Court Opinion

ID: 9840186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 15:11:55.063589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:48.761734
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              September 15, 2023
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                              EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                              SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                      OF WEST VIRGINIA

State of West Virginia,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent

vs.) No. 22-0153 (Kanawha County 20-F-164)

Charles Wesley Wild,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner Charles Wesley Wild appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s February
3, 2022, order resentencing him, for purposes of appeal, to a determinate term of thirty years of
incarceration following his conviction for second-degree murder. 1 Upon our review, finding no
substantial question of law and no prejudicial error, we determine that oral argument is
unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 21(c).

        Petitioner was indicted for the first-degree murder of Tressa Adkins in June 2020. The
parties entered into a plea agreement under Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure, providing for a binding sentence. Specifically, petitioner agreed to plead
guilty to second-degree murder, serve a determinate thirty-year sentence, waive parole
consideration, and not seek early release. The State agreed not to initiate recidivist proceedings.
The court accepted petitioner’s plea and adjudged him guilty of second-degree murder on
December 23, 2020. He was sentenced to thirty years of incarceration on February 2, 2021, and he
was resentenced on February 3, 2022, in order to prosecute the instant appeal.

        In his appeal to this Court, petitioner states that he and the victim would “overindulge on
cocaine and alcohol and enjoy rough and often violent, but consensual, sexual intercourse” and
that “[e]rotic strangulation was an important part of their dynamic.” Petitioner argues that the
victim’s death was “a tragic accident” resulting from this dynamic, but one or both of his attorneys

       1
          Petitioner appears by counsel Matthew A. Victor, and the State appears by Attorney
General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General William E. Longwell. Petitioner’s
counsel filed a brief under Rule 10(c)(10)(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.
In further accord with that rule, petitioner’s counsel requested leave for petitioner to file a pro se
supplemental brief containing assignments of error petitioner wished to raise but that counsel
lacked a good faith belief were reasonable or warranted, which leave this Court granted. Petitioner
filed a supplemental brief, and it was considered by this Court.
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discouraged him from proceeding to trial. 2 Petitioner also asserts that he “suffered a traumatic
brain injury in the past, was receiving psychiatric medication in the past[,] and . . . was self-
medicating at the time of the indictment,” seemingly suggesting that a psychological evaluation
was warranted. Petitioner concludes that when he was presented with the plea agreement, he was
“under mental stress and pressure” and that he was “scared and impressionable and easily
pressured into agreeing to any plea deal just to have closure and peace of mind.” In short,
petitioner’s claims center on the voluntariness of his plea and alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel.

        Ordinarily, a guilty plea results in a waiver of the right to appeal; however, “[a] direct
appeal from a criminal conviction based on a guilty plea will lie where an issue is raised as to the
voluntariness of the guilty plea or the legality of the sentence.” State v. Howell, No. 16-0541, 2018
WL 7075301, *3 (W. Va. Apr. 13, 2018)(memorandum decision) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Sims,
162 W. Va. 212, 248 S.E.2d 834 (1978)). But “where an adequate record is made to show [the
guilty plea] was voluntarily and intelligently entered, it will not be set aside.” Syl. Pt. 3, in part,
State ex rel. Burton v. Whyte, 163 W. Va. 276, 256 S.E.2d 424 (1979). Nearly fifty years ago, in
Syllabus Points 3, 4, and 5 of Call v. McKenzie, 159 W. Va. 191, 220 S.E.2d 665 (1975), this Court
outlined the procedure for accepting a guilty plea to ensure that the plea is knowingly and
intelligently made. See also W. Va. R. Crim. P. 11 (containing procedures for accepting a guilty
plea). Upon our review of the transcript of petitioner’s plea hearing, we find that the court complied
with the required procedure. Of particular relevance to his claim, petitioner stated that he
understood that he did not have to plead guilty, that he understood the rights he was giving up by
entering a guilty plea, and that he desired, nevertheless, to plead guilty. Petitioner acknowledged
signing his plea agreement and related waiver of rights freely and voluntarily, and he specifically
denied that anyone forced him to do anything that he did not want to do. In sum, petitioner agreed
that his guilty plea was “freely and voluntarily tender[ed]”; the court concluded that petitioner
“freely, voluntarily, intelligently, knowingly, and understandingly tendered . . . both his oral and
written plea of guilty”; and the record contains no information from which this Court could reach
a contrary conclusion. Accordingly, we find no merit to petitioner’s claim that his guilty plea was
not intelligently and voluntarily made.

        With regard to petitioner’s remaining claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we have
stated that “it is often difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to determine [in a direct appeal]
‘whether the attorney’s performance below was ineffective or merely the result of trial strategy.’”
State v. Woodson, 222 W. Va. 607, 621, 671 S.E.2d 438, 452 (2008) (quoting State v. Bess, 185
W. Va. 290, 293, 406 S.E.2d 721, 724 (1991)). As a result, “[i]neffective assistance claims raised
on direct appeal are presumptively subject to dismissal.” State v. Miller, 197 W. Va. 588, 611, 476
S.E.2d 535, 558 (1996). Such claims, instead, are more appropriately pursued in a habeas corpus
proceeding so that a factual record can be developed. See Woodson, 222 W. Va. at 621, 671 S.E.2d
at 452. The record here offers no justification for departing from this procedure, so we decline to
address petitioner’s claim that he received ineffective assistance from his counsel.

         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

         2
             Petitioner had different counsel during the circuit court proceedings than before this
Court.
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                                        Affirmed.

ISSUED: September 15, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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