Court Opinion

ID: 9376233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 15:05:09.631854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:05.051646
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21-P-1143                                            Appeals Court

              COMMONWEALTH    vs.   JUNIAS JEAN-LOUIS.

                           No. 21-P-1143.

       Middlesex.       September 7, 2022. – March 2, 2023.

            Present:   Neyman, Ditkoff, & Hershfang, JJ.

Practice, Criminal, Admission to sufficient facts to warrant
     finding, Plea, Presumptions and burden of proof, Record.
     Alien.

     Complaints received and sworn to in the Cambridge Division
of the District Court Department on January 4, 1995, December 4,
1995, and December 18, 1995.

     A motion to withdraw admissions to sufficient facts and
guilty pleas was heard by Richard A. Mori, J.

     Luke Rosseel for the defendant.
     Chia Chi Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

    NEYMAN, J.    The defendant, Junias Jean-Louis, claims that

two District Court judges failed to provide any immigration

warnings pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 29D, at two different plea

hearings, and thus that his motion to withdraw his admissions to
                                                                        2

sufficient facts and guilty pleas in three separate cases should

have been allowed.       In the circumstances of this case, where all

three dockets reflect that the defendant was advised of his

"immigration rights" and two of the three further reflect that

he was advised of his "alien rights," we conclude that the judge

did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion.      We

therefore affirm.

     Background.    1.     District Court admissions and guilty

pleas.   On January 4, 1995, a criminal complaint issued out of

the Cambridge Division of the District Court Department, docket

number 9552CR0045 (docket 0045), charging the defendant with one

count of assault by means of a dangerous weapon and one count of

larceny from a person.       On June 9, 1995, the defendant admitted

to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty on both

counts, and a District Court judge (first judge) continued the

case without a finding for one year.       Docket 0045 contains two

separate stamped notations located in the "FINDING" box for each

count that reflect, in relevant part, that the defendant was

"advised of immigration rights."1      The docket further reflects

     1 The two stamped notations read, in full, "Jury waived
change of plea advised of immigration rights plea of guilty
accepted by the court." However, the word "accepted" is crossed
out. Adjacent to each stamp is the handwritten notation "REJ"
next to the first judge's signature, signifying that the first
judge rejected the proffered guilty plea and, instead, continued
the case without a finding.
                                                                     3

that the defendant subsequently violated the terms and

conditions of the continuances without a finding, and, on

January 29, 1996, a different judge (second judge, and

collectively with first judge, plea judges) entered guilty

findings on both counts and sentenced the defendant to a term of

probation.

    On December 4, 1995, another complaint issued out of the

same court, docket number 9552CR4699 (docket 4699), charging the

defendant with one count of possession of a class B controlled

substance with intent to distribute and one count of possession

of a controlled substance within one thousand feet of a school

(school zone violation).   On January 29, 1996, the defendant

pleaded guilty to the count of possession of a class B

controlled substance with intent to distribute, and the second

judge, who was also the probation violation judge for docket

0045, see note 3, infra, sentenced him to serve two and one-half

years in a house of correction, with eighteen months to serve,

and the balance suspended with probation until January 30, 1998.

The second judge dismissed the school zone violation at the

Commonwealth's request and with the defendant's consent.    Docket

4699 contains the same stamped notation as docket 0045 in the

finding box that reflects, in relevant part, that the defendant
                                                                   4

was "advised of immigration rights."2   In addition, docket 4699

shows a box captioned "Advised of alien rights," which is

checked and dated "1-29-96."

     On December 18, 1995, another complaint issued out of the

same court, docket number 9552CR004880 (docket 4880), charging

the defendant with one count of possession of a class D

controlled substance with intent to distribute and one count of

a school zone violation.   On January 29, 1996, the defendant

pleaded guilty to the count of possession of a class D

controlled substance with intent to distribute, and the second

judge imposed the same sentence as the one in the other drug

case, with both sentences to run concurrently.3   The second judge

dismissed the school zone violation at the Commonwealth's

request and with the defendant's consent.   Docket 4880 contains

the same stamped notation as dockets 0045 and 4699 that

reflects, in relevant part, that the defendant was "advised of

immigration rights."   As with docket 4699, docket 4880 likewise

     2 The stamped notation in docket 4699 reads, in full, "Jury
waived change of plea advised of immigration rights plea of
guilty accepted by the court."

