Court Opinion

ID: 9914022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 14:08:53.634582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:52.959082
License: Public Domain

J-S38007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  PHILIP B. PRITCHETT                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2075 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 21, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0007568-2016

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 28, 2023

       Philip B. Pritchett appeals from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon

careful review, we affirm.

       On May 3, 2018, a jury found Pritchett guilty of rape of a child,1

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child (IDSI),2 endangering the

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c).

2 Id. at § 3123(c).
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welfare of a child (EWOC),3 corruption of minors,4 and unlawful contact with

a minor.5 After trial, but prior to sentencing, Pritchett was appointed new

counsel.    On September 21, 2018, the trial court conducted a sentencing

hearing, at which new counsel presented two witnesses to testify on

Pritchette’s behalf—Pritchett’s girlfriend, Lois Powell, and a member from

Pritchett’s religious community, Steven Paiano. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing,

9/21/18 at 8-9, 10-13.          Following the hearing, the trial court sentenced

Pritchett to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration.6

       Pritchett filed timely post-sentence motions, which were denied. This

Court affirmed Pritchett’s convictions but found his sentences for EWOC and

corruption of minors exceeded the lawful maximums and remanded for

resentencing.      See Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 3026 EDA 2018 (Pa.

Super. filed June 20, 2020) (unpublished memorandum decision).

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3 Id. at § 4304(a)(1).

4 Id. at § 6301(a)(1)(ii).

5 Id. at § 6318(a)(1).

6 The court imposed concurrent sentences of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for

Pritchett’s convictions of rape of a child and IDSI. The trial court imposed
sentences of five to ten years’ imprisonment for each of Pritchett’s convictions
of EWOC, corruption of minors, and unlawful contact with a minor. The trial
court imposed Pritchett’s sentences for EWOC, corruption of minors, and
unlawful contact with a minor concurrently to each other, and consecutively
to his sentences for rape of a child and IDSI.

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       On May 27, 2021, the trial court resentenced Pritchett to consecutive

terms of two-and-a-half to five years each for his convictions of EWOC and

corruption of minors. The trial court further directed that Pritchett’s sentences

for EWOC and corruption of minors be run concurrently to his sentence for

unlawful contact with a minor, which remained a period of five to ten years

imprisonment.        Further, all three of those convictions were to run

consecutively to the rape and IDSI sentences, which remained ten to twenty

years’ imprisonment, respectively.             Thus, Pritchett’s resentencing again

resulted in an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years in prison.

       Pritchett filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, his first, raising claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The PRCA court appointed new counsel,

who filed an amended petition, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective by

failing to (1) object to the court’s incorrect statement of fact at the first

sentencing hearing, and (2) present character witnesses at trial.              See

Amended PCRA Petition, 6/9/22, at 2.             On June 15, 2022, the PCRA court

issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing, pursuant

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Pritchett did not file a response. On July 21, 2022, the

PCRA court dismissed the petition.7

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7 The PCRA court referred this Court to footnote 1 in its July 21, 2022, order,

detailing its reasoning for dismissing Pritchett’s PCRA petition. See PCRA
Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 1 (incorporating order dismissing Pritchett’s PCRA
petition); see also Order, 7/21/22, at 1 n.1.

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       Pritchett filed a timely notice of appeal.8       Pritchett now raises the

following questions for our review:

       [1.] Did the [PCRA] court err when it denied, as a matter of law,
       [Pritchett’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
       to object at sentencing to a material incorrect statement of fact
       by the Court?

       [2.] Did the [PCRA] court err when it denied, as a matter of law,
       [Pritchett’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
       to present character witnesses?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

       We begin by noting our standard of review in this matter.

       On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review
       calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is
       supported by the record and free of legal error. The PCRA court's
       findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
       findings in the certified record.       The PCRA court's factual
       determinations are entitled to deference, but its legal
       determinations are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

       Pritchett raises two claims of ineffectiveness of counsel.          A PCRA

petitioner will be granted relief on such a claim only when he proves, by a

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8 The PCRA court did not order Pritchett to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Therefore, we will not conduct
a waiver inquiry pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4). See Commonwealth v.
Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 744-45 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Commonwealth
v. Thomas, 451 A.2d 470, 472 n. 8 (Pa. Super. 1982)) (“[T]he lower court
must order a concise statement of [errors] complained of on appeal and
appellant must fail to comply with such directive before this Court can find
waiver”).

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preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from

the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the

particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9543(a)(2)(ii).    Generally, counsel’s performance is presumed to be

constitutionally adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a

sufficient showing by the petitioner. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 950 A.2d

945, 954 (Pa. 2008).

      In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

petitioner must prove: (1) the underlying legal issue has arguable merit; (2)

counsel’s actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual

prejudice befell the petitioner as a result of counsel’s act or omission.

Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 12 (Pa. 2008). “If a petitioner fails

to prove any of the [ineffectiveness] prongs, his claim fails.” Commonwealth

v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).             Moreover,

“counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless

claim.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 108 A.3d 779, 789 (Pa. 2014) (citation

omitted).

      Pritchett first avers that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object

to the trial court’s material misstatement, at the first sentencing hearing, that

Pritchett’s conduct “lasted for years,” which the court listed as a specific

aggravating factor in fashioning its sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-13.

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As this Court vacated Prichett’s original sentence and resentenced him on May

27, 2021, we conclude this issue is moot.

       As we noted supra, on direct appeal, this Court vacated Pritchett’s

original sentence and remanded for resentencing.      See Pritchett, supra.

