Court Opinion

ID: 9892420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 19:05:06.728189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:21.044379
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/23/23

                             CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                               SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                         H050117
                                                    (Santa Cruz County
            Plaintiff and Respondent,                Super. Ct. No. 19CR06616)

            v.

 LUIS ORTIZ,

            Defendant and Appellant.

        In this appeal, we examine several aspects of Code of Civil Procedure section
231.7, 1 which addresses unlawful discrimination in jury selection. We analyze the
limitation on appellate review, under section 231.7, subdivision (j), to the “reasons
actually given” under section 231.7, subdivision (c) by the party exercising a peremptory
challenge. We also consider section 231.7, subdivision (g), which sets out presumptively
invalid reasons for the use of a peremptory challenge based on a prospective juror’s
demeanor, behavior, or manner. In so doing, we explain the statutory requirements
imposed by section 231.7, subdivision (g) on the trial court and the standards for
appellate review of the trial court’s ruling on the section 231.7 objection.
        A jury convicted defendant Luis Ortiz of 17 sex crimes against three minors. The
trial court sentenced Ortiz to 225 years to life in prison. On appeal, Ortiz contends the
trial court erred by overruling his section 231.7 objection to the prosecutor’s use of a

        1
            Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
peremptory challenge against a Black prospective juror. Ortiz also challenges the
admission of testimony from a defense character witness about her daughter’s midtrial
disclosure of molestation by Ortiz, the denial of a continuance request related to that
testimony, and the CALCRIM No. 1193 jury instruction. Finally, Ortiz claims that the
alleged errors were cumulatively prejudicial.
       For the reasons explained below, we decide Ortiz has not shown error by the trial
court in its application of section 231.7 or in the challenged evidentiary and legal rulings.
We affirm the judgment.
                  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. Procedural History
       In March 2022, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney filed a second amended
information (information) charging Ortiz with 18 sex crimes committed against three
minors (identified as Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 3) between March 15, 2004,
and December 24, 2018.
       More specifically, the information alleged nine counts of forcible lewd or
lascivious act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); count 1 [Doe 1];
counts 3, 5, 7, 10 & 12 [Doe 2]; counts 14–16 [Doe 3]), one count of lewd or lascivious
act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); count 2 [Doe 2]), three counts of
oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code,
§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 4 & 8 [Doe 2]; count 17 [Doe 3]), four counts of aggravated
sexual assault on a child under age 14 by sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 269, subd.
(a)(5); counts 6, 9, 11 & 13 [Doe 2]), and one count of aggravated sexual assault on a
child under age 14 by oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(4); count 18 [Doe 3]).
The information further alleged that Ortiz committed the charged offenses against more
than one victim (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (j)(2)) (multiple-victim enhancement).
       In April 2022, the jury found Ortiz guilty of all counts except for count 8 (sexual
penetration of Doe 2), on which the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the trial court
                                                 2
declared a mistrial. Additionally, the jury found true the multiple-victim enhancement
allegation for all 10 counts that were presented for a verdict with such an allegation. The
trial court dismissed count 8 on the district attorney’s motion.
         In June 2022, the trial court sentenced Ortiz to an aggregate prison term of 225
years to life, comprising consecutive terms of 25 years to life on nine counts (1, 2, 3, 7,
10, 12, 14, 15 & 16), a concurrent term of 25 years to life on count 5, and terms of 15
years to life on seven counts (4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 17 & 18), which were stayed pursuant to
Penal Code section 654.
         Ortiz timely filed a notice of appeal.
         B. Evidence Presented at Trial
                1. Prosecution Evidence
         Ortiz was born in 1960 and was 62 years old at the time of trial. The prosecution
presented evidence that over three decades he sexually abused four girls.
                   a. Evidence of Crimes Against Doe 1
         Ortiz is Doe 1’s great-uncle by marriage. Ortiz frequently hosted parties and
family gatherings, and Doe 1’s family often visited his house.
         On Christmas Eve 2018, when Doe 1 was 12 years old, she went to Ortiz’s home
with her family. Ortiz asked Doe 1 and her younger brothers whether they wanted some
potato chips. Doe 1 and one of her brothers followed Ortiz to a room used to store food
items.
         Ortiz and Doe 1 entered the room, and Ortiz partially closed the door. While
Doe 1 was standing, Ortiz forcibly touched her breasts, buttocks, vagina, and breasts
again, over her clothing from behind. When Ortiz noticed Doe 1’s brother looking at
them, he backed off. Doe 1 grabbed the potato chips and exited the room.
         Shortly thereafter, Doe 1 tried to tell her father what happened when she saw him
walking toward the bathroom. Doe 1 knocked on the bathroom door and told her father

                                                  3
to hurry up. Ortiz grabbed Doe 1’s hand and told her to give her father privacy. Ortiz
also told Doe 1 and her brother not to tell anyone.
       Later, when Doe and her family went out to their car, Doe 1 told her father what
had happened. The family drove to another party, and Doe 1’s parents told her to stay
with them and not to tell anyone. 2 Doe 1’s father subsequently noticed changes in
Doe 1’s behavior.
       On New Year’s Eve 2018, Doe 1 told her older cousin, Doe 2, about what had
happened on Christmas Eve. Doe 2 started crying and said it had also happened to her.
       In July 2019, Doe 1 told a therapist what had happened to her on Christmas Eve
2018. The therapist called the police.
                  b. Evidence of Crimes Against Doe 2
       Ortiz is Doe 2’s great-uncle by marriage. Growing up, Doe 2 spent time with
Ortiz’s family during parties, gatherings, and trips.
       Around 2005, when Doe 2 was about six years old and visiting Ortiz’s home, Ortiz
touched and fingered her vagina underneath her underwear as she sat on his lap. Doe 2
felt confused by the experience and did not tell anyone because she did not know if the
touching was “something normal or something out of the ordinary.”
       Ortiz sexually touched Doe 2 a second time when she was about nine years old.
Doe 2 went to Ortiz’s room to take a nap. Ortiz was lying on the bed, so Doe 2 lay down
on the edge of the bed, not wanting to get close to him. Ortiz moved toward Doe 2 and
began touching and aggressively kissing her as she tried to push him away. Ortiz touched
Doe 2’s breast area and vagina on top of her clothes. He then touched her breasts
underneath her clothing and digitally penetrated her vagina. Ortiz pulled down his pants
and grabbed Doe 2’s head, forcing her to orally copulate him as she tried to push him

       2
        At some point before Christmas Eve 2018, Ortiz’s wife told Doe 1’s father that
some very close friends from San Francisco had accused Ortiz of sexually molesting their
daughter.
                                                 4
away. Doe 2 felt bad for herself, betrayed, embarrassed, and lost. She kept what had
happened a secret and was afraid, disgusted, and traumatized. Doe 2 was scared to tell
anyone because of the bond between the families and because she thought her parents
might not believe her.
       The next sexual touching occurred when Doe 2 was about 10 years old—on the
day that she was promoted from the fifth grade. While Ortiz and his wife were driving
Doe 2 home from a restaurant, and as she was sitting between them in the front seat,
Ortiz put his hand inside Doe 2’s underwear and digitally penetrated her vagina. Doe 2
felt scared and stayed quiet.
       On Christmas Eve, when Doe 2 was around 10 or 11 years old, Ortiz followed her
into a bathroom at his home, forcibly kissed her, and digitally penetrated her vagina.
Doe 2 told him to get off her and screamed for help.
       On another occasion, when Doe 2 was about 12 years old, she was at Ortiz’s home
with her family after school. Doe 2 was doing homework at a desk inside the house and
her family was outside in the backyard. Ortiz brought Doe 2 some fruit, grabbed her by
the hair, and forcibly kissed her. Doe 2 told him to get off her, but he did not listen.
Ortiz squeezed her breast on top of her clothing, partially pulled down her pants “using
all of his force,” put his fingers inside her underwear, and digitally penetrated her. It was
painful, and Doe 2 felt traumatized but continued to keep the abuse a secret because of
the family bond.
       Eventually, Doe 2’s father recognized that something was wrong. Doe 2 was
depressed and getting bullied. Her father asked if there was something that she was not
telling him. After first denying it, Doe 2 started crying and told her father that Ortiz had
been sexually molesting her since she was six years old. Doe 2’s father told her that they
would put an end to it. 3

       3
        In early 2013, Doe 2’s father overheard a conversation between his mother and
Ortiz’s wife about an allegation of molestation that had been made by the daughter of
                                                  5
       Doe 2’s father told Ortiz’s wife that Ortiz had sexually touched Doe 2 several
times. Ortiz’s wife responded that Doe 2 was lying and begged him not to press charges.
Ortiz’s son accused Doe 2 of being a liar and provoking Ortiz. Doe 2 told Ortiz’s wife
and her two sons that Ortiz had sexually touched her for six years.
       In 2013, when she was 13 to 14 years old, Doe 2 told a therapist about the abuse,
and the therapist reported it to the police. Doe 2 did not disclose all the abuse during a
police interview and did not know what happened with the information she gave to the
police. A sheriff’s lieutenant testified that the reports generated about Doe 2’s allegations
did not indicate that any follow-up investigation had been conducted. In the lieutenant’s
opinion, the lack of further investigation was “an oversight and mistake.”
       Doe 2 testified about Doe 1’s disclosure on New Year’s Eve 2018. Doe 2 saw
Doe 1’s suffering and felt hatred and sadness. Doe 2 told Doe 1 that Ortiz had sexually
assaulted her as well. Doe 2 encouraged Doe 1 to go to therapy. Doe 2 told her parents
about Doe 1’s disclosure.
       Later, Doe 2 learned that Ortiz’s abuse of Doe 1 had been reported to the police.
In 2019, when she was 20 years old, Doe 2 gave a statement to a detective about what
had happened to her. Doe 2 provided more details to the police in 2019 than she had in
2013, because her therapy and healing “prepared [her] and [she] felt more confident to
speak up and say more.”
                 c. Evidence of Crimes Against Doe 3
       Doe 3’s family and Ortiz’s family had a close relationship. Doe 3’s parents were
the godparents of Ortiz’s son. Doe 3’s family lived in South San Francisco and
frequently attended gatherings and parties at Ortiz’s house.
       Around 2007 or 2008, when Doe 3 was about eight or nine years old, she visited
Ortiz’s house with her parents. Ortiz placed her on his lap, put his hand underneath her

