Court Opinion

ID: 9488920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:59:49.364924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:11.466161
License: Public Domain

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the en banc court in its judgment and join with Judge Kennedy in much of the reasoning of her opinion, but write separately to point out two important issues this case presents which I believe need to be emphasized.
First, I note that “[t]he temptation of many men of good will is to cut corners, take short cuts, and reach the desired end regardless of the means.” Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 494, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1546, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In this case, the United States presented facts to the district court perhaps insufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i), *144given our prior interpretation of that criminal statute in United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531 (6th Cir.1993), and United States v. Oleson, 44 F.3d 381 (6th Cir.1995). The government then requested a specific jury instruction knowing it was contrary to the law of this Circuit. After the district court refused the proffered instruction, the United States asked the district court to dismiss the indictment as to the money laundering charges for the sole purpose of eventually obtaining an en banc review of this Circuit’s previous interpretations of Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). In essence, the United States sought a dismissal of its own indictment in order to obtain a review of a law it did not like. Judge Kennedy’s majority opinion makes no mention of this fact, and I simply emphasize here that our opinion should not be read as condoning such behavior.
The United States argues that this Circuit’s interpretation of Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) foreclosed other avenues of review, save seeking a dismissal of its money laundering counts for the purposes of en banc review in the unique situation presented here. Be that as it may, I believe the district court erroneously dismissed the indictment upon the motion of the United States Attorney. The defendant, Rosalind Reed, should have been tried on the charges contained in the original multi-count, multi-defendant indictment. I believe, under either this or the superseding indictment, the United States should be able to try Reed and her co-defendants for attempting to conduct a financial transaction that in fact involved a transfer of the proceeds of drug money for the purposes of furthering future specified unlawful activity.
However, we have no way of knowing whether the United States is able to prove anything at this stage of the ease. In the district court, the United States simply sought a particular jury instruction on the definition of “financial transaction” knowing full well that, as it was phrased, the instruction was contrary to the law of this Circuit. When the district court refused, the United States asked for a dismissal of the money laundering counts in the indictment in order to pursue this appeal. In the meantime, Reed is left to ponder her impending prosecution because the United States has suspended prosecution against Reed on the other counts charged in the indictment pending this appeal. In any event, I simply point out that we should not encourage the use by the United States of this sort of procedural mechanism each time it disagrees with this Circuit’s interpretation of a criminal statute. See United States v. Stipe, 653 F.2d 446, 449 (10th Cir.1981) (condemning the United States’ attempt to “change the law of this circuit in order to expedite the prosecution of the case at hand”).
Second, I note that the facts set forth in the majority opinion have not been proven, and we have no way of knowing whether Reed in fact committed the acts alleged in the indictment. The United States, of course, must prove that Reed knew the cash represented the proceeds from illegal activity and that she transferred the money with the intent to promote a specified unlawful activity. I fully agree with the majority’s comment that “mere transportation” is not a violation of Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). However, if the United States can establish that Reed was involved with a large scale drug operation, that she knowingly accepted and secured the proceeds of unlawful activity, and then transferred them to another for the purpose of furthering the drug operation, the government would establish a violation of Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). Because no proof as to this alleged activity has been established, I cannot but agree with the majority that a trial should proceed.