Court Opinion

ID: 9925266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 06:06:28.645025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:53.217564
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                        STATE OF MICHIGAN

                          COURT OF APPEALS

JASON M. CURIS and LAURYN M. CURIS,                              UNPUBLISHED
                                                                 January 18, 2024
              Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-
              Appellants,

v                                                                No. 365003
                                                                 Oakland Circuit Court
JOHN A. JAMES, SHARON N. JAMES, PERRY                            LC No. 2021-189533-CH
JOHNSON, PETER MANNINO, and MARIE
MANNINO,

              Defendants-Appellees,
and

REGINALD KAKOS, JESSICA KAKOS, ROMAN
SHLAFER, MILENA SHLAFER, RAMANI
VADLAMURI, SREEKIRTHI BHAGYA
VADLAMURI, JACQUES G. DARMON, MARK
C. MILGROM, Trustee of MARK C. MILGROM
LIVING TRUST, MOONDEEP AGGARWAL,
KAMNA AGGARWAL, MAZEN SHINA, NIRAN
SHINA, LINDA SOLOMON, MONA
RAPPAPORT, Trustee of DANIEL J. RAPPAPORT
MARITAL TRUST, MARVIN FISHMAN,
HEMANT H. SHAH, NAYANA H. SHAH, KEN
MORGAN, SIMEN SAVAYA, and RACHEL
SAVAYA,

              Defendants/Counteplaintiffs-
              Appellees.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

                                              -1-
        This      property     dispute     involves    the     proposed      redevelopment      by
plaintiffs/counterdefendants, Jason M. Curis and Lauryn M. Curis (individually, “Jason” and
“Lauryn”; collectively, “the Curises”), of property previously used as an elementary school. The
trial court ruled in favor of defendants, various residents of the relevant subdivision where the
subject property lies,1 on the parties’ competing motions for summary disposition. On appeal, the
Curises argue that the trial court erred by (1) refusing to consider certain evidence limiting the
proposed use of the property, and (2) determining that the Curises’ proposed use constituted a
more serious violation of the subdivision’s building and use restrictions (BURs) than the former
school. Because the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the contested evidence, and
because a question of fact exists—under the relevant factors elicited in Bloomfield Estates
Improvement Ass’n v Birmingham, 479 Mich 206; 737 NW2d 670 (2007)—concerning whether
the relevant BURs were waived via construction and operation of the school, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        Franklin Oaks is a residential subdivision in Farmington Hills established in the mid-1940s
and initially divided into 18 separate lots. In 1945, the subdivision’s creators established BURs
affecting all 18 lots (the 1945 BURs). The intent and purpose of the 1945 BURs was to ensure
that Franklin Oaks “develop[ed] into a residential community of the highest type.” Among other
things, the 1945 BURs limited construction to one single private residence per lot. The essential
issue here is whether these restrictions, particularly that limiting construction to one residence per
lot, remain in force and circumscribe the Curis’s redevelopment options for the property at issue.

        In 1963, Farmington Public Schools purchased part of lot 11 and all of lot 12 (the school
property) in Franklin Oaks and subsequently constructed Fairview Elementary School (the school).
A 1965 document entitled “Amendment of Restrictions Agreement” (the 1965 Amendments) was
signed by the Farmington Public Schools and the owners of lot 7 and part of lot 8, Mr. and Mrs.
Goldman. The 1965 Amendments purported to create several new restrictions regarding access to
the school, parking, landscaping, and future building enlargement. Specifically, the amendments
waived the parties’ rights under the 1945 BURs “to the extent necessary to permit the
construction . . . of an elementary school.” They also set various requirements regarding school
access, parking, and landscaping. The school was demolished in 2012, and the district in 2015
released a request for proposals (RFP) to purchase the now-vacant former school property.

