Court Opinion

ID: 9372782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:33.162004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.465709
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                      2022 MSPB 17

                             Docket No. PH-1221-15-0408-W-1

                                Timothy Stephen Skarada,
                                        Appellant,
                                             v.
                            Department of Veterans Affairs,
                                          Agency.
                                       June 22, 2022

           Stephen D. Wicks, Esquire, Altoona, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

           Marcus S. Graham, Esquire and Sara Elizabeth Aull, Pittsburgh,
            Pennsylvania, for the agency.

                                         BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                  OPINION AND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we find that the appellant established jurisdiction
     over his IRA appeal but that he failed to show by preponderant evidence that he
     was subjected to a covered personnel action. Therefore, we deny the appellant’s
     request for corrective action.
                                                                                      2

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        At all times relevant to this appeal, the appellant has been employed as a
     GS-12 Supervisory Physical Therapist at the agency’s Altoona, Pennsylvania
     Medical Center in the Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Service (PM&RS).
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, 5, Tab 5 at 50. On or about August 1, 2014,
     he filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that the
     agency had retaliated against him for his protected whistleblowing disclosures to
     the Director and Chief of Staff regarding “unusual behavior” and deficient patient
     care on the part of his supervisor, the Chief of PM&RS (supervisor). IAF, Tab 1
     at 7-56. The appellant informed OSC that he made these “impaired provider”
     disclosures between June 26, 2013, and June 20, 2014, and that, because of these
     disclosures, his chain of command, including the Director, the Chief of Staff, and
     his supervisor had stopped communicating with him, excluded him from
     meetings, subjected him to unfounded investigations, refused his request for a
     “Salary Market Review” of his position, removed his previous responsibilities,
     yelled at him during meetings, and subjected him to a hostile work environment.
     Id. at 14-16, 24-28, 42-55.
¶3        In a May 5, 2015 letter, OSC notified the appellant that it had made a
     preliminary determination not to seek corrective action on his behalf.          Id.
     at 135-36.    In a May 15, 2015 response, the appellant contested OSC’s
     preliminary determination, submitted emails describing additional impaired
     provider disclosures, and alleged that the agency had continued to subject him to
     retaliatory acts through the date of his response. Id. at 60-134. In relevant part,
     he alleged that:   his chain of command had continued to exclude him from
     meetings and conversations; his supervisor refused to provide him the guidance
     necessary to carry out his duties; the Chief of Staff “degraded, yelled at, cursed
     at, and told [him] to shut up” in a meeting on one occasion; the Chief of Staff
     accused him of “fabricating data”; and his supervisor accused him of privacy
     violations, which resulted in an investigation. Id. at 64-66. On May 22, 2015,
                                                                                         3

     OSC notified the appellant that it had determined that he had not suffered a
     retaliatory personnel action and that it had terminated its investigation into his
     complaint. Id. at 58-59.
¶4        The appellant timely filed this IRA appeal, declining his option for a
     hearing.   IAF, Tab 1.     The administrative judge issued an order apprising the
     appellant of the jurisdictional requirements in an IRA appeal and ordering the
     parties to submit evidence and argument on the jurisdictional issue. IAF, Tab 12.
     In response, the appellant alleged, among other things, that the agency had
     retaliated against him for his impaired provider disclosures by: (1) creating a
     hostile work environment; (2) subjecting him to unfounded and frequent
     investigations; (3) refusing to allow review of his position for possible upgrade;
     and (4) removing previous responsibilities and duties from him.         IAF, Tab 15
     at 14-18. Before the record on jurisdiction closed, the appellant submitted an
     addendum in which he alleged that the agency had further retaliated against him
     by convening an Administrative Investigative Board (AIB) to investigate
     allegations that he “participated in harassment and intimidation of [agency]
     employees.” IAF, Tab 17 at 3-4. In a March 10, 2016 initial decision based on
     the written record, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation
     that the agency had taken or threatened to take a covered personnel action against
     him. IAF, Tab 18, Initial Decision (ID).
¶5        The appellant has filed a timely petition for review, and the agency has
     responded in opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. On review,
     the appellant asserts that he has new evidence and contends that he has continued
     to experience retaliation for his protected whistleblowing disclosures. 1 PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 3-5.

