Court Opinion

ID: 9376920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 11:06:52.791764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.350737
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-22-00323-CV
     ___________________________

        IN THE MATTER OF W.S.

  On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 323-114792-20

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant W.S. appeals the juvenile court’s order transferring him from the

Texas Juvenile Justice Department (Juvenile Department) to the Institutional Division

of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Criminal Department). See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 56.01. In a single issue, W.S. argues that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by transferring him to the Criminal Department to complete his sentence

instead of releasing him to the parole board. We hold that the juvenile court did not

abuse its discretion and affirm its transfer order.

                                     I. Background

       In November 2020, a grand jury approved the State’s petition seeking a

determinate sentence against W.S. The State alleged that in January 2020, when W.S.

was sixteen years old, W.S. had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the

offenses of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon.1

       In March 2021, as part of a plea agreement, the juvenile court adjudicated W.S.

of having engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the offense of aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony, see Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 22.02(a)(2), (b), and ordered W.S. to serve a term of six years in “the [Juvenile

       By the time the State filed its petition, W.S had turned seventeen.
       1

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Department] with a possible transfer to the [Criminal Department].” By March 2021,

W.S. was already seventeen-and-a-half years old.

      In June 2022, the Juvenile Department informed the juvenile court that W.S.

would not complete his statutory minimum period of two years’ confinement for his

offense by his nineteenth birthday (which would occur in August 2022), and was,

thus, subject to a hearing to determine whether he should be “transferred to the

Institutional Division or released to the Parole Division of the [Criminal

Department].” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11. Under Section 245.051(c)(3) of the

Texas Human Resources Code, the Juvenile Department was not authorized to

release W.S. “under supervision” without the juvenile court’s approval because W.S.

had not yet served a minimum two years for a second-degree felony. See Tex. Hum.

Res. Code Ann. § 245.051(c)(3).

      In addition to releasing W.S. to the Parole Division of the Criminal

Department, the juvenile court also had the authority to transfer W.S. to the

Institutional Division of the Criminal Department to complete his sentence provided

W.S.’s conduct indicated that “the welfare of the community require[d] the transfer.”

See id. § 244.014(a). As the testimony later showed, however, the Juvenile Department

was effectively asking the juvenile court for approval to release W.S. on parole. See id.

§ 245.051(d).

      In August 2022, after a hearing, the juvenile court ordered W.S. to “be

immediately . . . transferred to the care, custody[,] and control of the [Criminal

                                           3
Department] in accordance with the provisions of Section[] 245.151(c) of the Texas

Human Resources Code, and [S]ection 54.11 of the Texas Family Code, therein to

serve the remainder of his sentence as required by law.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 54.11(i)(2); Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 245.151(c). W.S. appealed.

                     II. The Law Concerning Transfer Orders

      When the Juvenile Department refers a juvenile who is serving a determinate

sentence to a juvenile court for a possible transfer to the Criminal Department, the

juvenile court must set a hearing. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(a). In W.S.’s case, at

the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court could either (1) order the juvenile

returned to the Juvenile Department or (2) transfer the juvenile to the Criminal

Department to complete his sentence. See id. § 54.11(i).

      But if the juvenile court ordered the juvenile returned to the Juvenile

Department, it could do so with or without approval to release him under

supervision. See id. § 54.11(j). Thus, if the juvenile court ordered him to complete his

sentence in the Criminal Department, the Juvenile Department would later transfer

him to the Institutional Division of the Criminal Department. See Tex. Hum. Res.

Code Ann. § 245.151(c). But if the juvenile court approved release on parole, on his

nineteenth birthday, the Juvenile Department would transfer him to the Parole

Division of the Criminal Department. See id. § 245.151(e).

      In making the decision whether the juvenile should be paroled or ordered to

complete his sentence, the trial court

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      may consider the experiences and character of the person before and
      after commitment to the [Juvenile Department] or post-adjudication
      secure correctional facility, the nature of the penal offense that the
      person was found to have committed and the manner in which the
      offense was committed, the abilities of the person to contribute to
      society, the protection of the victim of the offense or any member of the
      victim’s family, the recommendations of the [Juvenile Department],
      county juvenile board, local juvenile probation department, and
      prosecuting attorney, the best interests of the person, and any other
      factor relevant to the issue to be decided.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(k); see In re A.M., No. 02-17-00029-CV, 2017 WL

2812452, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re

H.C., No. 02-15-00149-CV, 2016 WL 354297, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 28,

2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that under Section 54.11(k), “the trial court may

assign different weights to the factors it considers, and the court need not consider

every factor”).

