Court Opinion

ID: 9914134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 17:07:44.269677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:19.917201
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Akron v. Calhoun, 2023-Ohio-4840.]

STATE OF OHIO                   )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                )

CITY OF AKRON                                        C.A. No.       30472

        Appellee

        v.                                           APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                     ENTERED IN THE
HOMELL T. CALHOUN                                    AKRON MUNICIPAL COURT
                                                     COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellant                                    CASE No.   22-CR-05122

                                DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 29, 2023

        SUTTON, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant Homell T. Calhoun appeals from the judgment of the Akron

Municipal Court. This Court affirms in part and reverses in part.

                                                I.

        {¶2}    In the early morning hours of July 18, 2022, Sergeant Alicia Lindsey, a member of

the police force at Akron Children’s Hospital, was patrolling the hospital campus when she spotted

a man laying in a grassy area next to a parking deck located at the corner of Exchange Street and

Locust Street, in the City of Akron. After noticing the man, Sergeant Lindsey pulled her vehicle

over to approach the man and radioed dispatch. Sergeant Lindsey approached the man and

unsuccessfully tried to wake him up. Within one minute of radioing her discovery to dispatch, two

other Akron Children’s Hospital police officers, Officer Brandon Broa and Officer Clarence

Dorsey, arrived on the scene. Slowly the man awoke, and the officers immediately began noticing
                                                2

signs that the man was intoxicated. The officers later testified at trial that Mr. Calhoun had

bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and was unsteady on his feet.

       {¶3}   As the officers helped Mr. Calhoun to his feet, he had difficulty remaining on his

feet. The officers asked for identification, and Mr. Calhoun became belligerent. Mr. Calhoun then

proceeded to stick his hands in his pockets, which the officers asked him not to do. When he

refused to comply with the officers’ requests, the officers handcuffed Mr. Calhoun. The officers

checked to see if Mr. Calhoun had any outstanding warrants, issued Mr. Calhoun a citation for

disorderly conduct and criminal trespass, and then drove Mr. Calhoun home. The officers testified

that they drove Mr. Calhoun home because he was highly intoxicated and allowing him to continue

to proceed down Exchange Street would have been a risk to Mr. Calhoun’s own safety.

       {¶4}   A complaint was issued that charged Mr. Calhoun with one count of disorderly

conduct, in violation of Akron City Ordinance 132.01(A)(1), and one count of criminal trespass,

in violation of Akron City Ordinance 131.08(B)(4). The case proceeded to trial. On the day of

trial, but before the trial began, the City of Akron moved to amend the disorderly conduct count

of the complaint, which cited Akron City Ordinance 132.01(A)(1), to a different subsection of the

same ordinance, Akron City Ordinance 132.01(B)(2). The citation Mr. Calhoun was issued at the

scene charged a violation of Akron City Ordinance 132.01(B)(2), however, the complaint

generated by the Akron Municipal Clerk of Court charged a violation of Akron City Ordinance

132.01(A)(1). The judge allowed the City to amend the complaint and the case proceeded.

       {¶5}   After deliberating, a jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the count of criminal

trespass and guilty on the count of disorderly conduct. Mr. Calhoun was sentenced to 30 days in

jail, suspended, and one year of community control. Mr. Calhoun was also ordered to undergo a

drug and alcohol evaluation.
                                                 3

       {¶6}    Mr. Calhoun timely appealed, assigning six errors for this Court’s review.

                                                 II.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE JURY’S VERDICT FORM FOR THE DISORDERLY CONDUCT
       COUNT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) AND PELFREY,
       AND WAS, THUS, INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT MR. CALHOUN OF A
       FOURTH-DEGREE MISDEMEANOR UNDER AKRON ORD. 132.01(E).

       {¶7}    In his first assignment of error, Mr. Calhoun argues that verdict form used by the

jury in convicting him of disorderly conduct was insufficient and does not comply with the

mandates outlined in R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) and State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-

256. We agree.

                            Standard of Review – Jury Verdict Forms

       {¶8}    “The sufficiency of a jury verdict form to justify convicting a defendant of a greater

degree of a criminal offense presents a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.” State

v. Dardie, 9th Dist. Summit No. 30168, 2023-Ohio-1656, ¶ 15, citing State v. Oliver, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 29535, 2021-Ohio-4153, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25206,

2010-Ohio-4863, ¶ 15.

