Court Opinion

ID: 9880860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 22:01:05.639166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:59.810407
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

                                                   :
                                                   :
       IN RE: MARTHA AKERS                         :      Civil Action No.:       22-2955 (RC)
                                                   :
                                                   :      Re Document No.:        11, 14, 15
                                                   :
                                                   :

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                       I. INTRODUCTION

       Before the Court is Ms. Martha Akers’s appeal from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the

District of Columbia (“Bankruptcy Court”). Ms. Akers seeks review of two related orders: first,

an order denying several of Ms. Akers’s earlier motions—including a motion for relief from

judgment, a motion for a stay of money held in the court register, and a motion for funds to hire

expert witnesses, and second, an order denying Ms. Akers’s motion for reconsideration. Because

the Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court did not clearly err in its finding of facts or abuse its

discretion, the Court affirms in all aspects.

                                 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       This bankruptcy appeal has a lengthy record of motions and orders in proceedings

centered around the foreclosure and sale of several of Ms. Akers’s properties. On November 17,

2016, Ms. Akers filed a voluntary petition commencing a case under chapter 13 of the

Bankruptcy Code in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321–22. During a hearing on May 22, 2017,

this case was converted to a chapter 7 case in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1307 on the basis that

conversion was in the best interests of creditors and the estate, and Wendell W. Webster (“Mr.

Webster”), the Appellee here, was appointed as the chapter 7 trustee. See Conversion Order,
Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 139. Following the hearing on May 22, 2017, Ms. Akers

sought to challenge the conversion of the case from a chapter 13 case to a chapter 7 case. See

Debtor’s Mot. to Dismiss the Bankr. Case at 2, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 172

(seeking “modification from chapter 13 to chapter 7”). However, this request was not timely

made. See Order Den. Mot. for Recons. at 3, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 435.

       On April 20, 2018, the Bankruptcy Court granted Mr. Webster’s motion to sell a property

owned by Ms. Akers. See Order Granting Trustee’s Mot. for Authority to Sell Real Property

Free and Clear of Any and All Liens and Interest Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, Bankruptcy Case

No. 16-600, ECF No. 306. A year later, on July 25, 2019, Mr. Webster filed a motion for

approval of distributions and final report. See Chapter 7 Trustee’s Final Report Before

Distribution, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 365; Chapter 7 Trustee’s Notice of Final

Report, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 366; Mem. Decision and Order Re Second Am.

Mot. to Determine Secured Claim of Gary Coleman, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 356.

On September 20, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court approved the final report and distributions. See

Order Approving Final Report, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 374. After the trustee

was unable to return the surplus funds from the sale to Ms. Akers for more than a year because

Ms. Akers refused to accept the funds, the surplus funds were paid into the Bankruptcy Court’s

unclaimed funds registry on October 28, 2020. See Report of Deposit of Unclaimed Funds,

Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 402.

       Both before and after the conversion of Ms. Akers’s case from chapter 13 to chapter 7,

Ms. Akers launched extensive challenges against the decision-making of trustees and of the

                                                2
Bankruptcy Court. 1 Ms. Akers has frequently challenged the conduct of Mr. Webster as a

chapter 7 trustee. 2 Most relevant to this dispute, Ms. Akers filed four further motions in late

2021 and 2022. On December 31, 2021, Ms. Akers again filed a motion challenging Mr.

Webster’s final report. See Debtor’s Opp’n to Trustee Final Account and Discharge and Mot. for

Relief from a J. Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1)(3) & (d)(1)(2)(3), Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF

No. 416. Six months later, on June 28, 2022, Ms. Akers filed a motion seeking an expedited

hearing regarding her earlier motion for relief from a judgement. See Mot. to Set an Expedited

Hr’g Date Regarding Mot. for Relief from a J. or Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b), Bankruptcy Case

No. 16-600, ECF No. 426. On the same day, Ms. Akers also filed a motion seeking the stay of

the money held in the court register. See Mot. for Stay of the Money Held in the Court Register,

