Court Opinion

ID: 9915848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 19:13:26.641544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:46.191343
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Marriage of
                                                    No. 84526-8-I
 CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH WALSH,
 JR.,                                               DIVISION ONE

                      Respondent,                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

               and

 ISABELLA ZENI ROSFORD,

                      Appellant.

       BIRK, J. — Isabella Rosford and Christopher Walsh, Jr. share two

daughters, E.W. and A.W. Walsh filed a petition for dissolution and following 13½

days of trial testimony, the trial court entered its final orders. Rosford appeals and

requests a new trial, arguing several findings of fact are unsupported by substantial

evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                          I

       On March 1, 2014, Isabella Rosford and Christopher Walsh were married

in Texas. Walsh and Rosford are the parents of E.W. and A.W., who were seven

and five years old, respectively, at the time of trial. Rosford and Walsh moved to

Washington in November 2019.

       On March 6, 2020, Rosford reported to police that she and Walsh had had

an argument the night before during which Walsh slammed a bedroom door, hitting

Rosford in her face. Rosford told police she was injured and would send a photo
No. 84526-8-I/2

she had taken showing the injury. Rosford, Walsh, and their roommate Marlen

Cardenas provided statements to the police. No charges were filed. The nature

of the fight and whether Rosford was injured were disputed at trial. Rosford elicited

that Walsh admitted to responding police officers that the door struck her face.

Walsh testified he did not feel the door hit anyone and believed it had struck

Rosford only because she said so. On cross-examination by Walsh’s counsel, an

investigating officer testified that he did not recall seeing Rosford having any

specific wound.

       On May 11, 2020, Rosford filed a petition for order of protection in

Snohomish County District Court, Evergreen Division.         Rosford alleged E.W.,

A.W., and herself were victims of domestic violence committed by Walsh. Rosford

alleged that on May 9, 2020, Walsh claimed he would kill himself because Rosford

was causing him to lose his ability to be a father. Walsh contacted the police to

have himself brought to a hospital. Rosford alleged a police officer transported

Walsh to a hospital, but Walsh was not committed and chose to leave. Rosford

made additional allegations that Walsh threatened to kill her and take the children,

had raped her and had become “violent and mentally unhinged,” had inserted

chemicals into her vagina, had damaged property in anger, had bruised and was

emotionally abusive to the children, contacted her up to 40 times a day and refused

to leave when asked, had made “over 100” suicide threats, threw objects, and had

threatened Rosford with box cutters. Rosford stated she feared Walsh would “rape

me again” and “harm or rape my children because he has [been] physically violent

with them in the past.”

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No. 84526-8-I/3

       Rosford obtained a temporary protection order, as a result of which, Walsh

testified, he did not return to the house. At trial, Rosford testified she had never

feared Walsh would sexually abuse the children.            Although Rosford made

statements to that effect in her petition for an order of protection, she implied

(despite a hearsay objection) that she included those statements at the suggestion

of a court clerk. She testified she omitted the incident that had prompted her to

call the police in March. Rosford also testified that Walsh “hadn’t hurt the children”

other than on one occasion when he left marks on their arms, which he said was

accidental. Rosford testified at trial that Walsh raped her when they lived in Texas

by engaging in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her.

       On May 26, 2020, Walsh filed in Snohomish County Superior Court a

petition for dissolution of his marriage to Rosford. On June 18, 2020, the court

appointed Edward Schau, PhD, as the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and set

a deadline for his GAL report as August 24, 2020.

       Also on June 18, 2020, the superior court entered an order denying

Rosford’s request for a final protection order because Rosford failed to establish

domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence. Based on Rosford’s

petition and pleadings, the court found the issues raised would be more

appropriately addressed under Walsh’s dissolution action. Nevertheless, in the

temporary parenting plan entered the same day, while the court reserved the

issues of neglect, child abuse, and domestic violence, the court limited Walsh to

supervised contact every Saturday from 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. The court ordered

either a professional supervisor or an agreed lay supervisor.

                                          3
No. 84526-8-I/4

       Trial was convened on 16 dates spanning June 6, 2022 to August 15, 2022,

and included 13½ days of testimony. Following trial, the trial court entered four

orders: a dissolution decree, findings and conclusions about a marriage, a

parenting plan, and a final child support order.       The court entered extensive

findings of fact, discussed below, and ordered that the children reside with Walsh,

with Rosford to have supervised visitation together with restrictions pursuant to

RCW 26.09.191. The court awarded Walsh $35,000.00 in partial attorney fees.

On September 13, 2022, the trial court denied Rosford’s motion for reconsideration

or for a new trial and awarded Walsh $2,500.00 in additional attorney fees.

Rosford appeals.

                                           II

       Initially, Walsh argues the trial court’s findings of fact are verities on appeal

because Rosford failed to assign error to any of them in her opening brief. Rosford

contends her brief makes clear that she assigned error to all of the trial court’s

findings in the parenting plan related to residential time, domestic abuse, the need

for supervision, and the limited decision making imposed on her.

       In general, we review the trial court’s dissolution orders for abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Buchanan, 150 Wn. App. 730, 735, 207 P.3d 478

(2009).   A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or based on untenable reasons.

State v. Dye, 178 Wn.2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013). Findings of fact are

reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d 342,

348, 506 P.3d 630 (2022). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade

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No. 84526-8-I/5

a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding. In re Marriage of Akon,

160 Wn. App. 48, 57, 248 P.3d 94 (2011). In determining the sufficiency of

evidence, an appellate court need only consider evidence favorable to the

prevailing party. Id. Unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true on appeal.

In re Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 386, 409 P.3d 1184 (2018). We

defer to the trier of fact for resolution of conflicting testimony, evaluation of the

evidence’s persuasiveness, and assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. In re

Parentage of G.W.-F., 170 Wn. App. 631, 637, 285 P.3d 208 (2012).

       RAP 10.3(g) requires a separate assignment of error for each challenged

finding of fact with reference to the finding by number. The rules of appellate

procedure are to “be liberally interpreted to promote justice and facilitate the

decision of cases on the merits. Cases and issues will not be determined on the

basis of compliance or noncompliance with these rules except in compelling

circumstances where justice demands.” RAP 1.2. We wield discretion to consider

cases and issues on the merits under RAP 1.2. State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315,

323, 893 P.2d 629 (1995). This discretion should be exercised unless there are

compelling reasons not to do so. Id. Where the nature of the appeal is clear and

the relevant issues are argued, citations provided, and the respondent is not

prejudiced, there is no compelling reason for an appellate court to not consider the

merits of the case or issue. Id.

       Rosford’s opening brief failed to comply with RAP 10.3 because Rosford

did not identify the specific findings of fact she is challenging. Rosford’s attempt

to comply belatedly by block quoting about 25 findings of fact in her reply brief is,

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No. 84526-8-I/6

on its own, insufficient to remedy these failures. See State v. Moses, 70 Wn.2d

282, 284-85, 422 P.2d 775 (1967) (declining to consider findings of fact as timely

challenged when set out verbatim for the first time in appellants’ reply brief);

Sherrell v. Selfors, 73 Wn. App. 596, 599, 871 P.2d 168 (1994) (holding findings

of fact challenged only in the appellants’ reply brief to be accepted as true on

appeal).

       However, most issues Rosford raised were sufficiently clear for Walsh to

discern and answer. The thrust of Rosford’s appeal is that she did not receive a

fair trial and therefore is entitled to a new one. Walsh does not demonstrate he

suffers unfair prejudice if we reach the merits of Rosford’s appeal. Accordingly,

we exercise our discretion and consider the assignments of error that are properly

before us. We set forth the specific findings of fact we deem sufficiently challenged

in each section below. The remaining findings of fact are accepted as true.

                                         III

       Rosford argues the trial court erred by failing to remove Dr. Schau as the

GAL and strike his reports.       Rosford contends Dr. Schau violated several

provisions of the Superior Court Guardian ad Litem Rules (GALRs) and

Snohomish County Local Guardian ad Litem Rules (SCLGARs). We disagree.

       A trial court’s denial of a motion to remove a GAL is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Bobbitt, 135 Wn. App. 8, 23, 144 P.3d 306 (2006).

The GAL’s role is to investigate and report factual information regarding the issues

ordered to be reported or investigated to the court. RCW 26.12.175(1)(b).

                                         A

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No. 84526-8-I/7

       On April 12, 2021, Dr. Schau completed the GAL report. In his report, Dr.

Schau detailed the backgrounds of Walsh and Rosford, including their social,

education, and employment histories. Dr. Schau observed Walsh and Rosford

visiting a park with their children and reported positive interactions during both

visits. Dr. Schau reviewed many declarations filed on behalf of both parents as to

their parental responsibilities. Dr. Schau concluded there was “strong evidence”

that Walsh was a fully engaged parent when at home.           As to allegations of

domestic violence and rape, Walsh denied ever hitting, threatening or abusing

Rosford, but accused her of physically hurting him. Dr. Schau noted it was difficult

to discern what happened between Walsh and Rosford and acknowledged they

“did seem to argue a great deal.” While Rosford did obtain a temporary protection

order, her petition was later dismissed, as there did not appear to have been a

sufficient basis for Rosford’s concern about physical abuse or fear of Walsh

kidnapping the children. Each parent had mental health concerns and was seeing

a therapist. Dr. Schau could not say whether Rosford truly feared Walsh, but

opined that she seized “on the moment” to “erase” Walsh from her life and the lives

of their children. Dr. Schau noted Rosford removed almost $14,000.00 from her

and Walsh’s joint account for the purpose of paying back the “forbearance amount

owed on their mortgage.”      Walsh, having just left the hospital, was left with

whatever little amount he had in his personal account. Dr. Schau noted there was

no need to pay the bank at the time and they owed the bank less than half of the

$14,000.00 Rosford removed.

