Court Opinion

ID: 9949521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 20:10:11.918657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:36.445170
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Lacamera, 2024-Ohio-899.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                   CASE NO. 2023-T-0049

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                 Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                   Court of Common Pleas

FRANCIS LACAMERA,
                                                 Trial Court No. 2021 CR 01073
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                              OPINION

                                      Decided: March 11, 2024
                                        Judgment: Affirmed

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Martin Yavorcik, 940 Windham Court, Suite 7, Youngstown, OH 44512 (For Defendant-
Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.

        {¶1}     Francis Lacamera, appellant herein, appeals the judgment of the Trumbull

County Court of Common Pleas convicting him, after a jury trial, of one count of felony-

three Gross Sexual Imposition, one count of felony-one Rape of a child under 13 years

old, and eight counts of felony-one Rape. Appellant challenges the sufficiency and the

manifest weight of the evidence upon which the convictions were premised. For the

reasons discussed in this opinion, we affirm.
       {¶2}   In December 2021, the Trumbull County Grand Jury returned a ten-count

indictment charging appellant with: Gross Sexual Imposition with a Sexually Violent

Predator Specification, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) and

(C)(2) as well as R.C. 2941.148 (“Count One”); Rape with a Sexually Violent Predator

Specification, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B),

R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(c), and R.C. 2941.148 (“Count Two”); and eight counts of Rape with

a Sexually Violent Predator Specification, felonies of the first degree, in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(2) and (B) and R.C. 2941.148 (“Counts Three through Ten”).

       {¶3}   Appellant pleaded not guilty and a jury trial commenced. The following

testimony and evidence was adduced at trial:

       {¶4}   In January 2020, appellant moved in with the juvenile victim, S.S. (born

February 15, 2008), her mother, and her younger brother. Shortly thereafter, S.S. was

watching a movie with appellant when he touched the victim’s vagina outside of her

clothes. S.S. advised appellant to stop, and he did. S.S. was 12 years old at the time.

       {¶5}   Several days later, S.S.’s mother was again out of the house when appellant

directed her to go upstairs of the residence and disrobe. S.S. viewed appellant as an

adult figure and consequently followed his instructions. Appellant inserted his penis into

S.S.’s vagina. She advised him to stop; S.S. stated she was crying, scared, and felt pain

in her vagina. After the episode, appellant left the room leaving S.S. to “clean [her]self

up.” Appellant told S.S. not to tell her mother because it was their “little secret.”

       {¶6}   According to S.S., such episodes occurred throughout the time appellant

lived with her and her family. Indeed, she asserted the assaults persisted “almost

everyday,” “like, seven days a week.” When asked if she felt threatened by appellant,

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Case No. 2023-T-0049
S.S. stated, “In a way, yeah. Just the, go upstairs now, like, what he would say kind of

made me feel threatened.” S.S. underscored she never wanted appellant to rub her

vagina or for appellant to insert himself into her vagina.

       {¶7}   Approximately a month after appellant and S.S.’s mother broke up, S.S.

was invited to appellant’s apartment. Appellant advised S.S. that his children were

coming over, and she was close with his kids. S.S. asserted she viewed them as siblings.

When she arrived, however, appellant’s children were not there. Appellant again had

vaginal intercourse with S.S. against her wishes. She was 13 years old at the time.

       {¶8}   About a year later, S.S. told a friend about the incidents. She testified she

waited to speak about the encounters due to fear of what people would say and whether

they would believe her.     S.S. then disclosed the incidents to her mother after which a

police report was filed. S.S. underwent a sexual assault examination.

       {¶9}   Monique Malmer, a registered nurse practitioner for Akron Children’s

Hospital Child Advocacy Center, conducted the examination of S.S. Ms. Malmer stated

she had conducted over three thousand examinations for sexual abuse. S.S. related the

alleged sexual abuse she had suffered, which echoed the above facts. During the genital

examination, Ms. Malmer located a transection of the hymen tissue, which she stated was

confirmatory of penetration trauma for sexual abuse.

