Court Opinion

ID: 9939382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 21:03:03.174118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:11.767040
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/24 In re Madison W. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 In re MADISON W. et al.,                                     B323340
 Persons Coming Under the                                     (Los Angeles County
 Juvenile Court Law.                                          Super. Ct. No.
                                                              22CCJP01775)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 MORIYA B. et al.,

            Defendants and
            Appellants.
In re JACKSON F., a Person          B328767
Coming Under the Juvenile           (Los Angeles County
Court Law.                          Super. Ct. No.
                                    22CCJP01775)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

      v.

MORIYA B.,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEALS from the orders of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and dismissed in part as moot.
      Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Moriya B.
      Linda S. Votaw, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Cammron F.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              ___________________________________

                               2
       On July 25, 2022 the juvenile court sustained a first
amended petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), and former
subdivision (b)(1),1 finding the history of domestic violence
between Moriya B. and her boyfriend Cammron F. placed the
couple’s three-year-old son Jackson F. and Moriya’s 13-year-old
daughter Madison W. at substantial risk of harm. The court also
found Cammron’s history of substance abuse and current abuse
of alcohol placed Jackson at substantial risk of harm. At the
same hearing, the court declared Madison a dependent child of
the court, terminated jurisdiction, and entered a final custody
order awarding joint legal custody of Madison to Moriya and
Madison’s father, Matthew W., and awarding sole physical
custody to Matthew. On October 13, 2022, at a continued
disposition hearing as to Jackson, the court declared Jackson a
dependent child of the court and removed him from Moriya’s and
Cammron’s custody.
       On appeal, Moriya contends there was insufficient evidence
to support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding that the
domestic violence between Moriya and Cammron placed Madison
at substantial risk of harm and the disposition order removing
Madison from Moriya. Moriya also appeals the disposition order

1     The Legislature amended section 300, effective January 1,
2023, in part by revising subdivision (b)(1) to specify in separate
subparagraphs ways in which a child may come within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court due to the failure or inability of
the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or care for
the child. Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                  3
as to Jackson, arguing his removal from her custody was not
supported by substantial evidence and the court abused its
discretion by ordering monitored visitation. Cammron filed a
brief joining the arguments raised in Moriya’s appeal as to
Jackson’s removal. Finally, Moriya appeals the court’s refusal to
provide enhancement services to her at the time Jackson was
returned to Cammron’s custody and its order transferring the
case to Riverside County. While the appeals were pending, the
juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Jackson and granted
Cammron sole legal and physical custody.
       On Moriya’s appeal regarding Madison, we reverse the
jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (a), affirm the
finding under former subdivision (b)(1), dismiss the challenge to
the disposition order as moot, and affirm the final custody order.
We dismiss Moriya’s and Cammron’s appeals of the disposition
orders regarding Jackson as moot. We affirm the orders denying
enhancement services and transferring the case to Riverside.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On May 9, 2022 the Department filed a petition under
section 300, subdivision (a), and former subdivision (b)(1),
asserting identical allegations under both subdivisions that
Moriya and Cammron had a history of engaging in violent
altercations in front of Jackson. Specifically, the petition alleged
that, during a March 2022 altercation, Moriya had “repeatedly
struck [Cammron’s] genitals with [a] Taser” while she was
holding Jackson. After Moriya tripped and fell on top of Jackson,
Cammron dragged Moriya out of the home by the wrist.

                                 4
Madison, who lived primarily with Matthew,2 was not home at
the time of the incident. The petition alleged Moriya’s and
Cammron’s behavior endangered the children’s physical health
and safety, placing them at risk of serious physical harm.
       A few days after the petition was filed, another domestic
dispute occurred between Moriya and Cammron. On May 13,
2022 Madison spent the night at her mother’s home. In the
middle of the night, Madison woke up to the sounds of Moriya
and Cammron arguing. She went back to sleep but woke up
again at 5:30 a.m. to the sounds of arguing. She saw that one of
the bedroom doors had been broken off its hinges. Matthew told
the Department social worker that Madison was upset by the
incident and was crying when she returned to Matthew’s home
that morning. During the detention hearing on May 23, 2022,
Madison’s counsel told the court Madison did not feel safe in her
mother’s home.
       On July 22, 2022 the Department filed a first amended
petition that contained the allegations from the initial petition
and added an allegation that Cammron had a history of
substance abuse and was a current abuser of alcohol. The
Department alleged multiple domestic violence incidents had
occurred, at least one in the presence of Jackson and Madison,
while Cammron was under the influence of alcohol. The first
amended petition alleged this behavior placed Jackson at risk of
serious physical harm.
       At the July 25, 2022 jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the first amended

2     Moriya and Matthew had an informal custody arrangement
pursuant to which Madison lived primarily with Matthew and
visited Moriya on some weekends and holidays.

