Court Opinion

ID: 9852181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:10.906798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:23.836925
License: Public Domain

BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
While I agree that the corporate ac-knowledgements affixed to the claims of lien are not tantamount to verifications, I dissent from the holding that the claims of lien may not be upheld under Alaska’s liberal validation statute, AS 34.35.020. The statute states:

Sufficiency in Hen notice or pleadings.

(a)No mistake in formality or lack of statement in the lien notice or the pleadings is ground for dismissal or unnecessary delay in an action to foreclose a lien.
(b)Substantial compliance with the law relating to the contents of the lien notice is considered sufficient, if the notice satisfactorily shows the name of the claimant, the amount of his demand, the time of his employment, the property sought to be charged with the lien sufficient for identification and the name of the owner or reputed owner of the property.
(c) The inclusion of nonlienable items in the amount of the claimant’s demand or error in the terms and conditions of the contract of employment, if there is a contract of employment, or other error in the lien notice, made in good faith, is not considered material, unless the error affects the substantial rights of the adverse party, acquired in good faith without notice.
(d) The lien notice and pleadings may be amended at any time before judgment. If a material statement or averment is omitted or misstated, this is ground for a reasonable delay or continuance to enable opposing parties to meet the amendment, and no nonsuit or dismissal may be entertained in the action except upon the merits of the cause.
There may be room for disagreement as to whether a corporate acknowledgment in lieu of a verification is a “mistake in formality” under subsection (a). Subsection (b), however, expressly states that “substantial compliance with the law relating to the contents of the lien notice is considered sufficient.” To achieve “substantial compliance,” the notice must satisfactorily show only the name of the claimant, the amount of his demand, the time of his employment, the property sought to be charged with the lien sufficient for identification and the name of the owner or reputed owner of the property. The requirement of a verification is not listed.
The remaining provisions of AS 34.35.020 afford additional compelling reasons for upholding the trial court’s decision. Subsection (c) provides that inclusions of nonliena-ble items
or other error in the lien notice, made in good faith, is not considered material, unless the error affects the substantial rights of the adverse party, acquired in good faith without notice.
No one contends that the lack of a verification in Tote’em Steel’s and ECA’s liens affected the substantial rights of an adverse *265party acquired in good faith without notice.1
Finally, the provisions of subsection (d) appear to demand affirmance of the trial court’s decision as to the validity of the liens. “If a material statement or averment is omitted or misstated,” a continuance is to be afforded the opposing parties to meet an amendment. Amendments to lien notices and pleadings are permitted at any time before judgment. The use of the term “averment” in addition to “material statement” could be construed to refer to the verification.2 The absence of verification is hardly the type of change requiring a continuance, and by its judgment, the trial court indicated acceptance of the liens. Any defect in the verification was cured by testimony under oath regarding the material requirements for the lien. Accordingly, the lien notices should be regarded as amended.3
Subsection (d) of the statute concludes by stating that “no nonsuit or dismissal may be entertained in the action except upon the merits of the cause.” This mandatory language seems dispositive of the instant case. It cannot be argued that the absence of a proper verification goes to the merits.
The majority cites two Oregon cases: Anderson v. Chambliss, 262 P.2d 298, 301 (1953), and Christman v. Salway, 206 P. 541, 547 (1922). The Christman case is quoted as follows:
[I]t must affirmatively appear from the complaint that the notice filed contained all the essential provisions required by statute; that it was proper in form, verified as required, and filed within the time prescribed, (emphasis added)
The majority states correctly that the Oregon statute is the basis for the Alaska mechanics’ lien statute. But what the majority has failed to note is that the Oregon law did not and still does not contain any liberalizing provision similar to AS 34.35.-020. The Act of May 17, 1884 declared the laws of the State of Oregon then in force to be the laws of the District of Alaska. In 1899 and 1900, Congress passed acts providing for codes of law for Alaska, and codification was accomplished by Thomas H. Carter in 1900. Carter’s Annotated Alaska Codes contain the basic lien laws adopted from Oregon. It was not until 1933, however, that the predecessor of AS 34.35.020 was enacted as Chapter 113, Section 61, SLA 1933. It seems quite likely that the provision was passed to avoid such technical constructions as indicated in the Christman decision.
Here, there is no contention that the liens did not give proper notice to the parties involved or that rights of third parties have *266been adversely affected. The sole basis for disregarding the lien is the policy argument that a verification requirement discourages false liens. That goal, however, can be achieved much more readily by recorders refusing to accept a nonverified lien.4 The lienor would be placed on notice and could speedily correct the defect rather than being subject to large losses because of a technical omission. Moreover, since a lien loses validity if suit is not filed within six months of recording (AS 34.35.080), encumbrances are of short duration. It thus seems unlikely that even a false claim could cause substantial hardship.
It seems to me that the policy considerations enunciated by Justice Rabinowitz, speaking for the court in the case of Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Building Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972), in the absence of a statute such as AS 34.35.020, are much more equitable than those urged by the majority. In Smalley, the court was confronted with the question of enforceability of a lease which lacked an acknowledgment, as required by statute. The court held:
These policy considerations comport with the general rule that the purpose of acknowledgment is usually to allow an instrument to be recorded or to be introduced into evidence without further proof of execution. Both these purposes can be ascribed to the Alaska acknowledgment rule, since an unacknowledged conveyance cannot be recorded and may not be read in evidence without further proof of the conveyance.
We therefore conclude that failure to comply with the mandatory acknowledgment requirement of AS 34.15.150(a), while affecting recordation and admissibility, does not have the effect of making the conveyance void as between the parties. The trial court’s contrary determination in the case at bar was erroneous, (footnotes omitted)
493 P.2d at 1301.
Regardless of the manner in which we balance the policy arguments set forth by the majority against those for disregarding technical errors, it seems to me that the matter has been decided by the legislature. I find that the provisions of AS 34.35.020 are controlling and would affirm the trial court’s decision enforcing the liens.5

