Court Opinion

ID: 9409043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 19:00:46.534288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.506105
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          JUL 14 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELENILSON A. COTO DELGADO,                      No. 22-984
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A029-212-247
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                      Argued and Submitted May 8, 2023
                          San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and M. BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and R. BENNETT,
Senior District Judge. **

      Petitioner Elenilson Armando Coto Delgado (“Coto”) is a native and

citizen of El Salvador who most recently entered the United States in 2019.

Through the instant petition, Coto challenges a ruling of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) upholding an oral decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), who

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States Senior District
Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
found that Coto’s Louisiana conviction for second-degree battery constitutes a

particularly serious crime barring withholding of removal. Coto also challenges

the BIA’s conclusion that he waived review of his CAT claim. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

   I.       Administrative Exhaustion

        “This Court may review a final order of removal only if ‘the alien has

exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.’” Sola v.

Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)).

“Exhaustion requires a non-constitutional legal claim to the court on appeal to

have first been raised in the administrative proceedings below, and to have been

sufficient to put the BIA on notice of what was being challenged.” Umana-

Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Bare v. Barr, 975

F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020)).1 This requirement is not applied “in a formalistic

manner.” Diaz-Jimenez v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011)). While “[a] petitioner must

do more than make a ‘general challenge to the IJ’s decision,’” they “may raise a

        1
        The Supreme Court recently held that the 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)
exhaustion requirement “is a non-jurisdictional rule ‘merely prescrib[ing] the
method by which the jurisdiction granted the courts by Congress is to be
exercised.’” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1114 (2023) (quoting
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)). The exhaustion requirement is
therefore “subject to waiver and forfeiture.” Id. at 1116. However, because the
government argues that Coto failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his
CAT claim and his challenge to the IJ’s consideration of his sentence, it has not
waived or forfeited this requirement.

                                        2                                    22-984
general argument in the administrative proceeding and then raise a more specific

legal issue on appeal.” Bare, 975 F.3d at 960 (quoting Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d

927, 930 (9th Cir. 2004)). “What matters is that the BIA was sufficiently on notice

so that it ‘had an opportunity to pass on this issue.’” Id. (quoting Zhang v.

Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)).

      Coto failed to exhaust his argument that the nature of his sentence does not

suggest he was convicted of a particularly serious crime. On appeal, Coto argues

that his “low-term, concurrent, suspended sentence” is not probative of severity,

and that the BIA erred by finding “that ‘hard labor’ was proof of severity, when

in fact, that term simply means the offense is a felony.” But Coto did not raise

these arguments before the BIA in any manner. The only legal argument he

offered to challenge the IJ’s finding that he had been convicted of a particularly

serious crime was that the IJ erred by considering hearsay in a police report.

Nowhere did he suggest that the IJ considered improper factors when evaluating

“the type of sentence imposed.” Id. at 961 (citation omitted). It is evident that the

BIA did not have sufficient notice of this issue, as the BIA did not review the IJ’s

evaluation of Coto’s sentence anywhere in its opinion.2 Accordingly, this issue is

unexhausted.

      2
        Coto argues that the BIA exhausted this issue for him by stating that “the
Immigration Judge correctly considered the nature of the conviction, the sentence
imposed, and the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction.” Viewed
in context, this sentence from the BIA opinion merely affirms that the IJ applied
the correct legal standard. The only factor from In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec.
244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982), that the BIA analyzed with any substance or depth was

                                         3                                     22-984
      Coto did exhaust his claim under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

Ordinarily, when the petitioner presents some issues in his Notice of Appeal but

fails to raise those issues in his brief to the BIA, he “will . . . be deemed to have

exhausted only those issues he raised and argued in his brief before the BIA.”

Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam).

However, the government argued against Coto’s CAT claim on the merits in its

responsive briefings before the BIA, and the BIA addressed that issue in its

opinion. In the specific context of this case, these facts are sufficient to indicate

that the BIA had notice of the issue and an opportunity to address it on the merits.

      Regardless, the BIA found that Coto forfeited this issue by failing to argue

it in his brief on administrative appeal. Cf. Cui v. Garland, 13 F.4th 991, 999 n.6

(9th Cir. 2021) (explaining in the context of federal appellate review that the

doctrine of forfeiture applies where an appellant fails to argue an issue in their

opening brief). While the BIA had sufficient notice of this issue for us to deem it

exhausted, the agency did not abuse its discretion by finding the issue forfeited

and declining to address it on the merits. See, e.g., In re R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec.

657, 658 n.2 (B.I.A. 2012) (applying doctrine of waiver in administrative appeal);

see also Lopez v. Garland, 60 F.4th 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting that the

the sole factor Coto raised on appeal—specifically, the IJ’s reliance on the police
report to determine “the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction.”
Bare, 975 F.3d at 961 (citation omitted). Nowhere did the BIA review the IJ’s
evaluation of Coto’s sentence.

                                         4                                     22-984
BIA “has authority to prescribe its own rules of procedure” so long as it “acts

within the broad limits imposed by the Due Process Clause”).

   II.      Particularly Serious Crime

         Coto contests the BIA’s finding that his second-degree battery conviction

constitutes a particularly serious crime barring withholding of removal. See 8

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). To determine whether a given offense is particularly

serious, an IJ must consider three factors developed in In re Frentescu, 18 I. &

N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982), including: “(1) ‘the nature of the conviction,’ (2)

‘the type of sentence imposed,’ and (3) ‘the circumstances and underlying facts

of the conviction.’” Bare, 975 F.3d at 961 (citation omitted). We have no

jurisdiction to “reweigh the evidence and reach our own determination about the

crime’s seriousness,” but we may review the BIA’s conclusion for abuse of

discretion. Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015).

Under this deferential standard of review, we may reverse “only if the BIA acted

‘arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law,’” Bare, 975 F.3d at 961 (quoting

Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 385 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)), or if the BIA

did not “rely on the appropriate factors and proper evidence to reach its

conclusion,” id. (cleaned up) (quoting Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1077).

         Coto’s only exhausted challenge is his argument that the BIA considered

improper evidence when evaluating “the circumstances and underlying facts of

the conviction.” See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247. The BIA “may consider

‘all reliable information,’ including ‘information outside the confines of a record

                                         5                                   22-984
of conviction,’” to evaluate this factor. Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 766

(9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir.

2010)). However, “the evidence introduced into removal proceedings remains

subject to other statutory and constitutional limitations,” such as the due process

requirement that the government “make a good faith effort to afford the alien a

reasonable opportunity to confront and to cross-examine the witness against

him.” Alcaraz-Enriquez v. Garland, 19 F.4th 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation

omitted). An immigrant seeking a new hearing based on a violation of this

requirement must show prejudice, “which means that the outcome of the

proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Id. at 1231–32

(quoting Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009)).

      Coto argues that the BIA and the IJ improperly relied on hearsay statements

presented in a police report without affording him a reasonable opportunity to

cross-examine the declarants. Regardless of whether the BIA’s consideration of

the police report was proper, Coto cannot show prejudice. The BIA and the IJ

found that Coto’s offense constitutes a particularly serious crime regardless of

whether the police report or Coto’s testimony is accurate, as either narrative of

events features the use of a dangerous weapon against an unarmed victim. Coto

argues that he testified he was acting in self-defense, and that his actions cannot

be construed as “attacking the victim,” but these arguments ask this Court to

“reweigh the evidence” and are nonreviewable. See Avendano-Hernandez, 800

F.3d at 1077. We therefore conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by

                                        6                                    22-984
affirming the IJ’s particularly serious crime determination.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                        7                      22-984