Court Opinion

ID: 9566666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:41:51.150092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:53.648252
License: Public Domain

Thompson, A.C.J.
(concurring) — I agree with the decision of the majority that, on the issues presented, Mr. Young's convictions should be affirmed. However, I feel compelled to write a separate opinion to emphasize that the precedential value of this case is limited by its unusual facts. The thrust of Mr. Young's appeal was an attack on the *114finding of unavailability of the hearsay declarant and the resultant denial of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The more germane issue is whether the hearsay statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability, given the peculiar facts of this case. Mr. Young failed to raise or address this issue in his appeal.
Even though a hearsay statement may be admissible under the rules of evidence, its introduction may still violate the defendant's right of confrontation. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255, 88 S. Ct. 1318 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965). The crucial question when deciding a confrontation clause issue regarding hearsay is not whether admission complies with common law hearsay rules, but whether it would be consistent with the purpose of the confrontation clause to advance the accuracy of the truth-determining process by assuring that "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement". Green, 399 U.S. at 161, quoted in State v. Parris, 98 Wn.2d 140, 146, 654 P.2d 77 (1982).
When a hearsay declarant is not present and subject to cross examination at trial, the United States Supreme Court has required other assurances that the integrity of the truth-finding process will not be compromised. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980) outlined a "general approach to the problem" of reconciling the hearsay rules with the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. Roberts set forth two general criteria: (1) unavailability of the hearsay declarant; (2) the prior testimony must have been obtained under circumstances providing satisfactory "indicia of reliability". Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. With regard to, the second criterion, the Court has held that reliability can be inferred, without more, in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. See also Bourjaily v. United States, _ U.S. _, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987); State v. Parris, supra at 148. Here, *115the defendant does not dispute the hearsay statement of the complaining witness was an "excited utterance". We have previously held, in an indecent liberties case involving hearsay statements of a child victim, that the excited utterance exception is "firmly rooted", and thus circumstantial guaranties of trustworthiness had been met and the statements were inferred to be reliable. State v. Robinson, 44 Wn. App. 611, 620, 722 P.2d 1379, review denied, 107 Wn.2d 1009 (1986). In Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197 (1st Cir. 1987), the court observed that the United States Supreme Court has not spoken to whether excited utterance exceptions meet the Roberts test for reliability. Puleio resolved the issue in favor of inferring reliability, noting that excited utterance is a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
Nevertheless, while the court need not engage in an independent inquiry into the reliability of such statements which fall within firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule, see Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2783, it should not ignore factors which weigh heavily in favor of the fundamental right to "face to face" confrontation guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. In other words, it should not ignore facts rebutting the inference of reliability.
The United States Supreme Court has not created a hard and fast rule with regard to confrontation clause challenges to admission of hearsay, but instead has sought to balance the right of a criminal defendant to confront his accusers with the need for effective law enforcement, the aim being to ensure the integrity of the truth-finding process. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397, 89 L. Ed. 2d 390, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986); Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2782. I believe the balance may, in some cases, be struck in a defendant's favor even though evidence falls within a firmly rooted exception. A close reading of the cases suggests the balance favored admission when the amount of infringement on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right was minimal in comparison to the reliability and trustworthiness of the statements. In several instances, the defendant had been able to fully cross-examine the witness at a prior trial *116or hearing, or the weighty admission against interests of a codefendant or coconspirator furnished enhanced reliability. Ohio v. Roberts, supra; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213, 91 S. Ct. 210 (1970); California v. Green, supra. See also United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
Here, the complaining witness' hearsay statement was the only evidence of guilt. "Where a case stands or falls on the jury's belief or disbelief of essentially one witness, that witness' credibility or motive must be subject to close scrutiny", especially in prosecution of sex crimes where the right of cross examination may determine the outcome. State v. Roberts, 25 Wn. App. 830, 834, 611 P.2d 1297 (1980). Here, cross examination was critically important, given the complaining witness' refusal to testify, her clearly expressed anger at the police at the time the hearsay statement was made and thereafter, for not having done something to get help for the mentally ill defendant,3 even though they had been summoned on a number of occasions, and the prior assaults, all of which the trial court was aware. These unique facts undermine the traditional indicia of reliability inferred from the "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. Thus, while in the usual case, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers is not violated by admitting the excited utterance of an unavailable witness, the facts here strongly suggest otherwise. Officer Pittman's testimony falls within what is referred to in Dutton as "crucial" and "devastating" evidence. The testimony not only goes to the heart of the case, but it is basically all there is. Officer Pittman was not able to testify to "what happened”. He could only testify to "what he was told happened". The jury was not able to view the demeanor of the complaining witness; though. Officer Pittman was under oath, the person whose testimony is critical was not; defense counsel was severely limited in cross-examining *117Officer Pittman since the officer's knowledge was limited by what he had been told; the usual cross examination which can test the presence or absence of sufficient facts to prove each element of the crimes charged cannot be undertaken since the witness on the stand does not have the knowledge to answer the questions.
Nevertheless, limited to those issues and assignments of error raised on appeal, agreeing with the court's opinion regarding the unavailability of the declarant, I am constrained to affirm.

As noted by the majority, expert testimony established the defendant was insane at the time of the acts.