Court Opinion

ID: 9661501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:40:26.434628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:29.240985
License: Public Domain

DIXON, Chief Justice
(on motion to dismiss).
I was the trial Judge before whom this case was tried. For that I reason I preferred not to participate in the proceedings pertaining to this motion. However Justices Young and Cramer have not been able to agree as to what should be done about it, so, notwithstanding my reluctance, it is my duty to take part in the disposition of the motion. Galveston & H. Inv. Co. v. Grymes, 94 Tex. 609, 64 S.W. 778; Burrage v. Hunt Production Co., Tex.Civ.App., 114 S.W.2d 1228.
I agree with Justice Cramer that appel-lees’ motion to dismiss should be overruled.
Appellees contend that if a contest of an affidavit of inability to pay costs is overruled at any time after thirty days from the time.the motion for new trial is overruled, such action comes too late, and this Court does not acquire jurisdiction of the appeal.
Rule 363 is very plain as to when an appeal is perfected. If an affidavit in lieu of a bond is contested the appeal is perfected “when the contest is overruled.” The above quoted words were added to the Rule by an amendment in 1941. In this case Judge Peurifoy, in conformity to our mandate, overruled the contest August 3, 1953. In my opinion that is the date when the appeal was perfected.
The case of Hugle v. Fritz Motor Co., 117 Tex. 411, 6 S.W.2d 84, cited by appellees, is not in point. It construed statutes materially different from Rules 355, 356, and 363. Under the statutes then in effect an affiant, even in the absence of a contest, was required to obtain a hearing on his affidavit and have it approved following the hearing. The statutes have since been repealed. Rule 355(e) on the contrary expressly provides that where no contest is filed in the allotted time the allegations of the affidavit shall be taken, as true. The opinion in the Hugle case was delivered prior to the promulgation of Rule 363 as amended in 1941.
Under appellees’ interpretation of the Rules deserving and diligent litigants could and doubtless would sometimes find themselves in position where, through no fault of their own, an appeal would be impossible. They would be without a remedy in either the trial court, or this court.
A, hypothetical case will illustrate my point. Suppose a litigant desiring to appeal files his affidavit of inability to pay costs on the twentieth day after his motion for new trial is overruled. He cannot fairly be charged with lack of diligence in waiting until the twentieth day, for Rule 356(b) allows him that much time. Moreover under our law it is his duty to try to make bond. Certainly twenty days is not too long a •time to allow him to explore and exhaust the possibilities, of raising the money, or obtaining sureties for an appeal bond. A litigant who filed his affidavit immediately upon the overruling of his motion and the fixing of- the amount of his appeal bond might well find it difficult to convince anyone that he had made a bona fide effort, to make a sufficient appeal bond. Furthermore under Rule 355(e) until a contest is filed his affidavit is accepted as true. So unless he knows in advance that a contest will be filed, he would not likely incur the expense and labor of preparing to prove up his affidavit.
A contest need not be filed until ten days after notice is given of the filing of the affidavit. In our hypothetical case, even if notice were given the very same day, the contestant could wait ten days under Rule 355(c), V.R.C.P. to file his contest Thus *611the contest in our hypothetical case could be filed at any hour ■ of the day on the thirtieth day after the overruling of the motion for new trial. Is it reasonable to say that the affiant must obtain a hearing on the contest that very day else lose his appeal? I think that under such circumstances and such an interpretation of the Rules, it would not only be an unreasonable requirement —it would also be a requirement with which deserving litigants might often find it impossible to comply.
I have not changed my mind about the validity and propriety of our order granting appellant a writ of mandamus, Wright v. Peurifoy, Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W.2d 234. At the hearing of the contest of appellant’s affidavit, appellant gave clear, positive, detailed testimony as to his income, debts, and property, and his efforts to raise money to make bond for this appeal. He gave the names of his creditors and the amounts he owed. The truth of his statements could easily have been checked. But contestants did not attempt to discredit or contradict the •testimony of appellant as to the material facts — facts which I believe permit of only one inference. Under such circumstances the testimony of appellant, though he was an interested party, must be accepted as true. McGuire v. City of Dallas, 141 Tex. 170, 170 S.W.2d 722; Bartsch v. Ruby, Tex.Civ. App., 229 S.W.2d 105; Wells v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W.2d 430, Dis.Judgm. Cor.; Century Ins. Co. v. Hogan, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 224; Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Edwards, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 921, Error Dism. I quote from page 926 of 32 S.W.2d of the last cited case: “The rule that the uncorroborated testimony of interested witnesses, although not controverted, does not conclusively establish a fact, is not applicable where the nature of the testimony is such that it might readily be discredited, if it were not true, and the adverse party offers no disparaging proof whatever.” The fact that appellant requested permission to make payment of $250 instead of giving security therefor, is not evidence of his ability to raise that much cash in the short time allowed him. It is rather evidence of his good faith and desperate hope. It shows merely that he desired and was willing to comply with the court’s order if he should succeed in raising the money.
I concur in overruling appellees’ motion to dismiss.