Court Opinion

ID: 9593175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:20:21.897544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:48.550220
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The question presented is whether, where, as stipulated, the insured was insane and did not have the mental capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or form the requisite mental intent to commit murder or an assault, the injury caused by the insured was "expected or intended” within the meaning of an exclusion to a homeowner’s liability policy.
I would hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that where the insured lacked the mental capacity to intend or expect the consequences of his actions, the policy exclusion for "expected or intended” injuries does not relieve the insurer of its duty to defend and indemnify the insured in the underlying actions.
I would further hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the circuit judge’s ruling that on the basis of the evidentiary record so far made there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the insured lacked the mental capacity to intend or expect the consequences of his actions *581within the meaning of the policy exclusion, and that therefore summary disposition may not be entered for the insured.
I
Harry Gordon Frost, Jr., announced that he intended to kill Gary Churchman, and then kill himself. Frost then proceeded to Churchman’s home, shot and killed him, and then shot and killed himself. Actions in tort were commenced against Frost’s estate for loss caused by the shooting.
Frost is the named insured under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Auto-Owners commenced this declaratory judgment action contending that it was not obliged to provide coverage.
It appears that Frost was a paranoid schizophrenic most of his life. For the purposes of this declaratory judgment action only, Auto-Owners and Churchman stipulated:
Frost was insane and did not have the mental capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or form the requisite mental intent to commit murder or some type of an assault.[1]
*582Auto-Owners moved for summary disposition contending that there was not a genuine issue of material fact concerning the nature and character of the shooting incident, and that Frost’s intent or expectation to cause bodily harm could be inferred from his actions as a matter of law.
The judge, after finding no binding Michigan case law deciding the issue, examined case law in other states, adopted the "majority standard,” and denied Auto-Owners’ motion for summary disposition and entered summary disposition in favor of the defendants who are the plaintiffs in the tort actions.2 The Court of Appeals affirmed.3
II
The policy obligates the insurer to pay all sums that Frost becomes legally obligated to pay because of "bodily injury,” but does not cover bodily injury "expected or intended” by Frost.4
*583The policy is not an "occurrence based” policy. There is, thus, no issue whether the facts as stipulated are an "occurrence” under the policy. The only issue presented is whether, assuming the facts as stipulated, the mental incapacity of the insured might preclude applying the exclusion for intended or expected injuries.
I agree with the majority that in applying the exclusion for injury "expected or intended by an insured person,” the expectation or intention of the insured is to be considered from the insured’s subjective point of view. This is consistent with Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins Co v DiCicco, 432 Mich 656; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), where a majority of this Court ruled that the language of a similar exclusionary clause5 unambiguously required a subjective standard.
I disagree with the decision of the majority that if an insane or mentally ill person is capable of intending or expecting the consequences of his actions, then, although he lacks, by reason of insanity, the mental capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or to form the requisite intent to commit murder, the exclusionary "expected or intended” language applies and coverage under the policy is precluded._
*584III
Most courts that have considered the question have ruled that an insane person cannot intentionally cause injury so as to exclude the resulting loss from coverage under an insurance policy containing an "intentional or expected” injury exclusion.
These courts have observed that such an exclusionary provision, which is to be strictly construed against the insurer, seeks to preclude persons from benefiting financially when they deliberately cause injury. A person who lacks the capacity to conform his behavior to acceptable standards will not be deterred by the exclusionary "expected or intended” language. Some of these cases have said that an "insane person cannot commit an intentional act within the meaning of the intentional injury exclusion clause.”6 In all these cases, it was a question of fact whether the person was indeed so insane.
In Ruvolo v American Casualty Co, 39 NJ 490; 189 A2d 204 (1963), the insured shot and killed a business associate, and was committed to a mental hospital after being found to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. The examining psychiatrists said that his mental disorder
"rendered him incapable of distinguishing right *585from wrong, that his insight and judgment were defective, that he was possessed with delusions of persecution, and that he did not at the time know the nature or quality of his acts and lacked the mental capacity to control his conduct.” [Id. at 494-495.]
The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the insurer’s argument that coverage for the resulting wrongful death actions was precluded because the insured intentionally caused the victim’s death. The court said:
In applying the exclusionary provision, however, whether in a life, accident, liability or fire policy, it has come to be commonly accepted that where the death or loss involved, be it of the insured or caused by the insured, is the product of an insane act, recovery is not barred. ... In this context, however, the critical, or precise, problem is the nature or extent of the mental incapacity necessary to transmute the character of the act involved from intentional to insane.
We have no doubt that if a homicidal act of an insured is of such character as to excuse him from criminal responsibility because of insanity, i.e., because at the time of its commission he did not have the mental capacity to understand the nature and quality of his act, or to be able to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to it, the killing should not be considered "intentional” within the meaning of the defendant’s policy. [Id. at 496-498.][7]
In Globe American Casualty Co v Lyons, 131 Ariz 337, 343; 641 P2d 251 (1982), the insured, who. was mentally ill, "intentionally caused” an automobile collision. The court said that "[i]n light of *586the overwhelming testimony that [the insured] was unable to act in accordance with reason at the time of the collision,” coverage under the policy was not precluded by the exclusionary clause. The court explained:
To hold, as [the insurer] argues, that mental illness is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether an act is "intentional” is inconsistent with long standing policy considerations in insurance law. Exclusionary provisions are to be strictly construed against an insurer. . . . Furthermore, to deny coverage for acts caused by an individual lacking the mental capacity to act rationally is inconsistent with a primary purpose for incorporating intentional injury exclusions into insurance policies, i.e., to preclude individuals from benefiting financially when they deliberately cause injury. . . . An individual who lacks the capacity to conform his behavior to acceptable standards will not be deterred by the existence or nonexistence of insurance coverage for the consequences of his acts. [Id. at 339-340.][8]
In addition to the Supreme Court of New Jersey9 and the courts in Arizona,10 courts in California,11 Colorado,12 Connecticut,13 Florida,14 *587Illinois,15 Indiana,16 Kentucky,17 Louisiana,18 Ohio,19 and Washington20 have similarly held that where the insured is insane, his actions may not be treated as intentional for the purposes of the exclusionary clause.21
IV
The Court of Appeals has divided on this issue.22 *588The majority adopts the holding and reasoning of the panel in Transamerica Ins Corp of America v Boughton, 177 Mich App 253, 258-259; 440 NW2d 922 (1989),23 that "the acts of a person deemed insane may be intentional within the meaning of an intentional and expected’ acts exclusion.”24
The majority also relies on the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Johnson v Ins Co of North America, 232 Va 340; 350 SE2d 616 (1986).25 The insured pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity of shooting and seriously injuring another person. The insurer argued that coverage was precluded under the exclusionary clause because the insured "knew” that he had a gun, that his victim was in front of him, and that he was pulling the trigger. The court found that the exclusion applied because the insured "intended” the act of shooting.26
V
In sum, I would hold that where an insane or *589mentally ill person commits an act that results in injury, and — as stipulated here by the parties — did not have the mental capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or form the requisite mental intent to commit murder or an assault, coverage under this exclusionary clause is not precluded, and that the insurer has the obligation to defend and indemnify the insured.
I would also hold that the facts of this case, which has not been tried, have not been sufficiently developed to determine, as a matter of law, whether Frost’s mental incapacity would have prevented him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his acts or from forming the requisite mental intent to murder.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the circuit court for trial.

