Court Opinion

ID: 9956256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 17:04:01.180945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:07.005395
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
                                Docket No. 50026

STATE OF IDAHO                      )
                                    )
   Plaintiff-Respondent,            )
                                    )                   Boise, December 2023 Term
v.                                  )
                                    )                   Opinion Filed: February 29, 2024
DEVELIN LYNN JOHNSON,               )
                                    )                   Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
   Defendant-Appellant.             )
____________________________________)

       Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
       Twin Falls County. Roger B. Harris, District Judge. Thomas Kershaw, Magistrate
       Judge.

       The district court’s decision is affirmed.

       Erik R. Lehtinen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender, attorney for Appellant.
       Andrea Reynolds argued.

       Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Respondent.
       Kenneth Jorgensen argued.
                          _________________________________

BEVAN, Chief Justice.
       Develin Johnson appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision affirming
his convictions for domestic battery and false imprisonment. On intermediate appeal to the district
court, Johnson argued that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor
to cross-examine him about a 2013 misdemeanor conviction for petit theft. While the district court
initially vacated Johnson’s judgment of conviction, the court later granted a petition for rehearing
from the State, and ultimately affirmed Johnson’s conviction. On appeal to this Court, Johnson
argues that the district court erred in affirming his judgment of conviction because his
misdemeanor conviction for theft was inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) and the
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. For
the reasons below, we affirm.

                                                    1
                                 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        Johnson was charged with domestic battery and false imprisonment following a fight with
his girlfriend, K.C. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and K.C. was the first witness for the State.
During her testimony, K.C. acknowledged she was in a romantic relationship with Johnson and
living with him. Following a verbal argument at their home that escalated throughout the day, K.C.
testified she tried to remove herself from the argument and leave the bedroom, but Johnson
physically prevented her from doing so. Johnson then grabbed K.C., pinning her to the bed, which
caused bruising and redness to K.C.’s arms. After K.C. testified, the State presented testimony
from Officer Comeau, who testified to witnessing the bruises on K.C. Comeau interviewed
Johnson, and Johnson admitted he grabbed “on to [K.C.’s] arms and put her down onto the bed”
after K.C. slapped him.
        After the State rested, outside the presence of the jury, the magistrate court asked if Johnson
intended to testify on his own behalf. Johnson said he would testify. The State said it had “some
[I.R.E.] 608 impeachment evidence about a prior incident from a few years ago where the
defendant was using a credit card without permission and admitted it to police.” Counsel for
Johnson said he would object if the State attempted to introduce Johnson’s prior conviction. The
State argued that “a theft case . . . squarely falls within credibility and squarely is impeachment
evidence.” In response to the magistrate, the State conceded it would not talk about Johnson’s
conviction “unless, you know, the defendant denies it in some way.”
        Ultimately, the magistrate court concluded Johnson’s conduct during that crime “would be
relevant to his character for truthfulness”; thus, admissibility was “just a 403 question.” According
to the magistrate, “whether it’s unfairly prejudicial, that is, if the prejudice outweighs its probative
value, substantially outweighs, then it would still be inadmissible under Rule 403.” The court
elaborated, “it’s a close case, only because it’s so old,” but “[i]n this situation I don’t think it does
substantially outweigh,” and so “I will allow that question to be asked.”
        Johnson took the stand to testify in his own defense, describing his version of events during
the argument with K.C. On cross-examination, Johnson testified that he was “telling the truth” and
was “a very honest man.” During cross-examination, the following exchange took place between
the State and Johnson:
        [The State]: All right. And I’m assuming you’re telling the truth today?
        [Johnson]: Yes, sir, I am telling the truth.

