Court Opinion

ID: 9962191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 21:19:14.102655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:59.350615
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 MIKE VAN VALKENBURG a/k/a
 MICHAEL ALLEN VAN                                  No. 85281-7-I
 VALKENBURG,
                                                    DIVISION ONE
               Respondent,
                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
               v.

 MESHESHA TADESSE, individually
 and on behalf of his marital community,

               Appellant.

 YET OIL AND BRAKE SERVICES
 LLC, a Washington limited liability
 company; LEO.RAH LLC d/b/a
 SASHA’S BIKINI ESPRESSO, a
 Washington limited liability company;
 and ANY OTHER OCCUPANTS OF
 THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT 2006
 RAINIER AVENUE SOUTH,
 SEATTLE, WA 98144,

               Defendants.

       BIRK, J. — Meshesha Tadesse appeals a judgment against him that found

him in unlawful detainer of a commercial property owned by Michael Van

Valkenburg and liable for unpaid obligations under the parties’ lease agreement.

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact, which in turn support

the trial court’s conclusions of law. We affirm and award reasonable attorney fees

and costs to Van Valkenburg pursuant to the lease’s attorney fees provision.
No. 85281-7-I/2

                                          I1

       Van Valkenburg owns seven to nine properties and has been leasing them

out for 35 years. One of these properties is the commercial property at issue in

this case, which is located in Seattle. In January 2020, Budget Batteries Inc., the

previous tenant, contacted Van Valkenburg to have Tadesse take over the lease

to the property. Van Valkenburg drafted a lease agreement and sent it to Tadesse,

who expressed interest in eventually converting the property from a service station

into a coffee shop. The lease was for a term of three years beginning on January

1, 2020. Absent Van Valkenburg’s written consent, the premises could be used

only for the business of a coffee shop and brake and oil repair shop. Under the

terms of the agreement, Van Valkenburg was required to maintain the structure of

the building, roof, common areas, and parking lot in good condition. Tadesse was

required to pay $3,000.00 per month for rent, pay 100 percent of all taxes levied

against the property, and reimburse Van Valkenburg for insurance premiums on

the property. The agreement prohibited Tadesse from subleasing any part of the

property without Van Valkenburg’s written consent. Under an option to renew

clause, Tadesse was entitled to a three year option to renew the lease only if he

was current on his obligations under the lease.        The agreement contains an

       1 The substantive facts in this opinion are drawn from the trial testimony and

the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact. Unchallenged findings of fact are
accepted as true on appeal. Tedford v. Guy, 13 Wn. App. 2d 1, 12, 462 P.3d 869
(2020). While neither party designated the trial exhibits for purposes of this appeal,
the trial exhibit list describes two exhibits admitted as attachments to Van
Valkenburg’s declaration, which are included in the clerk’s papers. Van
Valkenburg’s declaration was filed in support of his motion for order to show cause
why a writ of restitution should not be issued and motion for order directing
issuance of a writ of restitution.

                                          2
No. 85281-7-I/3

attorney fee provision, which states, “If legal notices, suit or action is instituted in

connection with any controversy arising out of this lease, the prevailing party shall

be entitled to recover, in addition to costs, reasonable attorney fees.”           Van

Valkenburg and Tadesse both signed, but did not separately include dates next to

their signatures, and a notary public notarized, signed, and dated the agreement

on February 1, 2020.

       According to a “Statement of Account” prepared by Van Valkenburg’s

counsel, Tadesse fairly consistently met his rent obligations only in 2021, paid the

annual insurance premium only one out of three times, and missed all three annual

property tax payments. Despite this history of missed payments, Van Valkenburg

agreed to renew Tadesse’s lease starting December 2022, increasing the rent to

$3,500.00 per month.

       Tadesse subleased part of the property at some point to a former barista in

his coffee shop and collected $2,700.00 in monthly rent from her, but never

remitted any portion of those payments to Van Valkenburg. On February 8, 2023,

Van Valkenburg gave notice to Tadesse, LEO.RAH LLC doing business as

“Sasha’s Bikini Espresso,” and all other occupants of the property that they were

in default of rent and other payment obligations totaling $36,135.38. The notice

told the occupants to pay the total amount in default or surrender the premises

within three days after service of the notice.

