Court Opinion

ID: 9393244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 18:07:28.149381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.946543
License: Public Domain

J-A01029-23

                                2023 PA Super 79

 BENJAMIN HANBICKI                        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant             :
                                          :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 CYNTHIA LEADER                           :   No. 835 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 28, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
                               2021-05272

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.:                                  FILED MAY 9, 2023

      Appellant Benjamin Hanbicki appeals from the order entering judgment

in favor of Appellee Cynthia Leader in a landlord-tenant dispute and ordering

Appellant to pay Appellee’s attorneys’ fees. Appellant argues that the trial

court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions on Appellant after finding

him in civil contempt. After careful review, we affirm in part, vacate in part,

and remand for further proceedings.

      The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history underlying

this case as follows:

      This is a landlord tenant case involving the landlord’s wrongful
      removal of and continued control of the tenants’ personal
      property. Initially, Landlord, [Appellant,] brought suit against
      Tenant, [Appellee,] for eviction for non-payment of rent.

      On January 11, 2021, [Appellant] initiated the eviction proceeding
      at the Warrington Magisterial District Court. On January 20, 2021,
      [following] a hearing held on January 19, 2021 by the Magisterial
      District Judge, Mark D. Douple, a judgment was entered in favor
J-A01029-23

       of [Appellant] for non-payment of rent. At this time, however, the
       [Center for Disease Control (CDC)] eviction moratorium was in
       effect. Therefore, Judge Douple did not issue an order for
       possession. It must be noted that the CDC eviction moratorium
       did not actually end until August 26, 2021, for areas experiencing
       substantial and high transmission of COVID-19. Additionally, on
       August 2, 2021, the Honorable [Wallace] H. Bateman, Jr.,[1]
       entered an order, staying residential evictions for non-payment of
       rent through October 31, 2021.

       [Appellee] resided in the subject leased property with her adult
       children Jay Leader and Alicyn Leader (hereinafter, collectively
       with [Appellee], “Tenants”). On August 1, 2021, Jay Leader
       submitted an application on behalf of the household for rental
       assistance from Bucks County Rental Assistance Program
       (“BERA”). On September 14, 2021, [Appellee] was served with
       an order for possession. Subsequently, on September 24, 2021,
       [Appellee] submitted a request for continuance to the Magisterial
       District Court along with an email from BERA confirming Tenants’
       application for rental assistance.     Notwithstanding Tenants’
       request for a continuance, a writ of eviction was executed on
       September 27, 2021.

       On October 5, 2021, Tenants filed an emergency petition to stay
       eviction and leave to file appeal nunc pro tunc. Tenants vacated
       the subject property on September 27, 2021, upon the execution
       of the writ of eviction. Since Tenants were not in possession of
       the subject property it would be difficult to enforce return of
       possession to Tenants. [The trial court] could not feasibly stay
       the eviction even if it did violate the CDC and Bucks County
       moratoriums.

       On October 12, 2021, a hearing was held in consideration of
       Tenants’ emergency petition to stay eviction and leave to file
       appeal nunc pro tunc. Prior to the October 12, 2021 hearing the
       parties conferenced and it appeared that the parties came to a
       partial agreement. The partial agreement was that [Appellant]
       would return Tenants’ property. Details of said agreement, such
       as payment of storage facilities, were not discussed or agreed to.
       Therefore, [the trial court] proceeded with the hearing. Before
       completion of the hearing, however, the parties conferred. Upon
____________________________________________

1Judge Bateman is the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks
County.

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      returning from their conference, the parties entered a settlement
      on the record.

      In order to [ensure] the parties complied with their agreement,
      [the trial court] directed that on October 14, 2021, the following
      occur: Tenants shall appear at the location, to be disclosed by
      [Appellant], to retrieve their property at 9 am; Tenants shall have
      from 9 am until approximately 4 pm with no obstruction from
      [Appellant]; if a dispute arises as to owner[ship] of belongings,
      Tenants will make a list of property that they believe is theirs but
      [Appellant] refused to allow them to take; if there is missing
      property, Tenants will make a list and exchange at the end of the
      day; if additional time is needed, the attorneys will be notified by
      2 pm and they can negotiate a longer period of time to stay or an
      additional day; there are no costs associated with the case that
      will be responsibility to either party. [The trial court] entered an
      order reducing its directives given during the October 12, 2021
      hearing to a writing.

