Court Opinion

ID: 807048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2012-08-20 20:05:53+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:22.021151
License: Public Domain

FILED
                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                AUG 20 2012

                                                                          MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 11-10239

              Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 4:10-cr-03542-DCB-
                                                 BPV-1
  v.

JOSE COBO-RAYMUNDO,                              MEMORANDUM*

              Defendant - Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                    David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted July 19, 2012**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and VANCE,*** Chief District Judge.

       Jose Cobo-Raymundo appeals his sentence of 51 months’ imprisonment

following his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). We affirm.

        *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
        **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
        ***
             The Honorable Sarah S. Vance, Chief District Judge of the Eastern
District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
      Cobo-Raymundo challenges the district court’s conclusion that his prior

conviction for unlawful wounding under Virginia Code § 18.2-51 qualified as a

“crime of violence” under the definition at U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §

2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). He also challenges the district court’s decision not to reduce

sua sponte his total offense level when calculating his sentencing Guidelines range.

Because Cobo-Raymundo did not raise these issues before the district court, we

review for plain error. United States v. Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d 744, 746-47 (9th

Cir. 2011); United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008). We may

reverse for plain error when the appellant shows that “(1) there was error; (2) the

error committed was plain; (3) the error affected substantial rights; and (4) the

error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d 419, 428 (9th Cir.

2011).

      We note first that the district court simply accepted the conclusion of the

unchallenged pre-sentence report that Cobo-Raymundo’s prior conviction was a

crime of violence, and did not conduct its own analysis. Although Cobo-

Raymundo does not challenge this aspect of the proceeding below, this was plainly

erroneous. See United States v. Castillo-Marin, 684 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2012).

However, the error did not affect his substantial rights because no prejudice

                                      Page 2 of 4
ensued. See id. at 918-19. As we explain below, “unlawful wounding” under

Virginia Code § 18.2-51 is categorically a crime of violence and therefore the

district court properly applied the “crime of violence” sentencing enhancement in

determining Cobo-Raymundo’s advisory sentencing Guidelines range.

      Unlawful wounding is not one of the listed offenses that categorically

qualify as a “crime of violence” under comment n.1(B)(iii) to U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2. However, because the Virginia statute’s elements are

necessarily encompassed by the “crime of violence” definition in U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2, unlawful wounding as defined by Virginia Code §

18.2-51 is categorically a crime of violence. See Penuliar v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d

603, 608 (9th Cir. 2008). To be convicted under § 18.2-51, a person necessarily

must have shot, stabbed, cut, wounded, or otherwise caused bodily injury to

another person, which means that the offense “has as an element the use . . . of

physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii).

Moreover, § 18.2-51 clearly requires the intentional use of physical force, because

it contains as an element “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill.” See

Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d at 749; Hampton v. Commonwealth, 542 S.E.2d 41, 45-

46 (Va. Ct. App. 2001). Finally, a violation of § 18.2-51 results in physical injury

to another, because the actus reus element of the statute is satisfied by shooting,

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stabbing, cutting, wounding, or causing bodily injury to another person. See

Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d at 749. Cobo-Raymundo points to no case in which the

Virginia state courts did in fact apply § 18.2-51 to conduct outside the federal

definition. See id. at 748.

      In addition, the district court did not plainly err when it declined to reduce

sua sponte Cobo-Raymundo’s offense level by one level for his assisting the

government by timely notifying it of his intention to plead guilty. United States v.

Johnson, 581 F.3d 994, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2009).

      AFFIRMED.

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