Court Opinion

ID: 9905448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 16:04:50.222404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:36.503127
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2023-0451
                  _____________________________

CITY OF GAINESVILLE, d/b/a
GAINESVILLE REGIONAL
UTILITIES,

    Appellant,

    v.

JACOB T. RODGERS,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Donna M. Keim, Judge.

                        November 29, 2023

BILBREY, J.

     The City of Gainesville appeals the judgment entered in a civil
suit following a tragic accident that resulted in catastrophic injury
to Jacob T. Rodgers. Because the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the City’s motion for a new trial, we reverse and remand
for further proceedings.

                Factual and Procedural Background

     Three friends were traveling home from an evening class at
their local community college in a pickup truck driven by Hank
Blackwell. Rodgers was a backseat passenger in the truck.
Blackwell’s truck was struck by an SUV belonging to the
Gainesville Regional Utilities, an agency of the City of Gainesville.
The driver of the City’s SUV, William Stormant, had failed to stop
at a stop sign. After Blackwell’s truck was struck, it rolled, and
two of the passengers were ejected. Sadly, Rodgers was one of
them, and he was rendered paraplegic. At the time of the accident,
Rodgers was not wearing a seat belt, and the truck driven by
Blackwell was traveling more than ten miles over the posted speed
limit.

     Rodgers sued Stormant and the City for negligence, though
Stormant was later dropped as a defendant. The City raised
several defenses, including the defense that the suit was barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The City then moved for
summary judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity. The
trial court denied that motion, and in its written order of denial,
the trial court found as a matter of law that “the doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity does not bar the instant action as [Stormant]
was in the course and scope of his employment based upon the
application of the dual-purpose exception to the going and coming
rule to the undisputed facts.”

     The City took an interlocutory appeal to this court, and we
affirmed the trial court’s order without comment. City of
Gainesville v. Rodgers, 272 So. 3d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

     As the case returned to the trial court, the City again argued
that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity. The trial court
ruled, though, that the issue was settled under the doctrine of law
of the case by this court’s affirmance of the order denying summary
judgment. In this appeal, the City continues to maintain Rodgers’
lawsuit is barred by sovereign immunity.

     Another recurring issue at the lengthy trial was what Rodgers
could argue regarding his failure to wear a seat belt. He sought to
inform the jury that there is no Florida law requiring a backseat
passenger to be seat belted. The City responded that such a claim
would be misleading to the jury as to the issue of negligence, and
the trial court agreed. So before closing arguments, the parties
were instructed not to “mention the law regarding seat belts.”

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     During its deliberations, the jury submitted several questions.
Pertinent to the instant appeal, one question referred to the
language on the verdict form which asked the jury to consider “was
there negligence on the part of the plaintiff Jacob Rodgers which
was the legal cause of loss, injury, or damage to plaintiff Jacob
Rodgers.” The jury asked about this language, asking “does this
mean it is legal to not wear a seatbelt in the backseat or not? What
does the word legal refer to?” After considerable discussion with
counsel, the trial court gave the following written response: “Read
the instructions and all of the questions on the verdict form and
answer it in light of all of the evidence.”

     Later during deliberations, there was a jury question asking
for additional instructions on the meaning of negligence. The trial
court and counsel agreed to tell the jury to reread the instructions.
The trial court was then handed a note reading:

    I feel that negligence was not explained well enough to
    base an opinion on this case, and we were ill prepared to
    determine a settlement amount. I feel that 5 of the jurors
    already were decided before deliberations, and that the
    settlement amount was not based on any kind of
    methodology.

With the agreement of counsel, the trial court responded:
“Continue to deliberate.”

    The jury ultimately returned a verdict for Rodgers. It found
no negligence on the part of Rodgers or on the part of Blackwell.
Instead, Stormant was found to be one hundred percent at fault.
Over $114,000,000.00 was awarded by the jury for non-economic
damages.

     The City moved for a new trial on two grounds — that the
verdict was excessive and that it was against the manifest weight
of the evidence. The evidence at trial was that Rodgers was not
wearing a seat belt and that Blackwell’s vehicle was traveling at
an excessive rate of speed. Both these factors contributed to the
injuries sustained by Rodgers, the City argued. It also argued that
the jury was likely confused as to whether the lack of statutory
requirement about seat belt use in a backseat prevented a finding

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of any comparative negligence by Rodgers. The City asserted that
counsel for Rodgers made the issue confusing for the jury, as
evidenced by the jury questions. The City also sought remittitur
claiming that the non-economic damages award was excessive. See
§ 768.74(3), Fla. Stat. (2015).