                                         7
No. 84526-8-I/8

       Dr. Schau opined, “Much of what Isabella says and writes is questionable,”

and she “distorts and minimizes in order to foster the illusion that she has done

nothing wrong.”     Dr. Schau characterized Rosford as having a “compulsive

personality,” “very intense,” “the dominant one in this relationship,” reactionary,

uncooperative, and “creates conflict,” while Walsh came across as “laid back” and

“conflict avoidant.” Dr. Schau noted of all the declarations he reviewed, most

described Walsh as an active and caring parent, while a few spoke well of Rosford

as a parent and showing generosity as a friend, but concerns were raised about

Rosford’s anger and control problems. The park visits showed Dr. Schau that

there is a strong attachment between Walsh and the children. Dr. Schau observed,

“[Rosford] create[d] controversy on a very small thing.” However, Dr. Schau stated

Rosford has “good interpersonal skills and is capable of expressing warmth and

affection.”

       Dr. Schau recommended Walsh be the primary caretaking parent on what

would have been close to a 50-50 split, because he is “more consistent and

reliable” than Rosford. Dr. Schau did not find any basis for any restrictions on

parenting, but noted Rosford comes “close to the edge with respect to abusive use

of conflict,” and her “inability or [un]willingness to cooperate justifies a basis for

sole decision-making” with Walsh. Dr. Schau did not find a sufficient basis for

domestic violence with either Rosford or Walsh.

       On October 22, 2021, Rosford filed a motion to remove Dr. Schau as the

GAL and strike his report. Rosford argued Dr. Schau violated several provisions

of SCLGAR Rule 7.1.        Rosford contended Dr. Schau improperly refused to

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No. 84526-8-I/9

interview several key witnesses, including the children, failed to include in the GAL

report specific facts or reasons of hers explaining her actions, and erroneously

relied on Walsh’s statements for domestic violence and alcohol abuse issues.

       On October 27, 2021, Walsh filed his first objection and motion to strike

and/or deny Rosford’s motion to remove Dr. Schau as the GAL and award Walsh

terms and attorney fees. The same day, Rosford signed a declaration opposing

Walsh’s motion and asking the court to maintain the parenting plan until trial. On

October 29, 2021, Walsh filed a second objection.

       On October 31, 2021, Dr. Schau filed an addendum to his GAL report. Dr.

Schau stated his new report was based on having reviewed “all attorney emails

since 4/12/21 related to various conflicts,” pleadings associated with “this 11/03/21

Hearing”—one issue at which was Rosford’s motion for Dr. Schau’s removal—and

“two videos of recent exchanges.” Dr. Schau stated, “[Rosford] has traveled far

over the edge of what is acceptable because of her abusive use of conflict and her

alienation of affection,” and was “escalating the conflict.” Dr. Schau recommended

Walsh be awarded sole decision-making, which should take effect immediately,

because of the parents’ inability to cooperate and Rosford’s alienation of affection

and engagement in abusive use of conflict. Dr. Schau deemed it necessary that

Walsh immediately become the parent with whom the children reside the majority

of the time.   Dr. Schau denied that his addendum report was influenced by

Rosford’s motion to have him removed as GAL.

       On November 3, 2021, a court commissioner denied Rosford’s motion to

remove the GAL and strike his report. On November 24, 2021, Rosford filed a

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No. 84526-8-I/10

motion to compel Dr. Schau to produce his complete file. On December 8, 2021,

the court entered its order on Rosford’s motions to compel discovery from Walsh

and Dr. Schau. The court ordered Dr. Schau to make his records available to

Rosford by December 9. The court later found Dr. Schau substantially complied

with Rosford’s discovery requests.

       Before calling Dr. Schau at trial, Rosford renewed her motion to remove him

as the GAL and strike his report. Rosford argued significant new materials from

his file had been disclosed in the two weeks leading up to trial. The trial court ruled

Rosford had the right to question Dr. Schau before he testified about items she

believed she had not received. The trial court ordered the parties and the GAL to

meet and confer concerning the completeness of the GAL’s file production before

the GAL testified. Rosford later argued she found several additional e-mails with

substantive information that had not been disclosed despite Dr. Schau indicating

he had provided everything, and Dr. Schau had been biased against her. The trial

court ruled that if Rosford believed the GAL was biased against her, the proper

remedy was to explore that theory during examination of the witness, during which

time the court would determine the GAL’s credibility and bias.

                                           B

       GALR 2 articulates the general responsibilities of GALs. Rosford claims Dr.

Schau violated the following provisions:

              (b) Maintain independence. A guardian ad litem shall
       maintain independence, objectivity and the appearance of fairness
       in dealings with parties and professionals, both in and out of the
       courtroom.

                                          10
No. 84526-8-I/11

              (c) Professional conduct. A guardian ad litem shall maintain
      the ethical principles of the rules of conduct set forth in these rules
      and is subject to discipline under local rules established pursuant to
      rule 7 for violation.

              (d) Remain qualified for the registry. Unless excepted by
      statute or court rule, a guardian ad litem shall satisfy all training
      requirements and continuing education requirements developed for
      Titles 13 and 26 RCW guardians ad litem by the administrator of the
      courts and for Title 11 RCW guardians ad litem as required by statute
      and maintain qualifications to serve as guardian ad litem in every
      county where the guardian ad litem is listed on the registry for that
      county and in which the guardian ad litem serves and shall promptly
      advise each such court of any grounds for disqualification or
      unavailability to serve.

      ....

             (f) Treat parties with respect. A guardian ad litem is an officer
      of the court and as such shall at all times treat the parties with
      respect, courtesy, fairness and good faith.

            (g) Become informed about case. A guardian ad litem shall
      make reasonable efforts to become informed about the facts of the
      case and to contact all parties. A guardian ad litem shall examine
      material information and sources of information, taking into account
      the positions of the parties.

      ....

              (i) Timely inform the court of relevant information. A guardian
      ad litem shall file a written report with the court and the parties as
      required by law or court order or in any event not later than 10 days
      prior to a hearing for which a report is required. The report shall be
      accompanied by a written list of documents considered or called to
      the attention of the guardian ad litem and persons interviewed during
      the course of the investigation.

             (j) Limit duties to those ordered by court. A guardian ad litem
      shall comply with the court’s instructions as set out in the order
      appointing a guardian ad litem, and shall not provide or require
      services beyond the scope of the court’s instruction unless by motion
      and on adequate notice to the parties, a guardian ad litem obtains
      additional instruction, clarification or expansion of the scope of such
      appointment.

                                        11
No. 84526-8-I/12

       ....

              (o) Perform duties in timely manner. A guardian ad litem shall
       perform responsibilities in a prompt and timely manner, and, if
       necessary, request timely court reviews and judicial intervention in
       writing with notice to parties or affected agencies.

              (p) Maintain documentation. A guardian ad litem shall
       maintain documentation to substantiate recommendations and
       conclusions and shall keep records of actions taken by the guardian
       ad litem. Except as prohibited or protected by law, and consistent
       with rule 2(n), this information shall be made available for review on
       written request of a party or the court on request. Costs may be
       imposed for such requests.

GALR 2(b)-(d), (f)-(g), (i)-(j), (o)-(p) (boldface omitted).

       Rosford argues Dr. Schau violated GALR 2(b) by concealing his case file,

details for plans for an ex parte hearing and contempt motions, and requests that

Dr. Schau address the exchange issues.

       Rosford identifies no prejudice she suffered as a result of these asserted

disclosure failures. The trial court advised at the end of trial day 12 that the court

would expect Dr. Schau’s testimony to be completed the following day. Rosford

cross-examined Dr. Schau concerning the e-mail review from the meet and confer.

Rosford established some instances of documents Dr. Schau had not provided to

her. Rosford was permitted to cross-examine the GAL for five and a half hours,

during which Rosford highlighted many e-mail communications. Rosford never

showed, however, that any withheld e-mail communications were germane to any

of Dr. Schau’s opinions or decisions before the trial court, or could have affected

any rulings. Rosford also does not refer to any such content in her brief on appeal.

The trial court’s remedy of ordering a further meet and confer during trial, review

                                           12
No. 84526-8-I/13

of the GAL’s e-mails, and affording extensive cross-examination met any objection

based on discovery disclosure.

       Rosford argues Dr. Schau violated GALR 2(c) and WAC 246-924-367 by

allowing his wife to “participate in the investigation and offer her opinions about the

case.” WAC 246-924-367 prohibits psychologists from delegating professional

responsibilities to a person not qualified or not appropriately credentialed to

provide such services.

