Court Opinion

ID: 9756142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:09:48.47396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:12.899582
License: Public Domain

GARTH, District Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) :
I concur with the majority with respect to Points I (Standing), II (Abstention) and III (Injunction). However, I disagree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion with respect to Point IV (Vagueness) and Point V (Right of Privacy).
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 91 S.Ct. 1294, 28 L.Ed.2d 601 (1971) in reversing the trial court, held that the abortion statute of the District of Columbia 1 which contains the phrase, “necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or health” was not unconstitutionally vague.
While it is true that the New Jersey-statute speaks in terms of “without lawful justification”, and to that extent differs from the District of Columbia statute, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that the saving or preservation of the mother’s life constitutes lawful justification. State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (1948). The New Jersey abortion statute does not outlaw all abortions, but only those which are not necessary to preserve the mother’s life. This is virtually the same statutory language upheld as constitutional in Vuitch. See also: dissenting opinion, State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Sup.Ct.Fla.1972).
It is argued by the majority that the differing views of the members of the New Jersey Supreme Court as expressed in its subsequent opinions may leave room for a broader definition of the term “[un] lawful justification” and that “. . .in some other case where the facts required it, . . . [the Supreme Court of New Jersey] might be called upon to determine the specific limits of the statutory exception for abortions performed with lawful justification . . .”. State v. Moretti, 52 *1077N.J. 182, 192, 244 A.2d 499, 505 (1968). In my view however, this latter expression does not detract from nor dilute the status of the law of New Jersey as it exists today, which equates “lawful justification” with “preservation of the mother’s life”. Whether or not there are other circumstances which might in time cause a re-definition or expansion of “lawful justification” should not concern us in our instant task. Suffice it to say, if New Jersey’s law, as interpreted by its highest court, is to the effect that only one exception exists for the commission of an abortion, then it is to that statutory concept, as so defined, that this court should address itself.
As Mr. Justice White stated in his concurring opinion in Vuitch (402 U.S. at 73, 91 S.Ct. at 1300, 28 L.Ed.2d at 601):
“The District Court’s holding that the District of Columbia statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it proscribes all abortions except those necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or health was a judgment that the average person could not understand which abortions were permitted and which were prohibited. But surely the statute puts everyone on adequate notice that the health of the mother, whatever that phrase means, was the governing standard. It should also be absolutely clear that a doctor is not free to perform abortions on request without considering whether the patient’s health required it. No one of average intelligence could believe that under this statute abortions not dictated by health considerations are legal.”
Having found no distinguishing characteristic between the New Jersey abortion statute as interpreted by the Su-„ preme Court of New Jersey, and the statute held constitutionally definite by the United States Supreme Court in Vuitch, swpra, which latter decision must control our decision here, I must respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority. This, of course, is not to say that I would have reached the same result, absent the Vuitch pronouncement.
With respect to Point V of the majority opinion (Right of Privacy), I agree generally that there is a fundamental right in a married woman to determine whether or not to bear a child, once conception has occurred. I reach that conclusion by an analysis that differs somewhat from the analysis projected in the majority opinion. As I see it, one must distinguish between the two lines of precedents which form the basis for the argument advanced by the plaintiffs to the effect that the New Jersey abortion statutes2 violate their fundamental rights of marital and family privacy. The one precedential line is represented by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (fundamental right of marital privacy); the other precedential line leads to a fundamental right of family privacy through the teachings of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).
The case of Griswold v.. Connecticut, supra, has been relied upon in large part to support the contention that a woman has the fundamental right not to bear a child. I do not agree that Griswold is authority for that proposition. Gris-wold held that a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the right of marital privacy. In the Griswold majority opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas maintained that this right, while not set forth specifically in any one amendment, was included within the *1078penumbra of guarantees of the Bill of Rights. As Mr. Justice Douglas explained :
“. . . [The] specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance [citation omitted]. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Njnth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.’ ” 381 U.S. at 484, 85 S.Ct. at 1681.3
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, affirmed the reasoning embodied in the majority opinion, but emphasized the conceptual relevance of the Ninth Amendment. The opinion noted that the language and history of the Ninth Amendment indicate that “the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments.”4
