Court Opinion

ID: 9543057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:41:44.744732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:37.594527
License: Public Domain

UDALL, Justice
(specially concurring).
I concur in the conclusion reached in the majority opinion that the commission was not in error in refusing to apportion the disability and that hence the award should be affirmed. Inasmuch, however, as I have reached this end result for reasons somewhat different from those advanced in the majority opinion, I deem it advisable to set forth in some detail the logic, as well as the reported cases, impelling this conclusion on my part.
L. B. Hadley, the respondent employee, was severely injured on November 17, 1944, as the result of an accident unquestionably arising out of and in the course of his employment. He was then employed in war work by the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation at Tucson. The petitioner, Eagle Indemnity Company, is the insurance carrier. The respondent Industrial Commission of Arizona found that said personal injury caused a permanent disability for work with a loss of earning power of one hundred per cent, and it, therefore, on October 14, 1948, awarded compensation for permanent total disability in the sum of $143.96 per month (being sixty-five per cent of his average monthly wage of $221.48) for the period of his natural life. The petitioners (employer and insurance carrier), being dissatisfied with this award and its affirmance on rehearing, have* by certiorari, brought the matter before us for review.
Primarily petitioners challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the award and particularly urge that under the facts shown by the record the commission erred in not apportioning the disability.
Other counsel were permitted to file a brief as amicus curiae herein, in which they make a sweeping attack on the methods used by the commission in determining the amount of such an award and they also set out certain claimed abuses to which the compensation fund is being subjected by reason of the use by the commission in the processing of a claim of the so-called “loss of earnings award”. No appeal was taken from “loss of earnings award” in this case hence same became final. The appeal herein is from the final award only and therefore any question of illegality concerning the “loss of earnings award” is not now before the court. As a matter of fact most of the questions raised by amicus curia were answered in our recent opinion in the case of Matlock v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ariz. 25, 215 P.2d 612.
*188The injured employee, prior to this accident, had worked steadily for petitioner 'for more than two years as helper-general doing electrical work on airplanes. According to his uncontradicted testimony he had enjoyed extraordinarily good health prior to this injury and previously had never had any' accidental injuries or diseases which caused any disability for work. At the time of the accident he was of the age of 66 years and 10 months. It is admitted that while in the regular and usual course of his employment a deck of a plane upon which he was working gave way causing claimant to fall onto the concrete floor about seven to nine feet below. He was thereby rendered unconscious and according to the report of the attending physician, Dr. Meade Clyne, claimant suffered the following injuries: “ * * * cuts on back of head; cut three fingers, right hand, and index finger left hand; bruised back, neck and shoulders ; complains of numbness with a prickly pain in both forearms and hands; unable to move fingers; no grasp present. Spinal cord apparently compressed slightly. Dislocation and fracture 6th cervical vertebra. * * * ” This injury resulted in claimant being hospitalized for a period of 101 days.
The commission allowed the usual accident benefits provided for under Sec. 56-938, A.C.A.1939, and also authorized a hernia operation recommended by the physicians for a condition developing more than two years after the accident. By a series of temporary total and temporary-partial disability awards the commission compensated the claimant in the total sum-of $7,005 for the period from the date of" injury until the final permanent disability award was made. The commission expressly found that claimant’s condition became stationary on October 6, 1947. During the period of approximately four years, that the case was under consideration by the commission, claimant was treated or examined by a total of some sixteen doctors.
A Medical Advisory Board in April, 1946, concluded that the applicant had a. seventy-five per cent general functional' physical disability. Two subsequent reports from advisory boards (composed in part of the same medical personnel), after his condition had become stationary, reduced this functional physical disability to-fifty per cent. One half of this they attributed to his injury and the other half they claimed was “due to degenerative changes due to advancing years”. Specifically the record shows that, as of the date of the final award, the claimant had the following disabling ailments, viz.: (1)-limitation of motion in cervical spine, (2) stiffness and limitation of motion in right-shoulder, (3) impaired eyesight, (4) loss; of hearing, (5) arthritis in both hands, (6) frequent urination at night, (7) cramps-in feet and legs and poor circulation ini legs, (8) complaints in lower back, (9) dizzy spells, (10) gall bladder attacks, and (11) excessive night sweats. It was the *189view of the doctors that only items 1 and 2 supra were due to the after effects of the injury, and that all the other complaints were due to normal physiological degenerating processes not referable to the injury. However, the report by Drs. Hastings, Kosanke, and Clyne states that “it is possible that some degeneration in the general physical condition might have been accelerated by his injury”.
The petitioners do not seem to question that claimant suffers from all of these ailments. Rather it is their contention that the commission erred (1) in failing to consider all of the factors prescribed by law in determining the claimant’s loss of earning capacity resulting from the injury, and (2) in not apportioning the disability. In effect the petitioners maintain that the evidence shows his disability from all causes only justified the commission in making a permanent partial disability award rather than one for permanent total disability.
The commission by the award determined that claimant’s ability to earn was nil. Petitioners urge that in reaching this conclusion the only factor taken into consideration was the fact that Hadley had not received any earnings from employment during the year previous to the final award and that it failed to consider the probability that claimant was not only without incentive to seek employment, but would be inclined to avoid it, by reason of the fact that a total disability rating would provide him with greater economic security for his old age than he could possibly obtain through maximum effort during the few years of his residual earning capacity. If the record bore out the charge that only “loss of earnings” was. considered it would indeed be a serious-indictment as that is only one of several factors enumerated under Sec. 56-957, A.C.A.1939, subsection (d), that the commission must take into consideration in determining the ultimate question, to wit :• claimant’s loss of earning capacity resulting from the injury. Some of the more important factors that would have a probative bearing on the matter (in addition-to loss of earnings) are: age, occupation, nature of injury and percentage of functional physical disability resulting therefrom, previous disability, etc. See Hoffman v. Brophy, 61 Ariz. 307, 149 P.2d 160.
