Court Opinion

ID: 9594120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:27:19.404176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:02.879254
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I. WRONGFUL TERMINATION
I agree with the lead opinion’s resolution of the plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. The plaintiff created a question of fact whether she was a just-cause employee because she had a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment under Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107; 507 NW2d 591 (1993). However, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of material fact that the defendant had just cause *68to terminate the plaintiff as part of its reduction in force.
H. DISCRIMINATION
I am unable to agree with the lead opinion’s disposition of the plaintiff’s claims of age and sex discrimination. As an initial matter, I do agree with the lead opinion’s adoption of the intermediate approach. Ante at 32-33. I also agree that “ ‘[t]he plaintiff must then introduce sufficient evidence to support two additional findings: (1) that the employer’s articulated reason for [laying off the plaintiff] is a pretext, and (2) that the true reason is discriminatory.’ Smith v Stratus Computer, Inc, 40 F3d 11, 16 (CA 1, 1994).” Ante at 36.
Though I agree with the lead opinion’s statement of the law, I disagree with its application of the law to the facts of this case. The lead opinion finds that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of both age and sex discrimination to survive the defendant’s summary disposition motion. Although I agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that this plaintiff has stated a prima facie case, she has offered little evidence which shows that the defendant’s proffered business reason is false. Rather, she must rely on her evidence of the prima facie elements to prove that the defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. I would find that this evidence was not enough to survive the motion.1
*69A. AGE DISCRIMINATION
The lead opinion bases its holding on findings that the defendant hired two “substantially younger persons,” Ms. Achterhoff and Mr. Billingsley, at higher rates of pay at the same time that it terminated plaintiff. Ante at 42. The lead opinion concludes that this “anomaly in defendant’s assertion that it was conducting an RIF” provided sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was terminated as a result of age discrimination. Id. However, this finding greatly oversimplifies the facts and ignores the defendant’s evidence.
As the lead opinion points out, the plaintiff has stated a prima facie case, and the defendant has met its burden of production by stating a nondiscriminatory business reason for the plaintiff’s termination. Thus, all presumptions have “dropp[ed] out of the picture.” St Mary’s Honor Center v Hicks, 509 US 502, 511; 113 S Ct 2742; 125 L Ed 2d 407 (1993). At this point, the plaintiff must show discrimination in one of two ways. First, she may offer direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the defendant was motivated by discriminatory animus. If persuasive, this will show that the employer’s real reason was discrimination, thus disproving the proffered nondiscriminatoiy reason. Second, the plaintiff may also meet this burden by presenting evidence of falsity sufficient to show that the employer possessed a discriminatory intent. 1 Lindemann & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (3d ed), pp 26-27. However, because this defendant has stated a nondiscriminatory business justification for its actions, the plaintiff will only survive summary disposition if there is sufficient evidence to create a question of material fact that the defendant acted out of a discriminatory *70intent. At this point, the analysis is identical to the federal standard for summary judgment. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US 242; 106 S Ct 2505; 91 L Ed 2d 202 (1986).
1) THE HIRING OF ANDREA ACHTERHOFF
The hiring of Ms. Achterhoff does not provide evidence of age discrimination. Indeed, it is irrelevant for several reasons. First, Ms. Achterhoff took a newly created position as human resources representative for the Operhall Research Center.2 Indeed, Ms. Achterhoff was hired six to eight weeks before the plaintiff was terminated.3 Thus, the plaintiff’s claims amount to an assertion that she should have been given Ms. Achterhoff’s position rather than being laid off. However, civil rights laws do not require an employer to retain older workers during a reduction in force at the expense of younger employees with less seniority.4 Barnes v GenCorp, Inc, 896 F2d 1457, 1471 (CA 6, 1990) (“An employer is free to retain the younger, less senior employee if the employer reasonably believes he or she is better qualified for the position”). The retention of younger employees during a *71reduction in force is not evidence of discrimination. Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 688; 385 NW2d 586 (1986). Thus, the hiring of Ms. Achterhoff does not show any evidence of discriminatory animus.
Second, crucial decisions regarding the hiring of Ms. Achterhoff were made by people other than those who terminated the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not contest Mr. Roofs narration of the events surrounding this decision. Accordingly, it is undisputed that Operhall was not interested in any of the human resources staff, save Mr. Malady and Mr. Boczkaja. Thus, the decision not to consider Ms. Lytle for this position was made by individuals at Operhall, not Mr. Roof. Therefore, any discrimination was not committed by the person who terminated the plaintiff, and is not relevant to this case. McDonald v Union Camp Corp, 898 F2d 1155, 1161 (CA 6, 1990).
Even if Ms. Achterhoff’s hiring was relevant to the plaintiffs claims, the lead opinion oversimplifies the facts and ignores crucial evidence that removes any suggestion of age discrimination. The lead opinion rests its conclusion on the fact that Ms. Achterhoff was less qualified than the plaintiff. However, this conclusion is based solely on the fact that Ms. Lytle had been with the defendant for a longer period. This ignores the fact that Ms. Achterhoff had ten years of supervisory human resources experience with other firms. The plaintiff had a similar number of years in a supervisory capacity with the defendant. Thus, the record actually shows that Ms. Achterhoff and the plaintiff had very similar employment histories. Moreover, Ms. Achterhoff received a degree in a human resources related field. The plaintiff had no such degree and had only partially completed a steno*72graphic course at a business college. Thus, I disagree that the comparative qualifications5 of Ms. Achterhoff and Ms. Lytle show evidence of intentional discrimination sufficient to survive summary disposition.6
