Court Opinion

ID: 9385492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 21:03:11.260644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.301835
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 200511-U

                                   Order filed April 6, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                            THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )       Appeal No. 3-20-0511
             v.                                       )       Circuit No. 15-CF-367
                                                      )
      KEVIN E. BARNETT,                               )       Honorable
                                                      )       Daniel L. Kennedy,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Brennan and Peterson concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                ORDER

¶1          Held: (1) The circuit court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
                  superseding indictment. (2) The defendant forfeited the arguments regarding the
                  overhear recordings. (3) The court did not err by allowing evidence of other bad
                  acts. (4) The evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
                  reasonable doubt. (5) This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s as-
                  applied constitutional challenge to the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act.

¶2          The defendant, Kevin E. Barnett, appeals his convictions for aggravated criminal sexual

     abuse. The defendant argues that the Will County circuit court erred by denying his motion to

     dismiss the superseding indictment, admitting overhear recordings into evidence, and admitting
     evidence of other bad acts. He further argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove him

     guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Last, he argues that the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act

     (SORA) is unconstitutional as applied to him and that, in any event, the registration requirement

     in effect at the time of the offenses should apply.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4          The State charged the defendant by superseding indictment with seven counts of

     aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West 1996)). Pertinent to this appeal,

     count II alleged that between January 7 and 8, 1999, the defendant “placed his penis upon the

     body of K.M.” K.M. was 14 at the time, and the defendant was 26. Count III alleged that

     between January 7 and 8, 1999, “the defendant placed his mouth upon the breasts of K.M.”

     Count IV alleged that on or about November 22, 1997, “the defendant placed his mouth upon the

     breasts of K.M.” The remaining counts alleged the defendant placed his hands on K.M.’s vagina

     or breasts between March 1, 1997, and November 30, 1999.

¶5          Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to admit other bad acts evidence involving

     the defendant and K.M. The State alleged that K.M. made statements that when she had visited

     her sister, T.R., and the defendant (her sister’s ex-husband) in Florida in 1997 and 1998, “the

     defendant and her would take showers, the defendant would put his finger in her vagina and

     would touch her breasts, she would rub his penis, and they would kiss and slow-danced together.

     On one occasion, the defendant placed his penis in her mouth.” The State argued that the

     evidence was admissible on various bases, including pursuant to section 115-7.3 of the Code of

     Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2018)). The defendant requested

     an evidentiary hearing, which the court denied. The court conducted an in camera review of the

                                                       2
     police reports and various statements by K.M., T.R., and the defendant. The court granted the

     motion.

¶6          The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. The motion alleged

     that during the grand jury proceedings, the State asked Detective William Sheehan, “During the

     overhears, did the defendant admit that he faintly remembers that [K.M.] gave him oral sex at

     one time?” and Sheehan responded “Yes.” The motion argued that this testimony was false and

     misleading and that no such admission was made by the defendant during the overhears. Further,

     the motion alleged that “the State misled and deceived the grand jury when answering the Jurors’

     questions regarding the Defendant’s coaching and sex offender status.” In this regard, the motion

     argued that it was irrelevant that the defendant coached softball. At the hearing on the motion,

     the defendant tendered a copy of the transcripts, Sheehan’s revised report, and the relevant

     overhear recording as exhibits. The defendant’s argument during the hearing focused on the

     purported admission that the defendant “faintly remember[ed]” and did not address the grand

     jury’s question regarding the defendant coaching.

¶7          The State argued that it “listened to the tape before we put the detective on the stand in

     the Grand Jury. That is what was said before the Grand Jury and that is what is on the overhear.”

     The State told the court that it believed that if the court listened carefully, it would hear the

     defendant state that he “faintly remember[ed].” The State contended that it had listened to the

     tape several times and that even if it misheard the tape, it was not falsified, deliberate or

     intentional. It further contended that Sheehan would stand by his testimony, The State reiterated

     that it believed defendant said “I don’t know, [K.M.], I faintly remember” on the overhear and

     that is why it presented it to the grand jury. The court read the exhibits and listened to the

     recording. It denied the motion.

