Court Opinion

ID: 9925235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 05:05:22.006448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:46.505629
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                   UNPUBLISHED
In re DICKY, Minors.                                               January 18, 2024

                                                                   No. 366061
                                                                   Genesee Circuit Court
                                                                   Family Division
                                                                   LC No. 19-135892-NA

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent’s two biological children were removed from his care after petitioner received
reports that respondent’s home was unfit. The trial court subsequently terminated respondent’s
parental rights to the children. He challenges the termination on appeal; finding no basis for
reversal, we affirm.

                                      I. BACKGROUND

        Respondent’s oldest child was removed from respondent’s care after a Children’s
Protective Services (CPS) investigator observed that respondent’s home did not have heat, did not
have running water, and was cluttered with garbage that blocked doorways and created fire
hazards. The trial court ordered respondent to participate in a treatment plan that included a
psychological evaluation, parenting and anger-management classes, supportive visitation, an
employment assistance program, and counseling. Respondent was also required to maintain
suitable housing and income.

        Respondent’s youngest child was born with cerebral palsy while he was participating in
his treatment plan, and the youngest child was also removed from respondent’s care because his
home remained unfit. The children remained in foster care for three years before they were
returned to respondent’s care subject to respondent’s continued participation with the Family
Reunification Program that would provide, among other things, daycare services for the children.
Respondent rented a new apartment that he furnished for the children, and he told petitioner that
he had arranged daycare services for the children. The children were not placed in daycare during
the pendency of the case, however, and the Family Reunification Program stopped providing
services to respondent because he did not respond to the program’s communications.

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        Respondent left the children unsupervised one night, and they walked to a nearby store at
2:00 a.m. A neighbor returned the children to their home, and the neighbor stated that respondent
appeared to be intoxicated. At the time, both children were under four years old. After this
incident, a CPS worker met with respondent, gave him a door alarm to install on his front door,
and gave respondent a drug test that revealed that his blood-alcohol-content level was 0.08 or
higher.

        A CPS worker visited respondent later, and he refused to submit to another drug test
because he admitted that he had already consumed alcohol that day. The CPS worker observed
garbage on respondent’s kitchen floor, rotten food in the kitchen, unattended knives that were left
out in reach of the children, and an infestation of flies throughout respondent’s apartment. Further,
the CPS worker noted that the children were not clean and respondent had not installed the door
alarm that was given to him. The children were once again removed from respondent’s care, and
they were eventually placed with the same foster parents.

        It was reported that respondent was drinking alcohol three to four days a week, and
consuming at least two 24-ounce beers each day that he did drink. Respondent testified that he
did not have a drinking problem because he was drinking in his own home, he was over 21-years-
old, he only drank beer, and he never lost employment or was arrested because of his alcohol
consumption. Several CPS workers, however, testified that respondent was intoxicated when they
interacted with him, and respondent was discharged from his parent-partner program because when
he was intoxicated he would become angry with the workers.

       Respondent’s parenting-time visits with the children revealed that respondent had a bond
with both children. Respondent did not know how to interact with his youngest child, however,
because she had medical needs including leg braces for mobility, reminders to swallow, and speech
delays. Respondent would also become angry when there were minor problems or issues during
his parenting time and, on two different occasions, a foster-care worker had to call security
personnel because respondent had threatened her in front of the children.

        The children’s foster parents testified that the children were receiving occupational, speech,
and physical therapy while they were in their care, and they were willing to adopt the children. It
was further reported that all of the children’s educational and medical needs were being met and
the children were doing well with their foster parents. This was in contrast to the children’s time
with respondent, because he consistently indicated that he did not believe that his children needed
therapeutic support. This included not maintaining medical appointments for his youngest child
with cerebral palsy.

        The trial court reviewed photographs of respondent’s apartment that showed trash
throughout his apartment, a carton containing sour milk sitting next to a knife, and ash covering
the apartment’s surfaces. Further, there was rotten food in the refrigerator and liquid from prepared
meat spread over the stove and the countertop. The trial court found that these were not suitable
living conditions for the children and that respondent had not rectified this condition. The trial
court also found that respondent’s alcohol consumption presented a continued barrier to his
reunification with the children, and his alcohol-use was not likely to be resolved within a
reasonable time given that he continued to drink alcohol throughout the pendency of the case while
stating that he did not have a problem.

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       The trial court held that respondent lacked the insight required to address the children’s
emotional and physical needs given that the children had endured extensive trauma and respondent
did not understand the impact of that trauma or the children’s need for services to address that
trauma. The trial court held that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate respondent’s
parental rights when addressing that the children’s needs were being met by their foster family.
Consequently, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j).