1 After deciding to grant leave to appeal in this case, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to clarify the scope and content of the stipulation entered into by the parties.
The judge based denial of summary disposition on his characterization of the parties’ stipulation which he described as follows:
For purposes of this motion, the parties have stipulated that Henry Gordon Frost, Jr. did not have the mental capacity to "intend or expect” his acts.
This was apparently an overbroad characterization of the parties’ stipulation. After reviewing the records and listening to arguments of counsel, the circuit judge found that the scope of the stipulation was as set forth in text.

 The judge granted Churchman’s motion for summary disposition. Later, the judge, on a motion for reconsideration, vacated the summary disposition in favor of Churchman, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether Frost lacked the mental capacity to intend or expect Churchman’s death within the meaning of the policy exclusion.

 184 Mich App 699; 459 NW2d 24 (1990).

 The relevant provisions are contained in section n, Personal Liability Protection:
COVERAGE E — PERSONAL LIABILITY
We will pay all sums which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, personal injury (libel, slander or defamation of character, false arrest, detention or imprisonment or malicious prosecution; invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction or wrongful entry) or property damage covered by this policy.
If a claim is made or suit is brought against the insured person for liability under this coverage, we will defend the insured person at our expense, using lawyers of our choice. We are not obligated to defend after we have paid an amount equal to the limit of our liability. We may investigate or settle any claim or suit as we think appropriate.
*583EXCLUSIONS
Under Personal Liability Coverage and Medical Payments to Others Coverage we do not cover:
7. bodily injury or property damage expected or intended by an insured person.

 The exclusionary clause at issue in DiCicco stated that the policy did not provide coverage for "bodily injury or property damage which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” 432 Mich 672.

