Court Opinion

ID: 9555141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 21:03:59.229978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:26.563595
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

PROMISE EASY LIMITED,                          )
                                               )
             Plaintiff/Counterclaim            )
             Defendant,                        )
                                               )
       v.                                      ) C.A. No. 12438-CM
                                               )
CHULSO MOON, JS YOON MEMORIAL                  )
CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, LLC,                )
FORECAST GENETICS, INC.,                       )
FORESECAST GENETICS HOLDING CO.,               )
INC., PROSPECT GENETICS, INC.,                 )
PROSPECT RESEARCH, INC., and                   )
PROSPECT OPERATIONS, INC.,                     )
                                               )
             Defendants/Counterclaim           )
             Plaintiffs.                       )

                    POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM OPINION

                            Date Submitted: June 5, 2023
                           Date Decided: August 10, 2023

John G. Harris, Peter C. McGivney, BERGER HARRIS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
Counsel for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Promise Easy Limited.

Julia B. Klein, KLEIN LLC, Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for Defendants and
Counterclaim Plaintiffs Chulso Moon, JS Yoon Memorial Cancer Research Institute, LLC,
Forecast Genetics, Inc., Forecast Genetics Holding Co., Inc., Prospect Genetics, Inc.
Prospect Research, Inc., and Prospect Operations, Inc.

McCORMICK, C.
       Dr. Chulso Moon convinced Promise Easy Limited to invest up to $2 million to

develop and commercialize a test to diagnose individuals at high risk for breast cancer.

Among other things, Dr. Moon represented to Promise Easy that he could commercialize

this test within 18 months of receiving the first $500,200 advance and that the test would

achieve an accuracy level of at least 95%. Dr. Moon provided information about the cost,

timing, and viability of the diagnostic test, which, before the investment, was indefinitely

stuck in the research phase. Dr. Moon stated that he already had relationships, agreements,

and laboratory facilities in place that would enable speedy passage through the regulatory

hurdles standing between his test and commercialization. Promise Easy took the bait and

advanced $500,200. Dr. Moon took the money but failed to deliver. Promise Easy noticed

breach and brought this suit against Dr. Moon and his entities, alleging violations of the

Delaware Securities Act, breach of express and implied contractual provisions, and

fraudulent inducement. At trial, Promise Easy proved that Dr. Moon knew that much of

what he represented to Promise Easy was false and that he breached his contractual

obligations. This post-trial decision enters judgment in favor of Promise Easy on most of

its claims.

I.     FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       Trial took place by Zoom over two days. As reflected in the Joint Schedule of

Evidence submitted by the parties, the record comprises 60 joint trial exhibits, trial
testimony from three fact witnesses, and deposition testimony from the same three fact

witnesses.1 These are the facts as the court finds them after trial.

         A.     Dr. Moon Presents His Research To NYG Capital.

         Dr. Chulso Moon is an oncologist with a medical degree from Seoul National

University in South Korea and a Ph.D from Johns Hopkins University in human genetics

and molecular biology.2 Dr. Moon’s resume is extensive and impressive. After obtaining

his Ph.D, he did a combined residency and fellowship program in oncology, and he has

since taught cancer biology and clinical oncology at Johns Hopkins.3 Dr. Moon began

conducting independent research in 2001, and he eventually founded his own independent

research foundation, Defendant JS Yoon Memorial Cancer Research Institute (“JS Yoon”),

on behalf of his mother who died of breast cancer.4 Dr. Moon’s area of research involves

developing tests for genetic and other biomarkers of cancer.5 He has published more than

40 articles and given over 60 presentations on this research.6

         One such presentation kicked off the events in this lawsuit. In January 2015, Dr.

Moon presented his research to New York Global Capital (“NYG Capital”) in New York

1
  See C.A. No. 12438-CM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 128 (Joint Schedule of Evid.). This decision
cites to: trial exhibits (by “JX” number); the trial transcript, Dkts. 90–91 (by “Trial Tr. at”
page, line, and witness); and the deposition transcripts of Chulso Moon, Benjamin Wey,
and Warren Raiti (by the deponent’s last name and “Dep. Tr. at” page and line).
2
    Trial Tr. at 233:8–234:3 (Moon).
3
    Id. at 234:4–19 (Moon).
4
    Id. at 234:23–235:8 (Moon).
5
    JX-34 at 5–6.
6
    Trial Tr. at 235:9–13 (Moon).
                                              2
City.7 NYG Capital’s CEO and founder Benjamin Wey, General Counsel James Baxter,

and Assistant General Counsel Warren Raiti attended the January 2015 presentation.8 One

of Dr. Moon’s good friends, Larry Agulnick, had set up the meeting.9

         Wey and Raiti understood Dr. Moon’s presentation to be a pitch for funding.10

According to Wey and Raiti, Dr. Moon presented that he had developed a test that was

“100 percent fully tested by Johns Hopkins University” with a “95 percent effective rate in

detecting breast cancer.”11 Dr. Moon represented that research on the test was complete

and that the “product was done, ready for commercialization, going to the FDA, marketing,

and sales.”12

         Dr. Moon, meanwhile, testified that he viewed the meeting as an opportunity to

present his research and develop a potential relationship, whether or not that ultimately

resulted in funding.13 From Dr. Moon’s perspective, he was merely presenting on his two

7
    Id. at 158:24–159:4 (Moon); id. at 341:21–23 (Wey).
8
    Id. at 343:9–12 (Wey).
9
    Id. at 152:15–153:5 (Moon); id. at 342:11–19 (Wey).
10
     Id. at 107:1–17 (Raiti); id. at 341:21–342:2 (Wey).
11
   Id. at 344:4–13 (Wey); see also id. at 22:13–22 (Raiti) (testifying that Dr. Moon
presented that the test had “a very, very high sensitivity and specificity for the identification
of particular genetic mutation that he could link to breast cancer, something like 96 and 97
percent, respectively”).
12
  Id. at 344:17–23 (Wey); see also id. at 22:23–23:4 (Raiti) (“[T]he status of the project
was effectively ready for Stage II clinical trials and that once Stage II clinical trials were
completed and even potentially before, that it would be relatively easy to obtain FDA
510(k) approval for the -- for what would be the genetic test.”).
13
     Id. at 238:5–239:2, 318:4–14 (Moon).
                                               3
years of breast cancer biomarker research that he hoped could one day be used to develop

a commercially viable breast cancer genetic test kit, though no such kit yet existed.14

         In what will become a common theme in this decision, Dr. Moon’s recall of what

happened is not the most reliable one. Dr. Moon was incentivized to paint his research in

the rosiest light possible.   Wey and Raiti were willing to trust Dr. Moon’s assurances.15

Wey and Raiti did not have the expertise necessary to understand all the science underlying

Dr. Moon’s presentation,16 and it does not make sense that they would have conjured the

precise testing and “effective rate” percentages from thin air. Wey and Raiti’s testimony

as to Dr. Moon’s representations at this initial meeting are thus more credible.

         B.     NYG Capital Conducts Due Diligence And Signs A Term Sheet.

         Based on Dr. Moon’s presentation, Wey decided to get the ball rolling on an

investment. In Wey’s own words, he was “enamored” with Dr. Moon and his research,

and Wey saw a joint venture as an opportunity to help women worldwide.17 Wey also saw

14
     Id. at 153:22–156:5 (Moon).
15
   Id. at 32:14–15 (Raiti) (“I mean, we relied on Dr. Moon for pretty much everything.”);
id. at 357:14–19 (Wey) (“Q. Did you rely on the information that Dr. Moon provided to
you during these meetings? A. Absolutely. I trusted him immensely.”)
16
   Id. at 26:16–21 (Raiti) (“I’m not a geneticist. I’m not a Ph.D biologist. You tell me,
right? How does this work and what are we looking into?”); id. at 358:14–20 (Wey) (“The
document and the related data came 100 percent from Dr. Moon and also his assistant,
Annie. Keep in mind we’re businesspeople; we are not scientists.”).
17
     Id. at 357:14–358:6 (Wey).
                                             4
it as a good business opportunity; he testified that Dr. Moon presented that the project could

eventually be worth more than $2 billion.18

         At trial, Wey characterized NYG Capital’s services as business consulting and

private equity investing.19 It is unclear to what extent NYG Capital invested its own funds

as opposed to connecting financers to potential investments. Both Wey and Raiti described

NYG Capital as a “brand.”20 According to Wey, NYG Capital would act as “an investor

or as investor’s representative in New York,” evaluate potential projects, and then

“introduce the project to a particular investor that we may have interest in.”21 Raiti testified

that NYG Capital was co-branded with an Asian company called NYGG Asia, and that

NYGG Asia often invested in projects recommended by NYG Capital.22 As a result, much

of NYG Capital’s efforts were expended in the due diligence stage, and then it would “go

to see some of our investor network when the deal becomes real.”23

         In the case of Dr. Moon’s research, however, both Wey and Raiti testified that the

NYG group was not interested in a direct investment, and so NYG Capital sought to

