Court Opinion

ID: 9545370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:10:42.407624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:35.767100
License: Public Domain

SCHROEDER, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the Court’s opinion but write separately on two points because they raise concerns for future cases. The first issue concerns Dr. Lee’s testimony as it relates to the motion in limine. While his testimony did not violate the letter of the order in limine, it is clear that it violated its spirit and was a blatant attempt — a suceessfiil attempt — to substitute advocacy for proper testimony. Initially, of course, his answer was not responsive to the question. He testified that the “child’s injuries to the brain and retinal hemorrhages were caused by a very high-force impact to the head.” He was then asked two very limited questions: “On what do you base that opinion? How did you come to the opinion?” After a few comments that set forth his background, he departed from the question and volunteered his opinion on what the jury should decide: “Or much more commonly than either of these other two scenarios would be what we call a nonaccidental trauma or child abuse.” This is a nonresponsive, gratuitous effort to tell the jury what the order in limine was intended to prevent. He successfully skirted the exact terms of the order, but in the context of the testimony, it is clear that he was telling the jury to discount any accidental causes of the injuries, and he did this as a pioneer, answering a question he wasn’t asked. It is a small slice of expert advocacy that is all too familiar in the trial courts. It should be condemned.
I am able to concur in the result in this ease on this point because a careful review of the proper testimony leads very strongly to the conclusion that the injuries were not the result of any accident identified by the defendant. The facts and legitimate medical opinions lead to the conclusion reached by the jury. Sadly, this expert did not trust the intelligence and common sense of the jury to reach the conclusion without gratuitous prompting.
My next concern is the use of the “firmly convinced” reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial court. I am “firmly convinced” as a personal interpretation of language that this instruction diminishes the State’s burden of proof. But my personal understanding of the words must give way to the significant authority that approves similar language. All language is subject to some individualistic interpretation, but this language seems more subject to that difficulty than most. I am firmly convinced that not many defense attorneys will request this instruction, sensing that some jurors will find a lower threshold of proof in these words than those approved by this Court. I am firmly convinced it should not be used by Idaho courts in the future.