Court Opinion

ID: 9604165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:15:51.155323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:16.315926
License: Public Domain

ARABIAN, J.
I respectfully dissent.
At its best, a judicial opinion not only decides a case, but also provides a factually accurate and reasoned statement of the grounds which impel the result. In this way, each decision effectively becomes an exercise in political and moral leadership. As Justice Holmes observed, “Every opinion tends to become a law.” (Lochner v. People of State of New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45, 76 [49 L.Ed. 937, 949, 25 S.Ct. 539].) Thus, as I have elsewhere observed, the court’s fundamental responsibility is “to place before the people . . . the common sense of the subject, not merely in the idiom of the law, but in terms so plain, firm and true as to compel their assent.” (Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 915 [281 Cal.Rptr. 34, 809 P.2d 809] (conc. opn. by Arabian, J.)
Recently, in J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009 [278 Cal.Rptr. 64, 804 P.2d 689] (J. C. Penney), we had the occasion to articulate an important policy concerning the availability of insurance benefits for wilful misconduct. Construing section 533 of the Insurance Code, *1090we held that public policy prohibits an insurer from providing coverage for injuries resulting from the sexual molestation of a child. Whatever the subjective beliefs, a child molester cannot disclaim an intent to harm the victim. (Id. at p. 1021.) Thus, we joined the vast majority of jurisdictions which hold such misconduct to be noncompensable.
Here, we are confronted with the argument that a child molester who not only molests his victim, but also enters a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct, and subjects her to to a continuous course of seduction culminating in the sexual violation, cannot be said, as a matter of law, to have intended harm. It is claimed that such a case is distinguishable from J. C. Penney, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1009, because the molester’s “nonsexual” acts “negligently” caused the victim unintended emotional distress, thus triggering the insurer’s duty to defend, if not indemnify, the child molester.
Fundamental common sense and sensitivity must compel the rejection of such a claim. Hugging, kissing or merely flirting with a minor become intentional acts of emotional, if not physical, violence when, as here, they are used to accomplish the sexual gratification of an adult. “The night and day distinction between acts of compassion and those motivated by wanton salacity is one which the reasonable person could not confuse.” (Whaley v. State (Okla. Crim. 1976) 556 P.2d 1063, 1064.) Accordingly, the same reasoning and policies which informed our decision in J. C. Penney, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1009, apply with equal force here. It is unfortunate that those laudable policies and that decision should be undermined so soon after their announcement.
Discussion
1. Background
This court has long acknowledged the duty of an insurer to defend its insureds against claims which create a potential for coverage, including claims that are groundless, false or fraudulent. (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 273-275 [54 Cal.Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168].) However, it is equally settled that “ ‘where there is no possibility of coverage, there is no duty to defend.’ ” (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Abbott (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1029 [251 Cal.Rptr. 620].) Although courts traditionally look to the complaint and the terms of the policy to determine that potential, we made clear in Gray that the duty to defend may be triggered by extrinsic facts apprising the insurer of the possibility of coverage. (65 Cal.2d at pp. 276-277.)
*1091Conversely, where extrinsic facts conclusively eliminate any potential for coverage, an insurer may, at its own risk, decline to defend even where the bare allegations in the complaint suggest potential liability. (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Flynt (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 538, 548-549 [95 Cal.Rptr. 296]; Atlas Assurance Co. v. McCombs Corp. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 135, 145 [194 Cal.Rptr. 66]; Saylin v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 256, 263-264 [224 Cal.Rptr. 493]; Fire Ins. Exchange v. Jiminez (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 437, 442-443 [229 Cal.Rptr. 83].) As Justice Tobriner cogently explained in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., supra, 65 Cal.2d 263, “[T]he duty to defend should be fixed by the facts which the insurer learns from the complaint, the insured, or other sources.” (Id. at p. 276.)
There is no potential for coverage where the gravamen of a complaint is the sexual molestation of a child. (J. C. Penney, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1014.) As we there explained, “The very essence of child molestation is the gratification of sexual desire. The act is the harm.” (Id. at p. 1021, italics added.) Hence, as a matter of law Insurance Code section 533 precludes coverage. (Id. at pp. 1014, 1028.) It follows, under settled law, that the insurer has no duty to defend such a case. (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Abbott, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1029.)
