Court Opinion

ID: 9604822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:27:02.402117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:24.157857
License: Public Domain

DON BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe mandamus, No. 09-03-532 CV, lies in this instance, but interlocutory appeal is the correct vehicle. Mandamus will he only if this dispute is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act rather than the Texas Arbitration Act. The majority notes Beaty “argues that the TAA applies because his employment was wholly within the State of Texas, and his cause of action arose in this state and involves construction of a state statute.” Not only does Beaty make those arguments, they are fact. Yet the majority concludes “Beaty’s employment contract with Granite relates to interstate commerce” based upon the following facts: “Granite is a California corporation with branch offices in four states, and operations nationwide. Granite’s operations include construction of bridges and highways. Beaty was working as construction superintendent on a bridge construction project when he sustained the on-the-job injury.” These facts relating to interstate commerce are as tenuous as those in In re Nasr, 50 S.W.3d 23 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001)(orig. proceeding) (Burgess, J. dissenting). The majority should reject the mandamus in this instance and overrule Nasr.
Because the majority reaches its result in the wrong vehicle, I decline to address the merits.