Court Opinion

ID: 9767579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:21:48.075952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.811442
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
STEAKLEY, J.
STEAKLEY, Justice (dissenting).
Unwittingly or not, as I see it, the majority has in practical effect rendered impotent the doctrine of negligence per se. Perhaps this is well and good; if so, why not abolish the doctrine ?
The majority assumes that the red arrow signal was legally installed and maintained. Everybody has known since traffic signals came into use that traffic stops on red and moves on green, whether the signal is round, or square, or flashing. How can it be said that a driver acts reasonably when the violated red signal is in the form of an arrow? It is undisputed that Mrs. Spark-man violated the signal when she drove into the path of Mrs. Maxwell who was proceeding legally through a green signal. Notwithstanding, the majority says that the jury may find that the conduct of Mrs. Sparkman was reasonable under the circumstances, i. e., that the violation was excused because she was confused. This gets us close to the alternative rule pointed out in 2 Harper & James, Law of Torts 1001, *859§ 17.6 (1956), quoted in Impson v. Structural Metals, Inc., 487 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.1972), that empowers juries “to dispense with reasonable statutory requirements in every case no matter how flimsy the excuse.”