Court Opinion

ID: 9897291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:45.490897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.338318
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                           Sep 12 2023, 8:36 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Casandra J. Nelson                                        Theodore E. Rokita
Law Office of Casandra J. Nelson, LLC                     Attorney General of Indiana
Noblesville, Indiana
                                                          Monika P. Talbot
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the                                      September 12, 2023
Commitment of:                                            Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-MH-632
B.A.,
                                                          Appeal from the Hamilton
Appellant-Respondent,                                     Superior Court
        v.                                                The Honorable Michael A. Casati,
                                                          Judge
State of Indiana,                                         Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          29D01-2302-MH-18
Appellee-Petitioner

                                 Opinion by Judge Mathias
                               Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

Mathias, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023                        Page 1 of 16
[1]   B.A. appeals the trial court’s order that she be involuntarily committed to the

      Logansport State Hospital. B.A. raises two issues for our review, which we

      restate as follows:

              1. Whether B.A. preserved her argument of insufficient service of
              process, which she raised for the first time during the closing
              arguments of the fact-finding hearing on the Hospital’s petition.

              2. Whether the Hospital presented sufficient evidence to support
              the trial court’s order that she be committed to the Hospital.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   In December 2021, the State charged B.A. with Level 2 felony criminal

      confinement (where the “victim [wa]s used as a shield or hostage”); Level 5

      felony criminal confinement; Class A misdemeanor domestic battery; Class A

      misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime; and Class A

      misdemeanor resisting law enforcement in the Hamilton Superior Court.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 9. In February and again in March 2022, two

      different clinical psychologists concluded that B.A. was not competent to

      understand the criminal proceedings against her or to aid in her own defense.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023       Page 2 of 16
[4]   In August, the Hamilton Superior Court committed B.A. to the Logansport

      State Hospital for competency restoration services.1 In February 2023, the

      Hospital petitioned the court for B.A.’s involuntary regular commitment.

      According to an attached physician’s statement of Dr. Danny Meadows, B.A.

      suffered from “[b]ipolar I disorder with mixed features and PTSD.” Id. at 11.

      Dr. Meadows opined that B.A.’s conditions “substantially disturb[ed her]

      thinking, feeling, or behavior[] and impair[ed] her ability to function.” Id. He

      further opined that that impairment resulted in her inability to function

      independently, noting that

               [B.A.] is unaware that she is psychotic, which affects both her
               judgement [sic] and insight. She is also unaware whenever she
               becomes verbally aggressive/threatening towards others, which
               occurs whenever she does not get her way (feels that she is being
               served a “child size serving,” isn’t served bread due to being on
               an 1,800 calorie diet, etc.), her delusional beliefs are challenged
               (during an evaluation[/]weekly or monthly assessment and/or
               her competency evaluation), or she feels betrayed, threatened, or
               wronged in some way (even if this is based on delusional beliefs).
               [B.A.’s] delusional beliefs are fixed, involve her being a CIA
               agent and [that] the Hamilton Co. police, her assigned attorney,
               and the judge involved in her criminal court case [are] working
               with multiple family members (her ex-husband, mother, and

      1
        The need for mental health services provided through Indiana’s state hospital system is great. It is our
      sincere hope that our partners in the Executive and Legislative branches consider providing even
      more support and resources to Indiana’s State Psychiatric Hospitals and other State-sponsored mental
      health service providers.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023                               Page 3 of 16
              sister) in a sex trafficking ring, which her two minor daughters
              are now involved in.

      Id. And, in the petition for B.A.’s involuntary commitment, Dr. Meadows

      added:

              [B.A.] is currently homeless and unemployed. She reports
              knowing a number of famous individuals and frequently asks
              staff to contact them on her behalf for a variety of reasons. While
              she remains overtly psychotic, [B.A.] continues to believe that
              she does not have a mental illness and should only be prescribed
              seizure medication.

      Id. at 9.

[5]   The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the Hospital’s petition in March.

      B.A. appeared at that hearing in person and by counsel, and, at the

      commencement of the hearing, her counsel informed the court that they were

      “ready to proceed” on the Hospital’s petition. Tr. p. 4. Dr. Meadows then

      testified and adopted his statements in his written physician’s statement.

[6]   Dr. Meadows also elaborated on how B.A.’s mental illness substantially

      impaired her judgment, reasoning, or behavior, resulting in her inability to

      function independently:

              Q [by B.A.’s counsel]: And your commitment [petition] is solely
              based on your belief that my client is gravely disabled?

              A        Yes, that’s correct.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023       Page 4 of 16
                                            ***

        A      . . . [S]pecifically, . . . [i]t is that we believe that [her
        mental illness] is impinging greatly on her judgments and her
        insight, which would then lead to her having additional
        difficulties if she were to be released. Now in actuality if she were
        to be released . . . , we would let the Hamilton County Sheriff’s
        Department . . . know that and she would be escorted back to the
        Hamilton County Jail.

