Court Opinion

ID: 9942458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 07:11:31.349955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:07.087116
License: Public Domain

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed February 16, 2024.

                                  S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                              No. 05-21-01191-CV

                MARISA LASERNA, Appellant
                           V.
   BW VENTANA LLC AND SOUTH OXFORD MANAGEMENT LLC,
                        Appellees

                On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. CC-22-02937-E

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy
                          Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      Appellant Marisa Laserna sued BW Ventana LLC (“BW Ventana”) and its

management company, South Oxford Management, LLC (“South Oxford”)

(collectively “BW Ventana Entities”), alleging that she sustained personal injuries

attributable to mold exposure while residing in an apartment she rented from BW

Ventana. The BW Ventana Entities moved for traditional summary judgment urging

Laserna’s claims were time barred. Laserna responded urging her claims were

timely filed under the discovery rule. The trial court granted the BW Ventana

Entities’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Laserna’s claims. On appeal,
Laserna, appearing pro se, challenges the trial court’s ruling on the BW Ventana

Entities’ motion. We affirm. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this

memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

                                   BACKGROUND

      In July 2019, Laserna rented an apartment owned by BW Ventana and

managed by South Oxford. On June 6, 2022, Laserna filed suit against the BW

Ventana Entities asserting she had been exposed to toxic mold in her apartment. On

June 28, the BW Ventana Entities filed their answer generally denying the allegations

in Laserna’s petition and asserting the affirmative defense of limitations.

      On July 27, the BW Ventana Entities filed a traditional motion for summary

judgment, in which they argued that Laserna’s claim was barred by the applicable

statute of limitations. In support of their motion, the BW Ventana Entities submitted

(1) a demand letter dated January 26, 2021, from Laserna’s attorney to South Oxford

to which various medical records, a report from Realtime Laboratories, Inc., and a

mold assessment summary were attached, (2) the declaration of a prior Chief

Administrative Office for South Oxford with maintenance records for Laserna’s

apartment attached, and (3) a second demand letter from Laserna’s attorney to the

BW Ventana Entities dated November 18, 2021.

      Laserna filed a response, attaching various medical records and a mycotoxin

report, urging she did not know the nature of her injuries and the likelihood that they

were caused by toxic mold exposure until a mycotoxin test was performed on August

                                         –2–
3, 2020, showing the presence of mycotoxins and toxic mold throughout her body.

Laserna claimed limitations did not begin to run until that date making her June 6,

2022, filing timely.

      The BW Ventana Entities filed a reply, in which they addressed the discovery

rule and attached additional medical records from Texas Health, Transcend Medical

Group, and Environmental Health Center.

      The record before the trial court and this Court establishes the following. In

the January 26, 2021, demand letter, Laserna asserted that upon moving into the

apartment in July 2019, she almost immediately began to feel ill. She further

detailed how unknown substances began to grow inside her apartment and stated that

in June 2020:

      [She] suffered acute breathing complications and chest pains and was
      forced to seek emergency medical attention. This event was attributed
      to her prolonged exposure to the aforementioned substances.

The letter more specifically indicated that Laserna went to the Emergency Room at

Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital (“Texas Health”) on June 1, 2020. South

Oxford’s maintenance records established Laserna first notified South Oxford about

the possible existence of mold in her apartment on May 27, 2020, a few days before

her emergency room visit. Medical records from Texas Health show Laserna sought

treatment for breathing complications on June 1, 2020, and that her complaint was

“mold exposure” in her apartment. She was diagnosed with “[d]yspensea and

respiratory abnormalities, acute bronchospasm,” and “mold suspected exposure.”

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The treating doctor’s notes indicate “s/p exposure to mold in apartment onset months

ago.” “[Patient r]eports symptoms worsen when in apartment, improves when not.”

A record from Transend Medical Group dated December 10, 2020, approximately

six months after Laserna’s emergency room visit, included a note, “43 year old

female is present today for F/U on HTN and Mold Exposure. PT states she has been

exposed for the past year.” Then on July 31, 2020, Laserna went to Environmental

Health Center. Records dated July 31 from the center indicate that patient “[h]ad

mold exposure in her apartment. Moved into the apartment 1 year ago, and started

feeling sick . . . left the apartment on 6/2/20 and was in a hotel.” The records further

showed Laserna had elevated mycotoxins on lab reports. On August 3, 2020,

mycotoxin and mold testing was done at RealTime Laboratories.

      On October 7, 2022, the trial court granted the BW Ventana Entities’ motion

for summary judgment and dismissed Laserna’s claims. This appeal followed.

