Court Opinion

ID: 9381602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 15:05:46.052074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:33.545287
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2023
                                                           TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                 2021-SC-0444-DG

MARION HUGHES; JAMES A. CRUME;                                       APPELLANTS
PHILLIP L. WESTERN; RAYMOND S.
BATTS; AND TERRI A. ROGERS

                    ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                          NO. 2019-CA-1457
                 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 07-CI-009996

UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC.;                                     APPELLEES
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.

           OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE VANMETER

                                       AFFIRMING

      In matters of statutory construction, courts have the duty to ascertain

and give meaning to the intent of the legislature. In this case, our task is to

determine whether KRS1 Chapter 337 encompasses the federal Portal-to-Portal

provisions such that preliminary and postliminary activities, such as

undergoing security screens, are non-compensable. Under customary rules of

statutory construction, we hold that such activities are non-compensable and

therefore affirm the Court of Appeals and the Jefferson Circuit Court.

      1   Kentucky Revised Statutes.
                     I.    Factual and Procedural Background.

      This action was filed back in 2007 as a wage-and-hour class action by

Marion Hughes2 against UPS Supply Chain Solutions and United Parcel

Service, Inc.3 The complaint alleged that UPS violated KRS Chapter 337 by

failing to compensate Class Members for time spent complying with mandatory

security procedures upon entering/exiting UPS facilities. The allegations were

that Class Members expended work time on (i) entering after complying with

mandatory entry security procedures and before being permitted to clock-in

and (ii) exiting after being required to clock-out and then complying with

mandatory exit security procedures. The Class Members refer to this

uncompensated time as “security time.”

      The long procedural history of this case is not particularly germane to

the issue before us, since, as noted, that issue is one of statutory construction.

Suffice to say that this case spent some time in the federal courts on UPS’s

attempt to remove it there,4 and then back in state court on whether it would

      2  By First Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint, James A.
Crume, Phillip L. Western, Raymond S. Batts, and Terri A. Rogers were added as
plaintiffs. We refer to the named plaintiffs and other members of the class as “Class
Members.”
      3   We refer to the defendants jointly as “UPS.”
      4  Hughes v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. 3:07-CV-605-S, 2008 WL 3456217
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 8, 2008) (denying federal diversity jurisdiction), denying permission to
appeal, In re UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. 08-0513, 2008 WL 4767817 (6th Cir.
Oct. 27, 2008); Hughes v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-576-S, 2010 WL
1257724 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2010) (denying second attempt at removal for federal
diversity jurisdiction); Hughes v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., 815 F. Supp.2d 993
(W.D. Ky. 2011) (granting employees’ motion to remand to state court for employer’s
waiver of Labor Management Relations Act’s claims).

                                             2
proceed as a class action.5 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s order certifying the class. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc. v. Hughes, No.

2014-CA-1496-ME, 2018 WL 3602262 (Ky. App. July 27, 2018).

      Following the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the trial court’s class

certification, UPS moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that “the time

for which the Class was seeking compensation – time spent waiting for and

undergoing security screenings – was not compensable under Kentucky law[]”

based on the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.6 §§ 251-262, and federal and

Kentucky case law interpreting the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 201- 219, the Portal-to-Portal Act and KRS Chapter 337. The Class

Members’ response was that because KRS Chapter 337 did not include

language tracking the provisions of the Portal-to-Portal Act, specifically 29

U.S.C. § 254,7 our legislature had elected not to include those provisions and

       5 Hughes v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. 2012-CA-001353-ME, 2013 WL

4779746 (Ky. App. Sept. 6, 2013) (reversing denial of class certification and remanding
for additional consideration under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 23).
Under CR 23.06, “[a]n order granting or denying class action certification is
appealable[.]”
      6   United States Code.
      7   29 U.S.C. § 254(a) sets forth general exemptions from compensable time:
      (a) Activities not compensable
             Except as provided in subsection (b), no employer shall be subject
      to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
      1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act, on
      account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum
      wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account
      of any of the following activities of such employee engaged in on or after
      May 14, 1947--

                                           3
therefore they were inapplicable. The trial court granted UPS’s motion and the

Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted the Class Members’ motion for

discretionary review.

                            II.    Standard of Review.

      In this case, the trial court granted UPS’s motion for partial judgment on

the pleadings. CR 12.03. A motion for judgment on the pleadings “should be

granted if it appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party cannot prove any

set of facts that would entitle him/her to relief.” Mosley v. Arch Specialty Ins.

Co., 626 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Ky. 2021); City of Pioneer Vill. v. Bullitt Cnty. ex rel.

Bullitt Fiscal Ct., 104 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Ky. 2003). Such motions are “based

purely on whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action as a matter of law

and do not require or permit the trial court to make any findings of fact.”

Mosley, 626 S.W.3d at 585 (footnote omitted). Because a trial court's ruling on

a motion for judgment on the pleadings is a question of law, appellate review of

            (1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of
      performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is
      employed to perform, and
             (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said
      principal activity or activities,
      which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which
      such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular
      workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. For
      purposes of this subsection, the use of an employer's vehicle for travel by
      an employee and activities performed by an employee which are
      incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be
      considered part of the employee's principal activities if the use of such
      vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer's
      business or establishment and the use of the employer's vehicle is
      subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or
      representative of such employee.

                                           4
a judgment on the pleadings is de novo. Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, we afford

no deference to the lower court’s opinions or rulings. Id. Similarly, we

interpret statutes without deferring to lower courts’ interpretations. Wheeler &

Clevenger Oil Co. v. Washburn, 127 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Ky. 2004).

                                  III.   Analysis.

      The issue presented is one of statutory construction, i.e., whether the

Portal-to-Portal exceptions are contained within Kentucky’s wage and hour

provisions.

      In matters of statutory construction, “our goal, of course, is to give effect

to the intent of the [legislature].” Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354

S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011). To derive that intent, we look first to the statute’s

language, “giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pleasant

Unions, LLC v. Ky. Tax Co., 615 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Ky. 2021); see Shawnee

Telecom, 354 S.W.3d at 551 (holding that intent is derived “from the language

the [legislature] chose, either as defined by the [legislature] or as generally

understood in the context of the matter under consideration[]”). “All words and

phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of

language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have

acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed

according to such meaning.” KRS 446.080(4). If the statutory language is

plain and unambiguous, the legislature's intent is deduced from the language

used. W. Ky. Coal Co. v. Nall & Bailey, 228 Ky. 76, 80, 14 S.W.2d 400, 401–02

(1929). On the other hand, if the language is ambiguous, we resort to rules of

                                          5
interpretation to guide our determination of the legislature’s intent. Pleasant

Unions, 615 S.W.3d at 45; MPM Fin. Group, LLC v. Morton, 289 S.W.3d 193, 198

(Ky. 2009).

