Court Opinion

ID: 9519364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:15:02.055044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:18.971760
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court. We adhere to the view expressed in our previous opinion that the finding of the jury on the question of liability should not be disturbed. We followed Bowman v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 9 Ill.App.2d 182, 202-3, in deciding that the verdict on the question of damages was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Since our opinion was filed, the Supreme Court, in reversing our judgment in the Bowman ease and reinstating the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, decided that in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases we are limited to determining whether there was an evidentiary basis for the verdict, and that it is error to reweigh the evidence and set aside the verdict. We conclude that on the record in the case at bar we do not have the right to decide that the finding of the jury on damages is against the manifest weight of the evidence.  In the opinion we pointed out that an instruction similar to plaintiff’s instruction No. 12 on the subject of damages was held to be faulty in Collins v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co., 325 Ill. App. 572 (Abst.). Defendant objects to the giving of this instruction on the ground that the injuries for which damages might be awarded were not limited to injuries proved by a preponderance of the evidence to have resulted from the occurrence. Under the instruction the jury was authorized to bring in a verdict “for the full amount of the damages” resulting from any physical condition existing at the time of the trial and which might extend into the future without regard to any causal relationship between the throwing of the switch and the existence of those conditions. The misconception conveyed to the jury by the instruction was not dissipated by any other instruction. Our analysis (in the previous opinion) establishes the tenuous basis on which, an award of $50,000 in damages rests. In this situation instruction No. 12 was prejudicial to a fair trial on the question of damages. Because of the giving of this instruction defendant should have a new trial on the question of damages. Remandment of the cause for a new trial on the question of damages gives the parties the right to introduce evidence as to the employment and activities of Ole Jensen following the entry of the original judgment. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial on the question of plaintiff’s damages. Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions. FRIEND, J., concurs. BRYANT, J., took no part.