Court Opinion

ID: 9593235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:20:50.205105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:19.128506
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the court’s finding that the Remedies on Default clause waived any sovereign immunity possessed by Venetie. I also agree with the court’s conclusion that the superior court erred in ordering exhaustion of tribal court remedies. In National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 2453, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985), the Supreme Court declared that the examination of a tribal court’s civil subject-matter jurisdiction “should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself.” The Court reiterated this doctrine in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 971, 976 n. 8, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987), stating that “[ejxhaustion is required as a matter of comity....” This comity “arises out of the ‘attributes of sovereignty’ possessed by Indian tribes, their ‘inherent powers’ of self-government, and the ‘vital role’ of tribal courts in that process.” State of Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Disk v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir.1988) (citing National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 851, 856, 105 S.Ct. at 2451, 2453, and LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 14-19, 107 S.Ct. at 975-78).
Before a state court can require the exhaustion of tribal court remedies, however, it must find that a legitimate tribal court exists. See Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, No. J84-024 Civ., order at 10 (D. Alaska, Jan. 11, 1990) (“[Ejxhaustion will not be required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction ... would be futile because of a lack of adequate opportunity to challenge tribal jurisdiction, as where, for example, a tribe lacks an operational court system.”). For a tribal court to be legitimate, it must serve a federally recognized tribe which occupies a territory over which it has governmental authority, see State of Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Disk v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d at 1388, and it must be established and able to entertain suits. See Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, No. J84-024 Civ., slip op. at 19 (D. Alaska, Oct. 9, 1990). A court established by a non-tribal entity is obviously not legitimate, since a non-tribal entity may not establish courts in which a state or federal court can require the exhaustion of remedies.1 State of Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Disk, 856 F.2d at 1388.
I write separately, however, because I believe the court has failed to address the crucial issue presented by this appeal, whether Venetie is an Indian tribe entitled to sovereign immunity. To date, no court has expressly considered whether a Native group which once resided on a federally recognized reservation in Alaska constitutes a sovereign Indian tribe after the passage of ANCSA. The primary reasons for this reluctance are the complexity and political nature of the questions involved. The unfortunate result of this judicial avoidance is that great uncertainty pervades the Natives’ economic dealings and jeopardizes beneficial legislation in the state legislature. In an attempt to partially remedy this situation, I will confront head-on the question of whether Venetie is an Indian tribe entitled to sovereign immunity.
The superior court determined that Vene-tie meets the criteria for sovereignty set *1235forth in Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988) and therefore falls within an exception to the general rule that Native groups in Alaska are not sovereign tribes. The court concluded that the Tribal Government has explicit powers of self-government pursuant to Article 4 of its constitution.2 The court further determined that Venetie meets the reservation requirement of Stevens Village. It noted that the Secretary of the Interior created the Venetie Reservation under the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act and that the villagers protested its termination when ANCSA became effective in 1971. Because the ANCSA village corporations within the former Venetie Reservation elected to acquire fee title to those lands and then to deed title to the Tribal Government, the court concluded that ANCSA’s termination of the reservation did not abolish the sovereign immunity previously held by the entire Venetie IRA organization.
Nenana Fuel contests this ruling on several grounds. First, it claims that Venetie does not meet certain prerequisites to sovereignty as described in Stevens Village. It also claims that any sovereignty Venetie had was extinguished when its reservation was terminated by ANCSA. Finally, Nena-na Fuel contends that Public Law 280 stripped the Village Corporation and Tribal Government of any jurisdiction they may have had over this litigation.
It has long been recognized that American Indian tribes outside Alaska are immune from suit due to their status as sovereign governmental entities. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Re-serv’n v. WoldEng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 891-92, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2313-14, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1676, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512-13, 60 S.Ct. 653, 656-57, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940). Courts also have consistently recognized that Alaska Native groups have a very different history than Natives in the lower forty-eight states; their interactions with the federal government have been very different from those between the government and tribes of other states. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 50-51, 82 S.Ct. 552, 556-57, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962); Stevens Village, 757 P.2d at 35; Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 154 (Alaska 1977). As the United States Supreme Court stated in Metlakat-la,
There were no Indian wars in Alaska, although on at least one occasion, see Gruening, The State of Alaska (1954), pp. 36-37, there were fears of an uprising. There was never an attempt in Alaska to isolate Indians on reservations. Very few were ever created, and the purpose of these, in contrast to many in other States, was not to confine the Indians for the protection of the white settlers but to safeguard the Indians against exploitation. Alaskan Indians are now voting citizens, some of whom occupy prominent public office in the state government.
Metlakatla, 369 U.S. at 51, 82 S.Ct. at 557. Because the land resources of Alaska appeared limitless in the early days of the territory, “the westward migration of white civilization which displaced the tribes [of the lower forty-eight states] never occurred in Alaska.” Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 154. And, due to the non-hostile history of Alaska’s settlement, the federal government never attempted to enter into treaties with Alaska Natives. Id. As a result of these circumstances, most of the facts which created the Indian law authority of the lower forty-eight states are absent from cases involving Alaska Natives. See Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 920-21 (Alaska 1961), partially rev’d 369 U.S. 45, 50-51, 82 S.Ct. 552, 556-57, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962).
We determined in Atkinson v. Haldane that the history of the Metlakatla Indian *1236Community was much more like the history of Indian tribes of other states than that of other Alaska Native groups, thereby entitling it to sovereign tribal status. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 154-55. Of particular importance to this holding was the fact that the Metlakatlans continued to reside on a federally recognized reservation even after the passage of ANCSA, which abolished all other reservations in Alaska. Id.; see 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1988). Our conclusion was further compelled by the strong central tribal government established by the Native community on the reserve. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 156.
In Stevens Village, we again acknowledged the unique status enjoyed by the Metlakatla community. 757 P.2d at 36. We emphasized that “judicial recognition of tribal sovereign immunity turn[s] on whether Congress, or the executive branch of the federal government, ha[s] recognized the particular group in question as a tribe.” Id. at 34-35 (citing Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 161-63). After reviewing the history of the relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives up until the passage of the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act in 1936, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), we concluded that, with the exception of the Metlakatlans, Congress had intended that Alaska Native groups not be treated as sovereigns. 757 P.2d at 34-41. Further, we determined that neither the IRA nor any subsequent congressional action had signaled recognition of the sovereign status of Alaska Native groups. 757 P.2d at 34.
In arriving at this conclusion, we observed that the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1982), was “designed to encourage Indians to ‘revitalize their self-government through the adoption of constitutions and bylaws and through the creation of chartered corporations, with power to conduct the business and economic affairs of the tribe.’ ” 757 P.2d at 39 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1271, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973)). Since § 16 of the IRA applied only to Indian tribes or tribes residing on a reservation,3 the Act’s applicability to Alaska was very limited. Not only were Alaska Native groups not tribes, but there were very few reservations in existence in Alaska. In 1936, § 1 of the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), extended § 17 of the IRA to Alaska and also expanded the applicability of the Act:
groups of Indians in Alaska not recognized prior to May 1, 1936 as bands or tribes, but having a common bond of occupation, or association, or residence within a well-defined neighborhood, community or rural district, may organize to adopt constitutions and by-laws and to receive charters of incorporation and federal loans under §§ 10, 16, and 17 ... of the [IRA].4
This expanded application of the IRA was deemed necessary because it had been “assumed that Alaska Natives were not members of federally recognized Indian tribes.” Report of the Governor’s Task Force on Federal-State-Tribal Relations, at 110-11 (Feb. 14, 1986). In Stevens Village, we interpreted these circumstances as an express Congressional statement that most Native groups in Alaska had not been recognized as tribes. 757 P.2d at 40.
Following our review of the IRA in Stevens Village, we concluded that the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act “expressly states that Native groups in Alaska have not been accorded tribal recognition.”5 *1237757 P.2d at 40. We found that while the IRA sets forth a means by which such groups might achieve self-governing status, the Native Village of Stevens clearly had not achieved that status. Id. at 40-41. This conclusion was based on the fact that the village did not have, and never had, a reservation on which to exercise its governmental powers. Id. at 40. We stated: “In our view, the mere approval of a section 16 constitution ... by the Secretary of the Interior ... does not suffice to afford ... tribal status for the purpose of application of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.” Stevens Village, 757 P.2d at 40. Rather, the existence of a federally recognized reservation was a “necessary precondition to native communities’ exercising local government powers under section 16 of the IRA.” 757 P.2d at 40. Because this crucial element of sovereignty was lacking in the Stevens Village case, we refused to accord sovereign status to the village.
The situation of the Native Village of Venetie lies between the two factual settings presented by the Metlakatla Indian community and the Native Village of Stevens. Unlike Stevens Village, which never possessed a reservation, Venetie once possessed a reservation. That reservation, however, was abolished in 1971 by ANC-SA.6 Due to this fact, Venetie is unlike *1238Metlakatla, whose reservation continues to exist pursuant to express congressional recognition in ANCSA. Our inquiries into tribal sovereignty in Stevens Village and Atkinson therefore provide me with insufficient guidance to resolve Venetie’s present claim. Accordingly, I proceed to analyze the question whether a Native group which once resided on a federally recognized reservation in Alaska can constitute a sovereign Indian tribe even after the federal government has expressly terminated the reserve.
I find that Congress expressly pronounced in its 1971 enactment of ANCSA that no Native Alaskan group other than the Metlakatla Indian community of the Annette Island Reserve may be entitled to sovereign tribal status. A review of the history of Alaska’s settlement and the goals which ANCSA was intended to pursue makes this conclusion inevitable. As noted previously, the history of Alaska Native groups is extremely different from the history of Indians in the lower forty-eight states. Specifically recognizing this unique history, and in hopes of arriving at a new, more successful means of resolving Native claims, ANCSA expressly rejected the reservation model which settled Native claims in other states.
The legislative history of ANCSA is instructive on this point. In its October 21, 1971 Report to Congress regarding the proposed ANCSA bill, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs acknowledged the errors of the past, stating: “The Congress has an opportunity in this last major settlement between the United States and the Native peoples of America to arrive at a more just and hopefully, a wiser resolution than has been typical of our country’s history in dealing with Native people in other times and in other states.” S.Rep. No. 405, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., at 61-62 (1971). The Committee then identified several major differences between ANCSA and previous Indian settlements. It wrote:
In several important respects the disposition recommended by the Committee for the Alaska Native land claims differs from previous settlements with Indian groups in the other States. The status of aboriginal claims in Alaska is not burdened with a history of conquest or of treaties between the United States and tribal groups. The status of the land, with minor and manageable exceptions, has not been complicated by the establishment of Indian Reservations.... The most important innovations [in the Committee’s proposed bill] are as follows:
(1) The settlement is statewide and applies to all Alaska Native groups; all eligible Natives regardless of their ethnic affiliation or their location are entitled to an equal share in the assets provided as compensation for claims extinguished in the settlement.
(2) The settlement will with minor exceptions put an end to racial or ethnic distinctions in land tenure or hunting and fishing rights.
(3) The assets granted to Alaska Natives under the terms of this settlement will be managed and disposed of by them either as individuals or through statewide, regional and local corporations controlled by them.
S.Rep. No. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 79-80 (1971).
The Act’s legislative history also shows that Congress intended that after ANC-SA’s enactment there was to be no trust relationship between the federal government and the Native groups of Alaska, as there is between the government and the Native tribes of other states. Congress intended that “lands granted to Natives under this Act [are not to be] considered ‘Indian reservation’ lands for purposes other than those specified in this Act. The lands granted by this Act are not ‘in trust’ and the Native villages are not Indian ‘reservations.’ ” H.R.Rep. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 40, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2253. In House consideration of ANCSA, it was again clarified that “[t]he [ANCSA] bill does not establish any trust relationship between the Federal Government and the Natives. The regional *1239corporations and the village corporations will be organized under State law, and will not be subject to Federal supervision except to the limited extent specifically provided in the bill. All conveyances will be in fee — not in trust.” H.R.Rep. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2199.
The legislative history of ANCSA thus reveals both the comprehensive scope of the Act as well as Congress’ intention to resolve Alaska Native claims in a new and entirely different manner than was used to resolve the claims of other Indian groups. Due to the specific tailoring of ANCSA to Alaska Native claims, as well as the comprehensiveness of the Act’s resolution of those claims, I conclude that ANCSA represents a final and binding settlement of Native claims, including claims of tribal sovereignty.7
The actual language of ANCSA is also absolutely inconsistent with the concept that Alaska Native groups carry on as independent and sovereign enclaves entitled to special federal recognition. The Act’s preamble unequivocally demonstrates Congress’ intention that ANCSA settle “all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska,” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1988), and that it accomplish the assimilation of Alaska Natives into society as a whole. Further, in the Act’s “declaration of policy,” Congress states:
[T]he settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives, without litigation, with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property, without establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, without creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship, and without adding to the categories of property and institutions enjoying special tax privileges or to the legislation establishing special relationships between the United States Government and the State of Alaska.
43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Any finding that ANCSA did not abolish native sovereignty clearly would be at odds with Congress’ desire to abolish the reservation system and to avoid prolonged wardship or trusteeship of Alaska Natives.8
The substantive provisions of ANCSA further illuminate the irreconcilability of that Act with concepts of tribal sovereignty in Alaska. Significantly, the Act explicitly provides for a privately-owned corporate system of operation rather than a reservation-based tribal system. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988). Section 7 of the Act establishes regional corporations which are organized like any other Alaska corporation, with, for example, articles of incorporation and bylaws, management under a board of directors, and ownership by stockholders. Id. The corporations operate the same as other Alaska corporations, with certain limited exceptions such as some restrictions on the alienation of shares. See 43 U.S.C. *1240§ 1606(h) (1988 & Supp.1992). These provisions make clear that the regional corporations created by ANCSA are business corporations governed by state law, not tribal sovereigns.9 As Senator Stevens of Alaska stated during the Senate’s discussion of the Act:
[The regional corporations] are not government entities, but they are a part of a profitmaking picture for the native people of Alaska for the future.... It is important for all to note that these are incorporated under the laws of Alaska to conduct business for profit.
They are not government bodies.... 117 Cong.Rec. 46,964 (1971).
