Court Opinion

ID: 9748851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:15:31.173264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:40.000176
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
dissenting.
Introduction
Antonio Andrews was convicted of first-degree murder, a crime he committed at age 15. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole — the only sentence the law allows for a juvenile so convicted. The principal opinion holds that a sentence of life in prison without parole for a juvenile offender does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Roper v. Simmons has held that sentencing a young person to death because of a crime he committed as a juvenile violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) Young Christopher Simmons, convicted in Roper of a murder he committed at age 17, was sent to prison to be put to death. In this case, young Andrews also has been sent to prison to die, albeit of whatever natural causes might take him.
The question in this case, then, is whether the state violates the constitution by sentencing a young man to die in prison for a homicide he committed as a 15-year-old juvenile.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment bars inflicting punishments that are disproportionate to the capacity of the offender to be held accountable. The difference in mental development between a child and an adult — specifically, the child’s still developing ability to make reasoned decisions — is a major premise of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper and in Graham, which held unconstitutional a sentence of life in prison -without parole for a juvenile in a nonhomicide case. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).
Life in prison without parole means Andrews is “an irretrievably depraved character,” 1 irrespective of any later maturation of his capacity to make decisions and to live a productive life. Life in prison with the possibility of parole nevertheless would mean Andrews will spend many years in prison before being eligible for parole and may spend the rest of his life in prison if the parole board does not determine that he is suitable for parole release under supervision in the community. A sentence of life with parole nonetheless would offer the possibility of redemption if the parole board determines, at some future date, that he is fit to be released on parole.
An increasing body of scientific knowledge confirms that juveniles are less capable — and therefore less culpable — than *380adults. Andrews’ case logically is indistinguishable from Roper and Graham. His sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole should be vacated, based on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, and his case remanded for re-sentencing to life with the possibility of parole.
The “Cruel and Unusual” Standard
The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const, amend. XIII. The Eighth Amendment has been incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (citations omitted); U.S. Const, amend. XIV. Embedded within the Eighth Amendment is the “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). What is permissive under the Eighth Amendment varies depending on the age of the defendant. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 553-54, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (considering the characteristics of juveniles in holding that imposing the death penalty on juveniles is unconstitutional); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988) (considering juveniles’ characteristics in holding that imposing the death penalty on children 16 and younger is unconstitutional).
To determine what is “cruel and unusual,” courts must look to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion). The standard of “cruel and unusual” is necessarily an evolving standard because it embodies a moral judgment. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2011; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008). The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must reflect the changes in moral understanding of society. Ghraham, 130 S.Ct. at 2011; Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2649 (2008).
The Graham and Roper Cases
Following Roper, Graham held that a sentence of life without possibility of parole for a juvenile in a nonhomicide case violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because it violates society’s “evolving standards of decency.”2 To determine the extent to which society’s standards of decency have evolved, three factors are to be considered. First, courts consider “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to determine whether there is a national consensus against a particular type of sentencing. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183). Next, courts look at the culpability of offenders in light of their crimes and the characteristics of the offenders — including scientific facts that bear on culpability — along with the severity of punishment. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026. Finally, the last step is to assess the effectiveness of the sentence in achieving four penological goals — retribution, de*381terrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. Id. at 2027-30.
The Supreme Court in Graham first considered “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice,” to determine whether there is a national consensus against a particular type of sentencing. Id. at 2022 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183). Looking at sentencing practice, the Supreme Court held that, given the rarity of imposition of life without parole for nonhomicide offenses, there was a national consensus showing that standards of decency had evolved to prohibit life without parole for nonhomicide offenses. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2023-26.
The Supreme Court then assessed the culpability of offenders — looking at the severity of their crimes and characteristics of the offender. Id. at 2026. Considering the characteristics of juveniles, the Supreme Court held that juveniles, as a class, were less culpable than other offenders. Id. at 2027. The Supreme Court, among other things, looked at the offense and determined nonhomicide offenses were less blameworthy than homicide. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court held that severity of punishment was extreme. Id. at 2027-28.
Graham is important for both reaffirming the considerations for determining whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment as well as illustrating the Supreme Court’s heavy reliance on the unique characteristics of juveniles in determining what juvenile sentences are permissible.
Graham also is important for what it does not say. Graham does not hold that a sentence of life without parole for a homicide is constitutional. The Supreme Court distinguished juvenile life without parole for homicide and nonhomicide cases in many parts of its analysis.3 The sentence at issue in Graham, however, was life without parole for the commission of a nonhomicide crime; therefore, the Supreme Court could not have held that life without parole was permissible for homicide because so holding would have been an advisory opinion in violation of the constitution.4
