Court Opinion

ID: 9911525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 14:00:42.534815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:43.856423
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12898    Document: 41-1      Date Filed: 12/20/2023   Page: 1 of 26

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12898
                           ____________________

        DARRYL SCOTT STINSKI,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION
        PRISON

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00066-RSB
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                22-12898

        Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Petitioner Darryl Stinski was sentenced to death in Georgia
        state court for the murders of Susan and Kimberly Pittman. He ap-
        peals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a
        writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted Stinski a certificate
        of appealability (“COA”) on one issue.
               After a thorough review of the record and with the benefit
        of oral argument, we affirm the district court’s denial of Stinski’s
        habeas petition.
                              I.      BACKGROUND
                             A.      Facts of Conviction
                The Supreme Court of Georgia set forth the facts of the case
        as follows:
                       The evidence at trial showed that Darryl
               Stinski and Dorian O’Kelley engaged in a crime spree
               that spanned April 10–12, 2002. On the night of April
               10, two police oﬃcers observed two men dressed in
               black clothing in a convenience store. Later, the oﬃc-
               ers responded to two separate calls regarding the
               sounding of a burglar alarm at a nearby home and the
               oﬃcers returned to the store after responding to each
               call. Then, at approximately 5:00 a.m. on April 11, the
               oﬃcers noticed while leaving the store that “the sky
               was lit up.” The oﬃcers discovered the victims’ house
               fully engulfed in ﬂames. As one of the oﬃcers moved
               the patrol vehicle to block traﬃc in preparation for
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        22-12898              Opinion of the Court                        3

              the arrival of emergency vehicles, his headlights illu-
              minated a wooded area where he observed the same
              two men that he and his partner had observed earlier
              in the convenience store. O’Kelley, as the neighbor
              living across the street from the burned house, gave
              an interview to a local television station. The oﬃcer
              saw the interview on television and identiﬁed O’Kel-
              ley as being one of the men he had seen in the con-
              venience store and near the ﬁre. The oﬃcer later
              identiﬁed both Stinski and O’Kelley in court.
                     Stinski and O’Kelley left items they had stolen
              with friends who lived nearby. The friends handed
              those items over to the police. Testimony showed
              that, before their arrest, O’Kelley had bragged about
              raping a girl and keeping one of her teeth as a me-
              mento and Stinski had laughed when he saw O’Kelley
              being interviewed on the news in front of the victims’
              house.
                     Stinski gave two videotaped interviews with
              investigators after his arrest, the second of which was
              suppressed on his motion. In the interview the jury
              heard, Stinski confessed to participating in the crime
              spree described below, which began with burglarizing
              a home and leaving when a motion detector in this
              ﬁrst home set oﬀ an alarm. After their botched bur-
              glary of the ﬁrst home, Stinski and O’Kelley turned
              oﬀ the electricity to the home of Susan Pittman and
              her 13–year–old daughter, Kimberly Pittman, and en-
              tered as both victims slept. O’Kelley took a walking
              cane and began beating Susan Pittman, while Stinski
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        4                    Opinion of the Court                22-12898

             held a large ﬂashlight. Stinski beat Susan Pittman
             with the ﬂashlight and then left the room to subdue
             Kimberly Pittman, who had awakened to her
             mother’s screams. O’Kelley then beat Susan Pittman
             with a lamp and kicked her. At some point, Susan
             Pittman was also stabbed three to four times in the
             chest and abdomen. Stinski took Kimberly Pittman
             upstairs so she would not continue to hear her
             mother’s screams. Susan Pittman eventually died
             from her attack. Stinski and O’Kelley then brought
             Kimberly Pittman back downstairs, drank beverages,
             and discussed “tak[ing] care of ” her. Stinski took
             Kimberly Pittman back upstairs and bound and
             gagged her. As Stinski rummaged through the house
             downstairs, O’Kelley raped Kimberly Pittman.
             Stinski and O’Kelley then agreed that Stinski would
             begin beating Kimberly Pittman with a baseball bat
             when O’Kelley said a particular word. On cue, Stinski
             hit Kimberly Pittman in the head with the bat as she
             knelt on the ﬂoor, bloody from the rape and with her
             hands bound. O’Kelley then slit Kimberly Pittman’s
             throat with a knife but she remained alive. Stinski
             went downstairs and came back upstairs when O’Kel-
             ley called him. Stinski then hit Kimberly Pittman in
             her knee with the bat as O’Kelley tried to suﬀocate
             her. O’Kelley then took another knife and stabbed
             her in the torso and legs. O’Kelley kicked her and
             threw objects at her head, but her groans indicated
             that she was still alive. Stinski and O’Kelley then set
             ﬁres throughout the house and went to O’Kelley’s
             house across the street to watch the ﬁre. Kimberly
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        22-12898                   Opinion of the Court                           5

