Court Opinion

ID: 9754043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:40:22.668724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:29.217712
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
I vigorously dissent from the majority’s attempt to revive Commonwealth v. Garner, 204 Pa. Superior Ct. 227, 208 A. 2d 333 (1964), and its denial of a remedy to appellant.
Garner held that a defendant could not attack a sentence which affected a sentence he was serving if the former sentence had been served. That rationale was rejected by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth *31ex rel. Ulmer v. Rundle, 421 Pa. 40, 218 A. 2d 233 (1966), and by this Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Ackerman v. Russell, 209 Pa. Superior Ct. 467, 228 A. 2d 208 (1967).
We stated specifically in Ackerman: “Prior to Ulmer it was held by us that a sentence which had expired might not be attacked. Commonwealth v. Garner, [supra; citations omitted]. However, ... we find in Ulmer a contrary ruling which impliedly overrules Garner . . . [citation omitted]. Therefore, the argument of expiration of sentence no longer prevents an attack on the sentences which have expired.” Id. at 472. I joined in Ackerman because it overruled Garner.
I would apply Ulmer and Ackerman to the instant case, even though appellant is not incarcerated under a second sentence as yet. See Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, §3, 19 P.S. §1180-3. The Act was designed to provide a uniform procedure for determining if convictions were obtained and sentences imposed without due process of law. Id. §2, 19 P.S. §1180-2. The procedure was to “encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose that exist when this statute takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” Ibid. Accordingly, I would construe the Act to grant a uniform procedure for petitioners who would have relief at common law or under the statutes.
However, even if the Court is reluctant to so construe the Act, habeas corpus and coram nobis remain as remedies and, on appeal, we may consider the petition below as properly raising a question of relief under them. See Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A. 2d 549 (1969).
The writ of coram nobis has been traditionally held to lie for errors of fact, “extrinsic of the record, un*32known and unknowable by the exercise of diligence at the time of its rendition, and which would, if knoAvn, have prevented the judgment either in its entirety or in the form in which it ivas rendered.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325, 327, 41 A. 2d 688 (1945). See Commonwealth v. Kurus, 371 Pa. 633, 92 A. 2d 196 (1952); Commonwealth v. Kadio, 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 196, 115 A. 2d 777 (1955). Although the fact of counsel’s absence is clear, to require an uncounseled defendant to have put his objection on the record begs the very question appellant seeks to raise. It certainly would not be in the interest of justice to require an ignorant defendant to raise claims apparent to those learned in the law on peril of losing the benefit of subsequent relief. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938). The extension of coram nobis to a claim of nonrepresentation by counsel has been made by several courts. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S. Ct. 247 (1954); Knight v. States, 42 Ala. App. 672, 178 So. 2d 101 (1965); State v. Lindsey, 231 Ind. 126, 106 N.E. 2d 230 (1952); Pike v. States, 152 Me. 78, 123 A. 2d 774 (1956); State v. Stodulski, 298 S.W. 2d 420 (Mo. 1957); Janiec v. McCorkle, 52 N.J. Super. 1, 144 A. 2d 561 (1958), cert. denied sub nom. Janiec v. New Jersey, 362 U.S. 944, 80 S. Ct. 811 (1960) [nonrepresentation by counsel soundable in coram nobis], 85 N.J. Super. 68, 203 A. 2d 727 (1964) [post-Gideon grant of coram nobis relief] ; People v. Silverman, 3 N.Y. 2d 200, 144 N.E. 2d 10, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 11 (1957). Cf. Davis v. State, 191 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1966); Ex parte Morgan, 412 S.W. 2d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); State v. Angevine, 62 Wash. 2d 980, 385 P. 2d 329 (1963). Also see Frank, Coram Nobis (1953).
Moreover, it is not clear that habeas corpus would not lie, though it is not a traditional remedy to attack *33so-called moot convictions. Cf. Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S. Ct. 1556 (1968) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A. 2d 613 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Rundle, supra.
Certainly the possibility of a harsher sentence upon conviction for a second offense is sufficient prejudice to make available either the writ of coram nobis, see United States v. Morgan, supra at 512-513; United States v. Forlano, 319 F. 2d 617 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Flanagan, 305 F. Supp. 325, 6 Cr. L. Rep. 2147 (E.D. Va. 1969), or the writ of habeas corpus, see Carafas v. La Vallee, supra. Also see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968).
Since it is admitted that appellant was unrepresented at his conviction in 1963, I would reverse the order of the lower court and order a new trial. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963); Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 202 A. 2d 303 (1964).
Spaulding, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.