Court Opinion

ID: 9430380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:29:37.446276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:24.283269
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
with whom Justice Rehnquist joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with much of the Court’s opinion, I write separately to emphasize that substantial weight should be accorded the judge’s finding of probable cause in determining whether petitioner state trooper (hereafter petitioner) will be personally liable for damages under § 1983. I also believe that summary judgment would have been appropriate here because respondents failed to show that petitioner’s decision to request a warrant was not objectively reasonable.
I — I
At the outset, I supplement the facts stated by the Court. Petitioner was supervising a wiretap in a narcotics investigation pursuant to an order by the Rhode Island Superior *347Court. It appears from a logged conversation recorded on the wiretap that a “Jimmy Briggs” and a “Luisa [sic] Briggs” attended a party where some of those present possessed and used marihuana. A marihuana cigarette may have been passed to Mrs. Briggs. The conversation also referred to a party that was going to be held at respondents’ home and attended by some of these people. A fair inference from the log is that respondents were hosting a marihuana party similar to the earlier one.
On the basis of this conversation, petitioner and his partner decided to seek warrants against respondents for possessing marihuana.1 Petitioner presented the affidavits to Judge Capelli, a Rhode Island District Judge.2 Judge Capelli reviewed the affidavits, and entered an order stating:
*348“TO ANY AUTHORIZED OFFICER:
“Affidavit (and complaint) having been made to me under oath, and as I am satisfied that there is probable cause for the belief therein set forth that grounds for issuing an arrest warrant exists [sic], you are hereby commanded to arrest the defendant forthwith and to bring him before a judge of this court without unnecessary delay.”
The record before us does not disclose any evidence or claim that Judge Capelli failed to act in a competent judicial manner, or that he failed to exercise independent judgment in determining whether the arrest warrant should issue.
Respondents were prominent citizens in the community, and had never previously been implicated in any violation of the criminal laws. The grand jury did not return an indictment against them, and they instituted this suit under § 1983, seeking to hold petitioner personally liable for damages.3 The District Court directed a verdict for petitioner. It held that Judge Capelli’s finding of probable cause and his issuance of the arrest warrants immunized petitioner from respondents’ claim for damages.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that liability under § 1983 will attach when “an officer is ‘constitutionally negligent,’ that is, where the officer should have known that the facts recited in the affidavit did not constitute probable cause.” 748 F. 2d 715, 721 (1984). The Court of Appeals also denied petitioner’s claim of immunity, purporting to apply the standard of objective reasonableness for qualified immunity articulated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982). This Court today affirms.
*349HH hH
I agree with the Court s decision that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity, and that the Harlow standard of qualified immunity — objective reasonableness — properly applies. In Harlow, however, the Court held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id., at 818. Putting it differently, we also stated that a claim for qualified immunity “would be defeated [only] if an official ‘knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].”’ Id., at 815, quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975).
At one point in the Court’s opinion today, it correctly recognizes that as the “qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” Ante, at 341 (emphasis added). The Court also says that liability will attach “if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.” Ibid.
I agree with the foregoing characterizations of the applicable standard when an official raises the defense of qualified immunity. I disagree, however, with the Court in two major respects. First, rather than deciding whether petitioner’s conduct met the foregoing standard, the Court remands for trial on this issue. Yet, as the Court recognizes, unless “no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue,” ibid., petitioner should *350be immune from damages. Ibid. In my view, in the light of the logs of the duly authorized wiretap, a reasonably competent officer could have believed that a warrant should issue.
It is undisputed that wiretaps initiated as part of a drug investigation revealed that respondents had attended a party where marihuana was being smoked, that a marihuana cigarette may have been passed to Mrs. Briggs,4 and that another party — at least inferentially of a similar type — was to be held in respondents’ home. Under the Harlow standard, we need not consider whether this information would be viewed by every reasonable officer as sufficient evidence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. Police often operate “in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation,” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 108 (1965), and they have to make judgment calls over which reasonable officers could differ. In this case, the logs from the wiretap at least arguably implicated respondents in unlawful activities. See supra, at 347, and n. 1. Under these circumstances, an officer of reasonable competence could have believed that the wiretap provided probable cause to arrest respondents.
