Court Opinion

ID: 9393087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 14:04:52.563883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.057601
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13022

               COMMONWEALTH      vs.   ANDREW MacCORMACK.

            Suffolk.        November 7, 2022. - May 9, 2023.

  Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ.

Homicide. Evidence, Prior misconduct, Third-party culprit,
     Inference, Consciousness of guilt, Inflammatory evidence,
     Relevancy and materiality. Practice, Criminal, Capital
     case.

     Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on October 31, 2017.

    The case was tried before Mary K. Ames, J.

     Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant.
     Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney (Ian
Polumbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the
Commonwealth.

    GEORGES, J.        A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant

of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or

cruelty, see G. L. c. 265, § 1, in the killing of his wife,

Vanessa MacCormack, by blunt force trauma and strangulation.       On

appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient
                                                                       2

evidence to support his conviction.   He also contends that the

police investigation focused exclusively on him, rather than

pursuing other leads, and that the judge abused her discretion

in permitting the introduction of certain evidence that the

defendant argues was used improperly as propensity evidence.      In

addition, the defendant asks us to exercise our extraordinary

authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to direct the entry of a

verdict of not guilty or to order a new trial.   Having carefully

reviewed the record, we discern no error that would warrant

vacating the conviction, or ordering a new trial, and no reason

to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

    1.   Facts.   We recite the facts the jury could have found,

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).

    The defendant and the victim were married in August of

2015, and purchased a house in Revere a few months later.      Both

of their families lived nearby and were intimately involved in

the couple's lives.   At the time of the victim's killing in

September of 2017, the defendant's mother was living with the

defendant and the victim, as she had been since the previous

April.   Ordinarily, the defendant already would have left for

work by the time his mother would wake up at 6 A.M.   The victim

was in daily contact with members of her family, calling and

sending text messages to them multiple times a day, and to
                                                                      3

family and friends, the victim and the defendant appeared to be

happy.

    Beginning in early 2017, however, issues arose stemming

from the defendant's financial improprieties, which the victim

suspected were to fund his growing use of drugs.     In February

2017, the victim realized that approximately $6,000 had been

taken from her bank account.   Evidence at trial pointed to the

defendant:   he had forged and cashed at least two checks to

himself, each for $350, from the victim's account, and there was

no evidence of third-party access.   That same month, the victim

realized that her wedding ring was missing.     The couple

purchased a replacement, but it also went missing two weeks

later.   When the couple called police to investigate a potential

robbery, officers found no signs of forced entry.     The defendant

mentioned to officers that the baby monitor had been "hacked,"

and a small basement window was open.     Police determined that

the window was too small for anyone to have entered through it.

The second ring was never found.

    The defendant began frequenting local pawn shops, taking

out loans on gift cards and other jewelry, including his wedding

ring, and then defaulting on the loans.    Unbeknownst to his

wife, the defendant repeatedly opened, overdrew, and closed bank

accounts throughout 2017.   By the summer, the defendant was

spending between $100 and $400 on cocaine and steroids weekly.
                                                                    4

     On July 28, 2017, the victim sent a text message to the

defendant saying that he was ruining their marriage and that she

was unhappy and furious.   The defendant tried to assure her that

everything would be fixed, but the victim said that she knew the

defendant was doing something suspicious, as she had seen a

notification on his cellular telephone from someone she knew to

be a drug seller, and the defendant had attempted to take out a

loan without her knowledge.     The victim continued to send the

defendant a series of angry and indignant text messages, full of

profanity, throughout the night.    Text messages over the

following month indicated that the victim's frustration with the

defendant continued to grow.1

     On August 31, 2017, the defendant and the victim got into

another argument.   The victim sent a text message to the

defendant saying that she was going to sell the house and find a

     1 Among other things, the victim sent the defendant a text
message saying, "I'm furious. You are ruining this marriage.
It's not fair. I'm unhappy in this marriage because of you.
You need to fix this." In subsequent messages, she reiterated
that the situation was not fair to her, she did not trust the
defendant, she was "at the end of [her] rope in this marriage,"
and the defendant was "making [her] fucking miserable."

