Court Opinion

ID: 9795806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:39:10.442766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:47.645341
License: Public Domain

*861MORENO, J., Concurring.
I concur with the majority under the compulsion of People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279], but write separately to urge this court to reconsider its holding in Howard that the limiting construction placed on the financial-gain special circumstance in People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 751 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994], applies only when necessary to avoid overlap of multiple special-circumstance allegations. The meaning of the financial-gain special circumstance should not vary depending upon the number of special circumstances alleged. In the present case, where only one special circumstance is charged, the financial-gain special circumstance has the strong potential to be applied too broadly and may offer an easy opportunity for overcharging by the prosecution. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that a special circumstance “must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” (Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 877 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 249-250, 103 S.Ct. 2733], fn. omitted.) I am concerned that the financial-gain special circumstance as interpreted in Howard and applied here does not meet this standard.
At the time of its inception in 1977, the financial-gain special circumstance applied only to contract killings. (People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 751.) The statute required that “[t]he murder was intentional and was carried out pursuant to an agreement by the person who committed the murder to accept valuable consideration for the act of murder from any person other than the victim.” (Pen. Code, former § 190.2, subd. (a), as added by Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 9, p. 1257.)1 The current version of the statute, enacted in 1978 by initiative, eliminated this “acceptance] [of] valuable consideration” language. (Ibid.) It currently requires that “[the] murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) In response to the change in language, we increasingly have interpreted the provision broadly even though there is “little to guide us in the construction of the financial gain special circumstance. No legislative history illumines the adoption of this special circumstance.” (People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 751.)
As the majority correctly notes, we have developed two interpretations of the financial-gain special circumstance. In 1984, we adopted a narrow construction of the financial-gain special circumstance in a case in which multiple special circumstances were alleged, “to minimize those cases in which multiple special circumstances will apply to the same conduct.” (People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 751.)
*862Four years later in Howard, we interpreted the financial-gain special circumstance more broadly to require only that the “purpose” of the murder have been for financial gain. (People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 410, fn. 10.) This standard expanded Bigelow's formulation of the financial-gain special circumstance to “cover a broad range of situations” when only one special circumstance is charged and overlap of multiple special circumstances is not a concern. (People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 410.) Justice Broussard, who authored the majority opinion in Bigelow, dissented from this broader interpretation because “it gives a dual meaning to the phrase ‘for financial gain.’ ” (Id. at p. 447 (conc. & dis. opn. of Broussard, J.).) Justice Broussard’s concern, which I share, is that this second interpretation allows the financial-gain special circumstance to be interpreted too broadly where one special circumstance is charged.
As the majority states, subsequent to Howard we continued to refine the financial-gain special-circumstance standard. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 850.) In People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 636 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160], and in People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1229 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254], we clarified that the murder need not be committed exclusively, or even primarily, for financial gain. Taken together, these cases have opened the door for the financial-gain special circumstance to be applied where the defendant gains financially in any respect from the murder, even if financial gain is not a motive for the killing.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer direct evidence that defendant killed the victim for the purpose of financial gain. Instead, the facts indicate defendant first spoke of killing the victim in May 1982, before the couple was married or the victim had decided to move with him to South Carolina. Together these facts show defendant thought of killing Nancy at least two months before she closed her accounts and withdrew a large amount of cash. Although defendant liquidated the victim’s assets after her death, it is debatable that these facts are sufficient from which to conclude that the murder was carried out for financial gain.
Today, the majority expands the application of the financial-gain special circumstance to include a new category of cases beyond the murder-for-hire or gain-from-insurance-proceeds schemes in People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d 375, People v. Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th 599, and People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164. The effect of this expansion is that it allows prosecutors to allege the financial-gain special circumstance in theft cases in which the evidence falls short of meeting the standard for the robbery special circumstance, resulting in an overlap among the special circumstances. Such an interpretation fails to narrowly define a set of cases to differentiate the special situation in which death is warranted. (Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 *863U.S. at p. 877 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 249-250].) Instead, as in the present case, evidence that shows defendant sold the victim’s belongings after the murder is sufficient to prove that the killing was carried out for the purpose of financial gain. For these reasons, the financial-gain special circumstance, as applied today, is too broad. The narrow construction adopted in People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at page 751, should remain the standard used to separate those cases that warrant a death sentence regardless of the number of special circumstances alleged.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 29, 2003, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

 Unless otherwise noted, all citations are to the Penal Code.