The principal opinion interprets Graham to hold that life without parole is permissible for homicides. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, the principal opinion cites Chief Justice Roberts’ lone concurring opinion, which is not binding precedent. The portion quoted, when examined in its entirety, merely sets forth Roberts’ objection to any categorical ban on life without parole for both homicide and non-homicide offenses — in contrast to the Supreme Court’s majority opinion that imposed a categorical ban. See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).5 While Graham is useful in determining *382how a juvenile’s unique characteristics interact with Eighth Amendment analysis, Graham does not dictate the outcome in this case.
The principal opinion also interprets Roper as expressly recognizing that sentences of life without parole are constitutional for juveniles. The Supreme Court in Roper held that sentencing a juvenile to death was cruel and unusual punishment. See Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). When discussing the inapplicability of deterrence as a legitimate penological goal, the Supreme Court said, “To the extent that the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.” Id. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Again, the Supreme Court was not holding that the deterrent effect of life without parole was sufficient justification for its imposition; instead, the Supreme Court merely was using life without parole as an example of alternative punishment. The offender in Roper was not challenging a sentence of life without parole; he simply was trying not to be put to death. The fact that the Supreme Court did not intend to hold life without parole constitutional in Roper is recognized by its holding in Graham that life without parole is unconstitutional for nonhomicide offenses. The principles expressed in Roper and Graham are helpful in this case; they do not foreclose the relief Andrews seeks here.6
Life Without Parole is Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole is cruel and unusual punishment because society’s standards have evolved to prohibit it.
While Graham and Roper examined legislation and statistics about the commonality of such sentences, these are incomplete indicators of the broader question of whether society’s standards have evolved, but they are helpful. See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2022; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183. There are about 2,600 offenders currently serving life without parole for homicides committed while they were juveniles.7 Seven states and the District of Columbia prohibit life without parole for juveniles, four states allow life without parole but do not impose it, and 40 states and the federal system actively sentence juveniles to life without parole.8 Legislation does not seem to be indicative of a national consensus against life without parole for juveniles. The absence of legislation prohibiting a particular type of sentence, however, is not conclusive as to contemporary standards of decency. See Graham, 130 *383S.Ct. at 2022 (looking part legislation to actual sentencing practices); Roper, 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (looking past legislation to actual sentencing practices).
Actual sentencing practices also can show evolving standards. Here, the statistics are inconclusive because of the lack of discretion in many states’ sentencing laws. Sixteen states have a mandatory juvenile sentencing statute (meaning that if a juvenile commits certain crimes, he or she must serve a mandatory sentence of life without parole), and 25 states have discretionary life without parole sentences (meaning that the sentence is authorized by statute but courts have discretion regarding if and when they sentence a juvenile to life without parole). Because courts have been mandated by statute to impose life without parole in the majority of states where such a sentence is permitted, it is impossible to determine whether sentencing practices show that standards have evolved because, in practice, many courts have no discretion in this area of sentencing.9
The average number of juveniles sentenced to life without parole, however, is significantly higher in states that mandate sentences of life without parole than states that allow courts to exercise discretion. The average number of juveniles sentenced to life without parole in states having mandatory such sentences is 82.36. This is significantly higher than the average number of juveniles sentenced to life without parole in states in which sentencing courts have discretion — 13.19. These statistics, which are raw numbers and not percentages of those sentenced, illustrate that an evolving standard may be occurring but that mandatory sentencing schemes prevent effective analysis.10
Society recognizes that juveniles are different, even without the specific statistics about sentencing. Missouri, for example, has enacted numerous laws that limit the privileges of a minor. See, e.g., section 115.133 (setting the minimum voting age at 18); section 302.060 (must be 16 to obtain a driving license); section 311.325 (setting the minimum drinking age at 21);11 section 431.056 (regarding minors’ capacity to enter into contracts); section 431.061 (must be 18 to consent to surgical or medical treatment); section 451.090 (must be 18 to enter into a marriage contract without parental consent); section 474.310 (must be 18 to make a will); and section 494.425 (must be 21 to serve on a jury). This legislation shows that society recognizes that, in a variety of situations, juveniles should be — and are — treated differently from adults.
The Role of Scientific Understanding
Without state legislation establishing clear guideposts, courts turn to a different barometer of social decency — scientific understanding. Roper and Graham show that the Supreme Court’s view and society’s view of juvenile offenders are influenced highly by scientific facts — namely that, due to juveniles’ innate biological differences, they must not be held to the same punitive standard as adults. See also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815-16, 108 S.Ct. 2687.
Brain imaging studies have shown that the frontal lobes of the brain, which are not developed until late adolescence, have *384an impact on response inhibition, regulation of emotion, planning and organization.12 Roper and Graham acknowledge that modern science now has established as fact the differences in juvenile brains and the effects of those differences on behavior and culpability. For instance, in Roper, the majority cites Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist, November 2009, at 1009, 1014; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Laurence Steinberg, one of the authors cited in Roper, has a more recent review of the science in the November 2009 issue of the same journal. Lawrence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy? 64 Am. Psychologist, November 2009, at 742-43. Steinberg notes four specific noteworthy changes in the brain during adolescence:
First, there is a decrease in gray matter in the prefrontal regions of the brain during adolescence — most likely due to the elimination of unused neuronal connections. This biological change results in major improvements in information processing and logical reasoning as the adolescent matures. Id. at 742.
Second, there is a significant change in activity of the neurotransmitter dopamine. Shifts in the proliferation and redistribution of dopamine receptors are believed to affect adolescent’s weighing of costs and rewards of behavior. Id. at 743.
Third, there is an increase during adolescence of white matter in the prefrontal regions. This increased white matter affects the adolescent’s response inhibition, long-term planning, weighing of risks and benefits, and the simultaneous consideration of multiple sources of information. Id.
Finally, as the child ages, there is an increase in connections between the cortical and subcortical regions, a change that is important for regulation of emotion. Id.
A very recent review of the relevant brain science notes “an explosion of studies examining the neurobiology of adolescence.” Leah H. Somerville & B.J. Casey, Developmental neurobiology of cognitive control and motivational systems, 20 Current Op. in Neurobiology, September 2010, at 236-241. The studies, the authors observe, have focused on “evaluating the hypothesis that during adolescence, unique patterns of brain activity arise that predict stereotypical aspects of adolescent behavior including risk-taking and sub-optimal decision-making in the face of incentives.” Id. According to recent studies, the authors report, “adolescents show a unique sensitivity to motivational cues that challenges the less mature cognitive control system, resulting in an imbalance between these systems and ultimately patterns of behavior that are unique to adolescents.” Id. (Emphasis added.).
*385Studies also show that preference for immediate rewards and sensation-seeking peak around ages 14 and 16 and then decline. Lawrence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy ? 64 Am. Psychologist, November 2009, at 745 (November 2009). Impulse control, anticipation of future consequences, strategic planning and resistance to peer influence all increase linearly from preadolescence through late adolescence. The compelling and simply stated result of this research? Juveniles are different. Id. at 746.
This current research confirms what the Supreme Court majority said in Graham:
No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.... [Developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.... Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults.
130 S.Ct. at 2026.13 This Court must consider the culpability of the offenders as well as the severity of their punishment. Roper and Graham, in their essence, recognize that juveniles are less culpable than adults. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, 125 S.Ct. 1183. The Supreme Court recognized:
As compared to adults, juveniles have a “ ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’ they “are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and their characters are “not as well formed.”
These salient characteristics mean that “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offenders whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”
Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-573, 125 S.Ct. 1183). Punishment, therefore, should reflect the ambiguity regarding motivation and culpability in the commission of a crime. A juvenile’s culpability for the same crime is innately less than an adult’s because “from a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a great possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183. This basic tenet holds true even when a juvenile commits the most heinous of crimes, homicide.
The severity of the punishment — life in prison without the possibility of parole — is the second most severe penalty of all and is the most severe that exists for juveniles. Although the state does not execute the juvenile, the sentence “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.” Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2027. A life without parole sentence is a “denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.” Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2027 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526, 779 P.2d 944 (1989)).
*386Life without parole in practicality is a death sentence. It is especially harsh for a juvenile offender, who will serve both a greater number of years as well as a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2027; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183. The lessened culpability of a juvenile— when compared to the greater relative severity of the punishment — does not meet contemporary standards of decency.
“Penological Goals”
The penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation are also relevant to the analysis as “a sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense” and cruel and unusual. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2028. Here, retribution does not justify the imposition of life without parole. To be a legitimate sentencing goal, retribution must be “directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.” Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). A juvenile’s culpability, even for homicide, is substantially less than an adult’s. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183; Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 31; Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2011 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7612). Imposing the most severe non-death punishment on a juvenile is not proportional to a juvenile’s culpability.
Likewise, deterrence is not sufficient to justify life without parole. Science establishes that juveniles have diminished capacity to evaluate the long-term consequences of their behavior as well as an increased tendency to engage in risk-taking behavior. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2028-29; Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy ? at 246^41. This inability to consider the consequences of behavior illustrates the limited impact of punishment as a deterrent. Any limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole, therefore, is insufficient to justify it as a penological goal. See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2029; Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 32, Graham, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
Incapacitation also does not justify imposing life without parole sentences. For life without parole to be a legitimate goal, the juvenile offender must be incorrigible and, therefore, present a permanent danger to society. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2029. The transient characteristic of youth, however, shows not only that can juveniles change but also that the ability to change is an essential characteristic of juveniles. Id. A life without parole sentence denies the juvenile offender the opportunity to grow into the adult that he could be at any time during his natural life.14
