Court Opinion

ID: 9761044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:30:03.553217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:19.834656
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Chief Judge.
On January 9, 1992, James J. White, III, a member of the Maryland Bar since 1963, was charged by the Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, with violations of Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property) and Rule 8.4 (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as with violating Maryland Code (1989), §§ 10-306 to -307 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article. We referred the matter, pursuant to Maryland Rule BV9 b, to Judge Theodore R. Eschenburg of the Circuit Court for Worcester County to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On June 16, 1992, after an evidentiary hearing, Judge Eschenburg found that White represented Marlene E. Steward and her minor child, Larry, Jr., then fourteen months old, in connection with a motor vehicle accident which occurred on December 23, 1980 and which resulted in the *414death of the father, Larry Steward, Sr. White settled the claims of the wife and minor child for $20,000. After deducting his fee and expenses, White disbursed the net sum of $11,982 to Mrs. Steward. Judge Eschenburg found that $5,000 of this amount was subsequently placed in a certificate of deposit in a local bank in the names of James J. White, III, as trustee for Larry, Jr. and Marlene, or the survivor of them. By February of 1989, that sum, with the addition of interest, had increased to $10,252.20. At that time, White transferred the funds to a money market account in The Chesapeake Bank, directing that the statements be sent to his home rather than to his office.
Judge Eschenburg found that Mrs. Steward died on March 19, 1989. Thereafter, an uncle of Larry, Jr. consulted White with respect to adopting the minor child, which White accomplished for him. White never advised the uncle of the existence of the money market account entrusted to him for Larry, Jr.
Between August 30, 1989 and May 5, 1990, as found by Judge Eschenburg, White, in a series of withdrawals, withdrew $10,450 from the trust account, leaving a balance of only $238.29. As a result of information received by Bar Counsel, White was asked to account for Larry’s money. Bar Counsel was told that $14,147.16 was then on deposit with The Chesapeake Bank. White did not at that time acknowledge that the money had been used by him for his own purposes and then replaced.
In his findings, Judge Eschenburg referred to a stipulation between White and Bar Counsel that White had testified falsely before an Inquiry Panel concerning his use of the trust account monies; and that these funds had actually been used by him “for personal and office expenses and that he knew at the time of the use of the funds that those funds were misused by him.” According to Judge Eschenburg, the evidence disclosed that White “hoped that the misuse of funds would escape detection and that ultimately, if called upon to account for the funds, he would replace the misused funds with other funds available to him.” Judge *415Eschenburg found from the evidence that White replaced the misappropriated funds prior to the misuse coming to the attention of the Attorney Grievance Commission and that White had added an additional sum to these funds representing interest which would have been earned if the fund had remained untouched.
At the hearing, White testified, as did Richard B. Vincent, Director of Lawyer Counseling for the Maryland State Bar Association, that White “suffered from severe alcoholism until on or about January 1992” when he contacted Vincent for help. The evidence further disclosed that Vincent referred White to an in-patient alcoholism treatment facility where White underwent and successfully completed the treatment program from January 22 through February 21, 1992. Thereafter, according to Judge Eschenburg’s findings, White regularly attended meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous and related counseling and maintained complete abstinence from alcohol.
In his findings, Judge Eschenburg acknowledged White’s testimony that at the time he misappropriated the trust funds, he “rationalized his behavior or justified it as borrowing.” He also referred to Vincent’s “expert testimony that such rationalization or justification was consistent with alcoholic thinking” and that the prognosis for White’s conducting a successful recovery from alcoholism and complete abstinence was excellent.
Judge Eschenburg concluded that White had violated the “Safekeeping Property” provisions of Rule 1.15(a), (b), and (c) and Rule 8.4(b), (c), and (d).1 He also found that White *416had violated §§ 10-306 and 10-307 of the statute, as charged in the disciplinary petition.2
In response to Judge Eschenburg’s findings, White states that “after almost thirty years of practicing law, without being the subject of any disciplinary proceeding, ... while in the throes of severe alcoholism, [he] misappropriated funds which he held in trust.” He invited our attention to the fact that he subsequently replaced those funds, with interest, before he had knowledge of any disciplinary proceedings against him. He acknowledged that he “compounded his misconduct, while still drinking alcoholically, by denying the misappropriation before the Inquiry Panel.” He maintained that after he voluntarily sought treatment for his alcoholism through Mr. Vincent, he admitted and accepted responsibility for his transgressions both in a prehearing deposition and in his testimony before Judge Eschenburg.
