Court Opinion

ID: 9712524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:55:28.152017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.721129
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting:
This is an appeal by the natural mother from a Final Decree involuntarily terminating her parental rights in her three-year old son. A bench decree1 had been issued on *103October 6, 1980 following a hearing on the petition2 of Children’s Services of Erie County (CSEC) to terminate her rights. Exceptions to the decree were filed and argument thereon was held on or about February 19, 1981.3 At that time, the chancellor directed CSEC to give the mother reasonable opportunity to visit her son and deferred final action on the petition. On May 18, 1981, the chancellor terminated the reinstituted visitation pending a further hearing, acting upon an unverified Motion to Terminate *104Visitation4 presented by CSEC. On June 3, 1981, a hearing was held and, on June 10, 1981, the chancellor entered his Final Decree from which this appeal is brought.
The chancellor based his initial decree5 on his finding that, as to the mother:
a) she, by conduct which continued for a period of at least six (6) months has refused and failed to perform parental duties;
and
b) the repeated and continued incapacity, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused such child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for the physical or mental well-being of said child and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent;
as grounded in § 311(1) and § 311(2) of the Adoption Act of 1970.6
To be determined on this appeal is whether the orphans’ court properly applied those sections of the Act to the facts in the instant case. While our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the orphans’ court’s decree termi*105nating parental rights is supported by competent evidence, In re D.K.W., 490 Pa. 134, 415 A.2d 69 (1980), the court’s inferences, deductions and conclusions are subject to review. In re Adoption of J.A.B., 487 Pa. 79, 408 A.2d 1363 (1979).
A careful review of the chancellor’s four page opinion filed June 10, 1981, the Petition filed by CSEC, and the entire trial transcript compels the conclusion that competent evidence was not presented to support a decree of termination of parental rights under either § 311(1) or § 311(2) and that the inferences and conclusions of the chancellor were in error. I would, therefore, vacate the lower court decree.
§ 311(1)
In the instant case, the six month period during which CSEC alleges the mother refused and failed to perform parental duties elapsed from the mother’s last visit with the child on January 18,1980 until the filing of the form petition for termination on June 26, 1980. The child had been taken from the mother at the age of one month by CSEC and was adjudicated dependent two weeks later under circumstances where it was found that the child had failed to thrive. The child has remained in placement ever since.
The child suffered from a developmental lag and had a blockage in the lungs which induced vomiting on occasion when improperly fed. In addition, the child was diagnosed as having cerebral palsy.
Between the time of the removal of the child from its mother’s home and early 1980, regular, frequent visits occurred between the mother and the child. During early 1980, the protective service caseworker—who was the only witness for the petitioner at the first hearing—was on strike along with her colleagues. Normally, subsequent visits between the mother and child were arranged at the conclusion of each visit in the foster home. The January 18, 1980 visit had been attended by a case aid from CSEC and no future visit was arranged. The caseworker conceded that the mother had requested visitation on April 7, 1980. This request was refused by the caseworker, in spite of a court *106order dated February 1, 1980 ordering visitation, on the grounds that the caseworker had not had any contact from the mother since before the strike and the caseworker’s belief that a visit at that time “would not be in the best interest of the child.”
On April 11, 1980, an order of court was issued placing all future visitation “at the discretion of the agency.”7
All of the visitations between the mother and her child were of short duration, lasting between fifteen and ninety minutes. In October 1979, a physician member of the multidisciplinary team had recommended that the mother be afforded the opportunity to regain her son for a one-week trial period, with daily supervision by the caseworker. When asked at trial why this recommendation had not been implemented, the caseworker testified:
First of all, the agency did not agree with that. We did not feel that it was in the best interest of the child, and based on the fact that the child had not been living with his mother and that she had only been visiting with him for maybe an hour a week, we felt it would be detrimental to the child’s health.
Early on, an evaluation had been made of the home in which the mother was residing. The caseworker found the home situation favorable, but felt that the adults with whom the mother was residing had been “uncooperative” with the *107agency. At a later date, the mother was abused by the adult male in that home and was forced to move out.
There is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that the mother refused to perform parental duties as contemplated by § 311(1) of the Adoption Act. Nor does the chancellor’s opinion address itself to any facts which, in the opinion of the lower court, would support this result. A parent is required to exert herself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life. In re Adoption of M.M., 492 Pa. 457, 424 A.2d 1280 (1981). But even where there has been no contact between parent and child for a period of more than six months—which is not the case here—a determination of failure to perform parental duties may not be found where the totality of circumstances does not warrant a termination of parental rights. In re Adoption of J.A.B., id., 487 Pa. at 89-90, 408 A.2d at 1368. A finding of abandonment will not be predicated on parental conduct which is reasonably explained or which resulted from circumstances beyond the parent’s control. It may result only when a parent has failed to utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship. In re Burns, 474 Pa. 615, 379 A.2d 535 (1977). A parent’s performance of parental obligations must be measured in light of what would be expected of an individual in circumstances in which the parent under examination finds herself. In re Adoption of B.D.S., 494 Pa. 169, 431 A.2d 203 (1981).
In view of the irreversible nature and serious emotional impact of the involuntary termination of parental rights, such action is not authorized unless a preponderance of the evidence clearly warrants it. In re Adoption of Baby Girl Fleming, 471 Pa. 73, 76, 369 A.2d 1200, 1202 (1977); In re Adoption of McAhren, 460 Pa. 63, 70, 331 A.2d 419, 422 (1975). In this case, the record establishes that the agency, CSEC, on frequent occasions, ignored the directions of the court to promote visitation and did not implement recommendations of the multidisciplinary team with which the agency disagreed. It sought and secured an order terminating visitation shortly after the chancellor had concluded, *108following argument on exceptions to his decree, that the mother had not received a reasonable opportunity to visit her son. It withheld information regarding the infant’s health and therapy program from the mother’s counsel on the pretext that this was confidential information. It limited contacts between the mother and her child to periods of less than two hours and, with rare exceptions, these contacts occurred in the presence of an agency employee or the foster mother.
On the question of whether the record clearly warrants a finding under § 311(1) of the Adoption Act that appellant has refused and failed to perform her parental duties in excess of six months, I would hold that the evidence does not justify the termination of the mother’s parental rights and hence would vacate the lower court decree.