        The Curises have lived in Franklin Oaks since 2013, when they purchased lot 13 subject to
“[BUR]s and easements of record[.]” They purchased the school property in 2018, which, as
explained above, included lot 12 and part of lot 11 of the original plat. According to the deed, this
purchase was subject to the 1945 BURs and the 1965 Amendments, except those based on race,
religion, or similar factors.

        According to Jason’s first affidavit, he initially planned some unspecified form of “single
family residential development at the subject property . . . .” During Jason’s deposition testimony,

1
 All parties involved in this case are provided in the caption of this opinion. For brevity and ease
of reference, defendants will be referred to collectively as “the residents.”

                                                 -2-
however, he stated, “I didn’t know what I was planning on doing [with the property.]” Asked of
his current plan, Jason said, “I don’t have a use for [the property] right now. I don’t know what I
want to do with it just yet.” Nevertheless, Jason did not believe he was restricted by “the original
[BUR]s,” and he believed he could develop anything allowed under the city’s zoning ordinances.
Jason acknowledged that the applicable ordinance would permit him to construct 21 separate
dwelling units on the subject property, including mobile homes.2

       The Curises filed a complaint against the residents, along with any unknown heirs,
devisees, and assignees, in August 2021. They asserted one count each for quiet title and
declaratory relief, requesting that the court enter a judgment (1) that the residents waived the
subdivision’s BURs and (2) allowing development of the subject property in conformance with
applicable zoning restrictions. They also asserted a separate quiet-title claim, alleging that the
subdivision’s BURs “are extinguished by statute” under the MRTA.3 The complaint asserted that
the Curises “intend[] to use the property for single family residential purposes in compliance with
the City of Farmington Hills RA-1 single family Residential use as allowed by the City of
Farmington Hills Zoning and Use Regulations.”

        Numerous residents answered and concurrently filed a countercomplaint against the
Curises, requesting that the court (1) enter a judgment upholding the applicability of the
subdivision’s BURs “other than those based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status
or natural origin,” and (2) enjoin the Curises, their successors, and their assignees from developing
the subject property contrary to the BURs, particularly the limitation of one residential structure
per lot. They also requested the same essential relief, but applicable to all real property in the
subdivision.

        The Curises moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that
the subdivision’s 1945 BURs were waived by the prior construction and operation of the school
on the subject property, and that their development of the property should, therefore, be limited
only by the city’s zoning restrictions. According to the Curises, subdivision residents acquiesced
to the building and operation of the school, which altered the character and use of the property and
constituted a substantial, extensive, and continuous violation of the 1945 BURs. Further, this
violation was “significantly more serious than any residential plans allowed by the City of
Farmington Hill[s] RA-1 Single Family Residential ordinance.”

        The residents also moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing
that the 1945 BURs remained in force and were explicitly accepted by the Curises when they
purchased their property. Specifically, the 1945 BURs were never waived because (1)
notwithstanding the former school, the subdivision’s character remained consistent with that
intended and fixed by the 1945 BURs, and (2) the school property has been vacant since 2012,
before the Curises ever purchased property in the subdivision, making the former school “moot”

2
  See Farmington Hills Code of Ordinances, Ch 34, § 3.1.4 (requirements and restrictions
regarding RA-1 One Family Residential zoning district).
3
 The parties agree that the MRTA is irrelevant in this case, which should be decided solely on the
waiver issue.

                                                -3-
in this case. The residents also asserted that uses allowed under the city’s applicable zoning
ordinance—particularly the possible construction of 21 separate homes, including mobile homes,
on the two lots at issue—would “drastically change the character of the subdivision and be
drastically counter to the platters’ intent.”

       Responding to the residents’ motion, the Curises clarified an intent to develop the subject
property “into four residential lots[,] . . . [which] is less serious than the elementary school
previously built [there].” The Curises provided with their response a survey depicting their
planned division of the property. They also provided a new affidavit from Jason, in which he
averred that the attached survey represented the plan for the property.

