Court Opinion

ID: 9868553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:40:46.589549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:51.522780
License: Public Domain

On Petition bob Rehearing.
Petition to rehear has been filed on three propositions: (1) That in its former opinion the Court overlooked the well settled rule that the cashier, and not the president was the Chief executive officer of the Bank and that, therefore, the president had no authority to waive any rights the Bank had to set aside'the conveyance by Bolton to his wife.
In addition to reasons' assigned in the original opinion, we think the Bank is clearly estopped by its pleading to raise the question of President Castles’ authority to enter the decree. Being a consent decree, it was a contract between the parties and to be construed as. a whole, as is conceded in the petition to rehear, page 21. The Bank in its original bill predicates its suit upon that part of the decree which awarded it a money judgment against Bolton. Neither equity nor common sense will permit the Bank to enforce a money judgment which is a part of the decree, and deny to Bolton and his wife, rights afforded them by other parts of the same instrument. As the Bank has sued on the money judgment awarded in the decree and introduced the decree as a part of its proof, it is estopped to question the authority of the representative of the Bank by whom the decree was approved and entered.
Further, even if original authority had been lacking in Castles, the fact that the decree was entered February 7,1939, and this suit not filed until May 1942, more than three years later, presents a clear ratification by the Bank and its officers, and of the action of Castles in ap*377proving the decree. Bank v. Shook, 100 Tenn. 436, 45 S. W. 338.
The second proposition of the petition to rehear is that since the petition for certiorari did not assail the constrnction by the Court of Appeals of the consent decree of Feburary 7, 1939, that therefore, snch construction is conclusive upon us.
In support of this petitioner cites Rose v. Brown, 176 Tenn. 429, 143 S. W. (2d) 303, and Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 166 Tenn. 498, 63 S. W. (2d) 668. We think that neither of these cases is authority for petitioner’s contention. The rule for which those cases are authority, and which is otherwise established, is that a party to be entitled to redress or relief in this Court, must present his application for such relief or redress by petition for certiorari. Code, Sec. 10629. In both Rose v. Brown and Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Hunter, supra, the party seeking* relief in the Supreme Court had failed to file petition for certiorari and relief was denied.
In the present case the defendants Bolton are seeking no relief. Since they have been successful both in the Chancery Court and the Court of Appeals, we may safely assume that they are satisfied and that it is a matter of indifference to them whether this Court affirms the Chancellor or the Court of Appeals in construing the consent decree, so long as we do not reverse the decree of either court.
However, upon a consideration of the Bank’s petition for certiorari, we were confronted with this situation— that both the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals had denied the Bank relief, but assigned different reasons for the denial. As stated in our former opinion (186 S. W. (2d) at page 620), we considered that the grounds supporting both decrees were valid, but since we agreed *378with the Chancellor that the consent decree was a finál release of the Bank’s claim, it was not necessary for ns to go farther and hold with the Court of Appeals that in any event, the Bank by laches, was estopped to assert that the conveyance was fraudulent.
The questions presented in the petition to rehear are, therefore, purely academic so far as they would affect or change the ultimate rights of the Bank in this litigation. If we should reconsider our former opinion and hold now that the chancellor was wrong and the Court of Appeals was right, the bill of the Bank against the Boltons is, nevertheless, finally dismissed.
Here, as stated, the original hill of the Bank filed on May 4, 1942, is predicated upon a money judgment against Bolton which was contained in a “consent decree” entered February 7, 1939. The decree is before this Court as the indispensable and essential basis of the Bank’s right to recover in this litigation. Such being the case, and the appeal being* a broad one from a Chancery decree, this Court in writing the opinion which will finally dispose of the case and constitute an expression by this Court of the rules of law controlling it, is not limited by the opinion of the Chancellor or the Court of Appeals, nor by the vagaries of counsel in devising assignments of error to support the petition for certi-orari.
As its third proposition on petition to rehear, the Bank urges that we have made an “ex post facto” construction of the consent decree, and by such construction inserted limitations of the Bank’s right against Gladys Bolton, which the decree did not contain. This insistence is reargument merely and ignores the clear statement of our holding in the original opinion where we said that the decree, not by our construction, but in *379express terms embodied a final release of all the Bank’s claims against Gladys Bolton, and those express terms were these:
“This decree settles and determines every claim of every kind and character which the said complainant has or máy have against the said defendants (i. e. Gladys and W. 0. Bolton).”
Petition denied.