Court Opinion

ID: 9376631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 14:10:11.159688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.955389
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 17

                  SUPREME COURT         OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP1616-D

COMPLETE TITLE:        In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
                       Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey, Attorney at Law:

                       Office of Lawyer Regulation,
                                 Complainant-Appellant,
                            v.
                       Nathan E. DeLadurantey,
                                 Respondent-Respondent.

                        DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DELADURANTEY

OPINION FILED:         March 3, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:
   COUNTY:
   JUDGE:

JUSTICES:
Per curiam. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
                                                                       2023 WI 17
                                                              NOTICE
                                                This opinion is subject to further
                                                editing and modification.   The final
                                                version will appear in the bound
                                                volume of the official reports.
No.   2020AP1616-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN                          :            IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey,
Attorney at Law:

                                                                   FILED
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
                                                               MAR 3, 2023
           Complainant-Appellant,
                                                                 Sheila T. Reiff
      v.                                                      Clerk of Supreme Court

Nathan E. DeLadurantey,

           Respondent-Respondent.

      ATTORNEY    disciplinary        proceeding.       Attorney         publicly

reprimanded.

      ¶1   PER CURIAM.       The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)

appeals    Referee   Robert    E.     Kinney's      report,       as     amended,

recommending that the court dismiss the remaining charges in the

disciplinary     complaint    filed     against      Attorney        Nathan       E.

DeLadurantey alleging     that Attorney DeLadurantey violated the

Attorney's Oath in Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 40.15,1 which is

      1SCR 40.15 (Attorney's Oath) provides in relevant part:                     "I
will abstain from all offensive personality . . . ."
                                                                                   No.     2020AP1616-D

enforced         via    SCR     20:8.4(g),2           by     failing          to     abstain          from

"offensive personality."

      ¶2         This court issued an initial opinion in this case on

July 8, 2022.            As explained below, because we were unaware of

the referee's submission of errata pages for his report that

eliminated much of the legal basis for our initial opinion, we

withdrew     that       opinion       by    order       dated       July      12,        2022.         The

discovery of those errata pages caused us to further review the

basis upon which the parties had requested the referee to accept

Attorney         DeLadurantey's        no-contest            plea     and      upon        which       the

referee had made factual findings in his report.                                         Having asked

for   and    received          responses     from       the       parties      regarding             their

agreement         as    the     factual      basis          for    the     plea,          and     having

reconsidered           the    record    in    this         matter,       we    now        issue       this

revised opinion.               We conclude that Attorney DeLadurantey did

engage      in    "offensive         personality"            in    one     incident             that    he

admits, and we determine that the appropriate discipline for

that misconduct is a public reprimand.                              We also determine that
Attorney DeLadurantey should be required to pay costs of this

disciplinary proceeding in the amount of $17,570.10.

      ¶3         In    order    to     review         the     legal      conclusion             in     the

referee's         amended       report,      we        first       need       to         clarify       the

procedural context in which this case comes to us on appeal

because     that       informs       what    we   are        reviewing         and       how     we    can

      2SCR 20:8.4(g) provides:    "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to violate the attorney's oath."

                                                  2
                                                                           No.     2020AP1616-D

proceed.       This further requires us to provide some background on

the use of no-contest pleas in attorney disciplinary cases, and

the procedural history of the proceedings before the referee in

this case.

      ¶4       Supreme Court Rule 22.14(2)3 contemplates that in a

respondent attorney's answer to a complaint filed by the OLR,

the attorney may "plead no contest to allegations of misconduct

in the complaint."            Although this rule speaks only in terms of

pleading       no      contest      in   the       respondent's        answer,       we    have

regularly upheld the entry of a no-contest plea entered at any

stage     of     the    proceedings      before          the    referee,     even     if    the

respondent attorney's answer initially denied some or all of the

complaint's factual allegations and claims of misconduct.                                  See,

e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis, 2019 WI 55,

386   Wis.       2d    719,   927    N.W.2d        525    (no-contest        pleas    entered

pursuant to stipulation after respondent attorney filed answers

to    original         and    amended     complaints);            In    re       Disciplinary

Proceedings Against Hudec, 2019 WI 39, 386 Wis. 2d 371, 925
N.W.2d     540      (no-contest      pleas     entered         pursuant    to     stipulation

after respondent attorney filed unsuccessful motion to dismiss

and an answer that denied all allegations of misconduct); In re

      3SCR 22.14(2) provides: "The respondent may by answer plead
no contest to allegations of misconduct in the complaint.     The
referee shall make a determination of misconduct in respect to
each allegation to which no contest is pleaded and for which the
referee finds an adequate basis in the record. In a subsequent
disciplinary   or   reinstatement   proceeding,   it   shall   be
conclusively presumed that the respondent engaged in the
misconduct determined on the basis of a no contest plea."

                                               3
                                                                       No.     2020AP1616-D

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heins, 2017 WI 93, 378 Wis. 2d

27, 902 N.W.2d 257 (referee construed stipulation entered after

completion     of      discovery      and    just   prior    to   final      evidentiary

hearing   to     be     entry    of     no-contest     pleas      to   all     counts    in

complaint).

    ¶5      In        the     criminal      context,     a     circuit       court      has

discretion whether to accept a plea, be it a guilty plea or a

no-contest plea.            State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470

N.W.2d 900 (1991) (". . . a court has discretion whether or not

to officially receive or accept [guilty or no-contest] pleas . .

."); State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 476, 192 N.W.2d 872

(1972)    ("The       trial     court    earlier      rejected     a    plea     of    nolo

contendere [i.e., no contest], but it was within its discretion

to do just that."); State v. La Pean, 247 Wis. 302, 308, 19

N.W.2d 289 (1945) ("The right of the court to refuse to accept a

plea is an inherent power of all criminal courts.");                             Brozosky

v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W.2d 311, 313 (1928) (a plea of

nolo contendere "is received at the discretion of the court").
Although an attorney disciplinary proceeding is a civil action,

rather than a criminal case, we see no reason why this rule

would not also apply to a referee in an attorney disciplinary

proceeding.          First, referees in such matters generally have the

powers    of     a     circuit     court      judge    trying      a   civil      action.

Moreover, our rules both explicitly authorize the entry of no-

contest    pleas       in   attorney        disciplinary     proceedings         and    use

language that tracks the rules for accepting pleas in criminal
cases.    See SCR 22.16(1) ("The referee has the powers of a judge
                                              4
                                                                 No.    2020AP1616-D

trying a civil action . . . ."); SCR 22.14(2) (authorizing entry

of   no-contest       pleas   and   providing     requirements    for    accepting

such pleas).          Thus, it is logical to interpret the plea entry

rule in disciplinary proceedings to give the referee the same

discretion in deciding whether to accept a plea that a circuit

court possesses in a criminal case.

      ¶6      Rule 22.14(2) states that when a no-contest plea is

included in the answer (or offered later in the proceeding), the

referee "shall make a determination of misconduct in respect to

each allegation to which no contest is pleaded," but only if

"the referee finds an adequate factual basis in the record" to

support the plea.         Id.   This tracks the language in the statute

that governs the entry of pleas in criminal cases, Wis. Stat.

