Court Opinion

ID: 9899412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 18:04:33.087197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:24.793297
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/15/23 P. v. Jaghama CA5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085150
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF124909A)
                    v.

 FALEH IBRAHAM JAGHAMA,                                                   ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
                                                                          [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
           Defendant and Appellant.

      It is ordered that the opinion herein filed on November 15, 2023, be modified as
follows:

         1. On page 1, in the caption, delete the word “DRAFT” before “OPINION.”

         This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.

                                                                                                             HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, J.

DE SANTOS, J.
Filed 11/15/23 P. v. Jaghama CA5 (unmodified opinion)

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085150
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF124909A)
                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
 FALEH IBRAHAM JAGHAMA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Chad A. Louie,
Judge.
         Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney and Eric L.
Christoffersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                       INTRODUCTION
         “There are ‘two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization.’ ”
(Miller v. Albright (1998) 523 U.S. 420, 423.) The Immigration and Naturalization Act
(INA) confers “derivative citizenship” on children of naturalized citizens under certain
statutorily prescribed conditions. (Minasyan v. Gonzales (9th Cir. 2005) 401 F.3d 1069,
1075.)
         Appellant Faleh Ibraham Jaghama (appellant) was born in Jerusalem, Palestine
and entered the United States in 2005 when he was 18 years old under a petition filed by
his father who was a naturalized citizen. Appellant believed he became a citizen based
on his father’s status. Under the applicable law, however, appellant only could have
received derivative citizenship if he had been under the age of 18 years when he arrived
in the United States under his naturalized father’s sponsorship (8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)).
         In 2005, appellant was living with his family in Bakersfield and applied for a
United States passport, based on his belief that he became a citizen as a result of his
father’s naturalized status. There is no evidence appellant committed fraud or perjury
when he applied for the passport. It is undisputed the United States Department of State
(the Department) issued a valid United States passport to appellant in 2006. Under
federal law, “Congress authorized passport holders to use the passport as conclusive
proof of citizenship.” (Magnuson v. Baker (9th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 330, 333.)
         In 2008, appellant was charged with and pleaded no contest to one felony count of
violating Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a),1 commission of lewd and lascivious
acts on a child under the age of 14 years and was sentenced to three years in prison. The
INA “renders deportable any alien convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’ after entering the
United States. [Citation.] Such an alien is also ineligible for cancellation of removal, a
form of discretionary relief allowing some deportable aliens to remain in the country.

1        All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                                 2.
[Citation.] Accordingly, removal is a virtual certainty for an alien found to have an
aggravated felony conviction, no matter how long he has previously resided here.”
(Sessions v. Dimaya (2018) __ U.S. __ [138 S.Ct. 1204, 1210–1211; 200 L.Ed.2d 549].)
A conviction for violating section 288, subdivision (a) constitutes an aggravated felony
under federal immigration law. (United States v. Baron-Medina (9th Cir. 1999) 187 F.3d
1144, 1145; United States v. Medina-Villa (9th Cir. 2009) 567 F.3d 507, 512.)
       At the times of his plea and sentencing, however, appellant still retained his
passport and had never been advised by any governmental agency that it had been
erroneously issued. Appellant declared that prior to the plea, he showed his passport to
his defense attorney, who said it was great that he was a citizen. As a result, they never
discussed possible immigration consequences that could result from a criminal
conviction, or whether they should negotiate for a plea to an immigration-neutral offense,
because they both believed he was a citizen of the United States based on his valid
passport. “United States citizens are not subject to deportation, exclusion, or denial of
citizenship regardless of the quantity or quality of crimes they may commit.” (People v.
Suon (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
       Shortly before appellant was released from prison, he was advised that an
immigration hold was placed on him and then withdrawn. He was released on parole in
2011 and returned to Bakersfield. In 2012, appellant was notified by the federal
government for the first time that it had erroneously issued his passport and demanded
that he surrender it. Appellant complied and surrendered his passport. In 2014, appellant
was arrested by immigration agents and found out for the first time that he was going to
be deported because of his criminal conviction.
       In 2022, appellant filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to
section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), that states a person who is “no longer in criminal
custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence” because “[t]he conviction
or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability

                                             3.
to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
       In support of his motion, appellant declared he failed to meaningfully understand
the potential immigration consequences of his plea, and his error was prejudicial because
he reasonably believed he was a United States citizen since he still had his passport at the
time of his plea. The trial court considered the parties’ declarations and documentary
exhibits, conducted an evidentiary hearing where appellant testified, and acknowledged
the case presented a “unique” situation because appellant reasonably believed he was a
citizen since he had the passport. However, the court denied appellant’s motion and
found his error was not prejudicial because his primary concern at the time of his plea
was to minimize the time he spent in custody, he admitted the victim’s allegations during
the investigation, and he would not have received a more favorable, immigration-neutral
plea or a better result if he went to trial.
       On appeal, appellant argues he met the burden required by section 1473.7 to show
he made a prejudicial error that affected his ability to meaningfully enter his plea because
he reasonably believed he was a citizen since he had a valid passport.
       We agree, find appellant’s motion should have been granted, and remand for
further appropriate proceedings.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Appellant’s Entry into the United States
       Appellant was born in Jerusalem in 1987. His parents divorced when he was 10
years old, his grandmother primarily raised him, and he graduated high school in
Jerusalem.

2      The factual and procedural background is taken from the following pleadings that were
considered by the trial court when it heard and denied appellant’s section 1473.7 motion to
vacate: declarations filed by appellant and Myra Azucena, his immigration attorney, in support
of appellant’s motion to vacate; documentary exhibits filed in support of appellant’s motion and

                                               4.
          In 1993, appellant’s father moved to the United States. In 2004, his father became
a naturalized citizen. Appellant was still a minor and remained in Jerusalem where he
graduated high school.
          In August 2005, appellant entered the United States as a legal permanent resident
through a petition filed by his father. Appellant was 18 years old. He arrived with his
older sister and stepmother, and they lived with his father in Bakersfield. Appellant’s
birth mother lived in Chicago. By 2008, appellant’s stepmother was a citizen.
Appellant’s grandmother remained in Jerusalem and died there in 2007.
          In his supporting declaration to his motion to vacate his conviction, appellant
stated:

          “Not long after my arrival into the U.S., I was informed by my mother that
          under U.S. immigration law, if a father becomes a U.S. citizen prior to his
          children reaching the age of eighteen (18) years old then those children
          automatically also become U.S. citizens. My father had obtained U.S.
          citizenship prior to me turning eighteen (18), thus all of these conditions
          applied to my situation, so what my mother told me led me to the belief that
          I had automatically become a U.S. citizen.”
          Appellant declared his primary language was Arabic, his second language was
Hebrew, and his third language was English. While he completed high school in
Jerusalem, he “was not sophisticated or had any experience in American immigration law
or legal principles.” “Thus, when my mother had told me about the American law that
automatically made me a U.S. Citizen, I had no reason to disbelieve her or sufficient
ability to think that she was incorrect.”

the People’s opposition; the record of appellant’s criminal conviction; and appellant’s testimony
at the evidentiary hearing on his motion to vacate.

                                                5.
Appellant Applies for and Receives a Passport
       Appellant declared that “based on the belief and understanding that I had
automatically become a U.S. citizen, on or about December 2005 I applied to the U.S.
federal government for a U.S. passport.”3
       It is undisputed that in 2006, the Department issued a valid United States passport
to appellant.
       Appellant declared he was excited when he received his passport because “[b]ased
on my cursory understanding of U.S. immigration law only U.S. citizens could obtain a
valid U.S. passport, and conversely non-citizens were not eligible to obtain a passport.
The fact that I was successfully issued a valid United State[s] passport after applying for
one cemented my belief that what my mother had told me about automatically becoming
a U.S. citizen was correct, and that I had in fact automatically become a U.S. citizen.”
Appellant also lawfully obtained a Social Security number and a California driver’s
license.
       Ms. Azucena, appellant’s immigration attorney, declared appellant applied for the
passport “under the belief that he derived citizenship from his parents because he was
18 years old when he entered the U.S.” Appellant’s application was based on the
provisions of the INA “which allows a person [to] derive citizenship after birth from a
U.S. citizen parent if the child was admitted into the U.S. as a legal resident prior to their
18th birthday.”
       Ms. Azucena declared the Department issued the passport to appellant, and “[t]he
Department … will only issue U.S. passports to U.S. citizens. There is no other
immigration status in which a person could be issued a U.S. passport.” (Italics added.)

3      At the evidentiary hearing, the district attorney stated he had obtained appellant’s
passport application from the Department, and it showed appellant filed the application in
October 2005.

