Court Opinion

ID: 9797893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:31:35.534355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:47.666436
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
with whom CARPENETI, Justice, joins as to part II, dissenting.
Today’s opinion holds that because T.E.’s statements to her mother were not offered into evidence as prior inconsistent statements, the court of appeals erred when it *1025held the statements to be admissible on that basis. The opinion acknowledges the rule that an appellate court may affirm a trial court’s ruling on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court. But the court holds that this doctrine cannot be relied on in this case because (1) no foundation was established for the admission of the statements on prior inconsistent statement grounds and (2) Vaska might have decided to cross-examine T.E. if he had known that the statements were offered on the ground that they were prior inconsistent statements.
I disagree and would affirm the decision of the court of appeals based on the rationale expressed by the court of appeals. In my view a satisfactory foundation for admission of the statements on prior inconsistent statement grounds was established. Further, affirming on prior inconsistent statement grounds does not result in unfairness to Vas-ka because he knew the statements were going to be offered and he had an opportunity to cross-examine T.E. concerning them and her lack of memory. In addition, I believe that the trial court also admitted the statements on a separate ground, namely, that they were statements of identification of a person. I would affirm on this basis as well.
I will first discuss the trial court’s decision, next the question of admissibility of the statements as statements of identification, and last why I believe that the prior inconsistent statement rationale employed by the court of appeals is correct and justifies affir-mance.
I. The Trial Court’s Decision
My first disagreement with the court is based on differences as to what happened at the trial. The court concludes that Judge Funk admitted T.E.’s out-of-court statements under Evidence Rule 804(b)(5), the catch-all exception. Although I acknowledge that the catch-all exception was the basis of the state’s offer, it was not the sole basis of the superior court’s decision to admit the evidence. Instead, Judge Funk admitted the evidence on two alternative grounds. First, he ruled that Olga E.’s account of her daughter’s prior statements was admissible as “pri- or identifications.”1 Only after this ruling, and without in any way receding from it, did he also rule that the testimony would be allowed under the catch-all exception. In the paragraphs that follow I will explain this in some detail.
Olga and the doctor who examined T.E. testified to several out-of-court statements made by T.E. First, Dr. Burgess, who examined T.E. a few days after the assault, testified that he asked T.E. “who hurt her.” She replied: “[M.VJ’s daddy’s ga-ga” — which signified that [M.VJ’s father, Vaska, was the perpetrator. Second, Olga testified to four prior statements by T.E. First, she said that T.E. told her that her “girl was hurting,” girl being their word for T.E.’s vagina. The second statement was that T.E. said a “ga-ga” had hurt her, a word Olga translated as “monster.” Third, prior to Dr. Burgess’s examination, Olga testified that T.E. told her that “[M.VJ’s dad hurt her.” Fourth, she related how T.E. saw Vaska while she and T.E. were walking in Russian Mission and identified him to her as the “ga-ga.”
The admissibility of the doctor’s statement is not at issue, because Vaska did not object to it at trial and has not challenged its admission in his petition for hearing. But the doctor’s written report was objected to on hearsay grounds. The report included a form child abuse report filled out by Dr. Burgess. This form report is important. It contains T.E.’s statement to Dr. Burgess that “[M.VJ’s daddy’s ‘gocha’ hurt her,” and sets out Olga’s account of T.E.’s report to Olga of T.E.’s sexual abuse by Vaska. In objecting to the report Vaska’s counsel made it clear that his “biggest concern” was paragraph VIII of the form report, which is Olga’s account of T.E.’s statements to Olga.2
*1026Initially Judge Funk indicated that the report might come in as a medical record under Evidence Rule 803(4). But defense counsel pointed out that the identification of the perpetrator would not be permitted under that exception. The court found that this observation was well taken, but after further study indicated that the identification made by the child would not be hearsay under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C)3 if the child testified at trial. In so ruling the court mentioned Rule 801(d)(1)(C) expressly, along with a court of appeals case concerning the rule, Bell v. State.4 At that point the child had not yet testified and the court deferred ruling on the admission of the report.5
Subsequently, there was a colloquy on whether Olga’s testimony was inadmissible as hearsay, and it was this colloquy that led to the ruling challenged here. The colloquy occurred in the interval after Dr. Burgess and T.E. had testified and before Olga took the stand. Immediately after T.E. was excused, the prosecutor asked that the court declare T.E. “unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(3), so that her out-of court statements could be admitted under the catch-all exception of Rule 804(b)(5). Under Rule 804, a declarant (here T.E.) is unavailable to testify where the declarant “establishes a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declar-ant’s statement.”6 If a declarant is “unavailable” in this way, her out-of-court statements can come in under Rule 804(b)(5) provided the other, somewhat open-ended prerequisites of that rule are also met. In making the offer, the prosecutor said he would be seeking to admit “certain statements made by [T.E.],” so that “it doesn’t have to come up every time as — potentially as an objection.” The prosecutor noted that statements made by T.E. could also be admitted under “some other grounds.” The prosecutor’s offer was thus evidently an effort to save time and avoid numerous objections during Olga’s forthcoming testimony; it amounted to an attempt to have Olga’s testimony declared admissible in advance. The content of this testimony was familiar to both parties, inasmuch as Olga had testified at the first trial about T.E.’s statements.
