Court Opinion

ID: 9897234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:02.80252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:40.468212
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                  Nov 02 2023, 8:38 am

                                                                       CLERK
                                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                        and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Zachary J. Stock                                          Theodore E. Rokita
Carmel, Indiana                                           Indiana Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                          Jodi Kathryn Stein
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                          Catherine Brizzi
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James Earnest Ramsey,                                     November 2, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-2877
        v.                                                Appeal from the Hendricks
                                                          Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Rhett M. Stuard,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          32D02-1908-F2-28

                                Opinion by Judge May
                      Chief Judge Altice and Judge Tavitas concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023                       Page 1 of 20
[1]   James Earnest Ramsey appeals his convictions of Level 2 felony dealing in

      methamphetamine, 1 Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, 2 and Class

      C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. 3 He argues the trial court abused

      its discretion when it admitted the drugs and paraphernalia found in Ramsey’s

      vehicle after a traffic stop. He presents two arguments for our consideration,

      which we restate as:

                 1. Whether the search of Ramsey’s vehicle violated his Fourth
                    Amendment rights against illegal search and seizure because
                    the dog sniff of his vehicle unreasonably prolonged the traffic
                    stop without the officer having reasonable suspicion to keep
                    Ramsey on the scene; and

                 2. Whether the search of Ramsey’s vehicle violated his rights
                    against illegal search and seizure under Article 1, Section 11.

      We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History                                4

[2]   On August 5, 2019, Sergeant Jeffrey Slayback of the Danville Police

      Department was “running plates” at a Circle K gas station in Danville. (Tr.

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1.
      2
          Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1.
      3
          Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3.
      4
        We held oral argument in this case on September 27, 2023, as part of the Indiana Bar Foundation’s “Behind
      the Curtain: The Judiciary” program. We thank the Indiana Bar Foundation for organizing the event, the
      high school and middle school teachers from around Indiana for attending, and counsel for their able
      presentations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023                           Page 2 of 20
      Vol. II at 163.) Sergeant Slayback was in his police car with his drug-sniffing

      dog, Zeke. Ramsey’s vehicle was parked in the lot. Sergeant Slayback ran the

      temporary plate on Ramsey’s vehicle. He discovered Ramsey was the owner of

      the vehicle, had a suspended license, and had been reported missing. Because

      Ramsey had a suspended license and was reported missing, Sergeant Slayback

      followed Ramsey after Ramsey returned to his vehicle and drove away. After

      he left the gas station, Ramsey failed to stop at a stop sign before turning right,

      and Sergeant Slayback observed him “weaving in his lane, um he crossed over

      the center line several times, left over the center line.” (Id. at 170.) Based

      thereon, Sergeant Slayback initiated a traffic stop.

[3]   Sergeant Slayback approached the vehicle and talked to Ramsey, who gave

      Sergeant Slayback his driver’s license. Sergeant Slayback explained the reason

      for his stop – the traffic infractions and the suspended license – as well as the

      fact that Ramsey was listed as a missing person. While he was talking to

      Ramsey, Sergeant Slayback observed “an open cut above [Ramsey’s] eye.

      Pretty large cut. Looked like it had occurred pretty recently.” (Id. at 179.)

      Ramsey told Sergeant Slayback that he had suffered a seizure earlier in the day.

      Sergeant Slayback offered Ramsey medical attention and Ramsey refused.

[4]   Sergeant Slayback also noticed Ramsey was “grinding his teeth, um hands were

      shaking uncontrollably, um and he was having somewhat of a difficult time

      answering basic questions.” (Id.) In addition, Ramsey “hesitat[ed] on most of

      the questions” Sergeant Slayback asked like “where he was headed to uh where

      he was coming from today, what had happened to his head.” (Id.) The initial

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023       Page 3 of 20
      conversation between Sergeant Slayback and Ramsey commenced less than a

      minute after Sergeant Slayback initiated the traffic stop. (See Ex. 4 at 00:45 -

      1:36) (dashcam video of traffic stop). The conversation between Sergeant

      Slayback and Ramsey lasted for approximately one minute. (See id. at 1:37 -

      2:27.)

