Court Opinion

ID: 9724629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:05:11.493266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:03.277567
License: Public Domain

*660Hallows, J.
(concurring). While we are again restating the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, I would prefer the articulation to be a bit more certain than what is now offered.
The oft-quoted statement of the doctrine as stated by Chief Justice Erle in 1865 in Scott v. London St. Katherine Docks Co. 3 Hurl. & C. 594 (*596), is :
“But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.”
This statement in substance is cited in Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed.), ch. 6, p. 218, sec. 39, and the headnote based on the statement has been cited with approval by the court in Kirst v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. R. Co. (1879), 46 Wis. 489, 492, 1 N. W. 89; Cummings v. National Furnace Co. (1884), 60 Wis. 603, 612, 18 N. W. 742, 20 N. W. 665; and in Dunham v. Wisconsin Gas S Electric Co. (1938), 228 Wis. 250, 256, 280 N. W. 291. The two elements requisite for the application of the doctrine in Wisconsin were extensively discussed in Turk v. H. C. Frange Co. (1963), 18 Wis. (2d) 547, 119 N. W. (2d) 365. The rule has long been considered to be in the nature of a permissive inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence in situations where it is more probable the injury was caused by some negligence of the defendant than that it was not. Lipsky v. C. Reiss Coal Co. (1908), 136 Wis. 307, 117 N. W. 803; Turk v. H. C. Prange Co., supra; Koehler v. Thiensville State Bank (1944), 245 Wis. 281, 14 N. W. (2d) 15.
When the rule is applicable to a given case is the subject of conflict in the cases. In Brunner v. Van Hoof (1958), 4 Wis. (2d) 459, 464, 90 N. W. (2d) 551, we pointed *661out, “. . . the doctrine may be applied in cases where evidence of specific negligence is introduced” and attempted to state when the doctrine was inapplicable in terms of a prima facie case. When evidence of specific acts of negligence reaches the point where a prima facie case is made, it is erroneous for the trial court to give an instruction to the jury that it is permissible for it to draw an inference of general negligence from the fact that an injury has occurred. Brunner v. Van Hoof, supra, so held.
The majority opinion states this concept in terms of a determination of “such substantial proof of negligence as to render superfluous the giving' of an instruction on res ipsa loquitur.” But what is substantial and when is the doctrine superfluous or redundant is not explained. These terms are new in the literature on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The only time giving an instruction on res ipsa loquitur would be superfluous or redundant is when the jury unaided by the doctrine may properly in its reasoning process conclude from the evidence of specific acts that the defendant was negligent in that specific respect. When the evidence of negligence is “substantial” enough to permit this, a prima facie case has been made and the plaintiff is entitled to go to the jury and neither public policy nor necessity can justify the application of the doctrine. The terms “substantial,” “superfluous,” and “redundant” are only meaningful in terms of whether the plaintiff without the aid of the application of the doctrine is entitled to go to the jury, and in that case the inference of general negligence or negligence in no specific respect is ruled out as being inconsistent with the proved specific negligence.
The quotation accepted by the majority from Prosser impliedly supports this rule because evidence of specific negligence which furnishes a full and complete explanation of the occurrence destroys the inference of general negligence inferred from the fact that the injury has occurred. *662This court in Commerce Ins. Co. v. Merrill Gas Co. (1955), 271 Wis. 159, 168, 72 N. W. (2d) 771, stated:
“Should their attempt to prove specific negligence on defendant’s part be unsuccessful, or should their introduction of evidence of specific negligence fail to establish the precise cause of the damage claimed, they will not as a result be deprived of the benefits available to them under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.”
Conversely, the effect of being “unsuccessful” in making a prima facie case on specific negligence is stated in Anno. 33 A. L. R. (2d) 791, 803, Res Ipsa Loquitur — Availability :
“In several cases recognizing the general rule that an unsuccessful attempt by the plaintiff to prove specific acts of negligence does not deprive him of the benefits of res ipsa otherwise available, the view has been taken that where the plaintiff’s evidence of specific negligence is sufficient to raise an issue for the jury or to make a prima facie case, the plaintiff’s ‘attempt’ to prove specific negligence can no longer be regarded as ‘unsuccessful,’ and the jury should not be permitted to consider any inference or presumption arising from res ipsa.”
In the instant case I do not consider the evidence much more than sufficient to qualify the facts by an expert for the application of the doctrine and certainly not as amounting to a prima facie case on specific negligence.
I am authorized to state Mr. Justice Wilkie joins in this concurring opinion.