Court Opinion

ID: 9562497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:30:20.274557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:22.798701
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it holds defendant did not waive the Witherspoon1 error as to jurors Holley and Hayter by failing to object to their excusal. As the majority indicate, the question whether failure to object constitutes waiver of Witherspoon error was recently resolved by this court in People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425 [162 Cal.Rptr. 306, 606 P.2d 341]. “The decisions of the *845United States Supreme Court and of the California courts have unanimously ruled that Witherspoon error is not waived by mere failure to object.” (Id., at p. 443.)2
As will be shown, the cases cited do not support this proposition, Review on appeal is not precluded by failure to object at trial when the law is substantially changed in the interim. (See, e.g., People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 22-23 [76 Cal.Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353].) All of the cases cited by the Velasquez majority are examples of the operation of this principle. Witherspoon substantially changed; the law. (In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 618-619 [73 Cal.Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117].) All of the cases cited by the Velasquez majority were tried prior to Witherspoon. Therefore, failure to raise a Witherspoon objection at trial was excused on appeal in these cases, expressly or impliedly, on this ground. The relevant portion of the Velasquez majority opinion follows.
“Shortly after Witherspoon, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded two cases in which the Witherspoon error was raised neither at trial nor on appeal. (Maxwell v. Bishop (1970) 398 U.S. 262 [26 L.Ed.2d 221, 90 S.Ct. 1578]; Boulden v. Holman (1969) 394 U.S. 478 [22 L.Ed.2d 433, 89 S.Ct. 1138].) The court then granted certiorari in State v. Wigglesworth (1969) 18 Ohio St.2d 171 [47 Ohio Ops.2d 388, 248 N.E.2d 607], in which the Ohio Supreme Court had held the defendant waived Witherspoon error (see 248 N.E.2d at pp. 613-614), and reversed per curiam, citing Witherspoon, Maxwell v. Bishop, supra, and Boulden v. Holman, supra. (Wigglesworth v. Ohio (1971) 403 U.S. 947 [29 L.Ed.2d 857, 91 S.Ct. 2284].) Harris v. Texas (1971) 403 U.S. 947 [29 L.Ed.2d 859, 91 S.Ct. 2291], also summarily reversed a lower court decision holding that failure to object waived Witherspoon error. [11] The California decisions similarly reject waiver of Witherspoon error. (See People v. Risenhoover, supra, 70 Cal.2d 39, 56 [73 Cal.Rptr. 533, 447 P.2d 925]; In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 618-619 [73 Cal.Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117].)” (26 Cal.3d at p. 443.)
First, the California cases cited will be examined. In In re Anderson, supra, the defendants’ failure to raise a Witherspoon objection below was excused on the following ground: “It is obvious that Witherspoon *846made a material change in the law in this state. Since petitioners were tried before Witherspoon, failure to object to the exclusion of the prospective jurors in question does not bar petitioners from now claiming error.” (69 Cal.2d at p. 619.) In People v. Risenhoover, supra, because the trial also obviously occurred prior to Witherspoon, failure to object in the trial court to the exclusion of prospective jurors was excused in reliance on Anderson. (70 Cal.2d at pp. 55-56.) Examination of the United States Supreme Court cases cited reveals that they, too, were all tried prior to Witherspoon. (Maxwell v. Bishop, supra, 398 U.S. 262, 264 [26 L.Ed.2d 221, 223]; Boulden v. Holman, supra, 394 U.S. 478, 484, fn. 8 [22 L.Ed.2d 433, 439]; State v. Wigglesworth, supra, 18 Ohio St.2d 171, 173; Harris v. State (Tex.Crim. 1970) 457 S.W.2d 903, 908.)
Significantly, the Velasquez majority did not mention the cases which have held that Witherspoon error is waived by failure to object. (Boulware v. State (Tex.Crim. 1976) 542 S.W.2d 677, 682-683, cert. den., 430 U.S. 959 [51 L.Ed.2d 811, 97 S.Ct. 1610]; Shippy v. State (Tex.Crim. 1977) 556 S.W.2d 246, 251, cert. den., 434 U.S. 935 [54 L.Ed.2d 294, 98 S.Ct. 422]; Von Byrd v. State (Tex.Crim. 1978) 569 S.W.2d 883, 891, cert. den., 441 U.S. 967 [60 L.Ed.2d 1073, 99 S.Ct. 2418]; Clark v. State (1978) 264 Ark. 630 [573 S.W.2d 622, 625-626].)
In People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048], we reiterated “the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal. [Citations.] The contrary rule would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would ‘permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.’ (Coy v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 471, 473 [334 P.2d 569].) For the same reason a Miranda issue, for example, may not be raised for the first time on appeal. [Citations.]”
Analogously, a Witherspoon contention should not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of objection below. The contrary rule encourages defense counsel to “sandbag” the trial judge. For example, this judge expressly invited defense counsel to further question prospective jurors before they were excused. Had counsel availed himself of this opportunity, the error of which he now complains might have been prevented. *847But counsel remained silent. Indeed, silence is golden in these circumstances, for counsel cannot lose by it. Either his client is acquitted or sentenced to life imprisonment, or the death penalty is reversed on appeal for Witherspoon error.
In the urgency clause of the 1977 death penalty statute, the Legislature stated: “The California Supreme Court has declared the existing death penalty law unconstitutional. This act remedies the constitutional infirmities found to be in existing law, and must take effect immediately in order to guarantee the public the protection inherent in an operative death penalty law.” (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 26.) In reality, the public still does not have the protection inherent in an operative death penalty law. Three years later, this court has yet to uphold a single death penalty judgment.
Thus far, four cases arising under the 1977 statute have been reviewed; in all four the death penalty has been reversed. (People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103 [151 Cal.Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773]; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]; People v. Velasquez, supra-, and the present case.) In two of those four cases—Velasquez and this case—the reversals were predicated on Witherspoon error despite failure to object on that ground at trial. It is therefore probable that Witherspoon error will now be claimed in virtually every one of the some 30 death penalty cases presently pending before us. I reluctantly conclude that it is also probable the will of the People will continue to be thwarted.
The judgment convicting defendant of first degree murder and imposing the penalty of death should be affirmed.
The petitions of both parties for a rehearing were denied May 14, 1980. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.

Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770],

I joined Justice Richardson in dissenting in Velasquez on the ground there was no Witherspoon error. Therefore, I did not find it necessary to reach the waiver question in that case.