Court Opinion

ID: 9408103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 16:00:37.073986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.784073
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHANE LOVE,                              No. 20-56003

                  Plaintiff-Appellant,      D.C. No.
  v.                                     2:20-cv-06557-
                                             PA-SP
AARON VILLACANA, Pasadena PD
Officer, individually and in official
capacity; THOMAS BUTLER,                   OPINION
Pasadena PD Officer, individually and
in official capacity; ROBERT
GRIFFITH, Pasadena PD Officer,
individually and in official capacity;
MICHAEL OROSCO, Pasadena PD
Officer, individually and in official
capacity; PHILLIP POIRIER,
Pasadena PD Officer, individually and
in official capacity; RAFAEL
SANTIAGO, Pasadena PD Officer,
individually and in official capacity;
CITY OF PASADENA; PHILLIP
SANCHEZ, Former PPD Chief,
individually and in official capacity;
PEREZ, PPD Chief, individually and
in official capacity; DOES, 1-10
inclusive,

              Defendants-Appellees.
2                        LOVE V. VILLACANA

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Central District of California
          Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

              Argued and Submitted June 6, 2023
                    Pasadena, California

                        Filed July 11, 2023

    Before: J. Clifford Wallace and John B. Owens, Circuit
       Judges, and Sidney A. Fitzwater, * District Judge.

                  Opinion by Judge Wallace;
                 Concurrence by Judge Owens

                          SUMMARY **

           Article III Standing / 42 U.S.C. § 1983

   The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal of a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action brought against the City of Pasadena
and several of its police officers.
    In 2018, Shane Love filed a federal Terry action against
the Defendants, seeking to recover for the death of Reginald
Thomas, a father figure to Love. The Terry action, which

*
  The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
**
   This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                      LOVE V. VILLACANA                      3

included a section 1983 claim, was dismissed with prejudice
for lack of Article III standing in 2019. Love then filed a
nearly identical lawsuit in California state court, which the
Defendants removed to federal court and successfully
moved to dismiss based on issue preclusion.
    The panel held that a plain reading of the first district
court’s judgment established that Article III standing was
actually      litigated     and      decided,      although
erroneously. However, erroneous, unappealed judgments
are still owed preclusive effect. The panel concluded that
issue preclusion was available, and Love was bound by the
prior standing determination. While issue preclusion was
available, the panel held that the Defendants waived issue
preclusion by removing the refiled case to federal court
because a removing defendant voluntarily invokes and
acquiesces to the federal courts and bears the burden of
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and Article III
standing.
    Accordingly, the panel vacated and remanded to the
second and current district court to determine, in the first
instance, whether jurisdiction lies in the federal courts and
whether Love adequately stated a claim, if the Defendants
pursue such an argument on remand.
     Concurring in the judgment, Judge Owens disagreed
with the majority that issue preclusion applies
notwithstanding waiver, and he would not reach the issue of
waiver. Because the district court erred in framing the issue
in this case as one of Article III standing and by subsequently
applying issue preclusion, he agreed that the panel should
vacate and remand so that the district court could properly
assess the merits of Love’s claims.
4                     LOVE V. VILLACANA

                        COUNSEL

Patrick J. Fuster (argued), Kahn A. Scolnick, and Isaac M.
Rottman, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles,
California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Scott J. Carpenter (argued), Jill Williams, and Steven J.
Rothans, Carpenter Rothans & Dumont LLP, Los Angeles,
California; Javan N. Rad, Chief Assistant City Attorney;
Michele Beal Bagneris, Pasadena City Attorney; Office of
the Pasadena City Attorney; Pasadena, California; for
Defendants-Appellees.

                         OPINION

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

    Shane Love appeals from the district court’s dismissal of
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Pasadena and
several of its police officers. We have jurisdiction over this
timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We vacate and
remand.
                              I.
    This case is about two parties and a district judge who
appear to have confused Article III standing with the case
merits and what results when a latter court gives preclusive
effect to the earlier erroneous standing determination.
    In 2018, Shane Love filed a federal action (the Terry
action) against the Defendants, seeking to recover for the
death of Reginald Thomas, a father figure to Love. Thomas
died in an incident with Pasadena police. Love brought one
                      LOVE V. VILLACANA                     5

section 1983 claim in the Terry action, alleging a violation
of his substantive due process rights as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. That action was dismissed with
prejudice for lack of Article III standing in 2019. In doing
so, the first district judge recited the Article III-standing
factors and held that Love “fail[ed] to establish standing” as
he did “not allege a custodial, biological, or legal
relationship” between himself and the decedent.
    After this dismissal, Love filed a near-identical lawsuit
in California state court. The Defendants subsequently
removed this case to federal court and then moved to dismiss
on the basis of issue preclusion. The second district court
dismissed Love’s action, holding that Love was “barred by
res judicata from relitigating his standing in this action.”
Love appeals from this issue-preclusion dismissal.
                             II.
    We review “de novo a district court’s dismissal based on
res judicata.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956
(9th Cir. 2002). We review whether issue preclusion is
available de novo and the district court’s decision to apply
issue preclusion for abuse of discretion. See S.E.C. v. Stein,
906 F.3d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 2018).
                             III.
    The first district court decided Love’s Article III
standing, and, absent other considerations, jurisdictional
issue preclusion is therefore available. Issue preclusion
applies when “(1) the issue at stake was identical in both
proceedings; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided
in the prior proceedings; (3) there was a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was
necessary to decide the merits.” Janjua v. Neufeld, 933 F.3d
6                      LOVE V. VILLACANA

