Court Opinion

ID: 9913206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 07:09:54.217823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:46.854226
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 19, 2023

                                                S   In The
                                     Court of Appeals
                              Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                           No. 05-23-00586-CV

                            IN THE INTEREST OF E.C., A CHILD

                      On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court
                                   Collin County, Texas
                          Trial Court Cause No. 199-30006-2022

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Miskel
                              Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
          Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s1 parental

rights to his son, E.C.2 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that

statutory grounds existed for the termination of Father’s parental rights to E.C. and

termination was in E.C.’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(F),

(O), 161.001(b)(2). The trial court signed a termination order based on those findings

and named the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the

    1
        Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to E.C. and is not a party to this appeal.
    2
      We refer to E.C. by initials and use pseudonyms or initials to refer to each of E.C.’s family members
to protect E.C.’s identity. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
Department) the child’s Permanent Non-Parent Sole Managing conservator and

ordered E.C. to remain in his current placement. After reviewing the parties’ briefs

and the record, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.

                                 BACKGROUND

      Mother and Father have two children together; V.C. was born in August 2017,

and E.C. was born in March 2020. The Department opened a conservatorship case

as to V.C. in March 2019. Father relinquished his parental rights to V.C. on August

12, 2020, and the trial court terminated his parental rights to V.C. in an August 31,

2020 final order. The court appointed Mother as V.C.’s Sole Managing Conservator.

Although the final order in the V.C. case is not at issue here, information obtained

by the Department during that case is relevant here. The V.C. proceeding also

marked the first of three proceedings forming the basis of the current case.

I.    The V.C. Proceedings

      According to Mother, Father assaulted her more than three times during the

V.C. proceedings. One of the assaults occurred when she was pregnant with E.C.

and required her to go to the emergency room. Mother’s caseworker at the time,

Jannell Dickerson, received a call about the assault and met Mother at the hospital.

Dickerson testified the incident occurred when Father and Mother got into an

argument. When Mother went to the bathroom to escape the situation, Father pushed

her. Mother called the police and was taken to the hospital. Mother told Dickerson

she was afraid of Father and “was tired of always fighting with him, and she didn’t

                                         –2–
feel safe.” Dickerson told the court Mother had expressed similar fears in previous

meetings. Mother also told Dickerson she wanted to leave the relationship and be

safe for herself and V.C.

      Mother later mentioned the assault to Michelle Behl, Mother’s caseworker

during the last three months of the V.C. proceedings and throughout the proceedings

related to E.C. Behl testified she had many conversations with Mother during the

V.C. proceedings about protecting herself, the difficulty in leaving a violent

relationship, and the dangers of returning to one. Mother also told Behl that Father

was no longer living with her and the children and was “not even involved.”

Although the Department knew of the past domestic violence between Father and

Mother, the Department did not intervene as to E.C. at that time because E.C. was

“born clean,” Father had no presence at Mother’s home during the final ninety days

of the V.C. proceeding, and Mother told Behl “she had ended the relationship and

that she was going to move to her mom’s home for safety.” It appeared to Behl that

Mother had “ended the relationship and appeared protective of her son.”

      But concerns about the safety of E.C. arose the same day the hearing in the

V.C. case ended. According to Behl, she went to Mother’s apartment to drop off

diapers after the hearing. When Behl approached the apartment, she saw someone

she believed to be Father walk to the apartment door, unlock it, and go inside. The

man was carrying what appeared to be groceries. When Behl confronted the man

and asked who he was, Father gave her a different name than his own. At that time,

                                        –3–
Behl did not know the whereabouts of Mother and the children. She yelled into the

apartment from the front door for Mother, but no one answered. Behl took a picture

of the man and sent it to the ad litem, who identified the man as Father. When Behl

spoke to Mother on the phone later that evening, Mother identified the man as her

brother. Mother only admitted the man was Father after Behl told Mother Behl had

confirmed the man was Father.

      This encounter worried Behl because she did not initially know the

whereabouts of Mother and the children, and she had concerns about potential

domestic violence between Father and Mother. It also concerned Behl that Father

had an entry key to Mother’s apartment because his rights to V.C. had been

terminated and Mother insisted she no longer had any contact with Father “because

she was fearful of [him].” When Behl reported seeing Father at the home, she was

told to make a report due to the violent behaviors Father had displayed in the past.

Behl testified: “The issue was that [Father] was in the residence when it was a danger

to the children that he was there at that time.” When Behl could not locate Mother

after making the report, she referred the case to the Department’s investigations unit.

That unit discovered Mother had left Texas and moved to Massachusetts.

II.   The Massachusetts Proceedings

      The record shows Father and Mother left Texas with the children after Behl

confronted Father at Mother’s apartment. Mother later testified she was afraid to stay

in Texas because she thought the Department would take the children away from her

                                         –4–
after seeing Father at the apartment. In Massachusetts, Father, Mother, and the

children moved in with the paternal father, paternal step-mother, and other members

of Father’s family.

      After discovering Mother moved to Massachusetts, Behl sent a referral to the

Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (MDCF). The MDCF opened

a case on September 1, 2020. Andrew Daher was the MDCF caseworker assigned to

the case. He testified MDCF opened the case because of Behl’s referral for a welfare

check on Mother and children. Father told Daher the family “fled Texas” because a

caseworker saw Father at Mother’s apartment after she was awarded custody of V.C.

