Court Opinion

ID: 988941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 22:59:41.884135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:37.195008
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WALDON KEITH DAVIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
                                                                No. 95-7656
WILLIAM C. DUNCIL, Warden,
Huttonsville Correctional Center,
Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.
(CA-95-513-2)

Submitted: February 20, 1996

Decided: April 1, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and
CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Waldon Keith Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.,
Scott E. Johnson, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Waldon Keith Davis, a West Virginia inmate, appeals the dismissal
of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The case was referred to a magistrate
judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 636(b)(1) (West 1993). On September 26, 1995, the magistrate
judge filed a recommendation that the petition be dismissed and stated
that Davis had thirteen days from September 26 to file objections to
the report.* Computing the time for objections in accordance with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (e), 72(b), Davis' objections were due on Octo-
ber 16.

In an order filed October 11, the district court noted that no objec-
tions to the magistrate judge's recommendation had been timely filed
and adopted the recommendation without a de novo review. On Octo-
ber 15, Davis filed a document in this court, signed October 5 and
labeled "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Adsubjiciendum," which
was rerouted to district court and filed there on October 18. The dis-
trict court construed Davis' filing as a notice of appeal.

If Davis' petition, filed on October 18, is treated as timely-filed
objections, the district court's order would nevertheless have been
appropriate. The district court is required to "make a de novo determi-
nation of those portions of the [magistrate's] proposed findings and
recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 636(c)(1)(B). Specific objections are necessary in order to focus the
court's attention on disputed issues. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
148 (1985). Because general objections do not direct the court's atten-
_________________________________________________________________
*Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) sets the objection period at only ten
days, the magistrate judge was probably including the additional three-
day period applicable when service is made by mail under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(e). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee's note.

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tion to any specific portions of the report, general objections to a
magistrate judge's report are tantamount to a failure to object.
Howard v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 529
(6th Cir. 1991); see also Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th
Cir. 1982) (de novo review not required where objections are general
and conclusory). A failure to object waives appellate review. Wright
v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985).

Davis' "objections" are presented as a memorandum nearly identi-
cal to his § 2254 petition. This "rehash" does not specify any objec-
tion to the magistrate judge's factual or legal recommendations.
Davis' general objections waived appellate review. Accordingly, even
if the district court had treated Davis' petition as objections, the result
would have been the same.

We therefore deny a certificate of probable cause and dismiss the
appeal. We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

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