       1
          Ms. Akers has challenged the final report submitted by Mr. Webster as chapter 7 trustee
and the final report submitted by Mr. Webster’s predecessor, the chapter 13 trustee. See
Debtor’s Mot. in Opp’n to Chapter-13 Trustee Final Report and Account, Bankruptcy Case No.
16-600, ECF No. 166; Notice of Obj. to (i) Chapter 7 Trustee’s Final Report and Appl. for
Compensation Request for Hr’g, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 368; Notice of Obj. to
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy (ii) All Fee Appl. for Compensation (iii) Req. for Hr’g, Bankruptcy Case
No. 16-600, ECF No. 369. Ms. Akers’s challenges were dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court.
See Order Dismissing Debtor’s Opp’n to the Chapter 13 Trustee’s Final Report and Account and
Den. Debtor’s General Req. for Review by a Panel of Three Judges, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-
600, ECF No. 186 (dismissing Ms. Akers’s opposition to the chapter 13 trustee’s final report);
Order Approving Final Report, Distribution and Appl. for Fees and Expenses, Bankruptcy Case
No. 16-600, ECF No. 374 (resolving objections to the chapter 7 trustee’s final report).
        2
          Ms. Akers has also challenged Mr. Webster’s appointment as a chapter 7 trustee, Mr.
Webster’s conduct as a chapter 7 trustee, and Mr. Webster’s authority to sell properties. See
Debtor’s Mot. to Dismiss the Bankruptcy Case at 2, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 172
(seeking modification from chapter 13 to chapter 7); Debtor’s Obj. to Wendell Webster, Chapter
7 Trustee’s Mot. and Judge S. Martin Teel Violating the Call for Recusal, Bankruptcy Case No.
16-600, ECF No. 190; Notice of Obj. to (i) Chapter 7 Trustee’s Final Report and Appl. for
Compensation Req. for Hr’g, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 368. Each of these
challenges was likewise rejected by the Bankruptcy Court. See Order Den. Debtor’s Obj. to
chapter 7 Trustee, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 194; Order Den. Debtor’s Mot. for
Reh’g on Trustee’s Mot. for Authority to Sell Real Property Free and Clear of Any Liens and
Interests and Den. Any Other Relief Being Sought, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 314
(appeal dismissed); Order Approving Final Report, Distribution and Appls. for Fees and
Expenses, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 374.

                                                 3
Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 425. Shortly thereafter, on July 15, 2022, Ms. Akers

filed a motion seeking access to funds to hire an expert witness. See Mot. for Funds to Hire

Expert Witness, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 429. All four of these motions were

addressed at a hearing on August 30, 2022, at which Ms. Akers was present. During this

hearing, Ms. Akers made two further oral motions: a motion for a continuance of the hearing and

a motion for appointment of counsel. See Order Den. Mots. at 2, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600,

ECF No. 431.

       At the conclusion of the hearing on August 30, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed all of Ms.

Akers’s motions. Id. On September 8, 2022, Ms. Akers filed a motion seeking reconsideration

of this order. See Pet’r’s Mot. for Recons. of August 30, 2022 Decision, Bankruptcy Case No.

16-600, ECF No. 434. Four days later, on September 12, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court denied

Ms. Akers’s motion for reconsideration. See Order Den. Mot. for Recons., Bankruptcy Case No.

16-600, ECF No. 435.

       On September 23, 2022, Ms. Akers filed a notice of appeal, appealing the Bankruptcy

Court’s orders issued on August 30, 2022 and September 12, 2022. See Notice of Appeal at 2,

Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 437. This notice of appeal was transmitted on September

26, 2022. See Transmittal of Notice of Appeal, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 438. In

her brief, Ms. Akers specifies that she “appeals the opinion and order entered on August 30,

2022 . . . [and] September 12, 2022.” Appellant Br. at 1, ECF No. 8. As a result, this Court

understands Ms. Akers to be appealing the following two orders of the Bankruptcy Court: (1) the

August 30, 2022 order denying several of Ms. Akers’s motions; and (2) the September 12, 2022

order denying reconsideration of the August 30, 2022 order.

                                                4
                                 III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

                                         A. Jurisdiction

       District courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals of the judgments, final orders, and

decrees of bankruptcy courts under § 158(a) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code. In re Owens, No. 19-

cv-2491, 2020 WL 1911541, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2020). Such appeals “shall be taken in the

same manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of appeals from the

district courts and in the time provided by Rule 8002 of the Bankruptcy Rules.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(c)(2).

