Court Opinion

ID: 9905780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 15:05:54.901564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.863235
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2157-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANDRZEJ J. DABEK,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted October 17, 2023 – Decided November 30, 2023

                   Before Judges Whipple, Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Passaic County, Municipal Appeal No. 6263.

                   Law Offices of Curt J. Geisler, LLC, attorney for
                   appellant (Curt J. Geisler, on the brief).

                   Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Timothy P. Kerrigan, Jr.,
                   Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
                   brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Andrzej Dabek appeals from a February 23, 2022 order of the

Law Division finding him guilty of driving under the influence, N.J.S.A. 39:4-

50, after conducting a de novo review of the record developed in the municipal

court pursuant to Rule 3:23-8. He also appeals from the denial of his motion for

a judgment of acquittal and his request for a stay. We are convinced the Law

Division judge's findings were reasonable and based on sufficient credible

evidence in the record and he did not abuse his discretion in denying the

defendant's request for a stay. We affirm.

      Defendant argues:

            POINT I.   DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IS
            AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND
            THE   STATE   FAILED    TO    ESTABLISH
            DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE
            DOUBT CONTRARY TO THE FOURTEENTH
            AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
            CONSTITUTION.

            POINT II. A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IN
            FAVOR OF DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
            ENTERED IN THE LAW DIVISION AS TO THE
            DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
            CHARGES AT THE END OF THE STATE'S CASE
            SINCE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND
            A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT
            WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE WHEN HE
            OPERATED A MOTOR VEHICLE.

            POINT III. THE COURTS BELOW ERRED IN NOT
            STAYING THE TRIAL UNTIL THE SPECIAL

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                                       2
            MASTER'S DECISION IN OLENOWSKI AS
            DEFENDANT'S     COUNSEL    AND    EXPERT
            WITNESS WERE DEPRIVED OF THE SPECIAL
            MASTER'S FINDINGS AT TRIAL; IN ADDITION,
            IN SPITE OF THE SPECIAL MASTER'S DECISION
            IN OLENOWSKI THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN
            NOT FINDING THE DEFENDANT "NOT GUILTY"
            AS REASONBLE DOUBT EXISTS IN THIS CASE.

                                       I.

      In conducting its "trial de novo on the record below," R. 3:23-8(a)(2), the

Law Division judge must make independent "findings of fact and conclusions

of law but defers to the municipal court's credibility findings."       State v.

Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017).

      Our standard of review is limited. State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super.

624, 639 (App. Div. 2005). In such an appeal, we consider only "the action of

the Law Division and not that of the municipal court." State v. Palma, 219 N.J.

584, 591-92 (2014) (quoting State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App.

Div. 2001)). The "standard of review of a de novo verdict after a municipal

court trial is to 'determine whether the findings made could reasonably have

been reached on sufficient credible evidence presented in the record,'

considering the proofs as a whole." State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App.

Div. 2005) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).

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                                       3
      We "do[] not weigh the evidence anew but merely determine[] whether

the evidence supports the judgment of conviction." Johnson, 42 N.J. at 157.

Furthermore, we "defer to trial courts' credibility findings that are often

influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of

witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the

record." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999). "[T]he rule of deference is

more compelling where, as in the present case, two . . . courts have [made]

. . . concurrent findings of fact and credibility determinations." Ibid. Therefore,

appellate review of the factual and credibility findings of the municipal court

and the Law Division "is exceedingly narrow." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154,

167 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470).

                                        II.

      The State summoned three witnesses to trial: Sergeant Louis Pakovics,

New Jersey State Police, and Sergeant Kevin Norton and Officer Daniel Banker

of the Wanaque Police Department. 1 The municipal court judge found Sergeant

1
  The municipal court judge qualified Sergeant Pakovics as a drug recognition
expert (DRE) and the parties stipulated that defendant's only witness, Frank
Novakowski, was qualified as a DRE. Since we affirm the Law Division judge's
conclusion of defendant's guilt, notwithstanding DRE opinions, we merely note
the municipal court judge found that Mr. Novakowski's testimony did not
undermine Sergeant Pakovics' credibility and the Law Division judge found Mr.

