Court Opinion

ID: 9709186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:42:14.676673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:46.651688
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). The sole issue in this case is the interpretation of a plainly worded statute:1 does that statute grant the plaintiff, a discharged patient of the defendant Institute of Living, access to her medical records.
Section 4-104 of the General Statutes provides that a private hospital receiving state aid shall, upon the demand of any discharged patient, permit such patient to examine his or her medical records. That the plaintiff, Jane Doe, is a former patient and that the defendant Institute of Living is a hospital which receives property tax exemptions cannot he disputed. See Institute of Living v. Hartford, 133 Conn. 258, 272, 50 A.2d 822.
This court has repeatedly held that when the state grants exemptions to an institution from the payment of taxes, it gives aid to such institution *67“just as much and just as efficiently as it would by the appropriation of an amount equal to the taxes the corporation or institution would be required to pay were there no exemption. The result in either case, although accomplished by different means, is precisely the same.” Corbin v. Baldwin, 92 Conn. 99, 105, 101 A. 834; Snyder v. Newton, 147 Conn. 374, 386, 161 A.2d 770, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S. Ct. 692, 5 L. Ed. 2d 688; Legat v. Adorno, 138 Conn. 134, 143, 83 A.2d 185; Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 516, 52 A.2d 702; Corbin v. American Industrial Bank & Trust Co., 95 Conn. 50, 52, 110 A. 459.
Indeed, to the recipient institution, an exemption from taxes is in many ways a more effective way of receiving state aid than a direct pecuniary appropriation. A direct appropriation depends each year upon the will of the legislature and the fullness of the state’s coffers. The tax exemptions, on the other hand, are granted on a perpetual basis as long as the exempt institution abides by the provisions of § 12-812 of the General Statutes. The statutes exempt the institution not only from property taxes but from state sales taxes and state succession taxes as well.
In any event, the statute under consideration says nothing about direct appropriations: it speaks only of state aid. Because the Institute of Living *68receives state aid through its tax exemptions it is subject to the provisions of § 4-104 of the General Statutes and must permit the plaintiff to examine her medical record. Her right to the record is unconditional. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and is not subject to modification by construction. Colli v. Real Estate Commission, 169 Conn. 445, 450, 364 A.2d 167; Bahre v. Hogbloom, 162 Conn. 549, 553, 295 A.2d 547. “We cannot ‘search out some intent which we may believe the legislature actually had and give effect to it, . . . we are confined to the intention which is expressed in the words it has used.’ Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 301, 57 A.2d 128.” Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110, 374 A.2d 133; Madison Education Assn. v. Madison, 174 Conn. 189, 192, 384 A.2d 361.
Whether a discharged mental patient should have unrestricted access to his or her medical record is a matter which must be addressed to the legislature and not to the court. “Legislation consists of formulating a rule for the future. A judgment [of the court] applies the law to past or present facts.” Eastern Oil Refining Co. v. Court of Burgesses, 130 Conn. 606, 610, 36 A.2d 586; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150. This court, therefore, cannot go any further than to apply the law to the statute as presently written.
Moreover, the effect of the majority opinion is to invite a challenge to the statute as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clauses of the Connecticut and the federal constitutions on the ground that the state cannot grant rights to one class of persons and deny those same rights to *69another class of persons similarly situated without a rational basis for the distinction. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 640, 376 A.2d 359. A difference in status can provide a difference in treatment only if the classification bears a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989. There can be no basis for such a classification here.
The questions reserved should be answered as follows: (1) Yes; (2) Yes; (3) Yes; (4) No.

 “[General Statutes] See. 4-104. inspection and subpoena op hospital records. Each private hospital, public hospital society or corporation receiving state aid shall, upon the demand of any patient who has been treated in such hospital and after his discharge therefrom, permit such patient or his physician or authorized attorney to examine the hospital record, including the history, bedside notes, charts, pictures and plates kept in connection with the treatment of such patient, and permit copies of such history, bedside notes and charts to be made by such patient, his physician or authorized attorney. . . .”

 General Statutes § 12-81 provides in pertinent part: “The following-described property shall be exempt from taxation: . . . (16) Hospitals and sanatoriums” provided that “quadrennially ... a statement on forms prepared by the tax commissioner shall be filed by such hospital society, corporation or sanatorium on or before the last day required by law for the filing of assessment returns with the local board of assessors of any town, consolidated town and city or consolidated town and borough, in which any of its property claimed to be exempt is situated.”