Court Opinion

ID: 9530782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:03:35.140731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:14.694905
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
Cecil E. Dyer appeals her exceptional sentence of 120 months, which the Superior Court imposed following her plea of guilty to the crime of controlled substances homicide, a violation of RCW 69.50.415(a).1 She contends the sentence, which is the maximum term for this crime, is clearly excessive. We affirm.
The report filed following the presentence investigation indicates Mrs. Dyer was 42 years old at the time of the crime. She frequently babysat Shirley Corona's three daughters, aged 10, 11, and 12. On the evening of December 16, 1989, Ms. Corona took two of the girls to Mrs. Dyer's residence and asked her to watch them because she wanted to go out. Mrs. Dyer said she did not want the girls that night because she was tired, but she reluctantly agreed to *687babysit. Between 5:30 and 6 p.m., she gave the girls some pills to make them sleepy.
At about 3 a.m., Mrs. Dyer was awakened by the 11-year-old's loud snoring. Mr. Dyer also awoke. He was hungry, so Mrs. Dyer brought him some cookies. She then noticed that the 11-year-old had quit snoring and, upon closer observation, saw that she was not breathing. She attempted CPR, then took her to the hospital. The emergency room staff was unable to revive her. An autopsy revealed that the 11-year-old had phenobarbital, methadone, and diazepam in her blood. Urine tests also showed the presence of benzodiazepine metabolic and barbiturates. The cause of death was aspiration pneumonitis as a consequence of administration of the combined medications. A search of the Dyer residence resulted in the seizure of numerous prescription drugs for persons other than Mr. and Mrs. Dyer.
Mrs. Dyer was charged by amended information with controlled substances homicide and three counts of distribution of controlled substances to the younger sister. Mrs. Dyer pleaded guilty in exchange for the prosecutor agreeing to recommend a 36-month sentence and seeking dismissal of the distribution charges. Her standard range sentence would then be 31 to 41 months.
The sentencing court dismissed the distribution charges but rejected the prosecutor's recommendation of a 36-month sentence.2 In its oral ruling, the court stated:
I'm finding that an exceptional sentence is warranted in this case, essentially for two primary reasons. One is that the victim was incapable of resistance because of youth and, secondly, because the victim was misled as to what substance was being given to her. She was led to believe it was a helpful substance, vitamins, something that's innocuous at worst, and in fact she was being given a substance which was controlled, could only be obtained by prescription, and more than one of those substances at that, three different controlled substances.
*688And frankly, controlled-substance homicide, the normal situation in which this is going to occur would be where both the provider and user know what they are doing, know what they are getting, and it turns out bad for the victim, but typically it's a knowing, understanding situation where one person has drugs and they are giving them to another person who wants to use that particular drug, and so that wasn't the case at all in this situation. It was not knowing in any way on the part of the victim as to what she was taking, let alone the risk involved, although it — those kinds of things were known to the defendant here.
And the second aspect of it was she was using her position of trust with this child to facilitate the crime. The child referred to her as Grandma, and she was using that position of trust to give the drugs to the child, to get the child to take them.
And for those reasons, the Court finds that an exceptional sentence is warranted, and the Court finds that ten years is a fair exceptional sentence.
The court's written findings refer to the same factors.
Our review of the trial court's sentence is governed by ROW 9.94A.210(4):
To reverse a sentence which is outside the sentence range, the reviewing court must find: (a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing judge are not supported by the record which was before the judge or that those reasons do not justify a sentence outside the standard range for that offense; or (b) that the sentence imposed was clearly excessive or clearly too lenient.
(Italics ours.) Mrs. Dyer's argument is concerned with the italicized provision.3 She contends the sentencing court gave no reason for the length of the sentence and did not exercise its discretion when it imposed the maximum term. In support of her argument, Mrs. Dyer relies on State v. Pryor, 56 Wn. App. 107, 782 P.2d 1076 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, 115 Wn.2d 445, 799 P.2d 244 (1990).
