Court Opinion

ID: 9882072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 22:00:18.44412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:58.547445
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit

No. 20-9009

         IN RE: LUIS MANUEL RUIZ RUIZ, d/b/a Lowy Farm,

                               Debtor,

                MILK INDUSTRY REGULATORY OFFICE
        OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, a/k/a ORIL,

                              Appellant,

                                  v.

               LUIS MANUEL RUIZ RUIZ, d/b/a Lowy Farm,

                              Appellee.

              APPEAL FROM THE BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
                         FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                Before

                         Barron, Chief Judge,
                  Lynch and Howard, Circuit Judges.

    Edward W. Hill Tollinche for appellant.
    Homel A. Mercado-Justiniano for appellee.

                           October 4, 2023
            PER CURIAM.      The Milk Industry Regulatory Office of the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (known by its Spanish acronym "ORIL")

challenges two bankruptcy court orders: one granting Luis Manuel

Ruiz Ruiz permission to enter a lease in the course of his

bankruptcy     proceedings,     and    one    denying     ORIL's      motion    for

reconsideration of that permission.               The Bankruptcy Appellate

Panel for the First Circuit (the "BAP") affirmed the bankruptcy

court orders on the merits.         We now dismiss ORIL's appeal as moot.

Determining    that    the   action    became     moot   prior   to    the     BAP's

judgment,     we   vacate    that     judgment.      Concluding        that    ORIL

contributed to the mootness, we leave the bankruptcy court orders

intact.

                                        I.

            ORIL, a subdivision of the Puerto Rico Department of

Agriculture, is tasked with regulating Puerto Rico's commercial

milk industry.     See Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587

F.3d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 2009).           Among other duties, ORIL issues

licenses to dairy farmers who produce raw milk and sell that milk

to processing plants.        Each license assigns a "quota" representing

the amount of milk that a dairy farmer can produce and sell every

fourteen days.        See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 5, § 1126(b)-(c), (f).

Prior to the events at issue in this case, Ruiz had a license from

ORIL to produce a quota of over 55,000 liters of milk.

                                      - 2 -
               In    June   2015,   Ruiz    filed    a    Chapter   12   bankruptcy

petition1 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto

Rico.     In August 2018, while Ruiz's bankruptcy proceedings were

still ongoing, ORIL suspended Ruiz's milk license on a "regulatory

presumption of milk trafficking"2 and filed an administrative

complaint seeking revocation of the license.                     In October 2018,

ORIL agreed to conditionally reinstate the milk license while

ORIL's administrative action proceeded.                    The bankruptcy court

entered    a    corresponding       order    "re-activat[ing]"       Ruiz's    milk

license "on a conditional basis . . . subject to a final judgment

in the administrative-agency proceedings."

               Later that month, after holding evidentiary hearings,

ORIL revoked Ruiz's license and ordered him to "dispose[] of" his

milk quota.         After ORIL denied reconsideration in early 2019, Ruiz

sought review of ORIL's decision in the Puerto Rico Court of

Appeals.        Ruiz    also   filed   a    motion   in    the   bankruptcy   court

requesting permission to lease 53,000 liters of his milk quota to

a willing lessee for a term of six months, so that Ruiz could

     1    Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code "allow[s] farmer
debtors with regular annual income to adjust their debts." Hall
v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 509 (2012).
     2    In particular, ORIL claimed that its inspections
revealed that Ruiz had made "milk deliveries . . . well above his
production capacity . . . . [and] far exceed[ing] his herd's
ability to produce the milk," thus "trigger[ing] a regulatory
presumption of milk trafficking."

                                       - 3 -
"obtain an income source out of which he c[ould] pay the Chapter

12 [t]rustee."    Ruiz provided electronic notice of this motion to

ORIL, but ORIL filed no objection to the motion.

           The bankruptcy court granted Ruiz's motion and approved

the lease on February 15, 2019, noting that ORIL had "no[t]

oppos[ed]" the motion despite having received "[d]ue notice" of

it.   Ruiz and a lessee then executed a lease for the quota, and on

February   20,    2019,   Ruiz   submitted   the   lease   to   ORIL   for

registration.

