Court Opinion

ID: 9965245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 21:01:29.184514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:49.380839
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10853    Document: 18-1      Date Filed: 05/01/2024   Page: 1 of 11

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10853
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        JENNIFER COVEL,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMUNITY PHYSICIANS OF NORTH PORT, P.A.,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02021-MSS-MRM
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10853

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Jennifer Covel, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
        order dismissing her complaint alleging retaliation by her former
        employer, Community Physicians of North Port, P.A. (“CPNP”) in
        violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
        § 12203(a).
               Ms. Covel asserts that she successfully pled all elements of
        an ADA retaliation claim. She also argues that the district court
        erred in concluding that her belief in the illegality of CPNP’s work-
        place COVID-19 policy was objectively unreasonable for three rea-
        sons. First, she contends—with respect to the promulgated stand-
        ard for ADA retaliation claims—that the objective reasonableness
        of her belief is not the correct standard for pro se litigants. Second,
        she maintains that CPNP’s policy was unreasonable because courts
        have not unanimously upheld mask mandates. Third, she argues
        that her belief in the policy’s illegality was objectively reasonable
        because the policy directly contravened the ADA’s prohibition on
        mandatory medical exams and inquiries.
              Because we ﬁnd no merit in Ms. Covel’s arguments, we af-
        ﬁrm the district court’s order of dismissal. We address each argu-
        ment below.
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        23-10853                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

                                                I*
            During the height of the global COVID-19 (“Covid”) pandemic
        in June of 2020, one of CPNP’s doctors, Dr. Juan Masi, tested posi-
        tive for Covid and caused the office to close for a week. Soon there-
        after, CPNP adopted a mask policy requiring its office staff to wear
        masks, test for Covid, quarantine where necessary, take their tem-
        perature, and disclose their temperature and test results. The policy
        applied to all employees at CPNP. Under this policy, employees
        were categorized as being either “masked” or “unmasked.”
            Ms. Covel worked at CPNP as a medical billing assistant and
        often assisted the front desk with certain tasks. Upon implementa-
        tion of the Covid mask policy, Ms. Covel refused to wear a mask
        because she felt CPNP’s policy regarded her—as an employee—as
        disabled. Ms. Covel alleged that CPNP wrongfully imposed the
        policy on all employees without conducting “individualized medi-
        cal assessments” of each employee’s health. She further alleged
        there was no statute in effect at the time that authorized the policy.
        To Ms. Covel, compliance with CPNP’s policy was voluntary.
            On July 22, 2020, Dr. Masi observed Ms. Covel working in the
        office without a mask. He warned her that she was required to
        mask and that failure to do so put her at risk of being terminated
        from her position. Ms. Covel explained she had a condition that

        * Because this is an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(c) dismissal, we accept as true the
        factual allegations in Ms. Covel’s operative complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
        Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10853

        prevented her from complying with the mask policy. A few weeks
        later, she offered to work from home as an alternative to comply-
        ing with the mask policy. In response, CPNP agreed to provide cer-
        tain accommodations that would allow Ms. Covel to continue
        working in the office without having to wear a mask.
            In September of 2020, Ms. Covel called in sick and was asked to
        quarantine for a period pursuant to the policy. When she returned
        to the office on September 21, 2020, Ms. Covel found that CPNP
        had implemented certain accommodations for her to continue
        working while unmasked. Specifically, CPNP moved Ms. Covel’s
        desk and work area from the main area of the office to an isolated
        portion of the office. CPNP also altered Ms. Covel’s work respon-
        sibilities such that she was no longer tasked with assisting in the
        front office or delivering inter-office mail.
            Ms. Covel alleged that CPNP made an announcement to its en-
        tire office disclosing these accommodations and portraying her as
        a direct threat to her coworkers. Ms. Covel further alleged that, in
        response to her objection to the mask policy and CPNP’s accom-
        modations, CPNP publicly listed her job position on Zip Recruiter,
        a job recruitment site; refused to allow her to work overtime,
        weekend shifts, or cover shifts for other co-workers; and refused
        her access to a career-building seminar.
            On November 13, 2020, Ms. Covel met with Dr. Masi and asked
        for help correcting what she felt had become a hostile work envi-
        ronment. During the meeting Ms. Covel told Dr. Masi that she was
        aware of CPNP’s plans to terminate her because of the job posting
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        23-10853               Opinion of the Court                        5

