Court Opinion

ID: 9946317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 17:10:50.352234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.279766
License: Public Domain

J-S46004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.M.S.                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: K.N.S., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 629 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
                           at No(s): 80 of 2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 29, 2024

       Appellant, K.N.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the April 20, 2023 order that

involuntarily terminated her parental rights to seven-year-old D.S. (“Child”).

Mother’s counsel, Shirley A. Makuta, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw as

counsel and an Anders1 Brief, to which Mother has not filed a response. Upon

review, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the order.

       In its April 20, 2023 opinion, the trial court authored a thorough and

accurate factual and procedural history, which we adopt for purposes of this

appeal. Trial Ct. Op., 4/20/23, at 3-7. Briefly, Mother and S.W.R. (“Father”)

(collectively, “Parents”) are parents to Child, who was born in August of 2016.

The Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (the “Agency”) first became

involved with the family when Child tested positive for opiates, cocaine, and

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1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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methadone at birth, and the Agency monitored Mother’s treatment in drug

and alcohol therapy.

       Most recently, in April of 2021, when Child was four years old, local

police responded to Parents’ house for a domestic violence incident. Parents

both admitted to illegal drug use, and the Agency discovered that Child had

not received medical care since 2018. The Agency implemented services for

drug and alcohol, mental health, and domestic violence treatment. After four

months, on August 25, 2021, the Agency obtained emergency custody of Child

after finding Mother unresponsive in the home; Father was incarcerated at the

time.2    The Agency also observed various safety hazards in the home,

including a bottle of butane, a used syringe, and a cap and bag with white

residue which were all within Child’s reach. Mother later tested positive for

eight illegal substances.

       The trial court adjudicated Child dependent on September 14, 2021.

The court ordered Mother to participate in a mental health evaluation, a drug

and alcohol evaluation, and a parenting assessment and to comply with all

treatment recommendations.           The court further ordered Mother to attend

domestic violence counseling, obtain appropriate housing, and secure and

maintain a legal and verifiable source of income. Finally, the court ordered

Mother to have therapeutically supervised visitation with Child.     The court

proceeded to hold several permanency review hearings and, at each hearing,
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2 The trial court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights to Child on

April 20, 2023. Father is not a party to this appeal.

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found Mother to either be non-compliant or minimally compliant with the

court-ordered objectives.

       On June 17, 2022, the Commonwealth charged Mother with one count

of Hindering Apprehension by Harboring or Concealing an individual, as well

as seven counts of drug-related offenses.3

       On December 5, 2022, the Agency filed a petition to involuntarily

terminate Mother’s parental rights.4

       On April 20, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. Mother

did not appear.      The court heard evidence from Christopher Haas, Agency

caseworker. Mr. Haas testified that Mother has failed to complete a drug and

alcohol evaluation or treatment, failed to appear for a parenting evaluation or

complete parenting classes, and was unsuccessfully discharged from domestic

violence counseling for lack of participation.    Mr. Haas explained that the

Agency made referrals for each of the court-ordered services, as well as

offered Mother transportation to assist her in engaging in the services. He

stated that Mother appeared for 10 out of 66 requested drug screens and

tested positive for numerous illegal drugs each time she appeared.5 Mr. Haas

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3 The Commonwealth also charged Father with, inter alia, numerous drug
related offenses, as well as Fleeing to Avoid Apprehension.

4 The trial court appointed Leslie Uncapher, Esq. to serve as Child’s legal
counsel.

5  Mother tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines,
benzodiazepine, fentanyl, norfentanyl, methadone, codeine, morphine,
ozepam, temazepam, cocaine, and marijuana.

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explained that Mother last participated in a drug screen on January 31, 2022.

Mr. Haas further testified that Mother only attended 2 out of 23 offered visits

with Child and has failed to visit Child for over a year, since February 15, 2022.

He explained that visits were placed on hold after Mother’s repeated failure to

appear.

