Court Opinion

ID: 9787814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:25:01.868645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:00.837081
License: Public Domain

Judge DAILEY
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
“Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2044, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)(quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)).
“ ‘[F]orcing a criminal defendant to go to trial pro se’ without conducting an appropriate inquiry into his financial ability to afford counsel ‘constitutes a denial of [a] defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel.’ ” United States v. Barcelon, 833 F.2d 894, 896-97 (10th Cir.1987)(quoting United States v. *18Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 662 (2d Cir.1983)); see also King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Colo.1986)(“before forcing the defendant to trial without the benefit of counsel, [the trial court] had the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant’s financial condition, the defendant’s understanding of his right to counsel, and his desires regarding legal representation”).
As noted by the majority, trial courts need not “maintain a continuing vigilance over the financial affairs of one accused of crime in order to ferret out his [possible] poverty.” Rather, once the trial court is satisfied that a defendant is able to secure the services of an attorney, the burden rests on that defendant “to apprise the court of any change in circumstances resulting in indigency.” Allen v. People, 157 Colo. 582, 591, 404 P.2d 266, 271 (1965).
Here, defendant’s retained counsel withdrew, in part at least, because of defendant’s inability or unwillingness to pay him. Following counsel’s withdrawal, the trial court inquired only in the most general terms about whether defendant was indigent and in need of court-appointed counsel. For the next two and a half months, the court simply directed defendant to obtain or proceed without counsel.
Throughout that period defendant maintained that he wanted the assistance of counsel, but was unable to obtain it for a variety of reasons relating to an inability to liquidate assets or come up with cash sufficient to afford separate counsel for himself and his codefendant wife: his customers had not paid him; their payments had not arrived in the mail; the bank would not release his funds; he had not yet cleared out his storage bins; and his friend had not come through with some cash.
I share the majority’s concern about a defendant’s abusing the right to counsel to manipulate trial court proceedings. Indeed, I do not discount the possibility that defendant was attempting to do that here. However, I find significant that (1) nothing in the record indicates that defendant understood the concept of indigency; and (2) the judge who ultimately required defendant to go forward without counsel was not the same judge who, during the course of the five prior hearings, accepted defendant’s assertions of inability to afford counsel as grounds to continue the case.
Because the record was not further developed, I cannot be sure that defendant was manipulating the system. And because of the importance to the right to counsel, I would resolve any doubts in favor of a defendant’s ability to exercise that right. See People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 93 (Colo.1989)(“Courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a waiver of the fundamental right to counsel”).
In my view, defendant’s proffer of a series of financial reasons for his inability to retain an attorney was sufficient to apprise the court that he may have become indigent, despite how he labeled or considered himself. And although defendant never requested the assistance of appointed counsel, it is clear that he did not want to proceed to trial pro se.
Consequently, when defendant appeared for trial and reported unsuccessful attempts to retain an attorney, the court had a duty to inquire into the specifics of his financial condition and determine whether he was eligible for the assistance of court-appointed counsel. See Douglas v. Hendricks, 236 F.Supp.2d 412, 429 (D.N.J.2002)(“Once a defendant puts the court on notice of his inability to retain private counsel, the district court must, 'make further inquiry into the defendant’s financial condition to ascertain whether he is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him.’ ’’Xquoting United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir.1982)); State v. Bush, 97 Ohio App.3d 20, 26, 646 N.E.2d 193, 196 (1994)(“[w]hen appellant stated that he had ‘been trying to get the money together’ to hire an attorney, appellant gave the court new information concerning his ability or inability to retain counsel,” and the court was required to “inquire fully into the circumstances impinging on appellant’s newly claimed inability to obtain counsel”); State v. Dubrock, 649 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983)(applying state statute: defendant “should have been afforded an in-digency hearing when he put the trial court *19on notice prior to trial that he was then unable to pay for a lawyer, even though he had previously retained an attorney”).
Because the trial court made no such inquiry and determination before forcing defendant to proceed to trial pro se, I would reverse. See United States v. Martin-Trigona, supra, 684 F.2d at 490; King v. People, supra, 728 P.2d at 1270.