Court Opinion

ID: 9678507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:21:23.814816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:05.060395
License: Public Domain

*99DONNELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
The principal opinion relies on South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), to support its conclusion that the search of appellant’s auto and seizure of the gun found hidden in the auto were not in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This reliance is misplaced.
A reading of Opperman and of United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) indicates to me that the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement created by five members of the Court in Opperman is limited to searches and seizures made in a “non-criminal context.” See Opperman, 428 U.S. supra at 370, n.n. 5, 6, 96 S.Ct. 3097 at n.n. 5, 6 (opinion of Burger, C. J.), and at 382-383; 96 S.Ct. at 3103-3104 (Powell, J. concurring); Chadwick, 433 U.S. supra at 10, n. 5, 97 S.Ct. at 2483, n. 5. The search and seizure in the present case, by contrast, cannot be said to have occurred in a non-criminal context. Opperman, therefore, does not exempt the search and seizure which occurred in the present case from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
We need not speculate whether the U. S. Supreme Court would exempt an inventory search in a criminal context from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Appellant also challenges the search under Art. I, § 15 of the Missouri Constitution. This section provides:
“That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported by written oath or affirmation.”
As Justices Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, and White pointed out, in dissent in Opperman, “this Court’s holding does not preclude a contrary resolution of this case or others involving the same issues under any applicable state law,” Opperman, 428 U.S. supra at 396, 96 S.Ct. at 3110; see also North Carolina v. Butler,-U.S.-, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1759 n. 7, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). I would resolve the issue of “inventory searches” under Mo.Const. Art. I, § 15, in accordance with the views expressed by the dissenting opinion in Opperman. I would hold that no objects or information discovered in the course of a warrantless inventory search may be subsequently used in criminal proceedings unless the searchers had probable cause to believe that the vehicle or its contents represented a threat of physical harm.
The remedy in Missouri for illegal searches and seizures has long been exclusion of the evidence seized, State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 357, 259 S.W. 100 (banc, 1924) (interpreting Art. II, § 11 Mo.Const. 1875; now Mo.Const. Art., I, § 15). The admission of the gun over defendant’s objection was, therefore, error requiring reversal.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.