       {¶10} Various other witnesses testified for the state and in appellant’s defense,

which testimony will be further developed below, as necessary.

       {¶11} At the conclusion of evidence, the jury convicted appellant of each count in

the indictment.    After a hearing was held relating to the Sexually Violent Predator

specifications, the trial court found appellant not guilty of those specifications.

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       {¶12} The trial court sentenced appellant on Count One, 48 months of

imprisonment; on Count Two, a minimum of 25 years up to a maximum of life

imprisonment; and on Counts Three through Ten, 10 years of imprisonment on each

offense. The trial court ordered each of the terms to be served concurrently for an

aggregate prison term of 25 years to life. Appellant was also classified as a Tier III Sex

Offender and Child Victim Offender. He now appeals assigning the following as error:

              [1.] The trial court erred in allowing a conviction where it was
              not supported by sufficient evidence.

              [2.] The trial court erred in entering judgment on the verdict
              against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶13} When an appellant challenges both the sufficiency and the weight of the

state’s evidence in an appeal, a reviewing court need only address the manifest weight

argument because the conclusion that a verdict is consistent with the manifest weight

necessarily includes the additional holding that it is also supported by sufficient evidence.

State v. Masters, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-037, 2020-Ohio-864, ¶ 17.

       {¶14} With this point in mind, a court considering a challenge to the manifest

weight of the evidence reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether, in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State

v. Schlee, 11th Dist. Lake No. 93-L-082, 1994 WL 738452, *5 (Dec. 23, 1994). In other

words, the court must evaluate conflicting testimony, review rational inferences that may

be drawn from the evidence, and evaluate the strength of the conclusions drawn

therefrom. See, e.g., State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

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Case No. 2023-T-0049
A challenge to the weight of the evidence requires a court to consider whether the state

met its burden of persuasion. State v. McFeely, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2008-A-0067,

2009-Ohio-1436, ¶ 78.

       {¶15} Bearing the foregoing in mind, appellant argues: (1) the delayed reporting

of the incidents as well as S.S.’s testimony that she only felt threatened by appellant “in

a way” rendered her credibility suspect and thus militates strongly against the verdict; (2)

his expert, Dr. Stephen Guertin, testified that the trauma caused to S.S.’s hymen could

have been from a variety of occurrences, not merely sexual assaults or intercourse; and

(3) if S.S. feared appellant or was at all threatened by him, there is no credible basis for

her to visit and remain in contact with him via cell phone.

       {¶16} Appellant does not challenge his conviction for Gross Sexual Imposition;

instead, he focuses upon the evidence as it related to the elements of rape. R.C. 2907.02

governs the crime of rape and provides, in relevant part:

              (A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another
              who is not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of
              the offender but is living separate and apart from the offender,
              when any of the following applies:

              ***

              (b) The other person is less than thirteen years of age,
              whether or not the offender knows the age of the other person.

              ***

              (2) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another
              when the offender purposely compels the other person to
              submit by force or threat of force.

       {¶17} R.C. 2907.01(A) defines “sexual conduct” as:

              vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal
              intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons
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Case No. 2023-T-0049
              regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion,
              however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument,
              apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of
              another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete
              vaginal or anal intercourse.

       {¶18} Accordingly, to prove Count Two, the state had to establish, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that appellant engaged in sexual conduct with S.S., who was not his

spouse, and that S.S. was less than 13 years old. Moreover, to sustain Counts Three

through Ten, the state had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant engaged

in sexual conduct with S.S. and appellant purposely compelled S.S. to submit by force or

threat of force.

       {¶19} Appellant initially attacks S.S.’s credibility regarding her perception of

appellant as a threat. Appellant diminishes S.S.’s testimony that she felt threatened “in a

way.” This argument addresses the “threat of force” prong of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).

