Court Opinion

ID: 9900869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 17:08:15.127943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:20.986175
License: Public Domain

J-S32031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: L.E.J.P., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: B.P., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 728 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered April 17, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at
                             No(s): 87 AD 2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: NOVEMBER 20, 2023

       Appellant B.P. (Father) appeals1 from the order granting the petition

filed by the Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth (the

Agency) to terminate Father’s parental rights to L.E.J.P. (Child), born in

September of 2017. On appeal, Father contends that the Agency failed to

meet its burden of proof and that the trial court erred when it involuntarily

terminated Father’s parental rights. We affirm.

       The trial court set forth an extensive recitation of the factual and

procedural history of this case. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/16/23, at 1-32. Briefly,

in June of 2019, Mother agreed to temporarily place Child with a host family

because she was undergoing a medical procedure and Father was unable to
____________________________________________

1 We note that the order also terminated A.T.’s (Mother’s) parental rights.
While Mother is not a party to the instant appeal, her appeal from the order
shall be addressed in a separate disposition. See In the Interest of:
L.E.J.P., a Minor, Appeal of A.T., Mother, 729 MDA 2023.
J-S32031-23

care for Child because he was employed as a long-haul trucker. After Mother

suffered complications from her medical procedure, she entered into a

voluntary placement agreement with the Agency, placing Child in the Agency’s

care and custody.

      Following a hearing on July 24, 2019, the trial court adjudicated Child

dependent. At that time, the trial court ordered Father to complete several

service plan objectives for reunification. Specifically, Father was directed to

attend all court hearings, maintain a safe and sanitary home, ensure Child

receives routine medical and dental care and also attend Child’s scheduled

appointments, complete parenting classes, meet Child’s basic needs (including

hygiene, nutrition, housing, clothing, etc.), participate in Parent-Child

Interaction Therapy (PCIT), attend visitation with Child, maintain regular

contact with the Agency, and express interest in Child’s well-being. N.T. Hr’g,

2/27/23, at 128-32.       Following the adjudication hearing, Child was

subsequently placed in foster care.

      Throughout the course of the instant case, the trial court held ten

permanency review hearings, with the most recent taking place on June 9,

2022. Child remained in foster care throughout this entire period. During the

termination of parental rights hearing, the Agency’s primary caseworker Jillian

Kaminskie testified that neither Father nor Mother had “substantially complied

to the extent that the Agency would expect them to [comply] to [reunite with

Child]” over the course of four years. Id. at 138. Specifically, Ms. Kaminskie

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testified that she had not seen “any indication that [Father] or [Mother] really,

really want[ed] to work hard to get their child back”. Id.

      On September 28, 2022, Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL), Heather L.

Paterno, Esq., filed a motion requesting immediate termination of both Father

and Mother’s visitation.    Specifically, the trial court explained the GAL’s

position that:

      (1) Child resisted visits and often hid whenever Father came to
      pick him up at the foster home and that this has been a consistent
      pattern for more than a year; it often took up to an hour of coaxing
      for Child to come out of hiding; (2) school officials noticed a
      dramatic change in Child’s demeanor when the Parents would pick
      him up including that Child would become withdrawn, silent, and
      would tell teachers he did not want to go, prompting school
      officials (as mandated reporters) to contact the [GAL] and express
      their concerns; (3) the foster family stopped informing Child when
      visits would occur because he would feign illness to avoid visits;
      (4) Father made false promises to persuade Child to visit or
      admonished or reprimanded Child for his reluctance to visit, rather
      than engaging in positive reinforcement; and (5) Mother only
      sporadically attended [parent-child interactive therapy (PCIT)]
      sessions, that Child reported during visits Mother often did not
      come out of her room and that the Parents sometimes shouted at
      each other when he is with them.

      The [GAL] expressed concern that Child’s extreme reactions
      anticipating visits were traumatizing and that his resistance had
      not diminished in the past year. The [GAL] believed that the
      family should participate in more intensive parenting education
      classes to address Child’s resistance, learn positive parenting
      techniques, and help him better adjust to and develop comfort in
      his Parents’ home. She requested that visits thus be suspended
      pending the [termination of parental rights] hearing, then initially
      scheduled just three weeks later (on October 19, 2022). The
      [GAL] also requested that the [trial court] appoint legal counsel
      for Child, who might accurately represent and convey his wishes
      to [the trial court]. On September 29, 2022, [the trial court]
      granted the [GAL’s] motion, suspending the Parents’ visitation and
      appointing Sarah Hoffman[, Esq., legal] counsel for Child.

