Court Opinion

ID: 9559300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:26:13.040682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:32.750555
License: Public Domain

EHRLICH, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s acceptance of special-action jurisdiction. I respectfully disagree with its resolution of the substance of the case.
The majority concludes that Hirschfeld’s uncivil behavior toward the mother of his Ghent’s child in the corridors of the Maricopa County Superior Court was criminally contemptible because it constituted “contumacious conduct which lessens the dignity and authority of the court.” See Ariz.Rule Crim.P. (“Rule”) 33.1. I disagree. Hirschfeld’s actions clearly were intentionally offen*217sive, unprofessional2 and opprobrious, but they were not, to my mind, contumacious. I take particular issue with the majority’s declaration that, under the “inherent” contempt power of the court, the term “contumacious” is accorded a broad definition. To the contrary, because the power to proclaim a person to be in criminal contempt of court invokes the independent authority of the judicial branch of government, the magnitude of that declaration dictates that the definition of the word “contumacious” be confined to describe actions impugning the dignity and authority of the court itself.
Rule 33.1 invokes the inherent ability of the court to punish a violation of a court’s “lawful writ, process, order or judgment,” to punish “wilfully contumacious conduct which obstructs the administration of justice,” or “wilfully contumacious conduct ... which lessens the dignity and authority of the court____” Hirschfeld was not charged with obstructing the administration of justice. Had he been found in criminal contempt of Judge Hall’s directive to “leave [the mother] alone,” this court likely would have affirmed with alacrity. But Hirschfeld’s contempt was not based upon disobedience to an order of Judge Hall but upon behavior of Hirschfeld “which lessenfed] the dignity and authority of the court.” In this case, that is too weak a post to support a criminal contempt lintel. There is no better proof of this weakness than the trial court’s pervasive incorporation of Hirschfeld’s disregard for Judge Hall’s leave-her-alone directive as support for its and, now, the majority’s, conclusion that Hirschfeld denigrated the “dignity and authority” of the court.
The trial court’s minute entry includes the following passages that crystalize the incorporative analysis in which it engaged.
The evidence clearly shows that Judge Hall asked—told Mr. Hirschfeld to leave the woman alone, and I understand and I realize that he is not being charged with willfully disobeying the order of Judge Hall, but looking at all the activities involved here, Mr. Hirschfeld really just disregarded anything that Judge Hall said. He went outside the chambers area of Judge Hall’s court and other courts, began harassment, haranguing, and badgering____ [Emphasis added.]
* * * * *
His actions lessened the dignity and authority of the court. He disregarded the request of Judge Hall. He harassed [the mother] to the point that she was in tears and upset and in fear, and I find that this shows beyond a reasonable doubt that he willfully engaged in contumacious conduct____ [Emphasis added.]
The tenor of these comments is marked by its repeated contextualization of Hirschfeld’s actions as being in disregard for Judge Hall’s order or directive. But Rule 33.1 is tripartite in nature. The significance of the divided nature of the rule is underscored in this case because of Judge Hall’s repeated avowals that Hirschfeld’s conduct was neither an obstruction of the administration of justice nor a disobeyance of an order. Accordingly, Hirschfeld’s actions must be analyzed only in the context of the “dignity and authority of the court” because that is all with which Judge Hall charged him. Therefore, to be guilty of criminal contempt, Hirschfeld had to engage in conduct diminishing the dignity and authority of the court but not causing an obstruction to the administration of justice nor violating a court order. The words “dignity” and “authority” are joined by the conjunctive “and.”3
*218As the majority notes, “‘contumacious’ means ‘obstinately resisting authority; insubordinate; disobedient,’ ” citing Webster’s New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, 1982. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, 443 (2d ed. 1987) concurs, adding only “stubbornly perverse or rebellious; wilfully and obstinately disobedient.” The Ootford English Dictionary (1933, 1971) provides “1. contemning and obstinately resisting authority; stubbornly perverse, insubordinate, rebellious. ... 2. Law. Wilfully disobedient to the summons or order of a court.” Based upon these definitions, reflective of the history of the contempt power, I believe that Hirschfeld correctly states that contumacious conduct requires a direct and immediate challenge to the court’s authority which could not be allowed to pass if the court were to maintain control of its proceedings. To interpret the term in any other manner, I fear, would be to improperly extend the contempt power, a power which the United States Supreme Court has consistently noted “uniquely is ‘liable to abuse.’ ” International Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, — U.S.-,-, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2559, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1482, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), quoting Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313, 9 S.Ct. 77, 83, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)).4
Hirschfeld’s words and actions were directed toward the mother of his client’s child; they were intended to cause her to tell him the location of the child who was the focus of an apparently bitter custody dispute. There is nothing in the record, again in the absence of Judge Hall’s directive to “leave her alone,” indicating that Hirschfeld intended his actíons as a stubborn rebellion or obstinate resistance to the authority of the court.
The majority counters this by reference to United States v. Patterson, 26 F. 509, 511 (Tenn.Cir.1886), wherein the court held that fighting in the courtroom, even during a recess of the court, was an attack upon the court’s dignity. The majority simply stretches the reasoning of the ease to cover those areas “adjacent to” the courtroom and ignores the phrase in Rule 33.1 “and authority of the court.” Additionally, the majority’s claim that, “at some point, conduct violates a standard that all can assume the court has set for those who are in attendance upon the court” is simply too tenuous.5 Certainly, as in Patterson, fighting in the courtroom can be assumed to be violative conduct. But that lies as much in the fact that fighting in any public arena generally is forbidden. The use of mere words, or even words accompanied by pursuit of the person to whom they are being addressed, outside of the courtroom and outside of the hearing of the judge, does not easily square with such an assumption. A lawyer other than Hirschfeld, a mother with a different personality, a mother represented by counsel, all are variables that could have rendered the actions in the underlying case simply another interaction in the courthouse and not the crux of a criminal contempt proceeding. To hold this particular lawyer liable for criminal contempt for his uncivil behavior, without connecting that conduct to a more direct challenge to the court’s authority, constitutes an abuse of the contempt power and a rejection of the principle that the contempt power should be used with caution. E.g., In re Matter of Little, 404 *219U.S. 553, 555, 92 S.Ct. 659, 660, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1973).