       {¶20} S.S. testified that she viewed appellant as a father figure and referred to

him as “dad.” And, during a police interview, appellant stated he considered himself a

father figure to S.S. It is also of some significant import that during the multiple assaults,

S.S. was between 12 and 13 years old. That both appellant and the victim acknowledged

the former assumed the role of a parental figure over the victim emphasizes everyone’s

mutual awareness of the authoritative position appellant held in S.S.’s life.

       {¶21} Given the filial duties of obedience and respect a child owes a parent or

parental figure, courts have acknowledged the same degree of force or threats of force is

not required as in cases where the defendant does not hold such a privileged position.

State v. Borecky, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-197, 2008-Ohio-3890, ¶ 25; see also State

v. Bolling, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20225, 2005-Ohio-2509, ¶ 41, citing State v.

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Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988). The Supreme Court of Ohio has

observed:

              We recognize that it is nearly impossible to imagine the rape
              of a child without force involved. Clearly, a child cannot be
              found to have consented to rape. However, in order to prove
              the element of force necessary to sentence the defendant to
              life imprisonment, the statute requires that some amount of
              force must be proven beyond that force inherent in the crime
              itself. Yet “‘[f]orce need not be overt and physically brutal, but
              can be subtle and psychological. As long as it can be shown
              that the rape victim’s will was overcome by fear or duress, the
              forcible element of rape can be established.’” Eskridge, 38
              Ohio St.3d at 58-59, 526 N.E.2d at 306, citing State v.
              Fowler (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 149, 154, 27 OBR 182, 187,
              500 N.E.2d 390, 395.

State v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 323, 327-328, 695 N.E.2d 763 (1998); accord State v. Barnes,

11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2022-T-0061, 2023-Ohio-353, ¶ 47.

       {¶22} The same reasoning applies with equal force when a child is sexually

assaulted by a non-parent who is in a position of authority. See Bolling at ¶ 41, citing

Dye.

       {¶23} Although direct force is not at issue in this matter, we conclude that, even

though S.S. stated she felt threatened “in a way,” she still testified she felt threatened.

Further, S.S. testified she feared appellant due to the persistent and repetitive sexual

assaults. And we would be remiss to ignore that, in addition to appellant’s status as a

parental figure, he is a fully grown adult male either directing or exhorting a 12- to 13-

year-old juvenile female to submit to sexual contact. The significant physical and

psychological power differentials between appellant and S.S. are patent, and appellant

exploited his position to compromise S.S.’s will and sexually assault her multiple times.

We accordingly conclude that appellant’s status as a “father figure,” which both appellant

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Case No. 2023-T-0049
and S.S. mutually recognized, as well as S.S.’s description of appellant’s actions leading

up to the assaults, provide sufficient, credible evidence to meet the “force” or “threat of

force” element of the rape charges in Counts Three through Ten.

       {¶24} Next, appellant contends S.S.’s delay in reporting the incidents weighs

heavily against her credibility. We do not agree.

       {¶25} Ms. Malmer informed the jury of the concept of delayed disclosure in sexual

assault cases. She testified that more than 70 percent of children and women of any age

take a minimum of a year to report incidents. Ms. Malmer stated that delay in disclosure

is more common in children. She noted that sexual abuse in children often occurs at the

hands of someone the child knows and trusts, and upon which the child is dependent.

Considering this evidence, we fail to see how S.S.’s delayed disclosure had any

meaningful impact upon the credibility of her substantive testimony regarding the

assaults. Appellant’s contention lacks merit.

