Court Opinion

ID: 9947704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:20:09.079091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:27:17.328938
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges O’Brien, AtLee and Chaney
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia

              JEREMIAH LARENZ MOUZON
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1938-22-4                                   JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR.
                                                                                  MARCH 5, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
                                               Dontae L. Bugg, Judge

                              Corinne J. Magee (The Magee Law Firm, on brief), for appellant.

                              Katherine Quinlan Adelfio, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                              Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     A jury convicted Jeremiah Larenz Mouzon of second-degree murder, use of a firearm in the

              commission of murder, and aggravated malicious wounding. On appeal, Mouzon challenges the

              admissibility of certain evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence to support this aggravated

              malicious wounding conviction. Mouzon’s evidentiary challenge is procedurally defaulted, and the

              evidence was sufficient to prove aggravated malicious wounding. Accordingly, we affirm the trial

              court’s judgment.

                                                        I. BACKGROUND

                     On appeal, we review the evidence “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth,

              the prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

              (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires us to “discard the

              evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).

       On December 30, 2019, Jayden Quick and his friend, Darien Davis, conspired to steal a

firearm from their neighbors’ residence. Early that morning, Jayden entered the residence and

stole the firearm while Davis kept watch outside. Jayden gave the firearm to Davis and directed

him to carry it to Davis’s house; meanwhile, Jayden returned inside the residence to speak to

some men he had encountered. When the men accused Jayden of stealing the firearm, he called

his brother, Kamren, for assistance. Kamren arrived a few minutes later and found Jayden

arguing with the men about the missing firearm.

       About 20 minutes later, another group of men—including the homeowners and

Mouzon—arrived at the residence and confronted Jayden and Kamren about the stolen firearm.

They threatened to kill Jayden and demanded to inspect the contents of his and Kamren’s cell

phones for evidence of the theft. When Jayden tried to retrieve his cell phone, Mouzon shot him

and Kamren repeatedly with a firearm before fleeing with his companions.

       Soon after, police arrived and found Jayden dead from an apparent gunshot wound to the

head. Kamren was bleeding from gunshot wounds in his abdomen and left foot and was unable

to move his legs. Kamren was transported to a hospital, where he underwent surgery to remove

a bullet that had penetrated his stomach, liver, and intestines. Surgeons removed and then

reattached a portion of Kamren’s colon to extract the bullet. Another bullet remained lodged in

Kamren’s foot after the surgery.

       The next day, police interviewed Kamren at the hospital, and he identified Mouzon as the

shooter. Police subsequently arrested Mouzon for second-degree murder, use of a firearm in the

commission of murder, and aggravated malicious wounding.

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       At Mouzon’s trial in April 2022, Kamren and his physician testified about the severity

and impact of Kamren’s injuries. The physician opined that Kamren probably would have died

if he had not received immediate medical attention after the shooting. He also opined that

Kamren’s prognosis for recovery was “fair,” although he might develop post-traumatic stress

disorder and permanent internal scarring that could cause Kamren to experience bowel

obstructions. Kamren testified that after the shooting, he had been “disabled to the point [he]

couldn’t work.” He also continued to experience medical issues due to the bullet still lodged in

his foot. The Commonwealth also introduced photographs showing Kamren’s injuries. The

photographs, which were taken more than a year after the shooting, demonstrated that Kamren

had visible scars from the sutures in his abdomen and his wounded foot.

       During its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth sought to introduce text messages Mouzon

sent his brother, Samuel Mouzon, the day after the shooting, which stated, “Good news . . . Dude

told Feds he didn’t know who the hitta is.” Mouzon objected, arguing that the texts contained

inadmissible “double hearsay.” He asserted that the first part of the statement, “Good news,”

satisfied the hearsay exception for a statement by a party opponent, but he maintained that the

second portion of the statement was offered to prove that Kamren could not identify the shooter,

and thus was hearsay without an applicable exception. Alternatively, he argued that if the texts

were not offered for their truth, then they were not relevant, and the risk of unfair prejudice

substantially outweighed their probative value.

       The trial court held that the first portion of the statement was admissible as a statement by

a party opponent and that the second portion was non-hearsay because it was offered solely to

prove Mouzon’s consciousness of guilt, not whether it was true that Kamren could not identify

the shooter. Accordingly, the trial court admitted the text messages and cautioned the jury “not

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to accept” the second portion of the statement, “Dude told Feds he didn’t know who the hitta is,”

for the truth of the matter asserted.

        Later, the Commonwealth attempted to introduce expert testimony about the meaning of

the term “hitta” used in the challenged text messages. Mouzon objected, arguing that the witness

was not qualified to offer an opinion on the subject. Additionally, Mouzon renewed his prior

“double hearsay” objection to the text messages. The trial court did not address Mouzon’s

hearsay argument but held that the witness could not offer an opinion regarding the meaning of

“hitta” because that term could be used differently by different people in different contexts.

        At the conclusion of the evidence, Mouzon made a motion to strike the aggravated

malicious wounding charge, alleging that the evidence failed to prove that Kamren sustained

“permanent and significant impairment” from his gunshot injuries. The trial court denied that

motion.

        While the jury was deliberating, it asked the trial court to clarify its ruling concerning the

admissibility of Mouzon’s text messages: “Are we to not consider the text itself? Or not

consider what the word hitta was?” Given the trial court’s previous ruling on his hearsay

objection, Mouzon asked the trial court to reiterate its previous cautionary instruction and not to

define “hitta” for the jury because doing so would require “speculation.” Accordingly, the trial

court repeated its admonishment to the jury not to consider the statement, “Dude told Feds he

didn’t know who the hitta is” for its truth. Ultimately, the jury convicted Mouzon on all charges.

