Court Opinion

ID: 9661994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:56:39.292908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:35.672638
License: Public Domain

REED, Justice
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It appears to me that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
*24It is unnecessary to consider strict liability, in my judgment, because it appears the defendant was subject to liability under ordinary negligence principles. My only disagreement with the Chief Justice is concerning the element of foreseeability so far as the defendant’s possible liability is involved. There are many situations in which a reasonable manufacturer would be expected to anticipate and guard against the conduct of others. When the risk becomes a serious one, either because the threatened harm is great or because there is an especial likelihood that it will occur, reasonable care, in . my judgment, demands precautions against occasional negligence, which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life and therefore to be anticipated. It is not due care to depend upon the exercise of care by another when such reliance is accompanied by obvious danger. See Prosser, Law of Torts, Sec. 33 at 170-71 (4th ed. 1971).
The majority opinion fairly states the obvious danger in marketing this pistol with the only warning contained in a separate operating manual. The harm that occurred was within the general area of the risk created by the manufacturer’s negligence. The defendant is not confined to foresee the precise method of causing the harm. It is enough if it is reasonable for him to foresee the general area of the risk of harm.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
AKER and CLAYTON, JJ., join in this dissent.