Court Opinion

ID: 9404556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 14:06:58.965645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:14.881147
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-618

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                             RUBEN E. HOLGUIN, JR.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a bench trial in the District Court, the

 defendant was found guilty of breaking and entering in the

 nighttime with intent to commit a misdemeanor, G. L. c. 266,

 § 16A.    On appeal, the defendant claims the judge erred in

 denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty because

 the Commonwealth failed to prove that he did not act out of

 necessity.     We affirm.

       Background.     Around 1 A.M. on June 28, 2019, the defendant

 climbed through an open window into a Lynn residence occupied by

 the victim, her adult granddaughter, and her granddaughter's

 nine year old son.       The granddaughter was trying to fall asleep

 when the defendant entered her room.           He locked her bedroom door

 and told her to stay quiet and call the police because he was

 being chased and someone was trying to kill him.              After the
granddaughter called 911 the defendant took her phone and texted

"Cacito," a contact he added to the phone.    He also blocked the

bedroom door with chairs and told her to stay in the room

because someone was downstairs or outside.   Meanwhile, the

victim, who was in an upstairs bedroom, had called 911 after she

was awakened by someone screaming and what she believed was the

sound of a chair being thrown inside her home.    When police

arrived, the defendant came out of the granddaughter's room.     A

police officer noted that the defendant was extremely sweaty,

had an overwhelming odor of alcohol, was not wearing shoes, and

had blood on his feet.

     The defendant testified that he was socializing with a

friend and an acquaintance outside his mother's house in Lynn.1

He claimed that after a couple of hours together, his friend

drove to the back of the building, where the defendant noticed

"someone with a gun."    He indicated that he was afraid that the

man was going to kill him, so he ran.   He did not explain why he

did not go into his mother's apartment building, but testified

that his phone battery had died so he was unable to call the

police.   The defendant claimed he knocked on several business

doors and tried to stop a passing motorist for help.   After the

1 Although the defendant testified that he lived in Lawrence with
his girlfriend at the time, he considered his mother's house to
be his "home."
                                 2
defendant ran one-quarter to one-half of one mile, he jumped

through an open window to escape "the person with a gun."        The

defendant acknowledged that no shots were ever fired and he

never had an actual confrontation with the man he believed was

chasing him.    At the time he entered the victim's home, he did

not know if he was being pursued because he never looked back as

he was running.

     The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at

the close of the Commonwealth's case and renewed his motion at

the close of the evidence, arguing the defense of necessity.

The judge denied the motions and found the defendant guilty of

breaking and entering in the nighttime with intent to commit a

misdemeanor.2   The judge subsequently stated that she "did not

find credible a necessity defense, just so you're clear."

     Discussion.     The defendant contends the judge erred in

denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty because

the Commonwealth failed to disprove the defense of necessity.          A

defendant properly raises a necessity defense only if he

presents "some evidence" on each of four underlying

requirements:     "(1) a clear and imminent danger, not one which

is debatable or speculative; (2) [a reasonable expectation that

2 The defendant was originally charged with breaking and entering
in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony, G. L. c. 266,
§ 16. On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence of the lesser included offense.
                                   3
his or her action] will be effective as the direct cause of

abating the danger; (3) there is [no] legal alternative which

will be effective in abating the danger; and (4) the Legislature

has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate

choice regarding the values at issue"3 (quotations and citations

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Magadini, 474 Mass. 593, 597 (2016).

"In determining whether there has been sufficient evidence of

the foundational conditions to the necessity defense, 'all

reasonable inferences should be resolved in favor of the

defendant, and, no matter how incredible his testimony, that

testimony must be treated as true.'"   Id. at 600, quoting

Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 395 (1998).   "If the

defendant satisfies these foundational conditions, the burden is

on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the

absence of necessity" (quotation and citation omitted).

Magadini, supra at 597.

     Here, the defendant failed to meet his initial burden of

producing evidence sufficient to raise the defense of necessity.

The person with the gun never threatened the defendant nor fired

the weapon.   By his own admission, the defendant ran for at

least ten minutes without looking back, and in any event never

saw anyone chasing him.   Thus, there was no evidence of a clear

3 The parties agree that the Legislature has not acted to
preclude the defense in the circumstances of this case.
                                 4
and imminent danger.   See Pike, 428 Mass. at 400-401 (no

necessity for defendant to steal police cruiser to escape if not

being attacked at time he took it); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 69

Mass. App. Ct. 232, 238 (2007) (no imminent threat absent

pursuit after fight broken up).   Nor are we persuaded that any

danger faced by the defendant was reasonably abated by him

breaking into a residence in the middle of the night.   Assuming

the defendant's fears were rational, his actions served only to

bring potential danger to the unsuspecting victims who lived in

the home.   Finally, the defendant had alternatives available

short of criminal breaking and entering, including accessing his

mother's apartment building, where he was staying that night.

See Commonwealth v. Morris M., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 688, 697 (2007)

(juvenile who did not "exit[] the Jeep and run the short

distance to his house to seek help" had not pursued legal

alternatives to abate danger).    In sum, we conclude that the

judge did not commit error by denying the defendant's motions

for a required finding where the defendant failed to show that

the harm sought to be avoided exceeded the harm resulting from

the crime committed.   See Commonwealth v. Kendall, 451 Mass. 10,

13-14 (2008).

    Even assuming the defendant met his burden and raised a

necessity defense, we are satisfied that there was no error in

the judge's denial of the defendant's motions for a required

                                  5
finding or in her guilty verdict.     In a jury-waived trial, it is

presumed that the judge correctly instructs herself on the law.

See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 431 Mass. 134, 141 (2000).      More

specifically, "[a] trial judge sitting without a jury is

presumed, absent contrary indication, to have correctly

instructed [herself] as to the manner in which evidence was to

be considered in [her] role as factfinder."     Commonwealth v.

Batista, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 648 (2002).     Whether taking the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth at the

required finding stage or as the ultimate factfinder, see

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), the

trial judge is "not required to believe the defendant's trial

testimony."    Batista, supra.   Here, the judge exercised her

prerogative to assess the defendant's testimony and found his

necessity defense lacked credibility.     We are satisfied that her

conclusion fell within her role as the finder of fact, and thus

was not error.

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Meade, Blake &
                                        Brennan, JJ.4),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    June 23, 2023.

4   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
                                  6