                                        Jury Verdict Form

       {¶9}    Revised Code 2945.75(A)(2) provides that,

       (A) When the presence of one or more additional elements makes an offense one
       of more serious degree:

       (2) A guilty verdict shall state either the degree of the offense of which the offender
       is found guilty, or that such additional element or elements are present. Otherwise,
       a guilty verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the least degree of the offense
       charged.

“R.C. 2945.75(A) plainly requires that in order to find a defendant guilty of ‘an offense * * * of

more serious degree,’ the guilty verdict must either state ‘the degree of the offense of which the
                                                  4

offender is found guilty’ or state that ‘additional element or elements are present.’” (Emphasis

added.) State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256, ¶ 12, quoting R.C. 2945.75(A).

“Pelfrey makes clear that in cases involving offenses for which the addition of an element or

elements can elevate the offense to a more serious degree, the verdict form itself is the only relevant

thing to consider in determining whether the dictates of R.C. 2945.75 have been followed.”

(Emphasis added.) State v. McDonald, 137 Ohio St.3d 517, 2013-Ohio-5042, ¶ 17.

        {¶10} Mr. Calhoun was convicted of violating Akron City Ordinance 132.01(B)(2), which

states in relevant part:

        B. No person, while voluntarily intoxicated, shall do either of the following: * * *
               2. Engage in conduct or create a condition which presents a risk of physical
               harm to himself or another, or to the property[.]

The ordinance also contains subsection, 132.01(E), that enhances the offense from a minor

misdemeanor to a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. That subsection states:

        E. Whoever violates this section is guilty of disorderly conduct, a minor
        misdemeanor, except that if the offender persists in disorderly conduct after
        reasonable warning or request to desist, or if the offender is within one thousand
        feet of the boundaries of any school, school premises, or school building, disorderly
        conduct is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. * * *

        {¶11} Here, Mr. Calhoun was convicted of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree for

persisting in disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist. However, the verdict

form, in its entirety, states:

        We, the jury, find the defendant, HOMELL CALHOUN, guilty of DISORDERLY
        CONDUCT pursuant to a violation of the Akron City Code 132.01.

The jury verdict form does not specify the degree of the offense, nor does it include any

aggravating elements. “Therefore, ‘the guilty verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the least

degree of the offense charged.’” See Oliver at ¶ 19, citing R.C. 2945.75(A)(2).
                                                 5

       {¶12} Because Mr. Calhoun’s verdict form does not include either the degree of his

disorderly conduct conviction or the additional element that he persisted in disorderly conduct

after reasonable warning or request to desist, Mr. Calhoun should have only been convicted of a

minor misdemeanor for his disorderly conduct offense. See State v. Wilson, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

12CA010263, 2014-Ohio-3182, ¶ 29; see also Dardie, 2023-Ohio-1656, at ¶ 20. Accordingly, we

reverse the trial court’s judgment of conviction and remand the cause of the trial court to enter a

judgment convicting Mr. Calhoun of disorderly conduct as a minor misdemeanor. Id.

       {¶13} Mr. Calhoun’s first assignment of error is sustained.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
       CONVICT MR. CALHOUN OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT BY
       INTOXICATION, A MISDEMEANOR OF THE FOURTH DEGREE OR A
       MINOR MISDEMEANOR, UNDER AKRON ORD. 132.01(B)(2)

       {¶14} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Calhoun argues his conviction for disorderly

conduct was insufficient as a matter of law because the City of Akron failed to prove that Mr.

Calhoun was voluntarily intoxicated or that he created a condition that presented a risk of physical

harm to himself or the property of another. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

                        Standard of Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence

       {¶15} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that

this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶

18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the

prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a

conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this

Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in
                                                 6

favor of the State. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it

allows the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

    The State presented sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Calhoun was guilty of disorderly
                                             conduct.

       {¶16} We note that in his argument, Mr. Calhoun argues the City presented insufficient

evidence to support the enhancement of the disorderly conduct charge to a fourth-degree

misdemeanor pursuant to Akron City Ordinance 132.01(E). However, given our resolution of the

first assignment of error, we will not address the sufficiency of the evidence presented related to

the enhancement because Mr. Calhoun cannot be sentenced to the fourth-degree misdemeanor

given the error in the jury verdict form. We confine our analysis to whether or not the City

presented sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Calhoun of disorderly conduct in violation of Akron

City Ordinance 132.01(B)(2).

       {¶17} The jury was instructed on, and found Mr. Calhoun guilty of, disorderly conduct in

violation of Akron City Ordinance 132.01(B)(2). The ordinance provides that “[n]o person, while

voluntarily intoxicated, shall * * * [e]ngage in conduct or create a condition which presents a risk

of physical harm to himself or another, or to the property of another.” Akron City Ordinance

130.02 defines “risk” as “a significant possibility, as contrasted with a remote possibility, that a

certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist.”

       {¶18} With respect to the requirement that the City prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Mr. Calhoun was voluntarily intoxicated, the City presented the testimony of the three responding

police officers, who all testified based on their training and experience, Mr. Calhoun was

voluntarily intoxicated. Sergeant Lindsey testified she believed Mr. Calhoun was intoxicated

because “the bloodshot eyes, the unsteady speech, the staggering back and forth, the slurred
                                                 7

speech.” Additionally, she testified Mr. Calhoun “stated he was coming from the bars and that he

was just trying to get home.” Officer Broa testified Mr. Calhoun “was slurring [his speech]. He

was very hard to understand. He was stumbling around. We had to catch him a few times.”

Officer Broa testified “it was pretty clear” that Mr. Calhoun “appeared to be highly intoxicated.”

Officer Dorsey believed Mr. Calhoun was intoxicated because Mr. Calhoun “smelled like * * * he

was intoxicated. He had that smell plus he was sleeping it off in the grass[.] He could not stand

up.” Therefore, construing this testimony in a light most favorable to the City, we cannot say the

City failed to establish that Mr. Calhoun was voluntarily intoxicated.

       {¶19} With respect to the requirement the City present sufficient evidence to establish Mr.

Calhoun “[e]ngage[d] in conduct or create[d] a condition which presents a risk of physical harm

to himself or another, or to the property of another,” the City again presented the testimony of the

three police officers who all testified to the various ways in which they thought Mr. Calhoun

presented a risk of physical harm to himself and to others.

       {¶20} All three officers testified that Mr. Calhoun was sleeping in a grassy area located

near the intersection of Exchange Street and Locust Street, which presented a risk to his physical

safety. All three officers testified to Exchange Street being a busy traffic area, even in the middle

of the night. Officer Dorsey stated, “we have a lot of traffic on Exchange and Locust and at that

time of night you get the bar crowds be flying down Exchange.”

       {¶21} Moreover, Mr. Calhoun told the officers he was going to walk home, despite his

intoxicated state. Sergeant Lindsey testified that “upon seeing [Mr. Calhoun] start moving,

walking, staggering,” the officers became concerned for Mr. Calhoun’s safety and believed that

based on his level of intoxication he was a danger to himself. Officer Broa testified that Mr.

Calhoun’s level of intoxication presented a risk to Mr. Calhoun’s personal safety. As Officer
                                                   8

Dorsey stated, “we told him we did not want him to walk home especially being intoxicated like

that.” Officer Dorsey testified Mr. Calhoun was so intoxicated that he believed that if the officers

had let Mr. Calhoun walk home, “[h]e would have went out there on Exchange Street and probably

got hit [by a vehicle]. He was that much intoxicated.” Construing this testimony in a light most

favorable to the City, we cannot say the City failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that

Mr. Calhoun presented a risk to his physical safety.

        {¶22} Mr. Calhoun argues he “was simply walking home allegedly intoxicated on a

beautiful, warm, summer night in July in Akron and decided he was too tired to complete his trek.

