Court Opinion

ID: 9527437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:30:34.835749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:47.457517
License: Public Domain

LAWSON, Justice
(concurring specially) :
I agree that on the record before us the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The opinion of Mr. Justice Coleman, in my judgment, correctly disposes of the questions argued in brief of counsel for the appellant.
The record contains nothing to indicate that Boykin’s plea of guilty was not voluntarily and knowingly made or that it was the product of coercion, either mental or physical, or was unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence. For aught appearing, the plea was entirely voluntary and Boykin fully realized and was competent to know and understand the possible consequences of such a plea. In briefs filed here on behalf of Boykin, by counsel who did not represent him at the trial below, it is not contended that Boykin did not voluntarily and knowingly enter the plea of guilty or that he did not fully realize the possible consequences of such plea.
. I am not familiar with any holding of this court to the effect that when a defendant pleads guilty in a capital case the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did not accept the guilty plea until after determining that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered by the defendant *663and that the defendant fully realized and was competent to know the consequences of such a plea. And such is not, in my opinion, the holdings of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Dickerson v. State, 202 Miss. 804, 32 So.2d 881, and Yates v. State, 251 Miss. 376, 169 So.2d 792, cited and relied upon in the dissenting opinion.
In Howard v. State, 280 Ala. 430, 194 So.2d 834, in reviewing the action of a trial court in a post conviction proceeding, we observed: “An accused’s plea of guilty may be accepted only if it is made voluntarily and knowingly. If it appears that a guilty plea is the product of coercion, either mental or physical, or was unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence, it is void since it is a violation of constitutional safeguards.” (194 So.2d 837-838) In my opinion the language just quoted is to the same effect as that quoted in the dissenting opinion from Yates v. State of Mississippi, supra.
Of course, a trial judge should not accept a guilty plea unless he has determined that such a plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered by the defendant. But neither the Howard case, supra, nor the Mississippi cases, supra, hold that the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge made such a determination. The effect of the dissenting opinion is to presume that the trial judge failed to do his duty.
If the trial court did fail to make such an ascertainment, or if the appellant, Boykin, was not adequately represented in the court below, or if because of his youth or ignorance he was unable to fully comprehend the possible effect of having all five cases tried before the same unstruck jury, he can raise any or all of those questions in a petition for writ of error coram nobis. In such a proceeding, of course, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence in support of his contentions. But, in my opinion, there is nothing in this record which would justify a reversal on any of those possible contentions.