White urges that we find his misconduct to be causally related to his severe alcoholism and resultant alcoholic rationalization. He claims that Judge Eschenburg, based upon Mr. Vincent’s uncontroverted expert testimony, recognized that he “suffered from severe alcoholism until on or about January 19, 1992.”
Bar Counsel, in response, noted that White’s admission that he misappropriated the funds was not made until April 14, 1992, after his bank records were subpoenaed, and that it was only after that that he admitted his misconduct. As to sanction, Bar Counsel contends that disbarment is the appropriate disposition for White’s misconduct. He maintains that the suggested nexus between White’s use of alcohol and his misconduct in misappropriating the trust funds was “tenuous at best,” falling short of the requisite *417proof that White’s alcoholism was a precipitating cause of the theft of his client’s funds.
Our review of the evidentiary record before Judge Eschenburg includes White’s prehearing deposition. It reveals that White acknowledged that from 1988 through 1990, when the funds were in the process of being misappropriated, he was “drinking alcoholically and gambling excessively.” He acknowledged lying to the Inquiry Panel when he said that he was sober and was not a recovering alcoholic. White also agreed with his lawyer’s proffer during the taking of his deposition that
“it would be [White’s] testimony that when he began taking the money from the account in question, ... he knew it was not his money, that like most people who set out on that course of conduct, he rationalized or lied to himself and told himself that he would borrow the money and pay it back with interest. In any event, over a period of close to two years, he continued to take money from that account until he had taken all of it ..., that no one would demand an accounting or funds from that account before he could put the money back in there, that while he was representing the adoptive father who was adopting the boy, he did not tell the adoptive father or the guardian anything about the existence of the account because he knew the money that was supposed to be in there was not in there because he had stolen it. He knew it was wrong when he did it, he knew it was wrong when he continued to take it. He did eventually, before or shortly before being caught and confronted by the Attorney Grievance Commission, he did replace all of the money in the account, with interest____”
We have said time and again that misappropriation of funds by an attorney “ ‘is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in disbarment in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction.’” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 404, 593 A.2d 1087 (1991); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 608-09, 541 A.2d 966 (1988).
*418Our cases have “looked at the shortcomings of attorneys in a somewhat different light where ... the acts giving rise to the charges against an attorney have resulted to a substantial extent from the physical and mental maladies the attorney was suffering, particularly where alcoholism was involved.” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Willemain, 297 Md. 386, 395, 466 A.2d 1271 (1983). Otherwise stated, we said in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Miller, 301 Md. 592, 608, 483 A.2d 1281 (1984), “that problems attributed to alcohol addiction may present circumstances sufficient to warrant sanction less severe than disbarment,” i.e., where the addiction has been proven, “we have ordered indefinite suspension when the addiction was to a substantial extent responsible for the conduct of the attorney.” See, e.g., Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Aler, 301 Md. 389, 483 A.2d 56 (1984); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Nichols, 301 Md. 172, 482 A.2d 499 (1984); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Dunphy, 297 Md. 377, 467 A.2d 177 (1983); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Finlayson, 293 Md. 156, 442 A.2d 565 (1982); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Cooper, 279 Md. 605, 612, 369 A.2d 1059 (1977).
In determining whether the evidence before the hearing judge was legally sufficient to establish a causal relationship between the misconduct and the alcoholism, we have at times focused on whether the alcoholism was the “root cause” of the professional misconduct, i.e., whether it was responsible for the misconduct. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Truette, 299 Md. 435, 446, 474 A.2d 211 (1984). We used similar language in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Willemain, 305 Md. 665, 680, 506 A.2d 245 (1986); there, in determining whether the evidence showed that alcoholism was a substantial factor in bringing about the misconduct, we sought to ascertain whether the alcoholism was “at the root” of the professional misconduct, i.e., whether the erring attorney was “not his own master.” Earlier, in Willemain I, supra, 297 Md. at 396, 466 A.2d 1271, we expressed the same thought in these terms: whether the misconduct was “triggered by the [attorney’s] bout with the bottle.”
