Court Opinion

ID: 9839863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 16:04:39.466218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:02.890098
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/14/23 Marriage of Donahue CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 In re Marriage of LUCY and ROBERT
 DONAHUE, JR.

 LUCY DONAHUE,
                                                                       G062025
      Appellant,
                                                                       (Super. Ct. No. 21D007702)
           v.
                                                                       OPINION
 ROBERT DONAHUE, JR.,

      Respondent.

                   Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Thomas
James Lo, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
                   Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Kirstin Ault, Susan Horst and
Claudia Ribet for Appellant.
                   Stephen Temko and Dennis Temko; Walzer Melcher & Yoda, Christopher
C. Melcher and Cynthia J. Ponce for Respondent.
                                     INTRODUCTION
              The due process clause of the United States Constitution “does not
contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual
or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”
(International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 319 (International Shoe).)
As such, “[t]he existence of personal jurisdiction . . . depends upon the presence of
reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought . . . and a sufficient
connection between the defendant and the forum State to make it fair to require defense
of the action in the forum.” (Kulko v. Superior Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84, 91 (Kulko).)
The “essential criterion in all cases is whether the ‘quality and nature’ of the defendant’s
activity is such that it is ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair’ to require him to conduct his defense in
that State. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 92.)
              Courts try to take a cautious and thoughtful approach to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant located outside the state. But it is possible to take
the caution too far. Trial courts must ensure that “. . . the Due Process Clause [is] not
readily . . . wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been
voluntarily assumed.” (See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 474.)
The line can be difficult to pinpoint because personal jurisdiction does not “turn on
‘mechanical’ tests. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 478.) Rather, “the facts of each case must be
weighed to determine whether the requisite ‘affiliating circumstances’ are present.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958).” (Kulko, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 92.) A
court mustn’t exercise jurisdiction where it doesn’t exist. But neither should the court
look away when jurisdiction is clearly discernible.
              The trial court in this case appears to have done that. We must reverse its
order granting respondent’s motion to quash and dismissing appellant’s petition for
dissolution of the parties’ marriage, and remand the proceedings.

                                               2
                                                      FACTS
                  Robert and Lucy Donahue had a destination wedding in Hawaii in March of
2010. For the first half of their marriage, the couple resided in their native Virginia.
Robert owned and ran a successful business there, and Lucy worked for it. It was a
second marriage for both, and Lucy’s two teenage daughters from her previous marriage
lived with the couple.
                  Lucy suffers from health issues which in 2015 caused the couple to travel
                                                                    1
to California seeking satisfactory treatment for her. They decided Lucy should rent a
cottage in Laguna Beach so she could have a more comfortable place than a hotel in
which to live while taking treatment. Robert purchased a Mini Cooper in 2015 for Lucy
to use,2 and the vehicle was registered in California in both their names.
                  Initially, Robert traveled back and forth between California and Virginia,
spending the majority of time in Virginia working and seeing to his stepdaughters. But it
was not long before the couple realized they liked Southern California enough to make
some more permanent connections.
                  Robert sold off 80 percent of his stake in his company in May 2017 and
later that year, the parties purchased a home at 1225 Cliff Drive in Laguna Beach. To
Lucy, this was the couple’s “dream home” and she and Robert intended to retire there.
Robert, however, testified it was a vacation home, an investment property where the
whole family could stay when they were in California.
                  Unfortunately, a year into their stay, the Donahues realized their new
property had a significant mold problem. Robert hired a California contractor to
remediate the mold. While this was going on, the couple determined they would like to

         1
                    Neither the nature of Lucy’s illness nor the scheduled duration of her treatment was explored in
any detail in the trial court proceedings, so we have no insight into how long the couple initially planned to stay in
California.
         2
                    Robert testified he did this because Lucy had rented a car which was costing $1,000 per day (!),
and he thought it would be cheaper if he just bought her a car to use.

