Court Opinion

ID: 9545149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:07:12.795412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:51.769901
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/4/23 Andersson v. Newhall School District CA2/3

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                             DIVISION THREE

 CHARLENE ANDERSSON,                             B315894

     Plaintiff and Appellant,                    Los Angeles County
                                                 Super. Ct. No.
     v.                                          18STCV07659
 NEWHALL SCHOOL DISTRICT
                                                 Order Denying Petition for
 et al.,
                                                 Rehearing and Modifying
          Defendants and Respondents.            Opinion
                                                 [No change in judgment]

BY THE COURT: *
       It is ordered that the petition for rehearing filed July 31,
2023, is denied and the opinion filed July 18, 2023, is modified as
set forth below. There is no change in the judgment.

       On page 29, first full paragraph, delete the following:

On appeal, Andersson attempts to argue that the District’s act of
placing her on administrative leave was also an adverse
employment action. However, that ground was not alleged in the
pleadings and thus may not be relied upon to oppose summary
judgment. (See California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor (2013) 222
Cal.App.4th 625, 637, fn. 3 [“[a] party may not oppose a summary
judgment motion based on a claim, theory, or defense that is not
alleged in the pleadings,” and “[e]vidence offered on an unpleaded
claim, theory, or defense is irrelevant because it is outside the
scope of the pleadings”].)

        Replace the deleted portion with the following:

       In her reply brief, Andersson attempts to argue that the
District’s act of placing her on administrative leave was also an
adverse employment action. However, this contention is
conclusory and not developed in her briefing. Regardless, it is
undisputed that Morse’s understanding was that B.U.’s file had
not arrived from the other school district or had been misplaced
at the time Andersson was placed on administrative leave.
Andersson concedes in her opening brief that Morse’s
“understanding of the situation did not change until after
Andersson filed her complaint with the CDE in April 2018.”
Thus, the undisputed evidence would not permit a trier of fact to
infer that the District placed Andersson on administrative leave
in retaliation for the disclosure of Sorenson-Howe’s intentional
concealment of B.U.’s IEP, of which Morse was not aware.

*
    EDMON, P. J.               LAVIN, J.                   HEIDEL, J.* 1

* 1 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                    2
Filed 7/18/23 Andersson v. Newhall School District CA2/3 (unmodified opinion)

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     DIVISION THREE

 CHARLENE ANDERSSON,                                            B315894

      Plaintiff and Appellant,                                 Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No.
      v.                                                       18STCV07659
 NEWHALL SCHOOL DISTRICT
 et al.,

      Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Affirmed.
     Arthur Kim Law Firm and Arthur Kim for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     McCune & Harber, Stephen M. Harber, and Amy A.
Evenstad for Defendants and Respondents.
           _______________________________________
                       INTRODUCTION

       Plaintiff Charlene Andersson, a teacher, appeals following
the grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer,
Newhall School District (the District), her former principal, Kim
Sorenson-Howe, and the former Assistant Superintendent of
Human Resources with the District, Michelle Morse (together,
defendants). Andersson’s complaint alleged that the defendants
gave her a notice of unsatisfactory performance and negative
performance review in retaliation for her disclosure that
Sorenson-Howe concealed that a student who transferred to the
District had an Individualized Educational Plan (IEP) from his
prior school district and delayed the student’s access to services
for several weeks. Andersson brought causes of action for
retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 and Education Code
sections 44110 to 44114 and asserted claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED).
       The court granted summary adjudication of Andersson’s
Labor Code cause of action because it concluded that the violation
of law she disclosed was already known to the District and thus
was not a protected disclosure. After this matter was submitted,
our Supreme Court issued its opinion in People ex rel. Garcia-
Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719 (Kolla’s). In that
opinion, the court clarified that protected disclosures include
information that was already known to the employer or
government agency to which it was disclosed. In light of Kolla’s,
we conclude that the court erred in granting summary
adjudication of the Labor Code cause of action on the grounds
that there was no protected disclosure. However, summary
adjudication was nevertheless appropriate because the District

                                2
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Andersson
would have received a negative performance review for legitimate
and independent reasons. We further conclude that Andersson
has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating prejudicial error
as to her Education Code, IIED and NIED causes of action. We
therefore affirm.

       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.    Factual Background
      Andersson has been a teacher with the District for over 25
years. During the relevant period, Andersson was a fifth grade
teacher at Meadows Elementary School (Meadows), Sorenson-
Howe was the principal at Meadows, and Morse was the
Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources with the District.
      1.1.   Concerns about Andersson’s Conduct Raised to
             or by Sorenson-Howe Between 2016 and Early
             2017
       In October 2016, the parent of a child in Andersson’s
classroom, L.S., informed Sorenson-Howe that L.S. was so afraid
of Andersson that the child wet himself rather than asking her
for permission to use the restroom. His mother also reported that
she was afraid of Andersson. L.S. was removed from Andersson’s
class.
       In July 2017, the parents of a student, V.F., asked that V.F.
not be placed in Andersson’s class because V.F.’s sister had been
in Andersson’s class and “had such a negative experience [they]
had to have her moved to another class.”
       In September 2017, Sorenson-Howe received an email from
the parents of M.E. regarding their “extremely serious issues”
with Andersson’s treatment of their daughter. According to

                                 3
M.E.’s father, since the first week of school, M.E. had reported
that Andersson did not like her and picked on her. He also stated
that he received a phone call from the parent of another child in
the class who had come home crying because of how badly
Andersson had treated M.E. Specifically, Andersson had spoken
in front of the whole class about how M.E. was “stupid” and how
she had gotten every math problem wrong. M.E.’s parents
confirmed that M.E.’s responses were correct and that she had
shown her work. M.E.’s father demanded that she be moved to
another class immediately.
       Sorenson-Howe forwarded the email to Morse several days
later. In it, she stated that when she entered the District the
prior year, she had been told that Andersson “has a personnel/HR
file that is thick,” but that she “ha[d] not experienced anything
with this teacher that has been too alarming over the past year”
and that Andersson typically corrects a situation immediately
after Sorenson-Howe addressed it with her. Sorenson-Howe
testified that she had “extensive conversations” with Andersson
regarding M.E. and concluded that Andersson “had not
intentionally done anything wrong” and that M.E. could remain
in her class with appropriate support and coaching, although
Sorenson-Howe “still had wonderings.” Several weeks later,
M.E.’s father emailed Sorenson-Howe stating that M.E. was
enjoying school again. However, he also requested that a further
meeting be set up with Andersson and Sorenson-Howe “to
facilitate positive communication between us all, and to discuss
any lingering issues.”
       In December 2017, Andersson missed three and a half days
of school to go to Paris, France but did not obtain permission from
the District to take that time off in advance. Andersson testified

