Court Opinion

ID: 9962202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 22:10:06.705514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:59.378354
License: Public Domain

04/22/2024
            IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                             AT NASHVILLE
                              Assigned on Briefs March 13, 2024

             MACK MANDRELL LOYDE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                   Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
                        No. 2013-A-430     Jennifer Smith, Judge
                        ___________________________________

                               No. M2023-00858-CCA-R3-ECN
                           ___________________________________

In 2016, the Petitioner, Mack Mandrell Loyde, was convicted of aggravated burglary,
aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony,
for which he received an effective sentence of life without parole. In 2018, this court
affirmed his convictions and remanded for resentencing. State v. Loyde, No. M2017-
01002-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1907336, at *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2018), perm.
app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018). In 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-
conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the denial of which was
affirmed on appeal. Loyde v. State, No. M2022-01132-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 5447386,
at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2023). In 2023, five years after his convictions and
sentence became final, the Petitioner, acting pro se, filed the instant petition for writ of
error coram nobis, which was summarily dismissed as beyond the one-year statute of
limitations. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends he is entitled to equitable tolling of the
limitations period based on an affidavit from an individual, Brandy Oldaker, who claimed
to have been involved in the underlying offenses and who denied the Petitioner was
involved. The Petitioner claims the affidavit is newly discovered evidence of his
innocence.1 Upon review, we affirm.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

        1
          We are compelled to note that the Petitioner has included two other issues in the argument section
of his brief which are not designated as issues presented. The issues are (1) “whether the criminal history
of Norris qualifies as newly discovered evidence;” and (2) “whether the trial counsel Caldwell’s affidavit
qualifies as newly discovered evidence,” both of which appear to have been rejected by the coram nobis
court as previously determined in the Petitioner’s post-conviction matter. Rule 27(a)(4) of the Tennessee
Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a petitioner’s brief include a statement of the issues presented
for review. “[A]n issue may be deemed waived when it is argued in the brief but is not designated as an
issue in accordance with [Rule 27(a)(4)].” Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325 (Tenn. 2012). Accordingly,
we decline to address those issues as they are waived.
CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES
CURWOOD WITT, JR., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Mack Mandrell Loyde, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Glenn Funk, District Attorney General; and Vincent P. Wyatt, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                         OPINION

        At the Petitioner’s February 22, 2016 trial, William Covington, the victim, testified
that on the night of September 22, 2012, he was “drinking some beer” with Brandy Oldaker
at his apartment. Loyde, 2018 WL 1907336, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2018). After
Oldaker and the victim “fooled around for a little bit,” he lost consciousness. When he
woke, he was “tied or bound . . . face down in [his] own couch” and Oldaker was gone.
When the victim tried to rise from the couch, a knee was “put into [his] back and a gun put
to the back of [his] head.” He was told by the assailant not to move or “[he] would blow
[the victim’s] head off.” The victim did not see the gun at the back of his head, but believed
due to his military training, that it was a revolver. The victim heard two or three other
males discussing “hit[ting] the back of the house.” Id. The men left the apartment, and the
victim called 911. It was discovered that a 12-gauge shotgun, an AK-47, and a .22 long
rifle belonging to the victim were missing. The victim also testified that two computers,
“some tablets[,]” his wallet containing his debit and credit cards, and military ID were also
missing. Id. On cross-examination, the victim explained that Oldaker knew the Petitioner,
and the victim speculated that Oldaker may have put something in his drink to perpetrate
the crime shortly before he passed out. The victim said he relayed his suspicions to the
police.

        Amber Norris, the Petitioner’s ex-girlfriend, testified that she locked the Petitioner
out of her apartment on the night of the offenses after he left to “go to Wal-Mart” and did
not return before midnight. The next morning, Norris “stepped on the barrel of some sort
of weapon” as she got out of bed. She then went to the bathroom, and the Petitioner entered
her apartment around 5:30 a.m. as she was getting ready for work. Id. at *2. Norris testified
that the Petitioner was carrying a duffel bag, a shotgun, and a “toboggan with the eye holes
in it.” She observed a handgun inside of the Petitioner’s duffel bag. She also saw a check
with the name “William Covington” on it on her coffee table. Id. She left her apartment
and called the police. When the police arrived, Norris let them into her apartment.