     1
       The appellant submits new evidence for the first time on review consisting of:
     (1) a February 22, 2016 letter from the Special Counsel to the President regarding the
                                                                                            4

                                           ANALYSIS
¶6         The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal based on whistleblower
     reprisal under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) 2 if the appellant has
     exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous
     allegations that: (1) he engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a protected
     disclosure; and (2) the disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s
     decision to take or fail to take a personnel action.          Yunus v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bradley v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 6 (2016). A nonfrivolous allegation is
     an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue.             Bradley,
     123 M.S.P.R.    547,    ¶ 6;   5 C.F.R.   § 1201.4(s).     Whether     allegations   are
     nonfrivolous is determined on the basis of the written record.                 Bradley,
     123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 6. Any doubt or ambiguity as to whether the appellant made
     nonfrivolous jurisdictional allegations should be resolved in favor of finding
     jurisdiction. Id. After establishing the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, the
     appellant then must establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation by

     agency’s investigation into the appellant’s impaired provider disclosures and OSC’s
     findings that the agency properly investigated and responded to the allegations; and
     (2) an April 12, 2016 email to OSC in which the appellant informed OSC that he had
     been subjected to an additional fact-finding interview. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-14. The
     Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time on review absent
     a showing that the documents and the information contained in the documents were
     unavailable before the record closed despite due diligence, and that the evidence is of
     sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision. See
     Cleaton v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 7 (2015), aff’d, 839 F.3d 1126
     (Fed. Cir. 2016); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Although these documents are new, i.e., they
     were unavailable before the record closed below, they are not material, i.e., they do not
     warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision because they do not
     establish that the appellant was subjected to a “personnel action” under the
     Whistleblower Protection Act. Therefore, we will not consider these documents for the
     first time on review.
     2
      The WPA has been amended several times, including by the Whistleblower Protection
     Enhancement Act. The references herein to the WPA include those amendments.
                                                                                      5

     proving by preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure that was a
     contributing factor in a personnel action taken against him.          Mastrullo v.
     Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 12 (2015); see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).
     For the reasons discussed below, we find that the appellant established Board
     jurisdiction over his IRA appeal, but failed to prove his prima facie case by
     preponderant evidence.

     The appellant exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his impaired
     provider disclosures and some of the alleged personnel actions raised in
     this appeal.
¶7        Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an employee is required to exhaust his
     administrative remedies with OSC before seeking corrective action from the
     Board in an IRA appeal.       The Board has recently clarified the substantive
     requirements of exhaustion.     Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security,
     2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 10-11.        The requirements are met when an appellant has
     provided OSC with sufficient basis to pursue an investigation.        The Board’s
     jurisdiction is limited to those issues that have been previously raised with OSC.
     However, an appellant may give a more detailed account of his whistleblowing
     activities before the Board than he did to OSC. An appellant may demonstrate
     exhaustion through his initial OSC complaint, evidence that he amended the
     original complaint, including but not limited to OSC’s determination letter and
     other letters from OSC referencing any amended allegations, and the appellant’s
     written responses to OSC referencing the amended allegations. An appellant may
     also establish exhaustion through other sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an
     affidavit or declaration attesting that the appellant raised with OSC the substance
     of the facts in the Board appeal. Id.
¶8        Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant exhausted his OSC
     remedy regarding his impaired provider disclosures and some of the alleged
     personnel actions—namely, the alleged significant change in his duties and
     hostile work environment. ID at 4-5. The parties do not challenge these findings
                                                                                     6

