Court Opinion

ID: 9395604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 15:05:52.280568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:09.768182
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 127828

                                         IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT
                                             OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                    (Docket No. 127828)

                THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                        SHAQUILLE P. PRINCE, Appellant.

                                Opinion filed May 18, 2023.

        JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Cunningham, Rochford,
     and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                         OPINION

¶1       A jury convicted defendant, Shaquille P. Prince, of the offense of obstruction
     of justice by furnishing false information (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1) (West 2018)), in
     that he gave the police a fake name and an incorrect birth date at the police station
     following his arrest. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, finding the evidence
     insufficient to convict as a matter of law, where the State failed to establish the
     “material impediment” element of the offense. Relying on this court’s decision in
     People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, the appellate court remanded the matter for a
     new trial, finding double jeopardy did not bar retrial. We allowed defendant’s
     petition for leave to appeal. As outlined below, we affirm in part and reverse in part
     the judgment of the appellate court and reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

¶2                                     BACKGROUND

¶3       We recite only those facts necessary to resolve the issue before us. Romeoville
     police officers arrested defendant on January 25, 2018. On February 7, 2018, a Will
     County grand jury returned a bill of indictment alleging defendant committed the
     Class 4 felony offense of obstruction of justice, by furnishing false information, in
     that he gave police a fake name and an incorrect birth date with intent to avoid
     arrest on a then-active warrant. Notably, the underlying Du Page County warrant
     “had been issued in error and was later vacated.” 2021 IL App (3d) 190440, ¶ 40.

¶4       During defendant’s jury trial in April 2019, the State presented the following
     evidence. Romeoville police officers responded to a call that a residential security
     alarm had been activated. When officers arrived at the residence shortly after 1
     a.m., the alarm was no longer sounding. At the rear of the house, they found an
     unlocked door. When the officers opened the door, the alarm began to sound again.
     Then, defendant came to the door wearing a tank top and sweatpants. When
     questioned regarding the whereabouts of the home’s occupant, defendant stated
     “Jessica” lived there but was out of town and refused to give the officers his name
     or identification or to assist officers in contacting Jessica. After officers entered the
     home to investigate, defendant attempted to push past the officers and go to the
     bedroom. Ultimately, defendant was arrested and taken to the Romeoville police
     station.

¶5       An officer who remained at the residence after defendant was transported to the
     Romeoville police station spoke to Amanda Reeves, a friend of Jessica’s, who gave
     the officer defendant’s social media username. From this, the officer determined
     defendant’s name and learned there was an active Du Page County warrant out for
     his arrest.

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¶6         At the police station, defendant initially refused to be fingerprinted or to take a
       booking photo. While at the station, defendant stated his name was “Sean
       Williams” and gave the police an incorrect birth date. Officers ran that information
       through the LEADS database and found no match. After speaking to a police
       supervisor, defendant agreed to allow the police to fingerprint and photograph him.
       One officer estimated that the time between defendant arriving at the station and
       agreeing to a booking photo and fingerprinting was “more than minutes,” but he
       did not want to guess the “exact time” this took.

¶7         Defendant testified that he had permission to stay in the house and had set off
       the alarm by accident. According to defendant, the police were combative and
       needlessly escalated the situation into a physical confrontation. Defendant denied
       giving the police a false name and birth date. During the jury trial, the parties did
       not raise, and the court did not address or enter any ruling on, “material
       impediment” as an element of the offense. A jury convicted defendant of
       obstructing justice. At sentencing, the court sentenced defendant to 24 months’
       conditional discharge and 360 days of jail time, with credit for 180 days already
       served. Defendant appealed.

¶8         On appeal, the State conceded that the evidence presented was insufficient as a
       matter of law where the State offered no evidence on the “material impediment”
       element. Id. ¶ 34 (citing Casler, 2020 125117, ¶ 69). The appellate court accepted
       the State’s concession and found the evidence insufficient as a matter of law where
       the State failed to prove the “material impediment” element of obstruction of
       justice. Id. ¶ 41. Relying on Casler, the appellate court remanded the matter for a
       new trial, finding double jeopardy did not bar retrial. Id. (citing Casler, 2020
       125117, ¶¶ 66-67).

¶9         We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct.
       1, 2021).

¶ 10                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 11       In this matter, we are asked to decide whether constitutional double-jeopardy
       principles bar remand for a new trial. An issue involving the constitutional
       protection against double jeopardy “presents a question of law subject to de novo

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       review.” People v. Gaines, 2020 IL 125165, ¶ 24. The double jeopardy clause of
       the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states
       through the fourteenth amendment, and the double jeopardy clause of the Illinois
       Constitution both provide that no person shall “be twice put in jeopardy” for the
       same offense. U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10. The fifth
       amendment’s “prohibition against placing a defendant ‘twice in jeopardy’
       represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit,” to prevent
       the government from “subject[ing] the individual to repeated prosecutions for the
       same offense,” given “the heavy personal strain” that a criminal trial places on a
       defendant. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).

