Court Opinion

ID: 9406350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 18:00:41.654306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:29.244078
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50066        Document: 00516806107             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/30/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                                        FILED
                                                                                     June 30, 2023
                                      No. 22-50066
                                     ____________                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                          Clerk
   Eddie Lee Wilson; Chester Jackson, Sr., as next friend
   Chester Jackson, Jr.,

                                                                  Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                            versus

   Robert Riley Baucom; Deputy John K. Bennett; City of
   Caldwell; Burleson County,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:20-CV-311
                     ______________________________

   Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Appellants Eddie Lee Wilson (“Wilson) and Chester Jackson, Sr.
   (“Jackson Sr.”), as next friends to Chester Jackson, Jr. (“Jackson Jr.”)
   appeal the summary judgment granted to the City of Caldwell, Burleson
   County, and Deputy John K. Bennett (“Bennett”), and the trial verdict in
   favor of Officer Robert Riley Baucom (“Baucom”). For the reasons
         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50066      Document: 00516806107          Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                    No. 22-50066

   explained below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and the trial
   verdict.
                                  I. Background
          On Friday, April 19, Linda Jackson (“Linda”) called 911, requested
   police assistance, and told the operator that her stepson, Chester Jackson Jr.,
   had “kicked in the door” and was “saying he was going to kill us.” A few
   minutes later, Linda called 911 a second time and said, “someone is going to
   get killed,” and that Jackson Jr. had “jumped” on her husband multiple times
   and punched him in the face. Linda also reported that she believed Jackson
   Jr. was under the influence of drugs and that Jackson Jr.’s girlfriend admitted
   that she had given him “a little weed” but that Linda believed “it’s
   something else.”
          Deputy Bennett, then with the Burleson County Sherriff’s Office, was
   dispatched. At approximately 7:59 p.m., Bennett discovered Jackson Jr.
   walking on the side of the road, wearing only boots and a pair of shorts.
   Bennett searched Jackson Jr., placed him in the back of his vehicle, and
   continued to Jackson Sr.’s home.
          At Jackson Sr.’s residence, Bennett met with Jackson Sr., Linda,
   Eddie Wilson (“Wilson”), who is Jackson Jr.’s mother, and Jackson Jr.’s
   fiancé. The group confirmed that Jackson Jr. had assaulted Jackson Sr., but
   they did not want to press any charges. Bennett explained that it was up to
   the state to press charges and that the situation appeared serious enough to
   warrant an arrest. Wilson then informed Bennett that she was attempting to
   have Jackson Jr. hospitalized because he was “mentally sick.” Bennett asked
   Wilson if she had contacted My Health My Resources Authority of Brazos
   Valley (“MHMR”), and she responded that she had.
          Wilson asked Bennett to take Jackson Jr. to the hospital in Houston.
   Bennett clarified that if he were to take Jackson Jr. to the hospital, he would

                                         2
Case: 22-50066      Document: 00516806107           Page: 3    Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                     No. 22-50066

   call the State, and Jackson Jr. would go to the hospital that has space for him.
   Bennett informed Wilson that if Jackson Jr. was willing to go to the hospital
   with her and if she was comfortable taking him, she may do so. Wilson
   responded that she “wants him to be stabilized” and that “in the rage he’s
   in now,” she was not sure she could take him. Bennett then attempted to
   speak with Jackson Jr. before returning to the larger group and informing
   them that no hospital would take Jackson Jr. in his condition and that Jackson
   Jr. was on PCP. Bennett explained that Jackson Jr. was cold to the touch and
   that when Bennett asked Jackson Jr. a question, it took a while for Jackson Jr.
   to register the question and respond. Wilson asked if Bennett was sure, and
   he responded “100%” and explained he has expertise in drug recognition.
   Bennett told Jackson Jr.’s parents that he would take Jackson Jr. to jail to let
   the drugs wear off, and then he could be evaluated for a hospital. Bennett
   explained that he would not file the assault charge but would file a public
   intoxication charge instead.
          At approximately 8:15 PM, Jackson Jr. was booked into the Burleson
   County Jail. In his cell in the county jail, Jackson Jr. allegedly broke a light
   fixture and extracted a metal conduit. Matthew Higgins (“Higgins”), the
   Burleson County Jailer, observed Jackson Jr. in possession of the conduit and
   requested back-up to assist in taking it from Jackson Jr. as it could be used as
   a weapon. Officer Hammons and Officer Baucom of the Caldwell Police
   Department and Trooper Gilliam of the Department of Public Safety
   responded to assist Higgins with retrieving the conduit. Jackson Jr. was
   placed in handcuffs and shackles and removed from his cell to be transferred
   to a new cell. As he entered the new cell, Jackson Jr. became uncooperative
   and dropped to the ground. Baucom entered the cell, dragged Jackson Jr.
   from behind into the cell, raised him up, and then forced Jackson Jr. in the
   direction of the bed, resulting in Jackson Jr. falling to the ground, hitting his
   back on a concrete wall, his arm and side on a metal bed, and his head on the

