Court Opinion

ID: 9952782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 19:03:21.235413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:29.691262
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/24 P. v. Stephens CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                              B328643

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                       (Los Angeles County
                                                          Super. Ct. No. NA117871)
          v.

 THRIASHAUN STEPHENS,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel J. Lowenthal, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
      Richard Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Stephanie Santoro, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant and appellant Thriashaun Stephens (defendant)
was placed on probation after pleading guilty to robbing K.S.
Later, the trial court found he violated the terms of his probation
by trying to smother his girlfriend, J.N., with a pillow. For the
violation, the court ordered probation terminated and sentenced
defendant to three years in prison on the robbery conviction.
       Also before the trial court during the probation violation
hearing was a separate alleged misdemeanor domestic violence
charge involving the victim of defendant’s earlier robbery
conviction, K.S. The prosecution indicated it would agree to
dismiss the misdemeanor domestic violence charge if defendant
agreed to a ten-year criminal protective order restraining him
from having any contact with K.S. Defendant agreed, and the
trial court dismissed the misdemeanor domestic violence charge.
Relying on Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1),1 the trial
court issued criminal protective orders on January 26, 2023, that
restrain defendant from having any contact with both J.N. and
K.S. for ten years.
       Defendant noticed an appeal from the judgment entered as
the result of his probation violation. His appointed attorney,
Richard Lennon, initially filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and declared he could find no
arguable issues to raise on appeal. This court thereafter
undertook an independent view of the record and ordered Mr.
Lennon to file a supplemental opening brief addressing a single
issue, namely, “whether the January 26, 2023, protective orders
issued by the trial court are authorized by Penal Code section

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

                                 2
136.2 (or any other law).” This court also invited the Attorney
General to file a response.
       Defendant’s supplemental opening brief argued the
protective orders issued without a proper statutory basis because
a ten-year criminal protective order can issue under section
136.2, subdivision (i) only when a defendant is convicted of a
crime involving domestic violence and defendant’s only crime of
conviction—obtained as a result of a guilty plea to a robbery
charge—does not qualify as a crime involving domestic violence
under the statute. The Attorney General filed a letter brief in
response arguing both protective orders properly issued. The
Attorney General argues K.S. was in a “dating-type relationship”
with defendant when he robbed her of a gold necklace and,
relying solely on a probation report, contends he struck her in the
face during the course of the robbery. As to the protective order
for J.N., the Attorney General argues she was defendant’s
girlfriend at the time and defendant’s actions placed her in
reasonable apprehension of imminent death by suffocation.
       Section 136.2, subdivision (i) provides in relevant part that
“[w]hen a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime
involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in
Section 6211 of the Family Code . . . , the court, at the time of
sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the
defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order
may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This
protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether
the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail,
whether the defendant is subject to mandatory supervision, or
whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is
placed on probation.” As we now explain, the record does not

                                 3
permit a conclusion that this statute authorizes the criminal
protective orders entered by the trial court.
       Regarding the K.S. protective order, robbery is not a
domestic violence offense (People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
887, 901) and neither defendant’s change of plea hearing nor any
other materials in the record establish the crime otherwise
“involv[ed]” domestic violence. More specifically, we do not
believe the probation report on which the Attorney General relies
(the facts of which defendant did not admit in entering his plea)
suffices to establish defendant abused K.S. in robbing her. In
addition, neither the probation report nor any other record
materials establish K.S. and defendant were in a dating
relationship at the time of the robbery.2
       With respect to the J.N. protective order, it is uncontested
that defendant was in a dating relationship with her at the time
of the probation violation. The problem, however, is that finding
defendant violated the terms of his probation by engaging in
violence against J.N. is not a “conviction” for committing a crime.
(See People v. Rosbury (1997) 15 Cal.4th 206, 209.) Procedural
safeguards in probation violation proceedings are less stringent
than they are in criminal trials (see, e.g., People v. Rodriguez
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 446), and the Legislature’s use of the term
“conviction” evinces an intent to limit use of criminal protective
orders—which can remain in force, as in this case, as long as ten

2
      The separate misdemeanor domestic violence charge
discussed earlier in our opinion is irrelevant to our analysis.
That charge was dismissed, and defendant obviously cannot be
said to have been convicted on a dismissed charge.

                                 4
years—to situations where the more stringent criminal
safeguards have led to a finding of guilt.3
      Defendant has raised no other challenges to the judgment
and our independent review has uncovered no other arguable
issues. We shall therefore strike the criminal protective orders
and affirm the judgment as so modified.

3
      Of course, if the Legislature wishes to permit use of
criminal protective orders to circumstances beyond criminal
convictions, it is free to do so by amending the text of section
136.2, subdivision (i).

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                           DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s ten-year criminal protective orders entered
on January 26, 2023, for victims K.S. and J.N. are vacated. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                       BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

      MOOR, J.

      LEE, J.*

*
      Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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