Court Opinion

ID: 9807715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:14:04.344724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:22.111147
License: Public Domain

"Walker, J.,
concurring in result: The judge should have given the instruction requested by the defendant in regard to the interest of the plaintiff as a witness, without adding the qualifying clause, and without any reference to the correctness of the proposition as decided by this Court. The prayer was this: “As a party to this action, he has an interest in the outcome of such a character that it is your duty to scrutinize his evidence with care and to give due consideration to the fact that he is interested.” The court gave" this instruction, but added the following: “That is the extent of your consideration, and I do this because the Supreme Court has held that it must be done. But after you have done so, and you shall conclude that he told the truth, you will give the same weight to the evidence that you would to that óf any other credible witness.” The qualification of the instruction, as prayed for by the plaintiff, was the subject of defendant’s twentieth exception. T-his question was considered in Herndon v. R. R., 162 N. C., 317; S. v. Vann, 162 N. C., 534, cited and approved in Herndon’s case, and in the case of In re Smith’s will, 163 N. C., 464. The Court decided in the Herndon case (by Justice Brown), quoting from and approving what is said in 30 A. and E. Enc. of Law, at p. 1094, that while the testimony of a party in interest, as that of any other witness, must be submitted to the jury, the interest is a matter to be considered by the *298jury in weighing the testimony and determining what force it shall have. It is very generally held proper to instruct the jury that they may take into consideration the interest of a party or other witness in determining the credibility of his testimony, and according to the weight of authority the court may instruct the jury that they should consider such interest. Instructions of this character are not objectionable as charging the jury with respect to matters of evidence, and the refusal of such instruction is error, and the error is not cured by a general instruction that the jury are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony of each, nor by an instruction that the jury are to use their common sense and experience in regard to the credibility of witnesses, citing also, for the same proposition, 38 Cyc., 1729. There was a dissenting opinion in Herndon’s case, based upon the distinct ground that the judge should not' charge the jury “that because of interest they should carefully scrutinize the evidence of the defendant,” without adding that, “if the jury believe the evidence, it should have the same weight as if the witness was not interested.” This was the point of plaintiff’s exception in this case, that without this addition or qualification, the bare instruction that they should consider the interest of the witness in the event of the action, and give it such weight as they may think it should have, in passing upon his credibility, was indirectly an expression of opinion prejudicial to the witness, and therefore error. But the majority of the Court did not take this view, and, on the contrary, held that no such modification was necessary, or should'be made, and no expression of opinion could be fairly inferred by the jury from the language used. The Chief Justice, dissenting from this decision, relied upon S. v. Holloway, 117 N. C., 732; S. v. McDowell, 129 N. C., 532, and other cases of a like kind. It may be admitted that there is some authority for the present contention of the appellee, that such a qualification of the general instruction is proper, but it has so recently been rejected, in explicit terms, as misleading, even if in itself sensible, that we prefer to stand by the ancient rule, which was adopted and enforced by this Court for so many'years, even down to a very recent date. In S. v. Vann, 162 N. C., at p. 541, we expressly approved what was said in S. v. Byers, 100 N. C., 512, for a unanimous Court, by Justice Ashe, who always stated a legal principle with great accuracy and proper limitation, as follows, in regard to such testimony: “It was their duty to scrutinize the testimony (of certain witnesses) carefully, because of their interest in the result; but, notwithstanding such interest, they might believe all they had said or only a part of it, or none of it, according to the conviction produced upon their minds of its truthfulness.” And there he stopped, as did the judge below in giving the charge to the jury in that case. He cited with *299approval tbe following cases: S. v. Nash, 30 N. C., 35; S. v. Nat, 51 N. C., 114; Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C., 205; S. v. Hardee, 83 N. C., 619; Ferrall v. Broadaway, 95 N. C., 551, and these are not all that he might have cited to sustain the ruling as to what is the proper instruction in the circumstances.
