Court Opinion

ID: 9720086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:15:04.414336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:30.754856
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from that part of the court’s opinion which holds that the *218relationship of governor and governed existed between plaintiffs and city with respect to the nuisance which is alleged to have injured plaintiffs’ property.
Before there can be a relationship of governor and governed in a nuisance case the government concerned must be acting in a governmental and not a proprietary function with respect to the injured party. This court held, in Matson v. Dane County (1920), 172 Wis. 522, 179 N. W. 774, and Lloyd v. Chippewa County (1953), 265 Wis. 293, 61 N. W. (2d) 479, 62 N. W. (2d) 431, that while the maintenance of a public highway by a county is a governmental function with respect to people traveling on the highway, it stands in a proprietary capacity with respect to adjoining property owners. It is immaterial that here it is the defendant city and not a county that is maintaining the highway. This principle was again acknowledged' in Thompson v. Eau Claire (1955), 269 Wis. 76, 81, 69 N. W. (2d) 239, when we quoted with approval this extract from the opinion in the Lloyd Case (p. 302):
“ ‘The defense of immunity of the county based upon governmental function is not available in the instant casé under the decision of this court in Matson v. Dane County (1920), 172 Wis. 522, 179 N. W. 774. In that case the court held that, while the maintenance of a public highway by a county may be a governmental function with respect to the rights of the public traveling thereon, it is not such a function with respect to injuries thereby occasioned to the owners of adjoining property, and as to such adjoining owners the county acts in a proprietary capacity.’ ”
In the Lloyd Case a county snowplow operated by the defendant county on a public highway blocked a drain opening, thereby causing flooding of the adjoining land. The rationale of the decision on the nuisance issue was that, while plowing snow by the county on a public highway is a govern*219mental and not a proprietary function, the relationship of the county to the owner of land bordering the highway was that of one land proprietor to another. If a private landowner is liable to an adjoining owner because of a nuisance maintained on the former’s land causing injury to the latter’s property, there is no reason why a public owner, such as a city or a county, should not likewise also be subject to the same liability even though the particular negligent act causing the nuisance is governmental in nature. I can perceive no difference in character between a nuisance which causes injury to adjoining property by backing up water from a street, and one which causes vibrations which travel through the ground underlying the street into the land of the adjoining owner thereby damaging his building, insofar as making a differentiation for the purpose of imposing liability.
However, in both cases, in order for there to be liability imposed upon the municipal corporation maintaining the street, the nuisance must be due to some negligence on its part. In the instant case I would hold as a matter of law that the complaint is insufficient to charge the city with negligence. For that reason I concur in the result.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hallows joins in this opinion.