       The Court has jurisdiction to consider both of the appealed orders. The August 30, 2022

Order Dismissing Motions is a “final order” under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). “Orders in bankruptcy

cases qualify as ‘final’ when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within the overarching

bankruptcy case.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586–87 (2020)

(citing Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015)). The August 30, 2022 order

disposed of several discrete disputes that “conclusively determine[d] substantive rights of

parties.” In re St. Charles Preservation Investors, Ltd., 112 B.R. 469, 471 (D.D.C. 1990)

(quoting In re Delta Services Industries, 782 F.2d 1267, 1269–70 (5th Cir. 1986)). The

September 12, 2022 Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, as an order disposing of a

discrete dispute, is also a “final order.” See, e.g., Allen v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., 334 B.R.

746, 749–50 (D.D.C. 2005) (exercising jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an order denying a

motion for reconsideration).

                                     B. Standard of Review

       A district court reviews the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact for clear error, while

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See Hope 7 Monroe St. Ltd. v. RIASO L.L.C., 473 B.R.

                                                 5
1, 6 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd sub nom. In re Hope 7 Monroe St. Ltd., 743 F.3d 867, 873 (D.C. Cir.

2014). Ms. Akers, as appellant, holds the burden of proof, and to prevail she “must show that the

court’s holding was clearly erroneous as to the assessment of the facts or erroneous in its

interpretation of the law and not simply that another conclusion could have been reached.”

Alberts v. HCA, Inc., 496 B.R. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 518

(D.D.C. 1999)). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when . . . the reviewing court on the

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

In re Johnson, 236 B.R. at 518 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

(1948)). Finally, equitable and discretionary decisions of the Bankruptcy Court are reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Capitol Hill Grp., 313 B.R. 344, 349 (D.D.C.

2004) (citing In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2004); In re I. Appel Corp., 300 B.R. 564

(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). The burden of proof is on Ms. Akers, as “the party that seeks to reverse the

bankruptcy court’s holding.” Advantage Healthplan, Inc. v. Potter, 391 B.R. 521, 537 (D.D.C.

2008).

                                         IV. ANALYSIS

         Ms. Akers appeals two orders from the Bankruptcy Court. 3 The Court will analyze both

of the challenged orders in turn. First, because the August 30, 2022 Order denies several

motions, the Court will consider the denial of each of the motions separately. The Court

ultimately concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in denying Ms. Akers’s motions in its

August 30, 2022 Order. Next the Court considers the Bankruptcy Court’s September 8, 2022

Order Denying Reconsideration. Again, the Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did not

         3
          The Court is mindful that Ms. Akers is proceeding pro se, and that the pleadings of pro
se parties “[are] to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

                                                 6
err in denying this motion. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court’s orders are affirmed, and Ms.

Akers’s appeal is denied.

                            A. August 30, 2022 Order Denying Motions

        Ms. Akers appeals Judge Gunn’s order on August 30, 2022 denying several of Ms.

Akers’s motions. See Appellant Br. at 1. Each of the dismissed motions will be considered in

turn.

    1. Order Denying Opposing Trustee Final Account and Motion for Relief from Judgment

        The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Debtor’s Opposition to Trustee Final Account and

Discharge and Motion for Relief from a Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1)(3) & (d)(1)(2)(3),

Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 416. See Order Den. Mots., Bankruptcy Case No. 16-

600, ECF No. 431. In this motion, Ms. Akers made several arguments to challenge Mr.

Webster’s final account, including assertions that the judge engaged in unlawful activity, fraud

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), inadvertence and surprise under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), absence

of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to provide adequate notice.

        For cases filed under the Bankruptcy Code, Rule 9024 of the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure incorporates Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 9024. Under Rule 60(b), a “court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order,

or proceeding” for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(1), for “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), because “the judgment is void,” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), or for “any other reason that justifies relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Ms.

Akers, as the moving party, “must establish fraud or misconduct, and resulting actual prejudice,

                                                  7
by clear and convincing evidence.” Bennett v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 2d 340, 341 (D.D.C.

