Court Opinion

ID: 9460069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:40:01.857262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:27.614661
License: Public Domain

*227AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
The well-reasoned opinion of the Florida Court of Appeal, First District (Wigginton, J.), 251 So.2d 672, in this matter, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida, 265 So.2d 701, which denied the double jeopardy plea and held that there was no denial of fundamental fairness to the minor herein, fully reflects my views and my reasons for dissent.
Some pertinent excerpts from Judge Wigginton’s opinion for the Court follow:
F.S. Section 39.02(6) (a), F.S.A., of the juvenile court act permissively authorizes a juvenile judge to waive its jurisdiction of a proceeding brought against a juvenile 14 years of age or older if the act forming the basis for the child’s alleged delinquency would constitute a felony under the laws of Florida. In this event the juvenile court shall certify the case to the court which would have jurisdiction of the child if he were an adult. F.S. Section 39.02(6) (c), F.S.A., provides that when an indictment is returned by the grand jury charging a child of any age with a violation of Florida law punishable by death or by life imprisonment, the juvenile court shall be without jurisdiction, and the child shall be handled in every respect as if he were an adult.
Appellant invites the court’s attention to the fact that the juvenile court in the case sub judice held a hearing, refused to relinquish jurisdiction and adjudged appellee to be a delinquent child within the short period of six days from the date on which the petition of the juvenile counselor was filed in the court. Although the indictment in this case was returned by the grand jury within 12 days thereafter, had the indictment been returned prior to the date on which the juvenile court adjudged appellee to be a delinquent child and committed him to the Division of Youth Services of the State of Florida, then the juvenile court would have lost jurisdiction of the case by virtue of the provisions of F.S. Section 39.02(6) (c), F.S.A. If the position of the appellee is sustained, it would appear that the stage would then be set for a race to the courthouse to see whether a child who commits a capital offense under the laws of Florida may escape prosecution in the criminal court by a hurry-up delinquency proceeding in the juvenile court in which he pleads guilty or enters no objection to an adjudication finding him to be a delinquent child because of the criminal offense which he committed. If such maneuver can be successfully accomplished, then under the theory advanced by appellee the child may never be subsequently prosecuted in the criminal court for the offense he has committed even though the period of time he may be lawfully confined in the custody of the Division of Youth Services may not go beyond his 21st year of age.
Id. 251 So.2d at 675.
It is of significance here that in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1984, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), the Supreme Court said that “the juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a ‘criminal prosecution’.” Though there are definite criminal aspects to child delinquency proceedings, the 16-year-old juvenile here has never been tried by any court for the serious capital offense of rape. It is true that the juvenile was adjudicated a delinquent by the Florida Juvenile Court on the basis of the same facts upon which he was subsequently indicted for a felony, but it cannot properly be held that the delinquency proceeding constituted a criminal prosecution so as to prevent trial of the felony case in the proper Florida state court. The majority’s attempt to distinguish the holding in McKeiver is unconvincing.
The citation by the majority of Hultin v. Beto, 5 Cir., 1968, 396 F.2d 216, is clearly inapposite as Judge Wigginton’s opinion demonstrates. Hultin, a 16-year-old minor, was adjudged a delinquent child for an assault and a murder. Under the law of Texas, where the offenses occurred, no minor may be tried for a criminal offense unless he has attained the age of 17. The attempt of the State of Texas to prosecute Hultin for murder when he thereafter attained the age of 17 was obviously contrary to law and violated principles of fundamental fairness. On the other hand, in *228Florida, a minor, 14 years of age or older, may be tried for any felony if the juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction, or a child of any age may be tried for a capital case and upon indictment the juvenile' court loses jurisdiction.
The Florida Court of Appeal aptly said in the conclusion of its opinion in this case:
We find nothing in the record before us which can reasonably be said to support the conclusion reached by the trial court that to now require ap-pellee to answer for the offense with which he is charged in the indictment would constitute fundamental unfairness. The juvenile court adjudication finding him to be a delinquent child for having, committed the offense of rape was undergirded by his full cooperation and resulted from his own urging over the timely objection of the criminal court authorities. If he was sufficiently mature at age 16 to feloniously assault and forcibly rape a mature woman, it would appear that he was sufficiently mature to have appreciated the unlawful character of his act and is sufficiently responsible to answer for its consequences. To make this requirement of appellee would not, in the words of the federal court in Hultin, supra, “violate those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions”.
Id. 251 So.2d at 680.
I agree with the Florida appellate courts which had all the facts and circumstances of this case before them, that the minor has not been denied fundamental fairness and his plea of double jeopardy should be denied.1
ON SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM:
A member of the Court in active service having requested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is denied.
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and WISDOM, GEWIN, BELL, THORN-BERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN, CLARK, RONEY and GEE, Circuit Judges.

. The double jeopardy issue involved in this case has been before several state courts that have denied the plea under circumstances similar to those here. See, e. g., Johnson v. State, 3 Md.App. 105, 238 A.2d 286 (1967) ; Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958) ; In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503, 510-511 (1943) ; People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal.App.2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953) ; In re Smith, 114 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Dom.Rel.Ct.1952). See also In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973, 75 S.Ct. 535, 99 L.Ed. 757 (1955) ; State v. Smith, 75 N.D. 29, 25 N.W.2d 270 (1946) ; In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (D.C.Mun.Ct.App.1959) ; Dearing v. State, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 6, 204 S.W.2d 983 (1947).