Court Opinion

ID: 9729583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:43:23.75285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.831017
License: Public Domain

LIPEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
Historically, the courts have used equitable principles to ameliorate the harshness of the law. We cannot ameliorate such harshness in direct contravention of a statute, such as 14 M.R.S.A. § 853 (setting forth the limited circumstances that justify tolling a statute of limitations). See Inhabitants of the Town of Beals v. Beal, 149 Me. 19, 98 A.2d 552, 555 (1953). We can, however, apply equitable principles to prevent a defendant from using fraudulent conduct, or the equivalent thereof, to invoke a statutory defense in a manner so unjust that the Legislature could not have intended the result. Given these considerations, I agree with that portion of the Court’s decision concluding that it is improper to equitably toll the statute of limitations in this case. I do not agree with the Court’s conclusion that this is an improper case for application of the doctrine of equitable estop-pel. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
As stated in the opinion of the Court, we have outlined the elements of equitable es-toppel as follows:
The gist of an estoppel barring the defendant from invoking the defense of the statute of limitations is that the defendant has conducted himself in a manner which actually induces the plaintiff not to take timely legal action on a claim. The plaintiff thus *997relies to his detriment on the conduct of the defendant, by failing to seek legal redress while the doors of the courthouse remain open to him. Only upon a demonstration that the plaintiff had in fact intended to seek legal redress on his claim during the prescriptive period can his failure to file suit be specifically attributed to the defendant’s conduct.
Townsend v. Appel, 446 A.2d 1132, 1134 (Me. 1982) (citations omitted). We have also said that a claim of equitable estoppel can be based on an act of negligence that is the equivalent of fraud. Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d 534, 539 (Me.1977). Indeed, we explained in Pino that:
[ejstoppel flows from the actual consequences produced by the conduct of A upon B regardless of whether A subjectively intended the consequences, and which resulted because, objectively evaluated, B has justifiably relied upon A’s conduct.
Id. at 538-39.
The stipulated facts describe conduct on the part of MMC that is the equivalent of fraud. The fraudulent conduct of a defendant, relied upon by a plaintiff, prevents the plaintiff from seeking legal redress. In this case, the negligent conduct of MMC prevented Dasha from seeking legal redress. MMC misdiagnosed the severity of Dasha’s brain tumor and subjected him to massive radiation treatments, causing him to become incompetent and unable to file a cause of action. Dasha’s agreement to undergo the radiation treatments was the detrimental reliance required by equitable estoppel. Objectively evaluated, MMC’s conduct effectively prevented Dasha from fifing a timely cause of action, in a manner far more devastating than fraud. The conduct of MMC made Dasha incompetent and unable even to understand that he had a cause of action.1
The intent to seek legal redress during the statute of limitations period, another requirement of equitable estoppel noted by the Court, is absent from this case only because the conduct of MMC left Dasha incompetent and hence unable to form any intention. It is that direct link between the conduct of MMC and the resulting incompetence of Da-sha that makes this case unique and that requires the application of equity to avoid an unjust result.2 Put most simply, the defendant should not be able to take advantage of this unique situation.3 See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232, 79 S.Ct. *998760, 762, 8 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959) (deeply rooted maxim states that “no man may take advantage of his own wrong”).
There is a legitimate concern that a hard case makes bad law. That concern is misplaced here. All statutes of limitations are arbitrary and cause unredressed wrongs. We accept that arbitrariness and those costs because of the importance of other goals advanced by the statutes. Implicit in any statute of limitations, however, is the notion that an individual subject to the statute has the capacity for self-protection. Even in cases of medical misdiagnosis, the misdiagnosed patient at least has the capacity to seek a second opinion or to act upon symptoms that remain troublesome. That capacity for self-protection arguably moderates the harshness of the rule that begins the limitations period with the act of misdiagnosis.
In this case, Dasha’s capacity for any degree of self-protection within the statute of limitations period was destroyed by the very party from whom he seeks redress. The application of the statute in this case has no redeeming rationality. See Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 207 A.2d 513, 519 (1965) (if plaintiffs insanity developed on or after date of accrual and resulted from defendant’s acts, then justice requires that defendant “not be permitted to cloak himself with the garb of the statute of limitations”). The lack of a direct precedent should not prevent the application of equity. Indeed, “[i]t is the distinguishing feature of equity jurisdiction that it will apply settled rules to unusual conditions and mold its decrees so as to do equity between the parties.” Unity Tel Co. v. Design Serv. Co. of New York, 158 Me. 125, 137, 179 A.2d 804 (1962) (citation omitted).
I would answer the certified question in the affirmative.

. Typically in equitable estoppel cases, the defendant incurs liability and subsequently commits an act inducing the plaintiff not to bring a cause of action. See, e.g., Hanusek v. Southern Maine Medical Ctr., 584 A.2d 634 (Me. 1990) (after receiving allegedly negligent treatment, plaintiff relied on representation of nurse in not bringing timely action); Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d 534 (Me.1977) (after sustaining injury, employee did not file timely worker’s compensation petition because nurse told him his claim was covered by informing employer); Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 79 S.Ct. 760, 3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959) (after sustaining damages, plaintiff misled to believe he could bring action any time within seven years). This case is not unlike the paradigm case for equitable estoppel. The initial act of negligence was the misdiagnosis and the radiation treatments were the subsequent act of negligence, equivalent to fraud, which caused Dasha not to bring a suit.

. To have a cause of action in a medical malpractice case, the claimant must have sustained damages. Dasha’s injury is the loss of his competence, the very thing he needed to realize he had a cause of action. It is the tragic paradox of this case that all the elements of Dasha's cause of action were not present until he lost his competence and was therefore unable to file a cause of action.

.The fact that Dasha executed a power of attorney in favor of his sister, Margaret S. Dasha, on March 2, 1989, does not preclude application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In equitable tolling cases, the existence of a power of attorney conferred by a person before the onset of incapacity does not preclude application of the tolling statute:
The aim of the tolling statute is “to relieve from the strict time restrictions any person who actually lacks the ability and capacity, due to mental affliction, to pursue his lawful rights ...” (citations omitted) The statute does not condition tolling on the absence of others who may be legally authorized to act for the insane person.
Kisselbach v. County of Camden, 271 N.J.Super.558, 638 A.2d 1383, 1387 (1994). That same principle should apply to this equitable estoppel case. The power of attorney conferred on Margaret Dasha the authority to sue when she learned of the misdiagnosis approximately two years and nine months after it occurred, not the obligation to do so. Id.