He then found the safest, most comfortable place to take a nap so that he could rest up a bit and

then finish his journey.” He argues this Court’s holding in City of Lorain v. Wright, 11 Ohio

App.3d 200 (9th Dist.1983) supports the idea that he was not at risk to himself. In Wright at 202,

this Court found insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for disorderly conduct where the

defendant locked himself inside of his car on his estranged wife’s property. This Court noted

“once intoxicated, [a defendant] must use whatever care he possesses to act safely. Here, [the

defendant] simply climbed into his car, locked the doors and fell asleep. It would appear that he

performed the safest act available to him at the time.” Id. In this case, Mr. Calhoun was passed

out asleep, in a highly intoxicated state, along a busy roadway in the middle of the night. All three

police officers testified to the fact that the street was heavily trafficked, even at night. When roused

by officers, Mr. Calhoun was staggering and indicated he was going to walk home and, as Officer

Dorsey stated, “[Mr. Calhoun] would have went out there on Exchange Street and probably got hit

[by a vehicle]. He was that much intoxicated.” Mr. Calhoun, who was passed out asleep in a

highly intoxicated state along a busy roadway in the middle of the night, and who planned to walk

down the street in this intoxicated state, presented a serious risk of harm to his person. As such,
                                                    9

unlike the defendant in Wright, we cannot say Mr. Calhoun was performing the safest act available

to him.

          {¶23} Mr. Calhoun’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                                   ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

          THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO
          GIVE THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON MR. CALHOUN’S RIGHT TO
          REMAIN SILENT AND NOT TESTIFY AT TRIAL, IN DEROGATION OF
          THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

          {¶24} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Calhoun argues the trial court committed plain

error by failing to instruct the jury regarding his constitutional right not to testify at trial. For the

reasons that follow, we disagree.

          {¶25} “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they

were not brought to the attention of the court.” Crim.R. 52(B). As this Court previously stated in

State v. Harris, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29583, 2020-Ohio-4365, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Martin, 154

Ohio St.3d 513, 2018-Ohio-3226, ¶ 28:

          By its very terms, [Crim.R. 52(B)] places three limitations on a reviewing court’s
          decision to correct an error that was not raised below. First, an error, i.e., a
          deviation from a legal rule, must have occurred. Second, the error complained of
          must be plain – that is, it must be an obvious defect in the * * * proceedings. Third,
          the error must have affected substantial rights. We have interpreted this * * * to
          mean that the trial court’s error must have affected the outcome of the proceedings.

Thus, “[t]his Court may not reverse the judgment of the trial court on the basis of plain error, unless

appellant has established that the outcome of trial clearly would have been different but for the

alleged error.” State v. Higgins, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27700, 2018-Ohio-476, ¶ 27, quoting State

v. Klingel, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010876, 2017- Ohio-1183, ¶ 29. More simply, “[a]n improper

or erroneous jury instruction does not constitute plain error unless, but for the error, the outcome

of the trial would clearly have been different.” State v. Barker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111597,
                                                 10

2023-Ohio-453, ¶ 28. As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “[n]otice of plain error under

Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to

prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three

of the syllabus.

        {¶26} In State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982), paragraph one of the syllabus, the Ohio

Supreme Court stated the following with respect to jury instructions regarding a defendant’s failure

to testify:

        A trial judge has the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the
        danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify.
        Upon proper request, defendant has a right, under the privilege against compulsory
        self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, to have the judge instruct
        the jury that the defendant’s failure to testify cannot be considered for any purpose.
        The trial court has a mandatory constitutional duty to give such a requested
        instruction.

Here, the trial court was only required to advise the jury “upon proper request” of Mr. Calhoun.

The record shows that Mr. Calhoun did not file a written jury instruction request at the close of

evidence pursuant to Crim.R. 30. Since such a request must be in writing and made at the close

of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs in order to be proper, and Mr.

Calhoun did not make such a request, the trial court did not err in not giving the instruction.

Because “error * * * [is] the starting point for a plain error inquiry[,]” Mr. Calhoun’s argument is

not well-taken. State v. Terry, 9th Dist. Summit No. 30137, 2023-Ohio-2234, ¶ 33, citing State v.

Gibson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 30078, 2022-Ohio-1653, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d

191, 200 (2001) and citing Crim.R. 52(B).

