Court Opinion

ID: 9915309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 01:05:40.78919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:46.126577
License: Public Domain

j39 Nev., Advance Opinion   58
                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   GINA ENGELSON, AS SPECIAL                           No, 84978-COA
                   ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
                   OF LENORE MEYER, DECEASED,
                   Appellant,
                   vs.
                   DIGNITY HEALTH, A FOREIGN                               MED
                   NONPROFIT CORPORATION, D/B/A
                   ST. ROSE DOMINICAN HOSPITAL-
                   SIENA CAMPUS; GRAPE HOLDINGS
                   LLC, A FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY                       C 1EF DEPtIrr' CLERK
                   COMPANY, D/B/A SAGE CREEK POST-
                   ACUTE,
                   Respondents.

                              Appeal from a district court order granting motions to dismiss
                   in a professional negligence action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
                   County; Jessica K. Peterson, Judge.
                              Reversed and remanded.

                   Burris & Thomas, LLC, and Steven M. Burris and Gary Myers, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC, and Kenneth M. Webster and Tyson J.
                   Dobbs, Las Vegas,
                   for Respondent Dignity Health.

                   Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC, and David J. Mortensen and Candace C.
                   Herling, Las Vegas,
                   for Respondent Grape Holdings LLC.

COuPT OF APPEALS
      oF
    N EvADA                                                                          &I:Z.(1E19
(oi MTh
                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

                                                    OPINION
                   By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.:
                               Complaints for professional negligence must be timely filed
                   within the applicable statute of limitations period, NRS 41A.097(2), and
                   must be supported by an affidavit of merit, NRS 41A.071. When a party
                   suffers an injury or wrongful death caused by professional negligence, NRS
                   41A.097(2) provides that the statute of limitations begins to run from the
                   date the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered their legal injury. In
                   the underlying proceeding, the district court dismissed an estate's
                   survivorship claims after finding "irrefutable" evidence that the estate and
                   its special administrator knew or should have known about the relevant
                   legal injury more than a year before filing the complaint.'
                               When appellant moved for reconsideration on grounds that the
                   cornplaint was timely when the claims were construed as wrongful death
                   claims, the district court denied reconsideration on the basis that her
                   complaint failed to state a claim for wrongful death. The district court also
                   found her affidavit of merit was insufficient to support a wrongful death

                         'For an injury or wrongful death that is alleged to have occurred on
                   or after October 1, 2002, but before October 1, 2023, a plaintiff must file
                   their professional negligence claim within one year after the plaintiff
                   discovers or should have discovered the legal injury. NRS 41A.097(2).
                   Recent amendments to NRS 41A.097 extended the statute of limitations for
                   professional negligence claims to two years after the plaintiff discovers or
                   should have discovered the injury, but only for claims arising on or after
                   October 1, 2023. See NRS 41A.097(2)-(3) (2023). As the claims in this case
                   arose before October 1, 2023, these amendments do not affect our analysis.
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                        2
OA 1947/4
                   claim because it did not establish that professional negligence caused the
                   wrongful death.
                               We conclude that the district court erred when it dismissed
                   appellant's complaint as time-barred. In doing so, we take this opportunity
                   to clarify that an affidavit of merit need not opine as to the element of
                   causation to support a professional negligence-based wrongful death claim
                   under NRS 41A.071.        Therefore, we reverse and remand for further
                   p roceedings.
                                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                               85-year-old Lenore Meyer was admitted to St. Rose Dominican
                   Hospital-Siena Carnpus (St. Rose-Siena) in late June 2020. During her stay
                   at St. Rose-Siena, Meyer received treatment for a urinary tract infection,
                   blocked bowels, and a possible Clostridium difficile (C-diff) infection.
                               On or about July 28, 2020, Meyer transferred to a skilled
                   nursing facility, Sage Creek Post-Acute (Sage Creek), to receive post-
                   treatment rehabilitation. Upon her admission, Sage Creek documented
                   that Meyer had a stage 3 decubitis ulcer, or bedsore, in her sacral region.
                               Because of COVID-19 pandemic protocols, Meyer's family was
                   unable to visit her at Sage Creek.        However, during this time, Meyer
                   apparently called members of her family to report that she was receiving
                   horrible treatment, which included failing to assist her when she needed to
                   go to the bathroom and leaving her to lie in bed in her own feces. Meyer's
                   family reportedly made numerous phone calls to voice their concerns to the
                   charge nurse and nurse manager.        Meyer remained at Sage Creek for
                   approximately two weeks before returning to St. Rose-Siena with a
                   recurrence of C-diff and possible sepsis.
                               When Meyer was readmitted to St. Rose-Siena on August 12,
                   the hospital documented that Meyer's sacral bedsore was now "huge," "down
COURT OF APPEALS
      OF
    NEVADA
                                                         3
   IY4711 .411,
                   to the bone," unstageable, and infected. Meyer remained at St. Rose-Siena
                   for almost a month, until the hospital discharged her on September 4.
                   However, just days later, on September 8, Meyer returned to the hospital
                   due to weakness and altered mental status. At that point, an infectious
                   disease specialist diagnosed Meyer with sepsis, colitis, and pneumonia, and
                   again noted the infected sacral bedsore. On September 10, St. Rose-Siena
                   discharged Meyer to home hospice, where she died four days later.
                               Exactly one year after Meyer's death, on September 14, 2021.
                   Meyer's daughter Gina Engelson—as special administrator of Meyer's
                   estate—filed a professional negligence complaint against St. Rose-Siena
                   and Sage Creek.2     Engelson alleged that the nursing care provided by St.
                   Rose-Siena and Sage Creek fell below the standard of care in more than a
                   dozen ways, which included negligence in "[f]ail[ing] to timely and
                   adequately treat skin lesions in order to prevent a preexisting ulcer from
                   getting worse." Engelson alleged that as a "direct and proximate result" of
                   negligence by St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek, Meyer was "caused to suffer
                   serious bodily injury, including worsened pressure ulcer wounds, infection
                   and great pain of rnind and body, loss of a chance of a better outcome, and
                   contributed to her death." Engelson further alleged that, under Nevada
                   law, Meyer's claims and causes of action "survive[d] her death and [could]
                   be prosecuted by the administrator of [her] [e]state." Engelson also alleged
                   that St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek were "vicariously responsible under the
                   doctrine of respondeat superior . . . for the injuries and death" of Meyer.

