Court Opinion

ID: 9915524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 17:03:02.938249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:04.789169
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 231002
             NOTICE
 Decision filed 01/05/24. The
 text of this decision may be                  NO. 5-23-1002
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of   a Petition for
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                  IN THE
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Vermilion County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 23-CF-384
                                                )
RICKEY D. FORTHENBERRY,                         )     Honorable
                                                )     Charles C. Hall,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
         Justices Welch and Cates concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                                OPINION

¶1       The defendant, Rickey D. Forthenberry, appeals the circuit court of Vermilion County’s

October 10, 2023, order regarding the defendant’s pretrial release pursuant to Public Act 101-652

(eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today

(SAFE-T) Act (Act). 1 See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70

(eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as

September 18, 2023). For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s detention order of

October 10, 2023. 2

         1
          The Act has been sometimes referred to as the “SAFE-T Act” or the “Pretrial Fairness Act.”
Neither name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or the public act. See Rowe v.
Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 n.1.
        2
          Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(5) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023), our decision in this case
was due on or before December 28, 2023, absent a finding of good cause for extending the deadline. Based

                                                     1
¶2                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶3      On July 3, 2023, the defendant was charged by information with one count of aggravated

discharge of a firearm (a Class 1 felony), two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (a

Class 3 felony), two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (a Class 3 felony), and

one count of possession of a firearm while not eligible for a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID)

card (a Class 3 felony). On the same date, the circuit court held the defendant’s first appearance

and set bond at $200,000, with 10% to apply and no additional conditions of release. On July 21,

2023, the grand jury returned a true bill of indictment as to all six counts. The defendant remained

in pretrial detention.

¶4      On September 29, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider his conditions of pretrial

release pursuant to section 110-7.5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS

5/110-7.5 (West 2022)). On October 4, 2023, a notice of hearing was filed by defense counsel

scheduling the defendant’s section 110-7.5 motion for hearing on October 10, 2023. On October

10, 2023, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant’s pretrial release. The State alleged

that defendant was charged with a qualifying offense under section 110-6.1(a)(1), (1.5), or (3)

through (7) (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1), (1.5), (3)-(7)) and that he posed a real and present threat to the

safety of persons or the community and that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate

the real and present threat to the safety of any persons or the community, based on the specific

articulable facts of the case.

¶5      On October 10, 2023, the circuit court conducted a hearing on both the defendant’s motion

for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions and the State’s petition to deny pretrial release.

on the high volume of appeals under the Act currently under the court’s consideration, as well as the
complexity of issues and the lack of precedential authority, we find there to be good cause for extending
the deadline.

                                                   2
At the hearing, the State first noted the defendant’s criminal history, which included three prior

convictions for driving while license suspended, two Class A misdemeanor convictions in 2004

for domestic battery and resisting arrest, and a Class 4 felony conviction in 2010 for obstructing

justice.

¶6         According to the State’s proffer, on July 2, 2023, at approximately 1:30 a.m., officers heard

gunshots and responded to the area of Kimball Street in Danville, Illinois. Officers received

information that the shots may have occurred near or at 504 Kimball Street. As they were

approaching, officers observed a black SUV leaving the area of the shooting and conducted a

traffic stop on the vehicle. The defendant was driving the vehicle, and a passenger was located in

the front passenger seat. Officers observed a black and silver .40-caliber Smith & Wesson

semiautomatic pistol in the vehicle. The firearm was loaded with one round in the chamber.

Officers also located a live .40-caliber round in the defendant’s pocket. Further, officers observed

multiple bullet holes in the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant and the front seat passenger told

officers that they were driving in the area of Kimball and Clarence Streets when someone shot at

their vehicle. They then indicated that the defendant drove home, got a gun, returned to the scene,

heard more gunshots, and then “fired back at the people theoretically shooting at him.” A video of

the incident was obtained and supports the defendant’s claim that he did not fire until his vehicle

was fired upon. The State argued that the defendant was dangerous based upon the seriousness of

the offenses charged; the defendant’s felon status, which prohibited him from possessing a firearm

at the time of the alleged crime; and the defendant’s willingness to leave the scene, return with a

firearm, and shoot at people.

