Court Opinion

ID: 9881641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 15:31:41.228619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:13:56.355674
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                        2023 WY 95

                                                       OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                   October 3, 2023

 TARAN MICHAEL SCHLEGEL,

 Appellant
 (Plaintiff),

 v.
                                                      S-22-0293
 BARNEY & GRAHAM, LLC, a
 Wyoming limited liability company and
 SHELBY NOEL HUGHES,

 Appellees
 (Defendants).

                    Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County
                      The Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Lucas E. Buckley, Sean M. Larson, Kari Hartman, Hathaway & Kunz LLP,
      Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Larson.

Representing Appellees:
      Scott E. Ortiz, Erica R. Day, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper,
      Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Ortiz and Ms. Day.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, JJ, and ROBINSON, D.J.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final
publication in the permanent volume.
ROBINSON, S., District Judge.

[¶1] Michael Lee Schlegel (Michael) and Charlene Ann Schlegel (Charlene) were in the
process of divorcing when Michael died of a heart attack without a known will.1 Under
the intestacy statute, Charlene inherited portions of Michael’s estate that she would not
have, had the divorce been finalized prior to Michael’s death. Taran Michael Schlegel
(Taran), Michael’s only living child, filed a legal malpractice suit against his father’s
attorney, Shelby Noel Hughes, and her law firm, Barney & Graham, LLC, for failing to
timely resolve Michael’s divorce. The district court granted Ms. Hughes and Barney &
Graham, LLC’s motion for summary judgment. It found no evidence was presented that
Taran was an intended beneficiary of his father’s attorney’s services, and thus no duty was
owed to Taran. We affirm.

                                                   ISSUE

          Did the district court err when it found no evidence was presented indicating
          Taran, a non-client, was an intended beneficiary of legal services provided
          by Ms. Hughes and Barney & Graham, LLC?

                                                  FACTS

[¶2] Michael and Charlene married three times and divorced two times between 1999
and 2017. They separated for the third time in June 2018, after having remarried a year
earlier. Michael had two sons, Taran and Kalen, from a different relationship. Kalen
predeceased Michael, but had two children, still minors at the time of Michael’s death.
There was no love lost between Taran and his stepmother, Charlene. Taran encouraged
Michael on multiple occasions to divorce Charlene.

[¶3] Michael met with Ms. Hughes, an associate attorney for Barney & Graham, LLC,
for divorce representation in the Spring of 2019. Sometime prior to this meeting, Michael
had a stroke and thereafter his speech was difficult to understand. Michael’s sister, Punky
Bradley, attended Michael’s first meeting with Ms. Hughes to assist with communication.
Ms. Hughes was informed in this meeting that Michael had one living son, and Ms.
Bradley, as well as other members of Michael’s family, did not like Charlene and believed
she had absconded with Michael’s money.

[¶4] Michael hired Ms. Hughes to represent him for his third divorce from Charlene. Ms.
Hughes filed a complaint for divorce on Michael’s behalf on April 2, 2019. Charlene failed
to answer, and default was entered against her. A default hearing was scheduled to be held
on June 20, 2019. Charlene appeared pro se; the district court continued the hearing to
allow Charlene to seek the assistance of counsel.

1
    Because the family members have the same last name, we refer to them by their first name for clarity.
                                                      1
[¶5] The default hearing was rescheduled for September 19, 2019. On that date,
Charlene again appeared without counsel. Ms. Hughes told the district court Michael
wanted to complete the divorce but there were unresolved personal property issues –
specifically the parties’ vehicles. The district court stated if Ms. Hughes would send a
proposed decree of divorce that divided all property except the vehicles, the court would
enter a divorce decree, and the vehicles could be addressed in a separate hearing if
necessary. The district court further stated to Ms. Hughes, “So get me the decree … get
your client divorced.”

[¶6] Following this hearing, Ms. Hughes did not immediately provide a proposed divorce
decree to the district court. Instead, Ms. Hughes attempted to have Michael complete his
initial disclosures so that all property could be distributed in the divorce decree. Michael
did not return the initial disclosures to Ms. Hughes, although he did inform her he was
“working on” them. Ms. Hughes made a settlement offer to Charlene, to which she
received no response. On January 15, 2020, following the court’s judicial assistant
inquiring about the matter, Ms. Hughes requested a hearing to resolve the vehicle
distribution. A hearing was scheduled for March 26, 2020.