               Pittman died of smoke inhalation before the ﬁre fully
               consumed the house. Later, in the early morning
               hours of April 12, Stinski and O’Kelley broke into nu-
               merous vehicles in the neighborhood.
        Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 840–41 (2010).
                              B.      Procedural History
                              1.      Pre-Trial Preparation
               In June 2002, Stinski was indicted by a grand jury on two
        counts of malice murder and related charges, and the prosecutors
        sought the death penalty. 1 Id. at n.1. Three attorneys were ap-
        pointed to represent Stinski. Stinski v. Warden, No. 2011-V-942, at 6
        (Super. Ct. Butts Cnty. Ga. Jan. 15, 2017). Trial counsel’s mitigation
        strategy involved showing that Stinski “[got] caught up” in the
        crime due to his immaturity, troubled background, and O’Kelley’s
        inﬂuence. State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 171:6–17, ECF No. 13-15.
               Counsel retained two experts for the mitigation phase of
        trial: Dale Davis, a social worker and mitigation specialist, and Dr.
        Jane Weilenman, a clinical psychologist. Id. at 147:16–148:24,
        159:22–161:5.
                To prepare for her testimony, Davis met with Stinski “many
        times,” interviewed forty people, and prepared an “extensive” so-
        cial history on Stinski, billing over 400 hours to the case. Stinski,

        1 O’Kelley was tried separately and convicted on two counts of malice murder

        and related charges. O’Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 758 n.* (2008). He also
        received a death sentence for the murders. Id.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12898

        No. 2011-V-942, at 31–35; State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 262, 73150–51,
        ECF No. 24-8 (“Persons Interviewed” Mem.); State Habeas Hr’g Tr.
        vol. 319, 90071–84, ECF No. 26-17 (Davis’s billing records).
               Dr. Weilenman conducted a psychological evaluation of
        Stinski to determine his mental-health status and social history.
        State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 321, 90813, ECF No. 26-19 (Weilenman
        Psychological Evaluation). To prepare her report and testimony,
        Dr. Weilenman met with Stinski at least four times, corresponded
        with him in writing, reviewed background documents, and con-
        ducted interviews of mitigation witnesses. Id.; State Habeas Hr’g
        Tr. vol. 254, 70690–97, ECF No. 23-21 (written correspondence);
        Hr’g Tr. vol 1, 197:22–198:1, ECF No. 13-15. Dr. Weilenman did
        not conduct any psychological testing, and counsel testiﬁed that
        she never recommended testing by additional experts, either.
        Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 38; Hr’g Tr. vol 1, 100:23–101:5, ECF No.
        13-15; State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 299:1–13, ECF No. 13-16.
               According to Stinski, though, several times before trial (in-
        cluding in a December 2004 email, a January 2005 defense-team
        meeting, and another meeting sometime in 2007 just before trial),
        Davis raised the issue of retaining additional experts besides herself
        and Dr. Weilenman. State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 146, 38346–47,
        ECF No. 19-9 (emails between Davis and counsel); State Habeas
        Hr’g Tr. vol. 5, 835:7–36:22, ECF No. 13-19; Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 158:12–
        59:21, ECF No. 13-15.
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        22-12898               Opinion of the Court                         7

                                     2.     Trial
               Trial began in May 2007. On June 8, 2007, at the conclusion
        of the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the jury found Stinski guilty
        on all counts, including two lesser-included counts of felony mur-
        der. Verdict Form, 34–37, ECF No. 7-11.
               During the sentencing phase, trial counsel presented exten-
        sive mitigation evidence, calling twenty-six witnesses to testify, in-
        cluding Davis and Dr. Weilenman. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 42–
        68. Many witnesses testiﬁed about Stinski’s childhood and back-
        ground, including his frequent moves, his parents’ divorce, his ex-
        periences of abuse and neglect, and his family’s history of alcohol-
        ism and mental-health issues. Id. Several of his former classmates
        and a teacher testiﬁed to Stinski’s nature as a “follower” and his at-
        tempts to ﬁt in with others. Id. at 49–50, 56. And several also tes-
        tiﬁed about O’Kelley and his potential inﬂuence on Stinski. Id. at
        43.
               Besides these witnesses, trial counsel called the two retained
        experts, Davis and Dr. Weilenman, to testify during the sentencing
        phase. Through Davis, the mitigation specialist, “several volumes
        of records” and a social history on Stinski were introduced into the
        record. Id. at 45; Trial Tr. vol. 11, 2350–455, ECF No. 10-9.
               Dr. Weilenman’s testimony built upon the records and his-
        tory introduced by Davis and the other mitigation witnesses, ex-
        plaining how Stinski’s entire background, not just the immediately
        preceding events, led to the crime. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 61;
        Trial Tr. vol. 13, 2766–845, ECF No. 10-11. Dr. Weilenman testiﬁed
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12898