                                5
petition. Proceeding to disposition as to Madison, the court
declared her a dependent of the court under section 300 and
removed her from Moriya’s custody. At the same hearing the
court found the conditions justifying the initial assumption of
jurisdiction no longer existed, terminated jurisdiction, and
entered a final custody order granting joint legal custody of
Madison to Moriya and Matthew and awarding sole physical
custody to Matthew with unmonitored visitation for Moriya.
Moriya timely appealed.
       At the continued disposition hearing for Jackson on
October 13, 2022, the juvenile court declared Jackson a
dependent child of the court under section 300 and removed him
from Moriya’s and Cammron’s custody. The court ordered
monitored visitation for Moriya and unmonitored visitation for
Cammron. Moriya’s court-ordered case plan required her to
complete 10 drug tests, 12 weeks of a domestic violence program,
parenting classes, and individual counseling. Moriya and
Cammron timely appealed.
       In reports prepared prior to the six-month review hearing,
the Department stated it had been unable to reach Moriya
despite multiple attempts to contact her by telephone, text
message, mail, and home visits. Moriya had missed all of her
court-ordered drug tests and had not provided any information
regarding enrollment or progress in court-ordered programs.
Jackson’s caregiver (Moriya’s mother) reported Moriya visited
Jackson multiple times per week depending on her work schedule
and had video calls with him when she could not visit. According
to Cammron, Moriya said she did not trust the Department, she
was unwilling to have any contact with the social worker, and she
had blocked the social worker’s phone number. Both Cammron

                               6
and the caregiver had urged Moriya to call the social worker, but
to no avail. Cammron told the social worker Moriya was not
seeking reunification with Jackson. Cammron also informed the
social worker he had moved to Riverside County for work. The
Department recommended the juvenile court return Jackson to
Cammron’s custody and transfer the case to Riverside.
       The six-month review hearing was held on April 18, 2023.
Moriya did not appear, but her counsel stated she did not object
to the Department’s recommendation to release Jackson to
Cammron’s custody. She did object to the request to transfer the
case to Riverside. The juvenile court released Jackson to
Cammron’s custody. While the court commended Moriya for her
regular visitation, it found Moriya had not made any progress on
her case plan. At the conclusion of the hearing, Moriya’s counsel
inquired whether the court would order enhancement services for
Moriya. The court declined based on Moriya’s failure to make
progress on her case plan. Moriya’s counsel responded, “Note my
objection.” Moriya filed a timely notice of appeal.
       On July 11, 2023 the juvenile court held a hearing on the
Department’s motion to transfer the case to Riverside. Moriya
again did not appear, but her attorney objected to the transfer
because Moriya lived in Los Angeles County. The court granted
the motion to transfer, and Moriya again timely appealed.3

3     We consolidated the appeal regarding Madison with the
appeals from Jackson’s disposition order. We separately
consolidated Moriya’s appeal from the order made at the six-
month review hearing as to Jackson denying Moriya
enhancement services and from the order transferring the case to
Riverside. We consider the appeals together in this opinion.

                                7
      On October 17, 2023, the juvenile court of Riverside County
found the conditions justifying the initial assumption of
jurisdiction over Jackson no longer existed. The court terminated
jurisdiction, staying its order pending receipt of a juvenile
custody order. On October 30, 2023 the court terminated
jurisdiction over Jackson and entered a final custody order
granting sole legal and physical custody of Jackson to Cammron
and ordering “[n]o visits to Mother until she presents herself to
Family Law Court.”4 Neither Moriya nor Cammron has appealed
from the order terminating jurisdiction over Jackson or the final
custody order, and their time to do so has expired.

                          DISCUSSION

A.     Governing Law and Standard of Review
      Section 300, subdivision (a), provides that jurisdiction may
be assumed if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.”
“Nonaccidental” generally means a parent or guardian “acted
intentionally or willfully.” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629
(R.T.).)
      Section 300, former subdivision (b)(1), authorizes the
juvenile court to assume jurisdiction when “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or

4     On our own motion we take judicial notice of the
October 17, 2023 minute order and the October 30, 2023 final
custody order entered by the Riverside County Superior Court.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

                                 8
inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise
or protect the child . . . or by the willful or negligent failure of the
parent to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter,
or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or
guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s
or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or
substance abuse.”
       “A jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
requires the Department to prove three elements: (1) the parent’s
or guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect
the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness
or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re
Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601 (Cole L.); accord, In re
L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848; see R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at
p. 624 [“section 300(b)(1) authorizes dependency jurisdiction
without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her
failure or inability to supervise or protect her child”].) “Although
section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk
of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the
court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the
child.” (Cole L., at pp. 601-602; accord, In re L.O. (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238 [“‘Although there must be a present risk
of harm to the minor, the juvenile court may consider past events
to determine whether the child is presently in need of juvenile
court protection.’”].) “A parent’s “‘[p]ast conduct may be probative
of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the
conduct will continue.’” (Cole L., at p. 602; accord, In re J.A.
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048.)

