Court Opinion

ID: 9926410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 18:01:18.969367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:45.847939
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 24 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT YORK, an individual,                      No. 23-55122

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:22-cv-09127-JAK-SP

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                   John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted January 17, 2024**

Before:      S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

      Scott York appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his

action alleging various federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo a sua sponte dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1987). We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed York’s action because York failed to

allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See id. (explaining that a district

court may dismiss sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) “without notice where the

claimant cannot possibly win relief”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (explaining that to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face,” and that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to

amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home

Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review

and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper if amendment

would be futile).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying York’s requests for

injunctive relief because York failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the

merits of his claims. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559

F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and explaining

that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that the plaintiff is

                                            2                                      23-55122
likely to succeed on the merits).

      We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      York’s motion for injunctive relief on appeal and judicial notice (Docket

Entry No. 6) is denied.

      AFFIRMED.

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