Court Opinion

ID: 9966143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 07:10:45.329596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:26.647275
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00172-CR
     ___________________________

  PETTIS MILAN WATSON, Appellant

                     V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 485th District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 1633674

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                    I. Introduction

      Appellant Pettis Milan Watson appeals his conviction for online solicitation of

a minor. Watson raised four issues in his opening brief, but after the State filed its

brief conceding that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting the

unauthenticated text messages that form the basis of Watson’s conviction and that

such admission was harmful, Watson filed a supplemental brief requesting that we

sustain that sole issue, waiving his other issues, and seeking that we reverse the trial

court’s judgment and remand this case for a new trial. We agree with the parties;

therefore, we reverse and remand.

                                    II. Background

      Because the State “is satisfied” with Watson’s statement of facts, we set forth

the relevant portions of that background here.1

      A.     The Investigation

      In February 2020, Sergeant Krystal Kaether2 with the Tarrant County Sheriff’s

Office was working an undercover sting operation when she posed and posted as a

      1
       See Rattani v. State, No. 02-19-00373-CR, 2020 WL 1949016, at *1 n.2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Apr. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Burton v. State, No. 05-08-01609-CR, 2009 WL 4879493, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Dec. 18, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (using facts from appellant’s
brief when the State agreed that “a satisfactory statement of the factual background”
had been set out in appellant’s brief).
      2
       Sergeant Kaether’s first name is misspelled as “Crystal” in the reporter’s record.

                                           2
fifteen-year-old girl on a social media app called “Whisper.”3 An individual with the

username “Person” initiated contact with her. This individual identified himself as

“Pettis” and sent several “selfie” images of a black male. Sergeant Kaether told the

individual that she was fifteen years old, and the individual responded that he was

twenty years old. After exchanging phone numbers, “Pettis” and Sergeant Kaether

continued communicating by text message.

      Over text message, the individual again identified himself as “Pettis” and sent

more images of the same black male. “Pettis” asked Sergeant Kaether whether she was

a virgin and made other sexually explicit comments. “Pettis” told Sergeant Kaether that

he wanted to hang out and offered to digitally penetrate her vagina. Sergeant Kaether

invited “Pettis” to meet her at a park, but nobody showed. The next day, “Pettis” and

Sergeant Kaether agreed to meet at her home, but again, nobody appeared.

      Sergeant Kaether ended her investigation and obtained an arrest warrant for

Watson.

      B.     Voir Dire of Sergeant Kaether and Objections to Evidence

      Prior to the start of testimony, defense counsel took Sergeant Kaether on voir

dire outside the presence of the jury. Sergeant Kaether explained that after she had

met an individual on the social media app Whisper, they had exchanged phone

      3
        As Sergeant Kaether explained during her testimony, “Whisper is an online
social media [app] where you can post a picture and [where] you can have text over
the picture. People call them ‘confessions.’ And people just say things, and then
there’s a private communication that can be started from whatever you post.”

                                          3
numbers. Sergeant Kaether then received several text messages from the phone

number that she was given and used a law-enforcement database to “connect”

Watson to the phone number used to send the text messages. This database provides

the individual’s name after a law-enforcement officer enters in the telephone number.

The information from this database, along with the selfie, led Sergeant Kaether to

identify Watson as the author of the messages.

      Defense counsel objected to the admission of the text messages because they

were not properly authenticated. Defense counsel specifically argued that the State

did not provide additional evidence beyond the “mere content of the message

itself”—such as forensic computer examination, subpoenaed phone records, or a

witness’s testimony that the text messages were similar to others sent by Watson—to

show that Watson was the author of the text messages. Defense counsel also argued

that the photographs of Watson were not, by themselves, enough to authenticate the

text messages because images of individuals are accessible to the public over the

internet; alternatively, if someone had access to another individual’s phone or

computer, then that person would also have access to the images thereon.

      The State responded by arguing that the totality of the evidence supported

authenticity because there was sufficient identifying information on the social media

application and over text messages to show that Watson was the author. On the

social media application, the individual provided his name and phone number and

sent a selfie.   Over text messages, the individual again stated his name in the

                                          4
conversation and sent a selfie, and then law enforcement researched the phone

number. All these sources, the State claimed, came back with “the same person”—

Watson. In turn, defense counsel argued that the State was attempting to prove

authentication by cross-referencing two non-authenticated pieces of evidence; in other

words, at least one source needed to be independently authenticated before it could

authenticate the other.

      After hearing argument, the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objections.

The trial court ruled that the images sent of Watson provided sufficient evidence to

corroborate the identity of the text messages’ author. However, the trial court did

grant Watson’s request for running objections to “all evidence about the text

messages and Whisper apps,” and defense counsel asserted those objections prior to

the introduction of each of the exhibits by the State.      The records of the text

messages, Whisper app conversations, and photographs were then admitted into

evidence for the jury.

