Court Opinion

ID: 9572973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:46:22.4595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:51.744099
License: Public Domain

D. E. Holbrook, Jr.
(dissenting). In my opinion the Supreme Court decision in Price v Price, 395 Mich 6; 232 NW2d 630 (1975), is not supportive of the majority opinion in the instant case. In Price v Price, supra, a petition for modification of a support order was pending in the circuit court when the Age of Majority Act became effective. The Supreme Court’s decision in that case was based upon that premise. In this case no such petition was pending and in fact none was filed until 31 days following the effective date of the Age of Majority Act, when defendant’s son was 19 years of age. The two cases are therefore factually distinguishable.
In dissenting I am not unmindful of Justice Williams’ language contained in footnote 5 of Price v Price, supra, wherein he stated in part as follows:
"While our disposition in this case rests upon the applicability of the saving provision, we are also inclined to the view that even after the effective date of the Age of Majority Act a court may enter an order or amend an order to provide for the college education of a person for whom a support order had been entered before he or she was 18.”
The above, however, appears to be nothing more than dicta since such language was totally unnecessary to the disposition of the case. Hence, in my opinion, this Court is not bound thereby.
While I agree that the savings clause reads in part: "This act does not impair or affect any * * * right accruing, accrued or acquired * * * before *737this act takes effect * * * ”, 1 would not interpret it in the same manner as does the majority. While I agree there was a continued right to support for any child, at the rate of $25 per week, so long as any such child attended an institution of higher education and learning beyond his or her 18th birthday up to age 21, I am of the opinion that this was the only right which accrued or had been acquired prior to the effective date of the Age of Majority Act.
I cannot in good conscience believe that the Legislature intended the above-quoted portion of the savings clause to give to the trial court carte blanche authority to rewrite the support provisions of a decree or judgment of divorce. To so hold, in my opinion, would be to confer rights upon children of divorced parents superior to those enjoyed by children whose parents were married and living together on the effective date of the act. I do not believe it can be intelligently argued that an 18 year old, after the effective date of the Age of Majority Act, would have a cause of action against his father for a college education. To my way of thinking, it is simply common sense that children of divorced parents should not be placed in such a preferred category; but this is what the majority does in this case.
I would hold, under the language of the savings clause, that the trial court was without authority to modify the original child support provision providing for extended payments of $25 per week to the plaintiff for so long as any child continually attended an institution of higher education and learning beyond his or her 18th birthday and up to age 21; for in my opinion this is the only right which accrued or had been acquired prior to the act taking effect.
I would reverse.