        on Zip Recruiter. She explained how she could no longer supple-
        ment her income by working weekends and overtime as she had
        done in the past, and how she felt her opportunities for advance-
        ment were adversely affected because of the accommodations she
        received.
            On December 6, 2020, Ms. Covel filed a charge with the Equal
        Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Two days
        later, Ms. Covel resigned from her position at CPNP.
                                         II
              In May of 2021, Ms. Covel received her right to sue letter
        from the EEOC. She filed suit in August of 2021, alleging that
        CPNP, by way of its Covid mask policy, regarded her as disabled
        and retaliated against her.
               Ms. Covel amended her complaint, asserting claims for in-
        tentional discrimination, retaliation, and constructive termination
        under the ADA. The district court granted in part CPNP’s motion
        to dismiss Ms. Covel’s first amended complaint, dismissing with
        prejudice her ADA discrimination and constructive termination
        charges, and dismissing without prejudice her retaliation claim.
                Ms. Covel then filed a second amended complaint, alleging
        retaliation under the ADA. CPNP moved to dismiss the retaliation
        claim. CPNP argued that Ms. Covel failed to allege a specific disa-
        bility, as well as the form of protected activity she engaged in with
        respect to requirements for establishing a prima facie case of retal-
        iation under the ADA.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10853

                Ms. Covel responded to CPNP’s motion to dismiss, stating
        she was proceeding under the “regarded as” disabled prong under
        the ADA. In her response, Ms. Covel argued that she had suffi-
        ciently pled this prong because CPNP’s masking policy assumed all
        employees suddenly acquired the same disability—the possibility
        of becoming infected with Covid. She further asserted that her be-
        lief in the policy’s unlawfulness was reasonable because the policy
        violated EEOC regulations providing a right to be free from medi-
        cal examinations or disability-related injuries. Finally, Ms. Covel
        maintained that but-for causation was satisfied because she would
        not have objected to the policy had it not existed.
                The district court granted CPNP’s motion to dismiss on the
        ground that Ms. Covel failed to allege that she had a good faith ba-
        sis for believing that CPNP’s Covid mask policy was unlawful. Ms.
        Covel timely appealed.
                                          III
               We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion
        to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting
        the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the
        light most favorable to the plaintiﬀ. See Castro v. Sec’y of Homeland
        Sec., 472 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006). To survive a motion to
        dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint need plead only
        enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
        See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560–64. “A claim is facially plausible when
        the plaintiﬀ pleads suﬃcient facts to allow the court to draw the
        reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged
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        23-10853               Opinion of the Court                          7

        misconduct.” Boyle v. City of Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir.
        2017). Pleadings by pro se litigants like Ms. Covel are liberally con-
        strued. See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
                                          IV
             On appeal, Ms. Covel argues that she successfully pled all el-
        ements of her claim for retaliation under the ADA. We disagree.
               The ADA prohibits retaliation against “any individual be-
        cause such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlaw-
        ful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge . . . un-
        der [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). We apply the same standard
        to retaliation claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
        of 1964 and those brought under the ADA. See Stewart v. Happy Her-
        man’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997). A
        plaintiﬀ may establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing
        she (1) engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) suﬀered an ad-
        verse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally
        related to the protected expression. See id. Once a plaintiﬀ estab-
        lishes a prima facie case, “the burden then shifts to the defendant
        employer to come forward with legitimate non-discriminatory rea-
        sons for its actions that negate the inference of retaliation.” Id. If
        the employer does this, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiﬀ
        to establish “that the employer’s proﬀered non-discriminatory rea-
        sons are a pretextual ruse designed to mask retaliation.” Id.
                Under the ﬁrst prong of the retaliation analysis, a plaintiﬀ
        must demonstrate that he or she engaged in statutorily protected
        activity. For expression to be statutorily protected, “[a] plaintiﬀ
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10853

        must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) be-
        lieved that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment
        practices, but also that his belief was objectively reasonable in light
        of the facts and record presented.” Little v. United Techs., Carrier
        Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997). Importantly,
        “[w]here binding precedent squarely holds that particular conduct
        is not an unlawful employment practice by the employer . . . an
        employee’s contrary belief that the practice is unlawful is unrea-
        sonable.” Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir.
        2009).
               Ms. Covel ﬁrst argues that whether her belief in the policy’s
        unlawfulness was objectively reasonable is not the correct inquiry
        because she is a pro se litigant. But the well-settled standard for an
        ADA retaliation claim “has both a subjective and objective compo-
        nent.” Little, 103 F.3d at 960 (explaining that it is “not enough for a
        plaintiﬀ to allege that his belief in this regard was honest and bona
        ﬁde; the allegations and record must also indicate that the belief,
        though perhaps mistaken, was objectively reasonable”). And
        though we read pro se ﬁlings liberally, we do not change or alter
        substantive legal standards for pro se litigants.
               Ms. Covel next asserts that her refusal to wear a mask pur-
        suant to CPNP’s policy constitutes protected activity because she
        believed the policy was illegal. She challenges the legality of the
        policy on two grounds: ﬁrst, CPNP’s Covid mask policy was unrea-
        sonable because courts have not unanimously upheld mask
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        23-10853               Opinion of the Court                        9