In response to this offer (and throughout the colloquy), defense counsel never argued that T.E.’s lack of memory had not been established, or that the court should not declare her unavailable. Instead, after the offer, Judge Funk pointed out that one of T.E.’s out-of-court statements had “[come] in already without objection.” This was a reference to Dr. Burgess’s testimony. Defense counsel responded — apparently to explain why he did not object to the doctor’s testimony-noting that once T.E. testified the doctor’s testimony would be admissible under “801” and “my reading of the Bell case.” The reference to “the Bell case” was, again, a reference to Bell v. State.7 In Bell, the court stated that even if an out-of-court statement could not come in under an exception for medical diagnoses, the statement might be admissible as a prior identification under 801(d)(1)(C).8
As I have noted, Bell had already come up in the colloquy over whether to admit the doctor’s medical report into evidence, so Judge Funk was familiar with the case. This discussion of Bell seemed to prompt the court to conclude that the out-of-court statements to Olga should be admissible as prior identifications under Rule 801(d)(1)(C), even though the state’s offer had been based on the catch-all exception of Rule 804(b)(5). *1027Specifically, both defense counsel and the court recognized that one issue was admissibility under Evidence Rule 801. Defense counsel mentioned the rule explicitly, and the court described the rule by its subject, “prior identifications.” After the court stated that one of the child’s statements had already come in without objection, the colloquy continued:
MR. SOBERAY: I understand that because my reading of the Bell case was such that unless she testifies — if she doesn’t testify then they wouldn’t be admissible. If she has testified under 801, I think it’s admissible.
THE COURT: It appears to me — I mean they’re a little ambiguous in the way the Court of Appeals and Judge Singleton’s language makes it ambiguous but it appears to the court that if the defendant[ 9] testifies then, if what it is is an identification. Then prior identifications are admissible.
MR. SOBERAY: Right.
THE COURT: And that appears to be what’s the issue bef — in this, is a prior identifications. ...
(Emphasis added.) Judge Funk then expanded on this with a statement that seemed to be based not only on Rule 801(d)(1)(C) (prior identifications), but also on a case not previously mentioned by the parties, Natkong v. State:10
Under Natkong v. State, Alaska App. '96, the court had faced issues where a lack of memory or refusal to testify came up and the Court of Appeals affirmed [the] ruling that prior statements describing the sexual amus — abuse were admissible. It appears to the court that if you consider that they were statements by a very young girl to more than one person, that they — or issues of identification, that they were issues involving sexual abuse that there is consistent case law that such prior statements, prior identifications, come in. That there’s no reason to believe any particular reasons to find that these statements are so unreliable as to be inadmissible. Certainly the extent of such statements and the — are a subject for the weight to be considered by the jury after appropriate cross examination argument. So the court would allow the mother to testify as to the statements that [T.E.] made concerning identification of the defendant and/or concerning the sexual abuse she suffered at the age that she was at the time. Do we need anything else at this point.
(Emphasis added.)
Natkong construes Rule 801(d)(1)(A), which admits prior inconsistent statements of a witness that would otherwise be hearsay.11 Judge Funk may have been saying that T.E.’s inability to remember the assault, which the state had said made her “unavailable” for purposes of the catch-all, was also what made her testimony “inconsistent” with her prior out-of-court statement for purposes of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). But this reference to Natkong does not clearly show that Judge Funk also relied on a prior inconsistent statement rationale for admitting the evidence for two reasons. First, Natkong contains a discussion of the admission on prior identification grounds of statements that a witness has forgotten.12 Second, Natkong contains a sentence that mentions Rule 804(b)(5), the catch-all, as an acceptable “alternative ground” for admitting the out-of-court statement involved there.13 The important point, in my view, is that this part of *1028the colloquy, with its many references to prior identifications, its discussion of the Bell case, and counsel’s express mention of Rule 801, indicates that the mother’s testimony was found admissible because it satisfied the prior identification criteria of Rule 801.
After this ruling, Vaska’s lawyer did not object or directly register his disagreement with the court’s decision to “allow the mother to testify as to the statements that [T.E.] made concerning identification of the defendant and/or concerning the sexual abuse she suffered at the age that she was at the time.” Instead he raised the possibility that the out-of-court statements might be thought admissible under a different hearsay exception, not mentioned by the court or the state — and then he explained why he believed this exception did not apply. More specifically, after the court asked if “we need anything else at this point,” defense counsel asked to “just make my argument,” even though he said he understood that “the court has ruled.” Urged to continue, Vaska’s lawyer then cited several cases, among them Greenway v. State,14, discussing the common law hearsay exception for “first reports” of a sexual assault. Although up to this point this exception had not been raised by anyone, the defense argued that the exception should not apply because too much time had supposedly elapsed between the assault and T.E.’s “report.” 15