The village corporations created by the Act are also businesses subject to state law. 43 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988). While these organizations have been endowed with sufficient land and other assets to ensure effective self-determination, see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1605 & 1610 (1988); 117 Cong.Rec. 38,-445 (1971) (statement of Senator Harris during Senate debate of the ANCSA bill) (arguing in favor of a generous ANCSA land settlement to ensure adequate power of Native self-determination), they are like the regional corporations in that they possess no sovereign status. See 117 Cong. Rec. 46,964 (1971) (statement of Sen. Stevens). In my view, both the regional and village corporate organizations possess no status as governing bodies, but are instead intended to facilitate the assimilation of Native Alaskans into the modern business world.10
I find further evidence of Congress’ intent to terminate Alaska Native claims to tribal status from the fact that Congress conveyed the land due under the Act to the ANCSA regional and village corporations, not to any governing IRA organizations. See 43 U.S.C. § 1611 (1988). Even in the case of villages such as Venetie, which elected not to become part of the regional corporate scheme and to take fee title to certain lands instead,11 43 U.S.C. § 1618(b) (1988), Congress conveyed the land due under § 1618(b) to the ANCSA village corporation of Venetie, not to the Venetie IRA organization. Because the membership of these two organizations may differ, I interpret Congress’ action as yet another indication that the land conveyed under ANCSA does not and cannot establish boundaries for any tribal entity’s jurisdiction.12
Finally, and most significantly, ANCSA § 19 specifically revokes all reservations existing in Alaska, with the exception of the Annette Island Reserve occupied by the Metlakatla Indian Community.13 43 U.S.C. *1241§ 1618(a) (1988). ANCSA therefore abolishes all claims to tribal status and sovereignty by Alaska Natives other than the Metlakatlans, since federal recognition of a reservation is a necessary prerequisite to judicial recognition of Alaskan tribal sovereignty.14 See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 148-49, 93 S.Ct. at 1270-71. (“Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the state.”); Stevens Village, 757 P.2d at 41. If Venetie’s claim to sovereignty were recognized in the absence of a federally recognized reservation, it would be impossible to ascertain what boundaries defined the area of Vene-tie’s jurisdiction.15
*1242In summary, after Stevens Village there remains no question that Venetie’s organization under the IRA is alone insufficient to support a finding of sovereignty. Moreover, ANCSA, the most far-reaching federal legislation ever to affect Alaska Natives, reveals Congress’ express intent that no Native Alaska group other than the Metla-katla Indian community may be entitled to sovereign tribal status. Congress envisioned state regulatory authority over almost all Native-owned lands and Native corporations, and mandated involvement by the state in the affairs of all Native villages. Federal trusteeship and reservations were terminated, and permanent racially-defined institutions were abolished. Because there is nothing in the language or legislative history of ANCSA which remotely suggests that Congress intended IRA villages to have a governmental role over the lands conveyed under ANCSA, I would accord Venetie no such role. I would hold that neither the Tribal Government nor the Village Corporation is entitled to sovereign immunity.
Venetie argues that the Stevens Village court analyzed ANCSA for purposes of confirming that it does not confer federal recognition of tribal status where none existed prior to passage of the Act. Venetie contends that the court did not conclude that ANCSA revoked tribal status where it did exist prior to the Act. Venetie also claims that any sovereign immunity it may have can be waived only if it is clear from the unambiguous language of ANCSA and its legislative history that Congress intended such a waiver. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2112-13, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976) (a congressional determination to terminate an Indian reservation must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history); Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 167 (sovereign immunity of the Metlakatla Indian Community was waived only if the clear and unambiguous language of the statute and its legislative history show Congress intended such a waiver). Venetie contends that ANCSA is not sufficiently unambiguous to justify my conclusion today.
I recognize that certain federal authority exists for the proposition that ANCSA contains no expression of congressional intent to alter the tribal status of Alaska Indian villages.16 Nonetheless, I disagree with *1243this line of federal authority because I see no possible way to reconcile the spirit and the terms of ANCSA with concepts of tribal sovereignty in Alaska. As demonstrated above, many provisions of the Act are at outright odds with any finding of sovereignty. I therefore conclude that ANCSA constitutes an express indication of Congress’ will that, with the sole exception of the Metlakatla Indian Community, any sovereign status held by Alaska Native groups prior to 1971 be terminated.17

