Court Opinion

ID: 9698061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:40:34.942022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:37.869409
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
The government’s theory of this case presupposes that on the very day of her appearance at the United States Attorney’s office to tell prosecutors and the grand jury about the armed robbery, kidnapping, and attempted murder allegedly committed by Huff, Artis and Bias, Deborah Davis was shot to death by a man who alluded to her “snitching” but who had no known connection with the grievous crimes which the three men were said to have committed, or with any individual member of that triumvirate. If this is what occurred, then the court was presented with what one can only describe as a remarkable coincidence. “Coincidences happen, but an alternative explanation not predicated on happenstance is often the one that has the ring of truth.” Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1213 (D.C.1993) (quoting Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134, 139 (D.C.1992)). A dose of life experience may make a wise juror wary of spectacular coincidences and reluctant, in a given case, to believe that one has occurred.
As a result of the trial judge’s ruling on the motion in limine, however, the jury was never informed that the prosecution’s case against Winfield rested on what an impartial trier of fact might reasonably view as a very unusual coincidence indeed. The case was thus tried on an artificially constricted record which, in my opinion, provided the jury with a selective (and therefore misleading) reconstruction of the relevant facts. Indeed, the jurors learned next to nothing about the stormy last month or so of the decedent’s life, and the question of the killer’s motive was dismissed by the prosecutor in closing argument as something the government was not required to prove. The obvious motive of Huff and his confreres, and the threats and assault alleged to have been so recently car*616ried out by them pursuant to that motive, were not disclosed to the jury at all. Because I believe that Winfield was deprived of his constitutional right to present relevant and exculpatory evidence, and that he was therefore denied a fair trial, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of his conviction.
I.
In order to demonstrate the extent to which the government’s theory presupposed a coincidence of which the jurors were not apprised, I briefly outline the facts relied upon by the defense to support its theory that Huff may have killed Ms. Davis, and that there was therefore a reasonable doubt of Winfield’s guilt.1 On June 16, 1990, Artis, Bias and Ms. Davis were arrested and charged with armed robbery. Bias was unable to post bond, but Artis and Ms. Davis were released. Artis apparently suspected Ms. Davis of having cooperated with the prosecutors. On June 26, 1990, Artis, who was later joined by Huff, abducted Ms. Davis, drove her to Prince George’s County, Maryland. Artis, in Huffs presence, threatened to kill her for “snitching.” Ms. Davis was stabbed, shot and left for dead. She managed to summon help, and she survived her injuries. On June 28, 1990, Artis was arrested, but Huff remained at large.
Charges were brought against Huff and Artis, both in the District of Columbia and in Prince George’s County, in connection with the kidnapping and shooting of Ms. Davis. On July 26, 1990, only one month after the kidnapping, Ms. Davis, who was cooperating with prosecutors, appeared at the United States Attorney’s office and testified before the grand jury. A few hours later, Ms. Davis was shot to death by a man who pointedly referred to her “snitching”: “you won’t tell this.” 2
While considering the cross-motions in li-mine, the judge described Huffs motive to kill Ms. Davis as “compelling,” and as “extraordinarily strong;” indeed, he expressed the view that “except for opportunity to commit the offense, there are very few cases which would probably be as compelling as to motive.” The judge also considered the shooter’s remark to Ms. Davis — “[y]ou won’t tell this” — but concluded that these words were “not so distinctive that they necessarily tie[d] Mr. Huff to the shooting by relating back to words allegedly spoken by Mr. Artis in Mr. Huffs presence.” (Emphasis added). Noting that no eye-witness had identified Huffs photograph,3 and that there was no proof that Huff knew of Ms. Davis’ appearance before the grand jury or was in the area at the time of her murder, the judge concluded that Huffs motive alone was insufficient to permit the introduction of evidence tending to inculpate Huff, that the proffered evidence did not “clearly link” Huff to the crime, and that its admission would potentially confuse and mislead the jury.
II.
According to the majority, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the government’s motion in limine because “motive alone” is “generally insufficient” to permit a defendant to introduce evidence tending to prove that someone else committed the crime. Assuming this proposition to be true,4 this is hardly a case of “motive alone.” *617The evidence which the judge excluded was designed to demonstrate:
1. that Ms. Davis allegedly “snitched” against Artis and Bias, thus providing them with the initial motive to harm or kill her;
2. that within a few days, Artis and Huff, acting in conformity with this motive, in fact threatened to kill her;
3. that the two men then attempted to carry out their threat by shooting and stabbing Ms. Davis (whom Artis had previously kidnapped) and by leaving her to die;
4. that in July, having survived the first attempt to silence her, Ms. Davis “snitched” again, exposing Huff and Artis to possible incarceration for the remainder of their lives, and thus creating an enhanced and urgent motive for them to finish the job that they had started in June;
5. that Huff was at liberty at the time Ms. Davis was killed, that he and Artis had located Ms. Davis previously, and that to that extent Huff had the opportunity to commit the crime; and
6. that the killer shot Ms. Davis to death on the day that she appeared before the grand jury, and that he voiced concern with her “snitching” — the very activity that precipitated the earlier threats and deadly assault; and
7.that there was no known or demonstrated connection between Winfield and any member of the Artis-Bias-Huff group.5
The existence of a latent motive is one thing; proof that a person not only had such a motive, but that he had acted pursuant to it quite recently (and almost killed the decedent) is quite another. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 356, 11 S.Ct. 350, 351, 34 L.Ed. 954 (1891); Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 381 Mass. 306, 409 N.E.2d 188, 192 (1980) (“[statements, not too remote in time, which indicate an intention to engage in particular conduct, are admissible to prove that the conduct was, in fact, put in effect”). Where threats by a third party have not been carried out, the authorities are divided as to whether evidence of them utterance is admissible, but the better-reasoned decisions would permit such proof. See 1A Wigmore, supra, §§ 140 & 141 n. 1, at 1725-28.6 I know of no precedent, in any event, for excluding evidence of such threats where, as here, a recent and deadly attempt has been made to carry them out, and where the murderer’s words at the scene suggested *618that his motive was identical to the motive of the Artis-Bias-Huff triumvirate.
The judge’s refusal to admit evidence as probative as that excluded here may have had its genesis in the loose use of language in some of our precedents. In Brown, supra note 4, 409 A.2d at 1097, this court stated that, to be admissible, evidence offered to prove that another person may have committed the offense must “clearly link that other person to the commission of the crime.” If the words “clearly link” are read literally, something very like proof of the other person’s guilt would arguably be a precondition for the admission of the evidence. But such an approach confuses relevance with conclusiveness and requires the defendant to demonstrate the latter at a point when only the former is at issue. This is contrary to established law, for “[i]t is enough [for purposes of admissibility] if the item could reasonably show that a fact is slightly more probable than it would appear without that evi-dence_ A brick is not a wall.” Martin, supra note 4, 606 A.2d at 128-29 (citations omitted).
In Johnson v. United States, 552 A.2d 513 (D.C.1989), this court clarified the meaning of “clearly link” and eliminated any doubt that relevance, rather than virtual proof of the third party’s guilt, is the touchstone:
What we mean by “clearly link,” as used first by this court in Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1097, is proof of facts or circumstances which tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense. This proof permits the admission of evidence which otherwise is generally excluded because it is too remote in time and place, completely unrelated or irrelevant to the offense charged, or too speculative with respect to the third party’s guilt.
Id. at 516 (emphasis added; citations omitted). We went on to explain that the proffered evidence may be circumstantial or direct,7 and “may include, for example, a third party’s actions, motives, opportunity, statements and declarations against penal interest.” Id. (citations omitted). While the proffered evidence “should not be too remote in time”8 or too weak in probative quality, and should be closely related to the facts of the case against the defendant,
[t]here is no requirement that the proffered evidence must prove or even raise a strong probability that someone other than the defendant committed the offense.
Id. at 517.9
In Freeland, supra, note 4, this court recently reversed a conviction for reasons similar to those asserted by Winfield in the present case. Freeland was charged with the murder of his wife. At trial, he proffered, inter alia, that he had testified before the *619grand jury and was scheduled to testify at trial as a witness against one Hawthorne, a murderer; that persons claiming to be acting on Hawthorne’s behalf had threatened Free-land and his family; that Hawthorne had in the past intimidated witnesses against him; and that he (Freeland) had told police before the killing that he apprehended reprisals against his family from Hawthorne or his confederates. 631 A.2d at 1189.10 Freeland contended that this evidence would tend to show a reasonable probability that someone else had killed Freeland’s wife in order to punish and silence Freeland. The trial judge excluded the proffered evidence, noting that there was no proof placing Hawthorne or any agent of Hawthorne at or near the scene, and that the nexus required by Brown and Beale was therefore lacking. Relying largely on the explanation in Johnson of the Brown/ Beale “clearly link” test, this court held that the proffer was sufficient, adding that
[g]iven this proffer, the fact that the defense did not also proffer that it could produce direct evidence placing Hawthorne or his agents at appellant’s home at the relevant time is not dispositive.

