Court Opinion

ID: 9373248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:42.860466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.378273
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BENJAMIN E. JENKINS,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-0752-16-0486-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: November 8, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Benjamin E. Jenkins, La Mesa, California, pro se.

           Julianne Surane, Port Hueneme, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his involuntary resignation appeal for lack of Board jurisdiction .
     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision
     contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
     the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review.    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and
     AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113(b).

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        On May 11, 2016, the appellant, a Supervisory Administrative/Technical
     Specialist, filed a timely appeal alleging that his resignation was involuntary.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1.     In response to the administrative judge’s
     acknowledgement order noting that the Board may not have jurisdiction over his
     appeal, the appellant admitted that his resignation was during his probationary
     period but alleged that the proposed termination that preceded his resignation was
     for “partisan reasons.” IAF, Tab 2 at 2, Tab 5 at 4-9.
¶3        Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision finding that the appellant was not an “employee” with
     Board appeal rights as defined at 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A), and thus the Board
     lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s probationary appeal. IAF, Tab 13, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 1, 8. The administrative judge also held that the appellant failed
     to raise nonfrivolous allegations that he was subjected to partisan political
     discrimination, or that his resignation was involuntary. ID at 9, 12. Finally, the
     administrative judge found that, because the appellant lacked an otherwise
                                                                                       3

     appealable claim, the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider his claims of
     discrimination and retaliation for engaging in equal employment opportunity
     activity. ID at 12-13.
¶4        On review, the appellant does not dispute the fact that he was serving in a
     probationary period at the time of his resignation. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 4 at 4. Instead, he argues, as he did below, that his proposed
     termination was motivated by what he describes as “partisan political
     motivations” and “internal partisan political reasons.”     PFR File, Tab 1 at 5,
     Tab 4 at 4; see IAF, Tab 8 at 5. He also restates his claim that his resignation
     was involuntary, and argues that his performance was satisfactory and
     undeserving of the proposed termination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. The agency has
     responded to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

     The appellant was not an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i).
¶5        The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.          Maddox v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Whether an individual in the
     competitive service has the right to appeal an adverse action depends on whether
     he is an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). Walker v. Department of
     the Army, 119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 5 (2013). Under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A), an
     employee is an individual in the competitive service (i) who is not serving a
     probationary or trial period under an initial appointment, or (ii) who has
     completed 1 year of current continuous service under other than a temporary
     appointment limited to 1 year or less. In an adverse action appeal, an appellant is
     entitled to a hearing on jurisdiction if he makes a nonfrivolous claim of Board
     jurisdiction, at which he must prove jurisdiction by preponderant evidence.
     Garcia v. Department of Homeland Security, 437 F.3d 1322, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
     2006) (en banc). Nonfrivolous allegations are allegations of fact that, if proven,
     could establish that the Board has jurisdiction over the matter at issue. Walker,
     119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 6 n.2.
                                                                                         4

¶6         Here, although the administrative judge did not directly address this point,
     because the appellant was appointed to the position at issue by reinsta tement, he
     is subject to the regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 315.801(a)(2) regarding probationary
     periods for reinstated individuals. 2
¶7         An agency may appoint by reinstatement to a competitive -service position
     an individual who previously was employed under a career or career -conditional
     appointment. 5 C.F.R. § 315.401(a). Under 5 C.F.R. § 315.801(a), the first year
     of service of an employee who is given a career or career -conditional appointment
     in the competitive service is a probationary period when, among other things, the
     employee was reinstated under the authority set forth at 5 C.F.R. § 315.401,
     unless during any period of service that affords a current basis for reinstatement,
     the employee completed a probationary period or served with c ompetitive status
     under an appointment that did not require a probationary period.         Abdullah v.
     Department of the Treasury, 113 M.S.P.R. 99, ¶¶ 11-12 (2009).            Thus, if the
     appellant’s appointment was a reinstatement appointment that met the criteria of
     5 C.F.R. § 315.801(a)(2), then he would be an “employee” with adverse action
     appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i). Id.
¶8         The Standard Form 50 documenting the appellant’s appointment reflects
     that he was appointed by reinstatement under 5 C.F.R. § 315.401. IAF, Tab 7
     at 11. Additionally, the agency does not dispute that the appellant was appointed
     to his position by reinstatement. Id. at 4. However, as the appellant concedes,
     and as the undisputed record establishes, the appellant did not complete a
     probationary period while serving in the position from which he was reinstated,
     resigning from that position after only 5 months. PFR File, Tab 4 at 4; IAF,
     Tab 7 at 10, Tab 10 at 4.       Thus, even if the appellant’s prior service were