. The mere fact that an Alaska Native village is organized under the IRA is not evidence of tribal status, since portions of the IRA applicable to Alaska Natives allow Native entities that do not constitute tribes to organize pursuant to the IRA. See infra note 5 & accompanying text.

. Included in those powers are the power 1) "[t]o do all things for the common good which [the Village] has done or has had the right to do in the past and which are not against Federal law and such Territorial law as may apply," and 2) "[t]o control the use by members or nonmembers of any reserve set aside by the Federal Government for the Village and to keep order in the reserve.”

. After the initial passage of the IRA in 1934, § 16, but not § 17, was applicable to Alaska.

. The 1936 Act also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to designate Indian reservations in Alaska. Reservations were deemed necessary to protect the economic rights of Alaska Natives, as well as to delineate the geographical limits of Native communities' power of self-government under the IRA. See Report of the Governor's Task Force on Federal-State-Tribal Relations, at 109, 111-12 (Feb. 14, 1986); Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d 32, 40 (Alaska 1988).

.Venetie urges us to overrule this conclusion. It claims that it is impossible to reconcile the holding of Stevens Village with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.1990), rev'd on other grounds, Blatchford v. Native Village of *1237Noatak and Circle Village, 501 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991).
In Noatak, the Ninth Circuit identified three bases upon which a court may infer that a tribe has been "duly recognized” by the federal government for purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362. Id. at 1160. They are: (1) the existence of a village governing body approved by the Secretary of the Interior under § 16 of IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 476; (2) a village’s listing as a Native Village under ANC-SA, 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b)(1); and (3) on the basis of three recent statutes, the Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (1988), the Indian Financing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1452(c) (1988), and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1988). Id. See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. State of Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.1991) (relying upon Noatak to find that Venetie is a duly recognized tribe under § 1362). But see Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 456 F.Supp. 784, 797-98 (D. Alaska 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 646 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that ANCSA village and regional corporations are not duly recognized tribes or bands for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1362).
I read Noatak and Venetie as recognizing tribal status only for the limited purpose of establishing federal jurisdiction under § 1362. This conclusion is confirmed by the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.1992), which provides:
We have held that certain Alaska native villages constitute tribes for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988), which provides for federal jurisdiction over civil actions raising a federal question "brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior.” Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council, 944 F.2d at 551-52; Native Village of Noatak, 896 F.2d at 1160. However, we have not addressed the question whether any Alaskan native village constitutes an Indian tribe for the purpose of sovereign immunity.
See also Noatak, 896 F.2d at 1166-67 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit’s finding of federal recognition of tribal status for Villages reorganized under § 16 of IRA or listed as Native Villages under ANCSA therefore peacefully co-exists with our ruling in Stevens Village. As such, the Noatak and Venetie decisions have no impact on my decision today.

. The State’s pleadings in State of Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir.1988), which Nenana Fuel relies on to support its argument that the Village Corporation and Tribal Government are not sovereign entities, cast grave doubt on the Tribal Government’s assertions that it is an effective § 16 organization. In that case, the State of Alaska seeks to enjoin the Tribal Government from collecting a business activity tax levied on a contractor who built new school buildings in Venetie. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction which prohibits the Tribal Government from conducting further enforcement proceedings during the pendency of the case. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment on July 6, 1990.
In the State’s cross-motion, the State alleged that the Tribal Government does not have an IRA constitution, that the Tribal Government is not a traditional government since it only came into existence in 1976, and that the Tribal Government is essentially defunct as it has no assets other than paper title to land in the area. The State also raised a question as to the validity of the Tribal Government's title to the former reservation land since the ANCSA village corporations of Venetie and Arctic Village deeded the property to the Tribal Government before they received the patent to the land from the federal government.
Moreover, the state argued that since the land was the sole asset of the ANCSA corporations and the membership of the Tribal Government differs from that of the corporations, the trans*1238fer could be subject to attack as an illegal transfer of corporate assets.

. Justice Matthews discussed ANCSA’s termination of tribal sovereign immunity in Stevens Village, 757 P.2d at 41 n. 24:
One purpose served by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is to give special protection to Indian lands and money. Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d at 160. Congress, by granting Alaska Natives’ lands and money to state regulated corporations which are not exempt from suit, and without imposing significant restraints on the alienation of lands, has evidently concluded that the special protection of immunity was not necessary or desirable for the great bulk of Native property.

. The Department of Interior (DOI) came to a similar conclusion after the passage of ANCSA when it denied a petition from the Tribal Government to restore the former Venetie reservation to trust status. The DOI found that the election by Venetie and Arctic Village to take their former reservation in fee pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1618(b), while rendering the villages ineligible for certain other benefits provided by ANCSA, did not disassociate them from the Act's settlement of all Native claims. Rather, section § 1618 unequivocally expresses Congress’ intention to revoke all reservations except the Annette Island Reserve. DOI therefore concluded that the Act did not allow the Natives of Venetie the option of voting for continued trust status, but only allowed them to choose between two competing forms of compensation in settlement of their claims: participating in the regional corporate plan of the Act, or electing to opt-out of that scheme and take fee title to the former reservation land.

. See S.Rep. No. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1971):
[T]he assets granted in settlement of the claims will be, or will rapidly become, ordinary and unrestricted forms of property. Organizations established to implement the settlement will have a strictly limited life or will become ordinary public and private corporations operating without any special privileges or restrictions.

