Court Opinion

ID: 9668118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:02:52.84505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:28.912105
License: Public Domain

*549White, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I believe, however, that the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in the case because the city attorney initially lacked the power to take the actions he did in case No. 7203 regarding paving district No. 395.
The single issue presented is whether the city attorney’s dismissal of case No. 7203 bars the city under the doctrine of res judicata from collecting delinquencies due on paving district No. 395 in case No. 7829. Resolution of this issue depends upon the legal effect, if any, of the city attorney’s action dismissing with prejudice case No. 7203. This, in turn, depends upon the scope of the city attorney’s power to bring and dismiss actions on behalf of the city.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 16-319 (Reissue 1983) includes in its delineation of a city attorney’s power the authority to “commence, prosecute, and defend all suits and actions necessary to be commenced, prosecuted, or defended on behalf of the city, or that may be ordered by the council.” This language does not condition the city attorney’s general power “to prosecute” a case on behalf of the city. “Prosecute” includes not only commencing the suit but also “following it to an ultimate conclusion,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1099 (5th ed. 1979), including settlements and compromises.
Section 16-319 cannot, however, be read in a vacuum. When, as here, the effect of another statute is to establish specific prerequisites to a city attorney’s authority, then § 16-319 must be interpreted in conjunction with such a statute. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-622 and 16-669 (Reissue 1979) provide the procedures a city must follow in accelerating future payments when foreclosing on a delinquent special assessment. These statutes require a city to publish a resolution declaring all future installments due on a future fixed date. Such a resolution may not be filed until three payments have become delinquent.
In foreclosing assessments a city is subject to a rigorous burden of proof at every stage. See Turner v. City of North Platte, 203 Neb. 706, 279 N.W.2d 868 (1979). A city’s record of special assessments must affirmatively show a compliance with all the conditions essential to a valid exercise of the taxing *550power, and no omission of essential fact may be supplied by a presumption. Belza v. Village of Emerson, 158 Neb. 641, 64 N.W.2d 214 (1954), vacated 159 Neb. 651, 68 N.W.2d 272 (1955). Any variation from compliance with statutory requirements renders the assessment void. Campbell v. City of Ogallala, 183 Neb. 238, 159 N.W.2d 574 (1968). Assessment authorization and collection statutes are so strictly construed because of the exclusive nature of the statutory assessment scheme. See 14 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 38.255 (3d ed. rev. 1970).
Here, the Kearney City Council properly did not include paving district No. 395 in its acceleration resolution because Mrs. Johnson was not yet three payments delinquent as required by statute. In this instance a prerequisite to the city attorney’s power to prosecute under § 16-319 was a council resolution seeking to accelerate and foreclose on thrice-delinquent special assessments. Since this condition was not met, the city attorney’s power to foreclose paving district No. 395 never arose, and its inclusion in case No. 7203 was without legal effect. Consequently, the city attorney’s dismissing the case with prejudice was void as to paving district No. 395,10 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.17 (3d ed. rev. 1981); see, also, Helleberg v. City of Kearney, 139 Neb. 413, 297 N.W. 672 (1941), and his action affords no basis for a plea of res judicata as against paving district No. 395.
Shanahan, J., joins in this concurrence.