Court Opinion

ID: 9954519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 15:21:15.700827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:57.371061
License: Public Domain

2024 WI 14

                  SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                2022AP1999-W

COMPLETE TITLE:          State of Wisconsin ex rel. Antonio S. Davis,
                                   Petitioner,
                              v.
                         Circuit Court for Dane County, Honorable Ellen
                         K. Berz and
                         State of Wisconsin,
                                   Respondents.

                           REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION FILED:           March 26, 2024
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:           October 9, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:                Circuit
   COUNTY:               Dane
   JUDGE:                Ellen K. Berz

JUSTICES:
PROTASIEWICZ, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court,
in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed
a dissenting opinion.

ATTORNEYS:

       For    the      petitioner,    there   were   briefs   filed   by   Kelsey
Loshaw,      assistant      state    public   defender.   There   was   an   oral
argument by Kelsey Loshaw, assistant state public defender.

       For the respondents, there was a brief filed by Jennifer L.
Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief
was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument
by   Jennifer       L.    Vandermeuse,     assistant   attorney   general,    and
Abigail C.S. Potts, assistant attorney general.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ellen Henak, Robert R.
Henak,   and   Henak   Law   Office,   S.C.,   Milwaukee,   on   behalf   of
Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kelli S. Thompson, Faun
M. Moses, and Office of the State Public Defender, Madison, on
behalf of Wisconsin State Public Defender.

                                       2
                                                                   2024 WI 14
                                                           NOTICE
                                             This opinion is subject to further
                                             editing and modification.   The final
                                             version will appear in the bound
                                             volume of the official reports.
No.    2022AP1999-W
(L.C. No.   2022CM1737)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                       :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin ex rel. Antonio S. Davis,

            Petitioner,

      v.
                                                               FILED
Circuit Court for Dane County, Honorable Ellen            MAR 26, 2024
K. Berz and State of Wisconsin,
                                                           Samuel A. Christensen
                                                          Clerk of Supreme Court
            Respondents.

PROTASIEWICZ, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
REBECCA   GRASSL  BRADLEY,  J.,   filed  a   concurring  opinion.
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a
dissenting opinion.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.             Affirmed and

cause remanded.

      ¶1     JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ, J.       The State charged Antonio

Davis with misdemeanor battery and disorderly conduct.                   Before

the State Public Defender (SPD) could appoint counsel for Davis,

a court commissioner conducted a combined initial appearance and

arraignment, entered a not guilty plea on Davis's behalf, and
                                                               No.    2022AP1999-W

scheduled       further   proceedings       before   Judge    Ellen   K.    Berz.

Sixty-five days later, the SPD appointed counsel for Davis.                     Six

days later, Davis filed a request for substitution of judge.

The circuit court denied the request as untimely.

       ¶2      Davis filed a petition for supervisory writ arguing

that the circuit court had a plain duty to treat his request for

substitution of judge as timely.              The court of appeals denied

the petition,1 and we review that denial here.

       ¶3      Under Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4) (2021-22),2 a defendant

must       request   substitution   "before    making   any   motions      to   the

trial court and before arraignment."                 In Dane County, where

Davis's case is pending, a local rule purportedly extends that

deadline in misdemeanor cases to "20 days after the initial

appearance."3

       Davis v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., No. 2022AP1999-W,
       1

unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2022).

       The full text of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4) is: "Substitution
       2

of trial judge originally assigned. A written request for the
substitution of a different judge for the judge originally
assigned to the trial of the action may be filed with the clerk
before making any motions to the trial court and before
arraignment."

     All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2021-22 version.

       See Dane County Local Rule 208, which reads:
       3                                                 "In all
[Criminal   Traffic]  and   [Criminal   Misdemeanor]  cases  the
defendant shall have 20 days after the initial appearance to
file a request for substitution of the assigned judge."

                                        2
                                                                           No.    2022AP1999-W

    ¶4      Here,     Davis    made      his      request      after       both    of   those

deadlines had expired.             He argues that the circuit court should

have nevertheless treated his request for substitution of judge

as timely based on the "government-created obstacle" exception

outlined    in      State     v.     Zimbal,       2017     WI       59,    ¶¶40-47,      375

Wis. 2d 643, 896 N.W.2d 327.                  Alternatively, he argues that the

circuit court should have treated his request as timely based on

the doctrine of equitable tolling.

    ¶5      This case presents us with two questions:

    ¶6      First, did Davis forfeit the issues he brings to this

court?      Specifically,          did   he    forfeit    the        "government-created

obstacle" issue by changing his identified obstacle between his

petition for review and initial brief?                      And did he forfeit the

equitable tolling issue by failing to raise it below?

    ¶7      Second,     is     Davis      entitled        to     a    supervisory        writ

directing     the     circuit        court        to   treat         his     request      for

substitution of judge as timely?

    ¶8      We answer the questions presented as follows:

    ¶9      First, assuming without deciding that Davis forfeited

the issues that he now presents to this court, we exercise our

discretion to address them.               Doing so allows us to clarify the

procedure for appealing a circuit court order denying a request

for substitution of judge as untimely.

                                              3
                                                                                No.     2022AP1999-W

       ¶10    Second, Davis is not entitled to a supervisory writ.

We conclude that the circuit court did not have a plain duty to

treat Davis's request as timely under Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4),

Dane       County       Local    Rule       208,       a   government-created             obstacle

exception, or a theory of equitable tolling.

       ¶11    We        also    take    this       opportunity        to       clarify        that   a

petition for supervisory writ is not the preferred vehicle for

appellate review of a judge's ruling on the timeliness of a

request       for       substitution         of        judge   that        was        filed    after

arraignment.

       ¶12    Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.

                                       I.      BACKGROUND

       ¶13    We do not have a complete record of the circuit court

proceedings concerning Davis's initial appearance, arraignment,

and request for substitution of judge.                         Indeed, while our rules

contemplate         a    full    record      and       creation   of       a    transcript       for

appeals, they do not require such a record for supervisory writ

actions.4

       ¶14    Here, the record shows that Antonio Davis was arrested

on August 16, 2022, and he applied for representation through

       Compare
       4        Wis.  Stat.  §§ (Rule)  809.11(4)  (mandating
transcript requests for appeals), and (Rule) 809.15(1)(a)
(listing components of a full record on appeal), with (Rule)
809.51 (not requiring such a record for supervisory writ
actions).

                                                   4
                                                                  No.     2022AP1999-W

the SPD the next day.            Two weeks later, on August 30, 2022, the

State filed a complaint5 charging Davis with misdemeanor battery

and    disorderly        conduct,    and       Davis    made   his      first    court

appearance.

       ¶15     At the August 30, 2022 appearance, a Dane County court

commissioner held both an initial appearance and an arraignment.

Notably, a court6 is not required to hold both proceedings at the

same       appearance.     Our    statutes      set    out   requirements       for   an

initial appearance——a defendant's first court appearance after

arrest——and for an arraignment——where a defendant enters a plea.7

While Wis. Stat. § 971.05 allows arraignments to be held in "the

court which conducted the initial appearance," our statutes do

not require that the initial appearance and arraignment happen

at the same appearance.8

       5   The complaint did not identify Davis's judge.

       These proceedings may occur in front of a judge or a
       6

commissioner.

       See Wis. Stat. §§ 970.01-02 (setting out procedures for an
       7

initial appearance, including delivery of the complaint and
informing defendants of the charges against them and of their
rights); 971.05 (setting out procedures for an arraignment,
including entry of a plea).

       In felony cases——not at issue here——a court cannot hold
       8

arraignment until after a preliminary examination or waiver of
preliminary examination. See Wis. Stat. §§ 971.02; 971.05. And
a defendant has a right to counsel at the preliminary
examination.     State v. O'Brien, 2014 WI 54, ¶40, 354
Wis. 2d 753, 850 N.W.2d 8.   Thus, a defendant in a felony case
who seeks appointed counsel will typically have counsel prior to
arraignment.
                                           5
                                                                  No.     2022AP1999-W

      ¶16   At the time of Davis's combined initial appearance and

arraignment, the SPD had not yet appointed counsel.                       So, Davis

received limited-scope representation from an SPD attorney who

was assigned to argue bail and receive the complaint.                     We do not

have a transcript of this court appearance, but we know the

court commissioner entered a not guilty plea on Davis's behalf

and scheduled further proceedings before Judge Ellen K. Berz.

      ¶17   On    the    day    of     his   combined   initial   appearance        and

arraignment, Davis received two documents identifying his judge:

a bail bond form, which noted that his case was assigned to

"Trial Judge – Br 11," and a Notice of Hearing, which identified

his judge as "Ellen K Berz."

