Court Opinion

ID: 9559126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:23:04.943221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:23.543210
License: Public Domain

PHELPS, Chief Justice
(specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I adhere to the principles of law set forth in the original opinion in this case and therefore concur with the majority opinion on the motion for rehearing insofar as it reaffirms that opinion.- I am still of the view that section 16-604, A.C.A.1939, is not only a law relating to cities but it is a law undertaking to impose a burden upon a city acting in its proprietary capacity the character of which it is without power to impose. We said in Luhrs v. City of Phoenix, 52 Ariz. 438, 83 P.2d 283, that if the activity of a city is carried on as an agent of the state (i. e., in its governmental capacity), it is of general or public concern. If it is exercised by the city in its proprietary capacity it is a power incidental to home rule. It was upon this basis that the original opinion held that section 16-604, supra, conflicted with section 16-303, A.C.A.1939, and therefore must fall.
I did not say in the original opinion that the legislature is without power to exercise proper control over a public utility .op*410erated by a municipality and I do not believe that any logical inference to that effect can be drawn from the language used therein.
It was the law in England and became a part of the common law of this country that when private property is affected with a public interest as is the property of a public utility, that it is subject to such regulation as the body politic may impose from time to time for the protection of the people and the promotion of the general welfare. These principles were clearly denounced in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77. Chief Justice Waite there said:.
“ * * * Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use} and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)
Lord Hale said in his treatise De Jure Maris, 1 Harg L.Tr. 6:
“The King has a right of franchise or privilege, that no man may set up a common ferry for all passengers, without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from the King. * *■ This privilege or prerogative of the-King, who in this connection only represents and gives another name to the body politic, is not primarily for his-profit, but for the protection of the people and the promotion of the general welfare.”
It will be seen that the power of the legislature is regulatory in character primarily for the protection of the public and not for' the profit of the owner of the property affected with a public interest.
The very foundation upon which the system of legalized and regulated monopoly rests in this state is the convenience and. necessity of the public. Judge Lockwood, said in Corporation Commission v. People’s. Freight Line, Inc., 41 Ariz. 158, 16 P.2d 420, 422, that:
“ * * * history and experience both clearly demonstrated that public convenience and necessity are not furthered in most cases by the maintenance and operation of a number of competing plants or systems of the same character to supply a locality, but that they are generally far better served in the long run by the maintenance only of the smallest number of such instrumentalities which will adequately serve the public needs'. * *” Later in the opinion he said:
“The various public utility acts which have been passed of recent years have *411therefore generally declared either in precise language or implied in effect that it is not ordinarily for the general welfare to permit such corporations to compete with each other unless the circumstances show clearly that it is necessary to protect the interests of the public.”
Again I say that the primary concern in such matters is to protect the interests of the public, not the investment of the property owner engaged in a public utility business.
The legislature of Arizona has no power whatever to pass legislation either requiring a municiality to purchase the physical property of a public utility operating within its corporate limits as a condition precedent to entering into competition with such public utility or to require it to pay damages to such public utility as a condition precedent to entering into competition with it. If a municipality enters the territory being served by the public utility and in the process of installing the city’s own water system it damages the pipe line or other physical property of the utility it is liable in damages to the extent of the damage done. Or if the municipality in entering the field takes possession of the physical property of the public utility within its corporate limits, thus depriving such public utility of its possession and use of such property, the city is subject to damages for such taking under the law of eminent domain. .
As was said by Chief Justice Waite in the Munn case, supra, the owner of a puDlic utility submits to the control by the legislature for the common good only to the extent of the interest he has granted to the public in its use. The entire history of this law as it existed in England and as it has been developed in the United States clearly indicates that the control of the legislature over such property is limited primarily “to the protection of the people and promotion of the general welfare.” In the instant case its powers are limited to requiring that public convenience and necessity be met in such matters as requiring adequate service to be rendered in the area affected for domestic use, fire protection, sewer and other uses as well as compelling it to meet public health requirements, etc. Beyond the limit of the interest granted to the public, such property is exclusively juris privati and therefore as free from legislative control as any other private property. I am convinced that no case can be found sustaining the view that the legislative control extends as far as the majority opinion on rehearing has gone. It is my view that the legislature, in the exercise of its police powers, must stay within the limits of police powers and that those powers do not authorize it to compel the city of Tucson to levy taxes upon its citizens for the purpose of reimbursing the Polar Wáter Company operating within its corporate limits for losses it may sustain as a result of competition with the municipality.