Court Opinion

ID: 9479584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:22:31.846816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:08.090030
License: Public Domain

TROTT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting, in which dissent Circuit Judge NOONAN concurs:
Judge Reinhardt’s scholarly opinion is impressive. It provides an excellent review of the law governing this case, as well as the policies at stake. But, in my respectful view, like a column of correct numbers added up improperly, the bottom line is wrong.
*1218When I first read the opinion, I could not help but be reminded of an incident that occurred off the coast of Hawaii a year or so ago. Part of the skin blew off an Aloha Airliner in flight, exposing the crew and passengers to the possibility of a crash landing at sea and almost certain death. One person was sucked out of the fuselage and killed. Incredibly, the two pilots pulled off a miracle, landing the seriously crippled aircraft without further incident. The two pilots shortly thereafter were interviewed as heroes on one of the network morning television shows. As I watched them describe their brush with death, I was astounded by their cool and professional demeanor, as well as their amazing skill. But, as much as anything else, I will always remember the response of one of the pilots when asked at the end of the interview if she had any advice for airline passengers as a result of this experience. She smiled and said, “Just remember to keep your seat belts fastened.”
The pilot’s remark is not only good advice for airline passengers, but it is now good advice for customers of Stead Motors and for other motorists who drive on the same streets with them in Contra Costa County, California. Why? Because this court today reinstates to the same position from which he was fired an auto mechanic who has demonstrated without a doubt by his reckless and obstinate conduct that he has a propensity not to affix tightly wheels to the cars that depend on them for safe passage; and, to add insult to injury, he was ordered reinstated with partial back pay.
The facts and circumstances surrounding Gale Rocks’ activities — for which he refused to accept responsibility — are described by the arbitrator in his Opinion and Award dated November 3, 1986 as follows:
On October 10, 1984, Grievant received a warning for “[failure] to use basic industry-wide safety procedures”. The warning stated in pertinent part as follows:
... After installing the left rear tire, you failed to properly tighten the lug bolts which caused all but 2 of the bolts to fall off. The 2 remaining bolts came so loose that the wheel almost came off while this owner was driving at highway speeds in San Francisco.
Your gross negligence was brought to our attention after this owner returned to us so we could replace the missing lug bolts.
In September of 1985, Grievant was involved in an argument with Shop Foreman Alan Banks concerning the proper procedure for tightening the lug bolts when tires are put back on a vehicle. Following this dispute, Grievant was advised that the Shop Foreman had absolute authority to determine policy, that Grievant was not authorized to disregard instructions from the shop foreman, and that he was required to mount and “torque” the wheels as instructed.
The incident which precipitated the termination occurred on October 14, 1985. On that date, Grievant performed certain repair work, including the replacement of brake pads which required the removal of the front wheels, on a vehicle owned by customer Richard Diebert. The Employer’s work order reflects that Griev-ant was the only employee who worked on the subject vehicle. He completed the work at about 1:00 p.m. and Diebert picked up the car and drove to his residence, a distance of about ten miles, at about 4:00 p.m.
Shortly thereafter, Diebert called Shee-han and reported that in the course of driving home he noted a “very heavy” vibration in the front end of the car. Sheehan immediately dispatched employee Joe Lyons to the Diebert home to inspect the vehicle. Lyons discovered that four lug bolts on the left front wheel were loose and the fifth was missing; in addition, three lug bolts were loose on the right front wheel. Lyons tightened all of the loose bolts and replaced the missing one. Shop foreman Brad Gibson subsequently inspected the car at the Employer’s facility for possible damage to any parts but no damage was identified.
In the course of investigating this matter, Sheehan noted that it appeared from *1219the work order that Grievant was the only employee who worked on Diebert’s vehicle and he discussed the matter with the employee. Grievant asserted that he could not “accept” that he was responsible for the problem. Sheehan made the decision to terminate Grievant and issued a letter dated October 15 which stated in pertinent part as follows:
On October 10, 1984 you were given a warning letter for this same reason, wheels being left loose.
Due to this latest occurrence, Stead Motors can no longer assume the liability for your actions. You were extremely remiss in performing your responsibilities which is tantamount to recklessness under Paragraph 5.02 of the present Union Contract. Your conduct not only compromised the reputation and liability of Stead Motors but also jeopardized the health and welfare and safety of Mr. Diebert. In accordance with this section we must exercise our option to terminate you for recklessness.