. ANCSA’s legislative history reveals Congress’ belief that recognition of Native Village corporations in place of the traditional unit in Native society, the village, maximized the local self-determination of Native groups while accomplishing the Act's goal of assimilating Natives into modern society. See Report of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, S.Rep. No. 405, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 132 (1971). Organization as a business corporation does not by any means end all Native control over their village affairs. To the contrary, ANCSA has liberally provided for the transfer of land and other assets to ensure that Natives are able to maintain local control over their affairs. That Act does, however, terminate any claim of tribal status.

. Notably, ANCSA offered no option to preserve the trust status of any reservation land, with the exception of the Annette Island Reserve occupied by the Metlakatlan Indian community. See 43 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988).

. Because ANCSA terminated the sovereignty of all Native groups in Alaska except the Metla-katlans, Venetie’s sovereign immunity has been extinguished regardless of whether title to Vene-tie’s land is held by its ANCSA village corporation or by the Tribal Government.

. The legislative history of 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) indicates that the reserves of certain Native groups, such as the Metlakatlans and the Tyo-nek Indians of the Moquawkie Reserve, were accorded special consideration before that provision was enacted. The Natives of Venetie apparently were not accorded this special consideration. See S.Rep. No. 405, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 44 (1971). The final ANCSA bill granted the Metlakatlans' request for an exemption from *1241revocation of their reservation. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1988).

. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly linked the concept of Indian sovereignty with that of reservations:
[The Indian sovereignty doctrine] has undergone considerable evolution in response to changed circumstances. As noted above, the doctrine has not been rigidly applied in cases where Indians have left the reservation and become assimilated into the general community. Similarly, notions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to take account of the State's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians_ Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Finally, the trend has been away from the idea of inherent sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal preemption, [footnote omitted] The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power.8 8 The extent of federal pre-emption and residual Indian sovereignty in the total absence of federal treaty obligations or legislation is therefore now something of a moot question.
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 262-63, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973) (citations omitted). See also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989) (implying that tribal jurisdiction ends beyond the boundaries of the reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1258-59, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) (identifying three situations in which a tribe can assert jurisdiction over a non-member: where the non-member was engaged in activities on reservation lands; where the non-member had consensually entered into a relationship with the tribe subjecting himself to tribal jurisdiction; or where the non-member was acting on fee lands within the reservation and those activities posed a direct threat to the health and welfare of the tribe).
In short, the Court increasingly looks to specific federal statutes or treaties granting tribal authority or limiting state authority when deciding Indian jurisdictional questions, instead of relying on the outdated notion of sovereign immunity. When analyzing the applicable federal law, the Court first looks to any authority establishing a reservation. This approach was particularly evident in the companion cases of Metla-katla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 82 S.Ct. 552, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962), and Organized Village of Kake, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962). Those cases arose from this court’s decision that the villages involved had no separate jurisdiction which would immunize them from state law prohibiting the use of fish traps. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961), partially rev'd, 369 U.S. 45, 82 S.Ct. 552, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962). The Supreme Court partially overruled this decision, holding that the reservation community of Metlakatla had separate authority derived from federal law as a result of its reservation, but that the non-reservation villages of Kake and An-goon possessed no such authority. Significantly, the Court affirmed that portion of our decision pertaining to Kake and Angoon, holding that the federal permits under which the Indians fished did not grant a right to be free of state regulation, and that the state has the power to regulate the off-reservation fishing by Indians.
The Department of the Interior has also recognized that only those Alaska Native communities which inhabit reservations are entitled to sovereign immunity. In its "Instructions for Organizing in Alaska under the Indian Reorganization Act as amended for Alaska," the Department of the Interior stated unequivocally that government powers are available to IRA councils only on reservations. Report of the Governor’s Task Force 113-15 (December 22, 1937).

. As Secretary Ickes stated in his letter to the House Committee on Indian Affairs accompanying § 2 of the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act: ‘‘[I]f native communities of Alaska are to set up systems of local government, it will be necessary to stipulate the geographical limits of their jurisdictions. Reservations set up by the Secretary of the Interior will accomplish this." H.R.Rep. No. 2447, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1936) (letter from Harold Ickes to Honorable Will Rogers), reprinted in Report of the Governor’s Task Force on Federal-State-Tribal Relations, at 112 (Feb. 14, 1986). See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557, 8 L.Ed. 483 *1242(1832) (Marshall, C.J.) (the "several Indian nations [constitute] distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive_") (emphasis added).

