Court Opinion

ID: 9899040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 20:03:40.562936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:39.556738
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/15/23 P. v. Joshua CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,                                                 B323960

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                          Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No. TA147191-02
         v.

LAQUIST JOSHUA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lynn D. Olson, Judge. Affirmed.

      Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _________________________
       In March 2019, defendant and appellant Laquist Joshua
entered into a plea agreement with the People. Joshua pleaded
no contest to one count of attempted murder and admitted he had
personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim within the
meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7.1 Joshua also admitted
an allegation under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) that
a principal had personally used a firearm in the commission
of the offense. In February 2022 Joshua filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6.2 The trial court denied
Joshua’s petition. We affirm because, by admitting he personally
inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, Joshua admitted
he was the perpetrator of the attempted murder and not merely
an accomplice. Accordingly, he is ineligible for resentencing
as a matter of law.
                          BACKGROUND
1.     The charges, plea agreement, and sentence
       In 2018 the People charged Joshua with several offenses.
In a second amended felony complaint filed February 11, 2019,
the People charged Joshua with the willful, deliberate,
premeditated attempted murder of two victims, Belizhane
Miranda (count 5) and Demore Newsome (count 6), with shooting
at an occupied motor vehicle (count 7), and with being a felon
in possession of a firearm (count 8), on February 3, 2017. As to
counts 5 through 7, the People alleged Joshua personally used
and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and a
principal did the same. As to counts 5 and 7, the People alleged

1    References to statutes are to the Penal Code.
2     Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)

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Joshua personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury to Miranda, and a principal did so as well.
       As to counts 5 and 7, the People further alleged Joshua
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Miranda. The People
alleged the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the
direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang.
Finally, the People alleged Joshua had a strike prior.3
       On March 29, 2019, Joshua entered into a plea agreement
with the prosecution. Facing a possible maximum of 29 years
plus 55 years to life, Joshua agreed to plead to count 5 (victim
Miranda) and to admit allegations that he personally inflicted
great bodily injury on the victim and that a principal personally
used a firearm in the commission of the offense, in exchange
for a determinate sentence of 22 years. The prosecution agreed
to strike the allegation that the attempted murder was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated and to move to dismiss the
remaining counts and allegations.
       In response to the prosecutor’s questions, Joshua confirmed
he understood his rights and the consequences of his plea, and
he was pleading freely and voluntarily. Joshua then pleaded
no contest to attempted murder. He also admitted the allegation
that, in the commission of the offense, a principal used a firearm.
Joshua’s counsel stipulated to a factual basis for the plea

3      In the same second amended complaint, the People charged
Joshua’s co-defendant Elvone Robinson with two counts of willful,
deliberate, premeditated attempted murder (of Miranda and
Newsome), shooting at a motor vehicle, and misdemeanor
vandalism. The People alleged firearm and gang enhancements
as to Robinson as well. The People did not allege that Robinson
personally used or discharged a firearm or that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury on either victim.

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“based upon the police reports, probation report and any other
discovery.”
      Joshua asked to postpone his sentencing. The parties
returned on April 18, 2019 for sentencing. The court noted
Joshua had not yet admitted the great bodily injury allegation.
After conferring with his counsel, Joshua confirmed counsel
had answered his question and he was ready to proceed. The
prosecutor, referring to Joshua’s plea to count 5, asked him,
“[D]o you additionally admit that in the course of that
commission that you violated Penal Code section 12022.7(a),
causing great bodily injury to B. Miranda? Do you admit or
deny that additional allegation?” Joshua replied, “I admit.”
Again, Joshua’s counsel joined.
      In accordance with the parties’ agreement, the court
sentenced Joshua to 22 years in the state prison, calculated
as the high term of nine years for the attempted murder plus
three years for the personal infliction of great bodily injury and
10 years for the firearm enhancement. The court dismissed
the remaining counts and allegations on the People’s motion.4
2.    Joshua’s petition for resentencing
      On February 17, 2022, Joshua, representing himself, filed
a form petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Joshua
checked boxes on the form stating (1) the complaint filed in
his case “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . .

4     Robinson also entered into a plea agreement with the
People. Robinson pleaded no contest to count 1 (attempted
murder of Miranda) and admitted allegations under section
12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1) that “a principal personally
used a firearm,” in exchange for a determinate sentence of
15 years (the low term of five years for the attempted murder
plus ten years for the firearm enhancement).

