Court Opinion

ID: 2964267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:23:00.363948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:47.637586
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2315

                                   ARTHUR SMULLEN,

                                Petitioner-Appellant,

                                          v.

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                 Respondent-Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Anthony M. Fredella with whom Fredella & Wheeler was on brief for
            ___________________           __________________
        appellant.
            Jeanne M. Kempthorne, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
            ____________________
        Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
        _______________
                                 ____________________

                                   August 30, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      CAMPBELL,  Senior Circuit  Judge.    The  principal
                                 _____________________

            issue is whether a criminal defendant, who is in custody, may

            under 28 U.S.C.   2255 collaterally challenge the restitution

            order imposed as a part of his sentence.  Following  the only

            two  circuits to  have explicitly  addressed this  matter, we

            hold he may not. 

                      Petitioner-appellant   Arthur    J.   Smullen   was

            convicted  following  a  jury  trial  in  the  United  States

            District  Court for  the District  of Massachusetts  on three

            counts  of  making false  statements to  a federal  agency in

            violation of  18 U.S.C.   1001.  On May 27, 1993, Smullen was

            sentenced to  27 months  in prison,  36 months  of supervised

            release,  restitution in  the  amount of  $121,377.78, and  a

            special assessment  of $150.   Smullen  never filed  a direct

            appeal from  his conviction and  sentence.   On November  30,

            1994,  Smullen, pro se, filed a motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
                            ______

              2255, to vacate, set aside, or  correct his sentence.1  The

            motion was  denied by  the district  court,  and Smullen  now

            appeals.  We affirm.

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Smullen has completed his  term of imprisonment.  Because
            Smullen was  imprisoned when  he  filed this    2255  motion,
            jurisdiction to  consider the  motion attached.   See Fernos-
                                                              ___ _______
            Lopez v. Figarella  Lopez, 929  F.2d 20, 23  (1st Cir.  1991)
            _____    ________________
            (holding that the "custody"  requirement of 28 U.S.C.    2255
            is determined as  of the  date a habeas  petition is  filed),
            cert.  denied, 502 U.S. 886 (1992); United States v. Michaud,
            _____________                       _____________    _______
            901 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1990).

                                         -2-

                                          I.
                                          I.

                      The following  facts  are taken  largely  from  the

            Presentence  Investigation Report  ("PSR")  submitted to  the

            district court by the probation department.

                      Smullen  was  employed  by the  United  States Post

            Office until 1974, when he left on total disability.  At that

            time, Smullen  began receiving  disability payments  from the

            United  States Department of  Labor.  Beginning  in May 1982,

            Smullen began to work full time at the New England Dragway in

            Epping, New Hampshire.   Smullen worked at the  Dragway until

            his  employment was terminated  in 1988.   Smullen then began

            preparations  to open  a motorcycle  parts and  service shop,

            Performance Cycles,  Inc., which  he opened in  January 1989.

            Throughout  the period  between May  1982 and  February 1990,

            during which  Smullen was  employed or self-employed  for all

            but a  brief period,  Smullen filed  annual reports with  the

            United  States  Department  of  Labor -  Office  of  Workers'

            Compensation Programs  falsely stating  that he had  not been

            employed or self-employed in  the preceding 15-month  period.

            As a result, Smullen obtained disability payments to which he

            was not entitled.

                 Smullen was  charged with  making false statements  to a

            federal agency in violation of 18 U.S.C.   1001.   The three-

            count indictment  alleged that Smullen  had filed  fraudulent

            statements with the  Department of Labor  on form CA-1032  in

                                         -3-

            1988, 1989, and 1990.  A jury convicted Smullen  on all three

            counts.  At sentencing, the district court ordered Smullen to

            pay $121,377.78  in restitution  -- an amount  recommended by

            defense counsel.2   The PSR recommended  an offense level  of

            15; however,  the district  court ordered an  additional two-

            level enhancement  for obstruction  of justice,  finding that

            Smullen's  trial  testimony  was   "thorough-going  perjury."

            Smullen's sentencing range was  then set at 24 to  30 months.

