Court Opinion

ID: 9676154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:16:16.009885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:44.700818
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 47. {concurring). I join the opinion of the majority. As the author of State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, I write separately to highlight that the case before the court today is a pr e-Gallion case. Additionally, I write to emphasize certain components of the basic sentencing framework set forth in Gallion.
¶ 48. The majority correctly notes "because Taylor was sentenced a little less than a year before we released Gallion, its holding does not apply to this case." Majority op., ¶ 17, n.9. Instead, the majority appropriately employs pr e-Gallion cases in its analysis.
¶ 49. Of course, many of the pr e-Gallion cases cited by the majority form the framework of the Gallion analysis. In Gallion, we reexamined the process of reasoning which demonstrates the proper exercise of sentencing discretion and noted that appellate courts are required to "more closely scrutinize the record to ensure that 'discretion was in fact exercised....'" Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶ 4 (quoting State v. McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)). We *62determined that the exercise of sentencing discretion "must be set forth on the record." Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶ 8.
¶ 50. In the wake of truth-in-sentencing legislation, we perceived a difference between the sentencing landscape prior to Gallion and that which existed at the time that Gallion was decided. See id., ¶ 28. Under the old, indeterminate sentencing system, all three branches of government played a role in establishing the sentence served.1 Id. Now, the executive branch role has been diminished with the abolition of the parole board. Id., ¶¶ 28, 33. The role of the legislative branch is limited to setting the parameters of the penalty. Id., ¶ 28. Thus, the responsibility of the judicial branch, in ensuring fair sentences, has significantly increased. Id.
¶ 51. Previously, judges were thought to have inadequate information to determine the actual date on which a prisoner should be released. Id., ¶ 32. Instead, the prison officials and the parole board who had sustained contact with the prisoner were thought to be in a better position to determine if the rehabilitation efforts were successful and when the prisoner could be safely released. Id. Now, in large part, the release date is determined up front, at the time of sentencing. Id., ¶ 34.2
¶ 52. In light of these changes, we reaffirmed in Gallion the sentencing standards set forth in McCleary and reexamined the manner in which those standards *63were to be applied. We noted a "regrettable disconnect" between the McCleary principles as-stated and those principles as-applied. Id., ¶ 26. Ultimately we concluded that "[w]hat has previously been satisfied with implied rationale must now be set forth on the record." Id., ¶ 38.
¶ 53. In reaffirming the McCleary standards and reexamining the manner in which those standards were to be applied, we set forth the basic framework for sentencing and emphasized the need for the court to set forth its rationale on the record. I highlight here certain components of that discussion:
• Courts must specify the objectives of the sentence. Id., ¶ 41.
• Courts are to describe the facts and sentencing factors relevant to those objectives, and explain why the sentence imposed advances the specified objectives. Id., ¶ 42.
• In each case, the sentence imposed shall " 'call for the minimum amount of custody or confinement which is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.'" Id., ¶ 44 (quoting McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276).
• Courts are to consider probation as the first alternative. Probation should be the disposition unless:confinement is necessary to protect the public, the offender needs correctional treatment available only in confinement, or it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶ 44.
¶ 54. The requirement of an on-the-record explanation will serve to fulfill the McCleary directive that discretion be exercised on a "rational and explainable *64basis." Id., ¶ 39 (quoting McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276). Merely uttering the facts involved, invoking sentencing factors, and pronouncing a sentence is not a sufficient demonstration of the proper exercise of discretion. Quoting McCleary, the Gallion court recounted that: "Discretion is not synonymous with decision-making. Rather, the term contemplates a process of reasoning." Id., ¶ 3 (quoting McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 277). Courts must reference the relevant facts and factors, and explain on the record the linkage between the sentence given and the sentencing objectives.
¶ 55. The McCleary court aptly described the importance of the on-the-record explanation. Thus, I end where the Gallion court began:
In all Anglo-American jurisprudence a principal obligation of the judge is to explain the reasons for his actions. His decisions will not be understood by the people and cannot be reviewed by the appellate courts unless the reasons for decisions can be examined. It is thus apparent that requisite to a prima facie valid sentence is a statement by the trial judge detailing his reasons for selecting the particular sentence imposed.
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶ 1 (quoting McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 280-81).

 "The legislature set the maximum penalty and the manner of its enforcement; the courts imposed an indeterminate term; and the executive branch, through the parole board, determined how much of that term was going to be served." State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 28, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.

 Early release options are restricted. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 973.195 (2003-04).