                                   9
       We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings for
substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (In re I.C.
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892; R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633 [“‘In
reviewing the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we look to
see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them.’”].) Substantial evidence is “evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (In re I.C., at p. 892;
accord, Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602.) “‘[W]e draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.’” (R.T., at p. 633; accord, In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773; Cole L., at p. 602 [“while substantial evidence may consist of
inferences, any inferences must rest on the evidence; inferences
based on speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding”].)
“The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of
a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or
orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206; accord, In re
D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328-329.)

B.     Mootness and Dependency Appeals
       “A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) “A case becomes moot when events
‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in
favor of plaintiff, to grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.”’
[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be

                                  10
met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (Ibid.) In other
words, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible
impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.] It
follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must
first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in
legal status.” (Id. at p. 277.) “Although a jurisdictional finding
that a parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally
stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to
sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect
on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being redressed by
a favorable court decision.” (Ibid.)
       Even where an appeal is moot, however, “courts may
exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the
dispute.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) The Supreme Court
explained that reviewing courts will generally exercise their
discretion when the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur, there may be a recurrence of the
controversy between the parties, or a material question remains
for the court to determine. (Ibid.) The court also identified
additional factors reviewing courts may evaluate when
considering whether to exercise their discretion to decide a moot
case, including whether a challenged jurisdiction finding could
impact current or future dependency proceedings, and the nature
of the allegations against the parent (with more egregious
findings showing a parent’s greater interest in challenging the
findings). (Id. at pp. 285-286.) In addition, courts may consider
why the appeal became moot; for example, principles of fairness
may favor discretionary review of cases rendered moot “by the

                                 11
prompt compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (Id. at p. 286.)
“It would perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness
doctrine resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional
findings only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the
court has issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)

C.    Moriya’s Appeal of the Jurisdiction Findings and
      Disposition Orders as to Madison

      1.     Termination of juvenile court jurisdiction over
             Madison does not moot Moriya’s appeal of the
             jurisdiction findings
      Moriya’s appeal as to Madison challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings
and the disposition order removing Madison from Moriya’s
custody. In her supplemental letter brief,5 Moriya argues the
appeal is not moot because the jurisdiction findings and removal
order served as the basis for the court’s final custody order, which
she has also appealed. The Department declines to take a
position on mootness.
      In her notice of appeal, Moriya checked the boxes on the
Judicial Council’s approved form JV-800, notice of appeal-
juvenile, stating her intent to appeal the juvenile court’s
section 360 declaration of dependency and removal of custody

5      On November 2, 2023 we requested the parties address in
supplemental briefing whether the juvenile court’s orders
terminating jurisdiction over Madison and Jackson and entering
final custody orders mooted Moriya’s appeal regarding Madison
and Moriya’s and Cammron’s appeals from the disposition orders
as to Jackson.

                                 12
from a parent, as well as the boxes for appeal of section 300
jurisdiction findings and “other orders.” The notice of appeal
attached the minute order from the hearing at which the
jurisdiction findings, disposition order, termination order, and
final custody order were made, although it did not attach a copy
of the final custody order. We liberally construe the appeal of
“other orders” to include an appeal from the orders terminating
jurisdiction over Madison and awarding sole physical custody to
Matthew. (See K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020)
8 Cal.5th 875, 882 [“Rule 8.100(a)(2)’s liberal construction
requirement reflects the long-standing ‘“law of this state that
notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the
right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was
trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not
possibly have been misled or prejudiced.”’”]; see also Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).)
       Because we construe Moriya’s notice of appeal to include an
appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding
sole physical custody to Matthew, Moriya’s appeal from the
jurisdiction findings is not moot. (See In re Rashad D. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 156, 159 [“[T]ermination of dependency
jurisdiction does not necessarily moot an appeal from a
jurisdiction finding that directly results in an adverse juvenile
custody order. But in most cases, including the one at bar, for
this court to be able to provide effective relief, the parent must
appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and disposition
order but also from the orders terminating jurisdiction and
modifying the parent’s prior custody status. Without the second
appeal, we cannot correct the continuing adverse consequences of

                                13
the allegedly erroneous jurisdiction finding.”]; accord, In re
Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 225.)

