Court Opinion

ID: 9620547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:43:43.092303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:51.489739
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting)—The appellant by this action is requesting reinstatement to the position of safety inspector for the Department of Labor and Industries, and the sum of $451 per month for each and every month from *501February 28, 1957, to the present time, plus sick leave and vacation time. The claim in wages is in excess of $15,000.
The veterans’ preference act was first enacted by Laws of 1895, chapter 84, § 1, p. 166, and with minor amendments has been continuously in effect since that time.
In State ex rel. Breslin v. Todd, 8 Wn. (2d) 482, 113 P. (2d) 315, we held that since the statute made a violation a misdemeanor on the part of the official involved, such criminal action was the exclusive remedy.
In 1951, the legislature added a new section (RCW 73.16.015) which provides: “Any veteran entitled to the benefits of RCW 73.16.010 may enforce his rights hereunder by civil action in the courts.”
Prior to 1951, the veterans’ preference act imposed no civil liability upon the employer which could be enforced by the veteran in the courts of this state. This liability was created by the 1951 enactment, and this is the only Lability upon which a cause of action can be based.
This court in an en banc hearing, Noble v. Martin, 191 Wash. 39, 70 P. (2d) 1064, held, after an extensive analysis of the question, that the two-year statute of limitations applied in an action brought upon a liability created by statute. Referring to Douglas Cy. v. Grant Cy., 98 Wash. 355, 167 Pac. 928, the court said at page 62:
“This decision, the decisions therein cited, and the still later decision in Robinson v. Lewis County, 141 Wash. 642, 252 Pac. 143, 256 Pac. 503, firmly establish the rule in this state that, under our system of limitations, actions to enforce a liability created by statute, other than actions for penalties or forfeitures, fall within Rem. Rev. Stat., § 165 [RCW 4.16.130]. This construction has been given to our limitation statutes, and our decisions relating thereto by other courts, including the supreme court of the United States.” (Italics mine.)
The rule has been applied in the following cases: Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wn. (2d) 227, 155 P. (2d) 500, 157 A. L. R. 530 (Lability imposed upon employers for overtime pay, under the fair labor standards act); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 49 L. Ed. 702, 25 S. Ct. 410 (“superadded” LabiLty *502imposed by statute upon national bank shareholders upon insolvency of the bank); Robinson v. Lewis Cy., 141 Wash. 642, 252 Pac. 143, 256 Pac. 503 (statutory liability imposed upon municipal officials for failure to take a contractor’s bond); Douglas Cy. v. Grant Cy., supra (special act making Grant County liable for Douglas County obligations); and Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, 36 Wn. (2d) 685, 220 P. (2d) 655, 18 A. L. R. (2d) 983 (statutory liability imposed upon dealers, winners, and gambling proprietors for amounts lost).
In the case in which this rule of law had its most recent pronouncement by the court (Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, supra), the court simply said:
“This is an action upon a liability created by statute and falls within Rem. Rev. Stat., § 165 . . . [RCW 4.16.130] which reads as follows: ‘An action for relief not herein-before provided for shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued.’
“The decision in Noble v. Martin, supra, ... is conclusive on this issue.”
The facts of Cannon v. Miller, supra, show that it is directly in point. The respondents there had been deprived of wages and overtime compensation which were recoverable by them, together with liquidated damages and attorney’s fees, under the provisions of the fair labor standards act of 1938 (52 Stat. 1060-1069; 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-217). On these facts, the theory of the majority— that there was a direct invasion of the employee’s personal or property rights—could have been, but was not, argued. However, the language which Judge Steinert, speaking for the full court, used in reaching the decision leaves no doubt as to what would have happened to the theory had it been urged:
“The phrase ‘liability created by statute’ means a liability which would not exist but for the statute. . . . [p. 241]
“It seems plain that, except for the provisions of the fair labor standards act, appellants would be under no obligation whatever to pay overtime compensation, liquidated damages, or attorney’s fees. . . . [p. 242]
“. . . we are of the opinion that respondents’ claims *503are to be classed as liabilities created by statute, for in the absence of the statute there would be no obligation at all upon the appellants to pay overtime compensation, liquidated damages, or attorney’s fees as therein prescribed.” (p. 248) (Italics mine.)
The same is true of the “veterans’ preference act.” Without it, the employer would have been under no obligation to give preference in employment to the relator. Consequently, the liability is one created by statute, and the well-settled rule is that the two-year statute applies.
If this were a case of first impression, it might be justifiably said that “a liability created by statute” is as much “an action . . . for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated” (RCW 4.16.080 (2)) as it is “an action for relief not hereinbefore provided for.” (RCW 4.16.130)
But the statute has been construed by this court and the interpretation has become well settled that a liability created by statute falls within the latter category. The majority, by distorting the holdings of the cases recognizing and following this interpretation, has managed to conclude that it never existed. I am reminded of Alice in Wonderland:
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean— neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”
I would affirm.
Hunter, J., concurs in the result of the dissent.