At hearing, Sheehan explained the basis of the termination penalty as follows: 1) Grievant experienced the same problem and received a warning a year previously; 2) Grievant had continual problems working with supervision (i.e. his attitude); and 3) Griev-ant’s conduct was “reckless” as defined in Webster’s Dictionary and the Employer had great liability exposure if such conduct was repeated and someone was injured.... Sheehan further testified that he gave “substantial” weight to the liability exposure factor.
In the “Discussion” section of his Opinion and Award, the arbitrator made these additional findings and observations:
However, when a person is made aware of the serious consequences of the mistake and nevertheless repeats it, the repeated behavior suggests an indifference to those consequences. Here, Grievant knew the requirements of this particular job function. He also knew of the potential danger to life and safety and the potential financial consequences thereof to the Employer. In all of the circumstances disclosed in this record, Grievant’s failure to tighten the lug bolts on October 14, 1985, constituted recklessness which warranted discipline pursuant to Section 5.02 of the Agreement.
In addition, at the arbitration hearing, Grievant was unduly argumentative and he attempted repeatedly to justify and excuse his conduct. His behavior did not assist his cause.
No wonder the district court refused to sanction this travesty. It would be one thing for the parties themselves to get together privately and agree on such an unpalatable result, but it is another altogether for a federal court to put its imprimatur on such a disaster.
Judge Reinhardt’s opinion attempts unconvincingly to cast this matter as involving only the “reinstatement” of an errant employee. I decline to accept this crabbed and incomplete characterization of what is at stake in this case. We are confronted not just with a case of reinstatement, but with reinstatement of a demonstrably reckless and obstinate mechanic to a job that requires skill and care. When Mr. Rocks does not do his job properly, wheels on moving vehicles loosen enough to send them careening out of control, endangering life in the process. This explains California’s prohibition against the unsafe operation of motor vehicles in its Vehicle Code: unsafe cars injure and kill.
I respectfully see the reinstatement of Gale Rocks to his old job as violating a clear and dominant public policy expressed in law and precedent by the State of California in favor of road-worthy automobiles and safety on the highways, and against dangerously reckless automotive maintenance and repair, especially by those in that business; and I view it thusly for two reasons.
First, I agree with Judge Noonan who wrote for the original panel in this case:
There exists in California a “well defined and dominant” public policy regarding automobile safety and maintenance. *1220California Vehicle Code § 24002 provides:
It is unlawful to operate any vehicle or combination of vehicles which is in an unsafe condition....
There is, the Supreme Court of California has said, “express legislative recognition of the fact that improperly maintained motor vehicles threaten ‘a grave risk of serious bodily harm or death.’ ” Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal.2d 442, 448, 71 Cal.Rptr. 897, 900, 445 P.2d 513, 516 (1968) (Traynor, C.J.), quoting Restatement (Section) of Torts § 423.
To minimize the risk of improper maintenance, the legislature established the California Bureau of Automobile Repair in 1971. Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 9882. The Bureau is authorized to “inquire into the practice and policies of the automotive repair industries ... and make such recommendations with respect to such policies, practices and functions as may be deemed important and necessary by the Bureau for the welfare of the consuming public and the automobile repair industry.” Id. at § 9882.13. The Bureau is further authorized to establish general motor vehicle repair standards, rules for the certification of repair facilities (including mechanics’ qualifications), and an on-site inspection program to insure compliance with the standards of certification. Id. at § 9889.33, § 9889.39. The Bureau’s rules and regulations are codified in Cal.Admin. Code, Title 16, §§ 3300, et. seq.
No one may be an automobile repair-dealer in California unless registered in accordance with law by the Bureau. Id. at § 9884.6. The Bureau may invalidate registration if it finds that the dealer or any employee of the dealer has been guilty of gross negligence. Id. § 9884.7. Stead Motors could not have kept Rocks and stayed in business. Id. § 9884.6.