Ortiz’s close friends from San Francisco. Thereafter, Doe 2’s father contacted the girl’s
father, who confirmed the allegation.
                                                 6
underwear, and rubbed her vagina. Doe 3 got down from his lap because she felt
uncomfortable. She left the room and went to her parents. Doe 3 did not tell her parents
what had happened because she was too young to understand what was going on. She
tried to keep her distance from Ortiz after this incident.
       Another time, Ortiz asked Doe 3 if she wanted to go to the store. While Ortiz was
driving, he unzipped her pants and rubbed her vagina underneath her underwear.
       A third incident occurred in a bedroom at Ortiz’s house when Doe 3 was about
nine years old. Doe 3 had been playing with other children when Ortiz entered. After
everyone left the room except for Doe 3 and another girl, Ortiz told the other girl to exit
the room and watch the door. Ortiz told Doe 3 to sit on the bed. He pulled down Doe 3’s
pants and underwear and orally copulated her. Doe 3 then left the room.
       A few months later, when Doe 3 was 10 years old and her family was supposed to
go to a party, she told her mother about the third incident. Doe 3 and her family did not
contact the police but stopped going to Ortiz’s house.
       Doe 3’s mother eventually told Ortiz’s wife about the molestation. Ortiz’s wife
said that she did not believe it and it was a misunderstanding.
       In 2019, the police contacted Doe 3’s mother and wanted to talk to Doe 3.
Doe 3’s mother told Doe 3 that there were possibly other victims. Doe 3 disclosed all
three incidents of abuse for the first time in 2019.
                  d. Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offenses
       V. Doe testified that she is 41 years old and has lived her entire life in Oaxaca,
Mexico. Ortiz is her uncle by marriage. When V. Doe was a child, Ortiz and his wife
lived near her.
       Ortiz first assaulted V. Doe when she was nine years old. She was sent by her
mother and aunt to Ortiz’s house to retrieve something. Ortiz pulled her by the arm
toward the bed on which he was lying. He hugged her, held onto her strongly, and put

                                                  7
his hand under her dress. Ortiz touched her legs, buttocks, and vagina underneath her
underwear. V. Doe was scared and felt “really bad.”
       After this incident, Ortiz sexually touched V. Doe “multiple times.” She was
around Ortiz often because of their familial relationship. The abuse stopped when she
was 14 years old and Ortiz and his wife moved to the United States. V. Doe never told
anyone about the abuse until her niece Doe 2 came to visit her in Mexico. Doe 2 told V.
Doe that Ortiz had sexually assaulted her. V. Doe said that she, too, had been abused by
him.
                     e. Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
                        Syndrome
       Dr. Anthony Urquiza, a licensed psychologist, testified as an expert on child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) and child sexual abuse. Dr. Urquiza
described some myths and misunderstandings that CSAAS is directed at dispelling,
including about disclosure and demeanor. He also explained some of the categories of
CSAAS, including secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, and delayed
and unconvincing disclosure. Dr. Urquiza said CSAAS “was developed to educate
people” and is not diagnostic. Dr. Urquiza did not discuss the facts of this case with the
district attorney.
               2. Defense Evidence
       Ortiz called six witnesses to testify about his good character, including cousins by
marriage, mothers of his godchildren, and a godchild. 4 The witnesses described Ortiz as
respectful, honest, honorable, and hardworking. They did not believe that he would
commit a lewd act on a child. The witnesses also did not observe any problems in Ortiz’s
interactions with children.

       4
        The testimony of one character witness, L.G., is detailed ante (pt. II.B.1.). The
prosecution recalled L.G. to testify because after she completed her defense testimony,
her opinion of Ortiz changed due to her daughter’s disclosure of molestation by Ortiz.
                                                8
       Ortiz testified in his own defense. Ortiz denied that he touched Doe 1, Doe 2,
Doe 3, or V. Doe inappropriately or that he ever kissed them. Ortiz said that when he
lived in Mexico, he “had seen [V. Doe]” but was never alone with her and never touched
her. Ortiz denied ever touching Doe 3 or being in a room alone with her. Ortiz denied
ever touching Doe 2 and denied ever driving with her in his vehicle which, at the time of
her account, was a Suburban that did not have a middle front seat. He also denied
following her into the bathroom and touching her there. Ortiz denied offering Doe 1
potato chips and touching her on Christmas Eve. Ortiz testified that he did not have any
relationship with L.G.’s children.
                                      II. DISCUSSION
       Ortiz raises four claims of error: (1) the trial court erred in denying his objection
to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge; (2) the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of a midtrial disclosure of molestation made by the daughter of a defense
character witness and denying a related request for a continuance; (3) the trial court erred
by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 (CALCRIM 1193); and (4) the alleged
errors were cumulatively prejudicial. We address Ortiz’s claims in turn.
       A. Peremptory Challenge
       Ortiz contends the trial court erred by overruling his objection under section 231.7
to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against S.H., a Black prospective juror.
Ortiz further asserts that the error violated his constitutional rights to an impartial jury, a
jury venire drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, and equal
protection.
       The Attorney General counters that the trial court did not err under section 231.7,
and its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. The Attorney General
further contends that because Ortiz’s section 231.7 claim fails, he necessarily has not
demonstrated a violation of his constitutional rights.

                                                   9
       Because Ortiz’s claim under section 231.7 requires careful review of the relevant
facts, we detail the written and oral questions posed to prospective jurors, and particularly
to S.H.
              1. Jury Selection
       S.H. was prospective juror No. 28 in the trial jury panel. He was the sole Black
juror orally questioned during voir dire. The record indicates that one other prospective
juror in the trial jury panel (prospective juror No. 41) was also Black, but she apparently
did not get called to the jury box and was not orally questioned during the jury selection
process.
                 a. Juror Questionnaire
       In advance of voir dire, prospective jurors were provided a four-page
questionnaire consisting of 32 questions. Most questions called for a yes-or-no answer
and asked for further explanation if a certain answer were chosen. Moreover, one of the
32 questions asked for a narrative answer about the prospective juror’s “attitude, in
general, toward law enforcement officers,” and six questions seemingly asked the
prospective jurors to explain their yes-or-no answer regardless of their choice of answer.
       S.H. answered all but one of the questions on the first, third, and fourth pages of
the questionnaire. He included further explanation for only one of the three questions on
those pages calling for elaboration of the answer. He left the second page completely
blank. That page included nine questions (Nos. 13–21) that, inter alia, asked about the
prospective juror’s criminal history, contacts with and attitude toward law enforcement,
personal beliefs about judging others, feelings about the criminal justice system, and
beliefs about a child’s accusations of and reactions to sexual molestation or sexual
assault.
       In response to question No. 28, which asked whether he would like to be a juror in
this case, S.H. put an “x” next to “No.” (Some capitalization omitted.) In response to the
follow-up question “Why?” he wrote “TIME!”
                                                10
       When distributing questionnaires to a group of prospective jurors, the trial court
emphasized that all four pages must be completed. The court remarked, “We know from
jurors doing it this morning that some people missed a few pages or missed a page.” The
trial court’s observation is corroborated by the questionnaires that are reproduced in the
record on appeal. Eight of the approximately 130 questionnaires in the appellate record
(including that of S.H.) contain one page left blank. Shortly before the court questioned
S.H. in voir dire, a male prospective juror (S.D.) disputed the court’s observation that he
had failed to complete the last page of his questionnaire. The prospective juror insisted
that he had filled out the entire questionnaire, saying “I filled out all four pages” and “I
don’t know [why that page is blank]. It was attached when I turned it in.” Only three of
the eight prospective jurors who had a blank page in his or her questionnaire were
questioned orally during voir dire (S.H. and two others, J.C. & S.D.). Defense counsel
exercised a peremptory challenge against J.C.; the court excused S.D. for cause.
                   b. Voir Dire of S.H.
       During the voir dire of S.H., the trial court posed the initial questions, followed by
Ortiz’s defense counsel and then the prosecutor.
       The court began its questioning by saying: “We also missed page [two] of your
form somehow. So on that page it’s where we’ve asked a few questions. If you don’t
mind me asking them of you in open court. We wanted to know your general attitude
towards the criminal justice system and law enforcement. Do you have anything to share
regarding that?”
       S.H. responded, “I don’t understand the question. My attitude towards --” S.H.
did not complete the sentence. The trial court replied to S.H.’s statement by explaining
that one of the questions on the questionnaire is “what is your attitude in general towards
law enforcement and there’s also a question whether you have any close friends or family
in law enforcement” (i.e., referring to the questionnaire question Nos. 15 & 16). S.H.

                                                 11
responded, “I have a friend who was a deputy. That was back in the 2000s. Other than
that, no.”
       The trial court asked S.H. three yes-or-no questions that tracked those on the blank
page of his questionnaire (i.e., question Nos. 19, 20 & 21) and then asked a question to
confirm S.H.’s questionnaire answer that he had never served on a jury before. In
responding to the latter question, S.H. volunteered that he “was dismissed back in ’81.”
The court next asked S.H., “And you’re a little concerned about the time of this jury, this
trial?” S.H. responded “No,” and the court replied, “No? Okay. All right. Anything
that’s come up today or yesterday that you think that the [c]ourt or counsel should
know?” S.H. again said “No.” The court did not ask S.H. any more questions.
       In response to questions from defense counsel, S.H. said that he was in his sixties,
his primary occupation when he was working was as a carpenter, and he had “worked in
the restaurant business.” S.H. also said he had been living in the Santa Cruz area since
1977 and had no children.
       S.H. answered questions posed to him about, inter alia, children potentially
making false allegations or delaying disclosure about something that had happened to
them. When defense counsel asked, “What about delayed disclosure?” S.H. responded,
“Delayed disclosure?” Defense counsel then clarified, “Where somebody believes
something happened to them and they wait until years later to tell about it.” To this
clarification S.H. responded, “That happens all of the time.”
       Next, defense counsel asked, “Is there anything that you’d like to share with us
today?” S.H. responded, “Um --” but did not complete the sentence. Defense counsel
replied, “Okay. No problem.” Thereafter, S.H. answered a series of yes-or-no questions
reaffirming that he could be fair to both sides.
       The prosecutor began her questioning of S.H. by asking, “Was there any reason
why you didn’t answer the entire page two of your form?” S.H. responded, “What was
it?” The prosecutor replied, “They are questions 13 through 21. They involve feelings
                                                   12
towards law enforcement []. Have you ever been charged or convicted of a crime.
General attitude towards law enforcement. Anything there that -- no?[5] Okay. Well, do
you have any experience with our office, anything about the DA’s office here in Santa
Cruz any favorable or unfavorable experiences?” S.H. answered, “No.”
       The prosecutor questioned S.H. about his employment history, noting S.H.’s
statement that he had worked as a carpenter. The prosecutor asked, “And how long ago
did you retire -- did you work full time with that or what kind of work was that?” S.H.
responded, “Full time. I was a local 829 and went through ’92.” In response to the
prosecutor’s seeming incomprehension of S.H.’s answer, S.H. explained that “829 was
the local” of the carpenters union and, upon further questioning, confirmed that he had
worked as a carpenter until 1992, including “on projects together with people.”
       The prosecutor then asked, “And after ’92 -- what do you normally do now that
you’re retired?” S.H. responded that he “buy[s] security lockers.” When the prosecutor
stated that she did not understand S.H.’s answer, he explained that he “buy[s] storage
lockers” at auction and then keeps or sells their contents. The prosecutor next asked,
“Anything else that you’ve done with your time since you’ve retired from carpentry?”
That question resulted in the following exchange: “[S.H.]: Just try to live. [¶]
[Prosecutor]: Since you lived? [¶] [S.H.]: Just trying to live. [¶] [Prosecutor]: Just
trying to live. I apologize. Okay.”
       After S.H. reiterated that he had never served on a jury before because he “didn’t
make it through,” the prosecutor asked him how he felt about the criminal justice system.
That question prompted the following exchange: “[S.H.]: How do I feel about the
criminal justice system? They’re there to do a job. I don’t have any quarrels. [¶]
[Prosecutor]: What was that? [¶] [S.H.]: I don’t have any bad feelings or quarrels about