                                                   2
       [The State]: Because you’re an honest man; fair to say?
       [Johnson]: I’m a very honest man, sir.
       [The State]: Okay. And telling the truth to Officer Cameau at the time about what
       happened because you’re an honest man; is that right?
       [Johnson]: Yes.
       [The State]: And isn’t it also true that in 2013 you had a case where you were
       investigated for using somebody’s debit card multiple occasions to withdraw
       money?
       [Johnson]: Yes.
       [The State]: And you did that without their permission?
       [Johnson]: Yes.
       [The State]: Withdrew about $450 over the course of about three days; is that right?
       [Johnson]: Exactly $450, yes, sir.
       [The State]: So you remember that very well?
       [Johnson]: Yes, sir, I do. Would you like to know the cause or why I did it?
       [The State]: Well, I know what you told the police. You said that there was an ex-
       girlfriend or someone that had kids that you wanted to pay for.
       [Johnson]: No, it was my son allegedly. I thought that I was going to be a dad. I had
       just gotten back from basic training, and I didn’t have a job or anything. I was going
       through a tough time.
       [The State]: But you’re an honest man?
       [Johnson]: I have pride and I didn’t think that telling someone’s parents of a new
       girlfriend that you just had that you might be having a kid was a great idea. Once
       again, that was also eight years ago and I was very young.
       [The State]: And that’s when you took the debit card and used it seven times to
       withdraw 450 bucks?
       [Johnson]: Yes, and then I sent that money to my ex for our son after he was born.
       After both sides rested, the State argued in closing that “the defendant’s character for
honesty is really important in this case.” Counsel for Johnson countered during his closing
arguments that “[t]he real question in front of [the jury] is one of credibility.” The jury returned
guilty verdicts on both counts. The magistrate court sentenced Johnson to 180 days in jail for
domestic battery, with 178 days suspended, and credit for two days served. For false imprisonment,
Johnson was sentenced to 365 days in jail, with 360 days suspended and credit for two days served.
Johnson was placed on probation for 24 months.

                                                 3
       Johnson appealed his judgment of conviction to the district court, arguing that the
magistrate court erred when it allowed the State to cross-examine him about his 2013 conviction.
The district court initially reversed Johnson’s conviction, concluding:
       In other words, if the State wants to attempt to attack a witness’ character for
       truthfulness, it can do so by bringing up evidence of past felony convictions, subject
       to the limitations and balancing tests required by I.R.E. Rule 609(a), or it may
       attempt to offer evidence about the witness’ reputation for truthfulness/
       untruthfulness in the form of opinion testimony as allowed by I.R.E. Rule 608(a).
       Disregarding the notice requirements of I.R.E. Rule 404(b) which should have been
       filed in advance of trial if the State intended to inquire about specific instances of
       past criminal conduct (which notice was not given), the State may not discuss a
       witness’ prior instances of specific conduct in an effort to attack that witness’
       character for truthfulness, except by referencing the existence of prior felony
       convictions as allowed by I.R.E. Rule 609(a).
       After the district court’s decision, the State petitioned for rehearing, relying, in part, on
State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 316 P.3d 117 (Ct. App. 2013). In its amended petition for
rehearing, the State emphasized that the prosecutor never referred to Johnson’s petit theft as a
“conviction” before the jury. The district court ultimately agreed because, “although the
connotation that Mr. Johnson might have been involved in a criminal case is present, the word
‘conviction’ [was] never used[.]” From this, the district court “agree[d] with the [m]agistrate’s
conclusion that theft is typically the type of conduct that is associated with dishonesty, and that
the line of questioning was therefore appropriate.” Johnson timely appeals.
                                   II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
       When this Court reviews the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity,
       [t]he Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine
       whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s
       findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those
       findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom
       and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm the district
       court’s decision as a matter of procedure.
Houston v. Houston, 172 Idaho 264, 531 P.3d 1161, 1165 (2023) (quoting Nelson v. Evans, 166
Idaho 815, 819, 464 P.3d 301, 305 (2020)). “Importantly, ‘this Court does not review the decision
of the magistrate court[,]...[r]ather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions
of the district court.’” Id. (quoting Matter of Est. of Hirning, 167 Idaho 669, 675, 475 P.3d 1191,
1197 (2020)).