       Dr. Schau stated he had Mary Schau, his wife and assistant, review videos

of the parties exchanging the children, “alcohol videos,” and Walsh’s past

YouTube1 videos. Dr. Schau testified that his wife’s comments after watching the

videos were that they were “basically just sophomoric rants,” and “immature.”

Mary Schau has a master’s degree in education, K-12, regular education, and

special education. For about 18 years, she taught Advanced Placement English

at a high school. She is not a medical professional, GAL, or parenting evaluator.

Dr. Schau described the extent of her assistance as editing the reports, reviewing

the videos the parties submitted to him, and providing notes to him. Dr. Schau

testified he did not delegate responsibility to Mary, but only asked for her

assistance and opinion, because he assumed responsibility for the opinions he

finalized in his report. Rosford does not show Dr. Schau violated GALR(c) or WAC

246-924-367 by relying on Mary Schau’s review and summary of some of the

available information.

       1
           YouTube is a social media platform for viewing and sharing videos.

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No. 84526-8-I/14

       Rosford argues Dr. Schau violated GALR 2(d). At trial, Dr. Schau testified

he was no longer on the GAL list in Snohomish County and had not been since

two years after his appointment in this case. This was because Dr. Schau was

“semi-retired” and therefore retired from the GAL registry. Rosford fails to point to

any evidence that Dr. Schau failed to remain qualified to serve as GAL or that his

not doing so affected his opinions.

       Rosford argues Dr. Schau violated GALR 2(f). Rosford points only to

matters in which she disagreed with the GAL in the characterization of various

facts, and to his referring to certain of her behavior as “petty.”          A party’s

disagreement with the GAL over the characterization of facts reasonably subject

to interpretation, without more, does not show lack of independence by the GAL.

Here, Rosford assumes the truth of her own characterizations to attempt to portray

the GAL’s disagreement as lack of independence.

       Rosford argues Dr. Schau violated GALR 2(g) for failing to request health

records, speak to her therapist, investigate her abuse allegations against Walsh,

and interview witnesses with knowledge of relevant facts. Dr. Schau, a clinical

psychologist, interviewed the parties, which he testified was sufficient. He testified

to his not needing to take additional steps several times, for instance testifying, “I

wasn’t provided with her Social Security Disability request, and it might have been

helpful, particularly Social Security Disability. I don’t think that there’s much value

added in all of that. I’m a psychologist. I can meet with [Rosford]. I think I can

fairly well determine early on whether her psychological status is such that as it

relates to parenting, the same with [Walsh].”

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No. 84526-8-I/15

       The court did not order Dr. Schau to review medical records, but only

investigate “mental health issues” of both parties and “physical health issues” of

Rosford. He testified he reviewed some U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)

records regarding Rosford’s mental health. He did not know whether posttraumatic

stress disorder affects Rosford.    Dr. Schau was reluctant to contact any of

Rosford’s therapists, former or current, because he thought that would affect

Rosford’s ability to receive treatment since patients are worried about what may

be disclosed to a GAL. Also, therapists are not “forensic” and do not hear both

sides. Dr. Schau did not speak with any of Walsh’s therapists.

       Dr. Schau did not review Rosford’s 700 pages of Social Security records or

2,400 pages of VA records. He did not think reviewing them would be worthwhile

to complete his tasks as GAL. Dr. Schau never interviewed the children even

though Rosford several times and Walsh at least once requested that he do so.

Dr. Schau testified that while children are sometimes interviewed for parenting

evaluations, it would be “appalling” to interview the children to figure out what is

happening between the parents’ homes. Dr. Schau viewed this as putting the

children in the middle of the conflict to decipher what had transpired in their

parents’ homes. He testified GALs do not talk to kids about residential preferences

or what is going on in the family until they are at least 10 years old. Based on

Rosford’s e-mails, Dr. Schau was concerned that Rosford would coach the children

if he decided to interview them. Because of the extensive declarations, interviews

of Rosford and Walsh, and observations of the children with each parent at the

park, Dr. Schau felt he had sufficient information to write his report without

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No. 84526-8-I/16

interviewing the children.    Dr. Schau’s testimony supports his decision to

investigate and complete his report as he saw fit. The court order appointing Dr.

Schau and outlining his duties did not require he perform them in any particular

way. That Rosford wanted him to review more or other materials does not mean

Dr. Schau failed to become informed about the case in violation of GALR 2(g).

Rosford’s criticisms pertain solely to the weight of Dr. Schau’s testimony, and she

had the opportunity to explore them fully on cross-examination.

        Rosford argues Dr. Schau violated GALR 2(j) by investigating the parties’

financial matters.   On cross-examination, Dr. Schau testified a review of the

parties’ finances was not part of the court order outlining his duties. The cross-

examination on this point concerned Rosford’s $14,000.00 withdrawal from

savings. In his report, Dr. Schau referred to this fact as it related to parenting,

because it showed an effort to disadvantage Walsh with respect to the children at

a time when Rosford had obtained a court order for supervised visitation, Walsh

was just out of the hospital, and he had no money. Dr. Schau did not violate GALR

2(j).

        Rosford argues Dr. Schau violated GALR 2(i) both by submitting untimely

reports and not including all of his recommendations in the reports. Dr. Schau’s

report was not timely as is required under GALR 2(i), but he explained the he had

needed to continue the investigation. In some instances, Dr. Schau suggested

slight amendments to his original recommendations concerning the balance of

residential time between the parents, but he consistently maintained his central

position that both parents were bonded with the children and should share

                                        16
No. 84526-8-I/17

residential time. The GAL never testified to different or new recommendations that

were significantly out of line with his main opinions outlined in his reports.

         Rosford argues Dr. Schau violated GALR 2(o). Rosford points to matters

she says Dr. Schau mistook, including the exact time frame during which she came

out as a lesbian, the full extent of Walsh’s mental health diagnoses and treatment

in Texas before they moved to Washington, the degree of Walsh’s desire or not to

move to Washington, and the exact nature of Walsh’s one documented instance

of having a level of self-harm ideation. None of these matters had significant

bearing on the ultimate questions of residential time and parenting restrictions,

especially considering it was always undisputed Rosford also had potentially

significant diagnoses. These minor errors do not show a violation of the GALR

rules.

         Rosford argues Dr. Schau violated GALR 2(p).           These final alleged

violations appear to be aimed at Rosford’s complaints about the GAL’s level of

discovery compliance. Rosford cross-examined Dr. Schau over several hours

nearly exclusively on the subject of e-mail communications between him and

Walsh’s counsel’s office. During this extensive cross-examination, Rosford had

the opportunity to show that Dr. Schau’s opinions were not reliable or that she had

been unfairly disadvantaged. Although she identified many e-mails that had not

originally been produced in discovery, Rosford never identified any content of any

e-mail that materially related to Dr. Schau’s opinions. If Dr. Schau’s discovery

production violated GALR 2(j) or (p), which Rosford never established, any such

violation was minor in nature and fully addressed by the trial court’s order for a

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No. 84526-8-I/18

further meet and confer during trial and the court allowing of extended cross-

examination.

       In Bobbitt, the GAL violated GALR 2 by failing to do an investigation that

included any witnesses from one side, among other deficiencies. 135 Wn. App. at

26-27. This court held the trial court nevertheless did not err by refusing to remove

the GAL, because there was time left before trial to remedy the deficient

investigation. Id. at 27. In this case, Rosford fails to establish a violation of GALR

2.   Even in the best possible light for Rosford, she could establish at most

ministerial violations such as the timing of the report and non-substantive discovery

violations that were fully cured by the trial court’s order to the parties to meet and

confer. Under Bobbitt, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

remove the GAL.

                                         IV

       Rosford challenges the trial court’s domestic abuse findings. We consider

Rosford as having adequately challenged the following findings of fact:

       16.14 Mother claims Father was verbally, emotionally and physically
             abusive during their marriage, yet the evidence does not
             support Mother’s allegations. For example, mother alleged
             that father intentionally assaulted her on March 5, 2020 by
             slamming a door in her face causing her lip to bleed. Yet the
             police report, admitted without objection as Exhibit 357,
             indicates that the mother “did not appear to have any visible
             physical indications of a broken lip.” The admitted exhibit also
             indicates “the two young children were nearby... seemed to
             be happy and smiling, talkative and did not seem to be
             frightened by my presence or of the disturbance that had
             taken place”. The officer testified credibly under oath that he
             did not see any injuries the mother claimed. Mother claimed
             she had photos with the police and to opposing counsel
             through her discovery, but none were produced despite her

                                         18
No. 84526-8-I/19

                 testifying that she had a busted lip and bleeding. Witnesses
                 for both parties testified that they did not observe Father
                 abusing Mother. Witnesses for Father testified that Mother
                 was the dominant party of the two.

          16.15 Mother introduced a photo exhibit to show a hole she alleged
                father punched in a wall (Exhibits 414 and 415). This Court
                finds the exhibits clearly show the wall damage to be at the
                exact level of where the door handle would impact drywall if
                opened quickly or forcefully, or without care, and is too low an
                angle to be caused by someone of regular height punching a
                wall in aggression. This Court finds that this photo exhibit,
                when considered together with testimony of witnesses, is
                another example of mother’s lack of credibility and her attempt
                to manipulate and create a narrative to her advantage.

          Rosford argues the trial court failed to credit the police officer report and

witness statements in exhibit 357 concerning the March 2020 domestic violence

report.     The trial court did not fail to credit exhibit 357.    Walsh testified his

statements in the report were based on Rosford’s statements. The investigating

officer testified domestic violence did take place in the March 2020 incident, but

specified “[t]hat doesn’t have to be physical injury.” The officer testified only that

“we did determine that a domestic violence verbal altercation occurred.” The

officer denied seeing that Rosford was injured, as she claimed. The evidence of

a domestic violence assault was equivocal, and the officer’s opinion concerning

domestic violence was not controlling on the court’s assessment.

          Rosford argues there is substantial evidence “that the abuse happened” and

the only evidence it did not is Walsh’s denial, which contradicts what he told the

police. However, Rosford testified she had denied abuse in medical reports. And

Walsh testified they had an argument, but he did not think he ever hit anyone with

a door.

                                           19
No. 84526-8-I/20

       Rosford confuses the standards we apply. While there may be evidence to

support Rosford’s interpretation of the evidence, we determine whether there is

substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings. The trial court may

disbelieve testimony, even if it is not contradicted by other evidence, particularly

where other facts and circumstances tend to discredit it.      Riblet v. Spokane-

Portland Cement Co., 45 Wn.2d 346, 349, 274 P.2d 574 (1954). We do not review

the trial court’s credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. In re

Marriage of Black, 188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017). The trial court’s

domestic abuse findings are supported by substantial evidence.

                                         V

       Rosford challenges the trial court’s parenting plan. We consider Rosford as

having adequately challenged the following findings of fact and other rulings:

       3.     Reasons for putting limitations on a parent (under RCW
              26.09.191)
       ....

                Emotional or physical problem - Isabella Rosford has a
                long-term emotional problem that gets in the way of her
                ability to parent

                Abusive use of conflict - Isabella Rosford uses conflict in a
                way that endangers or damages the psychological
                development of a child listed in 2., examples of this abusive
                use of conflict are so numerous, they are further described
                in Paragraph 16 of this Order.

                Other:

                Mother’s Attempted Alienation of Children from Father.

                Mother’s Harmful Conduct Re Children’s Medical/Health.

                                        20
No. 84526-8-I/21

      4.    Limitations on a parent

            The following limits or conditions apply to Mother

                   Limited contact as follows:

                   Supervised contact. All parenting time shall be
                   professionally supervised as set forth below and in
                   section 8. Any costs of supervision must be paid by
                   Isabella Rosford.

                     Every other weekend: Mother shall have up to 6 hours
                     supervised visitation on Saturday and up to 6 hours
                     supervised on Sunday.

            Evaluation or treatment required. Isabella Rosford must:

                   Complete a psychological evaluation with a psychologist
                   approved by the father.

                   Said psychological evaluation shall be paid by the mother.

                   Mother shall begin the evaluation within 30 days and shall
                   provide proof to father’s counsel that she has done so.

                   Said evaluation shall include collateral contact with the
                   father, with the GAL, review of the Guardian ad litem
                   reports, and with any third parties requested by the
                   psychologist.

                   Mother shall provide all VA Medical Records and Social
                   Security Records.

                   Mother shall sign all releases necessary for the evaluation
                   including having the evaluator provide a copy of the
                   evaluation directly to the father.

                   If there are recommendations arising from the evaluation,
                   the mother shall immediately comply. Mother shall sign
                   releases permitting any professional involved with the
                   recommendations to provide documentation evidencing
                   dates and status of mother’s participation.

                   Mother is required to provide any professional involved in
                   this case copies of the two Guardian ad litem reports by
                   Dr. Schau (April 2021 and October 2021) and a copy of

                                         21
No. 84526-8-I/22

                   the Final Parenting Plan. Said professional(s) shall sign
                   a written document affirming he/she received these
                   documents and will review these.

                   If mother fails to comply with any of the above, then
                   mother’s visitation with the girls shall remain in Phase
                   One set forth in section 8.

                   Father may seek the appointment of a Case Manager if
                   Mother’s conduct continues to harm the children, violate
                   this parenting plan or if she harasses the Father. The
                   Court shall require Mother to pay all costs of the Case
                   Manager unless the Case Manager believes the Father
                   should contribute based on his conduct (i.e. excessive
                   emails, etc.).

      ....

      8.     School Schedule

      ....

             The children are scheduled to reside with Chris Walsh.
             Mother’s time with the children is set forth in Phase ONE or in
             Phase TWO.

             PHASE ONE: Mother has to comply with obtaining the
             psychological evaluation as set forth in section 4. If there are
             no recommendations from the evaluation, then PHASE TWO
             shall begin. If there are any recommendations from the
             psychological evaluation, then mother shall comply with the
             recommendations for at least six consecutive months before
             moving to PHASE TWO. Mother shall sign releases from any
             professional involved with the recommendations arising from
             the psychological evaluation. If mother fails to remain in
             compliance with any/all of the recommendations for six
             consecutive months, then she needs to have another six
             months of consecutive compliance before PHASE TWO
             begins. This requirement for six months of compliance before
             PHASE TWO may continually be required if mother is unable
             to repeatedly comply.

             PHASE TWO: The Mother shall have unsupervised time with
             the children every other week from Thursday after school until
             Monday morning before school. If there is no school on

                                        22
No. 84526-8-I/23

             Thursday, the exchange time shall be 6pm. If there is no
             school on Monday, the exchange time shall be at 9am.

             Mother shall remain in compliance with any recommendations
             from the psychological evaluation and any other professionals
             that are involved with her as a result of the psychological
             evaluation.     Mother shall sign releases to allow all
             professionals to provide status updates at least once a month
             to the father directly; said status updates shall include any
             additional/updated recommendations. If mother fails to
             remain in compliance or fails to sign the necessary releases,
             and/or if father does not receive status updates directly from
             the professionals, then her time shall revert back to PHASE
             ONE immediately.

      ....

             16.2   The Mother claims she has serious physical health
                    problems, and has been diagnosed with [Ehlers Danlos
                    Syndrome]. The mother claimed, for purposes of
                    receiving financial benefits from various government
                    agencies, that she was so physically disabled by her
                    physical medical conditions that she was completely
                    unable to go through a day at home to care for her
                    children, that she passed out daily, and that she could
                    not do any type of even light housework or be around
                    any type of loud noise. In testimony mother claimed to
                    be at risk of death from “internal decapitation”. The
                    way the mother testified about her alleged medical
                    conditions in order to receive financial benefits from the
                    veteran’s administration would lead a finder of fact to
                    think she was completely disabled from being able to
                    physically or emotionally run a household or care for
                    her children, let alone be employed outside the home.
                    She also testified that it was her husband-the father in
                    this case-that “did most of the cleaning, general house
                    stuff and helping with kids when she cannot get out of
                    bed”. She testified that she claimed, in order to be
                    found disabled and to receive benefits that she could
                    not: lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, walk, kneel, talk, or
                    complete tasks and have any concentration. However
                    oddly, the mother’s testimony and the testimony of her
                    witnesses changed, and, once again under oath, the
                    mother and her witnesses testified that during the
                    same time periods that she had just alleged to be
                    completely physically disabled, the mother drove a

                                        23
No. 84526-8-I/24

                   truck with furniture and boxes across the country
                   without the assistance of the father, unpacked and
                   moved furniture items, went shopping for household
                   goods, and bought, transported and built furniture from
                   stores like IKEA.

            ....

            16.5   The mother claimed that the father and paternal
                   grandmother “forced” their daughter “to take naps
                   almost all day by swaddling her like a burrito”, and she
                   testified that she then ended up making pancakes and
                   having pancakes with her daughter. The Court finds
                   this completely incredible, as a child is either young
                   enough to be “swaddled like a burrito” or old enough to
                   be able to chew pancakes, but not both. This is an
                   example of how quickly and incredibly the totally
                   opposing alleged facts came in mother’s testimony.

            16.6   The Court finds that the mother’s lack of credibility, her
                   obvious lies under oath, as well as the implied
                   falsehoods corroborate other testimony and evidence
                   which established, by clear and convincing evidence to
                   this Court that the mother’s manipulative behavior is an
                   almost pathological abusive use of conflict.

            ....

            16.9   Mother claims the father cannot adequately care for the
                   children, for example: Mother alleges that Father feeds
                   them gluten causing them to have constipation.
                   Mother falsely informs various doctors that Father
                   feeds the girls excessive gluten causing the girls to
                   suffer from constipation. Yet Father and his witnesses
                   testified that the girls do not have such symptoms, and
                   this Court finds the Father and his witnesses credible
                   on this as well as other issues. Despite the girls not
                   having such symptoms, Father abided by what Mother
                   demanded yet she continued to make such allegations
                   to doctors and to Father’s attorney (via numerous
                   emails from Mother’s attorney).            Yet Mother’s
                   witnesses testified that she herself feeds them gluten,
                   to include her own brother, who testified that they
                   routinely ate pizza with him when they all visited.

