Court Opinion

ID: 9670148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:15:46.973414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:02.790655
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(concurring). I agree the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for new trial for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Black. I do not agree, however, that it is error to permit counsel for either party in a suit such as this to introduce ■evidence of plaintiff’s receipt of or future entitlement to workmen’s compensation benefits. As far as I have been able to determine, this question has never been squarely decided by this Court.
While the annotation in 77 ALR2d 1154, referred to by Mr. Justice Black, indicates that such evidence is excluded in a majority of jurisdictions, I remain troubled by the possible consequences of nondisclosure in view of the fact that our statute (CLS 1956, § 413.15 [Stat Ann 1960 Bev § 17.189]) requires repayment of such benefits from any judgment or settlement recovered from defendant. The statute provides that from any recovery the plaintiff may make •against the third-party defendant, after deducting ■certain expenses of recovery, the employer or its .workmen’s compensation insurance carrier first shall be reimbursed for any benefits paid or payable to the date of recovery and the balance of the sum recov*120ered shall be treated as an advance payment by the employer or carrier on account, and to the extent, of any future compensation benefits to which the plaintiff subsequently becomes entitled. Benefits under the workmen’s compensation act are designed to* recompense, in part, an employee for wages lost from an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and for certain medical expenses. There is no compensation allowed by the act for pain and suffering or for humiliation or for non-medical expenses incurred. Benefits allowed under the act are determined in advance by the legislature, not by a jury. In Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich 303, at p 308, the benefits allowed by the act were described as “limited to interference with earning capacity.”
But plaintiff’s recovery in a common-law negligence action* is not so limited. It may include wage losses and medical expenses, but it also may include much more. In those cases where the plaintiff is awarded a judgment which compensates him for wage losses and medical expenses at least to the extent of workmen’s compensation benefits received and receivable by him, CL8 1956, § 413.15 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.189) results in no injustice. However, it does not strain credulity to believe that jurors, and even judges, sometimes neglect to fully compensate a prevailing tort plaintiff for lost wages and medical expenses when damages are also awarded for pain and suffering and the like. In such cases, the jury’s (or the judge’s) lack of knowledge that reimbursable compensation benefits have been paid or are payable, results in postjudgment depletion (or exhaustion) of the award made plaintiff for non-reimbursable damages.
It would seem to me that evidence of payment of or entitlement to reimbursable workmen’s compensa*121lion benefits could properly be admitted in the interest of avoiding frustration, in whole or in part, of a common-law or death-act judgment. Such evidence in a jury trial, of course, would have to be accompanied (perhaps at the time of its introduction and again at the close of the case) by an appropriate protective instruction to safeguard against the jury’s misuse of it. I am willing to rely upon the ingenuity and skill of our trial bar, both plaintiff and defense counsel, and of our trial judges to protect against misuse of such evidence. On whichever side of counsel’s table the advantage ultimately may lie in the disclosure of such facts, a jury would be enabled more intelligently to determine the net effect of its award, while, on the other hand, the risk would be reduced that such award may be made with undue jury regard for factors of personal sympathy.
CL'S 1956, §413.15 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.189) allows plaintiff’s employer or its workmen’s compensation insurance carrier to join him in his suit against the third-party defendant without regard to plaintiff’s desires in the matter. See Muskegon Supply Co. v. Green, 343 Mich 340, 346, 347. In such cases, I would not suppose that the plaintiff, if he sb desired, would be barred from presenting evidence of the interest and its monetary value of his employer or its insurer. To deny him this right would, in my opinion, do a substantial injustice to such plaintiff compelled, perhaps against his wishes, to accept coplaintiffs in his suit (including, possibly, an insurance company). I know of no circumstance in the law where the interest of a named party to litigation must be kept secret from the jury. If, as I believe to be true, evidence of benefits paid and payable may be admitted in such eases, it would seem not unreasonable to admit the same evidence in cases where the employee alone sues, the employer or insurance car*122rier, the “silent” or “concealed” plaintiffs,* still having a very real interest in whatever recovery plaintiff' may be awarded.
For the foregoing reasons I have concluded that I must disagree with the conclusions reached by Mr.. Justice Black on this part of the case.
Carr, C. J., and Kelly and Adams, JJ., concurred’ with Souris, J.

 Or in a wrongful death action, as in this.ease.

 See Wright v. Delray Connecting R. Co., 361 Mich 619, 629.