      In this case, KRS Chapter 337 is ambiguous in that it does not define

“work,” and contains no provision which addresses, either way, whether

preliminary or postliminary activities constitute compensable work or time on

the job. We acknowledge that KRS Chapter 337 “protects employees from the

unlawful wage and hour practices of their employer.” Mouanda v. Jani-King

Int'l, No. 2021-SC-0089-DG, 653 S.W.3d 65, 2022 WL 3641175, at *3 (Ky. Aug.

18, 2022). KRS 337.010(1)(c)1 defines “wages” to include “any compensation

due to an employee by reason of his or her employment, including salaries,

commissions, vested vacation pay, overtime pay, severance or dismissal pay,

earned bonuses, and any other similar advantages agreed upon by the

employer and the employee or provided to employees as an established policy.”

An “employee,” with exceptions not applicable to this case, is defined as “any

person employed by or suffered or permitted to work for an employer[.]” KRS

337.010(1)(e). KRS 337.275 defines “minimum wage,” but that provision does

not specifically help our interpretation in this case. And, finally, and perhaps

most pertinently, “any employer who pays any employee less than wages and

overtime compensation to which such employee is entitled under or by virtue of

                                        6
KRS 337.020 to 337.285 shall be liable to such employee affected for the full

amount of such wages and overtime compensation[.]” KRS 337.385(1).8

      To resolve this ambiguity, we are guided by both state administrative

interpretation and federal case law. We discuss each in turn.

      A. State Administrative Interpretation of KRS Chapter 337.

      The legislature has empowered the Kentucky Labor Cabinet, specifically

the Kentucky Department of Workplace Standards, to issue administrative

regulations “defining and governing” KRS Chapter 337. See KRS 337.295.

Those agencies enjoy “wide discretion” in interpreting Kentucky law. Ky. Mun.

League v. Commonwealth Dep't of Labor, 530 S.W.2d 198, 201–02 (Ky. App.

1975) (citing Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of N. Ky., Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky.

1961)). And the Department of Workplace Standard’s administrative

interpretation of Kentucky law serves as a basis for the application of Kentucky

statutes. See City of Louisville, Div. of Fire v. Fire Serv. Managers Ass’n ex rel.

Kaelin, 212 S.W.3d 89, 92–93, 96 (Ky. 2006).

      For nearly half a century, the Kentucky Department of Workplace

Standards has concluded that the Portal-to-Portal Act’s compensation limits

are part of the KRS Chapter 337 framework.9 See 803 KAR 1:065 (LAB-12; 1

Ky. R. 253; eff. 1-8-75; TAM eff. 8-9-2007; expired 3-1-2020). For instance,

      8  This lack of specificity is underscored by the Class Members’ second amended
complaint which cites no specific statute or regulation, but merely alleges “UPS has
violated Kentucky’s wage and hour laws and regulations.”
     9 Kentucky’s current regulation regarding hours worked is codified at 803 Ky.

Admin. Regs. (“KAR”) 1:067 (48 Ky. R. 2336, 2980; eff. 8-30-2022).

                                          7
Kentucky’s longstanding administrative regulation regarding “Travel Time”

stated:

             (1)    General. The principles which apply in determining
       whether or not time spent in travel is working time depend upon
       the kind of travel involved.
              (2)   Home to work. An employe[e] who travels from home
       before his regular workday and returns to his home at the end of
       the workday is engaged in ordinary home to work travel which is a
       normal incident of employment. This is true whether he works at a
       fixed location or at different job sites. Normal travel from home to
       work is not worktime.
              (3)    Travel that is worktime. Time spent by an employe[e]
       in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job site
       to job site during the workday, must be counted as hours worked.
       Where an employe[e] is required to report at a meeting place to
       receive instructions or to perform other work there, the travel from
       the designated place to the work place is part of the day’s work,
       and must be counted as hours worked.

803 KAR 1:065 (emphasis added).

       And although the earlier regulation, 803 KAR 1:065, expired in 2020,

Kentucky’s current regulation regarding “Hours Worked” expressly

incorporates federal standards into the definition of “Travel Time,” stating,

“Travel Time. The requirements for travel time applicable to KRS 337.275 and

337.285 shall be as established in 29 C.F.R.10 785.33, 785.35, 785.38, and

785.39.” 803 KAR 1:067(7).11

       10   Code of Federal Regulations.
       11 The language in 29 C.F.R. 785.38, which is incorporated by reference in 803
KAR 1:067(7), is identical to the relevant language in Kentucky’s previous regulation
regarding travel time. Compare 803 KAR 1:065 (1975) (“[t]ime spent by an employe[e]
in travel as part of his principle activity, such as travel from job site to job site during
the workday, must be counted as hours worked[]”), with 29 C.F.R. 785.38 (“[t]ime
spent by an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job
site to job site during the workday, must be counted as hours worked[]”).

                                             8
      “Both the phrase and concept of a ‘principal activity’ are taken from the

text of the Portal-to-Portal Act.” Vance v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Amazon.com,

Inc., Fulfillment Ctr. Fair Lab. Standards Act (FLSA) & Wage & Hour Litig.), 852

F.3d 601, 613 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)). Inclusion of the

“principal activity” language in Kentucky’s administrative regulations

strengthens the connection between KRS Chapter 337 and the Portal-to-Portal

Act, “which has employer liability for ‘walking, riding [and] traveling to and

from the actual place of performance’ squarely at its focus.” Id. (quoting 29

U.S.C. § 254(a)(1)).

      Furthermore, Kentucky’s wait-time regulation, 803 KAR 1:063,12 imports

the Portal-to-Portal Act rule and is drawn from federal regulations, see 29

C.F.R. §§ 785.14–16. Id. “Both sets of regulations explain that ‘waiting is an

integral part of the job’ only when the employee is ‘engaged to wait’—meaning

his workday has begun and he is anticipating some further principal activity,

such as a stenographer waiting to take dictation or a firefighter waiting for a

call.” Id. (citing 803 KAR 1:065(3)(2) and 29 C.F.R. § 785.15).

      The longstanding similarities between KRS Chapter 337’s administrative

regulations and their federal counterparts bolsters the conclusion that the

Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions apply to KRS Chapter 337. Under Kentucky

law, administrative regulations have the full force and effect of law when duly

enacted and consistent with enabling legislation. Centre College v. Trzop, 127

      12 Although the previous version of 803 KAR 1:063 has expired, similar

language has been recodified at 803 KAR 1:064.