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                                        4
Pakovics credible, noting his "opportunity to observe him during his testimony,"

"his body language," and his "responsive . . . clear and concise" answers to

questioning.2 Further, the judge found Officer Banker credible, noting that his

"testimony was corroborated by . . . the video" and did not deviate between the

two days of trial, and because of how the officer "carried . . . and conducted

himself."   The judge also found Sergeant Norton credible.         He noted his

testimony was "corroborated by what was depicted in the video" and was

consistent with Officer Banker's testimony.

      The Law Division judge deferred to the municipal court's credibility

determinations but independently came to the same conclusions.

      We derive the following facts from the record. On July 14, 2018 at 1:19

p.m., Officer Banker responded to a 911 call at the intersection of Doty Road

and Greenwood Avenue in Wanaque, New Jersey. Upon his arrival, Officer

Banker observed an automobile that appeared to be making a right turn onto

Novakowski's testimony was "non-convincing" considering the video,
"overreaching" in its criticism of Sergeant Pakovics and "he d[id] not place great
weight on his testimony."
2
   We include the municipal court judge's credibility determinations as to
Sergeant Pakovics because, aside from his DRE opinion, the officer's credibility
was important when considering his lay testimony about defendant's admissions
and the sergeant's own observations.
                                                                            A-2157-21
                                        5
Greenwood Avenue but was "parked there" "blocking traffic." Sergeant Norton

responded to the call and "observed the vehicle stopped in the middle of the

road."

         Officer Banker approached the automobile and observed defendant

"leaning forward in the driver's seat," "apparently sleeping." Officer Banker

observed: the vehicle "was not moving"; "the keys were in the [ignition]"; "the

engine was running"; the vehicle "was in the drive position"; and defendant had

his "foot on the brake."

         Office Banker "shouted at [defendant] to wake him up." "After a few

seconds," defendant woke up. According to the officer, defendant was "in a

very sleepy stage, very confused, [and] he did not make much sense when

responding to questions." Defendant held "wax folds in his right hand" and,

when asked what they were, failed to give Officer Banker a "straight answer."

         Once back-up officers arrived, defendant was "asked to exit the vehicle to

[perform] field sobriety tests."      After exiting the vehicle, defendant "had

difficulty walking around or standing, he was swaying back and forth, and

continually moving." Defendant continued to "seem[] confused" and did not

talk in "complete sentences."

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                                          6
      Officer Norton instructed defendant to follow his finger as he motioned it

from side to side. Defendant could not follow his finger.

      Officer Banker "read . . . instructions for the walk-and-turn test from his

handbook of . . . traffic violations." Defendant indicated that he understood "the

instructions." However, he "struggled to get into the initial starting position."

"He was unable to put his left foot on the line and place his right [foot] in front,

touching his right heel to his left toe." "He moved his arms for balance, and

almost fell over."

      Defendant was instructed to do the one-leg stand test.

            He briefly put his heels together and his arms at his
            side. He then spread his legs completely and bent over
            to touch the ground like he was stretching. After
            approximately 30 seconds, he got up, and attempted to
            do the test again. He was not able to maintain the
            position he was standing in. He did not look at his
            raised foot, he used both arms for balance, and crossed
            his foot completely on the other side of his body for
            balance. He used the ground to try to pick himself up
            and almost fell over several times.

      Officer Banker, "based upon his observation and training, was of the

opinion that defendant was driving under the influence." Defendant "was placed

under arrest and transported to headquarters." He "consented to alcohol testing

. . . [and] the Alcotest results indicated a .05 blood alcohol content." Sergeant

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                                         7
Norton, who had administered the Alcotest, had "no doubt in his mind that

[defendant] was impaired."

      Since defendant "did not appear to be in any condition to" drive a motor

vehicle and "appeared to be more impaired than exhibited by the .05 blood

ffalcohol reading," he was transported to undergo an evaluation by Sergeant

Pakovics.