18
     Id. at 356:17–24 (Wey).
19
     Id. at 340:24–341:4 (Wey).
20
     Id. at 12:20–13:3 (Raiti); id. at 348:3–6 (Wey).
21
   Id. at 348:6–19 (Wey); see also id. at 13:4–9 (“They were advisory companies. They
did business advisory work. And they also worked with investors in Asia to look at
different projects and make investments.”).
22
   Id. at 12:20–14:2 (Raiti) (“So in part, it was identifying opportunities for the NYGG
Asia, so Jim [Baxter] and Ben [Wey] would look for different companies or opportunities
in the markets in the U.S. to basically identify for purposes of coordinating with NYGG
Asia. And NYGG Asia would make investments or not.”).
23
     Id. at 348:6–19 (Wey).
                                               5
connect Dr. Moon to other potential investors.24 After the January 2015 presentation, Raiti,

and to a lesser extent Wey, worked with Dr. Moon to conduct due diligence.25 Over the

course of several months, Raiti and Dr. Moon spoke frequently over the phone to hammer

out the logistics of developing Dr. Moon’s research into a commercially viable testing kit.26

Dr. Moon consulted with his personal attorney as to the terms of a potential investment.27

           On March 26, 2015, the parties entered into an Investment Term Sheet for Definitive

Agreement (the “Term Sheet”).28 The Term Sheet contemplated that Dr. Moon would form

Prospect Genetics, Inc. as a Delaware corporation.29 Prospect Genetics would wholly own

Prospect Research, Inc., an entity that held the venture’s intellectual property rights, and

Prospect Medical Testing, Inc., which would be the operating entity (all together,

“Prospect” or the “Company”).30 NYG Capital had not yet nailed down investors for the

project, so the Term Sheet identified NYG Capital or its assignee as the “Investor.”31 The

Term Sheet committed the Investor to providing a $2 million line of credit to Prospect

24
     Id. at 17:2–11 (Raiti); id. at 348:6–19 (Wey).
25
     Id. at 14:9–19 (Raiti); id. at 353:1–355:9 (Wey).
26
     Id. at 29:6–30:17 (Raiti); id. at 159:9–16 (Moon).
27
     Id. at 159:11–21 (Moon).
28
     JX-3 (“Term Sheet”).
29
     Id. at 1.
30
     Id.
31
  Id.; see also Trial Tr. at 348:3–23 (Wey) (“So at the point that this document was entered,
we would not have known the specific name or the investors or the amount to be precise
because it was still preliminary.”).
                                                6
Genetics.32 The Term Sheet was conditioned on a later-executed credit agreement.33 Dr.

Moon signed the Term sheet in his individual capacity, as President and Chairman of

Prospect Genetics, and as President of JS Yoon.34 Baxter signed on behalf of the Investor.35

           C.    The Parties Execute The Transaction Documents.

           Raiti and Dr. Moon continued to communicate almost every night and on weekends

through the spring of 2015 to flesh out the details of the joint venture.36 Dr. Moon testified

that he spent over a hundred hours communicating with Raiti about the project. 37 Wey

testified that he met with Dr. Moon at least six times during this period.38

           At the same time, Wey tried to connect the project to interested investors. He

pitched the investment to Roger Li, Wey’s friend and colleague of 20 years, in Beijing after

the January 2015 presentation.39 Li took an interest, and he formed Promise Easy as a

British Virgin Islands registered entity to carry out the investment.40 Li was a director of

32
     Term Sheet at 1.
33
     Id.
34
     Id. at 5.
35
     Id.
36
     Trial Tr. at 28:5–18 (Raiti); id. at 266:7–15 (Moon).
37
     Id. at 163:14–165:18 (Moon).
38
     Id. at 346:20–347:6 (Wey).
39
     Id. at 349:3–8, 384:6–9 (Wey).
40
     Id. at 341:5–20, 347:7–17 (Wey).
                                               7
Promise Easy, and Wey served as Promise Easy’s United States representative. 41 In this

role, Wey updated Li on developments in diligence.42

         These months-long negotiations culminated in the execution of a Convertible Note

Purchase Agreement on May 29, 2015 (the “NPA”).43 Contemporaneously and pursuant

to the NPA, Prospect Genetics issued a $2 million Convertible Promissory Note to Promise

Easy (the “Promissory Note”).44      The NPA governed the terms of Promise Easy’s

investment in Prospect.45 Dr. Moon signed the NPA as President of Prospect Genetics and

JS Yoon.46 Dr. Moon also signed the NPA individually and in his capacity as the sole

stockholder of Forecast Genetics Holding Company, Inc. and Forecast Genetics, Inc., the

entities Dr. Moon used to hold his 100% stake in Prospect Genetics.47 Li signed the NPA

on behalf of Promise Easy.48 Section 9.14 of the NPA requires Dr. Moon, Prospect, and

41
     Id. at 341:16–20 (Wey).
42
     Id. at 364:20–365:7 (Wey).
43
     JX-8 (“NPA”).
44
     JX-9 (“Promissory Note”).
45
  NPA § 1.1; see also Trial Tr. at 349:16–19 (Wey) (“This was the definitive investment
agreement between the investor and the investment target.”).
46
     NPA at 17–18.
47
  Id. at 18–19; see also Trial Tr. at 161:2–3 (Moon) (“It was a holding company that was
made by my lawyer.”). Dr. Moon testified that he did not know the difference between the
two Forecast Genetics entities. Moon Dep. Tr. at 209:11–210:18. The entities’ separate
roles do not alter the outcome here, and this decision refers to Forecast Genetics, Inc. and
Forecast Genetics Holding Company, Inc. together as “Forecast Genetics.”
48
     NPA at 19.
                                             8
JS Yoon to indemnify Promise Easy for “any and all claims, damages, losses, liabilities

and reasonable expenses” that Promise Easy incurred from a breach of the NPA.49

          The NPA contains five other provisions relevant to this dispute. First, it sets out the

purpose of the funding and defines a timeline for completion. Second, it establishes the

method for distributing funds and the conditions constituting default. Third, it requires Dr.

Moon to license a particular provisional patent to Prospect. Fourth, it requires Prospect to

enter a Consulting Agreement to retain Dr. Moon’s services. Fifth, it requires Dr. Moon

to execute a Security Agreement to collateralize the NPA. This decision refers to the NPA,

the Promissory Note, and the related ancillary documents as the “Transaction Documents.”

                   1.     The Product Timeline

          Section 1.2 of the NPA states that Prospect Genetics shall use the funds from

Promise Easy

                   to complete clinical and other research and product
                   development of a U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
                   approved prognostic breast cancer genetic screening test and
                   test kit, based on DNA sequencing and related scientific
                   discoveries and intellectual properties for all stages and aspects
                   of breast cancer detection in high risk patients (the “Test”),
                   together with associated overhead, operational, and
                   administrative costs as each may be approved in advance by
                   the Purchaser (collectively, the “Permitted Uses”)[.]50

49
     Id. § 9.14.
50
     Id. § 1.2.
                                                   9
Section 1.2 also requires that expenditures be “in accordance with the budget and

milestones provided in the product timeline attached hereto.”51 This provision refers to the

Product Timeline Budget Summary (“Product Timeline”), attached as Exhibit B to the

NPA.52 The Product Timeline represented the culmination of Raiti and Dr. Moon’s

conversations about the logistics of transforming Dr. Moon’s research into a commercially

viable product.53 Dr. Moon, with the help of his assistant Annie John, supplied Raiti with

the inputs for the Product Timeline.54 Raiti took these estimates, and through several

iterations, finalized them into the Product Timeline.55 The Product Timeline indicated that

the project could be completed in 18 months at a total cost of $1,986,658.56

           At trial, the parties hotly contested the Product Timeline’s purpose and utility.

According to Wey, the investors needed a concrete budget and timeline to provide

corresponding funding, and the Product Timeline served that purpose.57 According to

Raiti, all of the timeline and budget milestones came from Dr. Moon, and the final Product

51
     Id.
52
     JX-10 (“Product Timeline”).
53
     Trial Tr. at 28:5–29:5 (Raiti); id. at 266:7–15 (Moon).
54
     Id. at 26:22–27:4 (Raiti); id. at 165:8–21 (Moon); id. at 358:12–359:13 (Wey).
55
   Id. at 26:22–27:10 (Raiti); id. at 169:10–11 (Moon); see, e.g., JX-5 (May 4, 2015 email
from Dr. Moon to Raiti incorporating Dr. Moon’s edits to Raiti’s proposed draft).
56
     Product Timeline at 2.
57
   See Trial Tr. at 359:24–360:13 (Wey) (“We never understood that to be estimate.
Investors never understood that to be an estimate. We understand this [] process is ironclad
in stone. . . . It wasn’t a start-up venture. It was a private equity, mature investment to
commercialization. That was it. That’s why this was part of the [] definitive investment
document.”).
                                               10
Timeline was supposed to represent Dr. Moon’s best estimates for how the project would

proceed.58 Meanwhile, Dr. Moon testified that he repeatedly told Raiti and his personal

attorney that the numbers he supplied for the Product Timeline were unattainable “bare

bones” estimates that assumed a best-case scenario without any hiccups.59

         The evidence supports Wey and Raiti’s testimony. Wey testified that Promise Easy

was reticent to invest more than $2 million.60 The Promissory Note’s principal amount of

