Court Opinion

ID: 9743256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:29:19.26113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:40.095553
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
On direct examination plaintiff Jones testified regarding events occurring after dark:
Q. Okay. Then what did you do?
A. I got out of the car; I came behind it; and I looked both ways, and I didn't see any lights coming, and so I run like heck to get out of the rain.
On direct examination, Godines, the driver of the car from which plaintiff Jones had alighted, testified as follows:
Q. Okay, and approximately where did you stop your car?
A. Right in front of the medical building. |
And then what happened? ©
I told her to wait, she got out of the car and as she was gettin' out I told her to wait and would check to make sure because it was raining pretty bad that day. And, uh, she got out of the car, and as I gave her the honk of the car and says okay it's clear, so she left. She took off. >
Q. Okay, did you see any traffic coming... o
A. No.
The defendant Gleim testified for the plaintiff in the following manner:
Q. Did you have your headlights on?
A. Yes, I did.
Here, Jones and Godines, both looked up the dark street in the direction from which the defendant was in fact approaching in his car. Both were looking for oncoming cars. One testified that she saw no lights coming, and the other testified that he saw no traffic coming. Jones immediately darted across the street and was hit. It is apparent to me that a reasonable trier of fact could infer from the testimony of Jones and Godines that the defendant was operating his car with his headlights turned off as he approached the area in front of the medical building where the accident occurred.
To my mind the conclusion is unavoidable that a reasonable trier of fact could infer from the testimony of Jones and Godines, two persons, not simply one, both of whom were intent upon determining whether the street was safe to cross, and both of whom deliberately looked up the dark street from which the defendant was then approaching, that the defendant was operating his car with his headlights turned off as he approached the area in front of the medical building where the accident occurred. *209Jones and Godines were simply relating what they saw, namely a dark and empty stretch of road. The defendant was doing the same when he testified that his headlights were on. He was simply relating what he saw, namely an illuminated portion of the street directly in front of his car.
The nature of this negligence claim made it necessary for plaintiff Jones to prove that defendant was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, during her case in chief. Her testimony and that of Godines satisfied that burden, as she had pleaded that defendant was operating his car without the lights on, and at a speed which was too great for the conditions. Such testimony was sufficient to carry the case to the jury. It was not plaintiff's burden to allege or prove that she was free from contributory negligence. Trial Rule 9.1(A). To the extent that the issue of the plaintiff's negligence was raised when she elicited the defendant's testimony that he had been operating his car with the lights on, her testimony and that of Godines was sufficient to support the inference that the lights were indeed not on, and required denial of the motion for judgment on the evidence. I therefore vote to reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial