Court Opinion

ID: 9398144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 14:12:53.739434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.165170
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Athey, Chaney and Lorish
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Richmond, Virginia

              EMER GONZALEZ-ESTRADA, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS
                 EMER GONZALEZ ESTRADA
                                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.    Record No. 0033-22-2              JUDGE VERNIDA R. CHANEY
                                                            MAY 30, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
                                            Clarence N. Jenkins, Jr., Judge

                              Aaron C. Forstie, Senior Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

                              Matthew P. Dullaghan, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                              Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond (circuit court), Emer

              Gonzalez Estrada (Estrada) appeals three felony convictions for aggravated sexual battery in

              violation of Code § 18.2-67.3 and three felony convictions for taking indecent liberties with a

              child in violation of Code § 18.2-370. Estrada contends on appeal that the circuit court erred in

              (1) denying his motion to suppress statements obtained in violation of his Miranda v. Arizona,

              384 U.S. 436 (1996), rights, (2) denying his motion in limine to exclude irrelevant and unduly

              prejudicial photographs of the complaining witnesses, and (3) denying his motion to strike based

              on the inherent unreliability of the Commonwealth’s evidence. Finding no error in the circuit

              court’s judgment, this Court affirms Estrada’s convictions.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
                                           BACKGROUND

       “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party” in the circuit court. McGowan v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 516 (2020) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472

(2018)). This Court “regard[s] as true all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all

inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence.” Id. (citing Gerald, 295 Va. at 473).

                              A. Estrada’s Sexual Abuse of His Children

       For approximately eight years, from around 2007 to 2015, Estrada frequently sexually

abused his daughter, L.G. For approximately seven years, from around 2011 to 2018, Estrada

frequently sexually abused his son, O.T.1 O.T. is a year older than L.G., and they were born to

two different mothers. O.T. and L.G. resided in separate residences with their mothers and had

overnight visits with Estrada on weekends.2

       Estrada sexually abused L.G. from the time she was 5 or 6 years old until she was around

12, when she refused to visit Estrada’s home. The sexual abuse of L.G. included manually

touching each other’s genitals on multiple occasions.

       From the time O.T. was 10 or 11 years old until he was 17, Estrada sexually abused him

many times—probably more than a hundred times. The sexual abuse of O.T. included multiple

acts of oral and anal sex. At times, Estrada sexually abused O.T. and L.G. when they were all

together in the same bed or in the shower.

       1
           To protect the victims’ privacy, they are identified by initials throughout this opinion.
       2
       For a brief period when O.T. was a teenager, O.T. and his mother resided in the same
home with Estrada.
                                            -2-
                          B. The Victims’ Disclosures of Sexual Abuse

       In January 2019, L.G. disclosed to her mother that Estrada had sexually abused her and

O.T. The next day, L.G. called O.T. and told him that she planned to tell his mother about

Estrada’s sexual abuse because she did not want their younger sister to be sexually abused by

Estrada. O.T. asked L.G. not to tell his mother that Estrada had sexually abused him because he

feared she would “break down and cry” or be angry with him. When O.T. overheard L.G.’s

mother telling his mother about Estrada’s sexual abuse of L.G., O.T. cried and told his mother

that Estrada had sexually abused him too. Subsequently, O.T. and L.G., accompanied by their

mothers, went to the police station and reported Estrada’s sexual abuse.

       In February 2019, O.T. and L.G. were interviewed at the Henrico Child Advocacy Center

(CAC) by Stephanie Davis, an expert in the disclosure of child sexual abuse. The CAC works in

conjunction with the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office, law enforcement, child protective

services, and others in a multidisciplinary team. After L.G.’s first CAC interview, L.G. told her

mother that she did not disclose that Estrada once attempted to touch her vagina with his penis.

L.G.’s mother called and informed the prosecutor, and the prosecutor advised that L.G. should

return to the CAC for a second interview to inform them about the incident. At her mother’s

urging, L.G. arranged a second interview at the CAC in July 2019, when she reported the

previously undisclosed incident of sexual abuse by Estrada.

       Elsa Estrada, Estrada’s mother and the grandmother of O.T. and L.G., testified that she

had a good relationship with O.T. and L.G. prior to the allegations of sexual abuse, and they

never told her about any inappropriate interactions with Estrada. She also testified that she never

heard or saw anything inappropriate between Estrada and his children, although her bedroom

shared a wall with Estrada’s bedroom, and she could hear from her bedroom what was happening

                                               -3-
in Estrada’s room. She further testified that if she thought Estrada had sexually abused his

children, she would have immediately kicked him out of the house and called the police.