                                4
that she was sick and that her doctor had instructed her that she
should not go to school but that she could fly. In January 2018,
Sorenson-Howe met with Andersson regarding the absence.
      1.2.   The Discovery of B.U.’s IEP
       At the beginning of the 2017–2018 school year, a student
named B.U. was assigned to Andersson’s classroom. B.U. had
transferred from another school district. In September or October
2017,1 B.U.’s parents asked Andersson why he had not been
pulled out of class for services as he had been in the past.
Andersson arranged a meeting with the parents and with
Sorenson-Howe. After speaking with the parents, Andersson and
Sorenson-Howe went to the main office to look for documentation
concerning services for B.U. They located the cumulative file from
the other district in the office manager’s office. The file was in a
folder with a stamp indicating that it had been received by the
school district in August 2017. Andersson and Sorenson-Howe
looked at the folder and saw that the child was autistic and had
an IEP in place. Sorenson-Howe told Andersson that they should
tell the parents that the IEPs had not yet arrived from the other
district.2 Andersson asked, “How can we say that?” and “How

1 In her special education complaint made under penalty of perjury,

discussed infra, Andersson alleged that this meeting took place in
October 2017. At her deposition, she testified that it was on or about
September 15, 2017, though she did not remember the specific date it
took place. In a later declaration, she stated that it was on September
15, 2017.
2 Sorenson-Howe testified that she told Andersson that they should not

say anything specific to B.U.’s parents until they had a chance to
review the IEP and knew the details around the services. However,
after their meeting with the parents, Sorenson-Howe testified that she

                                   5
could this happen?” while they walked from the office back to the
classroom and Sorenson-Howe did not respond.
       Andersson testified that she did not know whether anyone
was in the office at the time they located the file. According to
Sorenson-Howe, the assistant principal, Janette Van Gelderen,
and two other employees were also present in the office, assisted
in the search for the file, and were there when it was located.
After the meeting with B.U.’s parents concluded, Sorenson-Howe
returned to the office and asked one of the office employees how
this could have happened. After she read the IEP, Sorenson-
Howe followed up with the office manager and told her they need
to develop a system so that every cumulative file that came in
would be reviewed before filing. Van Gelderen also participated
in developing this system.
       On October 9, 2017, Sorenson-Howe sent an email to the
special education team stating that she had put B.U.’s folder in
the mailbox of one of the team members. She further stated: “At
first glance, this student has an IEP that dictates both RSP and
Speech services with an eligibility of Autism. The
accommodations that are included in the IEP have been
happening since for [sic] the first day of school, thanks to
Charlene’s consistent effort to meet the student’s needs. [¶]
Obviously, we need to schedule a 30 day IEP ASAP to ensure that
the services outlined in his IEP accurately reflect his current
needs. In the meantime, please resume sped. services
immediately.” On October 23, 2017, an IEP meeting was held for
B.U.

went back to her office, reviewed the IEP, and immediately emailed
the special education team to inform them that B.U. had an IEP.

                                  6
      1.3.   Andersson’s Meetings with Morse in January and
             February 2018
       On or about January 22, 2018, Andersson had a meeting
with Morse. Andersson’s significant other also participated via
conference call. They discussed B.U. and Andersson told Morse
that, after discovering B.U.’s cumulative file, Sorenson-Howe
further delayed services for several weeks while pretending that
the file had not arrived from the other district. Andersson did not
remember whether Morse expressed surprise when she was
informed of B.U. but stated that Morse “made a comment that
the file was not misplaced, it didn’t arrive from Burbank.”
       Another meeting between Morse and Andersson took place
on February 8, 2018. This meeting was also attended by two
union representatives. One of the representatives took notes,
which indicate that there was discussion regarding B.U:
“[Michelle Morse]: Was there clarification about a student w/ a
former AP [¶] Autistic student [—] file never received for 5
weeks.” Morse testified that she recalled the question of B.U.
coming up at the February meeting with the union
representatives. She did not recall the specifics but stated: “The
knowledge I had at the time was that it had arrived late because
he had come in from another school district.”
      1.4.   Additional Concerns about Andersson’s Conduct
             Raised to Sorenson-Howe in January and
             February 2018
       On January 23, 2018, the mother of M.S., a student in
Andersson’s classroom, spoke with Van Gelderen. Van Gelderen’s
notes on the call indicate that M.S. felt “miserable” and
“targeted” in Andersson’s class. In her email to Van Gelderen
after they spoke, M.S.’s mother expressed surprise that

                                 7
Andersson had no problem with M.S. moving to another class. In
a later email, M.S.’s mother stated that M.S. was “feeling
sensitive and taking the teacher’s comments personally, and it
makes her feel like the teacher hates her because there’s no other
interaction between them.”
      On February 2, 2018, Sorenson-Howe had a meeting with
Ms. Davis, who was the room mother for Andersson’s class for the
2017–2018 school year. She stated that her son, G.B., reported
that Andersson did not treat students the same when another
adult was in the room. She also reported that G.B., who has
asthma, felt targeted for coughing and sniffling and had been
sent to the health office 11 times since the start of the school
year. She stated that she and other parents were upset about
Andersson being absent the last week of school in December as
they had spent time arranging a holiday party and gift for
Andersson. Davis stated that her son and other children were not
enjoying their fifth grade year and that she was frustrated with
how her son was being treated and how he felt targeted and
disliked by Andersson. Davis confirmed that the summary of the
meeting written by Sorenson-Howe was accurate.
      In February 2018, Morse received two written complaints
from teachers who felt intimidated and bullied because
Andersson believed that they had exposed that she had gone to
Paris while taking sick leave. On February 13, 2018, Van
Gelderen sent an email to one of the teachers, Jennifer Bronstein,
copying Sorenson-Howe, summarizing the conversation that the
three of them had earlier that day. Bronstein informed Van
Gelderen and Sorenson-Howe that Andersson had made her feel
uncomfortable at a meeting that took place on February 9, at
which Andersson stated: “I know when people go and speak to

                                8
Sorenson[-Howe] and Van Gelderen in the office. I know that
people are looking at my [F]acebook and saying things about me.”
This summary was signed by Bronstein.
       Sorenson-Howe also prepared a summary of their February
13 conversation, which Bronstein signed on February 22.
Bronstein had conveyed that she was now uncomfortable even
saying “hi” to Van Gelderen and Sorenson-Howe because of the
conversation with Andersson, that she felt that Andersson was
accusing her and another teacher, that Bronstein was fearful of
Andersson and intimidated by her, that she worried about her
reputation and felt that her character was being called into
question, and that she was afraid to speak to the administration
for fear of what Andersson would think of her or do to her.
Bronstein prepared her own written statement, also signed on
February 22. It stated that, at a meeting with Andersson and
another fifth grade teacher, Andersson had made a statement
suggesting that the other teachers had looked at her Facebook
page and said things about her, which made Bronstein very
uncomfortable. Bronstein felt that she had to get Andersson’s
approval for any idea before even suggesting it for the group’s
consideration “because [she felt] like [Andersson] is angry about
every decision” Bronstein made.
       On February 23, 2018, another teacher, Nicole Packer,
emailed Sorenson-Howe asking if they could talk alone. On
February 27, Packer thanked Sorenson-Howe for meeting with
her and asked that Sorenson-Howe attend the fifth grade
teachers’ planning meeting that week. Packer stated that
“[t]hings continue to be uncomfortable” and that “[j]ust sending
this email [made her] uncomfortable because of how loosely the
term ‘tattling’ is being thrown around by certain peers.”

