Court Opinion

ID: 9610150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:37:07.160677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:56.736911
License: Public Domain

*175Judge Gkeene
dissenting.
A speedy trial, for persons accused of committing crimes, serves to protect not only the accused, but also certain societal interests. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 110-11 (1972). The harm to society includes: (1) the detrimental effects on rehabilitation caused by a “delay between arrest and punishment”; (2) the cost of “lengthy pretrial detention”; (3) the loss of “wages which might have been earned” by the “incarcerated breadwinners”; (4) the opportunity of persons, released on bond for lengthy periods awaiting trial, to commit other crimes; and (5) the possibility, because of a large backlog of criminal cases, for defendants “to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system.” Id. at 519-21, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 111. The harm to the accused includes: (1) “oppressive pretrial incarceration;” (2) “anxiety and concern of the accused;” and (3) “the possibility that the [accused’s] defense will be impaired by” dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence. Id. at 532, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118. Of these harms to the accused, “the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire [criminal] system.” Id.
In evaluating whether a particular accused has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, our courts have identified “some of the factors which . . . should [be] assesfed].” Id. at 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117. Those factors include whether: “delay before trial was uncommonly long, . . . the government or criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, ... in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and . . . [the defendant] suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 528 (1992). None of these factors are “a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of a speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118. “Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Id.
The length of the delay is actually a two-part inquiry. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528. First, the court must determine if the delay between the accusation and the trial is unreasonable. As a general proposition, a post-accusation delay is unreasonable if it “approaches one year.” Id. at 652 n.1, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528 n.1. If the delay is not unreasonable, there has been no violation of the accused’s speedy trial rights and, thus, no need to consider the other factors. If the post-accusation is unreasonable, the delay is “pre*176sumptively prejudicial” and the longer the delay, the more “intensified” the presumption of prejudice. Id. at 652, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528.
There may be valid or acceptable reasons for the unreasonable delay, i.e., difficulty in locating a missing witness. The reasons may be invalid or unacceptable, i.e., prosecutorial bad faith (intentionally delaying the prosecution to gain some impermissible advantage over defendant at trial), prosecutorial negligence or overcrowded courts. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117. Prosecutorial bad faith, resulting in an unreasonable delay in prosecution, raises an inference of prejudice per se. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 531. Although prosecutorial negligence is generally “to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused’s defense,” an excessive delay based on prosecutorial negligence necessarily “compromises the reliability of the trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify,” id. at 655, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 531, and, thus, warrants granting a defendant relief, without a showing of particularized prejudice, unless the State can affirmatively show the delay left a defendant’s ability to defend himself unimpaired, id. at 657-58, 120 L. Ed. 2d. at 532; see State v. Chaplin, 122 N.C. App. 659, 663, 471 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1996) (lengthy delay establishes prima facie case that delay was caused by neglect of the State and the State is required to offer evidence explaining delay).
In this case, there was a delay, between defendant’s arrest and his trial, of four and one half years. He remained in jail, without the benefit of bond, during that entire time. This delay is not only unreasonable, but excessive and thus presumptively compromised the reliability and fairness of defendant’s trial.3 Because the State has neither justified the delay, nor shown the delay has not impaired the defendant’s ability to defend himself, defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and is entitled to a reversal of his conviction.4 Although there is no showing the prosecutor intention*177ally delayed the trial for the purpose of obtaining an advantage over defendant, the record clearly shows the prosecutor did not make a reasonable effort to avoid the excessive delay of defendant’s trial and thus was negligent. Indeed, the record reveals there were charges filed against other individuals, after defendant’s arrest, and those cases were tried prior to the date of defendant’s trial. Furthermore, there were forty-eight violent felonies filed in Robeson County Superior Court after defendant’s case was filed, all of which were disposed of prior to defendant’s case. These forty-eight felonies were disposed of, on average, within 502 days, as compared to defendant’s case that was disposed of in 1,498 days.
In summary, the prosecutor of Robeson County5 egregiously persisted in failing to prosecute defendant and, therefore, defendant is entitled to have his conviction reversed. To hold otherwise would permit the State to abuse the interests of criminal defendants assigned low prosecutorial priority.

. Even if defendant were required to show prejudice, which I do not believe is necessary in this case, he has done so.
Defendant was incarcerated for approximately four and one half years and held in jail without the benefit of bond. During this time, the State’s principal investigator died and the principal investigator’s notes were unable to be located by the State. Without the principal investigator, or his notes, defendant was prevented from discovering and presenting potentially exculpatory material at his trial. Moreover, as the majority points out, during the long delay, two witnesses changed their version of events.

. Defendant’s delay in asserting his speedy trial right, some four years into the process, weighs against him but does not foreclose his current claim. State v. Flowers, *177347 N.C. 1, 28, 489 S.E.2d 391, 407 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135, 140 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1998). This delay in asserting his right must be balanced against the other factors in this case. The lengthy delay, the negligence of the State in causing the delay, and the un-rebutted presumption of prejudice to defendant far outweigh defendant’s failure to earlier assert his speedy trial right. See Chaplin, 122 N.C. App. at 666, 471 S.E.2d at 657.

. I note that at the time of defendant’s arrest, J. Richard Townsend was the prosecutor of Robeson County and in 1994, L. Johnson Britt, III became the prosecutor of Robeson County.