§ 971.08(1)(b), which requires a circuit court, before accepting

a    guilty      or   no-contest    plea,    to    "[m]ake     such    inquiry    as

satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime

charged."

      ¶7      We have said in the criminal context that how a plea-
taking judge makes that inquiry and what the judge uses in the

record as the factual basis is left to the judge's discretion.

See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶¶19-22, 232 Wis. 2d

714, 605 N.W.2d 836.            However the plea-taking judge makes the

inquiry and whatever portion of the record the judge ultimately

relies     on,    the   judge   must   satisfy     the   two   purposes    of    the

factual basis requirement:             (1) that the defendant is aware of

the elements of the crime, and (2) that the defendant's conduct,
as established by the record, meets those elements.                     Id., ¶22.
                                         5
                                                                      No.    2020AP1616-D

Moreover, the plea-taking judge "must ensure that a defendant

realizes that his or her conduct does meet the elements of the

crime charged."       Id., ¶21 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394

U.S. 459, 467 (1969)).           We see no reason why those statements of

the law of pleas in the criminal context would not apply to the

requirement to find a "factual basis" for a no-contest plea in

an   attorney      disciplinary         proceeding.          The     use    of     similar

language    in     the   disciplinary          rule     regarding      the       need     to

establish a "factual basis" for a no-contest plea by an attorney

supports this conclusion.

     ¶8     With this background in mind, we now turn to the facts

of this case.        Attorney DeLadurantey was admitted to practice

law in Wisconsin in 2007.             Since 2008, he has been the owner of

DeLadurantey Law Office, LLC in Brookfield.                          Since 2013, the

primary    focus    of   Attorney        DeLadurantey's       law     firm       has    been

consumer litigation.            Attorney DeLadurantey has not previously

been disciplined.

     ¶9     The OLR's complaint in this proceeding focused on the
relationship       between      Attorney        DeLadurantey         and     H.M.,       the

grievant,    during      the     time     period      that    H.M.     worked      as     an

associate    attorney        for      Attorney        DeLadurantey's         law       firm.

Attorney    DeLadurantey        and     H.M.    graduated     from     the       same   law

school and met at an alumni function.                        Attorney DeLadurantey

subsequently hired H.M., and her employment with his law firm

extended from February 2012 until October 2017.

     ¶10    The    OLR's       complaint       alleged    that       the    law     firm's
growing consumer litigation practice required H.M. and Attorney
                                           6
                                                               No.     2020AP1616-D

DeLadurantey to work evenings and weekends, and to often travel

together    for    interviews,   depositions,       and   court      proceedings.

The complaint further alleged that over the course of H.M.'s

employment,       Attorney    DeLadurantey    and    H.M.      "established      a

friendship outside the office, including going to a gym to work

out, playing online games, sharing meals together when working,

and participating in social activities while traveling for Firm

business such as snorkeling, going to the beach, and watching

Netflix."     The complaint alleged, however, that during this time

period   Attorney     DeLadurantey    had    "engaged     in    a    pattern    of

behavior that was inappropriate and at times constituted sexual

harassment."       The OLR's complaint proceeded to allege a number

of incidents and statements that were a part of the alleged

pattern of inappropriate and harassing behavior.                  The complaint

alleged multiple violations of two ethical rules arising from

"each instance" of subjecting H.M. to physical contact, sexual

advances, and comments regarding her physical appearance:                      (1)

violations of SCR 20:8.4(i) (harassment),4 and (2) violations of
the "offensive personality" clause in the Attorney's Oath in SCR

40.15.     In other words, the complaint alleged that each instance

of such conduct summarized in the complaint had violated both of

those ethical rules.         Consequently, although the OLR's complaint

listed only a single count and the parties and the referee have

    4  SCR 20:8.4(i) provides:  "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age,
creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual
preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer's
professional activities."

                                      7
                                                                           No.     2020AP1616-D

often spoken of a single charge under each ethical rule in this

case, the OLR's complaint actually alleged multiple counts of

misconduct under each of two separate rules.                          We will therefore

refer to "charges" in the plural for each rule.

      ¶11   Attorney         DeLadurantey's         answer        to       the      complaint

admitted that the two attorneys had worked together on evenings

and weekends and had often traveled together.                          His answer denied

that he had engaged in harassment prohibited by SCR 20:8.4(i)

and that he had violated the "offensive personality" clause of

the   Attorney's       Oath.         With    the   exception          of    what     we    will

reference    as    the       "San    Francisco       incident,"            which     we    will

describe    in    detail     below,     Attorney        DeLadurantey's            answer     and

subsequent deposition testimony denied at least some portion of

the allegations surrounding each of the various incidents or

comments described in the complaint.                     Given the nature of the

proceedings for the taking of Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest

plea and his denial of many of the allegations of the complaint,

we will not set forth in detail those other alleged incidents
and comments.          We will include in the factual recitation only

facts that are uncontested.

      ¶12   It    is    undisputed          that   while       H.M.    was       employed    by

Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm, Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M.

traveled together on a number of business trips.                                 On some of

those   trips,         the     two    stayed       in      a    two-bedroom,              Airbnb

accommodation, with each occupying their own bedroom.                                     It is

undisputed that one such trip occurred in February 2016, when
the two attorneys traveled to San Francisco for depositions.
                                              8
                                                                                 No.        2020AP1616-D

       ¶13    Five     paragraphs             of    the    OLR's       complaint             (¶¶17-21)

addressed the San Francisco incident.                            Attorney DeLadurantey's

answer admitted some portions of those paragraphs, but denied

some     portions.              In    his     deposition         testimony,            however,      he

clarified that he had only vague and generalized recollections

of    the    events        of    that       evening     because        he    had       been     highly

intoxicated.          He therefore essentially indicated that he could

not    dispute       the    allegations            of   the     complaint        about        the   San

Francisco incident, which had been based on H.M.'s statements to

the    OLR.          Also,       in     the     statement        of     facts          in     Attorney

DeLadurantey's appellate brief, he says that he conceded before

the referee at the plea hearing that "his conduct relating to

the    San    Francisco              incident      referred       to        in   the         complaint

constituted offensive personality."                            His brief then quoted the

five paragraphs of the complaint addressing the San Francisco

incident in his statement of facts, indicating that he does not

dispute those factual allegations for purposes of this case,

although      he      also       included          an     extended      excerpt             from    his
deposition setting forth his limited recollection of the events

of    that    evening.               Consequently,        we    use    the       allegations         of

paragraphs 17-21 of the complaint to describe the events of the

San Francisco incident.

       ¶14    On the evening of February 3, 2016, H.M. was in a

common       space     watching             television.           Attorney             DeLadurantey

approached her and began to rub her back, arms, and legs in a

suggestive manner.               H.M. left the common area and went to her

                                                   9
                                                                    No.     2020AP1616-D

bedroom.     H.M. was upset and afraid, to the extent that she felt

physically ill.

