Court Opinion

ID: 9411022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 17:13:32.501833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.371375
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30289         Document: 00516832451             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/25/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                                      FILED
                                                                                  July 25, 2023
                                        No. 22-30289                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Chukwuma N. Okoye, Jr.,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 5:21-CR-36-1

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Defendant Chukwuma Okoye challenges the amount of restitution
   ordered by the district court for his participation in a criminal conspiracy,
   alleging that proceeds of the entire conspiracy were not sufficiently
   established as foreseeable as required by the statute. Because the record
   provides sufficient basis for establishing that the amount ordered was
   foreseeable, we affirm.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30289      Document: 00516832451         Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/25/2023

                                   No. 22-30289

                                         I.
          This case arises out of Defendant’s participation—along with two
   indicted co-defendants who have since fled the country—in a criminal
   conspiracy that illicitly obtained funds intended for emergency relief during
   the COVID-19 pandemic. The scheme involved using the stolen personal
   identifying information from at least 29 different individuals to apply for
   loans from the Small Business Administration and unemployment insurance
   from the Washington State Employment Security Department. Those funds
   were then deposited into PayPal accounts, which were in turn used to load
   Green Dot debit cards—both of which were also created using stolen
   personal identifying information. Those cards were then used at online
   retailers and various physical stores to purchase merchandise and money
   orders as well as to withdraw cash. The scheme was uncovered after the
   discovery of these transactions at a Walmart store in Bossier City, Louisiana,
   with investigators later concluding that $941,244 was laundered through that
   store alone in just 44 days.
          Defendant was indicted and subsequently entered into an agreement
   with the government by which he pled guilty to conspiracy to use
   unauthorized access devices. As part of the plea agreement, prosecutors and
   Defendant jointly “agree[d] and stipulate[d] that the reasonably foreseeable
   loss amount as to [Defendant’s] role in the conspiracy is between $250,000
   and $550,000, based on the number of transactions conducted at the Bossier
   City Walmart by [Defendant] and other conspirators,” though they added
   the caveat that the description “d[id] not represent the totality of the
   evidence obtained in this case.” Subsequently, the presentence report (PSR)
   detailed that the total amount deposited into the PayPal accounts from the
   federal and state agencies was $2,379,860 and recommended that Defendant
   be held responsible for restitution of that amount pursuant to the Mandatory
   Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.

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          Defendant filed his objections to the restitution amount, citing the
   stipulated loss range and alleging that he “was a small part of a much larger
   conspiracy.”     The probation officer declined to amend the restitution
   amount, explaining how the evidence indicated that Defendant was
   responsible for a much larger loss than the amount stipulated. The district
   court overruled Defendant’s objection to the restitution amount, explaining
   that “[t]he reasons related by the probation officer [made] perfect sense.”
   After adopting the PSR’s findings, the court ordered Defendant to pay the
   full $2,379,860 in restitution and made the restitution joint and several with
   his co-defendants. Defendant objected to the restitution order and filed a
   timely notice of appeal.
                                           II.
          The MVRA mandates restitution to victims of offenses committed by
   fraud or deceit. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). “To be a victim under the
   MVRA, a person or organization must suffer a foreseeable loss as a result of
   the conduct underlying the convicted offense.” United States v. Benns, 810
   F.3d 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2016). The MVRA also requires that the restitution
   award must reflect “the value of the . . . loss.” 18 U.S.C. §
   3663A(b)(1)(B)(i)(I).
          This court reviews the legality of a restitution order de novo and its
   amount for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 993 F.3d 976, 980
   (5th Cir. 2021). A factual finding concerning the amount is reviewed for clear
   error. Id. There is no clear error if a factual finding is plausible in light of the
   record as a whole. Id.
                                           III.
          Defendant’s contention, laid out in the two-page argument section of
   his brief, is that the government failed to establish that any loss above the
   range stipulated in the plea agreement was foreseeable. He asserts that the