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Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12.

      On October 6, 2022, the Agency filed a petition seeking termination of

Father and Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),

(8), and (b). The trial court explained:

      After the [termination of parental rights] petition was filed, Child’s
      attorney, [Attorney] Hoffman, filed a petition statement with the
      [trial] court averring that she had met with Child on multiple
      occasions, had spoken with him in accordance with his age and
      developmental level, and that it was clear to her that Child agreed
      with the termination of parental rights of both [Father and Mother]
      and a goal change to adoption. Hearings on the [termination of
      parental rights] petition and goal change were held before [the
      trial court] on February 27, March 2, [and] April 17, 2023.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13 (citations omitted) (some formatting altered).

      Ultimately, the trial court granted the Agency’s petition to terminate

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1),

(2), (5), (8), and (b) and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Father filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion explaining its

reasons for terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

      Father raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Were the trial court’s findings of fact supported by the record
         when it involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights where
         such a determination was not supported by clear and
         convincing evidence?

      2. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it involuntarily
         terminated Father’s parental rights where such a determination
         was not supported by clear and convincing evidence under the
         Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), [and] (8)?

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       3. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it involuntarily
          terminated Father’s parental rights without giving primary
          consideration to the effect that the termination would have on
          the developmental, physical and emotion needs of [Child] as
          required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

       4. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it involuntarily
          terminated Father’s parental rights where the evidence
          presented was overwhelming and undisputed that Father
          demonstrated a genuine interest and sincere and persistent
          effort to maintain a parent-child relationship with [Child]?

       5. Did the trial court err when it suspended visitation without a
          hearing by order dated September 29, 2022 without providing
          Father, who was unrepresented by counsel at that time, the
          meaningful opportunity to respond to such motion when such
          motion was filed by the guardian ad litem on September 28,
          2022?

Father’s Brief at 3 (some formatting altered).2

       We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

       The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
       requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
       credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
       by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
       courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
____________________________________________

2 While Father identifies five issues for our review in his statement of questions

presented, the argument section of his brief is only divided into three sections:
(1) whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by clear and
convincing evidence as required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a); (2) whether the
Agency failed to meet its burden of proof under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); and (3)
whether the trial court erred when it suspended Father’s visitation without
providing Father with an opportunity to respond to a motion filed by Child’s
GAL. Father’s Brief at 14-24. We note that the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure require that the argument section of the brief be divided
into as many parts as there are questions to be argued. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
Failure to do so may result in waiver. Ramalingam v. Keller Williams
Realty Group, Inc., 121 A.3d 1034, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2015). While we do
not condone Father’s failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
we find that our ability to render meaningful appellate review is not hindered;
therefore, we decline to find waiver on this basis. Id.

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      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted and formatting

altered). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and

resolve conflicts in the evidence.”    In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
      termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
      needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
      of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note

that we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental

rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

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                             Section 2511(a)(1)

      Father argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Agency

presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate his parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(1). Father’s Brief at 15. Specifically, Father argues that he

“never demonstrated estrangement or a deliberate decision to terminate his

parental relationship during the six months preceding the [underlying]

petition[,]” nor has he ever “demonstrated estrangement since this case’s

inception in 2019.” Id. at 16. Father further argues that he participated in

visitation when permitted, completed a parenting program, maintained

contact with the Agency, and attempted to complete his service objectives,

including therapy, which Father argues is consistent with his goal of remaining

a part of Child’s life. Id. at 16-17.

      Section 2511(a)(1) provides as follows:

      § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

      (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
         months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either
         has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim
         to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

      When reviewing the involuntary termination of parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(1), this Court has explained:

      Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties
      or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court

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     must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation
     for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
     parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination
     of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

     Further, the trial court must consider the whole history of a given
     case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
     provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances
     of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent
     facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the
     evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly
     warrants the involuntary termination.

