Court Opinion

ID: 9729626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:45:12.125007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.278591
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
concurring.
The dissent filed in the instant case supports a legal philosophy with which I cannot agree. It has been my belief that a proper administration of justice requires that litigants are entitled to a fair and impartial trial of the issues in dispute. This implies fairness and impartiality throughout the trial and imposes duties and responsibilities upon the court, legal counsel, and the parties. Such duties and responsibilities of the lawyer in the conduct of litigation were well stated in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Kellogg, 54 Neb. 127, 74 N. W. 454. We there said: “These cases establish that a lawyer charged with the conduct of a case is invested with certain rights and charged with certain duties. It is his duty to use all honorable means to protect his client’s interests; and in argument, within the limits of the evidence and the legitimate deductions and inferences to *58be drawn therefrom, he may not be limited, but may comment on the conduct and credibility of witnesses and parties to the suit. On the other hand, he must act honorably and fairly with the court, opposing counsel, the jury, and the parties to the litigation. But he may not, in his conduct of the case or in his argument to the jury, go outside the record, the evidence and the legitimate inferences deducible therefrom, and ask questions, make statements or arguments for the purpose of misleading and prejudicing the jury; and if he does so, such misconduct, if properly preserved in the record and assigned here, will cause a reversal of the judgment procured.”
Counsel for plaintiff in the instant case made assertions in his opening statement to the jury which he knew or should have known to be false. He made statements that were immaterial and had no relation to the issues being tried. He made statements which could be supported only by incompetent evidence. There is but one reason why counsel should engage in such conduct,— to enhance his chances for a verdict or to obtain a more favorable verdict at the hands of the jury. I submit that such conduct was prejudicial to the rights of the State and that he cannot be permitted to retain for his client the benefits of a judgment so obtained.
The dissenting opinion agrees that the opening statement was improper but asserts that it did not constitute prejudicial error. It states that there was no prejudicial error for the reason that the jurors could discern the true facts without difficulty and it would not therefore prejudice them in arriving at a fair and impartial verdict. Such a position is no more valid as to an opening statement than it is to the admission of improper and prejudicial evidence over objection or to improper and prejudicial arguments of counsel to a jury duly excepted to. A fair and impartial trial does not begin at the close of plaintiff’s opening statement.
It has long been the rule that when the record shows *59that evidence was wrongfully admitted it will be considered prejudicial unless it is affirmatively shown not to have affected the result of the trial. Singles v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 174 Neb. 816, 119 N. W. 2d 680; Higgins v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 159 Neb. 549, 68 N. W. 2d 170. The rule is no different when prejudicial assertions are made in the opening statement. There is nothing in this record to show that it did not accomplish the purpose intended. When the assertions of counsel in an opening statement recite incompetent, immaterial, exaggerated, and false recitations of facts that are so prejudicial as to permeate the whole trial, a mistrial should be declared or a new trial granted. In a situation such as we have here, a general instruction to the jury to disregard facts not supported by evidence will not separate the wheat from the chaff, and remove the prejudice from the minds of the jurors. A verdict based in part on such misconduct will not be permitted to stand.
The dissent implies that the conduct of counsel is controlled by the trial court and that this court should not interfere with that court’s discretion. Ordinarily this is true, but when the misconduct of counsel is such as to destroy the very basis of a fair and impartial trial, it is not only the province of this court, but its duty as well, to take the steps necessary to insure the injured party a fair and impartial trial.
I submit that the fact the verdict rendered finds support in the evidence is not a controlling factor in dealing with misconduct of counsel. Nor does the fact that a proper argument was made to the jury cure the error or mitigate the misconduct. The effect upon a jury of such misconduct is speculative, but unless it is affirmatively shown to be nonprejudicial, this court must assume that it had an adverse effect. Proper conduct in the trial of cases will avoid situations such as we have here. While this court dislikes to set aside judgments on such grounds, it will not hesitate to do so when its *60effect is to deny the adverse party a fair and impartial trial. Under such circumstances, this court will not permit a verdict to stand which has been brought about by such means. The adverse party is not required to suffer judgment against him when it is obtained by such tactics. To give approval to such a judgment is to encourage misconduct of counsel in judicial trials and to inspire others to do the same. This would lead to an intolerable situation to which this court should not and, I hope, never will become a party.
Messmore and Yeager, JJ., join in this concurrence.