Court Opinion

ID: 9388318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 16:03:53.560693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:19.788311
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                              In re the Marriage of:

          CIARA NICOLE JONES-WRIGHT, Petitioner/Appellant,

                                         v.

                JARED BOYLE WRIGHT, Respondent/Appellee.

                            No. 1 CA-CV 22-0479 FC
                             FILED 4-20-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                            No. FC2021-004221
               The Honorable Tracey Westerhausen, Judge

        AFFIRMED IN PART/VACATED IN PART/REMANDED

                                    COUNSEL

Cosmas Onyia PC, Phoenix
By Cosmas Onyia
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Law Offices of Kevin Jensen PLLC, Mesa
By Kevin Jensen
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
                       JONES-WRIGHT v. WRIGHT
                          Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1            Ciara Jones-Wright (“Mother”) appeals from the superior
court’s dissolution decree (“Decree”). We affirm as to legal decision-making
and parenting time, vacate and remand as to child support, and decline to
award Mother her attorney’s fees.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            Mother and Jared Wright (“Father”) married in June 2019 and
had a child the next year. In June 2021, Father was arrested for committing
domestic violence against Mother. Mother obtained an order of protection
based on this incident, which Father did not contest. Father later pled guilty
to aggravated assault and was placed on probation.

¶3             Mother filed to dissolve the marriage in July 2021. Following
a trial, the superior court entered the Decree in June 2022. The court found
Father had committed domestic violence against Mother but concluded his
conduct was not “significant domestic violence” under A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03(A). It also found Father had rebutted the statutory
presumptions against joint legal decision-making under A.R.S.
§§ 25-403.03(D) and -403.04(B). The court awarded the parties joint legal
decision-making authority and equal parenting time on a week-on,
week-off basis. It also granted Mother’s request to relocate with the child to
New Mexico. As for child support, it found that Mother would owe only an
insignificant amount of child support to Father under the Arizona Child
Support Guidelines and deviated to zero. See A.R.S. § 25-320 app.
(“Guidelines”).

¶4            Mother timely appealed the Decree. We reviewed the record
and determined the Decree contained contradictory relocation orders. We
stayed Mother’s appeal and provided her with time to move to clarify the
orders. The court corrected its relocation orders, and we lifted the stay. We
have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

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                           Decision of the Court

                                DISCUSSION

¶5             Mother challenges the joint legal decision-making, equal
parenting time, and child support rulings. We review the superior court’s
legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support orders for an
abuse of discretion. DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2019);
Birnstihl v. Birnstihl, 243 Ariz. 588, 590, ¶ 8 (App. 2018). A court abuses its
discretion when it “commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary
decision or when the record does not support” its decision. DeLuna, 247
Ariz. at 423, ¶ 9. We will affirm the order if it is supported by competent
record evidence. Smith v. Smith, 253 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 9 (App. 2022). We do not
reweigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the court’s credibility
assessments. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284, ¶ 20 (App. 2019).

A.    The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Awarding Joint Legal
Decision-Making.

       1.     The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding Father
       Did Not Commit Significant Domestic Violence or Have a
       Significant History of Domestic Violence.

¶6             To determine legal decision-making, the superior court
considers the best-interests factors under A.R.S. § 25-403(A), including
whether there has been domestic violence or child abuse under A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03. The court must not award joint legal decision-making if it finds
either “significant domestic violence” under A.R.S. § 13-3601 or if it “finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a significant history
of domestic violence.” A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A).

¶7           Citing the superior court’s finding that Father committed
domestic violence against her, Mother contends it “erroneously concluded
that the domestic violence was not significant.”

¶8              The court’s order, however, reflects its consideration of all the
§ 25-403.03(C) factors. The court then turned to A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A). It
determined that “though the Court by no means condones the actions
found in this case, those acts in the spectrum of domestic violence do not
constitute significant [domestic violence] as contemplated by [the] statute.”
The court also considered three more factors in reaching its conclusion:
“(1) [t]he seriousness of the particular incident of domestic violence, (2) the
frequency or pervasiveness of the domestic violence, (3) and the passage of
time and its impact.” Although not a part of any applicable statute or rule,
these factors have been applied in similar cases. See DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at
424, ¶ 15, n.6.

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                       JONES-WRIGHT v. WRIGHT
                          Decision of the Court

¶9             Mother argues the superior court’s “conclusion was not
supported by any evidence in the record or presented by Father at trial.”
We disagree. Mother testified she had not seen Father since his arrest a year
earlier, and she felt safe enough to communicate with him by email. Father
testified he was compliant with his probation and had completed anger
management and substance abuse classes. The court found that he had
completed 27 of 52 domestic violence classes and that although “[s]ome
kind of [substance] abuse was going on to cause the [domestic violence].
Father provided evidence that he turned to sober living, . . . tested clean for
drugs and never refused a drug test.” We will not reweigh the evidence on
appeal, Lehn, 246 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 20, and the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the superior court’s findings on this issue.

