Court Opinion

ID: 9774831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:35:02.444976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:16.639608
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority and with Mr. Justice Byrd that the search warrant was invalid. I agree with Mr. Justice Byrd that the state did not meet its burden of proving consent. I would add that the search was not permissible as incident to the arrest. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970). I still would hold that the search was not unreasonable. In spite of the fact that the affidavit for the search warrant failed to properly establish probable cause for a search, there was certainly probable cause for Byars’ arrest. By the same token, there was probable cause to search the automobile driven by him for contraband, marijuana. Ever since Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), it has been recognized that automobiles may be searched without a warrant in circumstances which would not justify the search of a house or office, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize. The United States Supreme Court said this in Carroll: “The measure of legality of such a seizure is, therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported.” In Chambers the precepts of Carroll were applied. In speaking of Carroll, the Chambers court said: The Court also noted that the search of an auto on probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly different from that justifying the search incident to an arrest: “The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Finding that there was probable cause for the search and seizure at issue before it, the Court affirmed the convictions. In Chambers it was held that given probable cause for a search, an intense warrantless search of the automobile after it had been removed to the police station was not unreasonable. A reading of Chambers in the light of Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S. Ct. 304, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1975), makes the search of an automobile reasonable if there is probable cause, and the fact that an automobile, rather than a house or an office is searched, furnishes exigent circumstances. In White consent was refused, and the automobile had been taken to the police station by a police officer. The search was not conducted until about 45 minutes after it had been brought to the station house, duri g which time the officers were questioning the arrested driv .r of the automobile. In this case the officers took Byars into custody, put him in jail, obtained an invalid warrant, then took Byars back to the automobile, and after he made the statements set out in full in the dissenting opinion, seized the automobile and returned both Byars and the automobile to the police station where the search was conducted. It seems to me that the seizure was justified under Chambers and that the search for contraband at the police station without a warrant can be justified. Even where contraband is not involved, we have sustained warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause. See Anderson v. State, 256 Ark. 912, 511 S.W. 2d 151; Roach v. State, 255 Ark. 773, 503 S.W. 2d 467; Cox v. State, 254 Ark. 1, 491 S.W. 2d 802; Moore v. State, 244 Ark. 1197, 429 S.W. 2d 122. I should note that Steel v. State, 248 Ark. 159, 450 S.W. 2d 545, was decided on the basis of validity of a search incident to an arrest, applying Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, reh. den. 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 36, 23 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1969). This was before the decision in Chambers. In a footnote to that opinion it was pointed out that nothing in Chimel purported to modify or affect the rationale of Carroll. Steel probably would have, been decided differently after Chambers, or if the searches in Steel has been considered in the light of anything except a search incident to an arrest and a search with a warrant. I would affirm the judgment.