Court Opinion

ID: 9953760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 20:02:54.401816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:48.487384
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 Noell v. Kenner & Greenfield CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 CRAIG NOELL,                                                         B316818

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. 19STCV25546)
           v.

 KENNER & GREENFIELD et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.
     Patrick Walsh for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Kenner Law Firm and David E. Kenner for Defendants and
Appellants.
                ____________________________
        In 2016, Craig Noell hired attorneys David Kenner and
Brett Greenfield (collectively Attorneys) to represent him in a
criminal matter and the parties signed an “agreement for legal
services” (Agreement).1 (Capitalization omitted.) Noell paid a
flat fee of $350,000 for the representation. Prior to trial, with
court approval, Attorneys withdrew from the representation
because of a breakdown in the parties’ relationship. Noell later
sued for breach of contract and legal malpractice. After a bench
trial, the court awarded Noell damages on the breach of contract
claim and found in favor of Attorneys on the professional
malpractice claim. The only subject of this appeal is the trial
court’s rulings on the breach of contract claim. Both sides appeal
from the judgment.
        Attorneys’ primary argument is that in keeping with their
ethical obligations, they had to withdraw and the court approved
their withdrawal, thus entitling them to retain the entire flat fee.
As set forth in our Discussion, Attorneys’ argument ignores
provisions in the Agreement regarding unearned fees in the event
of termination of representation, as well as an attorney’s ethical
duty to refund unearned fees. As for Noell’s appeal, he
challenges the amount of damages the trial court awarded in his
favor. He claims he is entitled to an award of the entire flat fee
or of the fee he paid new counsel. He fails to demonstrate that
the trial court’s award is inconsistent with the Agreement and we

      1 Although the Agreement identifies the contracting
parties as Noell and “Kenner & Greenfield, A Partnership of
Professional Law Corporations,” prior to trial the parties
stipulated the Agreement was between Noell and attorneys
Kenner and Greenfield. The Agreement refers to the partnership
as “the Firm.”

                                    2
cannot evaluate the reasonableness of the awarded fees when our
record does not contain the reporter’s transcript.
      We affirm the judgment.

                        BACKGROUND
      In July 2016, the parties executed the Agreement, which
concerned legal representation in a Ventura County criminal
matter in which Noell was charged with attempted murder and
felony domestic violence against a former spouse. When
Attorneys withdrew from representation, Noell hired new counsel
whom he paid $425,000.2 After a three-week trial, a jury
convicted Noell of felony domestic violence against a former
spouse but acquitted him on the attempted murder charge.3

1.    The Agreement’s fee and termination provisions
       The Agreement provides, “[It] shall not be effectively
binding, nor shall either party be responsible for or bound to its
terms until the monetary consideration referenced below is
deposited with the Firm.” Attorneys agreed to represent Noell in
the criminal action in Ventura County and to specially appear in
a divorce proceeding “for the purpose of obtaining discovery . . .
that the Firm deems to be relevant to the . . . criminal matter.”
       The Agreement contains a flat fee provision and a
statement of the Attorneys’ hourly rates. Specifically, the
Agreement provides, “The total flat fee for representation of
client in this matter is Three Hundred Fifty Thousand

      2Although the statement of decision indicates Noell paid
$425,000, Noell represents that he paid $475,000.
      3 According to Noell, the criminal court sentenced him to
serve 270 days in jail and placed him on probation for 36 months.

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Dollars . . . .” The agreement further provides, “Hourly rates,
required pursuant to this agreement: David E. Kenner,
Nine Hundred Fifty ($950.00) per hour, Brett A. Greenfield,
Seven Hundred ($700.00) per hour, and ($250.00) for the services
of specific designated additional associated attorneys and/or
personnel. . . .” It is undisputed that Noell paid the $350,000.
       The Agreement also provides for payment if Noell
dismisses the Attorneys: “Termination of Employment. In the
event the Client desires to dismiss the Firm and retain other
counsel to represent Clients’ interests in any matter encompassed
by or made the basis of this Agreement, after the date of the
execution of this Agreement, it is agreed and understood that the
terms of this Agreement as it pertains to fees, costs and expenses
for services rendered, up to and including such date of dismissal,
to be paid the Firm shall remain in full force and effect.” The
Agreement indicates the client “may contact” the State Bar if
there is a fee dispute.
       The Agreement further provides, “It is understood and
agreed that the Firm shall not have any responsibility with
respect to relationships of Client and any other lawyer or law
firm, presently, previously or hereafter retained or employed by
Client in connection with the lawsuit as to which legal services
are herein contracted.”

