Court Opinion

ID: 9958442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 14:06:38.589873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:22.452209
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0224-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ORRIC MITCHELL, a/k/a
JASUAH CARSTERFIN,
JASUAH CARSTERIN,
ORRIC MITCHEL,
OMAR THOMAS,
MICHAEL THOMAS, and
OQUAN THOMPSON,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted February 14, 2024 – Decided April 9, 2024

                   Before Judges Gummer and Walcott-Henderson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 18-01-0133.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Frank J. Pugliese, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).
            Bradley Daniel Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor,
            attorney for respondent (William Kyle Meighan,
            Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
            brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Orric Mitchell appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief

(PCR) petition, which was decided without an evidentiary hearing. Perceiving

no abuse of discretion in Judge Guy P. Ryan's decision to forego an evidentiary

hearing and agreeing with his finding that defendant did not establish a prima

facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.

      A jury convicted defendant of third-degree possession of a controlled

dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-degree possession

of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and -5(b)(3), and third-

degree distribution of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and -5(b)(3). The jury

acquitted him of fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law, N.J.S.A.

2C:29-1(a). Defendant received an aggregate imprisonment term of nine years

with a four-year period of parole ineligibility.

      We affirmed defendant's conviction and remanded for resentencing. State

v. Mitchell, No. A-1571-19 (App. Div. Apr. 30, 2021) (slip op. at 7). On

remand, the trial judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate imprisonment term

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of eight years and, pursuant to a joint motion filed by the parties, did not impose

a period of parole ineligibility.

      In his pro se PCR petition, defendant asserted his trial counsel had

rendered ineffective assistance but did not specify any basis for that assertion.

In his brief, defendant's appointed PCR counsel argued trial counsel had been

ineffective in failing to object during the trial to a question asked by the

prosecutor of a police detective about why he had requested consent to search a

motel room.     The detective answered:      "I believed there to be additional

quantities of heroin in the room." PCR counsel contended trial counsel, by

failing to object to the question, had "deprived appellate counsel of a more

effective argument as to the suppression of [the detective's] testimony." In our

opinion on defendant's direct appeal, however, we concluded the detective's

"belief that there was heroin in the room did not invade the jury's province as to

the elements of the crime" and, thus, was not capable of impacting the jury's

ultimate decision on whether defendant possessed the heroin with the intent to

distribute it or if he had actually distributed it. Id. at 7-8. We also noted the

strength of the evidence before the jury. Id. at 13.

      PCR counsel also asserted trial counsel was unprepared for trial, citing

counsel's request for a break before his cross-examination of the detective and

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his failure to ask the detective about a purported discrepancy regarding the CDS

evidence.   According to PCR counsel, trial counsel's purported cumulative

errors deprived defendant of a fair trial.

      After hearing argument, Judge Ryan denied defendant's petition in a

twenty-one-page opinion and corresponding order.         Defendant raises the

following arguments on appeal:

      POINT I

            DEFENDANT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE
            CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
            COUNSEL.      DEFENDANT’S   CLAIM     IS
            SUPPORTED BY MATERIAL ISSUES OF
            DISPUTED FACTS LYING OUTSIDE THE
            RECORD. THE RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTED
            FACTS NECESSITATED AN EVIDENTIARY
            HEARING. THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FAILING
            TO CONDUCT SUCH A HEARING.

            A. Trial Counsel's Failure to Object.

            B. Trial Counsel Was Unprepared for Trial.

      POINT II

            CUMULATIVE    ERRORS   COMMITTED    BY
            COUNSEL VIEWED IN THE AGGREGATE
            DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.

      We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Ryan's

comprehensive opinion.       The judge acknowledged defendant's arguments

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                                         4
concerning the questioning of the detective and the purported evidential

discrepancy were potentially procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-5 based

on his belief those issues already had been addressed on the merits. The judge

nevertheless substantively considered those arguments and correctly rejected

them.

        We discern no abuse of discretion in Judge Ryan's decision to forego an

evidentiary hearing. See State v. L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div.

2020) (holding "[w]e review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a defendant's

request for a hearing under an abuse of discretion standard"). A petitioner is not

automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343,

355 (2013); see also State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023)

(holding "[t]he mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to

an evidentiary hearing").

        Rule 3:22-10(b) provides that a court should hold an evidentiary hearing

on a PCR petition only if the defendant establishes a prima facie case in support

of PCR, "there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by

reference to the existing record," and "an evidentiary hearing is necessary to

resolve the claims for relief." See also Porter, 216 N.J. at 354; Vanness, 474

N.J. Super. at 623.     "A prima facie case is established when a defendant

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                                        5
demonstrates 'a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts

alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on

the merits.'" Id. at 355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). Defendant did not meet that

standard, and, thus, Judge Ryan did not abuse his discretion by deciding the

petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.

      Affirmed.

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