       ¶15   Attorney      DeLadurantey         subsequently      texted     H.M.    and

attempted to explain his inappropriate behavior.                    In the ensuing

text exchange between the two, Attorney DeLadurantey asked if he

could   "try    and    fix      the   awkwardness."        H.M.    responded,       "I'm

pretty sure I'm going to throw up shortly – I'm struggling not

to."

       ¶16   Later in the evening, H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey

had a face-to-face conversation in the kitchen of the rental

unit.    Despite H.M.'s earlier expression of being upset due to

Attorney       DeLadurantey's           suggestive     conduct,           during     the

conversation Attorney DeLadurantey told H.M. that he wanted to

"take her upstairs to her bedroom and hold her."                            H.M. told

Attorney DeLadurantey that would not happen.                    She also told him

during the conversation that she may have to leave Attorney

DeLadurantey's law firm.

       ¶17   At the end of the conversation, Attorney DeLadurantey
left the kitchen, went upstairs, and got into the bed in H.M.'s

bedroom.     When she discovered Attorney DeLadurantey in her bed,

H.M. told him that she was not going to share a bed with him.

He then left the bedroom.

       ¶18   The next morning, Attorney DeLadurantey admitted to

H.M. that his actions the prior evening had been inappropriate,

and he apologized for them.

       ¶19   Although      we    will    not    comment    on     specific     alleged
incidents,     it     is     undisputed     that     the   working        relationship
                                           10
                                                                  No.     2020AP1616-D

between H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey subsequently deteriorated

and that H.M. left Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm in October

2017.

      ¶20      As noted above, Attorney DeLadurantey denied many of

the allegations in the OLR's complaint about other incidents, at

least in part.          He continued to deny those allegations in his

deposition testimony.

      ¶21      The    parties   appeared     before   the   referee         for   the

evidentiary hearing in this matter on May 17, 2021.                     The referee

noted that there were a number of pending motions in limine that

needed to be resolved.5            Before doing so, however, the referee

met     with    the    attorneys    representing      the   OLR     and     Attorney

DeLadurantey.         The result of that off-the-record discussion was

an apparent agreement that the OLR would dismiss the charges6 of

harassment on the basis of sex under SCR 20:8.4(i) and that

Attorney DeLadurantey would plead no-contest to the charges7 of

engaging in offensive personality under SCR 40.15 and 20:8.4(g),

      5The referee noted that he had received and read copies of
the   parties'  voluminous   trial  exhibits,  except   for  the
deposition transcripts of Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M., which
counsel for the parties had asked him not to read in advance of
the evidentiary hearing.
      6As noted above, the OLR's complaint alleged that "each
instance" of physical contact, sexual advance, or comment about
H.M's appearance constituted a separate violation of SCR
20:8.4(i).
      7The OLR's complaint also alleged that "each instance" of
physical contact, sexual advance, or comment about H.M's
appearance constituted a violation of the offensive personality
clause of the Attorney's Oath and therefore of SCR 20:8.4(g).

                                        11
                                                                          No.     2020AP1616-D

with the parties jointly requesting the imposition of a private

reprimand.

      ¶22    Unfortunately, neither the attorneys nor the referee

specified on the hearing transcript precisely what facts the

referee      was    to     use     as     the       factual       basis    for         Attorney

DeLadurantey's plea.             It is not even clear whether they fully

understood     precisely         what     was       within    the     scope           of        their

agreement.         Counsel for the OLR initially said that Attorney

DeLadurantey's        no-contest         plea       would    be    "supported              by     the

allegations of the complaint."                      In response, however, counsel

for Attorney DeLadurantey responded that while he did not have

an objection to the description of the agreement described by

OLR's counsel, he said that there were "other provisions of the

agreement"     that       should        also    be     placed       onto        the        record,

indicating that the OLR's counsel had not described the full

agreement of the parties.               Specifically, Attorney DeLadurantey's

counsel stated that the referee should consider the record in

the case as a whole, which would include the proposed hearing
exhibits and the deposition transcripts of Attorney DeLadurantey

and H.M.8       OLR's counsel did not dispute this clarification.

This meant that the parties asked the referee to rely not only

on   the    factual      allegations      of    the    complaint,         but    also           on   a

      8Actually,   Attorney   DeLadurantey's   proposed  hearing
exhibits included the transcript of an interview that H.M. gave
to an OLR investigator that was not under oath.         Attorney
DeLadurantey's counsel asked that the transcript of H.M.'s
deposition be substituted for that interview transcript. There
was no objection by OLR's counsel to this substitution.

                                               12
                                                                  No.     2020AP1616-D

record   that     contained    express     denials    of   allegations       in     the

complaint and competing affirmative assertions of fact.

    ¶23     The    referee     then     initiated    a     plea    colloquy        with

Attorney DeLadurantey.          As part of that colloquy, the referee

noted    that,    in   order    to    accept   Attorney     DeLadurantey's          no-

contest plea, he was required to find an adequate factual basis

for the plea and he clearly indicated that he found such an

adequate factual basis in the record as a whole, not just in the

allegations of the complaint:

    The rule that I alluded to a minute ago requires that
    I find that there is "adequate factual basis" in the
    record, unquote, to support your plea. And I want to
    make sure that it's clear that I have reviewed
    hundreds of pages of discovery materials, and I have
    no difficulty finding that there is an adequate
    factual basis to support the plea of no contest to
    that charge.
Having also found that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary, the referee accepted the plea.                The parties agreed to

submit simultaneous legal memoranda in support of their sanction

request.

    ¶24     After receiving the parties' sanction memoranda, the

referee prepared his report and recommendation.                   Although he had

accepted     Attorney     DeLadurantey's        no-contest         plea     to      the

"offensive       personality"        charges   at    the    plea        hearing,     he

                                         13
                                                            No.   2020AP1616-D

concluded in his report that the "offensive personality" charges

should be dismissed.9

     ¶25    The referee's conclusion of no "offensive personality"

violations stemmed from his subordinate legal conclusion that in

order to engage in "offensive personality" in the context of

allegations of sexual conduct, the OLR was required to prove at

least    one     element    of     a     sexual    harassment     employment

discrimination       claim—that        Attorney    DeLadurantey's       sexual

advances to H.M. and alleged comments about her appearance were

"unwelcome," which the referee characterized as the "gravamen"

of any sexual harassment claim.              See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB

v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).

     ¶26    In his report, the referee did not consider just the

allegations     of   the   OLR's   complaint.        Consistent     with    the

parties' agreement expressed at the plea hearing, he reviewed

the totality of the record, including photographs of the two

attorneys      together,   communications       between   them,   and      their

testimony about their various interactions, which he discussed
in a section of his report entitled "Additional Facts."                    From

some of that record evidence, which he believed to be not in

dispute, the referee found that the two attorneys had a platonic

personal relationship as well as a professional one.                From his

findings about their personal relationship, the referee further

     9 Alternatively, the referee stated that if the court
disagreed with his conclusion and found a violation of the
Attorney's Oath, he recommended that the court impose a private
reprimand and that the case file should be sealed "for the
benefit of both parties."

