Court Opinion

ID: 9759431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:16:04.365378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:01.695458
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority that this case should be remanded to the court below for a hearing under Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975). Although I concur with the majority’s disposition of this case, I must confess that I do so with some hesitancy. This hesitancy arises because the order of the supreme court is not clearly phrased and therefore invites various interpretations. Assuming, however, that the majority does correctly fathom the directive of the supreme court to mean that first appellate counsel was ineffective, then we may properly consider only the first issue presented in this appeal, which is:
“I. Is not a criminal defendant, indicted for rape and statutory rape, denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel where his own lawyer, on direct examination, brings out before the jury the fact that the defendant has been on a previous occasion con*327victed of a sex-related offense with a young girl and where that prior conviction was not a felony, was not a misdemeanor in the nature of crimen falsi, and could not therefore have been used by the prosecutor for purposes of cross-examination?”
I agree with the majority that under the current state of the law we must remand this case in order to achieve a resolution of appellant’s claim. I do not find, however, that the appellant has claimed to this court that his trial counsel was ineffective in any other respect..
The remaining issues presented to this court for review are expressed by the appellant as follows:
“II. Does not the prosecuting attorney engage in misconduct requiring the granting of a new trial where he . asks the defendant, who has already testified on direct and who has denied committing the crimes charged, a question in the following form: ‘What would you say if I told you that your attorney told me that you told him [certain incriminating information]?’ ”
“III. Did not the trial court commit reversible error in excluding on defense counsel’s redirect examination any inquiry into the terms of a plea bargain of a co-defendant witness who had earlier pleaded guilty to the same charges pursuant to a plea bargain but whose testimony on direct was exculpatory of himself and of the non-guilty pleading defendants?”
“IV. Is there not insufficient evidence to support a conviction for forcible rape where the victims of the alleged rape testified that they shouted for help and screamed loudly, but defendants introduced the testimony of a witness, unrelated to any of the parties and unimpeached by cross-examination, who was approximately 30-40 yards from the scene of the alleged forcible rape and who testified that he heard no screams or shouts for help but only what sounded ‘like a beer party?’ ”
“V. Do not the offenses of corrupting the morals of a minor and assault and battery with intent to commit rape merge under Pennsylvania law with the more serious crime of forcible rape, and does not the crime of statutory *328rape itself merge with the crime of forcible rape where the underage prosecutrix testifies that she was forcibly raped against her consent?”
Clearly, the appellant does not set forth, or even suggest, a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel in any of the above-stated issues. We are therefore precluded from considering a claim of ineffective assistance in any of these issues. Pa.R.A.P. 2115; see also the per curiam order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Thomas Borris, No. 1341 Allocatur Docket (August 8, 1977).
I am further compelled to comment that the questions presented in issues IV and V above are exactly the same questions decided by this court in the appellant’s initial appeal. See Commonwealth v. Reidenbaugh, 238 Pa.Super. 14, 352 A.2d 446 (1975). The majority now accepts its earlier decision on issue IV, but reverses its decision on issue V. Certainly, a contrary conclusion by a majority of this court on the same issue with the same record in the same case is unwarranted. I would remand this case to the court below, and if the court below finds that trial counsel was ineffective, then a new trial should be awarded. If, however, the court below finds that the appellant was not denied effective counsel, then the same sentence should be imposed.
VAN der VOORT, J., joins in this opinion.