Court Opinion

ID: 9767769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:26:25.4103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.857133
License: Public Domain

WILSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant readily concedes that if the State had charged him with burglary under Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1989), rather than (a)(1), the evidence would have been sufficient to affirm his conviction. I respectfully dissent because I agree with appellant’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction under the “burglary with intent to commit a felony” section.
There is no question appellant’s estranged wife was the victim of a brutal crime committed in her apartment by appellant’s hand on the night of November 3, 1989. The only issue in the case is whether a rational factfinder could believe beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence, viewed *416in a light most favorable to the judgment, that appellant unlawfully entered the victim’s home with the specific intent to commit an aggravated assault.
The case would be less difficult to analyze if the majority would state more clearly what specific evidence is sufficient to prove appellant’s intent independent of appellant’s confession, and/or the recordings made by the police of appellant’s 911 call the night of the crime. The State’s evidence can be divided easily into two parts: (a) what came from appellant, the confession and the recordings; and (b) all other evidence.
While discussing the confession and the recordings, the majority discusses the abrogation of the voucher rule. This analysis is correct as far as it goes, but I respectfully suggest that it is not relevant to the question at issue because it ignores the law of Gold v. State, 736 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), in which the court stated, “a factfinder may not find facts necessary to establish an element of a criminal offense purely on the basis of its disbelief of the accused’s contrary assertions.”
The State no longer has the burden of disproving exculpatory parts of a defendant’s confession it introduces. However, this rule does not excuse the State from its burden of proof. “The State has the burden of going forward with evidence to show, and of persuading the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense.” Gold, 736 S.W.2d at 689.
In this case the State advanced a theory to explain the facts at odds with appellant’s statements introduced by the State. Although the State was responsible for putting into evidence exculpatory evidence given by appellant, the State no longer has to disprove the exculpatory parts to get a conviction (abrogation of the voucher rule). It is also true that the jury is permitted to disbelieve the exculpatory statements of appellant’s statements if it wishes. But a jury’s inferred disbelief of the exculpatory evidence is not to be used as affirmative evidence of proving the State’s theory. It is the lack of application to the facts of this case of this final principle, as elaborated in Gold, in which I respectfully disagree with the majority.
The majority states the following in reaching its conclusion:
The testimony of Janice and Randy Williams contradicted many of the statements in appellant’s confession. Appellant stated he went to the apartment because he was concerned Janice had overdosed on drugs. He said he had telephoned Janice before he broke in, but no one had answered. Janice testified both of her phones were in working order that night, and one was in her bedroom. Appellant stated he knew Randy Williams was a drug dealer because appellant had personally purchased drugs from him and had used cocaine with him. Yet, both Janice and Randy Williams testified they had never used drugs with appellant, and they had never used drugs with each other. Janice did admit she had used drugs before she met appellant, but not since then.
Further, in his statement appellant said Janice grabbed at the knife, cutting herself. His version of how the wounds were inflicted and what he did substantially differs from the physical evidence and the testimony of Janice and Randy. The jury could have reasonably discounted appellant’s whole statement as being incredible and unbelievable.
Additionally, the evidence showed appellant and Janice had been separated for approximately one year, and Janice had been dating Randy Williams for over nine months. The jury could have reasonably concluded that it was unlikely the fact appellant found Randy at the apartment was such an unexpected occurrence that it caused appellant’s violent reaction.
Considering the violence of the attack, considering the fact the jury could have reasonably believed appellant lied about his motivations for entering the apartment in the statement he gave the police, and considering the circumstances of the relationships among appellant and Janice and Randy Williams, we hold the jury could have reasonably concluded from *417the evidence that appellant had the requisite intent when he entered the apartment.
The bulk of the facts cited by the majority as supportive of the jury’s verdict runs afoul of Gold. What evidence remains after excluding all of the conclusions reached by the majority based on the disbelief of appellant’s statements is insufficient to sustain the State’s burden. Granting to the majority that there is some evidence to show what appellant’s intent was from the State’s other evidence, I cannot find a rational factfinder would be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that when appellant entered the apartment, he was intent on committing aggravated assault.
I do not find in the majority’s opinion a specific fact, or group of facts when considered together, and in a light most favorable to the judgment, that directly proves appellant’s intent when he entered the premises on that night. Nor do I find a fact, or group of facts when considered together, upon which a jury could rationally conclude by inference and beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was bent upon committing aggravated assault when entering the apartment.
Nothing in the prosecutor’s argument quoted by the majority sheds light on this deficiency. The jury may rationally infer from facts, but it cannot presume in this case the requisite intent from the violence of the attack, from appellant’s lying in his statement, or from the circumstances of the relationships. The brutality of the assault is no proof in itself of why appellant entered the apartment on that night. Making inferences based on the premise appellant lied in his statements runs afoul of Gold, and nothing in the evidence relative to the relationships of the parties proves appellant came that night for the purpose of doing what he did. The record is silent on any history of violence, or threats of violence between appellant, his wife, and/or Mr. Williams.
The issue of where the knives came from is illustrative of the failure of proof. In its opinion, the majority makes the following reference to the knives:
She (Janice) was not certain whether the two knives appellant used came from her kitchen. On redirect, Janice said she was not absolutely certain appellant didn’t bring the two knives with him that night.
The majority later states that a certain excerpt from the State’s closing argument casts the evidence relevant to appellant’s intent in the light most favorable to the State. On the issue of the knives, the prosecutor stated as quoted by the majority:
Think about what happened out there. The defendant went to the kitchen, if you want to believe that story, first, and got not one knife, but two. He’s just going to talk? Ms. Coleman told you she is not even sure that these are her knives. Well, Mr. Williams didn’t bring them with him. No intent?
The testimony at trial about the knives reveals, first from cross-examination of Ms. Coleman:
Q: Those knives that are laying there in front of you on the court reporter’s table that are marked State’s Exhibits 8 and 9 that you previously identified—
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Those are your knives, aren’t they?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you had seen them earlier that evening in your kitchen I guess?
A. No, sir, actually I hadn’t. My mother had given me a sack of knives earlier that day. I had never taken them out of the sack, and I did not see those knives earlier that day.
Q. Where was the sack of knives?
A. In a drawer in the kitchen.
Q. These are two of the knives though?
A. As far as I know, sir. I really don’t — I can’t testify to that without doubt because I had never seen the knives.
Later the prosecutor returned to the subject of the ownership of the knives in a single, unobjected to leading question:
Q. Ms. Coleman, as far as the knives are concerned, you are not absolutely certain that the defendant didn’t bring them with him that night, are you?
*418A. No, ma’am, I’m not.
I cannot find from this evidence, even considered in the light most favorable to the judgment, that a rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant brought the knives with him on the evening in question, and illegally entered the apartment with the intent to commit the specific crime of aggravated assault as required by the court’s charge. The charge stated:
In this case, the indictment has charged that the entry was made with intent to commit the crime of aggravated assault, a felony, therefore, before you would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault, you must be satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the entry, if any, in the habitation was made with the intent to commit the specific crime of aggravated assault.
(Emphasis added.)
It is, of course, possible for appellant to have entered the apartment without the knives but with the intent to commit aggravated assault. However, the majority does not point to evidence that supports such a theory, nor does the State’s argument quoted at length by the majority indicate the case was tried on such a premise.
Because the State has failed to prove the allegations of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to support the verdict, we should order the appellant acquitted, however reluctantly.
DUGGAN and MIRABAL, JJ., also participating.