      on review, and we discern no reason to disturb them. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
      drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of
      credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R.
      357, 359 (1987) (same).
¶9         The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to exhaust his
      OSC remedy regarding the alleged retaliatory “unfounded and frequent
      investigations.” ID at 8. We disagree, in part, with this finding. The record
      reflects that the appellant notified OSC that the agency subjected him to an
      investigation in September 2013, concerning a billing issue and to another
      investigation in or around February or March 2015, regarding an alleged Privacy
      Act violation. IAF, Tab 1 at 16, 65-66, 127-28. These statements sufficiently
      informed OSC of the grounds of the appellant’s charge of whistleblower reprisal
      with respect to these investigations and gave OSC a sufficient basis to pursue an
      investigation that might lead to corrective action. See Mason v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8 (2011).        Thus, we find that the
      appellant exhausted his OSC remedy regarding these investigations.
¶10        On the other hand, the appellant was not notified of the AIB investigation
      until January 15, 2016, IAF, Tab 17, approximately 8 months after OSC’s
      May 22, 2015 closure of its investigation into his prohibited personnel practice
      allegations, IAF, Tab 1 at 135-36.    Although the appellant has stated in his
      petition for review that he informed OSC of the AIB investigation, he has not
      presented any evidence showing that he did so. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4. His bare
      allegation, without any evidence showing that he specifically informed OSC of
      the alleged retaliatory AIB investigation, is insufficient to prove exhaustion of
      this matter. See Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11; Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8.
¶11        The administrative judge did not specifically determine whether the
      appellant exhausted his OSC remedy regarding his allegations that his chain of
                                                                                         7

      command retaliated against him by denying his request for review of his position
      for possible upgrade, excluding him from meetings and conversations, and failing
      to provide him support and guidance.           We find that he did exhaust these
      allegations by raising them before OSC. IAF, Tab 1 at 14-16, 24-28, 50, 54-55,
      62-66. Therefore, we will consider these allegations, as well as the appellant’s
      allegations regarding the September 2013 and March 2015 investigations, hostile
      work environment, and the change in his duties in our review of whether the
      appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that the agency subjected him to a covered
      personnel action in retaliation for his impaired provider disclosures.

      The appellant nonfrivolously         alleged     that   he   made   at   least   one
      protected disclosure.
¶12        A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an
      allegation of fact that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a matter
      that a reasonable person in his position would believe evidenced one of the
      categories of wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).              Salerno v.
      Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 6 (2016). The test to determine
      whether a putative whistleblower has a reasonable belief in the disclosure is an
      objective one: whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential
      facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably
      conclude that the actions of the agency evidenced a violation of any law, rule, or
      regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
      or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. Id.; see 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8).   Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant made a
      protected disclosure when he reported to agency officials that an agency
      physician was exhibiting an impaired mental status.          ID at 6.    The agency
                                                                                           8

      does not contest this finding, and we find that it is supported by the record. 3 See
      Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 106; Broughton, 33 M.S.P.R. at 359.

      The appellant has established Board jurisdiction over this IRA appeal.
¶13         In cases such as this one, when the appellant has alleged multiple personnel
      actions, the Board has jurisdiction when the appellant exhausts his administrative
      remedies before OSC and makes a nonfrivolous allegation that at least one
      alleged personnel action was taken in reprisal for at least one alleged protected
      disclosure. Usharauli v. Department of Health & Human Services, 116 M.S.P.R.
      383, ¶ 19 (2011). Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to
      nonfrivolously allege that he was subjected to a “personnel action” within the
      meaning of the WPA and, therefore, did not consider whether he nonfrivolously
      alleged that his disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s action. ID
      at 6-9. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the appellant’s allegations
      that the agency removed some of his previous duties and responsibilities and
      subjected him to a hostile work environment constitute nonfrivolous allegations
      of a covered personnel action. We further find that the appellant nonfrivolously

      3
        The administrative judge did not identify the nature of wrongdoing evidenced by the
      appellant’s disclosures. We find that the appellant reasonably believed that his
      disclosures concerned a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety. In
      determining whether a disclosed danger is sufficiently substantial and specific to
      warrant protection under the WPA, the Board must consider: (1) the likelihood of harm
      resulting from the danger; (2) when the alleged harm may occur; and (3) the nature of
      the harm, i.e., the potential consequences. Chambers v. Department of the Interior,
      602 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The disclosed danger here—an allegedly
      cognitively impaired physician—could undoubtedly lead to immediate and serious harm
      to patients. See Parikh v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 295, ¶¶ 7, 22
      (2008) (finding that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged a protected disclosure
      concerning purported inadequate supervision and training of interns, which could
      potentially endanger patients), overruled on other grounds by Hau v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 620, ¶ 16 (2016), aff’d sub nom. Bryant v. Merit
      Systems Protection Board, 878 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
                                                                                       9