Finally, the lead opinion also focuses on the fact Ms. Achterhoff received greater pay than the plaintiff. However, Ms. Achterhoff was compensated from the Operhall budget, whereas Ms. Lytle was paid from the human resources budget.7 The fact that the plaintiff was chosen for termination is consistent with the defendant’s claim that it was motivated by a desire to reduce human resources costs. The lead opinion’s reliance on the comparative salaries of these individuals fails to account for the significant fact that they were paid from different budgets. Indeed, this point removes the aberration that the lead opinion sees in the defendant’s presentation.8
*73I believe that Ms. Achterhoff’s hiring is irrelevant to Ms. Lytle’s termination and does not present evidence of discriminatory intent, even if considered. Thus, I cannot agree with the lead opinion that this created a question of fact concerning either the falsity of the defendant’s proffered business reason or the presence of intentional discrimination.
2) THE HIRING OF JEFF BILLINGSLEY
Similarly, the assignment of the training responsibilities at the Whitehall Division to Mr. Billingsley does not constitute evidence of discrimination. The lead opinion finds discrimination in the retention of Mr. Billingsley. Ante at 41, 47. However, this ignores several crucial facts. First, Mr. Billingsley was only five years younger than the plaintiff. I fail to see how this difference provides evidence of age discrimination.
Second, Mr. Billingsley had been working with a different department of the corporation since 1986. Thus, he was not hired into the corporation as Ms. Lytle left. Rather, he was merely given a new position as head of training as an expansion of his existing duties. While the lead opinion is correct that Mr. Billingsley had production experience, he had been training and development manager for the year preceding his promotion. Even the plaintiff acknowledged that Mr. Billingsley’s previous job had been in training and that the new position focused on training as well. Further, the lead opinion ignores testimony that the defendant was changing its production methods, and that this process was going to require exten*74sive retraining. Mr. Roof gave uncontroverted testimony that Mr. Billingsley had been conducting this type of training with other divisions of the corporation. It is unclear that the plaintiff had comparable qualifications. Rather, the lead opinion simply assumes that the plaintiff could have performed this job solely on the basis of her nineteen years working in the human resources department. However, even assuming that the plaintiff was qualified, Mr. Billingsley’s previous training experience with the company’s new production methods provides ample justification for the defendant’s decision. I fail to see how the plaintiff has offered evidence of discrimination.
The lead opinion also finds evidence of discrimination in the fact that Mr. Billingsley earned a greater rate of pay. However, this ignores the fact that only a part of Mr. Billingsley’s salary came from the human resources budget. In contrast, the plaintiff’s salary was paid entirely out of that budget, and she was terminated in an effort to reduce the costs of the human resources department. Thus, despite the lead opinion’s description of events, Mr. Billingsley was given a newly created post that consolidated functions previously held by different departments. This type of personnel change is inherent in corporate restructuring and does not constitute evidence of discrimination.
I cannot agree that the defendant’s treatment of Ms. Achterhoff and Mr. Billingsley evidences age discrimination. This defendant was reducing its work force— a process that involved the elimination of jobs and the reassignment of employees. The mere fact that two of the people retained happened to be younger than the plaintiff should not allow the plaintiff to raise a material question of fact concerning age discrimination. Matras, supra at 688.
*75B. SEX DISCRIMINATION
I also disagree that the record reveals evidence of sex discrimination. I agree with the lead opinion that the isolated confrontations with Mr. Malady are insufficient to constitute evidence of discrimination. However, for the same reasons as discussed abové, I do not feel that the hiring of Mr. Billingsley shows evidence of sex discrimination. Further, I fail to understand why the lead opinion ignores the employer’s evidence that six of the eight people who took over the plaintiff’s job duties were women. The plaintiff does not dispute this. Indeed, she testified that she was uncertain who had taken over her job duties and acknowledged that several of her former duties were assigned to female employees. This distribution of the plaintiff’s job duties is inconsistent with sex discrimination. Rather, it is consistent with the employer’s desire to reduce its payroll by eliminating the number of people working in its human resources department.9 Therefore, I do not believe that the plaintiff has shown that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory business reason was false or that discrimination on the basis of sex was the true motive for its actions.10
*76m. CONCLUSION
While I agree that summary disposition of the wrongful-termination claim was properly awarded to the defendant, I disagree with the lead opinion’s finding on the discrimination claims. That finding misapplies the governing law and oversimplifies the facts of this complex case. Essentially, it allows a plaintiff to overcome summary disposition if the plaintiff can identify anyone who: 1) has less seniority, 2) receives greater compensation, and 3) does not share in the plaintiff’s characteristics. Apparently, it is irrelevant if the retained individual’s job was different than that held by the plaintiff or if that individual was qualified for the job. Rather, the lead opinion second-guesses the employer’s decisions on the basis of its assumptions concerning which employee was more qualified. Under this holding, I fail to see how any employer could conduct a reduction in force without facing an employment discrimination trial for each and every individual it terminates. I cannot agree that this is the correct application of current employment discrimination law.
Weaver, J., concurred with Brickley, J., only with respect to the discussion of age and sex discrimination.

