Court Opinion

ID: 9464340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:31:06.872187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:35.045718
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge:
Both of these related cases involve an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission, entered February 12, 1976, which revoked the registration of Nassar, Inc. as a broker and dealer in securities, expelled it from membership in the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and barred Mr. Nassar from association with any broker or dealer.1 No. 76-1278 is before us on a petition to review the Com*792mission’s order pursuant to Section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a).2 In No. 76-1536, Nassar appeals from a district court order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction his action which sought to have the Commission’s order declared null and void. Apart from the jurisdictional issue raised by the second case,3 the issues in the two cases are virtually identical. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate the Commission’s order and remand for further consideration.
After a consolidated hearing involving several parties,4 the administrative law judge found that petitioner and the others had “willfully” violated the antifraud provisions of the securities acts in connection with the sale of stock of Interamerican Ltd.5 On review, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s finding that petitioner had violated these provisions by his participation in a “massive fraud” designed by Interameri-can’s promoter, Hausner. Hausner inflated the price of Interamerican stock by spreading the spurious claim that the company was ready to market an effective oral contraceptive whose “sustained release” feature made it suitable for sale in underdeveloped countries. In furtherance of this scheme, Hausner took pains to convince Nassar of the efficacy and potential profitability of this product.
Nassar’s allegedly unlawful activities occurred in his efforts to sell Interamerican stock to customers of his brokerage firm. Essentially, the Commission found that Nassar’s representations concerning the stock were unduly optimistic, lacked an adequate basis in fact, and were made on the basis of a wholly inadequate investigation. In addition, he was found to have made unwarranted predictions about the price to which the stock might rise. The Commission did not find, however, that Nassar was as culpable as Hausner. Indeed, “[f]or present purposes” the Commission accepted as true Nassar’s claim that he himself had been deceived by Hausner’s representations and had sustained heavy losses on purchases of Interamerican stock. J.A. 8.
After summarizing Nassar’s activities, the Commission found that he had “willfully” violated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Commission Rule 10b-5 implementing that section, and § 17(a) of the Securities *793Act. However, the Commission did not explain which activities violated which provision, or whether all of the activities violated both acts. Moreover, the Commission made no findings regarding Nassar’s scienter; indeed, the order contains no discussion of the mental state required to make out violations of these provisions. The Commission did refer to Nassar’s violation as being “willful” and his price quotations as being “reckless,” J.A. 16, but it failed to explain if it was using these terms in a technical or a descriptive sense. Similarly, the reasons for affirming the suspension of Nassar were not explained in detail, the Commission merely noting:
[W]e are unable to take a sanguine view as to the prospect of Nassar’s future honesty. To permit one so prone to irrational euphoria and blatant exaggeration to continue to meddle with other people’s money would be contrary to the public interest. J.A. 22.
These cases ensued. While review was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976). The Court held that a private action for damages will not lie under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Commission Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of “scienter,” which it referred to as intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. 425 U.S. at 193, 96 S.Ct. 1375.
The only substantive issue presented is whether, after Hochfelder, some form of scienter must be established in an administrative enforcement proceeding under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as well as in a private action.6 Another panel of this court recently addressed this question and concluded that it should be resolved in the first instance by the Commission itself:
The applicability of the Hochfelder decision to enforcement actions brought by the SEC is a question that has not been decided by this court. In addition, we have before us only the views of the attorneys representing the Commission, and not the Commission itself, as to the applicability of the Hochfelder scienter requirement in actions of this type. We emphasize that we intimate no view as to the applicability of the Hochfelder scien-ter requirement to this case. We hold only that the actions of the petitioners must be re-evaluated in light of significant Supreme Court precedents7 rendered since petitioners’ case was decided by the Commission.
Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 U.S. App.D.C. 301, at 308, 562 F.2d 820, at 827 (1977). In deference to Collins Securities, therefore, we also remand this case to the Commission for reconsideration in light of Hochfelder.
The Commission attempts to distinguish Hochfelder on the ground that the case under review involves a violation of § 17(a). In Hochfelder, the Court recognized that on its face Rule 10b-5 covered behavior in which scienter was absent. Since the language of § 17(a) is virtually the same as that of Rule 10b-5,8 the Commission rea*794sons that an action under § 17(a) will lie even in the absence of an allegation of scienter. Hence, the Commission regards § 17(a) as adequate support for its order. However, the Commission’s order neither indicates which behavior violated § 17(a) nor whether violations of § 17(a) alone would have sufficed to support Nassar’s suspension. Although on remand the Commission may rest on § 17(a) alone, “[the] administrative order [now under review] can be affirmed on appeal only on the grounds on which the Commission relied.” KIRO v. FCC, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 130, 545 F.2d 204, 208 (1976). Because the Commission’s discussion of § 17(a) is not separate from its discussion of § 10(b), we cannot affirm its result on the basis of § 17(a) alone.

Conclusion

We vacate the Commission’s order and remand the case to the Commission for reconsideration in light of this opinion and such further proceedings, if any, it deems appropriate. In connection with the remand, we note that Nassar maintains that the sanction ordered by the Commission is overly severe and hence arbitrary. We need not reach this issue at this time, since on remand the Commission may find no violation or may decide to impose a lesser sanction. However, should the Commission seek to reinstate this penalty it should articulate its reasons for doing so with greater particularity. The discussion in the order is simply too brief to enable this court to determine if the sanction ordered was based on a consideration of all the relevant factors and is in accord with Commission precedent.

The order of the district court in No. 76-1536 is affirmed. The petition for review in No. 76-1278 is granted and that case is remanded to the Commission for further consideration not inconsistent with this opinion.

. Nassar, Inc. and Mr. Nassar will be referred to either as “petitioner” or “Nassar.” The Commission’s order has not been published.

. That section states,
A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission entered pursuant to this title may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for the . . . District of Columbia Circuit ....

. Nassar recognizes that a petition for review in the Court of Appeals is a proper means for obtaining review of the Commission’s order. Nevertheless, he argues that in this case the Administrative Procedure Act also authorizes review in the district court by declaratory judgment. This argument is wholly without merit. Section 703 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 703, provides that,
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action
As noted above, § 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides for review of Commission orders in the Court of Appeals. Since that section also provides that such relief is exclusive, § 25(a)(3), and Nassar has not shown it to be inadequate in any way, the district court was correct in dismissing the declaratory action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See generally, Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 551 F.2d 1270 (1977).

. Nassar argues that his due process rights were infringed by having his case consolidated with others. However, “[n]o principle of administrative law is more firmly established than that of agency control of its own calendar.” Association of Massachusetts Consumers, Inc. v. S.E.C., 170 U.S.App.D.C. 118, 121, 516 F.2d 711, 714 (1975). Of course, an agency does not have unlimited discretion to consolidate cases. Id. But petitioner has shown no prejudice from the Commission’s decision to consider his case along with those of others involved in the alleged fraud. The Commission carefully distinguished every aspect of its decision regarding Nassar — evidence, violation and sanction — from those of the other parties. Nassar’s other contentions regarding the fairness of his hearing are equally meritless.

. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a); section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); and Commission Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

. Nassar also raises a spate of constitutional issues. Though we need not reach these issues because of our disposition of this case, we note that they appear meritless. Nor need we decide whether the Commission’s order was supported by substantial evidence.

. In addition to Hochfelder, Collins Securities also referred to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977).

. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of *794any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.