                         2 Engelson's complaint also alleged negligent hiring, training,
                   supervision, and retention, as well as corporate negligence, and further
                   requested punitive damages.
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                         4
Ini 1947B
                                 Two exhibits were attached to Engelson's complaint: a
                   "Declaration of Expert" made under penalty of perjury by Debbie Marsh,
                   R.N., which served as an "affidavit of merit,"3 and an electronic disc
                   containing the medical records and other documentation relied on by
                   Marsh. In her affidavit of merit, Marsh explained that she was familiar
                   with the standard of care for nursing at both hospitals and skilled nursing
                   facilities. She identified specific nurses at St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek
                   who she believed breached the standard of care in their treatment of Meyer
                   during the sumrner of 2020. And she identified specific acts of negligence
                   at St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek that she believed fell below the standard
                   of nursing care. As to St. Rose-Siena, Marsh opined that the hospital
                   negligently allowed Meyer's stage 3 pressure ulcer to develop while failing
                   to document its existence. As to Sage Creek, Marsh opined that its nurses
                   did not meet the standard of care for the prevention, clinical staging, and
                   management of Meyer's pressure-induced soft tissue injuries, which
                   required pressure redistribution, improving skin perfusion, minimizing
                   excess moisture, and turning Meyer every two hours. Although Marsh
                   asserted that the acts of negligence by St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek
                   "denied Mrs. Meyer a better outcome," she did not offer any opinion that
                   these acts of professional negligence caused Meyer's death.

                         3 For purposes of this disposition, we will refer to the Marsh
                   declaration as an "affidavit of merit" or "affidavit." As the Nevada Supreme
                   Court recognized in Baxter v. Dignity Health, the affidavit of merit required
                   by NRS 41A.071 "can take the form of either a 'sworn affidavit or an
                   unsworn declaration made under penalty of perjury." 131 Nev. 759, 762,
                   357 P.3d 927, 929 (2015) (quoting Buckwalter v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
                   126 Nev. 200, 202, 234 P.3d 920, 922 (2010)).
COURT OF APPEALS
      OF
    NEVADA
                                                        5
(0) MTH
                                   St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek moved to dismiss Engelson's
                       complaint pursuant to NRS 41A.097(2) on the basis that it was filed more
                       than one year after Engelson and/or Meyer discovered or should have
                       discovered the legal injury, which they characterized as Meyer's negligently
                       caused bedsore.4 To establish that Engelson's complaint was time-barred,
                       St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek relied on factual statements from Marsh's
                       affidavit of merit, where Marsh summarized the information that she had
                       received from Engelson's attorneys based on their interviews with unnamed
                       members of Meyer's family.
                                   Relying primarily on Marsh's affidavit of merit, St. Rose-Siena
                       argued that, as ofJuly 28, 2020, Engelson and Meyer were on inquiry notice
                       of the Meyer estate's negligence claims against the hospital because that
                       was the date that the stage 3 sacral ulcer was first documented in Meyer's
                       medical records at Sage Creek. Likewise, Sage Creek relied on the Marsh
                       affidavit to argue that Engelson and/or Meyer were on inquiry notice of the
                       estate's potential negligence claims on or before Meyer's discharge from
                       Sage Creek because, after Sage Creek documented the bedsore, Meyer had
                       spoken by phone with her family regarding the allegedly substandard care
                       she was receiving while at Sage Creek.
                                  The district court agreed, finding that Engelson's complaint and
                       the accompanying affidavit of merit established "irrefutable evidence that
                       Plaintiff was aware of her injury on or around August 11, 2020 at the

                             1n its motion to dismiss, Sage Creek conceded that Marsh's affidavit
                             4

                        appeaded] to support" her allegations of professional negligence for
                       purposes of NRS 41A.071(1).
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF

     NEVADA
                                                            6
 oi 1947B    e4glir,
                   latest."5 Because Engelson's complaint was filed more than a year after that
                   date, the court entered an order dismissing Engelson's complaint as time-
                   barred.
                               Thereafter, Engelson moved for reconsideration, arguing for the
                   first time that, because her complaint alleged wrongful death claims, it was
                   timely filed within one year of her discovery of that legal injury: Meyer's
                   wrongful death. In addition, Engelson reargued that Sage Creek was not a
                   "[p]rovider of health care" as defined in NRS 41A.017 and, therefore, the
                   one-year statute of limitations did not apply to Sage Creek. The district
                   court rejected both arguments.
                               In its order denying reconsideration, the district court
                   concl uded that Engelson's complaint failed to state a wrongful death claim
                   and that her affidavit of merit did not satisfy the requirements of NRS
                   41A.071 because it did not support the allegation that professional
                   negligence caused Meyer's death. Additionally, the district court concluded
                   that, regardless of whether Sage Creek was, itself, a "provider of health
                   care" as defined in NRS 41A.017, Engelson's claims against Sage Creek
                   were inextricably linked to the underlying alleged professional negligence
                   of its nurses, and therefore, her claims were subject to the requirements of
                   NRS Chapter 41A. Engelson appeals.

                         5When   Engelson asked the district court how it determined the
                   accrual date of August 11, 2020, the court explained it was "[b]ased on the
                   statements made by [St. Rose-Siena's counsel] that there was bedsore and
                   treatment of the same through August 1lth of 2020." St. Rose-Siena's
                   counsel then noted "just for the record, that [this] is from the Affidavit of
                   Debbie Marsh that says the family was aware that the bedsore was down to
                   the bone and notified that was the case prior to the transfer back to St. Rose
                   on August 12th." The district court then advised Engelson that its
                   determination of the accrual date was "based on your own Affidavit."
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                         7
101 1947B
                                                    ANALYSIS
                   St. Rose-Siena's and Sage Creek's motions to dismiss were not converted to
                   motions for summary judgment
                               St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek both acknowledge that they
                   sought dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5) on statute of limitations grounds and
                   that the district court granted the relief requested. Yet, they assert that
                   this court must treat their motions to dismiss as motions for summary
                   judgment because the parties' briefing was supported by "evidence outside
                   the complaint." Specifically, St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek contend that
                   the district court considered documents that were contained on an
                   electronic disc that was attached as an exhibit to Marsh's affidavit of merit
                   and incorporated by reference therein, copies of Governor Sisolak's
                   emergency directives regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, and unpublished
                   orders from other cases ostensibly cited for their persuasive authority. We
                   disagree that the district court's consideration of these documents converted
                   St. Rose-Siena's and Sage Creek's motions to dismiss into motions for
                   summary judgrnent.
                               Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), a defendant can move to dismiss a
                   plaintiffs complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
                   granted." And a court can dismiss a complaint under NRCP 12(b)(5) "if the
                   action is barred by the statute of limitations." Bemis v. Estate of Bemis, 114
                   Nev. 1021, 1024, 967 P.2d 437, 439 (1998) (citing NRCP 12(b)(5)). When
                   ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court generally "may not consider matters
                   outside the pleading being attacked." Breliant u. Preferred Equities Corp.,
                   109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993); see NRCP 12(d). However,
                   a court may properly consider "matters of public record, orders, items
                   present in the record of the case, and any exhibits attached to the complaint
                   when ruling" on such a motion. Breliant, 109 Nev. at 847, 858 P.2d at 1261.
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                         8
(0) 19478
                       Implicitly, the court may also consider legal authorities that, by definition.
                       are not "evidence," when reviewing a motion to disrniss. See id.
                                   A court's consideration of such matters will not convert a
                       motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Baxter, 131
                       Nev. at 764, 357 P.3d at 930 (stating that "[w]hile presentation of matters
                       outside the pleadings will convert [a] motion to dismiss to a motion for
                       summary judgment... such conversion is not triggered by a court's
                       'consideration of matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim,"
                       including an affidavit or declaration of merit (quoting 5B Charles Alan
                       Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1357, at 376
                       (3d ed. 2004))).
                                   ln this case, the district court did not consider evidence outside
                       of the complaint that would convert the motions to ones for summary
                       judgment.    Marsh's affidavit of merit was attached as an exhibit to
                       Engelson's complaint. Further, that affidavit incorporated by reference all
                       of the docurnents that Marsh reviewed, and copies of those documents were
                       contained on an electronic disc that was, itself, attached as an exhibit to
                       Marsh's affidavit. As a result, all of those documents effectively became
                       part of the complaint, and the district court could properly consider thern in
                       connection with St. Rose-Siena's and Sage Creek's motions to dismiss
                       without converting them into motions for summary judgment. See NRCP
                       10(c) ("A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is
                       a part thereof for all purposes."); see also Baxter, 131 Nev. at 764, 357 P.3d
                       at 930.
                                   To the extent the parties also attached unpublished orders and
                       copies of the Governor's emergency directives regarding the COVID-19
                       pandemic as exhibits to their briefing below, the district court's

