Court Opinion

ID: 9845655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:25:52.702484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:17.362525
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to Division 2 of the majority opinion. The majority finds no reversible error here in part because the witness did answer certain questions prior to invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege and, according to the majority, it was only the answers to those prior questions which were incriminating to the defendant. While it is true that the witness’ answers to some of the questions concerning his relationship with the defendant raised an inference concerning the defendant’s involvement in criminal activities, I believe the most damaging aspect of the witness’ testimony was his acknowledgement that he had given an incriminating statement to Florida authorities and his subsequent refusal to answer questions about the contents of that statement. Thus I think it matters little whether the defendant could have confronted the witness about other aspects of his testimony as the defendant could not confront the witness about the most damaging aspect of his testimony.
I also disagree that defendant invited the error here. The State knew of the witness’ intention not to testify about the incriminating statement, and it was incumbent upon the State, the party calling the witness, to request a hearing at the outset of the testimony, or at a minimum, to request a hearing before the question was asked which the State knew would cause the witness to invoke the privilege.
As I read the majority, reversible error occurs only if the State does exactly what the prosecutor did in Lingerfelt v. State, 235 Ga. 139 (218 SE2d 752) (1975). Such a rote application of precedent ignores the underlying rationale in that case and allows the State to circumvent the procedure established pursuant to Lingerfelt and its progeny. In my opinion, defendant’s motion for mistrial should have been granted.