Court Opinion

ID: 9901740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 15:06:28.563404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:38.338353
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2768-21

JENNIFER ISRAEL,

          Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
and OMNI KIDS, INC.,

     Respondents.
___________________________

                   Submitted October 17, 2023 – Decided November 22, 2023

                   Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

                   On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
                   Labor, Docket No. 166534.

                   Forman, Cardonsky & Tsinman, LLC, attorneys for
                   appellant (Samuel Tsinman, on the briefs).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent Board of Review (Sookie Bae-Park,
                   Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gina
                   Labrecque, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Claimant Jennifer Israel appeals from the March 30, 2022, final agency

decision of the Board of Review (Board), Department of Labor and Workforce

Development, reversing a decision by the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) that

upheld her claim for unemployment benefits. We affirm.

      We discern these facts from the record. Israel was employed from January

29, 2017, through November 10, 2017, as a teacher for Omni Kids, Inc. (the

employer). On November 10, 2017, the employer advised Israel that due to

parent complaints, she would be temporarily placed in a different classroom with

older children to receive mentoring and training for about two months or until

her performance improved.          The temporary assignment, which was

memorialized in writing, would result in a decrease in Israel's hours from 35

hours per week to 22.5 hours per week, with no change in her pay rate. Although

Israel agreed to the temporary assignment, after November 10, 2017, she only

returned to work once to pick up her final paycheck. At that time, the employer

advised her that the opportunity was still available, but Israel did not respond.

Israel never contacted the employer to discuss any concerns about the temporary

assignment.

      Israel subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. On December 18,

2017, a Deputy for the Director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability

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Insurance (Deputy) found Israel eligible for benefits as of November 12, 2017,

without disqualification. Nearly one year later, on November 8, 2018, the

employer filed an untimely appeal of the Deputy's determination to the Tribunal,

explaining that it did not receive the Deputy's determination and arguing that

Israel should be disqualified from receiving benefits because she left the job

voluntarily without good cause.       A telephonic hearing was conducted on

December 6, 2018, before the Tribunal.            The employer participated in the

hearing, but Israel did not.

      Following the hearing, the Tribunal determined the employer established

good cause for the untimely filing of the appeal. The employer's witness had

testified that the employer had two separate business addresses. Although the

employer did not receive the Deputy's initial determination, it received a denial

of relief of charges on October 29, 2018, prompting the filing of the November

8, 2018, appeal. Based on the testimony elicited at the hearing, the Tribunal

also found that Israel was disqualified for benefits as of November 12, 2017, for

leaving work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work.         See

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) (providing that a person is not qualified to receive

unemployment compensation benefits if he or she "left work voluntarily without

good cause attributable to such work . . . .").

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                                         3
      Israel appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board, and, on March 8,

2019, the Board remanded the matter for rehearing because Israel did not receive

proper notice of the December 6, 2018, hearing date. Both the employer and

Israel participated in the second hearing conducted on April 1, 2019. During

the hearing, Israel testified she left because of the financial hardship caused by

the reduction in her hours. Contrary to the employer's testimony, Israel stated

that although she asked, she was not told the length of the temporary assignment.

It was undisputed, however, that when Israel was hired, the employer was aware

that she did not have teaching "credentials." Nonetheless, Israel was allowed to

teach pre-school aged children after she was observed in the classroom by State

officials and the employer's staff.

      On April 2, 2019, the Tribunal issued a new decision, reaffirming its prior

finding that the employer's untimely filing of the appeal was excused for good

cause, see N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1), but concluding that no disqualification arose

under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) because the work offered to Israel "was not suitable"

and Israel "had good cause for refusal of the work." The Tribunal explained that

            [a]lthough [Israel] did accept the change in her
            position, she did not return back to work because the
            change would have resulted in a cut in her pay[,] which
            would have caused her a financial hardship. Here, the
            change in positions constitutes a substantial change and

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                                        4
            was not covered under the existing employment
            agreement . . . .

      Thereafter, the employer appealed to the Board.       In a decision dated

August 12, 2019, the Board adopted the Tribunal's findings of fact, agreed that

the employer's filing of a late appeal was excusable, and agreed with the

Tribunal that no disqualification arose under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) as Israel "did

not refuse an offer of suitable work without good cause." However, the Board

disqualified Israel for benefits because "she left the work voluntarily without

good cause attributable to such work in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)."

      The Board explained:

                   While we understand that the reduced hours may
            have presented a financial challenge for [Israel], she
            never discussed this issue with the employer. Instead,
            she just stopped showing up for work. Perhaps if she
            gave the employer an opportunity to address this issue,
            they may have decided on another alternative for
            [Israel] in order to keep her employed and avoid [Israel]
            joining the ranks of the unemployed. [Israel] could
            have filed for partial unemployment benefits and
            continued to work. However, she did not give the
            employer a reasonable opportunity to address any
            issues or concerns she had before she left the work
            voluntarily. [1]

1
   The Board noted that the employer believed Israel was trainable and wanted
to keep her employed.
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                                       5
      Israel appealed the Board's decision to this court. On the Board's motion,

on August 25, 2020, we remanded "for a new agency hearing on the merits." On

April 21, 2021, the Board "reopen[ed] the matter, set[] aside its prior decision,

and remand[ed]" to the Tribunal "for a new hearing and decision on the merits."

