Court Opinion

ID: 9592278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:12:18.356258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:38.987402
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
Although I agree with Divisions 1, 2, and 4 of the majority opinion, and concur in the ultimate judgment of affirmance and remand, I disagree with the holding in Division 3 that it is only the law which the trial court will not charge to the jury that counsel is prohibited from presenting to the jury in closing argument. Therefore, I concur specially.
It is fundamental that an attorney may not argue to the jury legal principles which differ from those the trial court will charge. However, Georgia case law also prohibits counsel from “reading the law” to the jury, even if it is correct and applicable. “ ‘Simply stated, the jury should receive law from the court and not from the attorneys.’ [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 215 Ga. App. 125, 127 (3) (449 SE2d 679) (1994). See also Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 570 (10) (b) (331 SE2d 532) (1985). Since Conklin, the rule in criminal cases has been the same as the rule initially established for civil cases. That rule prohibits counsel from reading law, regardless of its applicability, “from the Code or from appellate court decisions to the jury during closing argument.” Groover v. Dickey, 173 Ga. App. 73, 76 (8) (325 SE2d 617) (1984). See also Garrison v. Rich’s, 154 Ga. App. 663, 664 (3) (269 SE2d 513) (1980). It is clear that this prohibition would be circumvented if, instead of literally “reading,” lawyers could display *221legal principles in printed form with an accompanying attribution to the Code of Georgia or appellate court opinions.
Decided June 14, 1999.
James S. Lewis, for appellant.
J Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne K. Strickland, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
In this case, however, the prosecutor did not violate the mandate of Conklin, by reading from or citing any statute or opinion. Instead, she used visual aids with five short excerpts from the anticipated instructions, generally in outline form. Those visual aids attributed none of the excerpts to any statutory or case law. In my opinion, this was an acceptable method for counsel to present the State’s legal position to the jury. Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Sheriff, 210 Ga. App. 299, 303 (6) (436 SE2d 14) (1993); Blossman Gas Co. v. Williams, 189 Ga. App. 195, 200 (3) (375 SE2d 117) (1988). The prosecutor did not misstate the applicable law in the excerpts. Because the closing arguments were not transcribed, Kirkland has not made any showing that counsel orally attributed the excerpts as being from statutes or appellate decisions. Thus, I agree with the majority that Kirkland has shown no harm from the State’s conduct.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher and Justice Sears join in this special concurrence.