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                             9
10, 194711   •441,
                -1T,
                   consideration of such materials likewise did not convert the motions to
                   dismiss into motions for summary judgment because those materials
                   constitute legal authority, not evidence. See Breliant, 109 Nev. at 847, 858
                   P.2d at 1261; see also Lucky Lucy D LLC v. LGS Casino LLC, 139 Nev., Adv.
                   Op. 26, 534 P.3d 689, 692 (2023) (recognizing that the "Governor's
                   Emergency Directives ... carried with them the force of law for the
                   duration of the state of emergency").
                                 Therefore, we review the district court's order under the
                   "rigorous, de novo standard of review" applicable to an order granting a
                   motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Montanez v. Sparks Farn.
                   Hosp., Inc., 137 Nev. 742, 743, 499 P.3d 1189, 1191 (2021) (quoting Slade v.
                   Caesars Entrn't Corp., 132 Nev. 374, 379, 373 P.3d 74, 78 (2016)). A district
                   court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only "if it appears
                   beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could prove no set of facts, which, if true,
                   would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las
                   Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). When evaluating such
                   a dismissal, "this court will recognize all factual allegations in [the
                   plaintiff s] complaint as true and draw all inferences in [the plaintiffsl
                   favor." Id.
                   The district court erred by granting the motions to dismiss on statute of
                   limitations grounds
                                 Engelson argues that the district court erred when it initially
                   granted St. Rose-Siena's and Sage Creek's motions to dismiss. Engelson
                   contends that her complaint was timely filed within the one-year statute of
                   limitations for professional negligence actions then required by NRS
                   41A.097(2). Sage Creek disagrees, arguing that the district court properly
                   dismissed Engelson's complaint because the estate was on inquiry notice of

COURT OF APPEALS
          OF
      NEVADA
                                                         10
cU   19471;
                   its professional negligence claims more than one year before Engelson filed
                   the complaint."
                                NRS 41A.097(2) requires claims for professional negligence
                   occurring on or after October 1, 2002, and before October 1, 2023, to be filed
                   "within one year of the injury's discovery and three years of the injury date,"
                   whichever occurs first. Libby v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. 359,
                   361, 325 P.3d 1276, 1277 (2014). In Massey v. Litton, the Nevada Supreme
                   Court explained that the limitation period for the "discovery" of an injury
                   begins to run when the plaintiff "knows or, through the use of reasonable
                   diligence, should have known of facts that would put a reasonable person
                   on inquiry notice of his cause of action." 99 Nev. 723, 728, 669 P.2d 248,
                   252 (1983). For purposes of the discovery rule, the "injury" in question is
                   the legal injury, which means both the "physical damage" and the
                   "[professional] negligence causing the damage." Id. at 726, 669 P.2d at 250-
                   51.   In the proceedings below, the parties appeared to agree that the
                   "physical damage" at issue was Meyer's bedsore; however, they disagreed
                   about when the plaintiff was on inquiry notice that professional negligence
                   may have caused that bedsore.
                               We note that the one-year statute of limitations is expressly tied
                   to the plaintiff's discovery of the injury constituting professional negligence.
                   See NRS 41A.097(2) (describing the applicable statute of limitations for the
                   discovery of an injury as "1 year after the plaintiff discovers or through the
                   use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury" (emphasis
                   added)). In cases like this one, where a decedent's estate is the named

                         "St. Rose-Siena does not address this argument in its answering brief,
                   focusing instead on the district court's subsequent ruling on Engelson's
                   motion for reconsideration.
COURT OF APPEALS
          OF
      NEVADA
                                                         11
IIR 19-1713
                   plaintiff, Nevada law indicates that the discovery rule is triggered when the
                   estate or its representative are on inquiry notice of the legal injury. See,
                   e.g., Kushnir v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 137 Nev. 409, 411-14, 495 P.3d
                   137, 140-42 (Ct. App. 2021) (determining that a professional negligence
                   claim accrued on the date that the named plaintiffs—the estate and its
                   administrator—acquired the decedent's medical records); see also Valley
                   Health Sys., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, No. 82250, 2021 WL
                   4860728, at *2 (Nev. Oct. 18, 2021) (Order Granting Petition) (concluding
                   that professional negligence claims accrued when the special administrator
                   of the decedent's estate filed a complaint with the State Board o' Nursing).
                               As the special administrator of Meyer's estate asserting
                   survivorship claims pursuant to NRS 41.100, Engelson "stands in the shoes
                   of the decedent and is subject to all defenses that might have been asserted
                   against the decedent," including any applicable statutes of limitations.
                   Schwartz v. Wasserburger, 117 Nev. 703, 708, 30 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2001).
                   Although Engelson filed her lawsuit exactly one year after Meyer's death,
                   the district court had to determine whether Engelson or Meyer "discovered"
                   the legal injury prior to Meyer's death, because if so, the estate's claims
                   would be time-barred. See, e.g., White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 693 P.2d
                   687, 697 (Wash. 1985) (applying the discovery rule to survivorship actions
                   and concluding that the statute of limitations "commences at the earliest
                   time at which the decedent or his personal representatives knew or should
                   have known" of the legal injury).
                               Here, the district court dismissed Engelson's complaint after
                   concluding, as a matter of law, that "Plaintiff was aware of her injury on or
                   around August 11, 2020 at the latest" and that the complaint was untimely
                   filed more than one year after this accrual date, on September 14, 2021.

