Court Opinion

ID: 9940203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:19:50.548674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:59.586964
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                        February 13, 2024

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                          DIVISION II
 ALDOREN KAUZLARICH,                                              No. 57684-8-II

                              Appellant,

        v.                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 OFFICE OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
 DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY,

                              Respondent.

       MAXA, J. – Aldoren Kauzlarich appeals the Pollution Control Hearings Board’s (PCHB’s)

summary judgment decision affirming the issuance of an administrative order (AO) from the

Department of Ecology (Ecology) to decommission a well he constructed. It is undisputed that

the well does not meet the required minimum construction standards and constitutes an

environmental and public health hazard.

       Ecology ordered Kauzlarich’s well be decommissioned after learning that it was not built

to the proper specifications. Ecology determined that the well was an environmental, health, and

safety hazard, and that it must be decommissioned. Kauzlarich appealed the AO requiring him

to decommission his well to the PCHB.

       Before the PCHB, Ecology filed a summary judgment motion. Ecology relied on a

declaration from John Pearch, a well construction coordinator at Ecology and licensed

hydrogeologist, among other evidence. Kauzlarich submitted his own declaration that presented
No. 57684-8-II

hearsay statements from a well driller, who claimed that it was possible to repair the well. The

PCHB granted summary judgment in favor of Ecology and upheld the AO.

       Kauzlarich appealed the PCHB’s decision to the trial court. Nearly three years after

filing the appeal, Kauzlarich submitted a declaration from Christian Bland, a licensed well

driller. Bland claimed that decommissioning Kauzlarich’s well was unnecessary, and that he

would be able to repair the well. Kauzlarich filed a motion to remand the case to the PCHB for

further fact-finding. The trial court denied the motion and granted Ecology’s motion to certify

the case for direct review by this court.

       We hold that (1) Kauzlarich cannot raise arguments regarding PCHB’s treatment of

Pearch as an expert witness for the first time on appeal, (2) the PCHB did not err in granting

summary judgment in favor of Ecology and affirming the AO ordering Kauzlarich to

decommission the well, and (3) the trial court did not err when it declined to remand the case to

the PCHB for additional fact-finding in light of the Bland declaration.

       Accordingly, we affirm the PCHB’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ecology.

                                             FACTS

Background

       Puget Sound Power & Light (PSE) constructed the Lake Tapps Reservoir Project in 1910

to divert water to use for hydroelectricity. In 1954, PSE conveyed most of the land around the

Reservoir to the Lake Tapps Development Corporation (LTDC). PSE maintained ownership of

the land and the lake bed below a designated elevation. Cascade Water Alliance (Cascade), a

municipal corporation, succeeded PSE in ownership of the Lake Tapps property.

       Kauzlarich lives on property adjacent to both the Lake Tapps and a Cascade-owned

parcel. Around 2005, Kauzlarich constructed a well. The well is located six to 10 feet from the

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No. 57684-8-II

Lake Tapps bulkhead. It is a dug well, which means that it was constructed by digging a hole in

the ground using hand tools or other means before installing the well casing. The well is about

12 feet deep, has PVC casing, and lacks a surface seal.

       Kauzlarich thought that he dug the well on his property. However, the well actually is

located on Cascade’s property.

       In January 2017, Kauzlarich submitted a request for a waiver of the Bonney Lake

Municipal Code so that he could use his well as a geothermal heat source and for irrigation. The

City denied Kauzlarich’s request.

       The Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department and the City of Bonney Lake

subsequently contacted Ecology with questions about Kauzlarich’s well. They sent Ecology

photos of Kauzlarich’s well and the surrounding area. Ecology determined that Kauzlarich’s

well casing was surrounded by disturbed native soil, that he did not use approved casing

material, and that the top of the well sat below ground level.

       In July 2017, Ecology sent Kauzlarich a letter notifying him that his well was improperly

constructed and was in violation of several laws and rules. Specifically, Ecology stated that (1)

Kauzlarich had constructed a well without submitting a notice of intent and paying the required

fee, (2) the well did not have a proper surface seal and native soil existed outside the casing, (3)

the top of the well sat below ground level, (4) Kauzlarich failed to submit a well report to

Ecology within 30 days of completion of the well, and (5) Kauzlarich did not receive a permit

from local authorities to approve the well site.

