Court Opinion

ID: 9916263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 17:00:36.939132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:58.238957
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     RICH BRADLEY,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DA-1221-22-0365-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: January 8, 2024
                 Agency.

               THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Michael Kleinman , Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the appellant.

           Barry D. Elliott , Austin, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for failure to state a claim
     upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT
     the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND
     the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was appointed to the position of Physician (Aerospace
     Medicine) on January 31, 2021.         Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 35.
     The agency cited provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
     Year 2017 (2017 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016), as the
     legal authority for the appointment. Id. He was terminated during his trial period
     effective January 14, 2022. Id. at 11-12. The appellant filed a complaint with the
     Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that the agency terminated him and
     initiated a Quality Assurance Investigation (QAI) in reprisal for whistleblowing.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 9-10, Tab 4 at 32-45. After OSC informed the appellant that it was
     closing its investigation into his complaint, he filed this IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 1.
¶3         In response to the appeal, the agency argued that the Board could not order
     any relief because it lacks the authority to order the Adjutant General of Texas, a
     state employee, to take any remedial action regarding the appellant’s employment.
     IAF, Tab 10 at 6-7. After giving the appellant an opportunity to address the issue
     of relief, IAF, Tab 11, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     dismissing the appeal, IAF, Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID).        The administrative
     judge found that the Board has jurisdiction over the appellant’s whistleblower
     reprisal claim as to his termination, but not as to the QAI. She found that the
     appellant’s termination was accomplished by the Adjutant General of Texas and
     that under Singleton v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 244 F.3d 1331, 1336-37
     (Fed. Cir. 2001), the Board lacks authority to compel a state adjutant general to
     perform an ordered act. ID at 8-11. The administrative judge acknowledged that
     the 2017 NDAA had extended Board appeal rights to certain National Guard
     employees, but she found that it did not specifically grant the Board authority to
     order relief against a state entity such as an adjutant general. ID at 11-12.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. He argues that the Board has authority to
     order effective relief in this case, whether by ordering the Department of the
                                                                                             3

     Air Force to provide relief or by treating the Texas National Guard as a Federal
     agency for purposes of this appeal.         Id. at 16-24.     He also argues that the
     administrative judge erred in finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over his
     claim that the agency initiated an investigation in reprisal for his whistleblowing.
     Id. at 10-16. The agency has responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition
     for review, PFR File, Tab 3, and the appellant has filed a reply, PFR File, Tab 4.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

     The administrative judge correctly found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over
     the appellant’s claim that the agency initiated an investigation in reprisal for
     whistleblowing.
¶5         On petition for review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s
     finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over his claim that the agency initiated a
     QAI about him in reprisal for his protected disclosures and activities. 2 PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 10-16. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the administrative
     judge.
¶6         The agency initiated the allegedly retaliatory QAI in March 2022,
     IAF, Tab 4 at 24-25, approximately 2 months after the appellant’s termination,
     IAF, Tab 10 at 11.        The administrative judge found that the Board lacked
     jurisdiction over the claim arising out of the QAI both because the appellant was
     neither an employee nor an applicant for employment at the time it was initiated,
     and because the QAI was neither a personnel action covered under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(a)(2)(A) nor closely related to a personnel action. ID at 6-8.
¶7         The right to file an IRA appeal derives from 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a), which
     provides a right to seek corrective action before the Board to “an employee,
     former employee, or applicant for employment.” Maloney v. Executive Office of
     the President, Office of Administration, 2022 MSPB 26, ¶ 33. Although former

     2
       On petition for review, neither party challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
     the Board has jurisdiction over the appellant’s claim that the agency terminated him in
     reprisal for his protected disclosures and activities. ID at 2-6, 8. We see no reason to
     disturb that finding.
                                                                                        4

     employees are included among those who can seek corrective action from the
     Board, they cannot do so for matters occurring after their employment.
     See Guzman v. Office of Personnel Management, 53 F. App’x 927, 929-30
     (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that a former employee may not seek corrective action
     for alleged disclosures made or retaliatory acts taken after his employment
     ended) 3 ; Weed v. Social Security Administration, 113 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 11 (2010)
     (citing this principle from Guzman with approval). Section 2302(b)(8) prohibits
     any employee in a position of authority from taking, failing to take, or threatening
     to take “a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant.” 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) (emphasis added). Section 2302(b)(9) similarly prohibits personnel
     actions taken “against any employee or applicant” because of certain classes of
     protected activity. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) (emphasis added). Therefore, we agree
     with the administrative judge that the appellant cannot seek corrective action for
     an alleged personnel action that occurred after he was no longer a Federal
     employee.

     The Board has authority to grant relief in this appeal.
¶8         The Board has the authority to “order any Federal agency or employee to
     comply with any order or decision issued by the Board” in matters falling within
     its jurisdiction.   5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1)-(2).    In Singleton, 244 F.3d at 1333,
     1336-37, the Federal Circuit determined that the Board could not order an
     adjutant general to provide relief to a National Guard technician employee.
     It reasoned that an adjutant general is not a Federal employee, and a National
     Guard, even if an agency, “can only act through its adjutant general.”            Id.
     The administrative judge applied the holding in Singleton and determined that the
     2017 NDAA did not compel a different outcome. ID at 11-12. This was error.