       When O.T. testified at trial, he made contradictory statements about whether he had ever

performed oral sex on Estrada. O.T. acknowledged that some of his testimony was inconsistent

with statements he made during his interviews with police, prosecutors, and the CAC. On

re-direct examination, O.T. explained that he told a police officer that Estrada did not have oral

sex with him because the officer had questioned him in a hallway with no privacy and in the

presence of his mother, whom he didn’t want to upset with the information. O.T. further testified

that he kept Estrada’s sexual abuse a secret for years because he was afraid that his mother might

get angry at him and kick him out of the house.

       Ms. Davis from the CAC, testifying as an expert in the disclosure of child sexual abuse,

testified that “[i]t is very common for children to delay disclosure” of sexual abuse. And there is

usually a longer delay in disclosures of sexual abuse within a family. Ms. Davis further testified

that the majority of the children interviewed at the Henrico CAC and other child advocacy

centers around the United States do not promptly disclose sexual abuse. Additionally, Ms. Davis

confirmed that an authoritative article on the disclosure of child sexual abuse reported that “there

is a consensus in the research literature that most people who experience sexual abuse in

childhood do not disclose until adulthood.”

                                C. Estrada’s Statements to Police

       After O.T. and L.G. were interviewed at CAC, Estrada was arrested and interrogated by

Detective Gerald Brissette at Richmond Police headquarters. Before the interrogation, O.T.,

L.G., and their mothers told Detective Brissette that Estrada spoke both Spanish and English.

       At the beginning of the interrogation, Detective Brissette read Estrada his Miranda rights:

               I am Detective Gerald Brissette of the Richmond Police
               Department.
                                                -4-
               1. You have an absolute right to remain silent and make no
                  statement to me.

               2. Any statement you make can be used as evidence against you.

               3. You have the right to the presence of an attorney at this and
                  any future interviews the police might have with you. If you
                  are unable to hire an attorney, the court will appoint one for
                  you.

               I understand that I am being interviewed regarding the commission
               of a felony and or misdemeanor Crime. I understand these rights,
               and I wish to waive them and make a statement.

After the detective read aloud the statement of each Miranda right on the waiver form, he asked

Estrada if he understood and Estrada answered, “Yes” or nodded yes. When Detective Brissette

handed Estrada the Miranda waiver form, Estrada asked where he should sign the form and then

immediately signed it. Estrada never asked for an attorney.

       During the police interrogation, Estrada never requested a Spanish interpreter and never

requested that the interrogation be conducted in Spanish. Detective Brissette testified that he

experienced no problems communicating with Estrada in English.

       At the time of the interrogation, Estrada was 42 years old. Estrada told Detective

Brissette that he had lived in the United States since 1994. During the interrogation, Estrada

used English to spell his name, provide his date of birth, state his street address, affirm that he

knew the mothers of O.T. and L.G., and acknowledge that O.T. and L.G. were his children.

       During the interrogation, Estrada admitted that sometimes he slept in the same bed with

his children, but he initially denied ever inappropriately touching O.T. and L.G. Subsequently,

he admitted to Detective Brissette that he may have inappropriately touched them when he was

drunk or when they were playing. When Detective Brissette became “concerned things may be

lost in translation,” he arranged for Detective Jose Cartagena, who is fluent in Spanish, to join

                                                 -5-
and participate in the interrogation. Detective Cartagena did not advise Estrada of his Miranda

rights in Spanish.

       After about an hour of interrogation, Estrada admitted in Spanish that he had touched his

children “[w]here [he] shouldn’t have touched them.” Immediately thereafter, in response to

Detective Brissette’s inquiry in English, Estrada admitted touching O.T.’s penis. When

Detective Cartagena asked when this touching occurred, Estrada eventually answered, “I can’t

give you an exact date. It was maybe 2014.” After Detective Cartagena asked Estrada to tell

him what else happened, Estrada replied, “Just one touch, and that’s all, that’s all, that’s all.”