           On February 27, 2019, ORIL filed a motion with the

bankruptcy court requesting reconsideration of the order approving

the lease.       This was the first time ORIL had expressed any

opposition to the lease.     ORIL argued that, despite Ruiz's pending

appeal in the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, Ruiz could not lawfully

lease his milk quota because he no longer had an active license,

and that the lease of 53,000 liters exceeded the maximum leasable

amount under Puerto Rico law.       On March 8, 2019, the bankruptcy

court ordered ORIL to further explain its position and to "show

cause why its motion for reconsideration should not be denied for

failure to object to [Ruiz's] motion requesting leave to lease

milk quota."     ORIL attempted to explain that it had not opposed

Ruiz's motion because it had believed that the bankruptcy court

would deny the motion due to ORIL's having revoked Ruiz's milk

license.

                                  - 4 -
              The   bankruptcy      court    denied   ORIL's      motion    for

reconsideration on April 15, 2019, noting that ORIL had "failed to

promptly object" to Ruiz's motion seeking to lease the quota.

Observing that Ruiz's appeal of ORIL's revocation of his license

was   still    pending   in   the   Puerto   Rico   Court   of   Appeals,   the

bankruptcy court concluded that Ruiz was "authorized to use the

milk license" on a conditional basis until he "exhaust[ed] his

appeal rights."

              ORIL then appealed both orders of the bankruptcy court

-- i.e., the order approving the lease and the order denying

reconsideration -- to the BAP.         ORIL did not request a stay of the

bankruptcy court orders pending appeal.

              While ORIL's appeal was pending before the BAP, two

noteworthy events occurred.          First, the six-month lease executed

by Ruiz and the lessee expired on or about August 20, 2019.

According to Ruiz -- and uncontested by ORIL during the course of

this appeal -- ORIL had never registered the lease and thus had

prevented Ruiz and the lessee from ever actually implementing it.

Second, Ruiz exhausted his appeals of ORIL's revocation of his

milk license in the Puerto Rico court system, to no avail: the

Puerto Rico Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation order in

December 2019, and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico denied review

in February 2020 and denied reconsideration in May 2020.

                                     - 5 -
            The BAP   -- on June 10, 2020,      after requesting and

receiving supplemental briefing from the parties regarding the

action's potential mootness -- affirmed both of the bankruptcy

court orders.    Milk Indus. Regul. Off. v. Ruiz Ruiz (In re Ruiz

Ruiz), No. PR 19-023, 2020 WL 3264985, at *1 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. June

10, 2020) (unpublished decision).      The BAP noted that "the record

triggered some mootness concerns" because the lease "was never

implemented and expired by its terms."      Id. at *3.   Despite these

concerns, see id. at *3-4, the BAP purported to "bypass" the

question of whether the action was moot and thereby "advance to a

discussion of the merits," id. at *4.    The BAP then rejected ORIL's

challenges on the merits.    See id. at *4-7.

            After the BAP denied ORIL's motion for panel rehearing,

ORIL timely appealed to this court.

                                 II.

                                 A.

            Despite the BAP's discussion of this action's potential

mootness, the appellant, ORIL, has briefed only the merits of the

action to us.     Ruiz's responsive brief also does not discuss

mootness.   Nevertheless, "[b]efore turning to the merits, we must

'determine as a threshold matter that we have jurisdiction.'"

Moore v. Harper, 143 S. Ct. 2065, 2076 (2023) (quoting Goodyear

Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 178 (1988)).

                                - 6 -
              Article   III     of   the     Constitution    restricts   our

jurisdiction to "Cases" and "Controversies."                U.S. Const. art.

III,   § 2.      "As    '[a]    corollary    to   this   case-or-controversy

requirement,' there must exist a dispute 'at all stages of review

. . . .'"      Moore, 143 S. Ct. at 2076 (quoting Genesis HealthCare

Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013) (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).          An action becomes moot "when

the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a

legally cognizable interest in the outcome," such that "it [is]

impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to

a prevailing party."          Harris v. Univ. of Mass. Lowell, 43 F.4th

187, 191-92 (1st Cir. 2022) (first quoting Chafin v. Chafin, 568

U.S. 165, 172 (2013); and then quoting Gulf of Me. Fishermen's

All. v. Daley, 292 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2002)).

