Court Opinion

ID: 9727318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:30:42.992343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:36.223102
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 72. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). This case is best understood as illustrating the aphorism that "hard *237cases make bad law." This is a hard case because suppression of the evidence may jeopardize prosecution of Marquardt, who is charged with first degree intentional homicide.
¶ 73. I would not apply the good faith exception. I would remand the cause to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the seized items are admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.1
¶ 74. The Fourth Amendment protects each of us against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Constitution requires that a warrant be based on a finding of probable cause.2
¶ 75. The State, Marquardt, and this court agree that in the present case the search warrant was not based on probable cause and that the evidence seized must be suppressed unless an exception to probable cause applies.
¶ 76. The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a good faith exception to the probable cause requirement. The evidence need not be suppressed if a well-trained officer reasonably and in good faith relies on the search warrant. The good faith exception does not apply, *238however, when the warrant is "based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' "3 In other words, the officer is not acting in good faith when the affidavit lacks "indicia of probable cause." A law enforcement officer's reliance on the sufficiency of the facts stated must be objectively reasonable. Bare bones affidavits are not good enough.4
¶ 77. Thus, the focus in the present case is not the magistrate's determination of probable cause but rather whether there are "indicia of probable cause" to support a law enforcement officer's good faith belief that the warrant is valid.5
¶ 78. What facts bring a case within this "indicia of probable cause" rule is a difficult issue that is frequently litigated.6 "Indicia of probable cause" must have substantive force. Unless the "indicia of probable cause" standard is a check on searches by law enforcement officials, the Fourth Amendment warrant and reasonableness requirements are for naught. When a court takes an "anything goes" approach when looking for "indicia of probable cause," it has effectively excised the probable cause requirement from the Fourth Amendment.
¶ 79. I turn to the affidavits underlying the search warrant in the present case, searching for "indi-cia of probable cause."
*239¶ 80. The affidavit for the search warrant in the present case must contain "indicia of probable cause" that the described items used in the commission of the described crime are on the described premises.7
¶ 81. It is uncontested that the affidavits in the present case do not directly tie the items used in the commission of the murder to Marquardt's cabin. That is, the affidavits contain no evidence directly linking Marquardt's cabin to the crime or instrumentalities or evidence of the crime. Therefore, any nexus between the crime and the cabin must rest on a nexus between the crime and the person who occupies the cabin, in the instant case, Marquardt. If a nexus between the crime and Marquardt is established, then it is still necessary to tie the objects described in the search warrant to the cabin. "[Pjrobable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime does not automatically give the police probable cause to search his house for evidence of that crime."8 We have held, however, that where police have probable cause to believe an individual committed a crime, police could assert probable cause for a warrant to search locations connected to that individual (e.g., his home or car) if there was a nexus between the crime and the premises.9
*240¶ 82. The affidavits in the present ease do not provide "indicia of probable cause" that Marquardt murdered his mother.
¶ 83. The most that can be drawn from the affidavits is that Marquardt's father informed a law enforcement officer that Marquardt had not been seen or heard from since the body was discovered. Assuming the father spoke to Investigator Price and Investigator Price communicated this information to Investigator Vogler immediately before Investigator Vogler executed the March 15 affidavit, the maximum time the father did not see Marquardt is two days.
¶ 84. A two-day absence of an adult son is not an "indicia of probable cause" to believe that the person murdered his mother.
¶ 85. The majority further concludes that because a blanket covered the body, an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer could have inferred that the victim had an emotional attachment to the perpetrator and that the perpetrator was Marquardt. The majority cites no study, no peer-reviewed article, no text, not even a TV crime show or an article in a popular *241magazine to show that such a theory is either legitimate or has gained common knowledge or use. The majority's reasoning is based on no more than its own assertion and on an Eighth Circuit case10 in which the court cited to the trial record that apparently had evidence supporting this inference. No such evidence exists here. Furthermore, in that case there was additional strong evidence supporting probable cause.
¶ 86. Finally, although statistics show that most murderers are men and that men tend to use knives and guns in murders, these facts are not sufficient to supply "indicia of probable cause" pointing to Mar-quardt as the murderer. Nor are the facts that no break-in or theft occurred and the phone was busy "indicia of probable cause" pointing to Marquardt.
¶ 87. The facts in the affidavits taken together support a finding of probable cause to believe that (1) a crime was committed; (2) a knife and gun were used in committing this crime; and (3) if the evidence sought in the search warrant were discovered, it would tend to indicate that a particular person had committed the crime.
¶ 88. Giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences and rejecting an overly technical or formalistic approach to the affidavits or probable cause or "indicia of probable cause," I must disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the search warrant contained sufficient "indicia of probable cause" that Marquardt committed the murder and that the objects were located in his cabin to allow a reasonable, well-trained officer to objectively and in good faith rely on the warrant.
*242¶ 89. The most that can be said is that law enforcement officers may have had a hunch that Mar-quardt may be connected to the murder and believed it might be fruitful to search his cabin. My understanding is that the first suspects in a murder are generally members of the family. Such a hunch is not good enough to overcome the Fourth Amendment's protection against government intrusion into the home.
¶ 90. The court of appeals, in holding that the warrant application failed to show probable cause, described well the total lack of "indicia of probable cause" in the warrant affidavits:
Although these facts [in the affidavits] may lead a reasonable police officer to pursue further investigation of Marquardt, we conclude that there is nothing in the facts to tie Marquardt to the crime, much less to tie his home to the crime. Although the warrant-issuing judge may have been provided sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind that the particular types of objects sought — including shoes, knives, and guns — could be linked with the commission of the crime, there was no fact that suggested those items would be found in Marquardt's cabin,11
¶ 91. The Chippewa County Circuit Court had it right when it stated that if bare bones affidavits like the one in the present case satisfy the good faith exception, there is little deterrence to unlawful searches, which the exclusionary rule seeks to prevent. The circuit court correctly declared that under the good faith exception as conceived by the State (and now adopted by the majority opinion), it would take little creativity and minimal evidence to make any person the target of an *243investigation and obtain a search warrant for the person's residence. Based on these criteria, a common sense reading of the affidavits in the present case cannot lead to a finding of "indicia of probable cause."
¶ 92. For the reasons set forth, I would remand the cause for an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the items seized under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
¶ 93. I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. joins this opinion.