     Over the course of the month, the victim, on separate
occasions, sent the defendant messages saying that she was "so
fucking mad," demanded detailed information about the
defendant's whereabouts, said that she was "blind-sided" that he
was not where she thought he had been, protested that she
"thought [they] were trying to work on [their] marriage," and
repeatedly asked about different sums of money that had gone
missing from their joint account.
                                                                      5

divorce lawyer and that she could not stop thinking about the

possibility of divorce.   The following day, the defendant

responded that the victim was "crazy" and that he would not sign

anything to sell the house or to obtain a divorce.     On September

2, the victim continued to express her anger to the defendant in

text messages, and the following day, she demanded answers from

the defendant about times when she felt that he had lied to her,

including instances of missing cash, mysterious bank

withdrawals, and her missing credit card.

    On September 8, 2017, the victim sent the defendant a

message about additional money that was missing from their bank

account, and accused him of creating their financial problems

because of his drug habit and only saying he would improve

things and repay her missing money in order to avoid a divorce.

The next day, the victim again told the defendant that she was

unhappy with him and their marriage.   These later messages were

in response to the defendant's accrual of hundreds of dollars in

unpaid parking tickets for the victim's father's sport utility

vehicle (SUV), which the defendant had been using regularly

since February.

    On September 22, 2017, the victim checked into her gym at

6:36 P.M.   Later, after returning home, she had an audio-video

call with her parents so they could say goodnight to her

daughter.   At 8:17 P.M., the defendant sent the victim a
                                                                        6

photograph of his new haircut and they both called each other.

At 8:58 P.M., the victim sent the defendant a text message

asking where he was.

    The defendant ultimately spent the evening in the basement

of the house, where he intended to sleep.     He devoted his time

that evening to browsing Internet escort listings advertising

sex for money.

    a.     Events of September 23, 2017.   In the early morning

hours of September 23, 2017, the defendant sent a text message

to an escort and arranged to meet her at 10 A.M. on Route 1 in

Peabody.    He continued to peruse similar listings until after

3 A.M.

    The defendant's mother testified that she left the house at

around 8:30 A.M.    At 8:28 A.M., surveillance camera footage

showed the defendant driving toward a liquor store at the end of

the street, circling it, and returning home at 8:35 A.M.       During

this brief trip, the victim called the defendant's cellular

telephone twice.

    Throughout the morning, the defendant made a series of

telephone calls to his friend James Caruso, the first at

around 10 A.M.     Caruso lived in Saugus, which is north of

Revere.    Earlier that week, the defendant and Caruso had

discussed the defendant going to Caruso's house to help finish

some work on the house.     Surveillance video footage and cell
                                                                     7

site location information (CSLI) for the defendant's telephone

showed that he did not leave his house again until 12:49 P.M.,

when he drove away with his daughter in the SUV.    By that time,

according to the medical examiner, the victim was dead.     The

defendant had killed the victim and left her body on the floor

of their bedroom.

     After leaving the house, the defendant called Caruso at

12:54 P.M.    He told Caruso that he had taken the baby for a walk

and was going to see if the victim was home from the gym before

heading to Caruso's house.    Approximately four minutes later, as

he was driving south on Route 107 toward Revere, the defendant

called the victim at 12:58 P.M., and the call went directly to

voicemail.2   He then sent the victim two text messages saying

that he would be going to visit Caruso and asking why she was

not responding, respectively.    The defendant drove a meandering

route through Revere, and then drove north on Route 107 toward

Saugus; he arrived at Caruso's house, a five-minute drive from

his own house, at 1:30 P.M.

     As he was completing the work on Caruso's home, the

defendant called his mother-in-law.    He told her that the victim

had not been home when he left the house and that she was

     2 Other calls to the victim's cellular telephone that
afternoon, from the defendant and from the victim's sister and
parents, also went directly to voicemail.
                                                                       8

probably at the gym.     He said that he had been at Caruso's house

for approximately one hour with the baby and would be leaving in

about fifteen minutes.     After ending the call, the defendant

mentioned to Caruso that he had not heard from the victim since

she left for the gym that morning.     The defendant seemed

concerned and said that it was unusual not to have heard from

her, as the two usually spoke while the victim was at the gym.

The defendant called his home telephone for six seconds, and

then again called the victim's cellular telephone.     The victim's

mother called the defendant again at around 2:10 P.M.; he said

that he was still at Caruso's house, and would be leaving in

about twenty minutes.

    The defendant left Caruso's house a few minutes later.        He

bought gasoline in Winthrop, drove to a pharmacy in the East

Boston section of Boston, and then met his drug supplier in East

Boston, where he purchased cocaine.     The defendant took an

indirect route back to his house in Revere, approaching it from

Saugus to the north, rather than from Caruso's house to the

south.   During the drive, he again spoke with his in-laws

concerning the victim's whereabouts.