                                       24
No. 84526-8-I/25

            16.10 Mother frequently takes the children to doctors
                  unnecessarily and provides the doctors with false or
                  exaggerated history of her and her family’s health
                  conditions. The mother exaggerates the children’s
                  symptoms when in her care, whereas the father and
                  his mother testified that when in father’s custody the
                  children are healthy and do not display most of the
                  symptoms alleged by mother. The children, as a result
                  of these appointments and what mother claims, believe
                  they have long term health ailments that cause them to
                  have anxiety.

            16.11 Mother alleges that Father fails to take care of the girls’
                  health because he questions the girls’ medical
                  providers about whether the girls have diagnosis as
                  Mother claims. However, testimony showed that the
                  mother artificially creates what she calls a “family
                  medical history” by telling medical providers of
                  diagnoses she claims various family members have—
                  a third kidney, for example. There were conflicts about
                  such family history in testimony, and the Court finds
                  that the mother is not credible, and therefore her
                  reporting to the children’s medical providers is not
                  credible.    This is corroborated by the mother’s
                  inconsistency in reporting her own alleged medical
                  conditions in different ways depending on what she is
                  trying to accomplish—If she is trying to obtain benefits,
                  she claims to be incredibly physically disabled, and if
                  she is trying to establish her ability to physically and
                  emotionally care for her children alone, she claims to
                  not be affected at all.

            ....

            16.13 Mother alleged that Father does not protect the girls
                  from Covid by exposing them to unmasked or
                  unquarantined third parties. Mother refused to allow
                  Father a visit on Christmas Eve 2020 when Father’s
                  family was in town, falsely claiming that there was an
                  order from the governor prohibiting third party
                  gatherings. Fully contradicting her testimony were
                  mother’s own witnesses who testified that she
                  frequently exposed the children to unmasked and
                  unquarantined third parties, including her own brother
                  who was an essential grocery worker at the height of
                  the pandemic, and who testified mother did not require

                                       25
No. 84526-8-I/26

                      he wear a mask or be tested before allowing contact
                      with the children.

               ....

               16.19 Mother is attempting to alienate the children from
                     having a relationship with the father. The Guardian ad
                     litem credibly testified that Mother was trying to erase
                     Father from the girls’ lives. Mother intentionally
                     misrepresented facts regarding the Father in her
                     Petition for Domestic Violence, falsely claiming that
                     Father attempted suicide 100 times, that she feared he
                     would rape the children and that he had threatened to
                     kill her. This was done purposefully to gain advantage
                     in the dissolution, and to create self-serving court
                     documents to further handicap the father from having
                     a healthy relationship with his children while the case
                     was pending trial. The Court finds the mother intended
                     and continues to attempt to sow distrust and fear in the
                     children in relation to their father and his side of the
                     family. This behavior causes real damage to the
                     relationship the children can have with their own father,
                     and is abusive not only to the father, but to the children.

(Boldface omitted.)

       We accept the following unchallenged or insufficiently challenged findings

of fact as true:

               16.4   The mother admitted when examined by opposing
                      counsel that she had been diagnosed with oppositional
                      defiant disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and
                      had been prescribed psychotropic medication by a
                      psychiatrist in the past.

               ....

               16.8   Mother’s failure to effectuate the transfer of the children
                      from her to the father at the start of his custodial time.
                      Mother feigns that she cannot force the children to
                      leave with the father, yet her actions (as set forth on
                      the video exhibits) encourage the children to be
                      distraught and refuse to calmly transfer to Father.
                      During at least two exchanges, Mother called the police
                      when the children were present. Mother refused to

                                          26
No. 84526-8-I/27

                   leave the exchange location on more than one
                   occasion, after the children have been transferred to
                   father’s custody causing one of the children to be
                   upset.

            ....

            16.12 The Court finds that the mother manipulates and uses
                  the children’s medical providers for her end-goals,
                  attempting to create documentation in the form of
                  medical narratives and medical records as proof that
                  the children need benefits and that she needs benefits,
                  and also as proof that the children’s father is
                  inadequate, abusive or neglectful. This is corroborated
                  by the mother’s testimony that she provided her own
                  sister’s medical records to the genetic counselor for
                  purposes of diagnosing her children with a disease,
                  and then testifying that she “shredded the documents”
                  and therefore no longer has them—while also
                  separately testifying she had those records in digital
                  form, thus making it impossible to destroy by
                  “shredding.” This Court finds this behavior endangers
                  the children’s physical, psychological and emotional
                  well-being, and it is essential that the Court not permit
                  it to continue.

            ....

            16.17 On June 25, 2020, Mother intentionally provided the
                  health care providers a copy of the Temporary
                  Domestic Violence Protection Order entered against
                  the Father when she knew that it had been dismissed
                  on June 18, 2020. Mother intentionally failed to provide
                  the medical providers updated orders that expanded
                  Father’s residential time. Mother continued to allege to
                  the girls’ medical providers that Father was abusive.
                  This Court finds this is another way for the mother to
                  manipulatively attempt to create “records” that others
                  may view as reliable and accurate because they were
                  technically medical records.

            16.18 Mother continued to allege that Father was not
                  adequately assisting the children with their homework.
                  Mother sent numerous emails and texts to Father and
                  his family that were meant to be harassing in nature,
                  and were designed to elicit unnecessary stress, conflict

                                      27
No. 84526-8-I/28

                     and inflate legal costs. At the time this was taking
                     place, Mother refused to agree to an order stating that
                     a parent would be responsible for completing the girls’
                     assigned Friday homework on each parent’s weekend.
                     Mother insisted that father complete all assigned
                     Friday homework despite most of the homework not
                     being due until the following Monday. Mother’s refusal
                     required Father to file a motion for presentation and
                     included language regarding the homework as there
                     needed to be clarification this issue.

       Rosford argues several findings related to the parenting time schedule “go

against the great weight of the evidence” and in some cases “are against

undisputed evidence offered at trial.” Rosford appears to argue the trial court erred

by ordering that the children live with Walsh and have no contact with Rosford

except for limited supervised visits and by finding supervised visitation was

necessary until a complete psychological evaluation is performed.

       Rosford presented witnesses who, based on information they had received

from Rosford, testified it was not necessary to restrict her parenting. Rosford

points to testimony of the GAL and two “doctors” noting there was no need to

restrict her time with the children.   One such statement was a letter from a

physician stating her “physical and psychological disabilities should not prevent

her from taking care of her children.” This physician did not testify. The other was

a letter by a mental health counselor supporting Rosford’s parenting. Rosford’s

counselor stated on cross-examination she had reviewed only “maybe 22, 25”

pages of Rosford’s VA records. The counselor based her treatment only on what

Rosford told her. But there was other evidence supporting that restrictions were

necessary, including the GAL’s testimony and Rosford’s own conflicting testimony

at trial raising concerns that she was not accurately reporting facts relevant to

                                         28
No. 84526-8-I/29

parenting and the children’s medical care. The trial court was not obligated to

believe Rosford’s evidence as opposed to other evidence supporting a contrary

conclusion.

       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Rosford was

abusive toward the children with respect to medical care. For instance, Rosford

claimed she saw blood in A.W.’s urine and was critical of Walsh for not

communicating his plans to seek medical care for A.W. because Rosford wanted

to go with them. One later visit did show that A.W. had blood in her urine. But the

first visit that Rosford represented as addressing this problem reflected only

Rosford’s report that this occurred with no medical findings that it had. Rosford

also testified there was a medical recommendation for the children to have certain

dietary restrictions. The associated medical record did not support this testimony.

In response to reported history of constipation, “plenty of fiber through fruits,

vegetables and whole grains” was recommended.           No gluten restriction was

imposed but the record stated only that based on Rosford’s reporting the children

fared better on a low gluten diet “I think it is okay to continue this.” Rosford had

the children see geneticists about possible hypermobile Ehlers Danlos Syndrome

diagnoses. She became angry when Walsh attempted to provide additional history

from her family bearing on the diagnosis.

       Other trial evidence supported the trial court’s findings, but the issue was

summarized in Walsh’s testimony:

       Q.     Why are you concerned about Isabella’s statements about the
              girls’ health?

                                        29
No. 84526-8-I/30

       A.     Because she’s giving them a complex. I mean, she’s making
              them scared. She’s forcing them to police their diet when
              they’re in my care. She’s using that as a tool to control what
              I do at my house. She is keeping the girls away from social
              activities, social activities such as eating cupcakes at a party.
              She is taking away stuff that they really like, like just these
              very basic foods like nuggets and macaroni and cheese.
              She’s completely misleading them about what doctors have
              told them. She is—I mean, she’s lying to them about things
              the doctors have said to them, about them, and it’s very clear
              that she doesn’t really care what the doctor says. She just
              wants—as long as—if it doesn’t follow her preconceived
              notions, they are not going to follow their advice.
                      She’s done this multiple times, and it is very difficult to
              co-parent when there’s one person on one side, me, following
              the doctor’s orders as closely as I can and then somebody
              else on the other side is telling the girls that I’m wrong, that I
              am misreading what the doctors have said even though it was
              two sentences of advice, that I am lying to them about what
              the doctors have said and that they really shouldn’t—they
              shouldn’t trust me at all.
                      So there are a lot of reasons why this is a very big
              issue. I think, most importantly—this is what I discussed with
              their therapist—it’s giving [E.W.] unnecessary anxiety, that it’s
              tough to mitigate when I have their mother in their ear just
              saying, yeah, you’re right to have these anxieties and you
              really shouldn’t trust your dad because he doesn’t know what
              the doctors say.

