Court Opinion

ID: 9535398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:48:52.193887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:14.238595
License: Public Domain

Hill, J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the holding that tax exempt status under 32 V.S.A. § 3802 (2) depends on whether property is “substantially utilized in furtherance of [the taxpayer’s] organizational purposes” and from the consequence that the Boy Scouts’ “forever wild” area is taxable.
By the following language, the Legislature has unambiguously decreed that certain “boy scout” property shall be exempt from taxation:
The . . . following property shall be exempt from taxation:
(2) ... real and personal property owned by and used for the purpose of its work by a nonprofit organization chartered by an act of the Congress of the United States, such as a Red Cross, boy scout, girl scout, boy or girl organization.
32 V.S.A. § 3802(2) (emphasis added). The trial court concluded that all of the land, including the “forever wild” area, is owned and used by the Boy Scout organization for the purposes of its work.
*251Its findings establish that the wilderness tract is intentionally undeveloped and that it is used to enhance the Scouts’ understanding of the environment. The area is visited during the summer by Scouts for educational purposes, including the observation of flora and fauna. They are also taken there so they can observe land in its natural state, that is, without management or improvement. The court also found that the Boy Scouts have an environmental award for learning the names of plants and animals, and concluded that “understanding the environment, conservation and forestry are important achievements consonant with scouting objectives.”
Clearly, this supports the conclusion that the property falls within the terms of the statute, i.e., it is “used for the purpose of [the organization’s] work.” Hence, the “forever wild” area should be tax exempt. Nonetheless, the majority holds that the claim of exemption must fail. In reaching that conclusion, it adds an additional element to the wording of the statute. It requires a showing that the property is “substantially utilized in furtherance of the organization’s objectives.”
But no authority supports its proposition that the Legislature intended the exemption to be conditioned on the quantum of use. On the contrary, where the Legislature intended to more narrowly restrict exemptions, it explicitly did so. It should be noted, for example, that in order to be tax exempt, the real and personal property owned by a post of any veterans’ organization must be used as the principal meeting place of the post, 32 Y.S.A. § 3802(2), a Young Men’s Christian Association building must contain a free public reading room, 32 V.S.A. § 3802(6), and the grounds and property owned and occupied by agricultural societies must be used annually for agricultural fairs, 32 Y.S.A. § 3802(9).
By requiring Boy Scout property to be “substantially utilized,” the majority substitutes its judgment for the Legislature’s in an area of uniquely legislative concern. The implicit judgment in its holding is that if the property is not used “substantially,” it is a luxury and ought not be subsidized with a tax exemption. But the statute does not exempt property that is “substantially utilized”; it exempts property “used for the purpose of [the organization’s] work.” And I find no reason to confine the exemption to narrower limits *252than the terms of the statute fairly imply. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Daley joins in the foregoing dissent.