Court Opinion

ID: 9418099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:08:30.430494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:55.522188
License: Public Domain

Mb’. Justice McKenna,
dissenting:
J am unable to agree with the opinion -and judgment of the court. I think this case cannot be distinguished in principle from Muhlker v. Harlem Railroad Co., 197 U. S. 544; Burrell v. New York & Harlem Railroad Co. and Kierns v. New York & Harlem Railroad Co., 198 U. S. 390. On the authority.of those cases the judgment- in this case should be reversed. Those cases ..were determined by Story v. Elevated Railroad, 90 N. Y. 122, and Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated Railroad Co., 104 N. Y. 268; known as the Elevated Railroad cases. The structures there described, are what are known as elevated railroads, a,nd may be presumed to be familiar, and a structure of substantially similar' character was the subject- of the controversy in Muhlker v. Harlem Railroad Co., Burrell v. Same and Kierns v. Same. Its characteristic was elevation Above .the surface of the street, and this was the point of the decisions. - Let me quotefrbm.the Story.case: “But what,”-said the court, *557“is.the extent of this easement?- What rights or privileges are secured thereby? Generally, it may be said, it is to have the street kept open, so that from it access may be had to the lot and light. and air furnished across the open way. The street'occupies the- surface, -and to its uses the rights of the adjacent lots are subordinate, but above the surface there can be no lawful obstruction to the access of light and air, to the detriment of. the abutting'owner.”' And again, it was said that the agreement — grant from the city — was “that if the grantee would buy the lot abutting on the street he might have the use of light and air over the open space [italics mine] designated as a street.” And yet-, again (and the passage was quoted in the Muhlker case, page 566): “Before any interest passed to the city the owner of the land had from it .the benefit of air and light. The public purpose of a street requires of the soil the surface only.” The Lahr [case repeated the principle. And it was said in the Muhlker case, in effect, that the disregard of the distinction between the surface of a street and the space above the surface would leave “ remaining no vital element of the Elevated Railroad cases.”
It may be: said there was a qualification made in those cases and recognized in the Muhlker case, that it was not alone the elevation of a -structure above the surface, but the elevation of one“uselessfor general street purposes.” I may accept the limitation. The structure in the: cáse at bar comes within the charactérization. It is useless -for general street purposes. .It obstructs the frontage of abutting lots and affords ño access to or from them in any proper - sense. There is a descent by stairs- from it- to the street below, hut for pedestrians only— necessarily not for vehicles. But there is a like descent by stairs from elevated railroads to streets below, but this did. not save'the roads from-liability for-abutting property. '
It must be borne in mind that this case is not disposed of by' making a ..contrast between the passage of a railroad and the traffic on a. street. The contrast is catching and only seems important. In New York a railroad is a street use and can be *558imposed on the surface of a street without liability for consequential damages, and this even if it be a steam railroad. Fobes v. R. W. & O. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 505. The distinction, therefore, was'necessary to be made between the surface.and the open space over the surface. And we have, seen that this distinction was' noted in the cases and determined their judgment. In other words, the use of a street by a railroad was decided to be a proper street use, and, therefore, whether put upon the. surface or above the surface, retained that character. In either'place it-was a proper streetMsé and damages could only have been consequent to the elevation of the road above the surface, to which, to quote again the Story case, the “ public purpose of a street” attached only.
The Elevated Railroad cases get significance from the arguments of counsel. Such arguments, of course, are not necessarily a test of the decision. But they may be. The opinion may respond accurately to them. We find from the report of the Story case that the argument of Mr. Evarts for the plaintiff was that “a permanent structure above the surface, and an encroachment thereby, and. by its . use upon the appurtenant easement of the open frontage held by the abutting proprietors, was not covered by they original condemnation for thé public easement,. which was limited tó a maintenance of such open streets and perpetual frontage. People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Craig v. Rochester R. R. Co., 39 N. Y. 404.”
Mr. .Choáte, also for the property owners, submitted-the following: “The abutting owners on the streets have an interest in the nature of property for all' time in the streets above their surface, and in having them kept open and unobstructed forever, of which they cannot, be deprived without being compensated.” The . contentions" express • the invocation of the property owner of the"court,'and the court responded to and-sustained it. • Is not that response rejected in the casé at bar? The structure-’in the case towers as high as a house of five stories and is planted on columns, the size and. strength and number of which can easily be imagined.- - Does it need any *559comment to describe its effect? The plaintiffs have really no access to it from their land or from any building that may be put upon their land, because they may not bridge the intervening gap. They have no other access to' it but that which I have described. The public has no access from it to plaintiffs’ property but that which I have- described.
The buildings that stood upon the land when the- structure was built were practically under, its shadow.1 Any buildings that may-be erected will be equally so. “To get above it,” plaintiffs’ counsel asserte, “the abuttor must build up five stories,” and it is only from such elevation that he may contemplate the traffic that passes his premises, and must pass his premises. And even then, counsel also asserts, light can only reach the abuttor “through a slit ten feet widé between-his eaves and the edge of -the structure.” And to this measure his right to an'unobstructed frontage, his right to'unobstructed light and air, has been reduced. Is it possible that the law can see' no legal detriment in this, no impairment of the abut-tor’s grant from the city, no right to.compensation?
I am not insensible of the strength of the reasoning- by which this court sustains that conclusion, but certainly all lawyers would hot assent- to it. Indeed one must be a lawyer to assent to it. At times there .seems .to be a legál result which takes no account of the obviously practical result. At times there seems to come an antithesis between legal sense and common sense.
I say this in no reproach of the law. and its. judgments. I say it in no reproach to the opinion of-the court. I recognize it proceeds upon distinctions which are intelligible, although *560I do not assent to them. My purpose is only to' express the view. that, the legal opinion which I hold'has justification in the serious practical consequences, that the plaintiffs in error-have sustained,'by the violation of a right which this court said, in the Muhlker case, citing Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N. J. Eq., 481, was founded in- the “ common practice and sense of the world.”,
From my standpoint, what the courts of ..States other than New York have decided is of no consequeñcé- to thé pending controversy, and I take no time therefore to,- dispute the pertinence of their citation to justify the'structure of which plaintiffs complain.
I ain authorized to say that Me. Justice Day concurs in this

 When the original plaintiff, George Sauer, became the owner of the prop' erty there were standing upon it certain frame, buildings, which had .been used ás a pleasure-resort. -In 1890 he enlarged and improved the buildings at great expense and occupied them at the time of the erection of the structure in controversy. These buildings were destroyed in 1897 by fire, and the land is now vacant. And it may be noted that Sauer having died pending this writ of error, his administratrix and heirs have been substituted as parties plaintiff.