Court Opinion

ID: 9679617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:59:56.122273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:16.707667
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Justice
(concurring).
This is a workmen’s compensation case. The plaintiff, George McCardell, sued the defendant, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company to recover compensation for total and permanent incapacity resulting from an injury alleged to have been sustained on July 18, 1957. Plaintiff recovered a judgment for total incapacity for the limited period of five weeks. The trial was to the Court with the intervention of a jury. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals and that Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial. 360 S.W.2d 831.
The parties will hereinafter be designated as in the trial court. When the defendant’s petition for writ of error was granted, this court was of the tentative view that the trial court correctly overruled plaintiff’s special exceptions to paragraph IV1 of the defendant’s second amended original answer, and that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding to the contrary. Upon further consideration and after hearing oral argument, I have concluded that the action of the trial court in overruling plaintiff’s special exception *3402 and motion to strike paragraph IV of defendant’s answer was prejudicial error. In my opinion the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing that of the trial court should be affirmed.
In this opinion I will not only state my reasons for holding that the defendant’s general defensive pleadings were prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff, but will announce rules to he followed in the event of a retrial of this case. I deem this to be necessary since the procedural aspects of the case are made difficult because the defensive pleadings and the evidence introduced in the trial indicate that the plaintiff has sustained several injuries in the course of his career which the defendant claims contributed to plaintiff’s alleged incapacity.
Special Exceptions There are some basic rules which come into play in determining whether or not the trial court has committed error in ruling upon special exceptions to pleadings. Some of these rules are found in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and some have developed through the decided cases in this jurisdiction. The nature of plaintiff’s cause of action, as reflected by the pleadings, determines the ultimate plaintiff’s issues to be submitted to the trier of the facts. It is equally true that the rules require that in certain cases the defendant must affirmatively plead the defenses upon which he relies in order to be entitled to an affirmative submission of such issues in his behalf. “ * * [Ejxcept in trespass to try title, statutory partition proceedings and other special proceedings in which the pleadings are specially defined by statutes or procedural rules, a party shall not'be entitled to an affirmative submission of any issue in his behalf where such issue is raised only by a general denial and not by an affirmative written pleading on his part. * * * ” Rule 279,3 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 91 provides that a special exception shall not only point out the particular pleading excepted to, but it shall also point out intelligibly and with particularity the defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the allegations in the pleading excepted to. See also Rule 94.
Unless there is a strict compliance with the provisions of Rule 91, a pleading, wholly too general, may authorize the introduction of testimony to establish the generally alleged facts. The pleadings furnish the standard by which the Court determines the admissibility of evidence, but it is the duty of the Court to instruct the jury as to the law arising on the facts. Agnew v. Coleman County Electric Cooperative, 153 Tex. 587, 272 S.W.2d 877, 879 (1954). In the case of Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Jeanes, 88 Tex. 230, 31 S.W. 186, 187, it was held that the defendant’s pleadings were too general and that “[i]f specially excepted to for generality, the averment should have been held bad.” See also, May v. Taylor, 22 Tex. 348.
The plaintiff in the present case has complied with Rule 91 in regard to the form of special exceptions necessary to point out the claimed defect of the defendant’s pleadings. Plaintiff’s special exceptions pointed out to the Court that he was entitled to have the defendant plead specifically the *341disease, condition of health, physical defect, or injury, or combination of such causes which the defendant was relying upon to ■diminish or defeat his cause of action for a recovery for total and permanent incapacity as the result of the July 18, 1957, injury'; that without being so apprised through written pleadings, he would not be •able to investigate and prepare his defense against such claims.
I agree with the plaintiff that the trial court’s action in failing to respond favorably to the special exceptions resulted in material harm to the plaintiff. Any pleading, such as the one here under attack, which fails to give fair notice to the opposite party of the matters expected to be established is harmful. See Rust v. Rust, 131 Tex. 532, 117 S.W.2d 59 (1938); See International & G. N. R. Co. v. Pape, 73 Tex. 501, 11 S.W. 526 (1889); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Hicks, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 824 (1936); Garrett v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex.Civ. App., 329 S.W.2d 491 (1959), no.wr.hist. To hold otherwise in this case would render useless special exceptions, the chief method provided in the Texas Practice for the protection of litigants against unfair pleadings. The special exception provides a single, intelligible, straight-forward method of indicating those parts of the opponent’s pleading which should be reframed before trial. See McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Vol. 2, Sec. 7.21, pp. 643, 644.