                                9
       The next day, Packer followed up to clarify what she meant
regarding “tattling.” Packer reported that Andersson had said
that the district is cracking down on principals and teachers and
told them “that a teacher at another site was always tattling and
now she’s in trouble because she was always running to the
principal to tell them things and for instigating.” Andersson also
stated that “people need to be careful because things always come
back around and someone isn’t safe just because someone thinks
they are close with the principal” and that Bronstein and Packer
should “make sure [they] talk to our teammates because things
come back around.” Packer wrote that Andersson “continues to
bring up this topic” and assumed it was because Andersson
believed that Bronstein and Packer “had something to do with
her Facebook picture(s) situation.” Packer concluded by stating
that she almost went to urgent care the night before because of
how physically ill the situation was making her.
      1.5.   Andersson is Placed on Paid Administrative
             Leave
      On February 28, 2018, Andersson was placed on paid
administrative leave so the District could conduct an
investigation and to protect both Andersson and those who had
brought complaints against her. Morse testified that the signed
statements from the other teachers were only part of the decision
to put her on leave. She also cited Andersson’s concerns about
C.V., a student who had recently been placed in her class, and
about the request for a doctor’s note justifying her absence in
December. Morse followed up on these concerns and learned that
parents were “having concerns around their students being
bullied and mistreated in . . . Mrs. Andersson’s classroom.” She
was also informed of an allegation that Andersson had discussed

                               10
a current student with a former District employee in violation of
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. Morse testified
that all these factors led to the decision to place Andersson on
paid administrative leave.
       Morse sent Andersson an email asking her to come to a
meeting at the District office after school. Andersson indicated
that she could not attend because she had a prior engagement.
Sorenson-Howe called Andersson on her classroom phone and
yelled at her, instructing her to go the meeting. Andersson
became upset and began experiencing anxiety. She called the
office and asked for a substitute teacher and then left the
building. Sorenson-Howe came out to the parking lot and told her
not to leave and that Morse could meet them in the parking lot
shortly. Andersson told Sorenson-Howe that she felt sick and
that Sorenson-Howe was causing her anxiety. Sorenson-Howe
was standing between Andersson and her car door and
Andersson asked her to move. Andersson eventually made her
way into the car and left.
       Later that day, Andersson received a communication from
the District informing her that she was being placed on
administrative leave. The individual she spoke with did not know
why she was being placed on leave but told her that it was for her
own protection.
      1.6.   Andersson Files a Complaint with the California
             Department of Education Concerning B.U.
      On April 12, 2018, while on administrative leave,
Andersson filed a special education complaint with the California
Department of Education (CDE). With respect to B.U., she
alleged that, in October 2017, B.U.’s parents approached her and
asked why their son had not been pulled out of class for services.

                                11
Andersson called Sorenson-Howe to join the meeting and, after
briefly speaking with the parents, they went to the office to see if
there was a folder for B.U. related to his services. Eventually
they located the folder, which had been misfiled, and learned that
he had two IEPs. Sorenson-Howe stated that they should tell the
parents that the file had not yet arrived and did so.
       In June 2018, the CDE issued its investigation report on
these allegations, which was based on the investigator’s review of
documents provided by Andersson and the District, as well as
conversations with Andersson, B.U.’s parent, the District, and
B.U.’s previous district. The report found that B.U. entered the
district with an IEP from the previous district, which was
discovered October 9 and an IEP meeting was convened on
October 23, 2017. The report concluded that the District was out
of compliance with 34 Code of Federal Regulations part
300.323(c)(2), because it did not provide the required speech and
language and resource specialist program services to B.U. when
he enrolled in the District on August 17, 2017.
      1.7.   The District Issues Andersson a Notice of
             Unsatisfactory Performance and Negative
             Performance Review
      While Andersson was on leave, Morse investigated the
claims against Andersson and concluded that they were
substantiated. When Andersson returned to work in August
2018, she was presented with a “Notice of Unprofessional
Conduct and Unsatisfactory Performance” (Notice) that was
drafted and signed by Morse and received a negative performance
review. The Notice identified approximately 70 instances of
unprofessional conduct and unsatisfactory performance based on
the observations of parents, students, behavior support

                                12
specialists, staff, and other teachers. In addition to the
misconduct discussed above, the Notice identified incidents in
which Andersson made other teachers feel as if they did not know
what they were doing; inappropriately asked a student, C.V.,
whether he had ever punched another student in the face in front
of the whole class; left her students unsupervised by a
certificated employee during instructional time; and made
inappropriate comments about having to wait for B.U. and about
B.U. choosing not to listen in front of the entire class. The Notice
stated that Andersson’s acts were inconsistent with the policies of
the District’s governing board, its Code of Ethics, and with the
California Standards for the Teaching Profession.
      1.8.   The District Investigates Andersson’s Claims of
             Retaliation
      In November 2018, an attorney for the District contacted
an independent firm to investigate Andersson’s allegations that
she had been retaliated against. The firm interviewed District
employees, parents, and reviewed emails and documents before
issuing a report in January 2019. The report concluded that there
was no evidence that Sorenson-Howe and Morse issued frivolous
written discipline or retaliated against Andersson. It further
concluded that there was no evidence that Sorenson-Howe
concealed B.U.’s IEP or falsely represented that it had not
arrived.
2.    Procedural Background
      In December 2018, Andersson filed a complaint against the
District, Sorenson-Howe, and Morse, asserting six causes of
action: (1) retaliation under Education Code section 44110 et seq.
(against all the defendants); (2) retaliation under Labor Code

                                13
section 1102.5 (against the District); (3) false imprisonment
(against the District and Sorenson-Howe); (4) IIED (against the
District and Sorenson-Howe); (5) NIED (against the District and
Sorenson-Howe); and (6) a petition for writ of mandate
commanding the District to comply with Education Code section
44663, subdivision (a). The three acts of retaliation identified in
the complaint were: (1) Sorenson-Howe’s alleged verbal
harassment of Andersson in the parking lot; (2) the issuance of
the Notice, negative performance evaluation, and the
requirement that Andersson enter the Peer Assistance Review
program; and (3) the issuance of “frivolous conference
memoranda” on August 24 and 29, 2018. The court sustained a
demurrer as to the false imprisonment cause of action.
       In January 2021, the defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication.
The court granted the motion. With respect to the retaliation
cause of action under the Labor Code, the court concluded that
Andersson had not made a protected disclosure because the
failure to provide services to B.U. was known at the time of
Andersson’s disclosures. The court concluded that summary
adjudication was appropriate with respect to the Education Code
cause of action because Andersson failed to rebut the District’s
evidence or arguments that the disclosure concerned an internal
personnel matter rather than an “improper governmental
activity.” With respect to the intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress causes of action, the court concluded that
the claims were not grounded in statutory authority, as was
required to bring a claim against the District. With respect to the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against
Sorenson-Howe, the court found that Andersson had failed to

                                14
address how Sorenson-Howe’s conduct in the parking lot was
“extreme and outrageous conduct” rather than personnel
management. As to the negligent infliction of emotional distress
cause of action, the court concluded that Andersson had
presented no arguments or evidence with respect to duty.3
      Andersson timely appealed.
      Following oral argument and the submission of this matter,
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Kolla’s, which held that
a protected disclosure under Labor Code section 1102.5,
subdivision (b), encompasses reports or complaints of a violation
of law made to an employer or agency even if the recipient
already knows of the violation. This court invited the parties to
submit supplemental letter briefs addressing the impact, if any,
of Kolla’s on this appeal and the parties have done so.