¶ 12       The United States Supreme Court has explained that, as with an acquittal or
       directed verdict for the defendant at trial, the prohibition against double jeopardy
       similarly “precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence
       legally insufficient.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978). On the other
       hand, an appellate reversal in which a “conviction [is] set aside for error in the
       proceedings below” can result in a remand for a new trial. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488
       U.S. 33, 39-40 (1988).

¶ 13       In People v. Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139, 150 (2011), this court held that the State
       needed to show the defendant “materially impede[d] the police officers’
       investigation” to prove him guilty of obstructing justice by “concealing” evidence
       and, where no such showing was made, the evidence was legally insufficient to
       convict. This court then reversed the defendant’s conviction without remanding for
       a new trial. Id. at 151.

¶ 14       Similarly, in People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶¶ 29, 35-38, this court
       held that obstructing a police officer by providing false information requires that
       the giving of “false information actually impeded an act the officer was authorized
       to perform.” We affirmed the appellate court’s reversal for insufficient evidence to
       support a conviction. Id. ¶ 38. As in Comage, we did not remand for a new trial. Id.

¶ 15       Prior to the trial in this case, the appellate court in People v. Taylor, 2012 IL
       App (2d) 110222, ¶ 17, analyzed Comage and Baskerville and held a material
       impediment must be proven to support a conviction of obstructing justice by
       furnishing false information—the same offense at issue here. The Taylor court
       similarly reversed outright where the evidence was legally insufficient to convict

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       and distinguished People v. Davis, 409 Ill. App. 3d 457, 458 (2011), overruled by
       Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 53, an earlier appellate court case decided prior to the
       guidance of Baskerville. Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222, ¶¶ 14, 17-19; see
       Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 43 (noting that Taylor “correctly applied these principles
       as expressed in Comage and Baskerville”).

¶ 16       After trial in this case, we held in Casler that the decisions in Comage and
       Baskerville, when “[c]onstrued together,” already “firmly establish that a
       defendant’s acts must be a material impediment and must be proved in a
       prosecution for obstructing justice.” Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 41. The trial court
       in Casler barred the parties from arguing or introducing any evidence regarding
       whether defendant’s conduct there was a material impediment—preventing
       introduction of the very evidence this court found lacking. Id. ¶ 62.

¶ 17        Even so, we concluded that double-jeopardy principles allowed for retrial in
       those circumstances and remanded the case, noting “the error that manifested at
       defendant’s trial is, despite the nomenclature employed by the parties, more akin to
       trial error than to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. ¶ 66. Despite concluding that
       the need to prove a material impediment for obstructing justice was “firmly
       established” by prior opinions in 2011 and 2012 (id. ¶ 41), this court also opined
       that, to some extent, a “change in the law” had occurred in Casler (id. ¶¶ 65-66).

¶ 18       In this case, defendant argues that Burks should drive our remedy analysis rather
       than Casler, because here, unlike in Casler, there was no trial error that barred the
       introduction of sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.

¶ 19       Defendant also notes that, well before the time of trial here, Comage and
       Baskerville together had “firmly established” the need to prove that additional
       element, as this court would later recognize in Casler and the appellate court had
       already concluded in Taylor. Defendant argues that, taken together with the
       doctrine of legislative acquiescence and the rule of lenity, the State should have
       known it was required to prove a material impediment and, in any event, double
       jeopardy should now apply to bar remand for another trial.

¶ 20       The State initially asserts that Casler is “materially indistinguishable from this
       case,” pointing to the remedy portion of Casler, in which this court discussed cases
       analyzing a change-in-law exception and equated the error at issue there as being

                                                -5-
       like a trial error. The State then argues that a change-in-law exception should apply
       here too, citing Casler and a variety of federal cases. Defendant responds that this
       court need not reach the issue of a change-in-law exception to decide this case but,
       to the extent we do consider it, any such exception should be carefully limited.

¶ 21       In the alternative, the parties also dispute whether it would even be possible for
       the State to prove a material impediment on remand. Defendant asserts the facts of
       this case are straightforward and clearly foreclose that possibility, where defendant
       was already in custody at the police station by the time he gave a fake name and an
       incorrect birth date. In the meantime, officers both (1) inferred defendant’s real
       name around the same time by looking at his social media account and (2) gained
       his consent to be fingerprinted a short time later. The State argues it should be given
       the opportunity to try to present new evidence on remand.

¶ 22       Defendant additionally argues in the alternative that this court should reverse
       outright where he has already completed his sentence and “a new trial therefore
       would be neither equitable nor productive.” People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 87
       (2006). Defendant also highlights the fact that the underlying warrant was issued in
       error and later rescinded, while emphasizing that any further proceedings would be
       a waste of judicial resources. The State asserts that this court should remand and
       defer to prosecutorial discretion on the question of whether to retry defendant.

