Court Opinion

ID: 9537855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:25:49.811492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:05.970583
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent and join Mr. Justice Tuckett’s dissent.
First, the only issue here is legality of restraint. The main opinion says there was none, — hence I think the decision simply should be a reversal, perhaps, if a majority of the court is constrained to reverse, leaving the matter of restoring custody to the Warden to proper authorities,- — ■ unless something happened that would preclude it. It would appear that that something did happen, which would require a proceeding independent of this appeal.
The main opinion talks at length about the lack of authority in a criminal case, for the trial court to recall or vacate sentences once a prisoner has been committed, —with which doctrine I would not quarrel, — but that is not the situation here. The trial court recalled nothing and vacated nothing and did nothing on its own initiative, save to grant the petition for the writ after a full hearing and argument. After that the District Attorney moved to dismiss the criminal case, which motion was granted in the interest of justice. The main opinion relies rather heavily on the idea that once the trial court commits an accused, the court “has no power to recall” it, and that “its power over the prisoner or his destiny * * * would appear to be at an end,” as was any authority to vacate or revise the matter. I think such pronouncement and the authorities cited therefor are inapropos, since, as stated, the trial judge did nothing that would render them dispositive. This is a habeas corpus proceeding, — a civil matter, — and not the criminal case giving rise to it. There was no appeal from that case initially or in this appeal. The court here has only the burden of reversing the trial court’s order granting the writ, or of approving it,- — not the order dismissing the criminal case, which bears an entirely different docket number both in the District Court and this court, and which present *404case was prompted by the District Attorney’s motion to dismiss.
I am cognizant that in the McGuffey case, the state appealed and we unanimously reversed the trial court’s granting of a petition for writ of habeas corpus,— and we ordered the trial court to quash the writ and remand McGuffey to the Warden. In that case, however, the trial court dismissed the robbery charge on its own volition. That is not the case here.
The District Attorney’s office, an arm of the state, and under the direct supervision of the Attorney General (67-5-1), that is appealing here, — a somewhat unorthodox and inconsistent circumstance,— made the motion to dismiss the action, which at that point was as much an issue as Combs’ restraint of liberty. It would seem that before this court orders the trial court to do much of anything the matter of that motion to dismiss and the resulting dismissal, all for a presumably good cause, should be resolved.
In addition to the position I take on the aspect of this case reflected in the paragraph immediately above, I urge that perhaps we made a mistake in the remand portion of the McGuffey case and that we should overrule that part of it. The instant case itself seems to point up the advisability of so doing. To do anything more could lead us on safari in a civil proceeding down a road into an erstwhile juristic jungle of no return.