      ¶18   Sixty-five          days     after     Davis's    combined       initial

appearance       and    arraignment,         on   November   3,   2022,     the     SPD

appointed counsel.9         Six days later, on November 9, 2022, Davis

filed a request for substitution of judge.                    Davis argued that

the   request     should       be    considered    timely,   citing     Wis.      Stat.

§ 971.20(4), Dane County Local Rule 208, and a series of cases

from this court and the court of appeals.                     The circuit court

nevertheless denied Davis's request as untimely.

      9By chance, the appointed counsel was the same attorney who
provided limited-scope representation for Davis at his combined
initial appearance and arraignment.

                                             6
                                                                             No.     2022AP1999-W

    ¶19        Davis filed a petition for supervisory writ in the

court     of    appeals.           He    argued           that    a     government-created

obstacle10——the SPD's inability to appoint counsel before the

statutory      deadline      for     filing         a    request       for    substitution——

prevented him from timely filing.                         So, he argued, the circuit

court had a plain duty to treat his request for substitution as

timely.     The court of appeals denied the writ.

    ¶20        Davis   petitioned         this          court    for    review.         In     his

petition for review, he again argued that the SPD's inability to

appoint    counsel     was    a     government-created                obstacle.        He     also

raised an alternative theory:                       that the circuit court should

have applied equitable tolling.                      We granted his petition.                   In

his briefing, Davis argued that the government-created obstacle

was the court's sua sponte arraignment before Davis had notice

of his judge and before appointment of counsel.

                                     II.    ANALYSIS

                                    A.     Forfeiture

    ¶21        The respondents ask us to dismiss this appeal because

Davis forfeited the issues raised in his initial brief.                                     First,

respondents       argue      that       Davis       is     procedurally            barred    from

    10 See State v. Zimbal, 2017 WI 59, ¶40, 375 Wis. 2d 643,
896 N.W.2d 327 (allowing an "exception to the rule of strict
adherence" to substitution-request deadlines when "a government-
created obstacle prevents a defendant from complying with the
statutory deadline").

                                                7
                                                                             No.    2022AP1999-W

bringing his government-created obstacle argument.                                 They argue

that     Davis's     identified            government-created              obstacle     changed

between his petition for review and brief.                           They compare Davis's

petition      for    review,      which      identified         one    government-created

obstacle——"the        SPD's     inability            to    appoint    counsel      before     the

deadline      for    requesting        a    substitution"——with              Davis's     brief,

where he said the obstacle was "the court['s] sua sponte ent[ry

of] a plea" before Davis was appointed counsel and before he

knew his assigned judge.                    Second, the respondents argue that

Davis forfeited his equitable tolling argument because he failed

to raise it in any lower court.

       ¶22    But forfeiture "is a rule of judicial administration,"

and courts "may disregard a forfeiture and address the merits of

an     unpreserved      issue     in       an    appropriate          case."          State   v.

Counihan,     2020     WI   12,    ¶27,         390       Wis. 2d 172,      938    N.W.2d 530.

Assuming, without deciding, that Davis is procedurally barred

from    making      these   arguments,           we       exercise    our     discretion      to

address them in order to clarify the procedure for challenging a

circuit      court's    order     denying         a       request    for    substitution      of

judge as untimely.            See State v. Wilson, 2017 WI 63, ¶51 n.7,

376 Wis. 2d 92, 896 N.W.2d 682 (opting to address an "important

issue" despite alleged forfeiture).

       ¶23    With     regard     to       Davis's         government-created          obstacle

argument, we address the version of the argument that Davis

                                                 8
                                                                   No.     2022AP1999-W

presents in his briefing——namely, that the government-created

obstacle was the timing of Davis's arraignment.                       See State v.

Wilson, 2015 WI 48, ¶86 n.15, 362 Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52

("[I]t is within our discretion to review any substantial and

compelling    issue       which   the    case    presents."       (quoting    Univest

Corp. v. Gen. Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 32, 435 N.W.2d 234

(1989))).

             B.     Timeliness of Requests for Substitution

      ¶24   This court and the court of appeals have said that a

defendant should seek review of a judge's ruling on the form and

timeliness     of    a     request      for   substitution        "preferably"      by

bringing a petition for supervisory writ.                    Clark v. State, 92

Wis. 2d 617, 631, 286 N.W.2d 344 (1979); State ex rel. Tessmer

v.   Cir.   Ct.     for    Racine    Cnty.,      123   Wis. 2d     439,     441,   367

N.W.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1985) ("A petition for a supervisory writ

is the preferable route for review of the trial court's ruling

on the form and timeliness of a request for substitution of

judge.").

      ¶25   A supervisory writ is "an extraordinary and drastic

remedy" which serves a "narrow function."                   State ex rel. Kalal

v.   Cir.    Ct.    for    Dane     Cnty.,      2004   WI   58,    ¶¶17,     24,   271

Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source omitted).                         A party

seeking a supervisory writ must show that:                  (1) an appeal is an

inadequate remedy; (2) grave hardship or irreparable harm will

                                          9
                                                           No.    2022AP1999-W

result; (3) the trial court had a plain duty to act and violated

that duty; and (4) the petitioner requested relief promptly.

State ex rel. DNR v. Wis. Ct.        App., Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶9,

380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633,

¶17).

      ¶26    This case hinges on the third requirement——plain duty.

A circuit court has a plain duty when its "responsibility to act

[is] imperative."      Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶22 (quoted source

omitted).      The court's duty must be "clear and unequivocal."

Id. (quoted source omitted).       As such, courts grant supervisory

writs only for "non-discretionary" duties.          See id., ¶24.

      ¶27    We are sympathetic to the fact that Davis did not have

the   full   assistance   of   counsel   at   the   time   of    arraignment

despite his efforts to seek SPD representation.            Further, we are

mindful of the stresses to the criminal justice system caused by

heavy caseloads and delays in SPD appointments.

      ¶28    Nonetheless, we hold that the circuit court did not

have a plain duty to treat Davis's request for substitution of

judge as timely.      And we take this opportunity to clarify the

preferred route for reviewing a circuit court's ruling on the

timeliness of a request for substitution that was filed after

arraignment.

                                   10
                                                                              No.    2022AP1999-W

                       1.     Government-Created Obstacle

      ¶29    In   Wisconsin,         a     criminal       defendant            has    "a   right

to . . . one substitution of a judge."                         Wis. Stat. § 971.20(2).

The defendant must request substitution of judge "before making

any     motions   to        the    trial    court        and     before         arraignment."

§ 971.20(4).      In an attempt to extend this deadline, Dane County

courts created a rule allowing misdemeanor defendants "20 days

after      the    initial         appearance        to     file           a     request      for

substitution."      See Dane County Local Rule 208.

      ¶30    Here, all parties agree that Davis filed his request

after the deadlines in the statute and local rule expired.11

Davis argues that his request should nevertheless be considered

timely under our precedent.

      ¶31    We   have      said    that     a    request       for       substitution       may

sometimes be treated as timely, even if it is untimely under

Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4).               See Zimbal, 375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶¶40-47

(identifying "exception[s] to the rule of strict adherence" to

statutory substitution-request deadlines).                            In particular, we

have said that an untimely request may be considered timely when

"a    government-created           obstacle"       prevents           a       defendant     from

       Since there is no dispute that the request was filed
      11

after both deadlines had expired, we need not decide here
whether the local rule may extend the time for filing a
substitution request beyond that provided by Wis. Stat.
§ 971.20(4).

                                             11
                                                                No.     2022AP1999-W

meeting the statutory deadline.            Id., ¶40.       One such government-

created       obstacle       comes      from    the      "Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti

arraignment cases."           Id., ¶41 (citing State ex rel. Tinti v.

Cir.    Ct.    for     Waukesha      Cnty.,     159    Wis. 2d 783,     790,    464

N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1990); Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 443; Baldwin

v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 521, 530-32, 215 N.W.2d 541 (1974)).

       ¶32    Under Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti, an untimely request for

substitution may be treated as timely "when a criminal defendant

is arraigned before he receives notice of which judge will hear

his case."      Id.    In each of the Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti cases, the

defendant did not know the identity of his judge until after

arraignment.      Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d at 790; Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at

443;   Baldwin,       62   Wis. 2d at    529.     Without    that     information,

those courts concluded that the defendant could not exercise the

right of substitution intelligently.                  See Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d at

790; Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 443; Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 531;

see also Clark, 92 Wis. 2d 617, 628 ("[T]he key to the statutory

                                         12
                                                                   No.     2022AP1999-W

right of substitution [is] the defendant's ability to exercise

his right of substitution intelligently.").12

      ¶33     Here, Davis argues that he faced a similar government-

created obstacle.           A court commissioner arraigned him before the

SPD appointed counsel and before he knew his assigned judge.

