Court Opinion

ID: 9352765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 18:11:33.770653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:59:47.615202
License: Public Domain

J-S41040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ERIC A. CHAMBERS                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 720 MDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 27, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-22-CR-0000392-2012

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                        FILED JANUARY 09, 2023

        Appellant, Eric A. Chambers, appeals pro se from the January 27, 2022

order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

        A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant facts of this case as

follows:

              On September 9, 2011, Jalil Walters (“Jalil”) and his
              two brothers, Ibrahiim Muhammad (“Ibrahiim”) and
              Lewin Chism, Jr. (“Lewin”), were drinking at their
              grandmother’s house with family members and their
              friend, Mike Burgress (“Mike”). Lewin was admittedly
              intoxicated, having consumed three beers and several
              shots of liquor. Jalil had also consumed several shots
              and a beer. The group decided to continue drinking
              at the Jazzland Bar, located on Walnut Street in
              Harrisburg.
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41040-22

          Upon arrival, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Lewin
          began to feel anxious and uncomfortable; he told his
          brothers that he wanted to leave as he thought other
          people in the bar were thugs and gangsters. Lewin
          left the bar, which prompted Jalil, Ibrahiim, and Mike
          to follow in an effort to calm him down.

          Appellant and Demond Bates, who was security at the
          bar, followed them outside. Appellant approached
          Lewin and asked him what he had been saying about
          the clientele in the bar. Appellant then took a gun out
          of his pants and pointed it in Lewin’s face. The
          brothers asked Bates to interject, which he refused to
          do. Appellant then secreted the gun on his person and
          went back inside the bar.

          A short time later, appellant exited the bar again, and
          this time he was “even more aggressive.” Appellant
          stated he was going to kill one of them. Appellant,
          who was “irate and angry,” pointed the gun at
          Ibrahiim’s chest. The brothers claimed appellant
          pulled the trigger and at that split second, Jalil jumped
          in front of the gun taking the bullet that was fired. All
          of the brothers identified appellant as the shooter in a
          photographic lineup and in the courtroom. All of the
          brothers also stated that the gun used was a revolver.

          After Jalil was shot, the group flagged down a police
          vehicle, which then called for an ambulance. Jalil was
          hospitalized for six to eight days and underwent two
          surgeries. The bullet had traveled through his left
          elbow, which it shattered, and his abdomen. The
          bullet is to remain in his abdomen indefinitely, as the
          doctors were afraid his internal organs might rupture
          if they removed it.

          Mike, however, claimed that the shooting occurred
          right after the group exited the bar, and that the
          bouncer was most likely the shooter. Mike was
          standing approximately five feet from the shooter who
          he described as heavy set with hair on his head and a
          beard, not a goatee. Mike testified he was “unsure” if
          any of the individuals present at trial was the shooter,
          including appellant, who was bald with a goatee; he

                                    -2-
J-S41040-22

            averred he did not see the shooter in the courtroom.
            Lewin, Ibrahiim, Jalil, and Mike were also unable to
            give consistent descriptions of the shooter or what he
            was wearing. Demond Bates, who worked as a
            bouncer on the night in question, was familiar with
            appellant but did not see him in the area at any point.

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 113 A.3d 359 (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished

memorandum at *1) (citations to notes of testimony and footnote omitted),

appeal denied, 116 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2015).

      The relevant procedural history of this case was summarized by a prior

panel of this Court as follows:

            On May 16, 2013, a jury found Appellant guilty of
            attempted murder, aggravated assault, persons not to
            possess a firearm, firearms not to be carried without
            a license, simple assault, and recklessly endangering
            another person. On July 17, 2013, the trial court
            sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 25 to 50
            years of incarceration and assessed a $ 4,000.26 fine.
            Appellant filed a timely appeal.

            On November 25, 2014, this Court affirmed
            Appellant’s convictions, but vacated the portion of the
            judgment of sentence in which the trial court assessed
            the $ 4,000.26 fine. On June 2, 2015, the Supreme
            Court of Pennsylvania denied Appellant’s petition for
            allowance of appeal.

