Court Opinion

ID: 9586317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:09:24.132493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:07.831772
License: Public Domain

Webstek, J.
(dissenting in part) — I dissent with part F of the opinion because the majority misinterprets Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), and fails to recognize that due process requires counsel in certain community custody revocation hearings. I would hold that Scarpelli applies to community custody revocation hearings and that the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of the sound discretion of the appropriate DOC decision maker.
In performing the balancing required by a due process analysis, the Scarpelli court takes as its starting point the rehabilitative goals of probation and parole. 411 U.S. at 783. The Court recognized that where the parole officer recommends revocation of parole, a position at odds with that of the parolee, due process requires that the conflict *637be resolved before revocation is final. See id. at 785. All parties have interests in the “accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discretion—the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community.” Id. at 785. It was to serve all of these interests that the Morrissey protections were established. See id. at 786 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972)).
The state argued in Scarpelli that counsel was not required at parole revocation hearings because the Morrissey protections were sufficient to safeguard these interests. The Court disagreed:
What this argument overlooks is that the effectiveness of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills which the probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 786-87. It was for this reason, the risk that in some cases the Morrissey protections would be ineffective in the absence of counsel, that the Court determined that due process required counsel in those cases.
I submit that this same risk is present in community custody revocations. The “unskilled or uneducated” individual in community custody may no doubt have difficulty in presenting his version of disputed facts where it requires the examination or cross-examination of witnesses or presentation of documentary evidence.
Furthermore, as McNeal argues, the fact that community custody is primarily punitive rather than rehabilitative supports a finding that due process requires counsel in certain cases. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of a lib*638erty interest is less likely in a system operating with the goals of the parolee’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society than it is in a system operating with punitive goals. Thus, the need for counsel in certain cases is heightened rather than diminished by the punitive nature of community custody.
In its argument against the requirement of counsel, the State asserts its important interests in efficiency. The State undoubtedly correctly predicts that proceedings in which counsel is required will become adversarial and prolonged, and the State will bear the cost of its own counsel and the cost of appointed counsel. But application of Scarpelli here would not require counsel in every case. In balancing the interests at stake, the Court declined to find that counsel was required in all cases precisely because “it would impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages without regard to the need or the likelihood in a particular case for a constructive contribution by counsel.” Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 787. The Court recognized the costs to the State: “the decisionmaking process will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the State—for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, and the possibility of judicial review—will not be insubstantial.” Id. at 788. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that “the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings.” Id. at 790. Thus, the delay and expense here would arise only in those cases where the DOC itself decides that due process requires counsel. Admittedly, the costs of judicial review would add unavoidable State expense.
Although application of Scarpelli does not provide a bright-line rule for the DOC to follow,52 would hold that, at a minimum, an individual facing community custody re*639vocation must be informed of a right to request counsel, and if such a request is made, the DOC decision maker must consider that request, and grounds for refusal must be stated in the record. If the request for counsel is granted, counsel is limited to representation within the context of the type of hearing provided in Morrissey but is not limited to advising on the individual’s right to remain silent. Although in Washington probationers and parolees have a statutory right to representation of counsel at probation and parole revocation hearings,53 these statutorily provided rights would not apply to individuals in community custody.
Although the purposes of parole and community custody differ, the focus in a due process analysis is on the nature of the liberty interest at stake, not on the underlying purpose of that interest. Thus, I respectfully dissent with part F only of the majority opinion.

The Supreme Court provided the following guidelines:
Presumptively, it may he said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is *639uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 790-91.

CrR 7.5(b) entitles a probationer to representation by counsel and requires appointment of counsel for indigent probationers in probation revocation hearings. ROW 9.95.122 provides the right to representation of counsel at the parolee’s expense at parole revocation hearings and provides that upon request and proof of indigency counsel may be appointed.