      Daher completed an assessment and included “active plan tasks” for the

parents. During the assessment, Mother and Father admitted to using marijuana in

Texas and “during the assessment period” in Massachusetts. Mother reported she

and Father were fine, and both parents denied any issues regarding mental health or

substance abuse. Daher requested they engage in therapy or at least undergo a mental

health evaluation and substance abuse evaluation, but they refused. According to

Daher, Mother and Father “said they were not going to engage in the action plan.”

      When MDCF ran a routine check for open or closed criminal charges for

Father, they discovered a restraining order had been issued against him within days

of arriving in Massachusetts. The check also showed Father had a criminal history

and was a sex offender. After reviewing Father’s Texas file, the State of

Massachusetts identified him as a Level 2 offender, which prompted the police to

                                        –5–
contact Father. Later checks showed an open warrant for Father’s failure to register

as a sex offender and a warrant issued August 24, 2021 for threats to commit a crime.

      Daher described the risk to the children as “always medium to high,” but

stated MDCF could not take legal action because Mother was meeting the minimum

basic needs of the children. MDCF nonetheless kept the case open, and Daher

continued to monitor the family and discuss issues if they arose.

      Over the following months, police responded to additional calls regarding

domestic violence within the home, and the responding officers then made calls for

service to MDCF. Daher continued to meet with family members to get updates and

responses for these calls of service and to follow up to see if they would participate

in any of the services he was recommending. Mother and Father continued to decline

to engage in services. Father told Daher the allegations against him were false and

the result of the Department retaliating against him. MDCF was also concerned

about E.C.’s health because Mother did not timely provide medical paperwork for

E.C. According to Daher, MDCF does not believe E.C. received any medical care

during the first six months to a year the family was living in Massachusetts.

      Father’s mental health also remained a concern for MDCF. On March 18,

2021, Father and the paternal grandfather had a heated argument that ended when

Father left the house and called the police. When officers arrived, Father told them

he and Mother had argued because she locked him out of the home. He also told

police he needed help because he was worried he was going to harm himself or

                                         –6–
someone else. Officers transported Father to St. Luke’s Hospital for evaluation, and

Father was released the same day. Behl testified the police report from the March 18

incident said Father was “homicidal, suicidal, and that the police department offered

him services and took him to get evaluated.” Daher testified the medical records

from St. Luke’s Hospital indicated Father “had a mental breakdown” and had “some

suicidal ideation.”

      Daher met with Mother nine times between September 2020 and March or

April 2021. Father was present at those meetings. By March or April 2021, Father

had moved out of the home and “was no longer in the picture.” Daher continued to

monitor the family and meet with Mother. According to Daher, the MDCF case

remained open because of “a lack of compliance and there was ongoing instability.”

      After Father moved out, Mother notified MDCF about an incident in Rhode

Island in which Father was arrested following a brawl at a campsite. Father told the

court he was originally charged with assault with a deadly weapon in the Rhode

Island case but the charge was dropped to a misdemeanor. Mother also notified

MDCF of warrants for Father’s failure to register as a sex offender. MDCF did not

take any action to remove the children because Father was not observed in the home

and Mother denied she and father were together. The last time MDCF had contact

with Father was in April or May 2021.

      On December 18, 2021, Mother left Daher a voicemail saying she was fleeing

Massachusetts and returning to Texas because Father had threatened her and was

                                        –7–
threatening to take custody of the children. Police had been called to the home on

December 17, 2021, and twice on December 18, 2021. When he spoke with Mother

later, she “minimized the issue with [Father]” and said it was Father’s parents who

were mistreating her and the kids. She told Daher the paternal grandparents treated

her like a servant and were controlling her life.

       When Mother arrived in Texas, she would not give Daher her location, which

meant a welfare check could not be completed. She told Daher she did not want

Father to find her because he threatened to take the children from her in

Massachusetts. Daher was concerned Father went to Texas after Mother and wanted

to verify the children were safe. Because “there was a history of substance abuse or

other related matters” on both sides of the family, Maher sent a referral to the

Department requesting a welfare check and confirmation of the children’s safety.

III.   The E.C. Proceedings

       On January 4, 2022, MDCF sent the Department a “Priority Two referral

pertaining to the Neglectful Supervision of [V.C. and E.C.” by Father and Mother.

referral on January 4, 2022. The referral provided in large part:

       [T]he family left Texas in September 2020 during a CPS investigation
       out of Plano, Texas. There were concerns then about domestic violence
       perpetrated by [Father]. The state of Massachusetts opened up a case
       with the family there and now [Mother] fled the state of Massachusetts
       and moved back to Texas with the children about a week and a half ago.
       [Mother] refuses to provide a current address. [Father] updated his
       address with the sex offender registry on 11/30/2021 with a McKinney
       address. [Mother] denies that [Father] is with her and the children.

                                         –8–
      [Mother] and [Father] both refused treatment in Massachusetts after
      acknowledging use of Marijuana. There was concern that [Father] may
      have relapsed on Heroin. [Mother] denies that [Father] is with her and
      the children.

      [Mother] has three cases against [Father] for domestic violence. The
      last incident with [Mother] was on 11/30/2021. On 8/25/2020, [Father]
      had another domestic violence charge with another female. [Father] has
      a warrant out for failing to register as a sex offender. . . .

The Department assigned Investigator Devon Grigsby to the case. She enlisted the

help of a special investigator to locate Mother and the children.

      Grigsby tried to locate the family at a Plano address given to the Department

with the referral. But neither Mother nor the children were at that address. According

to Grigsby, Mother gave Daher different addresses to avoid being found. She heard

“different stories” of where they were, including a suggestion they were in Colorado.

