Court Opinion

ID: 9495216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:57:36.924369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:53.716570
License: Public Domain

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge,
Concurring in the Judgment:
Although I find myself in agreement with much of the majority’s opinion, including the ultimate result, I respectfully part company with the majority to the extent that its opinion can be read to bar habeas review under § 2241 in all cases that implicate abuse of discretion. It is one thing to acknowledge that Congress repealed direct judicial review of certain immigration orders; it is quite another to restrict habeas review for manifest abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have both held that the repeal of judicial review of final deportation orders does not affect the court’s jurisdiction to review such orders under the general ha-beas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 307-08, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001); Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir.1999). Although I agree with the majority that St. Cyr offers no definitive resolution to the scope of habeas review, 533 U.S. at 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271, it counsels against total abdication of jurisdiction to review discretionary determinations for egregious abuse. The court specifically discussed “the historical use of habeas corpus to *831remedy unlawful executive action,” including arguments that habeas applies to claims of “the improper exercise of official discretion.” 533 U.S. at 303-04, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Court ultimately concluded that in St. Cyr’s case, only “pure questions of law” were at issue. St. Cyr’s claim — that the INS had incorrectly decided that he was statutorily ineligible for discretionary relief — did not necessitate abuse of discretion review. Id. at 304-05, 121 S.Ct. 2271. I would heed the Court’s mandate and turn to the historical scope of § 2241 habe-as corpus review for guidance on this question.
As we have previously explained, “[e]laims of ... abuse of discretion in the application laws have long been cognizable on habeas corpus.” Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1101 n. 4 (9th Cir.2001). The import of this statement is unmistakable. We also earlier noted § 2241 habeas jurisdiction to review of the denial of § 212(c) discretionary relief from deportation in Sotelo Mondragon v. Ilchert, 653 F.2d 1254, 1256-57 (9th Cir.1980) (the court noted jurisdiction both under § 2241 and the now-repealed § 106).1
Claims of abuse of discretion have always been considered claims that an official violated a statute, and thus that the petitioner is being held “in violation of the ... laws ... of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Supreme Court specifically noted that “under the pre-1952 regime which provided only what Heikkila2 termed the constitutional minimum of review, on habeas lower federal courts routinely reviewed decisions under the Seventh Proviso, the statutory predecessor to § 212(c), to ensure the lawful exercise of discretion.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308 n. 30, 121 S.Ct. 2271;. see also id. at 303-04 & n. 23, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting petitioner’s claim of “historical evidence of the writ issuing to redress the improper exercise of official discretion”, and citing cases); see also Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110 n. 17 (noting amici argument that habeas jurisdiction traditionally allowed review for “manifest abuse of discretion”).
It is also instructive to look to closely related contexts in which § 2241 habeas jurisdiction has been invoked to review official abuse of discretion. Even in the highly discretionary context of decisions to parole aliens not yet admitted, courts retained habeas jurisdiction to review INS decisions. Marczak v. Greene, 971 F.2d 510, 515-16 (10th Cir.1992) (noting that “the deference due an administrative determination hinges not simply on the petitioner’s ability to proceed under the habe-as statutes but rather on the realm of the agency’s authority and the nature of the petitioner’s dispute”); Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir.1987) (habe-as review under “facially legitimate and bona fide” benchmark); Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 210-11 (2d Cir.1982). The *832Second Circuit’s reasoning in Bertrand is persuasive:
Discretion vested by statute in agents of the federal government is rarely, if ever, entirely free of judicial review for abuse. That discretionary power is not absolute power is fundamental to our constitutional form of government. The discretionary power to parole unadmitted aliens granted by statute to the Attorney General, and delegated by him to INS District Directors, is broad, but it is not without limits. In granting the Attorney General this discretionary power, Congress did not modify or qualify the availability of a habeas corpus action to unadmitted aliens detained pending completion of exclusion proceedings.
684 F.2d at 210-11 (internal citation and footnote omitted).
I have no quibble with the long-standing proposition that we will not disturb the BIA’s discretion under § 212(c), as long as it considered relevant factors, explained its outcome, and is consistent with its own precedent. See, e.g., Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir.1993). We must not, however, confuse the standard of review or the scope of review with lack of jurisdiction to review. See Marczak, 971 F.2d at 516. The majority’s reliance on the traditional distinction between the manner in which discretion is exercised and the failure to exercise discretion cuts too broad a swath. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 307-08, 121 S.Ct. 2271; United States ex rel. Ac-cardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954). Failure to exercise any discretion is a manifest abuse of discretion reviewable under § 2241. This fact does not, however, foreclose review in other circumstances of manifest abuse of discretion.

. A review of caselaw from sister circuits reveals little consensus. The Eighth Circuit has held that § 2241 habeas review extends to abuse of discretion claims. Reyes-Lechuga v. Reno, 183 F.3d 867, 867-68 (8th Cir.1999). Other circuits have declined to reach the issue. See Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 125 & n. 7 (1st Cir.1998); Alanis-Bustamante v. Reno, 201 F.3d 1303, 1311 n. 16 (11th Cir.2000). Yet others have held that habeas review would not extend to abuse of discretion. Sol v. INS, 274 F.3d 648 (2d Cir.2001); Toscano-Gil v. Trominski, 210 F.3d 470, 473 (5th Cir.2000); Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 483, 490 (4th Cir.1999); Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997). With the exception of the recent Sol case, it is unclear whether these opinions continue to hold force in light of intervening Supreme Court authority. Indeed, Yang was expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 480 n. 7, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999).

. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 73 S.Ct. 603, 97 L.Ed. 972 (1953).