Court Opinion

ID: 9374999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 17:07:07.44598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.755999
License: Public Domain

J-A21028-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KEVIN R. PETERS                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2591 EDA 2021

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2021
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
                 Criminal Division at CP-09-CR-0003901-2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2023

        Because I would conclude the Commonwealth established the malice

required to sustain Appellant’s convictions of third-degree murder and

aggravated assault,1 I respectfully dissent.

        The Majority skillfully detailed the factual and procedural history. See

Maj. at 1-5. I additionally observe, before the jury retired to deliberate, the

trial court issued the following instruction on malice:

               There’s no one definition of malice because it can involve so
        many different circumstances and so many different factors…. []
        I am going to give you three separate explanations[.] … Malice
        is a shorthand way of referring to … particular mental states … of
        a defendant [] that the law regards as being bad enough to make
        the killing murder.

              A killing is [committed] with malice if the defendant’s
        actions show his wanton and willful disregard of an unjustified and
____________________________________________

1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 2702(a)(1).
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       extremely high risk that his conduct would result in death or
       serious bodily injury to another person. In this form of malice,
       the Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant specifically
       intended to kill anybody.      The Commonwealth must prove,
       however, that the defendant took action or engaged in conduct []
       consciously; that is, knowingly[] disregarding the serious risk that
       his conduct was creating[,] and that … his disregard of that risk
       demonstrates an extreme indifference to the value of human life.

             The second way malice is described is a wickedness of
       disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of
       consequences, a mind regardless of social duty that indicates an
       unjustified disregard for the probability of death or great bodily
       harm and an extreme indifference to the value of human life. …

            … [T]he third way that the courts have defined malice is that
       the defendant consciously disregarded … an unjustified and
       extremely high risk that his actions might cause the death of
       another person or … [cause] serious bodily injury to another
       person.

N.T., 9/17/21, at 32-34 (some paragraph breaks omitted).2 The trial court’s

instruction on malice is consistent with Pennsylvania Standard Criminal Jury

Instructions. See Pa. SSJI (Crim) 15.2502C (third-degree murder); see also

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1184 (Pa. 2011) (“The law

presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the court.” (citation

omitted)).

____________________________________________

2 The trial court additionally instructed: “[I]n deciding, you may not rely on
evidence that [Appellant] became intoxicated of his own volition in order to
conclude that he was so intoxicated that he lacked the mental state required
for the crime to be committed.”            N.T., 9/17/21, at 59; see also
Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 312 (Pa. 2011) (“A defense
of … voluntary intoxication[] is an extremely limited defense available only to
those defendants who admit criminal liability but contest the degree of
culpability based upon an inability to formulate the specific intent to kill.”
(emphasis added)).

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      During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court for clarification of the

“three definitions of malice[.]” N.T., 9/17/21, at 72. In response, the court

re-read the same definitions quoted above. Id. at 72-74.

      I agree with the Majority that “our law is clear that the mere decision to

drive [while] intoxicated does not satisfy the malice requirement. If these

factors met the requirement of malice, then every DUI homicide would result

in a third-degree murder conviction.” Maj. at 13. As our Supreme Court in

Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2017) instructed, “an

impaired driver who causes the death of another does not typically act with

the requisite malice to support convictions of third-degree murder and

aggravated assault.” Id. at 166 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Kling,

731 A.2d 145, 148 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“motor vehicle crashes seldom give rise

to proof of the malice needed to sustain a conviction for third degree murder

or aggravated assault.”)). The Packer Court stated, “the decision to drive

while under the influence of alcohol and/or a controlled substance does not,

standing alone, constitute malice.” Id. at 170 (emphasis added); see also

id. (“the mens rea generally associated with the decision to drive under the

influence is ordinary recklessness and does not constitute malice.”).

      According to the Majority, the Packer Court “addressed [a] ‘notice,’ or

‘warning,’ requirement of malice with respect to motor vehicle accidents[.]”

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Maj. at 10 (emphasis added).3             In support, the Majority cites Packer’s

holding:

       Because of Packer’s history of losing consciousness after huffing
       and her knowledge of the immediacy of the effects of huffing on
       her, she “could reasonably anticipate that serious bodily injury or
       death would be the likely and logical consequence of [her] actions
       … [but] the consequence was ignored.[”]

Id. at 11 (quoting Packer, 168 A.3d at 171 (emphasis and citations omitted)).

The Majority concludes, “the facts of this case reveal that the Commonwealth

failed to present sufficient evidence of the ‘warning’ requirement of malice

necessary for third-degree murder and aggravated assault in the DUI

context.” Id. at 13.