[5]   Sergeant Slayback returned to his vehicle and ran Ramsey’s driver’s license

      through the appropriate databases, which took “probably thirty seconds to a

      minute maybe.” (Tr. Vol. II at 180.) Sergeant Slayback then tried “to get more

      information on the missing person” report like “who had reported him missing

      uh and uh start trying to gather some information from that and confirming that

      his license status was in fact suspended.” (Id. at 181.) Sergeant Slayback was in

      his car for approximately three minutes performing these tasks. (See Ex. 4 at

      2:28 - 5:10.)

[6]   Sergeant Slayback returned to Ramsey’s vehicle and told Ramsey that Sergeant

      Slayback had confirmed that Ramsey was a missing person. Ramsey told

      Sergeant Slayback that he believed his wife reported him missing because “he

      hadn’t been home in several months and she was . . . upset with him.” (Tr.

      Vol. II at 181.) Ramsey told Sergeant Slayback that “he was surprised he had

      been reported missing” and that he was under the impression that his driver’s

      license was valid. (Id.) This encounter was “a little more lengthy cause [sic] we

      had some more in-depth conversations about the license status, the stopping

      charges and then the missing person thing.” (Id. at 182.)

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023      Page 4 of 20
[7]   During the second encounter, Sergeant Slayback observed Ramsey’s hands

      were shaky and he continued to grind his teeth. Ramsey’s speech was also

      slurred. Sergeant Slayback told Ramsey “to call someone to come and get him

      because he wasn’t capable of driving at this point because of his license status.”

      (Id. at 186.) This conversation lasted less than four minutes. (See Ex. 4. at 5:11

      - 7:53.)

[8]   Sergeant Slayback returned to his car to further investigate the missing person

      report. While in his car, Sergeant Slayback had the police department’s

      communication center contact the missing person reporting agency to get more

      information on the person who reported Ramsey missing, so Sergeant Slayback

      could contact that person. By that time, he had also requested a second officer

      come to the scene because he had “developed some sort of reasonable suspicion

      or some level of reasonable suspicion. Uh just based on his behavior . . . [he

      thought there was] possible drug activity or some kind of impairment.” (Tr.

      Vol. II at 182.) Sergeant Slayback learned Ramsey’s wife reported him missing

      and Sergeant Slayback tried to call her, though it is unclear if he spoke with her.

      This process took approximately one minute. (See Ex. 4 at 7:54 - 8:58.)

[9]   Sergeant Slayback returned to Ramsey’s vehicle to ask additional questions

      regarding Ramsey’s suspected “drug activity or impairment.” (Tr. Vol. II at

      187.) Sergeant Slayback asked Ramsey if he had any illegal substances in his

      vehicle or if he had used any “stimulants or things of that nature” that day.

      (Id.) Ramsey denied feeling overstimulated and told Sergeant Slayback he did

      not have anything illegal inside his vehicle. Sergeant Slayback asked Ramsey to

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023     Page 5 of 20
       exit his vehicle, and Ramsey did so. This encounter took less than two

       minutes. (See Ex. 4 at 8:59-10:36.)

[10]   Sergeant Slayback returned to his police vehicle and removed his drug sniffing

       dog Zeke, from his car. Zeke was trained to detect the odor of “marijuana,

       methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, [and] ecstasy” (Tr. Vol. II at 199), by

       “methodically sniff[ing] his way down the vehicle.” (Id. at 198.) Sergeant

       Slayback took Zeke around the front of the vehicle and the dog “gave a positive

       identification” on the driver’s side door of the vehicle. (Id.)

