Court Opinion

ID: 9825656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:53:18.216919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:15.545723
License: Public Domain

McHaney, J. (Supplemental opinion on rehearing). On rehearing*, counsel for appellee insist that they “do not know of any provision of law in this State that entitles either party to a civil suit to have each proposed juror stand and be separately interrogated by counsel.” Section 6380 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest provides that: “In order to determine a challenge for cause the particular juror or jurors challenged may be sworn, or, at the instance of either party, all of the jurors may be sworn to make true and perfect answers to such questions as may be demanded of them touching their qualifications as jurors. The court may allow other testimony in regard to the qualifications of any juror.” The next section provides that each party shall have three peremptory challenges and § 6385 provides the procedure for challenges for cause. This court has recognized the right of litigants in civil cases to examine the jurors separately. In St. L. I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Aiken, 100 Ark. 437, 140 S. W. 698, this court said: “There is but one other assignment of error, and that relates to the ruling of the court in refusing to permit defendant’s counsel to pursue the examination of a juror as to his bias. After a lengthy examination of the juror by counsel, the court stopped the examination, and said that it was sufficient. Counsel then challenged the juror peremptorily, and agreed to a trial of the case before eleven jurors. It does not appear from the record that defendant exhausted its peremptory challenges and was compelled to accept a juror which it otherwise would not have accepted; therefore, no prejudice resulted from the ruling, even if it was incorrect. The extent of the examination of the juror rested, however, within the sound discretion of The trial court, and there was no abuse of that discretion. Defendant was permitted to pursue the examination until every matter bearing upon the juror’s qualifications seems to have been fully drawn out. ’ ’ The holding’ in this ease was cited with approval in Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Riley, 185 Ark. 699, 49 S. W. (2d) 397, where the court said: “Exception was saved to the qualifications of one of the jurors on the panel because it was shown upon his examination that he was a member of the board of aldermen of the city of-Hot Springs. The exception to the competency of the juror was based on the theory that the negligence of the city was the proximate cause of the injuries, and, as the city was interested, the fact that the juror was an alderman disqualified him. It is not necessary to say whether or not this juror was disqualified, for there is no showing of prejudicial error, since it is not shown that the appellant had exhausted all of its peremptory challenges.” Citing cases. It will be seen from the Aiken case, supra, that the discretion which rests in the trial court does not relate to the right to examine jurors separately, but only to the extent of the examination of each separate juror. This same case is cited in 35 C. J., p. 389, § 439, in support of the following text: “The extent to which parties should be allowed to-go in examining jurors as to their qualifications cannot well be governed by any fixed rules. The examination is conducted under the supervision and direction of the trial court, and the nature and extent of the examination and what questions may or may not be answered must necessarily be left largely to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which will not be interfered with unless clearly abused. In practice, considerable latitude is and generally ought to be indulged; the questions oug’ht to be confined to matters directly affecting the legal qualifications of the juror, and all questions ought to be allowed which are pertinent to test the juror’s competency. But such examination ought not to be permitted to take an indefinitely wide range concerning merely collateral or incidental matters having some connection with the case, and should be confined in some degree at least to the particular cause of challenge under investigation at the time. * * *” "We are, therefore, of the opinion that litigants in civil cases, as well as in criminal oases, have the right to examine the jurors separately in order to determine whether such jurors are subject to challenge for cause, or to elicit information on which to base the right of peremptory challenge, subject of course to the right of the court to control the extent of such examination, acting in its sound discretion. We think this right is recognized by our statutes and by the decisions above cited. The petition for rehearing is therefore, denied.