Court Opinion

ID: 9838539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 18:08:19.33709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:38.046564
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JULIA MCGLOTHLIN,                         )
                                          )
     Plaintiff,                           )
                                          )
            v.                            )     C.A. No. N20C-08-186 FWW
                                          )
PETRUNICH ORAL &                          )
MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY,                    )
                                          )
     Defendant.                           )

                          Submitted: June 30, 2023
                         Decided: September 6, 2023

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

    Upon Plaintiff Julia McGlothlin’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs:
                  GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

         Upon Plaintiff Julia McGlothlin’s Motion for Final Judgment:
                 GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Michele D. Allen, Esquire and Delia A. Clark, Esquire, ALLEN & ASSOCIATES,
4250 Lancaster Pike, Suite 230, Wilmington, Delaware 19805, Attorneys for
Plaintiff, Julia McGlothlin.

Daniel C. Herr, Esquire, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL C. HERR LLC, 1225 North
King Street, Suite 1000, Wilmington, Delaware 19801, Attorney for Defendant,
Petrunich Oral & Maxillofacial Surgery.

WHARTON, J.
                             I.    INTRODUCTION.

      Following a three-day trial, a jury found that Defendant Petrunich Oral &

Maxillofacial Surgery (“Petrunich Surgery”) intentionally discriminated against its

former employee, Plaintiff Julia McGlothlin (“McGlothlin”), on the basis of her sex

and pregnancy as well as on the basis of her need to tend to her family

responsibilities related to her pregnancy. The jury awarded McGlothlin $26,000 in

back pay and a total of $100,000 in punitive damages. McGlothlin now moves for

attorney’s fees, litigation costs, final judgment, and prejudgment interest. Petrunich

Surgery opposes McGlothlin’s Motion for Fees and Costs and partially opposes her

Motion for Final Judgment. For the reasons stated below, both of McGlothlin’s

motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

               II.    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.1

      McGlothlin filed her five-count Complaint on August 24, 2020.2 Two counts

survived Petrunich Surgery’s Motion for Summary Judgment.3 After mediation and

1
  The Court only addresses those facts necessary for the current Memorandum
Opinion and Order. A more thorough recitation of the factual background may be
found in the Court’s summary judgment decision, McGlothlin v. Petrunich Oral &
Maxillofacial Surgery, 2022 WL 2783811 (Del. Super. Ct. July 15, 2022).
2
  D.I. 1. Count 1 Sex and Pregnancy Discrimination in Violation of the Delaware
Discrimination in Employment Act (“DDEA”); Count 2 Violations of the Delaware
Family Responsibilities Act (“DFRA”); Count 3 Violation of the Delaware Persons
with Disabilities in Employment Protection Act (“DPDEPA”); Count 4 Failure to
Accommodate in Violation of DPDEPA; and Count 5, Violation of the Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing (voluntarily dismissed).
3
  McGlothlin, 2022 WL 2783811, at *8.
                                        2
settlement discussions failed, the case went to trial.4 At trial, the jury was asked to

determine whether Petrunich Surgery intentionally discriminated against

McGlothlin on the basis of her sex and pregnancy5 and whether Petrunich Surgery

intentionally discriminated against McGlothlin on the basis of her need to tend to

her family responsibilities related to her pregnancy.6

      The trial took place from March 20, 2023 to March 22, 2023. At trial, both

parties called witnesses and entered exhibits. McGlothlin called four witnesses –

Sandra Anderson, a human relations consultant employed by Petrunich Surgery’s

accounting firm; Dr. Petrunich; Emily Martin, a former Petrunich Surgery employee;

and herself.7 Petrunich Surgery called Dr. Petrunich, Alexis Sharpes, and Melissa

4
  Herr Aff., Def.’s Resp. in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Fees and Costs, D.I. 71 (entry
dated “12/16/2022” stating “discuss case/settlement with client; make 65k offer to
M. Allen[.]”); “Plaintiff asserted five counts in this litigation. After Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, two counts remained. Plaintiff demanded $250,000
on March 13, 2023 to resolve this litigation. Defendant rejected this demand and the
matter proceeded to trial a week later.” Def.’s Resp. in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Fees
and Costs, at ⁋1, D.I. 71.
5
  The Court granted partial Summary Judgment on this count (“Defendant Petrunich
Oral & Maxillofacial Surgery’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to
Count I, (but only as to Plaintiff Julia McGlothlin’s claims that she was subjected to
discriminatory conduct when she was refused pregnancy related accommodations to
be excused from taking x-rays and for more frequent bathroom breaks) … [and]
DENIED as to Count I, (but only as to Plaintiff Julia McGlothlin’s claim that she
was refused pregnancy leave when she was terminated while on leave)[.]”
McGlothlin, 2022 WL 2783811, at *8; Jury Verdict Form, D.I. 66.
6
  Jury Verdict Form, D.I. 66.
7
  In support of her economic damages claim, McGlothlin explained that her yearly
salary at Petrunich was $52,000 (excluding bonuses). Since her termination,
however, she was unable to find a similarly well-paying job. Based on her initial
                                           3
Nowocin, both former Petrunich Surgery employees.           Neither party played any