     3 It appears that on January 29, 1996, as part of a plea
agreement, the second judge sentenced the defendant to
concurrent sentences on the two separate drug cases, dockets
4699 and 4880, and, on that same date, accepted the defendant's
stipulation to a violation of the terms and conditions of his
continuances without a finding, docket 0045, entered findings of
guilty, and sentenced him to probation until July 26, 1996.
                                                                    5

shows a checkmark in the box captioned "Advised of alien

rights," with the date "1-29-96" written adjacent thereto.

     2.   Superior Court convictions.   In 2005, following a jury

trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of

assault with intent to rape, kidnapping, and indecent assault

and battery, docket number 0381CR01416, and sentenced to a term

of incarceration in State prison.   In 2011, this court affirmed

the convictions.   See Commonwealth v. Jean-Louis, 78 Mass. App.

Ct. 1119 (2011), cert. denied sub nom. Jean-Louis v.

Massachusetts, 568 U.S. 1174 (2013).    In 2014, shortly after the

defendant's release from State prison, he was deported to Haiti.

The defendant filed a motion for a new trial challenging the

Superior Court convictions "on grounds unrelated to immigration

consequences."   That motion was denied on July 22, 2022.4

     3.   Motion to withdraw admissions and guilty pleas.    On

September 23, 2021, more than twenty-five years after his guilty

pleas and more than twenty-six years after his admissions to

sufficient facts, the defendant filed in District Court a motion

to withdraw them pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 29D (motion to

withdraw).   As averred in the defendant's affidavit filed in

     4 On July 25, 2022, the defendant filed a notice of appeal
from the denial of his motion for new trial. That appeal is
currently awaiting briefing in this court and is not presently
before us.
                                                                   6

support of the motion to withdraw, the defendant claims that at

the two different plea hearings relating to the three cases, the

plea judges failed to provide any immigration warnings as

required by G. L. c. 278, § 29D.5   As further averred in the

defendant's affidavit, the purpose of the motion is to "seek to

re-open [his] immigration case and seek permission . . . to

return to [the United States]," if he is allowed to withdraw his

admissions and guilty pleas.6   On November 3, 2021, following a

nonevidentiary hearing, a judge (motion judge), who was not one

of the plea judges, denied the motion to withdraw in a margin

endorsement.7   The defendant now appeals therefrom.

     5 With respect to the defendant's June 9, 1995, admissions
to sufficient facts on docket 0045, the defendant averred in his
affidavit that "the judge did not say anything to me indicating
that my admissions could have immigration consequences." As to
the defendant's January 29, 1996, guilty pleas on dockets 4699
and 4880, the defendant similarly averred in his affidavit that
the second judge "did not say anything to me indicating that my
guilty pleas[] could have immigration consequences." As to each
case, the defendant further averred in his affidavit that "the
judge did not say that the guilty pleas [and admissions] could
result in me being excluded from admission to the United
States."

     6 In his affidavit, the defendant described the challenges
he faces living in Haiti, including the unstable political
situation, recent natural disasters, his inability to receive
the medical attention he needs, and the pain from being
separated from his family. The defendant submitted affidavits
by others in support of his motion to withdraw, including those
of his wife and three children wherein they describe the impact
of his absence in their lives.

     7 The motion judge did not make written findings of fact or
rulings of law.
                                                                     7

      Discussion.   1.   Legal standards.   The defendant moved to

withdraw his admissions and guilty pleas pursuant to G. L.

c. 278, § 29D.   A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated as

a motion for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as

appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).     Commonwealth v. Diaz, 75

Mass. App. Ct. 347, 350 (2009).     We review the denial of such a

motion "only to determine whether there has been a significant

error of law or other abuse of discretion" (citation omitted).

Id.   See Commonwealth v. Rzepphiewski, 431 Mass. 48, 56 (2000)

("judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's

motion to withdraw his plea pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 29D").

See also E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 24.74

(4th ed. 2014) (motion judge exercises sound discretion in

ruling on motion to vacate guilty plea).     However, in cases

brought under § 29D where a "noncitizen defendant 'actually

faces the prospect of [an immigration consequence enumerated in

the statute] occurring' as a result of the challenged plea . . .

and . . . the defendant was not verbally warned about that

particular adverse consequence during the colloquy as required

by the statute," a judge has no discretion and relief must be

granted.   Commonwealth v. Petit-Homme, 482 Mass. 775, 784 & n.10

(2019).

      At the time of the defendant's admissions and guilty pleas,

the plain language of § 29D required that a defendant be advised
                                                                    8

that a guilty plea may result in "deportation, exclusion from

admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization."

