Court Opinion

ID: 9517931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:37:20.792313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:05.519219
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 70. {concurring). The majority opinion declares that the instant case is moot. Majority op., ¶ 54 n.23. Nevertheless the majority writes on, characterizing the issue of the constitutionality of a "permit use only zone" as one "of great public importance." Simultaneously the majority opinion acknowledges that it cannot, and does not, determine the constitutionality of any other ordinance creating a "permit use only zone" similar to that of the Town of Rhine. See majority op., ¶ 54 n.23. Each "permit use only zone" ordinance, according to the majority opinion, must be gauged individually to determine to whether the ordinance has a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
¶ 71. I write for three reasons:
¶ 72. First, I want to stress that the wisdom of a zoning ordinance is a decision for the municipality, not for this court.1
¶ 73. Second, nothing in this opinion should be read to imply that the ordinance at issue is struck down because the majority opinion characterizes the Town of Rhine's zoning ordinance as uncommon.2 The majority opinion is mistaken that the Town of Rhine ordinance is very unusual.3 In any event, I do not read the majority opinion as stating or implying that only ordinances adopted by a majority of municipalities can pass constitutional muster in this court.
*49¶ 74. Third, I want to emphasize the precepts to be gleaned from this lengthy opinion, many of which are basic, well-known principles of law that are applied in the present case. The teachings of the majority opinion may be summarized as follows:
1. A zoning ordinance, including a "permit use only zone," is "presumed valid and must be liberally construed in favor of the municipality." Majority op., ¶ 26. An ordinance "will be held constitutional [as a matter of substantive due process] unless the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt." Majority op., ¶ 26.
2. The challenge to the ordinance at issue is a facial substantive due process challenge, not an as applied challenge, and not an eminent domain taking challenge.4 The majority opinion applies-, in keeping with precedent, a rational basis test to determine the validity of a law challenged on substantive due process grounds.5
*503. An ordinance, including a "permit use only zone," will be invalidated as a matter of substantive due process under the rational basis test only if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having "no substantial relation to the public health, safety, moral or general welfare." Majority op., ¶ 2.6 In applying the rational basis test, the court looks for support for the law that is challenged.7 The support for the law need not be expressed on the face of the law.
4. A "permit use only zone" is constitutional, as a matter of substantive due process, if it bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, moral or general welfare.8 A "permit use only zone" is unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due process when it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, moral or general welfare.9
5. The "permit use only zone" at issue in the instance case is unconstitutional because nothing in the record or in the Town's arguments describes a relation between the "permit use only zone" and the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.10 The court has not independently found support for the ordinance.
6. The majority opinion does not determine the constitutionality of ordinances of other communities similar to the Town of Rhine's ordinance at issue in the instant case. Each such ordinance has to be examined individually to determine whether it bears a substan*51tial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. In other words, the validity of an ordinance similar to that of the Town of Rhine's shall be determined on case-by-case basis, with the ordinance liberally construed in favor of the municipality and entitled to a presumption in favor of its validity.11
¶ 75. I concur in the court's mandate but write separately for the reasons set forth.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶ 39, 40, 50.

 See Brief and Appendix of Wisconsin Counties Association at 5-8 (citing zoning ordinances similar to the Town of Rhine's from 11 municipalities and counties in Wisconsin).

 See, e.g., májority op. ¶¶ 34, 47, 61. Several cases upon which the majority opinion relies treat the challenge as an as applied or a takings challenge. See, e.g., majority op. ¶¶ 40, 47.
It is very difficult to prevail upon a facial challenge to a statute or ordinance. With a facial challenge, the challenger must show that the ordinance cannot be enforced under any circumstances. See Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶ 44 n.9, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211 (" 'Facial challenge' is defined as: A claim that a statute .. . always operates unconstitutionally.' ") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 223 (7th ed. 1999). Although I question whether the defendants' challenge is properly considered a "facial" challenge, I accept the defendants' characterization of their challenge for purposes of this review. The majority opinion does not address any challenge to the "vagueness" of the standards for granting a conditional use. See, e.g., majority op. ¶ 58.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶ 28-29, 34, 37.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶ 26, 34-38, 65.

 Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶ 184, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶ 43-45.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶ 40-42, 46.

 See, e.g., majority op. ¶¶ 2, 65.

 See, e.g., majority op. ¶ 54 n.23.