2008).

         The “district court’s grant or denial of relief under Rule 60(b), unless rooted in an error of

law, may be reversed only for abuse of discretion.” Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia,

841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 191 (D.C.

Cir. 2006); Murray v. District of Columbia, 52 F.3d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1995). This includes

decisions by the Bankruptcy Court. See, e.g., In re Salas, No. 20-cv-3091 (FYP), 2022 WL

1154596, at *8 (D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2022) (reviewing for a Bankruptcy Court’s decision under Rule

60(b) on an abuse of discretion standard). When reviewing the appealed order, this Court must

take into account that Rule 60(b) may be used “to challenge alleged legal errors only in the most

extreme situations . . . ,” Ward v. Kennard, 200 F.R.D. 137, 139 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing D.C.

Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 520 F.2d 451, 451–53 (D.C. Cir. 1975)), and that “Rule 60(b)

was intended to preserve ‘the delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments . . . and

the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice can be done in light of all the facts.”

Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Bankers

Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970)). When deciding how this balance

is to be struck, district courts enjoy “a large measure of discretion.” Randall v. Merrill Lynch,

820 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

         After a thorough review of Ms. Akers’s filings, it seems that she is making several

arguments in support of her claim for relief under Rule 60. 4 Ms. Akers claims that she has

suffered injury at the hand of Mr. Webster and the Bankruptcy Court and that Mr. Webster and

         4
         Ms. Akers’s filings are long and at times disorganized. It is not always clear what it is
that Ms. Akers is arguing, or how Ms. Akers’s factual assertions connect to her legal claims.
The Court makes its best effort to understand and resolve her arguments.

                                                   8
the Bankruptcy Court have produced false evidence against Ms. Akers. See Appellant’s Resp. to

Ct.’s Order to Show Cause at 1, ECF No. 11. More specifically, Ms. Akers argues: that she did

not agree to the conversion of her case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7; that the Chapter 13 Trustee

purposefully acted against Ms. Akers’s interests in a conspiracy with the Bankruptcy Court and

that this resulted in a fraudulent foreclosure; that the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because it held secret proceedings and did not give Ms. Akers adequate notice; and

that her constitutional rights were violated contrary to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. Id. at 2–5.

These arguments, and the factual assertions that Ms. Akers makes in support of them, often blend

into one-another.

       Ms. Akers makes specific reference to Rule 60(b)(1) and (3). Rule 60(b)(1) empowers a

court to relieve a party from a final judgment where there has been “mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); Rule 60(b)(3) empowers a court to

relieve a party of a final judgment where there has been “fraud (whether previously called

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(3). Importantly, Rule 60(b)(1) is limited to “‘obvious error[s],’ such as [a court] basing its

legal reasoning on case law that it failed to realize had recently been overturned.” Munoz v. Bd.

of Trs., 730 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 520

F.2d 451, 451–53 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). Under Rule 60(b)(3), the moving party must show that the

fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct caused “actual prejudice,” such that the “[other party’s]

conduct prevented [the moving party] from presenting [their] case fully and fairly.” Ramirez v.

Dep't of Justice, 680 F. Supp. 2d 208, 210 (D.D.C. 2010).

       Judge Gunn did not abuse her discretion in concluding that there were no grounds to

relieve Ms. Akers from judgment under Rule 60(b). All of the arguments raised by Ms. Akers in

                                                 9
her motion have each been addressed in prior decisions of the Bankruptcy Court. See Order Den.

Debtor’s Mot. to Recuse, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 116; Order Den. Debtor’s Mot.

to Recuse, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 123; Order Dismissing Debtor’s Opp’n to the

Chapter 13 Trustee’s Final Report and Account and Den. Debtor’s General Req. for Review by a

Panel of Three Judges, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 186; Order, Bankruptcy Case No.

16-600, ECF No. 194; Order, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 221; Order, Bankruptcy

Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 259. Ms. Akers has also previously filed a motion opposing Mr.