1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019), quoting Oyeniran v. Holder, 672
F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2012). When deciding the preclusive
effect of an earlier decision, courts review the judgment’s
“natural reading.” Ruiz v. Snohomish Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist.
No. 1, 824 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016). A final
judgment is afforded preclusive effect even if erroneous.
See, e.g., Curlott v. Campbell, 598 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.
1979) (“If the [judgment] was appealable but unappealed,
the issues contained therein are res judicata, whether the
decision was right or wrong.”); see also B&B Hardware, Inc.
v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 157 (2015) (“Issue
preclusion prevent[s] relitigation of wrong decisions just as
much as right ones.” (internal citations and quotations
omitted)).
    A plain reading of the first district court’s judgment
establishes that Article III standing was actually litigated and
decided, although erroneously. At issue was whether Love’s
complaint “allege[d] a custodial, biological, or legal
relationship” to the decedent in order to recover under his
Fourteenth Amendment claim. The first district court
analyzed this question as one of “Article III standing.”
Ultimately, the court held solely that Love lacked Article III
standing and refused explicitly to consider whether the
complaint failed to state a claim on the merits.
    That the first district court decided Article III standing is
confirmed by review of the parties’ briefing before that
court. See Ruiz, 824 F.3d at 1167 (“[T]he entire record
before the issuing court . . . may be referenced in
determining what was decided.”), quoting Muckleshoot
Tribe v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 141 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.
1998). The parties litigated whether Love had “Article III
standing” to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim, and the
Defendants argued in the alternative that the claim should be
                      LOVE V. VILLACANA                     7

dismissed for failure to state a claim. As discussed above,
the first district court analyzed the Article III-standing
factors, held that Love lacked standing, and refused to reach
the question whether Love stated a claim.
    This Article III standing decision was almost certainly
wrong. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
83, 89 (1998) (“It is firmly established in our cases that the
absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action
does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the
court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case.”). The parties now appear to agree.
    However, that the first district court’s judgment is an
erroneous standing decision is of no moment when applying
issue preclusion. Erroneous, unappealed judgments are still
owed preclusive effect. See Curlott, 598 F.2d at 1178.
Moreover, the fact that the judgment is erroneous neither
renders it ambiguous nor transforms it into a merits decision.
Issue preclusion is not available where the earlier judgment
is “unclear” or if there is “any doubt” regarding what issue
was previously decided. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d
1045, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). However, the first district court’s dismissal was
not ambiguous—the district court held explicitly that it was
dismissing for lack of Article III standing. Any uncertainty
concerning what was decided arises only because the
decision was erroneous, but error alone does not equate to
ambiguity. Rather, a decision that confuses Article III
standing with the merits of the plaintiff’s claim is merely an
erroneous standing decision, not an ambiguous merits
decision. See Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d
1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2014). Holding otherwise would defeat
the principle that courts give preclusive effect to final,
8                    LOVE V. VILLACANA

unappealed, erroneous judgments. See Curlott, 598 F.2d
at 1178.
    Thus, Article III standing was actually litigated and
decided in the first district court. Moreover, the issues
involved in the prior action and in the instant case are
identical, and the parties had a fair opportunity to litigate
before the first district court. Therefore, absent other
considerations, issue preclusion is available, and Love is
bound by the prior standing determination.
                            IV.
    While issue preclusion is available under the usual test,
the Defendants waived issue preclusion by removing the
refiled case to federal court. A party’s conduct and
“acquiesc[ence]” may waive an argument that party would
otherwise be entitled to raise. Clements v. Airport Auth. of
Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 328–29 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that issue preclusion can be waived). Upon removal, a
defendant assumes voluntarily “the burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction.” Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co.,
443 F.3d 676, 682–83 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a
removing defendant must allege facts in the notice of
removal supporting the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction and Article III standing.      See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(a); Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S.
Ct. 1945, 1950–51 (2019).
    Such an invocation of and acquiescence to the federal
courts by a removing defendant is sufficient to waive
jurisdictional issue preclusion. It would turn the removal
statutes on their head if a defendant could remove a case,
attest that jurisdiction exists, and then contend that issue
                         LOVE V. VILLACANA                             9

