Court Opinion

ID: 9425872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:16:04.616257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:57.824935
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
These cases have created, as did the Penn-Central Merger cases,1 that “hydraulic pressure” which, Mr. Justice Holmes once said, “makes what previously was clear *162seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.” 2
If the rule of law under a moral order is the measure of our responsibility, as I have always assumed, we can only hold that the Rail Act of January 2, 1974, 87 Stat. 985, 45 U. S. C. §701 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. Ill), undertakes to sanction a fraudulent conveyance, as those words were used in 13 Eliz.,3 and in our Bankruptcy Act. I have been reluctant so to conclude, implicating as it does our legislative branch in a lawless maneuver of gigantic proportions. But, baldly put, the present law is a tour de force to that end.
Article I, § 10, of the Constitution bars the States from passing a law “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Though the Federal Government is not so enjoined, it is restrained by the Fifth Amendment which provides that no person can be deprived of “property” without “due process of law.” I assume it is conceded that Congress, apart from the bankruptcy power in Art. I, § 8, may not impair the obligation of contracts without violating the Due Process Clause.4 But “[t]he bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment,” as Mr. Justice Brandéis, writing for the Court in Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 589 (1935), held.
This does not mean that so far as rail carriers are concerned the creditors can exact their pound of flesh, dismembering or liquidating the debtor. The public in*163terest may not be subverted in that manner. As the Court said in Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 671 (1935), a case involving a rail reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 205:
“A railway is a unit; it can not be divided up and disposed of piecemeal like a stock of goods. It must be sold, if sold at all, as a unit and as a going concern. Its activities can not be halted because its continuous, uninterrupted operation is necessary in the public interest . . . .”
Congress made such findings in these cases in § 101 (a) of the Act, 45 U. S. C. § 701 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. III). Hence the congressional objective in the Rail Act of preserving the assets of these six railroads5 as part of a continuing enterprise in the form of a new corporation (for convenience called Conrail6) is well within the Bankruptcy Clause. The question remains, however, whether by the means it has chosen Congress has transgressed constitutional boundaries.
I
The property is “taken for public use” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. First is the mandate of Congress. The Rail Act provides for an obligatory transfer of the assets of these companies to Conrail. The creditors, the trustees, the stockholders, the reorganization judge have no other option. The record makes abundantly clear what all the parties concede, that Conrail, though dubbed “a for-profit corporation” by § 301 *164(b) of the Act, 45 U. S. C. § 741 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. Ill), shows no prospect of being an enterprise operating on a profitable basis.7 Penn Central losses between June 21, 1970, and December 31, 1973, were $851 million, and the Reorganization Court,8 whose judgment we are not reviewing, found that reorganization on an income basis was not possible. The values that ride on today’s decisions are therefore not based on the prospect of future profitable operations.9 The only consideration in the framework of the Act which provides “just compensation” for the taking is in the form of “securities” of Conrail, §206 (d)(1), 45 U. S. C. §716 (d)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. III). If those “securities” are common stock, they will have value only insofar as Conrail will be a viable entity which generates income in excess of costs and fixed charges. If the trustees under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 205, cannot make ends meet, there is no reason to expect that Conrail can. Conrail, to be sure, is made eligible to receive obligations of the United States Railway Associa-*165t-ion (USRA), an incorporated nonprofit association created by the Act to issue obligations not exceeding $1,500,000,000, which are guaranteed by the Secretary of the Treasury, § 210, 45 U. S. C. § 720 (1970 ed., Supp. III). But of this one billion and a half not more than one billion can be issued to Conrail; of the one billion "not less than $500,000,000 shall be available solely for the rehabilitation and modernization” of the rail properties, § 210(b). Hence $500 million might be apportioned under a plan to creditors. But if the Special Court determines under § 303 (c), 45 U. S. C. § 743 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. Ill), that the value of the securities given creditors in exchange for the property pledged under prior law for payment of their claims is less than the fair value of the properties conveyed, the Special Court can under § 303 (c) (2) do only three things:
1. Reallocate the securities issued;
2. Require Conrail to issue additional securities;
3. Enter a deficiency judgment against Conrail.