      On October 18, 202[1], [Appellee] filed a petition for contempt.
      The petition for contempt avers that [Appellant] denied Tenants
      access to their belongings and violated [the trial court’s] October
      12, 202[1] order by not allowing Tenants additional time to collect
      their personal property. On October 25, 2021, in response,
      [Appellant] filed an answer to [Appellee’s] petition for contempt
      with [a] counter-petition for contempt, requesting legal fees for
      responding to “[Appellee’s] frivolous petition for contempt.”

                                  *    *    *

      On February 4, 2022, a hearing was held in consideration of
      [Appellee’s] petition for contempt and [Appellant’s] counter
      petition for contempt. On February 25, 2022, [the trial court]
      entered an order entering a judgment in favor of [Appellee] and
      against [Appellant] in the amount of $98,000 and ordered
      [Appellant] to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of one thousand
      dollars $1,000.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/5/22, at 1-5 (footnotes omitted, some formatting altered).

      On February 14, 2022, Appellant filed a motion seeking reconsideration

and clarification of the trial court’s verbal order. Therein, Appellant alleged

that Appellee had either retrieved the personal property at issue or had the

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ability to do so. Specifically, Appellant stated that Appellee placed a lock on

the storage unit containing her personal property. However, the trial court

did not rule on Appellant’s motion, and as noted, the trial court entered

judgment in favor of Appellee on February 28, 2022.

      Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order

entering judgment.     Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the

mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On May 6, 2022, this Court issued a rule directing Appellant to show

cause as to the appealability of the trial court’s February 28, 2022 order, which

did not include a present finding of contempt.         Appellant timely filed a

response. This Court entered a per curiam order on May 31, 2022 discharging

the rule to show cause, and deferring the issue of appealability to the merits

panel.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which

we reorder as follows:

      1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning
         Appellant for civil contempt for violating its order where: (a)
         the alleged wrongful conduct was not prohibited by definite,
         clear, and specific language in the order and (b) the evidence
         shows that Appellant did not willfully engage in wrongdoing but
         rather was uncertain about what the order mandated and/or
         prohibited[?]

      2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by abruptly
         conducting the contempt hearing, proceeding in haste without
         permitting the parties’ attorneys time to meet and confer with
         each other, after meeting with their clients, about a potential
         settlement after a brief conference with the trial court’s staff,
         which gave the parties a sense of where the court was
         leaning[?]

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        3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a
           matter of law by imposing a punitive sanction authorized by
           the Landlord and Tenant Act as punishment for Appellant’s
           alleged   contempt,    rather   than    awarding    Appellee
           compensatory actual damages, which is what a court is
           authorized to impose as part of its civil contempt
           determination[?]

        4. Whether the trial court erred by finding that Appellee incurred
           actual damages in the amount of $98,000, when the evidence
           is insufficient to support it[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (formatting altered).2

                               Appealability of Order

        Before addressing Appellants’ claims, we must determine whether the

trial court’s order is appealable. It is well settled that questions concerning

the appealability of an order implicate our jurisdiction, and we may address

that question sua sponte. See Jacksonian v. Temple Univ. Health Sys.

Found., 862 A.2d 1275, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2004); see also Stivers Temp.

Pers., Inc. v. Brown, 789 A.2d 292, 294 (Pa. Super. 2001). Generally, an

appeal to our Court lies only from a final order. See Barak v. Karolizki, 196

A.3d 208, 215 (Pa. Super. 2018); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 742. A final order is

any order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties[.]”         Pa.R.A.P.

341(b)(1).