       Ecology notified Kauzlarich that they considered the well to be an environmental, safety,

and public health hazard that should not be used for any purpose. Ecology ordered Kauzlarich to

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No. 57684-8-II

hire a licensed driller to decommission the well within six months. Kauzlarich apparently took

no action.

       On October 11, 2017, Ecology issued an AO requiring Kauzlarich to decommission his

well. Ecology attached to the order a list of 16 licensed well drillers in Pierce County. They

ordered Kauzlarich to contact one of those drillers, who would then submit a decommissioning

plan to Ecology for their review within 30 days.

       Kauzlarich subsequently appealed the AO to the PCHB.

Appeal to PCHB

       In June 2019, Ecology filed a motion for summary judgment to the PCHB. In support,

Ecology submitted a declaration from Pearch. Pearch is a licensed hydrogeologist for Ecology’s

Southwest Regional Office. He has worked there as a well construction coordinator for the last

10 years. In his declaration, Pearch explained that he spoke with Kauzlarich and reviewed

materials provided to Ecology by the Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department, the City of

Bonney Lake, and Cascade during the course of his investigation of the well. Pearch determined

that Kauzlarich’s well likely would need to be decommissioned because of the well’s shallow

depth and close proximity to Lake Tapps.

       Regarding the possibility of repairing the well, Pearch stated that it would be highly

unlikely that a licensed driller would agree to repair the well because the driller would assume

responsibility for all problems with the well. Pearch concluded, “[M]y technical judgment is that

repairing or altering Mr. Kauzlarich’s well is not a practical solution.” Admin. Rec. (AR) at 48.

       Kauzlarich submitted a declaration in response to Ecology’s motion for summary

judgment. He explained that he had contacted a person named “Boyd” at Richardson Well

Drilling Company. Boyd proposed a method to repair the well, and included details about how it

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No. 57684-8-II

could be done. However, Boyd did not provide a cost estimate or state that he was willing to

repair the well. Kauzlarich did not submit a sworn declaration from Boyd.

       Kauzlarich also filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding ownership of the

property where the well is located. He argued that he adversely possessed the property where he

dug the well, and thus that he did not violate RCW 18.104.180 (which states that a person may

construct a well on land that they own). In the alternative, he argued that if the well was not on

his property, he should not be held responsible for decommissioning it.

       Ecology argued that the PCHB lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate real property disputes.

Ecology also claimed that Kauzlarich should be responsible for decommissioning the well

regardless of who owns the property because he is a well owner or operator under RCW

18.104.020.

       In July 2019, PCHB submitted its final order on the parties’ motions for summary

judgment. The PCHB granted Ecology’s summary judgment motion, denied Kauzlarich’s

summary judgment motion, and affirmed Ecology’s AO.

       On Ecology’s summary judgment motion, the PCHB ruled that: (1) Kauzlarich violated

RCW 18.104.055 by failing to submit a notice to Ecology before constructing his well; (2)

Kauzlarich violated WAC 173-160-231 and WAC 173-160-291(1) by constructing a well

without a proper surface seal and with casing that does not extend at least six inches above the

ground surface; (3) Kauzlarich violated RCW 18.104.050 and WAC 173-160-141 by failing to

submit a well report within 30 days of completion of construction of his well; and (4) Ecology

was justified in ordering Kauzlarich to decommission his well because it was an environmental

and public health hazard.

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No. 57684-8-II

        On the issue of decommissioning the well and Kauzlarich’s right to repair it, the PCHB

noted Kauzlarich’s conversation with Boyd. However, it ruled that their decision could not be

based exclusively on hearsay evidence, especially because it would unduly limit the parties’

opportunities to confront witnesses and rebut evidence under RCW 34.05.461(4). The PCHB

concluded that Kauzlarich’s declaration alone was insufficient to rebut the Pearch declaration on

the practicality of repairing the well.

        On Kauzlarich’s summary judgment motion, the PCHB agreed that Ecology did not have

jurisdiction to hear real property disputes and declined to address Kauzlarich’s adverse

possession argument.

