Court Opinion

ID: 9567451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:54:03.458646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:37.062280
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
dissenting.
Although I agree that there is a definite state interest in encouraging local industry, I cannot agree that such encouragement results from a statute which prevents a person who has been a resident of the state for many years from bidding on construction of a public building contract, without penalty, simply because he exercised his privilege to do business as a corporation within the year previous to the bid. Accepting all of the law cited in the majority opinion, I cannot find either a “legitimate state interest” or a “reasonable/rational” basis for giving a preference to A, who has lived in Wyoming for two years and makes his bid on construction of a public building as an individual, over B, who has lived in Wyoming for thirty years but makes his bid under the name of a corporation wholly owned by him but incorporated only a month prior to the bid.
That exact situation can result from the majority holding. The statute, then, would have an arbitrary and capricious application and would be violative of all of the constitutional provisions set forth in the question here reserved to us by the district court:
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the following specific constitutional question be, and the same hereby is, reserved and sent to the Wyoming Supreme Court for its decision:
“WHETHER W.S. 9-8-302, WHICH STATES:
“ ‘Whenever a contract is let by the state, or any department thereof, or any county, city, town, school district, high school district, or other public corporation of the state for the erection, construction, alteration, or repair of any public building, or other public structure, or for making any addition thereto, or for any public work or improvements, such contract shall be let, if advertisement for bids is not required, to a resident of the state. If advertisement for bids is required the contract shall be let to the responsible resident making the lowest bid if such resident’s bid is not more than five percent (5%) higher than that of the lowest responsible nonresident bidder.’ “VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 6, OF THE WYOMING CONSTITUTION, AND/OR ARTICLE 1, SECTION 3, OF THE WYOMING CONSTITUTION AND/OR SECTION 1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.”
It may be contended that I am assuming a fact not present — that the record does not reflect the plaintiff’s stockholders to have been Wyoming residents for an extended period prior to incorporation. But the majority opinion makes a like assumption. The record does not reflect that such stockholders were not long-time residents of Wyoming. If this fact were necessary to resolve the constitutional question, the matter would not be ripe for answer to a reserved question. State v. Rosachi, Wyo., 549 P.2d 318 (1976). However, the intent of the legislature as indicated by the legislative history of § 9-8-301, W.S.19771 was to preclude *752a long-time resident from bidding on construction of a public building contract, without penalty, through a wholly-owned corporation within a year after its incorporation. The following amendment to changes in § 9-8-301 was accepted on the House’s second reading of the file in 1961, but was struck on the third reading:
“At the end of the last sentence strike the period insert a semi-colon and the following language: ‘provided, however, that any corporation formed by persons who are bona fide residents of the State for one year or more immediately prior to bidding upon a contract and the corporate stock of which is owned in full by such bona fide residents shall be included within the meaning of the word “resident”.’ ” Digest of Journals, 36th Legislature, p. 65 (1961).
Legislative intent may be determined through legislative history. Saffels v. Bennett, Wyo., 630 P.2d 505 (1981); Sanches v. Sanches, Wyo., 626 P.2d 61 (1981).
It may also be contended that the reserved question concerns an inquiry about § 9-8-302, W.S.19772 and that we should not consider the constitutionality of § 9-8-301, W.S.1977. Such contention overlooks the fact that § 9-8-301 defines the terms used in § 9-8-302. The meaning and legislative intent as expressed in § 9-8-302 cannot be ascertained without reference to the validity of § 9-8-301. Whether or not § 9-8-302 is violative of the Constitutions depends upon the language thereof as defined by § 9-8-301. The word “resident” as used in § 9-8-302 makes the application of the section unconstitutional. Section 9-8-301 must be examined to determine the constitutionality of § 9-8-302. They must be considered pari materia.
“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that to ascertain the meaning of a given law all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose shall be read in connection with it as constituting one law. They must be construed in harmony, else the law of the State would consist of disjointed and unharmonious parts with a conflicting and confusing result. * * * ” Stringer v. Board of County Commissioners of Big Horn County, Wyo., 347 P.2d 197, 200 (1959). See Kuntz v. Kinne, Wyo., 395 P.2d 286 (1964); Brinegar v. Clark, Wyo., 371 P.2d 62 (1962).
Although upholding a state tax exemption for nonresidents on merchandise held in storage, the United States Supreme Court said, in applying the rational-basis test:
“ * * * [Tjhere is a point beyond which the State cannot go without violating the Equal Protection Clause. The State must proceed upon a rational basis and may not resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary. The rule often has been stated to be that the classification ‘must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.’ * * * ” Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527, 79 S.Ct. 437, 441, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959). See York v. State, 53 Hawaii 557, 498 P.2d 644 (1972).
I am not here addressing the reasonableness of the 5 percent figure vis-a-vis 4 percent, 1 percent, 25 percent, 65 percent, etc., — nor did the majority opinion — nor did the stipulation of facts upon which was based the finding of facts in the court’s order. And I am not here addressing the constitutionality of the statute as it might pertain to a penalty applicable only to actual nonresident persons or entities. I note in this connection, however, that an arbitrary classification has been held to exist in a statute prohibiting employment of aliens on public works. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, *75371 Cal.2d 566, 79 Cal.Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645 (1969). See Torao Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. 1478 (1948).
I would answer the reserved question by holding the statute unconstitutional in denying equal protection to some persons to which it is applicable, i.e., those long-time Wyoming residents who have chosen to do business as a corporation within a year previous to the bids referred to in the statute.

. Section 9-8-301, W.S.1977, provides:
“As used in this act [§§ 9-8-301 to 9-8-304, 9-8-308] the word ‘resident’ means any person who shall have been a bona fide resident of the state for one (1) year or more immediately prior to bidding upon the contract; a partnership or association, each member of which shall have been a bona fide resident of the state for one (1) year or more immediately prior to bidding upon the contract; a corporation which has been organized under the laws of the state of Wyoming and has been in existence therein for one (1) year or more immediately prior to bidding upon the contract and which has its principal office and *752place of business within the state of Wyoming.”

. Section 9-8-302, W.S.1977, is quoted in the question as reserved, supra.