Court Opinion

ID: 9649452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:53:55.002055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:10.978645
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I view the recall of the mandate by this division, sua sponte, as amounting to the raw exercise of power, and incompatible with the orderly administration of justice. Presumably the majority in doing so is not without qualms, since it deems it necessary to preface its opinion with the notation that Luvie Pearson (the losing party in our prior decision issued January 29, 1986) had filed a petition for rehearing en banc. I suggest that this reference to an unsuccessful en banc petition is of no legal significance whatever under the circumstances here.
We have already decided this case. Fireison v. Pearson, 503 A.2d 1271 (D.C.1986) (Fireison I). We did so after full briefing, after full argument, and after full deliberation. In Fireison I, a majority of this division reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the underlying action during trial and, as a result, the trial court set a new trial upon the merits to begin at 9:30 a.m. on June 24, 1987. Preparations for the new trial were taken in full compliance with our mandate reinstating the action for that purpose; the mandate issued to the trial court on March 6, 1986.
“Issuance of the mandate formally marks the end of appellate jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., D.C., 255 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 201, 801 F.2d 412, 415 (1986) (per curiam). Our rules provide that the mandate of this court shall issue twenty-one days after the entry of judgment. D.C.App.R. 41(a). A mandate is stayed by the timely filing of a petition for rehearing before the division. Id. But Pearson never filed such a petition. Although she did file a petition for rehearing en banc, the mandate is not stayed by an en banc petition, so that here the mandate duly issued during that petition’s pendency before the full court. Id. The real question in this case, therefore, one which the present majority utterly fails to confront, concerns the circumstances in which our mandate may be recalled.
In its footnote 1, ante at 1047, the majority makes its one passing reference to its recall of the mandate, the propriety of which action is now the sole issue in this already-decided case. The majority impliedly recognizes the complete absence of supporting authority for its disruptive action when it invokes, out of context, an internal operating procedure which on its face makes no reference to recall of a mandate.1 By its *1053very terms, the procedure relied upon by the majority is intended to give guidance only in cases — unlike this one — which remain in the “plenary control” of the deciding division.2
This case has not been in the plenary control of the division since our mandate issued on March 6, 1986. On that date “^jurisdiction retum[ed] to the tribunal to which the mandate [was] directed, for such proceedings as may be appropriate....” Johnson v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., D.C., supra, 255 U.S.App.D.C. at 201, 801 F.2d at 415; see also United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 144 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1427, 71 L.Ed.2d 648 (1982). After issuance of our mandate, the trial court was not only free to exercise its renewed jurisdiction, but was under a duty to do so by holding a new trial on the complaint it had erroneously dismissed. Id. Thus, at no time since issuance of the mandate has this division had “full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified” control of this case. The filing of a petition for rehearing en banc did not vest plenary jurisdiction in this division absent an otherwise proper recall of the mandate. See United States v. DiLapi, supra, 651 F.2d at 144. As our appellate rules make plain, “[tjhe pendency of a petition for rehearing en banc [on its own] shall not affect the finality of the judgment of the court or stay the issuance of the mandate.” D.C.App.R. 41(a) (emphasis added). Because plenary control has been, and still is, vested in the trial court, this division cannot rely on isolated language from our internal operating procedures to recall the mandate in violation of settled legal principles and the rules of this court.
The controlling legal principles are rather the well established standards governing recall of a mandate that has already issued. One instance in which a mandate may be recalled is when the en banc court grants a petition for rehearing en banc. See Towles v. United States, 497 A.2d 793 (D.C.), granting en banc reh’g, recalling mandate, and vacating en banc mem., 496 A.2d 560, argued en banc Mar. 19, 1986, petition for cert of division decision dismissed, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 269, 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985). Action by the full court in such circumstances is the functional equivalent of an order from a higher court and is not to be compared to the action of a division. In this case, the en banc court has not seen fit to grant Pearson’s petition for en banc rehearing. It has refused to do so because en banc rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless (1) consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) the proceeding involves a question of “exceptional importance.” D.C.App.R. 40(e). Here, neither of these conditions is met.
Instead, it is a majority of this division which today, sua sponte, recalls the mandate. A motion for recall of the mandate is appropriately addressed to the deciding division in the first instance. Derrington v. United States, 509 A.2d 605, 605-06 (D.C.1986) (per curiam). No motion for recall of the mandate was directed to this division. Even if a motion for recall of the mandate were properly before us, the action now taken by the division would be no less *1054troubling. The problem here is more than procedural.
