Court Opinion

ID: 9781231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:24:26.592837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:56.914020
License: Public Domain

*251McFADDEN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The material facts are not in dispute. With a single exception, the Appellate Division excised conclusions of law, not findings of fact. And there is no dispute about the single finding of fact excised — that the claimant needed and retained counsel to enforce this claim. The administrative law judge’s conclusions of law were correct, and an award of attorney fees was authorized. The superior court correctly reinstated them.
I recognize that “the appellate division may substitute its own alternative findings for those of the ALJ, and enter an award accordingly.” Bankhead Enterprises v. Beavers, 267 Ga. 506, 507 (480 SE2d 840) (1997). And I recognize that, consistent with the standard of review set out in Bankhead and the similar standard under prior law, we have often held that “[wjhether or not reasonable grounds for resisting the award exist is an issue of fact for the board to determine.” American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 144 Ga. App. 845, 847 (3) (242 SE2d 748) (1978).
But those cases so hold on the basis that a party’s conduct — not its legal argument — is at issue. American Motorist Ins. Co., supra at 846 (3) (discussing, inter alia, a finding of a “failure by the employer to live up to its offer of ‘light work’ made during the course of the original hearing”); McCoy v. J. D. Jewell, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 175, 175-176, 177 (179 SE2d 654) (1971) (affirming the board’s decision not to award fees by a vote of 6-3 on the basis that “it cannot be said that the actions of the employer here were ‘so palpably without merit as to demand a finding’ that its motion for a change of condition hearing ‘was frivolous and unfounded’ ” notwithstanding the dissent’s argument that “it is clear and uncontradicted that the employer stopped compensation payments for more than five weeks without any justification whatever”); Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 71 Ga. App. 184, 191 (30 SE2d 420) (1944) (“[The full board’s] finding, that the action had not been defended without reasonable ground, is supported by evidence, as [a physician] testified . . . that ‘he thought the claimant would be able to return to work in about 10 days or two weeks and . . . was an able-bodied man.’ ”).
Where the question is whether a party had reasonable grounds for a legal argument, this court treats the matter as a question of law and therefore applies de novo review. See City of Atlanta v. Sumlin, 258 Ga. App. 643, 647 (2) (574 SE2d 827) (2002) (“Because these arguments demonstrate that the statute contains a degree of ambiguity and conflict which had never been previously interpreted by the appellate courts, the City’s position was not ‘without reasonable grounds’ and it should not be penalized for seeking clarification of the statute.”); City of Atlanta v. Spearman, 209 Ga. App. 644, 646 (2) (434 SE2d 87) (1993) (“As a matter of law, we find that the City’s *252defense that the injury did not arise out of Spearman’s employment was not unreasonable and that the award of attorney fees regarding this defense was improper.”); Goode Bros. Poultry Co. v. Kin, 201 Ga. App. 557, 561 (3) (411 SE2d 724) (1991) (£‘[A]lthough appellants’ defense . . . was unsuccessful, it was, as a matter of law, not unreasonable. ”).
I recognize that all of those cases hold that an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 34-9-108 (b) (1) was not authorized. I have found no cases in which we have directed that an award of attorney fees be entered or reinstated.
The statute provides that “the administrative law judge or the board may assess” attorney fees. OCGA § 34-9-108 (b) (1). There is precedent in Georgia law for concurrent authority. Perdue v. Baker, 277 Ga. 1 (586 SE2d 606) (2003). The plain language of the statute vests concurrent discretionary authority in both the ALJ and the Appellate Division to award attorney fees in proper cases. This is a proper case.
The Appellate Division deleted the following language from the ALJ’s decision:
I find the insurer has defended the claimant’s claim for payment of temporary total disability income benefits without reasonable grounds. Therefore, I find the claimant’s attorney’s fees will be assessed against the insurer. See OCGA § 34-9-108 (b) (1).
I find the insurer failed to comply with the provisions of [OCGA §] 34-9-221, and I find no reasonable grounds for the insurer’s failure to comply with the provisions of that Code section. The claimant has had to engage the services of his attorney to enforce his rights under that Code section. I find the reasonable quantum meruit fee of the claimant’s attorney will be assessed against the insurer. See OCGA § 34-9-108 (b) (2).
In the next paragraph, the Appellate Division left intact the ALJ’s conclusion that a reasonable quantum meruit fee is $12,690 and the findings in support of that conclusion; but it deleted the ALJ’s final sentence: “This amount will be assessed against the insurer, to be paid without deduction from benefits payable to the claimant.”
Even under the any-evidence standard we must reverse the Appellate Division’s rejection of the ALJ’s finding that the claimant needed and retained counsel to assert this claim. The rest of the excised material is conclusions of law. Consequently the courts owe the Appellate Division no deference.
The ALJ correctly held that an award of attorney fees was *253authorized. The record contains no justification for the insurer’s failure to timely give notice, as required by OCGA § 34-9-221, that it was controverting the insured’s claim for benefits. The insurer’s legal argument is that — having accepted premiums from a self-employed worker — it was entitled to refuse to pay disability benefits because the claimant did not pay himself a formal wage, but paid both business and personal expenses from a single checking account. That argument flies in the face of the fundamental principle of workers’ compensation law that “[although the Workers’ Compensation Act is in derogation of common law, it is highly remedial in nature. It must be construed liberally in favor of the claimant in order to accomplish its beneficent purposes.” (Punctuation omitted.) CGU Ins. Co. v. Sabel Indus., 255 Ga. App. 236, 243 (2) (564 SE2d 836) (2002). See also Homebuilders Assn. of Ga. v. Morris, 238 Ga. App. 194, 196-197 (518 SE2d 194) (1999) (same). Prominent among those beneficent purposes is “providing] immediate financial assistance to injured employees.” Ayers v. Rembert, 241 Ga. App. 698, 701 (527 SE2d 290) (1999). Indeed the insurer’s argument flies in the face of fundamental principles of contract law: “The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties. If that intention is clear and it contravenes no rule of law and sufficient words are used to arrive at the intention, it shall be enforced irrespective of all technical or arbitrary rules of construction.” OCGA § 13-2-3. And more fundamentally still, “[t]he law abhors forfeiture.” Holden v. Smith, 236 Ga. App. 205, 207 (511 SE2d 569) (1999).
Decided June 22, 2011.
Gerald R. Ryan, Jr., for appellants.
Robert L. Lambert, Jr., for appellee.
Marci R. Rosenberg, Kenneth A. Smith, Christopher B. Scott, amici curiae.
I would affirm the judgment of the superior court, which reinstated the award entered by the administrative law judge.