                                           3
Case: 22-50066      Document: 00516806107          Page: 4   Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                    No. 22-50066

   side of the metal toilet. Baucom contends that Jackson Jr. grabbed Baucom’s
   genitals which caused Baucom to drop Jackson Jr. After the fall, Jackson Jr.
   did not report any pain or injury, did not request medical assistance,
   conversed normally with officers, and had no apparent injuries.
          Jail personnel conducted observations of Jackson Jr. every fifteen
   minutes from 11:30 pm, Saturday, April 20, to 7:00 a.m., Sunday, April 21.
   At approximately 3:45 a.m., Higgins attempted to remove Jackson Jr.’s
   restraints, and Jackson Jr. assaulted him by biting his arm. At approximately
   6:18 a.m., Jackson Jr. cooperated with the jailers, who were able to loosen his
   restraints. At 8:45 a.m., an evaluator from MHMR arrived to evaluate
   Jackson Jr. The evaluator noted that Jackson Jr. appeared to be in a state of
   psychosis, possibly drug induced, and that he “appeared to be coming down
   from intoxication.” Accordingly, the evaluator recommended in-patient
   hospitalization and was able to find him a bed at Cross Creek Hospital in
   Austin.
          On Sunday, April 21, members of the Burleson County Sherriff’s
   Office transported Jackson Jr. to Cross Creek Hospital. At Cross Creek,
   Jackson Jr. became noncompliant and aggressive. The medical staff gave him
   several medications, and Jackson Jr. then went into cardiac arrest. Jackson Jr.
   was transported to St. David’s Medical Center, and no physical trauma was
   noted in his extremities or his head. Jackson Jr.’s urine was negative for PCP
   but was positive for THC. Following the cardiac arrest, Jackson Jr. sustained
   a brain injury, but Appellants do not claim that the cardiac arrest caused the
   brain injury.
                              II. Procedural History
          Appellants Wilson and Jackson Sr., as next friends to Jackson Jr., filed
   a lawsuit against Burleson County, the City of Caldwell, Bennett, and former

                                         4
Case: 22-50066       Document: 00516806107        Page: 5    Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                   No. 22-50066

   officer Baucom. Appellants filed this suit in Texas state court, and Burleson
   County removed the case to federal court on March 23, 2020.
          On September 30, 2021, the District Court granted the City of
   Caldwell’s Second Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
   or, alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment, which dismissed all of
   Appellants’ claims against the City of Caldwell.
          On October 5, 2021, the District Court granted summary judgment
   for Burleson County and Bennett on all of Appellants’ claims arising from
   the arrest and incarceration of Chester Jackson, Jr. Appellants.
          Baucom did not file a dispositive motion, and a jury trial was held to
   determine if Baucom used excessive force when he moved Jackson Jr.
   between jail cells. The jury returned a unanimous verdict that Appellants
   failed to prove that Baucom used excessive force against Jackson Jr. This
   appeal follows.
                               III. Legal Standard
          We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Lewis v. Sec’y of
   Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is
   proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact
   and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sanders v.
   Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
   A fact is “material” if resolving it one way or another would change the
   outcome of the lawsuit. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 325
   (5th Cir. 2009). A genuine dispute over that fact exists if “the evidence is
   such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
   McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 357–58 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (citing Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005)). We
   view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve

                                         5
Case: 22-50066      Document: 00516806107           Page: 6     Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                     No. 22-50066

   factual controversies in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 326 (citing Little v.
   Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
          We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of
   discretion. Olibas v. Barclay, 838 F.3d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2016). “The district
   court abuses its discretion by denying a new trial only when there is an
   absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” Wellogix, Inc. v.
   Accenture, L.L.P., 716 F.3d 867, 881 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Seidman v. Am.
   Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 1134, 1140 (5th Cir. 1991)). “If the evidence is legally
   sufficient, we must find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
   denying a motion for new trial.” Williams v. Manitowoc Cranes, L.L.C., 898
   F.3d 607, 614 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. T. Wade Welch
   & Assocs., 841 F.3d 669, 676 (5th Cir. 2016).
          This court applies a deferential abuse of discretion standard when
   reviewing a district court’s evidentiary rulings. See Heinsohn v. Carabin &
   Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224, 233 (5th Cir. 2016). “A district court abuses its
   discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly
   erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Heinsohn, 832 F.3d at 233 (quoting
   Nunez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 2010)). “The harmless
   error doctrine applies to the review of evidentiary rulings, so even if a district
   court has abused its discretion, [this court] will not reverse unless the error
   affected ‘the substantial rights of the parties.’” Id. “The party asserting the
   error has the burden of proving that the error was prejudicial.” Ball v.
   LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 591 (5th Cir. 2015).
                                   IV. Discussion
   A. City of Caldwell
          Appellants appeal the district court’s decision to grant the City of
   Caldwell’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Appellants

                                           6
Case: 22-50066      Document: 00516806107          Page: 7    Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                    No. 22-50066

   dedicated the following singular paragraph—which cites no case law—of
   their 58-page brief to appeal Caldwell’s win at the district court:
          The District Court granted summary judgment to the City of
          Caldwell in error. The City of Caldwell’s response to the
          Appellant’s Third Amended Complaint was ro [sic] file a
          second renewed motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
          or, alternatively, motion for summary judgment. It attached
          affidavits, and 96 pages of other document evidence, including
          Baucom’s alleged training and personal records. The Motion
          for Summary Judgment was granted without allowing the
          Appellants to engage in discovery. The court denied the
          Appellant’s request for an extension of discovery deadlines,
          despite good cause meeting the FRCP 16 standards.
          “[A]ny issue not raised in an appellant’s opening brief is forfeited.”
   United States v. Bowen, 818 F.3d 179, 192 n.8 (5th Cir. 2016). “One way that
   an appellant can forfeit an argument is ‘by failing to adequately brief the
   argument on appeal.’” SEC v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (quoting Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021)). “To
   be adequate, a brief must ‘address the district court’s analysis and explain
   how it erred.’” Id. (quoting Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397 n.1). Appellants in no way
   engaged with the district court’s analysis and did not explain how the district
   court erred and have thus waived their appeal against the City of Caldwell.
   Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision dismissing the claims
   against the City of Caldwell.
    B. Burleson County and Deputy Bennett
          Appellants advance a number of issues concerning the district court’s
   decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Burleson County and
   Bennett.
          Appellants appeal the district court’s decision to grant summary
   judgment for Bennett with respect to Appellants’ false arrest claim because

                                          7
Case: 22-50066      Document: 00516806107           Page: 8    Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                     No. 22-50066

