Court Opinion

ID: 9900488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:23:49.315883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.379395
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                        CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                        E-filed: Nov 02 2023 05:10PM
                                                        Clerk Review: Nov 02 2023 05:10PM
                                                        Filing ID: 71294684
                                                        Case No.: 2022-SCC-0011-CIV
                                                        Judy Aldan

                           IN THE
                    Supreme Court
                           OF THE

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CONCEPCION FAISAO TUDELA,

                          Deceased.

          Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0011-CIV

            ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

                     Cite as: 2023 MP 11

                  Decided November 2, 2023

            CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
            ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
              ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS

          Superior Court Civil Action No. 20-0116-CV
         Associate Judge Joseph N. Camacho, Presiding
                            In re Estate of Tudela, 2023 MP 11

CASTRO, C.J.:
¶1      This appeal arises from probate proceedings of the Estate of Concepcion
 Faisao Tudela. Pro se Appellant Ivan-Rufo Faisao Tudela (“Tudela”), son of the
 decedent and named heir in her will, appeals the trial court’s order denying his
 objection to remove the administrator, Appellee Herman Sablan (“Sablan”), and
 the estate’s attorney, Anthony Aguon (“Aguon”).
¶2      Sablan moves to dismiss on the basis that we lack jurisdiction over this
 appeal. He also argues that the appeal is frivolous and requests sanctions
 awarding him his costs and attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we DENY
 the Motion to Dismiss. The appeal is not frivolous, and we decline to impose
 sanctions against Tudela.
                      I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3      Milne, Inc., the decedent’s lessee, petitioned to admit the decedent’s will
 in probate and to appoint a company representative as an executrix because
 individuals nominated in the will were residing outside the Commonwealth and
 unavailable. The court instead appointed one of the decedent’s sons, Rufino
 Edward Faisao Tudela (“Rufino”), conditional upon his finding an attorney to
 represent the Estate. When he did not secure counsel, the court removed him and
 appointed Teresita DeLeon Guerrero (“Guerrero”) as administratrix.
¶4     After an evidentiary hearing in August 2020, the court issued an order
 denying Tudela’s contest to the validity of the decedent’s will. Appellee’s Ex. B.
 Tudela failed to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of this order. See NMI
 SUP. CT. R. 4(a)(1). 1
¶5     In 2022, Guerrero withdrew as administratrix. Mar. 31, 2022 Hr’g Tr. at
 25–26. “To avoid the Probate Action being ‘rudderless’,” the court appointed
 Sablan as administrator. In re Estate of Tudela, No. 20-0116 (NMI Super. Ct.
 Apr. 5, 2022) (Minute Order at 3). The court ordered that:
         Any objection to Mr. Sablan’s appointment shall be filed within 10
         days of this Order otherwise the appointment shall be permanent.
         Unsupported allegations and personal attacks are not grounds for
         Mr. Sablan’s removal. If necessary, the Court may set a hearing to
         take up objections, or may decide the matter based on the filings, if
         any.
         Id.

1
    Tudela appears to reassert challenges to the validity of the will. See, e.g., “Docketing
    Statement of Declaration” at 4 (July 18, 2022) (“By far not to compare to what this fake
    Will made in coercion and fraud with intent to commit.”) (emphasis removed). Because
    Tudela failed to timely file a notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction to hear challenges
    under that order. See ANZ Guam, Inc. v. Lizama, 2014 MP 11 ¶ 10 (stating that the
    Court must address jurisdictional issues before considering the merits of an appeal).
                            In re Estate of Tudela, 2023 MP 11