                                                6.
“Because [appellant] was issued a U.S. passport, he would have no reason to believe that
he was not a citizen at the time he [entered] his plea.” (Italics added.)
                      APPELLANT’S CRIMINAL CONVICTION
       Appellant’s criminal conviction resulted from the following proceedings in 2008
and 2009.
Facts of the Underlying Offense4
       On September 8, 2008, a deputy was dispatched on a report of child molestation
and met with the mother of a 12-year-old victim, referred to as John Doe. The mother
reported appellant was her boyfriend, and he inappropriately touched Doe.
       The deputy spoke to Doe, who said that during the summer of 2008 when his
mother went to work, appellant would show up at Doe’s residence. Appellant would sit
down on the bed next to him, kiss his shoulder and neck, kiss him on the lips, and bite his
lower lip. Doe said appellant would lie on top of him at times. Doe was asked if
appellant was excited when kissing him. Doe said, “Yes,” and that appellant had an
erection.
       Doe stated one incident happened at appellant’s apartment, when appellant rubbed
Doe’s legs and back while pushing down on his pants. Appellant “rubbed [Doe’s] back
while moving his pants down his legs and then began rubbing his buttocks. While
rubbing his legs, [appellant] was touching [Doe’s] inner thigh and then [appellant]
brushed his hand against Doe’s testicles. Doe stated he told [appellant] to stop and
[appellant] complied.”
       Doe stated the incidents happened too many times to keep track. Sometimes it
happened every day, then stopped for a week, and then started again.

4       The following facts are from the probation report, which summarized a report from the
Kern County Sheriff’s Office. At his plea hearing, appellant stipulated to the “police report” as
the factual basis for his plea. We recite these facts to give context to the issues raised by the
parties in this appeal and not for the truth of the matter.

                                                7.
       Also on September 8, 2008, appellant was taken into custody. When asked if he
knew why he was in custody, appellant said, “Child molesting.” Appellant said four
molestations had occurred with Doe. Appellant said the first time was in June 2008, and
he admitted he pulled down Doe’s pants and underwear and rubbed Doe’s buttocks. He
said the second incident was about three weeks later, when Doe was lying on his bed and
appellant rubbed Doe’s thighs and penis. Appellant said the third and fourth incidents
occurred when he laid on top of Doe, kissed him, and they both had erections. Appellant
stated that when he was seven years old, he was molested by his uncle over a three-month
period and never told anyone about it.
The Charges
       On September 18, 2008, a felony complaint was filed in the Superior Court of
Kern County charging appellant with count 1, commission of lewd and lascivious acts on
a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)), occurring on or about and between
June 1 and September 1, 2008.
       Appellant did not have any prior convictions. As explained above, however, a
conviction for violating section 288, subdivision (a) constitutes an aggravated felony
within the meaning of the INA to trigger a noncitizen’s deportation and exclusion.
(United States v. Baron-Medina, supra, 187 F.3d at p. 1145.)
Plea Proceedings
       On October 30, 2008, Judge Colette M. Humphrey convened the scheduled pre-
preliminary hearing. Appellant appeared with his retained attorney, Benjamin Greene.5
       The court stated that appellant had agreed to a negotiated disposition and would
plead no contest to the charged felony offense based on an “understanding he would

5       Mr. Greene, appellant’s retained counsel for his plea, died in 2017. Appellant retained
Joseph Tang to file his section 1473.7 motion to vacate his conviction in the trial court. As part
of the instant motion to vacate, Mr. Tang filed a supporting declaration stating that after he
determined Mr. Greene had died, he repeatedly contacted Mr. Greene’s widow to determine if
appellant’s case file still existed. She never responded to his numerous telephone calls or letters.

                                                 8.
receive no more than three years in state prison,” and the matter would be referred for a
section 288.1 psychological evaluation to determine if he was suitable for probation.6
       The court asked appellant if he signed the waiver of rights form, and appellant
said, “Yes.” The court asked appellant if he went through his constitutional rights with
his attorney, understood those rights, and waived those rights, and appellant said, “Yes.”
Appellant’s attorney joined in the waiver. The parties stipulated to the “police report” as
the factual basis for the plea.
       Thereafter, appellant pleaded no contest to the charged felony violation of
section 288, subdivision (a). The court vacated the preliminary hearing, referred the
matter to the probation department, set a sentencing hearing, and noted the matter would
be referred to a doctor for a section 288.1 psychological evaluation.
Section 1016.5 Immigration Advisement
       During the plea hearing, the trial court did not verbally advise appellant about the
possible immigration consequences of his plea. However, appellant and his attorney
signed an advisement and waiver of rights form on the same day as his plea hearing, and
appellant acknowledged to the court that he understood the rights set forth in the form.
       One paragraph in the form was titled “ALIEN STATUS” and stated the
immigration advisement required by section 1016.5: “I understand that if I am not a
Citizen of the United States, my guilty or no contest plea will result in my deportation,
exclusion from admission, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United
States.” Appellant initialed this paragraph.7

6
        Section 288.1 states: “Any person convicted of committing any lewd or lascivious act
including any of the acts constituting other crimes provided for in Part 1 of this code upon or
with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of 14 years shall not have
his or her sentence suspended until the court obtains a report from a reputable psychiatrist, from
a reputable psychologist who meets the standards set forth in Section 1027, as to the mental
condition of that person.”
7       Section 1016.5 “requires that before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any
criminal offense, the trial court must advise the defendant that if he or she is not a United States

                                                 9.
The Section 288.1 Psychological Evaluation
       On January 6, 2009, Dr. Eugene Couture, a clinical neuropsychologist, filed the
section 288.1 psychological evaluation with the court and reported about his interview
with appellant, who was 21 years old.
       The report stated appellant was comfortable speaking English and was “generally
understandable.” Appellant said he was “able to obtain a visa to come to the United
States in only forty days” and that “it usually takes four years.” He “was not aware of
why his visa was approved so quickly.” Appellant “moved to the United States at age
18,” in 2005, and noted “that his father was a citizen in the United States.”
       Appellant said he started attending Bakersfield College in 2006 to continue his
education, but his father accused him of being selfish, and he had to quit school.
Appellant worked with his father in door-to-door sales. His father accused him of
stealing when he tried to spend some of his earnings, and appellant stopped working with
him. Appellant moved to Arizona, Ohio, and Illinois, where he worked for family and
friends, and complained he did not make much money. In 2007, he returned to
Bakersfield and got a job working for one employer at three convenience stores.
Appellant said he was such a good worker that his employer did not fire him when he
was initially taken into custody in this case.
       Appellant’s father had heart surgery in May 2008, had been disabled, and was
gradually returning to work at a gas station. Appellant “complain[ed] bitterly about how
other people do not care for him and his gross feelings of abandonment by all members of
his family.”

citizen, conviction of the offense may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” (People v.
Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 558, italics added.) A validly executed waiver form is a proper
substitute for verbal admonishment by the trial court of the section 1016.5 advisement. (People
v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 519, 521–523.)

                                               10.
       Appellant said he became involved in a dating relationship with Doe’s mother in
March 2008, and they did not live together. Appellant became sexually involved with
Doe that summer. When asked about the molestations, appellant “seriously minimized
his involvement and while minimizing his involvement, he complained that he himself
had been molested and that his birth family ignored him and expected too much of him.”
Appellant denied most of the behaviors and feelings of arousal about Doe that he
previously admitted.
       Dr. Couture diagnosed appellant with pedophilia. Appellant was not entirely
truthful about the charged offense but admitted he was very troubled about his actions
with Doe. Dr. Couture concluded appellant was a danger to the health and safety of
others. There was an order for appellant to stay away from Doe and he was complying
with that, but he had also started seeing Doe’s mother again after entering his plea.
       Dr. Couture stated probation was not appropriate, and recommended the court
commit appellant to either Coalinga or Atascadero State Hospital for intensive inpatient
treatment.
The Probation Report
       On March 26, 2009, the probation report was filed but contained errors about
appellant’s age and entry into the country. The report stated appellant was born in
Jerusalem in 2008 and arrived in the United States in 2005, whereas the record shows he
was born in 1987 and entered the United States in 2005.
       The probation report also contained the following statement: “Citizenship: U.S.”
       Appellant was not married, did not have any children, and did not have any known
prior criminal record. The report stated appellant was employed as a cashier at the
convenience stores since 2008.
       Appellant admitted to the probation officer that he committed the molestations and
wanted help for his “ ‘problem.’ ”