     2
       Although the appellant’s Standard Form 50 identifies that his appointment was by
     reinstatement, it does not identify the position from whi ch he was reinstated. IAF,
     Tab 7 at 11. Nothing in the record suggests that the appellant was not reinstated from
     the non-supervisory Administrative/Technical Specialist position with the agency that
     he occupied in the year prior to the position involved in this appeal.
                                                                                           5

      considered under 5 C.F.R. § 315.801(a)(2), he still would not have completed the
      requisite 1-year probationary period, and would not have any statutory right of
      appeal to the Board. 3

      The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant was not an
      “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii).
¶9          Alternatively, an appellant can show that, while he may be a probationer, he
      satisfies the definition of an “employee” in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), which
      requires that he have “completed 1 year of current continuous service under other
      than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less.” Hurston v. Department
      of the Army, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9 (2010).            The Board has held that, for
      competitive-service employees, “current continuous service” means a period of
      employment or service immediately preceding an adverse action without a break
      in Federal civilian employment of a workday.         Ellefson v. Department of the
      Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 14 (2005); 5 C.F.R. § 752.402.
¶10         It is undisputed that the appellant resigned from his previous Federal
      position with the same agency, effective September 21, 2014, and thus had a
      13-month break in service prior to his November 16, 2015 reinstatement
      appointment.    IAF, Tab 7 at 10-11.      The appellant did not identify any other
      Federal service during the 13-month period between his resignation on
      September 21, 2014, and his reinstatement appointment on November 16, 2015.
      IAF, Tab 7 at 11, Tab 10 at 4. Additionally, it is undisputed that the appellant
      was only employed in his reinstatement position for less than 6 months, from
      November 16, 2015, until his resignation on May 2, 2016. IAF, Tab 7 at 11,
      Tab 5 at 14. As such, we agree with the administrative judge’s fi nding that the
      appellant does not meet the definition of “employee” under                  5 U.S.C.

      3
        We also agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s prior service cannot
      be counted towards the completion of his probationary period under 5 C.F.R.
      § 315.802(b) because it was followed by a break in service of more than 30 calendar
      days.
                                                                                         6

      § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii) because he lacked 1 year of current continuous service. ID
      at 6-7.
      The appellant has not demonstrated that he was subjected to discrimination on the
      basis of any partisan political activity.

¶11           In describing his claim of discrimination on the basis of partisan political
      activity, the appellant argues that he was in the “wrong camp” and one “adver se
      to” his supervisor within the agency’s contracting department, and that this was
      the reason that the agency proposed his termination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. The
      appellant misunderstands the meaning of the language; the phrase “partisan
      political reasons” as used in 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b), means “discrimination based
      on affiliation with any political party or candidate.”       Mastriano v. Federal
      Aviation Administration, 714 F.2d 1152, 1155-56 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The appellant
      does not allege that he suffered any discrimination based on his affiliation with
      any political party or candidate. Instead, he repeatedly argues for an expanded
      reading of the term “partisan political motivations” to include the agency’s
      internal “partisan” divisions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. However, nothing in 5 C.F.R.
      § 315.806(b) or in any prior Board precedent contemplates such a reading of the
      term.
¶12           Merely citing the language, the appellant has not provided any evidence that
      he suffered any harm as a result of his affiliation with any political party or
      candidate, or even that any agency employee was aware that he had any such
      affiliation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. As such, we agree with the administrative
      judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s allegation of partisan political status
      discrimination is without merit.
¶13           Finally, as he did below, the appellant argues that his resignation was
      involuntary, stating that the agency coerced him into resigning by placing him in
      a “high stress” situation that “effectively deprived [him] of free cho ice” when it
      instructed him that he would be terminated and provided him the opportunity to
      resign in lieu of termination.      Id. at 4.   The appellant also argues that his
                                                                                            7

      performance was adequate and that he was not advised of any performance
      problems prior to being informed that he would be terminated. Id. at 5. These
      arguments pertain to the merits of the involuntary resignation claim, rather than
      to the Board’s jurisdiction over the appeal, and do not provide a basis to disturb
      the initial decision. See Schmittling v. Department of the Army, 219 F.3d 1332,
      1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that a decision on the merits would be a nullity in
      the absence of Board jurisdiction); Sapla v. Department of the Navy,
      118 M.S.P.R. 551, ¶ 7 (2012) (finding that an appellant’s arguments on review
      regarding the merits of an agency action were not relevant to whether the Board
      had jurisdiction over an appeal).
¶14         Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s determination to dismiss
      the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the ti me limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                          8

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                  9

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     10

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir cuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                11

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.