Court Opinion

ID: 9444727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:10:09.973657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:58.733166
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority concludes that “ * * * the public policy established by the Florida Supreme Court is opposed to actions such as the present one * * With deference, I respectfully dissent.
In the first place, if the Florida Legislature has acted, and acted constitutionally, the public policy of the State is not left to be “established by the Florida Supreme Court.” When, in 1949, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 541.-03(1) 1 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A., *200it left no possible doubt as to the public policy of that' State excepting only the constitutionality of the statute.
My brothers state categorically that, “We do not find it necessary to decide that Fair Trade contracts are invalid in Florida even between the parties”, and indeed they could not so decide without finding a State statute violative of the State Constitution in advance of such a holding by the State Supreme Court. The majority, nevertheless, clearly indicates its opinion that the Florida Supreme Court would hold the statute unconstitutional.2 Unless and until • the State Supreme Court has actually so held, it seems clear to me that the Act of the Legislature of Florida is entitled to complete respect in this Court, especially when as the majority concedes, “At the present time there seem no longer to be any federal constitutional or statutory barriers to Fair Trade Legislation.”
The Florida Supreme Court has gone no further than to declare the nonsigner clause of a Fair Trade Act unconstitutional.3 True, some of the Justices of that Court expressed in their opinions strong disapproval of the general economic soundness of Fair Trade legislation, but we do those Justices wrong if we assume that they will undertake to substitute their views of the economic wisdom of the Act for the views of the Florida Legislature to which the State Constitution has committed the duty and responsibility of acting upon such questions. I still entertain the view which I expressed for this Court in Schweg-mann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 788, 791, that “We have no judicial concern with the economic and social wisdom of any feature of the law, but solely with its constitutionality”, and I think that that principle should hold true in our prediction of any future decision of the Florida Supreme Court.4 Indeed, it seems *201to me, as I will presently explain, that the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida have already indicated their adherence to that principle as applied to the particular statute under consideration.
In an able opinion granting a preliminary injunction, the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, held the Florida statute constitutional. Sunbeam Corporation v. Chase & Sherman, Inc., decided June 30, 1953. The Supreme Court of Florida, after hearing argument before the full Court en banc, denied certiorari without opinion. Chase & Sherman, Inc., v. Sunbeam Corporation, 73 So.2d 714. The briefs of counsel, otherwise excellent and full, give us little help on the effect of that denial of certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court, and my brothers quite naturally assume that, like denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, it “carries no implication concerning the merits of the case,” citing State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252, 94 L.Ed. 562. Such research and information as has been available to me indicates that that assumption is not at all accurate, but that to the contrary the denial of certiorari in that case, even without opinion, had the effect of affirming the interlocutory decree of the Circuit Court. See Davis v. Strople, Fla.1949, 39 So.2d 468; Advertects, Inc., v. Sawyer Industries, Fla.1953, 64 So.2d 300. There are two interesting articles on the subject in Volume 4 of the University of Florida Law Review (1951) from each of which, due to the importance of the question in the present case, I quote rather full extracts in the footnote.5 As those ar-*202tides demonstrate, certiorari under Rule 34 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Florida, 30 F.S.A., is available as a matter of right for the review of interlocutory orders or decrees in chancery, and differs markedly from common law certiorari. See Kilgore v. Bird, 149 Fla. 570, 6 So.2d 541, 544. Under the State practice, therefore, it seems to me the Florida Supreme Court has .definitely recognized the validity of fair trade agreements as between the contracting parties.
On January 28, 1955, Judge Vincent C. Giblin of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, in a memorandum opinion in Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. H. Rayvis et al., said:
“ * * * the defendants A. Goldberg and Norman Morgan-stern knowingly induced the last mentioned retailers to violate their Fair Trade Agreement with plaintiff and sell them plaintiff’s merchandise below the fair trade price with full knowledge of all of the circumstances and are now selling such merchandise at retail below the established price.
“I approve the plaintiff’s theory as contained in the Amended Complaint that one who wrongfully induces the breach of a contract commits an actionable wrong that can be enjoined.”
No appeal was taken from the permanent injunction entered in that case.
A ruling directly contrary to the holding of the majority was made by Chief Judge Holland of the Southern District of Florida on October 2, 1953, in Sunbeam Corporation v. Rotenberger, No. 5125, M.Civil.*
Even in the absence of the two decisions from the Circuit Court of Dade *203County, of the denial of certiorari from one of those decisions by the Florida Supreme Court, and of Judge Holland’s decision, and if the Florida Statute (Footnote 1) stood alone, that statute, together with the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court on the nonsigner clause (Footnote 3), seems to me to make the public policy of the State of Florida clear to the effect that while a nonsigner cannot be bound merely by notice of a contract to which he is not a party, a manufacturer can maintain the resale prices of his product by contract.