The common stock of Conrail is plainly only token payment. Issuance of new and different securities by Conrail would have to have interest or dividend rights to be marketable and that would bring back into play some of the forces that plague the present trustees under § 77. Any securities issued by Conrail must “minimize any actual or potential debt burden” of Conrail, § 206 (i), 45 U. S. C. § 716 (i) (1970 ed., Supp. III). Moreover, § 301 (d) of the Rail Act provides that so long as more than half the debt of Conrail is guaranteed by the Government, a majority of the 15 directors are designated from outside — the Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman and the President of the USRA, and five others named by the President with the consent of the Senate. One cannot read the Rail Act and believe that Congress thought that federal money going *166into Conrail could be made subordinate to any debt created by Conrail. A contrary assumption would make the watch-dog purpose of § 301 (d) quite superfluous. Yet, unless Conrail’s new debt were serviced, it could not be marketed and even if it were, it could add no element of value to the compensation received by the creditors of these railroads under a reorganization plan. The upshot is that compensation for properties acquired by Conrail would be mostly paid for in Conrail stock with a sprinkling of the bonds of the Association issued to Conrail, assuming that they were not expended in the operations of Conrail between the time it started its operation and the date of the final plan of reorganization.
The value of the properties to be transferred has not yet been determined. We held in the New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U. S. 392, 489 (1970), where the New Haven road was being shut down and its assets sold, that just compensation was to be measured by the “highest and best value” of the assets sold. In that case that value was liquidation value. In light of the findings of the Reorganization Courts in the present cases, we cannot say that the $500 million of federally guaranteed bonds comes anywhere near any reasonably assured value.10 *167Value of any substantial amount cannot be attributed to the common stock of Conrail, because most of the problems of the existing roads will be inherited by Conrail and its prospects of generating income in excess of costs and fixed charges are, if not nil, remote. It would be irony to call entry of a deficiency judgment against Conrail adequate to make up any deficiency. For that judgment would only eat away at any value which the common stock of Conrail had.
The vicious character of these legislative decisions is emphasized by the cram-down provision of the Rail Act. In § 77 proceedings there is a cram-down provision to prevent one class from a holdup of a fair and equitable plan. Section 77, however, allows a cram-down only if the Court first finds the plan fair and equitable and after the security holders have had their hearing. Under the Rail Act the assets are first transferred to Conrail even before the Special Court has made its “fair and equitable” finding. Moreover, the security holders never have a vote on the plan.
Congress has lowered all the procedural barriers and foisted on these rail carriers a conveyance of their assets which, if done by private parties in control of a bankrupt estate, would be a fraudulent conveyance. Here it is achieved by Congress’ purporting to act in the “public interest.” That is a taking for a public purpose; but by Fifth Amendment standards it is a taking of property without assurance of just compensation.
II
The Court relies, as do all parties who seek to sustain the statute, on the assumed availability of a suit in *168the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, to recover any shortfall between fair liquidation value and the compensation the bankrupt roads receive under the Rail Act. The Solicitor General, while initially arguing that the judgment below could be reversed without reaching the Tucker Act question, now pitches his argument in support of the statute chiefly upon the availability of a Tucker Act suit.
The Tucker Act confers jurisdiction on the Court of Claims
“to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
The Rail Act neither expressly permits nor expressly excludes a suit under § 1491. USRA says that “[o]ne searches the Rail Act in vain for a sentence such as ‘The Court of Claims shall have no jurisdiction over any action alleging that the property of any person has been taken pursuant to this Act without just compensation.’ ” But this observation is only the beginning of analysis. It is not enough merely to note that the Rail Act carves out no exception to § 1491 in express words. “Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration upon isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions.” Boys’ Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235, 250 (1970). This precept requires us to inquire whether provisions that are not mutually exclusive by their terms are so divergent in approach that they cannot co-exist in a particular setting.. Congress may provide a mechanism for dealing with a particular problem that by its structure and purpose is inconsistent with a traditional avenue of relief applicable *169to a broader class of cases. Under these circumstances, Congress may have supplanted the traditional remedy, albeit by implication. In my view, this is precisely what Congress has done in the Rail Act.
The Act provides a strict timetable for bringing Conrail into operation. USRA is expected to present the Final System Plan to Congress within 570 days of the enactment of the Rail Act.11 The Plan is deemed approved unless Congress specifically disapproves within a specified period. § 208 (b). Once the plan is approved, USRA must certify it to the three-judge Special Court within 90 days, § 209 (c). Within 10 days after certification, Conrail must deposit its stock and securities with the Special Court, §303 (a), and the court must direct the conveyance of properties to Conrail pursuant to the plan within 10 days thereafter, § 303 (b).