Thus, Davis says, under Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti the circuit court

had   a     plain    duty   to    treat   his   request    for   substitution       as

timely.13     We disagree for two reasons.

      ¶34     First, although Davis asserts that he did not know his

assigned judge until after he entered his plea, the record is

unclear.        We    have       no   transcript,    and   there     has     been   no

evidentiary hearing on this point.                  All we know is that Davis

       Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence advocates
      12

for "overrul[ing] Baldwin."       See Justice Rebecca Grassl
Bradley's concurrence, ¶47.   No party has asked us to overrule
Baldwin, and "[w]e do not step out of our neutral role to
develop or construct arguments for parties; it is up to them to
make their case."   Doe 1 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2022 WI
65, ¶35, 403 Wis. 2d 369, 976 N.W.2d 584 (quoting Serv. Emps.
Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946
N.W.2d 35).

       Davis also argues that the court had a plain duty to
      13

treat the request as timely because it had a general duty to
apply the law to the facts. We have said that such a command is
too vague and malleable to create a plain duty.    See State ex
rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85, ¶81, 363
Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165 ("The obligation of a judge to
correctly find facts and apply the law is not the type of plain
legal duty contemplated by the supervisory writ procedure, 'as
it would extend supervisory jurisdiction to a virtually
unlimited range of decisions . . . .'" (quoting State ex rel.
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d
633, 681 N.W.2d 110)).

                                           13
                                                                         No.     2022AP1999-W

received two relevant documents on the day of his arraignment:

a notice of hearing which named Judge Berz and a bail bond form

which identified the assigned judicial branch.                           We do not know

if     Davis    received       these        documents       before       or     after      his

arraignment.       And we do not know whether the court commissioner

told    Davis     who    his     assigned          judge     would       be    during      the

arraignment.        Without      evidence         that     Davis    knew      his    assigned

judge only after arraignment, the obstacle from the Baldwin-

Tessmer-Tinti      cases      does     not    exist      here.          See    Zimbal,     375

Wis. 2d 643, ¶41 (identifying the obstacle).

       ¶35     Second, even if we accept Davis's assertion that he

did not know his assigned judge before arraignment, the court

did not have a plain duty to treat his request as timely under

our    precedent.        Davis       made    his    request        71   days     after     his

combined       initial   appearance          and    arraignment.              None    of   the

Baldwin-Tessmer-Tinti cases say a request would be timely under

such a delay.       See Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d at 791 (deciding a request

was    timely    when    it    was    filed       four   days      after      arraignment);

Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 444 (seven days).14

       Likewise, our decision in Baldwin does not suggest that a
       14

request filed 71 days after arraignment is timely.     There, we
found Baldwin's request untimely.        Baldwin v. State, 62
Wis. 2d 521, 532-33, 215 N.W.2d 541 (1974).        Moreover, we
suggested Baldwin's request would have been timely under
deadlines specific to Milwaukee County's calendaring system.
See id. at 530.

                                             14
                                                                             No.      2022AP1999-W

       ¶36    We recognize that Davis was unrepresented during the

first 65 days of the 71-day delay, but this does not change our

conclusion that there was no plain duty.                               We have never held

that    a    circuit      court       must    consider         whether      a       defendant    is

represented        when    assessing          the      timeliness      of       a   request     for

substitution.15         It may be the case that a circuit court should

consider a defendant's lack of representation when assessing the

timeliness of a request for substitution.                              But we cannot say

that the circuit court here had a plain duty to do so, because

no   law     requires      it.        See    Kalal,      271    Wis. 2d 633,           ¶25   ("[A]

plain,       clear,       non-discretionary,              and    imperative            duty"     is

"necessary for a supervisory writ.").

       ¶37    We conclude that under these facts and our precedent,

the circuit court had no plain duty to treat the request for

substitution as timely because of a government-created obstacle.

                                 2.    Equitable Tolling

       ¶38    Davis also argues that his request for substitution

should      have   been     treated          as   timely       based    on      the    equitable

tolling doctrine.            We conclude that the circuit court did not

       Even in Zimbal, where we "restart[ed]" the statutory
       15

clock after assignment of counsel, we did so "[u]nder the unique
facts of [that] case," which included the circuit court telling
the defendant to wait to file a request for substitution of
judge.   See Zimbal, 375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶52.   That unique factual
situation is not present here.

                                                  15
                                                                   No.     2022AP1999-W

have a plain duty to treat the request as timely under a theory

of equitable tolling.

    ¶39     Equitable tolling is a remedy that courts use to toll

statutory deadlines when justice requires.                      See State ex rel.

Griffin v. Smith, 2004 WI 36,                 ¶¶36-37, 270 Wis. 2d 235, 677

N.W.2d 259    (listing       examples   of    when     our    courts     have    tolled

deadlines due to "equitable considerations").                   Courts may invoke

equitable tolling when a party misses a deadline due to factors

outside the party's control.             See id., ¶37.           For instance, we

have said equitable tolling applies in the context of a pro se

prisoner who properly deposits a court document in an outgoing

prison mail system, but misses a filing deadline due to prison

mail processing times.          See State ex rel. Nichols v. Litscher,

2001 WI 119, ¶32, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, 635 N.W.2d 292.

    ¶40     Here, the circuit court did not have a plain duty to

equitably    toll      the     substitution-request           deadline         for   two

reasons.      First,      no   court    has    said    that     equitable       tolling

applies to Davis's situation.             Davis cites the concurrence in

Zimbal as authority that equitable tolling should apply to his

request.     See Zimbal, 375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶¶54-73 (Roggensack, J.,

concurring).        But      that   concurring        opinion    is      not    binding

precedent.     And even if it were, the concurrence argued for

tolling in the context of a judge directing a defendant to wait

to file a request for substitution——a circumstance that is not

                                         16
                                                                    No.      2022AP1999-W

present here.     See id., ¶72.             Thus, it is not a clear and

unequivocal mandate.         See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶22 ("A plain

duty 'must be clear and unequivocal.'" (quoted source omitted)).

    ¶41   Second,      Davis     seeks      application        of       an    equitable

doctrine——a   poor     fit     with   the     concept     of        a     plain      duty.

Equitable tolling inherently requires a case-by-case exercise of

discretion.      See    Williams      v.     Kaerek     Builders,            Inc.,     212

Wis. 2d 150, 162, 568 N.W.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision

to provide an equitable remedy rests within the circuit court's

discretion.").    Short of a judicial mandate to apply equitable

tolling in a specific situation, a circuit court will never have

a plain duty to apply a discretionary remedy.                       Without such a

duty, the failure to exercise discretion in a particular way

cannot support the issuance of a supervisory writ.                           See Kalal,

271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶24 (holding that supervisory writs are for

"non-discretionary duties").          In short, the circuit court here

had no plain duty to apply equitable tolling.

                 3.    Procedure for Appellate Review

    ¶42   In the past, we have said a petitioner should seek

review of a judge's ruling on the form and timeliness of a

request for substitution "preferably" by bringing a petition for

supervisory writ.      Clark, 92 Wis. 2d at 631; see also Tessmer,

123 Wis. 2d at 441 (suggesting petitions for supervisory writ

are the "preferable route" for review).

                                      17
                                                                     No.   2022AP1999-W

       ¶43    But our analysis here illustrates why a supervisory

writ    can    be   a    poor   vehicle    for   reviewing      a    circuit   court's

decision to deny a request for substitution that was filed after

arraignment.            Davis's   claims    fail   in    this       supervisory    writ

posture due to factors that could undermine review for future

petitioners.        To start, in a supervisory writ posture, appellate

courts may decide a case based on the existence of a plain duty

rather than address the substantive issue.                  Indeed, we have done

so here.      Similarly, appellate courts may be reluctant to find a

plain duty when doing so requires mandating application of an

equitable      doctrine.          See   Kalal,   271     Wis. 2d 633,      ¶25    ("[A]

plain,       clear,      non-discretionary,        and    imperative       duty"     is

"necessary for a supervisory writ.").                  Last, we are more likely

to have incomplete records under a supervisory writ posture.16

       ¶44    We clarify that a petition for supervisory writ is not

the preferred vehicle for appellate review of a judge's ruling

on the timeliness of a request for substitution of judge that

was filed after arraignment.                In that situation, a petitioner

should file a petition for interlocutory appeal or an appeal

from a final judgment or order, not a petition for supervisory

writ.

                                   III. CONCLUSION

       16   See supra note 4.

                                           18
                                                           No.   2022AP1999-W

    ¶45    In sum, the circuit court had no plain duty to treat

Davis's request for substitution of judge as timely, and the

court of appeals correctly denied the petition for supervisory

writ.