            On July 24, 2015, Appellant filed the underlying pro
            se PCRA petition, his first. On April 22, 2016, the
            PCRA court appointed counsel. On March 20, 2017,
            Appellant, although represented by counsel, filed a
            pro se “motion to withdraw counsel,” in which he
            sought the removal of PCRA Counsel because
            Appellant and PCRA Counsel had “yet to come to a
            mutual    understanding    of   what    [Appellant]’s
            arguments/claims to be raised are[,]” and requested
            to proceed with PCRA proceedings representing
            himself. Motion to Withdraw Counsel, 3/20/17, ¶ 3.

                                     -3-
J-S41040-22

              In response, on April 17, 2017, PCRA Counsel filed a
              petition for leave to withdraw as counsel in which he
              likewise sought removal from Appellant’s case based
              on Appellant’s withdrawal motion and “fundamental
              issues [that] have made representation unreasonably
              difficult.” Petition for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel,
              4/17/17, ¶ 4. On October 20, 2017, the court granted
              PCRA Counsel’s petition to withdraw. There is no
              indication in the record that the court held a
              Grazier[1] hearing.

              On July 19, 2018, the PCRA court held a hearing on
              Appellant’s PCRA petition during which Appellant
              represented himself. On September 20, 2018, the
              PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 216 A.3d 380 (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished

memorandum at *1) (some citations omitted; footnote added).

       On April 12, 2019, a panel of this court vacated the PCRA court’s

September 20, 2018 order denying Appellant’s first PCRA petition and

remanded this matter for a Grazier hearing. See id. Following a Grazier

hearing, the PCRA court determined that Appellant did not knowingly and

voluntarily waive his right to counsel and appointed Kaitlyn Clarkson, Esq.

(“Attorney Clarkson”) to represent him.

              On April 24, 2020, [Attorney Clarkson] filed a
              Supplemental Petition for PCRA relief. In this
              Supplemental Petition, Attorney Clarkson only
              identified one issue of merit, namely the calculation of
              [Appellant’s] credit for time served.         As to the
              remaining issues, Attorney Clarkson sent [Appellant]
              a letter certifying that they lacked merit in accordance
              with the requirements of [Commonwealth v.
              Turner],      544     A.2d   927    (Pa.    1988)    and
____________________________________________

1   Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

                                           -4-
J-S41040-22

              [Commonwealth v. Finley], 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.
              1988) (en banc). This Turner/Finley letter was
              attached to the April 24, 2020 Supplemental Petition.

              Thereafter, on May 21, 2020, [Appellant] filed a
              Motion to Proceed pro se and be permitted to file a
              Supplemental PCRA. We scheduled another Grazier
              Hearing for July 9, 2020. Following that hearing, we
              permitted Attorney Clarkson to withdraw as counsel
              and [Appellant] to proceed pro se. [Appellant] was
              given sixty (60) days to file a Supplemental Petition
              for PCRA Relief. Following several requests for
              extensions, [Appellant] filed his Amended PCRA
              Petition on March 1, 2021. Also following several
              requests for extensions, the Commonwealth filed its
              response on September 30, 2021.

PCRA court opinion, 12/20/21 at 3 (citation formatting corrected).

       On December 20, 2021, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice

of its intention to dismiss his petition without a hearing, pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).       The PCRA court also filed an opinion that same day

addressing each of Appellant’s claims. Appellant did not respond to the PCRA

court’s Rule 907 notice. Thereafter, on January 27, 2022, the PCRA court

entered an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and all the amendments

thereto. This appeal followed.2

       Appellant raises the following 11 issues for our review:

              1.     Whether the PCRA court committed reversible
                     error, where it abused its discretion and showed
                     judicial bias in its memorandum opinion denying

____________________________________________

2The record reflects that Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

                                           -5-
J-S41040-22

               Appellant’s PCRA petition, absent a written
               finding of facts and conclusion of law?

          2.   Whether the PCRA court committed reversible
               error and abused its discretion, in conducting an
               evidentiary hearing for 3 claims of ineffective
               assistance of trial counsel (IAC), without trial
               counsel’s     presence     (to      explain   his
               actions/inactions)?

          3.   Whether PCRA court committed reversible error
               in finding no merit and denying Appellant’s
               claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing
               to motion for the suppression of Jalil Walters’
               identification, which was obtained from
               Detective Ryan Neal’s suggestive and tainted
               identification process?

          4.   Whether the PCRA court committed reversible
               error, in violating Appellant’s due process
               protections of the Fourteenth amendment to the
               United States Constitution and Article 1, Section
               9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, when the
               PCRA court denied that all post-conviction
               counsel were ineffective, for failing to fulfill their
               duties, to review the entire record, for issues of
               merit?

