Court Opinion

ID: 2964013
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:19:01.693919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:23.041207
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1929

                                   PATRICK PERKINS,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              BRIGHAM & WOMEN'S HOSPITAL
                                         and
                                   GEORGE H. KAYE,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Boudin and Lynch,

                                    Circuit Judges.
                                    ______________

                              _________________________

               Daniel S.  Sharp, with whom Elaine  Whitfield Sharp, Barbara
               ________________            _______________________  _______
          C.  Johnson, and  Whitfield  Sharp &  Sharp  were on  brief,  for
          ___________       _________________________
          appellant.
               Richard P. Ward,  with whom  Bonnie B. Edwards  and Ropes  &
               _______________              _________________      ________
          Gray were on brief, for appellees.
          ____

                              _________________________

                                    March 21, 1996

                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  In this case, Brigham &  Women's
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          Hospital  (the  Hospital)  allegedly   fired  plaintiff-appellant

          Patrick Perkins, an African-American male,  because it discovered

          that  he  had engaged  in  a despicable  pattern  of work-related

          sexual harassment over a protracted  period of time.   Apparently

          convinced  that the best defense is a good offense, Perkins sued.

          Unimpressed by this effort to turn the tables, the district court

          rejected  Perkins' claims  of  race-based  discrimination at  the

          summary judgment stage.  On appeal, Perkins accuses  the court of

          straying  down the wrong path.   Undertaking de  novo review, see
                                                                        ___

          Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 1996) [No.
          _____    ________________

          95-1556, slip op. at 29], we find no navigational error.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    We  depict  the  facts   (which  are  by  any  standard

          unpleasant)  in  the  light   least  hostile  to  the  appellant,

          consistent  with record  substantiation.   See, e.g.,  Garside v.
                                                     ___  ____   _______

          Osco  Drug,  Inc., 895  F.2d 46,  48 (1st  Cir.  1990).   In this
          _________________

          process,   we  weed   out  "conclusory   allegations,  improbable

          inferences, and  unsupported speculation."   Medina-Munoz v. R.J.
                                                       ____________    ____

          Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
          ____________________

                    The appellant worked at the Hospital as a  patient care

          assistant.      He  garnered   generally   favorable  performance

          evaluations  over a ten-year span,  but his record  was marred by

          several  instances of  misconduct (which  led to  warnings and/or

          suspensions).   In mid-1990 a more serious incident occurred:  in

          the  dead of  night, the  appellant  invaded a  restricted lounge

                                          2

          where  two female  radiology  technicians  were sleeping  between

          cases.   One woman claimed  that, upon awakening,  she discovered

          the  appellant staring  at her  from the  foot of  her bed.   The

          technicians  reported  the   occurrence  and  informed   Hospital

          officials that the appellant had made sexual overtures to each of

          them  on  prior  occasions.1     A  supervisor  added  background

          information,  revealing that  the  appellant  habitually  uttered

          "flirtatious statements."

                    The  Hospital   moved  to  terminate   the  appellant's

          employment in the wake of this episode but the in-house Grievance

          Review  Board (the Board) reduced the proposed penalty to a four-

          week suspension without pay.  Withal, the Board  acknowledged the

          appellant's unfortunate penchant for making salacious comments to

          female employees, and advocated "appropriate disciplinary action"

          if this meretricious behavior continued.

                    In November  of 1991    roughly seventeen  months after

          his  nocturnal caper in  the technicians' lounge    the appellant

          telephoned  a nurse  while she  was participating  in a  surgical

          procedure and loudly warned her not to call him "Pat."  There was

          a  history leading  up to this  call, and  the nurse  demanded an

          investigation   of  what   she  described   as   the  appellant's

          "harassment" of  her.   Perkins' supervisor,  an African-American

                              
          ____________________

               1According to  one woman,  Perkins often  asked  her out  on
          dates,  and  in  one instance,  when  she  replied  that she  was
          married,  he retorted  that "I  don't want  your husband,  I want
          you."   The other  woman  revealed that  when, in  the course  of
          Perkins'  amorous  pursuit,  she  mentioned  her  gravidity,   he
          responded:  "Pregnant women turn me on."

                                          3

          woman, suspended him pending further review of the incident.

                    George  Kaye, the  Hospital's vice-president  for human

          resources, considered the  nurse's complaint in conjunction  with

          reports from operating room managers that the appellant continued

          to engage  in  inappropriate sexual  banter and  innuendo.   Kaye

          retained Nancy Avery, an independent social worker, to conduct an

          inquiry.    The  Hospital   adopted  an  investigatory   protocol

          calculated  to  provide  a  confidential forum  in  which  female

          employees could  safely discuss  their experiences  vis-a-vis the

          appellant.

                    Avery's report  was  damning.   It  recounted  numerous

          episodes  of unacceptable  behavior  involving the  appellant and

          myriad female employees.   It  would serve no  useful purpose  to

          take  a complete inventory of these tawdry vignettes.  Suffice it

          to  say that the list  includes instances in  which the appellant

          described his  sexual prowess  in explicit detail,  boasted about

          the length  of  his  penis,  exposed  himself,  patted  a  female

          employee's buttocks,  and proposed a menage-a-trois.   The report

          also memorialized  the appellant's threats  to retaliate  against

          women  who declined his advances by, for example, warning that he

          would slash their  tires (and, in one case, that  he would not be

          averse to attacking a woman in a garage).

                    Kaye concluded  that the  appellant had engaged  in the

          misconduct  described  by  Avery,  and  cashiered  him  effective

          February  7,  1992.   This  time  the  Board,  after hearing  the

          appellant's denial of the allegations, upheld his ouster.

                                          4

                    The  appellant brought  suit in  a Massachusetts  state

          court charging  inter alia racial discrimination.2   The Hospital
                          _____ ____

          removed the case to a federal forum.  Discovery lasted for over a

          year.   When the Hospital thereafter  requested summary judgment,

          the district  court obliged.  Overriding  Perkins' objection, the

          court ruled as a matter  of law that, although he had made  out a

          prima  facie case  of racial  discrimination under  the McDonnell
                                                                  _________

          Douglas  burden-shifting model,  see McDonnell  Douglas Corp.  v.
          _______                          ___ ________________________

          Green,  411  U.S. 792,  802  (1973),  the Hospital  had  produced
          _____

          evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the

          discharge,  namely, the extensive  misconduct related  in Avery's

          report, sufficient  to meet its  burden of production  under that

          model; that the record revealed no evidence probative of pretext;

          and that,  therefore, no rational factfinder  could conclude that

          the  Hospital  dismissed Perkins  on account  of  his race.   See
                                                                        ___

          Perkins  v. Brigham & Women's  Hosp., Civ. No.  93-11701- DPW (D.
          _______     ________________________

          Mass. July 31, 1995) (D. Ct. Op.).

                    In  this  appeal,  Perkins  abandons  several   of  his

          original  initiatives  and concentrates  his  fire  on the  lower

          court's  rejection  of  the   race  discrimination  claims.    He

          maintains  that the  court  allowed brevis  disposition on  those
                                              ______

          claims    only   because   it   overlooked,   misconceived,   and

          mischaracterized  the relevant  evidence,  and  then applied  the

                              
          ____________________

               2The  appellant   named  both  Kaye  and   the  Hospital  as
          defendants.    Because  Kaye's   liability  (if  any)  could  not
          conceivably  be greater than the Hospital's, we treat the case as
          if the Hospital were the sole defendant and appellee.

                                          5

          wrong analytic framework.

          II.  ANALYSIS
          II.  ANALYSIS

                    We  begin our discussion of  the merits by noting that,

          contrary to the appellant's  position, there is no insurmountable

          obstacle  blocking  the  use  of  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  56  in  the

          circumstances  of this case.  The function of summary judgment is

          "to pierce  the  boilerplate  of  the  pleadings  and  assay  the

          parties' proof  in order to  determine whether trial  is actually

          required."  Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976  F.2d 791, 794
                      _____    ________________________

          (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1845 (1993).  Here, the
                           _____ ______

          record, fairly  read, contains no  sign that  the district  court

          overlooked, misconceived, or  mischaracterized the evidence.   To

          the  contrary,  as  the  district  court  concluded,  the  record

          discloses  no genuine  issue as  to any  material event;  and the

          undisputed facts, taken most  favorably to the appellant, confirm

          that the  Hospital is entitled  to judgment as  a matter  of law.

          See, e.g., McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315
          ___  ____  ________    ________________________

          (1st  Cir. 1995)  (collecting  cases describing  summary judgment

          standard);  see  also Medina-Munoz,  896  F.2d  at 8  (discussing
                      ___  ____ ____________

          propriety of summary judgment even when "elusive concepts such as

          motive or intent" are at issue).

