Court Opinion

ID: 9583350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:37:54.906185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:58.444971
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment of the majority. I write specially because I cannot agree with all that is said in the majority opinion, particularly the majority’s analysis focusing on Hart’s having traversed the steps previously.
Nevertheless, I agree that summary judgment was proper. One of the primary teachings of Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997), thrice repeated, is that “[t]he issue is whether, taking into account all the circumstances existing at the time and place of the fall, the invitee exercised the prudence the ordinarily careful person would use in a like situation.” Id. at 735. See also id. at 741, 748.
In keeping with that guiding principle, once the defendant’s knowledge has been established and evidence has been presented that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an “intentional and unreasonable exposure of self to a hazard of which plaintiff has knowledge,” Robinson, supra at 748, to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a slip/fall plaintiff is required to produce evidence disproving his own negligence. Id. Here, the defendant’s knowledge *392of the hazard was established. And Hart admitted he also realized before the fall that the structure of the steps themselves constituted an “obvious hazard.” Thus, even under Robinson, to withstand the motion for summary judgment, Hart was required to present evidence disproving his own negligence. Id. at 748. Because I have found no such evidence in the record, I must agree that summary judgment in this case was properly granted against Hart.
Decided September 16, 1998.
Bynum, Lewis & McEvoy, Joe H. Bynum, Jr., for appellant.
Joe B. Sartain, Jr., for appellee.