Court Opinion

ID: 9567074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:48:07.656221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:33.571639
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In Arizona, by statute:
“In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.” A.R.S. § 13-131.
The intent referred to is merely the intention to do the act, People v. Wade, 71 Cal. App.2d 646, 163 P.2d 59 (1945). It does not mean an intent to commit a crime, but is the intent to perform the act, State v. Booton, 85 Idaho 51, 375 P.2d 536 (1962).
The court did not instruct the jury in the language of § 13—131; instead, over the defendant’s objection, read to the jury Criminal Standard 4 from Arizona’s Recommended Jury Instructions on general intent, as follows:
“The state must prove that the defendant has done an act which is forbidden by law and that he intended to do it. You may determine that the defendant intended to do the act if he did it voluntariJy * * * ”
The court correctly told the jury:
“Burglary has two elements: (1) There must be an entry into a dwelling; and (2) the entry must be with the intent to commit a felony or theft.”
The instruction, Criminal Standard 4, has the potential to confuse the jury. It says that the State must prove that the defendant has done an act which is forbidden by law and that he intended to do it. But the *335only act which is forbidden by law is burglary, itself, and burglary includes a specific intent element. Also, the instruction allows the jury to determine the defendant intended to do the act if he did it voluntarily. The jury, perceiving that all of the defendant’s actions were clearly voluntary, might have determined that he entertained the specific intent and was therefore guilty of burglary. Because the instruction is intended to inform the jury of the statute A.R.S. § 13-131, but, in fact, permits the jury to presume a specific intention, I believe it is erroneous.
The majority seem to be arguing that there was enough evidence for them to conclude the defendant intended to commit a theft when he entered the house, and I think so too. However, since it is possible that the jury equated the general intent spoken of in Criminal Standard 4 with the specific intention required under the burglary statute and there was no way of knowing that it did not, the conviction should be reversed.