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   government only established that $2,379,860 was the total amount laundered
   and did not make sufficient further findings to establish the foreseeability of
   that total amount.
           But as Defendant admits, the district court was not bound by the
   stipulation. And the record goes far beyond what the stipulation contained.
   While the stipulated facts focus on Defendant’s role in making purchases and
   withdrawals with the debit cards, the PSR details how Defendant and his co-
   conspirators were responsible for utilizing stolen personally identifiable
   information to open the PayPal accounts into which the stolen relief funds
   were all deposited and for transferring the money to the debit cards. The
   probation officer’s response to Defendant’s objections to the PSR also detail
   their culpability in the purchases and withdrawals far beyond those included
   in the stipulation, explaining how they visited Walmart stores in 27 cities
   across Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana. This provides a sufficient
   basis for establishing Defendant’s involvement in the entirety of the criminal
   scheme, rather than merely playing a small role in the purchases and
   withdrawals at a single Bossier City Walmart store. 1
           The record is open to different plausible interpretations as to whether
   the responsibility for these actions was Defendant’s alone or shared with his

           1
            Without rebuttal evidence to show that information in the PSR was “materially
   untrue, inaccurate or unreliable,” the district court can adopt the contents of the PSR.
   United States v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, the defendant’s objections
   to it don’t contain any new evidence to demonstrate his allegedly minimal role in the
   scheme. To be sure, “[t]he PSR . . . cannot just include statements, in the hope of
   converting such statements into reliable evidence, without providing any information for
   the basis of the statements.” Id. But that’s just not the case here, with the PSR
   documenting how information was gathered by Walmart’s Global Investigations Team, the
   Bossier City Police Department, and others. And the PSR makes clear that “[t]he total
   amount deposited into the 29 PayPal account from the [Small Business Administration]
   was $2,148,200; and the amount deposited by the [Washington State Employment Security
   Department] was $231,660, for a total . . . loss amount of $2,379,860.”

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   two co-conspirators. But we need not wade into allocating liability among the
   three because “a participant in a conspiracy . . . is legally liable for all the
   actions of [his] co-conspirators in furtherance of this crime” and “[t]he
   district court was therefore well within its discretion to order restitution for
   the losses resulting from the entire fraudulent scheme and not merely the
   losses directly attributable to [Defendant’s] actions.” United States v.
   Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 398–99 (5th Cir. 1996). See also United States v.
   Shelton, 694 F. App’x 220, 222–25 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying this rule in the
   MVRA context).
                                        ***
          For these reasons, we affirm.

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   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the amount of
   restitution ordered was foreseeable in light of the stipulation of facts.
   Because I would vacate and remand for resentencing, I respectfully dissent.
          Chukwuma Okoye pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to
   conspiracy to use unauthorized devices.         The factual basis included a
   stipulation of facts that was signed and agreed to by both parties. The parties
   stipulated that “the reasonably foreseeable loss amount as to Okoye’s role in
   the conspiracy” was “between $250,000 and $550,000, based on the number
   of transactions conducted at the Bossier City Walmart by Okoye and other
   conspirators.” (Emphasis added). The factual basis listed only three specific
   transactions of $1,003.74 involving Okoye at one Walmart in Bossier City.
   Significantly, the parties also stipulated that the pin number for the card
   Okoye used was provided to him by a co-conspirator.
          The factual basis also recounted the involvement of Patrick
   Madubuko, Barnabas Akporehe, and others, and the use of Green Dot cards
   funded by the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Washington
   State unemployment insurance via 29 PayPal accounts at one Walmart store
   in Bossier City. The factual basis made clear that the government knew the
   extent of the conspiracy at the time it entered into the plea agreement.
   Importantly, the factual basis also said: “The above-described facts do not
   represent the totality of the evidence obtained in this case. However, the
   parties signing below agree and stipulate that the preceding paragraphs