       2.    The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding Father
       Rebutted the Presumption Against Joint Legal Decision-Making.

¶10            If a court finds a parent has committed domestic violence, the
law imposes “a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint legal
decision-making to the parent who committed the act of domestic violence
is contrary to the child’s best interests.” A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D). The superior
court found that Father rebutted this presumption, but Mother again
contends the court’s ruling lacks evidentiary support.

¶11           The court must consider six factors in determining whether a
party has rebutted the presumption. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(E). Here, the
superior court made written findings on those six factors and found that
Father rebutted the presumption. The record supports those findings.
Mother admitted she did not question Father’s parenting skills or ability to
care for the child. She also testified that he did not pose a risk of harm to
the child and was a good father both before and after the domestic violence
incident. And both parties testified that, despite some issues, they generally
could communicate by email about co-parenting. Mother also proposed
Father have week-on, week-off parenting time during the summers if the
court permitted her to relocate to New Mexico. On this record, we see no
abuse of discretion.

       3.    The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding Father
       Rebutted the Presumption Against Parenting Time.

¶12          If the court finds a parent has committed domestic violence,
the offending parent bears the burden to show “that parenting time will not
endanger the child or significantly impair the child’s emotional
development.” A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F). If this burden is met, “the court shall

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                        JONES-WRIGHT v. WRIGHT
                           Decision of the Court

place conditions on parenting time that best protect the child and the other
parent from further harm.” Id.

¶13            Mother contends the superior court failed “to consider the
factors outlined under A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F).” Relying on DeLuna, she also
argues the court did not “explicitly determine whether Father had
affirmatively shown that parenting time will not endanger the child or
significantly impair the child’s emotional development.” See DeLuna, 247
Ariz. at 425, ¶ 18 (internal citations omitted).

¶14             The record shows the superior court considered whether
Father met his burden under A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F), and, in doing so, the
court placed appropriate conditions on his parenting time. The Decree
shows that the court considered and made specific findings about each
best-interests factor in A.R.S. § 25-403(A). The court explained that when it
considered whether there was domestic violence under A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03(C), it did so both in the context of legal decision-making and
parenting time. After its A.R.S. § 25-403.03(E) analysis, the court cited A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03(F) and imposed on Father’s parenting time “any conditions that
the Court imposes in the criminal case.” See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F)(9). The
court determined that the parenting plan was “practical and also
maximizes each parent’s parenting time to the extent it is in the child’s best
interests.” Because the court made these findings and considered these
factors, it did not abuse its discretion.

B.     The Court Erred When Ruling on Child Support.

¶15           Mother challenges the superior court’s child support order on
three grounds: (1) Father’s income, (2) Father’s adjustment for the support
of a child from another relationship, and (3) Father’s adjustment for the
child’s medical insurance premiums. We agree that the court erred when
computing child support and remand for a redetermination.

       1.    The Court Erroneously Used the Wrong Amount for
       Father’s Child Support Income.

¶16            Mother asserts that the superior court erred when it used
$6,280 as Father’s monthly child support income because it was undisputed
at trial that Father’s income was $6,820 monthly. Father concedes this was
an error.

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                       JONES-WRIGHT v. WRIGHT
                          Decision of the Court

      2.    The Court Erroneously Credited the Wrong Amount to
      Father for Support of a Child from Another Relationship.

¶17            Mother next argues that the superior court erroneously gave
Father a credit of $972 for supporting a child from another relationship.
Under the Guidelines, a parent may receive credit for supporting children
from another relationship if the parent is (1) the primary residential parent
or (2) has essentially equal parenting time. Guidelines § II.B.2.d–e.

¶18           Father acknowledged that a court order requires him to pay
$96 monthly for the support of his other child, but he voluntarily pays $150
each month. He also acknowledged that he does not have court-ordered
parenting time and is not the primary residential parent of his other child.
For this reason, the superior court erred when it credited him with $972.

      3.   The Court Erred by Crediting Father for Medical Insurance
      Premiums.

¶19            Mother also contends the superior court erred by crediting
Father $150 monthly for the child’s medical insurance premiums. Father
did not address this argument in his answering brief. But Father testified
that he does not pay for the child’s medical insurance and that Mother
covers it instead. Because no record evidence supports a premium medical
credit for Father, we also reverse and remand this issue. See Nia v. Nia, 242
Ariz. 419, 422, ¶ 7 (App. 2017).

                    ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶20           Mother requests her attorney’s fees on appeal under A.R.S.
§ 25-324(A). After considering the parties’ financial resources and the
reasonableness of their positions, we decline to award attorney’s fees. Per
A.R.S. § 25-324, we decline to award either party their costs on appeal.

                              CONCLUSION

¶21           We affirm the superior court’s orders about legal
decision-making authority and parenting time. We vacate and remand for
recalculation of child support consistent with this decision.

                         AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                         FILED: AA
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