Court Opinion

ID: 9556641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 05:09:26.431107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:46.408759
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                              COURT OF APPEALS

RONNIE FIELDS,                                                          UNPUBLISHED
                                                                        August 17, 2023
                Plaintiff-Appellant,
and

ANDERSON MEDICAL SUPPLIES,

                Intervening Plaintiff,

v                                                                       No. 361959
                                                                        Genesee Circuit Court
NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE                                              LC No. 20-113979-NI
COMPANY, INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, GARLANDO DOXIE, KANESHA
MARZETTE, and MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE,

                Defendants,
and

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY,

                Defendant-Appellee.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       In this no-fault insurance action, plaintiff, Ronnie Fields, appeals as of right the trial court’s
order granting summary disposition to defendant, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company,
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). We affirm.

                                                  -1-
                                   I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        This action arises out of an accident that occurred on September 30, 2019. Plaintiff was
hit by a car at around 8:15 p.m. while riding a bicycle near the intersection of Home Avenue and
Oxley Avenue in Flint, Michigan. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries, including multiple broken
bones and lacerations, blunt force trauma to the chest and abdomen, and a traumatic brain injury.

        In relation to the accident, plaintiff submitted two applications for personal protection
insurance (PIP) benefits through the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility
(MAIPF). The first application, dated October 4, 2019, explained that plaintiff was hit by a car
while riding his bicycle and transported to Hurley Medical Center for treatment. The application
further stated that plaintiff did not have any of the same injuries prior to the accident, that he had
no preexisting medical conditions, and that he had not applied for social security benefits before
or after the accident. The second application, dated November 4, 2019, again stated the cause of
the accident and confirmed that plaintiff had no preexisting medical conditions or injuries that
would be relevant to his claim for benefits. However, the new form noted that plaintiff was eligible
for social security benefits, contrary to the information from the October 4, 2019 application.
Notably, each of the applications contained a fraud warning, which stated:

        A person who presents or causes to be presented an oral or written statement,
        including computer-generated information, as part of or in support of a claim to the
        Michigan Assigned Claims Plan maintained by the Michigan Automobile
        Insurance Placement Facility for payment or any other benefit knowing that the
        statement contains false information concerning a fact or thing material to the claim
        commits a fraudulent insurance act under section 4503 of the Insurance Code that
        is subject to the penalties Imposed under section 4511. A claim that contains or is
        supported by a fraudulent insurance act as described in this subsection is ineligible
        for payment or benefits under the Assigned Claims Plan.

        Plaintiff filed his complaint in February 2020, initially naming the driver of the car that hit
him, the owner of the car, and two insurance companies as defendants. Plaintiff later amended his
complaint to add the MAIPF as a defendant, arguing that because he was not covered by a no-fault
insurance policy on the date of the accident, the MAIPF was required to assign his claim to an
insurer. The MAIPF eventually assigned his claim to Nationwide, and Nationwide was substituted
as a defendant.1 All of the other defendants to the lawsuit were dismissed through various means.

        Relevant to this appeal, Nationwide ultimately filed a motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Nationwide alleged that plaintiff committed fraud by submitting false
information in support of his claim for PIP benefits, and that under MCL 500.3173a(4), he was
therefore ineligible to receive said benefits. Nationwide took issue with information contained in
plaintiff’s medical records, deposition testimony, and his two applications for benefits. It alleged
that plaintiff failed to disclose medical conditions and injuries sustained before the car accident at
issue in this case in both of his benefits applications. In his deposition testimony, plaintiff testified

1
  The rest of the defendants were dismissed, either via motions for summary disposition or by
stipulation. None of said defendants participate in this appeal.