Judge Funk responded by saying that “[t]he court will still allow” the out-of-court statements. He appeared to appreciate that Vaska was arguing that the first report exception should not apply, but did not, at least not clearly, address this exception. Instead he said that any delay in reporting the assault was irrelevant, because “it’s not just a witness talking about a prior event, but it is someone identifying a defendant as causing an injury, it is a specific prior statement about sex abuse.” (Emphasis added.) This again suggests a reliance on the prior identification. But then, right at the end, Judge Funk concluded in a way that suggested he thought the out-of-court statements in the mother’s testimony were admissible under Rule 804(b)(5), the catch-all exception initially raised by the state. Specifically, the court said that the time lag was not a “sufficient basis, given broad general exceptions under 804(b)(5)” to exclude the “testimony by the mother of statements made ... by her daughter, concerning this incident.” On this note, the colloquy came to a close. Defense counsel made a “continuing objection” to Olga’s testimony “so as to not interrupt” that testimony, which the court acknowledged, and then Olga was called to the stand.
Putting aside for a moment whether the decision to admit the evidence was erroneous, I draw two conclusions from this colloquy.
First, Judge Funk’s initial ruling — the one in which he discussed Bell and made numerous references to “prior identifications”— must be evaluated on review. This is the clearest statement of the court’s rationale, and unlike the somewhat haphazard response to Vaska’s “first report” argument, it was clearly based on independent research and some forethought. This first ruling was based at least in part on Rule 801(d)(1)(C), the prior identification rule. This is seen in the court’s (and defense counsel’s) references to Bell, in the court’s repeated characterization of T.E.’s statements as “prior identifications,” and in defense counsel’s reference to Rule 801.16 When evidence is admitted on *1029two or more grounds, one of which has been correctly applied and justifies the admission, admitting the statement is not grounds for reversal.17
Second, it should be clear that insofar as Judge Funk relied on the “catch-all” ground under Rule 804(b)(5), this ruling was based on T.E.’s “unavailability,” which in turn was based on her apparent inability to remember the assault and her statements concerning it. Vaska never contested her lack of memory, and does not do so on appeal. He states, without sarcasm, in his reply brief that “T.E.’s memory loss amounted to virtual amnesia. ...”
II. The Trial Court’s Decision on Prior Identification Grounds Was Not Erroneous.
It seems clear to me that T.E.’s out-of-court statements were admissible as statements of “identification of a person made after perceiving the person” under subpart (C) of Rule 801(d)(1). T.E. told her mother prior to Dr. Burgess’s examination but after T.E.’s report of vaginal irritation that “[M.VJ’s dad [Vaska] hurt her.” In addition, sometime later while walking in Russian Mission with Olga, T.E. identified Vaska as the “ga-ga,” or perpetrator of the assault. These identifications by T.E. readily fall within the literal language of the rule and authoritative interpretations of it.18, 19
III. The Court of Appeals Correctly Affirmed on Prior Inconsistent Statement Grounds.
In my opinion the court of appeals correctly ruled that T.E.’s statements to Olga were admissible as prior inconsistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). As I explain in the discussion that follows, an adequate founda*1030tion for admitting the statements was established and no unfairness resulted from the fact that the statements were not explicitly admitted as prior inconsistent statements.
When a witness claims at trial that she does not remember the substance of a prior statement, the prior statement is considered to be inconsistent with the witness’s testimony and it may be admitted as a nonhearsay statement under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A).20
Today’s opinion treats lack of memory of a statement as a necessary foundational condition for admission of a statement as a prior inconsistent statement.21 In the second trial of this case T.E., then in the fourth grade, testified that she could not remember events when she was a “little tiny girl,” could not remember being in the first grade, and indeed could not remember anything before the third grade.22 The abuse that T.E. suffered, and her statements concerning it, occurred when she was three years old. In my view her testimony was sufficient to establish that she did not remember either the abuse or the statements, since she said that she remembered nothing at all about that period of her life. Thus it seems to me that the first foundational requirement for the admission of statements that the witness has forgotten making — lack of memory — was satisfied.
But the opinion of the court contends that, as a second foundational requirement, T.E. should have been given an opportunity to explain or deny the statements that she made when she was three years old.23 Normally, of course, the only explanation for not remembering making a statement is just that, not remembering making the statement. Where the witness is an adult, it does no harm to make a further inquiry, but in the ease of a young and frightened child, conducting an examination seeking some other explanation for unremembered statements would typically be both confusing and futile.24
The purposes of the opportunity to explain requirement are “to avoid unfair surprise to the adversary; to save time, since an admission by the witness may make extrinsic proof unnecessary; and to give the witness a fail’ chance to explain the discrepancy.”25 In this case considerations of fairness to the witness are not of concern because T.E. was not unfairly treated. Likewise, the time-saving purpose of the requirement is not implicated because the truth of T.E.’s lack of memory is not contested and because it would be an untenable irony to conclude that the possibility of avoiding delay could be a reason justifying reversing a jury verdict and requiring a new trial. In theory, the first purpose of the requirement — avoiding surprise to the adversary — might well be a significant factor. But here it was not because this case had already been tried. Yaska knew the substance of Olga’s impending testimony.26 Thus, under the facts of this case, none of the values sought to be advanced by the opportunity to explain foundational requirement would be prejudiced by not adhering to it.
