Court Opinion

ID: 2964004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:18:51.513242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:49.594456
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1350

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    RODRIGO BRAND,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                _____________________

        No. 94-1351

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                               FELIX APONTE-VELAZQUEZ,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                _____________________

        No. 94-1352

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                               CARMELO PULLIZA-DELGADO,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                      Aldrich and Coffin, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                          _____________________

                                 ____________________

            Peter Goldberger with whom James H.  Feldman, Jr., Pamela A. Wilk,
            ________________           ______________________  ______________
        Alan  Ellis and  Law Offices  of Alan  Ellis, P.C.  were on  brief for
        ___________      _________________________________
        appellant Felix Aponte-Velazquez.
            Graham  A. Castillo  Pagan with  whom  Luis  Rafael Rivera  was on
            __________________________             ___________________
        brief for appellants Rodrigo Brand and Carmelo Pulliza-Delgado.
            Luis  Rafael Rivera  with whom  Graham  A.  Castillo Pagan  was on
            ___________________             __________________________
        brief for appellants Rodrigo Brand and Carmelo Pulliza-Delgado.
            Jose  A. Quiles-Espinosa,  Senior  Litigation  Counsel, with  whom
            ________________________
        Guillermo  Gil, United  States  Attorney, Juan  A. Pedrosa,  Assistant
        ______________  ________________________  ________________
        United States Attorney, and Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant United States
                                    _________________
        Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                    March 26, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      ALDRICH,  Senior Circuit Judge.  Appellants Aponte,
                                ____________________

            Pulliza, and Brand raise several claims of error on appeal of

            their  convictions   for  various  substantive   offenses  in

            connection   with  a  cocaine  importation  and  distribution

            scheme.  Finding none meritorious, we affirm.

                          I.  Reconstruction of Trial Record
                          __________________________________

                      After  persistent efforts  by appellate  counsel to

            obtain  a  complete   trial  transcript,   the  trial   court

            determined that certain portions -- closing arguments and the

            court's jury charge -- had been permanently lost.  Appellants

            then moved this  court for summary reversal, which  we denied

            without prejudice in an order requesting the court to attempt

            a recreation adequate for appeal, or, if unable, to determine

            whether appellants  were prejudiced as a  result of remaining

            gaps.  The  court recreated  its jury charge,  and located  a

            transcript containing the complete closing argument on behalf

            of  Pulliza  and  a  "substantial  portion"  of  the  closing

            argument for Aponte.  It received from Brand's trial attorney

            some incomplete  notes prepared  for his closing,  along with

            assurances that it would be impossible to recreate the actual

            argument.   The government filed what the parties agreed is a

            "reasonable recreation" of its main closing argument, as well

            as a  recreation of  its rebuttal,  which appellants  view as

            inadequate.   All agreed that  no contemporaneous  objections

            had 

                                         -3-

            been  raised during these segments  of the trial.   The court

            then certified that the record had been reconstructed

                      as  best as  the  court and  the  parties
                      could.  The defendants have not shown any
                      specific   prejudice  arising   from  the
                      absence  of  the  trial transcript  other
                      than the inconvenience of not  having the
                      precise  text  . . .   for  purposes   of
                      developing  argument  on  appeal  on  the
                      basis of clear error.1

                      Appellants  contend  adequate  appellate review  of

            their  convictions is  impossible because  the court  did not

            produce a reasonable recreation  of the missing transcripts,2

            entitling them to  reversal and  a new trial.   They  concede

            that due process does not automatically require reversal when

            a defendant is denied a full verbatim  trial transcript, see,
                                                                     ___

            e.g., Bundy v. Wilson,  815 F.2d 125, 135 (1st Cir. 1987) (an
            ____  _____    ______

            "adequate   substitute"  may  suffice)  (citing  cases),  but

            contend that  non-compliance with the Court  Reporter Act, 28

            U.S.C.   753(b)(1), alone requires  reversal and a new trial.

            We disagree.

                      The Act  provides, inter alia, that  all open court
                                         __________

            proceedings  in criminal cases  "shall be recorded verbatim."