 See Ruvolo v American Casualty Co, 39 NJ 490; 189 A2d 204 (1963); Globe American Casualty Co v Lyons, 131 Ariz 337, 343; 641 P2d 251 (1982); Parkinson v Farmers Ins Co, 122 Ariz 343; 594 P2d 1039 (1979); Clemmer v Hartford Ins Co, 22 Cal 3d 865; 151 Cal Rptr 285; 587 P2d 1098 (1978); Mangus v Western Casualty & Surety Co, 41 Colo App 217; 585 P2d 304 (1978); Rosa v Liberty Mut Ins Co, 243 F Supp 407 (D Conn, 1965); George v Stone, 260 So 2d 259 (Fla App, 1972); Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mut Ins Co v Dunkel, 363 So 2d 190 (Fla App, 1978); Northland Ins Co v Mautino, 433 So 2d 1225 (Fla App, 1983); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v Dichtl, 78 Ill App 3d 970; 398 NE2d 582 (1979); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v Freyer, 89 Ill App 3d 617; 411 NE2d 1157 (1980); von Dameck v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 361 So 2d 283 (La App, 1978); U S F & G Ins Co v Brannan, 22 Wash App 341; 589 P2d 817 (1979).

7 The court remanded the case for trial on the issue of the insured’s insanity for the purposes of the exclusionary clause.

8 There was a trial on the merits in this declaratory judgment action. The judge found that the insured acted intentionally so as ,to cause the collision. The judge concluded that because an individual is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary actions, coverage was precluded. The court of appeals reversed, stating that such an inference does not address the effect of mental illness.

 See Ruvolo, supra.

 See Globe American Casualty Co, supra, and Parkinson v Farmers Ins Co, n 6 supra (recognizing the rule).

 See Clemmer v Hartford Ins Co, n 6 supra; Congregation of Rodef Sholom v American Motorists Ins Co, 91 Cal App 3d 690; 154 Cal Rptr 348 (1979).

 See Mangus v Western Casualty & Surety Co, n 6 supra.

 See Rosa v Liberty Mut Ins Co, n 6 supra (apparently applying Connecticut law).

 See George v Stone, Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mut Ins Co *587v Dunkel, and Northland Ins Co v Mautino, n 6 supra.

 See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v Dichtl and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v Freyer, n 6 supra (recognizing the rule).

 See West American Ins Co v McGhee, 530 NE2d 110 (Ind App, 1988).

 See Nationwide Mut Fire Ins Co v May, 860 F2d 219 (CA 6, 1988) (apparently applying Kentucky law).

 See von Dameck v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, n 6 supra.

 See Nationwide Mut Fire Ins Co v Turner, 29 Ohio App 3d 73; 503 NE2d 212 (1986).

 See U S F & G Ins Co v Brannan, n 6 supra.

 See anno: Construction and application of provision of liability insurance policy expressly excluding injuries intended or expected by insured, 31 ALR4th 957.
The insured must have the capacity to harbor a requisite intent in order for the insurer to be relieved of liability. Therefore, where the insured acts while insane, coverage will exist. [11 Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 44:289, p 450.]
A clause excluding "injury . . . caused intentionally” may not preclude coverage when an insured is incapable of forming an "intent” within the meaning of that term as used in the liability insurance provision, even though a recovery against the insured is based on an intentional tort. [Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law, § 5.4(d)(7), pp 532-533, but acknowledging contrary case law.]
Similarly, see also 7A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 4501.16, p 291.

 Three decisions of the Court of Appeals concerning this issue were announced after the judge announced his decision in this case. Allstate Ins Co v Miller, 175 Mich App 515; 438 NW2d 638 (1989), and Mattson v Farmers Ins Exchange, 181 Mich App 419; 450 NW2d 54 (1989), both holding that where an insane person cannot form the intent to act, he has not acted "intentionally” for purposes of an exclusionary clause. And Transamerica Ins Corp of America v Boughton, 177 Mich App 253; 440 NW2d 922 (1989), holding that a person found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity may nevertheless be *588found to have intended to cause injury for the purposes of the exclusionary clause.

 Transamerica Ins Corp states that "to avoid liability through the exclusion for expected injury, the insurer must show that the injury was the natural, foreseeable, expected, and anticipatory result of an intentional act.” Id. at 255-256. This objective standard, to determine whether the insured expected or intended injury, was expressly rejected by this Court in DiCicco, supra, which was decided the month after Transamerica was decided.

 The issue in Transamerica Ins Corp was whether "an intentional acts exclusion in a homeowner’s policy precludes coverage for a person previously acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity . . . .” Id. at 257.

 The policy was an occurrence-based policy, with a separate exclusion for injuries "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.”

 The court acknowledged a possible "blatant inconsistency” in finding a person criminally insane, yet denying him insurance coverage because he "intended his acts,” but found the situation like others where an intentional act (killing in self-defense, or in war, or as an executioner) is excused from criminal sanctions, but is nevertheless "intentional.” Id. at 348.