Court Opinion

ID: 9622141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:12:32.912886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:00.106731
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree with the results in this case, and concur fully and completely with Divisions 2, 3 and 4 of the majority opinion, I do not agree with all that is said in Division 1, and thus concur specially.9 Hooks argued that Humphries breached his fiduciary duty for failing to volunteer “material facts” — specifically, the reason he no longer delivered babies — that would have allowed her to make an informed *270decision on whether to continue under his care. She also argued that Humphries “had a duty to place the interests of Ms. Hooks and her child before his own, or any other interests,” and moved the court to compel Humphries to disclose why he stopped delivering babies. The trial court granted summary judgment to Humphries on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, holding that Hooks knew from her first visit that Humphries was not going to deliver her baby but planned to refer her to another physician for the delivery. The reason he no longer delivered babies was irrelevant to the malpractice issues, the trial court held, and Humphries had no independent duty to discuss with his patient any personal life reasons for no longer delivering babies in light of Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, 272 Ga. 296 (528 SE2d 777) (2000).
Decided March 30, 2010
Ford & Barnhart, James L. Ford, Sr, for appellants.
Contrary to the statement in Prince v. Esposito, 278 Ga. App. 310, 313 (1) (b) (628 SE2d 601) (2006), the court in Albany did not hold that a physician never has a duty to disclose negative information about his personal life to patients. It held that failure to disclose “personal factors” such as illegal drug use cannot give rise to a separate cause of action for fraud. Id. at 298. Disclosure was not required by Georgia’s informed consent statute, OCGA § 31-9-6.1 (a), and the plaintiff already had a right to recover for any injuries by suing for professional negligence. The plaintiffs could assert nondisclosure of a life factor by a professional in support of their malpractice or professional negligence claims. Id. at 303 (5). By extension, the holding in Albany that nondisclosure does not support a separate fraud claim also supports the conclusion that nondisclosure also does not create a separate breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Here, the plaintiff did not allege that Humphries’ failure to disclose why he no longer delivered babies constituted malpractice or professional negligence, only that his failure to do so deprived Ms. Hooks of the opportunity to decide whether to change doctors or not. But regardless of why Humphries decided not to deliver babies, Hooks knew he was not going to deliver hers. Her malpractice claim — that Humphries failed to ensure that her complete medical record reached the hospital before she delivered — has nothing to do with the reasons behind Humphries’ decision not to deliver more babies or Hooks’ decision to continue seeing him for prenatal care.
Accordingly, I concur specially in Division 1, and fully and completely in Divisions 2, 3 and 4.
*271McCall, Williams, Wilmot & Powell, W. Earl McCall, Henry E. Williams, for appellees.

 Because I do not concur fully and completely with all that is said in Division 1, that division is physical precedent only and does not establish binding precedent for cases other them this one. Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a).