Court Opinion

ID: 9706935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:55:52.374874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:26.052736
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I concur in the majority’s action in reversing the judgment for defendant Preitz, the retail seller, on count two of plaintiff’s complaint. However, for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in DiBelardino v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 416 Pa. 580, 586, 208 A. 2d 283, 286 (1965), I am unable to agree with the majority’s determination that an action for wrongful death is here precluded.1
Nor am I able to agree that the absence of privity of contract between plaintiff’s decedent and the remaining defendants, Rexall and Northern Electric, insulates those defendants from responding directly to plaintiff, *414without regard to fault, for the injuries caused by the defective product which they placed into the stream of commerce. In my view, once the issue of plaintiff’s right to claim the protection of strict liability has been settled, as it has by reason of §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Act of April 6, 1953, P. L. 3, §2-318, reenacted without change, October 2, 1959, §2, 12A P.S. §2-318 (Supp. 1965), there is no justification for permitting conceptual abstractions and procedural niceties to preclude a direct action against remote parties in the distributive chain.
I therefore dissent from those portions of the majority opinion which hold that an action for wrongful death may not be brought in assumpsit and that the issue of whether this Court will hold remote sellers and manufacturers absolutely liable for injuries inflicted by defective products must await an “appropriate case.” In my judgment, the Court is presently confronted with just such a case.
It must be emphasized that the action against Rexall and Northern Electric is not one which arises out of a purely commercial dispute; recovery is not sought for loss of bargain, economic loss or property damage.2 Here we are presented with an action seeking redress for personal injuries sustained as a result of the malfunction of a product which, by any stand*415ard, should have been known to be dangerous if defective. Moreover, the decedent was a member of a class of persons which the seller and manufacturer should reasonably have anticipated would use or be exposed to the product, so that injury to him, in the event of a defect, was within the foreseeable ambit of expectation. Thus, if the policy of strict liability for injuries caused by defective products has merit and is to be adopted, certainly the circumstances of this case call for its application. It should also be noted that §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, by setting aside the requirement of privity as a predicate to the maintenance of plaintiff’s action against the retail seller Preitz, has in part resolved the issue, since plaintiff may recover without regard to fault on the basis of a breach of the retailer’s implied warranty that the defective product was fit for human use. Thus, the only issue which presently confronts this Court is whether, despite the Code’s relaxation of the requirement of horizontal privity, we should insist on the presence of vertical privity before an action against other, more remote parties in the distributive chain may be permitted.
Since the majority appears to suggest that the adoption of strict liability, as provided in §402A of the Restatement 2d, Torts, would be desirable policy, I must assume that its determination that this case does not properly present the issue, and its application of the privity doctrine to bar a direct action against Rexall and Northern Electric, stems from a desire to maintain doctrinal purity and to compel adherence to strict forms of pleading. In my view, the majority’s concern with form, while possibly justified under certain circumstances, is not appropriate in the instant case and merely delays action on the part of this Court which is long overdue.
*416Over 500 years ago it was recognized that sellers of products for human consumption owed a special responsibility to purchasers of their products, a responsibility which extended beyond the mere avoidance of negligence. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict. Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1103-04 (1960). Many courts, including those of this Commonwealth, characterized this special responsibility as being in the nature of an implied warranty that such products would be fit for human consumption, the breach of which rendered the seller absolutely liable. See McNaughton v. Joy, 1 W.N.C. 470 (1875). At first this implied warranty was viewed as running merely from the seller to the immediate buyer and the ultimate consumer, if he were not the actual purchaser, was barred by lack of privity from recovering on the basis of this “special” or absolute liability for injuries sustained as a result of the consumption of adulterated or poisoned food.
