Court Opinion

ID: 9563661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:44:21.007397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:59.961315
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
The accusation charged that defendant committed “the offense of obstruction of officer, to wit” did knowingly and wilfully hinder R. S. Jones, a law enforcement officer, in the lawful discharge of his official duties.
*766“Hinder” has not been judicially interpreted by this state’s appellate courts. A dictionary definition is “to injure, physically or morally; to keep back or behind; to prevent from starting or moving forward; to check; obstruct; - often followed by ‘from’; to prevent or embarrass; to debar; to shut out.” Webster’s New Inti. Dictionary, 2d ed., Unabridged. Synonyms are “retard, delay; hamper, impede, block.” Ibid.
There is evidence that defendant’s perturbed refusal to get back in the. car, together with his loud and “boldly obnoxious and contemptuous” language and behavior, hindered the officer by jeopardizing the control over the situation which the lone officer was trying to maintain as he attempted to investigate whether or not the driver was under the influence. This refusal, coupled with the attitude expressed by defendant in the words and demeanor and tone by which he questioned the officer, plus his own condition of apparently being under the influence, caused the officer to cease his investigative procedure of administering tests and instead, occasioned by defendant’s behavior, to call a back-up unit so as not to be relegated to a defensive position. The officer testified that appellant, rather than returning to the car, “continued to interrupt while I attempted to perform the field sobriety tests on his brother.” There was evidence of interference with the officer’s performance of his duties in ascertaining the driver’s condition. The interference was caused by defendant’s testing the officer’s authority and asserting his own ill-conceived authority, all of which brought the officer’s testing to a halt because it constituted a threat to the officer’s remaining in control of the investigation. The officer had made a reasonable request which defendant refused to comply with and instead challenged the officer’s lawful investigation and the officer’s attempt to conduct his business. The officer felt threatened by the scenario and discontinued testing. Defendant, in refusing to obey the precautionary instructions, and in displaying an intention to exert a superior stance and insisting on it, impeded the performance of the officer’s duties.
In these circumstances, the question of whether or not defendant “hindered” the officer was properly left up to the jury, which had the witnesses before it and could hear as well as observe them, their relative size, their demeanor, and so on. Ratliff v. State, 133 Ga. App. 256 (211 SE2d 192) (1974). The circumstances are not identical to any of the cases cited, and each must be judged on its own merits, weighing all of the factors which combined to make up the incident. In Jenga v. State, 166 Ga. App. 36 (303 SE2d 170) (1983), for example, the defendant, when he was about to be arrested, “grasped and held on to a railing and had to be physically removed to a police vehicle.” Id. at 36. The court found there was sufficient evidence to authorize conviction of obstruction. In that case, as here, there was evidence that the *767defendant was deliberately preventing the officers from doing their job. He did not in fact stop them from arresting him, whereas Moccia did successfully block the officer’s efforts to carry out the testing. Moreover, he caused an additional unit to be called, which otherwise was not necessary, thereby preventing those officers from carrying out other duties. Thus, in the instant case, not only the defendant’s speech, but also his behavior in context, must be considered. It was not a mere matter of words.
Decided May 14, 1985.
Harvey A. Monroe, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, Solicitor, Jane Leib, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
What we are concerned with in a crime of this nature is the relationship between the defendant and the police officer, or more precisely, between the officer’s performance of his lawful duties and the defendant’s impeding him from accomplishing them.
I believe the evidence was sufficient to authorize a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Jenga v. State, supra.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Banke, Presiding Judge McMurray, and Judge Carley join in this dissent.