                                                  -2-
to suffering significant injury from a dog bite, which ultimately required a skin graft. Nationwide
also alleged that plaintiff failed to disclose that he had eye surgery prior to the accident and that
he is legally blind. According to Nationwide, “[p]laintiff’s blindness and eye surgery is material
to his claims in this matter as plaintiff testified that his eye sight was the same after the accident,
as it was from before the accident[.]” Nationwide further alleged that plaintiff’s medical records
revealed that between 2012 and 2019, he had been treated for complications arising from the dog
bite, as well as for injuries sustained after someone allegedly struck him with a baseball bat,
including a fractured leg. Plaintiff was also treated for “altered mental status” on two occasions,
first in 2012 and again in 2017. Based on all of this information, Nationwide argued:

               Plaintiff lied about his medical history, his medication history, and same
       and similar injuries in his application for benefits and at his deposition. While
       [MCL 500.3173a(4)] does not limit the misrepresentations to those only applicable
       to the claims at issue, Defendant has presented records to show prior head injuries
       and prior leg injuries and treatment, which are material [to] the alleged head and
       leg injury being claimed from the subject accident. The case law further supports
       that the failure to disclose medical conditions, similar and different to those claimed
       in an accident, is material and entitles defendant to summary disposition.

        Nationwide claimed that plaintiff violated MCL 500.3173a(4) by knowingly submitting
false statements in support of his claim for benefits. It asserted that no genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether plaintiff committed fraud and was thus ineligible for PIP benefits, and
asked the trial court to grant its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

        In response, plaintiff argued that under MCL 500.3173a(4), Nationwide could not show
that plaintiff “knowingly” sought to commit fraud, and pointed out that his applications for benefits
were clearly prepared by another person. Plaintiff also argued that the applications themselves
were inadmissible hearsay, as the preparer of the documents was unknown and it was unclear
whether plaintiff had a hand in preparing the documents at all.

       The trial court heard oral argument on the matter, and the parties largely argued consistent
with their briefs. At the close of the hearing, the trial court stated, in relevant part:

               The existing record does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
       [plaintiff’s] ability to be aware and understanding of what his signature on the
       document, the two applications, mean.

               The full context of the record which does not indicate any backtracking on
       his part either by saying I didn’t know what I was signing because of my head
       injury, my concussion, and the like.

                                               * * *

               He did sign it and his signing of it is an indication that what he is signing is
       true. If I couldn’t draw that conclusion, then what would be the point of anybody
       signing anything? How would somebody say, no, that’s not true, I’m not signing
       it?

                                                 -3-
                                               * * *

                And a lot of people don’t fill out things. I were [sic] to venture a guess that
       99% of the affidavits that I get with lawyers involved in case and are signed by the
       affiant are 100% nearly filled out by the lawyer. Could the affiant say, well, I didn’t
       fill that out? I just signed it. So I’m not saying that is true. That’s a little bit
       stronger because it’s an affidavit.

               But these are serious documents that are filed. And if he didn’t have the
       awareness of what he was signing, then somebody else should have been able to
       act for him. I’ve got nothing, other than the suggestion that, due to his injuries, he
       couldn’t have understood what he was signing and, by not understanding it, he
       couldn’t have knowingly misrepresented even though every single bit of the
       misrepresentations pertain to treatment for injures that he had . . . . Who would
       know more than him on this?

Accordingly, the trial court entered an order granting Nationwide’s motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

        Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing again that Nationwide
could not show that he “knowingly” committed fraud under MCL 500.3173a(4). Plaintiff also
argued for the first time that under Haydaw v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 332 Mich App 719; 957 NW2d
858 (2020), statements made during the course of litigation, including deposition testimony and
medical records, cannot be used to show fraud. Finally, plaintiff argued that discovery was
incomplete, and that summary disposition was thus premature. The trial court denied the order,
noting that it had not been persuaded that its decision to grant summary disposition to Nationwide
was erroneous. This appeal followed.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

         Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting Nationwide’s motion for summary
disposition because he did not knowingly commit fraud within the meaning of MCL 500.3173a(4).
Specifically, plaintiff contends that (1) under Williamson v AAA of Mich, ___ Mich App ___; ___
NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 357070), any medical records or deposition testimony obtained
after litigation was commenced cannot be used to defeat his claim for benefits; (2) the two
applications for benefits he submitted to the MAIPF must be considered inadmissible hearsay
under MRE 801 and 802; and (3) Nationwide cannot show that plaintiff intended to commit fraud
within the meaning of MCL 500.3173a(4). We disagree in all respects.

