Court Opinion

ID: 9846012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:32:46.52924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:31.155559
License: Public Domain

LEVINSON, Judge
dissenting.
This Court lacks the authority to address the merits of this appeal because (1) defendant appeals from an interlocutory order that does not implicate a substantial right, (2) defendant has not appealed from the final order, nor sought certiorari on the final order, and (3) neither N.C.R. App. R Rule 21, nor any other statutory or common law basis, gives this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari sua *612sponle where a litigant neither appeals from a judgment or order, nor files a petition seeking certiorari for review of a judgment. The desire to provide appellate review for litigants is understandable. However, because jurisdiction is lacking, this appeal must be dismissed.
While the factual and procedural history outlined by the majority opinion is accurate, I note several additional events. After granting defendant’s 20 September 2002 motion for a new trial on the issue of sanctions, the trial court conducted a hearing on the same on 11 December 2002. Thereafter, on 14 February 2003, the trial court entered what the majority acknowledges was the final order. The final order contained an amended order on sanctions, incorporated the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 11 September 2002 Amended Judgment, and added new findings and conclusions pertaining to the imposition of sanctions. After the hearing on 11 December 2002 but before the trial court entered its final order on 14 February 2003, defendant gave notice of appeal from several of the court’s earlier orders. However, defendant has neither appealed from the order of 14 February 2003, nor assigned error to it. On 10 October 2003 plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s appeal as interlocutory, and for violations of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. On 23 October 2003 defendant filed a response asking this Court either to deny plaintiff’s dismissal motion or to “issue its writ of certiorari and allow [defendant] to proceed with the pending appeal.” (emphasis added). At that time no appeal from the final order was “pending.”
I agree with the majority that defendant’s appeal is interlocutory. Under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(a) (2003), a judgment “is either interlocutory or the final determination of the rights of the parties.” A final judgment “is one which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court.” Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950).
Defendant appealed from several orders, the latest of which was the 30 October 2002 order, which granted in part defendant’s motion for a new trial and scheduled a hearing on the issue of sanctions. The order of 30 October clearly required “further action by the trial court,” and was therefore interlocutory.
I agree the final judgment in this case was the order of 14 February 2003. Defendant concedes as much in his Appeal *613Information Statement, which lists 14 February 2003 as the date final judgment was entered. In reaching this conclusion, I reject defendant’s argument that the order of 14 February 2003 cannot be the final judgment because it “merely” determined the amount of sanctions. See Steadman v. Steadman, 148 N.C. App. 713, 559 S.E.2d 291 (2002) (trial court’s order was interlocutory where it determined plaintiff was entitled to a money judgment, but deferred determination of the amount of judgment and attorney’s fees until a later hearing). Furthermore, the final order also incorporated findings and conclusions from earlier orders, and added new findings and conclusions.
“Generally, there is no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders and judgments.” Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 161, 522 S.E.2d 577, 578 (1999). In the instant case, the Record on Appeal does not include a notice of appeal from the 14 February order. Also, defendant did not assign error to the final judgment, did not argue in his brief that there was error in this order, and has not sought to amend the record to include notice of appeal from the final order entered 14 February 2003. Moreover, in his response to plaintiff’s dismissal motion and his petition for certiorari, defendant expressly disavows any desire to appeal the final order. “Failure of a party to file a notice of appeal regarding a particular order deprives this Court of jurisdiction over issues arising out of the order.” Albrecht v. Dorsett, 131 N.C. App. 502, 504, 508 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1998).
The majority purports to utilize Rule 21 to grant certiorari in order to review the 14 February 2003 order. However, defendant’s appeal from the interlocutory order of 30 October 2002 and earlier orders does not confer jurisdiction on this Court to review the final judgment of 14 February 2003 by way of Rule 21 certiorari. Under N.C.R. App. R 21(a)(1), this Court may issue a writ of certiorari “in appropriate circumstancés ... to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action, or when no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists[.]” Thus, we may issue a writ of certiorari in order to reach issues raised by an appellant who failed to timely file notice of appeal or failed to include the notice in the Record on Appeal. Anderson v. Hollifield, 345 N.C. 480, 482, 480 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1997) (“Rule 21(a)(1) gives an appellate court the authority to review the merits of an appeal by certiorari even if the party has failed to file notice of appeal in a timely manner.”). Rule 21 does not apply, however, to the present case.
*614Defendant has not sought certiorari review of the 14 February 2003 order. It bears repeating that defendant did not assign error to the final judgment or argue in his brief that it was erroneous. Nor does defendant’s petition for certiorari ask us to issue a writ of cer-tiorari to permit him to appeal the 14 February 2003 order. Although defendant’s introductory paragraph mentions the order, in the body of his motion and petition defendant takes pains to inform this Court that he intentionally “chose not to perfect his appeal, nor assign error” to the 14 February 2003 order “because he believed that the errors committed by the trial court were contained in [the trial court’s earlier orders].” Indeed, defendant argues that he “should not be required to pursue an appeal of an order, or assign error to it, when he does not find that the trial court’s errors were committed ... in that order.” Finally, the concluding paragraph of defendant’s motion asks that “in order for this Court to review the errors contained in the Judgment, Amended Judgment and Memorandum Order, . .. [defendant requests] that this Court issue its writ of certiorari and allow him to proceed with the pending appeal.” (emphasis added). The “pending appeal” concerned everything but the final order.
I am unaware of any other statutory or common law basis for our issuance of a writ of certiorari sua sponte where a litigant neither appeals from a judgment or order, nor files a petition seeking certio-rari for review of a judgment. Such is the present circumstance.
Moreover, as a practical matter, the majority’s attempt to review the final order ignores several glaring problems. Because notice of appeal was not taken from the final order, a record on appeal was not prepared as to that order. Because no assignments of error have been made as to the final order, the majority is apparently assuming that the errors assigned to the interlocutory orders apply equally to the final order. But, because the record does not include a transcript of the 11 December 2002 hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial, this Court has no information about the arguments and evidence presented at the hearing. Although the 11 December 2002 hearing was intended to concern only the issue of sanctions, it is possible that the court took additional evidence concerning the child support issue. Our Rules of Appellate Procedure, including Rule 21, afford appropriate structure to avoid such problems. The majority’s application of Rule 21 to address the final order creates a dangerous precedent. To obtain review of the final order, defendant could — and should — have timely appealed from the final order or sought certiorari review as to that order. In that event, we could have consolidated both appeals.
*615Rule 21 affords this Court an opportunity to overlook technical violations of the Rules under appropriate, specifically prescribed limitations. But the authority to do so should be limited to cases in which the parties are actually trying to appeal an order and make a request to do so. Again, defendant has expressly insisted he has not tried to do so.
Finally, defendant failed to include the Statement of Grounds for Appellate Review required by N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4). This might not ordinarily warrant a dismissal. However, in the instant case, the question of defendant’s entitlement to appellate review is a central issue before this Court, and the omission of a statement of grounds for appellate review is not merely a technical oversight. “It is not the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find support for appellant’s right to appeal[.]” Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994). Accordingly, this violation, in and of itself, is sufficient to warrant dismissal. During oral argument, counsel for defendant could not provide a satisfactory legal argument as to how this Court could address the merits of the 14 February 2003 order given the posture of this matter. Indeed, no such argument exists.
In sum, defendant’s appeal is interlocutory and he has neither appealed from nor properly sought review by certiorari of the 14 February 2003 final judgment. In addition, defendant’s failure to include a Statement of Grounds for Appellate Review constitutes a substantial violation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure warranting dismissal. In my view, defendant’s appeal must be dismissed.