Court Opinion

ID: 9733927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:20:32.14365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.526466
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
dissenting:
I believe that the majority exceeds the proper scope of review in refusing to accept factual findings of the trial court that are supported by the record. I therefore dissent.
The majority finds error by the trial court where the record does not reveal error. The majority’s first contention is that the trial judge should have considered the fact that father-appellant was admitted to Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) on two counts of indecent exposure. The record demonstrates that the trial judge considered the father’s ARD. In his opinion, the trial judge notes that the father was on ARD.
The judge as the finder of fact, however, believed the father’s testimony that he had not committed the acts charged but consented to ARD only to avoid the embarrassment of a trial. The credibility of witnesses is a matter uniquely within the province of the hearing court. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977). Since ARD is not a conviction, the judge was *371completely free to believe appellant’s assertion that he had not committed the acts charged.
Next, my review of the record supports the trial court’s disposition of shared custody. The majority finds the trial court was in error in concluding that the parties exhibited the minimal degree of cooperation required for an award of shared custody. In re Wesley J.K., 299 Pa.Super. 504, 445 A.2d 1243 (1982). The majority in so concluding has exceeded the proper scope of review by disregarding the clear findings of fact made by the trial court and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom.
Our Supreme Court recently reiterated the standards to be applied upon review of a custody determination in Lombardo v. Lombardo, 515 Pa. 139, 527 A.2d 525 (1987). The Lombardo court emphasized that the appellate court’s broad scope of review in custody matters was never intended to permit the overriding of findings of fact made by the trial court, provided such findings are supported by evidence in the record.
In light of the limited scope of review, it seems to me that the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in finding the parties could not minimally cooperate cannot stand. The four Wesley criteria for shared custody are: 1) both parents are “fit,” 2) both desire continuing involvement with their child, 3) both parents are seen by the child as sources of security and love, and 4) both parents are able to communicate and cooperate in promoting the child’s best interests. Id., 299 Pa.Super. at 516-17, 445 A.2d at 1249.
As we explained in Wesley, the fourth or cooperation criterion requires
A minimal degree of cooperation between the natural parents— ‘This feature does not translate into a requirement that the parents have an amicable relationship. Although such a positive relationship is preferable, a successful joint custody arrangement requires only that the parents be able to isolate their personal conflicts from their roles as parents and that the children be spared *372whatever resentments and rancor the parents may harbor.’
Ibid (Emphasis added), quoting Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 498, 432 A.2d 63, 71-72 (1981).
The rationale behind the minimal cooperation requirement is that if the parents have a total inability to make cooperative decisions relating to the child, the child will ultimately be harmed. If the parents dislike each other and fight between themselves but have the minimal ability to cooperate in decisions relating to the child, then shared custody may be appropriate. While in general shared custody is in the child’s best interest in that it helps the child maintain a close, realistic relationship with both parents, these benefits may be negated in cases where joint decision making relating to the child causes such bitter disputes that the atmosphere in which the child is raised may be poisoned. I recognize that a parent may prefer sole custody. The parent may think it preferable for him or her to have the legal right to make all decisions relating to the child, but the judge must ask if such an arrangement is best for the child. I also recognize that divorce is usually predicated on disharmony between the parties and that such disharmony may extend to childrearing. Disharmony alone is not a bar to shared custody if shared custody is in the best interest of the child. The law requires only that the parties be capable of a minimal degree of cooperation.1
The majority asserts that that the trial court erred in finding the minimal cooperation criterion to be met, citing the mother’s testimony that the father is uncommunicative regarding the care of the child, Sam, particularly with regard to the father’s practices in weaning Sam from the bottle, and that the father refuses to administer medicine to Sam. However, examination of the record reveals clear evidence to the contrary on both of these points. Such *373evidence supports the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court. This court is bound to accept those findings and conclusions despite the existence of other, contradictory evidence. In almost every custody case, conflicting testimony will be offered by the parties and their witnesses. It is precisely the function of the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses and decide whose assertions are more credible.
In the case sub judice, both mother’s and father’s testimony support the findings of the trial court that the parties exhibited cooperation in handling their son. The mother’s own words at trial are contrary to her assertions on appeal. She gave the following testimony regarding the communication between her and the father concerning Sam’s care when he was ill:
Q: (Appellee father’s attorney): Were there some instances that illnesses began when [father] had the child so you would get the child in an ill condition?
Appellant: Yes.
Q: Did [father] also give you medications?
Appellant: Yes he did or if he wasn’t on a prescription he’d tell me what he was doing for him.
Q: Would he tell you how the child was behaving so you knew what to look for?
Appellant: Yes.
Q: You were able to talk about those things?
Appellant: That’s correct.
N.T. 4/24/84, p. 44. Father also testified that he gives Sam appropriate medicine when he is ill. N.T. 3/3/86, p. 24.
Regarding the weaning of Sam from the bottle, mother testified as follows:
Q: (Appellee father’s attorney): And is it your testimony that on each of [the four occasions a month that the child is transferred] you have asked him about the bottle?
Appellant: I may not have asked him about the bottle everytime, but I asked him about other things that concerned me too.
*374Q: Limiting to the bottle, you had an opportunity to ask him about that.
Appellant: Yes.
Q: And each time he’s answered you is that correct?
Appellant: Yes.
Q: Has he ever refused to discuss it with you?
Appellant: No, he’s never refused.
N.T. 4/24/84, p. 29 (Emphasis added).
Having heard the testimony of both mother and father, the trial court made findings of fact that father did give the child his medicine and did communicate with mother regarding the care of the child. In light of the above record testimony, I cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in making those findings.2
In addition to finding adequate communication between the parents, the trial court highlighted other factors in the case that support the appropriateness of an order of shared custody. The parties originally agreed to shared custody, see Brown v. Eastburn, 351 Pa.Super. 479, 506 A.2d 449 (1986); Murphey v. Hatala, 350 Pa.Super. 433, 504 A.2d 917 (1986), and have between themselves successfully worked out adjustments in the custody schedule for holidays, vacations, birthdays, etc.. Brown v. Eastburn; cf. Agati v. *375Agati, 342 Pa.Super. 132, 492 A.2d 427 (1985). Most significantly, the court found that both parents have been actively involved in their child’s life to date. See Murphey v. Hatala.
Each parent, in fact, testified that they recognized and supported the important role the other has played and will continue to play in their young son’s life. Mother testified as follows:
Q: (Appellant’s attorney): What attitude or what feeling do you have concerning [father’s] contact with the child?
Appellant: Well, Sam has to see him sometimes as a father. It’s important for Sammy to see him.
Q: Is it your intention to exclude baby Sammy from Mr. DeNillo here?
Appellant: No.
Q: Do you feel his contact is important?
Appellant: Very important. Sammy has to know who his father is and has to have contact with him all the time no matter what.
N.T. 4/24/84, p. 21. Mother testified that she was trying to change the shared custody arrangement not out of any dissatisfaction with father’s parenting of the child, but out of a desire to have more time with the child herself. When asked why she was petitioning for sole custody, she testified:
Because I like to have full custody of him. I’d like to do things with him, not saying [father] would not____ I mean I don’t have anything against him, I think Sammy should see him but I’d like to have full custody of him.
N.T. 4/24/84, p. 21.
Similarly, when father was asked what custody arrangement he would prefer, he testified:
Well, of course I would like to have full custody of Sam, but I don’t think it would be right to take Sam completely off of Michelle. He does need his mother. I think he needs both of us. So by taking him and giving *376him to me or Michelle I don’t think that would be very good. I think he needs both of us.
N.T. 8/21/84, P. 15.
In light of the evidence of record, I cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that shared custody was in the best interest of the child.
Shared custody is a proper vehicle for each parent to maintain maximum commitment to the child. A parent who is merely a visitor with the child and who does not engage in decision making for the child may soon attenuate his ties to the child because he or she after a period of time may feel no real engagement with the child. It is best for the child to have the active participation of both parents who take the full parental role on an ongoing basis. Divorce is always disruptive to children. Shared custody, when properly arranged, minimizes that disruption. Both parents retain full responsibility for decisions relating to the child, and that is usually in the child’s best interest.
I address one final issue raised by the majority. The majority states that at oral argument it was revealed that Sam has been enrolled in two different school districts since the beginning of the 1987-88 school year. Assuming arguendo that this is true (it is not a fact of record), it in no way affects that portion of the order of the trial court entered on December 1986, relating to shared custody. Now that Sam is of school age it is essential that shared custody be redesigned so that Sam will be enrolled in only one school and reside during the school week with the parent in the school district in which he is enrolled. It would be completely proper, under an order of shared custody, to award physical custody of Sam to one parent for weekdays during the academic school year, and to the other parent for certain weekends, holidays and a portion of the summer months. Shared legal custody does not require equal physical custody; it merely requires shared decision making for the child. Ellingsen v. Magsamen, 337 Pa.Super. 14, 486 A.2d 456 (1984).
I would therefore affirm the order of the trial court.