    The victim's mother called the defendant again at around

3:30 P.M., as the defendant was pulling into his driveway.      The

defendant remained on the telephone with her as he parked and

entered the house.   Then he screamed, "Call 911.   She's dead."
                                                                      9

The victim's mother hung up and called 911.     When the defendant

called the victim's mother again, he told her that the victim

was "dead" and "cold."     The defendant picked up the baby, still

in her carrier seat, and ran out of the house to call 911.

    First responders found the victim in the couple's bedroom,

lying face-down in a pool of blood, with a garbage bag partially

full of trash over her head.     An autopsy later revealed that the

cause of death had been a combination of blunt force trauma to

the face, strangulation, and stab and slash wounds to the neck.

Blood pooling indicated that she had been alive when some of the

blunt force injuries and lacerations occurred, although the stab

and slash wounds to the victim's neck were inflicted "pretty

near death" or postmortem.

    b.   The investigation.     That evening, police officers

brought the defendant to the Revere police station for an

interview.    There were no signs of bruising, scratches,

injuries, or marks on the defendant's body.     The defendant

described to the officers the course of his actions that day.

He also said that he and the victim were "very happily" married

and did not have any problems related to infidelity, drugs, or

finances.    He explained that all of the doors had been locked

when he left the house that morning and that he had had to use a

key upon his return.     When the interviewing officers brought up

the issue of the missing rings, the defendant suggested that the
                                                                   10

second ring must have been stolen and said that police had found

a "suspicious" window in the basement that was unlocked.

    When police searched the defendant's and the victim's

house, they found no signs of forced entry.     Blood spatter on

the inside of the bedroom door, walls, closet doors, and

bedframe also showed no signs of a struggle.     The bathroom

appeared to have been cleaned recently, and the television and

other surfaces had been wiped down.     The bed linen had been

removed and was in a laundry basket, but contained no trace of

blood.   A large butcher knife was missing from the knife block

in the kitchen, and there was no bag in the kitchen garbage

container.   There was an overwhelming odor of bleach throughout

the house.   The investigation uncovered no useful fingerprints

or deoxyribonucleic acid.

    A forensic examination of the defendant's cellular

telephone revealed that he had deleted several items from it

shortly after the victim's death.     Those items included Internet

browsing history of visits to an escort Web site, and several

text messages in which the defendant attempted to arrange a

meeting with an escort, in the week leading up to the victim's

death and in the early morning hours of September 23, 2017.

    c.   Prior proceedings.   The grand jury indicted the

defendant on one count of murder in the first degree.     At trial,

the Commonwealth proceeded on theories of deliberate
                                                                   11

premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.     The defendant

maintained a defense that the Commonwealth's evidence did not

establish him as the killer beyond a reasonable doubt.     He

called two witnesses to testify for the defense.    His mother

testified to his former drug use and the time he spent in drug

rehabilitation.   Thomas Riley, who knew the defendant from

playing in a local hockey league, testified that the defendant

had given him a ride that afternoon.    The judge denied the

defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty at the

close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all the

evidence.   The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the

first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.

    2.   Discussion.   The defendant argues that there was

insufficient evidence to support a finding that he was the

perpetrator and that, thus, his motions for a required finding

should have been allowed.   Specifically, the defendant asserts

that the Commonwealth's case rested on improper speculation

about his character and that the prosecutor did not introduce

evidence that affirmatively demonstrated that the defendant had

committed the crime.

    a.   Sufficiency of the evidence.   In reviewing the denial

of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, we consider

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have found
                                                                   12

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 678 (1979), citing

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).    "The

relevant question is whether the evidence would permit a jury to

find guilt, not whether the evidence requires such a finding."

Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747 (1988).

Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt, Commonwealth v. Nadworny, 396 Mass. 342, 354

(1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986), and the reasonable

inferences drawn from such evidence "need not be necessary or

inescapable," only "reasonable and possible" (citation omitted),

Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass.

215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011).   At the same time, a

conviction may not rest on the piling of inference upon

inference or on conjecture and speculation.   Id.

