Court Opinion

ID: 9843225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:31:03.458177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:02.537311
License: Public Domain

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
First, I think the majority misconstrues the statute authorizing attorney’s fees by finding that items may be classified in multiple categories. I think that if we accept the majority’s reading that the provisos set out in the statute are not mutually exclusive, we rob 49 U.S.C. § 11711(f) (1993) (repealed 1995) of any purpose, and render the distinctions drawn by Congress meaningless.
In his brief, the plaintiff advances the argument that “the fee-shifting provisions' of the Act were aimed at curing a social ill arising in the interstate shipping industry.” He elaborates on the problem of suing for damage done to household goods, noting: “Everyday experience teaches that most household property shipped by common carrier has less value than the cost of *428any litigation to recover for its breakage. Thus in most settings, the carrier could simply hide behind the expenses of litigation, secure in the knowledge that the injured customer is not going to start an expensive lawsuit to pay for a comparatively less expensive piece of property.” Id. This point is well taken. However, it seems to me that the obvious exception to a carrier’s being able to “hide behind the expense of litigation” is when the property damaged is of significant value or rarity. The Baga serpent is just such an item.
The tripartite proviso scheme set forth by Congress supports the idea that only items of relatively low value in relation to the costs of litigation are covered by the fee-shifting provision. The type of goods listed in subsection (A), typically referred to as “first proviso” goods, encompasses standard household items such as furniture, fixtures, knick-knacks and other goods that are of relatively low monetary value, and easily replaceable. This is the category of goods to which the fee-shifting provision specifically applies. See 49 U.S.C. § 11711(d) (1993) (repealed 1995). Second proviso goods, listed in subsection (B) are similar in character to first proviso goods, but are employed in a business or institutional setting. Third proviso goods are specialty items, such as objects of art, “which because of their unusual nature or value require the specialized handling and equipment employed in moving household goods....” 49 U.S.C. §10102(11)(C) (1993) (repealed 1995).
Invoking the plaintiffs explanation of the reasons underlying the passage of the fee-shifting language, there is a clear logic to requiring that the categories be read as exclusive of one another. Because of the relatively low cost and easy replaceability of first proviso goods, a customer paying his own attorney’s fees is unlikely to resort to litigation for redress. Therefore, the availability of alternative dispute resolution, and the provision for recovery of legal fees is vital to the congressional intent of protecting consumers from careless movers who might hide behind the high wall of litigation costs. Although second proviso goods are similar in character to their first proviso brethren, the owners of second proviso goods (businesses and institutions) hold significantly more bargaining power and resources than does a homeowner who might employ common carriers on only a few occasions in his lifetime. Businesses and institutions are more likely to use common carriers frequently, and would often be able to bring economic pressure to bear by threatening to withhold future business, and would be more able to shoulder the costs of litigation if necessary. Third proviso goods are of such significant value and unique nature that the potential damages for loss or injury to them would outweigh the costs of litigation, making suit a meaningful and effective remedy and deterrent. Further, the uniqueness of third proviso goods is likely to require expert opinion to establish their value, making some forms of alternative dispute resolution unappealing.
Further, the idea that a work of art slides from the specific classification of subsection (C) to the broader classification of “personal effect” under subsection (A) merely because the owner intends to place it in a home defeats the purpose of the original categorization. Had congress intended to allow objects to occupy more than one category, it could have expressly said so in the statute. Instead, it created three subsections, and required alternative dispute resolution and recovery of attorney’s fees for only one of these subsections. I would hold that the Baga serpent is a “work of art” that fits exclusively within the class of goods listed in the third proviso. Accordingly, I would hold that the fee-shifting language is inapplicable to *429a suit brought for damage of a third-proviso item.
■ Second, I do not believe the district court abused its discretion in limiting travel expenses taxed as costs. An abuse of discretion is defined as a “definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Mack, 159 F.3d 208, 217 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting Logan v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir.1989)). I am simply unconvinced that enforcing the “100 mile rule” and disallowing certain travel expenses rises to such a level. Indeed, in my view, approving these expenses would have been an abuse of discretion.