Court Opinion

ID: 9895851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:10:32.973608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:11.716489
License: Public Domain

J-S30001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 SEAN J. HAMSKI                               :  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
                                              : OF
                                              :        PENNSYLVANIA
               v.                             :
                                              :
                                              :
 ASHLEY M. JONES                              :
 _______________________                      :
 MAUREEN M. WHITE                             :
                                              :  No. 436 EDA 2023
                                              :
               v.                             :
                                              :
                                              :
 ASHLEY M. JONES AND SEAN J.                  :
 HAMSKI                                       :
                                              :
                                              :
 APPEAL OF: ASHLEY M. JONES                   :

                Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2023
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court
                         Division at No(s): 0C0700119,
                                   XC0700119

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                     FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2023

       Ashley M. Jones (“Mother”) appeals, pro se, from the order dated and

entered January 25, 2023, awarding sole legal and primary physical custody

of her sons, Ni.M.H, born in December 2006, and Na.M.H., born in November

2009     (collectively,   “Children”),   to   Maureen   M.   White   (“Paternal

Grandmother”). The order awarded Mother partial physical custody as agreed
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and arranged with Paternal Grandmother and at the Children’s discretion.1 In

so awarding, the order overruled Mother’s preliminary objections and found

that Paternal Grandmother has standing as a party in loco parentis to the

Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2). After review, we affirm.

       The trial court aptly recounted the factual and procedural history in its

order as follows:
       This case has a long docket history and these [C]hildren have
       spent most of their childhoods in court proceedings in both
       Dependency and Domestic Relations Court. Between 2007 and
       2016, there were multiple court filings each year and each of the
       parents had periods of supervised custody over the years as they
       each struggled with domestic violence, abuse and neglect
       allegations, and substance use disorders. The Children were
       previously adjudicated dependent on June 22, 2016, and placed
       in the care of Paternal Grandmother as neither parent was
       determined to be fit to care for them at that time. The Children
       were then placed into the primary custody of Father by order of
       March 15, 2017, and the dependency case was closed.

       On February 5, 2019, Father was awarded primary physical
       custody and Mother was awarded partial physical custody, and
       Mother and Father shared physical custody during the summer.
       However, less than two months later, on March 27, 2019, Mother’s
       partial physical custody was again ordered to be supervised.
       Mother filed [a] petition to modify custody shortly thereafter on
       July 18, 2019.[2]

       In 2019, Father had been living with the Children at [Paternal
       Grandmother’s residence]. Father moved out of the residence at
       some point in 2019[,] and left the Children in the care of Paternal
____________________________________________

1 Father, Sean Hamski (“Father”), was additionally awarded partial physical

custody as agreed and arranged with Paternal Grandmother and at the
discretion of the Children. Father did not file a separate appeal and did not
participate in the instant appeal.

2 Mother sought primary physical custody.        Petition to Modify, 7/18/19, at ¶
6.

                                           -2-
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       Grandmother, as he once again struggled with a substance use
       disorder.   Paternal Grandmother then filed for custody on
       September 2, 2020,[3] after the Children had been living with her
       for over a year without Father or Mother present. During that
       time, Paternal Grandmother was the sole caregiver for the
       Children, performing all parental duties.

       Judge Twardy issued a temporary order on November 22, 2021,
       awarding Paternal Grandmother sole legal and primary physical
       custody of [Ni.M.H.], and Mother primary custody of [Na.M.H],
       separating the two brothers, but without making a determination
       on standing or ruling on the preliminary objections. This was after
       he interviewed the Children where [Na.M.H.] expressed he wanted
       to try to live with his [M]other. The case was not concluded and
       was continued to another date. Judge Twardy then ended his term
       in Family Court without the trial being completed.

                                           ...

       On September 6, 2022, parties and counsel appeared for a
       hearing on Mother’s petition to modify custody filed on July 18,
       2019, Paternal Grandmother’s complaint for custody filed on
       September 2, 2020, Mother’s petition for contempt filed on April
       9, 2021,[4] and preliminary objections filed by Mother on April 28,
       2021, on the issue of standing for Paternal Grandmother. The
       time slot was not sufficient for a full trial. This court interviewed
       both [C]hildren and provided detailed feedback to the parties and
       counsel in the hope of providing a resolution in light of the
       Children’s ages and preferences.

       Mother initially tried to keep [Na.M.H.] from testifying and did not
       bring him to court on that date, in violation of the order for him
       to appear. Mother claimed the child had a mental health crisis
       and should not be permitted to testify. This court contacted the
       child by telephone, and he informed the court he did wish to
       testify. He was then brought to court by another relative and []
       informed this judge he wished to be reunited with his brother and
       Paternal Grandmother as a result of treatment he received by []
____________________________________________

3 Paternal Grandmother sought sole legal and primary physical custody.
                                                                    See
Complaint for Custody, 9/2/20, at ¶ 13. On April 28, 2021, Mother filed
preliminary objections challenging Paternal Grandmother’s standing.

