Court Opinion

ID: 9566571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:40:58.330882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:31.854948
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
This decision flows with the spirit of Supreme Court Rule 85-4, now codified as SDCL 28A-44-5.1, with but one salient exception, which is elucidated below.
Although I agree with its basic rationale, the following sentence, to my way of thinking, debauches its core holding:
We therefore determine that State may have thirty days after the filing of this decision to file motions for good cause delay on pending cases that have already exceeded the 180-day period.
It is beyond my ken to arrive at a final conclusion, such as that expressed in the majority opinion, when the rationale and all of the authorities supporting absolute and complete discharge run contrary to such a conclusion. It is the duty of the prosecution and the courts, not the defendant, to dispose of a case. See United States v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir.1976).* The State or the Commonwealth must come *377forward and request an extension of time before the time under the rule has expired. See Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 338 Pa.Super. 615, 488 A.2d 63 (1985). The entire purpose behind creating this Supreme Court Rule in South Dakota was to ensure that cases be disposed of within 180 days unless the prosecution comes forward with a showing of good cause. Why, then, does the majority opinion permit and tolerate six months of delay by now giving the State thirty days to whitewash its neglect and, therefore, self destruct the very core holding of the decision? These criminal cases are mandated to be disposed of within 180 days or be dismissed unless good cause is shown. There is no grace period of thirty days. As the majority opinion expresses, the rule “is clear and unambiguous on its face.” Let us examine how another state looks at its special court rule:
Although the time for trial under the constitutional speedy trial rule is determined on a case-by-case basis, this court has adopted a special court rule requiring dismissal when certain time limits are not met in order to provide a degree of specificity not provided by that case-by-case analysis. The State must act not only in conformity with the provisions of the constitution, but also within the strictures of [the special court rule].
State v. Edwards, 94 Wash.2d 208, 213, 616 P.2d 620, 623 (1980). In State v. Darden, 99 Wash.2d 675, 663 P.2d 1352 (1983), the Supreme Court of Washington held that Edwards should be applied retroactively because it was not a new rule, but only an interpretation of an already existing rule. A grace period should not be applied, at this time, enabling the State to “get its feet on the ground,” so to speak, because it has been confronted with a loss at the appellate level. If the 180-day rule has not been followed, in accordance with the core ruling of the majority opinion, the rule has no teeth. Allowing a recharge, via a thirty-day grace period, would make the rule counterproductive and thus reward a failure to comply with the rule.
Via Exhibit A, received in evidence, Circuit Judge Gene Paul Kean warned the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s Office of the 180-day rule which letter is dated September 5, 1985. This letter forewarned a storm cloud, for it reflected, inter alia, as follows:
During the month of August, I was working with Tom Wright of your office and Bill Daugherty in an attempt to reduce the misdemeanor cases that appear to be piling up in the Magistrate’s Division. We began with seventy-nine cases. By setting these cases for trial, we were able to dispose of most but not all of them. There is a matter that should still be of some concern, however.
You are undoudtedly [sic] aware of the 180 [day] rule which requires the disposal of any criminal matter within that period unless good cause is shown. This rule became effective on July 1, 1985. A goodly number of the cases in the August trial list were already older than 180 days. While the rule does not begin to work or mark time on a case until July 1, 1985, the age of these cases should be some indication of a potential problem.
I am not sure why these backlogs continue to appear; but, the problem does seem to be an annual one in this circuit. I would like to suggest you review this matter with your staff. If you need trial judges, either the local circuit judges would help or judges could be brought in from another circuit.
During this storm-brewing time frame, the magistrates in this circuit had a policy of one “free” reset for the state in misdemeanor cases. Statistics reveal, in this record, that in a six-month period from July 1, 1985, to January 1, 1986, the circuit court judges disposed of ten misdemeanor cases which were transferred to their respective court from magistrate court but transferred more than fifty misdemeanor cases from the circuit court back to the magistrate level. It is noted that during this same six-month period, there were approximately twelve trial dates of magistrate court calendar time which were left open on Friday afternoons. Per the transcript on the Motion to Dismiss before Judge Hoyt on April 23-25, 1986, the Circuit Court Administrator offered case load *378lists to the State’s Attorney’s Office but the offer was declined. Six cases were tried to a jury in magistrate court from July 1,1985 to October 31, 1985, and there were no cases tried in magistrate court during the months of November and December 1985. A tremendous backlog of cases developed, particularly with respect to driving while under the influence of alcohol, and one Deputy State’s Attorney was assigned the primary responsibility of handling all of these cases. After motions to dismiss were filed, there began a flurry of activity to take care of the backlog. Examples: magistrates adopted a new “reset policy”; a committee was formed to try to cure future trial problems; meetings took place between the State's Attorney’s Office and court personnel to discuss scheduling problems. Candidly, the motions to dismiss triggered a heightened effort to dispose of cases and it is indeed unfortunate that the warning by Circuit Judge Gene Paul Kean was not harkened unto at an earlier and unperiled time. It was after the peril that the meetings and new procedures were held and adopted. In my opinion, the State was warned and the time ran, under this rule, on the State before it began to make efforts to remedy this situation. These efforts to dispose of the increasing backlog truly reflect that “the system" had the ability to cope with the problem earlier had it only, with due diligence and gusto, so acted. Thus, for me to join the majority opinion in a thirty-day “grace period” runs counter to the facts and the purpose for which the rule was established.

 Note the first four words of SDCL 23A-44-5.1. It states, inter alia: "The prosecution shall dispose. ...” (Emphasis supplied.) Colorado will not permit laxity under its special court rule. See People v. Deason, 670 P.2d 792 (Colo.1983).