The harmful effect of the general pleadings is best illustrated by considering the nature of plaintiff’s cause of action and the defendant’s defense thereto. Plaintiff alleged in this case that he had sustained an accidental injury in the course of his employment and that as a result of such injury he had sustained total and permanent incapacity. It is sufficient to say that if a jury had found upon sufficient evidence that some total incapacity existed as a result of the injury alleged to have been sustained on July 18, 1957, plaintiff would have been entitled to judgment. For the plaintiff to recover for total and permanent incapacity, it was not necessary for him to plead and secure a jury finding that the July 18, 1957, injury was the sole cause of his incapacity. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Murphree, Tex., 357 S.W.2d 744, and cases cited therein at page 749.
The defendant not only contends that its pleadings were not subject to the special exceptions urged by the plaintiff, but argues that in the event it should be held that the trial court erred in overruling the exceptions, it should be further held that such error was rendered harmless because the plaintiff demonstrated by his allegations in a motion in limine that he had knowledge of all the defenses the defendant expected to prove under the allegations' contained in paragraph IV, supra. I cannot agree. The fact that plaintiff knew that he had sustained the injuries enumerated in the motion in limine did not relieve the defendant of the duty of pleading its defense in such a manner as to enable the plaintiff to adequately prepare his case before the date of trial. Whatever “disease, condition of health, physical defect, or injury, or combination of causes” the defendant had in mind to establish to defeat plaintiff’s cause of action was certainly buried in obscurity. Under the Rules of Practice in Texas, obscure pleadings are no longer permitted where proper objection is made thereto. These rules apply equally to both plaintiff and defendant alike. The plaintiff in this case, in view of his special exceptions, was entitled to know before being required to announce ready for trial, what disease, what injuries or combination of injuries were to become issues in the case. The motion in limine requested the trial court to instruct the counsel for the defendant to make no reference to injuries he had sustained on three separate occasions, to-wit: On November 29, 1955; on September 12, 1956; and on October 31, 1957. The motion makes no reference to any disease, condition of health or some physical defect. Neither does the enumeration of three injuries other than the one in suit necessarily include all the injuries or com*342bination of causes unrelated to the injury of July 18, 1957, which the defendant might have attempted to prove under its general allegations. Under the circumstances, I am of the opinion that it should be held that the error of the trial court in overruling the plaintiff’s special exceptions amounted to such a denial of the rights of the plaintiff as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in this case. See Rule 503. Clearly, the erroneous ruling was such as probably prevented the plaintiff from properly preparing for trial and properly presenting his case in the trial court.
Upon a retrial of this case, I would respectfully direct the trial court’s attention to the case of St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Murphree, supra. That case was decided in May, 1962, after the judgment in the present case was entered. The Court there was confronted with some of the problems involved here. In that case, we were not concerned with special exceptions, but were called upon to pass upon the action of the trial court in sustaining Murphree’s motion in limine, and the action of the trial court in excluding evidence bearing upon injuries sustained by Murphree both before and after the injury directly involved in the suit. One phase of the Murphree case, and our holding thereon, does point up the correctness of our holding in the present case. In that case, the defendant pleaded as a defense that an injury sustained by Murphree on June 28, 1957, contributed 25% to the incapacity alleged by Murphree. The jury so found, but the trial court sustained Mur-phree’s motion to disregard the jury finding on the ground that the injury was general and noncompensable. We held that a general, noncompensable injury could not be used to reduce the liability of the insurer as a result of the injury made the basis of the suit. Had the defendant in the present case pleaded with particularity the specific injuries relied upon to reduce plaintiff’s recovery, the' plaintiff would have been in a position to move to strike any pleading reflecting a general but non-compensable injury. In such event, if the hearing on the motion revealed that the alleged contributing injury was, without dispute, general and noncompensable, the motion to strike should be granted. The time of the Court and the parties should not be consumed with immaterial matters. Furthermore, the trier of the facts should not be called upon to consider such immaterial' matters in determining the controlling issues in the case.