G. L. c. 278, § 29D, inserted by St. 1978, c. 383.8    For purposes

of § 29D, an admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding

of guilty is treated as the functional equivalent of a guilty

plea.    Rzepphiewski, 431 Mass. at 50 n.3.   The statute further

provided that "[a]bsent a record that the Court provided the

advisement required by this section, the defendant shall be

     8 At the time of the defendant's 1995 and 1996 admissions
and guilty pleas, G. L. c. 278, § 29D, inserted by St. 1978,
c. 383, provided as follows:

          "The Court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
     contendere from any defendant in any criminal proceeding
     unless the Court advises him of the following: 'If you are
     not a citizen of the United States, you are hereby advised
     that conviction of the offense for which you have been
     charged may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion
     from admission to the United States, or denial of
     naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States.'
     The defendant shall not be required at the time of the plea
     to disclose his or her legal status in the United States to
     the court.

          "If the Court fails so to advise the defendant, and he
     later at any time shows that his plea and conviction may
     have one of the enumerated consequences, the Court, on the
     defendant's motion, shall vacate the judgment, and permit
     the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo
     contendere, and enter a plea of 'not guilty.' Absent a
     record that the Court provided the advisement required by
     this section, the defendant shall be presumed not to have
     received the required advisement."

All references to § 29D in this opinion are to the 1978 version
unless otherwise noted.
                                                                    9

presumed not to have received the required advisement."   G. L.

c. 278, § 29D.   Thus, "[t]he burden is on the Commonwealth to

provide a record of the proceedings affirmatively demonstrating

that the defendant was advised that his plea might impair his

immigration status" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 459, 462 (2001).

"Where there is no record that the court provided the required

advisement, the presumption arises that no warning was given."9

Id.

9 General Laws c. 278, § 29D, was amended in 1996 and again in
2004, and now provides in relevant part:

           "The court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . or
      an admission to sufficient facts from any defendant in any
      criminal proceeding unless the court advises such defendant
      of the following: 'If you are not a citizen of the United
      States, you are hereby advised that the acceptance by this
      court of your plea of guilty . . . or admission to
      sufficient facts may have consequences of deportation,
      exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
      naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United
      States.' . . .

      "Absent an official record or a contemporaneously written
      record kept in the court file that the court provided the
      advisement as prescribed in this section, including but not
      limited to a docket sheet that accurately reflects that the
      warning was given as required by this section, the
      defendant shall be presumed not to have received
      advisement."

G. L. c. 278, § 29D, as amended through St. 2004, c. 225, § 1.
The 2004 revisions apply only to pleas and admissions entered on
or after the effective date of the act. See St. 2004, c. 225,
§ 2.
                                                                  10

     2.   Analysis.   The defendant argues that the plea judges

"did not say anything to [him] indicating that [his] admissions

[and guilty pleas] could have immigration consequences."   He

further contends that the Commonwealth cannot satisfy its burden

to prove that he received the immigration warnings required by

§ 29D because the law requires additional evidence beyond a

docket sheet.10   These arguments are unavailing.

     Given the twenty-five plus years that have passed since the

defendant's guilty pleas and admissions, it is neither disputed

nor surprising that, when the defendant filed his motion to

     10Where the defendant was deported to Haiti in 2014, he
contends that he is entitled to withdraw his admissions and
guilty pleas because he did not receive any of the immigration
warnings required by § 29D, has a bona fide desire to reenter
the United States, and if he tried to do so, there would be a
substantial risk that he would be excluded from admission under
Federal immigration law because of his convictions. See
Commonwealth v. Valdez, 475 Mass. 178, 187 (2016) ("where a
defendant has not received the required exclusion from admission
warning under § 29D, he or she satisfies the burden of showing
that his or her conviction 'may have' the consequence of
exclusion from admission to the United States by showing [1]
that he has a bona fide desire to leave the country and reenter,
and [2] that, if the defendant were to do so, there would be a
substantial risk that he or she would be excluded from admission
under Federal immigration law because of his or her
conviction"). For purposes of our analysis herein, we accept
the contentions that the defendant has a bona fide desire to
reenter the United States. See note 6, supra. As discussed
infra, the defendant's claim that these District Court
convictions give rise to a substantial risk that he would be
excluded from admission under Federal immigration law is
speculative in light of his more recent Superior Court
convictions.
                                                                    11

withdraw in 2021, no recordings, tapes, or transcripts of the

1995 and 1996 plea colloquies existed.    See Diaz, 75 Mass. App.

Ct. at 352 ("The interim of more than twelve and one-half years

between the defendant's admission and the Department of Homeland

Security notice triggering his first motion to withdraw it

effectively deprived the Commonwealth of a tape or transcript as

the primary record of the plea colloquy").    Thus, we look to the

available court record within the meaning of G. L. c. 278,

§ 29D.