                    We give  credit  where credit  is  due.   The  district

          court's opinion  is both  meticulous and  scholarly.   It  treats

          every  claim  and item  of evidence,  and closes  virtually every

          avenue that Perkins tries  to travel on appeal.   Because that is

                                          6

          so, we resist the temptation to transpose into our own words what

          has already been well expressed, preferring instead to affirm the

          judgment essentially on the basis of the opinion below.  We pause

          only to add punctuation in a few spots.3

                                          A
                                          A

                    The  appellant's   principal  complaint  is   that  the

          district court analyzed his  race discrimination claims under the

          McDonnell  Douglas framework.   He  bases  this complaint  on his
          __________________

          assumption  that  the  record  contains  evidence  sufficient  to

          warrant   deployment  of   the   somewhat   different   framework

          constructed  by the Court in Price Waterhouse Co. v. Hopkins, 490
                                       ____________________    _______

          U.S.  228,  258  (1989)  (plurality  op.).4    When,  as  now,  a

          plaintiff  alleges  disparate treatment,  he  ordinarily has  the

          burden of proving that the defendant took  the adverse employment

          action  (here, dismissal)  because  of a  protected trait  (here,

          race).  The Price  Waterhouse framework, where applicable, shifts
                      _________________

          the burden of persuasion to the employer.

                              
          ____________________

               3We think it is at least  arguable that the Civil Rights Act
          of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166,   102, 105  Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified
          at  42 U.S.C.     2000e-2000e-16), applies  in this  case.    But
          neither  party  cited this  statute in  the district  court; that
          court did not  refer to it in the opinion  below; and the parties
          ignore it in their  appellate briefs.  Given this  background, we
          do not base our decision on the 1991 Act (but we note that, if we
          were to apply  it, the result that we reach  in this appeal would
          not be affected).  By like token, given the circumstances of this
          case,  we see  no need to  differentiate between  the appellant's
          parallel claims of  race-based discrimination  under federal  and
          state law, respectively.

               4The  appellant does  not  contend that  the district  court
          erred  in its performance of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, but,
                                           _________________
          rather, that the analysis should not have been performed at all.

                                          7

                     For  present   purposes,  we  need  not   explore  the

          conditions under which  Price Waterhouse might apply.   The shift
                                  ________________

          in  the burden  of  persuasion contemplated  by Price  Waterhouse
                                                          _________________

          invariably  depends  upon a  plaintiff's  ability  to produce  or

          proffer evidence of the  employer's discriminatory motive for the

          adverse job action that  goes beyond the simple prima  facie case

          showing  needed to  invoke McDonnell  Douglas (which,  when made,
                                     __________________

          requires  the  employer  to   provide     but  not  prove      an

          explanation).  See, e.g., Fields v. Clark Univ., 966 F.2d 49, 51-
                         ___  ____  ______    ___________

          52 (1st Cir.  1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 976 (1993); Jackson
                               _____ ______                         _______

          v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498
             _____________                                _____ ______

          U.S, 848 (1990).

                    Courts are in some  disarray as to the type and kind of

          evidence  that  is  sufficient  to  bring  the  Price  Waterhouse
                                                          _________________

          framework  into play.5  Compare  Troupe v. May  Dept. Stores Co.,
                                  _______  ______    _____________________

          20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.  1994) with Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut.
                                            ____ _________    _____________

          Ins.  Cos., 968  F.2d 171,  182 (2d  Cir. 1992).   In  this case,
          __________

          however, there is no reason to essay fine distinctions or seek to

          clarify the Price Waterhouse  standard.  The evidence as  a whole
                      ________________

          simply will not support a  reasonable inference that the Hospital

          discharged  Perkins because it harbored an  animus against him as

          an African-American.  The extensive, point-by-point discussion of

          the proof  in Judge  Woodlock's detailed opinion  renders further

                              
          ____________________

               5The  Civil Rights Act  of 1991, see supra  note 3, does not
                                                ___ _____
          supply a ready means  of resolving this disagreement.   See Tyler
                                                                  ___ _____
          v.  Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958  F.2d 1176, 1182  (2d Cir.), cert.
              _____________________                                   _____
          denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992).
          ______

                                          8

          analysis on our  part supererogatory.   Because we  find in  this

          record nothing remotely resembling  probative evidence of a race-

          based animus, the appellant's claim fails.

