Court Opinion

ID: 9942830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 21:09:14.728755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:44.521293
License: Public Domain

Isaly v Garde
               2024 NY Slip Op 30490(U)
                   February 14, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 160699/2018
               Judge: James E. d'Auguste
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
 Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
 State and local government sources, including the New
  York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.
 This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
                       publication.
                                                                                                          INDEX NO. 160699/2018
  NYSCEF DOC . NO. 200                                                                           RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02 / 14 / 2024

                           SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                     NEW YORK COUNTY
          PRESENT:        Hon. James E. d'Auguste                              PART 55
                                                                   Justice
          -------------------------------------X                               INDEX NO.              160699/2018
             SAMUEL D. ISALY,
                                                                                                      06/23/2023,
                                                                               MOTION DATE            09/19/2023
                                             Plaintiff,

                                                                                                     003, 004 , 007,
                                      -v-
                                                                               MOTION SEQ. NO.            008
             DAMIAN GARDE, DELILAH BURKE,
                                                                                  DECISION + ORDER ON
                                             Defendants.                                 MOTION
                         ----------------------------X

                  Plaintiff moves in Motion Seq. No 007 for an order vacating the stay and protective orders granted
          in this defamation action as part of the Court's December 6, 2022 decision and order published at 2022
         NY Slip Op 34108(U) (the "December Decision"). 1 Plaintiff also seeks, in Motion Seq. No. 008, leave to
          conduct discovery to oppose those branches of defendants' motions to dismiss (Motion Seq. Nos. 003 and
          004) that had been held in abeyance pending the Court of Appeals' consideration of New York's Anti-
          SLAPP Law, and to deny those motions to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs motion for
          discovery is denied, plaintiffs motion to vacate the protective orders and stay is granted to the extent of
          lifting the stay and granting defendants' motions to dismiss this action pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Law,
          and the Court directs further proceedings to determine the award of defendants' reasonable attorney ' s fees
          and costs. 2

         Background and Previous Proceedings
                  This action, which has already been the subject of multiple reported decisions, arises from
         defendant Garde' s December 2017 article in STAT reporting the accounts of five women that plaintiff

         1
           The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the December Decision in a May 30, 2023 , decision published
         at 216 A.D.3d 594. The Court also declined to vacate the December Decision in a decision dated June 27 2023
         and published at 2023 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3365.                                                                  '     '
         2
           In considering Motion Seq. Nos. 007 and 008 (and through them, the remaining branches of Motion Seq. Nos.
         003 and 00~), the C~urt read all of the papers respectively filed in those motion sequence numbers in NYSCEF,
         and the parties are d!fected to NYSCEF for that information pursuant to CPLR 2219. Because of the sheer
         volume of papers, the Court has not listed them all here. To the extent any party wishes a separate list delineated
         by NYSCEF document number, they may settle an order doing so on notice.

          160699/2018 ISALY, SAMUEL D. vs. GARDE, DAMIAN
          Motion No. 007 008                                                                         Page 1 of 14

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         had "for years perpetuated a toxic culture of sexual harassment. .. routinely subjecting young female
         assistants to pornography in the workplace, lewd jokes, and pervasive sexist comments ... kept a set of
         breast implants on his desk, palpating them like stress balls during idle conversation ... and wantonly
         demeaned and verbally abused female employees," while managing a prominent hedge fund firm.
         (Amended Complaint, Ex. A., at 1). Plaintiff and his colleagues conceded during defendant Garde's
         interview of them that "the firm had investigated claims against (plaintiff]," (but had "concluded none
         rose to the level of 'a sexually egregious behavior,"' without defining that standard) while plaintiff
         acknowledged having had breast implants in his office. (Amended Complaint, Ex. A., at 2; and Interview
         Transcript filed NYSCEF Doc. No. 16, at 19). In a final comment to defendant Garde prior to publication,
         one of plaintiffs colleagues stated that "[i]fthis article proceeds I hope that you will be fair and focus on
         the person responsible, not the entire firm." (Amended Complaint, Ex. A., at 2). On December 5, 2017,
         the article published under the headline "[b ]iotech hedge fund titan Sam Isaly harassed, demeaned women
         for years, former employees say." (Amended Complaint, Ex. A, at 1).
                    Plaintiff subsequently commenced a series of actions litigated in state and federal court- including
         this action - variously alleging defamation by defendant Garde and his employers for having written and
         published the article, and against defendant Burke, the sole female accuser of plaintiff willing to speak
         with Garde on the record. See, Jsaly v. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, Dkt. No. 23-67-cv, 2023 U.S.
         App. LEXIS 26124, *2-4 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (affirming dismissal of federal action and discussing case
         history in state and federal courts). 3 The Court initially dismissed this action by decision and order dated
         July 11, 2022, and published at 2022 NY Slip Op 32203(U), about which plaintiff sought leave to reargue,
         which the Court granted in part by the Court's December 6th decision to the extent of holding defendants'
         Anti-SLAPP motions and a portion of defendant Burke's motion to dismiss in abeyance pending the Court
         of Appeals' action in Gottwald v. Sebert. 40 N.Y.3d 240 (2023). The First Department affirmed the
         December Decision (as noted previously), and denied plaintiff leave to reargue or appeal by decision and
         order dated September 7, 2023, and published at 2023 NY Slip Op 72896(U). Plaintiff then sought leave
         to appeal from the Court of Appeals, which the Court of Appeals denied by decision and order dated
         January 16, 2024, and published at 2024 NY Slip Op 60632.

