Court Opinion

ID: 9468700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:21:23.791397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:00.385576
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because I disagree with the conclusion of the district court and the majority that Rudolph’s appeal is not taken in “good faith,” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) as construed in Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962), I would grant the motion so that Rudolph’s appeal might be perfected. We agree that the complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted, insofar as it is construed solely as a damages claim against his former attorney under § 1983, and that to this extent an appeal on that issue would be frivolous and would not justify our granting the motion. Williams v. Rhoden, 629 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir. 1980). But considering Rudolph’s *521pro se complaint with the liberality with which we must regard such pleadings, I cannot say that it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The complaint alleges that the assistance rendered by Rudolph’s counsel was so inadequate as to subject him to loss of liberty without that degree of due process embodied in the right to counsel. Although claims of attorney malpractice will not lie under § 1983, this does not foreclose relief under the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, if the prisoner is otherwise entitled to such relief. Courtney v. Reeves, 635 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1981). I believe the lower court erred in regarding Rudolph’s complaint solely as an action for damages in constitutional tort and that it should have considered the complaint as a petition for habeas corpus. The liberality which must accompany consideration of prisoner pro se complaints requires no less. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See, e.g., Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1976).
“The Court’s core concern has been to ensure that, whatever procedure a district court employs, the procedure is such as to assure that prisoners’ claims receive fair, adequate and meaningful consideration.” Williams v. Rhoden, 629 F.2d 1099, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980). This petitioner has twice now attempted to get the federal courts to consider the adequacy of assistance rendered by his counsel. The majority denies the petitioner that fair, adequate and meaningful consideration which justice and precedent require.