      The Petitioner was arrested and read his Miranda rights by Agent William Stewart.
Agent Stewart testified that, “Immediately after Miranda [the Petitioner] was like, ‘I know
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I’m being arrested, I was just the lookout, I was just the lookout.’” Id. The Petitioner then
told Agent Stewart he drove “Kevin and Bryan” to the robbery but only served as lookout
and did not enter the apartment. He explained that the bankcards, military ID, and tablet
were his payment for his part in the offense. These statements were not recorded. From
Norris’ apartment, the police collected the victim’s shotgun, military ID, and tablet. The
backpack and ski mask were connected to the robbery, and another handgun was collected
from beneath the bed. The Petitioner offered no evidence at the close of the State’s proof,
and the Davidson County jury convicted him as charged. Id. at *3.

      The Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed by this court on direct appeal, however,
we remanded for resentencing. Id. at *3, *8. The record includes amended judgments,
which were entered on October 10, 2018.

       The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on February 1, 2019,
arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Loyde, 2023 WL 5447386, at
*3. At the evidentiary hearing on November 19, 2021, the Petitioner argued, among other
things, that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his case. As relevant here, trial
counsel testified that he did not call Oldaker as a witness despite the Petitioner’s belief that
she was an accomplice in the robbery because trial counsel was worried that she would
implicate the Petitioner if she testified. This court affirmed the post-conviction court’s
denial of post-conviction relief. Id. at*7.

       On January 9, 2023, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram
nobis based primarily on a handwritten affidavit by Brandy Oldaker, which was attached.
The Petitioner believed the affidavit was newly discovered evidence that established his
innocence. The affidavit provided:

       On September 22, 2012, myself and two other individuals whom go by the
       names of Rodney and Fred-Fred was [sic] involved in a [sic] aggravated
       robbery and burglary. The victim was my ex-boyfriend William Covington.
       Numerous items was [sic] taken. Myself, Brandy Oldaker[,] and the two
       others involve Rodney and Fred-Fred sold the items to [the Petitioner]. [The
       Petitioner] had no knowledge of the merchandise being stolen nor did he []
       participate in the aggravated robbery and burglary. All though [sic] [the
       Petitioner] purchased the items he committed no crimes. I [] was
       manipulated and placed under duress (threats) of being confine[d] if I did not
       name [the Petitioner] as a defendant. I was coerced by the police and
       detectives. I [] lied to help send [the Petitioner] an innocent man to prison.
       I [] am voluntarily making this oath. I [] have not been threatened or
       promise[d] any financial compensation. I [] being older realize I have a
       moral obligation to clear my conscience and tell the truth. I [] have done a
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       grave injustice to [the Petitioner]. I [] pray that me coming forward will assist
       this innocent man [the Petitioner] in regaining his freedom.

The affidavit was signed and notarized on December 9, 2022. The Petitioner believed the
affidavit was proof that Oldaker had lied to the police and was involved in the offenses.
Because the Petitioner did not receive Oldaker’s affidavit until December 17, 2022, the
Petitioner believed the statute of limitations began to run from the date he received
Oldaker’s affidavit.

       The State filed its response on February 14, 2023, and argued the petition was
untimely. In response, the Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the petition for writ of
error coram nobis and argued that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations was proper
because “common sense[] show[ed]” that Oldaker’s presence at his trial would have proven
his innocence and brought Oldaker and “the other two actual robbers” to justice. The
Petitioner further alleged that the affidavit proved that a conspiracy existed to make him a
scapegoat for the offense. The Petitioner also claimed that he had asked his trial counsel
to subpoena Oldaker, which trial counsel did not do.

