Court Opinion

ID: 9387471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 00:03:39.526784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.976502
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/17/23 Davis v. Philpott Meeks CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

LUCY DAVIS,                                                   B316618

         Cross-complainant and                                (Los Angeles County
         Respondent,                                          Super. Ct. No.
                                                              18STUD05169)
         v.

PHILPOTT MEEKS, LP,

         Cross-respondent and
         Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michelle Williams Court, Judge. Affirmed.
         Buchalter and Robert M. Dato for Cross-defendant and
Appellant.
         Sauer & Wagner, Gerald L. Sauer and Gregory P. Barchie
for Cross-complainant and Respondent.
       Lucy Davis filed an unlawful detainer complaint against
tenants living on property owned through Davis’s personal trust,
the 512 North Gower Street Trust. The tenants filed a cross-
complaint for premises liability against Brian Feldman, the
trustee and Davis’s business manager, and Davis. In response,
Feldman filed a cross-complaint against Davis for express and
implied indemnity. Davis then filed a cross-complaint against
Feldman and thereafter an amended cross-complaint against
Feldman and his employer, Philpott Meeks, LP,1 for
equitable/implied indemnity and declaratory relief to resolve a
dispute concerning the scope of the indemnification provision in
the business management services agreement between Davis and
Philpott. Davis also asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and fraud.
       Davis, Feldman and Philpott subsequently entered into a
tolling agreement pursuant to which Davis and Feldman
dismissed their cross-complaints without prejudice and tolled for
one year any statutes of limitations on their claims. Philpott
then moved for an award of attorney fees based on the attorney
fee provision in the management agreement between Davis and
the firm, contending it was the prevailing party under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), and the parties’
agreement. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

1   Philpott Meeks, LP is the successor to PM, LLC, which was
named as the cross-defendant in the trial court.

                                2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       1. The 512 North Gower Street Trust and the Davis-
          Philpott Business Management Services Agreements
       Davis created the 512 North Gower Street Trust in
March 2013 to hold residential property in Larchmont Village
previously owned by Davis in her own name. The trust
agreement was signed by Davis as grantor and Feldman as
trustee. Feldman was at the time employed by Philpott’s
predecessor in interest, which in September 2012 had entered
into a written engagement agreement with Davis, an actor, to
provide business management services.
       In August or September 2018 Davis and Philpott signed a
new management services letter agreement. The agreement
contained an indemnification provision pursuant to which Davis
agreed to “indemnity and hold harmless [Philpott], and each of its
partners, members, employees, representatives or agents, from
and against any and all losses, claims, and liabilities, including
reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, arising from, or in
connection with, the performance of our services under this
Agreement which are not the result of our gross negligence or
willful misconduct.”
       The 2018 management services agreement also contained a
provision requiring arbitration of all disputes between the
parties. However, the agreement further provided, “[I]f either
party files a claim in court in any jurisdiction that could have
been resolved through binding arbitration, the filing party must
immediately pay to the non-filing party the sum of $500,000 as a
deposit for the costs in defending the court action.” The
agreement continued, “The prevailing party in any arbitration or
litigation arising out of or relating to our engagement, this

                                3
Agreement, any obligation created by this Agreement, and/or the
performance or failure to perform services (including, without
limitation, claims of breach of duty or professional negligence),
shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
(whether or not such fees and costs are recoverable pursuant to
the California Code of Civil Procedure or federal law) as may be
incurred in connection with either obtaining or collecting any
judgment and/or arbitration award, in addition to any other relief
to which that party may be entitled.”
      2. The Harmon Litigation
     Madeleine Harmon and Vincent Cammarata leased the
Larchmont Village property in November 2017. Davis filed an
unlawful detainer action to evict the tenants in May 2018. In
January 2019 Harmon and Cammarata filed a cross-complaint
against Davis and Feldman for personal injuries allegedly caused
by Davis’s and Feldman’s failure to properly maintain the
property.2
     On August 13, 2019 Feldman filed a cross-complaint for
indemnity against Davis (and several others), alleging that Davis
had agreed to indemnify Feldman in the March 2013 trust
document against all claims relating to his actions as trustee,
which included the allegations made by Harmon and Cammarata

2     In July 2018, approximately two months after Davis filed
the unlawful detainer action (and before Davis and Philpott
entered their new management services agreement), counsel for
Harmon and Cammarata notified Davis, through Feldman, that
Harmon and Cammarata intended to sue Davis and Feldman for
personal injuries and economic damages based on their failure to
properly maintain the property. A draft complaint was enclosed
with counsel’s letter.