Grigsby and a special investigator went to several addresses in Plano, McKinney,

Irving, and Dallas but did not locate Mother or the children. Mother’s great Uncle,

I.G., and his husband, K.M. (collectively the Uncles) told Grigsby the children could

be in Bonham, Texas with their maternal grandmother. The Uncles were correct.

Grigsby located Mother and the children at the maternal grandmother’s home in

Bonham on January 11, 2022, a week after receiving the referral.

      On January 11, 2022, Daher sent the following letter to Grigsby:

      I am contacting you to follow up on the reason for filing a report of
      neglect and abuse . . . . Since the family’s case has been opened, Mother
      and Father have not engaged in any services such as mental health
      services or substance abuse treatment to address ongoing concerns that
      are especially in Father’s presentation and actions. Father has been
      hospitalized for suicidal ideation and is the aggressor in multiple
                                         –9–
         domestic violence with Mother and his paternal family. . . . Mother
         appears to struggle with her mental health and is not transparent with
         her relationship with Father similar to the same concerns that CPS had
         in the past. Her children have been exposed to neglect and both parents
         have been resistant with engaging the Department. On 12/18/21, The
         Department received a voicemail from Mother who stated she relocated
         to Texas but would not provide an address to verify she left without
         Father. The Department has made multiple calls to Mother who is
         concerned about providing her location as she stated she is worried the
         Texas CPS will take her children from her custody. . . .

When Grigsby located Mother in Bonham, Mother told Grigsby she had not spoken

to Father, did not have his phone number, and did not talk to him on messenger. The

Uncles had already informed Grigsby, however, that Mother and the children stayed

with them from the time they returned to Texas before Christmas through the New

Year holiday, and Father stayed with them Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and over

the New Year’s weekend. Mother denied Father was in Texas for Christmas and

“mentioned she didn’t want this to happen because she didn’t want to do services

again.”3

         Grigsby obtained an emergency ex parte removal order on January 11, 2022,

which she served on Mother and Father. Grigsby testified the removal was necessary

because Mother was hiding the children from the Department and not allowing a

welfare check to occur. Because of Mother’s prior actions, Grigsby was also

concerned Mother would leave Texas again to live with Father.

   3
       Massachusetts closed its case after the Department located Mother and the children in Texas.
                                                  –10–
        The children were removed on January 11, 2022, and placed with the Uncles.

V.C. had been placed with the Uncles previously, and Mother did not object to the

children returning to their care.

        Grigsby notified Father of the removal by email and spoke with him January

12, 2022. Father told Grigsby he believed the Department called the sex offender

registry and caused the warrant to issue against him for failure to register in

Massachusetts. He also said he had not seen the children since September 2021 and

was not in Texas at Christmas. Father was living in Massachusetts at the time of

removal.

IV.     Post Removal Proceedings

        As part of its initial investigation following removal, the Department had E.C.

drug tested. He tested positive for marijuana. E.C. was twenty-two months hold at

the time of removal.

        The required 14-Day Hearing4 was held on February 23, 2022. Mother,

Father, Behl, Daher, Grigsby, and Uncle K.M. testified. Grigsby asked the court to

continue the placement of the children with the Uncles, order services for the parents,

    4
      TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.201(a): “In a suit filed under Section 262.101 or 262.105, unless the child has
already been returned to the parent, managing conservator, possessory conservator, guardian, caretaker, or
custodian entitled to possession and the temporary order, if any, has been dissolved, a full adversary hearing
shall be held not later than the 14th day after the date the child was taken into possession by the
governmental entity, unless the court grants an extension under Subsection (e) or (e-1).”

                                                   –11–
and find it would be dangerous for the children to be placed in either one of the

parent’s care. Grigsby provided several reasons for the requested relief:

      The main one is that [E.C.] test[ed] positive for drugs. We have a
      second child of this two parents that are testing positive for drugs,
      specifically for the same drug: Marijuana. Worried about the continued
      family violence that has continued in Massachusetts. Mom fled – not
      fled, came to Texas, and made statements that she came to get away
      from [Father]. And then within a week he’s here visiting. . . .

At the hearing, Father told the court he is “not going to work any services” to have

E.C. returned to him because “I don’t think there’s any reason for me to work any

services.” He also testified he believes the Department is going to take the kids away

whether he does services or not. Father stated he would participate in services if he

believed there was a “reasonable probability” the Department would change its

position on him. Father asserted he did not think it would be helpful for him to go to

anger management counseling or a batterer’s intervention prevention program. But

he would be willing to go to private counseling if it is not provided by the

Department.

      Following the hearing, the trial court signed a temporary order appointing the

Department as E.C.’s temporary managing conservator, appointing Mother and

Father temporary possessory conservators, and ordering Mother and Father to

participate in specific services. The children were also ordered to remain in their

current placement with the Uncles.

      The temporary order required Father to participate in multiple services, which

included participating in the Father FOCUS program and the Batterers Intervention
                                       –12–
and Prevention Program (BIPP), applying to participate in the Moral Reconation

Therapy program and participating if accepted, undergoing a psychological

evaluation, psychiatric evaluation, and drug/alcohol assessment, and maintaining

stable, suitable housing and suitable, stable, legal employment. Father was also

subject to random drug and alcohol urinalysis / hair strand tests. On March 18, 2022,

the Department issued a letter to Father setting out those court ordered services and

providing Father the names and contact information for service providers.

      Father moved to Laramie, Wyoming in June or July 2022. He gave the

Department his Wyoming address on July 13, 2022.