                                            11.
       The report stated appellant was unsuitable for probation based on his conduct
toward Doe, and he should be sentenced to the lower term of three years in prison.
Sentencing Hearing
       On March 26, 2009, Judge Humphrey convened the sentencing hearing. Appellant
appeared with his attorney, Mr. Greene.
       Pamela Riel, a therapist with Kern County Mental Health, testified for appellant
that he voluntarily initiated therapy and she had seven sessions with him from December
2008 to March 2009. Appellant was compliant and eager to attend the sessions. Ms. Riel
testified appellant was not completely in denial and had not tried to rationalize his
behavior as a pedophile, but he needed ongoing and long-term treatment to understand
himself and his diagnosis. Ms. Riel agreed with Dr. Couture’s conclusions about
appellant.
       Doe’s mother addressed the court and stated Doe was in counseling and needed
help because he had trusted appellant as a father. She stated appellant should be punished
but he also needed psychological help.
       John Lua, the prosecutor, acknowledged that when appellant entered his plea, the
parties agreed there would be a section 288.1 psychological evaluation to determine if he
was suitable for probation. Mr. Lua argued the three-year prison sentence discussed at
the plea hearing was appropriate because appellant took advantage of a position of trust
with Doe, who suffered emotional and psychological harm from the molestation. In
addition, appellant minimized his conduct when he was interviewed by Dr. Couture, and
he refused to take full responsibility for his actions.
       Mr. Greene acknowledged appellant committed misconduct and deserved to be
punished, but he should be sent to jail and not to prison. Mr. Greene argued appellant
was suitable for probation because he did not have a criminal record, admitted his guilt
when initially contacted by law enforcement, voluntarily sought counseling, and felt
remorse for his actions.

                                              12.
       The court noted that Ms. Riel agreed with Dr. Couture’s conclusions about
appellant, that appellant should receive inpatient treatment, and that he took advantage of
a position of trust with Doe. The court found mitigating circumstances that appellant had
no known prior record, admitted his guilt upon arrest, and entered a plea early in the
proceedings.
       The court found appellant was not suitable for probation and imposed the lower
term of three years in state prison. The court ordered appellant to register as a sex
offender and not to have any contact with Doe. The court stated that consistent with
Dr. Couture’s recommendation, appellant should be housed at either Coalinga or
Atascadero State Hospital for intensive treatment for pedophilia.

               APPELLANT’S DECLARATION ABOUT HIS IMMIGRATION
                       STATUS AT THE TIME OF HIS PLEA
       In his declaration filed in support of his motion to vacate his conviction, appellant
stated he had been living with his father, stepmother, sister, and half-sister in Bakersfield
at the time of his plea in 2008. He was working full time as a gas station clerk. He was
the only person financially supporting his entire family because his father was disabled
after heart surgery, and no one else in the family worked. Appellant was “fully
responsible” for paying the family’s rent and living expenses.
       Appellant’s declaration stated that prior to entering his plea, he showed his
passport to Mr. Greene, his attorney:

       “During his representation of me, Mr. Greene had inquired as to my
       immigration status. In response, I told him that I was a U.S. citizen. I also
       showed him my U.S. passport that I had at the time. In substance, his
       response was essentially ‘great, you’re a U.S. Citizen’, and that was the
       extent of any discussion that he and I had about my immigration status
       during the course of his representation of me. As a result, Mr. Greene
       never discussed or brought up the subject of immigration consequences at
       all. Mr. Greene did not even make me aware that non-citizen defendants
       could possibly face any kind of adverse immigration consequences for
       criminal convictions generally.” (Italics added.)

                                             13.
          Mr. Greene did not attempt to “negotiate an alternative immigration-safe plea deal,
nor did we ever discuss” a deal for appellant to serve more time in prison that would be
immigration safe, or possibly going to trial. Appellant did not consult with an
immigration attorney before he entered his plea.
          Appellant declared he was in possession of his United States passport when he
entered his plea in this case. He had never received notice from any governmental
agency that he was not a citizen, or that the passport was mistakenly issued to him, and
stated:

          “I reasonably believed in good faith that I was in fact a U.S. citizen. The
          primary reason for my good faith belief that I was a U.S. citizen, and why
          that belief was reasonable … is because the U.S. federal government had
          mistakenly accepted my application for and issued me a valid U.S. passport
          by mistake prior to the [criminal charges].”
          Appellant recalled there was an immigration warning in the advisement and
waiver form that he signed before he entered his plea. Appellant declared that based on
his good faith belief that he was a citizen, he did not believe there was any possibility that
entering a plea in this case would result in his deportation, exclusion, or other
immigration consequences “because I objectively believed that I was a U.S. citizen,” and
“I did not believe that this admonishment applied to me.” Appellant believed the federal
government could not deport or remove individuals once they obtained citizenship, even
for a criminal conviction, so he was not concerned about possible immigration
consequences and did not investigate what those consequences would be, “since I
believed at that time that I was a U.S. citizen, and thus could not be deported.”

                  WITHDRAWAL OF APPELLANT’S PASSPORT AND
                   INITIATION OF IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
          After appellant was sent to prison, his father and the entirety of his family moved
from Bakersfield to Chicago.

                                               14.
       In 2011, approximately 90 days before his scheduled release on parole, appellant
was notified “by prison personnel” that United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) had placed an immigration hold on him. While he was still in prison,
however, he was advised that ICE had released the immigration hold because it
concluded he was “a naturalized U.S. citizen.”
       In October 2011, appellant was released on parole and returned to Bakersfield. He
still retained his United States passport and had not received any notice that the passport
was erroneously issued or suspended. Appellant obtained a full-time job at a
convenience store. He was not arrested, charged, or convicted of any other criminal
offenses.
       In 2012, appellant’s family in Chicago advised him that the federal government
sent a letter to appellant directed to their address in Chicago. The letter stated appellant’s
passport “had been suspended because the government stated that they had issued it to
[appellant] by mistake” and “commanded [appellant] to surrender the mistakenly issued
U.S. passport back to the federal government.” (Italics added.) Appellant complied and
surrendered his passport by mailing it to a federal agency, as directed in the letter.
Appellant’s Immigration Arrest
       On July 15, 2014, appellant was arrested at his residence in Bakersfield and taken
into custody by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for immigration
proceedings and deportation because of his 2008 criminal conviction. Appellant declared
he was arrested “without any advance warning,” and the agents advised him that he was
being placed into deportation proceedings because he was not a citizen and had the prior
felony conviction. As he was being arrested, appellant told the agents that he was a
naturalized citizen and asked them to gather and take possession of documents in his
residence that supported his claim of citizenship.
       DHS’s report about appellant’s arrest stated appellant was admitted to the United
States as a legal permanent resident in August 2005, and he had a driver’s license and

                                             15.
Social Security card. DHS’s report further stated that appellant was not a citizen of the
United States, and his passport was “erroneously issued” and subsequently surrendered
back to the Department.
       After his arrest, appellant retained Ms. Azucena as his immigration attorney, and
she obtained certain documents and advised him that he was never a naturalized citizen.
As a result of the information from Ms. Azucena, appellant learned for the first time that
he was never granted citizenship “because I had not entered into the U.S. before my 18th
birthday, and that my conviction in this matter made me removable from the U.S., and
that the U.S. federal government was seeking to deport me for that reason.”
       Ms. Azucena declared she obtained appellant’s records from DHS and ICE, and
the records “corroborate[ ] his claim and show[ ] that the Department … had erroneously
issued [appellant] a U.S. passport.” (Italics added.)
       Appellant received a notice dated March 7, 2022, that his case was scheduled for a
hearing before the immigration court on November 16, 2022.
             APPELLANT’S SECTION 1473.7 MOTION TO VACATE
       On August 5, 2022, appellant filed a section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) motion to
set aside his no contest plea from 2008 and vacate his conviction for violating
section 288, subdivision (a). Appellant argued his plea was invalid because he
reasonably believed he was a citizen since the federal government issued a valid passport
to him, his erroneous belief was prejudicial because it damaged his ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a plea to the charged offense, and he would not
have entered his plea if he had known of the adverse immigration consequences.
Supporting Declarations
       As explained above, appellant’s motion was supported by declarations filed by
appellant and Ms. Azucena, who stated appellant was at that time in immigration removal
proceedings as a result of his prior conviction, and the proceedings were pending the

