Court Opinion

ID: 9928180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:31.323147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:32.198411
License: Public Domain

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  E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY v.
            CHEMTURA CORPORATION
                   (AC 45707)
                  Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Cradle, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The plaintiff, D Co., sought, inter alia, to recover damages from the defendant
    for breach of contract in connection with D Co.’s purchase of the defen-
    dant’s fluorine chemical business and related equipment, located in
    Arkansas. The parties had previously entered into an asset purchase
    agreement, pursuant to which the defendant agreed to indemnify D Co.
    for any losses arising from a breach of the defendant’s representations
    and warranties in the agreement. The defendant’s representations and
    warranties related to the facility’s prior and ongoing compliance with
    various laws in connection with the operation of the defendant’s plant
    and to the good repair and condition of the transferred assets. Following
    the purchase of the business, D Co. requested reimbursement, pursuant
    to the agreement’s indemnification provisions, to cure several alleged
    deficiencies relating to, inter alia, four fire protection systems that were
    allegedly in violation of the standards set by the National Fire Prevention
    Association and incorporated by reference into the Arkansas State Fire
    Code, and two refrigeration units that were allegedly leaking refrigerant
    at an unacceptable rate. The parties ultimately were unable to settle their
    differences, and D Co. brought its claims to the trial court. Thereafter,
    C Co. was substituted as the plaintiff. The court rendered judgment for
    the defendant on C Co.’s breach of contract claims, and C Co. appealed
    to this court. Held:
1. C Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court failed to determine
    the applicable law and apply that law to the evidence to determine
    whether the fire protection systems at issue violated the Arkansas State
    Fire Code: the court’s determination that the evidence was unclear as
    to which Arkansas State Fire Code applied to each fire protection system
    was not clearly erroneous, as, although C Co. argued that testimony
    from one of the defendant’s former employees established time frames
    for the installation of each of the systems at issue, no evidence showed
    the actual installation date of any of the systems, the time frames pro-
    vided could have implicated any of four different versions of the Arkan-
    sas State Fire Code, and the court correctly determined that the applica-
    ble law would be the state fire code in effect at the time the systems
    in question were installed; moreover, C Co. failed to supply the court
    with a clear understanding of the Arkansas State Fire Code, which was
    the foreign law applicable to its claims, as C Co. provided only portions
    of certain National Fire Prevention Association standards and only one
    portion of one edition of a potentially applicable version of the Arkansas
    State Fire Code to the court, and it was not clear from the record which
    provisions of the state fire code C Co. alleged the defendant had violated
    as to the fire prevention systems at issue; furthermore, C Co. provided
    the court with no analysis as to whether the defendant’s alleged failure
    to comply with National Fire Prevention Association standards consti-
    tuted a violation of the Arkansas State Fire Code.
2. C Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in concluding
    that federal regulations did not require the replacement of certain
    refrigeration units that allegedly leaked ozone depleting substances at
    rates exceeding the regulatory (40 C.F.R. § 82.156) threshold: although
    there was evidence in the record that the refrigeration units in question
    were not in compliance with federal regulations in 2006 and 2007, which
    was within three years prior to closing as required by the agreement,
    C Co. failed to provide evidence addressing the reasons the units were
    replaced in 2012 and 2015 or to prove that the replacement damages
    resulted from the contractual violations, as there was testimony that
    repair efforts undertaken by the defendant may have been successful,
    and the regulations set forth the option to repair a leaking refrigeration
    unit, rather than requiring that the unit be replaced; moreover, C Co.’s
    claim that the court erred in finding that it failed to prove that the 2006
  and 2007 leak rates were the exclusive cause of the replacement of the
  refrigeration units, rather than a proximate cause, was unsupported by
  a fair reading of the court’s decision, as nowhere in its decision did the
  court hold, explicitly or implicitly, that the plaintiff was required to
  prove that the leak rates were the exclusive cause of the eventual
  replacement of those units in 2012 and 2015; furthermore, C Co. failed
  to provide expert testimony establishing that the 2006 and 2007 leaks,
  rather than the faulty performance of the units in subsequent years, led
  to the need for their replacement, as the evidence presented at trial
  indicated that refrigeration units were to be selected for replacement
  on the basis of type of refrigerant used, system maintenance costs,
  remaining life and system capacity considerations.
    Argued October 17, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

                          Procedural History

  Action to recover damages for breach of contract,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Waterbury, where The Chemours
Company FC, LLC, was substituted as the plaintiff;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Brazzel-
Massaro, J.; judgment for the defendant, from which the
substitute plaintiff appealed; thereafter, the Supreme
Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded
the case to that court for further proceedings; subse-
quently, the court, Schuman, J., rendered judgment for
the defendant, and the substitute plaintiff appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
  Daniel J. Krisch, with whom were Jennifer L. Mor-
gan, and, on the brief, Julie A. Lavoie and Joy C. Fuhr,
pro hoc vice, for the appellant (substitute plaintiff).
  Brian J. Wheelin, with whom, on the brief, was
Joseph L. Clasen, for the appellee (defendant).
                          Opinion

   CRADLE, J. This breach of contract case, which was
commenced by the plaintiff, E. I. du Pont de Nemours
and Company (DuPont),1 in 2014, was first tried to the
trial court in 2018, after which the court rendered judg-
ment in favor of the defendant, Chemtura Corporation,
on the ground that DuPont failed to strictly comply with
the notice provisions of an asset purchase agreement
(APA) between the parties. Our Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case
for further proceedings on the breach of contract
claims. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Chemtura
Corp., 336 Conn. 194, 218, 244 A.3d 130 (2020). Follow-
ing its review of the record from the first trial and
further briefing from the parties, the court rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plain-
tiff claims that (1) the court erred in rejecting its breach
of contract claims as to certain fire protection systems
in that it failed to determine the applicable law and
apply that law to the evidence to determine whether
those fire protection systems violated the Arkansas
State Fire Code, and (2) the court misinterpreted the
applicable federal regulations and improperly con-
cluded that those regulations did not require the
replacement of certain refrigeration units that leaked
ozone depleting substances at rates exceeding the statu-
tory threshold for several consecutive years.2 We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
   The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory, as set forth by our Supreme Court, are relevant
to the plaintiff’s claims on appeal. ‘‘In 2007, the parties,
DuPont and the defendant, negotiated the purchase of
the defendant’s fluorine chemical business and related
equipment located in El Dorado, Arkansas. On behalf
of DuPont, Brian Engler negotiated the terms of the
APA with Arthur Fullerton, the defendant’s associate
general counsel, and Arthur Wienslaw, the defendant’s
director of strategy and licensing. The parties ultimately
entered into the APA on December 14, 2007. Because
the parties were competitors in this field, DuPont’s pre-
contractual ability to inspect the defendant’s plant and
equipment and to conduct other due diligence was lim-
ited. Officials of DuPont conducted only one brief, after-
hours tour of the plant prior to signing the APA. As a
result, the defendant made certain representations and
warranties in the APA, including that the transferred
assets were in good repair and condition and were
sufficient to conduct business as of the closing date,
and that the business had been and was currently being
operated in accordance with applicable laws.
