Court Opinion

ID: 9773444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:46:05.707999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:53.606485
License: Public Domain

WOODLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
It was appellant’s contention that the court should instruct the jury that unless they believed “that the sale was actually consumated by the defendant by the delivery of the * * * marihuana to the purchaser” to acquit.
The majority opinion does not sustain such contention, though the effect of the opinion is to do so.
There is no question but that the state’s evidence shows a design, scheme and plan to sell narcotics, appellant’s part being to make the agreement, collect a down payment and instruct the buyer to return for the narcotics, another to conclude the *122transaction by collecting the balance of the agreed price and direct the buyer to where the narcotic drug had, in the meantime, been stashed.
Appellant, who agreed to sell Richards a pound of marijuana for $50, received a part of the purchase price and instructed Richards to return the next day for his purchase, was a principal in the sale of marijuana. Robson acted with appellant and was a principal in the sale of the marijuana.
This court has held that proof of the commission of an offense by two or more persons acting together as principals is sufficient to establish a conspiracy between them to commit the offense. The absence of allegation of a conspiracy is not material. Sinclair et al v. State, 159 Texas Cr. Rep. 35, 261 S.W. 2d 167, wherein we quoted from Cox v. State, 8 Texas App. 254, 255, as follows:
“* * * when two or more are found acting together, with an unlawful intent in the commission of an offense, the common design and acting together makes them ipso facto conspirators —endows them as a body with the attribute of individuality — ■ merges the conspiracy to do the act in the act itself; and that the previous acts and declarations of each or any such principal offenders in pursuance of the agreed plan, and tending to throw light upon it or the motive or intent with which it was committed, is and should be received as legal and admissible evidence against each and all, whether indicted, prosecuted, and tried jointly or separately.”
See also Young v. State, 150 Texas Cr. Rep. 378, 201 S.W. 2d 46, 50; Whitehead v. State, 148 Texas Cr. Rep. 190, 185 S.W. 2d 725.
The conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Montoya v. State, 150 Texas Cr. Rep. 158, 199, S.W. 2d 164.
It is well settled that acts and declarations of a co-conspirator during the conspiracy are admissible against other conspirators. The rule that the conspiracy must first be established no longer obtains in this state. Sapet v. State, 159 Texas Cr. Rep. 620, 266 S.W. 2d 154, 158, and cases cited; Counts v. State, 149 Texas Cr. Rep. 348, 194 S.W. 2d 267; Aguero v. State, 164 Texas Cr. Rep. 265, 298 S.W. 2d 822.
*123Under the rule stated, the acts and declarations of Robson in the delivery of the marijuana and the collection of the remainder of the purchase price therefor were admissible against appellant. Sapet v. Sapet, supra, quoting from Abbott on Evidence, p. 190 and 621:
“ ‘The familiar rule that, when several persons are engaged together in the furtherance of an illegal design, the actions and declarations of one conspirator, made together in pursuance of a concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, are competent, against the others though not made in their presence.’
“And again the same author, on pag'e 621 says:
“ ‘Slight evidence of concert or collusion between the parties to an illegal transaction admits evidence of the acts and declarations of one against the others under the rule already stated on page 190.’ ”
The trial court did not err in failing to charge on the law of principals, appellant being the principal actor in the offense. 24-A Texas Jur., p. 678, Sec. 97; Perez v. State, 141 Texas Cr. Rep. 575, 150 S.W. 2d 402; Durham v. State, 112 Texas Cr. Rep. 395, 16 S.W. 2d 1092; Hunter v. State, 119 Texas Cr. Rep. 558, 45 S.W. 2d 969.
Nor was a charge on circumstantial evidence required, there being direct evidence supporting the allegations of the indictment, 12 Texas Digest, 814(17), and cases cited, including Dodd v. State, 149 Texas Cr. Rep. 156, 192 S.W. 2d 263.
The court’s charge defined a sale as “the agreed transfer of property having some value to another for a valuable consideration.” Art. 725b V.A.P.C., in Sec. 1(10), defines “sale” as follows : “ ‘Sale’ includes barter, exchange, or gift, or offer therefor, and each such transaction made by any person, whether as principal, proprietor, agent, servant, or employee.”
Appellant’s offer to sell a pound of marijuana to Richards for a consideration of $50 and Richards’ agreement to buy it and his payment of $10 as a part of the purchase price, delivery to be made the next day, followed by the delivery and payment of the $40 balance in the manner indicatéd, fully satisfied either definition.