. See, e.g., Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, No. J84-024 Civ. (D. Alaska, Oct. 9, 1990); Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369 Civ., transcript of decision (D. Alaska, Dec. 3, •1986), rev'd on other grounds, 890 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Eric Smith & Mary Kance wick, The Tribal Status of Alaska Natives, 61 U.Colo.L.Rev. 455, 509 (1990) (arguing that ANCSA terminated only aboriginal title and all claims based on that title, and not tribal status). Cf. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.1990), rev'd on other grounds, Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991) (ANCSA constitutes congressional recognition of Native Villages as Indian tribes).
In Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 953 F.2d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.1992), opinion withdrawn, 957 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.1992), the Ninth Circuit held on remand from the United States Supreme Court that the Village of Tyonek was entitled to sovereign immunity from a claim that Tyonek Ordinance No. 4 violates the United States Constitution, the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That ordinance provides that "[a]ny white men except government men or outsider coming in is allow [sic] to stay only 24 hours." Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369 Civ., transcript of decision at 6 n. 2 (D. Alaska, Dec. 3, 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 883 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1989), opinion issued in 890 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion approximately two months after it was issued, partly because it was decided that "the present record fails to set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate that the Village is an Indian tribe in the political sense, and that the real property it owns is Indian country.” Tyonek, 957 F.2d at 634.
In its withdrawn opinion, the Ninth Circuit did not expressly consider the impact of ANCSA in Tyonek, for the court had affirmed that portion of the district court's decision holding that ANCSA did not terminate Tyonek’s sovereign immunity. The basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision that Tyonek was entitled to sovereign immunity was instead that Tyonek is “Indian country” under the test articulated in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991). That case stated that one test for determining whether land is Indian *1243country is "whether the area has been validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 111 S.Ct. at 910. In applying this test to the land which Tyonek received as a result of ANCSA, the court emphasized that "the mere fact that a tribe holds its land in fee simple does not prevent the land from having the status of Indian country.” 953 F.2d at 1183.
I find the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in the withdrawn Tyonek opinion unpersuasive for two reasons. First, I believe that the Tyonek court erroneously equated Indian country with sovereign immunity. Indian country, defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988), is a term used to define the special territory where Indians are governed primarily by tribal and federal law rather than state law. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 28 (R. Strickland ed.1982). While Indian country and sovereignty are often coterminous, they are not necessarily coterminous. See Stevens Village, 757 P.2d at 44 (Rabi-nowitz, CJ. dissenting) (stating that certain Alaska Native villages, which are not Indian country, might be entitled to sovereign immunity). In determining whether the Village of Tyo-nek was entitled to sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit should have examined whether the village’s inhabitants constituted a federally recognized tribe.
A second problem with the Tyonek decision is that, in determining that Tyonek was entitled to sovereign immunity, it unduly emphasized the fact that Tyonek held land in fee simple. The Supreme Court did the exact opposite in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992), where it expressly held that certain fee-patented reservation land allotted pursuant to the Dawes Act to the Yakima Tribe and its members is subject to Washington state ad valorem taxes. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that "when § 5 [of the Dawes Act] rendered the allotted lands alienable and encumberable, it also rendered them subject to assessment and forced sale for taxes.” Id. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 691.

. Nenana Fuel argues that Public Law 280 waived Venetie’s claim to jurisdiction over this dispute. Public Law 280 provides in relevant part:
Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian Country listed opposite the name of the State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State:
State of Indian country affected
Alaska .All Indian country within the State
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). This argument fails, for we have concluded that Public Law 280 was not intended by Congress to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 152-53. After an exhaustive review of the statute’s history, the Atkinson court recognized that the "primary intent of [the Act] was to grant jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state court.” Id. at 166 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 385, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2109, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976)).