Court Opinion

ID: 9579761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:21.020191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:45.096354
License: Public Domain

Calhoun, President,
dissenting:
In 1960, this Court approved a verdict for $50,000 for personal injuries suffered by a young man nineteen years of *205age. Nugen v. Hildebrand, 145 W. Va. 420, 114 S. E. 2d 896. It is my understanding that such was the largest verdict for personal injuries to a single individual ever to have been upheld by the Court to that date. Assuming that my understanding in this respect is correct, it must he regarded as a matter of more than passing moment that the Court in the present case has approved a verdict for personal injuries to a single individual which is 100 % greater in amount than any heretofore upheld in a similar case.
“This Court will set aside a jury verdict as excessive which is so high that it plainly appears to have resulted from mistake, partiality, passion, prejudice or lack of due consideration.” Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc., 138 W. Va. 437, pt. 11 syl., 76 S. E. 2d 916; Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, 134 W. Va. 815, pt. 6 syl., 62 S. E. 2d 126. “A verdict clearly in excess of the amount which the evidence shows the plaintiff is justly entitled to recover should he set aside by the trial court.” Thomason v. Mosrie, 134 W. Va. 634, pt. 2 syl., 60 S. E. 2d 699; Drummond v. Cook Motor Lines, 136 W. Va. 293, syl., 67 S. E. 2d 337. Such a verdict will be set aside when “it is clearly shown that the jury was misled by a mistaken view of the case.” French v. Sinkford, 132 W. Va. 66, pt. 3 syl., 54 S. E. 2d 38. It is not essential that actual fraud, prejudice or passion on the part of the jury appear before a court is warranted in setting aside a verdict for excessiveness. In the case of French v. Sinkford, 132 W. Va. 66, 75, 54 S. E. 2d 38, 43, the Court, in setting aside a verdict, stated: “We must always reason from what a jury does, rather than attempt to show the mental process which actuated its act.”
While this Court has displayed an appropriate reluctance to disturb jury verdicts for excessiveness, it has just as appropriately not hesitated tó do so in proper cases. “True, the finding of a jury is seldom disturbed on account of amount, especially where the law sets up no measure or standard of value. But the finding of a jury is in no case beyond the healthful and salutary control of the courts. Strong as is the function of a jury as to damages, whether in cases purely sounding in damages for tort, or where the law *206fixes a standard, its power is not arbitrary and unlimited, and cannot be allowed to work injustice and oppression.” 5 M. J., Damages, Section 52, page 544.
In the case of Virginian Railway Co. v. Armentrout, 166 F. 2d 400, 4 A.L.R. 2d 1064, in setting aside a verdict rendered in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia, the court quoted from the opinion in the case of Smith v. Times Publishing Co., 178 Pa. 481, 36 A. 296, 35 L.R.A. 819, as follows: “ ‘The authority of the common pleas in the control and revision of excessive verdicts through the means of new trials was firmly settled in England before the foundation of this colony, and has always existed here without challenge under any of our constitutions. It is a power to examine the whole case on the law and the evidence, with a view to securing a result, not merely legal, but also not manifestly against justice, — a power exercised in pursuance of a sound judicial discretion, without which the jury system would be a capricious and intolerable tyranny, which no people could long endure. This court has had occasion more than once recently to say that it was a power the courts ought to exercise unflinchingly.’ ”
I am wholeheartedly in accord with the well settled legal proposition that courts should be reluctant to set aside jury verdicts because of excessiveness; but I am just as strongly of the conviction that courts should be diligent in exercising the fundamental judicial function of protecting both parties against verdicts which are unwarranted in amount, whether too large or too small.
Every time any motorist goes upon a public highway, he is potentially both a plaintiff and a defendant. -For every plaintiff there must be a defendant, and vice versa. Their numbers are perhaps about equal. Either role may involve great hardship completely contrary to the will, intent or desire of either. Such risks are an incident of motor vehicular travel on modern public highways. Problems resulting involve not only life and health, but they have economic implications also.
*207In performing their solemn roles in the vast horde of suits for damages arising from injuries inflicted by negligent motorists, courts are not interested in the return of big verdicts or small verdicts. Their solemn job is, so far as mortal capacity permits, to bend their energies toward the attainment of fair verdicts.
I concede to nobody a more genuine sympathy for the plaintiff in this case and for all other persons injured in person or property by negligent motorists. But I do feel that we cannot arrive at a fair verdict by posing the question: How much in money would you require to submit to such pain, suffering and disability? I apprehend that the law does not contemplate that such amounts be fixed across the bargaining counter. It is not a matter of bargain and sale, involving “a willing seller and a willing buyer.” Perhaps only in literature has a value of a pound of flesh been determined on a contractual basis. The law has fixed no certain yardstick or formula for arriving at a fair verdict for personal injuries. It must be left to the conscience and sound judgment of those having the solemn duty of fixing the amount after carefully weighing all proper considerations.
This case involves a seriously injured woman, a resident of Webster County, against a Pennsylvania corporation. Any judge or practicing attorney of appreciable experience in trial courts cannot fail to recognize a jury trial of that nature as a contest of unequal odds. It is the type of contest which enhances the duty of a trial judge and of appellate judges in appraising the fairness and reasonableness of a jury’s verdict.
