Court Opinion

ID: 9915530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 17:08:21.301035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:24.376543
License: Public Domain

J-S37019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  STEFFEN SHAUN ROOKSTOOL                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3099 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 31, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0000741-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                           FILED JAUNARY 5, 2024

       Steffen Shaun Rookstool (“Rookstool”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after the trial court denied his severance motion and a jury

convicted him of theft by unlawful taking and persons not to possess firearms.1

We affirm.

       The facts recited by the trial court are as follows:

             The victim, [J.R.]2 resided with her two teenage daughters
       and [Rookstool] . . .. [Rookstool] was her boyfriend, and they had
       been in a relationship for approximately two (2) years. At some
       point, [Rookstool] moved into her residence.             [J.R.] had
       purchased her first firearm, a Glock 42, .380 caliber, in 2019. She
       had purchased the firearm for protection for herself and her
       daughters, and kept it in a safe during the day and under her
       mattress at night. [Rookstool] was aware of the safe, but he was
       not provided with the combination to open the safe.

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a), 6105(a)(1).

2 We elect not to state the victim’s full name.
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             In February of 2020, [J.R.] noticed that her firearm was
      missing from under her mattress. When asked, [Rookstool]
      denied knowledge of the whereabouts of the firearm.             She
      periodically asked him about the firearm, but [Rookstool] played
      dumb. He suggested that she misplaced the firearm. Eventually,
      on February 14, 2020, during a car ride, [Rookstool] admitted that
      he had taken the firearm and had given it to a “buddy” for drugs.
      [J.R.] told him to get it back, and [Rookstool] responded[,] “[I]t's
      not that easy.” When [Rookstool] did not call his “buddy” to
      retrieve the firearm, [J.R.] called the police, and the state police
      responded to her residence. They interviewed [Rookstool] outside
      the presence of [J.R.].

            One of the troopers who responded was Trooper Peter
      Hamati-Attieh. Upon his arrival, he spoke with [J.R.] about the
      stolen firearm. He then spoke to [Rookstool], who initially denied
      knowledge of what happened to the firearm. During the course of
      the interview, [Rookstool] changed his story and told the troopers
      that he did steal the firearm on February 6, 2020, and gave the
      firearm “to a friend.” He then elaborated, explaining that he
      “traded it in. I went and got drugs with it.” He told the troopers
      he traded it "to a guy named Corey." [Rookstool] did not provide
      Corey's last name, but provided a location and description where
      Corey resided.

            [Rookstool’s] statements led to the residence of Corey
      Beitler at 2156 North Cedar Crest Boulevard in South Whitehall,
      where a search warrant was executed.          Located inside the
      residence, in a speaker box on the floor, was the missing firearm.
      A loaded magazine was found inside [of] the firearm.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/23, at 2-3 (footnote and record citations omitted).

      On May 25, 2022, Rookstool’s trial counsel made an oral motion for

severance of the charges of theft by unlawful taking and persons not to

possess firearms, and the trial court denied the motion.

      A jury convicted Rookstool of the above-listed offenses, and the trial

court later imposed an aggregate standard range sentence of thirty to eighty-

four months of imprisonment.      Trial counsel filed post-sentence motions,

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J-S37019-23

which the trial court denied after a hearing. Rookstool filed a timely notice

of appeal and he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Rookstool raises the following issue for our review:

      Whether the lower court acted properly in denying [Rookstool’s]
      request for severance of the two charges, theft by unlawful taking
      and possession of a firearm prohibited and allowed the
      Commonwealth to use one trial to convict [Rookstool] for the two
      separate charges[?]

Rookstool’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization removed).

      Rookstool’s issue addresses the court’s denial of his severance motion

and the potential prejudice from a joint trial for multiple offenses.

      A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial

court and its decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of

discretion. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278 1282

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in

judgment but occurs where a court overrides or misapplies the law, an

exercise of judgement that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.    See Commonwealth v. Faison, 297

A.3d 810, 821 (Pa. Super. 2023).

      Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 563, two or more

offenses may be joined in the same information if:

      (1) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a
      separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury
      so that there is no danger of confusion; or

      (2) the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction.

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 563(A).

      A person commits theft by unlawful taking where he unlawfully takes

movable property of another with the intent to deprive him thereof. See 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 3921. A person commits persons not to possess firearms where,

having committed a prior enumerated offense, he possesses, controls, or sells

a firearm. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a).

      To determine whether each of the offenses would be admissible at a trial

for the other, this Court looks to Pa.R.E. 404(b).    That rule precludes the

admission of other crimes evidence to show that a person had a propensity to

commit crime, see Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), but permits the admission of other

crimes for other proper purposes. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d

491, 497 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Cascardo, 981 A.2d 245, 250 (Pa.

Super. 2009). One proper purpose our Courts recognize for the admission of

other crimes evidence is to explain the context or complete story of the events

surrounding the subject at issue by demonstrating the chain of events that

formed the history and natural development of the charge or charges being

considered. See Lark, 543 A.2d at 497; Cascardo, 981 A.2d at 250 (also

stating the importance that the events occur close in time and place to the

other crime).

      Other crimes evidence is admissible only if its probative value exceeds

its potential for prejudice, i.e., that jurors might convict the defendant

because he has a bad character or a propensity to commit crimes.          See

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Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 136-37 (Pa. 2007). Accordingly,

this Court assesses whether the other crimes evidence is offered for a proper

purpose, the evidence of each would be admissible in a separate trial for the

other, the evidence is capable of separation by the jury so there is no danger

of confusion, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 563(A)(1), and its probative value exceeds its

potential for prejudice, see Dillon, 925 A.2d at 136. See also Pa.R.Crim.P.

583 (stating that a court may sever an offense if it appears a party may be

prejudiced   by   offenses    being   tried   together);   Commonwealth     v.

Shackleford, 275 93 A.3d 692, 701 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted)

(stating the prejudice contemplated by Rule 583 is present “if the evidence

tended to convict the appellant only by showing his propensity to commit

crimes or because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence or could

not avoid cumulating the evidence”).

      Rookstool asserts that the proof of his commission of the firearms

charge did not require evidence of how he acquired the gun and evidence that

he stole the gun could have caused the jury “to accumulate [sic] that evidence

and find him guilty of the firearms offense as a result of that accumulation.”

Rookstool’s Brief at 11-13.

      The trial court found that the jury would have had no difficulty

separating the evidence, and Rookstool “forged his own linkage of events and

he deserve[d] to be tried jointly on them.” See Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/23,

at 5, quoting Lark, 543 A.2d at 500.

                                      -5-
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      We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Rookstool’s severance motion.      Rookstool’s theft of J.R.’s gun and his

possession of that gun are so closely intertwined in time and place that they

form the history of the case and the natural development of the facts. See

Lark, 543 A.2d at 497; Cascardo, 981 A.2d at 250. The offenses of theft

and prohibited gun possession and the facts establishing Rookstool’s

commission of those offenses are simple, and that simplicity defeats any

reasonable concern the jury would have been incapable of separating the

evidence or would have improperly cumulated the evidence as Rookstool

asserts. On this record, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the jury

convicted Rookstool of the firearms offense solely because it heard evidence

that he stole J.R.’s gun.     Rookstool does not show prejudice requiring

severance. No relief is merited.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 1/5/2024

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