      The Court held a Permanency Review Hearing on September 27, 2022. Behl

told the court she had provided a list of resources in Wyoming on August 10, 2022,

and encouraged him to find his own providers if the resources she found did not

work out. At the time of the September 27 hearing, however, Father had not reported

to Behl that he was participating in any of the services. Father told the court he

understood the services he was being asked to complete, understood he could seek

out his own services and provide proof of completion, and knew trial was set for

December 12, 2022. After that hearing, Mother contacted Behl and told her that she

wanted to relinquish her parental rights, stating: “I will never get rid of [Father] if I

don’t.” Mother voluntarily relinquished her rights to V.C. and E.C. in October 2022.

      The Department’s termination suit was tried to the bench on March 20, 2023

and April 10, 2023. The following witnesses testified at trial: Father, Behl, Grigsby,

                                         –13–
Daher, Uncle I.G., Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) Karuna Thomas, and

Department caseworker Janell Dickerson. On May 30, 2023, the trial court signed a

Final Order terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights to E.C. and appointing

the Department E.C.’s Permanent Non-Parent Sole Managing Conservator. The

Final Order includes the trial court’s predicate section 161.001 findings:

      The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [Father] has:

             1. failed to support the child(ren) in accordance with his
             ability during a period of one year ending within six
             months of the date of the filing of this petition; [Tex. Fam.
             Code 161.001(b)(1)(F)]

             2. failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that
             specifically established the actions necessary for the
             parent to obtain the return of the child(ren) who have been
             in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship
             of the Department of Family and Protective Services for
             not less than nine months as a result of the child(ren)'s
             removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse
             or neglect of the child(ren); [Tex. Fam. Code
             161.001(b)(1)(O)]

      IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parent-child relationship
      between [Father] and the child the subject of this suit, is terminated and
      is in the best interest of [E.C.].

The children remained in their placement with the Uncles. This appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

      Because the fundamental liberty interest of a parent in the care, custody, and

control of her child is one of constitutional dimensions, involuntary parental

termination must be strictly scrutinized. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 748 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (first citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–

                                        –14–
66 (2000); then citing In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014); and then

citing Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). In parental termination

cases, due process requires the petitioner to justify termination by clear and

convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). “Clear and convincing

evidence” is that “measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the

trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be

established.” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting

TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007).

      On appeal, we apply a standard of review that reflects the elevated burden at

trial. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 748. “As a matter of logic, a finding that must be

based on clear and convincing evidence cannot be viewed on appeal the same as one

that may be sustained on a mere preponderance.” Id. (quoting In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d

624, 630 (Tex. 2018)). Under both legal and factual sufficiency standards, we (i)

consider all the evidence, (ii) defer to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, and

(iii) determine whether the factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or

conviction that the grounds for termination were proven. Id. “The distinction

between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed evidence

contrary to a finding may be considered.” Id. (quoting In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at

630–31).

      When conducting a legal-sufficiency review of an order terminating parental

rights, the reviewing court cannot ignore undisputed evidence contrary to the finding

                                         –15–
but must otherwise assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of the

finding. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 748. We “consider all the evidence, not just that

which favors the verdict,” and we assume the fact-finder resolved disputed facts in

favor of its finding if a reasonable fact-finder could do so. Id. We disregard all

evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could have disbelieved or found to have been

incredible. Id. at 748-49.

       When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a

termination finding, an appellate court asks whether, in light of the entire record, the

evidence is such that a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm conviction about the

truth of the State’s allegations against the parent. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 749.

Further, the appellate court must consider whether the disputed evidence is such that

a reasonable fact-finder could not have reconciled that disputed evidence in favor of

its finding. Id. If the disputed evidence is so significant that a fact-finder could not

reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually

insufficient. Id. “And in making this determination, the reviewing court must

undertake ‘an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the

constitutional interests at stake.’” Id.

       In this case, the jury found Father engaged in conduct prohibited by

paragraphs (F) and (O) of section 161.001(b)(1), and that termination was in the best

interest of E.C. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(F), (O); TEX. FAM. CODE §

161.001(b)(2).

                                           –16–
                                     ANALYSIS

      “Texas Family Code section 161.001(b) allows for involuntary termination of

parental rights if clear and convincing evidence supports that a parent engaged in

one or more of the twenty-one enumerated grounds for termination and that

termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 232. Here,

the trial court’s order terminated Father’s rights on two grounds—sections

161.001(b)(1)(F), and (O)—in addition to finding that termination was in E.C.’s best

interest. In three issues, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence supporting termination under subsection (O) and supporting the finding

that termination was in E.C.’s best interest. We address each issue in turn.

I.    Trial court’s predicate findings for termination

      A court may terminate a parent-child relationship upon findings by clear and

convincing evidence: (1) the parent engaged in one or more of the courses of conduct

defined by § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(T), and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest

pursuant to section 161.001(b)(2). TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1), 161.001(b)(2).

Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights based on subsections (F) and

(O). TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(F), (O).

      Section 161.001(b)(1)(F) requires clear and convincing evidence the parent

“failed to support the child in accordance with the parent’s ability during a period of

one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition; . . .” TEX.

                                         –17–
FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(F). Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) requires clear and

convincing evidence the parent

      failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
      established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of
      the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing
      conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services
      for not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal from the
      parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child; . . .

Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O) (emphasis added).

      On appeal, Father does not challenge the trial court’s finding he failed to

support the child in accordance with his ability during a period of one year ending

within six months of the date of the filing of the petition. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(F).