                           DISCUSSION

      Andersson contends that the court erred in its
determination that she did not engage in protected activity
because she disclosed facts that were already known. Andersson
argues that summary adjudication of the Labor Code cause of
action must be overturned in light of Kolla’s. Andersson further
argues that she has a statutory basis for asserting her IIED and
NIED claims against the District, citing the statutes under which
she asserted her retaliation causes of action. She also contends
that she submitted substantial evidence that Sorenson-Howe

3 Both parties made evidentiary objections, which the court declined to

consider for the parties’ failure to comply with the California Rules of
Court, rule 3.1354. The court also granted summary adjudication as to
the sixth cause of action for failure to present evidence or argument.
Andersson does not contest these rulings on appeal.

                                   15
engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of the
IIED claim and that Sorenson-Howe had a duty not to retaliate
for purposes of the NIED claim.
       The defendants contend that the trial court’s order with
respect to the retaliation causes of action should be affirmed
because Andersson’s disclosure was not protected. The
defendants argue that Kolla’s is distinguishable on its facts. They
claim that Andersson’s disclosures were not protected because
she did not blow the whistle on a violation of law but reported a
disagreement with how her manager handled the IEP situation,
and because the violation was already resolved at the time
Andersson reported it. The defendants also argue that, even if
Andersson’s disclosures were protected under Kolla’s, summary
judgment was still appropriate on other grounds.
       The defendants further contend that Andersson has failed
to identify any statute authorizing the assertion of common law
torts against the District. They also argue that the IIED claim
against Sorenson-Howe fails because the confrontation in the
parking lot was a management action and thus not unfair or
outrageous conduct. Finally, the defendants contend that the
NIED cause of action fails because Sorenson-Howe did not have a
duty not to approach Andersson in the parking lot and because
the retaliation statutes do not create a duty of care for purposes
of a tort claim.
       We hold that the court erred in granting summary
adjudication of the Labor Code cause of action on the ground that
the violation of law was already known to the District. However,
summary adjudication of the Labor Code cause of action was
nevertheless appropriate because the District demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence that it would have given Andersson

                                16
a negative performance review for legitimate, independent
reasons even had she not engaged in protected conduct. We
further conclude that Andersson has failed to carry her burden of
demonstrating prejudicial error as to the Education Code, NIED,
and IIED causes of action. We therefore affirm.
1.    Standard of Review
       The standard of review in an appeal from a summary
judgment is well established. “The purpose of the law of summary
judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through
the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite
their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their
dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
843.) The moving party “bears the burden of persuasion that
there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 850; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (c).) The pleadings determine the issues to be
addressed by a summary judgment motion. (Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego (1980) 26 Cal.3d 848, 885, reversed on other
grounds by Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1981) 453 U.S.
490; Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co.
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 74.)
       On appeal from a summary judgment, we review the record
de novo and determine whether triable issues of material fact
exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763,
767; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.)
“An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is
not created by ‘speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess
work.’ [Citation.] Further, an issue of fact is not raised by
‘cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory assertions’ [citation], or
mere possibilities [citation]. ‘Thus, while the court in determining

                                 17
a motion for summary judgment does not ‘try’ the case, the court
is bound to consider the competency of the evidence presented.’
[Citation.]” (Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 190, 196–197.)
       “[I]t is well settled that on appeal following summary
judgment the trial court’s reasoning is irrelevant . . . . We
exercise our independent judgment as to the legal effect of the
undisputed facts [citation] and must affirm on any ground
supported by the record. [Citation.]” (Jimenez v. County of Los
Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 140.) “[O]ur review is
governed by a fundamental principle of appellate procedure,
namely, that ‘ “[a] judgment or order of the lower court
is presumed correct,” ’ and thus, ‘ “error must be affirmatively
shown.” ’ [Citation.] Under this principle, plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing error on appeal, even though defendants
had the burden of proving their right to summary judgment
before the trial court. [Citation.] For this reason, our review is
limited to contentions adequately raised and supported in
plaintiff’s brief. [Citation.]” (Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 412, 423.)
2.    Andersson has failed to demonstrate that the court
      erred in granting summary adjudication of her
      Education Code cause of action.
      Andersson begins her discussion of whether she made a
protected disclosure without stating the cause or causes of action
to which her arguments relate. From the first several pages, one
might fairly assume that she is addressing only the Labor Code
cause of action, as she refers to no other statute. Andersson
subsequently contends that the trial court erroneously granted
summary adjudication of her causes of action under the Labor

                                18
Code and the Reporting by School Employees of Improper
Governmental Activities Act (Ed. Code, §§ 44110–44114), but this
is the only point at which she cites the Education Code with
respect to her claim that the defendants retaliated against her.
Andersson does not identify which specific section of the Act
discusses protected disclosures, quote or paraphrase the relevant
language, or discuss how the court erred in its conclusion that the
undisputed evidence did not satisfy those requirements. This
issue is not remedied in her reply brief, which cites the Education
Code only when discussing the IIED and NIED causes of action.
       “It is the responsibility of the appellant, here plaintiff[], to
support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to
authority. [Citations.] When legal argument with citation to
authority is not furnished on a particular point, we may treat the
point as forfeited and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]
In addition, citing cases [or statutes] without any discussion of
their application to the present case results in forfeiture.” (Allen
v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) Andersson
has forfeited her claim that the court erred in granting summary
adjudication of her cause of action under the Education Code.
3.    Although the court’s ground for granting summary
      adjudication of the Labor Code cause of action was
      error, summary adjudication was proper.
       We turn to the issue of whether Andersson has established
a triable issue of material fact with respect to her retaliation
cause of action under the Labor Code. Section 1102.5, subdivision
(b), provides that an employer “shall not retaliate against an
employee for disclosing information . . . to a government or law
enforcement agency” or “to a person with authority over . . .
another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover,