   Bennett did not have probable cause for the arrest. “A warrantless arrest
   must be based on ‘probable cause.’ Probable cause exists when the totality of
   the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the
   moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the
   suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Deville v. Marcantel,
   567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Resendiz v. Miller, 203 F.3d 902,
   903 (5th Cir. 2000)). “If there was probable cause for any of the charges
   made . . . then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for
   false arrest fails.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 164 (quoting Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d
   90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995)) (emphasis removed). During Linda’s 911 call, she
   reported that Jackson Jr. was under the influence of drugs and that his
   girlfriend had given him marijuana. Bennett found Jackson Jr. walking in the
   street with just a pair of shorts on and observed that Jr. appeared to be under
   the influence. Based on his training, experience, observations, and the
   statements of Jackson Sr., Linda, and Wilson—any of which is sufficient for
   a reasonable person to conclude that Jackson Jr. had committed an offense—
   Bennett arrested Jackson Jr. and charged him with public intoxication.
   Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision granting summary
   judgment for Bennett on the false arrest claim.
          Appellants next appeal the district court’s decision to grant summary
   judgment for Burleson County on Appellants’ claims under the Americans
   with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. Appellants’ briefing is not clear,
   but it appears that they rest these claims on three allegations: that Jackson Jr.
   was arrested instead of taken to a mental health facility; that Jackson Jr. was
   denied access to medical care while in custody; and that restraints were used
   while Jackson Jr. was in custody. To make out a prima facie case under Title
   II, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he is a qualified individual within the
   meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or
   being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public

                                          8
Case: 22-50066      Document: 00516806107          Page: 9    Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                    No. 22-50066

   entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the public
   entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by
   reason of his disability.” Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669,
   671–72 (5th Cir. 2004). “A critical component of a Title II claim for failure
   to accommodate, however, is proof that ‘the disability and its consequential
   limitations were known by the [entity providing public services].’” Windham
   v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 875 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Jin Choi v.
   Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 633 Fed. Appx. 214, 215 (5th
   Cir. 2015)). “Mere knowledge of the disability is not enough; the service
   provider must also have understood ‘the limitations [the plaintiff]
   experienced . . . as a result of that disability.’” Windham 875 F.3d at 236
   (quoting Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996).
   Thus, the burden falls on the plaintiff “to specifically identify the disability
   and resulting limitations.” Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165. When a plaintiff fails to
   request an accommodation in this manner, he can prevail only by showing
   that “the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable
   accommodation” were “open, obvious, and apparent” to the entity’s
   relevant agents. Id.
          Regarding Appellants’ first contention, the undisputed evidence
   shows that Bennett believed that Jackson Jr. had a mental illness while he was
   simultaneously intoxicated in public. Appellants cite no case law that would
   prevent Bennett from arresting Jackson Jr. for an illegal act because he also
   has a mental illness. Concerning Appellants’ second contention, that the
   ADA/Rehabilitation Act was violated when Jackson Jr. was denied access to
   medical care while in custody, this court has previously held that “[t]he ADA
   is not violated by ‘a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of
   its disabled prisoners.’” Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F. App’x 368, 377
   (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996)).
   Lastly, the Appellants provide no support for their contention that Jackson

                                          9
Case: 22-50066     Document: 00516806107            Page: 10    Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                     No. 22-50066

   Jr. was left “in leg irons and handcuffs for hours overnight due to his
   disability.” Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision granting
   Burleson County summary judgment                 on Appellants’ ADA and
   Rehabilitation Act claims.
          Appellants next advance a “conditions of confinement” claim under
   the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment of the United States
   Constitution. Appellants contend that the use of leg irons combined with
   Jackson Jr. being left handcuffed in his cell with the lights on was torture and
   violated the Constitution since it “served no legitimate governmental
   purpose other than punishing him.” The Supreme Court has held that “if a
   particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related
   to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to
   ‘punishment.’” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). The undisputed
   evidence shows that the restraints were used because of Jackson Jr.’s
   behavior, including his assault on his father, the destruction of the light
   fixture in his first cell, the destruction of a wall phone in his second cell, the
   use of the metal conduit as a potential weapon, the alleged grabbing of
   Baucom’s genitals, and the biting of Higgins’ arm. Moreover, Jackson Jr. was
   closely monitored, and as soon as he was cooperative, his restraints were
   removed. As the conduct of the County appears to be reasonably related to a
   legitimate governmental objective—keeping Jackson Jr. and jail personnel
   safe—we affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to
   the County on the conditions of confinement claim.
          Appellants next appeal the district court’s decision to grant summary
   judgment for Burleson County on Appellants’ claims for failure to provide
   medical attention. Appellants argue that summary judgment was
   inappropriate because the MHMR sent a Qualified Mental Health
   Professional to evaluate Jackson Jr. instead of a doctor or some other more
   qualified health professional. To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment

                                          10
Case: 22-50066     Document: 00516806107            Page: 11   Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                     No. 22-50066

   based on failure to provide adequate medical treatment, a plaintiff “must
   allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
   indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
   (1976). A “prisoner must prove that the officials, despite their actual
   knowledge of the substantial risk, denied or delayed the prisoner’s medical
   treatment.” Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 2019).
   Appellants have satisfied none of the criteria to establish a credible failure to
   provide medical attention claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
   decision in granting summary judgment to Burleson County on Appellants’
   claim for failure to provide medical attention.
          Appellants also appeal the district court’s decision to grant summary
   judgment to Burleson County on their claim that the County failed to
   supervise and train Bennett. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for
   deprivations of constitutional and federal statutory rights by persons acting
   under of color of state law. A county qualifies as a “person” under § 1983
   and may be held liable for official policies or customs or the actions of its
   employees taken pursuant to those policies and customs. Monell v. Dep’t of
   Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). This official policy
   or custom must be the “moving force” of the plaintiff’s injury, and like all §
   1983 claims, the injury must be a violation of a right secured by the
   Constitution or federal law. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389
   (1989). When the policy or custom alleged is a failure to train or supervise,
   deliberate indifference must be shown. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388,
   Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir. 2009). “For
   liability to attach based on an ‘inadequate training’ claim, a plaintiff must
   allege with specificity how a particular training program is defective.” Roberts
   v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Benavides v.
   County of Wilson, 955 F.2d 968, 973 (5th Cir. 1992)). “Moreover, to prove
   deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘at least a pattern of

                                          11
Case: 22-50066     Document: 00516806107            Page: 12    Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                     No. 22-50066

   similar violations arising from training that is so clearly inadequate as to be
   obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation.’” City of Shreveport,
   397 F.3d at 292 (quoting Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th
   Cir. 2003)).
          Appellants fail at nearly every turn in making their 1983 claim.
   Appellants fail to show deliberate indifference on the part of Burleson County
   in their alleged failure to train or supervise. Appellants further fail to allege
   with specificity how Burleson County’s training program is defective.
   Appellants also fail to allege a pattern of similar violations. Lastly, Appellants
   fail to show any violation of a constitutionally protected right. Thus, we
   affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for Burleson
   County with respect to Appellants’ failure to supervise and train Claim.
    C. Robert Riley Baucom
          Appellants’ appeal the district court’s decision to not allow the
   introduction of character evidence, specifically, Baucom’s plea of “no
   contest” to a Class A misdemeanor of official oppression. Appellants
   contend that “the district court erred in finding Federal Rule of Evidence
   404(a)(2), exceptions to the general prohibition on character evidence that
   apply only in criminal cases.” Fed. R. Evid. 404 (a)(2) is titled “Exceptions
   for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case” and provides that “The
   following exceptions apply in a criminal case.” The district court correctly
   held that the Federal Rules of Evidence disallow character evidence in civil
   cases and that the exceptions listed in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)
   only apply in criminal cases, as the title and content of Rule 404(a)(2) make
   clear. We affirm the district court’s decision not to allow character evidence
   to be admitted under Rule 404(a)(2).
          Appellants also contend that the district court erred when it granted
   Baucom’s Motion to exclude (1) the Texas Rangers Report, which included

                                          12
Case: 22-50066     Document: 00516806107            Page: 13   Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                     No. 22-50066

