Court Opinion

ID: 8864583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 18:00:29.060529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:05:57.133001
License: Public Domain

SEVERENS, District Judge,
having stated the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The first of the assignments of error relates to the admission in evidence of the contracts between other parties and the National Mercantile Company of a kind similar to that of the plaintiff with the latter company. But no grounds were stated- for the objection to their admission, and for that reason, according to the settled rule, error cannot be assigned upon the action of the court receiving them. 8 Enc. PI. & Prac. 168, and cases cited. It may not be improper, however, to say that no valid reason occurs to us on which the objection could have been based, seeing that those contracts were immediately connected with the contracts in suit, and, all taken together, constitute the entire transaction in which the parties were engaged. The same observation is applicable to contracts between Cravens and the defendant, the Carter-Orume Company, and the National Mercantile Company, which are copied in the preceding statement of facts. They are to be construed as one.
The second assignment relates to the following ruling of the court at the conclusion of the evidence to the jury:
“Now on the face of the papers themselves, I do not thinlc, and I so charge you, that the contracts — the three of them — are against public policy. But there is evidence tending to show that these contracts were a part of a combination or plan entered into between the manufacturers to the extent of eighty per cent, of the output of the country of wooden dishes, by which they each made a contract with a central company, who was to be the selling company, agreeing to sell all their output to that company at cost, taking shares in that company, and allowing that company to fix the market price for the disposition of the goods after they had been transferred to them for sale, and that these contracts were made for the purpose of maintaining prices, and that for the purpose of maintaining prices further they made contracts to limit the production of machines for the making of wooden dishes.”
The record proceeds to state: ‘Whereupon the counsel for plaintiff excepted to that part of the charge of the court touching the contracts as being against public policy.” In explanation, it is proper to say that the abovp ruling was given in charge to the jury in its preliminary instructions. The jury reported a disagreement. Whereupon the court gave them direct instructions to find for the defendant. The latter instruction superseded the former, and opens the whole case.
The third assignment is based upon the exception to the direction of the verdict in favor of the defendant. We cannot, of course, assume, and the court below could not, that any fact was established about which there was room for controversy. All questions of fact *485material to the issue, about which different opinions could fairly have been formed, were for the jury; and the question for us is whether upon the facts, which were substantially uncontroverted, including those to which the plaintiff himself testified, the verdict which the court directed was the only one which the court would have allowed finally to stand. Railway Co. v. Lowery, 20 C. C. A. 596, 74 Fed. 463, and 43 U. S. App. 408. From the preceding statement of the case as exhibited upon the trial, the material and uncontroverted facts may be gathered into the following synopsis. But first, we lay out of consideration the typewritten minutes of the proceedings at the meeting of the directors of the National Mercantile Company, on August 28, 1896. We think it might well be that the jury would have been justified in sharing the suspicion of counsel for the plaintiff in regard to their genuineness and veracity. It must be admitted that it is most remarkable that any board of directors of a business establishment should pass such a resolution as is quoted in the foregoing preliminary statement, however much in line it might be with their real purposes.
The parties who were engaged in these transactions, of whom the plaintiff was one, representing 80 per cent, of the total product, undertook to, and did in fact, form a combination for the purpose of restricting the production of wooden dishes throughout the country and keeping up the prices thereof. The articles to which this combination had reference were articles in common use. The plaintiff’s contracts were part of the means employed for effecting the common object, and he secured the means of sharing in the profits expected to be gained through the combination. To this end all the factories were expected to he brought under the control of the National Mercantile Company, which was to- regulate the prices. The plaintiff testified that it was the purpose to close his factory, and not run it at all. He further testified that it was the purpose “to get all the factories in line,” in order “to maintain prices.” He was guarantied $9,000 for closing his factory for a year, and the contract included, all the dish machines that might come into his possession or control, thus disabling himself from manufacturing, and he obligated himself not to sell any wood dishes to any other person, directly or indirectly, during the continuance of the contract. It is manifest that it was the expectation, and that the parties intended, to get a sufficiently large number of manufacturers into the combination to practically accomplish, their purpose. We cannot doubt that süch a combination, for such purposes, was opposed to public policy, and therefore unlawful. It is the settled doctrine that one cannot maintain a suit in a court of justice upon a contract entered into for the purpose of promoting such objects. The doctrine was elaborately discussed, upon the principles of the common law, by Judge Taft in a case recently decided by this court. U. S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 29 C. C. A. 141, 85 Fed. 271. In that case the question was also discussed whether the antitrust law of 1890 was applicable to the contract then under consideration. But the relation of that act to the common law was involved In the discussion, and much research was bestowed upon the established principles of the latter. The proposition there maintained *486was that “no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party.” It was not doubted, nor, indeed, can it be, that where the direct purpose of the contract in suit is to establish, for increasing their profits, a combination among manufacturers and tradesmen whose function is to prevent competition, and thereby prevent the public from ob: taining those articles which are in general use, at the prices at whicli they could be obtained as the result of fair and untrammeled competition, such contract is unlawful, and cannot be enforced. We have, in the foregoing statement of what Ave suppose to be the conceded rule, restricted it to the case of “articles in general use,” in order to indicate a test which is not affected by a feature put forward in some decisions as creating a distinction. We do not commit ourselves upon the question whether such distinction exists or not. The result of the application of the test above formulated to the facts of this case is, manifestly, that the contract here in question cannot be enforced. It is argued by counsel for plaintiff that the contract should be sustained, within the principles stated and approved in U. S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., upon the theory that the contract upon which the. action is based was collateral merely, and did not require the aid of the agreement for combination. But it seems clear to us that this proposition cannot be maintained. This contract Avas one of the steps in the forbidden organization, and was intended to be one of many by which the objects of the combination were to be accomplished. Seeing what has been the result to the plaintiff, one cannot help feeling that he may have been duped by more artful men. But he was a business man. It is not claimed for him that he was mentally incompetent in any such sense as to absolve him from responsibility for the legal consequences of his acts, and, in such a case as'this, the court does not administer equities according to the relative merit of the parties.
We think the court below was right in directing a verdict for the defendant. The judgment is affirmed, with costs.