Court Opinion

ID: 9362957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 16:00:59.546541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.850729
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1103   Document: 43     Page: 1    Filed: 01/13/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                      MAE DAVIS,
                       Petitioner

                            v.

      OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
                    Respondent
              ______________________

                       2022-1103
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. PH-0843-20-0218-I-1.
                 ______________________

                Decided: January 13, 2023
                 ______________________

    DEBRA D'AGOSTINO, The Federal Practice Group,
 Washington, DC, for petitioner.

     NATHANAEL YALE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by REGINALD
 THOMAS BLADES, JR., BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
              ______________________

    Before PROST, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-1103    Document: 43     Page: 2    Filed: 01/13/2023

 2                                              DAVIS   v. OPM

 PROST, Circuit Judge.
     Mae Davis appeals a decision from the Merit Systems
 Protection Board (“Board”) affirming the Office of Person-
 nel Management’s (“OPM”) denial of her request for lump-
 sum death benefits under the Federal Employees’ Retire-
 ment System (“FERS”). Because the Board correctly con-
 cluded that the doctrine of substantial compliance does not
 apply to 5 U.S.C. § 8424(d)’s requirement that a beneficiary
 designation be signed, we affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
      Ms. Davis filed a claim for FERS lump-sum death ben-
 efits after the death of her cousin, Shirley Stinson.
 Ms. Stinson was a federal employee at the Internal Reve-
 nue Service (“IRS”) when she died. And she had named
 Ms. Davis as the beneficiary of her Federal Group Life In-
 surance policy and Thrift Savings Plan. J.A. 212–13. Ms.
 Davis was also the administrator of Ms. Stinson’s estate.
 J.A. 210.
      As for the FERS benefits at issue here, Ms. Stinson had
 filled out three separate SF-3102 Designation of Benefi-
 ciary Forms before her death.
      She submitted the first form in 2005 and designated a
 99% share to her sister, Gwendolyn Scott, and a 1% share
 to her daughter, also named Shirley Stinson. J.A. 68. This
 first form was dated, had Ms. Stinson’s signature, two wit-
 ness signatures, and a signed agency certification stating,
 “I have reviewed this designation and certify that the des-
 ignated shares total 100% and that no witnesses are desig-
 nated as beneficiaries.” Id.
     In 2011, after the death of her daughter, Ms. Stinson
 submitted a second Designation of Beneficiary Form.
 J.A. 67. This form designated a 90% share to Ms. Scott, a
 0.5% share to Sherry Blevins (a friend), and a 0.5% share
 to Tony Lamb (another friend). This second form similarly
 had Ms. Stinson’s signature and that of two witnesses. Id.
Case: 22-1103     Document: 43    Page: 3    Filed: 01/13/2023

 DAVIS   v. OPM                                            3

 And, despite the total shares adding up to only 91%, the
 agency signed the form “and certif[ied] that the designated
 shares total 100% and that no witnesses are designated as
 beneficiaries.” Id.
     In 2017, after Ms. Scott died, Ms. Stinson submitted a
 third Designation of Beneficiary Form. J.A. 66. It listed
 Ms. Davis as the sole beneficiary, allocating a 100% share
 to her. This form was dated and signed by two witnesses
 who “certif[ied] that th[e] statement was signed in [thei]r
 presence.” Id. And, like the other forms, the agency signed
 the form’s certification. But, unlike the two previous
 forms, Ms. Stinson’s own signature was absent. Id.
      In 2019, after Ms. Stinson died, the IRS informed Ms.
 Davis that she may be eligible for certain benefits and in-
 structed her to send a completed SF-3104 Application for
 Death Benefits to OPM. J.A. 205. After reviewing Ms. Da-
 vis’s application, OPM denied it, explaining that “the FERS
 Designation of Beneficiary form that lists you as a benefi-
 ciary is not valid, because the form was not signed by
 Shirley Stinson.” J.A. 30. Ms. Davis appealed to the
 Board. She argued that, although unsigned, the 2017 form
 was valid based on Ms. Stinson’s intent. In the alternative,
 Ms. Davis argued that she was the beneficiary of the 2011
 form’s undesignated shares as the administrator of
 Ms. Stinson’s estate. J.A. 28; see also Davis v. OPM,
 Docket No. PH-0843-20-0218-I-1, 6–7 (M.S.P.B. July 19,
 2021) (“Board Decision”).
     The Board affirmed OPM’s determination that Ms. Da-
 vis was not entitled to benefits under the 2017 designation
 form. Because § 8424(d) expressly states that a signed
 writing is required to designate a beneficiary, the Board
 found that it was not permitted to consider Ms. Stinson’s
 intent when evaluating the form’s validity. Board Deci-
 sion, at 12. The Board discussed Ms. Davis’s argument
 that the substantial-compliance doctrine applied but
Case: 22-1103    Document: 43      Page: 4    Filed: 01/13/2023

