Court Opinion

ID: 9599882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:22:02.525196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:47.244362
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I find the evidence in the case sub judice supportive of the superior court’s subjective determination that the City did not act in “bad faith” in condemning the subject properties.
After the City filed exceptions to the special master’s recommendation, the superior court found that the City did not act in bad faith, arbitrarily, capriciously and beyond its powers in condemning the subject property. The superior court supported this ruling after determining that the City is not estopped to exercise its condemnation powers based on Stephen T. Boland’s unauthorized representations to the Edwardses regarding the City’s future condemnation plans. The superior court also pointed out that the City complied with Marietta City Code § 7-5005 (a) (5), as well as Georgia’s Historic Preservation Act, after the special master’s finding that the City had acted in bad faith in exercising its condemnation powers; that (even though *627the City was not required to provide the Edwardses with notice of its February 9, 1994 agenda to consider condemning the subject realty) a member of the City’s city council informed the Edwardses about this agenda item on February 8, 1994, and that (while the City did not study or consider alternatives to taking the subject property before voting to condemn the land) the City conducted such studies after its mayor and city council voted to condemn the Edwardses’ land on February 9, 1994. The superior court, thus, granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, denied Weir and the Edwardses’ joint motion for summary judgment and remanded the proceedings for a special master to determine the amount of compensation due.1
The issue of necessity for taking property is a matter of legislative discretion which will not be judicially controlled unless the authority acted in bad faith or beyond its powers. City of Atlanta v. Heirs of Champion, 244 Ga. 620, 621 (261 SE2d 343). The term “bad faith” is equated with conscious wrongdoing motivated by improper interest, fraud or ill will. Concept Capital Corp. v. DeKalb County, 255 Ga. 452, 453 (3) (339 SE2d 583). The presence of such intent is for the superior court upon de novo review and the superior court’s findings in this regard are reviewable under an “any evidence” standard. Habersham Downs Homeowners’ Assn. v. Dept. of Transp., 212 Ga. App. 686 (442 SE2d 868). See Craven v. Ga. Power Co., 248 Ga. 79, 80 (281 SE2d 568). Although the case sub judice appeared before the superior court upon opposing motions for summary judgment, the superior court stated in its summary judgment order that the matter of the City’s intent is “subject to de novo review. . . .” Thus, contrary to the majority’s statement that “the record does not reflect that the superior court . . . acted in its capacity as factfinder,” I believe the superior court properly defined its role as factfinder before adjudicating the issue of the City’s alleged bad faith and that the City properly resolved this subjective question of fact. I therefore believe that this Court must apply an “any evidence” standard in reviewing the superior court’s findings. See MARTA v. Central Parking System of Ga., 167 Ga. App. 649, 652 (3) (307 SE2d 93). It is from this perspective that I find the superior court’s evidentiary findings supportive of that court’s determination that the City was not improperly motivated when its officials voted to condemn the subject properties. See Threatt v. Fulton County, 266 Ga. 466, 471 (6) (467 SE2d 546). Further, I do not agree with the majority that evidence of *628the City’s appointment of Stephen T. Boland to facilitate the “Dosser House” sale bears on the City’s alleged bad faith in condemning any portion of that property. Absent conclusive proof that the City’s mayor and city council authorized Stephen T. Boland’s unauthorized representations regarding the City’s purported decision not to condemn any portion of the “Dosser House” property, or that the City’s mayor and city council were aware of such a statement, I would affirm the superior court’s conclusion that Stephen T. Boland’s unauthorized statements do not estop the City from condemning a portion of that property. “Powers of all public officers are defined by law and all persons must take notice thereof. The public may not be estopped by the act of any officer done in the exercise of an unconferred power.” OCGA § 45-6-5.
It is my view that the superior court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary judgment, denying Weir and the Edwardses’ joint motion for summary judgment, and remanding the proceedings for a special master to determine the amount of compensation due.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews and Judge Eldridge join in this dissent.

 Although the issue of valuation remains in the trial court, it appears this Court is vested with jurisdiction to consider the direct appeal of this interlocutory order because the superior court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Compare Rabon v. Dept. of Transp., 221 Ga. App. 629 (472 SE2d 105), and cites.