Court Opinion

ID: 9610364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:40:08.410002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:34.877415
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Goolsby, Judge:
This matter is before the court on a petition for rehearing filed by the appellant William Franklin Prior, M.D. After careful consideration of the petition, we are unable to discover any material fact or principle of law that we overlooked or disregarded in affirming the judgment below. One of the two grounds on which Prior bases his petition warrants additional comment.
*536Prior questions the “soundness” of our decision in upholding the exercise of discretion by the trial court in qualifying two social workers as expert witnesses to give opinion testimony concerning their diagnoses of Honea’s psychiatric disorder, a position which Prior charges is “virtually unsupported in other jurisdictions.” He particularly complains of our use of People v. Scala, 128 Misc. (2d) 831, 491 N. Y. S. (2d) 555 (1985), as supporting authority. He contends this “mere trial court decision in New York ... strongly appears to be ‘out of step’ with the controlling authority in that jurisdiction of People v. Diaz, 51 N. Y. (2d) 841, 433 N. Y. S. (2d) 751, 413 N.E. (2d) 1166 (1980).”
Irrespective of whether Scala is “out of step” with Diaz or not, our decision in the instant case is in full accord with Diaz.
In a memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals of New York stated, “The trial court’s refusal to permit defendant to offer certain testimony of a psychologist concerning defendant’s mental condition was a matter within the court’s discretion.” 51 N. Y. (2d) at 842, 433 N. Y. S. (2d) at 752, 413 N.E. (2d) at 1166, [Emphasis ours.] In holding “[i]t was not error ... for the trial court to refuse to permit testimony regarding the interpretation of [psychological] tests as they applied to this defendant’s mental condition, since the witness’ expertise in interpretations of this nature had not been satisfactorily established,” the court expressly limited its holding to the case before it. Viz.:
This is not to say that only a psychiatrist may testify in this regard. Rather, we merely hold that, under the circumstances present in this case, the Trial Judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to permit the challenged testimony. Absent a finding by this court that the Trial Judge erred as a matter of law, a finding which we may not make in this case, there should be an affirmance.
51 N. Y. (2d) at 842-43, 433 N. Y. S. (2d) at 752, 413 N. E. (2d) at 1166-67.
Two judges dissented in Diaz. They viewed the trial judge as having committed an abuse of discretion in not allowing the psychologist, who had a bachelor of arts degree in psy*537chology and 27 years experience in the area of psychological testing, to testify concerning whether the defendant suffered from extreme emotional disturbance at the time he killed his paramour. As they read the record, the trial judge improperly predicated his ruling on the ground, “repeated several times in the course of the direct examination of the psychologist, that the witness was not a psychiatrist and that the opinion sought could only be given by a psychiatrist.” 51 N. Y. (2d) at 843, 433 N. Y. S. (2d) at 752, 413 N.E. (2d) at 1167.
Here, we have held, like the New York Court of Appeals did in Diaz, simply that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances. The only difference between the two cases, as we view them, is that in Diaz the trial court, in the exercise of discretion, disallowed the testimony in question while in the instant case the trial court, in the exercise of discretion, allowed it.
We do not agree, moreover, that Scala is “out of step” with Diaz. The trial court in Scala held that “[pjroperly trained clinical social workers are manifestly competent to diagnose mental disorders” and, in reaching this decision, expressly noted the Court of Appeals’ acknowledgement in Diaz that someone other than a psychiatrist may testify regarding a person’s mental condition.
In our decision, we also have acknowledged that one other than a psychiatrist may give an expert opinion concerning a person’s mental condition. See Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 510 A. (2d) 735 (1986) (wherein the court upheld the trial court’s admission of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome from a witness who did not have a medical degree and listed cases supporting its conclusion that an expert witness need not hold a medical degree in order to testify that a complainant exhibits symptoms of rape trauma syndrome).
Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is
Denied.
Shaw and Cureton, JJ., concur.