Court Opinion

ID: 9677039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:41:39.271185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:53.299739
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting on appellant’s petition for discretionary review.
Sudden passion arising from an adequate cause is neither a defense nor an affirmative defense.1 It is an odd duck that arose from courts being faced with the absurd conundrum of a sufficiency claim based on the fact that the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter contained an essential element not found in the greater offense of murder.2
*327Sudden passion now is actually a mitigation issue at punishment in murder cases. The statute places the burden on the defense to prove sudden passion by a preponderance of the evidence.3 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has addressed the trial court’s obligation to include a mitigation instruction in the context of a capital murder trial, comparing the capital murder mitigation issue to the sudden passion mitigation issue:
[T]he mitigation special issue for death penalty cases is neither embedded within elements the State must prove nor is it set up as an exception. Instead, the mitigation special issue is framed as a stand-alone punishment mitigation issue, a characteristic it shares with a number of punishment mitigating factors that are clearly defensive issues, including temporary insanity caused by intoxication, unsuccessful renunciation of an inchoate offense, the current sudden passion issue in a murder case, release in a safe place under both the older and newer versions of the aggravated kidnapping statute, and mental retardation in a death penalty case.
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We conclude that the mitigation special issue is a defensive issue that cannot be forfeited by inaction but can be waived, and because it is a defensive issue, the defendant has a right to insist upon its waiver. The trial judge in this case erred in refusing to allow appellant to waive submission of the issue to the jury, and as a result, erred in admitting victim-impact and victim-character evidence that would have otherwise been excluded.4
This holding from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals supports Appellant’s contention that the sudden passion mitigation issue before us cannot be forfeited. That is, contrary to the majority’s holding in overruling Appellant’s first point, Appellant’s failure to request a sudden passion instruction does not negate his right to the instruction triggered by the presence of evidence raising the issue.
I note that the majority’s holding, in overruling Appellant’s second point, that Appellant failed to raise the issue of sudden passion by a preponderance of the evidence, if correct, would moot the majority’s discussion of the first point. A careful review of the record, however, shows that Appellant did sufficiently raise the issue to be entitled to the instruction.
Although there are contradictions in the testimony, Appellant testified that Hall came to his door at 1:14 a.m. and made a point of saying that he knew Appellant’s girlfriend and that he knew Appellant’s daughter and “how to get ahold of’ her. Such threats, implied though they are, are the stuff suspense thrillers are made of for a reason — they’re scary. The evidence shows that after Appellant let Hall into his home, he realized that Hall was the local drug dealer. Hall attacked Appellant from behind, and they fought. Appellant testified that he was terrified. From the record before us, I conclude that Appellant clearly raised the issue of sudden passion arising from adequate cause.
The jury charge properly instructed the jury that they might consider “all of the facts shown by the evidence admitted before [them] in the full trial of this case.” And in deciding whether the evidence raises the issue of sudden passion, we also must consider the entire record that was *328before the jury.5 As the Murphy court points out, if, at sentencing, the jury does not consider the evidence admitted in the guilt phase of the trial, how can the jury make the punishment fit the crime? 6
Following the precedent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the sudden passion instruction “is a defensive issue that cannot be forfeited by inaction but can be waived, and because it is a defensive issue, the defendant has a right to insist upon its waiver.”7 In the case before this court, Appellant did not affirmatively waive the instruction; the instruction was never mentioned below.
I would hold that the evidence raised the issue of sudden passion, that Appellant could not and did not forfeit the right to a sudden passion instruction by his inaction, and, consequently, that the trial court was obligated to give the instruction sua sponte. The harm that Appellant suffered is readily apparent and egregious: the range of confinement Appellant faced as a result of the error was five to ninety-nine years instead of two to twenty years.8
I would sustain Appellant’s first point, not reach his second point, and reverse and remand this case for a new trial on punishment. Because the majority does not, I must respectfully dissent.

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 2.03, 2.04, 19.02(a), (d) (Vernon 2003).

. See Sanchez v. State, 275 S.W.3d 901, 907 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (Keller, P.J., concurring) (citations and references omitted).

. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(d).

. Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 222, 224-25 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (citations omitted).

. See Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (op. on reh'g) (“It is axiomatic, for example, that punishment should fit the particular crime. Accordingly, the trial court routinely instructs the jury it may consider all evidence admitted at the guilt phase in making its punishment determination.”), superseded on other grounds by Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).

. See Murphy, 111 S.W.2d at 63.

. Williams, 273 S.W.3d at 224.

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32(a), 12.33(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009), 19.02(c), (d).