Court Opinion

ID: 9951678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 19:00:56.835558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:00.935790
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13432    Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 03/18/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13432
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        TAURIAN JAVON WERTS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 7:21-cr-00053-HL-TQL-1
                           ____________________

        Before BRANCH, GRANT, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13432

        PER CURIAM:
              Taurian Werts appeals his 75-month sentence of
        imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a felon. In arriving at
        that sentence, the district court applied a base offense level
        enhancement to Werts’s guidelines range because, in 2017, he was
        convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
        under Georgia law.

               Werts argues that we should vacate his sentence because his
        2017 conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to
        distribute is not a predicate controlled substance offense under the
        sentencing guidelines, for two reasons. First, he contends that the
        Georgia statute was (at the time of the state conviction) and is (at
        the time of federal sentencing) categorically broader than the
        guideline definition of controlled substance offense. Second, he
        asserts that we must apply the “categorical approach” when
        interpreting the guidelines and assume that Werts committed the
        least culpable conduct criminalized by the statute—possession of
        “hemp” with intent to distribute—which was no longer a crime
        under state or federal law at the time of Werts’s federal sentencing.
        Thus, and because the application of the enhancement raised his
        guidelines range, he argues that his sentence was procedurally and
        substantively unreasonable.
               After review, we affirm. Werts’s arguments about the base
        offense level enhancement are foreclosed by our recent opinion in
        United States v. Dubois, No. 22-10829, --- F.4th ----, 2024 WL 927030
        (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024). And because Werts’s only arguments
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        22-13432                  Opinion of the Court                               3

        about the reasonableness of his sentence are based on the
        guidelines issue, the conclusion that Dubois controls here is enough
        to resolve this case.
                                     I.      Background

               Werts pleaded guilty in 2022 to possession of a firearm by a
        felon.1 Due in part to his prior drug conviction, the probation
        office assigned Werts a base offense level of 22 under U.S.S.G. §
        2K2.1(a)(3), 2 which requires the enhanced base offense level if:
               (A) the oﬀense involves a (i) semiautomatic ﬁrearm that
               is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine; or (ii)
               ﬁrearm that is described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); and (B)
               the defendant committed any part of the instant
               oﬀense subsequent to sustaining one felony
               conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled
               substance oﬀense[.]

        1 Werts was originally charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a

        felon, one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and one
        count of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.
        After Werts entered a not guilty plea, the government filed a superseding
        information on just the felon-in-possession charge.
        2 Werts took the position in his sentencing memorandum that, without the

        enhancement, his base offense level would have been 20, and his total offense
        level would have been 21, giving him a guidelines range of 57 to 71 months
        rather than the 70 to 87 months that the PSI calculated and the court accepted.
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                     22-13432

        U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3) (2021) (emphasis added). 3 Application Note
        1 of § 2K2.1 defined “controlled substance offense” by reference to
        § 4B1.2(b) 4 which, in turn, defined “controlled substance offense”
        as follows:
               The term “controlled substance oﬀense” means an
               oﬀense [1] under federal or state law, [2] punishable
               by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, [3]
               that prohibits the manufacture, import, export,
               distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or
               a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a
               controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with
               intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or
               dispense.

        U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (2021) (emphasis added). 5

        3 The probation office noted that, as part of the offense conduct, Werts

        possessed a semiautomatic Intratec firearm capable of accepting a “large
        capacity magazine” and that Werts had a 2017 Georgia conviction for
        possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, which qualified as a
        “controlled substance offense.”
        4 The Application notes to § 2K2.1 explain that the term “controlled substance

        offense” also can be defined by reference to Application Note 1 of the
        Commentary to § 4B1.2 (Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1). But
        Application Note 1 of § 4B1.2 deals with other definitions that do not apply
        here.
        5 Section 4B1.2(b) was amended in 2023 (which was after Werts was
        sentenced), but, because the amendments all deal with maritime drug
        offenses, they are irrelevant. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), November 01, 2023
        (Amendment 822).
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        22-13432                   Opinion of the Court                                5

               Werts objected to the enhancement, arguing that (1) the
        Georgia statute was and is categorically broader than the guideline
        definition of controlled substance offense and (2) the court must
        apply the categorical approach to his 2017 state conviction and
        assume that Werts committed the least culpable conduct
        criminalized by the statute—which, in his case, was no longer a
        crime under state or federal law at the time of his federal
        sentencing. Assuming that his guidelines objections prevailed,
        Werts asked for a sentence at the low end of what he argued was
        the guidelines range. The probation office rejected Werts’s
        objection and submitted the final PSI with a suggested base offense
        level of 22.
              The district court overruled Werts’s objection. Adopting
        the PSI, the district court found a total offense level of 23, 6 a
        criminal history category IV, and a guidelines range of 70 to 87
        months. The court sentenced Werts to 75-months’ imprisonment.
                Werts appealed.

