Court Opinion

ID: 9635020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:32:39.17459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:14.908937
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT
POMEROY, Justice.
Appellant Michael Francis Manning was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of York County on two counts of murder in the first degree. After denying his post-trial motions, the trial court imposed a sentence of two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. From that judgment of *497sentence the within appeal was taken.1 For the reasons set forth below, we must reverse and remand for a new trial.
Appellant has briefed six assignments of error. In view of our disposition of the case on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jury completely on the definition of voluntary manslaughter, we need not reach the remaining issues.2
Appellant specifically requested the trial court to instruct the jury on the elements of voluntary manslaughter in the language of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. 2503(b) (1973).3 The definitional portions of Section 2503 provide as follows:
“(a) General rule. — A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by:
(1) the individual killed; or
*498(2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidently causes the death of the individual killed.
“(b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable. — A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the killing under Chapter 5 of this title, but his brief is unreasonable.”
At his trial Manning testified that he had consumed large quantities of various drugs during the period immediately preceding his killing of the two victims, Joseph Anastasio and his girlfriend, Victoria Roehrs. On May 19, 1975, Manning said, he had quarreled with Anastasio in the back yard of Manning’s residence over difficulties involved in a proposal that they jointly purchase a certain farm. After the quarrel Manning entered his house, obtained a high-powered rifle, inserted ammunition and from his porch fired several shots over the heads of persons in the back yard. Appellant repeatedly demanded that Anastasio leave the premises and threatened to kill him. The uncontradicted testimony shows that when Anastasio appeared from behind a garage, appellant fired one shot at him, striking him in the chest. Victoria then ran towards Anastasio, and the appellant fired six shots at her, hitting her five times. Appellant came outside, shot Anastasio once more at close range, killed the victim’s dog and piled up the bodies before disappearing into a nearby wooded area.
Manning testified that he had no memory of the actual events. Instead, he claimed’ to have seen two gargoyles flying in the air and a snake crawling in the yard, at which objects he had directed his shots.
On the record before him, the trial judge held that Section 2503(b), supra, by its terms, did not apply to the case. He reasoned:
“This section presupposes an intentional killing. However, this Defendant claims that he had no intention of shooting anyone, that he shot at two flying gargoyles and *499a snake, and that he did not recall seeing anyone in the area. Secondly, the section does not apply to any killing which an accused may feel [is] justified for any reason, but to an unreasonable belief of justification ... or more specifically that the killing was justified in self-defense and in the protection of others. The Defendant did not claim that he was in mortal fear of his own life from these gargoyles and snakes, but to the contrary testified that the gargoyles were not attacking but just flying. Protection of others is obviously not an available theory, not only because the gargoyles were not attacking, but because the Defendant does not recall seeing others that needed protection.” Opinion attached to Appellant’s brief, at pp. 27-28.
This ruling would have been acceptable under the law prior to this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. den., 419 U.S. 1000, 95 S.Ct. 316, 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Matthews v. Johnson, 503 F.2d 339 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom Cuyler v. Matthews, 420 U.S. 952, 95 S.Ct. 1336, 43 L.Ed.2d 430 (1975). Both of these cases hold, in essence, that a trial judge has or should have no discretion to deny a defendant charged with criminal homicide a requested charge on voluntary manslaughter. See also Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 369 A.2d 1234 (1977) (opinions in support of affirmance); Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 471 Pa. 318, 370 A.2d 322 (1977). From the premise that a defendant charged with murder has a clear right to receive such an instruction on request, whatever the nature of the evidence presented or of his defense, it follows that he has an unconditional right on request to an instruction on the complete statutory definition of the offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court did charge on that aspect of voluntary manslaughter covered by subdivision (a) of § 2503; it did not charge on the aspect covered by subdivision (b), which is equally a part of the offense. This omission was apparently because it could find no evidence pointing to an *500unreasonable belief on the part of appellant that the killing was justifiable. But it is now impermissible to omit a charge on voluntary manslaughter, in whole or in part, because of a lack of a basis for a manslaughter verdict in the evidence. Such an omission was error which requires that a new trial be had.
Judgment of sentence reversed and case remanded for a new trial.
ROBERTS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
NIX, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, art. II, § 202(1), 17 P.S. § 211.202(1) (Supp. 1977-78).

. These issues are as follows:
(1) The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence of the results of tests on blood and urine samples taken from Manning after his arrest;
(2) The court erred in admitting such evidence because the Commonwealth had failed to meet its burden of proof as to the chain of custody of the samples;
(3) The court erred in overruling objections to the Commonwealth’s cross-examination of defense character witnesses;
(4) The court erred in refusing to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter, and
(5) The court erred in refusing to charge the jury that Manning’s ingestion of large amounts of drugs could negate the general intent element of the various degrees of homicide with which he was charged.

. Appellant’s brief asserts that the trial court erred in refusing defendant’s point for charge No. 10 and a verbal request for a charge, both having to do with voluntary manslaughter. The record before us contains no written points for charge, but the appellee’s brief seems to accept the fact that such points were submitted. The transcript of testimony does show that defendant made a timely request that the court charge the jury in the language of § 2503(b) of the Crimes Code.