Court Opinion

ID: 9636538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:32:27.065124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:39.957212
License: Public Domain

MATHEWS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of appellee and against appellants.1 Appellee is receiver of two Nevada corporations— Virginia & Truckee Railway and Virginia-Truckee Transit Company. Appellants are (1) International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America, hereafter called the brotherhood, (2) Local Union No. 533 of Reno, Nevada, hereafter called the union,2 and (3) H. A. Anderson.3 The judgment enjoins appellants :
*464“(a) From interfering with or causing interference with the business of the Virginia & Truckee Railway and/or Virginia-Truckee Transit Company, or from interfering with or causing interference with the employees or premises or property or business of either of said corporations in receivership by boycotting and/or by patrolling and/or picketing and/or loitering in the streets, roads, highways, or in front of the places of business of said corporations in receivership, or either of them, or wherever any of the property of said corporations in receivership, or either of them may be, and/or the streets, avenues, highways or approaches to said places of business or the premises or the property of said corporations in receivership or either of them.
“(b) From interfering with or harassing or obstructing or causing such interference, harassing or obstructing said receiver or his employees or patrons in the conduct of the business of both or either of said corporations in receivership in any manner or in any place or by any means whatsoever.”
The judgment contains the following declaration : “That all of the operations of the receiver, petitioner herein, in and about the conduct of the general trucking business of the above named Virginia and Truckee Railway Company4 are within the provisions of and are governed by the Federal Motor Carriers Act5 and the Railway Labor Act6 and that no part or portion thereof come within the provisions of or are governed by the National Labor Relations Act7 or the Norris-LaGuardia Act.”8
As this was not a declaratory judgment proceeding, the above quoted declaration, right or wrong, should not have been made a part of the judgment. Its proper place, if any, was in the trial court’s opinion. The judgment should be modified by striking out the declaration and, as thus modified, should be affirmed. Such affirmance should be upon the following grounds:
Appellee was appointed .receiver of the above named corporations by the court below—the District Court of the United States for the District of Nevada—and thus became an officer of that court. Milwaukee & Minnesota Railroad Co. v. Soutter, 2 Wall. 510, 519, 17 L.Ed. 900; Stuart v. Boulware, 133 U.S. 78, 81, 10 S.Ct. 242, 33 L.Ed. 568; Union Bank of Chicago v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U.S. 223, 236, 10 S.Ct. 1013, 34 L.Ed. 341; Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 287, 297, 10 S.Ct. 1019, 34 L.Ed. 408; Taylor v. Sternberg, 293 U.S. 470, 472, 55 S.Ct. 260, 79 L.Ed. 599. As such officer, appellee at all pertinent times had possession of the property and conducted the business of the corporations. Such possession, however, was not in a legal sense appellee’s possession, but was that of the court. Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co., supra; Taylor v. Sternberg, supra. So, too, the business which appellee conducted was, in legal effect, conducted by the court.
That the court had jurisdiction to appoint appellee as its officer (receiver) and, by such officer, take possession of the property and conduct the business of the corporations, as it did, is conceded. Thus, when appellants demanded that appellee sign proposed agreements (Exhibits A and B)9 and threatened that, unless he did so, they would cause the business to be boycotted and would cause the property and places where the business was conducted to be picketed,10 they, in effect, threatened to interfere with the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. To prevent such interference, the court was empowered to issue any appropriate writ (Judicial Code § 262, 28 U.S.C.A. § 377),11 including, of *465course, the writ of injunction. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 219, 21 L.Ed. 447; In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 181-191, 13 S.Ct. 785, 37 L.Ed. 689; Arthur v. Oakes, 7 Cir., 63 F. 310, 321-326, 25 L.R.A. 414; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Felton, 6 Cir., 103 F. 227; City of Shelbyville v. Glover, 6 Cir., 184 F. 234; Gas & Electric Securities Co. v. Manhattan & Queens Traction Corp., 2 Cir., 266 F. 625; Bethke v. Grayburg Oil Co., 5 Cir., 89 F.2d 536, 538.
Section 262 of the Judicial Code has not been repealed, in whole or in part. The power thereby conferred to issue an injunction when necessary for the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction is not impaired, diminished or in any wise affected by § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 107,12 or by any other enactment.
The argument that § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits the issuance of an injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, even when such injunction is necessary for the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction, is similar to the argument—often made and as often rejected— that § 265 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 379,13 prohibits the issuance of an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court, even when such injunction is necessary for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a Federal court. Cases rejecting the last mentioned argument are cited in the margin.14 These cases persuade me that appellants’ argument respecting the Norris-LaGuardia Act should also be rejected.
Rehearing denied. MATHEWS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

 In the court below, appellee was called petitioner and appellants were called defendants.

 The union and the brotherhood are distinct entities. The union is affiliated with the brotherhood, but it is not the brotherhood, nor is the brotherhood the union.

 In Anderson’s answer, in the trial court’s opinion, in the findings and judgment, in Anderson’s appeal bond, in appellants’ statement of points, and in the briefs of appellants and appellee, Anderson is described as “president and business agent of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 533.” Whether this means that Anderson is president and business agent of the brotherhood or of the union or of both the brotherhood and the union is not very clear. It probably means that he is president and business agent of the union.

 Meaning, evidently, Virginia & Truckee Railway, one of the corporations of which appellee is receiver.

 Meaning, evidently, part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-327, which, prior to its amendment by the Act of September 18, 1940, e. 722, title 1, §§ 1-27, 54 Stat. 899, 919-929, was entitled “Motor Carrier Act, 1935.” See 49 Stat. 543.

 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-188.

 2 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166.

 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115.

 Exhibit A was a proposed agreement between the brotherhood and appellee. Exhibit B was a proposed agreement between the brotherhood and the union and appellee.

 Anderson denied that such a threat was made, but the court found that it was made, and the finding is amply supported by evidence.

 “The Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals, and the district courts shall have power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

 “No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent inj'unction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, * * * [with specified exceptions].”

 “The writ of inj'unction shall not he granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may he authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.”

 French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 231, 250-253, 22 L.Ed. 799; Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494, 26 L.Ed. 497; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 112, 24 S.Ct. 399, 48 L.Ed. 629; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 245, 25 S.Ct. 251, 49 L.Ed. 462; Riverdale Cotton Mills v. Alabama & Georgia Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 188, 194-197, 25 S.Ct. 629, 49 L.Ed. 1008; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 291, 292, 26 S.Ct. 252, 50 L.Ed. 477; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U.S. 207, 219, 29 S.Ct. 430, 53 L.Ed. 765; Looney v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 247 U.S. 214, 221, 38 S.Ct. 460, 62 L.Ed. 1084; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 182-184, 41 S.Ct. 93, 65 L.Ed. 205; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 228, 229, 43 S.Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226, 24 A.L.R. 1077; Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 278, 279, 44 S.Ct. 311, 68 L.Ed. 678; Sovereign Camp v. O’Neill, 266 U.S. 292, 298, 45 S.Ct. 49, 69 L.Ed. 293; Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 133, 62 S.Ct. 139, 86 L.Ed. 100.