Court Opinion

ID: 9369243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 15:05:54.864287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.544730
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Benton, 2023-Ohio-153.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                       HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,                              :        APPEAL NO. C-210476
                                                     TRIAL NO. C-20CRB-21903
       Plaintiff-Appellant,                 :

 vs.                                        :           O P I N I O N.

JALIL BENTON,                               :

    Defendant-Appellee.                     :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 20, 2023

Mark Piepmeier, Interim Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald
Springman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, Judge.

       {¶1}    Jalil Benton was arrested six-and-a-half months after the police filed a

complaint charging him with domestic violence, a first-degree misdemeanor. Benton

filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the six-and-a-half-month delay between the

filing of the complaint and his arrest violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

After a hearing, the trial court agreed and dismissed the charge. On appeal, the state

argues that the trial court erred when it engaged in a full speedy-trial analysis pursuant

to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), because it

contends that the six-and-a-half-month delay was not sufficiently long to trigger such

an analysis. For the following reasons, we overrule the state’s assignment of error and

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                      Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶2}    Jalil Benton was charged with domestic violence on November 15, 2020,

and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On May 31, 2021, Benton was arrested for the

charge. On June 10, 2021, Benton filed a motion to dismiss, which was supplemented

on August 18, 2021, contending that the delay between the filing of the complaint and

his arrest violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

       {¶3}    At the hearing on the motion, North College Hill Police Officer Zachary

Whyle testified that he responded to a call from Nianah Shaw who alleged that Benton

had pushed her head against a framed picture. Whyle testified that “upon our initial

dispatch, they stated that he had left the scene, so I checked the area.” Whyle had a

description of Benton’s vehicle and spent “[s]omewhere between 5 and 10 minutes”

looking for him, but was unsuccessful. Whyle testified that Shaw provided Benton’s

phone number, but the police were in possession of his phone, so they did not try to

call. And while Benton’s registered address was the address of the alleged incident,

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                         OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Shaw reported that Benton no longer lived there. After the warrant was issued, no

other attempts were made to locate or notify Benton.

         {¶4}    Besides Shaw and Benton, there were no other witnesses to the

domestic-violence incident. Although Whyle was wearing a body camera at the time

of his investigation, he testified that the body-camera video was most likely deleted

pursuant to the department’s retention policy.1 Whyle testified that the video “would

have shown a broken glass from a picture frame that was on the wall in line with Ms.

Shaw’s statements,” in addition to Shaw’s demeanor and her statement to police.

Whyle testified that he remembered seeing the broken glass and looking for Benton’s

vehicle, but that given that “it’s been awhile” since the incident, he could “remember

some things. Just not everything.”

         {¶5}    Benton testified that he had no knowledge of the arrest warrant. Benton

stated that he was never contacted by police about the warrant, and did not learn about

it until he was arrested. He stated that he spoke with Shaw in 2021 after the incident,

and that she knew how to contact him. Benton was not familiar with the phone

number that Shaw gave to the police.

         {¶6}     After a hearing on the motion, the trial court found that Benton’s

constitutional speedy-trial right was violated by the delay and dismissed the charge.

         {¶7}    The state now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding

that Benton’s constitutional rights were violated because the delay in initiating the

arrest was not “presumptively prejudicial,” and therefore, was insufficient to trigger a

Barker speedy-trial analysis. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d

1   PROSECUTOR: So most likely—you can’t say for certain today, but most likely that video, if
    it ever existed, no longer exists?
    WHYLE: Yes.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

101 (“Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity

for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”).

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶8}    The review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and

fact. See State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d 179, 2020-Ohio-5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 15.

Therefore, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, including findings of historical

facts, if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.             Id.    We then

independently determine whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts.

Id.

                                  Law and Analysis

       {¶9}    “Both the United States and the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right

to a speedy trial.” State v. Gage, 2018-Ohio-480, 104 N.E.3d 994, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.),

citing State v. Meeker, 26 Ohio St.2d 9, 268 N.E.2d 589 (1971), paragraph one of the

syllabus. This right applies to delays in prosecution. Meeker at paragraph three of the

syllabus. To determine whether a particular delay is constitutionally reasonable, a

court must balance four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay,

(3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.

