Court Opinion

ID: 9615730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:40:10.422856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:51.151170
License: Public Domain

Baker, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I regret that I am unable to agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice FISHBURNE that there was a publication of a libel in the legal sense of publication.
His opinion is to the effect that the trial Judge correctly concluded in the first instance that the appellant was entitled to a directed verdict as to the charges of slander, and that he was in error in so much of his order granting a new trial as relates to that phase of the case. In this he is undoubtedly correct. But he concludes that the written investigation being only qualifiedly privileged, that it was for the jury to say if it was actuated by malice, as well as the sending of the letter of dismissal and, therefore, the case as to the charges of libel in the complaint should have been submitted to the jury.
I do not deem it necessary to consider whether the whole investigation and dismissal letter were such as to raise an issue as to malice and an abuse of the privilege, because it seems to be clear that there was no publication of the matter contained in the investigation or of the letter of dismissal. It was alleged in the complaint (Paragraph 12) concerning the investigation made on March 18, 1948, that the report thereof was reduced to writing and distributed among the persons testifying upon such investigation. There is no proof whatsoever to support this charge and on the contrary, the uncontradicted testimony is that a copy thereof was given *300only to the respondent, Fulton. The other claim of libel relates to the sending of the dismissal letter, dated April 3, 1948, from R. C. Murchison, Superintendent of appellant at Rocky Mount, N. C., to the respondent, and carbon copies thereof sent to H. S. Flippen, E. H. Powell and J. C. Mixon. It was stated in said letter that respondent had been dismissed from the service of appellant for misrepresenting facts regarding his personal injury, and directed respondent to report to Trainmaster Flippen’s office (at Richmond) and turn in all company property and transportation held by him. The record shows that Mixon was superintendent of transportation of the northern division at Savannah, Ga., and the man who finally decides on discipline applied. Powell was the trainmaster at the south end of the Richmond district, and the one who made the investigation and recommended the dismissal of the respondent from the service of the appellant. In fact, Powell testified that he dismissed the respondent from the service. It will therefore be seen that each of whom received a copy of the dismissal letter was an officer of the appellant, and who it was necessary should be informed of the dismissal of the respondent and the cause therefor. None of these parties, including the stenographer who wrote the letter, was a third person in the sense of the law relating to the publication of a libel.
That which was done in this case was not in a legal sense publication of the contents of the letter from Murchison, Superintendent, to- the respondent. These principles are firmly established. See Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S. C. 5, 7 S. E. (2d) 517, 518, Watson v. Wannamaker, 216 S. C. 295, 57 S. E. (2d) 477 and Prins v. Holland-North American Mtg. Co., 107 Wash. 206, 181 P. 680, 5 A. L. R. 451, a closely analogous case, which is cited with approval in Rodgers v. Wise, supra. Quoting from Rodgers v. Wise, supra: “In 36 C. J., § 174, p. 1225, it is announced that communication between officers and agents of a corporation, or dictation to a stenographer in the corporation’s employ by an officer or agent thereof, is not publication of libelous matter.”
*301For the foregoing reasons, I think it is unnecessary to consider the other issues raised by the appeal, and that the order granting a new trial should be reversed, and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the appellant.
Taylor, J., concurs.