Court Opinion

ID: 9536907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:09:17.794073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:30.889502
License: Public Domain

PENECKE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent upon-the ground that there was no evidence that the petitioner intelligently waived his right to counsel or understandingly entered his plea of guilty to the 1952 Klamath County conviction. •
There was no court reporter’s transcript, of what occurred at arraignment. The official Klamath County document, entitled . “Waiver, Arraignment and Plea,” recites:
“* * * [A]nd the defendant having been advised by the Court of his right to be represented by counsel, and the défendant having stated .that he did not desire counsel; and the said défendant having been fully advised of his right to be indicted by the. Grand Jury of Klamath County, Oregon, did then and there in writing, in open court, waive the right of indictment and consented that the District Attorney file an Information charging him with the commission of the crime of BOBBERY BY PUTTING IN FEAR OF FORCE AND VIOLENCE, NOT BEING ARMED WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON, * *
At the post-conviction hearing the petitioner testified that no one informed him of the nature of the charge' against him, of the elements or acts constituting the crime of unarmed robbery, of any possible defenses to said charge, or of the maximum sentence that could be imposed. This was not contradicted by any other evidence. .
McWilliams v. Gladden, 242 Or 333, 407 P2d 833 (1966), involved a .waiver of counsel and arose from a *610plea of guilty made in the same county and before the same judge as in the present ease. McWilliams was given more advice than the present petitioner. He was informed by the District Attorney of the elements of the crime with which he was charged and of the maximum sentence. A divided court held he had knowingly waived his right to counsel and the conviction was valid. In McWilliams v. Randall, 275 F Supp 700 (DC Or 1967), the United States District Court granted McWilliams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that McWilliams was not adequately advised of his rights before pleading guilty without counsel, and, therefore, “did not voluntarily and intelligently waive counsel and indictment and enter his guilty plea.” 275 F Supp at 703.
The decision in McWilliams v. Randall, supra (275 F Supp 700), was forecast by the decision in Sessions v. Wilson, 372 F2d 366 (9th Cir 1967).
In light of McWilliams v. Randall, supra (275 F Supp 700), and Sessions v. Wilson, supra (372 F2d 366), I am of the opinion that Schram did not waive his right to counsel and knowingly enter his plea of guilty to the 1952 Klamath County charge.
The majority holds that it was not necessary for the trial court or anyone else to advise the petitioner of anything except his right to counsel before taking his plea of guilty because four years before in Multnomah County petitioner, while represented by counsel, had pleaded guilty to the same kind of crime, robbery by putting in fear. The majority apparently assumes that at that time petitioner was advised of the elements of the crime and the maximum sentence.
In my opinion, explaining the abstract elements of the crime of robbery by putting in fear four years earlier to a man with a ninth grade education is not *611a constitutional substitute for the kind of knowledge that must be imparted to any defendant before his guilty plea can be accepted. Either counsel or the trial court, if waiver of counsel is permitted, has the burden of securing the defendant’s version of the basic facts and interpreting the significance of those facts to the defendant in light of the crime charged and the possible penalties.
Sloan and O’Connell, JJ., join in this dissent.