Court Opinion

ID: 9704003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:17:29.227784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:54.235251
License: Public Domain

SILVER, J.,
with whom LEVY, J., joins, concurring.
[¶ 21] I concur in part B of the opinion, which addresses partial benefits and post-injury earning capacity, but I would vacate on other grounds and would remand for further fact-finding. I agree that Tucker, in order to qualify for 100% partial benefits, must demonstrate that he conducted an adequate search for full-time work because he has full-time, light duty earning capacity. The hearing officer made no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding Tucker’s search for full-time work in late 2005 and early 2006. I would remand for further fact-finding on this issue.
[¶ 22] An employee seeking 100% partial benefits must establish that he or she has a combination of (1) a partially incapacitating work injury, and (2) a loss, attributable to that injury, of employment opportunities within the employee’s local *81community. Avramovic v. R.C. Moore Transp., Inc., 2008 ME 140, ¶ 16, 954 A.2d 449, 453; Monaghan v. Jordan’s Meats, 2007 ME 100, ¶ 13, 928 A.2d 786, 791. Proof of a loss of employment opportunities within the employee’s local community is governed by the judicially created “work search rule,” which is “designed to allocate the order and presentation of proof related to the availability of work.” Monaghan, 2007 ME 100, ¶ 14, 928 A.2d at 791.
[¶ 23] When, as here, the employee is the petitioning party, the employee has the ultimate burden of proof to demonstrate that work is unavailable, as a result of the work injury, within the employee’s local community. Id. ¶ 14, 928 A.2d at 791. Proof is not limited to demonstrations of unsuccessful job searches; an employee may introduce any competent evidence to show the unavailability of work in the local community. Id. ¶ 16, 928 A.2d at 791.
[¶24] We have held that for a work search to be adequate as a matter of law, the employee must demonstrate that he or she undertook a reasonable exploration of the labor market in the local community, and that either no stable market exists for the work, or no opportunity exists for the employee due to a work-related injury. Id. ¶ 17, 928 A.2d at 792. Work search evidence should
“give a rational person reasonable cause to believe that the work-related injury this particular worker sustained is preventing him from obtaining remunerative work ‘ordinarily’ available in the competitive labor market of his community. Such reasonable cause will arise where the worker’s exploration of the labor market in his community discloses a number of search experiences manifesting a ‘pattern’, ... from which it becomes reasonable to infer either that a stable market for the kind of work the worker has regained some ability to perform does not exist in his community, or, if such a market does exist, that work will not be made available to this particular worker because of the persisting effects of the work-related injury he sustained.”
Id. (quoting Ibbitson v. Sheridan Corp., 422 A.2d 1005, 1011 (Me.1980)).
[¶ 25] We have held that the issue of adequacy of a work search is a mixed question of fact and law. Id. ¶ 18, 928 A.2d at 792. Findings regarding the employee’s work search efforts are factual, but the evaluation of the reasonableness of those efforts is a mixed question involving the reasonableness and legality of the hearing officer’s conclusion, with deference to his or her expertise. Id. We have identified several non-exclusive factors to serve as guideposts in the hearing officer’s determination:
(1) The number of inquiries made or applications submitted by an employee;
(2) Whether the search was undertaken in good faith;
(3) Whether the search was too restrictive;
(4) Whether the search was limited solely to employers who were not advertising available positions, or whether the employee also made appropriate use of classified ads or other employment resources in the search;
(5) Whether the search was targeted to work that the employee is capable of performing;
(6) Whether the employee over-emphasized work restrictions when applying for jobs;
(7) Whether the employee engaged in other efforts to find employment or increase prospects for employment;
*82(8) The employee’s personal characteristics such as age, training, education, and work history; and
(9) The size of the job market in the employee’s geographic area.
Id. ¶ 21, 928 A.2d at 793. In the present case, the hearing officer appropriately took into account the full range of factors set forth in Monaghan, focusing particularly on Tucker’s efforts to increase his prospects for employment by seeking further education.
[¶ 26] However, the time period considered by the hearing officer with respect to Tucker’s job search appears to have been unnecessarily restricted to events after the March 2006 consent decree. The hearing officer was correct in considering that the date of the latest consent decree is normally the relevant starting date for events pertinent to determining whether a change in circumstances has occurred since the last determination. See Grubb v. S.D. Warren Co., 2003 ME 139, ¶ 7, 837 A.2d 117, 119. Once it has been determined that there has been a change in circumstances, however, the focus of inquiry shifts to the work search and the broad range of factors set forth in Monaghan. 2007 ME 100, ¶ 21, 928 A.2d at 793. Consideration of those factors may require the hearing officer to look at a broader time frame.
[¶ 27] In the present case, it is not possible to gauge the adequacy of the work search efforts that Tucker made after the March 2006 consent decree without also considering those he made since autumn 2005. Tucker asserts that he enrolled in school in January 2006 precisely because he could not find full-time work within his restrictions prior to that, notwithstanding considerable effort. Tucker asserts that he searched for full-time work from November 2005 through January 2006. There is evidence in the record that he applied for about 300 jobs during that time, and that many of those may have been full-time jobs. AGM contests Tucker’s assertion that he engaged in a search for full-time work during this period.
[¶ 28] Tucker’s assertions about his job search over this time period are crucial to putting his subsequent actions, including his decision to return to school and his efforts to find part-time work, into context. The Court, focusing only on the period after the consent decree was signed, notes that Tucker’s job search was directed exclusively at part-time jobs in order to accommodate his academic schedule. The Court characterizes this as Tucker’s “choice.” If, however, the time period over which Tucker’s efforts were evaluated had included his earlier efforts, the hearing officer would have been able to make a finding as to whether the option of full-time work was a viable alternative. If full-time work was not an alternative, it would be inaccurate to characterize his decision to return to school as a choice.
[¶ 29] This case should be remanded for further fact-finding with respect to Tucker’s work search. Although there is evidence in the record on this issue from which an inference could be made, AGM submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and therefore this Court may not infer any findings on this issue:
[W]hen there is a request for findings, ... we do not assume that the administrative agency made all the necessary findings to support its judgment. Instead, we review the original findings and any additional findings made in response to a motion for findings to determine if they are sufficient, as a matter of law, to support the result and if they are supported by evidence in the record.
Maietta v. Town of Scarborough, 2004 ME 97, ¶ 17, 854 A.2d 223, 228 (citation omitted). Because the hearing officer did not make any findings with respect to whether *83Tucker made an adequate search for full-time work, the hearing officer’s findings are insufficient as a matter of law to support her decision. The case should be remanded for farther fact-finding on Tucker’s work search, with a particular focus on the period from late 2005 to early 2006 and whether Tucker engaged in an adequate search for full-time work during that period.
[¶ 30] I concur in the remaining parts of the Court’s opinion.