                                 4
in their cross-complaint. On October 15, 2019 Davis filed a cross-
complaint against Feldman for equitable indemnity, breach of
fiduciary duty and negligence, alleging Feldman was responsible
for, but failed to take, all reasonable steps to manage and operate
the property as a rental residence and, if Harmon and
Cammarata suffered any injuries, they were caused in whole or
in part by Feldman’s breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.
       Davis filed a first amended cross-complaint on December 2,
2019, which added Philpott as a cross-defendant and requested a
declaration that the 2018 management services agreement did
not (as Feldman and Philpott contended) release Feldman and
Philpott from any liability for the claims asserted by Harmon and
Cammarata or in Davis’s cross-complaint. The first amended
cross-complaint reasserted Davis’s claims against Feldman for
equitable indemnity, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence and
added new causes of action against Feldman and Philpott for
breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud “in the event that
the [2018 management services agreement] is found (1) to apply
to the Trust and Feldman’s performance as trustee of the Trust,
(2) to have released Feldman from, and/or limited Feldman’s
liability for claims asserted in this Cross-Cross-Complaint or that
arise from the Harmon Cross-Complaint or Feldman’s
performance as trustee of the Trust[,] and/or (3) to have released
Feldman and Philpott Meeks from, and/or limited Feldman’s or
Philpott Meek’s liability for, for breach of duty arising from the
performance of prior business management services for Davis.”
These additional causes of action alleged, when presenting the
new management services agreement to Davis after Harmon and
Cammarata’s counsel had threatened a lawsuit over the condition
of the property in July 2018, Feldman did not disclose the

                                 5
releases in the agreement applied to the trust or Feldman’s
services as trustee.3
       On October 27, 2020, following a mediation session for the
Harmon litigation, Davis, Feldman and Philpott entered into a
tolling agreement covering all claims Davis might have against
Feldman or Philpot and Feldman or Philpott might have against
Davis that were or could be asserted in the Harmon litigation.
Pursuant to the agreement all defenses based on lapse of time
were tolled from October 27, 2020 through October 26, 2021. The
agreement further provided that Feldman would dismiss without
prejudice his cross-complaint against Davis and Davis would
dismiss without prejudice her amended cross-complaint against
Feldman and Philpott in the Harmon litigation.4 In a separate
paragraph titled “Exculpatory Provision,” the agreement stated,
“Nothing herein is intended to reflect upon the merits of any
claim or defense by any Party and shall not be deemed to be
admission of liability or waiver of any kind or nature
whatsoever.” There was no mention of attorney fees in the
agreement.
       Davis’s request for dismissal was filed October 30, 2020,
and the dismissal was entered on November 5, 2020.
      3. The Motion for Attorney Fees
       On April 23, 2021 Philpott moved for an award of attorney
fees in excess of $300,000 based on the fee provision in the

3     Davis requested and received leave of court to file a second
amended cross-complaint containing the same causes of action
after Philpott’s counsel asserted court permission was needed to
add Philpott as a party to Davis’s cross-complaint.
4    The parties provided their dismissals would stay all
pending discovery among them.

                                 6
parties’ 2018 management services agreement, which authorized
a fee award to the prevailing party in any arbitration or litigation
“arising out of or relating to” Philpott’s engagement by Davis, the
parties’ agreement or obligations created by the agreement,
“and/or the performance or failure to perform services.” Citing
Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4),5 Philpott
asserted it was the prevailing party under that costs statute
because it was a “defendant in whose favor a dismissal is
entered.” Then, acknowledging the term “prevailing party” was
not defined in the 2018 agreement, Philpott argued, citing
Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 609, the term should be
interpreted in its “ordinary or popular sense” and insisted a
defendant who secured a dismissal, as it had, achieved its goals
in the litigation. Finally, Philpott argued the 2018 agreement’s
fee provision was sufficiently broad to include Davis’s tort claims
and, as such, its recovery of fees was not barred by Civil Code
section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), which precludes an award of fees
incurred in defending contract claims that have been voluntarily
dismissed.6
       In her opposition Davis argued the “main thrust” of her
cross-complaint insofar as it related to Philpott was “on the
contract,” explaining she primarily sought a judicial
determination that the parties’ 2018 agreement had no
application to the trust and did not release or limit Feldman’s

5     Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stated.
6     Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), first paragraph,
provides, “Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or
dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no
prevailing party for purposes of this section.”

