Court Opinion

ID: 9596482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:50:13.962276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:16.573157
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case, concluding that, by entering the nolle prosequi, the trial court committed reversible error which was not induced by Smith. In *400my opinion, the trial court did not err and, even assuming that it did, any error was induced by Smith. Therefore, I dissent.
As the majority acknowledges, the existence of error vel non depends upon whether the amended accusation in this case was a superseding charging instrument. A superseding charging instrument has been defined as one which formally alleges that the defendant committed a crime, but which was returned without dismissal of a prior instrument charging him with the offense. See Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 178, 179 (1) (598 SE2d 898) (2004). If the amended accusation was a superseding charging instrument, it was not error to enter the nolle prosequi, since Smith had never been arraigned on it and, consequently, had never been placed in jeopardy. “ ‘ “A defendant is placed in jeopardy when, in a court of competent jurisdiction with a sufficient indictment, he has been arraigned, has pled guilty and a jury has been impaneled and sworn. [Cit.]” [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” Hubbard v. State, 225 Ga. App. 154, 155 (483 SE2d 115) (1997). See also Bryans v. State, 34 Ga. 323 (1866). “A nolle prosequi . . . maybe entered without the consent of the accused at any time prior to the attachment of jeopardy. [Cits.]” MeIntyre v. State, 189 Ga. App. 764, 765 (1) (377 SE2d 532) (1989).
The majority relies upon OCGA § 17-7-71 (f) for the proposition that the amended accusation did not constitute a superseding charging instrument to which the right of arraignment attached. That might be correct if the accusation had charged Smith with only misdemeanor offenses. See Vanorsdall v. State, 241 Ga. App. 871, 874 (2) (a) (528 SE2d 312) (2000); Prindle v. State, 240 Ga. App. 461 (1) (523 SE2d 44) (1999). However, the accusation charged him with felony shoplifting, as well as misdemeanors. Accordingly, the applicable provision is OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1), (2), which provides, in relevant part, that
defendants shall be tried on such accusations [as charge certain enumerated felonies, including shoplifting,] according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury. All laws relating to rights and responsibilities attendant to indicted cases shall be applicable to cases brought by accusations signed by the district attorney.
Georgia has long adhered to the principle that, “ ‘[generally, a person indicted for or charged with an offense against the laws of this state is entitled as a matter of right to be arraigned before pleading to the indictment____’ [Cit.]” Shorter v. State, 155 Ga. App. 609, 610 (1) (271 SE2d 741) (1980). Indeed, it is reversible error for a trial court to require a defendant to go to trial on an indictment “when [he] was not *401formally arraigned and refused specifically to waive such arraignment.” Presnell v. State, 159 Ga. App. 598 (284 SE2d 106) (1981). Thus, the express preservation in OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1), (2) of the “same rules of substantive and procedural laws” and “ [a]ll laws relating to rights and responsibilities” as are applicable in criminal cases pursued by way of indictment is significant. It renders the amended accusation in this case a superseding charging instrument as a matter of law, because it was, in effect, a “reindictment” of Smith on a felony charge, to which the right of formal arraignment attached. Thus, even though the prosecutor had the authority to amend the accusation under OCGA § 17-7-71 (f), Smith nevertheless retained the right to a formal arraignment on that amended accusation in accordance with OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1), (2). It is undisputed that Smith did not waive that right, so the trial court properly granted the nolle prosequi. The majority seeks to avoid this result by concluding that the “language [of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1), (2)] refers to the trial of the case brought by accusation, not to the process by which the accusation is produced and the defendant is brought to trial. [Cit.]” P. 399. This interpretation is clearly contrary to the express terms of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1), which specifies that an accused “shall be tried . . . according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury.” (Emphasis supplied.) An arraignment is certainly a procedural right of the defendant who has been indicted. Moreover, OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (2) is not limited to the actual trial proceedings, but refers to “[a]ll laws relating to rights and responsibilities attendant to indicted cases ....” (Emphasis supplied.) “Arraignment is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution in this state not only because the defendant must enter a plea, [cit.] but also because USCR 31.1 mandates that pre-trial motions be filed at or before arraignment.” Ledford v. State, 247 Ga. App. 885, 886 (545 SE2d 396) (2001). Therefore, even assuming that arraignment is not considered a part of a criminal trial, it certainly is deemed a crucial procedural stage in all criminal cases initiated by indictment.
Until arraignment and plea, there is no issue between the State and prisoner. [Cit.] It is conceded on all hands, that there had been in this case no arraignment of the prisoner, nor waiver of it. There could, consequently, be no plea to the indictment. The empaneling of a jury then was, merely an irregularity.
Bryans v. State, supra at 324. Therefore, absent Smith’s waiver of his procedural right to an arraignment, OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1), (2) *402precluded proceeding with his trial on the accusation charging him with one or more of the enumerated felonies.