                          D. Motion to Suppress Statements to Detectives

       In July 2020, a hearing was held on Estrada’s motion to suppress his statements to

Detectives Brissette and Cartagena. The Commonwealth stipulated that Estrada was in custody

during the interrogation. Estrada argued that the Commonwealth could not prove that Estrada

knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights given Estrada’s limited English

competence and lack of understanding of the American criminal justice system. The

Commonwealth argued that Estrada was sufficiently proficient in English to understand the

Miranda warnings and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The

Commonwealth argued that Estrada demonstrated that he had no trouble understanding English

when he answered Detective Brissette’s questions during the interrogation.

       Estrada testified that he was born in Guatemala and his family spoke Spanish at home.

He went to school through the sixth grade, and all his classes were conducted in Spanish. He

never had any formal English instruction. He can read and write in Spanish, but he can only read

English “a little bit,” and he is unable to write in English. He moved to the United States in

1994. At the time of the suppression hearing, he had lived in the U.S. for 26 years. He resided

in Virginia with his mother and siblings, and they all spoke Spanish at home. His employers

                                                 -6-
have been primarily Spanish-speaking, and he usually speaks in Spanish with his co-workers. As

a construction worker and HVAC worker, he does not interact with the public at work. When

shopping, he speaks in English when necessary. Estrada also testified that O.T. and L.G. spoke

to him in “Spanglish . . . like half Spanish and half English.”

       Estrada further testified that before he was arrested in this case, he had never heard the

term “Miranda warnings” and never had Miranda rights read to him, although he had been

arrested twice. Before the February 2019 interrogation, he had never been questioned in a police

interrogation room. At the time of the interrogation, he did not know the meaning of the English

words “appoint” and “waive.” Estrada also testified that he signed the Miranda rights waiver

form without reading it because he was nervous and he “just wanted to sign the paper and get out

of this.” On cross-examination, Estrada acknowledged that he had conversed with Detective

Brissette in English for almost an hour.

       The circuit court found that Estrada acknowledged his understanding of each Miranda

right that the detective read to him when he “either nodded his head or said, ‘Yes’” when asked

whether he understood. The circuit court concluded that Estrada’s responses indicated that he

understood his Miranda rights before the detectives questioned him.

       After viewing the video of Estrada’s conversation with Detective Brissette in English, the

circuit court made “the factual determination that [Estrada] clearly understood the English

language” and “had the requisite level of comprehension to validly waive his Miranda rights.”

The circuit court found that during the interrogation, “Estrada was speaking in sentence form.

He was not speaking in broken English, but he was putting his sentence structures together very

fluently as if he had no problems at all understanding the English language.” Based on the

totality of the circumstances, the circuit court found that Estrada knowingly and voluntarily

waived his Miranda rights “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned

                                                -7-
and the consequences of the decision to abandon.” Accordingly, the circuit court denied

Estrada’s motion to suppress his statements to the detectives.

                           E. Motion to Exclude Photos of the Victims

       Estrada moved in limine to exclude photos depicting O.T. as a teenager and depicting

L.G. at ages ranging from 6 to 11. At the time of trial, O.T. was age 20 and L.G. was 19.

Estrada objected that the photos had no probative value and were not relevant. Estrada further

argued that “balance[ing] under Rule 403 the probative value against any unfair prejudice[,] . . .

the photos of — especially [L.G.] as a young girl are inflammatory and don’t really add anything

to whether or not these offenses occurred.”

       The Commonwealth argued that it was required to prove, as an element of the charged

offenses, the age of each complaining witness at the time of the offense. The Commonwealth

proffered that the photos were relevant because the complaining witnesses were younger at the

time of the alleged offenses and the photos depicted them at those ages.

       The circuit court found that the photos were relevant and denied Estrada’s motion. Two

photos admitted into evidence depicted O.T. at ages 16 and 15. Four photos admitted into

evidence depicted L.G. at approximate ages 6, 7, 10, and 11.

                                       F. Motions to Strike

       After the Commonwealth rested its case, Estrada moved to strike the evidence and argued

that the complaining witnesses’ testimony was inherently incredible, impeached, and

uncorroborated. The Commonwealth responded that corroboration is not required and that the

credibility issue was a question for the jury. The Commonwealth also argued that O.T.’s

testimony and L.G.’s testimony were mutually corroborating and described incidents that they

both witnessed. The circuit court ruled that the Commonwealth established a prima facie case on

                                               -8-
all charges and denied the motion to strike. The court also ruled that the issue of witness

credibility was a question for the jury.