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   adequately describe Chukwuma N. Okoye, Jr.’s role in the offense.” 1
   (Emphasis added).
           After Okoye’s guilty plea was secured based on a binding agreement
   that he was responsible for an amount between $250,000 and $550,000
   involving transactions in Bossier City, the government then moved the mark
   by introducing a Presentence Investigative Report (PSR) seeking restitution
   in the amount of $2,379,860, which the district court granted. The PSR also
   sought to give Okoye a 16-level enhancement because the loss was more than
   $1.5 million. The district court correctly sustained Okoye’s objection as to
   that enhancement, instead giving him a 12-level enhancement instead for an
   intended loss of $550,000. 2 But the district court erroneously overruled
   Okoye’s objection to the restitution amount, saying that “the reasons related
   by the probation office make perfect sense to me.” The district court then
   adopted the PSR’s findings and ordered Okoye to pay restitution of
   $2,379,860.
               The district court ordered the higher amount of restitution despite
   the government’s concessions in its written response to Okoye’s objections
   to the PSR which said that it “agrees that the loss amount reasonably
   foreseeable to Okoye is between $250,000 and $550,000 as set forth in the
   factual basis” and “Okoye should be ordered to pay restitution in an amount
   between $250,000 and $550,000.” Notably, the government argues on
   appeal that the district court did not err.

           1
             Both the majority and the probation officer disregard the second sentence of this
   quote. The probation officer repeatedly relied on only the first sentence as meaning he was
   free to expand the evidence to which the government had already stipulated.
           2
            Okoye was sentenced to 46 months, which was at the top of his guidelines range
   of 37-46 months.

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           The majority now affirms “[b]ecause the record provides sufficient
   basis for establishing that the amount ordered was foreseeable.” 3 I disagree.
   The amount that the parties stipulated to was what was foreseeable.
   Moreover, the amount that went through the Bossier City Walmart and that
   the Walmart investigator attributed to this group, as discussed above, was
   less than $1 million. Authorities already seized $719,496. That puts the loss
   within the $250,000 and $550,000 stipulated amount.
           The majority opinion says, “as defendant admits, the district court
   was not bound by the stipulation. And the record goes far beyond what the
   stipulation contained.”          The majority is correct that the sentencing
   guidelines state that the court is not bound by the stipulation. See U.S.S.G. §
   6B1.4(d). 4 However, the government is bound by the stipulation, as this
   court has repeatedly concluded.
           “Evidentiary stipulations are binding on the parties,” United States v.
   Banks, 624 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Cantu, 510
   F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir. 1975). “A judicial admission is a formal concession
   in the pleadings or stipulations by a party or counsel that is binding on the
   party making them. Although a judicial admission is not itself evidence, it
   has the effect of withdrawing a fact from contention.” Martinez v. Bally’s,
   244 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2001).
           The majority relies on the probation officer’s response to Okoye’s
   objections as providing a sufficient basis for Okoye’s “involvement in the

           3
            The “record” the majority references is the PSR and the probation officer’s
   response to Okoye’s objections to the PSR, discussed more fully herein.
           4
             The district court also cited United States v. Gremillion, 418 Fed. App’x 273 (5th
   Cir. 2011), for this proposition. However, Gremillion is both unpublished and
   distinguishable, as it involved a situation where the defendant did not plead guilty pursuant
   to a binding plea agreement. Id. at 275.

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   entirety of the criminal scheme, rather than merely playing a small role in the
   purchases and withdrawals at a single Bossier City Walmart store.” 5 The
   majority then says, “[t]he record is open to different plausible interpretations
   as to whether the responsibility for these actions was [Okoye’s] alone or
   shared with his two co-conspirators.”
           The probation officer’s response to Okoye’s relevant objection set out
   a list of Walmart stores in Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas and Louisiana that the
   three men allegedly visited and cited the PSR at ¶¶ 21, 23, 29 and 56. 6
   Paragraph 21 of the PSR said, “[t]he [Walmart] investigator believed there
   were more stores that had been used including stores in Arkansas, Louisiana,