            28 U.S.C.    753(b)(1) (1982).  This  provision is mandatory,

            United States  v.  Andiarena, 823  F.2d  673, 676  (1st  Cir.
            _____________      _________

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Appellants  concede  plain error  is their  sole recourse
            with respect to the incomplete portions of the transcript.

            2.  We limit  our consideration to the  closing arguments and
            jury charge, as any other alleged breaches in the record were
            not brought to the attention of the district court.

                                         -4-

            1987), and concededly  not complied  with in  this case,  yet

            nothing  prescribes  automatic  reversal  of   a  defendant's

            convictions for non-compliance, and we  are aware of no cases

            which so hold.   Appellants cite Hardy v. United  States, 375
                                             _____    ______________

            U.S.  277 (1964),  for the  proposition that  new counsel  on

            appeal3 cannot  properly represent  their clients  without an

            "entire  transcript."   Id. at  279-80.   Hardy held  that an
                                    ___               _____

            indigent federal defendant is  entitled to a trial transcript

            free of charge in order to  perfect an appeal; we do not read

            it  to have created a rule mandating reversal for less than a

            verbatim account.

                      Alternatively,  appellants  suggest  we follow  the

            Fifth Circuit's view  that new counsel  on appeal may  obtain

            reversal for lack of  a verbatim transcript under   753(b)(1)

            merely  by showing  the missing  portion is  "substantial and

            significant,"  United States  v. Selva,  559 F.2d  1303, 1306
                           _____________     _____

            (5th Cir. 1977), and that any reconstruction  thereof is less

            than  "substantially verbatim."   United  States v.  Pace, 10
                                              ______________     ____

            F.3d 1106, 1124-25  (5th Cir. 1993),  cert. denied, ___  U.S.
                                                  ____________

            ___, 114 S. Ct. 2180, 128 L. Ed. 2d 899 (1994).   True, in Hardy
                                                                    _____

            the Court observed that the right established by Federal Rule

            of Criminal Procedure 52(b) to have "plain errors or defects"

            noticed  by  the  court  "is illusory  if  no  transcript  is

            available at least to  one whose lawyer on appeal  enters the

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Appellants have all obtained new counsel for this appeal.

                                         -5-

            case after the trial is ended."   375 U.S. at 280.  Yet  this

            was in  the  context of  deciding  whether or  not  appellant

            should be afforded a transcript at  all.  We do not take this
                                            _______

            statement to mean that if no verbatim transcript is available
                                         ________

            that an effective appeal is not possible.

                      The  majority  of  circuits construing    753(b)(1)

            have held that to obtain reversal and a new trial, whether or

            not  there  is new  appellate  counsel,  defendant must  show

            specific  prejudice  to his  ability  to  perfect an  appeal,

            beyond mere non-compliance with  the act.  See  United States
                                                       ___  _____________

            v.  Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1530 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
                _____                                       ____________

            474  U.S.  1068,  and  cert. denied,  474  U.S.  1069  (1986)
                                   ____________

            (disagreeing with  Selva); United States v.  Sierra, 981 F.2d
                               _____   _____________     ______

            123,  126-27 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113
                                          ____________

            S.Ct.  2949, 124 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1993)  (same); United States v.
                                                         _____________

            Antoine, 906 F.2d  1379, 1381 (9th  Cir.), cert. denied,  498
            _______                                    ____________

            U.S. 963 (1990) (same).   But see United States  v. Preciado-
                                      ___ ___ _____________     _________

            Cordobas, 981  F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1993) (as successor
            ________

            court  to former  Fifth Circuit,  bound by  Selva).   We have
                                                        _____

            indicated preference  for the majority view,  see Sabatier v.
                                                          ___ ________

            Dabrowski, 586 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that if
            _________

              753(b)(1) applied to  extradition proceedings, reversal  on

            account  of  non-compliance  would  require  showing specific

            prejudice), and explicitly adopt it today.