843 F.2d at 359.
In Maloney v. Rath, the defendant was the driver of a car that caused a serious accident due to defective brakes. Because she neither knew nor had reason to know the brakes were defective until they failed, she attempted in court to avoid liability for the damage by shifting the blame to her mechanic who was responsible for the faulty installation of a hydraulic hose which ruptured. In refusing to release her from liability, Chief Justice Traynor described the law in California in very explicit terms. It is from this passage that Judge Noonan selected his exerpt:
Section 423 of the Restatement Second of Torts provides that “one who carries on an activity which threatens a grave risk of serious bodily harm or death unless the instrumentalities used are carefully * * * maintained, and who employs an independent contractor to * * * maintain such instrumentalities, is subject to the same liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in * * * maintaining such instrumen-talities as though the employer had himself done the work of * * * maintenance.” Section 424 provides that “One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.” Both of these sections point to a nondele-gable duty in this case. The statutory provisions regulating the maintenance and equipment of automobiles constitute express legislative recognition of the fact that improperly maintained motor vehicles threaten “a grave risk of serious bodily harm or death.” The responsibility for minimizing that risk or compensating for the failure to do so properly rests with the person who owns and operates the vehicle. He is the party primarily to be benefited by its use; he selects the contractor and is free to insist upon one who is financially responsible and to demand indemnity from him; the cost of his liability insurance that distributes the risk is properly attributable to his activities; and the discharge of the duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of his vehicle is of the utmost importance to the public. (See *1221Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra, 68 A.C. 249, 257 [68 Cal.2d 245], 66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508 and authorities cited.)
In the present case it is undisputed that the accident was caused by a failure of defendant’s brakes that resulted from her independent contractor’s negligence in overhauling or in thereafter inspecting the brakes. Since her duty to maintain her brakes in compliance with the provisions of the Vehicle Code is nondelega-ble, the fact that the brake failure was the result of her independent contractor’s negligence is no defense. (Emphasis added).
69 Cal.2d at 448, 71 Cal.Rptr. at 900-01, 445 P.2d at 516-17.
Not only does this answer the key questions in this case about California’s policy, but it is also very bad news for customers of Stead Motors who will get Gale Rocks as a brake mechanic.
Second, I agree with the analysis of Judge Hill in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assn. Int’l., 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir.1988), reh’g denied, 867 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir.1989):
As noted above, Misco requires the finding of a well defined public policy and an award that conflicts with that policy. The public policy of which the Supreme Court speaks in Misco seems to be a public policy not addressing the disfavored conduct, in the abstract, but disfavored conduct which is integral to the 'performance of employment duties. The question we are instructed, by Mis-co, to ask is not, “Is there a public policy against the employee’s conduct?”, but, rather, “Does an established public policy condemn the performance of employment activities in the manner engaged in by the employee?” Such a policy does exist in this case; the arbitrator’s finding of no just cause explicitly conflicts with that policy.
Id. at 671.
Where the person performs his employment duties and, in doing so, violates standards, restraints and restrictions on conduct, clearly and explicitly established by the people in their laws, a requirement that the employer suffer that mal-performance and not discharge the offender does itself violate the same well established public policy.
Id. at 674.
It is disheartening to see this court turn its back on Delta and Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 201/. of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir.1987). This repudiation illustrates how narrowly this circuit now views the public policy exception reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 2183, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983). I use the term “narrowly” advisedly because it would appear that the result in this case chokes the “public policy” exception — hie sepultus —into oblivion. If it survives this case, it survives in name only.
A review of the facts in Delta is enlightening. In that case, the Pilot-in-Command flew while drunk a commercial airliner filled with passengers on a scheduled flight, and he flew it personally from takeoff to landing. His misconduct was discovered, and he was understandably discharged five days later. The pilot grieved unsuccessfully his discharge. The Air Line Pilots Association, asserting that “[the pilot’s] flying ... while drunk was not a sufficient cause for discharge, submitted the dispute to the System Board,” id. at 668, which ruled 3-2 that he should be reinstated. As in the case at hand, the district court overturned the arbitrator’s decision as violative of public policy, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Make no mistake about it: in this circuit the federal courts would most probably have seen to it that Delta Airlines would have been forced to permit the pilot to return to the cockpit of another Delta airliner.
The application of Judge Reinhardt’s approach in this case to the facts of Iowa Electric yields an equally troublesome result. In that case, a nuclear power plant employee — in a hurry to leave the area to go to lunch — ordered a foreman to discon*1222nect a safety device on a doorway designed to protect the public from harmful radiation. After being terminated for this misconduct, he, like the pilot in Delta, was ordered reinstated by an arbitrator. The district court, however, overturned the arbitrator’s order as incompatible with public safety concerns, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In this circuit that employee most likely would have been ordered back to work, same job, same nuclear facility.
