Court Opinion

ID: 9662643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:14:37.998583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:41.101694
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Justice KELLER,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the majority that we must remand this case for the trial court to reevaluate the amount and duration of maintenance after determining the parties’ post-tax, net incomes, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the trial court’s maintenance award as insufficient to “allow Ms. Powell to continue the standard of living that the parties enjoyed while married”1 and thus “unjust and an abuse of discretion.”2 Although this Court once reasoned that “what might be ample for a scullery maid is not necessarily sufficient for one accustomed to the lifestyle of a duchess,”3 the “standard of living established during the marriage” is just one of many factors that a trial court must consider in determining a “just” maintenance award4 — not, as the majority opinion appears to suggest, the sole determinative factor. And, as “few couples can maintain separately the standard of living *227that they enjoyed as a single household,”5 even a duchess may discover that it is simply impossible for her to enjoy a post-dissolution lifestyle similar to the one she enjoyed while married to the duke. Accordingly, a “more accurate rule regarding maintenance would be that in most cases a long-term homemaker may not be left in financial circumstances radically disparate from those of her former spouse.”6 In any event, the trial court in this ease appears to have determined that the $5,400.00 per month budget — that Appellant herself proposed — was a sufficient amount to provide “for [her] reasonable needs,”7 and therefore, a just amount considering “[t]he standard of living established during the marriage.”8 And, if that is the case, then I find nothing clearly erroneous about the trial court’s determination.
My concern, however, is that the trial court’s findings of fact are insufficient for us to evaluate whether Appellant will have sufficient income, including the maintenance awarded, to cover her monthly reasonable needs.9 I would thus remand this matter to the trial court for it to make explicit findings of fact as to “[t]he financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to [her], and [her] ability to meet [her] needs independently.”10 In my view, the trial court should make findings as to: (1) the amount necessary to provide for Appellant’s reasonable needs; (2) the amount of after-tax income Appellant could realize each month from employment and from investment of the property that she received in the parties’ property settlement agreement;11 (3) Appellant’s prospects for eventual economic self-sufficiency through additional education; and, (4) although it does not appear to be a matter in dispute, Appellee’s ability to pay maintenance.12 After making these determinations, the trial court should exercise its discretion and determine whether and to what extent rehabilitative maintenance, permanent maintenance, or both are necessary to balance the ledger.
JOHNSTONE, J., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

. Majority Opinion, 107 S.W.3d 222, 224 (2003).

. Id. at 225.

. Casper v. Casper, Ky., 510 S.W.2d 253, 255 (1974).

.KRS 403.200(2); Casper v. Casper, supra note 3 at 255 ("KRS 403.200(2) specifies a number of relative factors to be considered in determining the amount of maintenance, including the 'standard of living established during the marriage.’ ” (emphasis added)).

. Louise E. Graham and James E. Keller, 16 Kentucky Practice: Domestic Relations Law, § 16.7 at 10 (2d. ed. West 1997).

. Id. § 16.7 at 10-11.

. KRS 403.200(l)(a).

. KRS 403.200(2)(c).

. See Perrine v. Christine, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 825, 826 (1992) (“[T]he trial court has dual responsibilities: one, to make relevant findings of fact; and two, to exercise its discretion in making a determination on maintenance in light of those facts.”).

. KRS 403.200(2)(a).

. Although one of Appellant’s primary arguments appears to be that she cannot invest all of the $360,000.00 she received in the property settlement agreement because she must utilize a portion of that amount to purchase a suitable residence, I would observe that the purchase of a residence would constitute an investment that would offset, in whole or in part, budgeted-for rent or mortgage payments.

. KRS 403.200(2)©.