       On February 23, 2023, Van Valkenburg filed a complaint against Tadesse,

YET Oil and Brake Services LLC, and Sasha’s Bikini Espresso, alleging unlawful

                                           3
No. 85281-7-I/4

detainer and breach of contract. Tadesse filed his answer, a motion to dismiss

Van Valkenburg’s complaint, and a supporting affidavit, where he advanced a

forgery counterclaim based on the copy of the lease agreement Van Valkenburg

submitted and requested an award of $50,000.00. Tadesse further alleged he had

incurred expenses to repair the premises and install new equipment, he struggled

to pay rent as a result of COVID-19, and Van Valkenburg’s motivation for seeking

his eviction was to sell the property at a profit. Trial commenced on April 17, 2023

and lasted one day. Van Valkenburg, Tadesse, and Tadesse’s expert witness

James Green testified.

      Van Valkenburg denied being told about a leak in the roof and stated

Tadesse had told him that the roof was fixed. Van Valkenburg testified that in

December 2022 or early January 2023, Tadesse said he owed him $8,400.00 for

roof work, but Van Valkenburg never received any pictures of the work, information

on who did the work, or a receipt from a licensed contractor that the work was

completed. Van Valkenburg testified he learned Tadesse subleased the property

only after the sublessee reached out to him about a power problem on the property.

This was also the first time Van Valkenburg learned about a power issue on the

property. Van Valkenburg had not given Tadesse permission to sublease the

property.

      On April 19, 2023, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of

law, and final judgment. The trial court found Tadesse was in unlawful detainer of

the property, awarded a principal judgment of $32,135.38 to Van Valkenburg,

                                         4
No. 85281-7-I/5

dismissed Tadesse’s counterclaim with prejudice, and awarded attorney fees and

costs to Van Valkenburg. Tadesse appeals.

                                           II

         We review a trial court’s findings of fact in an unlawful detainer action for

substantial evidence. Tedford v. Guy, 13 Wn. App. 2d 1, 12, 462 P.3d 869 (2020).

We begin with a presumption in favor of the trial court’s findings and the appellant

has the burden of showing that a finding of fact is not supported by substantial

evidence. Lang Pham v. Corbett, 187 Wn. App. 816, 825, 351 P.3d 214 (2015).

Substantial evidence exists when there is a sufficient quantity of evidence to

persuade a fair-minded, rational person that a finding is true. Spencer v. Badgley

Mullins Turner, PLLC, 6 Wn. App. 2d 762, 794-95, 432 P.3d 821 (2018). Where

evidence conflicts, we need only determine “ ‘whether the evidence most favorable

to the prevailing party supports the challenged findings.’ ”         State v. Living

Essentials, LLC, 8 Wn. App. 2d 1, 14, 436 P.3d 857 (2019) (quoting Prostov v.

Dept. of Licensing, 186 Wn. App. 795, 820, 349 P.3d 874 (2015)). We will not

reweigh the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses on appeal. Id. at 15. After

reviewing the findings of fact, we then decide whether those findings support the

trial court’s conclusions of law. Tiller v. Lackey, 6 Wn. App. 2d 470, 484, 431 P.3d

524 (2018). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Tedford, 13 Wn. App. 2d

at 12.     Unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true on appeal.           Id.

Unchallenged conclusions of law become the law of the case. The-Anh Nguyen

v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn. App. 155, 163, 317 P.3d 518 (2014).

                                           5
No. 85281-7-I/6

                                         A

       Although not directly challenged by Van Valkenburg, we first address

Tadesse’s failure to specify the findings of fact he challenges in his opening brief.

       RAP 10.3(g) requires a separate assignment of error for each challenged

finding of fact with reference to the finding by number. The rules of appellate

procedure are to “be liberally interpreted to promote justice and facilitate the

decision of cases on the merits. Cases and issues will not be determined on the

basis of compliance or noncompliance with these rules except in compelling

circumstances where justice demands.” RAP 1.2(a). We wield discretion to

consider cases and issues on the merits under RAP 1.2. State v. Olson, 126

Wn.2d 315, 323, 893 P.2d 629 (1995). This discretion should be exercised unless

there are compelling reasons not to do so. Id. Where the nature of the appeal is

clear and the relevant issues are argued, citations provided, and the respondent

is not prejudiced, there is no compelling reason for an appellate court to not

consider the merits of the case or issue. Id.

