Court Opinion

ID: 9533457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:31:56.790716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:03.549683
License: Public Domain

STRUBHAR, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority in its opinion has stated that this case is not about the regulation of conduct between consenting adults in the privacy of their bedrooms or about the legal status to be provided to homosexual persons. Rather, it has held that this case is about whether Oklahoma City may legally prohibit public solicitations for private non-commercial acts of sodomy. Under the specific facts of this case, I agree that this limited approach is appropriate. It is with the majority’s ensuing analysis that I disagree.
*788The opinion notes that the sections of the Oklahoma City ordinance under which Appellant was convicted exempt married persons from the definition of lewdness.1 Accordingly, non-married persons can be convicted of offering to engage in certain acts which are legal for married persons to solicit. It is the reasoning of the majority that it is lawful to distinguish between married persons and non-married persons for purposes of solicitation of lewd acts because such solicitations are a consequence of the marital relationship to which its parties have impliedly consented. Although ambiguous, this language seems to imply that dissimilar treatment of married and non-married persons is justified because public solicitation of lewd acts by non-married persons is likely to offend whereas solicitation to participate in lewd acts by married persons to one another is not. Accordingly, the majority seems to indicate that there is a legitimate governmental interest in protecting unmarried persons from offensive solicitations to engage in lewd acts.
Assuming, arguendo, that this is a valid governmental interest, I would note that such situation was not implicated by the facts of this case. The record in this case clearly supports a finding that the language spoken by Appellant which was construed to be an offer to engage in lewd acts was not made under circumstances which could reasonably have been perceived to have been offensive. Rather, as is evinced by the testimony of the arresting officer, Appellant was purposefully led to believe that a sexual solicitation would be welcome. Nothing in this situation indicated that the solicitation was unwelcome or offensive. Although the majority opinion states in footnote 7 that “reasonable prohibitions against soliciting sexual acts do not violate the First Amendment whether the underlying conduct is lawful or unlawful” the municipal ordinance prohibits both invited and offensive solicitations and to this extent, it imposes unreasonable restrictions. Accordingly, I dissent.

. See Oklahoma City Municipal Code Sections 30-151 and 30-152.