Court Opinion

ID: 9515118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:53:57.046301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:25.212134
License: Public Domain

MEIERHENRY, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 27.] Dismissal with prejudice when the statute of limitations has not run is too harsh under the circumstances of this case. The trial court specifically based its decision to dismiss on three factors: (1) the lack of activity for two and one-half years, (2) no justification for the delay such as settlement negotiations, discovery or agreements, and (3) prejudice to United Fire because of the disappearance of a witness. United Fire did not claim it was financially prejudiced nor did the trial court make a finding of financial prejudice. Neither did the trial court in any way indicate that it was dismissing this case because of judicial economy. Further, the *769trial court did not dismiss because the plaintiff failed to obey a court order requiring substitute counsel. Since the trial court did not base its decision on financial prejudice, judicial economy or failure to follow a court order; this Court should not rely on them to justify the dismissal.
[¶ 28.] This Court has repeatedly stated that “mere passage of time” is not the test to determine if an action should be dismissed. Swenson v. Sanborn Co. Farmers Union Oil Co., 1999 SD 61 ¶ 17, 594 N.W.2d 339, 344; London v. Adams, 1998 SD 41, ¶ 12, 578 N.W.2d 145, 148; Opp v. Nieuwsma, 458 N.W.2d 352, 356 (S.D.1990); Holmoe v. Reuss, 403 N.W.2d 30, 31 (S.D.1987). Mere passage of time, however, appears to be the basis of this dismissal. Although the plaintiff did not present an excuse for the delay, completely closing the door to the claim does not comport to this Court’s goal of doing justice. I would, instead, adopt an approach similar to one the courts of Minnesota have taken to consider the statute of limitations in relationship to the reasonableness of delay.4 The Minnesota Supreme Court uses a two pronged test in evaluating dismissals for failure to prosecute under its equivalent 41(b) rule.5 “Before an action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute, it must be shown: (1) that the delay prejudiced the defendant, and (2) that the delay was unreasonable and inexcusable.” Modrow, 656 N.W.2d at 394 (citing Scherer v. Hanson, 270 N.W.2d 23, 24 (Minn.1978)). One of the factors in determining reasonableness of delay is whether the delay is shorter than the time period of the statute of limitations for bringing the action.
We also note that one of the factors a district court may consider in evaluating the reasonableness of any delay is whether the delay is shorter than the time period the statute of limitations provides for asserting the plaintiffs cause of action. It is difficult to conclude that a delay is unreasonably long when it is less than the length of time the legislature provides for a plaintiff to commence her cause of action.... It appears inconsistent to dismiss an action because of prefiling delay when the action included claims that may not be time-barred, especially when the dismissal is with prejudice and not on the merits. Such a dismissal is certainly contrary to the ‘primary objective’ of disposing of claims on their merits.
Id. at 397.
[¶ 29.] This Court has said many times that cases should ordinarily be decided on the merits. Upper Plains Contracting Inc. v. Pepsi Americas, 2003 SD 3, ¶ 22, 656 N.W.2d 323, 330; Roso v. Henning, 1997 SD 82, ¶ 12, 566 N.W.2d 136, 141; International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 19 v. Aberdeen School Dist. No. 6-1, 463 N.W.2d 843, 844 (S.D.1990). There were other sanctions less harsh which the court could have imposed *770to move the trial forward short of dismissal with prejudice. The court could have imposed sanctions, set the matter for trial, or any other number of requirements to get the case moving on the court’s docket or the court could have simply dismissed without prejudice.
[¶ 30.] For the reasons above I would reverse.
[¶ 31.] KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this dissent.

. In Simpson v. C & R Supply, Inc., we affirmed the trial court’s refusal to dismiss under SDCL 15-11-11. The trial court noted that the statute of limitations had not run. Justice Konenkamp notes in his writing that the trial court had legitimate reasons not to dismiss one of which was that the statute of limitations had not run. 1999 SD 117, ¶ 12, 598 N.W.2d 914, 918-19.

. Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 41.02(a) provides that the trial court may “upon its own initiative, or upon motion of a party, and upon such notice as it may prescribe, dismiss an action or claim for failure to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court.” Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393-394 (Minn.2003).