Court Opinion

ID: 9898881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 16:05:12.16826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:52.341312
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

                            JAMAL SANDERS,

                                 Appellee.

                              No. 2D22-881

                           November 15, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Cynthia S. Oster,
Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Elba Caridad Martin,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Pamela H. Izakowitz,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.

MORRIS, Judge.
     The State of Florida appeals from an order dismissing its
information in which it charged Jamal Sanders with battery. The State
attempted to amend the information during trial when it was discovered
that the date of the alleged offense was incorrect. However, the trial
court denied the State's request and instead granted Sanders' oral
motion to dismiss the information. A written order of dismissal was
entered thereafter. We conclude that the trial court erred, and we
therefore reverse.
                                    FACTS
     The information alleged that on February 7, 2020, Sanders
committed a battery in Tampa, Florida, during a tailgating party for the
Super Bowl. The police report that formed the basis for the information
listed the same date of offense, but it was signed by the investigating
officer on February 15, 2021.
     Just after the victim was sworn in to testify at trial, the State
recognized that the date listed in the information was incorrect and that
it should have reflected the alleged date of offense as February 7, 2021.
The State requested to file an amended information, but Sanders'
counsel made an oral motion to dismiss, arguing that the defense would
be prejudiced by such an amendment because it had relied on the
February 7, 2020, date in preparing for trial. The trial court declined to
allow the State to amend the information, instead granting the oral
motion to dismiss and subsequently entering a written order in
accordance with its oral ruling.
                                   ANALYSIS
     We review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion. See
State v. Erickson, 852 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (applying
abuse of discretion standard of review where trial court denied State's
request to amend information).
     The State is permitted to amend an information during trial, even if
the defendant objects, "unless there is a showing of prejudice to the
substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Clements, 903 So. 2d 919,
921 (Fla. 2005) (quoting State v. Anderson, 537 So. 2d 1373, 1375 (Fla.
1989)). "[T]he State's ability to amend an information is not unfettered,"

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see id., but "technical defects which have no bearing upon the
substantial rights of the parties" are typically excused, Lackos v. State,
339 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976) (quoting Lackos v. State, 326 So. 2d 220,
221 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)). "A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a
perfect trial." Lackos, 326 So. 2d at 221 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433 (1974)). Thus, an "amendment is permissible when it merely
clarifies some detail of the existing charge and could not reasonably have
caused the defendant any prejudice." Taylor v. State, 232 So. 3d 453,
456 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting Green v. State, 728 So. 2d 779, 781 (Fla.
4th DCA 1999)).
     The State is required to allege the time of the commission of a
particular offense as specifically as possible in an information. Howlett
v. State, 260 So. 2d 878, 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) (citing Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.140(d)(3)). "However, Florida courts have long regarded variances
between the time of the offense as alleged and the time as proved at trial
as non-fatal." Id.
     There may be some variance between the date alleged in the
     information as being the date the offense charged was
     committed and that proven on the trial, which variance is
     immaterial if the proof shows that the crime was committed
     before the filing of the information and that prosecution
     therefor was begun within the two year period, except in
     those rare cases (not here in point) where the exact time
     enters into the nature or legal existence of the offense.
Horton v. Mayo, 15 So. 2d 327, 328 (Fla. 1943) (en banc) (first citing
Alexander v. State, 23 So. 536 (Fla. 1898); then citing Thorp v. State, 59
So. 193 (Fla. 1912); then citing Hunter v. State, 95 So. 115 (Fla. 1923);
and then citing Overstreet v. Whiddon, 177 So. 701 (Fla. 1937)). Where
the defense is not based on an alibi or on another theory for which the
time element is important, the exception for "those rare cases . . . where