Webster’s final account alleging similar issues in 2019. See Notice of Obj. to (i) Chapter 7

Trustee’s Final Report and Appl. for Compensation Req. for Hr’g, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600,

ECF No. 368; Notice of Obj. to Chapter 7 Bankr. (ii) All Fee Appl. for Compensation (iii) Req.

for Hr’g, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 369. This motion was reviewed and rejected by

the Bankruptcy Court. See Order Approving Final Report, Distribution and Appl. for Fees and

Expenses, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 374 (resolving objections to the chapter 7

trustee’s final report).

        The Bankruptcy Court has reviewed Ms. Akers’s arguments at length in these prior

orders. The Court will not second guess the Bankruptcy Court’s findings, “given [Judge Gunn’s]

familiarity with the evidence and [her] thorough analysis of the legal issues.” See In re Salas,

2022 WL 1154596, at *8 (citing Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1138). Ms. Akers’s repetitive

filings, which do not raise any new issues not previously addressed by the Bankruptcy Court, fall

far short of proving an “obvious” error in Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning or of demonstrating that

she has been prevented from presenting her case fairly and fully. Judge Gunn therefore did not

abuse her discretion in denying Ms. Akers’s argument for relief under Rule 60.

                                                10
                    2. Order Denying Motion to Set Expedited Hearing Date

       The Bankruptcy Court also dismissed Ms. Akers’s Motion to Set an Expedited Hearing

Date Regarding Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b), Bankruptcy

Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 426. See Order on Mot. to Expedite Hr’g, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-

600, ECF No. 431. In this motion, Ms. Akers requested an expedited hearing date regarding a

motion for relief from a judgment on the basis of “illegal activities,” including failure to give

adequate opportunity to be heard, unconscionability, and absence of subject matter jurisdiction.

Id.

       The hearing concerning Ms. Akers’s motion for relief from a judgment was held on

August 30, 2022. As was noted above, see supra at 6, Ms. Akers bears the burden of proof in

this case. Ms. Akers has failed to demonstrate that she was disadvantaged by the denial of her

motion for an expedited hearing date. The Bankruptcy Court did not err in denying Ms. Akers’s

Motion to Set an Expedited Hearing Date Regarding Motion for Relief from a Judgment or

Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b).

               3. Order Denying Motion for Stay of Money Held in Court Register

       The Bankruptcy Court dismissed Ms. Akers’s Motion for Stay of the Money Held in the

Court Register, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 425. See Order on Mot. to Stay,

Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 431. In this motion, Ms. Akers made vague assertions

that there are “greedy and immoral parties willing to do anything to access the money,” that

“Petitioner challenges the legality of the proceeding on all asserted grounds,” and that “the

Respondents engaged in illegal activities.” Id. These vague and conclusory assertions do not

offer a clear ground for granting a stay of the money held in the court register. Ms. Akers’s

filings for this appeal do not elaborate on these arguments, nor on what a stay of money held in

                                                 11
the court register would entail. In her reply brief, Ms. Akers accuses Mr. Webster of engaging in

a “fraud[ulent] scheme” for failing to submit an objection to the application for the release of

funds held by the court by Fresh Start Recovery Partners LLC. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2,

ECF No. 15. This application was filed by Fresh Start Recovery Partners LLC on December 16,

2021. See Appl. to Release Unclaimed Funds, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 413. Less

than two weeks later John P. Fitzgerald, III, Acting United States Trustee for Region Four,

objected to this application, United States Trustee’s Objection to Second Application for

Payment of Unclaimed Funds, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 415, and less than a

month later the Bankruptcy Court found that the application “fail[ed] to meet . . . evidentiary

standards.” When Fresh Start Recovery Partners LLC failed to supplement its application, the

application to release funds was rejected by the Bankruptcy Court. See Order Den. Appl. for

Unpaid Funds, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 423.

       An earlier application for payment of the surplus funds was made by Asset Recovery

Group on April 1, 2021. See Appl. for Payment of Unpaid Funds, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600,

ECF No. 403. This application was likewise opposed by John P. Fitzgerald, III, see United

States Trustee’s Obj. to Appl. for Payment of Unclaimed Funds, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600,

ECF No. 406, and was rejected by the Bankruptcy Court in just over a month, see Order Den.

