Court Opinion

ID: 9636857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:45:40.662372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:06.257469
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Gunther, J.:
I dissent from the majority opinion sustaining the judgments of sentence in these appeals. My view compels reversal.
These appeals involve two basic questions which control the disposition of all other questions raised: (1) The jurisdiction of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Dauphin County to indict and try appellants for the crimes of cheating by fraudulent pretenses and conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Department of Highways of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdicts on these charges. Appellants were convicted of conspiring to submit and having submitted two false invoices for 8376.15 tons of cinders for use in Westmoreland County when only 5341.9 tons allegedly were delivered, or a shortage of 3034.25 tons valued at $4,-757.29.
On January 17, 1956, a contract was awarded by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to David E. Ankney for the delivery to certain points in Westmoreland County of 5,000 tons of cinders at $1.46 per ton and 3,000 tons at $1.52 per ton, for a total price of $11,-869.00. Ankney testified that he never received any requests from the superintendent of the State Highway Department for Westmoreland County or from any other person for the delivery of cinders under the contract. About a year after the contract was awarded, appellant Petrosky approached Ankney and stated he would like to fill the order and take it over. Ankney agreed to turn the purchase order over to him, and in return, Petrosky agreed to pay Ankney the sum of *114eight hundred dollars from the contract payments made. There was no formal assignment of the purchase order. Petrosky merely delivered cinders for Ankney under the order awarded to him. The invoices were prepared by Petrosky on Ankney’s billheads and sent by him to the State Highway Department office at Greensburg, Westmoreland County to be processed and ultimately forwarded by that office to the main office at Harrisburg for approval and payment. Subsequently, the State Treasurer sent a check for $12,-394.58 to Ankney at Ligonier, Pennsylvania. Ankney cashed the check and, in turn, gave his personal check to Petrosky in the amount of $11,594.58.
Appellants, Sell and Fait, were assistant superintendents in Westmoreland County for the Department of Highways. Each was in charge of certain designated townships but neither of them had authority to order or ordered or requested deliveries of cinders. This authority was vested in Patrick J. McShane, the superintendent for the area. Each assistant superintendent had several caretakers under his jurisdiction and each caretaker, in turn, had a number of laborers working under his control and supervision. When cinders were delivered to a stock pile in any of the localities,. any state employe on hand at the time signed the delivery slips or tickets which accompanied a truck driver for each load, one copy being retained by the driver and the other copy being retained for state records.
The delivery tickets were retained in the field (stock pile location) until a series of deliveries, usually covering several days, had been made, at which time these tickets were turned over to the caretaker in charge of the stock pile. He then compiled them on a state form No. 2140, called material delivery records. Appellants, Sell and Fait, signed these forms with their respective caretakers and then forwarded them *115together with the supporting delivery tickets, to the main office in Greensburg, Westmoreland 'County, for comparison with the purchase order and for checking for accuracy. From these records, state invoices, known as form No. 222, were prepared and sent by that office to Harrisburg for audit and payment.
Appellants’ first contention is that Dauphin County lacked jurisdiction or venue over the offenses here charged. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, urges that this contention has been effectively disposed of under our ruling in Commonwealth v. Prep, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 442, 142 A. 2d 460. We there held that a prosecution for the crime of cheating by fraudulent pretenses should be brought in the county where the offense is completed, that is, where the chattel, money or valuable security is obtained. We further held that such a crime was completed when checks were mailed in Dauphin County by the State Treasurer and that the postmaster was acting as an agent for the accused. When the checks were posted in Dauphin County they were, in effect, delivered to the accused in Dauphin County and this act, by reasons of the selection of the postmaster as agent for the recipient, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Quarter Sessions of Dauphin County.
In view of our holding in the Prep case, supra, there is no doubt that if the facts of the instant case were identical or sufficiently similar to that case, the question of jurisdiction or venue would no longer be an issue. I do not believe, however, that the facts of the instant case can be applied to that case. The contract for supplying cinders to the Commonwealth was made with Ankney, and it was he who furnished the required bond to the Commonwealth for faithful performance; the State Treasurer drew the check, dated February 8,1957, to D. E. Ankney as payee and mailed it to him at Ligonier, Pennsylvania, where it was re*116ceived, deposited for collection and cashed by Ankney. Any transaction completed in Dauphin County, therefore, was completed with Ankney who is not a defendant in these proceedings. The Commonwealth’s evidence disclosed that Ankney drew a check, dated February 13, 1957, payable to Petrosky, drawn on the Mellon National Bank and Trust Company, Ligonier, Pennsylvania. In the normal course of events, the check made payable to Ankney cleared the depositary bank of the Commonwealth before he drew his check made payable to Petrosky. Under the agency theory, the postmaster in Harrisburg was the agent for Ankney and not for Petrosky. There is no evidence that Petrosky received any Commonwealth funds whatever, and any funds received by him were received from Ankney and drawn on a bank in Westmoreland County, cashed in Westmoreland County.
