Court Opinion

ID: 9671686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:42:02.559617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.486614
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. I cannot accept the “no duty” analysis which the court employs to sustain the grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The rule of liability stated in section 344 of Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) is facially applicable to the defendants in the present case. That rule accepts as a given that the risk of third persons causing physical harm to business invitees is sufficiently foreseeable that the business invitor must take reasonable precautions to alleviate this danger. Accordingly, the existence of the duty which imposes this type of liability is not dependent upon foreseeability of harm. Foreseeability only bears on the question of whether the duty has been breached.
The Restatement rule makes the possessor of land (here the defendants) liable to members of the public for physical harm caused by the intentional harmful acts of third parties if the possessor fails “to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm.” All that is necessary to subject a possessor of land to the duty imposed by section 344 is to show that (1) the premises were held open to the public for entry for business purposes and (2) the injured party was on the land for business purposes. The element of holding open for public purpose is established in the present case without dispute. The question of whether the victim was on the premises for business purposes, while perhaps disputed, has not been negated by defendants as a matter of law in *324their summary judgment motion. Consequently, the business invitor’s duty of reasonable care must be considered to exist for purposes of deciding the motion for summary judgment.
This leaves other important issues which must be resolved before liability can be imposed. These include (a) whether the duty to exercise reasonable care was breached and, (b) if so, whether breach of that duty was a legal cause of the injury sustained. The issues argued on appeal do not include the question of whether there are any genuine issues of material fact with respect to these matters. On the issues which have been argued, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment.
LARSON and SCHULTZ, JJ., join this dissent.