Court Opinion

ID: 9643395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:27:53.004665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:00.306363
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee assigns as error our action in overruling his motion to affirm on certificate and in granting appellant’s motion for an extension of time within which to file the record on appeal.
*544These motions were timely filed by the respective parties and were decided by us on June 27, 1951, at which time we rendered no written opinion.
Appellee’s motion to affirm on certificate is, of course, controlled by the propriety of our action in granting appellant’s motion for an extension of time.
It is appellee’s position that we erred in granting appellant’s motion because “good cause”, within the meaning of Rule 386, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, was not shown by appellant for not having filed the record within the original sixty days allowed by the Rule.
The sworn motion of appellant alleged the following as constituting good cause for such delay:
“Immediately upon the over-ruling of the motion for new trial by the trial court, appellant ordered a statement of facts; and soon thereafter she requested the Clerk of the trial court to make up a transcript, and there was a delay in the preparation of the transcript due to the fact that the Clerk was out of the county a part of the time; and attorneys for appellant had as many as three long distance telephone conversations with the deputy in the office and with the Clerk upon her return with reference to the preparation of the transcript. There was also some delay in the preparation of the statement of facts, and an order was obtained extending the time for filing such statement of facts. However the statement of facts was filed in the office of the District Clerk of San Saba County, Texas, on June 8, 1951; and the transcript in said cause was finished and certified by the Clerk of the Court on June 8, 1951; and said transcript and statement of facts was sent to Woodruff and Holloway, attorneys for the appellant, by express, and was received a few days after June 8, 1951.
“R. R. Holloway, the member of said firm who had ordered the record, understood that upon said record being received at the office of Woodruff and Holloway, the secretary for said firm had delivered the transcript and statement of facts to the Railway Express Company to be delivered to the Clerk of the Court of Civil. Appeals at Austin, to be filed in this court within the time provided by law and the rules of this court.
“S. W. Hughes and Sam McCollum, both of Brady, Texas, are also attorneys for appellant, Mattie Matlock, having participated in the trial of said cause and in the District Court and likewise participate in this appeal. On June 13, 1951, said S. W. Hughes, inquired of said R. R. Holloway with reference to the filing of the transcript and statement of facts in said cause in the Court of Civil Appeals; and the said R. R. Holloway advised said Hughes that said record had already been sent to the Clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals for filing. Thereafter on June 18, 1951, (the last day of the sixty day period) said Sam McCollum inquired of said Hughes as to whether the record in the case had been filed and said Hughes reported to said Mc-Collum that he had talked with said Holloway a few days prior thereto and that said Holloway had advised him that the record in the case had been sent to the Clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals.
“Realizing that he had not 'received from the Clerk of this court any notice of the receipt and filing of the record, said Holloway proceeded to investigate and learned on this, the 20th day of June, 1951, that through mistake and inadvertence, said record had not been delivered to said Railway Express Company for delivery to the Clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals.”
The record was received by the clerk on the second day following the expiration of the original sixty days.
In our opinion those facts and circumstances are sufficient to constitute good cause. We believe that this rule should be construed and applied in a manner most favorable to the appellant. Parks v. Purnell, 135 Tex. 182, 141 S.W.2d 585. It is seldom of any material consequence to the parties, counsel or the court whether a record on appeal is filed two days late, as here, and in the absence of a showing of bad faith or careless indifference on the part of appellant we are satisfied that the *545benevolent purpose of the rule was accomplished in granting and in not depriving appellant of the right of appeal.
The motion is overruled.
Motion overruled.