Court Opinion

ID: 9742590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:16:33.048565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:33.989706
License: Public Domain

*363T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I must dissent.
The difficulty with the majority decision is that it does not fit the facts of the case before us.
Eor emphasis, I have underlined quoted portions of the majority opinion in the following quotations:
"The question before us as posed by defendant is as follows:
" 'Where an accused exercises his constitutional right to remain silent at the time of arrest, does the use of such silence against him at trial under the doctrine of impeachment by prior inconsistent statement constitute prejudicial error where he made no allegations on direct examination as to what was said or not said at the time of arrest ?’
"The prosecutor urges that we allow the prosecution to impeach a defendant by questioning him about what was said or not said to the police at the time of arrest as part of the res gestae citing People v Noble, 23 Mich App 100, 101; 178 NW2d 118, 119 (1970), or as an inconsistent 'nonutterance’, citing People v Calhoun, 33 Mich App 141, 147; 189 NW2d 743, 746 (1971).
"We will not condone conduct which directly or indirectly restricts the exercise of the constitutional right to remain silent in the face of accusation. 'Nonutteranees’ are not statements. The fact that a witness did not make a statement may be shown only to contradict his assertion that he did.”
These excerpts from the majority opinion demonstrate that the majority are of the mistaken view that the defendant in this case was under arrest and accused of burglary at the time of the alleged "nonutterance”. In fact, the defendant was not under arrest at that time, nor had he been accused of anything.
*364The following is an excerpt from the testimony of the defendant upon direct examination:
”Q. What did you see with reference to anybody running down the street toward you?
"A. I didn’t see nothing but two men running past me.
"Q. Did they—had you reached the alley in the middle of the street when these men ran past you?
’A: I believe I was past. As a matter of fact, I was.
”Q. And how long was it after these men ran past you that you were stopped by the policemen?
'A. It wasn’t too long, a matter of moments, I believe.
”Q. When you were stopped by the policemen, did you show them identification?
"A. Yes, I did.
”Q. And then what happened?
"A. Well, after I got through identifying myself, he told me and Milton Edison what had happened and then—
”Q. What did he say, what were the words that he used?.
"A. He said a man had been robbed. I had told him where I was and where I was going. And he let us go.
”Q. Then what happened, if anything?
"A. Well, me and Milton Edison, we made our first steps and then another squad police car came and stopped us.
”Q. And did those police officers say anything to you?
"A. Those were officers who put us under arrest.”
This testimony clearly shows, by defendant’s own words, that the first officer who stopped him on the evening in question did not place him under arrest, nor did he accuse the defendant of burglary. This comports with the testimony of officer Berryman. He was not investigating a burglary. He had observed a holdup in progress a few moments before his encounter with the defendant. *365He was investigating a robbery. He told the defendant that a man had been robbed.
The cross-examination of the defendant upon the question of whether or not he informed Berryman of the "two men running”, concludes as follows:
”Q. (By Mr. Stephens) You did indicate you did not tell the officer about these two men running, allegedly running down the street?
"A. What did I do?
"Q. You did not tell the officer who stopped you about these men running down the street?
"A. I don’t remember.
”Q. Did you tell the officer they went down that alley?
'A. I don’t recall.
”Q. Did you point down the alley?
”A. I don’t recall.
"Q. Did you describe these men to the officers?
”A. I don’t recall.
”Q. Did you get in the officer’s car and go down the alley with him?
’A. No, I didn’t.
”Q. Your testimony is that you took another step, you talked to the officer, and somebody else came up and arrested you; is that correct?
”A. I said I took more than a couple of steps. I said he let us go.”
Again it is clear that the defendant was not under arrest at the time of his conversation with officer Berryman.
I cannot conceive that our Court really intends to extend the rule of Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694; 10 ALR3d 974 (1966), to all cases where citizens engage in conversations of any kind with law enforcement personnel.
If every conversation between a policeman and a *366citizen on the street must begin with a recitation of the Miranda warnings then we may as well consign the whole matter of public safety to Divine Providence.
Certainly there could no longer be any meaningful police-community relations, nor any effective citizen assistance to officers of the law.
Swainson and M. S. Coleman, JJ., concurred with T. E. Brennan, J.