                                            16.
result of his motion to vacate his conviction. Ms. Azucena declared his conviction for
violating section 288, subdivision (a) constituted an “aggravated felon[y]” for
immigration purposes, “which makes him nearly ineligible for any statutory relief before
the immigration court.”
       Appellant’s declaration addressed the circumstances for his entry into the United
States, his receipt of the passport, and the reasons he believed he was a citizen when he
entered his plea, as set forth above. Appellant declared that even “years after my
conviction,” he did not know his plea would have adverse immigration consequences and
believed he was a citizen.
       Appellant declared the federal government alleged he was never a citizen, and he
was subject to removal because of his prior conviction. Appellant declared he did not
have any other prior convictions, and he filed the instant motion to vacate his conviction
and “begin my case over again, so that I can either obtain an alternative immigration safe
disposition, or have my matter decided by a jury at trial with the hope of being found not
guilty.”
       Appellant declared that at the time of his plea that he “did not meaningfully
understand, was unable to defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of my no contest plea.” If he had known about his
true immigration status, he would have “fought for an alternative immigration-safe plea
deal or chosen to go to trial to fight my case. I would not have accepted any plea deal
which would have resulted in my conviction if I knew that it would result in permanently
leaving my family and life in America and being deported back to Palestine.”
       Appellant further declared that if he faced deportation, he would have “no choice”
but to return to an area of Jerusalem that, “as a practical matter,” was controlled by
extremist militia groups. His situation would be “calamitous” because his conviction for
committing a sex crime against a child could result in his torture or death by these
groups. Appellant declared the same practices and punishments against people accused

                                             17.
of sexual crimes against children “still continue to this day,” and he would fear for his
life, which was “another reason why I wish to vacate my conviction now that I know
there are adverse immigration consequences for me due to my no contest plea in this
matter.”
        Appellant declared his family was “tight knit,” and he always had “a close
relationship” with his father and the rest of his family. He felt “a strong duty” to care for
and support his father and the family. “Even if had to do a state prison sentence for a
number of years, I still did not want to permanently leave the U.S. and my family behind,
and potentially never see them again or … be unable to take care of my father. I still
wanted to remain in the U.S. after I fulfilled my prison sentence in order to take care of
him.”
        Finally, appellant declared if he had known about his citizenship status and the
adverse immigration consequences at the time of his plea, he would have immediately
rejected the plea bargain. He would have consulted with an immigration attorney and
directed his attorney to negotiate an immigration-safe plea agreement, even if it meant
serving additional time in prison, or gone to trial and accepted the risk of a higher prison
term.
The People’s Opposition
        On October 10, 2022, the district attorney filed opposition to appellant’s motion to
vacate his conviction, requested an evidentiary hearing, and objected to any consideration
of appellant’s “self-serving” declaration unless he was available for cross-examination at
the evidentiary hearing.
        The district attorney further argued appellant was unable to show prejudice as
required by People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar) based on: his statements to
Dr. Couture in the section 288.1 psychological evaluation, where he minimized the
conduct he had already admitted to the investigating officers; he was diagnosed with
pedophilia; and his priority at the time of his plea was for less jail time so he could take

                                             18.
care of his family. As a result, appellant could not show that he had reason to believe an
immigration-neutral plea was possible because of the strength of the case against him.
                             THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
       On October 18, 2022, Judge Chad A. Louie conducted an evidentiary hearing on
appellant’s section 1473.7 motion. Appellant was present with his attorney, Mr. Tang.
       The parties had agreed they would submit on the pleadings and documents, the
court could take judicial notice of the file from appellant’s criminal case, and appellant
would be the only witness. Brandon Stallings, the deputy district attorney, had obtained
appellant’s application for the passport from the Department, and it could be considered
by the court but not be released or introduced into evidence.
Appellant’s Testimony
       Appellant was called by Mr. Stallings and the only witness at the evidentiary
hearing. Appellant testified he was living in Jerusalem when his father became a
naturalized citizen, but he knew that his father had to hire an attorney, take a test, and
then take an oath at a ceremony.
       Appellant testified he arrived in the United States in 2005 and obtained cursory
knowledge about how to become a citizen by talking with family and friends. He did not
obtain information from any governmental agencies.
       Mr. Stallings asked appellant to review his application for a passport, and
appellant acknowledged he filed the application in October 2005. Appellant testified he
was not fluent in English at the time, his father helped him fill out the application, and
appellant wrote down most of the information. Upon reviewing the application, appellant
conceded he did not answer the questions about whether his mother and father were
citizens and believed the federal government knew his father was already a citizen.8

8       As will be discussed below, the district attorney did not introduce any evidence that
appellant committed fraud or perjury in his passport application and did not raise that argument
at the evidentiary hearing.

                                               19.
       In response to Mr. Stallings’s questions, appellant testified he never took a test or
an oath to become a naturalized citizen as his father did, but believed he became a citizen
based on his father’s status, based on information provided to him by his family.
Appellant did not verify this information with any agency of the federal government.
       Mr. Stallings asked appellant about his conversations with Mr. Greene, his defense
attorney during the criminal case. Appellant testified Mr. Greene asked about his
immigration status shortly after he retained him, and appellant showed his passport to
Mr. Greene. “I recall we didn’t discuss it extensively because I showed him my
American passport, which to me was a valid American passport, and he said in the
context[ ] of his comment was, ‘Oh, great you’re a [United States] citizen.’ And that was
the extent of it.”
       Appellant told Mr. Greene how important it was for him to remain in the United
States. Mr. Greene told appellant that he would not be affected, and it was not an issue
because he was an American citizen. Mr. Stallings asked, and appellant answered:

               “Q.    Did you make it an issue?

               “A.    I didn’t believe I had an issue with immigration.

             “Q. Did you tell Mr. Green[e] at any point you believed your life
       would be jeopardized if you were sent back to Israel at [th]is point?

             “A. Again, we didn’t raise that issue because I didn’t believe I
       was facing immigration.”
       Appellant testified the plea offer was “the best deal” he could get because he could
receive probation or the lower term of three years. Appellant decided to take the plea
instead of going to trial.
       Appellant testified he signed the immigration advisement in the plea advisement
and waiver form, and knew it said his conviction could result in deportation, but believed
it was “a formality for a [United States] citizen just [to] sign.” Appellant believed he was

                                             20.
a citizen because he had the passport, and he “came to an agreement” with Mr. Greene
that the “immigration portion of this case … did not effect [sic] my status.”
          Mr. Stallings asked appellant if Mr. Greene went over the police reports and
reviewed appellant’s admissions that he committed the charged acts. Appellant said he
admitted committing four acts against Doe. Mr. Greene told appellant it was a fairly
strong case against him, and the possible sentences for the violation of section 288,
subdivision (a) were three, six, or eight years. Appellant attended counseling sessions
after the plea and hoped to receive probation and a more lenient sentence.
          Appellant testified he was released from prison as scheduled in October 2011.
About 90 days before his release, appellant was notified that ICE placed an immigration
hold on him. He did not retain an immigration attorney because “the counselor of the
dorm [in prison] explained to me that it’s a procedure that the prison system does that to
make sure that everybody’s legal status of this country is a citizen. Or if not citizen, they
will be deported.” The immigration hold was lifted before he was released from prison,
and he was told by prison officials that ICE determined he was a naturalized citizen.
After he was released from prison, appellant did not contact an attorney because ICE
lifted the immigration hold and that “cemented my belief that I was [a United States]
citizen in prison.”
          Appellant testified his passport was revoked in 2012. The Department sent a letter
to appellant at his family’s address in Chicago, based on his father’s change of address
form, and his family advised him about the letter and sent it to him in Bakersfield. The
letter notified appellant that his claim of citizenship based on his father’s status was
invalid because he was over 18 years old when he entered the United States. Appellant
consulted an attorney about the letter and was told it was probably because he was on
parole.
          Appellant testified he was arrested at his home in Bakersfield by immigration
agents in 2014, and advised he was subject to deportation because of his plea in the prior

                                              21.
case. Appellant still believed he was a citizen, and asked the agents to collect his
documents in the house that showed he was a citizen. Appellant testified he only realized
he was not a citizen when “the immigration Judge explained the law to me and how you
have to be under the age of 18 [years] to enter the United States … to become a [United
States] citizen.”
       Appellant testified his immigration case began in 2014, and he retained
Ms. Azucena as his immigration attorney. He told her that he was concerned about being
deported to Israel, and she said that would not happen. He did not ask her to file a
motion to withdraw his plea in 2014 because that did not occur to him, and he just
followed what his attorney said to do. Appellant did not contact Mr. Greene to ask him
to file a motion to withdraw his plea; Mr. Greene died in 2017. Appellant called different
attorneys who told him that he could not reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor.
The Parties’ Arguments
       After appellant testified, the court invited argument on whether appellant met his
burden to show prejudicial error as required by section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1),
damaging appellant’s ability to meaningfully understand or knowingly accept the actual
or potential adverse immigration consequences from his conviction.
       Mr. Stallings argued appellant failed to show prejudice because he had no reason
to believe an immigration-neutral plea was possible in this case, more serious charges
could have been filed, and there was no objective evidence to corroborate his claim that
he would not have entered the plea if he had known it would lead to deportation.
Mr. Stallings argued evidence from the plea proceedings showed appellant placed “great
weight on receiving a minimized sentence and, in fact, pled to a low term lid where …
there was a potential of him receiving felony probation, which was important to him, and
we can also see that through reading his declaration where his goal was to stay out of
custody and was to work to provide for his family.” (Italics added.)