          5.   Whether the PCRA court committed reversible
               error and upheld the violation of Appellant’s due
               process rights, in the prosecution, conviction,
               and sentence for Ibrahiim Muhammad, that
               shocked one’s sense of justice, when
               Muhammad was never a complainant, victim,
               nor the subject of Appellant’s trial?

          6.   Whether the PCRA court committed reversible
               error, in denying Appellant relief when all
               counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the
               due process, procedural and constitutional
               violations, for Ibrahiim Muhammad being
               named as a victim or complainant of any
               offenses, after trial ended, during jury
               instructions?

                                    -6-
J-S41040-22

          7.    Whether the PCRA court was in error, in failing
                to find trial counsel ineffective, when trial
                counsel failed to have ballistic testing done on
                the available exculpatory and tangible evidence
                of the bullet fragments and clothing (for GSR),
                that was removed from victim Walters, that
                would have proven his client’s innocence, and in
                turn, prove that all post-conviction counsel were
                ineffective for failing to raise (IAC) of trial
                counsel?

          8.    Whether the PCRA court erred, abused its
                discretion, and lowered the Commonwealth’s
                burden of proof, in failing to find all prior counsel
                ineffective, for failing to raise the erroneous jury
                instruction for attempted murder, that omitted
                the element of malice?

          9.    Whether the PCRA court’s upholding of the
                illegal maximum sentence of 40 years[’]
                incarceration at count 1, was in error and in
                conflict with the sentencing code, when the trial
                court assessed Walters’ injury at count 2, to
                Muhammad’s non- injury at count 1?

          10.   Whether the PCRA court’s upholding of the
                illegal sentence of 9-18 years[’] incarceration at
                count 2; 18 [Pa.C.S.A. §] 2702(a)(4), was in
                error, exceeded the statutory maximum and
                conflicts with the sentencing code for a second-
                degree felony?

          11.   Whether the trial court accepted the jury’s
                erroneous guilty verdicts of guilty, on the
                firearm offenses (counts 3 and 6) when        the
                Commonwealth failed to prove all of the
                essential elements of the uniform firearms act,
                and whether the [PCRA] court erred, abused its
                discretion, and committed reversible error in
                denying that all prior counsel were ineffective
                for failing to raise the omittance of the missing
                essential elements of the Commonwealth's
                prosecution of their client?

                                    -7-
J-S41040-22

Appellant’s brief at 5-7.3

       Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller,

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “This Court grants

great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those

findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.”

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 143 A.3d 394, 397 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation

omitted). In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a defendant must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence

arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).

These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(3).

       Preliminarily, we observe that a number of Appellant’s claims involve

allegations of trial court error that could have been raised on direct appeal.

To the extent Appellant failed to do so, we conclude that Appellant has waived

these claims under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b) (stating, “an issue

is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial,

____________________________________________

3 For the ease of discussion, we have elected to address Appellant’s claims in
a different order than presented in his appellate brief.

                                           -8-
J-S41040-22

at trial, … on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”); see also

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017).

      Additionally, to the extent Appellant challenges to the trial court’s jury

instructions and the sufficiency and weight of the evidence – issues 5, 8 and

11 – we note that these claims have been previously litigated on direct appeal

and found to be without merit by this Court.         See Commonwealth v.

Chambers, 113 A.3d 359 (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum at

*3-6), appeal denied, 116 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2015). Accordingly, these claims

are not cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (stating,

“[t]o be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the petitioner must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence ... [t]hat the allegation of error has

not been previously litigated[.]”).     A specific issue has been previously

litigated if “it has been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally

attacking the conviction or sentence.” Id. at § 9544(a)(3).

      Appellant next argues that the PCRA court demonstrated judicial bias in

its December 20, 2021 opinion by “relying solely on the Commonwealth’s and

[Attorney] Clarkson’s perspectives [and] failing to prove any specific facts to

reach its conclusion[.]” Appellant’s brief at 15-16 (issue 1). This claim is

baseless.