                                        14
                                                                      No.     2020AP1616-D

found that the OLR would have been unlikely to have proven that

Attorney    DeLadurantey's           conduct      during       the     San       Francisco

incident or in the other instances alleged in the complaint was

objectively       "unwelcome,"       as    that    term       is     used     in    sexual

harassment law.       Since he concluded that a reasonable person in

Attorney DeLadurantey's position would not have known that his

conduct was "unwelcome," the referee further concluded that the

same conduct could not be "offensive" under the Attorney's Oath.

Thus, he determined that the remaining "offensive personality"

charges should be dismissed.

     ¶27    The     OLR     appealed      from     the       referee's       report    and

recommendation.       In the Statement of Facts portion of the OLR's

appellate brief, it did not cite to the complaint as the source

of its factual statements.             It did, however, repeatedly cite to

Attorney    DeLadurantey's       and      H.M.'s    deposition        transcripts        as

support for its factual assertions.10                    Indeed, in at least one

instance,   the     OLR's    brief     described        an    incident      as     Attorney

DeLadurantey had done in his deposition, rather than as the OLR
had alleged in its complaint, indicating its belief that the

entire record, not just the complaint, was to be considered in

reviewing the referee's report.

     ¶28    The    heading     for     the      first    argument      in     the     OLR's

appellate    brief    was     that     "[t]he      record      supports       by     clear,

     10In the factual section of the brief, which occupied
roughly five pages, the OLR cited Attorney DeLadurantey's
deposition transcript 16 times and it cited H.M.'s deposition
transcript four times.   It cited the complaint zero times.    It
followed this same pattern in the argument section of its brief.

                                           15
                                                                No.   2020AP1616-D

satisfactory      and      convincing         evidence      that      [Attorney]

DeLadurantey engaged in offensive personality and violated the

Attorney's Oath."        OLR Brief at 12 (emphasis added).               In that

section the OLR essentially urged the court to find or rely on a

sizable number of "facts" from the record that the referee had

not found in his report, but which the OLR contended support a

conclusion that Attorney DeLadurantey engaged in multiple acts

of "offensive personality."

      ¶29    The OLR also argued in its brief that the referee had

made an error of law in concluding that the ethical rule against

sexual harassment is violated only by proving a violation of

federal     employment     law    against      sexual     harassment     in   the

workplace.     Similarly, the OLR argued that the referee legally

erred in concluding that because H.M. had occasionally requested

non-sexual      physical     contact         (shoulder      rubs),       Attorney

DeLadurantey's    request    for      more   intimate     and   sexual    contact

during the San Francisco incident was not "unwelcome" under both

federal law and Wisconsin's ethical rules.
      ¶30    As noted above, Attorney DeLadurantey's response brief

indicated, at least implicitly, that his agreement to plead no-

contest was primarily based on the allegations of the portion of

the   complaint   relating       to   the    San   Francisco    incident.      He

argued, however, that his no-contest plea did not prevent the

referee from making a recommendation to dismiss the offensive

personality charges that was based on the referee's review of

the record as a whole.           Moreover, he further asserted that the
referee's    recommended     dismissal       of    the   remaining    "offensive
                                       16
                                                                               No.     2020AP1616-D

personality" charges was based on the referee's factual findings

from the record which were not clearly erroneous.

       ¶31    Our initial opinion in this matter focused on what

appeared to be a clear contradiction in the referee's report.

Although      the     ultimate      conclusion            and    recommendation             of   the

report was that the evidence did not support a determination

that      Attorney       DeLadurantey             had        engaged        in         "offensive

personality," the second page of the report, as initially filed,

contained a Finding of Fact #3 that the complaint did contain an

adequate factual basis for Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest

plea to the charges of "offensive personality."                                That page also

contained       a     single        "conclusion            of     law"         that        Attorney

DeLadurantey          "did     engage           in        the         misconduct            charged,

specifically, he did not abstain from all offensive personality"

(emphasis      added).           This         factual       finding       and        this      legal

conclusion     appeared       to    conflict          with      the    report's        subsequent

"additional facts," legal analysis, and recommendation that the

"offensive personality" charges should be dismissed.                                   We adopted
the    initial      Finding      of      Fact        #3    and    accepted           the    initial

conclusion       of    law     in       the    referee's         report,         treating        the

referee's report as having confirmed the acceptance of Attorney

DeLadurantey's         no-contest         plea       and     affirming          the        referee's

initial      determination         at    the    plea       hearing       that    there        was   a

sufficient      factual       basis       in    the       complaint       as     a     whole     for

Attorney      DeLadurantey's             no-contest          plea.         We         essentially

concluded      that     the    remainder          of       the    referee's           report     was
factually and legally faulty, and we therefore disregarded it.
                                                17
                                                                        No.     2020AP1616-D

      ¶32     When we issued the initial opinion, however, we were

not aware of the fact that the referee had submitted errata

pages for his report, which had deleted both Finding of Fact #3

and the legal conclusion on page two of the report.11                                In the

cover      letter     accompanying       the       errata    pages,           the    referee

explained that after writing the first few pages of his report,

including Finding of Fact #3 and the initial legal conclusion on

page two, he had engaged in further review and research, which

had led him to conclude ultimately that Attorney DeLadurantey

had not engaged in "offensive personality."                            This explanation

clarified     that,       although    the   referee        had    initially         accepted

Attorney      DeLadurantey's         no-contest      plea,        he    had     ultimately

rejected the no-contest plea in his final report because he had

concluded that the facts in the record as a whole showed that

Attorney       DeLadurantey's         actions        toward        H.M.         were      not

"unwelcome,"        as     that   term      is     used     in    employment           sexual

harassment statutes and case law.

      ¶33     The referee's deletion of Finding of Fact #3 and the
initial legal conclusion on page two of his report eliminated

the   basis    for       our   initial   opinion,         which    implicitly          upheld

Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea.                     Our further review of

the   plea    hearing      transcript,       the    referee's          report,      and   the

       The referee's cover letter accompanying the errata pages
      11

directed that the attached errata pages be substituted for pages
two, six, and 22 of the referee's report.    The clerk's office,
however, did not substitute those pages as requested by the
referee. It simply filed the referee's submission as a letter,
leaving the report unchanged.

                                            18
                                                                         No.       2020AP1616-D

parties' appellate briefs demonstrated that there was confusion

among the referee and the parties as to what the parties had

agreed should be the factual basis for the no-contest plea and

therefore what should be the factual basis for this court's

opinion.

      ¶34      The   changes     to     the   referee's       report     in     the    errata

raised a number of questions.                 If the referee determined that he

needed    to    withdraw        his    interlocutory       acceptance          of    Attorney

DeLadurantey's         no-contest        plea,      on   what    basis       did     he    make

factual findings in his report, since there was no evidentiary

hearing at which he could weigh the credibility of witnesses?

