Court Opinion

ID: 9698917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:04:10.366996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:44.638772
License: Public Domain

LeGRAND, Justice
(dissenting).
Perhaps this case has already received too much public — and judicial — attention in view of the limited legal principles involved. Nevertheless I feel compelled to state briefly my reasons for dissenting.
I dissent only from Division I. My disagreement does not go to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence but to the failure of the trial court — and the majority —to submit the issue of lewdness for jury determination.
In short, defendants argue they were nude but not lewd. They say both are necessary to a conviction under section 725.1. I think they are right.
First, let me say there was plenty of evidence upon which defendants could have been found guilty of lewdness under this statute. But the issue was taken from them by the court’s instructions. The importance of this is pointed up by the specific inquiry which the jury directed to the trial court on this very subject after they had been deliberating for some time.
Under these circumstances I find it strange that the majority so studiously *449avoid any mention of this question. I have searched the opinion in vain for any reference to “lewd” or “lewdness”, a term the statute uses three times. There is none.
Yet this — aside from the free speech argument — is defendants’ sole justification for acts otherwise admittedly violative of the statute.
The majority admits some acts of nudity are permitted as exceptions under the law, although not specified in the statute, because such exhibitions are not lewd.
No one could disagree with such a reasonable interpretation of the law. All I want is for the jury to say whether this act of nudity was lewd. Defendants cannot otherwise be properly convicted of violating section 725.1. They should have a new trial.
MASON, J., joins in this dissent.