Id.

11

In the present case, Winfield proffered not only that Huff and Artis had threatened to kill the decedent — just as Hawthorne’s agents had allegedly threatened both Free-land and his wife — but also that they had attempted to carry out their threat by shooting and stabbing her. Cf. Stack v. United States, 519 A.2d 147, 153 (D.C.1986) (holding that evidence of past beatings allegedly administered by decedent’s boyfriend was im-properly excluded in defendant’s murder prosecution). A person who has tried to kill a “snitch” for telling prosecutors about one crime might reasonably be expected to try again after she has “snitched” again about even more serious crimes. “[A] [real or potential] defendant’s past conduct is important evidence — perhaps the most important — in predicting his probable future conduct.” Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C.1991).12 To ignore this is to ignore reality.
III.
The foregoing discussion will doubtless convince the reader that, if I had been the trial judge, I would have denied the government’s motion in limine. That, however, is not dispositive. “The trial court’s decision that proffered evidence is not sufficiently relevant or probative is renewable only for an abuse of discretion.” Beale, supra, 465 A.2d at 803; see also Watson v. United States, 612 A.2d 179, 182-83 (D.C.1992). There is no doubt that the trial judge carefully considered the arguments of counsel, familiarized himself with the precedents, and called the issue as he saw it, relying heavily on the words “clearly link.”
Nevertheless, I do not believe that the judge’s decision can properly be sustained. First, a criminal defendant’s right to present evidence in his own defense is a fundamental element of due process. Martin, supra, 606 A.2d at 127. Courts are “especially solicitous” in protecting it. Id. at 130-31. The *620trial judge was obliged to exercise his discretion with this constitutional backdrop in mind. Id. at 132. The exclusion of the evidence which Winfield proffered in this case was, in my opinion, potentially devastating.
Second, judicial discretion must be founded upon correct legal principles. “[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it rests its conclusion on incorrect legal standards.” In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 75 (D.C.1991). Perhaps as a result of loose language in our past cases, I believe that this is what happened here.
The judge in this case, like the trial judge in Freeland, read the words “clearly link” as placing a burden on the defendant far greater than Johnson and our other cases contemplate. This is readily apparent from the judge’s treatment of the murderer’s remark, at the time he shot Ms. Davis, that “you won’t tell this.” According to the judge, these words did not necessarily show that the speaker was one of the men present when the decedent was kidnapped threatened, and shot (and therefore presumably did not establish that the murderer was also involved in the earlier assault on the decedent). This is undoubtedly true, but the judge’s statement answered the wrong question. The issue, under Johnson, was not whether the speaker necessarily participated in the abduction and shooting of Ms. Davis, but rather whether the murderer’s utterance of these words, together with the other evidence, made it more likely that he was one of the threat-makers, and thus that Huff (or possibly an associate) and not Winfield was guilty of the charged offense.13
The judge also ruled that admission of the evidence proffered by Winfield would have potentially confused and misled the jury, and was thus more prejudicial than probative.14 In my opinion, the opposite is true. The exclusion of evidence which embraced the most important events of the last six weeks of the decedent’s life affirmatively misled the jurors because it denied them information about a critical fact, námely, that if Winfield killed Ms. Davis but had no connection with the Huff triumvirate, then a colossal coincidence had occurred. This court, sitting en banc, recently stated that probative evidence, as well as arguments based on reasonable inferences from such evidence, should not be excluded because of “crabbed notions of relevance or excessive mistrust of juries.” Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1224 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3050, 120 L.Ed.2d 916 (1992)). The evidence which the defendant sought unsuccessfully to exclude in Allen was presented by the prosecution. Allen’s reasoning applies a fortiori where a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present exculpatory testimony is implicated. To deny relevant defense evidence to the jurors because it may “confuse” the jury tends in my view, albeit unintentionally, to usurp the jury’s prerogative.
The interpretation in Johnson of the phrase “clearly link” is arguably not the most literal rendition of these words. This court did not explicitly say in Johnson, however, that it was departing from rigorous literalism, and the judge in this case attempted to apply these words literally.15 Under these circumstances, “abuse of discretion” comes across as too pejorative a characterization. I therefore note once again that “abuse of discretion is a phrase which sounds worse than it is_ The term does not imply ... any reflection on the judge.” King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348, 353 n. 3 (D.C.1988) (quoting United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1176 n. 9 (5th Cir.1985)).
IV.
Although each case has its own distinctive facts, it is difficult for me to see how the *621majority decision in this case can be reconciled with this court’s approach to “clearly link” in Freeland, Ford, Stack and Johnson. The kind of issue presented here arises with some frequency. Consideration by the full court may therefore be appropriate.
I respectfully dissent.

