Court Opinion

ID: 9757715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:56:32.668983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:43.565495
License: Public Domain

OPINION
Justice ROBINSON
for the Court.
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island has certified a question of law to this Court pursuant to Article I, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 The *293defendants in the underlying federal court civil action have moved for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs employment discrimination claims are time-barred. Before rendering a decision with respect to the defendants’ motion, the District Court certified the following question to this Court:
“What is the statute of limitations applicable to an employment discrimination claim asserted under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (‘RICRA’), R.I. Gen. Laws 42-112-1 et seq.?”2
The plaintiff in the underlying federal court action, Lynore Horn, was employed in several capacities by defendants, Southern Gas Company and New England Gas Company, from approximately 1989 until 2005. It is not necessary for us to summarize the entire procedural history of this case to date. Rather, in view of the narrow question of law that we must answer, it suffices for us to note that there is pending before the federal court a pleading in which plaintiff alleges, in pertinent part, that defendants engaged in employment discrimination against her on the basis of sex in violation of both the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, G.L.1956 chapter 5 of title 28 (FEPA) and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42 (RICRA). Our role is limited to determining what statute of limitations applies to an employment discrimination claim asserted under the latter statute.
Statutory and Decisional Background
It was in 1949 that the General Assembly enacted the FEPA; it did so in order to “assure equal employment opportunities for all persons by eliminating discriminatory practices.” Folan v. State, Department of Children, Youth, and Families, 723 A.2d 287, 290 (R.I.1999). Thereafter, in 1990, the General Assembly enacted the RICRA, which statute provides (inter alia) “broad protection against all forms of discrimination in all phases of employment.” 3 Ward v. City of Pawtucket Police Department, 639 A.2d 1379, 1381 (R.I.1994); see also Folan, 723 A.2d at 290. The protections against discrimination afforded by the RICRA are in many respects duplicative of those afforded by the FEPA; in many instances, an aggrieved party may assert the same employment discrimination allegations as the basis for both a FEPA claim and for a RICRA claim. The two statutes, therefore, are complementary employment discrimination statutes.
Unlike the FEPA, which contains a one-year statute of limitations (§ 28-5-17(a)), the RICRA is utterly silent as to the limitations period within which claims invoking that statute must be brought. In their brief concerning the certified question, defendants have taken the position that the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the FEPA should apply to RICRA claims and that, consequently, any of plaintiff’s *294claims that accrued prior to the commencement of that one-year period are time-barred. By contrast, plaintiff contends that Rhode Island’s residual statute of limitations for “injuries to the person,” G.L.1956 § 9 — 1—14(b), which provides for a three-year limitations period, should be applied to her RICRA claim.4
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have previously been faced with the issue of which statute of limitations should properly be applied to employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to the RICRA, and they have differed in their predictions as to which statute of limitations this Court would determine to be applicable. Compare Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62 (1st Cir.2004) (applying the three-year residual statute of limitations for injuries to the person to claims raised pursuant to the RICRA) with Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 253 F.Supp.2d 226 (D.R.I.2003) (applying the FEPA’s one-year statute of limitations to claims raised pursuant to the RICRA) and Place v. California Webbing Industries, Inc., 249 F.Supp.2d 157, 162 (D.R.I.2003) (same). We have previously noted the existence of that judicial difference of opinion without expressing our own view because we did not need to do so. See Croce v. State, Office of Adjutant General, 881 A.2d 75, 79 n. 6 (R.I.2005). Now, however, the question is squarely before us.
Statutory Analysis
It is clear to us that, with respect to employment discrimination claims, the FEPA and the RICRA are in pan mate-ria.5 Both statutes were enacted to provide protection against discrimination in employment. Although both provide relief for those who successfully prove that they are the victims of employment discrimination, the FEPA and the RICRA are not identical twins. We need not exhaustively describe here the differences between the two statutes; it is sufficient to note that each statute incorporates some features and criteria that the other does not.6 See Berthiaume v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 243, 249, 397 A.2d 889, 893 (1979). For our purposes today, however, the crucial point is that each statute provides a basis for litigating a claim of employment discrimination.7 See Folan, 723 A.2d at 290-91 (grouping the FEPA and the RICRA together as both providing remedies for employment discrimination). Since both the FEPA and the RICRA expressly deal with the subject of employment discrimination, in our view it is entirely appropriate to read the two statutes as being in pari materia — i.e. as necessi*295tating that they “be read in relation to each other.”8