                                            ***

        Q        . . . Can you please elaborate . . . ?

        A       All right, so based on the presentation of her mental health
        symptoms, we believe that she is not able to make rational and
        reasoned decisions. And that harm could come to her based
        on . . . how her mental health . . . symptoms[] are manifesting.
        So, the[] issue that we have is that we’re not . . . saying that she
        doesn’t have the ability to meet basic needs currently, but she is
        in a supervised setting. So, if she w[ere] not in this twenty-four-
        hour supervised setting . . . , if she were to go back into the
        community[,] based on her presentation and severity of her
        mental health symptoms we believe that she can come to harm
        potentially based on those symptoms.

Id. at 13-15. And Dr. Meadows testified that he has B.A. on a medication plan

and that, under that plan, she has shown “some improvement” with “mood

issues” but less improvement with her “delusional beliefs.” Id. at 18.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023        Page 5 of 16
[7]   Following Dr. Meadows’s testimony, B.A. testified. She appeared to deny

      suffering from mental illness and stated only that she once suffered from

      epilepsy. She also discussed living in both Florida and Indiana, and when asked

      if she had an Indiana address, she responded that she was not sure because her

      mother-figure from her childhood “doesn’t want me to live with her.” Id. at 20.

      When asked what she would do for employment, B.A. stated:

              Well, I would probably go back to, just for safety and peace, I
              probably would go to the fashion mall and go to the Body Shop.
              I already have large connections in the retail area. I’d probably
              go back[;] right now I can’t work in it now but it’s my side job.
              That I probably will take if I stay in Indiana, I will take that on
              fully. Yeah, and teach on occasion on weekends. Teach
              professional ballet and professional modern dance.

      Id. at 21.

[8]   Following B.A.’s testimony, the court invited the parties to make their closing

      statements or arguments. B.A.’s counsel then, for the first time, objected to the

      proceedings on the ground that the Hospital had not properly served B.A. with

      its petition for her commitment. Id. at 22-24. The court responded that it had

      “appointed [B.A.’s counsel] after the filing of the documents for the purpose[]

      of representing her with respect to the petition and these proceedings.” Id. at 27.

      The court then overruled B.A.’s objection and ordered her involuntary civil

      commitment.

[9]   This appeal ensued.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023          Page 6 of 16
       1. B.A. did not preserve her argument of insufficient service of
       process.
[10]   On appeal, B.A. first asserts that the Hospital failed to provide her with

       sufficient service of process. A judgment rendered in violation of the Due

       Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

       is void. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). We

       review whether a judgment is void or valid de novo. M.H. v. State, 207 N.E.3d

       412, 416 (Ind. 2023).

[11]   As we stated in Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005):

               [i]n the seminal case regarding due process and notice, the
               Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires at a
               minimum “that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
               adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
               appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover
               Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). “This right to be
               heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the
               matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear
               or default, acquiesce or contest.” Id. at 314. “An elementary and
               fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
               accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
               circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
               and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id.
               “[W]hen notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture
               is not due process. The means employed must be such as one
               desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
               adopt to accomplish it.” Id. at 315.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023             Page 7 of 16
       (Emphasis added.)2

[12]   An untimely defense of insufficient service of process is waived. See Ind. Trial

       Rule 12(B); see also Ind. Code § 12-26-1-6 (2022) (stating that the Indiana Trial

       Rules apply to civil commitment proceedings unless another statute provides

       otherwise). Likewise, our Supreme Court has held that claims of insufficient

       notice and opportunity to prepare a defense are waived when there is not a

       timely objection in the trial court. Salahuddin v. State, 492 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ind.

       1986) (“By not objecting, [the defendant] waived the issue, even though . . . the

       error is of constitutional dimension.”); see also Daniel v. State, 526 N.E.2d 1157,

       1162 (Ind. 1988) (“As no objection was made at trial to the late filing . . . , this

       allegation of error has been waived.”). An objection for an alleged inadequate

       opportunity to prepare a defense further requires a party to move for a

       continuance, and the failure to do so also results in waiver. Daniel, 526 N.E.2d

       at 1162. And our Supreme Court has further held that a party “should not be

       heard to argue [s]he was denied notice and opportunity to be heard” where her

       “counsel specifically acknowledged that they were prepared to proceed” on the

       matter at issue. Salahuddin, 492 N.E.2d at 296.

       2
         Proper service of process also enables a trial court to obtain personal jurisdiction over the party served. See
       Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 759 (Ind. 2014). B.A., who appeared at the March 2023 hearing
       and participated in those proceedings, does not suggest on appeal that the trial court lacked personal
       jurisdiction over her; we therefore interpret her service-of-process argument to go to her notice and
       opportunity to meaningfully participate in the fact-finding hearing on the Hospital’s petition.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023                                Page 8 of 16
[13]   All of those reasons for waiver exist here. B.A. does not appeal from the denial

       of a motion for relief from judgment following a default. See T.R. 60(B)(6).