            The  district court imposed a sentence of 27 months in prison

            and 36 months  of supervised release.   Although Smullen  did

            not  appeal from his conviction or sentence, he later filed a

            motion  under  28  U.S.C.    2255  seeking  relief  from  his

            sentence.  The district court denied this motion, and Smullen

            appeals.  

                                         II.
                                         II.

                      Smullen argued in his   2255 motion, and now argues

            on appeal,  that errors occurred  in his sentence  because he

            was  denied  his  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  the  effective

            assistance of  counsel.   Smullen contends that:  (1) counsel

            erred in  not arguing  for a  two-level reduction  in offense

            level for acceptance of  responsibility; (2) counsel erred in

                                
            ____________________

            2.  The  probation  department   suggested  $168,076  as   an
            appropriate  restitution  amount;  the  government  suggested
            $147,935.43 in restitution; Smullen's counsel  suggested that
            the proper restitution figure was $121,377.78.

                                         -4-

            agreeing to an allegedly  excessive loss amount, resulting in

            an improper Guideline sentencing range; and (3) counsel erred

            in suggesting a restitution amount approximately $100,000  in

            excess of the maximum  amount which could be ordered  by law.

            Only the third point  appears to have any substance,  but, as

            it  is beyond the purview of  a collateral proceeding brought

            under 28 U.S.C.   2255, we cannot resolve it.

                      Smullen's failure to  have raised the above  claims

            on direct appeal from his sentence would normally have barred

            him from raising them in a   2255 collateral attack unless he

            could show cause for  the failure and actual prejudice.   See
                                                                      ___

            Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991);  United States
            _______    ________                             _____________

            v.  Frady, 456 U.S. 152,  165-67 (1982).   However, cause and
                _____

            prejudice need not be shown when the underlying claim alleges

            ineffective  assistance of  counsel.   See  Knight v.  United
                                                   ___  ______     ______

            States, 37 F.3d  769, 774 (1st Cir. 1994).3  Smullen not only
            ______

            argues  that his  counsel  performed inadequately  during his

            sentencing hearing, but also that an appeal relative to these

            errors  was  not taken  because  of  his counsel's  allegedly

            incompetent advice that "an appeal was just a waste of time."

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Similarly,  because  the   purported  sentencing   errors
            allegedly arose from ineffective assistance, thus giving them
            a constitutional  dimension, they may be  considered under 28
            U.S.C.    2255 even though  errors in the  application of the
            sentencing  guidelines,  by  themselves,  are   not  normally
            cognizable on collateral attack.  See Knight, 37 F.3d at 772.
                                              ___ ______

                                         -5-

                      The   standard  for   constitutionally  ineffective

            assistance  of  counsel  was   set  forth  in  Strickland  v.
                                                           __________

            Washington, 466  U.S. 668, 687  (1984).  To  succeed, Smullen
            __________

            has the burden of showing that (1) counsel's performance fell

            below an objective standard  of reasonableness, and (2) there

            is a  reasonable probability  that, but for  counsel's error,

            the result of the proceedings would have been different.  See
                                                                      ___

            Scarpa v. DuBois, 38 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
            ______    ______                                ____________

            115  S. Ct.  940 (1995);  Lopez-Nieves v. United  States, 917
                                      ____________    ______________

            F.2d 645, 648 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
                                                  __________

            687).  In order to satisfy  the first prong of the Strickland
                                                               __________

            test, Smullen must show that  "counsel made errors so serious

            that counsel was not  functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed

            the defendant by the Sixth  Amendment."  Strickland, 466 U.S.
                                                     __________

            at 687.    There  is  a "strong  presumption  that  counsel's

            conduct  falls   within   the  wide   range   of   reasonable

            professional assistance."  Id. at 689.  
                                       ___

                      The first two  of Smullen's sentencing  claims must

            be  dismissed  as Smullen  cannot  meet either  prong  of the

            Strickland  test.  We  cannot attribute error  to counsel for
            __________

            failing  to   seek  an  offense  level   reduction  based  on

            acceptance  of responsibility.  See U.S.S.G.   3E1.1.  As the
                                            ___

            record  shows, Smullen never  accepted responsibility for his

            crimes.  Smullen pleaded not guilty to each of the counts and

            maintained his  innocence throughout  the trial.   See United
                                                               ___ ______