     The trial court denied a new trial but did grant remittitur
reducing the verdict for non-economic damages to $13,000,000.00.
Rodgers appealed the order granting remittitur, and the City
cross-appealed the denial of a directed verdict as well as the denial
of a new trial. After we questioned whether the order granting
remittitur was an appealable final order citing Stanberry v.
Escambia County, 813 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), Rodgers
requested that we relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court to
secure a final judgment. We did so and the trial court then entered
a final judgment consistent with its grant of remittitur. Including
economic damages, the final judgment entered was for
$18,319,181.20. Rodgers’ appeal was then dismissed by this court.
See Omni-Vest, Inc. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 352 So. 2d 53 (Fla.
1977). But the City’s cross-appeal remained.

    The City in an abundance of caution also appealed the final
judgment in a separate appeal — the instant appeal. For a time,
the City’s cross-appeal and its separate appeal here were pending.
Both parties agreed that dismissal of the City’s cross-appeal was
appropriate given the identity of issues with the instant appeal, so
we dismissed the cross-appeal.

     Here, the City again argues that the trial court erred in not
finding the cause barred by sovereign immunity. It also now
argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a new
trial.

                       Sovereign Immunity

     Earlier in the trial court proceedings, the City moved for
summary judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity. A motor
vehicle is a dangerous instrumentality. Susco Car Rental Sys. of
Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 835–36 (Fla. 1959). As a result,
the owner of a motor vehicle is normally liable for the negligence
of the driver of the vehicle. Id. But the waiver of sovereign

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immunity in section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2015), is specific and
does not allow the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to overcome
immunity. Rabideau v. State, 391 So. 2d 283, 284–85 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1980), aff’d, 409 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1982). Accordingly, the City
could only be liable for Stormant’s negligence if he was acting
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the
crash. See § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (waiving sovereign immunity for
the State and “its agencies or subdivisions” for negligence “of any
employee of the agency or subdivision while acting within the
scope of the employee’s office or employment”); see also § 768.28(9),
Fla. Stat.; City of Winter Park v. Veigle, 367 So. 3d 568, 571 (Fla.
5th DCA 2023).

    When the trial court denied the City’s motion for summary
judgment it found as a matter of law that Stormant was acting
within the course and scope of employment when the accident
occurred. Since we affirmed the denial of summary judgment,
Rodgers, 272 So. 3d at 377, the trial court correctly held that our
summary affirmance of the prior order operated as law of the case.
Thus, the trial court could not revisit the issue of sovereign
immunity.

     “The doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions of
law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same
court and the trial court, through all subsequent stages of the
proceedings.” Florida Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101,
105 (Fla. 2001) (citing Greene v. Massey, 384 So. 2d 24, 28 (Fla.
1980)). An interlocutory appeal may establish the law of a case.
See Schempp v. Schempp, 339 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
While the City has argued that our summary affirmance in
Rodgers precludes application of the law of the case, in fact, a per
curiam affirmance is sufficient. See Arch Se. Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Abraham Commc’ns, Inc., 702 So. 2d 556, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997);
see also Morris v. Winbar LLC, 273 So. 3d 176, 178 (Fla. 1st DCA
2019) (discussing law of the case after an affirmance without a
written opinion).

     The law of the case doctrine is not absolute. Instead, “it also
provides that an appellate court has the power to reconsider and
correct an erroneous ruling that has become the law of the case
where a prior ruling would result in a ‘manifest injustice.’”

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Juliano, 801 So. 2d at 106 (quoting Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So.
2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1965)). Here, we do not find a manifest injustice has
resulted, and consequently, we decline to reconsider the
applicability of sovereign immunity. See Strazzulla, 177 So. 2d at
4 (explaining that law of the case should apply “except in unusual
circumstances and for the most cogent reasons”). There was ample
evidence that Stormant was acting within the course and scope of
his employment at the time of the crash. Therefore, we will not
revisit the prior panel’s decision in Rodgers affirming the trial
court’s holding.

     The question of law we decided in Rodgers was whether
sovereign immunity applied to bar his suit versus the City. The
trial court did not just deny the City’s motion for summary
judgment on the issue and determine it was a jury question.
Rather, the trial court held that Stormant was in the course and
scope of his employment with the City at the time of the crash. It
was this holding from the trial court that was locked in as law of
the case following Rodgers. The trial court correctly declined to
revisit the issue.

                      Denial of a New Trial

    The City sought a new trial on the ground that the jury’s
verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The
verdict found no negligence on the part of Rodgers and no
negligence on the part of Blackwell. Thus, the verdict found
Stormant completely at fault. The trial court denied the City’s
motion for a new trial.