                                 7
liability for the claims asserted by Harmon and Cammarata and
only alternatively alleged contingent causes of action for breach
of fiduciary duty and fraud if it was determined that the releases
in the 2018 agreement applied to the trust. Davis also
contended, even if a fee award was not barred by Civil Code
section 1717, based on a pragmatic interpretation of the term
prevailing party in the parties’ agreement, Philpott did not defeat
Davis’s cross-claims. Rather, the parties’ tolling agreement,
pursuant to which both Davis and Feldman dismissed cross-
complaints, expressly provided the dismissals did not reflect on
the merits of the claims, creating a draw in which neither side
prevailed.
       The trial court denied Philpott’s motion. The court quoted
the first paragraph of Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2),
and then ruled, “Moreover, while Defendant argues it is the
prevailing party because it achieved the result it wanted, the
tolling agreement specifically states the dismissal has nothing to
do with the merits. Plaintiff may still refile and therefore
Defendant is not ‘free’ from Plaintiff’s claims.”
                          DISCUSSION
      1. Standard of Review
       A determination of the legal basis for an attorney fee award
is a question of law reviewed de novo when the issue is one of
statutory construction (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v.
Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751 (Mountain Air
Enterprises) [de novo review of a trial court order concerning
attorney fees is warranted when the determination whether the
criteria for an award of attorney fees have been satisfied amounts
to statutory construction]) or requires interpretation of a contract
where no extrinsic evidence has been offered on that question

                                 8
(Khan v. Shim (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 49, 55 [interpretation of a
contractual fee provision for which no party has offered extrinsic
evidence as an aid in interpretation is reviewed de novo]; Casella
v. SouthWest Dealer Services, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1127,
1161 [“[w]hen the facts are not in dispute and the right to recover
attorney fees depends upon the interpretation of a contract and
no extrinsic evidence is offered to interpret the contract, we
review the ruling de novo”]). In all other contexts the propriety
or amount of fees to be awarded is generally a discretionary
decision for the trial court that we review for an abuse of that
discretion. (Mountain Air Enterprises, at p. 751.)
      2. Governing Law
         a. The scope of the fee agreement
       Section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), authorizes the trial
court to award reasonable attorney fees as costs under
section 1032 when authorized by a contract between the parties.
(See § 1021 [“[e]xcept as attorney’s fees are specifically provided
for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of
attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express
or implied, of the parties”]; Mountain Air Enterprises, supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 751 [“section 1021 permits parties to ‘“contract
out” of the American rule’ by executing an agreement that
allocates attorney fees”].) “‘“[P]arties may validly agree that the
prevailing party will be awarded attorney fees incurred in any
litigation between themselves, whether such litigation sounds in
tort or in contract.”’” (Mountain Air Enterprises, at p. 751;
accord, Santisas v. Goodin, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 608 [“[i]f a
contractual attorney fee provision is phrased broadly enough, . . .
it may support an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party
in an action alleging both contract and tort claims”]; see Maynard

                                 9
v. BTI Group, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 991-992 [“[w]hile
it is clear that an attorney fee provision may authorize an award
of fees only to the party who prevails on a claim to enforce the
terms of the contract containing the provision, it is equally clear
that an attorney fee provision need not be so limited”].)
        In determining the breadth of a contractual attorney fee
provision, we necessarily focus on the words the parties elected to
use. (See Hom v. Petrou (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 459, 465 [“‘the
question of whether to award attorneys’ fees turns on the
language of the contractual attorneys’ fee provision, i.e., whether
the party seeking fees has “prevailed” within the meaning of the
provision and whether the type of claim is within the scope of the
provision’”]; Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998)
64 Cal.App.4th 698, 708 [same]; see also Santisas v. Goodin,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 602 [“[w]hether attorney fees incurred in
defending tort or other noncontract claims are recoverable after a
pretrial dismissal depends upon the terms of the contractual
attorney fee provision”].) Well-developed case law considering
this issue provides clear guidance in parsing the parties’
language.
        On the one hand, attorney fee provisions held to be broad
enough to cover tort or other noncontractual claims have referred
to claims “arising out of the execution of this agreement”
(Santisas v. Goodin, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 607); litigation
“concerning [the agreement’s] terms, interpretation or
enforcement or the rights and duties of any party in relation
thereto” (Khan v. Shim, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 59, italics
omitted); “any dispute” between the parties (Miske v. Coxeter
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1259); or “‘any action or proceeding
arising out of this agreement’” (Lerner v. Ward (1993)

                                10
13 Cal.App.4th 155, 159). On the other hand, attorney fee
provisions using narrower language, typically referring only to an
action to “enforce” the agreement, have been held to permit an
award of attorney fees only in connection with contract claims—
for example, “an action or proceeding to enforce the terms hereof
or declare rights hereunder” (Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty
Corp., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 702); an action “brought to
enforce the terms of this [Release]” (Gil v. Mansano (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 739, 742); or a legal action or arbitration “to
enforce the terms of this Agreement” (Loube v. Loube (1998)
64 Cal.App.4th 421, 429).
         b. The definition of “prevailing party”
       Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4),
expressly defines “prevailing party” for purposes of a statutory
award of costs to include “a defendant in whose favor a dismissal
is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant
obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs
who do not recover any relief against that defendant.”7 However,
“‘[c]ourts have consistently held the prevailing party for the
award of costs under section 1032 is not necessarily the
prevailing party for the award of attorney’s fees in contract
actions under [Civil Code] section 1717.’” (Zintel Holdings, LLC
v. McLean (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 431, 438.) Although an
essential predicate for an award of attorney fees as costs, the
finding a defendant is the prevailing party under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1032 is not determinative of whether the
defendant is also the prevailing party entitled to recover

7     Section 1032, subdivision (a)(1) and (2), provides, as used in
the section, a complaint includes a cross-complaint and defendant
includes a cross-defendant.

                                 11
reasonable attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 or the
parties’ agreement. (Zintel Holdings, at p. 438; accord, David S.
Karton, A Law Corp. v. Dougherty (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 600,
607; see DeSaulles v. Community Hospital of Monterey
Peninsula (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, 1147 [“[t]he definition of
‘prevailing party’ in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1032 is
particular to that statute and does not necessarily apply to
attorney fee statutes or other statutes that use the prevailing
party concept”].)
       Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(1), provides, “[T]he
party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered
a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also
determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract.”
(See Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876 [prevailing party
determination is to be made by comparing the parties’ relative
degrees of success “upon final resolution of the contract claims”].)
Despite this general authorization to award attorney fees when
provided by statute or the parties’ contract, Civil Code
section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), states, “Where an action has been
voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of
the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this
section.”8 “This bar, however, applies only to causes of action
that are based on the contract and are therefore within the scope
of section 1717. If the voluntarily dismissed action also asserts

8     Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), “overrid[es] or
nullif[ies] conflicting contractual provisions, such as provisions
expressly allowing recovery of attorney fees in the event of
voluntary dismissal or defining ‘prevailing party’ as including
parties in whose favor a dismissal has been entered.” (Santisas
v. Goodin, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 617.)

                                 12
causes of action that do not sound in contract, those causes of
action are not covered by section 1717, and the [contract’s]
attorney fee provision, depending upon its wording, may afford
the defendant a contractual right, not affected by section 1717, to
recover attorney fees incurred in litigating those causes of
action.” (Santisas v. Goodin, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
       With respect to a contractual attorney fee provision in
which the term “prevailing party” is not defined and no extrinsic
evidence has been offered indicating the parties ascribed to it any
particular or specific meaning, as here, the Supreme Court in
Santisas v. Goodin, supra, 17 Cal.4th 599 held, “Because
‘prevailing party’ has no settled technical meaning as including
or excluding a party in whose favor a dismissal has been entered,
we will assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
the parties understood the term in its ordinary or popular sense.”
(Id. at p. 609.) That requires, the Santisas Court continued, a
pragmatic evaluation of which party (if either) succeeded in its
litigation objectives: “If, as here, the contract allows the
prevailing party to recover attorney fees but does not define
‘prevailing party’ or expressly either authorize or bar recovery of
attorney fees in the event an action is dismissed, a court may
base its attorney fees decision on a pragmatic definition of the
extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives,
whether by judgment, settlement, or otherwise.” (Id. at p. 622;
see Hsu v. Abbara, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 877 [“in determining
litigation success [to decide whether there is a prevailing party
for purposes of a contractual attorney fee provision] courts should
respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be
guided by ‘equitable considerations’”]; Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc.
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 185, 192 [“‘In the absence of legislative

