Court Opinion

ID: 9552830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:17:58.23242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:08.574810
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with the majority in North Street Association v. City of Olympia and Greater Kingsgate Council, Inc. v. King County. I dissent in G-3 Properties, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners. I would affirm the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court's granting of the Browns' motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties within 30 days, and reinstate the writ.
The amended rule (CR 15(c)) does not permit joinder if the plaintiff's delay is due to "inexcusable neglect". Upshaw v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 85 F.R.D. 674 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Morse v. Michaelson, Rabig & Ramp, 101 Ill. App. 2d 366, 243 N.E.2d 271 (1968); 3 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 15.15, at 15-231 (1980).
*371The majority holds that the failure to join and serve necessary parties was inexcusable neglect, meriting dismissal. However, the record indicates that the attorney for G-3 Properties was not aware of the holding in the recent case of Veradale Valley Citizens' Planning Comm. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 22 Wn. App. 229, 588 P.2d 750 (1978), which required joinder of property owners on zoning appeals. When the attorney for applicants became aware of the Veradale joinder requirement, he promptly moved to join the Browns within 12 days of the time period for timely filing of the petition. As the Browns had actual knowledge of the appeal, they were not prejudiced by the 12-day delay. It would hardly seem, given this court's past silence in defining inexcusable neglect, that the nonjoinder within the statutory period in this case was inexcusable.
Further, I find the trend toward a broader and a more liberal application of CR 15(c), evident in the 1966 amendment of the rule, particularly appropriate in cases involving real property. It is often difficult to ascertain the actual owners of real estate at a time certain, since the titleholders may have assigned, optioned, deeded or otherwise transferred ownership to others without filing such instruments of record. In such cases, owners of record may have no interest in such real estate, with the actual ownership being in third parties unknown to the petitioner. This is particularly true in our large cities where properties are held in record title by subsidiary corporations, with their stock owned by holding corporations, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to learn accurate ownership within a 30-day period. Or again, property may be owned jointly by many owners, creating great difficulty in identifying and serving all of them within 30 days.
It seems strange that municipalities and counties permit notice to adjacent owners on a zoning application to be given by merely posting written notices on conspicuous places within 300 to 500 feet of the property asking for the rezone. There is no requirement that such neighbors be personally served with process. If we don't require such *372process at the original hearing, why do we put such a heavy burden and strict compliance on appellants on appeal, by requiring service on the owner of the zoned property within 30 days of the filing of the writ? After all, the municipality or county is the entity zoning the property, and if it is served within 30 days of filing the writ, the public interest is protected. Who would be harmed if other necessary and/ or indispensable parties, such as the owners, are served within a reasonable time thereafter? It will create great injustices if meritorious appeals from decisions of planning commissions are mandated to be dismissed simply because the appellant is unable to accurately attain names of owners of properties which are the subject of a rezone application and he fails to serve and file process on them within 30 days of filing a writ of review. I believe a more just and practical interpretation of the rules involved in the subject case, would be to permit owners to be served within a reasonable time, after the municipality or county is served, in the absence of actual prejudice shown by the owner.
The reasoning pertaining to the subject appeal in G-3 Properties, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 27 Wn. App. 625, 633, 620 P.2d 108 (1980), is persuasive on this point, wherein Judge Roe concluded:
The essence of the Veradale decision is prejudice and estoppel. In view of the liberal policy of joinder and amendment of pleadings and the absolute lack of prejudice to the Browns, we hold the request for joinder within 12 days of the time period for filing the petition timely. The factors of prejudice which were present in Veradale and lacking here must always be considered in deciding whether there may be joinder of necessary parties after the 30-day period has run. While the considerations will not always be the same, there must always be the presence of prejudice before the action can be dismissed.
(Italics mine.)
*373Conclusion
Under a realistic interpretation of CR 15(c), I believe that joining the Browns as parties within 12 days of the time period for filing of the petition is reasonable. I would have found CR 15(c) applicable and allowed the addition of the Browns as parties and reinstated the writ.
Rosellini, J., and Hamilton, J. Pro Tern., concur with Dore, J.
Reconsideration denied January 22, 1982.