        6 This offense level includes the enhanced base offense level of 22, a four-point

        enhancement based on the specific offense characteristics (possession of a
        firearm in connection with a drug crime), a two-point reduction for
        acceptance of responsibility, and a one-point reduction for entering a timely
        guilty plea.
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                        22-13432

                                II.      Standard of Review

               This Court “review[s] de novo the interpretation and
        application of the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Dupree,
        57 F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc).
                                       III.   Discussion

               Werts argues that the district court misapplied the base
        offense level enhancement, and therefore imposed a procedurally
        and substantively unreasonable sentence.
               In broad strokes, Werts advances this argument on two
        fronts. “First, Georgia’s marijuana offense” is “categorically
        overbroad from [sic] the federal definition at the time of Mr.
        Werts’[s] prior state arrest.” 7 “Second, by the time of his
        underlying federal offense . . . both the federal and Georgia
        marijuana statutes had changed since his prior arrest” such that the
        least culpable conduct for which he could have been convicted in
        2017 was no longer a crime at the time of his federal sentencing.

        7 In particular, Werts points to four alleged categorical “mismatches” between

        Georgia law and federal law:
              (1) what parts of the cannabis plant count as a controlled
              substance;
              (2) what species of cannabis count as a controlled substance;
              (3) what conduct counts as distribution of marijuana (e.g., does
              “social-sharing” count or must there be a commercial
              transaction); and
              (4) what mental state is required for conviction.
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        22-13432                   Opinion of the Court                               7

        For those reasons, he contends that, under the categorical
        approach, Georgia’s statute is not a “controlled substance offense”
        for purposes of the guidelines.
                While this case was pending, however, a panel of this court
        issued its decision in Dubois, 2024 WL 927030. 8 In Dubois, we
        considered, among other things, whether the appellant’s “Georgia
        marijuana conviction [was] a ‘controlled substance offense’ under”
        § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) of the sentencing guidelines. 9 Id. at *1. Dubois,
        like Werts, was sentenced in 2022 under the 2021 version of the
        guidelines. Id. at *1, *3. Dubois, also like Werts, was assigned a
        higher base offense level than he would have had otherwise
        because of an enhancement for having sustained a “felony
        conviction of . . . a controlled substance offense.” Id. at *10 (alteration
        in original) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A));
        see also U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). And Dubois, like Werts, “objected
        to the probation officer’s application of [the] enhanced base offense
        level” on the grounds that “his Georgia marijuana conviction d[id]
        not qualify as a categorical controlled substance offense under the
        guidelines.” Id. at *2.

        8 We ordered briefing to address the effect of Dubois on this case.

        9 At the time Dubois was sentenced, § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) provided for an enhanced

        base offense level of 20 if “(A) the defendant committed any part of the instant
        offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of
        violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2021).
        While Werts’s base offense level was enhanced under § 2K2.1(a)(3), both
        provisions defined “controlled substance offense” by reference to § 4B1.2(b),
        so the same interpretive conclusions apply.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13432

               In particular, and again like Werts, Dubois argued “that we
        should vacate his sentence because his 2013 conviction for
        possession with intent to distribute marijuana is not a predicate
        ‘controlled substance offense’ under the Sentencing Guidelines”
        because the Georgia statute is “categorically broader than the
        guideline definition of ‘controlled substance offense.’” Id. at *7.
        Under the categorical approach, Dubois pointed out, the court was
        required to assume that he had committed the least culpable
        conduct criminalized by the statute of conviction. Id. Dubois
        “explain[ed] that[,] at the time of his conviction in 2013, both
        Georgia and federal law defined ‘marijuana’ to include hemp.” Id.
        (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21(16) (2011); 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2009)).
        “But by the time he was sentenced for his federal offenses in 2022,
        both definitions had been amended to exclude hemp.” Id. (citing
        O.C.G.A § 16-13-21(16) (2019); 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(B)(i) (2018)).
        Thus, “[b]ecause the law at the time of his state conviction was
        broader than the law at the time of his federal sentencing, [Dubois]
        maintain[ed] that the state conviction is not a controlled substance
        offense.” Id.
               Analyzing the text of the guidelines, the panel concluded
        that “[a] drug regulated by state law is a ‘controlled substance’ for
        state predicate offenses, even if federal law does not regulate that
        drug.” Id. at *8; see also id. (“More precisely, state law defines which
        drugs qualify as a ‘controlled substance’ if the prior conviction was
        under state law, and federal law defines which drugs qualify as a
        ‘controlled substance’ if the prior conviction was under federal
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        22-13432                   Opinion of the Court                                9