Second, and perhaps of greater importance, in determining whether the police officer acted with objective reasonableness, the Court apparently would give little evidentiary weight to the finding of probable cause by a magistrate or judicial officer.5 The Court quotes from United States v. *351Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922, n. 23 (1984), that “‘our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.’” Ante, at 345 (emphasis added). Although this quotation does not foreclose some consideration by the District Court of the judge’s judicial decision, the Court seems to denigrate the relevance of the judge’s determination of probable cause and his role in the issuance of a warrant.6 In my view, the Court misconstrues the respective roles of, and the relationship between, the police officer and the magistrate or judicial officer. In cases where a criminal defendant has asserted claims of unconstitutional search and seizure, this Court has consistently accorded primary evidentiary weight to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause.7 No rea*352son has been articulated by the Court, and certainly none occurs to me, why less weight should be accorded the magistrate’s decision in a § 1983 damages suit against the police officer who applied for the warrant.
Our common law has long recognized a “reasonable division of functions,” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 145 (1979), in law enforcement: the gathering of information is the province of the police, and the weighing and judging of that information is virtually the exclusive province of the magistrate. As Lord Mansfield stated two centuries ago: “It is not fit that the receiving or judging of the information should be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should give certain directions to the officer.” Leach v. Three of the King’s Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765), quoted in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 316 (1972).
We have affirmed that the arrest warrant “should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify [issuance of a warrant].” United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 316. This Court also has recognized that “the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates . . . are to be preferred over the hurried actions of officers.” United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 UA. S. 452, 464 (1932). Judicial evaluation of probable cause by a magistrate is the essential “checkpoint between the Government and the citizen.” Steagald v. United States, *353451 U. S. 204, 212 (1981). As we stated in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 759 (1979):
“The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our decisions reflects the ‘basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of Government.’ United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 317. By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search ‘be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948), we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive authority.”8
The police, where they have reason to believe probable cause exists, should be encouraged to submit affidavits to judicial officers.9 I therefore believe that in a suit such as this, the Court should expressly hold that the decision by the magistrate is entitled to substantial evidentiary weight. A more restrictive standard will discourage police officers from seeking warrants out of fear of litigation and possible personal liability. The specter of personal liability for a mistake in judgment may cause a prudent police officer to close his eyes to facts that should at least be brought to the attention of the judicial officer authorized to make the decision *354whether a warrant should issue. Law enforcement is ill-served by this in terrorem restraint.
r — 1 J — i I — i
This Court has long sought to divide the functions of law enforcement to impose on the magistrate the primary responsibility for determining whether a warrant will issue. It is inconsistent with this jurisprudence to imply or hold that the magistrate’s determination of probable cause is irrelevant in this suit. A judicial officer’s “judgment call” in determining probable cause, although not conclusive, is entitled to substantial evidentiary weight in suits seeking to impose personal liability on the police officer. In this case, in the light of the judge’s determination and the evidence of illegal activity, I would hold that petitioner is immune from damages.
I agree with the judgment declining to accord absolute immunity to the officer seeking a warrant, but I do not join the Court’s opinion, and I dissent from the decision to remand this case for trial on the immunity issue.

