Court Opinion

ID: 9693431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:41:10.515321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:46.429971
License: Public Domain

*235CAPPY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s determination that an order denying a motion for continuance filed by the Commonwealth is sufficiently similar to an order granting suppression of evidence so as to permit an interlocutory appeal therefrom based solely on the Commonwealth’s assertion that the order substantially handicaps the prosecution. See, Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985). Contrary to the position of the Majority, I do not believe that the filing of a Dugger certification is a sufficient safeguard to prevent the Commonwealth from filing appeals simply to delay trial where, as here, the trial court has denied the Commonwealth’s motion to continue.
The Majority’s decision to permit an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to continue trial upon the bald assertion of a Dugger certification transcends this court’s holding and reasoning in Dugger to a degree that I cannot countenance. In Dugger, this court’s reasoning for permitting interlocutory appeals from suppression orders was made clear:
From the point of view of the Commonwealth, two possible situations may arise: (a) the order of suppression will result in a termination and conclusion of the prosecution or (b) while the order of suppression will not result in a termination or conclusion of the prosecution, it will result in a prosecution wherein the Commonwealth is substantially handicapped because it cannot present all its available evidence. In the first situation, the element of finality inherent in the order of the suppression is apparent and sufficient to render the order appealable. In the second situation, although the element of finality in the order is not so apparent it is nevertheless present. Without a right of appeal in the Commonwealth in the second situation, the Commonwealth is completely deprived of any opportunity to secure an appellate court evaluation of the validity of the order of suppression which forces the Commonwealth to trial without all of its evidence. The evidence suppressed may well mark the difference between success and failure in the prosecution; to deny the Commonwealth its only oppor*236tunity of securing an appellate review to determine whether the evidence was properly suppressed is highly unfair to the Commonwealth and the interests of society which it represents.
Dugger, 506 Pa. at 544-45, 486 A.2d at 385-86 (citing Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 63, 190 A.2d 304, 308 (1963)(emphasis in the original)). Thus, in recognition of the practical effects that an order suppressing evidence may have on the prosecution, the majority of the court in Dugger rendered permissible an appeal of a suppression order upon a good faith certification by the Commonwealth that the suppression order substantially handicaps its prosecution. The court specifically noted, however, that “[s]uch certification is required as a means of preventing frivolous appeals and appeals intended solely for delay.” Dugger, 506 Pa. at 547, 486 A.2d at 386.
Given these reasons as expressed in Dugger for permitting an appeal from an order of suppression, I think it a leap of faith to extend the class of orders from which a Dugger certification will suffice; especially to include therein orders such as the instant one which can be classified as none other than an order designed to delay trial irrespective of the good or bad faith of the Commonwealth in so certifying. As the above-recited portions of Dugger make clear, this court was acutely aware of the undesirable consequences of permitting unfettered Dugger certifications from all orders entered adversely to the Commonwealth.1 In short, I think the certification represents an unwarranted extension of Dugger.
Since I find the order denying the Commonwealth’s motion to continue to be a non-appealable interlocutory order, I would also conclude that, pursuant to Pa.R.App.P. 1701(b)(6), the *237trial court was not divested of jurisdiction of the matter upon the filing of the Commonwealth’s appeal from that order and Rule 1100 continued to run. The running of Rule 1100 was not tolled during that period of time which elapsed during the Commonwealth’s appeal for the further reason that the trial court explicitly found that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in bringing Appellee to trial. Finally, I do not believe that Jones v. Commonwealth, 495 Pa. 490, 434 A.2d 1197 (1981) is dispositive of the issue presented sub judiee as that case involved an order suppressing evidence which, as noted above, is significantly different than the order here appealed. Hence, I would agree with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that the charges be dismissed under Rule 1100 and would, thus, reverse the decision of the Superior Court.
ZAPPALA and NIGRO, JJ., joins this Dissenting Opinion.

. Moreover, the rules providing for interlocutory appeals by permission upon certification of the trial court adequately protect all the parties in circumstances such as the present. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b); Pa.R.App. 312, 1301-1323. Under those rules the Commonwealth would carry the burden of demonstrating the necessity for-an interlocutory appeal from the order denying the continuance. To allow the Commonwealth on its own initiative to by-pass these rules by self-certifying such interlocutory appeals would not only run afoul of Dugger, but also circumvent the rules respecting interlocutory appeals.