4 Mother subsequently withdrew this petition on January 5, 2023.               N.T.,
1/5/23, at 5.

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       Mother’s partner and that he did not feel safe or welcomed in that
       residence.[5]

       Despite the detailed feedback from the interviews of the Children,
       where both [C]hildren expressed well-reasoned preferences to be
       in the custody of their [P]aternal [G]randmother, the parties were
       not able to resolve any issues and this matter was then scheduled
       for a semi-protracted trial on January 5, 2023, and this court
       issued a temporary order on the basis of the testimony of the
       Children.

Order, 1/25/23, at 1-3 (cleaned up); see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/23,

at 2-9.

       The court then conducted a hearing on January 5, 2023. Mother and

Paternal Grandmother were each present and represented by counsel, and

testified on their own behalf.6 The court additionally spoke with both Children,

in camera, without counsel present. Notably, the Children, then sixteen and

thirteen years old, each acknowledged a tenuous relationship with Mother and

____________________________________________

5 Notably, Mother resided with her husband and their three young sons.   N.T.,
1/5/23, at 6; N.T., 9/6/22 (Children’s sealed testimony), at 57. Na.M.H.
testified that he was scared of Mother’s husband, who would get in his face,
scream at and threaten him, and tell him he was not welcome and kick him
out of the house. See N.T., 9/6/22 (Children’s sealed testimony), at 61-66.
Ni.M.H. confirmed that Mother’s husband was abusive. See N.T., 1/5/23
(Children’s sealed testimony), at 32; N.T., 9/6/22 (Children’s sealed
testimony), at 17-19. Na.M.H. additionally described unsanitary conditions in
the household, where he was unable to sleep in his bed or shower for extended
periods of time. See N.T., 9/6/22 (Children’s sealed testimony), at 68-71.
Na.M.H. explained that one of his younger brothers urinated on and put
tomato sauce in his bed on separate occasions, as well as repeatedly smeared
feces in the bathroom. As such, Na.M.H. slept on the floor and was unable to
shower for several days until Mother cleaned up. See id.

6 Father was not represented by counsel and did not appear at this hearing.

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indicated their desire to remain with Paternal Grandmother. See N.T., 1/5/23

(Children’s sealed testimony), at 1-34.

     By order dated and entered January 25, 2023, the trial court granted in

part and denied in part Mother’s petition to modify and granted Paternal

Grandmother’s complaint for custody. Specifically, the court awarded Paternal

Grandmother sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children. The

court further awarded Mother partial physical custody as agreed and arranged

with Paternal Grandmother and at the Children’s discretion. In so doing, the

court overruled Mother’s preliminary objections and found that Paternal

Grandmother has standing as a party in loco parentis to the Children pursuant

to Section 5324(2). Similarly, the court concluded that Paternal Grandmother

rebutted the presumption in favor of biological parents under Section 5327(b).

The order then proceeded to analyze each custody factor pursuant to Section

5328(a). See Order, 1/25/23, at 4-11.

     On February 23, 2023, Mother, pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal,

along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on

March 24, 2023.

     On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
     1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion when
     it overruled Mother’s preliminary objections pursuant [to 23]
     Pa.C.S. § 5324 and § 5325 averring that Paternal Grandmother
     lack[ed] standing for any form of custody and its conclusion that

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       Paternal Grandmother stands in loco parentis to [the] Children
       despite lacking consent of the natural mother.[7]

       2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
       denying Mother’s petition to modify custody for primary custody
       against the best interest of the Children, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
       § 5328(a).

Mother’s Brief at 6 (cleaned up; suggested answers omitted).8, 9, 10
____________________________________________

7 We find that Section 5325 would not be applicable as Paternal Grandmother

was seeking primary physical custody. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5325 (“In addition
to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating to standing for any form of
physical custody or legal custody), grandparents and great-grandparents may
file an action under this chapter for partial physical custody or supervised
physical custody in the following situations….”).
8 As Mother does not challenge the trial court’s finding regarding legal custody,

we do not address it.

9 Preliminarily, citing to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2188,
Paternal Grandmother argues that Mother’s appeal should be dismissed as her
brief was not filed with this Court in a timely manner. See Paternal
Grandmother’s Brief at 7-8; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2188 (stating, in part, “[i]f an
appellant fails to file his … brief … within the time prescribed by these rules,
or within the time as extended, an appellee may move for dismissal of the
matter”). On June 15, 2023, one day after Mother’s brief was due, Mother
requested an extension of time to file same. By order of June 20, 2023, this
Court denied Mother’s request and directed Mother to file her late brief on or
before June 21, 2023, or suffer dismissal of her appeal. Mother complied. As
such, we decline to dismiss Mother’s appeal for this reason.
10 We additionally note with disapproval procedural deficiencies related to the

organization of Mother’s brief. Specifically, the argument section of Mother’s
brief is not separated by the issues raised with distinct headings. While Mother
offers some form of what can be deemed sub-headings and/or separation
within her first issue, these are inconsistent and not distinctive. See Pa.R.A.P.
2101 (stating, “Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material
respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances
of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if
the defects are in the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are
substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed”); see
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       We review custody orders for an abuse of discretion. See R.L. v. M.A.,

209 A.3d 391, 395 (Pa. Super. 2019). We will not find such an abuse merely

because we would have reached a different conclusion. See id. Rather, an

abuse of discretion occurs only if the trial court overrode or misapplied the law

in reaching its conclusion, or the record shows the trial court’s judgment was

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.