       The trial court granted the motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). This
Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil v
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.” Id. at 160 (citation and emphasis
omitted). In considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court “must consider all
evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
Id. Such a motion “may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “A

                                                 -4-
genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
minds might differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

         However, to the extent that plaintiff raises arguments regarding Williamson and the use of
statements made after litigation has commenced in the context of no-fault insurance fraud, the
issue is unpreserved because plaintiff first raised this argument in his motion for reconsideration.
“Where an issue is first presented in a motion for reconsideration, it is not properly preserved.”
Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 284 Mich App 513, 519; 773 NW2d 758 (2009). As
a general rule, “a failure to timely raise an issue waives review of that issue on appeal.” Walters
v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 387; 751 NW2d 431 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). But
this Court has discretion to “overlook preservation requirements if the failure to consider the issue
would result in manifest injustice, if consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the
case, or if the issue involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been
presented.” Smith v Foerster-Bolser Constr, Inc, 269 Mich App 424, 427; 711 NW2d 421 (2006)
(citation omitted). Unpreserved issues are generally reviewed for plain error. Demski v Petlick,
309 Mich App 404, 426-427; 873 NW2d 596 (2015). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error
rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear
or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. at 427 (quotation marks and
citations omitted). “An error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the
outcome of the proceedings.” Lawrence v Mich Unemployment Ins Agency, 320 Mich App 422,
443; 906 NW2d 482 (2017) (cleaned up).

                                   A. EVIDENCE OF FRAUD

        Plaintiff first argues that evidence from his deposition and medical records cannot be used
to show that he committed fraud. Under MCL 500.3105, “an insurer is liable to pay benefits for
accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter.” MCL 500.3173a governs the
initial determination of eligibility for benefits through the MAIPF, and more specifically,
MCL 500.3173a(4) governs fraudulent insurance claims made to the MAIPF, or to insurers
assigned by the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP). The provision states, in relevant part:

       (4) A person who presents or causes to be presented an oral or written statement,
       including computer-generated information, as part of or in support of a claim to the
       Michigan automobile insurance placement facility, or to an insurer to which the
       claim is assigned under the assigned claims plan, for payment or another benefit
       knowing that the statement contains false information concerning a fact or thing
       material to the claim commits a fraudulent insurance act under [MCL 500.403] that
       is subject to the penalties imposed under [MCL 500.4511]. A claim that contains
       or is supported by a fraudulent insurance act as described in this subsection is
       ineligible for payment of [PIP] benefits under the assigned claims plan.

       In Candler v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 321 Mich App 772, 779-780; 910 NW2d
666 (2017), this Court explained that a person commits a fraudulent insurance act when:

       (1) the person presents or causes to be presented an oral or written statement, (2)
       the statement is part of or in support of a claim for no-fault benefits, and (3) the

                                                 -5-
       claim for benefits was submitted to the MAIPF. Further, (4) the person must have
       known that the statement contained false information, and (5) the statement
       concerned a fact or thing material to the claim. [Id. (footnote omitted).]

Relatedly, this Court in Williamson, ___ Mich App ___ (Docket No. 357070); slip op at 8, held
that “the fraudulent insurance act provision in MCL 500.3173a does not apply to statements made
after litigation has ensued.”

        Here, there is no dispute that the two applications for benefits erroneously indicated that
plaintiff had no preexisting medical conditions and had not sustained any prior injuries that might
be relevant to his claim for benefits. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and medical records
ultimately revealed that between 2012 and 2019, he was treated for complications arising from the
dog bite and for injuries sustained after someone struck him with a baseball bat, including a leg
fracture. Additionally, it is undisputed that plaintiff is legally blind, which was not disclosed on
either application. The October 4, 2019 application also noted that plaintiff was not eligible for
social security benefits, which was ultimately determined to be a false statement.

         Plaintiff argues that under Williamson, none of this information can be used to show that
he committed fraud in violation of MCL 500.3173a(4) because it was information obtained after
litigation had commenced. We agree that any information in plaintiff’s deposition testimony
regarding his social security eligibility, as well as conflicting information regarding his medical
records, may not be used to support Nationwide’s claim that plaintiff committed insurance fraud.
However, contrary to plaintiff’s argument on appeal, his medical records can be used to support
Nationwide’s fraud allegations.

