Court Opinion

ID: 9792397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:28:55.299024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.610215
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I. The Court’s opinion states that “Jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn.” From that point it is said by the Court that “Where a trial is terminated at the request of or with the consent of a defendant .. . the defendant is deemed to have waived his constitutional rights; thus there is no constitutional barrier to reprosecution.” Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416, delivered in May of 1982 — some two and a half years after the trial in this case, and almost two years after the briefs of the parties were filed — is said to stand for the High Court’s present double jeopardy rule upon which this Court’s opinion of today is predicated. But not, however, with any statement of the nature of the Oregon v. Kennedy controversy. Even a cursory reading of that case shows that Kennedy’s trial ended on his own motion for mistrial, all of which has little to do with Sharp’s case. Sharp’s counsel at no time ever moved for a mistrial and, indeed, so far as the record shows, had no grounds for requesting the declaration of a mistrial. The discharge of the first jury was not occasioned by any such motion of defense counsel. Quite the contrary, defense counsel moved to dismiss because of the prosecution’s neglect to comply with a discovery order. The trial court properly expressed due regard for the protection of defendant’s rights, saying “I will grant a continuance, should you wish, Mr. Wiebe.” Without doubt defense counsel then agreed to a continuance so that discovery could take place. Equally without doubt defense counsel did not move for a mistrial and discharge of the impaneled jury.
The minutes of the trial court are unequivocal:
“Another objection made by defense to the states witness because of the dis*696covery rule. Statements by both counsel in this regard. Defense request continuance.
“Court granted the continuance and directed both counsel to comply with the stipulation of discovery by November 13, 1979 and reset the trial for November 26, 1979 at 9:00 a.m. for one day.”
Notwithstanding that it flies in the face of a documentary record, the Court blithely holds against defendant on the basis of his having moved for a mistrial. No mention is made of the prosecution’s failure to caution the court against discharging the jury. Although defense counsel suggested a continuance of a week to ten days, for all that appears in the record a three to five day continuance should have been more than adequate.
When the court convened to commence anew a second trial and to consider defendant’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, the prosecutor, recognizing that a continuance had been ordered: “We have a situation where there is no conclusionary prior proceeding; rather this is a continuation, one that we already started.”
The prosecutor was correct. Unfortunately, however, the trial court on its own volition had discharged the jury. The second trial, to be before a new jury other than one selected by the parties, was not the continuation which defense agreed to, but was a completely new trial. The prosecutor candidly conceded to the trial court that “double jeopardy ... has now attached.” The prosecutor’s primary contention advanced to the trial court in argument opposing the motion to dismiss was a bare allegation of “essentially an invited error on the part of defense counsel.”
The trial court solved the dilemma created by its own discharge of the jury by characterizing the granting of a continuance as being “in the nature of a mistrial even though maybe the words were not used. I am going to treat it accordingly as a mistrial.” It is not clear from the record whether the trial court did or did not make its ruling partly on the prosecutor’s challenge to the timeliness of the defendant’s motion. That, however, is of no consequence where this Court reaches its appellate decision on the basis that defendant was guilty of moving for a mistrial when all that defense counsel did was to accept the court’s invitation to ask for a continuance. Notwithstanding the opinion the Court releases today, I would hope that future courts are able to draw the distinction that a defendant in moving for a mistrial does so on the basis that the impaneled jury has heard or seen something so prejudicial that a curing instruction would not suffice. A motion for mistrial contemplates the discharge of a jury and a trial before a new jury. A continuance is merely a delay in a trial that has once commenced.
Oregon v. Kennedy is interesting,1 but has no applicability to the issue we review. The Court’s concern should be with Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963). In Downum, the case was called for trial and a jury was selected and sworn. After a luncheon recess the prosecutor asked that the jury be discharged since his critical witness on two of the counts was not present. Defendant moved for a dismissal of those counts, his motion was denied, and the jury was discharged. When the trial was reconvened two days later, defendant argued that further proceedings were barred by the double jeopardy clause. The trial court disagreed, a new jury was selected and sworn, trial was had, and defendant was found guilty on all counts. On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed his conviction.
At the first trial the prosecutor had caused subpoenaes to issue to all his witnesses, but the court marshals had been *697unable to serve the subpoena on one key witness. Despite this, the prosecutor allowed the jury to be selected and sworn. In its opinion, the Supreme Court adopted the following language of the Ninth Circuit in Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69:
“The situation presented is simply one where the district attorney entered upon the trial of the case without sufficient evidence to convict. This does not take the case out of the rule with reference to former jeopardy. There is no difference in principle between a discovery by the district attorney immediately after the jury was impaneled that his evidence was insufficient and a discovery after he had called some or all of his witnesses.” 372 U.S. at 737-38, 83 S.Ct. at 1035, quoting Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d at 71.
See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 797.
The instant case is strikingly similar to Downum. Here, as there, a jury was impaneled in the initial proceedings causing jeopardy to attach. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). And here, as there, the proceedings were discontinued because of the prosecutor’s neglect. In Downum the prosecutor asked for the jury’s discharge. In this case, the failure of the prosecutor to comply with discovery was challenged by way of a motion to dismiss the information. After colloquy, the court granted a continuance, with no harm done, but discharged the jury and thereafter caused a new jury to be sworn.
II. The matter of the tape recording is, to say the least, unusual. Defense counsel, rather conditionally and tentatively stated: “I have no objection to its admittance.” But he did express wonder how the jury would identify the voices heard with particular persons, and opined that it was “pretty important for them to know precisely which individual is saying what here,” and suggested that the prosecutor produce a transcription. The prosecutor declared that “The tape itself is valuable evidence. It tells the jury a lot more than the transcribed version...” The trial court observed that “some of it is illegible (unintelligible?), and the record will so note.”
The prosecutor won the day with the argument that “if they don’t know who said every single word, it doesn’t really matter. It’s up to them to listen to the tape and decide what they think of it.”
Based thereupon the court concluded that the cassette would be admitted, and defense counsel would be entitled to stop the tape “and ask the question as to who is speaking.” The prosecutor later suggested that Officer Schnebly would answer any identity inquiries proffered by defense counsel.
The court and its staff during noon recess copied portions of the cassette on a master tape, and such was played to the jury, but with both counsel stating no objection. The court did rule prior to the playing of the tape against defendant’s motion that he desired “to object to certain portions,” but the motion was denied. It is this ruling, and not the admission of the tape itself, which is assigned as an issue on appeal.
Being unable to ascertain from the record and the briefs what in the tape was improperly played to the jury, I am not persuaded of error in that regard. I do not, as does the Court, tacitly approve of the procedure followed, and I suggest that if a transcription could not have been made because of the poor quality of the recording, it is difficult to understand the rationale upon which twelve jurors were allowed to speculate as to what they were hearing.
III. Under the rather broad language of the statute criminalizing traffic in controlled substances, I am not persuaded of error in the contention that defendant acted only as an agent for Officer Schnebly, the purchaser, and concur in the Court’s holding in that regard.

. A teaching which Oregon v. Kennedy brings to the Court is the High Court’s adherence to the “manifest necessity” standard applicable in the context of hung juries. In State v. Talmadge, 104 Idaho 249, 658 P.2d 920 (1983), four members of the Court did not deign to give it any consideration whatever. One member did. See dissenting opinion of Bistline, J.