       After the defense rested, Estrada renewed his motion to strike based on his previous

arguments. Additionally, Estrada argued that his motion to strike should be granted based on

(i) his testimony denying the accusations and (ii) his mother’s testimony that she never saw or

heard anything that would lead her to believe the children’s allegations of sexual abuse. The

circuit court ruled that the issues raised by Estrada were jury issues and denied the renewed

motion to strike. This appeal followed.

                                           ANALYSIS

                          A. Motion to Suppress Statements to Detectives

       Estrada contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress his

statements to detectives during custodial interrogation because his statements were elicited in

violation of his rights under Miranda. As a Spanish-speaking immigrant from Guatemala with a

sixth-grade education and no formal instruction in English, Estrada claims that he did not

understand the Miranda warnings that the detective read to him in English. Estrada argues,

therefore, that he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.

       The Commonwealth “bears the burden of showing a knowing and intelligent waiver” of

Miranda rights. Angel v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 248, 257-58 (2011). “The determination of

whether the [Miranda] waiver was made knowingly and intelligently is a question of fact that

will not be set aside on appeal unless plainly wrong.” Id. at 258 (citing Jackson v.

Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 432 (2003)). “[W]hether a [waiver] was voluntary is a ‘legal

rather than factual question.’” Tirado v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 15, 28 (2018) (quoting Gray v.

Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 324 (1987)). We review legal issues de novo. See Calokoh v.

Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 717, 728 (2023). In reviewing the circuit court’s denial of

                                               -9-
Estrada’s motion to suppress, we consider the evidence admitted at trial in addition to the

evidence admitted in the suppression hearing. See Tirado, 296 Va. at 24-25. Additionally, we

“view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, here the Commonwealth,

together with all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it.” Spinner v. Commonwealth,

297 Va. 384, 392 (2019).

       A Miranda waiver is a valid waiver only if it is “made with a full awareness of both the

nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Tirado,

296 Va. at 28 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). “Only if the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite

level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been

waived.” Id. (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421). In determining whether a defendant

comprehended the Miranda warnings, some of the circumstances we consider are “the

defendant’s age, education, language, alienage, experience with police, and whether the

defendant stated that he understood his rights as read to him.” Id. at 29.

       Estrada’s contention that he did not make a valid waiver of his Miranda rights hinges on

his claim that he did not comprehend the Miranda warnings due to his limited understanding of

English. This Court finds that the evidence supports the circuit court’s factual findings that

Estrada “clearly understood the English language” and had the requisite level of comprehension

to validly waive his Miranda rights. The audio-video recording of the police interrogation

supports the circuit court’s finding that Estrada “either nodded his head or said, ‘Yes’” after

Detective Brissette read each Miranda warning to him and asked whether he understood. The

recording and transcript of the interrogation also support the circuit court’s findings that when

speaking in English, “Estrada was speaking in sentence form. He was not speaking in broken

English, but he was putting his sentence structures together very fluently as if he had no

                                               - 10 -
problems at all understanding the English language.” Additionally, O.T., L.G., and their mothers

told Detective Brissette that Estrada speaks both English and Spanish, providing more

evidentiary support for the circuit court’s factual finding that Estrada comprehended and validly

waived his Miranda rights. Because the circuit court’s finding of a knowing and intelligent

Miranda waiver is not plainly wrong considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court

holds that the circuit court did not err in denying Estrada’s motion to suppress his statements to

the detectives.

                             B. Motion to Exclude Photos of the Victims

        Estrada contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude six

photos depicting O.T. and L.G. as children because these photos were irrelevant and unduly

prejudicial. Assuming without deciding that the circuit erred in admitting the contested photos into

evidence, this Court holds that any such error was harmless. See Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va.

411, 419 (2017) (basing decision on harmless error analysis as the best and narrowest ground

available, in accord with the doctrine of judicial restraint).

        “An appellate court reviews a decision to admit or exclude evidence where no federal

constitutional issue was raised under the standard for non-constitutional harmless error provided in

Code § 8.01-678.” Haas v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 465, 467 (2021). Under this standard, an

alleged error is harmless if it did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict. See id. Accordingly,

non-constitutional error is harmless “if other evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the error so

insignificant by comparison that the error could not have affected the verdict . . . .” Salahuddin v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 190, 212 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McLean

v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 200, 211 (2000)).