¶7         In response, defense counsel proffered a short summary of the facts. The only additional

information given was that officers received a report from an individual who lived on Kimball

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Street who reported that there was a big party going on next door, where her neighbors were firing

guns. Defense counsel then argued that the traffic stop was conducted in violation of the fourth

amendment and that any evidence obtained during the traffic stop was subject to suppression,

leaving only the video, which did not show the vehicle’s license plate. In addition, defense counsel

argued that the defendant had an affirmative defense of self-defense to the offense of aggravated

discharge because he did not fire until he was fired upon. Further, defense counsel argued that the

defendant having fired a gun did not suggest a danger to persons or the community who were not

using unlawful force against the defendant.

¶8      At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court ordered the defendant detained finding

by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof was evident or the presumption great that the

defendant had committed a qualifying offense; (2) defendant posed a real and present threat to the

safety of any person or persons in the community, based upon the specific articulable facts of the

case; and (3) no conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to safety. Specifically, the

circuit court considered the nature and circumstances of the current offense, the seriousness of the

offense, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, including the defense counsel’s

argument for suppression, and the defendant’s prior criminal history. Further, the court was

specifically concerned that the defendant returned to the area with a gun and “placed himself in a

position where he had to return fire” and that the defendant was a convicted felon and cannot

possess a gun. The trial court issued a written order of detention that day, providing the findings

and reasons for its decision. In the order, the court made a handwritten notation that the hearing

was held on the defendant’s motion for reconsideration of pretrial release and the State’s petition

to deny pretrial release.

                                                 4
¶9      The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 20, 2023. The Office of the State

Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent the defendant in this appeal and filed a

memorandum in support of the Rule 604(h) appeal. The State did not file a response to the

defendant’s appeal.

¶ 10                                    II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11    In this appeal, the defendant used the approved standardized notice of appeal form for

appeals brought under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023). In the notice of

appeal, the defendant indicated that he was appealing the order of October 10, 2023, and that he

was seeking “Pretrial Release of Defendant.” As grounds for relief, the defendant claimed that the

State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was

evident or the presumption great that he committed the offense charged. In support, the defendant

argued that it was questionable whether officers had information indicating a vehicle was involved

in the gunfire and that the State’s evidence is subject to suppression. The defendant also claimed

that the State failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a real and

present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on specific,

articulable facts of the case and that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that

threat. The defendant argued that he only returned fire after being fired upon and that there is video

from which the defendant cannot be identified that establishes the defendant’s version of events.

Further, the defendant argued that a condition to stay away from the location of the shooting and

not to possess any firearms would be sufficient to alleviate any dangerousness the defendant may

pose.

¶ 12    OSAD filed a memorandum pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff.

Oct.19, 2023). In its memorandum, OSAD raised three issues. The first two issues are consistent

                                                  5
with and correspond directly to the defendant’s arguments made in the standardized notice of

appeal form. The third issue raised in OSAD’s memorandum is a timeliness argument not initially

raised in the defendant’s notice of appeal.

¶ 13    Specifically, the three issues in OSAD’s memorandum argue (1) the trial court erred in

concluding that the State had proved that the proof was evident or presumption great that the

defendant committed a detainable offense, where the State’s evidence may have been the result of

an unlawful search or seizure; (2) in the alternative, the trial court’s determination that no condition

or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to safety was against the

manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) in the alternative, the trial court erred in considering the

State’s petition to deny pretrial release, because it was untimely.

¶ 14    The State did not file a memorandum in response.