                                                        3
¶8          At the bench trial, evidence established that K.M. was born March 11, 1984, and

     defendant was born October 31, 1972. K.M. testified that she originally had a brother/sister-like

     relationship with the defendant. They would often play wrestle. On one occasion in 1997, when

     they were wrestling, the defendant grabbed her breasts. She indicated it was intentional, although

     admitted she had previously described it as accidental. Sometime after this incident, in July

     1997, the defendant and T.R. moved to Florida. The defendant returned to Illinois in October

     1997 for a family reunion. While in Illinois, the defendant again touched K.M.’s breasts.

¶9          On November 22, 1997, the defendant was in Illinois for K.M.’s grandparents’

     anniversary party. She and the defendant made an excuse to leave the party, which she stated was

     for her to change clothes. There were discrepancies in K.M.’s testimony and previous statements

     as to what that excuse was. When K.M. and the defendant left the party, they went to K.M.’s

     parents’ house and

                    “were kissing each other and using our tongues, and he was feeling my breasts

                    and lifted up my shirt and moved my bra and was kissing my breasts and ***

                    sucked my nipples and used his teeth to drag my nipples, and then while we were

                    kissing and our bodies were dry humping.”

     She described “dry humping” as their “bodies were pressed against each other. I could feel his

     erection. His hands were touching my breasts and under my shirt and was rubbing on top of my

     underwear.” K.M. stated that the defendant used his hand to rub her vagina. The State admitted

     into evidence a VHS tape depicting portions of the anniversary party, which K.M. stated was

     accurate to the best of her knowledge. The defendant objected as to the reliability of the tape,

     noting that there were time gaps in the tape. The court allowed the tape into evidence. K.M.

     identified herself and the defendant on the tape.

                                                         4
¶ 10           K.M. testified that in July 1998, she visited the defendant and T.R. in Florida. K.M.

       thought of the defendant as a boyfriend at that time. During the visit, the defendant showered

       with K.M. once. In the shower, they kissed, their bodies touched, and the defendant kissed

       K.M.’s breasts and rubbed her vagina. On another occasion, the defendant was stroking his penis

       and K.M. put her mouth on his penis. She stated that the defendant showed her how and she

       “gave him a blow job.” On another occasion, while the defendant and K.M. watched a movie

       together, the defendant rubbed her vagina and breasts while she touched his penis.

¶ 11           During a December 1998 visit to Florida, K.M. and the defendant kissed using their

       tongues. Their bodies were pressed together, and the defendant had an erection.

¶ 12           In January 1999, the defendant returned to Illinois for K.M.’s grandfather’s funeral.1 The

       defendant and K.M. left the funeral and went to her parents’ home. There, they kissed, they “dry

       hump[ed]” and their bodies rubbed against each other. The defendant put his fingers in her

       vagina and kissed her breasts and bit her nipples. The defendant had an erection.

¶ 13           Aside from these specific instances of sexual contact with the defendant, there were other

       times that they would kiss, the defendant would touch her breasts, and the defendant would put

       his finger in her vagina. She could not recall exact dates or specifically how many times, but it

       happened frequently.

¶ 14           In January or February 1999, K.M. testified that the defendant sent her an email which

       stated that he missed touching and holding her. She did not recall what she did with the email

       and a copy was not introduced into evidence. T.R. confronted K.M. about K.M.’s relationship

               The transcript states that it was for her “Grandma[’s]” funeral. This was an apparent
               1

       misstatement, as all other references indicate it was the grandfather’s funeral.
                                                           5
       with the defendant after the email. The defendant told her to tell T.R. that the defendant was

       comforting her because she was upset her grandfather died and that is what K.M. did.

¶ 15          K.M. reported the abuse to the police in November 2013. In 2014, K.M. participated in

       various recorded conversations with the defendant pursuant to court-approved consensual

       overhears. When the State sought to admit the first of the overhear recordings, defense counsel

       objected stating that he had a standing objection to all the overhear recordings and the objection

       was “to the appropriateness of the overhear itself.” The court overruled the objection and the

       overhear recordings were admitted into evidence and played for the court.