                                         9
S.W.3d 562, 566 (Ky. 2003). As a result, even considering legislative silence on

the issue, the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions have been Kentucky law by way

of administrative regulation since 1975.

      Moreover, legislative inaction here supports the conclusion that KRS

Chapter 337 imports the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions. The legislature has

convened in regular session over thirty times since the Kentucky Department of

Workplace Standards first incorporated the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions

into KRS Chapter 337.13 As will be discussed in more detail infra, the

legislature has not been shy about amending other parts of KRS Chapter 337.

Legislative inaction under these circumstances demonstrates that the

legislature has ratified, or at the very least has acquiesced, in the Department

of Workplace Standard’s inclusion of the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions in

the KWHA framework.

      B. Federal Court Interpretation of KRS Chapter 337.

      In Kaelin, we described KRS Chapter 337 as “Kentucky's analogue to the

Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 [(“FLSA”)].” 212 S.W.3d at 92.

As such, “[w]e first look to Kentucky jurisprudence and find nothing other than

the statutes themselves to aid in interpreting the issue which is presented

before us today. In the absence of any Kentucky cases on point, we next look

to federal cases interpreting the FLSA.” Id. at 95.

      13 Before 2000, the Kentucky General Assembly met in regular sessions in even-
numbered years. In 2000, Kentucky established annual regular sessions through
constitutional amendment. See Ky. Const. § 36 (2000).

                                        10
      Two federal cases directly aid our interpretation. First, the United States

Supreme Court held, in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27

(2014), that security screenings are noncompensable activities under the FLSA

since such screenings were not the principal activity or activities which the

employee is to perform, id. at 35 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1)), and were not

“‘integral and indispensable’ to the employees’ duties as warehouse workers.”

Id. The Court noted that “[t]he screenings were not an intrinsic element of

retrieving products from warehouse shelves or packaging them for shipment.

And [the employer] could have eliminated the screenings altogether without

impairing the employees' ability to complete their work.” Id.

      Following this decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the

Integrity Staffing rationale to a case involving a similar requirement for workers

to pass through lengthy anti-theft security screenings after clocking out

without compensation for that time. Vance, 852 F.3d 601. In Vance, the

court, following a thorough analysis of the history of FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal

Act, KRS Chapter 337 and applicable federal and state regulations, concluded

that KRS Chapter 337 incorporates “the Portal-to-Portal Act's compensation

limits on preliminary and postliminary activities. Integrity Staffing is therefore

on point.” 852 F.3d at 615.

      The Class members argue that this Court, and not the federal courts, are

the final arbiters of Kentucky law. While that assertion is true, the Class

Members forget that we are not interpreting statutes for our benefit. Rather,

                                        11
our goal, as stated previously, is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s

intention. See KRS 446.080(1).

      While we agree with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis as to the Portal-to-Portal

Act’s applicability to KRS Chapter 337, another consideration mandates its

application. We have often cited the rule of statutory interpretation that “the

failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute

is extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent.” Bloyer v.

Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 219, 225 (Ky. 2022); Kindred Healthcare v. Harper,

642 S.W.3d 672, 684 (Ky. 2022); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Prichard, 532

S.W.3d 633, 636 (Ky. 2017); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 856

(Ky. 2002); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996). In other words, “a

strong implication [is created] that the legislature agrees with a prior court

interpretation of its statute when it does not amend the statute interpreted.”

Kindred, 642 S.W.3d at 684; Toyota, 532 S.W.3d at 636; Rye, 934 S.W.2d at

262. This rule of statutory interpretation equally applies when a federal court

exercising diversity jurisdiction interprets state statutes. See Democratic Party

v. Graham, 976 S.W.2d 423, 428-29 (Ky. 1998) (holding, in light of a prior

federal decision interpreting KRS Chapter 121 and subsequent legislative

reenactment, “the legislature is well aware of the interpretation of the existing

statute and has adopted that interpretation unless the new law contains

language to the contrary. . . . If the legislators intended to depart from the

existing statutory interpretation, it is incumbent that they use ‘plain and

unmistakable language[.]’”) (internal citations omitted).

                                         12
      In this case, after the Sixth Circuit’s 2017 decision in Vance, the

Kentucky General Assembly has convened five times. It has passed statutory

amendments to KRS Chapter 337 in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.14 Admittedly

some of these amendments do not implicate any of the sections at issue in this

case. But these amendments indicate that the legislature has been proactive

in amending KRS Chapter 337. Furthermore, notwithstanding that some of

the issues in this case arose more than fifteen years ago, the legislature may

make legislation retroactive, if it so desires. See KRS 446.080(3) (providing

that “[n]o statute shall be construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so

declared[]”); Peabody Coal Co. v. Gossett, 819 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1991) (holding

that remedial statutes may have retroactive application).

                                IV.    Conclusion.

      At bottom, the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions were incorporated into

Kentucky law in 1975, when the Department of Workplace Standards applied

the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions to KRS Chapter 337. Nearly a half

century of legislative inaction clearly demonstrates that the legislature has

acquiesced to the Department’s administrative interpretation. In addition, a

federal case, Vance, addressed a virtually identical factual situation and

      14 Act of Apr. 20, 2022, ch. 236 § 115, 2022 Ky. Acts 2216 (amending KRS
337.010); Id. ch. 236 § 176 (amending KRS 337.065); Id. ch. 236 § 116 (amending
KRS 337.075); Act of Apr. 8, 2022, ch. 94 § 3, 2022 Ky. Acts 566 (amending KRS
337.100); Act of Apr. 12, 2022, ch. 191 § 9, 2022 Ky. Acts 1117 (amending KRS
337.285); Act of Mar. 29, 2021, ch. 153 § 1, 2021 Ky. Acts 883 (amending KRS
337.010); Act of Mar. 23, 2021, ch. 76 § 1, 2021 Ky. Acts 412 (amending KRS
337.015); Act of Feb. 11, 2020, ch. 2 § 1, 2020 Ky. Acts 5 (amending KRS 337.010);
Act of Apr. 26, 2018, ch. 195 § 1, 2018 Ky. Acts 1671 (amending KRS 337.285).

                                         13
applied the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions to KRS Chapter 337. A contrary

interpretation would be squarely inconsistent with well-settled law concerning

the legal force of properly enacted administrative regulations, this Court’s

precedent regarding the proper application of legislative inaction, and accepted

principles of statutory interpretation. For these reasons, the decisions of the

Court of Appeals and the Jefferson Circuit Court holding that preliminary and

postliminary security screenings required by UPS are not compensable under

KRS Chapter 337 are affirmed.