COURT OF APPEALS

         OF

      NEVADA
                                                        12
(0.1 1547H
                      However, the accrual date for the one-year discovery period in NRS
                      41A.097(2) "ordinarily presents a question of fact to be decided by the jury,"
                      and "[o]nly when evidence irrefutably demonstrates this accrual date may a
                      district court make such a determination as a matter of law." Winn v.
                      Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 128 Nev. 246, 251, 277 P.3d 458, 462 (2012)
                      (emphasis added). Moreover, "[a]t this stage of proceedings [the] court must
                      determine whether there is any set of facts that, if true, would entitle [the
                      plaintiff] to relief and not whether there is a set of facts that would not
                      provide [the plaintiff] with relief."     Szyrnborski v. Spring Mountain
                      Treatment Ctr., 133 Nev. 638, 644, 403 P.3d 1280, 1286 (2017).
                                  To date, Nevada's appellate courts have found irrefutable
                      evidence of the accrual date under only limited circumstances.            For
                      instance, in Winn, the Nevada Supreme Court determined as a matter of
                      law that a plaintiff "discovered" his daughter's injury, including the cause
                      of that injury, on the date that he first received his daughter's medical
                      records. 128 Nev. at 253, 277 P.3d at 463. "At [that] point, [the plaintiff]
                      had not only hired an attorney to pursue a medical malpractice action, but
                      he also had access to [a relevant] postoperative report" that placed him on
                      inquiry notice that his daughter's injury was caused by professional
                      negligence. Id. TAkewise, irt Kushnir, this court concluded, as a matter of
                      law, that an estate's professional negligence claim on behalf of a decedent
                      accrued on the date that the estate acquired the decedent's medical records,
                      as that was the date its medical expert had all the information necessary to
                      discover the medical malpractice and prepare an expert affidavit. 137 Nev.
                      at 411-14, 495 P.3d at 140-42.
                                  Relatedly, in Estate of Curtis v. Socaoco, the Nevada Supreme
                      Court concluded that the personal representative of a decedent's estate was

COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
     NEVA DA
                                                           13
101 19471i    4EW-,
                   on inquiry notice of the estate's claims against certain health care providers
                   on the date that she was "explicitly inforrned" by medical professionals that
                   those providers "should have immediately sent [the decedent] to the
                   hospital" after erroneously injecting her with morphine. No. 79116, 2020
                   WL 5837916, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 30, 2020) (Order of Affirmance). When the
                   decedent died a few days later, the personal representative "knew or should
                   have known that someone's negligence in treating the morphine overdose
                   might have caused [her] death." Id. (emphasis in original).
                               Finally, in Valley Health System, the Nevada Supreme Court
                   looked to the date that the special administrator of the decedent's estate
                   filed a complaint with the State Board of Nursing to deterrnine the accrual
                   date for the professional negligence claims. 2021 WL 4860728, at *2.
                   Because the complaint alleged that the decedent's health care providers "did
                   not appropriately monitor her, abandoning her care and causing her death,"
                   the court concluded that the special administrator "had enough information
                   to allege a prima facie claim for professional negligence" on the date he filed
                   that complaint. Id.
                               Here, the district court did not have irrefutable evidence that
                   Engelson or Meyer were in possession of Meyer's medical records at any
                   time prior to her death. Cf. Winn, 128 Nev. at 253, 277 P.3d at 463; Kushnir,
                   137 Nev. at 411-14, 495 P.3d at 140-42. Likewise, the district court was not
                   presented with evidence that any medical professionals "explicitly
                   informed" Engelson or Meyer that the care Meyer was receiving may have
                   either caused her bedsore or caused it to worsen. Cf. Socaoco, 2020 WL
                   5837916, at *2. And the district court was not presented with evidence that
                   Engelson or Meyer filed an administrative complaint against Meyer's

COURT OF APPEALS
          OF
      NEVADA
                                                         14
40, 19-171{
                   health care providers at any point prior to Meyer's death. Cf. Valley Health
                   Sys., 2021 WL 4860728, at *2.
                               Although the district court found that Engelson's "complaint
                   and the accompanying [affidavit of merit] established irrefutable evidence"
                   of the accrual date, the court drew improper inferences against both
                   Engelson and Meyer to reach that conclusion. Engelson's complaint does
                   not contain any allegations indicating that Engelson or Meyer knew or
                   should have known that professional negligence might have either caused
                   Meyer's bedsore or caused it to worsen at any point prior to Meyer's death.
                   Likewise, Marsh's affidavit of merit does not irrefutably demonstrate that
                   Engelson or Meyer were on inquiry notice of their professional negligence
                   claims while Meyer was still alive. Though the affidavit describes how
                   Meyer's bedsore worsened during her stay at Sage Creek—as documented
                   in her medical records—it does not state that Meyer or her family were
                   aware that her bedsore had worsened due to professional negligence.
                   Additionally, while the affidavit states that Meyer placed phone calls to
                   family members to complain about her treatment at the facility, there is no
                   indication that those complaints had anything to do with Meyer's bedsore.
                               On appeal, Sage Creek asks this court to find irrefutable
                   evidence of the accrual date in the "memorandum to expert" that was
                   prepared by Engelson's attorneys and attached to Marsh's affidavit. But
                   this memorandum does not irrefutably demonstrate that Engelson's
                   complaint is time-barred either. The memorandum states that Meyer "was
                   told by a nurse at St. Rose-Siena named Anna that there was a bedsore from
                   St. Rose-Siena, but when she was transferred to Sage Creek, it was only the
                   size of a dime and was closing up." Even if Meyer knew she had a bedsore
                   that was healing when she first arrived at Sage Creek, the memorandum

COURT OF APPEALS
      OF
    NEVADA
                                                       15
                      does not establish that Meyer knew her bedsore worsened during her stay
                      at the facility due to the treatment and care she was receiving. And even
                      though the memorandum states that when Meyer was subsequently
                      transferred to St. Rose-Siena, the bedsore was "huge," "down to the bone,"
                      and "stage 4," the memorandum does not state that Meyer or Engelson were
                      actually informed by the hospital staff that her condition had in fact
                      worsened and, more specifically, was the result of professional negligence.
                                  While the affidavit of merit and the memorandum to expert
                      both generally referenced phone calls that Meyer had with unnamed "family
                      members" during her two-week stay at Sage Creek, neither document states
                      that Meyer discussed her bedsore during any of these calls. Instead, the
                      documents reflect that Meyer complained to her family about the treatment
                      she was receiving at Sage Creek and that she told her family about a few
                      specific instances of that mistreatment. The documents further state that
                      "the family" tried to call the head nurse and manager to get help for Meyer,
                      which was not given. To conclude, based on the vague references in these
                      documents that, as of August 11, 2020, Engelson and Meyer knew or should
                      have known that professional negligence by St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek
                      may have caused Meyer's bedsore or caused the bedsore to worsen, the
                      district court had to draw inferences against them, which it was not
                      permitted to do when ruling on a motion to dismiss.7