Barker at 530.

       {¶10} In holding that Benton’s right to a speedy trial was violated, the trial

court stated, “I am not finding that it is a presumptively prejudicial delay of six and a

half months. I understand that factor, but I am finding that is prejudicial.” The court

then went on to weigh the remaining Barker factors. The court found that the state

did not have any reason for the delay. The court stated, “I have a real problem with

this prong. * * * that’s not enough looking for someone for 5 minutes around the North

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

College Hill area. That is not enough over six months.” The court found that Benton

timely asserted his speedy-trial right. The court lastly found that Benton suffered

actual prejudice “because there is no body worn camera.”

       {¶11} In its sole assignment of error, the state argues that “The trial court

erred in dismissing the domestic violence charge against defendant based on

allegations his constitutional rights to speedy trial were violated.” In this appeal, the

state does not take issue with the trial court’s Barker findings, explain why the court’s

findings were not supported by competent, credible, evidence, or argue that the court

improperly weighed the Barker factors. Rather, the state argues that the trial court

erred in engaging in a Barker analysis at all. According to the state, because the court

stated that it was “not finding that it is a presumptively prejudicial delay,” the court

erred by engaging in “a complete analysis of the Barker four-factor test used to

evaluate the constitutionality of pretrial delay.”

       {¶12} In Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120

L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that the length of delay to

trigger a Barker analysis must cross the threshold from “ordinary” to “presumptively

prejudicial delay.” “[I]n other words, the length of the delay must be sufficiently

prejudicial to warrant further review of the speedy-trial claim.” State v. Long, 163

Ohio St.3d 179, 2020-Ohio-5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 50 (Dewine, J., dissenting).

However, no case has drawn a specific line regarding exactly how many months will

trigger a Barker analysis. This is because Barker “specifically rejected setting a fixed

approach to a speedy-trial analysis, finding that there could be no constitutional basis

for specifying a set number of days or months.” State v. Sears, 166 Ohio App.3d 166,

2005-Ohio-5963, 849 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). The Barker court reasoned that:

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       [B]ecause of the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of

       delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon

       the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the

       delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably

       less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.

       {¶13} The Doggett case later emphasized that the inquiry must be whether

the delay “crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’

delay, since, by definition, [the accused] cannot complain that the government has

denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary

promptness.” Doggett at 652, quoting Barker at 530-531. “If the accused makes this

showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to

which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial

examination of the claim.” Id.

       {¶14} Doggett mentioned in a footnote that “[d]epending on the nature of the

charges, lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay ‘presumptively

prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct.

2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, fn.1. Courts have generally applied this “approaching a year”

rule as the point at which an ordinary delay transforms into a presumptively

prejudicial delay. This has led to inconsistent results.

       {¶15} In State v. Sears, 166 Ohio App.3d 166, 2005-Ohio-5963, 849 N.E.2d

1060 (1st Dist.), we found that a nine-month delay triggered the Barker analysis. Id.

at ¶ 12. More recently, in State v. Mughni, 2022-Ohio-626, 185 N.E.3d 678 (1st Dist.),

we stated that “[w]e decline the state’s invitation to draw an indelible nine-month line

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

in the sand for establishing a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial,” and

held that an eight-and-a-half-month delay was “approaching a year, and therefore,

sufficient to trigger the remainder of the analysis.” Id. at ¶ 8.

       {¶16} Some courts have found delays around six months to be sufficient to

trigger a Barker analysis. See United States v. Valentine, 783 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th

Cir.1986) (“[W]hile the [6 month] delay in Valentine’s case was not very long, it was

sufficient to cause us to examine the other factors.”); United States v. Simmons, 536

F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir.1976) (“Although a borderline case, we hold that the six-month

delay [of trial on forgery charges] was sufficiently prejudicial to trigger an inquiry into

the other factors.”); See Takacs v. Engle, 768 F.2d 122, 128 (6th Cir.1985) (delay of

six-and-one-half months between arrest and trial for aggravated burglary, aggravated

robbery, and felonious assault was “probably a sufficient length of time to trigger [a

Barker] inquiry”).