It is urged, however, that because of the alleged agency manipulation of Petrosky, the postmaster in Harrisburg, in mailing the State Treasurer’s check, also became the agent of Petrosky and the co-defendants, Sell and Fait. The difficulty with this argument is that there is no evidence of any agency relationship1 between Ankney and Petrosky nor can one be inferred from their actions. The evidence, on the contrary, shows that Ankney assigned the performance of the contract to Petrosky (and this is alleged in the indictment) and that Petrosky agreed to pay him eight hundred dollars for filling the order. Ankney did not agree to supervise the filling of the order or to take any steps, either directly or indirectly, in filling-the same. While it is true, so far as the Commonwealth was concerned, that the responsibility of faithful performance remained with Ankney so far as his bond was concerned, the transaction between Ankney and Petrosky was not that of agency but that of an independent undertaking. This is so, notwithstanding the *117fact that the Commonwealth was not notified of the assignment. The postmaster in Harrisburg, therefore, could have acted as the agent of a disclosed principal but not as an agent for an undisclosed agent or agents. Moreover, defendants Sell and Fait were not present when the agreement was concluded between Ankney and Petrosky; they were not parties to it either directly or indirectly, and it is difficult to understand under what theory the postmaster could have acted as an agent for Sell and Fait.
The crime of obtaining any chattel, money, or valuable security by fraudulent pretenses under section 836 of The Penal Code of 1939, June 24, P. L. 872, as amended, 18 P.S. section 4836, is completed when, and only when, there coexists the following elements: (1) A false pretense; (2) obtaining of property of value thereby; and (3) an intent to cheat and defraud. Commonwealth v. Prep, supra; Commonwealth v. Hancock, 177 Pa. Superior Ct. 585, 112 A. 2d 407. The crime of cheating by fraudulent pretense is not complete until property is obtained by the defendant or defendants. As stated in Commonwealth v. Schmunk, 22 Pa. Superior Ct. 348, 354, affirmed by the Supreme Court at 207 Pa. 544, 56 A. 1088: “ . to obtain from another person any chattel, money or valuable security with intent to cheat or defraud any person of the same,’ within the meaning of our criminal statute means and refers to the final step in the succession of rights and events by which the defendant gets, secures and obtains the chattel, money or valuable security, so as to complete the offense, and consummates his purpose.” See also Commonwealth v. Randle, 119 Pa. Superior Ct. 217, 180 A. 720. There is no proof-here that any of the defendants obtained money or anything of value from the Commonwealth or that any one aided or assisted in securing the payment of such money from the Commonwealth. It does not follow that Dauphin *118County has jurisdiction in all cases simply because the money or thing of value may be traced directly or indirectly as coming from Harrisburg without regard as to where, under what circumstances and by whom such are received.
The crime of conspiracy, insofar as jurisdiction or venue is concerned, is open to the same objections. In Commonwealth v. Mezick, 147 Pa. Superior Ct. 410, 24 A. 2d 762, we said: “But it is well settled that prosecution for criminal conspiracy may be brought in the county where the unlawful combination or confederation was formed, or in any county where an overt act was committed by any of the conspirators in furtherance of that unlawful combination or confederacy.” All appellants contend that Dauphin County had no jurisdiction to try them on this charge since any alleged conspiracy was formed and completed in Westmoreland County. The evidence discloses no overt act in Dauphin County committed in furtherance of the object of the alleged conspiracy. Admitting that Petrosky submitted allegedly false or fraudulent invoices in Westmoreland County with the alleged intention that they be acted upon and forwarded to Harrisburg for payment, there is nothing to show that such intention was effectuated by payment to him in Dauphin County. Moreover, insofar as defendants Sell and Fait are concerned, whatever overt act they are alleged to have performed or committed terminated in Westmoreland County. While they might have been responsible for any subsequent act in furtherance of the objects of the alleged conspiracy, nothing has been shown here to give Dauphin County jurisdiction over this offense.
