Court Opinion

ID: 9883624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:00:52.377057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:27.274431
License: Public Domain

Wbinteato, C. J.
(concurring). In State v. Weleck, 10 N. J. 355, 365 (1952), the court quoted with approval the following definition from 1 Burdick, Law of Grime (1946), § 272, pp. 387-88:
“By ‘misconduct in office,’ or ‘official misconduct,’ is not meant misconduct, criminal or otherwise, which is committed by a person who happens to be a public officer, but which is not connected with his official duties. Such conduct is sometimes called private misconduct to distinguish it from official misconduct. * * *
Misconduct in office, or ‘official misconduct,’ means, therefore, any unlawful behavior in relation to official duties by an officer intrusted in any way with the administration of law and justice, or, as otherwise defined, any act or omission in breach of a duty of public concern, by one who has accepted public office.”
*11At the cited reference Burdick illustrates the difference between private and official misconduct in this way:
“A public official may, for instance, become voluntarily drunk without its interfering in any way with his official duties, and in such a case he may not be guilty of ‘official misconduct.’ Should his drunkenness, however, cause him to neglect his duties, or incapacitate him from performing them, he would be clearly guilty of official misconduct.”
With the above, I have no quarrel. However, Weleck went on to say (10 N. J., at page 369) :
“* * * If a public officer were under no duty imposed by law to regulate his official conduct in accordance with basic moral principles, then he could violate such principles and still be immune from indictment and prosecution for misconduct in office. We recognize no such divorce of morals from the duties of public office.”
This constitutes an innovation in the criminal law for which I can find no support if it means that an indictment will lie for “immoral” behavior even though it does not constitute the failure to perform or the improper performance of a specific duty of office. The prosecutor apparently so reads Weleck and seeks to sustain the indictment upon that thesis.
Heedless to say, I do not admire immorality. But the equation of immorality with criminality is something else. Men may not agree upon what is immoral. More than that, opinions may divide upon what immorality is worthy of the heavy hand of criminal liability. The State wisely leaves much to the sanction of private contempt and censure. Eew of the Ten Commandments found their way into criminal law. I could not agree that a public officer is guilty of crime in office if he fails to honor his mother or father, or takes the name of God in vain, or covets the house, wife, or anything else that is his neighbor’s, or labors on the Sabbath as some judges find they must. The question whether immorality shall be denounced as criminal falls solely within the province of the Legislature, the spokesman of the social conscience. Criminal law is no place for judicial ingenuity and invention. And if the Legislature declared it criminal *12for a public officer to do or say anything “immoral” the statute would hold a tyranny of vagueness which the Constitutions of the State and Nation forbid. I think it equally clear that the Judiciary cannot uphold a common-law crime, if one can be found, which thus depends upon the taste of the individual judge or juror.
The first count of the indictment charges defendant did “evilly and corruptly inform, confess and say” to another police officer that he had stolen $30,000 from parking meters. This count could not be sustained if it were read to charge that defendant committed a fresh crime by the act of confessing his guilt of another offense. With this the prosecutor agrees. If this count charges a false confession, it would raise the question whether it is a false official report and could be deemed a criminal breach of official duty. But the prosecutor disclaims that theme, for he does not intend to prove the “confession” was untrue. Thus the thesis becomes that it is poor behavior for a policeman to tell a brother officer that he has been guilty of crime, whether the tale be trite or false. That such behavior in one aspect or another is unworthy of a policeman, I do not doubt, and he may well be removed from office. See In re Cohen, 56 N. J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1959), certif. denied 31 N. J. 297 (1960). But I join the majority in its conclusion that a “confession” does not constitute a failure to perform or improper performance of a duty of the office of policeman.
The second count is of the same stamp. It alleges defendant “did attempt to get and obtain possession of a set of keys for the parking meters from the office of the City Manager,” saying to another policeman that “If I can only find that City Manager’s office open to get a set of those keys, I would be in,” meaning, as the indictment says, that he could then have easy access to parking meters and purloin their contents. The prosecutor does not seek to sustain this count as a charge of attempted larceny. Rather he advances the thesis that the declaration of an evil purpose is despicable in a policeman and, under the interpretation of Weleclc to *13which I alluded above, is immoral behavior punishable criminally. Again, removal from office is quite appropriate, but I agree with the majority that the allegations do not constitute nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance of a specific duty of office.
The majority find the remaining three counts do charge the crime of “misconduct in office.” These counts allege that in violation of his duty as a police officer defendant evilly and corruptly solicited other named persons, two described as special officers and meter collectors and the third as a meter repairman, to steal moneys from parking meters.
The common-law offenses of nonfeasance, misfeasance and malfeasance relate to the discharge of the specific duties attached to a public office. A duty of office, within the scope of those offenses, is not some general obligation of proper decorum. Eor example, a policeman must obey departmental rules and regulations of that character but I take it that he would not be indictable for crime if he smoked a cigarette or failed to button his coat. Rather, the duty to which these common-law crimes pertain is that duty, affirmative in nature, for the performance of which the public office was created. In the case of a policeman, the duty for the performance of which his office was constituted is the enforcement of the penal laws, including prevention of violations and the detection and arrest of offenders. He is indictable for nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance only if, with the requisite criminal mind, he fails to perform or improperly performs that public duty.
All persons have the “duty” to obey the law. More accuratety, there is no “duty” but rather a liability to punishment. Every public officer of course is thus amenable in his capacity of private citizen, but he does not necessarily commit two crimes by a single act merely because he happens also to be a public official.