Did   the      parties       agree    that    the    allegations        of     the     entire

complaint       (and     only    those       allegations)       could     serve       as    the

factual     basis      for    the     plea?        Did   they    agree,        as    Attorney

DeLadurantey's         appellate        brief      implies,     that    only        the    five

paragraphs of the complaint regarding the San Francisco incident

constituted the factual basis for his plea?                       Alternatively, did

they agree that both the allegations of the complaint and the
record as a whole should be used by the referee as the factual

basis for Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea?                             If the last

of those scenarios was accurate, what was the effect of the fact

that parts of the record (e.g., Attorney DeLadurantey's answer

and his deposition testimony) disputed many of the allegations

of the complaint, at least in part, and the fact that Attorney

DeLadurantey never withdrew his denials?

      ¶35      Given     these       questions,     we   ordered       the     parties      to
submit supplemental legal memoranda addressing the issue of what
                                              19
                                                                  No.      2020AP1616-D

they had agreed should serve as the factual basis for the no-

contest plea, as well as the issue of whether the matter should

be remanded to the referee for further proceedings.                        The OLR's

supplemental        memorandum        initially    claimed       that      only     the

complaint had served as the factual basis for the no-contest

plea, but it subsequently acknowledged that the referee had been

asked at the plea hearing to review the record as a whole.

Attorney DeLadurantey's supplemental memorandum indicated that

he had agreed that the five paragraphs of the complaint relating

to the San Francisco incident, which he acknowledged he could

not materially dispute in his deposition testimony, could be

used as the factual basis for the plea, along with the record as

a whole.      Both parties urged this court not to remand the matter

to the referee for further proceedings, given the additional

time and expense that would result.

      ¶36     Ordinarily, when we review a referee's report that is

prepared following the entry of a comprehensive stipulation of

facts    or   following     a   full    evidentiary      hearing,     we    affirm    a
referee's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous,

and we review a referee's legal conclusions on a de novo basis.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5,

305     Wis. 2d 71,    740 N.W.2d 125.            If   we   conclude        that    the

attorney      has   engaged      in    professional      misconduct,         we    then

determine the appropriate level of discipline to impose given

the particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's

recommendation,       but   benefiting     from    it.      In   re     Disciplinary

                                          20
                                                                         No.       2020AP1616-D

Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660

N.W.2d 686.

       ¶37     In    this    case,      however,     there    was    no    comprehensive

stipulation of facts or an evidentiary hearing at which the

referee could weigh credibility.                     There was a no-contest plea.

If   the      referee      had    continued     to    accept      that    plea       and    had

submitted a report based on that plea, we would review whether

the referee had properly exercised his discretion in accepting

the plea.          Cf. State v. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, ¶12, 397 Wis. 2d

758,    960    N.W.2d       888   (circuit     court's      denial   of        a   motion    to

withdraw       a    plea    in    a     criminal     case    is   reviewed          under    an

erroneous exercise of discretion standard); White v. State, 85

Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (same).12

       ¶38     In this case, however, it is clear from the referee's

report,       as    amended,      that    he   reconsidered       his     acceptance         of

Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and ultimately refused

to     accept        that        plea     because      he     concluded            that     the

       The usual procedural path of pleas in criminal cases is
       12

different from the path in attorney disciplinary cases. In most
instances, there is no appellate review of the circuit court's
acceptance of a guilty or no-contest plea.     What is reviewed
normally on appeal is a circuit court's denial of a defendant's
request to withdraw a plea.       In the attorney disciplinary
context, however, this court reviews every case in which a plea
is entered, whether or not the respondent attorney subsequently
sought to withdraw the plea or appealed from the referee's
report following the acceptance of the plea.     Thus, when the
respondent attorney does not seek plea withdrawal and the
referee's report confirms the acceptance of the plea, we review
the acceptance of the plea for an erroneous exercise of
discretion.

                                               21
                                                                                   No.     2020AP1616-D

"uncontroverted"            facts       he    found       from     the    record         as     a     whole

demonstrated          that       Attorney           DeLadurantey's            conduct           did        not

constitute          "offensive           personality"             in      violation             of         the

Attorney's Oath and SCR 20:8.4(g) because his conduct was not

objectively "unwelcome."                     His ultimate report is therefore more

in the nature of a report in a case where no plea is entered,

and we will utilize the standards of review for such cases, as

summarized above.

       ¶39     There       are     two   primary          problems        with      the       referee's

report, which preclude us from accepting the referee's findings

or legal conclusions.

       ¶40     First, the case was presented to the referee as being

resolved       through       a     no-contest            plea.      The       referee         initially

followed the proper procedure for the entry of that plea and

exercised his discretion to accept it.                             He then reconsidered the

entry of the plea and determined that it should not be accepted.

This    is    permissible          in    an     attorney          disciplinary            proceeding.

Referees in attorney disciplinary proceedings generally have the
powers of a judge trying a civil action.                                 SCR 22.16(1).                   This

would    include          the      ability          to    reconsider          an     interlocutory

decision, such as in this case accepting a no-contest plea to a

charge    of    misconduct,          and       then,       after    further         consideration,

reaching       the        opposite       conclusion          in     a     subsequent             report.

Although       it    is     unusual,         this    is    not     the    first          time       it     has

happened.           See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Clark,

2016     WI     36,        368     Wis. 2d 409,             878     N.W.2d 662             (following
attorney's          entry     of    a    no-contest          plea        to    a     charge           in     a
                                                    22
                                                                  No.     2020AP1616-D

disciplinary complaint, the referee concluded that the OLR had

failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to that charge).

      ¶41    What we do find troubling is that, once the referee

determined that the no-contest plea should not be accepted, he

proceeded to make findings of fact that served as the basis for

his   ultimate     legal   conclusion     of       no    "offensive     personality"

violations.       As an initial matter, it is clear from the record

of this case, both before the referee and on appeal, that the

parties     and   the   referee   were       not    on    the   same    page    as   to

precisely what was the universe of facts that should serve as

the   factual     basis    for    the    plea.           That   would    have    been

problematic even if the referee had continued to accept the

plea.13

       This case is a cautionary tale for referees and lawyers
      13

who appear in attorney disciplinary proceedings.         When a
respondent attorney decides to enter a no-contest plea, the
lawyers and the referee need to be clear regarding what universe
of facts will serve as the factual basis for the plea,
especially when the record contains disputes as to the
underlying events or the context of those events. Moreover, one
cannot agree to have one set of facts (e.g., the allegations of
the complaint) serve as the factual basis for a no-contest plea
and then ask the referee to consider a broader set of
conflicting factual assertions (e.g., the record as a whole) in
making a recommendation as to the appropriate level of
discipline.   In the context of a no-contest plea, a referee
cannot make factual findings from disputed record evidence to
support a discipline recommendation without a hearing at which
the referee can assess witness credibility, especially when
those factual findings conflict with the facts used to support
the plea. Finally, both referees and practicing lawyers need to
understand that clarity as to the facts relied on by referee to
accept a no-contest plea is necessary to permit this court to
review the referee's acceptance of the plea and to write a full
opinion deciding the case.

