Court Opinion

ID: 9712371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:52:30.061664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.699332
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REID, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The collateral source rule is applicable to this set of facts. Eastman v. Messner, 188 Ill. 2d 404 (1999), is distinguishable on its facts. In Eastman an employee was injured while working on a third party’s premises. The employee’s employer paid worker’s compensation benefits to the employee. The employee subsequently filed suit against the third-party tortfeasor. However, the employee’s attorneys failed to file the personal injury action within the applicable limitations period, and the employee subsequently brought a legal malpractice action against the attorneys. The issue considered in Eastman was whether the employer could assert a lien against the employee’s recovery in the legal malpractice action. The Eastman court was not considering whether or not the collateral source rule should be applied to its set of facts. In giving a general overview of the law as it concerns legal malpractice, the Eastman court wrote: “The injuries resulting from legal malpractice are not personal injuries but, instead, are pecuniary injuries to intangible property interests. [Citation.] The plaintiff must affirmatively prove that he suffered actual damages as a result of the attorney’s malpractice [citation], and a plaintiff who obtains recovery in a malpractice suit can be ‘in no better position by bringing suit against the attorney than if the underlying action against the third-parly tortfeasor had been successfully prosecuted’ [citation].” Eastman, 188 Ill. 2d at 411-12. Relying on Eastman, the majority maintains that Seith’s measure of damages on the third-party payment of the judgment against him is zero because he did not personally pay the judgment rendered against him, and that to allow Seith to recover would unjustly enrich Seith and permit a double recovery. I disagree. Here, we have a situation where two legal theories have collided and it is our decision to choose which path to take. In my view, the policy considerations behind why the collateral source rule was developed dictate that it should be applied in this case. The collateral source rule is generally applicable to tort liability. Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 308 Ill. App. 3d 213, 215 (1999). This is an action in tort, and under the collateral source rule, “benefits received by an injured party from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, a tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor.” First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 296 Ill. App. 3d 416, 432 (1998), citing Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 320-21 (1989); Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 242 (1986). “The rationale for the collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer should not benefit from expenditures made by the injured party, or take advantage of contracts or other relations which exist between the injured party and third persons.” (Emphasis added.) First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 296 Ill. App. 3d 416, 432 (1998); Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d at 320. “Although injured parties may receive a windfall from the collateral source rule, it is usually considered more just for an injured party to receive the windfall than for a wrongdoer to be relieved of full responsibility for his wrongdoing.” (Emphasis added.) First Midwest, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 432-33, citing Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d at 321-22. Here, all of the elements for the collateral source rule are met. It is undisputed that the appellees represented Seith in the Whiteside action, and that as a result of that judgment, Seith was held jointly and severally liable for $778,460.38. Seith alleges that the appellee’s negligence was the cause of the judgment against him. LH&S, a third party, who was not hable under the Whiteside action judgment, settled the judgment on Seith’s behalf for $300,000. LH&S and Seith held a special relationship which led LH&S to settle the Whiteside action. The type of relationship which LH&S and Seith held is immaterial under the collateral source rule. Under the collateral source rule benefits received by the injured party from a source independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor. As such, Seith’s damages should not be diminished because LH&S paid the Whiteside action judgment. The majority’s position ignores the policy considerations behind the development of the collateral source rule. Seith should be allowed to include the $300,000 in his special damages at trial. If the appellees are found to have acted negligently at trial, they will benefit from LH&S satisfying the judgment in the Whiteside action. The majority’s ruling allows the alleged wrongdoers, the appellees, to potentially be relieved of the full responsibility for their wrongdoing. This is exactly why the collateral source rule was developed, to prevent a tortfeasor from benefitting from the special relationship an injured party has with a third party. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court and direct it to include the $300,000 payment of the judgment as part of Seith’s special damages. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.