Court Opinion

ID: 9959968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-13 00:00:35.095612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:02.572149
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10328            Document: 66-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/12/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________
                                                                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit
                                     No. 23-10328
                                   ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                April 12, 2024
United States of America,                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                    Clerk
                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                          versus

Emmanuel Nicholas Rosa,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 5:22-CR-95-1
                   ______________________________

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Graves and Wilson, Circuit
Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       This case concerns whether the district court erred in setting an
assessment payment schedule as part of Emmanuel Rosa’s conditions of
supervised release and whether Rosa waived his right to appeal that aspect of
his sentence. Rosa signed a plea agreement that contained an appeal waiver
and then pled guilty to one count of receiving and distributing child

      _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-10328         Document: 66-1          Page: 2     Date Filed: 04/12/2024

                                     No. 23-10328

pornography.       The district court sentenced Rosa to 240 months of
imprisonment and ordered him to pay assessments of $10,000 under
18 U.S.C. § 2259A and 18 U.S.C. § 3014 ($5,000 under each statute).
        Rosa now contends the district court erred by ordering simultaneous
payment of the unpaid balance of these assessments during his period of
supervised release, asserting that the court could not order him to pay the
§ 3014 assessment until he has completed payment under § 2259A. The
Government counters that Rosa waived his right to appeal these assessments
and payment schedule but, even if not, Rosa fails to show any plain error that
affected his substantial rights. We conclude Rosa waived his right to appeal
the assessments and the payment schedule and dismiss this appeal.
                                           I.
        Rosa pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) & (b) by
receiving and distributing child pornography. His plea agreement contained
several relevant sections. Paragraph 3, titled “Sentence,” reads:
        3. Sentence: The minimum and maximum penalties the Court
        can impose include:
        ...
        f. an assessment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259A, for no more
        than $35,000 for offenses occurring on or after December 7,
        2018;
        g. if the Court finds the defendant is not indigent, an additional
        mandatory special assessment of $5,000 must be imposed
        pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3014;[1]
        ....

        _____________________
        1
          These are in addition to a separate $100 “mandatory special assessment” that is
not at issue in this case.

                                           2
 Case: 23-10328        Document: 66-1       Page: 3     Date Filed: 04/12/2024

                                   No. 23-10328

Paragraph 6, titled “Mandatory special assessment,” again delineates these
two assessments and the statutory parameters governing their imposition.
Paragraph 7, “Defendant’s Agreement,” orders “that any financial
obligation imposed by the Court . . . is due and payable immediately” and
emphasizes Rosa’s “continuing obligation to pay in full as soon as
possible . . . .” Finally, Paragraph 12 contains an appeal waiver: “[Rosa]
waives [his] rights, conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, to
appeal the conviction, sentence, fine and order of restitution or
forfeiture . . . .”
        After pleading guilty but prior to sentencing, Rosa received his pre-
sentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR recommended as a condition
of his supervised release that if any part of the § 2259A or § 3014 assessments
remained unpaid at the start of his supervised release, Rosa must “make
payments on such unpaid balance beginning 60 days after release from
custody at the rate of at least $100 per month until the assessment is paid in
full.” Rosa also received and reviewed his supervised release conditions,
which adopted this proposed condition. He did not object to the PSR or
conditions of supervised release, instead stating “the defense ha[d] reviewed
the PSR, [and] [saw] no meritorious objections . . . .”
        At sentencing, Rosa confirmed he had no objections to the PSR. The
district court ordered Rosa, inter alia, to pay $5,000 at the rate of $200 per
month for each assessment ($10,000 total, payable $400 per month). 2 Rosa
acknowledged he would pay “[a] total of 400 a month” for the “separate”
assessments.

        _____________________
        2
          The Government acknowledges there is a discrepancy between the oral
pronouncement and written judgment as to how much Rosa must pay each month while on
supervised release. However, this is not at issue on appeal.

                                        3
Case: 23-10328          Document: 66-1       Page: 4   Date Filed: 04/12/2024

                                  No. 23-10328

       Rosa now appeals the assessment payment schedule and requests that
this court modify it.
                                       II.
       We review de novo whether an appellate waiver bars an appeal. United
States v. Strother, 977 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2020). Doing so, we consider
“whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and whether, under the
plain language of the plea agreement, the waiver applies to the circumstances
at issue.” Id. (internal citations and punctuation omitted). Rosa does not
contest that he knowingly and voluntarily signed the plea agreement. The
case turns, then, on whether the plain language of Rosa’s appeal waiver
applies to “the circumstances at issue,” the assessment repayment schedule.
       We conclude it does. The plea agreement plainly shows that the
parties considered the assessments, and by extension their payment
schedule, to be part of Rosa’s sentence. Rosa plainly waived his right to
appeal the sentence, and thus the assessments and the payment schedule. 3
       Rosa admits that “sentence” “could encompass Rosa’s claimed error
in isolation,” but contends that, contextually, it “cannot bear that
construction.” He argues that “[t]he plea agreement’s plain language
compels an interpretation of ‘sentence’ that excludes monetary penalties
such as fines and restitution.” While Rosa concedes that the assessments are
included under the plea agreement’s “Sentence” paragraph, he contends
that reading “sentence” to cover the assessments would render the phrase

       _____________________
       3
         The Government makes alternative arguments that the assessments and their
payment schedule are encompassed by the term “fines” or are contained within the
conditions of supervised release. We do not address these contentions because we
conclude that the assessments are part of the sentence.