“Unchallenged predicate findings are binding” on the appellate court. In re E.A.F.,

424 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). We may

affirm the termination order based on the subsection F violation alone if we conclude

the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding that

termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 580

(Tex. 2014) (“Clear and convincing proof of any one ground will support a judgment

terminating parental rights, if similar proof also exists that termination is in the

child’s best interest.”) (citing In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 240 (Tex. 2013)); see

also In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d at 750 (“Only one predicate finding is required.”).

      Because only one predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary

to support an order of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in

a child’s best interest, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
                                          –18–
the trial court’s predicate findings under either subsection (F) or (O). See In re A.V.,

113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); see also In re A.I.F., No. 07-17-00464-CV, 2018

WL 2272604, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (first

citing In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362, then citing In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d 376, 384

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.), and then citing TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1). We,

therefore, overrule Father’s second issue challenging the predicate finding under

section 161.001(b)(1)(O).

II.   The best interest finding.

      In his final issue, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that terminating Father’s parental rights

was in E.C.’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2).

      A.     Applicable law

      A court may not terminate a parent’s rights unless it finds by clear and

convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM.

CODE § 161.001(b)(2). The best-interest element is child-centered and focuses on

the child's wellbeing, safety, and development. In re M.K., No. 05-23-00090-CV,

2023 WL 4229818, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing In re T.J., No. 05-22-00954-CV, 2023 WL 1988838, at *9 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Feb. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)). A judicial determination of the “best

interest” of a child “is not dependent upon, or equivalent to, a finding that the child

has been harmed by abuse or neglect or is in danger of such harm.” In re M.J.P., No.

                                         –19–
05-16-01293-CV, 2017 WL 655955, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 17, 2017, no

pet.) (mem. op.). Rather, “best interest” is “a term of art encompassing a much

broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant

discretion.” Id. (quoting In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (orig.

proceeding)); see also In re C.R., 263 S.W.3d 368, 375 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008,

no pet.) (“[P]arental rights may not be terminated merely because a child might be

better off living elsewhere.”).

       The supreme court has identified nine factors that may assist our review of a

best-interest finding:

       (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the
       child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to
       the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the person
       seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the person seeking
       custody in promoting the best interest of the child; (6) plans for the
       child by the person seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
       proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may
       indicate the parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any
       excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Holley factors focus on

the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent, and are not exhaustive.

Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1995, no writ); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.

       A best interest finding need not be supported by evidence of every Holley

factor, particularly if there is undisputed evidence the parental relationship

endangered the child’s safety. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Undisputed evidence

                                           –20–
of just one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that

termination is in the child’s best interest. D.M. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective

Servs., No. 03-17-00137-CV, 2017 WL 2628949, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 13,

2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant

to each factor will generally not support such a finding. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.

Further, the same evidence can be relevant to both section 161.001(b)(1) termination

grounds and the child’s best interest. In re D.W., 445 S.W.3d 913, 925 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2014, pet. denied).

      In addition, the Texas Family Code sets out factors to be considered in

evaluating a parent’s willingness and ability to provide the child with a safe

environment. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 748 (first citing TEX. FAM. CODE §

263.307(b), and then citing In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (citing

family code section 263.307 and Holley as containing factors to consider “when

determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the

child”)). The statutory best-interest factors include the following factors relevant to

the case:

      (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities;

      (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental
      evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or
      others who have access to the child’s home;

      (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the
      child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home;

                                        –21–
      (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family
      or others who have access to the child’s home;

      (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept,
      and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate
      an appropriate agency’s close supervision;

      (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive
      environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time;
      and

      (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills,
      including providing the child and other children under the family’s care
      with:

             (A) minimally adequate health and nutritional care;

             (B) care, nurturance, and appropriate discipline consistent
             with the child’s physical and psychological development;

             (C) guidance and supervision consistent with the child’s
             safety;

             (D) a safe physical home environment;

             (E) protection from repeated exposure to violence even
             though the violence may not be directed at the child; and

             (F) an understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(1), (6), (7), (8), (10), (11), (12).

      Although courts may consider any other factor relevant to the child’s best

interest, there is “[a] strong presumption ... that a child’s best interests are served by

preserving the parent-child relationship, where possible.” In re D.D.M., 2019 WL

2939259, at *5 (quoting Burns v. Burns, 434 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)); In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116 (“there is a strong

                                          –22–
presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a

parent”).

      B.     Application of law to facts

      Here, Father argues the evidence supporting the best interest finding is sparse,

conclusory, and focuses disproportionality on the child’s positive living situation

with the Uncles. We disagree.

             1.    E.C.’s age, vulnerability, needs, and desires

      E.C. was three years old when the case was tried, so he was too young to have

any desires relevant to the best-interest analysis. The record shows, however, E.C.

had specific medical and developmental needs not being met before being placed

with the Uncles. MDCF believed E.C. received no medical care for the first six

months to a year E.C. lived with Mother and Father in Massachusetts. When he was

first placed with the Uncles in January 2022, E.C. was aggressive at daycare, was

suffering from speech delays, and had recurring hearing problems and ear infections.

The Uncles obtained the medical and developmental support and treatments E.C.

needed. E.C. is now receiving speech therapy services through Plano ISD and was

diagnosed as autistic. E.C. also had surgery for the placement of ear tubes to address

recurrent ear infections and hearing problems.

