Court Opinion

ID: 9644381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:54:41.165294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:49.262382
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
dissenting. I dissent. I agree with the majority that special interrogatories, if improperly used, possess a potential to disrupt the proper functioning of a jury in a criminal case. Their utilization should therefore be prohibited in the absence of a court rule to the contrary. In this particular case, however, that potential did not come to fruition. Not only did the verdict procedure employed below not impact adversely upon defendants, it affirmatively aided their cause. Consequently, I am of the view that the error committed below could not possibly have “led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.” State v. Macon, 57 N. J. 325, 336 (1971); see also State v. Melvin, 65 N. J. 1, 18-19 (1974). Defendants’ convictions should therefore be affirmed.
*209I
The main reason underlying judicial disapproval of special interrogatories in criminal trials is that the use of such a verdict procedure, if not carefully circumscribed, may impermissibly “cathechize, color or coerce the jury’s decision making.” Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F. 2d 1241, 1246 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. den. 420 U. S. 955, 95 S. Ct. 1339, 43 L. Ed. 2d 432 (1975); see, e.g., State v. Heald, 307 A. 2d 188, 193 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1973). If such a result does come to pass, a defendant has been deprived of his right to be tried by a jury which is free from undue judicial control. See, e. g., United States v. O'Looney, 544 F. 2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. den. 439 U. S. 1023, 97 S. Ct. 642, 50 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1976); United States v. James, 432 F. 2d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 403 U. S. 906, 91 S. Ct. 2214, 29 L. Ed. 2d 682 (1971); United States v. Spock, 416 F. 2d 165, 181-182 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 276 (S. D. N. Y. 1957), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Gernie, 252 F. 2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert. den. 356 U. S. 968, 78 S. Ct. 1006, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1073 (1958).
As the majority points out, however, the utilization of special interrogatories is not per se unconstitutional, nor will their use always undermine a jury’s independence. See ante at 303-304. Given the proper circumstances, the submission of written questions to a jury might aid rather than obstruct the carrying out of its functions. Special interrogatories dealing with complex issues in a lengthy trial may assist jurors so that they can better perform their constitutional role. See United States v. Ogull, supra. Moreover, the use of written questions may be of invaluable aid to the judge in imposing sentence. See United States v. Ogull, supra. So long as the questions submitted “plainly lack any capacity to catechize, color or coerce the jury’s decision making,” their utilization would appear to be immune from constitutional attack. Heald v. Mullaney, supra, 505 F. 2d at 1246; see also State v. Heald, supra, 307 A. 2d at 193.
*210II
I agree with the majority that this Court should not at present attempt to catalog every instance in which special interrogatories might aid, rather than obstruct, a jury’s deliberations. Any decision in this regard should be made only after the Criminal Practice Committee and this Court have carefully scrutinized the matter and a rule explicitly allowing special interrogatories has been adopted. Our reluctance to examine the potential impact of interrogatories in every conceivable situation should not, however, lead us to ignore the concrete impact which the interrogatories here at issue had upon the particular case under review. See, e. g., United States v. O’Looney, supra, 544 F. 2d at 392-393; United States v. James, supra, 432 F. 2d at 308; State v. Heald, supra, 307 A. 2d at 193-196; Commonwealth v. Benefrical Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275 N. E. 2d 33, 97 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1971), cert. denied sub noms. Farrell v. Massachusetts, 407 U. S. 910, 92 S. Ct. 2433, 32 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1972) and Benefrical Fin. Co. v. Massachusetts, 407 U. S. 914, 92 S. Ct. 2433, 32 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1972).
The trial judge below did not have the benefit of today’s decision by this Court. Paced with a lengthy trial involving three defendants, twelve charged offenses, and an “intricate statute of limitations problem,” see ante at 196, he was justifiably fearful that consideration of all the issues at one time would thoroughly confuse the jury ■— a confusion which might redound to defendants’ detriment. It was for this reason that he considered the use of special interrogatories.
He adopted this procedure after consulting with all counsel. Although, in his view, a bifurcated verdict would result in a trial free from undue judicial pressure, he realized that he might have overlooked some element of prejudice to defendants’ cause inhering in such a procedure.