         3
            This is the first of three actions plaintiff commenced before the Court. Subsequent to this action, plaintiff
         commenced_lsaly v. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC under New York County Index No. 151825/2022 on March
         3, 2022 (wh1c_h was removed to federal court as noted by the Court's June 13, 2022, order in that action), and fsaly
         v. Garde (agamst defendant Garde alone) under New York County Index No. 161333/2023 on November 20, 2023.
             160699/2018 ISALY, SAMUEL D. vs. GARDE, DAMIAN
             Motion No. 007 008                                                                      Page 2 of 14

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                        Defendants do not oppose vacating the stay but instead request that the Court deny discovery and
              grant their applications for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Law. The Court
              addresses the parties' arguments in tum.

              The Anti-SLAPP Law as Amended by Chapter 250 Applies to the Continuation ofthis Action
                        Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the First Department's holding in Gottwald, which held that
              Chapter 250 did not apply to actions (like this one) commenced prior to its enactment, remains in force
              following the Court of Appeals' decision reviewing it.
                        While the Court of Appeals was divided 5-1 in holding that Chapter 250 was not retroactive to the
              commencement of all potential SLAPP actions pending at the time of its enactment, the Court
              unanimously held 6-0 that the First Department erred in Gottwald and that "continuation of Gottwald' s
              suit beyond the effective date of the amendments entitles Sebert to recover damages," provided that
              defendant could establish an anti-SLAPP claim. Gottwald, at *259. It is, as the Court of Appeals held in
              Gottwald, the continuation of this action following Chapter 250's enactment, that raises the specter of
              Chapter 250 remedies. The Court has noted as much in this action once already. June Decision, at *13.
              "Plaintiffs theory .. .is like the rabbit hole of Alice in Wonderland, a portal into a realm in which down is
              up and up is down," and neither the Court nor the parties are served by repeating arguments that are not
              only flatly contradicted by the plain text of decisions but have been expressly considered and rejected in
             this action. Brivikv. Murray, Dkt. No. ll-cv-2101, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26784, *10 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
              3, 2014). See also, D'Lil v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites, Dkt. No. cv 02-9506, 2010 U.S. Dist.
             LEXIS 163123, *31 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13,201 0)(noting Court's concern that plaintiffs repetition ofrejected
             arguments "was not the first time [plaintiffs counsel] had raised untenable arguments, wasting the Court's
             time and Defendants' money").
                        In re-casting his applicability argument in the instant motion, plaintiff relies upon the Appellate
             Division, Second Department's recent holding in VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v. Sproule, 2024 NY Slip
             Op 00205 (2d Dept. Jan. 17, 2024), which held that a plaintiffs complaint filed days before Chapter 250
             took effect (and in which no subsequent action had been taken) was not subject to Chapter 250. 4 VIP Pet
             Grooming Studio, at *4-5. See also, Burton v. Porcelain, 2024 NY Slip Op 00291 (2d Dept. Jan. 24,
             2024) (citing VIP Pet Grooming Studio in finding that Chapter 250 did not apply in motion to dismiss

             4
                 See, Jan. 22, 2024, email from Alan Lewis to Brian Krist.
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                 Motion No. 007 008                                                                 Page 3 of 14