¶ 15                 A. Timeliness of State’s Petition to Deny Pretrial Release

¶ 16    We first begin our analysis by briefly addressing the matter of forfeiture as it relates to the

timeliness issue raised in OSAD’s third argument of its memorandum. On appeal, the defendant

acknowledges that he did not object to or move to strike the State’s verified petition in the trial

court. The defendant concedes that typically this would result in forfeiture of the issue but asks us

to overlook said forfeiture under the doctrine of plain error. However, “forfeiture is a limitation on

the parties and not the reviewing court, and we may overlook forfeiture where necessary to obtain

a just result or maintain a sound body of precedent.” People v. Holmes, 2016 IL App (1st) 132357,

¶ 65. Given that the proceedings in the case occurred shortly after the effective date of the Act and

that the State has not argued for forfeiture, we will address the merits of this argument. We caution

that our decision to overlook forfeiture is limited to this specific case, and we take no position on

forfeiture in future cases.

                                                   6
¶ 17    The defendant’s argument presents an issue of statutory construction. “The primary goal

of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to

the intention of the legislature.” Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2012 IL 111928,

¶ 48. The best indication of the legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Id. “The statute

should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other

section. When the statutory language is clear, we must apply the statute as written without resort

to other tools of construction.” Id.

¶ 18    Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)),

as amended by the Act. Under the Code, a defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in

certain statutorily limited situations. See id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1. Upon filing a timely, verified

petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has

committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat

to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions

would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or

prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e), (f).

¶ 19    Section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code addresses the timing of the State’s petition. Id. § 110-

6.1(c)(1). Section 110-6.1(c)(1) provides that the State may file a petition without prior notice to

the defendant at the first appearance before a judge, or within 21 calendar days after arrest and

release with reasonable notice to the defendant. Id. In this case, the defendant was arrested, and

his bond was set prior to the effective date of the Act. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion

for reconsideration of the monetary condition of his bond, and the State then filed a petition to

deny pretrial release in response. The defendant argues that the State was not allowed to file a

                                                    7
petition to deny pretrial release where the defendant remained in custody after having been ordered

released on the condition of depositing security, and he relies on this court’s decision in People v.

Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724. The defendant’s reliance on Rios is misplaced, as Rios is

procedurally distinguishable from the case at bar.

¶ 20    In Rios, the defendant was arrested and detained prior to the effective date of the Act, and

the circuit court set bond, along with other conditions of pretrial release. Id. ¶ 3. The defendant,

however, remained in pretrial detention. After the effective date of the Act, the State filed a petition

to deny pretrial release. The circuit court granted the State’s petition based upon its finding that

the defendant should be detained according to the dangerousness standard, and the defendant

appealed. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.

¶ 21   This court determined that the plain language of section 110-6.1(c)(1) (725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(c)(1) (West 2022)) set forth a deadline for the State to file a petition to detain. Specifically,

this court determined that:

       “The State may file a petition to detain at the time of the defendant’s first appearance before

       a judge; no prior notice to the defendant is required. Alternatively, the State may file a

       petition to detain the defendant within 21 calendar days after the arrest and release of the

       defendant; however, reasonable notice is to be provided to the defendant under this

       circumstance.” Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 10.

¶ 22   This court found that the exceptions to the above timing requirements set forth in section

110-6 (725 ILCS 5/110-6 (West 2022)) were not applicable to the defendant since the defendant

had not been released following his arrest and no new offenses had been alleged. Rios, 2023 IL

App (5th) 230724, ¶ 12. As such, this court determined that the State’s petition to detain pursuant

to section 110-6.1 was untimely and that the circuit court did not have the authority to detain the

                                                   8
defendant pursuant to the untimely petition. Id. This court went on to find that the defendant fell

within section 110-7.5(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)) because he was a

person who remained in pretrial detention, on or after January 1, 2023, after having been ordered

released with pretrial conditions. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 14. Section 110-7.5(b) states

that such a defendant “shall be entitled to a hearing under subsection (e) of Section 110-5.” 725

ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022). This court further found that, in reviewing and analyzing sections

110-6.1(c)(1), 110-6, and 110-5(e) (id. §§ 110-6.1(c)(1), 110-6, 110-5(e)), along with one another

and the entire Code, defendants, such as the defendant in Rios, have the following two options:

       “Under sections 110-7.5(b) and 110-5(e), a defendant may file a motion seeking a hearing

       to have their pretrial conditions reviewed anew. Alternatively, a defendant may elect to

       stay in detention until such time as the previously set monetary security may be paid. A

       defendant may elect this option so that they may be released under the terms of the original

       bail.” Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 16.

