Court Opinion

ID: 9640760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:14:34.260878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:59.818403
License: Public Domain

EAGEN, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the order of the Court affirming the judgment of sentence. I also agree two issues now raised are waived, but not for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Roberts.
Two issues raised by Michael Twiggs, appellant, are waived because they were not properly preserved for review at trial under this Court’s rulings in Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Glenn, 459 Pa. 662, 330 A.2d 535 (1974).1 The third issue is *486whether the trial court erred in allowing into evidence prior contradictory statements of a defense witness which were allegedly involuntarily obtained. Of course, Twiggs had no standing to obtain suppression of these statements, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978), and the circumstances under which they were obtained were for the jury to consider.
This Court’s ruling that the issues are waived under Commonwealth v. Blair, supra, is contrary to prior precedent, Commonwealth v. Hitson, 482 Pa. 404, 393 A.2d 1169 (1978); Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 482 Pa. 538, 394 A.2d 453 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa. 172, 386 A.2d 495 (1978); Commonwealth v. Pugh, 476 Pa. 445, 383 A.2d 183 (1978); Commonwealth v. Perillo, 474 Pa. 63, 376 A.2d 635 (1977); Commonwealth v. Grace, 473 Pa. 542, 375 A.2d 721 (1977), contrary to a basic sense of fairness as enunciated in Commonwealth v. Bailey, 463 Pa. 354, 344 A.2d 869 (1975) and Commonwealth v. Fortune, 464 Pa. 367, 346 A.2d 783 (1975), cf. Commonwealth v. Roach, 477 Pa. 379, 381, 383 A.2d 1257, 1258 (1978) (concurring opinion, Roberts, J.), and contrary to the efficient administration of justice.
Commonwealth v. Blair, supra, held that, henceforth, issues not presented in written post-verdict motions, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a), would not be considered preserved for appellate review. Thereafter, a majority of this Court held that, if a brief was filed or presented to the post-verdict motion court and that court considered the issues,2 the mandate of a writing of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a) would be viewed as substantially complied with and the issues raised in such a brief would be reviewed. Commonwealth v. Hitson, supra, (Opinion of the Court affirming on the merits, Larsen, J. joined by Eagen, C. J.; Dissenting Opinion, which would have reversed on the merits, O’Brien, J. joined by Manderino, J.; Concurring Opinion, affirming on the merits, *487Pomeroy, J.);3 Commonwealth v. Slaughter, supra, (Opinion of the Court, Manderino, J. joined by Eagen, C. J., O’Brien and Pomeroy, JJ.; Larsen, J. noted a dissent, but did not join either of two dissenting opinions which would have found a waiver under Commonwealth v. Blair, supra);4 Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, (Opinion of the Court, affirming the judgment on the merits, Eagen, C. J. joined by O’Brien, Pomeroy and Larsen, JJ.; Dissenting Opinion, which would have reversed on the merits, Roberts, J. joined by Manderino, J.);5 Commonwealth v. Pugh, supra, (Opinion of the Court, remanding on the merits of an issue, Eagen, C. J. joined by O’Brien and Manderino, JJ.; Dissenting Opinion, which would have affirmed on the merits, Pomeroy, J.);6 Commonwealth v. Perillo, supra, (Opinion of the Court, reversing on the merits, Eagen, C. J. joined by O’Brien and Manderino, JJ.; Concurring Opinion joining in reversal on the merits, Roberts, J.);7 Commonwealth v. Grace, supra, *488(Opinion of the Court, affirming on the merits, Eagen, J. [now C. J.] joined by Jones, C. J., O’Brien and Pomeroy, JJ.; Dissenting Opinion, which would have reversed on the merits, Manderino, J.).8 Instantly, a brief raising the issues, now held waived under Commonwealth v. Blair, supra, was presented to the post-verdict motion court and that court considered the issues. Hence, it is readily apparent that today’s ruling by the court is contrary to the precedent established by this Court as previously and presently constituted.9
Be that as it may, I am willing to abandon Commonwealth v. Grace, supra, and its progeny, but as I have said before, Commonwealth v. Allen, 478 Pa. 342, 386 A.2d 964 (1978) (Opinion in Support of Reversal, Eagen, C. J. joined by Pomeroy, J.), we should do so prospectively. First, there is no reason to treat Twiggs any different than the manner in which a majority of this Court has treated other persons. Second, counsel, in using a brief instantly, was entitled to rely on the precedent of this Court if the trial court in which he was representing his client allowed briefs.10 Third, as Mr. Justice Roberts pointed out in Commonwealth v. Bailey, supra, wherein we held oral motions made before Commonwealth v. Blair, supra, would be considered preserved for review because to not do so would be “unfair” since prior practice misled counsel,11 fairness mandates that reliance on prior practice and precedent be considered and that that reliance dictates a prospective ruling in circumstances such as these. Accord Commonwealth v. Fortune, supra. Hence, it is also readily apparent that today’s ruling is basically unfair.
*489Finally, can anyone expect today’s ruling to result in anything but valid claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel such that post-conviction relief petitions will result? Will not these petitions result in unnecessary hearings in our trial courts? Can the result of those hearings be doubted? Surely trial counsel will say: “I relied on precedent because I read the law and kept tract of the majority view of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.” The trial court will say: “You have my sympathies, but the Supreme Court issued warnings even though they never held a brief was inadequate or that motions were mandatory. Hence, you were ineffective.” Then new counsel will be appointed and new post-verdict motions will be filed. The trial court will undoubtedly rely on its prior disposition of the issues when they were presented in a brief and an appeal will follow. Then, this Court will reach the merits. For shame, our trial courts have enough to do, they are already overburdened; and, the lawyers in this Commonwealth have enough to do with trying to keep up with the law as a result of the mountains of opinions courts are filing, they should not have to go through meaningless acts leading to predetermined results. Hence, it is readily apparent that the efficient administration of justice is today dealt an unnecessary and unwarranted defeat.
I emphatically disagree with the Court’s rationale, but concur in affirmance for the reasons previously stated.
O’BRIEN and FLAHERTY, JJ., join in this opinion.