      Mr. Haas testified that Child is currently placed in a pre-adoptive foster

home, where he has lived for the past four months with his foster mother

(“Foster Mother”) and foster brother. Mr. Haas explained that prior to living

with Foster Mother, both Child and his foster brother were placed with Foster

Mother’s parents (“Foster Grandparents”) and spent weekends at Foster

Mother’s home. Mr. Haas testified that Child calls Foster Mother “Mommy”

and Foster Grandparents “Mimi” and “Pap-Pap” and considers them all to be

his family.   Mr. Haas further testified that Child is doing well in school, is

participating regularly in therapy, and has significantly improved behavior

since Mother has stopped visits and communication with Child.           Mr. Haas

stated that Child has expressed numerous times that he loves his foster

family, wishes to stay with his foster family, and that he feels happy and safe

in the home. Mr. Haas testified Child has not seen Mother in over a year and

that Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare are

currently being met by the foster family and the extended foster family. Mr.

Haas further testified that he believes termination of Mother’s rights would be

in Child’s best interest.

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        At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated Mother’s

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother

timely appealed.      Both Mother and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        On August 14, 2023, Attorney Makuta filed an Anders Brief indicating

that, upon review, Mother’s appeal is wholly frivolous.         Mother failed to

respond.

        In the Anders Brief, counsel indicated that Mother wished to raise the

following issues for our review:

        I.    Did the trial court err when it terminated the parental rights
              of [] Appellant pursuant to the Adoption Act and specifically
              23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511?

        II.   Did the trial court err when it permitted [Child] to be
              transferred from his original foster care placement to a
              second placement, although it was within the same
              extended family?[6]

Anders Br. at 7.

                                               A.

        As a preliminary matter, we address appellate counsel’s request to

withdraw as counsel. “When presented with an Anders Brief, this Court may

not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the
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6 Mother raises this issue for the first time on appeal.  Accordingly, we find
this issue to be waived, and therefore frivolous, and decline to address its
merits. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived
and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); see also Commonwealth
v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 888 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“An issue that is waived is
frivolous.”).

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request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa.

Super. 2010). In order for counsel to withdraw from an appeal pursuant to

Anders, our Supreme Court has determined that counsel must meet the

following requirements:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record;

      (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
      supports the appeal;

      (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

      (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
      frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
      controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
      conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

      Counsel has complied with the mandated procedure for withdrawing as

counsel. Additionally, counsel confirms that she sent Mother a copy of the

Anders Brief and petition to withdraw, as well as a letter explaining to Mother

that she has the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and to raise any

additional points. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa.

Super. 2005) (describing notice requirements).

      Because counsel has satisfied the above requirements, we will address

the substantive issue raised in the Anders Brief.      Subsequently, we must

“make a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent

judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago,

978 A.2d at 355 n.5 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Yorgey,

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188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (noting Anders requires

the reviewing court to “review ‘the case’ as presented in the entire record with

consideration first of issues raised by counsel”).

                                       B.

      In addressing Mother’s issues, we are mindful of our well-settled

standard of review. When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny

a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record

supports them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual

findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent

an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for

the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273,

276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

      Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs

termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially,

the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d

1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).          “The party seeking

termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s

conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section

2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]f the court determines that the parent’s

conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights,” the court then

engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):

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determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best

interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, we need only agree

with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well

as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S.,

946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008).        We concentrate our analysis on

subsection 2511(a)(8).

                                      B.

      Section 2511(a)(8) provides for termination of parental rights where the

petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he child has been

removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary

agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of

removal or placement,” and “the conditions which led to the removal or

placement of the child continue to exist[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8); In re

C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). In addition, the

petitioner must prove that “termination of parental rights would best serve

the needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).          Section

2511(a)(8) creates a three-prong test requiring consideration of (1) whether

the child has been removed from the parent for twelve months or more, (2)

whether the conditions which led to the removal continue to exist, and (3)

whether termination would best serve the child’s needs and welfare. In re

Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). Section

2511(a)(8) requires only that the conditions continue to exist, not an

evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy those conditions. In

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re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa. Super. 2006). Further, this

Court defines the relevant “conditions” broadly. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d

at 1006-07 (concluding that a parent failed to remedy the conditions which

led to her child’s removal when the removal resulted primarily from the

parent’s positive drug test for cocaine and the parent was later incarcerated

for drug offenses). Regarding the third prong, it is important to note that the

needs and welfare analysis pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from the

needs and welfare analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), and courts must

complete their Section 2511(a)(8) needs and welfare analysis before reaching

Section 2511(b). Id. at 1009.