                             7Sage Creek also relies on language in the memorandum to expert
                      which states that the family has "recordings" of phone calls with Meyer
                      during her stay at the facility. But again, there is no indication these
                      recordings referenced Meyer's bedsore or showed that Meyer or Engelson
                      were aware that a professional negligence claim against Sage Creek may
                      exist.
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     N EVADA
                                                          16
(C» 1947B    4A1Sra
                                 It is important to remember that the professional negligence
                   alleged in this case occurred during the summer of 2020, when much of this
                   State was subject to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions and when Meyer's
                   family was not even permitted to see her in person to witness the wound
                   that is at the heart of this litigation. Although Meyer's medical records from
                   the summer of 2020 contain documentation regarding her bedsore, it is
                   unclear when Engelson first received copies of those medical records.8
                   Absent "irrefutable evidence" that Meyer or Engelson were aware of the
                   contents of Meyer's medical records by August 11, 2020, we cannot say that
                   they were on inquiry notice of the professional negligence claims as of that
                   date.
                                 Thus, because the evidence before the district court did not
                   "irrefutably demonstrate" that Meyer or Engelson discovered Meyer's legal
                   injury as of August 11, 2020, see Winn, 128 Nev. at 251, 277 P.3d at 462,

                           8We refuse, at this time, to adopt Engelson's contention that the true
                   accrual date was April 15, 2021—the day Engelson's attorney received a
                   copy of Meyer's medical records from Sage Creek. Although Engelson relies
                   on a Custodian of Records Affidavit indicating that Meyer's medical records
                   were reproduced on that date, the affidavit does not irrefutably demonstrate
                   that this was the actual accrual date when Engelson first discovered the
                   injury. Rather, this evidence merely establishes that Engelson discovered
                   Meyer's injury no later than April 15, 2021. See Winn, 128 Nev. at 253, 277
                   P.3d at 463 (holding that the date the plaintiff received medical records
                   irrefutably demonstrated the latest date on which he was placed on inquiry
                   notice of a potential cause of action). Discovery may reveal that Meyer's
                   family obtained the necessary information or medical records from Sage
                   Creek or St. Rose-Siena prior to their reproduction to Engelson's attorney
                   on April 15, 2021. And, because the accrual date is generally a question of
                   fact, it would be premature for us to decide this issue on appeal. See Ryan's
                   Express Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Arnador Stage Lines, Inc., 128 Nev. 289, 299,
                   279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012) ("An appellate court is not particularly well-suited
                   to make factual determinations in the first instance.").
COURT OF APPEALS

         OF
      NEVADA
                                                         17
10) I9-47B
                          the district court erred in determining as a matter of law that the complaint
                          was time-barred.
                          This court may address the district court's rulings on the merits of Engelson's
                          motion for reconsideration
                                      After the district court dismissed her complaint on statute of
                          limitations grounds, Engelson moved for reconsideration on the basis that
                          her complaint stated a wrongful death claim that was timely filed within
                          one year of Meyer's death. This was an argument that Engelson had not
                          raised in response to the previously filed motions to dismiss. In her motion
                          for reconsideration, Engelson also reargued a point that she had previously
                          raised in opposition to Sage Creek's motion to dismiss—namely, that Sage
                          Creek was not a "[p]rovider of health care" as defined in NRS 41A.017 and,
                          therefore, the one-year statute of lirnitations did not apply to Sage Creek.
                                      The district court could have declined to consider both
                          arguments, and it would have been within the court's discretion to do so.
                          See EDCR 2.24(a) ("No motion once heard and disposed of may be renewed
                          in the same cause, nor may the same matters therein embraced be reheard,
                          unless by leave of the court .. . ." (emphasis added)). Instead, the court
                          rejected both arguments on their merits in a written order that was issued
                          before Engelson filed her notice of appeal. Where, as here, the district
                          court's "reconsideration order and motion are properly part of the record on
                          appeal from the final judgment, and ... the district court elected to
                          entertain the motion on its merits, then we may consider the arguments
                          asserted in the reconsideration motion in deciding an appeal from the final
                          judgment." Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev, 410, 417, 168 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2007).

                                "We note that both St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek have asked this
                          court to decide whether Engelson's allegations are subject to NRS Chapter
COURT OF APPEALS
          OF

       NEVADA
                                                                18
 (1) 1.4471i   drtWIT.,
                               This court generally reviews the denial of a motion for
                   reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See Saticoy Bay, LLC, Series 34
                   Innisbrook v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec, Tr. 2007-3, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 35, 510
                   P.3d 139, 146 (2022). "An abuse of discretion can occur when the district
                   court bases its decision on a clearly erroneous factual determination or it
                   disregards controlling law." MB Arn., Inc. u. Alaska Pac, Leasing Co., 132
                   Nev. 78, 88, 367 P.3d 1286, 1292 (2016). And "deference is not owed to legal
                   error." AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 589, 245 P.3d
                   1190, 1197 (2010). Additionally, we review questions of law, including
                   questions of statutory interpretation, de novo. Soro v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
                   Court, 133 Nev. 882, 885, 411 P.3d 358, 361 (Ct. App. 2017); Pub. Agency
                   Comp. Tr. (PACT) v. Blake, 127 Nev. 863, 866, 265 P.3d 694, 696 (2011).
                               As detailed below, we conclude that the district court erred by
                   determining that Engelson failed to adequately plead and support a
                   wrongful death claim on behalf of the estate based on professional
                   negligence. And, because the one-year statute of limitations for a wrongful
                   death claim based on professional negligence begins to run when "the
                   plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the legal injury,
                   i.e., both the fact of death and the negligent cause thereof," see Pope v. Gray,
                   104 Nev. 358, 362, 760 P.2d 763, 765 (1988), we conclude that the district
                   court erred in determining that Engelson's complaint—filed exactly one
                   year after Meyer's death—was untimely. Consequently, to the extent it
                   based its denial of reconsideration on those erroneous determinations, the
                   district court abused its discretion.       Nevertheless, the district court

