Court Opinion

ID: 9826483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:59:38.296747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:04.582549
License: Public Domain

On Petition eor Rehearing
Mr. ChiEE Justice BlEase :
The appellant, seeking a rehearing, asserts that the Court in its opinion has based its conclusion upon an erroneous apprehension of two important facts.
The first is our statement to the effect that there were introduced in evidence receipts, signed by the insured, for certain sick benefits paid to her. The appellant says these receipts were not introduced. It now appears that, technically, the receipts were not really introduced. The record shows, however, that the receipts, or some receipts at least, were exhibited to the appellant by the counsel for the respondent, when the appellant testified as a witness, and she was examined fully as to her signatures to these papers, and as to their contents. If the receipts were not introduced, however, that fact had no effect on the conclusion we reached in the case. It was conceded by the appellant that $3.00 in sick benefits were paid to her, and she said she had signed receipts therefor.
Appellant’s counsel now says that the Court committed error in saying that the last payment of a fifteen cents pre*137mium took place on February IS, 1932, which payment kept the policy in force until February 22nd, two days after the date of the commencement of the suit. Fie attempts to argue that the evidence shows that the last payment was made on February 9th, which payment would have carried the policy only to February 16th, and, therefore, the policy was not in force on February 20th, when the suit was commenced. . The record does not bear out the contention made, and the petition for rehearing on that ground shows that appellant’s counsel is not at all careful in the presentation of petitions to this Court. It seems, too, that the Court knows a great deal more about the facts of counsel’s case than he knows. Perhaps his petition for rehearing, like the commencement of the suit, was gotten up in too great a hurry. We let the record speak for itself; the italics being supplied by us.
The third paragraph of the complaint, drawn by counsel for the appellant, is in this language: “That after said policy was issued, the plaintiff continued the payment of said weekly premiums, until the 15 day of February, 1932.”
The last sentence in the fourth paragraph of the complaint is as follows: “That on February 15th, 1932, said agent came back and collected the premium then due on said policy, and receipted for same in plaintiff’s receipt book.”
In the six exceptions of the appellant’s counsel, there is not a word to indicate that the last payment of premium was made on February 9th.
In the second exception, appellant’s counsel said that the presiding Judge erred in granting a nonsuit, “when the testimony offered by the plaintiff had fully sustained every allegation in the complaint.” In the fifth exception, the appellant’s counsel “respectfully submitted” that there was error in granting the nonsuit, “when there was ample evidence to sustain all of the allegations of the complaint.” The allegations of the complaint, as shown before, were to the effect that the weekly payments of premiums continued until February 15, 1932.
*138It is true that the appellant, Julia Bailey, when testifying, was quite indefinite as to the time the last payment was made; but she at no time testified that the last payment was made on February 9th. Counsel for the respondent, in cross-examining her, read two or three times allegations of the complaint, showing the last payment was made on February 15, 1932, and the witness did not question the correctness of the statement as to the date of payment.
Hattie Clark, a relative of the appellant, and her chief witness, testified positively, both on direct examination and cross examination, that she was present when the payment was made on February 15, 1932.
In his remarks granting the motion for nonsuit, the trial Judge said: “Under the allegations of the complaint, it is apparent that they collected the premiums for a week, fifteen cents, until February 15, 1932, which unquestionably kept the policy alive.” No effort was made by counsel for the appellant to correct in the mind of the Judge his impression that the appellant claimed that the last payment of premium was made on February 15, 1932.
The Court does not look with favor upon petitions of this character. They uselessly take up time. It is earnestly hoped that no such petition will be filed again soon. We call to the attention of counsel for the appellant what was said about petitions for rehearing in the case of Arnold v. Power Co., 168 S. C., 163, 167 S. E., 234.
The petition is dismissed.
Messrs. Justices Stabrer, Carter and Bonham and Mr. Acting Associate Justice W. C. Cothran concur.