        {¶27} Mr. Calhoun’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MR. CALHOUN
        BY PERMITTING THE CITY TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT ON THE
                                                 11

       DAY OF TRIAL, OVER HIS OBJECTION, FROM AKRON ORD.
       132.01(A)(1) TO 132.01(B)(2) AS SAID AMENDMENT CHANGED THE
       IDENTITY OF THE OFFENSE, IN DEROGATION OF CRIM.R. 7(D).

       {¶28} In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Calhoun argues the trial court erred in

permitting the City to amend the complaint the day of trial. For the reasons that follow, we

disagree.

                        Standard of Review – Amendment of Complaint

       {¶29} “A trial court’s decision to allow the amendment of an indictment is reviewed under

an abuse-of-discretion standard.” State v. Gray, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27365, 2015-Ohio-1248, ¶

7, citing State v. Sauto, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26404, 2013-Ohio-1320, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion

“implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). In addition to demonstrating that the trial court abused

its discretion, the defendant must also show that the amendment prejudiced his defense in order to

prove that the trial court committed reversible error. Gray at ¶ 7, citing State v. Dudukovich, 9th

Dist. Lorain No. 05CA008729, 2006–Ohio–1309, ¶ 16.

                               Amending of a Criminal Complaint

       {¶30} Crim.R. 7(D) states:

       The court may at any time before, during, or after a trial amend the indictment,
       information, complaint, or bill of particulars, in respect to any defect, imperfection,
       or omission in form or substance, or of any variance with the evidence, provided
       no change is made in the name or identity of the crime charged.

“An amendment that changes the penalty or degree of the charged offense changes the identity of

the offense and is not permitted by Crim.R. 7(D).” State v. Pepka, 125 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-

Ohio-1045, ¶ 15. As long as the City complied with Crim.R. 7(D), it may cure a defective

complaint by amendment, even if the original complaint omits an essential element of the offense

with which the defendant is charged. State v. O'Brien, 30 Ohio St.3d 122, 127-128 (1987).
                                                 12

       {¶31} Here, the City moved to amend the complaint the day of trial, changing the offense

from one count of disorderly conduct pursuant to Akron City Ordinance 132.01(A)(1) to one count

of disorderly conduct pursuant to Akron City Ordinance 132.01(B)(2). Akron City Ordinance

132.01(A)(1) states:

       No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by
       * * * engaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property, or in violent
       or turbulent behavior[.]

Akron City Ordinance 132.01(B)(2) states:

       No person, while voluntarily intoxicated, shall * * * [e]ngage in conduct or create
       a condition which presents a risk of physical harm to himself or another, or to the
       property or another[.]

       {¶32} In support of its amendment, the City argued that the citation Mr. Calhoun was

issued by police officers at the scene listed a violation of Akron City Ordinance 132.01(B)(2), but

a clerical error by the Clerk’s office resulted in a defective complaint listing Akron City Ordinance

132.01(A)(1). In moving to amend the complaint, the proposed amendment did not change the

name of the crime charged; the original and amended complaint both charged one count of

disorderly conduct. While the elements of the offense changed with the proposed amendment, the

penalty or degree of the offense did not change. Pursuant to Akron City Ordinance 132.01(E),

both a violation of 132.01(A)(1) and a violation of 132.01(B)(2) are minor misdemeanors.

Therefore, the identity of the offense did not change. See Pepka at ¶ 15.

       {¶33} The record also shows defense counsel reviewed proposed jury instructions that

incorporated the language of the amended offense with the prosecutor before trial, and the jury

instructions were submitted as a joint exhibit of the City and Mr. Calhoun.

       {¶34} Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the City to amend

the complaint.
                                                  13

       {¶35} Mr. Calhoun’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MR. CALHOUN
       BY SENTENCING HIM TO “COMPLETE A SUMMIT LINK
       EVALUATION AND FOLLOW ALL RECOMMENDATIONS” WITHOUT
       PUTTING IN THE SENTENCING JOURNAL ENTRY OR THE SUMMIT
       LINK ORDER, OR BY NOTIFYING HIM IN ANY WAY OF, A SPECIFIED
       DURATION OF TIME THAT THE WAS BOUND BY SUCH A
       COMMUNITY CONTROL SANCTION, IN DEROGATION OF R.C.
       2929.25(A)(2), AND BY NOT NOTIFYING HIM OF THE CONSEQUENCES
       FOR VIOLATING SAID SANCTION, IN DEROGATION OF R.C.
       2929.25(A)(3).

