Court Opinion

ID: 9379234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 06:08:30.795035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.969598
License: Public Domain

CONDITIONALLY GRANT and Opinion Filed March 10, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-23-00070-CV

                      IN RE JERRAL W. JONES, Relator

          Original Proceeding from the 302nd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. DF-22-06306

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Miskel
                           Opinion by Justice Reichek
      In this original proceeding, relator Jerral W. Jones, respondent in a proceeding

to adjudicate parentage under the Texas Uniform Parentage Act, challenges the trial

court’s denial of his counsel’s application for a legislative continuance. For the

reasons set out below, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying

the application. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Jones’s petition for writ of

mandamus.
                                           BACKGROUND

         Alexandra Davis filed the underlying petition to establish the parent-child

relationship between her and Jones. State Senator Royce West1 has served as one of

Jones’s attorneys since the inception of this lawsuit. West has participated in the

preparation and presentation of Jones’s defense, including appearing on Jones’s

behalf at every hearing held by the trial court.

         Davis filed a motion for genetic testing, which Jones opposed. A hearing on

the motion was held by the associate judge, who granted the motion on December

22, 2022. The next day, Jones appealed the associate judge’s ruling and requested a

de novo hearing before the district court. Meanwhile, the 88th Texas Legislative

Session was set to convene on January 10, 2023, in Austin, Texas. On January 6,

2023, Jones filed an application and motion for legislative continuance pursuant to

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 30.003 that was supported by an affidavit

signed by West. The affidavit explained that West (1) would attend the upcoming

legislative session, (2) intended to actively participate in the preparation and

presentation of Jones’s case once the session adjourned, and (3) did not undertake

Jones’s representation for the purpose of obtaining a legislative continuance. Davis

did not file a response, and the trial court did not hold a hearing on the application.

   1
       Senator West represents the 23rd Senatorial District in the Texas Legislature.
                                                    –2–
         On January 17, 2023, the court coordinator sent an email to counsel stating

“[t]he above-referenced matter[2] is set for a 10 min. de novo conference on 1/24 at

8:30 via zoom. Please be advised that this is a conference only with Judge Jackson

and within her discretion to set a de novo hearing.” The record shows that a proposed

order granting the legislative continuance was marked by the trial court as

“DISAPPROVED: CONFERENCE SET FOR JANUARY 24, 2023.” In addition,

the trial court’s docket sheet shows “Proposed Order Denied” and an “Appeal –

Conference” with a “hearing time” of 8:30 a.m. on January 24. Jones sought

mandamus review and a stay of proceedings. We stayed the January 24 conference

and all further proceedings pending resolution of this original proceeding.

                                             ANALYSIS

         To be entitled to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, Jones must show

both that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and that he has no adequate

appellate remedy. See In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex.

2004) (orig. proceeding). If properly requested, a legislative continuance is

mandatory. Ojeda v. State, 916 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1996,

pet. ref’d). The trial court lacks any discretion in such a circumstance and instead

serves a merely ministerial function. In re Starr Produce Co., 988 S.W.2d 808, 811

(Tex. App. – San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding). A party has no adequate remedy

   2
       The “above referenced matter” was the cause number in the proceeding to adjudicate parentage.
                                                  –3–
by appeal when a trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion for legislative

continuance. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 321–22 (Tex. 2005) (orig.

proceeding).

A. Jurisdiction

       Davis did not oppose Jones’s application for legislative continuance in the

trial court and does not challenge Jones’s entitlement to one in this original

proceeding. Instead, Davis argues this Court is without jurisdiction because the trial

court has not yet ruled on Jones’s application. We disagree. Rather than signing the

proposed order granting the legislative continuance, the trial court added text at the

top stating “DISAPPROVED: CONFERENCE SET FOR JANUARY 24.” The

record contains a corresponding docket entry of “Proposed Order Denied.”

       Even if the trial court did not explicitly deny Jones’s application, it implicitly

did so, making Jones’s complaint ripe for appellate review. TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a)(2)(A); see In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003) (“By proceeding

to trial without issuing a bench warrant, it is clear that the trial court implicitly denied

Thompson’s request.”); see also In re A.W., 302 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“The trial court did not rule on any of Williams’s motions to

appear by bench warrant or by alternative means. However, by signing the divorce

decree without addressing those motions, the trial court implicitly denied them.”).

In addition to marking the proposed order “DISAPPROVED,” the trial court set a

hearing to occur on January 24, which was after the beginning of the legislative

                                           –4–
session. The email from the court coordinator stated the “conference” was de novo

in nature, suggesting it was in reference to Jones’s motion for de novo review of the

associate judge’s ruling on Davis’s motion for genetic testing. This is supported by

the docket entry for the conference, which described it as an “appeal.” These actions

are inconsistent with the relief requested by Jones in his application for legislative

continuance. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court at least implicitly denied

Jones’s application. Stauder v. Nichols, No. 01-08-00773-CV, 2010 WL 2306385,

at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (by

proceeding to submission of motion for summary judgment court implicitly denied

appellants’ request for a continuance).

B. Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code § 30.003

      Section 30.003(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides,

      Except as provided by Subsections (c) and (c-1), at any time within 30
      days of a date when the legislature is to be in session, at any time during
      a legislative session, or when the legislature sits as a constitutional
      convention, the court on application shall continue a case in which a
      party applying for the continuance or the attorney for that party is a
      member or member-elect of the legislature and will be or is attending a
      legislative session. The court shall continue the case until 30 days after
      the date on which the legislature adjourns.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.003(b). Subsection (c) provides the only

circumstance where the decision to grant a legislative continuance is discretionary

in a civil case, and that is when the attorney-legislator was employed within 30 days

of a trial setting. The party seeking the continuance must file an affidavit stating the

grounds for the continuance, which constitutes “proof of the necessity for a
                                   –5–
continuance” and “need not be corroborated.” Id. § 30.003(d). The affidavit must

contain “a declaration that it is the attorney’s intention to participate actively in the

preparation or presentation of the case and that the attorney has not taken the case

for the purpose of obtaining a continuance under this section.” Id. § 30.003(e). The

statute makes it clear that a legislative continuance is one of right. Id. § 30.003(f).

      When a lawyer-legislator is retained more than 30 days before the date a civil

case is set for trial, a trial court lacks discretion to deny a properly requested motion

for legislative continuance. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d at 317–18. In this

case, West was retained more than 30 days before the date of trial and the application

supported by West’s affidavit was made within 30 days of the start of the legislative

session. The application also set forth all the information required by section 30.003.

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.003. Because Jones’s application for

legislative continuance met the statutory requirements, the trial court was without

discretion to deny the application. See In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d at 319.

      We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying Jones’s

application and motion for legislative continuance. We further conclude Jones has

no adequate remedy by appeal. We lift the stay imposed by order dated January 23,

2023, conditionally grant Jones’s petition for writ of mandamus, and direct the trial

court to grant the application.

                                          –6–
     The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply.

                                           /Amanda L. Reichek/
                                           AMANDA L. REICHEK
                                           JUSTICE

230070F.P05

                                        –7–