                                                 4
       Separately, “whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision to admit
relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ogden, 171 Idaho 258, 519 P.3d
1198, 1206 (2022) (quoting State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 781, 419 P.3d 1042, 1079 (2018)). When
this Court reviews a lower court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, it must analyze “whether
the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v.
Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591, 448 P.3d 1005, 1019 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
                                           III. ANALYSIS
A.     The district court did not err in finding that the magistrate court acted within its
       discretion in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine Johnson about conduct leading
       to a 2013 misdemeanor conviction.
       This appeal presents two closely related questions: the first is whether the district court
erred in affirming the magistrate court’s decision to permit the State to cross-examine Johnson
about conduct leading to his 2013 misdemeanor conviction. The second is whether, even if
admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608, the prejudicial effect of allowing the State to inquire
into Johnson’s conduct in 2013 substantially outweighed the probative value of that evidence to
judge Johnson’s credibility. As we will discuss below, the answer to both questions is no.
       1. Whether Johnson’s petit theft conviction should have been excluded under Idaho Rule
          of Evidence 608.
       This issue turns on whether the underlying conduct from a conviction for misdemeanor
petit theft is probative of a witness’s truthfulness. The magistrate court determined it was, and the
district court later affirmed that decision. Johnson argues that the conduct leading to his 2013 petit
theft conviction was inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) because the conduct did
not impeach Johnson’s character for truthfulness. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the
district court’s decision. Even though the State may not inquire into a misdemeanor theft
conviction under Rule 608(b), the behavior leading to that conviction—i.e., the fraudulent use of
a financial transaction card—is probative of a witness’s character.
       “It is well understood that all ‘relevant evidence is admissible, unless otherwise provided
by the Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules for the courts of Idaho.’” State v. Hayes, 166 Idaho
646, 654, 462 P.3d 1110, 1118 (2020) (quoting State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 926, 354 P.3d 462,