Judge Reinhardt's opinion brushes off Delta and Iowa Electric as “thought provoking.” If those cases would have arisen in this circuit, the results might have been nothing less than hair-raising. The results will be hair-raising when similar cases do arise in this circuit and are governed by today’s opinion. The bromidic observation of the court that all of us suffer when potentially productive workers are relegated to unemployment is scarcely a response to the threat to public safety embodied in the majority opinion.
Accidents happen in the blink of an eye. Danger appears out of nowhere, sinking ships, downing planes, and sending cars out of control. Our best defense to these inescapable perils of life is not air bags and seat belts, but attentive, trustworthy human beings, such as the pilots of the Aloha Airliner and the millions like them who take pride in jobs well done. I do not believe that deference to arbitration, a concept with which I wholeheartedly agree, suffers at all if the judiciary retains the right to keep arbitrators within the bounds of public policy; nor do I think that Misco compels the excessively “hands-off” policy adopted today in this circuit.
Misco’s main defect was that the Court of Appeals improperly based its views of public policy on “general considerations of supposed public interests,” not “laws and legal precedents” as required by W.R. Grace. Misco, 108 S.Ct. at 373-74. This mistake was not made by Judge Noonan and the three-judge panel. Judge Reinhardt’s opinion takes the view here, however, that the material relied on by the panel is insufficient to form an explicit, well-defined, public policy. With respect, I find this view unpersuasive. It ignores the clear meaning of the written word, and it slights the unmistakable purpose of California’s laws, suggesting that only a precise violation of a positive law caused by the award itself would suffice to meet the Supreme Court’s test — a question left undecided in Misco. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 374 n. 12.1 It is difficult to read Judge Reinhardt’s opinion, however, without coming to the conclusion that we have now answered this question in this circuit, without expressly saying so; and that we have closed our door’s permanently to complaints that an arbitrator’s award violates “public policy” unless the award itself clearly violates a statutory prohibition. The approach to this case and the treatment of Delta and Iowa Electric are tantamount to such a holding. Although Judge Reinhardt’s opinion seems to hold out some hope that another way could be found to reach the same result in those cases, I respectfully believe that these dicta amount to an illusion.
What Judge Reinhardt’s opinion does today in reinstating Gale Rocks and rejecting the rationale of Delta and Iowa Electric provides sufficient reason to question seriously the utility of a restrictive positive law test. A somewhat broader more rational approach grounded on analysis and informed judgment — confined by “law and precedent” — makes more sense in that it gives life to the public policy exception rather than suffocating it beyond resuscitation. The results in Delta and Iowa Electric do not trench inappropriately upon the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration, nor would the termination of Gale Rocks. To borrow from Iowa Electric, “ ‘He is no longer to be trusted to work in such a critical environment when he shows no respect for the safety implica*1223tions of his actions and when he is willing to jeopardize the safety of the public 834 F.2d at 1429 (citation omitted).
The approach adopted by Delta and Iowa Electric would not flatly prohibit the reinstatement via arbitration of a speeding truck driver or a petty thief. To suppose that they do is an error that again follows from the trap of narrowly casting this issue only as one of reinstatement. All a broader approach does is to insure that the federal courts would not find their hands tied by the magic word “reinstatement” uttered by an arbitrator if such a reinstatement, based on the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, would violate an explicit, well defined, and dominant public health and safety policy of a state or the federal government.
I am not moved by the suggestion that the life of a single driver or the lives of a family in a passenger car are somehow less significant than the lives of airplane passengers or the people who live in the vicinity of a nuclear facility. One life is as precious as many, and I do not believe that public policy demands otherwise. Certainly, airplane crashes and nuclear power plant disasters command more attention by the media than a single fatal automobile collision, but that should not define the reach of federal law. Moreover, it is common knowledge that more automobile passengers die per year than airline passengers or neighbors of nuclear power plants combined; and a single out-of-eontrol passenger car can kill an entire busload of school children.
