Court Opinion

ID: 9733483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:09:04.924021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:41.973469
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in re-suit).
Although I concur in the majority writing, the citation of Cheney brings to mind the principle of Continuity.1 See State v. Waff, 373 N.W.2d 18, 26-27 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., concurring by separate writing). This citation also brings to mind the thought of Consistency.2 It is good to have Continuity and it is good to have Consistency.
I maintained, as demonstrated by the authorities in my dissent in Cheney, 370 N.W.2d at 574, that the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company should pay the Cheney family under a group life insurance policy applied for by Cheney. I also strongly aver that the Washington National Insurance Company in this case owes the proceeds of a life insurance policy to the father of this young man who applied for insurance.
In Cheney, the decedent, Julian Cheney, applied for insurance. He paid a premium of $39.15 via a state payroll deduction. The premium was earned. Because of an administrative hiatus, created by thousands of checks which had to be printed for state employees, the Cheney family did not recover, for the “effective date of insurance” was lost in the complications of the computer world. But the just responsibility of honoring the insurance contract existed. In Cheney, (1) an application wa's made for insurance; (2) a man was eligible for insurance without a medical examination; (3) a premium was paid via a deduction from a payroll check; (4) a premium was earned; (5) the insurance company had constructive possession of the insurance premium; (6) insurance coverage was denied by the insurance company; and (7) this Court held there was no coverage because a “warrant date” was controlling and it adversely affected the “effective date of insurance.”
*428Here, we have a different name. Instead of Cheney, it is Sharkey. In Sharkey, (1) an application was made for insurance; (2) a man was eligible for insurance without a medical examination; (3) a premium of $30.00 was paid via a deduction from a checking account; (4) a premium was earned; (5) the insurance company had actual possession of the insurance premium; (6) insurance coverage was denied by the insurance company; and (7) this Court now holds that there is coverage. Again, the just responsibility of honoring the insurance contract exists. And again, I would judicially require the insurance company to pay the benefits of the policy. Sequence, accordant: good precepts.
In Cheney, there was no testimony as there was no jury trial. There, the parties stipulated to the documentary evidence and the facts for the trial court to consider. In Cheney, both parties moved for a summary judgment. The “effective date of insurance” was decided as a matter of law.
Here, this experienced, veteran trial judge permitted a jury, in effect, to decide the “effective date of insurance” as a matter of fact, for he gave the following instruction of law:
14. Ordinarily, under our law, the terms of a written contract cannot be varied or changed by oral testimony. However, in this case, the Court has allowed oral testimony to be introduced tending to show the moment in time when the effective daté was written in space # 9 of the Application, Part 1, and to enable you to determine if the words “Date policy Nov. 1,1977” then appeared in the Exhibit No. 3 at the time it was signed by Leo F. Sharkey, or if those words were inserted after it was signed by Leo F. Sharkey. If those words were written and appeared on the face of the Exhibit No. 3 at the time that Leo F. Sharkey signed Part 1 of the Application, then, in that event, you must find for the Defendant since the words formed a part of the written contract entered into with the Defendant.
If, however, you should find from all the evidence that the words “Date policy Nov. 1,1977” were written into space # 9 of the Application, Part 1 after and following the time of Leo F. Sharkey’s signing Part 1 of the Application without his written consent, then you may find for the Plaintiff.[3] (Emphasis supplied mine.)
This instruction was the heart of the lawsuit. It is to be noted that the insurance company did not object to the instruction. It is obvious the jury found that the insurance company, through one of its agents, tried to shuffle the October 11, 1977 “effective date of insurance” to November 1, 1977. If, in fact, the November 1, 1977 policy date was a part of the application when Leo Sharkey, decedent, signed it, then the coverage would not commence until that time, and appellee’s cause of action would tumble. Sharkey was killed on October 30, 1977. However, the jury’s clear finding is that the November 1, 1977 insertion was made by an agent of the insurance company after the original application was signed and, hence, was not consented to by this young oil field worker who bought an insurance policy and was killed shortly thereafter.4 Surely, the trial court had in mind an old ruling in this Court when it permitted parol testimony to vary or change the “effective date of insurance” from November 1, 1977 back to the date of the application, October 11, 1977. That rule evolved from Farmers’ Elevator Co. v. Swier, 50 S.D. 436, 210 N.W. 671 (1926), holding that in the absence of fraud, mistake, or accident, a written agreement which is complete, clear, and unambiguous in its terms and contains mutual contractual covenants cannot be changed or modified by parol or extrinsic evidence. Fraud or mistake was also recognized as an excep*429tion to the parol evidence rule in McCollam v. Littau, 307 N.W.2d 144 (S.D.1981). This was a classic illustration of not only an exception under the statute, which the trial court recognized, but also an old legal maxim set in Latin: “In contractibus, rei veri-tas potius quam scriptura perspici debet.” Literal translation: “In contracts, the truth of the matter ought to be regarded rather than the writing.” Uniquely, therefore, a jury, not the legal community, determined the “effective date of insurance.” A jury of peers produced a salutary result and I would affirm the judgment entered upon the jury verdict of .$50,554.00 plus the prejudgment interest assessed by the trial court.

. Synonyms of Continuity: succession, sequence, chain.

. Synonyms of Consistency: congruous, harmonized, accordant.

. Jury Instruction 15 pertained to advising the jury on the law governing alteration of insurance policy applications.

. Had the trial judge not permitted oral testimony to establish the insurance company’s "alteration” per Jury Instruction 14 and 15, the parol evidence rule would be used as a sword rather than a shield.