Court Opinion

ID: 9687326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:25:17.210905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:26.206867
License: Public Domain

*315PAGE, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent. I agree with that portion of the court’s opinion holding that the Consumer Fraud Act applies to a cause of action brought by a plaintiff who was defrauded in an isolated one-on-one purchase of a restaurant for the purpose of selling restaurant services. I disagree, however, with that part of the opinion holding that Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (1998), does not permit an award of attorney fees in cases arising under the Consumer Fraud Act unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the cause of action has a public benefit. “[When] the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, we have no right to construe or interpret the statute’s language.” Tuma v. Commissioner of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1986). “Our duty in such a case is to give effect to the statute’s plain meaning.” Id. The words the legislature used in Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a are clear and free from ambiguity. Subdivision 3a, in relevant part, reads:
In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney’s fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.
Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (emphasis added).
Had the legislature intended to limit the scope of section 8.31, subdivision 3a, to those causes of action that have a public benefit, it could have easily done so. Whether for good or for ill, by the plain words of the statute, it did not. This court is not authorized nor is it this court’s role to read into a statute that which the legislature, by its plain language, has left out.