Court Opinion

ID: 9956110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 08:10:35.567523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:20.336907
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
       ___________________________

            No. 02-22-00247-CR
       ___________________________

         SAMMY SPARKS, Appellant

                       V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS

   On Appeal from the 213th District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 1586948D

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Sammy Sparks1 challenges his conviction for murdering Kenneth

Daniels. He argues that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State, during voir dire,

to pose hypotheticals that amounted to improper commitment questions; (2) the trial

court erred by excluding evidence relevant to Sparks’s refutation of the State’s

contention that he had provoked the difficulty; and (3) there was insufficient evidence

to support the trial court’s submission of a jury instruction on the provoking-the-

difficulty issue. Because Sparks’s complaints were not preserved, not harmful, or

both, we will affirm.

                                    I. Background

      Sparks and Daniels knew one another long before the murder; they were

friends who had lived in the same neighborhood and who occasionally drank

together. Both were somewhat unsteady on their feet, and although Daniels was

younger than Sparks—58 to Sparks’s 65—Daniels walked with a cane and was a full

head shorter.2 To quote trial counsel, they were “two seemingly older men” who

“[we]re not young, spry fellows.” And on the day of the murder, both men had been

drinking.

      1
       The record indicates that Sparks’s full legal name is Sammy Sparks Jr.
      2
        Daniels’s autopsy reflected that he was five feet, six inches tall and 135
pounds. There was conflicting evidence regarding Sparks’s height and weight. Sparks
had been logged as being “six two, 180” in prior police records, but when he was
arrested for the murder, he was identified as “six three, 160.”

                                            2
A.    Murder

      That evening, Sparks and Daniels separately visited a neighborhood store, and

they began talking at the checkout counter. The interaction was captured on the

store’s surveillance cameras and parts of it were recorded on a bystander’s cellphone.

      The videos showed that verbal joking between the two men escalated into a

spat, which became physical. After Daniels responded to a verbal insult by motioning

towards Sparks’s face and telling him to “watch it b****,” Sparks told him to “get [his]

hands out of [Sparks’s] face, ” threatened that Daniels was “a dead man,” warned him

that if he “d[id] that again [he was] gonna die now,” and dared him to “try it again.”

When Daniels motioned towards Sparks’s face twice more, Sparks hit him, and that

began what a detective later described as a “slap fight back and forth.” The men

remained standing as they tussled. Contrary to Sparks’s later claims, nothing in the

videos showed Daniels throwing Sparks on the ground, knocking him to his knees, or

attempting to choke him.

      Meanwhile, bystanders in the convenience store, including the cashier behind

the counter,3 laughed.     The cashier later explained that he had interpreted the

interaction as a “joke” and “not serious.”

      During one pause in the “slap fight,” Daniels reached in his pocket to deposit

his money, and after doing so, he pointed his finger—hand empty—in Sparks’s face

      3
       The cashier owned the convenience store at the time of the murder.

                                             3
again. Following another tussle and pause in the action—while Daniels’s hands were

out of his clothing and while Sparks was repeating that Daniels needed to “get out of

[his] face”—Sparks pulled a knife out of his pocket.

         When the men returned to tussling, Daniels grabbed onto Sparks’s shirt with

one hand and reached up to hit Sparks in the face with his other hand. Sparks

responded by stabbing at Daniels’s side multiple times, hitting him twice, once in the

heart.

         Daniels continued holding and leaning on Sparks for strength as his torso

began to bleed onto the floor. When bystanders alerted Sparks to the injury, he

removed Daniels’s hands from his clothing, let him drop to the floor, and walked

around him to the cash register. Sparks then attempted to proceed with his beer

purchase, but the cashier refused and called 911.

         When asked why he had stabbed Daniels, Sparks gave different reasons to

different individuals. Daniels’s niece later testified that Sparks told her he had stabbed

Daniels because “he wouldn’t buy him a beer.” The cashier testified that Sparks had

said he stabbed Daniels because he was “jumping [him].” And Sparks told the police

that it had been self-defense.

B.       Interview and Indictment

         Sparks consented to a videotaped interview with police. In that interview

(which was admitted into evidence at Sparks’s trial) he told the authorities that he had

asked Daniels about his wife and Daniels had hit him, choked him, attempted to

                                            4
throw him on the ground, and knocked him to his knee. He said that he had seen

Daniels with a knife in the past and that he had not known what Daniels would do to

him if he had forced him to the ground, so he pulled his knife to protect himself. But

he acknowledged that Daniels had not pulled a knife out during the skirmish, insisting

that Daniels’s “chok[ing]” him and “try[ing] to throw [him] to the ground” were what

necessitated the self-defense.

      Although Sparks admitted that a knife could kill, he stated that his use of the

knife had not been intended to be deadly, that he “never thought it would kill

[Daniels],” and that he had not been trying to kill anyone. When asked if he had been

sufficiently threatened to have shot Daniels if he had possessed a gun rather than a

knife, Sparks scoffed and said “no,” describing the confrontation as a “squabble” and

saying that they were not mad at one another.

      He was later indicted for murdering Daniels by “intentionally or knowingly

caus[ing Daniels’s] death . . . by stabbing him with a deadly weapon” or by

“intentionally, with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to . . . Daniels,

commit[ting] an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely, stabbing him with a

deadly weapon, . . . and thereby caus[ing his] death.” [Capitalization altered.] See Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2).

