Court Opinion

ID: 9810501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:51:55.104642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:58.625447
License: Public Domain

Merrimon, C. J.
(dissenting): I concur in the judgment but not in the opinion of the Court, and will state some of the grounds of m3- dissent.
The Constitution (Art. 8, § 4) provides, that “ it shall be the duty of the Legislature to provide for the organization of cities, towns and incorporated villages, and to restrict their powers of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, so as to prevent abuses in assessments and in contracting debts by such municipal corporations.” This highly mandatory provision is significant and very important. Its leading purpose is to specially require the Legislature to provide for the organization of cities and towns and to restrict, restrain, keep within prescribed limits the great powers of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, conferred upon them, and thus prevent oppressive taxation, burdensome city debts, arbitrary assessments, wild schemes of extravagance and other like abuses. The purpose expressly declared is, “ to prevent abuses in assessments and in contracting debts,” by cities and towns. Long continued public experience in every direction pointed, and still points, to the great necessity for this organic provision, its wisdom and the importance of a strict observance of it. The legislative duty is expressed in clear, explicit and imperative terms. Cities and *49towns must not be left to exercise unrestricted and arbitrary-power of taxation and assessment. On the contrary, such powers must be restricted and defined by statutory authority, else they cannot be exercised at all. The Legislature has no authority to confer upon cities and towns unlimited power to impose taxes or to make assessments. The statute purporting to confer such power would be inoperative and void, because in contravention of the letter and purpose of the Constitution. The power of assessment, in its most general sense, is very broad, indefinite and arbitrary in its nature and application. It may be made a terrible engine of injustice and oppression, as long experience has shown. It is the more dangerous, and therefore to be the more guarded against, because the law and the decisions of the Courts in respect to it are unsettled, the latter being greatly in conflict. Oftentimes the party complaining against oppression and grievous wrong growing out of it, has found no adequate remedy. The purpose of the provision just recited is to prevent such evils. The Legislature is specially required to restrict, limit and define such power when conferred upon cities and towns in this State. A statute purporting to confer the general power of assessment is void, because not allowed or tolerated by the Consti tution. A statute conferring such power should and must prescribe the extent and the method of the exercise of the same. Towns and cities cannot be allowed to exercise and apply it at their will and pleasure, nor arbitrarily. Statutory regulation must exist to prevent this evil. Surely so important a constitutional provision should have effect, and the Courts should enforce it in appropriate cases.
Now it seems to me clear and palpable that the statutory provision under which the plaintiff city undertook to make and enforce its ordinance in question is violative of the constitutional provision above recited, in' that it purports and intends to confer upon the plaintiff the unrestricted arbitrary power of assessment, and goes beyond that, in requir*50ing assessments to be made, not simply against the property supposed to be specially benefited by the street improved, but as well against all the property, both real and personal, of the owner thereof and against him personally, thus empowering the plaintiff, in effect, to take the property of the citizen for public uses without compensation. These are the very grievous evils intended to be suppressed and prevented. The organic provision recited means this, or it practically means nothing.
In substance and effect the statute in question purports to confer upon the plaintiff unrestricted authority to require every owner of real estate situate in it “to pave one-third of the street or streets in front of his or her land,” as it may require, and if such owner fails to do so, then it may make such pavement and assess and charge “upon the property of such delinquent” the costs of such paving, to be “added to the taxes against him or her and collected in the same manner that other taxes or assessments are collected,” or the plaintiff may sue the delinquent for such costs, obtain judgment therefor, docket the same and thus obtain a judgment lien and enforce it by a sale of the delinquent’s property as in ordinary cases.
It seems that it was not the purpose of this statutory provision to confer upon the plaintiff power to impose a tax on the property of owners of real estate situate within it as prescribed for the purpose of paving the streets. But if such were its purpose it would be void, because in that case it would be violative of the Constitution (Art. 5, § 3; Art. 7, §9), which requires that the levy of all taxes, whether for the purposes of the State, counties, townships, cities or towns, “ shall be uniform and ad valorem upon all property in the same, except property exempted by” the Constitution. Plainly tbe costs of paving the streets in the case provided for, is not upon the ad valorem value of the taxpayer’s property. Moreover, such levy is not general or uniform — it is confined to a *51class of taxpayers who own real estate situate within the town. The Constitution contemplates and intends that all taxes imposed upon property shall be uniform and ad valorem-upon the property of all persons liable to pay tax, and not upon a part of them, or upon a class or classes owning particular kinds of property subject -to taxation.
It is, however, seriously insisted that the real purpose of the statutory provision is to confer upon the plaintiff power to pave the street in the case specified, and assess the real property in front of which the paving was done, and which received special benefit from it, with the costs of such paving. If such purpose was intended, it is- not expressed by the statute, nor is there any appropriate provision for effectuating it.
