Court Opinion

ID: 9655263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:04:36.893825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:49:03.485199
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/23/23 P. v. Macauley CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B319653

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. Nos. LA021054,
         v.                                                     LA021247

ALHASSAN MACAULEY,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Reversed with
directions.

         Brad Kaiserman for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                               _________________________
       A trial court may vacate the criminal conviction of a
noncitizen if a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the
conviction is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging
the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (Pen.
Code,1 § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1); id., subd. (e)(1).) To establish
prejudicial error, defendants must demonstrate a “reasonable
probability that [they] would have rejected the plea if [they] had
correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences.” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529
(Vivar); People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316
(Espinoza).)
       In 2021, appellant Alhassan Macauley, a citizen of Sierra
Leone, filed a motion to vacate his conviction for rape, alleging
his defense counsel gave him no advice as to the adverse
immigration consequences of his no-contest plea. He also
asserted he never would have taken the plea bargain had he
known the charges compelled his deportation. The trial court
denied the motion to vacate.
       Since the trial court’s ruling, our Supreme Court has
clarified the standard of proof, disapproving the former standard
used by this trial court and trial courts around the state. We
therefore reverse with directions to grant the motion to vacate
the conviction and withdraw the plea.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    The Conviction
       In 1995, appellant was charged with multiple offenses
arising out of an alleged sexual assault on his ex-girlfriend. In
addition to being charged with rape, he was charged with anal
and genital penetration by a foreign object with force and
violence; forcible oral copulation, criminal threats, stalking,
conspiring to dissuade a witness, and solicitation to commit a
crime. On November 13, 1995, appellant pled no contest to
forcible rape of his ex-girlfriend in violation of section 261,
subdivision (a)(2). All remaining charges were dismissed. He
was sentenced to the mid-term of six years in prison.
Deportation proceedings were initiated against him based on this
conviction.
       During the plea colloquy, the prosecutor advised appellant,
“If you are not now a United States citizen, this plea today could
cause you to be deported, could result in the denial of the reentry
into this country or could serve to prohibit you from becoming a
United States citizen.” Appellant stated that he understood the
advisement.
II.   2021 Motion to Vacate
      On April 14, 2014, appellant moved to vacate his conviction
on the ground that he had not been advised of the immigration
consequences of his plea as required by section 1016.5. The
record is silent as to the ultimate disposition of the motion.
      On November 5, 2021, appellant again moved to vacate his
conviction and withdraw his plea, this time pursuant to
section 1473.7.

                                 3
III.   Advice of Counsel
       In support of the November 2021 motion, appellant
submitted sworn declarations that his counsel never advised him
of the immigration consequences of the plea. Appellant stated
that the entire time he was in pretrial detention at the Los
Angeles County Jail his counsel did not visit him, nor did he
investigate the witnesses appellant wanted to present in his
defense at trial. Instead, during a 10-minute conversation in the
courthouse lockup, counsel told appellant he would go to prison
for 79 years if he did not take the plea offer. Appellant’s attorney
never asked him about his immigration status, despite his
accented English.
       Prior to the plea, appellant had moved under People v.
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 to obtain new appointed counsel.
The record is unclear as to the outcome of the motion, although
appellant was represented by the same attorney until the end of
the case, so we surmise it was denied. In any event, appellant
filed the Marsden motion to request the appointment of new
counsel as he understood his present counsel had done nothing to
prepare his defense for trial. He also wrote a letter to the trial
court asking for a release on his own recognizance so he could
retain counsel to represent him. In the letter he told the court
his attorney was not communicating with him. He declared his
innocence and stated the charges were trumped up by a girlfriend
and prior girlfriends trying to cash in on his property which, he
averred, they split among themselves after his arrest. He offered
to take a lie detector test to prove his innocence.

