Court Opinion

ID: 9950794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:02:57.834208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:46.002570
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 P. v. Villescas CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B330018

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. VA044837)
         v.

ALBERTO VILLESCAS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph R. Porras, Judge. Affirmed.

     Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                               ******
        In 1998, Alberto Villescas (defendant) was convicted of two
counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (former Pen.
Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1))1 and sentenced to 26 years to life in
prison, calculated as a base sentence of 25 years to life under our
state’s “Three Strikes” law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds.
(b)-(j)) plus one additional year for having served a prior prison
sentence (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).2 In 2022, defendant filed a petition
pursuant to what is currently section 1172.75 asking the trial
court to (1) strike the one-year “prison prior” enhancement; and
(2) engage in a full resentencing, which would include potentially
dismissing one or two of the prior “strike” allegations.3 The trial
court granted defendant’s request to strike the one-year “prison

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2      We affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence on direct
appeal. (People v. Villescas (May 2, 2000, B129758) [nonpub.
opn.].)

3      Although defendant’s petition did not confer jurisdiction on
the trial court (because section 1172.75 proceedings must be
initiated by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
rather than by a defendant’s petition) (People v. Escobedo (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447-448; People v. Newell (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 265, 268), the Department’s subsequent act in
informing the trial court that defendant was “on the list” eligible
for relief under section 1172.75 conferred that jurisdiction (People
v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332-333).

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prior” enhancement, but declined defendant’s request for a full
resentencing. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred
in denying a full resentencing.
       We conclude that there was no error.
       Section 1172.75 expressly provides that a trial court “shall
recall [a defendant’s] sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§
1172.75, subd. (c).) This “requires a full resentencing” (People v.
Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402), one in which the trial
court may reconsider all of its prior sentencing decisions as well
as “‘modify every aspect of the sentence,’” including in light of
“postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
[defendant’s] disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation . . .
while incarcerated” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3); People v. Coddington
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 568; see generally People v. Buycks
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893-894 [describing the “full resentencing
rule”]). A defendant’s prison record is an important part of any
resentencing because it provides highly relevant insight into the
“defendant’s risk for future violence” and whether “continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice,” factors that
section 1172.75 specifies are to be part of any resentencing (§
1172.75, subd. (d)(3)).
       Although defendant—while representing himself after
waiving his right to counsel—repeatedly asked for a full
resentencing, he simultaneously and steadfastly asked the trial
court not to consider his prison disciplinary record, going so far as
to “mo[ve] to suppress” that record on the ground that “most” of
the discipline in that record was inaccurate because the hearing
officers were biased, because the allegations were “false,” and
because none of the disciplinary findings were made beyond a
reasonable doubt. Defendant nevertheless asked the trial court

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to consider evidence of his positive progress while incarcerated.
The trial court succinctly summed up defendant’s position: “So
you want the court to consider the good stuff because that’s
accurate but not the bad stuff because that’s inaccurate?” When
the trial court eventually asked defendant, point blank, if he
wanted the court to consider his prison record, defendant replied
he did not; the court thereafter declined to resentence defendant
because it lacked “the requisite information” on defendant’s
postconviction conduct to meaningfully conduct the type of full
resentencing called for by the plain language of section 1172.75.
       The trial court did not err. Section 1172.75 entitles a
defendant to a full resentencing; it does not entitle him to a
myopic resentencing, where he is permitted to present only
favorable information while concealing unfavorable information
from the court’s view. In other contexts, litigants who seek to
have their cake and eat it too are deemed to have waived their
right to have cake. (See, e.g., Vesco v. Superior Court (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 275, 279; Guess?, Inc. v. Superior Court (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 553, 555; see generally People v. Concepcion (2008)
45 Cal.4th 77, 82 [“Waiver may be express or implied,” including
by a litigant’s conduct].) This precept applies here. The trial
court expressly gave defendant a choice: Allow the court to
consider the full prison record and have a full resentencing on the
basis of that record, or continue to insist that the court ignore the
negative parts of that record and forego a full resentencing
because there is no such thing as a myopic resentencing.
Defendant chose the latter, and he is stuck with that choice now.
       On appeal, defendant argues that the court should have
ruled on his motion to suppress “and then, regardless of that
ruling, proceeded with a full resentencing.” We frankly do not

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understand what this means. Is defendant suggesting that the
court should have granted his motion to suppress and ignored the
discipline in defendant’s record in order to engage in a myopic
resentencing? Or is he suggesting that the court should have
denied his own suppression motion and engaged in a full
resentencing notwithstanding defendant’s strident and crystal
clear position that the disciplinary record be ignored? Or is he
suggesting that the trial court should have simply made a ruling
and then, “regardless of that ruling,” done whatever it wanted
regarding the resentencing? In our view, none of these
suggestions is supported by the law or the record.
                          DISPOSITION
      We accordingly affirm the trial court’s order striking the
one-year prison prior enhancement without engaging in a full
resentencing.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                    ______________________, J.
                                    HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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