        In Williamson, this Court ruled that “the fraudulent insurance act provision in
MCL 500.3173a does not apply to statements made after litigation has ensued.” Williamson, ___
Mich App at ___; slip op at 8. In doing so, the Court extended its earlier holding in Haydaw, 332
Mich App 719, which involved a contractual claim for PIP benefits, to cases involving claims for
benefits made through the MACP. Regarding statements made after litigation has commenced,
the Haydaw Court explained:

       False statements made during discovery do not provide grounds to void the policy
       because, by that time, the claim has been denied and the parties are adversaries in
       litigation. Once suit is brought, what is truth and what is false are matters for a jury
       or a judge acting as fact-finder. And if it can be shown that a party intentionally
       testified falsely, it is up to the court to determine what, if any, sanction is proper.
       Indeed, defendant is essentially seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s claim on the basis
       of alleged discovery misconduct. Given that questions of credibility and intent are
       generally left to the trier of fact, “[i]t is . . . doubtful whether dismissal for
       intentionally false deposition testimony is ever appropriate.” Swain v Morse, 332
       Mich App 510, 524, 957 NW2d 396 (2020). In any event, it is up to the trial court
       to determine whether a drastic sanction such as dismissal is warranted for discovery
       misconduct, including untruthful deposition testimony. To be clear, once an insurer
       fails to timely pay a claim and suit is filed, the parties’ duties of disclosure are
       governed by the rules of civil procedure, not the insurance policy. [Id. at 726-727,
       957 NW2d 858 (alteration in original).]

                                                 -6-
The Williamson Court adopted this rationale wholesale, but also noted that this Court clarified the
scope of Haydaw in Fashho v Liberty Mut Ins Co, 333 Mich App 612, 619; 963 NW2d 695 (2020).
Williamson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8. There, this Court stated:

       We read Haydaw as standing for the unremarkable proposition that an insurer
       cannot assert that it denied a claim because of fraud that occurred after litigation
       began; the fraud must have occurred before the commencement of legal
       proceedings. This recognizes the reality that a plaintiff-insured only commences
       suit after the defendant-insurer denies the plaintiff’s claim and that the denial
       cannot possibly be based on an event that has not yet taken place. This does not
       mean that a defendant cannot rely on evidence of fraud obtained after litigation
       commences. It simply means that the evidence must relate to fraud that took place
       before the proceedings began. [Fashho, 333 Mich App at 619 (emphasis added).]

Based on Williamson and Fashho, plaintiff’s deposition testimony would constitute “[f]alse
statements made during discovery[.]” It thus cannot be considered evidence of fraud under
MCL 500.3173a(4).

        However, plaintiff’s medical records could be considered as evidence of fraud under
MCL 500.3173a(4). Even though the medical records were obtained by Nationwide during
discovery, the information contained in them concerned incidents that occurred well before
plaintiff applied for PIP benefits through the MAIPF. Although such evidence would not directly
show that plaintiff engaged in fraud, the medical records pertain to incidents that happened well
before litigation commenced. Consequently, they do not fall under Williamson’s umbrella, and
were properly considered by the trial court as documentary evidence in support of Nationwide’s
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff cannot show that error
occurred on this basis.

                                          B. HEARSAY

       Plaintiff next argues that the applications for benefits are inadmissible hearsay and should
not have been considered documentary evidence in favor of granting Nationwide’s motion for
summary disposition. Under MCR 2.116(G)(6), “[a]ffidavits, depositions, admissions, and
documentary evidence offered in support or in opposition to a motion based on
[MCR 2.116(C)(10)] shall only be considered to the extent that the content or substance would be
admissible as evidence to establish or deny the grounds stated in the motion.” MCR 2.116(G)(6).
Evidence presented in support of a motion for summary disposition does not itself have to be in
admissible form, but the content or substance of the evidence must be admissible. Barnard Mfg
Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 373; 775 NW2d 618 (2009).