The obvious question is whether the right of marital privacy recognized in Griswold is broad enough to encompass the right of a married woman to have an abortion. The Supreme Court found in Griswold that a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives had a “maximum destructive impact”5 upon the marital relationship. The use of contraceptive devices, therefore, was left to the discretion of married couples. The Gris-wold opinion implicitly recognizes that married couples have a right to regulate the size of their families prior to conception. Is there a valid reason why this right should not be extended to the post-conception situation as well? This question was raised by Mr. Justice Clark:
“. . . abortion falls within that sensitive area of privacy — the marital relation. One of the basic values of this privacy is birth control, as evidenced by the Griswold decision. Griswold’s act was to prevent formation of the fetus. This, the Court found, was constitutionally protected. If an individual may prevent conception, why can he not nullify that conception when prevention has failed?” 6
I maintain that the language in Gris-wold does not lend itself to such an expansive reading. I am mindful of the varied and broad readings given to Gris-wold by other courts. See, e. g., Doe v. Scott, 321 F.Supp. 1385 (N.D.Ill.1971); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F.Supp. 1048 (N.D. Georgia 1970), appeal docketed, No. 971, 39 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1970); Roe v. Wade, 314 F.Supp. 1217 (N.D.Texas 1970), appeal docketed, No. 808, 39 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1970); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F.Supp. 293 (E.D.Wisc.1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 12, 27 L.Ed.2d 1 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970), appeal docketed, No. 297, 39 *1079U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1971); People v. Belous, 71 Cal.2d 954, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 920, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970); But see Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F.Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C.1971); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F.Supp. 741 (N.D.Ohio 1970); and Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F.Supp. 1217 (E.D.La.1970), appeal docketed, No. 1010, 39 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1970). I cannot agree with the sweeping generalizations which seek to expand the Griswold factual context and holding beyond recognition. In Griswold, the majority focused on the sanctity of the marital home and the privacies of married life. The Court struck down an anti-contraceptive statute because it permitted the state to intrude upon “the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.” 7 The Court observed:
“We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife. . ,”8 [Emphasis supplied.]
The import of the Griswold decision is that private, consensual, marital relations are protected from unwarranted state regulation. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968); See also Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st. Cir. 1970); Mindel v. United States Civil Service Commission, 312 F.Supp. 485 (N.D.Cal.1970). But there is no discussion in Griswold of a “fundamental right” which can be exercised outside of the marital bedroom, weeks or months after a child is conceived. I would therefore hold that the right of marital privacy, as defined in Griswold, is not broad enough to encompass the right of a married woman to determine whether or not to bear a child once conception has occurred.
This analysis, however, does not stop with Griswold. While I have declined to stretch Griswold beyond its logical reach, I am aware that other expressions of the Supreme Court may be read as leading to the fundamental right asserted by plaintiffs. This right, if found, however, has its genesis in a famihj privacy context rather than in the Gris-wold context. The Supreme Court has previously established the principle that the states may not make unwarranted inroads into areas of personal or family autonomy. Thus, in Loving v. Virginia, supra, the Supreme Court noted that “the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 9 See also United States v. Nation, 9 USCMA 724, 26 CMR 504 (1958).
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute providing for the sterilization of “habitual criminals.” The Court observed that it was dealing “with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” 10
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the existence of certain fundamental rights associated with the family, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, and Meyer v. Nebraska, supra. In *1080Pierce the Court reviewed an Oregon statute which required parents to send their children to public schools. The statute, in effect, prevented parents from enrolling their children- in private schools or academies. The Court concluded that the act “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” 11 The same principle was stressed in Meyer, supra, where the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to children who had not passed the eighth grade. The Court maintained that the word “liberty” in the Due Process Clause included the freedom “to marry, establish a home and bring up children.” 12
The standard that emerges from these cases is clear. A fundamental right is protected by the Constitution unless the state has a compelling interest which outweighs this right. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra.13 This standard requires a two-step operation: the court must first determine whether the right asserted by the individual is a fundamental right-, if the court answers this question in the affirmative, it must then decide whether there is a compelling state interest which outweighs this right.
