Court Opinion

ID: 9882822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:20:32.75438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:02.365440
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Pond v. Conkle, 2023-Ohio-3438.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

David Pond, Trustee,                               :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,               :               No. 22AP-770
                                                              (M.C. No. 2021 CVI 034588)
v.                                                 :
                                                              (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Jason R. Conkle,                                   :

                Defendant-Appellee.                :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                 Rendered on September 26, 2023

                On brief: David Pond, pro se. Argued: David Pond.

                       APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court

BEATTY BLUNT, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, David Pond, Trustee, appeals from a judgment of the
Franklin County Municipal Court, Small Claims Division, dismissing his complaint against
defendant-appellee, Jason R. Conkle. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On November 29, 2021, appellant filed a complaint against Jason R. Conkle
(“Conkle”) in the Small Claims Division of the Franklin County Municipal Court. He alleged
that Conkle “subletted in a house rented to Steven Pond,” and that when Steven Pond
passed away, “[Conkle] was asked to pay rent while he held over and pay for damages he
and his minor son caused on the property.” (Nov. 29, 2021 Compl. at 1.) Appellant further
alleged that Conkle “agreed to pay $1000/month while there” but Conkle had never paid
any of the rent agreed upon, nor the damages caused by Conkle and his son. Id. Appellant
demanded judgment against Conkle in the amount of $6000, plus court costs and interest.
Id.
No. 22AP-770                                                                                 2

       {¶ 3} On July 21, 2022, the small claims court magistrate held a hearing to try the
case. At the hearing, Conkle argued that the suit should be dismissed based on the grounds
that there was no legal and/or enforceable lease or other agreement between himself and
appellant because appellant never had the authority to demand additional rent or payment
for damages. More specifically, Conkle asserted that at the time the demand for rent and
payment of damages was made by appellant and agreed to by Conkle, appellant was not a
trustee of the trust which owned the house where Conkle and his son had lived. Conkle
further testified that in any event, he “fixed all the damage.” (Jan. 26, 2023 Tr. at 13.)
       {¶ 4} On August 22, 2022, the magistrate issued a decision dismissing the
complaint, finding that “defendant is correct in his assertion of lack of standing” because
appellant’s “mother was the trustee at the time this agreement was made. The [appellant]
did not become trustee of this property until April 15, 2021, the following year.” (Aug. 22,
2022 Mag’s Decision at 2.) Appellant timely filed objections and amended objections to the
magistrate’s decision.
       {¶ 5}    On November 15, 2022, the trial court issued its entry and order overruling
appellant’s objections and adopting the magistrate’s decision and entering judgment. In its
entry and order, the trial court found that “the plaintiff stated he was not reinstated as
trustee until April 15, 2021.” (Nov. 15, 2022 Entry & Order at 1.)
       {¶ 6} This timely appeal followed.
II. Assignments of Error

       {¶ 7} Appellant assigns the following three errors for our review:

               [I.]    The Judge erred as a matter of law when he stated that
               David Pond the current trustee of the Robert J. Pond Trust
               lacks standing to sue Jason Conkle for damages to Trust
               Property that occurred while Mary Ann Pond was the Trustee
               of the trust.

               [II.] The Judge erred as a matter of law when he stated that
               David Pond lacks standing to sue Jason Conkle for damages to
               Trust Property that occurred while Mary Ann Pond was the
               Trustee of the trust.
No. 22AP-770                                                                                   3

              [III.] The Judge erred as a matter of law when he ignored
              ORC 5321.12 that states: In any action under Chapter 5321 of
              the Revised Code, any party may recover damages for the
              breach of contract or the breach of any duty that is imposed
              by law.

(Emphasis sic.)

III. Discussion

       {¶ 8} We address appellant’s first and second assignments of error together as they
raise the same issue regarding standing. In these two assignments of error, appellant
asserts, in essence, the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint on the basis of standing.
We agree.
       {¶ 9} Whether a litigant has established standing is a question of law which we
review de novo. Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, 164 Ohio St.3d 291, 2020-
Ohio-6724, ¶ 12; Wilkins v. Village of Harrisburg, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-1028, 2015-Ohio-
5472, ¶ 7, citing LULAC v. Kasich, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-639, 2012-Ohio-947, ¶ 23, citing
Ohio Concrete Constr. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-905, 2009-
Ohio-2400, ¶ 9.
       {¶ 10} It is well-established that before an Ohio court may consider the merits of a
legal claim, “ ‘the person or entity seeking relief must establish standing to sue.’ ” Ohioans
for Concealed Carry, Inc. at ¶ 12, quoting Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115
Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27. “At a minimum, common-law standing requires the
litigant to demonstrate that he or she has suffered (1) an injury (2) that is fairly traceable to
the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and (3) is likely to be redressed by the requested
relief.” Id., citing Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 22.
Standing does not turn on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims but rather on whether the
plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that he is
entitled to have a court hear his case. Id., citing ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139
Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7. “Standing may also be conferred by statute.” Id.,
citing Middletown v. Ferguson, 25 Ohio St.3d 71, 75 (1986).
No. 22AP-770                                                                                                  4