                                            22.
       Mr. Stallings acknowledged appellant believed he did not have any immigration
issues, but argued appellant’s belief was unreasonable because he knew his father had to
go through a certain procedure to become a naturalized citizen, and appellant did not take
a test or an oath:

       “[D]efendant essentially blindly went ahead with this belief that he was a
       citizen despite all of these … war[n]ing signs along the way. The first in
       2011 when he was in prison custody. In 2014 when he was arrested by
       ICE. All along the way there [are] warning signs, and [appellant] still …
       had a blind belief that he was, for whatever reason, a Naturalized citizen.
       The letter that was sent to him in 2012 clearly states that he was not a
       Naturalized citizen … because of the age … when he entered in the United
       States, that he … could not have been issued a passport because he was
       over the age of 18. But even though he was specifically notified of the
       Federal Government[’s] ruling in where their determination regarding his
       passport, he took no steps when he was arrested by ICE, and then
       ultimately in 2014 there is a[n] 8[-]year gap before he actually filed any
       sort of motion to withdraw. I think what the Court can do is … look at
       whether or not [appellant] actually holds a reasonable belief that he’s been
       prejudiced by the deal. I think that the record is that [appellant] buried his
       head in the sand despite … all of these warning signs. He did so because in
       his mind he prioritized that plea deal above all else, and he was sticking
       with the plea deal and really does not appear to care about the immigration
       consequences until now here we are in 2022, and it is 14 years after he
       entered the plea. So I do think that does reflect on his credibility.” (Italics
       added.)
       The court interrupted and stated:

       “I believe that [appellant] believe[d] that he was a citizen. I think that’s
       clear from the record that [he] believed that he was a citizen. He was told
       that by … at least one of his parents, that because he was a minor when his
       father bec[a]me a Naturalized citizen, then the law of this country would
       therefore make him a United States citizen. Then when he came to this
       country, he applies for [a] passport, gets a passport, which further
       confirmed his belief, in his mind, that he was a United States citizen. The
       question for this court that I need to decide is whether or not there was
       prejudicial error damaging [appellant’s] ability to meaningfully understand,
       defend[ ] against, or knowingly accept the actual or adverse immigration
       consequences of the conviction of sentence.”

                                            23.
       The court stated that appellant “believed he was a citizen at the time he entered
into the disposition in this case. And so whether or not [appellant] had reason to believe
that the charges would allow for a[n] immigration[-]neutral bargain the court would
accept, would not really apply in this case,” since appellant believed he was a citizen. “I
don’t believe that [appellant’s] aversion to immigration consequences would necessarily
apply in this case either,” because appellant’s belief he was a citizen was corroborated by
the existence of his passport.
       Mr. Tang, appellant’s counsel, argued his motion to withdraw was timely under
section 1473.7, subdivision (b), because appellant had received notice of immigration
proceedings and a final removal order had not yet been filed. Mr. Tang further argued
that while Mr. Stallings focused on the fact that appellant never took a test or an oath to
become a citizen, there would not have been a test or oath in the process for a minor’s
derivative citizenship through a parent. As stated in appellant’s declaration, the stakes
were so severe for him that it was reasonable that he would have literally done anything
to avoid deportation if he had realized he was not a citizen, even if going to trial only
gave him a 1 to 5 percent chance of being acquitted.
       Mr. Stallings replied appellant failed to prove prejudice because he “took no steps
to avoid deportation every step of the way,” he gave excuses for failing to previously file
a motion to withdraw his plea in the past 14 years, and his priority was to take advantage
of a plea bargain in a very serious case, serve the least amount of jail time, and get out of
custody.9

9        Section 1473.7 was enacted in 2016, and became effective in 2017 (Stats. 2016, ch. 739,
§ 1), to permit defendants “who were unaware of the immigration consequences posed by a plea
entered many years earlier” to subsequently move to vacate their convictions and obtain relief
from imminent immigration orders. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 523, italics added.)
        “[T]he Legislature created a strikingly generous timeliness standard for immigration-
related petitions.” (People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 759 (Alatorre).) The motion
“shall be deemed timely filed at any time in which the individual filing the motion is no longer in
criminal custody” and the events stated in section 1473.7, subdivision (b)(2) have not yet

                                               24.
       Mr. Tang argued the district attorney was ignoring the fact that appellant
reasonably believed he was a citizen because he had a passport, and there would not be
any immigration consequences because of the criminal conviction. When he found out
there were consequences, he retained an immigration attorney. Appellant did not have a
legal background, he was not required to decide what motions to file, and that was for his
lawyer to decide.
The Court’s Ruling
       The court stated this case presented a “unique situation” but denied appellant’s
motion to vacate. The court found that at the time of his plea, appellant’s goal was to
receive felony probation and the least amount of time in custody as possible. “But at that
time when [appellant] took his plea, I believe [he] believed he was a [United States]
citizen and didn’t have immigration consequences.”
       The court stated the question was whether appellant made a prejudicial error under
section 1473.7 and would have refused to take the plea if he had known that he was not a
citizen. The court stated:

       “At the time [appellant] changed his plea in this case in 2008, he had been
       in this country for about 3 years. His … father was already here in this
       country. So [appellant] had been living in … another country before
       coming into the United States when he was 18 [years old]. And he was
       here for 3 years when he entered into the plea to the [section] 288 …. This
       Court’s belief that [appellant] at the time of the case had admitted
       culpability, or that is what’s before this court now that he admitted
       culpability, and that it was a strong case for the People. [Appellant’s]
       chances at trial would be slim. And so [appellant] was at that point … as

occurred. (§ 1473.7, subd. (b)(1).) A motion may be deemed untimely if not filed with
“reasonable diligence” after the later of the following: (1) the moving party received a notice to
appear in immigration court that asserts the conviction as the basis for removal; (2) notice that a
final removal order against the moving party has been issued. (§ 1473.7, subd. (b)(2); see People
v. Perez (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1015–1016.)
        Appellant’s motion was timely filed because he was no longer in criminal custody, he
had received a notice to appear in immigration court in March 2022, a final removal order had
not yet been issued, and he filed his motion in August 2022.

                                               25.
       the case was progressing before he pled was looking to mitigate the amount
       of time he would have [to] spend in custody. His goal was to be able to get
       a disposition in this case that would entail as little time as possible. I think
       that is what I gather from the information before me. And so he pled for a
       low term as a lid, a 3[-]year prison commitment as a lid and was hoping to
       get felony probation with some local time. He was [in] this country at that
       time a relatively short amount of time, 3 years. I think he indicated that he
       didn’t speak English well and has become more competent in English .…”

       “The question again for the Court is has the defense shown by a
       preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable probability that
       [appellant] would have rejected the plea if [he] had correctly understood its
       actual or potential immigration consequences. If [appellant] had not been
       under the mistaken belief that he was citizen, and that by pleading to this
       disposition would have resulted in him being deported would he have
       rejected the plea.”

       “Given the information before this court that [appellant] had admitted
       culpability, that his chances at trial would have been slim, that it was a
       strong case for the People, and [appellant’s] goal at that time was to
       mitigate the time that he was going to be spending in custody as well as the
       amount of time that he had been in this country at that time, which had been
       around 3 years, which relatively speaking is not a long period of time, I’m
       going to find that the defense has not met its burden by a preponderance of
       evidence, that there is a reasonable probability that [appellant] would have
       rejected the plea if [he] had correctly understood its actual or potential
       immigration consequences.” (Italics added.)
       On October 21, 2022, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial
court’s denial of his section 1473.7 motion to vacate his conviction, and he requested and
received a certificate of probable cause.
                                            ISSUES
I.     Section 1473.7
II.    Appellant’s failure to meaningfully understand the immigration consequences
III.   Prejudicial error

                                             26.
                                        DISCUSSION
I.     Section 1473.7
       We begin with the provision of section 1473.7, subdivision (a), that states a person
who is “no longer in criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction or
sentence” for the following reason:

       “The conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error
       damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend
       against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
       consequences of a conviction or sentence. A finding of legal invalidity
       may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
       (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)10

       “The court shall grant the motion to vacate the conviction or sentence if the
       moving party establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence
       of any of the grounds for relief specified in subdivision (a). For a motion
       made pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the moving party shall
       also establish that the conviction or sentence being challenged is currently
       causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application
       for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.” (§ 1473.7,
       subd. (e)(1).)
The trial court may set aside a conviction based on counsel’s immigration advisement
errors without a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Ruiz (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1067.)