[11]   During the subsequent search, Sergeant Slayback found in the center console of

       the vehicle “a glass smoking pipe that appeared to have some kind of white

       residue in it, along with a small uh clear Ziploc baggie that contained a white

       crystalized substance” that Sergeant Slayback identified as methamphetamine.

       (Id. at 206.) The time from Ramsey’s exit from his vehicle until Seargeant

       Slayback’s deployment of the dog was less than two minutes. (See Ex. 4 at

       10:37 - 11:50.) The entire time elapsed from the initiation of the stop until

       Sergeant Slayback deployed the dog was almost exactly eleven minutes. (See id.

       at :45 - 11:50.)

[12]   Sergeant Slayback put Ramsey under arrest and advised him of his Miranda 5

       rights. Ramsey agreed to speak to Sergeant Slayback, and he “denied knowing

       what was in the vehicle.” (Tr. Vol. II at 208.) Sergeant Slayback returned to

       5
           Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reh’g denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023     Page 6 of 20
       the vehicle and continued to search. Therein, he found a toolbox containing “a

       set of scales, um and then a larger baggie . . . [with] a white . . . powdery

       substance” in it. (Id. at 209.) Ramsey told Sergeant Slayback he did not know

       why those items were in his vehicle. He claimed his vehicle was stolen in June,

       but Sergeant Slayback could not find a stolen vehicle report for the vehicle. He

       also told Sergeant Slayback that maybe his aunt left something in the car.

       When asked about the white powdery substance, Ramsey told Sergeant

       Slayback the substance was “possibly cocaine and/or sugar.” (Id. at 216.) The

       substance was later determined to be methamphetamine.

[13]   Sergeant Slayback placed Ramsey in his vehicle and took him to the hospital for

       treatment of the laceration on Ramsey’s face. On the way to the hospital,

       Ramsey told Sergeant Slayback “he was scheduled to pick up and drop off

       several pounds of methamphetamine [to] and from Anderson.” (Id. at 223.)

       Ramsey then alluded “several times to finding bigger drug dealers . . . [and] also

       alluded to knowing several people who had committed homicides in Marion

       County by name and he could give [Sergeant Slayback] those names” in an

       effort to “get out of the charges that their [sic] on by giving up someone else.”

       (Id.)

[14]   On August 6, 2019, the State charged Ramsey with Level 2 felony dealing in

       cocaine, Level 4 felony possession of cocaine, 6 Level 6 felony possession of

       6
           Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(c).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023       Page 7 of 20
       methamphetamine, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.

       The State later added a charge of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine

       and alleged Ramsey was a habitual offender. On June 2, 2020, Ramsey filed a

       motion to suppress the items found in his vehicle. On August 4, 2020, the trial

       court held a suppression hearing. On September 14, 2020, the trial court

       summarily denied Ramsey’s motion to suppress.

[15]   On January 1, 2022, Ramsey filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial.

       On May 19 and June 9, 2022, the trial court held a bifurcated bench trial. The

       State dismissed the cocaine-related charges at the start of the bench trial. At the

       end of the bench trial, the trial court found Ramsey guilty of Level 2 felony

       dealing in methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine,

       and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On November 4, 2022,

       the trial court sentenced Ramsey to sixty days for the misdemeanor, one year

       for the Level 6 felony, and twenty-five years for the Level 2 felony, and the

       court ordered the sentences served concurrently. The trial court enhanced the

       sentence for the Level 2 felony by ten years after it determined Ramsey was a

       habitual offender. Thus, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of thirty-five

       years executed in the Department of Correction.

       Discussion and Decision
[16]   Ramsey challenges the admission of the evidence found as part of the traffic

       stop. He appeals following the trial court’s admission of that evidence at trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023      Page 8 of 20
       and the denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress the same evidence. Our

       standard of review in such a circumstance is well-settled:

               When ruling on the admission of evidence at trial following
               denial of a motion to suppress, a trial court must consider the
               foundational evidence presented at trial. It also considers
               evidence from the suppression hearing that is favorable to the
               defendant only to the extent it is uncontradicted at trial. A trial
               court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess
               witness credibility, and we review its rulings on admissibility for
               an abuse of discretion and reverse only if a ruling is clearly
               against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the
               error affects a party’s substantial rights. However, the ultimate
               determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a
               question of law that we review de novo.

