Court Opinion

ID: 9788933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:22:45.037804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:17.723950
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
dissenting.
The right to use one's property is guaranteed by the Colorado Constitution, although it is subject to the proper exercise of the government's police power. See W. Income Props., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 174 Colo. 533, 485 P.2d 120 (1971). Zoning is one manifestation of the government's police power to regulate property use. See City of Colorado Springs v. Securcare Self Storage, Inc., 10 P.3d 1244 (Colo.2000). As the majority acknowledges, however, local governments like Pitkin County do not possess a general zoning police power-at least not before today. Rather, they "have only those powers that are expressly granted to them by the Colorado Constitution or by the General Assembly." Maj. op. at 605. In the *609case before us, the General Assembly has granted local governments the authority to bypass standard zoning procedures (and the due process interests they serve) through moratoria-but only through moratoria lasting six months or less. See § 30-28-121, C.R.S. (2006). Today, the majority approves a moratorium of limitless duration, one effective "until formally terminated by the Board of County Commissioners." Because such a moratorium exceeds the seope of authority granted to local governments by the General Assembly, I respectfully dissent.
The majority's opinion repeatedly refers to the moratorium at issue in this case as "temporary." See, eg., maj. op. at 608, 605, 607. It is true that, in this particular case, the Pitkin County Commissioners decided to end the moratorium after ten months. Id. at 608. But there is nothing in the moratorium itself that would indicate that it had an end date; the end date was purely discretionary with the County Commissioners. See Pitkin County Ordinance No. 18-2003 at 17 ("This moratorium shall remain in effect until formally terminated by the Board of County Commissioners."). In other words, although the moratorium did in fact last ten months, there was nothing preventing it from lasting twenty or thirty months. Nor would the majority's opinion prevent such a result so long as a court-after extended litigation between the county and affected property owners-deemed the duration "reasonable." Maj. op. at 607, 608.
The Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of 1974 (the "Land Use Enabling Act") gives "broad authority to local governments to plan for and regulate the use of land within their respective jurisdictions." § 29-20-102(1), CRS. (2006). Yet that "broad authority" is not unlimited. Section 29-20-107 provides that "where other procedural or substantive requirements for the planning for or regulation of the use of land are provided by law, such requirements shall control." The six-month time limitation on moratoria contained in section 30-28-121 is such a "requirement{ ] for the planning for or regulation of the use of land ... provided by law" that should control in this case.
The majority concludes that the six-month limitation does not apply here because seetion 80-28-121 deals only with moratoria imposed without a hearing, and a hearing was held in this case. Maj. op. at 607-08. But the hearing was held on April 9, 2003-nearly a month after the Board of County Commissioners adopted the moratorium.1 The moratorium was thus imposed, at least for part of the time, without a hearing. More importantly, the fact that section 30-28-121 permits moratoria to be imposed without a hearing does not imply that the six-month time limitation can be dispensed with as long as a hearing is held. The six-month limitation is still a "requirement[ ] ... provided by law." $ 30-28-1211. The General Assembly has allowed local governments to depart from standard zoning procedures- and the due process interests that they protect2-but only for a temporary period of time: six months or less. The majority attempts to craft a substitute moratoria power: one that is limitless on its face but in fact lasts for what a court, after the fact, deems to be a "reasonable" amount of time. The problem with the majority's substitute power is that it bears little resemblance to the authority actually granted local governments by the General Assembly.
As the majority recognizes, the "requirements" clause contained in the Land Use Enabling Act is a restatement of the "familiar rule that a specific provision controls over a more general provision." Maj. op. at 606, 607 (citing Pennobscot v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 642 P.2d 915, 919 (Colo.1982)). Section 30-28-121 is a very specific provision dealing with moratoria; the Land Use Enabling Act, by contrast, talks in broad and general terms and contains no reference to moratoria. See id. at 607-08. Section 80-
*61028-121's six-month limitation must therefore control. This is not a case in which the two provisions in question were adopted at different times but address the same subject. Cf. West v. Roberts, 148 P.3d 1037, 1046-47 (Colo.2006) (Eid, J., dissenting). In this case, the General Assembly enacted the Land Use Enabling Act and the temporary moratoria provision in 1974 in the same legislation.3 See 1974 Colo. Sess. Laws 353, 353-55. Under the majority's reasoning, the General Assembly imposed the six-month time limitation on moratoria while at the same time endowing local governments with the authority to evade that limitation.
The majority also finds it significant that section 80-28-121 uses the term "zoning," and suggests that the provision is inapplicable in this case because the Pitkin County Commissioners were engaged in the master planning process. Maj. op. at 607-08. Yet the majority's distinction between master planning and zoning is refuted by the moratorium itself, which states that "[the moratorium is to allow time to conduct a comprehensive study of what appropriate soning and development regulations should be imposed as a result of the Master Plan process." Pitkin County Ordinance No. 13-2003 at ¶5 (cited in maj. op. at 604) (emphasis added); see also id. at 16 ("It is anticipated by the Board of County Commissioners that an appropriate analysis of the area and adoption of necessary zoning regulations can be accomplished within sixty (60) days.") (cited in maj. op. at 604) (emphasis added). We, ourselves, have blurred the distinction between zoning (land use regulation that is legislatively imposed and binding) and master planning (land use planning that is merely advisory), finding that a master plan can be binding as long as it is legislatively imposed. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Conder, 927 P.2d 1339, 1347 (Colo.1996); but see id. at 1351 (Kourlis, J., dissenting). Clearly, the County Commissioners in this case were anticipating that they would enforce the provisions of the master plan through zoning regulations. The end result of today's decision is that this court is willing to relax the distinction between master planning and zoning when doing so would expand government authority, as in Conder, but not when it would limit government authority, as here.
Finally, I respectfully dissent from the majority's reliance upon "the local government's necessarily implied authority to adopt a reasonable moratorium of sufficient duration to prepare a master plan," maj. op. at 608 (emphasis added)-authority that the majority divines from "all the applicable provisions of Colorado's land use statutes," id. at 607. While we previously have recognized that local governments have incidental powers necessary to effectuate the express delegation of authority, see City of Central v. Axton, 150 Colo. 414, 373 P.2d 300 (1962), the authority to issue moratoria that the court recognizes today is so limitless that it can only be described as a general zoning police power. This notion is entirely inconsistent with section 80-28-121, which expressly imposes a time limitation on moratoria.
A moratorium that lasts longer than the six months provided in section 30-28-121 may be a land use tool that counties need to manage growth. See Amicus Brief of Boulder County and Colorado Counties, Inc. (arguing for broad development moratorium powers). But they need to get that authority from the General Assembly, not from us. I therefore respectfully dissent from the court's opinion.
I am authorized to state that Justice COATS joins in this dissent.

. Pitkin County's home rule charter permits the imposition of "emergency'' ordinances prior to a hearing. See Pitkin County Home Rule Charter

. See Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872, 878 (Colo.1983) (holding that the enactment of zoning regulations "through the usual legislative process" specified by Colorado law is consistent with due process).

. Section 2 of the Enabling Act now appears in section 30-28-121 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.