[¶7] On February 23, 2020, Michael died of a heart attack, with no known will.2 Despite
physical ailments due to Michael’s stroke, his death was unexpected.

[¶8] The day after Michael’s death, Charlene filed a motion to dismiss the divorce
complaint. Ms. Hughes provided a proposed divorce decree to the district court; her firm
argued the district court had granted a divorce at the September 19, 2019, hearing and
bifurcated the proceedings.3 Ultimately, the district court dismissed the divorce complaint
with prejudice.
2
 Taran believed Michael intended for Taran to inherit Michael’s entire estate. He also believed a will
existed, but his attempts to locate it were unsuccessful.
3
  Taran argued in the district court the statements made by the court at the September 19, 2019, default
hearing were an indication the court intended to grant a bifurcated divorce. Wyoming recognizes bifurcated
divorce proceedings, although granting bifurcation is a matter of judicial discretion. See Ransom v.
Ransom, 2017 WY 132, ¶¶ 25–31, 404 P.3d 1187, 1193–94 (Wyo. 2017); Kelly v. Kilts, 2010 WY 151, ¶
21, 243 P.3d 947, 952 (Wyo. 2010). In Kelly, the plaintiff was in critical condition in a hospital and
requesting an immediate divorce from the defendant, her husband, so he could not make health care
decisions for her or inherit her share of the marital property. Id., ¶¶ 1–4, 243 P.3d at 948–49. In affirming
the district court’s grant of an immediate divorce, while reserving the issue of property division for a later
date, we explained:

                Wyoming does not have a statutory provision expressly authorizing courts
                to grant a divorce in one proceeding and determine an equitable division
                of the marital property in a subsequent proceeding. However, the trial of
                issues separately is well accepted, such as in criminal cases where guilt

                                                      2
[¶9] Had the divorce been completed prior to Michael’s death, Taran would have
inherited fifty percent (50%) of Michael’s estate under the intestacy statute, Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 2-4-101 (LexisNexis 2023).4 Because the divorce was not completed prior to
Michael’s death, Charlene inherited fifty percent (50%) of Michael’s estate, Taran
inherited twenty-five percent (25%), and Kalen’s two children inherited the remaining
twenty-five percent (25%) in equal shares5. Taran argues this difference resulted in
Charlene receiving approximately $500,000.00; had the divorce been finalized prior to
Michael’s death she would have only been entitled to make a claim against the estate for a
vehicle worth a few thousand dollars.

[¶10] Taran filed a complaint against Ms. Hughes and Barney & Graham, LLC for legal
malpractice. The complaint alleged Ms. Hughes’ negligent delay in presenting a divorce
decree to the district court following the September 19, 2019, default hearing led to a
diminishment of his inheritance. Ms. Hughes and Barney & Graham, LLC filed a motion
for summary judgment, arguing they did not owe Taran, a non-client, a duty of care. The
district court granted the motion and concluded:

                          In certain circumstances, an attorney owes a duty to a
                   non-client. The threshold inquiry is whether [Taran] is an
                   intended beneficiary of the attorney’s services. The Court

                   and punishment are determined separately or personal injury cases where
                   liability and damages may be separately tried. Additionally, W.R.C.P. 56(c)
                   and (d) expressly contemplate the rendering of judgment as a matter of law
                   on some issues and a later trial on any remaining factual issues.

Id., ¶ 21, 243 P.3d at 952.
4
    Section 2-4-101(a) states:

               (a) Whenever any person having title to any real or personal property having the nature
          or legal character of real estate or personal estate undisposed of, and not otherwise limited
          by marriage settlement, dies intestate, the estate shall descend and be distributed in
          parcenary to his kindred, male and female, subject to the payment of his debts, in the
          following course and manner:
               (i) If the intestate leaves husband or wife and children, or the descendents of any
          children surviving, one-half (1/2) of the estate shall descend to the surviving husband or
          wife, and the residue thereof to the surviving children and descendents of children, as
          hereinafter limited;
               (ii) If the intestate leaves husband or wife and no child nor descendents of any child,
          then the real and personal estate of the intestate shall descend and vest in the surviving
          husband or wife.

