Court Opinion

ID: 9483985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:37:17.082707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:57.135600
License: Public Domain

PITTMAN, Senior District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority’s discussion and affirmance of Johnson’s conviction for conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. However, I respectfully dissent with regard to the reversal of Thomas' conviction for aiding and abetting in the use and carrying of a firearm during the course of a drug felony. The majority “reverse[s] the district court as to the gun count because there was insufficient evidence at the close of the government’s case to convict Thomas on this count."
I dissent for the following reasons:
(1) The entirety of the evidence is sufficient to support Thomas’ conviction on the gun count;
(2) The evidence regarding the gun count is inextricably interwoven with the facts in the drug count;
(3) Thomas failed to seek a severance at any time before the trial, at the time when Calloway’s testimony was introduced, or before the case was submitted to the jury;
(4) Thomas failed to make a motion for a mistrial when Calloway’s testimony was introduced or at any time thereafter; and
(5) Thomas failed to make a motion to exclude Calloway’s testimony and seek a cautionary instruction.
After scrutinizing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, it is clear that the evidence is sufficient to support Thomas’ conviction. There was evidence (Calloway’s testimony) that Thomas provided the gun used in the transaction and found in Calloway’s possession after his arrest. This testimony was neither objected to nor rebutted.
With reference to (2), the inextricable interweaving of the facts in both counts: the Federal Rules of Evidence generally favor the inclusion rather than the exclusion of evidence. Rules 401, 402, and 403. The principle of full disclosure to determine the truth, if such disclosure does not violate a person’s constitutional rights, should not be hindered by a new rule that places obstacles in the search for truth. The public has a fundamental right to be protected from crime and especially from violent criminal activity. Crime is rampant, especially violent crimes involving guns and illegal drug transactions. The public is entitled to a safe society based on the whole truth.
In the instant case, one count of the indictment charged Thomas, Johnson, and Calloway with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and the other count of the indictment charged Thomas, Johnson, and Calloway with aiding and abetting in the use of a firearm during the commission of a drug felony. At the time of the arrest in this case, the illegal drug transaction was taking place in the parking lot of a public mall, and the proposed transaction involved a substantial amount of cocaine, exotic cars, and a gun, which gun the evidence shows was given to Calloway by Thomas for use in the transaction. The transaction was in progress in a public place, with large numbers of people undoubtedly in the vicinity, and the gun was for the use of some of the participants in the drug transaction. This is not an instance in which one count of the indictment involves a gun remote in both time and place from an attempt to consummate a drug transaction: in this case, it is undisputed that the gun was present at the attempted transaction. Thomas claims that he was prejudiced by a failure on the government’s part to present sufficient evi*707dence in its case-in-chief to sustain his conviction for aiding and abetting in the use and carrying of a firearm during the course of a drug felony. However, in this case, the public’s interest outweighs any possible prejudice to the defendant.
With reference to my remaining reasons for dissenting, 3 through 5, the search for truth and the admission of evidence are governed by rules. Ours is an adversary process. The government is limited and is expected to observe the rules of adversary proceedings. The defendant likewise is subject to rules. Neither side in a criminal case can depend on the other side to supply evidence or arguments favorable to the opposing party, and neither side should depend on the trial judge to detect any possible prejudice to either side without being apprised of the possible prejudice, through objection or otherwise, by the parties.
With reference to the count by count waiver, the thrust of the enunciated new rule is that it would be unfair to a defendant to have his or her rights waived by the testimony or evidence of another defendant, especially in a case such as this one in which the defendant did not know of the evidence prior to its introduction. As pointed out in the discussion of the conspiracy count, a defendant who wishes to avoid waiver as a consequence of a codefendant's testimony can seek a severance from that eodefendant. A defendant should seek severance before trial if the grounds for severance are apparent at that time. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b), (f). Thomas could have avoided waiver by seeking a severance from Calloway. I would hold that if the grounds for a severance appear during the trial, as in this case, a defendant can seek, and a court can deny or grant, a severance at that time. However, Thomas made no pretrial motion for severance, and Thomas made no motion for severance at the time that Calloway’s testimony was introduced.1 I would hold that Thomas waived his opportunity to have his initial motion for acquittal reviewed solely on the basis of the government’s case because he failed to seek a severance at the time that Calloway’s testimony about Thomas giving him the gun was introduced. At this stage and subsequent thereto, Thomas failed to exercise any of the several options available to him and that failure to exercise his options constituted a waiver. I would hold that just as a defendant waives the opportunity for review of denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on a count solely on the basis of the government’s case by presenting evidence as to that count, a defendant likewise waives that opportunity by failing to take advantage of any of the several means to avoid the type of prejudice alleged in this case.