Congress plainly sought expedition in the process of creating Conrail. This is apparently the reason for deferring until after the transfer of the properties the question of valuation and distribution of stock to the contributing railroads.12 The policy of expedition carries over into the provisions for judicial participation in this process. Appeals from decisions of the reorganization district courts concerning the inclusion of the debtor roads in the provisions of the Rail Act lie exclusively to *170the Special Court; its decision in these appeals must be made within 80 days, §207 (b), 45 U. S. C. §717 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. III). Once the Final System Plan is approved by Congress, § 209 (b) of the Act, 45 U. S. C. § 719 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. Ill), provides for consolidation in the Special Court of “all judicial proceedings with respect to the final system plan.” The decision of the Special Court regarding the distribution of Conrail stock and securities pursuant to § 303 (c) is appealable directly to this Court. We are directed to give the appeal “the highest priority” and even to dismiss it within seven days if we conclude that its pendency “would not be in the interest of an expeditious conclusion of the proceedings.” §303 (d).
A suit in the Court of Claims would be quite an odd appendage to the streamlined judicial procedures just described. The language of § 209 (b) vesting in the Special Court “all judicial proceedings with respect to the final system plan” immediately raises doubt that a Tucker Act remedy is compatible with the Act.13 The doubt is amplified when one looks at the entire scheme of judicial participation. I do not think that Congress, in setting up a Special Court, consolidating proceedings, limiting appeals, and demanding expeditious decisions, intended at the same time to permit yet another round of litigation on the compensation question to begin *171in the Court of Claims after all the procedures mandated by the Rail Act had been exhausted.
Despite the obvious, frustration of the policy of expedition, the inference that a Tucker Act remedy is available might still be justified were it not for the special features of the compensation arrangement that limit the infusion of federal funds. As will be seen, these features were important to Congress, and they are circumvented if a suit in the Court of Claims is allowed.
The Special Court, after it has directed the transfer to Conrail of “all right, title, and interest” in the properties of contributing roads designated in the Final System Plan, § 303 (b), must determine whether the transfers of property from the bankrupt roads are “fair and equitable to the estate.” But the Special Court has only limited tools for rectifying any unfairness or inequity it finds, and the limitations on its powers quite clearly indicate congressional intent to limit the commitment of federal funds. The preferred form of compensation to the debtor roads is stock of Conrail. § 303 (c)(2)(A). If the stock is insufficient, the Special Court may next order distribution of Government-guaranteed obligations of Conrail, § 303 (c) (2) (B), but these are limited in face value to $500 million,14 absent an authorization by joint resolution of Congress to exceed the limitation. If any shortfall remains after distribution of stock and Government-guaranteed obligations, the Special Court is directed to enter a deficiency judgment against Conrail, § 303 *172(c) (2) (C). The judgment is against the corporation and not the United States, with the apparent purpose of protecting the Treasury from a liability of unanticipated magnitude. As Representative Adams, one of the principal architects of the Rail Act in the House, explained when specific assurances about the federal exposure were sought early in debate on the bill:
“Mr. ADAMS. There is a specific limitation in the final bill which says no more than $200 million [later raised to $500 million] of Government loan guarantees can be used for acquisition in any event, so if the court in 5 to 10 years should come in with a higher value, the only judgment would be against this new corporation that is there.
“Under the New Haven case the court was placed in this kind of position that if it loads up that new corporation with a debt structure by requiring it to issue additional bonds, it lowers the value of the common stock, which is what it is being paid for in terms of these assets.
“Mr RUPPE. Does it not have to deliver more stock? It seems to me from reading the language that we have to cause the corporation securities issued in payment of the properties to have a value which is a fair and equitable value as determined by the court.
“Mr. ADAMS. That is correct, but that is this corporation’s and not the taxpayers of the United States money.” 119 Cong. Rec. 36355 (1973).
The possibility that there might be a large deficiency judgment was not unnoticed. See id., at 36352 (remarks of Rep. Skubitz) and 36355 (remarks of Rep. Shoup). But those who adverted to this possibility noted that Congress would have an opportunity to consider later *173whether to deal with it by relaxing the limitations on the amount of Government loan guarantees available to Conrail, by means of a joint resolution as provided in § 210 (b). Congress was thus to have a “second look” at the debt structure of Conrail after the Special Court valuation proceedings had concluded; at that point Congress might improve the corporation’s balance sheet by an additional commitment from public funds. What is clear, however, is that Congress intended to preserve a choice whether to allow Conrail to begin life with a large deficiency judgment unalleviated by further federal aid.15