                                         -6-

            States  v. Bennett, 37 F.3d 687, 697 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
            ______     _______

            that U.S.S.G.   3E1.1 is generally not intended to apply to a

            defendant who  challenges the essential  factual elements  of

            guilt).    Moreover,  the  district  court  stated  that  the

            defendant's trial testimony was "thorough-going  perjury" and

            imposed a  sentence enhancement  for obstruction  of justice.

            See  United States v. Talladino, 38 F.3d 1255, 1265 (1st Cir.
            ___  _____________    _________

            1994)  ("[I]n  the universe  of  cases  where obstruction  of

            justice  looms, a reduction  for acceptance of responsibility

            is ordinarily forestalled altogether."). 

                      Smullen  has  provided no  better  support for  his

            contention that, had his  counsel served him competently, the

            court would have found a lower offense level and,  therefore,

            he  would  have  been  sentenced  within  a  lower  Guideline

            sentencing  range.    Smullen  argues that  the  loss  amount

            attributed to him as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes

            was  excessive, and faults  his lawyer for  not bringing this

            fact to the court's  attention.  However, the amount  of loss

            attributed to the petitioner's misconduct related to a period

            well within  the duration of "relevant  conduct" for purposes

            of  the Sentencing  Guidelines.   See U.S.S.G.    1B1.3(a)(2)
                                              ___

            (requiring that relevant conduct be "part of the same  course

            of  conduct  or  common scheme  or  plan  as  the offense  of

            conviction").  Over an  eight-year period, Smullen engaged in

            a   course  of  conduct  to  fraudulently  obtain  unentitled

                                         -7-

            disability benefits.   Smullen's  counsel made no  error, let

            alone a  constitutionally relevant  one, in failing  to argue

            for a lower  loss amount.  As it was,  defense counsel argued

            for a  loss amount significantly lower than  that proposed by

            the government or by the probation department.

                      Smullen's third and only  substantial claim is that

            the ineffective  assistance of his counsel  contributed to an

            order for him to  pay an amount of  restitution in excess  of

            that permitted by  law.   See United States  v. Ratliff,  999
                                      ___ _____________     _______

            F.2d  1023, 1026  (6th Cir.  1993) ("A  refusal to  appeal an

            erroneous  restitution  award, which  award  would have  been

            subject to reversal on appeal, would meet the Strickland test
                                                          __________

            and  would  clearly constitute  cause  for  [the] failure  to

            appeal  the award.")    If  Smullen's restitution  obligation

            exceeds  the maximum amount which the  law permits, there may

            be a  reasonable probability that counsel's  failure to point

            this out contributed to the unfavorable outcome.  Id.  
                                                              ___

                      It may be, but  we need not decide, that  Smullen's

            restitution  obligation did,  in  fact,  exceed  the  maximum

            permitted  by law,  notwithstanding the  basic equities  that

            appear  to have prompted it.   The Supreme  Court has limited

            restitution to losses caused by the specific conduct that  is

            the  basis of  the offense  of conviction.  Hughey v.  United
                                                        ______     ______