       5
        The reporter’s transcript does not reflect that S.H. verbally answered the
prosecutor’s question in the negative. Likewise, the transcript does not describe any
nonverbal response by S.H.
                                               13
it. [¶] [Prosecutor]: Okay. Okay. So no opinions either way? [¶] [S.H.]: Not really.
[¶] [Prosecutor]: Okay.”
       When asked if he thought child molestation and sexual assault were crimes that
“occur in front of a lot of people,” S.H. responded “Yes and no. They occur everywhere
at any time. There could be a lot of people. There could be no one there.” In response to
a follow up question by the prosecutor about whether people are “usually present when
sexual assault occurs,” S.H. responded, “Not normally.” Continuing in the same vein, the
prosecutor asked if S.H. was “comfortable” with the premise that a “single witness can
prove any fact if you find that witness credible and in a sexual assault if you find the
victim credible.” S.H. responded, “Until all of the evidence is clearly stated, no.” The
prosecutor next asked S.H. what he meant by his answer and the following exchange
occurred: “[S.H.]: I mean it could go either way. [¶] [Prosecutor]: You’d have to listen
to everything? [¶] [S.H.]: Yes. [¶] [Prosecutor]: But are you comfortable -- sorry. To
clarify. Are you comfortable with the direction that if you find a witness credible you
don’t need more evidence, it’s up to you? [¶] [S.H.]: Well, I would take that as a yes.
[¶] [Prosecutor]: Okay.”
       Regarding delayed reporting of sexual assault or molestation, S.H. said that
“[f]ear” could be a reason for the delay and he would not automatically disregard
testimony because of a delay in reporting. Regarding criminal intent, when the
prosecutor asked, “Do you feel comfortable trying to determine sexual intent in this case
in the actions and that kind of thing being able to determine sexual intent?” S.H.
responded, “No.” The exchange continued: “[Prosecutor]: No, you don’t feel
comfortable? [¶] [S.H.]: No. I wouldn’t have any problem with that. [¶] [Prosecutor]:
I see. You don’t have any problem.”
       The final topic covered by the prosecutor in her questioning of S.H. concerned
“conflict in testimony.” The questioning proceeded as follows:

                                                 14
       “[Prosecutor]: . . . And regarding conflict in testimony, so an adult says
something happened and a child says it didn’t. Do you feel comfortable resolving that
conflict?
       “[S.H.]: Resolving?
       “[Prosecutor]: Yeah.
       “[S.H.]: Meaning would I go either way?
       “[Prosecutor]: No. You would have to --
       “[S.H.]: Resolving.
       “[Prosecutor]: Yes. So making a decision about the conflict in testimony.
       “[S.H.]: I wouldn’t have any problem.
       “[Prosecutor]: Okay. Do you know what I’m saying by that?
       “[S.H.]: I’m not following, no.
       “[Prosecutor]: Sure. So my question is about resolving different testimony. So
one person comes in and says -- we’ll take it out of sexual assault. One person comes in
and says the light was yellow and the next witness comes in and says, no, the light was
red, okay. So you’ve got two different types of testimony. Your job is going to be to
resolve that testimony, to find the facts. Do you feel comfortable being able to do that?
       “[S.H.]: To be truthful no.
       “[Prosecutor]: Okay. And that’s what we want to hear. I want to hear -- there’s
no bad answers here. Sometimes people feel like there’s a good or versus bad answers,
but, you know, some people just really don’t feel comfortable resolving that and I
appreciate your answer and your response. Is there a reason why you really just don’t
feel comfortable doing that?
       “[S.H.]: Well, if I’m wrong it could be serious.
       “[Prosecutor]: Yeah. And there could be serious consequences, yeah. Okay.
Thank you very much for your time.
       “[S.H.]: You’re welcome.”
                                                15
                  c. Prosecutor’s Peremptory Challenge of S.H.
       Outside the presence of the prospective jurors and immediately after S.H. moved
from seat No. 18 into one of the 12 seats in the jury box, the prosecutor indicated her
intent to exercise her sixth peremptory challenge against him. 6 Ortiz’s defense counsel
objected under section 231.7. Defense counsel noted that “the entire jury [pool]” had
been “overwhelmingly white so far.” The trial court interjected to note that the pool
included “quite [a] lot of Latin potential jurors before hardships.” Counsel acknowledged
the court’s point and remarked further that S.H. was “the one person of color that’s made
it into the box so far” and “I can’t say that we’ve even had somebody that was Latina or
Latino in the box. Maybe one or two.”
       In response to defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor requested that the trial
court “make observations on the record about [S.H.]’s demeanor.”
       Before the trial court made any findings, the prosecutor offered her reasons for
challenging S.H. (hereafter initial statement of reasons): “[S.H.] was not able to answer
or understand some very basic questions. He seemed easily confused or unable to answer
questions. There [were] a couple of times that he did not answer questions. He left the
entire page, page [two], blank on his questionnaire form which, again, I think shows his
confusion in terms of a race [neutral] justification, for example, answering only two out
of ten questions with -- [sic] [that S.H.] actually omitted more than two out of ten
questions is a valid race neutral reason to use a peremptory challenge . . . . [¶] He was
often -- in terms of demeanor I’ll ask the [c]ourt to make a finding soft spoken, reluctant
and timid [] demeanor is a valid reason -- not race neutral reason to kick a juror [sic].” 7
       6
         By this point in the jury selection process, the prosecutor had exercised five
successive peremptory challenges and subsequently declined to exercise a challenge
following three peremptory challenges by defense counsel.
       7
         The prosecutor cited People v. Perez (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1313 and People v.
Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527 as supporting the race neutrality of her stated reasons. In
Perez, the Court of Appeal concluded that, among other things, a prospective juror’s
“reluctance to answer various questions on the questionnaire” and the need “to prod her
                                                 16
The prosecutor did not cite any other reasons for challenging S.H. in her initial statement
of reasons.
       In response to the prosecutor’s initial statement of reasons, the trial court made a
number of observations. The court noted that S.H. “is not of the same cognizable group
as any witness, as the defendant, [or] as any party.” The court continued: “There were
plenty of voir dire questions asked of [S.H.] His lack of responsiveness on this extensive
form to which most jurors gave lots and lots of answers -- a few gave, you know, more
sparse answers, but his was by far the most sparse. I mean just the fact that even on the
third question if retired or unemployed past employment, he left it blank[8] and we had to
push him to start talking about what he did in the past. He left that whole second page
blank. He was very confused when I asked about it. When I followed up on his response
about do you want to be a juror in this case he wrote no and time. When I asked him
about that he was absolutely confused, kind of denied even writing it, almost -- I would
say about half of the questions that the [c]ourt and counsel asked him he did not seem to
understand. He gave answers that were confused, very difficult to hear. Part of that was
he did have a double mask on. I’ll acknowledge that, but even when I asked for
clarification his answers were not very straightforward and on top of that it was almost a
cause challenge when he said he was not very comfortable resolving conflicts in the
evidence because he would be thinking about the consequences. [¶] I still am unclear on
what he said he did for a living, but, anyway, I just think that it’s really sad. I wish we
could have a diverse jury. I wish that we didn’t have to use this person, but I absolutely
think that there’s justification for a peremptory to be used for this person. If this was a

