Court Opinion

ID: 9796823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:06:08.091152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:43.534445
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Presiding Judge:
concur in results.
1 I concur in the results reached by the Court and agree this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial, However, I write separately to address the following concerns.
T2 I agree with the Court's analysis that prospective juror Scott MecKinnis should *576have been excused for cause, based on his bias in favor of the death penalty. Under the requirements set forth in Morgan v. Illinois, Wainwright v. Witt and Adams v. Texas, prospective juror McKinnis should have been exeused for cause. - Because Mr. McKinnis was not removed, defense counsel was required to use his last peremptory challenge to excuse him. Defense counsel made a thorough record as to how the peremptory challenge would have been used had he not been placed in the position he was placed due to the court's failure to remove Mr. McKinnis for cause. Therefore, this error has been preserved for our review and warrants reversal of this case for a new trial.
13 However, I disagree with the Court's analysis concerning prospective juror Thomas Owen. I do not believe Mr. Owen was statutorily disqualified from serving as a furor. The language of 38 0.8.1991, § 28(B), is specific and clear. When subpart 3 is read in conjunction with subpart 4, it reveals the Legislature was unequivocal in providing that "sheriffs or deputy sheriffs" are not qualified to serve as jurors. 38 0.8.1991, § 28(B)(8). However, subpart 4 contains a qualifier which provides that "Jailers or law enforcement officers, state or federal, having custody of prisoners" are not qualified to serve as jurors. 838 0.S8.1991, § 28(B)(d). If the Legislature had intended all law enforcement officers to be disqualified to serve as jurors, they would have specifically said so as they did in relation to sheriffs or deputy sheriffs. However, as to other law enforcement officers or jailers, the qualification is limited to "having custody of prisoners".
T4 In this particular case there was no showing that prospective juror Owen had custody of prisoners and, therefore, was statutorily disqualified from serving on this jury. It would appear, when reading sub-part 3 with subpart 4, the Legislature is consistent in disqualifying those individuals who serve in a capacity where they have the responsibility of maintaining jails or being responsible for the custody of prisoners. In Oklahoma, sheriffs have historically had that responsibility of maintaining county jails and having custody of prisoners. Other law enforcement officers, unless assigned to duties as jailers, do not have that responsibility.
15 Further, I disagree with the Court's finding that the voir dire transcript shows prospective juror Owen was biased and unable to be a fair and impartial juror. Mr. Owen was consistent in his assertion he believed he could be fair to both sides possessed actual bias or should have been dismissed for cause.
1 6 I do agree that trial counsel's failure to follow the statutory procedure and file a written motion for continuance with the attached affidavit was an action which constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Our caselaw is replete with citations to the principal of law that the failure to file an affidavit in support of a motion for continuance is fatal unless a procedural failure constitutes a substantial violation of appellant's rights. See Harris v. State, 841 P.2d 597, 600 (Okl.Cr. 1992); Shelton v. State, 793 P.2d 866, 876 (Okl.Cr.1990); Ellis v. State, 795 P.2d 107, 109 (Okl.Cr.1990); Hunnicutt v. State, 455 P.2d 105, 109 (Ok1.Cr.1988); Duckett v. State, 711 P.2d 944, 946 (Okl.Cr.1985). It is without question counsel was ineffective for failing to follow the law. This is especially true since trial counsel had, on Thursday, advised the court there would be no problem in proceeding on Friday with his case.
1 7 The issue then becomes was it an abuse of discretion due to the fact the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of counsel's failure to follow the law. I will agree with the Court that Appellant was prejudiced in this matter. Trial counsel failed to follow statutory procedures for obtaining a continuance, and failed to subpoena the mitigation witness or take any steps to ensure her appearance at trial.
T8 Additionally, the record indicates the requested continuance would not have burdened the trial court. As the Court's opinion relates, after the defense rested, the trial court told the jury they could receive instructions and deliberate that day, Friday, or wait until Monday. If the trial judge could accommodate the jurors, he could have likewise accommodated the defendant under this fact situation. For these reasons, I agree this *577case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial as to guilt, as well as sentencing.