                                 4
IV.   Facts Presented in the Motion
        In his November 2021 motion, appellant advised that he
was a citizen of Sierra Leone who entered the United States in
1977 at the age of nine. His mother and father legally resided in
the United States at that time. At the time of his arrest he was
27 years old and a legal permanent resident of the United States.
He had never before been arrested. He had never returned to
Sierra Leone and had no contacts or known family members
there. When he was charged, appellant had one 5 year-old
daughter and his country of origin, Sierra Leone, was engaged in
a civil war.
        Appellant added that his parents and U.S. citizen siblings
still reside in this country. Since his conviction he had married.
His children and stepchildren were also citizens. As of June of
2004, appellant worked as a patient transport driver at DW
Medical Supply/Transportation. In letters to the court
appellant’s employer praised him for his “kindness and
personable nature,” “excellent work habits,” “reliability” and
“excellent customer services skills.”
V.    The Trial Court’s Hearing and Decision
       On February 24, 2022, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. In addition
to submitting sworn declarations and written exhibits, appellant
testified that counsel never advised him of the immigration
consequences of the plea; he took the plea because he wanted to
see his five-year-old daughter grow up, and he would not have
taken the plea had he known he would be deported because “why
would I go to prison and then get deported afterwards?” This was
his “first and only offense” and “first time ever in custody,”

                                5
according to his counsel’s argument. He was isolated from family
while in custody and his attorney did not visit him there. He was
told that if he took the plea offer of six years, he would be out
sooner to see his daughter. Unaware of the immigration
consequences, he later applied for citizenship and was placed in
deportation proceedings based on the conviction.
       Appellant testified he wanted to defend himself against the
charges and his attorney was doing nothing to investigate or
prepare a defense on his behalf. He advised the court he “ended
up just hav[ing] to take the plea bargain because I don’t know
what else is going to happen. [The attorney] said: Don’t worry.
You’re going to waste your life in prison. This is all you’ve got.
You’ve got a daughter to take care of, and this and that. And
that’s why I took the deal. [¶] If I knew that I was going to be
deported because of taking the plea, I wouldn’t have taken it
because of the fact that why would I go to prison and then get
deported afterwards? Because I’m going to lose the time with her
and the time being somewhere else.” Appellant continued:
“When I tried—applied for my citizenship that’s when all this
situation came about with this immigration. I never knew that
the immigration—what happened in 1995 was going to reflect on
me today because everything I been doing, you know—matter of
fact, this is one of the lessons I teach my kids. You have no
reason not to be able to succeed.” As for his attorney, appellant
testified: “He gave me no information, no help, no assistance, no
anything for me to feel that I can be represented. That’s why I
asked for O.R. At the time I did not know the case, O.R. was, you
know. Was too low or whatever. That’s all I know. I was
learning because that’s when—you know, being in there that’s all
I knew. I didn’t understand the system. All I was doing was

                                6
trying to be able to get out to be able to have an attorney to
represent myself.”
       Before hearing any testimony, the trial court gave a
tentative ruling: “So my tentative ruling, based on what I have
before me, would be to deny the motion because there is an
absence of independent evidence that Mr. Macauley would have
rejected the deal had he been properly made aware of the
immigration consequences. There is a lack of evidence that he—
that his public defender didn’t advise him properly. There is no
evidence that there was a possibility of an alternative disposition
that didn’t carry immigration consequences. [¶] That’s my
tentative ruling. I would give counsel an opportunity to file a
more detailed declaration.”
       Two weeks later on February 24, 2022, the parties
reconvened for the evidentiary hearing. The court stated: “When
we were here last, I urged counsel to take a look at the Vivar, V-i-
v-a-r, case, 2021, 11 Cal.5th, 510, which is, I think the latest
guidance from the Supreme Court as to how I’m supposed to
interpret the statute. And it requires that the moving party, in
addition to showing that the petitioner got insufficient or
incorrect advice when it comes to immigration consequences,
petitioner must also demonstrate a reasonable probability that he
would have rejected the plea had he correctly understood the
actual immigration consequences. So, that’s part of the moving
party’s burden. [¶] . . . [¶] So when it comes to establishing
number one that the advice was inadequate or insufficient, is
there anything—is there anything independent? Something else
that the Vivar case mentioned, independent quote/unquote
objective evidence that he got inadequate or insufficient advice,
and is there anything especially in a case such as this, where we