        This Court has held that a contempt order is final and appealable if the

order contains (1) a present finding of contempt and (2) an imposition of

sanctions. See Genovese v. Genovese, 550 A.2d 1021, 1023 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

2   Appellee did not file an appellate brief in this matter.

                                           -5-
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1988).   This Court has determined that an award of attorney’s fees is a

sufficient sanction to render the order appealable. See Rhoades v. Pryce,

874 A.2d 148, 152-53 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc).

      Here, Appellant has appealed from the trial court’s order directing him

to pay attorneys’ fees as a sanction for contempt. As noted previously, the

order does not contain an explicit present finding of contempt. However, in

addition to attorneys’ fees, the order also entered judgment in the amount of

$98,000 in favor of Appellee and against Appellant. At the contempt hearing,

the trial court explained:

      Now the question is: Who is responsible for the $98,000 missing
      property? [Appellant] was told not to touch anything or he’d
      become responsible. He decided to become very aggressive,
      move stuff out of the storage units, put them in the driveway, took
      them out of the basement, et cetera, et cetera. He is responsible;
      therefore, the [trial court] enters a judgment in the amount of
      $98,000 in favor of [Appellee] and attorney’s fees in the amount
      of . . . $1,000.

N.T. Contempt Hr’g, 2/4/22, at 82.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court further explained:

      It was ordered by [the trial court] that Tenants receive additional
      time if requested by 2:00 pm on October 12, 2021 to collect all of
      their personal property. Tenants did make a timely request and
      [Appellant] allowed only a few additional hours on October 12,
      2021. [Appellant] refused any additional day for Tenants to
      collect all of their property. Additionally, [Appellant] refused
      Tenants access to the leased premises, which Tenants believed
      still housed some of their belongings. [The trial court] directed
      [Appellant] not to touch any of the personal property during the
      October 12, 2021 hearing.

      Even after [the trial court] ordered [Appellant] to allow reasonable
      access to Tenants to retrieve all of their personal property,

                                     -6-
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      [Appellant] failed to do so. At some point, [Appellant] allowed
      another day of access to Tenants, however, it was after
      [Appellant] refused and cancelled many arranged days, about
      fifteen times. Due to [Appellant’s] unreasonable refusal for
      access, Tenants had lost their moving help and money to rent a
      truck. Tenants lived in the leased premises since 2019, during
      which time, being a family of three, had amassed so much
      property that [Appellant] had to move and store it in three
      different locations. One storage unit was a twenty-by-twenty
      [foot] unit, and it was filled with Tenants’ belongings. Further, it
      was made clear to [the trial court] by [Appellant’s] admission that
      he was willingly holding onto Tenants’ personal belongings, and
      therefore, willfully violating Section 50[5.1] of the [Landlord
      Tenant Act], in order to gain leverage over Tenants because he
      “would like to get paid the money owed to him.”

                                  *    *    *

      [The trial court] did find [Appellant] in contempt. [The trial
      court’s] February 25, 2022 order states “in consideration of
      [Appellee’s] motion for contempt . . . Judgment is entered in favor
      of [Appellee]. . . .[”] When ruling on a motion, judgment in favor
      of the petitioner, and therefore, against the respondent, makes it
      clear that the motion was granted. In this case, [Appellee] had
      filed the motion for contempt of [Appellant. The trial court] ruled
      in favor of [Appellee] and thereby granted the motion for
      contempt of [Appellant.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 13-15 (footnotes omitted, ellipses in original, and some

formatting altered).

      Based on the record before us, it is clear that the order from which

Appellant appeals constitutes both a present finding of contempt and imposes

sanctions, despite the lack of an explicit written present finding of contempt.

See Genovese, 550 A.2d at 1023. Indeed, both the trial court’s order and

the relevant notes of testimony reflect that the trial court found Appellant

responsible for moving and/or withholding Appellee’s personal property in

violation of a prior order, and the court imposed sanctions. Moreover, in its

                                      -7-
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Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court specifically stated that it “did find

[Appellant] in contempt.” Trial Ct. Op. at 15. Accordingly, we conclude that

this appeal is properly before this Court, and we have jurisdiction to consider

it on its merits.

