Court Opinion

ID: 9854006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:59:02.101065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:52.441149
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
specially concurring.
Because of the holding in State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983), I reluctantly concur in the Court’s opinion. I write only to point out that as to the construction of article 1, section 17 of our state constitution consistently with the construction of the fourth amendment by the United States Supreme Court, Cowen is limited to the question of standing. In State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1988) we said:
This Court has previously noted that art. 1, § 17 of our constitution “is to be construed consistently with the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.” State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 650, 662 P.2d 230, 231 (1983). See also, State v. Rice, 109 Idaho 985, 989, 712 P.2d 686, 690 (App.1985), rev. den. (1986). However, this statement does not bear on our decision in this case, since the portion of the decision in Cowen where it appears concerned the standing of a person to raise the question of unreasonable search and seizure, and not the substance of the rights protected under art. 1, § 17. Seven months after Cowen, we voiced our willingness to consider whether the scope of art. 1, § 17 is different than that of the fourth amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court:
[T]he guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure in article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution is substantially the same as the parallel provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; nevertheless, it is for this Court to decide whether to relax the standard for the demonstration of probable cause in accord with [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ], or whether to retain the more protective criteria of Aguilar [v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) ] and Spinelli [v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) ] and their progeny as our test.
State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561 (1983).
Twice more since Cowen this Court has pointed out that in interpreting article 1, § 17 we are not bound by the interpretations of the fourth amendment by the United States Supreme Court. State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5,10 n. 6, 696 P.2d 856, 861 n. 6 (1985); and State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 520 n. 1,716 P.2d 1288,1292 n. 1 (1986). As we said in Newman:
[F]ederal and state constitutions derive their power from independent sources. It is thus readily apparent that state courts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their own constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975). This is true even when the constitutional provisions implicated contain similar phraseology. Long gone are the days when state courts will blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when in the process of interpreting their own constitutions.
108 Idaho at 10 n. 6, 696 P.2d at 861 n. 6.
Today we reaffirm that in interpreting provisions of our constitution that are similar to those of the federal constitution we are free to extend protections under our constitution beyond those granted by the United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution.
Since we have spoken on the question of standing in Cowen, I am prepared to be bound by that precedent here. I am not prepared to forego the construction of article 1, section 17 to limit the other protections afforded under our constitution to those provided by the United States Supreme Court under the fourth amendment.