        All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, and Nickell, JJ., concur.

Thompson, J., dissents by separate opinion in which Keller and Lambert, JJ.,

join.

        THOMPSON, J., DISSENTING: This protracted class action litigation

currently concerns whether Kentucky will adopt the federal law contained in 29

United States Code (U.S.C.) § 254, known as Section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal

Act (the Federal Law), and engraft it into our Wage and Hour law. The Federal

Law exempts from compensation “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the

actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such

employee is employed to perform, and . . . activities which are preliminary to or

postliminary to said principal activity or activities,” if they occur prior or

subsequent to the performance of the employee’s “principal activity or

activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).15 If we adopt the Federal Law, the question then

        15
        The relevant portion of the Federal Law is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)
which explains that the following activities are not compensable:

                                         14
becomes what impact this will have on UPS workers in the class who must

undergo extensive and potentially lengthy security screenings at the beginning

and end of their shifts as mandated by federal laws applicable to package

shipping companies.

      The majority opinion declares that the Federal Law has already been

incorporated into our Wage and Hour regulations, and determines that as a

matter of law, it creates a bright-line rule prohibiting compensation for any

type of security screenings. Accordingly, the majority opinion declares that

such workers must be summarily denied any compensation for the time they

spend passing through security. The majority opinion thereby concludes that

under any set of facts, no matter how onerous and time-consuming such

screenings are or why they are required, employees are required to bear this

cost of business themselves.

      I vehemently disagree with such an approach. I respectfully dissent from

the majority opinion as I cannot agree with its reasoning that UPS’s motion for

      (1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place
          of performance of the principal activity or activities
          which such employee is employed to perform, and

      (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to
          said principal activity or activities,

      which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which
      such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular
      workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities . . . .

       29 U.S.C. § 254(b) provides enumerated exceptions based on contract and
custom to the 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) restrictions to compensation, limited by 29 U.S.C. §
254(c), but I do not discuss these exceptions as they are inapplicable to the facts
before us.

                                          15
partial judgment on the pleadings16 was properly granted pursuant to the

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.03, given the incomplete record

available and the absence of adequate discovery. Additionally, I believe the

majority opinion is wrongfully legislating from the bench by engrafting the

Federal Law into Kentucky’s Wage and Hour laws and then interpreting this

law expansively to resolve a question that it is premature to address.

I conclude that under Kentucky’s own standards or the Federal Law that this

case should have survived the motion for judgment on the pleadings and

should be reversed and remanded for development of the record. It is well past

time for this matter, which was originally filed in 2007, to be decided on the

merits.

                  I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      The class is composed of UPS workers employed at the Worldport,

Elizabethtown, and Louisville Technical & Logistics Center (LTLC) facilities as

they were determined to have security procedures and methods in common.

Hughes v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., 2012-CA-001353-ME, 2013 WL

4779746, at *5-7 (Ky. App. Sept. 6, 2013).

          The class members generally alleged that they were not being

appropriately compensated for mandatory worktime which consisted of

entering and exiting through a security checkpoint, as they could not clock in

      16   The partial summary judgment on the pleadings fully dismissed the class’s
claims for unpaid wages for all time worked; it did not address the class’s claims for
illegal disability leave policies, which are apparently still pending.

                                           16
until after entering through a security checkpoint and then had to clock out

before exiting through a security checkpoint. They alleged that the time spent

going through the security checkpoints was for the benefit of UPS and was

uncompensated worktime, which was not de minimis, explaining that “Plaintiffs

were not free to effectively use the time expended between complying with

security and clocking-in or out for their own purposes.” Accordingly, they

generally alleged that UPS violated Kentucky’s Wage and Hour laws and

regulations.

      I focus my discussion on the security screening processes that take place

for the portion of the class that works at UPS’s Worldport facility. Some

pertinent information is needed to understand the size and scale of the

Worldport facility to put into perspective the limited information we have as to

what its security screening process entails:

                                UPS WORLDPORT17

      17  The data contained in this chart was gleaned from the following sources:
Louisville Regional Airport Authority, Aviation Statistics: December 2022,
https://www.flylouisville.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Aviation-Stats-2022-12-
revised-3.pdf; UPS, UPS Air Operation Facts (Revised Jun. 30, 2022), https://about.
ups.com/content/dam/upsstories/assets/fact-sheets/airlines-fact-sheets/Air-
Operations-Facts-063022.pdf; AeroSavvy, Inside Louisville’s UPS Worldport, https://
aerosavvy.com/ups-worldport/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2023) (Inside Worldport);
Louisville Regional Airport Authority, SDF History, https://www.flylouisville.com/
corporate/sdf-history/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2023); Louisville Regional Airport
Authority, Economic Impact: Fueling the Regional Economy, https://www.flylouisville.
com/wp content/uploads/2020/10/LRAA-CY2018-Economic-and-Fiscal-Impact-2-
Pager.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2023); UPS, UPS Welcomes New Developments in
Healthcare and Aviation (Nov. 18, 2022), https://about.ups.com/us/en/our-
stories/customer-first/ups-breaks-ground-on-louisville-expansions.html. I recognize
that Worldport has expanded greatly since the class filed suit, so this data is not
necessarily accurate for the time period at issue, but I provide it nevertheless as our
decision will affect how employees at Worldport are compensated going forward.
                                          17
Size             •   5.2 million square feet (the size of 90 football fields)

                 •   7.2 miles around its perimeter

                 •   Larger than Minneapolis’s Mall of America

                 •   ramp size of 300 acres

Capacity         •   125 aircraft parking spots

                 •   70 self-parking docks

                 •   387 in/outbound flights per day

                 •   Peak capacity of one aircraft arriving each minute

Volume           •   416,000 packages/documents per hour

                 •   2 million packages a day (up to 4 million during the
                     Christmas season)

Relative         •   UPS’s largest facility and company’s main air hub
Importance
                 •   second busiest cargo airport in North America

                 •   fourth busiest cargo airport in the world

Workers          •   12,000+ employees work there per day

Statistics for   •   3+ billion pounds of cargo enplaned and deplaned
2022                 (3,443,107,204 lbs enplaned; 3,249,700,296 lbs
                     deplaned)

                 •   47,365 planes landed

                                      18
      This publicly available information shows that this is a massive facility

with a population and footprint that is equivalent to some smaller Kentucky

cities.18 A workplace at such a scale is difficult to imagine.