to get answers to a number of questions” “are race-neutral explanations.” (Perez, at
p. 1329.) In Duff, our Supreme Court stated “that prosecutors may legitimately choose to
shy away from followers or unduly timid jurors.” (Duff, at p. 546.)
        8
          The trial court was referring to the following information on S.H.’s
questionnaire: “2. Current occupation and employer: None. [¶] 3. If retired or
unemployed, past employment: [blank/no answer provided].” (Italics indicate S.H.’s
handwritten answer.)
                                                 17
person of white skin or any other background it would clearly be a justified excuse. So
given that does anybody else have any comments?”
       Defense counsel noted that, under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1), certain
reasons—including inattentiveness, lack of rapport, problematic attitude, and
unintelligent or confused answers—“have historically been associated with improper
discrimination in jury selection” and are presumptively invalid unless the trial court
confirms that the behavior occurred and, regardless of any confirmation, the prosecutor
had to “explain why that demeanor matters.”
       The trial court responded that it believed it had confirmed “those observations.”
The court asked the prosecutor to “explain why the evasiveness matters.”
       The prosecutor provided the following explanation in response to the trial court:
“Your Honor, we are in a search to understand the potential jurors’ perspectives on
various areas of criminal law and feelings. The entire page [two] of his questionnaire
was blank. Those were well over failing to adequately fill out the responsive forms is a --
still a very valid neutral reason to kick somebody [sic]. Duff and Perez are still very valid
case law. The [c]ourt can make --”
       The trial court interrupted the prosecutor by saying, “I’m sorry if you didn’t
understand what I was trying to ask. [Defense counsel] represented that the statute
requires you to explain not just the reasons but why they’re relevant to your excusing
him. Like he is evasive and so we don’t know if he’s being truthful and he might be
hiding some kind of bias. Is that what you mean?”
       The prosecutor echoed the trial court’s observations in continuing her explanation
for the asserted behavior-based reasons. She said, “Yes, and the -- his -- inability to
answer the questions in a way that could be understood. I was unable to determine if
there were potential answers to many questions that could be a reason. And additionally
the People think that we’ve met our for cause burden. The . . . juror specifically said that
he would be considering punishment and would be considering that in his deliberation.
                                                18
So that would be another reason why the People would not want [S.H.] on the jury. [¶]
So he’s unable to answer the basic questions. He was unable to answer the form. He had
evasive questioning. The People were not able to ascertain several answers that were
resubmitted [sic]. Sometimes I asked it in different ways and he still was unable to give a
clear response and he clearly stated that he would be considering punishment when
resolving conflicts in testimony. For all of those reasons I am exercising my peremptory
challenge.”
       The trial court concluded the discussion by ruling as follows: “As stated -- I mean
this was a juror whose responses were so very different than any other juror who’s been
responding in terms of his -- like, again, his confusion, his evasiveness and I just also
want to just kind of go through some of these other checklists issues. [¶] You know, I
don’t believe that [the prosecutor] or her office have used preemptory challenges
disproportionately in the past or in this case towards African-Americans. Anyway, I
think that there’s none of the presumptively invalid reasons other than the ones that can
be confirmed by the Judge and I’m confirming those at this time. So I’m going to grant
that challenge. I’m just going to let [S.H.] know that he’s been excused and we’ll
proceed from there.”
       When the prospective jurors returned to the courtroom, the prosecutor exercised
her sixth peremptory challenge to excuse S.H.
              2. Law on Unlawful Discrimination in the Use of Peremptory Challenges
                  a. Peremptory Challenges Prior to 2022
       “ ‘ “Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race.” ’ [Citation.]
‘ “Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution
and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.” ’ ” (People v.
Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 759–760.)
                                                 19
       “Before January 1, 2022, trial courts examined peremptory challenges under the
three-step inquiry established by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v.
Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258. Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler
inquiry, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) to add
Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which creates new procedures for identifying
unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges.” (People v. Jaime (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943, fn. omitted (Jaime).) The Legislature intended that the new law
“be broadly construed to further the purpose of eliminating the use of group stereotypes
and discrimination, whether based on conscious or unconscious bias, in the exercise of
peremptory challenges.” (Stats. 2020, Ch. 318, § 1, subd. (c).)
                  b. Peremptory Challenges under Section 231.7
       Section 231.7 applies to all criminal jury trials in which jury selection began on or
after January 1, 2022. (§ 231.7, subd. (i).) It does not apply to civil cases until January 1,
2026. (§ 231.7, subds. (k), (n); Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 3.)
       Section 231.7, subdivision (a) prohibits the use of “a peremptory challenge to
remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender,
gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the
perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.”
       A party or the trial court on its own motion may object that a party’s use of a
peremptory challenge violates section 231.7, subdivision (a). (§ 231.7, subd. (b).) A
motion made under section 231.7 “shall also be deemed a sufficient presentation of
claims asserting the discriminatory exclusion of jurors in violation of the United States
and California Constitutions.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) The statue does not require any
threshold showing by the objecting party.
       If a party or the trial court objects to the use of a peremptory challenge, “the party
exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has
been exercised.” (§ 231.7, subd. (c).)
                                                  20
       After the party exercising the challenge states the reasons for it, the trial court
must decide whether to sustain the objection. In so doing, the court “shall evaluate the
reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the
circumstances.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).) The court may only consider the reasons stated
by the party using the peremptory challenge: “The court shall consider only the reasons
actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible
justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Ibid.)
       The trial court shall sustain the objection “[i]f the court determines there is a
substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity,
gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or
perceived membership in any of those groups, as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).) “[A] ‘substantial likelihood’ means more than a
mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not.” (Id., subd. (d)(2)(B).)
The court “need not find purposeful discrimination” to sustain an objection to a
peremptory challenge. (Ibid.)
       With respect to the section 231.7, subdivision (d)(1) determination, the statue
provides that “an objectively reasonable person is aware that unconscious bias, in
addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential
jurors in the State of California.” (Id., subd. (d)(2)(A).) In addition, an “ ‘unconscious
bias’ includes implicit and institutional biases.” (Id., subd. (d)(2)(C).)
       Subdivision (d)(3) of section 231.7 provides a nonexhaustive list of circumstances
the trial court may consider in making its determination (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)–(G)),
including “[w]hether the reason given by the party exercising the peremptory challenge
was contrary to or unsupported by the record” (id., subd. (d)(3)(F).)
       Once the trial court has made a determination under subdivision (d)(1), it “shall
explain the reasons for its ruling on the record.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).)

                                                  21
       In addition to the standard for the court’s determination provided by section 231.7
subdivision (d)(1), and the evaluative criteria set out in subdivision (d)(3), the statute
contains two separate provisions (subdivisions (e) and (g)) describing presumptively
invalid reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. Each subdivision sets out a
distinct process by which a court determines whether a presumptively invalid reason can
be absolved of that presumption. (Id., subds. (e), (f), (g)(2).)
       Section 231.7, subdivision (e) provides a wide-ranging list of reasons that are
“presumed to be invalid.” (Id., subd. (e)(1)–(13).) The presumptively invalid reasons
listed under subdivision (e) include “[e]xpressing a distrust of or having a negative
experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system” (id., subd. (e)(1)),
“[h]aving a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted
of a crime” (id., subd. (e)(3)), “[l]ack of employment or underemployment of the
prospective juror or prospective juror’s family member” (id., subd. (e)(11)) and “[a]ny
justification that is similarly applicable to a questioned prospective juror or jurors, who
are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, but
were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party” (id., subd. (e)(13)).
       If the party using the peremptory challenge states as a reason one of those listed in
section 231.7, subdivision (e), the “reason[] is presumed to be invalid unless the party
exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence that an
objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective
juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or
religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons
articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.”
(Ibid.) Subdivision (f) of section 231.7 defines the term “ ‘clear and convincing’ ” and
explains how a court determines whether “a presumption of invalidity has been
overcome.”

                                                  22
       Section 231.7, subdivision (g) contains a different list of presumptively invalid
reasons. 9 The reasons under subdivision (g) involve a prospective juror’s demeanor,
behavior, or manner: “The prospective juror was inattentive, or staring or failing to make
eye contact” (id., subd. (g)(1)(A)), “[t]he prospective juror exhibited either a lack of
rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor” (id., subd. (g)(1)(B)), and
“[t]he prospective juror provided unintelligent or confused answers” (id., subd.
(g)(1)(C)).
       The three demeanor-, behavior-, or manner-based reasons listed in section 231.7,
subdivision (g)(1)(A)–(C) “are presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to
confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the court’s own observations or the
observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel
offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in
which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.” (Id.,
subd. (g)(2).)
       Section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2) therefore provides for a two-step process. We
will call the first step the “confirmation requirement.” If a reason given by the party
exercising the challenge falls within the presumptively invalid reasons listed in
subdivision (g)(1)(A)–(C), the trial court must make a finding on whether the asserted
behavior occurred. If the court confirms that the asserted behavior occurred, then the
party exercising the peremptory challenge must satisfy what we will call the “explanation
requirement.” In this step, the party must explain why that behavior “matters to the case
to be tried.” (Id., subd. (g)(2).)
       The statute does not spell out what must occur if the trial court fulfills the
confirmation requirement and the counsel fulfills the explanation requirement—a
question we examine further below.

       9
        The subdivision states that the three listed reasons “have historically been
associated with improper discrimination in jury selection.” (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(1).)
                                                 23
       For purpose of appellate review of the trial court’s general conclusions under
section 231.7, the statute sets out different standards of review. It calls for de novo
review of a trial court’s decision to overrule an objection to a peremptory challenge,
“with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence.” 10 (Id.,
subd. (j).)
       The statute also limits the bases upon which an appellate court may affirm the trial
court’s ruling. The appellate court “shall not impute to the trial court any findings,
including findings of a prospective juror’s demeanor, that the trial court did not expressly
state on the record.” (§ 231.7, subd. (j).) In addition, just as the trial court may only
consider “the reasons actually given” by the party exercising the peremptory challenge
(id., subd. (d)(1)), so, too, “[t]he reviewing court shall consider only reasons actually
given under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not
given to explain either the party’s use of the peremptory challenge or the party’s failure
to challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group
as the challenged juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a comparative
analysis argument in the trial court.” (Id., subd. (j).)
       Finally, the statute precludes a finding of harmless error. If the appellate court
concludes that the trial court erred by overruling an objection under section 231.7, “that
error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded
for a new trial.” (§ 231.7, subd. (j).)
              3. Application of Section 231.7
       Ortiz contends “[t]he prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing [S.H.] were the
exact types of reasons that Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 expressly provides as

       10
          “Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (People
v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 627 (Lenix); see also Orange County Water Dist. v. The
Arnold Engineering Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 96, 129, fn. 12 [“ ‘[s]ubstantial
evidence’ ” is a “legal term of art”]; People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 871
[presuming the Legislature is aware of the ramifications of using a legal term of art].)
                                                  24
having ‘historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection.’ ” He
further asserts that the prosecutor’s characterizations of S.H.’s answers are not supported
by substantial evidence and the prosecutor “failed to provide an adequate explanation”
under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2).
       In interpreting a statute, “ ‘ “ ‘ “our fundamental task [] is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by
examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.” ’ ” ’
[Citation.] ‘ “[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine
the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe
the words in question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of
the statute . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must harmonize ‘the various parts of a
statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of
the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)
       “ ‘ “ ‘ “If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning
unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not
intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts
may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public
policy.” ’ ” ’ ” (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 183, 190.)
       “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo
review.” (People v. Harring (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 483, 495 (Harring).)
                  a. Section 231.7, Subdivisions (c) and (j): Reasons Actually Given
       As an initial matter, we must determine which of the prosecutor’s reasons are
proper for us to consider under section 231.7, subdivision (j). That subdivision
specifically directs that “[t]he reviewing court shall consider only reasons actually given
under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given
to explain either the party’s use of the peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to

                                                 25
challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as
the challenged juror.” (Ibid., italics added.)
       Because neither party in his initial briefing addressed the potential effect of that
limitation on our review of the present record, we requested supplemental briefing on
whether we should consider two reasons that the prosecutor gave to support the
peremptory challenge of S.H. after the trial court suggested them following the
prosecutor’s proffer of her initial statement of reasons. The two reasons we identified as
falling within that category are (as articulated by the prosecutor): (1) S.H. “ ‘said that he
would be considering punishment and would be considering that in his deliberation’ ”
and “ ‘clearly stated that he would be considering punishment when resolving conflicts in
testimony;’ ” and (2) S.H. “ ‘had evasive questioning.’ ” We also asked the parties to
address the implication of a determination that either reason or both could not be
considered in our review of the trial court’s denial of Ortiz’s objection to the peremptory
challenge.
       To provide context, we summarize the colloquy between the prosecutor and the
trial court about the prosecutor’s reasons for her use of a peremptory challenge against
S.H.
       In her initial statement of reasons, the prosecutor said that S.H. “was not able to
answer or understand some very basic questions,” “seemed easily confused or unable to
answer questions,” “did not answer questions” “a couple of times,” and “left the entire
page, page [two], blank on his questionnaire,” which further demonstrated his confusion.
In addition to providing these reasons, the prosecutor asked the trial court to find, “in
terms of demeanor,” that S.H. was “soft spoken, reluctant and timid.”
       After the trial court stated its own observations about S.H. and defense counsel
pointed out that the prosecutor’s reasons were presumptively invalid under section 231.7,
subdivision (g)(1), the court stated its belief that it had confirmed the demeanor and