*174To hold that a Tucker Act remedy is available is, first, to leave just compensation of security holders to wholly speculative chances that Congress might grant it and, second, to deprive Congress of that opportunity to choose, since the bankrupt estates would be permitted to obtain a deficiency judgment against the United States after proceedings under the Rail Act have been exhausted. Assurances against such an eventuality were given in the following colloquy between two of the managers for the House, during debate on the conference report:
“Mr. KUYKENDALL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the gentleman from Washington to clarify one point, and that is the matter of the deficiency judgment. There was a lot of colloquy in the original debate which expressed fears that the Federal court had the key to the Treasury.
“Will the gentleman give us his interpretation of the guarantees we have to keep that from happening in the court proceedings?
“Mr. ADAMS.. Mr. Speaker, there is a definite limitation on the total amount that can be authorized under this bill. Any amounts that go beyond that, or the shifting of the way in which it is spent, is to be approved by an act of Congress, to be signed by the President. It is defined as a joint resolution in the bill, and the statement of the managers, and it was the clear intent of the managers that any amount other than common stock was to be at the lowest possible limit to meet the constitutional guarantees.
“Mr. KUYKENDALL. Mr. Speaker, is it not *175true, I will ask the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Adams) that the creditors, of course, are given protection, and that the Board of Directors, under the control of Government officials, is the owner of the entire block of stock of 100 million shares, whatever it is?
“Mr. ADAMS. The gentleman is correct. It is controlled by the United States, so long as the Secretary determines that there is an amount of obligation funds which the United States might, in any way ever, have to have anything to do with.
“During that period of time, it is controlled by a board of directors which consists of Government officials.
“Mr. KUYKENDALL. There is no way the Federal court may assess the taxpayers or this Congress on the judgments of the creditors; is that correct?
“Mr. ADAMS. The gentleman is correct.
“Mr. KUYKENDALL. There is no way they can assess the Congress for the money?
“Mr. ADAMS. The gentleman is correct.” 119 Cong. Rec. 42947 (1973).
None of these comments refer expressly to the Court of Claims of to the Tucker Act. But the implication of depriving the courts of a “key to the federal Treasury” is powerful, and the reference to “assess [ing] Congress for the money” equally so, since that is in practical terms what the Court of Claims does. For me, the import of the words is clear: there was to be no possibility that an aggrieved party was to have recourse against the United States in such a way as to circumvent the limitations on federal funds embodied in the Rail Act.16 On *176oral argument as amicus curiae, Representative Adams stated that Congress had not repealed the Tucker Act. The majority seizes upon this statement as a concession that suit might be brought in the Court of Claims to *177supplement compensation. But that interpretation of his words is overborne by the manifestations of a contrary congressional intent reviewed above. Mr. Adams’ remarks, however, have a straightforward import that accords with the colloquy cited above and with the position taken in the brief he filed with this Court, which urged us to uphold the Rail Act without reference to a Tucker Act remedy. His remarks confirm that the Tucker Act remains available to enforce obligations against the United States (and not merely against Conrail) created by the Act. For example, should the Government fail to make good on its guarantee of bonds issued under § 210, holders thereof could obtain relief in the Court of Claims.
We are asked to infer a Tucker Act remedy by applying the canon that favors interpretations of statutes that avoid substantial constitutional questions. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407-408 (1909); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394 (1916); Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331 (1928); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 98 (1945). As originally stated, the proposition was that where a statute is “reasonably susceptible of two interpretations,” the courts will choose the one that steers clear of collision with constitutional limitations. United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., supra, at 407; Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U. S. 204, 217 (1922). The principle is applied so as to preserve substantially the legislative purpose, even where a statute must be tailored to avoid a question of constitutional infirmity. See Screws v. United States, supra; Crowell v. Benson, supra; FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924). In more recent applications, however, the Court has on occasion abandoned any fidelity to congressional intent in *178order to avoid a constitutional question. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953); United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 130 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring). In those cases, I believe, the Court engaged in a judicial rewriting of the relevant congressional Acts, and I concurred in the result only after reaching the constitutional questions the Court avoided. Today’s decision, however, goes well beyond what was done in Rumely and CIO. In those cases, as in most that have applied the canon of construction, the Court has narrowed the congressional regulatory scheme in order to avoid confronting the possibility of overreaching. See United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., supra; United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, supra; Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., supra; FTC v. American Tobacco Co., supra; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 466 (1926). Today, however, the Court expands the opportunities for correcting unfairness in the congressional program, foisting upon Congress a device it never chose and indeed thought it had rejected. Today’s holding thus represents a sheer tour de force. Cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring). This judicial legislation transgresses the bounds of our responsibility to avoid unnecessary constitutional questions. What Mr. Justice Cardozo said in Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373 (1933), bears repeating:
“ ‘A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ [Citation omitted.] But avoidance- of a difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion. Here the intention of the Congress is revealed too distinctly to permit us to ignore it ... . The problem must be faced and answered.” Id., at 379.
*179See also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 515 (1964); United States v. CIO, supra, at 129-130 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
The drafters of the Rail Act wrote against a background of reorganization law, in which the Tucker Act has never before been regarded as a device for escaping constitutional questions. Challenges to bankruptcy legislation as permitting unconstitutional deprivations of property have occurred before. Our cases until today have faced these challenges without adverting to any Tucker Act remedy. See Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Corp., 294 U. S. 648 (1935); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935); Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U. S. 440 (1937); Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Co., 318 U. S. 448 (1943).17 In construing the Rail Act to embrace a Tucker Act remedy, the Court disregards this tradition, and in this case opens up the possibility which Congress sought diligently to avoid — the imposition of a large financial burden upon the Treasury for the Conrail acquisition.
The Court of Claims is without power to enforce its judgments. While those amounting to less than $100,-000. are paid from a general appropriation, the payment of judgments exceeding this sum require special action by Congress. Ordinarily, of course, Congress pays these *180judgments as a matter of routine. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 570-571 (1962). But this is an exceptional case, involving the possibility of judgments in the billions of dollars.
The construction the Court gives the Rail Act today will amaze the legislators who drafted and voted for this statute. I cannot believe that Congress would have enacted this law had it been told that in the end it might have to dig into taxpayers’ pockets not for the one billion appropriated but for unknown billions — perhaps 10 or 12 billion — for “just compensation” for property it authorized to be “taken.”
Ill
Article I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution empowers Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” This Court held many years back that that requirement required “geographical” uniformity. Its main purpose was to treat claimants against debtors the same in one area as in another. As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 172-173 (1946):18
“The Constitutional requirement of uniformity is a requirement of geographic uniformity. It is wholly satisfied when existing obligations of a debtor are treated alike by the bankruptcy administration throughout the country, regardless of the State in which the bankruptcy court sits. See Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 190. To estab*181lish uniform laws of bankruptcy does not mean wiping out the differences among the forty-eight States in their laws governing commercial transactions. The Constitution did not intend that transactions that have different legal consequences because they took place in different States shall come out with the same result because they passed through a bankruptcy court. In the absence of bankruptcy such differences are the familiar results of a federal system having forty-eight diverse codes of local law. These differences inherent in our federal scheme the day before a bankruptcy are not wiped out or transmuted the day after.”
The Solicitor General makes the curious argument that the Commerce Clause power which supports the continuance of this rail system requires no uniformity. But it is the bankruptcy power that gives Congress power to cut down on the obligation of contracts. Recourse to the Bankruptcy Clause is necessary to sustain this statute, for, as noted below, it authorizes significant impairment beyond that permitted under § 77.
The Act applies not across the Nation but only in the midwest and northeast region of the United States. Section 102 (13), 45 U. S. C. § 702 (13) (1970 ed., Supp. III), indeed so defines "region.” It is to that "region” that USRA is confined by § 202 (b), 45 U. S. C. § 712 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. Ill), in the performance of its various duties. Reporting features of the Act reach only railroads in this “region.” § 203 (a), 45 U. S. C. § 713 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. III). The Secretary of Transportation is likewise so confined. § 204 (a), 45 U. S. C. § 714 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. III). So is the new office — Rail Services Planning Office — in the Interstate Commerce Commission. §§ 205 (a), (d), 45 U. S. C. §§ 715 (a), (d) (1970 ed., Supp. III). The “final system plan” covers *182only rail service in this “region.” §§206 (a), (c), (d), 45 U. S. C. §§ 716 (a), (c), (d) (1970 ed., Supp. III). In short, the Act would have to be amended to make its procedure applicable to rail carriers not in the midwest and northeast region. The Solicitor General is therefore quite wrong when he says that the Rail Act applies with the same force and effect wherever railroad reorganizations are found.
