Court Opinion

ID: 9745036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:29:38.779967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:54.771387
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GREEN, dissenting: I dissent. Any error that occurred in the instant trial was far less than that making remandment for a new trial proper. The State’s questioning of Officer Brienen as to whether, after he explained to defendant the availability of a blood test, defendant offered to take such a test, must be considered in the light of the evidence in the case. Arguing that evidence that defendant attempted to take a breathalyzer test would have no probative value, the State made a pretrial motion in limine to exclude such evidence. One argument made by defendant in opposition to the motion was that the evidence would properly show defendant’s “cooperation.” The motion was denied. Evidence of defendant’s attempts to take the breathalyzer test were first introduced by the defendant over the State’s objection. The evidence concerning the blood test was offered by the People in rebuttal and objected to by defendant solely on the grounds that it was not proper rebuttal but “new evidence.” When the objection was sustained, the State tendered the witness to the defendant. The defendant had no cross-examination and the witness was excused. The defendant then made a motion to “dismiss the cause” because of the reference to the blood test. No motion for a mistrial was made. Section 11 — 501 of the Motor Vehicle Code prohibits the driving of a motor vehicle in the State by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor and provides for the admission into evidence of the results of certain chemical tests of certain body substances in cases for the enforcement of the Code. The majority correctly states that the section provides that refusal to submit to such a chemical test is inadmissible in various proceedings including a prosecution for driving under the influence. The majority apparently conclude that the inadmissibility of such evidence is absolute. I disagree. Surely, despite the statutory statement of inadmissibility, if, after the defendant had offered evidence of his willingness to take a breathalyzer test, the State had offered evidence of a later refusal to take such a test, the latter evidence would be admissible. The evidence of the blood test here is only one step removed from that. As stated by Professor Edward W. Cleary: “A party introducing evidence of a particular kind cannot complain if the opposing party thereafter offers similar evidence. Lincoln v. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co., 262 Ill. 98, 104 N.E. 282 (1914), introducing testimony that property would not benefit in amount of assessment precluded objection that ultimate issue rule was violated by testimony that it would benefit in said amount.” Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence §7.3 (2d ed. 1963). The defendant raised the issue of his cooperation. If evidence of his willingness to take one type of chemical test was proper to show that cooperation, evidence of his rejection of an opportunity to take another type of chemical test was proper to show the contrary. Here the latter evidence would be of considerable weight because the breathalyzer test that defendant attempted was one that he was required to take under penalty of suspension of driver’s license pursuant to section 11 — 501.1 of the Motor Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95M, par. 11 — 501.1) whereas he was under no such compulsion to take the blood test. In addition, the jury could have concluded that he knew that he could not perform the breathalyzer test and would not have to suffer the consequences of the results of the test whereas he knew that the blood test could be taken and the result used. Having raised the issue of his willingness to take a chemical test to measure the alcohol in his blood, defendant cannot complain of innuendo raised by the attempt of the State to introduce evidence that he did not accept other chemical tests even though that evidence was excluded on other grounds. The majority also finds error in the admission of statements made by defendant to Officer Brienen while the officer was transporting defendant to the police station and prior to the officer’s giving the defendant his Miranda warnings. Ordinarily, objections to questions are waived by failure to make objection at the time the questions are asked even if constitutional issues are involved (People v. Jordan (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 133, 309 N.E.2d 274). Here, the failure to make the objection was important because the question was raised in a way that has made very difficult the determination as to whether the statements of defendant made while the officer was transporting him to the police station were made during interrogation. The officer testified that he and defendant conversed but that he did not ask any questions. The defendant’s testimony did not refute this. In People v. Mattison (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 1069, 271 N.E.2d 119, this court held that a motion to strike admissions similarly made by an accused in custody of and while being transported by a law enforcement officer to a police station were properly denied. There as here full Miranda warnings had not been given, defendant had made statements to the officer and asked him questions and the officer had asked questions of the accused. There as here, no showing was made that any admission was in response to a question. Defendant had made no showing that any of the colloquy occurring during the ride to the police station constituted interrogation. Voluntary statements made by an accused not resulting from interrogation are not protected by the Miranda doctrine although the statements are made while the accused is in custody. (People v. Hicks (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 550, 256 N.E.2d 853.) Accordingly I find no error in the trial court’s refusal to strike the testimony. Any error in the prosecutor’s inadvertent statement that Officer Brienen had testified that defendant had said he was intoxicated was very minor. The prosecutor corrected himself immediately and the jury was so advised. Since the jury had heard the testimony referred to themselves and knew what the witness had stated, no innuendo was created as would be the case if the prosecutor had made a misstatement about a matter outside the record. Accordingly, I would affirm.