 The State Police successfully sought 20 additional arrest warrants in connection with the narcotics investigation. The record before this Court does not disclose how many of these warrants resulted in indictments.

 Trooper Malley’s attachment to the affidavit seeking a warrant for the arrest of James R. Briggs stated:
“Your affiant upon oath states that he has reason to believe and does believe that grounds for issuance of an arrest warrant exists [sic] and states the following facts on which such belief is founded:
“Persuant [sic] to a court ordered wire intercept....
“On December 20, 1980, at 5:30 p.m. an incoming call was received to Paul Driscoll recorded on Reel 7, Side 1, Footage 30-48. This unidentified male calls Paul Driscoll and states, ‘This is Doctor Shotgun’ [sic]. General conversation reference to a party they went to last night. Caller states, T can’t believe I was token in front of Jimmy Briggs.’ Caller states that he passed it to Luisa [sic]. Caller and Paul talk about another party going on tonight. Paul says that Nancy was sitting in his lap rolling her thing.
“On the same date at 5:56 p.m., Reel 7, Footage 48-59. Male subject Scott calls Paul Driscoll. General conversation about a party at Jaime’s parents’ [respondents’] home. Also, that they went there last night. They are referring to Jaime’s parents’ home, that is James and Luisa Briggs. Further, in regard to the conversation at 5:30 p.m. this unidentified male who called himself Doctor Shotgun [sic] stated that he was token in front of Jimmy Briggs. In your affiant’s experience, he was smoking a marijuana cigarette in front of James Briggs. He then states that he passed it to Luisa. Luisa would be Luisa Briggs. He passed her a mari*348juana cigarette. Where Paul states that Nancy was sitting on his lap rolling her thing, she was rolling a marijuana cigarette.” App. 72-73.
The statement attached to the affidavit seeking a warrant for the arrest of Louisa Briggs was identical.

 Respondents each sought $1 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages.

 Although the affidavit from Trooper Malley stated that a marihuana cigarette was passed to Mrs. Briggs, the call log simply states that the caller “passed it to Louisa.” Id., at 78. A subsequent call to Driscoll mentioned a “Louisa (Bungershort),” probably in connection with the same party. Ibid. It is possible that the marihuana cigarette was passed to Louisa Bungershort rather than Louisa Briggs. At trial, Mrs. Briggs denied seeing any marihuana at that party or receiving a marihuana cigarette. Id., at 40.

 The words “magistrate” and “judicial officer” often are used interchangeably in Court opinions. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972). The Court’s emphasis on magistrates has “been directed at the *351need for independent, neutral, and detached judgment, not at legal training.” North v. Russell, 427 U. S. 328, 337 (1976).

 The Court observes that “ours is not an ideal system,” and states that “it is possible that a magistrate, working under docket pressures, will fail to perform as a magistrate should.” Ante, at 345-346. While I do not question the possibility that some magistrates in some cases may “fail to perform as a magistrate should,” no one suggests that such is the case here.
The Court previously has stated that “[i]f a magistrate serves merely as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the police or is unable to exercise mature judgment, closer supervision or removal provides a more effective remedy than the exclusionary rule.” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 917-918, n. 18. I also believe that closer supervision or removal provides a more effective remedy than personal liability for police officers.

 In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 105-106 (1965), the Court stated:
“We begin our analysis of [the Fourth Amendment] mindful of the fact that in this case a search was made pursuant to a search warrant. . . .
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“In Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 270, this Court, strongly supporting the preference to be accorded searches under a warrant, indicated that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, and Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610, the Court, in condemning searches by officers who invaded premises without a warrant, *352plainly intimated that had the proper course of obtaining a warrant from a magistrate been followed and had the magistrate on the same evidence available to the police made a finding of probable cause, the search under the warrant would have been sustained.”
Generally, the judicial officer’s determination of probable cause has greater reliability than a police officer’s, not only because the judicial officer is not immersed in the criminal investigation, but also because the judicial officer usually has greater time for deliberation and greater familiarity through training or education with the legal concepts concerning probable cause.

 There will, of course, be instances where “it is plainly evident that a magistrate or judge ha[s] no business issuing a warrant.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 264 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment). If the magistrate has wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319 (1979), then the magistrate’s approval of a warrant would not necessarily be probative of whether an officer’s request for a warrant was objectively reasonable.

 It is of course true that actions by police must comport with the Constitution. Police departments and prosecutors have an obligation to instill this understanding in officers, and to discipline those found to have violated the Constitution.