I conclude, therefore, that Dauphin County did not have jurisdiction over the offenses here charged and that such prosecutions should have commenced in Westmoreland County.
*119I now turn to the second question involved, whether under the Act of 1951, June 15, P. L. 585, 19 P.S. section 871, -the motions in arrest of judgment, because of insufficiency of evidence to sustain the verdicts, should have been granted. As stated in Commonwealth v. McSorley, 189 Pa. Superior Ct. 223, 150 A. 2d 570, the Act imposes upon the court the duty to consider the entire record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the defendants. We must reject all of the defendants’ evidence which the jury had a right to disbelieve and accept as true all of the Gommonwealth’s evidence upon which the jury could have properly based its verdicts.
The Commonwealth contends that Petrosky delivered 3034.21 tons of cinders less than what should have been delivered and that he submitted two material delivery records or caused the same to be submitted in which such shortages are disclosed. The first record purported to show that 2923.90 tons of cinders were delivered on December 4, 5 and 6, 1956, at Five Points, Salem Township, Westmoreland County when, in fact, only 600 tons were actually delivered, thus creating a shortage of 2323.90 tons. The second record purported to show that 1274.85 tons were delivered in Penn and North Huntingdon Townships when only 564.54 tons were actually delivered, creating a shortage of 710.31 tons. The delivery slips at Five Points were signed by R. J. Sell and Richard Y. Brahosky, the caretaker, whereas those at Penn and North Huntingdon Townships were signed by Charles E. Fait and Charles E. Weaver, the caretaker.
The evidence disclosed that when a truck driver of the defendant Petrosky appeared at the respective dumping sites with a load of cinders, he handed to the receiver of the load a pad or book containing original white delivery slips and carbon copies of the same. These slips were issued by Salem Supply Company *120which was owned by Petrosky. The representatives of the Commonwealth signed all slips and retained the original while the duplicates were returned by the driver to Petrosky as evidence of delivery.
The Commonwealth called three witnesses who were on the scene when the deliveries of the cinders were made. Richard V. Brahosky testified that during the deliveries made on December 4 and 5, 1956, he was on a hunting trip and that Howard S. Elliot, a laborer, receipted for shipments during those two days. He stated that at this delivery point “we got an awful lot of cinders at that time. Whenever we were stocking them, we had an extra high pile there because they were right up high.” He further stated that this stock pile would hold approximately 3000 tons of cinders but that he couldn;t be exact as he was not an engineer. Upon his return on December 6, 1956, he testified that additional deliveries were made and that he was present for these deliveries. He signed the 2140 form and stated that he would not have signed this form if, in fact, he did not receive all the cinders shown on the form. Howard Elliot testified that cinders were delivered on December 4 and 5, 1956, and that more than 50 loads may have been received in that period. He testified that more than one trucker delivered cinders to the site but the only one he could remember was Battistella. Mrs. Elizabeth Battistella testified that her records showed delivery of 600 tons of cinders •by her trucks on December 4 and 5, 1956 and that nothing was delivered by her trucks on December 6th.
In connection with this testimony, the Commonwealth attempted to prove that only 600 tons of cinders were actually delivered — that delivered by the trucks of Battistella Trucking Company. However, from the testimony of these witnesses for the Commonwealth, it became obvious that more than 600 tons of cinders were actually delivered. Elliot testified that more than one *121trucker delivered cinders during the two day period he was in charge and Brahosky testified to additional deliveries by other truckers on December 6, 1956.
E. J. Mellman, auditor for the Justice Department, testified that in arriving at the shortage claimed by the Commonwealth, he examined only the delivery records of Battistella Trucking Company and had no other records of deliveries by other truckers submitted to him.
Regarding the alleged shortage of deliveries to Penn and North Huntingdon Townships, Charles Weaver, caretaker, testified that during the period from December 3 to December 7, 1956, he was the caretaker at the two stations involved; that he kept some of the records — but not all — in a little book; that on December 3rd, his records showed a delivery of 12 loads at one station, 36 loads on December 4th, but kept no accurate records of deliveries for the vendor’s (Petrosky’s) trucks but that whatever were made were turned over to the Commonwealth; that accurate delivery records were kept by him only of the Wareham trucks; that on December 6th, Wareham delivered 9 loads to the other stock pile station and that on December 7, 1956, Wareham trucks delivered 8 loads plus “whatever the vendor was.” He further testified that there were records of deliveries other than the 74 loads he definitely kept records on but that such deliveries were turned over and that there could have been more than 74 loads during this period. Weaver testified that he was unable to make out the first material delivery record, form 2140, and that he gave the delivery slips from the stock piles to Fait and requested him to make out the first form. Thereafter, Weaver made out Ms own forms. This testimony also disclosed that defendant Fait was on a hunting trip when these first deliveries were made and delivery slips received and that upon his return Fait made up the 2140 form from delivery slips handed to him by Weaver. When he and *122Fait signed this form, he, Weaver, was satisfied that the cinders represented thereon had been delivered. Just how, in view of this evidence, Fait was supposed to have signed false and fraudulent form 2140 records has not been disclosed by either this witness or any other Commonwealth witness.