. Most of these facts are summarized in the government’s motion in limine, and do not appear to be disputed.

. A prosecution witness later testified that the killer rhetorically inquired of Ms. Davis, as he shot her, whether she "like[d] snitching, bitch.”

. Winfield’s attorney claimed, however, that the photograph of Huff was too old and did not resemble Huff's present appearance. She also contended that one witness had selected the picture of a third man who somewhat resembled Huff. The judge found that Huff did not resemble Winfield, but made no finding as to whether he resembled the person whose picture the witness chose.

.In one of this court’s most recent decisions on the issue, we observed that "a proffer of motive alone may not suffice in meeting the Brown/Beale burden...." Freeland v. United States, 631 A.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C.1993) (emphasis added) (citing Brown v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093 (D.C.1979) and Beale v. United States, 465 A.2d 796, 803 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1293, 79 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). In Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120 (D.C.1991), this court stated that "[m]otive is evidence of the commission of any crime,” id. at 128 (citations omitted), and emphasized that evidence of mo*617tive or lack thereof is generally admissible and that exclusion of such evidence may well require reversal of a defendant's conviction. Id. at 128-29. Professor Wigmore has written, in connection with the admissibility of evidence that someone other than the defendant committed the crime, that
[a] motive as evidence is perhaps not of such value as a threat, yet courts seem more inclined to receive it. There is no reason for requiring that it be coupled with other evidence in order to be admissible.
1A John Henry Wigmore, Evidence, § 141, at 1727 (Tillers ed. 1983) (emphasis added).
Generalizations do not decide concrete cases. Not every conceivable motive would be sufficient to permit a defendant to argue that another person committed the crime. If Lee Harvey Oswald had lived and faced trial for assassinating President Kennedy, for example, the judge could properly proscribe any attempt by Oswald's counsel to ask the jury to speculate that some hypothetical political rival committed the murder and that the rival’s motive was to become President. But where, as in this case, Huff’s motive to kill Ms. Davis was powerful, and closely related in time and circumstances to the decedent’s death, the evidence should be admitted.
[I]f the evidence is really of no appreciable value no harm is done in admitting it; but if the evidence is in truth calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the court should not attempt to decide for the jury that this doubt is purely speculative and fantastic but should afford the accused every opportunity to create that doubt. A contrary rule is unfair to a really innocent accused.
1A Wigmore, supra, § 139, at 1724.

