Court Opinion

ID: 9715914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:19:52.663649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:39.905481
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MANNING, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I disagree with that part of the majority’s holding which affirms the trial court’s finding that defendant possessed the requisite mens rea to violate the Illinois Vehicle Code (hereafter Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 1 — 100 et seq.). However, before I set forth the reasons for my disagreement, I will briefly address the State’s contention that the matter is waived on appeal on the grounds that defendant failed to renew his motion for a directed finding at the close of all the evidence. I would invoke the plain error doctrine (see People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124), because the error I perceive to be present here involves the State’s failure to prove an essential element of the offense. (In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072-73.) Where such an error affects substantial rights of the defendant (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), I would dispense with application of the waiver rule. Concluding then that the issue is not waived, I begin by looking to the applicable portion of the Act, known and cited by the short title “Vehicle Title and Registration Law” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, pars. 2 — 121 et seq., 3 — 100 et seq., 4 — 100 et seq., 5 — 100 et seq.), which provides: “It is a violation of this Chapter for: *** [a] person to possess any *** certificate of title *** without complete assignment.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 4 — 104(a)(2).) Although not explicitly prescribed by statute, I agree with the majority that the mental states of intent, knowledge or recklessness are applicable. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 4 — 3, 4 — 4, 4 — 5, 4 — 6. Consequently, as in all criminal cases, the burden is upon the State to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. I have searched the record. I find no indication that the State adequately addressed the issue of whether the defendant acted with the intent to violate the statute. (See People v. Yarbrough (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 782, 520 N.E.2d 1002.) To the contrary, in my opinion, the evidence presented by the prosecution to demonstrate that defendant knowingly possessed a certificate of title without complete assignment is insufficient to sustain his conviction. People v. Einoder (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 403 N.E.2d 641. In the present case, the record reflects that an individual by the name of Czeslaw was shown on the certificate of title as the title holder, commencing October 20, 1983, the date on which he purchased the truck. The certificate also showed that Czeslaw subsequently sold the vehicle on November 3, 1984, but failed to reflect to whom he had sold it. Defendant testified that he purchased the vehicle from Len Adams in December 1984. However, there is no recordation of this transaction or Mr. Adams’ name on the certificate. Where a defendant denies intent to do wrong or knowledge that a wrong has been committed, his knowledge can be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances. (See People v. Williams (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 143, 358 N.E.2d 58.) Here, the surrounding facts and circumstances reveal that a vehicle may have been the subject of three or four sales transactions; yet, only one person’s name was reflected on the certificate of title. Thus, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, there is no evidence that defendant had notice as to the necessity of completing the certificate of title under the factual matrix here presented. The fact that defendant requested Yearwood to place his name on the certificate as lien holder substantiates his version that counsel had advised him how to perfect his rights under the sales contract (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, pars. 3 — 201, 3 — 202, 3 — 303), rather than how to complete the certificate of title. I would find that the acts and declarations of defendant fail to demonstrate an objective to possess an incomplete title. A person acts with intent to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 4 — 4; People v. Wooff (1970), 120 Ill. App. 2d 225, 256 N.E.2d 881.) In the instant matter, defendant met Yearwood at his place of employment to negotiate the sales transaction. He consulted with legal counsel and had a sales contract drawn up. Following receipt of $1,000, the first installment of the $7,000 purchase price, defendant delivered to Yearwood a copy of the sales contract, possession of the truck and the certificate of title. It seems to me that these actions evidence an intent on the part of defendant to complete the necessary steps to effectuate a legal agreement and transaction, rather than an intent to forego the requirements of the law. Moreover, when Year-wood informed defendant of his inability to make future payments, he retook possession of the vehicle and had Yearwood execute a release of the previous contract. Consequently, I believe that the acts and declarations of defendant neither demonstrate a pattern of conduct relating to knowing possession nor infer defendant’s knowledge relating to the offense of possession of an incomplete title. Accordingly, I would conclude that because the State has presented clearly insufficient evidence (see People v. Meredith (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 409 N.E.2d 70 (which concluded that the appellate court can reverse a finding of fact if such finding was based on insufficient evidence or no evidence)) to prove intent or knowledge on the part of defendant, a key element of the offense, I would reverse the conviction.