Court Opinion

ID: 9690983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:58:07.433379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:29.272412
License: Public Domain

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 106. (dissenting). The majority opinion overturns the termination of Shannon R.'s parental rights to Darell and Daniel, both of whom have been out of her home for more than three years. The majority bases its decision on an evidentiary ruling that prevented Shannon from obtaining one answer to one question from one person over the course of a three-day jury trial. In order to achieve a reversal, the majority converts the eviden-tiary question that was presented into a constitutional issue. Majority op., ¶¶ 65-66. It does so by constructing a rationale that was never presented to the circuit court and by ignoring the need that two young boys have for a permanent home.
*325¶ 107. I conclude that the circuit court did not err in its evidentiary ruling, and even if it erred, it was harmless error; that the majority opinion's analysis of the constitutional issue it constructs is flawed; and that the majority opinion ignores the legislature's explicit direction that the best interests of the child are to be paramount in ch. 48 proceedings. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 108. Shannon R. is the mother of Darell, a four-year-old boy, and Daniel, a three-year-old boy. Darell was removed from Shannon's care less than one month after his birth. He has resided in foster care since that time. Daniel was removed from Shannon's care at birth. He has never resided with Shannon. The record shows that the precipitating event for Darefl's removal from Shannon's custody was the death of his sister, Tianna. She was found dead in her crib due to hyperthermia and dehydration. The record revealed that neither Shannon nor the father of Tianna, both of whom lived in the same residence, had had any physical contact with her for 17 hours prior to her death.
¶ 109. Since October 25, 2001, a dispositional order has been in place setting out those tasks that Shannon must do in order to regain custody of Darell. A similar order has been in place with regard to regaining custody of Daniel since August 5, 2002. Notice was given to Shannon when the orders were issued that if she did not meet the conditions necessary for the safe return of the boys, her parental rights could be terminated.1
*326¶ 110. After a three-day jury trial in which eight witnesses, including Shannon, testified, the jury found that Shannon had failed to meet the conditions necessary for the safe return of the children to her home and that there was a "substantial likelihood" that Shannon would not meet the conditions within the 12-month period following the conclusion of the jury trial. The jury also found that the return of the boys to Shannon's custody would "likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the [children]."
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 111. We review the evidentiary decisions of the circuit court to determine whether it erroneously exercised its discretion. Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982). We will sustain an evidentiary ruling if the circuit court considered the relevant facts, applied the correct rule of law and came to a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, ¶ 7, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214. We determine as a question of law whether a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to make a defense. See State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶ 49, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777.
B. Evidentiary Rulings
1. Expert testimony
¶ 112. Dr. Gerald Wellens is a licensed psychologist whom Shannon retained for trial. He interviewed Shannon for two hours, conducted four types of psychological tests, read the reports of her parole agent, that of *327a counselor and those of the social workers, as well as the record of past court proceedings involving Darell and Daniel. Based on that foundation, Shannon proposed to offer Wellens's expert opinion on special verdict question 4, which read: "Is there a substantial likelihood that Shannon R[.] will not meet [the conditions for the safe return of the children to her home] within the twelve-month period following the conclusion of this hearing?" The jury answered the question, "Yes."
¶ 113. The question put to Wellens to which the circuit court sustained an objection based on a lack of foundation was:
Based upon your years of experience as a psychologist, based upon your review of the three volumes of materials, based upon your interview with [Shannon], and based upon the four psychological instruments that you have utilized to test her, are you able to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty to reach an opinion as to the likelihood of her ability to complete these conditions as they now stand within the next twelve months?