5
 At the time of the summary judgment proceedings, the estate action had not been completed. The estate
action was completed shortly before Taran’s brief was filed on appeal.
                                                       3
             cannot identify any facts on the record indicating that
             [Michael] sought his divorce with the intention of enlarging his
             son’s inheritance. Therefore, [Taran] lacks standing to pursue
             legal malpractice claims against his father’s attorneys as a
             matter of law.

[¶11] Taran appeals.

                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶12] Rule 56 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure provides standards for summary
judgment motions. A motion should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the
motion.” W.R.C.P. 56(a).

                      A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed
             fact, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting
             an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted
             by the parties. The party moving for summary judgment bears
             the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for a
             summary judgment. If the movant carries this burden, the party
             opposing the summary judgment must come forward with
             specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material
             fact does exist.

Bidache, Inc. v. Martin, 899 P.2d 872, 874 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Thunder Hawk By and
Through Jensen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 844 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 1992)).

[¶13] Our standard of review for summary judgment is firmly established. “We accord
no deference to the district court’s decisions on issues of law.” Kahrs v. Bd. of Trs. for
Platte Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Halpern v. Wheeldon,
890 P.2d 562, 564 (Wyo. 1995)). In reviewing a district court’s decision on summary
judgment, we review the motion as if it had been presented to us originally. Creel v. L&L,
Inc., 2012 WY 124, ¶ 3, 287 P.3d 729, 730 (Wyo. 2012) (citing Bangs v. Schroth, 2009
WY 20, ¶ 20, 201 P.3d 442, 452 (Wyo. 2009)). We review the record and materials
received by the district court and give the party opposing the motion all favorable
inferences and benefits that may be fairly drawn from the materials. Id.

[¶14] In negligence cases, summary judgment is not favored, and the standard of review
requires further scrutiny. Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 886,
889 (Wyo. 2006). “This rule is particularly true in malpractice actions. The mixed
questions of law and fact usually involved in a negligence action concerning the existence

                                             4
of a duty, the standard of care and proximate cause are ordinarily not susceptible to
summary adjudication.” Rino v. Mead, 2002 WY 144, ¶ 13, 55 P.3d 13, 18 (Wyo. 2002)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Determining whether a duty has been
violated is generally a question of fact for the fact finder. Id. However, whether a duty
exists is “a question of law, ‘making an absence of duty the surest route to summary
judgment in negligence actions.’” Id. (quoting Schuler v. Cmty. First Nat’l Bank, 999 P.2d
1303, 1306 (Wyo. 2000)) (other citations omitted). Issues of a party’s intent are typically
a question for the fact finder, making summary judgment improper. In re Estate of
Drwenski, 2004 WY 5, ¶ 14, 83 P.3d 457, 461 (Wyo. 2004). If “reasonable minds could
not differ” as to the party’s intent, however, summary judgment may be appropriate. Id.

                                               DISCUSSION

[¶15] Whether Ms. Hughes and Barney & Graham, LLC owed a duty to Taran, a non-
client, is a mixed question of fact and law. Almost two decades ago, in Drwenski, we
analyzed whether an attorney owes a non-client a duty when the death of a divorce litigant
occurred prior to the completion of the divorce.

[¶16] Both parties find Drwenski to be germane in this matter; we find it to be controlling.
Vernon Drwenski died while his divorce was pending, resulting in his wife, Trudi
Drwenski, inheriting more of his estate than she would have, had the divorce been finalized
prior to his death. Id., ¶ 1, 83 P.3d at 459. Mr. Drwenski had hired an attorney to represent
him and filed a divorce complaint. Id., ¶ 5, 83 P.3d at 460. At the time his divorce
complaint was filed, Mr. Drwenski was terminally ill with cirrhosis of the liver and “was
trying to get his life in order.” Id. His intended first step in doing so was to divorce Mrs.
Drwenski. Id.

