Court Opinion

ID: 9575711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:16:08.954629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:49.984004
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ROVIRA
dissenting:
Contrary to the majority, it is my opinion that rather than refining the circumstances and manner in which the inherently dangerous exception is to apply, we should take this opportunity to repudiate that doctrine and overrule the prior decisions of this court adopting it. I would do so for a number of reasons. First, I am of the opinion that, to the extent the policy considerations that gave rise to this exception are justifiable, they are neither adequately nor properly advanced by invocation of the inherently dangerous exception. Second, though the exception may appear desirable in the abstract, when its practical implications and potential applications are considered, it is revealed to be impractical. Third, the costs that are imposed as a result of this exception far outweigh any incremental benefits that are to be gained by adherence to it. Finally, it is my view that the inherently dangerous exception is itself unnecessary, as clearer more predictable theories of liability are available to address the policy considerations that purportedly support the inherently dangerous doctrine. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I
The majority opinion refines the rule adopted by this court in Western Stock Center, Inc. v. Sevit, Inc., 195 Colo. 372, 578 P.2d 1045 (1978), and Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956), which recognized an exception to the general rule that an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for torts committed by the independent contractor. That exception provides that liability may be imposed on the employer based on the theory of vicarious liability so long as the torts occur while the independent contractor is engaged in an “inherently dangerous” activity on behalf of the employer. As refined by the majority, an “inherently dangerous” activity is one that
presents a special or peculiar danger to others that is inherent in the nature of the activity or the particular circumstances under which the activity is to be performed, that is different in kind from the ordinary risks that commonly confront persons in the community, and that the employer knows or should know is inherent in the nature of the activity or in the particular circumstances under which the activity is to be performed.
Maj. op. at 290.
The majority finds that this rule of vicarious liability is justified on the bases of two primary policy considerations. One such consideration is the propriety of establishing “another layer of concern in order to try to ensure that activity that is inherently dangerous gets enough attention so that we reduce the number of people who are injured.” Maj. op. at 287. The other policy rationale is
that employers whose enterprises directly benefit from the performance of activities that create special and uncommon dangers to others should bear some of the responsibility for injuries to others that occur as a result of the performance of such activities.
Maj. op. at 287. Although I acknowledge that these goals are desirable, I do not *296agree that the inherently dangerous exception to the general rule advances them.
It is axiomatic that reducing the number of injuries which result from the performance of inherently dangerous activities is a desirable end. Indeed, this policy is merely one way to express one of the primary functions of tort law, i.e., creating the incentive to prevent the occurrence of harm. W. Page Keeton et ah, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 4, at 25 (5th ed. 1984). Simply identifying this policy, however, begs the question whether, and at what cost, a particular rule of tort law may further this end.
The inherently dangerous exception to the general rule of nonliability does not necessarily insure that inherently dangerous activities will be performed any more safely than in the absence of this exception. This is so for at least three reasons. First, because the inherently dangerous exception creates no new obligations or duties on the part of the employer than would otherwise be applicable, it does not directly create the incentive on the part of the employer to more carefully select, instruct, or provide for the independent contractor. Second, because independent contractors— by definition — discharge their activities free from the control and supervision of their employer, there is no reason to assume that the imposition of vicarious liability on the employer will, or could, have a significant impact on the safety with which an independent contractor performs the inherently dangerous activity. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(3) (1958) (“An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking.”). Consequently, any additional safety incentives that may be created by imposition of the inherently dangerous exception could, by the very nature of the employer/independent contractor relationship, be only minimal. Finally, given that the inherently dangerous exception imposes liability on the employer, and not the independent contractor, it cannot be said that the rule creates any additional incentives on the independent contractor to perform the work any more safely than otherwise would be the case. In light of these observations, I am left with considerable doubt as to whether the inherently dangerous exception can be said to further the first policy rationale that purportedly justifies it, i.e., the avoidance of harm.
II
The propriety of abolishing the exception is similarly warranted on the grounds that the rule itself creates extremely impractical expectations on potential employers of independent contractors. The second policy justification thought to support the inherently dangerous exception identified by the majority is
that employers whose enterprises directly benefit from the performance of activities that create special and uncommon dangers to others should bear some of the responsibility for injuries to others that occur as a result of the performance of such activities.
Maj. op. at 287. While such a principle may seem perfectly logical, its impracticalities can clearly be seen by recognizing the wide range of circumstances to which the inherently dangerous exception applies.
It is important to note that “employers whose enterprises directly benefit” from inherently dangerous activities include not only large corporations, multi-million dollar manufacturers, and general contractors harnessing the expertise of many independent contractors. The “enterprises” which may benefit from the performance of inherently dangerous work can be as commonplace as a homeowner contracting to have his or her home painted. See Rohlfs v. Weil, 271 N.Y. 444, 3 N.E.2d 588 (1936) (affirming appellate court’s finding that a jury could properly impose vicarious liability on an employer who contracted with an independent contractor for painting services when a pedestrian passing near a scaffold used to complete the painting was injured by falling objects from the scaffold); Mackey v. Campell Constr. Co., 101 *297Cal.App.3d 774, 162 Cal.Rptr. 64 (1980) (affirming the imposition of vicarious liability on an employer for injuries sustained by an independent contractor’s servant who was injured when he fell from a scaffold while attempting to move it). In such a circumstance, it seems highly impractical to impose liability on a homeowner for the negligence of an independent contractor when the very reason for hiring the contractor may be the acknowledged lack of expertise, knowledge, and experience required to correctly perform the inherently dangerous activity. To what extent can it reasonably be expected that such activities will be undertaken more safely as a result of imposing liability on a party who may very well be completely ignorant with respect to the proper way to perform the task and wholly unknowing respecting possible safety measures that might be taken? Moreover, even if one accepts the notion that innocent persons injured as a result of inherently dangerous activities should not go uncompensated, to what extent does it make sense to impose the burden of compensation on the homeowner contracting for painting services?
