Court Opinion

ID: 9956116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 08:10:40.210148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:32.294312
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00268-CR
     ___________________________

         KECY KING, Appellant

                      V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 396th District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 1751802

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                  I. Introduction

       A jury convicted Appellant Kecy King of burglary of a habitation with intent to

commit assault (Count One) and burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft

(Count Two).     See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a).        The trial court assessed

punishment at ten years’ confinement for each offense but suspended imposition of

the sentence and placed King on community supervision for six years. King argues in

her sole point that her convictions for both Count One and Two violate the double-

jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We

will affirm.

                                  II. Background

       King and Akeem Junaid were in a dating relationship. According to Junaid, the

couple did not live together, but King spent the night at his house on occasion.

Junaid testified that he ended the relationship with King in March 2022.

       After Junaid ended the relationship, King would show up at his house and ring

the doorbell nonstop for an hour to disturb his sleep. She would also jump Junaid’s

fence and walk around in his backyard. Junaid recalled an incident on May 5, 2022,

where he backed his car out of his garage, and King appeared and started banging on

his car. King then ran into Junaid’s garage and refused to leave so Junaid called the

police. King eventually made her way into Junaid’s house before the police arrived,

and she locked herself in the bathroom. King told the police that she lived at Junaid’s

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house. The police issued King a criminal trespass warning and instructed her not to

come back to Junaid’s house; however, King did not comply with the warning and

continued to come onto Junaid’s property.

      On September 11, 2022, Junaid—who worked nights—went to work around

8:30 p.m. Brenda Johnson, his girlfriend at the time, remained at his house. Johnson

testified at trial that she was organizing Junaid’s pantry around 1:00 a.m. when she

heard a noise coming from the back patio. Johnson opened the blinds to the sliding

door and saw a person she identified as King standing just outside the door. Johnson

told King through the door that she was going to call the police, and King responded

for her to call them. Johnson was scared, and she ran upstairs to find her phone.

While she was upstairs, she heard the sound of breaking glass.

      King entered the upstairs bedroom and asked Johnson why she was in King’s

house. Johnson was able to run back downstairs where she located her phone. King

tried to prevent Johnson from calling the police, and the women struggled over the

phone. King knocked the phone out of Johnson’s hand and then punched her in the

chest. Johnson ran out of the front door. Johnson testified that as she was running,

King threw a spear—a piece of African art from Junaid’s home—at her. Johnson

went to a neighbor’s house and called 9-1-1.

      Officer Michael Chew arrived at Junaid’s house at 1:29 a.m. He was concerned

because he saw blood at the entryway of the home, on the front door, and inside of

the home. Officer Chew called for additional officers and a supervisor to respond to

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the scene.   The officers cleared each room of the house before going into the

backyard. In the backyard, Officer Chew observed that a screen was off of a window

frame and there was broken glass at the bottom of the window.

      After the house was secured, Johnson returned there with the police. Johnson

stated that the windshield on her car was cracked and that her phone, purse, and car

keys were missing from Junaid’s house. She described that there was blood on the

stairs, on the walls, and on the floor and that items had been removed from the walls.

Johnson did not feel comfortable staying at the house, so she stayed with the

neighbor. Officer Chew secured the house before leaving.

      Johnson woke up around 6:00 a.m. and went outside to see if Junaid was home

from work. She saw King’s car in the driveway and returned to the neighbor’s house

to call 9-1-1, but King’s car was gone before police arrived. Officer Chew responded

again to the call. He testified that there were items in the driveway that were not there

when he cleared the house earlier. The home’s condition was worse than it was when

he left. Johnson went into the home after it was cleared by police again. She testified

that the house was in worse condition than before and that food was on the floor,

blood was on the beds, and more items were missing. Junaid testified that his house

was destroyed. He said phones, laptops, personal files, his passport, jewelry, car keys,

and a gun were taken from his home.

      King testified at trial that she did not break into Junaid’s home. She said she

was in the hospital the day before the incident and was not physically capable of the

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acts Johnson described. She testified that she had ended the relationship with Junaid

and that she did not go to his house uninvited or enter his property without

permission.

                                III. Double Jeopardy

         In her sole point, King argues that her convictions and separate punishments

for Counts One and Two violate the double-jeopardy protections of the Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

         The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall have life or limb twice put

in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V. Generally, this provision—

the Double Jeopardy Clause—protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same

offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,

and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165,

97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (1977); Ramos v. State, 636 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021).

         King did not raise her double-jeopardy complaint in the trial court.         A

defendant may forfeit a potential double-jeopardy violation by not asserting it in the

trial court. Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680, 686–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). But she

may raise a double-jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal “when the undisputed

facts show the double jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record

and when enforcement of [the] usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate

state interests.” Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). King

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argues that the double-jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record

and that this court should review the record to determine if a double-jeopardy

violation occurred. We disagree.

      King specifically argues that each of the offenses in Counts One and Two refer

to the same incident of burglary of a habitation, implicating the double-jeopardy

protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. But the protection

against double jeopardy does not apply to separate and distinct offenses that occur

during the same transaction. Ex parte Milner, 394 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013). To determine if the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against multiple

punishments for the same offense has been violated, we assess whether an appellant

has been “convicted of more offenses than the legislature intended.” Id. at 507

(quoting Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)); see Ball v. United

States, 470 U.S. 856, 861, 105 S. Ct. 1668, 1671–72 (1985). To determine if the

legislature intended to treat an appellant’s acts as a single offense or as multiple

offenses, we must ascertain the “allowable unit of prosecution” from the statutory

text and any available legislative history. Milner, 394 S.W.3d at 507; see Sanabria v.

United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69–70, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 2181–82 (1978); Ex parte Hawkins, 6

S.W.3d 554, 556–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “Although this inquiry resolves the

double jeopardy analysis, it is purely one of statutory construction.” Harris v. State,

359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Jones v. State, 323 S.W.3d 885,

888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). Statutory construction is a question of law, which we

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review de novo. Id.

      A person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, without the

effective consent of the owner, she

      (1) enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not
      then open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an
      assault; or

      (2) remains concealed, with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an
      assault, in a building or habitation; or

      (3) enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a
      felony, theft, or an assault.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a).

      In Ex parte Cavazos, the issue before the court was whether the appellant could

be convicted of two offenses of burglary of a habitation, each with a different

complainant but arising from a single entry. 203 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006). The court held that the offense of burglary of a habitation is complete once

the unlawful entry is made. Id. at 337. The allowable unit of prosecution is the

unlawful entry. Id.

      King argues that she was punished twice for a single unlawful entry. However,

the record shows that King entered Junaid’s house unlawfully two separate times.

King initially entered Junaid’s home without consent around 1:00 a.m. and had an

altercation with Johnson.    Johnson stated that King punched her in the chest,

scratched her arms, and threw a spear at her. After arriving at the scene, the police

                                         7
cleared each room and did not find King inside of the residence. Officer Chew

secured the residence before leaving and took all items that were outside the house

back into the house. Johnson went to stay with a neighbor.

       Several hours later, King’s car was at Junaid’s residence.      When Johnson

entered the residence, there was more damage to the residence and additional items

had been taken from the residence. Officer Chew stated that more items were

scattered about and that the house looked worse than it did the first time he

responded. Junaid was missing multiple items from his home, including phones,

laptops, personal files, his passport, jewelry, car keys, and a gun.

       King does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support either

conviction. A reasonable jury could have found that King initially entered the house

without consent with the intent to assault Johnson or did commit or did attempt to

commit assault (Count One) and entered the residence a second time without consent

with intent to commit theft or did commit or did attempt to commit theft (Count

Two).1 Unlike Cavazos, there is evidence of two separate unlawful entries into Junaid’s

home. Because the record supports a finding that there were two separate unlawful

       King was indicted on two counts and each count alleged two manners and
       1

means of committing burglary as defined in subsections (1) and (3) of Texas Penal
Code Section 30.02(a). The charge allowed the jury to convict King of Count One if
they found she entered Junaid’s residence without his effective consent (1) with intent
to commit assault, or (2) did commit or did attempt to commit assault. The charge
allowed the jury to convict King of Count Two if they found she entered Junaid’s
residence without his effective consent (1) with intent to commit theft, or (2) did
commit or did attempt to commit theft.

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entries by King, we hold that King was not punished multiple times for a single entry.

King’s convictions for both Count One and Count Two do not violate the double-

jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

      Further, King’s lack of objection failed to preserve her double-jeopardy claim.

It is not clearly apparent that a double jeopardy violation occurred and that

enforcement of the rules of procedural default would serve no purpose. Gonzales, 8

S.W.3d at 643. We overrule King’s sole point.

                                  IV. Conclusion

      Having overruled King’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                    /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                    Dabney Bassel
                                                    Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 28, 2024

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