    By    the   Court.—The   decision   of   the   court   of    appeals   is

affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for

further proceeding consistent with this opinion.

                                   19
                                                                    No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

       ¶46      REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.                (concurring).        Presented

with       a   simple      question,   this    court      should    provide    a    simple

answer.         Davis asks whether the circuit court violated a plain

duty       when       it   denied   his     request    to    substitute       the   judge

originally assigned to his case.                   It did not.        Wisconsin Stat.

§ 971.20(4) requires a defendant who wishes to substitute the

judge originally assigned to his trial to file a substitution

request        "before      arraignment."         Davis     filed   his    substitution

request 71 days after his arraignment.                      The circuit court does

not    have       a    plain   duty    to    accept    an    untimely      substitution

request.          Although this court comes to the right conclusion, it

does nothing to address the errors this court made interpreting

§ 971.20 in Baldwin v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 521, 215 N.W.2d 541

(1974).1

       Justice Brian Hagedorn correctly observes that Davis
       1

forfeited all the arguments he made before this court. He also
correctly notes that the majority's reason for reaching the
merits is nonsense——the majority does not need to reach the
merits to address the court's preferred method of receiving
claims like Davis's. Because the majority needlessly addresses
the merits and applies prior cases that are unsound in
principle, I also address the merits, applying the statute's
text.

     The majority opts to apply Baldwin and its progeny because
"[n]o party has asked us to overrule Baldwin."      Majority op.,
¶32 n.12. The majority forgets that "[l]itigants do not dictate
the decisions of this court; the law does.    As proclaimed over
160 years ago, '[w]e sit here to decide the law as we find it,
and not as the parties or others may have supposed it to be.'"
St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶102, 398 Wis. 2d 92,
961 N.W.2d 635 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Ross v. Bd. of Outagamie Cnty.
Supervisors, 12 Wis. 26, 44 (1860) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting)).

                                              1
                                                                   No.       2022AP1999-W.rgb

      ¶47   In Baldwin, this court improperly rewrote Wis. Stat.

§ 971.20.     The Baldwin decision gives a defendant a "reasonable

time" to exercise his substitution right after he discovers the

identity    of    the    judge,     even    if    the     statutory          deadline     has

already lapsed.         Baldwin has repeatedly led courts to ignore the

text of § 971.20.          E.g., State ex rel. Tinti v. Cir. Ct. for

Waukesha Cnty., Branch 2, 159 Wis. 2d 783, 464 N.W.2d 853 (Ct.

App. 1990).      Instead of applying Baldwin, as the majority does,

I would overrule Baldwin and simply apply the statute's text.

                                   I.    BACKGROUND

      ¶48   Officers       arrested       Davis    for    two     offenses,        and    the

state   charged     him     with        misdemeanor       disorderly          conduct     and

misdemeanor battery.            At Davis's initial appearance, the court

entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf.                         Seventy-one days

after   his      initial       appearance,        Davis     filed        a     request    to

substitute the judge originally assigned to his trial, Judge

Ellen K. Berz, who denied the request as untimely.

      ¶49   Davis       petitioned        the     court      of     appeals         for     a
supervisory writ directing the circuit court to grant Davis's

request for judicial substitution.                 The court of appeals denied

the   petition.         This    court      correctly       affirms       the      court    of

appeals,      but       misguidedly          applies        Baldwin's             erroneous

interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.20.

                                   II.    DISCUSSION

                                   A.    Methodology

      ¶50   In    Kalal     this    court       "confirmed        textualism        is    the
correct methodology for statutory interpretation," "binding" all

                                            2
                                                             No.       2022AP1999-W.rgb

courts in Wisconsin to adhere to it when interpreting statutes.

Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims Bd., 2023 WI 60, ¶13, 408 Wis.

2d 370, 992 N.W.2d 126 (lead opinion).                 As explained in Kalal,

the goal of statutory interpretation is to determine a statute's

objective    meaning,    focusing        primarily     on   the    words        of    the

statute.    State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004

WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.                       This court has

held time and time again that if the meaning of a statute is

plain, our interpretive inquiry ends.                   E.g.,     id., ¶45;           Wis.

Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶18, 373 Wis. 2d

543, 892 N.W.2d 233 (calling this rule the "the bedrock of the

judiciary's    methodology").            "Statutory    language        is    given     its

common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or

specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or

special definitional meaning."                Kalal,   271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45

(citations omitted).          A text's scope, context, and purpose "are

perfectly    relevant    to     a   plain-meaning       interpretation           of    an

unambiguous statute as long as" they are "ascertainable from"
the statute's text and structure.             Id., ¶48.

    ¶51     This court's adherence to textualism is grounded in

and fundamental to the rule of law and democratic governance.

Textualism is the only method of statutory interpretation that

properly    respects    the    legislature's      authority       to    make     policy

choices.      "[T]he    object      of    interpretation     is    to        enforce    a

decision that is attributable to the legislature."                          See John F.

Manning & Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation 22
(1st ed. 2010).    The people never gave this court "the power to

                                          3
                                                                    No.      2022AP1999-W.rgb

second-guess         the      legislature's             policy      choices[,]         [and]

[j]udicial deference to the policy choices enacted into law by

the    legislature         requires      that       statutory    interpretation        focus

primarily on the language of the statute."                        Sanders, 408 Wis. 2d

370,    ¶48    (internal       quotation         marks    and     citations       omitted).

"While       textualism      cannot       prevent        the    incursion       of    policy

preferences         into    legal     analysis[,] . . . without                textualism,

such encroachment is certain."                      Wis. Jud. Comm'n v. Woldt, 2021

WI 73, ¶92, 398 Wis. 2d 482, 961 N.W.2d 854 (Rebecca Grassl

Bradley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see Kalal,

271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49 n.8 (A "methodology . . . that calls for

consultation of extrinsic, non-textual sources of interpretation

in every case, regardless of whether the language of the statute

is clear[,] . . . subordinates the statutory text and renders

the analysis more vulnerable to subjectivity.").                          "[D]iscovering

the meaning of a statute is not just a worthy endeavor, but also

an    exhaustive      recitation         of     the    judiciary's      authority          when

interpreting a statute."              Wis. Carry, 373 Wis. 2d 543, ¶20 n.15.
Applying our longstanding interpretive methodology to Wis. Stat.

§ 971.20       illustrates          how       Baldwin         rewrote     the        statute,

impermissibly        altering      the    policy       determinations         made    by    the

legislature.

                              B.    Wis. Stat. § 971.20

       ¶52    The legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 971.20 in 1969.

See § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969.                       Although the legislature has

modified      § 971.20      over    the       years,    the     words   of    the    statute
pertinent      to    this    decision      have       remained    the   same.         In    its

                                                4
                                                                       No.    2022AP1999-W.rgb

original iteration, Wis. Stat.                   § 971.20(1) (1969-70) provided

that a "defendant may file . . . for a substitution of a new

judge for the judge assigned to the trial of that case.                                     Such

request shall . . . be made before making any motion or before

arraignment."2       Notably, the statute required the request to be

filed "before arraignment" regardless of whether the judge was

the judge originally assigned to the trial.                               Over time, the

legislature       added    new     deadlines           for     filing     a     substitution

request.     For example, Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1975-76) allowed

a defendant to substitute the judge assigned to his trial if the

request     was    filed     "before         making          any    motion       or    before

arraignment."       If a new judge was assigned to his trial, the

defendant could file his request "any time before making any

motion    before    such    new     judge       or     before      commencement       of     any

proceeding before such new judge."                   § 971.20(1).

     ¶53    With    § 3,     ch.     137,       Laws    of     1981,      the    legislature

repealed    and     recreated       Wis.        Stat.        § 971.20.          Obtaining      a

substitution of the judge originally assigned to a trial is
currently    governed       by    § 971.20(4).               The   legislature        has    not

altered     § 971.20(4)      since        its     creation.              Although     Baldwin

interpreted       Wis.     Stat.     § 971.20(1)             (1971-72),         Baldwin      has

bearing     on    this    court's     interpretation               and    application        of

§ 971.20(4)       because        courts     have       applied      its       reasoning      to

     2 The statute also provided, "a request for the substitution
of a judge may also be made by the defendant at the preliminary
examination except that the request must be filed at the initial
appearance or at least 5 days before the preliminary examination
unless the court otherwise permits."      Wis. Stat. § 971.20(3)
(1969-70).

                                             5
                                                                         No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

§ 971.20(4), as well as other subsections of § 971.20.                                State ex

rel. Tessmer v. Cir. Ct. Branch III, In & For Racine Cnty., 123

Wis. 2d 439, 367 N.W.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1985); Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d

783; State v. Zimbal, 2017 WI 59, 375 Wis. 2d 643, 896 N.W.2d

327.

