10-1409 of the Code by receiving the evidence, but did not comply with the following provision of the statute, “shall hear and decide any objection which may be made to the competency, relevancy or admissibility of any testimony which may be offered.” Neither did he in any manner attempt to separate the evidence deemed by him to be inadmissible. Instead, he found as a finding of fact, rather than a conclusion of law, that “much testimony offered by both parties was irrelevant and incompetent.” He went on to say that “a large portion of the testimony and exhibits have been sifted as the chaff from the wheat.”
With all due respect to the esteemed Master of long judicial experience, he did not furnish the litigants, the circuit court or this court any insight into his mental processes employed in sifting the “chaff” from the “wheat”. He gives no guide or even intimation whatsoever as to what he deter*366mined to be “chaff” and what he determined to be “wheat”, or how he arrived at such determination.
Since we are totally in the dark as to what the Master considered to be “wheat” and what the Master considered to be “chaff”, I do not know how it is possible for either the circuit Court or this court to determine whether his findings of fact were based upon and supported by competent, relevant evidence or not. For the appellant here to have made specific exceptions as to the consideration of inadmissible evidence or the failure by the Master to consider admissible evidence, would have involved pure speculation on the part of the appellant since it was left totally in the dark as to what evidence the Master considered and what evidence he did not consider. Had it attempted to speculate and frame specific exceptions in this respect, such exceptions could not have been supported by the record since- there is nothing to show what evidence was considered and what was not considered.
We, of course, held in the cited case of Cox v. Fist Provident Corp., 240 S. C. 130, 125 S. E. (2d) 1, that the failure of the Master to there comply with Section 10-1409 was not shown to be prejudicial. The factual situation there was, however, totally different from the case at bar, the objection there being simply to one line of questioning. The North Carolina case of Pack v. Katzin, 215 N. C. 233, 1 S. E. (2d) 566, is likewise totally distinguishable from the instant case on the facts. Here, the objections went to much of the evidence offered by both of the parties and we are not given even any intimation as to the Master’s rulings thereabout.
Much more nearly in point, I think, is the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in the case of Greer v. Andrew, 133 Ga. 193, 65 S. E. 416. There the report of the auditor was much more nearly in accord with the provisions of a similar Georgia statute than is the report of the Master here. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision confirming the auditor’s report and refusing to recommit it for failure to comply with the statutory provisions.
*367It seems clear to me that the purposes of Section 10-1409 are clearly twofold: (a) The master is required to receive evidence which he regards as inadmissible to the end that it will be unnecessary to recommit the matter for the purpose of a further reference should the reviewing Court conclude that the evidence was properly admissible (b). To require a ruling from the master as to the admissibility of evidence so as to afford the parties and the reviewing judge full opportunity to consider the effect of the referee’s rulings and to give proper consideration to his findings from the evidence reported.
The decision of this court in Elrod v. Elrod, 230 S. C. 109, 94 S. E. (2d) 237, dealt with the first purpose of the statute, above stated, and held that it was reversible error for the master to refuse to take evidence which he deemed inadmissible. I think the second purpose of the statute is even more important than the first and that the Master committed reversible error in failing to incorporate in his report his rulings as to the admissibility of evidence. In the absence of such rulings, I do not see how the circuit co,urt or this court could possibly intelligently review the record and determine whether the Master’s findings of fact were based on competent, relevant, admissible testimony, or to the contrary, were arrived at by the failure to consider proper evidence or possibly the consideration of inadmissible evidence. It would seem to me that we could only speculate as to the mental processes employed by the Master in separating what he termed “wheat” from what he termed “chaff”.
I would reverse and remand the cause for failure of the Master to comply with the statute. Doing so would make it unnecessary to now discuss most, if not all, of the other questions involved in the appeal. With respect to other questions, however, I wish to point out that in my humble opinion the affirmance of the judgment of the lower court, in accordance with the majority opinion, leaves unanswered very serious constitutional questions as to whether the appellant here has been accorded due process of law and whether the appellant *368was denied the equal protection of the laws. In my view as to the proper disposition of the appeal, under the rule of restraint, it becomes unnecessary for me to discuss or attempt to decide these serious constitutional questions.