       Gerth v. State, 51 N.E.3d 368, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations and

       quotation marks omitted).

       1. Fourth Amendment
[17]   The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens

       against unreasonable searches and seizures by prohibiting them without a

       warrant supported by probable cause. To deter state actors from violating that

       prohibition, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment generally

       is not admissible in a prosecution of the citizen whose right was violated. Clark

       v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). The State has the burden of

       demonstrating the admissibility of evidence collected during a seizure or search.

       Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023      Page 9 of 20
[18]   A traffic stop is a seizure that must comply with the Fourth Amendment.

       McLain v. State, 963 N.E.2d 662, 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. It is

       well-settled that a traffic stop “must be supported by, at least, reasonable

       suspicion that a traffic law has been violated or other criminal activity is afoot.”

       Bush v. State, 925 N.E.2d 787, 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), clarified on reh’g 929

       N.E.2d 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). An officer may stop and briefly detain an

       individual for investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable

       facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, even if the

       officer lacks probable cause to make an arrest. Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d

       316, 319 (Ind. 2009).

[19]   The existence of reasonable suspicion cannot be reduced to a neat set of legal

       rules. Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Ind. 1992). Suspicious behavior is by

       its very nature ambiguous. Id. Therefore, we look to the totality of the

       circumstances surrounding a Terry 7 stop to determine whether it was supported

       by reasonable suspicion. Paul v. State, 189 N.E.3d 1146, 1154-55 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2022), trans. denied. “Reasonable suspicion ‘depends on the factual and

       practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,

       not legal technicians, act.’” Id. at 1155 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S.

       393, 402 (2014)). We expect officers to assess whether reasonable suspicion

       7
           Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023      Page 10 of 20
       exists by relying upon their training and experience as well as commonsense

       judgments and inferences about human behavior. Id.

[20]   The “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement allows police to search

       a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe the

       vehicle contains evidence of a crime. State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285

       (Ind. 2010). Under this exception, “an operational vehicle is inherently mobile,

       whether or not a driver is behind the wheel or has ready access.” Id. at 1286. A

       dog sniff of the exterior of the vehicle indicating the presence of illicit

       substances provides probable cause for a warrantless search of the interior of the

       vehicle under the automobile exception. Id.

[21]   A “dog sniff” sweep of a vehicle is not a search protected by the Fourth

       Amendment. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). When a dog

       sniff occurs incident to a legitimate traffic stop and does not prolong the stop

       beyond what is necessary to complete the purpose of the traffic stop, no

       reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity is required. Bush, 925 N.E.2d at

       790. If a dog sniff occurs after the completion of a traffic stop, an officer must

       have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to proceed thereafter with an

       investigatory detention. Bradshaw v. State, 759 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2001). The critical facts in determining whether a vehicle was legally detained

       at the time of the dog sweep are whether the traffic stop was concluded and, if

       so, whether there was reasonable suspicion at that point to continue to detain

       the vehicle for investigatory purposes. Id. at 273-4. The burden is on the State

       to show the time for the traffic stop was not increased due to the dog sweep. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023          Page 11 of 20
       In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration, we examine whether

       the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm

       or dispel their suspicions quickly. Id.

[22]   Ramsey argues that while the traffic stop was legitimate, the dog sniff of his

       vehicle was not conducted within a reasonable amount of time and Sergeant

       Slayback did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop to

       perform the dog sniff. Specifically, he contends those tasks related to Sergeant

       Slayback’s initial traffic stop were complete before Sergeant Slayback removed

       the police dog from his vehicle to conduct an open-air search of Ramsey’s

       vehicle. Ramsey asserts Sergeant Slayback had three reasons to conduct the

       traffic stop: “(1) Slayback suspected [Ramsey] was operating with a suspended

       license; (2) Slayback was aware [Ramsey] had been reported missing; and (3)

       Slayback witnessed [Ramsey]’s commit [sic] of a minor traffic infraction.” (Br.

       of Appellant at 10.)