       {¶36} In his fifth assignment of error, Mr. Calhoun argues that the trial court erred in

sentencing him to Summit Link evaluation and community control without assigning a specified

duration. In light of this Court’s resolution of the first assignment of error, this Court declines to

address his fifth assignment of error as it has been rendered moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI

       MR. CALHOUN RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
       AT TRIAL, IN DEROGATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
       UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

       {¶37} In his sixth assignment of error, Mr. Calhoun argues he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object to the jury instructions and failed to

argue that Mr. Calhoun did not present a risk of harm to himself when making his Crim.R. 29

motion. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

                     Standard of Review – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       {¶38} In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Calhoun must

show that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that

prejudice arose from counsel’s performance.” State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 674 (1998),

citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “The benchmark for judging any claim
                                                      14

of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland

at 686. Thus, a two-prong test is necessary to examine such claims. First, Mr. Calhoun must show

that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient by producing evidence that counsel acted

unreasonably. State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 534 (1997), citing Strickland at 687. Second,

Mr. Calhoun must demonstrate that but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that

the results of the trial would have been different. Keith at 534. “This Court need not address both

prongs of the Strickland test if the appellant fails to satisfy either prong.” State v. Gannon, 9th

Dist. Medina No. 19CA0053-M, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 23, citing State v. Ray, 9th Dist. Summit No.

22459, 2005-Ohio-4941, ¶ 10.

                          Mr. Calhoun’s trial counsel was not ineffective.

        {¶39} Mr. Calhoun argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to make an

argument during his Crim.R. 29 motion that Mr. Calhoun did not present a risk of harm to himself

and (2) failing to object to the jury instructions.

        {¶40} With respect to Mr. Calhoun’s assertion that trial counsel’s alleged failure to argue

Mr. Calhoun did not present a risk of harm to himself, when making a Crim.R. 29 motion for

acquittal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court determines Mr. Calhoun’s

argument lacks merit. Mr. Calhoun posits it was error for his trial counsel to “argue[] that [Mr.

Calhoun] wasn’t a risk of harm to the police officers ‘or anyone there’” Mr. Calhoun, however,

does not explain how, but for counsel arguing the motion in a different way, there is a reasonable

probability that the results of his trial would have been different. In fact, Mr. Calhoun concedes

within the same argument that his trial counsel “did challenge this element; [Mr. Calhoun] just
                                                 15

didn’t know who the victim was when he challenged it; and the term “anyone” could “actually

refer to [Mr. Calhoun] himself[.]”

       {¶41} With respect to trial counsel’s alleged failure to object to the jury instructions, as

stated in the third assignment of error, the trial court has the discretion to advise the jury on Mr.

Calhoun’s Fifth Amendment right to testify unless Mr. Calhoun requested the jury instruction. No

such request for a jury instruction was made in this case. “[C]ounsel's decision not to request a

jury instruction falls within the ambit of trial strategy.” State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412,

2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 111, citing State v. Lawson, 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 341 (1992); State v. Schaim,

65 Ohio St.3d 51, fn. 9 (1992). “Furthermore, debatable trial tactics do not constitute ineffective

assistance of trial counsel.” Id., citing State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49 (1980); State v.

Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 146.

       {¶42} Mr. Calhoun’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

                                                III.

       {¶43} Mr. Calhoun’s first assignment of error is sustained. His second, third, fourth, and

sixth assignments of error are overruled and his fifth assignment of error is moot. The judgment

of the Akron Municipal Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.

                                                                         Judgment affirmed in part,
                                                                                  reversed in part,
                                                                              and cause remanded.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
                                                16

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Akron Municipal

Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed equally to both parties.

                                                     BETTY SUTTON
                                                     FOR THE COURT

FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.

HENSAL, J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.

APPEARANCES:

HOMELL T. CALHOUN, pro se, Appellant.

EVE V. BELFANCE, Director of Law, and BRIAN D. BREMER and KIRSTEN L. SMITH,
Assistant Directors of Law, for Appellee.