    Here, the jury reasonably could have found that it was the

defendant, and not a third-party culprit, who committed the

murder, where the evidence supported an inference that the

defendant was the only person in the house with the victim and

their baby during the relevant time frame.    Video surveillance

footage showed the defendant driving away from the house in the

SUV at 12:49 P.M.; that is the first time the defendant appears

on surveillance footage near his street after he was shown

returning home at 8:35 A.M.
                                                                    13

     Moreover, the prosecutor introduced sufficient evidence

from which the jury reasonably could have found that the

defendant was alone with the victim, because there was no

evidence that anyone else was present in the house at that time.3

Cf. Commonwealth v. Coonan, 428 Mass. 823, 829 (1999) (evidence

showing that victim and defendant were together at time of

killing, in conjunction with other incriminating evidence, was

sufficient to support conviction).     The defendant told police,

the victim's mother, and Caruso that the victim intended to go

to the gym that morning.     CSLI evidence, however, indicated that

the victim's telephone had been at her house all morning, as did

testimony from employees of the victim's gym asserting that her

last visit to the gym had been the previous evening.     The

defendant's mother testified that she left the house at around

8:30 A.M, and the victim's mother and father testified that they

were out of town that day.     No evidence was introduced to

suggest that any other person had entered the house; given the

     3 Testimony by a paramedic who responded to the 911 call
indicated that in her opinion, the victim had been dead for at
least two to three hours based on the state of rigor mortis in
the victim's jaw when first responders arrived at the scene
shortly after 3:30 P.M. The jury later heard testimony from a
State medical examiner that there was no certain way to
establish a time of death from rigor mortis, nor a current
reliable formula to establish the precise time of death from
temperature. If the jury credited the paramedic's testimony,
drawing all inferences in the Commonwealth's favor, the victim
would have been dead when, as the surveillance video footage
indicated, the defendant left the house at 12:49 P.M.
                                                                   14

locked doors and windows, the jury reasonably could have

concluded that no one had done so.    The jury thus could have

discredited the defendant's version of events and found instead

that the victim had remained home that morning and that the

defendant was the only one there with her and the baby after the

defendant's mother left the house.    See Commonwealth v. Lopez,

484 Mass. 211, 217 (2020) (jury may credit or reject some, part,

or all of particular witness's testimony).

    In addition, the prior bad act evidence that the defendant

challenges, which was introduced to show the nature of his and

the victim's prior relationship, was properly before the jury as

evidence of consciousness of guilt.   Evidence of consciousness

of guilt, while not conclusive, may be considered in conjunction

with other evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.   See Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 715, cert.

denied, 573 U.S. 937 (2014), S.C., 480 Mass. 231, cert. denied,

139 S. Ct. 649 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Rojas, 388 Mass.

626, 629 (1983).   Such evidence may include making false or

inconsistent statements to police and giving a false alibi.

Woods, supra.   See Rojas, supra at 629-630.

    As discussed, quite a few of the defendant's statements

about his location and activities on the day of the crime were

inconsistent with other evidence introduced at trial.   In his

statement to police, the defendant said that he went to the
                                                                    15

beach at around 12:30 P.M. with his daughter, and then stopped

at a pharmacy and a gasoline station, before he headed to

Caruso's house at around 2 P.M.    The defendant also stated that

after leaving Caruso's house, he drove directly home, where he

discovered the victim's body.     Riley testified that he saw the

defendant at the beach in East Boston that afternoon and said

that the defendant had given him a ride to a liquor store.

     The jury, however, reasonably could have inferred that the

images on the surveillance footage, and the CSLI records,

reflected the defendant's actual location.    The CSLI and

telephone records suggested that the defendant had remained at

his house until 12:49 P.M., not 12:30 P.M.     Video surveillance

footage then showed the defendant driving around Revere and

Saugus, in a direction away from his and Caruso's houses, for

approximately forty minutes.    Additional footage showed the

defendant leave Caruso's house and drive to a pharmacy and a

gasoline station before going to East Boston to purchase

cocaine.   The jury could have inferred from the CSLI and video

surveillance footage that the defendant returned home from East

Boston using a deliberately circuitous route, in order to delay

his report of having found the victim dead in their house.4

     4 CSLI from that period was consistent with the defendant's
route as seen in the surveillance footage.
                                                                  16

    In his statement to police, the defendant repeatedly

emphasized how concerned he was about the victim and that he had

communicated his concern to others throughout the day.   In the

defendant's concerned calls to the victim's telephone, his

statements to Caruso, and his meandering drives, the jury

reasonably could have inferred that the defendant was attempting

to orchestrate a timeline that placed him away from the house at

critical moments and provided a way for him to express concern

for his wife.   See Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581,

594 (2012) (defendant's fabricating alibi by parking truck in

driveway so it would be visible, and recounting false series of

events to police, was consistent with consciousness of guilt).