[23]   Regarding whether the dog sniff unreasonably lengthened the traffic stop,

       Ramsey argues the reasons for the stop were addressed within six minutes from

       when the traffic stop commenced – Sergeant Slayback could have written

       tickets or warnings for any traffic infraction; confirmed Ramsey’s license was

       suspended and told Ramsey he would need a ride home because he could not

       drive; and confirmed Ramsey was a missing person and attempted to call the

       person who reported him missing. Based thereon, Ramsey contends the traffic

       stop should have already been completed and thus “anything that occurred

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023    Page 12 of 20
       beyond that point constituted an unconstitutional detention, and the evidence

       obtained during the detention should have been excluded.” (Id. at 10-11.)

[24]   Ramsey likens the facts of his case to those in Wells v. State, 922 N.E.2d 697

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. In Wells, two officers initiated a traffic stop

       because Wells was driving at a high rate of speed and had a cracked windshield.

       Id. at 699. The stop began at 11:45 a.m. Id. When they approached Wells’s

       vehicle, they noticed he was “very nervous and fidgety” and one of the officers

       believed his behavior was consistent with methamphetamine use. Id. While in

       his police car entering Wells’s information into the database, the officer saw

       Wells moving about in the car and “lean down entirely onto the passenger side

       of the vehicle” despite the fact that the officer told Wells to keep his hands on

       the steering wheel. Id.

[25]   The officer returned to the car and asked Wells to step out of the vehicle. Id.

       The officer performed a pat down search and did not find any illegal substances

       or weapons. Id. The officer again asked Wells if there was anything in the car

       the officer should be concerned about. Id. Wells indicated there was a shotgun

       behind the front seat, but he would not allow the officer to remove it from the

       vehicle. Id. The officers then made Wells sit on a nearby curb and would not

       allow him back into his vehicle. Id.

[26]   At 12:01 p.m., the officer entered the Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”) of

       Wells’s vehicle and confirmed it was not stolen. Id. Shortly thereafter, the

       officer confirmed there were no outstanding warrants for Wells. Id. At 12:04

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023       Page 13 of 20
       p.m. the officer called the K9 officer for backup. Id. At 12:08 p.m. the K9

       officer indicated he was on the way to the scene and arrived approximately

       fifteen minutes later. Id. When the K9 officer arrived, the drug dog sniffed

       Wells’s vehicle and alerted on it. Id. The officer then searched Wells’s vehicle

       and found a shotgun and methamphetamine. Id. Officers arrested Wells, called

       a wrecker to tow his vehicle, and wrote a ticket for the cracked windshield. Id.

[27]   Based thereon, the State charged Wells with Class C felony possession of

       methamphetamine and Class C felony possession of methamphetamine and a

       firearm. Id. Prior to trial, Wells filed a motion to suppress the evidence found

       in the vehicle. Id. The trial court held a hearing and subsequently denied the

       motion. Id. The case came to us on interlocutory appeal.

[28]   On appeal, Wells argued the evidence in his vehicle was obtained in violation

       of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at

       700. Both parties acknowledged the time taken for the K9 officer to arrive on

       scene substantially lengthened the traffic stop. Id. However, Wells contended

       the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to call for a K9 officer and thus the

       officer should not have detained Wells any longer than needed to complete the

       traffic stop. Id. He asserted the officer had all the information he needed to

       write a ticket or a warning for the alleged traffic infractions before he called the

       K9 officer. Id.

