Court Opinion

ID: 9863413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:09:44.42626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:28.664258
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON, dissenting: On appeal, defendant asked this court to vacate one of his two convictions on the ground that the possession of a single loaded firearm cannot serve as the basis for multiple convictions. I must dissent, because I agree that we must vacate one of defendant’s two convictions. I reach this conclusion based on our legislature’s amendment, enacted in response to our supreme court’s decision in People v. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d 295 (2004). This is a case of first impression; neither the court nor the parties found another case interpreting and applying the 2005 amendment. Pub. Act 94—284 (eff. July 1, 2005) (amending 720 ILCS 5/24—1.1(e) (West 2008)).3  The majority finds that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Carter presented an issue, which was then resolved by a statutory amendment. The majority finds that the amendment is not ambiguous and thus our job is done. However, the Carter case actually presented a number of different issues, which were not resolved by the subsequent amendment. Once one realizes the different issues involved, the ambiguities in the amendment become apparent. In Carter, during a search of defendant’s vehicle, the police recovered weapons and ammunition.4 Carter, 213 Ill. 2d at 298. As a result of this one incident, defendant was charged with four separate counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d at 298. The four counts were for: (1) an unloaded .22-caliber handgun; (2) a .25-caliber handgun; (3) the ammunition clip that was attached to the .25-caliber handgun; and (4) a clip for the .22-caliber handgun, that was found near the .22-caliber handgun, but that was not attached to it. Carter, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 664-65. The Carter case thus presented at least three potential issues: (1) whether the simultaneous possession of two firearms constituted one offense or two; (2) whether the possession of a loaded handgun constituted one offense or two; and (3) whether a loaded handgun presented a different issue than an unloaded handgun with a clip nearby. The Carter court found that, under the version of the statute that applied to the facts before it, the simultaneous possession of the two weapons and their respective ammunition constituted one offense. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d at 304. Thus, the Carter court resolved all three potential issues with one holding. However, the Carter court asked our legislature to provide guidance on the issues raised by “the simultaneous possession of multiple firearms” and “the simultaneous possession of *** a firearm and ammunition.” Carter, 213 Ill. 2d at 304. Our supreme court observed that almost every federal court of appeals that had considered these issues had found only one crime. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d at 304. Our supreme court specifically asked for legislative guidance with respect to a “loaded gun,” stating: “While we agree with the State that a felon who possesses a loaded gun may be more dangerous than a felon who possesses a gun but no ammunition, it is for the legislature to ‘ “define what it desires to make the [allowable] unit of prosecution.” ’ ” Carter, 213 Ill. 2d at 306 (quoting Manning, 71 Ill. 2d at 137, quoting Bell, 349 U.S. at 83). The subsequent amendment states that “[t]he possession of each firearm or firearm ammunition in violation of this Section constitutes a single and separate violation.” 720 ILCS 5/24—1.1(e) (West 2008). Thus, “each firearm” leads only to a “single” offense. The amendment refers simply to “each firearm,” without making any distinction between a loaded firearm and an unloaded firearm. Thus, to resolve any ambiguity in the defendant’s favor as we are required to do, we must hold that “each” loaded firearm creates only a “single” offense. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d at 301 (“criminal or penal statutes must be strictly construed in the defendant’s favor”). In other weapons laws, the legislature has carefully drawn distinctions among: (1) a “loaded” firearm; (2) an “unloaded” firearm where “the ammunition for the weapon was immediately accessible”; and (3) an unloaded firearm without immediately accessible ammunition. 720 ILCS 5/24—1.6 (West 2008). However, the legislature chose not to draw those distinctions here. Thus, resolving any ambiguity in favor of the defendant, we must find that “each firearm” means a firearm, whether loaded or not. 720 ILCS 5/24—1.1 (West 2008). The ambiguity inherent in the statute becomes clear when we consider the phrase “each *** ammunition.” 720 ILCS 5/24—1.1 (West 2008). “Ammunition” can be either plural or singular;5 while “each” is singular.6 The legislature’s use of the phrase “each *** ammunition” raises the question of whether “each” round of ammunition can lead to a separate offense or whether an entire collection of ammunition, without regard to the number of clips or rounds present, constitutes only one offense. If we were to accept an interpretation that both the rounds in a firearm and the firearm itself can give rise to separate offenses, I am not sure how many separate offenses could result from one loaded firearm, considering the number of rounds in the firearm itself or in any attached clip. Carter, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 675 (McLaren, J., dissenting) (noting the “absurd result” that would be reached if every round of ammunition gave rise to a separate offense). The majority suggests that, if we hold that a loaded firearm represents only one offense, our holding would have the absurd result of encouraging convicted felons to carry their guns loaded. If a holding that a loaded firearm is a single offense would lead to an absurd result, then there is absurdity no matter which way we interpret this amendment. As already discussed above, one firearm with a clip attached could lead to dozens of offenses. If there is ambiguity in a criminal or penal statute, we are required to interpret it in the defendant’s favor. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d at 301 (“criminal or penal statutes must be strictly construed in the defendant’s favor”). Since I decide this issue based solely on statutory construction, I do not reach any possible constitutional questions, such as whether the statute violates the one-act, one-crime rule. People v. Quinones, 362 Ill. App. 3d 385, 397 (2005) (multiple convictions “based on the same act, specifically, defendant’s possession of the firearm” “cannot stand under the one-act, one-crime doctrine”). “One-act, one-crime principles apply only if the statute is construed as permitting multiple convictions ***.” Carter, 213 Ill. 2d at 301. Our supreme court has “repeatedly stated that cases should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, reaching constitutional issues only as a last resort.” In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006); People v. Melchor, 226 Ill. 2d 24, 34 (2007). Since the amendment is ambiguous, I find that only one offense is permitted for a single loaded firearm, and I would vacate one of defendant’s two convictions. Defendant did not ask this court to remand for re-sentencing; otherwise I would also have ordered it.  The majority states that the Lee case “suggests” that the 2005 amendment permits multiple convictions for one loaded firearm. 408 Ill. App. 3d at 802 n.2 (citing Lee, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 538 n.2). The Lee case does not suggest that at all. In Lee, the law that governed was the old statute, prior to the amendment. Lee, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 538. In Lee, the defendant argued, the State conceded, and the trial court agreed that the old statute did not permit multiple convictions for one loaded firearm. Lee, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 538. The Lee court did observe that the statute had been subsequently amended, and the court reiterated the language of the amendment in a footnote, but the Lee court had no reason to consider the 2005 amendment, and it did not. Lee, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 538 n.2.   In Carter, there was a drive-by shooting; the shooter’s vehicle crashed as it tried to avoid the police; the defendant, who was the driver, fled from the crashed vehicle; and police officers recovered weapons and ammunition from the crashed vehicle. People v. Carter, 344 Ill. App. 3d 663, 664-65 (2003), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by Carter, 213 Ill. 2d 295 (2004).   Although the Criminal Code of 1961 defines “ammunition” as any one self-contained cartridge (720 ILCS 5/2—7.1 (West 2008), incorporating by reference section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2008))), the word is commonly understood to he a plural noun. A dictionary defines “ammunition” as “[t]he projectiles, along with their fuses and primers, that can be fired from guns or otherwise propelled.” American Heritage Dictionary 103 (2d coll. ed. 1982). The word “projectiles” is plural.   “Each” is defined as “[b]eing one of two or more, considered individually; every.” American Heritage Dictionary 434 (2d coll. ed. 1982). “Each” thus means “being one.”