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attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine,” (2) he was convicted of attempted murder “following
a trial or [he] accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which
[he] could have been convicted of . . . attempted murder,” and
(3) he “could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder
because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019 [sic].” Joshua also checked a fourth box that
stated, “Having presented a facially sufficient petition, I request
that this Court appoint counsel to represent me.”
       The court appointed counsel for Joshua. The court ordered
the People to file a response to the petition by April 18 and
Joshua to file a reply by May 18. The court set a date for “further
proceedings re: prima facie hearing on 6/1/22.”
       On April 11, 2022, the prosecution filed a response to
Joshua’s petition. In its statement of facts, the prosecution said
Joshua and Robinson had driven to the intersection of Main and
109th Street in Los Angeles on February 3, 2017. Joshua drove
and parked. Robinson got out and starting spray painting graffiti
on a wall. Miranda and Newsome were in a car leaving the
parking lot near where Joshua was parked. The victims saw
Joshua looking at them. As Newsome drove away, Joshua got
out of his car with a semi-automatic firearm and fired about
four times at Newsome’s car. One of the bullets hit Miranda
in the head and Newsome crashed the car. Robinson got into
the driver’s seat, Joshua got into the back passenger seat, and
Robinson drove them away. Miranda survived.
       The prosecution asserted Joshua was not entitled to relief
under section 1172.6 because he was “a direct perpetrator” of the
crime and he “could not have been convicted of attempted murder

                                5
based upon the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”5
Joshua did not file a reply to the People’s response.
        On June 1, 2022, the court called the case for hearing.
While the reporter’s transcript is unclear, it appears both the
prosecutor and defense counsel appeared “via speakerphone.”6
The court stated it had received and considered the People’s
response. The court continued, “Mr. DeBlanc, it appears that
Mr. Laquist [sic] is not eligible for the relief requested, pursuant
to Penal Code section 117[2.6].” Counsel replied, “Yes. I did
receive a couple of documents yesterday, basically the charging
document, the information, and the plea transcript; and based
on all of that, I would submit to the court. So submitted.”
The prosecutor said he had nothing to add.
        The court stated, “The court is finding that Mr. Laquist
[sic] is ineligible for any requested relief, pursuant to Penal Code

5      The prosecution stated Joshua had “admitted to
discharging a firearm at the victim,” and his “admission to
personally using a firearm during the offense” was “an admission
to being a direct perpetrator and harboring express malice in
this case.” The prosecution was mistaken about the firearm
enhancement. Joshua did not admit having personally used
a firearm; he admitted that a principal had done so.
6      The reporter’s transcript states, “Appearances: Defendant
Joshua Laquist [sic], present with counsel Albert DeBlanc, Esq.;
Alex Hogue, Deputy District Attorney, appearing via
speakerphone.” However, the minute order states, “Defendant
is not present in court, but represented by A. DeBlanc Jr.
bar panel attorney. . . . Deputy District Attorney, Alex Hogue,
appears telephonically.” The minute order for an earlier setting
date, March 23, 2022, states, “Defendant is not present in
court, but represented by A. DeBlanc Jr. bar panel attorney[.]
Defendant appearing by counsel pursuant to Penal Code
section 977 et seq., by A. DeBlanc Jr. bar panel attorney.”

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section 117[2.6]. The petition is denied.” The court then added,
“[J]ust to make the record—a more thorough record, pursuant
to the plea transcript, the defendant admitted the charge
as well as the 12022.53 allegation and the 12022.7 allegation.
And the defendant’s plea does provide proof that he is the
direct perpetrator, and this is pursuant to his admission that
he personally discharged the firearm.”
                              DISCUSSION
1.     Section 1172.6
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) took effect on
January 1, 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The bill
amended existing law on accomplice liability for murder “ ‘to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer . . . .’ ” (People v. Gutierrez-Salazar (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 411, 417, quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f);
§ 189, subd. (e)(1).) To accomplish this goal, Senate Bill 1437
limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it
relates to murder, to ensure a person’s sentence is commensurate
with his individual criminal culpability. (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 971 (Lewis).)
       Senate Bill 1437 also authorized, through new section
1172.6, an individual convicted of felony murder or murder based
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition
the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced
on any remaining counts if he could not have been convicted of
murder because of Senate Bill 1437’s changes to the definition
of the crime. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960;
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)
       If the petition contains all the required information,
including a declaration by the petitioner that he was convicted

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of murder and is eligible for relief (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)),
section 1172.6, subdivision (c) requires the court to direct
the prosecutor to file a response to the petition and permit
the petitioner to file a reply,7 and to determine if the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief.
(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.)
       In determining whether the petitioner has carried the
burden of making the requisite prima facie showing he falls
within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief,
the superior court properly examines the record of conviction,
“allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971.) However, “the prima facie inquiry under [section
1172.6,] subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie
inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled
to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so,
the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ . . . ‘However,
if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s]
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then
“the court is justified in making a credibility determination
adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see People v. Daniel (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 666, 675.)
       Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
775), effective as of January 1, 2022, amended section 1172.6
in various respects. The bill clarified that “persons who were
convicted of attempted murder . . . under . . . the natural [and]

7      Section 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) also requires the court to
appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested. Here,
the trial court did appoint counsel for Joshua.