¶ 16          During the first overhear recording, K.M. told the defendant that they never talked about

       what happened years ago and it bothered her. When K.M. asked if he ever told anyone, the

       defendant said no and then stated he did a complete turnaround in his life. Further, he

       acknowledged that what happened was inappropriate for both of them. When confronted with

       specific allegations, the defendant stated that he had “somewhat mentally blocked all of that.”

       Over the course of the recordings, the defendant apologized but did not explicitly admit to any

       specific allegations K.M. made, other than kissing her.

¶ 17          During cross-examination, the defense highlighted various discrepancies in K.M.’s

       testimony or between K.M.’s testimony and her prior statements. Additionally, counsel elicited

       testimony that K.M. lied to the defendant during the recorded conversations and that her goal

       during the conversations was to get the defendant to admit to the sexual contact she alleged

       occurred between them.

¶ 18          T.R. testified that in February 1999, she found an email from the defendant to K.M. that

       stated that the defendant missed holding, touching, and kissing K.M. She confronted the

       defendant, and they argued about the email. The defendant told T.R. to call K.M. and ask her

                                                        6
       about it. T.R. called K.M. and confronted her. She believed what K.M. told her. K.M. printed a

       copy of the email and kept it until she shredded it in 2004.

¶ 19          In August 2014, T.R. called the defendant and told him she had a conversation with K.M.

       The defendant apologized for hurting her and K.M. The defendant did not have an answer when

       T.R. asked him why he did it.

¶ 20          Marc Reid, a lieutenant with the Joliet Police Department, testified that he knew the

       defendant. In March 2015, the defendant asked if he would be willing to speak on his behalf for

       an upcoming court matter. The defendant described the matter as “approximately 18 years ago,

       ex-boyfriend/girlfriend relationship, and the ex-girlfriend was alleging that the relationship went

       too far.” Reid testified on the defendant’s behalf at a bond condition hearing.

¶ 21          After the State rested, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court granted a

       directed verdict as to count VII. Defense counsel called Sheehan as a witness and questioned him

       regarding statements made by K.M., Sheehan’s report, and Sheehan’s testimony in front of the

       grand jury. After the close of evidence, the court found the defendant guilty of counts II, III, and

       IV and not guilty of counts I, V, and VI.

¶ 22          Defense counsel filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new

       trial. The motion argued there was insufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty beyond a

       reasonable doubt. It further argued that the court erred in granting the State’s motion to admit

       other bad acts evidence and admitting the VHS tape because this evidence was not probative and

       was overly prejudicial. The motion also argued that: (1) the court erred in denying the

       defendant’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment; (2) the court erred in not sustaining

       objections and striking testimony, although it does not reference any specific instances; and (3)

       “[t]he Court also erred in admitting into evidence each and every exhibit offered by the State to

                                                        7
       which the Defendant objected” and allowing the State to make inflammatory and prejudicial

       remarks in closing arguments. At the hearing, counsel largely stood on the written motion, but

       made some argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence and the alleged error in admitting

       evidence of other bad acts. The court denied the motion.

¶ 23          The defendant also filed a motion arguing that the SORA requirements were

       unconstitutional as applied to him, and that regardless, he should be allowed to choose whether

       to be subject to the SORA requirements in effect at the time of the offense or those in effect at

       the time of sentencing. The court denied the motion. It sentenced the defendant to 60 days in jail

       and 30 months’ probation. The court entered orders certifying the defendant as a sex offender,

       and notifying the defendant that he must register, that the failure to register shall result in

       probation revocation, and the period of registration is natural life. The defendant appeals.

¶ 24                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25                            A. Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment

¶ 26          The defendant argues that the court should have granted his motion to dismiss the

       superseding indictment because the State presented false and misleading testimony and irrelevant

       information to the grand jury. Specifically, the State elicited testimony that the defendant stated

       he “faintly remember[ed]” K.M. giving him oral sex and that it allowed a question from the

       grand jury regarding whether the defendant was coaching at that time.