In S. v. Nash, supra, this Court sustained this as a correct instruction : “The law regards with suspicion the testimony of near relations when testifying for each other, and it is the province of the jury to consider and decide on the weight due the testimony.” And so, in S. v. Nat, supra, this one: “When near relations depose for near relations, their testimony is to be received, and ought to be received, with many grains of allowance.” In Hardee's case, supra, it was held that the nature of the particular caution to be given by the judge to prevent an improper use of testimony, likely to be biased, and an excessive confidence in it, must be left largely to the sound discretion of the court, no special form being required, but only such general guidance as will enable the jury to understand clearly how they may consider it, the matter being at last one upon which they must exercise their good judgment and their common sense, as to the weight that should be given to the circumstance of interest or to any other fact calculated to produce bias, and they should be freed from any arbitrary rule which would require the witness to be put upon a perfect equality with other witnesses, who, apart from any consideration of bias at all, may have more intelligence, knowledge, and character than the witness in question, and who, in other respects, have had better opportunity for information as to the matter under investigation. If the jury conclude that a party or an interested person, who testifies in the cause, has divested himself of all prejudice or leaning toward his own side, and has honestly endeavored to tell the truth, they should not stop there, but find whether he is entitled, in other respects, to their favorable consideration,' by himself or in comparison with other witnesses; and yet the court instructed the jury in this case, “After you (they) have done so” (that is, found that he is honest and truthful and had no bias), “you' (they) will give the same weight to the evidence that you (they) would to that of any other credible witness” — which means, because it so says, that he should stand upon the same base with them, when there may be many other considerations which tend to impeach his character or to weaken his testimony. If the court meant that, if in giving his testimony the witness was not influenced by his interest in the cause he is entitled to be classed as a disinterested person in weighing his testimony, the charge would have been unobjectionable, as that is a self-evident proposition, and the jury would be likely to understand it and act accordingly, without any special advice from the court; but that is not what was said, *300and by the qualification to the requested instruction, the witness was presented in a better attitude than he should, perhaps, have occupied before the jury. The credit due to a witness is not determined alone by his interest, or lack of personal interest, in the cause, as a party or otherwise, but his intelligence, demeanor on the stand, character, and so forth, must be placed in the balance when weighing his testimony. This idea is well expressed by Judge Pearson in S. v. Williams, 47 N. C., 257. The learned judge in that case was referring to the rule, falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus, and repudiating it as an unsafe one, because no fixed rule can be formulated for gauging the jury’s belief in the credibility of a witness. They may consider even one false statement he may have made during the trial as bearing upon it, but not as necessarily controlling and requiring them to disregard all of his testimony. S. v. Hardee, 83 N. C., at 622. The remarks of Judge Pearson in the Williams case are very pertinent here. He said: “The charge of the judge directs the attention of the jury to the question to be decided; his control over the admissibility of evidence excludes all that is incompetent, and the jury are relied on to find the truth. It is the exclusive province of the jury to decide issues of fact, and to pass upon the credit of witnesses; when the credit of a witness is to be passed on, each juror is called on to say whether he believes him or not; this belief is personal, individual, and depends upon an infinite variety of circumstances ; any attempt to regulate or control it, by a fixed rule, is impracticable, worse than useless, inconsistent and repugnant to the nature of a trial by jury, and calculated to take from it its chief excellence, on account of which it is preferred by the common law to any other mode of trial, and to adopt in its place the chief objection to a fixed tribunal. ‘Do I believe what that witness has sworn to ?’ is a question for each juror. The statement may be' more or less probable, and in accordance with the way in which men act and things occur. It may be more or less corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses and the attendant circumstances. The manner of the witness, even his looks, may impress my mind more or less favorably, and this is the reason every witness is required, by the common law, to be examined in the presence of the jury. Is it practicable to frame a general rulé by which my belief-must be regulated ?” And I ask the same question in this case. Commenting upon this passage, taken from the opinion of Judge Pearson in the Williams case, Chief Justice Smith said, in Ferrall v. Broadaway, 95 N. C., at p. 559: “The charge is not corrected, and its objectionable features removed, by the reference to the second instruction to which it is subjected; for while the latter is appropriate and proper, its efficacy is neutralized by the part of the instruction, to which we have adverted, preceding it. If cautionary words had been used in calling *301the attention of the jury to the possible consequence of a verdict declaring the illegitimacy of the plaintiffs, to induce a careful scrutiny of the evidence, it might not have overstepped the limits of judicial right, as in regard to the testimony of an accomplice (S. v. Hardin, 19 N. C., 407) ; or the discredit attaching to the testimony of near relations (S. v. Nash, 30 N. C., 35) ; or to that of fellow-servants (S. v. Nat. 53 N. C., 114) ; or the detection of a witness in a false statement upon his sworn examination (S. v. Smith, 53 N. C., 132); but these matters of discredit are for the jury to weigh and consider, and are not rules of law to control the jury. S. v. Noblett, 47 N. C., 418; Wiseman v. Cornish, 53 N. C., 218; Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C., 205.” Numerous other authorities could be cited to the same effect, which strongly support the view herein taken.
This question has undergone discussion very recently in the case of In re Smith, 163 N. C., 464. It is true, counsel there insisted that, in directing the jury how to pass upon the testimony of interested witnesses, it was not sufficient for the judge, as was done in that case, to charge merely that the jury might consider any bias they may have had (if any at all) by reason of their relation to the parties in the cause, but that he should have added that if the jury found that they were not influenced thereby they should have the same credit as any other witness, as was .said in S. v. Holloway, 117 N. C., 732; and that with reference to this suggestion as to the addition, we stated that no such special instruction was asked, and therefore the point was not directly raised. But the Court, after stating preliminarily that the instruction should not have been so qualified if the special request had been made, observed substantially that if the jury had decided that the witnesses were not biased by their interest or relationship, they should not necessarily have received the credit due to-other witnesses, and put upon an equality with them, as the credit to which they were entitled depended, not upon their bias or indifference alone, but upon other circumstances as well — -as, for example, their intelligence and their appearance and deportment while on the stand; their character, whether good or bad; their means-of knowledge; the probability of their story — these and other matters entered into the estimate of the value to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses, and the jury had the right to put them in the scales, in weighing the testimony, for the purpose of separating the true from the false and finally ascertaining where was the preponderance of the evidence. It may be proper for a judge to tell the jury “that if the witness is not biased by his interest, his testimony should have the same weight as if he was not interested,” as said in some of the cases, for this is a truism, and a sensible jury would not overlook it. It is a proposition that proves itself; but it does not mean that the witness *302shall occupy a position of equality with another who has a better character, more sense and knowledge of the facts, a stronger memory, superior judgment, and whose other qualities and advantages inspire the jury with greater confidence in his credibility. Speaking of the rule of the common law, whereby parties to and persons interested in the event of an action were disqualified, this Court said in Hill v. Sprinkle, 76 N. C., 353 : “For generations past, and up to the last few years, interest in the event of the action, however small, excluded a party altogether as a witness, and that upon the ground, not that he may not sometimes speak the truth, but because it would not ordinarily be safe to rely on his testimony. This rule is still applauded by great judges as a rule founded in good sense and sound policy. The parties to the action are now competent witnesses, but the reasons which once excluded them still exist, to go only to their credibility.” We think that this change in the law of evidence was a wise and salutary one; but it did not abolish the other rules of evidence, and the jury should not be handicapped by an imperative instruction that, in the absence of bias of some who are interested, they should give credit to all the witnesses equally, as those who have had no interest may, in other respects and apart from any consideration of bias or impartiality, be more reliable. It is undoubtedly true that interest naturally produces bias, for we have been told that, “If self the wavering balance shake, it’s rarely right adjusted”; but. notwithstanding this tendency of his nature, and his frailty, the witness may resist the temptation which thus besets him‘and prove himself to be worthy of credit. Smith v. Moore, 142 N. C., 277. If he is not in fact prejudiced by his relation to the cause or the parties, the jury may then consider whether there are other circumstances which impair the strength of his testimony, such as want of intelligence, character, knowledge of the facts, and so forth. The subject has so recently been fully discussed in this Court that further comment is unnecessary. Herndon v. R. R., 162 N. C., 317. See, also, S. v. Vann, 162 N. C., 534, which, while not so authoritative as it would have been had the question been directly presented for decision, is nevertheless worthy of serious consideration, as in itself correct, and especially as being fully in line with the cases which have been decided here and elsewhere for nearly a century.
