Court Opinion

ID: 9849102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:34:48.734766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:01.019496
License: Public Domain

Krivosha,C.J.,
dissenting.
For the reasons more particularly set out by McCown, J., in his dissent in Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978), and my own dissent in Creason v. Myers, 217 Neb. 551, 350 N.W.2d 526 (1984), I must dissent from the majority opinion in this case. In my view, perpetuating either of these causes of action created by courts ignores the reality of today’s lifestyle. I would abolish both causes of action. While we ought to strive to improve the sanctity of marriage, the fact that the relationship withers and dies, as it did in this case, should not be grounds for one to recover what are obviously punitive damages. If the majority opinion is strictly construed, one who engages in a social relationship with another who has obtained a decree of divorce, during the 6 months after the decree was obtained but before it becomes final, may be liable in a suit for alienation of affections because by engaging in this relationship the formerly married couple is prevented from reconciling. In my view, that is not appropriate.