Court Opinion

ID: 9695810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:29:46.092987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:16.734112
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority correctly postulates that any reference by the prosecution at trial to an accused’s assertion of his right to remain silent would be prejudicial. E. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966); Commonwealth v. Dulaney, 449 Pa. *13945, 295 A.2d 328 (1972); Commonwealth v. Greco, 227 Pa.Super. 19, 323 A.2d 132 (1975). I do not disagree, therefore, with the majority’s statement of the law. However, I do believe that the majority has incorrectly applied the law to the present fact situation.1
The appellant was accused of committing a burglary of a medical office in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, which resulted in the theft of a quantity of drugs. After his arrest, and despite being warned that he had a right to remain silent, the appellant readily responded to police questioning concerning the incident. First, under general examination, the appellant emphatically denied any knowledge of the burglary. Next, the appellant immediately identified a lug wrench which had been found at the scene of the crime as one which he owned, explaining that the wrench, and a stereo set, had been recently stolen from his apartment. The police examiner then advised the appellant that his explanation was contradicted by other information which had been received by the police. The appellant failed to expand or vary his explanation, stating that “he had no more to say. . . . ”
Unlike the majority, I do not interpret the appellant’s remark as an assertion of his right to remain silent. I believe that the appellant’s statement, viewed in context, indicates solely that the appellant had finished relating his knowledge of the questioned incident to the police. We must distinguish circumstances in which an accused truly exercises his right to remain silent by withdrawing his consent to be questioned from those circumstances in which an accused can no longer answer police questions because he has completely told all that he is able to tell. I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
WATKINS, President Judge, and VAN der VOORT, J., join in this dissenting opinion.

. I dispute the rationale of the majority only in regard to the issue involving the appellant’s right against self-incrimination.