Court Opinion

ID: 9572259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:40:10.996689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:09.782885
License: Public Domain

Justice Carlton
dissenting.
I dissent to that portion of the majority decision which overrules State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 718, 228 S.E. 2d 424 (1976).
In Harris, this Court held that in all cases in which the State relies upon premeditation and deliberation to support a conviction of murder in the first degree, the trial court must submit to the jury an issue of murder in the second degree. Id. at 730, 228 S.E. 2d at 432. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Moore noted that this has been the rule in North Carolina since 1928 when he cited State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187 (1928). State v. Harris, 290 N.C. at 729-30, 228 S.E. 2d at 431-32. Indeed, the Harris opinion presents a careful analysis of the rule’s origins. Id. at 727-30, 228 S.E. 2d at 430-32. In State v. Keller, 297 N.C. 674, 256 S.E. 2d 710 (1979), and State v. Poole, 298 N.C. 254, 258 S.E. 2d 339 (1979), this Court recently affirmed the rule. Despite all of this precedent and the sound reasoning articulated for the rule, a new majority of this Court has, on the most specious reasoning, abruptly elected to overrule Harris. I cannot join in this injudicious disregard for this Court’s unanimous recent precedents (except for Poole in which Justice Huskins dissented) recognizing this sound rule of law.
*308In Harris, this Court reaffirmed the rule, articulated many years earlier, that a second-degree murder charge also must be submitted to the jury whenever the State relies on premeditation and deliberation to support a first-degree murder conviction. We stated:
We hold, therefore, that in all cases in which the State relies upon premeditation and deliberation to support a conviction of murder in the first degree, the trial court must submit to the jury an issue of murder in the second degree. Again, we reaffirm the rule originally stated in State v. Spivey [151 N.C. 676, 65 S.E. 995 (1909)], that in those cases in which the State proves a murder committed by one of the means stated in G.S. 14-17, or in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony, an instruction to the jury to return a verdict of murder in the first degree or not guilty is proper; provided, that there is no evidence, or an inference deducible therefrom, tending to show a lesser offense. See State v. Duboise, 279 N.C. 73, 181 S.E. 2d 393 (1971); State v. Hill, 276 N.C. 1, 170 S.E. 2d 885 (1969).
Id. at 730, 228 S.E. 2d at 432.
When this Court reaffirmed the rule again three years later in State v. Keller, 297 N.C. 674, 256 S.E. 2d 710 (1979), we explained the reason for the rule: the jury must be allowed to decide whether to infer that the defendant did premeditate and deliberate the killing. This Court stated:
Ordinarily premeditation and deliberation, being operations of the mind, must always be proved, if at all, by circumstantial evidence. . . . These mental operations of defendant must be inferred, if at all, from the circumstances of the case. Perhaps the only reasonable inference which could be made here is that defendant did indeed premeditate and deliberate the killing. Nevertheless in first degree murder cases the jury must be left free to draw or not to draw this inference; and if the jury chooses not to draw it, it should be given the alternative of finding defendant guilty of second degree murder.
Id. at 677-78, 256 S.E. 2d at 713 (original emphasis).
*309The majority has much to say about the general rule in this jurisdiction that a lesser included offense is not required to be submitted unless there is some positive evidence to sustain it. Indeed, in Keller the State had specifically requested that we abandon the Harris rule in view of the general rule. We specifically responded to this argument: “[t]his Court has not applied this rationale in cases involving crimes other than first degree murder which have as an essential element a specific criminal intent on the part of the defendant.” State v. Keller, 297 N.C. at 678, 256 S.E. 2d at 713 (citing State v. Allen, 297 N.C. 429, 255 S.E. 2d 362 (1979)—in burglary prosecution, no error in refusing to submit nonfelonious breaking and entering where State’s evidence tends to establish that defendant intended to rape occupant, defendant’s defense is alibi and mistaken identity, and there is no evidence of nonfelonious breaking and entering—and State v. Roseman, 279 N.C. 573, 184 S.E. 2d 289 (1971)—in assault with intent to commit rape prosecution, no error in refusing to submit assault on a female where there was no evidence tending to show that victim was assaulted for any purpose other than rape or for no purpose at all).