       Tadesse’s opening brief failed to comply with RAP 10.3 because Tadesse

did not identify the specific findings of fact he is challenging. Courts hold pro se

litigants to the same standards as attorneys. In re Vulnerable Adult Pet. for Winter,

12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 844, 460 P.3d 667 (2020). But the issues Tadesse raised

were sufficiently clear for Van Valkenburg to discern and answer. This is evinced

by the fact that Van Valkenburg explicitly outlines in his brief the findings and

conclusions he believes Tadesse is challenging and addresses them accordingly.

                                          6
No. 85281-7-I/7

We exercise our discretion and consider the assignments of error that are properly

before us. We set forth the specific findings of fact we deem sufficiently challenged

below. The remaining findings of fact are accepted as true.

                                         B

       Tadesse challenges finding of fact 2, which states,

       On January 24, 2020, Plaintiff Michael Van Valkenburg and
       Meshesha Tadesse executed an agreement for the lease of the
       Property from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2022 (the “Lease”).

The lease agreement states the lease begins on January 24, 2020 and both Van

Valkenburg and Tadesse signed the agreement. Although neither Van Valkenburg

or Tadesse separately affixed dates to those signatures, the trial court was entitled

to believe that the date listed at the top of the lease agreement was the date of its

execution.   The date listed on the lease agreement and Van Valkenburg’s

testimony about the December 2022 lease renewal supports a three year lease

term from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2022. Tadesse made payments for

rent and one payment for annual insurance premiums along the terms laid out in

the lease agreement. Substantial evidence supports finding of fact 2.

       Tadesse challenges finding of fact 5, which states,

       On February 1, 2020, Defendant Tadesse had his signature
       witnessed and acknowledged by Notary Public Maricarmen Magana.

Van Valkenburg testified he believed he received the signed, notarized lease

agreement back from Tadesse and did not have the document notarized himself.

Tadesse denied having the lease agreement notarized in 2020.              On cross-

examination, Van Valkenburg’s counsel referenced a declaration Magana signed

                                         7
No. 85281-7-I/8

where she certified that she worked at a Well Fargo Bank branch in Seattle in 2020

and notarized documents as part of her job.         Magana stated she notarized

Tadesse’s signature on February 1, 2020 and her practice would have been to

obtain Tadesse’s identification, witness him sign the document, then notarize his

signature. This declaration was not admitted as a trial exhibit. But Tadesse agreed

that he made early 2020 payments from a Wells Fargo Bank branch in Seattle and

testified he had no reason to believe Magana was lying in that declaration. The

trial court was entitled to credit Van Valkenburg’s testimony and reject Tadesse’s.

Finding of fact 5 is supported by substantial evidence.

      Tadesse challenges finding of fact 6, which states,

      Between January 1, 2020 and November 30, 2022, Mr. Tadesse
      failed to pay amounts due under the Lease in the sum of $32,135.38.

Van Valkenburg testified that Tadesse never paid him any property taxes or

reimbursed for insurance premiums, other than a one time payment of $1,000.00.

Van Valkenburg testified at length about three of his bank statements from 2020,

2021, and 2022 that tracked the payments Tadesse made. These exhibits were

admitted into evidence. The trial court also admitted Van Valkenburg’s statement

of account that summarized the charges to Tadesse and payments made against

those charges from January 2020 to February 2023. Van Valkenburg stated this

ledger looked true and correct to the best of his knowledge. At the time the parties

renewed the lease in December 2022, Tadesse owed $32,135.38. By February

2023, Tadesse’s outstanding balance totaled $36,135.38.           Van Valkenburg

testified he eventually spoke with Tadesse about his outstanding balance and

                                         8
No. 85281-7-I/9

explained that based on the terms of the lease agreement, Tadesse was required

to pay the property taxes and reimburse him for the insurance payments, to which

Tadesse said he would. In 2020, Van Valkenburg reminded Tadesse once or twice

about the outstanding payments that he owed. Tadesse testified he made all

required payments under the lease including the rent he owed and disagreed that

he was obligated to pay the property taxes. The trial court declined to award any

amount due on the December 2022 lease renewal because Van Valkenburg “was

on notice that [Tadesse] was unable/unwilling to reliably and fully pay the rent.”