       In reply, the residents argued that the Curises violated MRE 408 by attaching the recent
survey produced in the course of compromise negotiations, and that Jason’s second affidavit
improperly contradicted his deposition testimony. Attached to the residents’ reply is an August
2022 email exchange between the parties’ attorneys, with the subject “Settlement Pursuant to MRE
408.” In the first email, the Curises’ attorney asked whether the residents “intend to accept the
settlement” and described the offer as “reasonable compared to alternative possible
developments.” The residents’ attorney responded that his clients “are not willing to agree to four
lots. They would be willing to consider two lots.”

        The trial court issued an opinion and order ruling in favor of the residents. First, the court
declined to consider the recent survey and Jason’s second affidavit submitted by the Curises.
Specifically, it determined that (1) Jason’s second affidavit contradicted his deposition testimony
about using the subject property for whatever city ordinances would allow; (2) the position taken
by the Curises in the affidavit and in the survey contradicted their earlier position throughout the
case; and (3) the Curises’ use of the survey as an exhibit opposing summary disposition violated
MRE 408. Next, the court concluded that the 1945 BURs were not waived because insufficient
evidence supported that the former school or any of the other alleged violations (1) were more
serious than the Curises’ proposed use for the subject property and (2) altered the subdivision’s
character such as to defeat the purpose of the 1945 BURs. Ultimately, the trial court upheld the
applicability of the contested BURs, granted the residents’ motion for summary disposition, denied
the Curises’ motion for summary disposition, and dismissed the Curises’ complaint. This appeal
followed.

                                 II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Id. at 160. “When considering such a
motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion.” Id. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted
when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when
the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id.

       A movant satisfies its burden under MCR 2.116(C)(10) by “submitting affirmative
evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or by demonstrating to
the court that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of

                                                 -4-
the nonmoving party’s claim.” Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1, 7; 890 NW2d 344
(2016) (cleaned up). “[T]he nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in
pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue
of material fact exists. If the opposing party fails to present documentary evidence establishing
the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly granted.” Id. (citations omitted;
quoting Quinto v Cross and Peters Co, 451 Mich 359, 362-363; 547 NW2d 314 (1996)).

        “A trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Alpha Capital Mgmt v Rentenbach, 287 Mich App 589,
620; 792 NW2d 344 (2010), lv den 488 Mich 948 (2010). “The trial court abuses its discretion if
its decision is outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id. “To the extent that this issue involves
the meaning of a Michigan Rule of Evidence, we consider this legal issue de novo.” Id.

                                          III. ANALYSIS

        The trial court determined that Jason’s second affidavit contradicted his deposition
testimony, the position taken by the Curises via the affidavit and survey contradicted their earlier
position throughout the case, and the survey violated MRE 408. The Curises argue that the trial
court improperly excluded from evidence the survey depicting their proposed development. We
also address whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Jason’s related affidavit.

       MRE 408 provides:

       Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
       offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
       attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
       amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
       amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
       likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
       otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
       negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered
       for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
       contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
       or prosecution.

        As an initial matter, based on the August 2022 email exchange between the parties’
attorneys, the Curises’ plan to develop the subject property into four residential lots, as depicted
by the survey, was initially discussed as part of a “Settlement Pursuant to MRE 408.” The residents
were unwilling to consider the Curises’ “offer” of “four lots.” Further, while the Curises claim
that they submitted the survey for another proper purpose under the court rule, their asserted
purpose is not one enumerated by MRE 408. Rather, they proposed the survey as evidence
supporting waiver of the 1945 BURs and, therefore, to prove the invalidity of the residents’
counterclaims.

       However, the survey was still admissible under MRE 408 as otherwise discoverable
evidence sufficiently distinct from the parties’ actual settlement negotiations. See In re Estate of

                                                 -5-
Doyle v Covenant Med Ctr, Inc, unpublished4 per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
March 3, 2016 (Docket No. 324337), p 14 n 10 (Because “MRE 408 ‘does not require the exclusion
of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it was presented in the course of
compromise negotiations[,]’ ” the plaintiff “was free [to] pursue the source of . . . factual
information [contained in the defendant’s otherwise inadmissible settlement offer] and submit that
evidence in an admissible form with a proper foundation.”).