Appeal to Superior Court

        Kauzlarich appealed the PCHB’s decision to the superior court. No material action

occurred on the case until May 2022, when Ecology submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal for

want of prosecution. Ecology also moved to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals, pursuant

to RCW 34.05.518. Kauzlarich opposed the motion to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals

and stated that he planned to request that the matter be remanded to the PCHB for additional fact

finding. He also filed a declaration from himself and from Christian Bland.

        In his declaration, Kauzlarich explained that he had been unable to get a statement from a

well driller in Pierce County who would support his claim that his well could be repaired. He

said that he called multiple licensed well drillers in Pierce County. Kauzlarich speculated that

perhaps no licensed well drillers in Pierce County were willing to speak to him because they

might be afraid to go against Ecology.

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No. 57684-8-II

       Kauzlarich stated that he found Bland, the vice president of a licensed driller in Oregon,

who indicated that he would be able to repair his well. He requested that the trial court remand

the case to the PCHB to consider the new evidence.

       In his declaration, Bland said that he had looked at photos of Kauzlarich’s well, the well

report of a nearby well, and information on the Washington Ecology Well Construction &

Licensing website. Based on his training, experience, and the aforementioned data, he believed

that it was possible to repair Kauzlarich’s well. The trial court subsequently set October 28 as

the deadline for filing a motion to remand. Kauzlarich missed the deadline, and later filed a

motion for an extension to file a motion to remand to the PCHB for consideration of new

evidence. He then filed the motion to remand. The trial court denied the motion to extend time,

denied a motion to supplement the record, and transferred the case to this court.

       Kauzlarich appeals the PCHB’s order requiring him to decommission his well.

                                           ANALYSIS

A.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review PCHB decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter

34.05 RCW. RCW 34.05.510; Puget Soundkeeper All. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 191 Wn.2d 631, 637,

424 P.3d 1173 (2018). Our review is limited to the record before the PCHB. Id.

       Under the APA, we may grant relief from an agency’s order based on the reasons listed

in RCW 34.05.570(3). Specifically, we must grant relief if we find that an agency order is based

on an erroneous interpretation or application of the law. RCW 34.05.570(3)(d). The party

challenging the agency’s decision has the burden of demonstrating the invalidity of that decision.

RCW 34.05.570(1)(a).

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No. 57684-8-II

       When the administrative decision was on summary judgment, we must overlay the APA

and summary judgment standards of review. Waste Mgmt. of Wash., Inc. v. Wash. Utils. and

Transp. Comm’n, 24 Wn. App. 2d 338, 344, 519 P.3d 963 (2022), review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1003

(2023). We review the ruling de novo and construe the facts and all reasonable inferences in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

       We review de novo questions of law, statutory construction, and an agency’s application

of the law. Puget Soundkeeper, 191 Wn.2d at 637.

B.     CHALLENGE TO PCHB TREATMENT OF PEARCH AS EXPERT

       For the first time on appeal, Kauzlarich argues that the PCHB erred in accepting Pearch

as an expert. Because Kauzlarich failed to challenge Pearch as an expert before the PCHB, we

decline to address the issue.

       RCW 34.05.554(1) states that “[i]ssues not raised before the agency may not be raised on

appeal.” The purpose of this rule is to protect the integrity of the administrative process. B&R

Sales, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 186 Wn. App. 367, 381, 344 P.3d 741 (2015). And we

generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a); Samra v.

Singh, 15 Wn. App. 2d 823, 838, 479 P.3d 713 (2020).

       Because Kauzlarich did not raise the issue of Pearch as an expert before the PCHB, we

decline to address the issue.

C.     PCHB’S AUTHORITY TO ORDER DECOMMISSIONING

       Kauzlarich argues that Ecology lacked authority to order him to decommission the well.

We disagree.

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No. 57684-8-II

        1.   Legal Principles

        Under RCW 18.104.040(7), Ecology has the authority to “require [a] well owner to repair

or decommission any well . . . (b) that is an environmental, safety, or public health hazard.” And

under RCW 18.104.065(1), Ecology “may order a well contractor or well operator to repair,

alter, or decommission a well if the department demonstrates that the construction of the well did

not meet the standards for well construction in effect at the time construction of the well was

completed.” Finally, Ecology’s regulations state that any well which is “an environmental,

safety, or public health hazard shall be decommissioned.” WAC 173-160-381.