¶ 23       To begin, we reject the State’s assertion that this case is “indistinguishable”
       from Casler. Critical to our decision to remand for a new trial in Casler was the
       fact that the trial court barred the parties from introducing evidence on the key issue
       of whether defendant’s actions constituted a material impediment. Casler, 2020 IL
       125117, ¶ 62 (emphasizing that “the record in this case plainly shows that the trial
       court categorically excluded any evidence relating to the essential element of a
       material impediment”). As we noted, such an error should be considered as “more
       akin to trial error than to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. ¶ 66.

¶ 24       Here, by contrast, no such restriction occurred at trial. The State—which has
       the burden of proof—had the opportunity to introduce evidence proving each
       element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite this, the State
       made no attempt to introduce any evidence of a material impediment, thus failing
       to provide legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction.

                                                -6-
¶ 25       As we have noted, the State’s reliance on Davis, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 458—which
       was decided prior to Baskerville and correctly distinguished in Taylor on that basis,
       before being overruled in Casler—is misplaced. The State also cites two cases from
       this court, People v. Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d 28, 46-47 (2002), and In re Q.P., 2015 IL
       118569, ¶¶ 23-27, but neither case addresses whether evidence of a material
       impediment is required in a prosecution for obstructing justice.

¶ 26       The State next urges us to consider federal change-in-law cases. But in each of
       the federal cases cited by the State—including some cited in Casler, 2020 IL
       125117, ¶¶ 65-66 (collecting cases)—the parties were required at trial to follow a
       then-binding trial or appellate court ruling or law that was later overturned, similar
       in effect to what occurred in Casler. See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453,
       1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial on one count where the then-applicable
       rule on “use” of a firearm was abrogated by the Supreme Court); United States v.
       Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial where the Supreme
       Court abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s mens rea requirement for relevant financial
       offenses after trial); United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2015)
       (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Sixth Circuit’s standard
       defining a “true threat” after trial); United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d 708, 711-12 (4th
       Cir. 2013) (permitting retrial where the erroneous definition at issue was “binding
       on the district court” at trial); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F.3d 311, 318 (7th Cir.
       1996) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Seventh Circuit’s
       definition of “use” for a drug offense after trial); United States v. Harrington, 997
       F.3d 812, 817 (8th Cir. 2021) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court
       abrogated the Eighth Circuit’s standard for relevant drug offenses after trial);
       United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1225 (11th Cir. 2007) (remand allowed
       where an erroneous ruling defining “navigable waters” controlled at trial).

¶ 27       We decline to apply such logic in this case, which lacks any similar trial
       restriction. There was no trial error, or anything akin to one, that prevented the
       State—which bore the burden of proof—from introducing evidence in this case on
       the issue of whether a material impediment occurred. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 39-
       40; Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 66. Nor was there an appellate court ruling or law in
       effect at the time of trial, later overruled, that similarly limited the State’s approach
       at trial. See, e.g., Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1465; Weems, 49 F.3d at 531. Instead, the
       evidence presented by the State was legally insufficient to convict. See Taylor,

                                                 -7-
       2012 IL App (2d) 110222, ¶¶ 14, 17-19. On this basis, we conclude the double
       jeopardy clause bars any retrial. We therefore reverse defendant’s conviction and
       vacate his sentence.

¶ 28      In an effort to provide clear guidance for future cases, we acknowledge that this
       holding could be read to conflict with the following discussion in Casler:

              “We determine that the evidence was sufficient under the instruction that
          was given, rather than the instruction that would otherwise be given on
          remand. [Citations.] Here, the State had no reason to introduce evidence
          regarding a material impediment requirement because, at the time of trial, this
          court had not yet held that the government was required to prove that element
          with regard to the furnishing of false information. [Citations.]

              More fundamentally, the error that manifested at defendant’s trial is, despite
          the nomenclature employed by the parties, more akin to trial error than to the
          sufficiency of the evidence. [Citation.] Any insufficiency in proof was caused
          by the subsequent change in the law and not the State’s failure to present
          sufficient evidence. [Citation.] Courts considering this issue agree that where a
          reviewing court determines that the evidence presented at trial has been
          rendered insufficient only by a posttrial change in the law, double jeopardy
          concerns do not preclude the government from retrying the defendant.
          [Citations.]” Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶¶ 65-66.

¶ 29       To the extent that our holding in this matter seems at odds with the previously
       mentioned discussion in Casler, we caution that the remedy portion of Casler
       should be read narrowly to apply to its facts. For purposes of double-jeopardy
       analysis, we conclude that a “change in law” only occurred there in the sense that
       this court reversed the trial court’s erroneous ruling barring the introduction of key
       evidence.

¶ 30      Given our conclusion that retrial is prohibited in this matter, we decline to
       address the remaining arguments pertaining to a potential remand.

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¶ 31                                    CONCLUSION

¶ 32       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of
       the appellate court and reverse the judgment of the circuit court. We reverse
       defendant’s conviction and vacate his sentence.

¶ 33      Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

¶ 34      Circuit court judgment reversed.

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