        extensively about the general themes of instability, neglect, aban-
        donment, and abuse in Stinski’s childhood. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942,
        at 61; Trial Tr. vol. 13, 2771–827, ECF No. 10-11. Throughout her
        testimony, Dr. Weilenman also noted Stinski’s various mental-
        health diagnoses, including attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity disor-
        der, “adjustment disorder with depressed features,” a potential
        learning disability, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Trial Tr. vol.
        13, 2817:3–20, ECF No. 10-11. In explaining Stinski’s diagnoses and
        general immaturity, Dr. Weilenman discussed the development of
        the frontal lobes and Stinski’s executive functioning, suggesting
        that his impulse control and follower tendencies may have im-
        proved with time, post-crimes. Id. at 2817:20–18:17, 2819:12–20:12,
        2822:2–85:22.
               At the end of the sentencing phase, on June 12, 2007, the
        jury found that nine aggravating factors warranted the death sen-
        tence for Stinski for the murders of the Pittmans:
               [1] The oﬀense of murder [of Susan Pittman] was
               committed while the defendant was engaged in the
               commission of a burglary. . . .
               [2] The oﬀense of murder [of Susan Pittman] was
               outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
               in that it involved depravity of mind of the defend-
               ant[,] or
               [3] The oﬀense of murder [of Susan Pittman] was
               outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
               in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim
               before death. . . .
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        22-12898               Opinion of the Court                         9

              [4] The oﬀense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
              committed while the defendant was engaged in the
              commission of another capital felony (the murder of
              Susan Pittman)[.]
              [5] The oﬀense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
              committed while the defendant was engaged in the
              commission of a burglary.
              [6] The oﬀense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
              committed while the defendant was engaged in the
              commission of arson in the ﬁrst degree.
              [7] The oﬀense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
              outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
              in that it involved torture to the victim before death[,]
              or
              [8] The oﬀense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
              outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
              in that it involved depravity of mind of the defend-
              ant[,] or
              [9] The oﬀense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
              outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
              in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim
              before death.
        Verdict Sentencing Form, 210–13, ECF No. 8-11. The trial court
        denied Stinski’s motion for a new trial, Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at
        2, and the Georgia Supreme Court aﬃrmed Stinski’s convictions
        and death sentence, Stinski, 286 Ga. at 840, cert. denied, Stinski v.
        Georgia, 562 U.S. 1011 (2010).
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                22-12898

                        3.      State Court Habeas Proceedings
                Stinski ﬁled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Su-
        perior Court of Butts County on September 26, 2011, State Pet.
        Writ Habeas, ECF No. 11-19, and amended his petition on March
        21, 2013, State First Am. Pet. Writ Habeas, ECF No. 12-24. Stinski
        argued, among other claims, that his trial counsel rendered ineﬀec-
        tive assistance during the sentencing phase of trial. Id. at 9–24.
                The state habeas court held an evidentiary hearing at which
        twenty witnesses were called, Stinski v. Ford, No. 4:18-CV-66, 2021
        WL 5921386, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2021); Stinski, No. 2011-V-942,
        at 2, including three additional experts: Dr. Joette James, a clinical
        neuropsychologist, State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1150–263, ECF No.
        13-20; Dr. Peter Ash, a forensic psychiatrist, State Habeas Hr’g Tr.
        vol. 3, 417–579, ECF No. 13-17; and Dr. James Garbarino, a devel-
        opmental psychologist, State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 7, 1322–445, ECF
        No. 13-21. As a part of his ineﬀective-assistance-of-counsel claim,
        Stinski argued that his trial counsel unreasonably neglected to pro-
        cure and present expert mental-health mitigation evidence from
        the three doctors. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 81.
               The additional proposed expert testimony focused on deﬁ-
        ciencies or abnormalities in Stinski’s brain functioning, caused by
        the psychological maltreatment he experienced in childhood, that
        could have made him particularly vulnerable to outside inﬂuence
        in a high-stress situation. The testimony thus implicated Stinski’s
        culpability on the night of the crime. Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1220:10–21:8,
        ECF No. 13-20; Hr’g Tr. vol. 3, 477:2–20, ECF No. 13-17; Hr’g Tr.
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        22-12898               Opinion of the Court                       11

