Court Opinion

ID: 9677102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:43:27.95934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:52.393550
License: Public Domain

*890VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that even though appellant raised the issue of the validity of a 1980 prior conviction before his 1988 trial as a first degree persistent felony offender, he had forfeited his right to raise such an issue by his failure to raise it in 1983 when he pled guilty as a second degree PFO on the basis of the same prior conviction.
The majority cites Alvey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 858 (1983), as authority for the decision but the majority opinion represents a quantum leap from the holding in Alvey. In Alvey we held that a defendant charged as a PFO who failed to raise during his trial on the PFO charge any question as to the validity of his prior conviction could- not thereafter contest his PFO sentence in a collateral RCr 11.42 attack.
Alvey, supra, did not hold that once a defendant has failed to raise the validity of a prior conviction at trial of a PFO charge he is forever thereafter precluded from contesting the validity of the prior conviction. The 11.42 motion in Alvey was an attack, not on the validity of the prior conviction but rather upon his sentence as a PFO. We did not hold that he could not attack the validity of the prior conviction but only held that because he did not raise the issue of the prior conviction at his trial on the PFO charge, he could not collaterally attack his PFO sentence on that ground.
The very purpose of RCr 11.42 is to allow vacation of judgments which are the result of the denial of constitutional due process. A motion to vacate for denial of constitutional due process may be filed within a period of days, months or years after the judgment of conviction. I do not understand the logic in saying this defendant should have raised the issue in his 1983 trial as a PFO when he had the opportunity to do so and failing that he is forever precluded from contesting the validity of that prior conviction. True, he could not contest its validity in an attack upon his PFO sentence at the 1983 trial because he did not raise the issue in the 1983 trial but
I see no reason why he should not be allowed to raise the issue for the first time at a later trial as he attempted to do here when he was again accused as a PFO. The issue then, unlike the issue in Alvey, supra, would be whether or not the prior conviction was obtained in violation of constitutional due process and, of course, if the prior conviction is vacated it cannot be used as a basis of a PFO conviction at the second trial.
The majority decision seems to be based upon the fact that appellant had the opportunity to raise the issue concerning his 1980 conviction at his 1983 trial and having failed to do so he should never be allowed to raise it thereafter. It must be noted however that appellant had the opportunity to raise the issue of the validity of his prior 1980 conviction every day between 1980 and his 1983 trial. Does the majority opinion mean that one who fails to raise validity of a prior conviction at his first opportunity to do so, cannot thereafter ever raise the question — if so, RCr 11.42 will become meaningless unless the prior conviction is attacked on the next day following the entry of judgment.
It would seem to follow from the majority opinion that the appellant even today, would not be allowed to attempt to set aside his 1980 conviction even though he could clearly and convincingly show that that conviction resulted from a denial to him of due process under the United States Constitution. I do not believe we should, in this manner, foreclose his right to constitutional due process.
LAMBERT and LEIBSON, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.