¶ 23   This court came to the above conclusion because, although the plain language of section

110-1.5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-1.5 (West 2022)) abolished the requirement of posting a

monetary bail, it did not eliminate the option to post the previously ordered security, and some

defendants may prefer the second option, as opposed to requesting a hearing. Rios, 2023 IL App

(5th) 230724, ¶ 17.

¶ 24   In this case, like Rios, the defendant was arrested and had a cash bond set prior to the

effective date of the Act—September 18, 2023. The defendant was unable to post bond, and he

remained in pretrial detention. Unlike Rios, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the

conditions of pretrial release on September 29, 2023, pursuant to section 110-7.5 (725 ILCS 5/110-

7.5 (West 2022)). Specifically, the defendant asked the court to remove the deposit of monetary

                                                9
security as a condition of his pretrial release. On October 10, 2023, the State filed a responsive

petition to deny pretrial release.

¶ 25    Section 110-6 of the Code addresses, among other things, the revocation of pretrial release

and the modification of pretrial release conditions. Id. § 110-6. Section 110-6(g) provides, “The

court may, at any time, after motion by either party or on its own motion, remove previously set

conditions of pretrial release, subject to the provisions in this subsection. The court may only add

or increase conditions of pretrial release at a hearing under this Section.” Id. § 110-6(g). Section

110-6 further provides, “Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit the State’s ability to

file a verified petition seeking denial of pretrial release under subsection (a) of Section 110-6.1 or

subdivision (d)(2) of Section 110-6.1.” Id. § 110-6(i).

¶ 26    Based upon the plain language of the Code, a defendant who was arrested prior to the

implementation of the Act and who remains in detention after having been ordered released with

conditions, including the posting of monetary security, has the option (a) to remain in detention

until the previously set monetary security may be paid or (b) to file a motion to modify the

previously set conditions of pretrial release under sections 110-7.5(b) and 110-5(e) of the Code

(id. §§ 110-7.5(b), 110-5(e)). See Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶¶ 16-17. Section 110-6(g)

provides for the removal of previously set conditions of pretrial release upon motion by either

party or on the court’s own motion; it also provides for the increase of conditions of pretrial release

at a hearing. 725 ILCS 5/110-6(g) (West 2022). If a defendant moves to modify the conditions of

pretrial release, the State may file a responsive petition. See People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d)

230435, ¶ 14. Upon a defendant’s motion to have his conditions of pretrial release reviewed, the

trial court shall hold a hearing, during which the defendant may argue for the most lenient pretrial

release conditions and the State may make competing arguments. Id.

                                                  10
¶ 27   Contrary to the defendant’s argument, the State is permitted to file a responsive pleading

in a situation such as this where a defendant was arrested and detained on a cash bond prior to the

implementation of the Act and subsequently filed a motion seeking to modify the conditions of his

pretrial release. Therefore, we reject the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred when it

considered the State’s responsive petition.

¶ 28      B. Trial Court’s Consideration of Evidence Potentially Subject to Suppression

¶ 29   Next, we turn to the defendant’s first argument in his memorandum. The defendant argues

that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence and an abuse of discretion for the trial court

to conclude that the State had met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the

proof was evident or presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense, where

the State’s evidence proffered at the hearing may have been the result of an unlawful search or

seizure. Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court “ignored” or improperly “deferred”

consideration of the factor set forth under section 110-6.1(f)(6) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(f)(6) (West 2022)), the likelihood of suppression of the State’s proffered evidence at the

hearing. We disagree.

¶ 30   As set forth above, a defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily

limited circumstances. In order to detain a defendant, the State has the burden to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has

committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat

to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions

would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or

prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e), (f).