. The fact that the trial court has found that the parties are not cooperating as fully as they might, and that it would be desirable if they would do so, does not mean that they do not exhibit the required minimal degree of cooperation. Brown v. Eastburn, 351 Pa.Super. 479, 506 A.2d 449 (1986).

. The majority states in footnote 2 that, whatever the state of the relationship between the parties at the March 24, 1984 hearing, the testimony offered at the March 3, 1986 hearing demonstrated that by then the mother and father’s cooperation had dwindled away to nothing. I disagree. At the March 3, 1986 hearing, the father testified that he and the mother had worked out changes in the custody schedule to permit the mother to have Sam with her during her vacation. N.T. 3/3/86, pp. 18-19. They did this without involving their lawyers or the court. Ibid. The father also gave testimony that demonstrated that he and the mother communicate on important issues affecting Sam’s medical care. On one occasion merely two weeks before the March 3, 1986 hearing, the mother told father when he came to pick Sam up that Sam had fallen and hit his head, N.T. 3/3/86 pp. 22-23, which alerted the father to watch for complications that might develop while Sam was in his care. The father also testified that the mother gives him any medication Sam might be on at exchange time. N.T. 3/3/86, p. 23. This testimony that the parties are capable of working together on issues such as custody scheduling and Sam’s medical care supports the trial court’s finding that Sam’s parents possessed the requisite minimal degree of cooperation.