Court Opinion

ID: 2963422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:09:32.298057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:00.124778
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          June 13, 1995          NOT FOR PUBLICATION

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1623

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   FRANCIS FUENTES,

                                      Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
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                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
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                        and Schwarzer,* Senior District Judge.
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                                 ____________________

            Paul J. Garrity for appellant.
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            Andrew Levchuk, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom  Kevin
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        O'Regan, Assistant United States Attorney, and Donald K. Stern, United
        _______                                        _______________
        States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________
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        * Of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

                 Per Curiam.  Francis Fuentes was convicted of three drug
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            offenses arising from his involvement in a heroin importation

            and distribution  scheme.  21  U.S.C.     841, 846, 963.   On

            appeal, he argues  that in four  respects the district  court

            erred in its instructions to the  jury.  We review for  plain

            error only,  since Fuentes did  not object to  the challenged

            instructions when they were given.  United States v. Whiting,
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            28  F.3d 1296, 1308 (1st Cir.), cert.  denied, 115 S. Ct. 532
                                            _____  ______

            (1994).

                 1.   Fuentes first claims  that the instructions  quoted

            below, given at different places in the charge, impermissibly

            reduced  the  government's  burden   of  proof  by   equating

            reasonable doubt with a preponderance of the evidence:

                      If  the jury  views the  evidence in  the
                      case as reasonably  permitting either  of
                      two  conclusions,  one of  innocence, the
                      other of guilt, the  jury must of  course
                      adopt the conclusion of innocence.

                      Consider the  evidence  in the  case  for
                      only those purposes for which it has been
                      admitted,  and give  it a  reasonable and
                      fair construction in light of your common
                      knowledge of the  natural tendencies  and
                      inclinations of human beings.

                      You  should  consider all  the  facts and
                      circumstances  in  evidence to  determine
                      which  of  the  witnesses  are  worthy of
                      greater credence.

                 The  first instruction, known  as the  "two conclusions"

            instruction, was  upheld in United  States v. Del  Toro Soto,
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            676 F.2d 13, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1982).  Read literally, the two-

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            conclusions  instruction  merely emphasizes  that in  a close

            case  the  jury  must  acquit;  it  says  nothing  about  the

            government's burden of proof.  In this case the judge advised

            the  jury separately,  and reiterated throughout  his charge,

            that  the government had the burden of proving guilt beyond a

            reasonable  doubt.   However the  two-conclusions instruction

            might be read  out of context,  we do not  think that a  jury

            repeatedly instructed on the reasonable  doubt standard could

            view  the  two-conclusions  charge  as  substituting  for  or

            modifying the reasonable doubt standard.

                 In  United  States v.  Kahn, 821  F.2d  90, 91  (2d Cir.
                     ______________     ____

            1987), the  Second Circuit  disapproved of a  two-conclusions

            instruction similar to that  in this case; but it  also found

            that the  instruction did not constitute  reversible error in

            the context  of the  full reasonable doubt  instruction there

            given.  In another  case, the Second Circuit refused  to find

            plain error when, without objection, the trial  court gave an

            arguably  more harmful version of the two-conclusions charge.

            United  States v. Marcus, 401  F.2d 563, 567  (2d Cir. 1968),
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            cert.  denied,  393 U.S.  1023 (1969).    Since there  was no
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            objection  to the charge in our case, we see no conflict with

            the Second Circuit.

                 The  second and third  instructions criticized on appeal

            relate  to the  jury's  evaluation of  witness testimony  and

            other evidence.   As  with  the two-conclusions  instruction,

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            these  instructions say  nothing about  the burden  of proof;

            they  merely guide the jury in evaluating and considering the

            evidence  and are  perfectly appropriate.   United  States v.
                                                        ______________

            DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1317-18 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.  denied,
            ______                                         _____  ______

            115 S.  Ct. 947 (1995);  United States v.  Ocampo-Guarin, 968
                                     _____________     _____________

            F.2d 1406, 1412 (1st Cir. 1992).

                 Fuentes says that though the challenged instructions may

            not  be  erroneous  per  se, they  did  cause  confusion here
                                _______

            because the  jury was  not instructed  on  the definition  of
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            reasonable doubt.  But  the judge was not required  to define

            reasonable doubt, an  effort that often is itself  the source

            of  error.  United States  v. Olmstead, 832  F.2d 642, 645-46
                        _____________     ________

            (1st Cir. 1987), cert.  denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988).   Here,
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            the judge explained that  the defendant was presumed innocent

            and  that the  government  must prove  every  element of  the

            crimes charged  beyond a  reasonable doubt.   The judge  then

            repeated the government's burden over 20 times throughout its

            charge.   The  jury  did not  misunderstand the  government's

            burden  of proof.  Victor v. Nebraska,  114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243
                               ______    ________

            (1994).