It is an especially well-settled principle of statutory construction that when, as here, “we are faced with statutory provisions that are in pari materia, we construe them in a manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent with their general objective scope.” State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 666 (R.I.2004); see also Kells v. Town of Lincoln, 874 A.2d 204, 212 (R.I.2005); Folan, 723 A.2d at 289-90; In re Doe, 717 A.2d 1129, 1132 (R.I.1998); Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I.1996); State v. Ahmadjian, 488 A.2d 1070, 1081 (R.I.1981). This is true even when “the statutes in question contain no reference to each other and are passed at different times.” Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d at 1081; see also Folan, 723 A.2d at 289-90; Blanchette v. Stone, 591 A.2d 785, 786 (R.I.1991).
Since the FEPA and the RICRA are in pari materia with respect to employment discrimination claims, we must make every effort to harmonize the two statutes when determining what statute of limitations applies to employment discrimination claims raised pursuant to the RICRA.9 It is our opinion that harmonization of these two statutes can best be achieved by engraft-ing onto the RICRA the one-year statute of limitations contained in the FEPA.
It is highly significant to us that the FEPA represents the only time that an enactment of the General Assembly has addressed with specificity the issue of how much time should be accorded to potential employment discrimination plaintiffs as they decide whether or not to seek relief for perceived wrongdoing. The FEPA reflects the General Assembly’s weighing of policy considerations and its legislative judgment that one year is the appropriate amount of time within which claims of employment discrimination should be brought, and we would be most reluctant to second-guess that considered legislative determination. We are unable to perceive any adequate reason for not holding that the same legislative determination should be applied to the RICRA, bearing in mind that it is a later-enacted statute and (significantly) is silent as to the limitations issue.10
This Court has on several occasions also pointed to policy considerations that tend to validate the relatively brief limitations period that the General Assembly established with respect to FEPA claims. See, *296e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 416 A.2d 673, 676 (R.I.1980) (“The time limit * * * also ensures that persons charged with violating the Act will receive notice of those charges within one year of the alleged violation. Prompt notification will enable such persons to investigate alleged violations and to preserve evidence * * Ferguson Perforating and Wire Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 415 A.2d 1055, 1056 (R.I.1980) (“These procedural protections are designed to provide respondents with adequate time for such matters as scheduling witnesses, hiring lawyers, and gathering and compiling evidence of the alleged violations before witnesses’ memories of the incidents become too obscure.”).
In addition, it is presumed that the General Assembly, when enacting a statute, is aware of earlier legislation. See, e.g., Narragansett Food Services, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Labor, 420 A.2d 805, 808 (R.I.1980) (“The legislature is presumed to know the state of existing relevant law when it enacts * * * a statute.”); see also Shelter Harbor Fire District v. Vacca, 835 A.2d 446, 449 (R.I.2003); Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers, 711 A.2d 1131, 1134 (R.I.1998). On the basis of this principle, we may take it as a given that, when the General Assembly enacted the RICRA in 1990, it did so with knowledge of the explicit one-year limitations period that is contained in the FEPA; and there is no reason to conclude that it thought that some other time period would be appropriate for employment discrimination actions under the RICRA.
It is also worth noting that, if we were to accept plaintiffs contention that the three-year residual statute of limitations applies to claims brought under the RICRA, rather than harmonizing the two statutes, we would in effect be rendering meaningless the one-year statute of limitations contained in the FEPA by allowing plaintiffs an end run around the limitations provision of the latter statute. Such a reading of the RICRA would be inconsistent with the principle that “repeals by implication are not favored.” Providence Electric Co. v. Donatelli Building Co., 116 R.I. 340, 344, 356 A.2d 483, 486 (1976); see also Shelter Harbor Fire District, 835 A.2d at 449. We perceive no evidence that the General Assembly had any such intention.
It logically follows from the foregoing that we need not in this instance grapple with the residual “injuries to the person” statute, § 9 — 1—14(b). In our judgment, even assuming arguendo that employment discrimination could be considered to be an injury to the person, we cannot ignore the fact that the General Assembly has expressly chosen (when it included a one-year limitations period in the FEPA) to treat employment discrimination differently from the way that it has treated certain other arguable injuries to the person.11 Since the General Assembly has specifically focused on the issue of an appropriate time for the bringing of an employment discrimination action, our application of a venerable and often-invoked principle of statutory construction (viz., the principle that statutes that are in pari materia should be harmonized when possible) has convinced us that we are being true to the legislative intent in holding that the statute of limitations applicable to employment *297discrimination claims asserted under the RICRA is one year.12
Conclusion
For these reasons, we answer the question certified by the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island by holding that the statute of limitations applicable to employment discrimination claims asserted under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act is one year.