 Because it found that the good faith exception applied, the Eau Claire County Circuit Court did not reach the inevitable discovery issue. The Chippewa County Circuit Court considered inevitable discovery, but only on a motion for reconsideration of its suppression order and without an evidentiary hearing.

 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).

 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n.24.

 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.3(f) at 96 (4th ed. 2004).

 LaFave, supra note 5, at 92.

 See State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 408, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978).

 State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 995, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added)).

 State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶¶ 31, 33, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437 (holding that probable cause existed to search Multaler's home for evidence of murders because he was an alleged serial killer, and a unique characteristic of serial killers is to keep mementoes of their murders indefinitely); State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶¶ 27, 29-34, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d *240517 (holding that probable cause existed to search Ward's home based on fact that because he was an alleged large-scale drug dealer, it was reasonable to infer that he kept the drugs in his home, which was his likely place of business); Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 995-96 (in arson case, probable cause for warrant to search defendant's residence based on earlier sighting of turpentine at defendant's home); State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 123-24, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988) (finding probable cause for warrant to search Tompkins' automobile, even though it was just as likely drugs could have been found at two alternate locations); State v. Schaefer, 2003 WI App 164, ¶¶ 17-19, 266 Wis. 2d 719, 668 N.W.2d 760 (probable cause for warrant to search Schaefer's home for child pornography based on probable cause that he was a pedophile and child molester).

 See Thiel v. Schuetzle, 200 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 1999).

 State v. Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, ¶ 19, 247 Wis. 2d 765, 635 N.W.2d 188 (emphasis added).