I emphasize that the fundamental rights doctrine is not designed to open the door to the subjective views of individual judges. The courts are directed to recognize only those rights which are rooted in the “traditions and [collective] conscience of our people.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 493, 85 S.Ct. at 1686.
Certainly, the fundamental rights heretofore recognized by the Supreme Court have roots in our culture and traditions. The right to marry14 and the right to procreate 15 are not the products of popular movements. They are threads woven into the fabric of our society. And the right of parents to make determinations about their children’s education or religious training 16 is basic to the family structure. These are rights which are firmly established. The right to travel, recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) is not the product of judicial whim. Its roots antedate the Constitution.17 The right of private association, also sustained by the Supreme Court,18 is fundamental to our democratic society.
Mr. Justice Holmes repeatedly criticized a subjective, fundamental rights approach to Constitutional doctrine. In *1081a series of dissenting opinions,19 he maintained that a court should not read into the Constitution conceptions of public policy which the court happened to entertain.20 The Holmesian view has won wide acceptance, and the states are now granted wide latitude to experiment with social and economic programs.
However, this grant does not permit the state to experiment with basic rights, rooted in our culture and traditions. As Mr. Justice Goldberg said in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1073, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), “. . . I quite agree with Mr. Justice Brandéis that ‘a State may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments’ . . . . I do not believe that this includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens . . . .” The Supreme Court has since reaffirmed its desire to protect personal and family rights which are based on more than contemporary social or economic viewpoints. See Loving v. Virginia, supra; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra.
The right of family privacy lies at the base of our social and cultural institutions. The Supreme Court has recognized the right to establish a home and bring up children in Pierce, supra, and Meyer, supra. These decisions “have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944).
If I am correct in my reading of these precedents and of their teachings, then it would appear that the right of family life or privacy which lies at the base of our social, traditional and cultural institutions, must of necessity result in a concomitant fundamental right of a married couple to determine the scope, dimension and extent of their family unit. While it is true that no direct authority has extended the family privacy concept to this pointy I feel that it is a logical extension of the Supreme Court pronouncements in this area.
I do not see how recognition can be given to the rights previously accorded to home establishment, rearing and education of children, without acknowledging the impressive sociological, economic and educational effect that family size has upon these considerations. A decision to bear a child hence to add to the family unit, inevitably affects all facets of family life and each and every member of the family.
If, as discussed, there exist fundamental rights pertaining to family life and privacy, I can find no basis nor reason for restricting those rights in this most vital and threshold aspect. Accordingly, I would hold that, subject to state interest, there is a fundamental right in a married woman21 to deter*1082mine whether or not to bear a child (thereby adding to the family unit or not, as the case may be) once conception has occurred.
I therefore reach the same conclusion as the majority, but predicated upon a “family right” analysis rather than on an analysis which would expand Gris-wold to what I regard would be impermissible limits. That distinction, of course, would restrict to some extent the scope of the fundamental right which I would recognize. It is with respect to the latter half of the equation (the nature and extent of the state interest necessary to justify an invasion of this fundamental right, Corkey v. Edwards, supra,) that I part company with the majority.
Certainly, the courts have been watchful to prevent unwarranted intrusions upon fundamental personal liberties. But even First Amendment rights are not considered absolute.22 This point is illustrated in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878), which held that a clan or colony may not permit polygamy even though this practice accords with the religious beliefs of its members. The religious practice23 reviewed in Reynolds was in no way frivolous. It was clear that the members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints believed that failure or refusal to practice polygamy would result in “damnation in the life to come.” 24 But fundamental personal liberties must give way where there are compelling state interests. The Supreme Court touched upon this problem in Reynolds when it asked:
“Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile [sic] of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?” 25
I hold that the state has such a compelling interest in the preservation of life, including fetal life,26 that even the fundamental right which I have acknowledged must be subordinated to that state interest.27