      Michell Behl, Mother’s caseworker, Uncle I.G., and the CASA testified E.C.

has shown improvement in his health and behavior. Behl confirmed E.C. had

improved his expressions and decreased his aggression level while in the Uncles’

                                        –23–
care. Uncle I.G. reported many improvements. He told the court E.C. has had speech

services since he was placed with the Uncles, and his speech and physical health

have improved: “His weight is right on target. His health is very good right now.

The speech is improving a lot.” Uncle I.G. explained further:

      Right now just – [E.C.] is doing very good. I think he’s healthier than
      he’s been in his little few years, and then I just want to make sure he
      stays like that. I want to make sure he stays in a place that's -- where he
      has just quiet and no fighting and no drugs and safe. That’s my goal,
      that’s [Uncle K.M.’s] goal to keep the kids safe at all times.

CASA also observed “huge significant improvements” in E.C.:

      So when [E.C.] initially came into placement, he was little, he was
      agitated, there were challenges with his behavior especially daycare,
      but over the span of over a year -- in fact, let’s say within the first six
      months with the ear tubes and all of the medical support that he – speech
      therapy, he tremendously improved.

      I mean, now the child has so much enthusiasm. He’s so well taken care
      of. His health has improved significantly and there is nothing but good
      feedback even from the school that I visited recently. His speech, the
      way he interacts and engages has changed 180 over the course of time.
      So the uncles leaves [sic] no stone unturned when it comes to taking
      him to all the appointments and making sure all his needs are met from
      medical, school, to daycare, to speech therapy and now that he's in
      school.

      The trial judge could reasonably conclude from this evidence, Father’s history

of drug use, domestic violence, and Department involvement here and in

Massachusetts, and Father’s failure to provide E.C. with adequate medical care for

his physical, mental, and developmental needs that it is unlikely Father would be

able to meet E.C.’s needs in the future. We conclude the evidence regarding these

                                        –24–
factors supports the trial judge's best-interest finding. See In re M.K., 2023 WL

4229818, at *5–6.

             2.     History of abusive or assaultive conduct

      The record shows a history of verbal and physical abuse between Mother and

Father and among family members within the Massachusetts home. For example, in

December 2018, Father plead guilty to a Class C domestic violence charge for

assaulting Mother. According to Father, Mother’s foot got caught in a door as he

was shutting it, and he was only arrested because the maternal grandmother was

“always quick to call the police” to get him arrested. During the V.C. proceedings

when Mother was pregnant with E.C., Father pushed Mother during an argument

and Mother was taken to the emergency room.

      Father also has a history of assaultive conduct against others. In 2021, he was

arrested for assault with a deadly weapon in Rhode Island following a “brawl” at a

campsite. Father testified the charge was lowered to a misdemeanor and dismissed,

but provided the court no documentation to confirm that result. He also admitted to

being charged in Massachusetts for threatening his step-dad George’s ex-girlfriend.

He stated that charge was also dismissed and again failed to produce documentation

to prove that assertion. Similarly, in October 2021, Father and his brother were

arrested in Massachusetts following a fight with each other. Moreover, Mother

relinquished her rights to the children for their safety and to keep them free of Father.

Further, Father refused to participate in any counseling, anger management classes,

                                         –25–
or the Batterers Intervention and Prevention Program (BIPP) demonstrating he took

no steps to address his history of assaultive and abusive conduct.

      Under this record, the trial court could reasonably conclude Father would

remain abusive and volatile if he had custody of E.C. We conclude the evidence

regarding this factor supports the trial judge’s best-interest finding.

             3.     History of substance abuse

      Father testified he began smoking marijuana when he was fifteen and last

smoked marijuana the week before trial when he was in Colorado. Father maintained

he never smokes around the children. E.C., however, tested positive for marijuana

at the time of removal on January 11, 2022. Mother and Father blamed each other

for E.C.’s positive drug test. At the 14-Day Hearing, Mother testified she believed

E.C. was exposed to marijuana because of Father’s daily use of the drug. At trial,

Father accused Mother of smoking marijuana in the bedroom of the Massachusetts

home and insisted he only smoked in a downstairs apartment in which the children

were not allowed to enter. Mother, however, tested negative for marijuana before

and after the 14-Day Hearing. Father, in contrast, tested positive for THC on a

December 12, 2022 urinalysis test performed in Laramie, Wyoming. Despite orders

in Texas for random drug testing, he failed to be tested prior to the December 12,

2022 test. Moreover, Father’s testimony indicated he did not intend to end his

marijuana use and, rather than take responsibility for potentially exposing E.C. to

marijuana, he accused Mother of smoking in the child’s presence. Father admits he

                                         –26–
is a drug user and repeatedly testified he has the right to smoke marijuana if his

children are not present.

      The trial court could reasonably infer Father’s failure to address his marijuana

use would lead to continued drug use. See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118 (stating a

fact finder may infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may

recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent); In re M.L.G.J., No. 14-14-

00800-CV, 2015 WL 1402652, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar.

24, 2015, no pet.). Under this record, the trial court could reasonably conclude Father

would continue using drugs if he had custody of E.C. We conclude the evidence

regarding this factor supports the trial judge’s best-interest finding.

             4.     Father’s willingness and ability to seek, accept,
                    and complete counseling services and to
                    cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate
                    agency’s close supervision

      By his own admission, Father refused to engage in court-ordered services

during the underlying proceedings. He also testified he did not believe he did

anything to cause E.C.’s removal. Father insisted he should not be required to

participate in services and the court should recognize he was not given sufficient

time to complete the services. The record shows Father was given fourteen months

to complete the services before trial.

