Court Opinion

ID: 9563962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:51:12.248918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:09.633239
License: Public Domain

KEETON, Chief Justice,
with whom
SMITH, Justice, concurs, dissenting:
This appeal presents for determination the power of the District Judge, under the provisions of Sec. 19-2601, I.C. (formerly Sec. 19-2501, I.C.A.) to commute in whole or in part the sentence to be imposed on a person who has pleaded guilty or been convicted of a crime. The District Judge did commute respondent’s sentence.
Under this provision, Sec. 19-2601, the District Court is granted power, in its discretion, to commute the sentence, confine the defendant in the county jail, suspend the execution of the judgment, withhold the judgment, or place the one convicted on probation.
“Commute” as used in Sec. 19-2601, and as generally defined, means to substitute a sentence less severe than the maximum prescribed by law.
The provision of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and to read something into it, not expressly stated, is to amend it by judicial construction.
If Sec. 19-2501, I.C.A., did not grant the District Court power to lessen a penitentiary sentence from that prescribed by law, then it is clear that the Legislature intended by the amendment to change the *219meaning of the statute as it formerly existed, and it must be assumed that the meaning as changed by the amendment, was intended. Effect should be given to the statute as so amended.
The Legislature clearly stated the purpose of the amendment; its meaning should not be changed by judicial construction.
When a statute is amended it carries with it the presumption that the Legislature intended the statute as amended to have a different meaning than theretofore accorded it. Union Pacific Ins. Co. v. Bakes, 57 Idaho 537, 67 P.2d 1024.
The obvious intention of a legislative enactment should prevail where the words used can be given a construction that will effectuate that intention. In re Segregation of School District #58, from Rural High School District #1, 34 Idaho 222, 200 P. 138.
Nor should the courts insert words in a statute which is plain and unambiguous and which does not need such insertion to determine the meaning. Courts in interpreting such a statute should be guided by the language used, thereby to ascertain and declare the intention of the Legislature. 50 Am.Jur., Sec. 223, p. 200; Packard v. O’Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262 P. 881, 56 A.L.R. 317; Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 220 P. 1088, 35 A.L.R. 200. It is a general rule that courts will not by construction insert words or phrases in a statute. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes; Sec. 234, p. 221, and collection of cases under note 20.
In Cabell v. City of Cottage Grove, 170 Or. 256, 130 P.2d 1013, syl. 11, 144 A.L.R. 286, the Oregon Court held that words should never be inserted into a statute unless necessary to give effect to the obvious and plain intention or meaning of the Legislature.
The majority opinion of the Court inserts the word “and” which gives the statute a meaning not shown by its terms. To say that the Legislature so intended is to usurp the powers of the Legislature and in this particular situation hold in substance that the court could have given the prisoner a jail sentence, but if he were sentenced to the penitentiary the sentence imposed would have to be the maximum of fifteen years. Such an interpretation and such insertion of a word is judicial legislation.
When the Legislature amends a prior act, there arises a presumption that some change in meaning was intended. In Boise Street Car Co. v. Ada County, 50 Idaho 304, 296 P. 1019, 1021, this Court held:
“Undoubtedly, in certain cases, the courts do have the power to read words into an act. But it is a power that should be exercised with caution, and should be indulged only when the omission is palpable and the omitted word clearly indicated by the context. Where *220the omission is not plainly indicated, and the statute, as written, is not incongruous or unintelligible, and leads to no absurd results, the court is not justified in making an interpolation.”
In the situation presented there is no reason to change the statute by interpolation or otherwise.
The fact that the bill as originally enacted did not contain “asterisks” or underline the word “or” when substituted for the word “and” is of no importance. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662, syl. 9, holds:
“The power of legislative houses to make their own rules is for orderly procedure and expedition and disposition of their business, and failure to comply with such rules does not invalidate resolutions or legislative acts.”
The amended enactment contains no obvious clerical error or misprint necessitating correction by judicial interpretation or otherwise. Where there is any reasonable doubt about the meaning of a statute, it should be construed in favor of the prisoner.
The case should not be remanded for a new sentence. The judgment was not appealed from. The State simply asks that the commutation part of the sentence be stricken as surplusage.
If I correctly interpret the majority opinion the prisoner is to be returned to Kootenai County for resentencing, and the Court then would have the power to commute the entire penitentiary sentence to a jail sentence, or in its discretion to release the prisoner on probation.
The interpretation expressed in this dissent of Sec. 19-2601, I.C. relative to the intention of the Legislature is also fortified by Ch. 156, page 266, and Ch. 47, page 82, of the 1957 Session Laws. The Legislature has taken notice of the disparity' of sentences imposed and has attempted to-correct inequities by the enactment of these two chapters.
The District Judge had the power to-commute the sentence. The order appealed from should be affirmed.