       By written order on May 9, 2023, the coram nobis court denied the petition because
it was untimely and the Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations was appropriate. In rejecting the Petitioner’s claim that Oldaker’s
affidavit was newly discovered evidence, the court reasoned that “Oldaker was known to
the Petitioner at the time of trial, but she was not called to testify at trial or at his post-
conviction hearing.” The court stated that “discovery of or ignorance to the existence of a
claim does not create a ‘later-arising’ claim[,]” and concluded that the Petitioner had failed
to demonstrate that his claim was “later-arising.” The Petitioner filed a timely notice of
appeal, and this case is properly before this court for review.

                                         ANALYSIS

        The Petitioner argues that Oldaker’s affidavit is newly discovered evidence which
entitles him to error coram nobis relief. The State responds that the Petitioner is not entitled
to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. We agree with the State.

        A writ of error coram nobis is available to convicted defendants. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-26-105(a). However, a writ of error coram nobis is an “extraordinary procedural
remedy” that “fills only a slight gap into which few cases fall.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d
661, 672 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Penn v. State, 670 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Ark. 1984)). “The
purpose of this remedy ‘is to bring to the attention of the [trial] court some fact unknown
to the court, which if known would have resulted in a different judgment.’” State v. Hart,
911 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting State ex rel. Carlson v. State, 407
                                             -4-
S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tenn. 1966)). Relief by petition for writ of error coram nobis is provided
for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105. The statute provides, in pertinent
part:

       (b) The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors dehors
       the record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on
       the trial of the case, on a motion for new trial, on appeal in the nature of a
       writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Upon a
       showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to
       present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will
       lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which
       were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have
       resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.

       (c) The issue shall be tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and
       if the decision be in favor of the petitioner, the judgment complained of shall
       be set aside and the defendant shall be granted a new trial in that cause. . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105(b), (c).

        The decision to deny a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the grounds of
subsequently or newly discovered evidence rests within the sound discretion of trial court,
which this court will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-
105. In order to qualify as “newly discovered evidence” for the purposes of a writ of error
coram nobis, the proffered evidence must be (1) evidence of facts existing, but not yet
ascertained, at the time of the original trial, (2) admissible, and (3) credible. Nunley v.
State, 552 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2018). A motion seeking a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence “must also be supported by affidavits.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d
141, 152 (Tenn. 2010) (Koch and Clark, JJ., concurring). These affidavits “should be filed
in support of the petition or at some point in time prior to the hearing.” Hart, 911 S.W.2d
at 375. The affidavits must be relevant, material, germane to the grounds raised in the
petition, and based on personal knowledge. Id. “Affidavits which fail to meet these criteria
will not justify the granting of an evidentiary hearing since the information contained in
the affidavits, taken as true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief.” Id.

       A petition for a writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence need
only show that the newly discovered evidence, had it been admitted at trial, may have
resulted in a different judgment, and does not need to show that the result of the proceeding
would have been different had the evidence been available at trial. A criminal trial “may
have resulted in different judgment,” so as to warrant coram nobis relief based on newly
discovered recantation testimony, if the trial court is reasonably well satisfied that trial
                                             -5-
testimony was false, that recanted testimony was truthful, and that a jury might have
reached a different conclusion had truth been told. State v. Workman, 111 S.W.3d 10
(Tenn. 2002); Johnson v. State, 370 S.W.3d 694, 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (citing State
v. Ratliff, 71 S.W.3d 291, 298 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)). The assessment of witness
credibility is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. (citing Hart, 911 S.W.2d
at 375; Bennett v. State, No. E2004-01416-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 1661721 (Tenn. Crim.
App. July 14, 2005) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying error
coram nobis relief after determining that a witness who recanted previous testimony was
not credible), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2005)).