The Special Court is a bankruptcy court, for Congress has given it “such powers” as “a reorganization court” has. § 209 (b), 45 U. S. C. § 719 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. III). And, “a railroad in reorganization” as defined in § 102 (12) includes those in § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. That means that a railroad in § 77 proceedings but not located in the midwest and northeast region has more benign treatment than the six rail carriers before us in these cases. The importance of that difference is felt among the ranks of security holders: security holders of rail carriers who now or in the future are in a § 77 reorganization in the South or West will receive more considerate treatment than plaintiffs below in these cases. The differences are not minor but exceedingly substantial.
(1) Under § 77, as we held in the New Haven Inclusion Cases, supra, a plan was approved whereby the rail assets were disposed of with a view to reorganizing the remaining enterprise as an investment company. Under the Rail Act, § 207 (b) mandates a dismissal if “this chapter does not provide a process which would be fair and equitable to the estate of the railroad.” 45 U. S. C. § 717 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. III). As the Reorganization Court held, the plan approved in the New Haven Inclusion Cases would not be permissible under the Rail Act, as. the Rail Act nowhere envisages a bifurcated reorganization, one for nonrail assets and another for rail assets. The only choice is between an overall reorganization on *183the one hand and a dismissal whereupon all the diversities of the old equity receivership can be explored. Thus, security holders of companies reorganized under the Act are deprived of advantages which security holders of other rail carriers in § 77 proceedings enjoy.
(2) In a sale or conveyance of assets pursuant to a plan under § 77, any lien on those assets is transferred to the proceeds. § 77 (o). But by reason of §303 (b)(2) of the Rail Act the transfer is “free and clear of any liens or encumbrances.”
(3) Under § 77 (d) before a plan can be consummated, the judge (as well as the Interstate Commerce Commission) must find it to be “fair and equitable.” Under the Rail Act, § 303 (c), that finding is made only ex post facto. Thus the pressures are on to consummate the plan with no alternatives open to the Special Court except dismissal. The choice under § 77, which the New Haven Inclusion Cases illustrate, is barred; and the security holders here lack the benefit of the expertise of the Interstate Commerce Commission to which the courts give very great deference. See Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. S. 448, 472-475 (1943). The ex post facto finding on the “fair and equitable” prerequisite of this plan robs these security holders of protective measures that security holders enjoy in reorganizations of rail carriers in other geographical areas.
(4) While the Rail Services Planning Office is directed to hold public hearings on the “preliminary system plan,” § 207 (a)(2), it is USRA that prepares the final system plan, §§ 207 (c), (d), and submits it to the Congress. § 208. That submission to Congress is, however, perfunctory in the sense that the plan clears that hurdle unless Congress disapproves it. Under § 77 (e) the security holders (“all parties in interest”) have a right to be heard before the court approves a plan. Under the *184Rail Act no like hearing is granted. The denial of the right to be heard may at times amount to a denial of due process. I intimate no opinion on whether such a right could be constitutionally eliminated from all § 77 rail reorganizations.19 But where the security holders of some rail carriers under § 77 are given that right and those who are claimants against plaintiffs below are denied it, that provision of this Rail Act obviously lacks that “uniformity” which the Constitution mandates.
While we have heretofore recognized that local variations by reason of state law governing the rights of creditors and debtors may be honored in bankruptcy without violating the uniformity clause,20 we have never sanctioned a harsher bankruptcy procedure for the same class of debtors in one region than is applied to the same class in a different region. The bankruptcy court may, of course, be empowered to make its orders turn on the availability of credit which may be existent in one area but not in another.21 But down to this day we have never dreamed of allowing debtors in the same class and their creditors to be treated more leniently in one region than in another.22
*185My conclusion that this Rail Act does not have that “uniformity” required by Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution does not mean that it is unconstitutional in its entirety. It does mean, however, that the four ways in which “uniformity” is lacking must be remedied before the present group of security holders can be made to suffer both from § 207 (b) of the Act and from the cram-down provisions in § 303, including the absence of any meaningful right of the security holders to be heard on the fairness of a law.
We are urged to bow to the pressure of events and expedite in the public interest the reorganization of these six rail carriers. An emergency often gives Congress the occasion to act. But I know of no emergency that permits it to disregard the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution.
I fear that the “hydraulic pressure” generated by this case will have a serious impact on a historic area of the law, jealously protected over the centuries by courts of equity in the interests of justice.

