Court Opinion

ID: 9739276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:35.572305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.285134
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 94. (dissenting).
The majority takes the circuit court to task for failing to provide a detailed or exhaustive Sullivan three-prong analysis in determining the admissibility of other acts evidence. It criticizes the court of appeals for avoiding the careful step-by-step analysis set forth in Sullivan. Then, after explaining the careful analysis required by Sullivan and reaffirming its vitality, the majority inexplicably neglects to engage in the mandated analysis.
¶ 95. The majority, like the circuit court, fails to carefully analyze each item of other acts evidence to ensure that it does not merely color the defendant's character, but legitimately serves a permissible purpose. Its "kitchen sink" listing of permissible purposes without adequate analysis of how each item of other acts evidence is relevant to the identified purpose falls short of the approach required by Sullivan. I write to emphasize that the Sullivan mandate includes a careful statement of a clearly articulated purpose of each piece of other acts evidence and an analysis of whether that evidence is relevant to the purpose.
¶ 96. In Sullivan, we observed that the introduction of other acts evidence creates a risk that jurors will punish the accused for being a bad person regardless of *50his or her guilt of the crime charged. State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 783, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). We cited Whitty which set forth the following reasons for excluding other acts evidence:
"(1) The overstrong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a person likely to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn not because he is believed guilty of the present charge but because he has escaped punishment from other offenses; (3) the injustice of attacking one who is not prepared to demonstrate the attacking evidence is fabricated; and (4) the confusion of issues which might result from bringing in evidence of other crimes."
Id. at 782-83 (citing Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 292, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967).
¶ 97. To protect against the improper admission of other acts evidence, the Sullivan court described a three-pronged analysis to be used in determining whether to admit other acts evidence. This analysis requires a circuit court to consider (1) whether the other acts evidence is offered for a permissible purpose; (2) whether the other acts evidence is relevant; and (3) whether the probative value of the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772.
¶ 98. The Sullivan court observed that the absence of careful statements regarding the rationale for admitting or excluding other acts evidence substantially increases the likelihood for trial court error and makes appellate review more difficult. Id. at 774. The analysis set forth in Sullivan requires a clearly articu*51lated purpose of each piece of other acts evidence and an assessment of whether that evidence is relevant to the purpose.
¶ 99. The proponent of other acts evidence must clearly articulate the purposes for which it is intended and apply the facts to the analytical framework. Id. Similarly, the court's obligation is to clearly articulate its reasoning for admitting or excluding other acts evidence, applying the facts of the case to the three-prong analysis. Id. Thus, I agree with the majority opinion that the circuit court erred in failing to perform the required analysis and neglecting to clearly articulate its reasoning for admitting the other acts evidence. Majority op., ¶ 3.
¶ 100. The majority, however, fares little better in its attempt to articulate its reasoning in a manner that satisfies Sullivan. Its inadequate analysis is particularly apparent in its explanation of how the other acts evidence satisfies the first and second prongs of Sullivan.
¶ 101. The majority cites to a litany of permissible purposes that it considers to be applicable in this case. In ¶ 59, the majority opines that the other acts evidence was permissible to show the victims' state of mind, to corroborate information provided by the police, and to establish the credibility of victims and witnesses in light of their recantations. The opinion, however, fails to reference which of the 15 enumerated other acts related to which purpose.1
*52¶ 102. After listing these purposes as applicable to this case, some of them disappear from sight. The opinion does not take any of these purposes through the second and third prongs of the Sullivan analysis and does not include them in the list of purposes for which the evidence was properly admitted. See majority op., ¶ 90. Likewise, in a tag along line at the end of ¶ 59, the majority raises the purposes of preparation or plan. They also disappear from the opinion without further analysis.
¶ 103. Next, in ¶ 60, the majority adds the dual purposes of establishing opportunity and motive. Yet it never explains what other acts evidence is offered for those purposes. In ¶ 61, the majority again makes a generic reference to other acts evidence and concludes that it is "relevant to show that Hunt did not touch the victims by accident or mistake." Without a proffered analysis, it is difficult to understand the relevance given that Hunt never raised accident or mistake as part of his defense.
¶ 104. Even more troubling is the majority's discussion of why the other acts evidence satisfies the second prong of the Sullivan analysis. In this discussion, the majority concludes that the other acts evidence was relevant for the purposes of showing context, opportunity, intent, absence of mistake or accident, and motive. Majority op., ¶ 62.
¶ 105. To support this conclusion, the opinion cites excerpts from a motion hearing which contain arguments regarding admitting the evidence for the purposes of showing context. These excerpts also vaguely refer to the purposes of showing the defendant's state of mind, the victims' and the witnesses' state of mind, absence of mistake or accident, motive, and opportunity. The reference to these ex*53cerpts is the extent of the majority's articulation of the reasons why the other acts evidence was relevant.
¶ 106. The excerpts are woefully inadequate in articulating the reasons for relevance. Rather than attempt to set forth the reasons, the majority simply concludes that the other acts evidence was relevant for the purposes of showing context, motive, opportunity, intent, and absence of mistake or accident because of "the reasons offered by the State and the decision of the circuit court." Majority op., ¶ 67. Apparently the majority now decides to rely on the reasoning of the circuit court even though it determined that the circuit court "could have provided a more detailed or exhaustive Sullivan analysis for admitting the other-acts evidence in this case ...." Majority op., ¶ 3.
¶ 107. Nowhere in the paragraphs leading up to this conclusion does the majority state the reasons offered by the State and the circuit court for why the other acts evidence was relevant to motive, opportunity, intent, or absence of mistake or accident. Nowhere in the analysis assessing relevance is there any discussion of similarity between the other acts and the charged offenses. A comparison of the nearness of time, place, and circumstance is central to, but completely absent from the majority's analysis. Yet, in ¶ 64, the majority acknowledges that such a discussion is mandated by the Sullivan second prong.2
"The measure of probative value in assessing relevance is the similarity between the charged offense and the other act." State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 58, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999). Similarity is demonstrated by showing the "nearness of time, place, and circumstance" between the other act and the alleged crime. State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 305, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999).. .. Even *54when evidence may be considered too remote, the evidence is not necessarily rendered irrelevant if the remoteness is balanced by the similarity of the two incidents....
¶ 108. It is not surprising that the majority does not attempt to explain the reasons because, with respect to many of the identified purposes, it is difficult to articulate any persuasive justification for why the other acts evidence is relevant. It is also not surprising because, as predicted by the Sullivan court, the absence of a circuit court's careful statements regarding the rationale for admitting other acts evidence makes appellate review difficult. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 774.
¶ 109. Nevertheless, the majority criticizes the court of appeals for failing to conduct an independent Sullivan analysis. Curiously, although paying lip service to the Sullivan framework, the majority itself fails to engage in the step-by-step analysis mandated by Sullivan. Given the laundry list of other acts evidence admitted, the litany of permissible purposes accepted by the circuit court, and the lack of the development of the record regarding the nature of each item of other acts evidence, I think this case should be remanded to the circuit court for a proper Sullivan analysis.
¶ 110. In sum, Sullivan mandates a careful statement of a clearly articulated purpose of each piece of other acts evidence and an analysis of whether that evidence is relevant to the purpose. Because neither the circuit court nor the majority conducted a proper Sullivan analysis of the other acts evidence admitted in this case, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 111. I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.

 Hunt's brief-in-chief before this court contained a list of 15 other acts introduced at trial. According to Hunt, this list was not exhaustive and the admission of the other acts permeated the proceedings.

 In ¶ 64, the majority emphasizes the import of the mandated analysis: