Court Opinion

ID: 9675320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:49:04.091503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:33.360914
License: Public Domain

*528ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds that the trial court erred in failing to apply the law of self-defense to involuntary manslaughter. The result of this holding is that a person may defend himself (ie: intentionally engaging in conduct) by recklessly engaging in conduct. To me this is not only inconsistent, but also impossible. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
A person commits involuntary manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 19.05 (Vernon Supp.1989). Self-defense in a homicide, on the other hand, involves a claim that the killing was by an intentional act necessary because of apprehension of death or serious bodily injury. See Whitehead v. State, 450 S.W.2d 72, 83 (Tex.Crim.App.1969) (Opinion on Second Motion for Rehearing).
In the instant case, the facts giving rise to a charge on involuntary manslaughter were that the gun held by appellant fired during a shoving match with the deceased and that appellant did not intend to shoot his victim. During oral submission, counsel for appellant argued that the theory of self-defense gave appellant the right to pull the gun on the deceased. He further argued that the actual firing of the weapon, though unintentional, was merely a continuation of the affirmative act of initially drawing the pistol.
It appears to me that the error in both appellant’s argument and the majority opinion lies in the emphasis on the actual firing of the weapon. After the adoption of our present penal code in 1974, the fact that a person may act “unintentionally” is of no consequence — he still commits an offense, provided he acts with knowledge, recklessness or negligence. Dockery v. State, 542 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Therefore, whether appellant intended to pull the trigger and thus fire the weapon is immaterial. As stated by the court in Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), “[I]t must be recognized that the term ‘intentional’ had a much different meaning in the law of accident under the former penal code than it now has in the law of culpable mental states under the present penal code.” The act or conduct of appellant which renders him subject to criminal liability is not the firing of the weapon; rather, it is his intentional brandishing of the pistol.
When the situation is viewed in this light, I agree that appellant may have had the right to intentionally pull the weapon under a theory of self-defense. His reckless handling of the weapon, however, simply cannot be viewed as an affirmative act of self-defense. I believe the Missouri court of appeals best answered the question presented by this record when it held:
Self-defense might justify producing the weapon to prevent being attacked by In-man, but would not justify the reckless handling of it. Defendant was not entitled to the instruction on self-defense.
State v. Miller, 772 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Mo.App.1989). Appellant’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter, which involves the culpable mental state of recklessness, is simply incompatible with a theory of self-defense.
An additional problem with the majority opinion is that to reach the conclusion that self-defense is a defense to involuntary manslaughter, it relies upon cases which hold that under appropriate facts, both a charge on self-defense and accident may be necessary. Since the adoption of the penal code in 1974, however, accident is no longer a defense to a criminal charge. Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). It follows, therefore, that the cases upon which the majority relies are no longer authority for the proposition for which they are cited.
By this discussion, I do not intend to imply that no defensive theory was available to appellant under the charge of involuntary manslaughter. In fact, the trial court instructed the jury in the instant case to acquit appellant if his actions were not voluntary as follows:
You are instructed that a person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession. Conduct is not rendered involuntary merely because the *529person did not intend the results of his conduct. Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on the,occasion in question the defendant, William Harold Jordan, Jr., did cause the death of James Parker by shooting him with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, as alleged in the indictment, but you further believe from the evidence that the shooting was the result of the pushing of a firearm against the complainant, James Parker, or the complainant, James Parker, pushing the firearm with his hand, causing the discharge of the firearm and not the voluntary act or conduct of the defendant, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict, “Not guilty.”
However, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, William Harold Jordan, Jr., did cause the death of James Parker by the voluntary act or conduct of shooting James Parker with a firearm, then you must find against the defendant, William Harold Jordan, Jr., on the issue of an involuntary act or conduct.
While not a model charge, this adequately protected appellant’s rights.
I dissent.