                                                 26
behaviors that the prosecutor asserted. The court then asked the prosecutor to explain,
under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2), why “the evasiveness matters.” 11
       In response to the trial court’s request, the prosecutor mentioned the “search to
understand the potential jurors’ perspectives on various areas of criminal law and
feelings” and then reiterated that a page of S.H.’s questionnaire was blank and failure to
adequately fill out a questionnaire is “still a very valid neutral reason to kick somebody.”
The court interrupted the prosecutor’s effort to explain why her stated reasons mattered.
       The trial court asked if the prosecutor meant that evasiveness renders her unable to
“know if [S.H.] is being truthful and he might be hiding some kind of bias.” The
prosecutor responded “Yes” and explained further that S.H. has an “inability to answer
the questions in a way that could be understood,” such that she was “unable to determine
if there were potential answers to many questions that could be a reason.” The prosecutor
also reiterated that S.H. was “unable to answer the basic questions” and “unable to
answer the form,” and added (for the first time) that S.H. “had evasive questioning”
(italics added) which left the prosecutor unable “to ascertain several answers [to
questions] that were resubmitted” or “asked [] in different ways.”
       In addition to providing these explanations and reasons, the prosecutor added a
new reason for her peremptory challenge. The prosecutor asserted her belief the
prosecution had “met [its] for cause burden” because S.H. “specifically said that he
would be considering punishment and would be considering that in his deliberation.”
The prosecutor also said that S.H. “clearly stated that he would be considering
punishment when resolving conflicts in testimony.” This reason largely paralleled an
earlier comment made by the trial court after the prosecutor had provided her initial
statement of reasons: “[O]n top of that it was almost a cause challenge when [S.H.] said
he was not very comfortable resolving conflicts in the evidence because he would be

       11
         Up to this point in the discussion of the peremptory challenge, the prosecutor
had not used the word “evasiveness” or “evasive” in stating her reasons for striking S.H.
                                                27
thinking about the consequences.” There is no indication in the record that the prosecutor
ever moved the trial court to excuse S.H. for cause.
       In other words, after the prosecutor had provided her initial statement of reasons
upon Ortiz’s objection, she offered two additional reasons when the trial court asked her,
during the two-step confirmation and explanation process under section 231.7,
subdivision (g)(2), to explain why her initial demeanor-, behavior-, or manner-based
reasons mattered to the case. More specifically, the prosecutor added that S.H. “had
evasive questioning” and had said that he “would be considering punishment and would
be considering that in his deliberation” or “when resolving conflicts in testimony.” The
prosecutor’s additional reasons substantially resembled statements made by the trial court
after the prosecutor offered her initial statement of reasons.
       In his supplemental letter brief, Ortiz argues the trial court erred under section
231.7, subdivision (d)(1) by offering additional reasons to justify the prosecutor’s
peremptory challenge and those reasons that were adopted by the prosecution “do not
qualify as ‘reasons actually given’ for purposes of a section 231.7 analysis.” 12 Ortiz
further asserts that “[u]pon a determination that these additional reasons cannot be
considered, this [c]ourt must find that the trial court therefore erred in relying on those
reasons to deny the defense objection to the peremptory challenge.”
       The Attorney General suggests a different approach to our consideration of the
present circumstances. The Attorney General contends that section 231.7, subdivision
(d)(1) “is satisfied so long as the [trial] court allows the prosecutor to offer her reasons
and then considers only those reasons given, without speculating on others.” The
Attorney General asserts that where, as here, the trial court notes issues concerning the
prospective juror and the prosecutor then offers the same or similar concerns, “the trial

       12
         Section 231.7, subdivision (d)(1) provides in relevant part: “The court shall
consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the
existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.”
                                                  28
court should determine whether those concerns are genuinely held by the prosecutor,
notwithstanding the court’s statements, or are merely post hoc parroting. If genuinely
held, the court must then evaluate whether those justifications are valid or run afoul of the
various protections set out in the statute. (§ 231.7, subds. (d)–(g).) If not genuinely held,
the concerns must be disregarded.”
       Similarly, the Attorney General asserts that, on appellate review, section 231.7,
subdivision (j) does not preclude consideration of a reason given “because it was
mentioned first by the trial court” and reading the statute in that manner would be
improper under rules of statutory interpretation. Rather, an appellate court should
examine the genuineness of the reason given and then evaluate the reason “through an
objective lens” as prescribed by section 231.7, subdivision (d)(1).
       The Attorney General argues that the prosecutor here did not simply parrot the
trial court’s observation that S.H. “would be thinking about the consequences” of
resolving conflicts in the evidence because, instead, the prosecutor focused her reason on
S.H.’s consideration of “punishment.” This difference and the strength of the reason
“support the conclusion that the prosecutor genuinely relied on it.” Similarly, the
Attorney General asserts that the trial court’s use of the term evasiveness and the
prosecutor’s subsequent statement about S.H.’s “ ‘evasive questioning’ ” were a fair
summary of the prosecutor’s initial statement of reasons and do not render the
prosecutor’s “evasive questioning” reason “not ‘actually given’ ” or require this court to
speculate about reasons not given.
       Additionally, the Attorney General contends that even if the two reasons may not
be considered by this court, given the mandate of de novo review under section 231.7,
subdivision (j), the trial court’s denial of Ortiz’s objection should be affirmed because the
prosecutor’s initial statement of reasons are supported by the record, neither of the two
identified reasons “evinced explicit or implicit bias,” and there is no substantial

                                                 29
likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view S.H.’s race as a factor in the
prosecutor’s use of her peremptory challenge.
       We agree with the Attorney General that we may consider the additional reasons
given by the prosecutor. Section 231.7 makes clear that the prosecutor’s actual reasons
for the peremptory challenge are what matters. (See id., subds. (c), (d)(1), (j).) The
statute directs the party exercising the peremptory challenge to state its reasons in
response to an objection (id., subd. (c)) and precludes both the trial court and a reviewing
court from speculating on other possible justifications or reasons when determining
whether an objection should be or should have been sustained (id., subds. (d)(1), (j).)
       Based on the plain meaning of the statute, a reason is “actually given” under
section 231.7, subdivision (c), and thus the statute is satisfied, if the party exercising the
challenge states the reason before the trial court rules on the objection, regardless that the
party did not articulate the reason when initially stating its reasons upon the objection and
the trial court first suggested the reason. We reject Ortiz’s arguments, first, that the trial
court here violated section 231.7, subdivision (d)(1) by suggesting the two additional
reasons for the peremptory challenge and, second, that those reasons do not qualify as
reasons actually given by the prosecutor in this case. The prohibition against speculation
in section 231.7, subdivision (d)(1) precludes the trial court from conjecturing about
possible justifications when ruling on whether the objection to a peremptory challenge
should be sustained. However, nothing in the language of the statute confines the party
who exercised the challenge to those reasons it initially stated in response to an objection.
Further, the statute does not deem a reason that was in fact given by the party as not
“actually given,” even if the reason were first articulated by the trial court. (Ibid.)
       Nevertheless, a reason first suggested by the trial court rather than the party
exercising the challenge might call for special scrutiny by the reviewing court in its de
novo review of the trial court’s denial of an objection made under section 231.7. (See
People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 166.) A colloquy such as that which occurred
                                                  30
here injects additional uncertainty into the genuineness of the party’s reasons for
exercising a challenge. Therefore, trial courts should consider asking a party to state at
the outset all of their reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge before inviting
argument on the stated reasons or proceeding to the confirmation and explanation process
(§ 231.7, subd. (g)(2)). 13
       For the reasons stated above, we decide that the “evasive questioning” and
consideration of punishment reasons were “actually given [by the prosecutor] under
[section 231.7,] subdivision (c)” (§ 231.7, subd. (j)). Therefore, we may consider and
evaluate those reasons as justifications for the peremptory challenge under section 231.7,
subdivision (d)(1)—including by evaluating their genuineness and any record-based
support for them—when reviewing de novo the trial court’s decision overruling Ortiz’s
objection.
       Before doing so, however, we must address whether the “evasive questioning”
reason or any of the prosecutor’s initially stated reasons—namely S.H.’s inability and/or
unwillingness to answer questions and his “soft spoken, reluctant and timid” demeanor—
are presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (g). 14
                   b. Section 231.7, Subdivision (g): Demeanor/Behavior/Manner
                      Reasons
       There is no dispute on appeal that the prosecutor’s reasons trigger the section
231.7, subdivision (g) inquiry. As described above, section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2)

       13
          We reject as unsupported by the statutory text the Attorney General’s suggestion
in supplemental briefing that the trial court must make a determination of genuineness
before it addresses any issues of the validity of the reason (§ 231.7, subds. (e)–(g)) and
evaluates the reason (along with any others given) “in light of the totality of the
circumstances” (id., subd. (d)(1)). The trial court may consider the genuineness of the
proffered reasons as part of those inquiries.
       14
          Ortiz made no argument at trial and makes no assertion in this court that the
consideration of punishment is a presumptively invalid reason under section 231.7,
subdivision (g).
                                                31
calls for a two-step inquiry concerning the presumptively invalid reasons listed in
subdivision (g)(1)(A)–(C): that is, the confirmation requirement and the explanation
requirement.
       The parties agree that the trial court engaged in the confirmation requirement and
confirmed the prosecutor’s observations. Nevertheless, Ortiz contends the prosecutor’s
characterizations of S.H. as “ ‘easily confused or unable to answer questions’ ” and
“ ‘soft spoken, reluctant and timid [] demeanor’ ” “are belied by the record, as the record
shows that [S.H.] gave direct and intelligent answers to the questions.” Ortiz further
asserts that “the only question” asked by the prosecutor that S.H. was confused about was
“whether he would be comfortable resolving conflicts in testimony” and “he directly
stated that he was having trouble following the prosecutor’s question. . . . He then
proceeded to answer once the prosecutor clarified the question.”
       Regarding our standard for reviewing Ortiz’s assertions, the parties apparently
agree that the substantial evidence standard applies to the trial court’s express finding,
under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2), confirming that the behaviors asserted by the
prosecutor here occurred. We agree. We decide that the substantial evidence standard
applies where—as here—the trial court has made explicit findings in the confirmation
stage. (Id., subd. (j).)
       We reject Ortiz’s contention that the trial court’s confirmation finding lacks
substantial evidence. The record includes exchanges demonstrating S.H.’s inability to
answer or understand questions, failure to answer questions, confusion, reluctance,
timidity, and evasiveness. For example, S.H. responded “I don’t understand the
question” when the trial court asked him if he had “anything to share regarding” his
“general attitude towards the criminal justice system and law enforcement.” During voir
dire by defense counsel, counsel asked if there was anything S.H. wanted to share and
S.H. responded, “Um --”