. Logically, the Court should not even reach the waiver issue under Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975), as to these two issues because they were waived before post-verdict motions were filed.

. Where the issues are considered waived by the post-verdict motion court for failing to strictly comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a), we have held the issues waived. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Carillo, 483 Pa. 215, 395 A.2d 570 (1978).

. Four members of this Court as it is presently constituted reached the merits of the issues raised in Commonwealth v. Hitson, supra, along with former Justice Pomeroy.

. Clearly Commonwealth v. Slaughter, supra, represents a majority view, as the Court was then constituted, on waiver.

. Mr. Justice Roberts has stated Commonwealth v. Blair, supra, should not be applied if post-verdict motions were filed prior to March 1, 1975, the date of publication of that case by West Publishing Company. See Commonwealth v. Roach, 477 Pa. supra at 381, 383 A.2d at 1258. But, in reaching the merits in Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, he expressed agreement with the principle that a brief preserves the issues because Mr. Justice Nix pointed out in his concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Jones, supra 478 Pa. at 180, 386 A.2d at 499, that post-verdict motions were filed on June 30, 1975. Accordingly, five members of this Court as it is presently constituted, along with former Justice Pomeroy, reached the merits of the issues raised in Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, on the basis of a presented brief.

. Clearly Commonwealth v. Pugh, supra, represents a majority view of the Court, as then constituted, on waiver.

. Motions were filed prior to the publication date of Commonwealth v. Blair, supra, by West Publishing Company, but were not decided until after that date. Accordingly, four members of this Court as presently constituted reached the merits of the issue raised in Commonwealth v. Perillo, supra, on the basis of a filed brief.

. Commonwealth v. Grace, supra, is thus a majority view of this Court on waiver.

. There has never been precedent to the contrary. The opinion of the Court erroneously relies on cases involving oral motions only.

. See n. 2, supra. Where the trial court would rule the issues are waived despite a brief, counsel could not rely on our precedent.

. See also Commonwealth v. Roach, supra 477 Pa. at 381, 383 A.2d at 1258 (Concurring Opinion, Roberts, J.).