                                13
direction in the attorney fees statute, the courts have concluded
that a rigid definition of prevailing party should not be used.
[Citation.] Rather, prevailing party status should be determined
by the trial court based on an evaluation of whether a party
prevailed “‘on a practical level,’” and the trial court’s decision
should be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion’”];
Donner Management Co. v. Schaffer (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1296,
1310 [same].)
      3. The Trial Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion in
         Denying Philpott’s Motion for Attorney Fees
      In its opening brief Philpott argued the trial court erred in
denying its motion for attorney fees because it was the prevailing
party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032,
subdivision (a)(4), as a defendant in whose favor a dismissal had
been entered; the attorney fee provision in the parties’ 2018
management services agreement, which applied to “any
arbitration or litigation arising out of or relating to our
engagement,” covered the tort claims alleged in Davis’s cross-
complaint (for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud); and Civil Code
section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), was not a complete bar to the
recovery of attorney fees for successfully defending against
Davis’s tort claims, as the court had ruled.
      In her respondent’s brief Davis contended the trial court
correctly concluded Philpott was not the prevailing party under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), not
simply Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), because Davis
had dismissed her cross-complaint with a mutual tolling
agreement that did not benefit one side more than the other.
Since the trial court found “[Philpott] is not ‘free’ from [Davis’s]
claims,” Davis argued, the dismissal of Philpott was not a

                                 14
dismissal “in its favor.” Davis additionally argued the “main
thrust” of her cross-complaint was “on the contract,” emphasizing
her tort claims were all contingent, applicable only if the
underlying contractual dispute was resolved in Philpott’s favor,
and any recovery of fees was therefore barred by Civil Code
section 1717, subdivision (b)(2). Finally, noting that the fee
provision was included in a section of the 2018 management
services agreement titled “Arbitration of Disputes,” Davis argued,
read in context the provision for an award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party only applied in arbitration or a judicial
proceeding to enforce an arbitration award, not, as here, a
lawsuit initiated in court.
      We agree with much of Philpott’s position on appeal. For
purposes of an award of costs under section 1032, Philpott was
the prevailing party as to Davis’s cross-complaint under three of
the four mandatory provisions of subdivision (a)(4): a cross-
defendant in whose favor a dismissal was entered, a cross-
defendant where neither the cross-complainant nor cross-
defendant obtained any relief, and a cross-defendant as against
those cross-complainants who did not recover any relief against
that cross-defendant. Davis’s strained (and unsupported)
interpretation of the phrase “in whose favor a dismissal is
entered” to include a requirement that the court evaluate the
reasons for the dismissal, even were we to find it persuasive,
would not eliminate the other two bases for a required finding
that Philpott was the prevailing party in light of Davis’s
dismissal of her cross-complaint.
      Similarly, Davis’s contention that the placement of the
attorney fee provision in the section of the 2018 management
services agreement requiring arbitration of disputes limited the

                                15
award of fees to arbitration proceedings disregards the actual
language used by the parties. As discussed, notwithstanding the
intended mandatory nature of arbitration, the agreement
anticipated a lawsuit might be filed and expressly required the
payment of a substantial deposit to the nonfiling party to cover
the costs of defending the prohibited court action. The following
sentence then authorized the recovery of attorney fees by the
prevailing party “in any arbitration or litigation.” The
availability of attorney fees in a judicial forum could hardly have
been made any clearer. (See Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc.
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 900, 919 [“[w]hen the contract is clear and
explicit, the parties’ intent is determined solely by reference to
the language of the agreement”] see generally Civ. Code, §§ 1638
[“[t]he language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the
language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an
absurdity”], 1644 [words of a contract are to be understood in
their ordinary and popular sense unless used by the parties in a
technical sense].)
       Finally, although Davis acknowledges the attorney fee
provision in the 2018 management services agreement is broad
enough to include tort or other noncontractual claims, her
attempt to categorize her entire cross-complaint as “on the
contract” because the “main thrust” was contractual is also
flawed. To be sure, to the extent Davis sought a declaration the
parties’ 2018 agreement did not apply to the 512 North Gower
Street Trust and did not release Feldman from liability arising
from his performance as trustee, it was contract-based. But as
our colleagues in the Sixth District explained in Orozco v. WPV
San Jose, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 375, 408, “Although the
phrase ‘on a contract’ in Civil Code section 1717 has been

