Court Opinion

ID: 9565725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:26:33.171679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:51.049638
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
The child testified in court and was subject to cross-examination. The mother related the sleep utterances, and testified concerning her conversation with the child after he awakened — which was consistent with those utterances and with the child’s testimony at trial.
There is no question that the child’s testimony, given in court and subject to cross-examination, was admissible. If OCGA § 24-3-16 governs the evidence in this case, similar indications as contained in the sleep utterances must be considered as cumulative, hence harmless.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Hunt join in this dissent.
On Motion for Reconsideration.
On motion for reconsideration, the State points to two theories in addition to that of OCGA § 24-3-16 which the Court of Appeals used to uphold the conviction in this case. We have examined both theories and find them insufficient as a basis for admitting the child’s sleep-talk.
The first theory was that the child’s sleep-talk was admissible under OCGA § 24-3-2 to explain the mother’s conduct. However, we hold it was not necessary for the mother to explain her conduct in questioning the child. Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867 (294 SE2d 482) (1982).
The second theory was that the child’s sleep-talk was a spontaneous declaration in response to a startling event. The difficulty with that theory is that the outcry was not in response to an actual event. Rather, the event was contained in a dream. It is the very nature of dreams which has led us to exclude the child’s sleep talk until relia*30bility of dreams can be adequately established. The child’s outcry in his sleep is no more reliable than the dream itself.
Decided February 18, 1988
Reconsideration denied March 2, 1988.
William L. Reilly, for appellant.
Roger G. Queen, District Attorney, for appellee.