Motion in Limine and Objections to Evidence

On another trial if a motion in limine-is filed, the trial court will necessarily be required to pass upon the motion. Since, in my opinion, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be affirmed on-another ground, I need not express my views as to the defendant’s point complaining of the action of the Court of Civil.' Appeals in holding that the trial court erred in not sustaining plaintiff’s motion in> limine. However, I would point out that in the case of Bridges v. City of Richardson, Tex. 354 S.W.2d 366, we held that the purpose in filing a motion in limine was to-suppress evidence or to instruct opposing counsel not to offer it so as to prevent the asking of prejudicial questions and the making of prejudicial statements in the-presence of the jury with respect to matters which have no proper bearing on the-issues in the case or on the rights of the parties to the suit. The holding in the Bridges case points out the procedure to-be followed in the event the motion in lim-ine is overruled. In regard to the admission of evidence, a proper objection made-at the time evidence is offered is sufficient to preserve the right of review of’ error committed in admitting it, and a motion in limine is not a necessary predicate-for complaint on appeal that the admission-of the evidence was error and that the-error was prejudicial. Bridges v. Richardson, supra.
*343In the Murphree case, the trial court sustained plaintiff’s motion in limine. However, for reasons stated in the opinion, we held that such action was not reversible error. Regardless of whether a motion in limine is filed or not filed, it is made clear in the Murphree opinion that evidence showing the nature and extent of the prior and subsequent injuries there involved was admissible. The evidence of such injuries was held to be admissible on the theory that it is the extent of the prior and subsequent injuries that reduces the insurer’s liability. The Murphree case also stands for the proposition that pleadings in other actions which contain statements inconsistent with the party’s present position with reference to such other actions are receivable as admissions. See McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, 2d Ed. 1956, Vol. 2, § 1145, p. 34. We held in the Murphree case that the action of the court in excluding evidence of the sums of money obtained in settlement of other claims was proper, citing authorities. We also held that what an employee is paid in settlement of his claim growing out of an injury does not determine the extent of the prior and subsequent injuries. Settlement agreements and the sums paid in settlement of other suits or claims cannot serve the jury or the trier of the facts materially in determining the extent of the injuries contributing to McCardell’s disability. See Myers v. Thomas, 143 Tex. 502, 186 S.W.2d 811 (1945), and other cases cited in the Murphree case.
The defendant admits in its briefs that proof of prior claims merely for the sake of proving prior claims, by means of prior pleadings, notice of injury, and similar papers is a “vice” that under proper circumstances is to be condemned. However, it is argued that as a matter of practical economics, pleadings, affidavits and related papers in cases involving other claims are admissible, and if not admitted, “ * * * it will be literally impossible for the members of the Bar to obtain and have ready for trial, expert and lay witnesses and other evidence of prior injuries * * * ” I do not share the view thus expressed. On the other hand, I see no reason why the well-settled rules of evidence should not govern in compensation cases where multiple injuries are involved. To avoid complications in the future, so far as this case is concerned, I have herein announced some of these rules, which could be applicable on a retrial.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
GREENHILL, STEAKLEY and WALKER, JJ., join in this opinion.

. “Answering further, if necessary, Defendant says that Plaintiff’s disability or incapacity, if any, was caused by some disease, condition of health, some physical defect and/or some injury other than that made the basis of this suit, or some other cause or combination of' causes unrelated in whole or in part to the alleged injury or disease alleged herein and made the basis of this suit.”

. “Plaintiff specially excepts and takes exception to Paragraph IV. of the Defendant’s Second Amended Original Answer wherein the Defendant only generally sets out that the Plaintiff’s disability or incapacity was caused by some disease, condition of health, some physical defect, or some injury other than that made the basis of this suit, or some other cause or combination of causes unrelated in whole or in part to the alleged injury or disease alleged to be made the basis of this suit since such pleading does not sufficiently inform the Plaintiff of what disease or general condition or physical defect or injury or combination of such causes, which the Defendant is relying upon, and, therefore, the Plaintiff cannot properly prepare a defense to such pleading. * * * ”

. All reference to rules herein has reference to Texas Rules of Oivil Procedure.