                              III. Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s decision to transfer a juvenile from the Juvenile

Department to the Criminal Department for an abuse of discretion. A.M., 2017 WL

2812452, at *5; In re K.Y., 392 S.W.3d 736, 737 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); In

re J.D.P., 149 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). “We are to

review the entire record to determine whether the trial court acted without reference

to any guiding rules and principles. We may not reverse a trial court’s decision merely

because we disagree with that decision, so long as the trial court acted within its

discretionary authority.” J.D.P., 149 S.W.3d at 792 (citation omitted). An abuse of

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discretion does not occur when some evidence of substantive and probative character

supports the trial court’s decision. See A.M., 2017 WL 2812452, at *5; K.Y., 392

S.W.3d at 737.

                                   IV. Discussion

      In W.S.’s brief, his primary argument to support his contention that the

juvenile court abused its discretion is that the Juvenile Department itself

recommended not transferring him to the Criminal Department to complete his

sentence. Instead, it recommended having him released on parole.

      The State acknowledges that some evidence supported parole. But the State

adds that “there was unquestionably sufficient evidence in the record to support the

trial court’s discretion in deciding to transfer [W.S.] to [the Criminal Department]” to

complete his sentence.

      We agree with the State.

A. Evidence

      1. The Master File

      At the start of the hearing, the juvenile court admitted into evidence the

Juvenile Department’s master file for W.S. The master file contained a description of

W.S.’s underlying offense.

      According to the master file, multiple people had “jumped” W.S.’s friend. Two

days later, W.S. and his friend saw the victim—a peer W.S. claimed was involved in

the “jumping” of his friend—outside a gas station.

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      The victim, however, had not participated in the “jumping” but had, instead,

associated with the youths who had “jumped” W.S.’s friend. Nevertheless, W.S.’s

friend approached the victim, started a fight with him, and stabbed him multiple times

with a knife. The victim ran behind the gas station, where W.S. and his friend

pursued him and continued the assault.

      W.S. purportedly brandished a handgun and shot at the victim four times.

How many bullets struck the victim was not clear: “Records do not note the number

of gunshot wounds suffered by the victim, but it is noted that the victim was shot in

the leg and was also observed doubled over in video after a shot went off, possibly

indicating he was additionally shot in the abdomen.”

      After the assault, W.S. and his friend absconded to Mexico, where they

remained for seven months. Authorities arrested W.S. when he attempted to re-enter

the United States.

      2. The Juvenile and Criminal Departments’ Court Liaison

      The State called as its only witness Maricela Amador, who was a court liaison

for the Juvenile and Criminal Departments. She acknowledged that W.S. had been

admitted to the Juvenile Department for the offense of aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon for which he had received a six-year determinate sentence and that

W.S. had been in the Juvenile Department’s custody for about seventeen months.

The issue, Amador explained, was that the minimum confinement period in the

Juvenile Department for a second-degree felony was twenty-four months.

                                          7
              a. Incidents While at the Juvenile Department

      Amador estimated that W.S., while at the Juvenile Department, had about forty

incidents on record. Of those, three rose to the level of requiring Level II hearings.2

      The most recent incident was in October 2021; it was for stealing an iPad. As a

result of the Level II hearing, W.S. was demoted to Stage 1 and had his privileges

suspended.3

      W.S.’s second Level II hearing was in July 2021. On that occasion, he had

participated in a food fight in the cafeteria that had caused a major campus disruption.

      The third and oldest incident occurred in June 2021. W.S. had refused to go to

his room at bedtime. The incident involved not just W.S. but a group of ten youths,

who—rather than going to their rooms as instructed—“locked their arms together.”

Ultimately, staff had to either escort or carry the youths to their rooms.