              “To prevail under section 1473.7, a defendant must demonstrate that
       his conviction is ‘legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging [his or
       her] ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly
       accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
       conviction or sentence.’ [Citation.] The defendant must first show that he
       did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea.
       Next, the defendant must show that his misunderstanding constituted
       prejudicial error. ‘[P]rejudical error … means demonstrating a reasonable

10
        Section 1473.7 states two additional grounds that are not at issue in this case, where a
person no longer in custody may file a statutory motion to vacate based on the claim there is
“[n]ewly discovered evidence of actual innocence,” or that a conviction or sentence was “sought,
obtained, or imposed on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 1473.7,
subd. (a)(2), (3).)

                                              27.
       probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant
       had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
       consequences.’ ” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319, second
       bracketed insertion added (Espinoza); accord, Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
       p. 529.)
       In reviewing a section 1473.7 motion, “ ‘[a] “reasonable probability” “does not
mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract
possibility.” ’ ” (People v. Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610, italics added, cited with
approval in Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 321–322.)
       A section 1473.7 motion will not always be granted “merely because the [moving
party] claims to have misunderstood the consequences of a plea.” (Alatorre, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 769.) “Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc
assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s
deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a
defendant’s expressed preferences.” (Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S. 357, 369.)
       “A defendant must provide ‘ “ ‘objective evidence’ ” ’ to corroborate factual
assertions. [Citation.] Objective evidence includes facts provided by declarations,
contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions
with counsel, and evidence of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 321; accord, Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530–531.)

               “A party seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required to
       provide the declaration of plea counsel. [Citation.] Nor is a defendant
       required to submit contemporaneous documentation from the time of the
       plea. Rather, the inquiry under section 1473.7 requires consideration of the
       ‘totality of the circumstances,’ which necessarily involves case-by-case
       examination of the record [citation], and no specific kind of evidence is a
       prerequisite to relief. As noted, the burden rests with the defendant to
       establish entitlement to relief. In addition to submitting declarations, both
       parties are entitled to request an evidentiary hearing. [Citation.] The more
       robust and inclusive a record, the greater the opportunity for effective
       persuasion and meaningful judicial review. And the inquiry into a
       defendant’s state of mind may often involve the weighing of credibility and
       circumstantial evidence.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 325.)

                                            28.
       “We apply independent review to evaluate whether a defendant has demonstrated
a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its
immigration consequences. [Citation.] ‘ “[U]nder independent review, an appellate court
exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of
law.” ’ [Citation.] When courts engage in independent review, they must give deference
to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are based on ‘ “ ‘the credibility of
witnesses the [trial court] heard and observed.’ ” ’ [Citation.] But when the trial court’s
findings ‘derive entirely from written declarations and other documents,’ the trial court
and the reviewing court ‘ “are in the same position,” ’ and no deference is owed.”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 319–320, second bracketed insertion in original;
accord, Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527–528.) “Ultimately it is for the appellate court
to decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under
section 1473.7.” (Vivar, at p. 528.)

II.    Appellant’s Failure to Meaningfully Understand the Immigration
       Consequences
       The first question under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) is whether appellant
met his burden to establish “he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319; accord, Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “[T]he focus of an inquiry in a section 1473.7 motion is on the
‘defendant’s own error in … not knowing that his plea would subject him to mandatory
deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States.’ ” (People v. Mejia (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871.)
       A.     Section 1016.5 Advisement
       In determining the merits of a section 1473.7 motion to vacate, a statutorily valid
section 1016.5 advisement may be insufficient to mitigate the prejudice resulting from a
defendant’s erroneous beliefs about the impact of his plea on mandatory immigration
consequences, since it states that deportation may be a possibility. (Vivar, supra,

                                              29.
11 Cal.5th at p. 533.) In this case, however, appellant received a section 1016.5
advisement in the plea and waiver of rights form that went beyond the statutory
“possibility” language and instead stated that if he was not a citizen, his plea “will result”
in his “deportation, exclusion from admission, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the
laws of the United States.” (Italics added.)
       As we will explain, even though the immigration advisement went beyond the
requirements of section 1016.5, appellant met his burden to show his own subjective
error—that he did not meaningfully understand his plea would subject him to adverse
immigration consequences.
       B.     Appellant’s Passport
       The record contains overwhelming objective evidence to corroborate appellant’s
claim that he reasonably believed he was a citizen when he entered his plea in 2008.
While appellant’s understanding of derivative naturalization and his actual status was
legally erroneous, it is undisputed appellant held a valid passport issued by the
Department from 2006 to 2012. As explained above, under federal law, “Congress
authorized passport holders to use the passport as conclusive proof of citizenship.”
(Magnuson v. Baker, supra, 911 F.2d at p. 333.)
       There is no evidence appellant engaged in fraud or perjury when he applied for the
passport. Appellant declared, without contradiction, that at the time of the criminal
charges and his plea in 2008, he had never received notice from any governmental
agency that he was not a citizen, or the passport was mistakenly issued to him, and there
is no evidence to contradict that declaration. In his declaration and at the evidentiary
hearing, appellant stated the federal government notified him by letter in 2012 that his
passport “had been suspended because the government stated that they had issued it to
[appellant] by mistake,” and he surrendered it as ordered. (Italics added.) DHS’s report
about appellant’s arrest by ICE agents in 2014 similarly stated his passport was

                                               30.
“erroneously issued” and surrendered back to the Department; it did not state that he
committed any acts of fraud or perjury to obtain the passport.
       At the evidentiary hearing, the district attorney presented the passport application
to appellant and asked him to review it. Appellant testified he was not fluent in English
when he filled out the form, his father helped him, and appellant wrote down most of the
information. Upon reviewing the application, appellant testified he did not answer the
questions about whether his mother and father were citizens and believed the federal
government knew his father was already a citizen. The district attorney did not rely on
this testimony or present evidence to argue that appellant engaged in fraud or committed
perjury when he applied for the passport, and the court did not make any such finding.
       Appellant further declared, without contradiction, that when he was charged in the
criminal case, his defense attorney, Mr. Greene “inquired as to my immigration status. In
response, I told him that I was a U.S. citizen. I also showed him my U.S. passport that I
had at the time. In substance, his response was essentially ‘great, you’re a U.S. Citizen’,
and that was the extent of any discussion that he and I had about my immigration status
during the course of his representation of me. As a result, Mr. Greene never discussed or
brought up the subject of immigration consequences at all.” (Italics added.)
       Appellant’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was consistent with his
declaration—that Mr. Greene asked about his immigration status shortly after he retained
him, appellant showed his passport to Mr. Greene, and Mr. Greene said, “ ‘Oh, great
you’re a [United States] citizen.’ And that was the extent of it.” Appellant told
Mr. Greene how important it was for him to remain in the United States, and Mr. Greene
told appellant that it was not an issue because he was an American citizen.
       Appellant acknowledged that he read the immigration warning in the advisement
and waiver form that he signed before he entered his plea, but he did not believe the
admonishment applied to him “because I objectively believed that I was a U.S. citizen.”
Appellant believed that the federal government could not deport or remove individuals

                                            31.
for a criminal conviction once they obtained citizenship, so he was not concerned about
possible immigration consequences and did not investigate what those consequences
could be, “since I believed at that time that I was a U.S. citizen, and thus could not be
deported.”
       C.     The District Attorney’s Arguments
       “A defendant must provide ‘ “ ‘objective evidence’ ” ’ to corroborate factual
assertions. [Citation.] Objective evidence includes facts provided by declarations,
contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions
with counsel, and evidence of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 321; accord, Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530–531.) While appellant’s
declaration and testimony about his passport were not contradicted, the district attorney
argued at the evidentiary hearing that appellant’s beliefs about his legal status were not
credible or reasonable. The district attorney’s arguments were refuted by the objective
existence of appellant’s passport, the undisputed evidence that he lawfully held it at the
time of his plea in 2008, and he was not notified that it was erroneously issued to him
until 2012, after he was released from prison.
       The district attorney also asserted appellant’s beliefs about his citizenship status
were not credible because he “essentially blindly went ahead with this belief that he was
a citizen despite all of these … war[n]ing signs along the way,” since he was notified
about the immigration hold while he was in prison in 2011, the federal government
revoked his passport in 2012, and he was arrested by ICE in 2014. The district attorney
argued that there were “warning signs, and [appellant] still … had a blind belief that he
was, for whatever reason, a Naturalized citizen,” and he “buried his head in the sand
despite … all of these warning signs. He did so because in his mind he prioritized that
plea deal above all else, and he was sticking with the plea deal and really does not appear
to care about the immigration consequences until now here we are in 2022, and it is