$2 million and the NPA’s aggregate limit of $2 million reflect that Promise Easy did not

anticipate expenses deviating wildly from the Product Timeline.61 Raiti had no experience

in breast cancer biomarker diagnostic research, and he necessarily relied on Dr. Moon’s

expertise to draft the Product Timeline.62 The Product Timeline does not list ranges of

timing or cost suggesting that the estimates were on the low range, and nowhere does it

state that it is a best-case estimate.63 Dr. Moon admitted this at trial.64

58
     Id. at 29:6–39:19 (Raiti).
59
   See, e.g., id. at 180:7–21 (Moon) (“It is a general accepting out of common sense in
scientific community that any budget can be bare bones and [] on any biotechnical
document, we have to assume that this can be changed any time because . . . we have to
sign certain development agreement here, but this is my best guess and the best scenario.”).
60
     Id. at 352:3–5, 360:20–361:12 (Wey).
61
     Promissory Note at 1; NPA § 1.1.
62
     Trial Tr. at 26:22–27:10 (Raiti).
63
     See Product Timeline.
64
     Trial Tr. at 180:2–4 (Moon).
                                              11
          Dr. Moon testified that his personal attorney drafted the Transaction Documents and

that he reviewed the documents with his attorney before signing them.65 Dr. Moon also

copied his personal attorney on emails containing Dr. Moon’s revisions to the Product

Timeline,66 and Dr. Moon testified that “everything went to my lawyer” in preparing the

Transaction Documents.67 In Section 3.11 of the NPA itself, Dr. Moon on behalf of

Prospect agreed that the Transaction Documents, plus any information given in connection

with those documents, did “not contain any untrue or inaccurate statement of a material

fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements contained

therein not misleading in the light of the circumstances under which they were made.”68

          It is hard to infer on these facts that the NPA does not reflect Dr. Moon’s

representation that the Product Timeline was an attainable estimate of the project’s

progress.

                  2.    Distribution And Default Terms

          Section 1.1 of the NPA outlines the scope of Prospect Genetics’ line of credit from

Promise Easy. In exchange for the Promissory Note, Promise Easy agreed to issue an

initial advance of at least $500,000 (the “Initial Advance”).69 Thereafter, Prospect Genetics

65
     Id. at 180:5–181:11, 200:10–22 (Moon).
66
     See, e.g., JX-5.
67
     Trial Tr. at 161:6–9 (Moon).
68
     NPA § 3.11.
69
     Id. § 1.1.
                                              12
could request “Additional Advances,” which when aggregated with the Initial Advance

could not exceed $2 million.70

           Section 1.3 provides that Prospect Genetics could request Additional Advances by

providing written notice to Promise Easy ten days before the requested disbursement (a

“Notice of Drawdown”).71 Dr. Moon had to include details in the Notice of Drawdown

that identified the permitted uses of the funds to further testing kit development.72 If the

Notice of Drawdown requested funds “for one or more Permitted Uses and is consistent

with the Product Timeline,” and Prospect had not breached any of its contractual

obligations, then Promise Easy could not unreasonably withhold its approval of the

Additional Advance.73 If Dr. Moon satisfied the requisite conditions for an Additional

Advance and Promise Easy denied the request, then Dr. Moon could deliver a notice of

default.74

                  3.    Patent Licensing Agreement

           Section 2.3(a) of the NPA required Dr. Moon to contemporaneously execute a

Patent License Agreement, attached as Exhibit C to the NPA.75 The Patent License

Agreement granted Prospect Research a license to Dr. Moon’s provisional patent for his

70
     Id.
71
     Id. § 1.3.
72
     Id.
73
     Id.
74
     Id.
75
     Id. § 2.3(a).
                                              13
genetic sequencing method, which formed the basis of the breast cancer screening kit.76

The patent was held by JS Yoon.77 The Patent License Agreement gave Prospect Research

a “non-transferrable, worldwide, royalty-free, perpetual, exclusive right and license to use

the Licensed IP Rights in the Field of Use to research, develop, and/or commercialize the

Test.”78      The “Licensed IP Rights” included Dr. Moon’s provisional patent, any

improvements he made thereon, and any additional discoveries or data arising from Dr.

Moon’s continued research.79          Dr. Moon could only terminate the Patent License

Agreement after providing thirty days’ written notice of Prospect Research’s material

breach of the agreement.80

          Dr. Moon executed the Patent License Agreement individually and on behalf of JS

Yoon.81

                   4.   Consulting Agreement

          Section 2.3(c) of the NPA required that Dr. Moon execute an individual Consulting

Agreement for his continued role at Prospect, attached as Exhibit E-1 to the NPA.82 Dr.

Moon’s Consulting Agreement defined his services as “all activities, efforts and actions

76
     JX-11 (“Patent License Agr.”).
77
     Trial Tr. at 166:24–167:2 (Moon).
78
     Patent License Agr. § 2.1
79
     Id. § 1.1.
80
     Id. § 12.2.
81
   Id. at 14; Trial Tr. at 166:24–167:2 (Moon) (“Q. Was the patent filed in your name? A.
It was filed under the name of JS Yoon, patent holder. I was inventor.”).
82
     NPA § 2.3(c).
                                              14
necessary and sufficient to complete the items listed in the Product Timeline.” 83 Prospect

paid Dr. Moon $20,000 per month in exchange for his services. 84 Dr. Moon’s Consulting

Agreement automatically terminated after eighteen months.85 Dr. Moon testified that he

understood his responsibilities under the Consulting Agreement as providing “all clinical

and scientific items, while Warren Raiti works as details in terms of legal contract or the

details necessary to execute the finance.”86

                  5.    Security Agreement

           Section 2.3(b) of the NPA required the parties to execute a Security Agreement,

attached as Exhibit D to the NPA.87 Execution of the Security Agreement was a condition

precedent to Promise Easy’s disbursement of any funds under the Promissory Note.88

Under the Security Agreement, Prospect granted Promise Easy “a security interest in and

to the Collateral (as hereinafter defined) to secure the Loans.”89 The Security Agreement

defined “Collateral” to include virtually all of Prospect’s assets, including machinery,

intellectual property, and trade secrets.90 This Collateral secured Dr. Moon and Prospect’s

83
     JX-58 (“Dr. Moon Consulting Agr.”) at 7.
84
     Id. § 3.1.
85
     Id. § 2.
86
     Trial Tr. at 195:8–13 (Moon).
87
     NPA § 2.3(b).
88
     JX-12 (“Security Agr.”) at 1.
89
     Id.
90
     See id. §§ 2(a)–(l).
                                               15
obligations under the Transaction Documents.91 The Security Agreement also contains an

indemnity provision requiring Prospect to indemnify Promise Easy for any damages from

breaches of the Security Agreement.92 Dr. Moon signed the Security Agreement on behalf

of Prospect, and Li signed on behalf of Promise Easy.93

          D.      Prospect’s First Month

          The transaction closed on June 1, 2015, setting the venture in motion. Dr. Moon,

Raiti, Wey, Annie John, and Baxter served as the initial board of directors (the “Board”),

with Baxter as chairman.94 Dr. Moon was named CEO, and Raiti was appointed CFO.95

Promise Easy distributed an Initial Advance of $500,200 into Prospect’s bank account on

June 10, 2015.96

          The Product Timeline contemplated that, in the first month of the project, Dr. Moon

and Prospect would accomplish milestones in five categories: independent review board

(“IRB”) sites in Montana and Wyoming; IRB sites through a Contract Research

Organization (“CRO”); lab setup; DNA sequencing; and patent application.

          First, under the Product Timeline, Dr. Moon was supposed to coordinate with his

colleagues to set up three IRB sites in Montana and Wyoming to collect patient samples

91
     Id. §§ 3(a)–(b).
92
     Id. § 14.
93
     Id. at 13.
94
     Trial Tr. at 85:20–22 (Raiti); id. at 299:4–15 (Moon); id. at 362:2–14 (Wey).
95
     Id. at 68:21–69:13 (Raiti); id. at 335:3–5 (Moon); id. at 362:2–14 (Wey).
96
     JX-31 (“Prospect Bank Statement”) at 2.
                                               16
for Dr. Moon’s research.97 IRB sites are physical locations monitored by physicians to

oversee research sample collection and ensure compliance with established protocols.98

Dr. Moon had been in Montana since January 2015, and he remained there through the end

of June.99 Dr. Moon testified that, during this time, he talked to three physicians about

assisting with the IRB sites, though they did not ever reach any formal agreement.100

            Second, the Product Timeline required Prospect to sign a contract with Total CRO

Clinical Trial Management in Dallas, Texas (“Total CRO”) to set up six or seven more IRB

sites for sample collection.101 The Product Timeline estimated that the Total CRO contract

would cost $525,000, “all inclusive” of expenses for a comprehensive list of services.102

Dr. Moon testified that he arrived at this figure based on conversations with a lead doctor

at Total CRO, who told Dr. Moon that the project could be completed at that price.103

According to Raiti, however, when he called Total CRO to implement Dr. Moon’s

arrangement, Total CRO “didn’t have any idea what I was talking about” and told him that

97
     Product Timeline at 10.
98
  Trial Tr. at 129:19–130:5 (Raiti) (“IRB sites were basically organizational components
where you would be able to oversee the collection of samples. . . . So whether it’s a buccal
swab or a blood sample, those were the sites where that would be collected. And I believe
the IRB board, [] were doctors who would oversee that data and, to my understanding,
supervise it and make sure that it was conducted in a scientifically defensible way.”).
99
     Id. at 198:23–199:9 (Moon).
100
      Id. at 208:7–210:22 (Moon).
101
      Product Timeline at 8.
102
      Id.
103
      Trial Tr. at 248:20–251:7 (Moon).
                                               17
the “proper price for an ask like the one that I was making was at least twice, if not more,

of what we were indicating that they had agreed to.”104 Dr. Moon admitted at trial that that

there was no documentation memorializing his purported agreement with Total CRO.105

