Court Opinion

ID: 9705890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:25:27.029521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:11.018257
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
dissenting:
Although I agree with the majority that electronic home monitoring is not “imprisonment” as contemplated by the legislature in its enactment of 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. *556§ 3731(e), which mandates a minimum term of imprisonment for recidivist drunk drivers, I nevertheless would find that in the instant case both case law and notions of fundamental fairness demand reversal of the lower court’s decision. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
A review of the legislative history of the sentencing provisions of the laws pertaining to drunk driving compels the conclusion that in enacting the mandatory sentencing provisions in section 3731(e) the legislature intended to impose severe penalties for repeat offenders. This was done in order to send a clear and urgent message to those who continue to drive on the Commonwealth’s roadways under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, the statute provides that those convicted of drunk driving more than once in a seven year period must serve a minimum of 30 days imprisonment Both the plain meaning of the statutory language and the legislative debate and reports accompanying this enactment make plain that what was contemplated was a period of confinement in a prison or similar institution. This reading is consistent with the obvious legislative intent to impose sanctions which would both punish recidivist drunk drivers and deter those inclined to indulge in this fatal behavior in the future. I would decline to reinterpret the term “imprisonment” to allow it to encompass electronic home monitoring or similar modes of “house arrest”. In my view, doing so exceeds the proper bounds of judicial action and usurps the legislature’s prerogative. Until such time as the legislature acts to refine the statutory definition of “imprisonment” within the terms of the drunk driving laws, I would hold that electronic home monitoring does not meet the requirements of the statute.1
*557Having stated this, however, it is also plain that the law requires us to grant this defendant credit for the time he served participating in Chester County’s electronic home monitoring program. I agree with my dissenting colleague, Judge Popovich, that, under the circumstances of this case, we should reverse based on the reasoning of the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Jacobs v. Robinson, 49 Pa. Commw. 194, 410 A.2d 959 (1980). In Jacobs, the Commonwealth Court concluded that a defendant must receive credit for the time spent out of prison when his inadvertent release was the product of the mistaken actions of the prison authorities. This holding was based on the principle that a defendant is entitled to serve his sentence continuously unless the interruption was caused by his own wrongdoing, i.e., an escape from imprisonment or a violation of release conditions. Since the prisoner’s release in Jacobs was due to administrative error by the prison authorities, the Court reasoned that he could not be classified as an escapee and therefore was entitled to continue to serve his sentence with credit given for the time he was at liberty.
Appellant Kriston’s case is even more compelling than that of the appellant in Jacobs. Here appellant was released by the warden who, first, was acting under apparent authority to do so and, second, assured appellant that the time spent in electronic home confinement would apply towards the serving of his minimum sentence. The inherent unfairness of denying appellant credit for time served under these circumstances is inescapable, whatever this court’s conclusion might be regarding the propriety of electronic home confinement as “imprisonment”. Surely this defendant should not have to bear the burden of the warden’s overreaching, when all parties were acting in genuine, albeit mistaken, good faith. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I would remand this case to the lower court for a new parole hearing, directing the lower court to *558include the time spent in electronic home confinement when making the parole eligibility determination.

. This conclusion is in accord with this court’s recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Conahan, 388 Pa.Super. 369, 565 A.2d 798 (1989), in which a panel of the court found that a defendant’s voluntary, pre-sentencing participation in an inpatient alcohol treatment program does not constitute "imprisonment” entitling defendant in that case to credit for time served in such a program. The court concluded that such a voluntary, non-compulsory commitment to a treatment center would not be consistent with the clear legislative intent to punish and deter drunk drivers. The court left open the question of whether *557court-ordered confinement to such a facility pursuant to imposition of sentence would constitute “imprisonment" under the terms of the statute.