§ 311(2)

Since the petition filed in this case proceeded on the separate grounds of §§ 311(1) and 311(2), the petitioner’s burden can be met in showing by the preponderance of the evidence that either of the disjunctively listed elements of § 311 was satisfied. In Interest of T.S.L., 487 Pa. 245, 248, 409 A.2d 332, 334 (1979); see Matter of Adoption of David C., 479 Pa. 1, 7, 387 A.2d 804, 807 (1978). My review of the record leads me to conclude that it is equally inadequate to support termination under § 311(2).
The form petition filed by CSEC merely avers, in a conclusionary fashion by tracking the statute, that:
[T]he repeated and continued incapacity, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the subject child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his/her [sic] physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
This form language is repeated in the printed decree signed by the lower court in its order of October 6, 1980 and again in its opinion filed June 10, 1981. However, it is evident from reviewing the opinion of the lower court that the *109decision to terminate the parental rights of the mother was based solely upon the lower court’s conclusion that “the respondent does not have the capability and cannot acquire the capability to cope with and handle this particular child and, consequently, [the lower court] must reinstate its Decree of October 6, 1980.” A fair reading of both the lower court’s opinion and the record demonstrates that neither “neglect” nor “refusal” was an issue before the court, and that the termination decree depends upon the chancellor’s inferences, deductions and conclusions concerning the mother’s incapacity.
When proceeding under § 311(2), three things must be shown before a natural parent’s rights in a child will be terminated on grounds of parental incapacity: (1) repeated and continued incapacity must be shown; (2) such incapacity must be shown to have caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) it must be shown that the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied. In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975).
My reading of the record has not uncovered competent evidence to clearly establish any of the three elements which must be shown to exist. The lower court, in its opinion, finds that the mother “does not have the qualities necessary to parent this child. She has had ample time since 1978 to show whether she could improve herself sufficiently to handle this particular child.”
However, the evidence presented by CSEC consisted primarily of accounts by the caseworkers) and the foster mother regarding the interaction between the natural mother and her son. While much of the evidence reflects that the brief visitations often included anxiety and withdrawal by the son, there is absolutely no evidence which would tie together the behavior of the son as flowing directly from his mother’s alleged incapacities. On the contrary, the only possible competent evidence on this point was presented by a pediatrician who was familiar with the child’s medical history since the child was about six weeks of age. She testified *110that the child had neurological disability, developmental delays and some physical problems. She indicated that the child had an unstable autonomic system reaction and had undergone some behavioral changes. The pediatrician pointed out that “certain children with the type or problem that [this child] has are not easily adaptable to changes in the environment, to changes in handling.” She further noted that, not only in terms of previous visits with the mother but also in terms of previous hospitalizations, the child “separates very poorly from his foster mother and undergoes a great deal of problems.”
In its short opinion justifying its decree, the lower court only referred to the pediatrician’s opinion that the child should not be moved from his present home, a foster home, at the time of the hearing in June 1981 because of the problems which the child suffers. Surely, the need to maintain a temporary, stable foster home environment arising from the medical and neurological problems of the child, even if relevant, is not the kind of demanding evidence necessary to support a termination decree. See Jones Appeal, 449 Pa. 543, 547, 297 A.2d 117, 119 (1972).
CSEC seems to place great weight on the failure of the mother to comply with the counseling procedures recommended by the multi-disciplinary team. The mother resides in a rural area some twenty miles from the Counseling Center to which she was directed and some thirty miles from Erie where she was expected to attend parenting classes. She does not drive and did not have regular access to a car. There was no public transportation available. CSEC conceded that there was no homebound instruction available and that the agency provided no transportation in cases such as this. At the time of the final hearing, the mother testified that she was then enrolled in parenting classes which had given her a different outlook on matters and taught her something about herself. The mother’s former counsel was permitted to testify, without contradiction in the record, that the mother was attending parenting classes at Family Counseling in Union City, that the Family Counseling coun*111selor had reported that progress was being made, that the mother was grasping the material and that the Family Counseling counselor felt that the mother was both sincerely interested in caring for her children and was strongly motivated. This is totally inconsistent with the lower court’s conclusion that the mother could not acquire the capability to cope with and relate to this child.