It must be remembered that the fundamental right with which we are here concerned can only be exercised by destroying potential life. See Corkey v. Edwards, supra. The interests of family privacy or convenience no matter how forcefully argued and no matter how vital, cannot be elevated over the right to live. As one Court has ob*1083served, “Protection of life has traditionally been one of the first duties owed by a state to its people.28 ”
Even in the first few weeks of pregnancy, the embryo 29 shows unmistakable signs of life. I realize that some courts have found it helpful to use terms such as “quickening” or “trimester” in evaluating fetal rights. See Babbitz v. McCann, supra; Doe v. Scott, supra. Older cases generally used the words “quickening” and “viability” to chart fetal development. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “quickening” is the first motion of the fetus which is felt by the mother. Quickening occurs in the middle of the term of pregnancy, usually in the last part of the fifth month. But the moment of quickening varies with each woman, and this makes it an unreliable measuring device. An unborn child is said to be “viable” when it is capable of existence apart from its mother.30 Viability also does not occur on a fixed date. In fact, advances in medical technology keep pushing the date of viability further back into the early months of pregnancy.
I do not find these concepts helpful in adjudicating the competing interests of the mother and the fetus. In fact, I fail to see how sound constitutional doctrine can be based on artificial time-lines. I view fetal life as a continuous growth process without the qualitative changes suggested by terms such as quickening or viability.
I do not imply that fetal life is equivalent in every sense to “human life.” I maintain only that the state’s interest in preserving fetal life outweighs the interest of the mother and the family unit. This view is consistent with the policy expressed in three decisions by the New Jersey Supreme Court. In Raleigh Fit-kin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985, 84 S.Ct. 1894, 12 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1964), a pregnant woman refused, on religious grounds, to submit to a blood transfusion. There was sufficient evidence to indicate that at some point in the pregnancy she would hemorrhage severely and that both she and the unborn child would die unless a blood transfusion was administered. Finding some support in previous cases, the court held:
“We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law’s protection and that an appropriate order should be made to insure blood transfusions to the mother in the event that they are necessary in the opinion of the physician in charge at the time.” 31
A similar conflict was raised in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), when plaintiff-family, brought a malpractice action against doctors who allegedly failed to inform them that their child could be defective when born. Plaintiffs maintained that the failure to give the warning prevented the woman from procuring an abortion.
In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the court observed:
“The right to life is inalienable in our society ....
We are not faced here with the necessity of balancing the mother’s life *1084against that of her child .... Eugenic considerations are not controlling. We are not talking here about the breeding of prize cattle. It may have been easier for the mother and less expensive for the father to have terminated the life of their child while he was an embryo, but these alleged detriments cannot stand against the preciousness of the single human life to support a remedy in tort, [citations omitted].
Though we sympathize with the unfortunate situation in which these parents find themselves, we firmly believe the right of their child to live is greater than and precludes their right not to endure emotional and financial injury.” 32
The New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed its interest in preserving life in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). In that case, Dolores Heston, a twenty-two year old Jehovah’s Witness was injured severely in an automobile accident. For religious reasons, Miss Heston’s mother insisted that a blood transfusion not be administered and signed a release of liability for the hospital and medical personnel. The hospital then made application to a state court judge for the appointment of a guardian for Miss Heston. After a hearing, the court apppinted a guardian with authority to consent to blood transfusions. Surgery was performed at the hospital and blood was administered. Following the operation, the defendants moved to vacate .the order, but the court declined to grant the motion.
On appeal the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that there was no constitutional right to choose to die. The court found that “the interest of the hospital and its staff, as well as the State’s interest in life, warranted the transfusion of blood under the circumstances of this case.” 33
As I have previously made evident, “the State’s interest in life” is not confined or restricted to that “life” after birth. The State’s interest in protecting and preserving life as I view it commences at the moment of conception. “Whatever that entity is, the state has chosen to protect its very existence. . . ” Corkey v. Edwards, supra, 322 F.Supp. at 1253. In this respect I am in agreement with the rationale of Corkey v. Edwards, supra, and with the dissent of Judge Campbell in Doe v. Scott, supra.
Whatever may be the merits of the sociological, economic and moral, arguments advanced by the plaintiffs as a basis for our holding otherwise, it would appear to me that these arguments and the data supporting them are more appropriate for a legislative rather than for a judicial forum.
Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the conclusions reached by the majority of this Court. I would hold the New Jersey abortion statute to be constitutional for the reasons hereinabove expressed.