        vol. 7, 1411:6–16, ECF No. 13-21. Two experts, Dr. James and Dr.
        Ash, conducted cognitive-function testing. Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1159–
        61, ECF No. 13-20; Hr’g Tr. vol. 3, 463–67, 473, ECF No. 13-17. All
        three experts reviewed Dr. Weilenman’s social history as a part of
        their analysis. Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1258:17–20, ECF No. 13-20; Hr’g Tr.
        vol. 3, 437:7–12, ECF No. 13-17; Hr’g Tr. vol. 7, 1411:19–20, ECF
        No. 13-21.
               The Georgia State Superior Court denied Stinski’s habeas
        petition. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 1. In relevant part, the state
        habeas court addressed both prongs of the Strickland test regarding
        Stinski’s ineﬀective-assistance-of-counsel-at-the-sentencing-stage
        claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (deﬁn-
        ing the two-part test for ineﬀective assistance of counsel as requir-
        ing the defendant to show that (1) counsel’s performance was deﬁ-
        cient and (2) that deﬁcient performance prejudiced the defense).
               As to deﬁcient performance, the court found that trial coun-
        sel was “reasonable in retaining Dr. Weilenman and relying upon
        her ﬁndings, which did not include any recommendation of further
        testing” or additional experts. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 38.
        “Where, as here, trial counsel presented substantial mitigation, but
        did not employ the additional means of mitigation as urged by Pe-
        titioner,” counsel was not ineﬀective for not pursing that line of
        investigation, the court concluded. Id.
               As to the prejudice prong, the state habeas court found that
        Stinski’s trial attorneys “eﬀectively presented much of the same
        factual evidence urged by Petitioner” and his chosen experts related
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12898

        to his life circumstances, immaturity, susceptibility to O’Kelley’s in-
        ﬂuence, and developmental issues. Id. at 5, 80–83 (“The fact that
        Petitioner’s new expert witnesses may provide additional details re-
        garding similar conclusions does not equate to a showing of preju-
        dice.”). Because the subject matter raised by Stinski’s habeas wit-
        nesses was “largely cumulative” of the testimony actually and ef-
        fectively presented at trial, the court found, Stinski had not ade-
        quately demonstrated prejudice. Id. at 5, 42, 80. And “[c]onsider-
        ing the overwhelming evidence in aggravation,” the court con-
        cluded that “new evidence of Petitioner’s subtle neurological im-
        pairments” would not, “in reasonable probability,” have altered the
        outcome of the sentencing phase.” Id. at 80. Accordingly, the court
        denied Stinski’s ineﬀective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Id. at 5.
               On February 5, 2018, the Georgia Supreme Court denied
        Stinski’s application for a certiﬁcate of probable cause to appeal the
        denial of his habeas petition. Stinski v. Warden, No. S17E1093 (Sup.
        Ct. Ga. Feb. 5, 2018).
                       4.     Federal Court Habeas Proceedings
               Stinski timely ﬁled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus un-
        der 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the
        Southern District of Georgia. As relevant for this appeal, Stinski
        argued his trial counsel “unreasonably neglected to present availa-
        ble expert mental health mitigation evidence, including testimo-
        nies from experts such as Dr. James, Dr. Ash, and Dr. Garbarino.”
        Stinski, 2021 WL 5921386, at *7.
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        22-12898               Opinion of the Court                         13

                The district court denied Stinski’s claims. Id. at *1. It con-
        cluded that Stinski failed to show that the state-court decision deny-
        ing his ineﬀective-assistance-of-counsel claim was based on an un-
        reasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2). The dis-
        trict court also found that the state habeas court reasonably deter-
        mined that Stinski had failed to satisfy both Strickland prongs, id. at
        *10–16. As to the ineﬀectiveness prong, the district court con-
        cluded that “the state court reasonably determined that trial coun-
        sel’s decision not to retain additional experts was supported by ‘rea-
        sonable professional judgments.’” Id. at *13 (quoting Strickland,
        466 U.S. at 690–91). The district court found that the record “at
        best” revealed contradictory evidence about whether Dr. Weilen-
        man discussed the need to retain additional experts, and Dr.
        Weilenman never recommended additional testing. So the district
        court thought the record lacked enough evidence to overcome the
        presumption of correctness aﬀorded to a factual determination
        made by the state court. Id. (stating that overcoming such a pre-
        sumption requires “clear and convincing evidence”).
               As to the prejudice prong, the district court reiterated the
        state court’s ﬁndings that Stinski’s new proposed evidence was
        largely cumulative or duplicative of that presented at trial because
        it covered the same social history and themes of abuse, instability,
        abandonment, trauma, and neglect provided by Dr. Weilenman in
        the sentencing phase. Id. The district court also echoed the state
        court’s ﬁnding that the evidence against Stinski was “highly aggra-
        vating,” and that “it is hard to imagine that any amount of mitigat-
        ing evidence could have outweighed it.” Id. at *15–16.
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12898

