Court Opinion

ID: 9394746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 14:01:16.062568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.550537
License: Public Domain

22-1476-cv
Xaviera Romero v. St. Vincent’s Services, Inc.

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                           SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
16th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

Present:
            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                  Chief Judge,
            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
            MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
                  Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________

XAVIERA ROMERO,

                          Plaintiff-Appellant,

                 v.                                                     22-1476-cv

ST. VINCENT’S SERVICES, INC., AKA HEARTSHARE
ST. VINCENT’S SERVICES (“HSVS”),

                  Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________

For Plaintiff-Appellant:                         DANIEL E. DUGAN (Stewart Lee Karlin, on the briefs),
                                                 Stewart Lee Karlin Law Group, PC, New York, NY.

For Defendant-Appellee:                          STEFANIE TOREN, Clifton Budd & DeMaria, LLP, New
                                                 York, NY.

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       Appeal from a judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York

(Matsumoto, J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

       Plaintiff-Appellant Xaviera Romero (“Romero”) appeals from a June 10, 2022 order of the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Matsumoto, J.) granting summary

judgment to Defendant-Appellee Heartshare St. Vincent’s Services (“HSVS”).            Romero alleged

that HSVS, her former employer, discriminated against her because of her gender by terminating

her due to her pregnancy, perceived pregnancy, and pregnancy-related medical conditions, in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as

amended by the Pregnancy Act of 1978, id. § 2000e(k), the New York State Human Rights Law

(“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law

(“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq.            For the reasons set forth below, we affirm

the district court’s judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

                                           *       *        *

       The standard for granting summary judgment is well established.          Summary judgment is

granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   “We review the district court’s

grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party.”      Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2006).             To determine

whether there is any genuine dispute as to material facts, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities

and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment

                                                   2
is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003). The party seeking summary

judgment bears the burden to demonstrate that no such disputes exist, and “[a] fact is ‘material’

for these purposes when it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law.’” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).       Further, “[a]n issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

        Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual with respect to

“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . .

sex.”   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 1     In 1978, Congress amended Title VII and specified that the

term “because of sex” prohibits discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related

medical conditions.”      42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).         As amended, Title VII further provides that

“women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same

for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability

or inability to work.”   Id.

        As with other Title VII claims, we apply the three-step burden shifting analysis of

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).              Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944

F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2019).     A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case “by showing that: (1) she

is a member of a protected class; (2) she satisfactorily performed the duties required by the

1
  “We typically treat Title VII and NY[S]HRL discrimination claims as analytically identical, applying the
same standard of proof to both claims.” Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 107 n.7 (2d Cir. 2019)
(quoting Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 226 n.9 (2d Cir. 2008)) (addressing federal
and state law-based pregnancy discrimination claims together because the parties did so). Here, the parties
agree that pregnancy discrimination is actionable under the NYSHRL and that the same standard applies to
Romero’s Title VII and NYSHRL claims.

                                                    3
position; (3) she was discharged; and (4) . . . the discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise

to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 401 (2d Cir.

1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

        “If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, ‘a presumption of discriminatory intent

arises and the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for its policy or action.’” Lenzi, 944 F.3d at 107 (quoting Legg v. Ulster County, 820 F.3d 67, 73

(2d Cir. 2016)).    “If the employer puts forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification, the

presumption drops out of the analysis and the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the employer’s justification is a pretext for discrimination.” Legg, 820 F.3d at 73–

74.

        As under Title VII and the NYSHRL, “[p]regnancy discrimination is a form of gender

discrimination under the NYCHRL.”          Chauca v. Abraham, 841 F.3d 86, 90 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016).

We have said that “courts must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any

federal and state law claims” because the statute has more liberal pleading standards. Mihalik v.

Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013).     Under the NYCHRL,

“summary judgment is appropriate if ‘the record establishes as a matter of law’ that discrimination

. . . ‘play[ed] no role’ in the defendant’s actions.”   Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of New York, 805

F.3d 59, 76 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 n.8).

        We need not decide whether Romero established a prima facie case because the record is

clear that Romero failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that HSVS’s purported legitimate, non-

discriminatory justifications for her termination were a pretext for discrimination. HSVS argues

that the reasons for Romero’s termination were her pattern of poor treatment of employees and her

insubordination based on refusing to implement a proposal suggested by her supervisor. Romero

                                                   4
admitted that she was aware that multiple employees complained to her supervisors about her

professionalism and management decisions.        In addition, HSVS put forth evidence that, on

September 14, 2018, before Romero provided her doctor’s note, Romero’s supervisor and other

high-level managers and officers had a call in which HSVS’s executive director recommended

terminating Romero’s employment because of the employee complaints and insubordination.

       Romero argues that HSVS’s reasons are pretextual because her supervisors did not discuss

employee complaints with her, did not counsel her on her management style, and did not follow

HSVS’s progressive discipline protocol. She also points to the fact that she received a favorable

2017 performance review as well as a raise and a bonus in 2018, and did not receive an annual

performance review in 2018. However, Romero has not put forth evidence to dispute that she

was aware of the employee complaints or that the complaints and the belief that she was

insubordinate motivated HSVS’s decision to terminate her employment.            In fact, her 2017

performance evaluation references employee complaints and the need for additional training

related to management skills. Moreover, Romero has produced no evidence suggesting animus

toward her protected status or that anyone at HSVS was motivated to fire her for discriminatory

reasons.   On this record, Romero has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence “that

the employer’s justification is a pretext for discrimination.” Legg, 820 F.3d at 73–74.

       As to Romero’s NYCHRL claims, for the reasons discussed above, “‘the record establishes

as a matter of law’ that discrimination . . . ‘play[ed] no role’ in the defendant’s actions.”   Ya-

Chen Chen, 805 F.3d at 76 (quoting Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 n.8).       Thus, summary judgment

was appropriate on all of Romero’s claims.

                                         *      *       *

                                                5
       We have considered Romero’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                                 FOR THE COURT:
                                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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