Court Opinion

ID: 9668543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:17:45.645843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.054324
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Relying on Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970), the majority holds that the “law is clear that statements obtained by the police where the Miranda rules have not been observed may be used for impeachment purposes only if they are in fact voluntary” and remands for case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of appellant’s statement.
Relying on Art. I, § 19, of the Missouri Constitution, which states, in part, that “no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause,” I would hold that the statement involved in this case is inadmissible for any purpose, impeachment or otherwise.
I agree with Mr. Justice Brennan, who, in his dissent in Harris, supra, made the following observations:
“[T]he accused is denied an ‘unfettered’ choice when the decision whether to take the stand is burdened by the risk that an *215illegally obtained prior statement may be introduced to impeach his direct testimony denying complicity in the crime charged against him. We settled this proposition in Miranda where we said:
‘The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner .... [Statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial .... These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.’ 384 U.S., at 476-477 [86 S.Ct. at 1629] (emphasis added).
This language completely disposes of any distinction between statements used on direct as opposed to cross-examination. ‘An incriminating statement is as incriminating when used to impeach credibility as it is when used as direct proof of guilt and no constitutional distinction can legitimately be drawn.’ People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 324, [274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876] 221 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1966) (dissenting opinion).”
Harris, supra, at 230-31, 91 S.Ct. 648-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court’s withdrawal from Miranda, described by Mr. Justice Brennan in his Harris dissent, supra, has been the subject of widespread criticism by the commentators. See, e. g., 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 11.6(a) (1978); The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 44 (1971); Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 Yale L.J. 1198 (1971); Comment, Harris v. New York: The Death Knell of Miranda and Walder ?, 38 Brooklyn L.Rev. 357 (1971); Comment, Impeachment of a Defendant-Witness By the Use of Illegally Obtained Statements: From Walder to Harris—The Exception Becomes the Rule, 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 685 (1971); Note, 40 Cin.L.Rev. 350 (1971); Note, 24 Fla.L.Rev. 194 (1971); Note, 40 Fordham L.Rev. 394 (1971); Note, 25 Miami L.Rev. 531 (1971); Note, 7 New Eng.L.Rev. 123 (1971); Note, 24 Vand.L.Rev. 843 (1971); Note, 8 Wake Forest L.Rev. 276 (1972); and Note, 1971 Wash.U.L.Q. 441.
The Supreme Court, in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 376 n.7, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1759, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), stated that it “must accept whatever construction of a state constitution is placed upon it by the highest court of the State.” With this in mind, I would join those states that “impose greater restrictions on police activity than the Supreme Court of the United States holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.” Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). See also State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Mo. banc 1975). Those states are: California, People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal.3d 101, 127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272 (banc 1976); Hawaii, State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); and Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975).
“The objective of deterring improper police conduct is only part of the larger objective of safeguarding the integrity of our adversary system. The ‘essential mainstay’ of that system, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at 460, 86 S.Ct., at 1620, is the privilege against self-incrimination, which for that reason has occupied a central place in our jurisprudence since before the Nation’s birth.” Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 231-32, 91 S.Ct. at 648-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I would assure that “essential mainstay” through the Missouri Constitution and reverse and remand the case for a new trial.