What then is the liability of a policeman if he himself violates the law? If his act would be a crime when committed by another, he of course is indictable as a private citizen. If his act, thus criminal when committed by a *14private citizen, does relate to the performance of his duty of office, as, for example, if a policeman detailed to coin collection should pilfer those very moneys while performing his official role, he would be guilty at least of nonfeasance with respect to his specific duty to collect and turn them in. There may be other situations in which the commission of a non-official crime simultaneously involves a criminal dereliction with respect to the performance of an affirmative duty of office. That question is likely to remain largely academic, for plainly it is more sensible to indict for the basic offense than to follow the tortuous path of nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in office. It would be pointless for a prosecutor to assume the added burden of proving a connection with official duty, unless his purpose should be to seek multiple punishment for a single act, an objective which would invite attention to the guarantees with respect to double jeopardy and due process of law. ■
But I cannot agree that a policeman is guilty of the common-law crime by reason of his every infraction of the penal laws. A police officer is not appointed to prevent himself from committing offenses, nor to detect and arrest himself. Rather his official role is so to deal with others. It is much too attenuated and unrealistic a thought that a man be his own policeman. In my view, the common sense of the situation makes this evident. It would be startling to indict for crime a police officer who exceeds the speed limit or parks too close to a hydrant. It would be absurd to find him guilty of still a second crime for failing to detect himself, i. e., to give himself a ticket and to make a full report, i. e., a confession of his traffic offense, or perhaps of still a third crime, for his failure to charge himself with nonfeasance in failing to report that he had failed to confess his motor vehicle violation. I do not see how a line could be drawn short of such absurdities if it were held that a policeman has the public duly to prevent himself from violating the law and to detect his own infractions.
Ueither counsel nor any member of the court has uncovered a precedent to support an indictment at common *15law upon the thesis discussed above. That circumstance suggests caution. As I have said, the creation of criminal liability is singularly a legislative function. The Legislature has not denounced such conduct as an official crime. We are asked to find that it was so regarded at common law and so remains under the catch-all provision of 7V7 <77 8. 2A :85-l which constitutes as a misdemeanor an offense “of an indictable nature at common law, and not otherwise expressly provided for by statute.” We should not sustain an indictment thereunder unless we are thoroughly satisfied that criminal liability existed at common law. Especially is that true in the situation before us, in which the full reach of the concept can scarcely be foreseen and in which the public interest is amply protected by prosecution of the officer as a private offender.
The majority opinion, as I read it, holds that even less than what I have discussed above suffices for criminal liability. I say this because the opinion does not find that the solicitation would itself be a crime if made by a private citizen. The theory appears to be that a policeman, being charged with enforcement of law, violates that duty if he solicits a criminal violation (and this without regard to even a connection with the performance of the officer's specific detail or beat). If the thesis is good, the same liability for official crime should exist if the policeman solicits a disorderly person’s offense, or traffic violation, or an infraction of a local ordinance. It should be clearly understood that we are not discussing the liability of a policeman as an aider and abettor, for in the present ease the offense solicited was not committed by the party solicited. No authority supports criminal liability for misconduct in office in these circumstances. If the public interest requires criminal sanctions, we should leave the matter to the Legislature which could define and limit the offense within the range of reasonableness.
Although I am satisfied the last three counts do not charge the official crime of .nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance *16of an affirmative duty of office, I am equally satisfied each does charge a crime, to wit, the common-law crime of solicitation, in violation of the same catch-all phrase of N. J. 8. 2A :85-l quoted above. Each alleges the essential facts constituting solicitation to commit larceny. I would uphold these counts on that basis and treat the irrelevant allegation of defendant’s official status as surplusage.
The authorities are substantially agreed that solicitation to commit a felony was indictable at common law. See State v. Blechman, 135 N. J. L. 99, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1946); State v. Quinlan, 86 N. J. L. 120, 125 (Sup. Ct. 1914), affirmed on opinion below 87 N. J. L. 333 (E. & A. 1915); State v. Boyd, 86 N. J. L. 75, 79 (Sup. Ct. 1914), affirmed on opinion below 87 N. J. L. 328 (E. & A. 1915); Rex v. Higgins, 2 East. 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (K. B. 1801); State v. Beckwith, 135 Me. 423, 198 A. 739 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1938); Commonwealth v. Wiswesser, 134 Pa. Super. 488, 3 A. 2d 983 (Super. Ct. 1939); State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 A. 805, 35 A. L. R. 952 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1923); annotation, 35 A. L. R. (1925) 961, 963; 1 Burdick, Law of Grime (1946), § 104, pp. 115-117; 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law (12th ed. 1932), § 218, p. 288; 22 C. J. S. Criminal Laiu § 78, p. 142. What solicitations, other than for the commission of a common-law felony, are thus indictable need not he considered since larceny, the offense here alleged to have been solicited, was a felony at common law. State v. Hauptmann, 115 N. J. L. 412, 424 (E. & A. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 649, 56 S. Ct. 310, 80 L. Ed. 461 (1935); 32 Am. Jur., Larceny, § 2, p. 882.
Upon that basis, I would sustain the last three counts and thus concur in the result reached by the majority.
Weintraub, C. J., concurring in result.
For reversal—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Burling, Jacobs, Francis, Proctor, Hall and Schet-TINO—-7.
For affirmance—Fone.