         Here, the Curises did not submit evidence of any settlement negotiations themselves or
statements made during the course of such negotiations. Rather, they presented the survey
factually depicting their clarified, proposed use for the property. Further, although MRE 408 “does
not require” (emphasis added) the exclusion of otherwise discoverable evidence under the rule,
the trial court nevertheless acted outside the range of principled outcomes and abused its discretion
by excluding the survey. Specifically, the trial court should have considered the Curises’ clarified
plan and position as depicted by the survey, especially given that the alternate proposed use
actually considered by the trial court—development of up to 21 units on the property—was elicited
by questioning from defense counsel regarding only what Jason believed would be permitted under
the applicable ordinance.

        We similarly conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Jason’s second
affidavit. “[A] witness is bound by his or her deposition testimony, and that testimony cannot be
contradicted by affidavit in an attempt to defeat a motion for summary disposition.” Broz v Plante
& Moran, PLLC (On Remand), 331 Mich App 39, 56; 951 NW2d 64 (2020). In Gamet v Jenks,
38 Mich App 719, 726, 197 NW2d 160 (1972),5 this court observed that

       [d]eposition testimony damaging to a party’s case will not always result in
       summary [disposition]. However, when a party makes statements of fact in a ‘clear,
       intelligent, unequivocal’ manner, they should be considered as conclusively
       binding against him in the absence of any explanation or modification, or of a
       showing of mistake or improvidence. The purpose of [the predecessor court rule
       regarding summary disposition] is to allow the trial judge to determine whether a
       factual issue exists. This purpose is not well served by allowing parties to create
       factual issues by merely asserting the contrary in an affidavit after giving damaging
       testimony in a deposition. [(citations omitted).]

4
 “Unpublished opinions are . . . not binding authority but may be persuasive or instructive.”
Haydaw v Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 332 Mich App 719, 726 n 5, 957 NW2d 858 (2020).
5
 Although this Court is not required to follow cases decided before November 1, 1990, see MCR
7.215(J)(1), a published case decided by this Court “has precedential effect under the rule of stare
decisis,” MCR 7.215(C)(2). See also Woodring v Phoenix Ins Co, 325 Mich App 108, 114-115;
923 NW2d 607 (2018) (stating that although this Court is not “strictly required to follow
uncontradicted opinions from this Court decided before November 1, 1990,” those opinions are
nonetheless “considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are
unpublished cases.”).

                                                -6-
Consistent with this rationale, a party may provide an affidavit to explain, clarify, or expand upon
deposition testimony, especially where the deposition testimony was not unequivocal. Wallad v
Access BIDCO, Inc, 236 Mich App 303, 312-313, 600 NW2d 664 (1999); see also Broz, 331 Mich
App at 56 (“although a witness is bound by his or her deposition testimony, an affidavit that
clarifies or expands upon previous testimony is not prohibited from consideration.”).

        Here, the Curises generally asserted an intent throughout the case to develop some
unspecified residential use at the property consistent with the applicable zoning ordinance. But
Jason testified that he was uncertain of his particular plans for the property. Questioned by defense
counsel, Jason acknowledged believing that he could, legally, develop anything allowed by the
city. Jason later averred that he planned a “single family residential development [at] the subject
property in conformance with the City of Farmington Hills, RA-I single family Residential
Ordinance as represented in the attached survey.”

