Court Opinion

ID: 9850950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:04:54.85325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.076618
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Judge
(concurring in result only in a separate opinion):
I disagree with the analysis by the majority in regard to the law in South Carolina on verdict forms in comparative negligence cases.
The evidentiary record is not complicated. In fact, it is the prototypical comparative negligence case tried involving only two parties.1

RULE 49

The efficacy or consequence of “jury verdict forms” for comparative negligence cases in a trial setting is novel in South Carolina.
*347It is apodictic that Rule 49, SCRCP, controls in regard to verdict forms submitted to the jury. Rule 49(a) provides:
(a) Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue, (emphasis added).
In a plethora of factual scenarios, our Supreme Court has articulated with exactitude the rule.
In Baxley v. Rosenblum, 303 S.C. 340, 400 S.E.2d 502 (Ct.App.1991), this Court enunciated:
As part of his general supervisory authority over the conduct of litigation, the trial judge is given discretion to determine how the case will be submitted to the jury. Rule 49, SCRCP; Harper v. Ethridge, 290 S.C. 112, 348 S.E.2d 374 (Ct.App.1986). In this case, the trial judge determined that Baxley’s three “causes of action” constituted particular specifications of negligence flowing from a single course of diagnosis and treatment. The separate elements of damage alleged also arose from a common course of events relating to all three claims, as Baxley’s own pleadings and arguments demonstrate. On this basis, the judge decided, correctly in our opinion, to submit the case for a general verdict. The general verdict form allowed the jury to return a verdict for Baxley if it found any one of his claims to be well founded. In any event, the judge’s decision was well within his discretion.
Baxley, 303 S.C. at 349-50, 400 S.E.2d at 508.
In Harold Tyner Dev. Builders, Inc. v. Firstmark Dev. Corp., 311 S.C. 447, 429 S.E.2d 819 (Ct.App.1993), this Court further explicated:
*348Firstmark asserts the trial court erred in refusing its request for a special verdict form. The question of whether to grant a party’s request for a special verdict form is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and we find no abuse of discretion here. See Rule 49(a), SCRCP (“The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict----” (emphasis added)); Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 107, 406 S.E.2d 350, 352 (1991) (“[T]he determination as to whether special verdict forms should be submitted to the jury is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”). Again, as we discuss below, it is clear which cause of action the jury based its verdict upon.
Harold Tyner Dev. Bldrs., 311 S.C. at 452, 429 S.E.2d at 822-23.
In Butler v. Gamma Nu Chapter of Sigma Chi, 314 S.C. 477, 445 S.E.2d 468 (Ct.App.1994), we held:
Finally, Gamma Nu Chapter and Sigma Chi argue the trial court erred in denying their motion to submit to the jury either a special verdict form or general verdict forms with written interrogatories.
The question of whether to grant a party’s request for a special verdict form is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rule 49(a), SCRCP; Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 406 S.E.2d 350 (1991); Harold Tyner Dev. Builders, Inc. v. Firstmark Dev. Corp., [311] S.C. [447], 429 S.E.2d 819 (Ct.App.1993). The same is true regarding the question of whether to submit to the jury written interrogatories with general verdict forms. See Rule 49(b), SCRCP (“The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict.”) (emphasis added).
Butler, 314 S.C. at 483, 445 S.E.2d at 471-72.
Our Supreme Court addressed the issue in Constant v. Spartanburg Steel Prods., Inc., 316 S.C. 86, 447 S.E.2d 194 (1994):
SS contends the trial judge erred in denying its motion to submit a special verdict. We disagree. Rule 49(b), SCRCP, states a trial judge may submit interrogatories to *349the jury. Whether a trial judge submits a special verdict or interrogatories is a matter of discretion. Smoak v. Liebherr-America, Inc., 281 S.C. 420, 315 S.E.2d 116 (1984); Love v. Oswald, 272 S.C. 347, 251 S.E.2d 766 (1979). We hold the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
Constant, 316 S.C. at 90, 447 S.E.2d at 196.
The absence of a statute in South Carolina gives credence to the idea we do not have a bright line rule mandating special verdict forms. Clearly, the establishment of a mandatory rule requiring the usage of special verdict forms in comparative negligence cases is violative of the language and spirit of Rule 49 and prior precedent. Additionally, the formulation of such a rule is especially egregious in its impact.

SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

2

Some jurisdictions require the use of special verdicts or interrogatories to the jury in all comparative negligence cases, either by statute,3 court rule,4 or decision.5 Section 2(a) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act requires interrogatories and special verdicts unless all parties agree on a general verdict. Courts that follow the uniform act in administering a judge-*350made rule of comparative fault6 will presumably require interrogatories. A number of states make interrogatories mandatory when requested by any party.7
Mississippi practice does not permit special verdicts or interrogatories. In Flournoy v. Brown, 200 Miss. 171, 26 So.2d 351 (1946), the Mississippi Supreme Court held only general verdicts were authorized. The statutes of New Hampshire,8 Vermont,9 and Illinois10 specifically provide for general verdicts. The Maine statute11 mandates a general verdict between a plaintiff and defendant on total dollar damages of the plaintiff and then a dollar amount reflecting damages after reduction because of the plaintiffs fault. The lesser figure is the final verdict in the case on which judgment is entered. In Maine, special verdicts may be requested by any defendant to allocate responsibility between multi-defendants. The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act12 provides for general verdicts.
In other jurisdictions, the submission of the case on a general verdict, on interrogatories, or on a special verdict remains in the discretion of the trial judge.13 Rule 49 of the *351Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowing special verdicts and general verdicts accompanied by answers to interrogatories are also discretionary with the court.
Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia do not recognize the doctrine of comparative negligence.
Succinctly put, South Carolina places authority and discretion with the trial court in the area of verdict forms.