See id.

       Moreover, our scope of review is broad. See id. Because this Court

does not make independent factual determinations, however, we must accept

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record.

See S.C.B. v. J.S.B., 218 A.3d 905, 913 (Pa. Super. 2019). Importantly, we

defer to the trial court on matters of credibility and weight of the evidence, as

the trial court viewed and assessed witnesses firsthand. See id. We are not,

however, bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences.             See id.

“Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable

as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the

trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of

the sustainable findings of the trial court.” E.D. v. M.P., 33 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa.

____________________________________________

also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating, “The argument shall be divided into as many
parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each
part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point
treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are
deemed pertinent”). However, as we discern the general issues raised and
related arguments, we proceed with the merits of Mother’s appeal.

                                           -7-
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Super. 2011) (quoting A.D. v. M.A.B., 989 A.2d 32, 35–36 (Pa. Super.

2010)). As we stated in King v. King, 889 A.2d 630 (Pa. Super. 2005), “[i]t

is not this Court’s function to determine whether the trial court reached the

‘right’ decision; rather, we must consider whether, ‘based on the evidence

presented, given [sic] due deference to the trial court’s weight and credibility

determinations,’ the trial court erred or abused its discretion….” Id. at 632

(quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 878 A.2d 127, 129 (Pa. Super. 2005)).

      With her first issue, Mother contests the trial court’s overruling her

preliminary objections and finding Paternal Grandmother had standing as a

party who stood in loco parentis pursuant to Section 5324(2). See Mother’s

Brief at 14-16.   Mother vehemently denies that she consented to Paternal

Grandmother’s custody of the Children. She suggests that, in fact, Paternal

Grandmother illegally usurped her custodial rights to the Children, and

insinuates that Father and Paternal Grandmother actively misled the court by

not disclosing that Father no longer resided in the home with Paternal

Grandmother and the Children.       Mother further contends that she made

numerous attempts to secure physical custody and/or visitation. See id. at

15-16.

      As to the relevant standard and scope of review, we have stated,

“[t]hreshold issues of standing are questions of law; thus, our standard of

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”           Raymond v.

Raymond, 279 A.3d 620, 627 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

                                     -8-
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      Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324, the following may file an action for any

form of physical custody or legal custody:
      (1) A parent of the child.

      (2) A person who stands in loco parentis to the child.

      (3) A grandparent of the child who is not in loco parentis to the
      child:

         (i) whose relationship with the child began either with the
         consent of a parent of the child or under a court order;

         (ii) who assumes or is willing to assume responsibility for
         the child; and

         (iii) when one of the following conditions is met:

            (A) the child has been determined to be a dependent
            child under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 63 (relating to juvenile
            matters);

            (B) the child is substantially at risk due to parental
            abuse, neglect, drug or alcohol abuse or incapacity;
            or

            (C) the child has, for a period of at least 12
            consecutive months, resided with the grandparent,
            excluding brief temporary absences of the child from
            the home, and is removed from the home by the
            parents, in which case the action must be filed within
            six months after the removal of the child from the
            home.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5324 (italics added).

      For purposes of the instant matter, we focus on Section 5324(2) and in

loco parentis. On this topic, this Court has stated:
      “The term in loco parentis literally means ‘in the place of a
      parent.’” Peters v. Costello, … 891 A.2d 705, 710 ([Pa.] 2005)
      (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 791 (7th Ed. 1991)). A person
      stands in loco parentis with respect to a child when he or she
      “assum[es] the obligations incident to the parental relationship
      without going through the formality of a legal adoption. The

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      status of in loco parentis embodies two ideas; first, the
      assumption of a parental status, and, second, the discharge of
      parental duties.” Id. (quoting T.B. v. L.R.M., … 786 A.2d 913,
      916-17 ([Pa.] 2001)). Critical to our discussion here, “in loco
      parentis status cannot be achieved without the consent and
      knowledge of, and in disregard of[,] the wishes of a parent.” E.W.
      v. T.S., 916 A.2d 1197, 1205 (Pa. [Super.] 2007) (citing T.B.,
      supra).

K.W. v. S.L., 157 A.3d 498, 504-05 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      Moreover,
      while it is presumed that a child’s best interest is served by
      maintaining the family’s privacy and autonomy, that presumption
      must give way where the child has established strong
      psychological bonds with a person who, although not a biological
      parent, has lived with the child and provided care, nurture, and
      affection, assuming in the child’s eye a stature like that of a
      parent. Where such a relationship is shown, our courts recognize
      that the child’s best interest requires that the third party be
      granted standing so as to have the opportunity to litigate fully the
      issue of whether that relationship should be maintained even over
      a natural parent’s objections.

T.B., 786 A.2d at 917 (citation omitted).