                                        23
                                                            No.   2020AP1616-D

      ¶42    Once the referee rejected the plea, however, there was

no express stipulation of the parties as to any facts.               The case

at that point reverted to the status of any other case prior to

an evidentiary hearing.           There was a complaint containing many

factual allegations, and there was an answer that disputed many

of   those   factual   allegations.        There    were   also   deposition

transcripts    for   H.M.   and    Attorney    DeLadurantey,   but    both   of

those consisted of out-of-court declarations that the referee

had not observed in order to make credibility determinations.

Moreover, the deposition testimony of both of those witnesses

was certainly not the full testimony that those witnesses would

have presented at an evidentiary hearing.               H.M. and Attorney

DeLadurantey answered only those questions that were asked by

opposing counsel, and those questions did not cover every aspect

of the various incidents alleged in the complaint.                   Moreover,

even with respect to the documentary exhibits that the parties

submitted and asked the referee to review, H.M. and Attorney

DeLadurantey were not given the opportunity to explain their
contents or put them in context.              This case was not about the

language of a contract or an insurance policy or a deed, which

could be interpreted on its face by a referee or by this court

on review; it involved various interactions between two people,

some of which were captured in paper form (e.g., printouts of

text messages), but many of which depended on the testimony of

H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey, as well as any other third party

who might have witnessed their interactions.

                                      24
                                                                               No.    2020AP1616-D

     ¶43       In this situation, we cannot see how the referee could

make the large number of factual findings that he did about

various        aspects          of      the         relationship            between      Attorney

DeLadurantey and H.M.                 Once there was no longer an accepted no-

contest    plea      to    resolve           the    case,      the     referee       should   have

proceeded either to obtain a comprehensive stipulation of facts

from the parties or to conduct an evidentiary hearing, at which

he   could      observe         the     demeanor          of    the    witnesses        and   make

credibility determinations.                    At that point, he could then have

made factual findings based either on the stipulation or on the

testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing.

     ¶44       While      the    referee           stated      that    he    was     making   only

factual findings that were "uncontroverted," it is clear that

there were still many disputes of fact about a wide range of

incidents.          The OLR's appellate brief included a statement of

facts that was very different from the factual recitation in the

referee's       report.              Given    the       presence       of     ongoing     factual

disputes and the lack of a basis for the referee to make factual
findings       in    the    absence           of     an     opportunity        to     weigh   the

credibility of the witnesses, we cannot accept the referee's

"additional" findings of fact in his report.                                   The failure to

follow the proper procedure for making findings of fact was an

error     of    law,       which       invalidates             those    additional        factual

findings.

     ¶45       The   second          foundational         problem       with    the     referee's

report is another error of law.                         Although the referee stated in
his report that a charge of "offensive personality" is "neither
                                                   25
                                                                       No.   2020AP1616-D

a    watered-down        version    of     sexual        harassment    nor    a    lesser

included offense of it," it is clear that he conflated sexual

harassment       under     SCR     20:8.4(i)       and     engaging    in    "offensive

personality"      under     SCR     20:8.4(g).           He    began   the   discussion

section     of   his     report     with   an    extended       discussion        of   what

constitutes      sexual     harassment      under        employment     discrimination

law, stated that the "gravamen" of a claim of sexual harassment

is   whether     the     conduct     at    issue    was       "unwelcome,"    and      then

reasoned that conduct that would not be considered "unwelcome"

under sexual harassment law also cannot be "offensive" under the

"offensive personality" clause of the Attorney's Oath.                            Indeed,

he analyzed whether both Attorney DeLadurantey's sexual advances

during the San Francisco incident and his alleged comments about

H.M.'s appearance at other times were "unwelcome," concluding

from what he believed to be the context of their personal, as

well as professional, relationship that neither type of conduct

was objectively unwelcome.

      ¶46    Although it is possible that the same conduct could
constitute both harassment on the basis of sex and "offensive

personality,"       they     are     separate       ethical       violations.           The

requirement to "abstain from all offensive personality" is one

of a number of standards to which attorneys must conform when

they enter the practice of law in this state.                          Such standards

apply not only to the direct practice of law, but also to the

business of law, and to the lawyer's conduct beyond the practice

or business of law.              See, e.g., SCR 20:4.1 (requiring a lawyer
to avoid knowingly making a false statement of a material fact
                                            26
                                                                           No.     2020AP1616-D

or   law      to    a    third     party    when     representing       a    client);             SCR

20:4.4(a) (when representing a client, a lawyer may not use

means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass,

delay, or burden a third party); SCR 20:6.1 (every lawyer has a

professional responsibility to provide legal services to those

unable       to     pay);    SCR    20:8.4(b)          (lawyer   has       duty        to     avoid

committing         any    criminal       act    that    reflects      adversely             on   the

lawyer's          honesty,      trustworthiness         or    fitness       as     a        lawyer,

whether or not the act occurs during the provision of legal

services); SCR 20:8.4(c) (lawyer has duty to avoid engaging in

conduct            involving         dishonesty,             fraud,          deceit,               or

misrepresentation).                 Similarly,         the    duty    to     abstain             from

"offensive personality" can apply to conduct that occurs outside

the direct practice of law.                    See In re Disciplinary Proceeding

Against Johann, 216 Wis. 2d 118, 574 N.W.2d 218 (1998).                                          This

does not mean, however, that all personal conduct of a lawyer

that     is       "offensive"       violates         the     Attorney's      Oath.               The

prohibition         in    SCR    20:8.4(g)       against      engaging      in     "offensive
personality"            applies     to      offensive        conduct        that        reflects

adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.                               Id. at 122.

When offensive conduct reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness

to practice law, this court, on behalf of the state, has a

legitimate interest in prohibiting such actions and disciplining

attorneys who engage in such conduct in order to protect the

public and the administration of justice.

       ¶47     Contrary to the referee's conflation of the charges of
"offensive         personality"       and      employment      discrimination               through
                                                27
                                                                       No.    2020AP1616-D

sexual harassment, we have previously held that inappropriate

language    and   conduct      may   constitute         offensive      personality     in

violation    of   the   Attorney's       Oath      in     a   number    of    situations

involving    sexual     conduct      that    did      not     constitute      employment

discrimination.         See,    e.g.,       In   re     Disciplinary         Proceedings

Against Beatse, 2006 WI 115, 297 Wis. 2d 292, 722 N.W.2d 385

(using     state's    email     system      to     send       and   receive     sexually

explicit email messages and making inappropriate comments to a

county employee who was not the attorney's subordinate in a work

environment); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bruckner,

161 Wis. 2d 385, 467 N.W.2d 780 (1991) (trading surreptitiously

taken photographs of nude minors without their consent); see

also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heilprin, 168 Wis.