        {¶ 11} The Supreme Court of Ohio has “recognized that standing is a ‘jurisdictional
requirement,’ and [has] stated: ‘It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action.’ ” Fed. Home
Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 22, quoting State
ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 179 (1973).
“Because standing to sue is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court,
‘standing is to be determined as of the commencement of suit.’ ” Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570-71 (1992), fn. 5.
        {¶ 12} Here, the record shows the complaint was filed on November 29, 2021.
Thus, standing is to be determined as of November 29, 2021. The undisputed evidence
submitted shows that appellant was reinstated as trustee of the trust on April 15, 2021.
Indeed, the magistrate and the trial court specifically made this finding in its decision and
entry and order, respectively. The record contains no evidence indicating that appellant
was subsequently removed as trustee at any point between April 15, 2021 and November
29, 2021. Therefore, as of the filing of the complaint, appellant’s status was that of trustee.
As trustee, appellant had standing to bring suit on behalf of the trust.1 Revocable Living
Trust of Mandel v. Lake Erie Utils. Co., 8th Dist. No. 97859, 2012-Ohio-5718, ¶ 13.
        {¶ 13} The record further shows that appellant is not only trustee of the trust but is
the sole beneficiary of the trust. As a present trust beneficiary, appellant also had standing
to bring suit in his individual capacity. Revocable Living Trust of Mandel at ¶ 14, citing
Papiernik v. Papiernik, 45 Ohio St.3d 337, 344 (1989) (holding that “a remainderman
holding a vested interest in a trust which is subject to defeasance by the exercise of a
testamentary power of appointment has standing to maintain an action to modify the
administrative provisions of the trust agreement.”). Like the plaintiff in Mandel, appellant

1 We acknowledge that ordinarily, a non-attorney trustee may not prosecute a civil action on behalf of the

trust. Heath v. Teich, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1018, 2007-Ohio-2529, ¶ 9, citing Tubalcain Trust v. Cornerstone
Constr., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 93APE12-1701, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2307. However, Heath and Tubalcain are
distinguishable in that they involved an estate and trust, respectively, in which the plaintiff was not the only
beneficiary. Furthermore, in this case the issue is academic as appellant has standing based on his status as
sole beneficiary and may represent himself pro se in that individual capacity in any event.
No. 22AP-770                                                                                 5

had an interest in the dispute between the trust and Conkle because the alleged damages
and failure to pay the rent agreed to would result in diminution in value of the trust’s asset—
namely, the house. This injury to the value of the Trust’s asset would be directly borne by
appellant as sole beneficiary and is directly traceable to the actions of Conkle. Furthermore,
the claims brought against Conkle, if successful, would provide relief to appellant. Thus, the
three requirements of standing—injury, causation, and redressability—are all met in this
case.
        {¶ 14} Therefore, we find the trial court erred in dismissing appellant’s claims
against appellee for lack of standing to bring his claims and the case must be remanded for
further proceedings. Accordingly, appellant’s first and second assignments of error are
sustained. In sustaining these errors, we wish to make clear that our ruling concerns only
the narrow issue implicated in the within appeal and in no way reflects any opinion on the
underlying merits of this case, including but not limited to whether the alleged agreement/s
between appellant and Conkle are otherwise enforceable.
        {¶ 15} As for appellant’s third assignment of error, we have already found that the
trial court erred in dismissing appellant’s claims against Conkle for lack of standing to bring
suit and that the case must be remanded for further proceedings. Accordingly, appellant’s
third assignment of error is rendered moot.
IV. Disposition
        {¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain appellant’s first and second
assignments of error, find moot appellant’s third assignment of error, and reverse the
judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court with instructions that the matter be
remanded for further proceedings consistent with our findings herein.
                                                                  Judgment reversed; and
                                                         cause remanded with instructions.

                          DORRIAN and JAMISON, JJ., concur.