        We agree with the Curises that Jason never testified to any definite plan for the property,
let alone one involving construction of 21 separate units. Jason’s testimony on the Curises’
proposed use—that he (1) had no specific plan for the property “just yet,” i.e., at the time of his
deposition, and (2) believed he was only restricted by the applicable zoning ordinance—was far
from a clear, unequivocal statement of fact on the matter. As such, the Curises properly submitted
Jason’s second affidavit (and the related survey) to clarify and expand upon his earlier uncertainty
concerning plans for the property. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding
Jason’s second affidavit.6

        The Curises argue further that the trial court erred in evaluating the factors under
Bloomfield Estates, 479 Mich 206. Properly considering Jason’s second affidavit and the related
survey under the applicable factors, we conclude that a question of fact exists concerning waiver
of the 1945 BURs.

        Property owners in Michigan may “create and enforce covenants affecting their own
property.” Id. at 214. “Such deed restrictions generally constitute a property right of distinct
worth.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In Bloomfield, the Michigan Supreme Court
stated, “If a deed restriction is unambiguous, we will enforce that deed restriction as written unless

6
  We note that the trial court potentially applied erroneous reasoning by commenting that the
affidavit and survey both contradicted the Curises’ general position throughout the case. The trial
court did not support this analysis with any authority, and the only authority on this issue presented
in the trial court and on appeal relates to affidavits contradicting deposition testimony, not other
documents contradicting a parties’ general position in court filings. See Peace v State Farm Mut
Auto Ins, Co, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 21, 2016
(Docket No. 323891), p 4 n 2 (“while it is true that a litigant cannot create a question of fact by
offering her own affidavit to contradict her own sworn deposition testimony, [the defendant] offers
no authority to suggest that this rule has been applied to documents other than affidavits or personal
statements by the individual . . .”). In any event, any potential error in this regard was cumulative
and need not be discussed further.

                                                 -7-
the restriction contravenes law or public policy, or has been waived by acquiescence to prior
violations . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).

          When determining whether prior acquiescence to a violation of a deed restriction
          prevents a p[arty] from contesting [a later] violation, we compare the character of
          the prior violation and the [later] violation. Only if the [later] violation constitutes
          a “more serious” violation of the deed restriction may a p[arty] contest the deed
          restriction despite the p[arty]’s acquiescence to prior violations of a less serious
          character. In general, a “more serious” violation occurs when a particular use of
          property constitutes a more substantial departure from what is contemplated or
          allowable under a deed when compared to a previous violation. [Id. at 219.]

This determination “will hinge on the facts of a particular case,” but courts may consider:

          (1) whether the later violation involved the erection of a structure where no such
          structure had previously been permitted; (2) whether the later violation constituted
          a more extensive violation of restrictions on the size or extent of a building; (3)
          whether the later violation increased the use of land from a sporadic violation of
          the restriction to a continuous violation; (4) whether the later violation significantly
          increased the noise or pollutant level on restricted land; (5) whether the later
          violation increased the level of traffic occasioned by the prior violation; (6) whether
          the later violation permitted an action that had been previously prohibited; and (7)
          whether the later violation altered in some material respect the character of the use
          of the restricted property. [Id. at 219-220 (footnotes omitted).]

See also Carey v Lauhoff, 301 Mich 168, 174; 3 NW2d 67 (1942) (“The true rule seems to be that,
even after one or more breaches [of a BUR], equity will grant relief if the restriction can be shown
to be of value to [the] complainant, and such breaches have not resulted in a subversion of the
original scheme of development resulting in a substantial, if not entire, change in the
neighborhood.”); Rofe v Robinson, 126 Mich App 151, 155; 336 NW2d 778 (1983) (“There is no
waiver where the character of the neighborhood intended and fixed by the restrictions remains
unchanged.”)7

    (1) Whether the later violation involved the erection of a structure where no such structure had
                                       previously been permitted.

       This factor is neutral between the school and the Curises’ proposed use. Importantly, both
developments involved or would involve the erection of a structure or structures prohibited by the
1945 BURs. The school built in the 1960’s was certainly not a residential structure as required by

7
  While the residents cite to both these cases in addition to Bloomfield Estates, the test of waiver
has seemingly evolved from these earlier cases’ focus on a neighborhood’s overall character to the
evaluation of the relative seriousness of any prior violations, as articulated in Bloomfield Estates.
In analyzing this issue, we apply the Supreme Court’s more recent standard from Bloomfield
Estates and the factors articulated therein.