This is substantial evidence, which the trial court was entitled to believe, that

Rosford was subjecting the children to excessive medical treatment.

       Rosford argues the trial court erred in finding she misrepresented her

medical conditions. In her written closing argument, Rosford represented herself

as the children’s primary caregiver and sought a parenting plan that would continue

her in that role. Despite the physical capabilities that would be necessary for

Rosford to have had that role and continue it, she admitted statements on cross-

examination inconsistent with having those capabilities. Rosford made statements

in disability applications such as “I haven’t been driving or able to do any household

                                          30
No. 84526-8-I/31

tasks that require a lot of movement.” And, “I cannot even drive or hug my children

without my common joints dislocating.            It’s painful and dangerous in certain

situations. My fainting got worse, too, as I now faint almost daily.” Rosford had

reported because of her conditions her “husband does most cleaning, general

house stuff, also helps me with the kids if I cannot get out of bed.” The trial court’s

findings were supported by substantial evidence where Rosford reported

conflicting levels of physical capability in her disability applications compared to

her portrayal of her parenting abilities at trial.

       Rosford argues there is no evidence disputing her family medical history of

the presence of three kidneys. Before trial, Walsh filed a declaration by Rosford’s

mother indicating “Benjamin” “has a third kidney” as does one of Rosford’s sisters.

Rosford seems to rely on her mother’s pretrial declaration to prove Rosford’s family

medical history of the presence of three kidneys and Walsh’s knowledge of that

history. Those statements are hearsay, and no hearsay exception applies to this

statement. See Portmann v. Herard, 2 Wn. App. 2d 452, 464, 409 P.3d 1199

(2018) (noting a statement in a declaration was hearsay if the party offered it to

prove the truth of the matter the declarant asserted); ER 801(c). Rosford’s mother

did not testify at trial, and Rosford submitted no admissible evidence at trial of any

family history of extra kidneys. Rosford also claims the trial court improperly

disbelieved Rosford had Ehlers Danlos Syndrome. But as noted above, separate

from any diagnosis, there was conflicting evidence concerning Rosford’s true

physical capacities. The trial court was not required to accept Rosford’s testimony

on any issue merely because Walsh did not specifically rebut it.

                                            31
No. 84526-8-I/32

       Rosford argues the trial court erred by disbelieving A.W.’s constipation and

urinary symptoms. Walsh told health care professionals and testified he had not

witnessed such symptoms while the child was in his care. There is no evidence

that his statements were not accurate. There is medical record evidence where

A.W. presented with blood in her urine, but there are other chart notes where

providers were unable to verify that any issues needing any medical care on this

issue were present. While these visits note imaging showing a thickened bladder

wall, they did not recommend any treatment for that condition. Rosford put on no

evidence that Walsh denied constipation or urinary symptoms that he had

witnessed, and Rosford’s only evidence that he denied symptoms at all was her

own testimony, which the trial court did not find credible.

       Rosford argues the trial court misunderstood parenting techniques such as

swaddling. The trial court based its credibility determination on a statement by

Rosford that the children had been improperly swaddled by Walsh’s relatives and

later the same morning she made them pancakes for breakfast. Rosford did not

put on evidence that the children were routinely swaddled even after they had

reached an age at which they could eat solid foods such as pancakes. This

appears to be another instance in which Rosford is attempting to put on more

evidence in an effort to explain why a contradiction in her testimony should not be

viewed as a contradiction. Rosford ignores that the trial court is entitled to make

a credibility assessment based on the evidence admitted at trial, and further that

the court is reviewing the totality of Rosford’s testimony, not merely a series of

statements unconnected to one another. The import of this finding is that the court

                                         32
No. 84526-8-I/33

did not believe Rosford’s account of the split of parenting responsibilities at this

time in the parties’ marriage, where Rosford was implying that Walsh had almost

no participation in caring for the children.

       Rosford argues the trial court erred by finding she violated COVID-19

protocols, because Rosford’s visitors would meet in her outdoor kitchen area.

Rosford’s witnesses did not specify that they visited only in her semi-enclosed

outdoor kitchen. The trial court could plausibly interpret their testimony as implying

they visited indoors without masks. The trial court was not required to accept

Rosford’s later insistence they met only in the “outdoor kitchen” with “open walls.”

Further, the context was Rosford’s unreasonably strict interpretation of COVID-19

requirements for Walsh’s family as a means to justify her own resistance to

visitation in compliance with the court’s order. Even if Rosford’s version of the

facts were entirely true, which the court plainly did not accept, the court would still

be entitled to conclude she was unreasonably interfering with Walsh’s visitation by

strictly construing his sister’s quarantine obligations on the one hand, but liberally

interpreting her right to have nonhousehold guests in a semi-enclosed area on the

other. The point of the court’s finding was that Rosford seized on the issue as a

means of controlling Walsh’s visitation rights.

       Rosford argues the trial court noted her childhood mental health diagnosis,

but ignored evidence this was a misdiagnosis. Rosford cites an April 10, 2013 Air

Force memorandum clearing Rosford notwithstanding past mental health

diagnoses, in which based on Rosford’s report the reviewer acknowledges a

possible connection between her childhood outbursts and diagnosis and abuse by

                                          33
No. 84526-8-I/34

her stepfather. The report does not say, as Rosford asserts, that any childhood

diagnoses were misdiagnoses.

       In conjunction with the unchallenged findings taken as true, the findings

Rosford challenges on this issue are supported by substantial evidence. The

findings in turn support that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

phased approach to residential time dependent on Rosford receiving appropriate

mental health treatment. See In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 648,

327 P.3d 644 (2014) (a trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes a restriction

that is not reasonably calculated to prevent the child from physical, mental, or

emotional harm).

                                        VI

       In her opening brief, Rosford claimed the trial court “erred in its findings

related to discovery issues,” but simply offers explanations for her various

discovery actions and lists grievances with Walsh’s discovery practices without

ever identifying an alleged erroneous discovery ruling. Rosford failed to provide

any reasoned argument or citations to authorities to support this assignment of

error, so we decline to consider it. “Passing treatment of an issue or lack of

reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.” Holland v. City

of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290 (1998). We may decline to

consider conclusory arguments unsupported by citation to authority. Brownfield v.

City of Yakima, 178 Wn. App. 850, 876, 316 P.3d 520 (2014); West v. Thurston

County, 168 Wn. App. 162, 187, 275 P.3d 1200 (2012).

                                        34
No. 84526-8-I/35

       Rosford argues the trial court erred by allowing Walsh to contest issues at

trial that he had admitted to in discovery. This argument appears to be based on

Walsh’s questioning at trial whether Rosford truly has hypermobile Ehlers Danlos

Syndrome. She claims she would have been prepared to present expert testimony

if she had known this would be questioned. Rosford’s argument fails for two

reasons.    First, Walsh never admitted she had hypermobile Ehlers Danlos

Syndrome.     Second, he had a reasonable basis to question any previous

statement at the time of trial.

       For Walsh’s alleged prior admission, Rosford points to discovery

responses, declarations filed in court, and Walsh’s statements to the police

reflected in exhibit 357. We discussed Walsh’s statements to the police above,

and Walsh’s trial testimony was that he believed Rosford had hypermobile Ehlers

Danlos Syndrome only because she had said so. Walsh’s interrogatory answers

were admitted as exhibit 419. Rosford never points to it, but Walsh referred to her

having Ehlers Danlos Syndrome at least on page 55 in his response to her request

for production number 69. Rosford does not specify any declaration in which this

was allegedly admitted. However, none of these are binding discovery admissions

that would prevent a party from testifying differently at trial, subject to

impeachment. All of the statements are attributable to the time before April 2022

when Walsh first received Rosford’s medical records, which provided new grounds

to question whether she had hypermobile Ehlers Danlos Syndrome. The trial court

made no error in refusing Rosford’s trial objection to Walsh bringing out reasons

to question her claimed diagnoses.

                                        35
No. 84526-8-I/36

                                        VII

       Rosford challenges several findings of fact related to the division of the

parties’ assets and the designation of assets and debts. We consider the following

findings of fact on this issue from the findings and conclusions about a marriage to

be properly challenged:

       5.     Separation Date

              The marital community ended on May 8, 2020. The parties
              stopped acquiring community property and incurring
              community debt on this date.

       ....

       9.     Community Personal Property (possessions, assets, or
              business interests of any kind)

       ....

              1. Community $14,500.77 funds

       ...