              Because a "case that becomes moot at any point during

the proceedings is        'no longer a       "Case"   or "Controversy"   for

purposes of Article III,' and is outside the jurisdiction of the

federal courts," United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532,

1537 (2018) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91

(2013)), federal courts lack authority to "bypass [the mootness]

inquiry when the record reveals mootness may be an issue," Harris,

43 F.4th at 191 n.7; see Redfern v. Napolitano, 727 F.3d 77, 82-

84 (1st Cir. 2013) ("The question of whether [a] case is moot . . .

call[s] into question our power to hear th[e] case under Article

                                     - 7 -
III and we are thus prohibited from sidestepping it . . . .                           'When

a case is moot[,] . . . dismissal of the action is compulsory.'"

(quoting      Maher    v.    Hyde,   272    F.3d     83,    86    (1st   Cir.    2001))).

Moreover, because "[e]very federal appellate court has a special

obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but

also [of] that of the lower courts in a cause under review,"

Arizonans     for     Off.   Eng.    v.    Arizona,        520   U.S.    43,    73   (1997)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport

Area   Sch.    Dist.,       475   U.S.    534,     541   (1986)),       we   must    assure

ourselves that the mooting event did not occur prior to a decision

below, see id. ("[When the lower federal court] lacks jurisdiction,

we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for

the    purpose   of    correcting         the    error     of    the    lower   court   in

entertaining the suit." (alterations in original) (quoting Bender,

475 U.S. at 541)).

              ORIL's challenge to the bankruptcy court orders became

moot no later than approximately August 20, 2019, when the lease

of Ruiz's milk quota expired.              See ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conf. of

Cath. Bishops (ACLUM), 705 F.3d 44, 53 (1st Cir. 2013) ("It is

ordinarily true that a challenge to a contract becomes moot upon

that contract's expiration.").                   ORIL has never pursued damages

based on Ruiz's execution of the lease; it has sought only to

reverse the bankruptcy court order approving the lease.                         After the

lease expired, ORIL retained no concrete interest in seeking that

                                           - 8 -
reversal.     See id. at 53 ("Once a contract has expired, . . . if

no damages are sought, the parties usually do not have a legally

cognizable interest in the case's outcome. . . .             [T]here is no

ongoing conduct left for the court to enjoin. . . .           [And] [w]ith

limited exceptions, not present here, issuance of a declaratory

judgment deeming [the contract] illegal is also not permissible as

it would be merely advisory.") (citations omitted); Harris, 43

F.4th at 192-93 (noting that "[a]lthough 'a claim for damages will

keep a case from becoming moot where equitable relief no longer

forms the basis of a live controversy,'" the appellants had not

made "any specific request for damages" (quoting Thomas R.W. v.

Mass. Dep't of Educ., 130 F.3d 477, 480 (1st Cir. 1997))).

             That is especially so here because the lease was never

actually implemented.       See Marek v. Rhode Island, 702 F.3d 650,

652,   654   (1st   Cir.   2012)   (finding   an    action   moot   where   a

development permit expired and the proposed development "ha[d] not

gone forward," rendering the "project . . . a dead letter" that

"was no longer authorized").        Indeed, the action may have become

moot even earlier, upon ORIL's decision to not register the lease

in spite of the bankruptcy court's denial of reconsideration of

its approval of the lease.         In any event, the action became moot

well before the BAP's June 10, 2020,               decision affirming the

bankruptcy court orders, so the BAP should have dismissed the

action without reaching the merits.           See, e.g., Arizonans, 520

                                    - 9 -
U.S. at 48 (noting that the lower court "had no warrant to proceed"

to the merits where the "case had lost the essential elements of

a   justiciable       controversy");         Redfern,    727     F.3d    at     82

("prohibit[ing]" federal courts "from sidestepping" questions of

mootness).