      In overruling Mother’s preliminary objections and finding that Paternal

Grandmother had standing as a party in loco parentis to the Children, the trial

court highlighted Paternal Grandmother’s long-standing care of the Children,

both with and without Father. The court stated:
      The preliminary objections filed by Mother on April 28, 2021[,] are
      overruled.      This court finds that Paternal Grandmother has
      standing as a party who has been in loco parentis to the Children
      pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] Section 5324(2). Paternal Grandmother
      acted in the role of a parent to both [C]hildren with the consent
      of the Children’s father when [he] voluntarily left the Children in
      her care and vacated her home in 2019, which was one year prior
      to the filing of her complaint. Mother’s preliminary objections aver
      that she did not give permission for the Children to live with
      Paternal Grandmother without Father present. However, the
      permission/consent of both parents is not required to determine

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     that a party has standing where the third party has performed
     parental duties with the consent and acquiescence of at least one
     parent. … The record and credible testimony from Paternal
     Grandmother and the Children strongly support this finding that
     Paternal Grandmother has been a parental caregiver performing
     these duties for many years. She has taken a primary role with
     respect to education, medical and all other caregiving duties. As
     of the time of trial, the Children had been living in the primary
     custody of Paternal Grandmother for over four years.

Order, 1/25/23, at 3 (cleaned up).

     As the court further explained in its Rule 1925(a) opinion:
     This court found [Paternal Grandmother] to have standing
     pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2) as a third party who stands [in
     loco parentis] to the Children as she has been the primary
     caregiver for both [C]hildren continuously and exclusively for a
     full year as of the time of her filing. [Paternal Grandmother] had
     solely performed all parental responsibilities for the Children
     including physician visits, dental care, schoolwork, therapy
     appointments, cooking, housing and financially supporting the
     Children from the summer of 2019 to the time of her filing in
     September 2020.

     Prior to 2019, [Paternal Grandmother] had been a court-ordered
     kinship caregiver through the dependency case involving the
     children in 2016. [Paternal Grandmother] also testified credibly,
     as confirmed by both [C]hildren, that they had lived with [Paternal
     Grandmother] for most of their lives. In 2019, [Father] consented
     to her acting in loco parentis when he, as the parent with primary
     physical custody, left the Children in the sole care of [Paternal
     Grandmother] and moved away from the Children. … In 2019[,]
     when [Father] left the Children in the care of [Paternal
     Grandmother], [Mother] only had supervised physical custody as
     set forth in the final order of March 22, 2019. Even after [Mother]
     filed for expedited relief on August 19, 2019, alleging she only had
     “sporadic contact” with the Children, the court did not lift the
     provision for [Mother]’s custody to be supervised in the order of
     November 15, 2019. [Mother]’s standing issue raised on appeal
     specifically turns on the question of her consent to [Paternal
     Grandmother’s] acting as a parent to the Children.              It is
     uncontested that [Paternal Grandmother] had in fact acted in the
     place of a parent to both [C]hildren over the years. Here, [Father]
     co-parented the Children with [Paternal Grandmother] when he

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       was residing in her home and [Paternal Grandmother] parented
       them once [Father] moved out of her home. [Mother] claimed in
       her preliminary objections she did not consent to this. However,
       grandparents and other third parties have been found to be in loco
       parentis where that relationship began with the consent or
       acquiescence of a parent. Similar to the present case, in both
       M.J.S. v. B.B.[, 172 A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. 2017),] and McDonel
       v. Sohn, [762 A.2d 1101 (Pa. Super. 2000),] third parties were
       found to have stood in loco parentis where the third party and one
       of the parents together co-parented the children during a period
       of their lives.

                                           ...

       [Paternal Grandmother] in the present case had assumed the role
       of parent in the Children’s lives. [Paternal Grandmother] was the
       one who attended the daily needs of the Children consistently and
       exclusively from the summer of 2019 until the filing of her
       complaint in September 2020. [Father] was absent as he left both
       [C]hildren in her care. [Mother] petitioned the court in August
       2019, as she only had “sporadic contact” with the Children, and
       the court denied her petition for expedited relief. Both parents
       have consented to [Paternal Grandmother]’s role by their action
       and inaction over the years as [Paternal Grandmother] has had to
       take on increased responsibility for the Children due to [Father]’s
       substance     use    disorder    and    the   parents’   increasing
       disengagement and mistreatment of the Children over the years
       as the procedural history in this case illustrates. Moreover,
       [Mother] has failed to consistently exercise even the very limited
       partial custody she had pursuant to this court’s [] temporary order
       for partial physical custody of Na.M.H. entered on September 6,
       2022. [Mother] only exercised one of her weekend visits between
       September 2022 and January 2023 because her partner [] denied
       the child entry to his home where [Mother] resides.[11]

Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/23, at 20-22 (cleaned up).

       With this, we agree. Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s

determination as to Paternal Grandmother’s standing pursuant to Section

____________________________________________

11 Na.M.H. refused to visit with Mother thereafter.   See N.T., 1/5/23, at 65-
70.

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5324(2) as a party in loco parentis to the Children. In McDonel, this Court

affirmed the in loco parentis standing of a maternal aunt and uncle, over the

father’s objection, where they had extensive involvement in the life of the

child. McDonel, 762 A.2d at 1105-06. Despite the father’s being unaware of

the maternal aunt and uncle’s involvement, we rejected his argument that he

therefore did not consent to their role, as he failed to take actions which

prevented their relationship from developing. Id. at 1106.