                                                  5
488 (2015)). “The burden is on the opponent of the evidence to establish that relevant evidence is
otherwise inadmissible.” Id. (quoting Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 617–18,
726 P.2d 706, 729–30 (1986) (Bakes, J., dissenting)). Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b):
       Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not
       admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or
       support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-
       examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character
       for truthfulness or untruthfulness of … the witness.
       On intermediate appeal, the district court first reversed the magistrate court’s decision, on
the ground that Idaho Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 do not allow the admission of prior
misdemeanor convictions:
       In sum, when read together, [Rules] 608 and 609 convince this [c]ourt that using
       proof of prior convictions to attack a witness’ character for truthfulness is not
       allowed unless the prior conviction is for a felony and that prior felony conviction
       is of the type that is relevant to truthfulness. Even if the prior felony conviction is
       of the type involving truthfulness, the court must still perform a balancing test to
       determine whether the probative value of allowing evidence of the past felony
       conviction to be admitted outweighs the prejudicial effect doing so will have on the
       party offering the witness.
Shortly after the district court entered this decision, however, the State petitioned for rehearing. In
its brief, the State argued that the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho
705, 316 P.3d 117 (Ct. App. 2013), held that the facts of a misdemeanor relating to honesty are
admissible under Rule 608(b), without deciding whether the conviction itself was proper for
impeachment. Bergerud applied to the cross-examination of Johnson, according to the State,
because no evidence of a conviction or criminal case was ever presented to the jury.
       Following oral arguments from the State and Johnson, the district court reversed its earlier
decision and agreed with the State:
       [T]his [c]ourt acknowledges and notes that although the connotation that Mr.
       Johnson might have been involved in a criminal case is present, the word
       “conviction” is never used. As such, this [c]ourt must acknowledge that when this
       appellate issue was originally put before this [c]ourt in May of 2022, this [c]ourt
       incorrectly read the above quoted colloquy and interpreted the questions to imply
       that Johnson was being questioned about a prior misdemeanor conviction, and
       therefore focused much of its original June 2022 [m]emorandum [d]ecision analysis
       on that premise and I.R.E. 609.
               After now re-reviewing the record and evidence before it, this [c]ourt must
       find that its original understanding of the questions and connotation contained
       therein cannot stand. It is clear that the State never referenced a “conviction” as it
                                                  6
       attempted to impeach Johnson’s credibility, and that it only questioned Mr. Johnson
       about the specific instances of the 2013 case during cross-examination which
       appears to be allowed under I.R.E. 608(b) and the Bergerud holding.
               ....
       . . . [B]ecause the State did not utilize the word “conviction” nor did it attempt to
       present extrinsic evidence of a past misdemeanor conviction while attempting to
       impeach Mr. Johnson’s character for truthfulness, the [c]ourt finds that the
       Bergerud case and I.R.E. 608(b) allowed the State to question Mr. Johnson about
       the specific instances of conduct surrounding his 2013 petit theft case. This [c]ourt
       agrees with the [m]agistrate’s conclusion that theft is typically the type of conduct
       that is associated with dishonesty, and that the line of questioning was therefore
       appropriate.
       On appeal to this Court, Johnson advocates that Rule 608 is strictly limited to prior
instances where the witness lied, perjured himself, or acted dishonestly. Johnson directs this Court
to State v. Hayes, 166 Idaho 646, 650, 316 P.3d 1110, 1114 (2020), in support of his argument. In
that case, Hayes (an inmate) was charged with two counts of felony battery on a correctional
officer. Id. at 649, 462 P.3d at 1113. At trial, Hayes testified on his own behalf. Id. at 650, 316
P.3d at 1114. During cross-examination, the State asked Hayes about his conduct toward
correctional officers and other inmates at the prison. Id. After Hayes testified that he was “always
respectful” to correctional staff and inmates, the State requested, outside the presence of the jury,
to question Hayes about his prior conduct. Id. The State wanted to question Hayes about ten prior
instances where he threatened or orally abused other inmates and correctional staff. Id. The district
court permitted the questions, concluding the testimony was relevant to Hayes’ character and
truthfulness under Rule 608(b). Id.
       On appeal, this Court disagreed with the district court, concluding that, although Hayes’
prior conduct was relevant, it was not admissible under Rule 608 because none of the prior
instances the State asked about related to a situation that reflected on Hayes’ character for
truthfulness. Id. at 656, 462 P.3d at 1120. In reaching that decision, this Court examined Idaho’s
rule against its federal counterpart: “After examining this Court’s precedent and interpretations of
the federal rules, . . . I.R.E. 608(b) applies to prior instances of conduct that bear on a witness’s
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. These situations are limited to prior instances where
the witness lied, committed fraud, or otherwise acted untruthfully.” Id. Even so, the Court held
that Hayes’ prior instances of conduct were still admissible as direct impeachment evidence under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 607.