. D.C.Code Ann. § 22-201: “Whoever, by means of any instrument, medicine, drug or other means whatever, procures or produces, or attempts to procure or produce an abortion or miscarriage on any woman, unless the same were done as necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or health and under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner of medicine, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year or not more than ten years . . . ”. [Emphasis supplied.]

. N.J.S.
2A :87-l
2A :87-2
2A: 170-76
45: 9-16
45: 10-9

. Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that there was nothing in these amendments which gave the Court authority to invalidate the Connecticut law.

. Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 488, 85 S.Ct. at 1684.

. Id. at 485, 85 S.Ct. 1678.

. Clark, Religion, Morality, and. Abortion:
A Constitutional Appraisal, 2 Loyola L.Rev. 1 (1969).

. Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. at 485, 85 S.Ct. at 1682.

. Id. at 482, 85 S.Ct. at 1680.

. 388 U.S. at 12, 87 S.Ct. at 1824. The Court held that a Virginia anti-miscegenation statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion was not based solely on recognition of vital personal rights. The presence of invidious racial discrimination was also a factor. As the Court stated, “To deny this fundamental freedom [marriage] on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive to the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all of the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.” 388 U.S. at 12, 87 S.Ct. at 1824.

. Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S.Ct. at 1113.

. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534, 535, 45 S.Ct. at 573.

. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399, 43 S.Ct. at 626.

. Where fundamental rights are involved, flic courts do not utilize the “rational regulation” standard. It is not sufficient, therefore, to maintain that the state has a rational or reasonable purpose for its policy. As Mr. Justice Goldberg said in Griswold : “In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a allowing that, a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. ‘Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.’ ” [citation omitted 1 381 U.S. at 497, 85 S.Ct. at 1688.

. Loving v. Virginia, supra.

. Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra.

. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.

. The Constitution does not mention a “right to travel,” but the Articles of Confederation provided for free ingress and egress to and from any state. Art. IV, Articles of Confederation.

. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958).

. See Tyson & Brother United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 S.Ct. 426, 71 L.Ed. 718 (1927) ; Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923) ; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441 (1915) ; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905).

. Judge Learned Hand was also an opponent of this doctrine. He once stated : “For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.” Hand, The Bill op Rights 73 (1958).

. While my conclusion has been framed in terms of married women as distinct from single women, the thrust of the plaintiffs’ argument is that this fundamental right is possessed by all women, married and single.
The fundamental right which I have found stems from Pierce and Meyer, which establish a right of family privacy. The force of precedent and this analysis necessarily restricts this right to married women.
I recognize, however, that the New Jersey abortion statutes make no distinction between married and unmarried women. Thus, in the absence of a compelling state interest (but see discussion infra), I would be obliged to hold these statutes overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 12 L.Ed.2d 325 (1964) ; *1082Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).

. I cite Mr. Justice Holmes’ maxim : “The most stringent protection of free speecli would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919).
Other cases in the First Amendment area illustrate this point. A farmer may be forced to comply with Federal agricultural quotas even though lie feels that they are contrary to the teachings of the Holy Scriptures. United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958, 78 S.Ct. 995, 2 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1958). An individual may be precluded from using poisonous snakes in a religious ritual, State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial Federal question, sub nom. Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942, 69 S.Ct. 813, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1949).

. The Free Exercise clause is absolute in its protection of religious beliefs, but it does not serve as an absolute bar to state regulation of religious practices.

. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161.

. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.

. I include in the term “fetal life” all potential life as it may exist from the moment of conception.

. There are other possible state interests which might be asserted : population control, health and public safety and regulation of sexual conduct. My holding makes it unnecessary to determine the significance of these interests.

. Commonwealth v. Brunelle, No. 83879, at 5 (Middlesex County, Mass.Super.Ct. 1970).

. Fetal life may be subdivided into various stages: the zygote, the embryo, and the fetus. According to Dobland’s Illustbated Medical Dictionaky a zygote is “the cell resulting from the fusion of two gametes; the fertilized ovum. Dorland’s defines embryo as “the early or developing state of an organism, especially the developing product of fertilization of an egg. In the human, the embryo is generally considered to be the developing organism from one week after conception to the end of the second month.” The same source defines a fetus as “the developing young in the human uterus after the end of the second month.”

. See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).

. Raleigh, 42 N.J. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538. The court noted that at the time of the action “the child was quick” since the pregnancy was beyond the thirty-second week.

. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, supra, 49 N.J. at 30, 31, 277 A.2d at 693.

. John P. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, supra, 279 A.2d at page 674.