Court Opinion

ID: 9762919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:33:52.377895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:38.472754
License: Public Domain

Levine, J.,

dissenting:

Because in my view it was erroneous and prejudicial to have included in the jury charge the “Declaration of policy” contained in Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 36B (a), I respectfully dissent from the plurality opinion.
While there may be nothing inherently wrong with the inclusion of a statement of legislative purpose in jury instructions, neither does such matter, even when stated in a preamble or “Declaration of policy,” bear the special stamp of validity which the majority seems to accord it here in adopting what it calls the “Massachusetts view.” Rather, an instruction concerning legislative purpose should be treated like any other, the question being in each case whether, under the circumstances, the instruction is calculated to advise the jury as to the law and enable them to apply it to such facts as they find to exist in a given case. When unnecessary, irrelevant or otherwise erroneous matter is included in an instruction, the question becomes whether, considering the charge as a whole, the erroneous matter was *589prejudicial to the defendant. See Bell v. United States, 185 F. 2d 302, 311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 930 (1951); Presley v. State, 257 Md. 591, 595, 263 A. 2d 822 (1970).
The “legislative facts” contained in the “Declaration of policy” read to the jury here were totally irrelevant to the issues raised at trial and, as the majority concedes, formed no part of the substantive crime with which the defendant was charged. Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Yol.) Art. 27, § 36B (d), for the violation of which the defendant was convicted, provides:
“Any person who shall use a handgun in the commission of any felony or any crime of violence as defined in § 441 of this article, shall be guilty of a separate misdemeanor . .. .”
The indictment charged armed robbery and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. The first issue for the jury to consider, therefore, was whether the defendant had committed the crime of armed robbery. A decision against the defendant on that issue raised the single additional issue, and the only question which should have been put to the jury in the charge, whether in committing the armed robbery the defendant had used a handgun.
Though the act proscribed by Art. 27, § 36B (d) is both totally uncomplicated and clearly set forth in the statute, the trial judge nonetheless felt it necessary to include in his charge the “Declaration of policy” contained in § 36B (a) and set out in the opinion of the majority. In that “Declaration of policy,” read in its entirety to the jury, the Legislature “found and declared” that “[t]here has, in recent years, been an alarming increase in the number of violent crimes perpetrated in Maryland,” resulting in “a substantial increase in the number of persons killed or injured,” and further, that “[t]he laws currently in force have not been effective . . . [in] preserving] the peace and tranquility of the State. . . .” In my view, this “crime-in-the-streets” oration was not only irrelevant and unnecessary, but also had a pronounced tendency to inflame the jury by arousing its anger and fear and otherwise to divert the minds of its *590members from the issue of this defendant’s guilt. See Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643, 652, 65 A. 2d 316 (1949). The erroneous inclusion of such matter, attended by so clear a possibility of prejudice, should not be allowed to stand uncorrected. I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.
A possible explanation for including the “Declaration of policy” in the charge, as pointed out by the majority, is that the trial judge may have felt it necessary to clarify an apparent dichotomy in the crimes charged. Even assuming, however, that the majority is correct in observing that a jury might, under the circumstances, perceive some ambiguity in the separate charges of armed robbery and use of a handgun in the commission of an armed robbery, and conceding the necessity for clarification, the instruction actually given was nonetheless unjustified. The desired clarification could have been accomplished quickly and simply by stating that these crimes were considered sufficiently dangerous to be deemed separate offenses and that conviction for both, if warranted by the facts, was possible. See People v. Nicoll, 3 App. Div. 2d 64, 158 N.Y.S.2d 279, 295 (1956).
The assertion by the majority, citing Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 326 A. 2d 707 (1974), that there- could be no prejudice here because the “facts” recited were “common knowledge” is simply not a sufficient answer. These “facts” were not facts at issue in the case and were, therefore, patently irrelevant. Moreover, if these “facts” were within the common knowledge of the jury, the only purpose served by reciting them would be to emphasize them by repetition, thereby attributing to them even greater weight than they would otherwise have had, magnifying the prejudice and further misleading the jury. See Ager v. Baltimore Transit Co., 213 Md. 414, 423, 132 A. 2d 469 (1957). Created was a real possibility for the jury to conclude that it would “be particularly astute to convict” the defendant of the crimes charged. State v. Waletich, 51 S. D. 209, 213 N. W. 21, 22 (1927). Such apparent “roving unrestrained authority to convict the defendant” was condemned by the Arizona *591Supreme Court in State v. Locks, 94 Ariz. 134, 382 P. 2d 241, 244 (1963).
It is likewise insufficient to assert that the “Declaration of policy” could have been read to the jury by the state’s attorney. First, the premise that a prosecuting attorney could read such a statement to the jury is doubtful at best. It is improper for a prosecuting attorney to include in his remarks facts which are plainly inadmissible at trial. Clarke v. State, 238 Md. 11, 20, 207 A. 2d 456 (1965). This is particularly true where, as here, those remarks are “likely or apt to instigate prejudice against the accused.” Contee v. State, 223 Md. 575, 584, 165 A. 2d 889 (1960). The “legislative facts” contained in the “Declaration of policy” were plainly irrelevant to the issue whether the defendant in this case committed the acts charged in the indictment. See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 643-46, 350 A. 2d 665 (1976).