                      Appellants conceded  to the  trial  court that  the

                                         -6-

            government's reconstruction of  its main closing argument  is

            substantially accurate.  This should enable  effective review

            for plain error, yet  appellants make no particularized claim

            that such error  occurred.  Nor  do they make any  claim that

            plain error could have  occurred during the closing arguments

            of  one  of  their  own  attorneys.    With  respect  to  the

            government's rebuttal,  we are hard-pressed to  conceive what

            sort  of illegitimate  argument could  have been  made during

            these  few moments that might have "so poisoned the well that

            the trial's outcome was likely affected," Arrieta-Agressot v.
                                                      ________________

            United States,  3  F.3d 525,  528  (1st Cir.  1993)  (quoting
            _____________

            United States  v. Mejia-Lozano, 829  F.2d 268, 274  (1st Cir.
            _____________     ____________

            1987)),  nor   do  appellants   suggest  any  based   on  the

            reconstruction that was  submitted.  In any  event, given the

            quantity  and  strength of  the  evidence  against all  three

            appellants  from the testimony  of several co-conspirators --

            eye-witnesses   to   their   involvement   in   the   various

            preparations, possessions  and transactions amounting  to the

            offenses charged -- we are not  persuaded that any deficiency

            could have risen to  a miscarriage of justice; i.e.,  even if

            the rebuttal was  tainted by some imaginable  error, we would

            not find "a substantial chance that absent the error the jury

            would have acquitted."  Id.  We therefore uphold the district
                                    ___

            court's  conclusion that  appellants'  ability to  perfect an

            appeal  was not  prejudiced, and  turn now  to the  merits of

                                         -7-

            their claims.

                                         -8-

                             II.  Motion for Continuance
                             ___________________________

                      On  the morning of  trial the defense  made a final

            request for continuance based on  the last minute decision of

            Jorge Hernandez  Miller, the  lead  co-conspirator, to  plead

            guilty and become the  government's chief witness.  Remaining

            defendants argued this necessitated more time to adjust trial

            strategy  and  gather  information  to impeach  him.    After

            thorough exploration, the  court, though sympathetic, saw  no

            justification for delay:

                      [Y]ou  had  the opportunity  to interview
                      him . . . as you told me in chambers that
                      this has  been done and now  that all the
                      Jencks  Act  [material]  has been  turned
                      over . . . the latest bits of information
                      that were generated  like the  interviews
                      [of  the witness]  with the  agents . . .
                      are  going  to  be  turned  over  to  you
                      including rough notes, . . .  I will  not
                      continue this case.

                      A  trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny

            a request  for continuance.   United States v.  Saccoccia, 58
                                          _____________     _________

            F.3d  754, 770  (1st Cir.  1995).   "Only an  unreasoning and

            arbitrary insistence  upon expeditiousness  in the face  of a

            justifiable  request  for delay  violates  the  right to  the

            assistance  of counsel," and would amount to an abuse of that

            discretion.   Morris  v. Slappy,  461  U.S. 1,  11-12  (1983)
                          ______     ______

            (internal quotations omitted).  We assess appellants' special

            reasons, plus relevant  factors such  as the  amount of  time

            needed  for effective  preparation  and  the amount  actually

            available, diligence  in preparing for trial  and whether the

                                         -9-

            defense contributed to its perceived  predicament, the likely

            utility  of  a  continuance,  inconvenience  to   the  court,

            opposing  party,  and  witnesses,  and  any  unfair prejudice

            caused by the denial.   Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at  770 (citations
                                    _________

            omitted).

                      Appellants  allege  the  court  failed  to  address

            "special  circumstances of  an emergent  nature beyond  their

            control."  They claim that after Miller's change of plea they

            suddenly  faced  an  unexpected  need  to gather  impeachment

            material  and  to  do  additional preparation,  as  they  had

            divided   responsibilities  among   themselves  due   to  the

            considerable   volume  of   trial  material   involved,4  and

            Miller's  defection  overburdened  the remaining  defendants.

            They contend they "could not  have been more diligent," would

            have   found  valuable   impeachment   material  if   granted

            additional  time,  and  were  prejudiced  in  cross-examining

            Miller  because of  the denial;  inconvenience to  others, by

            comparison, was minimal.