      At this juncture of the litigation, our knowledge about the security

screening process at Worldport and the other facilities is limited.19 However,

considering this and my general knowledge that Worldport is at the airport and

that its employees are working in a facility that has package distribution that is

loaded and unloaded from airplanes, the security screening process appears to

be closely analogous to the airport security screenings that passengers undergo

      18 For comparison, the number of employees present every day, about 12,000,
makes Worldport’s “population” slightly smaller than Kentucky’s 33rd largest city,
Bardstown, which has a population of 14,028, but around the same size as Kentucky’s
36th largest city, Somerset, which has a population of 12,143. World Population
Review, Cities in Kentucky by Population, https://worldpopulationreview.com/states/
cities/kentucky (last visited Feb. 28, 2023).

      19 Hughes, 2013 WL 4779746, at *5 briefly recounts this process for the
Worldport, LTLC and Elizabethtown facilities for purposes of determining if they met
the requirements of commonality and typicality:
      Upon entering the Elizabethtown facility, employees removed personal
      items, passed through a metal detector, and presented any bags for
      search by security personnel. Upon exiting the Elizabethtown facility,
      employees again passed through a metal detector. Upon entering the
      LTLC facility, employees removed personal items, passed through a metal
      detector, and presented any bags for search by security personnel. Upon
      exiting the LTLC facility, employees again passed through a metal
      detector. Upon entering the Worldport facility, employees were required
      to pass through a metal detector and remove all personal belongings. If
      an audible alert sounded, the employee again passed through a metal
      detector and could be wanded by security personnel if another alert
      sounded. The employees at Worldport followed the exact same security
      procedure upon exiting the facility.

This summary appears to be derived from the May 4, 2012, affidavit of Domenic
DiMauro, Jr., UPS’s Air District Security Manager (DiMauro Affidavit) and the May 3,
2012, affidavit of Steve Hamm, UPS’s North American Security Director (Hamm
Affidavit).

                                         19
before they can board commercial flights. There are even a similar number of

employees and passengers being screened each day.20 The main difference

appears to be that Worldport employees must undergo this process on both

ends of their shifts and they have a much farther distance to traverse than

passengers.21

      As our passenger screening time varies, I imagine theirs must as well.

Just as passengers plan ahead for screening time and often arrive far earlier

than is actually needed to pass through security so that they will not risk (or

worry about risking) failing to make it to the gate on time, such employees

likely also need to arrive substantially ahead of time to ensure they can clock

in on time so as to avoid workplace discipline.

      II. THE JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
                               GRANTED

      From the pleadings, and the class certification process, it appears that

the security screenings at Worldport differ substantially from those security

      20  Publicly available statistics are that the Louisville Muhammad Ali
International Airport had more than 3.88 million passengers in 2022, which when
divided by 365 days, provides an average of about 10,630 passengers per day.
Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport, Louisville Muhammad Ali International
Airport Marks Third Best Year in 2022 (Feb. 7, 2023), https://www .flylouisville.com
/louisville-muhammad-ali-international-airport-marks-third-best-year-in-2022/.
Thus, there are fewer daily passengers than Worldport’s 12,000 daily employees.
      21  The passenger terminals are comprised of just 360,000 square feet.
Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport, Louisville Muhammad Ali International
Airport (SDF), https://www.flylouisville.com/corporate/louisville-muhammad-ali-
international-airport-sdf/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2023). This makes the passenger
terminals appear tiny next to Worldport. Inside Worldport. According to the DiMauro
Affidavit, the Worldport employees enter through one of four security entrances or
through the hanger. How much entering through these entrances may divert
employees from proceeding directly to their assigned workstations is unclear.

                                         20
screenings that have been deemed non-compensable under the Federal Law.

Therefore, whether or not the Federal Law applies, disputed issues of fact

should have precluded granting judgment to UPS on the pleadings.

      Under Kentucky Civil Rule 12.03, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed
      but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move
      for judgment on the pleadings.” The moving party “admits for the
      purposes of his motion not only the truth of all his adversary's
      well-pleaded allegations of fact and fair inferences therefrom, but
      also the untruth of all his own allegations which have been denied
      by his adversary.” Pioneer Vill. v. Bullitt Cnty., 104 S.W.3d 757,
      759 (Ky. 2003) (citing Archer, 365 S.W.2d 727). Importantly, a
      motion for judgment on the pleadings should never be granted
      unless “it appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party cannot
      prove any set of facts that would entitle him/her to relief.” Id.
      (citing Spencer v. Woods, 282 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1955)).
      Furthermore, as our predecessor Court stated, if “the pleadings
      raise any issue of material fact,” then a judgment on the pleadings
      “should be denied.” La Vielle v. Seay, 412 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Ky.
      1966).

Russell v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 610 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Ky. 2020). Joined to

this basic premise is that fact that under notice pleading, claims need not be

stated with precision and must be liberally construed. Id. at 241.

      The entitlement to compensation is necessarily fact specific. However,

very few of the facts have yet been established. While we generally know what

type of security screening the employees go through, we do not have much

information about how this process works in practice and how different

employees are affected by it. We do not know how many employees are lined

up to go through such screenings before or after their shifts begin, how many

screening stations there are at each entrance, how long the wait time is to pass

through such screenings, and how much this may vary between different

                                       21
shifts, days and other factors.22 We do not know if the length of the delay in

reaching a workstation is caused by the diverted path needed to pass through

a screening station, compared to the wait to pass through the screening

process.

      The information we have about why employees are required to be

subjected to these particular kinds of screenings is provided in affidavits from

UPS’s North America Security Director Hamm and UPS’s Air District Security

Manager DiMauro. They indicate these screenings are mandated for UPS to

comply with federal regulations from the Transportation Security

Administration (TSA), which must approve its security program, the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Food and Drug Administration

(FDA).23 Hamm Affidavit; DiMauro Affidavit. Additionally, UPS has chosen to

      22  The DiMauro Affidavit indicates that at the Worldport facility “[i]t takes most
employees only a few seconds to pass through this security screening process.”
DiMauro does not clarify whether this means that employees essentially walk through
security gates unimpeded and complete the entire security process in this length of
time, or if they have to wait to be screened, but each individual screening is typically
completed within a few seconds. He also does not clarify how long a security
screening may take if the metal detector alerts or a bag requires closer inspection and
how that impacts employees waiting to be screened. The Hamm Affidavit, which
addresses security at LTLC and Elizabethtown, indicates that security processing at
LTLC and Elizabethtown typically only takes seconds, but that wait times to pass
through security at LTLC can take up to two minutes (with those times varying by
building), and that at Elizabethtown wait times can be up to four minutes during peak
morning rush. The employees alleged that their wait times were not de minimis but
did not provide any affidavits about their individual experiences with wait times. I
note that these are all factual questions to be resolved below but whether such time
must be compensated does not hinge on how long an activity takes.
      23 UPS is required by federal regulations to implement security protocols
mandated by the TSA at its Worldport facility because UPS has entered into an
agreement with the Louisville International Airport, making it responsible for the areas
under its exclusive control. DiMauro Affidavit. Certain UPS facilities must also
comply with DEA and FDA regulations to guard against theft and diversion of
controlled substances. Hamm Affidavit. However, it is unclear from these affidavits
                                           22
participate in the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), “a

joint government-business initiative” which “requires member businesses

involved with the import process to work with the U.S. Customs and Border

Patrol (CBP) to assess, develop, and implement procedures that ensure tighter

cargo and supply chain security,” to be C-TPAT certified and validated.