*419We have thus made clear that where alcoholism is allegedly implicated in cases involving misappropriation of trust or client funds, a sanction less severe than disbarment may be imposed if the evidence discloses that the alcoholism, to a substantial extent, was the responsible, the precipitating, the root cause of the misappropriation. More, therefore, is required to establish the requisite causal relationship than a mere recitation of the attorney’s life style and lengthy history of alcoholism. See Bakas, supra, 323 Md. at 403, 593 A.2d 1087. Indeed, in Willemain II, supra, 305 Md. at 676, 506 A.2d 245, as here, the erring attorney characterized his misappropriation of trust funds as “borrowing” and sought to justify his action by reason of his alcoholism. We there recognized that “[borrowing obviously is a volitional act,” as to which attorneys sometimes “ ‘find themselves in a position where the flow of cash in their practice is insufficient to meet office overhead, family needs, and the like,’ ” which may result in “the temptation to dip into funds which have been entrusted to the attorney, with the thought that the money soon can and will be paid back and the hope that no one will be the wiser.” Id. at 676, 506 A.2d 245, quoted in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Pattison, 292 Md. 599, 607-08, 441 A.2d 328 (1982). A sanction less than disbarment, to be justified, must therefore demonstrate more than that the attorney is an alcoholic and that, as Vincent’s testimony seemed to suggest, the theft was therefore a necessary product of that disease. In this regard, we may accord evidentiary significance to the fact that a lawyer, who claims that the misconduct was the result of mental illness or a drug or alcohol addiction, carried on an effective law practice for a substantial period during the time of the misconduct without any adverse effect on the lawyer’s clients. See, e.g., Bakas, supra, 323 Md. at 403, 593 A.2d 1087; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Winters, 309 Md. 658, 667, 526 A.2d 55 (1987); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 686, 480 A.2d 807 (1984).
*420Both White and Vincent testified before Judge Eschenburg as to White’s thirty-year history of progressively worsening alcoholism and that because of it White’s thinking was “alcoholically impaired.” White testified that his income from the practice of law was on the decline at the time he misappropriated the trust funds; that he was drinking and gambling excessively when he stole the money and needed it to pay his office expenses; and that because of his drinking, he rationalized the theft of the money as “acceptable behavior, although he knew that it was not, even though he intended to replace the misappropriated funds.” White stated that he had been drinking “heavy” when he appeared before and lied to the Inquiry Panel. He acknowledged having been found guilty on two earlier occasions of driving under the influence of alcohol and of having been put on probation under the Drinking Driver Monitor Program and directed to attend meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous, which he did while continuing to drink. He acknowledged that he had been arrested on a third DWI offense but that that case had not then been scheduled for trial.
Vincent testified that it was “consistent” with White’s “alcoholic thinking” that he had a right to “borrow” the trust funds and that had White not been an alcoholic he would not have stolen the money. Vincent stated that there was a “connection” between White’s thinking processes when he took the funds and his alcoholism. On cross-examination, Bar Counsel asked Vincent whether White, despite his alcoholism, knew what he was doing when he misappropriated the funds. Vincent said that was probable; nevertheless, he said that it was White’s drinking that “allowed him to do it.”
As we see it, the evidence before Judge Eschenburg amounted to little more than a recitation of White’s lengthy history of alcoholism and a generalized claim that the theft was caused by his alcoholism. In view of the dearth of substantive evidentiary support, it is apparent that Judge Eschenburg found it unnecessary to make a factual finding *421as to the existence of a causal relationship. That he made no such specific factual finding does not, in the circumstances of this case, require a remand for that purpose. Simply to show that the attorney was in the throes of alcoholism at the time he misappropriated client funds; that his thinking was “alcoholically impaired” to the point where he rationalized his behavior as “acceptable,” even though he knew it was not, is insufficient mitigation of itself to justify a sanction less than disbarment. Evidence that White’s misconduct was, to a substantial extent, precipitated by his alcoholism is woefully absent in this case. Accordingly, we think the appropriate disposition is disbarment, and we shall order that the name of James J. White, III shall be stricken from the rolls of those authorized to practice law in Maryland.3
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE BV 15c, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST JAMES J. WHITE, III.

. Rule 8.4(b), (c), and (d) provide:
"(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."

. These statutory provisions proscribe the use of trust money by a lawyer for “any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer" and make violations subject to disciplinary proceedings under the Maryland Rules.

. On September 21, 1992, White was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Kent County of theft over $300 and fraudulent misappropriation of funds by a fiduciary. See Maryland Code (1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 342 and 132 respectively. Sentencing is now pending.