Court Opinion

ID: 9789392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:35:50.726762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:22.239518
License: Public Domain

WOOD, Judge (specially concurring). This special concurrence is for the purpose of identifying my views on two aspects of Judge Bivins’ opinion — knowledge and filing. I concur in all of Judge Bivins’ opinion except the specific basis for the result reached as to the two aspects. (a) Knowledge. There is no “knowledge” requirement in the SIA. We lack authority to change the statutory provisions. Ranville v. J.T.S. Enterprises, Inc., 101 N.M. 803, 689 P.2d 1274 (Ct.App.1984). We lack authority to adopt a “knowledge” requirement which avoids the statutory requirements of the SIA. Cf. Varos v. Union Oil Co. of California, 101 N.M. 713, 688 P.2d 31 (Ct.App.1984). (b) Filing. The Fund may not be held liable for a disability which occurs before a certificate of preexisting physical impairment has been executed. NMSA 1978, § 52-2-6(D) is clear on this. The Fund admitted in its answer that the certificate was timely filed. The trial court so found. An admission in pleadings will support a finding. Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229, 501 P.2d 673 (Ct.App.1972). The finding as to a timely filing is not pertinent in this case. The filing may be made at any time. Section 52-2-6(A). Regardless of the time of filing a certificate, the pertinent question is the time the certificate was executed. Section 52-2-6(D) provides that the Act applies “to any disability arising out of [an] accident or occurrence taking place after the date a certificate is executed.” Filing and execution are separate matters. They should not be confused.