   information concerning the investigation into Baucom for official oppression,
   and; (2) any attempt to elicit testimony that there was a criminal investigation
   or; (3) that Baucom pled no contest to a charge of official oppression. “We
   afford the district court broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings on
   relevance.” Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 860 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir.
   2017) (citing United States v. Young, 655 F.2d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1981)). “A
   district court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous
   view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Heinsohn,
   832 F.3d at 233 (quoting, 604 F.3d at 844). “If the district court abused its
   discretion, the harmless error doctrine applies, and the ruling will be reversed
   only if it affected the substantial rights of the complaining party.” Nunez, 604
   F.3d at 844 (quoting Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351
   (5th Cir. 2007)). Appellants provide no explanation or case law that would
   support a finding that the district court abused its discretion. Moreover, even
   if the district court had made an error in granting Baucom’s motion,
   Appellants have made no showing as to how that ruling has affected their
   substantial rights. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision
   regarding the motion in limine.
          Appellants also appeal the district court’s imposition of a five-hour
   limitation per side for the trial. “FED. R. EVID. 403 and 611(a) give the
   district court wide discretion in the management of its docket and the
   presentation of evidence.” Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 520 (5th Cir.
   1994). “A party is not entitled, as a matter of right, to put on every witness
   he may have.” Id. (citing Manbeck v. Ostrowski, 384 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir.
   1967)). In the management of its docket, the court has an inherent right to
   place reasonable limitations on the time allotted to any given trial. Deus, 15
   F.3d at 520 (citing United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575 (E.D. Ky. 1986)).
   The district court forewarned the parties that each would have five hours to
   present its case. The record indicates that Appellants improvidently

                                          13
Case: 22-50066      Document: 00516806107           Page: 14   Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                     No. 22-50066

   squandered much of their time and Appellants even concede in their brief
   that they employed “stall tactics” when they encountered technical
   difficulties. Appellants have not pointed to any evidence that they were
   unable to present that would have aided their case in any significant way. We
   find no error in the district court’s time limitation.
            Appellants argue that the district court’s admonishment of
   Appellants’ counsel for violating the “Golden Rule” of closing arguments
   was in error. “This court has forbidden plaintiff’s counsel to explicitly
   request a jury to place themselves in the plaintiff’s position and do unto him
   as they would have him do unto them.” Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120,
   1128 (5th Cir. 1983). Such arguments encourage the jury to “decide the case
   on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence.” Loose
   v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Ivy v.
   Security Barge Lines, Inc., 585 F.2d 732, 741 (5th Cir. 1978)). The invocation
   of the Golden Rule does not create immutable error. The trial judge may, by
   appropriate instruction, salve the suit. Loose, 670 F.2d at 497. Appellants’
   argument that the jury should be “glad” their family member was not
   subjected to a use of force assumes that Baucom’s use of force violated the
   law—putting the jury’s focus on damages rather than liability—and
   represents the kind of emotional appeal the golden rule is designed to
   prevent. Thus, district court was compelled to salve the suit, and we find no
   error.
            Appellants also argue that they “were prejudiced by the lack of
   presence of any African Americans on the jury venire or the final jury” and
   that “the selection process did not allow for a fair-cross-section and was
   unfair and unreasonable since there was 0% African Americans in the
   venire.” In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section
   requirement, Appellants must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded
   is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) the representation of this

                                          14
Case: 22-50066     Document: 00516806107           Page: 15    Date Filed: 06/30/2023

                                    No. 22-50066

   group in the venire panel is not reasonable in relation to the number of such
   persons in the community; (3) that this under-representation is due to
   systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439
   U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Appellants make no showing that the absence of African
   Americans is due to systemic exclusion in the jury selection process and have
   therefore failed to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section
   requirement. Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny
   Appellants’ motion to strike the venire panel on the basis of race.
          Lastly, Appellants argue that a new trial was required as a “rational
   trier of fact could not have reached the same conclusion based on the
   evidence in the record.” Appellants’ motion for a new trial is one paragraph
   long and primarily consists of the standard for an excessive force claim. The
   district court denied the motion and explained: “Plaintiffs present no facts or
   evidence. Plaintiffs merely include a paragraph of information about
   excessive force standards, without mounting a challenge to the jury
   instructions. Without more, this Court will not ‘invade the fact-finding
   province of the jury.’” Appellants make no contention that the district court
   abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial and again only offer
   information regarding excessive force. As Appellants make no contention nor
   showing that there was an “absolute absence of evidence to support the
   jury’s verdict,” we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion,
   and we affirm the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for a new trial.
                                   V. Conclusion
                 We AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment as to
   Burleson County and the City of Caldwell and AFFIRM the district court’s
   judgment as to the verdict for Baucom.

                                          15