Court Opinion

ID: 9629478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:43:25.176981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:19.988774
License: Public Domain

GARIBALDI, J.,
dissenting.
In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the fourth *229amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside a home. It concluded that society does not accept as reasonable a person’s claim to an expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an area readily accessible to the public. The majority recognizes that the garbage searches and seizures in both cases are valid under the fourth amendment, but holds that under the New Jersey Constitution, New Jersey citizens have a different expectation of privacy in their garbage from that of citizens under the federal constitution. I disagree.
I would not depart from federal-constitutional law for two reasons. First under principles of federalism, there is no sound public policy that would justify such a departure. Secondly, in my view, federal law better comports with the reasonable expectation of privacy that most New Jersey citizens have for their discarded garbage placed on the street for collection.
I
Although it is undisputed that the New Jersey Constitution may provide greater protection to individual rights than the federal constitution, “it is equally settled that such enhanced protection should be extended only when justified by ‘sound policy reasons.’ ” State v. Stever, 107 N.J. 543, 557, 527 A.2d 408, (quoting State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 345, 450 A.2d 952 (1982); State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 59, 459 A.2d 641 (1983)) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954, 108 S.Ct. 348, 98 L.Ed.2d 373 (1987); see also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 301, 450 A.2d 925 (1982) (“We proceed cautiously before declaring rights under our state Constitution that differ significantly from those enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of the federal Constitution.”).
It is essential that a
considerable measure of cooperation [] exist in a truly effective federalist system. Both federal and state courts share the goal of working for the good of the people to ensure order and freedom under what is publicly perceived as a single system of law.
*230[State v. Hunt, supra, 91 N.J. at 363, 450 A.2d 952 (Handler, J., concurring).]
We have declared that “[divergent interpretations are unsatisfactory from the public perspective, particularly where the historical roots and purposes of the federal and state provisions are the same.” Id. at 345, 450 A.2d 952. A citizen becomes confused when he or she finds that under virtually identical constitutional provisions, it is permissible for a federal agent, but not a New Jersey law-enforcement officer, to search his or her garbage. Such distinctions between federal and state constitutions are difficult for a citizen to fathom. In my view, garbage does not change its constitutional dimensions based on who searches the garbage in a particular location. Different treatment of such an ordinary commodity appears illogical to the public and hence breeds a fundamental distrust of the legal system that develops such distinctions.
An examination of the “divergence criteria” developed in State v. Hunt, supra, 91 N.J. at 364-68, 450 A.2d 952 (Handler, J., concurring) and reaffirmed in State v. Williams, supra, 93 N.J. at 59, 459 A.2d 641, indicates that there are no independent state-constitutional grounds to justify our divergence from federal law in this area. The textual language, phrasing, and structures of the fourth amendment and article I, paragraph 7 are virtually identical. There is no state statute on this issue and hence no legislative history that would support interpreting the provision independently of federal law. Unlike those cases in which we have departed from federal search-and-seizure jurisprudence, see, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987) (rejecting good-faith exception to exclusionary rule); State v. Hunt, supra, 91 N.J. at 338, 450 A.2d 952 (finding privacy right in telephone-toll-billing records), the most analogous pre-existing state law supports uniform interpretation. For example, in State v. Farinich, 179 N.J.Super. 1, 430 A.2d 233 (App.Div.1981), aff'd, 89 N.J. 378, 446 A.2d 120 (1982), the defendants, having been approached by police at the airport, dropped their suitcases and fled. Finding that the defendants had voluntarily abandoned their property, the court rea*231soned that defendants could “no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy ... [in their suitcases] at the time of the search.” 179 N.J.Super. at 6, 430 A.2d 233. Although disputing the majority’s conclusion factually that the defendants had “abandoned” their suitcases, the dissent agreed that a defendant maintains no expectation of privacy in discarded property when an “intent to part with possession is unmistakably shown.” Id. at 8, 430 A.2d 233 (Antell, J., dissenting). See also State v. Burgos, 185 N.J.Super. 424, 425, 449 A.2d 536 (App.Div.1982) (defendant had no protectible privacy interest in aspirin tin that he hid under car on public street).
Nor do I find that discarded garbage is a matter of particular state interest that affords an appropriate basis for resolving this issue on independent state grounds. New Jersey garbage is not unique, nor is there any reason to suppose that New Jersey citizens have a greater expectation of privacy in their trash than do citizens of most other states.
II
I also dissent from the majority because I think that federal law better reflects the “expectations of privacy” that New Jersey citizens have in their discarded trash.
