Court Opinion

ID: 9673203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:08:14.170835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.693633
License: Public Domain

O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent on points of error two and three. We should reverse and remand for a trial de novo.
*623The version of Texas Government Code § 54.010 in effect at the time of this appeal was:
(a) At the conclusion of any hearing conducted by a master and on the preparation of a master’s report, the master shall transmit to the referring court all papers relating to the ease, with the master’s signed and dated report.
(b) After the master’s report has been signed, the master shall give to the parties participating in the hearing notice of the substance of the report. The master’s report may contain the master’s findings, conclusions or recommendations. The master’s report must be in writing in a form as the referring court may direct. The form may be a notation on the referring court’s docket sheet.
(c) Notice of the right of appeal to the judge of the referring court shall be given to all parties. This notice may be given at the hearing or by posting the notice inside or outside of the courtroom of the referring court or otherwise as the referring court directs.
Tex. Gov’t Code § 54.010 (1998)1 (emphasis added.)
Section 54.010 required the associate judge to give the parties (1) written notice of the substance of the master’s report, and (2) notice of the right of appeal to the judge of the referring court. Waddell v. Huckabee, 807 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding). The associate judge did neither.
The majority seems to excuse the associate judge’s errors by blaming Gus for not attending the hearing on November 30. The majority seems to imply that if Gus had been present at that hearing, the associate judge would have given him the required statutory notice. Nothing in section 54.010 exempts the judge from giving notice if one of the parties is not present at the hearing.
Written Report
Gus Robles contends the associate judge did not prepare and sign a written report, and therefore did not provide the parties with notice of the substance of his report. I agree. The majority holds that the docket notation “divorce granted per record” was sufficient under section 54.010(b) as a written report of the substance of the master’s findings. I disagree. In Waddell, 807 S.W.2d at 458, we held:
The docket entry merely recites that a record was made and that the matter was taken under advisement_ [S]ince recommendations were not filed by the master, relator was deprived of her statutory right to appeal the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the master to Judge Huckabee.
Here, the associate judge did not file a written report with the trial court judge. Thus, the appellant was deprived of this statutory right to appeal the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the master.
The majority holds the docket notation “granted per record” can transform the associate judge’s oral statement at the hearing into a “written report.” I do not believe the docket notation “granted per record” meets the statutory requirements of written report required by section 54.010. If the associate judge had written the substance findings on the docket sheet, only then would the docket sheet notation meet the section 54.010(c) requirements of a written report.
The majority ignores the holding of Stein v. Stein, 868 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) by simply stating that the difference between the two cases was that the associate judge in this case “did prepare a proper written report by making a signed entry on the trial court’s docket sheet.” That holding again assumes that the notation “divorce granted per record” is the same as a written report.
Notice of Right to Appeal to Referring Court
Gus Robles contends the associate judge did not give him notice of his right to appeal to the referring court. I agree.
*624-640The majority notes that the associate judge could have given notice of the right to appeal by one of three ways: oral notice, written notice, or by posting a written notice inside or outside of the referring court. The majority admits the associate judge did not make an oral statement on the record regarding the notice of the right to appeal. However, the majority states that the record does not show if a notice of the right to appeal was posted. If the notice of appeal had been posted, the posting itself would have been in writing. If it had been in writing, either of the parties could have secured a copy of the written notice that was posted and included it in the record. There is no written notice of the right to appeal in this record.
The majority’s actual holding is that when a party does not appear at a hearing, the party waives the statutory requirements of the notice of right to appeal contained in section 54.010. The only problem with that holding is there is no support for it in the case law or in section 54.010.
The majority seems to fault Gus for Sling a detailed notice of appeal on January 4, 1994, the same day the trial court adopted the master’s report and rendered judgment. The majority concludes that Gus must have had some notice of the associate judge’s findings because the notice of appeal was a detailed challenge to those findings. I agree that Gus filed a detailed notice challenging the master’s findings on January 4, but that is not the issue. The issue is when Gus learned about the master’s finding — did he learn about the findings in time to file a timely notice of appeal? The answer is no.
Under the provisions of the Family Code, Gus was required to file a notice of appeal within three days from the date of the associate judge’s report, that is by December 3, 1993. The only document in the record that contains the associate judge’s findings is the reporter’s record from the November 4,1993 hearing. The court reporter transcribed the record from that hearing on December 7, 1993, four days after the deadline for Gus to file notice of appeal. Thus, Gus learned the details of the associate judge’s findings when it was too late for him to file a timely notice of appeal. The notice of appeal Gus filed on January 4, 1994, has no bearing on the issue of whether Gus received timely notice of the associate judge’s findings.
I would reverse and remand for a trial de novo.

. Act of April 30, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 148, § 2.74, 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 534, 569, repealed by Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 2, 1995 Tex.Gen.Laws 113, 282.