Court Opinion

ID: 9589294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:43:22.809512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:38.909874
License: Public Domain

Justice Martin
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority relies upon Green v. Patriotic Order Sons of America, Inc., 242 N.C. 78, 87 S.E. 2d 14 (1955), which I do not find persuasive. Green involved the interpretation of the bylaws of a funeral association. The phrase in question in Green was “not less than sixteen years of age nor over fifty years.” The portion of the statute we are faced with is “a child of the age of 12 years or less.” An applicant in Green could not qualify for insurance if “over fifty years,” that is, after his fiftieth birthday. In the statute before us, children are protected during the period that they are “of the age of 12 years.” A child is “of the age of 12 years” during the period between his twelfth birthday and thirteenth birthday. See People ex rel. Makin v. Wilkins, 22 A.D. 2d 497, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 288 (1965). Other courts faced with the issue in Green have resolved it contrary to Green. In Wilson v. Mid-Continental Life Ins. Co., 159 Okla. 191, 14 P. 2d 945 (1932), the court held that “over the age of 65 years” meant until the sixty-sixth birthday. Green, although it may be correct as applied to its fact situation, is not dispositive of the issue before us. It is concerned with determining the contractual intent of private parties in the light of the specific setting and the interpretive objective therein sought.
On the other hand, we are concerned with a question of public policy to be reconciled by statutory construction. We must seek the intent of the legislature. The intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of statutes. State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213 S.E. 2d 291 (1975).
“Of course criminal statutes must be strictly construed. [Citations omitted.] But this does not mean that a criminal statute should be construed stintingly or narrowly. It means that the scope of a penal statute may not be extended by implication beyond the meaning of its language so as to include offenses not clearly described. [Citations omitted.] Even so, *704an interpretation which leads to a strained construction or to a ridiculous result is not required and will not be adopted. State v. Pinyatello, 272 N.C. 312, 158 S.E. 2d 596 [1968]. ‘While a criminal statute must be strictly construed, the courts must nevertheless construe it with regard to the evil which it is intended to suppress. And the rule that statutes will be construed to effectuate the legislative intent applies also to criminal statutes.’ . . .”
Id. at 80-81, 213 S.E. 2d at 295 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 547, 173 S.E. 2d 765, 773-74 (1970)).
In construing amended statutes it is presumed that the legislature intended either to change the substance of the original act or to clarify the meaning of it. Childers v. Parker’s, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 162 S.E. 2d 481 (1968).
The rape and sex offense laws were recodified in 1979 when our legislature adopted article 7A of chapter 14 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. The 1979 act defined new crimes of first and second degree sexual offenses and also rewrote the rape statute. In so doing, the legislature provided that the language with respect to the age of the victim in first degree sexual offense, N.C.G.S. 14-27.4(a)(l), and first degree rape, N.C.G.S. 14-27.2(a)(l), would be identical. The present language of both sections was established by the 1981 amendment effective 1 July 1981. The new rape section replaces former N.C.G.S. 14-21 (Supp. 1975). Therefore, we may look to the changes in the rape statute in determining the intention of the legislature in adopting the age provision common to it and N.C.G.S. 14-27.4(a)(l).
N.C.G.S. 14-21, with respect to the age of a child victim, read “any female child under the age of twelve years.” (Emphasis added.) Under this statute, if the victim had reached her twelfth birthday, she was not protected by the statute. Cf. State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E. 2d 314 (1944). N.C.G.S. 14-27.2(a)(1) applies if the victim “is a child of the age of 12 years or less.”
Why did the legislature change the wording of the statute in 1979 and 1981? Any material change in the language of the original act indicates a change in legal rights. The logical inference is that the legislature wanted to extend the protection of the statute to children who had not attained their thirteenth *705birthdays. Otherwise, there is no reasonable basis for the deletion of “under” and the use of the phrase “of the age of 12 years.” This phrase has a particular meaning: it means “while a child is 12 years old,” or “during the period that a child is 12 years of age.” If the legislature intended the protection of the statute to terminate at the instant of a child’s twelfth birthday, it would have used language such as “a victim who has attained his 12th birthday or less.” The words “of the age of 12 years” denote a continuing condition until the child’s thirteenth birthday. The use of the verb “is” with the phrase “of the age,” rather than “has attained” or similar language, denotes a continuing or existing condition. The phrase “or less” immediately following “of the age of 12 years” indicates that the legislature intended to include the entire period that a child was twelve years of age and also the period before the child becomes twelve years of age. The deletion of the word “under” clearly manifests the intent to extend the protection of the statute. State v. Ashley, 54 N.C. App. 386, 283 S.E. 2d 805 (1981), cert. denied, 305 N.C. 153, 289 S.E. 2d 381 (1982).
In Wilkins, supra, 22 A.D. 2d 497, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 288 (1965), the New York court was faced with a similar question on facts close to those in the case before us. There, the court interpreted the amendment of a sex offense statute. The original act made it a felony to carnally abuse a child “ten years or under.” The legislature amended the companion statute to make it a misdemeanor to carnally abuse a child “over the age of ten years.” The court held that the felony act applied where the victim was ten years and three months of age. By the amendment, the legislature intended to change the legal rights affected by the act. The court stated that a child “of the age of 10 years” was one who has reached the tenth birthday but has not reached the eleventh birthday. By so doing, the court expanded the protection of the felony statute to children in this age bracket. The reasoning in Wilkins is equally applicable to the case before us.
Moreover, one of the primary purposes of a criminal statute is to put the public on notice as to what they can or cannot lawfully do. The legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. State v. Lowry and State v. *706Mallory, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E. 2d 870 (1965). The aim of the criminal statute is to notify a person of ordinary understanding and intelligence of the conduct that is prohibited. State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E. 2d 768 (1961). The words “of the age of 12 years” mean to the average person of ordinary understanding and intelligence that the victim has passed her twelfth birthday but has not reached her thirteenth birthday. The legislature intends that its statutes be understandable by the general public as well as English scholars.
In recodifying former N.C.G.S. 14-21 and in prohibiting a broader range of sexual offenses, the legislature intended to expand the protection of children from such assaults. I find the indictment to be lawful and proper. Defendant had a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.
Justices Exum and Mitchell join in this dissent.