Court Opinion

ID: 9810973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:05:27.426668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:22.726864
License: Public Domain

*287Shepherd, J.,
(dissenting): I very much regret my inability to' agree with the Court in the disposition which it has made of this appeal. Under the provisions of the policy the parties agreed to submit their differences as to the amount of the “loss and damage” to arbitration, and the validity of the award made in pursuance of said agreement, is the chief question presented for our consideration.
It appears that the arbitrators had some difficulty in determining whether, as a matter of law, a certain expense account should be allowed the plaintiff, but it is admitted that there is nothing upon the face of the award to indicate that they undertook to decide that question according to legal principles. It is conclusively settled, as said by Avery, J., in Smith v. Kron, 109 N. C., 104, that arbitrators “are a law to themselves, are not bound to decide correctly, and unless they gratuitously incorporate in their award erroneous views of the law as reasons for the conclusions reached, their action, in the absence of fraud, is not subject to review. Robbins v. Killebrew, 95 N. C., 19; Miller v. Bryan, 86 N. C., 167.” To the same effect is the opinion of the Court in this case. It is also well settled in this State that evidence aliunde will not be heard for the purpose of showing that the arbitrators intended to decide according to law. Ryan v. Blount, 1 Dev. Eq., 382; Wyatt v. Railroad, ante, 145. These principles being established, and, indeed, conceded by the Court, I am clearly of opinion that his Honor erred in refusing to give the fifth instruction prayed for by the defendant, viz.: “That it does not appear upon the face of the award that the arbitrators undertook to decide according to law, and that the award cannot be set aside on account of a mistake of law,” etc. Not only did the Court fail to give this instruction, but the jury were told that “if the award was made to hinge upon supposed principles of law, and they were erroneously decided, the award was not final and complete.” So there was not only a failure to give an admit*288tedly proper construction, but there was a charge directly in the teeth of it. It may be urg'ed, however, that the error is cured by the following language of the Judge: “If they (the arbitrators) once agreed, the arbitrament is final and the plaintiffs cannot recover;” but this language does not occur in immediate connection with the other part of the charge, but after the Court had remarked upon the manner of making the report and. the dissent of Heartt. But conceding that the two instructions may be reconciled (which I apprehend it is not easy to do), the same error is repeated later by the instruction that “if they (the arbitrators) came to the conclusion that they have no right as a matter of law to include the expense account, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict upon the first issue.” It will be observed that the award was also attacked on the ground that there was no delivery or publication, and in the opinion of the Court upon that question I entirely concur. Both of these questions, however, were comprehended under one issue (that is, -whether there had been an “arbitrament and award”), and how is it possible to tell which view was adopted by the jury ? If we could know that they found that the award was never legally delivered or published, the error would of course be harmless; but this does not appear, and we have no right to indulge in conjectures upon so serious a question. The charge, as set out in the case on appeal, is so brief that I very much question whether it fairly presents the instructions as actually given by the Judge. It may be but a summary of the charge, wh'ch if given in full might reconcile the conflicting language to which I have adverted. As it appears in the record, I do not think that it can be made to harmonize with the defendant’s prayer for instructions and the unquestionably correct principles of law embodied therein. To say the least, it did not clearly present the view *289insisted upon by the defendant, and was calculated to confuse the jury.
I am, therefore, most decidedly of the opinion that there should be a new trial.