   ‘‘To further protect DuPont, given its limited ability
to inspect the plant, the parties also entered into a
side letter dated January 31, 2008, which confirmed
‘additional understandings’ of the parties. The side let-
ter included the disclosure and discussion of all poten-
tial violations of codes and regulations that controlled
the operation of the plant and its products, including
potential violations of the ozone depleting substances
regulations.3 The side letter primarily addressed any
past deficiencies or violations that continued to impact
the operation of the plant at the time of closing that
DuPont would not have been able to discover given its
limited inspection of the plant. The parties closed the
sale on January 31, 2008.
   ‘‘The APA contains two provisions, §§ 3.16 and 3.17,
that set forth a number of representations and warrant-
ies by the defendant related to the facility’s prior and
ongoing compliance with various laws in connection
with the operation of the plant. Under article 8 of the
APA, the defendant agreed to indemnify DuPont from
any losses arising from any breach of those representa-
tions or warranties.4 Section 8.4 (a) of the APA provides
a four year time period for indemnification as a result
of a breach of the representations or warranties con-
tained in §§ 3.16 and 3.17 and requires that DuPont
notify the defendant in writing within four years of the
closing date, ‘specifying the amount and factual basis
of that claim in reasonable detail to the extent known.’
The APA’s notice provision, § 11.4, provides in relevant
part: ‘All notices, consents, waivers and other communi-
cations under this [a]greement must be in writing and
will be deemed given to a party when (a) delivered
to the appropriate address by hand or by nationally
recognized overnight courier service (costs prepaid),
(b) sent by facsimile or e-mail with confirmation of
transmission by the transmitting equipment or (c)
received or rejected by the addressee, if sent by certified
mail, return receipt requested, in each case to the following
addresses, facsimile numbers or e-mail addresses and
marked to the attention of the individual (by name
or title) designated below (or to such other address,
facsimile number, e-mail address or individual as a party
may designate by notice to the other parties) . . . .’
To properly notify the defendant, § 11.4 of the APA
provides that the notice shall be sent to the defendant’s
general counsel ‘with a simultaneous copy’ to the defen-
dant’s outside counsel, Baker & McKenzie, LLP.
   ‘‘Following the closing, the parties remained in regu-
lar contact because DuPont purchased only a portion
of the Arkansas facility and the defendant continued
to operate the remainder. Specifically, DuPont’s plant
manager, Donald Kuhlmann, communicated with Ful-
lerton, the defendant’s associate general counsel, and
Frank DiCristina, one of the defendant’s plant manag-
ers. DuPont did not communicate with the defendant’s
general counsel. DuPont subsequently discovered that
certain areas of the plant required repair or replace-
ment, and DuPont requested reimbursement pursuant
to the defendant’s indemnification obligations. Namely,
DuPont asserted that certain refrigeration units were
leaking refrigerant at an unacceptable rate, and the fire
suppression systems were not operating within applica-
ble laws at the time of the purchase. From the closing
in 2008 until 2011, the parties held discussions and
corresponded to resolve those deficiencies.5 During this
time, in March, 2009, the defendant filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy. For the reorganized company to assume
the APA, the defendant had to cure any prebankruptcy
defaults under the APA. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (b) (2006).
This led to extensive negotiations between the parties
over ‘cure claims.’6 Ultimately, the parties summarized
their positions on various items in a claims list, which
included, among other things, the refrigeration and fire
suppression system claims. These discussions did not
resolve all of the claims, and the present action fol-
lowed.
   ‘‘DuPont commenced this action in June, 2014,
asserting two claims sounding in breach of contract
against the defendant. The complaint alleged violations
of the side letter and §§ 3.16 and 3.17 of the APA. DuPont
alleged that, in accordance with the APA and the side
letter, the defendant is obligated to repair or replace
refrigeration units that either are not properly working
or violate applicable regulations, as well as certain fire
suppression systems that did not comply with the appli-
cable laws at the time of the sale. Specifically, in count
one, DuPont alleged that the defendant breached the
APA because, at the time of closing, the defendant had
been operating nine areas of the plant in violation of
applicable fire safety laws and regulations. Count two
alleged that multiple refrigeration units were leaking
refrigerant at rates impermissible under applicable envi-
ronmental law.
   ‘‘After three and one-half years of pretrial litigation,
the case was tried in January, 2018. On the last day of
trial, the defendant claimed—for the first time, in a
motion for a directed verdict—that DuPont failed to
provide notice in accordance with the terms of the APA.
The defendant argued that DuPont did not comply with
the APA’s notice provision because it had been commu-
nicating with the defendant’s associate general counsel
rather than the general counsel. The court requested
briefing on the issue, and the plaintiff and the defendant
submitted posttrial briefs. The plaintiff and the defen-
dant agreed that, under § 11.16 of the APA, New York
law governs this dispute. The defendant argued that
New York law requires strict compliance with notice
provisions in a contract and that the plaintiff failed to
prove all the elements of breach of contract. The plain-
tiff disagreed and argued that New York law did not
require strict compliance, and that the claims list and
the correspondence between the parties to the APA
satisfied New York law because they provided the
defendant actual notice.
  ‘‘The trial court determined that at no time after the
closing did DuPont provide notice in accordance with
§ 11.4 of the APA. The court noted that a number of
the plaintiff’s exhibits submitted as proof of actual
notice did not rise to the level of actual notice of a
violation of the contract purchase provisions.’’ (Foot-
notes in original.) E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Chemtura Corp., supra, 336 Conn. 196–201. Our Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the trial court on the
notice issue and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claims. Id., 217–
18.
