Court Opinion

ID: 9943055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:02:06.957364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:00.170049
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11395    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11395
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       CHAD WILLIAMSON,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00041-LAG-TQL-1
                           ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11395

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Chad Williamson appeals his sentence of 240 months’ im-
       prisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release, for
       one count of attempt to possess methamphetamine with intent to
       distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii) and
       846, which was below the sentencing guidelines range. On appeal,
       Williamson argues that the district court abused its discretion in
       weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, as it failed to properly ac-
       count for his relatively brief prior terms of imprisonment, the need
       to avoid an unwarranted sentencing disparity, and the Sentencing
       Guidelines’ ten-to-one treatment disparity between methampheta-
       mine (actual) and methamphetamine mixtures, resulting in a sub-
       stantively unreasonable sentence. For the following reasons, we
       affirm.
                                         I.
               When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we con-
       sider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential abuse-of-
       discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The
       party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that
       it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the § 3553(a)
       factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
              The district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to
       afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant
       weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant
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       23-11395                Opinion of the Court                           3

       factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
       proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
       2010) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174
       (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). The proper factors are set out
       in § 3553(a) and include the nature and circumstances of the of-
       fense, the personal history and characteristics of the defendant, the
       seriousness of the crime, the promotion of respect for the law, just
       punishment, adequate deterrence, and the need to avoid unwar-
       ranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants.
       § 3553(a).
               The district court is not required to state on the record that
       it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss
       each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d
       1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). It is enough that the record reflects the
       district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. United States
       v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 609 (11th Cir. 2020). Addition-
       ally, a failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate that
       the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evi-
       dence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).
       The decision about how much weight to assign to a particular fac-
       tor is within the district court’s discretion, and it is given discretion
       to attach great weight to one factor over another. United States v.
       Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). We will vacate
       a sentence only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction
       that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
       weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
       outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11395

       the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515
       F.3d 1159, 191 (11th Cir. 2008)). An indicator of a reasonable sen-
       tence is one that is well below the statutory maximum for the
       crime. United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir.
       2014).
                 When considering a claim of disparity, we first consider
       “whether the defendant is similarity situated to the defendants to
       whom he compares himself.” United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d
       1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015). “A well-founded claim of dispar-
       ity . . . assumes that apples are being compared to apples.” United
       States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
       United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (1st Cir. 2005)).
       The defendant has the burden of showing specific facts that estab-
       lish the similar situation. United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048
       (11th Cir. 2015). Courts “need[] to have more than the crime of
       conviction and the total length of the sentences to evaluate alleged
       disparities. The underlying facts of the crime and all of the individ-
       ual characteristics are relevant.” Id.
              Under the 2021 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ drug conversion
       table, one gram of methamphetamine is equal to a converted drug
       weight of two kilograms. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.8(D). One gram
       of methamphetamine (actual) is equal to a converted drug weight
       of 20 kilograms. Id.
              In Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), the Supreme
       Court upheld a district court’s decision to vary downward from the
       guideline range, holding that a district court could conclude that
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       23-11395               Opinion of the Court                         5

       the Sentencing Guidelines’ 100-to-1 treatment disparity between
       crack cocaine and powder cocaine at the time yielded a sentence
       greater than necessary, supporting a downward variance. Id. 109
       (2007).
             A conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A) carries a statutory mini-
       mum term of imprisonment of ten years and a statutory maximum
       term of imprisonment of life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
               Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
       varied downward and imposed a sentence of 240 months’ incarcer-
       ation, which was below the guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’
       incarceration that the district court calculated based on a total of-
       fense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI. First, the
       district court indicated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors
       and identified three factors which it weighed particularly heavily in
       reaching Williamson’s sentence, namely the nature and circum-
       stances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defend-
       ant, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, thus
       satisfying its burden to demonstrate that it considered the sentenc-
       ing factors. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 609.
              Next turning to Williamson’s arguments on appeal, Wil-
       liamson first failed to provide sufficient information to support a
       disparity claim. Indeed, his argument relies on a broad dataset of
       sentences for methamphetamine traffickers, but this dataset is de-
       void of any detail concerning the individual cases involved or the
       specific characteristics thereof. See Azmat, 805 F.3d at 1048.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                    23-11395

              Additionally, Williamson’s arguments that the district court
       abused its discretion in failing to give proper weight to his relatively
       brief prior sentences and the treatment disparity between metham-
       phetamine (actual) and methamphetamine mixtures are without
       merit, as the district court has broad discretion in the weight it as-
       signs to any factor and can choose to attach greater or lesser weight
       to one factor over another. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. In
       this case, the district court’s focus on the factors it identified and its
       downward variance to 240 months’ incarceration was supported
       by the significant quantity of methamphetamine involved and the
       specific health concerns identified by Williamson.
              Given this, Williamson’s sentence is not clearly “outside the
       range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts,” particularly as
       the sentence was well below the statutory maximum of life. See
       Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190; Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1364; § 841(b)(1)(A).
       Accordingly, we affirm his sentence.
              AFFIRMED.