Appellate courts have inherent power to recall a mandate upon a showing of “good cause,” but that power should be exercised sparingly. American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 592-95, 44 A.L.R. Fed. 813, 818-21 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914, 98 S.Ct. 1467, 55 L.Ed.2d 505 (1978); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 331, 463 F.2d 268, 277 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 2042, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972). Recall of the mandate must be necessary to avoid injustice and it is proper only in the presence of “exceptional circumstances.” American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, supra, 560 F.2d at 599, 44 A.L.R. Fed. at 829; Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, supra, 149 U.S.App.D.C. at 332, 463 F.2d at 278; see also Watson v. United States, 508 A.2d 75, 81, en banc reh’g granted and vacated en banc mem., 514 A.2d 800, argued en banc Nov. 6, 1986 (D.C.1986); Bell v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 507 A.2d 548, 549 (D.C.1986); Streater v. United States, 478 A.2d 1055, 1057 n.3 (D.C.1984). The present division majority recalls the mandate with barely a nod to the “good cause” requirement. That requirement is not openly acknowledged because it cannot be met. There has been no showing of “good cause” here.
Specific instances of “good cause” shown, which justify an appellate court in recalling its mandate, are: (1) the correction of clerical mistakes and clarification of mandate and opinion; (2) fraud on the court or other misconduct affecting the integrity of the judicial process; (3) the avoidance of differences in results to cases pending at the same time; (4) the need to revise an unintended instruction to the trial court that produces an unjust result; and (5) other grounds of injustice which render it “manifestly unconscionable” that a judgment be given effect. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, supra, 149 U.S.App.D.C. at 331-33, 463 F.2d at 278-80 (and cases cited therein). Not one of these “exceptional circumstances” can be invoked in this case.3
One division judge dissented from our original decision in this case. Fireison I, supra, 503 A.2d at 1277-80. A new division majority now reinstates the trial court’s dismissal of the Fireisons’ complaint because another division judge (a member of the original majority) after much further reflection has concluded (I think mistakenly) that the holding of a case relied upon in the original dissent controls. This is not “good cause” justifying recall of a mandate.
The “good cause” standard is a high one. Our power to recall mandates “is not to be availed of freely as a basis for granting rehearings out of time for the purpose of changing decisions even assuming the court becomes doubtful of the wisdom of the decision that has been entered and become final.” Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, supra, 149 U.S.App.D.C. at 331-32, 463 F.2d at 277-78 (emphasis added) (citing Estate of Iverson v. Commissioner, 257 F.2d 408, 409 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 893, 79 S.Ct. 154, 3 L.Ed.2d 120 (1958)). Recall is not a vehicle for correcting alleged errors of law: “Certainly, an alleged failure to correctly construe and apply the applicable state law does not constitute ‘good cause’.... ” Hines v. Royal Indemnity Co., 253 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir.1958); see generally 16 C. Wright, A. MilleR, E. CoopeR & E. Gress-MAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3938 (1977).4
*1055Underlying the “good cause” requisite for recall of the mandate is the showing of a need to avoid injustice. The relief of injustice is the consideration which can override the deep-rooted policy in favor of the repose of judgments and the interest of finality. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, supra, 149 U.S.App.D.C. at 331-33, 463 F.2d at 277-79. What the court is doing today is creating injustice, not relieving it. It is recalling the mandate, vacating a published opinion, and changing its disposition a year after the decision was published and almost eleven months after the mandate has issued. It is doing so despite the fact that our original opinion did nothing more than give purchasers of land, who complained of and presented proof of fraud on the part of the seller, the right to a trial on their complaint. This belated change of thinking in effect gives the defendant— whose agent has admittedly engaged in misleading conduct — a valid defense of contributory negligence against the purchasers she defrauded. It defeats the legitimate expectations of litigants who have relied upon a final decision in their favor. The division majority’s recall of the mandate in this fact-specific case — under the guise of complying with an octogenarian decision whose holding is in any event open to dispute — is unprecedented.5
*1056Finally, I suggest that today’s action by the majority is in conflict, not only with our caselaw and our rules, but also with the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....” It is unquestionable that the issuance of our mandate in Firei-son I, favorable to the appellants and directly affecting the outcome of their suit for damages arising out of a contract to purchase land, implicates a property interest. I cannot believe that due process permits a division of this court to sua sponte deprive successful litigants of their property interest in a final decision without any showing of “good cause,” the manner in which the mandate is recalled here.6 If the division majority can recall the mandate in this case, there is not a case in the books that can rest in peace.
Litigants are aware of their rights to request reconsideration and recall of the mandate, or to petition an en banc or a higher court for further review. At some point, however, the winner is entitled to expect, and the loser must accept, that their controversy will reach a state of repose in order that they may get on with their lives.7 It is not asking too much of judicial responsibility that it take on the task of making definitive decisions. It would be bad enough if the new majority’s uninvited reentry into the decisionmaking arena only cluttered up the law reports. But, much worse, in working an injustice upon successful litigants, today we invite a *1057legion of decided cases to arise from their graves and come back to haunt this court.
I respectfully dissent.
Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEBEKER, MACK, NEWMAN, FERREN, BELSON, TERRY, ROGERS and STEADMAN, Associate Judges.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
On consideration of appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc of our decision of January 29, 1986, 503 A.2d 1271, it is
ORDERED that the petition is denied.

