Court Opinion

ID: 9947756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 17:00:54.729039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:32.112793
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                                                                          MAR 5 2024
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIME M. BARTON,                                No.   22-56002

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:19-cv-02431-JLB

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of California
                   Jill L. Burkhardt, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted February 13, 2024**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, NGUYEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

      Jaime Barton appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner

of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability benefits. We review the

district court’s order de novo, and may reverse a denial of benefits only when that

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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decision is “based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the

record.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 653–54 (9th Cir. 2017). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      Barton alleges disability due to his ankle pain, lower back pain, and carpal

tunnel syndrome. The administrative law judge applied the Commissioner’s five-

step “sequential evaluation process” to determine whether Barton was disabled

under the Social Security Act and determined that he was not.           20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4). On appeal, Barton challenges step four of the ALJ’s analysis.

      1. Barton first argues that the ALJ failed to set forth clear and convincing

reasons for discrediting his testimony about his pain symptoms. An ALJ may

discredit a claimant’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms if the ALJ

offers “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Garrison v. Colvin,

759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014). Those reasons must be supported by

substantial evidence, and the ALJ must identify the specific testimony he or she

finds incredible and explain what evidence undermines that testimony. Treichler v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014).

      Here, the ALJ provided four such reasons.

      First, the ALJ faulted Barton for his failure to ever seek treatment for his

lower back pain. The ALJ was “permitted to consider lack of treatment” in his

determination of Barton’s credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th

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Cir. 2005).

      Second, the ALJ discredited Barton because he was noncompliant with

treatment recommendations made by his medical providers, including several

recommendations from Dr. Chodos, his orthopedic surgeon, to use an “ankle

brace” or “high top shoe or boot” instead of flip flops. The ALJ was entitled to

consider Barton’s “inadequately explained failure to . . . follow a prescribed course

of treatment.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008).

      Third, the ALJ noted that, despite Barton’s noncompliance with his

recommendations, Dr. Chodos prescribed increasingly conservative treatments for

Barton’s ankle injury. For example, at their first appointment in September 2016,

Dr. Chodos suggested Barton consider surgical treatment for his ankle. By 2018,

Dr. Chodos only recommended that Barton use a “compression stocking” and a

“more supportive shoe than a flip flop.” The ALJ was entitled to rely on evidence

of “conservative treatment” to discount Barton’s testimony regarding severity of an

impairment. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007).

      And finally, the ALJ discounted Barton’s pain testimony because Barton was

“previously able to work with similar symptoms.”         The ALJ was entitled to

consider evidence of Barton’s gainful employment during symptomatic periods in

assessing his credibility. Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2021).

      2. Barton next challenges the ALJ’s decision to reject the medical opinions

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of three of his treating physicians—Dr. Chodos; Dr. Fitzgerald, his orthopedic hand

surgeon; and an unidentified third doctor who assessed Barton for his ankle pain in

November 2016. Those opinions conflict with other medical opinion testimony in

the record, and can thus be rejected by the ALJ for “specific and legitimate

reasons” supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,

1216 (9th Cir. 2005).

      The ALJ reviewed “Medical Information Questionnaires” filled out by

Dr. Chodos and Dr. Fitzgerald, and a “Physical Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment” filled out by the unidentified physician. These documents outlined

extreme physical limitations for Barton but were not conducted in conjunction with

any physical assessment of Barton’s injuries. The ALJ determined that these

documents were unpersuasive because they relied on Barton’s “subjective

symptoms rather than objective medical findings.” That is a legitimate reason for

rejecting medical testimony. “An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion if

it is based to a large extent on a claimant’s self-reports that have been properly

discounted as incredible.”   Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (internal quotations

omitted).   Because the ALJ provided a specific, legitimate, and substantiated

reason for rejecting the medical opinions of those treating physicians, we uphold

that determination.

      AFFIRMED.

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