A sentence of life without parole explicitly rejects the final theory of sentencing— rehabilitation. Offenders serving life without parole usually are denied access to vocational training and other rehabilitative services. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2030, citing briefs Amici Curiae of The Sentencing Project supporting Petitioners, Florida v. Graham, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. OS-7412; 08-7612) and J. Lawrence Aber et *387al. supporting Petitioners, Florida v. Graham, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412; 08-7612).15 By sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, the juvenile is denied the chance to become rehabilitated and rejoin society.
Despite the heinousness of his crime, there may come a time when a future parole board could find that Andrews has matured fully, that he has been punished enough, that he is unlikely to be a danger to society and that he can function in society as a productive member. Under the current law, that is impossible; the parole board has no discretion. Such redemption is possible, however, if his sentence is reduced to a life sentence with the possibility of parole. Current law provides for a lengthy time in prison before a convicted murderer becomes eligible for parole, and he may yet spend the rest of his life in prison.16 “The state is not required to guarantee eventual freedom,” the Supreme Court said in Graham,, referring to nonhomicide juvenile offenders and noting the lack of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate “maturity and rehabilitation.” 130 S.Ct. at 2030. But, in any case, it is cruel and unusual punishment to deny the juvenile offender the possibility that he might redeem himself.
Age as a Mitigating Factor Under the Eighth Amendment
Another reason to find Missouri’s sentencing scheme unconstitutional is its failure to consider age as a mitigating factor. If the jury were given the choice of whether to recommend a sentence of life with parole, in addition to the choice of life without parole, the sentencing law may be constitutional only if a jury were able to consider a defendant’s age in making this determination. “An offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2031.
In fact, Missouri law requires the jury to consider a defendant’s age at the time of the crime as a statutory mitigating factor in determining whether to recommend a death sentence or instead a sentence of life imprisonment. Section 562.032.3(7). This requirement still applies to those over 18. But for those under 18, because death has been removed as a possible punishment, the statutory admonition has no meaning. In view of the stakes involved here— stakes that invoke the protections of the Eighth Amendment — age is no less relevant as a mitigating factor in determining whether that life sentence should be with *388or without the possibility of parole than it was previously.
Now that Missouri law requires that the guilt and punishment phases of criminal trials be separated, section 557.086.2, defendants are entitled to introduce mitigating evidence (and the prosecution to put on victim impact evidence as aggravating factors) in all cases in which punishment is tried to a jury except one involving a person found guilty of first-degree murder committed while under the age of 18,17 for in all such cases, more than one punishment is available and the relevance of such mitigating evidence is self-evident.
The evidence is even more relevant in the case of a youth, yet Missouri’s mandatory life without parole sentencing scheme does not permit judge or jury to consider a juvenile offender’s youth. Instead, Missouri laws demands the imposition of a life sentence without parole regardless of the characteristics of the offender. The imposition of a life sentence without parole— without consideration of Andrews’ age— fails to ensure that Andrews’ sentence is proportional to his crime. As such, the Missouri sentencing mandate is flawed and violates the Eighth Amendment.
The principal opinion rejects this analysis, arguing that Missouri’s consideration of the defendant’s youth in the juvenile certification hearing is sufficient. Section 211.071.6(7). The principal opinion goes to great length to explain why it believes that the certification decision is not part of the criminal trial and, therefore, that the jury is not required under Apprendi18 to make the findings required by that statute, including the statute’s requirement that the defendant’s age be considered in determining certification.19 If this certification is to satisfy Graham’s requirement that a child’s youth be considered, then it must be considered by the jury. Additionally, the certification is only to determine whether the youth can be tried as an adult. It is not intended to — and does not require the court to — determine whether the child is sufficiently culpable and his or her cognitive processes are developed sufficiently that the child can be sentenced to life without parole. The latter is a separate question that may have a different answer, as Roper recognized in stating that a child may be certified to stand trial as an adult yet not be eligible for the death *389penalty because of his or her youth. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79, 125 S.Ct. 1183.
Because the jury here was not permitted to consider defendant’s youth or other mitigating factors in determining punishment, the constitution requires Andrews’ case be remanded for a new penalty phase trial at which a sentence including parole may be considered. It is hoped that the General Assembly will act to set out parameters for this “penalty phase” hearing and to dictate what considerations the jury ought to assess at that hearing, including the defendant’s youth. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2031-2032. In the interim, however, juries have long been thought capable of considering mitigating factors and determining punishment in all cases other than those involving first-degree murder by a juvenile, and they should similarly be permitted to do so in this and other similar cases.20
Conclusion
Life in prison with no possibility for parole for a juvenile may be worse than the death penalty. It may seem quaint to note here the original purpose of the “penitentiary” — to permit the prisoner to do penance for his crime, to examine his conscience and to repent for his past criminal life. There surely are many cases in which the juvenile offender has done just that; nevertheless, he still will have to spend the remainder of his life behind bars.
Society’s treatment of children in the criminal justice system reflects an evolving standard of decency, a standard that science reinforces. Juveniles, whether sentenced for homicide or other offenses, are significantly less culpable than adults. Sentencing a juvenile offender to spend his life in prison without the possibility of parole is cruel and unusual punishment and violates the Eighth Amendment.
Juveniles should not be sentenced to die in prison any more than they should be sent to prison to be executed. Certainly, should they be so sentenced, it should be because of an individual finding of sufficient culpability, not because Missouri law categorically requires a judge or jury to disregard the defendant’s youth and other mitigating factors to which older offenders are entitled consideration in determining punishment.
I respectfully dissent.