Raiti then had to “brutally renegotiate” the Total CRO contract, and the final agreement

did not include the full host of services originally promised in the Product Timeline.106

          Third, the Product Timeline required Prospect to lease a suitable lab space, which

required a deep-chill freezer to maintain samples, advanced security to protect the samples,

and tracking systems to connect samples to their corresponding patients.107 Dr. Moon also

recommended, and the Product Timeline dictated, that Prospect hire a full-time lab

technician.108 According to the Product Timeline, one of Dr. Moon’s colleagues would

accept the role at a 20–30% discount.109 Raiti testified that Dr. Moon had suggested they

rent a space in Baltimore from the Abell Foundation, with whom Dr. Moon had a prior

relationship.110 Raiti claimed that Dr. Moon described this lab space as “turnkey,” meaning

that they “were told by Dr. Moon that the prerequisite operational facilities to accomplish

all of these different pieces were in place.”111 When Raiti contacted the Abell Foundation

104
      Id. at 44:4–45:4 (Raiti).
105
      Id. at 321:22–322:3 (Moon).
106
      Id. at 45:5–47:14 (Raiti).
107
      Product Timeline at 12; Trial Tr. at 273:6–275:6 (Moon).
108
      Product Timeline at 12; Trial Tr. at 60:9–22 (Raiti).
109
      Product Timeline at 12.
110
      Trial Tr. at 60:9–61:23 (Raiti).
111
      Id. at 54:1–10, 64:10–18 (Raiti).
                                               18
to set up the space, however, they told Raiti that this purported arrangement did not exist,

and that Dr. Moon owed $8,000 in outstanding fees to the Foundation that Prospect needed

to pay before any discussions could move forward.112 Even if the fees were paid, the space

would still require substantial construction.113 Without the lab space, there was no reason

to hire the lab technician.114 Although Dr. Moon testified that Raiti’s expectations for the

lab were unrealistic, Dr. Moon was the one who provided the inputs to the Product

Timeline.115

          Fourth, the Product Timeline envisioned that Prospect would contract with AI

Biotech within the first month to extract and sequence DNA from Dr. Moon’s existing

patient samples.116 Prospect did execute such a contract with AI Biotech on July 1, 2015,117

and Raiti testified that the AI Biotech agreement accurately reflected the costs estimated

by Dr. Moon in the Product Timeline.118

          Fifth, the Product Timeline required that Dr. Moon retain counsel to submit a patent

application for Dr. Moon’s new research.119 Dr. Moon testified that he had existing patent

112
      Id. at 60:9–61:23 (Raiti).
113
      Id. at 62:21–64:9 (Raiti).
114
      Id. at 60:9–22 (Raiti).
115
      Id. at 273:13–275:13 (Moon).
116
      Product Timeline at 3.
117
      JX-15 (AI Biotech Agreement).
118
      Trial Tr. at 34:1–9 (Raiti).
119
      Product Timeline at 14.
                                               19
counsel for JS Yoon, and that he contacted the same counsel begin work on the new

application.120

         E.      Wey Steps Down From Prospect’s Board.

         As the project continued, Dr. Moon learned more details about Wey. In 2014, one

of Wey’s former employees had filed a sexual harassment suit against him.121 The case

gained substantial media attention before it was voluntarily dismissed.122 Dr. Moon

testified that, while he was in Montana, his colleagues raised the allegations against Wey

as a potential sticking point for their collaboration.123 According to Raiti, once Dr. Moon

learned about the pending litigation against Wey, Dr. Moon became “obsessed” with the

allegations and no longer wanted to cooperate on a project associated with Wey.124 At trial,

Dr. Moon disputed this characterization, but he admitted that the allegations concerned

him.125

         Dr. Moon stirred some of the trouble himself by telling Montana colleagues his

misguided belief that Wey was the investor behind Promise Easy, at which point they

searched Wey’s name and found information on the sexual harassment lawsuit.126 Dr.

120
      Trial Tr. at 194:24–195:3 (Moon).
121
      Id. at 372:16–373:9 (Wey).
122
      Id. at 375:18–20 (Wey); see also JX-23, JX-26, JX-30 (articles reporting on lawsuit).
123
      Trial Tr. at 260:17–261:11 (Moon).
124
      Id. at 83:23–84:16 (Raiti).
125
      Id. at 303:11–306:1 (Moon).
  Trial Tr. at 272:6–23 (Moon); see id. at 261:1–11 (Moon) (“[The colleague] asked about
126

who is investor. I said it is [] a Mr. Ben Wey with NYGG. And who are they? So I talked

                                              20
Moon testified that he misunderstood Wey’s early efforts in diligence as predicating an

investment by NYG Capital, and Dr. Moon assumed that the venture was funded entirely

with Wey’s own money.127 The NPA did not include any mention of Wey or NYG Capital,

however, and none of the Transaction Documents mentioned either party.128

         Wey resigned from the Board at the end of June 2015.129 Wey and Raiti credibly

testified that Wey’s resignation stemmed both from his desire to focus on the pending

litigation and his understanding that, having connected Prospect to funding, his role had

been fulfilled.130 A June 10, 2015 email from Wey supports the latter narrative—Wey

wrote, “[t]his company will now be run by professionals (Dr. Moon being the CEO and

Warren Raiti being the CFO).”131 Li took Wey’s place on the Board.132

         According to Dr. Moon, this was the first time he learned of Li’s existence. 133 Dr.

Moon testified that he continued to believe through trial that Wey personally funded the

to him about he is investor located in Wall Street. And one day he came to me and showed
me all of the negative news, and he expressed my concern, saying that this is a very small
community and, you know, people all talk with each other.”).
127
      Id. at 158:8–17, 298:22–299:24 (Moon).
128
   See, e.g., NPA at 1 (listing only Promise Easy Limited as the NPA purchaser);
Promissory Note at 1 (listing only Promise Easy Limited as the purchaser of the Promissory
Note); Security Agr. at 1 (listing only Promise Easy Limited as the secured party).
129
      Trial Tr. at 114:19–115:5 (Raiti); id. at 311:6–12 (Moon); id. at 362:15–20 (Wey).
130
      Id. at 135:20–136:2 (Raiti); id. at 362:2–14 (Wey).
131
      JX-7 at 1.
132
      Trial Tr. at 291:7–15 (Moon).
133
      Id. at 300:7–10 (Moon).
                                               21
investment into Prospect.134 Raiti, however, testified that he repeatedly explained Wey’s

role to Dr. Moon, and Dr. Moon himself served on the Board with Li, who was connected

to the actual investor.135

          F.     Prospect Fails To Meet Milestones Through The Summer Of 2015.

          The venture strained as the months wore on. The main tension concerned the

division of labor between Raiti and Dr. Moon.

          Raiti testified extensively and credibly about the tireless hours he devoted to getting

Prospect off the ground.136 Raiti felt as though he was performing one hundred percent of

Dr. Moon’s job “for many months.”137 Raiti was in consistent contact with Total CRO and

with the Abell Foundation trying to iron out the details of their contracts with Prospect.138

Raiti testified that Dr. Moon was hard to reach during this period, and that when Raiti could

get Dr. Moon on the phone, Dr. Moon was restless and agitated.139

134
      Id. at 298:16–299:24 (Moon).
135
    Id. at 86:4–8 (Raiti) (“Q. [D]id you ever explain to Dr. Moon what Mr. Wey’s role was
in the transaction or, I guess, more appropriately, what his role wasn’t in the transaction?
A. Yeah, many times.”); see id. at 86:14–20 (Raiti) (testifying that he told Dr. Moon, “Ben
was not a part of the project. He wasn’t on the board. There was no involvement. This
certainly came up later as well after the indictment in 2015.”).
136
      Id. at 76:2–83:2 (Raiti).
137
    Id. at 80:21–24 (Raiti); see also id. at 73:13–18 (Raiti) (“And so I very much got stuck
in the middle trying to develop something with basically an absentee CEO in a field that
was -- I mean, to say it’s not my expertise is an understatement or a gross understatement.
And it was a lot of work.”).
138
      Id. at 74:2–8, 78:17–22 (Raiti).
139
      Id. at 72:14–74:8 (Raiti).
                                                22
         Meanwhile, Dr. Moon testified that he was on a “break” between April and

September 2015.140 According to Dr. Moon, he only worked 20–30% of his normal hours

during this period, which he spent at a part-time job on the East coast.141 Dr. Moon

continued to receive his $20,000 monthly compensation pursuant to the Consulting

Agreement.142

         By the end of August, the third month of the project, most of the Product Timeline

milestones were unmet. Dr. Moon’s Montana and Wyoming IRB sites were supposed to

be set up and receiving samples; no such IRB sites had been established, nor would they

ever be.143 Total CRO was supposed to have six or seven functional IRB sites; no such

IRB sites existed, nor would they ever, and the protocol for running them had not even

been established.144 The lab was to be operational and running Dr. Moon’s proposed study;