                                        B.

          "'Since the controversy at issue is not live, and the

requested relief is not available, [ORIL] must rely on an exception

to the mootness doctrine' to save [its] appeal from dismissal."

Harris, 43 F.4th at 194 (quoting ACLUM, 705 F.3d at 54).                Two such

exceptions merit brief discussion.

                                        1.

          ORIL argued to the BAP, but not in its brief to us, that

the action falls within the exception for controversies that are

"capable of repetition, yet evading review."             Kingdomware Techs.,

Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 170 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna,

523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).          That exception applies only if "(1) the

challenged   action    is   in    its   duration   too   short    to    be   fully

litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is

a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be

subjected to the same action again."           Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at

1540 (quoting     Turner    v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 439-40 (2011)

(alterations omitted)).          "[O]nly in exceptional situations" does

an action meet this exception, Kingdomware Techs., 579 U.S. at 170

                                     - 10 -
(quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17), and the "party arguing for the

exception has the burden of showing" its applicability, Redfern,

727 F.3d at 84.

          Even were we to assume, dubitante, that ORIL "could show

the requisite short timing for the exception to apply," ORIL

"clearly [has] failed to meet [its] burden as to the second prong

of the test." Id. That prong "requires a 'reasonable expectation'

or a 'demonstrated probability' that 'the same controversy will

recur involving the same complaining party.'"       FEC v. Wis. Right

to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 463 (2007) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt,

455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam)). "Notably, this requirement

cannot   rest   on   '[t]he   possibility   that   other   parties   may

subsequently bring a similar claim'"; rather, the expectation of

repetition "must be specific to [ORIL]."      Harris, 43 F.4th at 195

(quoting Thomas R.W., 130 F.3d at 480).

          ORIL has demonstrated no such reasonable expectation.

It offers no reason to believe that Ruiz, or any other milk

producer, will imminently seek approval of a short-term lease of

a large quantity of milk quota after license revocation.        See id.

("[A]voiding mootness cannot rest on 'speculation' about some

future potential event." (quoting Pietrangelo v. Sununu, 15 F.4th

103, 106 (1st Cir. 2021))).      Ruiz seems particularly unlikely to

do so, given that he has now exhausted his appeals of ORIL's

revocation of his license: even under the bankruptcy court's

                                 - 11 -
interpretation of ORIL's agreement to conditionally reinstate the

license, the license would endure only until the end of that

appeals process.3     "[I]n the improbable event" that Ruiz seeks

approval of another lease of milk quota, that request will be

adjudicated   in    markedly   different   circumstances   from   those

underlying the instant dispute.     Marek, 702 F.3d at 655.   Further,

ORIL "would be able to mount a challenge" by objecting to any such

request, which it failed to do here.       Id.

                                   2.

          At oral argument, when this court raised the question of

mootness, ORIL presented a new argument which it has never briefed.

Noting that Ruiz had recently filed an adversary complaint4 against

ORIL seeking damages based on ORIL's failure to register the lease,

ORIL claimed to suffer an "ongoing injury" based on its potential

"exposure to liability" from that complaint.     ORIL posited that if

this court upholds the bankruptcy court orders approving the lease

     3    Notably, the appeals process concluded prior to the
BAP's decision: the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico denied
reconsideration of its denial of review in May 2020, and the BAP
affirmed the bankruptcy court orders in June 2020. So even at the
time of the BAP's decision, ORIL had no stronger claim to the
applicability of the exception than it has now.
     4    "[A]n adversary proceeding is a subsidiary lawsuit
within the larger framework of a bankruptcy case."     Botelho v.
Buscone (In re Buscone), 61 F.4th 10, 16 n.1 (1st Cir. 2023)
(quoting Assured Guar. Corp. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for
P.R. (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.), 872 F.3d 57, 63
(1st Cir. 2017)).

                                 - 12 -
and   denying        reconsideration,      then    ORIL    could       be    subject   to

liability       in    the   pending   adversary      proceeding.             This   oral

contention appears to be meant to invoke the exception to mootness

for controversies that may engender "collateral consequences" for

a party.    ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 88 (1st Cir.

