Court Opinion

ID: 9371787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 21:00:55.468453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:30.380246
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10884     Document: 17-1    Date Filed: 02/16/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10884
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       ROGELIO GALVEZ,
       a.k.a. Francoise Roger,

                                                   Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:96-cr-00075-JIC-27
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                      22-10884

                               ____________________

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Rogelio Galvez, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se on ap-
       peal, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for compas-
       sionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by
       § 603(b) of the First Step Act.1 He asserts his “remarka-
       ble” post-conviction rehabilitation, time-served, release plan,
       health conditions, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors all support his
       compassionate release.
              The Government moves for summary affirmance of the dis-
       trict court’s order and to stay the briefing schedule, contending
       Galvez has failed to show the district court abused its discretion
       when it found he did not establish an extraordinary and compelling
       reason to reduce his sentence. The Government asserts the district
       court independently determined the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did
       not support Galvez’s compassionate release, and he continued to
       be a danger to the community. After review, 2 we grant the Gov-
       ernment’s motion for summary affirmance.

       1 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21,
       2018) (First Step Act).
       2 We review de novo a district court’s determination about a defendant’s eli-
       gibility for an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant,
       996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). However, we review a district court’s
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       22-10884                  Opinion of the Court                              3

             District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term
       of imprisonment but may do so within § 3582(c)’s provisions.
       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251
       (11th Cir. 2021). As amended by § 603(b) of the First Step Act,
       § 3582(c) now provides, in relevant part, that:
              [t]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bu-
              reau of Prisons [(BOP)], or upon motion of the de-
              fendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all ad-
              ministrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to
              bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse
              of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the
              warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is ear-
              lier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after
              considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.
              §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable if it
              finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons
              warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduc-
              tion is consistent with applicable policy statements is-
              sued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .

       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing
       Guidelines provides the applicable policy statement for
       § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The application notes to
       U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 list four categories of extraordinary and compel-
       ling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical condition, (B) his age,
       (C) his family circumstances, and (D) other reasons. Id., comment.

       denial of a prisoner’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion under an abuse of dis-
       cretion standard. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                        22-10884

       n.1(A)–(D). The defendant’s medical condition qualifies as an ex-
       traordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release if he
       is “suffering from a serious physical or medical condition” that
       “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide
       self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from
       which he or she is not expected to recover.” Id., comment. n.1(A).
       Additionally, § 3582(c)(1)(A) mandates the district court must con-
       sider the § 3553(a) factors 3 before granting a motion for compas-
       sionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
               The Government is entitled to summary affirmance of the
       district court’s denial of Galvez’s motion for compassionate release
       under § 3582(c)(1)(A) because its position is clearly correct as a mat-
       ter of law. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,
       1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 4 (stating summary disposition is appropriate,
       in part, where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as
       a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to

       3 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the offense’s nature and circumstances and
       the defendant’s history and characteristics; the need to (2) reflect the offense’s
       seriousness; (3) afford adequate deterrence; (4) protect the public; (5) provide
       the defendant with educational or vocational training or medical care; to re-
       flect (6) the kinds of sentences that are available; (7) the advisory guideline
       range; (8) the pertinent U.S. Sentencing Commission policy statements; and
       the need to (9) avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (10) provide vic-
       tims with restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(a)(7).
       4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
       this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
       cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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       22-10884                Opinion of the Court                          5

       the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case,
       the appeal is frivolous”).
                First, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
       denied Galvez’s motion for compassionate release because he
       failed to demonstrate he possessed an extraordinary and compel-
       ling reason for compassionate release under § 1B1.13. Although he
       asserts his rehabilitation should be considered as an extraordinary
       and compelling reason for compassionate release, his argument is
       foreclosed by Bryant, where we held a defendant was only entitled
       to compassionate release based on (A) the defendant’s medical con-
       dition, (B) his age, or (C) his family circumstances. Bryant,
       996 F.3d at 1248 (holding, following the enactment of the First Step
       Act, § 1B1.13 continues to constrain a district court’s ability to eval-
       uate whether extraordinary and compelling reasons were present
       and that Application Note 1(D) did not grant discretion to courts
       to develop other reasons that might justify a reduction in a defend-
       ant’s sentence); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. n.1(A)–(C). Addition-
       ally, aside from his general concerns about the risks of COVID-19,
       Galvez has not demonstrated he suffers from a medical condition
       that impairs his ability to provide self-care within the prison envi-
       ronment. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. n.1(A). The district court
       adequately considered Galvez’s claims his heart condition was an
       extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release,
       but ultimately concluded that, after he was vaccinated for
       COVID-19, his heart condition no longer rose to the level of ex-
       traordinary and compelling. Likewise, neither his rehabilitation
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10884

       nor the length of his already-served time can substitute a finding of
       extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant compassionate re-
       lease.
               Second, Galvez has failed to show the district court abused
       its discretion when it weighed the § 3553(a) factors, as the court had
       the discretion to determine how much weight to give to each of
       the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Frazier, 823 F.3d 1329,
       1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The district court has discretion to deter-
       mine how much weight to grant to a specific § 3553(a) factor.”).
       The district court did not abuse its discretion when it explained the
       § 3553(a) factors weighed against his release, specifically, “his ex-
       tensive criminal history, the violent nature of his crimes, and the
       substantial time remaining on his sentence.” Because a court
       “must find that all necessary conditions are satisfied before it grants
       a reduction” under § 3582(c), the district court’s finding Galvez
       failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason for
       compassionate release was enough to preclude relief. See United
       States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Un-
       der § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must find that all necessary condi-
       tions are satisfied before it grants a reduction,” and the absence of
       any one of the necessary conditions—support in the 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adher-
       ence to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy statement—forecloses a sentence
       reduction). Likewise, its finding the § 3553(a) factors did not sup-
       port his early release was also sufficient to preclude relief. Accord-
       ingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
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       22-10884                Opinion of the Court                          7

       Galvez’s motion for compassionate release, the Government’s po-
       sition is clearly correct as a matter of law, and it is entitled to sum-
       mary affirmance of the district court’s denial of Galvez’s
       § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release.
              Therefore, we GRANT the Government’s motion for sum-
       mary affirmance of Galvez’s motion for compassionate release un-
       der § 3582(c)(1)(A), and DENY as moot its motion to stay the brief-
       ing schedule.
              AFFIRMED.