Here, however, the prejudice arising out of the presentation of these extraneous “facts” contained in the “Declaration of policy” is exacerbated by the fact that they were recited not by the prosecuting attorney, but rather by the trial judge. Thus, the remarks were accompanied by the imprimatur of the court, adding to the weight given these facts by the jury. Hardison v. State, 226 Md. 53, 62, 172 A. 2d 407 (1961); see Commonwealth v. Moyers, 280 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Ky. 1955).
Nor is the charge here saved by the fact that the § 36B “Declaration of policy” has been treated in a judicial opinion. While it may be proper in some cases for the court to read to the jury from appellate decisions, such a practice is not favored. In fact, this Court has on more than one occasion held that it was inappropriate to include in jury instructions quotations from appellate decisions. See, e.g., State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 186, 345 A. 2d 436 (1975), and cases cited therein.
The final point made by the majority concerns Maryland’s unique constitutional provision, Article XV, § 5, which makes the jury in a criminal case the “Judges of Law” as well as of the facts. This provision, says the majority, *592justifies such comments as were made here concerning the “alarming increase in the number of violent crimes” as “aids” for the jury in interpreting the relevant statutory provision. Impliedly, then, the majority holds that the prosecutor could introduce any such “legislative facts,” however irrelevant to the guilt of a defendant in a given case, so long as those “facts” might be relevant in showing the legislative purpose in enacting the statute. Such a principle is fraught with dangers to the rights of the accused.
But whatever the merits of the principle espoused by the majority in a proper case, and leaving aside questions of the validity of Article XV, § 5 under the Federal Constitution, at least as so applied, it has no application here. No problem of statutory construction or application is mentioned by the majority, which can only lead one to conclude, especially in light of the simplicity and clarity of the statute, that no such problem exists. Indeed, the Court of Special Appeals has observed that the legislative intent with respect to § 36B (d) is “pellucid.” Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 344, 307 A. 2d 503, Md. cert. denied, 269 Md. 755 (1973), U. S. cert. denied, 415 U. S. 930 (1974). It is axiomatic that where a statute is clear and unambiguous, no other indicia of intent or meaning need be consulted. Comptroller v. A. Cyanamid Co., 240 Md. 491, 506-07, 214 A. 2d 596 (1965); Md. Medical Service v. Carver, 238 Md. 466, 478, 209 A. 2d 582 (1965); Board of Sup. v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A. 2d 734 (1958).
There being no problem of construction or application of the statute in this case, no other use of the “Declaration of policy” by the jury was proper. Article XV, § 5 does not confer upon the jury the right to enact new law or ignore existing law. See Hamilton and Fletcher v. State, 12 Md. App. 91, 98, 277 A. 2d 460 (1971), aff'd, 265 Md. 256, 257, 288 A. 2d 885, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1006 (1972). At most, Article XV,' § 5 was intended to provide that in a criminal case the jury was “not bound to abide by the interpretation of the court of the meaning of a law,” but was “free to construe and apply it according to their own judgments.” *593Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236, 246 (1858); accord, Wilson v. State, 239 Md. 245, 254, 210 A. 2d 824 (1965).
Nothing in the foregoing, I suggest, is in conflict with the cases cited by the majority as establishing or following the “Massachusetts view.” In fact, I doubt the existence of a “Massachusetts view,” such as described by the majority and the Court of Special Appeals, which holds that in all cases it is proper for the court to include in its instructions a statement of the legislative purpose in enacting the statute. In Commonwealth v. Sansone, 252 Mass. 71, 147 N. E. 574, 575 (1925), apparently the origin of the “Massachusetts view,” the court simply stated, without discussion, that it was not error for the trial court to state the legislative purpose. There, it appears that the trial court was attempting to give meaning to a statute which proscribed “so driving an automobile that the lives and safety of the public might be endangered,” id. at 574, this apparently only to dispel any notion that all driving might be in violation of the statute.
The second Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 361 Mass. 6, 277 N.E.2d 826, 831 (1972), while citing Sansone, makes it clear the court was deciding that the instruction at issue, which included a statement of the legislative purpose, was harmless when considered in light of all the circumstances of the case and the charge viewed as a whole. It is significant that the Massachusetts court, like the majority here, noted that the statement' of the legislative purpose was “wholly unnecessary” and that it would have been wiser if the court had omitted it from the charge. And finally, the charge in People v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P. 2d 355, 362 n.1 (1953), the last case cited by the majority, was, in context, wholly innocuous. All the trial court said there was “that the basic purpose of the Juvenile Court Law is to safeguard children.”
In sum, I question the existence of a “Massachusetts view” which permits the trial court in all cases to state to the jury the legislative purpose in enacting a statute. Rather, such an instruction must be tested by the same standard as any *594other instruction. I would hold, therefore, that the instruction in this case was both erroneous and prejudicial.
Judge Eldridge authorizes me to say that he concurs in the views expressed herein.