                                           5
C.    Jury Trial

      At trial, Sparks argued that he had not intended to kill Daniels and that using a

knife had been a reasonable exercise of self-defense. The jury trial that followed

involved three events with particular bearing on Sparks’s appeal.

      1.     Voir Dire Hypotheticals

      First, during voir dire, the State presented a series of hypothetical scenarios to

the venire. It asked, for example, whether deadly force would be reasonable if

another prosecutor “pushes me, [and] I pull out a gun, and I shoot [him].” Although

the State sought feedback from the venire on some of its hypothetical questions, it

used others rhetorically for illustration.       When Sparks objected to two of the

hypotheticals as improper commitment questions, his objections were overruled. But

the objected-to hypotheticals were among those used as rhetorical questions and did

not elicit any recorded responses from any of the veniremen.

      2.     Exclusion of Testimony

      Then, during trial, Daniels’s niece testified regarding her uncle’s death. The

niece had driven Daniels to the convenience store on the night of the murder, and

when Sparks’s counsel asked about Daniels “not [being able to] go to [a different]

store anymore,” the State objected. Out of the jury’s earshot, the State told the trial

court that it anticipated the niece testifying that Daniels had been “standing out [at the

other convenience store] and drinking and hanging out all the time and so the store

owner told them they weren’t allowed at the other store.” The State challenged the

                                             6
evidence as irrelevant (among other things), and when the trial court asked Sparks

how the testimony was relevant, Sparks responded that the State had “opened the

door” to the issue. The trial court disagreed, sustained the State’s objection, and

excluded the testimony.

      3.     Jury Charge

      Finally, at the conclusion of the evidence, the parties and trial court conferred

regarding the jury charge. The charge presented several theories and issues for the

jury’s consideration, including instructions on the offenses of murder by intentionally

or knowingly killing Daniels; murder by causing Daniels’s death while intentionally

committing an act clearly dangerous to human life with the intent to cause Daniels

serious bodily injury; and manslaughter by recklessly stabbing Daniels with a deadly

weapon thereby causing his death. It also instructed the jury on the justified use of

deadly self-defense and the provoking-the-difficulty doctrine as a qualification on self-

defense.

      Sparks objected, stating that “the Defense opposes any instructions on

provocation.” He repeated the objection later, telling the trial court that he was

“objecting to the provocation paragraph.” Neither time did Sparks elaborate on the

legal basis for his objection. His objection was overruled.

                                           7
D.    Verdict and Judgment

      The jury found Sparks guilty of murder. After hearing punishment evidence

not relevant to this appeal, the jury assessed Sparks’s punishment at 28 years’

confinement, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict.

                                   II. Discussion

      Sparks challenges (1) the State’s hypothetical questions during voir dire; (2) the

exclusion of Daniels’s niece’s testimony; and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the provoking-the-difficulty instruction.4

A.    Voir Dire Hypotheticals: No Preservation or No Harm

      Sparks first argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to question

the venire about three hypotheticals5 that he claims amounted to improper

commitment questions:

•     “So William [one of the prosecutors] pushes me, I pull out a gun, and I shoot
      William. Again, is . . . the fact that he pushed me, would it be reasonable to use
      deadly force in that situation?”

•     “William pulls a gun on me yesterday. I see William with no gun today, and I
      pull out a gun and shoot him. . . . . [D]o y’all think that’s immediately necessary
      in self-defense?”

•     “William calls me the worst names imaginable. . . . I pull out a gun and shoot
      William[.] . . . [W]ould this be reasonable for self-defense? What about pulling
      out a gun for verbal provocation? Is that sufficient? Is that okay?”

      4
       We have reordered Sparks’s issues for organizational purposes.
      5
       The State posed other hypotheticals as well, but because they are not
challenged on appeal, we need not recite them.

                                           8
      For an erroneous voir dire question to amount to reversible error, it must be

preserved and harmful. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a), 44.2(b).

      Because Sparks did not object to the first of these hypotheticals, that challenge

was not preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Halprin v. State, 170

S.W.3d 111, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding appellant failed to preserve

challenge to allegedly improper commitment question when he failed to object to it).

      As for the latter two hypotheticals, although Sparks preserved his challenges by

unsuccessfully objecting to them, there were no recorded responses from any of the

veniremen. To be harmful, the allegedly improper question must have resulted in

“the defendant [being] tried by a juror that had prejudged him or some aspect of his

case because the State had improperly committed one or more veniremen to a verdict

or course of action before hearing any evidence.” Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707,

714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Salinas v. State, No. 02-18-00060-CR, 2019 WL 1574953,

at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 11, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); see Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). When a question is directed at the entire

venire, the harm analysis requires consideration of factors such as the number of

veniremen who committed themselves, whether those veniremen served on the jury,

and whether the defendant used and exhausted his preemptory challenges on the

committed veniremen. See Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 714 (listing seven nonexhaustive,

nonexclusive factors for consideration).