Prospect had not yet prepared an adequate lab space, and it never retained a lab

technician.145 AI Biotech was supposed to have a completed its genome sequencing report;

140
      Id. at 212:1–4 (Moon).
141
      Id. at 199:6–15, 212:1–11 (Moon).
142
      Prospect Bank Statement at 1–2.
143
   Compare Product Timeline at 10, with Trial Tr. at 189:20–22 (Moon) (“Q. So you did
not set up any IRB sites? A. I did not.”).
  Compare Product Timeline at 8, with Trial Tr. at 46:7–48:13 (Raiti) (“[T]hey did not
144

complete the protocol. No independent review board sites were ever set up.”).
145
   Compare Product Timeline at 12, with Trial Tr. at 81:23–82:4 (Raiti) (“And then with
regard to the lab, there was equipment and other things that were necessary as the
construction project that we had undertaken with that was developing. So in order to take
the lab to the next phase, equipment and all of the other materials would have been
necessary. But at that point it was a little bit silly because the whole thing was off track.”).
                                              23
according to Dr. Moon, only 80% of that work had been completed.146 The lone part of

the project on track was the patent application, and that was because Dr. Moon’s only task

for the first seven months was to contact the patent counsel he had already retained for JS

Yoon.147

         G.      Prospect Faces Setbacks In September 2015.

         In September 2015, Wey was indicted for securities fraud, wire fraud, and money

laundering in connection with reverse merger transactions he executed between Chinese

and United States companies.148 Although the Department of Justice later voluntarily

dismissed the charges,149 these allegations sent Dr. Moon’s concerns into overdrive.

         According to Raiti, this news prompted Dr. Moon to decide: “I’m not going to work

with anything having to do with Ben Wey.”150 Dr. Moon corroborated this narrative,

testifying that under his belief that Wey was financing the project, he was “really

scared.”151 Raiti testified that Dr. Moon was considering refinancing the Promissory Note

through a different source.152 These refinancing options never came about.153

146
      Compare Product Timeline at 3, with Trial Tr. at 271:18–272:5 (Moon).
147
      Product Timeline at 14; Trial Tr. at 194:24–195:3 (Moon).
148
      Trial Tr. at 375:6–17 (Wey); JX-23 (September 10, 2015 article discussing charges).
149
      Trial Tr. at 375:6–17 (Wey).
150
    Id. at 89:7–12 (Raiti); see also id. at 305:21–24 (Moon) (“I do not want to have a
situation working certain project on which money is involved in wire fraud, which is very
serious crime, as far as I know.”).
151
      Id. at 300:23–301:21 (Moon).
152
      Id. at 89:13–24 (Raiti).
153
      Id. at 90:16–91:24 (Raiti).
                                             24
            Then, on September 11, 2015, Annie John was terminated because “she became a

substantial risk to the business.”154 Prospect paid her a $10,000 termination fee.155 Dr.

Moon testified that she had become increasingly concerned about working with Wey after

the sexual harassment allegations and indictment.156

            H.      Promise Easy Denies Prospect’s Request For Additional Funds.

            It became clear in September through October 2015 that Prospect would soon burn

through the entire Initial Advance.157 On October 5, 2015, Dr. Moon submitted a Notice

of Drawdown to Promise Easy, requesting an Additional Advance of $498,175 pursuant to

the NPA.158 The requested funds included $60,000 for three months of Dr. Moon’s

consulting fees, $12,000 to hire Dr. Moon’s proposed lab technician, $60,000 to retain

patent counsel, and $20,000 for Dr. Moon to contact research institutions to set up IRB

sites.159 The Notice of Drawdown tied each expense to a line item in the Product Timeline,

and $349,425 of the requested expenses related to milestones that were supposed to be

completed in the project’s first four months.160 By this time, the project was in its fifth

month.

154
      JX-33 at 6.
155
      Id.
156
      Trial Tr. at 296:13–298:5 (Moon).
157
      Id. at 81:6–18 (Raiti); id. at 202:2–15 (Moon).
158
      JX-32 (“Notice of Drawdown”).
159
      Id. at 1–2.
160
      Id.
                                               25
            On October 5, Li emailed Baxter, Dr. Moon, and Raiti questions concerning the

Notice of Drawdown.161 On October 9, Baxter emailed Li a memorandum addressing Li’s

concerns.162 The memo stated that “Prospect Genetics, Inc. has made moderate but

encouraging progress since it was funded in May, 2015.”163 As support, the memo stated

that Total CRO had “completed a clinical trial protocol,” a prerequisite to opening the IRB

sites.164 This was only partially true. While Total CRO had completed a draft protocol, it

had not been finalized, and Total CRO never ultimately provided a finalized protocol.165

The memo acknowledged that no IRB sites had been established, which it blamed on

“concerns over the recent media coverage regarding Benjamin Wey.”166 The memo

acknowledged that the AI Biotech progress was not up to speed, that the lab space was not

ready, and that Annie John had been terminated.167 The memo concluded: “In sum, it is

likely that the project will be delayed by 3–5 months. The ability of Prospect to remain on

161
    Though Li’s email is referenced in the trial record, it was not submitted by the parties
as a joint exhibit. See JX-33 (October 9, 2015 email from Baxter to Li stating, “Attached
is a memo from Prospect Genetics, Inc. responding to your questions and comments and
request for information in your October 5 email.”) (“Oct. 9, 2015 Email”).
162
      Id.
163
      Id. at 3.
164
      Id.
165
   Trial Tr. at 47:15–19 (Raiti); id. at 189:1–7 (Moon) (“[Total CRO] did provide the draft
protocol, but that is not enough to go to IRB and open the site. They want to see the final
protocol.”).
166
      Oct. 9, 2015 Email at 5.
167
      Id. at 5–6.
                                              26
budget for each aspect of the project going forward is unknown with respect to those

Product milestones that have not been reached or fully tested.”168

            In the cover email to the memo, Baxter noted that Li was considering suing

Prospect.169 Baxter wrote, “I think that would be the worst thing that could be done from

the standpoint of you [Li], Ben and Prospect.”170

            The parties dispute who led Promise Easy’s response to the Notice of Drawdown.

The NPA required Raiti as CFO to sign off on Dr. Moon’s request.171 Raiti testified that

he intended to approve the request, but that Baxter and Wey encouraged him to stop the

project from “bleeding money.”172 Dr. Moon testified that Baxter was the one who drafted

the Notice of Drawdown and led the charge in getting Prospect more funding.173 Based on

Baxter’s contemporaneous memo and email to Li defending the Additional Advance, Dr.

Moon’s narrative is more plausible. It seems likely that Raiti faced pressure from Wey and

Li to avoid doling out more of Promise Easy’s money. Raiti admitted at trial that he was

worried about exposure to personal liability if Promise Easy sued Prospect.174 It makes

sense that Raiti would try to appease Wey and Li in the interim to avoid that outcome.

168
      Id. at 6.
169
      Id. at 2.
170
      Id.
171
   NPA § 1.3 (“Each Notice of Drawdown shall be . . . signed by the Chief Financial
Officer (‘CFO’) of the Company and by Dr. Moon.”).
172
      Trial Tr. at 88:1–14 (Raiti).
173
      Id. at 216:11–217:6 (Moon).
174
      Id. at 123:8–20 (Raiti).
                                              27
            Irrespective of motivations, Raiti did not approve the requested funds in the Notice

of Drawdown.175 Shortly thereafter, in mid-October 2015, Raiti resigned as CFO.176

Baxter filled his role.177 When Promise Easy failed to disburse the Additional Advance

requested in the Notice of Drawdown, Prospect sent a Notice of Purchaser Default on

October 30, 2015.178 Baxter executed the document as CFO.179

            I.     Promise Easy Notices Breach.

            Raiti continued to serve as a director and COO of Prospect after he stepped down

as CFO.180 Raiti focused on finding new financers for the project so that Promise Easy

could walk away.181 After failing to do so, Raiti formally left Prospect in February 2016.182

            Meanwhile, on November 9, 2015, Dr. Moon refiled the provisional patent covered

by the Patent License Agreement in his own name, rather than under JS Yoon.183

175
      Id. at 121:12–21 (Raiti).
176
      Id. at 114:11–15 (Raiti).
177
      Id. at 121:3–5 (Raiti).
178
      JX-37 (“Notice of Purchaser Default”).
179
      Id.
180
   See JX-38 at 1 (November 18, 2015 email from Raiti signing off as “Chief Operating
Officer, Director”).
181
   See JX-39 (texts between Raiti and Dr. Moon’s personal attorney discussing meetings
with potential financers).
182
      Trial Tr. at 76:8–12 (Raiti).
183
      Id. at 333:14–20 (Moon).
                                                 28
         On May 3, 2016, Promise Easy delivered notice to Prospect that it was in current

and ongoing breach of the NPA.184 Promise Easy claimed that Prospect was in breach of

three major provisions.185 First, Promise Easy claimed that Prospect had made “untrue and

inaccurate statements of material fact in the Product Timeline” in breach of the

representations and warranties provision in Section 3.11 of the NPA.186 Second, Promise

Easy claimed that Prospect had failed to enforce Dr. Moon’s obligations under the

Consulting Agreement as required by Section 5.1(g) of the NPA.187 Third, Promise Easy

stated that Prospect had improperly transferred the provisional patent in violation of the

