Court Opinion

ID: 9583499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:39:15.783419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:03.149091
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that the appropriate level of discipline in this case is suspension for 90 days. I believe Freeman’s conduct mandates the sanction of disbarment.
ABA Standard 5.11,13 which we have relied upon in this Court as persuasive authority, provides that absent mitigating or aggravating factors, disbarment is generally appropriate for serious, intentional conduct involving criminal conduct or dishonesty. The special master found that Freeman engaged in professional conduct involving dishonesty. Standard 4, Bar Rule 4-102. Conversely, there were no persuasive mitigating circumstances surrounding Freeman’s misconduct. This Court has consistently held that
[i]n determining the appropriate sanction, the American Bar Association’s standards provide guidance. In the Matter of Jack O. Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (2) (456 SE2d 52) (1995). Under those standards, disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any serious criminal misconduct ... or engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit. Standard 5.11, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991).
In the Matter of Thomas Washburn, 266 Ga. 50 (464 SE2d 192) (1995). Freeman took funds held in a guardianship account which belonged to an incapacitated adult he was representing. He was found to have violated Standards 4, 65 (A) and 65 (D) of Bar Rule 4-102, each of which may be punished by disbarment. In failing to apply disbarment as the appropriate level of discipline, the majority sends the wrong message to the bench, bar, and public, by again failing to punish the disciplinary infraction with a penalty appropriate to the seriousness of the misconduct. See In the Matter of Kenneth Raymond Carlson, 268 Ga. 335 (489 SE2d 834) (1997). Because I *910would disbar Ronald J. Freeman, I must dissent to the majority’s imposition of a 90-day suspension in this case.
Decided October 13, 1998.
William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Steven J. Kaczkowski, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.
Rogers & Hardin, Robert S. Remar, for Freeman.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.

 Standard 5.11 provides that disbarment is generally appropriate when: (a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes . . . misappropriation or theft; or (b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.