Court Opinion

ID: 9635832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:07:31.72348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:37.345877
License: Public Domain

[J-17-2023] [MO: Wecht, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                WESTERN DISTRICT

 DONALD R. BINDAS,                                :   No. 27 WAP 2022
                                                  :
                      Appellant                   :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                  :   Commonwealth Court entered May
                                                  :   18, 2021 at No. 652 CD 2018,
               v.                                 :   affirming the Order of the Court of
                                                  :   Common Pleas of Washington
                                                  :   County entered February 26, 2018
 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    :   at No. 2016-4760
 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,                    :
                                                  :   ARGUED: April 19, 2023
                      Appellee                    :

                                  DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE                                             DECIDED: AUGUST 22, 2023
       I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court based on the majority opinion

of that court. Bindas v. Dep’t of Transp., 260 A.3d 991 (Pa. Commw. 2021). While I

agree with the entirety of the intermediate court’s majority opinion, I write to highlight the

portion of the opinion that analyzes Donald Bindas’ lack of due diligence.

       As the Commonwealth Court noted, the Superior Court has made the following

observations regarding Pennsylvania law:

              Our law provides that “[i]t is always the duty of a purchaser of
              real estate to investigate the title of his vendor[,]” and the
              purchaser must exercise due diligence in this regard. Ohio
              River Junction R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., [72 A. 271, 273
              (Pa. 1909)]. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
              explained the due diligence obligation as follows:

               [Purchasers’] title could be affected only with what they
               actually or constructively knew at the time of the purchase;
               necessarily, as to the latter, by what they could have
               learned by inquiry of the person in possession and of others
                 who, they had reason to believe, knew of facts which might
                 affect the [title], and also by what appeared in the
                 appropriate indexes in the office of the recorder of deeds,
                 and in the various courts of record whose territorial
                 jurisdiction embraced the land in dispute; but not of that
                 which they could not have learned by inquiry of those only
                 whom they had reason to believe knew of the facts.

                Lund v. Heinrich, [189 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa. 1963)] (internal
                citations omitted). Accordingly, a purchaser fulfills his or her
                due diligence requirement when he or she examines the
                documents recorded in the county or counties in which the
                property is situated and when he or she asks the possessor
                about title, as well as any other people the purchaser has
                reason to believe would know about the status of the
                property’s title.
Bindas, 260 A.3d at 1000-01 (quoting Nolt v. TS Calkins & Assoc., LP, 96 A.3d 1042,

1048 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

         Donald Bindas’ duty to employ due diligence to investigate the title to the property

was triggered when he purchased it in 1977. However, his deposition testimony reveals

a complete lack of diligence on his part. Importantly, Bindas testified that he did not

investigate the title of the property until approximately 2016, around the time when the

Department of Transportation began the I-70 project. N.T., 8/30/2017, at 15. This failure

is particularly noteworthy given the trial court’s observation that, “[b]ecause the property

is a small parcel between a major highway and a local road, a search for the Highway

Plan would be warranted by a prospective buyer.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/2018, at 6.

The record establishes that Bindas purchased the property without concern for the status

of its title.

         In terms of what the exercise of due diligence would have produced for Bindas, the

Commonwealth Court accurately reported that “the chain of title of the Carter property

that [Bindas] purchased specifically referenced the portion of the Property that the

Department of Highways condemned in the Plan that was recorded in the County

Recorder’s Office.” Bindas, 260 A.3d at 1000. Any question regarding the condemnation

                                [J-17-2023] [MO: Wecht, J] - 2
could have been resolved prior to the purchase of the property with a modicum of

diligence by Bindas. To the extent there was uncertainty after a search of records

evidencing the fact of the condemnation in the chain of title, further diligence at the time

of purchase, which was at a time closer to the condemnation, would have been required.

This type of diligence is precisely what the Commonwealth Court correctly concluded that

Bindas failed to employ. Bindas’ failure to conduct a title search at the time of purchase

negates any claim based on lack of notice of the condemnation. This highlights the fallacy

of the Majority’s holding, which emphasizes the importance of notice of a condemnation

to a purchaser of property. If a purchaser of property does not conduct due diligence

prior to the purchase, any claim based on a lack of notice is specious. In my view, the

Majority’s holding and mandate ignore Bindas’ duty of due diligence and upends sound

established case law.

        Juxtaposed to Bindas’ lack of due diligence, the Department of Highways did what

the Legislature asked of the agency. I completely agree with the Commonwealth Court’s

statement that, “[n]ot only did the Department of Highways follow the proper procedures

as set forth in Section 210 of the Highway Law[1] to condemn a right-of-way with respect

to the [p]roperty in 1958, the Department of Highways also clearly compensated the

owners of the [p]roperty at that time.” Bindas, 260 A.3d at 999. For these reasons and

on the basis of the majority opinion of the Commonwealth Court, I would affirm the

intermediate court’s order.

1   Act of June 1, 1945, P.L. 1242, as amended, 36 P.S. § 670-210.

                              [J-17-2023] [MO: Wecht, J] - 3