Court Opinion

ID: 9750607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:10:30.837419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:13.976063
License: Public Domain

Joslin, J.,
dissenting. The petitioner makes no direct ■attack upon the Viti 'doctrine, although upon, such a challenge the court would have the opportunity, if it so desired, to reexamine the validity of the principle that side and rear yard regulations governing a permitted use do^ not constitute “zoning” as that term is generally construed. Even under the Viti doctrine, however, I am unable to find anything in this record which meets the standard the court has established for permitting a variation from duly ■enacted side and rear' yard regulations.
In Viti v. Zoning Board of Review, 92 R. I. 59, and Reynolds v. Zoning Board of Review, 95 R. I. 437, compliance with lot-line regulations was excused upon showings that insistence upon strict deference thereto would destroy the purpose of the proposed use or would make it impossible to construct the .proposed structure. It was not until the decision in H. J. Bernard Realty Co. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R. I. 390, however, that a standard was fixed for determining when and under what circumstances a landowner should be permitted to deviate from side and rear yard regulations.
*516In that case the applicant, notwithstanding that he could have constructed the proposed addition to a building within the lot-line regulations, applied for a variation. He sought relief because construction within the limits of the regulations would be more costly, would cut off daylight from ■the basement windows of the existing structure, and would reduce the area available for parking. The zoning board denied relief and we'refused to disturb its decision. We said in -substance that affirmative board -action would have been justified only if there had been “a showing by the petitioner that such relief was reasonably necessary for the full -enjoyment -of a permitted use.” In that statement we find the test. -Stated in terms of -a standard, it allows a grant of a “deviation” only upon a showing that the applicant will otherwise be denied the opportunity to utilize his property for a permitted use. In applying the standard the -court in -substance held that such factors as added expense, loss of light and reduced parking areas amount to nothing more than “inconvenience” if the circumstances are such that an applicant -can fully enjoy his land for the desired purpose without “deviating” from lot-line- regulations. “Mer-e inconvenience,” the- -court concluded, should never be enough to justify relief.
-On the record in this case, a record which the majority concede is “scanty,” it cannot reasonably foe said that the test has been satisfied. C-o-noededly, the applicant can construct a two-car cinder1 block garage- within the- lot-line limitations. Nonetheless, he seeks permission to site it one foo-t from petitioner’s land and he -bases his request for a relaxation of the ordinance’s six-foot requirement, not up-on a showing that he would otherwise be denied a full enjoyment of his property, but upon a desire “to give the tenants a little yard.” This is the- basis upon which he premises application for relief -and upon it, and it alone, notwithstanding what is made so clear in Bernard, the majority say in s-uibstance that the relief they approve “was *517reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of a permitted use.”
If a grant of permission is appropriate upon such a showing, then in my judgment zoning boards are now free on applications for a relaxation of side and rear yard regulations to cater to the convenience of landowners and to tailor the relief they authorize to the whims and caprices of applicants. With such a rule I cannot agree.
I recognize as settled that a decision of a zoning board which contains no -findings of fact may nonetheless be approved if it is predicated upon competent record evidence. And, of course, it is true, as the majority say, that “implicit in the board's decision is the finding that the evidence showed an adverse effect amounting to more than mere inconvenience and to deny the applicant a fuller use of his property and at the same time serve no public interest would be arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.” That abstract proposition, however, is of no help in this case where the only question relates to the nature of the evidence upon which the implicit finding rests. On that- question, as I have already indicated, recognition of a property owner’s desire for more yard space1 as the necessary prerequisite for permitting a relaxation of lot-line limitations renders illusory and makes meaningless the ordinances of our various -cities -and towns duly enacted pursuant to a legislative grant of authority (G. L. 1956, §45-24-1) to regulate and restrict the size of yards and the percentage *518of lots that may ibe occupied. I am unable to join in any such action.
Anthony J. Dennis, Jr., for petitioner.
Anthony R. Berretto, for respondent.
Kelleher, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Joslin.

The only reason for the proposed variation disclosed by the record of the proceedings before the board a record which consists of only one and one-quarter typed pages, appears in the -applicant’s statement which in its entirety reads as follows:
“I’ve been there twenty-two ye-ars, I’ve improved the corner of Constitution Street and High Street, I want a garage for modem cars and there is little land- available. I want to stay on the line to give the tenants a little yard. I want to build a modem garage to put two cars, a big one and a small one. The old garage is too far gone to repair, it would cost too m-uch money to repair.”