In Keller we added: “The first degree murder rule is, however, firmly rooted in our cases. More importantly it was carefully reconsidered, reaffirmed and applied in Harris. In keeping with that reasonable predictability rightly expected of appellate courts, it should be applied here." 297 N.C. at 678, 256 S.E. 2d at 713 (emphasis added).
In stressing the general rule concerning submission of lesser included offenses and the necessity for what it calls an “evidentiary approach,” the majority completely misses the point: The Harris rule, which I suggest has only been slightly modified by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hopper v. Evans, --- U.S. ---, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed. 2d 367 (1982), is, as modified, nothing more than a specific application of the very principle urged by the majority — that whenever the evidence supports a conviction of a lesser included offense, the lesser included offense must be submitted to the jury with the greater offense. The Harris principle requires that a second-degree murder charge be submitted in first-degree murder cases relying on the elements of premeditation and deliberation because these elements connote a state of mind described with great particularity in our homicide *310law and must be proved (with one exception discussed below), if at all, by inferences arising from circumstantial evidence. This pervasive use of circumstantial evidence (and the inferences to be drawn from it) and the particular nature of the state of mind required compels the conclusion that whether the defendant premeditated and deliberated the killing is inherently a jury question.
Because the elements of premeditation and deliberation are essentially “operations of the mind,” the only “witness” to this amorphous process — the only person with firsthand knowledge of what went on in the defendant’s mind at the time of the offense — is the defendant himself. If the defendant never testifies to what his state of mind was at the time of the killing the jury faces only one question: whether to infer from the circumstantial evidence that the defendant premeditated and deliberated the killing. If it decides to infer the defendant premeditated and deliberated the killing it will find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder. If it decides not to infer the existence of premeditation and deliberation but finds that the other elements of first-degree murder were proved beyond a reasonable doubt the jury will find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder. To allow the jury to decide whether to infer the existence of premeditation and deliberation, it must have for its consideration both a first-degree and a second-degree murder charge. This is the case because a decision whether to convict of first-degree murder or second-degree murder hinges on the jury’s resolution of the premeditation and deliberation elements. The determination of whether premeditation and deliberation were proved beyond a, reasonable doubt is a decision which only the jury should be allowed to make because that decision rests on an inference.
The above instance — where the defendant chooses not to testify about his state of mind — must be distinguished from the situation where the defendant’s own evidence affirmatively demonstrates the existence of premeditation and deliberation. In so doing, I acknowledge that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Hopper v. Evans, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed. 2d 367 (1982), tempers the rule in Harris. The Supreme Court held in Hopper that no jury instructions on lesser included offenses were required in a capital case in which the defendant’s *311own evidence affirmatively negated the possibility that such an instruction might have been warranted. Id. In Harris we held, “that in all cases in which the State relies upon premeditation and deliberation to support a conviction of murder in the first degree, the trial court must submit to the jury an issue of murder in the second degree.” 290 N.C. at 730, 228 S.E. 2d at 432 (1976) (emphasis added).
I agree, therefore, in accordance with Hopper, that the rule in Harris has been modified by the United States Supreme Court to this extent: In cases in which the defendant’s own evidence affirmatively demonstrates the defendant had the required mental state for first-degree murder — premeditation and deliberation-then an instruction on second-degree murder is improper in capital cases. In short, the Supreme Court carved out only a very narrow exception to the Harris rule.