                                             32.
14 years after he entered the plea. So I do think that does reflect on his credibility.”
(Italics added.)
       The district attorney’s arguments about appellant’s knowledge and/or conduct
from 2011 to 2014, and the impact of his actions on his credibility, were not relevant to
the question presented by section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), because “[t]he key to the
statute is the mindset of the defendant and what he or she understood—or didn't
understand—at the time the plea was taken” in 2008. (People v. Mejia, supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 866, italics added.) Appellant’s conduct after the plea, and after he
was released from prison in 2011, does not undermine the undisputed evidence that he
reasonably believed he was a citizen when he entered his plea because he had a validly
issued passport.
       In addition, the district attorney’s complaints that appellant failed to move to
withdraw his plea after he was arrested by ICE in 2014 are contradicted by the fact that
section 1473.7 was enacted in 2016 and became effective in 2017, and appellant’s motion
to vacate was timely filed under the provisions of the statute. (See Alatorre, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 752–753; People v. Perez, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1015–
1016; § 1473.7, subd. (b)(1), (2).)
       D.     The Trial Court’s Findings
       As explained above, we apply independent review and exercise our independent
judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law in a section 1473.7
motion. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319; accord, Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 527.) In doing so, we “must give deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if
they are based on ‘ “ ‘the credibility of witnesses the [trial court] heard and
observed.’ ” ’ ” (Espinoza, at p. 320; accord, Vivar, at p. 527.) While appellant testified
at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court did not reject the credibility of his testimony and
declarations about the existence of his valid passport and his reasonable belief that he was
a citizen because he had the passport.

                                              33.
       Indeed, the trial court found appellant believed he was a citizen when he entered
his plea based on his father’s information that appellant became a citizen when he entered
the country, and because he applied for and was issued a passport by the Department
“which further confirmed his belief, in his mind, that he was a United States citizen.”
The court found that “at that time when [appellant] took his plea, I believe [he] believed
he was a [United States] citizen and didn’t have immigration consequences,” and
appellant’s belief he was a citizen was corroborated by his passport. Thus, contrary to
the district attorney’s arguments, the court did not reject appellant’s credibility as to his
beliefs about the legal impact of receiving his passport, and the court’s findings are
supported by appellant’s uncontradicted declarations and testimony.
       We conclude that while appellant’s belief that he was a citizen was legally
erroneous, he reasonably believed he was a citizen when he entered his plea in 2008
because the Department issued a valid passport to him in 2006, he had not been informed
that the passport was erroneously issued, and he had no factual or legal reason to consider
whether he would face immigration consequences as a result of his conviction for any
criminal offense since he was already a citizen of the United States. Appellant thus met
his burden to establish he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences
of his plea based on his own error.
III.   Prejudicial Error
       The next question is whether appellant met his burden to show prejudicial error.
“What someone seeking to withdraw a plea under section 1473.7 must show is more than
merely an error ‘damaging [his] ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences’ of the plea.
[Citation.] The error must also be ‘prejudicial.’ ” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 528.)

                                              34.
       A.     Factors to Evaluate Prejudice
       The California Supreme Court has set forth certain factors to determine whether
the moving party met his burden to show prejudicial error under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a)(1).
       “At the heart of the prejudicial error analysis ‘is the mindset of the defendant and
what he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the time the plea was taken.’ ”
(People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 713–714 (Lopez).)

               “To determine whether there is a reasonable probability a defendant
       would have rejected a plea offer if he had understood its immigration
       consequences, courts must ‘consider the totality of the circumstances.’
       [Citation.] ‘Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the
       defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed
       on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea
       bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-
       neutral negotiated disposition was possible.’ [Citations.] Also relevant are
       the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if he had
       rejected the plea, as well as the difference between the bargained-for term
       and the likely term if he were convicted at trial. [Citation.] These factors
       are not exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to
       relief.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 320–321; accord, Vivar, supra,
       11 Cal.5th at pp. 529–530.)

               “Ties to the United States are an important factor in evaluating
       prejudicial error under section 1473.7 because they shed light on a
       defendant’s immigration priorities. [Citation.] ‘[W]hen long-standing
       noncitizen residents of this country are accused of committing a crime, the
       most devastating consequence may not be a prison sentence, but their
       removal and exclusion from the United States.’ [Citation.] Depending on
       the strength of a defendant’s community ties, ‘the prospect of deportation’
       may be ‘ “an integral part” ’ or ‘ “the most important part” ’ of the
       defendant’s ‘calculus in responding to certain criminal charges.’ [Citation.]
       Community ties may be established by length of residence; immigration
       status; lack of connection to the country of origin; connections to family,
       friends, or the community; work history or financial ties; or other forms of
       attachment.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321, second bracketed
       insertion in original.)

                                            35.
         “Objective evidence of a defendant’s community ties includes facts provided by a
defendant’s declaration or declarations from family members, friends, colleagues,
community members, or other acquaintances.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.)
A court commits error by disregarding the moving party’s declaration “on the basis that it
did not constitute objective evidence. We made clear in Vivar that a defendant’s
declaration is one form of objective evidence relevant to a prejudicial error inquiry.” (Id.
at p. 322.)
         B.    Bravo, Abdelsalam, and Lopez
         At the evidentiary hearing and on appeal, the People argue appellant failed to
prove prejudicial error, similar to the circumstances in People v. Bravo (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 1063 (Bravo) and People v. Abdelsalam (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654
(Abdelsalam). Appellant disputes the People’s reliance on these cases and argues that
Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 698 is dispositive and supports his claim of prejudicial
error.
         In Bravo, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence and child
cruelty and was placed on probation. (Bravo, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.) The
victims were his girlfriend and their infant child. (Id. at p. 1068.) Bravo held the
defendant’s section 1473.7 motion to vacate his plea was properly denied. (Bravo, at
pp. 1077–1078.) Bravo held the factors required to establish prejudicial error were
“conspicuously absent” because the contemporaneous evidence showed the defendant’s
priority at the time of the plea was to avoid a custodial term so he could keep his job, and
“he elected to take the plea bargain to obtain release and return to his girlfriend and son
and resume his job. There is nothing to substantiate his claim that had he known of the
ultimate immigration consequences he would have refused the plea bargain.” (Id. at
pp. 1074–1075.) Bravo concluded “the events to which [the defendant] pleaded guilty in
1997 were domestic violence and child cruelty felonies against that very girlfriend and
son, undercutting any claim now that he would have put himself in immediate peril of

                                             36.
deportation … by a pending ICE sweep at the jail in order to go to trial in an attempt to
avoid later immigration consequences.” (Id. at p. 1077, italics added.)
       In Abdelsalam, the defendant arrived in the United States sponsored by his
girlfriend “on a fiancé visa” and secretly planned to divorce her once they were married
and he gained citizenship. (Abdelsalam, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 658.) His girlfriend
discovered his plan, ended their relationship, and reported the defendant to immigration
authorities. (Ibid.) When he learned of her actions, the defendant assaulted her with a
knife. (Ibid.) He was charged with multiple offenses and faced 10 years in prison. (Id.
at pp. 658–659.) The defendant pleaded no contest to one count and was placed on
probation for five years. (Id. at p. 659.) At the plea hearing, the court specifically
advised the defendant, “ ‘If you are not a citizen of the United States your plea will result
in your deportation, denial of naturalization and amnesty, and exclusion from the United
States,’ ” as a result of the plea if he was not a citizen. (Id. at p. 660.) The defendant said
he understood but was “ ‘just going to wait for immigration.’ ” (Ibid.) He was later
detained by federal immigration authorities and filed a section 1473.7 motion to vacate
his plea, and it was denied. (Abdelsalam, at p. 659.)
       Abdelsalam held the defendant failed to establish prejudicial error because he “had
just arrived here. And he was admitted on a fraudulently procured fiancé visa, with an
intent to gain citizenship by deception. In the short time he was here, [he] engaged in
conduct that got him arrested for stalking, assaulting, burglarizing, and threatening the
person who had made his presence here possible. She wanted him deported. Deportation
agents literally sat in on his preliminary hearing. He faced 10 years in prison, and now
claims he would have somehow avoided deportation and rejected the plea agreement that
resulted in only a few months of additional custody.” (Abdelsalam, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 665, italics added.)
       In contrast to Bravo and Abdelsalam, the court in Lopez found the defendant in
that case met his burden to prove prejudicial error. (Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at