[29]   The State argued the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Wells for

       approximately forty minutes after the beginning of the traffic stop because

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023      Page 14 of 20
       “Wells’s extreme nervousness and fidgetiness” was indicative of

       methamphetamine use. Id. at 701. The State also asserted Wells’s furtive

       movements after the officer directed him to keep his hands on the wheel

       supported Wells’s removal from the car for officer safety. Id. We noted we

       had “no qualms with the officers then deciding that Wells would not be

       permitted to re-enter his vehicle while the traffic stop was proceeding[,]” id.,

       however, once those officer safety concerns were alleviated by the pat down

       search and Wells’s removal from the vehicle, there was a lack of reasonable

       suspicion to continue Wells’s detention while waiting additional time for the

       arrival of the K9 officer. Id. We noted the officer’s testimony acknowledging

       that he could have called for a nearby officer for backup but chose instead to

       call the K9 officer, who was likely farther away than the closest backup officer.

       Id. at 701-2. The officer also testified that if he had called a regular backup

       officer, he would not have searched Wells’s vehicle and Wells would have been

       free to leave. Id. at 702. Additionally, we noted there was another officer

       already on scene who could have acted as backup. Id. Based thereon, we

       reversed the denial of Wells’s motion to suppress. Id.

[30]   However, the situation here is drastically different than in Wells. In Wells,

       officers held Wells at the scene of the traffic stop for forty minutes while the

       officers waited for the K9 officer and dog to arrive on the scene. Here, Sergeant

       Slayback was a K9 officer, and his dog, Zeke, was on scene during the entire

       traffic stop, and only eleven minutes elapsed between the initiation of the traffic

       stop and the dog sniff. During those eleven minutes, Sergeant Slayback

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023      Page 15 of 20
       investigated the status of Ramsey’s driving license, the commission of an

       alleged traffic violation, and the missing person’s report. Upon determining

       Ramsey’s license was suspended, Sergeant Slayback directed Ramsey to “call

       someone to come get him because he wasn’t capable of driving at this point

       because of his license status.” (Tr. Vol. II at 186.) It is unclear from the record

       whether Ramsey called anyone to come get him, but no one had arrived to

       drive Ramsey and his vehicle from the scene by the time Sergeant Slayback

       began the dog sniff. Based thereon, we conclude the traffic stop was not

       unreasonably lengthened by the dog sniff. 8 See Danh v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1055,

       1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (dog sniff performed by drug sniffing dog on the

       scene of the traffic stop lasting approximately ten minutes did not unreasonably

       prolong traffic stop), trans. denied.

       2. Article 1, Section 11
[31]   The language of Article 1, Section 11, the search and seizure provision of the

       Indiana Constitution, is virtually identical to its Fourth Amendment

       counterpart. Article 1, Section 11 provides:

               The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
               papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall
               not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
               cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly

       8
        As the dog sniff did not unreasonably lengthen the duration of the traffic stop, we need not analyze whether
       Sergeant Slayback had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023                            Page 16 of 20
               describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
               seized.

       Our Indiana Supreme Court has interpreted and applied Section 11

       independently from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Mitchell v. State,

       745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind. 2001).

[32]   To determine whether a search violates Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana

       Constitution, we must evaluate the “reasonableness of the police conduct under

       the totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind.

       2005). “The totality of the circumstances requires consideration of both the

       degree of intrusion into the subject’s ordinary activities and the basis upon

       which the officer selected the subject of the search or seizure.” Id. at 360. In

       Litchfield, our Indiana Supreme Court summarized this evaluation:

               In sum, although we recognize there may well be other relevant
               considerations under the circumstances, we have explained
               reasonableness of a search or seizure as turning on a balance of:
               1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation
               has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search
               or seizure imposes on the citizens’ ordinary activities, and 3) the
               extent of law enforcement needs.

       Id. at 361.

[33]   As to the first Litchfield factor - the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge

       that a violation has occurred - Ramsey contends Sergeant Slayback had a low

       degree of suspicion or knowledge that Ramsey was engaged in criminal activity.