                   41A and whether her complaint and expert declaration complied with NRS
                   41A.071.
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     N EVA DA
                                                         19
{0) 194711
                     correctly found that Engelson's professional negligence claims against Sage
                     Creek were subject to the requirements of NRS Chapter 41A.
                           Engelson's complaint adequately stated a claim for wrongful death
                           based upon professional negligence
                                 Before addressing whether Engelson's complaint sufficiently
                     stated a claim for wrongful death on behalf of the estate, we note that
                     "[w]rongful death is a cause of action created by statute, having no roots in
                     the common law." Alsenz v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 109 Nev. 1062, 1064, 864
                     P.2d 285, 286 (1993).      Nevada's wrongful death statute, NRS 41.085,
                     provides that "[w]hen the death of any person . . . is caused by the wrongful
                     act or neglect of another, the heirs of the decedent and the personal
                     representatives of the decedent" may maintain a wrongful death claim for
                     "damages against the person who caused the death." NRS 41.085(2). The
                     statute thus "creates two separate wrongful death claims, one belonging to
                     the heirs of the decedent and the other belonging to the personal
                     representative of the decedent, with neither being able to pursue the other's
                     separate claim." Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 130 Nev. 252, 256, 321
                     P.3d 912, 914 (2014).
                                 To state a wrongful death claim under NRS 41.085(2),
                     Engelson's complaint needed to allege that the defendants' "wrongful act or
                     neglect ... caused" Meyer's death.     NRS 41.085(2); see also Gilloon v.
                     Humana Inc., 100 Nev. 518, 521, 687 P.2d 80, 82 (1984) ("The death of the
                     decedent being an essential element of the cause of action for wrongful
                     death, there can be no legal injury until the death has occurred."). Further,
                     Engelson needed to allege that she was among the classes of persons
                     entitled to assert a wrongful death claim: a statutory heir, a personal
                     representative, or both.    See NRS 41.085(2).     And depending on how
                     Engelson self-identified in the complaint—as an heir or a personal
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                          20
4o) 1947n    .42p.
                   representative—her available dana ages would have been limited. See NRS
                   41.085(4)-(5).
                                Nevada is a notice pleading jurisdiction that liberally construes
                   pleadings. NRCP 8(a); Droge v. AAAA Two Star Towing, Inc., 136 Nev. 291,
                   308, 468 P.3d 862, 878 (Ct. App. 2020). "A complaint need only set forth
                   sufficient facts to demonstrate the necessary elements of a claim for relief
                   so that the defending party has adequate notice of the nature of the claim
                   and relief sought." W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 108 Nev. 931, 936, 840
                   P.2d 1220, 1223 (1992). As mentioned, a complaint should be disinissed for
                   failure to state a claim "only if it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff]
                   could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle [her] to relief." Buzz
                   Stew, 124 Nev. at 228, 181 P.3d at 672.
                               Although Engelson's complaint was inartfully drafted, it set
                   forth the essential elements of a wrongful death claim against both St. Rose-
                   Siena and Sage Creek. Engelson alleged that St. Rose-Siena and Sage
                   Creek were both "vicariously responsible under the doctrine of respondeat
                   superior.... for the injuries and death" of Meyer.            Engelson identified
                   specific "wrongful act[s] or neglect" by both St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek
                   relating to the development and progression of the pressure ulcer. And
                   Engelson alleged that as a "direct and proximate result" of the negligence
                   by St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek, Meyer was "caused to suffer serious
                   bodily injury, including worsened pressure ulcer wounds, infection and
                   great pain of mind and body, loss of a chance of a better outcome, and
                   contributed to her death."
                               Importantly,     Engelson       self-identified   as   "the   Special
                   Administrator of the Estate of LENORE MEYER, deceased," and brought
                   her lawsuit "on behalf of the Estate of LENORE MEYER, deceased." Thus,

COURT OF APPEALS
          OF
      NEVADA
                                                          21
((I   .+4711
                   for purposes of Nevada's wrongful death statute, Engelson was Meyer's
                   personal representative, see NRS 132.265 (defining the terrn "[p]ersonal
                   representative" to include "a special administrator"), and was therefore
                   entitled to seek the damages available to Meyer's estate under NRS
                   41.085(5). These allegations in the complaint, which we must accept as
                   true, sufficed to state a claim for wrongful death against both St. Rose-Siena
                   and Sage Creek under NRCP 8(a). Therefore, the district court abused its
                   discretion when it found that Engelson's complaint failed to state a wrongful
                   death claim.
                         Engelson's affidavit of merit satisfied NRS 41A.071
                              As noted, the district court also found that Engelson's affidavit
                   of rnerit was insufficient to support a wrongful death claim pursuant to NRS
                   41A.071. St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek contend that the affidavit of merit
                   was insufficient because it failed to allege that they caused Meyer's death,
                   where causation is an essential eleinent of a wrongful death claim.
                   Engelson responds that there is no requirement in NRS 41A.071 that an
                   affidavit of merit must establish causation in wrongful death cases. To
                   resolve this dispute, we must examine the statute.
                               When interpreting a statute, appellate courts look first to the
                   statute's plain language. Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65, 72, 481 P.M
                   1222, 1230 (2021). If the statute's plain language is unambiguous, we will
                   enforce the statute as written, without resorting to the rules of construction.
                   Local Gov't Emp.-Mgrnt. Relations Bd. v. Educ. Support Ernps. Ass'n, 134
                   Nev. 716, 718, 429 P.3d 658, 661 (2018). However, if a statute's language is
                   ambiguous, meaning it is susceptible to more than one reasonable
                   interpretation, we will examine the provision's legislative history and the
                   statutory scheme as a whole to ascertain the Legislature's intent. We the

COURT OF APPEALS
      OF
    NEVADA
                                                         22
                     People Neu. v. Miller, 124 Nev, 874, 881, 192 P.3d 1166, 1] 71 (2008): In re
                     Candelaria, 126 Nev. 408, 411, 245 P.3d 518, 520 (2010).
                                 NRS 41A.071 sets forth the requirements for an affidavit of
                     merit in a professional negligence case. The statute states:
                                 If an action for professional negligence is filed in
                                 the district court, the district court shall dismiss
                                 the action, without prejudice, if the action is filed
                                 without an affidavit that:
                                       1. Supports the allegations contained in the
                                 action;
                                        2. Is submitted by a medical expert who
                                 practices or has practiced in an area that is
                                 substantially similar to the type of practice engaged
                                 in at the time of the alleged professional negligence;
                                        3. Identifies by name, or describes by
                                 conduct, each provider of health care who is alleged
                                 to be negligent; and
                                       4. Sets forth factually a specific act or acts of
                                 alleged negligence separately as to each defendant
                                 in simple, concise and direct terms.
                                 At the outset, we note that NRS 41A.071 does not specifically
                     state that an affidavit of merit must opine as to causation. Indeed, the word
                      causation" does not appear anywhere in the text of NRS 41A.071. Rather,
                     when describing the requisite contents of the affidavit, the statute provides
                     only that the affidavit must support the complaint's allegations, identify the
                     negligent providers of health care, and identify the specific act(s) of
                     negligence alleged against each defendant. NRS 41A.071(1), (3), (4).") On

                           1"NRS 41A.071(2) does not address the contents of the affidavit;
                     rather, it addresses the qualifications of the medical expert who submitted
                     the affidavit. See, e.g., Monk v. Ching, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 18, 531 P.3d 600,
                     602 (2023) ("Subsection 2 of NRS 41A.071 requires [affiant], as the medical
                     expert submitting the affidavit in support of the complaint, to have
COURT   or APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                          23
 )1 19471i
                   its face, the plain language of NRS 41A.071 does not require any discussion
                   of actual or proximate causation. Therefore, in order to conclude that an
                   affidavit of merit must opine as to actual or proximate "causation," we
                   would have to read that requirement into the statute. There are only two
                   subsections where a causation requirement could possibly be found—either
                   in NRS 41A.071(1) or in NRS 41A.071(4)—so we will address each in turn."
                               To satisfy NRS 41A.071(1), an affidavit must "[s]upportH" the
                   allegations in the action. St. Rose-Siena and Sage Creek contend that an
                   expert affidavit cannot support a wrongful death claim within the meaning
                   of NRS 41A.071(1) unless it offers an opinion regarding causation. We
                   disagree. In Zohar v. Zbiegien, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that
                   the support requirement "is ambiguous because it may reasonably be
                   interpreted as merely providing some substantiation or foundation for the
                   underlying facts within the complaint, or it rnay also be interpreted to
                   require that the affidavit corroborate every fact within the complaint." 130
                   Nev. 733, 737, 334 P.3d 402, 405 (2014). After finding that NRS 41A.071's
                   support requirement is ambiguous, the court looked to the legislative
                   history of the statute. Id.
                               The supreme court observed that NRS 41A.071 "was enacted to
                   deter   baseless   medical    malpractice   litigation,   fast   track   medical
                   malpractice cases, and encourage doctors to practice in Nevada while also
                   respecting the injured plaintiff s right to litigate his or her case and receive
                   full compensation for his or her injuries." Id. at 738, 334 P.3d at 405-06.

                   practiced 'in an area that is substantially similar to the type of practice
                   engaged in at the time of the alleged professional negligence.").