                                 7
have nothing from the original lawyer, anything to show that Mr.
Macauley, who was looking at more than 75 years in prison at
85 percent, wouldn’t have taken the deal?”
       After hearing appellant testify, the court stated: “So here’s
my ruling: I’m focusing on the Vivar case. Has Mr. Macauley
demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have
rejected the deal? Is there quote/unquote objective evidence to
corroborate the claim that he’s making now that he wouldn’t have
taken the deal? [¶] Looking at the Vivar case is really instructive,
looking at the similarities and differences between that set of
facts and this set of facts is, I think the clearest way to address
the issues raised by this case. [¶] As in Vivar, we have a
defendant who came to the United States at a very young age. As
in Vivar, we don’t have any evidence of any particularly strong
ties to the country of origin. The differences, however, are very
compelling. In Vivar, there was an alternate offer, one that
didn’t carry immigration consequences. There’s no evidence here
that there was ever an offer made that would have avoided
immigration consequences. There was nothing to indicate that
the D.A. had ever offered anything other than the six years.”
       The court further stated, “No evidence of any other charges
being discussed or even what that charge might have been. In
the Vivar case, there was something from prior counsel. And in
fact, the inadequacy of the response from prior counsel is one of
the things that the court of appeal took into consideration. [¶]
Here we have nothing from either side as to what Mr. Boche, a
public defender, what he said to Mr. Macauley regarding the
immigration consequences of the plea. [¶] In Vivar, there was
something—and the Court of Appeal could deduce from it the
inadequacy of the legal advice. In Vivar, the petitioner

                                 8
repeatedly asked for the case to be reopened, sought at a very
early stage to withdraw the plea. We don’t have that here,
although we have something from 2015, according to the
declaration—the original declaration of Mr. Macauley, once
deportation proceedings were initiated. [¶] At that point, he
attempted to attack the plea, however, apparently, there wasn’t a
habeas based on inadequate assistance of counsel. Not that the
standard’s necessarily the same, but the mere fact that he had an
opportunity to raise these issues previously and didn’t is
something that I can’t [sic] consider. [¶] In Vivar there was, as in
this case, a letter to the judge. That letter specifically mentioned
immigration. [¶] . . . [¶] Bottom line, the differences from this set
of facts and the set of facts in Vivar are illustrative and they’re
pretty compelling. The fact that Mr. Macauley was facing more
than 75 years of custody, even though he might never have gotten
that, even if he had only gotten half or a third of that, it still
would have made sense for him to take the six-year deal, and in
the absence of any independent evidence to the contrary the
motion and the petition is respectfully denied. [¶] I’m well aware
Mr. Macauley has been a productive person with strong family
ties and has le[]d, in many ways, an exemplary life so far as I can
deduce, so far as I can tell; nevertheless, the petition doesn’t
reach the threshold.”
       Thus, based on the comparison of the facts in Vivar to the
facts presented by appellant, and relying on the standard
seeming to require corroborative evidence contemporaneous in
time with the plea to support a non-citizen’s testimony, the trial
court denied the motion. This timely appeal followed.

                                 9
                         DISCUSSION
I.   Applicable Law
      Mandatory deportation from the United States is an
immigration consequence where a defendant is convicted of a
crime deemed an aggravated felony under federal immigration
law. (Moncrieffe v. Holder (2013) 569 U.S. 184, 187–188; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1228(c) [aggravated felony is conclusively presumed
deportable].) Rape is an aggravated felony. (8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).)
      Section 1473.7 authorizes a person to file a motion to
vacate a conviction or sentence for any of the following reasons:
“The conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial
error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or
potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or
sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
      Effective January 1, 2019, legislative amendments to
section 1473.7 afforded a defendant relief under the statute
without a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel per the
Strickland2 standard. (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
998, 1005.) To establish prejudice, defendants must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that they did not meaningfully
understand or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of the plea. (Camacho, at pp. 1010–
1011; see People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 862 (Mejia);
see People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 565 [defendants
may show prejudice by convincing the court that a reasonable

2    Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668.