        WAC 173-160-231 requires that all constructed water wells must contain a surface seal

and provides specifications. WAC 173-160-261 also provides detailed specifications on how to

construct surface seals on a dug well. Further, WAC 173-160-291 provides that the top of the

well casing must be six inches above the ground surface.

        2.   Well in Violation

        Here, it is undisputed that the well did not “meet the standards for well construction in

effect at the time construction of the well was completed.” RCW 18.104.065(1). The well did

not contain a surface seal. The well casing was not six inches above ground level. Kauzlarich

acknowledges these defects. In addition, Pearch opined that in his technical judgment, the well

“constitutes an environmental and public health hazard and must be decommissioned.” AR at

47. This is because without a surface seal, contaminated surface water can travel down the side

of the well and contaminate groundwater. And placing the well casing below ground surface

risks that contaminated surface water will get inside the well and travel to the groundwater.

        Therefore, we conclude that Ecology had the authority to order decommissioning of the

well.

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No. 57684-8-II

       3.   Decommissioning vs. Repair

       Kauzlarich’s primary argument is that Ecology should have ordered him to repair the

well rather than decommission it. Kauzlarich argues that Boyd’s hearsay statements about

repairing the well created a question of fact whether decommissioning was appropriate. We

disagree.

            a.   Legal Principles

       The APA contains the following provision for the admission of evidence at

administrative hearings: “Evidence, including hearsay evidence, is admissible if in the judgment

of the presiding officer it is the kind of evidence on which reasonably prudent persons are

accustomed to rely in the conduct of their affairs.” RCW 34.05.452(1). However, with regard to

hearsay evidence specifically, the APA states:

       Findings shall be based on the kind of evidence on which reasonably prudent
       persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of their affairs. Findings may be
       based on such evidence even if it would be inadmissible in a civil trial. However,
       the presiding officer shall not base a finding exclusively on such inadmissible
       evidence unless the presiding officer determines that doing so would not unduly
       abridge the parties’ opportunities to confront witnesses and rebut evidence.

RCW 34.05.461(4) (emphases added).

       The regulations that are specific to the PCHB contain similar provisions:

       Evidence, including hearsay evidence, is admissible if in the judgment of the
       presiding officer it is the kind of evidence on which reasonably prudent persons are
       accustomed to rely in the conduct of their affairs. All relevant evidence is
       admissible which, in the opinion of the presiding officer, is the best evidence
       reasonably obtainable, having due regard for its necessity, availability and
       trustworthiness. In passing upon the admissibility of evidence, the presiding officer
       shall give consideration to, but shall not be bound to follow, the rules of evidence
       governing civil proceedings in matters not involving trial by jury in the superior
       courts of the state of Washington.

WAC 371-08-500(1).

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No. 57684-8-II

       We review the PCHB’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Port of Seattle v.

Pollution Control Hr’gs Bd., 151 Wn.2d 568, 642, 90 P.3d 659 (2004). “The law gives

considerable discretion to administrative law judges to determine the scope of admissible

evidence.” Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Dept. of Health, 164 Wn.2d 95, 104, 187 P.3d 243

(2008). Discretion is abused if the decision is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable

reasons, or is otherwise manifestly unreasonable. Bayley Constr. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 10

Wn. App. 2d 768, 795-96, 450 P.3d 647 (2019).

            b.   Consideration of Hearsay Statements

       Initially, it is unclear whether the PCHB refused to consider the hearsay statements from

Boyd as Kauzlarich suggests. The PCHB acknowledged that hearsay was admissible, but also

noted that a judicial finding cannot be based exclusively on hearsay evidence. The court then

concluded that Kauzlarich’s declaration was “insufficient to rebut Ecology’s expert testimony on

the practicality of repairing the well.” AR at 196-97.

