Court Opinion

ID: 9706985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:57:48.121554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:26.667321
License: Public Domain

CRONE, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in grant*131ing Father's petition to modify custody of S.N. Therefore, I concur as to issue I.
As to issue II, however, I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision to remand pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1(a) and Farrell, 790 N.E.2d 612. To reiterate, the statute states, "A noneus-todial parent is entitled to reasonable parenting time rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time might: (1) endanger the child's physical health and well-being; or (2) significantly impair the child's emotional development." Ind. Code § 31-14-14-1(a). The plain language of the statute requires the trial court to enter findings only when it denies any parenting time to the noneustodial parent. That was the situation in Farrell, on which the majority relies. To the extent that Farrell may be interpreted as holding that findings are required if the trial court grants parenting time that deviates, no matter how slightly, from the Parenting Time Guidelines, I would respectfully disagree with that interpretation as contrary to both the letter and the spirit of Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1(a) and the Parenting Time Guidelines. See Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines, Preamble ("'The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a model which may be adjusted depending upon the unique needs and circumstances of each family."); id. at § 83 ("Where there is a significant geographical distance between the parents, scheduling parenting time is fact sensitive and requires consideration of many factors which include: employment schedules, the costs and time of travel, the financial situation of each parent, the frequency of the parenting time and others."). To equate reasonable parenting time with the full panoply of visitation rights pursuant to the Parenting Time Guidelines and to allow a deviation therefrom only in situations where there is child endangerment would severely limit a trial court's ability to fashion a visitation schedule that best suits the situation of the parents involved. Such a result would be ill advised.
Here, the trial court granted Mother "parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines with the exception that [Mother] shall have only one weekend of parenting time per month." Appellant's App. at 76. Because the trial court granted Mother parenting time, the court was not required to enter findings pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1, and thus Mother may not challenge its failure to enter such findings. Mother may challenge only whether her parenting time is reasonable. Based on the record before us, including evidence regarding the significant geographical distance between Mother and Father, I conclude that it is. Therefore, I respectfully dissent as to issue II and would affirm the trial court in all respects.