Court Opinion

ID: 9691538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:38:26.303609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:22.349583
License: Public Domain

Dissenting by
Justice WINTERSHEIMER.
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion that determines it was error to apply the whole man theory to this case. Otherwise, I concur in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Administrative Law Judge applied the “whole man” theory and awarded Nye full disability benefits. The “whole man” doctrine applies where an individual suffers a subsequent work-related injury and the nature of that subsequent injury is such that it causes the individual to be totally occupationally disabled regardless of any injury previously suffered. See Schneider v. Putnam, Ky., 579 S.W.2d 370 (1979).
If the prior injury did not contribute to the subsequent total and permanent occupational disability, then the prior injury was not a preexisting disability for the purposes of determining the degree of occupational disability which existed immediately prior to the subsequent injury. Wells v. Bunch, Ky., 692 S.W.2d 806 (1985). As such, the employer will not receive a credit for any award for the prior injury. The ALJ properly determined, pursuant to the “whole man” doctrine that Nye’s total and permanent occupational disability was caused solely by the subsequent 1994 injury and thus, Garrett was not entitled to the 22 percent credit which represents the award to Nye for the 1990 injury.
Garrett argues that it and the Special Fund were denied the proper credit for the prior awards. It contends that the ALJ should have excluded the 22 percent prior active disability that was due to the 1990 work-related injury. Further, it argues that the prior award of 50 percent occupational disability awarded as a result of the August 1994 injury would likewise be excluded as active, preexisting and non-compensable, thereby limiting Nye’s recovery to 28 percent occupational disability. I cannot agree.
The ALJ determined Nye to be totally disabled as a result of the deterioration that stemmed from his August 1994 injury alone. Clearly, the ALJ determined that the 1994 injury, in and of itself, was sufficient to have produced the physical and occupational worsening proven by Nye on reopening entitling him to total disability benefits. Such a finding comports with the “whole man” doctrine. Under that doctrine, even if an individual has previously been determined to have some degree of occupational disability, whether it be work-related or not, an ALJ retains the discretion to rule that a subsequent event in and of itself is sufficiently significant to render that claimant totally occupationally disabled and entitled to full benefits. Schneider v. Putnam, Ky., 579 S.W.2d 370 (1979) and International Harvester v. Poff, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 712 (1959). Consequently, because the 1994 injury by itself resulted *524in a total disability, no exclusion is required.
A prior determination which made an active impairment rating under circumstances such as involved here does not necessarily constitute res judicata. Res judicata does not attach if the issue at stake was not specifically decided in the prior proceeding or, even if decided, was not essential to the final decision of the case. Woodbridge INOAC v. Downs, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 306 (1993). In the 1995 opinion and award, the ALJ found that the August 1994 injury produced a 50% permanent partial disability. Consequently, the finding that the 1990 injury also produced a 22% active disability was not essential to the overall decision of the ALJ in 1995. No error occurred.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed totally.
STUMBO, J., joins this dissenting opinion.