Assessments are commonly called a species of taxes, but they are not so properly denominated, certainly not in this State. The Constitution provides and establishes with much precision a system óf taxation for all public purposes, and how the legislative power in that respect shall be exercised, but that system does not in terms, or by implication, embrace or refer to the power of assessment. This power is distinct from that of taxation, and is not limited by constitutional restraint otherwise than as above indicated. The word assessment as employed in the Constitution, has reference to what are commonly designated as local assessments, generally of money, for the purposes of' some local improvement, and “ are imposed only upon those owners of property who in respect to such ownership are to derive a special benefit in the local improvements for whicli they are expended, and are not within the restraints put upon general taxation.” Cain v. Commissioners, 86 N. C., 8. The power and rights to make such assessments are founded upon the benefits, or supposed benefits, such property derives specially from the public improvements, beyond the benefit derived generally by the community. Government has authority to compel every*52one whose property derives, special benefit from local public improvements to pay, in addition to his ordinary taxes, charges, assessments, expended in making such improvements, equal to such special benefits. That power is not unreasonable or unjust. Every citizen should pay his proportion of taxes as the money price for the benefits he derives from government in the protection of his life, liberty and property, and general advantages incident thereto, and when his property derives special benefits not common to the whole community from local public improvements, he should pay for the same to the extent of, but not beyond, such special benefits. In such case the owner of the property cannot reasonably or justly complain, because his property has been so benefited. It may happen in possible cases that the assessment is too great, or in some aspects of it not strictly just; but this is not attributable to the law or its purpose, but to its erroneous or imperfect administration in particular cases. But such power is great, indefinite, not precisely defined in its nature and limits, and hence subject to very great abuses. It is therefore that the organic provision requires this power to be restricted and carefully guarded.
No assessment should exceed the special benefit to the land deriving the same, and all methods of assessments that work a different result are defective and objectionable. To the extent that it exceeds such benefit, the owner’s property is, in effect, taken for the benefit of the public without compensation, and to that extent it is violative of fundamental right. Hence, a statute whose terms and effect produce such a result would be void. It is intended in this State that the statute granting such power shall guard against such oppression and injustice by appropriate restrictions.
The assessment, in its nature, must be made against the property so specially benefited, and not against other property of the owner, or him personally, because the assessment is founded solely upon such benefit to the property particu*53larly benefited. That property, and that alone, must be assessed. The owner may pay the assessment and thus relieve his land from the charge, but if for any reason he will not, then the land may be sold' to satisfy the same, but no other part of the delinquent’s property may be sold for such purpose, nor in that case would he be chargeable personally or otherwise on that account. This must be so because'the land so benefited, and none other, may be charged with the assessment. Can it be that the public may benefit and assess a particular lot of land and afterwards sell it, and part or all of the owner’s other property, to satisfy the assessment, and still perhaps have a charge against him personally for an unpaid balance of the same? A proposition so arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive shocks every sense of right and justice. A statute that purports to authorize the property of the owner of the land so assessed, other than that land, to be sold by legal process to satisfy such assessment, is inoperative and void, because it, in effect, undertakes to allow the arbitrary appropriation of the owner’s property to the use and purposes of the public without compensation to the owner thereof. The statute cannot authorize the sale of property other than that so specially benefited. That property alone is subject to be assessed. Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo., 525; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 240; Cooley on Taxation, 472.
An essential element of such assessments is that they must rest upon the principle of uniformity as to all property subject to and affected by them, and especially they should be so regulated in respect to making them as to charge the property of each owner benefited by the same public improvement in proportion as such property is so benefited, and as to rhe costs and character of the .same. They must, in their nature, affect all property subject to them alike in all material respects, and a s'atute authorizing them to be made should so require by proper regulations and restrictions. Busbee v. Commissioners, 93 N. C , 143. The Legislature has *54no power to allow arbitrary assessments to be made, or to grant power that may be so exercised. As we have seen, it is expressly made its duty to restrict the power of assessment conferred upon cities and towns, “ so as to prevent abuses in assessments.” It may not leave such corporations at large to make assessments as they will. A statute so providing is inoperative and void, because it fails to provide appropriate and reasonable restrictions as the Constitution requires in express and mandatory terms and such is its clear purpose.