 4                                               DAVIS   v. OPM

 concluded that it did not because the signature require-
 ment at issue was statutory. Id. at 11–12.
     As for her alternative argument, the Board remanded
 to OPM to determine whether Ms. Davis was entitled to the
 2011 form’s unallocated 9% share as the administrator of
 Ms. Stinson’s estate. 1 Id. at 15.
    Ms. Davis timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
                         DISCUSSION
      The scope of our review is limited by statute. We do
 not disturb the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) arbitrary,
 capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
 cordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
 quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
 (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”           5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c). “We review the Board’s determinations of law
 for correctness, without deference to the Board’s decision.”
 Becker v. OPM, 853 F.3d 1311, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
 (cleaned up).
     Ms. Davis’s appeal challenges the Board’s determina-
 tion that the signed writing requirement of § 8424(d) was
 not amenable to analysis under the doctrine of substantial
 compliance.
     It was Ms. Davis’s burden to demonstrate entitlement
 to the lump-sum benefits she sought. See Carreon v. OPM,
 321 F.3d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Cheeseman v.
 OPM, 791 F.2d 138, 141 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). And OPM is only
 permitted to provide benefits authorized by law, regardless

     1    Though Ms. Davis argued that 99% of the shares
 were undesignated, the Board found that only 9% were.
 Board Decision, at 14. Ms. Davis has not contested that
 finding here or any other aspect of the Board’s ruling on
 this alternative argument.
Case: 22-1103     Document: 43     Page: 5    Filed: 01/13/2023

 DAVIS   v. OPM                                              5

 of the equities involved. OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,
 416 (1990). That is true even when the employer’s error
 has negatively impacted the employee’s entitlement. Id.
     Relevant to OPM’s authorization here, § 8424(d) pro-
 vides that FERS lump-sum death benefits:
     [S]hall be paid to the individual or individuals sur-
     viving the employee or Member and alive at the
     date title to the payment arises in the following or-
     der of precedence, and the payment bars recovery
     by any other individual:
     First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated
     by the employee or Member in a signed and wit-
     nessed writing received in the Office before the
     death of such employee or Member. For this pur-
     pose, a designation, change, or cancellation of ben-
     eficiary in a will or other document not so executed
     and filed has no force or effect.
 5 U.S.C. § 8424(d) (emphasis added).
     The Board correctly determined that Ms. Davis was not
 entitled to benefits based on the 2017 designation form.
 The express language of § 8424(d) mandates that a desig-
 nation “has no force or effect” unless it is signed (and meets
 other requirements). Thus, the statute does not allow OPM
 or the Board to consider Ms. Stinson’s intent in lieu of a
 signature. And this case does not present a question about
 how the language “signed” should be understood or other-
 wise ask us to consider whether certain actions taken by
 Ms. Stinson or marks on the form fall within the meaning
 of the statute’s express requirements. Instead, there is an
 undisputed blank in the signature box. What is framed as
 an argument about substantial compliance really asks us
 to do what we can’t: rewrite § 8424(d).
     Further, we agree with OPM that Ms. Davis’s cited
 cases do not support her position that substantial compli-
 ance applies. First, even in the context of tax law, where
Case: 22-1103    Document: 43      Page: 6    Filed: 01/13/2023