       ¶54    Wisconsin Stat. § 971.20(4) creates a simple rule for

a     defendant        who    wants     to     substitute          the   judge       originally

assigned to his trial:                 "A written request for the substitution

of a different judge for the judge originally assigned to the

trial of the action may be filed with the clerk before making

any     motions        to    the      trial    court        and    before      arraignment."3

Unsurprisingly, dictionaries define "before" to mean "previous

to" or "earlier than."                 Before, Random House Dictionary of the

English Language 134 (1st unabridged ed. 1966).                               Wisconsin Stat.

§ 971.05 provides that an arraignment has four elements:                                    (1)

the    arraignment           occurs    in     open   court;        (2)   if    the    defendant

appears      to    not       have     counsel,       "the    court       shall    advise    the

defendant         of    the     defendant's          right        to   counsel";      (3)   the
defendant shall be read the information or complaint unless the

       The original iteration of Wis. Stat. § 971.20 required a
       3

defendant to file the substitution request "before making any
motion or before arraignment."     Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1969-
70) (emphasis added).   Since 1981, the statute has allowed for
the substitution of the judge originally assigned to a
defendant's trial if requested "before making any motions to the
trial court and before arraignment."     Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4)
(1981-82) (emphasis added). It doesn't appear that changing the
"or" to an "and" makes any interpretive difference because
courts interpreted the "or" as an "and" in the prior iterations
of the statute. Clark v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 617, 626, 286 N.W.2d
344 (1979).

                                                 6
                                                                       No.    2022AP1999-W.rgb

defendant waives such a reading; and (4) the defendant makes his

plea unless the defendant has filed a motion that requires a

determination before the entry of a plea.                             Under the current

iteration    of      the    § 971.20(4),             a       defendant       must    file     a

substitution request before the statutorily defined arraignment

occurs.     The statute provides no other means to substitute the

judge   originally     assigned       to    the      trial;         indeed,    the    statute

declares,    "The    right     of    substitution             shall    be     exercised      as

provided in this section."             § 971.20(2).                In short, the current

version of § 971.20(4) does not authorize this court to create

an   ever-evolving         common    law        of       judicial      substitution;         it

provides    an    easy-to-apply        rule:             A    defendant       must    file    a

substitution request before making any motions to the circuit

court and before arraignment or the request must be denied.

     ¶55    Applying the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4),

the circuit court properly denied Davis's substitution request.

Because Davis filed his request 71 days after his arraignment,

his request was untimely.             See State v. Beaty, 57 Wis. 2d 531,
542, 205 N.W.2d 11 (1973).                  A circuit court does not have a

plain duty to accept untimely substitution requests.                                See State

v. Bell, 62 Wis. 2d 534, 536, 215 N.W.2d 535 (1974) (citations

omitted) (holding a circuit court properly denied a substitution

request    because    it    was     filed    after           the   statutory     deadline);

Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶22-24 (defining what constitutes a

plain duty).      This case should end there; no further analysis is

required.        Because of Baldwin, however, the majority opinion
does not end there——despite the clarity of the statutory text.

                                            7
                                                                     No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

      ¶56   The Baldwin court rewrote Wis. Stat. § 971.20 under

the veneer of statutory interpretation.                       The Baldwin court held

a   defendant     must   have        a     "reasonable       time"    to   exercise      the

statutory right to substitution after the defendant learns the

identity of the judge assigned to his trial.                          Baldwin, 62 Wis.

2d at 530-33.        To afford the defendant a reasonable time to

exercise    the    statutory         right,          the   court    gave   an   "enlarged

definition" to the word "arraignment," unsupported by the text

of the statute.          Id. at 532.                 Courts have applied Baldwin's

tortured analysis of § 971.20 without critical thought.                                 This

court should overturn Baldwin and return to applying the plain

meaning of § 971.20.

                           C.    The Baldwin Decision

      ¶57    In    Baldwin,          the       defendant    filed    his    substitution

request on the date of his trial.                          The court in Baldwin was

asked whether the defendant's substitution request, under Wis.

Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72), was timely.                      Id. at 526-28.          At the

time, Milwaukee County used calendaring judges for arraignments.
If a guilty plea were entered at the arraignment, the case would

conclude; if a not guilty plea were entered, the court would

assign the case to a judge, who might not be the calendaring

judge presiding over the entering of a plea.                          Id. at 529.         In

Baldwin,    the   defendant          was    arraigned,       after    which     the    judge

originally      assigned        to       the     defendant's       trial    disqualified

himself and a new judge was assigned to the defendant's trial.

Id. at 526-28.

                                                 8
                                                               No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

      ¶58    The Baldwin court interpreted Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1)

(1971-72), which provided that a "defendant may file with the

clerk a written request for a substitution of a new judge for

the   judge    assigned        to   the   trial    of    that        case.      Such

request . . . shall be made before making any motion or before

arraignment."        The Baldwin court acknowledged a plain-meaning

interpretation of the statute "requires that [a substitution]

request be made prior to arraignment."                 Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at

529; see also Clark v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 617, 626, 286 N.W.2d

344 (1979).     However, the Baldwin court decided this clear rule

does not "work[] well" when a county's calendaring procedure

prevents a defendant from knowing the identity of the judge

assigned to his trial prior to arraignment.               Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d

at 529.       The court also determined the plain meaning of the

statute     would    violate    the   right   to   a    fair     trial    for   some

defendants.     Id. at 530.

      ¶59    To fix these perceived infirmities, the court altered

the statute.        The court held, "The right to the substitution of
a judge must have a reasonable time limit for its exercise."

Id. at 532.         Toward that end, the court created an "enlarged

definition      of     'arraignment'"         to   apply         under       similar

circumstances.       Id.   "[I]n a calendaring procedure, such as is

used in Milwaukee [C]ounty, the arraignment is only initiated at

the calendaring of the case and the plea of not guilty entered

then is for the purpose of obtaining a judge who will actually

hear the case," and "[t]he arraignment is completed upon the
confirmation of the plea of not guilty before the judge to whom

                                          9
                                                                      No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

the case is assigned for trial when he sets the date for trial."

Id. at 530.4

      ¶60    According to the court, its proffered interpretation

"witnesse[d] and g[ave] effect to the predominant intention of

the   legislature"          to   "'afford       a     substitution     of       a    new    judge

assigned to the trial of that case.'"                        Id.   Like its predecessor

statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.20 (1971-72) was "an expression of the

'legislative        intent       that    a    person's       right   to     a       fair    trial

(should) be observed.'"                 Id. at 532 (quoting Meverden v. State,

258 Wis. 628, 634, 46 N.W.2d 836 (1951)).                             According to the

Baldwin     court,      a   plain-meaning            interpretation       would       make    "it

impossible to obtain the objective of this section and would

frustrate     the       objective        of     this     statute."          Id.       at     530.

Overriding        the    text    with     its    ostensible        "intent,"         the    court

decided to "apply as reasonably as possible [the language of the

statute]     to    all      cases   to    attain       its    object."          Id.    at    532.

Finally, the court discovered "support [for its interpretation]

in the history of the section."                         Id. at 530.             The judicial
committee's comments to the statute "reference[d]" the Illinois

and Montana substitution statutes, which set the filing date at

a time when the defendant would know the identity of the judge.

Id. at 530-31.

      4The court deemed the defendant's substitution request late
even   under   its  expansive   interpretation   of  Wis.   Stat.
§ 971.20(1) (1971-72) because he waited until the day of trial
to make his request. Baldwin v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 521, 532-33,
215 N.W.2d 541 (1974).

                                                10
                                                                 No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

       ¶61       Baldwin's policy-driven interpretation of the original

iteration of Wis. Stat. § 971.20 invited courts to ignore the

text       of    the    statute,    and   the     text    of   other    substitution

statutes,5 during the ensuing decades.                    Over the years, courts

have relied on Baldwin for the proposition that "a defendant

[must      have]       an   opportunity   to    request   a    substitution     for   a

reasonable period of time after he learns specifically which

judge will be assigned to his case."                 State ex rel. Akavickas v.

Cnty. Ct. of Marathon Cnty., 77 Wis. 2d 297, 298-99, 252 N.W.2d

386 (1977) (per curiam); see also Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d 443-44;

Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d 789-90.                Baldwin convinced courts there may

be      "exceptions"           to    § 971.20(4)'s         unambiguous        "before

arraignment" requirement, such as if the defendant does not know

the identity of the judge assigned to his trial.                         See Zimbal,

375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶3 n.2.            Baldwin must be overturned.