The trial court’s determination of $32,135.38 as the amount due is supported by

Van Valkenburg’s testimony and the statement of account.

      Tadesse argues on appeal that at the signing of the lease agreement,

Tadesse asked Van Valkenburg about property tax payments and insurance

premium costs and Van Valkenburg allegedly responded, “ ‘Do not worry about it;

just pay $3,000 every month.’ ” Even if these statements had been before the trial

court in evidence, the trial court would not have been required to credit them.

Finding of fact 6 is supported by substantial evidence.

      Tadesse challenges conclusions of law 2 and 3, which state,

      Mr. Tadesse breached the terms of the lease by failing to pay rent
      and property taxes, and failing to reimburse Mr. Van Valkenburg for
      insurance on the property.

      . . . . As a result of Mr. Tadesse’s breaches of the Lease, Mr. Van
      Valkenburg was damaged in the amount of $32,135.38.

Unchallenged finding of fact 3 states the lease agreement obligated Tadesse to

pay base rent of $3,000.00, property taxes due on the property, and to reimburse

                                        9
No. 85281-7-I/10

Van Valkenburg for property insurance. By failing to meet his payment obligations

under this agreement and accruing a total unpaid balance of $32,135.38, Tadesse

breached the terms of the lease agreement. Findings of fact 2, 3, and 6 support

conclusions of law 2 and 3.

      Tadesse challenges conclusion of law 5, which states,

      Mr. Tadesse neither paid rent nor quit the premises, placing him in
      unlawful detainer of the property.

A person who continues in possession of real property after defaulting by failing to

pay rent is liable for unlawful detainer. RCW 59.12.030(3); Sprincin King St.

Partners v. Sound Conditioning Club, Inc., 84 Wn. App. 56, 63, 925 P.2d 217

(1996). RCW 59.12.030(3) requires the landlord to provide notice in writing that

permits the tenant to pay the outstanding rent owed or the surrender the detained

premises three days after service of the notice. An unlawful detainer action is “a

summary proceeding for obtaining possession of real property.” Fed. Nat’l Mortg.

Ass’n v. Ndiaye, 188 Wn. App. 376, 382, 353 P.3d 644 (2015). “The action is a

narrow one, limited to the question of possession and related issues such as

restitution of the premises and rent.” Munden v. Hazelrigg, 105 Wn.2d 39, 45, 711

P.2d 295 (1985).

      In an unchallenged conclusion of law, the trial court noted that Tadesse was

validly served with the required statutory notice to pay rent or quit the premises

pursuant to RCW 59.12.030 and .040. Van Valkenburg testified he had the right

to give Tadesse three day notice when he had not paid rent and not paid back

property taxes, so “that’s the process we took.” Because Tadesse defaulted by

                                        10
No. 85281-7-I/11

failing to pay his rent and Van Valkenburg properly served Tadesse with the

required notice to vacate the property or pay, Tadesse was in unlawful detainer of

Van Valkenburg’s property. Findings of fact 2 and 6 and conclusion of law 4

support conclusion of law 5.

      Tadesse challenges conclusion of law 6, which states,

      At Mr. Tadesse’s request, the Court allowed Mr. Tadesse to pursue
      his counter-claim that the lease was a forgery, which the Court
      accepted as a fraud cause of action. The Court heard testimony from
      forensic document examiner, Mr. Green. The Court did not find that
      any forgery occurred.

Tadesse argues Van Valkenburg impermissibly altered the lease agreement after

he signed it and failed to provide a copy of the revised lease agreement to him. If

findings of fact are mischaracterized as conclusion of law, we analyze them as

findings of fact. Real Carriage Door Co., Inc. ex rel. Rees v. Rees, 17 Wn. App.

