Court Opinion

ID: 9754503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:02:43.277176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:53.977570
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I have no quarrel with the majority’s analysis of the equal protection problem under the rational basis standard. I see no reason, however, to discuss and suggest that a three-tiered equal protection analysis is necessary. At 84. Although I joined the majority opinions in Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare, 509 Pa. 293, 502 A.2d 114 (1985) and Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Spa Athletic Club, 506 Pa. 364, 485 A.2d 732 (1984), which contained similar dictum, I have *100now concluded that it is unwise to imply acceptance of the three-tiered analysis unless or until the issue is squarely presented. See Martin v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 502 Pa. 282, 466 A.2d 107 (1983).
Some commentators have suggested that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court imply acceptance of an intermediate level of review for equal protection cases involving an important right or sensitive classification. Nevertheless, that Court itself has not expressly adopted the intermediate standard or three-tiered analysis except in cases involving gender based classifications. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 592-98 (2d ed. 1983). Absent an express adoption of this analysis and standard for federal constitutional purposes, I do not believe we should imply its adoption or consider it unless necessary to decide a particular case. Here it is no more necessary to the majority opinion than it was in Fischer, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board and Martin. The majority correctly decides the case by applying the rational basis standard. I, therefore, join its reasoning, but disassociate myself from what I believe is unnecessary dictum concerning the general existence of three categories in analyzing equal protection cases.