       {¶17} Other courts have found that delays around six months are not

sufficient to trigger a Barker analysis. See State v. Webb, 4th Dist. Washington No.

01CA32, 2002-Ohio-3552, ¶ 26 (delay of 186 days not presumptively prejudicial);

State v. Pinson, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 00CA2713, 2001-Ohio-2423 (delay of six-and-a-

half months not presumptively prejudicial); State v. Davis, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05

MA 235, 2007-Ohio-7216, ¶ 31 (six-month delay “does not begin to approach the time

frame in which presumptive prejudice applies.”).

       {¶18} To be sure, any delay longer than six months is arguably “approaching

a year.” But, when faced with a borderline case like Benton’s, rather than focus on

whether the delay is “approaching a year,” the question should instead be whether the

delay causes any constitutional concern or is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant further

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

review of the speedy-trial claim. Such an inquiry is more in line with Barker’s

observation that “the right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other

procedural rights” and that it is “impossible to determine with precision when the right

has been denied.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.

       {¶19} The dissent accuses the majority of ignoring the trial court’s finding that

there was no presumptive prejudice, “judicially rewrit[ing] the Barker analysis,” and

“disregard[ing] Ohio precedent.” But that is simply not the case.

       {¶20} To “presume” means “[t]o assume beforehand; to suppose to be true in

the absence of proof.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1304 (9th Ed.2009). In this case, the

trial court stated that it did not have to “presume” that there was prejudice, because it

found that there actually was prejudice. No presumption of prejudice was required in

this case.2 To require a finding of presumptive prejudice when the testimony elicited

at the hearing demonstrated actual prejudice ignores the heart of the inquiry and

works to draw that indelible line in the sand that we have been warned to avoid. Would

a delay of a few more weeks, when some evidence has already been destroyed,

somehow transform the case and allow the trial court to examine the Barker factors?

Such an approach was not the aim of Barker or Doggett. Thus, we are left to determine

whether the length of the delay in this particular case was sufficiently prejudicial to

2 In discussing speedy-trial prejudice, the Doggett court explained that one important role of
presumptive prejudice is to demonstrate prejudice when a defendant otherwise cannot. The court
explained,
        Barker explicitly recognized that impairment of one’s defense is the most difficult
        form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time’s erosion of exculpatory
        evidence and testimony “can rarely be shown.” [Barker,] 407 U.S. at 532 [,92 S.Ct.
        2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101]. * * * Thus, we generally have to recognize that excessive
        delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party
        can prove or, for that matter, identify. While such presumptive prejudice cannot
        alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to other Barker criteria, it is
        part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of
        delay.
(Citation omitted.) Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

warrant further review. Our analysis is completely in line with the Barker/Doggett

precedent and follows the directive not to draw a line in the sand regarding the length

of delay that will trigger a Barker analysis.

       {¶21} In determining whether the six-and-a-half-month delay in this case

causes any constitutional concern, we must keep in mind the “peculiar circumstances

of the case,” such as the fact that Benton was charged with a first-degree misdemeanor.

While the allegations are serious, this is precisely the type of ordinary street crime

where a lengthy delay should not be tolerated. In fact, R.C. 2945.71(B)(2) requires the

state to bring a defendant to trial 90 days from the date of arrest. Sears noted that in

evaluating the length of delay between the filing of the complaint and the service of

the warrant for a first-degree misdemeanor, “we might start with a premise that any

delay of more than 90 days is presumptively prejudicial.” Sears, 166 Ohio App.3d 166,

2005-Ohio-5963, 849 N.E.2d 1060, at ¶ 10. The length of delay in Benton’s case is

more than twice that.

