Court Opinion

ID: 9944794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:38:32.425464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:08.260990
License: Public Domain

ON MOTIONS OF APPELLANT AND APPELLEE
The foregoing cause, heretofore reported in 141 So.2d 558, is again before this Court on two motions to correct the former judgment. The first motion was filed by appellants, including the sureties of the bond of the original defendants, asking that the judgment of this Court dismissing the appeal of Al Schultz and Bernice Schultz, sureties, be set aside, and that the final judgment in favor of the original defendants, be amended so as to include the sureties. The second motion was filed by appellee, requesting this Court to correct the final judgment so as to clearly indicate that Al Schultz and Bernice Schultz, sureties, were not intended to be released by the final judgment of this Court.
The untidy confusion, apparent on the face of the record, came about under the following circumstances. Will C. Hartwell Realty and Insurance Company, Inc. brought a suit against Edward R. Shoebridge, Dorothy M. Shoebridge, Leon Schultz and Helen E. Schultz, to collect an alleged broker's commission. A judgment was entered in the County Court in favor of plaintiff and against the four above-named defendants. Defendants appealed to the Circuit Court, and gave a supersedeas bond, with Al J. Schultz and Helen E. Schultz as sureties. The Circuit Court affirmed the judgment *Page 636 
of the County Court, and granted judgment against the original defendants and also against their sureties, Al and Helen Schultz. The case was then appealed to this Court by the original defendants. The sureties, Al and Helen Schultz, did not appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court, but again signed a supersedeas bond to the Supreme Court as sureties for the original defendants.
The appellee Realty and Insurance Company filed a motion in the Supreme Court setting out that the supersedeas bond was insufficient for the reason that there were no sureties as required by the statute, because only the parties named in the judgment of the Circuit Court were named in the bond and the case should be dismissed. This Court entered an order March 19, 1962, overruling the motion and allowing the substitution of a new bond. The original defendants and the two sureties filed a new bond, all signing as "principals" and two new sureties were secured on the new supersedeas bond. The appellee Realty and Insurance Company then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of the two sureties, Al and Bernice Schultz, because it is said they "did not attempt to appeal from the judgment as principals, but instead chose to act as sureties on the appeal bond of the other four appellants." It was therefore argued that since they did not appeal within the statutory ninety days, their appeal should be dismissed. This motion was submitted to another judge of this Court, and since no answer was filed, an order was entered on May 14, 1962, sustaining the motion to dismiss the appeal of the two sureties.
When the case was finally submitted for determination on the merits, this Court reversed the lower courts and rendered a judgment here in favor of defendants. The final judgment did not mention the order entered dismissing the appeal of the sureties. The holding of this Court is not clear, it would appear that although plaintiff *Page 637 
had no cause of action against the original defendants, nevertheless the sureties would be required to pay plaintiff the full amount of the judgment rendered in the Circuit Court. The injustice of such a conclusion is self-evident.
The fallacy of this reasoning becomes apparent, when we remember that sureties are not parties to a cause of action. (Hn2) They are bound by their contract to stand liable as sureties for the principal named in the bond, and it is not necessary to summon them on appeal to the Supreme Court. See Wilson v. City of Lexington, 153 Miss. 209, 119 So. 795.
(Hn 3) This Court has pointed out in the case of Jayne v. W.B. Nash Lumber Co., 108 Miss. 449, 66 So. 813, that where a judgment is rendered on a bond against a principal and his sureties thereon, the sureties become parties to the judgment and on appeal therefrom they cannot again act as sureties on the appeal bond, and said: "It is true that the sureties have not appealed from this judgment, neither are they necessary parties thereto; but nevertheless the supersedeas thereby obtained inures as much to their benefit as it does to that of appellant." See also 2 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, Sec. 240, p. 993.
This Court permitted the filing of a new supersedeas bond in the present case, and the sureties on the former bond in the lower court were not necessary parties on appeal, but as was said in the Nash case, supra: "* * * nevertheless the supersedeas thereby obtained inures as much to their benefit as it does to the appellant."
The motion of appellants to correct judgment — insofar as it applies to the final judgment of this Court dated May 28, 1962, and recorded in Minute Book BM at p. 492 — is sustained. The judgments entered in the County and Circuit Courts are reversed, and the judgment against appellants and Al J. Schultz and Helen E. Schultz as sureties on the supersedeas bond in the *Page 638 
Circuit Court from the judgment of the County Court is set aside and held for naught, and the appellee Will C. Hartwell Realty and Insurance Company, Inc. will be taxed with the cost of court.
The motion of the appellee Will C. Hartwell Realty and Insurance Company, Inc. to correct judgment will be, and is, overruled.
Appellants motion to correct judgment sustained; and appellee's motion to correct judgment overruled.
All Justices concur.