      Similarly, in M.J.S., this Court also affirmed that a grandmother had in

loco parentis status where she lived with the mother and child for five years

and “either shared or assumed parenting responsibility for the entirety of the

child’s life” and the child’s father did not oppose her assumption of parental

duties at any point. M.J.S., 172 A.3d at 656-67. We reasoned:

      Stated plainly, [the f]ather failed to oppose [the g]randmother’s
      assumption of parental duties.         Instead, he allowed [the
      g]randmother to share the parental responsibilities with [the
      m]other.     [The f]ather not only declined to protest [the
      g]randmother’s emergent role, he did not attempt to intercede in
      [the g]randmother’s assumption of parental duties, and he failed
      to perform any parental obligations beyond exercising partial
      physical custody.      Through his own inaction, [the f]ather
      acquiesced to the development of the in loco parentis relationship
      between [the g]randmother and [the child].

Id. at 657.

      In the case sub judice, analogous to McDonel and M.J.S., Mother

acquiesced to the development of Paternal Grandmother’s relationship with

the Children. The record establishes that Paternal Grandmother enjoyed a

long-standing, care-giving relationship with the Children which included

                                    - 13 -
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shared and/or assumed parenting responsibilities. See N.T., 1/5/23, at 78-

80; N.T., 9/6/22 (Children’s sealed testimony), at 29, 32. Mother, however,

failed to oppose Paternal Grandmother’s assumption of parental duties and

the development of an in loco parentis relationship. In fact, Mother does not

dispute shared responsibilities between Father and Paternal Grandmother.

Rather, Mother’s argument is that she was unaware that Father was no longer

living in the residence with Paternal Grandmother and the Children. Thus, she

asserts any assumption of parental duties was in defiance of her wishes and

without her consent.        Notwithstanding, Mother’s inaction belies any such

argument.       Moreover, and significantly, given Paternal Grandmother’s

enduring relationship with the Children, she was a “stabilizing force” and a

source of consistency for the Children. M.J.S., 172 A.3d at 657. As such,

Paternal Grandmother stood in loco parentis to the Children pursuant to

Section 5324(2).12

       To the extent Mother relies on B.A. v. E.E., 741 A.2d 1227 (Pa. 1999),

to support her assertion of lack of consent, we find B.A. inapposite. In B.A.,

our Supreme Court found prospective adoptive parents failed to attain in loco

parentis standing where, despite the mother’s consent, their care and control

of the child began in defiance of the express wishes of the father, who refused

to consent and filed for custody shortly after the child’s birth and placement.
____________________________________________

12 Even if Paternal Grandmother failed to attain in loco parentis status, we
would determine that she had standing pursuant to Section 5324(3)(i-iii)(B),
given the abuse and neglect in Mother’s household and Father’s substance
abuse.

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Id. at 1228. Here, however, as stated above, Mother did not oppose Paternal

Grandmother’s assumption of parental duties.            Consequently, Mother’s

challenge to Paternal Grandmother’s standing fails.

      Having found the trial court did not err in concluding that Paternal

Grandmother had standing as a party who stood in loco parentis pursuant to

Section 5324(2), we next review Mother’s second issue, her substantive

challenge to the trial court’s custody order. Significantly, “[w]hen a trial court

orders a form of custody, the best interest of the child is paramount.” S.W.D.

v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. Super. 2014). “The best-interests standard,

decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all factors which legitimately have

an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being.”

M.J.N. v. J.K., 169 A.3d 108, 112 (Pa. Super. 2017). To that end, the Child

Custody Act sets forth sixteen factors that a court must consider before

making any custody determination. See E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 460 (Pa.

Super. 2019). “It is within the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to

determine which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.”

Id. (citation omitted). The statutorily required factors are as follows:

      § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.

      (a) Factors.-- In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
      determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
      factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
      affect the safety of the child, including the following:

         (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
         frequent and continuing contact between the child and
         another party.

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       (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
       member of the party’s household, whether there is a
       continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
       which party can better provide adequate physical
       safeguards and supervision of the child.

       (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and
       (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
       with protective services).

       (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
       of the child.

       (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
       education, family life and community life.

       (5) The availability of extended family.

       (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

       (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
       child’s maturity and judgment.

       (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
       other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
       reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
       child from harm.

       (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
       consistent and nurturing relationship with the child
       adequate for the child’s emotional needs.

       (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
       physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
       needs of the child.

       (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

       (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability
       to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

       (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
       willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
       another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
       another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
       cooperate with that party.

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        (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
        member of a party’s household.

        (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
        member of a party’s household.

        (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).

     A trial court must “delineate the reasons for its decision when
     making an award of custody either on the record or in a written
     opinion.” S.W.D.[, 96 A.3d at 401]. See also 23 Pa.C.S. §
     5323(a) and (d). However, “there is no required amount of detail
     for the trial court’s explanation; all that is required is that the
     enumerated factors are considered and that the custody decision
     is based on those considerations.” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331,
     336 (Pa. Super. 2013).