 See Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 386 U. S. 372 (1967); Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U. S. 486 (1968); New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U. S. 392 (1970). In Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, supra, I summarize in my dissent, 386 U. S., at 452-459, some of the financial chicanery behind the creation of the “new Franken-steins” with which we now deal, id., at 455.

 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 401 (1904) (dissenting opinion).

 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1570); G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances & Preferences (rev. ed. 1940).

 The Gold Clause cases are on a different footing, for as Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote in Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 294 U. S. 240 (1935), the power of Congress to regulate the currency and establish the monetary system was involved.

 Penn Central Transportation Co. and its subsidiaries; Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.; Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey; Lehigh & Hudson River Railway Co.; Reading Co.; Ann Arbor Railway Co.

 Consolidated Rail Corp. created by § 301 of the Act, 45 U. S. C. §741 (1970 ed., Supp. III).

 The Reorganization Court found that Penn-Central (the debtor) was "not reorganizable on an income basis within a reasonable time”; and that ruling has not been appealed. In re Penn-Central Trans. Co., 382 F. Supp. 831, 842 (ED Pa. 1974).

 Section 209 (b), 45 U. S. C. § 719(b) (1970-ed., Supp. Ill), designates a Special Court of three federal judges which, inter alia, is to pass on the question whether the plan is “fair and equitable.” § 303 (c) (2), 45 U. S. C. § 743 (c) (2) (1970 ed., Supp. III). A preliminary decision by the Special Court which in certain important aspects conflicts with that of the Reorganization Court was rendered September 30, 1974. In re Penn Central Trans. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895.

 A study commissioned by the Penn Central Trustees, on file with the ICC, estimates for Penn Central assets as of December 31, 1970, a “continued railroad use" value of $13,585,493,000 and a “liquidation of non-rail uses” at $3,532,110,000. PCTC Physical Asset Valuation Study (Apr'. 1973, revised May 30, 1973), ICC Fin. Docket No. 26241 (Joint Documentary Submission No. 40).

 See n. 9, supra. In the case of Penn Central alone, the Reorganization Court said that “there is every reason to suppose that the included properties would be worth considerably more than $500 million.” 382 F. Supp. 856, 864 (ED Pa. 1974) (Fullam, J.').
Judge Fullam’s concurring opinion in the District Court noted:
“As a matter of simple maximization of values, if there is no ‘going concern’ value in the usual sense, there is no justification for continuing a reorganization proceeding, unless either or both of the following conditions are established: (1) a reasonable prospect that, because of streamlining, consolidations, and other changes in circumstances, earning power and profitability can be restored; or (2) a reasonable prospect that the public need for preserving the debtor’s railroad is such that it will be appropriated for public use, and that the values inherent in its assemblage as an operating railroad will *167be recognized and paid for. Cf. Port Authority Trans. Hudson Corp. v. Hudson Rapid Tubes, 20 N. Y. 2d 457, 231 N. E. 734, cert. denied 390 U. S. 1002 (1967).” 383 F. Supp. 510, 537 (ED Pa. 1974). (Footnote omitted.)

 Section 207 (c), 45 U. S. C. § 717(c) (1970 ed., Supp. Ill), required the executive committee of USRA to present the final system plan to USRA’s board of directors for approval within 420 days after enactment of the Act, later extended to 540 days by Pub. L. 93-488. Within 30 days after presentation by the executive committee, the board shall “approve a final system plan which meets all of the requirments of section 716 [prescribing contents of the plan and the general goals].” The plan is then submitted to Congress, § 208 (a), 45 U. S. C. § 718 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. III).

 See H. R. Rep. No. 93-620, pp. 54-55 (1973) (hereinafter cited as H. Rep.).

 This' language originated in the Senate bill. The House bill had provided for consolidation in the Special Court of “all proceedings of any kind which arise or may arise concerning the final system plan or implementation thereof.” (§501 (a)). The House Report explains that “Title V . . . guarantees the creditors their day in court and preserves their Constitutional right to a judicial determination of just compensation for their property.” H. Rep. 47. The Senate language was incorporated in the final bill, and apparently no significance was attached to the disparity between the two versions. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-744, pp. 56-59 (1973).

 Under §210 (b), 45 U. S. C. §720 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. III), USRA is authorized to issue Government-guaranteed obligations not exceeding $1.5 billion. Only $1 billion, however, may be issued to Conrail, and of this amount $500 million must be made available solely for rehabilitation and modernization of properties acquired from contributing roads. This leaves $500 million of obligations available to the Special Court for distribution to the estates under §303 (c)(2)(B).

 Were Congress so to choose, the creditors of the bankrupt roads, armed with a large deficiency judgment, might cause a levy to be made upon Conrail's assets. Since the value of Conrail stock held would presumably reflect the value of the assets, a levy would not give the estates any additional value but would merely change its form. Liquidation would, at most, terminate further erosion of asset value due to continued unprofitable operations.
An amicus brief submitted by Representative Adams for himself and 35 other Representatives suggests that liquidation would allow the creditors to get back what they relinquished, involuntarily, to Conrail (p. 7). But, as the Special Court noted, this position ignores the probable erosion of asset value during the pendency of valuation proceedings, the possibility of new senior debt, and the difficulty of unscrambling the assets. In re Penn Central Trans. Co., 384 F. Supp., at 930.
Appearing as amicus curiae at oral argument, Representative Adams made statements that the majority now reads as indicating a conclusion that a Tucker Act suit would be available to remedy an uncompensated “erosion taking.” Ante, at 132-133. Yet this position is contrary to that taken in the brief Mr. Adams submitted, which urges us to decide the case without reaching the Tucker Act question and specifically cites the colloquy printed, injra, at 174r-175. The Court properly notes that these post-enactment expressions should be treated with caution, a warning that applies as much to the “relatively spontaneous responses of counsel to equally spontaneous questioning from the Court,” Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 170 (1972), as to the more considered statements that appear in written submissions. Viewed in their entirety, the post-*174enactment expressions are ambiguous and add little to the statute and legislative history. Moreover, Mr. Adams’ remarks bear an interpretation fully consistent with the nonavailability of the Tucker Act. See infra, at 177.