                                                 7
       Hayes is of little help to Johnson here. Hayes’ conduct involved threats and abusive
language, which this Court clarified were not probative of a witness’s character for truthfulness.
Johnson’s conduct, on the other hand, involved fraudulently using another person’s debit card
seven times without permission. Johnson held himself out as the owner of someone else’s debit
card. Such behavior reflects on Johnson’s character for truthfulness, unlike Hayes’ threats and
verbal abuse, which reflected on his history of violence. This Court was clear in Hayes that Rule
608(b) applies to situations in which the witness acted untruthfully. Johnson’s conduct reflects
such a situation.
       We find State v. Bergerud, which the State and the district court both relied on below, more
persuasive here. Daniel and Kathleen Bergerud were convicted on several drug-related charges.
155 Idaho at 707, 316 P.3d at 119. The State called Robert Jones during its rebuttal; Jones had
stayed at the Bergeruds’ home. Id. at 709, 316 P.3d at 121. Jones had pleaded guilty to a
misdemeanor charge of providing false information to a police officer in an unrelated case. Id. On
cross-examination, defense counsel wanted to ask Jones whether he had ever lied to the police. Id.
If he denied lying to police, defense counsel wanted to impeach Jones with his prior conviction.
Id. The State objected to the defense’s proposed questions, arguing the cross-examination was
prohibited under Rules 608 and 609. Id. The district court agreed and excluded questions from the
defense about Jones’ prior conviction because the crime was not a felony and lying to police was
not probative of Jones’ credibility. Id.
       The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that “[e]ven with
evidence of the misdemeanor conviction itself barred, nothing in either Rule 608(b) or Rule 609
precludes evidence of untruthful conduct merely because the conduct resulted in a conviction.” Id.
at 711, 316 P.3d at 123. If it did, the Court of Appeals explained, a witness could be cross-
examined about prior conduct only if the charge was dismissed but would otherwise be prohibited
from inquiring into conduct that resulted in a conviction. Id.
       We also look to State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 275 P.3d 12 (Ct. App. 2012), which both
parties have cited in this appeal. There, Grist argued that the district court abused its discretion by
not allowing him to impeach a witness with a prior felony theft conviction. Id. at 789, 275 P.3d at
15. During Grist’s trial, a witness testified to observing Grist inappropriately touch his sister. Id.
at 790, 275 P.3d at 16. On cross-examination, Grist wanted to inquire into the witness’s earlier
theft conviction, which he argued was important because the witness was the only person other
                                                  8
than the victim who testified to observing Grist engage in inappropriate physical conduct. Id. The
State maintained that the conviction had no relevance to the witness’s credibility, and the
prejudicial nature of the question outweighed its probative value. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed
with the district court’s conclusion that the witness’s second-degree theft charge had little relation
to the witness’s character for truthfulness. Id. According to the Court of Appeals, “theft is a crime
like robbery and burglary and, therefore, is less relevant to credibility because it does not deal
directly with veracity and has only a general relationship with honesty.” Id. The Court of Appeals
explained that “Grist offered no evidence that the statute under which the witness was convicted
included an element of fraud or deceit.” Id
       We conclude that both Grist and Bergerud support the district court’s conclusion that
Johnson’s underlying conduct was probative to his character for truthfulness. In Grist, the Court
of Appeals held that a theft charge was “somewhat less relevant to credibility” than crimes like
perjury “because [theft crimes] do not deal directly with veracity and have only a general
relationship with honesty.” 152 Idaho at 789, 275 P.3d at 15. That said, perjury is not the only
crime about which a witness may face cross-examination under I.R.E. 608. The Grist court’s
statement that theft-related acts, especially when they involve dishonesty, are relevant to veracity
and honesty, even if less relevant than crimes involving actual false statements, is sound and
supports the conclusion we reach today.
       In addition, Bergerud clarified the distinction between a misdemeanor conviction and the
conduct that results in that conviction. Relying on this case, the district court noted that it was
“clear that the State never referenced a ‘conviction’ as it attempted to impeach Johnson’s
credibility, and that it only questioned Mr. Johnson about the specific instances of the 2013 case
during cross-examination which appears to be allowed under I.R.E. 608(b) and the Bergerud
holding.”
       To that end, the only party that referenced Johnson’s theft “charge” in front of the jury was
Johnson’s attorney, who questioned him about the charge and decision to plead guilty on redirect:
       [Defense Counsel]: The theft charge, do you remember what year that was?
       [Johnson]: 2013.
       ...
       [Defense Counsel]: Okay. Do you remember how that case was resolved? Did you
       plead guilty?