                         "A causation requirement cannot be found in NRS 41A.071(3), which
                   simply requires identification of the negligent provider of health care.
COURT OF APPEALS

         OF
      NEVADA
                                                         24
101 194713
                   But because the legislative history of the statute did not reveal the precise
                   level of specificity" necessary for an affidavit to "support" the allegations of
                   a medical malpractice claim, the court chose "to construe the statute in a
                   manner that conforms to reason and public policy" while balancing the
                   interests of both health care providers and injured patients. Id. at 738, 334
                   P.3d at 406.
                                  As a result, the suprerne court rejected the notion that an
                   affidavit of merit must "independently state every fact required to
                   demonstrate a cause of action for medical malpractice." Id. at 739, 334 P.3d
                   at 406. Rather than isolating and subjecting the affidavit to hyper technical
                   scrutiny, "district court[s] should read a medical malpractice complaint and
                   affidavit of rnerit together when determining whether the affidavit meets
                   the requirements of NRS 41A.071." Id. at 735, 334 P.3d at 403.
                                  Reviewing the complaint in Zohar (which alleged specific
                   conduct by individual hospital employees) alongside the expert affidavit,
                   which opined that "the medical staff in the emergency department of [the
                   hospital] breached the standard of care in their treatment of [the injured
                   patient] through the inappropriately tight application of a wound dressing
                   and/or bandage," the supreme court deemed the affidavit sufficient to
                   satisfy the support requirement of NRS 41A.071. Id. at 741, 334 P.3d at
                   407 (emphasis added). The supreme court's analysis demonstrates that an
                   affidavit of merit need not separately address causation and recite each of
                   the other essential elements of a particular claim to satisfy the support
                   requirement of NRS 41A.071. Rather, an affidavit of merit can adequately
                   support a complaint's allegations of professional negligence when it opines

COURT OF APPEALS
          OF
      NEVADA
                                                         25
40) I9471.1
                   as to the professional standard of care and the breach of that standard of
                   care. -
                                  Next, we must examine NRS 41A.071(4) to determine if that
                   section requires an affidavit of merit to address causation. To comply with
                   NRS 41A.071(4), an affidavit must identify the "specific act or acts of alleged
                   negligence" engaged in by each defendant.            Yet, unlike the support
                   requirement in NRS 41A.071(1), the language of NRS 41A.071(4) is not
                   ambiguous. First, we note that this subsection refers to an "act or acts" of
                   negligence as opposed to a "claim or claims" of negligence. Even though
                   causation is an element of a negligence claim, causation is not necessary to
                   establish that an act was, in and of itself, negligent. Compare Element,
                   Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining an "element" as "[a]
                   constituent part of a claim that must be proved for the claim to succeed"),
                   with Negligence, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining
                   c`negligence," in relevant part, as "[t]he failure to exercise the standard of
                   care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar
                   situation"). To specify an act of negligence, one need only describe the act
                   that breached the duty of care; one need not demonstrate the consequences
                   of that act.
                                  Additionally, while NRS 41A.071(4) generically refers to acts of
                   Cfnegligence," the statute's prefatory language clarifies that the type of

                   negligence at issue is "professional negligence" as expressly defined in NRS
                   41A.015. See Nev. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. v. Smith, 129 Nev. 618, 627, 310

                         12We note that, although NRS 41A.071 was amended in 2015 after the
                   decision in Zohar, those amendments did not substantively alter the
                   support requirement. 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 439, § 6, at 2527 (effective
                   June 9, 2015).
COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA
                                                          26
(01 014711
                      P.3d 560, 566 (2013) ("A statute's express definition of a term controls the
                      construction of that term no matter where the term appears in the statute."
                      (quoting Williams v. Clark Cty. Dist. Attorney, 118 Nev. 473, 485, 50 P.3d
                      536, 544 (2002))).
                                  NRS 41A.015 provides that, for purposes of NRS Chapter 41A,
                      'c[p]rofessional negligence' means the failure of a provider of health care, in
                      rendering services, to use the reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily
                      used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and experienced
                      providers of health care." While the statutory definition of "professional
                      negligence" incorporates the concepts of both duty of care and breach, it does
                      not include the concepts of actual or legal causation found in caselaw
                      describing the elements of negligence claims. Cf. Perez v. Las Vegas Med.
                      Ctr., 107 Nev. 1, 4, 805 P.2d 589, 590-91 (1991) ("To prevail on a negligence
                      theory, the plaintiff generally must show that: (1) the defendant had a duty
                      to exercise due care towards the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached the
                      duty; (3) the breach was an actual cause of the plaintiff s injury; (4) the
                      breach was the proxirnate cause of the injury; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
                      damage."). Thus, read in context, the term "negligence" in NRS 41A.071(4)
                      rneans "professional negligence" as defined in NRS 41A.015, rather than a
                      cause of action for negligence as more broadly defined under common law.
                      See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
                      Legal Texts 225, 228 (2012) (stating that "[d]efinition sections and
                      interpretation clauses are to be carefully followed" and "pit is very rare that
                      a defined meaning can be replaced with another permissible meaning of the
                      word on the basis of other textual indications; the definition is virtually
                      conclusive").

COURT Of APPEALS
         OF
       NEVADA
                                                            27
(0)   1947R   .415.
                               The 2015 amendment to the definition of "professional
                   negligence" underscores that the Legislature did not intend for the affidavit
                   requirement in NRS 41A.071(4) to include actual or proximate causation.
                   The prior version of NRS 41A.015 was enacted pursuant to a ballot
                   initiative in 2004 and defined "professional negligence" as "a negligent act
                   or omission to act by a provider of health care in the rendering of
                   professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a
                   personal injury or wrongful death." Nevada Ballot Questions 2004, Nevada
                   Secretary of State, Question No. 3 (emphasis added). However, as a result
                   of the 2015 amendment, the Legislature removed all references to causation
                   from this definition and, at the same time, added the language in NRS
                   41A.071(4). See 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 439, § 1.5, at 2526. We presume that
                   these changes were intended to remove causation from the definition of
                   "professional negligence" and the related affidavit requirements in NRS
                   41A.071. See McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 650, 730 P.al 438,
                   442 (1986) ("It is ordinarily presumed that the legislature, by deleting an
                   express portion of a law, intended a substantial change in the law.").
                               The language of NRS 41A.100, the res ipsa loquitur statute,
                   further supports our reading of NRS 41A.071's affidavit requirement. See
                   State, Diu. of Ins. v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co., 116 Nev. 290, 295, 995
                   P.2d 482, 486 (2000) ("Whenever possible, this court will interpret a rule or
                   statute in harmony with other rules or statutes."). NRS 41A.100(1) sets
                   forth five factual circumstances where a rebuttable presumption of
                   professional negligence exists such that a plaintiff need not present expert
                   testimony at trial, See, e.g., Cummings v. Barber, 136 Nev. 139, 144-45, 460
                   P.3d 963, 968 (2020) (concluding that an injured patient was not required
                   to present expert testimony to withstand surnmary judgment where she