2. Duty to Defend for Insured’s Related Misconduct
As this and other cases sadly illustrate, the criminal act of sexual molestation (Pen. Code, § 288) is often accompanied by ancillary misconduct designed to facilitate the ultimate sexual exploitation. Such acts may include attempts to isolate the minor from his or her peers, induce an emotional dependence, or arouse a precocious sexual response though manipulative foreplay such as kissing, petting or hugging. (See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [256 Cal.Rptr. 766,769 P.2d 948], [teacher used private tutoring sessions to “develop a close relationship” with the minor which he sexually exploited]; Fire Ins. Exchange v. Abbott, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1017 [teacher made student feel that he “was his only friend and was very supportive” to accomplish subsequent sexual molestation]; State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Abraio (9th Cir. 1989) 874 F.2d 619, 623 [molester “sought opportunities to be alone with (the minor), taking her on motorcycle rides and camping trips far from the protection of her family.”].)
This genre of premeditated sexual manipulation is present here. Defendant, Barbara B., alleges that her teacher, Gary Lee, engaged in a calculated course of misconduct which included removing her from class, arranging to be alone with her during the school day, allowing her to sit on his lap, *1092kissing, hugging and putting his arm around her, making sexually suggestive jokes, fomenting rumors of a sexual relationship with her, making her his “teacher’s pet,” and engaging in childish and flirtatious behavior.
Viewing these allegations in still-frame isolation, the majority assert that “[njothing in the complaint or the materials submitted in connection with the summary judgment proceedings enabled Horace Mann to determine that those allegations were related to the molestation . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1083.) On the contrary, the record discloses that the “nonsexual” allegations and the sexual molestation were not only “related,” but effectively inseparable. The very document in which defendant recites Lee’s litany of “nonsexual” misconduct states that these acts served to isolate Barbara B. from her peers, induced an emotional dependence on Lee, and forced her to seek Lee’s favor and approval, thus facilitating the sexual molestation. Referring to these specific “nonsexual” acts, plaintiff states: “Overall, by the demeaning nature of Gary Lee in public towards Barbara [B.], Gary Lee forced Barbara [B.] to become further and further isolated from her peers and friends, and to turn to only him for emotional support. Gary’s exercise of control over Barbara included the allowing of her to eat in the band room alone, which meant she would not be teased or harassed by her peers, f In addition, Gary Lee did not treat Barbara [B.] in public like a person, but as a thing. This caused Barbara [B.] to seek Gary Lee’s praise, approval or favor.” (Italics added.)
It is difficult to conceive a purer example of psychological and physical manipulation designed to seduce an innocent minor. As defendant herself states, these other acts “isolated” her from her peers, forced her to “turn to [Lee] for emotional support,” and “caused [her] to seek [Lee’s] praise, approval or favor.” Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, this is not “harassing conduct separable from the molestation” (maj. opn., ante, p. 1087, italics added), but rather a pattern of corrupt behavior targeting a victim for sexual exploitation. The record demonstrates that these ancillary acts which the majority repeatedly characterize as “separable from the molestation” in fact were inextricably linked to Lee’s pedophilia. Relabeling such misconduct as “nonsexual” or “negligent” cannot alter its true nature and intent, nor withstand informed scrutiny.
Viewed in isolation, some of the alleged “nonsexual” acts might not appear to be intentional or part and parcel of the molestation. But the facts must be viewed in their entirety, not antiseptically separated and microscopically examined. Lee’s attempts to isolate defendant and to make her emotionally dependent on his favor and approval, although not per se criminal, bore a direct causal relationship to the molestation. Under the circumstances, *1093these acts must themselves must be considered intentional, wrongful and inherently harmful.
In sum, the extrinsic evidence adduced by defendant conclusively eliminated any potential for coverage. Horace Mann reasonably determined that it had no duty to defend.
3. Case Law Supports a Finding of No Duty to Defend
Not surprisingly, the foregoing analysis is consistent with several recent decisions from other jurisdictions. In Houg v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. (Minn.App. 1992) 481 N.W.2d 393, a church pastor who was sued by a parishioner brought a declaratory relief action to determine his insurer’s duty to defend. The complaint alleged that during the process of counseling, the pastor (Houg) “engaged in a course of conduct designed to entice and seduce” the parishioner, M.C., and that he ultimately coerced her into sexual relations. (Id. at p. 395.) While conceding that the policy did not apply to the sexual misconduct, Houg claimed that the allegations of emotional distress resulting from “negligent counseling” were potentially covered. Nevertheless, the court held there was no duty to defend, observing that “any alleged negligence in Houg’s counseling centers on his entering into a sexual relationship with M.C. Any negligent counseling is so intertwined with Houg’s sexual exploitation of a psychologically dependent person as to be inseparable.” (Id. at p. 397, italics added.)
As earlier discussed, Lee’s “other” acts here were no less “intertwined” with the molestation. Like the pastor’s negligent counseling, Lee’s attempts to isolate Barbara B. and to induce an emotional dependence on his continued favor and approval were so inextricably linked with his “sexual exploitation of a psychologically dependent person as to be inseparable.” (Houg v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., supra, 481 N.W.2d at p. 397.)
Another case closely on point is Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber (W. Va. 1988) 376 S.E.2d 581. There, the insurer filed a declaratory relief action to determine its duty to defend a teacher who had sexual relations with one of his students, Brian H., and pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual abuse. The complaint by the student’s parents alleged that the teacher, Leeber, had “cultivated an abnormal relationship with some of his students, trying to become their friend, confidant and surrogate parent.” (Id. at pp. 582-583.) They demanded damages for intentional and “negligent acts” in having sexual contacts with the student and “in seducing and enticing him into a relationship which caused emotional distress to Brian H. and his parents.” (Id. at p. 583.) The court held that there was no duty to defend the claim of *1094intentional sexual misconduct or the alleged “negligent conduct, a sort of ‘negligent’ seduction into the nonphysical aspects of the relationship with Brian H. so as to cause emotional harm.” (Id. at p. 587.) These alleged “nonphysical” acts which comprised the so-called “negligent seduction,” the court held, were nothing more than a “ ‘transparent attempt to trigger insurance coverage by characterizing allegations of [intentional] tortious conduct under the guise of negligent activity.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Linebaugh v. Berdish (1985) 144 Mich.App. 750 [376 N.W.2d 400, 406], italics added.)
The instant case is essentially indistinguishable. The “nonsexual” acts alleged by defendant represent nothing if not a concerted seduction by every means at Lee’s disposal. Defendant’s effort to premise a duty to defend on the basis of these allegations is no less “transparent” than the similar attempt in Leeber. Like the court there, we should decline to be deluded into a result that flies in the face of common sense and undermines our own judicial philosophy.
It is beyond serious dispute that once the duty to defend attaches, the insurer often finds it necessary to fund all or part of a settlement regardless of its underlying duty to indemnify, because the costs of defense may far exceed the settlement offer. The duty to defend becomes, in effect, the duty to indemnify. Because almost every complaint based on child molestation can truthfully allege pre- or postmolestation acts designed to facilitate or cover up the sexual misconduct (see John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d 438; Fire Ins. Exchange v. Abbott, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d 1012), the net effect of the majority opinion is to nullify our holding in J. C. Penney, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1009, that the insurer owes no duty to pay for damages resulting from child molestation.
Conclusion
The majority have created a fictional character that rivals any we have previously encountered, the bifurcated molester—a modern day Jekyll and Hyde whose sexual transgressions against a minor must be considered inherently harmful and noninsurable, but whose “harassing conduct” which assists the molestation is merely negligent and hence potentially insurable.
If the taking of this path represents an exercise of judicial leadership, I fear we have gone seriously astray. We have entered a valley of trees and have lost sight of the forest. But then a forest, like beauty, exists only in the eye of the beholder.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 13, 1993, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Arabian, J., and Baxter, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.