.See Sullens & Hoss, Inc. v. Farvour, 117 F.Supp. 535, 537, 14 Alaska 492 (D. Alaska 1954), where there was a defect in identifying the property sought to be charged. The judge held:
In regard to the property description, the yardstick seems to be whether the notice sufficiently identifies the property sought to be charged. If this test is met, apparently no amendment would be necessary. Further, “other errors” in the notice shall not be deemed material, unless such error shall affect the substantial rights of the adverse parties.
117 F.Supp. at 537. Since the lack of a verification would be considered an “other error(s),” the subject liens would be enforceable under the rationale of this case. Additionally, in the only Alaska Supreme Court case directly addressing AS 34.35.020, an unsigned verification was upheld on the basis of substantial compliance. Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, Inc., 412 P.2d 496, 499 (Alaska 1966).

. Webster’s New International Dictionary, p. 190 (2nd ed. 1960) defines “aver” as: “Law. To avouch or verify; to offer to verify; to prove or justify.”

. See Gleason v. Diamond, 9 Alaska 621, 626-27 (D. Alaska 1939), where, after quoting portions of the predecessor to AS 34.35.020, the court held:
The Court is of the opinion that while the description in the various liens is general, it is sufficient to identify the property; that there has been no change in the ownership of the property and no rights acquired by the adverse party; . . . that if there are any mistakes in either the liens or the complaint, the liens and complaint should be considered as amended in accordance with the testimony introduced and that findings, conclusions and a decree should be made in favor of the plaintiffs.

. AS 34.15.350 defines a “conveyance” for purposes of recording as including:
every instrument in writing by which an estate or interest in real property . . [is] encumbered, or by which the title to real property is affected, except a will.
To be eligible for recording, the instrument must be acknowledged, proved or certified as prescribed. Nelson v. Lord, 4 Alaska 174 (1910); Alaska Exploration Co. v. Northern Mining & Trading Co., 152 F. 145 (9th Cir.1907). See AS 34.15.260.

. Like the majority, I do not pass on the other issues raised by appellants.