Court Opinion

ID: 9683559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:31:30.023228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:48.771648
License: Public Domain

MAUZY, Justice,
dissenting.
The court today legitimizes a mechanism that dramatically enhances the State’s power to deprive Texas landowners of their property without full compensation. At issue is whether a landowner has the right to designate an economic unit reflecting the highest and best use of property condemned by the State. Because today’s opinion compromises that right, I dissent.
The Texas Constitution prohibits the State from taking property for public use without “adequate compensation.” Tex. Const, art. I, § 17. This provision, we have held, entitles a landowner to be compensated for the full value of the land taken, without reference to any effect the taking might have on the remaining property. State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 609, 89 S.W.2d 194,197 (1936); see Buffalo Bayou, Brazos & Colorado R.R. Co. v. Ferris, 26 Tex. 476 (1863) (construing the predecessor of art. I, § 17).
Since Buffalo Bayou, courts have enforced the constitutional guarantee of adequate compensation by allowing the landowner to choose the method by which the value of the land taken is determined. Under one such method, recognized and approved in State v. Meyer, 403 S.W.2d 366, 374 (Tex.1966), the landowner may waive all severance damages and seek an apprais*79al of the part taken as a severed unit.1 If the part taken is not a self-sufficient economic unit, the landowner may designate a larger area subsuming the part taken for the purpose of determining a fair per-acre value. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Ramsey, 542 S.W.2d 466, 472 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The law as developed in Meyer and Ramsey recognizes the landowner’s right to focus the jury’s attention exclusively on the part taken, or on a designated area subsuming that part. This approach is consistent with the axiom of State v. Carpenter: the landowner’s compensation for the part taken is to be determined without reference to the remainder.
The law was thus clear on this point until 1983, when the Texas Legislature, apparently dissatisfied with Carpenter, decided to change this basic rule. With its enactment of section 21.042(e) of the Texas Property Code, the legislature sought to mandate consideration of “any special and direct benefits that arise from the highway improvement ... that are peculiar to the property owner and that relate to the property owner’s ownership, use, or enjoyment of the particular parcel of remaining real property.” Texas courts have rightly rejected this statute as a legislative attempt to circumvent the constitution by denying the condemnee adequate compensation. State v. Enterprise Co., 728 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Roberts v. State, 754 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
With today’s opinion, the court effectively resurrects the statute held unconstitutional in Enterprise and Roberts. Even when a landowner waives damages to the remainder, a court will now be obligated to allow evidence concerning the remaining land whenever the State offers a land valuation theory based on the whole tract. This approach undercuts the protections articulated in Meyer and Ramsey, and effectively deprives the landowner of the right to choose a method of valuation.
The method chosen by the landowner in this case is essentially the same as the method chosen by the landowner in Ramsey.2 In both cases, the condemned land abutted a highway, and was thus substantially more valuable than the rest of the tract. In both cases, the land condemned was too small to be a self-sufficient economic unit, so the landowner designated a larger area subsuming the part taken for the purpose of determining a fair per-acre value. And in both cases, the trial court properly excluded any evidence concerning the remaining land.
This time, though, this court steps in to change the rules. No longer will a landowner have the right to choose an appropriate economic unit for the highest and best use of his or her own property. Nor will the landowner be able to prevent the admission of evidence concerning the entire remainder. All the State need do is assert that the highest and best use of the property would result in a constant value per acre throughout the tract, and the trial court will be obligated to admit evidence that clearly would have been inadmissible under Meyer and Ramsey.
*80I would adhere to the case law that has long guaranteed Texas landowners the right to adequate compensation for the taking of their property. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

. In Meyer, the State had sought to introduce evidence that the landowners retained access rights on the condemned property. We upheld the trial court’s granting of a motion in limine excluding the evidence, noting that admission of the testimony would have improperly permitted the jury to consider an element of enhancement to the remainder. Id. at 374.

. One court has held that, under Ramsey, a landowner has “an absolute right to the exclusion of evidence of the existence and potential uses of the non-designated remainder,” provided that "the highest and best use of the designated remainder is one to which no part of the non-designated remainder is suitable or adaptable." State v. Oak Hill Joint Venture, 815 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex.App. — Austin 1991, no writ). Here, Windham showed that the highest and best use of the designated remainder was as commercial frontage property — a use for which the rest of the property was clearly not suitable. Thus, the trial court properly excluded the State’s evidence regarding the non-designated remainder. See also City of Richardson v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d 933, 938-39 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (if part taken differs materially from remainder, all references to remainder must be excluded).