Court Opinion

ID: 9642366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:56:01.827492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:48:09.794503
License: Public Domain

PETERS, District Judge
(dissenting).
I do not concur with the views of the majority of the court as to the necessity of the proposed decrees.
The affirmative action ordered by the Labor Board, enforcement of which is asked for, is almost wholly predicated upon the finding of the Board that the shutdown of March 24, 1937, was for the purpose of interfering with the free right of its employees to choose their own organization and bargaining agent, — particularly to discourage their adherence to the C. I. O. connection. If such was the purpose of the shutdown; if it was for the purpose of coercing and interfering with the free action of the employees, it would be an unfair practice under the statute. However, I am unable to satisfy myself from the record that there was sufficient substantial evidence to support such a finding. It cannot be doubted that the introduction of the C. I. O. into the picture was wholly displeasing to the managers of the factory,— as it apparently turned out later to be unsatisfactory to the employees, — and it might naturally be thought that the shutdown was a manifestation of displeasure; and it may be that the management was not adverse to such a conclusion being drawn; but if that was only an incidental effect of their action, and if their determination to shut down was for good reasons other than involving coercion of employees, there is not sufficient ground for the imposition of the heavy penalties which the Board has ordered.
The reasons given by the management for the shutdown, — disturbed labor conditions, beginning early in the year, affecting unfavorably the quality and quantity of the output, — are as readily believable as that it was for the purpose Of interfering with the rights of employees under the Act. No discrimination is shown at any time in the attitude of the respondent toward its employees on account of their union affiliations.
The Board says that it is “convinced” that the closing of the plants was for the purpose of coercing the employees. Others, considering the evidence, might become convinced that the shutdown was determined upon by the management for valid business reasons. The purpose is a matter of inference, and, if one inference can be drawn as well as another, neither is proved.
I agree that there was evidence to support a finding that at one time, after the employees called in the outside agency, or C. I. O., that organization represented a majority of the respondent’s employees. Also that there was a refusal to bargain *692with the C. I. O., not especially because of failure to answer a letter which the director of the C. I. O. sent to the respondent, but because from all the evidence it is .manifest that the C. I. O. was in such disfavor with the respondent that the respondent was unwilling to bargain with it. But I fail -to see sufficient ground for now directing the respondent to bargain with that organization. It seems to me there is as much reason for directing bargaining with the Pine Tree organization as with the outside unit. The evidence appears to be un-contradictcd that the Pine Tree organization had received the support of a great majority of the employees at the time of the hearing before the Board, and that the C. I. O., although originally called in, had been displaced by their own locally formed union.
I assume that the purpose of the Act is to give workers full liberty to make their own choice, which purpose would seem to be defeated by ordering recognition of the outside organization in this case. The proceeding is supposed to be in the interest of the employees, and not primarily for the benefit of the C. I. O. I cannot think that the full liberty of action guaranteed the workers would be promoted by now ordering them to be represented by the outside group. Nor do I think that the change of attitude on the part of employees was brought about by an illegal attitude of the respondent; rather, by more mature consideration of their own welfare.
In my view the fundamental worthy purposes of the Act are best promoted in this case by dismissing the petition, there being really nothing to be gained now by enforcing the “cease and desist” part of the Board’s order.