Court Opinion

ID: 9892208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 23:01:04.772217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:19:56.537271
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ROZINA KIMANI MUTHOKA,                        )
                                              )
               Plaintiff,                     )
                                              )
       v.                                     )      Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02434 (UNA)
                                              )
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, et al.,                    )
                                              )
                                              )
                Defendants.                   )

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Currently before the court is plaintiff’s pro se initiating pleading, ECF No. 1, and

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained

herein, the court will deny plaintiff’s IFP application and dismiss the complaint.

       Plaintiff, who is currently designated the St. Louis County Jail, has presented submissions

that are difficult to follow. Her initiating pleading is captioned as a “Remonstrance of Remnants

and Surplusese and Remit Unsent Escheat Tacit Remission Adjust and an Act Entitled March 19,

1874, an Act to Audit and Adjust the War Debt to the State.” But a plaintiff must open a civil

matter by filing a civil complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; see also Adair v. England, 193 F. Supp.

2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A party commences a civil action by filing a complaint. . . [and]

[w]hen no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3). The

pleading also fails to comply with the formal requirements of Federal Civil Rule 10(b) and D.C.

Local Civil Rule 5.1(d), (e), (g). Plaintiff sues the League of Nations, the United Nations, the

United States, “all the several states of the confederate,” and the state of Missouri, and fails to

provide contact information for the defendants, in contravention of D.C. Local Civil Rule

5.1(c)(1).
       Assuming that plaintiff intended her pleading to serve a complaint, and generously

construing it as such, the contents fare no better. The complaint consists of a mix of vague and

unconnected allegations, non-sequiturs, and personal anecdotes, all covering a range of topics.

Plaintiff asks this court “help adjust the war debt and remove our estates bodies from being bounty

of war indebtedness to this foreign government who has us as an alien enemy,” citing to a litany

of different laws, but she fails to make out a cognizable claim under any of the authority cited.

       Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.

Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction

[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d

661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of

the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498

(D.D.C. 1977). When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly

nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and

personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D.

408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C.

Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not

comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163,

169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The instant complaint falls

within this category. As presented, neither the court nor the defendants can reasonably be expected

to identify any of the intended claims.
       Furthermore, it appears that plaintiff is attempting to proceed with this matter, at least in

part, on behalf of an estate and/or trust, and she indicates that she brings this matter as a class

action. But, “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases

personally or by counsel[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. First, as an artificial entity, a trust cannot proceed

in federal court without licensed counsel. See Fromm v. Duffy as Tr. of Gary Fromm Family Tr.,

No.19-cv-1121, 2020 WL 109056 at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2020) (noting that “[c]ourts have

interpreted [§ 1654] to preclude a non-attorney from appearing on behalf of another person or an

entity such as a corporation, partnership, or trust”); see also Casares v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

No. 13-cv-1633, 2015 WL 13679889 at *2 (D.D.C. May 4, 2015) (a litigant proceeding pro se

“cannot represent the trust in federal court, even as the trustee, as he is not a licensed attorney”)

(citing Hale Joy Trust v. Comm’r of IRS, 57 Fed. App’x. 323, 324 (9th Cir. 2003) and Knoefler v.

United Bank of Bismark, 20 F.3d 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994)). Second, a pro se litigant cannot bring

a class action. See Georgiades v. Martin–Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (individual

“not a member of the bar of any court . . . may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in

[federal] court as counsel for others”)(citation and footnote omitted); see also U.S. ex rel.

Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2003), aff'd sub nom.

Rockefeller ex rel. U.S. v. Washington TRU Solutions LLC, No. 03–7120, 2004 WL 180264 (D.C.

Cir. Jan. 21, 2004) (“[A] class member cannot represent the class without counsel, because a class

action suit affects the rights of the other members of the class”) (citing Oxendine v. Williams, 509

F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975)).

       To that same end, plaintiff has filed an IFP application, at least in part, on behalf of a trust,

however, an artificial entity cannot proceed under the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); the

Supreme Court has interpreted that provision as applicable “only to individuals” or “natural
persons,” not “artificial entities.” Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory

Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201–07 (1993). More, even if plaintiff intended to bring the IFP application

only on her own behalf, it is devoid of any of the information or material necessary to assess her

financial circumstances, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and fails to include her prison ledger sheets,

see id. § 1915(a)(2). For these reasons, the IFP application must be denied.

       For the foregoing reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: October 19, 2023                       __________/s/_________________
                                                     JIA M. COBB
                                                United States District Judge