 6                                               DAVIS   v. OPM

 the substantial-compliance doctrine has been recognized,
 this court emphasized its narrow scope. See Credit Life Ins.
 Co. v. United States, 948 F.2d 723, 726–27 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
 cf. Woodbury v. Comm’r., 900 F.2d 1457, 1460 (10th Cir.
 1990) (“In assessing substantial compliance, a court must
 ask whether the requirements are mandatory in nature, or
 merely procedural details established to facilitate the Com-
 missioner’s administration of the Internal Revenue
 Code.”). Second, the cases Ms. Davis cites involving certi-
 fications under the Contract Disputes Act analyzed
 whether the words used in the certification given com-
 ported with the scope of certification required by statute—
 they did not evaluate whether something other than a cer-
 tification could substitute. See, e.g., Fischbach & Moore
 Int’l Corp. v. Christopher, 987 F.2d 759, 762–63 (Fed. Cir.
 1993). In contrast, here we are asked to substitute intent
 for the required signature.
      Finally, the Board was correct that cases where the
 substantial-compliance doctrine was used to evaluate the
 validity of beneficiary changes under the Employee Retire-
 ment Income Security Act (“ERISA”) policies have only a
 superficial similarity to this case. As the Fourth Circuit
 noted, “[t]he doctrine [of substantial compliance] does not
 conflict with ERISA’s statutory provisions because ERISA
 is silent on the matter [of who shall be deemed a benefi-
 ciary].” Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 563
 (4th Cir. 1994). In those cases, the insurance policies them-
 selves provide the requirements for designating beneficiar-
 ies and substantial compliance with those non-statutory
 requirements are evaluated. See id.; Davis v. Combes,
 294 F.3d 931, 942 (7th Cir. 2002). Where ERISA itself pro-
 vides the requirement at issue, the doctrine does not ap-
 ply. 2 See, e.g., Butler v. Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc.,

     2   In some contexts, courts have found that the doc-
 trine was inapplicable even where the requirement was set
Case: 22-1103     Document: 43      Page: 7    Filed: 01/13/2023

 DAVIS   v. OPM                                               7

 41 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e cannot adopt a sub-
 stantial compliance doctrine as a matter of federal common
 law in this case if it would conflict with ERISA’s literal re-
 quirement that a spousal consent be ‘witnessed.’”).
     The substantial-compliance doctrine has no role here
 where it would conflict with § 8424(d)’s literal requirement
 that a designation be “signed.” This mandatory require-
 ment does not leave room to look behind the lack of signa-
 ture and instead evaluate intent. See Langston v. OPM,
 395 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“In construing a stat-
 ute, our analysis begins with the language of the statute,
 and where the statutory language is clear and unambigu-
 ous, it generally ends there as well.”); cf. Sanford v. Clarke,
 52 F.4th 582, 586 (4th Cir. 2022) (“A district court’s discre-
 tion to forgive strict compliance with a rule that explicitly
 allows for substantial compliance does not support the
 proposition that a district court has discretion to forgive
 strict compliance with a rule that contains no such provi-
 sion and, in fact, imposes mandatory requirements.”). As
 a result, the Board was correct to conclude that it did not
 have the authority to consider Ms. Stinson’s intent when
 evaluating the force or effect of the unsigned form.
                         CONCLUSION
     We have considered Ms. Davis’s other arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. Since § 8424(d) allows OPM to
 provide benefits to a designated beneficiary based only on

 out by the ERISA policy itself. See, e.g., Fortier v. Hartford
 Life & Accident Ins. Co., 916 F.3d 74, 84 (1st Cir. 2019); cf.
 Hall v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir.
 2014) (“[T]hat a court may decide as a matter of common
 law to excuse technical non-compliance with the terms of
 an ERISA plan does not mean that an administrator with
 discretion under an ERISA plan is forbidden to enforce
 strict compliance with plan requirements.”).
Case: 22-1103    Document: 43       Page: 8   Filed: 01/13/2023

 8                                               DAVIS   v. OPM

 a signed writing, and it is undisputed that the 2017 form
 listing Ms. Davis was unsigned, we affirm the Board’s find-
 ing that Ms. Davis is not entitled to benefits under the 2017
 form.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.