2.    First amended complaint
      In July 2019, Noell sued Kenner & Greenfield and
Attorneys alleging causes of action for breach of a written contact

                                    4
and legal malpractice.4 Noell alleged that on or about July 22,
2016, he entered into a written agreement with Attorneys to
represent him in a criminal matter. Noell also alleged that
despite numerous requests, Attorneys failed to perform the
services promised in the Agreement. In September or
October 2017, Attorneys withdrew from representation, forcing
Noell to obtain other counsel at significant cost. As damages, he
sought disgorgement of the $350,000 fee.

3.    Court findings
       Our record does not include a reporter’s transcript of the
bench trial. According to the trial court, both Attorneys “testified
at length concerning the time they allegedly spent on this
case. . . . The number of hours [Attorneys] worked on the case
was a significant focus of the trial.”
       After a bench trial, in its statement of decision, the court
ruled in Attorneys’ favor on Noell’s legal malpractice claim. On
appeal, Noell does not challenge that ruling.
       The court found in Noell’s favor on the breach of contract
claim and awarded unearned fees as damages in the amount of
$52,750 against David Kenner and Brett Greenfield jointly and
severally. In his trial brief, Noell had requested damages in the
amount of the entire $350,000 fee or the entire amount he paid to
new counsel.
       The court made the following findings in its statement of
decision. Attorneys agreed to represent Noell in a criminal action

      4  The first amended complaint also asserted a cause of
action for fraud. It appears that cause of action was dismissed
prior to trial. The trial court did not consider it at trial and there
is no issue on appeal with respect to this claim.

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in which he was charged with attempted murder and domestic
violence against his former spouse. Both counts arose out of an
incident occurring on November 23, 2015. The parties entered
into an agreement for legal services and Attorneys “were
ethically obligated to make the motion to be removed” as legal
counsel because there was a complete breakdown in the attorney
client relationship.
       The court also made the following findings as to parties’
respective obligations under the Agreement. “Pursuant to the
contract, Plaintiff [Noell] paid Defendants [the Attorneys]
$350,000 to represent Plaintiff in the criminal case. It was
understood by the parties that this flat fee included, but was not
limited to, the following: (1) Defendants representing Plaintiff
through trial; (2) Defendants conducting discovery in Plaintiff’s
divorce and custody proceedings; (3) Defendants conducting
discovery in the criminal case; (4) Defendants attending all court
proceedings in the criminal matter; (5) Defendants conducting a
mock jury; (6) Defendants requesting a bail review;
(7) Defendants arranging expert[ ] witnesses that may be needed
for the trial; [and] (8) Defendants requesting modification of [the]
Criminal Protective Order . . . .”
       Regarding Attorneys’ hourly rates, the trial court found,
“The hourly rate pursuant to the contract was: Defendant
David Kenner $950.00 per hour; Defendant Brett Greenfield
$700.00 per hour; other associated attorneys or personnel
$250.00 per hour. [Citation.] Plaintiff does not dispute that he
agreed to these rates or that these rates are reasonable.” The
court calculated that prior to their withdrawal, Kenner worked
165 hours, Greenfield worked 165 hours, and other personnel
worked 100 hours. The court observed although “Defendant

                                    6
Brett Greenfield testified that Plaintiff’s file was so organized
that he could easily provide a written breakdown of the hours
Defendants spent on Plaintiff’s case[,] Defendants failed to
provide such a breakdown of hours to the court.”
       The trial court further found, as noted above, that there
was a “severe breakdown in the attorney client relationship.”
Specifically, the court found reasonable, Attorneys’ concerns after
an August 7, 2017 meeting with Noell, a jury consultant, and an
investigator in which, according to Attorneys, Noell gave such a
different version of events so as potentially to impact whether he
could successfully testify in support of a self-defense strategy.
Thereafter, Noell lost confidence in Attorneys and stopped
cooperating, and ultimately communicating with Attorneys. The
Attorneys withdrew and Noell hired new counsel.
       Regarding the agreed-upon services Attorneys failed to
perform, the trial court found Attorneys did not: (1) take
depositions in the family law matter; (2) complete discovery in
the criminal matter; (3) represent plaintiff at trial; (4) prepare or
attend a mock trial; (5) request a bail review; or (5) request a
modification of the criminal protective order.
       The trial court added, where an attorney has good cause to
withdraw from representation, “the court may allow recovery for
services rendered prior to withdrawal.” “[T]he contract
specifically provided that if [Noell] desires to dismiss [Attorneys,
they] are entitled to attorney fees to be paid ‘up to and including
the date of dismissal.’ ” As noted above, the court found David
Kenner had worked 165 hours, Brett Greenfield 165 hours, and
other personnel 100 hours. The court found Noell had “overpaid
Defendants $52,750.”

