Court Opinion

ID: 9447418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:34:38.562236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:02.114633
License: Public Domain

JONES, Chief Judge
(dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent.
Stripped of nonessentials, the primary issue in this case narrows to interpreting and finding the meaning of the applicable statute. The special provision, Act of August 26, 1950 (5 U.S.C.A. § 22-1), is as follows:
“ * * * any person whose employment is so suspended or terminated * * * may, in the discretion of the agency head concerned, be reinstated or restored to duty, and if so reinstated or restored shall be allowed compensation for all or any part of the period of such suspension or termination in an amount not to exceed the difference between the amount such person would normally have earned during the period of such suspension or termination, at the rate he was receiving on the date of suspension or termination, as appropriate, and the interim net *884earnings of such person * * [Emphasis supplied.]
The plaintiff was reinstated pursuant to a court order after being discharged as a security risk. He has been paid his basic salary for the period of suspension, but at the time the question of his dismissal was raised, he was working in the Pacific islands. Consequently, he was receiving a post differential of 25 percent in addition to his basic salary. He claims to be entitled to this differential notwithstanding the fact that he was brought home and spent no part of the interim period outside of the continental United States.
I disagree with the interpretation which the majority has placed on this provision of the statute quoted above. It will be noted that there are at least two bases of discretion. The statute provides that on reinstatement the employee shall be allowed compensation “for all or any part of the period of such suspension.” Following that provision it is stated that such compensation shall be in an amount “not to exceed the difference between the amount such person would normally have earned during the period of such suspension or termination, at the rate he was receiving on the date of suspension or termination * * and the interim net earnings of such person.”
This statute has been construed by the majority as if the expression “or any part” and the expression “not to exceed” had been deleted from the statute. There must be a reason why these two limitations were inserted.
In addition, this court has already decided the question of an employee’s entitlement to the differential payments during the period when he was not located abroad. The same question was before the court in Kalv v. United States, 1954, 124 F.Supp. 654, at page 656, 128 Ct.Cl. 207, at page 211 from which we quote:
“ * * * Every provision of law and every executive order which we have been able to find which bears upon this subject indicates that the reason for the differential is either the increased expense of living abroad, or the difference in environment involving physical hardship, health or extraordinarily difficult living conditions.
“Plaintiff was abroad not a single day during the period for which he is claiming the additional compensation. All the reasons, therefore, for allowing the additional compensation are removed from the case, and this portion of the claim is left hanging on a bare technicality.”
The same conclusion was reached in Casman v. United States, Ct.Cl., 181 F.Supp. 404. See order entering judgment of October 7, 1959.
The plaintiff in the instant case spent no time in the Pacific during the period of suspension.
For the double reason that I do not regard the 25 percent differential as being applicable when the plaintiff during the period involved was in the continental United States and that I regard the statute quoted above as not mandatory, but only as placing a ceiling on the amount an employee may recover, the plaintiff's claim for differential payment should be denied.
In the circumstances involved in this case I would dismiss plaintiff’s entire petition.