                 2.   Fuentes next  claims that the judge  erred by using

            charge language inconsistent  with jury  nullification.   The

            judge instructed the jury, in essence, that it "must" convict

            the defendant  if the government  proved all the  elements of

            the  crimes charged; Fuentes says  that the proper wording is

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            "should," so  that the  possibility of jury  nullification is

            left open.   Although  the government has  conceded that  the

            defendant raised and preserved  his objection in the district

            court, the government  is mistaken, and  we review for  plain

            error.1

                 We  have squarely held that a  defendant is not entitled

            to have  the jury  told that  nullification is a  permissible

            course for the jury  to take, United States v.  Sepulveda, 15
                                          _____________     _________

            F.3d 1161, 1190  (1st Cir.  1993), cert. denied,  114 S.  Ct.
                                               _____ ______

            2714 (1994), a holding arguably at odds with Fuentes' attempt

            to encourage the same  result soto voce.  Even  assuming that
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            "should" rather  than "must"  were a preferable  instruction,

            but see F.J.C. Pattern  Instruction 21 (1987) (using "must"),
            ___ ___

            the  difference between  "should" and  "must" in  the present

            context  is far too subtle an  adjustment to constitute plain

            error.

                 3.   Fuentes now claims that the judge erroneously  left

            out the  "intent to  distribute" element when  instructing on

            the  charge  of  possession  of  heroin  with  an  intent  to

            distribute.   21 U.S.C.    841(a)(1).  It  is quite true that

            the  district court did say,  in what was  almost certainly a

            slip of the tongue,  that "if [the defendant] did  know [that

                                
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                 1Fuentes'   co-defendant   asked   for  an   instruction
            affirmatively  advising  the jury  that  it  could engage  in
            nullification and Fuentes adopted his co-defendant's request.
            Neither  Fuentes  nor his  co-defendant  asked  the court  to
            substitute "must" for "should."

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            he  possessed  a  controlled   substance]  and  he  did  have

            possession,  then  you  must  find the  defendant  guilty  as

            charged."  In this passage,  the intent to distribute element

            is  omitted and, taken literally, the jury is told to convict

            based on mere knowing possession.

                 But  in fact this slip  occurred in a  discussion of the

            possession  element of  the  offense that  occurred when  the

            court  had  already  painstakingly  told the  jury  that  the

            offense  required two  elements:   knowing possession  and an

            intent to distribute.   Further, after finishing the separate

            discussion of possession, the district court then returned to

            the "second  element," repeated  that "the Government  [must]

            prove beyond  a reasonable doubt that  the defendant intended

            to distribute  the controlled substance," and  the court then

            enlarged at some length on the intent element.

                 The district court would undoubtedly have  corrected the

            slip if it had been asked to do so, and the case is a perfect

            example of why counsel is obligated to make timely objections

            to instructions.  In all events,  reading the instructions as

            a  whole there is virtually  no chance that  the jury thought

            that it could convict on this count without finding an intent

            to  distribute.  The risk that the conviction was affected by

            this slip is not only far from what is needed for plain error

            review,  see United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777-79
                     ___ _____________    _____

            (1993), but is virtually nonexistent.

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                 4.   As his final argument,  Fuentes says that the judge

            erred when,  in connection  with the conspiracy  charges, the

            judge instructed the jury  that "it is reasonable for  you to

            draw the  inference that  a  person intends  the natural  and

            probable consequences of his acts knowingly done or knowingly

            committed."  This, says Fuentes, amounts to the creation of a

            presumption that at the very least shifts the burden of proof

            onto the defendant to disprove intent; and he reminds us that

            presumptions  to this  effect were  condemned by  the Supreme

            Court  in  Sandstrom v.  Montana,  442 U.S.  510  (1979), and
                       _________     _______

            Francis  v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985).  No such objection
            _______     ________

            was made at trial.

                 The disputed instruction does  not create a presumption,

            nor does it direct the jury to draw any kind of inference; it

            merely poses  a permissive  inference based on  common sense.

            Hardy  v. United  States, 691  F.2d 39,  42 (1st  Cir. 1982).
            _____     ______________

            Although  we   have  expressed  doubt  about   this  type  of

            instruction, United  States v. DeWolf,  696 F.2d 1,  3-4 (1st
                         ______________    ______

            Cir. 1982), it is not governed by Sandstrom or Francis and is
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            certainly not plain  error.   See Lannon v.  Hogan, 719  F.2d
                                          ___ ______     _____

            518,  521-22 (1st  Cir. 1983),  cert. denied,  465 U.S.  1105
                                            _____ ______

            (1984).

                 Affirmed.
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