portions of video depositions, nor were any deposition transcripts entered into

evidence.

      Following the presentation of evidence, the jury returned verdicts in

McGlothlin’s favor.8 It awarded her $26,000 in back pay and $50,000 in punitive

damages on each count, for an aggregate of $126,000 in damages.9

      In her Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, McGlothlin seeks $130,910.50

in attorney’s fees and $4,669.84 in litigation costs. In her Motion for Final Judgment

she asks for $28,778.48 in prejudgment interest on the total damages awarded by the

jury from August 24, 2020, the date she filed her Complaint, until the jury returned

its verdict on March 22, 2023.10

      In its Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees and Costs,

Petrunich Surgery argues for a significant reduction in attorney’s fees,11 and “objects

to all costs and [argues that] the Court should exercise its discretion to award little

to no costs.”12 In its Response in Partial Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Final

calculations, she suffered a loss of approximately $130,000. After cross-
examination, highlighting some mathematical errors, McGlothlin arrived at a re-
calculated loss of $125,800.
8
  Jury Verdict Form, D.I. 66.
9
  Id.
10
   Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, D.I. 68.
11
   Def.’s Resp. in Opp. To Pl.’s Mot. for Fees and Costs, passim, D.I. 71.
12
   Id. at ⁋17 (citation omitted).
                                           4
Judgment, Petrunich Surgery agrees that prejudgment interest should be awarded,

but in the amount of $3,515.32 for the $26,000 back pay award only.13

      McGlothlin submitted replies to Petrunich Surgery’s Response to the Motion

or Attorney’s Fees and Costs14 and its Response in Partial Opposition the Motion for

Final Judgment.15 In those replies, McGlothlin acknowledges that she is entitled to

pretrial interest on compensatory damages only16 and that some of the costs for

which she seeks reimbursement may not qualify to be taxed as costs.17

                    III.   THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS.

A.    Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

      1. Attorney’s Fees.

      McGlothlin argues that, as the prevailing party, the Court should award her

reasonable attorney’s fees.18 In support of her request for $130,910.50 in attorney’s

fees, McGlothlin submitted a comprehensive Activities Export,19 a copy of the Pre-

Lit Contingency Fee Agreement (“the Agreement”),20 and an affidavit from attorney

James H. McMackin, III (“McMackin”).21 In her affidavit, McGlothlin’s attorney,

13
   Id. at ⁋⁋4–7.
14
   Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, D.I. 75.
15
   Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Final Judgment, D.I. 76.
16
   Id. ⁋1.
17
   Pl.’s Mot. in Support of Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, at ⁋18, D.I. 75.
18
   Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, at ⁋1, D.I. 67.
19
   Id. at Ex. A-1.
20
   Id. at Ex. A-2.
21
   McMackin Aff., Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Ex. B, D.I. 67.
                                          5
Michele Allen (“Allen”), claims that “[a]ll of the legal services rendered by [her]

and [her] firm and the expenses incurred … were, in [her] professional opinion,

necessary to obtain the favorable result achieved for Plaintiff[.]”22

      The Activities Export is a 77-page line-item “contemporaneous” account of

counsel’s actions throughout litigation.23 In the written motion, McGlothlin presents

a brief list of items for which she is seeking reimbursement.24 She does not,

however, cite to any supporting case law, nor does she group any of the proffered

items based on compensability.

