Court Opinion

ID: 9540948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:21:05.864274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:49.459061
License: Public Domain

SHENK, J.
This appeal is by the petitioner from a judgment denying relief in a mandamus proceeding brought to compel the respondent city council to approve a proposed subdivision map without certain imposed conditions.
A tentative map for the subdivision of 13 acres owned by the petitioner in what is commonly known as the Westchester District in the city of Los Angeles was submitted in October, *331944, to the city planning commission pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act (Stats. 1937, p. 1874, as amended, now Bus. & Prof. Code, § 11500 et seq.). The planning commission attached four conditions to which the petitioner objected, whereupon he appealed to the city council. The matter was noticed for a hearing before that body, after which an order was made sustaining each of the conditions. The petitioner thereupon commenced the present proceeding in the superior court. Because of the inclusion in the petition of allegations tendering the issue of lack of a full hearing, the court in overruling the demurrer to the petition also ordered that the trial of other factual issues proceed on presentation and consideration of all material and relevant evidence. The trial consumed two weeks in the course of which the trial judge viewed the locality of the proposed subdivision. Findings were made and judgment entered upholding the lawfulness and reasonableness of the imposed conditions. The appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings and judgment.
The area known as Westchester District of which the proposed 13-acre subdivision forms a part consists of 3,023 acres. It is bisected in a northerly and southerly direction by Sepulveda Boulevard, and easterly and westerly by Manchester Boulevard. It extends 1 mile to the south of Manchester and a mile and a half to the north; and 1 mile on either side of Sepulveda. Before subdivision the land in the district was owned by Los Angeles Extension Company, Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles, and Superior Oil Company. The petitioner represented the latter as subdivider and selling agent. In 1940, the formation of a general plan of development of the district was commenced. The plan fixed the business area on Sepulveda Boulevard immediately south of Manchester Boulevard and the petitioner was placed in charge of development by the subdividers. The so-called cellular design of residence lot subdivision was employed so that the rear of residential lots abuts the principal thoroughfares, thus prohibiting access to the lots therefrom. Another purpose of this type of subdivision was to minimize the amount of land required for street purposes. This general plan had been followed in the Westchester district. Requirements insuring uniformity were imposed, among which were the dedication of a 10-foot strip in the residence areas and a 13-foot *34strip on each side in the business section for the widening of Sepulveda Boulevard, and the setting aside of a strip for planting purposes varying in width at the rear of lots in the residence sections bordering the principal thoroughfares.
The petitioner’s 13-acre tract, the last of the subdivisions in the district, is a long narrow triangle. Its northerly boundary is less than 500 feet in length, and the southerly point of the triangle about 2,400 feet from the northerly line. Arizona Avenue runs along the 'westerly line. Sepulveda Boulevard, the principal thoroughfare and heavily trafficked artery, borders the easterly line. These highways converge and form the southerly point of the triangle. Sepulveda Boulevard, from a point a short distance north of the convergence to the north line of the tract, is 100 feet wide but south of that point is 110 feet wide. Seventy-seventh Street enters Arizona Avenue from the west approximately opposite the center of the tract, and the proposed subdivision map shows the extension of that street through the tract. Seventy-ninth Street enters Arizona Avenue from the west a short distance north of the southerly point of the tract. An extension of that street through the subdivision would leave a triangular tip of land about 12% feet wide by 75 feet to the southerly point. The proposed subdivision would include 10 residence lots north of the Seventy-seventh Street extension fronting on Arizona Avenue with 80-foot frontages and depths to Sepulveda Boulevard varying from 312 to 462 feet. Entrance to the residence lots would be from Arizona Avenue exclusively. The lot immediately north of and adjoining the Seventy-seventh Street extension is proposed to be used for business drive-in, and the lot south of Seventy-seventh Street for religious purposes.
The four conditions imposed by the planning commission and approved by the city council and the trial court are:
1. That a 10-foot strip abutting Sepulveda Boulevard be dedicated for the widening of that highway.
2. That an additional 10-foot strip along the rear of the lots be restricted to the planting of trees and shrubbery for the purpose of preventing direct ingress and egress between the lots and Sepulveda Boulevard.