      alleged that his disclosures were a contributing factor in at least one of the
      covered personnel actions.
¶14        Under the WPA, a “personnel action” is defined as an appointment; a
      promotion; an action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 or other disciplinary or corrective
      action; a detail, transfer, or reassignment; a reinstatement; a restoration; a
      reemployment; a performance evaluation under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43 or under
      title 38; a decision about pay, benefits, or awards concerning education or
      training if the education or training reasonably may be expected to lead to an
      appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other action described in
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A); a decision to order psychiatric testing or examination;
      the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form, or
      agreement; and any other significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working
      conditions.   5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).     The legislative history of the 1994
      amendment to the WPA indicates that the “any other significant change in duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions” should be interpreted broadly, to include
      “any harassment or discrimination that could have a chilling effect on
      whistleblowing or otherwise undermine the merit system and should be
      determined on a case-by-case basis.” 140 Cong. Rec. H11,419, H11,421 (daily
      ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of Rep. McCloskey); see Savage v. Department of the
      Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 23 (2015); Roach v. Department of the Army,
      82 M.S.P.R. 464, ¶ 24 (1999).
¶15        Notwithstanding the broad interpretation accorded to the term “significant
      change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions,” not every agency action
      is a “personnel action” under the WPA.      See King v. Department of Health &
      Human Services, 133 F.3d 1450, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Rather, to constitute a
      covered personnel action under the WPA, an agency action must have practical
      consequences for the employee. Id. Therefore, we conclude that to amount to a
      “significant change” under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii), an agency action must
                                                                                      10

      have a significant impact on the overall nature or quality of an employee’s
      working conditions, responsibilities, or duties.
¶16         In determining whether an appellant has suffered a “significant change” in
      his duties, responsibilities, or working conditions, the Board must consider the
      alleged agency actions both collectively and individually.       See Holderfield v.
      Merit Systems Protection Board, 326 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2003).            In
      Savage, the Board stated that a hostile work environment itself may constitute a
      covered personnel action under the WPA.            Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 23.
      Although the term “hostile work environment” has a particular meaning in other
      contexts, we take this opportunity to clarify that allegations of a hostile work
      environment may establish a personnel action under the WPA, as established by
      longstanding Board precedent covering whistleblowing claims raised in a civil
      service law context, only if they meet the statutory criteria, i.e., constitute a
      significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions.    5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A).       Thus, as described above, although the “significant change”
      personnel action should be interpreted broadly to include harassment and
      discrimination that could have a chilling effect on whistleblowing or otherwise
      undermine the merit system, only agency actions that, individually or
      collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall nature and
      quality of an employee’s working conditions, duties, or responsibilities will be
      found to constitute a personnel action covered by section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).
¶17         In the instant case, the appellant alleged that his chain of command directed
      him to stop attending leadership meetings and performing “extra duties.” IAF,
      Tab 1 at 14-15, 28, 45. He also alleged that he was excluded from the interview
      and hiring process for two new hires to his service. Id. at 103. We find that these
      allegations constitute a nonfrivolous allegation of a significant change in duties
      or responsibilities.
¶18         In addition, the appellant alleged that his chain of command harassed him
      and subjected him to a hostile work environment by, among other things,
                                                                                        11

excluding him from meetings and conversations, subjecting him to multiple
investigations, 4 accusing him of “fabricating data” and of a Privacy Act violation,
refusing his request for a review of his position for possible upgrade, yelling at
him on three occasions, and failing to provide him the support and guidance
needed to successfully perform his duties. Id. at 14-16, 24-28, 50, 54-55, 62-66.
Although none of these allegations constitute a covered personnel action
individually, 5 we find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that
the cumulative effect of these actions constituted a significant change in his
working conditions. See Holderfield, 326 F.3d at 1209 (suggesting that a number
of minor agency actions relating to the appellant’s working conditions may
amount    to   a   covered    personnel    action    under    section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii)
collectively, even if they are not covered personnel actions individually);
Covarrubias v. Social Security Administration, 113 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶¶ 8, 15 n.4
(2010) (finding that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged a significant change in
working conditions when she alleged that her supervisors harassed her about