DiMauro Affidavit. Obtaining such status greatly benefits UPS as “[i]n return

for implementing [the C-TPAT] security guidelines, C-TPAT partners receive

expedited processing of their cargo into the United States.” Hamm Affidavit;

DiMauro Affidavit. Additionally, some of UPS’s customers require certain levels

of security as part of their contractual agreements with UPS. Hamm Affidavit.

      Without further development of the record, it is unclear which of the

Kentucky Department of Workplace Standards (KDWS) regulations most aptly

apply to the security screenings at issue. It is also unclear whether such

regulations would provide compensation for security time, or not.

      Kentucky’s Wage and Hour laws do not squarely address whether going

through security checkpoints should be considered compensable worktime.

The most that can be said at this juncture is, “it depends” as such inquiries are

highly fact dependent. While our Court can interpret what our regulations say,

we cannot say how these regulations apply to undetermined facts.

whether the Worldport, LTLC, and Elizabethtown facilities are governed by DEA and
FDA regulations.
                                        23
                 III.      THE FEDERAL LAW DOES NOT APPLY

       The Federal Law exempts from wages “preliminary” and “postliminary”

activities that are not the “principal activity or activities” of the employment.

Kentucky’s Wage and Hour laws and administrative regulations have never

used the phrase “portal-to-portal” or used the terms “preliminary” and

“postliminary” in relation to determining whether something is compensable

work time. See generally 803 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR)

1:065; 803 KAR 1:067. These terms are also unknown when it comes to

employment law in Kentucky unless a claim is being made under the Federal

Law.

       The KDWS has not explicitly adopted the Federal Law in any form, and I

firmly believe that the KDWS has not implicitly adopted it either. The only

significant language our regulations, past and present, share with the Federal

Law is the use of the term “principal activity.” This term is only used once in

all of 803 KAR 1:065, in Section 7(3), in the following sentence: “Time spent by

an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job

site to job site during the workday, must be counted as hours worked.” Our

current administrative regulation pertaining to hours worked, 803 KAR 1:067,

which was adopted in 2022 and incorporates specific sections of 29 C.F.R. 785

by reference, also only uses the term “principal activity” once, in 29 C.F.R.

785.38, stating “[t]ime spent by an employee in travel as part of

his principal activity, such as travel from job site to job site during the

workday, must be counted as hours worked.” For both regulations then, this

                                         24
language is used to make such time compensable, rather than to exclude it

from compensation as the term does in the Federal Law.

      The sections of the federal regulations that the KDWS chose to adopt and

failed to adopt through 803 KAR 1:067, also support my reasoning. The KDWS

failed to adopt any section of 29 C.F.R. 785 which either clearly references the

Federal Law, see 29 C.F.R. 785.9, 785.24 and 785.50 (extensively quoting from

and interpreting the applicability of the Portal-to-Portal Act), or any provisions

that reference it more discretely. See 29 C.F.R. 785.7, 785.26 and 785.34. The

only C.F.R. section 803 KAR 1:067 adopts which even makes mention of the

Federal Law, 29 C.F.R. 785.33, only does so in referring to another (unadopted)

regulation, 29 C.F.R. 785.34.24 803 KAR 1:067 § 7 specifically declined to

adopt 29 C.F.R. 785.34, while adopting the adjoining regulations of 29 C.F.R.

785.33, 785.35, 785.38, and 785.39. I believe such action indicates that there

was never any prior intent to adopt or follow the Federal Law.

      Accordingly, I strongly disagree with the majority opinion that our

regulations, past and present, which contain the singular use of the term

“principal activity” as detailed, supra, should be interpreted as an implicit

adoption of the Federal Law with its concomitant elimination of time subject to

compensation, as the Sixth Circuit did in Vance v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re

      24   29 C.F.R. 785.33 is a general regulation on travel time which states in full:
      The principles which apply in determining whether or not time spent in
      travel is working time depend upon the kind of travel involved. The
      subject is discussed in §§ 785.35 to 785.41, which are preceded by a
      brief discussion in § 785.34 of the Portal-to-Portal Act as it applies to
      travel time.

                                             25
Amazon.com, Inc., Fulfillment Ctr. Fair Lab. Standards Act (FLSA) & Wage &

Hour Litg.), 852 F.3d 601, 613 (6th Cir. 2017). I additionally disagree with the

majority opinion’s assertion, which goes beyond the reasoning in Vance, that

“[f]or nearly half a century, the Kentucky Department of Workplace Standards

has concluded that the Portal-to-Portal Act’s compensation limits are part of

the KRS Chapter 337 framework.”

      The majority opinion’s reliance on Vance for this proposition is

misplaced. The Sixth Circuit in Vance specifically acknowledged that the

litigants agreed that the question of whether the Kentucky Wage and Hours Act

incorporates the Federal Law was unsettled; it implicitly agreed but chose not

to certify such a question to our Court based on the advanced state of the

litigation. Vance, 852 F.3d at 607-08. Therefore, Vance does not provide any

authority for the majority’s conclusion that the Federal Law has clearly been

incorporated into our regulations.

      Additionally, this federal opinion is not binding on us and not

particularly persuasive. It is hardly surprising that a federal court might wish

to apply the Federal Law and the case law interpreting it where Kentucky has

not yet interpreted its own regulations.

      I am further unmoved by the majority’s conclusion that “legislative

inaction here supports the conclusion that KRS Chapter 337 imports the

Portal-to-Portal Acts exemptions” because the legislature has not acted in the

more than thirty times it has convened in regular session to overrule the KDWS

since it first incorporated the Federal Law into our statutes. As noted in

                                       26
Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 560 (Ky. 2011),

“legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which to lean, and a poor beacon to

follow in construing a statute.” I believe this observation to be even more apt

when it comes to construing a regulation in a manner in which it has never

been interpreted before.

      Finally, even were I in error in my conclusion that the KDWS has never

implicitly incorporated the Federal Law via regulations, the KDWS has certainly

not incorporated the Federal Law in such a clear manner that the General

Assembly should be on notice that such an incorporation took place.