       11.    Community Debt

              The spouses’ community debt is listed below:

              Solar Panel Debt $19,126.37 (at separation)
              Chris Best Buy credit card $5,971.15
              Chris Chase credit card $4,380.59

(Boldface omitted.) Rosford also challenges the equalization payment the trial

court ordered her to pay Walsh in the Dissolution Decree: “$12,716.59 which is the

equalization payment from wife to husband, payable from wife’s attorney trust

account.”

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No. 84526-8-I/37

       Rosford argues the parties separated by March 2020, pointing to some

evidence that could have supported such a finding. The trial court found they

separated May 8, 2020. This is supported by substantial evidence, specifically,

Rosford’s testimony that May 22, 2020 was “two weeks” after they separated.

       Rosford argues based on exhibit 304 that she removed only $13,996.77

from the USAA Federal Savings Bank savings account, not $14,500.77 as found

by the trial court. On May 4, 2020, Rosford transferred $13,996.77 from the parties’

joint savings account to herself.

       Exhibit 304 includes a statement from the parties’ joint USAA savings

account for the period April 30, 2020 through May 31, 2020. It shows a balance

from the last statement of $14,500.77, and two debits during the statement period.

Both debits were on May 4, 2020. One was an automatic teller machine (ATM)

withdrawal of $504.00, and the second was a funds transfer to Rosford of

$13,996.77, leaving a balance of “.00.” The statement shows a deposit on May

29, 2020, of $4.00 plus interest of $0.12, leaving an ending balance for that period

of $4.12. Walsh testified that “at some point I went to an ATM to withdraw some

money” from the joint USAA savings account and “did not have any money in my

account.” This is substantial evidence that Rosford drew down the account to a

zero balance through the combination of the $504.00 ATM withdrawal and the

$13,996.77 funds transfer, amounting to an appropriation of $14,500.77.

       Rosford also argues that these funds or a portion of them were awarded to

her in temporary orders in June 2020. Rosford does not provide a citation to the

clerk’s papers where such an order can be found. We have noted in our record a

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No. 84526-8-I/38

temporary parenting plan entered June 18, 2020, and an order appointing guardian

ad litem for a child entered June 18, 2020, but Rosford fails to establish a

temporary order influencing the trial court’s ultimate determination about the

characterization of the funds Rosford removed from the joint savings account.

Rosford also argues it was undisputed these funds in savings had been earmarked

to pay the community mortgage debt. But Walsh gave testimony that the trial court

was entitled to believe that it was unnecessary for Rosford to make substantial

payments toward the mortgage when she did, and that they would have been

entitled to additional forbearance when Rosford made the payments. Rosford

does not show error in the trial court’s treatment of her unilateral withdrawals from

the USAA joint savings account.

       Rosford argues the trial court erred in finding the parties’ community debt

for installing solar panels on their former residence in Texas was $19,126.37,

contending the proper figure was $19,907.03.        However, Rosford appears to

misread the statements admitted into evidence documenting this debt. Rosford

testified that page 909 of exhibit 394 was a statement for the solar debt for May

22, 2020. That page showed a “beginning balance” for the statement period of

$19,907.03. However, according to that statement, May 22, 2020 was the due

date for the next payment. Page 907 of the same exhibit showed a new balance

of $19,126.37 after crediting a payment on April 30, 2020. Based on the trial

court’s supported finding that the parties separated on May 8, 2020, the court

appropriately valued this community debt based on the new balance of $19,126.37

                                         38
No. 84526-8-I/39

after the last payment before the parties separated. The valuation is supported by

substantial evidence.

       Rosford argues it was error to treat Walsh’s credit card debt as community

property because Walsh listed both credit cards as separate debt in his

interrogatory responses and offered no testimony at trial to contradict this. The

trial court’s characterization of property as community or separate is a legal

question subject to de novo review. In re Marriage of Mueller, 140 Wn. App. 498,

503-04, 167 P.3d 568 (2007). Although property is characterized as of the date of

its acquisition, the date alone is not dispositive. See In re Marriage of Sedlock, 69

Wn. App. 484, 506, 849 P.2d 1243 (1993). The test for determining a property’s

character is “ ‘whether it was acquired by community funds and community credit,

or separate funds and the issues and profits thereof.’ ” Id. at 506 (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Katterhagen v. Meister, 75 Wash. 112, 115, 134 P. 673

(1913)). Dissipation of community assets is one of the factors that the trial court

may consider in creating a just and equitable distribution of property.          In re

Marriage of Williams, 84 Wn. App. 263, 270, 927 P.2d 679 (1996).

       Walsh testified he incurred credit card debt to meet living expenses. In

conjunction with Rosford’s withdrawal of funds from the parties’ USAA savings

account on May 4, 2020 before separation, the trial court had substantial evidence

to find that Walsh incurred this debt because of Rosford’s unilateral appropriation

of community assets and therefore it was appropriately characterized as

community debt. In addition, Rosford fails to show that the trial court’s allocation

                                          39
No. 84526-8-I/40

of this debt, given these facts, was an abuse of discretion regardless of its

characterization as community or separate.

      With respect to the trial court’s property division, Rosford challenges the

court’s equalization payment. She argues it was not supported by substantial

evidence and alternatively that it should be adjusted based on the valuations she

proposes for the assets and debts discussed above. But because the trial court’s

disposition of the above assets and debts is supported by substantial evidence,

the trial court’s equalization payment is also supported by substantial evidence.

                                       VIII

      Rosford challenges the findings of fact related to the award of $35,000.00

in attorney fees to Walsh.

      We consider the following findings of fact from the findings and conclusions

about a marriage order to be properly challenged:

      14.    Lawyer Fees and Costs

      ....

             Other findings: The Petitioner incurred fees and costs in
             excess of $140,000, of which a significant amount was
             incurred as a result of the Respondent’s intransigence and
             conduct. The Court has evaluated the credibility of testimony
             of both parties, and, for reasons further explained in
             Paragraph 16 of the Final Parenting Plan Findings of Fact,
             gives little weight to much of Respondent’s testimony. The
             Court also evaluated certain trial conduct by Counsel, and as
             further explained in Supplemental Findings of Fact, finds that
             conduct by Respondent’s Counsel unreasonably inflated the
             costs of this litigation.

             On two separate occasions, the Court ordered that Husband’s
             request for attorney fees was reserved for trial: 1) On
             September 8, 2020 when Husband had to file the motion to

                                        40
No. 84526-8-I/41

              appoint his mother as lay supervisor and he requested $2,000
              and 2) on November 3, 2021 for Wife’s retaliatory filing of
              motions (motion to remove GAL and motion to compel) and
              Husband requested $9,084 in fees.

              The Wife failed to provide relevant discovery timely and failed
              to adequately answer. For example, wife failed to timely
              submit the 2,400 plus pages of her VA medical records which
              were not provided to Husband until April 26, 2022. Wife had
              these records prior to her submission to Husband, as she
              utilized these for her Mormon Church lawsuit settled in
              October 2021. During her testimony in trial the wife claimed
              that she “shredded” these records, and at other times she
              admitted that she received them and possessed them in
              digital format. Another example is when wife objected to
              providing documents based on attorney-client privilege but
              failed to comply with the obligation to submit a privilege log.

              The Wife made numerous demands for discovery from
              Husband despite him being substantially compliant, which the
              Court found. Wife’s complaints were frivolous and improper
              when Wife alleged that Husband had some hidden financial
              accounts despite it being documented he had limited income
              and no money and when wife disputed his narrative answers.
              Despite the frivolous complaints, Husband spent hours and
              incurred substantial fees answering Wife’s demands.

              In addition, the number of days for trial were excessive caused
              primarily by the length of time it took for Wife’s direct testimony
              and the length of time it took for Wife to cross examine the
              Guardian ad litem. The number of days for trial was also
              unreasonably excessive due to Respondent’s counsel calling
              a number of witnesses who had either no relevant testimony
              to the issues before the Court, or, as was the case with Meera
              Shin, that testimony was clearly biased, uneducated, and
              unprofessional—though, as aptly noted by the witness herself
              not technically “illegal”.

(Boldface omitted.)

       Rosford contends, “Awarding attorney’s fees to the Petitioner goes against

the great weight of the evidence in relation to the course of conduct in this case.”

                                          41
No. 84526-8-I/42

Walsh argues the record supports the trial court’s finding of Rosford’s

intransigence, which in turn supports the court’s fee award.

       Under RCW 26.09.140, courts wield discretion to award attorney fees and

expenses in marriage dissolution proceedings both at trial and on appeal.

Buchanan, 150 Wn. App. at 739. “ ‘An award of attorney’s fees rests with the

sound discretion of the trial court, which must balance the needs of the spouse

requesting them with the ability of the other spouse to pay.’ ” Id. (quoting Kruger

v. Kruger, 37 Wn. App. 329, 333, 679 P.2d 961 (1984)).                 An important

consideration, apart from the relative abilities of the two spouses to pay, is the

extent to which one spouse’s intransigence caused the spouse seeking the award

to require legal services. Id. Intransigence includes “ ‘making the trial unduly

difficult and costly by one’s actions,’ and causing the other party to ‘incur

unnecessary and significant attorney fees.’ ” In re Marriage of Bresnahan, 21 Wn.