           5
              In footnote 1, the majority says that “[w]ithout rebuttal evidence to show that
   information in the PSR was ‘materially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable,’ the district court
   can adopt the contents of the PSR,” citing United States v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 721, 724 (5th
   Cir. 2001). The majority acknowledges that Taylor also says: “The PSR, however, cannot
   just include statements, in the hope of converting such statements into reliable evidence,
   without providing any information for the basis of the statements.” Id. (internal marks and
   citation omitted). The majority then says: “But that’s just not the case here, with the PSR
   documenting how information was gathered by Walmart’s Global Investigations Team, the
   Bossier City Police Department, and others.” The majority also quotes a statement in the
   PSR about money from the SBA and Washington state that was deposited into PayPal
   accounts. Significantly, the PSR in no way connects Okoye to Washington state, the PayPal
   accounts, or those amounts, as discussed herein. As quoted from Taylor above, merely
   including such statements in no way converts them into reliable evidence. Moreover,
   $719,496.42 of the amount referenced by the majority was already seized by authorities.
   The majority’s claim is unsupported by the PSR. Nothing in the PSR documents how
   Okoye was responsible for a foreseeable loss of $2,379,860. Instead, as discussed more fully
   herein, the PSR documents that Okoye was responsible for three transactions of $1,003.74
   and that the government stipulated the reasonably foreseeable loss attributed to Okoye’s
   role in the conspiracy was between $250,000 and $550,000 to induce a guilty plea before
   reneging on the stipulation. The majority now ignores both the record and precedent,
   thereby nullifying the effect of legal stipulations and condoning the fraudulent inducement
   of guilty pleas.
           6
            The probation officer follows a troubling pattern of citing his original statement
   of facts without a source as authority for stating them a second time throughout his
   responses. However, this circular logic does not establish an indicia of reliability.

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   Texas, and Oklahoma. An aggregate amount of $960,324 was the amount
   the Walmart investigator calculated this particular group amassed from
   unloaded gift cards.” (Emphasis added).
           Paragraphs 23 and 29 referenced the response from Green Dot,
   clusters of addresses in Texas, and various transactions. However, paragraph
   23 did not mention Okoye, and paragraph 29 only possibly mentioned him to
   the extent that it said transactions at the 8 oz. Burger Bar in Bossier City
   matched a participating Walmart employee’s statement of eating there with
   “the suspects.” Paragraph 29 also said that the “total amount of money that
   was transferred from PayPal to Green Dot cards was $1,339,600.” 7
           Paragraph 56 essentially blamed Okoye for the entire conspiracy and
   said:
                  The investigative material indicates the defendant
           defrauded the Cares Act and/or the Washington State
           Unemployment Insurance in that he, using the identity of at
           least 29 people, applied for and received loans and
           unemployment benefits. The defendant then laundered the
           money by opening PayPal accounts in the names of the victims
           and transferred the money to Green Dot debit cards. To obtain
           the laundered money from the Green Dot cards, the defendant
           traveled in rented cars (from Dallas, Texas) to areas (mostly)
           in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana . . . .

           Other than the broad statement that, “[t]he investigative material
   indicates,” this paragraph offered no source for any of the alleged facts.
   However, as discussed above, paragraph 21 said that the source for part of it
   is an investigator from Walmart, and the facts were what he “believed.” The