                                           9
      Here, the State used the two objected-to hypotheticals rhetorically by answering

its own questions, explaining the reasoning behind its answers, and asking—again

rhetorically—“[d]oes that makes sense?” or “[d]o y’all understand that?”6 The record

does not indicate that the veniremen confirmed that the hypothetical “ma[d]e sense”

or that they “underst[ood],” nor does it indicate that any of the veniremen committed

themselves to a particular verdict or course of action. Consequently, Sparks cannot

show that the allegedly erroneous hypotheticals harmed him. See Salinas, 2019 WL

1574953, at *7 (holding no harm from allegedly improper commitment question and

explaining that “no veniremen committed to a verdict or a course of action on the

indecency charge” and the jury did not reach the lesser-included offense of

indecency); Montoya v. State, Nos. 03-15-00125-CR, 03-15-00126-CR, 2016 WL

4527599, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (noting that “[o]nly two venire members responded to the

commitment question and, although the question was posed to the entire panel of

      6
       For example, when the State posed the second listed hypothetical—asking
whether it was “immediately necessary in self-defense” to shoot William the day after
seeing William with a gun—it answered its own question and moved on without any
recorded responses:

      So in my situation we have here, when William pulled a gun on me
      yesterday and then today I see him with no gun and I shoot William, do
      y’all think that’s immediately necessary in self-defense? Why not?
      Right? Just because it’s been a day, and you didn’t have a gun now?
      Does that make sense?

              Okay. So [proceeding to the next hypothetical,] number
      three, . . . . .

                                         10
potential jurors, the likelihood that the jury’s verdict was substantially affected by the

State’s commitment questioning during voir dire is very low”); cf. Dancer v. State, 253

S.W.3d 368, 372–73 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem.

op.) (holding instruction to disregard alleged improper commitment question cured

the error and noting that “none of the jurors responded to the allegedly improper

commitment question”).

      We overrule this issue.

B.    Excluded Evidence: No Preservation and No Harm

      Sparks next contends that the trial court erroneously excluded Daniels’s niece’s

testimony regarding Daniels’s banishment from another neighborhood store. But this

complaint was not preserved, and even if it had been both preserved and erroneous,

the testimony’s exclusion would not have been harmful.

      1.     Standard of Review

      To preserve an evidentiary complaint for appellate review, a party must make a

“timely request, objection, or motion” to the trial court that “state[s] the grounds for

the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient

specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds

were apparent from the context.” Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); see Reyna v. State, 168

S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Rule 33.1(a) and describing it as “a

prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review”).             “[T]he party

complaining on appeal . . . about a trial court’s admission, exclusion, or suppression of

                                           11
evidence must, at the earliest opportunity, have done everything necessary to bring to

the judge’s attention the evidence rule or statute in question and its precise and proper

application to the evidence in question.” Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 177 (quoting Martinez v.

State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 335–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)); see Ruiz v. State, No. 14-05-

00757-CR, 2007 WL 2239289, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 7, 2007,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Failure to present a particular

argument to the trial court in support of the admission of excluded evidence waives

that argument for appeal.”). If the party’s appellate rationale for the admission of

evidence differs from the one it presented to the trial court such that “the trial judge

‘never had the opportunity to rule upon’ th[e appellate] rationale,” then the complaint

has not been preserved for review. Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 179 (quoting Clark v. State,

881 S.W.2d 682, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)); see Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Whether a party’s particular complaint is preserved depends

on whether the complaint on appeal comports with the complaint made at trial.”).

      Even if an evidentiary complaint is properly preserved, though, the erroneous

admission or exclusion of evidence will not result in reversal unless the error affected

the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning that it “had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Bosquez v. State, 446 S.W.3d 581,

585 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.); see Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b);

Petty v. State, No. 02-21-00130-CR, 2022 WL 4545532, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Sept. 29, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (recognizing that

                                           12
“an error does not affect a substantial right if the appellate court has a fair assurance

from an examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury

or that it had but a slight effect”).

       2.     No Preservation

       At trial, the State argued that the challenged testimony regarding Daniels’s

banishment from another neighborhood store “d[id]n’t amount to something that

[wa]s impeachable for the victim,” it “d[id]n’t fit the specific fact pattern,” and it was

“not relevant.” Sparks responded that the banishment was “part of the fact pattern,”

that the State “already brought [it] up” that Daniels had alcohol in his system, and that

the banishment “plac[ed] it into context in addition to it being relevant.” But when

the trial court noted that the anticipated testimony described a “bad act” and asked

Sparks to explain how it was relevant, Sparks did not enunciate its relevance. There

was no mention of the doctrine of provoking the difficulty or the testimony’s alleged

relevance to that doctrine. Rather, Sparks argued that the State had “opened the

door” to the issue by asking the niece about Daniels “being a friendly individual who

was walking around normally.” See Hayden v. State, 296 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009) (“Evidence that is otherwise inadmissible may become admissible when a

party opens the door to such evidence.”). The trial court rejected this as a basis for

the testimony’s admission, explaining that the banishment went to Daniels’s “drinking

and being a vagrant” as opposed to him “being violent or aggressive,” so the State did

                                           13
not open the door to it. And without Sparks enunciating any further grounds for the

testimony’s admission, the trial court sustained the State’s objection.

