Court Opinion

ID: 9747189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:01:12.868923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:21.149064
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge KELLEY.
I respectfully dissent.
It is well settled that, in the case of an easement by express grant, the rights and liabilities of the parties are determined by the terms of the agreement and each has the right to insist that the terms of the agreement are complied with so that, as long as the easement is enjoyed, it will remain substantially the same as it was at the time that the right accrued. Minard Run Oil Company v. Pennzoil Company, 419 Pa. 334, 214 A.2d 234 (1965) (quoting Piro v. Shipley, 211 Pa. 36, 60 A. 325 (1905)). When reviewing an express easement, the language of the agreement, unless ambiguous, controls. Fedorko Properties, Inc. v. C.F. Zurn & Associates, 720 A.2d 147 (Pa.Super.1998). Where the terms of an express easement are general, ambiguous, and not defined in reference to the circumstances known to the parties at the time of execution, the express easement is to be construed in favor of the grantee. Lease v. Doll, 485 Pa. 615, 403 A.2d 558 (1979).1
In the instant case, the Grant of Easement executed by the parties provides, in pertinent part:
GRANTOR declares, makes know, and covenants for himself/herself, their heirs, successors and assigns, that the land described in the deed book and page mentioned above shall be restricted to agricultural and directly associated uses as hereafter defined....
1. Agricultural uses of land are defined, for the purposes of this instrument, as:
(a) The use of land for the production of plants and animals useful to man, including, but not limited to, forage, grain and field crops, pasturage, dairy and dairy products, poultry and poultry products, other live*1181stock and fowl and livestock and fowl products, including the breeding and grazing of any or all such animals, bees and apiary products, fruits and vegetables of all kinds, nursery, floral and greenhouse products, silviculture, aquaculture, and the primary processing and storage of the agricultural production of the Property and other similar and compatible uses.
2. Directly associated uses are defined as customary, supportive and agriculturally compatible uses of farm properties in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania and are limited to the following:
(a) The direct sale to the public of agricultural products produced principally on the farm;
(b) Any and all structures contributing to the production, primary processing, direct marketing and storage of agricultural products produced principally on the farm;
(c) Structures associated with the production of energy for use principally on the farm ...;
(d) The provision of services or production and sale, by persons in residence, of incidental agricultural goods services, supplies and repairs and/or the conduct of traditional trades and the production and sale of home occupation goods, arts and crafts, so long as these uses remain incidental to the open space and character of the farm and are limited to occupying residential and/or principally agricultural structures of the Property;
(e) Structures and facilities associated with irrigation, farm pond impoundment and soil and water conservation;
(f) The accommodation of tourists and other visitors within principally residential and/or agricultural structures of the farm Property so long as this use is incidental to the agricultural and open space character of the Property;
(g) Religious uses including the conduct of religious ceremony on the Property and family cemeteries.
(h) Other similar uses may be considered upon written request to the Lancaster County Agricultural Preserve Board.
4. All permitted non-agricultural structures shall, when feasible, be located in the immediate vicinity of existing structures, described as the homestead or curtilage, as reasonable expansions of the homestead or curtilage or on the area(s) of the Property of least productive capability. Such permitted structures shall, when feasible, utilize existing or common driveways, lanes or rights-of-way.
5. Institutional, industrial and commercial uses other than those associated uses described in restrictions 1 and 2 are prohibited.
12. The GRANTEE, its successors and assigns, shall have the right to enforce these Restrictions by injunction and other appropriate proceedings....
Reproduced Record at 10a-lla, 12a.
Thus, even if it is assumed that the provisions of what is commonly known as the Open Space Lands Act2 do not apply *1183in this case, and that the instant proposed access road to the school facilities is a use and a structure which are permitted under the express terms of the Grant of Easement 3, Section 2(h) of the Grant of Easement specifically provides that such “[o]ther similar uses may be considered upon written request to the Lancaster County Agricultural Preserve Board ....” Id. As a result, the permission of Lancaster County Agricultural Preserve Board was required in this case even if the proposed right-of-way and the access road structure do not violate the express terms of the Grant of Easement.4
Accordingly, unlike the Majority, I would affirm the trial court’s order in this case.

. See also Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.1 cmt. d ("In interpreting expressly created servitudes, the expressed intention of the parties is of primary importance. Their intention is ascertained from the servitude's language interpreted in light of all the circumstances. Relevant circumstances include the location and character of the properties burdened and benefited by the servitude, the use made of the properties before and after creation of the servitude, the character of the surrounding area, the existence and contours of any general plan of development for the area, and the consideration paid for the servitude....”).

