Court Opinion

ID: 9854258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:04:03.710756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:59.804574
License: Public Domain

RUFFIN, Judge,
dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that Fluellen is guilty of some form of robbery, under the indictment alleged and the facts proven, I cannot agree that he is guilty of armed robbery.
The salient facts are as follows. After Creegan was robbed of his money bag by an unidentified individual, Fluellen demanded that Creegan give him the food.4 Creegan refused. At that point, Fluellen informed Creegan that he had a gun, and he reached under his t-shirt. Although Creegan could see Fluellen’s hand bulging under the t-shirt, Creegan admitted that he did not see the bulge of a weapon. Thus, Creegan turned and began walking toward his car without giving Fluellen the food. As Creegan was leaving, Fluellen snatched the bag of food from him, ripping the bag and causing the food to fall to the ground. Fluellen retrieved the food and left.
*589The indictment alleged that Fluellen committed the offense of armed robbery by “unlawfully then and there with intent to commit theft,... takfing] from the person of Brendan Creegan and immediate presence of Brendan Creegan, certain property ... by the use of a handgun, an offensive weapon.” “A person commits the offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon.”5
Here, however, no weapon was seen. Accordingly, Fluellen’s conviction may not be sustained absent “some physical manifestation of a weapon or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be inferred.”6 The proper inquiry is whether Fluellen’s acts created a reasonable apprehension on the part of Creegan that an offensive weapon was being used.7 A weapon is being “used” if “the victim is aware of the weapon and it has the desired forceful effect of assisting to accomplish the robbery.”8
In the case before us, Creegan’s testimony that Fluellen claimed to have a gun and reached into his waistband provides some physical manifestation that a weapon was present.9 However, there simply is no evidence that Creegan was apprehensive of any such weapon or even that he believed any such weapon existed. Significantly, the State elicited no testimony from Creegan that he was either apprehensive or fearful in any way.10 And Creegan’s actions provide no circumstantial evidence of such emotion as Creegan did not acquiesce to Fluellen’s demand to hand over the food, and Creegan simply walked away.* 11 Under these circumstances, I fail to see any evidence that Creegan experienced anything resembling “reasonable apprehension.”
The majority cites Lemming v. State12 for the proposition that lack of fear does not preclude a finding of reasonable apprehension. But I do not think Lemming alters the result here. In Lemming, the victim was approached by a man wielding a small knife. Although the victim claimed he was unafraid, we found that the victim could still *590objectively appreciate the risk of harm given that he had seen the perpetrator wielding the knife. Here, Creegan never saw a weapon, thus he cannot have the same objective appreciation of injury as the victim did in Lemming. Furthermore, the victim in Lemming acted in a manner consistent with the presence of an offensive weapon as he armed himself with a broom in an attempt to defend another from the attacker. Creegan, on the other hand, merely turned and walked away.13 Although Creegan was aware that Fluellen was following him, there simply is no evidence that Creegan was attempting to flee. In other words, there is nothing from which jurors could reasonably infer that Creegan was experiencing either objective appreciation of injury or subjective fear.
Moreover, I cannot find — based upon the evidence presented — that the alleged weapon was “used” in the commission of the crime as it did not have “the desired forceful effect of assisting to accomplish the robbery.”14 Again, upon being verbally threatened with an alleged gun, Creegan ignored Fluellen’s demand to hand him the food and walked away. Shortly thereafter, Fluellen snatched the food away from Creegan. Under these circumstances, the alleged weapon was not actually a factor in the robbery.15
The majority cites Ramey v. State16 for the proposition that the mere presence of a weapon before a taking “satisfies the statutory requirement that the taking be by use of an offensive weapon.” But the majority’s reading of Ramey is not text-true. Rather, its reading of Ramey is so broad that it eviscerates the “by use” requirement contained in OCGA§ 16-8-41 (a). Afull reading of the case shows that more than the mere presence of a weapon is required. Significantly, in Ramey, the perpetrator actually had a weapon — a knife — which he used to attack the victim; it was not the mere threat of weapon as is the case here.17 Using the knife, Ramey bound the victim, sexually assaulted her, and stole her car. Although Ramey did not use the knife directly upon the victim when taking her car, we nonetheless found *591the knife was used “to apply constructive force to intimidate the victim.” Thus, it was not the mere presence of the weapon, but its use to intimidate the victim and to accomplish the robbery that satisfied the “by use” element of armed robbery.18 I fail to see how this element was established here.
Decided March 28, 2007.
Patricia M. Moon, James S. Purvis, Thomas O. Humphries, Jr., for appellant.
Richard R. Read, District Attorney, Roberta A. Earnhardt, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
If Creegan had taken any action consistent with the belief that a weapon was being used — either admitting subjective fear or attempting flight — then Fluellen’s threat of a gun might have constituted armed robbery.19 But under the unique facts of this case, there was simply nothing in Creegan’s conduct to suggest that he found Fluellen’s threat of a weapon to be credible. And I am aware of no case in any appellate court in this state in which we have upheld an armed robbery conviction where there was no weapon seen and no evidence — circumstantial or otherwise — from which a jury could conclude the victim experienced reasonable apprehension. Indeed, such conviction violates due process.20 Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Barnes joins in this dissent.

 Although the prior theft of the money bag might be considered part of the res gestae, it is irrelevant to the issue of Fluellen’s guilt as he was not charged with armed robbery on this basis.

 OCGA§ 16-8-41 (a).

 Joyner v. State, 278 Ga. App. 60 (1) (628 SE2d 186) (2006).

 Id. at 60-61.

 (Emphasis supplied.) Oliver v. State, 232 Ga. App. 816, 817 (1) (503 SE2d 28) (1998).

 See Joyner, supra at 61; Forde v. State, 277 Ga. App. 410, 412 (1) (626 SE2d 606) (2006).

 Although Creegan testified that he thought Fluellen’s friends might “beat [him] up” if he did not provide the food, he never said anything regarding fear that a gun would be used.

 Compare Joyner, supra (victim testified she was frightened and believed that defendant had a gun); Rutledge v. State, 276 Ga. App. 580, 583 (623 SE2d 762) (2005) (victim acceded to robber’s demand).

 272 Ga. App. 122, 124 (1) (612 SE2d 495) (2005).

 I find the majority’s contention that this was evidence of apprehension to be unpersuasive. Again, the state elicited no testimony that Creegan believed a gun was present and there is no evidence that Creegan was walking either quickly, which might suggest flight, or particularly slowly, which might suggest he was wary. Rather, the evidence shows simply that Creegan turned and walked away. Given that the only item of value Creegan had was food that did not belong to him, it is unfathomable that he would risk any harm to himself to protect that item. Thus, the only conclusion I can draw from the evidence - or lack thereof- is that Creegan did not believe Fluellen had a weapon.

 Oliver, supra.

 See Gatlin v. State, 199 Ga. App. 500, 500-501 (1) (405 SE2d 118) (1991).

 206 Ga. App. 308, 309 (425 SE2d 385) (1992).

 Similarly, in Maddox v. State, 174 Ga. App. 728 (330 SE2d 911) (1985), another case relied upon by the majority, it is undisputed that the perpetrator actually had a shotgun.

 See id.

 If the State had charged Fluellen with armed robbery based upon the use of caustic oven cleaner to steal the money bag, he likely would have been guilty of armed robbery as a party to the crime.

 See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199, 206 (80 SC 624, 4 LE2d 654) (1960). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 315 (III) (A) (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case against conviction ‘except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ”).