      Our Supreme Court has stated the following with respect to a claim of

judicial bias:

             Under our PCRA statute, relief may be due where a
             conviction or sentence results from “a violation of the

                                      -9-
J-S41040-22

            Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution
            or laws of the United States which, in the
            circumstances of the particular case, so undermined
            the truth-determining process that no reliable
            adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
            place.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)(i). The
            Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state
            “shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
            without due process of law.” U.S. Const. XIV, Sec. 1.
            Due process concerns extend to the actions of the
            judiciary; accordingly, litigants are guaranteed an
            absence of actual bias on the part of any judge
            adjudicating their case.         The concept of bias
            encompasses matters in which an adjudicator has a
            direct, personal, substantial, [or] pecuniary interest in
            the outcome of the matter. While a fair trial is indeed
            a basic requirement of due process, most matters
            relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a
            constitutional level. In order to determine whether a
            judge harbors an unconstitutional level of bias, the
            inquiry is an objective one wherein the requisite
            question is whether the average judge ... is likely to
            be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional
            potential for bias. The Supreme Court has determined
            that there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when
            a judge has had significant, personal involvement ...
            in a critical decision regarding [the litigant’s] case.

Commonwealth v. Fears, 250 A.3d 1180, 1193-1194 (Pa. 2021) (internal

quotation marks and case citation omitted; some brackets in original), cert.

denied, ___ A.3d ___, 142 S. Ct. 1235 (2022).

      Here, even a cursory review of Judge Andrew Dowling’s December 20.

2021 written opinion reveals that it did not contain any bias, and certainly

none that reached the levels of constitutional interference.          Accordingly,

Appellant’s claim to the contrary is entirely unfounded.

                                      - 10 -
J-S41040-22

      Appellant’s remaining claims allege the ineffectiveness of both his trial

and PCRA counsel. See Appellant’s brief at 19-31, 37-53 (issues 3-4 and 6-

8).

      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA,

a petitioner must establish the following three factors: “first[,] the underlying

claim has arguable merit; second, that counsel had no reasonable basis for

his   action    or   inaction;   and   third,    that   Appellant   was   prejudiced.”

Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2014).

               [A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he
               proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
               conviction or sentence resulted from the [i]neffective
               assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
               the    particular   case,     so    undermined        the
               truth-determining     process     that     no    reliable
               adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
               place.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation

marks    omitted;      some      brackets   in    original),   citing   42   Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(2)(ii).

      “[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of demonstrating

ineffectiveness rests on appellant.”        Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d

1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 30 A.3d 487

(Pa. 2011).

      Our Supreme Court has set forth the proper framework for alleging a

layered ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the context of the PCRA:

                                        - 11 -
J-S41040-22

            Succinctly stated, a petitioner must plead in his PCRA
            petition that his prior counsel, whose alleged
            ineffectiveness is at issue, was ineffective for failing
            to raise the claim that the counsel who preceded him
            was ineffective in taking or omitting some action. In
            addition, a petitioner must present argument, in briefs
            or other court memoranda, on the three prongs of the
            [ineffectiveness] test as to each relevant layer of
            representation. . . . [T]his means that the arguable
            merit prong of the [ineffectiveness] test as to the
            claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in not
            raising trial counsel’s ineffectiveness consists of the
            application of the three-prong [ineffectiveness] test to
            the underlying claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.
            If any one of the prongs as to trial counsel’s
            ineffectiveness is not established, then necessarily the
            claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness fails. Only
            if all three prongs as to the claim of trial counsel’s
            ineffectiveness are established, do prongs 2 and 3 of
            the [ineffectiveness] test as to the claim of appellate
            counsel’s ineffectiveness have relevance, requiring a
            determination as to whether appellate counsel had a
            reasonable basis for his course of conduct in failing to
            raise a meritorious claim of trial counsel’s
            ineffectiveness (prong 2) and whether petitioner was
            prejudiced by appellate counsel’s course of conduct in
            not raising the meritorious claim of trial counsel’s
            ineffectiveness (prong 3).

Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 482 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

      Instantly, our review of Appellant’s oft-disjointed, 70-page pro se brief

indicates that he has failed to properly raise his layered ineffectiveness claims

by   applying   the   three-prong   ineffectiveness   test   to   each   level    of

representation.    A determination that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance is a prerequisite to finding that any subsequent counsel was himself

ineffective, and no such findings were demonstrated in this case.                See

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010).