     We review a ruling on a motion for a new trial under the abuse
of discretion standard. See Heartland Express, Inc. of Iowa v.
Farber, 230 So. 3d 146, 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). “A trial court’s
discretion, while broad, is not unbridled.” Ashcroft v. Calder Race
Course, Inc., 492 So. 2d 1309, 1314 (Fla. 1986).

     As an appellate court, we do not reweigh the evidence.
Rather, weighing the evidence is for the trial court. “In deciding
whether the evidence manifestly weighs against the verdict, the
trial court must examine all of the evidence—giving consideration
to its weight and credibility.” Meyers v. Shontz, 251 So. 3d 992,

                                6
1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citing Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243,
260 (Fla. 2013), and Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla.
1988)); see also Smith v. Lyles, 364 So. 3d 1123, 1129 (Fla. 6th DCA
2023) (citing Meyers for authority that a trial court must consider
“all of the evidence” when deciding whether a verdict is contrary
to the manifest weight of evidence).

     “A jury’s verdict is generally not against the manifest weight
of the evidence if the record shows conflicting testimony from two
or more witnesses.” Bachman v. Oliveros, 293 So. 3d 555, 560 (Fla.
5th DCA 2020) (quoting Lindon v. Dalton Hotel Corp., 113 So. 3d
985, 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)); see also National Healthcorp Ltd.
P’ship v. Cascio, 725 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). For a
verdict to be against the manifest weight of the evidence to
warrant a new trial, the evidence must be clear, obvious, and
indisputable; where there is conflicting evidence, the weight to be
given that evidence is within the province of the jury. See Miami-
Dade Cnty. v. Davis, 307 So. 3d 883, 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020);
Harlan Bakeries, Inc. v. Snow, 884 So. 2d 336, 340 (Fla. 2d DCA
2004). Here the evidence of comparative fault by both Rodgers and
Blackwell was clear, obvious, and indisputable. As a result, the
trial court abused its discretion in not granting a new trial based
on that evidence.

     One of the witnesses called by the City was Christine Raach,
Ph.D., an expert in biomechanics. She testified that within a
reasonable degree of certainty the spinal injury Rodgers sustained
was caused by the effect of his ejection from the truck and that
Rodgers would not have been ejected had he been wearing a seat
belt. Had he been seat belted, despite the rollover Rodgers would
have walked away from the accident with only minor injuries,
Raach testified.    There was no evidence disputing Raach’s
testimony that Rodgers would not have been so severely injured
had he been wearing his seat belt. Yet the jury found no negligence
on the part of Rodgers.

     Similarly, the jury found no negligence on the part of
Blackwell, the driver, even though the truck’s airbag data revealed
that he was exceeding the posted speed limit by ten miles per hour
at the time of the accident. Another witness for the City, accident
reconstruction expert Andrew Irwin, testified that the excessive

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speed contributed to Blackwell’s inability to avoid Stormant’s
vehicle and thus contributed to the accident. No evidence was
offered contradicting this testimony. While Blackwell testified
that he was traveling at the same speed as other drivers, such is
not testimony that he was not speeding. That is, Blackwell’s
testimony does not conflict with Irwin’s.

     In denying the City’s motion for a new trial, the trial court
found that “there was sufficient evidence presented to support the
jury’s finding” that Stormant was a hundred percent liable for this
accident. The trial court identified that evidence as being:
“Stormant’s testimony that he ran the stop sign and that he was
responsible for the accident; Mr. Blackwell’s testimony that he was
driving at the same rate of speed as traffic; and testimony that Mr.
Blackwell was not injured and that he was also not wearing his
seatbelt.”

     These findings do not consider the undisputed testimony of
Raach and Irwin.           Further, while Stormant laudably
acknowledged fault, such is hardly evidence that he was the sole
cause of Rodgers’ catastrophic injury. Further still, as noted,
traveling at the same rate of speed as others is not a denial of
speeding. As for the lack of serious injury sustained by Blackwell,
he was not seated on the side of the vehicle struck by Stormant
and was not in the back seat. Thus, Blackwell experienced the
dynamics of the accident differently. As a result, we hold that the
trial court did not “examine all of the evidence—giving
consideration to its weight and credibility.” Meyers, 251 So. 3d at
1000. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
a new trial.