        mandates, and second, that the policy violated the ADA’s prohibi-
        tion on mandatory medical examinations and inquiries.
                First, Ms. Covel relies on two cases to assert the policy was
        unlawful, but they are inapposite. See Health Freedom Def. Fund v.
        Biden, 599 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (M.D. Fla. 2022), vacated on mootness
        grounds, 71 F. 4th 888 (11th Cir. 2023); NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109
        (2022). Both cases concerned the authority of government agencies
        to enact mandatory mask or vaccine mandates; they did not call
        into question the ability of private employers to decide voluntarily
        whether to require masks or vaccination for their employees. In
        Health Freedom Defense Fund, the plaintiﬀs sued various government
        oﬃcials and the CDC seeking a declaratory judgment that the fed-
        eral mask mandate that required travelers to wear a mask on public
        transportation and several other public areas was unlawful. See
        Health Freedom Def. Fund, 599 F. Supp. 3d at 1153 (striking down the
        CDC mask mandate on public transportation as violating the Ad-
        ministrative Procedure Act). Similarly, in NFIB, the Secretary of La-
        bor, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
        istration (“OSHA”), imposed a Covid vaccine mandate on the coun-
        try’s workforce, making it mandatory for employers with more
        than 100 employees to require employees to either vaccinate or
        submit to weekly Covid testing and wear masks in the workplace.
        NFIB, 595 U.S. at 112–113 (striking down OSHA’s mask and vaccine
        mandates as exceeding OSHA’s authority).
              Unlike the defendants in Health Freedom Defense Fund and
        NFIB, CPNP is a private company which implemented a Covid
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10853

        mask policy. Generally, an employer does not need statutory au-
        thorization to make employment decisions. Cf. Gogel v. Kia Motors
        Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1148 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (not-
        ing in a Title VII case that the “[r]ole of the court is to prevent un-
        lawful Title VII practices, not to act as a super personnel depart-
        ment that second-guesses employers’ business judgments”).
        CPNP’s oﬃce mask policy did not require statutory or judicial au-
        thorization, nor was it illegal because governmental mask and vac-
        cine mandates were struck down. And we know of no federal law
        or Florida law that prohibited private employers from requiring
        that their employees wear masks during the Covid pandemic.
                Second, Ms. Covel argues that the policy violated the ADA’s
        prohibition on mandatory medical examinations and inquiries.
        The ADA prohibits an employer from requiring mandatory medi-
        cal examinations and inquiries into an employee’s disability status
        “unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and
        consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). But
        requiring an employee like Ms. Covel to wear a mask is neither a
        medical examination nor an inquiry related to a non-existent disa-
        bility.
               We note, as well, that Ms. Covel has not alleged a legally cog-
        nizable disability that would trigger the prohibition on inquiries
        into an employee’s disability status. Though Ms. Covel mentions
        having a condition that prevented her from wearing a mask, she
        does not assert that condition as her relevant disability. She instead
        maintains that she is proceeding under the “regarded as” disabled
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        23-10853              Opinion of the Court                       11

        prong of the ADA. But that is not a legally cognizable disability.
        Regarding employees as at risk of imminently contracting a conta-
        gious disease does not meet the statutory deﬁnition of disability.
        See EEOC v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2019)
        (holding that a person is not regarded as impaired within the mean-
        ing of the ADA just because the employer believes they are at im-
        minent risk of contracting an infectious disease, because the statu-
        tory language requires the employer to see the person as presently
        impaired, not merely at risk of future impairment). Thus, Ms.
        Covel has not asserted a disability suﬃcient to trigger the ADA’s
        prohibition against inquiries into an employee’s disability status.
                                         V
                Because mask mandates by private employers like CPNP are
        not prohibited by federal law or Florida law, and because CPNP’s
        mask requirement did not constitute a medical examination or in-
        quiry, Ms. Covel failed to suﬃciently allege a good faith and objec-
        tively reasonable belief that CPNP’s policy was unlawful under the
        ADA. Consequently, Ms. Covel did not adequately plead her claim
        of retaliation under the ADA. We aﬃrm the district court’s dismis-
        sal for failure to state a claim.
              AFFIRMED.