                      Appellants'  accusations  against  the   court  are

            unfounded.  As  the court  pointed out, the  defense had  had

            ample  time  and substantial  assistance  from  the court  to

            prepare for trial, and although more might have helped,  that

            is always true.  Defense  counsel could have anticipated that

                                
            ____________________

            4.  Aponte  points out  that  discovery involved  "some  1453
            documents totaling over 5000 pages."

                                         -10-

            a division  of labor strategy  might leave them in  a bind if

            one dropped  out,  especially since  the original  indictment

            included some 31 co-defendants who had been pleading out on a

            regular basis up  to and even  during trial.   The court  was

            very careful to elicit from  counsel precisely what more they

            thought  they needed and hoped to find to impeach Miller, and

            why.  It  gave a thoroughly reasoned response, observing that

            the  defense had been  given unlimited access  to the witness

            for four  days  prior to  the  start of  trial and  at  least

            several  more afterward until he took the stand, a "dream for

            a defense attorney,"  as well as notes government  agents had

            taken during their interviews  of the witness.  There  was no
                         _____

            abuse of discretion in ruling this was sufficient.

                      We  add  only  that  we   do  not  see,  even  with

            hindsight, what more a continuance would have achieved.   The

            defense   had  apparently  hoped   to  discredit   Miller  by

            implicating  him   in  the  uncharged   murders  of   several

            accomplices in  the cocaine conspiracy, and  wished more time

            to  locate, interview  and subpoena  witnesses who  could tie

            Miller to these crimes.   The court, however, in  a pre-trial

            ruling,  had strictly  prohibited  introduction of  extrinsic

            evidence of  Miller's involvement in the  murders and limited

            cross-examination  in reference to  these crimes  strictly to

            questioning his  motivation to enter the  plea agreement,5 in

                                
            ____________________

            5.  This ruling has not been appealed.

                                         -11-

            accordance  with  Federal  Rule  of Evidence  608(b).6    See
                                                                      ___

            Tigges v.  Cataldo, 611 F.2d 936, 938 (1st Cir. 1979).  As to
            ______     _______

            this, post.
                  ____

                            III.  Prosecutorial Misconduct
                            ______________________________

                      Before  trial government  counsel had  informed the

            defense  and the  court  that Miller  had stated  during plea

            negotiations that he  had decided to plead guilty because "he

            thought that he was  going to be imputed with some murders to

            which he denies, and  . . . the reason that motivated  him is

            because he wanted to clear the record that in fact he did not

            participate in those murders."   During a pre-trial interview

            Miller had told defense  counsel roughly the same --  that he

            was  afraid  "the government  . . .  [was] going  to  bring a

            massacre  against him,  a  murder against  him,  but he  also

            stated to  us that  in fact he  did not do  that."   The plea

            agreement was admitted in  evidence.  It made no  mention, of

            course, of murders.

                      During  cross-examination  defense  counsel  sought

            vigorously   to  impeach  Miller's  testimony  linking  their

            clients to  the  drug venture  by  attempting to  solicit  an

                                
            ____________________

            6.        (b)    Specific  instances   of  conduct.
                      Specific  instances of  the conduct  of a
                      witness, for the  purpose of attacking or
                      supporting   the  witness'   credibility,
                      other  than conviction of crime . . . may
                      not be proved by extrinsic evidence.

            Fed.R.Evid. 608(b).

                                         -12-

            admission from Miller that he was motivated to cooperate with

            the government by a  desire to "minimize the severity  of the

            accusations against himself,"  specifically by avoiding being

            implicated  in,  or  charged   with,  the  murders.    Miller

            repeatedly denied such motivation,  professing only a  desire

            to "repent" and "tell the truth."