In connection with the audit conducted by Mellman on these deliveries, he testified that he used only the actual records furnished by Weaver as contained in his little book to arrive at the shortage claimed by the Commonwealth. If other records were available, he did not consider these in arriving at the alleged shortage.
The testimony relied upon to sustain the verdict against Petrosky came primarily from Ankney. In addition to what has been referred to heretofore, evidence was produced to show that six months after the dates set forth in the two 2140 forms in question and several months after payment was actually made and received by Ankney, Petrosky asked one of his employes, James G. Lattimer, to change the original truck drivers’ delivery slips by having him sign new forms as weigh-master.1 While conceding that such changes were improper and done under somewhat suspicious circumstances, such new slips could have had no bearing on any charge of fraudulent pretenses since the original slips were submitted to the Greensburg office of the State Highways Department on December 21, 1956. Neither could such evidence sustain the charge of conspiracy in view of the unequivocal testimony of Brahosky and Weaver that they had not seen these later delivery slips and that form 2140 was not made up from these slips but was made from the original de*123livery slips in their possession at the time. Such forms were signed by defendants Sell and Fait at that time and not subsequent to the rewriting of the delivery slips.
The testimony of the Commonwealth, brought out under cross-examination, disclosed that when all the forms 2140 were compiled as against the invoices submitted by Petrosky, the deliveries totalled the 8076.15 tons for which a check was issued to Ankney. There was no evidence presented which disclosed any short deliveries except as testified to by Mellman, the auditor, who stated that based upon the records he examined or was instructed to examine, the shortage contended for by the Commonwealth was indicated.
Such testimony as here produced fell far short of the evidence necessary to sustain conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The false or fraudulent pretense is predicated on two allegedly false invoices submitted by Petrosky on billheads of Ankney but there was no evidence produced to show in what respect these invoices were fraudulent. It is admitted by the Commonwealth that neither Sell nor Fait either prepared or presented these invoices. There was no evidence, except suspicion or surmise, that the forms 2140 signed by Fait or Sell were in fact false or that either Fait or Sell knew they were false. Such convictions based upon suspicion or surmise cannot stand. Commonwealth v. McSorley, supra.
Criminal intent may be inferred by the jury from facts and circumstances which are of such nature as to prove defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A. 2d 820; Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 94 A. 2d 743. Guilt must be proved and not conjectured. The reasonable inference of guilt must be based on facts and conditions proved and not on surmise. Commonwealth v. Bausewine, 354 Pa. 35, 46 A. 2d 491. The only cir-*124cums'tance which in any way connects Fait and Sell to the crimes charged is the signing of two forms 2140. This, of course, was normal procedure and no corrupt motive may be inferred from this act alone. The inference. of guilt contended for by the Commonwealth could be drawn equally in favor of the defendants. Where two mutually inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same set of circumstances, a jury may not be permitted to guess what inference it will adopt, especially where one of two guesses will deprive a defendant of his liberty. Commonwealth v. New, 354 Pa. 188, 47 A. 2d 450.
The elements of the offense of conspiracy are: (1) a combination of two or more persons; (2) with criminal intent or corrupt motive; (3) to do a criminal or unlawful act, or an act not itself unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. Commonwealth v. Kirk, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 123, 14 A. 2d 914. I cannot find that sufficient evidence was produced to make out these elements.
I would sustain the objection to jurisdiction and I would grant the motions in arrest of judgment. Basic legal principles cannot be stretched to a point where they become meaningless simply on the desire to convict. I consider the majority decision as the path toward misconstruction of those principles of law we have considered as settled.

 These delivery slips at the time were not required to be submitted to Harrisburg as part of the documents required for payment, and the Commonwealth did not nor could have relied on such slips in making payment.