      Now on appeal, Sparks argues that the niece’s testimony regarding Daniels’s

banishment was relevant because it disproved the State’s theory of provoking the

difficulty. But Sparks did not present this argument to the trial court as a basis for the

evidence’s admission.

      Our sister court addressed a similar discrepancy between an appellant’s trial and

appellate court evidentiary arguments in Ruiz v. State. 2007 WL 2239289, at *4.

There, the appellant attempted to offer testimony from witnesses who feared the

complainant along with testimony regarding specific bad acts that had contributed to

their fear. Id. at *2. The appellant told the trial court that such evidence was relevant

to rebut the contention that she was dangerous, that it was required by “fairness,” and

that the State had opened the door to it. Id. at *4. After the trial court excluded the

evidence, the appellant argued on appeal that such exclusion was erroneous in part

because the testimony was necessary to support her theory of self-defense. Id. But

“[a]t no point during the proceedings [below] did defense counsel argue that any

excluded evidence was admissible as proof of any defensive theory, much less self-

defense specifically.” Id. Thus, our sister court concluded that the appellant had

failed to preserve her complaint. Id.

      Similarly here, Sparks did not tell the trial court of the evidence’s alleged

relevance to the provoking-the-difficulty issue, even when Sparks was directly asked

                                           14
by the trial court how the excluded evidence was relevant. Because “[a]t no point

during the proceedings [below] did defense counsel argue that any excluded evidence

was admissible as proof of [his] defensive theory” or the provoking-the-difficulty

limitation upon it, id., “the trial judge ‘never had the opportunity to rule upon’ th[at]

rationale.” Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 179–80 (quoting Clark, 881 S.W.2d at 694). Sparks’s

complaint thus was not preserved for our review. See id. (holding appellant failed to

preserve challenge when he argued to trial court that evidence was admissible to

attack victim’s credibility and argued on appeal that “the Confrontation Clause

demanded admission of the evidence”); Clark, 881 S.W.2d at 694 (holding appellant

failed to preserve challenge when he argued to trial court that evidence was admissible

to impeach witness on one basis and argued on appeal that it was admissible to

impeach witness on different basis); Mejia v. State, Nos. 09-14-00419-CR, 09-14-

00420-CR, 09-14-00421-CR, 09-14-00422-CR, 2016 WL 3564408, at *1–2 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont June 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(holding appellant failed to preserve complaint when he asserted at trial that witness’s

immigration status was relevant to motive to lie but argued on appeal that exclusion

of the evidence violated his constitutional rights to present a complete defense and

cross-examine witnesses).

                                           15
       3.     No Harm

       Even if Sparks had preserved the issue, though, and even if we assume that the

testimony’s exclusion was erroneous, we do not see how it could have substantially

influenced the jury’s verdict.

       Sparks claims that Daniels’s niece’s testimony would have shown that Sparks

“could not have set up the unforeseen event of the decedent being ejected from the

other store” and thus “could not have orchestrated the set of events as a ploy to kill,”

as Sparks claims was required to prove that he was provoking the difficulty. See

Elizondo v. State, 487 S.W.3d 185, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (reciting elements of

provoking the difficulty including that the provocation was “for the purpose and with

the intent that the defendant would have a pretext for inflicting harm upon the

other”). But this was not the State’s theory of provoking the difficulty.

       The State did not claim that Sparks knew Daniels would “be[] ejected from the

other store”; it claimed that Sparks had provoked the fight after he and Daniels ran

into one another at the neighborhood store. It pointed to evidence, for example, that

“the first push was thrown by [Sparks]” as showing that he had allegedly provoked the

difficulty. There was no dispute that Sparks was in the convenience store before

Daniels arrived, and the State offered no evidence that Sparks plotted to run into

Daniels at the store on the night of the murder. Given that Sparks claims the

excluded testimony was relevant to a theory of provoking the difficulty different from

the one the State was advancing, the record as a whole provides a fair assurance that

                                           16
the testimony’s exclusion “did not influence the jury or that it had but a slight effect.”

Petty, 2022 WL 4545532, at *10.

      Based on the absence of both preservation and harm, we overrule this issue.

C.    Provoking-the-Difficulty Instruction: No Preservation and No Harm

      Finally, Sparks argues that the trial court erred by charging the jury on the

doctrine of provoking the difficulty because, he contends, there was insufficient

evidence to support such an instruction. Much like Sparks’s evidentiary complaint,

though, even if we assume that the instruction was erroneous, Sparks’s objection to it

was insufficiently specific to apprise the trial court of the error, and the instruction’s

inclusion in the charge was not egregiously harmful.

      1.     Standard of Review and Governing Law

      Provoking the difficulty is a term of art that refers to a particular qualification

on the right of self-defense. See Elizondo, 487 S.W.3d at 197–98. Specifically, “if the

defendant provoked another to make an attack on him, so that the defendant would

have a pretext for killing the other under the guise of self-defense, the defendant

forfeits his right of self-defense.” Id. at 196, 198. A jury may be charged on the

doctrine only if there is some evidence for a rational jury to find, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the State has proved the doctrine’s three elements:

      (1) that the defendant did some act or used some words that provoked
      the attack on him,

      (2) that such act or words were reasonably calculated to provoke the
      attack, and

                                           17
       (3) that the act was done or the words were used for the purpose and
       with the intent that the defendant would have a pretext for inflicting
       harm upon the other.