The statute under which the plaintiff claims to exercise authority to make the assessment in question, in broad terms undertakes to confer upon it general power to pave one-third of any one or all of its streets in front of a lot of land abutting upon the same, and to assess the cost of the paving against the property'of the owner thereof. It is not required to observe uniformity in any respect in making such assessments. They may be made without any reference to the special benefit the paved street may extend to the lot on account of which they are made, and without reference to the cost of the paving done. The assessment as to one lot deriving small benefit, may be a sum of money equal to two or three times the value of such benefits, while the assessment as to another lot, deriving much greater benefit, may be greatly less than the former. The cost of the pavement in front of one* lot may be double or treble that in front of another, and the assessment as to both may be precisely the same. The plaintiff is not restrained in these or any respect; no restraining regulations are prescribed for its government therein|to be observed by it. The whole unrestricted power of assessment is sought to be conferred. It may make assessments at its will. This the Constitution does not allow or sanction.
The ordinance of the plaintiff in question well illustrates the truth, force and importance of what has just been pointed out. It is in large measure purely arbitrary. It requires *55the assessment to be made without regard to the special benefit the paved street extends to the lot on account of which it is made, and without reference to the real cost of the paving done. It requires uniformity only in a single respect, that of the cost of paving a square yard, and this is based upon mere estimate and is wholly arbitrary; it might just as well have been fixed at a greater or less sum, so far as the particular property assessed is concerned. If the cost of paving a square yard in front of a lot is less than that specified, the assessment is the same as if it had cost that or double that sum, and the cost is the same whether the pavement is of greater or less or no special benefit to the lot.
The statute does not require the assessment to be made against the lot benefited, as it should do, in any case; it directs that it be made “ upon the property of such delinquent (the owner of the property who failed to pay the sum of money demanded for the paving), and added to the taxes against him or her.” This language is plain and broad. It cannot be said that it should and may be construed as directing the assessment to be made against the property — the lot benefited specially. The plain terms do not so imply, nor was it so intended, as plainly appears from the further provision that the assessment shall be “ collected in the same • manner that other taxes and assessments are collected.” This implies that any of the delinquent’s property may be sold to satisfy it. As we have seen, the assessment must be made against the particular property benefited, and if the owner will not pay the sum charged, then that property, and no other, may be sold to satisfy it.
The statute further prescribes that the plaintiff may sue and obtain judgment against the delinquent owner of the property assessed, docket the same and sell any of his property to satisfy it. The reasons why this cannot be done have already been pointed out. Such directions of the statute in effect provide for taking indirectly the delinquent’s property *56for the use of the public without compensation to him. It allows property not liable for such assessment to be sold to satisfy the same. It thus practically confiscates the delinquent’s property to the use of the public.”
Nor does the general statutory provision (The Code, § 3803) in respect to towns and cities, confer upon the plaintiff power to make such assessments as that here in question, even if it were applicable. It prescribes that the commissioners of towns and cities “ may cause such improvements in the town to be made as may be necessary, and may apportion the same equally among the inhabitants by assessment of labor or otherwise.” The power thus vaguely sought to be conferred as to assessments like that in question here, is quite as objectionable as the power intended to be conferred by the clause of the plaintiff’s charter in question. It intends to confer the vague power of assessment without restriction, restraint or direction of any kind or in any respect; it leaves the plaintiff to make assessments as it will; it may arbitrarily assess by the front foot, the square yard, the actual cost, by or without reference to a uniform rule, with or without reference to the benefit of the property charged; it may make a general charge for the whole paving done, and charge each owner of land his or her proportion of the whole cost. This statute does not make the assessment a lien upon the property assessed, nor does it prescribe how the property may be sold to satisfy the assessment. Any proceeding to sell it, unless by a decree of a Court, will be arbitrary and unauthorized. The very purpose of the constitutional provision is to prevent the exercise of such unbridled power, and save the property owner from unjust discrimination and oppression for which he can have no remedy. It is not sufficient to say that this plaintiff will not unjustty or unreasonably exercise such power. It may do so, other cities and towns may do so, no doubt have done so to a greater or less extent. The Constitution wisely does not intend that *57they shall have, be charged with or exercise such great power without restraint or limitation of any kind. It commands the Legislature to restrict such power. It seems to me that if its provision to which I have referred has not the meaning and purpose I have attributed to it, then it has no practical meaning and is a dead letter, serving no purpose.
In my view this case depends upon the proper interpretation of the constitutional provision I have cited and commented upon, and not upon a vast multiplicity of conflicting and confusing decisions of Courts out of this State in respect to the general power of assessment. An important part of the purpose of the Constitution is to rid the people of this State of uncertainty and confusion in respect to the power of assessment, and the serious evils incident thereto.
In my judgment, the statute in question fails to restrict and regulate the power.of assessment it purports to confer upon the plaintiff, as required by the constitution, and hence, it had no power to make or enforce its ordinance in question.