Case law in Alaska counsels that the opportunity to explain requirement is distinctly optional where the witness is a young child. The leading case is McMaster v. State.27 McMaster was accused of shooting her husband. The couple’s five year-old daughter *1031testified that the father shot himself.28 The state put a family friend on the stand, who testified that the daughter told him after the shooting that “she saw her mommy shoot her daddy.”29 Over .objection, the state sought to admit this testimony under the predecessor to Rule 801(d)(1)(A), which had a substantially similar opportunity to explain requirement. The child had not been asked about the prior statement and it was offered after she had already testified. Nonetheless, this court upheld the admission of the statement. We observed that commentators on the law of evidence generally supported flexibility with respect to the opportunity to explain requirement, including dispensing with it altogether “if it seems fairer to do so.”30 We noted that this relaxed approach was advocated in the case of adult witnesses “without direct reflection on the other crucial problem in this ease: the fact the witness in question was only five years old.”31 In cases involving young children we indicated that there were even greater reasons not to insist on a mechanical application of this foundational requirement: “This is particularly true when the court is dealing with the testimony of a child of tender years.”32 Since McMas-ter, in every case in which the failure to adhere to the opportunity to explain requirement has been raised in cases involving young children, Alaska appellate courts have either approved dispensing with the requirement or have found incomplete compliance to be sufficient.33
Based on the above discussion, I conclude that of the two foundational requirements found wanting by today’s opinion, the first, lack of memory, was satisfied. The second, opportunity to explain, would not properly have been required in this case because any attempt to satisfy it would likely have been futile, none of the values sought to be advanced by the requirement were lost by dispensing with it, and case law suggests that it need not be applied to children of tender years.34
*1032But the question remains whether it was unfair to rule on appeal that the evidence would have been admissible on prior inconsistent statement grounds given that it was actually offered under the catch-all exception contained in Evidence Rule 804(b)(5). I do not think that there was any unfairness, primarily because admission of the evidence under either theory was predicated on T.E.’s lack of memory which Vaska decided not to challenge.
The basis for invoking the catch-all exception is unavailability of a witness due to lack of memory. Under Evidence Rule 804(a)(1) a witness is said to be unavailable when the witness “establishes a lack of memory of the subject matter of the [witness’s] statement.” As already noted, Vaska did not oppose the state’s offer of unavailability on the ground of T.E.’s lack of memory. If he had wished he could have requested that T.E. be recalled to the stand for cross-examination as to her lack of memory on the subject matter of the statements that he knew were about to be offered.35 T.E.’s lack of memory would also have been the foundational basis for admission of her statements on prior inconsistent statement grounds. Since Vaska chose not to cross-examine T.E. concerning her lack of memory when it formed the predicate for admission of her statements under Rule 804(b)(5), there is no reason to think that he would have done so if her lack of memory had formed the predicate for the admissibility of her statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).36
Moreover, at the time that T.E. testified the question of the admission of Dr. Burgess’s written child abuse report was still pending. Judge Funk had already indicated that the report might be admissible under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C) as a statement of identification if T.E. testified but, as T.E. had not yet testified, he had deferred ruling on the admission of the report. Vaska’s counsel, of course, knew T.E.’s testimony was the *1033predicate for admissibility of the child abuse report on prior identification grounds. The purpose of requiring a witness to testify before a statement of identification may be admitted under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C) is so that the opponent of the evidence may question the witness about the statement she has reportedly made.37 Vaska’s counsel thus knew that T.E.’s testimony opened the door for admission of the report containing T.E.’s statements to her mother, and that he had an opportunity to cross-examine her concerning it, yet he chose not to take advantage of this opportunity.38 Again, this points to the conclusion that Vaska likewise would have declined to cross-examine T.E. if T.E.’s statements to her mother had been offered on prior inconsistent statement grounds.
In summary, because T.E.’s lack of memory concerning her prior statements would be the predicate for admitting them under either the catch-all exception or as prior inconsistent statements, Yaska’s failure to seek cross-examination of her when the evidence was being offered under the former theory demonstrates that he would have done nothing different if the evidence had been introduced under the latter theory. This is underlined by the fact that while Vaska knew that the written account of the most damning statement that T.E. had made to Olga was pending admission as a prior identification, he still declined to exercise his right of cross-examination.
The bottom line is that the court is contemplating the possibility of a third trial in this case,39 ostensibly to give Vaska an opportunity to ask T.E. about the assault and her statements concerning it — even though Vaska conceded that T.E. has no memory of these matters, and even though Vaska had an opportunity to cross-examine T.E. about her lack of memory of the subject matter of her statements at a time when he knew the statements were about to be offered, yet showed no interest in doing so. I do not see what unfairness would be remedied by giving Vaska another trial.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

APPENDIX

THE COURT: You can leave now, that’s the end of your testimony ma’am.
(Witness excused)
THE COURT: Mr. Olson, your next witness?
MR. OLSON: I — you could just wait right outside. If we could approach?
THE COURT: Certainly.
(Bench conference as follows:)
(Whispered conversation)
MR. OLSON: (Indiscernible — away from microphone).
*1034THE COURT: Well, I mean, as to what? As to the next witnesses’ testimony?
(Whispered conversation)
THE COURT: Should we discuss this?
(Whispered conversation)
THE COURT: You’d like to discuss this for a while?
(Whispered conversation)
THE COURT: All right.
(End of bench conference)
THE COURT: We’re going to need to send you back to the jury room for a little bit to discuss this — a legal question. So, even though you’ve only been here a short while, we’ll send you back, we’ll get you back in here as soon as we can. Thank you very much.
(Pause)
THE COURT: Mr. Olson? The jury is not present.
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, what I am asking to do, rather than having to — number 1, so we can determine the issue but number 2, so it doesn’t have to come up every time as — potentially as an objection is to have [T.E.] declared unavailable under 804(a)(3).
THE COURT: And under 804(a)(3) unavailability of witness includes situations in which the declarant establishes a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement. And.
MR. OLSON: Then I’d, among other things, there’s some other exceptions but I’d be asking that certain statements made by [T.E.] be admitted under 804(b)(5).
THE COURT: Which is the catchall?
MR. OLSON: That’s correct. And I’m just doing it as an abundance of caution, Your Honor. This wasn’t — although the youth — wha—the—my—the young girl was unavailable in the last trial, she was actually physically hiding underneath a table in the library. So physically couldn’t come in but all the statements had — -were admitted before but I just want to establish this and there are some other grounds for admitting certain statements.
THE COURT: Mr. Soberay?
MR. SOBERAY: Well, if we have the jury out now, I.
THE COURT: I’m sorry, I didn’t understand the last statement.
MR. SOBERAY: Well, if the jury is out right now, I guess what the prosecution is asking is for the court to rule not on the availability or unavailability of a witness but to go further and determine whether or not the out of court statements by [T.E.] would be admissible.
THE COURT: Well, one come- — came in already without objection.
MR. SOBERAY: I understand that because my reading of the Bell case was such that unless she testifies — if she doesn’t testify then they wouldn’t be admissible. If she has testified under 801, I think it’s admissible.
THE COURT: It appears to me — I mean they’re a little ambiguous in the way the Court of Appeals and Judge Singleton’s language makes it ambiguous but it appears to the court that if the defendant testifies then, if what it is is an identification. Then prior identifications are admissible.
MR. SOBERAY: Right.
THE COURT: And that appears to be what’s the issue bef — in this, is a prior identifications. Under Natkong v. State, Alaska App. '96, the court had faced issues where a lack of memory or refusal to testify came up and the Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Carpeneti’s ruling that prior statements describing the sexual amus — abuse were admissible. It appears to the court that if you consider that they were statements by a very young girl to more than one person, that they — or issues of identification, that they were issues involving sexual abuse that there is consistent case law that such prior statements, prior identifications, come in. That there’s no reason to believe any particular reasons to find that these statements are so unreliable as to be inadmissible. Certainly the extent of such statements and the — are a subject for the weight to be considered by the jury after appropriate cross examination argument. So the court would allow the *1035mother to testify as to the statements that [T.E.] made concerning identification of the defendant and/or concerning the sexual abuse she suffered at the age that she was at at the time. Do we need anything else at this point.
MR. SOBERAY: Can I just make my argument.
THE COURT: Certainly.
MR. SOBERAY: .regarding that, Your Honor? And I understand the court has ruled, I’m — just maybe.
THE COURT: Make an offer of proof, you bet.
MR. SOBERAY: Well, essentially, Your Honor.
THE COURT: There’s (indiscernible) to be a ruling.
MR. SOBERAY: Well, essentially, Your Honor, I think we all know from the previous trial and we would — we’d expect that the testimony would be rather consistent with what had previously been testified. So that — that’s the proffer of what essentially is — think the testimony is going to be. But there is case law that goes back to — well, the 1970’s. I think it started with Torres versus State at 519, 788 where there was an exception for sex crimes and the first reporting of abuse or assault. But there were cases — a litteny of cases after that that sort of homed in on, you know, what it was that was so reliable about this first reporting exception. And what they basically said is, you know, the courts found that it to be reliable based on the fact that it was the first reporting and then they started getting into issues of how much time had passed. And there was one case that’s — that was cited in Greenway in 1980 — Greenway versus State, which was at 626, 1060 — 626 P.2d 1060, a Supreme Court from 1980 where they cited another case, State versus Tiuyford[ 85 S.D. 522, 186 N.W.2d 545 (1971)], T-w-y-f-o-r-d, which was a case out of South Dakota from 1971 where they said a delay of over two months not reason to exclude testimony since victim was only 12 years old.
The problem that we have here is we don’t know when this all — when this is supposed to have happened. The only thing that we have is the spring of 1994 is what’s alleged in the indictment. So if the spring of 1994 started in — March 20th and this is being reported in — May 6th or early May, then the question becomes is that such a long delay that we now get into the considerations that Green-way talked about in saying that delays reduce that indicia of reliability. And I don’t have any case law and I don’t think that any court is going to say it’s got to be two weeks or four weeks — I don’t think there’s anything like that, I think it’s a judgment call. So, we don’t know exactly when, and I don’t think anybody is going to tell us, but I think the court could glean some information from the doctor’s testimony and that would suggest that some healing had taken place and that there had to be some length of time and so if that’s the case, that — that’s basically my argument. We just don’t know — it’s just there’s no nexus between when it occurred and when the reporting is done and your indicia of reliability is substantially reduced and therefore it would be unfair to admit the statements.
THE COURT: The court will still allow it. The court accepts that what the argument that’s being asserted is is that certainly on issues of reliability, newness of the event to the time of report, especially when dealing with adults increases the level of reliability. And clearly in this case, we — we’re dealing with a very young child whose ability to carefully discern dates, if we had them, would be difficult to find reliable. In this case we don’t have any but the court, given the number of eases that find because it’s not just a witness talking about a prior event, but it is someone identifying a defendant as causing an injury, it is a specific prior statement about sex abuse, it is one where the person testifying is of such young age that these are always problematic.
The court doesn’t find that a sufficient basis, given broad general exceptions under 804(b)(5), the court finds in its discretion that given the evidence presented to date and the review of the court file that the offer of proof is such that the court believes that testimony *1036by the mother of statements made by her, by her daughter, concerning this incident will be admissible. Anything further at this time?
MR. SOBERAY: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So we’re ready to — why don’t we call her in and get her in and situated.
MR. SOBERAY: Your Honor, so as not to interrupt, may I have a continuing objection.
THE COURT: And — absolutely. And there will be a continuing objection. I’d much prefer to make sure that’s clear on the record so I don’t have to — you don’t feel compelled to keep jumping up and down.
MR. SOBERAY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Vaska, that means that your attorney — the court respects and has admitted for the record that your attorney, if I didn’t say there was continuing objection, would want to object to each and every question and I’d say overruled and not to have that happen, I’ve just — he has just said that he’s going to continue to object to the court’s ruling and that I have noted that for the record and I’ve denied all of those objections now to all the questions. Okay?

