Court Opinion

ID: 9529033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:46:38.368535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:36.269861
License: Public Domain

MATHIAS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that Simmons was subjected to an investigatory stop. Citing Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), the majority notes that not every encounter between a citizen and a police officer constitutes an investigatory stop, but to constitute a stop, the citizen must be under a reasonable impression that he was not free to leave the officer's presence. In this case, Officer Parker proceeded up Simmons' driveway at approximately two o' clock in the morning in a dark, rural area, with his emergency lights activated and pulled up next to the truck Simmons had been driving. Although I agree with the majority that it is possible that Officer Parker may have activated his emergency lights merely to announce his presence, it is not Officer Parker's intention which controls, but whether a reasonable person would be under the *1156impression that he was free to leave the officer's presence. Under these facts and cireumstances, I do not believe a reasonable person would feel free to leave the officer's presence, and therefore, the encounter between Simmons and Officer Parker did constitute an investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. .
The Fourth Amendment "prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures' by the Government, and its safeguards extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639, 641 (Ind. Ct.App.2002), trans. denied (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). However, "it is well-settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if, based on specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 'may be afoot'" Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 6683 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trams. denied (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). "The reasonable suspicion inquiry is determined on a case-by-case basis." Glass, 769 N.E.2d at 648. Reasonable suspicion requires something more than "an inchoate and unparticular-ized suspicion or hunch," but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. Person v. State, 764 N.E.2d 748, 748 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied.
In this case, at the time that he made the investigatory stop, Officer Parker knew only that: 1) there had been an accident which resulted in a pickup truck lying on its side in a nearby ditch; 2) Simmons and his sister did not know what happened to cause the accident or the identity or whereabouts of the driver of the truck involved; 3) a second truck was sitting off to the south side of Simmons's driveway, but neither Officer Parker nor Deputy Meredith believed that it was involved in the accident; 4) neither Simmons nor his sister knew to whom that truck belonged; but 5) neither Simmons nor his sister had requested that the truck be towed from their property; and 6) Simmons had suggested that maybe the driver of the green pickup truck in his driveway stopped to assist the driver of the truck involved in the accident. Tr. p. 5. At the hearing, Officer Parker stated that the green pickup truck was properly plated, it was on private property, and the truck was not in violation of any statute or ordinance. Tr. pp. 12, 14. Importantly, Officer Parker also testified that he did not have any knowledge that Simmons was or might be intoxicated at the time Simmons was driving the pickup truck up the driveway. Tr. p. 15.
While it likely seemed odd to Officer Parker that neither driver of the two pickup trucks was present, I do not believe that the facts of this case rise to the level of reasonable suspicion required in order to make an investigatory stop. Officer Parker may have had a hunch that something was amiss, but as our court has previously stated, "a 'hunceh' is not sufficient to authorize an investigatory stop." Bovie v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ind.Ct.App.2002); see also Williams v. State, 745 N.E2d 241, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). Here, the green pickup truck was on private property, and the residents of that property, Simmons and his sister, did not want it to be removed. Officer Parker could have run the license plate number on the truck to discover who owned it, but he chose not to do so.1 Additionally, at the *1157hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Parker merely stated that he thought the pickup truck was suspicious; he did not give any indication that he believed that any criminal activity had occurred.
The citizens of Indiana should not be subjected to surveillance by a police officer when that officer has no reason to suspect that any criminal activity has occurred or may be afoot. Under these facts and circumstances, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Simmons motion to suppress.
ORDER
Comes now the Court, on its own motion, and FINDS AND ORDERS that this Court's opinion heretofore handed down in this cause on December 31, 2002, marked Memorandum Decision should now be ordered published.
All Panel Judges Coneur.

. Deputy Meredith did run the license plate information, but did not write it down and did not relay that information to Officer Parker. Tr. p. 40.