      2.     Substantial evidence does not support the jurisdiction
             finding under section 300, subdivision (a)
       As we explained in Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 603,
“Under certain circumstances incidents of domestic violence
between a child’s parents, if they occur in the child’s immediate
presence, may support a jurisdiction finding under section 300,
subdivision (a). [Citation.] For example, if a father strikes an
infant’s mother while she is holding the child or an older child
intervenes during a fight to protect her mother from her father’s
abuse, the risk of harm to the child may be properly viewed as
nonaccidental.” However, the “potential for accidental injury
during parents’ physically violent fights in the presence of
bystander children,” without more, is insufficient to establish
dependency jurisdiction under subdivision (a). (Cole L., at p. 603
[“[a]n unintended injury to a bystander child that results from an
intentional act directed at another—for example, due to an object
thrown by one parent at another during an argument—does not
satisfy that statutory requirement [of nonaccidental injury under
subdivision (a)]”].)
       Here, Madison was not present for the March 2022
altercation and, while she was in the home during the May 2022
incident, she was in her bedroom and did not witness any
domestic violence as it occurred—she only heard arguing and saw
the door had been broken off its hinges. Accordingly, there was
no evidence any violence took place in Madison’s presence, let
alone under circumstances that would support a finding of
substantial risk that Madison would suffer serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally. (See Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at

                                 14
p. 604 [evidence did not support jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (a), where children were asleep in their bedroom
during domestic violence incident].)

      3.     Substantial evidence supports the jurisdiction finding
             under section 300, former subdivision (b)(1)
        Exposure to domestic violence, even absent the threat of
nonaccidental injury, may serve as the basis for dependency
jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (See In re
T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 [“[e]ven though [the child]
had not been physically harmed, the cycle of violence between the
parents constituted a failure to protect her”]; In re R.C. (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 930, 942 [“‘“Both common sense and expert
opinion indicate spousal abuse is detrimental to children.”’”]; In
re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.th 453, 460-461 [“‘domestic violence in
the same household where children are living is neglect; it is a
failure to protect [them] from the substantial risk of encountering
the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from
it’”].)
        Moriya does not deny she engaged in physical altercations
with Cammron in March and May 2022, although Moriya and
Cammron have made inconsistent statements regarding what
occurred during the incidents. Nonetheless, Moriya argues the
evidence did not establish Madison was at current risk of harm at
the time of the jurisdiction hearing because Madison lived
primarily with Matthew and was safe in his care. Moriya’s
contention ignores the May 2022 incident, at which time Moriya
was living with Matthew but spending the night with Moriya; the
altercation between Moriya and Cammron resulted in Madison
feeling unsafe in Moriya’s home. In addition, despite the recent
significant incidents of domestic violence, Moriya and Cammron

                                15
continued to be in a relationship, and there was evidence Moriya
did not understand the impact these violent incidents had on her
children. For example, two weeks before the May 2022 incident,
Moriya told the Department social worker that the Department’s
involvement was “excessive” and the children were not in any
danger. Finally, the fact that Madison lived primarily with
Matthew certainly mitigated her risk of future harm, but a
significant risk nonetheless remained. Accordingly, substantial
evidence supported the court’s finding of jurisdiction under
section 300, former subdivision (b)(1).

      4.     Termination of juvenile court jurisdiction over
             Madison moots Moriya’s appeal of the disposition
             order
       Moriya’s challenge to the disposition order is moot because
she is no longer subject to any orders made at disposition, which
have been superseded by the juvenile court’s order terminating
jurisdiction and the final custody order. Because the disposition
order is no longer in effect, we cannot provide any relief that will
have a practical, tangible impact. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 276-277.)
       While a reviewing court has discretion to reach the merits
of a moot issue in certain circumstances, Moriya has not asked us
to exercise that discretion or identified any factors warranting
our exercise of discretion. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282;
In re Gael C., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 225-226.)