The problem the court had with the foundation that counsel had laid for the question was in part a temporal one, i.e., whether Shannon would meet the conditions for the safe return of the children within the 12 months after the trial. The court concluded that nothing in Wellens's prior testimony established that he had expertise in predicting what Shannon would accomplish within that 12-month period. However, the court patiently explained the type of questions that would be permitted:
I'm going to allow you to ask questions, if you choose to do so, as to whether or not the counseling — excuse me — the testing that he undertook and the conclusions *328that he's reached as a result of that regarding her personality and psychological traits will be a bar to anything. You can ask those. But you keep making a hurdle to whether that prevents her from doing the conditions within the next twelve months, and he can't answer that. He can't make that leap. He can tell you whether his test results and his evaluation present any bars to her, but he can't conclude that i.e., therefore, she will finish those conditions in twelve months. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 114. The guardian ad litem also tried to explain a question that could be asked and to which she would make no objection. She posed the following question: "Is there anything that has come out of these testings that would — as you said, Your Honor— that would pose as a bar to her completing these conditions? I won't object to that question." The court tried repeatedly to explain why Wellens's testing, two hours of interview time and reading the reports of others did not form a foundation for him to opine what Shannon actually would do in the next 12 months, and counsel tried valiantly to understand the court's concern. However, the record is clear that the court and counsel were talking past each other. Nonetheless, following a lengthy colloquy among counsel, the guardian ad litem and the court, these questions and answers were presented before the jury:
Q Is there anything in the testing results that you performed in your professional capacity and the conclusions you reached in your professional capacity that lead you to believe that there is a bar or — inability or bar to Miss Shannon obtaining stable and suitable housing in the future for herself and her children?
A I don't believe that there is a bar. ...
*329Q Was there anything in your testing or professional conclusions that led you to believe that there is a bar to Miss R[.] obtaining stable employment in the future?
A No. ...
Q Well, rather than go through all of her conditions one by one in each court order, are there any psychological impediments that prevent her from completing any of the conditions that are listed?
A No.
From the questions and answers above, the jury could have inferred that it was substantially likely that Shannon would meet the conditions necessary for the children to return to her home safely, but it did not do so.
¶ 115. Wellens's expert opinion was also offered on special verdict question 7, which read: "Would the return of custody of the [children] to Shannon R[.] likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the [children]?" The jury also answered this question, "Yes." There was no objection to the testimony counsel elicited from Wellens in regard to special verdict question 7. Shannon's question was asked and answered as follows:
Q What is your expert opinion as to whether or not the return of Daniel and Darell to the custody of their mother, Shannon, is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children...?
A As a psychologist I — in evaluating Shannon, I — she strives to be a good mother. She's making *330progress, in my opinion, psychologically, and I don't see that there would he a likelihood that there would be damage to these children from what I've read in the notes and evaluating her.
2. Exercise of discretion
¶ 116. Expert testimony generally is admitted if it is relevant to the issue to be decided and will assist the trier of fact in coming to a decision. Wis. Stat. §§ 904.01 and 907.02 (2003-04).2 However, expert testimony is required on an issue only if the issue that the jury must decide is "beyond the general knowledge and experience of the average juror." State v. Whitaker, 167 Wis. 2d 247, 255, 481 N.W.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1992). Additionally, an expert may testify only "within the areas in which he or she is qualified." Herman v. Milwaukee Children's Hosp., 121 Wis. 2d 531, 551, 361 N.W.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1984).
¶ 117. Before ruling, the circuit court considered that Wellens had limited exposure to Shannon's past noncompliance with the court-ordered conditions for the return of Darell and Daniel, except for reading the records made by others. In deciding whether the testimony would aid the trier of fact, the court understood that Shannon's tests showed she had the ability to meet the county's conditions for the return of the children. However, the court found that was not necessarily transferable into a reliable opinion that Shannon would actually meet the conditions in the next 12 months.
¶ 118. I conclude that the rationale the circuit court applied was reasonable, given that if the opposite were true, i.e., because Shannon had the ability to meet *331the conditions, she would do so in the next 12 months, Shannon would have met those conditions in the more than 25 months that both boys had been in the custody of the county. And while it may be true that some judges may have let in the testimony as counsel initially phrased the question, that is not the legal test we use when examining an evidentiary ruling. State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 370, 334 N.W.2d 903 (1983) (concluding that a discretionary ruling that, is made on the facts and the correct law must be upheld, even though the reviewing court does not necessarily agree with the ruling).
¶ 119. Further, Shannon never argued that if the court refused to permit her to phrase the question as she chose, it would deny her constitutional right to present a defense, so the circuit court did not address that contention. Accordingly, because the circuit court considered the relevant facts, applied a correct standard of law and reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could have reached, there was no erroneous exercise of discretion. Cofield, 238 Wis. 2d 467, ¶ 7.