     Our courts have explained that parental duty is best understood
     in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection,
     guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional,
     cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of
     the child. Thus, [our Supreme] Court has held that the parental
     obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
     performance. This affirmative duty encompasses more than a
     financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and
     a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
     the child. Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental
     duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a
     place of importance in the child’s life.

In Interest of T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d 618, 628 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

omitted and formatting altered).

     This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make
     diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full
     parental responsibilities. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long
     period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability
     of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.

     In Adoption of S.P., our Supreme Court reiterated the standard
     with which a parent must comply in order to avoid a finding that
     [he] abandoned [his] child.

        Applying [In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652, 655
        (Pa. 1975),] the provision for termination of parental rights
        based upon abandonment, now codified as § 2511(a)(1), we
        noted that a parent “has an affirmative duty to love, protect
        and support his child and to make an effort to maintain

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          communication and association with that child.” [McCray,
          331 A.2d at 655].

                                       *       *   *

          Where the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in
          declining to yield to obstacles, his other rights may be
          forfeited.

       [In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012)].

In re J.R.E., 218 A.3d 920, 925 (Pa. Super. 2019) (some citations omitted

and some formatting altered).

       Here, the trial court addressed Section 2511(a)(1) as follows:

       The evidence established under [Section 2511] (a)(1) that [] “the
       parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months
       immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has
       evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a
       child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.” Most
       notably, for a period of thirty-nine (39) months—between July
       2019, when custody of [] Child was voluntarily relinquished to the
       Agency and the filing of the [termination of parental rights]
       petition on October 6, 2022—Father failed to adequately perform
       parental duties.

       Father failed to maintain consistent visits with [] Child early in the
       case when, as with Mother, his attachment to [] Child was very
       much in the balance, particularly since he had not been home
       much after [] Child’s birth due to his job. As noted, Father was
       present to hear all of Dr. Rosen’s[3] testimony at the October 2019
       permanency review hearing, including the fact that [] Child was in
       a critical stage for attachment, the possibility that [] Child would
       be bonding with his consistent caregivers (i.e. Foster Parents) and
       of need for a bonding assessment. He was also present and
       notified that Mother and Father should participate in couples’
       counseling.

____________________________________________

3  Dr. Howard Rosen was the psychologist who performed Mother’s
psychological evaluation as part of her court-ordered service objectives. See
Trial Ct. Op. at 14.

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       Regarding visitation, the Agency approved visits between Father
       and [] Child at his foster home during the weekend in July of 2019,
       Father failed to coordinate the visit, which was his obligation, and
       offered a non-credible explanation for his failure. Father was later
       allowed unsupervised visitation with [] Child but due to Father not
       communicating well with the Foster Parents and arriving late for
       some visits, supervised visitation was arranged. Again, keeping
       consistent contact with [] Child was imperative given the critical
       stage of [] Child’s development, including of his attachment. After
       in-person visits were suspended in March 2020, the Parents were
       offered video visits with [] Child while at the Foster Parents’ home,
       but Father was inconsistent with visits and would also attempt to
       contact [] Child when not scheduled for visits, making it difficult
       for the Foster Parents.

       After in-person visits resumed, Father had supervised visits with
       ChildFirst,[4] which reported to the Agency that it had observed
       both Parents in need of parenting education because they did not
       know how to engage [] Child. ChildFirst noted that Father and
       Mother would not get down on the floor to play with [] Child but
       would instead sit and play with games and toys by themselves,
       instead of with [] Child.

       As with Mother, when visitation occurred, there were problems
       noted by third parties. For instance, at a November 6, 2020
       supervised visit at ChildFirst, [] Child turned his back on the
       Parents and mumbled and whined.           ChildFirst reported this
       incident to the Agency and recommend parenting education. On
       July 29, 2021, while in the Agency waiting room prior to a
       permanency review hearing, a caseworker observed the Parents
       having no interaction with [] Child and that the Parents left
       without saying goodbye. This incident was relayed to the [GAL]
       who requested a bonding assessment, which was granted. In
       addition, there was credible evidence presented that daycare
       personnel and/or the Foster Parents reported that [] Child
       returned without a fresh diaper or that he had not eaten properly
       when with Father and Mother. Caseworker [Kaminskie] credibly
       testified that she believed the Parents never really wanted to visit
       [] Child.

