Court Opinion

ID: 2715626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-08-06 17:25:40.989662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:08.584217
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                           )      DIVISION ONE
                Respondent,
                                                                                 i—
                                           )      No. 71961-1-1                  no
                                                                                 ——.

                      v.                                                               SflP""'
                                           )      UNPUBLISHED OPINION                  win'
                                                                                 zsc
SEAN MICHAEL KLAMN,
                                                                                       —136 Wn.2d 619, 621-22, 964

P.2d 1187 (1998). The proper remedy for a failure to comply with CrR 6.1 (d) is

remand for entry of written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Head, 136

Wn.2d at 624. Reversal is only appropriate where the defendant has

demonstrated actual prejudice. Head, 136 Wn.2d at 624.

       On October 3, 2013, the trial court issued its written findings of fact and

conclusions of law supporting the convictions. On December 18, 2013, the trial

court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the exceptional

sentence. Because the trial court entered written findings of fact and conclusions

of law, albeit untimely, remand is unnecessary.

       Reversal is also inappropriate. "We will not infer prejudice .. . from delay

in entry of written findings of fact and conclusions of law." Head, 136 Wn.2d at

625. Rather, as the Supreme Court stated in Head, "a defendant might be able

to show prejudice resulting from the lack of written findings and conclusions

where there is strong indication that findings ultimately entered have been

'tailored' to meet issues raised on appeal." 136 Wn.2d at 624-25. Here, the trial

judge declared that he had not read Klamn's appellate brief. Thereafter, despite

having the opportunity to file a supplemental brief addressing prejudice, Klamn

did not do so. Accordingly, Klamn fails to demonstrate any prejudice from the

trial court's delay in entering written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

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No. 71961-1-1/7

       Because written findings of fact and conclusions of law have been entered

and because he failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the delay, Klamn is not

entitled to appellate relief on this assignment of error.

                                          Ill

       Klamn contends that the trial court erred by sentencing him to 600 months

in confinement. This is so, he asserts, because 600 months is clearly excessive

for the crimes of which he was convicted. We disagree.

       We review whether the length of a sentence is clearly excessive by using

an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Oxborrow, 106 Wn.2d 525, 529-30,

723 P.2d 1123 (1986). A sentence is clearly excessive if it is "'clearly

unreasonable, i.e., exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, or

an action that no reasonable person would have taken.'" Oxborrow, 106 Wn.2d

at 531 (quoting State v. Strong, 23 Wn. App. 789, 794, 599 P.2d 20 (1979)). "In

other words, the reviewing court asks whether the grounds relied on, if any, in

determining the length of the sentence are tenable and whether the amount of

incarceration imposed is such that 'no reasonable person' would have imposed

it." State v. Ross. 71 Wn. App. 556, 569, 861 P.2d 473, 883 P.2d 329 (1993)

(citing State v. Harmon. 50 Wn. App. 755, 762, 750 P.2d 664 (1988)).

       "'[T]he sentencing court need not state reasons in addition to those relied

upon to justify the imposition of an exceptional sentence above the standard

range in the first instance to justify the length of the sentence imposed.'" State v.

Ritchie, 126 Wn.2d 388, 395, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995) (quoting Ross. 71 Wn. App.

at 573). "Indeed, once a reviewing court has determined that the facts support

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No. 71961-1-1/8

the reasons given for exceeding the range and that those reasons are substantial

and compelling, there is often nothing more to say." Ross. 71 Wn. App. at 571-

72. Accordingly, we first review whether an exceptional sentence is justified by

the facts in this case.

       Here, the trial court found three aggravating factors that justified an

exceptional sentence: domestic violence, an ongoing pattern of abuse, and

abuse of a position of trust. The facts adequately support the trial court's

findings. Klamn is S.A.K.'s father, both a family member and someone who

occupies a position of trust to a child. However, Klamn sexually abused his

daughter for seven years. These facts support the trial court's finding of the

three aggravating factors and justify an exceptional sentence.

       Additionally, the trial court found that Klamn had committed 14 offenses,

resulting in a high offender score and some offenses going unpunished. See

RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c). The trial court also found that the victim was under fifteen

at the time of the offenses. In light of these findings and the three aggravating

factors, we cannot conclude that no reasonable person would have sentenced

Klamn to 600 months.

       The trial court did not err by sentencing Klamn to 600 months of

confinement.

                                          IV

       In his statement of additional grounds, Klamn contends that the trial court

erred by allowing S.A.K. to testify to Klamn's statements made during a

telephone conversation with her. According to Klamn, this testimony was overly

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No. 71961-1-1/9

prejudicial.4 Although Klamn objected to the admission of S.A.K.'s testimony at

trial, he did so on the basis of hearsay, not unfair prejudice. Issues raised for the

first time on appeal are not reviewable unless they constitute "manifest error

affecting a constitutional right." RAP 2.5(a)(3). Because Klamn's contention is

raised for the first time on appeal and does not affect a constitutional right, we

decline to consider it.

                                               V

         Klamn further contends, in his statement of additional grounds, that his

convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence. This is so, he asserts,

because he cannot be convicted on S.A.K.'s uncorroborated testimony and

because the evidence violated the "corpus delicti rule." Neither assertion has

merit.

         Contrary to Klamn's assertion, there is no requirement that victim

testimony be corroborated by physical evidence. Circumstantial evidence is not

necessarily less reliable than direct evidence. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634,

638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). Moreover, the trier of fact is entitled to make credibility

determinations and believe or disbelieve any of the witnesses.5 State v.

Camarillo. 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). Here, the trial court heard

the testimony often witnesses, and determined that S.A.K. was more credible
than Klamn. We do not disturb that determination. See Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d at

         4 Klamn also asserts that S.A.K.'s testimony "assumes facts not in evidence" and
"constituted impermissible opinion testimony." These claims fail for the same reason.
         5 Further, contrary to Klamn's assertions, S.A.K.'s testimony was corroborated by other
evidence. Seven witnesses testified consistent with S.A.K.'s version of events. The audio- and
videotapes presented at trial also lent support to S.A.K.'s testimony.
No. 71961-1-1/10

71 (determinations of credibility not subject to appellate review).

       Similarly, Klamn's convictions do not violate the "corpus delicti rule." The

"corpus delicti rule" provides that "confessions or admissions of a person charged

with a crime are not sufficient, standing alone, to prove the corpus delicti and

must be corroborated by other evidence." State v. Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640, 655-56,

927 P.2d 210 (1996). Any self-incriminating statements made by Klamn6 were

far from the only evidence presented. Rather, S.A.K. testified as to her version of

the events. Her testimony was corroborated by seven witnesses. The "corpus

delicti rule" has no applicability to this case.

       The trial court did not err by finding Klamn guilty and entering judgment on

all 14 counts.7

       Affirmed.

We concur:

    1
    ftt^rv^B^ C)J,
                                                                 '7~y

        6 We assume that the statements to which Klamn refers were present on the audio- and
videotapes, as we discern no self-incriminating statements from the record provided.
        7 Klamn further makes numerous claims of ineffective assistance against three of his
attorneys. However, the record on appeal is not sufficient for us to review any of these claims.

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