. I have attached as an appendix the portion of the transcript that contains these rulings. The ruling on prior identification grounds is found at pages 1034-35 of the appendix.

. The form report sets out T.E.’s statements to Olga as follows: Child told mother that her "girl” hurt for four days and mother noted irritation and slight discharge from vagina. She cont'd to complain of pain from that area. Stated that "go-*1026cha” hurt her (monster), then stated [M.VJ's "gocha” and after further questioning she stated that [M.VJ's daddy's "gocha” touched her and hurt her.

. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C) provides:
(d) A statement is not hearsay if
(1) The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and the statement is
[[Image here]]
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person[J

. 716 P.2d 1004 (Alaska App.1986).

. After the child testified and the state had presented its last witness the court again took up the question of the admissibility of the report. The court ruled that the report was admissible, particularly that the identifications were permitted under the prior identification theory of Bell.

. Alaska R. Evid. 804(a)(3).

. 716 P.2d 1004.

. Id. at 1006.

. The court presumably meant "declarant” instead of "defendant” (since all the exceptions of Rule 801(d) apply only if "[t]he declarant testifies”).

. 925 P.2d 672 (Alaska App. 1996).

. Alaska Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) provides:
(d) A statement is not hearsay if
(1) The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony. Unless the interests of justice otherwise require, the prior statement shall be excluded unless
(i) the witness was so examined while testifying as to give the witness an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement or
(ii) the witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action[.]

. Natkong, 925 P.2d at 678 n. 5.

. Id. at 678.

. 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980).

. This argument was based on the fact that the indictment said the assault occurred in "spring,” which begins in March, whereas T.E. first reported the crime in May, suggesting a gap of perhaps a month and a half. But the evidence at trial established that T.E. reported the assault only a few days after it occurred.