2d 449, 457, 486 P.3d 955 (2021).

      There are several handwritten notations on the lease agreement. Van

Valkenburg testified he added notes for himself and since his children have started

getting involved in his business, they can refer to the notes for help.       Van

Valkenburg testified he mistakenly wrote “2003” as the end date for the lease,

crossed out “2003” and corrected it to “2022.” This also led him to write “please

sign and send original back to me” at the bottom of that page. Next to the lease’s

option to renew clause, Van Valkenburg had written “3,500.00 per month amount,”

but could not remember if he wrote that in 2020. The remainder of the handwritten

notes are located at the bottom of the lease. At the time of the lease renewal in

                                        11
No. 85281-7-I/12

December 2022 and after having spoken on the phone with Tadesse, Van

Valkenburg testified that he wrote, “This is a NNN lease 3000.00 3 year” and

“3,500.00 for Mesh starting Dec 2022.” Van Valkenburg included his initials and

signatures after these notes at the end of the lease.

      Green is a forensic document examiner. Green testified he was asked to

compare the three page lease Tadesse reportedly received from Van Valkenburg

with the six page lease Van Valkenburg subsequently provided to Tadesse. Green

discussed several observations: the difference in page length between the two

documents, the difference between notation marks and the top of the first page

between the two documents, the lack of any handwritten notes in the three page

lease, and the lack of a notary block on the three page version. Those differences

led Green to conclude that further exploration should be considered.           Green

created a report containing his observations and conclusions, which the trial court

denied admission into evidence. On cross-examination, Green agreed that it is

possible that Tadesse “may have omitted a page or two” from the documents he

was given, and at least the signatures of the parties appear consistent.

      Substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s finding that no forgery

occurred.    Although Green noted some discrepancies between the two

agreements Tadesse provided him, several of the differences could be explained

by omitting pages from one of the agreements. Van Valkenburg described a

logical explanation for his handwritten notations on the lease. Tadesse’s actions

after December 2022 in paying $3,500.00 at the end of the month corroborate the

                                         12
No. 85281-7-I/13

renewal agreement’s terms as described by Van Valkenburg’s testimony and

handwritten notes on the original lease. The trial court did not erroneously enter

conclusion of law 6.

       The trial court’s challenged findings of fact and conclusions of law are

supported.

                                          C

       Tadesse makes several additional arguments.

       Tadesse cites case law discussing the standards for the admissibility of

evidence, including expert opinion, and accuses Van Valkenburg of intentionally

providing fabricated documents to mislead the court.            We read Tadesse’s

arguments not as challenging the admissibility of the evidence presented, but

rather the weight and persuasiveness given to what was admitted by the trial court.

We do not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses on appeal.

       Tadesse contends the trial court failed to ask questions of Van Valkenburg

and his expert witness. ER 614(b) permits the court to question witnesses called

by a party during a bench trial. But the rule does not require trial judges to question

witnesses, and Tadesse cites no authority to support this argument.

       Tadesse cites RCW 9A.60.010 and .020, the definitions section for the

criminal chapter on fraud and the criminal forgery statute, claiming Van Valkenburg

violated these statutes by refusing the fix damage to the property. However, the

trial court found, based on substantial evidence, that no forgery occurred. Further,

                                          13
No. 85281-7-I/14

these statutes fall outside scope of an unlawful detainer action and therefore our

review.

       Tadesse argues the trial court lacked impartiality, perhaps on account of

Tadesse being a minority, and the trial court was “harsh and inconsiderate” to him

and “acted contrary to the Judicial Canon.” While Tadesse does not point us to

specific statements by the trial court to support his argument, our review of the

record reveals that the trial judge exhibited patience and understanding when

explaining trial proceedings, the appropriate form of questions during cross-

examination, and objections to the admissibility of exhibits. Nothing in the record

demonstrates that the trial court exhibited bias against Tadesse’s theory of his

case or Tadesse individually.