 The House Report in its cost estimate specifically notes those cost elements as to which the ceiling is not fixed, such as the open-*176ended authorization for a federal contribution to operating subsidies paid for local rail service. This authorization, originally contained in § 701 of the House bill, appears in § 402 of the Rail Act, 45 U. S. C. §762 (1970ed., Supp. Ill), subject to an annual limitation of $90 million. Significantly, there is no mention of a possible Court of Claims judgment of uncertain but potentially astronomical proportions. See H. Rep. 30. The Senate Report is similar. In a section entitled “Minimizing Taxpayer Expense” it explains:
“Although the amounts of money required to implement the rationalization and restructuring of the bankrupt railroads in the Northeast authorized by this legislation may seem substantial to the uninitiated, every effort has been made to design a bill which minimizes the direct cost to the U. S. taxpayer. Indeed, the very process by which the bill would create a new healthy railroad out of the bankrupt ones arose from this strong desire to limit the use of Federal money. The bill is thus written to permit the transfer of the required rail properties of the bankrupt estates in exchange for securities of the new corporation via a reorganization plan under the umbrella of a Section 77 proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act. In addition, the bill calls for the use of Federal loan guarantees rather than direct grants wherever possible. This procedure allows for the necessary funds to come from the private sector in exchange for loans which are to be repaid by the new Corporation or other recipients. The use of loan guarantees in this instance was felt to be particularly appropriate since they will support a new railroad with excellent earnings prospects.” S. Rep. No. 93-601, p. 18 (1973).
In the section on cost estimates it is noted: “The obligational authority of the Association is limited to $150,000,000 to finance the Secretary’s agreements with railroads in reorganization for the acquisition, maintenance and improvement of rail facilities prior to the completion of the final system plan. Under the bill any additional obligation authority necessary for the implementation of the final system plan must be designated in the final system plan and affirmatively approved by a joint resolution of Congress.” Id., at 125-126. Had Congress intended to allow a Tucker Act remedy in addition to all that was created by the Rail Act, all of the foregoing assurances would have been worthless.

 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, held that the first Frazier-Lemke Act, which provided special relief to farm mortgagors in bankruptcy, was an unconstitutional taking of the mortgagee’s security. Had the theory offered here by the Government been applied there, the Court could have avoided the issue by inferring a Tucker Act remedy. The possibility of such a course could not have escaped the Court’s attention; Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95 (1932), had been decided just three years earlier, and Mr. Justice Brandéis, author of the Radford opinion, had written Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934), only the previous Term.

 The requirement of “uniformity” does not preclude local variations, that make rights of creditors or debtors depend on peculiarities of state law relating, e. g., to dower exemptions, validity of mortgages, and the right to enforce through bankruptcy state remedies against fraudulent conveyances. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 613-615 (1918); Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U. S. 440, 463 n. 7 (1937).

 Under § 77 (e) a two-thirds vote of each class of security holders affected by the plan is normally required. The bankruptcy court, however, may nevertheless approve the plan even though the two-thirds vote is lacking if it finds that the plan is fair and equitable and the rejection of it by a class of security holders “is not reasonably justified in the light of the respective rights and interests of those rejecting it and all the relevant facts.” For an instance where we sustained a bankruptcy court in approving a plan that a class of security holders had rejected, see RFC v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U. S. 495, 531-535 (1946).

 N. 18, supra.

 Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U. S. 440 (1937).

 Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 648 (1935), cited by the majority, ante, at 158— 159, involved no question of geographical nonuniformity; § 77, upheld *185in that case, adopted special procedures for all railroad bankruptcies. Similarly inapposite are the Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884), which involved the uniformity requirement of Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Although the head tax classified persons by citizenship and mode of entry, it applied “alike in every port of the United States where such passengers can be landed.” Id., at 594.