Court Opinion

ID: 9551582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:55:52.949287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:14.142492
License: Public Domain

*253Fontron, J.,
dissenting: It is a formidable task to dissent from one of Mr. Justice Schroeder’s monumental opinions, but the attempt must be made nonetheless. I shall confine my remarks to the property division made by the trial court, overlooking the paucity of evidence showing mutual incompatibility.
When judgment was entered in this action our decision in Almquist v. Almquist, 214 Kan. 788, 522 P. 2d 383, had not come down. In that case we pointed out specifically that all property constituting part of the family estate, regardless of source, should be taken into account in arriving at an equitable division of the marital assets. The trial court, of course, could not have foretold our opinion in Almquist. Hence, it is my opinion this case should be remanded for reconsideration of the property division in the light of Almquist.
In my view, the facts in the case at hand are very similar to the facts in Almquist, except that here the source of the farm is found in the wife, rather than in the husband. This difference is not material since what was sauce for the goose in Almquist should be sauce for the gander here.
The record in Almquist disclosed that some twenty years before the divorce the husband’s parents deeded him the farm, referred to as the “home place”, on which the Almquists made their home and raised their family. Shortly before the marriage broke up the husband inherited an interest in the estate of his mother, which was still being probated. The trial court gave certain items of property to the wife and others to the husband, but the list did not include either the home place or the husband’s interest in his mother’s estate. These two items, which had a total value of $115,849, were awarded to Kenneth Almquist, and we said:
“. . . Apart from these two items [the home place and the interest in the estate] Kenneth received $56,584 in jointly accumulated property, against which he was to pay $28,250, or just about one-half, in cash. If this were all, Mrs. Almquist would obviously have little ground for complaint.
“This, of course, is not all. Mrs. Almquist’s chief complaint goes to the fact that in making the property division the trial court apparently first set aside to her husband the home place and his interest in his mother’s estate, and apportioned only the balance. In so doing, she says, the trial court abused its discretion.” (p. 791.)
As to Kenneth’s interest in his mother’s estate we could not “say that it should necessarily have been subject to division” considering its source and recent acquisition, but our ruling as to the home place, was quite a different matter. Concerning this farm, we said:
*254. . This property, as we see it, was part and parcel of the family assets, regardless of its source.” (p. 792.)
“. . . Mrs. Almquist was entitled to an equitable portion of all property which might fairly be deemed part of the family estate. This would include, under the facts in this case, the family home. Any other result would, in our opinion, fall short of the statutory demand that the property settlement be ‘just and reasonable/” (p.794.)
The present case fits well within the Almquist pattern. In a memorandum of opinion the trial court said:
“. . . An award to defendant of one-half of the assets other than the real estate will not give him any benefit from improvements of the real estate to which he has contributed physically, as well as financially, nor of the increase in value thereof over twenty-nine years which has been substantial, it does give him a portion of the assets accumulated during the marriage. . . .”
The personal assets, less indebtedness, amounted to approximately $20,000. The trial court awarded the personal property to plaintiff and gave defendant a judgment for $10,000. In other words what this court did was to award all the real estate to the wife and split the personal property half and half — as had been done in Almquist.
For some 29 years this couple had made their home on the land which plaintiff brought to the marriage. The evidence clearly shows that LaRue did substantial work on and about the property, and sank his entire inheritance in its improvement. The cattle, from which it may fairly be assumed most of the accumulated assets were derived, were purchased after the couple moved to the farm and Mr. LaRue is shown to have cared for them and their offspring for many years thereafter.
It occurs to me that the defendant has received scant consideration from a bad tempered old lady who met him at the door with a shotgun upon his return from a sojourn in' the hospital. She now emerges from the twenty-nine year old marriage with a farm worth at least $62,000, plus one-half in value of the personal property acquired over the years, while Mr. LaRue comes out at the short end of the horn with the other half of the value of the personalty, or $10,000. The equities of the situation escape me.
In preparing this dissent, I recognize the superior position occupied by the trial court in viewing the witnesses and listening to their testimony. I also have great respect for Judge Coffman’s integrity *255and judgment. He did not, however, have the benefit of our opinion in the Almquist case. For this reason, I respectfully dissent from so much of the opinion as relates to division of property. I would return the case for reconsideration as previously indicated.
Fatzer, C. J., and Owsley, J., join in the foregoing dissent.