Court Opinion

ID: 9487640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:22:50.63723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:24.460219
License: Public Domain

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Although I accept the majority’s reasoning in Part IV of its opinion that the defendants were given sufficient notice of the fact that they were being sued in their individual capacity, and I therefore concur in that conclusion, I disagree with the majority’s determination that the district court improperly granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the Eighth Amendment claim. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Pelfrey’s first argument on appeal is that the behavior of defendants violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court considered Pelfrey’s claim pursuant to defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). In considering this motion, the district court must accept all the factual allegations as true. Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 51, 61 S.Ct. 418, 421, 85 L.Ed. 577 (1941). After consideration of the applicable law, the district court granted the motion.
The standard of review for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same as that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11 (6th Cir.1987). Whether the district court correctly dismissed the suit at the pleadings stage is a question of law subject to de novo review. Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 296 (6th Cir.1993). After a careful de novo review of the record, I believe that the district court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion.
In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992), the Supreme Court set out the standard to apply when prison officials are accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Eighth Amendment: “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. -, 112 S.Ct. at 996. Pelfrey contends that in cutting his hair, the defendants acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.
The district court, in rejecting Pelfrey’s argument, noted that in McMillian, the Court tempered this broad standard stating: “[t]hat is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a *1039federal cause of action.” Id. -, 112 S.Ct. at 1000 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights”), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973)). The district court went on to focus on whether the guards’ actions constituted “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.
The district court stated:
Punishment is an action by prison guards or a condition of confinement applied to an inmate for a penal or disciplinary purpose and authorized by high level prison officials. George v. Evans, 620 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.1980). A spontaneous, isolated assault by a prison guard on an inmate is not punishment within the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 497; Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032. (“[Although a spontaneous attack by a guard is ‘cruel’ and, we hope, ‘unusual,’ it does not fit any ordinary concept of ‘punishment.’ ”).
Pelfrey v. Chambers, No. C-2-92-225, slip op. at 5 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 8, 1993).
The Supreme Court explicitly refused to address the “punishment” argument in McMillian. Citing Glick and George v. Evans, 620 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.1980), the McMillian Court noted that circuit courts had found similar uses of force to be beyond the scope of “punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. However, the Court found this argument was “inapposite” to the facts of McMillian, since the violence at issue in McMillian was “not an isolated assault,” the question of whether the acts were unauthorized was not before the Court, and the supervisor had “ ‘expressly condoned the use of force in this instance.’ ” McMillian, 503 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1001-02 (quoting the Magistrate’s finding).
Unlike the plaintiff in McMillian, Pelfrey does not claim that this assault was anything other than an isolated incident; neither does he claim that the use of force was authorized or condoned by defendants’ supervisors. Further, Pelfrey does not claim that there was a penal or disciplinary purpose for the haircut or that this was anything other than a spontaneous isolated assault. See Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032; Evans, 633 F.2d 413, 415.1 Rather, he claims solely that the assault was an isolated, malicious act by the defendants.
While the punishment issue has not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court, the reasoning of the district court and the holdings of the Fifth Circuit in Evans and the Second Circuit in Glick are persuasive. A hair cut would not ordinarily be considered a punishment and, in this case, it is clear from the facts as stated by Pelfrey, that this haircut was an isolated and unauthorized assault upon him. Even if Chambers and Clos-ser cut Pelfrey’s hair, their actions, while inexcusable, are outside the scope of “punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
I therefore disagree with the majority that Pelfrey has stated an Eighth Amendment claim. In its opinion the majority summarily “rejects” the district court’s reliance on Johnson v. Glick and George v. Evans because of a perceived change in the legal landscape of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s pronouncement that Glick and Evans are dead. Contrary to the majority opinion, both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have continuously relied upon Glick in analyzing allegations of cruel and unusual punishment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, -, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 300, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2325, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir.1993); Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir.1992); Branham v. City of Dearborn Heights, 830 F.Supp. 399, 401 (E.D.Mich.1993); Jabbar-El v. Sullivan, 811 F.Supp. 265, 273 (E.D.Mich.1992). Furthermore, both Glick and Evans are cited favorably by the Supreme Court in Hudson v. McMillian which set the standard to apply when considering Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force. *1040See McMillian, 503 U.S. at -, -, and -, 112 S.Ct. at 998, 1000, and 1001.
In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 n. 10, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), the Court clarified the principle that post-conviction excessive force claims are properly raised pursuant to the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the majority’s analysis, Glick and Evans, both decided before Graham v. Connor, are not to be relied upon now because they led the Second and Fifth Circuits, respectively, to recognize claims of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. The majority’s reading of Glick and Evans is curious. In Glick, the Second Circuit first analyzed the prisoner’s excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment. Pursuant to its analysis, the Glick court rejected the prisoner’s claim on Eighth Amendment grounds “express [ing] doubt whether a ‘spontaneous attack’ by a prison guard, done without the authorization-of prison officials, fell within the traditional Eighth Amendment definition of ‘punishments.’ ” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 393 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1870 n. 6 (citing Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032). Having concluded that the claim was not cognizable under the Eighth Amendment, the Glick court went on to consider the claim under a substantive due process analysis. At the very least, the Glick court applied a broader constitutional standard under a general due process analysis and still found that an isolated, spontaneous incident does not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
Likewise, the Evans court could not have relied upon the Eighth Amendment more explicitly than it did when it stated: “An isolated assault by an individual guard on an inmate is not, within the meaning of the eighth amendment [sic], punishment.” Evans, 633 F.2d at 415-16 (citing Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032).
The majority cites Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.1992) as significant for its holding that post-conviction excessive force claims are properly raised exclusively pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. However, seven months after this Court’s decision in Cornwell, we again relied upon Glick in our decision in Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901 (6th Cir.1992). In Williams, this Court affirmed the district court which had specifically relied upon Glick in dismissing a prisoner’s claim for relief on Eighth Amendment grounds. Williams, 981 F.2d at 905. Therefore, Cornwell should not be interpreted to nullify the holding in Glick.
The majority also cites Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697 (6th Cir.1993), for the principle that a violation of the Eighth Amendment will nevertheless occur if “the offending conduct [ ] reflects] an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’ ” Id. at 700 (citations omitted). Once again, however, Moore itself cites Glick: “ ‘the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on “whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” ’ ” Moore, 2 F.3d at 700 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (quoting Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973))).
Unlike the majority I would not reject Glick or Evans. Both Glick and Evans analyze excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment. Both cases have been relied upon by the Supreme Court in McMillian. Once again I believe the district court’s reasoning and the court’s reliance on Glick, Evans, and McMillian is persuasive and that Pelfrey did not state an Eighth Amendment claim.
On the Eighth Amendment claim, therefore, I would affirm the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings for the defendants.

. Evans was initially withdrawn and then re-released. The pertinent language is retained in the subsequent opinion of the Fifth Circuit. George v. Evans, 633 F.2d 413 (5th Cir.1980).