Ill
Such doubts should, in and of themselves, create considerable apprehension regarding the desirability of maintaining this rule. This skepticism is enhanced, however, after recognition is given to the fact that any minimal safety gains that may result from invocation of this rule are far outweighed by the significant uncertainties and costs imposed by the exception.
As we recognized in Western Stock Center, Inc., the question of what constitutes an inherently dangerous activity is a difficult one. Western Stock Center, Inc., 195 Colo. at 378, 578 P.2d at 1050. The inconsistencies and ambiguities that have resulted from the adoption of the inherently dangerous rule have led to a line of cases that is, as one commentator has noted, “divided against itself without reason.” James B. McHugh, Note, Risk Administration in the Marketplace: A Reappraisal of the Independent Contractor Rule, 40 U.Chi. L.Rev. 661, 665 (1973).
For example, “fumigating is regarded as inherently dangerous ... while disinfecting railroad cars with a creosote solution is not. Similarly, steam sawmills have been held both to be and not to be inherently dangerous, while negligently piled beams have revealed an insidious character unknown to negligently piled pipes.” Id. at 665 (footnotes omitted). In addition, constructing a dam has been held to be inherently dangerous whereas the construction of a bridge is not. Id. 665 n. 26. The removal of a decayed structure has been found to be inherently dangerous, but not raising the roof of a building. Id. Further, there is little reason to suppose that such contradictory results will be avoided simply by invocation of the majority’s refined rule — different juries will always be free to apply the inherently dangerous test differently.
Given the seeming contradictions evidenced by these cases regarding what is or is not an inherently dangerous activity, it is safe to assume that this exception often will provide no warning to prospective employers of independent contractors respecting their potential liabilities. Again, this fact tends to repudiate the notion that the inherently dangerous exception would enhance the safety with which inherently dangerous activities are undertaken.
Further, any minimal benefits provided by the exception are outweighed by the significant costs that it imposes on employers and consumers alike. There can be little doubt that independent contractors who engage in inherently dangerous activities should be insured for any injuries that might result from their activities. Naturally, the cost of such insurance will be passed on to those who employ these contractors. This increased cost carried by the employer will in turn be passed on to his or her consumers. With the inherently dangerous exception, however, the law now imposes upon prudent employers the obligation to insure against the potential negligence of their independent contractors. As stated above, however, responsible independent contractors should also insure against their *298negligence. The result is that all independent contractors who engage in inherently dangerous activities will now be “double insured” — resulting in increased and unnecessary costs both to the employer of independent contractors and to the ultimate consumer. Moreover, because of the confusion regarding what an inherently dangerous activity might be, it would be reasonable to assume not only that many independent contractors will be double insured, but that many employers will be obtaining insurance for the activities of their independent contractors when such insurance may in fact be unnecessary. Once again, any minimal safety benefits that may result from the inherently dangerous exception will be outweighed both by the uncertainties and costs imposed by the exception.
IV
It could be argued, of course, that the costs, uncertainties, and impractical expectations which attend the inherently dangerous rule adequately could be avoided by properly restricting the scope of the inherently dangerous exception. This is, in fact, precisely what the majority opinion purports to do. The majority, after articulating the proper test to apply in determining what activities are inherently dangerous, seeks to restrict the overly broad test set forth in Western Stock Center which failed to “adequately identify the legal criteria by which to determine whether an activity may properly be characterized as ‘inherently dangerous’_” Maj. op. at 288. Examination of the majority opinion, however, reveals the intrinsic difficulty in attempting to restrict the coverage of the rule and thereby avoid the problems identified above. This can most clearly be seen simply by looking to the facts of the case before us. It is certainly possible that in the present case, a jury applying the inherently dangerous exception could find that a special or peculiar danger was presented by flying a single-engine plane in a mountainous area during poor weather and thus, hold UREA liable for pilot Brook’s negligence. This alone reinforces my views regarding the propriety — or lack thereof — in maintaining this rule. I am bothered even more, however, after consideration is given to the fact that in this case, the court of appeals noted that “[statistics show that air transportation is far safer than automobile transportation.” Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. Ass’n, 821 P.2d 862, 866 (Colo.App.1992). Thus, it would be entirely safe to assume that a jury could also find that hiring a taxicab or bus service to transport people through the mountains is an inherently dangerous activity. If such a finding is indeed possible, I think that such a fact speaks for itself regarding the majority’s success in its effort to “supply the appropriate analytical framework for answering” the question of what an inherently dangerous activity is. Maj. op. at 288.
V
Though I acknowledge the desirability of achieving the policy considerations which are thought to support the inherently dangerous exception, I would nevertheless abolish the inherently dangerous exception not only for the reasons stated above, but also based on my view that the exception is wholly unnecessary to attain those policies. In its stead, I would favor application of the principles developed in the area of negligent hiring.1 Doing so would more appropriately create the incentives on the part of independent contractors to properly perform their activities safely, because good safety records could more reasonably be expected to translate into the confidence required to hire independent contractors. *299In addition, such a rule would squarely place the obligation on employers to ensure that the independent contractors whom they hire are adequately qualified and sufficiently responsible to properly discharge their duties.
Therefore, I dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice VOLLACK joins in this dissent.

. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1958) provides:
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless:
(a)in giving improper or ambiguous orders of [sic] in failing to make proper regulations; or
(b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others:
(c) in the supervision of the activity; or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon promises or with instrumentalities under his control.