    Additionally, Kimberly Donovan, a friend of the victim's

mother, testified that she gave the defendant a ride to the

victim's parents' house on the evening of the killing.   During

that ride, the defendant insisted to Donovan, without prompting,

that investigators had asked him repeatedly about the presence

of bleach in the house in efforts to "trick" him.   During that

interview, however, the officers deliberately had not mentioned

bleach.   Here, too, the jury reasonably could have inferred that

the defendant's non sequitur protestations to Donovan that the

police were trying to "trick" him were intended as an attempt to

fabricate sympathy and protest his innocence.
                                                                    17

    The defendant also repeatedly told police that he and the

victim were "very happily" married, had no financial

difficulties, and were faithful.   From the victim's text

messages, testimony by the defendant's friends and members of

the victim's family, and content on the defendant's cellular

telephone, however, the jury could have determined that the

relationship was quite different from what the defendant

described.   The jury heard evidence from which they could have

concluded that the defendant was buying and using drugs, had

stolen money, jewelry, and credit cards from the victim, and had

sought to exchange money for sex with escorts.   The victim's

text messages suggested a degree of frustration with, and anger

at, the defendant to such an extent that she was contemplating

obtaining a divorce.

    The forensic investigation of the defendant's telephone

indicated that he had deleted certain text messages and browsing

history from his telephone that portrayed him in an unflattering

light, detailed his efforts to find escorts, including hours

before the victim's death, and showed contentious discussions

between the victim and himself concerning financial

difficulties.   The jury could have understood these deleted

telephone records as a willful attempt at concealment, and as

evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt.    See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 423 Mass. 863, 869-870 (1996), S.C.,
                                                                  18

447 Mass. 161 (2006) (defendant's repeated denial of serious

difficulties between couple in face of consistent evidence to

contrary was evidence of his consciousness of guilt).     While

such evidence by itself would be insufficient to sustain a

conviction, it may be considered as part of the "mosaic of

evidence" upon which the jury could have concluded that the

Commonwealth had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt.   See Commonwealth v. Javier, 481 Mass. 268, 284 (2019),

quoting Commonwealth v. Salim, 399 Mass. 227, 233 (1987).

    And although the Commonwealth need not prove motive for a

conviction of murder in the first degree, evidence of a

defendant's motive may be relevant and admissible, as it was

here, to show that the defendant intended and acted as argued.

See Commonwealth v. Carlson, 448 Mass. 501, 508-509 (2007).

    The jury heard multiple types of evidence from which they

reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had a motive

to kill the victim.   Text messages from the victim, as well as

police testimony, indicated certain underlying reasons for the

increasingly fraught relationship between the defendant and the

victim and the growing animosity the victim directed at the

defendant.   This evidence, among other things, showed that the

defendant forged and cashed two checks from the victim's

accounts, repeatedly opened and closed bank accounts, was

dishonest about having paid parking tickets, pawned his wedding
                                                                     19

ring and household gift cards, and caused the disappearance of

the victim's two wedding rings, in the victim's view, to support

his drug habit.   The defendant also repeatedly told the victim

that their bank accounts had been hacked, notwithstanding the

absence of any evidence indicating that this had occurred.     See

Commonwealth v. Tassinari, 466 Mass. 340, 347 (2013) (victim's

statements expressing dissatisfaction with marriage and hopes

for divorce were relevant to defendant's motive); Commonwealth

v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 464-465 (2004) (evidence of husband's

financial irregularities, use of cocaine, and consorting with

prostitutes established existence of strained marital

relationship as possible motive for killing).

    The victim told the defendant multiple times that she was

thinking of divorcing him.   Each time, the defendant responded

that he did not want the marriage to end, apologized, and

promised that he would do better.    See Lao, 443 Mass. at 780

(defendant's knowledge of termination of marriage was evidence

of motive); Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 463 (2000)

(evidence showing deteriorating relationship between victim and

defendant in year prior to murder was probative of motive).

    b.   Defendant's arguments.     The defendant argues that the

Commonwealth's case was based on attacking his character and

speculation about his behavior in the months leading up to the

victim's death, rather than on any direct evidence that he had
                                                                     20

played a role in the killing.     The only way he could have been

convicted, the defendant contends, is if the jury failed to

presume him innocent while weighing the evidence, in violation

of his right to due process.     He argues that because the

Commonwealth did not demonstrate to the jury that it ruled out

other suspects and lacked direct evidence that he had played a

role in the killing, his conviction cannot stand.