       Contrary to the Majority, I would not hold that Packer (or its progeny)

created a “warning requirement.”               Rather, Packer’s holding reflects the

unique facts in that case. See, e.g., Packer, 168 A.3d at 163 (“Based on

Packer’s history of losing consciousness after huffing [] and her knowledge of

the immediacy and intensity of the effect, we conclude that her conduct

constituted the high degree of recklessness required for a finding of malice.”),

____________________________________________

3  The Majority states this purported notice/warning requirement was also
addressed in “Commonwealth v. Urbanski, 627 A.2d 789, 793 (Pa. Super.
1993) (concluding appellant’s wife’s repeated reminders of the danger of
drunk driving and repeated requests he let her drive instead, conveyed a
sufficient warning for malice).” Maj. at 14. The Urbanski Court held “a
finding of malice is supported where an accused drives recklessly immediately
prior to the accident and ignores the request of another to stop driving.”
Urbanski, 627 A.2d at 793 (citing Commonwealth v. Pigg, 571 A.2d 438,
442 (Pa. Super. 1990)).

                                           -4-
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and id. at 171 (“There is a significant difference between deciding to drive

while intoxicated and deciding to drive with knowledge that there is a strong

likelihood of becoming unconscious.”). In my view, the presence or absence

of a warning to an intoxicated driver is merely one factor to consider in the

totality of the circumstances. As this Court has explained, “[m]alice may be

inferred by considering the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth

v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v.

Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 709 (Pa. Super. 2017) (same).

     What Packer did require was conduct “virtually guaranteeing some

manner of accident will occur through the intentional doing of an uncalled-for

act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effects on others.” Packer, 168

A.3d at 171 (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court explained:

     for the purpose of third-degree murder or aggravated assault, our
     courts have consistently held that malice is present under
     circumstances where a defendant did not have an intent to kill,
     but nevertheless displayed a conscious disregard for “an
     unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions might cause
     death or serious bodily harm.”

Packer, 168 A.3d at 168 (citations and quotations omitted).

     We have expounded upon the high degree of recklessness required for

a finding of malice in the DUI context in Commonwealth v. McHale, 858

A.2d 1209 (Pa. Super. 2004):

     [R]eckless conduct will not support a finding of malice unless the
     conduct in question poses a very high likelihood that death or
     injury will result. For when such a considerable risk of injury or
     death has been created and then callously disregarded, the actor
     demonstrates that he essentially cares not whether he maims or

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      kills another, and when a person consciously creates such a high
      likelihood that injury or death will ensue, or continues his actions
      after realizing he has created such a risk, he exhibits the
      “wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart and cruelty” that is
      the hallmark of malice.

                                     ***

      Additionally, when one driving a vehicle creates a circumstance
      which virtually assures that injury or death will result, the driver
      often will be driving in such a fashion as to create a substantial
      risk that he will also be injured or killed. Consequently, unless the
      driver has essentially a “death wish,” or steamrolls through a
      crowd of pedestrians, it would seem unlikely that the recklessness
      would rise to the level sufficient to find malice.

Id. at 1213-14 (footnotes omitted).

      Further, in Kling, supra, this Court held that “a conviction based on

malice is appropriate where evidence demonstrates the element of sustained

recklessness by a driver in the face of an obvious risk of harm to his

victims.”   Kling, 731 A.2d at 149 (emphasis in original); see also id.

(emphasizing that motor vehicles “still outdistance firearms as the most

dangerous instrumentality in the hands of irresponsible persons in our society

today.”). We defined sustained recklessness as a pattern supported by the

facts and circumstances of a case which exhibits

      the sustained, purposeful recklessness necessary to prove a
      knowing and conscious disregard that death or serious bodily
      injury was reasonably certain to occur.            Indeed, these
      circumstances are facts which allow a [fact-finder] to [determine]
      the [defendant] had time and reason to calculate and reflect upon
      a deadly condition taking place, such that recklessness and malice
      exist.

Id. at 150 (quotation marks omitted).

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     Upon review of the record, I would conclude the Commonwealth

established Appellant’s “sustained, purposeful recklessness” and “knowing

and conscious disregard that death or serious bodily injury was reasonably

certain to occur.” See id. The evidence showed Appellant knew he would be

attending a holiday party, and was aware of alternate means of transportation

and overnight accommodations. See N.T., 9/15/21, at 83, 85, 89. Appellant

regularly took the train to Philadelphia. See N.T., 9/16/21, at 49, 86. On the

night of the party, a co-worker offered him a ride home, while other co-

workers used private transport services. See N.T., 9/14/21, at 114-15; N.T.,

9/16/21, at 85. This evidence, alone, would not establish malice.

     However, the evidence also showed the intoxicated Appellant could not

operate the payment machine in the parking garage, and damaged the garage

gate when he manually lifted the gate to exit. See N.T., 9/15/21, at 182-83,

185, 191-93; N.T., 9/16/21, at 75-76. Appellant’s difficulty in the parking

garage should have alerted him that he was too intoxicated to drive safely,

but he was not deterred. After Appellant began driving, there were numerous

indications which should have alerted him that continuing to drive while

impaired posed an extremely high and unjustifiable risk to others. Indeed,

Appellant committed numerous traffic violations, driving at an excessive

speed, twice missing his exit on I-95, and nearly colliding with two other

motorists prior to the fatal crash, prompting both motorists to call 911 to

report Appellant’s hazardous driving.   See N.T., 9/13/21, at 138-41, 151;

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N.T., 9/14/21, at 7, 10; N.T., 9/15/21, at 90.       Immediately prior to the

collision, Appellant admittedly took his eyes off the road while driving

115 mph (nearly double the posted speed limit), in an attempt to

retrieve his phone from the floor of the car. See N.T., 9/16/21, at 81-82, 91.

