Court Opinion

ID: 9753519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:17:04.780915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:37.245035
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
The majority concludes that under our Supreme Court’s newly established “public policy exception” to the essence test, a public employer can be forced to reinstate an employee who is convicted for committing theft on the job. In so doing, the majority reaches a conclusion exactly opposite that reached by this Court under the so-called “core functions” exception to the essence test.1 I believe that under either test, a public employer cannot bargain away its authority to discharge an employee who has committed theft on the job.
A public employer must retain the exclusive authority to decide whether, and when, to terminate a public employee who has committed an act of theft while working in a public service job. This point has been made by the Supreme Court on several occasions. In City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 447, 562 Pa. 438, 448, 756 A.2d 1107, 1112 (2000), the Supreme Court held that a public employer “cannot bargain away its right” to discharge an employee who has stolen from the employer or “from a third party while he was working in the employ of the [cjity.” City of Easton reiterated the Supreme Court’s earlier holdings in this area of law. See, e.g., Greene County v. District 2, United Mine Workers of America, 578 Pa. 347, 362, 852 A.2d 299, 308 (2004) (noting that “[ujnlike private sector employers, public employers are ultimately responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of our communities.”); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Independent State Stores Union, 520 Pa. 266, 553 A.2d 948 (1989) (holding that the Liquor Control Board did not bargain away its right to discharge an employee who falsified records). City of Easton, Greene County and Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board all predate the establishment of the public policy exception in Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Association, PSEA/NEA, 595 Pa. 648, 939 A.2d 855 (2007) (Westmoreland I). Westmoreland I did not render this precedent irrelevant, a point acknowledged by the majority.
The majority holds that
the underlying principle remains that there is a clear public policy against theft, and, more specifically, a public policy against the employment of thieves by [public employers].
City of Bradford v. Teamsters Local Union No. 110, 25 A.3d 408, 415 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011). Nevertheless, the majority believes that Taylor, convicted of theft committed in the course of his work for a public employer, can be reinstated, reasoning *417that the public policy test focuses not upon the public employee’s conduct but, rather, upon the award itself. Only if a reinstatement poses an “unacceptable risk that a clear public policy will be undermined if the award is implemented” will it be vacated under the public policy exception. Id. at 415. It follows, according to the majority, that the arbitrator can consider “the particular circumstances of the case and any attendant aggravating or mitigating factors.” Id. at 415. I disagree with this précis of the public policy exception to the essence test.
By directing a review of mitigating factors, the focus is on the conduct of the employee, not the award, notwithstanding the majority’s assertion to the contrary. A consideration of mitigating factors undermines the public policy against employment of thieves because it obligates the public employer to excuse some acts of theft committed by employees who do not hold a position of “trust.” There is no precedent, whether Greene, Easton or Westmoreland, to suggest that the public employee must be in a position of trust, whatever that means, in order for the public policy exception to the essence test to be implicated.
Evaluating an arbitration award according to the “particular circumstances” of the public employee’s act of theft, or other act that violates a well-defined, dominant public policy, eviscerates the public policy exception.
First, “particular circumstances” is no test at all. It places no meaningful limit on the arbitrator’s discretion, who can be guided solely by sympathy. Indeed, Taylor does present a sympathetic case. His impulsive act to seize what looked like abandoned property does not even seem very criminal. Had I been in charge of human resources for the City of Bradford, I might have recommended a discipline other than discharge. However, the public policy exception confers the choice of discipline solely upon the public employer. City of Easton, 562 Pa. at 447-48, 756 A.2d at 1112.
Second, a “particular circumstances” review focuses on what seems fair to the individual employee and not on the needs of the public employer. The City of Bradford believes that Taylor’s discharge was necessary to maintain discipline among its work force and to fulfill its duty to the public. Taylor’s reinstatement means that the City must tolerate some acts of theft and that it will be forced to bargain away its discretion in this regard. It is for the public employer, and not an arbitrator or this Court, to decide whether a public employee who commits theft can be reinstated.
It has been well established that a public employer cannot bargain away its right to terminate an employee who has committed an on-the-job theft, and I do not believe the new public policy exception altered this principle. The arbitrator’s award granting reinstatement to Taylor contravened that public policy, requiring that the arbitrator’s award be vacated.
Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the trial court and vacate the Arbitrator’s award as violating public policy.
Judge BROBSON joins in this dissenting opinion.

. See City of Bradford v. Teamsters Local Union No. 110, 901 A.2d 1103 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), reversed, 596 Pa. 353, 943 A.2d 263 (2008) (City of Bradford I).