Id. at 196–98 (indentation altered) (quoting Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1998)). If a jury is instructed on provoking the difficulty without evidence

of its three elements, then the instruction is erroneous, and we review the error for

harm. See id. at 197, 199, 204.

       The degree of harm required for an erroneous jury instruction to warrant

reversal depends on whether the defendant preserved the error. Ngo v. State, 175

S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“The degree of harm necessary for reversal

depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.”). To preserve an

objection to a jury-charge instruction, a party must “present his objections

thereto . . . distinctly specifying each ground of objection.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 36.14. The objection “must be sufficiently specific to point out the errors

complained of” and to “afford [the trial court] an opportunity to correct it” by

identifying in “what respect the defendant regards the charge as defective.” Hernandez

v. State, No. 02-17-00353-CR, 2019 WL 490510, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 7,

2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Harkins v. State,

268 S.W.3d 740, 746–47 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d)); see Tex. R. App.

P. 33.1(a).

                                          18
       If a party does not preserve error, then we review the inclusion of the

erroneous instruction for egregious harm. See Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165

(Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743–44. A defendant suffers egregious

harm if the erroneous jury instruction caused actual harm that “affect[ed] the very

basis of the case, deprive[d] the accused of a valuable right, or vitally affect[ed] a

defensive theory.” Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165; Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834, 840

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

To determine whether a jury instruction’s inclusion caused egregious harm, we

consider the error in light of (1) the entire jury charge; (2) the state of the evidence,

including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence; (3) the arguments of

counsel; and (4) other relevant information in the record. Almanza v. State, 686

S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g); see Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165;

Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 840. “Egregious harm is a difficult standard to meet.”

Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165.

       2.      No Preservation7

       Sparks did not preserve his challenge to the provoking-the-difficulty

instruction.

       The State does not dispute Sparks’s preservation of his appellate challenge to
       7

the provoking-the-difficulty instruction. But preservation is a “systemic requirement,”
and whether or not it is raised by the parties, we cannot reverse a conviction without
addressing the issue. Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

                                           19
       During the charge conference, Sparks’s counsel objected to the instruction with

a single sentence: “Judge, I guess the only other matter before we close on this

charging conference would be that the Defense opposes any instructions on

provocation.” Sparks did not elaborate on this objection or provide any basis for it.

Later, as the charge conference was wrapping up, Sparks reiterated his objection,

telling the trial court that he was “objecting to the provocation paragraph.” Again, he

failed to elaborate.

       Sparks’s objection is similar to that in Willis v. State, No. 03-01-00671-CR, 2002

WL 31118305, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 26, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for

publication). There, the appellant argued on appeal that the trial court’s charge had

erroneously instructed the jury on an issue—the law of parties—without sufficient

evidence to warrant the instruction. Id. But as here, the appellant had lodged a bare-

bones objection to the instruction with a single sentence: “We would also object to

the parties charge as it stands in paragraph 4 of the charge.” Id. The Austin Court of

Appeals held that this was insufficiently specific to preserve error.       Id. at *4–5

(holding further that single-sentence objection to instruction on joint possession also

failed to preserved error).

       Although Willis is neither published nor binding on us, we agree with its

analysis of the preservation issue. As there, Sparks’s broad, unexplained objection to

“any instructions on provocation” was insufficient to notify the trial court of the

specific basis for his challenge. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14. Sparks did

                                           20
not tell the trial court that there was insufficient evidence of provoking the difficulty,

much less specify which elements of the doctrine were allegedly lacking.8             He

therefore failed to preserve his challenge. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

      3.     No Egregious Harm

      Because Sparks failed to preserve his challenge, even if we assume that there

was insufficient evidence to support submission of the provoking-the-difficulty

instruction, the instruction will not warrant reversal unless its inclusion in the charge

caused egregious harm. Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);

Hernandez, 2019 WL 490510, at *7. It did not. While the jury charge itself suggests

harm, the state of the evidence, counsels’ arguments, and other factors in the record

indicate that the instruction did not affect the “very basis of the defendant’s case,

deprive[] him of a valuable right, or vitally affect[] a defensive theory.” Lozano, 636

S.W.3d at 29; see Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 840.

             a.     Jury Charge

      As the State concedes, the jury charge as a whole suggests that the provoking-

the-difficulty instruction was harmful.9

      8
        In fact, when Sparks initially stated that he “oppose[d] any instructions on
provocation,” the trial court stated that it “heard on the video the injured party
saying . . . a slur about his sexual behavior, Mr. Sparks’s.” Based on this response, the
trial court appears to have understood Sparks’s objection as a reference to Daniels’s
verbal provocation of Sparks rather than Sparks’s provocation of the conflict. Either
way, Sparks did not clarify during the charge conference.