                                             37.
p. 719.) The defendant came to the United States when he was 13 years old, grew up in
this country, completed high school, and became a lawful permanent resident. (Id. at
p. 706.) In 1998, when he was 22 years old, the defendant was charged with four counts
of second degree robbery and one count of attempted second degree murder. (Id. at
p. 705.) The robberies were committed by an accomplice, while the defendant was the
getaway driver and provided the air pellet gun that the accomplice used during the
offenses. (Id. at p. 704.)
       At the time the defendant in Lopez was charged, he had a stable employment and
residential history, and financially supported his mother. (Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th
at p. 705.) The defendant had never been previously arrested, and he did not have any
prior convictions or experience with the criminal justice system. (Id. at p. 707.) The
defendant’s family retained an attorney, David Kwan, to represent the defendant, but
Mr. Kwan never asked the defendant about his immigration status. Mr. Kwan had died
by the time the defendant filed his motion to vacate (id. at p. 718, fn.10), but the
defendant declared Mr. Kwan thought the defendant was a citizen and never mentioned
that adverse immigration consequences could result from the plea (id. at pp. 706–707).
The defendant further declared that Mr. Kwan did not explain the significance of a
noncitizen being convicted of an aggravated felony under federal immigration law, and
Mr. Kwan did not tell the defendant that he would lose his lawful permanent resident
status if he pleaded to robbery. Instead, Mr. Kwan only discussed the seriousness of the
defendant’s case, how much time he was facing if convicted, and the defendant’s goal of
trying to get jail time and avoid state prison. (Id. at p. 707.)
       The defendant in Lopez pleaded no contest to one count of second degree robbery
and was sentenced to the lower term of two years. (Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 705–706.) The defendant received the section 1016.5 advisement at the plea hearing,
but he incorrectly presumed the warning did not apply to him because he was a lawful
permanent resident. (Ibid.) The defendant first learned of the mandatory immigration

                                              38.
consequences of his conviction when he was deported to Mexico. (Id. at p. 707.)
Thereafter, the defendant filed a section 1473.7 motion to vacate his plea and argued that
he did not appreciate the seriousness of the charge and the mandatory immigration
consequences that would occur by entering a plea as a result of his own error and
ignorance. (Lopez, at pp. 706–707.)
       Lopez held the trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s section 1473.7
motion because the defendant’s declaration explained “a reasonable basis for his
erroneous belief that he would not be subject to adverse immigration consequences: In
the absence of any advice from counsel, [the defendant] incorrectly assumed that his
status as a lawful permanent resident of the United States shielded him from any possible
adverse immigration consequences mentioned by the prosecutor at his plea hearing. At
the time of his plea, [the defendant] was only 22 years old and had no previous
encounters with the criminal justice system during which he might have received legal
advice about the immigration consequences of a conviction. [His] lawyer never asked
about his immigration status, nor did he mention that a conviction for robbery constitutes
an aggravated felony under federal immigration law which would subject appellant to
mandatory deportation. The record also reveals no effort by his attorney to negotiate a
plea that would not carry such dire immigration consequences.” (Lopez, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 712–713.)
       Lopez further held the defendant’s undisputed declaration established his error was
prejudicial because his “personal history, deep ties to the United States, and at the time of
his plea, his youth and lack of experience with the criminal justice and immigration
systems sufficiently corroborate [his] claim that his ability to remain in the United States
with his family was a paramount concern. In the absence of any legal advice about the
dire immigration consequences that would follow from his plea and conviction, [he]
accepted a plea to an aggravated felony in the mistaken belief that the warning about

                                             39.
possible adverse immigration consequences did not apply to him because of his lawful
permanent resident status.” (Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 719.)
       C.       Analysis
       We find that, as in Lopez, appellant met his burden to show prejudicial error.
Appellant’s background and circumstances are similar to those found sufficient in Lopez.
Appellant legally entered the United States in 2005 when he was 18 years old as a lawful
permanent resident and lived with his family in Bakersfield. Appellant was regularly
employed, initially worked with his father in Bakersfield, went to other states and worked
for various family members, and then returned to Bakersfield and worked at convenience
stores. He did not have any prior convictions. As explained above, he obtained a valid
passport and reasonably believed he was a citizen. In contrast to Abdelsalam, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th 654, there is no evidence he committed any fraud or perjury when he
entered the country and applied for the passport.
       In 2008, appellant was charged with committing lewd and lascivious acts on a
minor, who was his girlfriend’s son. His statements at the time of his plea and sentence
indicated that he hoped for probation and/or a minimal custodial term so he could
continue to support his family since his father was on disability and unable to work.
While appellant had been in the United States for less time than the defendant in Bravo,
he did not claim he wanted to avoid a custodial sentence so he could support the victims
of his crime.
       The trial court denied appellant’s section 1473.7 motion because the record
showed that at the time of his plea, appellant “was looking to mitigate the amount of time
he would have [to] spend in custody” and get a disposition “that would entail as little
time as possible,” and he agreed to the plea agreement for either probation or the lower
term of three years.
       We agree with the trial court that at the time of his plea in 2008, appellant’s
primary concern was to minimize his time in custody so he could continue to financially

                                             40.
support his family, based on his statements in the probation report and the section 288.1
psychological evaluation. Appellant’s intent at the time of the plea, however, must be
considered in light of the undisputed evidence that at the same time, he reasonably
believed he had a valid passport that was issued by the Department, which meant he was
a citizen, and he could not be deported or removed from the United States regardless of
the nature of the charged offense, a possible plea agreement, or a conviction after trial.
As in Lopez, appellant’s declarations and testimony on this point were undisputed.
       In his supporting declaration, appellant stated that if he had known about his actual
immigration status at the time of his plea and faced deportation, he would have
immediately rejected the plea bargain, consulted with an immigration attorney, directed
his attorney to negotiate an immigration-safe plea agreement even if it meant serving
additional time in prison, or gone to trial and accepted the risk of a higher prison term.
“Even if I had to do a state prison sentence for a number of years, I still did not want to
permanently leave the U.S. and my family behind, and potentially never see them again
or … be unable to take care of my father.” Appellant declared he would have been sent
back to an area of Jerusalem that, “as a practical matter,” was controlled by extremist
militia groups and his situation would have been “calamitous” because his conviction for
committing a sex crime against a child could result in his torture or death by these
groups.
       Appellant did not present any evidence or arguments about potential
“immigration-neutral” pleas that might have been available at the time of his plea in
2008. However, “[a] decision to reject a plea bargain … ‘might be based either on the
desire to go to trial or on the hope or expectation of negotiating a different bargain
without immigration consequences.’ [Citation.] When a court weighs whether a
defendant would have taken the latter path, it need not decide whether the prosecution
would actually ‘have offered a different bargain’—rather, the court should consider

                                             41.
‘evidence that would have caused the defendant to expect or hope a different bargain
would or could have been negotiated.’ ” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.)
        The court also found appellant failed to meet his burden to show prejudicial error
because he had already admitted his culpability to the charged offense during the
investigation, the prosecution had a strong case, his chances at trial “would be slim,” and
the plea achieved his goal of minimizing the time he was going to spend in custody.
These factors, however, are not dispositive. “[W]hile the probability of obtaining a more
favorable result at trial may be one factor a court considers in determining prejudice, it is
not controlling or necessarily even the most important factor courts consider. [Citations.]
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has declared that where avoiding deportation
was the deciding factor for a defendant, there is a reasonable probability that such a
defendant ‘would have rejected any plea leading to deportation—even if it shaved off
prison time—in favor of throwing a “Hail Mary” at trial.’ ” (People v. Lopez, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 714–715, quoting Lee v. United States, supra, 582 U.S. at pp. 367–
368.)
        “Because the prospect of deportation ‘is an integral part,’ and often even ‘the most
important part,’ of a noncitizen defendant’s calculus in responding to certain criminal
charges [citation], both the Legislature and the courts have sought to ensure these
defendants receive clear and accurate advice about the impact of criminal convictions on
their immigration status, along with effective remedies when such advice is deficient.”
(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 516.) We conclude appellant’s error was prejudicial
because his goal at the time of his plea, to minimize his custodial time, was based on his
reasonable but legally erroneous belief that he was a citizen and could not be deported
under any circumstances, regardless of the nature of the charges or conviction. In
reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge the seriousness of the offense that he was
charged with and pleaded to but cannot ignore the unique circumstances that were created

                                             42.
by the federal government’s erroneous issuance of the passport to appellant in 2006 and
failure to correct that error until 2012, four years after he entered his plea.
                                       DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order denying appellant’s section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1)
motion to vacate his plea and conviction is reversed, and the matter is remanded for
further appropriate proceedings.

                                                                                  HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, J.

DE SANTOS, J.

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