                                                 32
       When the prosecutor asked S.H. if there was any reason for his failure to complete
page two of the questionnaire, S.H. answered, “What was it?” S.H. gave this answer
even though the trial court had earlier described and asked some of the questions
appearing on page two. Further, when asked about “making a decision about a conflict in
testimony,” S.H. said that he would not have “any problem” with that. However, in
response to a follow-up question about whether he knew what the prosecutor was “saying
by that,” S.H. admitted that he was “not following” the prosecutor’s questions and
ultimately said he would not feel comfortable resolving conflicts in testimony.
       In addition, regarding S.H.’s nonverbal behaviors and demeanor that might not be
reflected completely in a written transcript—such as S.H.’s soft-spoken nature,
reluctance, and timidity—there is nothing in the record that calls into question the trial
court’s finding confirming that S.H. acted in such manner. (See People v. Reynoso
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 926.)
       S.H.’s failure to answer the questions on page two of his questionnaire further
demonstrates that he was confused when completing the questionnaire. We acknowledge
that there is no substantial evidence to support a conclusion that S.H. deliberately
bypassed the nine questions on the second page of the questionnaire. We also
acknowledge that other prospective jurors appear to have skipped a page when filling out
the questionnaire and one prospective juror (S.D.) claimed he had in fact filled out the
entire questionnaire. 15
       Although S.H. might not have intentionally skipped a page of his questionnaire,
each page had a statement at the bottom reading “please fill out all pages of this form”
(boldface and capitalization omitted). In addition, the trial court repeatedly noted to the

       15
          S.D. was ultimately excused for cause, but there is no record of which party
challenged S.D. for cause or the precise reason for his excusal. The other prospective
juror (J.C.) who had a blank page in his questionnaire and was questioned orally did not
serve on the jury because he was peremptorily challenged by defense counsel at the first
opportunity.
                                                 33
prospective jurors that the questionnaire had four pages and all pages had to be
completed. Thus, the prosecutor had sufficient reason to argue that S.H.’s failure to
complete page two of his questionnaire “shows his confusion.”
       Regarding evasiveness, in his questionnaire S.H. noted that he had no current
occupation or employer, but he failed to answer the next question that prompted him to
provide information regarding his past employment if “retired or unemployed.” In the
same vein, when the prosecutor asked S.H. if there was “[a]nything else” he had done
with his time since his retirement from carpentry 30 years earlier (and up to his current
pursuit of buying storage lockers), S.H. responded vaguely, “Just try to live” and “Just
trying to live.” S.H. also failed to elaborate on his prior mention of working in the
restaurant business.
       When asked by the trial court about his general attitude toward law enforcement
and whether he had any close friends or family in law enforcement, S.H. only responded
that he had a friend who was a deputy in the 2000s. In addition, S.H. appeared to act
evasively when he answered “No” to the court’s question about him being “a little
concerned about the time of . . . this trial,” despite having said in his questionnaire that he
did not want to be a juror on the case because of “TIME!” S.H.’s responses demonstrate
an avoidance of some topics during the jury selection process.
       For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s confirmation, pursuant to
section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2), of the “asserted behavior” described in the prosecutor’s
initial statement of reasons and the “evasive questioning” reason are supported by
substantial evidence.
       The second step of section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2) requires that “the counsel
offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in
which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.” (Ibid.)
       The parties do not explicitly suggest a standard for examining a given explanation,
and they do not address the standard of review applicable to our determination whether
                                                  34
the explanation requirement of section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2) has been fulfilled.
Rather, the parties dispute the merits of the prosecutor’s explanation in this case. The
Attorney General argues that “the prosecutor stated the relevance for the presumptively
invalid justifications.” Ortiz replies that the prosecutor “failed to satisfactorily provide[]
an explanation under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2) of the relevance of the
presumptively invalid justifications.”
       The trial court here did not expressly state any factual finding or ruling on the
explanation provided by the prosecutor. Rather, when stating its ultimate ruling on
Ortiz’s objection, the court only confirmed that the asserted behaviors falling within the
“presumptively invalid reasons” of section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1) had occurred.
       The trial court did not refer to the prosecutor’s explanation itself. Given that
subdivision (j) of section 231.7 provides that only “the trial court’s express factual
findings [are] reviewed for substantial evidence” and “[t]he appellate court shall not
impute to the trial court any findings . . . that the trial court did not expressly state on the
record,” we will on this record review de novo whether the prosecutor here fulfilled the
explanation requirement. (See Harring, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 495.)
       Section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2) requires only that the counsel who offered the
presumptively invalid reason “explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner
. . . matters to the case to be tried.” By contrast, subdivision (e) of section 231.7 provides
that “certain reasons for a peremptory challenge are presumptively invalid . . . unless
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that they are unrelated to the prospective
juror’s perceived membership in a protected group and that the reasons bear on the
juror’s ability to be fair and impartial.” (Jaime, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 943, citing
§ 231.7, subd. (e); see also § 231.7, subd. (f) [defining the term “ ‘clear and convincing’ ”
and explaining how a court determines whether “a presumption of invalidity has been
overcome”].)

                                                   35
       Based on the language of section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2), and given the
contrasting “clear and convincing evidence” showing required to overcome the
presumptive invalidity of the reasons set forth separately in section 231.7, subdivision
(e), we conclude that counsel’s proffer of any explanation regarding “why the asserted
demeanor, behavior, or manner . . . matters to the case to be tried” fulfills the explanation
requirement of section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2).
       We also decide that if the confirmation and explanation requirements have been
fulfilled, then the proffered reason that falls under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1) is no
longer presumptively invalid and can be considered as a valid reason when the court
ultimately determines if “there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable
person would view race . . . as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(1).) The statute does not explicitly call for any further finding by either the trial
court or a reviewing court with respect to the explanation requirement, and we see no
reason in the statutory structure to imply such a requirement. In other words, in contrast
to the confirmation requirement, neither the trial court nor the reviewing court must
examine whether the prosecutor’s explanation is supported by substantial evidence when
deciding whether the explanation requirement has been fulfilled. We only determine
whether any explanation was in fact provided by the prosecutor.
       Nevertheless, a court may consider the substance of the prosecutor’s explanation,
as part of “the totality of the circumstances” inquiry. (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).) The trial
court may do so in the first instance when ruling on the objection (ibid.), and a reviewing
court may do so in its de novo review of the trial court’s denial of an objection. (Id.,
subd. (j).)
       Here, the prosecutor explained that S.H.’s inability to answer questions in an
understandable fashion rendered her “unable to determine if there were potential answers
to many questions that could be a reason.” The prosecutor also said that S.H.’s inability
to answer and “evasive questioning” left her unable “to ascertain several answers that
                                                  36
were resubmitted.” Although the prosecutor did not state her explanation very
articulately, we understand her to have explained that S.H.’s unclear answers, failure to
answer, confusion, reluctance, and evasiveness did not allow her to determine his views
and impartiality, and it was not for lack of her trying.
       By providing this explanation, we decide the prosecutor fulfilled the explanation
requirement of section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2).
       Having concluded that the trial court’s confirmation finding is supported by
substantial evidence and the explanation requirement has been fulfilled, we further
conclude that the reasons stated by the prosecutor in her initial statement of reasons and
the evasiveness reason are valid reasons that can be considered to determine whether
“there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race”
(§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1)) as a factor in the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge
against S.H. We next turn to that question.
                    c. Section 231.7, Subdivision (d)(1): Evaluation of the Reasons Given
                       to Justify the Peremptory Challenge
       Section 231.7, subdivision (j) states that we must review “[t]he denial of an
objection made under this section . . . de novo.”
       Pre-section 231.7 precedent supports that “[a]n advocate may legitimately be
concerned about a prospective juror who will not answer questions.” (People v. Howard
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1019; see also People v. Jordan (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 232,
256–257.) Additionally, “where a prosecutor’s concern for a juror’s ability to understand
is supported by the record, it is a proper basis for challenge.” 16 (People v. Turner (1994)
8 Cal.4th 137, 169, abrogated on another ground by People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th
536, 555, fn. 5.)

       16
         However, challenging a prospective juror because he or she is not “a native
English speaker”—a reason not relevant here—is presumed to be an invalid reason for
the use of a peremptory challenge. (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(7).)
                                                 37
       Furthermore, Ortiz does not dispute the trial court statements that S.H. is not of the
same perceived cognizable group as Ortiz or any witness, the prosecutor asked “plenty of
voir dire questions” of S.H., and the prosecutor and her office had not disproportionately
used preemptory challenges in the past against Black prospective jurors. (See § 231.7,
subd. (d)(3).)
       The two reasons that the prosecutor gave after the trial court suggested them are
grounded in the record and do not evince a lack of genuineness or unlawful bias. We are
mindful that when the party exercising the peremptory challenge gives additional reasons
after hearing comments by the court or arguments by the objecting party, such conduct
may be suggestive of unlawful bias. (See Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. 488, 512
[noting the prosecutor’s “shifting explanations” in concluding that the peremptory
challenges were motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent]; Miller-El v.
Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 246 [“It would be difficult to credit the State’s new
explanation, which reeks of afterthought.”]; People v. Arellano (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
1139, 1169 [relying on Miller-El when examining a reason raised by a prosecutor “only
after the court and defense counsel attempted to question [the prosecutor’s]
characterization of [the prospective juror’s] employment and speculation about her
political views”].)
       Nevertheless, as discussed ante (see pt. II.A.3.b.), the prosecutor’s evasiveness
reason is supported by substantial evidence demonstrating S.H.’s avoidance of certain
topics that hampered the prosecutor’s and the trial court’s ability to get answers to
questions. Further, the prosecutor’s genuineness in adopting the evasiveness
characterization is bolstered by the similarity of that characterization to the behaviors she
described in her initial statement of reasons.
       Likewise, regarding the prosecutor’s belatedly stated reason that S.H. would
consider punishment in the face of conflicting testimony, S.H. stated in response to the
prosecutor’s questions that he would not “feel comfortable” resolving or “find[ing] the
                                                 38
facts” if witnesses were to provide competing versions of an event, because if he were
“wrong it could be serious.” He also apparently agreed with the prosecutor that “there
could be serious consequences” flowing from his wrong decision.
         We decide S.H.’s answers do show potential impairment of his ability to follow
the trial court’s instructions to decide “what evidence, if any, to believe” if he
“determine[d] there is a conflict in the evidence” (CALCRIM No. 302) and “reach [his]
verdict without any consideration of punishment” (CALCRIM No. 3550). Further, we
are not persuaded by Ortiz’s suggestion that the prosecutor’s reason is dubious because,
after the prosecutor struck S.H., “another prospective juror noted the difficulty of being
comfortable resolving conflicts due to ‘the gravity’ of the situation” but “was accepted as
an alternate.” Even assuming arguendo that we can consider the voir dire of another
prospective juror that occurred after the trial court had ruled on Ortiz’s objection (see
Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 624), the alternate juror’s answers are not comparable to
S.H.’s answers. 17
         Given that the prosecutor’s two belatedly stated reasons are not implausible or
unsupported by the record, we decide that they do not “fatally impair the prosecutor’s
credibility” or indicate unconscious bias. (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1157–
1158.)
         As discussed ante (see pt. II.A.3.b.), the prosecutor’s initial statement of reasons is
supported by the record. Those reasons are legitimately related to S.H.’s ability to fulfill
his duties as a juror and do not evidence conscious or unconscious bias in the
prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against S.H. Furthermore, the prosecutor questioned
S.H. fairly and extensively, and the record does not indicate that the prosecutor or her