      The Agreement, titled “Re: Pre-Lit Contingency Fee Agreement,”25 states in

relevant part that Allen & Associates is handling the case “for a 33% contingency

fee or reimbursement of hourly rate, whichever is higher.”26 It is e-signed by Allen

and McGlothlin.27

      In his affidavit, McMackin explains that he knows that Allen has decades of

experience as an attorney, justifying her hourly billing rate of $325.28 He similarly

claims that the rates billed by her “associates, law clerks and paralegals referenced

in the motion for attorney’s fees are reasonable and customary for this type of

22
   Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Ex. A, at ¶8, D.I. 67.
23
   Id. at ¶3a.
24
   Id. at ¶3b.
25
   Id. at Ex. A-2.
26
   Id. at Ex. A-2.
27
   Id.
28
   Id. at Ex. B, passim.
                                         6
litigation.”29 McMackin also states that he was “advised as to the amount of work

performed and reviewed the Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and supporting

documents.”30

      Petrunich Surgery opposes an award of $130,910.50 in attorney’s fees. It

argues that since this was a “basic case,” it did “not … require[] several attorneys

plus several staff members. [The] matter most certainly did not require two attorneys

and a law clerk for Plaintiff at trial.”31    Pointing to the Delaware Rules of

Professional Conduct,32 alleging problems with the contingency fee agreement,33

and calling the requested amount “extreme[,]”34 it claims that the agreed-upon

contingency of 33% should be awarded.35 If, however, the Court finds “that Plaintiff

is entitled to more than 33% of $126,000, then it should be a substantial discount

against $53,332.50 (164.1 hours multiplied by Ms. Allen’s rate of $325 per hour).”36

Petrunich Surgery “eliminated 40% of Plaintiffs’ [sic] claims, so a discount against

$53,332.50 should be applied.”37

29
   Id. at Ex. B, ⁋6.
30
   Id. at Ex. B, ⁋4.
31
   Def.’s Resp. in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Fees and Costs, at ⁋12, D.I. 71.
32
   Id. at ⁋⁋2–5.
33
    E.g., “A contingency fee must be premised on the success of the client, not
unreasonable phantom billing.” Id. at ⁋10.
34
   Id. at ⁋11. It emphasizes that the requested amount “equates to an approximate
104% contingency fee in comparison to the $126,000 award.” Id. at ⁋4.
35
   Id. passim.
36
   Id. at ⁋13. This amount is what counsel for Petrunich Surgery billed.
37
   Def.’s Resp. in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Fees and Costs, at ⁋13, D.I. 71.
                                           7
      2.     Litigation Costs.

      In support of her request for $4,669.84 in litigation costs, McGlothlin submits

another multi-page Activities Export.38 She summarizes her request for costs as

including: “filing fees, deposition transcript fees, service fees, copying, witness fees

and reproduction, etc.”39

      Petrunich Surgery argues that since no depositions or medical records were

admitted into evidence, none of the associated costs should be assessed against it.40

It also argues against assessing it reproduction costs since “Plaintiff has not

substantiated what portions, if any, … were actually used at trial” 41 and the

mediation fee since McGlothlin “only recovered half of her final pre-trial demand.”42

The gravamen of Petrunich Surgery’s objections is that “the Court should exercise

its discretion to award little to no costs” because “Plaintiff has abdicated her

responsibilities to indicate what, precisely, is statutorily authorized to be taxed to

Defendant as a cost.”43

B.    Motion for Final Judgment.

38
   Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Ex. A-3, D.I. 67.
39
   Allen Aff., Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Ex. A, at ⁋14, D.I. 67.
40
   Id. at ⁋14.
41
   Id. at⁋15.
42
   Id. at ⁋16.
43
   Id. at ⁋17 (citations omitted).
                                           8
      McGlothlin claims entitlement to prejudgment interest “at the rate of 5% over

prime from the date of the filing of the Complaint on all damages pursuant to 6 Del.

C §2301(a).”44 In support of her request for $28,778.48 in prejudgment interest

(calculated using the full $126,000 jury award) McGlothlin provides the Court with

a table purporting to show the breakdown of her prejudgment interest calculations.45

The table sets out nine time frames of differing durations with corresponding interest

amounts, but provides no explanation of how those dates were chosen or how the

interest amounts were calculated.46

      Petrunich Surgery argues that 6 Del. C. §2301(a) calls for the award of 5.25%

interest; 5% over the Federal Discount Rate at the time the Complaint was filed, not

the prime rate as McGlothlin contends.47 It also argues that “Delaware law is well

settled that pre-judgment interest on compensatory damages is awarded as a matter

of right and is not subject to judicial discretion.”48 So, it claims that 5.25%

prejudgment interest must only be applied to the awarded $26,000 in compensatory

back pay,49 for a total of $3,515.32 in prejudgment interest.50 It reaches that amount

44
   Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋2a, D.I. 68.
45
   Id. at ⁋2b; Ex. 2.
46
   Id.
47
   Def.’s Resp. in Partial Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋⁋1–3, D.I. 72.
48
   Id. at ⁋4 (quoting Salaman v. National Media Corp., 1994 WL 465535, at *1 (Del.
Super. Ct. July 22, 1994).
49
   Id. at ⁋⁋3–7.
50
   Id. at ⁋3.
                                           9
by multiplying $26,000 by 5.25% to arrive at a yearly interest of $1,365, or $3.7397

per day multiplied by 940 days between August 24, 2020 and March 23, 2023.51

      McGlothlin replied to Petrunich Surgery’s Response to her Motion for Final

Judgment.52 In her Reply, she concedes that she is not entitled to prejudgment

interest on the punitive damages award.53 She states her Motion for Final Judgment

sought prejudgment interest at “the rate of 5% plus the discount rate from the date

of the filing of the Complaint”54 eliding her original contention that prejudgment

interest was based on the prime rate.       She also adjusts the date she alleges

prejudgment interest began accruing from the date she filed her Complaint – August

24, 2020 – to the date of the violation – July 3, 2019 when the Federal Reserve

Discount Rate was 3.00%.55 Noting that Petrunich Surgery employed a fixed rate in

its calculations, she abandons her prior variable interest rate methodology and adopts

a fixed rate calculation as well.56 According to McGlothlin, 5% over a fixed discount

rate of 3.00% from July 3, 2019 through March 22, 2023 would result in yearly

interest of $2,080.00, with a daily rate of $5.70.57 She calculates there to be 1,358

51
   Id.
52
   Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Final Judgment, D.I. 76.
53
   Id. at ⁋1.
54
   Id.
55
   Id. at ⁋⁋2,3.
56
   Id. at ⁋⁋1,3
57
   Id. at ⁋3.
                                         10
days between the injury and the award, yielding a total of $7,740.60 in prejudgment

interest.58

                        IV.    STANDARD OF REVIEW.

       For attorney’s fees, “[t]he general rule in Delaware is that attorney’s fees are

not awarded to the prevailing party.”59 The Court may, however, order the payment

of attorney’s fees if “authorized by some provision of statute or contract.”60

Importantly, “[t]he party seeking the attorneys’ fees … bears the burden of

establishing the reasonableness of the amount sought.”61         When assessing the

reasonableness of a potential fee, the Court must be guided by Rule 1.5(a) of the

Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.62            Here, the fee shifting

provision of 19 Del. C. § 715(d) applies.

58
   Id.
59
    Dreisbach v. Walton, 2014 WL 5426868, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 27,
2014)(citation omitted).
60
   Id.
61
   Glob. Link Logistics, Inc. v. Olympus Growth Fund III, L.P., 2010 WL 692752, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010)(citations omitted); 19 Del. C. §715(d).
62
    Mahani v. Edix Media Group, Inc., 935 A.2d 242 (Del. 2007)(the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the Chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees and other costs
“because the Chancellor properly weighed all the factors listed in Rule 1.5(a) of the
Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.”)(Mahani, 935 A.2d at 243)).
                                         11
      The prevailing party is generally entitled to an award of costs upon entry of a

final judgment,63 subject to the trial court’s discretion.64 These costs may include

court filing fees,65 costs of depositions (so long as the video and/or transcript is

introduced at trial),66 and the costs of mediation.67 When costs are awarded as “a

matter of course,” the court has the discretion to determine how much to award,

“consider[ing] … whether the cost reasonably could have been avoided.”68 “The

Courts will not award costs, however, if the request for a certain fee is not

substantiated by the prevailing party.”69

      Prejudgment interest is awarded as a matter of right.70 “[I]nterest accumulates

from the date payment was due the plaintiff, because full compensation requires an

allowance for the detention of the compensation awarded and interest is used as a

basis for measuring that allowance.”71 When the parties have not agreed to a rate,