¶6      Tudela timely objected to Sablan’s appointment and Aguon’s role as
 counsel for the estate. 2 After reviewing the objections, the court found “no legal
 or factual grounds . . . that warrant[] the removal of Mr. Herman Sablan as well
 as Attorney Anthony Aguon.” In re Estate of Tudela, No. 20-0116 (NMI Super.
 Ct. Apr. 19, 2022) (Order Finding No Grounds for Removal of Administrator
 Sablan and Attorney Aguon at 2) (“April 19 Order”). The court determined that
 both Sablan and Aguon would continue in their respective roles. Id. Tudela
 timely appeals.
¶7     Tudela submitted his opening brief on January 3, 2023. 3 On February 2,
 2023, Sablan moved for dismissal and sanctions under NMI Supreme Court Rule
 38. We suspended the briefing schedule pending the disposition of the motion to
 dismiss.
                                  II. JURISDICTION
¶8      We have jurisdiction to hear final judgments and orders of the
 Commonwealth Superior Court. NMI CONST. art. IV, § 3. See Commonwealth v.
 Hasinto, 1 NMI 377, 381–85. We also have jurisdiction over orders or refusals
 to grant or revoke letters testamentary or of administration under 8 CMC § 2206.
                                 III. DISCUSSION
¶9      Sablan moves to dismiss Tudela’s appeal, arguing that we lack jurisdiction
 because the April 19 Order is not a final order, nor is it appealable under 8 CMC
 § 2206. Appellee’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3. He also argues that the appeal is
 frivolous and requests that we sanction Tudela under NMI Supreme Court Rule
 38. We first address whether the order is final for purposes of appellate
 jurisdiction and whether it is appealable under Section 2206. We then consider
 whether the appeal is frivolous or warrants sanctions.
                       A. Whether the April 19 Order is Final.
¶ 10     A final judgment or order is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and
  leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Chan v. Chan, 2003

2
    Tudela expressed concerns regarding Sablan’s appointment and alleged, again, that the
    decedent’s will was invalid. He accused Aguon and other individuals of fraudulent
    behavior towards the estate. In particular, Tudela alleged that Sablan may not “act in
    the best interests of beneficiaries” and that his “relationship with Milnes and Mr. Juan
    Tudela Lizama will be biased.” In re Estate of Tudela, No. 20-0116 (NMI Super. Ct.
    Apr. 12, 2022) (Tudela’s Opposition at 2). Additionally, Tudela accused Aguon of
    refusing to communicate with the decedent’s family, withholding funeral expenses, and
    forging the executrix’s signature. Id. Tudela also accused the decedent’s daughter of
    intending to defraud the heirs and beneficiaries, and Milne, Inc. of using the probate
    action to cover up missing payments owed to the decedent. Id.
3
    Prior to filing his brief, Tudela submitted numerous pleadings before this Court,
    including a “Motion to Consider the Notice of Appeal,” a “Motion on Grounds for
    Judgment to be Set Aside,” a “Motion to Consider,” and a writ of certiorari, all of which
    have been denied. A status conference was also held, after which we granted Tudela
    leave to file a certified transcript.
                         In re Estate of Tudela, 2023 MP 11

 MP 5 ¶ 13 (quoting Tanki v. S.N.E. Saipan Co., 4 NMI 69, 70 (1993)). Here, the
 April 19 Order is not final—the order merely rejects Tudela’s repeated
 objections. The order states:
          The unsupported allegations as alleged by Ivan Rufo Faisao
          Tudela’s Response lacks any supporting documents. The
          allegations of misconduct, theft, life, deceive, etc. many of these
          has been raised and addressed at the beginning of probate.
          April 19 Order at 1.
 The order also specifies that Sablan and Aguon “shall continue” as administrator
 and attorney. Id. at 2. Furthermore, the order does not determine the administrator
 fee, as that “will be addressed at the Final Distribution of the probate.” Id. at 1.
 Use of the language indicating a continuation of the litigation and reference to
 future proceedings is inconsistent with any determination that the order is final.
 In effect, the order is interlocutory in nature and fails to meet the requirements
 of a final order.
     B. Whether a Denial to Remove the Administrator or Estate Attorney is an
                          Appealable Interlocutory Order.
¶ 11     We next ask whether the April 19 Order is appealable under 8 CMC §
  2206. Sablan contends that the order “does not grant or revoke any letters
  testamentary or of administration or fall under any of the other” exceptions to the
  final judgment rule in probate cases. Appellee’s Mot. To Dismiss at 3.
  Specifically, he asserts that Section 2206 fails to “provide an exception for
  appealing an order that overrules an heir’s objections.” Id.
¶ 12    Generally, an interlocutory order is not appealable “unless expressly
  permitted by statute, rule, constitutional provision or other recognized common
  law doctrine.” Friends of Marpi, 2012 MP 9 ¶ 1. For interlocutory appeals of
  probate matters, we are guided by 8 CMC § 2206. When interpreting a statute,
  “we give the statute its plain language, where the meaning is clear and
  unambiguous.” Aurelio v. Camacho, 2012 MP 21 ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks
  omitted). “Only when such statutory language is unclear will the Court’s analysis
  venture outside the plain wording of the statute.” Oden v. N. Marianas Coll.,
  2003 MP 13 ¶ 10
¶ 13     Appellee correctly notes that an order refusing to remove counsel from
  representing an estate is not enumerated in Section 2206. However, the same is
  not true for an order refusing to remove an administrator or executor. The statute
  is clear: “[a]n appeal may be taken from an order granting or revoking letters
  testamentary or of administration,” including from an order “refusing to make
  any order mentioned in this section.” 8 CMC § 2206 (emphasis added). The
  court’s order found “no legal or factual grounds” warranting Sablan’s removal.
  April 19 Order at 2. By denying Tudela’s objections, the court refused to revoke
  Sablan’s appointment, making the order appealable under Section 2206.
¶ 14     We reached a similar conclusion in Malite v. Tudela, et al., 2007 MP 3. In
  that case, we found jurisdiction under Section 2206, holding that the court’s
                             In re Estate of Tudela, 2023 MP 11