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           pending at the time of its enactment). Although plaintiff argues that VIP Pet Grooming Studio controls,
           plaintiff is incorrect. This action is immediately distinguishable in the sheer scale of plaintiffs post-
           enactment litigation activity, and the Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]here is no retroactive effect when
           these provisions are applied, according to their terms, to the continuation of the action beyond the effective
           date of the amendments." Gottwald, at 258. This particularly includes plaintiffs August 2022 effort to,
           again, amend his complaint in Motion Seq. No. 005, long after Chapter 250 took effect.
                   Plaintiff is essentially inviting the Court to disregard the Legislature and the Court of Appeals
           because plaintiff disagrees with them, which the Court cannot do. The Court "is bound to apply the law
           as it exists, and as interpreted by controlling ... precedents," and cannot "usurp the role of the legislature
           or the Appellate Courts." Luongo v. Records Access Officer, 150 A.D.3d 13, 26 (1st Dept. 2017); and
           People v. Alvarez-Hernandez, 2002 NY Slip Op 50493(U), *5 (Westchester Co. Ct. 2002). The Court is
           "not free to disagree, to disregard in the guise of reinterpretation, or to speculate upon probabilities or
           personalities," and "must follow the decisions and interpretations of our highest court in spite of any
           individual predilections," plaintiff may have. United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D.
           Ill. 1960). The Legislature and the Court of Appeals have spoken clearly that Chapter 250 applies to the
           continued litigation of existing cases after its enactment, and the Court will heed them.

           Plaintifrs Constitutional Obiections to Anti-SLAPP Legislation are Misplaced
                   Plaintiff asserts that the Anti-SLAPP Law, as amended by Chapter 250, violates his state and
           federal constitutional rights of petition and jury trial. Once again, plaintiff is wrong. "[I]n amending its
           anti-SLAPP law to set a higher standard of fault for defamation claims involving private individuals ... the
           New York legislature sought to protect an important substantive interest: the exercise of free speech about
           matters of public concern." Shannon Jankowski, SLAPP-ing Back: Recent Legal Challenges to the
           Application of State Anti-SLAPP Laws, American Bar Association (Mar. 16, 2022), at *8. "The news
           media-and those who share their stories with the news media-have faced an onslaught of retaliatory
           and meritless litigation in recent years," which is a pernicious harm that New York may, and has, sought
           to curb without offending the state or federal constitutions. Jankowski, at *9
                   Federally, the Framers recognized the idea that while "the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy
           of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
           U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (citing James Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798). While the
           Supreme Court noted that "the individual's right to the protection of his own good name reflects no more

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            Motion No. 007 008                                                                    Page 4 of 14

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           than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being -- a concept at the root of
           any decent system of ordered liberty," -- the Court has also "been especially anxious to assure to the
           freedoms of speech and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise," and "(t]o that end
           this Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood." Gertz, at 342. While
           "many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount
           the barrier," imposed by that "strategic protection," society's interest in protecting the marketplace of
           ideas trumps plaintiffs desire for heartbalm.          Gertz, at 342. Put simply, and recently, "[t]he First
           Amendment, we have concluded, requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
           matters." Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct. 2106, 2115 (2023) (discussing Gertz).
                      Plaintiffs reliance on decisions from Washington, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Maine is
           misplaced. The Supreme Court of Washington premised its jury trial concerns about Washington's anti-
           SLAPP law entirely upon the Washington Constitution and, while finding that Washington's anti-SLAPP
           law interfered with plaintiffs' federal First Amendment rights, the Court simultaneously noted that
           "[f]rivolous suits (i.e., those that lack a 'reasonable basis,' are 'based on insubstantial claims,' or are
           11
                baseless') are not within the scope of a First Amendment protection." Davis v. Cox, 183 Wn. 2d 269,
           290 (2015). In Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court based
           its holding striking down Minnesota's anti-SLAPP law entirely upon the Minnesota Constitution, without
           reference to the federal constitution at all. 895 N.W.2d 623, 634-635 (Minn. 2017). The New Hampshire
           Supreme Court similarly relied upon state, not federal, constitutional provisions in an ex parte advisory
           opinion to the New Hampshire Senate against a proposed anti-SLAPP bill. See, Opinion of the Justices
           (SLAPP Suit Procedure), 138 N.H. 445, 446-447 (1994). Although the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
           noted Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment concerns generally about Maine's anti-SLAPP law in Thurlow
           v. Nelson, the Court, again (like its sister courts), ruled upon its own state constitution. 2021 ME 58, *17
           (2021).
                      Plaintiffs cherry-picking of precedent also failed to disclose that constitutional arguments against
           anti-SLAPP legislation have failed elsewhere. 5 See, Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of
           America, 115 Cal. App. 4th 322, 360-361 (Cal. Ct. App, 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 2004 Cal. LEXIS 3097
           (Cal.), cert denied, 543 U.S. 942 (2004) (finding that anti-SLAPP laws did not violate plaintiffs First

