Court Opinion

ID: 9364306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 21:02:58.012592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:37.010478
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/23 P. v. Wallace CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C092426

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 95F02739)

           v.                                                                     OPINION ON TRANSFER

    JILES LEE WALLACE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In 1997, the trial court found defendant Jiles Lee Wallace guilty of first degree
felony murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 with two special circumstance
enhancements that the murder occurred during an attempted robbery and burglary
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) for which defendant received a sentence of life without the

1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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possibility of parole.2 We upheld this judgment in an unpublished decision issued
December 21, 1998. (Wallace, supra, C027310.)
       Because of case developments associated with the sentencing of youthful
offenders, defendant received a new sentencing hearing on January 27, 2016. At the
conclusion of that hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant, in pertinent part, to 25
years to life for the murder.
       Thereafter, on February 13, 2019, defendant petitioned the trial court for
resentencing based upon changes to the felony-murder rule under recently enacted Senate
Bill No. 1437 (Reg. Sess. 2017-2018) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2019)
(Senate Bill 1437). Following the appointment of counsel and briefing, the trial court
denied defendant’s petition in a written order without a hearing. While finding defendant
had made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief, the court found defendant was a
“major participant” who had “acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
       On appeal, defendant originally contended the trial court erred in conflating the
procedures associated with former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6),3 subdivisions (c) and
(d), including engaging in impermissible factfinding. He reasoned the trial court
correctly determined he had made a prima facie showing entitling him to relief, but erred
in determining he had acted with “reckless indifference to human life” precluding his
eligibility for relief. We issued an unpublished decision rejecting these contentions
because, although the trial court might have erred in how it reached its decision denying

2  Defendant was also convicted of burglary, attempted robbery, and the trial court found
true another sentencing enhancement that defendant had used a firearm in connection
with the crime. (People v. Wallace (Dec. 21, 1998, C027310) [nonpub. opn.] (Wallace).)
However, neither these convictions, nor defendant’s sentence related to them, are relevant
to this appeal.
3 Effective June 30, 2022, long after defendant filed his petition, the Legislature
renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the section where possible by its new numbering.

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defendant’s petition for resentencing, we concurred with the People that a review of
defendant’s record of conviction established as a matter of law that he was ineligible for
resentencing.
       Defendant appealed to the California Supreme Court, which directed this court to
vacate its previous decision and reconsider the matter in light of People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). Having done so, we agree with the parties that the trial court’s
order must be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this decision.
                                   I. BACKGROUND

A.     The Underlying Conviction
       We take the facts from our 1998 unpublished opinion affirming defendant’s
convictions in Wallace, supra, C027310:
       Around 3:00 a.m. on November 16, 1994, Scott Lewis was awakened by armed
intruders in his apartment and shot to death by one of them. Lewis shared the apartment
with his sister Kowana, her six-month-old child, and her boyfriend Billy Stack (who was
not there at the time).
       Less than a week before the shooting, Larry Freeman had accused Stack of
stealing a stereo out of Freeman’s car. Shortly thereafter Stack was shot in the leg by an
acquaintance of Freeman’s, while Freeman was present.
       Albert Rhine, who earlier entered a negotiated guilty plea to voluntary
manslaughter stemming from Lewis’s death, testified about his involvement in the
incident. Rhine stated that on the evening of the murder, he was with Freeman and Chris
Dupree. Freeman had talked about Stack threatening Freeman’s mother, in retaliation for
being shot in the leg. Rhine, Freeman, and Dupree set out to pick up defendant at his
apartment. On the way to defendant’s apartment, Freeman stated he wanted Stack “taken
care of”; Dupree replied that he would handle it.