       {¶26} Appellant next points out his expert witness, Dr. Guertin, a physician and

expert in sexual-abuse evaluation, testified that the injuries observed during Ms. Malmer’s

examination could have been caused by numerous benign events; namely, accidents,

such as a straddle-type injury, splits, water skiing; use of a sex toy or voluntary sexual

intercourse. Significantly, Dr. Guertin did not rule out forcible penile vaginal penetration

as a cause of the injury. Regardless of the alternative, potential explanations for the

vaginal trauma identified in the initial examination, the jury was able to evaluate S.S.’s

rendition of events as well as Ms. Malmer’s testimony relating to her interview and

examination of S.S. Further, the jury was able to compare this testimony against that of

Dr. Guertin. In resolving the conflicts, if any, between the testimony, the jury determined

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that multiple, forcible sexual assaults occurred. Dr. Guertin’s testimony did not in any

way refute this conclusion. We therefore conclude the jury did not lose its way when it

concluded, consistent with the vast weight of the testimony, that appellant committed the

charged crimes.

       {¶27} Finally, appellant contends S.S.’s version of events is suspect because she

testified she continued to remain in contact with appellant after he moved out of the

residence he shared with S.S. and her family. We recognize S.S. testified she remained

in touch with appellant after he and her mother broke up. She stated she kept in touch

“[a] little bit[.]” She noted that sometimes she would reach out to appellant and other times

he would reach out to her. Appellant maintains S.S.’s behavior in this respect is untenable

and cuts strongly against the version of events which led to the charges.

       {¶28} We certainly recognize the anomalous nature of S.S. remaining in contact

with appellant after he moved out and ceased dating her mother, particularly considering

the harshness of the allegations. Nevertheless, S.S. testified, despite the sexual assaults,

she viewed appellant as a parental figure. As such, one can reasonably infer that her

perception of appellant was somewhat bifurcated: on one hand, she viewed him as a

father figure, but on the other, he assaulted her on multiple occasions against her will.

These competing perceptions, both of which are supported by S.S.’s testimony, provide

a sound basis for the conclusion that S.S., as a young girl who had been subjected to

repeated sexual assaults, was confused about the situation in which she found herself.

Considering the other evidence surrounding the jury’s verdict, we conclude that S.S.’s

actions of contacting appellant after he was no longer in the residence does not weigh

heavily against the conclusion that her will was compromised during each sexual assault.

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      {¶29} Moreover, in an interview with an investigating officer, which was played for

the jury, appellant waived his Miranda rights and made several admissions. He claimed

that, after he moved out of the residence he shared with S.S. and her family, S.S. sent

him suggestive text messages. Throughout the interview appellant painted S.S. as the

aggressor, but he initially denied anything occurred. He stated, however, S.S. came to

his apartment and expressed an interest in having a sexual relationship with him.

Appellant claimed he declined any such invitation and, that night, retreated to his bed to

sleep. He asserted he awoke in the middle of the night, and S.S. was “stroking [his] dick.”

Appellant asserted he immediately left the bedroom and played video games. He did not

admit to engaging in vaginal intercourse with S.S. during the interview.        Appellant,

however, was recorded on a jail telephone call to his mother, stating S.S. had “ridden” his

penis while he was sleeping. The jury was entitled to resolve the conflicts between the

interview and the telephone call and place that evidence in the context of the remaining

testimony. In doing so, it elected to believe S.S. and discount appellant’s white-washed

account which placed the entirety of the blame for any sexual acts solely on S.S.

      {¶30} Viewing the evidence in its entirety, the jury was in the best position to

assess the credibility of witnesses and evaluate the substance of the recorded exhibits.

In doing so, we cannot conclude that the jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of

the evidence. There was sufficient, credible evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that appellant engaged in sexual conduct with S.S., who is not his spouse, and

that S.S. was under 13 years of age at the time (Count Two); there was also sufficient,

credible evidence to support the conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant

engaged in sexual conduct with S.S. by purposely compelling her to submit by force or

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the threat of force. (Counts Three through Ten). We therefore hold the state met both its

burden of production and persuasion.

      {¶31} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error lack merit.

      {¶32} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Trumbull

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

MATT LYNCH, J.,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

concur.

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