           5
             Pl~intiff has burden~~ the Ciurt throug~ such ~ac~ics befor~, an~ been cautioned in this action against doing so
           prev10usly. June Decision, at 10 n. 7 (notmg plamtiff s selective disclosure of precedent and noting that "the Court
           expects greater care from counsel when advancing arguments in the future").
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               Motion No. 007 008                                                                      Page 5 of 14

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         Amendment rights); and Klem v. Access Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 595, 608 n. 6 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist.
         2017), depublication denied, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 1729 (2018) (collecting authorities and holding that "Anti-
         SLAPP is no impediment to redress of grievances or jury trial rights"). The Supreme Court of Nevada
         expressly cited and distinguished Leiendecker and Davis in upholding Nevada's anti-SLAPP law. See,
         Taylor v. Colon, 136 Nev. Adv. Rep. 50, *10-11 (2020). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
         while limiting certain anti-SLAPP procedures on home rule grounds, rejected plaintiffs constitutional
         arguments when presented with them. See, Morgan Banks v. Hoffman, Dkt No. 20-cv-0318, 2023 D.C.
         App. LEXIS 258, *34-37 (D.C. Sept. 7, 2023) (discussing constitutional objections to local anti-SLAPP
         law and finding that "[w]e need not pause long over these claims").
                   In addressing burden-enhancement and shifting in anti-SLAPP regulation, the Morgan Banks
         Court explained:
                 We cannot agree that the Act's burden-shifting prov1s1on infringes on appellants'
                 constitutional right to petition. The Supreme Court has explained that the right of access
                 to the courts is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have
                 suffered injury by being shut out of court. The burden-shifting provision imposes on
                 SLAPP plaintiffs the burden of showing that the complaint rests on more than unsupported
                 claims that do not meet established legal standards, and of successfully rebutting any
                 argument that the plaintiff could not prevail as a matter of law after allowing for the
                 weighing of evidence and permissible inferences by the jury. A plaintiff who is shut out
                 of court because it cannot meet that burden has not been denied its constitutional right to
                 petition the courts.

         Morgan Banks, at *35-36 (quotations and citations omitted).
                 While not specifically addressing this State's or the federal constitution, the Court of Appeals cited
         Gertz and others in noting that while the "actual malice standard need not apply to private figures," New
         York and other states "may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for those
         individuals." Gottwald, at* 1 (quotations and citations omitted). As the Court previously discussed in the
         December Decision, "[t]he Court of Appeals has noted and affirmed the expansive language of our State
         constitutional guarantee of a free press and the consistent tradition in this State of providing the broadest
         possible protection to the sensitive role of gathering and disseminating news of public events," and that
         "we value speech and public participation knowing that the power may be misused, aware that the
         advocacy of some may be injurious or false, refusing to judge in individual cases whether debate itself
         would be good or bad." December Decision, at *5-6 (citations and quotations omitted). That New York
         has chosen to protect more speech under its state constitution and statutory law than might be required by
         the federal constitution is within New York's sovereign discretion, and "[a]bsent a debilitating
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          Motion No. 007 008                                                                    Page 6 of 14

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         constitutional flaw in the Act, this Court must effectuate the common will expressed in the purpose of the
         legislation." Swails v. State, 263 Ga. 276, 276 (1993). Accordingly, the Court finds that Chapter 250 is
         permissible under both the state and federal constitutions.

         Defendants May Seek Attorney's Fees by Motion Pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Law
                    Procedurally, plaintiff also objects to awarding fees and costs as part of an order dismissing this
         action, instead arguing that defendants cannot recover fees and costs without asserting their demand by
         answering the pleadings in this action with a counterclaim or filing a new action. (Mem of Law in Supp.,
         at 6). Plaintiff relies upon a number of decisions from coordinate state and federal courts, and appellate
         decisions predating Chapter 250. Plaintiff's position is unavailing.
                    Pursuant to Civil Rights Law§ 70-a(l)(a):
                     [C]osts and attorney's fees shall be recovered upon a demonstration, including an
                    adjudication pursuant to [CPLR 32Jl(g)]. .. that the action involving public petition and
                    participation was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and
                    could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification or reversal
                    of existing law. (emphasis added).