       {¶22} The Sixth Amendment’s speedy-trial provision has several purposes: (1)

to prevent undue delay and oppressive incarceration prior to trial; (2) to reduce

anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation; and (3) to limit the possibility

that long delay will impair the ability of the accused to defend himself. United States

v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). In this case,

because Benton was not incarcerated and had no knowledge of the criminal charges

prior to his arrest, the only concern at issue is the possibility that the delay impaired

the ability of Benton to defend himself. As set forth in Doggett, this is the “most

serious form[] of prejudice, * * * because the inability of a defendant to adequately

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Doggett, 407 U.S. at 532,

112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520.

       {¶23} The trial court found that there was more than a possibility that the

delay impaired Benton’s defense.      The court found that Benton suffered actual

prejudice due to the delay. The state has not challenged this finding.

       {¶24} Benton was charged with a first-degree misdemeanor and was not

arrested for six-and-a-half months, which is more than twice the statutory speedy-trial

time limit. This delay led to the destruction of evidence, which the trial court found to

have prejudiced the defense. Based upon the peculiar circumstances of this case, we

hold that the six-and-a-half-month delay caused constitutional concern and was

sufficiently prejudicial to warrant further review of Benton’s speedy-trial claim.

Because the state has not challenged the court’s ultimate constitutional speedy-trial

findings or its weighing of the Barker factors, we do not undertake that analysis.

       {¶25} The holding in this case should by no means be interpreted to mean that

a six-and-a-half-month delay will always trigger a Barker analysis. Rather, the

peculiar facts of this case drive the outcome.

       {¶26} Accordingly, we hold that trial court’s examination of the remaining

Barker factors was not in error and we overrule the sole assignment of error.

                                                                    Judgment affirmed.
BOCK, J., concurs.
ZAYAS, P.J., dissents.

ZAYAS, P.J., dissenting.

       {¶27} The majority correctly acknowledges that the trial court determined

that this six-and-a-half-month delay was not a presumptively prejudicial delay.

Additionally, neither the state nor Benton challenged this finding. We are not at

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

liberty to ignore this finding and judicially rewrite the Barker analysis. Consequently,

I must respectfully dissent.

       {¶28} In this case, after finding that the delay was not presumptively

prejudicial, the trial court proceeded to engage in the Barker analysis. The state

maintains that, “After this finding, the trial court’s analysis of Benton’s speedy trial

claim under Barker should have ended.” I agree. Under Barker, “Until there is some

delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the

other factors that go into the balance.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33

L.Ed.2d 101. “Presumptive prejudice,” when used in this threshold context simply

“marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the

Barker enquiry.” Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, fn.1. Absent

a finding of presumptive prejudice, the trial court should not have analyzed the

remaining Barker factors.

       {¶29} Instead of addressing the state’s argument, the majority reexamines the

court’s determination that the delay was not presumptively prejudicial and rejects the

trial court’s finding. In doing so, the majority admittedly disregards Ohio precedent

finding that delays around six months are not presumptively prejudicial and further

concludes that a finding of presumptive prejudice was unnecessary because the trial

court found actual prejudice after weighing the Barker factors.

       {¶30} To justify its contrary finding, the majority concludes that “rather than

focus on whether the delay is ‘approaching a year,’ the question should instead be

whether the delay causes any constitutional concern or is sufficiently prejudicial to

warrant further review of the speedy-trial claim.”

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶31} Perhaps that is what the question “should be,” but we are bound by

precedent.     Barker is clear that the length of delay operates as a “triggering

mechanism.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. While I

recognize that presumptive prejudice is not necessarily determined by drawing a line

in the sand, this does not obviate the Barker directive that unless the delay “has

crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay,”

inquiry into the remaining Barker factors is unnecessary. Doggett at 651-652.

       {¶32} Because I am bound by precedent to apply the analysis set forth in

Barker and Doggett, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause

for further proceedings, including reinstatement of the complaint.

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry this date.

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