Furthermore, there have been no Kentucky cases prior to this one to alert the

General Assembly that this is how these regulations are being construed by

Kentucky’s appellate courts.

   IV. KENTUCKY’S APPLICABLE WAGE AND HOUR REGULATIONS, WHEN
         APPLIED TO THE RELEVENT FACTS, MAY WARRANT RELIEF

      So, what do our applicable regulations require? 803 KAR 1:065, which

expired in 2020 but was in effect at the time the litigation commenced,

contains definitions relating to worktime and is applicable to this litigation and

the timeframe at issue. However, for simplicity, I focus my discussion on the

current regulations for hours worked, as they are very similar to our former

regulations and use nearly identical pertinent phrasing, but I also quote from

the former regulations in footnotes.

      803 KAR 1:067 Section 3, concerning waiting time, adopts 29 C.F.R.

785.13 through 785.17. 29 C.F.R. 785.14 notes that it is a fact specific inquiry

                                        27
as to whether an employee was engaged to wait or waited to be engaged.25 29

C.F.R. 785.15 explains an employee is on duty and working while waiting for

the next task if the periods of inactivity are “unpredictable” and “are usually of

short duration.” Key to such times is that “the employee is unable to use the

time effectively for his own purposes. It belongs to and is controlled by the

employer. In all of these cases waiting is an integral part of the job. The

employee is engaged to wait.” Id.26

        In defining “off duty” in 29 C.F.R. 785.16, the regulation contrasts hours

not worked as those “[p]eriods during which an employee is completely relieved

from duty and which are long enough to enable him to use the time effectively

for his own purposes” with hours worked when such employee “is not

completely relieved from duty and cannot use the time effectively for his own

purposes[.]”27 29 C.F.R. 785.16(b) explains that a truck driver who has to wait

        25   Similarly, 803 KAR 1:065 § 3(1), regarding waiting time states in relevant
part:

                 Whether waiting time is worked under the act depends
                 upon particular circumstances. . . . Facts may show that
                 the employee was engaged to wait, or they show that he
                 waited to be engaged. Such questions must be determined
                 in accordance with common sense and the general concept
                 of work or employment.

        26This is consistent with 803 KAR 1:065 § 3(2) which provides examples of
when an employee is “on duty” while waiting during a period of inactivity, such as
when employees engage in personal activities while waiting an unpredictable amount
of time for an assignment or for machinery to be repaired. Importantly, this section
notes during these periods “the employee is unable to use the time effectively for his
own purpose. It belongs to and is controlled by the employer. In all of these cases
waiting is an integral part of the job. The employee is engaged to wait.” Id.

        Similarly, in 803 KAR 1:065 § 3(3)(a), “off duty periods” are times “during
        27

which an employee is completely relieved from duty and which are long enough to
                                              28
at or near the job site for goods to be loaded and at the final destination to take

care of the employer’s property before a return trip is working as such

employee is engaged to wait.28 This contrast, between being able to use time

effectively for the employee’s own purposes as compared with the employer’s

purposes, is raised again as to whether in 29 C.F.R. 785.17 on-call time is

work.

        803 KAR 1:067 section 7, which contains the current travel time

regulation, adopts 29 C.F.R. 785.33, 785.35, 785.38 and 785.39. 29 C.F.R.

785.35 explains that the ordinary commute from home to work and back again

is not worktime.29 29 C.F.R. 785.38 explains that in contrast “[t]ime spent by

an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job

site to job site during the workday, must be counted as hours worked.”30 29

enable him to use the time effectively for his own purposes are not hours worked.”
This section clarifies:
        [An employee] is not completely relieved from duty and cannot use the
        time effectively for his own purposes unless he is definitely told in
        advance that he may leave the job and that he will not have to commence
        work until a definitely specified hour has arrived. Whether the time is
        long enough to enable him to use the time effectively for his own
        purposes depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of the case.

        28   803 KAR 1:065 § 3(3)(b) provides a similar trucker scenario.
         Similarly, 803 KAR 1:065 § 7(2) explains that “[n]ormal travel from home to
        29

work is not worktime.”
        30   803 KAR 1:065 § 7(3) explains “travel that is worktime” as follows:
              Time spent by an employee in travel as part of his principal activity,
              such as travel from job site to job site during the workday, must be
              counted as hours worked. Where an employee is required to report at
              a meeting place to receive instructions or to perform other work there,
              the travel from the designated place to the work place is part of the
              day’s work, and must be counted as hours worked.

                                              29
C.F.R. 785.38 provides examples of when travel time is work time as including

when “an employee is required to report at a meeting place to receive

instructions . . . or to pick up and to carry tools[.]”

      803 KAR 1:067 section 6, while at first blush is not directly applicable,

as it establishes the requirements for lectures, meetings and training programs

by incorporating 29 C.F.R. 785.27 through 785.32, also provides additional

clarity in the difference between work and non-work hours. The basic

distinction between work and non-work hours is that when attendance is

involuntary because it is required, these are work hours, 29 C.F.R. 785.28,

while if attendance is voluntary and the employee engages in such activity that

is not directly related to the job and does not take place during work hours,

such time is not compensable as work, 29 C.F.R. 785.29.31

      As should be evident from this review, going through security

checkpoints does not perfectly fit into these categories but the purpose of this

security time and what employees can or cannot do during this time, and the

fact that this process is required by the employer, is highly relevant to

The wording of both 29 C.F.R. 785.38 and 803 KAR 1:065 § 7(3) raises the question as
to whether a security checkpoint is one job site which must be traveled from to reach
another job site, where the employee commences work, or if the security checkpoint
could be considered part of a larger job site, with going through security being part of
the principal activity.
      31 803 KAR 1:065 § 6(1) provides four specific criteria that must be met for
attendance at lectures, meetings and trainings to not be considered “working time.”
Among these are that attendance is voluntary. In defining “involuntary attendance,”
803 KAR 1:065 § 6(1) explains: “Attendance is not voluntary if it is required by the
employer. It is not voluntary if the employee is given to understand or led to believe
that his present working conditions or the continuance of his employment would be
adversely affected by nonattendance.”

                                          30
determining whether it is compensable. I believe under the KDWS regulations

that the employees’ allegations are more than sufficient to maintain this action

for unpaid wages for the time they mandatorily must spend passing through

security for UPS’s benefit. However, whether this time is definitively

compensable cannot be resolved at this juncture.

