Court Opinion

ID: 9664988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:35:55.404312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:11.908949
License: Public Domain

Gauleton Harris, Gliief Justice. I disagree with the majority insofar as this case relates to Nelson. Though the property occupied by Bussell was being used as a truck terminal as early as February, 1967, and though Nelson was familiar with this fact, he did not, at any time before the fire, on September 28, 1967, advise the company by letter, endorsement, new policy, or in any other manner, that the status of the property had changed from residential to commercial. He admitted that he had a duty as appellant’s agent to notify the company of the change of use, and his only defense was to say that the company would have accepted the policy, even though it had been endorsed to cover the new classification. This evidence is not only speculative, but is also contrary to the evidence offered by appellant. James Arthur Dunaway, also an agent for appellant, testified that the company furnished an underwriting guide and handbook to its agents, which showed whether a particular company would or would not write insur¡mee on a particular type of risk. The witness said that the risk accepted by Nelson was on the Millers Mutual prohibited risk list. The result of Nelson’s negligence in failing to notify appellant is that Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Texas is liable under a risk that it did not know it held — ¡1 risk that it never had the opportunity to refuse. 1 am of the opinion that the company is entitled to recover from Nelson the full amount of the judgment rendered against it. I. therefore respectfully dissent. Byrd, J., joins in this dissent.