Court Opinion

ID: 9688640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:59:19.385241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:40.893958
License: Public Domain

Martin, J.
(dissenting). In my opinion the question presented as to Walter was not whether he was guilty of negligent management and control, but whether there was evidence from which the jury could infer that he increased the danger assumed by the plaintiffs or created a new danger in that respect.
Walter was the plaintiffs’ host. In that relationship he owed them no greater duty than the conscientious exercise *429of his skill and judgment in managing the car. His testimony is that immediately upon seeing the deer he applied his brakes, not too hard, because they were power brakes and he didn’t want to tip over, and “it went through my mind to stay off to the right, near the shoulder — didn’t want to get off too far — didn’t want to go into the ditch- — -and try to avoid anything that we could.” Nowhere can it be inferred from the evidence that Walter was attempting to stop his car. We can say now that he should have stopped, but he did not know then that the deer would remain where it was on the highway.
The evidence clearly shows that Walter conscientiously exercised what skill and judgment he had in controlling his car. It also shows that he had very little time in which, to consider what course of action to follow and having adopted the course that he did, there was no time for a second guess. Whether what he did was the right thing to do to avoid an accident depended upon matters outside his control, to wit, the possible action of the deer. To allow the jury to pass on whether the exercise of his judgment constituted negligence because he did not stop would be to permit the jury to reason backwards and substitute its judgment for his. This would be tantamount to requiring of a driver the same duty to a guest as that which he owes to other users of the highway.
In School v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co. (1940), 234 Wis. 332, 335, 291 N. W. 311, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Wickhem, held:
“Plaintiffs were guests of Anderson and as a matter of law assumed the risk as to his skill and judgment. We see no possibility of holding that Anderson did not conscientiously exercise such skill and judgment as he had. This being true, there was no violation of his duties as a host even if it were to be held that his judgment was so faulty as not to measure up to the standard of ordinary care.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*430Likewise, in Schwab v. Martin (1938), 228 Wis. 45, 52, 279 N. W. 699, in another opinion written by Mr. Justice Wickhem, it was held :
“The guest clearly assumes the risk of negligent failures on the part of his host in the held of skill and judgment and may not predicate his recovery upon them.”