Court Opinion

ID: 9891768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 17:00:46.19438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:24.146631
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          OCT 19 2023
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

 Carlos Enrique Tayun-Herrera,                  No. 21-481

              Petitioner,                       Agency No.       A206-768-943

  v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
 Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney
 General,

              Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                      Department of Homeland Security

                        Submitted March 16, 2023**
                    Submission Withdrawn March 16, 2023
                       Resubmitted October 17, 2023

Before: BRESS, MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and Ericksen,*** District Judge.

       Carlos Enrique Tayun-Herrera, native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions

for review of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) negative reasonable fear

       *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
       ***
             The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States Senior District
Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
determination. We review the IJ’s affirmance of the asylum officer’s negative

reasonable fear determination for substantial evidence, reversing only if “any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

Orozco-Lopez v. Garland, 11 F.4th 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.1

      Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Tayun-Herrera

failed to establish a reasonable possibility of persecution on account of a

protected ground. Tayun-Herrera stated that extortionists have targeted him for

money. However, we have held that perceived wealth does not constitute a

cognizable social group. Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 814 (9th Cir.

2018). Tayun-Herrera’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals

motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a

protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).

      Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Tayun-

Herrera failed to show eligibility for protection under the Convention Against

Torture (CAT). To demonstrate a reasonable probability of torture, a petitioner

must show that the torture “would occur with the consent or acquiescence of a

public official.” Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1195–96 (9th

1
  The government now concedes that the petition is timely and that we have
jurisdiction under Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1039 (9th Cir. 2023)
(holding that the thirty-day deadline provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), is a non-
jurisdictional rule and that a reinstated order of removal becomes final only
after reasonable fear proceedings have concluded).

                                        2                                     21-481
Cir. 2021). Although Tayun-Herrera stated that the police told him to go to the

Public Ministry, “general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to

investigate and prevent crime [does] not suffice to show acquiescence.”

Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016). Tayun-Herrera

failed to show how a police car driving by an incident involving the

extortionists constitutes awareness of, let alone acquiescence in, any alleged

torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7); Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026,

1034 (9th Cir. 2014).

      PETITION DENIED. The motion for stay of removal is DENIED AS

MOOT.

                                        3                                    21-481