In other words, Appellant maliciously exhibited sustained recklessness prior

to the fatal crash, despite an obvious risk of harm to others. Kling, 731 A.2d

at 149 (“a conviction based on malice is appropriate where evidence

demonstrates the element of sustained recklessness by a driver in the face

of an obvious risk of harm to his victims.” (emphasis omitted)); see also

McHale, 858 A.2d at 1214 (an intoxicated driver’s reckless driving can “rise

to the level sufficient to find malice” where the driver has essentially a ‘death

wish’”). As the Commonwealth explained, “This is not an instance where the

driving under the influence of alcohol ‘standing alone’ constitutes malice.

Rather, it is Appellant’s repeated and continued decisions over a sustained

period of time that when combined constitute the requisite malice.”

Commonwealth Brief at 33; see also id. at 46 (“Appellant had repeated

opportunities to stop and reflect upon his choices.”).

      This Court has found the requisite malice for convictions of third-degree

murder and aggravated assault in similar circumstances. In Dunphy, supra,

the defendant drove after consuming a large amount of alcohol and struck and

killed a pedestrian attempting to cross the street. Dunphy, 20 A.3d at 1216-

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17. We held malice existed “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,”

id. at 1219, comprised of the following factors:

       •   “The intoxicated condition of appellant[] and the excessive
           rate of speed he was traveling on a street where pedestrians
           were present”;

       •   Appellant admitted “although he saw pedestrians in front of
           him, he speeded up to make the [red traffic] light”;

       •   Appellant’s flight from the scene after striking the victim; and

       •   “The absence of any testimony that there was a physical or
           climatic condition that would explain his failure to stop before
           or after the accident.”

Id. at 1219-20 (some capitalization altered).4 In support, we cited, inter alia,

Commonwealth           v.   Taylor,    337     A.2d   545   (Pa.   1975)   (plurality).

Summarizing Taylor’s holding, we explained:

       [E]vidence was sufficient to demonstrate malice based on the
       following factors: intoxicated condition of the driver; excessive
       rate of speed; distance the victim’s body was propelled;
       defendant’s awareness that children were present in the area; and
       absence of any physical or climate condition that would contribute
       to the accident or his failure to stop immediately after[.]

Dunphy, 20 A.3d at 1220.

       Further, and following careful review, the cases upon which Appellant

relies are distinguishable.         Appellant argues this case is governed by

____________________________________________

4 There was no evidence in Dunphy that prior to the collision, anyone
attempted to warn the defendant about his reckless driving. This further
undermines the Majority’s assertion of a “‘warning’ requirement of malice
necessary for third-degree murder and aggravated assault in the DUI
context.” Maj. at 13.

                                           -9-
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Commonwealth v. Comer, 716 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1998) (superseded by statute

on other grounds), McHale, supra, and Commonwealth v. Dellavecchia,

725 A.2d 186 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc). See Appellant’s Brief at 21-23.

These cases are primarily distinguishable because in the instant case, the

crash in “did not ensue immediately after the driver became aware of his life-

threatening conduct.”   Kling, 731 A.2d at 150 (distinguishing, inter alia,

Comer); cf. Comer, 716 A.2d at 595 (“immediately prior to the

accident[,]” appellant was driving “at a speed exceeding 45 m.p.h.” (the

posted speed limit), when his car went over a curb and struck pedestrians

(emphasis added)), and McHale, 858 A.2d at 1211 (intoxicated driver struck

pedestrians moments after starting his car and leaving parking spot).

Moreover, Appellant chose to excessively and recklessly exceed the speed

limit, at a rate drastically higher than that presented in Comer, McHale, and

Dellavecchia.

      I acknowledge this is a close case. However, the totality of the evidence

with respect to malice is not “so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of

law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.”

Commonwealth v. Lake, 281 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. 2022) (emphasis

added). The trial court properly defined “malice” for the jury; the court even

repeated its instruction on malice when the jury requested clarification. See

N.T., 9/17/21, at 32-34 & 72-74, and id. at 62 (in response to jury’s question

about malice, trial court clarifying, at the request of Appellant’s counsel:

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“[The defense] has never argued … that [Appellant] was …

intoxicated to a point where he could not … recognize what the

dangers were … or what risks weren’t present at the time he was

driving.” (emphasis added)).      Appellant was conscious of his impaired

condition and repeatedly disregarded the “extremely high risk that his actions

might cause death or serious bodily harm.”        Packer, 168 A.3d at 168

(citations and quotations omitted).

      Accordingly, I would affirm the jury’s convictions of third-degree murder

and aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 2702(a)(1).

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