Court Opinion

ID: 9628899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:33:47.409764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:12.949855
License: Public Domain

DISSENT
WHITE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I understand the district court to have made a factual finding regarding B.H.’s intent, which finding is adequately supported by the record, I dissent.
In an appeal of a criminal sentence “[w]e review de novo the sentencing court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and statutes, and we review for clear error its factual findings.” United States v. Corrado, 304 F.3d 593, 607 (6th Cir.2002); see also United States v. King, 516 F.3d 425, 427 (6th Cir.2008).
The district court analyzed the relevant guideline and concluded that “the language of [18 U.S.C. § ] 2246(3) defining ‘sexual contact’ is much broader” than the language defining “sexual act.” (J.A. at 125.) *449The court discussed the statutory language and applied it to the instant case:
The language in the statute says the term “sexual contact” means the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, and some other body parts, of any person, a person masturbating is caught touching the genitalia of any person, namely, his or her own, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, and the desire of any person could include the person masturbating, or in this case could include the people filming it, namely, the defendants. So I think that the literal language of the statute, even applying the guideline in its narrowest possible application to the specific offense of conviction and no other related contact or conduct, is enough to warrant the enhancement.
(J.A. at 125-26.) The majority agrees with the district court’s statutory analysis but stops short of accepting its application of the statute to the facts. I would accept the district court’s conclusion in its totality-
In holding that “the desire of any person could include the person masturbating, or in this case could include the people filming it, namely, the defendants,” and that the “narrowest possible application” of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 “is enough to warrant the enhancement,” the court implicitly found that B.H.’s intent in engaging in sexual contact was to arouse or gratify Shafer’s and Amundson’s sexual desire. It is quite possible that B.H. had additional intentions when he engaged in the sexual contact (e.g., gaining defendant’s approval, avoiding defendant’s disapproval, gratifying his own desires). However, this does not render the district court’s conclusion either unsupported or clearly erroneous. Given the entire pattern of conduct — which involved ongoing sexual acts and sexual contact in the years preceding the offense of conviction — I do not agree that the inference that B.H. acted with the intent to gratify Shafer’s sexual desire is “not legally sound.” Maj. Op. at 446-47. It was a fair inference that B.H. had become familiar with Shafer’s sexual desires and engaged in the activity to satisfy them, without regard to whether at age eleven he fully understood what he was doing.
I would affirm on this basis.