        law.”). 10 Thus, “[b]ecause Dubois’s underlying conviction was
        under Georgia law,” the panel concluded that it was required to
        “consult Georgia law to determine whether the substance that he
        trafficked [was] a ‘controlled substance’ under the guidelines.” Id.
        at *9.
                And finally, the panel held that courts must look to state law
        at the time of conviction “even if [the substance the defendant was
        convicted of possessing] is no longer regulated when the defendant
        is sentenced for the federal . . . offense.” Id. at *10.
               In sum, Dubois held “that a ‘controlled substance’ under §
        4B1.2(b)’s definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ is, for prior
        state offenses, a drug regulated by state law at the time of the
        conviction.” Id. at *11. The panel emphasized that this conclusion
        holds “even if [the substance] is not federally regulated, and even if
        it is no longer regulated by the state at the time of federal
        sentencing.” Id. Thus, “[b]ecause Georgia law regulated
        marijuana—including hemp—at the time of Dubois’s 2013
        conviction,” the panel concluded that “the district court did not err

        10 The panel also “reject[ed] the parties’ suggestion that [it] need not decide

        which sovereign’s law controls to decide [Dubois’s] appeal” because “our
        answer to this ‘whose law’ question informs our answer to the ‘what time’
        question that follow[ed].” Dubois, 2024 WL 927030, at *9; see also id. at *11
        (explaining that the only circuits to conclude that courts must look to the law
        at the time of federal sentencing, rather than the law at the time of the
        predicate conviction, did so on the theory that substances had to be controlled
        by federal law to be captured by the guidelines—and “th[at] distinction is absent
        here”).
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13432

        by enhancing Dubois’s base-offense level under section
        2K2.1(a)(4)(A).” Id.
                Under the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by
        holdings in prior published decisions that have not been overruled
        by the Supreme Court or this Court en banc. United States v. Romo-
        Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Birge,
        830 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the rule
        “applies only to holdings, not dicta”). “The holding of a case
        comprises both the result of the case and those portions of the
        opinion necessary to that result.” United States v. Caraballo-
        Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
        marks omitted). Once we have decided that a statement is a
        holding, not dicta, “[t]he prior panel precedent rule applies
        regardless of whether the later panel believes the prior panel’s
        opinion to be correct, and there is no exception to the rule where
        the prior panel failed to consider arguments raised before a later
        panel.” United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019).
                Dubois controls this case for three reasons. First, Dubois’s
        interpretation of “controlled substance offense”—on both the
        question of which law applies, and the question of when in time the
        law is to be assessed—is plainly a holding, because it was necessary
        to the judgment: affirming Dubois’s sentence. Dubois, 2024 WL
        927030, at *11, 13.
              Second, the issues Dubois resolves foreclose Werts’s
        arguments. The four categorical mismatches Werts points to are
        premised on comparing how state and federal law define marijuana
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        22-13432                   Opinion of the Court                               11

        and how they define the crime of possessing it with the intent to
        distribute it. 11 And his point that hemp is no longer criminalized
        turns on comparing the definitions of marijuana—both state and
        federal—in 2017 versus 2022. Given that the predicate conviction
        is an offense against state law, all of Werts’s arguments fail both
        because Dubois directs us to state law, not federal law, and because
        Dubois directs us to the time of the state conviction, not the present.
        Id. at *7, 11.
              Third, Werts’s arguments about the reasonableness of his
        sentence depend entirely on his argument that his guidelines range
        was improperly calculated. Since his guidelines argument fails, so
        too does his argument about the reasonableness of his sentence.
                                       IV.     Conclusion

               In sum, Werts’s arguments that the district court improperly
        applied § 2K2.1(a)(3) to raise his base offense level, and thus that his

        11 Werts suggests in a supplemental brief that Dubois does not foreclose all of

        his arguments because Dubois “addresses only the overbreadth concerns raised
        as a result of the changes in Georgia and federal law legalizing hemp products”
        and “does not consider all of the grounds [he] raise[s].” See Footnote 7 (detail-
        ing purported categorical mismatches). We disagree. Regardless, “there is no
        exception to the [the prior panel precedent] rule where the prior panel failed
        to consider arguments raised before a later panel.” Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1198.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                    22-13432

        sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable, are
        foreclosed by Dubois. We therefore affirm his sentence.
               AFFIRMED.12

        12 This appeal was originally scheduled for oral argument, but the panel

        unanimously agreed to remove it from the oral argument calendar under 11th
        Cir. R. 34-3(f).