2008).

            "There is a recognized defense to a claim of mootness in

the appellate context when a party can demonstrate that a lower

court's    decision,        if   allowed    to    stand,       may    have   collateral

consequences adverse to its interests."                  Id.    "This exception has

been applied traditionally in criminal cases because a federal

court    can,    as     a   general   matter,      'presume          that    [collateral

consequences]          exist'     stemming        from     an        unconstitutional

conviction."         Rivera-Rivera v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.

(In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.), 16 F.4th 954, 962-63

(1st Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Sibron v. New

York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968)).             But we also found the exception to

apply in the civil context in ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg.                        See 522

F.3d at 88-89.         There, we noted that "collateral consequences may

be found in the prospect that a judgment will affect future

litigation or administrative action."                Id. at 89 (quoting 13A C.

Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 3533.3 (2d ed. 1984)).           Although "collateral consequences that

are remote or speculative will not inoculate an appeal against a

                                      - 13 -
finding of mootness,"        id.; see also In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt.

Bd. for P.R., 16 F.4th at 963 (noting that "inchoate and barely

articulated [collateral] consequences that . . . [are] too diffuse

and    unformed     to   supply    a   basis    for   finding   a   substantial

controversy of sufficient immediacy" cannot negate mootness), a

judgment     that    would    "ha[ve]      a    concrete    (and    potentially

devastating) impact on [another] action . . . . suffices to defuse

a claim of mootness," ConnectU, 522 F.3d at 88-89.

             ORIL has waived its argument that the case is not moot

under this exception.         See Conduragis v. Prospect Chartercare,

LLC,   909   F.3d    516,    518   n.2   (1st    Cir.   2018)   ("[E]xcept   in

extraordinary circumstances, arguments not raised in a party's

initial brief and instead raised for the first time at oral

argument are considered waived." (quoting United States v. Pulido,

566 F.3d 52, 60 n.4 (1st Cir. 2009))); cf. ACLUM, 705 F.3d at 56

(finding that a party's "appellate brief ha[d] waived the issue"

of the applicability of the exception to mootness for controversies

that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, by "addressing

the exception only once in a footnote").              ORIL chose to completely

ignore the issue of mootness in all of its briefing.                It is true

that Ruiz filed his adversary complaint after briefing to this

court had finished, but ORIL knew of his intention to do so much

earlier: ORIL had ample notice of Ruiz's argument because Ruiz, in

response to the BAP's request for supplemental briefing regarding

                                       - 14 -
mootness, expressly stated his intention to file the adversary

complaint, contending that the action was not moot because "if

[the bankruptcy court orders are] upheld by th[e] BAP, . . . [Ruiz]

will be able to seek a remedy for ORIL's violation of a valid

[o]rder       from   the   [b]ankruptcy    [c]ourt   . . .   [via   ORIL's]

unilateral action of not registering the lease."             Nevertheless,

ORIL's briefs made no mention of this to either this court or the

BAP.       We thus cannot conclude that "extraordinary circumstances"

exist to excuse ORIL's waiver.5           Conduragis, 909 F.3d at 518 n.2

(quoting Pulido, 566 F.3d at 60 n.4).

                                    III.

              The issue remains of determining the proper disposition

of this action upon a finding of mootness.

              At the outset, it is clear that we must vacate the BAP's

judgment.        Because the mooting event occurred prior to that

       5  We note -- without deciding -- that a party seeking to
invoke the "collateral consequences" exception in a civil case may
bear the burden of demonstrating its applicability. See United
States v. Juv. Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011) (noting, in the
criminal context, that courts "presume[] the existence of
collateral consequences" when a defendant whose sentence has
expired challenges the underlying conviction, but that "no such
presumption applies" when a defendant challenges the expired
sentence); Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-14 (noting, in the habeas
context, that a petitioner who is no longer incarcerated bears the
burden of demonstrating that collateral consequences stem from a
prior parole revocation); cf. Redfern, 727 F.3d at 84 (noting that
the "party arguing for the exception [for controversies that are
capable of repetition, yet evading review] has the burden of
showing" its applicability).