Furthermore, even assuming that, contrary to the unambiguous terms of the statute, the majority is otherwise correct when it holds on p. 399 that “OCGA § 17-7-70.1 does not import into prosecutions based on accusations all the procedural rules applicable to indictments,” it nevertheless appears that any error in this case was induced by Smith himself. In rejecting the applicability of the induced error principle, the majority concludes that “Smith was not alone in treating the amended accusation as a superseding charging instrument since the trial court and the prosecution made the same assumption.” P. 397. By very definition, however, the concept of “induced error” is intended to apply in those instances in which the appellant attacks on appeal a ruling of the trial court that he was responsible for invoking. “ A party cannot reap the benefit of any error caused or aided by his own trial tactics, procedure or conduct.’ [Cit.]” Carr v. State, 262 Ga. App. 676, 680 (2) (586 SE2d 337) (2003). Therefore, the fact that Smith played an instrumental part in the trial court’s treatment of the amended accusation as a superseding charging instrument is simply not a valid ground for holding that the induced error principle cannot be invoked against him. To the contrary, his success in that regard is precisely the reason why that principle should apply. In my opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly held that, under the circumstances presented here, Smith “cannot now profit from an error that he induced. [Cit.]” Smith v. State, 268 Ga. App. 231, 232 (601 SE2d 708) (2004).
The majority observes that amendment of the accusation did not constitute the commencement of a new prosecution, and that Smith’s arraignment on the previous accusation was sufficient. See Vanorsdall v. State, supra; Prindle v. State, supra. If that is true, then the trial should have proceeded on the amended accusation. However, Smith never asserted his right to go forward with the trial. Instead, he moved for a mistrial, and maintained in the Court of Appeals that “the proper remedy was ... to nolle prosequi the amended accusation and proceed with a new trial on the original accusation.” Smith v. State, supra at 232. Thus, Smith did not contend below that the amended accusation was not a superseding charging instrument. “Indeed, by refusing to waive arraignment as to the amended accusation and then moving for mistrial, Smith took the position at trial that the amended accusation was in fact a superseding charging instrument.” Smith v. State, supra at 232. Therefore, he caused or aided in the trial court’s treatment of the amended accusation as a superseding charging instrument on which he could not be tried unless and until he had been arraigned separately thereon. It is clear that, if the trial court had granted the mistrial that Smith sought, no *403reversible error would have occurred. “Generally, where a mistrial is granted on the defendant’s motion, double jeopardy does not bar a retrial . . . .” Weems v. State, 269 Ga. 577, 580 (4) (501 SE2d 806) (1998). It is also clear that, had Smith’s motion for mistrial been granted, he could not now complain of the subsequent entry of the nolle prosequi. “[A] nolle prosequi entered after mistrial, even without the consent of defendant, does not have the effect of acquittal.” Rhyne v. State, 209 Ga. App. 548, 550 (1) (434 SE2d 76) (1993), aff'd, 264 Ga. 176 (442 SE2d 742) (1994).
Therefore, the majority’s rather odd rationale for refusing to apply the induced error principle in this case appears to be that the trial court did not err “enough.” Had it erroneously granted the motion for mistrial that Smith actually insisted on, and then subsequently entered the erroneous nolle prosequi of the amended accusation, then a retrial presumably would not be barred. See Weems v. State, supra; Rhyne v. State, supra. However, because the trial court acted on the purported mischaracterization, fostered by Smith, of the amended accusation as a superseding charging instrument to which jeopardy did not attach until arraignment, the majority holds that the limited error in treating it as such by granting the motion for nolle prosequi is reversible. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible for the majority to conclude that the proper remedy in this case was to deny Smith’s motion for mistrial and also to deny the State’s nolle prosequi motion as to the amended accusation. However, our present inquiry should be limited to determining whether, considering what was asserted below, the trial court committed reversible error when it responded to Smith’s insistence on ending his trial on the amended accusation. The majority concludes that it would be unconstitutional to retry Smith. However, a retrial was precisely what he sought when he urged that the amended accusation was a superseding charging instrument and moved for a mistrial. The only difference is that his retrial would have been conducted on the amended accusation, rather than on the original instrument. If the majority is correct, however, trying Smith on the amended accusation was always proper. Having obtained the right to have the retrial that he sought, Smith cannot now claim that he will be harmed simply because he will receive it as the result of an erroneous nolle prosequi, rather than the erroneous grant of his motion for mistrial. “ ‘A self-induced error is too close to premeditated error, hence beyond further appellate scrutiny.’ [Cits.]” Gordon v. State, 252 Ga. App. 133, 135 (2) (555 SE2d 793) (2001). Because, by contending that the amended accusation was a superseding charging instrument and by insisting that it be treated as such, Smith was responsible for inducing the retrial of which he now complains, the error is not reversible and, consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals to that effect should be affirmed.
*404Decided June 6, 2005.
Marcy Ann Jolles, Benjamin A. Pearlman, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Brian V. Patterson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.