Court Opinion

ID: 9940871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 16:12:01.287163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:59.804682
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Derrick, 2024-Ohio-548.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  MAHONING COUNTY

                                             STATE OF OHIO,

                                             Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                     v.

                                        LANCE D. DERRICK,

                                        Defendant-Appellant.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                             Case No. 23 MA 0054

                                   Criminal Appeal from the
                       Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
                                   Case No. 2022 CR 00449

                                            BEFORE:
            William A. Klatt, Retired Judge of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
                                     Sitting by Assignment,
                          Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

                                                JUDGMENT:
                                                  Affirmed.

 Atty. Gina DeGenova, Mahoning County Prosecutor, and Atty. Edward A. Czopur
 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

 Atty. Aaron M. Meikle, for Defendant-Appellant.

                                       Dated: February 13, 2024
                                                                                        –2–

 KLATT, J.

       {¶1}   Appellant, Lance D. Derrick, appeals the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences for seven counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor in
violation of R.C. 2907.321(A)(5), felonies of the fourth degree, following his plea of guilty
in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas. In his sole assignment of error,
Appellant contends the trial court did not make the statutory findings required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive sentences. For the following reasons, Appellant’s
sentence is affirmed.

                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶2}   The following facts were adduced at the sentencing hearing. Law
enforcement received a tip from Internet Crimes Against Children (“ICAC”), a national
network of task forces dedicated to investigating, prosecuting, and developing effective
responses to internet crimes against children. The ICAC traced thirty-one JPEG files
classified as child pornography to an Internet Protocol address owned by Appellant.
       {¶3}   A search predicated upon the tip yielded two mobile telephones, as well as
other devices, in Appellant’s possession.        Law enforcement discovered over one
thousand photographs and/or videos of child pornography on the mobile telephones.
       {¶4}   The videos depicted prepubescent girls engaged in various sex acts with
adult men and young boys. One of the photos depicted a nine-month old infant in a sexual
situation. Appellant subsequently admitted to authorities that he downloaded all of the
images.
       {¶5}   Defense counsel had the opportunity to review the images prior to the plea,
and described the same by saying “repulsive isn’t strong enough.” (3/21/23 Sentencing
Hrg., p. 7.) The trial court described the sheer number of images found on Appellant’s
devices as “mind [ ] boggling.” (Id., p. 12.)
       {¶6}   Appellant was indicted on fifteen counts of pandering obscenity involving a
minor. On February 8, 2023, Appellant entered into a Crim.R. 11 agreement, in which
the state dismissed eight of the counts in exchange for Appellant’s plea of guilty to the

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remaining seven counts. The agreement further indicated the state would seek an
aggregate seven-year prison term.
       {¶7}    On March 21, 2023, the trial court imposed one-year sentences for each of
the respective counts to be served consecutively. Next, the trial court explained Appellant
would be subject to a mandatory five-year term of post-release control, and the
consequences of a violation of post-release control and/or committing another felony
during that time.
       {¶8}    At that point, the trial court inquired as to whether there was any credit to
be applied to Appellant’s sentence for time served. The following colloquy occurred
between the trial court and the state:

       THE STATE: Your Honor, I believe there are two things that we need to do
       go through. Number one –

       THE TRIAL COURT: Sexual offender registry.

       THE STATE: Correct. And number two, the consecutive sentence language
       has to be put on the record.

       THE TRIAL COURT: [That is] right. [I am] sorry. I did have that prepared
       but I had to rush threw [sic] it.

(Id., p. 15-16.)

       {¶9}    As a consequence, the trial court explained Appellant was required to
register as a sexual offender. Next, the trial court made the following findings with respect
to the seven-year aggregate sentence:

       With regard to the sentence that was imposed previously, that sentence is
       imposed consecutively and according to – or pursuant to Revised Code
       Section 2929.14(C)(4), consecutive sentences are imposed because [they
       are] necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the
       defendant. [They are] not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
       [Appellant’s] conduct and the danger that the defendant poses to the public

Case No. 23 MA 0054
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      and these – in addition to some criminal history, the offenses were
      committed during the course of conduct, and the harm was so great or
      unusual that a single term does not reflect the seriousness of the
      [Appellant’s] conduct.

(3/21/23 Sentencing Hrg., p. 17.)