        A petition for a writ of error coram nobis must be filed within one year after the
challenged judgment becomes final. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103. The petition is subject
to being summarily dismissed if it does not show on its face that it has complied with the
one-year statute of limitations, and such compliance is an essential element of a coram
nobis claim. Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828. To accommodate due process concerns, the one-
year statute of limitations may be tolled if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeks
relief based upon new evidence of actual innocence discovered after expiration of the
limitations period. Id. 828-829. If the coram nobis petition does not show on its face that
it has been filed within the one-year statute of limitations, the petition must set forth with
particularity facts demonstrating that the prisoner is entitled to equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations:

               To be entitled to equitable tolling, a prisoner must demonstrate with
       particularity in the petition: (1) that the ground or grounds upon which the
       prisoner is seeking relief are “later arising” grounds, that is grounds that arose
       after the point in time when the applicable statute of limitations normally
       would have started to run; [and] (2) that, based on the facts of the case, the
       strict application of the statute of limitations would effectively deny the
       prisoner a reasonable opportunity to present his or her claims. . . . A prisoner
       is not entitled to equitable tolling to pursue a patently non-meritorious ground
       for relief.

Id. at 829.

       “Whether due process considerations require tolling of a statute of limitations is a
mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo with no presumption of
correctness.” Id. at 830. Upon review of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis for
timeliness, an appellate court must first determine whether the petitioner “asserted the
claim in a timely manner and, if not, whether he has demonstrated that he is entitled to
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations as provided in [Tennessee Code Annotated

                                              -6-
Section 27-7-103]. The inquiry ends if his petition is not timely and if he has failed to
demonstrate that he is entitled to relief from the statute of limitations.” Id.

        The record shows that the amended judgments in this case were entered on October
10, 2018. A petition for writ of error coram nobis must be filed within one year of the
judgment becoming final, and in this case that deadline was October 10, 2019. The
Petitioner filed his petition for writ of error coram nobis on January 9, 2023, over three
years after the limitations period had expired. Accordingly, the petition is time-barred
unless the Petitioner demonstrates he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations. To establish equitable tolling, the Petitioner argues the December 2022
Oldaker affidavit is “later arising” grounds for relief because it was “the only and first time
Oldaker started to tell the truth.” The Petitioner likens his case to Holliman v. State, No.
W2011-01071-CCA-R3-CO, 2012 WL 3793143, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2012),
and argues that Oldaker’s “change of heart” should be considered the same as the recanted
statement of the co-defendant in Holliman. The State responds that information contained
in the Oldaker affidavit would not have changed the outcome of the trial because it is
contrary to the Petitioner’s admissions to the police to driving the two other perpetrators to
the offense location, being the “look out” for them, and receiving “the shotgun, bankcards,
military ID, and tablet as payment for his involvement in the crimes.” We agree with the
State.

       In State v. Holliman, No. W2003-01736-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 819735, at *1
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2005), the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree
murder and conspiracy to commit the first-degree murder of her husband. She received an
effective sentence of life without parole. The proof at trial established that Holliman paid
her first cousin, James Rodney Mills, and another individual to commit the murder.
However, Mills did not testify at trial. The defendant testified and admitted that she
discussed murdering the victim with Mills. However, the defendant claimed that there was
no agreement for the killing and that she only participated to the extent that she did because
Mills had threatened to kill her and her family. The defendant claimed that she was afraid
of Mills. On August 24, 2009, a reporter from a Memphis television channel interviewed
Mills. During the interview, Mills recanted statements he made at his guilty plea hearing
implicating the defendant in the first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree
murder. He stated that he exaggerated the defendant’s involvement to avoid the death
penalty. Holliman, 2012 WL 3793143, at *1.