3. That the extension of Seventy-seventh Street be dedicated to a width of 80 instead of 60 feet.
4. That the area which would be covered by an extension of Seventy-ninth Street and south to the point of the tri*35angle be dedicated for street use for the purpose of eliminating it as a traffic hazard.
The petitioner objected to the foregoing conditions on the ground that they were not expressly provided for by the Subdivision Map Act nor by city ordinance; that conditions 1, 2 and 4, and condition 3 insofar as it required dedication in excess of 60 feet in width, bear no reasonable relationship to the protection of the public health, safety or general welfare, and amount to a taking of private property for public use without compensation.
Article VIII (§§ 94 to 99%) of the Los Angeles City Charter deals with the department of city planning. By section 94 the department is given all the powers and duties which are granted to or imposed upon city planning commissions or departments*by state law, and as provided by city ordinance, subject to article VIII. Pursuant thereto and to the Planning Act of 1929 (Stats. 1929, p. 1805 as amended2 Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act 5211b), there is functioning in the city of Los Angeles a planning commission and a director of planning appointed by it who acts as the advisory agency of the commission. Section 95 of the charter requires the director of planning to prepare a master plan for the physical development of the city, and vests in him the powers and calls for discharge of the duties in relation to proposed subdivisions as required by the Subdivision Map Act and as may be imposed by ordinance. By section 96% the planning commission is required to hold hearings on the master plan or parts thereof and consider and adopt the same.
Section 11525 of the Subdivision Map Act vests control of the design and improvement of subdivisions in the governing bodies of cities and counties, subject to review as to reasonableness by the superior court in and for the county in which the land is situated.
Section 11526 provides that the design, improvement and survey data of subdivisions and related matters, including procedure in securing official approval, are governed by the provisions of the Subdivision Map Act and by the provisions of local ordinances regulating the design and improvement of subdivisions.
Section 11538 makes it unlawful for any person to offer for sale or to sell any subdivision lot until the filing of a final map in compliance with the act and local ordinances. The conveyance of any part of a subdivision by lot or block num*36her is not permitted until a final map has been recorded (§ 11539). Section 11550 declares that the initial action is the preparation of a tentative map with data as specified in the local ordinances and the map act.
Section 11551 states that if there is a local ordinance regulating the design and improvement of subdivisions the sub-divider shall comply with its provisions before the map may be approved; but if there is no such ordinance the governing body as a condition precedent to approval may require streets and drainage ways properly located and of adequate width but may make no other requirements.
Section 11552 provides that if the subdivider is dissatisfied with the initial action regarding the tentative map he may appeal to the governing body which upon a noticed hearing shall take testimony as to the character of the neighborhood in which the subdivision is to be located, the kinds, nature and extent of improvements, the quality or kinds of development to which the area is best adapted and any other phase of the matter it may desire to inquire into, at the conclusion of which the governing body may make such findings as are not inconsistent with the provisions of the act or local ordinances.
The words “Design” and “Improvement” as used in the act are defined. Section 11510 provides that “Design” refers to street alignment, grades and widths, alignment and widths of easements and right of ways for drainage and sanitary sewers and minimum lot area and width. Section 11511 defines “Improvement” as only such street work and utilities to be installed, or agreed to be installed, by the subdivider on the land to be dedicated for streets, highways, etc., as are necessary for the general use of the lot owners in the subdivision and local neighborhood traffic and drainage needs.
