Court Opinion

ID: 9850751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:22.090099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:42.838771
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring specially.
Although I concur in the result of the majority opinion, I write to fully explain my reasons. In Georgia, an aggravating circumstance “ ‘must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’ ”9 For this reason, I conclude that when two aggravating circumstances are alleged by the state, but they in fact only illuminate one reason for selecting the defendant’s case as a case eligible for the death penalty, such so-called “double-counting” is improper. Moreover, because I further conclude that the aggravating circumstances at issue in this case do not merely duplicate a single reason for distinguishing Simpkins’ conduct from that of defendants who do not receive the death penalty, but instead serve to elucidate two separate *226reasons for justifying the imposition of a more severe sentence on Simpkins, I find no improper double-counting of aggravating circumstances and therefore concur in the majority opinion.10
Decided July 14, 1997.
Garrett & Gilliard, Michael C. Garrett, Melissa S. Padgett, for appellant.
Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, Thurhert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Beth Attaway, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
In this regard, the facts of the murder and armed robbery committed by Simpkins would authorize a jury to find that Simpkins was willing to commit a capital felony, armed robbery, that involved the prospect of violence to a person, and that he was then willing to eliminate the witness to that offense. OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (2).* 11 These considerations are, I believe, what this Court meant in McClain v. State12 in describing the (b) (2) aggravating circumstance as relating to the “manner in which the victim was killed.”13 Second, the facts of the murder and armed robbery would authorize a jury to find that Simpkins was willing to commit murder for pecuniary gain. OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (4). Although the evidence probably will authorize a jury to find these two aggravating factors in the vast majority of armed robbery-murder cases, and although these aggravating factors arise from the same conduct in this case, the aggravating circumstances reveal different characteristics of the defendant and his crimes, and each aggravating circumstance genuinely serves to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.14

 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 877 (103 SC 2733, 77 LE2d 235) (1983); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 244 (108 SC 546, 98 LE2d 568) (1988).

 See generally Henderson v. Dugger, 925 F2d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that, in Florida, there is no impermissible double-counting of aggravating circumstances when “the same facts .. . reveal different characteristics of the crime”).

 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 221, n. 10, 224 (96 SC 2909, 49 LE2d 859) (1976).

 267 Ga. 378, 387 (7) (477 SE2d 814) (1996).

 Id.

 Further, I can discern no reason why a jury would not be authorized to find that a defendant acted with dual motives in committing a crime, here monetary gain and the elimination of a witness. Moreover, each of these motives serves independently to justify the imposition of the death penalty.