4
  Although employee investigations generally are not personnel actions within the
meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A), it is proper to consider evidence regarding an
investigation if it is so closely related to an alleged personnel action that it would have
been a pretext for gathering information to retaliate for whistleblowing. Mattil v.
Department of State, 118 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 21 (2012). Here, the appellant has not
identified any specific personnel actions associated with the September 2013 and
February 2015 investigations; rather, he admits that there was no follow-up to either
investigation.     IAF, Tab 1 at 46, 66.         Accordingly, we find that he has not
nonfrivolously alleged that the investigations themselves constitute a covered
personnel action.
5
  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (NDAA for 2018), Pub.
L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on December 12, 2017. The NDAA
for 2018 amended 5 U.S.C. § 1214 to allow the Office of Special Counsel to petition the
Board for corrective action concerning damages reasonably incurred by an employee
due to an agency’s investigation of the employee if it was commenced, expanded, or
extended in retaliation for protected whistleblowing activity. NDAA for 2018,
§ 1097(c)(4), 131 Stat. at 1619 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1214(i)).       Regardless of
questions concerning retroactivity, the provision does not apply to the instant appeal
because OSC has not petitioned the Board for such relief.
                                                                                       12

      personal telephone calls, closely monitored her whereabouts, followed her to the
      bathroom, and denied her an accommodation for her spina bifida, which required
      her to self-catheterize), overruled on other grounds by Colbert v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 12 n.5 (2014).
¶19        Having determined that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he was
      subjected to a significant change in duties or responsibilities and a significant
      change in working conditions, we proceed to the question of whether he
      nonfrivolously alleged that his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in
      the agency’s decision to take these alleged personnel actions.       To satisfy the
      contributing factor criterion, an appellant only need raise a nonfrivolous
      allegation that the fact of, or content of, the protected disclosure was one factor
      that tended to affect the personnel action in any way. Ontivero v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 117 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 21 (2012). One way to establish this
      criterion is the knowledge-timing test, under which an employee may
      nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel
      action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking
      the personnel action knew of the disclosure and that the personnel action occurred
      within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the
      disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Id. The Board has
      held that a personnel action taken within approximately 1 to 2 years of the
      appellant’s disclosures satisfies the knowledge-timing test. Id., ¶ 23.
¶20        Here, the appellant alleged that, on June 26, 2013, he made his first
      disclosure regarding his supervisor’s alleged impaired status to the Director and
      Chief of Staff. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. He further alleged that, less than 2 weeks later,
      the Chief of Staff instructed him to stop going to “other meetings” and
      “apparently informed” his supervisor of the disclosures because, beginning on
      July 26, 2013, his supervisor became hostile towards him.          Id. at 14.   The
      appellant alleged that he continued to report his concerns about his supervisor’s
      impaired status over the next 2 years and, as described above, alleged that his
                                                                                       13

      chain of command continued removing his previous duties and responsibilities
      and subjecting him to a hostile work environment during that time. Id. at 15-16,
      24-28, 42-55, 60-66.      We thus find that the appellant has satisfied the
      knowledge-timing test because he nonfrivolously alleged that his supervisor and
      the Chief of Staff were aware of his disclosures and that they commenced the
      alleged retaliatory acts within several weeks of his first disclosures.         See
      Ontivero, 117 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 23.     In light of the foregoing, we find that the
      appellant has established Board jurisdiction over this IRA appeal by proving
      exhaustion of his OSC remedies and nonfrivolously alleging that he made at least
      one protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in at least one covered
      personnel action. Mastrullo, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 12.