                                                 11
¶ 31   In considering whether the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any

person or the community, i.e., making a determination of “dangerousness,” the trial court may

consider evidence or testimony concerning factors that include, but are not limited to (1) the nature

and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence

involving a weapon or a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the

identity of any person to whom the defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the

threat; (4) any statements made by or attributed to the defendant, together with the circumstances

surrounding the statements; (5) the age and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age and

physical condition of the victim or complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to

possess or have access to a weapon; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or any other

offense, the defendant was on probation, parole, or supervised release from custody; and (9) any

other factors including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code (id. § 110-5). Id. § 110-6.1(g).

¶ 32   To set appropriate conditions of pretrial release, the circuit court must determine, by clear

and convincing evidence, what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the

appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the

likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. § 110-

5(a). In reaching its determination, the circuit court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances

of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and

characteristics of the person; (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present threat

to any person that would be posed by the person’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of

the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. Id. The statute lists

no singular factor as dispositive. See id.

                                                  12
¶ 33   Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is twofold. The circuit court’s

factual findings will be reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, such as the

State’s burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that conditions of pretrial release would

not protect any person or the community, that the defendant has a high likelihood of willful flight

to avoid prosecution, or that the defendant failed to comply with previously ordered conditions of

pretrial release. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. “A finding is against the

manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding

itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227

Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008).

¶ 34   The circuit court’s ultimate determination regarding the denial of pretrial release is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. “An abuse of

discretion occurs where the circuit court’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or fanciful or where

no reasonable person would have taken the position adopted by the circuit court.” People v.

Heineman, 2023 IL 127854, ¶ 59. “ ‘[I]n reviewing the circuit court’s ruling for an abuse of

discretion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court, “merely because we

would have balanced the appropriate factors differently.” ’ [People v.] Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st)

191253, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 280, 412 N.E.2d 541, 547 (1980)).” People v.

Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11.

¶ 35   Section 110-6.1(f)(6) of the Code addresses evidence that may be subject to suppression at

the detention hearing. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(6) (West 2022). Section 110-6.1(f)(6) provides, “The

defendant may not move to suppress evidence or a confession, however, evidence that proof of the

charged crime may have been the result of an unlawful search or seizure, or both, or through

improper interrogation, is relevant in assessing the weight of the evidence against the defendant.”

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Id. Thus, the defendant may not suppress evidence or a confession at the hearing but may argue

that the evidence was obtained unlawfully and the court should assess less weight to that evidence

against the defendant.

¶ 36   We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal in this matter. Here, the State provided

sufficient evidence at the hearing to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is

evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed the alleged offenses. Officers heard

gunshots in the area. They had received information that the gunshots had come from a specific

area on Kimball Street. Officers conducted a traffic stop on defendant’s vehicle leaving that area.

Officers noticed bullet holes in the vehicle. Further, they discovered a loaded firearm in the vehicle

and a live round in the defendant’s pocket. The defendant and the front seat passenger told officers

that they were driving in the area of Kimball and Clarence Streets when someone shot at their

vehicle. The defendant then drove home, got a gun, returned to the scene, and fired back when he

was shot at again. The defendant is a convicted felon and cannot own or possess a firearm. There

is sufficient evidence for the trial court to find the State met its burden. Further, we find that the

trial court properly complied with section 110-6.1(f)(6) when assessing the weight of the evidence

against the defendant. Specifically, we note the following exchange that occurred on the record

between the trial court and defense counsel:

               “THE COURT: Well, a couple points. One, to the defense, you may well have a

       motion to suppress that should be given serious consideration, but I’m not going to rule on

       a motion to suppress based on proffers today.

               MR. BRAKKE: Just so my argument is clear, your Honor. I apologize for

       interrupting you. I’m not asking for a motion to suppress today, but it is explicitly

       something that the Court—

                                                 14
               THE COURT: I can look at the admissibility as a factor in making my decision. I

       agree. I just wanted to clarify, you know, at the appropriate time if you feel that you should

       file a motion to suppress, then get it on the calendar and we will hear it with proper evidence

       and in accordance with the rules of evidence.”

