Court Opinion

ID: 9898426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:37.923774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:18.388313
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 JANICE GREENLEE,
                                                       No. 84374-5-I
                       Appellant,
                                                       DIVISION ONE
                v.
                                                       UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 MATTHEW F. BARNES, Personal
 Representative of the Estate of Barnes,

                       Respondent.

       MANN, J. — This appeal arises from a breach of contract claim asserted by

Janice Greenlee against Matthew Barnes, the personal representative of the estate of

Brooke Barnes (Estate). 1 Greenlee appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment

dismissing her complaint. Greenlee argues that the trial court erred because she can

recover damages for the Estate’s breach of contract under Washington’s real estate

brokers and managing brokers act, chapter 18.85 RCW. We disagree and affirm.

        1 Because Brooke Barnes and respondent Matthew Barnes share the same last name, this

opinion will use their first names for clarity.
No. 84374-5-1/2

                                            I.

      Greenlee first met Brooke in 1993, and they became friends. Brooke was a real

estate developer. In late 2017 to early 2018, Brooke encouraged Greenlee to

participate in the real estate business and obtain a real estate brokerage license. In

2018, Greenlee began obtaining a real estate brokerage license in Arizona and

obtained her license in January 2019.

      In spring 2019, Brooke proposed to Greenlee that, if she obtained a Washington

license, he would use her for his real estate listings. Greenlee agreed, and on June 7,

2019, Brooke and Greenlee entered into a “Listing Broker Exclusive Employment

Agreement” (Agreement) that contained these terms:

      Seller: Brooke Barnes, The Estate of Brooke Barnes, Any LLC formed on
      or upon behalf of Brooke Barnes, and any party hereto.

      Broker: Janice Greenlee

      Term: This agreement shall commence on 06/07/2019 and expire at 11:59
      pm on 06/06/2024

      Employment: Broker agrees to list all Residential, Land and Commercial
      property on behalf of client. Broker shall also negotiate at Seller’s
      direction to obtain acceptable terms and conditions for the purchase,
      exchange, sale, option or lease of the Properties owned on behalf of the
      above referenced client. Broker shall also assist [S]eller during the
      transaction within the scope of Broker[’s] expertise and licensing.

      Compensation: Seller agrees to compensate Broker as follows:

      The amount of compensation shall be 3% or the compensation Broker
      receives from the buyer or buyer’s Broker, whichever is greater. Broker’s
      compensation shall be paid at the time of and as a condition of closing or
      as otherwise agreed upon in writing.

      Seller agrees to pay such compensation if within 365 calendar days after
      the termination of this agreement Seller/Lessor enters into an agreement
      to sell, purchase, exchange, option or lease any property previously listed

                                         -2-
No. 84374-5-1/3

         by Broker, or negotiated by Broker on behalf of above referenced client,
         during the term of this agreement.

         If completion of any transaction is prevented by Seller/Lessor’s breach,
         the total compensation shall be due and payable by the Seller.

         On February 18, 2020, Greenlee obtained a Washington Real Estate Brokerage

License.

         Before Brooke and Greenlee worked together, Brooke’s health deteriorated, and

he unexpectedly died on November 26, 2020. After Brooke’s death, Brooke’s nephew,

Matthew Barnes, became the personal representative of the Estate. Matthew notified

Greenlee that he had found a copy of the Agreement and regarded the document as not

creating enforceable rights in Greenlee’s favor against Brooke or his estate. As a result,

Greenlee filed a creditor’s claim based on the Agreement. Matthew rejected Greenlee’s

claim.

         In his role as personal representative, Matthew sold four commercial real estate

properties that were previously owned by Brooke following his death. Matthew did not

use Greenlee as the listing broker for any of these transactions.

         Greenlee sued Matthew for breach of contract. The trial court granted Matthew’s

motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims asserted by Greenlee with

prejudice. The trial court found that Greenlee could not collect compensation for any

real estate transaction that occurred during the Agreement period because she was not

licensed or in compliance with chapter 18.85 RCW when the Agreement was executed.

         Greenlee appeals.

                                           -3-
No. 84374-5-1/4

                                            II.

      This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment. Our review is de

novo and we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Marquis v. City of Spokane,

130 Wn.2d 97, 104-05, 922 P.2d 43 (1996). Summary judgment is proper when there is

no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. CR 56(c); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192

P.3d 886 (2008). We “must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from the

evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the motion should be

granted if a reasonable person could reach only one conclusion.” Dunnington v.