      2
        Contextually, a Level II hearing appears to be a disciplinary hearing. See In re
M.J.-M., No. 02-14-00367-CV, 2015 WL 4663978, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Aug. 6, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing juvenile’s violation of “twenty-six major
rules,” which “result[ed] in sixteen Level II hearings” while serving his sentence in the
Juvenile Department).
      3
        Amador explained that the Juvenile Department had five stages with the first
being Stage 1; a juvenile is assigned Stage 1 when admitted to the Juvenile
Department. Before a juvenile can be promoted to a different stage, the juvenile must
complete certain objectives, such as behavior requirements, educational requirements,
and overall progress. The progressions go as follows: Stage 1, Stage 2, Stage 3, Stage
4, and Stage YES, which is an acronym for Youth Empowerment Stage.

                                            8
               b. Rehabilitation

       Regarding rehabilitation, Amador stated that W.S. had been referred to the

capital-and-serious-violent-offender treatment program, which was the most intensive

treatment program that the Juvenile Department offered to violent offenders.

Although W.S. completed the program, Amador added that he had done so

unsuccessfully. She explained,

       Although he had worked through the sessions within the workbook,
       towards the end of it when his overall participation was reviewed, it was
       determined that he did not truly take accountability for his offense, and
       he wasn’t demonstrating the components that were necessary for them
       to evaluate him as a successful completion.

W.S. had also been placed in an alcohol-and-drug treatment group, which he

successfully completed. Additionally, W.S. had sat for the GED exam, but he failed

parts of it.

       Amador explained that the minimum time to advance from Stage 1 to Stage 2

was thirty days. By comparison, W.S. took about six months to make the transition.

She acknowledged that the six-month period that W.S. needed to advance to Stage 2

was unusual.

               c. Moderate Risk for Violent Recidivism

       A psychologist evaluated W.S. The psychologist found W.S. to be a moderate

risk for violent recidivism.

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             d. Juvenile Department’s Recommendation

      Amador stated that the Juvenile Department’s recommendation was to transfer

W.S. to the Parole Division of the Criminal Department. She explained,

      Although . . . he was not able to complete his primary need for violent
      offending, he was able to demonstrate still that he had determination to
      complete the program.         He eventually came to have a better
      understanding of his victim, developing and demonstrating empathy,
      along with demonstrating eagerness to obtain his . . . general education
      diploma as well as earning a vocational certification.

Amador acknowledged that she was aware that W.S.’s offense involved his shooting at

someone on the ground four times.

      Amador was not sure, however, what others in the Juvenile Department knew.

Amador explained that the executive director of the Juvenile Department, who made

the ultimate decision, did so based on the recommendations originating

      from the people that work closest with [W.S.]; his case manager, his
      dorm leader, the facility superintendent, the manager of clinical services
      at the facility. They’re the ones closest to him that have been able to
      gain that assessment of his progress. They compile their information
      together when submitting it into the database that is then reviewed by
      the executive director.

Amador acknowledged, however, that for reasons involving W.S.’s privacy, the staff

making those recommendations might not have known the specifics of his underlying

offense.

B. Arguments

      The State advocated transferring W.S. to the Institutional Division of the

Criminal Department. The State noted the violent nature of the underlying offense

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during which W.S.’s friend had stabbed the victim multiple times even before W.S.

had shot the victim. The State also questioned W.S.’s ability to successfully assimilate

back into the community without being a danger to others.

      In contrast, W.S.’s counsel argued that W.S. had an IQ of 834 and that he might

not rehabilitate as quickly as other people. W.S.’s counsel also argued that the offense

had happened four-and-a-half years earlier and that young people change. 5

C. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling

      When making its ruling, the juvenile court explained to W.S. at length why it

thought it necessary to transfer him to the Criminal Department to complete his

sentence.   The juvenile court was aware of the underlying offense’s facts and

commented that but for the plea bargain, in its estimation, if W.S.’s case had gone to a

jury, a jury would have likely assessed a punishment far greater than six years. The

juvenile court also noted that W.S. had not shown any desire to change his behavior

while at the Juvenile Department until his transfer hearing became imminent and opined,

      I think if I was to parole you, you would go back to being a drug dealer,
      having guns and threatening people and being disruptive, and that’s the
      reason why I’m transferring you is I just don’t think you’ve matured
      enough and you’ve been rehabilitated. I feel like our community is in
      danger. 6

      4
       The record supports counsel’s assertion that W.S.’s IQ was 83.

      The offense had occurred in January 2020, and the transfer hearing was in
      5

August 2022, so the offense had occurred about two-and-a-half years earlier.
      6
       An incident report from February 21, 2022, showed that during a routine cell
search, W.S. was found with communications with another youth that described