       Instead, she appeared in person and by counsel at the fact-finding hearing on

       the Hospital’s petition. She did not object to the purported insufficient service of

       process at the commencement of the hearing but, rather, expressly informed the

       court that she was ready to proceed on the merits of the petition. After the

       Hospital presented its case, B.A. presented evidence contesting the petition.

       Only then, at the close of the fact-finding hearing, did B.A. object for the first

       time to the purported insufficient service of process. B.A.’s objection was not

       timely, and it is waived.

[14]   In addition to being subject to waiver, our Supreme Court has held that, even if

       a claim of insufficient service of process is properly preserved for appeal, there

       is no reversible error unless the party appealing the trial court’s judgment

       demonstrates prejudice. Specifically, in 624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Housing

       Authority, 193 N.E.3d 381, 386 (Ind. 2022), our Supreme Court held that even

       demonstrably insufficient service of process is subject to a harmless-error

       analysis.

[15]   Here, however, B.A. does not argue, let alone demonstrate, how the outcome

       of the hearing on the Hospital’s petition might have been different if she had

       had better documented service of process. For instance, she does not explain

       what she might have done differently at the hearing, and she has not shown that

       she was denied an opportunity to present her evidence or objections at the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023       Page 9 of 16
       hearing due to the purported insufficient service of process. Accordingly, there

       is no reversible error here.

[16]   Nonetheless, in support of her argument on appeal, B.A. relies on our Court’s

       opinion in In re Commitment of M.E., 64 N.E.3d 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). In

       M.E., another panel of this Court recognized that service of process is, of

       course, required for petitions seeking an involuntary civil commitment. 64

       N.E.3d at 860. But the M.E. panel went further, stating that documentary

       “proof” of “actual service” is “required” for all civil commitment cases. Id. The

       panel also stated that any waiver of service of process by a respondent in a civil

       commitment case “cannot be valid” because “[i]t is difficult, if not impossible,

       to see how an individual who is involuntarily detained . . . by a mental health

       institution can be considered able to exhibit the competency required” to waive

       his or her rights. Id. at 860-61.

[17]   We decline to follow M.E. for three reasons. First, the Indiana Supreme Court

       has expressly disapproved of the M.E. panel’s waiver analysis. As our Supreme

       Court subsequently stated, the M.E. panel’s waiver analysis “conflates mental

       illness and mental competency, while Indiana law distinguishes between them.”

       A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC, 97 N.E.3d 606, 612 (Ind. 2018).

       Second, and relatedly, the M.E. panel’s conclusion that waiver of a defense of

       insufficient service of process can never be valid in civil commitment cases is

       not supported by our Trial Rules or precedent. See, e.g., T.R. 12(B); Salahuddin,

       492 N.E.2d at 296. Third, the M.E. panel did not conduct an analysis of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023     Page 10 of 16
       whether the insufficient service of process in that case was prejudicial, and,

       thus, the panel’s analysis is at best incomplete from the standpoint of appellate

       review. Cf. 624 Broadway, 193 N.E.3d at 386 (holding that even demonstrably

       insufficient service of process must be prejudicial for it to be reversible error).

[18]   Accordingly, we decline to follow M.E., and we conclude that B.A.’s objection

       to the purported insufficient service of process was not timely. We further

       conclude that she has not demonstrated reversible error even if the service of

       process here were insufficient. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment against her

       is not void.

       2. The Hospital presented sufficient evidence to support the
       trial court’s judgment.
[19]   B.A. also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the trial court’s

       judgment. For such issues, we will affirm if, “considering only the probative

       evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting it, without weighing

       evidence or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could find the

       necessary elements proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Commitment

       of T.K., 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015) (cleaned up).

[20]   To support its petition for B.A.’s involuntary regular commitment, the Hospital

       was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that B.A. is mentally ill;

       that she is either dangerous or “gravely disabled”; and that her commitment is

       “appropriate.” I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e) (2022). B.A. challenges only whether the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023       Page 11 of 16
       Hospital demonstrated that she is gravely disabled 3 and that her detention is

       appropriate.

[21]   First, B.A. argues that the Hospital failed to show that she is gravely disabled.

       According to Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96 (2022), “gravely disabled,” as

       relevant here, “means a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental

       illness, is in danger of coming to harm because the individual . . . has a

       substantial impairment . . . of that individual’s judgment, reasoning, or

       behavior that results in the individual’s inability to function independently.”