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probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief
as those persons convicted of murder under the same theor[y].”
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).) Senate Bill 775 also clarified
that the burden of proof at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing
is beyond a reasonable doubt and a trial court’s finding that there
is substantial evidence to support a conviction is insufficient to
meet this burden. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       We independently review a trial court’s determination of
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden).)
2.     The trial court was not required to issue an order
       to show cause or conduct an evidentiary hearing
       because—as the direct perpetrator of the attempted
       murder—Joshua is ineligible for resentencing
       as a matter of law
       As noted, Senate Bill 775 extended resentencing eligibility
to individuals convicted of attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1,
subd. (a).) In his reply brief on appeal, Joshua asserts he was
required to establish only “that he could have been prosecuted
under a natural and probable consequences theory of liability.”
But neither in the trial court, nor here on appeal, has Joshua
offered any factual premise or theory under which he “could have
been prosecuted under a natural and probable consequences
theory of liability.” Indeed, throughout these proceedings,
Joshua has offered no facts about the crime, his role (if any),
or Robinson’s role.
       Nor was there any discussion of this issue in the trial court.
The court gave two reasons for finding Joshua ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6: he “admi[tted] that he personally
discharged the firearm,” and he admitted he personally inflicted
great bodily injury on the victim. The Attorney General agrees

                                  9
with Joshua that the first of these two reasons was incorrect:
Joshua admitted that a principal personally used a firearm,
not that he personally used a firearm in the attempted murder
of Miranda. (See People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 592,
597 (Offley) [true finding that a principal to the crime—not the
defendant himself—discharged a firearm does not disqualify
defendant from relief under section 1172.6].)
       But the second reason the court gave was valid: Joshua
admitted he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Miranda.
A true finding on an allegation under section 12022.7 that a
defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim
means that defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
(See Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 48, 54–55.) “The
natural meaning of ‘personally inflicted’ is that the defendant
[himself] inflicted the injury.” (Id. at p. 55. See People v. Cole
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 578–579 [under section 12022.7, “personally
inflict” means those who “directly perform” the act causing
physical injury].)
       Joshua cites Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th 588 and argues
its reasoning applies equally to his admission that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Joshua is mistaken.
       Offley involved an attack by five defendants on two victims.
At least three of the defendants fired shots into the victims’ car.
One victim was killed and the other was seriously wounded.8
(Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 592.) The trial court
instructed the jury on “the natural and probable consequences
doctrine in cases of conspiracy.” (Id. at p. 593.) Although the

8      As Offley was decided before Senate Bill 775 extended relief
to defendants convicted of attempted murder, Offley petitioned
for relief only on his murder conviction. (Offley, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 592.)

                                10
prosecution alleged Offley had personally and intentionally fired
a handgun causing the victim’s death, the prosecutor “agreed”
during the trial “that a bullet from Offley’s gun could not have
killed” the victim. (Id. at pp. 592, 594.)
       The trial court denied Offley’s petition for resentencing
without appointing counsel and the appellate court reversed.
The court stated that—given the prosecutor’s closing argument
relying on a natural and probable consequences theory—it could
not “exclude the possibility that the jury believed Offley acted
without intending to kill [the victim] or consciously disregarding
that risk,” and thus without malice aforethought. (Offley, supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 594, 597, 599.)
       Joshua’s contention that the “malice aforethought” issue
discussed in Offley applies to his section 12022.7 admission here
misses the first, critical inquiry in any analysis of a section
1172.6 petition: was the petitioner merely an accomplice, or
does the record of conviction demonstrate he was the direct
perpetrator of the shooting? The whole point of section 1172.6
is to provide relief for individuals who were accomplices to
murders and attempted murders. A defendant who was not
an accomplice but instead was the direct and actual perpetrator
of the attempted murder is not eligible for resentencing. (See,
e.g., Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 53–54, 56; People v.
Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 692–694 [affirming denial of
resentencing because defendant, as actual killer, was directly—
not vicariously—liable]; People v. Edwards (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
666, 669, 671, 674 [affirming summary denial of resentencing
petition where record of conviction showed petitioner was actual
killer].) By admitting he personally inflicted great bodily injury

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on Miranda, Joshua admitted he was the actual shooter.9 He
therefore is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter
of law.
                           DISPOSITION
       Based on our independent review, we agree with the trial
court that Laquist Joshua failed to make a prima facie showing
for relief. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying his
petition for resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                      EGERTON, J.

We concur:

                   EDMON, P.J.                           ADAMS, J.

9      While Joshua’s check-the-boxes petition was facially
sufficient, “it is devoid of factual allegations” concerning the
shooting of Miranda. (See People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
982, 989, review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643.) Neither in
the trial court—where his counsel submitted based on the record
of conviction—nor here on appeal has Joshua denied he was the
shooter. Nor does he assert that another person fired the shot
that struck Miranda in the head. “He merely states the legal
conclusion that he could not now be convicted of [attempted]
murder because of changes made to the law of [attempted]
murder under Senate Bill No. 1437.” (See ibid.)

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