R.L., 209 A.3d at 395.

     Further, as it relates to parents and third parties, we have further

explained:
     The parent has a prima facie right to custody, “which will be
     forfeited only if convincing reasons appear that the child’s best
     interest will be served by an award to the third party.” V.B. v.
     J.E.B., 55 A.3d 1193, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Charles
     v. Stehlik, … 744 A.2d 1255, 1258 ([Pa.] 2000)). Section 5327
     of the Custody Act pertains to cases “concerning primary physical
     custody” and provides that, “[i]n any action regarding the custody
     of the child between a parent of the child and a nonparent, there
     shall be a presumption that custody shall be awarded to the
     parent. The presumption in favor of the parent may be rebutted
     by clear and convincing evidence.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5327(b). This
     Court has defined clear and convincing evidence “as presenting
     evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing so as to
     enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
     hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” M.J.S.[, 172
     A.3d at 660] (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

     Accordingly, “even before the proceedings start, the evidentiary
     scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the biological parents’ side.”
     V.B., 55 A.3d at 1199 (quoting Charles, 744 A.2d at 1258).
     When making a decision to award primary physical custody to a

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       nonparent, the trial court must “hear all evidence relevant to the
       child’s best interest, and then, decide whether the evidence on
       behalf of the third party is weighty enough to bring the scale up
       to even, and down on the third party’s side.” Id. (quoting
       McDonel[, 762 A.2d at 1107]).

       These principles do not preclude an award of custody to the
       nonparent but simply instruct the trial court that the nonparent
       bears the burden of production and the burden of persuasion and
       that the nonparent’s burden is heavy. Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d
       915, 918 (Pa. Super. 2005). It is well settled, “[w]hile this
       Commonwealth places great importance on biological ties, it does
       not do so to the extent that the biological parent’s right to custody
       will trump the best interests of the child. In all custody matters,
       our primary concern is, and must continue to be, the well-being
       of the most fragile human participant—that of the minor child.”
       Charles, 744 A.2d at 1259. “Once it is established that someone
       who is not the biological parent is in loco parentis, that person
       does not need to establish that the biological parent is
       unfit, but instead must establish by clear and convincing evidence
       that it is in the best interests of the children to maintain that
       relationship or be with that person.” Jones, 884 A.2d at 917
       (emphasis in original).

R.L., 209 A.3d at 396 (emphasis in original).13

       Instantly, the trial court addressed and analyzed the custody factors

pursuant to Section 5328(a).           See Order, 1/25/23, at 4-11.    The court

determined that Section 5328(a)(1), (2), (2.1), (3), (4), (6), (7), (9), and

(10) strongly favor Paternal Grandmother and (8), (11), and (14) favor

Paternal Grandmother. The court found Section 5328(a)(5), (12), (13), and

(15) are neutral. Most critical to the court, however, was Section 5328(a)(7),

the well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child’s maturity and

judgement.       The court noted, “[t]his factor strongly favors Paternal

____________________________________________

13 Mother does not oppose the trial court’s finding that Paternal Grandmother

rebutted the presumption in favor of biological parents in Section 5327(b).

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Grandmother and is the most significant factor [in] this case in light of the

Children’s ages.” Order, 1/25/23, at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Mother assails the court’s determinations as to Section 5328(a)(1), (2),

(3), (4), (6), (8), (9), (10), (14), and (15). As to these factors, the trial court

stated:
      1. WHICH PARTY IS MORE LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE AND PERMIT
      FREQUENT CONTACT AND CONTINUING CONTACT BETWEEN THE
      CHILD AND ANOTHER PARTY.

      This factor strongly favors Paternal Grandmother. She has not
      denied the Children access and communication with their [M]other
      or [F]ather. In contrast, Mother denied [Na.M.H.] access to his
      phone and other electronics to prevent him from communicating
      with his brother and Paternal Grandmother and cut him off from
      contact during the time she had [him] in her primary physical
      custody. This resulted in the expedited relief and contempt
      petitions.

      2. THE PRESENT OR PAST ABUSE BY A PARTY [AND] WHETHER
      THERE IS A CONTINUED RISK OF HARM TO THE CHILD OR AN
      ABUSED PARTY.

      This factor strongly favors Paternal Grandmother based upon past
      abuse. See 2.1 below.

      2.1. THE INFORMATION SET FORTH IN SECTION 5329.1(A)(1)
      AND (2) (RELATING TO CONSIDERATION OF CHILD ABUSE AND
      INVOLVEMENT WITH PROTECTIVE SERVICES).

      While there are no active open investigations involving the
      Department of Human Services currently, the Children have been
      seriously impacted by their history in past cases. Now that they
      are teenagers, this has been apparent to each of them. Based
      upon this history, this factor strongly favors Paternal
      Grandmother.       Mother’s and Father’s prior history and
      involvement with the Department of Human Services [(“DHS”)],
      resulted in the removal of the Children from their care in 2016[,]
      based upon valid reports of child abuse and neglect. An order of
      protective custody removed the Children from the care of the
      parents and placed the Children with the Paternal Grandmother

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     on June 2, 2016. Previously in 2012 and 2013, DHS was involved
     with the Children due to domestic violence between Mother and
     Father.