                                   - 15 -
judgment, the BAP "had no warrant to proceed" as it did and resolve

the case on the merits.   Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 48; see, e.g., 13C

C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.10

(3d ed. 2023) ("No difficulty is encountered if an action is moot

at the time of the lower court's decision -- any decision on the

merits is vacated, even if the [lower] court both ruled that the

action was moot and alternatively addressed the merits."); Scruggs

v. Lowman (In re Scruggs), 392 F.3d 124, 129 (5th Cir. 2004)

("[W]hen a matter on appeal is determined to have become moot, not

merely prior to or during the appeal but prior to the date of the

order being appealed from, we must dismiss as moot the appeal

before us and vacate . . . the ruling from which the appeal was

sought.").

          That still leaves the proper disposition with respect to

the two bankruptcy court orders on appeal -- i.e., the February

15, 2019, order approving the lease and the April 15, 2019, order

denying reconsideration of that approval.     We turn now to that

issue.

          When a civil case becomes moot pending appeal, the

"established practice . . . is to reverse or vacate the judgment

below and remand with a direction to dismiss."    United States v.

Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950).    "That procedure clears the

path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and

eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through

                               - 16 -
happenstance."      Id. at 40.       "The equitable remedy of vacatur

ensures that 'those who have been prevented from obtaining the

review to which they are entitled [are] not . . . treated as if

there had been a review.'"       Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 712

(2011) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Munsingwear,

340 U.S. at 39); see U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship,

513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994) ("A party who seeks review of the merits of

an   adverse   ruling,   but   is     frustrated   by     the   vagaries   of

circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the

judgment.").

          This    practice,      however,    is    "not     exceptionless."

Camreta, 563 U.S. at 712; see Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1793

(2018) ("[N]ot every moot case will warrant vacatur . . . .").

Although vacatur is justified where mootness either occurs "by

happenstance" or "results from unilateral action of the party who

prevailed below," it is not warranted where mootness "results from

settlement" or when "the party seeking relief from the judgment

below caused the mootness by voluntary action."           Bancorp, 513 U.S.

at 24-25, 25 n.3.

          Accordingly, after concluding that an action is moot, we

must determine on which "side of the line" the action falls.

Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 95 (2009). Ultimately, the decision

of whether to vacate is "rooted in equity" and "turns on 'the

conditions and circumstances of the particular case.'"             Azar, 138

                                    - 17 -
S. Ct. at 1792 (quoting United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische

Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U.S. 466, 478 (1916)); see

Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 24 ("[W]e have disposed of moot cases in the

manner 'most consonant to justice . . . in view of the nature and

character of the conditions which have caused the case to become

moot.'" (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting   Hamburg-Amerikanische,   239   U.S.   at   478));   28   U.S.C.

§ 2106 (allowing a reviewing court to "direct the entry of such

appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further

proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances"

(emphasis added)).

           We note that a finding of mootness "may require multiple

vacaturs in the bankruptcy context," because "three, not two, court

systems are involved."    Pilate v. Burrell (In re Burrell), 415

F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dunlavey v. Ariz. Title

Ins. & Tr. Co. (In re Charlton), 708 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir.

1983)); see 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b) (providing that an appeal from

a bankruptcy court order is heard by either a district court or a

bankruptcy appellate panel prior to the circuit court of appeals).

In appropriate circumstances, as described above, we thus may

vacate "both the judgments of the district court or the BAP and

the bankruptcy court."   In re Burrell, 415 F.3d at 1000; accord,

e.g., Neidich v. Salas, 783 F.3d 1215, 1216 (11th Cir. 2015); In

                              - 18 -
re Biggs, 271 F. App'x 286, 289 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished

decision).

                 We conclude that the "balance of equities" weigh against

vacatur of the bankruptcy court orders here.              Azar, 138 S. Ct. at

1793.          Several factors inform this conclusion.      First, ORIL never

sought a stay pending appeal of the bankruptcy court orders -- a

request that, had it been granted, could have forestalled the

mootness of this action.           See, e.g., Cook v. Fletcher (In re Cook),

730 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he appellants' failure to

seek       a    stay   of   the   bankruptcy   court's   orders   supports   our

conclusion that this appeal is moot."); cf. 13B Wright & Miller,

supra, § 3533.2.3 (noting that in bankruptcy appeals, particularly

those involving sales and leases of property, "the appellant has

a high obligation to seek a stay pending appeal, even if the

chances of success seem dim" and "[a] failure to seek a stay

increases concern that relief may be inequitable").6              That failure

       6  We note that obtaining a stay could have protected ORIL
from the risk of statutory mootness stemming from implementation
of the lease.      See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) ("The reversal or
modification on appeal of an authorization . . . of a sale or lease
of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under
such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such
property in good faith, . . . unless such authorization and such
sale or lease were stayed pending appeal." (emphasis added)); see
also, e.g., Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Old Cold LLC (In re
Old Cold LLC), 879 F.3d 376, 382-88 (1st Cir. 2018) (discussing
this provision). Although statutory mootness is not implicated
here because the lease was never implemented, we note that ORIL's
failure   to  register   the   lease   allegedly   prevented   that
implementation.    And ORIL's failure to seek a stay still

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by ORIL does not stand alone. Significantly, ORIL failed to timely

object to Ruiz's motion requesting permission to enter the lease

in the first place, and the bankruptcy court relied on that lack

of objection.     It is abundantly clear that ORIL "slept on its

rights"   in   several   respects   throughout   the   course   of   this

litigation. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 41. Moreover, as Ruiz claims

and ORIL does not contest, ORIL decided to not register the lease,

and so prevented its implementation, even after the bankruptcy

court denied reconsideration of the order approving the lease.7

That choice contributed to this action's mootness because it

minimized any concrete impact of the lease and ORIL's stake in

challenging it.    See Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 24 (noting that vacatur

is not warranted where "the party seeking relief from the judgment

below caused the mootness by voluntary action").

contributed to the constitutional mootness of this action. Cf.
Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Grp. (In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.),
963 F.2d 469, 472 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[T]he equitable and
jurisdictional considerations underlying the mootness doctrine are
interactive . . . . Although in bankruptcy cases these concerns
most often coincide in the context of transfers to good faith
purchasers, we have acknowledged that the same principles 'pervade
the Bankruptcy Code.'" (citations omitted) (first citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 363; and then quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Miller (In re
Stadium Mgmt. Corp.), 895 F.2d 845, 848 (1st Cir. 1990))).
     7    We express no view on how ORIL's alleged failure to
register the lease may impact the outcome of Ruiz's pending
adversary complaint or other future litigation between the
parties. We note only that in the instant action, ORIL has not
contested Ruiz's claim that ORIL chose to not register the lease,
a choice which contributed to the action's mootness.

                                - 20 -
           We emphasize that our analysis is confined to the "unique

circumstances of this case."    Azar, 138 S. Ct. at 1793.   We do not

hold, for example, that a party must always seek a stay in order

to later request vacatur.      Cf. Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Grp.

(In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.), 963 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1992)

("The failure to obtain a stay is not sufficient ground for a

finding of mootness.").   But ORIL's actions, viewed cumulatively,

have tilted the "balance of equities" against vacatur.      Azar, 138

S. Ct. at 1793; see also Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 26 (noting that the

"party seeking relief from the status quo of the . . . judgment

[below]" must "demonstrate not merely equivalent responsibility

for the mootness, but equitable entitlement to the extraordinary

remedy of vacatur").

                                 IV.

           For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the

BAP and remand to the BAP with instructions to dismiss ORIL's

appeal as moot.      The bankruptcy court orders will       "remain[]

extant."   Harris, 43 F.4th at 195 (quoting Med. Pro. Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Breon Lab'ys, Inc., 141 F.3d 372, 376 (1st Cir. 1998)).     Costs

are awarded to Ruiz.

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