Court Opinion

ID: 9411410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 19:04:27.725666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:06.667835
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/26/23 P. v. Navarro CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                       (Siskiyou)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C091909

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. MCYK-CRF-
                                                                                         2015-706-2)
           v.
                                                                                  OPINION ON TRANSFER
 BALDEMAR NAVARRO,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Baldemar Navarro appeals from the trial court’s order authorizing the
involuntary administration of medication. His appointed counsel has asked this court for
an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues
on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable
issues, we shall affirm.

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                                   I. BACKGROUND
       Defendant was charged with eight counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child—
six for sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(5)),1 one for rape (§ 269, subd.
(a)(1)), and one for oral copulation (§ 269, subd. (a)(4))—and two counts of lewd act
upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). It was further alleged that for all counts defendant
committed an offense specified in section 667.61, subdivision (c) against more than one
victim (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)); for all counts but one lewd act count that more than
one victim was under 14 years old; and that for all counts he had two prior convictions
for sex crimes (§§ 667.51, subd. (a), 667.6, subd. (a)).
       On January 15, 2019, the trial court found defendant not competent to stand trial
and suspended criminal proceedings. The court based its finding on two psychologists’
reports. The court also heard and denied defendant’s motion for new counsel pursuant to
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. The court committed defendant to the State
Department of State Hospitals for a maximum of two years.
       On January 16, 2020, the State Department of State Hospitals filed a petition to
compel involuntary treatment with antipsychotic medications. The trial court held a
hearing on the petition on January 30, 2020. A psychiatrist who had been working with
defendant at the state hospital testified in support of the petition. The court found “the
evidence established really without contradiction that [defendant] lacks the capacity to
make decisions regarding antipsychotic medication,” “his mental disorder requires
medical treatment with antipsychotic medication,” and “that serious harm will result to
[defendant’s] mental health if he’s not treated with antipsychotic medication.”
Consequently, the court ordered defendant be administered antipsychotic medication
involuntarily. Defendant filed a notice of appeal to this order on April 22, 2020.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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       On May 20, 2020, the State Department of State Hospitals filed a certification that
defendant was competent to stand trial and on June 2, 2020, the trial court ordered
criminal proceedings reinstated.
       Appointed counsel for defendant asked this court to independently review the
record pursuant to Wende. Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a
supplemental brief within 30 days. Defendant did not file a supplemental brief and we
dismissed the appeal as abandoned. The California Supreme Court granted review of the
case and later transferred the matter back to this court with instructions to vacate the
dismissal and reconsider the case in light of People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo). We vacated our decision.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
       In Wende, our Supreme Court held that “Courts of Appeal must conduct a review
of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on direct appeal which
raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as frivolous.” (Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 221.) The Wende procedure applies “to the first appeal as of right and is
compelled by the constitutional right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.” (Ibid.)
       In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court held that Wende independent review is not
constitutionally required in an appeal from a postconviction order denying a section
1172.6 petition for resentencing, because the denial does not implicate a defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel in a first appeal as of right. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 222, 224-225.) The court further found that general due process principles
regarding fundamental fairness did not compel a Wende independent review of the order.
(Id. at pp. 229-232.) Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, the court exercised
its discretion to conduct its own independent review of the record given that the lower
court’s “suboptimal” notice to defendant referenced Wende but did not indicate that his

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appeal might be dismissed as abandoned if he did not file a supplemental brief. (Id. at
pp. 222, 233.)
       While Delgadillo addressed the application of Wende’s review procedures in the
specific context of a postconviction relief order under section 1172.6 (Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 231, fn. 5 [“[i]n this case, we are not deciding Wende’s application to
other postconviction contexts, which may present different considerations”]), which is
not the type of postconviction order at issue here, the same principles may nonetheless
apply given that this is not defendant’s first appeal as of right. However, we need not
decide whether Delgadillo in fact governs review of the instant order because, like the
Supreme Court, we shall exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review of the
record given that we cannot confirm defendant received notice that his appeal might be
dismissed as abandoned if he did not file a supplemental brief.
       Our review of the record reveals no arguable issues.
                                   III. DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order authorizing the involuntary administration of medication is
affirmed.

                                                         /S/

                                                 RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

EARL, P. J.

/S/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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