Court Opinion

ID: 9722546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:38:39.572391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:36.832823
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent because the result reached by the majority exalts form over substance, disregarding the remedial nature of the savings statute and its status as a single provision within the entire Code of Civil Procedure. The Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor, the Civil Practice Act, were enacted to eliminate technical pitfalls and to encourage a procedure whereby substantive rights could be determined with a minimum of delay, technicality and expense. (Skolnick v. Martin (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 55, 59.) This court has early on recognized that the several provisions contained within the Code of Civil Procedure (and its predecessor) should be construed together in light of this general purpose and philosophy, so as to give effect to the main intent of the legislature. (Johnson v. Moon (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 561, 566.) Indeed, it is the express direction of the legislature, contained in section 1 — 106, that “[tjhis Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 1 — 106. The defendants allegedly libeled the plaintiff in 1986. Plaintiff filed a timely complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri (Federal court). Defendants were promptly served with process and a copy of plaintiff’s complaint and did in fact appear before the court. (Presumably, the appearance was a general, rather than a special and limited, appearance.) Defendants motioned the court for dismissal on two grounds, lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. The Federal judge granted their motion and dismissed the action against defendants on the basis of improper venue. This constitutes an involuntary dismissal of plaintiff’s action on grounds other than an adjudication on the merits. Fed. R Civ. P. 41(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 273. Plaintiff refiled the libel action on March 30, 1988, in the circuit court of Christian County, Illinois. This was within one year after the entry of the dismissal order in the Federal action. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s State court action because the alleged libel occurred in 1986 and, therefore, plaintiff’s case is barred by the one-year statute of limitations for libel actions. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13 — 201. Plaintiff argues that the action was timely filed because the Federal case was commenced within one year of the libel. This State action was commenced within one year of the dismissal of the Federal case. Therefore, this case is merely a continuation of the Federal action. Defendants contend, and the majority agrees, that this cannot be a continuation of the Federal case because the Federal case was not dismissed “for lack of jurisdiction” but for lack of venue. The majority reasons that if the legislature wanted to save plaintiff’s action it could have written “lack of venue” into section 13 — 217. It chose not to do so; therefore plaintiff’s action cannot be saved because of his mistaken filing in the Federal court. I disagree. The majority focuses only on section 13 — 217 (the savings statute), disregarding the liberal construction mandated by section 1 — 106 of the Code. This court has already determined that the plain purpose of the savings statute is “to facilitate the disposition of litigation upon the merits and to avoid its frustration upon grounds that are unrelated to the merits.” (Roth v. Northern Assurance Co. (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 40, 48.) Justice Cardozo expressed this philosophy in construing a New York statute similar to our savings statute: “The statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a hearing in court till he reaches a judgment on the merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not to be frittered away by any narrow construction. The important consideration is that, by invoking judicial aid, a litigant gives timely notice to his adversary of a present purpose to maintain his rights before the courts. *** There is nothing in the reason of the rule that calls for a distinction between the consequences of error in respect of the jurisdiction of the court and the consequences of any other error in respect of a suitor’s rights.” Roth v. Northern Assurance Co. (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 40, 46-47, citing Gaines v. City of New York (1915), 215 N.Y. 533, 539, 109 N.E.594, 596. Likewise, in the instant case, it is of no consequence that plaintiff’s error was one of venue rather than jurisdiction. In either case, no harm has been visited on the defendants. They were put on notice, in a timely manner, of plaintiff’s claim. The determination of the Federal court was not on the merits. At the very outset, the Code reminds us that it must be “liberally construed *** according to the substantive rights of the parties.” This “liberal purpose is not to be frittered away by any narrow construction” of section 13 — 217. The majority erected an artificial wall between the Federal court system and our State court system. Within the Federal system, if a plaintiff files in the wrong venue, the United States district court “may transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” (28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988).) Within our State system, “[n]o action shall abate or be dismissed because commenced in the wrong venue if there is a proper venue to which the cause may be transferred.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 104(a).) Both systems have instituted mechanisms to ensure that a litigant, because of a procedural error in selecting venue, is not prevented from obtaining a disposition on the merits of his cause. In the case at bar, plaintiff is denied the opportunity of a trial on the merits of his action because he selected the wrong venue in the Federal system and then refiled the same action in the State system. The majority’s holding only serves to frustrate, rather than further, the purpose, philosophy and remedial nature of our savings statute. The majority justifies its narrow construction of section 13 — 217 by stating that if the legislature intended to save actions filed in the wrong venue it could have easily added “lack of venue” to section 13 — 217. What the majority overlooks is that the same legislature was also aware of the purpose and construction to be placed on the entire Code of Civil Procedure when it enacted section 1 — 106. It also overlooks the fact that the legislature was aware of the fact that it already saved actions filed in the wrong venue when it enacted section 2 — 104. It did not have to be saved again in section 13 — 217. I would therefore affirm the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court of Christian County and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. JUSTICE CLARK joins in this dissent.