Court Opinion

ID: 9746008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:49:56.807436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:07.514724
License: Public Domain

WOODS, J.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion holding that the arbitration proceedings in the trial court were final thereby entitling Woodman to claim attorney fees. The majority opinion, in my view, is overly technical in its approach to the problem, and sidesteps equitable principles which should lead to a reversal. Of great importance is the fact that the Legislature has not revealed its intent when it enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 1287 as to the meaning of the word “rehearing.” In my view the question is one of first impression and requires the application of two guiding principles which I hereafter discuss. Before applying the guiding principles which I find applicable and determinative of the appeal, it first appears prudent to repeat the content of the statute which is pertinent to the central issue in this case. Section 1287 is entitled “Rehearing before arbitrators” and provides as follows:
“If the award is vacated, the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators. If the award is vacated on the grounds set forth in subdivision (d) or (e) of Section 1286.2, the court with the consent of the parties to the court proceeding may order a rehearing before the original arbitrators.” (Italics added.)
When the Legislature uses language in a statute which is indicative of discretion, such as the use of “may” in Code of Civil Procedure, section 1287, as opposed to more mandatory language such as “must” or “shall,” the parties to litigation and the courts are left in a position of having to speculate as to the proper application of such words, unless the Legislature has made it clear how such words are to be applied by a statement in the legislative history. As the majority and this dissenting justice maintain, the legislative history is unavailing in this instance. To put it in the vernacular, the parties and the courts are at sea without a rudder on the core issue in this appeal.
The quandary of the parties and the courts in such instances is generally exemplified in 58 Cal.Jur.3d (2004) Statutes, section 152, pages 578-579 as follows: “The distinction between directory and mandatory statutes is not susceptible of exact definition, for it depends on legislative intent, and consequently there is no simple, mechanical test for determining whether a provision should be given directory or mandatory effect. . . . The *519mandatory-directory and obligatory-permissive dichotomies are analytically distinct. ... In order to determine whether a particular statutory provision is mandatory or directory, in the absence of express language reflecting the legislative intent, the courts must ascertain or gather such intent from the terms of the statute construed as a whole, from the nature and character of the act to be done, and from the consequences which would follow the doing or failure to do the particular act at the required time. . . . While the use of particular terms [is] generally indicative of a command rendering the provision mandatory, including terms such as ‘must’ or ‘shall,’ which as used in statutes is ordinarily the language of command, the use of the word ‘must’ in a statute does not necessarily make the provision mandatory, and likewise, the use of the term ‘shall’ does not necessarily make the provision mandatory... . Although ‘may’ is ordinarily permissive, evoking the idea of possibility, this is not a fixed rule of statutory construction. . . . Directory provisions ordinarily relate to matters of form. Where consequences are attached to failure to do a required act, the direction to do it will be held mandatory. . . . Statutory time limits are usually deemed to be directory. . . .” (Citations omitted.)
What we are left with are two principles. The first and foremost is the general proposition that arbitration statutes are remedial in nature and are to be liberally construed with every reasonable intendment favoring the validity of arbitration awards. (Goossen v. Adair (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 810 [8 Cal.Rptr. 855].) The policy in this state is to favor arbitration. (Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers of America (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 444 [335 P.2d 990].) The second principle rests on the fact that Code of Civil Procedure section 1287 uses discretionary language stating that “the court with the consent of the parties to the court proceeding may order a rehearing before the original arbitrators.” (Italics added.) Left with these two guiding principles and nothing further, I conclude the trial court erred in awarding fees and costs to Woodman, since the matter was still pending in arbitration and not final, thereby undercutting the attorney fees clause in the contractual arbitration agreement stating: “In any litigation, arbitration or other legal proceeding which may arise between any of the parties hereto, including Agent, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its cost, including costs of arbitration, and reasonable attorneys’ fees in addition to any other relief to which such party may be entitled.”
I opine that the Legislature certainly knew how to utilize the mandatory word “shall” or even “must” had it chosen to do so. One need only examine Code of Civil Procedure section 1293.2 to find evidence of the Legislature’s sophistication in the available use of the mandatory word “shall,” where the Legislature has declared “The court shall award costs upon any judicial proceeding under this title as provided in Chapter 6 (commencing with [s]ection 1021) of the Title 14 of Part 2 of this code.” (Italics added.) Often, *520courts resort to dictionary assistance in determining the meaning of words. For instance, “shall” denotes “[determination or promise”; “[i]nevitability”; “[c]ommand”; “directive or requirement.” (American Heritage Dict. (2d college ed. 1982) p. 1125, col. 2.) In contrast, “may” denotes “[t]o be allowed or permitted to”; “likelihood or possibility”; or “contingency.” (American Heritage Dict., supra, p. 774, col. 1.)
I recall that the intention of General Douglas MacArthur pertaining to the invasion of the Philippine Islands was expressed in determined language when he declared “I shall return.” He didn’t say “I may return.” I find the use of may by the Legislature to be just as permissive, contingent and confusing as had the great general made the mistake of using the word may in his declaration of intentions.