. The majority introduces the language of the procedure with editorial opening and closing comments referring to recall. Specifically, the procedural language relied upon provides that "[t]he filing of a petition for rehearing en banc does not take the case out of the plenary control of the division deciding the case. The division may, on its own, grant rehearing and may do so without action by the full cotut.” D.C.App. I.O.P. XI A (emphasis added). The provision that the filing of an en banc petition does not take the case "out of the division’s plenary control is patently irrelevant to cases — where the mandate has issued — which are not "in” the plenary control of the division in the first place.
The obvious purpose of I.O.P. XI A is one of fostering judicial economy by allowing the de*1053ciding division to reconsider its position before the mandate has issued, thus making consideration of the en banc petition unnecessary. D.C. App.R. 40(e), 41(a). In this case, the full court, with knowledge that the mandate has issued, has refused to grant en banc rehearing (and thus refused to recall the mandate) and the division’s persistence in seeking to act without authority has actually defeated the purpose of judicial economy.
I.O.P. XIA is not intended to give this division a license to sua sponte recall its mandate and change its disposition, here effective a year after the decision, without any regard to the limited circumstances in which recall is appropriate.
The majority’s construction of I.O.P. XIA puts that procedure in direct conflict with D.C. App.R. 41(a).

. “Plenary” means "complete in every respect: ABSOLUTE, PERFECT, UNQUALIFIED Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1739 (1971). It has also been defined as “[f]ull, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1038 (5th ed. 1979).

. Indeed the full court has implicitly recognized, by refusing to grant Pearson's petition for en banc rehearing, that the underlying merits do not involve "exceptional” circumstances. D.C.App.R. 40(e). Today's recall of the mandate by the present division majority, of course, introduces into this case an issue not considered by the en banc court in denying Pearson's petition.

. The case which is the focal point of such agony of decision is Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232, 24 S.Ct. 259, 48 L.Ed. 419 (1904), a *1055case, like this one, involving a dispute between a seller and a purchaser of land.
In the first place, I note that Shappirio is of persuasive value only, as it was an interpretation of District of Columbia law whereas Firei-son I involved an interpretation of Maryland law. Although Shappirio was decided by the United States Supreme Court in its then capacity as the highest court of the District of Columbia, it is axiomatic that the Maryland Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court, is the final arbiter of the law of that state. E.g., Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234, 64 S.Ct. 7, 10, 88 L.Ed. 9 (1943); Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng’g Co., 230 Md. 584, 588, 187 A.2d 864, 866 (1963).
Moreover, the precise holding of the Shappirio Court is subject to dispute. In my view, Shappirio is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Shappirio fraud (by silence) was alleged against the seller but not proved; in this case "misrepresentations [were] made which deceived the purchaser in which it is no defense to say that had the plaintiff declined to believe the representations and investigated for himself he would not have been deceived.” Shappirio v. Goldberg, supra, 192 U.S. at 241, 24 S.Ct. at 261 (emphasis added). I note also that in Shappirio the true size of the lot conveyed was apparent to the purchasers from a complete description on the face of the deed, id. at 241, 24 S.Ct. at 261; see majority opinion, ante at 1050, whereas here, because "[t]he deed included no physical description of the lot, but referred to the plat book and number,” majority opinion, ante at 1048, the discrepancy between the contract and the conveyance could be discovered only by reference to extrinsic sources.
It is clear that one can reach different interpretations depending upon which phrases one underlines in Shappirio. It is likewise clear that the analysis employed by the majority today compels the ridiculous result that contributory negligence is a defense to fraud. It is clearer still that changing, but still conflicting, interpretations of Shappirio do not involve “exceptional circumstances" justifying recall of the mandate.

