Court Opinion

ID: 9721456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:59:52.982015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:26.067221
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE ROMITI, dissenting: Because I believe that the trial court barred plaintiff’s request for Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) tests solely because it erroneously believed it had no discretion to allow such tests, I would reverse and remand. Well before trial plaintiff petitioned the court to allow HLA testing. The court denied this request but subsequently indicated it would reconsider if plaintiff produced expert testimony establishing that the test was “foolproof.” However, at trial plaintiff was barred from presenting the testimony of Dr. Chang Ling Lee, identified as an expert on paternity testing, concerning the reliability and viability of HLA testing. Indeed, the court even barred plaintiff from making an offer of proof as to Dr. Lee’s testimony. The court stated that although it would like to hear this testimony, it believed that the Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, pars. 1401-1407) barred the use of such evidence to affirmatively establish paternity. At the time section 1 of the Act provided: “In a civil action, in which paternity is a relevant fact, the court, upon its own initiative, or upon motion of any party to the action, may order the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests to determine whether or not the defendant shall be excluded as being the father of the child. The results of the tests shall be receivable in evidence only if definite exclusion is established. If the defendant refuses to submit to such tests, such fact shall not be disclosed upon the trial.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1401.) It is clear from the record that the trial court believed that this provision applied to HLA testing. I believe the court erred in this conclusion. In Cramer v. Morrison (1979), 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, the court determined that its Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (Cal. Evid. Code §§890-897 (1966)), which, like ours, was drawn from the Model Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (see 9A Uniform Laws Annotated 623, 624 (1979)), was not applicable to HLA tests. The court noted that when the California statute was adopted in 1953 the Landsteiner series of red cell blood grouping tests were in use, having been endorsed the year before by the American Medical Association as sufficiently accepted within the scientific community to be legally valid. Indeed, the court noted that as late as 1975 the Landsteiner tests were still the standard tests for non-paternity (citing Lee, Current Status of Paternity Testing, 9 Earn. L. Q. 615 (1975)), and the HLA test, which involves tissue typing of the white blood cells, was not yet in use for paternity testing in California. This reasoning is equally applicable to our Act, which was adopted only four years after that of California. Our legislature cannot be said to have contemplated barring use of evidence obtained by scientific techniques not then known to it. I would hold that the Act, as it existed at the time of trial, was not applicable to HLA testing and thus did not bar the use of the results of such tests as affirmative evidence of paternity. See J.H. v. M.H. (1980), 177 N.J. Super. 436, 426 A.2d 1073; Phillips v. Jackson (1980),_Utah_, 615 P.2d 1228; contra J.B. v. A.F. (1979), 92 Wis. 2d 696, 285 N.W.2d 880. The majority in its opinion appears to concede that if the Act did not apply then the trial court possessed the discretion to order HLA testing under Supreme Court Rule 215 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 215). This rule gives the court the authority to order the physical examination of a party (or a person in the custody or legal control of a party) where the physical condition of that individual is in controversy. The examination may be ordered prior to trial or even during trial. Here the physical condition at issue was the blood relationship of the plaintiff to the child of defendant H.M. But, contrary to the apparent holding of the majority, I believe it to be clear that the trial court, because of its construction of the Act, never exercised its discretion to determine whether the tests should be ordered. The majority concludes, on the basis of the evidence plaintiff was allowed to present, that he failed to rebut the presumption of legitimacy accorded the child. But this begs the question. Where the HLA test does not exclude an individual as the father of a child, the probability of that person being the father will usually be over 90 percent. (Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. Fam. L. 543 (1977-78).) In some instances the probability can be determined to be higher than 99 percent. (Terasaki, at 551.) At the time of trial the Act provided that blood test results could be utilized to rebut the presumption of legitimacy accorded a child during wedlock. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1405; People v. Askew (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 743, 393 N.E.2d 1124.) Although I believe that the Act was not drafted in contemplation of HLA testing, the principle established by this provision, that scientific evidence disproving the paternity of a husband will suffice to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, applies equally to the use of HLA test results. Indeed, the Act as amended in 1980 retains this provision without alteration so that the “tests” to which it refers include, by reference to the amended provisions, the HLA tests. From this analysis it seems clear that an erroneous statutory construction by the trial court prevented plaintiff from obtaining evidence which could have rebutted the presumption of legitimacy invoked by the court to support its judgment for defendants. Accordingly I believe the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. The newly amended Act would be applicable to that proceeding and would provide a proper framework for consideration of any renewed request by plaintiff for HLA testing. I would also note that I find no basis for this court to consider plaintiff’s constitutional attack on the Paternity Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, pars. 1351-1368.) Plaintiff’s constitutional arguments are based on the premise that the trial court construed that act so as to deny him the right to bring this action. But in fact plaintiff did not claim to be bringing this action by authority of the Paternity Act. More importantly, he was afforded a trial on the merits; he was not barred from bringing this action. For these reasons I believe the majority’s discussion of these issues can only be considered dictum.