     3. THE PARENTAL DUTIES PERFORMED BY EACH PARTY ON
     BEHALF OF THE CHILD.

     This factor strongly favors Paternal Grandmother. She has been
     the most consistent caregiver in the lives of the Children as both
     parents struggled through the majority of the Children’s lives.
     This was supported by credible testimony from [Ni.M.H].

     4. THE NEED FOR STABILITY AND CONTINUITY IN THE CHILD’S
     EDUCATION, FAMILY LIFE AND COMMUNITY LIFE.

     This factor strong[ly] favors Paternal Grandmother. Neither
     Mother nor Father has been able to offer the Children any stability.
     Paternal Grandmother has consistently been involved in the
     Children’s lives and provided them with stability and continuity
     that they could not get from their parents. With respect to
     education, Mother claims she can better provide for education
     because … [Na.M.H.] was in in[-]person school when he was in
     her care[,] and both [C]hildren are now in virtual school based
     upon the problems they each faced[,] testified to by Paternal
     Grandmother and the Children.            However, this in [sic]
     disingenuous because [Ni.M.H.] is suffering with limited options
     for his education as a direct result of actions Mother took to
     expressly interfere with his ability to obtain an education. As
     detailed below, Mother testified against [Ni.M.H.] at the expulsion
     hearing for New Foundations School and [] took action to interfere
     with his acceptance to Girard College.

                                     ...

     6. THE CHILD’S SIBLING[] RELATIONSHIPS.

     This factor strongly favors Paternal Grandmother having primary
     custody of both [Ni.M.H.] and [Na.M.H]. The boys are bonded to
     each other as siblings and other than the brief period when they
     were separated as a result of Judge Twardy’s temporary custody
     order [sic].     Both [C]hildren testified that the temporary
     arrangement that separated then [sic] was difficult and not in their
     best interests.

     [Na.M.H.] previously said he was having conflicts with his brother
     [Ni.M.H.] and Paternal Grandmother. He said [he] got mad at

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     them and he made up stuff to get back at them. He admitted that
     he lied to Judge Twardy when he told him that his [P]aternal
     [G]randmother was mistreating him and not feeding him enough.
     He said he and [Ni.M.H.] have been getting along much better
     now when he is there for the weekends and that he wants to go
     home. He stated home for him has always been Paternal
     Grandmother’s residence.

     [Ni.M.H.] and [Na.M.H.] have strained relationships with their
     three younger brothers, especially [Na.M.H.], for the reasons set
     forth in number 7 below.

                                    ...

     8. THE ATTEMPTS OF A PARENT TO TURN THE CHILD AGAINST
     THE OTHER.

     This factor favors Paternal Grandmother. Mother and her partner
     [] have attempted to alienate [Na.M.H.] against Paternal
     Grandmother by regularly speaking negatively against Father and
     Paternal Grandmother to [Na.M.H.] and denying him
     communication with them.        However, this has resulted in
     [Na.M.H.’s] not wanting to remain in Mother’s household rather
     than turning him against Paternal Grandmother.

     [9]. WHICH PARTY IS MORE LIKELY TO MAINTAIN A LOVING,
     STABLE, CONSISTENT AND NURTURING RELATIONSHIP WITH
     THE CHILD ADEQUATEFOR THE CHILD’S EMOTIONAL NEEDS.

     This factor strongly favors Paternal Grandmother.          Paternal
     Grandmother has been the most consistent caregiver throughout
     the Children’s lives. For all the reasons set forth herein, Mother
     has acted in ways that are extremely damaging to the Children’s
     emotional needs.

     [10]. WHICH PARTY IS MORE LIKELY TO ATTEND TO THE DAILY
     PHYSICAL, EMOTIONAL, DEVELOPMENTAL, EDUCATIONAL AND
     SPECIAL NEEDS OF THE CHILD.

     This factor strongly favors Paternal Grandmother. Mother has
     actively interfered with the education of [Ni.M.H.] in a way that
     has limited his options. This court finds Mother’s actions and
     inactions warrant an award of sole legal custody to Paternal
     Grandmother. For all the reasons set forth herein, Mother has
     acted in ways that are extremely damaging to the Children’s
     emotional needs.

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      13. THE HISTORY OF DRUG OR ALCOHOL ABUSE BY A PARTY OR
      MEMBER OF A PARTY’S HOUSEHOLD.

      This factor favors Paternal Grandmother based on the history of
      the parents. Father continues to struggle with substance use
      disorder but is seeking help now in Florida.

      14. THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CONDITION OF A PARTY OR
      MEMBER OF A PARTY’S HOUSEHOLD.

      This factor favors neither party. Mother testified that Paternal
      Grandmother has physical impairments and disabilities that
      impact her ability to care for the Children. However, this was not
      credible based upon Paternal Grandmother’s testimony and the
      testimony of the Children.