                                     7
       The court rejected Attorneys’ argument that “they did not
breach the contract because their performance was excused.” The
court responded, Attorneys “ignore the fact that the contract
specifically provided that if [Noell] desires to dismiss [Attorneys,
they] are entitled to attorney fees to be paid ‘up to and including
the date of dismissal.’ ” “Also, [Attorneys] ignore the fact that
part of the contract was for them to request a modification of the
Criminal Protective Order, and they breached the contract prior
to being relieved by not performing this obligation within a
reasonable time. [Attorneys] ignore the fact that part of the
contract was for them to request a modification of the bail, and
they breached the contract prior to being relieved by not
performing this obligation within a reasonable time. It is also
undisputed that part of the contract was for [Attorneys] to take
depositions in the family law case, to do a mock trial, [and] to
prepare for and attend trial, and as a result of being relieved,
they did not do any of this work. While the Court has accepted
[Attorneys’] representation that they were obligated to withdraw
because of the deterioration in the attorney-client relationship,
the court is unaware of any case that allows an attorney to obtain
a financial windfall when he withdraws from representation.”
       The trial court rejected Noell’s measure of damages. “The
bail modification and criminal protective order modification were
material terms of the contract, and even though [Attorneys]
materially breached the terms of the contract prior to making
their request to be relieved, the court finds that it would be
unjust to require [Attorneys] to disgorge all of the $350,000 that
plaintiff paid.”
       The trial court noted Attorneys’ argument that Noell “may
contact the State Bar to resolve such a dispute,” but responded

                                    8
Noell was not required to do so, and “no one in this action made a
request for arbitration.”

4.    Judgment
      The judgment indicates that prior to trial, the parties
stipulated the Agreement was entered into between Noell and
David Kenner and Brett Greenfield. The court awarded Noell
$52,750 plus interest and costs. Kenner and Greenfield timely
appealed from the judgment. Noell also timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION
       Fundamental principles of appellate review require us to
presume the judgment is correct, indulge all intendments in favor
of a correct judgment, and require an appellant affirmatively to
demonstrate error. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc.
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) We review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the judgment and resolve all conflicts in
its favor. (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570,
574.) Under our standard of review, “parties challenging a trial
court’s factfinding bear an ‘ “enormous burden.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id.
at p. 582.)
       On appeal, no party challenges the trial court’s finding that
the Agreement is valid and enforceable. We thus presume the
correctness of that finding in our analysis. We begin with the
Attorneys’ appeal and then turn to Noell’s cross-appeal.

A.    Attorneys’ Appeal
      Attorneys argue the trial court did not find they breached
the Agreement, and even if they breached the Agreement, their
breach was excused. They also contend because their breach was
excused, they are entitled to retain the entire flat fee.

                                    9
Accordingly, the trial court entered an “improper ‘fee award’
ordering [Attorneys] to return unearned fees.”
      Contrary to Attorneys’ contention, the trial court did find
material breaches, some of which predated Attorneys’ withdrawal
from representing Noell. To recap, the court found:
      (1) The Attorneys did not take depositions in Noell’s family
law case;
      (2) Although the Attorneys conducted some discovery, they
did not complete discovery in the criminal matter;
      (3) The Attorneys did not prepare for, or appear at trial;
      (4) The Attorneys did not attend a mock trial with a mock
jury;
      (5) The Attorneys failed to request a bail review; and
      (6) The Attorneys did not request modification of the
criminal protective order.
      Attorneys do not argue, let alone demonstrate that any of
these findings is erroneous other than to assert the breaches were
excused.
      Turning to that contention, as a general principle, when
one party fails to perform a contractual obligation and the breach
is material, the other party may be excused from performing its
contractual obligations. (Brown v. Grimes (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 265, 277.) According to Attorneys, Noell caused
an attorney client conflict that required them to withdraw. They
conclude from this premise that their obligations under the
Agreement were excused and they were entitled to retain the
entire $350,000 fee.
      Attorneys’ theory ignores their ethical duty as attorneys to
refund a client’s unearned fees, and is based on the incorrect
assumption they performed all of their contractual obligations