COURT OF APPEALS
           OF
       NEVADA
                                                        28
(I I p 19471i
                   presented evidence giving rise to a presumption of negligence under NRS
                   41A.100(1)).   However, NRS 41A.100(3) creates an exception to this
                   rebuttable presumption when "a plaintiff submits an affidavit pursuant to
                   NRS 41A.071, or otherwise designates an expert witness to establish that the
                   specific provider of health care deviated frorn the accepted standard of care."
                   (Emphasis added.) By discussing the affidavit requirement in this way, the
                   statute confirms that the affidavit requirement is concerned with the
                   alleged deviation from the standard of care, not causation.
                               Notably, although causation is not within the statutory
                   definition of professional negligence for purposes of the affidavit
                   requirement, it remains an element that must be proven at trial. See NRS
                   41A.100(1) ("Liability for personal injury or death is not imposed upon any
                   provider of health care based on alleged negligence in the performance of
                   that care unless evidence ... is presented to demonstrate the alleged
                   deviation from the accepted standard of care in the specific circumstances
                   of the case and to prove causation of the alleged personal injury or death."
                   (emphasis added)). When interpreting statutes, Nevada follows the maxim
                   that "the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." Rural Tel.
                   Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comrn'n, 133 Nev. 387, 389, 398 P.3d 909, 911 (2017)
                   (quoting Sonia F. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 495, 499, 215 P.3d
                   705, 708 (2009)). The Legislature's express statutory inclusion of causation
                   as an element of professional negligence claims that must be proven at trial
                   further emphasizes the legislative intent to exclude causation from the
                   affidavit requirements that must be established at the initial pleading
                   stage.
                               In sum, we hold that NRS 41A.071 does not require an expert
                   affidavit addressing legal or proximate causation in professional negligence

COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA
                                                         29
(01 194713
                   cases. Thus, Engelson's complaint alleges claims of wrongful death, and we
                   conclude that the complaint was adequately pleaded and supported by an
                   affidavit of merit. The district court erred in concluding otherwise and thus
                   abused its discretion in denying reconsideration on that basis.
                         The district court correctly concluded that Engelson's professional
                         negligence claims against Sage Creek were subject to the requirements
                         of NRS Chapter 41A
                               Finally, Engelson contends that the district court abused its
                   discretion in denying her motion for reconsideration after erroneously
                   finding that Sage Creek was subject to the one-year statute of limitations
                   set forth in NRS 41A.097(2). Engelson contends that, because Sage Creek
                   is a "skilled nursing facility," and such facilities are not included in the
                   definition of "provider of health care" set forth in NRS 41A.017, the claims
                   against Sage Creek are not governed by NRS Chapter 41A. We disagree.
                               Skilled nursing facilities may be covered under NRS Chapter
                   41A when a complaint alleges liability against the facility based on the
                   professional negligence of its nurses, who are "providers of health care" as
                   defined in NRS 41A.017." For instance, in Estate of Curtis v. South Las

                         'The version of NRS 41A.017 in effect at the relevant time defined
                   "[p]rovider of health care" as

                               a physician licensed pursuant to chapter 630 or 633
                               of NRS, physician assistant, dentist, licensed
                               nurse, dispensing optician, optometrist, registered
                               physical therapist, podiatric physician, licensed
                               psychologist, chiropractic physician, doctor of
                               Oriental medicine, holder of a license or a limited
                               license issued under the provisions of chapter 653
                               of NRS, medical laboratory director or technician,
                               licensed dietitian or a licensed hospital, clinic,
                               surgery center, physicians' professional corporation
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
    NEVADA
                                                        30
   194713
                   Vegas Medical Investors, LLC, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that
                   NRS Chapter 41A applied to the plaintiff s allegation that a nursing home,
                   through its nursing staff, failed to monitor its patient after administering
                   morphine. 136 Nev. 350, 358, 466 P.3d 1263, 1270 (2020). In Yafchak v.
                   South Las Vegas Medical Investors, LLC, the supreme court clarified that
                   the reason NRS Chapter 41A applied to the professional negligence
                   allegation in Estate of Curtis was because the plaintiff had "specifically
                   asserted that the underlying negligence was committed by a nurse (a person
                   included within NRS 41A.017's definition of a provider of health care)." 138
                   Nev., Adv. Op. 70, 519 P.3d 37, 40 (2022). In addition, the supreme court
                   explained that a "nursing home facility may be vicariously liable for the
                   professional negligence of a nursing home employee who is a provider of
                   health care, in which case the nursing home would be subject to NRS
                   Chapter 41A." Id.
                               Engelson's complaint alleged that Sage Creek's nurses and staff
                   were negligent in providing nursing care to Meyer, including by failing to
                   properly treat her sacral bedsore. Engelson further alleged that Sage Creek
                   was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the
                   negligence of its nursing staff. Insofar as the complaint seeks to hold Sage
                   Creek vicariously liable for the professional negligence of its nurses, we
                   conclude that NRS Chapter 41A necessarily applies to those claims."

                               or group practice that employs any such person and
                               its employees.
                         "In light of our disposition, we need not determine whether all of
                   Engelson's allegations against Sage Creek and St. Rose-Siena sound in
                   professional negligence as opposed to general negligence, or whether the
                   statute of limitations on Engelson's claims was tolled by Governor Sisolak's
                   emergency directives regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. See Miller v.
COURT OF APPEALS
          OF
      NEVADA
                                                       31
COI I Y471t
                   Further, as we have noted, the district court erred in dismissing those
                   claims as time-barred.
                                                  CONCLUSION
                                The evidence in this case did not irrefutably demonstrate that
                   Engelson or Meyer discovered or should have discovered the legal injury
                   more than a year before Engelson filed her complaint. Therefore, the
                   survivorship claims should not have been dismissed as untimely as a matter
                   of law. Moreover, Engelson's complaint adequately pleaded wrongful death
                   claims based on professional negligence and was timely filed within one
                   year of Meyer's death. Although the district court found the attached
                   affidavit of merit deficient because it did not opine as to the cause of Meyer's
                   death, the affidavit was not required to address causation and adequately
                   supported the allegations of professional negligence for purposes of NRS
                   41A.071. Accordingly, we reverse and rernand this matter to the district
                   court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                        Westbrook

                   We concur:

                   Gibbons

                   Bulla

                   Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 588-89, 188 P.3d 1112, 1118-19 (2008) (explaining that
                   this court need not address issues that are unnecessary to resolve the case
                   at bar).
COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA
                                                         32
40) 1.54711