On June 8, 2021, a third hearing was conducted by the Tribunal. Although not

indicated on the Board's remand order, the Tribunal stated that the matter was

remanded "for audible testimony." Only Israel and her attorney participated in

the June 8, 2021, hearing, during which, for the first time, Israel testified that

she was informed by the employer that her hours were being reduced because

"[b]usiness was slow," as opposed to any needed training.

      On June 9, 2021, the Tribunal issued its decision, based on testimony

adduced at all three hearings. Once again, the Tribunal found good cause for

the employer's late filing of the appeal and concluded that no disqualification

arose under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) because "the work was not suitable and [Israel]

had good cause for refusal of the work." The Tribunal explained that "the

change in positions constitute[d] a substantial change and was not covered under

the existing employment agreement and would have created a hardship for

[Israel]."

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                                        6
      The employer appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board, challenging

the Tribunal's assessment of the suitability of the temporary assignment offered

to Israel. See N.J.A.C. 12:20-4.1(a) (providing that the submission of a written

statement specifying that a party is aggrieved by or dissatisfied with a Tribunal's

decision "shall be deemed to be an appeal"). In a supporting June 15, 2021,

letter to the Board, the employer argued that the temporary assignment with its

attendant "training and mentorship" was offered "to help . . . Israel not only

improve, but to also retain her position in the classroom."         Instead, after

indicating her agreement to the temporary assignment, "Israel chose to abandon

her job" and reject the training opportunity without any further discussion. In a

January 24, 2022, letter, Israel's attorney urged the Board to disregard the

employer's June 15, 2021, letter, asserting that the employer was precluded from

"provid[ing] additional testimony by way of the appeal" because the employer

failed to participate in the hearing before the Tribunal.

      In a March 30, 2022, decision, the Board agreed with the Tribunal that the

employer's late filing of the appeal was excused for good cause, but reversed the

Tribunal's decision that no disqualification arose under N.J.S.A. 43:21 -5(c).

After adopting the Tribunal's findings of fact, the Board explained:

            [T]he . . . Tribunal found that the work was not suitable
            as there was a substantial change that was not covered

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                                        7
           under the existing employment agreement. However,
           the change was only going to be temporary in order to
           provide [Israel] with additional training due to
           complaints received by the employer from a few
           parents. The purpose of the temporary change was to
           improve [Israel's] job performance and skills.
           Therefore, the work was not considered unsuitable.
           [Israel] could have filed for partial unemployment
           benefits to supplement her income during this
           temporary training period. Furthermore, [Israel] made
           no attempt to discuss her concerns regarding this
           temporary change with the employer. Hence, [Israel]
           is disqualified for benefits from November 05, 2017[,]
           through December 02, 2017[,] as she refused an offer
           of suitable work without good cause in accordance with
           N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c).

This appeal followed.

     On appeal, Israel raises the following points for our consideration:

           I.  THE BOARD OF REVIEW IMPROPERLY
           CONCLUDED THAT EMPLOYER'S APPEAL WAS
           FILED LATE WITH GOOD CAUSE IN
           ACCORDANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(B)(1), AS
           THE RECORD CONTAINED INSUFFICIENT
           EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SAME.

           II.  THE BOARD OF REVIEW IMPROPERLY
           CONCLUDED       THAT     CLAIMANT         IS
           DISQUALIFIED     FOR   BENEFITS       FROM
           NOVEMBER 5, 2017 THROUGH DECEMBER 2,
           2017 AS SHE REFUSED AN OFFER OF SUITABLE
           WORK      WITHOUT    GOOD     CAUSE      IN
           ACCORDANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(C), AS THE
           RECORD CONTAINED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
           TO SUPPORT SAME.

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      The scope of our review of an administrative agency's final decision is

limited. Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997); see also Allstars Auto

Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) ("Judicial

review of agency determinations is limited."). We will disturb an agency's

decision

            only if we determine that the decision is "arbitrary,
            capricious or unreasonable" or is unsupported "by
            substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole."
            In determining whether an agency action is arbitrary,
            capricious, or unreasonable, we examine:

                  (1) whether the agency's action violates
                  express or implied legislative policies, that
                  is, did the agency follow the law; (2)
                  whether the record contains substantial
                  evidence to support the findings on which
                  the agency based its action; and (3)
                  whether in applying the legislative policies
                  to the facts, the agency clearly erred in
                  reaching a conclusion that could not
                  reasonably have been made on a showing
                  of the relevant factors.

            [Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 473 N.J. Super. 284, 302
            (App. Div. 2022) (citations omitted) (first quoting
            Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80
            (1980); and then quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474,
            482-83 (2007)).]

