Court Opinion

ID: 9850507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:58:26.531671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:38.318375
License: Public Domain

DAY, J.
(dissenting). There is simply no reason for subjecting the child victim in this case, a female five years old at the time she was sexually assaulted, to the trauma of another trial, as the majority mandates. In addition to the allegations here, the child victim previously had been sexually assaulted by two other adult males. The majority's decision today unjustly continues *122her tragic story by requiring her to relive those events at a needless second trial.
Relying upon our recent decision in State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990), the majority concludes that Defendant was unconstitutionally denied his right to introduce evidence of the prior sexual assaults the child complainant experienced. The basis for the majority's conclusion is that the evidence should have been admitted to permit Defendant to rebut the inference that the child complainant could only have possessed the sexual knowledge she did if Defendant sexually assaulted her. I dissent because the record clearly shows that despite the circuit court's pre-trial ruling prohibiting Defendant from presenting evidence of the prior sexual assaults, the jury had the benefit of that evidence in reaching its verdict. Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction.
I do not dispute the fact that in the circumstances of a particular case, a defendant's constitutional rights may require admission of evidence of a child complainant's "prior sexual conduct" for the limited purpose of establishing an alternative source for sexual knowledge, despite the potentially damaging consequences admission could have for the child. Pulizzano resolved that issue. But Pulizzano has no bearing here.
Pulizzano applies only in specific circumstances. First, the complainant must be a child whose age is such that he or she can reasonably be presumed "sexually innocent." Second, the child complainant's "prior sexual conduct" must include acts which are substantially similar to those alleged against the defendant. Third, evidence of the child complainant's "prior sexual conduct" must have been excluded at trial. It is the last of these conditions that the majority ignores here.
*123Unlike Pulizzano, in this case the jury heard evidence that the child complainant had a substantially similar prior sexual experience through her own testimony. The evidence was elicited by Defendant's counsel while cross-examining the child complainant. The record provides as follows:
[CHILD COMPLAINANT]: Uh-huh. Before when I was in preschool, she — we went to McDonald's and were talking and we draw a picture of Conley [Moats] and whoever else, Mark [Marvel Clements, Jr.].
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mark? who's Mark?
[CHILD COMPLAINANT]: He done that same thing, what Conley done to me.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did he use—
[CHILD COMPLAINANT]: Too.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did he use his finger?
[CHILD COMPLAINANT]: No, he used that (indicating). That's all he used.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He used his penis.
[CHILD COMPLAINANT]: Uh-huh.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And where did he put it?
At this point, the prosecutor objected.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I'll object to this line of questioning.
[CHILD COMPLAINANT]: (Indicates).
The circuit court sustained the objection stating:
She's pointing to it, but I agree that the testimony's not relevant and material, and I so rule. And you don't have to answer. She wouldn't have to answer that question.
*124The majority construes the prosecutor's objection and the circuit court's ruling to apply to the entire transcript excerpt above and concludes evidence of the child complainant's prior sexual conduct was excluded. I disagree. The prosecutor's objection and the circuit court's ruling are ambiguous at best. I construe each as applying only to the line of questioning by Defendant's counsel regarding where "Mark," one of the prior assaulters, had put his penis. It was only at that point that the prosecutor objected, and the circuit court is very specific in its response and makes reference to that line of questioning. If the prosecutor objected to the entirety of the transcript excerpt, he should have objected sooner. The failure to make a timely objection constitutes a waiver of the objection. Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 585, 596, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974). The objection must be made as soon as the objectionable nature of the testimony is reasonably apparent. Id. Here the objectionable nature of the child complainant's testimony was apparent immediately in her response to the first question above by Defendant's counsel. The child complainant testified that the "same thing" had been done in a previous sexual assault. Yet the prosecutor did not object until four more questions were asked by Defendant's counsel.
Even if the majority's interpretation is accepted, it matters little. The prosecutor failed to state the specific grounds for his objection — that the testimony was excluded by the rape shield law. It has long been the rule that a general objection, as the prosecutor made here, is insufficient. See, e.g., Shafer v. City of Eau Claire, 105 Wis. 239, 244, 81 N.W. 409 (1900); Teegarden v. Town of Caledonia, 50 Wis. 292, 296, 6 N.W. 875 (1880); Knapp v. Schneider, 24 Wis. 70, 72 (1869). Analogous to the prosecutor's objection here, this court in In re the Estate *125of Menzner, 189 Wis. 340, 207 N.W. 703 (1926), held that the mere statement "I object to that" failed to constitute a valid objection. Id. at 342. Even if the prosecutor had properly objected, he failed to carry his burden to move to have the testimony stricken from the record. Cf. In re Utting's Estate, 250 Wis. 97, 106, 26 N.W.2d 254 (1947); Prentiss v. Strand, 116 Wis. 647, 654-55, 93 N.W. 816 (1903); Allen v. Boge, 114 Wis. 1, 10, 89 N.W. 924 (1902); Bigelow v. Sickles, 80 Wis. 98, 103-04, 49 N.W. 106 (1891); Tebo v. City of Augusta, 90 Wis. 405, 407-08, 63 N.W. 1045 (1895); Jaqueish v. Town of Ithaca, 36 Wis. 108, 113 (1874).
No matter which interpretation is taken, the jury learned through the child complainant's own testimony that she previously had been sexually assaulted in the "same" manner. The circuit court did not strike the evidence from the record or instruct the jury to disregard it. Because the child complainant's testimony was not properly objected to and stricken from the record, the jury could consider it in reaching its verdict. See Drexler v. All American Life & Casualty Co., 72 Wis. 2d 420, 432, 241 N.W.2d 401 (1976); John v. Pierce, 172 Wis. 44, 50, 178 N.W. 297 (1920); Coggswell v. Davis, 65 Wis. 191, 203, 26 N.W. 557 (1886). If up to that point in the trial the jury had logically presumed from the child complainant's young age that she was sexually innocent, that inference was instantly vanquished upon hearing that evidence. Yet the majority finds a constitutional deprivation and grants Defendant a new trial because he was not permitted to rebut an inference that did not exist.
Defendant cannot claim that he should have been permitted greater latitude in presenting the evidence. There is no doubt a defendant is entitled to the fullest opportunity to present his or her defense. But the constitutionally-required exception to the rape shield law rec*126ognized in Pulizzano is a very narrow one. As we stated there, the State has legitimate and important interests in excluding evidence of a child complainant's prior sexual conduct, and in somé cases those interests might even overcome a defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation and compulsory process. Chief among those interests is protecting the child victim. Mindful of the State's interests, defendants are only entitled under Pulizzano to present that measure of evidence necessary to rebut the inference that the child could only have possessed the sexual knowledge he or she did if the allegations against the defendant were true. In this case, the measure of "prior sexual conduct” evidence which Defendant would have been entitled to present under Pulizzano is no greater than that which the jury in fact heard.
The majority's decision finds fault with the circuit court's order excluding evidence of the prior sexual assaults, but ignores the circuit court's error, with respect to its own ruling, in admitting it. Particularly disturbing is that Defendant elicited the evidence despite the circuit court's pre-trial ruling. The evidence did not "slip in through the back door." Defendant's counsel's questions on the matter were direct and calculated, even though the circuit court had denied his vigorous pre-trial arguments to admit the evidence. Despite the fact Defendant had the benefit of that evidence, however, the jury still returned a guilty verdict.
There is simply no basis for subjecting the child to the trauma of another trial. I would affirm.
*127I am authorized to state that Justices William G. Callow and Louis J. Ceci join in this dissenting opinion.