        Holliman subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis and raised for
the first time a claim of newly discovered evidence based on the recantation of her co-
defendant James Rodney Mills. Id. at *3. This court reversed the summary dismissal of
the untimely petition because the petitioner offered newly discovered evidence that her co-
defendant recanted incriminating testimony made during his guilty plea hearing. Id. In
                                             -7-
doing so, the panel in Holliman acknowledged that “whether the testimony qualifies as
impeachment evidence may be relevant in the determination but is not controlling[.]” Id.
(citing State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527-28 (Tenn. 2007)) (emphasis added).
Holliman does not afford the Petitioner any relief as it simply stands for the proposition
that there is not a complete bar to coram nobis relief in cases involving alleged newly
discovered impeachment evidence. Compare Bowen v. State, No. W2022-00229-CCA-
R3-ECN, 2022 WL 17408878, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2022), perm. app. denied
(Mar. 8, 2023) (stating that the co-defendant’s testimony of the petitioner’s innocence was
not newly discovered solely because the co-defendant was now willing to testify); Skinner
v. State, No. W2017-01797-CCA-R3-ECN, 2018 WL 3430339, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App.
July 16, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2018) (concluding the “newly
discovered evidence” was not later arising when trial counsel had access to and reviewed
the evidence prior to trial).

        We conclude that summary dismissal was proper because the Petitioner failed to
establish that the information provided by Oldaker was “later arising,” and he is not entitled
to equitable tolling to pursue a patently non-meritorious ground for relief. First, as noted
by the coram nobis court, Oldaker was known to the Petitioner at the time of trial and at
his post-conviction hearing. Trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that he
did not call Oldaker as a witness despite the Petitioner’s belief that she was an accomplice
in the robbery because trial counsel was worried that she would implicate the Petitioner if
she testified, which was determined by this court to be a sound tactical decision made after
adequate preparation for the case. Loyde, 2023 WL 5447386, at *6. More importantly, in
contrast to Oldaker’s affidavit, the facts from the Petitioner’s trial demonstrate:

       “Immediately after Miranda [the Petitioner] was like, I know I’m being
       arrested, I was just the lookout, I was just the lookout.” The [Petitioner]
       continued, stating he drove “Kevin and Bryan” in a Honda Accord to the
       scene of the robbery, but he did not go inside the apartment. Rather, the
       [Petitioner] maintained he served as a lookout for the two who committed
       the robbery. The [Petitioner] told Agent Stewart he received the shotgun,
       bankcards, military ID, and tablet as payment for his involvement in the
       crimes.

       ****

       Officer Foster testified, “[a]fter his Miranda [r]ights had been read the
       [Petitioner] made an excited utterance that he knows he’s going to jail for
       agg[ravated] robbery.” At the time, Officer Foster was “under the impression
       that [the Petitioner] might have been involved with a burglary and that’s the
       reason why we were out there, items that he probably took in a burglary were
                                            -8-
       in [Ms. Norris’s] apartment.” Officer Foster heard [the Petitioner] again state
       he “was going to jail for agg[ravated] robbery,” and he also “overheard [the
       Petitioner] tell [Agent Stewart] he was only the lookout for the robbery.”

Loyde, 2018 WL 1907336, at *2.

        Even if we considered Oldaker’s affidavit as later arising grounds for tolling
purposes, “[a]s a general rule, subsequently or newly discovered evidence which . . . serves
no other purpose than to contradict or impeach the evidence adduced during the course of
the trial . . . will not justify the granting of a petition for the writ of error coram nobis when
the evidence, if introduced, would not have resulted in a different judgment.” Hart, 911
S.W.2d at 375 (internal citations omitted). Based on the above facts, the Petitioner twice
admitted his involvement in this case to police, and it is unlikely that Oldaker’s information
may have resulted in a different judgment at trial. Accordingly, strict application of the
statute of limitations period by the coram nobis court did not effectively deny the Petitioner
a reasonable opportunity to present his claim and summary dismissal was proper.

                                       CONCLUSION

      Based upon the above reasoning and authority, we affirm the coram nobis court’s
dismissal of the petition.

                                       ___________________________________________
                                         CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE

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