Court Opinion

ID: 7822050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:58:19.576853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:45.689866
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice. This appeal concerns a dispute over a debt between three corporations. Stewart Electric, the appellant, supplied material worth $5,822.23 to a construction job at a Firestone Tire and Rubber Company plant in Prescott, Arkansas. Meyer Systems Corp., a Texas corporation, was the prime contractor and it hired Bildon Industries Inc., as general contractor, to do all electrical work. Stewart filed this suit against Meyer claiming it was liable for the debt. Bildon had gone bankrupt. Firestone simply interpleaded the amount claimed asking that it be paid to either Stewart or Meyer. The case was tried to the judge without a jury and only three witnesses testified. The only records Stewart had, thirty-two “tickets” for the job, were introduced into evidence. The trial judge found that Meyer was not liable on this open account; Meyer had not contracted for the supplies and Stewart had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Meyer, through its alleged agent, had either expressly or impliedly authorized the contract with Stewart. Denying Stewart’s claim, the judge awarded the interpleaded money to Meyer. We affirm. On appeal Stewart alleges essentially two errors: The court was wrong in its findings, and the Wingo Act precludes Meyer from getting the money and that, therefore, the money should go to Stewart. While the legal issue of this case is agency, that is, whether Meyer actually entered into a contract with Stewart for the material, the resolution is purely a.fact question. The trial court, after hearing the witnesses, and examining the evidence, found the facts to be against Stewart. In order for us to reverse that judgment we would have to find the judge was clearly erroneous in his findings. ARCP Rule 52. The trial judge correctly stated it was Stewart’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a Meyer employee had the express or implied authority to make the contract. Jackson v. M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co., 169 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. Ark. 1958), aff'd, 271 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1959). The plaintiff called only one witness, James Ellis Stewart, the president of the Stewart family corporation. Stewart said his first knowledge of the agreement was when he overheard a conversation between his father and an employee of Meyer, whose first name was Weldon. He said on the basis of that conversation an account was set up so that material could be supplied to the Firestone job. He said he called Firestone to check on Meyer, since they had had no previous dealings with the company, and was told by a woman that Meyer would be a good account. He said he understood that Meyer was not to be billed until after the job was completed. Stewart said after Meyer was billed and did not pay the account, he contacted a Mr. Keys at Meyer and he said the account would be paid. Two of the tickets were made out to Meyer, one dated August 6, 1979, and another dated August 8, 1979. The first one was signed by Weldon Geron. The rest were al 1 made ou t to “Beldon Indus tries, ” or “Bildon Industries,” or “Bil-don Industries.” Stewart said the August 6, 1979, ticket was the first ticket issued but was dated later when the tickets were posted. The first tickets, according to dates, were three dated June 19, 1979, all made out to Bildon. Stewart also testified that Nick Grasel, the president of Meyer, assured him the account would be paid. Nick Grasel testified that Meyer was the prime contractor for Firestone; that Bildon was the general contractor for Firestone and also responsible for the electrical work. He denied that Meyer ever authorized any of its representatives to obligate Meyer to Stewart, or that any had the authority to do so. He said Weldon Geron was sent by Meyer to the job site to check on the work and to assist Bildon in expediting material to the site. He denied that he ever acknowledged to Mr. Stewart that Meyer was liable on the account. Weldon Geron testified that he was working for Meyer at the time in question and made several trips to Prescott to check on the job, pick up material, and keep the job moving. He said he had no authority to obligate Meyer for any of the equipment used by Bildon and that he did not authorize Stewart to open an account for Meyer. He said he did pick up some equipment at Stewart’s and signed for it, but that when he saw a ticket made out to Meyer he told Stewart to change it, that it was a mistake because the account was Bildon’s. If an agent has the express or implied authority to bind the principal, then the principal is bound by the agent’s actions. That is undisputedly the law, as both parties and the judge agreed. Jackson v. M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co., supra. But this case involves the application of the law to the factual question of whether Geron had the express or implied authority to bind Meyer. The trial court specifically found that the appellant had failed to prove that proposition by a preponderance of the evidence. There is ample evidence to support the trial court’s findings. All but two of the tickets were made out to Bildon. The tickets seem to square with Geron’s testimony, and Meyer’s president denied he ever assured Stewart the bill would be paid. The trial court obviously chose to believe the testimony offered by Meyer. It is unfortunate that Bildon did not pay this account and Stewart must suffer a loss, but it does not follow that Meyer owes the account as a matter of law. The trial court, sitting as a jury, found that Stewart failed to make its case, a decision we cannot on this record overturn. The second issue raised is one that was not presented to the trial court. It is argued the “Wingo Act” prohibits Meyer from recovering the $5,822.23 from Firestone. The Wingo Act is Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-1202 (Repl. 1980), and it generally prevents a foreign corporation, not authorized to do business in Arkansas, from enforcing a contract in Arkansas. While it is alleged that Meyer was a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in Arkansas, nowhere by pleading, orally, or even in a motion after trial to dismiss the case without prejudice, did Stewart invoke the Wingo Act and ask that Meyer be prevented from collecting the money interpleaded by Firestone. That argument is raised for the first time on appeal. We do not consider such arguments. Wilson v. Lester Hurst Nursery, Inc., 269 Ark. 19, 598 S.W.2d 407 (1980). Affirmed. Purtle and Hays, JJ., dissent.