Webster County, like the counties in which most of my past| life has been lived, is not one of the populous, metropolitan or wealthy counties of the state. One hundred thousand dollar situations do not abound or occur frequently in that county or any other county of this state. It is inconceivable to me that a verdict of this nature would have been rendered in this case had the defendant been an average individual citizen of the county rather than a Pennsylvania corporation. Whatever may be a fair verdict in a case such *208as this, the amount thereof cannot be permitted to vary according to the identity, status.or nature of the defendant.
While the plaintiff’s injuries were severe, various facts preclude her case from being an exceptional one from the standpoint of damages. She was forty-nine years of age when she was injured on April 1, 1960. She kept house for herself and two children aged sixteen and fourteen, respectively. She also did housework for others on a day-to-day basis. She estimated her earnings from this work at $60 a month. She was also receiving a monthly public assistance check of $87. She had sold cosmetics for one month prior to the date she was injured and had thereby earned $30. That is to say, she was not a young person, and she was in a comparatively low income bracket. Strange as it maj? seem, there was no proof of the plaintiff’s life expectancy. As a matter of fact, the record in many respects leaves much to be desired by a court which is asked to approve a $100,000 verdict. Counsel for the plaintiff state in their brief that they have the case on a contingent fee basis of one-third. The verdict, therefore, is drawing interest which yields $4,000 annually to the plaintiff and $2,000 annually to her counsel.
The total of plaintiff’s doctor and hospital bills is $1474.79. The evidence falls short of establishing future total disability, either temporary or permanent. Her chief attending physician, Dr. Jack W. Hunter, testified simply that “* * * she will continue to have pain and discomfort, especially in her neck and shoulder joints.” He was asked the following question and gave the following answer: “Q. What in your opinion would be the effect of this pain and these injuries in her working and moving about in the normal manner of living? A. The usual routine would be somewhat restricted. She would not be able to do as much work as she previously did.” The other physician who treated the plaintiff, Dr. George Edmiston, testified that she would have arthritis permanently and that it would get worse. Later he was questioned as follows: ■ “* * * Would she be able to do her normal house work with the exception of the things that would require lifting and reaching, which you demon*209strated?”, to which he replied, “I would not want to maké a statement as to what her work capacity would be. I would assume she could do light house work which would not require any heavy work or lifting or reaching above the head.” Dr. Hunter- gave the following additional testimony:
“Q. Mrs. Williams’ physical condition at the present time, would that permit her to carry on her normal house work?
“A. I would say she coud to a certain extent but not to the extent she did before.
“Q. You would not consider her a helpless person?
“A. No, indeed.”
The plaintiff was hospitalized from April 1 to May 22, 1960. Between the date of her discharge from the hospital and the date of the trial, which commenced on May 17, 1961, a period of almost a year, she seems to have required relatively little attention by physicians. .
In other words, considering the plaintiff’s age, her previous earnings, the extent of her hospitalization and medical treatment, the amount of her medical and hospital bills and the extent of her disability, I am not convinced that this is an exceptional case which would require such an exceptionally large verdict. I believe that in our effort to determine the reasonableness of a verdict, we should consider it on a relative basis. Since the Court upholds the verdict in this case, I can readily envision many cases coming before courts of this state which, when considered on a relative basis, will call for verdicts of several times $100,060 for personal injuries suffered by a single individual. I feel that such presents an unrealistic situation and one which cannot be supported from an economic standpoint. Defendants must be thought of in this connection, I believe, not simply as corporations which may be wealthy and carry heavy insurance, but rather I feel we must think of the defendant as an average defendant, whether individual, corporate or otherwise.
*210For reasons stated herein, I would reverse the judgment because of the excessiveness of the verdict and remand the case for a new trial.
The case from the standpoint of both primary negligence and contributory negligence is, in my judgment, a very close one. Chapter 17C, Article 10, Section 6 (b) of the Code, 1931, as amended, provides: “Where sidewalks are not provided any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall when practicable walk only on the left side of the roadway or its shoulder facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction.” The plaintiff’s testimony indicates that she saw the defendant’s truck, apparently in motion; that she assumed that it was about to proceed in the opposite direction; and that under such circumstances she turned her back toward the truck and proceeded to walk on the berm on the right side of the highway, where motor vehicles customarily traveled. However, this statute was not urged before the trial court and jury. The plaintiff’s only excuse for walking on the right side of the highway was that there was a service station adjacent to the sidewalk on the opposite side of the highway. No map, plat or photograph appears in the record to portray the situation relative to this critical element of the case.
I do not base my dissent on questions pertaining to primary negligence and contributory negligence, but I do want to record my view that salutary statutory provisions of this nature are quite generally held to bar recovery by pedestrian plaintiffs. Perhaps in the majority of jurisdictions such conduct on the part of a pedestrian plaintiff is held as a matter of law to be negligence sufficient to bar recovery. Lloyd v. Andrews, 192 Va. 41, 63 S. E. 2d 734; Crouse v. Pugh, 188 Va. 156, 49 S. E. 2d 421, 4 A.L.R. 2d 1242; Standridge v. Godsey, 189 Tenn. 522, 226 S. W. 2d 277; Annotation 4 A.L.R. 2d 1253.