Court Opinion

ID: 9836733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:55.169356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.697964
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge, with whom COX, Senior Judge, joins
(concurring in the result):
I disagree with the majority’s treatment of this case as a plain-error case. Defense counsel made a timely objection to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Evans testifying about his diagnosis of appellant, on the ground that there was no foundation for LTC Evans’ diagnosis. The military judge sustained the objection.
When LTC Evans later strayed from his diagnosis of the victim to describing his “assumption” that the victim was groomed by appellant, defense counsel again objected. This time, the military judge overruled the objection, stating that LTC Evans “is not specifically testifying about Sergeant Patterson, but is testifying about how these offenses were probably committed as evidence!^] by his examination of this person.” Thus, LTC Evans was permitted to testify about his “assumption” that appellant had groomed the victim and about the rehabilitative potential of “those who groom young children.” He opined that there is no medically proven cure for such a person.
In my view, defense counsel’s two specific objections were sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. I am also satisfied that the military judge erred. In United States v. Homer, 22 MJ 294, 296 (CMA 1986), this Court stated that an opinion about rehabilitative potential is “simply not helpful” if it is not based on assessment of an accused’s character and potential. In United States v. Ohrt, 28 MJ 301, 304 (CMA 1989), this Court stated that “a foundation must be laid to demonstrate that the witness does possess sufficient information and knowledge about the accused — his character, his performance of duty as a servicemember, his moral fiber, and his determination to be rehabilitated — to give a ‘rationally based’ opinion.” While Homer and Ohrt dealt with lay witness testimony, the same foundational requirements apply to expert testimony. See United States v. Banks, 36 MJ 150, 161 (CMA 1992) (Expert testimony must be “based on a sufficient factual basis to make it relevant.”). Furthermore, because of the enhanced weight of expert testimony, its erroneous admission has a higher potential for prejudice.
Notwithstanding my conclusions that the military judge erred and that defense counsel preserved the issue, I join in affirming the decision of the court below. I am satisfied that the convening authority’s action, reducing the adjudged confinement from 45 years to 25 years, was sufficient to cure any error in admitting LTC Evans’ testimony about appellant’s potential for rehabilitation.