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the exact time enters into the nature or legal existence of the offense" is
not applicable. Howlett, 260 So. 2d at 880 (quoting Horton, 15 So. 2d at
328).1
      Furthermore, there is no prejudice to a defendant from a change in
the date of the alleged offense where the defendant was on notice of the
correct date and thus could not have relied on the incorrect date to his or
her detriment. See State v. Garcia, 692 So. 2d 984, 986 (Fla. 3d DCA
1997). In that situation, a change in the date is merely "a clerical
correction." Id.; cf. Hoffman v. State, 372 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 4th DCA
1979) (concluding that the appellant did not demonstrate prejudice
resulting from the State's inclusion of the wrong date of the alleged
offense in its statement of particulars where the appellant knew of the
mistake before trial but did not claim an alibi or file a notice of intention
to claim alibi).
      To allow the defendant in a criminal case, with full knowledge
      of the crime alleged against him and with knowledge of a
      technical error [in the date of the alleged crime] on a pleading,
      to wait in ambush for the state until the jury is sworn [and]
      then spring his trap is tantamount to asking the court to
      referee a game of hide and seek.
Hoffman, 372 So. 2d at 534.
      Here, the information incorrectly alleged that the battery was
committed on February 7, 2020. The police report stated this was the
date of the offense, but it was signed by the arresting officer on February
15, 2021. The correct date of the offense was February 7, 2021.

      1 Cf. Davis v. State, 740 So. 2d 86, 87-88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)

(reversing for a new trial and explaining that the amended information
changed the date of the offense which was significant in that case
because the defendant denied committing the offense and stated an
intention to present an alibi defense).
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     In denying the State's request to amend the information and in
granting Sanders' oral motion to dismiss, the trial court focused on the
facts that (1) the police report listed the same incorrect date of the
alleged offense and (2) Sanders had not been arrested at the time of the
offense, which would have put him on notice of the date of the alleged
offense. Thus the trial court concluded that there was no record
evidence that Sanders had been on notice of the correct date.
     We conclude that this was error. In the description of the alleged
offense, the police report clearly indicated that it took place during a
tailgating party for the Super Bowl and that the location was at a
particular address in Tampa. The State has alleged—and Sanders does
not refute—that the Super Bowl was held in Tampa on February 7, 2021.
The address where the alleged offense took place is very near Raymond
James Stadium, where the Super Bowl was held on that date.2 Based on
the descriptive information contained in the police report, it strains
credibility to believe that Sanders had no notice of the correct date of the
offense and was somehow misled by the incorrect year of the offense
being cited in both the police report and the information. The 2020
Super Bowl was held on February 2, 2020, in Miami, Florida.3 Thus, to
conclude that Sanders would be prejudiced by allowing the State to
amend the information, this court would have to accept that Sanders
was misled into believing that the State was alleging that he committed
the crime during a tailgating party for the Super Bowl that was held
several days after the 2020 Super Bowl was played and in a different city

     2 We take judicial notice of this fact pursuant to section 90.202(12),

Florida Statutes (2023).
     3 We take judicial notice of this fact pursuant to section 90.202(12).

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from the one in which the 2020 Super Bowl was played. We will not defy
logic by doing so.
      We note too that when the amendment issue arose at trial, defense
counsel pointed out that the trial had been set for several weeks during
which time the State could have sought to amend the information.
Defense counsel asserted that the defense had relied on the incorrect
date and that "because . . . it was incorrect[,] we did intend to move to
dismiss." This implies that the defense was aware that the information
contained the incorrect date prior to trial. If defense counsel was, in fact,
aware of the technical error prior to trial, then his strategic decision not
to challenge it until after the jury was sworn should not be rewarded.
      But even assuming defense counsel was not aware of the issue
prior to trial, Sanders is not entitled to relief. Sanders did not claim alibi
as a defense. Nor did he even assert that his defense was somehow
prejudiced other than to conclusively state that he "had relied on the
date listed in the information." Thus this is not one of those rare cases
wherein the variance in the date of the charged offense and the date
proven at trial was fatal to the prosecution.
      The trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the State's request
to amend the information and by thereafter granting Sanders' oral
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the
information.
      Reversed and remanded.

SLEET, C.J., and LaROSE, J., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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