                                                           3
remodel 1225 Cliff Drive, and Robert hired an architect and contractors to conduct the
renovation. In the meantime, they moved out of the residence and rented a villa at the
Montage resort.
              The remodeling process sretched out longer than expected because of
delays in permitting and approvals from the California Coastal Commission. Robert
hired an attorney to represent him in connection with this. In 2019, while they waited on
1225 Cliff Drive, the couple purchased another home in Laguna Beach at 17 Montage
Way. Robert testified he paid property taxes on both Cliff Drive and Montage Way.
However, he says he planned to sell Montage Way once the Cliff Drive renovation was
completed.
              In 2018, Lucy’s younger daughter moved out to California. Robert and
Lucy enrolled her at Sage Hill High School and hired a personal assistant, Emily Brock,
who would take her to and from school and take care of other personal errands. Lucy’s
older daughter desired to remain in Virginia to complete high school so Robert continued
to travel back and forth, and the parties maintained their domestic staff at their Virginia
residence.
              In the spring of 2019, the older child graduated high school and that fall
entered college at Vanderbilt University in Tennessee. Robert began spending more time
in California, but he contracted Covid in March 2020. It took him two months to recover
fully, and by that time, travel restrictions were difficult to circumvent, so he worked and
lived mainly in California in 2020 and 2021.
              Around October 2021, Lucy discovered a letter in the couple’s printer at
Montage Way that indicated Robert was contemplating divorce. This precipitated a
series of events culminating in Robert’s departure from the Montage Way property in late
October 2021,and his return to Virginia. Lucy remained in California and filed a petition
for dissolution on November 3, 2021. Robert was served with the petition in Virginia on
November 5, 2021.

                                              4
              Robert responded to the petition by filing a request for order on December
3, 2021, seeking to quash Lucy’s summons and petition because he was “not a resident of
California and therefore h[ad] insufficient contacts with California to satisfy the
constitutional requirements for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over” him. He filed
his own petition for divorce in Virginia on November 8, 2021 and served Lucy on
November 19, 2021 in California.
              After reviewing submissions from both parties and listening to two days of
testimony and argument, the trial court issued a statement of decision granting Robert’s
motion to quash and dismissing Lucy’s petition for lack of in personam jurisdiction over
Robert. The trial court reasoned Robert did not do business in California and maintained
his residency in Virginia. The court also found Robert had not caused effects in
California such that he could be brought into court here.
              Lucy filed a petition for writ of mandate, supersedeas, and temporary stay
in this court, seeking relief from the trial court’s ruling in light of the concurrent divorce
proceedings in Virginia. Alternatively, she requested we exercise our original
jurisdiction to decide the matter. We denied her request for a temporary stay of the trial
court’s orders, but gave calendar preference to her appeal of the rulings, which we now
decide.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.            Standard of Review
              “When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional
grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise
of jurisdiction. (State of Oregon v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557.)
Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it
becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable. (Burger King [Corp. v. Rudzewicz], supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 476–477.)
When there is conflicting evidence, the trial court’s factual determinations are not

                                               5
disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (Felix v. Bomoro
Kommanditgesellschaft (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 106, 111.) When no conflict in the
evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the
reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record. (Great–West Life
Assurance Co. v. Guarantee Co. of North America (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 199, 204.)”
(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons).)
              Here, there was certainly conflicting evidence as to whether Lucy and
Robert intended to permanently relocate to California from Virginia. But the question of
permanence is not central to our inquiry here. Instead, the question turns on whether
Robert had sufficient contacts with the state of California for him to be brought into court
here. As we shall explain, the facts pertinent to this inquiry are largely undisputed. Our
review of the jurisdictional question is therefore de novo.
II.           Personal Jurisdiction Framework
              “California’s long-arm statute authorizes California courts to exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) A state court’s assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has not been served with process
within the state comports with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal
Constitution if the defendant has had such minimum contacts with the state that the
assertion of jurisdiction does not violate ‘“traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”’ (International Shoe[, supra,] 326 U.S. [at p.] 316; see also Burnham v.
Superior Court (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 618–619.)” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 444-
445.)
              Since International Shoe, two forms of in personam jurisdiction have been
recognized: general and specific. General jurisdiction is present where the nonresident
defendant has such “‘extensive or wide-ranging’ [citation]” or “‘substantial . . .
continuous and systematic’ [citation]” activities in the state so as to “warrant jurisdiction