App. 2d 385, 411, 505 P.3d 1218 (2022) (citations omitted) (quoting Bobbitt, 135

Wn. App. at 30; In re Marriage of Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 873, 56 P.3d 993

(2002)). When intransigence causes the party seeking attorney fees “ ‘to require

additional legal services,’ the parties’ relative financial resources are irrelevant.”

Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Foley, 84 Wn. App. 839, 846, 930 P.2d 929 (1997)).

The attorney fee award should segregate the fees incurred because of

intransigence, unless the spouse’s “ ‘bad acts permeated the entire proceeding.’ ”

Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Sievers, 78 Wn. App. 287, 311, 897 P.2d 388 (1995)).

       The trial court must indicate on the record the method it used to calculate

the attorney fee award. Foley, 84 Wn. App.at 846. In determining fees a court

                                         42
No. 84526-8-I/43

should consider (1) the factual and legal questions at issue, (2) the amount of time

spent preparing the case, and (3) the value of the property involved. Id. at 846-

47. The lodestar formula is not required to calculate attorney fees in a dissolution

action. In re Marriage of Van Camp, 82 Wn. App. 339, 340, 918 P.2d 509 (1996).

       Rosford argues her cross-examination of Dr. Schau took “so long largely

due to Dr. Schau’s refusal to acknowledge what parts of his electronic file he had

produced and what he hadn’t.” As discussed above, Rosford highlighted many e-

mail communications during her five and a half hour cross-examination of Dr.

Schau. The trial court appropriately concluded that this time was wasted, because

Rosford never demonstrated any withheld e-mail communications were

particularly germane to any of his opinions or decisions before the trial court.

       Rosford attempts to justify her lengthy testimony by suggesting it “took time

to go over all evidence to demonstrate that the allegations made by Chris were not

true.” What Rosford sought to disprove largely had little relevance to the trial

court’s ultimate determination to fashion a final parenting plan, child support order,

dissolution decree, and findings and conclusions about the parties’ marriage. The

trial court appropriately concluded that this use of time was also wasteful.

       Rosford argues the trial court failed to indicate on the record what method

was used to calculate fees. Walsh submitted a financial declaration before trial,

on April 29, 2022, that stated the total attorney fees and costs he incurred as of

that date amounted to $96,859.71. He represented in his written closing argument

he had by then incurred “close to $140,000” in attorney fees. In his written

argument, Walsh argued that several pretrial motions, several discovery issues,

                                         43
No. 84526-8-I/44

and several trial disputes showed intransigence that supported shifting $35,000 in

fees. The trial court granted Walsh’s attorney fees request for having to respond

to Rosford’s motion for reconsideration. The trial court entered the following

findings on the record in support of its ruling:

       The Court finds the amount of time the Court spent reviewing all the
       materials and in estimating based on previous evidence having been
       submitted by both sides about attorney’s fees as well as being familiar
       with the litigation history in this case and the findings of abusive use of
       litigation and conflict that this amount is reasonable and appropriate,
       that the father has need for it, and the mother has the ability to pay.

In addition to specific pretrial motions on which fees had been reserved, the trial

court’s final orders reflect that the testimony of Rosford and her cross-examination

of Dr. Schau were excessive. Together, this supports the award of $35,000.00 in

attorney fees to Walsh as the portion of his attorney fees reasonably attributable

to Rosford’s intransigence.       The trial court reasonably relied on Rosford’s

intransigence when calculating the fee award and, under Bresnahan, was not

required to segregate fees based on intransigence from fees based on other

grounds, because the trial court found Rosford’s intransigence permeated much

of the proceedings.

       Rosford argues she does not have the ability to pay a $35,000.00 attorney

fee award and the trial court ignored the fact that the court awarded almost all of

the parties’ community assets to Walsh. Under Bresnahan, the parties’ relative

financial resources are irrelevant because of Rosford’s intransigence.

       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact, and Rosford

demonstrates no abuse of discretion in the fee award entered against her.

                                           44
No. 84526-8-I/45

                                           IX

         Rosford argues the trial court failed to grant her motion for a new trial under

CR 59(a)(1), (2), (5), (7)-(9). We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for a

new trial for abuse of discretion. Henderson v. Thompson, 200 Wn.2d 417, 430,

518 P.3d 1011 (2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2412 (2023). To the extent Rosford

relies on arguments she made as to other issues, those have been addressed

above.

         CR 59(a)(1) permits a new trial when irregularities in the proceedings of the

court prevent the moving party from having a fair trial. Rosford argues the trial

court judge committed irregularities in the trial by shopping online and doing other

activities during testimony and imposing different rules for each party.

         After the trial court entered its final orders, Rosford moved for

reconsideration. Rosford filed a declaration claiming she saw the trial court judge

shop online, use a texting or messaging application, and write and send personal

and work-related e-mails, and browse a social media website during testimony.

Walsh challenged these accusations, claiming Rosford either could not or did not

see what was on the trial court’s computer screen. We have thoroughly reviewed

the entirety of the 13½ days of trial testimony.         It shows the trial court was

immediately responsive to the issues as they arose, including issues in the trial

testimony, the objections of counsel, the behavior of the parties and witnesses,

and the thousands of pages of exhibits the parties presented and whose

admissibility they repeatedly argued. This was followed by detailed findings. The

transcript and the subsequent detailed written orders show the trial court judge

                                           45
No. 84526-8-I/46

was paying exacting attention to the evidence. We do not revisit the trial court’s

discrediting Rosford’s posttrial declaration.

       Nor does Rosford show error in the trial court’s management of the

examination of witnesses at trial. The trial court allowed Rosford days’ worth of

time to present her evidence and cross-examine witnesses over the 13½ days of

testimony. That the trial court eventually was forced to place reasonable limitations

on the continued examination of witnesses establishes no error. “ ‘Courts may,

within their sound discretion, deny cross-examination if the evidence sought is

vague, argumentative, or speculative.’ ” Farah v. Hertz Transporting, Inc., 196 Wn.

App. 171, 187, 383 P.3d 552 (2016) (quoting State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612,

620-21, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002)). Finally, Rosford does not specifically identify the

separate rules the trial court allegedly imposed on Rosford and Walsh.                We

therefore decline to consider that argument.

       CR 59(a)(2) permits a new trial due to misconduct of the prevailing party.

To the extent Rosford makes the same arguments as to Walsh’s alleged

misconduct during the proceedings below, those have been addressed above.

       CR 59(a)(5) permits a new trial where damages are so excessive as

unmistakably to indicate that the verdict must have been the result of passion or

prejudice.   Because this trial did not involve a money damages remedy and

Rosford does not identify what damages she characterizes as excessive, we

decline to consider this ground.

       CR 59(a)(7) permits a new trial if there “is no evidence or reasonable

inference from the evidence to justify the verdict or the decision, or that it is contrary

                                           46
No. 84526-8-I/47

to law.” As we discussed above, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s

findings. Rosford’s arguments for a new trial on this ground are meritless.

       CR 59(a)(8) permits a new trial when an “[e]rror in law occurring at the trial

and objected to at the time by the party” moving for a new trial. Rosford offers no

argument or citation to authorities or the record in support of this ground, so we

decline to consider it.

       CR 59(a)(9) permits a new trial when substantial justice has not been done.

A court may grant a motion for a new trial when important rights of the moving

party are materially affected because substantial justice has not been done.

Ramey v. Knorr, 130 Wn. App. 672, 686, 124 P.3d 314 (2005). Rosford fails to

prove her rights were materially affected because of any irregularity at trial.

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rosford’s motion for

a new trial under CR 59.

                                          X

       Walsh argues he should be awarded attorney fees as sanctions under RAP

18.9(a), because Rosford’s brief failed to prove any entitlement to relief, Rosford

failed to follow the RAPs, and her brief is disorganized. Walsh claims Rosford’s

appeal is frivolous and devoid of merit with no possibility of reversal. We decline

to award attorney fees.

       Under RAP 18.9(a), a party is subject to sanctions for filing a frivolous

appeal or failing to comply with the rules of appellate procedure. “ ‘Appropriate

sanctions may include, as compensatory damages, an award of attorney fees and

costs to the opposing party.’ ” Kinney v. Cook, 150 Wn. App. 187, 195, 208 P.3d

                                         47
No. 84526-8-I/48

1 (2009) (quoting Yurtis v. Phipps, 143 Wn. App. 680, 696, 181 P.3d 849 (2008)).

An appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues on which reasonable minds

might differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility

of reversal. In re Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 644, 316 P.3d 514

(2013). An appeal that is affirmed simply because the arguments are rejected is

not frivolous. Id. In determining whether an appeal is frivolous, we consider the

record as a whole and resolve all doubt in favor of the appellant. Skinner v.

Holgate, 141 Wn. App. 840, 858, 173 P.3d 300 (2007).

       Rosford’s appeal is not frivolous. The trial court’s final residential schedule

imposes very strict requirements on Rosford, despite the GAL’s recommendation

that originally proposed more equal parenting terms. Rosford’s challenges of the

trial court’s findings on Rosford’s motion to remove the GAL, parenting plan,

domestic abuse, and assets are not frivolous even though substantial evidence

exists to support those findings.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

                                           48