                               10
probability exists they “would have chosen to lose the benefits of
the plea bargain despite the possibility or probability deportation
would nonetheless follow”]; People v. Rodriguez (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 995, 1003.)
       The advisement that a defendant may face certain adverse
immigration consequences is insufficient to inform a defendant
that the conviction would subject him to mandatory deportation
and permanent exclusion from the United States. (People v.
Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 712 (Lopez); Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 521 [to warn merely that a plea might have
immigration consequences in circumstances where the
consequences were certain is constitutionally deficient]; People v.
Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 204 [same].)
       Apart from a trial court’s advisement, defense counsel has
an independent obligation to explain to clients the adverse
immigration consequences of a criminal plea. (People v.
Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 905 (Manzanilla).)
       The importance of counsel’s responsibility to give a client a
complete advisement of all material adverse immigration
consequences cannot be overstated – and it is not excused by
official admonitions given during plea colloquy. As our Supreme
Court has stated: “That defendants have a right to counsel when
they undertake the plea evaluation and negotiation specifically
provided for in section 1016.5, subdivisions (b) and (d) is not
disputed. . . . ‘[I]t is the attorney, not the client, who is
particularly qualified to make an informed evaluation of a
proffered plea bargain.’ [Citation.] Thus, whether or not the
court faithfully delivers section 1016.5’s mandated advisements,
‘[t]he defendant can be expected to rely on counsel’s independent
evaluation of the charges, applicable law, and evidence, and of

                                 11
the risks and probable outcome of trial.’ ” (In re Resendiz (2001)
25 Cal.4th 230, 240–241, abrogated on other grounds by Padilla
v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 370.)
       The key to section 1473.7 is “the mindset of the defendant
and what he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the
time the plea was taken.” (Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
p. 866.) Showing prejudicial error under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a)(1) means “demonstrating a reasonable probability
that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant
had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences. When courts assess whether a petitioner has
shown that reasonable probability, they consider the totality of
the circumstances.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) Factors
relevant to this inquiry include appellant’s ties to the United
States, the importance appellant placed on avoiding deportation,
appellant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether
appellant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
negotiated disposition was possible. (Id. at pp. 529–530;
Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) Also relevant are the
defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if
he had rejected the plea, as well as the difference between the
bargained-for term and the likely term if he were convicted at
trial. These factors are not exhaustive and no single type of
evidence is a prerequisite to relief. (Espinoza, at pp. 320–321.)
       Ties to the United States are an important factor in
evaluating prejudicial error under section 1473.7 because they
shed light on a defendant’s immigration priorities. (Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 529–530.) When long-standing noncitizens
residents of this county are accused of committing a crime, “the
most devasting consequence may not be a prison sentence, but

                                12
their removal and exclusion from the United States.” (Id. at
p. 516; Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 703 (Lopez); Mejia,
supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 872 [compelling evidence of prejudice
where the defendant lived in the United States since he was 14
years old, and his wife and child lived here, as well as his mother
and siblings].)
II.   Standard of Review
       In Vivar, the California Supreme Court determined the
standard of review for section 1473.7 proceedings and endorsed
the independent standard of review. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 524.) Under independent review, an appellate court exercises
its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy
the rule of law. (Id. at p. 527.) Independent review is not the
equivalent of de novo review. (Ibid.) An appellate court may not
simply second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial
court’s own observations. (Ibid.) Factual determinations by the
trial court are given particular deference, even though courts
reviewing such claims generally may reach a different conclusion
from the trial court on an independent examination of the
evidence even where the evidence is conflicting. (Ibid.) Where
the facts derive entirely from written declarations and other
documents, however, there is no reason to conclude the trial court
has the same special purchase on the question at issue; as a
practical matter, the trial court and the appellate courts are in
the same position in interpreting written declarations when
reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding. (Vivar, at
p. 528.) It is for the appellate court to ultimately decide, based on
its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice
under section 1473.7. (Vivar, at p. 528.)

