Court Opinion

ID: 9795360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:27:07.900101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:37.063237
License: Public Domain

BUETTNER, J.,
dissenting.
111 I respectfully dissent. In seeking to compel arbitration, a party "must present a statement of the law and facts showing an enforceable agreement to arbitrate the issues presented by the petition." Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 2005 OK 51, ¶ 16, 138 P.3d 826. Ambiguities are resolved in favor of finding the dispute is arbitrable; "arbitration should be allowed wnless the court can say with 'positive assurance' the dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause." City of Muskogee v. Martin, 1990 OK 70, 796 P.2d 337, 340 (emphasis added).
T12 Cemetery asserts that all of Rusts' claims in this case must be arbitrated because the arbitration provision is not limited to disputes arising out of the contract containing the arbitration clause. The arbitration agreement provides that it applies to any dispute between the parties. The nature of Rusts' claims do not depend on the existence of the bench purchase agreement, and indeed if Rusts had never entered the bench purchase agreement, their claims presented in this case would remain. This case presents a question of first impression in Oklahoma: whether an arbitration provision which includes no limiting language, except that disputes must be between the parties, applies to require arbitration of a dispute that unquestionably arose out of an earlier agreement which did not include an arbitration provision.
[ 13 There is a strong public policy favoring arbitration which is reflected in both state and federal statutory law.6 The arbitration clause at issue in this case provides that interpretation of the arbitration clause must be arbitrated. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that where the parties have agreed to arbitrate even the interpretation of an arbitration clause, "the court's function is narrowly restricted to determine whether the party requesting arbitration asserts 'a claim which on its face' is covered by the (arbitration) agreement.7 Under the FAA, any doubt as to the seope of arbitrable issues is resolved in favor of arbitration.8 The plain language of the OUAA suggests that a valid arbitration clause need not limit its application except that the dispute to be arbitrated must be between the parties to the arbitration clause.9
1 14 The South Carolina Court of Appeals has held that an arbitration clause which applies to claims "arising out of or related to this agreement" may cover disputes outside the agreement only if the disputes relate to the subject matter of the agreement. But, a 'clause requiring arbitration of disputes "arising out of the relationship of the parties" does not require that the disputes relate to the contract containing the arbitration *810clause.10 The pertinent concern is that the dispute concern the parties' relationship. Id. The South Carolina Court of Appeals relied in part on authority from the Tenth Cireuit to hold that where the parties expressly agreed to arbitrate all controversies between them, the source of the claim is not relevant because the parties "have manifested an intention to arbitrate all of their disputes arising from their business relations, not just those arising under a particular contract." Id. at 189 (emphasis added). The court found that where the clause applies to any dispute between the parties, it may apply to any dispute of the parties, even where, as here, the dispute arose under an earlier contract without an arbitration provision. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
15 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals's decision cited in The Vestry and Church Wardens involved an arbitration clause requiring arbitration of "any controversy between us arising out of your business or this agreement." Zink v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 13 F.3d 330 (10th Cir.1993). In that case, the plaintiff purchased securities from Merrill Lynch in 1980. In 1982, Merrill Lynch executed a formal account agreement which included the arbitration provision. The plaintiff later sued Merrill Lynch based on the 1980 sale of securities. The plaintiff challenged Merrill Lynch's motion to compel arbitration, arguing the claims arose before the 1982 arbitration agreement.
16 The Tenth Cireuit Court of Appeals held the 1980 claims were subject to arbitration under the later agreement. After noting that doubts are to be construed in favor of arbitration, the court concluded that the language "any controversy ... arising out of your business" was "clearly broad enough to cover the dispute at issue despite the fact that the dealings giving rise to the dispute occurred prior to the execution of the [arbitration] agreement." Id. at 382. The court quoted another circuit court's pronouncement that "(a)n arbitration clause covering disputes arising out of the contract or business between the parties evinces a clear intent to cover more than just those matters set forth in the contract," citing Belke v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1028 (I1ith Cir.1982). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also found that an agreement to arbitrate "any dispute between (the parties) or claim by either against the other" was "brief, unequivocal and all-encompassing" language that required arbitration of "any and all claims against each other, with no exceptions." Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11thCir.2000). In Brown, the court further held that the presumption of arbitra-bility in the FAA means that "parties must clearly express their intent to exclude categories of claims from their arbitration agreement." Id. at 1222.
{17 The Fourth Cireuit Court of Appeals has enforced an arbitration provision that plainly required arbitration of any dispute arising out of the parties' relationship. Cara's Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d 566 (4th Cir.1998). The court explained "(Whe breadth of the language clearly establishes that the arbitration clause was intended to apply to all conflicts between the parties and not only to conflicts regarding (the second contract) in particular." Id. (Emphasis added).
1 18 In this case, Rusts' claims do not arise out of the contract containing the arbitration clause. However, the dispute is undoubtedly between the parties to the contract containing the arbitration clause. That is all that is required by the unambiguous arbitration clause here. Where an arbitration clause has no limiting language, the strong policy in favor of arbitration compels the finding that the unambiguous language of the agreement prevails. The arbitration clause here applies to any dispute between the parties, and the claims here constitute a dispute between the parties. Any remaining question of arbitra-bility must be determined by an arbitrator, as provided by the arbitration clause. Given *811the plain language of the arbitration clause, along with authority finding such clauses en-foreeable, I am unable to say "with positive assurance" that Rusts' claims are not covered by the arbitration agreement. I would therefore reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to enter an order compelling arbitration of Rusts' claims.

. 12 O.S.Supp.2006 § 1857(A); 9 U.S.C. § 2; Towe, supra, 947 P.2d at 599.

. City of Muskogee, supra, 796 P.2d at 340, citing United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).

. Wilkinson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 1997 OK 20, ¶ 8, 933 P.2d 878, 879.

. 12 0.S$.Supp.2005 § 1857(A), provides:
An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.

. - The Vestry and Church Wardens of the Church of the Holy Cross v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 356 S.C. 202, 588 S.E.2d 136, 140 (S.C.App.2003).