Patent License Agreement and in violation of Section 5.1(b) of the NPA.188

184
      JX-41 (“Notice of Breach”).
185
   The Notice of Breach also states that Prospect has breached by failing to “obtain key
man life insurance Dr. Moon within 30 days of Closing in Violation Section 5.11 of the
Agreement[].” See id. Promise Easy did not raise this breach as a basis for liability in
post-trial briefing.
186
    Id.; see also NPA § 3.11 (“[T]his Agreement (including all schedules and exhibits
hereto), together with all other information provided by any of the Prospect Group to the
Purchaser in connection with the transactions contemplated hereby and by any other
Transaction Document does not contain any untrue or inaccurate statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements contained
therein not misleading in the light of the circumstances under which they were made[.]”).
187
   Notice of Breach; see also NPA § 5.1(g) (prohibiting Prospect from taking actions to
“[a]mend, waive or modify any term of the Patent License Agreement [or] any of the
Transaction Documents” without Promise Easy’s consent).
188
   Notice of Breach; see also NPA § 5.1(b) (prohibiting Prospect from taking actions to
“[c]onvey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of (collectively, ‘Transfer’), any
material part of its or its subsidiaries’ business or property (including intellectual property),
other than Transfers in the ordinary course of business” without Promise Easy’s consent).
                                               29
         J.      This Litigation

         Promise Easy filed the Complaint in this action on June 9, 2016, against Dr. Moon,

JS Yoon, Forecast Genetics, and the Prospect entities (collectively, “Defendants”).189 The

Complaint asserts five counts:

         •       In Count I, Promise Easy alleges that Dr. Moon, Forecast Genetics, and
                 Prospect Genetics violated the Delaware Securities Act by misrepresenting
                 the Product Timeline, which induced Promise Easy to enter the NPA.

         •       In Count II, Promise Easy seeks a declaratory judgment that Dr. Moon, JS
                 Yoon, and Prospect breached the Transaction Documents, that they must
                 indemnify Promise Easy for the Initial Advance and any losses incurred
                 thereafter, and that Prospect Research must assign Promise Easy its rights
                 under the Patent License Agreement.

         •       In Count III, Promise Easy alleges that Dr. Moon breached his Consulting
                 Agreement.

         •       In Count IV, Promise Easy alleges that Dr. Moon and Prospect breached the
                 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by demanding the Additional
                 Advance in bad faith.

         •       In Count V, Promise Easy alleges fraudulent inducement against Dr. Moon
                 for materially representing the inputs to the Product Timeline.

Promise Easy sought declaratory relief, rescissory damages, actual and compensatory

damages, and attorneys’ fees and expenses.

         In their Answer and Counterclaim, Defendants asserted a single count for breach of

the NPA against Promise Easy for failing to provide the Additional Advance requested in

the Notice of Drawdown.190

189
      Dkt. 1.
190
      Dkt. 13.
                                              30
         The parties forewent dispositive motion practice and participated by Zoom in a two-

day trial on March 29 and 30, 2021.191 Post-trial briefing proceeded in fits and starts as the

parties repeatedly attempted to resolve their dispute without this court’s intervention. The

parties entered six different post-trial briefing scheduling orders before ultimately asking

that this court hold the deadlines in abeyance pending settlement discussions on January

26, 2022.192 After these efforts failed, the parties started back up again by filing a new

scheduling order in August 2022, then filed six amended scheduling orders so that the

parties could continue settlement negotiations.193 Ultimately, the parties filed their opening

post-trial briefs in December 2022 and concluded the process in January 2023.194 By then,

Defendants had agreed to drop their counterclaim.195 The court heard post-trial oral

argument on June 5, 2023.196

191
      Dkts. 90–91.
192
      Dkts. 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 103.
193
      Dkts. 106, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122.
  Dkt. 123 (“Pl.’s Opening Post-Trial Br.”); Dkt. 124 (“Defs.’ Opening Post-Trial Br.”);
194

Dkt. 126 (Pl.’s Answering Post-Trial Br.); Dkt. 127 (“Defs.’ Answering Post-Trial Br.”).
195
      Defs.’ Answering Post-Trial Br. at 1 n.2.
196
      Dkt. 131 (June 5, 2023 Hr’g Tr.).
                                              31
II.      LEGAL ANALYSIS

         This legal analysis proceeds in five parts, addressing each count from the Complaint

in order. In each claim, Promise Easy bears the burden of proving its claims by a

preponderance of the evidence.197

         A.     Promise Easy Proved A Violation Of The Delaware Securities Act.

         In Count I, Promise Easy claims that Dr. Moon, Forecast Genetics, and Prospect

Genetics violated the Delaware Securities Act through misrepresentations in the Product

Timeline that induced Promise Easy to purchase the Promissory Note.198

         The Delaware Securities Act authorizes a private cause of action for the purchaser

of a security against the seller if the seller makes an untrue statement or omission regarding

the security.199 The buyer can sue to recoup the principal amount on the security, plus

197
   See S’holder Representative Servs. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 2017 WL 1015621, at *15
(Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2017) (“To succeed at trial, Plaintiffs, as well as Counterclaim-
Plaintiffs, have the burden of proving each element . . . of each of their causes of action
against each Defendant or Counterclaim-Defendant, as the case may be, by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
198
      The Promissory Note is governed by the laws of Delaware. See JX-9 § 12.
199
   See 6 Del. C. § 73-605(a)(2) (“Any person who: . . . . Offers . . . a security by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading (the buyer . . . not knowing of the untruth or omission), and who does
not sustain the burden of proof that the person did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person
buying . . . the security from . . . him or her, who may sue either at law or in equity to
recover the consideration paid for the security, together with the interest at the legal rate
from the date of payment costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, less the amount of any
income received on the security, upon the tender of the security, or for damages if he or
she no longer owns the security.”).
                                              32
interest and attorneys’ fees.200 The Delaware Securities Act defines the unlawful act as

making “any untrue statement of a material fact or [] omit[ting] to state a material fact

necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under

which they are made, not misleading” in connection with the sale of a covered security.201

            Defendants respond to Count I in two ways. They first contend that the Promissory

Note does not constitute a “security” within the purview of the Delaware Securities Act.

They next contend that Promise Easy has failed to carry its burden of proving a violation

of the Act.

                  1.     The Promissory Note Was A “Security” Under The Delaware
                         Securities Act.

            The Delaware Securities Act defines a covered “security” to include “any note,”

“unless the context otherwise requires.”202 In determining whether a note is a security,

Delaware courts apply the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Reves v.

Ernst & Young.203         Under Reves, calling an instrument a “note” creates a rebuttable

presumption that it is a qualifying security.204 Once this presumption applies, the seller

bears the burden of proving that the note was not a qualifying security.205

200
      Id.

202
      Id. § 73-103(a)(23).
203
   494 U.S. 56 (1990); see also Boo’ze v. State, 846 A.2d 237, 2004 WL 691903, at *1
(Del. Mar. 25, 2004) (TABLE) (adopting Reves standard).
204
   Fletcher Int’l, Ltd. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 2012 WL 1883040, at *8 (Del. Ch. May
23, 2012).
205
      Id.
                                               33
            The presumption can be rebutted in two ways. First, a seller can demonstrate that a

note is not a security if it falls into a judicially crafted list of instruments that are “not

properly viewed as securities”:

                  (1) a note delivered in consumer financing, (2) a note secured
                  by a mortgage on a home, (3) a short-term note secured by a
                  lien on a small business or some of its assets, (4) a note
                  evidencing a character loan to a bank customer, (5) a short-
                  term note secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, (6)
                  a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred
                  in the ordinary course of business and (7) notes evidencing
                  loans by commercial banks for current operations.206

            Second, even if a note does not fall within one of the seven enumerated categories

above, “if, after engaging in a multi-factor test, the note bears a ‘family resemblance’ to

one of the instruments on the list, then it is not a security.”207 The “family resemblance”

analysis requires comparing the note to the seven enumerated categories along four factors:

                  (1) the motivations of the parties to enter into the note (whether
                  they were for investment purposes); (2) the note’s plan of
                  distribution (whether it was for common trading); (3) the
                  reasonable expectations of the investing public (that such was
                  an investment); and (4) whether there is other non-Securities
                  Act protection available to the alleged victims.208

206
      Id.
207
   Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 2021 WL
710816, at *8 (Del. Super. Feb. 21, 2021) (citing Reves, 494 U.S. at 65; Boo’ze, 846 A.2d
237, at *2–3).
208
      State v. Attarian, 2014 WL 4782859, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 8, 2014).
                                                 34
“No one factor is dispositive as they are considered as a whole,” and the test “necessarily

becomes highly individualized to the facts of the particular case.”209

         The Promissory Note states that it is a “10% Convertible Promissory Note.”210 This

creates a rebuttable presumption that the Promissory Note is a covered security.

Defendants do not contend that the Promissory Note falls within any of the seven

enumerated categories under Reves.211 This leaves the “family resemblance” factors as

Defendants’ only option to show that the Promissory Note is not a covered security. None

of these factors supports Defendants’ position.