                D.   The Interpretive Errors of the Baldwin Court

                        1.    The Right to an Unbiased Judge

       ¶62       The court in Baldwin erred when it refused to apply
the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72) because

such an application "would deny in many cases the constitutional

right to a fair trial . . . ."                 Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 530.         The

court never cited a single source for its claim that the statute

violates the right to an impartial judge for some defendants.

Nor did the court explain how the right to an unbiased judge

       State ex rel. Akavickas v. Cnty. Ct. of Marathon Cnty., 77
       5

Wis. 2d 297, 298-99, 252 N.W.2d 386 (1977) (per curiam) (Wis.
Stat. § 345.315(1)); State ex rel. Tarney v. McCormack, 99 Wis.
2d 220, 235, 298 N.W.2d 552 (1980) (Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1)).

                                           11
                                                                   No.    2022AP1999-W.rgb

would be violated by applying the plain meaning of the statute.

While every defendant is entitled to a trial before an impartial

judge,   Wis.      Const.    art.     I,    § 8;   State      ex   rel.    Mitchell     v.

Bowman, 54 Wis. 2d 5, 6-7, 194 N.W.2d 297 (1972) (per curiam),

the ability to exercise a peremptory judicial substitution is

unrelated to judicial bias against the defendant.                         See Mitchell,

54 Wis. 2d at 6-7.           It is similarly unrelated to whether a judge

has a personal interest in the case's outcome.                           Tumey v. Ohio,

273   U.S.    510      (1927).        Exercising        the    statutory       right    of

substitution without knowing the identity of the judge assigned

to the trial does not make it any more or less likely that

"there is 'a serious risk of actual bias . . . .'"                            Miller v.

Carroll,     2020     WI   56,    ¶24,     392   Wis.    2d   49,    944    N.W.2d     542

(quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884

(2009)).     The unavailability of peremptory judicial substitution

does not deprive a defendant of his right to an impartial judge.

      ¶63    There is "no constitutional right to the peremptory

substitution of a judge."             State ex rel. Garibay v. Cir. Ct. for
Kenosha Cnty., 2002 WI App 164, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 438, 647 N.W.2d

455 (citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 46, 315 N.W.2d 703

(1982)).        The    legislature         provided     the    statutory       right    of

substitution to protect the right to an unbiased judge.                          Holmes,

106   Wis.    2d      at   38,    46-47,     55.        The    statutory       right   to

substitution        serves       as   a    prophylactic        protection        of    the

constitutional right to an unbiased judge and does not embody

the right itself.           See id. at 46; Zimbal, 375 Wis. 2d 643, ¶74
(Ziegler, J., concurring).                The statutory right of substitution

                                            12
                                                                      No.    2022AP1999-W.rgb

is a "matter of legislative grace, not constitutional mandate.

As such, the legislature may limit or qualify that right" as it

sees fit.      Garibay, 256 Wis. 2d 438, ¶9.

       ¶64    Even    if    applying       the      plain    meaning    of    the    statute

would violate due process when the defendant doesn't know the

identity of the assigned judge prior to arraignment, the Baldwin

court erred by impermissibly rewriting the statute.                                 State v.

Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 140, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X–Citement

Video,       513    U.S.    64,     86     (1994)      (Scalia,       J.,     dissenting))

("[A]lthough         this        Court     will      often      strain       to      construe

legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it

must     not        and     will         not     carry       this      to      the     point

of . . . judicially rewriting it.").                        Under the constitutional-

doubt    canon,       if     a     statute       raises       serious       constitutional

questions, a court should interpret the statute to avoid those

constitutional questions.                State v. Hager, 2018 WI 40, ¶31, 381

Wis. 2d 74, 911 N.W.2d 17.                "[I]t is a cardinal rule that courts
should avoid interpreting a statute in a way that would render

it unconstitutional when a reasonable interpretation exists that

would render the legislation constitutional."                          State v. Hamdan,

2003 WI 113, ¶27 n.9, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (citation

omitted).          Critically, the court can apply only reasonable or

plausible      interpretations           to    the    text    under     these      rules   of

interpretation.            Id.; Hager, 381 Wis. 2d 74, ¶31.                       This court

can avoid questions of unconstitutionality only if the statute
is ambiguous.         Fleming v. Amateur Athletic Union of U.S., Inc.,

                                               13
                                                             No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

2023 WI 40, ¶31 n.10, 407 Wis. 2d 273, 990 N.W.2d 244 (citations

omitted).       It isn't.

      ¶65   The    Baldwin     court   did    not   supply   a     reasonable   or

plausible interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72); it

supplied    a    contrived,    textually     unsupportable       interpretation.

The   Baldwin     court     assigned   the   word   "arraignment"       different

meanings depending on the facts of a particular case, lending

the word a chameleon-like character.                Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at

530, 532 (providing an "enlarged definition of 'arraignment'"

only when "a calendaring procedure, such as is used in Milwaukee

[C]ounty," is used).          Not only is it confounding that the court

gave "arraignment" different meanings depending on the facts of

the     case,     the     Baldwin   court's     "enlarged        definition"    of

arraignment conflicts with the statutory definition.                      Compare

id. at 530, with Wis. Stat. § 971.05 (1971-72).

      ¶66   Baldwin turned the statute's clear rule (file "before

arraignment") into a vague standard (file within a "reasonable

time") without any explanation or textual support.                  The words of
Wis. Stat. § 971.20, taken collectively or individually, do not

give a defendant a "reasonable time" to file a substitution

request after learning the identity of the judge assigned to his

case.    The Baldwin court added words to the text of the statute

because it felt the legislature's rule didn't "work[] well."

Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 529.             "One of the maxims of statutory

construction is that courts should not add words to a statute to

give it a certain meaning."              Fond Du Lac Cnty. v. Town of

                                        14
                                                               No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989)

(citation omitted).

             2.   Legislative Intent and Statutory Purpose

      ¶67   The Baldwin court justified its interpretation of Wis.

Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72) on the ground it gave effect to the

legislature's "intent" while a plain-meaning interpretation of

the statute frustrated the objective of the statute.                       Baldwin,

61 Wis. 2d at 530.        Statutory interpretation is not a quest to

effectuate the legislature's intent; its goal is to ascertain

the objective meaning of a statute and apply that meaning in the

case at hand.         "This court has long disavowed reliance on so-

called 'legislative intent,' the search for which leads to pure

judicial activism."       Cobb v. King, 2022 WI 59, ¶44, 403 Wis. 2d

198, 976 N.W.2d 410 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting)

(citing Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC, 2021 WI 86, ¶24, 399 Wis. 2d

599, 967 N.W.2d 21); accord Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶43-44.

Although the objectives of a statute are valid considerations in

a plain-meaning analysis to the extent they can be ascertained
from the words of the statute, Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48,

statutory "purpose[s] cannot produce an interpretation that the

statute's language rules out of bounds."                Stephen Breyer, Making

Our   Democracy   Work:       A   Judge's   View   98   (2010).       A   statute's

manifest objectives may help a court choose between "textually

permissible interpretation[s]." see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.

Garner,     Reading    Law:       The   Interpretation    of    Legal     Texts   63

(2012).     But a statute's objectives cannot give "a word [or]
sentence . . . a meaning that it cannot bear."                  Id. at 31; State

                                          15
                                                                           No.    2022AP1999-W.rgb

v. Hinkle, 2019 WI 96,                 ¶28, 389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d                          271

(quoting    Scalia       &    Garner,       supra,       at     57).            After   all,   "no

legislation pursues its purposes at all costs."                                    Rodriguez v.

United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam).                                       The

Baldwin court violated these fundamental rules of interpretation

by adding words to a statute and stretching the existing words

of the statute past their breaking point.

                  3.    The History of Wis. Stat. § 971.20

    ¶68     Contrary          to   the     claims       of    the     Baldwin       court,     the

"history    of    [Wis.        Stat.     § 971.20]"           does        not    "support"     its

interpretation of the statute.                         Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 530.

Although    the     judicial        committee's           note       to     the    statute     did

"reference"       the    Illinois          and        Montana       judicial       substitution

statutes,    id.,       the    Baldwin      court        misused          that    reference     to

support    its    conclusion.            The      reference          to    the     Illinois    and

Montana     substitution           statutes       was        made     in    the     context    of

changing the terminology used to describe the right to judicial

substitution; the new statute would not use the term "affidavit
of prejudice," which the prior substitution statute, Wis. Stat.