The majority in the instant case holds that a defendant who is denied a directed verdict of acquittal after the close of the government’s case can present rebuttal evidence as to some counts of the indictment while preserving for appellate review on the basis of the government’s case alone the motion for directed verdict as to the counts on which no rebuttal evidence was presented. The majority.notes that this is a question of first impression for this court.
The waiver rule sets up a bright-line distinction: if a defendant puts on evidence after denial of a motion for acquittal at the close of the government’s case, then that motion for acquittal is deemed waived. If the motion is renewed at the end of all the evidence, then “it is only the denial of the later motion that may be claimed as error. The conviction will be affirmed, even though the prosecution may have failed to make a prima facie case, if the evidence for the defense supplied the defect, and the whole record is sufficient to sustain the conviction.” 2 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 463 (2d ed. 1982 & supp. 1992) (citations omitted). The “count by count” waiver scheme proposed by the majority, however, disregards the waiver rule by failing to give sufficient weight to the fact that Thomas did not *708preservé his initial motion for acquittal by requesting a severance or a mistrial, or by even objecting at any point during the trial to the testimony that he now argues prejudiced him.
The policy behind the waiver rule is “that a defendant demonstrated to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of all the valid and admissible evidence will not be set free merely because, had an earlier erroneous ruling been made correctly, the trial would have ended before sufficient evidence to convict had been introduced. That balance between the procedural rights of the defendant and the protection of society might have been struck differently; but the fact is that it has not been.” United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1082, 1084-85 (D.C.Cir.1986). A trial judge, when ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence in a case should be able to consider all of the admissible evidence adduced at trial, and review of a trial judge’s determination in such a case should also be on the basis of all of the admissible evidence. The reasoning of the waiver rule where a defendant offers evidence in defense of a particular count should be applied here. The principle of waiver is applied to the gun count not because the defendant offered evidence in his defense of the conspiracy count (he offered no evidence as to the gun count) but because he did not exercise the various options described herein during the course of the trial.
I would further hold that even if the defendant objected, the trial court should be given the opportunity to weigh the public interest as set out above against any prejudice to the defendant. The court frequently weighs the admission of evidence on other motions, balancing competing interests such as set out in Rules 403, 404(b), and 609(a)(1), (b). I believe the trial judge should be given the opportunity to hear arguments pro and con with reference to motions regarding whether the evidence is sufficient and whether defendants or counts should be severed, and if, as in this case, the facts of one count are so inextricably interwoven with the other count, the public interest outweighs any prejudice that might accrue to the defendant by the submission of the case to the jury or denial of a motion to sever. The trial court’s familiarity with the totality of the evidence should only be overruled for compelling reasons and when it has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. In a case such as this one in which there is no alleged constitutional deprivation, the trial judge should have the right, after weighing the competing interests, to grant or deny a severance and, if denied, to submit the case to the jury, and those decisions should be given great deference by a reviewing court.
As it is common and proper for several defendants to be tried jointly on numerous counts, we should not tie the hands of the trial judge unnecessarily with numerous trials by reason of severance if a constitutional right is not involved and the facts of the various counts are so interwoven. Conversely, we should not unlock the handcuffs of a person whose guilt is supported by the totality of the evidence unless that person has been deprived of a constitutional right. We should be endeavoring to create a more just and efficient legal system, seeking to do justice based on the whole truth without unnecessary obstacles based on nonconstitutional grounds. For these reasons, I dissent from the reversal of Thomas’ conviction on the gun count.

. In fact, Calloway’s testimony that Thomas gave him the gun was admitted without objection by any party.