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       At defendant’s apartment, with Shawn Shorter present, Freeman told defendant
that someone “was messing with his mom” and that he “wanted to go over and do
something about it.” Freeman and defendant went into a bedroom and returned with
three handguns; the guns were inspected by all. Freeman also said that he had a safe
stored at Stack’s apartment, which contained drugs and maybe some money. If the others
backed Freeman up, he said, they could have the contents of the safe.
       Borrowing two cars (so Freeman’s car could not be traced), the five men arrived at
Stack and Lewis’s apartment. Freeman stayed downstairs and instructed the others
(defendant, Dupree, Rhine, and Shorter) to let Dupree handle things. While walking up
to the apartment, defendant stated that if he was going in, he was going to get something
out of it, like a TV or VCR. Defendant, Dupree, and Shorter were each armed with one
of the handguns from defendant’s apartment.
       When the four men barged into the apartment, Lewis was on the couch.
Defendant, with a mask over his head and the gun in his hand, told Lewis to get down
and everything would be all right. Defendant and Rhine then went into Kowana’s
bedroom to look for the safe, while Shorter and Dupree, who had been behind defendant
and Rhine, stayed with Lewis with guns drawn. While defendant and Rhine were
“tearing the place up” looking for the safe in another bedroom, they heard three shots.
All the intruders ran from the apartment; Lewis reached for Rhine, but defendant grabbed
Rhine’s shoulder and said let’s go.
       When they reached the cars, Freeman yelled at Dupree for shooting Lewis.
Dupree later explained that was the way people did it in Louisiana.
       An eyewitness saw the two borrowed cars at the scene, saw three black males and
one white male go into Lewis’s apartment complex, heard shots fired, and saw the four
men return to the cars, one of whom was tentatively identified as defendant.
       On January 28, 1997, the trial court determined defendant was guilty of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true the enhancement allegations that

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defendant had used a gun (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that the murder was committed while
engaged in burglary and attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The court also found
defendant guilty of attempted robbery (§§ 664/211) and burglary (§ 459) and found true
the allegations that he had used a gun during the commission of these crimes (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)). We affirmed this judgment on appeal. (Wallace, supra, C027310.) While
defendant successfully petitioned for a new sentence that included the possibility of
parole, the substance of his underlying convictions and related enhancements did not
change.
B.     The Section 1172.6 Resentencing Proceedings
       On February 13, 2019, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing
based upon changes to the felony-murder rule brought about by Senate Bill 1437 and
requesting the appointment of counsel. This petition averred in pertinent part that
defendant had been convicted of first degree murder under a felony-murder theory, but
that he could not now be convicted of murder because of changes to sections 188 and
189. Pertinent to defendant’s issues on appeal, the defendant also averred that he “was
not a major participant in the felony or [that he] did not act with reckless indifference to
human life during the course of the crime or felony.” The court appointed counsel and
briefing ensued. The People’s opposition included in pertinent part that the true finding
on the section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) enhancements precluded defendant’s ability to
show that he was eligible for relief. In response, defendant argued the court should grant
his petition given his youth at the time of the murder, the older age of his codefendants,
and that other factors concerning his upbringing, etc., supported relief.
       Thereafter, on May 1, 2020, the trial court denied defendant’s petition in a written
order without a hearing. While finding defendant had made a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief, the court found defendant was a “major participant” who had “acted
with reckless indifference to human life.” Instead of highlighting the true finding on the

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enhancement allegations to make this determination, the court relied on information from
defendant’s record of conviction:
       “1. The Defendant proceeded to trial, waiving his right to a jury trial. In
sentencing the Defendant, the sentencing judge stated ‘There was evidence provided that
Mr. Wallace was actively involved in getting the weapon that was used in this and he was
very active in the 211 against the -going into the apartment and trying to find the safe’
(RT 3-5: 26-36:3)[;]
       “2. The four males who entered the apartment did so to ‘teach the male a lesson’
(RT 36:4) as well as to commit a robbery[;]
       “3. The Defendant was one of the first young males to enter the apartment while
wearing a mask, pointed a gun at the victim and told him to get to the ground. (Dec 18,
2014 Probation report P.2)[;]
       “4. The Trial Judge made a factual finding the Defendant ‘was not what I would
consider a passive participant [or] had a minor role in this, because of the fact that [he]
was the one that was actively involved in helping get the weapon and the fact that he was
very active in going into the apartment and setting the whole situation up that resulted in
the killing’ (RT []:10-16).”
       The court’s order continued: “Petitioner has requested this Court to take into
consideration his youth and potential duress defense. Having done so, [t]his court still
finds the Petitioner to have been a major participant who acted with reckless indifference
to human life as defined in CALCRIM 703. [¶] It is ordered that Petitioner Jiles Lee
Wallace’s . . . Section 117[2.6] Petition for vacating of his first degree murder conviction
in Case No. 95F02739 is Denied.”
       Defendant timely appealed.

