Court Opinion

ID: 9962979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 14:02:12.50942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:01.755505
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 274
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION I
                                      No. CR-23-573

                                               Opinion Delivered April 24, 2024
 JOHN DAMRON
                               APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BAXTER
                                         COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
 V.                                      [NO. 03CR-22-135]

                                               HONORABLE JOHN R. PUTMAN,
 STATE OF ARKANSAS                             JUDGE
                                 APPELLEE
                                               AFFIRMED

                           N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge

       John Damron appeals his conviction for boating while intoxicated (BWI). Damron

was initially tried in the Baxter County District Court for BWI and negligent operation of a

motorboat. He was found guilty of BWI and not guilty of the boating violation. Damron

appealed to the Baxter County Circuit Court, where he was again convicted of BWI in a

bench trial. He raises three points on appeal. We affirm.

       The circuit court first addressed whether there was probable cause for the stop of

Damron’s boat. Corporal Lyndle Crownover, a wildlife officer for the Arkansas Game and

Fish Commission, testified that on July 3, 2021, he was on routine patrol in his patrol boat

on Norfork Lake. Crownover saw a jet ski and a boat driven by Damron going back and

forth such that they appeared to be racing or trying to cut each other off. Crownover said
that the jet ski and boat were about twenty-five to thirty feet apart, that they were traveling

roughly thirty miles an hour, and that the jet ski was in danger of running into the bank.

Crownover believed that a crash was imminent and stopped Damron’s boat for that reason.

According to Crownover, Damron acknowledged that he was about twenty-five to thirty feet

from the jet ski and said that he understood why he was stopped since it could have been a

dangerous situation. Crownover testified that Damron violated the law that requires that a

boat travel at a safe distance and a safe speed where, here, the vessels were dangerously close;

he believed it to be reckless or negligent operation of the boat. The circuit court found

probable cause for the stop.

       Crownover then testified that when speaking with Damron, he smelled an odor of

intoxicants on him and asked Damron how much he had had to drink. Damron told him

he had five beers that day. Crownover administered a portable breath test (PBT) at 6:41

p.m. and a second PBT approximately fifteen minutes later before determining that they

needed to move to solid ground for field-sobriety testing. Crownover testified that Damron

failed all three field-sobriety tests, demonstrating all six indicators of intoxication on the

horizontal-gaze-nystagmus test and two clues each on the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand

tests. Crownover testified that he determined that Damron was intoxicated and needed to

have a blood or breath alcohol concentration (BAC) test. This test was given to him at 8:37

p.m. with a result of 0.09 alcohol concentration. Crownover wrote Damron a ticket for BWI

and improper distance.

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       On cross-examination, Crownover testified that he “probably” would have considered

Damron to have passed the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests on their own, but his

conclusions were based on the horizontal-gaze-nystagmus test. Crownover agreed with

Damron’s attorney that it takes time for a person’s body to absorb alcohol and that if

Damron “had just consumed alcohol that his body would have been absorbing it and it

would have been causing his BAC to rise.”

       The State rested following Crownover’s testimony, and Damron moved to dismiss,

arguing that the State had failed to prove intoxication. Damron argued that his BAC rose

during the two hours between the stop and the BAC test, and if the test had been given

sooner, he would have been under the legal limit. The circuit court denied the motion.

       Damron testified that he probably had five or six beers that day as well as sandwiches

and snacks. He said that he had a couple of beers in the hour preceding the stop and

probably finished his last beer ten or fifteen minutes before the stop. Damron agreed that

the BAC test was given approximately two hours and twenty-two minutes after he had

stopped drinking, and he said that he did not have an explanation as to why his BAC would

register 0.09 at that time. The circuit court denied Damron’s renewed motion to dismiss

and found him guilty of BWI. The court acquitted him of the boating violation.

                                I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Damron first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing a challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial

evidence, direct or circumstantial. Lockhart v. State, 2017 Ark. 13, 508 S.W.3d 869.

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Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the

other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. This court views the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Id. It

is well settled that it is the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight of evidence

and the credibility of witnesses. Id.

       Under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-65-103 (Repl. 2016), it is unlawful for a

person to operate or be in actual physical control of a motorboat on the waters of this state

if the person is either (1) intoxicated or (2) at that time the alcohol concentration in the

person’s breath or blood was eight hundredths (0.08) or more. For purposes of the offense,

intoxicated means influenced or affected by the ingestion of alcohol, a controlled substance,

any intoxicant, or any combination of alcohol, a controlled substance, or an intoxicant, to

such a degree that the driver’s reactions, motor skills, and judgment are substantially altered

and the driver, therefore, constitutes a clear and substantial danger of physical injury or

death to himself or herself or another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-102(4) (Supp. 2023).

       Damron argues that considering Crownover’s testimony regarding rising BAC and

the fact that the 0.09 BAC result was not obtained until more than two hours after the stop,

there was insufficient evidence to prove that his BAC was over the legal limit at the time he

was operating the boat when the State failed to present evidence “as to the possible calculable

effect of time” on his BAC. We disagree.

       The State is not required to present expert testimony explaining the meaning of

blood-alcohol content. Sparks v. State, 25 Ark. App. 190, 756 S.W.2d 911 (1988). In Hayden

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v. State, 103 Ark. App. 32, 286 S.W.3d 177 (2008), the appellant similarly claimed that the

State had failed to prove that his BAC was 0.08 or more at the time he was driving because

test results of 0.099 and 0.096 were obtained more than an hour after the stop. The

argument in Hayden that the appellant’s alcohol level would have been rising at the time of

the offense and peaking at the time of the test was, like here, unsupported by evidence about

the changes in alcohol levels that occur after alcohol is consumed. Although Crownover

agreed that if Damron “had just” consumed alcohol, his BAC would rise, he did not give

any opinion regarding the effect Damron’s drinking would have on his BAC more than two

hours after the stop. The BAC result of 0.09 is sufficient to establish Damron’s alcohol

concentration at the time of the offense.