3. Harmless error
¶ 120. If I were to assume, arguendo, that the circuit court erred by sustaining the objection to the question, the error was harmless because the questions that were asked and answered differed little in regard to their phrasing and import from that which was not permitted. See Teasdale v. Teasdale, 264 Wis. 1, 7, 58 N.W.2d 404 (1953) (concluding that the opinion of trustees that had been rejected on a prior appeal was not improved by the document offered because the document did not differ in character and import from that which had been presented previously). Furthermore, Wellens was not the only witness who testified on *332Shannon's behalf relative to whether she would meet the conditions for the safe return of the children to her home. Shannon, herself, took the stand and explained that she would meet those conditions in the next 12 months.
¶ 121. In addition, it is not clear to me that the jury needed expert testimony in order to answer special verdict question 4. Generally, expert testimony will assist the jury when the issue to be decided is based on an analysis that would be difficult for the ordinary person in the community to apply. State v. Blair, 164 Wis. 2d 64, 74-75, 473 N.W.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1991). However, expert testimony is not always required in those cases; "expert testimony is required only if the issue to he decided by the jury is beyond the general knowledge and experience of the average juror." Whitaker, 167 Wis. 2d at 255.
¶ 122. Here, special verdict question 4 inquired whether there was a substantial likelihood that Shannon would not meet the conditions necessary for the safe return of the boys to her custody in the next 12 months. Special verdict question 3 asked whether Shannon previously had failed to meet those same conditions. The jury answered this question, ’Yes," too. The testimony showed she had repeatedly failed to attend scheduled visitations with the boys; she did not continue in counseling; she continued to commit crimes; she failed to maintain stable housing; and she repeatedly failed to be employed over a period of 25 months.
¶ 123. Nothing in Shannon's testimony showed a change in circumstances that would indicate that her performance in the next 12 months would be different from what it had been in the previous 25 months. It is within the common experience of mankind that past performance is a good indicator of future performance. *333It is that kind of common knowledge that we recognize as "reputation." For example, the past experiences of a community with an individual may give that person a reputation for being honest and kind, or for being deceitful and cruel. Therefore, in my view, expert testimony was not needed to answer special verdict question 4.3
C. Constitutional Right to Present a Defense
¶ 124. A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to present a defense to the charges against him. State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 645, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). This right is "grounded in the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Id. While the constitutions of the state and federal governments guarantee a defendant a fair trial, what is required to achieve a fair trial is defined in the several provisions of Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United *334States Constitution. St. George, 252 Wis. 2d at ¶ 14 n.8 (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 329-30 n.16 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
¶ 125. Shannon is a parent in a proceeding to terminate her parental rights, not a criminal defendant subject to prosecution. No Wisconsin case has held that the Pulizzano line of cases4 applies in termination of parental rights proceedings, perhaps because Article I, Section 7 and the Sixth Amendment, upon which Pu-lizzano is based, describe rights for defendants in criminal trials. A termination of parental rights proceeding is a civil proceeding. See Door County DHFS v. Scott S., 230 Wis. 2d 460, 465, 602 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1999).
¶ 126. The majority opinion raises a whole host of new problems in ruling on evidentiary issues. For example, if the constitutional right to present a defense is now to be applied in a civil context, on what clauses in the state and federal constitutions is it based? Does it apply to plaintiffs in a civil trial, as well as to defendants? Will the circuit court err if it does not consider this right, even though the party who now asserts it did not raise it before the circuit court, as the majority opinion concludes here? The majority opinion does not analyze the rationale of St. George; it simply assumes that it applies to this civil proceeding, without a word about why it should be precedent for a civil case. Majority op., ¶ 53 n.25.
¶ 127. However, even assuming, for the sake of discussion, that St. George does apply to termination of parental rights proceedings, Shannon does not contend *335that her right to present a defense was denied by the circuit court's action. She does not cite to Pulizzano or to St. George, as supporting a contention that there was a complete bar to her presentation of evidence of a certain type. Instead, she argues by analogy from State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993), claiming she was denied a "level playing field" because Tribal Judge Smart and her two social workers testified without objection, while there was a sustained objection to one question she wanted to ask.
¶ 128. Maday involved "whether a defendant in a sexual assault prosecution is entitled to a pretrial psychological examination of the victim when the state gives notice that it intends to introduce evidence generated by a psychological examination of the victim by the state's experts." Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 349. In concluding that the trial court did have the discretion to order such discovery, the court of appeals explained:
Before the trial court may grant such a request, the defendant must have presented evidence of a compelling need or reason for the psychological examination and the trial court must balance the rights of the defendant against the interests of the victim.