¶ 27          The State argues this court must presume the circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s

       motion to dismiss was proper because the grand jury transcripts are not contained in the record

       on appeal. See People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264 (2000). The defendant acknowledges the

       record does not contain the grand jury transcripts but appended them to his reply brief. The

       appendix is not part of the record and although the defendant references a motion to supplement

                                                          8
       the record in his briefing, no such motion was filed. See People v. Wright, 2013 IL App (1st)

       103232, ¶ 38 (“[t]he inclusion of evidence in an appendix is an improper supplementation of the

       record with information dehors the record”); Ill. S. Ct. R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). Therefore, we

       do not consider the grand jury transcripts. However, the record is sufficient to address the

       defendant’s argument without presuming the court’s ruling was proper.

¶ 28          “The grand jury determines whether probable cause exists that an individual has

       committed a crime” and “[g]enerally, a defendant may not attack an indictment returned by a

       legally constituted grand jury.” People v. Sampson, 406 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1057 (2011). “A

       defendant may, however, challenge an indictment that is procured through prosecutorial

       misconduct.” People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 255 (1998). Dismissal of the indictment is

       only warranted if there is an “unequivocally clear” denial of due process and “actual and

       substantial” prejudice. People v. Oliver, 368 Ill. App. 3d 690, 695 (2006). “The due process

       rights of a defendant may be violated if the prosecutor deliberately or intentionally misleads the

       grand jury, uses known perjured or false testimony, or presents other deceptive or inaccurate

       evidence.” DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 257. “[A] due process violation consisting of prosecutorial

       misconduct before a grand jury is actually and substantially prejudicial only if without it the

       grand jury would not have indicted the defendant.” Oliver, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 696-97.

¶ 29          In the circuit court, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment contained a

       purported quote of the grand jury transcripts indicating that the State elicited testimony that the

       defendant said he “faintly remember[ed]” K.M. giving him oral sex. He argued that this was

       false and misleading because the overhear recordings did not contain such a statement. The State

       acknowledged that it elicited the testimony but maintained that the overhear recordings contained

       that statement. Both parties and the court agreed that it was difficult to hear what was said.

                                                         9
¶ 30          In light of the State’s representation to the circuit court, the absence of any evidence to

       the contrary, and the agreement of all that the recording was difficult to hear, we find that the

       State did not deliberately or intentionally provide inaccurate information or mislead the grand

       jury. Thus, it is not “unequivocally clear” that the defendant was denied due process. See id. at

       695. Regardless, the purportedly improper testimony involved allegations of oral sex but none of

       the charges levied against the defendant in the superseding indictment contain allegations of oral

       sex. Therefore, we cannot say the grand jury would not have indicted the defendant absent the

       testimony and thus, no actual or substantial prejudice resulted from the alleged misconduct.

¶ 31          As to the defendant’s arguments regarding questions about the defendant coaching, the

       defendant’s motion in the circuit court only made a conclusory statement that the State misled

       and deceived the grand jury when answering questions regarding coaching. Neither the motion,

       nor counsel during argument on the motion, expounded on the substance of such answers or how

       they were allegedly false or misleading. In his opening brief, the defendant provides slightly

       more detail, noting that the grand jury questioned whether the defendant was currently coaching

       softball for 12 and 13 year old girls, which was the same general age of K.M. at the time of the

       alleged abuse, but fails to point to anything false or misleading about this purported question or

       the answer. Assuming the grand jury asked that question, there is nothing about that question that

       would lead to a conclusion that the defendant was denied due process or that the question or

       answer led to the indictment of the defendant. In his reply brief, the defendant attempts to

       provide significantly more detail regarding this allegation by quoting various portions of the

       transcript, but the defendant did not make these arguments in the circuit court, and they are

       forfeited. See People v. Estrada, 394 Ill. App. 3d 611, 626 (2009) (“It is axiomatic that

                                                        10
       arguments may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Based on the foregoing, the circuit

       court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

¶ 32                                        B. Overhear Recordings

¶ 33          The defendant argues that the overhear authorization was obtained without a showing of

       reasonable cause, and admission of the overhear recordings into evidence caused significant

       prejudice. The defendant forfeited review of this issue as he did not raise the specific arguments

       in the circuit court that he advances on appeal. See id. (“Because it is improper to raise an

       argument for the first time on appeal, we deem it waived.”); see also Mabry v. Boler, 2012 IL

       App (1st) 111464, ¶ 15 (“Generally, arguments not raised before the circuit court are forfeited

       and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Instead, defendant only made a general

       objection to the admittance of the overhear recordings during trial and never referred to the

       purported lack of reasonable cause for the overhear in his trial objection or posttrial motion.

