Court Opinion

ID: 9847627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:03:35.278499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:23.809589
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I join in the result, but I am baffled by the reasoning and cannot agree that Peters1 and Atkins2 are inconsistent with Lester.3
Initially, however, I believe it is necessary to show the posture in which this case came to us and what appellant is really complaining about.
In his “motion in autrefois acquit” he contended that to retry him on Count I would be a violation of the Sixth4 and Fourteenth Amendments of the U. S. Constitution “in that a second trial upon the same matter and the same criminal episode will constitute double jeopardy.” He “showed,” i.e., contended, in the motion that the “substance” of the charge in Count I is the same as the “substance” of the charge in Count II, pointing to parts of OCGA §§ 16-1-7 (a) and 16-1-8 (a) as authority.
*538It was upon those grounds that the motion was denied.
Now, on appeal, his claim is that the trial court erred because to retry him on Count I would violate OCGA § 16-1-8 (b) (1) in that subsections (1) and (4) of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) are “the same crime based on different facts” and they involve the “same conduct” in that “the facts necessary to establish” Counts I and II “are the same.”
First of all, he raises a new ground and we should not consider it because we are a review court. Ridley v. State, 141 Ga. App. 854, 855 (1) (234 SE2d 688) (1977).
Second, he does not invoke or argue the Constitution, and thus we are not faced with a question of whether the U. S. Constitution would be violated by reprosecution. He expressly recognizes that the Georgia statutes provide broader coverage against double jeopardy than does the U. S. Constitution, as was pointed out in State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 (1) (206 SE2d 475) (1974).
Third, as to the merits, the fallacy of his contention is obvious from the internal inconsistency contained within it. This becomes even plainer when his argument is studied. He speaks of subsection (4) as an “additional” offense from subsection (1) and points out that the elements for the two are different. These “two . . . crimes,” he argues, “are distinct both as a matter of fact as well as a matter of law”; each requires proof of different facts although the “common denominator” is alcohol. However, he also says the “two offenses” arose out of “ ‘the same conduct’ ” and “the facts necessary . . . are the same in both counts 1 and 2 of the accusation.”
Thus, he concludes, a second prosecution on Count I is barred by the acquittal on Count II.
If we must reach the merits of his enumeration of error despite its not being properly raised, I would simply hold that his claim of an impending violation of the procedural aspect of double jeopardy (i.e., reprosecution) is fully met by referring to the statute he invokes. For it contains a very important exception. If the former prosecution is for “a different crime or for the same crime based upon different facts,” he may not be subsequently prosecuted “for a crime which involves the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required on the other prosecution.” OCGA § 16-1-8 (b) (1). That is what he says is being violated, but he admits in part of his argument, and the majority agrees as do I, that Count I requires proof of the fact that defendant “was a less safe driver,” which Count II does not, and that Count II requires proof of the fact that his blood alcohol level was .12 percent or more by weight, which Count I does not.
Thus it is clear that, in keeping with Lester, Peters, Atkins, and Melton v. State, 175 Ga. App. 472 (333 SE2d 682) (1985), a second prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of *539OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) after an acquittal for driving with .12 percent blood alcohol content would not violate Mr. Hogan’s rights as provided in OCGA § 16-1-8 (b) (1).
Decided March 20, 1986
Rehearing denied April 2, 1986
C. Alan Mullinax, for appellant.
Ralph T. Bowden, Jr., Solicitor, Nancy H. Jackson, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
I see no reason to overrule Peters or Atkins, inasmuch as I believe they are correct and do not conflict with Lester, which they rely on, and inasmuch as their holdings are not in issue in this case. They, and Lester, do not even deal with double jeopardy. Moreover, all of the discussion of whether subsection (1) and subsection (4) of the statute are one crime or two crimes is irrelevant because the statute invoked here by appellant covers both “a different crime” and “the same crime based upon different facts.” OCGA § 16-1-8 (b) (1).

 Peters v. State, 175 Ga. App. 463 (333 SE2d 436) 1985).

 Atkins v. State, 175 Ga. App. 470 (333 SE2d 441) (1985).

 Lester v. State, 253 Ga. 235 (320 SE2d 142) (1984).

 He apparently meant the Fifth, which provides: “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”