            States,  495 U.S.  411,  420 (1990)  (holding that  "the loss
            ______

            caused by  the conduct  underlying the offense  of conviction

                                         -8-

            establishes  the  outer  limits  of a  restitution  order").4

            Smullen was  ordered to repay $121,377.78  in connection with

            his  guilty  verdict  on   three  counts  relating  to  false

            statements  submitted to  the  Department of  Labor in  1988,

            1989, and 1990.  The $121,377.78 figure represents the entire

            amount of loss relating to Smullen's false statements  to the

            Department  of  Labor over  the  eight-year  duration of  his

            fraudulent scheme.  The loss related to the three-year period

            for which  the  government actually  secured convictions  was

            approximately $20,250.93.5   

                                
            ____________________

            4.  In Hughey, the defendant,  charged in several counts with
                   ______
            the use of stolen credit cards, pled guilty to the fraudulent
            use  of one.    The order  for  restitution included  use  of
            others.  The Supreme Court  reversed, saying the outer  limit
            for restitution awards  was "the loss  caused by the  conduct
            underlying the offense of  conviction."  Hughey, 495 U.S.  at
                                                     ______
            420.
                 The  statute authorizing  restitution,  the  Victim  and
            Witness  Protection Act  of  1982, specifically  18 U.S.C.   
            3663,  was amended  in 1990  to  allow broad  restitution for
            offenses involving "as  an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
            a  pattern of criminal activity."  Crime Control Act of 1990,
            Pub. L.  No. 101-647,    2509,  104 Stat.  4789, 4863.   That
            amendment  does not  apply  here, however,  because Smullen's
            offense of  conviction, filing false statements  to a federal
            agency in violation  of 18 U.S.C.    1001, did not  include a
            plan,  scheme or conspiracy as an element of the offense. See
                                                                      ___
            United States v.  Neal, 36  F.3d 1190, 1201  (1st Cir.  1994)
            _____________     ____
            (holding that  a defendant convicted of  money laundering and
            of being an accessory after the fact  could not be ordered to
            pay  restitution for  losses  not directly  related to  those
            offenses  because   neither  involved  proof  of   a  scheme,
            conspiracy or  pattern of  criminal activity as  an element),
            petitionfor cert. filed, (U.S. July 25, 1996) (No. 96-5380). 
            _______________________

            5.  The  $20,250.93  figure  is  the amount  put  forward  by
            petitioner.   The government does not  put forward a specific
            calculation of  the amount of  loss specifically attributable
            to Smullen's false statements made in 1988, 1989, and 1990.

                                         -9-

                      As  noted,  this   might  be   attributed  to   the

            ineffective assistance of counsel where, as here, counsel not

            only  did  not point  out the  relevant  law to  the district

            judge, but apparently agreed with the prosecution's erroneous

            interpretation.  See  Scarpa, 38 F.3d at  11 ("Serious errors
                             ___  ______

            in an  attorney's performance, unrelated to  tactical choices

            or to  some plausible  strategic aim,  constitute substandard

            performance.").6  However, even assuming  this is so, we  are

            powerless in a  proceeding under  28 U.S.C.    2255 to  grant

            relief to Smullen.  Section 2255 provides:

                      A prisoner in custody under sentence of a
                      court  established  by  Act  of  Congress
                      claiming  the right  to be  released upon
                      ____________________________________
                      the ground that the sentence  was imposed
                      in  violation of the Constitution or laws
                      of the  United States, or  that the court
                      was without jurisdiction  to impose  such
                      sentence,  or  that the  sentence  was in
                      excess of the  maximum authorized by law,
                      or  is  otherwise  subject to  collateral
                      attack,  may move the court which imposed
                      the  sentence  to  vacate, set  aside  or
                      correct the sentence.

            28  U.S.C.   2255 (emphasis supplied).  The plain language of

            the statute indicates that   2255 is available to petitioners

                                
            ____________________

            6.  The   government's  attempt   to  avoid   a  finding   of
            ineffective assistance by arguing that Smullen's counsel  may
            have  been acting strategically  need not be  addressed.  Cf.
                                                                      ___
            United  States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 227-28 (1st Cir. 1993)
            ______________    ______
            (holding  that a strategic choice on the part of counsel will
            not  be  second guessed  by  the  courts); United  States  v.
                                                       ______________
            Tabares, 951 F.2d 405, 409 (1st Cir. 1991).   There is little
            _______
            in the record to suggest that counsel was aware of Hughey and
                                                               ______
            its  progeny,  but  nonetheless  decided not  to  bring  this
            doctrine to the court's attention for strategic reasons. 

