Court Opinion

ID: 9729621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:45:06.313616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.222550
License: Public Domain

BUCHANAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur with the majority’s treatment of the second issue, but I must respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the trial court’s decision to modify the child support order.
The only change in circumstances relied upon by the trial court was the fact that ten years had passed since the original decree had been issued (Finding # 4). The trial court simply assumed a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. There is no evidence to that effect.
The supreme court’s decision in Crowe v. Crowe (1965), 247 Ind. 51, 211 N.E.2d 164, was decided before the current statutory scheme requiring “substantial and continuing” changed circumstances was in place. At the time of that decision, the general rule was that a trial court could modify a custody or support decree “at any time during the dependency of the children, as the circumstances of the parents may require and in order best to serve the interests and welfare of the children involved.” Haag v. Haag (1959), 240 Ind. 291, 298, 163 N.E.2d 243, 245.
In 1973, the current statute, Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-17 (1988), was enacted. As the statute now requires a substantial change in circumstances to justify a modification, the rule enunciated in Crowe, that time alone was a sufficient change in circumstances to justify modification, is no longer valid. Crowe is not on point.
While I agree that the passage of time may be a factor the court may consider when determining whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, see Blichenstaff v. Blichenstaff (1989), Ind. App., 539 N.E.2d 41; Estate of Brummett v. Brummett (1984), Ind.App., 472 N.E.2d 616; Hunt v. Hunt (1984), Ind.App., 465 N.E.2d 203, standing alone the passage of time is not sufficient. See Blichenstaff supra.
An examination of the record reveals no other change in circumstances that could be used to bolster the trial court’s decision. Dana was not even present at the hearing, and she gave no evidence as to any specific changes in the cost of raising the children whatsoever. While evidence of both Terry’s and Dana’s income was introduced, there was no evidence as to what the parties’ income was at the time of the dissolution; therefore Dana failed to establish that Terry’s income had improved at all. There really was no evidence of any change other than the passage of time with its attendant inflation.
The majority also suggests that modification is warranted because of the difference between the original child support award and the amount that would be awarded pursuant to the Ind. Rules of Procedure, Child Support Guidelines. This court, however, has specifically rejected the proposition that such a difference constitutes a substantial change in circumstances. Stierwalt v. Dyer (1988), Ind.App., 531 N.E.2d 1213. The Guidelines are to be used only after a determination has been made that *159circumstances have substantially changed. Id.1
As there was not even a scintilla of evidence of actual changed circumstances presented to the trial court, the trial court’s assumption that circumstances had changed substantially is unsupported.
Even if the trial court could properly conclude a substantial change in circumstances had occurred, modification is, nevertheless, unwarranted. The modification statute provided that the change in circumstances must be “so substantial and continuing as to make the terms [of the original child support order] unreasonable.” IC 31-1-11.5-17(a) (1988) (emphasis supplied).
The statute does not provide that all substantial changes in circumstances necessitate modification, but only those substantial changes that render the original support terms unreasonable. Logically, a decision that the terms of a support order are unreasonable necessarily requires consideration of the present condition of the children and a determination that the present support order fails to satisfy the children’s needs.
The record does not support a determination that the terms of the original support order are unreasonable. Nothing suggests that the children’s needs are not being met by the original order. As there was absolutely no evidence of children’s present condition submitted to the trial court, there was no basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the terms of the original order were unreasonable.
I find it somewhat quixotic to come to the aid of a trial court’s modification of a support order when there is no evidence of a substantial change in circumstances or that the children’s present conditions render the original order unreasonable, accomplishing this result by presuming the passage of time has filled the evidentiary void.
The trial court’s judgment should be reversed.

. As IC 31-1-11.5-17 was amended by P.L. 155— 1990 to provide for modification if the Guidelines’ award differs by more than 20% from the current order, this rule applies only to those modification awards made prior to the July 1, 1990, effective date of the amendment.