Court Opinion

ID: 9779496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 22:03:45.776687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:27.191841
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. What was done in this case by the plaintiff, Robert Craig, is akin to cleaning sawdust from a chain saw while it is running or grabbing the hot end of a branding iron. Craig himself admitted to Traylor that what he did was “dumb” and said he usually turned the manure spreader off before attempting to clean the chain and small sprocket area. To actually get to the small sprocket and clean where his hand got caught, Craig had to bend down and reach into metal housing which covered the small sprocket. There was no surprise as to how the equipment operated. Craig could see that. The sum and substance of this case comes down to whether the employer had a duty to tell his employee to turn off the manure spreader before attempting to clean it. I believe that there was no duty to tell the employee the obvious, and for that reason, I would affirm. Whether a duty exists is always a question of law. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng’g, 321 Ark. 210, 900 S.W.2d 202 (1995); Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Carlton, 319 Ark. 555, 892 S.W.2d 496 (1995); Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 890 S.W.2d 250 (1994). We have stated that there is no duty to warn when the danger is obvious. Allen v. Lake Catherine Footwear, 246 Ark. 237, 437 S.W.2d 803 (1969) (flammable solvent). We have recently said that there is no duty to warn when the danger, or potential for danger, is generally known and recognized. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng’g, supra (firearm sales). And we have affirmed a summary judgment premised on the obvious danger rule pertaining to the owner or occupier of land. See Jenkins v. International Paper Co., 318 Ark. 663, 887 S.W.2d 300 (1994). The obvious danger rule does not apply when an invitee is forced, as a practical matter, to encounter the danger in order to perform his job. See Carton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 303 Ark. 568, 798 S.W.2d 674 (1990). Nor should it apply when a farm employee is forced to encounter danger on the job. We have held that a manufacturer’s duty to warn could not be decided as a matter of law. See Hergeth, Inc. v. Green, 293 Ark. 119, 733 S.W.2d 409 (1987). In Hergeth, a worker had his hand amputated by a rotating beater in a flock-feeder machine, which was housed behind a plexiglass window. He had reached in behind the window to retrieve some hangers. The manufacturer raised the argument that there was no duty to warn about work with a flock-feeder machine because the danger was open and obvious. We held that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of inherent dangers and that whether the danger was open and obvious was for the jury to decide on proper instructions. Here, the issue is not the duty of the manufacturer to warn about its equipment but the duty owed by the employer to warn about an obvious danger. There is clearly an issue of fact over whether Traylor told Craig to clean the manure spreader. But assuming he did, does the duty to warn entail telling Craig to turn off the spreader before he begins cleaning chicken litter from the area of a sprocket and chain? I do not think so. Were this merely a causation issue, I would agree with the majority that a fact question is presented. But it is not. The appropriate analysis is over the duty to warn, and because of our workers’ compensation laws there is little authority on this point in the master/servant context. I also disagree with the majority opinion that the OSHA regulation (29 C.F.R. § 1928.57) is pertinent. That regulation requires employers to protect employees from inadvertently coming into contact with the hazardous machinery. Inadvertence is not at issue here. Craig purposefully reached into the covered area where the small sprocket and chain were located. Craig’s various statements in depositions substantiate that. Though the circuit court entered summary judgment due to no genuine issues of material fact, I would affirm the court on the basis that no duty existed to warn the employee under these facts to turn off the chain and sprocket before cleaning that area. I respectfully dissent.