                            Finding of Contempt

      We address Appellant’s first two issues together. First, Appellant argues

that the trial court abused its discretion when it held the contempt hearing

without providing the parties with an opportunity to confer to discuss a

potential settlement. Appellant’s Brief at 49. Second, Appellant contends that

the trial court abused its discretion by finding Appellant in contempt because

Appellant “did not willfully violate definite, clear, or specific terms [of] the

October 12, 2021 order.” Id. at 34. Specifically, Appellant argues that the

trial court held him in contempt due to his noncompliance with what

“[Appellee] and the trial court expected him to do,” without express language

indicating the same found in either the trial court’s October 12, 2021 order or

in the October 12, 2021 hearing transcript.       Id. at 37-38.    Additionally,

Appellant alleges that the October 12, 2021 order does not require Appellant

to grant unlimited access in order for Appellee to retrieve her personal

property and that “the fact that [Appellant] also wished to return to the trial

court to discuss [outstanding judgments in favor of him and against Appellee]

does not prove that he violated any of the specific terms of the October 12[,

2021] order.” Id. at 38.

                                     -8-
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      In reviewing Appellant’s claims, we are guided by the following

principles:

      This Court’s review of a civil contempt order is limited to a
      determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. If
      a trial court, in reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the
      law or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or
      reaches a conclusion that is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias
      or ill will as shown by the evidence of record, then discretion is
      abused.

Thompson v. Thompson, 187 A.3d 259, 263 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted, some formatting altered).

      We first address Appellant’s argument that the trial court abused its

discretion when it held a hearing without providing the parties with an

opportunity to confer and reach a potential settlement. Specifically, Appellant

contends that the custom of the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas and

other jurisdictions require “attorneys conference the case with the judge or

his staff and they typically glean a sense of where the court is leaning. Armed

with this crucial knowledge after having staked out their respective positions

in their pleadings, the attorneys speak with their clients to resolve the dispute

if possible.” Appellant’s Brief at 50-51.

      Importantly, we note that this Court is not bound by the “unwritten

rules” of Bucks County or any other jurisdiction. Indeed, Appellant has not

directed this Court to any case law, statute, Pennsylvania rule of court, or local

Bucks County rule of court that requires providing parties the opportunity to

negotiate a settlement prior to a hearing. Moreover, Appellant’s claim that

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the trial court “had a different agenda from fostering a resolution by allowing

counsel sufficient time to confer” is conclusory and belied by the record. Id.

at 50. As noted by the trial court, roughly four months had elapsed from the

time the instant contempt petition was filed until the trial court convened the

hearing on February 4, 2022. See Trial Ct. Op. at 10. Based on our review

of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court

in holding a hearing after four months without providing an additional

opportunity for the parties to confer.

      We next address whether the trial court erred when it found Appellant

to be in civil contempt. “In civil contempt proceedings[,] the burden is on the

complaining party to prove noncompliance by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Jordan v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 276 A.3d 751, 765 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (citation omitted and formatting altered), appeal denied, ---

A.3d ---, 410 MAL 2022, 2023 WL 3069525 (Pa. filed Apr. 25, 2023).

      This Court has explained:

      To be punished for contempt, a party must not only have violated
      a clear order, but that order must have been definite, clear, and
      specific—leaving no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the
      contemnor of the prohibited conduct. Because the order forming
      the basis for civil contempt must be strictly construed, any
      ambiguities or omissions in the order must be construed in favor
      of the defendant. In such cases, a contradictory order or an order
      whose specific terms have not been violated will not serve as the
      basis for a finding of contempt. To sustain a finding of civil
      contempt, the complainant must prove certain distinct elements:
      (1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree
      which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting
      the contemnor’s violation was volitional; and (3) that the
      contemnor acted with wrongful intent. A person may not be held

                                     - 10 -
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      in contempt of court for failing to obey an order that is too vague
      or that cannot be enforced.