       To the extent that the PCHB did not consider Boyd’s hearsay statements, we cannot

conclude that this decision was manifestly unreasonable. As noted above, hearsay evidence is

admissible if “it is the kind of evidence on which reasonably prudent persons are accustomed to

rely in the conduct of their affairs.” WAC 371-08-500(1). Boyd’s statements were not made

under oath and resulted from informal conversations with Kauzlarich. A reasonably prudent

person arguably might not rely upon such informal information in the conduct of their affairs –

determining whether a repair could be accomplished. Further, Boyd did not give a bid or say

that Richardson Drilling was willing to perform the work. A reasonably prudent person arguably

might not rely on Boyd’s information without some commitment that the work would be done.

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No. 57684-8-II

Finally, RCW 34.05.461(4) states that the Board generally cannot base a finding exclusively on

inadmissible evidence.

       The standard of review for evidentiary matters is abuse of discretion. Port of Seattle, 151

Wn.2d at 642. We conclude that the PCHB did not abuse its discretion to the extent that it

declined to consider the hearsay statements in Kauzlarich’s declaration.

             c.   Sufficiency of Hearsay Statements

       To the extent that the PCHB considered the hearsay statements but discounted them, the

question is whether the statements were sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. Ecology

submitted Pearch’s opinion that repair was impractical:

       In my experience, it is unlikely that a licensed driller would elect to deepen the
       existing excavation because the fill materials behind the bulkhead could become
       unstable. This would pose technical challenges for well construction. It is also
       unlikely a licensed driller would use the existing excavation when it was first
       excavated by an unlicensed person. This is because the driller would assume
       responsibility for construction problems that may arise at the well. It is likely that
       Mr. Kauzlarich’s well would need to be decommissioned, and a new well would
       need to be constructed with a new bore hole being drilled. Thus, my technical
       judgment is that repairing or altering Mr. Kauzlarich’s well is not a practical
       solution.

AR at 48.

       Significantly, Kauzlarich did not rebut this opinion. Boyd did not say that Richardson

Drilling was willing to actually repair the well. He did not provide a work plan or estimate.

Boyd just suggested that a repair technically could be done. Therefore, there was no evidence

that a licensed driller was willing and able to repair the well.

       We conclude that the PCHB did not err in ruling that the hearsay statements were

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

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No. 57684-8-II

            d.    Ecology Discretion

       The final part of the analysis involves Ecology’s discretion. The PCHB expressly

deferred to Ecology’s discretion in deciding whether to decommission or repair.

       Under RCW 18.104.065(1), Ecology “may order a well contractor or well operator to

repair, alter, or decommission a well if the department demonstrates that the construction of the

well did not meet the standards for well construction in effect at the time construction of the well

was completed.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, the legislature granted Ecology the

discretion to decide – in its expertise – whether to decommission or repair a well that is not up to

standards. Kauzlarich may disagree with the decision. But he has not shown that the decision to

decommission was an abuse of Ecology’s discretion.

            e.   Well on Another’s Property

       Kauzlarich argues that even if Ecology had authority to order decommissioning of the

well, it had no authority to order him to decommission the well because it was located on

Cascade’s property. We disagree.

       RCW 18.104.020(16) defines “well owner” as a person “who owns the property on which

the well is or will be constructed or has the right to the well by means of an easement, covenant,

or other enforceable legal instrument for the purpose of benefitting from the well.” A well

“operator” is “a person who (a) is employed by a well contractor; (b) is licensed under this

chapter; or (c) who controls, supervises, or oversees the construction of a well or who operates

well construction equipment.” RCW 18.104.020(15).

       Kauzlarich is not a well owner – the well is not located on his property – and he does not

have an easement to use Cascade’s property. Therefore, the issue is whether Kauzlarich is

properly considered a well operator under the statute.

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No. 57684-8-II

          We conclude that Kauzlarich is a well operator as defined in RCW 18.104.020(15)(c).

He controlled, supervised, and oversaw the construction of the well, and operated well

construction equipment to dig the well. Because Kauzlarich is a well operator, Ecology had

authority under RCW 18.104.065(1) to order him to decommission the well.

          Kauzlarich argues that, while it is true that he was an operator when he constructed the

well, he no longer is an operator. He argues that the statute is written in the present tense, which

means that because Kauzlarich is not presently constructing the well, he is not an operator as

defined by the statute.