         Under the first factor, the trial record supports a finding that Dr. Moon, Prospect,

and Promise Easy’s motivations were to create an investment. Defendants argue that

Wey’s personal interest in breast cancer research and desire to work with Dr. Moon imply

that the funding was primarily a commercial loan. To the contrary, Promise Easy had

demonstrable profit motives behind its funding—Wey testified that Dr. Moon presented

that the project could eventually be worth more than $2 billion.212 This fact also weighs in

Promise Easy’s favor on the third factor, as Promise Easy’s reasonable expectation was

that it would reap a profit from funding Dr. Moon’s research.

209
   Fletcher, 2012 WL 1883040, at *9 (citing Thomas Lee Hazan, The Law of Securities
Regulation § 1.6(14) (4th ed. 2002)).
210
      Promissory Note at 1.
211
      See Defs.’ Opening Post-Trial Br. at 28–30.
212
      Trial Tr. at 356:17–24 (Wey).
                                              35
       The second and fourth factors further support this conclusion. As to the second

factor, Defendants argue that the fact that the Promissory Note was never transferred is

evidence that it was not freely transferable. Though Defendants are factually correct that

the note was never transferred, nothing in the Promissory Note prohibited Promise Easy

from transferring it to third parties, and in fact Dr. Moon sought other financers to purchase

Promise Easy’s obligation. Under the fourth factor, while the Security Agreement may

have initially provided some extra-statutory protection through collateralization, as

discussed below, Dr. Moon’s refiling of the patents in his own name threatened that

collateral.

       In sum, Defendants have failed to rebut the presumption that the Promissory Note

was a security covered by the Delaware Securities Act.

              2.     Promise Easy Proved The Elements Of Its Delaware Securities
                     Act Claim.

       To show that a defendant violated Section 73-201(2) of the Delaware Securities Act,

a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: “(1) made a misstatement or omission (2) of

material fact (3) with scienter (4) in connection with a purchase or sale of a security (5)

upon which the plaintiff . . . relied and (6) that reliance proximately caused the plaintiff's

(or other person’s) injury.”213

213
   Hubbard v. Hibbard Brown & Co., 633 A.2d 345, 349 (Del. 1993); see also XComp,
Inc. v. Ropp, 2002 WL 1753168, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2002) (listing same elements);
Van Roy v. Sakhr Software Co., 2014 WL 3367275, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2014) (listing
same elements).
                                             36
       Promise Easy proved factors (1), (2), (4), (5), and (6). The Product Timeline formed

the basis of the parties’ obligations in the NPA, and Dr. Moon testified that these goals

were never actually achievable. These misstatements, or the omission of Dr. Moon’s

characterization as “bare bones,” were material because the Product Timeline drove every

obligation in the NPA: how to measure Dr. Moon’s performance; when Promise Easy had

to make distributions; and when Dr. Moon could notice default. As found above, the

Promissory Note and NPA fall within the statutory definition of the “sale of a security.”

And as to reliance, the Product Timeline was the method of communicating expectations

of the investment to Promise Easy, and Promise Easy naturally relied on those expectations.

Promise Easy’s reliance on Dr. Moon’s misrepresentations proximately caused it to enter

into the failed investment. Defendants’ argument to the contrary, that Wey’s indictment

doomed the project, is specious: Dr. Moon failed to meet any of the milestones in the

Product Timeline, even those unrelated to relationships allegedly harmed by the allegations

against Wey.

       The remaining element, scienter, requires closer examination. In interpreting the

“antifraud” provisions of the Delaware Securities Act, the Delaware Supreme Court has

noted that they are virtually identical to the antifraud provisions in SEC Rule 10b-5.214 As

a result, state and federal courts in Delaware have applied a “knowingly” standard to claims

214
   See Hubbard, 633 A.2d at 349 (“Thus, both federal and state antifraud provisions share
the goal of protecting investors by preventing deception.”).
                                            37
under the Delaware Securities Act.215 Since the statute targets deception, it makes sense to

apply the same mental state standard to the antifraud provision as common law fraud: “a

misrepresentation must be made either knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless

indifference to the truth.”216

         The civil remedial provision of the Delaware Securities Act, Section 73-605, flips

the burden of proof, imposing liability where a seller defendant “does not sustain the

burden of proof that the [seller] did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could

not have known of the untruth or omission.”217 This court has interpreted an identical

Pennsylvania state antifraud provision to mean that a plaintiff need not plead scienter, but

that the plaintiff risks not recovering if the defendant can meet its burden of showing that

it exercised reasonable care.218 In this case, it is a distinction without a difference: Promise

Easy has proven that Dr. Moon, acting on behalf of Prospect, knowingly misrepresented

the Product Timeline inputs, which negates a finding that he did not know of their falsity

despite exercising reasonable care.

215
    See XComp, 2002 WL 1753168, at *2 (describing findings of the Securities
Commissioner of the State of Delaware that individual had violated the Delaware
Securities Act by making “knowingly false” statements); Van Roy, 2014 WL 3367275, at
*5 (applying Delaware common law fraud analysis to dismiss Delaware Securities Act
claims).
216
   Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 143
(Del. Ch. 2004).
217
      6 Del. C. § 73-605(a)(2).
218
      Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 599–600 (Del. Ch. 2004).
                                              38
         Both direct and circumstantial evidence support this outcome. Dr. Moon testified

that he knew that the project could feasibly take up to 36 months or more to complete,219

that a $2 million budget was “too tight,”220 and that the Total CRO contract could cost up

to $1 million.221 Dr. Moon supplied the inputs and ultimately signed the Transaction

Documents stating that the project could be completed in 18 months, within a $2 million

budget, based on an agreement with Total CRO to perform its services for $525,000.

Promise Easy has proven that Dr. Moon knew these statements to be false when he made

them.

         The surrounding circumstances and incentives further support this finding. Raiti,

Wey, and others on the investment side relied on Dr. Moon’s specialized expertise to create

the Product Timeline. It would not make sense for Promise Easy to agree to invest a

maximum of $2 million under the Promissory Note, while knowing that the project could

far exceed that estimate. Meanwhile, Dr. Moon needed funding to continue his research

and to supplement his part-time working income. Dr. Moon had an incentive to sugarcoat

the likely timeline and costs to encourage Promise Easy to make its investment. Once the

checks were signed, Dr. Moon went on a “break,” and he never completed any of the tasks

in the Product Timeline.         Promise Easy has proven that Dr. Moon knowingly

misrepresented the Product Timeline to induce Promise Easy to invest.

219
      Trial Tr. at 165:17–21 (Moon).
220
      Id. at 168:2–16 (Moon).
221
      Id. at 176:14–18 (Moon).
                                            39
         Promise Easy has thus proven a violation of the Delaware Securities Act. Under

Section 73-605(a)(2), Prospect Genetics is liable for this violation as the seller of the

Promissory Note.222 Section 73-605(b) imposes joint and several liability on “[e]very

person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable under subsection (a).”223

Dr. Moon, through his controlled entities (Forecast Genetics), held 100% of Promise

Easy’s outstanding shares. Prospect Genetics, Dr. Moon, and Forecast Genetics are thus

jointly and severally liable for the award of damages under the Delaware Securities Act,

which allows Promise Easy to “recover the consideration paid for the security, together

with the interest at the legal rate from the date of payment costs, and reasonable attorneys’

fees.”224 Promise Easy represented that the sum of its $500,200 principal payment, interest,

costs, and attorneys’ fees was $715,911.25 by the time of post-trial briefing.225 Counsel

shall submit an updated form of order and affidavit reflecting its final calculation for this

court’s approval.

         B.     Promise Easy Is Entitled To Declaratory Relief.

         In Count II, Promise Easy seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants breached

the Transaction Documents. Typically, the party seeking to enforce a contract must prove

222
      See 6 Del. C. § 73-605(a)(2).
223
      Id. § 73-605(b).
224
      Id. § 73-605(a)(2).
225
      Pl.’s Opening Post-Trial Br. at 33.
                                             40
each element of its breach of contract claim by a preponderance of the evidence.226 “Under

Delaware law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are: 1) a contractual obligation;

2) a breach of that obligation by the defendant; and 3) a resulting damage to plaintiff.”227

         Promise Easy contends that Defendants violated myriad provisions in the

Transaction Documents. Promise Easy seeks to enforce its right to indemnification for all

of its losses related to Defendants’ breaches under Section 9.14 of the NPA. Promise Easy

also seeks to enforce its right to have the patents reassigned in a manner consistent with

the Patent License Agreement.

         Defendants raise two arguments in response: that the count for declaratory relief is

duplicative of Promise Easy’s contract claims, and that any breach was excused under the

frustration of purpose doctrine due to Wey and Raiti’s conduct.

         First, Defendants say that Promise Easy’s requested declaratory judgment is entirely

duplicative of its contract claims in Counts III and IV, discussed in more detail below. This

position oversimplifies Promise Easy’s requested relief in the declaratory judgment. The

declaratory judgment seeks separate relief than the other counts. A finding of breach of

the NPA expands Promise Easy’s potential recovery to include JS Yoon under Section

9.14. The requested declaratory judgment also would require Defendants to indemnify

Promise Easy for all related losses. Finally, the requested declaratory judgment requires

226
  See Dermatology Assocs. of San Antonio v. Oliver St. Dermatology Mgmt. LLC, 2020
WL 4581674, at *19 n.214 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2020).
227
      H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 140 (Del. Ch. 2003).
                                              41
Dr. Moon to reassign the patents consistent with the Patent License Agreement. In other

words, the declaratory judgment is necessary to wholly resolve the dispute between the

parties of this case and avoid future litigation.