      In other words, the alleged contemnor must know of the
      prohibited conduct, with any ambiguities, omissions, or
      uncertainties in the order construed in favor of the alleged
      contemnor, the act constituting the violation must be deliberate,
      and the act of the alleged contemnor must have been done with
      improper intent.

                                  *     *      *

      [A] mere showing of noncompliance with a court order, or even
      misconduct, is never sufficient alone to prove civil contempt.
      Unless the evidence establishes an intentional disobedience or an
      intentional disregard of the lawful process of the court, no
      contempt has been proven.

Sutch v. Roxborough Mem’l Hosp., 142 A.3d 38, 67-68 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

      Here, as noted previously, both parties attended the initial hearing on

October 12, 2021. At that time, the parties entered a settlement agreement

concerning Appellee’s personal property, which the trial court explained as

follows:

      There’s been further [off the record] discussion with regard to this
      case, and the [trial court] is indicating that [October 14, 2021] at
      9:00 [a.m. Appellee] will be appear at the residence to reclaim all
      of [her] property. There’s to be no obstructions or other things
      by [Appellant].

      If a dispute arises as to the property as to whether it’s your
      property or not, [Appellee] will make a list of property they believe
      is theirs that they’re not being allowed to take and the attorneys
      will negotiate it or come back again.

      If there is missing property, [Appellee] will make a list of what
      [she] believes is the missing property, and they will exchange
      their lists at the end of the day.

                                      - 11 -
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      [Appellee] should have from 9 a.m. until approximately 4 p.m. to
      remove [her] items from the storage bins. If additional time is
      needed, the attorneys will be notified by 2 p.m. so they can
      negotiate a longer period of time to stay or an additional day.

N.T. Hr’g, 10/12/21, at 53.

      Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order stating:

      (1)   [Appellant] shall allow [Appellee] to collect all personal
            property on October 14, 2021, from 9:00 AM until 4:00 PM;

      (2)   If additional time is necessary, [Appellee] shall notify
            [Appellant] by 2:00 PM on October 14, 2021;

      (3)   If a dispute arises, [Appellee] shall make a list of any
            missing property. Likewise, [Appellant] shall make a list of
            any property believed to be his; and

      (4)   No costs are associated with this case.

Trial Ct. Order, 10/12/21.

      On October 18, 2021, Appellee filed a petition for contempt in which she

alleged that Appellant violated the terms of the trial court’s October 12, 2021

order. On February 4, 2022, the trial court conducted a contempt hearing.

Ultimately, the trial court found Appellant in civil contempt, finding that

Appellant improperly moved and/or withheld Appellee’s personal property. As

a result, the trial court entered a $98,000 judgment against Appellant and

sanctioned him with an additional $1,000 in counsel fees.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

      [Appellant] acted with volition, he did not make a good faith effort
      to allow [Appellee] to retrieve all of [her] property, he made it
      very difficult, continued refusal and wrongly withheld [Appellee’s]
      property, admitting he did so in order to gain leverage over
      [Appellee.      Appellant] admitted to wrongful intent, in his

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       admission to wrongfully withholding [Appellee’s] property in an
       attempt to recover monies [Appellee] owed to him.

Trial Ct. Op. at 17.

       Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in finding Appellant in civil contempt. First, there is no dispute

that Appellant had notice of the trial court’s October 12, 2021 order. Indeed,

Appellant was not only present at the October 12, 2021 hearing, but also

affirmatively expressed understanding of the trial court’s order.              See N.T.

Hr’g, 10/12/21, at 53-57. Further, the record reflects that Appellee timely

requested additional time to move her personal property in accordance with

the trial court’s October 12, 2021 order. See N.T. Contempt Hr’g, 2/4/22, at

30. In response, Appellant, by his own admission, granted an additional “few”

hours for Appellee to recover her property.            See id. at 65.     During the

contempt    hearing,   Appellant   further     noted    the   existence   of    several

outstanding judgments against Appellee and in favor of Appellant, and he

admitted that he intended to withhold Appellee’s property as a means of

leverage against Appellee. See id. at 72-73. For these reasons, we find that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Appellant in civil

contempt of court. See Sutch, 142 A.3d at 67-68. Accordingly, no relief is

due.