               On January 14, 2022, Stinski moved under Rule 59(e), FED.
        R. CIV. P., to alter or amend the judgment. Among other issues,
        Stinski argued that he was entitled to a certiﬁcate of appealability
        regarding his ineﬀective-assistance-of-counsel claim because, at the
        time the district-court opinion was issued, a circuit split existed on
        the correct application of Sections 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1) of the
        Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), and the
        Eleventh Circuit had no binding precedent on the issue.
               The district court granted a COA on just one issue:
        “whether the Court properly applied Sections 2254(d)(2) and
        2254(e)(1) of the AEDPA in the Habeas Order when evaluating Pe-
        titioner’s ineﬀective assistance of counsel claim.” Order, 35, ECF
        No. 75. In other words, the district court explained, it granted
        Stinski a COA on the issue of whether it was proper for the district
        court “to apply Section 2254(d)(2)’s deference to the state habeas
        court’s decision but apply Section 2254(e)(1)’s deference to the state
        habeas court’s individual ﬁndings of fact.” Id. at 31 (emphasis in orig-
        inal). Invoking the certiﬁcate of appeal that the district court
        granted, Stinski ﬁled notice of this appeal on August 30, 2022.
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        22-12898                 Opinion of the Court                     15

                        II.      STANDARDS OF REVIEW
                This Court reviews “de novo a district court’s denial of ha-
        beas relief on an ineﬀective-assistance-of-counsel claim, which pre-
        sents a mixed question of law and fact.” Pye v. Warden, 50 F.4th
        1025, 1034 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). But AEDPA governs our re-
        view of federal habeas petitions. AEDPA prescribes a highly defer-
        ential framework for evaluating issues previously decided in state
        court. Id. Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas
        relief on claims that were “adjudicated on the merits in [s]tate
        court” unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or in-
        volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
        law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or
        (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
        light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” 28
        U.S.C. § 2254(d).
              Regarding § 2254(d)(2), we must defer to a state court’s de-
        termination of the facts unless the state-court decision “was based
        on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
        dence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2).
        Section 2254(d)(2) requires us to give state courts “substantial def-
        erence.” Brumﬁeld v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015). “We may not
        characterize . . . state-court factual determinations as unreasonable
        ‘merely because [we] would have reached a diﬀerent conclusion in
        the ﬁrst instance.’” Id. at 313–14 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S.
        290, 301 (2010)). “If ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record
        might disagree about’ the state court factﬁnding in question, ‘on
        habeas review that does not suﬃce to supersede’ the state court’s
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12898

        factual determination.” Daniel v. Comm’r, 822 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th
        Cir. 2016) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2006)). Re-
        garding § 2254(e)(1), we presume that the state court’s factual de-
        terminations are correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to
        the contrary. Pye, 50 F.4th at 1035.
               On each claimed basis for relief, we review “the last state-
        court adjudication on the merits.” See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34,
        40 (2011). In this case, where the Georgia Supreme Court’s ﬁnal
        decision “doesn’t come with reasons,” we must “‘look through’ the
        unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that
        does provide a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained
        decision adopted the same reasoning.” Pye, 50 F.4th at 1034 (inter-
        nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct.
        1188, 1192 (2018)).
                In sum, AEDPA sets “a diﬃcult to meet and highly deferen-
        tial standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that
        state-court decisions be given the beneﬁt of the doubt.” Cullen v.
        Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation marks and
        citations omitted).
                               III.   DISCUSSION
               As we’ve noted, the district court certiﬁed the following
        question on appeal: “whether the Court properly applied Sections
        2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1) of the AEDPA [in the Habeas Order]
        when evaluating Petitioner’s ineﬀective assistance of counsel
        claim.” Order, 12, 31, 35, ECF No. 75. That is, “whether it was
        proper for the [c]ourt to apply Section 2254(d)(2)’s deference to the
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        22-12898               Opinion of the Court                         17

        state habeas court’s decision but apply Section 2254(e)(1)’s defer-
        ence to the state habeas court’s individual ﬁndings of fact.” Id. at 31
        (emphasis in original). Our review is limited to this issue. Murray
        v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n an appeal
        brought by an unsuccessful habeas petitioner, appellate review is
        limited to the issues speciﬁed in the COA.”).
               After careful review of the record and with the beneﬁt of
        oral argument, we conclude that the district court properly applied
        §§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1) when evaluating the state habeas
        court’s decision and factual determinations. Under § 2254(d)(2), a
        federal court may not grant habeas relief on claims that were “ad-
        judicated on the merits in [s]tate court” unless the state court’s de-
        cision was, among other potential exceptions, “based on an unrea-
        sonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre-
        sented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” Section 2254(e)(1) further
        mandates that a state court’s ﬁndings of fact “shall be presumed to
        be correct,” unless rebutted “by clear and convincing evidence.”
        While the Supreme Court has not yet deﬁned the precise relation-
        ship between these two provisions, Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18
        (2013), since the district court granted its COA, our binding prece-
        dent has deﬁnitively answered the question certiﬁed for appeal in
        this case.
               In Pye v. Warden, we held, in an en banc opinion, that (1) a
        petitioner must meet § 2254(e)(1)’s “clear and convincing evi-
        dence” burden to overcome the presumption of correctness ap-
        plied to state-court factual determinations, and (2) even if a
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12898