   On remand, the parties agreed to submit the case to
a different judge for adjudication based on the record
from the first trial, including all testimony and exhibits.
Following its review of that record, in addition to briefs
filed by both parties, the court, Schuman, J., issued a
memorandum of decision wherein it rendered judgment
for the defendant on both of the plaintiff’s breach of
contract claims. This appeal followed. Additional facts
and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
                             I
   The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in
rejecting its breach of contract claim as to the fire
protection systems in that it failed to determine the
applicable law and apply that law to the evidence to
determine whether those fire protection systems vio-
lated the Arkansas State Fire Code. We disagree.
   The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our consideration of this claim. In count one
of its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, in 2008, fol-
lowing the transfer of ownership of the subject prop-
erty, DuPont conducted a fire assessment to determine
whether the plant was compliant with applicable fire
protection laws. The assessment and associated report
(FPA report) concluded that the defendant had been
operating the business in violation of applicable fire
safety laws at the time of the sale.7 The plaintiff alleged
that the assessment revealed ‘‘at least nine violations
of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
codes’’ in that the fire protection systems ‘‘did not com-
ply with NFPA §§ 13 (Standard for Installation of Sprin-
kler Systems), 24 (Standard for Installation of Private
Fire Service Mains), 45 (Standard on Fire Protection
for Laboratories Using chemicals),8 58 (Liquefied Petro-
leum Gas Code) and 101 (the Life Safety Code) . . . .
These provisions of the NFPA, which Arkansas has
adopted as its Fire Prevention Code, have been in place
since 1982.’’
  At trial, the plaintiff sought damages for money spent
replacing four fire protection systems that allegedly
were in violation of the standards set by the NFPA and
incorporated by the Arkansas State Fire Code: (1) the
deluge valve house for the ethylene storage tank; (2)
the deluge valve house for the TFP process;9 (3) the
deluge sprinkler system for the FM 200 Therminol 66
heater and tank;10 and (4) the safety equipment for the
TFP railcar loading station.
   On January 14, 2022, following remand from the
Supreme Court, the plaintiff filed a motion in limine
asking the court to take judicial notice of NFPA 13
(1989), NFPA 58 (1989) and NFPA 101 (1988), which
were incorporated by reference into the 1992 edition
of the Arkansas State Fire Code that had been admitted
into evidence at the first trial. In that motion, the plain-
tiff also asked the court to take judicial notice of ‘‘the
1965 Arkansas Fire Prevention Code and NFPA Codes
13 [1964] and 101 [1963] incorporated therein,’’ pur-
porting to demonstrate that ‘‘the applicability of NFPA
Codes to the fire safety equipment at the plant and
that the principles material to the issues in this case
pertaining to NFPA 13 and NFPA 101 have remained
constant since 1965.’’ Finally, the plaintiff asked the
court to take judicial notice of NFPA 13 (1978), NFPA
58 (1974) and NFPA 101 (1973). After hearing argument
from both parties, the court, Pierson, J., granted the
plaintiff’s motion in the ‘‘limited sense’’ that it took
judicial notice only of ‘‘the 1992 Arkansas State Fire
Code, which adopts and incorporates certain NFPA pro-
visions . . . .’’ The plaintiff had introduced into evi-
dence, at the 2018 trial, thirty-two pages from the 1992
Arkansas State Fire Code. The plaintiff attached to its
motion in limine four pages from NFPA 13 (1989), six
pages from NFPA 58 (1989) and seven pages from NFPA
101 (1988).11
   On April 29, 2022, the plaintiff filed with the trial
court a document titled ‘‘Plaintiff’s Statement of Law
and Legal Theories of the Case,’’ wherein it alleged,
inter alia, that ‘‘[t]he 1992 Arkansas State Fire Code
incorporates by reference NFPA 13 (1989), NFPA 58
(1989) and NFPA 101 (1988), all of which were in effect
at the time that [the defendant] installed and established
the TFP and FM200 fluorine businesses acquired by
DuPont.’’
   On June 28, 2022, the plaintiff filed a posttrial brief
setting forth, inter alia, its claimed violations of the
NFPA as to each of the four fire protection systems at
issue.12 The plaintiff attached to its posttrial brief five
additional pages from NFPA 13 (1989),13 five pages from
NFPA 101 (1988) and four pages from NFPA 58 (1989).14
    In its July 18, 2022 memorandum of decision, the
court began its consideration of the plaintiff’s fire pro-
tection claims by noting that the ‘‘parties agreed, and
the court finds, that the ‘applicable law’ is the state fire
code in effect at the time that the system in question
was installed.’’ The court explained, however, that
‘‘[t]he initial difficulty for the plaintiff is that the evi-
dence ranges from unclear to completely missing as to
when the defendant installed each of the four systems
at issue. The testimony was that the defendant installed
the TFP process . . . ‘around 1998’ . . . or that the
plaintiff authorized the project in 1998 and installed it
‘shortly thereafter.’ . . . For the FM 200 Therminol 66
heater and tank . . . the evidence is that the defendant
installed the system some undefined time after it ceased
making the chemical halon at the end of 1994. . . .
   ‘‘The related problem in these two cases is that it is
not clear what Arkansas [State] Fire Code applies.
There is a 1992 Arkansas [State] Fire Code in the record,
which might have been applicable at the time of the
installation of these two systems. . . . But there were
subsequent Arkansas [State] Fire Codes promulgated
in 1999, 2002, and 2007, all of which predated the APA
and some or all of which could, alternatively, have been
the applicable code at the time of installation of each
of these two systems. . . .
   ‘‘Without knowing what version of the state fire code
applies, the court cannot determine the applicable
NFPA standards. The 1992 code refers to the 1989 NFPA
standards for the installation of sprinkler systems, but
it is not clear that the 1992 code applies. . . . And it
is uncertain whether subsequent codes refer to the 1989
standards or later standards, the contents of which are
unknown.
   ‘‘The final difficulty is that a violation of NFPA stan-
dards is not necessarily a violation of the state fire code.