In Hopper the United States Supreme Court was concerned that in a capital case, in which the defendant’s own evidence affirmatively proved the requisite mental state, the inclusion of instructions to the jury on lesser included offenses “invited the jurors to disregard their oaths and convict a defendant of a lesser offense when the evidence warranted a conviction of first-degree murder, inevitably leading to arbitrary results.” — at —, 102 S.Ct. at 2053, 72 L.Ed. 2d at 373 (citing Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed. 2d 974 (1976)). On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Hopper also noted its decision in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed. 2d 392 (1980). In Beck the Court held, “if the unavailability of a lesser included offense instruction enhances the risk of an unwarranted conviction, [the state] is constitutionally prohibited from withdrawing that option from the jury in a capital case.” Id. at 638, 100 S.Ct. at 2390, 65 L.Ed. 2d at 403.
In defining the two poles between which due process must operate with respect to the inclusion of instructions on lesser included offenses, the Supreme Court wrote:
Beck held that due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction. But due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. The jury’s discretion is thus *312channelled so that it may convict a defendant of any crime fairly supported by the evidence.
Hopper v. Evans, — at —, 102 S.Ct. at 2053, 72 L.Ed. 2d at 373 (original emphasis). In sum, to fail to give an instruction on a lesser included offense when the evidence or lack of evidence on a particular essential element warrants it is a violation of due process. Conversely, to give an instruction on a lesser included offense when the evidence supports only the greater offense also violates due process.
In Hopper the defendant’s own testimony, his confession regarding his state of mind, constituted direct evidence of the essential mental element and at the same time affirmatively negated any claim or inference that he did not intend to kill the victim. In the case at bar, however, defendant Strickland denied he had committed the murder and did not present any evidence as to the requisite mental elements of premeditation and deliberation. The jury’s duty was to determine first whether defendant had committed the killing. If it found that he had it was then to decide whether to infer that defendant had premeditated and deliberated the killing. Defendant here did not confess; he did not provide evidence to support the charge that he had premeditated and deliberated the killing nor did his evidence affirmatively demonstrate that he had the requisite state of mind. There was no evidence to preclude the jury from reasonably declining to infer that defendant had the requisite state of mind for first-degree murder. In other words, the jury reasonably could have decided that defendant strangled the victim but that he did not do so with premeditation and deliberation. Without the instruction on second-degree murder the jury was prevented from making such a determination.
The only uncontroverted evidence bearing on the requisite mental state of the person who committed the murder in the case at bar is the fact that the victim was tied to a tree and strangled. To hold, as the majority apparently does, that the mere use of such means to kill another is sufficient, as a matter of law, to support only the inference that the murderer premeditated and deliberated the killing is to judicially amend G.S. 14-17 (1981) by adding “death by strangulation” to the list of methods of murder, proof of which are alternatives to próof of premeditation and *313deliberation for first-degree murder. We, of course, should not attempt to do so.
The rule in Hopper is only a very narrow exception to the rule in Harris. This conclusion that the Harris rule is only slightly modified is based on the language found in Hopper itself. First, the issue in Hopper was framed very narrowly, as narrowly as I believe Harris is now modified. In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Burger stated the issue as follows: “[W]hether ... a new trial is required in a capital case in which the defendant’s own evidence negates the possibility that such an instruction [on lesser included offenses] might have been warranted.” Hopper v. Evans, — at —, 102 S.Ct. at 2050, 72 L.Ed. 2d at 369-70 (emphasis added).
In addition, the Chief Justice repeatedly emphasized the significance of the particular facts in Hopper, specifically, the defendant’s own statements which “made it crystal clear that he had killed the victim, that he intended to kill him, and that he would do the same thing again in similar circumstances.” The Court wrote:
The uniqueness of respondent’s claims has been outlined in the statement of facts, but those facts merit emphasis for they bear on the key issue of whether there was any eviden-tiary basis to support a conviction of a lesser included offense. From the outset, beginning with his appearance before the grand jury, respondent made it crystal clear that he had killed the victim, that he intended to kill him, and that he would do the same thing again in similar circumstances. At trial, he testified that he always tried to choose places to rob so that he could avoid killing people. However, he also testified that, if necessary, he was always prepared to kill.
Id. at ---, 102 S.Ct. at 2053, 72 L.Ed. 2d at 373-74.