                    In contrast, "other compensatory damages may only be recovered upon an additional
         demonstration that the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued for
         the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of
         speech, petition or association rights," and "punitive damages may only be recovered upon an additional
         demonstration that the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued for
         the sole purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise
         of speech, petition or association rights." Civil Rights Law § 70-a(l )(b) and (c ). That is a marked, and
         presumably purposeful distinction crafted by the Legislature. While a demand for costs and fees is non-
         discretionary and may be premised solely upon a decision granting a CPLR 3211 (g) motion to dismiss,
         the other discretionary compensatory and punitive damages claims available to deter SLAPP's require
         progressively higher levels of intent and motive that are more conducive to pleadings and litigation
         independent of the underlying CPLR 321 l(g) motion to dismiss. 6

         6
           T~ ~e clear, nothing in this de~i~ion_should be read as deciding that claims for non-cost-and-fee compensatory or
         pumttve damages pursuant to CIVIi Rights Law § 70-a(l) cannot be awarded through motion practice, as that issue
         ts not before the Court.

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             Motion No. 007 008                                                                     Page 7 of 14

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                      Indeed - and troublingly contrary to plaintiffs argument - the First Department has addressed this
           issue in reinstating a motion for fees and costs in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery P. C. v. Silva, 206 A.D.3d 26,
           29 (1st Dept. 2022). 7 There, as here, a defendant sought attorney's fees and costs as part of a CPLR
           321 l(g) motion, which was denied. While the gravamen of the First Department's decision in Aristocrat
           Plastic Surgery and the parties' arguments concerned whether Supreme Court correctly found that the
           claim at issue was subject to the Anti-SLAPP Law at all, the question of whether fees and costs could be
           sought by motion rather than a counterclaim or standalone pleading was posed by the parties and answered
           by the First Department. And the answer was yes. That the answer was short does not diminish its
           substance, as the First Department has "broad discretion in determining the level of detail that it provides,"
           and "some issues and actions may require a greater level of detail than others, and discerning which case
           calls for a heightened level of detail is part of the subjective art of judging." Charalabidis v. Elnagar, 188
           A.D.3d 44, 49 (2d Dept. 2020), citing, NYCTL 2012-A Trust v. 1698 Lex Corp., 169 A.D.3d 577 (1st Dept.
           2019).      That point is further illustrated by the First Department having affirmed the very practice
           contemplated, citing itself in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, nearly a year ago. See, Golan v. Daily News,
           L.P., 214 A.D.3d 558, 559 (1st Dept. 2023). Plaintiffs problem is not that the First Department has not
           considered plaintiffs motion versus claim argument, but that the Appellate Division has considered it and
           does not agree with him.
                      Even assuming the question remains unsettled following Aristocrat Plastic Surgery or Golan
           arguendo, the answer would be the same on a fresh slate. In interpreting Chapter 250, the Court notes the
           Legislature's clear intent in crafting Chapter 250 as a vehicle through which defendants could
           expeditiously halt SLAPP claims and recover attorney's fees and costs without the burden of the same
           protracted litigation that Chapter 250 was designed to combat. The pre-Chapter 250 decisions plaintiff
           relies upon are unavailing because of the marked changes brought forth in Chapter 250, which the
           Legislature enacted in direct response to its disagreement with the Courts' interpretations of the Anti-

           7
             As plaintiff expressly referenced (in his sur-reply, at 7) the substance of the briefing in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery,
           the Court took notice of the briefs. While plaintiff asserts that "the argument was raised perfunctorily and at the
           end of a long brief," this precise issue was one of Aristocrat Plastic Surgery's two counter-questions presented on
           appeal, and the subject of an entire point (Point 2 of 3, which the Court also notes is the middle rather than the end)
           in its opposition brief. That brief itself is available on NYSCEF, and published on Westlaw at 2022 WL I 125935.
           T~e defendan! in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery replied to that argument with its own point (Point 2 of 4) in their reply
           bnef, consummg over 4 pages of an I I-page reply, itself also available on NYSCEF. That is flatly not perfunctory.