Ordinance No. 79310 of the city of Los Angeles, as amended, prescribes the rules and regulations governing the platting and subdividing of lands and the filing and approval of subdivision maps. The ordinance adopts the definitions for “Design” and “Improvement” as declared in the Subdivision Map Act. Specifically treated are such subjects as primary and secondary streets, which are to conform to the master plan of traffic arteries, alignments, street widths, grades, curves and tangents, intersections, dead-ends, rounding block corners, private streets, alleys, size, frontage and side lines of lots, blocks, sewer and drainage grades and facilities, existing improvements, dangerous areas, easements, walkways, and *37the like. Under “Conditions of Acceptance” it is provided that the city engineer may refuse to accept any final map which does not conform to the provisions of the Subdivision Map Act, the provisions of the ordinance, or the conditions of approval of the tentative map. It is also provided that upon recommendation of the advisory agency or the city engineer such variations may be made as in the exercise of sound, reasonable judgment may be warranted or required because of the size, use, physical or other conditions of the property, or the type of subdivision, except that no variations may be made as to the requirements of the Subdivision Map Act.
It appears to be the petitioner’s contention that no condition may be exacted which is not expressly provided for by the Subdivision Map Act or the ordinance provisions not in conflict therewith; that at all events the requirements may deal only with streets to be laid out by the subdivider within the confines of the subdivision to take care of traffic needs therein, and that no dedication may be exacted for additions to existing streets or highways.
It must be obvious at the outset that this effect may not be drawn from the statute or from the city’s organic law or ordinances. The foregoing review of those provisions does not indicate that the authority of the city planners is so circumscribed. The status of an autonomous city (Const, art. XI, § 6; West Coast Advertising Co. v. San Francisco, 14 Cal.2d 516 [95 P.2d 138]; City of Oakland v. Williams, 15 Cal.2d 542 [103 P.2d 168]) is recognized by express references to city ordinances in the Subdivision Map Act. Where as here no specific restriction or limitation on the city’s power is contained in the charter, and none forbidding the particular conditions is included either in the Subdivision Map Act or the city ordinances, it is proper to conclude that conditions are lawful which are not inconsistent with the map act and the ordinances and are reasonably required by the subdivision type and use as related to the character of local and neighborhood planning and traffic conditions.
The petitioner relies on section 11551 of the act which purports to limit authority to impose conditions in the absence of local ordinances, and on the definition of the word “Improvement” id section 11511. But here the applicable provisions of the ordinances and of the act do not restrict reasonable conditions to provide streets and highways in relation to the local and neighborhood traffic needs. The *38word “Improvement” as used in the act refers only to such improvements as are to be installed by the subdivider on the land to be dedicated to those needs. Implicit therein is the recognition that reasonable conditions may be imposed for the dedication of land for necessary purposes which is not to be improved by the subdivider. The provisions of the act do not impose the restrictions or limitations on the land which may be dedicated as invoked by the petitioner, but merely constitute a definition of the word “improvement” as used in the act. If the dedications for the widening of Sepulveda Boulevard and for the elimination of the southern tip of the triangle are otherwise lawfully required it can be no source of complaint to the petitioner that he is not required to make the improvement as well as the dedication. The trial court correctly determined that the conditions imposed were not precluded by the act.
The Subdivision Map Act (§ 11552) and the city ordinances indicate that the matters for consideration in relation to the reasonableness of imposed conditions contemplate the character of the neighborhood, the kinds, nature and extent of improvements, the quality or kinds of development to which the area is best adapted, the traffic needs, and other phases, including the size, use, physical or other conditions of the property, and the type of subdivision.
As to condition 1, that a 10-foot widening strip be dedicated, the finding is that the widening of Sepulveda Boulevard had been in contemplation by the authorities whether or not the petitioner intended to subdivide; but that the creation and the proposed uses of the subdivision would give rise to traffic and other conditions necessitating the widening of the boulevard; that the widening was necessary for and would benefit the lot owners, and that the requirement was reasonably related to the protection of the public health, safety and general welfare.
With regard to condition 2, that an additional 10 feet be reserved for a planting strip, the court found that such a strip was already in contemplation, but that the creation of the subdivision necessitated the restricted use to confine ingress and egress to and from the lots away from Sepulveda Boulevard; to screen the lot owners from the traffic noises, fumes and views of the fast-moving traffic on the boulevard; to provide safety islands for residents crossing the boulevard on foot and waiting lanes for vehicular traffic, and that the imposition of the condition was reasonably related to the *39protection of the public health, safety and general welfare.