preclusion bars Article III standing. 1 See Embury v. King,
361 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding, in the sovereign
immunity context, that it is “inconsistent for the [defendant]
to invoke federal jurisdiction by removal, thereby
contending that the judicial power of the United States
extended to the case, yet claim that jurisdiction did not
extend to the case”), citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002). Removal constitutes
a defendant’s voluntary entreat to federal court, and the
removing defendant cannot then expect to disabuse him or
herself so easily of the burden of establishing jurisdiction by
invoking jurisdictional issue preclusion. See Lapides, 535
U.S. at 624 (“[R]emoval is a form of voluntary invocation of
a federal court’s jurisdiction sufficient to waive the
[defendant’s] otherwise valid objection to litigation of a
matter . . . in a federal forum.”); see also Gospel Missions of
Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553–54 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that the party bearing the burden of
establishing jurisdiction may not invoke issue preclusion to
“force[] [courts] to pretend to exercise” jurisdiction where it
may not otherwise exist).
    Failure to recognize waiver here would amount to a
“substantial injustice.” See Clements, 69 F.3d at 329–30
(ruling that waiver applies when “the failure to hold the
defendants to their waiver would subject the plaintiffs to
gross prejudice”). When a federal action is dismissed for

1
  The likelihood of such a scenario is mitigated by the fact that a
defendant could be subject to Rule 11 sanctions for misrepresenting
jurisdictional facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Moreover, if a defendant
removes a case and subsequently argues that federal subject-matter
jurisdiction does not lie, a plaintiff could file a motion to remand. See
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
10                        LOVE V. VILLACANA

lack of Article III standing, a plaintiff can either appeal or
refile in a state court of general jurisdiction. See ASARCO
Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have
recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not
apply to state courts.”). If a plaintiff, as here, 2 forgoes an
appeal and refiles in state court, the earlier dismissal is final
and entitled to preclusive effect. See Tripati v. Henman, 857
F.2d 1366, 1367 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1988). Permitting a
defendant to remove a refiled case and invoke issue
preclusion as to Article III standing would render a
plaintiff’s choice between pursuing an appeal of the earlier
standing dismissal versus refiling in state court illusory.
Moreover, absent waiver, no court—state or federal—would
provide a forum for redress for the plaintiff’s claim. See
Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 970 n.6
(9th Cir. 2018) (“A ‘perpetual loop’ of removal to federal
court and dismissal for lack of standing should not occur.”);
cf. Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, 832 F.3d
1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that Lapides and its
waiver-removal rule did not apply, in part as the plaintiff still
had access to a judicial forum to decide her claim absent
waiver).
    The rule established here is narrow: if a federal action is
dismissed for lack of Article III standing and a plaintiff
forgoes an appeal of that dismissal and refiles in state court,
a defendant waives any jurisdictional issue preclusion
argument upon voluntary removal of the lawsuit back to
federal court. This rule is consistent with a defendant’s

2
  Love appealed the first district court’s dismissal, but that appeal was
dismissed for failure to prosecute. Love then refiled in state court.
                      LOVE V. VILLACANA                     11

burden to establish jurisdiction upon his or her voluntary
resort to the federal courts.
                              V.
   For these reasons, we vacate and remand to the second
and current district court to determine, in the first instance,
whether jurisdiction lies in the federal courts and whether
Love adequately states a claim, if the Defendants pursue
such an argument on remand.
   VACATED AND REMANDED.

OWENS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
    I concur in the judgment to vacate and remand this case.
However, I respectfully disagree with the majority that issue
preclusion applies notwithstanding waiver.         I would
therefore not reach the issue of waiver.
    Here, the district court “confused Article III standing
with the merits” of Love’s Fourteenth Amendment claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chaudhry v. City of L.A., 751 F.3d
1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2014). Despite framing the issue as one
of standing, the district court found that Love previously
failed to establish a “custodial, biological, or legal
relationship between [himself] and decedent.” In other
words, the district court assessed whether Love previously
asserted a cognizable liberty interest in his relationship with
Thomas under the Due Process Clause, not whether he had
standing. See id. (holding that the plaintiffs’ failure to show
12                       LOVE V. VILLACANA

“a legal interest in the disposition of” their sibling’s remains
had no bearing on standing). 1
    By improperly characterizing the issue as a jurisdictional
question, the district court also erred by applying issue
preclusion. Issue preclusion requires, inter alia, that “the
issue was actually litigated and decided in the prior
proceedings.” Janjua v. Neufeld, 933 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). As the majority correctly
notes, the issue in the Terry action could be reasonably
characterized as one of Article III standing. Majority at 6-7.
But Defendants attempted to preclude litigation on whether
Love “had a due process right in the companionship . . . of
the decedent,” which was never litigated nor decided in the
prior proceeding.       Issue preclusion was therefore
unavailable. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065
(9th Cir. 2010) (“Where a decision could have been
rationally grounded upon an issue other than that which the
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration, collateral
estoppel does not preclude relitigation of the asserted issue.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
    Because the district court erred in framing the issue in
this case as one of Article III standing and by subsequently
applying issue preclusion, I agree that the panel should
vacate and remand so the district court can properly assess
the merits of Love’s claims.

1
 As Defendants concede on appeal, this error was, in large part, a result
of their own erroneous framing of the issue.