The Court concluded:
It would be an extraordinary perversion of the law to say that intent to kill is not established when a felon, engaged in an armed robbery, admits to shooting his victim in the back in the circumstances shown here. The evidence not only supported the claim that respondent intended to kill the victim, but affirmatively negated any claim that he did not *314intend to kill the victim. An instruction on the offense of unintentional killing during this robbery was therefore not warranted.
Id. at —, 102 S.Ct. at 2054, 72 L.Ed. 2d at 374 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the State relied solely on the theory of premeditation and deliberation to support its first-degree murder charge. The trial court submitted only the issue of first-degree murder to the jury. Hence, under the long-standing rule in this jurisdiction that a second-degree murder charge also must be submitted to the jury whenever the defendant relies on premeditation and deliberation to support a first-degree murder conviction, I believe defendant is entitled to a new trial on the murder charge.
Finally, I think it particularly interesting to analyze the reasons the majority advances for overruling Harris. The majority states that it is “compelled” to overrule Harris because: (1) the Harris rule is not required or supported by precedent, (2) it does not manifestly improve the administration or quality of justice, (3) it has been “emasculated” by Hopper, and (4) it is “suspect of being constitutionally impermissible.”
With respect to the first reason, if the Harris rule is not required or supported by precedent, then I submit the doctrine of stare decisis must be dead in this jurisdiction because the new Court majority simply refuses to acknowledge the clear holdings of pre-Harris decisions of this Court. For example, the majority conveniently quoted only the following language from a concurring opinion in State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187 (1928), to support its position:
When on the trial of a criminal prosecution it is permissible under the bill, as here, to convict the defendant of ‘a less degree of the same crime’ (C.S., 4640), and there is evidence tending to support a milder verdict, the case presents a situation where the defendant is entitled to have the different views presented to the jury, under a proper charge,
The entire paragraph, which reads as follows, does not support its position, however:
*315When on the trial of a criminal prosecution it is permissible under the bill, as here, to convict the defendant of “a less degree of the same crime” (C.S., 4640), and there is evidence tending to support a milder verdict, the case presents a situation where the defendant is entitled to have the different views presented to the jury, under a proper charge, and an error in this respect is not cured by a verdict convicting the defendant of the highest offense charged in the bill of indictment, for in such event it cannot be known whether the jury would have convicted of a less degree of the same crime if the different views, arising on the evidence, had been correctly presented to them by the trial court. S. v. Holt, 192 N.C., 490, 135 S.E., 324; S. v. Kline, 190 N.C., 177, 129 S.E., 417; S. v. Lutterloh, 188 N.C., 412, 124 S.E., 752; S. v. Allen, 186 N.C., 302, 119 S.E., 504; S. v. Williams, 185 N.C., 685, 116 S.E., 736; S. v. Merrick, 171 N.C., 788, 88 S.E., 501; S. v. Kennedy, 169 N.C., 288, 84 S.E., 515; S. v. Kendall, 143 N.C., 659, 57 S.E., 340; S. v. White, 138 N.C., 704, 51 S.E., 44; S. v. Foster, 130 N.C., 666, 41 S.E., 284; S. v. Jones, 79 N.C., 630.
State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. at 566-67, 143 S.E. at 194-95 (Stacy, C. J., concurring in result)(emphasis added).
The majority appears to believe the phrase “there is evidence tending to support a milder verdict” supportive of its position. This is not the case, however. The import of the Newsome decision is that in a first-degree murder case relying on premeditation and deliberation to support the charge there is always evidence tending to support a milder verdict, that is, a second-degree murder verdict. I will quote the facts, the trial court’s charge to the jury and the holding in Newsome to demonstrate the precedential value of Newsome and the extent to which it supports the Harris rule.
The pertinent facts in Newsome are as follows:
There was evidence tending to show that defendant was at his home, when deceased and Cora Reid passed the same, going to the home of the latter, walking together along the path, and that defendant saw them as they passed. He knew that deceased would later return to her father’s home, by this path, alone. There was evidence tending to show further that defendant waylaid the deceased as she was returning *316from the home of Cora Reid to the home of her father, about 6:30 o’clock, and that he killed her by cutting her throat with a knife.