                                        4
Case: 23-10328        Document: 66-1        Page: 5     Date Filed: 04/12/2024

                                  No. 23-10328

“fine and order of restitution or forfeiture” in his appeal waiver
“meaningless.”
       To confect this reading, Rosa compares the language in Paragraph 3—
“Sentence”—to that in Paragraph 12—the appeal waiver. The “Sentence”
paragraph includes potential assessments, fines and restitution that might be
imposed upon Rosa in the district court’s discretion. The appeal waiver
states that Rosa “further waives [his] right to contest the conviction, sentence,
fine and order of restitution or forfeiture . . . .”   So, in Rosa’s view, his
“sentence” cannot subsume “fines” and “restitution” in Paragraph 3 while
those terms are enumerated separately in Paragraph 12. Otherwise, “fine
and order of restitution” would be “meaningless.” Rosa asserts that the
term “sentence” is at least ambiguous and urges us to “turn ‘from the
language of the contract’ to the ‘surrounding circumstances.’” Ultimately,
Rosa urges that the ambiguity dictates a construction against the
Government and a finding that he did not waive his right to appeal the
assessment payment schedule.
       The Government responds that the assessments, and by extension
their payment schedule, are plainly included in Rosa’s “sentence.” For
support, the Government cites United States v. Madrid, 978 F.3d 201 (5th Cir.
2020). In Madrid, this court determined that the plea agreement at issue
“addressed terms regarding restitution and special assessments, and [the
defendant] expressed a clear understanding of his right to appeal and agreed
to that waiver.” Id. at 205. Moreover, the Madrid district court had
“confirmed that [the defendant] read, reviewed with his counsel, and
understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver
provision and that the other charges that would be dropped.” Id. This court
held the appeal waiver was enforceable and applied to bar the defendant’s
appeal. Id.

                                        5
Case: 23-10328       Document: 66-1       Page: 6    Date Filed: 04/12/2024

                                 No. 23-10328

       While Rosa counters that the appeal waiver at issue here differs
substantially from the one in Madrid, that case is at least instructive. As in
Madrid, we must consider “the parties’ intent at the time the agreement was
executed, as determined from the language of the contract and the
surrounding circumstances.” 978 F.3d at 205. And we may not “rewrite the
terms of a plea agreement entered into willingly and knowingly; instead, the
court is only responsible for ensuring that freely negotiated terms of plea
agreements are enforced.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Applying these principles, Rosa has clearly waived his right to appeal his
sentence, and that includes the assessments and their payment schedule.
       For starters, Rosa admits that “[t]he term [sentence] . . . could
encompass [his] claimed error . . . .”     Moreover, the assessments are
included in the “Sentence” paragraph of the plea agreement. Paragraph 7 of
the agreement clearly outlines Rosa’s obligation to pay the assessments
(immediately). Rosa was provided his PSR and proposed conditions of
supervised release, which both included proposed payment schedules, prior
to sentencing. At sentencing Rosa confirmed he understood he would pay
“[a] total of 400 a month” for the “separate” assessments. Finally, he stated
before and during sentencing that he had no objections to the PSR or the
proposed assessment payment schedule.
       Rosa’s contention that his “sentence” must be distinct from the
assessments because the appeal waiver separately enumerates the “sentence,
fine and order of restitution or forfeiture” is unpersuasive. If anything, the
more specific language in the appeal waiver cuts against his position because
that language sweeps in the assessments whether they are part of the
“sentence,” or are “fines” or “restitution.”        Regardless, reading the
paragraphs of the plea agreement together, the parties clearly intended for
these assessments, including when they would be paid, to be a part of Rosa’s
sentence, and for them to be covered by the appeal waiver. Rosa’s attempts

                                      6
Case: 23-10328          Document: 66-1         Page: 7     Date Filed: 04/12/2024

                                    No. 23-10328

to create ambiguity are unavailing. 4 “By challenging [the terms of the
agreement] of which he was repeatedly admonished, [Rosa] is attempting to
circumvent the waiver-of-appeal provision contained in the negotiated plea
agreement.” Madrid, 978 F.3d at 205 (citing United States v. Rivas-Lopez,
678 F.3d 353, 356-57 (5th Cir. 2012)). He may not do so.
                                        III.
       It is clear that the assessments and their payment schedule set by the
district court were part of Rosa’s sentence. Rosa expressly confirmed at
sentencing that he understood that during his supervised release, he would
owe $400.00 per month until the assessments were fully paid. And Rosa
plainly waived his right to contest his sentence on appeal. “[T]he court
is . . . responsible for ensuring that freely negotiated terms of plea agreements
are enforced” and not “re-writ[ten].” Id.
                                                         APPEAL DISMISSED.

       _____________________
       4
         Because the plea agreement is unambiguous regarding the intent of the parties,
we decline Rosa’s invitation to consider the “surrounding circumstances,” i.e., the
“statutory framework at the backdrop of the parties’ negotiation[s].”

                                          7