____________________________________________

4 ChildFirst Family Services provided supervision for some of Father and
Mother’s visits with Child. See e.g. Trial Ct. Op. at 6, 37, 44; Agency’s Pet.
for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 10/6/22, at ¶ 41.

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       Finally, during the two years prior to the TPR hearings, Father had
       only reached out to the Foster Mother about ten times to inquire
       about the Child’s well-being.

                                       *       *    *

       Beginning around August 2021, the exchanges between the
       Parents and [] Child dramatically changed to the point they
       became extremely traumatic to [] Child, as outlined in detail
       above. These emotional transitions, which Agency personnel
       testified were without precedent in their experience, occurred on
       at least nineteen (19) occasions through January 4, 2022, a period
       of only four months. Father was present for almost every
       transition and had to carry [] Child to his car on many occasions,
       kicking and screaming. The witnesses recounting some of these
       incidents never indicated that Father ever positively affected the
       direction of [] Child’s emotional outbursts.

       As with Mother, the bonding assessments unequivocally reflected
       that Father was failing to perform parental duties, most notably
       by failing to meet [] Child’s emotional needs. [] Child was found
       to have a disorganized attachment to Father and perceived both
       Parents as sources of threat and distress, and that placement of
       [] Child with them would be detrimental to [] Child’s physical,
       emotional and mental health. It was notable to [the trial court]
       that during the bonding assessments, when the Parents were
       brought into the room with [] Child and Foster Parents, [] Child’s
       demeanor      immediately      changed      to   hysterical   crying,
       apprehension, and fear. [Donna Mae] Fierras[5] observed that
       neither Father nor Mother made any attempt to console him.
       While others tried to calm [] Child down, Father indicated that
       such outbursts were temporary and [] Child would come out of it
       “if they stand their ground.” [Ms.] Fierras identified this response
       by Father as reflective of his inability to meet [] Child’s emotional
       needs and that Father should have been trying to soothe him or
       partake in proactive parenting like directing him to play. [Ms.]
       Fierras found that both Father and Mother showed [] Child low
       nurturance and [] Child did not seek out either parent to meet his
       emotional or physical needs. [] Child’s attachment style was
       characterized by fear and a sense of mistrust of both Parents.

____________________________________________

5 Ms. Fierras was the psychologist who conducted the bonding assessment.

See N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 21, 23.

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      During [Ms. Fierras’] observations, Father never attempted to
      engage [] Child but kept doing paperwork. Because of Father’s
      lack of intervention or engagement, [Ms.] Fierras excluded him
      from the Strange Situation observations. As noted, to address
      these significant attachment problems, one of [Ms.] Fierras’
      primary recommendations was PCIT, especially because of []
      Child’s fear of his Parents. Father’s attendance at PCIT, while
      much better than Mother’s, was still a bit inconsistent, as outlined
      above.

      In addition, the primary caseworker, who had significant contact
      with the Parents and [] Child over the years, credibly testified that
      Father (and Mother) had not worked very hard to reunify with []
      Child, that she failed to see any attachment or a nurturing bond
      between them, and observed nothing beneficial to [] Child from
      his relationship with either parent. The caseworker also credibly
      testified that she had never seen either parent demonstrate an
      ability to care for [] Child independently or together as a couple,
      nor demonstrate a full understanding of what was needed to
      properly care for a child.

Trial Ct. Op. at 43-46.

      Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion or

error of law in the trial court’s conclusion that the Agency presented clear and

convincing evidence to support termination of Father’s parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(1). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

      The record reflects that, at the time of the termination hearing, Child

had been in the Agency’s care for forty-two months. See N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23,

at 78. Although Father has been aware of his single case plan (SCP) objectives

throughout the life of the case, he has made minimal progress towards

reunification. Specifically, Father failed to maintain consistent visits with Child

and failed to adequately coordinate visitation with Foster Parents. Id. at 131.

Further, the record reflects that Father failed to communicate with Foster

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Parents regarding Child’s well-being, only reaching out ten times over the two-

year period preceding the filing of the termination of parental rights. N.T.