                                     DISCUSSION

      We review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Mid–Century Ins. Co.

of Tex. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007); Beesley v. Hydrocarbon

Separation, Inc., 358 S.W.3d 415, 418 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). When

reviewing a traditional summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant, we

determine whether the defendant conclusively disproved at least one element of the

plaintiff’s claim or conclusively proved every element of an affirmative

defense.    Cathey     v.   Booth,    900       S.W.2d   339,    341    (Tex.    1995).

                                          –4–
The traditional summary judgment movant must show there is no genuine issue of

material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P.

166a(c); Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1994). In

deciding whether a disputed material fact issue exists precluding summary

judgment, we must take evidence favorable to the non-movant as true, and we must

indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in favor of the non-

movant. Sysco Food Servs., 890 S.W.2d at 800.

      A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of

limitations has the burden to establish the applicability of the defense. KPMG Peat

Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). Thus,

the defendant must (1) conclusively prove when the cause of action accrued, and (2)

negate the discovery rule, if it applies and has been pleaded or otherwise raised, by

proving as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of material fact about when

the plaintiff discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have

discovered, the nature of its injury. Id. If the movant establishes that the statute of

limitations bars the action, the non-movant must then adduce summary-judgment

proof raising a genuine fact issue in avoidance of the statute of limitations. Id.

      A claimant must bring suit for personal injury or property damage not later

than two years after the day the cause of action accrues. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 16.003(a). Generally, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes

some legal injury, when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek

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a judicial remedy, or whenever one person may sue another. Am. Star Energy &

Min. Corp. v. Stowers, 457 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex. 2015). A claimant’s knowledge

of injury initiates the accrual of a cause of action and triggers the putative claimant’s

duty to exercise reasonable diligence to investigate the problem. See In re Springs

Condo., L.L.C., No. 03-21-00493-CV, 2021 WL 5814292, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin

Dec. 8, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). The cause of action will accrue even if

the claimant does not know the specific cause of the injury or its full extent. Id.

(citing Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 209 (Tex. 2011)).

      However, under the discovery rule, a cause of action will not accrue until the

plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongfully caused injury. Baxter v.

Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, 182 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet.

denied). The discovery rule “does not turn on whether the injured person knows the

exact identity of the tortfeasor or all of the ways in which the tortfeasor was at fault

in causing the injury.” Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830, 834

(Tex. 2018).

      The summary judgment evidence establishes Laserna visited the Emergency

Room at Texas Health on June 1, 2020. Records from the hospital indicate that

Laserna sought treatment for breathing complications she attributed to exposure to

mold in her apartment. The hospital records include a diagnosis of mold suspected

exposure. Records from Texas Health dated June 1, 2020, further reflect suspected

exposure to mold in apartment onset months ago and that Laserna reported her

                                          –6–
symptoms worsen when in the apartment and improve when not. Six months later,

on December 10, 2020, Laserna told her treating physician that she has been exposed

for the past year. The fact that Laserna received her mycotoxin test results on August

3, 2020, does not alter the fact that Laserna, at least by June 1, 2020, knew about her

breathing problems and attributed them to an exposure to mold in her apartment,

precluding the application of the discovery rule to extend the accrual of her cause of

action beyond that date. See In re Springs Condos., 2021 WL 5814292, at *3

(limitations period accrued when claimant “had knowledge of her injury, the date

that she and her physician reviewed [sic] her diagnosis to exposure to mold and [sic]

was provided with the kit to test for mold in her apartment.”); Pirtle v. Kahn, 177

S.W.3d 567, 573 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet denied) (plaintiff’s cause

of action accrued when she found a leak, saw mold, and drew inference mold caused

her illness).

       Because the summary judgment record establishes that Laserna’s cause of

action accrued, at the very latest, on June 1, 2020, and she did not file suit within

two years of the date of the accrual of her claim, her claim is time barred.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the BW Ventana Entities’ motion

for summary judgment. We overrule Laserna’s sole issue.

                                         –7–
                                 CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the

BW Ventana Entities and dismissing Laserna’s claim.

                                         /Nancy Kennedy/
                                         NANCY KENNEDY
221191F.P05                              JUSTICE

                                      –8–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

MARISA LASERNA, Appellant                      On Appeal from the County Court at
                                               Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-01191-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. CC-22-02937-
                                               E.
BW VENTANA, LLC, and                           Opinion delivered by Justice
OXFORD MANAGEMENT LLC,                         Kennedy. Justices Nowell and Miskel
Appellees                                      participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

    It is ORDERED that appellee BW VENTANA, LLC, and OXFORD
MANAGEMENT LLC recover their costs of this appeal from appellant MARISA
LASERNA.

Judgment entered this 16th day of February 2024.

                                         –9–