      Instantly, the trial court found that Child had been removed from the

home for over 20 months, that Child was removed from Mother’s care due to

Mother’s drug addiction, failure to maintain a safe and stable residence, and

failure to tend to Child’s medical needs, and that these conditions have not

been remedied because of Mother’s refusal to participate in services. Trial Ct.

Op. at 8-9. The trial court opined:

      There was ample evidence presented demonstrating that Mother
      [has] failed to remedy the conditions that led to the Child[]'s
      removal. [Mother] ha[s] not engaged in any of the services that
      have been offered. Through their actions, neither Parent has
      demonstrated that they are likely to remedy the conditions.
      Mother has not been in communication with the [Agency] or her
      attorney. She is not actively participating in any services and did
      not attend the termination hearing. [Mother] has [not] seen the
      child since February 15, 2022.

      While drug abuse was one of the [Agency]’s main concerns,
      [Mother] participated in far fewer than half of the attempted drug
      screens. [Mother was] positive for numerous illegal drugs on each

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      test. Mother has not been tested since January 21, 2022[,] and
      her current whereabouts are unknown. . . .

      The termination of Mother[‘s] parental rights would best serve the
      needs and welfare of the child as [Mother has] made no progress
      towards reunification and the services provided are unlikely to
      remedy the conditions which led to [] Child's removal.

Trial Ct. Op. at 10. The trial court further emphasized that, at the time of the

trial, Mother had only participated in two visits with Child since he was placed

in foster care 20 months prior. Id. at 11. The record supports the trial court’s

findings and we decline to reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, the Agency

presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).

                                       D.

      With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that

terminating the parental bond will have on the child.       This Court reviews

whether “termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).             It is well settled that

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the

inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284,

1287 (Pa. Super. 2005).

      “One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the

nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such

bond.”   In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super. 2018)

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(citation omitted). “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between

the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent

of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of

the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762–63. “In addition to a

bond examination, the court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the

child under subsection (b), particularly in cases involving physical or sexual

abuse, severe child neglect or abandonment, or children with special needs.”

Id. at 763. Moreover, the trial court should consider intangibles, such as the

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the adoptive

resource. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). Ultimately, the

concern is the needs and welfare of the child. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108,

1121 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      Here, the trial court emphasized that Child has not had contact with

Mother in over a year, placed great weight on the fact that Child was

emotionally attached to the foster family, whom he considered to be his own,

and concluded that severing the bond with his foster family would cause the

Child emotional harm. The trial court opined:

      [C]hild is currently thriving in his current foster home. He views
      his foster mother as his mother and the rest of her family as his.
      [C]hild’s adverse behaviors have stopped since [Mother’s] visits
      ceased. [C]hild has become rooted in his foster family and
      removing him from this family would cause further stress, as he
      has developed stability in his current home.

      [C]hild reports feeling safe and secure in his current home. He is
      well-adjusted to his schedules and is doing well in school. [C]hild
      has made progress while residing with his foster family [and]

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      participates in therapy when needed. [C]hild reportedly wants to
      remain in his current foster family.

      [C]hild has developed secure and beneficial relationships with the
      foster parents and is residing in a safe and predictable home.
      [C]hild has not seen Mother . . . in over fourteen months. For
      these reasons, this [c]ourt is convinced that termination of
      Mother[’s] parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
      of [C]hild.

Trial Ct. Op. at 12. The trial court also credited the testimony of Mr. Haas,

who expressed that termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in Child’s

best interest. The record supports the trial court’s findings, and we discern

no abuse of discretion.   Once again, we decline to usurp the trial court’s

credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence.

                                     E.

      Following our review of the issues raised in counsel’s Anders Brief, we

agree with counsel that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b). In

addition, our independent review of the proceedings reveals there are no

issues of arguable merit to be raised on appeal.       Accordingly, we grant

counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the decree terminating Mother’s

parental rights.

      Order affirmed; petition to withdraw as counsel granted.

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FILED: 2/29/2024

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