       Ramsey contends “the alleged traffic violations were merely a type of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023     Page 17 of 20
       bootstrapping” and, while Sergeant Slayback had reasonable suspicion Ramsey

       was driving with a suspended license, that alone “did not authorize a fishing

       expedition.” (Br. of Appellant at 15.) However, at the time of the traffic stop,

       Sergeant Slayback suspected Ramsey was driving with a suspended license and

       Ramsey had been reported missing. Further, Ramsey failed to stop at a stop

       sign before turning right and Sergeant Slayback observed him “weaving in his

       lane, um he crossed over the center line several times, left over the center line.”

       (Tr. Vol. II at 170.) As Sergeant Slayback observed Ramsey commit traffic

       infractions and believed he was driving with a suspended license, we conclude

       Sergeant Slayback had a high degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a

       violation had occurred. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 211 N.E.3d 574, 581 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2023) (officer had high degree of suspicion of criminal activity based on

       traffic violation and smell of burnt marijuana upon approaching defendant’s

       vehicle).

[34]   Ramsey does not make an argument regarding the second Litchfield factor - the

       degree of intrusion the method of search imposes on a person’s ordinary

       activities. However, our Indiana Supreme Court has held a traffic stop

       “amount[s] to a small intrusion” on a defendant’s “ordinary activities.”

       Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1262 (Ind. 2019). Further, the dog sniff itself

       was not a search and, particularly because the dog sniff occurred shortly after

       Ramsey was stopped, the intrusion into Ramsey’s ordinary activities was

       minimal. See Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1036 (dog sniff conducted shortly after a

       legitimate traffic stop did not intrude into defendant’s ordinary activities).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023      Page 18 of 20
[35]   Regarding the third Litchfield factor – the extent of law enforcement needs –

       Ramsey argues Sergeant Slayback did not have a compelling need to conduct a

       dog sniff of his vehicle. He contends that, because Sergeant Slayback knew he

       would be towing Ramsey’s vehicle after discovering his license was suspended

       and thus he could not drive the vehicle, the police were “free to do with the

       vehicle as they saw fit, which would have included plenty of time to seek a

       search warrant.” (Br. of Appellant at 15.) However, Sergeant Slayback’s

       observation of Ramsey’s intoxication after he made contact with Ramsey

       regarding the suspended license changed Sergeant Slayback’s intention from a

       need to remove a suspended driver from the road to a need to remove an

       impaired person from the road. As Sergeant Slayback was reasonably certain

       criminal activity was occurring based on those observations, we conclude law

       enforcement needs were high. See Crabtree v. State, 199 N.E.3d 410, 417 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2022) (law enforcement needs were high based on suspicion criminal

       activity was afoot after completing initial reason for investigation).

[36]   To summarize, Sergeant Slayback had a high degree of concern, suspicion, or

       knowledge that Ramsey violated traffic laws, including driving with a

       suspended license. Additionally, the dog sniff of the vehicle was minimally

       intrusive. Finally, Sergeant Slayback’s law enforcement-related needs were

       high because there were multiple indicators that criminal activity was afoot.

       Based on the totality of those circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not

       abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence found in Ramsey’s vehicle

       because the search thereof did not violate Ramsey’s rights against illegal search

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023     Page 19 of 20
       and seizure under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. See Garcia

       v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2016) (based on the totality of the

       circumstances, search did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana

       Constitution).

       Conclusion
[37]   Because the dog sniff did not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop, Ramsey’s

       Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated and the trial court did not abuse

       its discretion when it admitted the evidence found in Ramsey’s car. Further,

       the search of Ramsey’s vehicle did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the

       Indiana Constitution because Sergeant Slayback had high suspicion a crime had

       occurred, the dog sniff was minimally intrusive, and the law enforcement need

       was high. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

[38]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2877 | November 2, 2023       Page 20 of 20