                                  16
liberally construed, it does not stretch to tort claims. ‘“[T]ort
claims do not ‘enforce’ a contract” and are not considered actions
on a contract for purposes of section 1717.’ . . . It ‘is well settled
that “. . . an action for fraud seeking damages sounds in tort, and
is not ‘on a contract’ for purposes of an attorney fee award, even
though the underlying transaction in which the fraud occurred
involved a contract containing an attorney fee clause.”’” At the
very least Davis’s cause of action for fraud, which sought
compensatory and punitive damages, even though “contingent,”
remained a traditional tort claim and, therefore, outside the bar
of Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2).
       All of that said, however, Philpott was entitled to an award
of attorney fees as costs pursuant to section 1033.5,
subdivision (a)(10)(A), only if it was the “prevailing party” under
both section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), and the parties’ 2018
management services agreement. Philpott insists the meaning of
that term in the statute and the agreement is identical. In
support Philpott cites three inapposite cases that address
whether a general contract provision authorizing the prevailing
party to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs permits the
prevailing party to recover cost items not identified as allowable
in section 1033.5 or other statutes.9 Nothing in those cases

9      In a supplemental brief filed after we requested the parties
expressly address whether the meaning of “prevailing party” in
their 2018 agreement was identical to the meaning of that term
in section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), Philpott cited Thrifty Payless,
Inc. v. Mariners Mile Gateway, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1050,
1065; Arntz Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
(1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 464, 491; and Ripley v. Pappadopoulos
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1616, 1621 to 1627, all of which considered
whether a contractual provision for the recovery of costs by the

                                  17
suggests the definition of “prevailing party” is properly
determined solely by reference to section 1032, subdivision (a)(4).
And, as discussed, that is not the law: A pragmatic evaluation of
which party, if either, succeeded in its litigation objectives, not
rigid definitions, governs determination of the prevailing party
for purposes of a contractual fee provision absent a definition in
the agreement or extrinsic evidence indicating the parties
intended a particular meaning. (Santisas v. Goodin, supra,
17 Cal.4th at pp. 609, 622; Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc., supra,
241 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.)10
       The trial court ruled Philpott had not attained its litigation
objective because Davis’s dismissal was without prejudice and
Philpott remained at risk of a renewed cross-complaint seeking
indemnity for any award of personal injury damages Harmon and
Cammarata might recover against Davis in the Harmon
litigation. While it might have been reasonable for the court to
reach a different conclusion—as Philpott notes, even though
without prejudice, the dismissal of Davis’s cross-complaint could

prevailing party permitted the recovery of items as costs not
otherwise authorized by statute. Even if those authorities had
some minimal persuasive value, Thrifty Payless and Arntz
contradict Philpott’s position, rather than support it: In both
cases the courts of appeal held contracting parties may agree the
prevailing party is entitled to recover costs not identified as
allowable in section 1033.5. (See Thrifty Payless, at p. 1065;
Arntz, at p. 472.)
10     Unlike in this court, in its motion for attorney fees in the
trial court, Philpott recognized the Supreme Court’s Santisas
holding that, if “prevailing party” is undefined in the contract,
courts should evaluate as a practical matter which party
achieved its litigation objectives.

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properly be viewed as a victory for the cross-defendants—the
court’s evaluation was neither arbitrary nor irrational: There
was no judgment in Philpott’s favor; and, although Davis
achieved nothing by the filing and dismissal of the cross-
complaint, she gave up nothing either. (See Santisas v. Goodin,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 622 [in a voluntary pretrial dismissal case
with noncontractual claims, in determining the prevailing party
for purposes of a contractual fee provision, the trial court is not
limited by Civil Code section 1717 and may base its decision on a
pragmatic assessment of each party’s relative success].) There
was no abuse of discretion.
                         DISPOSITION
      The July 23, 2021 order denying Philpott’s motion for
attorney fees is affirmed. Davis is to recover her costs on appeal.

                                           PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.

            FEUER, J.

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