      Father took a similar position in Massachusetts; refusing to voluntarily engage

in services offered by the MDCF. Moreover, he and Mother chose to flee to

                                         –27–
Massachusetts rather than face further Department intervention after Behl

discovered Father entering Mother’s apartment at the end of the V.C. proceedings.

      At trial, Father testified he understood what services he was ordered to

complete and confirmed he did not complete any services ordered. Father did not

complete the psychological and psychiatric evaluation, did not undergo a substance

abuse evaluation, and did not participate in the Batterers Intervention and Prevention

Program (BIPP). Father provided various excuses for why he could not participate

in or complete the ordered services. For example, he testified he worked in the

logging industry and could not speak to providers because of poor cell service when

he was working. Father also stated the providers in Laramie are limited in number

and often work only with the college students who live there. According to Father,

he provided no documentation of efforts to contact service providers because he just

“played phone tag” with them. Some of Father’s other reasons for not completing

service included a lack of time and resources. He did not complete a parent education

class because he “didn’t have time to do them,” and did not complete the Father

Focus program because he hasn’t “had the resources at the time to get them

completed, any of the services.” Father stated he did not start any services when he

lived in Massachusetts because he was working and “was never given any service

providers or list of services” while he lived there. The weather in Wyoming also

purportedly hampered Father’s efforts to engage in court-ordered services. He

testified he called the Casper CPS office about services, but it was winter, and the

                                        –28–
roads were shut down for weeks. He also insisted he could not figure out how to do

services online and he “got ignored” when he asked the court to help him.

      Behl testified she assisted Father when he was in Wyoming by providing a list

of possible service providers in Wyoming. Father, however, did not follow-up with

Behl after she gave him the provider information. He did not inform her of providers

he found, or update her on whether he found a provider from the service list. He did

not call her again to ask for assistance with the services. According to Behl, Father

has not provided any certificate or documentation regarding services completed.

      In a court’s best interest analysis, it is appropriate to consider evidence

showing the parent did not comply with the court-ordered service plan for

reunification with the child. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (findings under

section 161.001(1)(O) can support best interest finding); In re J.T.G., No. 14–10–

00972–CV, 2012 WL 171012, *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet.

denied) (considering failure to participate in services required for reunification in

best-interest determination). Here, it is undisputed Father failed to perform any

court-ordered services in Texas. Father’s failure to engage in the programs ordered

in the Family Service Plan supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. See In re

D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 640 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

                                        –29–
             5.    Father’s parental abilities, including his ability
                   to provide E.C. with minimally adequate living
                   conditions and health support

      We see no evidence that Father possesses the parental ability or skill to raise

E.C., and there is ample evidence to the contrary. Father refused to participate in

parent education classes. Behl testified she is concerned there has been no change in

Father’s attitude and no knowledge gained because he has not worked the services.

Behl told the court she does not believe Father has made any progress or appreciates

why E.C. came into the Department’s care.

      Uncle I.G. told the court he had concerns about Father having even limited

custody of E.C. because Father had not participated in or gained the knowledge and

skills needed to parent E.C.

      My concern is [E.C.] is a busy little boy. My concerns is for just what
      I see in our -- how he doesn't have that patience. Sometimes he's real
      good, sometimes he is very upset with [E.C.] because [E.C.] doesn't
      want to communicate. There was a time when I had to cut it off because
      [E.C.] was just not talking, didn't want to even look at the camera and
      he went from his regular, hey, buddy, what's going on to, oh, you want
      to do that? You don't want to talk to me? That's when I'm like, well --
      so, yes, I'm concerned about that.

Uncle I.G. also testified Father and Mother are “still communicating” and he does

not think their relationship “is completely over.” Mother told him she doesn’t know

what she wants and “this is why she let the kids go. She doesn’t want the kids to go

back and repeat what just happened.” He is also concerned Father could use E.C. to

get to Mother if Father had custody of E.C.

                                       –30–
      Father insisted he would do anything to have custody of E.C., but he failed to

do anything required of him by the Department to obtain custody. Father failed to

provide E.C. with medical care in Massachusetts and showed no concern when E.C.

tested positive for marijuana. He also did not offer to provide monetary support to

the Uncles for E.C.’s care. Although Father testified he was gainfully employed and

had a lease on a three-bedroom apartment, he did not provide the Department with

any documentation, such as copy of the apartment lease or pay stubs, to confirm his

employment and living conditions. We conclude that substantial, nonconclusory

evidence relevant to these factors supports the trial judge’s best-interest finding.

             6.     The plans for E.C. and the stability of the
                    proposed placement

      These factors also weigh in favor of termination. The Uncles plan to adopt

E.C. and V.C. They testified their main concern is to keep the children healthy and

safe in their care. The evidence showed E.C.’s health has dramatically improved

since the removal, and he is receiving consistent health care, including management

of sinus infections, insertion of ear tubes, and speech therapy. The CASA testified

E.C. is safe with the Uncles, there is stability and security there, and she has observed

“the huge significant positive change in the children’s well-being from the time they

entered the placement until now.” By remaining in the Uncles’ custody, both

children will grow up together and will be able to interact with Mother and her

family.

                                         –31–
      Father’s plans for E.C. were not settled. He testified he did not know if he

would stay in Wyoming or move back to Texas if he was given custody of E.C. If

he decided to stay in Wyoming, he told the court his employer would allow him to

work exclusively in Wyoming and would not require him to travel to Colorado to

work during the week. He provided no documentation to support those statements.

Further, Father’s rights to V.C. were previously terminated. If he was given custody

of E.C., the children would be raised separately.