At the close of the State’s case — and thus well before the trial had come to a close — he therefore asked all counsel to comment upon the propriety of this procedure. Counsel *211for defendant-Simon labeled the procedure “very fair.” Counsel for Van lettering remarked that he did not “have any problem with that.” Counsel for Haussmann remained silent. Indeed, the only person to raise reservations concerning the propriety of the bifurcated verdict form was the prosecutor. In his view, this procedure would unduly prejudice the State’s case.
It is with these factors in mind that we must review the interrogatories used below to determine whether the judge’s error was indeed “clearly capable of producing an unjust re-, suit.” B. 3:10-3; State v. Melvin, supra, 65 N. J. at 18-19; State v. Macon, supra, 57 N. J. at 336.
Ill
Ample evidence was presented at trial from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants were guilty of the crimes charged against them. Various landowners and building contractors testified that they had been approached by Ferdinand Heinige or Edward Gorleski and informed that they had to “take care of the boys” on the Planning Board if their proposed construction projects were to be approved. Ferdinand Heinige, the State’s star witness, stated that he had received illegal payments from these and other landowners, stored the monies in a safe at his home, and biannually distributed portions of these funds to Planning Board members, including defendants. He further testified that before the Planning Board formally convened in order to take action with respect to a particular matter, he would inform the members whether he had consummated a “deal” with the applicant. Applications from those who had in fact promised to make payments were always quickly and unanimously approved. Moreover, Heinige recollected making distributions from his safe to Planning Board members in December of 1969, distributions that were not solely derived from the proceeds of the “Swagger-Heinige transaction.” .
Russell Stoeek, another member of the Planning Board in the 1960’s, corroborated Heinige’s testimony regarding *212the informing of Planning Board members as to whether a “deal” existed with a particular applicant. Edward Gorleski — the borough’s Building Inspector — testified that final payment of the money deriving from the Ledgewood Terrace transaction did not take place until December of 1969. Finally, Jerry Yozeh, a member of the Borough Council, stated that he had received payments from Heinige at the end of 1969.
More than sufficient evidence thus existed from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that these defendants had committed the substantive elements of the offenses charged against them and that these offenses had been perpetrated within the limitations period provided in N. J. S. A. 2A:159-2. It is true that defendants denied the existence of a tacit agreement to condition Planning Board approval upon the receipt of illegal payments, and that they maintained that no payments were made by Heinige in the latter part of 1969. However, it is not the province of an appellate court to weigh the credibility of witnesses who have testified at trial. That is the function of the jury.
Our sole inquiry is whether there exists “a reasonable doubt as to whether the error [committed below] led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.” State v. Macon, supra, 57 N. J. at 336, 273 A. 2d at 7; see also State v. Melvin, supra, 65 N. J. at 18-19. I find that no such doubt exists.
The questions submitted to the jury did not deal with each and every element of the offenses with which defendants were charged. Quite the contrary, only three specific matters were touched upon: (1) the existence of payments to defendants in December 1969; (2) the relation of the “Swagger-Heinige transaction” to the conspiracy in which these defendants allegedly participated; and (3) the existence of distributions of proceeds from the “Swagger-Heinige transaction” in December of 1969. These questions thus did not seek to elicit responses relating to whether defendants had committed any of the substantive elements of the offenses *213with which they were charged. Rather, the interrogatories were designed to probe only the intricacies involved in the statute of limitations problem.
Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the wording of the interrogatories did not unreasonably predispose the jury to return a general verdict of guilty. Prior to their submission, the judge instructed the jurors as to the legal significance of the terms “conspiracy” and “co-conspirators” and informed them that they would have to assume the existence of a conspiracy only when responding to Interrogatory II. Moreover, after the interrogatories had been answered, the judge emphasized that the jury could no longer assume the existence of a conspiracy when it retired to consider a general verdict.