The 1992 Arkansas [State] Fire Code provides: ‘Where
provisions of this Code do not apply to specific situa-
tions involving the protection of life and property from
the hazards of fire, smoke and explosion, compliance
with nationally recognized standards or publications
listed in this chapter, when not in conflict with provi-
sions of the Building Code, shall be evidence of compli-
ance with this Code.’ . . . The plaintiff provides no
analysis or evidence addressing the questions of
whether provisions of the code apply to the specific
situations at issue, whether the NFPA standards are in
conflict with the Code, and whether a violation of the
standards is automatically a violation of the Code,
rather than merely evidence of noncompliance. For all
these reasons, the plaintiff has failed to prove, with
respect to the deluge valve house for the TFP process
and the FM 200 Therminol 66 heater and tank system,
that the defendant violated ‘applicable law’ and there-
fore breached its contract.
  ‘‘This conclusion is even more obvious for the
remaining two systems: the deluge valve house for the
ethylene storage tank and the railcar loading station.
There is no evidence at all concerning when the [defen-
dant] installed these two systems. Thus, the applicable
law is simply unknown.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes
omitted.)
   On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court
‘‘had the necessary information to determine and apply
the applicable law and was statutorily required to do
so’’ and, alternatively, that the fire systems at issue
violated all potentially applicable editions of the Arkan-
sas State Fire Code. We address each of these argu-
ments in turn.
   In arguing that the court had the necessary informa-
tion to determine the applicable law, the plaintiff argues
that, ‘‘[w]hile the defendant failed to produce evidence
establishing with particularity when it constructed each
system, there is sufficient evidence in the record to
establish the time frames for construction such that the
court can determine which Arkansas [State] Fire Code
applies to each system.’’ The plaintiff contends that the
court’s determination that the evidence was unclear
was clearly erroneous. ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erro-
neous when there is no evidence in the record to sup-
port it . . . or when although there is evidence to sup-
port it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Powell-Ferri v. Ferri, 326 Conn. 457, 464, 165 A.3d
1124 (2017).
   In support of its argument that the evidence adduced
at trial demonstrated that the 1992 Arkansas State Fire
Code applies to each system at issue, the plaintiff
addresses separately each of the four fire systems at
issue: the deluge valve house for the ethylene storage
tank, the deluge valve house for the TFP process, the
TFP railcar loading station and the FM200 Therminol
66 heater and tank. As to the deluge valve house for
the ethylene storage tank, the deluge valve house for
the TFP process and the TFP railcar loading station,
the plaintiff cites to the same two or three pages of
deposition or trial testimony of Gregory Barron, a for-
mer employee of the defendant. In the portion of testi-
mony cited by the plaintiff, Barron testified that he
could not remember exactly when those systems were
installed but that it would have been sometime after
1998. The court cited to this very testimony in finding
that the evidence as to the dates of construction was
unclear. Likewise, as to the FM200 Therminol 66 heater
and tank, the plaintiff cites to Barron’s testimony indi-
cating that it was installed sometime after 1994. The
court also cited to that testimony in finding that the
evidence as to the date of construction was unclear.
Although the plaintiff is correct in that the evidence
established ‘‘time frames’’ for the installation of the fire
protection systems at issue, the court aptly noted that
those time frames could have implicated any of four
different editions of the Arkansas State Fire Code, 1992,
1999, 2002 or 2007. Because the evidence did not assist
the court in ascertaining the dates of installation of
those systems, and, thus, identifying the applicable law,
the court’s characterization of that evidence as unclear
was not erroneous.
  The plaintiff nevertheless contends that the court
erred in rejecting its fire protection claims because the
fire protection systems at issue violated every poten-
tially applicable version of the Arkansas State Fire
Code. It is well settled that, ‘‘if a party wants the court
to take judicial notice of foreign law, it is that party’s
responsibility not only to bring the statutory law to the
attention of the court in the proper manner, but also
to inform the court, through proper means, of the mean-
ing or construction of the law by courts of that foreign
jurisdiction. Matter which it is claimed the court should
judicially notice should be called to its attention by the
party seeking to take advantage of the matter so that,
if there is ground upon which it may be contradicted
or explained, the adverse party will be afforded an
opportunity to do so. . . . Where another jurisdiction’s
law is applicable, it is the duty of counsel to supply the
court with a clear understanding of that foreign law.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Pagliaro v. Jones, 75 Conn. App. 625, 634–35, 817 A.2d
756 (2003).
   Our thorough review of the record reveals that the
plaintiff failed to supply the court with a clear under-
standing of the foreign law that is applicable to its
claims—the Arkansas State Fire Code.15 The flaws of
the plaintiff’s argument that the fire protection systems
at issue violated every potentially applicable edition of
the Arkansas State Fire Code are multifold and can be
gleaned by examining the portion of the 1992 Arkansas
State Fire Code that the plaintiff introduced into evi-
dence. As noted previously, the plaintiff submitted to
the court thirty-two pages of the 1992 Arkansas State
Fire Code. Those thirty-two pages include fifteen pages
from Chapter 3, which is titled ‘‘Recognized Standards
and Publications.’’ Section 301, titled ‘‘General,’’ pro-
vides: ‘‘Where provisions of this Code do not apply to
specific situations involving the protection of life and
property from the hazards of fire, smoke and explosion,
compliance with nationally recognized standards or
publications listed in this chapter, when not in conflict
with provisions of the Building Code, shall be evidence
of compliance with this Code.’’16 Following that expla-
nation is the list of those standards or publications,
which includes specific NFPA provisions, the year of
enactment of those specific provisions and the corres-
ponding section of the Arkansas Fire Code to which
each of those NFPA provisions applies. For example,
the list includes ‘‘[NFPA] 13 Installation of Sprinkler
Systems, 1989,’’ and the corresponding sections of the
Arkansas State Fire Code are §§ 2203.1.15.1, 2203.12.2.3
and 2204.1.17. The plaintiff did not submit for the record
those sections of the Arkansas State Fire Code. The
list also includes ‘‘[NFPA] 58 Storage and Handling of
Liquified Petroleum Gases, 1989,’’ and the listed corres-
ponding sections of the Arkansas State Fire Code are
§§ 1701.4.1, 1701.4.4 and T2201.2.2. The plaintiff did not
submit for the record those sections of the Arkansas
State Fire Code. The list also includes ‘‘[NFPA] 101 Life
Safety Code, 1988,’’ and the listed corresponding section
of the Arkansas State Fire Code is § 801.2. The plaintiff
did not submit for the record this section of the Arkan-
sas State Fire Code. Rather, the only substantive por-
tions of the 1992 Arkansas State Fire Code submitted
by the plaintiff is a portion of Chapter 6, specifically
§§ 601.1 through 603.19.5. Nowhere in those sections,
which comprise ten pages, are NFPA 13, 58 or 101
expressly referenced. It is therefore not clear from the
record which provisions of the Arkansas State Fire
Code the plaintiff is alleging the defendant violated
as to the fire protection systems at issue. Moreover,
because the Arkansas State Fire Code does not incorpo-
rate all NFPA standards, each edition may have incorpo-
rated different NFPA standards. Without examining all
of the potentially applicable versions of the Arkansas
State Fire Code, which were not provided to the court,
there was no basis on which the court could have deter-
mined that the fire protection systems at issue violated
all of them.