         17
          When the prosecutor asked the alternate juror if he felt “comfortable resolving
conflicts in testimony” or “able to roll up [his] sleeves and determine [the] facts,” the
alternate juror said, “Yeah. I mean I would have to be thorough, you know, because of
the gravity and -- but -- yeah.” (Italics added.)
                                                   39
office had disproportionately used preemptory challenges in the past against Black
prospective jurors. In addition, race was not an issue that pervaded the facts of this case.
       Viewing all the prosecutor’s reasons for the peremptory challenge independently
and under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that there is not a substantial
likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race as a factor in the
prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against S.H. (§ 231.7, subds. (d), (j).) We
thus uphold the trial court’s decision overruling Ortiz’s objection under section 231.7.
       Having rejected Ortiz’s claim under section 231.7, we further decide that the trial
court’s ruling did not violate Ortiz’s constitutional rights to an impartial jury, a jury
venire drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, and equal protection.
Under Batson/Wheeler jurisprudence, “ ‘[t]here “is a rebuttable presumption that a
peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing
party to demonstrate impermissible discrimination.” ’ [Citations.] Under a now familiar
three-step process, a defendant must first ‘make out a prima facie case “by showing that
the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”
[Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden
shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible
race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, “[i]f a race-neutral
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the
strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” ’ [Citations.] The defendant’s
ultimate burden is to demonstrate that ‘it was more likely than not that the challenge was
improperly motivated.’ ” (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 766 (Armstrong).)
       Because section 231.7 provides broader protection than that afforded under
Batson/Wheeler (cf. Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 766 with § 231.7, subd. (d)(1)–(2)),
Ortiz’s failure to demonstrate error under section 231.7 necessarily leads us to conclude

                                                  40
that there was no violation of his constitutional rights when the prosecutor exercised a
peremptory challenge against S.H. 18
       B. Evidence of Midtrial Disclosure of Molestation and Denial of Continuance
       Ortiz contends the admission of testimony by L.G., a defense character witness,
about her daughter’s disclosure of molestation during trial violated Evidence Code
section 352 because the testimony was more prejudicial than probative and, further,
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of his due process rights.
Alternatively, Ortiz contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his requested
continuance to investigate the disclosure, thereby violating his rights to the effective
assistance of counsel, to prepare a defense, and to due process.
               1. Background
       On Thursday, March 24, 2022 (the fourth day on which witnesses were called to
testify at Ortiz’s trial), L.G. testified for the defense as a character witness. 19 L.G. stated
that she had known and socialized with Ortiz for about 13 years, after having met him
and his wife at church. L.G. had three children, including an 11-year-old daughter, and
Ortiz was the godfather of L.G.’s son. L.G. testified that she never had any issues with
how Ortiz treated her children. She had observed Ortiz around children, described him as
“always very, very friendly with everybody,” and said that she “d[id] not consider him
committing anything against a child.” L.G. testified that her opinion of Ortiz would not
change if she knew that he was accused of touching five or even 10 girls. L.G. also
testified that she believed Ortiz to be “really honest” and having “a very, very good
reputation.”
       18
          Because we have addressed Ortiz’s claim of error entirely on the merits, we
need not consider his alternative claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel for any
argument that might have been deemed forfeited.
       19
          We note that the prosecution had not yet rested its case when L.G. testified for
the defense. The defense presented some of its case out of order because two prosecution
witnesses were not available to testify on the day that L.G. (and the five other defense
character witnesses) testified.
                                                   41
       The day after L.G. testified (Friday, March 25, 2022), the prosecutor lodged a
motion seeking to recall L.G. to present impeachment evidence. In the motion, the
prosecutor asserted that earlier that day, L.G. had contacted the sheriff’s office and
reported that when she spoke with her family about her experience testifying at Ortiz’s
trial, her daughter disclosed that Ortiz had sexually touched her when she was six years
old. The prosecutor further asserted that L.G. no longer believed that Ortiz had a
“character for peacefulness” and L.G. would no longer permit Ortiz to be around her
daughter. The prosecutor argued that rebuttal of good character evidence is allowed
under Evidence Code section 1102, subdivision (b), and impeachment evidence, too, is
permissible. The prosecutor explained that she was “not seeking to introduce the
statement of [L.G.’s daughter] for its truth, but rather the basis for which the opinion of
[L.G.] has changed.”
       In supplemental briefing on the motion to recall L.G. (filed on Monday, March 28,
2022), the prosecutor asserted further that Ortiz’s presentation of L.G.’s testimony
opened the door to the introduction of hearsay evidence that undermined his character
evidence.
       At a hearing held on Monday, March 28, 2022, the trial court indicated its
inclination to permit the prosecutor to recall L.G. and said, “I think the issue is going to
be the scope of her testimony if she’s allowed to be recalled.” Defense counsel
responded that he had not had an opportunity to “really investigate these allegations or
look into [them],” and the allegations appeared to be “more [Evidence Code section]
1108 type evidence. Clearly we don’t have time to deal with [Evidence Code section]
1108 evidence that happens [] this late in the trial.” 20

       20
          Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a), provides: “In a criminal action in
which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by [s]ection
1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [s]ection 352.” In turn, Evidence
Code section 352 states: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
                                                  42
       The prosecutor argued that because Ortiz had offered reputation and opinion
evidence regarding his good character, L.G. could be cross-examined with evidence of
Ortiz’s conduct. The prosecutor also reiterated that she was offering the daughter’s
disclosure not for its truth but as a basis for L.G.’s changed opinion.
       Defense counsel stated an objection “to any questions that have to do with an
incident that [L.G.’s] daughter has stated [occurred] when she was six years old. We
don’t have time to look into it and look at the veracity.” Counsel said he would be
willing to stipulate that L.G. no longer considered her testimony to be valid and the trial
court could instruct the jury to disregard L.G.’s testimony.
       When the trial court stated that it needed to perform an analysis of the evidence
under Evidence Code section 352, the prosecutor suggested that to reduce any undue
prejudice, L.G.’s testimony could be limited to the fact of the daughter’s disclosure of
molestation. The prosecutor reiterated that the basis of L.G.’s change of opinion “is that
her daughter disclosed” the molestation. Regarding the Evidence Code section 352
analysis, defense counsel added that the proposed testimony was “extremely prejudicial
at this late stage” and that his strategy would have been “completely different with
witnesses with how evidence came in.”
       The trial court ruled that the prosecutor could recall L.G. and present her
testimony “in the limited fashion . . . just discussed which is to introduce it with the
similar limitations to what a fresh complaint would be.” The court explained further that
the prosecutor was “allowed to introduce the daughter’s hearsay statement just limited to
the fact that there was a disclosure made and the timing of it and circumstances of it and
that is for the purpose of undermining the testimony [from L.G.] that [Ortiz had]
elicited.” The court said it did not “really see any way to do it without making the jury

probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
                                                 43
speculate and [thought] that’s probably more dangerous than getting in the actual
circumstances and the disclosure.”
       The next day (Tuesday, March 29, 2022), the prosecutor recalled L.G. to the
witness stand. Before she began testifying, Ortiz’s defense counsel objected to the trial
court’s prior Evidence Code section 352 ruling and asserted that he would move for a
mistrial if L.G. testified to her daughter’s disclosure. Counsel reiterated that he had not
had enough time to investigate the daughter’s allegations and that the testimony was
improper and should not be allowed. Alternatively, counsel asked for a continuance to
“talk with her” and “investigate further.” Counsel noted that on the preceding day, he
had received a recorded prosecution interview of L.G. and “[had] been trying to make
calls back and forth with the family after listening to that call last night. So it’s just --
timing is really hard for us.”
       The prosecutor responded that the mistrial motion was premature and a
continuance was not appropriate because she was not offering the daughter’s disclosure
for its truth, so investigation into the disclosure was unnecessary. The prosecutor
reiterated that “[i]t is the change in [L.G.’s] opinion that is relevant for today’s
testimony.”
       The trial court reaffirmed its ruling on the propriety of the proposed testimony and
denied Ortiz’s continuance and mistrial requests. In addition, the court said that it would
give the jury a limiting instruction for the testimony.
       Under questioning by the prosecutor, L.G. testified that although she had
previously told the jury about Ortiz’s good character, her opinion that Ortiz was a good
person had changed. L.G. stated that when she spoke with her family about her earlier
testimony, her daughter “came out of the room crying and then [] said that [Ortiz]
sexually assaulted her when she was six.” L.G. testified that she did not know about this
information previously. Ortiz’s defense counsel cross-examined L.G., largely asking
L.G. to recapitulate her prior statements.
                                                   44
       Immediately after L.G. testified that her daughter had said Ortiz “sexually
assaulted her when she was six,” the trial court interrupted the testimony and gave the
following limiting instruction to the jury: “[T]hat statement that was made by the person
who is not in court today is not to be considered for its truth. It’s only to be considered
for the purpose of determining how much weight to give this witness’ opinion regarding
the defendant’s character.”
       After L.G. completed her testimony, the prosecution presented one additional
witness (V. Doe) and rested its case. Ortiz then testified on his own behalf, and the
defense rested. The prosecution did not present any rebuttal evidence.
              2. Legal Principles
       “ ‘When a defense witness gives character testimony, the prosecutor may inquire
of the witness whether he or she has heard of acts or conduct by the defendant
inconsistent with that testimony, so long as the prosecutor has a good faith belief that
such acts or conduct actually took place.’ ” (People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839,
902; see People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 357–358; People v. Hempstead
(1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 949, 953–954; Evid. Code, §§ 1100, 1102, subd. (b).)
Nonetheless, if the impeachment or rebuttal evidence “would create a substantial danger
of undue prejudice to the defendant, the trial judge has the discretion to preclude [it]
under Evidence Code section 352.” (Hempstead, at p. 954.)
       Evidence Code section 352 “ ‘requires the exclusion of evidence only when its
probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. “Evidence is
substantially more prejudicial than probative [citation] [only] if, broadly stated, it poses
an intolerable ‘risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the
outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 948 (Jones); see Evid. Code,
§ 352.) “ ‘The admission of relevant evidence will not offend due process unless the
evidence is so prejudicial as to render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.’ ”
(Jones, at p. 949.)
                                                  45
       “An appellate court reviews a court’s rulings regarding relevancy and
admissibility under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We
will not reverse a court’s ruling on such matters unless it is shown ‘ “the trial court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 74.)
       “A midtrial continuance may be granted only for good cause. ‘A showing of good
cause requires a demonstration that counsel and the defendant have prepared for trial with
due diligence.’ ” (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 469–470; see Pen. Code,
§ 1050, subd. (e).) “The granting or denial of a motion for a continuance in the midst of a
trial traditionally rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Laursen
(1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 204.) In exercising its broad discretion, a trial court “must consider
‘ “ ‘not only the benefit which the moving party anticipates but also the likelihood that
such benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors and the court and, above all,
whether substantial justice will be accomplished or defeated by a granting of the
motion.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450 (Doolin).)
       “The party challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of establishing
an abuse of discretion, and an order denying a continuance is seldom successfully
attacked. [Citation.] [¶] Under this state law standard, discretion is abused only when
the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered. [Citations.]
Moreover, the denial of a continuance may be so arbitrary as to deny due process.
[Citation.] However, not every denial of a request for more time can be said to violate
due process, even if the party seeking the continuance thereby fails to offer evidence.
[Citation.] Although ‘a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a
justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty
formality[,] . . . [t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a
continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.’ [Citation.] Instead, ‘[t]he answer
must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons
                                                 46
presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.’ ” (People v. Beames (2007)
40 Cal.4th 907, 920–921; see also Ungar v. Sarafite (1964) 376 U.S. 575, 589.)
       “A reviewing court considers the circumstances of each case and the reasons
presented for the request to determine whether a trial court’s denial of a continuance was
so arbitrary as to deny due process. [Citation.] Absent a showing of an abuse of
discretion and prejudice, the trial court’s denial does not warrant reversal.” (Doolin,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 450; see also People v. Garcia (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 240, 248
[“In cases where a defendant’s federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial
are implicated, courts apply the de novo standard of review.”].)
              3. Analysis
       Ortiz contends that L.G.’s testimony upon recall by the prosecutor “was more
prejudicial than probative.” He argues that because the evidence of the daughter’s
disclosure “was ostensibly admitted only for its ‘effect on the listener’ – namely, [L.G.]’s
change in opinion – it had negligible probative value because [L.G.] could easily have
testified that she changed her opinion after learning new information and left it at that.”
He further asserts that a prior uncharged offense is inherently prejudicial and, in this case,
“the addition of yet another accuser . . . likely caused the jury to return guilty verdicts
based primarily on the number of accusations rather than based on a close analysis of the
testimony from the accusers.” In addition, Ortiz characterizes the trial court’s limiting
instruction as “effectively useless” in the face of the “erroneously admitted prejudicial
evidence” and claims that the instruction was undermined by the court’s final instruction
regarding the jury’s consideration of uncharged sex offenses (see CALCRIM No.
1191A), because the final instruction failed to make clear that the uncharged offense
involving L.G.’s daughter could not be considered.
       We are not persuaded that the trial court erred under Evidence Code section 352 in
admitting L.G.’s testimony. L.G.’s testimony about her daughter’s disclosure was
probative of L.G.’s opinion of Ortiz’s character and properly provided context for the
                                                  47
change in her opinion. If no evidence were provided about the disclosure, the jurors
would have been left without any basis to evaluate L.G.’s initial opinion and her changed
opinion. L.G.’s testimony also was not unfairly prejudicial in the context of the charges
against Ortiz.
       “ ‘The prejudice that [Evidence Code] section 352 “ ‘is designed to avoid is not
the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative
evidence.’ [Citations.] ‘Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense of
“prejudging” a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors. [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” [Citation.] In other words, evidence should be excluded as unduly
prejudicial when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating
them to use the information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant,
but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction. In such a
circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the substantial likelihood the
jury will use it for an illegitimate purpose.’ ” (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 439.)
       The disclosure evidence here was brief and not graphic or inflammatory. (See
Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 438–439.) The acts described by L.G. were not more
serious than those testified to by the named victims. In addition, the trial court’s limiting
instruction curtailed the potential for undue prejudice and foreclosed any confusion about
how the jury should consider the evidence. The court further reinforced the limiting
instruction with its final jury instruction that evidence admitted “for a limited purpose”
could be considered “only for that purpose and for no other.” We presume that the jurors
followed the court’s instructions. (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 32.)
       Likewise, there was no violation of Ortiz’s constitutional rights to due process.
The limited admission of probative evidence regarding the disclosure was both
appropriate and unexceptional, and it did not render Ortiz’s trial fundamentally unfair.
(See Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 949; see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir.1991)
926 F.2d 918, 920.)
                                                 48
       For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting L.G.’s testimony about her daughter’s disclosure of molestation for a limited
purpose; we also decide no constitutional violation occurred.
       Nor did the trial court err in denying Ortiz’s requested continuance for time to
investigate the information that L.G.’s daughter had disclosed. Ortiz’s defense counsel
made his oral request for a continuance four days after the prosecutor first lodged her
motion to recall L.G. with the trial court. Counsel did not provide details about the
actions he had taken once he learned of the daughter’s disclosure, saying only that he had
listened to the prosecution’s interview of L.G. and “[had] been trying to make calls back
and forth with the family” on the third night after the prosecutor submitted her motion.
Counsel also did not offer specifics about the investigation that he believed was
necessary to adequately defend against the prosecution’s proposed evidence. Counsel’s
minimal explanation is particularly significant because the disclosure evidence was not
being admitted for its truth, only for consideration of the weight to give L.G.’s opinion
regarding Ortiz’s character.
       Under these circumstances, because Ortiz failed to demonstrate good cause for a
continuance of his trial, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of
Ortiz’s continuance request. Furthermore, Ortiz has not persuasively demonstrated that,
on this record, the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance was arbitrary or that he was
deprived of his ability to present a defense or the effective assistance of counsel. We thus
conclude that the trial court’s denial of Ortiz’s continuance request did not violate his
constitutional rights. 21

       21
         Because we have addressed Ortiz’s claim of error on the merits, we need not
consider his alternative claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel for any
argument that might have been deemed forfeited.
                                                 49
        C. CALCRIM 1193
        In the final instructions to Ortiz’s jury, the trial court instructed with CALCRIM
1193 as follows: “You have heard testimony from Anthony Urquiza regarding child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. [¶] Anthony Urquiza’s testimony about child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any
of the crimes charged against him or any conduct or crimes with which he was not
charged. [¶] You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not the alleged
victims’ conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been
molested, and in evaluating the believability of their testimony.” Ortiz did not object to
this instruction. 22
        On appeal, Ortiz contends the trial court erred when it instructed with CALCRIM
1193 because the instruction allowed the jurors to use the CSAAS evidence to evaluate
the complaining witnesses’ credibility in a manner that exceeds the permissible usage,
thereby lessening the prosecution’s burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and violating his due process rights. Focusing on the last sentence of the instruction,
Ortiz asserts that “[t]he instruction allows the jury to find that, because a complaining
witness’s conduct after the fact was consistent with having been sexually abused, the
complaining witness is more believable.” 23
        “We review a claim of instructional error de novo. [Citation.] The challenged
instruction is considered ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record
to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an
impermissible manner.’ ” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326.) “We of course
        22
          Earlier in the trial, before Dr. Urquiza testified for the prosecution, the trial court
provided a similar instruction to the jury, without any defense objection.
       23
          We reach the merits of Ortiz’s claim despite his failure to object at trial because
he contends the challenged instruction was legally incorrect and affected his substantial
rights. (See People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 604; People v. Gomez
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 312; Pen. Code, § 1259.) In turn, we need not consider his
alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
                                                  50
presume ‘that jurors understand and follow the court’s instructions.’ ” (People v. Wilson
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.)
       Ortiz acknowledges that multiple California Courts of Appeal have upheld the
language of CALCRIM 1193 as accurately informing the jury of the limited use of
CSAAS evidence. (See People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 503–504
(Gonzales); People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 473–474; People v. Lapenias
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 175–176 (Lapenias).) Nonetheless, Ortiz contends that those
cases were wrongly decided.
       We are not persuaded by Ortiz’s argument that the existing precedent is wrong.
Furthermore, assessing the instruction in light of the entire record, we are not convinced
that there is a reasonable likelihood the jurors here applied the instruction in an
impermissible manner. The instruction told the jurors that Dr. Urquiza’s testimony could
not be considered as evidence that Ortiz “committed any of the crimes charged against
him or any conduct or crimes with which he was not charged.” Thus, the instruction
explicitly precluded the use of that testimony to conclude inferentially from the victims’
conduct and Dr. Urquiza’s testimony that Ortiz committed the charged or uncharged
crimes. Moreover, the last sentence of the instruction did not compel a conclusion that
the victims’ conduct was consistent with being a sexual abuse victim. In the same vein,
Dr. Urquiza testified that CSAAS was not a diagnostic tool for determining whether a
child had been sexually abused.
       Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly instructed the
jury with CALCRIM 1193, and Ortiz’s constitutional rights were not violated by that
instruction. (See Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 504; Lapenias, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 175.)
       D. Cumulative Error
       Having concluded that Ortiz’s claims challenging his convictions are without
merit, we in turn reject his claim of cumulative prejudice resulting from the asserted
                                                 51
errors. There is no prejudicial error to cumulate. (See People v. Hensley (2014) 59
Cal.4th 788, 818.)
                                  III. DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                              52
                           ______________________________________
                                      Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Grover, Acting P.J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H050117
People v. Ortiz
Trial Court:   County of Santa Cruz

Trial Judge:   Hon. Syda K. Cogliati

Counsel:       Brad Kaiserman, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under the Sixth
                  District Appellate Program, for Defendant and Appellant.

               Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
                 General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
                 Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorney General and Claudia H. Phillips,
                 Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

       H050117
       People v. Ortiz