. Rule 6 of Article I of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in pertinent part:
"(a) This Court may answer questions of law certified to it by * * * a United States District Court when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court *293and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this Court.”

. It is clear from the explicit text of the certified question that the case pending in the United States District Court relates to a claim of employment discrimination. Accordingly, we need not and do not address the issue of what statute of limitations is applicable to RICRA actions that do not involve employment discrimination claims.

. The RICRA was enacted in reaction to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), in which the Court had narrowly construed 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Ward v. City of Pawtucket Police Department, 639 A.2d 1379, 1381 (R.I.1994).

. General Laws 1956 § 9-1-14(b) states:
"Actions for injuries to the person shall be commenced and sued within three (3) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after.”

. The in pari materia canon of statutory interpretation has been succinctly defined in a helpful treatise as being a principle according to which "statutes on the same subject * * * are, when enacted by the same jurisdiction, to be read in relation to each other.” Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 233 (1975).

. For example, unlike the RICRA, the FEPA provides for administrative agency involvement before actual in-court litigation commences.

. The fact that this Court has employed the same methodological approach in evaluating the merits of employment discrimination claims raised pursuant to both the FEPA and the RICRA, without distinguishing between them, is a further indication that the two statutes are in pari materia. See, e.g., DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13, 23 (R.I.2005).

. Dickerson, supra, at 233.

. The instant case involves an explicit limitations period in one statute (the FEPA) and the absence of any expressed limitations period in the other (the RICRA). In such circumstances, the task of harmonizing the two provisions is substantially easier than is the case where we are confronted with two apparently inconsistent statutory provisions. See, e.g., Davis v. Cranston Print Works Co., 86 R.I. 196, 199, 133 A.2d 784, 786 (1957).

. The fact that the FEPA contains an obligatory administrative process does not alter our conclusion that the one-year statute of limitations prescribed therein should also apply to claims raised pursuant to the RICRA. As we have stated, the policy justification for FEPA’s requirement that an aggrieved party must file an administrative charge within one year of the alleged discriminatory acts is to enable prompt investigation of those acts. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 416 A.2d 673, 676 (R.I.1980). It is our view that the FEPA's one-year limitations period is not a product of the fact that said statute calls for administrative agency involvement; rather, it is a product of the General Assembly’s judgment that inquiry into perceived employment discrimination should be conducted before the evidentiary trail grows cold. The fact that the RICRA contains no mandate concerning agency involvement does not make the need for prompt investigation of alleged violations any less compelling.

. There is precedent for the General Assembly’s treating some injuries to the person differently from others. We note, for example, that, with respect to "[ajctions for words spoken,” the General Assembly specifically opted for a one-year limitations period for such actions. Section 9-1-14(a).

. It should go without saying that we have very carefully weighed the First Circuit’s thoughtful opinion in Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62 (1st Cir.2004), in which that highly respected court vaticinated as to how this Court might resolve the instant statute of limitations issue. Nevertheless, while we readily acknowledge the cogency of much of the First Circuit’s reasoning in this regard, ultimately we were not persuaded by it. The correct answer to the question certified to us by the District Court is by no means self-evident, and we have considered the competing arguments with great care. In the end, however, especially in view of our numerous prior decisions employing the in pari materia canon of statutory construction, we are unable to agree with the First Circuit’s conclusion that a three-year limitations period for employment discrimination actions brought under the RICRA would effectuate the legislative intent.