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Finally, the juvenile court noted that even though W.S.’s offense was an aggravated

one with stiffer parole requirements, given W.S.’s short sentence, W.S. would soon

become eligible for parole in any event.7

D. Analysis

      Some evidence of substantive and probative character supports the juvenile

court’s decision; thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. See A.M., 2017

WL 2812452, at *5; K.Y., 392 S.W.3d at 737.           After arriving at the Juvenile

Department, W.S. continued to violate basic rules, such as when he stole property

from others. He also showed a penchant for not following verbal instructions, such

as when he refused to go to his room when told and when he stole bags of chips even

after being told not to. 8    W.S.’s ability to contribute positively to society was

questionable because he had not yet passed his GED (making gainful employment

detailed plans to trick the parole officers and to continue criminal activity such as
selling drugs and committing robberies.
      7
         The juvenile court referred to W.S.’s offense as a “3G” offense, which refers
to former Section 3g of Article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See
State v. Kahookele, 604 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020), aff’d, 640 S.W.3d
221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Hervey v. State, No. 05-17-01040-CR, 2018 WL 3198401,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). The current provision is located in Article 42A.054 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054(b)(2)(A), (c).
When a judgment contains a deadly weapon finding, an inmate is “not eligible for
release on parole until the inmate’s actual calendar time served, without consideration
of good conduct time, equals one-half of the sentence or 30 calendar years, whichever
is less, but in no event is the inmate eligible for release on parole in less than two
calendar years.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.145(d)(2). The juvenile court’s transfer
order credited W.S. with 517 days detained—a little less than a year and a half.

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difficult) and because stealing, drug dealing, and robberies (some alternatives to

gainful employment) are not considered positive contributions to society. W.S. was a

moderate risk to violently reoffend. Although W.S. had shown some signs of promise

while in the Juvenile Department, the juvenile court could have reasonably questioned

whether he had made sufficient progress.

       And although the Juvenile Department recommended parole, whether the

persons recommending parole to the executive director were even aware of W.S.’s

underlying offense was not clear. In contrast, the prosecuting attorney was aware of

W.S.’s underlying offense, and she recommended a transfer to the Criminal

Department to complete his sentence:

       The State is arguing . . . that transfer to [the Criminal Department] is more
       than appropriate in this case. [W.S.], his underlying offense is an aggravated
       assault deadly weapon which, frankly, should have been a murder. He shot
       the victim four times. His co-respondent started the fight, stabbed the
       victim multiple times before [W.S.] shot him, and by the grace of God the
       victim survived. The shots were also fired at close range.

       The prosecutor also emphasized W.S.’s failure to take accountability: “I noticed

in the master file that . . . [W.S.] described the offense” as his trying “to scare the dude

[by] brandish[ing] his firearm. He then stated, quote, [‘]I turned back and three

gunshots went off.[’] That . . . says it all, Judge. There’s no accountability there.” We

note, though, that the report to which the prosecutor referred was dated April 5,

       In February 2022, W.S. ran to a Mrs. Baird’s food trailer and started throwing
       8

bags of chips to his friends. When told to stop, W.S. refused and continued to toss
bags of chips to his friends.

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2021. W.S. was admitted to the Juvenile Department only about two weeks earlier, on

March 23, 2021. On the other hand, W.S. had failed the capital-and-serious-violent-

offender treatment program precisely because he had failed to take accountability for

his offense.

      A psychologist who evaluated W.S. in June 2022 also recommended parole.

The legislature, however, entrusted the juvenile court—not the psychologist who had

evaluated W.S. and not the executive director of the Juvenile Department—to make

the ultimate decision whether to release W.S. back into society while on parole or to

transfer him to the Criminal Department to serve out his sentence. And while the

psychologist and the Juvenile Department saw enough improvement in W.S. to risk

parole, the juvenile court had evidence before it that W.S. posed a danger to the

community. The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion by transferring

W.S. to the Institutional Division of the Criminal Department.

      We overrule W.S.’s issue.

                                  V. Conclusion

      Having overruled W.S.’s sole issue, we affirm the juvenile court’s order

transferring W.S. to the Criminal Department.

                                                    /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                    Wade Birdwell
                                                    Justice

Delivered: March 2, 2023

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