     Adding to the problem was the trial court’s refusal to give a
curative instruction during closing arguments. Prior to closing
arguments, counsel for Rodgers stated that he intended to argue
to the jury that no law requires a backseat passenger to utilize a
seat belt. The City opposed such an argument. The trial court
agreed such an argument was inappropriate and ordered that
neither side was permitted to “mention the law regarding
seatbelts.” The parties could only argue that the court’s jury
“instructions are all of the law that applies to the case.” During
his closing, counsel for Rodgers addressed the testimony of Irwin

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and the claim of the City that the excessive speed and failure to
wear a seat belt were contributing factors. Counsel argued in part:

    Mr. Stormant says no, it’s on me. That’s their employee.
    And there’s the instruction, they’re [i.e., the City is]
    responsible, legally responsible for his actions. He came
    here under oath uncomfortably, feeling horrible about
    this but said, I can’t blame anybody else. It’s all on me.

    The lawyers want to say something different. . . . Use
    your common sense when you apply these laws that
    you’re required to apply to this case. They want to blame
    him for his injuries. Oh, it’s all his fault.

    Well, let’s talk about what reasonably prudent people do.
    We talked about it on Monday. We talked about some
    people getting into Ubers and they don’t wear them in the
    backseat. Some people in the backseat don’t put on
    seatbelts, period. That’s just what their experience is.

    You heard what Mr. Rodgers said in addition to saying,
    well, the windshield, didn’t want to go through the
    windshield. He also said it’s because he knows he’s
    required by law to wear a seatbelt in the front seat. Go
    read through these instructions. This is the law in the
    case. And find one thing that he violated, one thing that
    he violated by being in the backseat without it.

     Given counsel’s implication that Rodgers did nothing wrong
because he did not violate a statute, the City moved for a mistrial,
and alternatively, sought a curative instruction at the end of
Rodgers’ closing argument. The trial court denied both. The jury,
though, appears to have been confused about the legal significance
of Rodgers’ failure to use a seat belt as evidenced by the questions
submitted during its deliberations. 1         This confusion likely

    1  This confusion is to some extent understandable. If
Stormant had not run the stop sign, there would have been no
accident. But comparative fault considers the allocation of fault

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contributed to the jury’s failure to consider the unrebutted
evidence about the consequences of Rodgers’ failure to wear a seat
belt and therefore to its verdict which was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.

                               Remedy

     At oral argument both parties assumed that if we reversed on
the manifest weight of the evidence issue, we would order a new
trial on all issues — liability as well as damages. Our remand can
be more limited, however.

     In Botta v. Florida Power and Light Company, the court
affirmed an order granting a new trial because the jury finding no
comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff Botta was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. 197 So. 3d 1222, 1224
(Fla. 4th DCA 2016). As here, there was no claim in Botta that
finding the tortfeasor liable was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. In Botta, the amount of damages awarded was not
argued to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, while
here any issue the City had with the amount of damages being
against the manifest weight of the evidence was resolved with the
order granting remittitur and Rodgers’ acceptance of a remitted
judgment.

     So in Botta the court ordered “the new trial should be only on
the issue found to have been erroneous,” which was the
comparative negligence of Botta. Id. at 1226; see also Griefer v.
DiPietro, 625 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), as modified
on denial of reh’g (Sept. 8, 1993) (“[W]e now hold that a reversal
for a new trial on damages is not appropriate where the error
complained of affects only the issues of liability”). A similar order
is appropriate here. See also Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So.
2d 934, 945 (Fla. 1996), as clarified on reh’g (Mar. 27, 1997)
(limiting retrial “to the issue of the alleged comparative negligence
of [plaintiff] in failing to wear a seat belt, and if he is found to be

for the damages a plaintiff suffers. See Ridley v. Safety Kleen
Corp., 693 So. 2d 934, 944 (Fla. 1996).

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comparatively negligent, the issue of the percentage of fault
attributable to [plaintiff]”).

     As the court in Botta did, we adopt the procedure from
Shufflebarger v. Galloway, 668 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (en
banc), as well as the procedure from Ridley. On remand, the jury
is to be instructed that Stormant was negligent and the City is
liable for Stormant’s actions. Testimony and evidence can be
received on the actions of Stormant, Rodgers, and Blackwell to
allow the jury to apportion fault appropriately. 2

     We, therefore, AFFIRM the trial court’s holding that law of the
case precluded the City from reasserting the issue of sovereign
immunity. We REVERSE and REMAND for a new trial solely as it
relates to Stormant’s negligence, and Rodgers’ and Blackwell’s
negligence, if any, recognizing that Stormant has already been
found to be negligent and the amount of damages have already
been determined.

ROBERTS and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Stacy D. Blank, Bradford D. Kimbro, Joseph H. Varner, III, Anne
L. Kelley of Holland & Knight LLP, Tampa, for Appellant.

Brian J. Lee of Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

    2 We are not directing that fault must be apportioned to
Rodgers or Blackwell because we do not know what evidence will
be presented at trial on remand.

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