Court Opinion

ID: 9683881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:39:30.730897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:51.097028
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
In his motion for rehearing appellant contends that he did not allege im•moral conduct on the part of his wife in his cross action in the case and that he did not allege that she was unfaithful to him. His petition' alleged “that she, disregarding her marital vows, has constantly kept company with a single man spending nights with him * * * He likewise further alleged “that she, on numerous occasions, has left the home of this defendant in company with another man, and failed to return to their home until 3:00 or 4:00 o’clock the following morning.” He alleged that because of such conduct" he was entitled to a divorce from her and he further alleged that she was “not a fit person to have the care and custody”' of their said two minor children and he asked for their custody. She testified, in effect, tha,t he had falsely accused her of having improper relations with other men whom she named and her sister corroborated such tes- • timony. Appellant did not testify or seek to refute such, .testimony. It is our opinion that a stronger implication could hardly have been made charging his wife of immoral conduct and of being unfaithful to him as a wife and it is our opinion further that he did, in effect, so allege. No other reasonable construction could be given such allegations in view of the charges his wife and her sister testified he had made against his wife, which charges he did not see fit to deny.
He further contends that a trial court has less discretionary powers in determining the issues in a divorce action than it has in other civil cases. The rule is well recognized that a trial court has authority to construe the pleadings more liberally in a divorce action than in any other civil cases. Fain v. Fain, Tex.Civ.App., 6 S.W.2d 403, writ dismissed. . The court held in the case of Caywood v. Caywood, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W. 889, that much latitude is allowed a trial court in passing upon the grounds alleged for a divorce. The court there further held that the cruel treatment given in the statute as one of the grounds for a divorce has often been held to include injury to the feelings and sensibilities as well as to physical injuries actually inflicted or threatened. It has likewise been may times held that in a divorce action: the trial court is clothed with more discretionary power in deter-"miriing "the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to warrant a decree than perhaps in any. other form of civil action. Kreiter v. Kreiter, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 184, and other authorities there cited. While. the case at bar was not a jury case, 'the rule is well. established that in a divorce action either party may demand a jury trial. Yet a trial court is not bound by the jury finding's'in such a case even though its verdict has support in the evidence. A jury verdict in such a case is only of an advisory nature to the trial court, Hodges v. Hodges, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W.2d 943; Tims v. Tims, Tex.Civ.App., 201 S.W.2d 865; Scanned v. Scanned, Tex.Civ.App., 117 S.W.2d 538.
It is a serious matter for a man to question directly or indirectly the virtue of his *882wife who has borne him children. And it is far more serious if he makes false accusations against her virtue. Such is calculated to insult her sensibilities of refinement to such an extent drat she could not live with him again under any circumstances as was the testimony given by ap-pellee in this case. It is our opinion that the well known rules of law fully support the trial court’s holdings to the effect that the pleadings and evidence in this case warranted a judgment for appellee. Appellant’s contentions to the contrary set out in his motion for a rehearing are not well taken. His motion is therefore overruled.