       The theory of the defense at trial, consistent with the

defendant's statement to police, was that the defendant was not

at home at the time of the killing.     In his statement to police

on the evening of the victim's death, the defendant said that he

had slept in the basement the previous night.     According to the

defendant, the victim woke him up at around 9 A.M. with the

baby, and his mother left the house at approximately 9:30 A.M.

At 11:30 A.M., the victim told him that she wanted to go to the

gym.   He told the victim he would take the baby for a walk and

then go to Caruso's house.     The victim was still at home when

the defendant left at 12:30 P.M. and took the baby in her

stroller to the beach.    When he got to the beach, he contacted

Caruso to arrange his visit.     The defendant showed the officers

his cellular telephone, which indicated that he had tried to

call the victim and had sent her a text message at 12:59 P.M.

       The jury reasonably could have rejected the defendant's

account.   The absence of any sign of entry by anyone else, the
                                                                    21

locked doors, the lack of any means of alternate entry, and the

absence of any struggle by the victim, in conjunction with the

testimony, video surveillance footage, and CSLI, discussed

supra, would have allowed a reasonable juror to infer that the

defendant had not been where he claimed he had been at the time

of the killing.   Rather, he and the victim had been alone with

their daughter in the house at the time of the victim's death.

See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 396 Mass. 306, 311-313 (1985)

(evidence that defendant was alone with victim at about time of

murder, along with evidence of consciousness of guilt, was

sufficient to sustain verdict); Rojas, 388 Mass. at 629-630

(same).

    The defendant's argument that the Commonwealth improperly

relied on solely circumstantial evidence also fails.    When

reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, we "must look at the

evidence as a whole and not examine exhaustively each piece of

evidence separately."   Salim, 399 Mass. at 233.   Each inference

drawn from the evidence must be a reasonable and logical

conclusion, and the jury may not rely upon conjecture,

guesswork, or speculation to choose between alternate

inferences.   See Commonwealth v. Dostie, 425 Mass. 372, 376-377

(1997).   Thus, where the Commonwealth's evidence is entirely

circumstantial, it cannot meet its burden if the evidence

equally supports inconsistent propositions, as resolution of
                                                                  22

such a case necessarily requires conjecture or surmise.    See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Merry, 453 Mass. 653, 663 (2009).

    The case before us, however, is not one of equally

inconsistent propositions, as there was no evidence of a

plausible culprit aside from the defendant.    See Merry, 453

Mass. at 663 (evidence did not equally support defendant's and

Commonwealth's theories of crime).   Rather, the evidence would

have supported an inference that the defendant and the victim

were home alone with their infant daughter on the morning of the

killing, and there was no evidence of a forced entry.     See

Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 535 (1989).   From the

inconsistencies between the defendant's statements and the

record evidence of the location of his cellular telephone and

the surveillance footage showing the location of the SUV, the

jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant's

statements were false and represented an attempt to construct an

alibi, demonstrating consciousness of guilt.   See Rojas, 388

Mass. at 629-630.   In addition, evidence was introduced of a

troubled marriage, resulting from the defendant's financial

improprieties, which coincided with his return to, and

increasing use of, drugs.   There also was abundant evidence of

the victim's escalating anger toward the defendant and her

contemplation of leaving the marriage in the weeks and days

leading up to her death.    See Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. at 594.
                                                                     23

    While a conviction may rest entirely on circumstantial

evidence, "[t]he evidence and the inferences permitted to be

drawn therefrom must be 'of sufficient force to bring minds of

ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt]

beyond a reasonable doubt.'"     Commonwealth v. Sokphann Chhim,

447 Mass. 370, 377 (2006), quoting Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.

Here, no single inference the jury reasonably could have drawn

would have been sufficient, in isolation, to establish guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.     Combined, however, those reasonable

inferences create a "fabric of proof" that is sufficient to

warrant the jury's finding that the defendant was the person who

killed the victim beyond a reasonable doubt.     Rojas, 388 Mass.

at 629-630.   See Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. at 594.    As the

defendant emphasizes, the evidence against him was wholly

circumstantial.   Nonetheless, it was not, as he contends,

insufficient to warrant the jury's conclusion that he killed the

victim.   See Lao, 443 Mass. at 780.

