Court Opinion

ID: 9636454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:29:31.326993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:46.177167
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s order of contempt. For the reasons that follow, I would reverse the decision of the trial court’s order of contempt and vacate the contempt award.
¶ 2 The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides, inter alia, that “Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press_” U.S. Const, amend. I. It is clear that at the very least, Appellants, in their capacity as reporters, have a qualified First Amendment privilege. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972).
¶ 3 In the instant case, the Majority concluded that the Commonwealth overcame Appellants’ qualified First Amendment privilege. I disagree. In United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, Cuthbertson v. CBS, Inc., 454 U.S. 1056, 102 S.Ct. 604, 70 L.Ed.2d 594 (1981), the Third Circuit, citing its earlier decision in United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 358-359 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113, 101 S.Ct. 924, 66 L.Ed.2d 842 (1981), reiterated that before a reporter may be compelled to disclose confidential information, the following criteria must be met:
First, the movant must demonstrate that he has made an effort to obtain the information from other sources. Second, he must demonstrate that the only access to the information sought is through the journalist and her sources. Finally, the movant must persuade the Court that the information sought is crucial to the claim.
Id. at 195-196; See also Davis v. Glanton, 705 A.2d 879, 885 (Pa.Super.1997).
¶ 4 A review of the record, however, is devoid of evidence submitted by the Commonwealth that the information sought is crucial to its case. A review of exchanges that transpired prior to trial indicate that the court was requiring Appellants to disclose the verbatim or substantially verbatim statements of Mr. Tyson; then, it was “up to [counsel for the Commonwealth] to determine how crucial [these statements] are.” N.T. 12/13/00 at 9. The court added that after the statements were disclosed, Commonwealth counsel could “decipher whether she wants to use these statements or not....” Id. at 12. As argued by Appellants, “the trial court never required the Commonwealth to demonstrate what in the published statements proved that there were crucial unpublished statements or why the speculated unpublished infor*336mation was crucial....” Brief of Appellants at 27-28. ■ Thus, it is evident that the Commonwealth failed to meet its initial burden of establishing that the information sought was sufficiently crucial “to override the claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure.” Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680, 92 S.Ct. 2646.
¶ 5 I believe that the Majority opinion incorrectly further restricts the First Amendment rights which are so important to freedom of speech and of the press.3
¶ 6 Contrary to the decision of the Majority, I would also find that the Pennsylvania Shield Law applies and would not permit the trial court to compel the disclosure of the criminal defendants’ non-published verbatim statements. For example, the Pennsylvania Shield Law provides:
No person engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general circulation.. .for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing news shall be required to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation for any government unit.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5942(a).
¶ 7 While the Majority is correct in its citation of In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 40, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963), for the proposition that “source” of information includes “documents, inanimate objects and all sources of information”, the Majority fails to follow the law as enunciated in Taylor.
¶ 8 Instead, the Majority concludes that the Pennsylvania Shield Law does not apply and bases its decision on civil cases. For example, Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987), cited by the Majority, is actually a defamation case. Since the instant case involves application of the criminal law and thus principles of criminal law, I would find that In re Taylor, supra, provides the legal framework for this Court to conclude that the Pennsylvania Shield Law does apply, and thus the Commonwealth would not be entitled to the unpublished information.
¶ 9 Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court order which found Appellants to be in contempt.4'

. "Let it be impressed upon your minds, let it be instilled into your children, that the liberty of the press is the palladium of all the civil, political, and religious rights.” Junius.

. Since I find the above determination of Appellants’ First Amendment claim to be dispos-itive of this appeal, I have no occasion to address the merits of Appellants’ remaining claims. See Feden v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 746 A.2d 1158, 1163 (Pa.Super.2000) (declining to address allegations of error obviated by court's disposition of prior issue on appeal).