§ 956.03(1) (1967-68), used:

    Note:   This is new terminology replacing present s.
    956.03 (1). 'Affidavit of Prejudice' has normally not
    meant   prejudice  since  most   defendants have   no
    knowledge of the judge and have filed the affidavit
    solely for tactical purposes usually on an attorney's
    advice. This terminology is felt to be more accurate.
    (See Ill. Rev. Code Chap. 38, s. 114-5, Mont. Rev.
    Code 95-1709.)
Note,   § 63,     ch.    255,       Laws    of        1969.         Despite       the   fact   the
reference made to the Illinois and Montana statutes was about

                                                 16
                                                                    No.    2022AP1999-W.rgb

terminology, the court cited the Illinois and Montana statutes

as support for the claim that a defendant needs to know the

identity     of     the    judge     assigned      to     his    trial     prior    to    the

substitution deadline.

    ¶69      Not only did the court in Baldwin deceptively misuse

the judicial committee's note, the statutory history of Wis.

Stat.   § 971.20         reveals    the    legislature          denied    the     court   any

authority      to    provide       exceptions       to    the     statute's       deadline.

"Unlike      legislative         history,        prior     versions        of     statutory

provisions        were     enacted        law;     as    such,     statutory        history

constitutes an intrinsic source that 'is part of the context in

which we interpret the words used in a statute.'"                          Brey v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶20, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970

N.W.2d 1 (quoting Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52,

¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581).                     Prior to the creation of

§ 971.20,     Wis.       Stat.     § 956.03      (1967-68)       gave     defendants      the

right   of     substitution.           Section 956.03(1)            provided       that    in

felony cases, the request needed to be made "within 20 days
after   [the      defendant's]        arraignment         and    before     the    case   is

called for trial."           For misdemeanors, the request needed to be

made "at arraignment or at the time the defendant demands a jury

trial   if    one    is    demanded."            § 956.03(1).        Importantly,         the

statute had an exception——the deadline could be "extended for

cause but not more than 10 days."                       § 956.03(1).       The enactment

of § 971.20 eliminated the "for cause" exception.                                  See Wis.

Stat. § 971.20 (1969-70).                 Likewise, the current iteration of
the statute does not include any exceptions for the statutory

                                             17
                                                                         No.    2022AP1999-W.rgb

deadline.         "[A]    change       in     the   language        of    a    prior    statute

presumably connotes a change in meaning."                                Scalia & Garner,

supra, at 256.           The removal of the "for cause" exception to the

deadline suggests the deadlines in § 971.20 are to be enforced

as they are written, and this court cannot extend the deadline

in     § 971.20(4)        for     filing        a      substitution            request        past

arraignment.        This court cannot restore what the legislature

specifically removed from a statute.

                                        4.     Policy

       ¶70   Buried beneath the Baldwin court's handwringing over

fair    trials,     legislative             intent,     statutory          objectives,         and

legislative history lies the obvious truth:                               The court simply

disagreed with the policy decisions made by the legislature.

The court did not think the statute's deadline "works well" in

all cases.        Baldwin, 62 Wis. 2d at 529.                       The Baldwin court's

interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1) (1971-72) was designed

to     improve     what     the       court     regarded       as        the    legislature's

imperfect        work.          The     Baldwin        court    "observed            what     the
legislature had written, decided it didn't like it, and replaced

the     statutory         text        with      what      the        court          deemed     to

be . . . preferable . . . ."                    Town     of     Wilson          v.     City    of

Sheboygan, 2020 WI 16, ¶73 n.12, 390 Wis. 2d 266, 938 N.W.2d 493

(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).                       But the court's role

is not to reweigh the pros and cons of a policy and correct any

perceived errors in the legislature's judgments, especially when

it comes to deadlines:                  "Deadlines are inherently arbitrary;
fixed     dates,     however,          are     often     essential             to    accomplish

                                               18
                                                                  No.    2022AP1999-W.rgb

necessary results."            United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249

(1985).

    ¶71        Courts act beyond their authority by adding words to a

law, even when they believe their handiwork will make the law

better    accord       with    justice.         "The    problem   is    that   although

properly informed human minds may agree on what a text means,

human hearts often disagree on what is right."                        Scalia & Garner,

supra, at 348.           "[I]t is precisely because people differ over

what is sensible and what is desirable that we elect those who

will write our laws——and expect courts to observe what has been

written."        Id. at 22.           That is why "[o]ur unwillingness to

soften the import of [the legislature's] chosen words even if we

believe the words lead to a harsh outcome is longstanding."                            See

Lamie    v.    U.S.     Tr.,    540     U.S.     526,    538    (2004);    Mannino      v.

Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 615, 299 N.W.2d 823 (1981).                                 The

appropriate      judicial       response       to   a   law    that    leads   to   harsh

results is not to legislate from the bench, but to "take the

statute as we find it."               Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27
(1933).

    ¶72        By adding words to Wis. Stat. § 971.20, the Baldwin

court    not    only    violated      foundational       principles       of   statutory

interpretation,         it    invaded     the    legislature's        constitutionally

assigned domain, "arrogating to itself the power to make law."

St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶116, 398 Wis. 2d 92,

961 N.W.2d 635 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).                               The

court's decision in Baldwin "reflects the philosophy that judges
should    endure       whatever    interpretive         distortions       it   takes   in

                                            19
                                                                     No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

order to correct a supposed flaw in the statutory machinery."

King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Our constitution counters that dangerous philosophy, enshrining

a separation of powers between the three branches of government.

The people of Wisconsin gave the legislature——not this court——

"[t]he    legislative        power."          Wis.     Const.     art.    IV,   § 1.       The

legislature         is     the    only        body     in    this    state      with       the

constitutional authority to make and modify laws.                          See League of

Women Voters v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶35, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929

N.W.2d 209.          In contrast, the people gave this court "[t]he

judicial power of this state."                  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2.             This

court does not create laws, nor does it fix laws that fail to

meet their objectives.                State ex rel. Rose v. Superior Ct. of

Milwaukee         Cnty.,   105    Wis.        651,   675,    81     N.W.    1046    (1900).

Instead,      this       court    has     a     more     modest     and     circumscribed

constitutional role——interpreting and applying laws as written.

Gabler v. Crime Victims Rts. Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶37, 376 Wis. 2d

147, 897 N.W.2d 384.                  This court in Baldwin overstepped its
constitutionally assigned role by rewriting § 971.20 without any

authority to do so.

                                 5.   Baldwin's Progeny

       ¶73    Courts applying Baldwin showcase the extent to which

the Baldwin court usurped the legislature's policy-making role.

Following Baldwin, the court of appeals held that if a defendant

does   not    receive       "adequate         notice    of   the    assigned       judge    in

advance      of    arraignment,         the    statute's        filing     deadlines       are
relaxed in order to allow a defendant to intelligently exercise

                                               20
                                                                    No.       2022AP1999-W.rgb

the right of substitution."                 Tinti, 159 Wis. 2d at 789-90 (first

citing Tessmer, 123 Wis. 2d at 443; and then citing Baldwin, 62

Wis. 2d at 529).              In Zimbal, this court added to Baldwin's

atextual     interpretation           of    Wis.     Stat.    § 971.20.            The    Zimbal

court held § 971.20's deadlines are not to be enforced if a

circuit court told the defendant the substitution issue would be

addressed only after trial counsel is appointed.                               375 Wis. 2d

643, ¶40.         According to the Zimbal court, this exception to the

deadlines aligns with Baldwin, Tessmer, and Tinti, which allow

for   an    exception      to     the      deadline    "when    a   government-created

obstacle prevents a defendant from complying with the statutory

deadline."         Id.    Under such circumstances, the court proclaimed

it too "problematic" to apply the statute's actual deadline,

id., ¶48; instead, the court engaged in a balancing test to

determine if the defendant filed his substitution request within

a reasonable time:              "We again look to the arraignment cases,

which      have    balanced     the     importance      of     giving     effect         to   the

legislative        intent       expressed       in     Wis.    Stat.      §        971.20     and
preventing a defendant from using a request as a technique to

disrupt scheduled calendaring or delay a scheduled trial."                                    Id.,

¶50     (citations       omitted).            Such     balancing       belongs           to   the

legislature, which already balanced those interests in the text

of § 971.20.        The judiciary lacks any authority to reweigh those

interests         and    create     case-by-case         exceptions           to     statutory

deadlines.         See Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 529, 576 N.W.2d

245 (1998).6

      6The Zimbal court euphemistically stated it would not
require the defendant to "strict[ly] adhere[]" to the statutory
                               21
                                                                    No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

       ¶74    The    majority          follows      Zimbal's      lead,    stating     "an

untimely request may be considered timely when 'a government-

created       obstacle'       prevents         a    defendant     from     meeting     the

statutory deadline."              Majority op., ¶31 (quoting Zimbal, 375

Wis. 2d 643, ¶40).            But nowhere in Wis. Stat. § 971.20 is there

any reference to "government-created obstacles."                          It is a court-

created      criterion       at   odds      with    the   law's   text.      Instead    of

applying Baldwin and its progeny, this court should overrule the

decision.