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                                      II. DISCUSSION
A.     Legal Background
       Senate Bill 1437, which became effective on January 1, 2019, was enacted “to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The legislation accomplished this by amending sections 188 and
189 and adding former section 1170.95 (now 1172.6) to the Penal Code.
       Section 188, which defines malice, now provides in part: “Except as stated in
subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely
on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Section 189, subdivision (e)
now limits the circumstances under which a person may be convicted of felony murder:
“A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
subdivision (a) [defining first degree murder] in which a death occurs is liable for murder
only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶]
(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
       Section 1172.6 allows “those convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief.” (People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 843.) Section 1172.6, subdivisions (b) and (c) create a two-step process
for evaluating a petitioner’s eligibility for relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
960-962.) First, the trial court determines whether the petition is facially sufficient under

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section 1172.6, subdivision (b). (Lewis, supra, at p. 960.) If the petition is facially
sufficient, then, the trial court moves on to subdivision (c), appointing counsel (if
requested) and following the briefing schedule set out in the statute. (Lewis, supra, at
p. 966.) Following the completion of this briefing, the trial court then determines
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing they are entitled to relief. (Ibid.)
       As our Supreme Court explained, “[w]hile the trial court may look at the record of
conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie case for section 117[2.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c)
is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the
court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations
were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A]
court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including
the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
       As relevant here, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which took effect
on January 1, 2022, amended section 1172.6 to codify the holdings of Lewis regarding
petitioners’ right to counsel and the standard for determining the existence of a prima
facie case, as well as to clarify the burden of proof at the resentencing hearing as proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and address what evidence may be presented at the
resentencing hearing. (Cal. Const. art. IV, § 8; Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)
B.     Application
       Here, the trial court determined defendant had stated a prima facie showing of
eligibility but went on to find defendant was a “major participant” who had “acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” Defendant originally argued this was impermissible

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factfinding at a section 1172.6, subdivision (c) stage. Whether the trial court actually
engaged in factfinding is ambiguous on this record. Nonetheless, we agreed with the
People that the trial court’s decision should be upheld because a review of defendant’s
record of conviction established as a matter of law that defendant was ineligible for
resentencing. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 972 [“ ‘ “ ‘[A] ruling or
decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a
wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be
sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its
conclusion’ ” ’ ”].)
       This was so because the trial court had determined defendant was guilty of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true the enhancement allegations that the
murder was committed while engaged in burglary and attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)). In order to find these enhancements true, the trial court necessarily determined
that defendant was a major participant and that defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life. (CALCRIM No. 703.) Thus, we concluded the section 190.2 special
circumstance findings rendered defendant ineligible for relief.
       Following our unpublished decision in this case, the California Supreme Court
issued Strong, which concluded: “Findings issued by a jury before [People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522] do not preclude a
defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437. This is
true even if the trial evidence would have been sufficient to support the findings under
Banks and Clark.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) Accordingly, the trial court’s
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) enhancement findings, which predated Banks and
Clark (Wallace, supra, C027310), do not preclude defendant from making a prima facie
case. We therefore conclude that we must vacate the trial court’s order and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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                                  III. DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is vacated, and the matter is
remanded with directions to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                          /S/

                                                RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

HULL, Acting P. J.

/S/

KRAUSE, J.

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