        petitioner successfully meets that burden, he has not necessarily
        met his burden under § 2254(d)(2). 50 F.4th at 1035. That is, “that
        decision might still be reasonable even if some of the state court’s
        individual factual ﬁndings were erroneous—so long as the decision,
        taken as a whole, doesn’t constitute an unreasonable determination
        of the facts and isn’t based on any such determination.” Id. (quo-
        tation marks omitted). Pye makes clear that Sections 2254(e)(1) and
        2254(d)(2) are independent hurdles to relief. Id. (citing Miller-El v.
        Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003) (noting that subsections (e)(1) and
        (d)(2) are “independent requirements”)).
               Pye also analyzed the reasonableness of the state court’s de-
        terminations there “with respect to each alleged deﬁciency, and
        with respect to the deﬁciencies cumulatively.” Id. at 1042. For each
        alleged deﬁciency, the court ﬁrst resolved challenges to the state
        habeas court’s factual determinations, ﬁnding that even where the
        state court’s assessment “might have been debatable,” its factual
        ﬁndings were not “clearly and convincingly erroneous.” Id. at 1043
        (cleaned up). Then the court determined that each individual deﬁ-
        ciency was reasonably found nonprejudicial by the state habeas
        court. Id. at 1043–1055 (ﬁnding the weight that the state court gave
        to each factor in its prejudice analysis was not unreasonable in light
        of the factual record); id. at 1049 (“None of [the state habeas
        court’s] choices individually resulted in a decision that . . . was
        based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.”).
               Finally, the court looked at the deﬁciencies cumulatively and
        the reasonableness of the state habeas court’s ultimate conclusion:
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        22-12898                Opinion of the Court                         19

        “Even if the state court’s prejudice determination as to each
        ground of allegedly deﬁcient performance was reasonable, we
        must still decide whether its conclusion as to the cumulative preju-
        dice constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland.” Id. at
        1055. Ultimately, the Pye court concluded that, “[g]iven the reason-
        ableness of the state court’s weighing of the evidence and the lack
        of contrary precedent, AEDPA requires us to defer to that court’s
        cumulative-prejudice conclusion because it wasn’t . . . based on an
        unreasonable determination of the facts.” Id. at 1056 (citing
        § 2254(d)).
              Although the district court decided Stinski’s habeas claim
        before we issued Pye, the district court was spot on in its analysis.
        Indeed, the district court articulated the same standard and fol-
        lowed the same application as we did in Pye.
               In particular, the district court stated that § 2254(e)(1)’s bur-
        den applied to state-court ﬁndings of fact, Stinski, 2021 WL
        5921386, at *8 (“The Court ‘presume[s] ﬁndings of fact made by
        state courts are correct, unless a petitioner rebuts that presumption
        by clear and convincing evidence.’”), and that § 2254(d)(2) set the
        standard for reviewing state-court decisions, id. (“Regarding Sec-
        tion 2254(d)(2), the Court must ‘evaluat[e] whether a state court’s
        decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
        in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.’”
        (quotation marks omitted)). The district court then applied
        § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness to state-court factual
        ﬁndings, asking whether Stinski had carried his burden to rebut
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        20                       Opinion of the Court                    22-12898

        that presumption. See id. at *13 (ﬁnding that Stinski did not over-
        come the “presumption of correctness” aﬀorded to the state
        court’s determination that Dr. Weilenman did not recommend fur-
        ther testing and additional experts). Then, under § 2254(d)(2), the
        district court asked whether the state court’s overall determination
        was reasonable, given the evidence presented. See id. (holding that
        the state court “reasonably determined that trial counsel’s decision
        not to retain additional experts was supported by ‘reasonable pro-
        fessional judgments[,]’” and that “the state habeas court reasonably
        determined that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice for [any al-
        leged] deﬁciency”). The district court followed this analysis for
        both the deﬁcient-performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.
        See id. at *9–15. Therefore, the district court properly articulated
        the rules and applied them in Stinski’s case.
               Stinski’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Stinski
        ﬁrst asserts that, in violation of Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 341, the district
        court impermissibly combined the two standards under § 2254,
        claiming that the district court required that the petitioner prove
        by clear and convincing evidence that the state-court decision, as
        opposed to an individual ﬁnding of fact, was objectively unreasona-
        ble. Miller-El stands for the proposition that “AEDPA does not re-
        quire petitioner to prove that a decision is objectively unreasonable
        by clear and convincing evidence.” 537 U.S. at 341.
               But the district court did no such thing. It did not apply a
        clear-and-convincing-evidence burden to § 2254(d)(2)’s unreasona-
        ble-decision review. As the district court stated in its order granting
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        22-12898               Opinion of the Court                         21