   Moreover, the trial court was correct in that it is not
clear, on the basis of the record in this case, that a
failure to comply with an NFPA provision constituted
a violation of the Arkansas State Fire Code. For
instance, in its complaint, the plaintiff cited to the viola-
tion of NFPA 13 cited in the FPA report as to the deluge
valve. According to the FPA report, ‘‘NFPA 13 states
the following requirement: ‘With deluge systems, the
deluge valve should be located as close as possible
to the hazard protected, outside any fire or explosion
hazard area.’ ’’ That language on which the FPA report
relies17 is contained in § B-5-1.2 of Appendix B to NFPA
13. It is clearly stated in NFPA 13, however, that ‘‘[t]he
Appendix is not a part of this NFPA Standard for the
Installation of Sprinkler Systems but is included for
information purposes only.’’18 The plaintiff provided the
court with no analysis as to whether a failure to comply
with this language, which explicitly was not a part of the
NFPA standard, constituted a violation of the Arkansas
State Fire Code.19
   The court explained: ‘‘The court can and will take
judicial notice of the existence of these subsequent
state fire codes. See General Statutes § 52-163a (a). But
it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove the ‘applicable law’
under the APA, and the court will not speculate as to
which code applies or attempt to determine the provi-
sions of that code on its own. . . . The parties dispute
whether the standards vary over the years. The court
cannot resolve this dispute without seeing the actual
standards that apply.’’ We agree with the court’s deter-
mination that the plaintiff failed to supply it with a clear
understanding of the law on which its claims are based.
Throughout the course of this litigation, the ‘‘applicable
law’’ that the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant
failed to abide has been a proverbial moving target,
ultimately ending with the plaintiff’s ‘‘catchall’’ position
that the defendant violated every potentially applicable
version of the Arkansas State Fire Code. The plaintiff,
however, did not provide the court with those versions,
leaving the court to figure that out for itself. The plaintiff
submitted to the court only portions of certain NFPA
standards on which it, at times, has relied and only one
version of a portion of one edition of the Arkansas State
Fire Code. As this court has explained, ‘‘[a]t bottom,
[i]t is not the court’s duty, unaided by the [plaintiff], to
scour the annals of the law of [foreign jurisdictions]
. . . in an effort to locate or to fashion a hook upon
which [the plaintiff’s claim] can be hung.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Olson v. Olson, 214 Conn.
App. 4, 19, 279 A.3d 230, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 918,
284 A.3d 299 (2022). On the basis of the foregoing, we
cannot conclude that the court erred in rejecting the
plaintiff’s fire protection claims.
                              II
   The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in
rejecting its claim for damages to replace the refrigera-
tion units at the plant. Specifically, the plaintiff argues
that the court misinterpreted the federal regulations
and improperly concluded that it was not necessary to
replace refrigeration units that leaked ozone depleting
substances at rates exceeding the statutory threshold.20
We are not persuaded.
   In rejecting the plaintiff’s refrigeration claims, the
court reasoned: ‘‘The plaintiff claims a breach of con-
tract because two refrigeration [units] leaked refriger-
ant regularly and excessively despite numerous repairs
and ultimately required replacement in 2012 and 2015
at [a] total cost of $508,698.68. The plaintiff’s brief,
however, is not clear on precisely what contractual
provision the defendant allegedly breached. It appears
from a generous reading of the brief that the plaintiff
is claiming that the refrigerant leaks violated United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regula-
tions, which in turn constituted a breach of the defen-
dant’s warranty in the January, 2008 APA that ‘[t]he
Business and Transferred Assets, are, and for the last
three years have been, in compliance with, and are
not subject to any liability under, any Environmental
Law.’ . . .
   ‘‘There is, in fact, evidence that the defendant’s
refrigeration units were not in compliance with federal
regulations during the three years prior to closing. In
a January, 2008 letter to the EPA, Great Lakes Chemical
Company (GLCC), a subsidiary of the defendant, dis-
closed ‘its discovery of violations under the ozone
depleting substances regulations, 40 CFR § 82 (‘‘ODS
regulations’’)’ at the ‘South Plant.’21 The letter admitted
that GLCC had ‘failed to follow the recordkeeping
requirements in the ODS Regulations and that there
have been, or may have been, other instances of failure
to verify repairs under the ODS Regulations.’ The letter
noted ‘some instances in which leak rates exceeded 35
[percent]’ and acknowledged that there may have been
‘emissions above permitted levels.’ . . . There was
also testimony confirming that these violations
occurred in the refrigeration units. . . . An exhibit
showed that refrigeration machine RU-86-802 had an
annual leak rate of 52.08 percent in 2006 and that
machine RU-86-807 had leak rates of 172.44 percent in
2006 and 152.24 percent in 2007. . . . Under the regula-
tions, ‘[r]epairs must bring the annual leak rate to below
35 percent.’ 40 C.F.R. § 82.156 (i) (1). . . . Therefore,
the evidence does establish a probable violation of the
defendant’s warranty that its units ‘are, and for the last
three years have been, in compliance with, and are not
subject to any liability under, any Environmental Law.’
  ‘‘The more difficult question is whether the plaintiff
proved that the replacement of these two units in 2012
and 2015 stemmed from the regulatory violations in
2006 and 2007. Under New York law, it is the plaintiff’s
burden to prove that ‘the breach resulted in damages
to the party claiming breach.’ Van Wie Chevrolet, Inc.
v. General Motors, LLC, 145 App. Div. 3d 1, 11, 38
N.Y.S.3d 662 (2016), leave to appeal denied, 28 N.Y.3d
913, 73 N.E.3d 358 (2017).