Courts soon recognized the injustice inherent in such a limitation, however, and developed numerous theories which extended the scope of strict liability and permitted the ultimate consumer to recover, without regard to fault, for injuries caused by defective food products. See Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119, 153-55 (1958). Today, most jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, afford protection in the nature of strict liability to consumers in food cases without reference to the doctrine of privity, a doctrine which has been discarded in such cases as circumscribing too narrowly the circle of those persons who should be permitted to obtain redress for injuries sustained without regard to fault. See Caskie v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A. 2d 901 (1953); Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915) ; Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 147 Pa. Superior Ct. 39, 23 A. 2d 342 (1941) ; Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Superior Ct. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931).
*417Despite this development in the food cases, and the concomitant recognition that the scope of a seller’s strict liability for injuries sustained as the result of the consumption of contaminated or adulterated food should not be restricted by reference to contractual relationships, and despite the relaxation of the privity requirement contained in §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code — and the admonition of the draftsmen of the Code that §2-318 was not intended to inhibit case law development of the scope of strict liability through the relaxation of the privity requirement — this Court has refused to apply this reasoning to non-food cases.8 This refusal continues today in the face of the present case, which demonstrates that the danger to the public from defective articles intended for human use is frequently as great as the danger from contaminated or adulterated food intended for human consumption.3
4 *418Moreover, it continues in the face of a case in which plaintiff’s right to claim the protection of strict liability has already been settled by §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the only issue which is presented is whether he may proceed directly against the remote seller and manufacturer or is to be restricted to an action against the immediate seller Preitz. Thus, the majority’s insistence on privity in order for plaintiff to proceed against Rexall or Northern Electric does not insulate those defendants from liability, since each may be required to indemnify its immediate purchaser in the event that Preitz, the retail seller, is held liable in the instant suit. All that is really accomplished by *419the restriction which the majority imposes is to expose plaintiff to the risk that the retail seller may not be financially able to make redress and to deprive him of the opportunity of proceeding directly against the more financially able parties in the distributive chain. The danger that the plaintiff may be restricted to an action against a judgment proof defendant and the needless and bothersome circuity of actions which insistence on privity engenders counsel strongly against the position taken by the majority.
In my view, the arguments for extending the full protection of strict liability to consumers in non-food cases, widely accepted by other jurisdictions,5 as well as by legal commentators,6 are compelling, just as those same arguments were compelling in food cases. The public interest in affording the maximum protection possible under the law to human life, health and safety;7 the inability of the consumer to protect himself;8 the seller’s implied assurance of the safety of a product *420on the open market;9 the superior ability of the manufacturer or seller to distribute the risk of loss;10 the needless circuity of recovery and the expensive, time' consuming, wasteful and often unjust process which insistence upon privity frequently occasions11 — all support the extension of the protection of strict liability beyond the food cases to those involving other consumer goods as well.
Since the so-called warranty action originated in tort,12 it seems particularly appropriate that the re*421quirement of privity,13 as a limitation on the scope of a seller’s or manufacturer’s absolute liability, should be finally discarded in cases involving personal injuries. While the doctrine may have had some utility in the past, by limiting the liability of sellers and manufacturers, new and different considerations now dictate the expansion of the class of persons entitled to be redressed for injuries caused by defective products without regard to fault. Thus, whether the defendant should be strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective product is a question which cannot be determined by resort to doctrines of contract law, such as privity of contract, which developed in response to considerations for the most pait not here relevant. The matter is solely one of policy and should be approached without the encumbrance that reference to contract law needlessly imposes.
I am of the view that the issue has been properly resolved by the formulation contained in §402A of the Restatement 2d, Torts, which provides:
“§402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
“(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer ... is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer ... if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
*422“(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.” Restatement 2d, Torts, §402A (1965).
I believe that the time has arrived for this Court to settle the long perplexing problem of strict liability in cases involving defective products causing personal injuries by discarding privity as a predicate to the maintenance of such actions. See Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A. 2d 189 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W. 2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A. 2d 69 (1965) ; Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F. 2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897 (1963) ; Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A. 2d 769 (1965) ; Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A. 2d 305 (1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963) ; Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E. 2d 92 (1965); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 300, 405 P. 2d 624 (1965).14 As a result of such an approach, the more objectionable barrier of “horizontal” privity would no longer deprive ultimate consumers of the protection afforded by the doctrine of strict liability. It should be noted, however, that although the major expansion of liability would occur as the result of dispensing with “horizontal” privity, such as is done in part by §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a certain degree of practical expansion would also occur where “vertical” privity, the issue here in dispute, is discarded as a *423prerequisite to recovery, since those who would otherwise he unable to obtain redress from the immediate seller because of his inability to pay any judgment awarded, or because of the inability to obtain jurisdiction over such seller, would have the alternative remedy and additional protection of an action directly against the manufacturer or others in the distributive chain.
In the present case, therefore, I would hold that plaintiff, the personal representative of the deceased, may maintain this action against defendants Rexall, the distributor, and Northern Electric, the manufacturer. Certainly, once the issue of plaintiff’s right to recover without the necessity of establishing negligence has been settled, as it has in this case by reason of §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, I see no reason for introducing the complication of privity to insulate remote parties in the distributive chain from responding directly to the injured party. Nor do I see what is to be gained by remitting plaintiff to an action of trespass when the same result would obtain through the simple expedient of disregarding the lack of privity between the parties.
While it is clear that the matter could be handled by permitting suits such as the instant one to be brought in trespass, the majority elevates form over substance by insisting that it be brought only in trespass. I would permit plaintiff to bring suit in trespass on the basis of §402A of the Restatement 2d, Torts or in assumpsit cn the basis of a breach of warranty.
There is nothing unusual or novel about such an approach. Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which contains an exception to the requirement of horizontal privity where suit is brought by a member of the family or guest of the actual purchaser, permits, at least with respect to the persons therein specified, recovery in assumpsit. The majority, however, would require that those cases not within §2-318 and *424all cases in which vertical privity is to be dispensed with be brought only in trespass. There is no sound reason for treating the cases differently, especially in light of the comment of the draftsmen of the Code that §2-818 was not intended to inhibit the expansion of strict liability through the relaxation of the privity requirement.
Moreover, such an approach is consistent with that taken in the food cases where, although the true basis of recovery is the duty imposed by law to redress an injury caused by the defective nature of the product, we permit the action to be brought in assumpsit while ignoring any absence of privity of contract. Conceptual abstractions and niceties of pleading have not been permitted to obscure what is truly involved in those cases and they should likewise not be permitted to obscure the considerations which militate in favor of permitting the instant actions against Rexall and Northern Electric.
Finally, as the very least, I would permit plaintiff here to amend his complaint to one in trespass and permit an action on the basis of the rule embodied in §402A of the Restatement 2d, Torts.
Accordingly, I dissent from the action of the majority in affirming the judgment entered for defendant Preitz, on count one of plaintiff’s complaint, and the judgments entered for defendants Rexall and Northern Electric.
Mr. Justice Musmanno joins in this opinion.