       Tadesse contends Van Valkenburg avoided repairing the damaged

building’s roof and electrical panel as required under RCW 62A.2A-301. That

statute states, “Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a lease contract is

effective and enforceable according to its terms between the parties, against

purchasers of the goods and against creditors of the parties.” Id. This statute is

not applicable and Van Valkenburg’s testimony makes clear that these issues were

not brought to his attention or sufficiently supported by documentation for him to

take action. The trial court was entitled to credit this testimony over Tadesse’s.

       For the first time on appeal, Tadesse argues Van Valkenburg violated the

Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW. Because Tadesse did not make

                                        14
No. 85281-7-I/15

this argument before the superior court, we decline to address this claim. RAP

2.4(a). .

       For the first time on reply, Tadesse advances new bases for relief: the trial

court’s alleged violation of RCW 4.44.070 and .080 and that Van Valkenburg

allegedly committed perjury and fraud. We decline to reach those arguments.

RAP 10.3(c); Ainsworth v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 180 Wn. App. 52, 78 n.20,

322 P.3d 6 (2014) (“We will not consider issues argued for the first time in the reply

brief. The reply brief is limited to a response to the issues in the responding brief.

To address issues argued for the first time in a reply brief is unfair to the respondent

and inconsistent with the rules on appeal.” (citation omitted)).

       On April 5, 2024, after having filed his reply brief as authorized by RAP

10.1(b), Tadesse filed a “petition for extraordinary urgent action for injunction &

sanction,” an affidavit he signed and had notarized on April 4, 2024, and two

exhibits. In this filing, Tadesse discusses several issues he raised in his briefs,

such as the credibility of Van Valkenburg’s testimony and the trial court’s alleged

partiality. Tadesse also raises new issues, such as whether the trial court received

materials he submitted before trial. Tadesse’s affidavit and one of the attached

exhibits appear to be additional evidence outside our record. Under RAP 10.1(b),

the parties “may” files the briefs listed there, and under RAP 10.1(h), the court on

motion may direct the filing of other briefs. The rules contemplate that briefs other

than those listed in RAP 10.1(b) may be filed only with leave of court. Tadesse did

not obtain leave of court to file an additional brief as required by RAP 10.1(h).

                                          15
No. 85281-7-I/16

Further, RAP 9.11(a) allows this court to take additional evidence only if six criteria

are met. Tadesse does not address these six requirements. City of Seattle v.

Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, 17 Wn. App. 2d 21, 60, 484 P.3d 485 (2021). We

have reviewed Tadesse’s new filing and conclude it is both impermissible under

the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, in addition, does not raise any issue that

would affect the analysis of the arguments properly before the court.

                                          III

       Van Valkenburg requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1.

       “We will award attorney fees to the prevailing party ‘only on the basis of a

private agreement, a statute, or a recognized ground of equity.’ ” Buck Mountain

Owner’s Ass’n v. Prestwich, 174 Wn. App. 702, 731, 308 P.3d 644 (2013) (quoting

Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Cedarbrook, Inc., 52 Wn. App. 497, 506, 761 P.2d

77 (1988)).   “ ‘A contractual provision for an award of attorney’s fees at trial

supports an award of attorney’s fees on appeal under RAP 18.1.’ ” Thompson v.

Lennox, 151 Wn. App. 479, 491, 212 P.3d 597 (2009) (quoting W. Coast Stationary

Eng’rs Welfare Fund v. City of Kennewick, 39 Wn. App. at 477, 694 P.2d 1101

(1985)). Pursuant to RCW 4.84.330, the prevailing party in an action to enforce or

defend a contract is entitled to attorney fees and costs where the contract so

provides. Reeves v. McClain, 56 Wn. App. 301, 311, 783 P.2d 606 (1989). A

prevailing party is one in whose favor final judgment is rendered. RCW 4.84.330.

       Van Valkenburg is the prevailing party in this appeal.          The trial court

awarded Van Valkenburg “reasonable contractual attorneys’ fees and costs”

                                          16
No. 85281-7-I/17

based on the terms of the lease. Tadesse does not challenge that award and the

same provision entitles Van Valkenburg to reasonable attorney fees and costs on

appeal. These shall be determined by a commissioner of this court, subject to Van

Valkenburg’s compliance with RAP 18.1(d). Because Tadesse is not the prevailing

party, he is not entitled to the affirmative relief he requests.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

                                           17