In State v. Oxborrow, 106 Wn.2d 525, 530, 723 P.2d 1123 (1986), the court held that "the sentencing court's decision regarding length of an exceptional sentence should *689not be reversed as 'clearly excessive' absent an abuse of discretion." See also State v. McNeil, 59 Wn. App. 478, 480, 798 P.2d 817 (1990). Pryor, 56 Wn. App. at 123, applied the Oxborrow standard, but noted "the term of the exceptional sentence must nevertheless have some tenable basis in the record." However, the standard of review of the length of an exceptional sentence continues to be abuse of discretion. Pryor simply restated the long-standing definition of abuse of discretion, i.e., was the trial court's conclusion the product of an exercise of discretion that was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons? State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971); Layne v. Hyde, 54 Wn. App. 125, 135, 773 P.2d 83, review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1016 (1989). The decision in Pryor does not purport to change this standard as applied to the review of the length of an exceptional sentence. Were we to change the standard, we would be in conflict with the holding in Oxborrow and would be substituting our judgment for that of the sentencing court. The Legislature did not intend such a result.
The term of the exceptional sentence in this case does have a tenable basis in the record. Specifically, the reasons given by the court in imposing the exceptional sentence also justify sentencing Mrs. Dyer to the maximum term. This was not an ordinary homicide by controlled substances in which a willing user dies as a result of drugs supplied by a defendant. The situation here is egregious, involving a totally innocent and unsuspecting victim. It is comparable to Oxborrow, in which the defendant's first degree theft conviction was based upon a fraud involving more than $1 million and fulfilling all the listed criteria for a "major economic offense" under RCW 9.94A.390. Oxborrow, at 533. As in Oxborrow, " [sjurely this is the quintessential crime for which the Legislature contemplated a maximum sentence". Oxborrow, at 533. We find no abuse of discretion.
We emphasize that our holding is not a general invitation to sentencing courts to impose the maximum term whenever an exceptional sentence is justified. Rather, we uphold *690Mrs. Dyer's maximum sentence because the record evidences a "worst case" scenario in which the "circumstances of the crime distinguish it from other crimes of the same statutory category." (Italics ours.) State v. Woody, 48 Wn. App. 772, 778, 742 P.2d 133 (1987) (citing D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 9.6, at 9-13 (1985)), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1006 (1988). The statutory category here is controlled substances homicide; not manslaughter, as the dissent suggests by its citation to sentences for first degree manslaughter.
Likewise, the dissent's reliance on cases such as State v. Norman, 61 Wn. App. 16, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991) is misplaced. There, the defendant had refused to seek medical aid for his obviously ill son and beat the child repeatedly until a few hours before the boy's death. He was convicted of first degree manslaughter and received a sentence of 4 years. The dissent asserts that if 4 years for that crime was appropriate, then 10 years for Mrs. Dyer's crime must be inappropriate. What the dissent ignores is the posture of the Norman case. The appropriateness of Mr. Norman's sentence was not an issue on appeal. In fact, the filed opinion in Norman does not indicate the length of Mr. Norman's sentence. Hence, that opinion cannot be read as approving or disapproving the sentence imposed there.
Affirmed.
Green, C.J., concurs.

RCW 69.50.415(a) provides:
1A person who unlawfully delivers a controlled substance in violation of RCW 69.50.401(a)(1) (i) or (ii) which controlled substance is subsequently used by the person to whom it was delivered, resulting in the death of the user, is guilty of controlled substances homicide."

The author of the presentence investigation report recommended a high-end standard range sentence of 41 months.

In her pro se brief, Mrs. Dyer generally contends the court erred in sentencing her outside the standard range. She does not make a specific argument in support of her contention. We hold that the reasons relied upon by the sentencing court are supported by the record and justify the exceptional sentence. See State v. Fisher, 108 Wn.2d 419, 426, 739 P.2d 683 (1987).