                                    Damages

       In his next issue, Appellant alleges that the trial court imposed a punitive

sanction rather than a sanction based on actual damages. Appellant’s Brief at

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39. Specifically, Appellant contends that the trial court exceeded its contempt

authority when it imposed a $98,000 judgment3 against Appellant for violating

provisions of the Landlord-Tenant Act4 (LTA).          Appellant’s Brief at 42.

Appellant argues that the trial court’s judgment was akin to “a penalty

imposed on [Appellant] that had nothing to do with his alleged violation of the

October 12[, 2021] order.” Id. Further, Appellant alleges that the trial court

improperly raised and considered whether Appellant violated provisions of the

LTA. Id. at 43.

        This Court has explained a trial court’s authority to exercise civil

contempt powers as follows:

        The power to punish for contempt, including the power to inflict
        summary punishment, is a right inherent in the courts and is
        incidental to the grant of judicial power under the Constitution.
        The court may order civil or criminal contempt.

        The characteristic that distinguishes civil from criminal contempt
        is the ability of the contemnor to purge himself of contempt by
        complying with the court’s directive. If he is given an opportunity
____________________________________________

3 The record reflects that the trial court entered a judgment of $98,000 based
on Jay Leader’s testimony and accompanying documenting evidence that
included items such as diamond earrings valued at $22,000, a refrigerator
valued at $5,000, three televisions valued at a total of $4,900, and $10,000
in cash. See Reproduced Record at 207a. When he testified during the
contempt hearing, Mr. Leader initially stated that the value of the missing
property was “roughly $100,000.” N.T. Contempt Hr’g, 2/4/22, at 13. After
further questions from the trial court, Mr. Leader again testified that the value
of the missing property was $100,000. Id. at 14. The trial court asked Mr.
Leader if he was sure of the value, at which point Mr. Leader indicated that he
was “not one hundred percent positive sure” of the value, and he then stated
that he added the value of the missing property the night prior to the contempt
hearing to arrive at a total value of $98,000. Id.

4   68 P.S. § 250.101-250.602.

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     to purge himself before imposition of punishment, the contempt
     Order is civil in nature. If the purpose of the Order is to punish
     despite an opportunity to purge, the Order is criminal in nature.

     A court may exercise its civil contempt power to enforce
     compliance with its Orders for the benefit of the party in whose
     favor the Order runs but not to inflict punishment.

In re Estate of DiSabato, 165 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

omitted). Indeed, this Court has held that in civil contempt, the contemnor

must be provided with an avenue to “relieve himself of the sanction by

complying with the court order.” Gleit v. Nguyen, 199 A.3d 1240, 1248 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (citations omitted).

     Additionally, this Court has further explained:

     It is clear that a court can for present or past acts of misbehavior
     amounting to civil contempt impose an unconditional
     compensatory fine and/or a conditional fine and imprisonment,
     and such fine may be payable to the United States or to the
     Commonwealth or to the county or to the individual who was
     injured.

     In Parker v. United States, [126 F.2d 370, 380 (1st Cir. 1942),
     the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated:] “It
     is well settled, however, that the court may, in a proceeding for
     civil contempt, impose the remedial punishment of a fine payable
     to an aggrieved litigant as compensation for the special damages
     he may have sustained by reason of the contumacious conduct of
     the offender.” Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings
     may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two
     purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court’s
     order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.
     Where compensation is intended, a fine is imposed, payable to the
     complainant. Such fine must of course be based upon evidence
     of complainant’s actual loss, and his right, as a civil litigant, to the
     compensatory fine is dependent upon the outcome of the basic
     controversy.

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Jack Rees Nursing & Rehab. Servs. v. Hersperger, 600 A.2d 207, 209

(Pa. Super. 1991) (citations omitted and some formatting altered); see also

Sutch, 142 A.3d at 68 (same).