. I note that the government has not provided any explanation why someone having no connection with the Huff triumvirate would coincidentally allude, in killing Ms. Davis, to the very concerns which led Artis and Huff to try to murder her a short time earlier.

. Dean Wigmore has criticized courts which exclude evidence of threats by a third party for a "wholly unnecessary strictness,” and has added that "the illiberal attitude of some courts in this respect toward accused persons is in singular contrast with the maudlin tenderness otherwise often exhibited.” Id., § 140, at 1725.

.The proffered defense evidence could not properly be excluded on the basis of the existence of direct eyewitness testimony identifying Winfield as the murderer. In spite of some problematic language in Freeland, 631 A.2d at 1190, which is unnecessary to the disposition of that case, the admissibility of proffered defense evidence cannot depend on whether, in the court’s view, the prosecution's case is a strong one, nor does it matter whether the government's evidence, as in this case, was direct rather than circumstantial. To illustrate, the judge surely could not exclude a defendant's alibi evidence because witnesses identified him as the murderer; the same principle applies here.
Moreover, "circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.” Janifer v. Jandebeur, 551 A.2d 1351, 1352 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Winfield's proffer regarding Huff was not rendered insufficient by the prospective testimony of several prosecution witnesses identifying Winfield as the gunman. In any event, the reliability of these witnesses (two of them young children) and their opportunity to observe, were vigorously challenged, and Winfield presented a substantial defense of his own. It is not at all obvious that the jurors would have credited the prosecution witnesses if they had known of the evidence pointing to Huff and his associates.

. This disapproval of temporal remoteness seems at odds with the last sentence of the preceding quotation from Johnson which is recited in the text.

. More recently, in Ford v. United States, 616 A.2d 1245 (D.C.1992), this court, after quoting from Johnson, went on to state that
it is not a question of absolute proof, nor even of strong probability, but only of raising a reasonable doubt about A’s commission of the offense and for this purpose the slightest likelihood of B's commission may suffice or at least assist.
Id. at 1249 (quoting 1A Wigmore, supra, § 139, at 1724 (emphasis added; internal brackets omitted)).

.Winfield proffered evidence in the present case that the decedent had telephoned her mother after she testified before the grand jury, and only hours before her death, and that she had stated that the word was out on the street that "they” were out to get her. Although this evidence had considerable potential — it would be a remarkable coincidence if the "they” to whom Ms. Davis referred were unconnected with the people whom she was helping to propel toward the penitentiary by her grand jury testimony— Winfield’s attorney did not rely on it in her motion in limine (she had, however, previously brought the alleged telephone conversation to the court's attention in another connection). Moreover, it is not readily apparent how the proponent of such testimony could have successfully responded to a hearsay objection.

. The present case is even stronger for the defense than Freeland in this respect. Artis and Huff knew enough about Ms. Davis' whereabouts a month before her death to enable them to kidnap her, reprove her for "snitching,” shoot her, stab her, and leave her for dead. The majority's suggestion that Huff lacked the opportunity to kill Ms. Davis appears somewhat strained on this particular record.

. This proposition is supported not only by common sense, but also by empirical studies. See State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289, 302 & n. 12 (1975), and authorities there cited.

. I note, incidentally, that according to the government’s submission to the trial court, Huff was originally the police’s prime suspect.

. “Even when [evidence tending to inculpate a third party] is relevant, the trial court must weigh its probative value against its prejudicial impact.” Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1097.

.I note, though, that at least in my view, the evidence in this case "clearly linked” Huff to the crime even in the broadest sense of these words.