Court Opinion

ID: 8634319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 19:42:41.242356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:55:52.774615
License: Public Domain

TANEY, Circuit Justice,
held: 1. If, at the time the special contract was made, upon which this suit is brought, .it was understood between the parties, that the services of the plaintiff were to be of the character and description set forth in his letter to the president of the railroad company, dated November 17, 1846, and the paper therein inclosed; and that, in consideration of the contingent compensation mentioned in the contract, he was to use the means and influences proposed in his letter and the accompanying paper, for the purpose of obtaining the passage of the law mentioned in the agreement; the contract is against the policy of the law, and no action can be maintained upon it.
2.If there was no agreement between the parties that the services of the plaintiff should be of the character and description mentioned in his letter and communication referred to in the preceding instruction, yet the contract is against the policy of the law, and void, if, at the time it was made, the parties agreed to conceal from the members of the legislature of Virginia, the fact that the plaintiff was employed by the defendants, as their agent, to advocate the passage of the law they desired to obtain, and was to receive a compensation in money for his services, in case the law was passed by the legislature, at the session referred to in the agreement.
3. If there was no actual agreement to practise such concealment, yet he is not entitled to recover, if he did conceal from the members of the legislature, when advocating the passage of the law, that he was acting as agent for the defendants, and was to receive a compensation in money in case the law passed.
4. If the contract was made upon a valid and legal consideration, the contingency has not happened upon which the sum of fifty thousand dollars was to be paid to the plaintiff, and the law passed by the legislature of Virginia being different, in material respects, from the one proposed to be obtained by the defendants, by the agreement of February 11, 1847, and the passage of which, by the terms of that contract, was made a condition precedent to the payment of the money.
Verdict and judgment for defendants.