                      Appellants  now contend  this was  an outright  lie

            that due process required the  government to correct.7   They

            rely principally upon Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959),
                                  _____    ________

            which held that  a defendant's due  process rights under  the

            Fourteenth  Amendment  required  reversal  of  his conviction

            where the prosecutor  failed to correct a  witness' denial of

            receiving promises of leniency in exchange for his testimony,

            knowing  it was  false, even  though the  prosecutor had  not

            himself  solicited the falsity. 360  U.S. at 269.   The Court

            said  this principle,  "implicit  in any  concept of  ordered

            liberty,  does not cease  to apply  merely because  the false

            testimony  goes only to the credibility of the witness."  Id.
                                                                      ___

            Nor  did  the fact  that the  jury  was presented  with other

            grounds for questioning the witness' credibility "turn[] what

            was otherwise a tainted trial into  a fair one."  Id. at 270.
                                                              ___

                                
            ____________________

            7.  Defense counsel  made no indication  to the court  at the
            time that  the defense believed  the government was  under an
            obligation   to   clarify  Miller's   statements   about  his
            motivation to plead, and, indeed, indicated satisfaction with
            coverage  of  the issue  when  the  court  inquired prior  to
            allowing examination of Miller to proceed into another area.

                                         -13-

            Appellants  contend  defense  counsels'  equal  knowledge  of

            Miller's pre-trial admissions cannot alleviate the government

            of its duty in this case to bring this impeachment "evidence"

            before the jury.

                      There are two answers  to this.  The first  is that

            the court had already ruled that testimony of murders was too

            prejudicial to  be admitted.   But, more  important, although

            defendant  refused  this  specific  characterization  of  his

            motives, he did concede to believing the plea agreement meant

            that "if I speak about things of which I have knowledge or in

            which  I have taken part,  I wouldn't be  indicted for them,"

            and  "would be  sentenced  to  fewer  years."    This  was  a

            sufficient acknowledgment that his  claim of rebirth was less

            than genuine; there  could be no question  the government had

            no duty to go further.

                                IV.  Jury Instructions
                                ______________________

                      Having raised  no objections  to any aspect  of the

            jury  instructions at  trial, Aponte  now claims  plain error

            both in the  court's explanation of  reasonable doubt and  in

            its  failure   to  give   a  requested  instruction   on  the

            defendant's  exercise of  his right  to remain  silent.   The

            following  instructions (emphasis  ours) contain  the alleged

            errors:

                           A reasonable doubt  is a doubt based
                      upon reason  and  common sense,  and  may
                      arise  from  a   careful  and   impartial
                      consideration  of  all  the evidence,  or

                                         -14-

                      from lack of  evidence.   Proof beyond  a
                      reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you
                      firmly  convinced  that the  defendant is
                      guilty.

                                         -15-

                           If  after  a  careful and  impartial
                           __
                      consideration with your fellow  jurors of
                      all  the evidence, you  are not convinced
                                         ______________________
                      beyond  a  reasonable   doubt  that   the
                      _________________________________________
                      defendant is  guilty, it is  your duty to
                      _________________________________________
                      find the  defendant not  guilty.   On the
                      ________________________________
                      other   hand,  if  after  a  careful  and
                                     __
                      impartial consideration  with your fellow
                      jurors  of  all  the  evidence,  you  are
                                                       ________
                      convinced beyond a reasonable  doubt that
                      _________________________________________
                      the defendant is guilty,  it is your duty
                      _________________________________________
                      to find the defendant guilty.
                      _____________________________

                           . . . Each defendant is  presumed to
                      be innocent and does not  have to testify
                      or   present   any   evidence  to   prove
                      innocence.  The government has the burden
                                  _____________________________
                      of  proving every  element of  the charge
                      _________________________________________
                      beyond a  reasonable doubt.   If it fails
                      _________________________________________
                      to do  so, you  must return  a not-guilty
                      _________________________________________
                      verdict.
                      ________

                                          A.

                      Aponte  contends that  by the  first paragraph  the

            court  permitted the  jury to  convict by  a degree  of proof

            lower than constitutionally required.  He argues that "firmly

            convinced"  suggests  a burden  of  proof akin  to  the civil

            "clear   and   convincing"   standard,   use   of   which  is

            impermissible in  a criminal case.   See Addington  v. Texas,
                                                 ___ _________     _____

            441  U.S.  418,  425  (1979)  (clear  and  convincing  is  an

            "intermediate standard" between preponderance of the evidence

            and proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
                                                  _____________

            358, 363-64 (1970) (guilt  in a criminal case must  be proved

            by  no less  a standard  than "beyond  a reasonable  doubt").