[¶17] After the divorce complaint was filed, Mr. Drwenski had a falling out with one of
his daughters and disinherited her by changing his will and “leaving the bulk of his estate
to another daughter [Erin] Connelly.” Id., ¶ 6, 83 P.3d at 460. His new will recognized
the divorce proceedings and “that Mrs. Drwenski would be entitled to twenty-five percent
of his estate under Wyoming’s elective share statute in the event his divorce was not final
at the time of his death.” Id. Despite offers of settlement, the divorce litigants were unable
to resolve the divorce prior to Mr. Drwenski’s death. Id., ¶ 7, 83 P.3d at 460. Mrs.
Drwenski was thus entitled to twenty-five percent (25%) of Mr. Drwenski’s estate pursuant
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).6 Id., ¶ 8, 83 P.3d at 460.

6
    Section 2-5-101 is Wyoming’s elective share statute and states, in part:

                   (a) If a married person domiciled in this state shall by will deprive the
                   surviving spouse of more than the elective share, as hereafter set forth, of
                   the property which is subject to disposition under the will, reduced by
                   funeral and administration expenses, homestead allowance, family

                                                        5
[¶18] Ms. Connelly sued Mr. Drwenski’s divorce attorney for failing to timely obtain a
divorce for Mr. Drwenski prior to his death. Id., ¶ 9, 83 P.3d at 460. The district court
granted partial summary judgment against Ms. Connelly, holding the attorney did not owe
a duty to a non-client under the circumstances. Id., ¶ 10, 83 P.3d at 460.

[¶19] After a thorough examination of the state of the law in other jurisdictions, we found
the question of “whether there are any circumstances in which an attorney owes a duty to
a nonclient” in Wyoming to be a matter of first impression. Id., ¶ 24, 83 P.3d at 463. We
then explained:

              [W]e conclude it is time to apply the law equally to attorneys
              and recognize they can also be found to owe a duty to
              nonclients in limited circumstances. We see no reason why
              attorneys deserve absolute immunity when their clients intend
              their services to directly benefit a nonclient. “The law of
              professional malpractice should be uniform, unless it can
              reasonably be shown that one profession is more deserving of
              protection than another for valid policy or social reasons.”
              Steven K. Ward, Developments in Legal Malpractice
              Liability, 31 S. Tex. L.Rev. 121, 142–43 (1990).

                     We find the California balancing test adopted in Lucas
              v. Hamm an appropriate approach to take with regard to this
              issue. As noted above, that test is similar to the test we adopted
              in Gates v. Richardson, albeit more narrowly tailored to fit its
              objective of determining an attorney’s duty to a nonclient. The
              public policy considerations of the balancing test appropriately
              require attorneys to exercise their position of trust and superior
              knowledge responsibly so as not to adversely affect persons
              whose rights and interests are certain and foreseeable. Heyer v.
              Flaig, 70 Cal.2d 223 at 228–229, 74 Cal.Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161
              (1969).

              allowances and exemption, and enforceable claims, the surviving spouse
              has a right of election to take an elective share of that property as follows:
              (i) One-half (1/2) if there are no surviving issue of the decedent, or if the
              surviving spouse is also a parent of any of the surviving issue of the
              decedent; or
              (ii) One-fourth (1/4), if the surviving spouse is not the parent of any
              surviving issue of the decedent.

                                                    6
                     This Court elects to further tailor the Lucas test by
              emphasizing the first factor, the extent to which the transaction
              was intended to directly benefit the plaintiff. Thus, the
              threshold inquiry must be whether the plaintiff is an intended
              beneficiary of the transaction; if not, no further inquiry need be
              made. Strait v. Kennedy, 103 Wash.App. 626, 13 P.3d 671
              (2000). We align with the Washington court, which stated:

                      Put another way, if the plaintiff was not an
                      intended beneficiary of the transaction, the
                      plaintiff lacks standing to sue the attorney for
                      legal malpractice. Leipham v. Adams, 77
                      Wash.App. 827, 832, 894 P.2d 576
                      (1995) (citing Trask, 123 Wash.2d at 842-43, 872
                      P.2d 1080. An “intended beneficiary” of the
                      transaction under Trask means just that—the
                      transaction must have been intended to benefit
                      the plaintiff; it is not enough that the plaintiff
                      may be an incidental beneficiary of the
                      transaction. See Trask, 123 Wash.2d at 845, 872
                      P.2d 1080.

              Id. at 674.