                                              6
for all causes of action asserted against him,” whether the specific cause of action alleged
in the lawsuit arises from or pertains to that activity or not. (See Cornelison v. Chaney
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147 (Cornelison).) “If, however, the defendant’s activities in the
forum are not so pervasive as to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over him, then
jurisdiction depends upon the quality and nature of his activity in the forum in relation to
the particular cause of action. In such a situation, the cause of action must arise out of an
act done or transaction consummated in the forum, or defendant must perform some other
act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Thus, as the relationship
of the defendant with the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction over him grows more
tenuous, the scope of jurisdiction also retracts, and fairness is assured by limiting the
circumstances under which the plaintiff can compel him to appear and defend.[fn] The
crucial inquiry concerns the character of defendant’s activity in the forum, whether the
cause of action arises out of or has a substantial connection with that activity, and upon
the balancing of the convenience of the parties and the interests of the state in assuming
jurisdiction.” (Cornelison, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 147-148.)
              As the United States Supreme Court acknowledges, “general and specific
jurisdiction have followed markedly different trajectories post-International Shoe.”
(Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 132.) Specific jurisdiction has become the
main focal point while “general jurisdiction has come to occupy a less dominant place in
the contemporary scheme” due to the Court’s reluctance to “stretch [it] beyond limits
traditionally recognized.” (Id. at p. 133, fns. omitted.) But general jurisdiction is still a
valid concept, depending on the facts of the case. In the past, the U.S. Supreme Court has
described certain factors such as the maintenance of offices, the presence of employees,
use of bank accounts, and marketing or selling products in the state, but these factors are
not an exhaustive list. (See BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
421, 435.)

                                               7
              A court can exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident “‘only if: (1)
“the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits”. . .; (2) “the
‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” [the] defendant’s contacts with the forum’”
. . .; and (3) “‘the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with “fair play and
substantial justice.”’”’ (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.)” (SK
Trading Internat. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 378, 387 (SK
Trading).)
III.          Jurisdictional Analysis as to Robert
              A.             Minimum Contacts
              As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, the personal jurisdiction analysis
“is one in which few answers will be written ‘in black and white. The greys are dominant
and even among them the shades are innumerable.’ Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545
(1948).” (Kulko, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 92.) But this case seems to us more
monochromatic. In our view, the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over Robert in
the marital dissolution action, and could take its pick of general or specific jurisdiction.
              A review of the undisputed facts in the matter portrays a well-delineated
picture of general jurisdiction. Between 2015 and the beginning of the pandemic, Robert
traveled weekly back and forth between California and Virginia, dividing his
responsibilities between Lucy’s treatments and his stepdaughters and his business. He
rented a home here. He purchased a car here and registered it here, using his California
address. He then sold a large stake in his out-of-state company and purchased a separate
home in Laguna Beach. He enrolled his stepdaughter in an exclusive private high school
in Newport Beach, paid her tuition, and donated to the school. He hired contractors to
remediate mold and conduct a remodel of the Laguna Beach home. He hired a California
lawyer to represent him before California regulatory bodies to acquire permits for the
remodel. When it came time to move out of the home to allow renovations to proceed, he
did not return to Virginia, but proceeded to rent a villa and then purchase another home

                                              8
in Laguna Beach. Robert received health care from concierge doctors in California. He
hired and paid a household employee in California. Between 2019 and 2021 when he
left, Robert spent most of his time in California. This set of facts establishes rather
clearly the type of systematic, wide-ranging, continuous, and substantial contacts
required for general jurisdiction. (See Khan v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d
1168, 1178 [jurisdiction present where husband “intentionally established numerous
contacts” and “diverse links with the state run[ning] the gamut from the personal to the
professional to the commercial.”].)
              Even if we hesitated to exercise general jurisdiction over Robert, we could
not but conclude he had sufficient contacts to justify specific jurisdiction over the marital
dissolution. “‘The purposeful availment inquiry . . . focuses on the defendant’s
intentionality. [Citation.] This prong is only satisfied when the defendant purposefully
and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue
of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court’s jurisdiction based on’ his contacts
with the forum.” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269; see also
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 475.) The “‘“purposeful
availment” requirement ensures that a defendant will not be hailed [sic] into a jurisdiction
solely as a result of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts, [citations], or of the
“unilateral activity of another party or a third person.’” [Citations.].” (SK Trading,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 387-388.)
              Robert could very fairly expect to be subject to California court jurisdiction
in this case based on his years of presence in the state with his wife. Of that we simply
have no doubt. The trial court focused on whether Robert was conducting his business
affairs in California. Because it thought he was not, it felt he should not have to defend
the marital dissolution in California. This was error.
              It is true Robert conducted little or no business in the state – but that only
further demonstrates the point. His contacts with California were mostly, if not entirely,