Appellee's brief describes this action as “an adroit effort to effectuate and enforce the nonsigner provision of the Florida Fair Trade Act which has been repeatedly held unconstitutional,” and the majority of this Court sees “little merit in the attempted distinction relative to policy.” The position of the majority may be sound if it is correct in assuming that the public policy of Florida is opposed to all fair trade contracts; on the other hand, it is not sound if, as its Legislature has enacted, Florida permits price maintenance by contract. (See Statute, Footnote 1, supra.)
In the forty-five fair trade states, appellant restricted the distribution and sale of its products to distributors and dealers who would voluntarily contract with it to maintain resale prices. As was aptly said by Judge Freeman of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in the case of Sunbeam Corporation v. Economy Distributing Co., Inc., 131 F.Supp. 791, decided March 3, 1955:
“Indeed, it is one thing to say that a manufacturer may not, by a single fair trade contract, fix the price of its products throughout the entire state even as to nonsigners; it is quite another to say that it may not accomplish this end by selling only to those willing to execute fair trade contracts.”
The averments of the complaint went much further than simply alleging the selling of plaintiff’s products at cut prices. In addition,6 it alleged: (a) that defendant knew that plaintiff confined its sales to persons who contracted with it to maintain re-sale prices; and (b) that defendant intentionally induced some of such persons to violate their contracts with plaintiff.
The law of Florida seems clear to the effect that intentional and unjustifiable interference with contractual relations is actionable. Dade Enterprises, Inc., v. Wometco Theatres, Inc., 119 Fla. 70, 160 So. 209. In that case the Florida Supreme Court said:
“And upon a like principle, it has been held that when owing to special features, a contract involves peculiar convenience or advantage, or where the loss occasioned by its breach would be a matter of uncertainty, so that the breach of such contract might be deemed to cause irreparable injury and subject to equitable enforcement, the threatened or *204impending tort of a third party who interferes with the performance of such contract, or consciously contributes to the impairment of the right of a party thereto to avail himself of its obligations, may be enjoined by the party whose enjoyment of existing contractual rights is thus endangered; the application of this doctrine being no longer restricted to contracts for personal services.” 160 So. at page 210.
See also, Harvey Corp. v. Universal Equipment Co., 158 Fla. 644, 29 So.2d 700, 704. The authorities generally are well collected by Judge- Oliver T. Carter of the Northern District of California in Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F.Supp. 31, 36:
“The theory upon which the- first claim for relief is based, is the'allegation that defendants have tortiously interfered with .plaintiff’s contractual relations. It is alleged that defendants have knowingly, wilfully and without justification induced breaches of plaintiff’s contracts. That such .conduct is actionable has .long been well. settled in law and equity in a long line of cases stemming from Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, and including, to cite but a few of the modern eases, Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R. Co., 151 U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 240, 38 L.Ed. 55; Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 207 U.S. 205, 28 S.Ct. 91, 52 L.Ed. 171 ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131; American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 2 Cir., 209 F. 351; Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Iowa Fruit & Produce Co., 8 Cir., 112 F.2d 101; Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 1 Cir., 165 F.2d 815; Baruch v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 10 Cir., 175 F.2d 1; Hope Basket Co. v. Product Advancement Corp., 6 Cir., 187 F.2d 1008; Gruen Watch Co. v. Artists Alliance, 9 Cir. 191 F.2d 700; Philadelphia Record Co. v. Leopold, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 40 F.Supp. 346; Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 112 P.2d 631; California Grape Control Board, Ltd. v. California Produce Corp., 4 Cal.App.2d 242, 40 P.2d 846; cases collected in 84 A.L.R. 55; in Prosser on Torts (West Pub. Co., 1941) 976-1013; note in 24 Calif.L.Rev. 208. See also Sayre, ‘Inducing Breach of Contract,’ 36 Harv.L.Rev. 663; Carpenter, ‘Interference with Contractual Relations,’ 41 Harv.L.Rev. 728; Restatement of Torts, Section 766.”
Nor can I see how the criterion of balancing of public interests espoused in the concurring opinion on the authority of Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Texas Electric Service Co., 5 Cir., 63 F.2d 702, and Padgitt v. Lone Star Gas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 213 S.W.2d 133, would justify the dismissal of the complaint in this case without- a hearing. My consideration of that doctrine simply brings me. back to the question of what is the public policy of the State of Florida. To.me, there can be no better evidence of that public policy than the statute (Footnote 1, supra) never declared unconstitutional by the Florida Courts, and indeed consistently sustained by the lower courts and, I think, also by the Supreme Court of Florida.
Lastly, it seems to me that the present decision is not only contrary to the decision of Judge Holland within our Circuit, but is in conflict with the following Federal cases in other Circuits: Wells & Richardson Co. v. Abraham, C.C.E.D.N.Y., 146 F. 190, affirmed 2d Cir., 149 F. 408; Sunbeam Corporation v. Payless Drug Stores, D.C.N.D.Cal., 113 F.Supp. 31; Sunbeam Corporation v. Economy Distributing Co., Inc., D.C.E.D. Mich., 131 F.Supp. 791, decided March 3, 1955. So far as I have found, this is the first time that a manufacturer has been refused relief against' tortious interference with valid price maintenance contracts on the ground of public policy. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