Aside from the apportionment angle-which will be discussed later, I do not believe that the record bears out the charge-that “loss of earnings” was the only factor considered by the commission in making its final award. It must be remembered that in the instant case it was dealing with an injured employee then over the-age of 71 years, with a fifty per cent functional physical disability, including impaired vision and hearing. Claimant’s testimony stands uncontradicted that he tried, exercise, with little benefit, endeavored to-work around the yard, that he tired easily, and his equilibrium was bad. The record, further shows that he. applied for work, but was unable to secure employment. *190These facts lend support to the commission’s findings that Hadley was in effect totally and permanently disabled and that ■despite claimant’s willingness to work he was unable to find and hold remunerative employment. The evaluation of all these matters presented questions of fact to be ■decided by the commission, and under our rule its determination should not be disturbed unless clearly without support in the ■evidence. After a complete review of the entire record it is my view that the reasonable inferences to be drawn from these facts sustain the commission’s conclusion that applicant was totally disabled for work.
Finally, as to the refusal of the commission to apportion the disability, the law is well settled in this jurisdiction that if a compensable physical injury aggravates a pre-existing physical disease or condition, the injured workman is entitled to compensation to the extent of the disability caused thereby in the same manner as though his ■condition had been produced originally and directly by the injury. For example see Hunter v. Wm. Peper Construction Co., 46 Ariz. 465, 52 P.2d 472, involving arthritis; Maxwell v. Hart, 45 Ariz. 198, 41 P.2d 1089, involving a rupture and back injury; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission, 38 Ariz. 307, 299 P. 1026, involving a heart ailment; Dauber v. City of Phoenix, 59 Ariz. 489, 130 P.2d 56, involving a rupture of stomach ulcer; Horn v. Industrial Commission, 68 Ariz. 323, 205 P.2d 1198, involving arthritis. In such cases the commission is not required to apportion the disability between the concurring causes. See Lee Moor Contracting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 61 Ariz. 52, 143 P.2d 888, and Aluminum Co. of America v. Industrial Commission, 61 Ariz. 520, 152 P.2d 297. The latter case is also authority for the proposition that where an injured workman was suffering from a disabling disease (palsy) which was unaffected by the injury there must be an apportionment. It is always true, however, that compensation is only to be granted when the disabling condition or disease results proximately from the disease. While in the instant case claimant undoubtedly had some physical impairment caused by the passage of time, yet the record shows that prior to the injury he enjoyed good health and was not suffering from any disease or “previous disability.” According to the Lee Moor Contracting Co. case, supra, this latter term “means an existing disability at the time of the injury — -something that affects his earning power.” [61 Ariz. 52, 143 P.2d 890] See also Gibson v. Industrial Commission, 68 Ariz. 313, 205 P.2d 588. Hence it becomes apparent to me that the claimant in the instant case had no “previous disability” as referred to in Sec. 56-957, subsection (d), supra. I submit that old age alone is not a disease but rather a condition. True there was present a condition of physical degeneration incident to. old age, though the effects *191thereof had not become manifest prior to the accident.
It is apparent from this record that but for the accident Hadley could have gone on working until something else happened. It is a well known fact that often following a serious accident dilapidation is rapid. Dr. Kosanke, speaking of Hadley, expressed this forcefully: “And from that date (date of accident) on there has been a marked deterioration in health, the only cause of which is the accident. Now, we can assume that a man from 65 to 68 will deteriorate, the normal wear and tear of old age. However, the rate that this man has deteriorated is far above the normal expectancy for the period of time at that age.”
The rule established by the decisions of this court is that while the employer is not an insurer he takes the employee subject to his condition when he enters the employment. See Dauber v. City of Phoenix, supra; Aluminum Co. of America v. Industrial Commission. I quote from 71 C.J., Workmen’s Compensation Acts, Sec. 358: “ * * * Every workman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities; his employer takes him as he finds him and assumes the risk of a diseased condition aggravated by injury. Compensation is not made to depend upon the condition of health of the employee, or upon his freedom from liability to injury through a constitutional weakness or latent tendency; compensation is awarded for an injury which is a hazard of the employment, and it is the hazard of the employment acting upon the particular employee in his condition of health and not what that hazard would be if acting upon a healthy employee or upon the average employee. * * * ”
In the excellent case of Masses v. Central Foundry Co., 131 N.J.L. 41, 34 A.2d 751, which comes to grips with the precise problem here presented, it is stated: “ * * * The old workman stands on an-equal footing with the young when an accident occurs, even though the result might have been less devastating but for age. (Citing cases.)” This case presents a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. Can the medical profession or the commission surmise, speculate or prognosticate as to the percentage of disability caused by degenerative changes due to-advancing years which are accelerated by the injury suffered? The commission found, upon competent proof, that the-claimant had been permanently incapacitated for work as a result of the accident and that this injury was the proximate cause of claimant’s entire disability. Under these circumstances I am of the opinion that neither the doctors nor the commission would, as a matter of law, be-justified in speculating as to what percentage of disability may have been due to age and usual disintegration or whether the result would have been less if the workman had been, before the accident,, a strong and vigorous man. Masses v. *192Central Foundry Co., supra. See also Duprey v. Maryland Casualty Co., 219 Mass. 189, 106 N.E. 686, and Congoleum Nairn v. Brown, 158 Md. 258, 148 A. 220, 67 A.L.R. 780. In an independent search of the authorities these three cases to my mind stand out as being very persuasive and most nearly in point.