Court Opinion

ID: 9709645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:52:37.326372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.699602
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority’s depiction of Zotaley’s misconduct. Zotaley had numerous opportunities over a three-month period to inform opposing counsel and the arbitrator of the source of the PIP endorsement form, but he failed to do so. However, I write separately because I believe imposition of a six-month suspension is not supported by prior cases decided by this court.
*22Due process requires that the sanction imposed in a discipline ease be consistent with the sanction imposed in similar cases. We do not impose a heavier sanction due to the status of the attorney, nor do we impose a lighter sanction due to the fear of the deleterious effects on the attorney’s career. Rather, we seek an evenhanded approach, determining the appropriate measure of discipline based upon the particular professional misconduct in the case before us and the precedent provided by the sanctions we have previously imposed in analogous eases.
The majority cites Schmidt as support for the imposition of a six-month suspension because the attorney in Schmidt misrepresented facts to a judge, opposing counsel, and a client during the course of litigation, and also misrepresented facts to a client in order to secure a release absolving the lawyer from professional responsibility. In re Schmidt, 402 N.W.2d 544, 550 (Minn.1987). These facts alone distinguish Schmidt from the present case because Zotaley cooperated with the disciplinary investigation and committed no further misconduct in an attempt to thwart the Director’s investigation.
But the majority’s focus on the misrepresentation in Schmidt also obscures other professional misconduct in that case which warranted a six-month suspension. The attorney in Schmidt grossly neglected his client, letting the statute of limitations run so that his client lost whatever rights he had to recover for damages in a personal injury action relating to the loss of his arm. Id. at 549. The lawyer’s misconduct also did not “arise out of an isolated nor aberrant action,” but was reflective of two prior disciplinary warnings for the neglect of client matters. Id. at 550.
The majority’s reliance on Jagiela is similarly misplaced. In re Jagiela, 517 N.W.2d 333 (Minn.1994). The attorney in Jagiela participated in creating a document in 1990 that was not in existence in 1988. The document was then backdated as if it had been signed in 1988. Id. at 334. The backdated document was given to opposing counsel during litigation, submitted to the court, and testified to by the various parties, including the attorney’s client, during the litigation. The attorney also filed briefs and other pleadings in which it was alleged that the backdated document had been executed in 1988. In an unrelated matter, the attorney gave false testimony in an affidavit used by another attorney in that attorney’s divorce proceedings. Id.
A six-month suspension was appropriate in Jagiela because the attorney used a document he knew to be false. As the majority suggests, Zotaley could have avoided discipline by informing opposing counsel and the arbitrator of the source of the PIP endorsement form. No such remedy, and consequent avoidance of disciplinary action, would have been available had Zotaley backdated a document. The attorney’s conduct in Jagiela also was more egregious because he allowed signatories to the document to give false testimony concerning it, and the attorney affirmatively argued that the document had been executed in 1988. Id. at 335. Moreover, the attorney’s misconduct in connection with the backdated document was compounded by his false statements in the divorce affidavit. Zotaley, by contrast, implicated only himself through the use of the borrowed PIP endorsement form, and has committed no other professional misconduct other than that arising in the present case.
Schmidt and Jagiela thus provide weak support for the six-month suspension imposed by the majority. A six-month suspension based upon Schmidt and Jagiela is inappropriate because Zotaley’s misconduct was less egregious than that in either of these two prior cases, he has never been previously sanctioned by this court, and has no known history of neglect of client matters or other professional misconduct. The record and the referee’s findings support the conclusion that Zotaley’s conduct was isolated and a departure from an otherwise unblemished 25-year legal career.
The referee recommended that the sanction be a public reprimand. In support of his recommendation, the referee concluded that Zotaley’s professional misconduct did not “rise to the level” of that sanctioned in Schmidt and Jagiela. The referee specifically cited three analogous cases in which a 30-day suspension was imposed. Matter of Dis*23cipline of Holmay, 399 N.W.2d 564 (Minn.1987); Matter of Discipline of Kaminsky, 407 N.W.2d 670 (Minn.1987); and Disciplinary Action Against Mahoney, 474 N.W.2d 598 (Minn.1991). The attorney in Holmay forged or procured the forgery of his client’s signature on documents and falsely notarized them. He submitted the documents to the court and served them on the opposing party. 399 N.W.2d at 565. The attorney in Kamin-sky forged a signature on three affidavits, made arrangements to have the affidavits notarized and then presented them to the court. The attorney was also found to have neglected a client matter. 407 N.W.2d at 670. In Mahoney, the attorney signed, directed or was responsible for the false dating, false recitations, false acknowledgments and false notarizations on documents which made it appear that the parties had executed the documents earlier than they actually had. These actions enabled the attorney’s client to receive rental reimbursement to which he was not entitled. 474 N.W.2d at 598-99.
The referee concluded that Zotaley’s actions were more serious than those in Hol-may and Kaminsky, but less serious than those in Mahoney, except that Zotaley had permitted the endorsement form to be submitted to a tribunal and failed to take corrective action. Accordingly, the referee concluded that a 30-day suspension would be appropriate but for the unique facts of Zota-ley’s case and certain mitigating factors. The referee found the following mitigating factors: the insurance company’s payment of stacking benefits prior to Zotaley’s involvement; failure of Benkler s insurance agent to provide the endorsement form with the summary of coverage; failure of the insurance company’s attorney to provide a copy of the PIP endorsement form showing no stacking which the insurance company claimed was part of Benkler’s policy; and the claim of the insurance company’s attorney that Benkler had signed a form declining stacking coverage, but his failure to produce such a form.
I agree with the referee’s conclusion that Schmidt and Jagiela do not support a six-month suspension and that Holmay, Kaminsky and Mahoney do provide some support for a 30-day suspension. However, I conclude that neither a public reprimand, as recommended by the referee, nor a 30-day suspension is appropriate. Because Zota-ley’s actions were more serious than those sanctioned in Holmay and Kaminsky and were of about the same magnitude of those in Mahoney, and because I give much less weight to the unique facts of this ease and the mitigating factors than did the referee, I would impose a suspension of 60 days.