         Defendants argue in a single conclusory sentence that there is “no evidence that Dr.

Moon breached the NPA or other Transaction Documents.”228 This decision resolves the

claims in a similarly summary fashion.

         Under the Patent Licensing Agreement, Dr. Moon and JS Yoon granted an indefinite

license of the provisional patent to Prospect Genetics, with Promise Easy as a third-party

beneficiary. The document explicitly references the provisional patent that was then held

by JS Yoon. By refiling the patent in his own name, Dr. Moon effectively and unilaterally

withdrew the licensed patent from the agreement. Dr. Moon does not allege that any of the

conditions justifying termination were met in this instance, and thus terminating the

applicable patent was a breach.

         In Section 3.11 of the NPA, Defendants agreed that all information in the NPA and

its exhibits was not false or materially misleading. Defendants, through Dr. Moon, made

misleading statements as to the feasibility of the Product Timeline in breach of Section

3.11.

         In Section 5.1(g) of the NPA, Prospect covenanted not to “[a]mend, waive or modify

any term” of the Transaction Documents.229 By condoning Dr. Moon’s failure to complete

228
      Defs.’ Opening Post-Trial Br. at 53.
229
      NPA § 5.1(g).
                                              42
milestones in the Product Timeline, Prospect effectively waived or modified Dr. Moon’s

obligations under the Consulting Agreement in breach of Section 5.1(g).

       In other words, Promise Easy is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Defendants

breached the Transaction Documents.

       Second, Defendants contend that any breach is excused under the frustration of

purpose doctrine. Defendants’ argument on this point was also raised in a single sentence

in their post-trial opening brief.230 This argument is unconvincing, particularly as to actions

that were entirely within Dr. Moon’s own control, like reassigning the patents.

       Summing it up, Promise Easy is entitled to its proposed declaratory judgment, with

the caveat that Promise Easy cannot collect a double recovery for the same conduct. But

to the extent that the declaratory judgment encompasses relief with a greater scope than

that already awarded, Promise Easy is entitled to that relief.

       C.     Promise Easy Proved That Dr. Moon Breached The Consulting
              Agreement.

       In Count III, Promise Easy claims that Dr. Moon breached the Consulting

Agreement. The legal standard for breach of contract applied to Count II also applies to

Count III.

       Section 1 of the Consulting Agreement requires Dr. Moon to complete:

              [A]ll efforts, actions and activities necessary and sufficient to
              complete the development and commercialization of the Test
              as defined in the Convertible Note Purchase Agreement and all

230
    Defs.’ Opening Post-Trial Br. at 53 (“And even if the Court finds that a breach occurred,
it should also find that the breach was excused under the doctrine of frustration of purpose
because Plaintiff’s own agents frustrated the purpose of the Transaction Documents.”).
                                              43
                attachments and exhibits thereto, which are incorporated
                herein by reference. Such services include, but are not limited
                to, all activities, efforts and actions necessary and sufficient to
                complete the items listed in the Product Timeline.231

Promise Easy contends that Dr. Moon took his compensation under the Consulting

Agreement without performing any of the required services.

         As this decision has already discussed, Dr. Moon did not definitively complete any

tasks within the Product Timeline. In fact, Dr. Moon testified that he was on a “break” for

the first four months of the project. Meanwhile, Dr. Moon continued to receive his full

$20,000 monthly compensation under the Consulting Agreement. By failing to do “all

activities, efforts and actions necessary and sufficient to complete the items listed in the

Product Timeline,” Dr. Moon breached the Consulting Agreement.

         Defendants argue that any breach should be excused because Promise Easy and its

agents frustrated the Transaction Documents’ purpose by denying Dr. Moon’s request for

an Additional Advance. The frustration of purpose doctrine applies when: “(1) there is

substantial frustration of the principal purpose of the contract; (2) the parties assumed that

the frustrating event would not occur; and (3) the [d]efendant is not at fault.” 232 “In all the

cases holding that the promisor was discharged from duty by impossibility of performance

or frustration of purpose, it has been assumed that the promisor was not himself the

231
      Consulting Agr. § 1.
232
    Level 4 Yoga, LLC v. CorePower Yoga, LLC, 2022 WL 601862, at *26 (Del. Ch. Mar.
1, 2022) (quoting CRS Proppants LLC v. Preferred Resin Hldg. Co., LLC, 2016 6094167,
at *7 (Del. Super. Sept. 27, 2016)).
                                                44
responsible cause of the impossibility or frustration.”233 Frustration of purpose is “very

difficult to invoke,” and Delaware courts are “extremely reluctant to allow parties to

disavow obligations that they have agreed to.”234

         Defendants did not brief the elements of frustration of purpose. Regardless, they

have failed to demonstrate that Dr. Moon was not at fault for Promise Easy’s refusal to

disburse funds. The trial record shows that Promise Easy denied the Additional Advance

after Dr. Moon was unable to meet any of the contemplated deadlines in the first months

of the project. Defendants cannot now invoke the doctrine after stoking the fire themselves.

         Promise Easy has proven that Dr. Moon breached the Consulting Agreement.

         D.     Promise Easy Failed To Prove That Dr. Moon Breached The Implied
                Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing.

         Promise Easy argues that Dr. Moon’s demand of the Additional Advance, while he

simultaneously planned to terminate the project, was taken in bad faith. Under Promise

Easy’s theory, the Notice of Drawdown was pretextual so that Dr. Moon could deliver a

notice of default and prevent Promise Easy from exercising its conversion right under the

NPA.

         The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that a party vested with

discretion under a contract exercise its discretion reasonably, in good faith, and not in an

unreasonable or arbitrary way that would destroy the counterparty’s right to receive the

233
      Martin v. Star Publishing Co., 126 A.2d 238, 242–43 (Del. 1956).
234
   Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 2005 WL 5757652, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 27,
2005).
                                              45
fruits and benefits which they reasonably expected to receive under the contract. 235 The

implied covenant cannot be invoked to override the express terms of the contract.236

Moreover, rather than constituting a free floating duty imposed on a contracting party, the

implied covenant can only be used conservatively “to ensure the parties’ ‘reasonable

expectations’ are fulfilled.”237 The implied covenant is a limited remedy.238 Its application

is a “cautious enterprise.”239

            Section 1.3 of the NPA provides that Prospect Genetics can request Additional

Advances “at any time.”240 While Promise Easy alleges that Dr. Moon should have known

that the request would not be granted, the only requirement to make a request under the

NPA is that the Additional Advance be requested “for one or more Permitted Uses” and be

“consistent with the Product Timeline.”241 Further, some of Dr. Moon’s most credible

testimony suggested that it was Baxter’s idea to submit a request for an Additional Advance

235
   See, e.g., Miller v. HCP Trumpet Invs., LLC, 194 A.3d 908, 2018 WL 4600818, at *1
(Del. 2018) (TABLE), reargument denied (Oct. 9, 2018) (noting that “the mere vesting of
‘sole discretion’” does not relieve a party of its “obligation to use that discretion
consistently with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”).
236
   Dave Greytak Enters., Inc. v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 622 A.2d 14, 23 (Del. Ch.
1992) (“[W]here the subject at issue is expressly covered by the contract, or where the
contract is intentionally silent as to that subject, the implied duty to perform in good faith
does not come into play.”).
237
      Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005).
238
      Id. at 441.
239
      Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Del. 2010).
240
      NPA § 1.3.
241
      Id.
                                              46
to keep the project alive. Promise Easy failed to show that the request was so unrelated to

legitimate needs of the project as to violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.

         E.     Promise Easy Proved Fraudulent Inducement.

         Under Delaware law, the elements for fraudulent inducement are:

                (1) [T]hat a defendant made a false representation, usually one
                of fact; (2) with the knowledge or belief that the representation
                was false, or with reckless indifference to the truth; (3) with an
                intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4)
                that plaintiff's action or inaction was taken in justifiable
                reliance upon the representation; and (5) damage to the
                plaintiff as a result of her reliance on the representation.242

         This exercise mirrors the Delaware Securities Act analysis above. Dr. Moon

provided the false inputs behind the Product Timeline while knowing that the estimates

were unattainable. Dr. Moon made the misrepresentations to induce Promise Easy to

provide funding, which Promise Easy did in justifiable reliance on Dr. Moon’s expertise in

the field. Promise Easy has proven that it was damaged by its investment, which it still has

not recovered.

         Promise Easy has proven its claim for fraudulent inducement.

         F.     Available Remedies

         Promise Easy is entitled to compensatory damages, including return of the Initial

Advance, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. Promise Easy is also entitled to declaratory

relief as discussed herein, including enforcing its right to indemnification under the NPA.

242
      In re Swervepay Acq., LLC, 2022 WL 3701723, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2022).
                                               47
Promise Easy is not entitled to rescissory damages as an equitable remedy because they

have failed to show that compensatory and declaratory relief do not provide them an

adequate remedy at law.

III.   CONCLUSION
       Judgment is entered in favor of Promise Easy as to Counts I, II, III, and V of the

Complaint. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants as to Count IV of the Complaint.

Counsel shall submit a form of order implementing this decision within ten business days

after its publication.

                                           48