Court Opinion

ID: 9829229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:06:51.90339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:58.688192
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee contends that the portions of the charge held erroneous in discussing the fifth and sixth assignments were not calculated to lead the jury to believe that an unauthorized employé was meant. The charge given is subject to the construction that plaintiff was acting within his rights in giving the ticket to an unauthorized agent, provided he was not guilty of negligence in so doing. True, the term “employé” is used, and not the words “authorized employé” or “unauthorized employé” ; but when the court, after using the term “employé” many times, finally tells the jury that, if plaintiff, by reason of his want of reasonable and ordinary care, delivered his ticket to a person not authorized to receive it, defendant’s employés had the right to ask him to leave the train, and, upon his refusal to do so, to eject him, it could be construed in no other way than as an instruction that, if the employé mentioned throughout the charge was not authorized to take up the ticket, plaintiff’s rights would not be affected by such want of authority, unless he was guilty of negligence in delivering his ticket to such employé.
It is also contended that no issue was made as to delivery of ticket to an unauthorized agent. It appears from the charge of the court that he considered the issue in the case,.but was of the opinion that, even if the ticket was delivered to an unauthorized agent, it would not bar a recovery,, unless such delivery constituted negligence on the part of plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that he surrendered his ticket to the servant and agent of the railroad company before the arrival of the train at San Antonio, but did not allege that such servant or agent was one authorized to take up tickets. Such allegation should have been made, and it may be that we erred in not holding that a general demurred should have been sustained because of the failure to make same, for it seems clear that, in order to make out his case, and as a basis for showing that his ejection was not warranted, he should allege that he delivered his ticket to an agent authorized to receive same, and therefore was excused from delivering it when it was demanded by the conductor as alleged by him. The petition should be amended in this respect before another trial.
But, if the petition was only subject to a special exception, plaintiff, because of such omission, would not be excused from proving the facts necessa'ry to make out his case.
Defendant filed a general denial and a special answer. In the special answer it stated that, if plaintiff bought a ticket entitling him to passage from Uvalde to Seguin on June 5, 1912, one portion was detached and retained by defendant’s servants, and the other returned to plaintiff, and, if he did not present it to the conductor, it was his own fault, as he had either lost or misplaced it. Appellee contends that this is an admission that the ticket was delivered to an agent authorized to receive same. We do not so construe it, and it is clear from what follows that it was not even intended to admit that any employé received plaintiff’s ticket, authorized or not authorized, as the further allegation is made that, if it be true that the ticket was presented to some “clerk” of defendant, and such servant failed to return the ticket, plaintiff was negligent in not securing such ticket from such servant, or purchasing another one. We do not think it would be just to construe this answer as an admission that the ticket was received by Brakeman Stevens or the conductor on the *606train from Uvalde to San Antonio. It was not so construed by the trial court, nor was it intended as such an admission by the pleader.
The motion is overruled.