This is not a minor problem that occurs only infrequently. Arbitration in these kinds of cases is very common, and as I have tried to show, the results are not always comforting. To take one example from another area, that of medical care, and use an actual case, Nurse S. put medicine not intended for the patient on his over-bed table. The patient took it while the nurse’s back was turned. When she discovered the medicine was gone she told him “I don’t know if it is going to hurt you but we’ll keep an eye on you.” She told no one about the mistake. When she came back from lunch, she found the patient had serious breathing problems. The supervisor tried to find out what medication the patient would normally be taking and asked Nurse S. directly what medication she had given him. Nurse S. claimed at the arbitration hearing “that in the excitement of the medical emergency she had forgotten about the medication error.”
Less than an hour later the patient was in respiratory arrest with convulsions and had stopped breathing. A half dozen persons worked to resuscitate him including Nurse S. At no point did she report the medication she had let him have. Only the next day, when the patient had revived, did she respond to a question from a doctor who had obtained the information about the medicine from the patient himself. The hospital concluded that “it would not be safe to keep her [Nurse S.] in the environment.” She was discharged.
The arbitrator found this “an extremely difficult case.” He went on to say that Nurse S. “committed an appalling error in patient care.” The arbitrator also observed that Nurse S. should “be seriously faulted for failing to formally report the incident” and that there was a serious question as to whether the failure “was inadvertent or deliberate.” There was no doubt this failure was “a serious breach of patient care.” She had also made a serious error in going to lunch before the other nurse had returned to her floor. The arbitrator concluded that there was no just cause for discharge. In re Ohio Valley Hospital Association, 79 L.A. 929 (1982). His decision would be final now in this circuit. There might be just cause for the elderly and infirm to worry about the kind of nursing care they would get where federal courts approve such reinstatement.
Or, what do we do with Warren Watson, the power company employee in Georgia responsible for reading gauges and meters designed to prevent the overheating of high pressure equipment? When he failed badly a drug test and was discovered to be a heavy chronic drug user, he was fired as a safety risk. But an accommodating arbitrator ordered his reinstatement to his for*1224mer position. Shades of Gail Rocks. Fortunately for his co-workers, the federal district court balked at this order, remarking that, among other things, it could subject Watson’s employer to liability for damages caused by Watson’s future drug use. Georgia Power Co. v. IBEW, Local 84, 707 F.Supp. 531 (N.D.Ga.1989).
I suppose a lab technician, either intoxicated or in a hurry to get to lunch, who recklessly introduced AIDS-contaminated blood into our supply of blood maintained for purposes of medical transfusion would also be beyond the reach of the law in this circuit if a non-lawyer arbitrator, beholden to no one other than the parties to the contract in question, decided to cut the baby in half and put the offender back to work. The same is true of other unrepresentative workers in our labor force, such as the occasional inebriated engineer of a train, the deliberately indifferent pilot of an ocean-going tanker that goes around and spills millions of gallons of crude oil into our oceans and inland waterways, and the law enforcement officer who exceeds his authority and beats and abuses a prisoner. If an arbitrator uses the word “reinstatement,” the federal courts in this circuit are now next to helpless to do anything about it. A new form of kryptonite has been invented that renders us impotent to vindicate the public interest in health and safety. What amounts to a general policy favoring reinstatement — which is committed entirely to arbitrators — now trumps the public policy exception and ousts us of our jurisdiction to keep the players on the appropriate playing field.2 Although the analogy is far from perfect, it strikes me as curious that the pumping in a hospital by a doctor of the stomach of a drug dealer suspected of swallowing narcotics shocks the conscience of the federal courts,3 yet we are serenely sanguine about our complicity in putting a dangerous pilot back into the cockpit of a commercial airliner, a reckless worker back into a nuclear facility, and in returning Mr. Rocks to his responsibility for safely attaching wheels to passenger vehicles.
I would affirm the district court.

. In Misco, The Supreme Court took some comfort in the provision of the award that permitted the worker’s reinstatement to a different equivalent job, stating that it was not "clear ... that [he] would pose a serious threat [to safety] in every job for which he was qualified.” 108 S.Ct. at 374. There is no room for such comfort here: Mr. Rocks gets his old job back.

. Misco counsels against reliance on "general considerations of supposed public interests.” 108 S.Ct. at 373. Does this not describe the majority's description and use of “reinstatement”?

. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1951).