Referring again to Judge Pearsons clear and vigorous statement of the law, as applicable to such cases, we cannot safely or wisely bind the jury by any “hard and fast rule,” but should leave them at full liberty to judge of a witness’s credibility in view of all the surrounding circumstances, his interest and probable bias being among them.
Let the jury consider the interest of the witness — as they are very apt to do, whether they are so instructed or not — and give it such weight, or no weight, as in their judgment it should have. This is the safest and *303best rule, to leave tbe matter as mueb at large as possible, trusting to tbe intelligence and honesty of tbe jury to so balance tbe facts as to give to tbe witness, whose interest is involved, bis due proportion of credit or discredit. Tbis view was entertained by tbe Court also in Herndon v. R. R., supra, where, through Justice Brown, who wrote tbe opinion, it approved tbis charge given below: “His Honor, after charging fully, fairly, and correctly on each issue, concluded bis charge with these words, to which plaintiff excepts, towit: ‘Weigh all of tbis evidence, gentlemen, in every way, and in weighing it you have a right to take into consideration the interest that the parties have in the result of your verdict, the conduct of the witnesses upon the stand and their demeanor, the interest that they may have shown, or bias, upon the stand, the means they have of knowing that to which they testify, their character and reputation, in weighing this testimony, so as to arrive at the truth of what this matter is- Take the case, gentlemen.’ ” In this connection it may be said that the rule to be found in 30 A. and E. Enc. of Law, 1094, and 38 Cyc., 1729, and stated above, was adopted in that case as the true one and as sustaining the charge, without any addition or qualification whatsoever. Though there was a dissent in Herndon v. R. R., supra, there was none in the case of In re Smith's will, supra, where the question was more sharply and formally stated, and discussed with full reference to the authorities.
For these reasons I would dissent from the judgment of this Court and the opinion, as I think the judge came dangerously near to the expression of his personal opinion upon the weight of testimony in his reference to what had been decided by this Court, and also that he laid down an erroneous rule in regard to interested witnesses, refusing the simple and correct instruction, as requested by defendant’s counsel. As said in 38 Cyc., p. 1772: “It is improper for a judge to weaken the force of a proper instruction by sarcastic comment (or any expression of his opposition to the settled principle), so as to leave the jury in doubt whether the instruction was given or refused, or by intimating that, although the instructions given in behalf of a party are correct, they present a loose and inadequate presentation of the law applicable to the case, or to intimate that his personal opinion is otherwise than the law he charges.” But after a most careful review of the entire record, I am convinced that the error worked no substantial disadvantage to the defendant, and that, all things considered, the case has been fairly and correelfly decided upon its real merits, and the error, therefore, is not sufficient for a reversal. The Court, at a former term) had passed upon the questions of negligence which are involved, ..unfavorably to the defendant (163 N. C., 351), and another trial may be still worse for it, as the damages have been increased, so far, in “arithmetical progression,” and practical wis*304dom dictates that it is better to halt here than to risk a steady and “harmonic progression” hereafter. I therefore concur in the result.
As the opinion of the Court is now worded, I hardly know what the law has been declared to be. It is very certain that Herndon, v. R. R., 162 N. C., 317, decides, by the clearest implication, that the addition to the prayer in this case was error. The entire instruction, as given, falls under the condemnation of Hill v. Sprinkle, 76 N. C., 353, cited and quoted from at length in Herndon v. R. R., supra, which says: “At all events, the charge is not such a clear and distinct enunciation of an important principle or fact as could leave any reasonable doubt of its meaning in the minds of the jury. The prayer was distinct, and the response should have been equally so.” This is an important question, and should be decided finally, one way or the other, for the charge is either erroneous in law or not so, and the question should not be left open in the way of a mere suggestion to the judges'. The addendum is clearly harmful, if it is not correct, as it gives the interested witness a credit to which he is not entitled, by ranking him with those who are disinterested and are better qualified, in every way, to testify as to the facts.