Court Opinion

ID: 9491733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:22:08.895026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:54.836659
License: Public Domain

TACHA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting
I respectfully dissent only from the portion of the majority opinion finding that the district court failed to adequately explain the degree of upward departure in sentencing the defendant. I recognize that our cases require an explanation by the district judge of the degree of departure and that he or she “may use any reasonable methodology hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines to justify the reasonableness of the departure.” See United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d 1297, 1309 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, when the reason for that departure is that the conduct exceeds the seriousness contemplated by the Guidelines, I do not believe that the district court must go through the tortured process of articulating precisely why the excessiveness, in its judgement, justifies a particular degree of departure. The degree of departure determination in a case involving a subjective judgement of the excessiveness of a defendant’s conduct lies within the province of the sentencing court under the abuse of discretion standard. See Collins, 122 F.3d at 1303 (holding that decision to depart and reasonableness of departure are subject to unitary abuse of discretion standard); cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2046, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court’s decision to depart from the Guidelines ... will in most cases be due substantial deference.”)
Here, the judge found the defendant’s conduct exceeded the recklessness contemplated by the Guidelines. He cited as his reasons the defendant’s extreme intoxication, prior drunk driving conviction, and numerous opportunities to correct her conduct prior to the accident. I am perplexed why a three-level degree of departure is so unrelated to the finding of excessive recklessness as to require remand for further elaboration. A departure unrelated to the reasons given or of extraordinary magnitude might require such an explanation. However, it seems to me that a district judge adequately justifies a sentence increase from 16 to 24 months when he gives as his reasons the facts upon which he based his determination of excessive recklessness in the initial upward departure decision. In the instant case, requiring additional explanation of why this level of recklessness merits this incremental upward departure is precisely the kind of mechanistic appellate review that Koon instructs us we are not free to employ. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 96-100, 116 S.Ct. at 2046-47. Collins and our other post-Aoo??. cases are not to the contrary, for those cases did not involve a departure tied to greater recklessness than that contemplated by the Guidelines and explained by facts recited by the sentencing judge. See Collins, 122 F.3d at 1308-09 (finding district court properly justified level of downward departure by reducing criminal history level where court found career offender enhancement overstated defendant’s criminal past and likely criminal future); United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 751-52 (10th Cir.1997) (finding degree of upward departure for fraudulent conduct *1256was reasonable because it considered the seriousness of the offense, the need for punishment and deterrence, and protection against future offenses); United States v. Lowe, 106 F.3d 1498, 1503 (10th Cir.1997) (upholding upward departure where defendant’s underrepresentative criminal history category was already at maximum, so sentencing judge increased base offense level to compensate). In fact, this court in Smith recognized that the district judge’s reasons for departure may be adequate to explain the level of departure as well. See Smith, 133 F.3d at 752 (relying, at least in part, on reasons, such as seriousness of the offense, articulated by the district court to support its initial departure decision in affirming a four-level upward departure).
The record in this case contains the 1997 United States Sentencing Commission Manslaughter Working Group Report prepared by the Sentencing Commission staff to aid the Commission in assessing the appropriateness of current Guideline penalties for manslaughter relative to other violent offenses. The testimony to the working group of Chief Judge Richard Battey of the District of South Dakota highlights the difficulties the sentencing judge in this case encountered. Chief Judge Battey urged the Sentencing Commission to review the Manslaughter Guidelines. See Manslaughter Working-Group Report at 7,14. I join those who urge this careful study.