¶ 34                                      C. Other Bad Acts Evidence

¶ 35          The defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in admitting other bad acts

       evidence—allegations of sexual contact between the defendant and K.M. in Florida during the

       same time period as the conduct underlying the charges in the instant matter. Relatedly, he

       argues that the court erred by concluding the other bad acts evidence was admissible without

       conducting an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 36          Generally, evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes is inadmissible because it is so

       persuasive of the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes that it becomes unfairly prejudicial.

       People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003). However, in matters involving charges of

       aggravated criminal sexual abuse, evidence that the defendant committed another similar offense

       “may be admissible (if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence) and

                                                        11
       may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (b)

       (West 2018). Section 115-7.3 of the Code allows “courts to admit evidence of other crimes to

       show defendant’s propensity to commit sex offenses.” Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 176. Additionally,

       “it is well established that in sexual offense cases evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual activity

       with the same child is admissible to show the defendant’s intent, design or course of conduct and

       to corroborate the victim’s testimony concerning the charged offense.” People v. Anderson, 225

       Ill. App. 3d 636, 647 (1992). “In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue

       prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider: (1) the proximity in time to the charged or

       predicate offense; (2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or

       (3) other relevant facts and circumstances.” 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(c) (West 2018).

                              “The trial court’s decision to admit or deny other-crimes evidence to show

                      the defendant’s propensity to commit sex offenses will not be disturbed absent an

                      abuse of discretion. [Citation.] A trial court abuses is discretion where its ruling is

                      arbitrary, fanciful or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by

                      the court.” People v. Taylor, 383 Ill. App. 3d 591, 594 (2008).

¶ 37          Here, the situations involving the Florida acts and the offenses the defendant was charged

       with are similar as they involve sexual acts with the same victim, K.M. Additionally, the Florida

       acts occurred during the same time frame as the instant offenses. The evidence was probative to

       show the defendant’s propensity to commit the offenses, to show his course of conduct with

       K.M., and to corroborate K.M.’s testimony regarding the instant offenses. Moreover, the

       defendant was tried in a bench trial and

                      “[t]he rule generally barring other-crimes evidence is based on the belief that the

                      introduction of the evidence may over-persuade a jury to convict a defendant only

                                                        12
                       because the jury believes the defendant is a bad person deserving punishment.

                       [Citation.] In a bench trial, this fear is assuaged; it is presumed that the trial court

                       considered the other-crimes evidence only for the limited purpose for which it

                       was introduced.” People v. Nash, 2013 IL App (1st) 113366, ¶ 24.

       The defendant has not rebutted this presumption. Therefore, the prejudicial effect of the

       testimony did not substantially outweigh its probative value. The court did not abuse its

       discretion in admitting the evidence. See Donoho 204 Ill. 2d at 183.

¶ 38           Additionally, although the defendant argues that the court erred in refusing to hold an

       evidentiary hearing as he requested, he acknowledges that there is no law granting him the right

       to an evidentiary hearing. We see no error in the court’s refusal to hold one.

¶ 39                                D. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

¶ 40           The defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion for a judgment

       notwithstanding the verdict. However, the defendant’s argument is framed as a challenge to the

       sufficiency of the evidence and a contention that the court’s erroneous evidentiary rulings

       deprived him of a fair trial such that his motion for new trial should have been granted.

       Accordingly, we address each of these arguments in turn.

¶ 41           When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, this court determines whether the

       evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, would permit any rational trier of

       fact to find that the State proved the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People

       v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). “This standard of review does not allow the reviewing court

       to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the

       evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009).

       “[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to

                                                          13
       be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v. Akis, 63

       Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976). The credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict. People

       v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36.

