Court Opinion

ID: 9774981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:40:10.24575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:18.599200
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer
PER CURIAM ¡
Plaintiff has filed a motion for rehearing or, in the alternative, to transfer to court en. banc.
Plaintiff says that the opinion sets aside the established rule in this State that: ‘ ‘ Generally speaking, a minor is no more responsible for his representations than he is for his deed,” stressing the eases mentioned in this paragraph. Plaintiff’s cases are distinguishable on the facts. In Ridgeway v. Herbert, 150 Mo. 606, 615, 616, 618, 51 S. W. 1040, 1042-1044, the infant and others were under the mistaken belief that he was of age when he executed the papers; the adult took advantage of the infant’s improvidence, and under the circumstances the minor was considered not responsible for his representations. As we read Gerkey v. Hampe, Mo. App., 274 S. W. 510, 514[8], 515, and Sassenrath v. Lewis Motor Co., Mo. App., 246 S. W. 2d 520, 522, the minor did not misrepresent that he was of age. The answers in the Sassenrath case were general denials. In the Gerkey case the court stated it was not saying a minor could never estop himself; Plaintiff directs attention to the fact that Ryan v. Growney, 125 Mo. 474, 484, 485, 28 S. W. 189, 191, 755, mentioned in the original opinion, was on “motion for rehearing” remanded “that the lower court may rehear the same,.unbound by anything said in the original opinion.” The decree in that case cancelled the minor’s deed to defendant but adjudged in defendant a lien upon the laud for the consideration paid plaintiff. ■ There was no bill of exceptions in the case, and [518] upon the findings of the trial chancellor set out in the record proper that the plaintiff was not under the influence of liquor to the extent he did not comprehend his actions, and that he made an affidavit that he was of full age, this court in the original opinion held plaintiff was estopped from calling upon- a court of equity to repudiate his contract and reversed the decree with directions to dismiss plaintiff’s petition. The court, as expressly stated on the motion for rehearing, remanded, the case because the facts were not as fully disclosed in the'record or in the chancellor’s 'findings as desired for a final adjudication. There was no evidence or finding before this court that defendant was ignorant of plaintiff’s *350age and was deceived by representations of the plaintiff that he was of age. Had the court desired to depart from the law announced, it appears that the judgment would have been affirmed and the case not remanded for a new trial as only the defendant appealed.
The instant plaintiff had reached the age of discretion and had the appearance of and was engaged in and conducting business as an adult. His representation that he was of age is attributable to a base motive. No advantage was taken of him in the transaction by defendant.
Plaintiff’s claim, though at law to disaffirm his obligation and for money had and received, is in its nature a substitute for a suit in equity. Defendant, as stated, interposed the defense and the proof established that plaintiff was guilty of tortious conduct to the injury of defendant. If seeking, in effect, equity, plaintiff should do equity. The result may be the same as an estoppel. In the circumstances of the instant case, the essential facts being established, the defendant should be allowed such relief in the nature of a set-off as might be available to the extent of plaintiff’s claim. Defendant was denied a recovery on its counterclaims based on debts contracted by plaintiff during infancy.
Plaintiff’s motion for rehearing or to transfer is overruled.