            According  to  Aponte,  it  is  linguistically  impossible to

            conceive how "firmly convinced"

                                         -16-

            could equate  with "beyond  a reasonable doubt,"  when "clear

            and convincing" does not.

                      Assessing the  instructions as a  whole, Victor  v.
                                                               ______

            Nebraska,  ___ U.S.  ___,  ___,  114  S. Ct. 1239,  1243,  127
            ________

            L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), we  conclude that the emphasized portions

            adequately and  ultimately conveyed an  accurate, unambiguous

            and comprehensible description of the government's burden and

            the standard  for  acquittal.   Whether  or not  the  "firmly

            convinced"   definition   alone  would   be  constitutionally

            sufficient to convey the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable

            doubt, the court's further exposition here left no doubt that

            the jury's duty  was to convict only  upon reaching consensus

            as to guilt beyond  a reasonable doubt.8  Nothing  further is

            required.  United States v. Andujar, 49 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir.
                       _____________    _______

            1995).

                                          B.

                      As was  his right,  Aponte elected not  to testify,

            and requested the following instruction be given to the jury:

                                
            ____________________

            8.  The  "firmly  convinced" language  has  withstood similar
            attack  in a  variety  of contexts.    See United  States  v.
                                                   ___ ______________
            Velazquez, 980 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
            _________                                       ____________
            ___  U.S.  ___,  113  S. Ct.  2979,  125  L. Ed. 2d  677  (1993)
            (upholding same pattern instruction used here); United States
                                                            _____________
            v.  Hunt, 794 F.2d  1095, 1100-1101 (5th  Cir. 1986) ("firmly
                ____
            convinced"  adequately  conveys "beyond  a  reasonable doubt"
            standard); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1557 (D.C.
                       _____________    ______
            Cir. 1993)  (same); see  also United  States v.  Williams, 20
                                _________ ______________     ________
            F.3d 125, 131  (5th Cir.),  cert. denied, ___  U.S. ___,  115
                                        ____________
            S.Ct. 239, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994); United States  v. Barrera-
                                               _____________     ________
            Gonzales,  952 F.2d  1269, 1272-73  (10th Cir.  1992); United
            ________                                               ______
            States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir. 1995).
            ______    ______

                                         -17-

                                         -18-

                      Under  the law,  a defendants  [sic] does
                      not  need  to  testify, since  it  is the
                      Government  who  must  prove  her  [sic]9
                      guilty  beyond  a reasonable  doubt.   No
                      presumption or inference  of guilt may be
                      made or drawn.

            The  court  declined, instructing  instead  as  quoted above.

            While he did not  object, Aponte now claims violation  of his

            constitutional rights.

                      The Fifth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant

            both  the  right  to  remain  silent  and  that  no   adverse

            inferences  may be  drawn from  his exercise  of this  right.

            Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981).  Further, "when
            ______    ________

            the  defendant makes  a  timely request  that a  prophylactic

            instruction be given . . . [the court] has the constitutional

            obligation . . .  to minimize the  danger that the  jury will

            give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify."

            Id.10   We have not read  Carter to require use  of the exact
            ___                       ______

            wording  requested, however,  so  long as  the trial  court's

            instructions complied with this obligation.  United States v.
                                                         _____________

            Ladd, 877 F.2d 1083, 1089 (1st Cir. 1989).
            ____

                                
            ____________________

            9.  The  district  court  apparently accepted  from  Aponte's
            appellate counsel  a set  of proposed jury  instructions that
            counsel believed  had been  submitted to  the court but  were
            inexplicably  absent from  the record.   We  note that  these
            instructions  were not prepared  for Aponte, but  for a Sonia
            Berrios Rodriguez, but since the government did not object to
            their inclusion in the appellate record as Aponte's requested
            instructions, we will treat them as such.