Virginia Mason Med. Ctr., 187 Wn.2d 629, 638, 389 P.3d 498 (2017).

                                            A.

      Greenlee argues that she is entitled to a real estate commission because she did

not provide brokerage services before obtaining a Washington license. We disagree.

      RCW 18.85.331 requires a real estate broker to be licensed in Washington

before offering to perform a real estate transaction or procure a promise or contract for

the payment of compensation for performing any real estate transaction:

      It is unlawful for any person to act as a real estate broker, managing
      broker, or real estate firm without first obtaining a license therefor, and
      otherwise complying with the provisions of this chapter.

      No suit or action shall be brought for the collection of compensation as a
      real estate broker, real estate firm, managing broker, or designated
      broker, without alleging and proving that the plaintiff was a duly licensed
      real estate broker, managing broker, or real estate firm before the time of
      offering to perform any real estate transaction or procuring any promise or
      contract for the payment of compensation for any contemplated real estate
      transaction.

                                          -4-
No. 84374-5-1/5

The statute requiring a real estate broker to be licensed is penal and must be strictly

construed. See Johnson v. Rutherford, 32 Wn.2d 194, 199, 200 P.2d 977 (1948) (citing

Salisbury v. Alskog, 144 Wash. 88, 256 P. 1030 (1927)).

        Chapter 18.85 RCW does not define “real estate transaction.” The statute does,

however, define “real estate brokerage services” to mean:

       any of the following services offered or rendered directly or indirectly to
       another, or on behalf of another for compensation or the promise or
       expectation of compensation, or by a licensee on the licensee’s own
       behalf:
              ....
       b) Negotiating or offering to negotiate, either directly or indirectly, the
       purchase, sale, exchange, lease, or rental of real estate, or any real
       property interest therein.

RCW 18.85.011(17)(b).

       Under the Agreement, Greenlee agreed to “negotiate at [Brooke’s] direction to

obtain acceptable terms and conditions for the purchase, exchange, sale, option or

lease of the Properties” owned by Brooke. On its face, the Agreement meets the

definition of a real estate brokerage service because Greenlee agreed to negotiate the

sale or purchase of Brooke’s property.

       Because the Agreement constitutes “real estate brokerage services,” Greenlee

needed to be licensed before executing the Agreement under RCW 18.85.331. The

Agreement was entered on June 7, 2019. Greenlee did not obtain her Washington

license until February 18, 2020. RCW 18.85.331 specifically says that “[n]o suit or

action shall be brought for the collection of compensation as a real estate broker . . .

without . . . proving that the plaintiff was a duly licensed real estate broker . . . before the

time of offering to perform any real estate transaction or procuring any promise or

contract for the payment of compensation for any contemplated real estate transaction.”

                                            -5-
No. 84374-5-1/6

Under the Agreement, Greenlee offered to perform real estate transactions for Brooke

for compensation, but did not have a Washington license. Greenlee failed to meet the

requirements of RCW 18.85.331.

                                             B.

       Greenlee also argues that she complied with the exception to the Washington

license requirement because she was licensed in Arizona when the Agreement was

entered. We disagree.

       Under RCW 18.85.131(1), an out-of-state licensee may provide commercial real

estate brokerage services in Washington, “provided that the out-of-state licensee, as

approved by the director, does all of the following”: (1) associates with a Washington

licensed real estate broker, (2) agrees to follow Washington law, (3) furnishes a copy of

the out-of-state license in good standing, (4) consents to jurisdiction in the state for any

legal actions arising out of their conduct, and (5) includes the name of the Washington

broker on all advertising.

       Greenlee offers no evidence that she complied with any of the requirements of

RCW 18.85.131(1) before entering the Agreement. Nor does she offer evidence that

she was approved by the director. Instead, Greenlee contends that because the

Agreement was merely “a promise of receiving a fee,” she did not need a Washington

license when she entered into the Agreement. But the Agreement was not merely a

promise of receiving a fee. Instead, as discussed above, executing the Agreement itself

was providing a brokerage service.

       Greenlee’s argument that the purpose of entering into this Agreement was to

encourage her to obtain a Washington license does not change the analysis. There is

                                           -6-
No. 84374-5-1/7

no dispute of material fact that Greenlee did not meet the requirements of either RCW

18.85.331 or RCW 18.85.131 before entering into the Agreement. The trial court did not

err in granting summary judgment and dismissing Greenlee’s breach of contract claim

because she was prohibited from recovery under chapter 18.85 RCW.

      We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

                                        -7-