Court Opinion

ID: 9549824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:25:20.840408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:57.284205
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
joined by MOORE, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s holding that the Director improperly counted 32 absentee ballots which had been witnessed by lay persons on different dates. Thus, I would affirm the certification of the Director of the Division of Elections that W.E. “Brad” Bradley is the winner of the election for Seat A in House District 13.
This court’s Special Master rejected the state’s contention that the dating of lay witnesses’ signatures is only directory. Instead the Special Master ruled that it is a mandatory aspect of absentee voting that lay witnesses be present when the ballot is cast and the voter certificate is executed. AS 15.20.081(d). The Special Master further reasoned that normally the failure to comply with a mandatory provision which has as its purpose establishing “presence” should prove fatal to these ballots. Nevertheless the Special Master concluded that the director properly counted these disputed absentee ballots. In so doing the Special Master reasoned as follows:
However, once again, the Division has utilized procedures, in this case forms, that are seriously deficient. Option 2 under the witnessing affidavit provides in full:
If no authorized official is reasonably available, you may have the certificate witnessed by two persons over the age of 18.
Witness Signature_
Date_
Witness Signature_
Date_
at (City/State or Country)_
Finkelstein Ex. 147, p. 1. Unlike the official executing an affidavit under Option 1, the lay witnesses are not told what it is that they are to “witness.” They may reasonably believe that it is sufficient if a person they know to be the individual whose name appears on the oath brings the certificates to them to sign, after the fact. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the type of certification required on permanent fund dividend application forms.
While the witness’ certificate is simply unclear, the instructions to the voter on the secrecy envelope are actually misleading. The voter is directed to take certain steps. The first four are summarized below. The fifth step is quoted as it appears in the instructions.
[1. & 2. Mark the ballot.]
[3. Turn the ballot over and vote the other side.]
[4. After all choices have been marked, put the ballots in the secrecy envelope.]
5.Complete and sign the VOTER OATH on the back of the return mailing envelope. Also have your oath WITNESSED, using OPTION 1 or OPTION 2 described on the back of the return mailing envelope.
Two additional steps regarding mailing follow.
These instruction suggest that the voting process itself need not be witnessed. There is, furthermore, nothing said to inform the voter that his or her oath should be executed in the presence of the lay witnesses. To negate the votes of 35 *794individuals on the grounds that they did not meet requirements never made known to them or their witnesses would constitute disenfranchisement of a most egregious sort. Under these circumstances, the ballots of these individuals were properly counted.
In my view the Special Master’s analysis is in accord with this court’s voting decisions. In Fischer v. Stout,1 we said:
In Willis we upheld the decision of a master to count the votes of two voters whose names did not appear on the voters list because the registrars failed to send their registration applications to the Division of Elections. 600 P.2d at 1087. As in Willis, the error with regard to Ms. Munoz’s application was ‘solely on the part of the election officials.’ Id. Her vote should have been counted.2
An additional point in Fischer concerned whether the ballot of Daryl Wallace should have been counted. In attempting to correct an error in the address given on his voter registration card, the voter checked the box cancelling his registration. In regard to the issue we said:
Fischer argues that the voter registration card is confusing and that Mr. Wallace’s ballot should have been counted. We agree....his vote should have been counted.3
Of additional significance is that portion of our decision in Fischer v. Stout where in connection with a name change issue we observed that:
We will seek a construction of the phrase which avoids the wholesale disfranchisement of qualified electors. See Carr v. Thomas, 586 P.2d 622, 626 (Alaska 1978)4 (footnote omitted).
The authorities alluded to above are reflective of this court’s recognition that the right to vote is a fundamentally important right.5 Our own precedents are also in accord with the view that “[ajbsentee voting regulation should not be construed in a manner that unduly interferes with the exercise of this right by those otherwise qualified to vote.”6 In this regard the Supreme Court of Colorado further concluded that:
Nor should the exercise of the voting right be conditioned upon compliance with a degree of precision that in many cases may be a source of more confusion than enlightenment to interested voters. A rule of strict compliance, especially in the absence of any showing of fraud, undue influence, or intentional wrongdoing, results in the needless disenfranchisement of absent voters for unintended and insubstantial irregularities without any demonstrable social benefit.7
Given the importance of the right to vote, and our decisions which have refused to disenfranchise voters due to mistakes of election officials, I conclude that the special master correctly upheld the director’s decision to count these 32 disputed absentee ballots.8 As the Special Master noted the lay witnesses were given unclear instructions concerning the witness certificate. Additionally, the instructions tothe absentee voter were “actually misleading.” In short, these inadequate directions failed to articulate the precise roles the voter and his or her witnesses were to play in the absentee voting process. Further, there is no indication in this record of fraud, voter *795-797eoereion, intentional wrongdoing, or a pattern of similarity among the names of the witnesses who signed the witness certifications on these absentee ballots. In such circumstances I would not penalize the absentee voters for the failure of Alaska’s election officials to furnish unambiguous instructions concerning the manner in which the absentee voter, and his or her two lay witnesses, were required to carryout their respective roles in the absentee voting process.7 »

. 741 P.2d 217, (Alaska 1987).

. Id. at 225.

. Id. at 224.

. Id. at 225. In Carr this court noted:
Courts are reluctant to permit a wholesale disfranchisement of qualified electors through no fault of their own and ‘[where] any reasonable construction of the statute can be found which would avoid such a result, the courts should and will favor it.’
586 P.2d at 626 (brackets in original) (quoting Reese v. Dempsey, 153 P.2d 127, 132 (N.M.1944)).

. See also Erickson v. Blair, 670 P.2d 749, 754 (Col.1983). ("the right to vote is a fundamental right of the first order").

. Id. at 754.

. Id. at 754-55.
The Erickson court went on to reject the rule of strict compliance and in turn adopted a standard of substantial compliance concluding that such standard "is adequate to the task of both preventing fraud in the elections and perserving the absent voter's right of suffrage against unnecessary and technical restrictions." Id. at 755.

. See also Application of Moore, 57 N.J.Super. 244, 154 A.2d 631, 637-38 (1959).

. Implicit in the resolution I would reach is my agreement with the state’s contention that the requirements of AS 15.20.081(d) should be construed as directory, under AS 15.20.203(b)(2), for purposes of determining the consequences of any noncompliance on the part of lay witnesses in executing absentee voter certificates,