                                     - 12 -
J-S41040-22

Accordingly, we could find Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims waived on this

basis alone. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 161 A.3d 960, 969 (Pa.Super.

2017), appeal denied, 176 A.3d 850 (Pa. 2017).

      In reaching this decision, we note that Appellant’s status as a pro se

litigant does not absolve him from responsibility for compliance with the rules.

            Although this Court is willing to liberally construe
            materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status
            confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the
            contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in
            a legal proceeding must . . . assume that his lack of
            expertise and legal training will be his undoing.

Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation

omitted).

      In any event, even if we were to reach the merits of Appellant’s claims,

we would find they warrant no relief, and adopt the December 20, 2021

opinion of the PCRA court as our own, which in turn relies, in part, on the

analysis set forth in Attorney Clarkson’s well-reasoned Turner/Finley letter

attached to Appellant’s April 24, 2020 supplemental PCRA petition.

      Based on the foregoing, we affirm the January 27, 2022 order of the

PCRA court dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

                                     - 13 -
J-S41040-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/09/2023

                          - 14 -
                                                                          Circulated 12/21/2022 11:10 AM

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                       IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,
                                                     DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
              V.

                                                     CRIMINAL - PCRA
 ERIC CHAMBERS,
                         Defendant                  : NO. 392-CR-2012

                             Pa.R.A.P. 192S(a) OPINION

                                       J1
              AND NOW, this       3f     day of _   _,/,_2_~_,Y,____, 2022, in accordance
with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure I 925(a)( 1), this Court finds the issues

raised by Appellant, Eric Chambers, in rus Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal

of our December 20, 2021 and January 27, 2022 Orders are adequately addressed in the

Memorandwn Opinion filed on December 20, 2021 , and no additional opinion will be fil ed.

                                                           BY THE COURT:

                                                    -~-And,£ie:1
Distribution: ~/,/Jr iY f : 30,.,,,.,
The Hon. Andrew H. Dowling -J))
Dauphin County District Attorney's Office -::CO
Smart Communications/PADOC, Eric Chambers/#LC6450, SCI at Houtzdale, P.O. Box
       33028, St. Petersburg, FL 33733 M~,

                                                           03NNVJS '
                                     5I-f
 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                         IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,
                                                       DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
               V.

                                                        CRIMINAL - PCRA
 ERIC CHAMBERS,
                           Defendant                   NO. 392-CR-2012

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Presently pending before this Court is Defendant/Petitioner' s pro se Amended

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The background of this case is as follows: On September 9,

20 11 , Lewin Chism, Ibrahim Muhammad, Jalil Walters and Mike Burgess were drinking alcohol

at their grandmother's residence. They then went to the Jazzland Bar in Harrisburg to continue to

drink alcohol. At ,some point, Mr. Chism left the bar and Mr. Muhammad, Mr. Walters and Mr.

Burgess followed him out of the bar. At that time, Petitioner, Eric Chambers, also exited the bar

and, fo llowing a verbal altercation, pointed a firearm at Mr. Chism. Petitioner then put the firearm

away and re-entered the Jazzland bar.

               As the four men were walking away from the bar, Petitioner came out of the bar a

second time and pointed a firearm at Mr. Muhammad. Petitioner pulled the trigger to the firearm,

and Mr. Walters jumped in front of Mr. Muhammad and was struck by a bullet.

               Following a trial, on May 16, 2013, Petitioner was found guilty of Criminal Attempt

Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Persons Not to Possess a Firearm, Carrying a Firearm Without a

License, Simple Assault by Physical Menace, and Recklessly Endangering Another Person. On

July 17, 20 13, Petitioner was sentenced as follows:

       1. Count 1 - Criminal Attempt Homicide - 20-40 years at a State Correctional Institution
       2. Count 2 - Aggravated Assault - 9-18 years at a State Correctional Institution

                                                 1

                                            L/ L,- 1
       3. Count3-PersonNotto Possess Firearm-5-10 years at a State Correctional Institution,
          concurrent with Count 1
       4. Count 4 - Carrying a Firearm Without a License - 3-6 years at a State Correctional
          Institution, consecutive with Count 1 , ,, .
       5. Count 5 - Simple Assault by Physical Menace - 1-2 years at a State Correctional
          Institution, concurrent with Count 1
       6. Count 6 - Recklessly Endangering Another Person - 1-2 years at a State Correctional
          Institution, concurrent with Count 1. ,