      Finally, this Court has held that a trial court should not act as an

advocate for either party. See In re Estate of Tscherneff, 203 A.3d 1020,

1027 (Pa. Super. 2019). In Tscherneff, the orphans’ court was reviewing an

executor’s first and final account and petition for adjudication of a will. Id. at

1022. The trial court denied the petition, and further directed the filing of an

amended account to include a bank account.          Id.   On appeal, this Court

determined that the inclusion of the bank account in an amended account for

the estate was an issue that had not been raised by any party. Id. at 1026.

By raising that issue sua sponte, the trial court deprived one of the parties of

an opportunity to be heard and “inappropriately acted as an advocate” for one

of the heirs. Id. at 1027; see also Commonwealth v. Morales, 80 A.3d

1177, 1179 (Pa. 2013) (per curiam) (stating that it is “improper for trial court

to act as advocate and sua sponte raise defenses on behalf of a party” (citing

MacGregor v. Mediq Inc., 576 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 1990))).

      In the instant case, the trial court classifies this case as one of civil

contempt. See Trial Ct. Op. at 17. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court

indicates that it entered a $98,000 judgment against Appellant, not only

because he was in contempt of the trial court’s October 12, 2021 order, but

because he was also in “willful violation of the LTA [which] occurred prior to

[the trial court’s] October 12, 2021 order and continued to occur after [the

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trial court] ordered compliance.” Id. at 16. Indeed, the trial court noted as

follows:

        The LTA provides for recovery of damages arising out of a
        landlord’s violation of the statute. Any damages awarded in
        violation of section 50[5].1[5] are awarded based on the violating
        conduct and not based on whether a landlord rights his wrongs.
        Further, the LTA allows for treble damages, or three times the
        value of the wrongfully controlled personal property, in such
        cases. Section 505.1 of the LTA was amended in 2014 adding the
        treble damages provision.         While treble damages remain
        discretionary, treble damages are meant for remedial purposes
        but do contain a deterrent, punitive element. Punitive damages
        are never considered unjust enrichment and therefore, [the trial
        court’s] judgment in the amount equal to the value of personal
        property under the continued, willful, and in bad faith control
        cannot be seen as such.

                                       *       *    *

        In this case, [Appellant] was adjudged to be in civil contempt with
        [the trial court’s] October 12, 2021 order enforcing [Appellant’s]
        compliance with Section 50[5].1 of the LTA by continuing to refuse
        [Appellee] access to retrieve all personal property. [The trial
        court], therefore, had the power to impose sanctions in an amount
        which would afford Appellee complete remedial relief.

Id. at 16, 18 (citations and footnotes omitted and formatting altered).

Specifically, the trial court stated that it calculated the $98,000 judgment

value based upon Appellee’s computation. Id. at 14. As noted by the trial

court, items for which Appellee was unable to provide a value were not

included in the judgment. Id. As the trial court further explained:

        [The trial court] based its judgment on the actual value of
        [Appellee’s] property that [Appellant] wrongfully took control of in
        violation of the section 505.1 of the [LTA].         The value of
____________________________________________

5   68 P.S. § 250.505a.

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      [Appellee’s] property that [Appellant] wrongfully controlled was
      testified to and entered into evidence. [Appellee’s] methodology
      in calculating value was done by both receipts and by way of
      research. As noted in [the trial court’s] February 4, 2022 order
      entered at the [contempt] hearing, [the trial court] had no
      alternative but to accept the value of [Appellee’s] property
      because [Appellant] did not object to value presented or the
      methodology used by [Appellee] in calculating the value.

Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted).

      The record, however, does not reflect that Appellee filed a complaint

pursuant to LTA, nor does Appellee ever plead that Appellant violated the LTA.

Rather, the record reflects that the instant case first came before the trial

court in the form of an emergency motion to stay eviction and leave to file an

appeal nunc pro tunc, which Appellee filed on October 5, 2021, stemming from

an eviction that was executed on September 27, 2021. On October 8, 2021,

Appellee filed a memorandum of law. At no point in Appellee’s emergency

motion or in the memorandum of law was the LTA referenced, nor did Appellee

allege that Appellant had acted in violation of the LTA with regard to the

disposition of Appellee’s personal property.

