Court Opinion

ID: 9724500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:59:02.007007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:01.443138
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(concurring). In this appeal we are required to determine in what manner a mechanic’s *303lien nan be continued beyond tbe period of one year. Specifically, the question presented is whether plaintiff’s mechanic’s lien, which first arose on March 19, 1962, continued in force beyond one year thereafter, plaintiff having filed its complaint to enforce the lien on February 28, 1963 and service of process therein having been made upon defendants on July 9, 1963.
Mr. Justice Otis M. Smith has written that the provisions of our general statute of limitations1 are applicable to toll the one-year period of limitations contained in our lien act2 for a period of 90 days when a complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are in good faith placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service. He has concluded that in this case of Maschmeyer, jurisdiction over defendants not having been acquired within the period of one year and 90 days from the inception of the lien, the lien expired and the trial judge, therefore, should not have dismissed defendants’ affirmative defense on plaintiff’s motion. While I agree with my Brother Smith’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s lien did not survive until jurisdiction was acquired over defendants and that, therefore, defendants’ affirmative defense was dismissed erroneously, I do not agree that the general statute of limitations is applicable to this determination.
Section 9 of the lien law reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“The several liens herein provided for shall continue for 1 year after such statement or account is recorded in the office of the register of deeds, and no longer unless proceedings are begun to enforce the same as hereinafter provided.” CLS 1961, § 570.9 (Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 26.289).
*304Section 10 of the law reads, pertinently, as follows:
“Proceedings to enforce such lien shall he by bill in chancery, under oath, and notice of lis pendens recorded in the office of the register of deeds, shall have the effect to continue such lien pending such proceedings.” CLS 1961, § 570.10 (Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 26.290).
Thus, those two sections of the lien law provide that a statutory mechanic’s lien continues beyond a one-year period only if proceedings are begun to enforce it and a notice of Us pendens is duly recorded in which event the lien shall continue pending the proceedings.
Under our practice prior to adoption of our General Court Rules of 1963, service of process had to be made within 90 days either of issuance of the original process or of alias processes issued within 10 days after the filing of a return showing failure of service of the preceding process. See Court Rules No 13 and No 14 (1945). Failure to make service within such successive periods of time and failure to have issued timely and alias summons resulted in termination of proceedings and, therefore, loss of the lien.
Our currently applicable court rules no longer limit the time for service of process and, without more, it might be argued that, therefore, a mechanic’s lien could be continued indefinitely even without attempting service of process upon defendants. However, simultaneous with the effective date  of our General Court Rules of 1963, the statutory provisions regarding notices of Us pendens, due recording of which, by express provision of the lien law, has the effect of continuing a lien pending enforcement *305proceedings, were changed to include the following language pertinent to the issue herein:
“Such a notice [of lis pendens] may he filed with the complaint before the service of the summons; but, in that case, personal or substituted service of the summons must be made upon a defendant, within 60 days after the filing, or else, before the expiration of the same time, publication must be commenced, or service thereof must be made without the State, as prescribed by law.” CLS 1961, § 600.2701 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2701).
While CLS 1961, § 600.2725 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2725) provides for record cancellation of a notice of lis pendens upon failure of timely service of process or determination of the cause, I cannot read the statutory language above quoted to mean that a notice of Us pendens, recorded upon the express statutory condition that service of process be made within 60 days, has any continuing legal vitality upon failure of plaintiff to fulfill the express statutory condition. Like any other fictitious record encumbrance upon title to property, an invalid notice of Us pendens can be canceled of record. Section 600.2725 provides the means; it does not imply that such a notice of Us pendens is legally effective notwithstanding the falsity of the notice it conveys. Thus, upon failure to fulfill the statutory condition of service of summons within 60 days after recording the notice of Us pendens, the notice loses its legal vitality and the lien, which depends for its continuation beyond its first year of existence upon a valid recorded notice of Us pendens, likewise terminates.
Our General Court Rules of 1963 now also provide, see GrCR 1963, 101, as does section 1901 of the revised judicature act,4 that “A civil action is com*306menced by filing a complaint with the court”. Thus, if a complaint to enforce a mechanic’s lien is filed with the court before expiration of one year from the lien’s inception, the lien law’s requirement that such proceedings be begun within such period is satisfied and, upon recording of notice of lis pendens, the law provides that the lien’s life is extended, but only so long as a notice of lis pendens is recorded validly.
In view of GrCR 1963, 101, and the above quoted statutory provisions regarding recording of notice of lis pendens before service of summons, expressly made the means of extending a lien’s life by the lien law, I perceive no reason requiring our reliance upon the general statute of limitations to determine when a suit is commenced, or when process is to be issued or served therein, or for any other purpose, in actions seeking the enforcement of a statutory lien, which lien the statute creating the right expressly provides must be enforced, if at all, by suit begun within one year of its creation.
Particularly is this so in the light of our recent decision in Holland v. Eaton (1964), 373 Mich 34, reaffirming our well-settled, and well-reasoned, rule that provisions of our general statute of limitations which extend the period within which an action must be commenced do not apply to actions enforcing a right created by a statute which itself includes a time limitation on bringing such an action.
As I read the lien law and GCR 1963, 101, plaintiff’s lien would have continued in force during these proceedings and beyond the one-year statutory period if plaintiff had filed its complaint, acquired jurisdiction over defendants by service of process or otherwise and duly recorded its notice of lis pendens, all within the one-year period. As to this, I take it there is no disagreement with my Brother Smith. Where we do disagree, however, is in resolving the consequences of plaintiff’s failure to acquire juris*307diction over defendants until July 9, 1963, almost four months after the one-year period mentioned in the mechanic’s lien law had expired. I regard as impermissible, in the light of Holland v. Eaton, supra, and other authorities therein considered, Justice Smith’s reliance upon the general statute of limitations to extend the lien for an additional 90-day period within which time service upon defendants could be made.
Instead, plaintiff’s right to maintain its action, in my opinion, depends upon its acquiring jurisdiction over defendants within 60 days of recording its notice of lis pendens. Nothing in the record before us discloses whether or not plaintiff recorded a notice of lis pendens, but even if we assume that such notice was recorded on March 19, 1963, the last day for extending plaintiff’s lien beyond its first year’s existence, service upon defendants was not made until July 9, 1963, well beyond the 60 days provided by statute for conditionally recording notice of Us pen-dens before service of summons. Thus, in the view I take of the record before us and of the statutory and rule provisions above discussed, defendants’ affirmative defense should not have been dismissed either because plaintiff did not record notice of Us pendens on or before expiration of the one-year period, and, therefore, the lien was not thereafter continued, or because, having duly recorded a notice of Us pendens within such period, it became invalid, thus terminating the lien, upon plaintiff’s failure to serve process upon defendants within 60 days of recording the conditional notice of Us pendens.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Costs to defendants.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Dethmers and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.

 Specifically section 5856 of the revised judicature act, PA 1961, No 236 (CLS 1961, § 600.5856 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5856]).

 See CLS 1961, § 570.9 (Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 26.289).

 PA 1961, No 236, § 1901 (CLS 1961, § 600.1901 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27 A.1901]).