               Petitioner filed a pro se PCRA on July 24, 2015, and we a)Jpointed Damian
                  '
DeStefano, Esquii'e to represent him,             Petitioner was unhappy with Attorney DeStefano's

representation, and Attorney Destefano ultimately filed a Petition to Withdraw as Counsel,

averring that fundamental disagreements had arisen between Petitioner and Attorney DeStefano

regarding the issues that Petitioner wanted to raise and the merits of those issues. We granted

Attorney DeStefano's Petition to Withdraw by Order dated October 20, 2017 and granted

Defendant thirty days to file a supplemental PCRA that raises all issues that he would like the

Court to consider. '.The Commonwealth 'was then graiited forty-five days to file a response.
                  .                                       ~--
               Pet/tioner ultimately fil!rf      asupplemental PCRA, and the Commonwealth filed a
response to same.' Upon review of Petitioner's 'PCRA and the Commonwealth's response, we

determined that Petitioner only raised three issues that had arguable merit, and dismissed

Petitioner's remaiJing issues for the reasons set forth in the Commonwealth's response. We held
                  1
a Hearing on July 19, 2018 that was limited to those three issues, all of which claimed ineffective

assistance of counsel. We later entered an Order on September 20, 2018, wherein we denied the

supplemental PCRA.

               Petitioner appealed our September 20, 2018 Order to the Superior Court. The

Superior Court ultimately vacated our September 20, 2018 Order and remanded the case back to
                  •.                                      1..,
this Court for a he/rring pursuant to Com. v. Grazier, 1713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). We held a Grazier
                                        .,   .   ~-
                                        '
                  I

                                                      2
Hearing and, upon a determination that Petitioner did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently

waive his right to PCRA counsel, we appointed the McShane Law Firm to represent Petitioner.

               On April 24, 2020, Kaitlyn Clarkson, Esquire from the McShane Law Firm filed a

Supplemental Petition for PCRA relief. In this Supplemental Petition, Attorney Clarkson only

identified one iss~e of merit, namely the calculation of Petitioner's credit for time served. As to
                   '                                 ,:\·,
                                                      '

the remaining issues, Attorney Clarkson sent Petitioner a letter certifying that they lacked merit in
                                        '
accordance with the requirements ofCo'm. v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Com. v. Finley.

550 A.2d 213 (Pa.1988) (en bane). This Turner/Finley letter was attached to the April 24, 2020

Supplemental Petition.

               Thereafter, on May 21, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion to Proceed pro se and be

permitted to file a Supplemental PCRA. We scheduled another Grazier Hearing for July 9, 2020.

Following that He~ring, we permitted Attorney Clarkson to withdraw as counsel and Petitioner to

proceed pro se. Petitioner was given sixty (60) days to file a Supplemental Petition for PCRA

Relief. Following several requests for extensions, Petitioner filed his Amended PCRA Petition on

March 1, 2021. Also following several request~ f9r extensions, the Commonwealth filed its
                                                          '.'
                   i
response on September
                 \
                      30, 2021.            ,,
               In his Supplemental PCRA, Petitioner has made several claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must

overcome the prJsumption that counsel is effective by establishing the following: (1) the

underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action

or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice because of counsel's ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-59, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987). "A petitioner

establishes prejudice when he demonstrates 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

                                                 3'       '"'
                                                          :')
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' Com. v.

Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 345-46, 966 A.2d 523, 532-33 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

               Petitioner's first claim is that Trial Counsel was ineffective in failing to object,
                    '
failing to file a motion to suppress and failing to raise issues concerning Jalil Walters'

identification. Petitioner claims that this identification was a result of a suggestive identification

process.   We find that this claim has no arguable merit for the reasons set forth in the

Commonwealth's response as well as Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter. As such, we

hereby incorporate as if fully set forth herein pages 2-4 of the Commonwealth's response and

pages 19-22 of Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley let,ter.
                    .
               Petitioner's second claim is that all prior counsel were constitutionally ineffective
                    .                   , ../'   '       ~
when they failed t,o object at trial and failed to properly raise and argue on appeal that the trial

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to ·prosecute and sentence Petitioner for the attempted

murder of lbrahirii Muhammad. We find that this issue does not have arguable merit for the

reasons set forth on page 4 of the Commonwealth's response and pages 10-12 of Attorney

Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter, and we incorporate them both herein.

