Court Opinion

ID: 9566037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:32:23.322212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:58.334549
License: Public Domain

Banke, Judge,
dissenting.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant editors in this libel action based on a determination that their published reply to the plaintiff’s letter was non-libelous as a matter of law. I concur in that determination; therefore I must dissent.
“A libel is a false and malicious defamation of another, expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputation of the person and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” OCGA § 51-5-1. “Liability for libel may attach when a negative characterization of a person is coupled with a clear but false implication that the author is privy to facts about the person that are unknown to the general reader.” Hotchner v. Costillo-Puche, 551 F2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977). “[I]n considering whether a writing is defamatory as a matter of law, we look ... at what construction would be placed upon it by the average reader. Southeastern Newspapers v. Walker, 76 Ga. App. 57, 60 (44 SE2d 697); Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321 (3), 330 [60 SE2d 802]; Garland v. State, 211 Ga. 44, 48 (84 SE2d 9).” Macon Tel. Pub. Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 721 (302 SE2d 692) (1983).
“A plaintiff cannot avoid a summary judgment by taking statements out of context to force a libelous meaning when none otherwise exists.” Raymer v. Doubleday & Co., 615 F2d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1980).
The majority appears to agree with the plaintiff’s contention that a reasonable interpretation of the answer to her letter is that she is a sexually promiscuous lady. However, I must agree with the trial court that, crude and insulting though it may be, the answer does not purport to make any factual statement at all regarding the plaintiff. Indeed, the defendants do not even purport to know her. While the reply certainly demonstrates sarcastic contempt for the plaintiff’s desire for moral responsibility and good taste in the Cadaver, any defamatory implications in it are directed to the editors themselves rather than the plaintiff. Accordingly I do not believe that consistent with *462the First Amendment, it may be construed as libelous. Accord Pring v. Penthouse Intl., 695 F2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982). I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier and Judge Pope join in this dissent.