                      Whether a limited duty to a nonclient exists must be
              assessed on a case-by-case basis utilizing the following factors:
              (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to directly
              benefit the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm; (3) the
              degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the
              closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
              and the injury suffered; (5) whether expansion of liability to
              the nonclient would place an undue burden on the legal
              profession; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm.

                     While the answer to the threshold question of intent
              does not totally resolve the issue, no further inquiry need be
              made unless such intent exists. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash.2d
              835, 872 P.2d 1080 (1994). …

Id., ¶¶ 27-31, 83 P.3d at 464-65. We then concluded there was no evidence indicating Mr.
Drwenski intended to benefit Ms. Connolly or anyone else when hiring his divorce attorney
to obtain a divorce. Id., ¶ 33, 83 P.3d at 465. “While we recognize that a divorce client’s
children will be affected by the divorce, that fact alone is not sufficient to support a finding

                                               7
that the attorney hired to obtain the divorce owes a duty to the children of the client.” Id.,
¶ 34, 83 P.3d at 465. We affirmed the district court’s partial summary judgment in favor
of the attorney as no duty was owed to Ms. Connelly. Id., ¶ 39, 83 P.3d at 467.

[¶20] The question today is whether Taran was an intended beneficiary of Michael’s
divorce proceedings. We find he was not. To do so would require facts showing the
divorce proceedings were intended to serve as an estate-planning device. There is no
evidence in the record to support this.

[¶21] Taran argues he was Michael’s intended beneficiary because he would have
benefited had the divorce been completed prior to Michael’s death through estate
proceedings. However, this disregards the test we adopted in Drwenski. The question is
whether the transaction, i.e., the divorce proceedings, was intended to directly benefit
Taran. Evidence in the record only lends support to Taran being an intended beneficiary
of Michael’s estate. In a pretrial deposition, Taran answered the following questions:

              Q: You don’t have any evidence via text message or e-mail or
                  anything else that your father said, “I’m divorcing Charlene
                  to financially benefit you,” do you?
              A: No, not at all.
              Q: Nothing that specific was ever said by him, was it?
              A: It was probably said by him, but not in those terms, not like,
                  “I’m specifically divorcing Charlene so that you get all the
                  stuff.” It was just like, “I don’t want my legacy to be gone.”
              Q: You were never asked to communicate at all with your dad’s
                  lawyers about this divorce, were you?
              A: No, not at all.

[¶22] When later asked in the same deposition what other evidence Taran had to support
he was an intended beneficiary of the divorce, he stated the following:

              A: Only his friends and family saying that’s the only thing I
                 have that’s not presented here today.
              Q: What friends or family are we talking?
              A: His aunts – not his aunts. His sisters, my mother, which was
                 his friend, all of his friends that he worked with and lived
                 with in Story.
              Q: So what have they told you that leads you to believe that
                 you are the intended beneficiary of the divorce?
              A: That’s just what he would talk about I guess when he was
                 with him, how proud of me he was and that he would just
                 do anything to help me.

                                              8
              Q: So the fact that he was proud of you and would do anything
                 to help you, that’s feedback you got from your friends and
                 family?
              A: Yeah. That he would just – I was the only thing he would
                 talk about after his stroke to his people.
              Q: And from hearing those nice things your dad was saying
                 about you, you interpreted that to mean that he wanted you
                 to be a beneficiary of this divorce?
              A: I’m also his son. And I have been his son. So it would just
                 only make sense.

[¶23] The above only supports Taran was “an incidental beneficiary” of the divorce
proceedings. Id., ¶ 29, 83 P.3d at 464. The record is devoid of evidence Taran was intended
to directly benefit from the transaction – the divorce. This is not sufficient to withstand
summary judgment. Accordingly, inquiry into the remaining factors given in Drwenski is
unnecessary.

                                     CONCLUSION

[¶24] The district court properly granted summary judgment to Ms. Hughes and Barney
& Graham, LLC. They owed no duty to Taran, a third-party non-client. Taran did not
meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case of a genuine issue of material fact. No
evidence was presented to the district court that Taran was intended to directly benefit from
Michael’s divorce proceedings. Taran lacked standing to file a claim of legal malpractice
against Ms. Hughes and Barney & Graham, LLC.

[¶25] Affirmed.

                                             9