    refusal to issue a temporary restraining order disgorging attorney’s fees was an
    appeal taken from the refusal of an order “directing or allowing the payment of
    a debt, claim, legacy, or attorney’s fee” as defined under the statute. Id. ¶ 12
    (quoting 8 CMC § 2206). In effect, the order “amounted to a payment of an estate
    claim, or in the alternative a refusal to make an order” Id. (emphasis added).
    Although the order in question relates to the revocation of a letter of
    administration rather than the payment of a claim, in both cases the refused order
    is among those listed in Section 2206, making the decision appealable. We,
    therefore, reject the claim that the order is outside the scope of Section 2206. An
    order refusing to remove an administrator or executor is appealable.
                C. Whether Tudela’s Appeal is Frivolous as Filed.
¶ 15 Sablan next argues that the appeal is frivolously filed because it is both
  devoid of factual and legal arguments and concerns an order he alleges is not
  appealable. He also moves to sanction Tudela for the same reasons. We first
  address whether the appeal is frivolous before turning to whether sanctions are
  warranted.
¶ 16     Relevant to this motion, an appeal can be deemed frivolous if either “a
  court lacks jurisdiction” or it presents “no justiciable question.” Commonwealth
  v. Sablan, 2016 MP 12 ¶ 7 (citing Beachboard v. United States, 727 F.2d 1092,
  1094–95 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); Commonwealth v. Kawai, 1 NMI 66, 72 n.4 (1990).
  The order that Tudela appeals is subject to our jurisdiction under Section 2206.
  Therefore, the appeal is not frivolous on jurisdictional grounds.
¶ 17      However, whether Tudela’s various submissions to this Court, including
  his opening brief, present a justiciable question requires some discussion. An
  appeal lacking a justiciable question is frivolous if it “is readily recognizable as
  devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed.” Kawai, 1
  NMI at 72 n.4 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 601 (5th ed. 1979)). Although
  on its face the appeal presents a justiciable question—whether the trial court
  should have revoked Sablan’s appointment—Tudela’s opening brief is devoid of
  merit and fails to raise any articulable legal or factual argument.4 Substantively,
  at this juncture, Tudela’s appeal is meritless.