. See Rule 42, Rules of the (Arizona) Supreme Court, Ethical Rule 4.4: "Respect for Rights of Third Persons. In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.”

. The majority cites United States v. Lumumba, 794 F.2d 806, 810-11 (2d Cir.1986), as favoring the trial court’s incorporative comments. However, that case, as well as the cases cited therein, permitted consideration of uncited conduct in the determination of whether cited conduct was contumacious because the uncited acts involved direct criminal contempt wherein the authority of the court was unquestionably challenged. Indeed, the uncited conduct in Lumumba, entailing "mocking, condescending actions and querulous, acidic, baiting tone of voice," id. at 811 n. 2, and, in the other cases, "insulting remarks, scornful tone of voice and disrespect,” United States v. Martin-Trigona, 759 F.2d 1017, 1026 (2d Cir. *2181985), or disruptive "outbursts” during trial, In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 401 (7th Cir.1972); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 371 (7th Cir.1972), were components of the contemnors’ cited challenges to the courts’ authority.

. The majority’s attempt to finesse the definitional problems it faces with the term “contumacious” by likening it to the word “contumely” is precisely the overextension with which I am concerned. The nouns "contumacy,” from which "contumacious” is derived, and "contumely,” while linguistically related, each bear a distinct definition. Had the drafters of Rule 33.1 intended to punish merely "haughty and contemptuous rudeness,” or "insulting and humiliating treatment or language” they would have used the phrase "contumelious conduct,” not "contumacious conduct.”

. Equally gossamer, and of questionable relevance, is the majority’s illustration of Hirschfeld’s violation of the "assumed” standard of conduct. The supreme court made it clear in its order of June 7, 1995, that its "conclusion is reached apart from the resolution of the legal challenges advanced by [Hirschfeld] to the trial court’s finding of criminal contempt and the sentence imposed.”