                                              9
personal. They were in pursuit of his perceived obligations to the wife who is now
divorcing him. Indeed, it appears he would not have been in California at all if Lucy’s
medical condition had not prompted moving their household here. The marriage
relocated to California and seemingly fell apart in California. We fail to see why the
locus of Robert’s business activity is the fulcrum on which the trial court should have
                                                         3
rested its analysis, rather than the marriage.
                  B.                Reasonableness
                  Since we find the evidence demonstrated sufficient contacts to allow the
court to exercise jurisdiction over Robert, we must next analyze whether Robert met his
burden to show that it would be unreasonable for it to do so. Robert argued he never
intended to relinquish his domicile in Virginia, and was only caught in California for a
time due to the pandemic. He further argued the “vast majority” of the couple’s estate is
located outside California, and the issue of spousal support is unrelated to California.
                  We find none of these arguments persuasive. Inconvenience alone does not
establish unreasonableness. Nor does Robert’s assertion of domicile in Virginia. He may
have been “caught” in California during the pandemic, but that was a situation created by
his own choice to spend substantial amounts of time here prior to the pandemic. Even if
much of the marital estate is located outside of California, California courts would still
have the authority to adjudicate rights to land located outside its borders so long as
jurisdiction over both parties exists, which it does. (See In re Marriage of Thompson
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 481, 487. (Thompson).) And spousal support is indeed relevant to
California. Lucy lives here, and so presumably her living expenses are being incurred
here.

         3
                    Even were it proper to require Robert to derive some economic benefit from his presence in the
state for specific jurisdiction, such benefit was proven by his acquisition and remodeling of two properties, which
were – by his own admission – investments.

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IV.               Miscellaneous Matters

                  Robert invites us to affirm the lower court order based on Family Code
                 4
section 2320. He contends the trial court made factual findings that neither he nor Lucy
was a resident of California, and thus, even if we find personal jurisdiction over Robert is
present, section 2320 provides an alternate basis on which to affirm. We disagree.
Contrary to Robert’s assertions in the briefing, the trial court never considered whether
there were grounds to dismiss Lucy’s petition based on section 2320. Indeed, the court
said as much in the statement of decision: “At the hearing, Robert also challenged Lucy’s
residency under . . . section 2320. Since Robert failed to raise this issue in his moving
papers, this Court precluded Robert from challenging Lucy’s residence because no notice
of this issue was given.” Robert must “adhere to the theory (or theories) on which [his]
case[] w[as] tried,” as it would be both unfair to Lucy and the trial court to allow him to
assert on appeal a theory he was – quite reasonably – explicitly precluded from asserting
below. (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548.) The
motion was based on lack of personal jurisdiction, and that was the focus of both the
evidentiary hearing and the court’s ruling.
                  We recognize our decision today has repercussions in Virginia, where
Robert’s marital dissolution action has apparently been proceeding apace. This we regret
but cannot help. “‘[W]here two [courts] have concurrent jurisdiction over the same
parties and subject matter, the tribunal which first acquires jurisdiction of the parties is
entitled to retain it exclusively.’”’ (In re Marriage of Hanley (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d
1109, 1115.)” (Thompson, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 486-487, italics omitted.) The
status of the Virginia proceeding does not change the time at which the trial court in this
matter acquired jurisdiction.

         4
                    All further statutory references hereinafter are to the Family Code. Section 2320 states in
pertinent part: “a judgment of dissolution of marriage may not be entered unless one of the parties to the marriage
has been a resident of this state for six months and of the county in which the proceeding is filed for three months
next preceding the filing of the petition.” (Id., subd. (a).)

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                                     DISPOSITION
              The orders granting respondent’s motion to quash and dismissing
appellant’s petition for dissolution are reversed with instruction that respondent’s motion
be denied. The matter is remanded to the trial court. Appellant to recover her costs on
appeal.

                                                 BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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