   ‘‘An exhibit showed that these two units had annual
leak rates that frequently exceeded 35 percent from
2008 on. . . .22 But federal regulations generally do not
require replacement of a leaking refrigeration unit.
Instead, in the first instance, ‘[t]he owners or operators
of industrial process refrigeration equipment normally
containing more than 50 pounds of refrigerant must
have leaks repaired if the appliance is leaking at a rate
such that the loss of refrigerant will exceed 35 percent
of the total charge during a 12-month period . . . .’
(Emphasis added.) 40 C.F.R. § 82.156 (i) (2). Only if the
first round of repairs are unsuccessful do the regula-
tions create a qualified obligation on the owner to ‘retro-
fit or retire the equipment.’23 The qualification is that,
if the owner successfully repairs the unit on a second
try,24 or establishes that the annual leak rate will not
exceed 35 percent,25 the regulations relieve the owner
of the obligation to replace.
  ‘‘The plaintiff’s brief states that it replaced the two
refrigeration [units] because they ‘leaked R22 refriger-
ant at annual rates in excess of 35 percent,’ they were
‘undersized,’ and ‘attempts to repair the machine[s] so
that [they] could be operated in accordance with ODS
regulations were unsuccessful.’ . . . A review of the
authorities cited by the plaintiff for this proposition
reveals that they do not support it. To the extent that
there is any evidence addressing the reasons that the
plaintiff replaced these two units, that evidence does
not include leakage from 2006 and 2007 as a reason.26
And there was no evidence that repairs were unsuccess-
ful. On the contrary, the testimony was that the repair
efforts worked, if not on the first try, then on the sec-
ond. . . .
   ‘‘More specifically, it is simply unclear whether the
need to replace these two units stemmed from the leaks
in 2006 and 2007, which were the basis for the contrac-
tual breach, rather than the faulty performance of these
units in subsequent years. The plaintiff did not present
an expert on causation to establish this connection.
Thus, the state of the record is that federal law did
not require the plaintiff to replace these units, that the
replacement decision could well have stemmed from
the regular history of leakage after the closing, and that
the real reason that the plaintiff replaced these units
is unknown. Based on all [of] these factors, the court
concludes that the plaintiff did not meet its burden to
prove that the replacement damages resulted from the
earlier contractual violations.’’ (Citations omitted; foot-
notes added; footnotes altered; footnotes in original.)
   On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that the court
misinterpreted the federal regulations when it held that
‘‘federal regulations generally do not require replace-
ment of a leaking refrigeration unit.’’ In so claiming,
the plaintiff ignores the court’s explanatory sentences
that follow, which set forth the option to repair such
units prior to triggering the requirement to replace
them, an option that the regulations clearly provide.27
A full reading of the court’s opinion reveals that the
court did not misinterpret the federal regulations.
   The plaintiff also challenges the court’s determina-
tion that the plaintiff failed to prove that its replacement
of the refrigeration units at issue was caused by the
excessive leak rates in 2006 and 2007. ‘‘In order to prove
a breach of contract cause of action, the plaintiff must
prove that a defendant’s breach was the proximate
cause of its damages. . . . The damages for which a
party may recover for a breach of contract are such as
ordinarily and naturally flow from the non-perfor-
mance. . . . In the law of contracts, as in torts, causa-
tion in fact is established if the defendant’s breach of
duty was a substantial factor in producing the damage.
. . . This test is satisfied if the defendant’s actions
would be thought of by people generally as having oper-
ated to an important extent in producing the harmful
result. . . . It is not necessary that the breaches be the
exclusive cause or the sole cause of the damages. . . .
Damages must nevertheless be reasonably certain and
directly traceable to the breach, not remote or the result
of other intervening causes.’’ (Citations omitted; empha-
sis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fed-
eral Housing Finance Agency v. Morgan Stanley ABS
Capital I Inc., 59 Misc. 3d 754, 783–84, 73 N.Y.S.3d 374
(2018). ‘‘Generally, it is for the trier of fact to determine
the issue of proximate cause. However, the issue of
proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law
where only one conclusion may be drawn from the
established facts . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lola Roberts Beauty Salon, Inc. v. Leading
Ins. Group Ins. Co., Ltd., 160 App. Div. 3d 824, 826, 76
N.Y.S.3d 79 (2018).
   ‘‘The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court
unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence
and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . We
cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the
witnesses. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it
. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
AAA Advantage Carting & Demolition Service, LLC v.
Capone, 221 Conn. App. 256, 279–80, 301 A.3d 1111,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442, and cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023).
   In challenging the court’s causation analysis, the
plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding that the
plaintiff failed to prove that the 2006 and 2007 leak
rates were the exclusive cause of the replacement of
the refrigeration units at issue and that, instead, it
should have considered whether they were a proximate
cause of the replacement of those units. This argument
is not supported by a fair reading of the court’s decision.
Nowhere in its decision does the court hold, expressly
or implicitly, that the plaintiff was required to prove
that the 2006 and 2007 excessive leak rates were the
exclusive cause of the eventual replacement of those
units in 2012 and 2015. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim
that the court erred by applying the wrong legal stan-
dard is without merit.
   The plaintiff also argues that ‘‘there is no question
that the need to replace [the refrigeration units at issue]
was a consequence that ‘ordinarily and naturally flowed’
from the fact that, when the defendant transferred the
units, they had been leaking in excess of the statutory
threshold for at least one or two years prior to the
closing, without appropriate repairs (or records thereof),
and continued to leak in excess of the statutory thresh-
old for multiple years after the closing despite repair
efforts.’’ The plaintiff contends that, ‘‘[i]f the machines
had not been perpetually leaking when DuPont acquired
them, they would not need to be replaced.’’ As the court
noted, the plaintiff did not present expert testimony in
support of these assertions. Indeed, as the court also
noted, there was evidence presented at trial indicating
that the refrigeration units ‘‘were to be selected for
replacement based on (in order of priority) type of
refrigerant used (HFC vs. HCFC), system maintenance
costs and remaining life, as well as system capacity
considerations.’’ Accordingly, we cannot conclude that
the court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to
prove that the excessive leaking of refrigerant in 2006
and 2007 caused the 2012 and 2015 replacement of the
refrigeration units was clearly erroneous.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     DuPont was the original plaintiff in this action. In 2017, The Chemours
Company, FC, LLC, was substituted as the sole plaintiff. We hereinafter
refer to the substitute plaintiff as the plaintiff throughout this opinion.