                                           21
      Key portions of the instruction were almost identical to those used in Reeves v.

State, where the Court of Criminal Appeals described the provoking-the-difficulty

instruction as “[in]comprehensible” and found that the jury charge as a whole

weighed in favor of harm. 420 S.W.3d 812, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Elizondo,

487 S.W.3d at 206–07 (denouncing similarly worded provoking-the-difficulty

instruction as incomprehensible).    As in Reeves, the two paragraphs applying the

provoking-the-difficulty doctrine consisted of two run-on sentences with more than

120 words each.10 420 S.W.3d at 818 (noting that first application paragraph on

      9
       In his harm analysis, Sparks complains of various other alleged deficiencies in
the charge, which he claims contributed to the jury charge as a whole weighing in
favor of harm. Because we agree with him that the jury charge as a whole weighs in
favor of harm, we need not address all of his separate allegations. See Tex. R. App. P.
47.1.
      10
          The application paragraphs provided:

      So, in this case, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a
      reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Sammy Sparks, immediately
      before the difficulty, then and there did some act, or used some
      language, or did both, as the case may be, with the intent on his, the
      Defendant’s, part to produce the occasion for killing the deceased,
      Kenneth Daniels, and Defendant’s part, if there were such, were
      reasonably calculated to, and did, provoke a difficulty, and that on such
      account the deceased attacked Defendant with deadly force, or
      reasonably appeared to Defendant to so attack him or to be attempting
      to so attack him, and that the Defendant then killed the said Kenneth
      Daniels by the use of deadly force, to-wit, by stabbing him with a knife,
      in pursuance of his original design, if you find there was such design,
      then you will find against the Defendant on the issue of self defense.

           On the other hand, if you find from the evidence that the acts
      done or language used by the Defendant, if any, were not, under the

                                          22
provoking the difficulty “contain[ed] 156 words in one sentence,” that second

paragraph “contain[ed] 125 words in one sentence,” and that “[n]either [wa]s

comprehensible”). And “[b]ecause these instructions were not [understandable], ‘this

is not a case in which the reviewing court should apply the usual presumption that the

jury understood and applied the court’s charge in the way it was written.’” Id. at 818–

19 (quoting Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (Cochran, J.,

concurring)); see Elizondo, 487 S.W.3d at 208 (quoting and applying Reeves in harm

analysis of similar provoking-the-difficulty instruction).

       Moreover, also like Reeves, the provoking-the-difficulty instruction followed the

instruction on self-defense and came at the very end of the jury charge, “[s]o the last

substantive instruction that the jury read was the erroneous one.” Reeves, 420 S.W.3d

at 819; see Elizondo, 487 S.W.3d at 208 (similar).

       Although Reeves reviewed the comparable charge error for “some harm” rather

than applying the higher egregious-harm standard applicable here, see Reeves, 420

S.W.3d at 816–17; see also Elizondo, 487 S.W.3d at 204–05 (similar), the court’s sharp

       circumstances, reasonably calculated or intended to provoke a difficulty
       or an attack by deceased upon the Defendant, or if you have a
       reasonable doubt thereof, then in such event, Defendant’s right of self
       defense would in no way be abridged, impaired, or lessened, and if you
       so find, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will decide the
       issue of self defense in accordance with the law on that subject given in
       other portions of this charge, wholly disregarding and without reference
       to the law on the subject of provoking the difficulty.

                                            23
criticism of the provoking-the-difficulty instruction leaves little doubt that, even under

the higher standard, the charge as a whole weighs in favor of harm.

             b.     State of the Evidence

      The state of the evidence, though, indicates the improbability that the

provoking-the-difficulty instruction caused actual harm that tainted the very basis of

the case or vitally affected a defensive theory. See Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 840 (stating

standard for egregious harm).

      In reviewing the state of the evidence, we must consider not only the extent to

which the parties contested and presented evidence on the relevant issue but also the

weight and “plausibility of the evidence raising the defense.” Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at

29 (analyzing egregious harm due to erroneous inclusion of instructions on duty to

retreat); see Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (noting that

court of appeals must consider “the relative [strength or] weakness of the defensive

evidence in light of the entire record”). Although Sparks’s purported need to act in

self-defense was hotly contested, his need to use deadly force in self-defense was

neither as contested nor as plausible, and that was the form of self-defense presented

to the jury and woven into the provoking-the-difficulty instruction.

      The State presented evidence that Sparks had intended to kill Daniels and that

deadly self-defense was not warranted. To prove intent, it highlighted the portions of

the video evidence showing that Sparks had stabbed Daniels multiple times, that he

made no effort to help Daniels, and that he had tried to purchase a beer over

                                           24
Daniels’s dying body. To disprove Sparks’s alleged need to act in deadly self-defense,

the State noted how the video evidence debunked Sparks’s claims that Daniels had

choked him and knocked him to the ground, it emphasized the portions of the videos

showing that Sparks had threatened Daniels and had thrown the first punch, it

highlighted the size and strength differences between Sparks and Daniels, and it

elicited testimony that Sparks and Daniels appeared to be “joking together” and “not

serious” before the stabbing.

      Sparks, meanwhile, contended that he had not intended to kill Daniels, that the

skirmish warranted his use of self-defense generally, and that he had not intended for

his use of the knife to be deadly. To show his lack of intent, Sparks highlighted

evidence that he and Daniels had been friends, that he had stayed at the store after the

stabbing, and that he had cooperated with the police.          Sparks further elicited

testimony that “not . . . everybody who gets stabbed dies” and that “the odds of being

stabbed in the left [heart] ventricle are pretty low if somebody doesn’t know where

they’re aiming.” And he attempted to show that his acting in self-defense was

reasonable by offering testimony that the neighborhood was a high-crime area,

questioning alleged overstatements of his size, and emphasizing footage from his

videotaped interview in which he told the police that Daniels was stronger than he

was, that Daniels had carried a knife in the past, and that he had not known what

Daniels would do to him.

