Court Opinion

ID: 9751883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:14:39.211444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:01.283605
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s holdings that no lesser offense instructions were required, error regarding the *1242definition of “harasses” was harmless and selection of the upper term was appropriate.1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Penal Code section 646.9 does not require an intent to carry out a threat. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1234-1240.) The majority expends significant energy indulging in statutory construction in a case where such analysis is unwarranted. Furthermore, the result of this analysis has effectively rewritten the statute to delete the “credible threat” as an element of the offense.
There is no need for statutory interpretation since Penal Code section 646.9 is clear and unambiguous. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 843 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380].) The 1992 version of the section provided, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury is guilty of the crime of stalking . ...” In relevant part, a “credible threat” was defined as:
1) “. . . a threat made with the intent. . . to carry out the threat. . .’’and
2) “. . . a threat made with ... the apparent ability to carry out the threat,”
3) “. . . [thereby causing] the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety.” (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (e), italics added.)2
The response to the jury’s question that “[I]t is required that a person had the intent to threaten the victim .... [f] It is not required that the person making the threat actually intended to carry out the threat” effectively *1243removed from the jury’s consideration the “intent to carry out the threat” element of “credible threat.” This being the case, the error was reversible because no other instructions required a finding on the missing intent element and the jury may well have convicted the defendant without having found each element of the offense. (People v. Figueroa (1986) 41 Cal.3d 714, 725, 726 [224 Cal.Rptr. 719, 715 P.2d 680].)3
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 14, 1995.

 Ialso concur with that portion of the majority opinion upholding exclusion of Dr. Krasnow’s testimony as cumulative. I do not join in the subsequent observation that evidence of good character is “irrelevant” because “intent to kill or cause great bodily injury was not an element of the crime.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1241.) This observation is unnecessary to the decision and represents a fundamental misperception of good character evidence. It is no longer subject to question that “[g]ood character for the traits involved in the commission of the crime[s] charged may be sufficient by itself to raise a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of a defendant. It may be reasoned that a person of good character as to such traits would not be likely to commit the crime[s] of which the defendant is charged.” (CALJIC No. 2.40 (5th ed. 1988); People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1310-1311 [283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563].)

 Subdivision (e) provided at the time of the offense: “For the purposes of this section, ‘a credible threat’ means a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause great bodily injury to, a person as defined in Section 12022.7.”

 The majority’s reliance upon People v. Heilman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 391 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 422] is misplaced. There the court, in relevant part, considered only the term “repeatedly” in the face of a vagueness challenge. (Id. at pp. 398-401.) The court did not consider the element of “credible threat.” (Id., at p. 399, fn. 4.)