Court Opinion

ID: 9855527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:26:58.492939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:07.968463
License: Public Domain

LANE, Vice Presiding Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent to the opinion of the majority, and I would not overrule Newbury v. State, 695 P.2d 531 (Okl.Cr.1985). In New-bury a babysitter disappeared while babysitting a four year old child and her sibling. When the child’s father returned to the house the children were asleep. When the little girl awoke at 9:00 a.m. the next morning and was asked what happened to the babysitter she replied that the babysitter left with the T.V. man. This Court affirmed the admission of this evidence under the “excited utterance rule” of 12 O.S.1981, § 2803(2), stating that even though there was an intervening time between the event and the utterance, the child was asleep and made the statement at the first opportunity upon awakening.
We have the same situation in the current matter. When the mother returned home on the night of the injury the child was asleep. When the child awoke the next morning and the mother noticed his physical condition, she inquired as to the cause of the condition and was told that Appellant did it. The purpose of § 2803 is to permit evidence that would constitute hearsay to be admitted if it rises to a certain level of reliability. I find more reliability in a statement made by a two year old boy who has been a victim of a crime than I do in a statement of a four year old who has only been a witness to a part of a crime, especially when he is still suffering from his injuries.
The child also made similar statements to others the same day, but at a time more remote than when he made the statement to his mother and these statements were received into evidence. The same thing occurred in Newbury and this court did not reverse, holding that the evidence of other statements was merely cumulative. I would hold that the same applies here.
In light of the above reasoning, I hereby DISSENT.