      Sergeant Pakovics "observed that [defendant had a] slow, low and raspy

speech, was very sluggish in movement, had an odor of an alcoholic beverage

coming from his breath, [had] bloodshot and watery eyes, and droopy eyelids."

Sergeant Pakovics administered the modified Romberg balance test, walk-and-

turn test and one-leg stand test but defendant "swayed and was[ un]able to

maintain his balance." On the "finger to nose test, [defendant] touched his nose

on three of six attempts." Moreover, defendant admitted to Sergeant Pakovics,

that he "had three Bacardis" and took "two, five milligram tablets of Percocet

and two, three milligram tablets of Lunesta" that day.

                                      III.

      Defendant was convicted under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 of "operat[ing] a motor

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor[,] . . . narcotic,

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                                       8
hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug[s]." State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 576

(2006).

      "[T]he driving while intoxicated statute 'does not require that the

particular narcotic[, hallucinogen or habit-producing drug] be identified.'" Id.

at 589 (quoting State v. Tamburro, 68 N.J. 414, 421 (1975)). "The statute does

not define the quantum of narcotics, hallucinogens or habit-producing drugs

required to violate this prohibition." Ibid. "[T]he issue is simple: was the

defendant 'under the influence' of a narcotic, hallucinogen or habit producing

drug while he operated a motor vehicle." Ibid.

      In Bealor, our Supreme Court distinguished between alcohol, where "[a]n

ordinary citizen is qualified to advance an opinion in a court proceeding that a

person was intoxicated because of consumption of alcohol," id. at 587 (quoting

State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 213 (1972)), and marijuana where "[n]o such general

awareness exists as yet with regard to the signs and symptoms of the condition

described as being 'high' on mari[j]uana." Ibid. Nonetheless, "[h]aving rejected

the . . . invitation to place lay opinion testimony regarding marijuana

intoxication on the same footing as lay opinion testimony as to alcohol

intoxication," ibid., the Court still analyzed "whether, in the absence of lay

opinion testimony, the evidence tendered . . . was sufficient to prove that

                                                                          A-2157-21
                                       9
defendant was under the influence of marijuana while he operated a motor

vehicle." Id. at 588.

      In Tamburro, our Supreme Court considered the statutory phrase "under

the influence" and explained:

            [t]he language "under the influence" used in the statute
            has been interpreted many times. Generally speaking,
            it means a substantial deterioration or diminution of the
            mental faculties or physical capabilities of a person
            whether it be due to intoxicating liquor, narcotic,
            hallucinogenic or habit producing drugs. In State v.
            Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 165 (1964), . . . we stated that
            "under the influence" meant a condition which so
            affects the judgment or control of a motor vehicle
            operator as to make it improper for [the operator] to
            drive on the highway. . . . In State v. DiCarlo, 67 N.J.
            321 (1975), we held that an operator of a motor vehicle
            was under the influence of a narcotic drug within the
            meaning [of the statute] if the drug produced a narcotic
            effect "so altering his or her normal physical
            coordination and mental faculties as to render such
            person a danger to himself [or herself] as well as other
            persons on the highway." Id. at 328.

            [Tamburro, 68 N.J. at 420-21.]

      In Bealor, our Supreme Court concluded that "the State proved beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendant 'operate[d] a motor vehicle while under the

influence of . . . narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug[s]' in violation

of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50." The Court based its conclusion on the arresting officer's

                                                                              A-2157-21
                                        10
            fact testimony in respect of defendant's erratic and
            dangerous driving, his slurred and slow speech, his
            "bloodshot and glassy" eyes, his droopy eyelids, his
            "pale and flushed" face, his "fumbl[ing] around the
            center console and his glovebox searching for all his
            credentials," or the smell of burnt marijuana on
            defendant, his sagging knees and the "emotionless stare
            on his face."

            [Bealor, 187 N.J. at 590.]

