Court Opinion

ID: 9641412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:31:14.05688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:37.454724
License: Public Domain

Davidson, J.,

dissenting.

I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in its instructions on the question of the voluntariness of the appellant’s inculpatory statements. Unlike my colleagues, however, I believe that there are compelling or exceptional circumstances in this case which justify the exercise of the discretion accorded by Maryland Rule 757 h. I, therefore^ respectfully dissent.
I do not agree with the majority’s assessment that the trial court’s error “may have resulted in some prejudice to the *637appellant.” In my view, the error resulted in substantial prejudice.
The significant impact of an accused’s inculpatory statement has long been recognized. Thus, in Jackson v. Denno,1 the Supreme Court said:
“It is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal ease is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession... and even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction." 2
Here the appellant adduced evidence to show that his inculpatory statements were involuntary. The record shows that these statements constituted the most damaging evidence presented against him. Indeed, it is unclear whether absent those statements, the evidence would have been sufficient to sustain his convictions. Because the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, or in the alternative, improperly articulated the applicable standard by which to determine the voluntariness of the statements, the jury may well have concluded that the statements were voluntary and considered them in reaching its verdict. But for these improper instructions, the jury might have concluded that the statements were involuntary and might well have excluded them from consideration. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s error was fundamental. It resulted not simply in “some” prejudice to the appellant, but rather in substantial prejudice.
Moreover, I do not agree with the majority that “if the error had been brought to the court’s attention the proper clarification could have been made without confusing the jury and any prejudicial effect could have been dissipated.” In order to correct this error the trial court would have had to explain either that the State had the burden of proving, not by a preponderance of the evidence, but rather beyond a *638reasonable doubt, that the incriminating statements were voluntary, or, alternatively, that the State and not the defendant had the burden of proving, not by a preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt that the incriminating statements were voluntary. Additionally, the trial court would have had to define not only what is meant by a “reasonable doubt,” but also by a “preponderance of the evidence.” 3 At the conclusion of all of the requisite corrective instructions, the jury, in my view, would have been hopelessly confused. Thus, the prejudicial effect of the incorrect instructions would not have been dissipated.
Finally, I do not agree with the majority that it would be improper to exercise the discretion accorded by Rule 757 h because “counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous jury instruction was more the result of inadvertence than of an understandable belief that the instruction was correct.” In my view, the appellant’s failure to object to the erroneous instruction was neither a bad guess nor a trial tactic, but resulted rather from a misunderstanding of the applicable law — a misunderstanding shared by the court and by the State despite clear articulation of the law in numerous previous cases. Under similar circumstances, in Parker v. State,4 this Court determined that discretion should be exercised.5
The majority implicitly relies upon Squire v. State6 in which the Court of Appeals took into account, as one of the factors to be considered in determining whether to exercise discretion, the fact that counsel’s failure to object stemmed from an understandable belief that the instruction was correct.7 Squire, however, did not hold that it would be an *639abuse of discretion to take cognizance of a material error where a failure to object resulted from a misapprehension of well-established law. I believe that Parker should be followed here.
The purpose of Rule 757 h is to serve the ends of fundamental fairness and substantial justice.8 These ends cannot be achieved when a lawyer for any reason misapprehends the law and fails to object to a material erroneous instruction. Whether the reason for counsel’s misapprehension of the law is understandable or inexcusable, the result is the same; an error in instructions will not be brought to the attention of the trial court. Thus, as a practical matter, the trial court’s error will not be corrected and is, in effect, irremediable. An accused’s only recourse then is to pursue a Post Conviction procedure grounded upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a posture in which it is difficult for the accused to establish his claim.
I believe that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court “committed a plain and irremediable error ... material to the rights of the accused, which deprived him of his right to a fair trial and which must be corrected to serve the ends of fundamental fairness and substantial justice.” 9 Accordingly, I believe that, notwithstanding the absence of any objection, the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted.

. 378 U. S. 368 (1964).

. I believe here as I did in Dempsey v. State, 24 Md. App. 8 (1974), rev’d 277 Md. 134 (1976), that although the differences between the expressions “by a preponderance of the evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt” might well be discernible to a lawyer or a judge whose mastery of such legalistic parlance or jargon is part of their professional expertise, a jury of laymen totally unversed in these linguistic niceties would require clarification of the differences between these terms. Id. at 44 (Davidson, J., dissenting).

. 4 Md. App. 62 (1968), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 984 (1971).

. Id. at 67.

. 280 Md. 132 (1977).

. Id. at 136.

. See 24 Md. App. at 53.

. Id. at 52-53.