¶ 37   The trial court made it a point to clarify on the record that section 110-6.1(f)(6) was a factor

the court could consider in making its decision but that it would not be making an ultimate

determination as to suppression, because it is explicitly not allowed at the hearing under the same

section. The court did well in considering, to the extent allowed by section 110-6.1(f)(6), the

potential for suppression, as it is relevant in assessing the weight of the evidence against the

defendant. And thus, we disagree with the defendant’s contentions on appeal that the trial court

improperly “ignored” the factor or “deferred” it. We find that the court’s ultimate determination

to detain the defendant despite the potential for suppression of evidence was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence or an abuse of discretion.

¶ 38                    C. Alternative Arguments in Notice of Appeal

¶ 39   Lastly, we turn to the defendant’s second and alternative argument in his memorandum. In

section II of OSAD’s memorandum there are no facts, argument, evidence, or any legal authority

presented. Instead, there is a title paragraph, and in lieu of argument, OSAD states, “With respect

to this claim, Mr. Forthenberry rests on the argument in the notice of appeal.”

¶ 40   In the defendant’s standardized notice of appeal, the defendant checked the box indicating

the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition

or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. In the lines provided

below, the defendant states,

                                                 15
       “Please see above, as it establishes that if Defendant is dangerous, it’s to people who shoot

       [sic] at him on two different occasions for no reason. An order to stay away from the

       location of the shooting and to not possess any firearms or other dangerous weapons are

       conditions more than sufficient, given the specific facts of the case, to alleiate [sic]

       dangerousness, should some be found.”

While the defendant does make some level of argument in his notice of appeal, it also references

a separate argument contained in the notice of appeal that is not set forth in the memorandum. In

essence, we are first directed by the memorandum to the notice of appeal, and then we are

redirected to another portion of the notice of appeal not argued in the memorandum.

¶ 41   Rule 604(h), as amended due to the Act, provides a new procedure for these appeals. See

Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023). Under Rule 604(h), the appellant has two options. The

appellant may stand on the notice of appeal, or the appellant may file, but is not required to file, a

memorandum. “The new provisions of the Code, however, cannot function independently from

the larger, longstanding body of law governing appeals.” Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 10.

¶ 42   As a matter of practicality and considering the long-standing principles of appellate

procedure, we find that, if a memorandum is filed, it will be the controlling document for issues

or claims on appeal and we will not reference the notice of appeal to seek out further arguments

not raised in the memorandum, except in limited circumstances, e.g., to determine jurisdiction.

The memorandum must contain some form of argument for each issue presented, along with

justification for claiming entitlement to relief—like references to the record, evidence presented,

or, if possible, legal authority. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The memorandum cannot

simply reference or direct the court to the notice of appeal for its argument.

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¶ 43   “Rule 604(h) requires the notice of appeal to include a description of the relief to be

requested ‘and the grounds for the relief requested.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Inman, 2023 IL App

(4th) 230864, ¶ 12 (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023)). Accordingly, “some form

of argument is required, along with justification for claiming entitlement to relief—like references

to the record, the evidence presented, or, if possible, legal authority.” Id. A reviewing court “cannot

be expected to formulate an argument for defendant out of whole cloth.” Id. ¶ 13. “The appellate

court is not a depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.”

Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986). As a reviewing court,

we are entitled to have the issues clearly defined, pertinent authority cited, and a cohesive legal

argument presented. Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 5.

¶ 44   In this case, the memorandum provides no argument in support and attempts to incorporate

arguments in the notice of appeal into the memorandum by way of reference. Therefore, we find

this argument forfeited.

¶ 45                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 46   For the reasons stated, we affirm the October 10, 2023, detention order of the circuit court

of Vermilion County.

¶ 47   Affirmed.

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                  People v. Forthenberry, 2024 IL App (5th) 231002

Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion County, No. 23-CF-
                           384; the Hon. Charles C. Hall, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                  James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Benjamin Wimmer,
for                        of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                  Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State’s Attorneys
for                        Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Springfield, for the People.
Appellee:

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