Hr’g, 4/17/23, at 15. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that, for a period

far in excess of the six-month statutory minimum, Father has refused to

perform his parental duties to Child. J.R.E., 218 A.3d at 925; T.J.J.M., 190

A.3d at 628.

      With respect to Father’s explanation for his conduct, the record reflects

that Father generally denied the Agency’s allegations.           Specifically, in

response to the Agency’s allegation that Child would return from visits with

Father and Mother with a wet diaper or pullup, Father testified that he never

knowingly sent Child away from a visit with a soiled diaper or pullup. N.T.

Hr’g, 3/2/23, at 89. Father attributed this, in part, to a lack of communication

on Child’s part. Id. at 90. Additionally, Father testified that he missed several

therapy sessions due to his work schedule. Id. at 104. He also attributed

missed therapy sessions to illness, Foster Parents being on vacation, and

Mother having an emergency dental procedure. Id. Father also testified that

he had not been in communication with the Agency regarding visitation since

May of 2022. Id. at 111. Father further testified that he reached out to Foster

Parents on a regular basis to discuss how Child was doing up until “a couple

months” before the termination of parental rights hearing. Id. at 124-25.

When confronted about cancelling scheduled visits, Father could not recall

cancelling those visits. Id. at 126-29. However, the trial court ultimately

credited Ms. Kaminskie’s testimony that Father “had not worked very hard” to

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unify with Child. See Trial Ct. Op. at 44; N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 138; see also

S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 (stating that where a “parent does not exercise

reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles, his other rights may be

forfeited” (citation omitted)).

       Finally, we note that although Father contacted Foster Parents

approximately ten times in a period of two years, see N.T. Hr’g, 4/17/23, at

15, Father’s inconsistent contact with Child was insufficient to “demonstrate a

serious intent . . . to recultivate a parent-child relationship” or “a willingness

and capacity to undertake the parental role.” See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108,

1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

       For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court

in concluding that termination was appropriate under Section 2511(a)(1).6

See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267; J.R.E., 218 A.3d at 925; T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d at

628. Accordingly, Father is not entitled to relief.

                                   Section 2511(b)

       Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusions concerning Section

2511(b).    Specifically, Father argues that the trial court erroneously relied

upon the bonding assessment conducted by Ms. Fierras. Father’s Brief at 22.

In support, Father contends that he was not involved in the assessment in any

meaningful way and that Ms. Fierras failed to “meaningfully engage” him. Id.

Father further argues that the testimony describing Child’s temper tantrums
____________________________________________

6 We reiterate that we need only agree with the trial court as to one subsection

of Section 2511(a). B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.

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during custody exchanges provided only a “snapshot in time” and, “that once

[Child] calmed down, he enjoyed his visitation with his parents. Father and

[Child] went to parks, outings, and spent quality time playing together at

Father and Mother’s home.” Id. at 23-24.

     Section 2511(b) provides as follows:

     (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
     which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
     filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

     This Court has explained:

     While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
     aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
     nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
     court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

     [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
     emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
     the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
     the child might have with the foster parent.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)), abrogated in part on other

grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023).

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      Our Supreme Court has stated that “if the child has any bond with the

biological parent, the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which ‘is

not always an easy task.’” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1106 (Pa. 2023)

(quoting T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267). In K.T., our Supreme Court explained that

“a court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and welfare analysis must

consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from severance

of the parental bond.” Id. at 1113. Indeed, the parent-child bond analysis

must include “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial

to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id.

      “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they

have a bond with their foster parents.”      T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (citation

omitted).   More specifically, courts must consider “the child’s need for

permanency and length of time in foster care . . . whether the child is in a

preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster

home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs,

including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.”

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113 (footnote omitted).

      In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b),

“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 269. “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have

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an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail .

. . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

      In the instant case, the trial court addressed Section 2511(b) as follows:

      [T]he record strongly supported that these needs would be best
      served by termination of Father’s parental rights.              The
      overwhelming evidence presented was that the termination of
      Father’s parental rights will have no detrimental effect on [] Child
      whereas a severance of any bond between [] Child and [] Foster
      Parents would be highly detrimental to [] Child. The evidence
      upon which [Ms.] Fierras based her conclusions was further
      corroborated by numerous other witnesses, including evidence of
      traumatic and highly distressing transitions with the Parents and
      [] Child, and the absence of a perceivable bond between them.