Payment of Unpaid Funds, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 407. It seems that neither

Fresh Start Recovery Partners LLC nor Asset Recovery Group represented the same Ms. Akers

to which the surplus funds held in the court register belong, and that both groups instead

represented different individuals who happen to have the name “Martha Akers.” Ms. Akers

therefore clearly would not want the surplus funds released to these parties. But if anything, the

quick opposition to these applications by the Acting United States Trustee John P. Fitzgerald, III

                                                12
and the quick denial of these applications by the Bankruptcy Court indicate that the trustee and

Bankruptcy Court are able to quickly identify and reject false applications. The current system

for addressing applications for the release of the funds held in the court register is therefore

working as intended.

       Ms. Akers holds the burden of proof, see supra at 6, but has failed to identify any

argument for why the order denying the stay should be overturned. Indeed, as discussed above,

the current system seems to have worked well. Accordingly, the denial of Ms. Akers’s motion

for appointment of counsel is affirmed.

             4. Order Denying Debtor’s Motion for Funds to Hire Expert Witnesses

       The Bankruptcy Court also denied Ms. Akers’s Motion for Funds to Hire Expert Witness,

Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 429. See Order Den. Mots., Bankruptcy Case No. 16-

600, ECF No. 431. In this motion, Ms. Akers seeks funds “to hire expert witnesses to review

[Ms. Akers’s] medical and psychiatric history and the medication she was prescribed.” Mot. for

Funds to Hire Expert Witness, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 429 at 1. The other

Circuits that have considered the issue have concluded that a denial of funds to hire an expert

witness is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Labansat, 94 F.3d

527, 530 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Pitts, 346 F. App'x 839, 841 (3d Cir. 2009); United

States v. Bertling, 370 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2004).

       The Due Process Clause requires that criminal defendants be equipped with the “the basic

tools of an adequate defense . . . .” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). However, the

“strict constitutional safeguards afforded to criminal defendants are not applicable to civil cases .

. . .” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 n.22 (1996). Moreover, the “Due Process

Clause does not require that all persons everywhere be treated alike.” Noble v. United States

                                                 13
Parole Comm’n, 194 F.3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Ms. Akers must show that the expert’s

assistance is “likely to be a significant factor in [her] defense . . . .” Ake, 470 U.S. at 82–83. It is

not clear why expert witnesses reviewing Ms. Akers’s medical and psychiatric history, as well as

Ms. Akers’s medication, would be a significant factor in her case. Ms. Akers has not offered any

further argument as to why such expert testimony would be a significant factor. Accordingly,

the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Akers’s motion for funds to

hire expert witnesses.

                 5. Order Denying Debtor’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

        During the hearing on August 30, 2022, Ms. Akers made an oral motion for appointment

of counsel. See Order Den. Mots. at 2, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 431. The

Bankruptcy Court denied Ms. Akers’s motion. Id.

        Judge Gunn rejected Ms. Akers’s motion for appointment for counsel on the basis that

Ms. Akers was, and remains, entitled to the surplus funds paid into the court register on October

28, 2020. See Order Den. Mot. for Recons. at 4, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 435.

These surplus funds held in the court register amount to $687,545.40. See Report of Deposit of

Unclaimed Funds, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 402. These funds were deposited with

the Bankruptcy Court after Mr. Webster made several attempts to contact Ms. Akers to transfer

the funds but was unable to do so. Judge Gunn’s factual findings that Ms. Akers remains entitled

to the surplus are reviewed for clear error. See Alberts v. HCA, Inc., 496 B.R. 1, 8 (D.D.C.

2013); Hope 7 Monroe St. Ltd., 473 B.R. at 6, aff’d sub nom. In re Hope 7 Monroe St. Ltd.

P’ship, 743 F.3d 867. Judge Gunn did not clearly err in these findings. Judge Gunn clearly laid

out her findings, see Order Den. Mot. for Recons., Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 435 at

4, which are supported by Mr. Webster’s report on the deposit of the surplus funds, see Report of

                                                  14
Deposit of Unclaimed Funds, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 402. Indeed, Ms. Akers

does not dispute that she remains entitled to these surplus funds. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2,

ECF No. 15.