                                 13
       Here we note that the trial court did not make a credibility
determination as to appellant’s oral testimony at the hearing.
Instead, the trial court appeared to deny the motion because
appellant’s motion was not corroborated by evidence
contemporaneous in time with the plea. This approach, as we
will discuss, has been abrogated.
III.   Analysis
       A.   Understanding of the Immigration Consequences of
            the Plea
       A preponderance of the evidence supports our conclusion
that appellant did not understand the consequences of his plea.
His sworn testimony establishes that he was never advised by his
own counsel that he was subject to deportation, let alone, as here,
mandatory deportation. Appellant’s testimony that he was
unaware of the immigration consequences is corroborated by the
fact that notwithstanding his conviction, he applied for
citizenship, an act that triggered the deportation proceedings.
Had he known his deportation was a certainty, it is logical to
infer that he never would have invited the attention and scrutiny
of immigration authorities by applying for citizenship.
       The trial court’s insufficient advisement that appellant
could face deportation when deportation was indeed mandatory is
another factor supporting our conclusion that appellant did not
fully understand the consequences of the plea.
       Here the trial court noted that there was no declaration
from appellant’s trial counsel about what, if any, advisements
were given to appellant. The court cited Vivar for the proposition
that a moving party’s testimony had to be corroborated by
evidence contemporaneous in time with the plea. That is indeed

                                14
how Vivar had been interpreted by trial and appellate courts at
the time of the hearing. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 324.)
But in Espinoza, our Supreme Court repudiated that
interpretation and emphasized that the inquiry requires
consideration of the totality of the circumstances which
necessarily involves case-by-case examination for the record, and
“no specific kind of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Id. at
p. 325.)
      B.    Prejudice
       Appellant must show prejudice in addition to error.
“[S]howing prejudicial error under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a)(1) means demonstrating a reasonable probability
that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant
had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “Reasonable
probability” does not mean more likely than not, but merely a
reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility. (People v.
Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610; People v. Rodriguez (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 301, 324.) Indeed, reasonable probability
requires reversal when there exists at least such an equal
balance of reasonable probabilities as to leave the court in serious
doubt as to whether the error affected the result. (Ibid.)
       Appellant’s ties to the United States were lifelong. He
arrived here when he was nine years old. At the time of the plea,
he had been in this country almost 20 years and had a United
States citizen five-year-old daughter. He had no known familial
ties to Sierra Leone, the country of his birth and has never
returned to Sierra Leone since moving here. (Lopez, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 716; Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 912 [courts noting lack of ties to country of birth as factor

                                15
supporting finding of prejudice].) Appellant has a spouse and
biological and stepchildren who are United States citizens. Both
his parents still live in the United States as well as his siblings
who are American citizens.
       Appellant’s long residence in this country, coupled with his
resident nuclear and extended family members, militate in favor
of a finding of prejudicial error. His lengthy and legal United
States residence is evidence itself of appellant’s ties to the United
States, an important factor in evaluating prejudicial error
because they shed light on a defendant’s immigration priorities.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) As our high court has
stated, appellant’s longstanding ties “weigh in favor of finding
that he would have considered immigration consequences to be of
paramount concern in deciding whether to accept a plea
agreement.” (Id. at p 322.)
       Another consideration is whether alternative, immigration-
safe dispositions were available at the time of the plea. Factors
relevant to this inquiry include defendant’s criminal record, the
strength of the prosecution’s case, the seriousness of the charges
or whether the crimes involved sophistication, the district
attorney’s charging policies with respect to immigration
consequences and the existence of comparable offenses without
immigration consequences. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 323; Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 873.)
       There is no evidence that appellant has a criminal record
apart from the instant conviction and certainly nothing since the
instant conviction. That fact is relevant because a defendant
without an extensive criminal record may persuasively contend
that the prosecutor might have been willing to offer an
alternative plea without immigration consequences. (Espinoza,