Brief mention should be made regarding the relationship between the foster mother and the family here involved. The mother’s former counsel testified that, on February 25, 1981, she had met with the protective service caseworker of CSEC and had been informed that the foster mother, who had had actual custody of the child involved in this case since the time he had been removed from his mother at four weeks of age, was in line for adoption of this child. This was not denied by the caseworker. When asked at the June 3, 1981 hearing whether she wanted to adopt the child, the foster mother testified that if the opportunity occurred, she would consider it. The mother’s former counsel also testified, without contradiction by either the petitioner or the court, that the lower court had expressed its opinion, at the hearing on February 19, 1981, that if the foster mother was in line for adoption of the child, the child should be moved out of that foster home, preferably to a foster home closer to the mother’s residence. This was not done.
Since the issue on this appeal is the capacity of the natural mother to relate effectively to her child, and since a substantial part of the testimony before the lower court involves both the testimony of the foster mother and the circumstances surrounding visitations occurring within the foster mother’s home, it is difficult to avoid the troubling question of whether any fair test of the natural mother’s capacity could take place in an environment where the setting is prepared and potentially controlled by a party possessing an abiding self-interest. Where, as here, the agency refused to implement a recommendation from a professional on its own multi-disciplinary team for a minimal one-week trial period so that the mother could attempt to re-establish a genuine *112relationship with her son, and where the child involved has, without interruption, been living in the home of a foster parent who very well may have an intense, albeit well-meaning, desire to protect and continue that relationship by converting her status from foster mother to adoptive parent, this court should not be prepared to conclude that petitioner has satisfied its burden to secure termination of those sacred parental rights of the natural mother.

Conclusion

Cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights can often be most difficult to decide. This is because, lurking in the background, is the desire to insure the best interests of the child or children involved. But that question cannot be reached unless, and until, a determination is properly- made that the elements found in § 311 of the Adoption Act have been satisfied through a preponderance of the competent evidence brought forth on the fitness of the parent under attack. See In re Adoption of R. L, 468 Pa. 287 n.12, 361 A.2d 294 n.12 (1976), appeal dismissed, U.S. cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1032, 97 S.Ct. 722, 50 L.Ed.2d 743 (1977).
On this record, I have no difficulty in concluding that CSEC has fallen far short of meeting its burden. When a child has been placed in foster care, a parent has an affirmative duty to work towards the return of the child. See In re Burns, supra. However, even when there has been a long separation occasioned by parental neglect or incapacity, termination of parental rights will not be ordered if there is a reasonable possibility that the causes and conditions which have led to the separation can be remedied and the family restored. In re William L., id., 476 Pa. at 333-34, 383 A.2d at 1233.
In all, this is not a case where the parent abandoned or utterly failed to satisfy her parental obligations. Her child was taken from her one month after birth for failure to thrive and yet has been withheld from appellant’s care throughout the proceedings despite the child’s improvement. The mother has taken advantage of those court-ordered *113visitation privileges which have been extended. At no point has she failed to visit her child for any extended period of time, with the exception of those times when visitation was refused.
The cause which led to the separation between mother and child in this case was the child’s failure to thrive when barely an infant. While it appears clear from the record that the child has multiple physical or neurological problems, the record is devoid of any competent evidence of any attempt on the part of the petitioner to review these problems with the mother and seek to fashion a plan by which she might begin to cope with these unique aspects of her son’s development. Given the irreversible nature of involuntary termination, I am not prepared to conclude that the conditions existing at the time of this child’s birth which may have led to his separation from his mother cannot be remedied.
The trial court’s conclusion that the involuntary termination of this mother’s parental rights was justified under either § 311(1) or § 311(2) of the Adoption Act cannot stand. I do not feel the demanding standard of evidence required to support termination has been met.
I therefore would vacate the decree and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. At the conclusion of the hearing on October 6, 1980, the chancellor entered the following decree on the record:
BY THE COURT: Well, the parental rights of [the natural mother] to [her son] are hereby terminated since the parent by conduct which has continued for a period of at least six months has failed *103and refused to perform parental duties; the repeated and continued incapacity, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being, and the conditions of the neglect cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
The Court will recess.
Appellant has improperly, I believe, incorporated this decree as Appendix A to her Brief, inasmuch as the original record contains a two-page form decree signed by the lower court but containing numerous interlineations. It is worth noting that although the October 6, 1980 decree in the bound record finds that “the conditions and causes of the incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent” [emphasis added], the bench decree speaks only to the “conditions of the neglect” [emphasis added]. See footnote 2, infra.

