Court Opinion

ID: 9543962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:50:56.528499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:35.706649
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
Surely Chester McDonough must feel as though he has just won the lottery. Just as surely, Cory Whitney is wishing he had sent his entry in on time.
McDonough and Whitney were involved in a minor traffic accident resulting in injuries to McDonough and damage to his automobile. Whitney’s insurer paid McDonough promptly for his property damage and a great portion of his medical expenses.
Through a series of snafus,1 Whitney failed to respond and suffered entry of a default. Thereafter, McDonough applied for a default judgment, primarily in reliance upon his own affidavit and the unsworn statement of an “economist.” Based upon the “economist’s” statement, and little else, McDonough struck it rich at the judgment hearing. That hearing was notable for the absence of medical testimony; tax record production; evidence of income; competent or admissible evidence of damages;2 or sworn testimony of any ilk.
Judgment was entered in the amount of $362,727.13 — more than sixty fold actual damages claimed by McDonough. Perhaps the damages awarded are fair recompense— we cannot know from the materials relied upon by the district court and contained in the record on appeal.
No apologia by Whitney can gainsay the neglect which precipitated this judgment. One must, however, disregard apparent symmetry to ask if Whitney’s neglect was so egregious as to countenance the majority’s disregard of McDonough’s failure to prove his damages. Damages should make Mc-Donough whole for his injuries; avoiding the temptation to punish Whitney for his neglect.
The majority acknowledges that unliqui-dated damages may only be awarded when supported by affidavit or sworn testimony. Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339, 347 (Wyo.1986). Judicially glossed over is the proposition that without such evidence, entry of a default judgment on damages constitutes an abuse of discretion. Halberstam v. Cokeley, 872 P.2d 109, 113 (Wyo.1994) (citing Midway Oil Corp., 714 P.2d at 345).
We have authority to remand for rehearing on damages only. Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056, 1065 (Wyo.1986); cf. Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire, 562 P.2d 287, 291 (Wyo.1977). The sticking point is the misconception that requiring a proper hearing on damages necessarily bootstraps an opportunity to appear therein for Whitney. W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides that relief may be obtained from a judgment “upon such terms as are just * ⅜ *_» justice) ⅛ this case, hinges upon a proper showing of damages by the non-defaulting party rather than necessarily afford*796ing the defaulting party with an unmerited opportunity to appear.
The opening of a default judgment should go no further than placing the parties in that position they occupied on the day the judgment was entered. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C.Cir.1966). The object of imposing “such terms as are just” should be to see that the non-defaulting party is not prejudiced by the requirement that his proof of damages comport with the law. Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3rd Cir.1984).
By allowing this damage award without putting McDonough to his proof, we sacrifice compensation for actual damages on the altar of punitive damages, plain and simple. The better course would be to vacate the default judgment as to damages, remanding to the district court. That court may then impose such conditions (including standing to appear vel non) as will mitigate prejudice to Mc-Donough and place the parties in the position they occupied the day the vacated judgment was entered. Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir.1974).

. Born of World War II, an acronym for situation normal, all fouled up.

. As with testimony not given under oath, we are disinclined to attribute evidentiary weight to un-sworn written statements. Matter of EB, 795 P.2d 1212, 1215 n. 3 (Wyo.1990).