. I do not use the word "unprecedented” merely for its rhetorical impact. A WESTLAW search for the word "recall” (and its derivatives) in the same sentence as "mandate” reveals not a single case that supports the action taken by the division majority today. (Recall; /s Mandate, databases DC-CS, CTADC, and CTADC-OLD, WEST-LAW search dated Jan. 13, 1987.) The search was conducted in the binding caselaw of this jurisdiction, which includes all decisions of this court, together with those of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rendered prior to February 1, 1971. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971).
This court refused to recall its mandate in three of the six cases in which the issue has arisen. Derrington v. United States, supra, 509 A.2d at 605-06; Watson v. United States, supra, 508 A.2d at 79-81, 88, 91; McKeamer v. United States, 458 A.2d 737, 738 (D.C.1983) (en banc mem.) (Nebeker, J., separate statement).. In another, the full court recalled the mandate within six weeks after issuance when it sua sponte called for rehearing en banc. Towles v. United States, supra, 497 A.2d 793. In a second case, we recalled the mandate in order to reopen the direct appeal of a criminal defendant who claimed that appellate counsel in his original appeal had provided ineffective assistance, a claim which by its very nature called for such an approach. Streater v. United States, supra, 478 A.2d at 1057. In the one remaining case, we recalled our mandate in light of a claim that it would produce “harmful effects ‘on the administration of justice in this jurisdiction,’ ” it being also apparent from the motion to recall the mandate that the government had "misinterpreted” our earlier decision. Epperson v. United States, 495 A.2d 1170, 1171-73 (D.C.1985). It is *1056significant that the search reveals not one civil case in which we recalled our mandate. (Due to limitations on the WESTLAW DC-CS database, the above search covers full text and head-notes back to 203 A.2d 37 (1965), only head-notes from then back to 121 A.2d 178 (1956), and no earlier cases. However, neither the District of Columbia Digest (1958 & Supp.1986) nor the Atlantic Digest 2d (1982 & Supp.1986) reveals any prior case on this issue.)
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to recall its mandate in four of the nine cases which came before it and its predecessors prior to February 1, 1971. Pratt v. United States, 70 App.D.C. 7, 10, 102 F.2d 275, 278 (1939); Snyder v. Hunter, 56 App.D.C. 164, 11 F.2d 336 (1926); Faunce v. Woods, 55 App.D.C. 330, 330, 5 F.2d 753, 753, 40 A.L.R. 208 (1925); Ass'n of Survivors of Seventh Ga. Regiment v. Larner, 55 App.D.C. 156, 156, 3 F.2d 201, 201 (1925). In three others, it recalled and reissued the mandate in order to clarify its true meaning. Washington v. Clemmer, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 220, 339 F.2d 715, 719 (1964) (per curiam); Freid v. McGrath, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 385, 386, 135 F.2d 833, 834 (1943); Pratt v. Pratt, 56 App.D.C. 336, 336-37, 15 F.2d 735, 736 (1926) (per curiam). In another, it recalled and stayed the mandate immediately after issuance so as to allow the losing party to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 52 App.D.C. 339, 343, 286 Fed. 1003, 1007 (1923). In the one remaining case, the fact of immediate recall and stay of the mandate is noted but not explained, which suggests that it too was to facilitate an appeal to the Supreme Court. Fred v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 App.D.C. 79, 79, 33 F.2d 375, 375 (1929). (This search extends back to 258 Fed. (1919).)
All of the cases in which the mandate was recalled involved “exceptional circumstances." None involved a situation where a new majority of the division simply changed its mind, and subsequently brought about a change in the disposition of the case a year after the court’s opinion was first published.

. While on the due process issue, I note yet another problem with the present division majority’s reliance on the legally irrelevant filing by Pearson of an unsuccessful petition for rehearing en banc. That petition was not filed, as our rules require, within the fourteen day period following entry of judgment in Fireison /. Pearson did successfully move this court — also after expiration of the fourteen day period following entry of the judgment — for an enlargement of time. Although our rules allow these requests to be granted "for good cause shown,” D.C.App.R. 26(b), the Fireisons were never given an opportunity to contest whether such a showing had been made. Indeed they assert that they were unaware of Pearson’s request for enlargement of time until after it was granted. The majority's reference, in its footnote 1, ante at 1047, to the pendency of an unsuccessful en banc petition and the briefing of the parties does precisely nothing to refute either of the due process claims presented here and in the text.

. I recognize that special considerations exist with regard to criminal convictions because of their unusually grave consequences. This point is illustrated by our recent adoption of D.C. App.R. 41(c), which makes special provision in our rules for the recall of mandates in criminal cases.