                                  19
or correct the violation of noncompliance . . . if the employee has
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a
violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or
noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or
regulation . . . .”
       “In a civil action or administrative proceeding brought
pursuant to Section 1102.5, once it has been demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that an activity proscribed by
Section 1102.5 was a contributing factor in the alleged prohibited
action against the employee, the employer shall have the burden
of proof to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent
reasons even if the employee had not engaged in activities
protected by Section 1102.5.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.6.)
       In other words, three elements must be satisfied to make
out a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation: (1) the
plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) the plaintiff was
subjected to adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link
between the two previously stated elements. Once an employee
makes a prima facie case under Labor Code section 1102.5, the
employer must “demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence,
that it would have taken the action in question for legitimate,
independent reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in
protected activity.” (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718 (Lawson); see also Lab. Code,
§ 1102.6.)
       The court granted summary adjudication of the Labor Code
cause of action because it held that Andersson did not make a
protected disclosure because the violation of law she disclosed
was already known. Following the Supreme Court’s

                                20
interpretation of Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) in
Kolla’s, we cannot affirm summary adjudication of the Labor
Code cause of action on that ground. However, we conclude that
the District has met its burden of demonstrating that it would
have taken the same actions for legitimate, independent reasons
under Labor Code section 1102.6.
      3.1.   After Kolla’s, the court’s order granting summary
             adjudication on the ground that Andersson did
             not make a protected disclosure cannot stand.
      Under prior Court of Appeal decisions, the reporting of
already known facts did not constitute a protected disclosure
under the Labor Code or the Act. (See Mize-Kurzman v. Marin
Community College Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 832, 858–859;
see also Hager v. County of Los Angeles (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
1538, 1552 [a “report of ‘publicly known’ information or ‘already
known’ information is distinct from a rule in which only the first
employee to report or disclose unlawful conduct is entitled to
protection from whistleblower retaliation”], disapproved of on
other grounds by Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th 703.) However, after
this matter was submitted, the Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Kolla’s, which expressly disapproved of Mize-Kurzman, on
which the court relied.
      In Kolla’s, an employee complained to her supervisor that
she had not been paid wages for her previous three shifts and her
supervisor terminated her employment and threatened to report
her to immigration authorities. (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 721.) The employee informed the Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement (DLSE) of the Department of Industrial Relations
and, after the employer and supervisor declined to accept DLSE’s
proposed remedies, the Labor Commissioner sued them for

                               21
violations of the Labor Code. (Ibid.) The trial court ruled against
the Labor Commissioner as to the section 1102.5, subdivision (b)
cause of action on the grounds that the employee reported her
complaints to her employer rather than a government agency.
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded that this ruling was error
because it was based on an outdated version of section 1102.5
that only protected disclosures made to government agencies but
held that there was no protected disclosure because the
supervisor had perpetrated the violation and thus was already
aware of it. (Id. at pp. 721–722.) According to the Court of
Appeal, a disclosure is only “ ‘the revelation of something new, or
at least believed by the discloser to be new, to the person or
agency to whom the disclosure is made.’ ” (Id. at p. 722.)
       The Supreme Court reversed. It agreed with the Labor
Commissioner that, under dictionary definitions of “disclose,”
“information disclosed need not be previously unknown to the
recipient” and that “[t]o ‘make [something] openly known’
[citation] or ‘open [something] up to general knowledge’ [citation]
does not require that the ‘something’ be unknown to the current
recipient.” (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 725.) The Supreme
Court further observed that the legislative history of section
1102.5 supported a broad reading of “disclose.” (Id. at p. 728.) The
statute, as amended in 2013, “does not limit its protections to a
disclosure directed to a person with the authority to ‘discover’ the
alleged violation (i.e., a person who previously did not know
about the alleged violation); instead, it also protects a disclosure
made to a person with the authority to ‘investigate . . . or correct’
the violation, even if the disclosure does not cause the person to
‘discover’ the violation.” (Id. at p. 729.)

                                 22
       The Supreme Court observed that the rule adopted by the
Court of Appeal “would exclude from section 1102.5(b)’s
protection a worker who discloses a workplace violation to his or
her employer or to a government or law enforcement agency with
the knowledge that another employee has disclosed the same
violation, or with the unreasonable belief that no one has
disclosed the violation. But denying protection for these
corroborating disclosures undermines the purpose of section
1102.5(b). Because multiple disclosures would not receive
protection, employers and government agencies would miss out
on potentially corroborating information that may be valuable in
investigating and confirming violations of the law. Without
antiretaliation protections, an employee who knows that his or
her coworker has already disclosed a violation may be hesitant to
disclose the same violation.” (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 730.)
The Supreme Court further stated that nothing in section 1102.5
requires an employee to believe that they were revealing new
information. (Id. at p. 731.) “The only reference to an employee's
state of mind in section 1102.5(b) is the requirement that the
employee ‘has reasonable cause to believe that the information
discloses a [legal] violation.’ [Citation.] The statute thus does not
protect employees who do not believe or who unreasonably
believe that the information they are disclosing shows a violation
of the law. However, there is no indication that an employee must
also have reasonable cause to believe that he or she is the first to
report the alleged violation, and we see no basis for reading such
a requirement into the statute.” (Ibid.)
       In response to concerns from an amicus curiae that the
court’s interpretation “threatens ‘to convert everyday workplace
disputes into whistleblower cases[,]’ ” the Supreme Court noted

                                 23
that the protections of section 1102.5, subdivision (b), “apply only
where the disclosing employee ‘has reasonable cause to believe
that the information discloses a [legal] violation’ ” and that “an
employer accused of retaliation in violation of section 1102.5(b)
can rebut the charge by ‘demonstrat[ing] by clear and convincing
evidence that the alleged [retaliatory] action would have occurred
for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not
engaged in activities protected by Section 1102.5.’ [Citation.]”
(Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 734.)
       Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Labor Code
section 1102.5, subdivision (b), in Kolla’s, the fact that the
District was already aware of the violation of law reported by
Andersson is not dispositive. Our Supreme Court stated that a
disclosure for purposes of Labor Code section 1102.5 “does not
require that the ‘something’ [disclosed] be unknown to the
current recipient.” (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 725.) Nor does
section 1102.5 require that the individual making the disclosure
believe that the information disclosed was not already known to
employer or government entity to whom she makes the
disclosure. “The only reference to an employee’s state of mind in
section 1102.5(b) is the requirement that the employee ‘has
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a
[legal] violation.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 731.) Thus, as long as
Andersson believed that she was disclosing a violation of law, her
disclosure was protected even though she had reason to believe
that the violation of law was already known to the District.
       The defendants contend that, unlike in Kolla’s, Andersson’s
disclosure to Morse only concerned her assertion that Sorenson-
Howe lied or mishandled the situation, which was not a violation
of the law but a personnel matter. They further argue that the