           7
               The PSR does not address what happened to the remainder of the $2,379,860.

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   PSR also reflected that Green Dot and PayPal allegedly replied to requests
   and provided partial information but neither identified Okoye as having any
   involvement. The PSR discussed the statements of the three Walmart
   employees who were involved in the conspiracy, but the reference is
   repeatedly to “the suspects” without identifying Okoye. One Walmart
   employee specifically referenced someone named “Steve.” The PSR also
   said that one of the participants, Willie Townsel, provided an interview and
   said that he got the cards and pin numbers from Madubuko and Akporehe.
         The PSR specifically referenced Okoye in other paragraphs though.
   For example, in paragraph 30 the PSR stated that a comparison of records
   from the Horseshoe Casino and Green Dot transactions revealed that
   Madubuko was a guest at the hotel on specific days the Walmart employees
   alleged. It then says, “The following suspects were also developed: Patrick
   Madubuko, Barnabas Akporehe, Willie Townsel, and Okoye. These names
   also matched information from the Margaritaville Casino/Hotel.” The PSR
   does not explain what exactly that is supposed to mean. In paragraph 31, the
   PSR said that the Walmart employees were able to identify Okoye and others
   in a photo lineup. However, there is no explanation as to what that means
   beyond the fact that Walmart employees recognized photos of the guys they
   had been helping and socializing with at the casino hotel. There is also no
   indication that any of the Walmart employees ever said that Okoye set up any
   of the PayPal accounts or Green Dot cards or that he had more than the role
   stipulated to by the government.
          This court has previously concluded that a probation officer’s
   conclusions lack an indicia of reliability when there is nothing else in the
   record to support them and they do not provide the source. See United States
   v. Shacklett, 921 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1991). Such is the case here.
   Additionally, Okoye’s indictment did not mention any transactions in

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   Arkansas or Oklahoma; it only mentioned the three transactions in Bossier
   City.
           There is no evidence that Okoye even had the pin number for the
   Green Dot card(s) he used. Instead, the government stipulated that Okoye
   obtained the pin number from a co-conspirator. That is an indication that
   Okoye was not involved in setting up the PayPal accounts or Green Dot cards.
   Also, the PSR recites nothing that directly connects Okoye to Washington
   state, the SBA or the PayPal accounts.
           This court has previously said that the PSR cannot merely include a
   recitation of conclusions “in the hope of converting such statements into
   reliable evidence, without providing any information for the basis of the
   statements.” United States v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 2001).
   Further, “[b]ald, conclusionary statements do not acquire the patina of
   reliability by mere inclusion in the PSR.” United States v. Elwood, 999 F.2d
   814, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1993). The PSR is rife with bald, conclusory statements
   that have now been accepted as fact. 8
           Here, there was a stipulation of facts. Because they were stipulated
   to, both Okoye’s role in the conspiracy and the amount of foreseeable loss
   were withdrawn from contention. See Martinez, 244 F.3d at 476. Also, the

           8
             The government asserts that Okoye “did not rebut the evidence in the
   presentence report.” The government does not explain how Okoye would have rebutted
   evidence that did not exist. Again, nothing in the PSR directly tied Okoye to the SBA,
   Washington state, or setting up either the PayPal accounts or Green Dot cards. The
   government also asserts that Okoye is liable in restitution for the reasonably foreseeable
   losses caused by their co-conspirators. But nothing in the PSR directly tied Madubuko or
   Akporehe to the SBA, Washington state or setting up the PayPal accounts. There is
   arguably evidence indicating that Madubuko and/or Akporehe were involved in setting up
   the Green Dot cards, as Townsel said they provided the pin numbers. But there is not
   substantial evidence that Okoye played a much larger role than what was in the stipulation.

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   stipulated facts are just as binding on the government as they are on Okoye.
   See Banks, 624 F.3d at 264.
          This court has said that a “trial court may disregard stipulations
   between parties only if accepting them would be manifestly unjust or if the
   evidence contrary to the stipulation was substantial.” United States v. Ret.
   Serv. Group, 302 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hymel v. Comm’r,
   794 F.2d 939, 940 (5th Cir. 1986). Here, accepting the stipulation between
   Okoye and the government would not be manifestly unjust, and there is not
   substantial evidence contrary to the stipulation. The district court did not
   address either finding before disregarding the stipulation and overruling
   Okoye’s objection.
          The district court had no basis for even considering a much higher
   amount for restitution until the government reneged on the stipulation and
   used the PSR to seek more time and more restitution after Madubuko and
   Akporehe fled the country. The district court clearly erred in finding that the
   amount of loss was $2,379,860 rather than within the stipulated range. The
   majority now fails to provide any authority to support a conclusion that the
   government is not bound by a binding agreement regarding Okoye’s role and
   the amount of reasonably foreseeable loss attributable to him. Because I
   would vacate and remand for resentencing, I respectfully dissent.

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