. It is not uncommon for courts to admit, and approve the admission of, evidence on more than one basis, even when one of the grounds for admission is the catch-all ground expressed in Rule 804(b)(5). Judge Funk would have understood this because one such case is Natkong v. State, 925 P.2d 672 (Alaska App.1996), which he referred to in his ruling. Another is Dezarn v. State, 832 P.2d 589, 590 (Alaska App.1992) (discussed in footnote 17). Courts elsewhere are in accord. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 699 N.W.2d 790 (Minn.App.2005) (Subsequently recanted statements by victim to nurse were offered as statements of identification or, alternatively, under the medical diagnosis and catch-all exceptions to the hearsay rule. Trial court admitted them under the medical diagnosis exception. On *1029appeal, statements were held not admissible under the medical diagnosis exception but they were admissible as statements of identification and under the catch-all exceptions.); United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F.Supp. 329, 339-41 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (Statement admissible under three specific exceptions to the hearsay rule as well as under the catch-all. The trial judge, Judge Weinstein, an eminent evidence expert, observed that the guarantee of trustworthiness required by the catch-all provision “has already been demonstrated in the discussion of [the specific hearsay exceptions under which the evidence was also admissible].”).

. See, e.g., Dezarn, 832 P.2d at 590 (Testimony was admitted both as an excited utterance under Alaska Evidence Rule 803(2) and under the residual hearsay exception of Alaska Evidence Rule 804(b)(5). The court of appeals upheld the admission as an excited utterance and concluded that because the statement "was admissible under Evidence Rule 803(2), we need not reach [the superior court's] alternative ruling that [the] statement was also admissible under Evidence Rule 804(b)(5).").

. See, e.g., Buchanan v. State, 554 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Alaska 1976), a case foreshadowing and suggesting the adoption of the prior identification exception so that "witness A may testily as to witness B's extra-judicial identification if the circumstances surrounding the prior identification were not such as to render it unfair or unreliable, and witness B is available for cross-examination.” See also, e.g., United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir.1994) (“Generally, evidence is admitted under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C) when a witness has identified the defendant ... but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.”); Commentary, Alaska R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C) ("An early, out-of-court identification provides fairness to defendants by ensuring accuracy of the identification. At the same time, it aids the government by making sure that delays in the criminal justice system do not lead to cases falling through because the witness can no longer recall the identity of the person he saw commit the crime.... Accord, Buchanan v. State, 554 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Alaska 1976)."). I note also that under Buchanan a case-by-case review of the circumstances surrounding the prior identification for reliability is appropriate.

.In deference to the position of my colleagues, I am willing to assume for purposes of discussion that Judge Funk’s ruling that he "would allow the mother to testify as to the statements that [T.E.] made concerning identification” indicated not that he was admitting the mother's testimony directly as a prior identification but instead that because he viewed the testimony as equivalent in trustworthiness to a prior identification, he was admitting it under the catch-all exception. If so, it seems to me that the question of admissibility would be put to rest by deciding that admission on prior identification grounds would have been proper. It should be easier, not more difficult, to admit evidence that satisfies a direct hearsay exception on the basis of the particular exception rather than under the multi-factored catch-all rule. And unlike the prior inconsistent statement basis in the present case, there are no arguably unmet foundational rules in connection with the statement of identification ground. All that is required is an identification and that the declar-ant testify.

. See Wassilie v. State, 57 P.3d 719, 722-23 (Alaska App.2002) (reviewing federal cases).

. See 135 P.3d at 1015-17.

. See the excerpt of the transcript quoted in the opinion of the court at pages 1013 and 1014 supra.

. 135 P.3d at 1015-17; the opportunity to explain requirement is expressed in Evidence Rule 801 (d)(1 )(A)(i) set out supra at note 11.

. At the first trial T.E. was so frightened that, according to Vaska, "she hid from the prosecutor and the judge and refused to come out from under a desk....”

. McCormick on Evidence § 37 at 133 (5th ed.1999).

. At the first trial T.E.’s statements to Olga identifying Vaska as the person who had abused her that were made before the visit to Dr. Burgess were admitted without objection. T.E.’s later identification of Vaska during the walk in the village was elicited by Vaska’s counsel on recross-examination.

. 512 P.2d 879 (Alaska 1973).

. Id. at 882.

. Id. at 880.

. Id. at 883 (quoting McCormick Law of Evidence § 37 at 70 (1954)).

. Id.

. Id. at 882.

. See, e.g., Richards v. State, 616 P.2d 870, 871-72 (Alaska 1980). ("When Lonnie testified at trial that he had forgotten much of what he had seen that night, the tape was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement. And under McMas-ter the prosecution was not required to allow Lonnie to explain his inconsistent statement before introducing it, because of his young age.") (citations omitted); Bodine v. State, 737 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Alaska App.1987) (general questions found to be sufficient compliance since "[i]n determining the sufficiency of the foundation for admission of prior inconsistent statements, the trial court is allowed considerable latitude, particularly where the witness is a young child."); Yatchmenoff v. State, Mem. Op. & L No. 4717, 2003 WL 21350242 (Alaska App., June 11, 2003) (child was confronted with several but not all of the inconsistent statements that were admitted; noting the generally fruitless result of the confrontation the court held that the superior court had not abused its discretion in finding that an adequate foundation had been laid); accord Wassilie, 57 P.3d at 722 (where prosecution sought to introduce elderly witness's prior statement after witness had been excused, prior statement was properly admitted even though the witness was not asked about his prior statement or requested to explain or deny it, because witness was confused and further testimony was not apt to be useful).