                                  10
prior to withdrawing. Attorneys also incorrectly deduce from the
trial court’s finding that because they “had an ethical obligation
to withdraw” they had the right to keep the entire flat fee even
when they did not perform all their contractual obligations. An
attorney’s right to withdraw is a “different question” from an
attorney’s right to fees. (Rus, Miliband & Smith v. Conkle &
Olesten (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 656, 675 [analyzing in a
contingent fee case, when an attorney is entitled to fees on a
quantum meruit basis depending on the grounds for the
attorney’s withdrawal and whether the client fired the attorney
or the withdrawal was voluntary].)
       Even if arguendo Attorneys’ performance were excused
under general contract principles, that would not entitle them to
retain unearned legal fees. An attorney whose employment has
terminated has a professional obligation promptly to refund any
part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned. Rule 1.16
of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct provides, “Upon
the termination of a representation for any reason . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
the lawyer promptly shall refund any part of a fee or expense
paid in advance that the lawyer has not earned or incurred.”
(Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(e)(2), italics added.)5 Here,

      5  Rule 1.16 of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct
was adopted November 1, 2018, after the parties entered the
Agreement. Former rule 3-700, however, contained the same
provision. “It is well established that an attorney’s duties to his
client are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct, and
that those rules, together with statutes and general principles
relating to other fiduciary relationships, ‘help define the duty
component of the fiduciary duty which an attorney owes to his
client.’ [Citation.]” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1032.)

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Attorneys’ employment terminated and they had a professional
obligation to refund that part of the $350,000 flat fee that had not
been earned. Under rule 1.16 of the State Bar Rules of
Professional Conduct, the reason for termination is irrelevant.6
       Attorneys’ argument their performance was excused
because Noell’s conduct is based on the representation that “[u]p
to the time of their withdrawal, [Attorneys] fully performed their
obligations under the agreement.” Attorneys ignore the trial
court’s findings that Attorneys “breached the contract prior to
being relieved” by not seeking modification of the criminal
protective order or a modification to bail. In short, Attorneys’
argument that they could retain the entire $350,000 Noell paid
lacks merit for these independent reasons.
       Attorneys also argue the damages the trial court awarded
Noell was not supported by substantial evidence. We cannot
evaluate this challenge because Attorneys failed to provide a
reporter’s transcript. The record on appeal contains no evidence
of the work Attorneys performed on Noell’s behalf.
       Finally, Attorneys argue we must reverse the judgment
because “the trial court findings and resulting verdict contains
[sic] contradictory findings . . . .” Their argument is based on the
incorrect premise that “the court essentially did not find that
[Attorneys] breached the retainer agreement . . . .” As noted

      6  The requirement that an attorney refund unused fees
is not applicable to a true retainer fee paid solely for the purpose
of ensuring availability of the attorney for the matter. (Rules
Prof. Conduct, rule 1.5(d).) Here, Attorneys do not argue that the
Agreement was a true retainer and acknowledge that instead, the
Agreement contained a “flat fee.”

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above, the trial court found Attorneys committed multiple
breaches.

B.    Noell’s Cross-Appeal
       As noted in our Background, the trial court found the
“contract specifically provided that if [Noell] desires to dismiss
[Attorneys, they] are entitled to attorney fees to be paid ‘up to
and including the date of dismissal.’ ” The trial court also found
although Attorneys “materially breached the terms of the
contract prior to making their request to be relieved, the court
finds that it would be unjust to require [Attorneys] to disgorge all
of the $350,000 that plaintiff paid.” On appeal, Noell argues the
trial court should have instead awarded damages in the amount
of $350,000, the flat fee he paid Attorneys, or the greater amount
Noell paid his replacement counsel.
       The Agreement forecloses Noell’s arguments. The
“Termination of Employment” clause in the Agreement allowed
the Attorneys to receive “fees, costs and expenses for services
rendered, up to and including such date of dismissal.” Further
the Agreement provides, “It is understood and agreed that the
Firm shall not have any responsibility with respect to
relationships of Client and any other lawyer or law firm,
presently, previously or hereafter retained or employed by Client
in connection with the lawsuit as to which legal services are
herein contracted.”
       Noell does not contend these provisions are invalid or
inapplicable. On appeal, Noell does not challenge the
reasonableness of fees the trial court awarded for unearned
services, and the record on appeal is inadequate to assess that
award because we lack a reporter’s transcript. In short, Noell

                                    13
has not demonstrated error in the damage amount awarded on
his breach of contract cause of action.

                        DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Appellant Craig Noell is entitled
to his costs on appeal. Upon the issuance of the remittitur, the
clerk of the court is ordered to forward a copy of this opinion to
the State Bar of California.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          BENDIX, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             WEINGART, J.

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