¶ 42          To find the defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the State needed to

       prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed “an act of sexual penetration or

       sexual conduct with [K.M.] who was at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the

       [defendant] was at least 5 years older than [K.M.]” 720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West 1996). The

       defendant solely challenges the proof of the alleged sexual conduct. As alleged in the indictment,

       the State needed to prove that “the defendant placed his mouth upon the breasts of K.M.” on two

       different occasions, and the defendant “placed his penis upon the body of K.M.” The State

       presented evidence of these acts through K.M.’s testimony. Although the defendant asserts that

       K.M. was not credible because the alleged conduct occurred long before it was reported and

       there were some inconsistencies in her statements, it is for the trier of fact to determine the

       credibility of the witnesses. See Akis, 63 Ill. 2d at 298. Further, the testimony from K.M. alone

       was sufficient to convict. See Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36. Additionally, on the overhear

       recordings, the defendant admitted to an inappropriate relationship with K.M. and that he kissed

       her. Further, he failed to deny any of her allegations and apologized. K.M.’s testimony was also

       partially corroborated by T.R.’s testimony that she found an email from the defendant to K.M.

       stating that he missed holding, touching, and kissing K.M. Viewing this evidence in the light

       most favorable to the State, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant

       guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 43          Turning to the defendant’s alternative arguments regarding the allegedly improper

       evidence, we have already addressed the defendant’s alleged errors regarding the other bad acts

                                                        14
       evidence and overhear recordings and found no error as to the other bad acts evidence and that

       the overhear recordings argument was forfeited. See supra ¶¶ 36-42. Defendant further argues

       that his objections to evidence were routinely overruled, the court improperly admitted the VHS

       tape, and “[b]ias and vendetta.” However, the defendant failed to provide a cohesive argument or

       support for these contentions, and we therefore decline to address the merits of these issues. See

       People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 29 (“A reviewing court is entitled to have

       issues clearly defined with *** cohesive arguments presented; this court is not a repository into

       which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research.”); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d

       317, 332 (2005). (“A point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority

       *** is *** forfeited.”). Specifically, the defendant failed to set forth any specific objections or

       why any such objections should have been sustained and instead he summarily directs the court

       to various pages of the transcripts. As to the VHS tape, while he provides some argument as to

       the chain of custody and missing portions of the tape, he provides no legal analysis or citations to

       support this argument. He likewise fails to provide any legal support for his “[b]ias and vendetta”

       argument.

¶ 44                                  E. Constitutional Challenge to SORA

¶ 45           The defendant argues that SORA is unconstitutional as applied to him. He further argues

       that if this court disagrees, he should be subject to the SORA requirements in effect at the time of

       the offenses, which would only require him to register as a sex offender for 10 years rather than

       for life.

¶ 46           In People v. Tetter, 2019 IL App (3d) 150243-B, ¶ 22, the circuit court ordered the

       defendant to register as a sex offender. On appeal, this court, determined that we lacked

       jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s as-applied SORA challenge because the supreme court

                                                        15
       held in Bingham “that even if the SORA statute’s requirements constitute punishment, it would

       not be punishment imposed by the trial court.” Id. ¶ 38 (citing People v. Bingham, 2018 IL

       122008, ¶ 18). Consistent with Tetter, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider the

       defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenges to SORA. See also People v. Kochevar, 2020 IL

       App (3d) 140660-B, ¶¶ 16, 33-35 (concluding this court lacked jurisdiction to consider an as-

       applied challenge to SORA even though the circuit court ordered the defendant to register as a

       sex offender); People v. Vesey, 2020 IL App (3d) 180075, ¶ 10 (rejecting an argument that the

       defendant’s case was distinguishable from Bingham because language in the probation order

       required him to register and determining that the probation order language did not create an order

       by which he could challenge the constitutionality of SORA because “the registration requirement

       applied to defendant with or without the language in the probation order”). We likewise lack

       jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s argument as to which version of SORA should apply to

       him.

¶ 47                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 48          We dismiss the portion of the defendant’s appeal challenging the constitutionality of

       SORA. In all other respects, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 49          Appeal dismissed in part and affirmed in part.

                                                       16