        The testimony of O.T. and L.G. provided overwhelming evidence that Estrada sexually

abused them as charged in the indictments. By comparison, the erroneous admission of the

                                                  - 11 -
contested photos is so insignificant that such error could not have affected the verdict. The

contested photos of O.T. and L.G. depict them as children in common settings and engaged in

“normal child activities.” Op. Br. 17. These photos did not inculpate Estrada and were not likely to

inflame the jurors’ passions and influence them to base their verdicts on considerations beyond the

evidence. Thus, the admission of the contested photos could not have substantially influenced the

jury’s findings of guilt. Therefore, assuming that the contested photos were erroneously admitted

into evidence, such error was harmless.

                                          C. Motion to Strike

       Estrada contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions because the

complaining witnesses’ testimony was inherently incredible given the years-long delay in reporting

the allegations, the inconsistencies in their testimony, and their prior inconsistent statements. When

an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, this Court

“reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party at

trial, and considers all inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.” Commonwealth v. Herring,

288 Va. 59, 66 (2014) (quoting Allen v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 68, 72 (2014)). At issue on

appeal is “whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021) (quoting Sullivan

v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 (2010)). The circuit court’s judgment will be affirmed

“unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Sarka v. Commonwealth, 73

Va. App. 56, 62 (2021); see also Code § 8.01-680.

       On appellate review, this Court defers to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations unless

the witness’s testimony is “inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it

unworthy of belief.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019) (quoting Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303, 315 (2011)). “A legal determination that a witness is inherently

                                                - 12 -
incredible is very different from the mere identification of inconsistencies in a witness’[s]

testimony or statements. Testimony may be contradictory or contain inconsistencies without

rising to the level of being inherently incredible as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Juniper v.

Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006)). “Determining the credibility of witnesses who give

conflicting accounts is within the exclusive province of the jury, which has the unique opportunity

to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify.” Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300,

304 (1993).

        The testimonial evidence supporting Estrada’s convictions was not inherently incredible

despite the complaining witnesses’ delay in disclosing the sexual abuse. According to the expert

testimony, delays in reporting childhood sexual abuse are very common, and there is usually a

longer delay in disclosures of sexual abuse within a family. Additionally, the expert in the

disclosure of child sexual abuse testified that most people who experience sexual abuse in

childhood do not disclose the abuse until adulthood. Therefore, the fact that O.T. and L.G. were

in their late teens when they reported their experiences of childhood sexual abuse does not render

their testimony inherently incredible. See Juniper, 271 Va. at 415 (holding that a witness’s delay

in reporting knowledge of a case is “appropriately weighed as part of the entire issue of witness

credibility, which is left to the jury to determine”).

        The inconsistencies in the complaining witnesses’ testimony and prior statements did not

render their testimony inherently incredible. O.T. made some contradictory statements during

his trial testimony, and he also acknowledged that some of his testimony was inconsistent with

statements he made during his interviews with police, prosecutors, and the CAC. Additionally,

there were some inconsistencies between O.T.’s and L.G.’s testimony about their experiences of

sexual abuse by Estrada. However, their testimony was not “wholly uncorroborated” and

“replete with contradictions and inconsistencies” as in Willis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 560,

                                                 - 13 -
563-64 (1977) (reversing rape conviction where complaining witness’s testimony was inherently

incredible as a matter of law). In large part, O.T. and L.G. corroborated each other’s testimony

about Estrada’s frequent sexual abuse spanning years of their childhood. And O.T. explained

that he omitted details of Estrada’s sexual abuse from his original police report because his

mother was present, and he did not want to upset her with the information. Here, the

inconsistencies in the complaining witnesses’ testimony were appropriately weighed and

“resolved by the fact finder,” as part of the overall credibility determination. Kelley, 69 Va. App.

at 626 (quoting Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 292 (2011)). The jury observed the

demeanor of O.T. and L.G. as they testified, and the jury credited their testimony in finding

Estrada guilty of sexual abuse as charged. Because this testimony was not inherently incredible,

this Court will not disturb the jury’s verdict.

                                           CONCLUSION

       The circuit court did not err in denying Estrada’s motions to suppress his statements to

detectives, to exclude photos depicting the complaining witnesses as children, and to strike the

evidence based on legal insufficiency. Therefore, this Court affirms Estrada’s convictions.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

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