                                          25
      Yet, “the issue [wa]s deadly force, not regular self-defense.”     Lozano, 636

S.W.3d at 32 (noting similarly and holding no egregious harm from erroneous

instructions on duty to retreat). The only form of self-defense presented to the jury

asked it to determine whether Sparks had “reasonably believ[ed] that the use of deadly

force on his part was immediately necessary to protect himself against [Daniels’s]

attempted use of unlawful deadly force.” “Deadly force,” in turn, was defined as

“force that [wa]s intended or known by the person using it to cause, or in the manner

of its use or intended use [wa]s capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.”

And the evidence that Daniels had used “deadly force” and that Sparks’s “deadly”

response had been reasonably necessary was weak at best.

      In Sparks’s police interview, he admitted that he had not seen Daniels with a

knife that night, he scoffed at the idea that the “squabble” would have warranted him

to shoot Daniels, and despite conceding that a knife could kill, he denied that he had

intended to respond with deadly force.11        In other words, Sparks indirectly

acknowledged that Daniels had not attacked him with deadly force and that a deadly

response was not necessary. Plus, the videos of the murder revealed that Daniels’s

hands were out of his pockets and weaponless when Sparks pulled his knife, and the

      11
        Of course,“[t]he Penal Code does not require that a defendant intend the
death of an attacker in order to be justified in using deadly force in self-defense.”
Alonzo v. State, 353 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). But the defendant must
have “reasonably believed that the force [used] was necessary to protect himself
against [the ]other’s unlawful use of force, and the amount of force actually used
[must have been] permitted by the circumstances.” Id.

                                         26
videotaped differences in size and stability depicted Daniels as the smaller, cane-

reliant party. It is extremely unlikely that the jury could have found that Sparks

reasonably believed a deadly response to be necessary when Sparks himself had

scoffed at the idea in the context of use of a gun.

       Perhaps this is why neither party dedicated substantial time to presenting

evidence regarding provoking the difficulty. As a doctrine that acts as a limitation to

self-defense, it was premised on the idea that Sparks’s actions provoked Daniels to

“attack[] . . . with deadly force.” And on this record, there is no evidence that Daniels

ever attacked Sparks with deadly force.

       While at trial the parties periodically referenced “provocation” in the general

sense—disputing who started the argument and who was the first to become

physical—apart from Sparks’s threat that Daniels would die, the State did not present

evidence that Sparks had hatched a plan to kill Daniels and intentionally provoked a

tussle as a rouse to kill him.

       Given the lack of evidence and implausibility of the idea that deadly self-

defense was reasonably necessary, the provoking-the-difficulty instruction was

extremely unlikely to have caused actual harm that affected the very basis of the case

or a defensive theory. See Villarreal, 453 S.W.3d at 440 (weighing state of the evidence

against egregious harm when defendant’s statements “were internally inconsistent

with his claim of self-defense and were contradicted by the entirety of the record”).

                                           27
             c.     Arguments of Counsel

      The arguments of counsel similarly weigh against egregious harm.

      Sparks’s opening statement did not mention the doctrine of provoking the

difficulty at all. Rather, Sparks’s counsel argued that the incident was not murder.

And she expounded on this in her closing argument, repeatedly telling the jury that

the death was “a tragedy,” that Sparks “didn’t mean for [Daniels] to be killed,” and

that even after the stabbing, Sparks “didn’t think anyone would die in that store[—

]that’s why he[ was] standing around outside” afterward. She claimed that Sparks had

considered the knife to be a means of non-deadly force, telling the jury that “most of

the time, knife wounds don’t kill anybody” and that “[t]his is just the way they handle

stuff over there” in Sparks’s neighborhood.

      Sparks’s counsel further emphasized that these were “old men,” that Sparks

“felt threatened,” that Sparks knew Daniels to be “younger” and “stronger,” and that

he knew Daniels to carry a knife. But only one component of Spark’s closing

argument attempted to justify the use of deadly force, as opposed to non-deadly,

force: Sparks’s counsel pointed the jury to the portion of the videos in which Daniels

“reach[ed] in his pocket,” speculating that Sparks could have believed that Daniels

was pulling a knife and could have reasonably perceived an apparent, deadly danger.

As the State noted in its rebuttal argument, though, this allegation came at the very

                                          28
end of the case,12 and Sparks’s own interview belied it. As already noted, Sparks told

the police that he had not seen Daniels with a knife that night, he acknowledged that

Daniels had not had a knife out during the skirmish, and he scoffed at the idea that a

deadly response—such as shooting Daniels—had been necessary.