. I note, with disapproval, that the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights filed with the orphans’ court on June 26, 1980 is a “form petition” (Form A-4) containing a large number of words and phrases whch have been either struck through with typewriting or crossed out by pen and ink. The decree attached to the Petition also contains whole sections which have been crossed out, both with blue and with black ink. An examination does not permit any conclusion as to whether any, some or all of these deletions and amendment(s) were made by counsel for CSEC, the lower court, or some other party. The Petition does not contain all of the allegations required by Supreme Court Orphans’ Court Rule 15.4(a). I would submit that the demanding standards of the Adoption Act, the strong policy of restraining from interfering with the family enunciated both by our Legislature and our courts, and the need for adequate review both by the orphans’ and appellate courts require a higher standard of work product than presented here. Cf. In Re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 328-35, 383 A.2d 1228, 1231-34 (1978), U.S. cert. denied, Beatty v. Lycoming County Children’s Services, et al; Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services, et al., 439 U.S. 880, 99 S.Ct. 216, 58 L.Ed.2d 192 (1978).

. No transcript of this proceeding has been brought to our attention, but was discussed in the transcript of testimony of the second termination hearing. N.T. 6/3/81, pp. 46-7.

. The Motion to Terminate Visitation, filed with the Clerk of Orphan’s Court on May 18,1981, contains numerous averments of facts not appearing of record in the action, contains no verification, and appears to be in clear violation of Rule 1024(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. See Orphans’ Court Rule 3.1, Pa.RCiv.P. Rule 1501. Although the lower court’s Opinion of June 10, 1981 refers to a hearing held on that Motion on June 3, 1981 “concerning the activities leading up to the Motion”, I note the only order entered is attached to the Motion and filed May 18, 1981, terminating the reinstituted visitation. »

. Although the chancellor characterized his Decree of June 10, 1981 as a “Final Decree”, there is nothing about either the form or contents of the earlier decree entered October 6, 1980 to suggest anything other than a final decree. However, since exceptions were filed and argued, and since the chancellor appears to have reinstituted visitation on or about February 19, 1981 (see text, at footnote 3, supra), without filing any order thereon, the decree of October 6, 1980 may properly be considered a decree nisi.

. Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, No. 208, art. Ill, §§ 311(1), 311(2), 1 P.S. §§ 311(1), 311(2) (Supp. 1980-81).

. At the termination hearing held October 6, 1980, the witness for the petitioner, CSEC, read into the record orders of court bearing dates Of 10/4/78, 11/22/78, 3/23/78, 10/19/79, 2/1/80 and 4/11/80. None of these orders were identified as to the proceedings in which they were entered, nor were copies of them made a part of the original record at No. Ill, In Adoption 1980, from whence this appeal is taken. Though the order of 4/11/80 directs CSEC to “proceed with filing a petition for termination of parental rights” [as read into the record on this appeal] there is nothing before this Court to explain why such a directive may have been given nor why CSEC did not proceed with filing a petition until June 26, 1980. It does appear that the refusal of CSEC to grant visitation following the mother’s request on or about April 7, 1980 was, temporarily at least, in violation of the then-outstanding order of 2/1/80 providing that “visitation between [the mother] and her son take place under the supervision of the agency for the foster mother.”