      The trial court held a hearing on October 12, 2021 to address the

emergency motion to stay eviction. At the hearing, during direct examination

of Appellee’s son, Jay Leader, Mr. Leader began testifying about his

unsuccessful attempts to remove personal property from the premises

Appellee leased from Appellant. N.T. Hr’g, 10/12/21, at 27-29. At that point,

the trial court asked Appellee’s counsel about permissible damages and

offered to continue the proceedings in order for counsel to obtain evidence of

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the value of Appellee’s personal property. Id. at 29-30. Specifically, the trial

court said: “Counsel, I’ll continue this so you can get that kind of evidence, if

that’s what you need. But you need evidence. You need somebody that can

estimate the value of the personal property.” Id. at 30.

        During Appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination of Mr. Leader, the

parties reached a settlement agreement. As detailed above, pursuant to the

terms of the agreement, Appellee had from 9:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. On

October 14, 2021 to retrieve her personal property, and that if any additional

time was required, Appellee was required to notify Appellant by 2:00 p.m. on

October 14, 2021. See Trial Ct. Order, 10/12/21.

        On October 18, 2021, Appellee filed a petition for contempt and alleged

that Appellant violated the terms of the trial court’s order entered October 12,

2021.    See generally Appellee’s Pet. for Contempt, 10/18/21.         However,

Appellee did not allege that Appellant violated provisions of the LTA in that

petition.   Id.    During the hearing on Appellee’s contempt petition, while

Appellee’s counsel indirectly referenced the LTA, telling the trial court that

“the statute does allow for treble damages,” N.T. Contempt Hr’g, 2/4/22, at

18,6 neither party addressed it specifically. Additionally, the record reflects

that when each party gave closing arguments, neither party even mentioned

the LTA nor alleged that Appellant had violated the LTA.          Id. at 77-80.

Moreover, when announcing its decision regarding the petition for contempt,
____________________________________________

6 The LTA permits a court to award treble damages when a landlord violates
the provisions of 68 P.S. § 250.505a. 68 P.S. § 250.505a(i).

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the trial court did not reference the LTA, nor did it find that Appellant had

violated the LTA. Id. at 80-82.

     On this record, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court failed

to provide Appellant with the opportunity to purge himself of his contempt,

which is a requirement in civil contempt proceedings. See DiSabato, 165

A.3d at 992; see also Gleit, 199 A.3d at 1248. Moreover, to the extent that

the $98,000 judgment represents compensation to Appellee for an actual loss,

the evidence of record does not indicate that the $98,000 judgment represents

Appellee’s actual loss. See Jack Rees Nursing & Rehab. Servs., 600 A.2d

at 209; see also Sutch, 142 A.3d at 68. By comparison, damages awarded

pursuant to a violation of the LTA are not limited to actual loss, as the LTA

permits a court to award treble damages. 68 P.S. § 250.505a(i). Indeed, the

record indicates that following the February 4, 2022 contempt hearing, the

personal property of Appellee that remained in Appellant’s possession was

held in one fixed-location storage unit, and that Appellee placed her own lock

on the storage unit. Appellant’s Mot. for Recons. and to Clarify Verbal Order,

2/14/22, at ¶¶ 10-11. The record before us does not contain any evidence as

to what Appellee’s actual loss was relating to Appellant’s contempt. For these

reasons, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion when it entered a $98,000 judgment against Appellant.          See

Thompson, 187 A.3d at 263.

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       Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s finding of contempt, and we affirm

the trial court’s award of $1,000 in counsel fees.7 However, we vacate the

$98,000 judgment entered against Appellant and remand this case for further

proceedings for the trial court to ascertain the amount of actual loss incurred

by Appellee relating to Appellant’s contempt.

       Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.         Case remanded.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/9/2023

____________________________________________

7Appellant does not contest the award of counsel fees. Appellant’s Mot. for
Recons. and to Clarify Verbal Order, 2/14/22, at ¶ 25.

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