Order, 1/25/23, at 4-11 (cleaned up).

      Specifically, as to Section 5328(a)(1), which party is more likely to

encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and

another party, and (8), the attempts of a parent to turn the child against the

other, Mother contends that Paternal Grandmother has withheld the Children,

specifically Na.M.H., from her by failing to transport Na.M.H. for Mother’s

partial physical custody.    See Mother’s Brief at 19, 23.       As to Section

5328(a)(2), the present or past abuse by a party and whether there is a

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party, and (2.1), the

information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and (2) (relating to consideration

of child abuse and involvement with protective services), Mother indicates no

existing record relating to either her or her husband is in a statewide abuse

database and that all DHS reports concerning her and her fiancé were

unfounded. See id. at 19-20. As to Section 5328(a)(3), the parental duties

performed by each party on behalf of the child; (4), the need for stability and

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continuity in the child’s education, family life and community life; (9), which

party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing

relationship with the child adequate for the child’s emotional needs; and (10),

which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, emotional,

developmental, educational and special needs of the child, Mother maintains

that Paternal Grandmother neglects the Children’s educational, medical,

dental, and mental health needs.         Conversely, she contends that she

consistently provides for such needs, as demonstrated by Na.M.H.’s time in

her primary physical custody. See id. at 20-27. As to Section 5328(a)(6),

the child’s sibling relationships, Mother references the Children’s three

younger half-siblings who reside with her.      See id. at 23.    As to Section

5328(a)(13), the history of drug or alcohol abuse by a party or member of a

party’s household, Mother states that she has not failed any drug tests, while

recognizing Father’s “long history of drug abuse.” See id. at 27. Finally, as

to Section 5328(a)(14), the mental and physical condition of a party or

member of a party’s household, Mother asserts that Paternal Grandmother

has a medical condition. See id. at 27-28.

      We, however, conclude that any assertion of error is waived for failure

to address this issue in a meaningful way with citation to pertinent legal

authority and/or the record.     See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c)-(d); see also In re

W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d

884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any

discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the

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issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is

waived.”); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super.

2017) (citation omitted) (reiterating that a claim is waived where an appellate

brief fails to provide any discussion of the claim with citation to relevant

authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable

of review).   Mother provides a rambling, repetitive argument that each of

these factors should be determined to be in her favor without any citation to

relevant law other than regurgitating the statutory language and, critically,

without any citation to the record. See Mother’s Brief at 19-28.

      Notwithstanding, even if not waived, Mother’s claim fails.     As stated

above, with regard to the custody factors, we have stated that the trial court

is required to consider all such factors. A.V., 87 A.3d at 822-23. Although

the court is required to give “weighted consideration to those factors which

affect the safety of the child” pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a), we have

acknowledged that the amount of weight a court gives any one factor is almost

entirely discretionary. M.J.M., 63 A.3d 331 at 339. As we stated in M.J.M.,
      It is within the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to
      determine which factors are most salient and critical in
      each particular case. See A.D.[, 989 A.2d at 35-36] (“In
      reviewing a custody order ... our role does not include making
      independent factual determinations…. In addition, with regard to
      issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to
      the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses
      first-hand.”). Our decision here does not change that.

M.J.M., 63 A.3d 331 at 339 (emphasis added).             However, while not

controlling, a child’s wishes are of critical consideration.       McMillen v.

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McMillen, 602 A.2d 845, 847 (Pa. 1992) (stating, “[a]lthough the express

wishes of a child are not controlling in custody decisions, such wishes do

constitute an important factor that must he carefully considered in

determining the child’s best interest”).

      As we construe Mother’s claim, we interpret the issue raised at its core

to be a dispute as to the trial court’s findings of fact and determinations

regarding credibility and weight of the evidence.          Mother, in essence,

questions the trial court’s conclusions and assessments and seeks this Court

to re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and/or re-assess credibility to his view of

the evidence.   This we cannot do.     Under the aforementioned standard of

review applicable in custody matters, the trial court’s findings of fact and

determinations regarding credibility and weight of the evidence are not

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443; see

also E.R., 129 A.3d at 527. We reiterate, “[i]t is not this Court’s function to

determine whether the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must

consider whether, ‘based on the evidence presented, given [sic] due deference

to the trial court’s weight and credibility determinations,’ the trial court erred

or abused its discretion….” King, 889 A.2d at 632. After a thorough review

of the record, we find no abuse of discretion. Further, to the extent Mother

challenges the weight attributed to any factor by the trial court, we likewise

find no abuse of discretion. As stated above, the amount of weight that a trial

court gives to any one factor is almost entirely within its discretion.      See

M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 339.

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      Here, the trial court analyzed and addressed each of the custody factors

pursuant to Section 5328(a). See Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/23, at 4-11. After

careful review of the record, and in deference to the trial court’s

determinations as to credibility and weight of the evidence, we conclude that

the trial court’s findings and determinations regarding the custody factors set

forth in Section 5328(a) are supported by competent evidence in the record.

We, therefore, will not disturb them. See C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443; see also

E.R., 129 A.3d at 527.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 11/8/2023

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