                                24
disclosure is not protected because the violation of law was
resolved at the time that Andersson made her purported
disclosures to Morse. The defendants also assert that the April
2018 disclosure to the CDE “could not be the reason for any
alleged retaliation, as Appellant was already on leave for
unrelated reasons while her reported misconduct was being
investigated at that time.”
       It is not clear that Andersson’s disclosure to Morse was
exclusively a personnel matter. The Supreme Court observed that
additional reports regarding the same violation of law can
corroborate or assist in the investigation or correction of a known
violation. (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 730–731.) Kolla’s also
reaffirms that Labor Code section 1102.5 “ ‘reflects the broad
public policy interest in encouraging workplace whistle-blowers
to report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation.’ [Citations.]”
(Id. at p. 723.) There does not appear to be any dispute that the
failure to provide services to B.U. was a violation of law or that
Andersson reasonably believed it to be one. Andersson’s
disclosure that the delay in providing services was intentional
clearly related to that violation and provided additional
information that could have been relevant to the District in
investigating and correcting the issue.
       We agree with the defendants that, unlike in Kolla’s, the
undisputed evidence supports that the District took steps to
address the violation of law—the failure to timely provide B.U.
with the services to which he was entitled under 34 Code of
Federal Regulations part 300.323—before Andersson’s
disclosures to Morse were made. The defendants express concern
that a holding that disclosures of known and resolved violations
of law are protected would incentivize abuse of Labor Code

                                25
section 1102.5, subdivision (b). However, the causation
requirement for a prima facie case of retaliation and the
affirmative defense for employers set forth under Labor Code
section 1102.6 guard against such abuse. Further, a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that correcting the violation includes
addressing the circumstances that led to the violation, not merely
providing B.U. with the services to which he was entitled.
Whether the violation was caused by intentional delay or a
simple filing error is relevant to that resolution. Considering the
principles set forth in Kolla’s, we are reluctant to hold that
Andersson’s disclosures to Morse, which pertained to a violation
of law and provided further information and context regarding
that violation, are not protected.
       Even if the disclosures to Morse pertained only to personnel
matters, Andersson’s later disclosure to the CDE did not simply
concern Andersson’s disagreement with how Sorenson-Howe
managed the situation with B.U. Rather, Andersson reported her
belief the District’s failure to provide B.U. with services prior to
October 2017 violated 34 Code of Federal Regulations
part 300.323 and the CDE concluded that the District was out of
compliance. The CDE ordered training in connection with its
conclusion that the District had violated 34 Code of Federal
Regulations part 300.323 with respect to B.U., which indicates
that it did not consider the matter entirely resolved or corrected
at the time Andersson made her disclosure. The defendants
contend that the April 2018 disclosure to the CDE could not
possibly be the basis for retaliation because Andersson was
already on leave to allow the District to investigate complaints
against her, but this argument goes to whether there was a

                                26
causal connection between the disclosure and alleged retaliation,
not whether the disclosure was protected.
      Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that Andersson
made at least one protected disclosure and that the court erred in
granting summary adjudication of the Labor Code cause of action
on the ground that Andersson did not make a protected
disclosure.
      3.2.   Summary adjudication of the Labor Code cause
             of action was nevertheless appropriate.
      Having concluded that the ground on which the trial court
relied in granting summary adjudication is not valid, we consider
whether summary adjudication of the Labor Code cause of action
was appropriate on a ground not reached by the trial court.
      Although we may affirm an order granting summary
adjudication on any ground supported by the record (Jimenez v.
County of Los Angeles, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 140), Code of
Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (m)(2), imposes a
limitation. In relevant part, it provides: “Before a reviewing court
affirms an order granting summary judgment or summary
adjudication on a ground not relied upon by the trial court, the
reviewing court shall afford the parties an opportunity to present
their views on the issue by submitting supplemental briefs.”
      Courts of Appeal have held that “[t]he purpose of section
437c, subdivision (m)(2) has . . . been fully met” and supplemental
briefing is not required where “the parties have already been
provided ‘an opportunity to present their views on the issue,’ ”
including where “[d]efendants directly addressed the issue in
their briefs, and plaintiffs addressed it in their reply brief.”
(Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 471, fn. 39; accord,
Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th

                                27
1134, 1147 [concluding supplemental briefing not required
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision
(m)(2) where issue was raised below and on appeal].) The parties
briefed the issues of whether there was a causal connection
between the disclosure and adverse employment action and
whether there was a legitimate, nonretaliatory ground for the
adverse employment action both below and on appeal. Thus, we
conclude that the requirements of section 437c, subdivision
(m)(2), have been satisfied as to these alternative grounds, which
we now address.
      3.2.1. Causal Connection
      With respect to the causal connection element, an employee
need not show that retaliation was the “ ‘but for’ cause of the
employment decision” but must show that retaliation was at least
a “substantial motivating factor” for the decision. (Harris v. City
of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 230, 232.) “ ‘ “The causal
link may be established by an inference derived from
circumstantial evidence, ‘such as the employer’s knowledge that
the [employee] engaged in protected activities and the proximity
in time between the protected action and allegedly retaliatory
employment decision.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Essential to a
causal link is evidence that the employer was aware that the
plaintiff had engaged in the protected activity.’ [Citation.]”
(Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88
Cal.App.4th 52, 69–70 (Morgan).) A causal connection can also be
demonstrated by a “sudden change of position” toward an
employee after a disclosure is made. (Mokler v. County of Orange
(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 141, disapproved of on another
ground by Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th 703.)

                                28
      “ ‘[W]e identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it
is these allegations to which the motion must respond by
establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no
factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by
the opponent’s pleading. [Citation.]’ ” (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 635, 639, italics omitted.) Andersson’s complaint
alleged that the acts of retaliation were Sorenson-Howe’s attempt
to prevent her from leaving campus in February 2018 and the
Notice and negative performance review she received upon her
return from leave in August 2018.4 On appeal, Andersson
attempts to argue that the District’s act of placing her on
administrative leave was also an adverse employment action.
However, that ground was not alleged in the pleadings and thus
may not be relied upon to oppose summary judgment. (See
California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 625,
637, fn. 3 [“[a] party may not oppose a summary judgment motion
based on a claim, theory, or defense that is not alleged in the
pleadings,” and “[e]vidence offered on an unpleaded claim, theory,
or defense is irrelevant because it is outside the scope of the
pleadings”].)
      With respect to the first claimed act of retaliation, the
undisputed evidence establishes that Sorenson-Howe was not

4 The complaint also alleges that the defendants retaliated against her

with two “frivolous conference memoranda on August 24 and 29, 2018.”
These memoranda do not appear in the record. The only evidence of
them cited on appeal is Andersson’s statement in her declaration that
she was subject to “further unfounded written and verbal discipline
beginning in August 2018.” This vague, conclusory statement is not
evidence sufficient to create an issue of fact. Thus, we do not consider
the issue of causation with respect to these purported acts of
retaliation.