 The lead opinion asserts that I have improperly engaged in fact finding and credibility determinations. Ante at 38, n 39. However, a court must consider “affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence” when examining a motion made under MCR 2.116(0)(10). MCR 2.116(G)(5). Citing unrefuted deposition testimony does not constitute an impermissible credibility determination.

 The plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that this position was created as a pretext for her termination. Rather, it is undisputed that the position was created to serve legitimate business purposes.

 Though there was testimony that the decision to terminate plaintiff had been made in September, plaintiff was not terminated until November.

 Indeed, had the plaintiff been given Ms. Achterhoff’s job because of her age, Ms. Achterhoff would have been entitled to sue because Michigan’s anti-age discrimination laws do not define a protected class as does federal law. Once Ms. Achterhoff was hired, the defendant was required to make its decision on the basis of neutral criteria. Mr. Roof testified at length that the decision was based on the decreased need for the position held by the plaintiff. The plaintiff fails to offer any evidence that rebuts this analysis.

 The lead opinion apparently reads this phrase to mean comparable qualifications. Ante at 39-40, 46. However, I do not mean that the qualifications of the plaintiff and Ms. Achterhoff were similar. Rather, when compared, their qualifications reveal no evidence that discrimination motivated the decision to retain Ms. Achterhoff. See Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d college ed), p 283.

 It is not sufficient for the employee to merely show a question of fact concerning qualifications. Rather, a plaintiff must offer proof that she was more qualified than the employee who received the position in order to present evidence of intentional discrimination at this stage of the analysis.

 Again, the plaintiff has not presented any proof suggesting that this arrangement was fraudulent. Rather, it is uncontroverted that this arrangement was a legitimate effort to reduce the human resources budget.

 The fact that Ms. Achterhoff’s salary was not paid from the human resources department’s budget is consistent with the employer’s stated business reason that it terminated Ms. Lytle as part of a reduction in the human resources budget. Rather than show evidence of falsity, this supports the employer’s proffered explanation. Thus, the lead opinion’s reliance on the retention of Ms. Achterhoff as evidence of falsity and discrimination is misplaced.
Martin v Teledyne Brown Engineering, 924 F Supp 1131, 1138, n 4 (SD Ala, 1996) (finding that only employees within the plaintiff’s department *73should be considered similarly situated because the defendant had conducted its reduction in force on a “department-by-department basis”).

 I also question the lack of importance that the lead opinion gives to Ms. Achterhoffs hiring in its discussion of the sex discrimination claim after finding it relevant on the question of age discrimination. The lead opinion also misinterprets my reference to the number of females who assumed the plaintiff’s job duties. I do not feel that the “plaintiff could only establish her claim if defendant corporation had discharged all its female employees.” Ante at 43, n 49. Rather, I simply would not ignore the fact that the plaintiff’s job responsibilities were awarded to mostly female employees. This evidence mitigates against a finding that “one sex has been treated differently.” Id. Indeed, the lead opinion’s reliance on the retention of one male employee amounts to a finding of discriminatory animus because the defendant did not fire all its male employees.

 The lead opinion repeatedly refers to the need to review all the circumstances of the plaintiff’s discharge. I am well aware of the requirement that the facts of a case must not be viewed “in a vacuum.” See ante *76at 45.1 merely would not allow a plaintiff to compile numerous irrelevant and insignificant events to provide evidence of discriminatory intent.