Court Opinion

ID: 9884710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:09:07.764294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:40.201565
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Kelley, P. J.
I reached the same result as the majority opinion but perhaps upon different ground.
It seems to me that the true rule was announced as the doctrine of that phase of the case by our Supreme Court in Hays v. Hays (1939), 216 Ind. 62, 22 N. E. 2d 971, wherein it is stated:
“. . . Many of our cases have held that a court trying a divorce case has a continuing jurisdiction over the children of the litigants during the minority of such children. This does not mean that the particular judge who tries the case, merely by reason, of having tried the case, has such continuing jurisdiction over the custody of the children. The order entered by the special judge in the divorce action above mentioned was the order of the court and the violation of that order by the appellant constituted a contempt of the Jennings Circuit Court and not of the special judge who made the order. Only the regular pre*268siding judge of that court, or some one duly authorized to act for him, could hear the contempt proceedings. Kissel v. Lewis (1901), 27 Ind. App. 302, 306, 61 N. E. 209.”
There can be little question that if the order entered by the special judge on January 2, 1959 had not contained the words “until such time as the plaintiff may have provided a suitable home for said child within the jurisdiction of this court”, said order would constitute a final disposition of the proceeding under the authority of the Hays case, supra.
In my opinion the above quoted words contained in the final order did not serve to continue jurisdiction in the special judge who made the order but amounted, in legal effect, to a condition subsequent to the right of the defendant, Morris Heller, to retain custody of the child. In other words, it seems to me that the special judge gave said Morris Heller the custody of the child until such time as the plaintiff, Roxanne Heller, provided a suitable home for said child within the jurisdiction of the court. Upon the happening of that event the right of custody of said child in Morris Heller became subject to be terminated either by mutual action on the part of the litigants or by action of the court taken upon a petition averring the facts leading to the cessation of the right of custody.
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the special judge terminated upon the entry of said order of January 2, 1959 and that the appellant’s objections to the jurisdiction or right of said special judge to further act in said cause should have been sustained. As, in my opinion, the special judge had no jurisdiction to act in such matter, his actions and determination in said proceeding was void and of no *269force and effect and, therefore, he had no power or jurisdiction to rule upon appellant’s motion for a new trial. I think this court should declare his actions and determination in said proceeding to be void and that this appeal should be remanded to the Wabash Circuit Court for further proceedings.