      {¶10} The sentencing entry reads in relevant part:

      Pursuant to [R.C.] 2929.14(C)(4), the Court finds that a consecutive
      sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish
      the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
      seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses
      to the public. In addition, the Court further finds that pursuant to [R.C.]
      2929.14(C)(4)(b) the offenses were committed during a course of conduct
      and the harm was so great/unusual that a single term does not reflect the
      seriousness of [Appellant’s] conduct. In addition, the Court further finds that
      pursuant to [R.C.] 2929.14(C)(4)(a) [Appellant] was under post-release
      control, specified statutory control, or awaiting trial/sentencing.

(3/22/2023 Sentencing Entry, p. 2.)

      {¶11} This timely appeal followed.

                               ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

      THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE TIMELY, NECESSARY, AND
      ADEQUATE FINDINGS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE
      SENTENCES.

      {¶12} When reviewing a felony sentence, an appellate court must uphold the
sentence unless the evidence clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s
findings under the applicable sentencing statutes or the sentence is otherwise contrary to
law. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1; R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(a)-(b).   The Ohio Supreme Court has defined “clear and convincing

Case No. 23 MA 0054
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evidence” as “that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance
of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief
or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St.
469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
       {¶13} Regarding consecutive sentences, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) reads:

       (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of
       multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison
       terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive sentence is
       necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
       and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness
       of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
       and if the court also finds any of the following:

       (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
       offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
       pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
       was under post-release control for a prior offense.

       (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
       more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
       multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
       prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
       of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

       (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
       sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the
       offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).

       {¶14} In State v. Thomas, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 18 MA 0025, 2020-Ohio-633,
we observed:

Case No. 23 MA 0054
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       It has been held that although the trial court is not required to recite the
       statute verbatim or utter “magic” or “talismanic” words, there must be an
       indication that the court found[:] (1) that consecutive sentences are
       necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender,
       (2) that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness
       of the offender’s conduct and to the danger posed to the public, and (3) one
       of the findings described in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c). State v.
       Bellard, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12-MA-97, 2013-Ohio-2956, ¶ 17. The court
       need not give its reasons for making those findings however. State v.
       Power, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 12 CO 14, 2013-Ohio-4254, ¶ 38. A trial
       court must make the consecutive sentence findings at the sentencing
       hearing and must additionally incorporate the findings into the sentencing
       entry. State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13-MA-125, 2015-Ohio-
       4100, ¶ 33-34, citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177,
       16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37.

Id. at ¶ 41.

       {¶15} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant advances two arguments. First,
the imposition of consecutive sentences prior to the trial court’s articulation of the statutory
factors reveals the statutory factors were “merely an afterthought and not actually factored
into the sentencing court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences.” (Appellant’s Brf.,
p. 3.) Second, the trial court did not reach a conclusion regarding the necessity of
protecting the public and punishing the offender, but instead merely read the statute into
the record. Specifically, the trial court stated, “[w]ith regard to the sentence that was
imposed previously, that sentence is imposed consecutively and according to -- or
pursuant to Revised Code Section 2929.14(C)(4), consecutive sentences are imposed
because [they are] necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the
defendant. (Emphasis added) (3/21/23 Sentencing Hrg., p. 17.)
       {¶16} With respect to Appellant’s first argument, we find the timing of the trial
court’s statement regarding the statutory factors does not demonstrate the trial court did
not consider the statutory factors prior to the imposition of sentence. In addition to its

Case No. 23 MA 0054
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statutory obligation pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the trial court was required to provide
notice of various aspects of the sentence, including post-release control and registration
requirements. Appellant cites no case law requiring the trial court to address the statutory
factors immediately following the imposition of sentence. Moreover, the trial court clearly
stated it had prepared its findings with respect to the imposition of consecutive sentences
prior to the hearing.
       {¶17} We addressed Appellant’s second argument, the trial court’s use of the
statute’s conditional language – “or,” in State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA
0041, 2017-Ohio-856. At the sentencing hearing in Williams, the trial court ordered
consecutive sentences accompanied by the following relevant findings:

       The court further finds that there was a conviction for multiple offenses and
       the court will therefore require the defendant to serve consecutive time,
       which is necessary to protect the public from future crime and punish –
       and/or to punish the offender, and is not disproportionate to the seriousness
       of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.

Id., ¶ 15. We concluded the trial court’s findings at the sentencing hearing, despite the
conditional language, complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and the Bonnell mandates. The
same is true here.
       {¶18} For the foregoing reasons, we find Appellant’s sole assignment of error is
meritless, and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences is affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, P.J., concurs.

Case No. 23 MA 0054
[Cite as State v. Derrick, 2024-Ohio-548.]

          For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error
 is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
 Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.
          A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
 in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that
 a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into
 execution.

                                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL

          This document constitutes a final judgment entry.