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               Motion No. 007 008                                                                          Page 8 of 14

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           SLAPP Law, and post-hoc coordinate decisions to the contrary are unpersuasive. 8 See, Sponsor's Mem.
           of Sen. Hoylman-Sigal, Bill Jacket, Chapter 250, at 1; and Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, at 29 (citing the
           sponsoring memorandum in support of Chapter 250 and the "narrow interpretation by the courts" of the
           Anti-SLAPP Law prior to Chapter 250).
                      Even if, arguendo, the Court were to find (which it expressly does not) that Chapter 250 was
           ambiguous or inartful, that clear legislative intent would disfavor plaintiffs argument. See, People v.
           Vespucci, 144 A.D.2d 48, 55 (2d Dept. 1988), affd, 74 N.Y.2d 434, cert. denied, sub nom. Corrigan v.
           New York, 498 U.S. 814 (1990) (director of the Organized Crime Task Force could apply for
           eavesdropping warrants because "literal construction" of a statute is inappropriate when it "circumscribes
           its application," and "fails to meaningfully incorporate as guiding criteria the policy objectives sought to
           be achieved by Congress in utilizing the statutory term") (internal quotations and citations omitted);
           Turner v. Dept. of Finance, 242 A.D.2d 146, 147 (1st Dept. 1998) (in interpreting local freedom of
           information statute, "the spirit and purpose of the act and the objects to be accomplished must be
           considered and given effect," and a literal reading of the text "should not be adhered to or suffered to
           defeat the general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted") (citation omitted); and King v.
           Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 493 (2015) (cautioning that courts should not interpret "statutes to negate their
           own stated purposes" in interpreting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), quoting, New York
           State Dept. ofSocial Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973).
                      Plaintiffs suggestion that the Legislature intended for those it intended to protect through an
           enhanced anti-SLAPP pre-answer motion to dismiss by requiring those same people to forgo the very pre-
           answer motion practice the Legislature expressly crafted for them in order to recover the enhanced
           penalties specifically designed for them through protracted litigation the Legislature expressly intended
           to avoid, and that the Court should impose such a procedure, is illogical. The defendants in Aristocrat
           Plastic Surgery argued as much to the First Department, in stating that "Appellants did not file an answer
           denying the allegations of the Complaint and asserting a counterclaim for alleged damages," as "[s]uch a
           course of conduct would have caused Appellants to engage in needless and expensive discovery-the very
           harm that the anti-SLAPP statutes are intended to eliminate." Reply Brief for Respondents, Aristocrat
           Plastic Surgery, at 6.

           8
             See, Chin~~e Am. Civ. Right~ Coal. ~- Trump, 21-cv-4548, 2022 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 82562, *15 (S.D.N.Y. May
           4, 2022) (c1tmg federal cases m denymg motion for anti-SLAPP attorney's fees); and 315 W. 103 Enters. LLC v.
           Robbins, 171 A.D.3d 466 (I st Dept. 2019).
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                     Plaintiffs reliance on federal cases denying fee applications by motion in favor of requiring
           defendants to pursue separate claims is particularly misplaced because of conflicting federal decisions
           regarding the applicability of state anti-SLAPP laws claims heard in federal court by diversity jurisdiction.
           See, Jankowski, supra.      That the Legislature established a separate cause of action for anti-SLAPP
           remedies merely reflects the common will of New York that anti-SLAPP remedies be available in federal
           court (where awarding anti-SLAPP remedies through procedural rules may not carry through diversity
           procedure) as well as state court. However, nothing in the text or intent of the Legislature precludes
           awarding fees by motion rather than a pled claim.
                     For proceedings in state court, to the extent the First Department has not already resolved this
           question in Aristocrat Plastic Surgery or Golan, plaintiffs argument remains unavailing.

           Plaintiff Has Not Established Good Cause to Conduct Anti-SLAPP Discovery
                     Pursuant to CPLR 321 l(g)(3) (emphasis added), "[t]he court, on noticed motion and upon a
           showing by the nonmoving party, by affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury that, for specified
           reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, may order that specified discovery be
           conducted," that "shall be limited to the issues raised in the motion to dismiss." Plaintiff has not met this
           burden.
                     In seeking discovery from defendant Burke, plaintiff relies solely on his attorney's affirmation as
           the basis of his purported necessity. That is deficient. The person in the best position to state what
           information plaintiff has concerning communications between plaintiff and defendant Burke is plaintiff
           himself, yet plaintiff has not offered an affidavit detailing his own personal knowledge in the instant
           motion. That alone is largely fatal to plaintiffs motion for discovery. See, People v. Trump, Index No.
           452564/2022, 2023 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 12067, *40 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. Oct. 30, 2023), interim stay
           denied, Case No. 2023-5460, slip op., at 1 (1st Dept. Nov. 2, 2023) (Mendez, J. in chambers) (noting lack
           of affidavit upon personal knowledge in denying motion to quash subpoena). Further, plaintiff does not
           offer an affidavit from anyone asserting that they conducted a search of materials under plaintiffs control
           regarding communications between plaintiff and defendant Burke at all.
                  Indeed, a recent First Department decision plaintiff cited for a different point in his memoranda of
           law illustrates the issue: Carey v. Carey, 220 A.D.3d 477 (1st Dept. 2023). In words that might as well
           have been written at the outset for the instant motion:

            160699/2018 ISALY, SAMUEL D. vs. GARDE DAMIAN
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                   The court's denial of his CPLR 321 l(g)(3) discovery motion was a provident exercise of
                   its discretion. Plaintiff cites no authority-construing CPLR 3211 (g)(3) or otherwise-to
                   support his assertions that he was, by definition, entitled to discovery because the
                   court found certain of the statements potentially defamatory, or because of the enormous
                   burden the anti-SLAPP amendments place on defamation plaintiffs. CPLR 321 l(g)(3)
                   allows for discovery in connection with a motion to dismiss only if, for specified reasons,
                   the nonmovant states, under oath, that it cannot present facts essential to justify its
                   opposition, in which case the court may order that specified discovery be conducted
                   notwithstanding the general stay of discovery otherwise effected by CPLR 3211 (g). His
                   statements that facts relevant to actual malice are, as a general matter, typically in the sole
                   possession of a ... defendant, fall short.

           Carey, at 478-479 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                  In the absence of any proof, the Court cannot simply assume that discovery must be necessary to
           defeat an anti-SLAPP motion. Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiffs motion for CPLR 321 l(g)(3)
           discovery from defendant Burke.

           Plaintiff Has Not Established a Substantial Basis in Fact and Law to Continue This Action
                   In opposing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (g), plaintiff must demonstrate "that the
           cause of action has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension,
           modification or reversal of existing law." Plaintiff has not done so.
                   Plaintiffs arguments that Chapter 250 does not apply to this action because it was commenced
           prior to the effective date of Chapter 250 do not offer a substantial basis in law as contemplated by the
           statute following the Court of Appeals' holding in Gottwald and the First Department's holdings affirming
           the Court in this action and denying reargument or leave to appeal (about which the Court of Appeals also
           denied leave). For the same reasons, plaintiff's arguments do not offer a substantial argument to extend,
           modify, or reverse existing law.
                   Turning to the facts, plaintiffs argument is, at its essence, that defendant Burke told defendant
           Garde false stories of sexually harassing acts by plaintiff, and that Garde published them in an article.
           Plaintiff offered nothing in support of this in his unverified pleadings, and has continued to offer nothing
           (either by his word or through supporting statements or documents) in support through the course of three
           years of protracted motion practice in Motion Seq. Nos. 004 through 008. Plaintiff's unadorned assertions
           amount to nothing more than the very type of bare notice pleadings that Chapter 250 is specifically
           designed to foreclose. In considering the standard plaintiff must meet to survive defendants' motion to
           dismiss, the Court notes that the Second Circuit has affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's allegations in

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         plaintiff's parallel litigation against Garde's publisher based on the federal plausibility standard, "rejecting
         Isaly's main argument that he was physically incapable of taking the actions attributed to him in the article
         - primarily, sending inappropriate emails - because he is quadriplegic and has limited use of his arms
         and fingers." Jsaly v. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *2-3, quoting, Isaly
         v. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, Dkt. No. 21-1330-cv, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1006, *1 (2d Cir.
         Jan. 13, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court found, and the First Department affirmed,
         plaintiff's claims against Garde failed even under the pre-Chapter 250 pleading standard. As plaintiff's
         claims are not even plausible, they cannot be substantial.
                    Instead, the continuation of this action after the Legislature's enactment of Chapter 250 has been
         a veritable archetype of the strategic litigation against public participation that the Legislature intended to
         curb in reforming the Anti-SLAPP Law. After the enactment of Chapter 250, plaintiff has noticed four
         motions before the Court (Motion Seq. Nos. 005 through 008) and vigorously litigated motions and cross-
         motions in two others (Motion Seq. Nos. 003 and 004), sought to amend his complaint again, noticed two
         appeals to the First Department, sought reargument from the First Department when he did not prevail
         there, and then sought leave from the Court of Appeals. That plaintiff has pursued this course oflitigation
         on allegations that are not even plausible, let alone substantial, harkens directly to the Supreme Court,
         Westchester County's warning that "SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the judicial arena
         where the SLAPP filer foists upon the target the expenses of a defense," and "(t]he longer the litigation
         can be stretched out, the more litigation that can be churned, the greater the expense that is inflicted and
         the closer the SLAPP filer moves to success." Gordon v. Marrone, 155 Misc. 2d 726, 736 (Sup. Ct.,
         Westchester Co. 1992). Plaintiff has not met his burden in opposing defendants' motions, and the Court
         accordingly finds that plaintiff's claims lack a substantial basis pursuant to CPLR 321 l(g).