. “ § 541.03. Contract may govern price of sale or resale.
“(1) No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and which commodity is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others shall be deemed in violation of any law of the State of Florida by reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained in such contract:
“(a) That the buyer will not resell such commodity at less than the minimum price stipulated by the seller;
*200“(b) That the buyer will require of any dealer to whom he may resell such commodity an agreement that he will not, in turn, resell at less than the minimum price stipulated by the seller;
“(c) That the seller will not sell such commodity
“1. To any wholesaler, unless such wholesaler will agree not to resell the same to any retailer unless the retailer will in turn agree not to resell the same except to consumers for use and at not less than the stipulated minimum price, and such wholesaler will likewise agree not to resell the same to any other wholesaler unless such other wholesaler will make the same agreement with any wholesaler or retailer to whom he may resell; or
“2. To any retailer, unless the retailer will agree not to resell the same except to consumers for use and at not less than the stipulated minimum price.”

. “For it seems to us that the constitutional theories repeated in so many of its decisions would be more consistent with declaring the entire Act invalid. * * * We think it may well be that Fair Trade contracts are unenforceable in Florida even between the parties * *

. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb’s Cut-Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91; Liquor Store, Inc., v. Continental Distilling Corporation, Fla., 40 So.2d 371; Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., Fla., 54 So.2d 235; Miles Laboratories, Inc., v. Eckerd, Fla., 73 So.2d 680.

. Actually, the Supreme Court of Florida has many times adhered to that principle. Scarborough v. Webb’s Cut Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 754, 8 So.2d 913, holding that courts are not concerned with the policy of legislative acts. Accord: State ex rel. McMullen v. Johnson, 102 Fla. 19, 135 So. 816; Stewart v. De Land-Lake Helen Special Road & Bridge District in Volusia County, 71 Fla. 158, 71 So. 42; Lainhart v. Catts, 73 Fla. 735, 75 So. 47; Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839; See also, City of Hernando v. Robertson, 97 Fla. 1083, 125 So. 529, holding that if a statute does not violate federal or state Constitution, policy of legislature is not subject to judicial review. Courts may not strike down act because it does not square with court’s view on public policy. State ex rel. Landis v. Dyer, 109 Fla. 33, 148 So. 201. Accord: State ex rel. Dowling v. Butts, 111 Fla. 630, 149 So. 746, 89 A.L.R. 946; L. Maxcy, Inc., v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 111 Fla. 116, 150 So. 248, affirmed 111 Fla. 116, 151 So. 276; Shelby v. City of Pensacola, 112 Fla. 584, 151 So. 53. Court is not concerned with wisdom, necessity, or poli*201cy of laws, but is responsible only for their construction and interpretation. State ex rel. Richardson v. Ferrell, 130 Fla. 26, 177 So. 181. Accord: State ex rel. Hosack v. Yocum, 136 Fla. 246, 186 So. 448, 121 A.L.R. 270.
For more recent cases, see Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So.2d 419, holding that the Legislature is the policy making authority and courts must heed its policy declarations, assuming the statute being construed was validly enacted. Accord: Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So.2d 234; Saunders v. City of Jacksonville, 157 Fla. 253, 25 So.2d 655; Cf. Local No. 234 of United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of United States and Canada v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., Fla., 66 So.2d 818.
Finally, see a July, 1954 decision by Florida Supreme Court, Volusia County Kennel Club v. Haggard, 73 So.2d 884, certiorari denied sub nom., Lane v. Volusia County Kennel Club, 348 U.S. 865, 75 S.Ct. 87, holding that the wisdom of policy and motive and determination with reference to policy of legalizing gambling with relation to dog races is a legislative and not a judicial function.