         “ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). In
general, hearsay evidence is not admissible unless it qualifies under an exception to the rules of
evidence. MRE 802; Merrow v Bofferding, 458 Mich 617, 626; 581 NW2d 696 (1998). Plaintiff
makes no mention of any of the hearsay exceptions, and instead simply states that the two benefits
applications from October 4, 2019, and November 4, 2019, lack foundation and are inadmissible

                                                -7-
hearsay because the person responsible for preparing each document is unknown and because it is
unclear whether plaintiff understood what he was signing.

      The statements at issue do not themselves qualify as hearsay because they are admissions
by a party opponent under MCR 801(d)(2). MCR 801(d)(2) governs admissions by a party
opponent, and states:

       (2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is
       (A) the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative
       capacity . . . or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or
       belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a
       statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party’s agent or servant
       concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during
       the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
       during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy on independent proof of the
       conspiracy.

Plaintiff signed the applications, suggesting that they must be considered his own statements under
MCR 801(d)(2)(A). Even so, plaintiff contends that the applications were inadmissible because
questions exist about whether someone read the contents of either application to him and whether
he truly understood what he was signing. He further argues that nobody has been able to identify
the person who prepared the November 4, 2019 application on his behalf, as he is legally blind and
could not have done it himself.

        The circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s decision to sign the October 4, 2019 application
are certainly suspect. In the trial court and on appeal, plaintiff presented copies of his medical
records in order to show that on October 4, 2019, he was not capable of understanding that he was
signing an application for benefits or that it contained inaccuracies. Plaintiff’s medical records
indicate that on October 4, 2019, he was “disoriented as to time,” and was experiencing a speech
delay. Since plaintiff signed the application within days of sustaining severe injury, including a
traumatic brain injury, and his medical records suggest that he was disoriented on the date that he
signed the application, a question of fact exists as to whether plaintiff was competent to sign the
application on October 4, 2019, and whether he was fully aware of its contents. The trial court
erroneously overlooked these issues in granting Nationwide’s motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

        However, the trial court ultimately reached the correct result regarding the November 4,
2019 application for benefits. Plaintiff points out that the November 4 application appears to have
been prepared by an individual named “Briana Pitts,” whose name appears on the document.
However, a separate check box indicates that plaintiff prepared the document himself. Plaintiff
claims that Briana Pitts cannot be found, and that the document is thus invalid and untrustworthy
on its face. He further argues that it is unclear whether he knew what he was signing, as he was
legally blind at the time and would have needed someone to read the document to him.

       There is no dispute that plaintiff was legally blind when he signed the November 4, 2019
application. In this instance, however, plaintiff presented no evidence, other than the fact of his
blindness, to indicate that he did not understand the document he was signing, or that he was

                                                -8-
unaware of its contents. He states that it is unclear whether Briana Pitts helped him with the
application, as well as whether anyone read the documents to him so that he understood their
contents. But if Briana Pitts cannot be found, as plaintiff alleges on appeal, then plaintiff himself
is the only person who could have provided evidence to support the claim that he was unaware of
the contents of the application due to his blindness. Plaintiff has presented nothing but speculation
that the November 4, 2019 application is untrustworthy and should not be admitted. Mere
speculation does not create a genuine issue of material fact. See Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460
Mich 446, 457; 597 NW2d 28 (1999) (stating that the plaintiff’s argument regarding the
authenticity of the information contained in a life insurance application was insufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact where the plaintiff “offered no proof that someone else answered
the health inquiries contained in the application without [his] knowledge or direction[.]”).
Accordingly, the November 4, 2019 application for benefits was admissible as the statement of a
party opponent, MCR 801(d)(2), and trial court did not err by considering it as documentary
evidence in support of Nationwide’s motion for summary disposition.

                                            C. INTENT

        Plaintiff’s final argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by granting summary
disposition to Nationwide where no evidence was presented to show that plaintiff intended to
defraud Nationwide. In doing so, plaintiff implies that there is an intent element in
MCL 500.3173a(4). We disagree.