                                         -10-

            "in  custody"  who "claim[]  the right  to be  released" from

            custody.   Smullen,  while in  custody at  the time  he moved

            under   2255, was not "claiming the right to be released" but

            was merely claiming the right to a reduced restitution  order

            establishing the  monetary restitution  he should pay.   This

            court has  previously held that  a petitioner,  no longer  in

            custody,  subject  only  to  a  fine  cannot  challenge  that

            obligation in a   2255 action.  United States v. Michaud, 901
                                            _____________    _______

            F.2d  5,  7  (1st  Cir. 1990)  ("A  monetary  fine  is  not a

            sufficient  restraint on  liberty  to meet  the 'in  custody'

            requirement for     2255  purposes[;]  [n]or  does  potential

            future incarceration for  failure to pay such  a fine provide

            the requisite subject matter jurisdiction."). 

                      The Fifth  and Sixth  Circuits have held,  in cases

            analogous to  the present, that  a person  in custody  cannot

            bring an ineffective assistance of counsel  claim challenging

            a  fine because  that  person is  not  "claiming a  right  to

            release"  from custody.  See United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d
                                     ___ _____________    ______

            1131, 1137  (5th Cir. 1994) ("[I]f counsel's constitutionally

            insufficient  assistance  affected  the  trial  court's guilt

            determination or the sentencer's imposition of a prison term,

            a prisoner's ineffective  assistance of  counsel claim  falls

            within the scope of    2255; if, as here, it relates  only to

            the  imposition of a fine, his claim falls outside   2255.");

            United  States v. Watroba, 56  F.3d 28, 29  (6th Cir.), cert.
            ______________    _______                               _____

                                         -11-

            denied,  116  S.  Ct. 269  (1995);  accord  United States  v.
            ______                              ______  _____________

            Gaudet, 81 F.3d 585, 592  (5th Cir. 1996).  We are  not aware
            ______

            of any  court of appeals  that, having addressed  this issue,

            has reached a contrary result.7

                      The Fifth and Sixth  Circuits' interpretation of   

            2255  not only tracks the literal language of the statute but

            also  promotes  the equal  treatment  of similar  claims.   A

            defendant,  not    in  custody,  sentenced  to  an  allegedly

            erroneous  fine or restitution  order because  of ineffective

            assistance of counsel  cannot seek relief  under   2255,  see
                                                                      ___

            Michaud, 901  F.2d at  7, and therefore,  it seems  congruent
            _______

            that a petitioner  who is given the  same allegedly erroneous

            fine  or restitution order but  also happens, at  the time he

            petitions,  to be  rightfully imprisoned  also should  not be

            able  to challenge  his monetary  obligation in  a collateral

            attack.

                                
            ____________________

            7.  This  Circuit  has  not  authoritatively   addressed  the
            question  decided by Segler and  Watroba -- whether  or not  
                                 ______      _______
            2255 is a proper avenue for  a person in custody to assert an
            ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  claim  relating to  the
            imposition of  a  fine  or restitution  order.    In  several
            unpublished opinions  lacking in precedential  force, we have
            implied that a restitution  order can be addressed in    2255
            proceedings.   See, e.g., Vela-Fossas v.  United States, 1990
                           ___  ____  ___________     _____________
            WL 443937 (1st  Cir. Sept.  7, 1990).   In addition, we  have
            assumed  without deciding  that  there  was  jurisdiction  to
            challenge a restitution order under the  former Fed. R. Crim.
            P.  35 (which  permitted  the court  to  correct an  "illegal
            sentence"  at any time).  See United States v. Lilly, 80 F.3d
                                      ___ _____________    _____
            24, 28 (1st Cir. 1996).  

                                         -12-

                      Agreeing  with  the   Fifth  and  Sixth   Circuits'

            analyses,   we  hold  that   Smullen  cannot   challenge  his

            restitution obligation in this   2255 proceeding.8  

                      Affirmed.
                      Affirmed
                      ________

                                
            ____________________

            8.  Should Smullen become incarcerated in the future due to
            his failure to meet the restitution order as the basis for
            his confinement obligations, he may, although we need not
            decide for present purposes, be entitled to bring a   2255
            action challenging his restitution at that point.

                                         -13-