. “In summarizing certiorari in Florida one must at least recognize federal statutory certiorari, issued by the Supreme Court of the United States to state courts of last resort and the United States courts of appeal; it can always be requested, is granted some fifteen percent of the time, and nevertheless accounts for more reviews than does appeal, which is of right but strictly limited in availability and scope. Denial of a petition for certiorari is not an affirmance of the judgment below; it merely signifies that less than four members of the Supreme Court of the United States are persuaded that review is advisable.
“At the other extreme is certiorari under Buie 34 of the Buies of Practice of the Supreme Court of Florida, which is not certiorari at all but rather a sadly misnamed method of taking, on the equity side, ‘ * * * appeals from interlocutory decrees as authorized by statute including orders or decrees after final decree * * It lies as of right; no writ actually issues; and denial of this ‘certiorari’ is a definite affirmance of the interlocutory decree under attack rather than a mere refusal to consider it.” 4 University of Florida Law Beview, pp. 447-448.
“Effect of Denial of Certiorari Under Buie 34
“Authority need hardly be cited to the proposition that review of interlocutory orders under Buie 34 is not discretionary but a matter of right, and that Buie 34 merely provides a novel method of exercising the right.
“But the novelty of the method of such review, after having confused the .bar and the legal editors, finally produced still further confusion in the bench. In Davis v. Strople the Supreme Court, in *202a 5-1 decision held that an earlier decision in that case holding merely ‘petition for certiorari denied’ conclusively settled the law of the case on the point raised. The Court cited as authority Hunter v. Tyner [151 Fla. 707, 10 So.2d 492] and Hager v. Butler [156 Fla. 113, 22 So.2d 631].
“The dissent in the Davis case argued that a denial of certiorari without opinion, in a prior interlocutory appeal should not be considered as an affirmance of the order reviewed, establishing the law of the case, but on the contrary should be considered merely the exercise of discretion not to consider the merits of the legal point raised, as is inherent in common law certiorari. The dissent urged, by way of analogy, the holdings of the United States Supreme Court as to the legal effect of ‘certiorari denied’ in review sought there.
“The practice. of the United States Supreme Court in disposing of petitions for certiorari has recently been summarized in [State of] Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show. An examination of this opinion will disclose that that practice has no remote analogy to that of the Supreme Court of Florida in deciding interlocutory appeals taken under Rule 34.
“When the United States Supreme Court is petitioned to grant certiorari, the only question presented and briefed is the question whether or not it will hear the case later on the merits. The grant-mg of certiorari is a discretionary decision to put the case on its docket, and thereafter, in due course, to hear it on the merits. The denial of certiorari is a discretionary decision to let the final judgment of the lower court stand.
“On the contrary, when an interlocutory order in equity is appealed to the Florida Supreme Court under Rule 34, the merits are presented by the petition and supporting brief, and controverted in the brief of respondent; the case is orally argued on the merits; and what the Court takes under consideration for determination is the merits of the order reviewed. No question is presented or considered as to whether or not the Court will later hear the merits; the Court actually hears the merits; and when it rules, of necessity it decides the merits.
“The distinction between the two types of certiorari is obvious. There is no analogy. But here’s the rub. The fact that any justice of the Florida Supreme Court should think the federal practice bears the slightest resemblance to the Florida practice is, in and of itself, a condemnation of Rule 34 as a source of unjustifiable confusion resulting from the mere use of the word ‘certiorari’ in the rule.”
4 University of Florida Law Review, pp. 529-531.

 Case pending.

. To quote some of the averments of paragraph 23 of the complaint:
“ * * * The defendant, well knowing that plaintiff’s dealers and distributors were bound by contract, as aforesaid, not to deal with any person who had not executed a contract, has by devious means, on information and belief, directly and indirectly, through its parent company and through agents, brokers, clandestine intermediaries, and diverse (sic) persons unknown to plaintiff, solicited, sought and succeeded either directly or indirectly, in inducing distributors and/or retailers in those states bound by Sunbeam fair trade contracts to supply and sell Sunbeam products to the defendant in violation of such contracts, and, well knowing of plaintiff’s contractual system of distribution aforesaid, has knowingly purchased and accepted delivery of products bearing plaintiff’s trademark from persons not authorized by contract to engage in the business of handling or selling the same, well knowing that in so doing it would encourage dealers and distributors surreptitiously and clandestinely to violate their contracts and directly or indirectly sell such products to defendant thereby interfering with and depriving plaintiff of the benefits of its said fair trade contracts and contractual system of distribution.”