            10.  This  obligation is also imposed by  statute.  18 U.S.C.
              3481  (formerly designated as 28 U.S.C.   632).  See United
                                                               ___ ______
            States v. Bruno, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
            ______    _____

                                         -19-

                      Our   question  is  whether  instructing  that  the

            government  has the burden  of proof and  that defendant does

            not   have  to   testify   or  present   evidence  adequately

            communicates that no adverse inferences may be drawn from the

            fact that he  does not testify.  The government urges that we

            answered  this affirmatively  in Ladd,  where we  approved an
                                             ____

            instruction  that the  defendant's  silence  "cannot even  be

            considered by you in arriving at your verdict."  Id.  Not so.
                                                             ___

            A  jury  might well  think that  a  defendant's right  not to

            testify means merely that  he cannot be called as  a witness,

            leaving  it to draw such  conclusions from his  silence as it

            felt warranted.   An instruction not to  consider his failure

            to testify  precisely forbids drawing inferences.   Ladd, 877
                                                                ____

            F.2d at  1089.   Here, however,  the court  mentioned nothing

            beyond  the  defendant's  right  not to  testify  or  present

            evidence.  Carter  v. Kentucky makes clear that, once request
                       ______     ________

            for a  no-adverse-presumption instruction has  been made, the

            "full and free  exercise" of the  constitutionally guaranteed

            privilege  against  self-incrimination  requires   more  than

            instruction  on the right not  to testify and  to be presumed

            innocent  until proven  guilty.   450 U.S.  at 305.  See also
                                                                 ________

            United  States v. Eiland, 741  F.2d 738, 743  (5th Cir. 1984)
            ______________    ______

            (holding   instructions   similar   to   those   given   here

            constitutionally deficient under Carter).
                                             ______

                      We also find,  per United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
                                         _____________    _____

                                         -20-

            725,  ___, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993), that

            the forfeited error was "plain," and  "affect[ed] substantial

            rights" within the meaning of  Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b).  See Bruno
                                                                ___ _____

            v.  United States,  308 U.S. 287,  293-94 (1939)  (failure to
                _____________

            give   requested   instruction  cautioning   against  drawing

            presumptions from  defendant's failure  to testify was  not a

            mere "technical  erro[r] . . . which do[es]  not affect . . .

            substantial   rights  . . . .").     We   therefore  perceive

            discretion  to   reverse,  but   no  obligation  to   do  so.

            Fed.R.Civ.P.  52(b);  Olano, 113  S. Ct.  at 1778.    See also
                                  _____                          ________

            Chapman  v. California,  386 U.S.  18,  23 (1967)  (not every
            _______     __________

            constitutional error automatically requires reversal).

                      Olano  contemplates  that we  guide  our discretion
                      _____

            under  Rule 52(b)  by further  determining whether  the error

            "seriously  affect[ed]  the  fairness,  integrity  or  public

            reputation  of the judicial proceedings."   113 S. Ct. at 1779

            (internal quotations  omitted).   We have long  realized that

            among  the  things  we may  consider  is  the  weight of  the

            evidence of guilt or  innocence, without casting it favorably

            to the  government or presuming that  credibility issues were

            resolved in  its favor, Arrieta-Agressot,  3 F.3d at  528, to
                                    ________________

            determine whether the error could have made any difference to

            the verdict.11   We do  not view Olano  as having  removed or
                                             _____

                                
            ____________________

            11.  At  this  stage  of   review  for  forfeited  error  the
            assessment  is  whether  the  error was  "harmless  beyond  a
            reasonable  doubt,"  and  differs  from  so-called  "harmless

                                         -21-

            limited   such   an   assessment   from   our   discretionary

            consideration  as a general  matter.  However,  the Court has

            deemed a small number of "structural defects" not amenable to

            "quantitative[]  assess[ment],"  Arizona  v. Fulminante,  499
                                             _______     __________

            U.S.  279, 308  (1991),  including total  deprivation of  the

            right to counsel at trial (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
                                       ______    __________

            (1963)), and lack of  an impartial judge (Tumey v.  Ohio, 273
                                                      _____     ____

            U.S. 510 (1927)).  Id.  at 309.  See also id. at  310 (citing
                               ___           ________ ___

            additional cases); Sullivan v.  Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, ___,
                               ________     _________

            113   S. Ct.    2078,   2082,   124    L. Ed. 2d   182    (1993)

            (constitutionally  deficient  reasonable doubt  instruction).