. A phrase used in Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, and Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026.

. In Graham, the petitioner was 16 when he committed armed burglary and attempted armed robbery. Id. at 2019. Graham pleaded guilty to burglary and attempted armed robbery 34 days before his 18th birthday and was sentenced to life in prison for armed burglary and 15 years for attempted armed robbery. Id. at 2019-20. Because Florida abolished its parole system, a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of parole. Id. at 2020. Graham challenged the imposition of life without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2020.

.For example, the Supreme Court in Graham, in dicta, alluded to the possibility that life without parole may further a legitimate goal by saying: "But while incapacitation may be a legitimate penological goal sufficient to justify life without parole in other contexts, it is inadequate to justify that punishment for juveniles who did not commit homicide.” Id. at 2040 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court, however, neither specified that life without parole may be a legitimate goal in sentencing juveniles nor specified the context in which it would be acceptable.

. U.S. Const, art. III, sec. 1; Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969) (per curiam).

. Chief Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion said: "A more restrained approach is especially appropriate in light of the Court's apparent recognition that it is perfectly legitimate for a juvenile to receive a sentence of life without parole for committing murder.” See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

.The application of Roper and Graham to juvenile life without parole sentences is rare, due perhaps to how recently Graham was decided. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2022; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Similarly recent is the question of applying Apprendi to the process of certifying a juvenile to stand trial as an adult and be subject to a life sentence without parole. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). I agree with the cogent analysis of this issue in Judge Stith’s separate opinion about the Apprendi issue in this case. See State v. Rudy B., 149 N.M. 22, 243 P.3d 726 (Chavez, J., dissenting).