   2
     The plaintiff also claims that it did not ‘‘receive the trial to which it was
entitled on remand [in that] the trial court, Schuman, J., neglected to exam-
ine all of the evidence anew, neglected to make the required legal determina-
tions and adopted factual findings from the initial trial court, Brazzel-Mas-
saro, J., in spite of General Statutes § 51-183c, which provides that a case
cannot be tried again by the same judge where there has been a reversal
by our Supreme Court.’’] The plaintiff argues that the court’s ‘‘multi-page
block quote [consisting of] approximately five pages of factual findings from
the Supreme Court’s decision in this case, which actually were factual
findings of the original trial court judge’’ was ‘‘entirely improper and patently
inconsistent with the rights conferred by § 51-183c.’’ The plaintiff asserts
that the court ‘‘abdicated both its role to determine and apply the law and
its role as fact finder.’’ Despite the gravity of these allegations, counsel for
the plaintiff, at oral argument before this court, acknowledged that the facts
quoted by the trial court from the Supreme Court’s decision are undisputed
historical facts and conceded that the plaintiff simply is arguing that the
court’s other factual findings as to the dates of installation of the fire equip-
ment and the applicable fire codes were clearly erroneous. Our resolution
of the plaintiff’s first enumerated claim identified herein addresses this
argument. Consequently, the plaintiff’s claim based on a purported violation
of § 51-183c warrants no further discussion.
   3
     ‘‘The ozone depleting substances regulations regulate the leakage rates
of ozone depleting substances, such as chemicals used in industrial process
refrigeration equipment. See 40 C.F.R. § 82.156 (2019).’’ E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Chemtura Corp., supra, 336 Conn. 197 n.2.
   4
     ‘‘Specifically, § 8.8 of the APA provides: ‘A claim for indemnification for
any matter not involving a third-party claim may be asserted by notice to
the party obligated to indemnify under this [a]greement. Such notice must
be provided by the [i]ndemnified [p]erson to the [i]ndemnifying [p]erson
promptly in writing describing the [l]oss incurred by the [i]ndemnified [p]er-
son, the amount or estimated amount thereof, if known or reasonably capa-
ble of estimation, and the method of computation of such [l]oss, all with
reasonable specificity and containing a reference to the provisions of this
[a]greement in respect of which such [l]oss will have occurred.’ ’’ E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Chemtura Corp., supra, 336 Conn. 198–99 n.3.
   5
     ‘‘Specifically, in 2008, a site wide survey of the facility was completed,
addressing various compliance issues. A copy of the audit report was for-
warded to DiCristina. The report stated that the purpose was to ‘inform
[the defendant] of [a] preliminary estimate of expenses which DuPont plans
to incur between now and the end of 2009, which will be invoiced to [the
defendant] per the [APA] and the January 31, 2008 [s]ide [l]etter . . . .’ In
August, 2008, Kuhlmann and James Scroggins, one of the defendant’s plant
managers, also communicated about the refrigeration units. In September,
2008, correspondence between DuPont and the defendant outlined the scope
of work required for the refrigeration units. Throughout 2009 and 2010, the
parties continued to exchange e-mails and other correspondence about
expenditures reimbursable to DuPont.’’ E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Chemtura Corp., supra, 336 Conn. 199 n.4.
   6
     ‘‘In an e-mail to DiCristina and Kuhlmann, Fullerton explained what the
term ‘cure claim’ meant in the claims list he created: ‘I’ve tried to . . . use
the following criteria for putting something in the ‘‘cure claim’’ category for
purposes of resolving this: assuming there is a tie-in to a reimbursement
obligation under the [APA], has work been done for which either (a) an
invoice has been generated and sent to [the defendant] or (b) the issuance
of an invoice to [the defendant] is a [pro forma] step at this point [because]
the amount that would appear on the invoice is [un]known? . . . [T]he
fact that something may not be in the ‘‘cure claim’’ category does not mean
it never gets paid; it just means that the claim is handled per the [APA]
terms as if there had never been a [Chapter] 11 filing.’ ’’ E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Chemtura Corp., supra, 336 Conn. 199 n.5.
   7
     The Fire Protection Assessment (FPA), which was prepared by members
of DuPont’s Safety Fire Protection and Environmental Engineering Group,
indicated that, ‘‘[a]t the time the site was built, the fire protection code to
be used was the 1982 Southeast Fire Protection Code. This version of the
code required the use of [National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)] fire
codes. Process additions, modifications and changes were made to a number
of manufacturing processes at the site over time, including the installation
of the TFPII process in 1998. Each project should have followed the NFPA
code in place at the time of the respective project. . . . Below are detailed
reviews and the recommendation for each of the respective areas, based
on the Southeast Fire Protection Code and applicable NFPA fire codes. A
Building Life Safety Code review is highly recommended if it has not already
been performed. A building code review would cover construction require-
ments, egress, emergency lighting, access, fire walls/doors, etc.’’ Neither the
1982 Southeast Fire Protection Code nor a Building Life Safety Code were
ever submitted to the court.
   8
     No portions of NFPA 24 or 45 were presented to the court.
   9
     As set forth in the trial court’s memorandum of decision, TFP stands
for trifluoropropene, a flammable chemical.
   10
      The trial court’s memorandum of decision noted that the Therminol 66
heater and tank are used in a flammable process to manufacture FM 200,
a liquified gas.
   11
      Although the plaintiff submitted pages from the 1965 Arkansas Fire
Prevention Code and additional editions of the NFPA, the court declined
to take judicial notice of them.
   12
      For example, the plaintiff claimed that the deluge valve violates NFPA
13 § 5-3.2 (1989). That subsection of § 5-3 (Preaction and Deluge Systems)
is titled ‘‘Description’’ and provides in relevant part: ‘‘Preaction and deluge
systems are normally without water in the system piping. The water supply
is controlled by an automatic valve operated by means of fire detection
devices and provided with manual means for operation that are independent
of the sprinklers. . . .’’
   13
      The pages appended to the posttrial brief were completely different
from those submitted with the motion in limine.