63
   10 Del. C. §5101; Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(d).
64
   Bishop v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 2019 WL 2009331, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.,
May 3, 2019) (“Generally speaking, the decision to award costs is left to the
discretion of the trial court.”)(citations omitted).
65
    E.g., Cooke v. Murphy, 2013 WL 6916941 at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 26,
2013)(citations omitted).
66
   Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(f)–(h); 10 Del. C. § 8906.
67
   Cooke, 2013 WL 6916941 at *6.
68
   Dreisbach, 2014 WL 5426868 at *4 (citation omitted).
69
   Russo v. Medlab Clinical Testing, Inc., 2001 WL 34082277, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct.
Nov. 14, 2001).
70
   Brandywine Smyrna, Inc. v. Millennium Builders, LLC, 34 A.3d 482, 486 (Del.
2011)(quoting Moskowitz v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 391 A.2d 209, 210
(Del. 1978)).
71
   Id.
                                            12
“the legal rate of interest shall be 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate

including any surcharge as of the time from which interest is due[.]”72

                               V.     DISCUSSION.

A.     Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

       1. Attorney’s Fees.

       Pursuant to 19 Del. C. §715(d)’s fee shifting provision, McGlothlin seeks

$130,910.50 for a total of 589.7 hours of work billed by several attorneys, law clerks,

associates, and paralegals. She provides the Court 77 pages of “contemporaneous

time records.” In determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to award,

the Court must be guided by Rule 1.5’s non-exhaustive list of factors.73 The factors

are:

       1) [T]he time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
       involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
       2) [T]he likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
       particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
       3) [T]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
       4) [T]he amount involved and the results obtained;
       5) [T]he time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
       6) [T]he nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
       7) [T]he experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
       performing the services; and
       8) [W]hether the fee is fixed or contingent.74

72
   6 Del. C. §2301(a).
73
   Mahani, 935 A.2d at 243.
74
   DRPC Rule 1.5.
                                          13
      Not all of those factors are pertinent here. The Court is unaware of any

likelihood that McGlothlin was aware that representing her would preclude Allen

from accepting other employment (factor 2), nor is the Court aware of any time

limitations imposed by McGlothlin or by the circumstances (factor 5).

      Other factors, all of which support the fee application, require little discussion.

The fee is within the customary hourly range (factor 3);75 Allen & Associates was

involved in this case from the onset (factor 6);76 and Allen has a great deal of

experience, a positive reputation, and is a competent attorney (factor 7).77

      The remaining factors require more in depth analysis. The first factor takes

into account the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions

involved, and the skill required to properly perform the legal services. There was

nothing extraordinary about the time and labor required here.            Allen filed a

complaint, engaged in routine written discovery, participated in depositions of her

client, Dr. Petrunich, and four others, participated in mediation, defended Petrunich

Surgery’s summary judgment motion, moved in limine to exclude certain evidence,

and prepared for and tried the case.78 The trial itself was short and uncomplicated.

A total of six individual witnesses testified,79 all of whom were lay witnesses. This

75
   McMackin, Aff., Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Ex. B, at ⁋6, D.I. 67.
76
   See Compl., D.I. 1.
77
   McMackin, Aff., Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Ex. B., D.I. 67.
78
   See, Docket.
79
   Dr. Petrunich testified twice, once for each side.
                                           14
case was, as Petrunich Surgery described it, “a basic case.”80           From a labor

standpoint, the case was significantly overstaffed. The case simply did not require

two lawyers, and four law clerks/paralegals,81 including one law clerk/ paralegal at

trial to “assist with note preparation and coordination of witnesses.”82 Given that

two of the four witnesses McGlothlin called – Dr. Petrunich and herself – were

present at all times in the courtroom and lawyers are fully capable of taking their

own notes, the presence of this paralegal in the courtroom for the entire trial seems

unnecessary. For an experienced practitioner accustomed to litigating disability and

discrimination claims, as Allen is, this case presented no novel or difficult questions.

Further, the skill necessary to perform the legal service properly is that of a

reasonably competent civil trial lawyer practicing in the area.

      The Court next looks at the fee amount requested and the results obtained.

Naturally, any case where the attorney is requesting fees in excess of the amount the

jury awarded the client presents an optics problem. Here, that problem is mitigated

to some degree by the fact that the fee request and the client’s recovery, when

prejudgment interest is included, are comparable. The Court also is mindful of the

80
   Def.’s Resp. in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Fees and Costs, at ⁋12, D.I. 71.
81
   The Court appreciates that Allen & Associates experienced employee turnover.
Nevertheless, it appears at least four lawyers worked on the case in addition to law
clerks and paralegals, although not concurrently. Id. at ⁋21.
82
   Allen Supp. Aff., Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs,
at ⁋20, D.I. 75.
                                          15
societal interest to be served by fairly compensating attorneys representing clients

who are victims of discrimination. Absent fair compensation, lawyers would be

unlikely to take on representation of those clients and those guilty of discrimination

would go unpunished,

      There is no doubt that McGlothlin prevailed. But, that victory was not a

resounding one. McGlothlin’s Complaint originally alleged five counts. 83 She

voluntarily agreed to dismiss one of them.84 The Court granted summary judgment

in favor of Petrunich Surgery on two and partial summary judgment on the third.85

