Court Opinion

ID: 9681373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:49:11.10081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:33.627289
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Judge
(dissenting).
I most respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe we reached the point of no return in Terry v. Associated Stone Company, Ky., 334 S.W.2d 926, and Grimes v. Goodlett and Adams, Ky., 345 S.W.2d 47. Without intending to emasculate the science of semantics I am of the opinion that, when a doctor states a condition could have caused a coronary occlusion, he has concluded the question almost as definitely as when he states the same condition probably caused the trouble.
In both the Terry and Grimes cases the doctors vacillated in their testimony concerning the cause of the traumatic injury. For example, in the Grimes case various doctors discussing the relationship between the work which was being done and the injury which occurred said: “Don’t know,” “could have,” “direct contribution,” “could reasonably be,” “I believe it was,” “probably precipitated,” “not necessarily a precipitating cause,” etc. In the Terry case one *895doctor said physical exercise was a factor, another said it could be a factor, a third said it probably was a factor. In other words, doctors seldom, if ever, say without reservation that physical exertion does precipitate a coronary occlusion, so I believe it is incumbent upon the courts and the Workmen’s Compensation Board to use common sense in the interpretation of a doctor’s testimony.
We have not held that testimony of a doctor must be absolute. In fact, in the Grimes case we said: “The facts or hypotheses on which the professional witness testifies need not be conclusive. They are sufficient if in his opinion they indicate the cause within reasonable probability. The claimant is not required to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Whether the conditions possibly or probably could have caused the injury is purely a question of degree. Each requires speculation. At any rate, I feel that we have gone so far in heart attack cases that we should not quibble over the testimony of a reluctant doctor.
The question before us is whether there was sufficient testimony to justify the finding made by the Workmen’s Compensation Board. The doctor who testified was as reluctant as any of his brothers to state that the conditions existing caused the coronary occlusion. However, despite his vacillation, he did make the following statement:
“A man who has engaged in a similar occupation over a period of a year or thereabouts could in that interval have progression of coronary arterial disease to the extent that the conditions that existed on the day of his death zvould have been sufficient to induce a fatal occlusion. Those conditions were the type of work he was doing, the heat of the day, which concentrated his circulating blood because of his perspiring.”
It was proved that the day was hot, that Robinson was perspiring, and that he had probably been digging ditches. Those are the conditions the doctor was discussing. He had already stated that Robinson had a pre-existing heart condition which doubtless had progressed during the year Robinson worked for the appellant. The doctor said that those conditions would have been sufficient to induce a fatal occlusion. Certainly this is sufficient to sustain the finding of the Board.
I agree the Board was in error in rejecting the doctor’s thesis concerning the preexisting condition which was aggravated by the injury. The finding of the Board should be sustained and the award apportioned according to the contribution of the injury to the disability.