Id. Therefore, even in a criminal trial, the right to present evidence that supports a defendant's defense is subject to limitation. See also State v. David J.K., 190 Wis. 2d 726, 734, 528 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1994).
¶ 129. The majority opinion relies mainly on St. George. Majority op., ¶¶ 35-37 n.14-17, ¶ 53 n.25, ¶ 68 n.49. St. George, in part, involved the exclusion of an expert witness's opinion about the scientific limitations on the use of recantations of prior claims of sexual abuse. St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶ 35. St. George had argued to the circuit court that the preclusion of his *336expert's testimony would violate his constitutional right to present a defense. Id., ¶ 38. To consider his contention, in St. George we set up a three-step analysis. First, the defendant must offer testimony that is admissible under the evidentiary rules. Id., ¶ 39. In this step, relevancy, Wis. Stat. § 904.01, and assistance to the trier of fact by one qualified to give such opinions, Wis. Stat. § 907.02, must be evaluated. Id. If the defendant satisfies those criteria, the defendant must make an offer of proof sufficient to show that the testimony is "necessary" to his or her defense. Id., ¶ 54. If that criterion is satisfied, the defendant must show that the probative value of the testimony is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id.
¶ 130. The majority opinion did not analyze Wellens's testimony under the three-step test established in St. George, but if it had, it would have concluded that Shannon had not carried her burden. First, as explained above, the circuit court's analysis that Wellens had insufficient knowledge to form the requisite foundation to answer the question posed is reasonable. Second, the excluded question was not necessary to Shannon's case in regard to special verdict question 4 because: (1) the questions that were permitted, as quoted in ¶ 114 above, allowed the jury to make the same inference in deciding on an answer to special verdict question 4, as did the question to which an objection was sustained; (2) Wellens testified that it was his opinion that returning the children to Shannon's custody would not likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children; and (3) Shannon testified that she would meet the conditions for the safe return of the children to her home in the following 12-month period. Applying the St. George analysis to the proceedings before the circuit court, I *337conclude that if Shannon had a constitutional right to present a defense, the circuit court did not deny her that right.
D. The Best Interests of the Child
¶ 131. The legislature has mandated that the judicial branch of government in its interpretation and application of the provisions of ch. 48 shall always consider how its decisions will affect the best of interests of the children to which they are applied. Wis. Stat. § 48.01. In § 48.01(1), the legislature plainly said:
This chapter may be cited as "The Children's Code." In construing this chapter, the best interests of the child or unborn child shall always be of paramount consideration.
This policy choice was made by those who were elected by the citizens of Wisconsin to establish public policy. In a tri-partite system of government, the courts are not free to ignore policies established by the legislature.
¶ 132. The majority opinion is careful to talk as if it were recognizing the will of the legislature that places the best interest of the child as the highest concern in ch. 48 proceedings. Majority op., ¶ 6. However, those are hollow words that are belied by the lack of any reasoning that explains why Darell's and Daniel's best interests will be served by the possibility of an eventual return to Shannon at some unspecified time, rather than by a permanent home now where each little boy will have a chance to develop to his fullest potential.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 133. I conclude that the circuit court did not err in its evidentiary ruling, and even if it erred, it was harmless error; that the majority opinion's analysis of *338the constitutional issue it constructs is flawed; and that the majority opinion ignores the legislature's explicit direction that the best interests of the child are to be paramount in ch. 48 proceedings. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
¶ 134. I am authorized to state that Justices JON E WILCOX and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent.

 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.

 The majority opinion makes much of the county's presentation of opinion testimony by the social workers assigned to Shannon and Tribal Judge Smart, and contends that permitting their testimony while refusing to permit Wellens to testify in the way Shannon proposed is an error of law. Majority op., ¶ 43. This assertion is an erroneous statement of law, and it sets up a complete red herring, which the majority opinion repeats and repeats and repeats. Majority op., ¶¶ 49, 50, 54, 70, 71. The testimony came in, at least in part, because Shannon did not object to any of the social workers' or Tribal Judge Smart's testimony. It is black letter law that the circuit court does not err by permitting testimony to which no objection was made. State v. Heredia, 172 Wis. 2d 479, 482 n.1, 493 N.W.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that unohjected-to hearsay is admissible for the truth of the matter asserted).

 See, e.g., State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777; State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413; State v. Ruszkiewicz, 2000 WI App 125, 237 Wis. 2d 441, 613 N.W.2d 893.