                                    III.      CONCLUSION

       ¶75    The majority correctly concludes the circuit court did

not    have    a    plain    duty      to    accept   Davis's     tardy     substitution

request.       But the majority errs by perpetuating the                         Baldwin

court's       usurpation          of        legislative     power     by      atextually

interpreting the judicial substitution statute.                            "Rather than

rewriting the law under the pretense of interpreting it," King,

576 U.S. at 516 (Scalia, J., dissenting), this court should

leave it to the legislature to fix any infirmities in Wis. Stat.
§ 971.20's text.            Section 971.20(4) requires a defendant to file

a     substitution       request         "before      arraignment."           Only     the

legislature possesses the authority to change that.                              Baldwin

should be overruled and its reasoning abandoned.                                I would

apply the statute's plain meaning and hold the circuit court

deadline.   State v. Zimbal, 2017 WI 59, ¶40, 375 Wis. 2d 643,
896 N.W.2d 327. Such language disguises the fact that the court
would not require the defendant to adhere to the statute's
deadline at all.

                                               22
                                                       No.   2022AP1999-W.rgb

properly   denied   Davis's   substitution   request     because    it   was

filed after arraignment.      I respectfully concur in the judgment.

                                   23
                                                                 No. 2022AP1999.bh

    ¶76      BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.      (concurring).       In a petition for

a supervisory writ, the question is whether we should force the

circuit court to do something it had a plain duty to do.                     Yet

before us, the legal theory Davis presents for why the circuit

court had such a duty is entirely different than the one he

argued below and in his petition for review.                  He also adds a

brand new argument regarding equitable tolling not raised below

at all.     Davis forfeited these arguments, full stop.               The best

course of action would be to hold him to his forfeiture and call

it a day.

    ¶77     The   majority   disagrees,     however,    and    overlooks     the

forfeiture——ostensibly       to   clarify    the    proper     procedure     for

raising judicial substitution questions.            But it doesn't need to

overlook the forfeiture to address this point.                  And while I

agree that a supervisory writ is particularly ill-suited to the

kind of claims raised here,1 the majority attempts to do more.

It dives head-first into the merits and seems to blaze at least

some new legal ground on the forfeited questions.

    ¶78     Forfeiture should not be overlooked so easily though;

it is not just procedural nitpicking.              When we allow litigants

to present a wholly different case to us than they did below, we

put ourselves in the awkward position of "telling a lower court

    1  I'm not sure whether this court should tell parties how
best to press their claims. In any event, a supervisory writ is
a poor fit for the claims raised here, as the majority
emphasizes.

                                     1
                                                                 No. 2022AP1999.bh

it was wrong when it was never presented with the opportunity to

be   right."2     This   is   especially     so   in   this   request    for    a

supervisory writ where we are asked to order the circuit court

to comply with a legal command that it was never asked to obey

in the first place.      In the end, although well-intentioned, the

majority says more than it should, and risks confusing the law

rather    than   clarifying    it.       I   respectfully     concur    in   the

judgment.

      2Tory A. Weigand, Raise or Lose: Appellate Discretion and
Principled Decision-Making, 17 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc.
179, 186 (2012) (cleaned up).

                                     2
                                                                      No.   2022AP1999-W.akz

      ¶79     ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.                       (dissenting).       The

majority answers a question of its own choosing, rather than the

question presented in the petition for review.                              The majority

could, as Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Brian Hagedorn do

in their respective concurrences, answer questions that meet the

criteria for this court's review.                        But the majority chooses

instead to merely restate prior law.                          I dissent because this

case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.                                We

accept    cases    based     on    statutory       criteria         which   require    that

there be      "real and significant question of federal or state

constitutional law" or that lead to "develop[ing], clarify[ing],

or   harmon[izing]         the    law."        Wis.   Stat.     § (Rule)      809.62(1r).

There    is   no     new    law    development          in    the    majority     opinion.

Additionally, Davis argues different issues than that presented

in his petition for review.                    Because neither the majority nor

Davis follow the court's order to answer the question presented

in the petition for review, and the majority opinion develops no

new law, this case should be dismissed as improvidently granted.

      ¶80     This court does not grant every petition for review.

Wisconsin      Stat.       § (Rule)        809.62(1r)          instructs       that    when

exercising     our     discretion         to    grant    or    deny     a   petition    for

review:

      CRITERIA FOR GRANTING REVIEW. Supreme court review is a
      matter of judicial discretion, not of right, and will
      be granted only when special and important reasons are
      presented. The following . . . indicate criteria that
      will be considered:

      (a) A real and significant question of federal or state
          constitutional law is presented.
                                               1
                                                          No.   2022AP1999-W.akz

     (b) The petition for review demonstrates a need for the
         supreme    court    to    consider    establishing,
         implementing or changing a policy within its
         authority.

     (c) A decision by the supreme court will help develop,
         clarify or harmonize the law, and

           1.    The case calls for the application of a new
                 doctrine rather than merely the application of
                 well-settled   principles   to   the   factual
                 situation; or

           2.    The question presented is a novel one, the
                 resolution of which will have statewide impact;
                 or

           3.    The question presented is not factual in nature
                 but rather is a question of law of the type
                 that is likely to recur unless resolved by the
                 supreme court.

     (d) The court of appeals' decision is in conflict with
         controlling opinions of the United States Supreme
         Court or the supreme court or other court of
         appeals' decisions.

     (e) The court of appeals' decision is in accord with
         opinions of the supreme court or the court of
         appeals but due to the passage of time or changing
         circumstances,   such  opinions   are   ripe   for
         reexamination.
§ (Rule) 809.62(1r).         Davis argued that our review was proper

because he satisfied at least two of those criteria.1

     ¶81    In    granting   Davis's   petition     for   review,   our    order

stated   that     "the   petition   for    review    is   granted    and   that

pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6), the petitioner may

     1 Davis argued that the question presented was "a purely
legal issue that is likely to recur unless the Supreme Court
grants review and develops the law governing exceptions to the
deadline for filing requests for substitution of judge." Davis
also argued that our review was proper "because there was a need
for the supreme court to consider establishing policy within its
authority." See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(b), (c).

                                       2
                                                                       No.    2022AP1999-W.akz

not raise or argue issues not set forth in the petition for

review unless otherwise ordered by the court".2                               Davis v. Cir.

Ct. for Dane Cnty., No. 2022AP1999-W, unpublished order (Wis.

Mar.       31,   2023)      (granting      petition       for    review).           The   issue

presented was

       [w]hether the [State Public Defender's] inability to
       appoint counsel before the deadline for requesting a
       substitution of judge expires is a "government created
       obstacle" that interferes with defendant's intelligent
       exercise    of    his    right   of    substitution[.]
       Alternatively, whether the doctrine of equitable
       tolling tolls the deadline for filing a request for
       substitution of judge until the defendant is appointed
       counsel[.]
But    Davis,         in   his   briefing    and     at    oral      argument,       argued   a

different         issue     than    the    one   ordered        by   the     court,   namely,

"[w]hen the court sua sponte entered a plea on behalf of an

unrepresented defendant awaiting appointment of counsel before

giving notice of assignment of judge, did that procedure result

in a government-created obstacle that deems Mr. Davis' request

for substitution timely?"                  The majority may begin to consider

portions         of   Davis's      newly   developed       issue,      but     it    does   not

definitively answer it, and that was not the issue for which

review was granted.3                Instead, the majority dodges the issue

       See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6) ("If a petition . . . is
       2

granted, the petitioner . . . cannot raise or argue issues not
set forth in the petition . . . .").

       See, e.g., majority op., ¶23 ("With regard to Davis's
       3

government-created obstacle argument, we address the version of
the argument that Davis presents in his briefing——namely, that
the government-created obstacle was the timing of Davis's
arraignment.").

                                                 3
                                               No.   2022AP1999-W.akz

presented and proceeds to the merits anyway, merely restating

existing law.

    ¶82   We are not an error-correcting court; we are a law-

developing court.4   This case is not law-developing.       I would

dismiss this case as improvidently granted.

    ¶83   For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

    4  See State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 407-08, 424
N.W.2d 672 (1988) (noting that the court of appeals is an error-
correcting court while the supreme court is a law-developing or
law-declaring court); see also State v. Lee, 197 Wis. 2d 959,
970, 542 N.W.2d 143 (1996) ("The rules of appellate practice
applicable to the court of appeals are not always applicable to
this court, which functions primarily as a law-developing
court.").

                                4
    No.   2022AP1999-W.akz

1