It was found that the foregoing pattern of subdivision, including the widening and planting strips in the development of Sepulveda Boulevard frontage, was in conformity with neighborhood plan and design, and had been carried out without objection by the petitioner and others in the district until the filing by petitioner^ the tentative map for subdivision of his 13 acres. Variations in some requirements, changes in or abandonment of others, delays in making improvements, incompleteness of the master plans or failure to indicate thereon the precise details, the court found to be minor, not unauthorized, and without adverse bearing on the lawfulness or reasonableness of the conditions imposed.
The finding as to condition 3, respecting the required 80-foot width of the Seventy-seventh Street extension through the tract, was covered by the trial court’s general conclusion that there was no unreasonable application of the Subdivision Map Act as to any of the conditions objected to by the petitioner.
Specifically as to condition 4, the dedication to eliminate the southerly tip of the triangle, it was found that without regard to the subdivision it had been the intention to project Seventy-ninth Street either across the petitioner’s tract or below it; also that the subdivision would give rise to and create traffic conditions and hazards necessitating the elimination of the tip for the proper control of traffic in the locality, would benefit the lot owners in the proposed subdivision, and was reasonably related to the protection of the public health, safety and general welfare.
All intendments must be indulged to sustain the findings and judgment. Consideration alone of the physical facts and conditions, remembering also that the trial judge viewed the locality, indicate sufficient support therefor.
The contentions respecting the required width of the Seventy-seventh Street extension will not be further discussed except to note that the proposed business and religious uses of the respective abutting lots and the fact that Seventy-seventh is the only street to transverse the tract between Sepulveda Boulevard and Arizona Avenue, sufficiently support the conclusion that the required width is reasonably related to the potential traffic needs.
The petitioner does not quarrel with the conclusion that the other conditions are desirable and that their fulfillment will accomplish the ends stated. His more specific *40complaint is that the city contemplated taking the property for the purposes indicated in any event, that the benefit to the lot owners and the tract will be relatively small compared to the beneficial return to the city at large; therefore that the requirements amount to an exercise of the power of eminent domain under the guise of pursuing the authority of subdivision map proceedings, and that the exercise thereof is unconstitutional unless compensation be paid.
In his arguments the petitioner appears to have lost sight of the particular type of lot subdivision and uniformity of neighborhood design and plan theretofore applied in the locality, including the requirement for strip dedication for widening purposes and strip restriction to planting use without dedication. As stated, consideration of these matters is not precluded by the provisions of the Subdivision Map Act, but on the contrary both the statutory provisions 'and the local ~7 law indicate that the subdivision design and use "should conform to neighborhood planning and zoning requirements. Here the greater than average depth of the lots minimizes the land loss and street improvement cost. In fact it may be said that the petitioner’s position would seem to be greatly improved by this type of subdivision and its related requirements in conformity with neighborhood planning and zoning.
The regular design of subdivision, with ingress and egress to and from Sepulveda Boulevard, would have been out of harmony with the neighborhood plan and traffic needs. It would have required dedication and improvement by the petitioner of lateral service roads and lanes for diversion of the local traffic to and from the main artery which the evidence shows would have used more land than for the widening and planting strips, and would have increased the cost of the improvements to be installed by the petitioner. The record indicates that the so-called cellular design was generally adopted because it interfered less with the free flow of traffic, minimized the hazards on the main thoroughfares, and reduced land dedication and improvement expense. The petitioner and the lot owners in the subdivision will participate in these benefits and savings by the selection of and adherence to the particular design. In fact the petitioner makes no objection to that design as such. It is to be assumed that he prefers it with the resulting savings in land and cost. But he seeks in addition compensation for the fulfillment of the conditions which make this type of lot subdivision feasible. Similar observations apply to the dedication of the southerly *41tip of the triangle. The petitioner could reasonably be required to provide for the dedication and improvement of the extension of Seventy-ninth Street through the tract to provide safe turning for traffic to and from the subdivision, and incidentally to eliminate as a traffic hazard the practically useless remainder of the tip. He has lost nothing by the requirement for dedication and is benefited by being relieved of the burden of improvement. The conclusion is justifiable that the widening and planting strips and the elimination of the hazardous tip are as much a part of design and improvement within the proposed subdivision as would the lateral and transverse service roads and lanes had the regular or non-cellular design been selected.
Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact. They are not abstract ideas or theories. In a growing metropolitan area each additional subdivision adds to the traffic burden. It is no defense to the conditions im- -v ■ - posed in a subdivision map proceeding that their fulfillment will incidentally also benefit the city as a whole. Nor is it a valid objection to say that the conditions contemplate future as well as more immediate needs. Potential as well as present population factors affecting the subdivision and the neighborhood generally are appropriate for consideration. Nor does the fact that master plans are incomplete, or that the specific details are not shown thereon, affect the result. It was in evidence that the city had been working toward the formulation of a complete and entire master plan, although all the elements orparts thereof were not as yet in the final , stage of completion.''  The contention that the require- ¿\ ments for a master plan or some over-all plan must be approved and adopted before authority vests in relation to the conditions here imposed is without merit since in any event the charter contemplates that portions thereof may be adopted. It is inconceivable that a master plan including all essential factors for a growing city could be completed in a short period of time. The trial court correctly concluded that delay in the adoption of the final master plan or plans had no material bearing on the controversial issues in this proceeding. The reasonableness of the conditions and the authority to impose them do not necessarily depend upon their inclusion in the „ official master plan for the district. As noted, subdivision design and improvement obviously include conformance to neighborhood planning and zoning, and it may properly be said that the formulation and acceptance of the uniform *42conditions in the development of the district constitute the practical adoption of a master plan and zoning requirements therefor.  Nor is there merit in the petitioner’s contention that a uniform plan is lacking because of some discrepancies in uniformity or delays in enforcement or fulfillment of the conditions. Time, funds and manpower are requisites to execution, and lack of speed in accomplishment, or some changes because of differing circumstances as to use or otherwise, cannot defeat the otherwise uniform and reasonable application of the imposed conditions in a growing community.
The petitioner may not prevail in his contention that, since the use of the land for the purposes stated was contemplated in any event, the dedication and use reservation requirements in this proceeding are unconstitutional as an exercise of the power of eminent domain. A sufficient answer is that the proceeding here involved is not one in eminent domain nor is the city seeking to exercise that power. It is the petitioner who is seeking to acquire the advantages of lot subdivision and upon him rests the duty of compliance with reasonable conditions for design, dedication, improvement and restrictive use of the land so as to conform to the safety and general welfare of the lot owners in the subdivision and of the public. The well-considered observations in Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145 [198 A. 225], also involving a subdivision proceeding, are pertinent in this connection. The court there recognized the distinction between the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain and the noncompensatory nature of reasonable restrictions in respect to private interests when they must yield to the good of the community. That these general principles apply in subdivision map proceedings is also demonstrated in the cases of Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468 [217 N.W. 58], and Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 948 [148 S.W.2d 311], where the distinction was made between the exercise of authority in such proceedings and the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In each of those eases it was held that the requirement for the dedication of land to the widening of existing streets was not a compulsory taking for public use; but that where it is a condition reasonably related to increased traffic and other needs of the proposed subdivision it is voluntary in theory and not contrary to constitutional concepts.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 at 387 [47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303] (1926) it was observed *43that regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which as applied to existing conditions were so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, would probably have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive a century or even a half a century ago; that while the meaning of constitutional guaranties is invariable, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the physical changes which are constantly coming within the field of their operation; and that only those regulations must fall which clearly do not meet the constitutional meaning as applied to changing conditions. Similar expressions are found in Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484-485 [234 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479]; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497, 513 [234 P. 388]; and Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 514 [253 P. 932] (1927). These declarations by the Supreme Court of the United States and of this state more than 20 years ago are also pertinent in this case to uphold the conclusions of reasonableness based on the record.
No sufficient reasons have been advanced which would justify this court in overturning the findings of the trial court as to the authority for and the reasonableness of the conditions imposed.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.