Court Opinion

ID: 9481405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:18:11.541447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:17.908186
License: Public Domain

BERTELSMAN, District Judge,
concurring.
I am in agreement with Judge Boggs’ excellent opinion except for one point. That is, I disagree that the trial judge was in error when he relied on a confidential employee exception, since this case involves a member of the personal staff of a policy-making public official.
In my view, such an exception is well-established in the precedents of this court and other circuits. Nor is it contrary to the holdings of the Supreme Court precedents cited by Judge Boggs. The Supreme Court cases did not involve personal staffs, and I do not believe the Court had a confidential secretary or assistant to a policy-making official in mind in rendering these decisions.
The opinion of this court in Balogh v. Charron, 855 F.2d 356 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming Judge Cohn’s opinion reported at *918666 F.Supp. 987 (E.D.Mich.1987)), expressly/recognized the confidential employee/personal staff exemption relied on by the earlier opinion of the trial judge in the instant case.
In Balogh, this court, speaking through now Chief Judge Merritt, held that the bailiff to a state court judge could be discharged by a newly elected judge on the basis of a confidential employee exception to the political patronage rule. The court defined the parameters of the confidential employee exception as follows:
“The test of confidential employment does not depend on the subjective view of the employee concerning the trust the judge reposes in him, nor does it depend on the subjective view of the judge concerning the need for intimacy or trust. It is a more objective standard. It depends on the function of the job. Judicial aides who work in chambers and are assigned to one judge as court officer, bodyguard and general assistant normally handle sensitive information about eases of a confidential nature, information which is not public information. Judges must be able to rely on the confidentiality of the relationship with such aides, just as they must rely on the confidentiality of their relationship with their private secretaries and law clerks. The need for confidentiality between a judge and the staff in his immediate chambers is no less necessary than the need for confidentiality between legislators and their aides.”
855 F.2d at 356-57 (emphasis added); see also Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151 (6th Cir.1990); Monce v. City of San Diego, 895 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.1990); McDaniel v. Woodard, 886 F.2d 311 (11th Cir.1989); Vazquez Rios v. Hernandez Colon, 819 F.2d 319 (1st Cir.1987); Raffucci Alvarado v. Sonia Zayas, 816 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.1987); Donlin v. Watkins, 814 F.2d 273 (6th Cir.1987).
Also, I believe that the comments of the court in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1692, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), are applicable, although made in another context.
“When close working relationships are essential to filling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”
In summary, I believe there is ample authority and policy support for recognizing the “confidential employee” exception employed by the trial court.