Court Opinion

ID: 9694770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:54:14.995241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:05.237832
License: Public Domain

*839Connolly, J.,
dissenting.
Gross High’s duties to perform under the lease agreement were not dependent upon its acknowledgment of delivery of the surge suppressors.
The majority finds that the acceptance and delivery letter was part of the agreement between LSL and Gross High, because it constituted an addendum to the lease. However, there are several problems with considering the acceptance and delivery letter as an addendum. First, the majority states that the acceptance and delivery letter was attached to the lease and delivered at the same time. While the record indicates that the acceptance and delivery letter was delivered at the same time as the lease, there is no evidence in the record that the acceptance and delivery letter was attached to the lease. Additionally, the lease contains no reference to the acceptance and delivery letter.
Second, the majority concludes that the letter was an addendum despite the fact that it was not labeled as such. The parties’ actions demonstrated that when they intended a writing to be considered an addendum to the lease, it was labeled an addendum. For example, the lease makes explicit reference to addendum 1, which describes the property that is the subject of the lease. The lease makes no such reference to the acceptance and delivery letter.
Third, the acceptance and delivery letter was not executed at the same time as the lease. Execute is defined in relevant part as “[t]o complete; to make; to sign.” Black’s Law Dictionary 567 (6th ed. 1990). While the parties signed the lease on November 15, 1990, Gross High never signed the acceptance and delivery letter. In fact, Monahan testified that he told Gross High’s principal not to sign the acceptance and delivery letter until after the surge suppressors were received and installed. Nevertheless, the majority determines that the unsigned acceptance and delivery letter must be construed together with the lease as one contract.
The majority cites a number of cases stating the proposition that instruments made in reference to and as part of the same transaction are to be considered and construed together. The majority asserts that Baker’s Supermarkets v. Feldman, 243 Neb. 684, 502 N.W.2d 428 (1993), should control this case. In *840Feldman, a supplemental lease executed at a later date was held to supersede inconsistent provisions in the original lease. However, neither Feldman nor any of the cases cited by the majority concern transactions in which one instmment is never executed. All of the cases cited by the majority concern situations in which the two separate instruments were executed at some time.
While the majority concludes that instruments “made or dated at different times” may be construed together “if they are related to and were part of the transaction,” the majority fails to recognize that in this case, the acceptance and delivery letter was never executed. The authority cited by the majority indicating that documents executed separately can be construed together is not on point, because it applies to documents that have actually been executed.
Even if the acceptance and delivery letter had been executed, it would not need to be read together with the lease. This court has stated that
a provision of one document [need not be] imported bodily into another contrary to the intent of the parties or the express provision of the [document]. They may be intended to be separate writings though made at the identical time by the same parties and to provide for entirely different things.
Gerdes v. Omaha Home for Boys, 166 Neb. 574, 585, 89 N.W.2d 849, 856 (1958).
The majority correctly asserts that we cannot look to the intent of the parties to vary the meaning of the lease document. However, this court has held that parol evidence is generally admissible when offered for the purpose of explaining and showing the true nature of the transaction between the parties. Peterson v. Hynes, 220 Neb. 573, 371 N.W.2d 664 (1985). In this case, parol evidence would not be used to vary the meaning of the lease. Instead, evidence of the intent of the parties would assist in determining whether the acceptance and delivery letter was intended to be a part of the lease agreement.
The record indicates that the parties did not intend for the acceptance and delivery letter to be a part of the lease agreement. LSL’s general manager, Dennis Monahan, testified *841that while he delivered the acceptance and delivery letter at the same time as the lease, it was intended to be a separate document and not a part of the lease agreement. Gross High’s business manager, Julien Van Haute, did not contradict Monahan’s testimony. While Van Haute testified that the acceptance and delivery letter was received at the same time as the lease, he did not dispute Monahan’s characterization of the parties’ understanding. In a bench trial of a law action, the court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Ashland State Bank v. Elkhom Racquetball, Inc., 246 Neb. 411, 520 N.W.2d 189 (1994).
As Gerdes indicates, the court may not do violence to a complete, unambiguous contract by consolidating it with another writing if the effect of doing so would be to avoid an essential part of the contract. By consolidating the acceptance and delivery letter with the lease, Gross High will be able to avoid its obligation under the lease. This violates the terms of the clear, unambiguous lease agreement signed by the parties.
Nevertheless, the majority contends that the signing of the acceptance and delivery letter was a condition precedent to Gross High’s duty to perform under the lease agreement. However, there is no language in the lease to indicate that there are any conditions precedent to the performance of Gross High’s obligation under the agreement. In fact, the lease states that the first lease payment was due on November 15, 1990, which was the date that the lease agreement was executed. As stated previously, the acceptance and delivery letter was not to be signed until the equipment was received, “fully installed and in good working condition”; however, no mention is made in the lease that Gross High could withhold payment until such time as the acceptance and delivery document was signed. Therefore, Gross High’s obligation under the lease was independent of its signing of the acceptance and delivery letter.
The majority seizes upon one sentence of an unsigned document to determine that Gross High should be released from its clear obligation under the lease, because Gross High never signed the letter acknowledging delivery of the equipment. I disagree. The letter clearly did not create a condition precedent *842as to Gross High’s obligation to pay LSL. The district court’s judgment should be affirmed.
Wright and Gerrard, JJ., join in this dissent.