         The Court Will Conduct a Hearing Regarding Defendants' Demands for Attorney's Fees
                    "It is well established that courts have broad discretion in determining an award of attorney fees
         and costs," and that "New York courts often use the lodestar method, which is based on a reasonable
         hourly rate times a reasonable number of hours expended." New York Times Co. v. New York Office of
         the Mayor, 2023 NY Slip Op 32941(0), *3 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2023) (citations omitted). 9 Courts

         9
             The lodestar method is based upon a 12-factor test considering:
                   (I) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite
                   to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to

             160699/2018 ISALY, SAMUEL 0. vs. GARDE DAMIAN
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                    applying the lodestar method have varied in considering fee applications on papers alone or through
                    evidentiary hearings.    Compare, e.g., JO v. New York City Dept. of Educ., Dkt. No. 20-cv-5061, 2021
                    U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122346, *1 (S.D.N.Y Jun. 29, 2021) (determining reasonable attorney's fees in IDEA
                    litigation after trial); and Matter of Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund Securities Litig., 2023 NY Slip Op
                    34527(U), *19 (declining to grant attorney's fees without hearing); with, R.S. v. New York City Dept. of

I
                    Educ., Dkt. No. 21-cv-2257, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176654, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (determining
                    reasonable attorney's fees in IDEA litigation on papers); and New York Times Co., at* 1. (determining
                    fees in FOIL litigation on papers). If anything, New York courts have generally favored hearings rather
                    than papers in determining fees, especially where there is sharp disagreement at the fore or on the horizon.
                    See, e.g., Matter of Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund Securities Litig., supra., citing, Sheridan v. Police
                    Pension Fund, 76 A.D.2d 800, 801-802 (1st Dept. 1980). Based upon the litigation of this action thus far,
                    Matter of Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund Securities Litig. is particularly instructive, and the Court will
                    conduct a hearing to calculate reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

                    Conclusion
                           The Court does not minimize plaintiff's incandescent disagreement with defendants' statements in
                    the article. However, the common will of this State has considered and accepted that plaintiff's ill-feeling
                    is an accepted consequence to preserving the marketplace of ideas. Plaintiff's path to relief from that
                    policy decision runs through the Legislature in Albany, not a courthouse in New York City. Thus, he has
                    not stated a claim for which relief can be granted and, given the nature of plaintiff's dismissed claims,
                    defendants may now recover their costs and attorneys' fees due to plaintiff's continued litigation of this
                action.
                           Accordingly, it is hereby,
                           ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for discovery (Motion Seq. No. 008) is denied; and it is further
                           ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to lift or vacate the stay in this action (Motion Seq. No. 007) is
                granted to the extent set forth below; and it is further

                           acceptance of the case; ( 5) the customary fee; ( 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent: (7) time
                           limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved, and the results
                           obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirability" of the
                           c~s~; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
                           s1mtlar cases.
                           New York Times Co., supra. (citations omitted).
                    160699/2018 ISALY, SAMUEL D. vs. GARDE, DAMIAN
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                   ORDERED that the branches of defendant Damian Garde's motion to dismiss this action pursuant
           to CPLR 3211 (g) as part of Motion Seq. No. 003 and 004 are granted; and it is further
                   ORDERED that the parties shall contact the Court by email to SFC-Part55@nycourts.gov and
           bkrist@nycourts.gov within 30 days of this decision to schedule a fees hearing.
                   This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

                    2/14/2024
                         DATE                                                        James d'Auguste, J.s.c:
            CHECK ONE:                     CASE DISPOSED                   NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                           GRANTED           □ DENIED      GRANTED IN PART                0    OTHER
            APPLICATION:                   SETTLE ORDER                    SUBMIT ORDER

            CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:          INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN      FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT          □ REFERENCE

            160699/2018 ISALY, SAMUEL D. vs. GARDE, DAMIAN
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