      Each of the three District Court dockets contains at least

one stamped notation that the defendant was "advised of

immigration rights."11   Two of the three dockets contain an

additional checkmark in the box captioned, "Advised of alien

rights[,]" with the date of the plea hearing handwritten beside

it.   Contrary to the defendant's claim, it is well established

that docket sheets qualify "as a 'record' within the meaning of

G. L. c. 278, § 29D, so as to avoid operation of the statutory

presumption in favor of the defendant."    Commonwealth v.

Podoprigora, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 929 (1999).    See

Rzepphiewski, 431 Mass. at 52-53 (agreeing with Appeals Court's

conclusion in Podoprigora that term "record" in G. L. c. 278,

       Docket 0045 contains two stamped notations -- one in each
      11

finding box for the two separate counts -- that the defendant
was "advised of immigration rights."
                                                                   12

§ 29D, "includes a docket sheet on which a box has been checked

indicating that the deportation advisement was given").

Contrast Diaz, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 349, 352-353 (remanding case

to plea judge to explain basis for denial of motions to withdraw

guilty plea where, inter alia, docket sheet contained no

affirmative evidence of required warnings, but rather "an

unmarked box beside a line item of the words, 'Advised of alien

rights[,]'" and judge failed "to provide an explanation

[findings or reasoning] in rebuttal of the § 29D presumption of

nonadvisement").   Accordingly, we have no difficulty concluding

that the three docket sheets in the present case -- containing a

total of six separate notations substantiating that the

defendant was "advised of immigration rights" and "[a]dvised of

alien rights" -- constitute a record that "the Court[s] provided

the advisement required" by § 29D.   G. L. c. 278, § 29D.    Thus,

"the statutory presumption of nonadvisement . . . is not

operative here."   Rzepphiewski, supra at 55.   See E.B. Cypher,

Criminal Practice and Procedure § 24.74, at 351 ("A docket

sheet . . . that indicates that the defendant did receive the

warnings is sufficient to avoid the operation of the statutory

presumption in favor of the defendant").

    The defendant responds that even assuming that the

statutory presumption of nonadvisement is inoperative, the

docket entries are insufficient because they do not contain
                                                                  13

explicit citations to § 29D, and thus do not prove the content

of any immigration warnings to the defendant.   This claim is

likewise unpersuasive.   In Podoprigora, we concluded that a

docket sheet, "which contained a check mark at the box on the

docket form entitled 'Advised of alien rights[,]'" qualified as

a record within the meaning of § 29D and satisfied the

Commonwealth's burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the

defendant received the required statutory advisement.

Podoprigora, 46 Mass. App. Ct. at 929-930.   Critical to our

analysis here, the docket sheet entry in Podoprigora did not

contain an explicit citation to § 29D.   Of note, the Supreme

Judicial Court has confirmed that holding.   See Commonwealth v.

Hilaire, 437 Mass. 809, 818 n.5 (2002), citing Podoprigora,

supra at 929 ("notation on docket that defendant advised of

'alien rights' constituted sufficient 'record' that § 29D

warnings administered").

    The defendant also contends that affirming the denial of

the motion to withdraw would contradict the teachings of the

Supreme Judicial Court in Rzepphiewski, 431 Mass. at 53-55.      We

disagree.   In Rzepphiewski, the court concluded that a docket

sheet indicating that the defendant admitted to sufficient facts

after a hearing, "coupled with" (a) the plea judge's

"'contemporaneously made notes' of the [plea] hearing which

recorded the defendant's age and years of schooling," and (b)
                                                                    14

the judge's reliance on his "customary practice of including the

deportation advisement in a plea colloquy," sufficed to

reconstruct a record that the trial court provided the requisite

§ 29D warning at the plea hearing.     Id. at 52, 54-55.   The court

then considered whether that reconstructed record "adequately

establishe[d] that the [plea] judge[, who was also the motion

judge,] gave the deportation advisement mandated by statute at

the defendant's hearing."     Id. at 55.   Noting that the only

other evidence before the judge was the defendant's affidavit

averring that during the plea hearing the judge never advised

him that his admission to sufficient facts could result in

deportation, the court concluded that the judge did not err or

abuse his discretion in rejecting the claim in the defendant's

affidavit.     See id. at 55-56 ("judge is not required to accept

as true the allegations in a defendant's affidavit, even if

nothing in the record directly disputes them").