.In addition, since none of the purposes of the opportunity to explain requirement would have been advanced by adhering to it in this case, any complaint by Vaska that it should have been followed falls within the realm of harmless error. Civil Rule 61 teaches that courts "at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Today's opinion suggests that a substantial right, namely a defendant's "right to rely on the State’s burden of proof in a criminal case,” is affected when the opportunity to explain requirement is not followed. 135 P.3d at 1017. I do not agree. The burden of proof at all times remains with the state regardless of whether or not the opportunity to explain requirement is followed. The suggestion to the contrary by the court would make the explicit alternatives to the opportunity to explain requirement that are built into the rule— 801 (d)(l)(A)(ii) (witness not excused from giving further testimony) and the interests of justice exception — dead letters in criminal cases; it is also inconsistent with McMaster. Today's opinion also suggests that the opportunity to explain requirement is necessary to protect a defendant's "rights to effective confrontation and cross-examination.” 135 P.3d at 1017 (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988)). Owens held that *1032the confrontation clause is not violated by the admission of an out-of-court identification made by a witness who suffers from memory loss at trial. The Court held that an opportunity to cross-examine a forgetful witness satisfies the confrontation clause: "The confrontation clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id. at 559. Owens does not state that the opportunity to explain requirement serves vital purposes in protecting rights to effective confrontation and cross-examination. In fact, tire opinion does not mention the opportunity to explain requirement by name nor does it refer to the Federal Evidence Rule that includes the requirement, F.R.C.P. 613(b) (relating to use of prior statements for impeachment purposes).

. The opponent of evidence offered based on a claim of unavailability of a witness arising from the witness's loss of memory may cross-examine the witness. McCormick on Evidence § 253 at 128 (5th ed.1999). If the witness's forgetfulness is only partial we have suggested that resort both to present testimony, to the extent of recollection, and hearsay would be appropriate. In re T.P., 838 P.2d 1236, 1240 n. 7 (Alaska 1992).

. A defendant's right to cross-examine a witness whose statement is admitted on inconsistent statement grounds because the witness does not remember making the statement is not regarded as meaningless in a constitutional sense. As the court of appeals noted in this case, quoting Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 188-89, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), which subsequently was adopted by the Court in Owens, 484 U.S. at 558, 108 S.Ct. 838:
The fact that the witness, though physically available, cannot recall either the underlying events that are the subject of an extra-judicial statement or previous testimony or recollect the circumstances under which the statement was given, does not have Sixth Amendment consequences. The prosecution has no less fulfilled its obligation simply because a witness has a lapse of memory. The witness is, in my view, available. To the extent that the witness is, in a practical sense, unavailable for cross-examination on the relevant facts, for reasons stated [previously], I think confrontation is nonetheless satisfied.
Vaska v. State, 74 P.3d 225, 229 (Alaska App.2003). Today's opinion seems to agree with this statement. 135 P.3d at 1020-21. This is a matter of significance because the question initially presented by Vaska in his petition for hearing to this court (before the scope of the petition was expanded by this court’s direction to brief additional issues) was whether the court of appeals had erred in its reliance on Owens in preference to Van Hatten v. State, 666 P.2d 1047 (Alaska App.1983). In Van flatten the court of appeals rejected the general formula advocated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Green. Van flatten, of course, was decided before Justice Harlan's rationale was adopted by the opinion of the Court in Owens. The state argues, and I agree, that this aspect of Van Hatten "appears to be out of step with current law.”

.See Buchanan v. State, 554 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1976). In Buchanan this court suggested adopting a new exception to the hearsay rule that became the prior identification rule expressed in Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C). We stated:
Although we do not decide the question at this time, we also think there is considerable merit in the state’s argument that a new exception to the hearsay rule should be recognized. The state contends that witness A may testify as to witness B's extrajudicial identification if the circumstances surrounding the prior identification were not such as to render it unfair or unreliable, and witness B is available for cross-examination. Professor Wigmore supports such a rule as do a large number of courts, both on the basis of the reliability of such evidence and because cross-examination is readily available. If the rationale behind the hearsay rule is that the declarant cannot be cross-examined and cannot be observed by the trier of fact, such rationale is inapplicable when the person actually making the identification is available at trial.
Id. at 1157-58 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

. I do not question the soundness of this tactical decision. I suspect that most trial attorneys would have concluded that the possible risks involved in cross-examining T.E. far outweighed any benefits that might have been gained. Likewise, I do not suggest that Vaska had a duty to cross-examine T.E. Contra 135 P.3d at 1021-22.

. Whether a third trial takes place depends on the court of appeals' resolution on remand of the questions whether Olga’s account of T.E.'s statements was admissible on grounds other than prior inconsistent statement grounds and whether any error was harmless.