Court Opinion

ID: 9708952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:36:23.15208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:53.778767
License: Public Domain

Liacos, J.
(concurring). The court today appears to suggest that the allowance of a motion in limine to bar the introduction of any evidence at trial which would have substantiated a necessity defense constituted nonprejudicial error. While I agree with this conclusion, I believe that the court’s reasoning sweeps too broadly.
A persuasive body of law has developed condemning the indiscriminate use of motions in limine “‘to choke off a valid defense in a criminal action,’ State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 311 (1979), or to ‘knock out’ the entirety of the evidence supporting a defense before it can be heard by the jury.” Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 314, 324-325 (1982). The use of such motions to prevent the defendant from introducing “evidence on an available defense not only distorts the traditional application of motions in limine, but likewise raises serious constitutional questions relating to an accused’s right to present a defense.” People v. Brumfield, 72 Ill. App. 3d 107, 113 (1979). Commonwealth v. O’Malley, supra at 323-325. State v. Bradley, 223 Kan. 710, 713 (1978). See People v. Williams, 60 Ill. App. 3d 529 (1978); State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, 29-32 (1979) (Billings, J., dissenting). Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-295 (1973). If the defendant’s right to have his day in court is to be guaranteed, he must be given the opportunity to establish even a tenuous defense. People v. Brumfield, supra. Lewis v. Buena Vista Mut. Ins. Ass’n, 183 N.W.2d 198, 200-201 (Iowa 1971). See Commonwealth v. O’Malley, supra. The court accepts the validity of these principles, but fails to recognize their clear implications.
Necessity is a legally viable defense to criminal behavior. W. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 50 (1972). *597Once a defendant offers to prove sufficient facts to establish each element of the defense, it is reversible error to disallow evidence of necessity. State v. Warshow, supra (Billings, J., dissenting). It is irrelevant to this point whether the trial court, or this court, would find later that the defendant had not introduced sufficient evidence on each element of the defense to generate a jury question.
That the defendants should be allowed to present their defense is required by a proper respect for the role of the jury in the criminal justice system.1 The essential purposes of the jury trial are twofold. First, the jury temper the application of strict rules of law by bringing the common sense judgment of a group of laymen to the case.2 Second, the jury stand as a check on arbitrary enforcement of the law. “Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). The legitimacy of a jury verdict depends on the ability of the jury to perform these two functions.
In the instant case, however, the defendants’ offer of proof fell short and satisfied only two elements of a necessity defense. They offered to prove that they were faced with a *598clear and imminent danger and that their actions reasonably could be expected to be effective.3 They did not offer to prove that there was no legal alternative which would have been effective in abating the danger, or that the Legislature had not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the values at issue. Since the defendants did not allege that they would introduce sufficient evidence on each element of the defense to generate a jury question, I agree with the court that “they were not prejudiced by their inability to present their evidence to the jury.” Supra at 595. Had their offer of proof been sufficient, they would have been entitled to present their evidence to the jury, and the allowance of the motions in limine would constitute reversible error. State v. Warshow, supra (Billings, J., dissenting).

 The importance of the jury in criminal prosecutions finds both constitutional and statutory expression. See art. 3, § 2, cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United States and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and G. L. c. 263, § 6, and G. L. c. 218, § 27A. Even if the right to present evidence supporting a defense is not constitutionally required, cf. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (Federal law), the legislative policy of statutes providing for jury trials mandates that we protect this right, cf. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), 384 Mass. 390, 392-393 (1981).

 As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “ [T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence.” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).

 In my view, the court goes too far in deciding that the defendants “could not have reasonably expected their actions to abate the alleged danger directly.” Supra at 593.