4
     Despite this Court’s best efforts, Tudela’s submissions in support of his appeal are, at
     best, difficult to understand, and at worst, incoherent and immaterial. Compare “The
     self-portrait of power of a person’s life of its totalitarian management of the conditions
     of existence from Anthony H[sic] Aguon, Estate Attorney and Herman P[sic] Sablan,
     recently appointed Executor including the names and unnamed Investigator[sic]
     involved of its holdings communication of reasons ‘conflict of interest.”’ In Opposition
     to Appellees’ Motion at 2, with “That exposes many of the injustices of inheritance law
     as well as in its customary law of bloodline of its practice against culture by novel of
     their oral traditions by contrasts of its purpose based on the ‘Inheritance Law In
     Uganda: The Plight of Widows and Children.’” Id. at 10. The Court cannot aid appellant
     nor respond to unintelligible arguments. See, e.g., Clayton v. Trotter, 796 P.2d 262, 266
     (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (finding an appellant’s arguments unascertainable even though
     the court reviewed the complaint to the best of its ability).
                             In re Estate of Tudela, 2023 MP 11

¶ 18     Because we have not addressed whether lack of merit is sufficient reason
  to find an appeal frivolous under Rule 38, we look to federal caselaw for
  guidance. 5 The Fifth Circuit, for example, has held that while “an appeal that
  lacks merit is not always—or often—frivolous[,]” sanctions can be imposed for
  sufficiently meritless appeals. Crain v. Comm’r, 737 F.2d 1417, 1418 (5th Cir.
  1984). In Crain, the appellant challenged the Tax Court’s constitutionality,
  authority, and jurisdiction over his claim to levy taxes against his income. Id. at
  1417. The appellee sought sanctions under 26 U.S.C. § 6673 and Rule 38. Id. at
  1418. After rejecting the appellant’s argument, the court was then tasked with
  determining whether the appeal was frivolous. It found that while the appeal was
  not frivolous, “[i]t [was] a hodgepodge of unsupported assertions, irrelevant
  platitudes, and legalistic gibberish. The government should not have been put to
  the trouble of responding to such spurious arguments, nor this court to the trouble
  of “adjudicating” this meritless appeal.” Id. The court granted appellee’s request
  for sanctions, which included double costs of the appellant’s appeal and an
  additional damage award of $2,000. Id.
¶ 19      The Ninth Circuit has found that an “appeal is frivolous if the results are
  obvious or the arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Tuli v. Charter Pac.
  Bank (In re Tuli), 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1909 at *4–5 (9th Cir. 1994); Erde v.
  Bodnar (In re Westwood Plaza N.), 886 F.3d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 2018); see also
  Jaworski v. Master Hand Contractors, Inc., 882 F.3d 686, 691 (7th Cir. 2018)
  (explaining that an appeal is frivolous if its arguments are merely cursory, wholly
  undeveloped, or simply reasserting previously rejected facts) (citations omitted);
  Berwick Grain Co. v. Illinois Dept. of Agric., 217 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2000)
  (finding that an appeal is frivolous if it rehashes positions the trial court rejected
  or when the present arguments lack substance and are “foreordained” to lose)
  (citations omitted).
¶ 20      Tudela’s appeal, at this juncture, is clearly without merit—it contains an
  illustrious array of unsupported accusations against Sablan and Aguon and points
  to no factual or legal basis to justify reversing the trial court’s order. While we
  recognize the challenges pro se litigants encounter as they navigate a legal system
  on their own, “[t]heir pro se status does not excuse failure to comply with our
  Rules.” Villagomez v. Sablan, 4 NMI 396, 398 (1996). Tudela’s opening brief
  fails to comply in both form and substance with the standard of appellate briefs
  before this Court. Despite the lack of merit exhibited to date in this appeal, we
  must weigh heavily the fact that Tudela’s argument presents a justiciable
  question beneath the personal attacks against Appellees, rambling arguments,
  and non-sequiturs. While this appeal borders on frivolous, the deficiencies in the
  opening brief and various other motions are not incurable, and could be corrected

5
    See Commonwealth v. Palacios, 2003 MP 6 ¶ 9 (stating that when a Commonwealth
    rule is substantially similar to a federal rule, consulting the interpretation of the federal
    counterpart is appropriate). Compare FED R. APP. P. 38 with NMI SUP. CT. R. 38.
                            In re Estate of Tudela, 2023 MP 11