          This argument is not persuasive. If we adopted Kauzlarich’s definition of “operator,”

then all well operators would escape liability as soon as they completed construction of any well.

Such a reading undercuts the legislative intent that well operators be liable for their work after

they complete construction. See RCW 18.104.065(2) (limiting the time period during which

Ecology may order a well operator to decommission a well if it did not meet standards for well

construction in effect at the time construction was completed).

          Kauzlarich also argues that WAC 173-160-381 is invalid because it conflicts with RCW

18.104.040(7)(b). He claims that RCW 18.104.040(7)(b) grants Ecology discretion to order

wells decommissioned or repaired if they are an environmental, safety, or public health hazard.

In contrast, WAC 173-160-381 mandates decommissioning a well that is deemed to be such a

hazard.

          We need not address this argument because Ecology clearly had statutory authority to

order decommissioning under RCW 18.104.040(7) and RCW 18.104.065(1). Under those

statutes, Ecology had the authority and the discretion to order that Kauzlarich’s well be

decommissioned.

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No. 57684-8-II

        Based on the analysis in all the above sections, we conclude that Ecology had authority to

order Kauzlarich to decommission his well.

D.      FAILURE TO REMAND FOR NEW EVIDENCE

        Kauzlarich argues that the trial court should have remanded the case to the PCHB to

consider the Bland declaration as new evidence. We disagree.

        1.     Legal Principles

        RCW 34.05.562(2)(b) states that the trial court “may remand a matter to the agency” to

conduct additional fact-finding if (1) “new evidence has become available that relates to the

validity of the agency action at the time it was taken, that one or more of the parties did not know

and was under no duty to discover or could not have reasonably been discovered until after the

agency action” and (2) “the interests of justice would be served by remand to the agency.”

(Emphasis added).

        We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to supplement the record under RCW

34.05.562 for abuse of discretion. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 14

Wn. App. 2d 945, 964, 474 P.3d 1107 (2020).

        2.     Analysis

        In October 2017, Ecology sent the AO to Kauzlarich ordering him to decommission his

well. Ecology included in its AO a list of 16 licensed well drillers in Pierce County to whom

Kauzlarich could reach out about the well. There is no evidence that Kauzlarich contacted any

of the drillers on Ecology’s list within 30 days, as required by the AO. The PCHB issued its

order affirming Ecology’s AO in July 2019. Kauzlarich did not submit the Bland declaration

until July 2022, almost five years after Ecology issued its AO and three years after PCHB

affirmed it.

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No. 57684-8-II

        Kauzlarich had a duty to discover relevant information related to Ecology’s AO in a

timely fashion. And he could have reasonably discovered the information before the PCHB

affirmed Ecology’s action. Instead, he waited for several years to submit the Bland declaration.

        For that reason, he fails to meet the requirements of RCW 34.05.562(2)(b). Accordingly,

we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not remand this matter to the

PCHB.

E.      FAILURE TO JOIN CASCADE IN ORDER

        Kauzlarich argues that Ecology should have joined Cascade in its AO because Cascade

owns the property on which the well sits. Ecology argues that Kauzlarich has improperly raised

this issue for the first time on appeal. RCW 34.05.554. We agree with Ecology, and refrain

from addressing this issue.

F.      ATTORNEY FEES

        Kauzlarich argues that we should award him attorney fees and costs under RCW

4.84.350(1) because the Board’s summary judgment order was not substantially justified. We

deny Kauzlarich’s request for attorney fees.

        RCW 4.84.350(1) provides that

        Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award a qualified
        party that prevails in a judicial review of an agency action fees and other expenses,
        including reasonable attorneys’ fees, unless the court finds that the agency action
        was substantially justified or that circumstances make an award unjust.

(Emphasis added). Kauzlarich is not the prevailing party. Accordingly, we deny Kauzlarich’s

request for attorney fees.

                                          CONCLUSION

        We affirm the PCHB’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ecology.

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No. 57684-8-II

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is

so ordered.

                                                    MAXA, J.

 We concur:

CRUSER, A.C.J.

VELJACIC, J.

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