                                  29
present at the January or the February meetings at which
Andersson made her disclosures to Morse. Andersson does not
contend that Sorenson-Howe was informed of what was discussed
or identify any evidence supporting that Sorenson-Howe was
aware of the substance of the discussions on February 28, 2018,
when she confronted Andersson in the parking lot. Thus,
Andersson has failed to identify a triable issue of material fact of
a causal connection between her January and February
disclosures to Morse and Sorenson-Howe’s verbal harassment of
her. (See Morgan, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 73 [“In the absence
of evidence that the individuals who denied appellant
employment were aware of his past filing of a grievance, the
causal link necessary for a claim of retaliation can not [sic] be
established.”].)5
       With respect to the Notice and negative performance
review, the undisputed evidence does not establish any “sudden
change of position” with respect to Andersson. (Mokler v. County
of Orange, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 141.) By the time
Andersson made her complaint to the CDE, the administration at
Meadows had received multiple complaints from parents and
teachers concerning Andersson and an investigation into the
various complaints against her was already underway. However,
a causal link may also be established by circumstantial evidence,
such as “ ‘ “ ‘the proximity in time between the protected action

5 Adverse employment actions are those that “materially affect[] the

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal
USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1051.) Although we have doubts as
to whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Sorenson-Howe’s
attempt to prevent Andersson from leaving the school was an adverse
employment action, the District did not advance this argument below.

                                  30
and allegedly retaliatory employment decision.’” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (Morgan, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 69–70.)
Although the District’s representatives had received reports of
misconduct prior to any disclosures, and additional reports
between the various alleged disclosures, we do not agree with the
defendants that the complaint to the CDE could not have had any
bearing on the Notice and negative performance review as a
matter of law because an investigation against Andersson was
already underway. Even if the CDE’s findings corroborated
Sorenson-Howe’s version of events, it is possible that Andersson’s
decision to escalate the issue to the CDE nevertheless caused
resentment. For purposes of argument, we will assume that a
reasonable juror could conclude that the proximity in time
between Andersson’s disclosure to the CDE and the negative
performance review provides circumstantial evidence that her
disclosures motivated the negative performance review.
      3.2.2. Clear and Convincing Evidence of an
             Independent and Legitimate Reason for the
             Adverse Actions
      Even where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
retaliation, Labor Code section 1102.6 provides a “statutory
affirmative defense to employer liability for retaliation in
violation of the whistleblower statute when the employer can
show that it would have made the same decision for legitimate
and independent reasons.” (Assem.Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 777 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 29,
2003; Lawson, supra, 12 Cal. 5th at p. 712.)
      Under Labor Code section 1102.6, the defendants must
identify clear and convincing evidence to show that no reasonable
jury could find that the District would not have given Andersson

                               31
a negative performance review for legitimate, independent
reasons. “ ‘Clear and convincing’ evidence requires a finding of
high probability.” (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 908, 919,
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Cody
W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221, 229–230.) Although this standard
of proof “demands a degree of certainty greater than that
involved with the preponderance standard” (Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998), it does not require absolute
certainty. (Estate of Moramarco (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 326, 333.)
       The District has carried its burden. Approximately a month
into the 2017–2018 school year, a parent wrote an email to
Sorenson-Howe in which he claimed that Andersson’s treatment
of his child was so bad that a classmate cried to her parents
about it. He further stated that Andersson had called his child
“stupid” in front of the class. The situation was only resolved
following “extensive conversations,” coaching, and support from
Sorenson-Howe. In early 2018, a parent called and spoke with
Van Gelderen about how her child felt “miserable” and “targeted”
in Andersson’s class. The student’s mother expressed surprise
that Andersson had no problem with the child moving to another
class. Shortly thereafter, a parent complained to Sorenson-Howe
that she was frustrated with how her son was being treated in
class and how he felt targeted and disliked by Andersson. In
February 2018, two teachers also complained to Sorenson-Howe
and Van Gelderen about Andersson’s behavior towards them.
According to the teachers, Andersson intimated that she knew
that they had revealed the contents of her Facebook page to
Sorenson-Howe (a claim they denied) and suggested that they
would get in trouble for “tattling,” which made the teachers
uncomfortable and anxious. One of the teachers also felt that she

                               32
had to get Andersson’s approval for any idea before even
suggesting it for wider consideration “because [she felt] like
[Andersson] is angry about every decision” the teacher made. The
Notice disclosed many further incidents supporting that
Andersson treated students and colleagues in a disrespectful
manner, contrary to the policies of the governing board of the
District, its Code of Ethics, and the California Standards for the
Teaching Profession.
       Andersson does not meaningfully dispute the conduct set
forth in the Notice but simply asserts that the incidents therein
are “untrue or unfairly characterized.” “[A]n issue of fact is not
raised by ‘cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory assertions’
[citation] . . . .” (Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler, supra, 231
Cal.App.3d at p. 196.)
       Andersson contends that the District’s reasons for issuing a
negative performance review were “false and pretextual” because
she had not previously received a negative performance review or
written discipline during her 20-year career and because of the
timing of the adverse actions.6 However, the undisputed evidence
does not support that the complaints identified in the Notice were
unprecedented. A confidential memorandum from June 2010
records complaints received from two sets of parents whose
children felt poorly treated and picked on by Andersson and who
requested that their children not be placed in Andersson’s class
again. Andersson signed the memorandum.7 Further, months

6 We note that, “[u]nder section 1102.6, a plaintiff does not need to

show that the employer’s nonretaliatory reason was pretextual.”
(Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 715–716.)
7 The independent investigation report states that there was also a

memorandum dated October 2010 documenting Andersson’s violation

                                   33
before Andersson made any of her disclosures, Sorenson-Howe
remarked in an email to Morse that she had been told that
Andersson “has a personnel/HR file that is thick” when she
entered the District.
       Andersson also presents a declaration from a former
District employee who vaguely asserted that Sorenson-Howe
mischaracterized facts relating to that employee’s work
performance and attributed a fabricated statement to the
employee. However, Andersson identifies no evidence suggesting
that any of the parents, students, behavior support specialists, or
teachers “fabricated” the incidents described in the Notice. The
results of the independent investigation, which involved
interviews with many parents and teachers, support that they
were not fabricated.
       Andersson further contends that certain isolated incidents
of misconduct in the Notice “border[] on the absurd.” However,
Morse repeatedly emphasized in her undisputed deposition
testimony that it was not any single incident that justified the
negative performance review, but the sum of the behaviors
reflected in the Notice. Andersson does not meaningfully respond
to this contention.
       Andersson suggests that the negative performance review
is not legitimate because Sorenson-Howe observed Andersson
teaching in November 2017 and gave her positive feedback.
However, Sorenson-Howe received multiple additional complaints
from parents of students and Andersson’s colleagues after she

of a District Civility Policy and California Standard for the Teaching
Profession, which was signed by Andersson and others. However, this
document does not appear to be included in the record.

