Court Opinion

ID: 9836921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:32.079358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.319476
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge
(dissenting):
The fourth principle of United States v. Ginn, 47 MJ 236, 248 (1997), controls this case. The record as a whole and the appellate filings “‘compellingly demonstrate’ the improbability” of appellant’s post-trial assertions.
Appellant says his counsel never mentioned the possibility of an administrative discharge, and that they unequivocally told him he would be allowed to retire if he were not sentenced to a dismissal. In a joint affidavit, his counsel say that they explained the administrative elimination process and that they told him that his retirement eligibility would turn on the Navy’s interpretation of the phrase “resolved in favor of the member.” The affidavit from Capt Morgan, the Assistant Legal Counsel for Navy BUPERS, corroborates defense counsel’s affidavit in some respects. Although Capt Morgan is vague as to the dates on which he consulted with appellant's defense counsel, his affidavit is consistent with and corroborates the statement in LCDR Tinker’s affidavit that BU-PERS’ interpretation of the phrase “resolved in favor of the member” was unclear at the time appellant’s court-martial was pending.
I agree with the court below that appellant’s assertions are “quite incredible,” 47 MJ at 713, for three reasons. First, the corut below concluded that the discretionary nature of TERA was common knowledge. The majority dismisses the lower court’s conclusion because it “lacks support in the record.” 52 MJ at 204. The majority cites no authority for the proposition that a Court of Criminal Appeals may not make a factual finding regarding matters of common knowledge in the Navy. It recites no basis in law or fact for rejecting the court's conclusion, other than to point to the complexity of the issue. The members of the court below were all senior officers on active duty at the time in question and are much better situated than this Court to say what was common knowledge in the Navy at the time. The court below did not dispute that TERA was legally complex; it found only that it was common knowledge that it was discretionary.
Second, appellant had previously applied for early retirement under TERA, indicating that he was generally familiar with the policies and procedures for requesting early retirement under TERA.
Third, I think it incredible that two military lawyers would conduct extensive research and investigation into the applicability of TERA to appellant, and then tell appellant that he could count on retiring if he were not dismissed. Unlike most claims of ineffective representation, appellant does not assert that his lawyers were negligent or incompetent; he asserts that they lied to him.
In my view, it takes more than a bare assertion to impugn the professional competence of counsel. Appellant’s counsel had nothing to gain by lying to him. Appellant has everything to gain by this incredible attack on his counsel.