       The State, meanwhile, used its jury arguments to reiterate its own theory of the

case by arguing that Sparks had intended to kill Daniels. In its opening statement, it

told the jury that it would see video footage of Sparks “say[ing] something to the

effect of ‘You’re going to die right here in this store[,]’” followed by him “tak[ing] out

a folding knife . . . [and] . . . stab[bing] this victim in the chest.” And it repeated this

line multiple times in its closing argument before telling the jury that, “[i]t’s pretty

simple[:] You stab someone in the chest after telling them they’re going to die, that’s

murder.” It urged the jury to “[t]hink about all the intentional acts that [Sparks]

did”—that he “hit the victim first,” that he “intentionally pulled the knife out,” that

he “lean[ed] in and smile[d] to the victim” after pulling the knife, and that when

Daniels fell to the floor bleeding, Sparks did not call 911 or “see if [the victim] was

okay” but instead “[w]alk[ed] around [the] dying body and trie[d] to get . . . a beer.”

       The State’s closing also poked a variety of holes in Sparks’s theory of self-

defense. It argued that no reasonable person in Sparks’s situation would have felt so

threatened as to consider deadly self-defense to be necessary, it pointed out “the size

       12
         The State commented that “[n]ow, magically, [Sparks] has formulated this
thing in closing arguments about [Daniels] reaching into his pocket.”

                                            29
difference” between Sparks and Daniels and the fact that “the victim had a cane,” and

it asserted that pulling out a knife was not a reasonable response to what everyone in

the store thought was “kind of a joke.” It also questioned whether Sparks subjectively

felt threatened, highlighting the discrepancies between Sparks’s statements to the

police and the video footage, and reminding the jury that Sparks was “smiling” and

“[l]aughing” during the tussle that preceded the stabbing.

      The State also referenced the doctrine of provoking the difficulty as one of its

many challenges to self-defense, commenting that “you also can’t be the one

provoking the situation.” But it did not linger on the doctrine, dive into the elements,

or draw the jury’s attention to the provoking-the-difficulty instruction.

      The same was true when the State mentioned provoking the difficulty in its

rebuttal argument. It asked the jury “to think about the fact the first push was thrown

by [Sparks],” claiming that this showed he was “provoking the difficulty.” But it did

not elaborate on how or why the facts allegedly satisfied the elements of the doctrine.

Indeed, its arguments largely invoked the ordinary meaning of the term “provocation”

rather than advancing the idea that Sparks had plotted a rouse to kill Daniels, as was

required by the provoking-the-difficulty doctrine.

      Because the parties’ arguments did not emphasize or draw the jury’s attention

to the provoking-the-difficulty instruction, this factor weighs against egregious harm.

See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 777 (weighing arguments of counsel against finding of

egregious harm because “neither of the parties nor the trial judge added to the charge

                                           30
errors by telling the jury that it did not have to be unanimous”); cf. Elizondo, 487

S.W.3d at 208–09 (concluding that, although State’s argument addressed concept of

provoking the difficulty, the instruction was not brought to the front of jurors’ minds,

so factor was neutral regarding presence of some harm); Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 750–51

(holding egregious harm when “the trial judge and the prosecution misstated the law

at the very beginning of the case [in voir dire] and at the very end [in the charge]”).

             d.     Other Record Considerations

      The record contains another relevant consideration as well: self-defense was

not Sparks’s only defensive theory.13 See Elizondo, 487 S.W.3d at 209 (considering lack

of other defensive theories in fourth harm factor). Sparks’s primary defensive theory

was that he had not intended to kill Daniels at all. Sparks repeated this argument

throughout the case, and when the State rested, Sparks moved for a directed verdict

based on the alleged “fail[ure] to prove that there was intent.” Self-defense was

arguably a secondary defensive theory, and provoking the difficulty was merely one of

the ways the State sought to shoot holes in that secondary theory.

      Even for the State, though, the doctrine of provoking the difficulty was

relatively far down the list of its challenges to self-defense. As already discussed, the

State primarily argued that Sparks had intended to kill Daniels, that Sparks was not in

fear, and that the spat did not warrant a deadly response.

      13
        In his harm analysis, Sparks raises new voir dire and evidentiary complaints
regarding statements and excluded evidence that he claims contributed to the harm.

                                            31
      Because self-defense and provoking the difficulty were not the only theories

relied upon by the respective parties, this factor weighs against egregious harm. Cf. id.

(weighing factor in favor of harm when self-defense was defendant’s sole defensive

theory and holding that some harm existed); Villarreal, 453 S.W.3d at 440 (concluding

that “[b]ecause the [erroneously omitted instruction] affected only appellant’s

secondary defensive theory,” it did not “touch[] upon a ‘vital aspect’ of his case”).

             e.     Summary

      “Egregious harm is a difficult standard to meet,” Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165,

and the record in this case shows that the provoking-the-difficulty instruction does

not meet that standard. Despite the “[in]comprehensible” nature of the instruction,

Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 818, the state of the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and

other record considerations demonstrate the improbability of any actual harm that

“affect[ed] the very basis of the case, deprive[d] the accused of a valuable right, or

vitally affect[ed] a defensive theory.” Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165; see Engel v. State, 630

S.W.3d 192, 204 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.) (holding no egregious harm

from erroneous wording of provoking-the-difficulty instruction when state of the

evidence and arguments of counsel weighed against harm).

      We overrule this issue.

                                            32
                                III. Conclusion

      Having overruled Sparks’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

                                                 /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                  Bonnie Sudderth
                                                  Chief Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 28, 2024

                                        33