Moreover, the arresting officer "on cross-examination . . . testified without

objection that defendant was intoxicated . . . ."    Ibid.   "Finally, the State

incontrovertibly proved, through qualified experts, the presence of marijuana in

defendant's blood stream . . . ." Ibid.

      In sum, Bealor "explicitly disavowed" the notion "that the nexus between

the facts of intoxication and the cause of intoxication can only be proved by

expert opinion" to support a conviction under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Cases with

similar fact patterns have considered a wide variety of other corroborative

evidence, but usually involve either admissions or physical scientific results.

See Tamburro, 68 N.J. at 416-17 (defendant admitted to taking narcotics that

day); State v. Franchetta, 394 N.J. Super. 200, 203 (App. Div. 2007) (blood test

revealed cocaine metabolites).

      Here, the Law Division judge conducted a Bealor analysis. The Law

Division judge credited the officers' observations and found: (1) "defendant was

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                                          11
asleep in a driver's seat of his motor vehicle which was parked on a public

highway blocking traffic," "the key was in the ignition, the engine was running,

the vehicle was in the drive position, and [defendant]'s foot was on the brake";

(2) once defendant "was awaken he was in a very sleepy stage, very confused,

did not make much sense when responding to questions," and was "unable to

make complete sentences"; (3) "[a]fter defendant exited his motor vehicle, he

had difficulty walking around or standing, he swayed back and forth, and

continuously moved"; (4) defendant only "partly performed the walk-and-turn

test" ("crossing one foot over the other" and "unable to walk forward") and "the

one-leg stand test" ("put[ting] his foot down several times"); (5) defendant "was

unable to follow Sergeant Norton's finger with his eyes"; and (6) defendant's

"voice [wa]s slurred and slow."

      Furthermore, the Law Division judge credited the observations of

Sergeant Pakovics, who observed: (1) defendant "displayed slow, low and raspy

speech, was very sluggish in movement, had an odor of an alcoholic beverage

coming from his breath, [and had] bloodshot and watery eyes, and droopy

eyelids"; (2) defendant "was[] [un]able to maintain his balance" during "the

modified Romberg balance test, walk-and-turn test and one-leg stand test"; and

                                                                           A-2157-21
                                      12
(3) on "the finger to nose test, [defendant] touched his nose on three of six

attempts."

      The State witnesses' observations were corroborated by other evidence of

defendant being under the influence. For example, defendant admitted he took

two, five-milligram tablets of Percocet, a narcotic analgesic; two, three-

milligram tablets of Lunesta, a CNS depressant; and drank three Bacardis. In

addition,    defendant's   Alcotest   reading   registered   .05   blood    alcohol

concentration.

      The Law Division judge found, "beyond a reasonable doubt, that

defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 by operating his motor vehicle under the

influence of alcohol and a narcotic drug."           The judge considered "the

perception[s] of [the] officers that [defendant] was under the influence . . . based

upon his speech, appearance, and body movement." Further, he attributed the

cause of defendant's "intoxication to his admission of drinking three Bacardis,

and his .05 Alcotest reading, and his admission to consuming Percocet and

Lunesta."

      Our role "is to 'determine whether the findings made could reasonably

have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present[ed] in the record,'

considering the proofs as a whole." Elbert, 377 N.J. Super. at 8. Here, the Law

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                                        13
Division judge's conclusion of guilt is unassailable and supported by sufficient

credible evidence. We affirm the conviction.

                                       IV.

      Defendant next argues

            [a] judgment of acquittal in favor of defendant should
            have been entered in the law division as to the driving
            while under the influence charge at the end of the
            [S]tate's case since the [S]tate failed to prove beyond a
            reasonable doubt that defendant was under the
            influence when he operated a motor vehicle.

We disagree.

      A motion for a directed verdict for acquittal is governed by Rule 3:18-1,

which requires a judgment of acquittal "if the evidence is insufficient to warrant

a conviction." In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence:

            the trial judge must determine . . . whether, viewing the
            State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct
            or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all
            its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable
            inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom,
            a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond
            a reasonable doubt.

            [State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967).]

We apply the same standard as the trial court to decide if the motion should have

been granted. State v. Moffa, 42 N.J. 258, 263 (1964).

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                                       14
       Considering all the evidence, including the significant fact testimony we

have discussed, we are satisfied the judge could reasonably have found

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of operating a "motor vehicle while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit -

producing drug[s]." N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.

                                         V.

       Defendant also argues that the municipal and Law Division judges erred

by denying his request to stay his trial matter pending delivery of the Special

Master's decision in Olenowski. Again, we disagree.

       In Olenowski, our Supreme Court "adopt[ed] a Daubert-type3 standard

going forward to assess the admissibility of [DRE] expert evidence under

N.J.R.E. 702 in criminal and quasi-criminal cases" and "remand[ed] the matter

to the Special Master for further proceedings . . . ." State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J.

133, 155 (2023).

       While our Supreme Court awaited delivery of the Special Master's report,

it ordered:

              that the motion for a "stay of all proceedings in other
              courts . . . that raise issues regarding the admissibility
              of [DRE] testimony, which may be potentially affected"
              by the pending appeal is denied. The Court expresses

3
    Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
                                                                             A-2157-21
                                         15
            no view on the merits of any stay application filed in an
            individual case in Municipal Court or Superior Court
            by a party to a proceeding involving DRE testimony.

            [State v. Olenowski, 241 N.J. 65 (2020).]

Therefore, the question of whether to stay a particular proceeding was left to the

respective courts.

      "We apply the principles set forth in State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 537-38

[] (2011), governing a trial court's exercise of its discretion to grant or deny

adjournments." State v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 47 (2013). "[W]hen an appellate

court reviews a trial court's discretionary determination of a defendant's motion

for an adjournment, 'there are two conditions which must exist to warrant'

reversal of the conviction." Id. at 66 (quoting Hayes, 205 N.J. at 539) (quoting

Smith v. Smith, 17 N.J. Super. 128, 132 (App. Div. 1952)).

      "First, 'the judicial action must have been clearly unreasonable in the light

of the accompanying and surrounding circumstances.'" Ibid. "Second, the

ruling must have prejudiced the . . . " defendant. Ibid. Defendant must have

"suffered [a] manifest wrong or injury." Ibid.

      Here, defendant argues that denial of his stay request was:

            erroneous as the State's main witness was a [DRE]
            whose qualifications and analysis of the case were both
            called into question by the defense expert witness.
            Defendant and his counsel were deprived of the

                                                                             A-2157-21
                                       16
             analysis conducted in Olenowski in violation of his
             Sixth Amendment confrontation right to cross examine
             the State's witness and in violation of his Fourteenth
             Amendment due process right to a fair trial.

      However, defendant's argument is misplaced because he was convicted

based upon corroborated observations "that [he] was under the influence [of

alcohol, Percocet and Lunesta] while he operated a motor vehicle." Bealor, 187

N.J. at 574. As mentioned, Sergeant Pakovics' lay testimony, about defendant's

admissions or his observations of defendant, was independent of the sergeant's

DRE opinion. His credible testimony was important because it provided the

factual basis for the Law Division judge to conclude that defendant used

"alcohol, Percocet and Lunesta" before operating his motor vehicle.

Additionally, Sergeant Pakovics' testimony also was consistent with the

observations of Sergeant Norton and Officer Banker.

      Therefore, the DRE opinion was inconsequential to defendant's conviction

because his conviction rested on officers' observations and corroborative

evidence, not expert opinion. Consequently, the denial of his request for a stay,

pending receipt of the Special Master's report on DRE evidence, was neither

"unreasonable" nor "prejudicial."     Miller, 216 N.J. at 66.      Under these

circumstances we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of defendant's request

for a stay of the trial.

                                                                           A-2157-21
                                      17
Affirmed.

                 A-2157-21
            18