Court Opinion

ID: 9607254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:56:47.142166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:37.804135
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Bell, Presiding Judge.
In her motion for rehearing the plaintiff charges that this court in the opinion carrying with it the judgment of reversal ignored certain evidence showing that the insured’s death was accidental. The evidence referred to is a certificate of the death of the insured completed by “Tom Compton, Coroner.” The certificate shows that the immediate cause of death was “Contact gunshot wound of head with destructive brain damage” and that the injury occurred through “Accidental discharge of a gun.”
Code Ann. § 88-1118 provides that certificates filed under the provisions of Code Ann. Ch. 88-11, pertaining to the registration of births and deaths, “shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.”
The fault of evidence admitted under this provision is that it is hearsay evidence, and thus, Code Ann. § 88-1118 amounts to an exception to the hearsay rule. This initial fault is further compounded by including in the certificates statements based on hearsay—that is upon information supplied by other persons to the person completing the certificate—and by including in the certificates statements of conclusions of the person completing *470the certificate, which may be either conclusions based upon hearsay or conclusions as to which the person completing the certificate would not be qualified as an expert or otherwise to testify personally.
The language of Code Ann. § 88-1118 makes a death certificate completed and filed in accordance with the provisions of Code Ann. Ch. 88-11 “prima facie evidence of the facts stated.” This necessarily means that only “facts” contained in the certificate are accorded the dignity of constituting prima facie evidence. While Code Ann. § 88-1116 (4) directs the official completing the certificate to include whether the death was probably accidental, suicidal or homicidal, that requirement amounts to nothing more than authorization to express- an opinion, surmiss or conjecture as to the probabality of the means of death. The expression of an opinion, surmise or conjecture as to the probability of the means of death is not a statement of an ultimate fact and not being a statement of fact expressions of that nature are clearly excluded by the statute from constituting prima facie evidence. See Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Stinnett, 13 F2d 820, 822 (1).
Such a statute is in derogation of the common law. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Bell, 147 Fla. 734 (3 S2d 487); Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76 (211 NW 75). Being in derogation of -common law, it must be strictly construed. Foster v. Vickery, 202 Ga. 55, 60 (42 SE2d 117) and citations.
Under the rule of strict construction that must be applied to Code Ann. § 88-1118, a death certificate is incompetent to prove particular matters stated in the certificate (1) where the statement is based on hearsay and not upon the personal knowledge of the physician or official completing the certificate and (2) where the statement is a statement of opinion to which the physician or official would not be qualified to testify personally. In these instances the statements contained in the certificate are not statements of “fact” within the meaning of Code Ann. § 88-1118, and the exception to the hearsay rule is inapplicable. Although there is some foreign authority to the contrary, we consider that the rule stated here represents the better view and the preponderance of authority. See, e.g.: Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Stinnett, 13 F2d 820, supra; Morton v. Equitable *471Life Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 846 (254 NW 325, 96 ALR 315); Kentucky &c. Ins. Co. v. Watts, 298 Ky. 471 (183 SW2d 499); Backstrom v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 183 Minn. 384 (236 NW 708); Callahan v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 357 Mo. 187 (207 SW2d 279); Welz v. Commercial &c. Accident Assn., 40 NYS2d 128 (266 App. Div. 668); Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 Ohio St. 104 (100 NE2d 197, 28 ALR2d 344). Contra: Branford Trust Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Conn. 481 (129 A 379, 42 ALR 1450). On this subject generally, see: Ann. 17 ALR 366; Ann. 42 ALR 1455; Ann. 96 ALR 324; Ann. 28 ALR2d 352; 27 New York University Law Review 158; 32 CJS 827-828, Evidence, § 638.
The coroner’s statement in the certificate in question, that the insured’s death occurred through “Accidental discharge of a gun,” was a statement of mere opinion and not one of fact. Thus, it did not constitute prima facie evidence. Further, it was hearsay not within the exception provided by Code Ann. § 88-1118. As hearsay, this evidence of the accidental death of the insured, though admitted without valid objection, had no probative value whatever. Eastlick v. Southern R. Co., 116 Ga. 48, 49 (42 SE 499); Higgins v. Trentham, 186 Ga. 264 (1) (197 SE 862); Fuller v. Fuller, 213 Ga. 103, 104 (97 SE2d 306).
“The Georgia courts steadfastly declare that hearsay has no probative value. This means what it says. In this state, hearsay alone will not support a verdict.” Green, Georgia Law of Evidence (1957 Ed.) § 222, p. 501.

Motion for rehearing denied.

Chief Judge Felton and Judges Hall and Eberhardt concur with these expressions.
Judges Frankum and Russell concur only in the judgment denying the motion for rehearing.
Chief Judge Felton does not concur in the judgment denying the motion for rehearing.
Presiding Judge Nichols and Judges Jordan and Pannell do not concur in the judgment denying the motion for rehearing but take no position on the discussion on the motion as they consider it unnecessary in light of their views on the case.
Bell, Presiding Judge. Addendum. It seems advisable to *472point out that there is in this case no holding of law sufficient to constitute a binding precedent on anybody. The case as published is nothing more than an evenly balanced series of views with four judges representing one and four judges another. One judge agrees with the reasoning of neither but does concur in the judgment of reversal. A judgment of the court is made possible only by the circumstance of numbers and the duty of all of the judges to go one way or another.
This situation displays the confusion existing in the phase of the law under consideration and dramatically demonstrates that this court cannot alleviate the chaos. It must remain for higher authority to do so.