       Respondent now appeals.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

                                     A. STATUTORY BASIS

        Respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it found that there were statutory
grounds sufficient to terminate his parental rights to the children. “This Court reviews for clear
error the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for
termination.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding is clearly
erroneous if although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Rood, 483 Mich
73, 91; 763 NW2d 587 (2009) (cleaned up).

       The trial court found that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) was one of the statutory bases
appropriate to terminate respondent’s parental rights to the children, and it provides:

               (3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
       finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

                                               * * *

              (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
       182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
       and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

              (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
       no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
       time considering the child’s age.

        MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) is appropriate “when the conditions that brought the children into
foster care continue to exist despite time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage
of a variety of services.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 710 (cleaned up).

       In this case, there were more than 182 days between the initial dispositional order and the
termination hearing. Therefore, the 182-day statutory period was satisfied.

        The children were brought into petitioner’s care as a result of respondent’s unfit home and
his alcohol use. Respondent participated in parenting classes, psychological evaluations, and
found new housing that was, at one point, suitable. That new housing, however, became unfit

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when respondent let trash pile up in the home, left spoiled milk out on the counter, and left rotten
food in the refrigerator that led to an infestation of flies throughout his home. Further, it was
reported that respondent consumed alcohol three to four days a week and he was reportedly
intoxicated when the children left his home at 2:00 a.m. without him noticing. Respondent also
testified that he did not believe that he had a problem with alcohol, demonstrating that he was not
willing to change his behavior.

        Given respondent’s conduct during the pendency of this case, we are not left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817
NW2d 111 (2011). “[T]he totality of evidence amply” supports that respondent “had not
accomplished any meaningful change” in the conditions that led to adjudication because he did
not display any improvement in his ability to maintain a fit home, and he continued to consume
alcohol that led to him not realizing when his children wandered out of his care. In re Williams,
286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). Therefore, the record supports that the trial court
did not clearly err when it found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s conditions
continued to exist.

       Because one statutory ground for termination is established, “we need not consider whether
the other grounds cited by the trial court also supported the termination decision.” In re Foster,
285 Mich App 630, 633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).

                                  B. REASONABLE EFFORTS

        Respondent also briefly argues that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to reunify
him with the children. This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that “reasonable
efforts were made to preserve and reunify the family.” In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543;
702 NW2d 192 (2005). “A finding is clearly erroneous if although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” In re Rood, 483 Mich at 91. “While the [Department of Health and
Human Services] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure
reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate
in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).

        Specifically, respondent argues that petitioner failed to take respondent’s limitations into
consideration under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101 et seq, and the termination
of his parental rights would have been avoided if daycare had been arranged for the children. The
record demonstrates, however, that respondent told petitioner that he had daycare services
arranged before the children were returned to him, and he ignored assistance from the Family
Reunification Program that would have also provided daycare services. Further, respondent did
not inform petitioner that he needed accommodations to set up those services. Petitioner “cannot
accommodate a disability of which it is unaware.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 87; 893 NW2d
637 (2017).

        Given the petitioner’s attempts to facilitate daycare services, and respondent’s refusal to
participate, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that petitioner made reasonable efforts
to reunify respondent with his children on this issue. See In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 542-543.

                                                 -4-
                                       C. BEST INTERESTS

        Lastly, respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that the termination of his
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. “Once a statutory ground for termination has
been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can
terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).
“[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The
trial court’s ruling regarding best interests is reviewed for clear error. In re Schadler, 315 Mich
App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676 (2016). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is
evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 33.

        “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best
interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. With respect to the children’s best interests, this
Court places its focus on the children rather than the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. “In
deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s
bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and
finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors,
297 Mich App at 41-42 (cleaned up). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of
domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation
history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In
re White, 303 Mich App at 714.

        In this case, the trial court acknowledged that respondent had a bond with the children, but
it found that respondent did not understand the children’s needs. Further, respondent stated that
the children did not need therapeutic support and he failed to maintain medical appointments for
his youngest child while she was in his care.

        This was in contrast to the foster parents’ care of the children, who testified that the children
were receiving occupational, speech, and physical therapy while they were in their care. Further,
the foster parents were willing to adopt the children. It was further reported that all of the
children’s educational and medical needs were being met and the children were doing well with
their foster parents.

       Given that the children were doing well in their preadoptive home, and respondent did not
demonstrate improvement in his ability to parent the children, we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 33. Therefore,
the record supports that the trial court did not clearly err when it found by a preponderance of
evidence that termination and adoption was in the children’s best interests.

                                         III. CONCLUSION

        Petitioner provided reasonable efforts for the reunification of respondent with the children.
Respondent was not able, however, to maintain fit housing and his alcohol consumption interfered
with his ability to parent and supervise the children. The trial court did not err when it found clear
and convincing evidence that a statutory basis existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights

                                                  -5-
because respondent did not rectify his barriers to reunification, and, similarly, a preponderance of
the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                             /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                             /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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