Court Opinion

ID: 9885803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 14:07:31.908465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:23:19.288210
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1239

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                               ABIMAEL BATISTA.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The probationer, Abimael Batista, appeals from an order

 finding him in violation of his probation but continuing

 probation on the conditions then in effect.            On appeal, Batista

 argues that the hearing judge's finding of a violation was an

 abuse of discretion.       Seeing no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

       Background.     Batista was sentenced to probation after he

 was convicted of four counts of indecent assault and battery on

 a child under fourteen.        Batista's probation terms contained a

 "no contact" provision, which prohibited him from having any

 contact with the victim and also required him to stay at least

 one hundred yards away from her at all times.             On December 30,

 2021, a probation violation notice was issued to Batista after

 the victim reported encountering him in the checkout area of a

 store roughly one week earlier.
      At the hearing, after the victim testified about the

incident, Batista agreed through counsel that he was in the

store at the time, but he argued that he took reasonable steps

to leave after becoming aware of the victim's presence.

Batista's fiancée testified that Batista remained at the

checkout for two to three minutes after seeing the victim.      The

judge credited the fiancée's testimony and thus found that

Batista had failed to take reasonable steps to end the encounter

as quickly as possible.   Because this was Batista's first

violation in five years, the judge ordered that Batista be

reprobated without any modification in terms.    Batista appealed.

      Discussion.   A no contact provision in a probation

condition "is reasonably understood to impose an obligation on

the defendant to avoid encountering or engaging [a protected

person] in any way; to refrain from attendance at places where

proximity to, and thus an encounter with, [a protected person]

is likely; and promptly to remove himself from such proximity if

an encounter arises unexpectedly."    Commonwealth v. Kendrick,

446 Mass. 72, 76-77 (2006).   If "inadvertent and unavoidable

proximity" occurs, then a defendant should "remove[] himself

from the situation as quickly as reasonably possible."      Id. at

78.   See Commonwealth v. Stoltz, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 644

(2009).

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     Batista argues that the judge abused his discretion by

concluding that it was unreasonable for Batista to remain at the

checkout to finish paying after discovering the victim was

nearby.    We are not persuaded.   In a probation revocation

hearing, the issue to be determined is not guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt but, rather, whether the probationer more

likely than not violated the conditions of his probation.      See

Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 324 (2013).     The court

has also said that determining whether a violation occurred

involves a measure of discretion.      See Commonwealth v. Bukin,

467 Mass. 516, 519-520 (2014).

     In announcing his decision, the judge indicated that he was

crediting the fiancée's testimony that Batista lingered at the

checkout for "two, maybe three minutes" after noticing the

victim.1    Batista argues in his brief that, once he became aware

of the victim, he completed his transaction and "immediately"

left the premises.    However, Batista's subjective view of the

encounter was but one factor out of several for the judge to

consider.    The judge could credit the fiancée's estimation of

1 The fiancée also testified that even after Batista noticed the
victim, "he had to stay because his debit card was still in the
machine." The judge was not required to credit this portion of
her testimony or to agree that Batista "had to" stay (as
opposed, for example, to leaving and allowing the fiancée to
retrieve the card). Nor was he required to find that the simple
act of retrieving the card was what led Batista to remain near
the victim for two to three minutes.

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the time and find that Batista remained for two to three

minutes.    Based on this finding, the judge could properly view

Batista's conduct as unreasonable.     Accordingly, seeing no abuse

of discretion or other error, we affirm the order finding

Batista in violation of his probation conditions and reprobating

him.

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Milkey, Blake &
                                        Sacks, JJ.2),

                                      Clerk

Entered: October 6, 2023.

2   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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