        In Bakeman v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, ___ Mich App ___ (2022) (Docket
No. 357195), the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to the
defendant after concluding that the plaintiff knowingly signed and submitted false claims for PIP
benefits. The plaintiff claimed that he did not intend to defraud the defendant, who was assigned
to administer his claim via the MAIPF, and that he did not know he was signing fraudulent
documents. Id. at ___; slip op at 1, 4-5. Regarding the plaintiff’s “intent” argument, this Court
held that MCL 500.3173a(4) “unambiguously establishes that the only scienter requirement is
mere knowledge ‘that the statement contains false information concerning a fact or thing material
to the claim.’ ” Id. at ___; slip op at 4. The Court therefore concluded that a “[p]laintiff’s
subjective intent is therefore irrelevant. Rather, the critical concern is whether [the] plaintiff knew
that false material information had been provided.” Id.; slip op at 4. Regarding the plaintiff’s
argument that he did not sign the forms with knowledge that they contained false statements, this
Court stated that “ ‘the law is clear that one who signs an agreement, in the absence of coercion,
mistake, or fraud, is presumed to know the nature of the document and to understand its contents,
even if he or she has not read the agreement.’ ” Id., quoting Lease Acceptance Corp v Adams, 272
Mich App 209, 221; 724 NW2d 724 (2006) (emphasis added). The Court found that the plaintiff
had not presented evidence of “coercion, mistake, or fraud” in signing the documents, and that he
thus could not claim to have no knowledge of their contents. Bakeman, ___ Mich App at ___; slip
op at 4-5.

        In this case, we are not convinced that the trial court correctly concluded that no genuine
issue of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiff knew or understood the contents of the
October 4, 2019 application. According to plaintiff’s medical records, plaintiff was still in the
hospital and suffering from obvious cognitive impairment as a result of the injury on that date, and
yet signed the application anyway. Thus, it is unclear whether he was competent to sign the

                                                 -9-
application, or whether he effectively did so by “mistake,” id.; slip op at 4, in that he may have
been too disoriented to understand what he was signing. Whatever the case may be, we would
conclude that the trial court erred in relying on the October 4, 2019 application as documentary
evidence that supported granting Nationwide’s motion for summary disposition.

        The same cannot be said of the November 4, 2019 application. With regard to that
application, plaintiff merely argues that he did not know what he was signing because he is blind,
and nobody read him the contents of the application. To our knowledge, no Michigan caselaw
exists discussing whether legal blindness is sufficient to prove that an individual did not know or
understand the contents of a document they were asked to sign; plaintiff presents no caselaw on
this subject either. Moreover, under Bakeman, a person is presumed to understand the contents of
a document even if he or she has never read it. Id. at ___; slip op at 4, Further, even though he is
blind, plaintiff has never argued that he lacked the capacity to sign the November 4, 2019
application for benefits or that his decision to sign the document was based on “coercion, mistake,
or fraud[,]” id.; slip op at 4, nor has he ever presented evidence to support such a claim. That
plaintiff did not ask someone to read him the contents of the document before he signed it does
not negate the fact that he did sign it. Accordingly, this Court must presume that plaintiff “kn[e]w
the nature of the document and . . . underst[ood] its contents.” Lease Acceptance Corp, 272 Mich
App at 221. Under the circumstances, even if the trial court erred regarding the October 4, 2019
application, it nevertheless reached the correct result regarding the November 4, 2019 application.

                                        III. CONCLUSION

        Although the October 4, 2019 application could have been considered inadmissible under
MRE 803(6) due to a lack of trustworthiness, the same is not true of the November 4, 2019
application; plaintiff has presented no proof to show that his signature on that document was not
trustworthy or authentic. Further, plaintiff’s medical records were not improperly considered as
evidence of fraud in violation of Williamson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8, and there is no
intent element in MCL 500.3173a(4) that might bar Nationwide’s claim. Moreover, since plaintiff
signed the applications—particularly the November 4, 2019 application—and has provided no
evidentiary proof to support the argument that he lacked the capacity to do so, that he did so by
mistake, or that he was coerced or defrauded in this case, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. For all
of these reasons, plaintiff has failed to show that the trial court erred by granting summary
disposition to Nationwide under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Michelle M. Rick

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