. Human Rights Watch, State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) (October 2, 2009), available at www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole.htm.

. Michelle Leighton & Connie de la Vega, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice, U.S.F.L. Rev. 983, 1002 (2008).

. See State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), (October 2, 2009), available at www.hrw.org/ en/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole.htm.

. Id.

. All citations are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise stated.

. Studies with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) show substantially less maturity in critical areas of the brain at age 15 when compared to adults. Nico U.F. Do-senbach et al., 329 Prediction of Individual Brain Maturity Using fMRI, Science (AAAS), September 2010, no. 5997 pp. 1358-1361. See also, J.N. Geidd et. al., Quantitative magnetic resonance imaging of human brain development: Ages 4-18, Cereb Cortex, July 1996, at 551-560; Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In vivo evidence for post-adolescent brain maturation in frontal and striatal regions, 2 Nature Neuroscience, October 1999, at 859-61; Katerina Velanova, et al. The Maturation of Task Set-Related Activation Supports Late Developmental Improvements in Inhibitory Control, 29 Journal of Neuroscience, October 2009, at 12558-67.

. The authorities the Supreme Court cites for these developments are briefs amici curiae filed on behalf of the American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association et al. Supporting Petitioners, Graham, 130 S.Ct.. at 2026 (nos. 08-7412, 08-7612).

. The Missouri Constitution, however, does grant to the governor the power to commute a sentence or to pardon an offender. Mo. Const, art. IV, sec. 7. Given the history of governors’ reluctance to use the constitutional power of clemency, especially in homicide cases, the executive’s power of commutation is an unlikely source of hope for the juvenile offender sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison.

. Discussing the lack of rehabilitation services for offenders serving life without parole leads me to the uncomfortable subject of race. Black juveniles are prosecuted more frequently as adults in criminal courts as well as sentenced to juvenile life without parole. Blacks sentenced as juveniles serve life without parole sentences at a rate that is 10 times higher than white children. Human Rights Watch, State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) (October 2, 2009), available at www.hrw.org/ en/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole.htm. State statistical data also show extreme disparity in life without parole sentences. Id. Missouri has a ratio of 7.9 black youths sentence to life without parole for every white youth and has the 16th highest black/white ratio in the country for such sentencing. Amnesty International, CLWOP: How Does Your State Measure Up? (last visited November 29, 2010), available at http:// www.amnestyusa.org/us-human-rights/other/ clwop-laws-in-your-state/page. do?id= 1011341&st=MO&sid=25.

. See section 558.016; see also Missouri Department of Corrections, Board of Probation and Parole, Procedures Governing the Granting of Paroles and Conditional Releases at 10 (April 2009) available at http://doc.mo.gov/ documents/prob/Blue%20Book.pdf.

. When the punishment phase is heard by a judge rather than a jury, the judge will consider these mitigating factors. Section 557.036.4, RSMo Supp.2009.

. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

. As the principal opinion notes, section 211.071.6 requires the court to consider 10 factors in determining certification, including:
(1) The seriousness of the offense alleged and whether the protection of the community requires transfer to the court of general jurisdiction;
(2) Whether the offense alleged involved viciousness, force and violence;
(3) Whether the offense alleged was against persons or property with greater weight being given to the offense against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;
(4) Whether the offense alleged is a part of a repetitive pattern of offenses which indicates that the child may be beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile code;
(5) The record and history of the child, including experience with the juvenile justice system, other courts, supervision, commitments to juvenile institutions and other placements;
(6) The sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of his home and environmental situations, emotional condition and pattern of living;
(7) The age of the child;
(8) The program and facilities available to the juvenile court in considering disposition;
(9) Whether or not the child can benefit from the treatment or rehabilitative programs available to the juvenile court; and
(10) Racial disparity in certification. Section 211.071.6.

. This lack of legislative guidance compounds the problem, which the Supreme Court noted in Graham, that courts and juries could not "with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.” Id. The American Bar Association has noted that the decision as to the "appropriateness — or inappropriateness — of parole for juvenile offenders [should not be made by courts and juries, but] should be made at reasonable points in their sentences, based on the adults they have become.” Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Graham, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (nos. 08-7412, 08-7621). Otherwise:
[a]n unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.
Id. See also Brief for Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators et al. as Amici Curiae, supporting Petitioners, Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2011 (nos. 08-7412, 08-7621).