                                                    -8-
the 1945 BURs. And the Curises’ proposed use, while only involving residential development,
calls for constructing one more residential structure per lot than allowed under the 1945 BURs.

    (2) Whether the later violation constituted a more extensive violation of restrictions on the size
                                         or extent of a building.

        This factor somewhat favors the school as the more serious violation. As discussed, both
developments involved or would involve the erection of a structure or structures prohibited by the
1945 BURs. However, the size and extent of the former school constituted a more serious violation
than would the Curises’ proposed development. The school was a large, nonresidential building,
whereas the Curises plan involves developing four residences essentially, if not technically,
consistent with the 1945 BURs. While the plan would add one more residence per existing lot
than allowed under the restrictions, the four new lots would still be of substantial size and thus
consistent with the neighborhood’s intended and longstanding character.8

       (3) Whether the later violation increased the use of land from a sporadic violation of the
                                 restriction to a continuous violation.

        This factor is neutral between the school and the Curises’ proposed use. The school
operated for over 40 years in violation of the 1945 BURs. At the same time, the Curises’
development would involve construction of physical structures that would violate the 1945 BURs
in a similarly permanent, and thus presumably continuous, manner. To the extent the residents
emphasize that the school was demolished in 2012, it nonetheless constituted a continuous
violation for more than four decades.

    (4) Whether the later violation significantly increased the noise or pollutant level on restricted
                                                   land.

        This factor favors the school as the more serious violation. Admittedly, the 1965
Amendments included various provisions to mollify potential adverse effects, particularly traffic
and noise, from the school. Nonetheless, it is intuitively clear to this Court that the addition of just
two more residential lots— not significantly smaller than other lots in the subdivision—on the
subject property would not significantly increase the noise or pollutant level of the land, especially
when compared to the former school.

    (5) Whether the later violation increased the level of traffic occasioned by the prior violation.

       For similar reasons, this factor also favors the school as the more serious violation.
Specifically, despite apparent efforts to control traffic from the former school, adding just two

8
  Notably, while the Curises’ survey shows that their proposed lots would respectively measure
2.33, 3.1, 3.14, and 3.89 acres, there is nothing in the record to definitively establish the
comparative size of the subdivision’s other lots. But viewing the survey alongside the images of
the subdivision’s original plat and current layout, the proposed lots do not appear significantly—
if at all—smaller than numerous of the subdivision’s existing lots.

                                                   -9-
additional residential lots on the property would not significantly increase the traffic level of the
land compared to a public and frequently-visited elementary school.

     (6) Whether the later violation permitted an action that had been previously prohibited.

        This factor is neutral between the school and the Curises’ proposed use. As discussed
under the first factor, both developments involved or would involve the erection of a structure or
structures prohibited by the 1945 BURs.

  (7) Whether the later violation altered in some material respect the character of the use of the
                                        restricted property.

        This factor favors the school as the more serious violation. While the Curises’ plan would
add one more residence per existing lot than allowed under the restrictions, the four new lots would
still be of substantial size and, as already mentioned, thus consistent with the neighborhood’s
intended and longstanding character. And the plan maintains the residential use mandated by the
1945 BURs. In contrast, the school was contrary to the subdivision’s intended character as “a
residential community of the highest type” (emphasis added), and to the residential use
requirement mandated by the 1945 BURs.

        Given that the balance of the Bloomfield factors support that the school constituted a more
substantial departure from the 1945 BURs than the Curises’ proposed development would, the trial
court erred by finding, as a matter of law, that these restrictions remained in effect, i.e, were not
waived by the former school. This issue should have been submitted to a fact-finder.

        Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                              /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                              /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

                                                -10-