      Moreover, everyone who testified to E.C.’s best interest, except for Father,

believes termination is in E.C.’s best interest. Uncle I.G. believes it is in the

children’s best interest to grow up in a household where there is no violence, no drug

use, and not in a state of continual chaos. Because of Father’s volatile demeanor and

past aggression, Uncle I.G. does not think Father can provide E.C. with a safe

environment. Mother relinquished her rights to the children for their safety and to

make sure they are free of Father. That decision supports Uncle I.G.’s view of

Father’s inability to provide a safe environment.

      The CASA also testified termination is in E.C.’s best interest.

      From what CASA has observed, yes, [Father] has kept his visits, virtual
      visits and a couple of in person visits with [E.C.], but the concern
      remains that he’s not completed any of the Court-ordered services, has
      been unwilling to give any information on income, and continues to
      state that he smokes marijuana. What I’ve observed, [E.C.] over more
      than a year now is he’s in a safe, stable and secure home or placement
      where all of his needs are being taken care of and he needed those
      additional needs especially with speech and medical with his ear tubes.

                                        –32–
      So the concern is there could be a disruption of all that given the
      domestic violence, the abuse and the drug conditions that has come to
      light.

Based on her observations of the children, she believes “there was definitely trauma.

There was definitely emotional trauma…” CASA also noted E.C. is well cared for

with the Uncles: “They’re loving as well as supported and CASA has seen a

tremendous change, specifically with [E.C.], since January 2022 to March of 2023,

significant change, positive.”

      Behl testified allowing Father to retain any conservatorship right would not

be in E.C.’s best interest because “[I]t hampers with permanency of the child,

prevents him from being adopted. It is just going to be confusing” because Father’s

parental rights to V.C. have already been terminated. She also noted “[t]he

caregivers have expressed several concerns about safety, and I don’t truly believe

that he would follow the court orders.” Finally, Behl stated she is concerned about

Father’s continued drug use and the possibility Father could “abscond with” E.C.

      Finally, the ad litem reported E.C. “is thriving in his current placement.” The

ad litem concluded it is in E.C.’s best interest to remain with the Uncles and for

Father’s rights be terminated.

      Based on this evidence, we conclude that the trial judge could reasonably

conclude that these factors supported the best-interest finding.

                                        –33–
             7.     Father’s acts and omissions indicating that the
                    existing parent-child relationship is not a proper
                    one and any excuses for same

      It is undisputed Father did not participate in or provide proof of participation

in any of the services listed in his service plan. Father did not initiate any services or

provide any substantiated reason for not performing the services. Father testified he

did not have time to engage in services because he was working and provided various

excuses for not finding service providers in Wyoming or Colorado where he lived

and worked. He failed to provide any documentary evidence of his purported efforts

to contact services provider.

      Further, Father did not complete any anger management class, the BIPP, or

anything related to domestic violence. It is also very concerning that E.C. tested

positive for marijuana. Father’s testimony showed he took no responsibility for the

positive test and did not understand why a positive test might be an issue for E.C.

CASA cited those issues as further reasons why she did not think Father should have

unsupervised visits with E.C.

      On this evidence, the trial judge could reasonably conclude that these factors

supported the best-interest finding.

      C.     Conclusion regarding best interest finding

      After reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s

best-interest finding and considering any undisputed contrary evidence, we conclude

the trial judge could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that E.C.’s best

                                          –34–
interest would be served by terminating Father’s parent-child relationship with him.

In analyzing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we assume the trial court, as

factfinder, resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding for termination of parental

rights because a reasonable factfinder could do so in this case. See In re Baby Girl

H., No. 05-23-00487-CV, 2023 WL 7485748, at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 13,

2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). In analyzing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we

do not find the disputed evidence to be so significant that the trial court could not

have formed a firm belief or conviction in favor of termination of parental rights.

See id. Considering the evidence under the applicable standards of review, we

conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s

finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of E.C.

We overrule Father’s third issue.

III.   Fit-Parent Presumption

       In his first issue, Father argues the evidence was insufficient to overcome the

fit-parent presumption and the constitutional rights afforded to him. A parent has a

constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of her child. In re J.W., 645

S.W.3d 726, 740 (Tex. 2022). And when the government seeks not only to infringe

on this fundamental right, but to terminate the right altogether, such termination is

considered “traumatic, permanent, and irrevocable” and “constitutes the ‘death

penalty’ of civil cases.” In re J.C.H.-P., 673 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2023, no pet.). As extensively discussed above, the trial court could have

                                        –35–
formed a firm belief or conviction Father engaged in a course of conduct that

endangered E.C.’s physical or emotional well-being and termination of his parental

rights was in E.C.’s best interest. To assert Father’s “sole transgression” was Father

delivering groceries to “Mother and the child into the Mother’s home, while Mother

was not present” is unsupported by the record and a myopic view of the evidence.

Under the facts of this case, the Department overcame the fit parent presumption,

and Father has not shown he was denied any other constitutional due process. We

overrule Father’s first issue.

                                  CONCLUSION

      Having overruled each of Father’s appellate issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                           /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
                                           ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
                                           JUSTICE
230586F.P05

                                        –36–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF E.C., A                     On Appeal from the 199th Judicial
CHILD                                          District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. 199-30006-
No. 05-23-00586-CV           V.                2022.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
                                               Kipness. Justices Reichek and Miskel
                                               participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

    It is ORDERED that APPELLEE recover its costs of this appeal from
APPELLANT.

Judgment entered this 19th day of December 2023.

                                        –37–