Court Opinion

ID: 9742607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:16:44.086255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:43.944683
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, P. J.
(dissenting). I dissent. Whether by design or neglect, the parties never raised the constitutional infirmities inherent in the prejudgment garnishment procedure. The logic of Fuentes v Shevin, 407 US 67; 92 S Ct 1983; 32 L Ed 2d 556 (1972), has been applied to a wide variety of situations. Cf. Straley v Gassaway Motor Co Inc, 359 F Supp 902 (SD W Va, 1973); Mason v Garris, 360 F Supp 420 (ND Ga, 1973) (repairman’s lien); Inter City *673Motor Sales v Judge of the Common Pleas Court for the City of Detroit, 42 Mich App 112; 201 NW2d 378 (1972) (replevin); Quebec v Bud’s Auto Service, 105 Cal Rptr 677 (Super, 1973) (mechanic’s lien); Hall v Garson, 468 F2d 845 (CA 5, 1972) (innkeeper’s lien); Oakland National Bank v Anderson (Docket No. 15788, decided August 1, 1973 [unreported]) (replevin). In Western Coach Corp v Shreve, 475 F2d 754 (CA 9, 1973), the Court voided the Arizona prejudgment garnishment statutory scheme for failure to provide adequate notice and opportunity for hearing as required by Fuentes v Shevin, supra. I have serious doubts that our court rule could survive scrutiny for due process violations. I do not think we can safely ignore the constitutional problem.
Several courts, prior to Fuentes v Shevin, supra, considered the constitutionality of prejudgment garnishment of bank accounts in light of Sniadach v Family Finance Corp, 395 US 337; 89 S Ct 1820; 23 L Ed 2d 349 (1969). Sniadach outlawed prejudgment garnishment of wages, apparently because the Court disdained the deprivation of necessities of life absent prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. Courts then split on the question of whether bank accounts were necessities within the scope of Sniadach. Some said the Sniadach rationale simply did not apply; bank accounts are not wages. Cf. Michael’s Jewelers v Handy, 6 Conn Cir 103; 266 A2d 904 (1969); Andrew Brown Co v Painters Warehouse, Inc, 11 Ariz App 571; 466 P2d 790 (1970). Other courts, convinced that due process violations do not depend on the type of property involved, extended the requirement of notice and a prior hearing to prejudgment garnishment of bank deposits. Cf. Randone v Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Sacramento *674County, 5 Cal 3d 536; 96 Cal Rptr 709; 488 P2d 13 (1971); Larson v Fetherston, 44 Wis 2d 712; 172 NW2d 20 (1969). The Supreme Court later apparently adopted the Randone approach in Fuentes, supra.1 The Court explained that its earlier "necessities” language was but a part of the mainstream of its prior due process decisions, requiring an opportunity for a prior hearing before a deprivation of property takes place. The crucial test is whether the procedure deprives a person of any signiñcant property interest without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing.
The threshhold question is whether the freezing of funds in a bank account is a significant property interest within the meaning of Fuentes. While Fuentes disdained establishing gradations in property interests, the interest at stake in a bank account is clearly as crucial as a debtor’s interest in his continued use of replevied goods. Since Fuentes found a defaulting buyer’s possessory interest in goods purchased on a conditional sales contract within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment protection, then appellee’s interest in its own bank account is surely within the scope of interest protected.
Again, in Sniadach the Court indicated that extraordinary circumstances might permit seizure to precede a hearing. In Fuentes, the Court refined the meaning of extraordinary circumstances. Prior hearings can be dispensed with, said the Court, if the seizure is related to an important governmental or general public interest, if prompt action is *675required by a special need, and if the person initiating the seizure is a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that the taking is justified and necessary in the circumstances. I think our court rule meets, and must yield to, the same criticism as the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes in Fuentes. First, no important governmental interest is served, only the interest of a private creditor acting for his own gain. Next, no special need for prompt action is shown. While Fuentes posits a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger, destruction or concealment, our statute is not so narrowly drawn. Why should the creditor’s apprehension of loss, a subjective state of mind, supported by facts, justify deprivation of a significant property interest without a prior hearing? Finally, our statute effectively abdicates state control since no judicial scrutiny occurs before the seizure. The garnishment writ issues automatically upon the filing of the papers.
I appreciate Fuentes’ acknowledgment that hearings can take different forms dependent on the property interest at stake. Yet I cannot extend that pronouncement to hold that an opportunity to quash the writ of garnishment after the seizure comports with contemporary notions of due process and fair play.
Because of these reservations, I would remand for a trial court determination of the issue in a full adversary proceeding. This case presents special circumstances mandating invocation of our broad remedial powers to fashion appropriate relief. GCR 1963, 820.

 Cf. Fuentes v Shevin, 407 US 67, 88; 92 S Ct 1983, 1998; 32 L Ed 2d 556, 574 (1972), fn 19: "The Supreme Court of California recently put the matter accurately: 'Sniadach does not mark a radical departure in constitutional adjudication. It is not a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the mainstream of the past procedural due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court.’ Randone v Appellate Department, 5 Cal 3d 536, 550; 488 P2d 13, 22.”