2d 1, 482 N.W.2d 908 (1992) (although the court indicated that

repeatedly asking divorce clients explicit questions about their

sexual behavior qualified as "offensive personality," it relied

on the attorney's disobedience of a prior court order against

such conduct as an alternative basis for finding such actions to
be professional misconduct).             Consequently, the referee's legal

analysis that relied on the "welcomeness" element of employment

sexual     harassment       claims       was       legally          erroneous,     which

invalidates his legal conclusion of no "offensive personality"

violation and his ultimate rejection of Attorney DeLadurantey's

no-contest plea.

    ¶48     Having concluded that the referee made errors of law

in ultimately rejecting Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea,
the question becomes what should the next step be in this case.
                                         28
                                                                            No.     2020AP1616-D

Ordinarily, because the decision to accept a no-contest plea is

a discretionary one initially committed to a referee and there

is a need for an evidentiary basis for the referee to make

affirmative factual findings (as opposed to finding an adequate

factual basis for a plea in an agreed-upon set of facts), we

would    remand    the    matter          back     to    the        referee       for    further

proceedings—either        a    new       plea    based        on    a    more     specifically

defined set of facts or a full evidentiary hearing.

         ¶49       In this unique instance, however, we choose not

to do so.       First, the parties have urged us not to remand the

matter in light of the additional time and expense that would be

involved.      Second, there is a set of agreed-upon facts here that

permit us to render a proper judgment.                         Sending the matter back

to the referee for further proceedings would not change those

particular facts and would not change the ultimate outcome in

this    proceeding.       Thus,          in   this      unique      circumstance,         it   is

proper for us to proceed at this time with rendering a final

decision in this disciplinary proceeding.
       ¶50   Specifically,          although       we    do    not       address    the    other

incidents      alleged    in       the    complaint       because         there     are   still

disputes as to some portion of those incidents in the record as

a   whole,     Attorney   DeLadurantey             has    admitted         that     he    cannot

contest the allegations of the complaint regarding the events of

the San Francisco incident because his intoxication at the time

has left him with no real memory of those events.

       ¶51   As summarized above, there is no dispute that while on
a   business      trip,        a    senior         lawyer          and    employer,        while
                                              29
                                                                            No.        2020AP1616-D

intoxicated, made repeated sexual advances toward a subordinate

attorney     employee     that    were        clearly      and     repeatedly           rebuffed.

Indeed,     even   after    H.M.    told           Attorney      DeLadurantey           that    his

physical     contact      had    made        her    physically        ill    and        then    had

refused his request to go to her bedroom, Attorney DeLadurantey

still went into H.M.'s bedroom and crawled into her bed, which

can   be    interpreted     only        as    a     persistent        demand       for     sexual

activity     despite      H.M.'s    refusal           to    consent.              We     have    no

hesitation in holding that such conduct constituted "offensive

personality"       that    not    only        reflected       adversely           on     Attorney

DeLadurantey's professional judgment and fitness to be a member

of the legal profession, but also reflected adversely on the

reputation     and    integrity         of    the     legal      profession            generally.

Regardless of any personal relationship that had developed, H.M.

was   a     subordinate     attorney          whose        professional           success       and

continued employment were, in large part, subject to Attorney

DeLadurantey's       control.           This        was    not    a     matter         solely    of

Attorney DeLadurantey's private affairs and personal morality.
Consequently,        Attorney      DeLadurantey's                offensive        conduct        in

pressuring a subordinate employee to engage in unwanted sexual

activity during the San Francisco incident constituted a clear

violation of the Attorney's Oath and SCR 20:8.4(g).

      ¶52    We    now    turn     to    the        question       of    the       appropriate

sanction     for   Attorney      DeLadurantey's             professional           misconduct.

We weigh the seriousness, nature, and extent of the misconduct;

the level of discipline needed to protect the public; the need
to impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct;
                                              30
                                                                        No.     2020AP1616-D

and the need to deter other attorneys from similar misconduct.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14,

269    Wis. 2d 43,         675    N.W.2d 747.          Sources      of        guidance      in

determining         appropriate        sanctions       are:        prior       case       law;

aggravating         and    mitigating       factors;     and      the        American      Bar

Association (ABA) Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.                                  In

re    Disciplinary        Proceedings       Against    Arthur,     2005       WI    40,    279

Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910.

       ¶53    Both Attorney DeLadurantey and the OLR have requested

a private reprimand in this proceeding, and the referee agreed

that    a    private      reprimand     would     be   the    appropriate          level    of

discipline if we reject his legal conclusion that the "offensive

personality" charges should be dismissed.                         In prior cases, a

lawyer's      sexually       offensive      language     and      conduct       has     often

received a private or public reprimand, unless it was coupled

with other misconduct.                 See, e.g., Beatse, 297 Wis. 2d 292,

¶¶16-17      (public        reprimand);       Private        Reprimand        No.     1991-6

(consensual      private         reprimand    imposed        on   lawyer       who,     while
awaiting      the     return      of    a    jury,     approached        a     female      law

enforcement officer at a courthouse and made statements that she

interpreted      as       sexually     aggressive,      subsequently          grabbed      her

shoulders and attempted to embrace her, and later approached a

different female officer, pushed her against a wall and made

suggestive and disparaging remarks); Private Reprimand No. 2008-

38 (consensual private reprimand imposed on attorney who made

sexually suggestive comments to a co-worker over a period of
several years and, on one occasion, kissed the co-worker without
                                             31
                                                                        No.       2020AP1616-D

consent);       Private    Reprimand          No.   2015-2     (imposing          consensual

private reprimand on attorney who grabbed the breast of a female

employee of a bar, made several sexually suggestive comments to

her, followed her from the bar, was arrested, and completed a

deferred prosecution agreement after being charged with fourth-

degree sexual assault).                 We note that the private reprimands

cited    above    were     consensual         reprimands     that      were       issued     by

referees    without       this    court's      review    pursuant          to    our    rules.

While we recognize that similarly situated respondents should

receive     comparable         levels         of    discipline,        we        take       this

opportunity to advise members of the bar that we are applying

increasing scrutiny to attorneys' sexual misconduct.                             Compare In

re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritland, 2021 WI 36, 396

Wis. 2d 509, 957 N.W.2d 540.               We do so because sexual harassment

comes at a heavy price for victims who can suffer significant

psychological effects as well as job-related costs, including

job     loss,     reputational          harm,       impairment        of        professional

opportunities,          and      irreparable         damage       to        interpersonal
relationships      at     work.         Attorneys     should     be    on       notice      that

sexual misconduct by attorneys, whether directed toward fellow

lawyers, clients, or others, is not taken lightly.                              Ritland, 396

Wis. 2d 509, ¶39.