      The party challenging the administrative action bears the burden of

making the requisite showing. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014).

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                                       9
Although we "must defer to an agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a

particular field," In re Carter, 191 N.J. at 483 (quoting Greenwood v. State

Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)), we are "in no way bound by

[an] agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal

issue." Allstars Auto Grp., Inc., 234 N.J. at 158 (alteration in original) (quoting

Dep't of Children & Fams. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 302 (2011)).

      Pertinent to this appeal, under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c), "[a]n individual shall

be disqualified for benefits" if "it is found that the individual has failed, without

good cause, . . . to accept suitable work when it is offered."

                      For purposes of this subchapter, "good cause"
               means any situation over which the claimant did not
               have control or which was so compelling as to prevent
               the claimant from accepting work. In order to establish
               good cause, the claimant must have made a reasonable
               attempt to remove the restrictions pertaining to the
               refusal.

               [N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.4.]

      N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) delineates the following factors in evaluating work

suitability:

               (1) In determining whether or not any work is suitable
               for an individual, consideration shall be given to the
               degree of risk involved to health, safety, and morals,
               the individual’s physical fitness and prior training,
               experience and prior earnings, the individual's length of
               unemployment and prospects for securing local work in

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                                         10
            the individual's customary occupation, and the distance
            of the available work from the individual's
            residence. . . .

            (2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
            chapter, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits
            shall not be denied under this chapter to any otherwise
            eligible individual for refusing to accept new work
            under any of the following conditions: the position
            offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or
            other labor dispute; the remuneration, hours, or other
            conditions of the work offered are substantially less
            favorable to the individual than those prevailing for
            similar work in the locality; or, the individual, as a
            condition of being employed, would be required to join
            a company union or to resign from or refrain from
            joining any bona fide labor organization.

            [N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) (emphasis added).]

See also N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.1.

      N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.5(a)(3) defines "new work" as "[a]n offer of work made

by an individual's present employer of substantially different duties, terms or

conditions of employment from those he or she agreed to perform in his or her

existing contract of hire."     When determining whether an assignment will

constitute "new work," the court may consider "the employer's change of hours

or shift, job duties, location, salary, benefits, work environment and health and

safety conditions." Ibid. Importantly, the consequences of refusing to accept

suitable "new work" has significant implications regarding the time frame for

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                                      11
disqualification. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) (limiting disqualification period to

four weeks).

      N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1) prescribes time frames for filing a timely appeal.

Under N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1), an employer's appeal from an initial

determination of eligibility shall be filed within ten days of the mailing of the

determination, or within seven days of the receipt of the determination. Late

appeals may only be considered on the merits "if it is determined that the appeal

was delayed for good cause." N.J.A.C. 12:20-4.1(h). "Good cause" exists where

it is shown that:

             1. The delay in filing the appeal was due to
             circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or

             2. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for
             circumstances which could not have been reasonably
             foreseen or prevented.

             [Ibid.]

      As a threshold matter, we reject Israel's challenge to the Board's finding

that the employer's late filing of its appeal of the Deputy's determination was

excused for good cause. The Board's decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable, and is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as

a whole. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).

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                                      12
      Next, the record amply supports the Board's decision that Israel was

disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c) because she failed to accept

suitable work offered by the employer without good cause. Contrary to Israel's

contentions, the record supports the Board's findings that Israel rejected the

employer's offer of a temporary assignment to another classroom where she

would receive training and mentorship to improve her job performance and

address parent complaints. Although Israel's work hours would have been

temporarily reduced, her rate of pay would remain the same. Israel claimed she

could not withstand the financial hardship resulting from the reduced work

hours. However, Israel made no attempt to negotiate an alternative resolution

or discuss her financial hardship with the employer before quitting. As such,

Israel failed to demonstrate that her refusal of the temporary assignment was

with good cause. "[G]ood cause does not ordinarily exist when a person gives

up partial employment for none at all." Zielenski v. Bd. of Rev., 85 N.J. Super.

46, 53 (App. Div. 1964).

      Furthermore, notwithstanding the reduced hours and concomitant salary

reduction, we disagree with Israel's assertion that the temporary assignment

constituted "involuntary termination" or "was unsuitable" under the statutory

and regulatory provisions. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c); N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.5(a)(3).

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                                      13
                  An unemployed claimant, receiving benefits,
            may be justified in refusing a job referral at materially
            lower wages on the theory that the claimant should have
            a reasonable opportunity to seek work in line with his
            [or her] demonstrated earning capacity. This reasoning
            does not apply where the claimant is gainfully
            employed and could have continued working until he
            [or she] found a better job.

            [Zielenski, 85 N.J. Super. at 53.]

Israel's precipitous decision to quit rather than accept a temporary reduction in

hours and pay, without the prospect of employment elsewhere, was objectively

unreasonable and at odds with her concern of financial hardship.

      In sum, given our highly deferential standard of review, we discern no

reason to interfere with the Board's decision.     To the extent we have not

specifically addressed any of Israel's arguments, they are without sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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