Court Opinion

ID: 7809919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:11:37.061378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:26.510972
License: Public Domain

HART, J., (after stating the facts). It appears from the record that in 1893, A. J. Hanson executed to J. T. Waller, as trustee, a deed of trust to the lands in controversy to secure an indebtedness which he owed to J. M. Waller and that his wife never joined him in its execution. The act to render more effectual the constitutional exemption of homesteads, approved March 18, 1887, provides that no conveyance or mortgage affecting the homestead of any married man shall be of any validity except for taxes, laborer’s and mechanic’s liens, and the purchase money, unless his wife joins in the. execution of such instrument and acknowledges the same. Kirby’s Digest, section 3901. The Legislature of 1893 passed an act to cure defective conveyances and acknowledgments which were defective or ineffectual by reason of not having complied with the act of March 18, 1887, above referred to. See Acts of 1893, p. 303. This act has the effect to validate the deed of trust from A. J. Hanson to J. T. Waller to secure an indebtedness to J. M. Waller. W. B. Stevens, as substituted trustee, sold the lands pursuant to the terms of said deed of trust to J. M. Waller for the sum of $209.60 and executed a deed to him therefor, on the 6th day of May, 1899. On the 20th day of November, 1900, J. M. Waller entered into an executory contract of sale in writing with A. J. Hanson for sale of said lands for the sum of $117. The contract of sale provided that the note for the purchase money should be due and payable on the first day of November, 1901, and that, upon the failure of A. J. Hanson to pay tbe note when due, the contract of purchase should cease and $40 rent should be paid for said lands for the year 1901. Under the terms of this agreement the vendor had the power, upon the failure of his vendee to pay the purr chase money, to declare the contract of purchase at an end, and thereafter to establish the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties. See Ish v. Morgan, McRae & Co., 48 Ark. 413, and Souter v. Witt, 87 Ark. 593. This, however, Waller failed to do. It is true Waller wrote Hanson a letter in September, 1902, reminding him that he had not paid the purchase money and threatening to take action in the matter at once, but so far as the record discloses, no action was ever taken by him in the premises. This letter was written almost a year after the purchase money became due. Hanson died soon after this letter was written, and in a few months thereafter his widow and some of his children moved back on the lands and have continued in possession thereof in person, or through their tenants, ever since. Waller did not make any attempt to oust them from the land. He gives as an excuse that he was advised by his attorneys that the widow of A. J. Hanson had a homestead interest in the lands and was therefore entitled to the possession of them. For the reasons already given, it is apparent that Mrs. Hanson had no homestead interest in the lands and it is no excuse that J. M. Waller made a mistake about the law; for he is presumed to know the law and to have asserted his rights under it. His action, therefore, in allowing the defendants to continue in the possession of the lands after so long a period of time will be deemed a waiver of his right to a forfeiture under his contract with A. J. Hanson. This brings us to a consideration of the prayer of the defendants and cross-complainants for specific performance. A. J. Hanson died intestate, leaving the defendants as his heirs at law. By virtue of the bond for title from J. M. Waller to himself, he came into the possession of an estate which was descendible by inheritance, which at his death vested in his heirs at law. Roach v. Richardson, 84 Ark. 37. A. J. Hanson was left in possession of the land under this contract and he continued in possession until his death; His widow and heirs have been in possession in his right ever since. The continuation of their possession, by the tacit consent of J. M. Waller and his vendee, J. G-. Brown, until the latter brought this suit to quiet his title and made the defendants parties thereto, was a constant and continued affirmance, on the part of them, that the holding of the defendants and their father was under the bond for title. There was no necessity for the defendants to bring a bill for specific performance until J. M. Waller, or his vendee, J. Gh Brown, created the necessity by bringing an action for the lands. Hargis v. Edrington, 113 Ark. 433. To the same effect see Waters v. Travis, 9 Johnson’s Rept. (N. Y.) 448; Norman v. Bennett (W. V.), 9 S. E. 914; Coffey v. Emigh (Col.), 10 L. R. A. 125; Mudgett v. Clay (Wash.), 31 Pac. 424, and Western Railroad Corporation v. Babcock, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 346. Therefore, neither the statute of limitations, nor the doctrine of laches can have any application to the rights of the defendants to maintain their bill for specific performance. The chancellor, however, found that the defendants had not paid the purchase money, and in this finding we think he was correct. It is true one of the defendants testified that he was with his father when he paid the purchase money in the fall of 1900 just before Christmas. He said that his father went to town with some cotton and after selling it paid off the note. He was 33 years of age when he testified and consequently was only 15 years old when this transaction occurred. J. M. Waller flatly contradicted his testimony and he is corroborated by the circumstances of the case. According to the testimony of N. S. Hanson, the money was paid to J. M. Waller at the latter’s house. The note was not delivered to A. J. Hanson, but was retained in the possession of Waller. This is inconsistent with the fact of payment. Besides this, A. J. Hanson did not demand a deed, but on the- contrary soon moved away from the lands to the State of Louisiana. When all the attending circumstances are considered, we are convinced the chancellor was right in holding that neither the defendants, nor their father ever paid the purchase money. For this reason a decree for the specific performance will not be granted to the defendants except upon their payment of the purchase money together with the accrued interest and the taxes which have been paid by J. M. Waller, or the plaintiff, J. Gr. Brown. For the error indicated in the opinion the decree must be reversed, and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.