                                 16
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 324.) Also relevant is the prosecutor’s
willingness to deviate so far from a 79-year maximum sentence to
a six-year sentence. This may represent the prosecutor’s
assessment of problems of proof in a “he said-she said” case, a
willingness to give appellant a break given the absence of a prior
criminal record, or more focus on getting a conviction rather than
the length of the sentence. Whatever the reason, that the
prosecutor was willing to deviate significantly from 79 years to
six years indicates there may have been room to negotiate an
immigration-neutral disposition that may have gelled with the
prosecutor’s priorities. (Ibid.) Of course, because appellant’s
counsel did not advise him of the mandatory deportation
consequence of pleading no contest as he did, it is unlikely
anyone focused on the possibility or probability of an alternative
plea disposition.
       What is unrebutted is that remaining in the United States
was a priority for appellant because he wanted to see his five-
year-old daughter grow up. Accepting a plea that involved
mandatory deportation halfway around the world was anathema
to his goal of seeing his daughter grow up. It also conflicted with
the benefit of serving only a six-year sentence and being released
back to his family in this country. Finally, appellant’s long held
desire not to return to Sierra Leone (he raised it in 2014 in his
initial motion to vacate his plea) makes sense given that Sierra
Leone was in the throes of a lengthy and violent civil war at the
time of his plea. (Jalloh v. Gonzalez (2d Cir. 2007) 498 F.3d 148,
149–150 [civil war in Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to 2002].)

                                17
       Since the trial court’s ruling, its seeming focus on
contemporaneous corroborating evidence of a defendant’s
priorities or a particular combination of facts that mirror Vivar
has been disfavored. In Espinoza, the Court reiterated that the
inquiry under section 1473.7 requires consideration of the totality
of the circumstances “which necessarily involves case-by-case
examination of the record [citation], and no specific kind of
evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 325.)
       The totality of the circumstances supports our conclusion
that appellant has shown a reasonable probability that had he
understood the mandatory consequences of the plea, he would
have rejected the plea and either gone to trial or sought a
different, immigration-neutral disposition. He has been in the
United States since 1977 when he arrived at age nine. He
arrived with permanent residency status and applied for United
States citizenship. He has no known remaining familial ties to
Sierra Leone as his parents and siblings were all in the United
States. He has a United States citizen wife and child. He had
little prior familiarity with the criminal justice system and there
is nothing in the record to suggest he sustained other felony
convictions in his lifetime. He immediately filed a motion to
vacate his convictions in 2014 when he was placed in deportation
proceedings.
       Indeed, while each case stands on its own facts, appellant’s
facts eerily mirror those that warranted relief in Espinoza. This
includes that Espinoza lived and worked openly after his
conviction (as did appellant). And, seemingly oblivious, he left
the country and returned on an international commercial flight,
learning of the immigration consequences of his conviction when

                                18
he was questioned by immigration officials upon his return and
placed in deportation proceedings. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 320.) Appellant sealed a similar fate when he applied for
citizenship.
       We conclude appellant’s long and deep ties to the United
States, his lack of experience with the criminal justice system,
and his oblivious attempt to apply for U.S. citizenship despite his
conviction sufficiently corroborate appellant’s claim that his
ability to remain in the United States would have been expressed
as a paramount concern had he been advised of the issue. (See
Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 703–704 [“ ‘the prospect of
deportation “is an integral part,” and often even “the most
important part,” of a noncitizen defendant’s calculus in
responding to certain criminal charges’ ”].) We conclude it is
reasonably probable appellant would have rejected the plea
agreement had he correctly understood the adverse mandatory
deportation consequences that flowed from it.
       Exercising independent review, we conclude appellant has
carried his burden for section 1473.7 relief. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to grant
appellant’s motion to vacate the conviction pursuant to section
1473.7, subdivision (e).

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                          DISPOSITION
      The order denying appellant’s motion to vacate his
conviction is reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior
court with directions to grant the motion and vacate the plea.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                    STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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