   14
      The plaintiff attached to its posttrial brief two pages from NFPA 13
(1964) and five pages from NFPA 13 (1978).
   15
      The plaintiff argues: ‘‘To the extent the court wanted to verify the parties’
evidence that the NFPA standards have not materially changed during the
relevant time frame, it should have reviewed the text of the NFPA provisions
before it. Indeed, the court, Pierson, J., expressly took judicial notice of
the relevant NFPA standards incorporated into the 1992 Arkansas Fire Code
(i.e., NFPA 13 (1989), NFPA 58 (1989) and NFPA 101 (1988)) . . . as well
as earlier versions of these NFPA standards (i.e., NFPA 13 (1964 and 1978),
NFPA 58 (1974) and NFPA 101 (1963)), incorporated into earlier editions
of the Arkansas [State] Fire Code.’’ (Citations omitted.) This representation
of the record is not accurate. The court did not grant the plaintiff’s motion
in limine ‘‘insofar as it would take judicial notice of the requested materials,
as the plaintiff represents.’’ The record reflects that the court, Pierson, J.,
took judicial notice only of ‘‘the 1992 Arkansas State Fire Code, which
adopts and incorporates certain NFPA provisions . . . .’’ It did not take
judicial notice of any earlier versions of the Arkansas State Fire Code or
NFPA provisions. Furthermore, the court found that it was uncertain as to
whether any versions of the code after 1998 applied, and the plaintiff never
asked the court to take judicial notice of such later versions of the code.
   16
      The plaintiff never disclosed or addressed this prefatory language of
the Arkansas State Fire Code and provided no evidence or argument that
would support a determination that the NFPA provisions on which it relied
were not in conflict with the Building Code.
   17
      In its January 14, 2022 motion in limine asking the court to take judicial
notice of certain NFPA provisions, the plaintiff cited to those same pages
of the FPA report as the basis of its claimed violation of NFPA 13. The
plaintiff cited to the same pages of the FPA report in its April 29, 2022
‘‘Statement of Law and Legal Theories of the Case.’’
   18
      The plaintiff did not provide to the court the portion of NFPA 13 that
explained this; nor did the plaintiff inform the court that this language was
contained in the Appendix and that it was not a part of the NFPA standard.
This information was presented by the defendant through its introduction
into evidence of a complete version of NFPA 13 (1978), which consists of
more than 200 pages.
   19
      Additionally, the testimony at trial revealed that there are exceptions
to the requirement that certain systems comply with the NFPA in that the
‘‘authority having jurisdiction’’ may consider exceptions as to the design
and location of deluge valve houses.
   20
      The plaintiff also challenges the court’s determination that it failed to
comply with the side letter’s requirement that the parties ‘‘select a nationally
recognized independent industrial refrigeration appliance expert’’ to mutu-
ally determine retrofit or replacement. The court explained: ‘‘It is undisputed
that there was no ‘mutual determination of the parties’ on retrofit or replace-
ment. Thus, the issue is whether there was compliance with the requirement
that the parties ‘select a nationally recognized independent industrial
refrigeration appliance expert . . . .’ The plaintiff hired Terry Dyer, a . . .
refrigeration design expert [formerly employed by the defendant], for advice
on refrigeration issues. Although it may seem that hiring an expert from
the opposing party would conform to the opponent’s wishes, there was no
evidence to that effect and no indication that the defendant even participated
in the selection process. Further, it is not clear that Dyer met the criteria
of a ‘nationally recognized independent industrial refrigeration appliance
expert . . . .’ The plaintiff’s failure to comply with the side letter’s proce-
dural requirements in this respect provides an additional reason why it
cannot recover for replacement of the refrigeration units.’’
   In challenging the court’s determination that it failed to comply with the
requirements of the side letter, the plaintiff additionally argues that the
court erred in requiring that it strictly comply with those requirements
and, instead, should have employed a substantial compliance analysis. The
plaintiff argues that it substantially complied by retaining Dyer. Even assum-
ing, arguendo, that the proper standard is whether the plaintiff substantially
complied with the requirements of the side letter, we are not persuaded by
the plaintiff’s substantial compliance argument. We instead conclude that
the court’s analysis was correct, whether the standard is strict or substantial
compliance.
   21
      ‘‘The APA identifies ‘Plant Site’ as the ‘manufacturing site of Seller or
GLCC known as ‘Chemtura South Plant’ with an address of 324 Southfield
Cutoff, El Dorado, AR . . . .’ ’’
   22
      ‘‘For unit RU-86-802, annual leak rates were 100 percent in 2008, 45.42
percent in 2009, and 101.25 percent in 2011. For unit RU-86-807, annual leak
rates were 100 percent in 2009, 115.38 percent in 2011, and 110.26 percent
in 2012.’’
   23
      ‘‘40 C.F.R. § 82.156 (i) (3) (ii) provides [in relevant part]: ‘If the follow-up
verification test indicates that the repairs to industrial process refrigeration
equipment, federally-owned commercial refrigeration equipment, or feder-
ally-owned comfort cooling appliances have not been successful, the owner
or operator must retrofit or retire the equipment . . . .’ ’’
   24
      ‘‘40 C.F.R. § 82.156 (i) (3) (iv) provides [in relevant part]: ‘The owner
or operator is relieved of the obligation to retrofit or replace the industrial
process refrigeration equipment as discussed in paragraph (i) (6) of this
section if second repair efforts to fix the same leaks that were the subject
of the first repair efforts are successfully completed within 30 days or 120
days where an industrial process shutdown is required, after the initial failed
follow-up verification test. . . .’ ’’
   25
      ‘‘40 C.F.R. § 82.156 (i) (3) (v) provides [in relevant part]: ‘The owner or
operator of industrial process refrigeration equipment is relieved of the
obligation to retrofit or replace the equipment in accordance with paragraph
(i) (6) of this section if within 180 days of the initial failed follow-up verifica-
tion test, the owner or operator establishes that the appliance’s annual leak
rate does not exceed the applicable allowable annual leak rate . . . .’’
   26
      ‘‘A 2012 memo from [DuPont] states that the [units] in question ‘were
to be selected for replacement based on (in order of priority) type of refriger-
ant used (HFC vs. HCFC), system maintenance costs and remaining life, as
well as system capacity considerations.’ ’’
   27
      See footnote 23 of this opinion.