Court Opinion

ID: 9463763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:15:33.78625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:16.451357
License: Public Domain

STATEMENT OF CHIEF JUDGE BAZELON AS TO WHY HE WOULD GRANT REHEARING EN BANC
The administration of criminal justice in the District of Columbia is profoundly implicated in this case, which challenges practices in the Superior Court for the payment of fees to court-appointed counsel. Plaintiffs allege facts which, if substantiated, suggest that indigent defendants are not likely to receive adequate representation because their appointed counsel cannot expect to receive adequate compensation. This case thus carries profound implications not only for the propriety interests of plaintiff attorneys, but also for the right of *1272criminal defendants to effective assistance of counsel.1
Despite its importance, plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed in the district court without opinion. Afterwards, a panel of this court affirmed that dismissal under local Rule 8(f), which allows cases to be disposed of by memorandum opinions that are not published. I would grant rehearing en banc to reconsider the panel’s affirmance for the persuasive reasons set forth in Judge McMillan’s dissenting memorandum opinion, which is appended along with the panel majority’s memorandum.2 I write this statement to bring the important issues of this case into public view.3
APPENDIX
Before McGOWAN, and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges and McMILLAN,* United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and approximately nine hundred other attorneys similarly situated, filed a complaint in the District Court against the United States and the judges of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that reductions in the amounts of their claimed compensation under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970), constitute a breach of contract and violate the Fifth Amendment. All defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim; and the court, without opinion, ordered dismissal.
The Criminal Justice Act provides that attorneys appointed under the Act to represent indigent criminal defendants shall recover their expenses and
. shall ... be compensated at a rate not exceeding $30 per hour for time expended in court or before a United States magistrate and $20 per hour for time reasonably expended out of court, or such other hourly rate, fixed by the Judicial Council of the Circuit, not to exceed the minimum hourly scale established by a bar association for similar services rendered in the district. . -. . (Emphasis added.)
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[T]he court shall fix the compensation and reimbursement to be paid to the attorney .
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970). Plaintiffs provided representation under the Act by appointment between February 1, 1971 and Octo*1273ber 4, 1973 — the date of the complaint. They allege that the established practice, custom, and usage in the Superior Court with respect to Criminal Justice Act claims is to compensate attorneys at the rate of twenty ($20.00) per hour for out of court time and thirty ($30.00) per hour for in-court time, and that these rates are substantially less than the prevailing rates charged by members of the District of Columbia bar for similar services to non-indigent clients. It is further alleged that in cases disposed of before trial compensation claims are processed by the “Judge in Chambers,” an assignment rotated among the various judges. Given the rotation system, there is said to be no assurance that the judge passing on the compensation claim will have had prior contact with the case. The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs’ CJA claims have recently been drastically reduced, and that these reductions were accomplished in an arbitrary and capricious manner, without notice, opportunity for hearing, or the statement of reasons for the reduction.
Plaintiffs seek money damages against the United States in the amount of the difference between filed claims based on the maximum rates and the claims actually allowed. With respect to the defendant judges, they seek prospective relief by way of declaratory judgment and injunction. In the ease of the claim for damages, plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970), which gives the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims over
“Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the complaint that plaintiffs have no legal claim against the United States for sums in excess of the amounts actually authorized by the judges of the Superior Court. The Criminal Justice Act is not self-executing; payment can be made only after a judge has determined the appropriate fee. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(4) (1970). The role played by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts within this statutory framework is actually quite limited; it is to disburse funds pursuant to an authorized voucher, and it has no authority to make further payments once the approved amount has been paid. See id. § 3006A(j). To the extent that the complaint seeks money damages in excess of the amounts actually approved by Superior Court judges and subsequently paid by the Administrative Office, there is no claim against the United States within the meaning of. the Tucker Act, and consequently no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).
With respect to the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, the defendant Superi- or Court judges, not having answered the complaint by reason of the motion to dismiss, have not in the present state of the record denied that these claims are reduced by judges who are unacquainted with the details of the representation involved, that the reductions are accomplished without providing attorneys with a hearing on the issue, and that no reasons are given for the reductions. Standing alone, these allegations raise procedural due process issues, but we have concluded that it would be inappropriate at this time for a federal court to grant the requested relief.
The complaint speaks as of a time when the federal Criminal Justice Act was applicable to the local District of Columbia courts, and federal monies were appropriated for payment of vouchers approved by Superior Court judges. Apparently recognizing the numerous difficulties that the local District of Columbia Government experienced in implementing the federal Criminal Justice Act, including most especially the inadequacy of the funds provided to meet the claims filed, Congress has, since the judgment under review was entered, enacted a separate and independent “District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act” for *1274the local courts as part of the District of Columbia Code, with appropriations to be made directly to the District Government. Pub.L. No. 93-412, §§ 2-3, 88 Stat. 1089, see D.C.Code §§ 11-2601 to 11-2609.
The responsibility for the development and implementation of a plan to provide representation under the new statute falls to the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration of the local D.C. courts. That Committee consists of (1) the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, who serves as Chairman, (2) an associate judge of that court elected annually by the judges thereof, (3) the Chief Judge of the Superior Court and (4) two associate judges of that court elected annually by the judges thereof. D.C.Code § ll-1701(a).
Since the local courts are in the early stages of administering a new statute designed for their use alone, this is hardly the time for a federal court to prescribe by injunction or declaratory judgment precisely how that act should be either interpreted or administered. The decision to issue a declaratory judgment or to enter an injunction is a matter of judicial discretion, e. g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 19, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) (declaratory judgment); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9 (1943) (injunction), and in our view a sound exercise of that discretion by the District Court would mandate denial by it of the requested relief. Under these circumstances, we leave the judgment appealed from undisturbed.1

. See United States v. DeCoster, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 487 F.2d 1197 (1973).

. I note that the panel’s ground of affirmance does not forever foreclose plaintiffs’ claims in federal court. “Since the local courts are in the early stages of administering a new statute [District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (West Supp.1976)] designed for their use alone, this is hardly the time for a federal court to prescribe by injunction or declaratory judgment precisely how that act should be either interpreted or administered.” Memorandum, infra at 1274 (emphasis added). I trust that the considerations of comity persuading the court not to exercise its equitable powers at this time will not be found to outweigh the substantial interests of counsel and indigent defendants beyond the period reasonably required for the local courts to bring the administration of the Criminal Justice Act into line with the mandates of due process.
Although the panel states in dicta that “it seems unlikely that there is any statutory or constitutional bar to determination of attorney’s fees by a judge other than the one trying the case,” Memorandum, infra at 1274 n. 1, this statement does not foreclose plaintiffs’ due process claims. Plaintiffs contend that there must be some rational basis for the cutting of their vouchers and that rationality would be promoted by requiring the judge who heard the case also to rule on the attorney’s voucher. Because rationality might also be promoted by requiring the judge who heard the case to describe the attorney’s performance in writing so that another judge might have some sensible basis for disposing of the voucher, see United States v. Thompson, 361 F.Supp. 879, 884 (D.D. C.1973), I agree with the panel that due process does not require one method over another. I read the panel’s statement to say no more than this.

. See Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 U.C.L. A.L.Rev. 432, 439 (1976).

. Although this disposition renders it unnecessary for us to pursue the matter further, it seems unlikely that there is any statutory or constitutional bar to determination of attorney’s fees by a judge other than the one trying the case (i. e., by the chief judge, a judge assigned administrative duties, or by rotation). In any event, such determination is one that, albeit of an ancillary nature, would seem to be subject to legal challenge only on direct review.