Court Opinion

ID: 9610290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:39:23.243233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:08.373511
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I concur with Justice Golden in his special concurrence that error existed in the admission of the statement of the accused in the presence of the priest under these circumstances, but not to explicate as harmless. I will further dissent because I believe the majority opinion permits the trial judge to supersede a fact-finding function of the jury. The majority claims a self-defense instruction was not warranted under Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544 (Wyo.1990) and Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192 (Wyo.1990) because it was unreasonable for appellant to have believed he was in immediate danger of suffering serious bodily injury. The reasonableness of such belief is a crucial element of self-defense under Patterson v. State, 682 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Wyo.1984). The question of reasonableness belongs to the jury, not to this court.
The majority relies on Patterson, 682 P.2d at 1053 for the proposition that appellant was not entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of self-defense. Such reliance appears misplaced. The Patterson defendant was charged with first degree murder for slashing the victim’s throat. The trial court refused Patterson’s request for a self-defense instruction because it related, not to the throat slashing, but to an earlier incident in which the victim’s head was slightly injured. Id. at 1052 n. 1.
The standard of review for this appeal is controlled by constitutional concepts considered in Oien, 797 P.2d 544 and Thom, 792 P.2d 192. Unfortunately, the majority does not apply that standard for this decision. Under Oien and Thom, a defendant has the right to have the jury informed of his or her theory of defense if the instruction sufficiently informs the jury of that theory, if competent evidence supports the law, and the proposed instruction articulates Wyoming law.
Under Oien and Thom, testimony by a defendant qualifies as competent evidence. Because appellant testified as he did, the trial judge should have given the jury a Patterson instruction on the elements of self-defense. The jury, rather than the trial court or this court, could then have determined if the circumstances warranted reasonable grounds for appellant to fear serious bodily injury and if an acquittal was warranted under Patterson.
Under the Oien and Thom standard, the majority assumes the testimony by appellant to be true. Appellant testified that his brother-in-law told him to go outside if he wanted to fight him and that his brother-in-law insisted on him going outside. He also testified that his brother-in-law threw down his jacket and charged him, trying to reach for his neck. He said he thought that if he took out his knife, the victim would not get near him and that the stabbing was inadvertent. The majority says that evidence, even if true, does not indicate that appellant could reasonably believe he was in immediate danger of suffering serious bodily injury. Such an inference is not permitted under Oien or Thom. Such an inference is one of the jury to make, not an appellate court.
These right to instruction on theory of defense cases, see 4 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Procedure § 538 (12th ed. 1976), have a dual constitutional constituent. First presented is the right of due process, *832Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6; Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 (Wyo.1987); Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127 (Wyo.1970); and the second is the right to have the jury perform the fact-finding function of guilt determination, Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 9.
Illustrative and definitive within the history of a right to a theory of defense/self-defense instruction is the foundational case which is factually similar. Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896). In Stevenson, there was a homicide involving a Deputy United States Marshall in the Indian Territory. The only factual difference from the general circumstance of that case was in the trial. The theory of defense was the alternative of manslaughter to capital murder which occurred within the factual context of a continued fracas between the decedent and the defendant.
The United States Supreme Court identified the theory of defense inquiry by the consideration and question:
The jury should have been permitted to determine the credibility of the evidence, as above detailed, and, if true, whether the effect of the conduct of the deceased in shooting, as he did, into the saloon, and considering all the circumstances of the case, was such as naturally tended to and did excite in the mind of the plaintiff in error a sudden passion, either of rage or fear, and under the influence of which he fired the shot and killed the deceased wilfully and unlawfully, but at the same time without malice. If he thus fired the pistol, would not a jury have the right to say that the consequent killing was manslaughter instead of murder? Is it not clearly a question of fact for a jury to determine just what the mental condition of plaintiff in error was in regard to malice?
Id. at 320, 16 S.Ct. at 841. The right to a theory of defense instruction was restated as a controlling principle most recently by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988) in citing Stevenson as his authority in the case.
I would paraphrase Stevenson, 162 U.S. at 321-22, 16 S.Ct. at 842 (emphasis in original) only slightly for application to this case:
The ruling of the trial judge in effect was to say that as matter of law there was nothing in all this evidence, if true, which would permit the jury to find that the [accused could reasonably believe that he was in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering serious bodily injury]. Is it perfectly plain and clear, as a conclusion of law, that [decedent’s activities] such as were detailed by some of the witnesses in this case can have no tendency to raise within the mind of the person thus assaulted [a question of the imminence of danger and physical harm]? If it is not to be so asserted as matter of law, then it becomes a question of fact in such case, and that question must be answered by the jury. Whether the witnesses told the truth in regard to such circumstances is not for the court to say, nor is it for the court to decide upon the weight to be given to them if proper for the consideration of the jury.