The majority characterizes this later instruction as “a weak palliative * * * hardly to be expected to overcome the conscious or subconscious feelings as to guilt the jurors were impelled to develop in making the factual determinations * * * called for by the special interrogatories.” See ante at 201-202. In effect, the majority deems the average juror intellectually incapable of applying the instructions given by a trial judge. The majority conveniently ignores the fact that our whole system of criminal justice is predicated upon the ability of laymen to comprehend and follow such instructions. Under the majority’s thesis, therefore, Evid. B. 6 — a rule which requires a judge to give jurors a limiting instruction when evidence is admissible for one purpose but not for another purpose — serves no function whatsoever, inasmuch as any such instruction amounts at best to a “weak palliative.”
I cannot accept such an anomalous result. The judge in the present case explicitly informed the jurors that they could not assume the existence of a conspiracy during their general verdict deliberations. In the absence of proof demonstrating the contrary, we must assume that the jurors ■ — ■ as intelligent laymen — were capable of following this charge. The majority’s assertion that the jurors believed, consciously *214or subconsciously, that the defendants were guilty is just that —• an assertion supported neither by the record nor by scientific evidence of which we can take judicial notice.
It is noteworthy in this regard that had the trial judge not utilized a bifurcated verdict form, he would have been obliged to instruct the jurors as to the precise matters encompassed by the interrogatories prior to their general verdict deliberations. That is, he would have been compelled to inform the jury of the existence of the statute of limitations problem and the necessity of determining whether an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy had occurred during the limitations period. In order that defendants’ cause not be prejudiced, he could properly have charged that unless the jurors found (1) that a payment was made by Heinige to defendants or their co-conspirators in December of 1969 and (2) that any such payment was made as part of a conspiracy in which these defendants participated, they need not deliberate upon the substantive elements of the charged offenses, but instead should return a verdict of not guilty. Indeed, in view of the potentially dispositive nature of the statute of limitations question, he could properly have suggested that this matter be considered at the outset of the jurors’ deliberations.
Although the procedure utilized in the present case differed in form from such a jury charge, in substance the two techniques are identical. Just as the charge would have been completely unobjectionable, so too did the written interrogatories not result in any prejudice to defendants’ cause. Indeed, the use of special interrogatories had the distinct advantage — from defendants’ viewpoint • — - of focusing the jurors’ attention on the statute of limitations and therefore averting the possibility that the triers of fact would disregard the legal implications of a “technical” element of the offense which did not bear upon defendants’ culpability.
The verdict procedure here utilized therefore did not “catechize, color or coerce the jury’s decision making,” Heald v. Mullaney, supra, 505 F. 2d at 1246; see also United States *215v. O’Looney, 544 F. 2d 385, 392-393 (9th Cir.) cert. den. 429 U. S. 1023, 97 S. Ct. 642, 50 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1976); United States v. James, supra, 432 F. 2d at 308; State v. Heald, supra, 307 A. 2d at 193-196; Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275 N. E. 2d 33, 97 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1971), cert. den. sub noms. Farrell v. Massachusetts, 407 U. S. 910, 92 S. Ct. 2433, 32 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1972) and Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Massachusetts, 407 U. S. 914, 92 S. Ct. 2433, 32 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1972). Not only did the verdict procedure not impact adversely upon defendants, it aided their cause. Had the jury returned with negative responses to the interrogatories, the case would have been at an end. Defendants were thus in effect given two chances to prevail on the merits. Indeed, the jury’s response to the interrogatory dealing with the “Swagger-Heinige transaction” impacted favorably upon defendants’ ease. It removed that transaction from the conspiracy charged, thereby precluding its use to overcome the bar of the statute of limitations. It is therefore not surprising that counsel for all defendants approved of the bifurcated procedure, while the prosecutor complained that such a verdict form would undermine the chances of a conviction. See United States v. James, supra, 432 F. 2d at 308.
The majority today concludes that public officials who have breached the trust placed in them by the citizenry at large shall have yet another chance to argue their cause in court. Although the average citizen is given only one opportunity to prevail on the merits, Van Wettering and Haussmann are to be accorded three such opportunities. And this, merely because the majority deems jurors incapable of following the instructions of a judge.
I dissent. Justice Sullivan and Justice Scheeiber join in this opinion.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Clieeoed and Handler — 4.
For affirmance — Justices Sullivan, Pasiiman and Scheeiber — 3.