      5.    Moriya has forfeited any challenge to the final custody
            order
      While we liberally construe Moriya’s notice of appeal to
include an appeal of the final custody order, Moriya has not

                                16
presented in her opening, reply, or supplemental briefs any legal
or factual arguments challenging the order. In particular, she
has not addressed why the final custody order was not in
Madison’s best interest or how the juvenile court abused its
discretion in awarding sole physical custody to Matthew. (See
In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 965 [when making a
juvenile court custody order, “it is the best interests of the child,
in the context of the peculiar facts of the case before the court,
which are paramount”]; see also In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
835, 863 [juvenile court custody and visitation orders reviewed
for abuse of discretion].)
       To the contrary, Moriya principally argues in her appellate
briefs that substantial evidence does not support the disposition
order removing Madison from her care because Madison was safe
in Matthew’s care. Accordingly, Moriya has forfeited or
abandoned any argument the juvenile court abused its discretion
in entering the final custody order. (See In re Rashad D., supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at p. 167 [failure to appeal orders terminating
jurisdiction and awarding custody “forfeited any challenge to
those rulings”]; see also Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
640, 653 [“An appellant abandons an issue by failing to raise it in
the opening brief.”].)

D.     Termination of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction over Jackson
       Moots Moriya’s and Cammron’s Appeals of the Disposition
       Order as to Jackson
       Moriya’s and Cammron’s appeals challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s disposition order
removing Jackson from their custody. Moriya also argues the
court abused its discretion by ordering her visits to be monitored.
Neither parent challenges the court’s jurisdiction findings. As

                                 17
discussed, because the disposition orders have been superseded
by entry of the final custody order, Moriya and Cammron are no
longer subject to any orders made at disposition. Accordingly, we
are unable to provide any effective relief. (See D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 276-277.) In addition, Cammron has already
received the outcome he seeks on appeal—return of Jackson to
his custody.
      Finally, Moriya argues we should exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of her appeal because, due to Jackson’s young
age, “a recurrence of the underlying controversy likely will recur”
and the “jurisdictional findings as to Moriya, if erroneous, could
have severe and unfair consequences to both Jackson and Moriya
in future court proceedings.” However, this potential harm is
speculative (see D.P., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 285),6 and, as
discussed, Moriya has not challenged the jurisdiction findings as
to Jackson.

E.     The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
       Enhancement Services to Moriya in Jackson’s Case
       Moriya argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when
it declined to order enhancement services for Moriya at the six-
month review hearing when the court returned Jackson to
Cammron’s custody. Enhancement services are “‘child welfare
services offered to the parent not retaining custody, designed to

6      Moriya relies on In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713,
for the proposition that we should exercise our discretion to
review moot findings where those findings could have unfair
consequences in future court proceedings. However, in D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278, the Supreme Court disapproved In re
Daisy H. “to the extent it held . . . that speculative future harm is
sufficient to avoid mootness.”

                                 18
enhance the child’s relationship with that parent.’” (In re C.S.
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 636; accord, In re Destiny D. (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 197, 212-213.) “Enhancement services” are not
defined by statute but are authorized by the court’s general
authority to “make any and all reasonable orders for the care,
supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the
child.” (§ 362, subd. (a); see C.S., at p. 637; In re A.L. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 138, 142, fn. 2.) Accordingly, an order for
enhancement services is subject to the court’s discretion. (C.S.,
at p. 637; Destiny D., at p. 212.)
       Even if not forfeited for failure to sufficiently object in the
juvenile court,7 Moriya’s argument is without merit. The court
found Moriya had failed to make any progress on her court-
ordered case plan and refused to have any communication with
the Department. Moriya has not disputed those findings on
appeal. There is no indication in the record that Moriya was
willing to participate in enhancement services, nor did she
suggest any particular services that would benefit the family.
Given her refusal to participate in prior services, the court’s
refusal to provide additional services was neither arbitrary nor
irrational. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 [under
abuse of discretion standard, order must be affirmed unless
juvenile court has “‘“exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd

7     As discussed, Moriya’s counsel made only a general
objection to the denial of enhancement services. Such objections
“are insufficient to preserve issues for review. [Citation.] The
objection must state the ground or grounds upon which the
objection is based.” (In re E.A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787, 790;
accord, In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672.)

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determination”’”]; In re Destiny D., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at
p. 213 [same].)

                         DISPOSITION

       With respect to Moriya’s appeal as to Madison: (1) the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (a), is reversed; (2) the jurisdiction finding pursuant
to section 300, former subdivision (b)(1), and the July 25, 2022
final custody order are affirmed; and (3) Moriya’s appeal of the
disposition order is dismissed as moot. Moriya’s and Cammron’s
appeals of the disposition order with respect to Jackson are
dismissed as moot. The orders in Jackson’s case denying Moriya
enhancement services and transferring the case to Riverside are
affirmed.

                                     FEUER, J.
We concur:

      SEGAL, Acting P. J.

      MARTINEZ, J.

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