     In the present case, the defendant likewise filed an

affidavit in which he averred that neither plea judge provided

any warnings whatsoever regarding any potential immigration

consequences.    Just as in Rzepphiewski, the motion judge had the

discretion to reject the defendant's self-serving claims in his

affidavit.12    Moreover, in Rzepphiewski, there was no other

     12Although the judge denied the motion to withdraw in a
margin order without any findings of fact or rulings of law, it
                                                                  15

evidence, apart from the notation on the docket that the

defendant admitted to sufficient facts after a hearing and the

judge's general notes about the defendant and recollection of

his customary plea colloquy practice, countering the claims in

the defendant's affidavit.   Rzepphiewski, 431 Mass. at 54-56.

Here, by contrast, the motion judge had before him abundant

documentary evidence that he could and implicitly did credit.

See Podoprigora, 46 Mass. App. Ct. at 930 (compared to motion

judge's observation of "standard practice" to give immigration

warnings, docket sheet is "an even more explicit contemporaneous

document reflecting the provision of the advisement").     See also

Diaz, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 353 (judge's "denial of the motions

[to withdraw plea] implies a rejection of the defendant's

credibility").   Here, there were multiple entries, on multiple

dockets, on different plea dates, before two different judges,

confirming that the defendant was advised of immigration

warnings and alien warnings as required by § 29D.   Consequently,

on the record before us, there was no error or abuse of

discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw.13

is clear from the record that he implicitly rejected the
defendant's contention in his affidavit that he did not receive
any immigration warnings at either of his plea hearings. See
Diaz, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 353.

     13We do not suggest that a judge must conclude that any
docket entry referencing an immigration or alien warning is
dispositive. Rather, we hold only that a judge who rejects a
                                                                   16

     Finally, the defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v.

Marques, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 203 (2013) is misplaced.   In that

case, the contemporaneous certification on the "green sheet,"14

plea form, signed by the judge, established that the immigration

warnings given did not comport with the statutory requirements.

Id. at 206.   As we stated, "[t]here is nothing in the record to

permit the motion judge (or us) to take the plea judge's

contemporaneous certification at anything less than face value,"

and thus we could not "accept the Commonwealth's argument that

the certification did not reflect the judge's actual warning."

Id. at 206-207.   The instant case does not involve

contemporaneous (or indeed, any) evidence that the immigration

and alien warnings given did not follow the statutory

requirement, and nothing in Marques requires us to presume that

the judges either gave incorrect or no immigration or alien

warnings, in the absence of credible evidence to that effect.

     We also affirm on an alternative basis.   As discussed

supra, the parties do not dispute that the defendant was also

defendant's self-serving affidavit has the discretion to rely on
such docket entries in determining that the proper warnings were
given. See Rzepphiewski, 431 Mass. at 55-56.

     14"A green sheet is a form promulgated pursuant to Rule 4
of the District/Municipal Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and
used to tender a plea under the procedures set forth in G. L.
c. 278, § 18" (quotation and citation omitted). Marques, 84
Mass. App. Ct. at 205 n.9.
                                                                   17

convicted in the Superior Court in 2005 for assault with intent

to rape, kidnapping, and indecent assault and battery.      Based on

those convictions, and following his release from State prison,

he was deported to Haiti.   Those convictions, which were

unrelated to the immigration warnings at issue in the present

case, "independently are a basis for deportation, refusal of

readmission, and denial of naturalization."   Commonwealth v.

DeSorbo, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 911 (2000).   In such

circumstances, any prejudice to the defendant from the

convictions at issue here is speculative.15   See id. ("Having

already been convicted of offenses that subject him to permanent

exclusion from the United States, this particular [drug]

conviction caused no incremental harm").   See also Commonwealth

v. Barreiro, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 27 (2006) ("any prejudice the

defendant claims as a result of the inadequate warnings given

prior to his separate . . . conviction for receiving stolen

     15The defendant's attempt to rely on the fact that he,
unlike the defendant in DeSorbo, is presently challenging his
unrelated Superior Court convictions is unavailing. That the
defendant has filed a notice of appeal from the order denying
his motion for a new trial in the Superior Court case does not
render any alleged prejudice to the defendant materially less
speculative.
                                                                 18

property is merely speculative and insufficient to trigger the

remedy under G. L. c. 278, § 29D").16

                                   Order denying motion to
                                     withdraw admissions and
                                     guilty pleas affirmed.

     16We decline the defendant's request to overrule DeSorbo,
49 Mass. App. Ct. at 911, or in the alternative, to stay this
appeal until his appeal from the denial of his motion for new
trial in his Superior Court case is resolved.