Court Opinion

ID: 9539860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:11:10.44832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:25.697531
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
The ambiguity inherent in the phrase “for value received” is, to me, readily apparent. “Value received” might mean one dollar, it might mean millions of dollars, it might mean rare paintings, it might mean precious stones, it might mean love and affection, or it might mean personal services performed, to name a few possibilities. Additionally, “for value received” is a generic phrase, preprinted on deeds, in form books, etc. Therefore, how can it be unambiguous when it is universally used in so many different situations to mean so many different things? The possibilities are endless, and the phrase doesn’t describe what the consideration was. The phrase being ambiguous, Mrs. Faull’s parol evidence was admissible to explain what the “value received” consisted of.
From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as “for value received” or “for one dollar and other valuable considerations,” parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance. Rosenberry v. Clark, 85 Idaho 317, 324, 379 P.2d 638, 642 (1963) (“Under certain conditions parol evidence may be introduced to show the true consideration, or want of consideration for a promissory note or other instrument.”); Reynolds Irr. Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949) (oral evidence offered to show what the “other valuable considerations” were should have been admitted); Boise Valley Construction Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by “other considerations”). See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a *496receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence).
Our sister states are in accord. A concise explanation of the applicable law is contained in Neils v. Deist, 180 Mont. 542, 591 P.2d 652, 655 (1979):
On the parol evidence question both the law of contracts generally and the law relating specifically to deeds allow parol evidence on the issue of consideration when the recital in the instrument is, as here, merely. a receipt (“for value received”).
“In a case in which the consideration for a written contract is mentioned merely by way of recital or as a receipt, the parol evidence rule does not preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show the true consideration____” 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 90; to the same effect, 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence §§ 1056 and 1057. “The tendency of modern times has been to regard the consideration clause in a deed merely in the light of a receipt and to allow parol evidence to explain the consideration for almost every purpose except to allow the grantor to avoid the deed where no fraud or mistake is shown.” 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 71.
“As a general rule, and in line with the modern tendency ... parol or extrinsic evidence ... is admissible to show the actual consideration for the conveyance____” 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 73.
Where a deed is the only instrument involved in a controversy, the stated consideration (“one dollar and other considerations”) can be explained by oral testimony. Warner v. Johns (1949), 122 Mont. 283, 201 P.2d 986.
See also State v. Wilson, 103 Ariz. 194, 438 P.2d 760, 764 (1968) (en banc) (“We have repeatedly held that the parol evidence rule does not prevent evidence of the true consideration for a deed.”).
In cases such as the one at bar, Professor Corbin states that the parol evidence rule only precludes the admission of parol evidence when it varies or contradicts the writing. 3 Corbin on Contracts § 573 (1960). In the instant case, however, the parol evidence offered by Mrs. Faull did not vary or contradict the writing. The deed stated that there was “value received,” and Mrs. Faull’s testimony simply explained what the “value received” was. Her testimony did not vary or contradict the deed. Stone v. Bradshaw, 64 Idaho 152, 159, 128 P.2d 844, 847 (1942) (“Testimony thus introduced [to explain what was meant by the language used in a document] merely defines or translates the language of the instrument. It does not vary or add to the terms of the writing and does not fall within the parol evidence rule.”). Accordingly, Mrs. Faull’s testimony did not violate the parol evidence rule.
Today’s decision also runs counter to this Court’s unanimous opinion in Russ Ballard & Family Achievement Institute v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 548 P.2d 72 (1976), and subsequent cases.7 There, it was “undisputed that title to the real property ... was in Frank and Cecelia Jouglard who transferred it to Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc.” 97 Idaho at 579, 548 P.2d at 79. Nevertheless, one Irick (and the parties claiming through him) alleged that he had an ownership interest in the property. Rather than summarily ruling that the undisputed title to the property could not be varied or amended by parol evidence, this Court ruled that parol evidence could be offered, but that it must be “clear, satisfactory and convincing” proof in order for Irick to prevail. We stated:
The law presumes that the holder of title to property is the owner thereof [citations omitted]. The effect of this presumption is that:
*497“[0]ne who would claim the ownership of property of which the legal title stands of record in another, or that the same is held by such person in trust for the one so claiming, must establish such claim by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and convincing. [Citations omitted.]”
97 Idaho at 579, 548 P.2d at 79. Hence, in Lava Hot Springs this Court unanimously held that the undisputed title to real property could be varied or amended via parol evidence if that evidence was “clear, satisfactory and convincing.” The Court’s opinion today, however, makes no such allowance. Neither does it explain why the Lava Hot Springs rule should not apply in the instant case. Instead, the majority simply summarily assumes that “[w]here the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous the intention of the parties must be determined from the deed itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to show intent.” Ante at 484, 777 P.2d at 256. However, several of our cases have held otherwise, particularly our unanimous decision in the Lava Hot Springs case. The deed in Lava Hot Springs was just as “unambiguous” as the deed in the instant case; in fact, title to the real property involved in Lava Hot Springs was undisputed. 97 Idaho at 579, 548 P.2d at 79. Lava Hot Springs, it seems to me, is controlling, and under it Mrs. Faull’s testimony was properly admitted. The majority makes no analysis of the Lava Hot Springs case, presumably because they conclude that decision is distinguishable. It would be helpful to know upon what basis it is being distinguished.
In any event, the phrase “for value received” is inherently ambiguous. This Court and other courts have already held that parol evidence is admissible when a deed is ambiguous, or merely recites that it was given “for value received.” And finally, the Court errs when it fails to apply the Lava Hot Springs case without giving any explanation of its rationale for not doing so.
I would affirm the judgments of the district court and the magistrate court which made the factual determinations in this case.

. See, e.g., Lynch v. Cheney, 98 Idaho 238, 561 P.2d 380 (1977); Collins v. Parkinson, 98 Idaho 871, 574 P.2d 913 (1978); Ed Sparks & Sons v. Joe Campbell Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 139, 578 P.2d 681 (1978); Estate of Courtright v. Robertson, 99 Idaho 575, 586 P.2d 265 (1978); Aztec Limited, Inc. v. Creekside Investment Co., 100 Idaho 566, 602 P.2d 64 (1979); M.K. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 612 P.2d 1192 (1980); State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 615 P.2d 116 (1980).