Court Opinion

ID: 9619437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:27:51.396313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:40.835180
License: Public Domain

Olly Neal, Judge, dissenting. I agree that the affidavit failed to satisfy Rule 13.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and that such failure was a substantial violation. However, I differ with the majority and would hold that Deputy Spencer failed to act in “good faith” pursuant to United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon, the supreme court held that objective good-faith rebanee by a police officer on a facially valid search warrant will avoid the application of the exclusionary rule in the event the magistrate’s assessment of probable cause is found to be in error. Nonetheless, a police officer may not rely entirely on the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. In determining whether the good-faith exception is applicable, this court must decide whether it was objectively reasonable for a “well-trained police officer” to conclude that the search was supported by probable cause. A well-trained police officer is an officer who has reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, n. 20. In this case, Hampton was riding in the rear of the vehicle, behind the driver. The officer failed to find any drugs in Hampton’s possession. However, marijuana was found on the person of Shanneta Simmons, also a passenger in the vehicle, and on the rear passenger side of the vehicle. The amount of marijuana found was less than an ounce and would, thus, lead one to conclude that the marijuana was for personal use. Furthermore, this was not Hampton’s vehicle, and the owner of the vehicle did not live in Bradley County. Yet, Hampton was the only person to have his home searched. Deputy Spencer failed to offer facts that would lead a well-trained police officer to believe contraband or evidence of a crime would likely be found in Hampton’s residence. Here, the majority has held that the magistrate, who was also the trial judge at the suppression hearing, lacked substantial evidence to support a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court has said that “the courts must insist that the magistrate purport to ‘perform his ‘neutral and detached’ function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964)). A magistrate who fails to “’manifest that neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer when presented with a warrant application’ and who acts instead as ‘an adjunct law enforcement officer’ cannot provide valid authorization for an otherwise unconstitutional search.” Id. at 914. In Leon, the Supreme Court provided that the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant the magistrate issues must be objectively reasonable. I cannot find that Deputy Spencer, as a well-trained police officer, could have had an objectively reasonable basis to believe contraband would be found in Hampton’s home. I am authorized to state that Judge Griffen joins in this dissent.