            The distinction these  special errors share is  that they are

            "structural defects in the trial mechanism" which affect "the

            entire  conduct  of the  trial  from  beginning to  end"  and

            "without [which]  a criminal trial cannot  reliably serve its

            function  as   a  vehicle  for  determination   of  guilt  or

            innocence," rather  than being simply "error[s]  in the trial

            process itself."   Fulminante,  499 U.S. at  309-10 (internal
                               __________

            quotations omitted).   We think failure  to give a  requested

            Carter instruction falls comfortably  in the latter category.
            ______

            It is  not the sort of  error for which an  assessment of the

            evidence  is  unsuitable precisely  because  it  concerns the

            evidentiary value the jury may give to a defendant's election

                                
            ____________________

            error"  review only in that the defendant bears the burden of
            persuasion.  Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1778.
                         _____

                                         -22-

            not  to testify on his own behalf.   Carter, 450 U.S. at 305.
                                                 ______

            On   this  basis  we   are  confident  in   saying  that  the

            uncontradicted   evidence   against  appellants   Aponte  and

            Pulliza,   from  the  testimony  of  several  co-conspirators

            involved in various aspects  of the scheme, was overwhelming,

            and the verdict rendered would have ensued regardless  of the

            error.   In sum, although  "the failure to  limit the jurors'

            speculation on the meaning of [the defendant's] silence, when

            the  defendant makes  a  timely request  that a  prophylactic

            instruction  be given,  exacts an  impermissible toll  on the

            full  and  free  exercise  of  [defendant's  Fifth  Amendment

            privileges]," id., we do not  believe it could have seriously
                          ___

            affected the fairness of the proceedings.  

                                 V.  Double Jeopardy
                                 ___________________

                      Aponte  maintains that  because  the same  offenses

            underlying  his convictions also formed  the basis of a civil

            forfeiture  of   some  personal  assets,   pursuant  to   the

            Controlled  Substances and  Money Laundering Acts,  21 U.S.C.

               881(a)(6) and  (7) and 18 U.S.C.    981, respectively, his

            criminal sentence constitutes a prohibited second punishment,

            for the  same offenses, in  violation of the  Double Jeopardy

            Clause of the Fifth  Amendment.  See, e.g., United  States v.
                                             ___  ____  ______________

            Dixon,  ___  U.S. ___,  ___,  113  S. Ct. 2849,  2855-56,  125
            _____

            L.Ed.2d 556 (1993).  The   Clause   only  becomes   relevant,

            however, once a  defendant has first been placed in jeopardy,

                                         -23-

            and  "even then,  it is  only the  second proceeding  that is
                                               ______

            constitutionally  endangered."  United  States v.  Pierce, 60
                                            ______________     ______

            F.3d 886, 889 (1st Cir. 1995), pet. for cert. filed, Oct. 19,
                                           ____________________

            1995 (No. 95-6474).   Aponte contends, against all authority,

            that jeopardy in the  criminal case did not attach  until his

            sentencing,  well after  imposition of  the civil  penalty.12
                              _____

            We regard it  as beyond question that "jeopardy attaches when

            the  jury is empaneled and sworn."   Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S.
                                                 _____    _____

            28, 35  (1978).   Pierce, 60 F.3d  at 889.   A glance  at the
                              ______

            sequence  of events in this case, supra note 12, reveals that
                                              _____

            the criminal  sanction therefore  cannot have been  second to

            the forfeiture, and thus whether or not civil sanctions under

            21  U.S.C.     881(a)(6) and  (7) and  18  U.S.C.    981 even

            constitute punishment for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy

            Clause is a question we need not reach.  

                      The   convictions   of  appellants   are  therefore

            affirmed.
            _________

                                
            ____________________

            12.  The following chronology is pertinent:

                      Jury empaneled:           September 21, 1993
                      Criminal trial began:     September 22, 1993
                      Verdicts read:            October 1, 1993
                      Civil action commenced:   Nov. 4, 1993
                      Forfeiture stipulated:    March 9, 1994
                      Forfeiture order:         March 10, 1994
                      Criminal sentencing:      March 21, 1994

                                         -24-