[22]   The Hospital presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

       conclusion that B.A. is gravely disabled. The Hamilton Superior Court

       committed B.A. to the Hospital in connection with criminal charges that

       included Level 2 felony criminal confinement in which she is alleged to have

       used a victim as a shield or hostage. There, she was diagnosed by Dr.

       Meadows, who stated in the physician’s statement attached to the Hospital’s

       petition that B.A. suffered from “[b]ipolar I disorder with mixed features and

       PTSD.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 11. Dr. Meadows further stated that B.A.’s

       conditions “substantially disturb[ed her] thinking, feeling, or behavior[] and

       impair[ed] her ability to function.” Id.

       3
           The Hospital did not premise its petition on the alternative basis that B.A. is dangerous.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023                             Page 12 of 16
[23]   Dr. Meadows explained how B.A.’s substantial impairment of her judgment,

       reasoning, or behavior would result in her inability to function independently.

       Specifically, in his written statement, Dr. Meadows noted that B.A. is

       “unaware that she is psychotic, which affects both her judgement [sic] and

       insight.” Id. He further stated that she is “also unaware whenever she becomes

       verbally aggressive/threatening towards others,” and that she becomes

       aggressive toward others “whenever she does not get her way . . . , her

       delusional beliefs are challenged . . . or she feels betrayed, threatened, or

       wronged in some way (even if this is based on delusional beliefs).” Id.

[24]   During his ensuing testimony at the March fact-finding hearing, Dr. Meadows

       adopted his written statements. He further testified that B.A.’s mental illness

       would “lead to her having additional difficulties if she were to be released,”

       adding:

               she is not able to make rational and reasoned decisions. And that
               harm could come to her based on . . . how her mental
               health . . . symptoms[] are manifesting. So, the[] issue that we
               have is that we’re not . . . saying that she doesn’t have the ability
               to meet basic needs currently, but she is in a supervised setting.
               So, if she w[ere] not in this twenty-four-hour supervised
               setting . . . , if she were to go back into the community[,] based
               on her presentation and severity of her mental health symptoms
               we believe that she can come to harm potentially based on those
               symptoms.

       Tr. pp. 13-15.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023       Page 13 of 16
[25]   B.A.’s argument against the Hospital’s evidence of her being gravely disabled is

       that her “conduct does not rise to the level of a substantial impairment . . . .”

       Appellant’s Br. at 22. According to B.A., “[s]he has been able to meet her needs

       in a supervised setting.” Id. at 23. Further, B.A. asserts that Dr. Meadows’s

       testimony was only that, if released from that setting, “harm could come” to her.

       Id. (emphasis in original).

[26]   B.A.’s arguments mischaracterize Dr. Meadows’s testimony. His testimony was

       not that B.A.’s risks are uncertain, and he did not testify that, if released, B.A.

       would be able to function independently. Rather, his testimony was that she is

       currently able to have her basic needs met because she is currently in a

       supervised setting. And the plain implication from his testimony was that, if

       released from a supervised setting, B.A. would be unable to function

       independently and would be in danger of coming to harm because of her

       impaired ability to make rational and reasoned decisions and because of her

       behavior of acting aggressively toward others over perceived slights, even where

       those perceptions stemmed from delusions. We thus conclude that Dr.

       Meadow’s written statements and testimony provided the fact-finder with a

       sufficient basis from which to conclude that B.A. is gravely disabled.

[27]   We similarly conclude that Dr. Meadows’s testimony supports the trial court’s

       conclusion that her commitment to the Hospital is appropriate. Again, a

       reasonable fact-finder could readily find from Dr. Meadows’s testimony that

       B.A. would not do well in a less restrictive setting and that she needed

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023       Page 14 of 16
       continued hospitalization. Dr. Meadows testified to B.A.’s aggressive behaviors

       while at the Hospital. And he testified that he has B.A. on a medication plan.

       Under that plan, B.A. has shown “some improvement” with “mood issues” but

       less improvement with her “delusional beliefs.” Tr. p. 18. That evidence is

       sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that her commitment is

       appropriate. See, e.g., In re Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 836-37 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2011).

[28]   Still, B.A. argues that Dr. Meadows did not give a timeframe for her release,

       and, thus, his testimony is not sufficient to show that her commitment is

       appropriate. But we agree with the Hospital that B.A.’s argument here appears

       to “conflate[] her involuntary commitment case with her criminal case.”

       Appellee’s Br. at 20. B.A. does not cite any provision of the Indiana Code that

       requires a date certain for a person’s release from an involuntary regular

       commitment in order to support a petition for that commitment.

[29]   Accordingly, the Hospital presented sufficient evidence to support the trial

       court’s judgment.

       Conclusion
[30]   For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order for B.A.’s involuntary

       regular commitment to the Hospital.

[31]   Affirmed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023     Page 15 of 16
Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-632| September 12, 2023   Page 16 of 16