      ¶54   This    court        has    the    responsibility          to       oversee     the

practice    of    law     in     this    state.        Consequently,             it    is   our

responsibility to determine what is the appropriate level of

discipline in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.                                While the
facts of each case are unique, in light of existing precedent,
                                              32
                                                                              No.        2020AP1616-D

we    conclude         that    Attorney     DeLadurantey           should           be     publicly

reprimanded.            His    misconduct      is   at   least         as     serious       as    the

conduct in Beatse, where we also imposed a public reprimand on

an    attorney     who        downloaded    pornographic           images         onto      a    work

computer, sent and received sexually explicit messages on a work

email system, and made inappropriate sexual comments to female

government employees.               Here, a supervising lawyer engaged in

unwanted sexually suggestive physical contact with a subordinate

employee, repeatedly asked the employee for sexual activity even

in the face of clear refusals, and then escalated the situation

by climbing into the employee's bed.                     A private reprimand would

unduly depreciate the seriousness of such misconduct.                                     Moreover,

we conclude that a public reprimand is necessary to put other

members of the bar on notice that such actions will not be

tolerated.

       ¶55   We    next       address   the      question         of       costs,    which       were

$20,530.47        as    of     November     4,      2021,     at       the       completion        of

appellate briefing.             Attorney DeLadurantey filed an objection to
costs, arguing that SCR 22.24(1m) supports a reduction of the

costs imposed on him.              Supreme Court Rule 22.24(1m) articulates

six    factors     we     consider      when     evaluating            a    costs        challenge.

First, we consider the number of counts charged, contested, and

proven.      In        Attorney    DeLadurantey's           view,          the    OLR's      "major

focus" was the sexual harassment charges that the OLR eventually

dismissed.         He     argues    that    because         the    OLR       dismissed          these

charges, no costs should be assessed in connection with                                           the
OLR's pursuit of these alleged violations.                             Second, we consider
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the nature of the misconduct.                       Attorney DeLadurantey says that

had the "offensive personality" charges been the only alleged

violations from the outset of this matter, the costs incurred

would have been substantially lower.                             Third, we consider the

level of discipline sought by the parties and recommended by the

referee.      The parties ultimately requested a private reprimand,

and    the    referee       recommended          a       dismissal    of     the     remaining

charges.             Fourth,     we         consider            Attorney     DeLadurantey's

cooperation with the disciplinary process.                             It is undisputed

that        Attorney        DeLadurantey             cooperated            throughout        the

disciplinary         process.         Fifth,        we    consider     prior       discipline.

Attorney       DeLadurantey         has        no        prior     disciplinary        record.

Finally, we consider "other relevant circumstances."                                  Attorney

DeLadurantey         contends    that       the      "sexual       harassment       claim    was

poorly based in fact from the start and all costs in furtherance

of    the    OLR's    attempts      to      satisfy        that    claim    should     not   be

assessed."          He   suggests      we      impose      ten    percent     of    the   total

costs, or $2,053.05.
       ¶56    The     OLR   maintains          that       the     sexual    harassment       and

offensive personality claims were intertwined, meaning that the

OLR's counsel's time was spent concurrently pursuing both.                                   The

OLR reminds us that, traditionally, costs are not reduced even

when a respondent prevails on some, but not all, counts, and it

cites several cases in support of this assertion.

       ¶57    We generally agree with the OLR on this issue.                                  We

decline      to   deviate      from      our    long-standing          disinclination         to
apportion costs based solely on the number of counts proven or
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unproven.14    We note, moreover, that the referee found the pre-

appellate costs to be both reasonable in amount and necessarily

incurred, stating:

     Having read and made notes on the hundreds of pages of
     exhibits   provided   by  both  counsel,   and  having
     performed many hours of research, I am in a good
     position to assess the work that went into this case.
     I find that the sum of $18,311.47 is reasonable, and
     the costs enumerated were necessarily incurred by the
     [OLR] in this matter.
     ¶58    We acknowledge that Attorney DeLadurantey has, by all

accounts,     cooperated          completely       with   this         disciplinary

investigation       and   proceeding.         He   ultimately    entered     a   no-

contest plea to the "offensive personality" charges, but the

referee undertook a lengthy analysis and issued a problematic

report,    resulting      in    the   OLR's   appeal.     The    referee     billed

$5,920.74     for    the       time   spent    writing    his    report      which,

unfortunately, complicated this matter.               We therefore reduce the

costs billed for writing the report by 50 percent ($2,960.37).

This matter has also been made unnecessarily complex by the

parties' lack of precision in specifying what facts could serve

as the factual basis for the no-contest plea.                      This lack of

clarity required us to order the parties to submit supplemental

     14See, e.g., In   re   Disciplinary   Proceedings   Against
Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988) (declining
respondent's request to apportion costs according to the number
of misconduct counts that resulted in determinations of
professional misconduct); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Konnor, 2005 WI 37, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376 (rejecting
argument that costs not be assessed because he would have agreed
to a public reprimand, which the referee ultimately recommended
as discipline).

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legal memoranda.         Because this was caused in part by the OLR and

was not corrected by the referee, we do not require Attorney

DeLadurantey        to   pay    the    OLR's          costs    of   preparing     its

supplemental legal memorandum.              Consequently, we direct Attorney

DeLadurantey to pay costs of $17,570.10.

    ¶59     Finally,       we    reject          the     referee's        unsupported

recommendation that we "seal" the record in this case.                            Our

rules require that once a disciplinary complaint is filed, the

disciplinary proceeding and all papers filed in it are public

documents, except where a specific rule or other law mandates

confidentiality, or where the court determines that sealing or

redaction      of   a    document     in     a    disciplinary       proceeding    is

necessary.      SCR 22.40(1).15       There is nothing in this proceeding

that mandates that the record be sealed.                      It is true that the

filings   in    this     proceeding    may       be   embarrassing    for   everyone

involved, but that is not a legal basis for sealing a case

record.     We recognize that keeping the record in the case open

to the public may cause distress to H.M., but the public has a

    15 SCR 22.40(1) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in
this chapter, all papers, files, transcripts, and communications
relating   to   an   allegation  of   attorney  misconduct,   an
investigation pursuant to SCR Chapters 10, 22, and 31, and
monitoring compliance with conditions, suspension, or revocation
imposed by the supreme court, are to be held in confidence by
the director and staff of the office of lawyer regulation, the
members of the district committees, special investigators, the
members of the special preliminary review panel, and the members
of the preliminary review panel.     Following the filing of a
complaint or petition, the proceeding and all papers filed in it
are public, except where expressly provided otherwise in this
chapter, by court order, or by law."

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right to learn and understand the process by which this court

renders decisions in attorney disciplinary proceedings and we

have attempted to minimize the impact of this published opinion

by using her initials.         There is nothing in this case that

overcomes    the   public's   right    to   observe   its    government    in

action.

    ¶60     IT IS ORDERED that, as discipline for his professional

misconduct     and    violation       of    SCR   40.15,     enforced     via

SCR 20:8.4(g), Nathan E. DeLadurantey is publicly reprimanded.

    ¶61     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date

of this order, Nathan E. DeLadurantey shall pay to the Office of

Lawyer Regulation $17,570.10 for the costs of this proceeding.

                                      37
       ¶62   ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring).          Although I do not

join   the   per   curiam   opinion,       I   concur   with   the   level   of

discipline it imposes.

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