      The appellant is not entitled to corrective action because he failed to establish by
      preponderant evidence that he suffered a covered personnel action.
¶21         As stated above, once an appellant establishes jurisdiction over his IRA
      appeal, he is entitled to adjudication on the merits of his claim.        Id.   The
      administrative judge informed the appellant of his burden of proof on the merits
      of his IRA appeal and ordered him to submit evidence pertaining to both
      jurisdiction and the merits of his request for corrective action.      IAF, Tab 12
      at 6-7. The administrative judge further informed the appellant that, because he
      did not request a hearing, a merits decision would be based on the written record.
      Id. at 8.   As the appellant was provided a full and fair opportunity below to
      develop the record on the merits of his IRA appeal, we may decide the matter
      here without remanding the case for further proceedings. See Lis v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 113 M.S.P.R. 415, ¶ 10 (2010).
¶22         When reviewing the merits of an IRA appeal, the Board must determine
      whether the appellant has established by preponderant evidence that he made a
      protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in an agency’s personnel
      action.     Aquino v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 10
      (2014). A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a
                                                                                         14

      reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient
      to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. Id.; 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.4(q).   If the appellant makes such a showing, the Board must order
      corrective action unless the agency can establish by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the
      disclosure. Aquino, 121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 10. For the reasons discussed below, we
      find that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that the agency
      subjected him to a covered personnel action. 6
¶23         To meet his burden of proving that the agency subjected him to a
      “significant change” in his duties, responsibilities, or working conditions, the
      appellant must provide sufficient information and evidence to allow the Board to
      determine whether the agency’s alleged action or actions were “significant.” See
      Shivaee v. Department of the Navy, 74 M.S.P.R. 383, 388-89 (1997) (finding that
      an employee’s relocation from a building on the naval base to a building located
      outside of the base did not constitute a personnel action because the employee
      failed to provide sufficient information for the Board to determine whether his
      move was “significant,” such as whether other employees in his position worked
      outside the base and whether it is common for such employees to be moved from
      inside the base to outside and vice versa).      As described above, only agency
      actions that, individually or collectively, have practical and significant effects on
      the overall nature and quality of an employee’s working conditions, duties, or
      responsibilities, and are likely to have a chilling effect on whistleblowing or

      6
        The Board may not order corrective action if, “after a finding that a protected
      disclosure was a contributing factor, the agency demonstrates by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence” of the
      disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2). Because we find that the appellant failed to
      establish his prima facie case, we do not reach the question of whether the agency
      established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions
      in the absence of the appellant’s disclosures.
                                                                                        15

      otherwise undermine the merit system will be found to constitute a covered
      personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).
¶24         Here, as discussed above, the appellant alleged that, as a result of his
      protected disclosures, his chain of command removed some of his previous duties
      and responsibilities.   Specifically, he alleged that:     in July 2013, the Chief of
      Staff told him to stop attending his “other meetings” and to start attending
      meetings with his supervisor; in September 2013, the Chief of Staff directed him
      not to attend any more Leadership Development Institute (LDI) meetings after the
      appellant completed that program and to focus on helping his supervisor “get the
      department where it was when [he] started”; in July 2014, his supervisor directed
      him to stop attending the Multidisciplinary Pain Management Committee
      (MPMC) meetings; and, on unspecified dates, his supervisor and the Chief of
      Staff excluded him from participating in the interview and hiring process for two
      new hires in his service. IAF, Tab 1 at 14-15, 28, 45, 103.
¶25         The appellant’s position description does not mention participation in LDI
      classes, MPMC meetings, or the interview and hiring process as part of his
      regular duties and responsibilities.       Id. at 33-41.     Although the appellant
      submitted a copy of a memorandum regarding the MPMC, which lists his position
      as one of the members of the MPMC and states that the MPMC meets monthly,
      id. at 88, he has not described the nature of his prior participation in these
      monthly meetings or stated how many meetings per year he attended. Likewise,
      he has not described the nature and frequency of his prior participation in the
      interview and hiring process, the LDI meetings, or the “other meetings” he was
      told to stop attending.     The record does not establish that these apparently
      collateral duties and responsibilities constituted a “significant” part of the
      appellant’s duties and responsibilities.     See Shivaee, 74 M.S.P.R. at 388-89.
      Moreover, the record reflects that the appellant completed the LDI program in
      May 2014, and, thus, there would have been no basis for his continued
      participation thereafter.   IAF, Tab 1 at 71-72.     Accordingly, we find that the
                                                                                      16