      C.     Cross-Examination of Sergeant Kaether

      During cross-examination in the State’s case-in-chief, Sergeant Kaether made

multiple admissions that conclusively demonstrated her failure to take reasonable

steps to authenticate the text and Whisper app messages. First, she admitted that it

was possible for any person to use a “spoofing” website to send fraudulent text

messages from another person’s phone number. She admitted that she could have,

but did not, get a subpoena for Watson’s cell phone records, download his text

                                          5
messages, or compare them to the text messages sent in this case and that doing so

would have helped rule him in or out as the sender. She admitted (1) that she could

have, but did not, get a search warrant for Watson’s cell phones and computers and

(2) that she could have, but did not, use Cellebrite or other software to download their

contents and verify that the texts had come from Watson’s cell phone or other device

and that he was the one using the device at the time they were sent. She admitted that

she did not know who, if anyone, was living with Watson at the time the text messages

were sent, how many cell phones or other devices Watson possessed that could send

those text messages, or who had access to those devices. Finally, she admitted that she

had no personal knowledge as to the identity of the individual who had sent the text

messages.

       D.     Verdict

       During its deliberations, the jury sent back four separate notes asking for

additional exhibits and for testimony to be read back and then two notes informing

the trial court that the jury could not reach a verdict. After defense counsel twice

moved for a mistrial and was twice denied, the trial court proposed sending the jury

an Allen4 charge. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court submitted the Allen

charge, and shortly thereafter, the jury found Watson guilty of the charged offense.

       4
        Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154 (1896); see Barnett v. State, 189
S.W.3d 272, 277 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (explaining that an Allen charge is a
supplemental jury instruction that “reminds the jury that if it is unable to reach a
verdict, a mistrial will result, the case will still be pending, and there is no guarantee
that a second jury would find the issue any easier to resolve”).

                                             6
The parties agreed to a sentence of five years, probated over a period of five years,

and the trial court sentenced Watson accordingly.

                     III. Harmful Error in Admitting Texts

      In his first issue, Watson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting, over his objections, the text messages that Sergeant Kaether received from

a person identified as “Pettis.” The State concedes that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting the text messages and that the admission of this evidence was

harmful. We agree that harmful error is present.

      A.     Standard of Review

      We review the trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion—

an abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling falls outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Merrick v.

State, 567 S.W.3d 359, 375 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d).

      B.     Applicable Law

      Rule 901(a) of the Rules of Evidence defines authentication as a condition

precedent to admissibility of evidence that requires the proponent to make a threshold

showing that would be “sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the

proponent claims it is.” Tex. R. Evid. 901(a); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012).     Whether the proponent has crossed this threshold as

required by Rule 901 is one of the preliminary questions of admissibility contemplated

by Rule 104(a). Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638.

                                             7
      We have previously explained that authenticity in the context of electronic

messages

      includes a subsidiary issue: whether the messages were authored by the
      purported sender. Although the trial court’s preliminary authenticity
      determination is a “low bar,” evidence “that merely shows the
      association of a phone number with a purported sender—alone—might
      be too tenuous” to show authorship. Butler[ v. State], 459 S.W.3d [595,]
      601–02[ (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)] (analogizing a cell phone number to a
      return address on a letter); Gardner[ v. State, No. 02-14-00459-CR], 2015
      WL 4652718, at *2[ (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2015, pet. ref’d)
      (mem. op., not designated for publication)]; see Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at
      641–42 (observing that “cell phones can be purloined” and thus
      evidence “that a text message emanates from a cell phone number
      assigned to the purported author . . . without more . . . [i]s [in]sufficient
      to support a finding of authenticity”); Chavezcasarrubias[ v. State, No. 02-
      14-00418-CR], 2015 WL 6081502, at *2[ (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct.
      15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)]. To
      “bridge the logical gap” and permit an inference that the person
      associated with a specific cell phone number authored and sent the text
      messages at issue, the proponent is generally required to offer additional
      direct or circumstantial evidence—such as testimony from a witness with
      knowledge, contextual details indicating authorship, or distinctive
      content in the substance of the messages themselves. Butler, 459 S.W.3d
      at 601–03; see also Tex. R. Evid. 901(b).

Cain v. State, 621 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d).

      C.     Error Analysis

      As concisely summarized by the State,

      Here, the State’s only witness, Sergeant Kaether[,] testified that she had
      created an account on Whisper. On February 20, 2020, she received a
      message from someone with the profile name “Person,” who then said
      his name was Pettis. During this exchange, [“Pettis”] sent her a picture
      of [a black male that was allegedly] himself, and the two exchanged
      phone numbers. [“Pettis”] then texted her from the number he had
      provided and sent two more pictures of himself. Sergeant Kaether told
      the jury that she was able to connect the phone number from which she

                                           8
      was receiving the text messages to [Watson]. She also compared the
      pictures with his driver’s license photo[;] they were the same person.
      But other than this testimony, the State presented no evidence to “bridge
      the logical gap [that] would permit a proper inference that the purported
      author sent the message[s].” [Record references omitted.]