Thus, Pritchett’s original judgment of sentence is a legal nullity.       See

Commonwealth v. Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 514 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“When a

sentence is vacated, it is rendered a legal nullity”). Furthermore, it is well-

settled that “[w]hen a sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the

sentencing court for resentencing, the sentencing judge should start afresh.”

Id. at 522 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 640 A.2d 914, 919-20 (Pa.

Super. 1994)). Because a resentencing hearing was held on May 27, 2021,

and the trial court imposed a new sentence,9 the trial court’s stated reasons

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9 As detailed supra, this Court vacated Pritchett’s sentences for the EWOC
and corruption of minors because they exceeded the statutory maximum. See
Pritchett, supra; Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 744 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa.
2000) (“[w]hen a trial court imposes a sentence outside of the legal
parameters prescribed by the applicable statute, the sentence is illegal and
should be vacated and remanded for correction”); Commonwealth v.
Kratzer, 660 A.2d 102, 104 (Pa. Super 1995) (stating that when an illegal
sentence is imposed, sentence must be corrected). In imposing its new
sentence, the trial court reconsidered the factors that prompted its original
judgment of sentence and reassessed the penalties imposed for each count to
ensure that each sentence did not exceed the lawful maximum for any count.
See N.T. Resentencing Hearing, 5/27/21, at 3-4, 22, 26-27, 33; see also
Caple, 121 A.3d at 523 (stating that “[t]he judge at the second sentencing
hearing should reassess the penalty to be imposed on the defendant . . . and
reevaluate whether the jail term [appellant] received is a just and appropriate
punishment.”).

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for imposing Pritchett’s initial sentence are immaterial. See Caple, supra.

Accordingly, this claim is moot and warrants no relief.

          In his second claim, Pritchett argues that he was denied his

constitutionally-guaranteed right to effective representation when trial

counsel failed to call character witnesses to testify on Pritchett’s behalf at trial.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 8-13. Specifically, Pritchett argues that character

witnesses were available and willing to testify as to his good character, as

demonstrated by the appearance and testimony of Powell and Paiano at the

September 21, 2018, sentencing hearing. Id. at 17-18. He is entitled to no

relief.

          The failure to call character witnesses does not constitute per se

ineffectiveness.      Commonwealth        v.   Cox,   983   A.2d   666,   693    (Pa.

2009) (citation omitted).        Rather, to establish that defense counsel was

ineffective for failing to call witnesses, a petitioner must prove:

          (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
          for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
          the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
          for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
          witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
          trial.

Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 277 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).

          Here, although Powell and Paiano appeared and testified at the initial

sentencing hearing, Pritchett has not provided any certifications, affidavits,

documents, or otherwise in his PCRA petition or amended PCRA petition

establishing that Powell or Paiano were available and willing to testify during

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his trial. Nor does Pritchett provide any evidence that the claimed character

witnesses would have offered proper, admissible character evidence at trial.

See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 27 A.3d 244, 248 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(compiling cases and explaining proper procedures for producing admissible

evidence of good character); see also id. (“Evidence of good character

offered by a defendant in a criminal prosecution must be limited to his general

reputation for the particular trait or traits of character involved in the

commission of the crime charges . . . and must be established by testimony

of witnesses as to the community opinion of the individual in question, not

through specific acts or mere rumor.”).          Rather, Pritchett relies on the

assumption that, because Powell and Paiano testified at the initial sentencing

hearing, they would have been available and willing to testify as character

witnesses during his trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 18.

       Pritchett’s claim is based solely on vague, conclusory, and speculative

allegations—with no basis in the record—that character witnesses were

available and willing to testify as to his good character at trial. Such bald

assertions are insufficient to prove that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to call those witnesses.10 See Commonwealth v. Fulger, 283 A.3d 403,

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10 In his brief, Pritchett does cite to the testimony that Paiano and Powell
provided at the first sentencing hearing. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-16; N.T.
Sentencing Hearing, 9/21/18, at 8-9, 10-13. However, our review of this
testimony reveals that Paiano and Powell would only be able to testify as to
their personal opinions and observations of Pritchett, which is expressly
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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(Pa. Super. 2022) (appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to call character witnesses at trial is meritless because appellant “simply

averred that because the witnesses testified at Appellant’s sentencing, they

probably would have been available and willing to testify as character

witnesses during trial”).

       In conclusion, Pritchet has not met his burden of production to provide

evidence supporting his second ineffectiveness claim.        Additionally, he has

failed to demonstrate that this alleged character evidence would be

admissible. Accordingly, we find this claim without merit, and conclude that

the PCRA court properly dismissed Pritchett’s PCRA petition.11 See Puksar,

supra; see also Rivera, supra; Nero, supra.

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inadmissible character evidence. See Johnson, supra (requiring evidence of
defendant’s good character be based upon “community opinion of the
individual”) (emphasis added). Pritchett does not demonstrate how this
testimony comports with our case law or rules. See id.; see also, Pa.R.E.
404.

11 Additionally, Pritchett argues for the first time on appeal that the PCRA court

erred in failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing. See Appellant’s Brief, at
17-18. We disagree. It is well settled that “[t]here is no absolute right to an
evidentiary hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine
from the record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing
is not necessary.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super.
2008). “[T]o obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition
without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of
fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that
the     court     otherwise    abused    its   discretion   in    denying      a
hearing.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Order affirmed.

Date: 12/28/2023

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Here, as we discuss supra, Pritchett failed to present any evidence to the
PCRA court that these witnesses were available and willing to testify, or how
their testimony would constitute proper admissible character evidence. See
Johnson, supra. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the PCRA
court’s decision to dismiss Pritchett’s PCRA petition without a hearing. See
Hanible, supra.

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