               In his third claim, Petitioner asserts that his all of his prior counsel were ineffective

when they failed to have the existing available, tangible evidence of the bullet fragments

ballistically tested and scrutinized by a forensic technician to determine the caliber of the firearm

used. Petitioner claims that this would have established his innocence but does not provide any

support for this cl1im. This issue also has no arguable merit as Petitioner has not provided any
                    .                                    1
support for his claim that the caliber of the weapon used could have been determined from the

bullet fragments.       We further iricorporate as if fully set forth herein pages 4-5 of the

Commonwealth's fesponse and pages 7-8 of Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter.

                                                     4
                Petitioner's fourth claim is that all prior counsel were ineffective when they ignored

tangible, available and admissible evidence of Jalil Walters' clothing. Petitioner alleges, without
                    i                                ,J-;,
support, that this would have established his innocence. Again, this claim does not have arguable

merit as Petitioner provides no support for ~hat he assumes would have been found on the clothing
                                                       !
or how this would have affected his trial. His argument consists of pure speculation, which is

insufficient to stat\l a meritorious claim for post-conviction relief. We also incorporate as if fully

set forth herein page 5 of the Commonwealth's response and page 9 of Attorney Clarkson's

Turner/Finley letter.

                In his fifth claim, Petitioner asserts that all prior counsel were ineffective in failing

to object to the jury instruction on the attempted murder oflbrahirn Muhammad. Petitioner claims

that this instruction was illegal and unconstitutional for several reasons. However, this issue was

previously litigate.cl and found by the Pe~sylv~ia;Superior Court to be rneritless. Petitioner
                      !                                    :n
                     \                                     .,.
cannot obtain post~conviction relief based. on previously litigated claims. See Corn. v. Santiago,
                                             .,.,
                   .                   ,: ·'  \

579 Pa. 46, 73, 85_5 A.2d 682, 698 (20.04) ("Appellant cannot attempt to resurrect this claim 'by
                                                    !
alleging ineffectiJe assistance of prior counsel ~d presenting new theories of relief to support

previously litigate~ claims."') (citations omitted).
                         '
                Petitioner's sixth claim is that all prior counsel were ineffective when they failed to

assert that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted murder. This

claim was also previously litigated on direct appeal and thus cannot now be a basis for post-

conviction relief.

               The seventh claim is that Petitioner's sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, and

all prior counsel were ineffective for failing· tci ~ddress this issue during sentencing or post-
                     ,.
conviction proceedings.      We find that .this issue is rneritless for the reasons stated in the
                                         '·
                                                    ,·
                                                   5
                     ,..
                   '
                   '.~

Commonwealth's response and Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter. To that end, we hereby

incorporate as if fully set forth herein pages 6-7 of the Commonwealth's response and pages 25-

28 of Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter.

                Petitioner's eighth and final allegation is that he received an illegal sentence on the

charge of Aggravated Assault. This issue is also meritless for the reasons set forth in pages 7-8 of

the Commonwealth's response and pages 28-29 of Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter, and

we hereby incorporate those pages herein .. ,.
                                         '
               For the foregoing reasons, we enter the following Order:

                                                  6
 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                         IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,
                                                       DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
               V.

                                                       CRIMINAL - PCRA
 ERIC CHAMBERS,
                          Defendant                  : NO. 392-CR-2012

                                       ,RDER                          ~o~ I
               AND NOW, this        Oday of
                                 _2__             lfe c- e ..,. b~/ , upon consideration of
Petitioner Eric Chambers' PCRA Petition and the Commonwealth's response thereto, for

the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that

the Court intends to dismiss the Petition without an evidentiary hearing.

               The Petitioner is hereby given notice of this Court's intent to dismiss

his PCRA Petition and has twenty (20) days from the date of this Order to file a

Response to this Notice of Intent to Dismiss

                                                            BY THE COURT:

                                                            Andrew H. Dowling, J.         c

Distribution: I 'A- 1-.D -'J-.I @II : 5 3 AM
The Hon. Andrew H. Dowling JD
Mari L. Hamb}ight, Deputy District Attorney .ID
Smart Communications/PADOC, Eric Chambers/#LC6450, SCI at Houtzdale, P.O. Box
       33028, St. Petersburg, FL 33733 yY) CUJ...