        the COA and demonstrated in the underlying order itself, the dis-
        trict court applied § 2254(e)(1) to state-court factual ﬁndings and
        § 2254(d)(2) to state-court decisions—as Miller-El requires. Stinski,
        2021 WL 5921386, at *8.
               And to the extent that Stinski argues that the district court
        treated §§ 2254(e)(1) and 2254(d)(2) as compounding barriers to re-
        lief—such that an erroneous factual ﬁnding under § 2254(e)(1) was
        necessary to ﬁnd an unreasonable determination of fact under
        § 2254(d)(2)—the district court did not do this, either. It merely
        asked, where the petitioner attempted to rebut a state-court factual
        ﬁnding, whether he had done so with clear and convincing evi-
        dence. See Stinski, 2021 WL 5921386, at *13. Then, it looked at the
        evidence presented before the state court and asked if its ultimate
        determination was reasonable. See id. So the district court relied
        on the state court’s undisturbed factual ﬁndings to hold that the
        state court’s ultimate conclusion was not based on an unreasonable
        determination of fact. That is not the same thing as using
        § 2254(e)(1) as a prerequisite to applying § 2254(d)(2).
               Nor does Stinski oﬀer speciﬁc examples of where he believes
        the district court improperly “merged” the standards or treated
        § 2254(e)(1) as a prerequisite in its application of the rule. Instead,
        Stinski advocates for an entirely new rule.
              Stinski argues that § 2254(e)(1)’s burden applies to only new
        evidence presented to the district court, not evidence that was also
        presented to the state court. In so arguing, he implies that we
        should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s (former) approach to § 2254: ﬁrst,
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12898

        resolve “intrinsic” challenges to the state court’s decision under
        § 2254(d)(2)’s “unreasonable determination” standard; then, if the
        state court’s fact-ﬁnding process survives, or if no intrinsic chal-
        lenge is raised, look to any new or “extrinsic” evidence presented
        for the ﬁrst time in federal court and see if it survives § 2254(e)(1)’s
        clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d
        992, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled by Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 185;
        Hayes v. Sec’y, 10 F.4th 1203, 1223 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., con-
        curring) (stating that the Ninth Circuit alone has held that
        “§ 2254(e)(1)’s presumption applies only when a habeas petitioner
        presents new evidence in federal court”). Stinski contends that be-
        cause he presented no “new” evidence to the district court,
        § 2254(e)(1)’s clear-and-convincing-evidence burden should not
        have been applied to his challenge.
               But we rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Pye, where
        we articulated and applied a contrary standard. 50 F.4th at 1052–
        53 (applying § 2254(e)(1)’s “clear and convincing” evidence stand-
        ard where the petitioner presented no new evidence to rebut a state
        habeas court ﬁnding). We also noted previous cases in our Circuit
        that declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Taylor. Id.
        at 1040 n.9 (citing Landers v. Warden, 776 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir.
        2015)); see also Prevatte v. French, 547 F.3d 1300, 1304 n.1 (11th Cir.
        2008) (noting that “the plain language of § 2254 does not provide
        the basis” for petitioner’s argument that § 2254(d)(2) is applicable
        and § 2254(e)(1) is inapplicable where no new evidence is presented
        to the federal court).
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        22-12898                    Opinion of the Court                                  23

                Besides that, even the Ninth Circuit no longer follows the
        approach Stinski argues for. The Supreme Court’s decision in Cul-
        len v. Pinholster “eliminated the relevance of ‘extrinsic’ challenges
        when we are reviewing state-court decisions under
        AEDPA, . . . because it held that petitioners may introduce new ev-
        idence in federal court only for claims that we review de
        novo. . . . Thus Taylor’s suggestion that an ‘extrinsic’ challenge may
        occur ‘once the state court’s fact-ﬁndings survive any intrinsic chal-
        lenge’ under § 2254(d)(2) is no longer applicable.” Murray v. Schriro,
        745 F.3d 984, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pinholster, 563 U.S. at
        185).
               The upshot of this is that Stinski’s proposed application of
        § 2254(e)(1) does not comport with the law of this Circuit and is no
        longer even enthusiastically endorsed by the Ninth. See also id. at
        1001 (“[O]ur panel decisions appear to be in a state of confusion as
        to whether § 2254(d)(2) or (e)(1), or both, applies to AEDPA review
        of state-court factual ﬁndings. . . . We believe any tension between
        Taylor and our cases or between Taylor and limited statements by
        the Supreme Court will have to be resolved by our court en banc,
        or by the Supreme Court.”).2
              Finally, to the extent that Stinski’s remaining arguments can
        be construed as a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), asserting that the