Mouzon now appeals.

                                             II. ANALYSIS

                                        A. Admissibility of Texts

        Mouzon argues that his text messages stating, “Good News . . . Dude told Feds he didn’t

know who the hitta is” were inadmissible because there was no evidence defining the term “hitta”

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for the jury, which he asserts rendered the texts irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. We do not

consider his argument because it is not preserved.

        “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an

objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause

shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. The purpose of this rule

“is to allow the trial court a fair opportunity to resolve the issue at trial, thereby preventing

unnecessary appeals and retrials.” Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 195 (2015).

“Not just any objection will do. It must be both specific and timely—so that the trial judge

would know the particular point being made in time to do something about it.” Bethea v.

Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019) (quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App.

351, 356 (2011)). Thus, appellate courts “will not consider an argument that differs from the

specific argument presented to the trial court, even if it relates to the same general issue.”

Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 761 (2003) (en banc).

        Mouzon failed to preserve his argument that his text messages were inadmissible unless

the term “hitta” was defined for the jury because he did not raise that specific argument in the

trial court despite multiple opportunities to do so. Mouzon objected to the admission of the text

messages on two alternative grounds. First, he argued that the texts contained inadmissible

hearsay within hearsay. Second, he argued that if the statements were not offered for their truth,

then they were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. But Mouzon did not argue that the texts were

irrelevant specifically because the Commonwealth did not define the word “hitta.” Instead, he

argued that it was not relevant because he “d[idn’t] see how it shows state of mind” or “how it

impeaches.”

        Mouzon also did not raise that argument when the Commonwealth later attempted to

introduce expert testimony regarding the meaning of the term “hitta” or when the jury asked the

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trial court to clarify its cautionary instruction. Rather, Mouzon merely reiterated his previous

hearsay objections and, in fact, asked the trial court not to define “hitta” for the jury. Thus,

Mouzon’s argument on appeal “differs from the specific argument presented to the trial court.”

Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761. Accordingly, Rule 5A:18 bars us from reaching the merits of

Mouzon’s argument, which he asserts for the first time on appeal.1

                                    B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

        Mouzon contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove aggravated malicious

wounding because “there was no evidence” that the victim sustained “permanent and significant

physical impairment.” We disagree.

        “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather,

the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016)

(quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)).

        “If any person maliciously shoots, stabs, cuts or wounds any other person, or by any means

causes bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill,” he is guilty of aggravated

malicious wounding “if the victim is thereby severely injured and is caused to suffer permanent and

significant physical impairment.” Code § 18.2-51.2(A). Under that statute, a “physical

        1
         Mouzon does not invoke Rule 5A:18’s good cause or ends of justice exceptions, and
this Court will not do so sua sponte. Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761.
                                              -6-
impairment” is “any physical condition, anatomic loss, or cosmetic disfigurement.” Lamm v.

Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 637, 644 (2010) (quoting Newton v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 86,

90 (1995)). “The word ‘permanent’ has been defined as ‘continuing or enduring (as in the same

state, status, place) without fundamental or marked change.’” Ellis v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App.

385, 392 (2019) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1683 (3d ed. 1993)).

       “[T]o prove a physical impairment is permanent under Code § 18.2-51.2, ‘the

Commonwealth need not present definitive testimony that a victim’s injuries will never improve’

and . . . the determination of permanency is left to the ‘common sense of the [finder of fact].’” Id.

(third alteration in original) (quoting Lamm, 55 Va. App. at 644-45). Nor is expert testimony

required to prove the significance and permanence of the victim’s injuries. Martinez v.

Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 9, 24-25 (2003). Thus, this Court has held that “permanent and

significant” impairments include “visible scars and scars connected to nerve damage.” Ellis, 70

Va. App. at 392; see also Newton, 21 Va. App. at 90 (finding victim suffered permanent and

significant physical impairment where defendant cut his cheek with a razor blade and caused visible

scarring); Martinez, 42 Va. App. at 24-25 (finding permanent and significant physical impairment

where victim suffered scarring and nerve damage from gunshot wound).

       The record established that Mouzon “severely injured” Kamren and caused him to suffer

“permanent and significant impairment” by shooting him. Code § 18.2-51.2(A). Unchallenged

evidence established that Mouzon shot Kamren repeatedly with a firearm. A bullet lodged in

Kamren’s foot, and another penetrated his abdomen and damaged his internal organs, including his

stomach, liver, and intestines. Kamren’s subsequent surgery and hospitalization, while life-saving,

nonetheless did not prevent visible scarring and ongoing health complications. Indeed, when

Kamren underwent surgery to remove the bullet from his abdomen, doctors removed and reattached

a portion of his colon, which an expert opined could cause Kamren to develop permanent internal

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scarring that might induce bowel obstructions. Moreover, over a year after the shooting, Kamren

had visible scars on his abdomen and foot from his injuries. And at the time of Mouzon’s trial—

over two years after the shooting—Kamren testified that he continued to experience “medical

issues” from the bullet still lodged in his foot and that his injuries had prevented him from working.

Collectively, that evidence permitted the jury to infer that Kamren’s gunshot wounds were severe

and caused him permanent and significant physical impairment. Thus, the evidence was sufficient

to support the conviction.

                                          III. CONCLUSION

       We hold that Mouzon’s evidentiary challenge is procedurally defaulted and that the

evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated malicious wounding. Accordingly,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                             Affirmed.

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