Only one count survived intact.86 Further, the jury’s verdict was mixed. Although

McGlothlin argued for $125,800 in total lost wages,87 the jury only awarded her

$26,000 in back pay and no front pay.88 It awarded her no other compensatory

damages on either her sex and pregnancy discrimination claim or her claim based on

her need to tend to her family responsibilities related to her pregnancy.89 The jury

awarded her $50,000 in punitive damages on each of those claims. Thus, the

outcome was decidedly mixed.

83
   Complaint, D.I. 1.
84
   McGlothlin, 2022 WL 2783811, at *8.
85
   Id.
86
   Id.
87
   On direct examination, McGlothlin claimed a total loss of $130,000, but adjusted
that figure to $125,800 after mathematical errors were pointed out on cross-
examination.
88
   Jury Verdict Form, D.I. 66.
89
   Id.
                                       16
      The last factor the Court considers is whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

The arrangement here is a hybrid – a contingency fee of 33% or and hourly rate,

whichever is greater.90 The higher here is the hourly fee. Petrunich Surgery raises

and ethical issue with the structure of the fee agreement, but the Court need not

engage in that dispute. It simply notes the differential between what Allen’s fee

would have been if it were a contingency fee versus the hourly fee she is requesting.

      The factors set out in Rule 1.5 are not exclusive and the Court may consider

other factors as well. As McGlothlin notes in her Reply in Support of the Motion

for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, “[T]he determination of reasonable fees begins by

examining the number of hours reasonably expended on the case multiplied by a

reasonable hourly rate. Excluded from the calculation are hours which are excessive,

redundant or otherwise unnecessary.”91 The Court finds significant the relative

amounts of time expended on behalf of the parties. Petrunich Surgery’s defense

devoted 164.1 hours to the case, doing what it describes as “the same – and likely –

more substantive work” as work done on behalf of McGlothlin.92 In contrast,

McGlothlin’s team spent more than three and a half times as many hours - 589.7 -

working on her behalf, split among lawyers, paralegals and law clerks. 93 While the

90
   Allen Aff., Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Ex. A-2, D.I. 67.
91
   Pl.’s Reply in Support of the Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, at ⁋6 (citing
Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)), D.I. 75.
92
   Herr Aff., Def.’s Resp. in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Fees and Costs, at ⁋9, D.I. 72.
93
   Pl.’s Mot for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, at ⁋3.a., D.I. 67.
                                          17
Court accords some deference to the party initiating a lawsuit and having the burden

of proof, the disparity is striking and supports the Court’s conclusion that

McGlothlin’s team was significantly overstaffed.

      The factors that this Court is to consider in determining reasonable attorney’s

fees are mixed. But, on balance, the Court finds that McGlothlin’s request is

unreasonable. The case was routine, the results mixed, and McGlothlin’s team

significantly overstaffed. Also unreasonable is Petrunich Surgery’s suggestion that

the Court award a 33% contingency fee of $42,000. Determining a reasonable fee

is necessarily an imprecise exercise. For example, the Court cannot simply parse

the Activities Export and subtract charges attributable to extra attorneys or

paralegals. Some amount of those tasks would have to be performed by someone

else resulting in some charge. Nonetheless, considering all of the above, the Court

finds an award of $85,000 in attorney’s fees to be reasonable.94

      2.     Litigation Costs.

      Superior Court Civil Rule 54(b) provides that “costs shall be allowed as of

course to the prevailing party upon application to the Court within ten (10) days of

entry of final judgment unless the Court otherwise directs.”95 Awarding costs is a

94
   If the $85,000 were attributable all to Allen, it would represent 261.5 hours at
her rate of $325 per hour – still nearly 120 hours more than Herr. If she worked
the same amount of hours as Herr, her fee would be $53,332.50.
95
   Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(d).
                                           18
matter of judicial discretion,96 but, generally, the prevailing party is entitled to

costs.97 McGlothlin is the prevailing party and, therefore, is entitled to costs. The

question is what costs.