       Moreover, the circuit court was also presented with evidence of intoxication to

establish the other definition of BWI. Damron argues that the non-BAC evidence was

insufficient because he passed two of three field-sobriety tests and there was no other

evidence of impairment. However, the State presented evidence that Damron failed his field-

sobriety testing, admitted drinking alcohol, smelled of alcohol, and drove the boat

dangerously close to a jet ski. Crownover opined that Damron was intoxicated. Opinion

testimony regarding intoxication is admissible, and it is the fact-finder’s province to

determine its weight and credibility. Henry v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 169, 378 S.W.3d 832.

We hold that this evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for BWI.

                          II. Consideration of Facts Not in Evidence

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       Damron next argues that the circuit court considered facts not in evidence in finding

him guilty. This allegation is based on the court’s statement that

       for the reasons I stated previously, I’m going to deny the motion. From what I
       understand about alcohol absorption, if he drank the beers, as he said, one early and
       began drinking at 2:00 to 2:30, and his last beer was consumed a little before 6:30,
       and then when the test was given, there’s no way he would have been at .09. Some -
       - but that’s what he registered, so I’m going to find him guilty of DWI.

Damron contends that the court discredited his testimony on the basis of alcohol-absorption

rates for which there was no evidence. We agree with the State, however, that Damron failed

to preserve this argument for appeal.

       To preserve an argument for appeal, there must be an objection in the circuit court

that is sufficient to apprise the court of the particular error alleged, and the appellate court

will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Vanesch v. State, 343 Ark. 381,

37 S.W.3d 196 (2001). The law is well settled that to preserve an issue for appeal, a

defendant must object at the first opportunity. Mezquita v. State, 354 Ark. 433, 125 S.W.3d

161 (2003). Damron contends that his argument for dismissal regarding rising BAC levels

preserved this argument. While his sufficiency argument was preserved, we do not agree that

his motion to dismiss preserved the separate argument he now raises that inadmissible

evidence was considered. The purported consideration of inadmissible evidence did not

arise until after Damron completed his argument for dismissal, and he made no objection

thereafter. See Rasmusen v. State, 277 Ark. 238, 641 S.W.2d 699 (1982) (holding that

defense’s objection to question posed by State did not preserve argument on appeal that the

trial court made misleading comments in the discussion following the objection).

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       Damron alternatively contends that his argument should be considered under the

third or fourth Wicks exceptions to the contemporaneous-objection rule. See Wicks v. State,

270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980). The third Wicks exception applies when the circuit

court should intervene on its own motion to correct a serious error. White v. State, 2012

Ark. 221, 408 S.W.3d 720. This exception is limited to only those errors affecting the very

structure of the criminal trial, such as the fundamental right to a trial by jury, the

presumption of innocence, and the State’s burden of proof. Id. The fourth Wicks exception

is implicated when the admission or exclusion of evidence affects a defendant’s substantial

rights. Id. Damron argues that evidence that was not presented was “admitted,” which

violated the confrontation clause and affected his substantial rights. Our case law is clear

that Wicks presents only narrow exceptions that are to be rarely applied. Id. In Witherspoon

v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 468, we noted that these exceptions are not intended to apply when

a party simply fails to make a contemporaneous objection to an alleged confrontation-clause

error. We decline to apply any of the Wicks exceptions here.

                               III. Probable Cause for the Stop

       Damron also argues that the circuit court erred in finding that there was probable

cause to stop his boat. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we conduct a de

novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical fact

for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or

probable cause, giving due weight to the inferences drawn by the circuit court. Brewer v.

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State, 2010 Ark. App. 275. We reverse only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance

of the evidence. Id.

       The law regarding probable cause for traffic stops applies to cases involving boats. Id.

In order to be valid, a traffic stop requires that the officer have probable cause to believe that

a traffic violation has occurred. Id. Probable cause is defined as facts or circumstances within

a police officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to permit a person of reasonable caution to

believe that an offense has been committed by the person suspected. Lockhart v. State, 2017

Ark. 13, 508 S.W.3d 869. In assessing the existence of probable cause, our review is liberal

rather than strict. Id. Whether a police officer has probable cause to make a traffic stop does

not depend on whether the driver was actually guilty of the violation that the officer believed

to have occurred. Id.

       Damron argues that there was no evidence to support a finding that a reasonable

officer would conclude that he violated the law. We disagree. Crownover testified that he

believed Damron was in violation of the law requiring him to keep a safe speed and distance

and that he operated the boat negligently or recklessly.          Pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 27-101-202(1) (Repl. 2022), no person shall operate any motorboat in a

reckless or negligent manner that endangers the life, limb, or property of any person.

Crownover testified that Damron’s boat was getting in the jet ski’s space, that they were

dangerously close to each other, that they appeared to be racing, and that a crash appeared

imminent. These facts support a finding that Crownover had probable cause to believe that

                                                8
a violation of section 27-101-202(1) had occurred. Accordingly, the circuit court’s ruling was

not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

       Affirmed.

       GLADWIN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.

       Jeremy B. Lowrey; and Cooper & Bayless, by: Paul Bayless, for appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Jacob H. Jones, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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