CONCLUSION

Indubitably, procedural control in reference to the use of verdict forms in comparative negligence cases must be entrusted to circuit judges. The exercise of discretion as to verdict forms in comparative negligence cases on a case by case basis by a trial judge is efficacious and salutary.
A decision as to the form of verdicts to be used in a specific case, albeit comparative negligence, should be left to the sagacity of the trial judge. In the name of general appellate supervision, the majority concludes “[t]he better practice for the trial court would have been to require the jury to return a special verdict in the form of special written findings on the issue of whether Steele was himself negligent and, if he was so, on the issue of the extent of Steele’s negligence____” I adamantly disagree with this decision and conclude that no reason existed in the record to require the trial court in the case sub judice to use a special verdict form. This trial record epitomizes simplicity in the hierarchy of comparative negligence cases. There is nothing complicated about this jury verdict. The trial court used the best practice in a simplistic case involving comparative negligence. No reason, legal or factual, exists in this trial record to support the recommendation by the majority in reference to a “better practice.” Implementation of the “better practice recommendation” of the majority effectually mandates the use of special verdict *352forms in every comparative negligence trial. This result wreaks havoc in comparative negligence law.
Notwithstanding the rule in some jurisdictions, South Carolina should maintain the pristine rule enunciated in Baxley v. Rosenblum, 303 S.C. 340, 400 S.E.2d 502 (Ct.App.1991); Harold Tyner Dev. Builders, Inc. v. Firstmark Dev. Corp., 311 S.C. 447, 429 S.E.2d 819 (Ct.App.1993); Butler v. Gamma Nu Chapter of Sigma Chi, 314 S.C. 477, 445 S.E.2d 468 (Ct.App.1994); and Constant v. Spartanburg Steel Prods., Inc., 316 S.C. 86, 447 S.E.2d 194 (1994).

. See, e.g., more complicated cases: (1) one plaintiff v. multiple defendants — no counterclaim; (2) one plaintiff v. one defendant — with counterclaim; (3) one plaintiff v. multiple defendants — with counterclaim; (4) one plaintiff v. one defendant from private sector and a governmental entity; (5) one plaintiff v. multiple defendants — with counterclaim and cross-claim; and (6) one plaintiff v. any number of defendants involving multiple theories such as comparative negligence, strict liability, and warranty.

. See generally 57B AmJur.2d Negligence §§ 1285-1751 (1989).

. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.17.080(a) (Supp.1996); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 12-2506 (1987 & Supp.1997); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111(2) (1989 & Supp.1996); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-572h(f) (1991 & Supp.1997); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 663-31(b) (Supp.1996); Ind.Code § 34-4-33-5 (Supp. 1997); Iowa Code § 668.3 (1987 & Supp.1996); Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-258a(b) (Supp.1995); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 411.182(1) (Baldwin 1988 & Supp.1996); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.141(2)(b) (Supp.1995); N.J.Rev.Stat. § 2A: 15-5.2 (1987 & Supp.1997); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2315.19(B) (Baldwin Supp.1996); Wash.Rev.Code § 4.22.070 (1988 & Supp.1996); Wis.Stat. § 805.12 (1994 & Supp.1995); Wyo.Stat. § l-l-109(c) (Supp. 1996).

. See, e.g., New Mexico Supreme Court Order No. 8000, Misc. (March 30, 1981); Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. r. 277 (West 1997).

. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida East Coast Ry., 346 So.2d 1012 (Fla.1977) ("We hold that special verdicts shall be required in all jury trials involving comparative negligence."); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).

. Such as Missouri, as stated in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.1983).

. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 6-802 (Supp.1996); Minn.Stat. § 604.01(1) (1988 & Supp.1996); N.D.Cent.Code § 32-03.2-02 (1987 & Supp. 1995); Or.Rev.Stat. § 18.480(1) (Supp.1995); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1994).

. N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 507:7-e(II) (Supp.1995).

. Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973 & Supp.1995).

. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 735 para. 5/2-1108 (1992 & Supp.1997).

. Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 14, § 156 (West 1980 & Supp.1996).

. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 7102 (Supp.1997).

. See, e.g., Ga.Code Ann. § 9-11-49 (Supp.1996); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1121 (Supp.1996); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 15-6-49 (Supp.1996); Rule 49, Ark.R.Civ.Pro.; Rule 49, Del.R.Civ.Pro.; La.Code Civ.Proc. Ann. art. 1812 (West 1990 & Supp.1996); Rule 49, Mass.R.Civ.Pro.; Rule 49, Mont.R.Civ.Pro.; Rule 49, R.I.R.Civ.Pro.; Rule 49, W.Va. R.Civ.Pro.; Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975) (interrogatories and special verdicts suggested, but *351general verdict permitted); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981) (suggested special verdicts and special interrogatories may be useful in comparative negligence cases, but did not prohibit use of general verdicts); Oklahoma, see 57B AmJur.2d Negligence % 1624(1989).