Court Opinion

ID: 9587582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:23:54.726851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:51.338335
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
BURNS, C.J.
Upon consideration/reconsideration of the precedent supporting it, I disagree with the second paragraph of section I of the majority opinion.
That paragraph states that the abuse of discretion standard of appellate review applies when reviewing the trial court’s decision on a motion to set aside a default entry or a default judgment. In my view, the abuse of *422discretion standard of appellate review is not appropriate in this context because the trial court has no discretion.
Initially, the trial court finds the relevant facts. The standard of appellate review applicable to such findings of fact is the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Sujohn, 5 Haw. App. 459, 697 P.2d 1143 (1985).
What facts are relevant? As indicated in the majority opinion, the controlling precedent is as follows:
In general, a motion to set aside a default entry or a default judgment may and should be granted whenever the court [decides] (1) that the nondefaulting party will not be prejudiced by the reopening, (2) that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, and (3) that the default was not the result of inexcusable neglect or a wilful act. The mere fact that the nondefaulting party will be required to prove his[/her/its] case without the inhibiting effect of the default upon the defaulting party does not constitute prejudice which should prevent a reopening.
BDM, Inc. v. Sageco, Inc., 57 Haw. 73, 77, 549 P.2d 1147, 1150 (1976) (citations omitted).
Therefore, based on the relevant and valid findings of fact, the trial court decides whether (1) the nondefaulting party will not be prejudiced by the reopening, (2) the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, and (3) the default was not the result of inexcusable neglect or a wilful act.
The answers to questions (1) and (2) are conclusions of law because there is only one right answer to each of them. The standard of appellate review applicable to conclusions of law is the right/wrong standard. Concerning question (3), the answer to the sub-question of inexcusable neglect *423is a conclusion of law and the answer to the sub-question of wilful act is a finding of fact.
BDM, Inc.’s use of the words “[i]n general” and “may and should” suggests some trial court discretion. However, neither the right/wrong standard of appellate review nor the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review involves discretion. In other words, if the valid answers to questions (1), (2), and (3) are yes, the trial court would reversibly err if it denied the motion. If the answer to question (1), (2), or (3) is no, the trial court would reversibly err if it granted the motion. Therefore, the trial court does not have any discretion.