Court Opinion

ID: 9549078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:12:55.909402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:48.459043
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J.
I concur in the judgment affirming defendant’s conviction. I dissent, however, to the majority’s analysis in two major respects.
First, for the reasons set forth in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Grodin, I am convinced that new article I, section 28, subdivision (f), of the state Constitution was intended to abrogate all judicially created restrictions upon the admissibility of prior felony convictions, and to preclude the exercise of discretion to exclude certain prior convictions pursuant to section 352 of the Evidence Code. Both the language of the new provision *323and the history leading up to its enactment by the voters conclusively demonstrate the flaws in the majority’s contrary position.
Second (and unlike Justice Grodin), I cannot join in the majority’s creation of a “moral turpitude” exception to the general rule of admissibility. Section 28, subdivision (f), means what it says: “Any prior felony conviction . . . shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence . . . .” (Italics added.) Any prior felony conviction shall be used, not only those convictions which some court may characterize as morally reprehensible. True, there may exist some federal due process restriction upon the kinds of prior convictions deemed relevant for impeachment purposes. I am unaware of any such restrictions, however, and the majority cites no cases imposing any. Rather than burden our trial courts with the confusing and uncertain “moral turpitude” standard,1 I would, in the absence of any restrictions imposed by the federal courts, allow admission of all prior felonies on the theory that the commission of a felony offense necessarily bears on one’s credibility regardless of the nature of that offense.

 As Justice Tobriner once observed, “Terms such as ‘immoral or unprofessional conduct’ or ‘moral turpitude’ stretch over so wide a range that they embrace an unlimited area of conduct.” (Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 224-225 [82 Cal.Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375].)