      In her Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, McGlothlin asks for $4,669.84

in costs incurred for filing, payment for medical records, service of process fees,

mediation fee, reporter fees, reproduction costs and witness fees.98 She attaches an

itemization of those costs to Allen’s affidavit, but does not group them by category.99

      In its Response, Petrunich Surgery argues that McGlothlin fails to supply any

bases for her claimed costs.100 It contends that, since no deposition transcripts or

medical records were introduced into evidence, costs for those items are not

chargeable to it, nor are subpoena costs related to the depositions.101 McGlothlin’s

failure to substantiate what reproductions actually were used at trial precludes

recovery for them, according to Petrunich Surgery.102 It also disputes McGlothlin’s

request for reimbursement of the mediation fee because McGlothlin’s jury award of

96
   Phelps v. West, 2018 WL, 1341704, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 20189)
(citing Olson v. A-del. Constr. Co., Inc. 2014 WL 1325909, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.
Feb. 12, 1014)).
97
   Id. (citing Bodley v. Jones, 65 A. 2d 484, 487 (Del. Ch. 1948)).
98
   Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, at ⁋4, D.I. 67.
99
   Allen Aff., Id. at Ex. A-3.
100
    Def.’s Resp. in Opp. at ⁋⁋14-17, D.I. 71.
101
    Id. at ⁋14.
102
    Id. at ⁋
                                          19
$126,000 was less than her demand of $250,000.103 Finally, Petrunich Surgery

submits, because McGlothlin “has abdicated her responsibilities to indicate what,

precisely, is statutorily authorized to be taxed to Defendant as a cost,” the Court

should award “little to no costs.”104

      In her Reply, McGlothlin groups some of the expenses she wants taxed as

costs to Petrunich Surgery as follows: (1) $150.00 for service fees; (2) $865.00 for

filing fees; (3) $120.00 witness fees; (4) $450.00 for mediation fees; and $266.40

for reproduction costs for trial a notebook.105 Those items total $1,851.40.106 She

maintains that additional charges of $2,818.44 for copying costs, delivery fees,

medical records, and deposition transcripts, which she acknowledges may not

qualify as taxed costs, might be considered included as part of the fee shifting statute

under 19 Del. C. § 715(d).107

      The Court awards McGlothlin $1,851.40 in litigation costs. As McGlothlin

acknowledges, expenses for medical records and deposition transcripts not used at

trial “may not qualify as taxed costs.”108 She is correct.109 The Court declines to

award them under statutory fee shifting as it has already determined to award

103
    Id. at ⁋16.
104
    Id. at ⁋17.
105
    Pl.’s Reply in Support of the Motion for Attorney’s and Costs, at ⁋17, D.I. 75.
106
    Id.
107
    Id. at ⁋18.
108
    Id.
109
    Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(f)–(h); 10 Del. C. § 8906.
                                          20
attorney’s fee of $85,000 or the equivalent of 261.5 hours at Allen’s usual rate.

Mediation fees are discretionary,110 and the Courts awards them.

B.    Motion for Final Judgment.

      In her Motion for Final Judgment, McGlothlin requested prejudgment interest

“at the rate of 5% over prime”111 from August 24, 2020 to March 22, 2023 in the

amount of $28,288.48.112 Petrunich Surgery agreed that prejudgment interest was

due to McGlothlin from the date of the filing of the Complaint – August 24, 2020 –

to the date the jury returned its verdict – March 22, 2023, a period of 940 days, but

only on the $26,000 back pay award.113

      Apart from the fact that it requests prejudgment interest, McGlothlin’s current

request, as expressed in her Reply, has nothing in common with what she requested

in her Motion. In a remarkable display of flexibility, she has changed every variable.

Before, she based the calculation of prejudgment interest on the prime rate.114 Now,

she bases it on the discount rate (as the statute requires).115 Before, she sought

prejudgment interest on all damages, including punitive damages.116 Now, she seeks

110
    Cooke, 2013 WL 6916941, at *6.
111
    Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋2a, D.I. 68.
112
    Id. at ⁋2b.
113
    Def.’s Resp. in Partial Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋⁋ 1-3, D.I. 71.
114
    Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋2a, D.I. 68.
115
    Pl.’s Reply in Support of the Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋1, D.I. 76; 6 Del. C. §
2301(a).
116
    Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋2b, D.I. 68.
                                           21
it only on the back pay award.117 Before, she requested prejudgment interest from

August 24, 2020.118 Now, she seeks it from July 3, 2019.119 Before, her calculation

accounted for fluctuations in interest rates.120 Now, she uses a fixed rate.121

      Although the parties now agree that prejudgment interest is to be calculated

at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate, applied only to the back pay award, in

the end, neither party correctly calculates the amount of prejudgment interest due

