Court Opinion

ID: 9581093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:11:37.865395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:42.000276
License: Public Domain

PHIPPS, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with Divisions 1 through 4 and 6 of the majority opinion but I respectfully disagree with the conclusions reached in Division 5 and, therefore, dissent from the majority’s affirmance of Hunt’s convictions.
In Division 5, the majority reviews Hunt’s claim that the trial court erred by overruling an objection by defense counsel to a remark by the prosecuting attorney during her concluding argument. During concluding argument, the prosecutor stated that if the jurors returned a verdict of not guilty, it meant that they “must be prepared to come out and look those boys in the eye and call them liars. . . .” Defense counsel objected on the ground that such argument was improper. The prosecuting attorney countered that the argument was not improper. The court stated, “I’m going to allow it. You’ll remember, ladies and gentlemen, that the arguments are not evidence.”
OCGA § 17-8-75, relied on by Hunt, provides:
Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to *578remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender.36
The complained-of statement by the prosecutor was improper and, under the circumstances, highly prejudicial. The basic legal duty of the jury is to determine whether the evidence proves the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the jury is not to concern itself with the consequences of its verdict. Under the law, the jury could find that the evidence failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without having to “call [the boys] liars.” Defense counsel did not make any comment during his closing argument to lead the jury to believe otherwise.37 The state’s comment thus diverted the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence in accordance with the law.38 Consequently, OCGA § 17-8-75 required the trial court to rebuke counsel.39 Instead, the court found the argument proper and merely qualified its approval of the argument by reminding the jury that argument is not evidence. That reminder did not eliminate the prosecuting attorney’s improper statement from the jury’s consideration. A new trial is thus required.40
I cannot find it highly probable that the improper argument did not contribute to the verdict.41 This matter became the subject of investigation because of Cy.’s revelation to his mother that Hunt had touched his “privates” while driving down the road. Initially, Cs. denied that anything had happened to him. After extended interviews, Cs. began saying that Hunt had anally and orally sodomized him. The credibility of the children’s claims under the circumstances presented became a battle of experts. The only corroborating physical evidence was Cs.’s dilated sphincter muscle, which could have been the result of sexual abuse or a medical condition. In closing argument, defense counsel criticized the investigators and prosecutors for failing to interview Cs.’s primary pediatrician or review his medical records to determine whether any alternative explanations were present; and defense counsel argued there were. In her closing *579argument, the prosecutor did not respond. Although a rational trier of fact certainly could have found Hunt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this was not a case that presented overwhelming evidence or an easy determination that guilt had been proven by the requisite standard. The prosecuting attorney’s offending comments were calculated to lead the jury to believe that it had to do something which neither the law nor evidence required in order to acquit the defendant. I cannot find it highly probable that this uncorrected misinformation could not have tipped the balance and led a wavering juror to return a guilty verdict.
Decided July 16, 2004
Garland, Samuel & Loeb, Donald F. Samuel, William C. Lea, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Robert B. Lovett, Amy H. McChesney, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Ruffin and Judge Barnes join in this opinion.

 “In order to secure appellate review of a purported violation of OCGA § 17-8-75, it is necessary to object in the trial court to the allegedly prejudicial comment at the time it is made. [Cit.]” Johnson v. State, 198 Ga. App. 316, 317 (7) (401 SE2d 331) (1991). Here, Hunt did object. Consequently, his claim that the trial court erred in failing to rebuke counsel has been preserved for appellate review.

 Compare Grant v. State, 257 Ga. App. 275, 276-277 (2) (570 SE2d 597) (2002).

 See Rivers v. State, 265 Ga. 694, 697 (6) (461 SE2d 205) (1995).

 Id.

 Pullin v. State, 258 Ga. App. 37, 42 (3) (572 SE2d 722) (2002).

 See generally Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 263, 265 (2) (577 SE2d 548) (2003); Blanchard v. State, 247 Ga. 415, 417 (2) (276 SE2d 593) (1981).