       The ultimate decision to refuse to appoint counsel is a discretionary one reviewed on the

abuse of discretion standard. See Snipes v. Chutkan, 839 F. App’x 563, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2021)

(per curiam); Johnson v. D.C. Gov’t, No. 03-7142, 2004 WL 758958, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7,

2004) (per curiam). In light of the substantial surplus funds being held by the court and available

to Ms. Akers, Judge Gunn did not abuse her discretion in finding that Ms. Akers was not entitled

to the appointment of pro bono counsel. Accordingly, the denial of Ms. Akers’s motion for

appointment of counsel is affirmed.

                      6. Order Denying Debtor’s Motion for Continuance

       During the hearing on August 30, 2022, Ms. Akers also made an oral motion for a

continuance. See Order Den. Mots. at 2, Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 431. The

Bankruptcy Court also denied this motion. Id.

       Judge Gunn’s denial was based on the “pendency of the Debtor’s Motions for over eight

months. . . .” Order Den. Mot. for Recons., Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 435 at 4.

Like the denial of the motion for appointment of counsel, denial of a motion for continuance is

reviewed on the abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Stanfield, 360 F.3d 1346,

1358 (D.C. Cir. 2004). As the Bankruptcy Court noted, Ms. Akers’s motions were pending for

many months and raised arguments that the Bankruptcy Court had already considered. Judge

Gunn therefore did not abuse her discretion in concluding that a motion for a continuance would

not be helpful in bringing new arguments or information to light and that therefore such a motion

should be denied. Moreover, in order to obtain a reversal on the basis of the denial of a motion

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for a continuance, “an appellant must show that actual prejudice resulted from denial of the

continuance.” United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.

Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Ms. Akers has made extensive filings to the

Bankruptcy Court in the past several months and has made oral representations at hearings.

There has been ample opportunity for Ms. Akers to present her arguments, and Ms. Akers has

failed to demonstrate that the denial of the continuance has caused her actual prejudice.

             B. September 8, 2022 Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration

       On September 8, 2022, Ms. Akers filed a motion to reconsider the August 30 order. See

Mot. for Recons., Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF No. 434. Judge Gunn denied this motion

on September 12, 2022. See Order Den. Mot. for Recons., Bankruptcy Case No. 16-600, ECF

No. 435. Ms. Akers appeals this denial. See Appellant Br. at 1.

       Rule 9023 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure incorporates Rule 59 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023. A court may “grant a new trial on all

or some of the issues,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a), or grant a “motion to alter or amend a judgment,”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Importantly, Rule 59(e) does not allow Ms. Akers to “relitigate old

matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry

of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting 11 Charles

Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1, pp. 127–128 (2d ed. 1995)).

Motions under Rule 59(e) are “disfavored and the moving party bears the burden of establishing

‘extraordinary circumstances’ warranting relief from a final judgment.” Schoenman v. FBI, 857

F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Niedermeier v. Off. of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28

(D.D.C. 2001)). Rule 59 motions must only be granted if: “(1) if there is an ‘intervening change

of controlling law’; (2) if new evidence becomes available; or (3) if the judgment should be

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amended in order to ‘correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic

Republic, 881 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205,

1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Decisions refusing to vacate a judgment under Rule 59 are reviewed for

abuse of discretion. See Osborn v. Visa Inc., 797 F.3d 1057, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing

Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

          As was noted above, see supra at 10, Ms. Akers’s arguments have all been reviewed

before the Bankruptcy Court. Ms. Akers may not use a Rule 59 motion to relitigate issues that

she has already argued before the Bankruptcy Court. Because Ms. Akers failed to prove that

there had been an intervening change of controlling law, that new evidence had become

available, or that the judgment should be amended to correct clear error or prevent manifest

injustice, Judge Gunn did not err in finding that Ms. Akers had not met the standard under Rule

59. Judge Gunn therefore did not abuse her discretion in finding that Ms. Akers’s arguments had

been raised and considered before, and that these same issues may therefore not be relitigated

under Rule 59(e).

                                       V. CONCLUSION

          For the foregoing reasons, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s August 30,

2022 Order Denying Motions and AFFIRMS the September 12, 2022 Order Denying Motion for

Reconsideration.

          An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously

issued.

Dated: September 28, 2023                                          RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
                                                                   United States District Judge

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