      appellant has not established by preponderant evidence that his exclusion from
      these meetings and the interview and hiring process constituted a significant
      change in his duties or responsibilities under the WPA.
¶26        The appellant also alleged that, as a result of his protected disclosures, his
      chain of command subjected him to a hostile work environment, i.e., subjected
      him to harassment that constituted a significant change in his working conditions.
      Specifically, he alleged that his supervisor avoided him or walked away from him
      on multiple occasions, often responded to his questions by stating that he did not
      know the answer, and failed to provide him adequate guidance. Id. at 14, 24-26.
      For example, he alleged that, in January 2014, he asked his supervisor for
      guidance regarding scheduling, but that his supervisor failed to provide any
      guidance over the course of 2 weeks and only responded by saying “I am going to
      take care of that.” Id. at 50. Furthermore, the appellant alleged that the Chief of
      Staff and his supervisor excluded him from meetings in which they discussed
      realigning audiology services under the appellant’s supervision, and then his
      supervisor denied knowledge of the realignment and failed to provide him
      guidance on his new supervisory responsibilities.     Id. at 24, 50, 54.   He also
      alleged that his supervisor told him that he would not support the appellant’s
      request for a review of his position for possible upgrade, even though the Speech
      and Audiology Service had come under his supervision and his staff had grown to
      21 employees. Id. at 26-27.
¶27        In addition to the above allegations regarding the lack of communication,
      cooperation, and guidance from management, the appellant alleged that, as a
      result of his protected disclosures, his chain of command began treating him in a
      hostile manner.    Specifically, he alleged that, on September 18, 2013, his
      supervisor came into his office, became visibly angry, walked around to stand
      behind the appellant’s desk, and yelled at him that he needed to fix something.
      Id. at 45-46. The appellant also alleged that, on April 2, 2014, his supervisor
      “grabbed [his] arm to pull [him] into a room” and yelled at him for reporting an
                                                                                            17

      incident of improper patient care to the Director and Chief of Staff. Id. at 64,
      82-83. He further alleged that, on September 30, 2014, the Chief of Staff yelled
      at him, accused him of “making up our service data,” and told him to “shut up”
      during a meeting. Id. at 106.
¶28         As noted above, the appellant also alleged that the agency directed him to
      stop attending MPMC and LDI meetings, told him to stop performing “extra
      duties,” and convened investigations against him in September 2013, concerning
      a billing issue and another investigation in or around February or March 2015,
      regarding an alleged Privacy Act violation. Id. at 14-16, 28, 45, 65-66, 127-28.
      The appellant additionally alleged that he was excluded from an annual leadership
      retreat in 2014. Id. at 103.
¶29         As discussed above, to determine whether allegations of a hostile work
      environment establish a covered personnel action, we must consider whether the
      appellant has shown, by preponderant evidence, that the agency’s actions,
      considered individually and collectively, had practical and significant effects on
      the   overall   nature   and   quality   of   his   working   conditions,   duties,   or
      responsibilities. Although the appellant submitted witness affidavits supporting
      many of his allegations, IAF, Tab 10 at 21-87, we find that he has failed to
      establish by preponderant evidence that the agency’s actions constituted
      harassment to such a degree that his working conditions were significantly and
      practically impacted. His chain of command may have been unresponsive to his
      requests or untimely in providing guidance, but such deficiencies do not amount
      to harassment. In addition, the three alleged incidents involving yelling were
      spread out over the course of a year and, while unprofessional, were not
      sufficiently severe or pervasive to significantly impact the appellant’s working
      conditions.     The investigations, although likely inconvenient, were not overly
      time-consuming, did not result in any action against the appellant or follow-up
      investigation, and appear to have been routine workplace inquiries. IAF, Tab 1
      at 46, 66. The appellant’s remaining allegations represent mere disagreements
                                                                                           18

      over workplace policy.      In sum, the appellant’s allegations, collectively and
      individually, while perhaps indicative of an unpleasant and unsupportive work
      environment, do not establish, by preponderant evidence, that he suffered a
      significant change in his working conditions under the WPA.
¶30         Finally, we have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the
      pendency of this appeal and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of
      the appeal.

                                             ORDER
¶31         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

      7
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        19

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                20

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court‑ appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     21

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                22

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.