The significant volume of Wyoming case law should give us constitutional caution where in result we weigh the evidence to foreclose a jury fact-finding function. If the evidence is slight, the jury as well as the judge is competent and responsible. In addition to our very recent cases of Oien and Thom, see also the historical progression in State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119 (1947); Blakely, 474 P.2d 127; Thomas v. State, 562 P.2d 1287 (1977), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561 (Wyo.1989); Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400 (Wyo.1977); and Sanchez v. State, 694 P.2d 726 (Wyo.1985). See also Best, 736 P.2d 739; Naugher v. State, 685 P.2d 37 (Wyo.1984); Patterson, 682 P.2d 1049; Scheikofsky v. State, 636 P.2d 1107 (Wyo.1981); and Benson v. State, 571 P.2d 595 (Wyo.1977).
We become fact finders who change the rules of review as well as denigrate due process and right to a jury trial by this decision. It may well be, and may even likely be, that the jury would take little stock of this explanation as a defense *833against criminal conviction responsibility for the conduct of this accused. Decision, however, should be made by the jury and not by the court that the jury is unable or incompetent to make the decision. There is evidence, if the appellant is to be believed, which would support his claim that he acted in self-defense and the baton should be passed to the State to shoulder its burden of the proof for homicide conviction. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 571 A.2d 1251, 1257 (1990).
The problems that this appellant had with trial error did not end or start with his inability to submit his theory of defense to the jury for consideration. In concurring with Justice Golden in his special concurrence that clear error existed in the admissibility of the statement to the investigator, I can by no means accept the further conclusion that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as would be required under the circumstances, to avoid reversible error. Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358 (Wyo.1979). We are presented with a simple, direct and specific occurrence where a police officer interrogated appellant after he had requested the assistance of counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, reh’g denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981); Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, reh’g denied 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966).
The United States Supreme Court, most recently in Minnick v. Mississippi, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), recognized constitutional error when interrogation occurred after counsel had been requested and it is apparent that the intentional interrogation here for later trial testimony by the police officer was anything but harmless under the criteria of both our case law and that developed by the United States Supreme Court. Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, reh’g denied 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). Additionally, I again question whether intentional interrogation by a police officer knowing that the individual had asked for assistance of counsel can constitute harmless error if the elicited testimony has a meaningful inculpatory effect for the jury resolution of guilt. To say that obvious interrogation which is asking questions to obtain guilt suggestive answers is not interrogation solves no problems within our responsibility to assure constitutional rights to those persons accused of criminal offenses. Minnick, 111 S.Ct. 486.
Furthermore, since this was clear and overt interrogation, the Denno hearing should have been provided. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Failure of the trial court to provide a Denno hearing when a motion to suppress an alleged confession is presented becomes an open invitation for trial error and future reversal upon appeal. Juries are not so unobservant as maybe sometimes assumed. Forcing the defendant to conduct the suppression hearing as a trial recess activity re-emphasizes for the jury whatever the significance of the statements may have been when testimony resumes. Obviously, the jury recognizes in most cases that objection was taken and subsequent rejection by the trial court following the recess time required for the hearing psychologically provides additional emphasis to the validity of the testimony when then presented upon reconvened trial.
I would suggest to the trial bench and lawyers of defense and prosecution that failure to arrange for a Denno hearing on something as serious as a suppression matter prior to trial may frequently if not usually cause a violation of the rights of the defendant to constitutional due process. In this case, the motion was properly made before trial in accord with the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure and appellant should have received a hearing and decision before trial commenced. The fairness required for due process as directed to the Denno hearing is equally applicable to prosecution or defense or strategy planning and evidentiary presentation.
The problem is conversely reflected for this case in a further claimed error where a motion in limine was actually granted regarding conduct prior to trial and then inquiry was permitted by cross-examination *834in contravention of the previously granted motion in limine. The justification for accepting the trial court’s reversal of prior decision might more properly be found as derived from an obvious untrue answer by appellant on direct examination, but certainly not as a subject of rejected plain error or applied alternative of unlimited discretion of the trial court. On this issue, where an answer of legal reason might be provided for appeal justification of non-reversal, this court provides the wrong reason which lacks both philosophical and adjudicative validity. See Shields v. Carnahan, 744 P.2d 1115 (Wyo.1987).
Based principally, although not entirely, on the failure to provide a right to appellant to have his instruction on the theory of defense, I would reverse and remand for retrial.