McGlothlin. Prejudgment interest is available as a matter of right where the damages

are of a pecuniary nature and are capable of calculation prior to judgment.122 Here,

the award for back pay clearly is calculable. Prejudgment interest is calculated from

the date of injury/payment due at 5% over the Federal Reserve Discount Rate.123 “A

successful plaintiff is entitled to interest on money damages as a matter of right from

the date the liability accrues.124 Liability accrued when McGlothlin was terminated

on July 3, 2019. Thus, she is entitled to prejudgment interest from that date.

117
    Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋1, D.I. 76.
118
    Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋2b, D.I. 68.
119
    Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋2, D.I. 76.
120
    Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, Ex. 2, D.I. 68.
121
    Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Final Judgment, at ⁋⁋1,3, D.I. 76.
122
    Janas v. Biedrzycki, 2000 WL 33114354, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2000).
123
    6 Del. C. §2301(a);
124
    Summa Corporation v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 409 (Del. 1988).
                                          22
       Petrunich Surgery errs, and McGlothlin copies that error, in applying a fixed

rate of interest. The rate actually fluctuated between .25% and 4.75%.125 If a

purpose of prejudgment interest is to fully compensate a plaintiff for loss sustained

by virtue of a defendant unjustly retaining what rightfully belongs to the plaintiff,

then the Court sees no reason why a calculation based on variable interest rates

would not be the more accurate method to accomplish that purpose. Setting a fixed

rate at the time of the loss would result in a windfall to a plaintiff if the rate fell and

a loss if the rate rose. Adjusting the interest rate as the discount rate rises or falls

fully compensates McGlothlin without overcompensating or undercompensating

her.

       Accordingly, the Court finds that McGlothlin is entitled to prejudgment

interest on the compensatory damages award of $26,000 at the various statutory rates

in effect from July 3, 2019 through March 22, 2023.

125
   See, https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/fixed-income/disc/historical. From
July 3, 2019 through July 31, 2019, the rate was 3.00%; from August 1, 2019 through
September 18, 2019, it was 2.75%; September 19, 2019 through October 30, 2019,
it was 2.50%; from October 31, 2019 through March 3, 2020, it was 2.25%; from
March 4, 2020 through March 15, 2020, it was 1.75%; from March 16, 2020 through
March 16, 2022, it was .25%; from March 17, 2022 through May 4, 2022, it was
.50%; from May 5, 2022 through June 19, 2022, it was 1.00%; from June 20, 2022
through July 27, 2022, it was 1.75%; from July 28, 2022 through September 21,
2022, it was 2.50%; from September 22, 2022 through November 2, 2022, it was
3.25%; from November 3, 2022 through December 15, 2022, it was 4.00%; from
December 16, 2022 through February 1, 2023, it was 4.50%; and from February 2,
2023 through March 22, 2023, it was 4.75%.
                                          23
                                VI.    CONCLUSION.

         For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that McGlothlin is entitled to final

judgment as follows:

            Jury Award                                 $126,000.00

            Attorney’s fees                            $85,000.00

            Litigation costs                            $1,851.40

         The Court also finds that McGlothlin is entitled to prejudgment interest on

the jury’s award of $26,000 from July 3, 2019 through March 22, 2023 at the rate

of 5% above the prevailing Federal Reserve discount rates during that period.

         The Court notes that McGlothlin’s original proposed Order of Final Judgment

did not include post-judgment interest.126 Her revised proposed Order of Final

Judgment, attached to her Reply in Support the Motion for Final Judgment, includes

post-judgment interest “from the date of the verdict March 23, 2023, of 10%.”127

         McGlothlin shall submit a revised Final Order of Judgment with a calculation

of pretrial interest consistent with this Opinion and Order within 15 days.

         Petrunich Surgery shall have 10 days thereafter to submit any objections to

McGlothlin’s revised Final Order of Judgment.

126
      Pl.’s Mot. for Final Judgment, Ex. 1, D.I. 68.
127
      Pl.’s Reply in Support of the Motion for Final Judgment, Rev. Ex. 1, D.I. 76.
                                            24
     THEREFORE, Plaintiff Julia McGlothlin’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and

Costs is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Her Motion for Final Judgment

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                   /s/ Ferris W. Wharton
                                                    Ferris W. Wharton, J.

                                   25