There was also evidence tending to show that defendant met the deceased, as she was returning from the home of Cora Reid to her father’s home, near defendant’s home, and that he then and there assaulted her, with intent to commit rape upon her. This assault, made about 125 to 140 yards from the place at which the body of the deceased was found, was not successful. The deceased broke away from defendant and ran toward her father’s home. There was evidence tending to show that defendant pursued her with intent to commit rape upon her, and that he overtook her; that defendant killed her by cutting her throat with a knife, while attempting to perpetrate upon her the crime of rape.
There was evidence tending to show further that when defendant failed in his attempt to commit rape upon the deceased, at the time of his first assault upon her, because of her successful resistance, he abandoned his purpose to rape her, and that deceased escaped and ran from him; that as she was running toward the home of her father, she called to defendant, saying that she would tell her father of defendant’s assault upon her, as soon as she arrived at his home; that defendant then pursued her a distance of 125 to 140 yards from the place where he first assaulted her, overtook her and again assaulted her. with a knife with no intent to rape her, but with intent to prevent her from telling her father of the previous assault with intent to commit rape; that while making this latter assault upon deceased, defendant cut her throat with a knife, thus causing her death.
Id. at 554, 143 S.E. at 188.
The trial court’s charge to the jury was as follows:
“I charge you that if you are satisfied from this evidence, and find beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, to a moral certainty, that the defendant killed Beulah Tedder, while lying in wait, or that he killed her while attempting to commit rape upon her person, or if not in either of these instances, that he killed her after premeditation and delibera*317tion, as I have defined those terms to you, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree; but if you are not so satisfied, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.”
“In this case I do not see and cannot arrive at any conclusion that would lead me to leave with you the question of his guilt upon charge of second degree murder or manslaughter; I therefore charge you that you can return but one of two verdicts in this case — either murder in the first degree, or not guilty.”
Id. at 560-61, 143 S.E. 191-92.
The holding in Newsome was as follows:
When, however, the state relies upon evidence tending to show, not only that the murder was perpetrated by one of the means specified in the statute, or that it was committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony as defined in the statute, but also upon evidence tending to show deliberation and premeditation, the jury should be instructed that, if they fail to find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder was perpetrated by one of the means specified in the statute, or that it was committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony, and further fail to find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it was committed after deliberation and premeditation, they should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, provided, of course, they shall find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the murder. Deliberation and premeditation, if relied upon by the state, as constituting the homicide murder in the first degree, under the statute, must always be proved by the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt. In such case, under the statute as construed by this court, it is for the jury and not the judge to find the fact of deliberation and premeditation from the evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt. Premeditation and deliberation are always matters of fact to be determined by the jury, and not matters of law to be determined by the judge.
*318It cannot be held as a matter of law that all the evidence in this case, and every inference fairly and reasonably to be drawn therefrom, required the jury to return a verdict of “Guilty of murder in the first degree,” or of “Not guilty.” A verdict of “Guilty of murder in the second degree” could have been returned by the jury under the law and the evidence in this case.
Id. at 564, 143 S.E. 193.