Because there was no evidence—such as testimony from a witness with knowledge,

contextual details indicating authorship, or distinctive content in the substance of the

messages themselves—that the text messages were authored by Watson, the trial

court thus abused its discretion by admitting them. See Mata v. State, 517 S.W.3d 257,

266–67 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (holding

that appellant did not demonstrate that the text messages were authentic when there

was no testimony of a witness with knowledge that would show the association of the

phone and its text messages with the complainant).

      D.     Harm Analysis

      Having concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by erroneously

admitting the text messages, we must review the record to determine if the error is

reversible. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2. Because the error is not constitutional, we apply

Rule 44.2(b). Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Patterson v. State, 508 S.W.3d 432, 440 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.).            That rule requires us to disregard any

nonconstitutional error that does not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Tex. R.

App. P. 44.2(b); Patterson, 508 S.W.3d at 440. A substantial right is affected when the

error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.” Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see King v. State,

                                           9
953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.

750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253 (1946)).          Conversely, an error does not affect a

substantial right if the appellate court has a fair assurance from an examination of the

record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury or that it had but a slight

effect. Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). In deciding that

question, we consider (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might be

considered in connection with other evidence, (2) the nature of the evidence

supporting the verdict, (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating

guilt, and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained-of error. Id.; Motilla v.

State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We may also consider the jury

instructions, the State’s theory and any defensive theories, closing arguments, and even

voir dire, if applicable. Haley, 173 S.W.3d at 518–19; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56.

       The State concedes that “the text messages were the only evidence supporting

[Watson’s] conviction” and that “[t]here is no question that their admission had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” We

agree, 5 and we sustain Watson’s first issue.6

       Although Watson raises a sufficiency challenge in his third issue, under the
       5

circumstances presented here, it does not provide greater relief than his evidentiary
challenge. When an appellant raises both a claim of trial-court evidentiary error and a
claim of insufficient evidence, there is often so much overlap that it is hard to separate
the two claims. See Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The
Court of Criminal Appeals has explained how this might play out:

                                            10
For example, suppose that the identity of a bank robber is proven
through the testimony of one and only one witness at trial. Suppose
further that this witness’[s] testimony is rank hearsay: “Little Nell told
me that Simon was the bank robber.” On appeal[,] a defendant might
raise a hearsay claim and a claim of sufficiency of the evidence to prove
identity. He will have the right to have the hearsay question considered
on its merits only if he objected properly at trial; he will have the right to
have the question of the sufficiency of evidence to prove identity
considered on its merits whether or not he objected.

        But an appellate court must consider all evidence actually
admitted at trial in its sufficiency review and give it whatever weight and
probative value it could rationally convey to a jury. Thus, even if the
trial court erred [by] admitting the witness’[s] testimony of Little Nell’s
out-of-court statement, the reviewing court must consider that
improperly[ ]admitted hearsay in assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove the bank robber’s identity. As Professors Dix and
Dawson explain[,] “An appellant . . . is not entitled to have an appellate
court first consider the appellant’s complaints concerning improper
admitted evidence and, if it resolves any of those in favor of the
appellant, to then, second, consider the sufficiency of the
properly[ ]admitted evidence to support the conviction.” There is much
logic in that rule:

       This rule rests in large part upon what is perceived as the
       unfairness of barring further prosecution where the State
       has not had a fair opportunity to prove guilt. A trial judge’s
       commission of trial error may lull the State into a false
       sense of security that may cause it to limit its presentation
       of evidence. Erroneous admission of hearsay evidence, for
       example, may cause the State to forego offering other
       evidence that would ultimately prove admissible.

       In our example, had the judge excluded the hearsay identification
evidence, the State might have put on other evidence to prove identity.
The remedy lies in a new trial, not an acquittal for insufficient evidence,
because “[t]he risk of frustrating the State’s legitimate interest in a full
opportunity to prove guilt, in any case, outweighs the defendant’s
interest in being subjected to trial only once.”

                                     11
                                   IV. Conclusion

      Having sustained Watson’s first issue, which is dispositive of his appeal, we

reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for a new trial.

                                                      /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                      Dabney Bassel
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: May 2, 2024

Id. at 489–90 (footnotes omitted). Based on this guiding precedent for when the sole
evidence presented was erroneously admitted, we agree with the parties that the case
should be remanded for a new trial.
      6
         As noted in the introduction, in Watson’s supplemental brief, he requested this
court to decide this case solely on his first issue and explained why we did not need to
reach other issues. We thus conclude that he has abandoned his remaining issues.
See, e.g., Gomez v. State, No. 13-09-00039-CR, 2011 WL 6142735, at *1 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (stating that appellant initially presented three issues on appeal but
abandoned his second issue regarding jury misconduct in his reply brief).

                                           12