. Act of January 19, 1968, P.L. (1967) 992, as amended, 32 P.S. §§ 5001 — 5013. Although I rely exclusively on the written provisions of the Grant of Easement, thereby rendering the application of the Open Space Lands Act unnecessary, I must comment on the Majority’s *1182interpretation and application of its provisions.
In its opinion, the Majority reads Section 11(a) of the Act to apply only to acquisitions from a local government unit, implying that the acquisition of the right-of-way must be from the government. See Majority Opinion at 15-16. In this case, the School District acquired the right-of-way from the servient property owners, and requested that the County either relinquish its easement over the right-of-way or approve the acquisition by the School District. The Majority’s reading of Section 11(a), therefore, would render County approval unnecessary because the right-of-way was not acquired "from a local government unit.” I strongly disagree with this interpretation.
Section 11(a) states that ownership by a local government unit "of an open space property interest shall not preclude the acquisition, by lease, purchase, or eminent domain, and the use of rights of way or underground gas storage rights in such property ... by ... [a] body entitled to exercise the power of eminent domain.” 32 P.S. § 5011(a). "Open space property interests” is defined in Section 2 of the Act as "[a]ny interest in real property acquired hereunder for the purpose of achieving open space benefits.” 32 P.S. § 5002. Although the provisions of Section 11(a) seem to only require approval where the "acquisition” is "from a local government unit”, I believe that the history of Section 11 mandates a contrary conclusion.
Prior to the 1996 amendment, Section 11 provided:
The ownership by the Commonwealth or a county of an open space property interest shall not preclude the acquisition, by lease, purchase, or eminent domain, and use of rights of way or underground gas storage rights in such property by a public utility or other body entitled to exercise the power of eminent domain, if in the case of acquisition by a body other than a public utility the State Planning Board, or, in the case of ownership by a county, the County Planning Commission, after notice to the Department of Forests and Waters or the Department of Agriculture as the case may be, after public hearing, shall approve such acquisition....
The pre-1996 language clearly illustrates that the State Planning Board was required to approve all acquisitions by a body other than a public utility except in the case of ownership by a County, in which case approval by the County Planning Commission was required. It is equally clear from the pre-1996 language that "ownership by a County” did not refer to ownership of the servient estate, but rather the "ownership” of an open space property interest. Because most of the property subject to open space easements remains in' private hands, the pre-1996 language required approval by either the State Planning Board or the County Planning Commission of any acquisition in the servient estate by a body entitled to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Prior to 1996, the Act allowed only the Commonwealth and the various counties to acquire open space property interests. The amendments to the Open Space Lands Act occasioned by Act 153 of 1996 expanded the original act to allow certain other local government units to acquire such interests. The bulk of the amendments contained in Act 153 relate to the addition of "local government units” and/or make necessary editorial changes to the Open Space Lands Act. The amendment to Section 11(a) was, I believe, intended to do nothing more than update that section. The current language of section 11(a) is ambiguous, as it leaves in doubt whether it was intended to apply only to the acquisition of servient estates owned by the government, or the acquisition of servient estates burdened by a government-owned open space easement. Accordingly, Section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921, requires us to ascertain the legislative intent from, inter alia, the object to be obtained by the statute, the former law and the consequences of a particular interpretation. The object to be obtained by the law is the preservation of open space, which would not be aided by the Majority's interpretation allowing an open space easement to be avoided whenever a local government seeks to acquire other property interests in the servient estate. The former law, as explained above, was clear in that State or County approval was required regardless of who owned the servient estate.
Finally, the consequences of the Majority’s interpretation would be that no approval is ever required where, as is most often the case, a private party retains ownership of the ser-vient estate. Such an interpretation would allow wholesale destruction of the easement based on the whim of the acquiring local government, and runs counter to the espoused purpose of the Open Space Lands Act. See Section 1, 32 P.S. § 5001 ("[T]he Legislature finds that it is important to preserve open space and to meet needs for recreation, *1183amenity, and conservation of natural resources, including farm land, forests, and a pure and adequate water supply. The acquisition and resale of property interests authorized by this act are hereby declared to be for the public benefit, for the advancement of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the citizens of the Commonwealth, and for the promotion of sound land development by preserving suitable open space and concentrating more dense development in nearby areas.”).

. If such a use and structure are not permitted under the express terms of the Grant of Easement, see Section 5 ("Institutional, industrial and commercial uses other than those associated uses described in restrictions 1 and 2 are prohibited.”), then Section 12 specifically empowers the Lancaster County Agricultural Preserve Board to "[e]nforce these Restrictions by injunction and other appropriate proceedings....”

. Cf. Redwood Construction Corp. v. Doombosch, 248 A.D.2d, 698, 699-700, 670 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561-562 (1998) ("[Hjere, the restrictive covenants set forth in West Branch’s conservation easement do not expressly address or prohibit the proposed use of the access way at issue. Rather, the conservation easement expressly reserved to the grantors the right to ‘sell, give away or otherwise convey the Protected Property or any portion or portions thereof, provided such conveyance is consistent with and subject to the terms of this Conservation Easement', and prohibited only those changes in use of the property as 'would be detrimental to any significant open space interest, significant natural habitat interest or other significant conservation interest sought to be protected by this Conservation Easement’. West Branch agreed not to unreasonably withhold its consent to a proposed change in use. Here, Redwood presented an unrebutted prima fa-cie case that its de minimis proposed use of the Doornbosch property would not be inconsistent with West Branch’s conservation easement. In any event, even assuming that the consent of West Branch was required for the conveyance of the Doornbosch easement, in light of the de minimis use sought, the court did not err in declaring, inter alia, that such consent was unreasonably withheld....”).