    The defendant also objects that the criminal investigation

improperly focused on him to the exclusion of all others.     The

defendant moved in limine to introduce evidence that police

improperly and immediately focused on him, and did not pursue

any other investigative leads.     The defendant argued that there

was evidence of hostility between a boyfriend of the victim's

sister and the victim's family; the boyfriend's telephone number
                                                                    24

was stored in the mother's telephone under the moniker

"asshole."    At the time of the victim's death, the boyfriend

lived a short distance away, on the same street as the victim.

At a hearing on the motion, the defendant explained that the

victim's family told investigators that when her family was

trying to locate her on the day of her death, they looked at a

map showing the location of all telephones enrolled in their

family's cellular provider's plan.   On that map, the victim's

cellular telephone appeared in near vicinity to the boyfriend's

telephone, suggesting that the two were close by.    The defendant

maintained that police should have investigated this individual

further.

    The defendant also argued in his motion in limine that

police failed to investigate the hacking of the baby monitor.

When they spoke to police after the victim's replacement wedding

ring vanished, the defendant and the victim both mentioned that

they had seen the motorized baby monitor moving as if it were

being operated, but without either of them doing so.     The

defendant also mentioned the baby monitor in his statement to

police.    The judge allowed the defendant's motion to introduce

both pieces of Bowden evidence, but declined the request for a

Bowden instruction.    See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472,

485-486 (1980).   At trial, the defendant attempted to suggest
                                                                  25

the possibility of an unknown third-party culprit through cross-

examination.

    A defendant has a constitutional right to a defense and to

present evidence that another may have committed the crime.    See

Commonwealth v. Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 559 (2015).

Consequently, we afford such evidence wide latitude, insofar as

it tends to show that another person had the motive, intent, or

opportunity to commit the offense.   Commonwealth v. Steadman,

489 Mass. 372, 383 (2022), citing Commonwealth v. Silva-

Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800-801 (2009).   Such evidence "must

have a rational tendency to prove the issue the defense raises,

and the evidence cannot be too remote or speculative."

Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 (1996).

    Information concerning a third-party culprit whose

existence was known to police, but whose potential involvement

was never investigated, may be admissible in order to defend

against a criminal charge by suggesting the existence of other

possible culprits whom police did not investigate.   See Silva-

Santiago, 453 Mass. at 802; Rosa, 422 Mass. at 22.

    Here, as the defendant concedes, although his motion in

limine regarding Bowden evidence was allowed, he did not present

any evidence at trial that a specific third-party culprit
                                                                     26

existed.5    The Commonwealth was not required to prove that no one

else possibly could have killed the victim.     See Merola, 405

Mass. at 533, citing Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 175

(1980).     The Commonwealth's burden was to prove that there was

sufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the defendant had done so.     See Latimore, 378 Mass.

at 677.     They have done so here.

     Finally, the defendant argues that the judge abused her

discretion in allowing the introduction of evidence that, during

the evening before the killing, the defendant spent several

hours browsing websites advertising escort services, scheduled a

meeting with an escort, and sent an explicit photograph of

himself to her (escort evidence).     The defendant maintains that

the admission of the escort evidence resulted in overwhelmingly

unfair prejudice that was disproportionate to its limited

probative value.    By associating him with a website that he

describes as "the most infamous illicit sexual marketplace in

America," the defendant contends, the prosecution improperly

played on the jury's emotions and caused them to conclude that

he was capable of killing his wife.     He argues that the escort

evidence was not probative, because it was not logically related

     5 No evidence regarding the victim's sister's boyfriend or
the family's view of him was introduced at trial, nor did the
jury hear any specific evidence concerning the absence of any
investigation of the baby monitor.
                                                                     27

to the crime charged and, to the extent that it suggested

marital strain, it was cumulative of other evidence.    The

defendant also argues that any limiting instructions would have

been ineffective, as the evidence left the jury to conclude that

he was deceitful.   As a result, he contends, the jury must have

inferred, based only on his "sinister" behavior, rather than on

any direct evidence, that the defendant was the killer.

    Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts may not be

introduced to show the defendant's bad character or propensity

to commit the crimes charged.   See Commonwealth v. Da Lin Huang,

489 Mass. 162, 173 (2022), citing Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398

Mass. 214, 224 (1986); Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2022).     Such

evidence may be admissible, however, for other purposes, such as

to establish motive, state of mind, or intent.   See Commonwealth

v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014); Mass. G. Evid.

§ 404(b)(2).   Even where relevant for a permissible purpose,

such evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is

outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.

See Crayton, supra at 249 n.27; Mass. G. Evid. § 403.

    Evidentiary rulings on relevance, probative value, and

prejudice are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.

See Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 805 (2021).    A judge's

decision to permit the introduction of prior bad act evidence

will be upheld unless the judge made a clear error of judgment,
                                                                    28

such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable

alternatives.   Id. at 805-806.   When assessing whether the risk

of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the

challenged evidence, a reviewing court considers, inter alia,

(1) whether the trial judge carefully weighed the probative

value and prejudicial effect of the evidence to be introduced;

(2) whether the judge mitigated the prejudicial effect through

proper limiting instructions; (3) whether the challenged

evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence,

thereby reducing the risk of any additional prejudicial effect;

and (4) whether the challenged evidence was so similar to the

charged offense that it increased "the risk of propensity

reasoning by the jury."    Da Lin Huang, 489 Mass. at 174, quoting

West, supra at 807.

    Here, the judge initially denied the Commonwealth's

pretrial motion to introduce the escort evidence because she

found that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of

unfair prejudice; she also allowed the Commonwealth to renew its

motion as the evidence before the jury developed.   When the

Commonwealth again sought to introduce the escort evidence on

the ninth day of trial, the judge again denied the motion, but

allowed the Commonwealth to resubmit it based on the state of

the evidence introduced.   After the Commonwealth filed a

subsequent renewed motion following the introduction of the
                                                                  29

defendant's statement to police, and having reviewed the

transcript of that statement, the judge found that the escort

evidence bore on the defendant's motive and state of mind.     The

judge commented that the defendant's assertion that the marriage

had been happy was the "tipping point" and concluded that the

escort evidence was more probative than unfairly prejudicial,

based on the defendant's "repeated remonstration[s]" of how

happy the marriage was, in conjunction with the remainder of the

evidence.

    The judge then undertook efforts to limit any possible

unfair prejudice to the defendant.   When the escort evidence was

introduced, the judge instructed the jury on the "very, very,

very circumscribed" way that they could consider the evidence:

"on the very limited issue of motive of the defendant and [the]

defendant's state of mind."   The judge also required the

prosecutor to redact the explicit photograph and the substance

of the escort websites so that the jury's attention would not be

drawn to the redactions.   The judge reiterated the limiting

instruction in her final charge.

    Given the juxtaposition of the defendant's statements of

happiness and his efforts in the hours before his wife's death

to meet with an escort, there was no abuse of discretion in the

judge's decision to permit the introduction of the challenged

evidence after concluding that the risk of unfair prejudice was
                                                                    30

outweighed by the probative value of the evidence.     At several

different times, after considering the totality of the evidence

that had been presented to that point in the trial, the judge

had denied the motion.    See Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 378,

394 (2020) ("A record of the thoughtful weighing of the risks of

unfair prejudice . . . may indicate a reasonable exercise of

discretion").    It was only after the defendant's statement to

police was introduced that the judge found that the balance had

shifted.   Evidence that a defendant has sought out an

extramarital relationship also may form the basis of a finding

that the defendant entertained feelings of hostility toward his

or her spouse.    See Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 444 Mass. 678, 683

(2005).    Such inferences are permissible where the potential

adultery is not too remote in time from the killing.      Id. at

682.   See Mendes, 441 Mass. at 465 (defendant's history of

spending money on drugs and prostitutes was probative of

deterioration of marital relationship).

       Without the challenged evidence, at a minimum, the jury

would have lacked context about the defendant's state of mind in

the hours before the killing, and could have concluded that the

killing was "an essentially inexplicable act of violence."

Mendes, 441 Mass. at 464, quoting Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385

Mass. 244, 269 (1982).    The judge's decision to allow

introduction of the evidence, for limited purposes and with a
                                                                  31

clear, contemporaneous limiting instruction, was not outside the

"range of reasonable alternatives."    West, 487 Mass. at 805-806.

    c.   Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.     Having carefully

reviewed the entire record, we discern no reason to exercise our

authority to grant extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E.

                                      Judgment affirmed.