     V. EVEN IF THE FEDERAL LAW APPLIES, REVERSAL FOR FURTHER
                      FINDINGS IS STILL WARRANTED

      Even assuming that the majority opinion is correct that our legislature or

the KDWS have sub silentio adopted the Federal Law generally (a conclusion

that I strongly disagree with), the majority opinion errs in its application of it at

this juncture with the limited record before us. The United States Supreme

Court concluded in Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 37, (2014),

that anti-theft security screenings upon leaving work are not “integral and

indispensable to the principal activities that an employee is employed to

perform” as such screenings are not “an intrinsic element of those activities

and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his

principal activities.” Vance followed this reasoning, also, for Amazon’s anti-

theft security screenings.

      However, even if these cases were to apply, strong distinguishing factors

here are that the limited evidence we have is that UPS’s screenings at its

Worldport facility were not principally for anti-theft purposes and that these

screening processes took place at both ends of the workday. Vance specifically

disclaimed that the security screening which only occurred after the employees

                                         31
completed their work, could be characterized as either travel from job site to

job site or as wait time, “because [the employees] do not perform or anticipate

performing other principal job activities after the screening.” 852 F.3d at 615.

These distinguishing factors alone, should have compelled a reversal.

      More apt of a comparison to the situation at hand can be found in

Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 247, (1956), a “case which raise[d] the issue of

coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as Amended by the Portal-to-

Portal Act . . . with respect to work performed before or after the direct or

productive labor for which the worker is primarily paid.”

      The precise question [in Steiner] [was] whether workers in a battery
      plant must be paid as a part of their ‘principal’ activities for the
      time incident to changing clothes at the beginning of the shift and
      showering at the end, where they must make extensive use of
      dangerously caustic and toxic materials, and are compelled by
      circumstances, including vital considerations of health hygiene, to
      change clothes and to shower in facilities which state law requires
      their employer to provide, or whether these activities are
      ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ within the meaning of the Portal-to-
      Portal Act and, therefore, not to be included in measuring the work
      time for which compensation is required under the Fair Labor
      Standards Act.

Id. The specific hazards employees faced in Steiner was exposure to lead in

various forms and sulphuric acid. Id. at 249-50.

      Relevant considerations for the Supreme Court included that showering

and changing clothes was mandated by state law, was also a requirement of

the employer being able to obtain workers compensation insurance, and that

such practices were needed for the employees’ health. The Supreme Court

recounted that the “[s]afe operation [of the battery plant] . . . requires the

removal of clothing and showering at the end of the work period. This has
                                         32
become a recognized part of industrial hygiene programs in the industry, and

the state law of Tennessee requires facilities for this purpose.” Id. at 250,

(emphasis added). The Supreme Court noted that the employer’s requirement

that the workers change clothing and shower was also needed so the employer

could obtain the legally mandated workers compensation insurance which

covered lead poisoning as a compensable occupational disease because “the

insurance carrier would not accept the insurance risk if defendants refused to

have showering and clothes-changing facilities for their employees.” Id. at 251.

Finally, the Supreme Court recounted that “the employees testified and the

foreman declared in a signed statement that ‘In the afternoon the men are

required by the company to take a bath because lead oxide might be absorbed

into the blood stream. It protects the company and the employee both.’” Id. at

251.

       Given this evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that changing clothes

before and showering after a shift under these circumstances was “an integral

and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered workmen

are employed and are not specifically excluded by Section 4(a) (1) [of the Portal-

to-Portal Act][,]” reasoning “it would be difficult to conjure up an instance

where changing clothes and showering are more clearly an integral and

indispensable part of the principal activity of the employment than in the case

of these employees.” Id. at 256.

       Another illustrative case is that of Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S.

260 (1956). In Mitchell, knifemen at a meatpacking plant were required to

                                         33
sharpen their knives outside of their work shifts so that the knives would be

sharp enough to perform butchering tasks. Id. at 262. The Supreme Court

ruled:

         We believe the facts clearly demonstrate that the knife-sharpening
         activities of these workmen are an integral part of and
         indispensable to the various butchering activities for which they
         were principally employed, and that they must be compensated for
         by respondent in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, as
         amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, and as construed by us today
         in Steiner v. Mitchell.

Id. at 263.

         Similarly, I believe that any employee in the class who must pass

through security screenings so that UPS can (1) comply with mandatory TSA,

DEA and FDA regulations, (2) satisfy C-TPAT screening requirements (thus

gaining expedited customs processing for the packages it imports, resulting in

the rapid delivery customers have come to expect), and (3) honor whatever

additional screening requirements for which its shipping partners have

contracted, may be entitled to compensation for this time. If these

requirements apply to the security screenings the workers in the class are

required to complete, then if the employees did not pass through such security,

UPS could not lawfully, expeditiously, or contractually conduct its shipping

business. By going through such screenings, employees facilitate and make

possible the performance of UPS’s packaging shipping business in general and,

thus, this time may be characterized as integral and indispensable to the

                                         34
employee’s principal activities for UPS even under the rigorous standards of the

Federal Law.32

                                    VI. CONCLUSION

      I disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the grant of partial

judgment on the pleadings was appropriate. I believe I have amply established

that there are potential facts that the workers could prove that would entitle

them to relief. Just as the battery plant workers could not assemble batteries

without changing their clothing and showering, and the knifemen could not

butcher without sharpening their knives, the as yet undetermined facts may

establish that UPS could not ship its packages without its employees going

through such security screenings. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for

further factual findings and proceedings.

      Keller and Lambert, JJ., join.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:

Andrew Michael Grabhorn
Michael Douglas Grabhorn
Grabhorn Law

Andrew John Horne
Horne Law Office

      32 Of course, not all of these requirements may be necessary for such

screenings to still be integral and indispensable to the employee’s principal activities.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:

Samuel Benjamin Goldstein
Joseph Russell Palmore
Morrison & Foerster, LLP

Kyle Donald Johnson
Charles Laurence Woods, III
Frost Brown Todd, LLC

John Choate Roach
Ransdell Roach & Royce, PLLC

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, AIRLINES
FOR AMERICA:

James Burton Lind
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, LLP

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA:

Philip Williamson
Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS
LOCAL UNION 369:

Benjamin Sequoyah Basil
Schulz Messex Dermody, PLLC

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL 783:

Jerome Park Prather
Garmer & Prather, PLLC

                                     36
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, KENTUCKY CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE:

Philip Williamson
Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, KENTUCKY EQUAL
JUSTICE CENTER:

John Saoirse Friend
Friend Law, PSC

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, KENTUCKY
JUSTICE ASSOCIATION:

Michele Diane Henry
Craig Henry, PLC

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, KENTUCKY RETAIL
FEDERATION:

Philip Williamson
Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, NATIONAL
RETAIL FEDERATION:

Philip Williamson
Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP

                                   37