      There was no credible evidence presented that termination of
      [Father’s] rights would have a negative impact upon [] Child’s
      developmental, physical and emotional needs, and the welfare of
      [] Child. [Ms.] Fierras presented evidence that [] Child established
      predominantly secure and positive attachments or bonding with
      his Foster Parents and that [] Child would suffer harm if his bonds
      with the Foster Parents were severed. On the other hand, [] Child
      had a disorganized attachment to his Parents and perceives them
      as sources of threat and distress and that placement with his
      biological parents would be detrimental to [] Child’s physical,
      emotional and mental health.          The poor attachment and
      attachment style [Ms.] Fierras observed was typically seen of a
      child who has experienced trauma and does not feel physically or
      emotionally safe with parents and that the attachment style was
      characterized by fear and mistrust.

Trial Ct. Op. at 47-48 (formatting altered).

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights would

best serve Child’s needs and welfare. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113; T.S.M.,

71 A.3d at 267. As noted by the trial court, Ms. Fierras testified that she

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performed a bonding assessment involving Child. N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 21,

23.   As part of the bonding assessment, Ms. Fierras performed bonding

assessments for Father, Mother, and Foster Parents. Id. at 23. Ms. Fierras

concluded that Child had a “secure attachment” with Foster Parents. Id. at

25-26. Ms. Fierras further testified that removing Child from Foster Parents

“would not be in his best interests.” Id. at 35.

      Relating to Mother and Father, Ms. Fierras testified that Child’s bonding

was a “resistant disorganized attachment type.”      Id. at 49.    Ms. Fierras

specifically stated that such an attachment style “usually stems from poor

attachment, inconsistently being able to meet a child’s physical and/or

emotional needs, not being able to console a child for whatever reason, [and]

low nurturance[.]” Id. at 50. Ms. Fierras further concluded that Child, during

the bonding assessment, did not seek out Mother or Father to meet his

emotional or other instrumental needs, and she observed that Child did not

try to maintain contact with Mother and Father. Id. at 51-52. Ms. Fierras

opined that such an attachment style is “characterized by fear and mistrust

toward Mother and Father.”      Id. at 52.   As noted above, the trial court

concluded that there was no credible evidence presented that termination of

Father’s rights would have a negative impact upon Child’s developmental,

physical and emotional needs, and the welfare of Child. See Trial Ct. Op. at

47.   For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it terminated Father’s parental rights.     See 23 Pa.C.S. §

2511(b); K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113; T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

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                                GAL’s Motion

      In his final issue on appeal, Father alleges that the “trial court erred

when it suspended Father’s visitation without providing Father the opportunity

to respond to the [GAL’s] motion.” Father’s Brief at 23. Specifically, Father

argues that the GAL’s motion hindered his ability to reunify with Child. Id. at

23. Father further argues that his participation in therapy and his progress

toward his service objectives “were pulled out from under [him] without the

benefit of having input from the [trial] court.” Id.

      The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require that appellate

arguments include “discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed

pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Specifically, we have stated that “[w]e shall

not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to

find evidence to support an argument[,]” as doing so “would place this Court

in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter.” Trust Under Deed

of Wallace F. Ott, 271 A.3d 409, 421 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted).

“Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to these rules may be considered

waived, and arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived.”

Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

      Here, Father fails to provide this Court with any discussion of or citation

to relevant authority pertaining to his final issue on appeal. Rather, Father

raises a general claim of error on the part of the trial court when it suspended

visitation without providing Father with the opportunity to respond.        See

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Father’s Brief at 23-24. We find that Father has not sufficiently developed this

issue for appellate review; therefore, the issue is waived on appeal.      See

Trust of Ott, 271 A.3d at 421; Coulter, 94 A.3d at 1088. Accordingly, Father

is not entitled to relief. For these reasons we affirm the trial court’s order

terminating Father’s parental rights to Child, L.E.J.P.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/20/2023

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