                                          B
                                          B

                    The  appellant attacks  the  lower court's  reliance on

          affidavits supplied by three  female employees that contain lurid

          firsthand accounts of his unsavory conduct.  The court considered

          these  affidavits in determining that the Hospital had advanced a

          nondiscriminatory rationale for its  actions.  See D. Ct.  Op. at
                                                         ___

          32.   The appellant  reasons  that, because  the affidavits  were

          unavailable  to the Hospital at  the time it  discharged him, the

          court could not mull them in analyzing the Hospital's motivation.

          This anfractuous reasoning distorts the applicable legal rule.

                    It is true that  an employer's proffered  justification

          must be based on information that  it knew and relied upon at the

          time  it  decided to  take the  adverse  employment action.   See
                                                                        ___

          McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995)
          ________    _________________________

          (explaining  that  because  an  employee's  misconduct   was  not

          discovered  until after  her discharge,  the "employer  could not

          have been motivated  by knowledge it  did not have and  it [could

          not] claim that the employee was fired for  the nondiscriminatory

          reason");  Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 921 F.2d 396, 403
                     ______    _________________________

          (1st Cir. 1990) (similar).   That is  to say, an employer  cannot

          avoid liability in a discrimination case by exploiting a weakness

          in an employee's credentials or performance that was not known to

          the  employer at the time  of the adverse  employment action (and

                                          9

          that,  therefore,  could  not  have  figured  in  the  decisional

          calculus).

                    This rule is inapposite in the case at bar.  Though the

          challenged affidavits did  not exist when the Hospital handed the

          appellant his walking papers, the information that they contained

          was known  to and fully absorbed  by the Hospital at  the time it

          fired Perkins.  The  affiants had reported their  encounters with

          the  appellant  to Avery,  their  stories  were  embodied in  her

          report,  and  the  relevant  information was  factored  into  the

          Hospital's decisional process.  Consequently, the court below did

          not err in considering the affidavits.

                                          C
                                          C

                    The  district court rejected the appellant's attempt to

          show intentional discrimination by comparing his treatment at the

          Hospital's  hands  with the  treatment  accorded  to a  Caucasian

          clinical supervisor who was  also terminated for harassing female

          co-workers.  See D. Ct. Op. at 38-42.  Perkins assigns error.  We
                       ___

          discern none.

                    A  claim of  disparate  treatment based  on comparative

          evidence  must  rest  on  proof that  the  proposed  analogue  is

          similarly situated  in material respects.   See Morgan  v. Harris
                                                      ___ ______     ______

          Trust & Savs. Bank,  867 F.2d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir.  1989); Lanear
          __________________                                         ______

          v.  Safeway  Grocery,  843  F.2d   298,  301  (8th  Cir.   1988).
              ________________

          Accordingly,  the proponent  of the  evidence must show  that the

          individuals  with whom he seeks  to be compared  have "engaged in

          the  same  conduct  without  such  differentiating  or mitigating

                                          10

          circumstances  that  would  distinguish   their  conduct  or  the

          employer's  treatment of them for it."  Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp.,
                                                  ________    ____________

          964  F.2d 577,  582  (6th Cir.  1992).   The  test  is whether  a

          "prudent person,  looking  objectively at  the  incidents,  would

          think  them roughly  equivalent  and the  protagonists  similarly

          situated."  Dartmouth Review  v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d  13,
                      ________________     _________________

          19 (1st Cir. 1989).  While an exact correlation is not necessary,

          the  proponent   must  demonstrate  that  the   cases  are  "fair

          congeners."  Id. at 19.
                       ___

                    In  this instance, Judge Woodlock's opinion illustrates

          beyond hope  of contradiction,  citing book  and verse,  that the

          requisite similarities are lacking.  See D. Ct. Op. at 38-42.  We
                                               ___

          see no advantage  in repastinating soil already well ploughed and

          instead  adopt Judge  Woodlock's characterization.    However, we

          think  it wise to emphasize two aspects.  First, the Hospital had

          good reason to believe that the clinical supervisor's misconduct,

          while  reprehensible,  was   markedly  less   serious  than   the

          appellant's  misconduct.   Second,  the supervisor    unlike  the

          appellant     did not  have  a history  of  repeated disciplinary

          actions over a ten-year period.

          III.  CONCLUSION
          III.  CONCLUSION

                    We  return  to   the  point  of  our  beginning.    The

          appellant's several efforts to mount an offensive (including some

          initiatives  that  we  have  not discussed  here)  are  uniformly

          unavailing.   The record  in this case simply  will not support a

          reasonable inference  that the Hospital  discharged the appellant

                                          11

          because   it  harbored   an  animus   against  African-Americans.

          Consequently, we need go no further.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                          12