Court Opinion

ID: 9713734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:21:25.867333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:20.195095
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the evidence here is sufficient to prove that appellant operated a vehicle while suspended as a habitual violator.
The proof of the element of a valid suspension is cireumstantial. It consists of (1) the hearsay entry of mailing notice of suspension; (2) the copy of the notice itself, *1130and (3) appellant's admission at the scene of his arrest that his license was suspended. Likewise the proof of the element of knowledge that the license was suspended on habitual traffic offender grounds is circumstantial. It consists of the same three items of proof. Such three items of proof, if believed, would warrant a rational trier of fact in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the requisite suspension occurred and that appellant knew of it when he drove and was arrested.
I cannot agree, however, with the unqualified proposition in the majority opinion that material facts in issue are proved by hearsay evidence which is let in without objection. The cases cited in support do not satisfactorily support so sweeping a proposition. Furthermore, it is evident that hearsay evidence, "ranging as it does from mere thirdhand rumors to sworn affidavits of credible observers" is spread across a wide scale of probative value. McCormick On Evidence § 245 at 728 (8d ed. 1984). I would hold that Indiana trial judges, in ruling on whether the State or a party has made a prima facie case, and Indiana appellate judges, in ruling on sufficiency of evidence, must consider hearsay evidence let in without objection, but have the flexibility to give it only its natural probative effect.