I find it difficult to understand how the majority adopts an objective standard of reasonable expectations, starting from the “premise that ‘expectations of privacy are established by general social norms,”’ supra, at 200-201, 576 A.2d at 802-803 (quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2847, 69 L.Ed.2d 744, 751 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)), yet reaches a conclusion that “conflicts not only with California v. Greenwood, supra, ... but also with the holdings of virtually every other court that has considered the issue.” Ante at 224, 576 A.2d at 814 (citations omitted). The existence of such overwhelming au*232thority undermines the majority’s position that society has a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left on the curb.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has succinctly stated the underlying rationale for the widely-embraced theory:
Defendant claims that ... he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash he placed in a public area to be picked up by trash collectors____ A mere recitation of the contention carries with it its own refutation.
Having placed the trash in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it, it is inconceivable that the defendant intended to retain a privacy interest in the discarded objects.
[United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (1981).]
Similarly, in United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 973-74 (7th Cir.1978), the court explained:
In the real world to so view the status of one’s discarded trash is totally unrealistic, unreasonable, and in complete disregard of the mechanics of its disposal. In our view the placing of trash in the garbage cans at the time and place for anticipated collection by public employees for hauling to a public dump signifies abandonment____ The contents of the cans could not reasonably be expected by defendant to be secure, nor entitled to respectful, confidential and careful handling on the way to the dump. Trash generally is not so highly regarded____
It is common knowledge, at times due to the unfortunate circumstances of some persons or even just for curiosity or mischief, that others may disturb one’s trash. The defendant admitted that this had happened on occasion but argues that it is irrelevant. We believe it should at least have served to remind the defendant of the unreliability of any thought of privacy he may have had about his trash. It therefore seems to be more prudent to put only genuine trash, not secrets, in garbage cans[.]
[Footnotes omitted.]
I do not believe that the people of New Jersey objectively regard their trash any differently from the way most citizens in the United States do. Most people have little interest in their garbage once they have placed it on the street for pick-up. They have left it there because they wish to be rid of it. They do not expect to see their garbage again and do not care when or how it will be disposed of by the municipal garbage collector. A search of a person’s discarded garbage presents no intrusive invasion of that person’s rights, whether the garbage is inspect*233ed by municipal officials for recycling violations, law enforcement officers for criminal violations, or by any other member of the general public.
It is common knowledge that curb-side garbage is readily accessible to the public. Most people know that their garbage will be seen at some point by a third person, at thé very least by the local garbage collector. Most people are aware that garbage sitting on public streets is readily accessible to “animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public.” California v. Greenwood, supra, 486 US. at 40, 108 S.Ct. at 1628-29, 100 L.Ed.2d at 36-37. The homeless often rummage through garbage for food and other items. Id. at 40, nn. 3 & 4, 108 S.Ct. at 1629, nn. 3 & 4, 100 L.Ed.2d at 36-37, nn. 3 & 4. Although most people would undoubtedly prefer that others leave their garbage alone, this is less, I suspect, for privacy reasons, than for the inconvenience of having the contents of their garbage strewn on the sidewalk in front of their residence.
The majority’s position that a person’s expectation of privacy in a letter he or she throws into the garbage is as great as the expectation of privacy in a letter kept in a bedroom, ante at 214, 576 A.2d at 809, defies common sense. It is the action a person takes in preserving an item as private, not the nature of the item, that determines a person’s expectation of privacy. I would hope that a person’s expectation of privacy in a letter under lock and key in a safe deposit box is much greater than the expectation of privacy in a letter thrown in the garbage.
Likewise, I find little merit to the majority’s comparison between a letter placed in a mail box and trash put on the street. Ante at 206, 576 A.2d at 805. Most people, I believe, have a greater expectation of privacy in their mail than in their garbage. The Court correctly recognizes that when a person sends a letter, he or she expects that it will be opened only by the addressee. It ignores, however, that when a person puts *234the trash out, he or she expects that it will be seen, examined, or perhaps even repossessed by third parties.
In sum, I am unable to discern a unique New Jersey state attitude about garbage. The inherent nature of garbage and its method of disposal diminishes any expectation of privacy. Nor do I find that the amount of freedom guaranteed to New Jersey citizens under our state constitution will be so diminished as to be inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society if police are allowed to search garbage placed on the curb for pick-up before it is carried to the dump.
Hence, I would find that the garbage searches are valid under both the federal and state constitutions.
For affirmance, reversal and remandment—Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK and STEIN—5.
Concurring in part; dissenting in part—Justice O’HERN—1.
Dissenting—Justice GARIBALDI—1.