Court Opinion

ID: 9480811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:59:12.771932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:55.555994
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the court in its opinion so far as Section III is concerned or in its result.
I believe the court’s opinion conflicts with the clear, unambiguous language of the statute and, in addition, creates an unwarranted exception which does not enhance the statute but rather flies in the face of its purposes. The confidentiality provision could hardly be more sweeping. It forbids any official or employee of the Department of Justice (a clear description of the prosecutor in this case) to use the information furnished pursuant to an application filed under the amnesty section of the statute for “any purpose other than to make a determination on the application or for enforcement_” 8 U.S.C. § 1160(b)(5) & (6) (1989) (emphasis added). I simply cannot torture either ambiguity or an exception out of this provision.
I have never pretended to be one who would not read expansively a statute or precedent for either an exception or extension providing it was warranted and consistent with the purposes of the statute. What has been done here not only is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute but also is flatly contradictory to its purposes. One can read nothing else in this statute except that it was intended to convey confidence that one coming forward under the statute could do so in complete confidence that information included in the application would be used only for the purposes for which it was filled out.
I find nothing in the legislative history that mandates the exception created by the court. The fact that the legislative history concentrates on its primary purposes related to deportation is a far cry from suggesting that anything in the legislative history suggests exceptions to its plain prohibition and purpose to generate confidence that it will not be used for other law enforcement purposes. Indeed, as the panel reports, the House Reports explained, “[t]he confidentiality of the records is meant to assure applicants that the legalization process is serious, and not a ruse to invite undocumented aliens to come forward only to be snared by the INS.” H.R. 99-682(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 5649, 5677. I am simply unable to find in this positive language any suggestion that its use for *1515some other purpose is either mandated or permitted by this legislative history. Congress used plain, broad, and sweeping language. The only exception made was with reference to the enforcement of that act itself. The fact that the legislative history does not contain a laundry list of illegitimate uses simply does not support a judicially created exception to its plain language.
I agree with the panel that no meaningful distinction can be made between the name of the applicant and the information he provides on the application. To that extent, I am in accord. It is beyond that point which I cannot go.
My views here are consistent with what we have done in a closely parallel situation. In McNichols v. Klutznick, 644 F.2d 844 (10th Cir.1981), aff'd, 455 U.S. 345, 102 S.Ct. 1103, 71 L.Ed.2d 199 (1982), we enforced the broad, clear language of confidentiality which closely parallels this case against perfectly logical arguments for exceptions which were not categorically forbidden. Our response to the perfectly logical arguments for the exception which the trial court made was:
Congress has neither made nor implied such an allowance in its prohibition and no authority is given for the notion that Congress is constitutionally required to yield to such an argument. The government has promised its citizens that census information will be kept confidential. 13 U.S.C. §§ 8(b), (c), 9(a). In exchange for and in reliance on this promise, citizens cooperate with the government’s census taking efforts relatively free of inhibitions that might otherwise distort their disclosures. In these times when confidence in the government’s resolve to keep its promises to its citizens is not notorious, we should not readily find excuses to abandon or prohibit the enforcement of those promises. We do not believe that in the face of the congressional prohibitions, the trial court has the authority to substitute its own techniques for protecting the confidentiality mandated by the statute.
McNichols v. Klutznick, 644 F.2d at 845.
Neither the language nor reason suggests that the purpose to encourage application and forthright disclosure can be served by the creation of an exception which potentially puts the applicant in jeopardy of criminal prosecution. Quite the contrary is true. For that reason I would reverse and remand for a new trial without the use of this information which was disclosed under a guarantee of protection by the statute itself and on the solemn promise of our government that it would be held confidential even from the Attorney General of the United States for these purposes.