 See generally Note, Wrongful Death Action for Breach of Warranty, 39 Temp. L. Q. 352, 359 (1966), which characterizes the DiBelardino decision as “unfortunate.” The writer, taking a position similar to that expressed in my dissent in DiBelardino, concludes that “those states not allowing recovery seem to be caught in a semantical web which prevents their reaching the heart of the problem. They overlook both the remedial nature of . . . [wrongful death statutes] and the purpose behind . . . [such enactments] as well as the tort origin and nature of a breach of warranty action. . . .” Id. at 360.

 I see no present need to offer a view as to the proper resolution of actions based upon economic loss. Compare Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P. 2d 145 (1965), with Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A. 2d 305 (1965). “ ‘Economic loss’ is defined as the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold.” Note, Manufacturers’ Liability to Bemote Purchasers for “Economic Loss”— Damages — Tort or Contract, 114 U. Pa. L. Bev. 539, 541 (1966).
By the same token, since we are not here presented with a claim for property damage, I see no need to express an opinion respecting such actions at this time.

 As a result, adherence to the dictates of privity in two recent cases made the right of an injured party to recover for an injury sustained from a defective product turn upon the completely irrelevant fact of who purchased the product. In Hochgartel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A. 2d 575 (1963), the Court held that a bartender who was injured by an explosion of an unopened bottle of carbonated water sold by defendant to the plaintiff’s employer was not entitled to bring an action based upon breach of implied warranty. The Court found that he was not a member of the class of persons included within §2-318 of the Code and that the absence of privity precluded a common law action based upon implied warranty. However, in Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A. 2d 463 (1964), the Court permitted a hotel employee who was injured by a cork exploding from a bottle of champagne to recover on implied warranty. The action was allowed on the sole ground that plaintiff had executed the purchase on behalf of his employer.

 Other jurisdictions have been willing to recognize that strict liability, although first imposed in cases involving unwholesome food products, should logically be extended to other products which, when defective, create a like hazard to human life, health and safety. See, e.g., Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F. 2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965) (automobile tire) ; Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. *418Co., 319 F. 2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (water heater) ; Brown v. Chapman, 304 F. 2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (skirt) ; Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 P. 2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) (surgical pin) ; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F. 2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) (automobile tire) ; McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D.C. Conn. 1960) (insect spray) ; Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. N.Y. 1959) (airplane) ; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897 (1963) (power tool) ; Simpson v. Powered Products of Mich., Inc., 24 Conn. Sup. 409, 192 A. 2d 555 (C.P. 1963) (power golf cart) ; McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962) (playground equipment) ; Continental Copper & Steel Industries v. E. C. “Red” Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958) (electric cable) ; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965) (tractor unit) ; Graham v. Bottenfield’s, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P. 2d 413 (1954) (hair dye) ; Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W. 2d 730 (1965) (garage door) ; Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. 2d 873 (1958) (cinder blocks) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960) (automobile) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963) (airplane) ; Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E. 2d 92 (1965) (steel bar joists) ; Markovich v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E. 2d 181 (1958) (home permanent) ; General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W. 2d 655 (1960) (automobile) ; cf. Beck v. Spindler, 99 N.W. 2d 670 (Minn. 1959).

 See note 4, supra.

 See, e.g., Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne L. Rev. 1 (1963) ; Jaeger, How Strict is the Manufacturer’s Liability? Recent Developments, 48 Marq. L. Rev. 293 (1964-65) ; Keeton, Products Liability — Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855 (1963) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960) ; Speidel, The Virginia “AntiPrivity” Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 Va. L. Rev. 804 (1965) ; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363 (1965) ; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965) ; Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 916 (1964) ; and articles cited in Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F. 2d 911, 920 n.20 (5th Cir. 1964).

 gee, e.g., Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1122-23 (1960).

 See, e.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942).

 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W. 2d 449 (1961) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960) ; Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W. 2d 805 (N.D. 1965).

 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P. 2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).

 The possibility of enforcing strict liability “by resort to a series of actions, in which the retailer is first held liable on a warranty to his purchaser, and indemnity on a warranty is then sought successively from other suppliers” presently exists, but “what is needed is a blanket rule which makes any supplier in the chain liable directly to the ultimate user, and so short-circuits the whole unwieldy process.” Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Vale L.J. 1099, 1123-24 (1960). Prosser goes on to note that such a rule would be “in the interest, not only of the consumer, but of the courts, and even on occasion of the suppliers themselves.” Ibid.

 As early as 1944, Justice (now Chief Justice) Traynor, arguing persuasively in a concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P. 2d 436, 440 (1944), called for the recognition “that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.” He observed that “warranties are not necessarily rights arising under a contract. An action on a warranty ‘was, in its origin, a pure action of tort,’ and only late in the historical development of warranties was an action in assumpsit allowed; (Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8; 4 Williston on Contracts (1936) §970.)” 24 Cal. 2d at 466, 150 P. 2d at 443.

 This, of course, includes both so-called horizontal privity ivhich involves the question of who besides the purchaser should have a right of action against the manufacturer or seller of a defective product, and so-called vertical privity, which involves the question of who besides the immediate seller may be sued in an action to redress personal injuries caused by a defective product.

 See also cases cited in note 4, supra.