Court Opinion

ID: 9682376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:10:20.420143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:00.078668
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
WHITE, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction of murder under V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sections 7.01 and 19.02. A jury assessed punishment at 99 years’ imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine.
Subsequent to the jury verdict, the trial court then added to the judgment an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the crime. On appeal, appellant raised one ground of error. Appellant claimed that it was error for the trial court to make the affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the jury implicitly made the said finding in its verdict. The court below also held that where the jury makes the finding, the judgment should reflect that the jury, not the trial court, found that the defendant used a *401deadly weapon in the commission of his crime. The court below held that even though the trial court erred in stating that it made the finding, the error was harmless. The court below overruled the ground of error, but reformed the trial court’s judgment to show that the jury, and not the trial court, made the affirmative finding. Travelstead v. State, (No. 09-83-060 CR, February 15, 1984).
In the appellant’s petition for discretionary review, he raises the ground of review that it was error for the trial court to make the affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used. In the instant case the appellant was indicted for capital murder. The indictment, omitting the formal parts, reads:
“did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, Bob Yarbrough, by shooting him with a gun; and the said Lloyd Sherman Tra-velsted (sic) did then and there intentionally cause the death of the said Bob Yarbrough in the course of committing the offense of robbery.” 1
The evidence shows that appellant, Lloyd Sherman Travelstead, hated his step-father, Bob Yarbrough, and wanted him dead. Travelstead approached his friend Stephen Oates to help him kill Bob Yar-brough. Together they planned the murder. Travelstead and Oates met on the day of June 13, 1982 to carry out the plan. As they drove to the victim’s residence Travel-stead loaded the gun.
At the time Oates and Travelstead arrived, the victim was home alone, seated at his kitchen table eating his evening meal. Travelstead and Oates knocked at an outside door which opened into the kitchen. When the victim opened the door Oates fired a shotgun blast into his body causing him to fall face down on the floor. Travel-stead said “shoot him, Shoot him. Make sure he is dead.” Oates then walked up to the victim on the floor and shot him again in the back. Travelstead then picked up the money bag which the victim had brought home from his place of business and he and Oates fled the scene in Oates’ car.
After the close of evidence, the trial court charged the jury, in the paragraph applying the law to the facts, as to the offense of murder, and whether or not the appellant was a party to that murder. The jury was not charged on whether the appellant committed the murder himself. The verdict of the jury, omitting the formal parts, reads:
“We, the jury, find the defendant ‘Guilty of Murder’ as charged in the indictment.”
After the jury assessed the appellant’s punishment, the trial court added the statement, “The Court makes an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used,” to the judgment. Ex parte Moser, 602 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), would certainly be applicable in this case except for the issue of the law of parties.
Appellant states that he was convicted only as a party to murder. Appellant argues that the law of parties does not apply to Section 3f(a)(2), Article 42.12, Y.A.C.C.P. Appellant claims that the trial court incorrectly found that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the murder.
In Section 15(b), Article 42.12, V.A.C. C.P., the Legislature set out that:
“If the judgment contains an affirmative finding under section 3f(a)(2) of this Article, he is not eligible for release on parole until his actual calendar time served, without consideration of good conduct time, equals one-third of the maximum sentence or 20 calendar years, whichever is less.”
Section 3f(a)(2) states, in part:
“Upon affirmative finding that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon 2 during the commission of an offense *402or during immediate flight therefrom, the trial court shall enter the finding in the judgment of the court.”
We find that the phrase “the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon” implies that the defendant, himself, use or exhibit a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony or flight therefrom. When a defendant is a party, as defined in Sections 7.01 and 7.02 of the Penal Code, to the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, there must be a specific finding by the trier of facts that the defendant himself used or exhibited the deadly weapon. The power of the trial court to make an affirmative finding should only be invoked if he is the trier of the facts. When the issue of punishment is before the jury, the trial court should submit a special issue to the jury regarding an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon. Much confusion would be eliminated if this procedure were followed. Additional guidelines have been set out in a case decided this day. Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).
We agree with the court below that “the statute does not require any specific wording or terminology when making a finding that a deadly weapon was used.” However, the defendant, not another party, must use or exhibit the deadly weapon.
As a party to the fatal shooting of Bob Yarbrough, appellant was improperly found to have used a deadly weapon in the commission of that crime. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The judgment of the trial court shall be reformed to delete the affirmative finding that the appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon in the commission of the murder.
TEAGUE, J., concurs in the result.

. This is not a model indictment for capital murder. For a proper form, see 7 Texas Practice 33 ff, Wilson’s Texas Criminal Forms, Morrison and Blackwell, Section 4.05.

. As defined in V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 1.07(a)(ll).