Court Opinion

ID: 9845754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:22.799508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:21.189285
License: Public Domain

Felton, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the judgment of affirmance for two reasons. I think that the charge complained of in ground six was a plain expression of opinion by the court to the effect that the plaintiff relied upon the representation of the defendant that the automobile was a 1949 model, and that a new trial should be granted for that reason. The court was at the time referring to a contention of the plaintiff as to an item of damage. He was not discussing the contention of the plaintiff that he relied on the representations of the defendant, and I therefore cannot see how the jury could have interpreted the words otherwise than as an expression of the court’s opinion. Second, I do not think that the plaintiff made out a case for damages. He traded in his 1949 Ford on the new Hudson and was allowed $2100 for it. There is no evidence that he was not allowed more for his car than he would probably have been *211allowed on a 1949 model Hudson or any other new car for which he might have traded. If he was allowed $350 more for his car than he could have obtained elsewhere, or $350 more than its market value, he was not damaged. There was no evidence as to the trade-in or market value of the plaintiff’s 1949 Ford.