Court Opinion

ID: 9366389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 18:01:23.464268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:51.910155
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                  _____________

                                       No. 21-3144
                                      _____________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                    JEREMY BANEY,
                                        Appellant
                                    ________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                              (Case No. 1-18-cr-00116-001)
                      District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
                                    ______________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                    October 3, 2022
                                    _____________

     Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed: January 26, 2023)
                                     ____________

                                        OPINION*
                                      _____________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
CHAGARES, Chief Judge.

       Jeremy Baney appeals the sentence imposed by the District Court for his

conviction related to tax fraud. For the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s

judgment.

                                              I.

       We write for the parties and recite only the facts necessary for disposition of this

case. In 2002, Baney began serving a twenty- to forty-year sentence in Pennsylvania

state prison for drug-related offenses. While in prison, Baney aided a co-conspirator in

filing false tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for other inmates. Baney

was charged in an Information with aiding or assisting in making false statements to the

IRS in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). He waived presentment to the grand jury,

agreeing to proceed on the information, and then pleaded guilty.

       The United States Probation Office calculated a sentencing guideline range of

eighteen to twenty-four months, to be served consecutively to his ongoing state sentence.

The Guidelines range ultimately adopted by the District Court was eight to fourteen

months. At sentencing, Baney requested a sentence of six to seven months and also

requested that the sentence be imposed immediately, to run concurrently with his state

sentence. The Government agreed that the sentence should run concurrently, but

requested a sentence within the Guidelines range. The court imposed a sentence of

twelve months of imprisonment, to take effect immediately and to run concurrently with

his state sentence. After his anticipated release from state custody in March 2022, Baney

                                              2
would serve approximately eight months of his federal sentence in federal custody.1

Baney requested the sentence be adjusted to twelve months and one day, so that he could

benefit from the good time adjustment with the Bureau of Prisons. The court declined

that request. Baney timely appealed.

                                                   II. 2

       Baney argues that the sentence imposed was procedurally deficient and

substantively unreasonable. Because Baney did not object to the sentence

contemporaneously, we review the District Court’s judgment for plain error. Fed. R.

Crim. P. 52(b). To establish plain error, Baney must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain,

and (3) affects substantial rights. See United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 340 (3d

Cir. 2020). If all three elements are established, it is within this Court’s “sound

discretion” to correct the error, but only if “the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted)

(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).3

       Baney cannot meet this burden. We begin with the asserted procedural error.

Procedural errors in sentencing include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)

1
 The Government represents, and Baney’s counsel does not dispute, that Baney was
paroled from his state sentence in March 2022.
2
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
3
 The Government argues that Baney waived, rather than merely forfeited, any objection
to the sentence and that we should not consider this appeal at all. We will assume here
that the objection was not waived and will apply plain error review.

                                               3
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing

to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d

148, 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir.

2009) (en banc)).

       When imposing the sentence, the District Court stated that it had “considered the

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a)” without elaborating further. Appendix

(“App.”) 22. Baney asserts this constitutes reversible procedural error. See 18 U.S.C. §

3553(c) (“The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its

imposition of the particular sentence[.]”). We disagree. On appeal, we “may apply a

presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper

application of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347

(2007). And although district courts should explain their reasoning in order to “satisfy

the appellate court” that a reasoned basis for the sentence exists, “when a judge decides

simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require

lengthy explanation.” Id. at 356. Where a case is “conceptually simple” and “the record

makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments,” a lengthy

explanation is not required. Id. at 359.

       That is the case here. The sentence imposed reflects a compromise of the

positions advanced by both parties at sentencing: the District Court granted Baney part

of his request, by ordering that the sentence run concurrently with his state sentence, and

granted part of the Government’s request by imposing a sentence within the Guidelines

                                              4
range. This indicates that the court listened to and considered all arguments. Baney

spoke at his sentencing, where he stated that his behavior was “unacceptable,” apologized

to the court, and stated that he knew he had to “pay the penalty” for his actions. App. 21.

The sentence was not the top of the Guidelines range, and was well below the statutory

maximum of thirty-six months. This was a straightforward case, due in large part to

Baney’s acceptance of responsibility early on. The District Court’s straightforward

sentencing was not plain error. Cf. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d at 154 (holding that even

assuming arguendo that the lack of explanation by the sentencing judge was a clear or

obvious error, the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights given the facts of

the case established by the record).4

       Baney next argues that even if the District Court’s sentence was procedurally

sound, it was not substantively reasonable. A sentence is substantively unreasonable only

if “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that

particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United States v.

Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568). We

presume that a sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable, and we consider the

totality of the circumstances. Id. Baney argued for a lower sentence, so he has preserved

his challenge to the sentence’s substantive unreasonableness and we will therefore review

4
  Finally, even if Baney could show that the first three elements of plain error review
were met, we would not exercise our discretion to correct the error because the asserted
error did not “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. Baney received a sentence within the range he
and his able counsel negotiated with the Government and which, as explained below, is a
fair sentence based on the conduct.

                                              5
it for abuse of discretion. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766

(2020) (holding that “[n]othing more” than “a criminal defendant advocat[ing] for a

sentence shorter than the one ultimately imposed” is required to “preserve the claim that a

longer sentence is [substantively] unreasonable”); United States v. Wilson, 960 F.3d 136,

151 (3d Cir. 2020) (reviewing defendant’s substantive unreasonableness claim under an

abuse of discretion standard because the defendant had preserved his claim by requesting

a lower sentence than the one ultimately imposed); United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759

F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[A] substantive objection to the sentence that a

court will impose is noted when made and need not be repeated after sentencing[.]”).

       The sentence imposed here was eminently reasonable. The sentence fairly

balanced Baney’s acceptance of responsibility with the seriousness of the crime and the

fact that he committed the crime while incarcerated for other conduct. Moreover, since

the sentence was imposed concurrently, the actual time spent serving the federal sentence

alone will total less than twelve months. Given all these factors, we cannot say that no

reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence.

                                             III.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

                                             6