Court Opinion

ID: 9476022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:46:15.117451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:05.899889
License: Public Domain

A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
When we heard reargument in this case on March 3, 1987, certiorari had been granted in Shabazz v. O’Lone, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.) (in banc) (Hunter, J., joined by Garth, J., dissenting), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 268, 93 L.Ed.2d 245 (1986). Since then, Shabazz has been argued before the United States Supreme Court. See 55 U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1987). I think that we should not decide this matter now, since — as the majority admits — “this appeal presents a question ... under the standard announced in Shabazz.” Maj. op. at 120. However, if we are to predicate an opinion on the Shabazz standard, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that “the record does not establish that rosary beads ... present a security risk.” Maj. op. at 122-23.
This appeal is from a grant of summary judgment. If the majority were merely remanding this matter for a full evidentiary hearing, I would not dissent. But the majority is making findings on what are, at a minimum, disputed and genuine issues of material fact. While there was probably an absence of disputed material facts sufficient to warrant the entry of summary judgment for the State, there is certainly— even reading the record in what the majority considers the light most favorable to Higgins — enough of a dispute to require some further evidentiary hearing on the contraband issue. Given even the majority’s view of the facts, in other words, the matter should be remanded to the district *125court for further findings on a full evidentiary record.
I.
The record in this case establishes that rosary beads typically consist of a string up to two feet long, with wooden beads of varying sizes and an attached wooden cross of approximately one to three inches in length. Included in the officials’ reasons for refusing to allow Higgins to bring his rosary beads with him into the visiting room was the danger that, hollowed out, the beads could be used to smuggle contraband such as drugs from the visiting area back into the prison. App. at 206-207. Inspecting the beads upon entering and exiting the visiting room, the State maintains, would be both an impracticable and unreasonable burden to place upon its prison guards. Brief for Appellees at 3. The district court agreed that prison officials should not be required to accommodate Higgins’ claimed free exercise interest in carrying his rosary beads at all times. “It would be impracticable, unreasonable and too time-consuming to have prison security dismantle and inspect upwards of fifty individual beads contained in the rosary each time the prisoner enters and exits the visiting room.” Higgins v. Burroughs, No. 85-3655, mem. op. at 5 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 26, 1986) [Available on WESTLAW, DCTU database].
As Higgins points out, statements by prison officials indicate that accommodation of his claim is possible but, from their perspective, undesirable. For example, in his deposition Deputy Vaughn acknowledged that “[i]f I felt that [the rosary] is something that a person would need in the visiting room when he is visiting with his people, I would say yes, I have no problem with it.” App. at 145. Higgins also stresses that Deputy Vaughn testified that he would merely order the next batch of prison pants with pockets if a court ordered that Higgins be allowed to carry his rosary into the visiting area. Id. at 123. From these two statements, Higgins concludes that permitting him to carry his beads into the visiting area “would require no greater measures for the order, security and control at Graterford than what already exists.” Brief for Appellant at 6. Higgins contends that, because officials have conceded that accommodation is possible, the first amendment mandates that he be allowed to carry the rosary into the visiting area.
II.
The minimum security plaintiffs in Shabazz were denied all access to the central religious service of their faith even though inmates who were classified as greater security risks were allowed to attend the weekly Jumu’ah service. In such a situation, we held, officials should be required to show that accommodation would pose a genuine security problem. Shabazz thus articulated a balancing test, which weighs the degree of infringement of a free exercise interest against the degree of risk posed by accommodation, and places the burden on prison officials to demonstrate that no reasonable accommodation exists. We remanded Shabazz so that the district court could determine through additional fact-finding whether the prisoners’ free exercise interest reasonably could be accommodated by prison officials without creating an undue security risk. Shabazz, 782 F.2d at 420. We did not decide that accommodation was constitutionally mandatory. Shabazz held only that security considerations and the feasibility of accommodation must be weighed against the claimed infringement of free exercise rights. Id.
Prison officials already have accommodated Higgins’s religious beliefs to a significant degree. He is permitted to carry his rosary beads throughout the prison, and only during the few hours he spends in the visiting area — some three or four times per year — is he forbidden to carry the beads. This amounts to less than ten out of approximately 8,760 hours per year.
The State’s security concerns focus on the dangers of contraband storage. Deputy Vaughn testified that “the beads themselves could be altered and it could be the form of a tablet or pill or anything.” App. at 207. He further testified that “we have found things hidden under stamps---[Y]ou would be surprised how some things, very small items are tried to be smuggled in____ I wouldn’t put anything past any*126body from trying to put something in the holes.” Id. at 222. I am persuaded that, even if the district court improperly concluded that summary judgment for the State was warranted, whether this contraband risk outweighs Higgins’s free exercise right should be reconsidered by the district court, assisted by further findings.
III.
Because Higgins’s religious beliefs already have been substantially accommodated, and because valid security considerations appear to militate against creating this cumbersome exception to the State’s visiting area regulations, I decline to intrude into the province of the state penological system on the record before us at this time. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.