Court Opinion

ID: 9545585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:15:51.269603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:08.821117
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
(concurring and dissenting)
I join all of the majority opinion except that part holding the erroneous admission of evidence of three prior convictions to be harmless error. I agree with the State’s position and would reverse.
The standard for harmful error is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in the absence of the error. E.g., State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1987); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). In Knight, we discussed the meaning of “a reasonable likelihood.” Such a likelihood exists when the reviewing court’s confidence in the outcome is eroded; this erosion occurs at some point between a “mere possibility” and a “probability” of a different outcome. Knight, 734 P.2d at 920.
In the present case, the State conceded at oral argument that if we found rule 609(a) barred evidence of the three prior theft-type convictions, the trial court’s admission of that evidence was harmful error. Utah R.Evid. 609(a). I agree with the State. First, standing alone, proof of the three prior similar crimes presumptively had a strong tendency to suggest to the jury that defendant was guilty of the charged crime. In fact, it is the very power of prior-crimes evidence to produce convictions for bad character that underlies rule 609(a)’s hostility to such evidence. And our recent cases have shown that in this state, we have a very strong aversion to the gratuitous admission of evidence of prior crimes. See, e.g., State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 556-57 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 494-98 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring, joined by Stewart and Durham, JJ.).
Second, while the improper admission of such powerful evidence might be harmless in some cases, here the State did not have an overwhelming case. As the majority notes, three of the four eyewitnesses could not identify defendant at a subsequent lineup; in fact, two of them picked out another individual. The weaknesses of eyewitness identifications led to our decision in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), mandat*658ing cautionary instructions whenever such identifications are a central issue. In the present case, all the other evidence against defendant was circumstantial. The car in which he was riding at the time of arrest resembled a car that was seen near the robbery but was not directly connected to the robber. It is true that the amount of money found on defendant and his companion approximated the amount taken; however, the bills could not be traced to the robbery. At bottom, then, defendant’s conviction depends upon the eyewitnesses’ identifications, only one of which was even arguably solid.
Under all the circumstances, I conclude that absent the erroneous admission of the three prior convictions for similar offenses, there was a reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to defendant. The convictions should be reversed.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring and dissenting opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.