                                                  9
       [Johnson]: I ple[d] guilty, yes.
       [Defense Counsel]: You ple[d] guilty. Do you accept responsibility for an act you
       did when you were 19?
       [Johnson]: Yes, of course, I do. I was a young, dumb child.
       As the district court noted in its amended memorandum decision, the State never mentioned
Johnson’s conviction, charge, or guilty plea. During oral arguments here, Johnson correctly noted
one reference the State made, in which the prosecutor acknowledged Johnson “had a case.” This
statement was made without objection and occurred after the magistrate court conducted its Rule
608 and 403 analyses. We will not fault the court for allowing unobjected-to evidence that was not
before it at the time it rendered its ruling in limine. With no reference to Johnson’s conviction from
the State, our focus is on whether Johnson’s conduct surrounding the theft may be properly
inquired into on cross-examination. We conclude that it can.
       Idaho Rule of Evidence 608 permits inquiry into conduct that is probative for truthfulness.
I.R.E. 608. While this Court has not explicitly held that theft may be the type of conduct that bears
on one’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, we do so now. In Hayes, we acknowledged
that Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) applies to conduct that bears on a witness’s character for
truthfulness, which includes situations where the witness “acted untruthfully.” Hayes, 166 Idaho
at 656, 462 P.3d at 1120. We reemphasize that conclusion in this opinion.
       In some cases, such as in this case, acts leading to a theft conviction may encompass lying,
deception, dishonesty, or fraud. In other cases, they may not. While theft can occur without directly
making a false or dishonest statement, in cases like this one, deception, dishonesty, and fraudulent
conduct are at the heart of the criminal conduct at issue. Whether such evidence is probative on
one’s character for truthfulness will have to be assessed by trial judges case-by-case. Although
Johnson ultimately pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor petit theft charge, the acts he committed, as
noted by the prosecutor in cross-examination, involved repeatedly using another person’s debit
card implicitly representing himself as that person, and obtaining funds fraudulently as a result.
This conduct is probative of Johnson’s character for truthfulness and was relevant under Rule 608.
As a result, the district court did not err in concluding the magistrate court did not err in making
this relevancy determination.

                                                 10
       2. Whether Johnson’s petit theft conviction should have been excluded under Idaho Rule
          of Evidence 403.
       Johnson argues that the district court erred in failing to address Idaho Rule of Evidence
403 when it issued its decision reversing itself on the Rule 608 issue. Had the district court
analyzed the second question presented to it under Rule 403, Johnson maintains it would have
upheld its initial decision reversing the magistrate court one those grounds. While the State
concedes that the district court did not conduct a Rule 403 balancing test in its second opinion, it
points out that the district court did address the Rule 403 issue in its initial opinion and maintains
that the error by the district court was harmless.
       We review the district court’s opinion with due regard, but independently. We are tasked
to review the magistrate court’s exercise of discretion on the Rule 403 question. In addition, we
independently review the magistrate court’s exercise of discretion to see whether its decision-
making process tracks the four-prong test set forth above. See State v. Ochoa, 169 Idaho 903, 912,
505 P.3d 689, 698 (2022) (“to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion, we
independently review the record of the proceeding before the magistrate court.”). Requiring us to
remand this question to the district court for a do-over is unnecessary since we can make this
determination now, with the entire record that is before us—the same record that would be before
the district court on remand. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. State, 171 Idaho 634, 524 P.3d 913, 924 (2023)
(declining to remand when doing so would not change the outcome); Idaho v. Mummert, 98 Idaho
452, 455, 566 P.2d 1110, 1113 (1977) (same). Since the record of the magistrate court’s decision-
making process is sufficient, we can make this decision under our standard of review.
       Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, a court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” This rule requires the court to balance the probative value of the evidence
against the danger that the evidence may be unfairly prejudicial. See I.R.E. 403. “Unfair prejudice”
is prejudice that “tends to suggest a decision on an improper basis.” State v. Diaz, 170 Idaho 79,
91, 507 P.3d 1109, 1121 (2022) (quoting State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179
(1998)).
       For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the magistrate court did not abuse its
discretion when it conducted its Rule 403 analysis., Specifically, when we review its analysis, we