     3
      The Board may follow a nonprecedential decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
     Federal Circuit when, as here, it finds its reasoning persuasive.       LeMaster v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 11 n.5 (2016).
                                                                                       5

¶9         The holding in Singleton that the Board lacks the authority to issue
     enforceable orders to remedy improper employment actions taken against
     National Guard technicians has been abrogated by Congress’s changes to
     32 U.S.C. § 709, enacted as part of the 2017 NDAA. Erdel v. Department of the
     Army, 2023 MSPB 27, ¶¶ 11-16. In any event, the appellant was not a dual status
     National Guard technician.      The agency appointed the appellant under the
     authority of section 932 of the 2017 NDAA. 4 IAF, Tab 10 at 35. Section 932
     amended 10 U.S.C. § 10508 to authorize the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
     to employ individuals within the National Guard Bureau and the National Guard
     of each state and territory. 130 Stat. at 2363 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
     § 10508(b)(1)). Section 932 further authorizes the Chief of the National Guard
     Bureau to designate adjutants general to employ National Guard employees. Id.
     (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 10508(b)(2)).    Section 932 provides that the adjutant
     general and National Guard of a jurisdiction are responsible for taking and
     defending any personnel action against employees appointed under its authority,
     stating as follows:
           The adjutant general of the jurisdiction concerned shall be
           considered the head of the agency and the National Guard of the
           jurisdiction concerned shall be considered the employing agency of
           the individual and the sole defendant or respondent in any
           administrative action.
           The National Guard of the jurisdiction concerned shall defend any
           administrative complaint, grievance, claim, or action, and shall
           promptly implement all aspects of any final administrative order,
           judgment, or decision.
     130 Stat. at 2363-64 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 10508(b)(3)(A)-(B)). It would be
     implausible for Congress to have specifically provided for an administrative
     remedy for improper personnel actions, but for there to be no relief available

     4
      The agency also cited section 1084 of the 2017 NDAA, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 10217,
     as authority for the appellant’s appointment. IAF, Tab 10 at 35. However, that
     provision does not actually authorize the appointment of new employees such as the
     appellant. See 130 Stat. at 2421.
                                                                                      6

      from the Board, which has jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 1221 to adjudicate
      whistleblower reprisal claims arising out of such actions. See Erdel, 2023 MSPB
      27, ¶ 11 (observing that it would be “beyond strange” for Congress to have
      specifically amended two statutory provisions in different titles of the United
      States Code to provide for Board appeal rights to National Guard technicians, but
      for there to be no relief available from the Board).
¶10        We note that whereas Erdel involved an appeal of a chapter 75 removal
      action, the instant case involves a request for corrective action under 5 U.S.C.
      § 1221 for alleged whistleblower reprisal.     However, that distinction does not
      affect the Board’s ability to order relief here. Section 932 authorizes adjutants
      general to accomplish “all personnel actions or conditions of employment,
      including adverse actions under title 5,” and to defend “any administrative
      complaint, grievance, claim, or action arising from, or relating to, such a
      personnel action or condition of employment.” 130 Stat. at 2363-64 (codified at
      10 U.S.C. § 10508(b)(3)). Based on that broad statutory language, we find that
      Congress did not intend to limit the Board’s remedial authority regarding
      National Guard employees to a particular subset of personnel actions or types of
      appeals.
¶11        Accordingly, we vacate the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant
      failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
                                                                                                   7

                                                    ORDER
¶12         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. 5

      FOR THE BOARD:                             ______________________________
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      5
        After the close of the record on review, the appellant requested leave to file an
      additional pleading to address the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ohio
      Adjutant General’s Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority , 598 U.S. 449,
      453-54 (2023). PFR File, Tab 6. He subsequently requested further leave to file an
      additional pleading to address a recent nonprecedential decision in another Board
      appeal involving the Board’s authority to order relief in an appeal filed by a National
      Guard employee. PFR File, Tab 8. The Board generally does not permit any pleadings
      on review other than a petition for review, cross petition for review, and the responses
      and replies to those petitions. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5). No other pleading is allowed
      unless the party seeking leave demonstrates the need for such a pleading. See 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.114(a)(5) (requiring that a motion for leave to file an additional pleading on
      review “describe the nature and need for the pleading”). The Board has already
      addressed the Supreme Court’s decision in its recent Opinion and Order in Erdel, 2023
      MSPB 27, ¶¶ 6, 14, which was issued after the appellant filed his first request for leave.
      Our decision in this case is consistent with the nonprecedential decision that is the basis for
      the appellant's most recent motion, and we do not require any additional pleadings
      addressing that decision. Because there is no need for additional argument, we deny the
      appellant’s requests for leave.