Court Opinion

ID: 9619454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:28:11.019405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:25.162009
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in the judgment of affirmance and in general with the language of the opinon. However, I do not agree to the ruling in Division 3 with reference to the requested charges involving presumptions of law.
In my opinion, the requests to charge with reference to certain presumptions of law are not apt inasmuch as the evidence presented here does not require an instruction with reference to any presumptions of law.
I do not agree that a request to charge the jury must now be "correct and even perfect; otherwise, refusal to give it is not error.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statement is based upon the case law interpreting old Code § 70-207 and as thereafter amended by Ga. L. 1937, p. 592 and previous language of the various codes of Georgia at least back to 1863 and perhaps the law beyond that date. This statute is no longer the law of Georgia.
*851The earliest decision I can locate interpreting this Code section that refusal to give a pertinent legal charge in the language requested to be error is that of Etheridge v. Hobbs, 77 Ga. 531 (4), 534 (3 SE 251) (1886), which holds that a request to charge should be perfect in itself, or the court may refuse it. While not citing any law to support the ruling, the Supreme Court, composed at that time of only three judges, stated as follows: "We have frequently held that a request must be perfect in itself; and if not, the court should refuse the same.” See also Macon, D. & S. R. Co. v. Joyner, 129 Ga. 683 (4), 688 (59 SE 902). For further discussions as to the interpretation of Code § 70-207, as amended, requiring a written request that is correct and even perfect to be given in charge regardless of whether or not it is covered substantially in the language used in the general charge see Werk v. Big Bunker Hill Mining Corp., 193 Ga. 217 (4), 225-234 (17 SE2d 825); Lewis v. State, 196 Ga. 755 (3), 760-765 (27 SE2d 659); Bibb Transit Co. v. Johnson, 107 Ga. App. 804 (1), 805, 806 (2) (131 SE2d 631); and Grasham v. Southern R. Co., 111 Ga. App. 158, 159 (9), 163 (141 SE2d 189).
With the adoption of the new Appellate Practice Act of 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 40), Code § 70-207, as amended, relating to the charge of the court was repealed. This was specifically so to do away with earlier rulings of the Supreme Court and this court in following the Supreme Court as to the requirement that written requests to charge must be perfect, and if so, the trial court must give it in the charge regardless of whether or not the court had substantially covered same in the general charge, else same was error.
In Hardwick v. Price, 114 Ga. App. 817 (3), 821 (152 SE2d 905), then Chief Judge Felton discussed the fact that the trial judge was no longer required to give written requests to charge "in the exact language requested, where the charge substantially covered the same principle.” He then stated that it was no longer a ground for new trial, "since the repeal and re-enactment of Code Ann. § 70-207. . .” However, Code Ann. § 70-207 was not re-enacted, but the unofficial codifiers of Georgia Code Annotated (The Harrison Company) chose to install § 17 of the Appellate Practice Act of 1965 as Code Ann. § *85270-207 (thereafter amended, Ga. L. 1966, pp. 493, 498; 1968, pp. 1072,1078) instead of in Title 6 of the annotated code.
This special concurrence is written to point out the above because this court continues to summarily overrule enumerations of error because of the older cases based upon the old law of Code § 70-207, as amended, prior to the Appellate Practice Act that a written request to charge "must be correct and even perfect, otherwise refusal to give it is not error.” In my view this is no longer the law.