                                                 11
conclude that the record demonstrates the magistrate court exercised reason in ruling that the
evidence was admissible.
       During Johnson’s trial, the magistrate court conducted a colloquy with the State and
Johnson to perform its obligation under Rule 403: to weigh the probative value of Johnson’s earlier
theft conduct against the prejudicial effect of allowing the inquiry.
       [THE COURT]: I think the question would be just a 403 question.
       Given that it’s eight years ago and it’s petit theft for whatever the facts are, is it
       more prejudicial than probative as to its credibility? Is that what you’re saying?
       [JOHNSON’S COUNSEL]: I think that is a perfectly fair analysis, yes, Your
       Honor.
       [THE COURT]: So what’s your response to that issue, Mr. [prosecutor]?
       [PROSECUTOR]: Well, I’ll point out the question is not just prejudice because
       obviously it does prejudice the jury as to his truthfulness to talk about these issues.
       The question is if it’s prejudicial in an unfair way.
       [THE COURT]: Yeah, if it outweighs –
       [PROSECUTOR]: If it substantially outweighs the probative value. His credibility
       is directly at issue if he testifies in the case. So I would say his credibility absolutely
       is an important issue in the case where we have two people saying two different
       things.
       The prejudicial part of it, if this were a theft case, then I think there might be a
       problem with prior bad acts and unfair prejudice because then I think we could say,
       well, this is repeated conduct. That’s what the rules try to get away from is to say
       we don't want to have the jury think, well, he did it before, he’s doing it again.
       But because these charges are totally unrelated, I . . . think that prejudicial analysis
       just doesn’t apply because this is not a case about theft. It’s not a case about any of
       those issues.
       ...
       [THE COURT]: Well, I mean, it’s some concern to me that it's so long ago.
       Sometimes that's an issue.
       [JOHNSON’S COUNSEL]: That is one point.
       ...
       [THE COURT]: Okay. Well, I certainly think it’s probative of his character for
       truthfulness so it would be generally admissible under Rule 608(b).
       So then the question becomes whether it’s so unfairly prejudicial, that is, if the
       prejudice outweighs its probative value, substantially outweighs, then it would still
       be inadmissible under Rule 403.

                                                   12
       I think it’s a close case, only because it’s so old. We’re talking eight years ago,
       roughly, and I think that’s an issue because people’s nature sometimes changes over
       time.
       In this situation I don’t think it does substantially outweigh, and, by the way, I don’t
       know how this is all going to come out in front of the jury. He may have
       explanations that will be, you know, that nobody anticipates, but I will allow that.
       I will allow that question to be asked.
       From Johnson’s perspective, the evidence had no probative value, and the danger of unfair
prejudice was extremely high. But as discussed above, theft involving deceit or fraud can be
probative of a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The nature of Johnson’s theft,
using another’s debit card to secure cash, is especially so. That misconduct is defined by our
legislature as a fraudulent act. See I.C. § 18-3124(4)(c). And it is the nature of the wrongful
conduct, not the moniker of the ultimate conviction (here petit theft) that drives the determination
of whether the evidence is “probative of the [witness’s] character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness.” I.R.E. 608(b). The acts constituting Johnson’s conduct are probative of his
character for truthfulness.
       Weighed against the probative value of such evidence is the potential unfair prejudice of
this evidence toward Johnson. Importantly, mere “prejudice” is not the benchmark; the benchmark
is whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial so that a jury could make its decision on an unfair
inference from the evidence. See State v. Rambo, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 540 P.3d 974, 983 (2023)
(quoting State v. Diaz, 170 Idaho 79, 91, 507 P.3d 1109, 1121 (2022)).
       We disagree with Johnson’s assertion that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. It is
important to remember that in this case Johnson was charged with a crime of violence. The
character evidence derived from Johnson’s 2013 theft conviction did not improperly invite the jury
to infer that Johnson was violent. This is not a “because he did it before, he did it here” type of
case; instead, this case centered on credibility, and the evidence surrounding Johnson’s conduct in
2013, while certainly prejudicial, is not unfairly so, as the magistrate court recognized.
       We conclude that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion. The magistrate court
exercised reason in concluding that the probative value of the evidence in relation to the battery
charges was greater than the danger that the jury would infer Johnson was a violent person.
Whether Johnson had a character for untruthfulness is precisely why this evidence is admissible;
such an inference does not make this kind of evidence inadmissible. As a result, the district court
correctly affirmed Johnson’s conviction on appeal.
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                                 IV. CONCLUSION
The district court’s decision is affirmed.

JUSTICES BRODY, MOELLER, ZAHN, and JUDGE MILLER, CONCUR.

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