Court Opinion

ID: 9838847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 14:06:02.284455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:16.594777
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-1147-MR

BILLY A. POE                                                         APPELLANT

                       APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                    HONORABLE JAMES R. REDD, III, JUDGE
                            ACTION NO. 18-CR-00010

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND CETRULO, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Billy A. Poe (Poe) appeals the trial court’s denial of his

motion seeking a new trial pursuant to RCr 11.42.1 Having reviewed the record,

the briefs of the parties, and the law, we affirm.

                                            FACTS

                In 2018, Poe was indicted by the Lyon County Grand Jury for

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
prohibited use of an electronic communication system to procure a minor for sex

and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO).2 He entered a guilty

plea to the charges and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, enhanced to ten

years by virtue of the PFO charge.

              Three years after the entry of the guilty plea, Poe filed a pro se motion

seeking relief from his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42 and CR3 60.02. The trial

court determined that each of the claims he forwarded was refuted by the record.

The trial court determined an evidentiary hearing was not required and denied

relief. Poe appeals from the trial court’s decision.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              The denial of an RCr 11.42 motion in a matter involving a guilty plea

is first reviewed factually, primarily to ascertain voluntariness. The trial court’s

determination as to voluntariness is reviewed for clear error. Rigdon v.

Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004). A determination is not

clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence. Baltimore v.

Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky. App. 2003). On appeal, the trial

2
  The Indictment incorrectly listed the wrong statute number for the offense charged. Rather
than the correct statute, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.155, the statute number in the
body of the Indictment listed KRS 510.090, third-degree sodomy. Poe raises this as one of the
grounds for relief.
3
 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite invoking CR 60.02, Poe raises no issues
implicating such rule.

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court’s decision whether to grant or deny the motion for relief is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Ky. 1998).

Abuse of discretion has been defined as occurring when the trial court enters an

order or makes a ruling which is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by

sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.

1999) (citations omitted).

                                    ANALYSIS

             To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
             counsel, a movant must satisfy the two-prong test
             articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
             104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). “First, the
             defendant must show that counsel's performance was
             deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the
             deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at
             687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

Wagner v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.3d 381, 383 (Ky. App. 2015). Reviewing

courts must presume that the assistance offered by counsel “falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” Strickland, supra, at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. With this in mind, we review Poe’s allegations.

             When the prosecution ends in a guilty plea, the movant seeking later

relief must show prejudice which establishes, had the ineffective assistance not

been rendered, the matter would not have ended in a guilty plea but would have

instead ended in a trial.

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                     The second, or “prejudice,” requirement, on the
              other hand, focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally
              ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea
              process. In other words, in order to satisfy the
              “prejudice” requirement, the defendant must show that
              there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
              errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
              insisted on going to trial.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985).

              Here the trial court conducted a plea colloquy when Poe entered his

plea.4 At that time, Poe indicated that he was pleading guilty knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. He told the judge that he was satisfied with

counsel’s advice and had no complaints about her services. He stated he had

received adequate time to discuss the offer and the consequences of entering a

guilty plea with counsel. The court recalled these circumstances in the order

denying relief, citing the fact that Poe did not complain about counsel’s

performance or advice, and therefore held that an evidentiary hearing was

unnecessary as Poe’s allegations could be refuted by the existing record. We do

not disagree with this holding.

              Poe further complains that his attorney was ineffective because the

trial court erred in placing the statute number for sodomy in the third-degree on the

4
 At the same time, Poe entered guilty pleas to charges out of Caldwell County, No. 19-CR-
00061. The sentence in the Caldwell County case was to be served concurrently with the
sentence in this matter.

                                             -4-
plea form. He fails to acknowledge that the trial court corrected the error and at all

times it was clear on the record that he was entering a plea to the charge indicted

and not a sodomy charge. This argument is without merit.

             Next, Poe complains that counsel did not utilize an affidavit executed

by his compatriot taking blame for the communications. Poe fails to recognize,

had he gone to trial, he would have had every opportunity to present the affidavit

as well as the testimony of his compatriot. But, by entering a guilty plea, there was

no opportunity to employ the affidavit. He complains that counsel “lied” to him by

explaining that the affiant’s credibility would be attacked at a trial, which might

lead to a longer sentence than that outlined in the guilty plea offer.

             Poe’s allegation is without merit; counsel properly advised him that

simply because another is willing to take the blame for the activity with which he

was charged does not mean that he would be vindicated and found innocent.

Attorneys have a duty to advise their clients of likely eventualities. See Stiger v.

Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 230, 237-238 (Ky. 2012) (holding that advice

concerning likelihood of a longer sentence is not ineffectiveness); Hill, 474 U.S. at

59, 106 S. Ct. at 371 (“[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise

the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution

of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense

likely would have succeeded at trial.”).

                                           -5-
             Poe was asked when he entered his plea if he was doing so of his own

choice and whether he was satisfied with counsel’s performance and he answered

affirmatively. Sworn declarations by a defendant in open court that his guilty plea

is made voluntarily “carry a strong presumption of verity.” Edmonds v.

Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 569 (Ky. 2006).

             We also note that Poe received a ten-year sentence covering multiple

indictments and, given his PFO I status, he received the minimum available

sentence. Such vitiates against the entry of the plea not being voluntary and clearly

establishes he was not prejudiced by the entry of the plea. See Russell v.

Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. App. 1999).

             Poe additionally alleges that he was not allowed by counsel to

participate in his own defense and that counsel failed to provide adequate

investigation into his case prior to his plea. These arguments are summarily

presented and of no merit, as is also his argument that cumulative error compels

reversal of the trial court. “Conclusory allegations that counsel was ineffective

without a statement of the facts upon which those allegations are based do not meet

the rule's specificity standard and so ‘warrant a summary dismissal of the motion.’”

Roach v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Ky. 2012).

                                         -6-
                                 CONCLUSION

            For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order denying relief

on the RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Billy A. Poe, pro se                      Daniel Cameron
LaGrange, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Melissa A. Pile
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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