Similarly, the majority finds this language in State v. Perry, 209 N.C. 604, 184 S.E. 545 (1936), particularly persuasive: “Whenever there is any evidence or when any inference can be fairly deduced therefrom tending to show a lower grade of murder, it is the duty of the trial judge, under appropriate instructions, to submit that view to the jury.” Id. at 606, 184 S.E. at 546. The majority uses this language to reach its conclusion that Harris “appeared to convert a rule requiring the presence of evidence into a more inflexible rule requiring as a matter of law a second degree murder instruction in every case in which the State relied on premeditation and deliberation.” In so doing, the majority fails to read the language of the Perry opinion in context, that is, in light of the facts and holding in the case. The language in Perry the majority quotes, language similar to that which it lifts from the concurring opinion in Newsome, stands for the proposition that there is always evidence of a lower grade of murder in first-degree murder cases relying on premeditation and deliberation to support a murder conviction. The Court in Perry wrote:
The State offered evidence to the effect that the defendant made a confession in which he stated that he was with Joseph Terry late at night, and that Joseph Terry went into his house, out of sight of the defendant, and fired the fatal shot that killed the deceased. The State also offered in evidence the testimony of Joseph Terry to the effect that he and the defendant were out together at night and that the defendant told him (witness) that he (defendant) had shot and killed the deceased during an interval when they were separated. No eye-witness to the homicide was introduced. The evidence as to how the actual killing was accomplished is entirely circumstantial. While there was evidence of threats *319and of motive and of other facts and circumstances amply sufficient to take the case to the jury upon the issue of murder in the first degree, there was no evidence that the crime was committed by any of the means specifically mentioned in the statute defining the two degrees of murder or in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a felony, as delineated in C. S., 4200.
The defendant offered no evidence.
The court charge [sic] the jury to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree or not guilty.
It is only in cases where all the evidence tends to show that the homicide was committed by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a felony, that the trial judge can instruct the jury that they must return a verdict of murder in the first degree or not guilty. In those cases where the evidence establishes that the killing was with a deadly weapon the presumption goes no further than that the homicide was murder in the second degree, and if the State seeks a conviction of murder in the first degree it has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was committed with deliberation and premeditation. Under such circumstances it is error for the trial judge to fail to submit to the jury the theory of murder in the second degree, since it is the province of the jury to determine if the homicide be murder in the first or in the second degree, that is, whether they, the jury, are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, from the evidence, that the homicide was committed with deliberation and premeditation. Whenever there is any evidence or when any inference can be fairly deduced therefrom tending to show a lower grade of murder, it is the duty of the trial judge, under appropriate instructions, to submit that view to the jury. The defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed to the effect that if they should find beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the murder, and should fail to find beyond a reasonable doubt that such murder was committed with deliberation and premeditation, they should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. S. v. Spivey, 151 N.C., 676; S. v. Newsome, 195 N.C., 552.
*320Under the authorities cited, we hold that the failure to submit to the jury the theory of murder in the second degree entitles the defendant to a new trial, and it is so ordered.
State v. Perry, 209 N.C. at 605-06, 184 S.E. at 546.
The majority relies heavily on its interpretation of various bits of language in our pre-Harris decisions. It simply fails to acknowledge that Newsome and Perry, on their facts, are clear holdings supporting the Harris rule.
The majority does not explain its second reason — that the Harris rule does not manifestly improve the administration or quality of justice — and I can think of no reason to support such a statement. Indeed, the majority’s opinion in this case serves only to confuse what was once a settled area of the law. Under this Court’s decision today, the trial judges of this State no longer have any guidance whatsoever in determining when a second-degree murder charge is to be submitted to the jury. If the majority believes that its decision in this case will help get heinous murderers off the streets and into prison, then I fear it will be terribly disappointed. The majority’s decision may require that a jury permit a killer to go free because it was unwilling to find that he premeditated and deliberated the killing although it would have found him guilty of second-degree murder had it been given the opportunity to do so. The majority’s statement that the decision in Hopper “emasculated” the Harris rule is simply a gross exaggeration. If Hopper really did “emasculate” the Harris rule, rather than merely create a narrow exception to it, then the majority should simply announce that the United States Supreme Court had overruled Harris; it would have been unnecessary for the majority to then present page after page of strained reasoning to justify its holding. Finally, if the majority believes that Harris is “constitutionally impermissible” it ought to so hold.
The decision which the majority reaches today is, in my opinion, an extremely unfortunate oné. I vote to give defendant a new trial on the murder charge for failure of the trial court to submit to the jury the alternative verdict of guilty of second-degree murder.
Chief Justice BRANCH joins in this dissenting opinion.