    by diligent research and genuine argument. At this early stage in the briefing
    schedule, we decline to find that the appeal is wholly frivolous.
                                    D. Sanctions.
¶ 21     Because we find the appeal not frivolous, the request to sanction Tudela
  under Rule 38 must be denied. However, Rule 38 is not the only avenue by which
  a party before this Court may be sanctioned. Our Rules put parties on notice that
  they may be sanctioned for “unreasonably and vexatiously increasing litigation
  costs by including unnecessary and duplicative materials in the appendices,”
  NMI SUP. CT. R. 30(b)(3); or for filing a brief “not in substantial conformity”
  with our Rules. NMI SUP. CT. R. 32(i). In fact, non-compliance with any of our
  Rules may lead to sanctions if we deem them appropriate. NMI SUP. CT. R.
  45-1(c)(2).
¶ 22     This Court has never imposed sanctions against a pro se appellant. 6 The
  closest we have come to doing so occurred in Palacios v. Yumul, 2012 MP 14. In
  that case, the appellant “use[d] much of his petition to express his frustration over
  the Court’s ultimate conclusion” and the petition “lacked any persuasive legal
  argument, which raise[d] the issue of sanctions.” Id. ¶ 11. We also considered
  sanctioning the appellant because “[t]he writing style . . . appear[ed] to indicate
  the handicraft of a lawyer.” Id. at ¶ 11 n.3. Ultimately, we declined to impose
  sanctions “because he raise[d], though in a conclusory manner, one colorable
  argument about transcripts.” Id. at ¶ 11. Here, Tudela’s submissions have
  repeated his frustrations over the decision to appoint Sablan and retain Aguon as
  the estate’s counsel. Time and again, Tudela has raised the same unsubstantiated
  claims of fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation against Appellees and former
  attorneys who participated in these probate proceedings. 7 Unlike Palacios,
  Tudela has failed to present any factual or legal argument in support of his appeal.
¶ 23    Because we have found that his appeal is not frivolous and have never
  before sanctioned a pro se appellant, we will allow Tudela one last chance to
  present written arguments before this Court in his reply brief. Further personal

6
     At worst, we have admonished a pro se appellant by dismissing their appeal for failure
     to comply with procedure. Villagomez, 4 NMI at 398–99 (dismissing the case after pro
     se appellants repeatedly failed to produce a certified transcript despite receiving
     numerous opportunities to cure past failures).
7
     See, e.g., “To continue on false misrepresentation, purposefully, knowingly failing to
     disclose a material fact committing a fraudulent practice “through fraudulent means”
     working on behalf of Mr[sic] Juan Tudela Lizama, an attorney at law, who chose
     Herman P[sic] Sablan to be the Executor . . . .” Motion to Consider for Summary
     Judgment or Disposition of Appellee’s Claim To Rule 38 Frivolous Appeal-Damages
     And Cost, Pursuant to Rule31-1(a)(1)(A)(i) at 4; “Mr[sic] Aguon for misappropriating
     and converting someone else’s money, goods, or any other personal property by
     definition the Estate funds . . . Herman P Sablan . . . [t]o continue on false
     misrepresentation, purposefully, knowingly failing to disclose a material fact
     committing a fraudulent practice . . . .” In Opposition to Appellee’s Request Of A
     Motion For An Automatic Extension Of Time at 2.
                            In re Estate of Tudela, 2023 MP 11

 attacks directed towards Sablan, Aguon, or any other individual will be grounds
 for sanctions and a finding that his appeal is frivolous, or grounds for dismissal.
 See Villagomez, 4 NMI at 398–99.
                                  IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 24     For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Sablan’s motion to dismiss. We have
  jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Section 2206. The appeal is not frivolous
  because it presents a justiciable question on its face. We decline to sanction
  Tudela, allowing him to submit a written reply brief in conformance with our
  Rules. The stay on the briefing schedule in the underlying appeal is hereby lifted.
  Sablan shall have thirty days from the date of this order to submit his response
  brief.

         SO ORDERED this 2nd day of November, 2023.

/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice

 /s/
JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
Associate Justice

/s/
PERRY B. INOS
Associate Justice

                                         COUNSEL

Ivan-Rufo Faisao Tudela, Pro Se Plaintiff-Appellant.

Anthony H. Aguon, Saipan, MP, for Defendant-Appellee.

                                          NOTICE
This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any
event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication,
the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715,
fax (670) 236–9702, e–mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.