        2 To the extent that Stinski asks for clarity on the order in which a reviewing

        court must approach challenges to state-court decisions versus individual find-
        ings of fact, we decline to reach this issue, as it is not necessary to adopt a rigid
        approach to our system of review in order to resolve the issue on appeal.
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        24                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12898

        state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination
        of the facts in light of the evidence presented, these arguments are
        also unavailing.
                The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
        right to eﬀective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
        As we’ve noted, to succeed on an ineﬀective-assistance-of-counsel
        claim, a movant must show that (1) his attorney’s performance was
        deﬁcient, and (2) the deﬁcient performance prejudiced his defense.
        Id. at 687. A court need not address both prongs if a defendant has
        made an insuﬃcient showing of one. Id. at 697. But when both
        Strickland and AEDPA apply, “the question is not whether counsel’s
        actions were reasonable” or there was prejudice; “[t]he question is
        whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisﬁed
        Strickland’s deferential standard” or that the errors were not preju-
        dicial. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (emphasis
        added).
                In this case, trial counsel presented substantial mitigation ev-
        idence, and the new habeas evidence was “largely cumulative” of
        that presented at trial. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 37–39, 80–83.
        Trial counsel presented testimony from twenty-six witnesses dur-
        ing the sentencing phase at trial, including two experts. Id. at 80.
        These witnesses gave an “extensive and detailed” account of
        Stinski’s background, including the abuse and neglect he was sub-
        jected to as a child, giving the jury an explanation for Stinski’s par-
        ticipation in the crime. Id.
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        22-12898               Opinion of the Court                        25

               As for the new expert testimony Stinski proﬀered in the state
        habeas proceeding, it merely “provide[d] additional details regard-
        ing similar conclusions” as the experts presented at trial. Id. at 82;
        Holsey v. Warden, 694 F.3d 1230, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating
        that postconviction proceeding evidence is largely cumulative of
        that presented at trial “when it tells a more detailed version of the
        same story told at trial or provides more or better examples or am-
        pliﬁes the themes presented to the jury”). The new experts covered
        the same themes as Dr. Weilenman’s testimony: the instability, ne-
        glect, abandonment, and abuse Stinski experienced as a child; his
        “follower” tendencies and susceptibility to peer pressure; and his
        emotional immaturity, characterized by his impulsivity and inabil-
        ity to consider consequences. Compare Trial Tr. vol. 13, 2811–25,
        ECF No. 10-11, with Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1191–93, 1214, ECF No. 13-20,
        Hr’g Tr. vol. 3, 477–78, 491–95, 543–45, 554–55, ECF No. 13-17, and
        Hr’g Tr. vol. 7, 1339–44, 1360–81, 1396–97, ECF No. 13-21.
               And the new experts oﬀered similar bottom-line conclusions
        as those Dr. Weilenman testiﬁed to: that Stinski’s background
        made him more impulsive and more easily inﬂuenced, such that a
        jury could infer that his background aﬀected his behavior on the
        night of the crime. Compare Trial Tr. vol. 13, 2823–24, ECF No.10-
        11, with Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1220–21, ECF No. 13-20, Hr’g Tr. vol. 3,
        491–93, ECF No. 13-17, and Hr’g Tr. vol. 7, 1411:6–16, ECF No. 13-
        21. That the additional experts further explained scientiﬁc terms
        and concepts that Dr. Weilenman had already introduced—such as
        executive functioning, or frontal lobe anatomy—“does not alter
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12898

        the cumulative nature of the rest of the additional evidence.” Hol-
        sey, 694 F.3d at 1264.
               Ultimately, when we weigh this mitigation evidence against
        the nine aggravating factors that the jury found, we can’t say that
        no reasonable jurist would have reached the same decision denying
        Stinski relief that the state habeas court did.
                               IV.    CONCLUSION
                For the foregoing reasons, the district court correctly articu-
        lated and applied the standards from §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), as
        clariﬁed in this Court’s decision in Pye. We therefore aﬃrm the
        district court’s denial of Stinski’s habeas petition.
               AFFIRMED.