                                  34
made this positive report, including from a parent whose child
stated that Andersson behaves differently towards students when
other adults are present in the classroom. Indeed, most of the
specific incidents set forth in the Notice occurred after that date.
      Finally, Andersson contends that the Notice and negative
performance review were not legitimate because much of the
unprofessional conduct identified was not discussed with her at
the time it took place. Although there is a factual dispute as to
whether Sorenson-Howe contemporaneously discussed all the
issues identified in the Notice with Andersson, Andersson
concedes that Sorenson-Howe discussed at least six of the
incidents described in the Notice with her at the time they
occurred. Several of the incidents in the Notice that Andersson
claims were never raised to her were conversations between
Andersson and Van Gelderen or Sorenson-Howe. Further,
Andersson does not claim that she was unaware any of the
actions described were inappropriate or unprofessional at the
time they took place. Indeed, much of the alleged misconduct that
Andersson claims she was not informed of was of a similar nature
to misconduct that was discussed with her. For example, a jury
could not reasonably find that Andersson was unaware that
making unsupportive and embarrassing comments about a
student in front of the class was inappropriate after she received
feedback and coaching in connection with an earlier complaint
that she had stated in front of the entire class that M.E. had
gotten all the math problems wrong.
      Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
367 is instructive. The plaintiff, who had been promoted to a new
position that was probationary for six months, claimed that she
had been released from probation for complaining that her duties

                                35
were not consistent with civil service rules. (Id. at p. 376.) In
response, the defendant argued that it had released the plaintiff
for insubordination, disrespect, and dishonesty. (Id. at pp. 376,
384.) The employer prevailed on summary judgment and the
Third District affirmed on the grounds that the employer had
legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons to release the plaintiff from
probation. (Id. at p. 377.) The court observed that the plaintiff
“never meaningfully disputed the alleged act of dishonesty,” or
“the alleged acts of disrespectful and insubordinate conduct,”
many of which were reflected in “the undisputed evidence of her
emails.” (Id. at pp. 384–385.) Indeed, during a call with her
supervisor, the plaintiff “appeared to at least acknowledge that
she had been ‘difficult’ to work with, ‘distant,’ and ‘unwilling to
cooperate.’ ” (Id. at p. 386.) Although the plaintiff argued that the
defendant’s reasons for releasing her from probation “were
‘factually baseless’ because she ‘was a competent employee,’ ‘was
never coached or disciplined,’ and ‘was never provided
assignments where she could manage or provide leadership,’ ” the
Third District concluded that these arguments were “either
immaterial or lack[ed] evidentiary support.” (Ibid.) The court
noted that the plaintiff’s “general competency as an employee is
not material to this case, which concerns the [defendant’s]
adverse employment action based on her ‘insubordinate,
disrespectful, and dishonest’ conduct.” (Ibid.) It concluded that
her claims that she was not given managerial tasks was refuted
by the record and that the record further indicated that she was
coached, albeit not in writing. (Id. at pp. 386–387.) Considering
these circumstances, Vatalaro affirmed an order granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment under Labor Code
section 1102.6. (Id. at pp. 387–388.)

                                 36
       Here, as in Vatalaro, many of the complaints from parents
or other teachers are reflected in the undisputed evidence of
emails received by Sorenson-Howe or Van Gelderen. Andersson
similarly makes no attempt to factually dispute the misconduct
alleged against her that formed the basis of the District’s
negative performance review. Moreover, it is undisputed that
Andersson also received “extensive” coaching and feedback, even
if not in connection with every single incident raised in the
Notice. Thus, “[w]e find . . . that the [District] presented sufficient
undisputed evidence to satisfy its burden under section 1102.6 on
summary judgment. We also find that [Andersson] failed to raise
any triable issue of material fact that would preclude summary
judgment in this case.” (Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 386.)
4.    Andersson forfeits her appeal of the IIED and NIED
      causes of action.
      In her opening brief, Andersson does not identify the
elements of the IIED and NIED causes of action or cite legal
authority in support of her claim that the court erred in its
rulings with respect to these causes of action.8 “The failure to

8 The sole authorities Andersson cites in the portion of her opening

brief addressing the IIED and NIED causes of action are the statutes
under which she brought her retaliation causes of action. Because a
claim cannot be maintained against a public entity unless the tort is
authorized by statute (Gov. Code § 815, subd. (a)), Andersson contends
that her “IIED and NIED claims [against the District] are wholly
grounded in Labor Code § 1102.5 and Education Code §[] 44110 et seq.”
However, the referenced sections of the Labor Code and Education
Code only provide for damages for violations of those same statutes.
We find no indication that they also authorize damages for common

                                  37
provide legal authorities to support arguments forfeits
contentions of error.” (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948; accord, Wright v. City of Los Angeles
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [“asserted grounds for appeal that
are unsupported by any citation to authority and that merely
complain of error without presenting a coherent legal argument
are deemed abandoned”].) “Without a statement of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by authority, counsel cannot
establish whether triable issues of fact exist as to [that] cause of
action.” (Ewald, at p. 949.)
       With respect to the IIED cause of action against Sorenson-
Howe, Andersson asserts that Sorenson-Howe acted in an
extreme and outrageous fashion that exceeded “normal personnel
management activity” but does not include any citations to the
record. Any statement in a brief concerning matters that are in
the appellate record, whether factual or procedural, whether in
the statement of facts, the procedural history, or the argument
portion of the brief, must be supported by a citation to the record.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); City of Lincoln v.
Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239, fn. 16 [record
citations in statement of facts do not cure failure to include
record citations in argument portion of brief]; Alki Partners, LP v.
DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, fn. 8
[same].) Andersson’s reference to a prior portion of her brief does
not cure this failure. “To provide record citations for alleged facts
at some points in a brief, but not at others, frustrates the purpose
of [Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)], and courts will decline to consider any

law torts, and Andersson fails to cite any authority or advance any
argument to that effect.

                                  38
factual assertion unsupported by record citation at the point
where it is asserted.” (Alki, at p. 590, fn. 8, italics added.) Even if
we were inclined to overlook that failure, Andersson furnishes no
law with which we may determine what “normal personnel
management activity” is, or whether she has created a triable
issue of material fact as to whether Sorenson-Howe’s conduct was
extreme or outrageous. Andersson similarly fails to identify any
authority supporting her contention that the Labor Code and
Education Code create a duty of care (specifically, a duty not to
retaliate) for purposes of a common law negligence claim.
       Although Andersson includes some authority in her reply
brief, she again fails to identify the elements of the IIED and
NIED causes of action. Andersson contends that governmental
immunity does not apply without specifying whether she is
talking about the District, Sorenson-Howe, or both, and does not
identify or discuss the relevant statutes concerning governmental
immunity. Further, the scant record citations included are to the
parties’ briefing of these issues below. The parties’ arguments are
not evidence and cannot create a triable issue of material fact.
(See Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 139
[“Statements and arguments by counsel are not evidence.
[Citations.]”]; Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 [citation to footnote of memorandum of
points and authorities “obviously is not to admissible evidence in
the record that indicates a triable issue of fact exists”].)
       “An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped
claims, nor to make arguments for parties.” (Paterno v. State of
California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106, accord, Dills v.
Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1
[appellate court “will not develop the appellants’ arguments for

                                  39
them”].) We conclude that Andersson has forfeited her appeal as
to the IIED and NIED causes of action.

                               40
                           DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed. The defendants shall recover
their costs on appeal.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                           LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      HEIDEL, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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