Court Opinion

ID: 9410786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 16:07:15.203491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:00.346812
License: Public Domain

J-S13009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    v.                                         :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAQUAN WOODEN                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2502 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0000521-2020

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    v.                                         :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAQUAN WOODEN                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2504 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0000522-2020

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                                FILED JULY 24, 2023

         Appellant Jaquan Wooden appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered following his conviction for third-degree murder and related offenses.

Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and imposed an

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S13009-23

excessive aggregate sentence       without adequate consideration of the

applicable sentencing factors. After review, we affirm.

      The trial court summarized the factual background of this matter as

follows:

      At trial the Commonwealth presented the testimony of
      Philadelphia police officers Padraic Feeney, Jerald Furey,
      Jacqueline Brennan, Christine Hilbert, and Paul Ward; Philadelphia
      police detectives Paul Scarinci, Thorsten Lucke, Peter Marrero, Jr.,
      and Danielle Slobodian; Philadelphia police sergeant Matthew
      Lowe; Philadelphia chief medical examiner Dr. Albert Chu; civilian
      Milton Abreu; and, by stipulation, forensic scientists Lissette Vega
      and Tarah Helsel. [Appellant] presented no evidence. Viewed in
      the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
      winner, the evidence established the following:

      At approximately 7:57 p.m., on November 19, 2019, Jose
      Espinosa-Molina was walking down the 6100 block of Castor
      Avenue in Philadelphia. After Espinosa-Molina crossed the street,
      [Appellant] drove up behind Espinosa-Molina in a black vehicle.
      As the vehicle approached Espinosa-Molina, [Appellant], as well
      as other individuals in the vehicle, fired multiple gunshots at
      Espinosa-Molina. Espinosa-Molina was struck in the back of the
      head by a .380 caliber bullet and collapsed onto the ground.

      The police arrived at approximately 8:04 p.m. and found
      Espinosa-Molina laying on the ground and unresponsive. The
      police immediately transported Espinosa-Molina to Aria Torresdale
      Hospital, where he was pronounced dead two days later. Dr. Chu,
      the chief medical examiner, concluded that the death was a
      homicide caused by complications of a gunshot wound to the
      head.

      The police recovered four fired cartridge casings (“FCCs”) from the
      scene, as well as two bullet fragments. One of the FCCs was a
      .380 caliber, while the other three were all 9mm.

      Two days after the Espinosa-Molina shooting, on November 21,
      2019, at approximately 8:21 p.m., [Appellant] was standing with
      a group of individuals outside the Abreu Super Deli on the corner
      of Castor Avenue and Benner Street. [Appellant’s] black Honda
      Accord was parked outside of the deli, and [Appellant] was

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        wearing dark clothing, a baseball hat, and yellow sneakers. A
        vehicle approached the group and fired gunshots. [Appellant]
        then ran down the street chasing the vehicle while firing multiple
        gunshots in the direction of the fleeing vehicle.

        When the police arrived, responding to the sound of gunshots,
        they found [Appellant] assisting an injured individual out of the
        backseat of a vehicle. As the police attended to the injured
        individual, who had been shot, [Appellant] left and went inside the
        Abreu Super Deli. [Appellant] went to the back of the deli, where
        he encountered Milton Abreu, whose family owned the deli.
        [Appellant] handed Mr. Abreu his gun. Mr. Abreu then took the
        gun to the basement and placed it on top of a ceiling panel.

        The Philadelphia Police Department has a Real Time Crime Center
        (the “Crime Center”) where police officers can monitor video
        surveillance recorded on cameras connected to the Crime Center.
        Because a Crime Center camera was posted outside of the corner
        where the shooting occurred, the police at the Crime Center were
        able to view footage of the shooting and relay a description of one
        of the shooters to the officers on the scene. Those officers
        observed that the description of the shooter provided by the Crime
        Center matched [Appellant]. Police then viewed surveillance
        video from inside the Abreu Deli, which showed [Appellant] inside
        of the store. The officers then placed [Appellant] under arrest.
        Afterwards, Mr. Abreu informed the police where he had hidden
        [Appellant’s] gun, and the police recovered it from the basement.

        While [Appellant] was in custody at Curran-Fromhold Correctional
        Facility (“CFCF”), police received information from the National
        Integrated Ballistic Information Network (“NIBIN”) linking the
        ballistics recovered from the November 19, 2019 shooting of Jose
        Espinosa-Molina to the firearm [Appellant] used on November 21,
        2019, to fire down the street at the fleeing car.[FN3] After receiving
        this information from the NIBIN, Detectives Slobodian and
        McKenna picked up [Appellant] from CFCF and drove him back to
        the Philadelphia Police Department Homicide Unit for an interview.
        Following Miranda[1] warnings, [Appellant] gave a statement to
        police wherein he confessed to the murder of Jose Espinosa-Molina
        and described in-detail the events leading to the murder.

               NIBIN is a service run by the ATF, in which a computer
           [FN3]

           looks for matches of FCCs entered into the computerized
____________________________________________

1   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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           system. A match from NIBIN of two or more FCCs would be
           a preliminary indication that the FCCs were fired from the
           same firearm. After a NIBIN match, a trained ballistician
           would examine the actual ballistics to confirm the match.

Trial Ct. Op., 12/1/22, at 2-5 (some formatting altered and citations omitted).

        Following a waiver trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of one

count each of third-degree murder, possession of a firearm by a prohibited

person, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on a public

street or public property in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of

crime (PIC) at Docket No. 521-2020.2 See N.T., Trial, 3/15/22, at 145. At

Docket No. 522-2020, the trial court found Appellant guilty of one count each

of carrying a firearm without a license, possession of a firearm by a prohibited

person, carrying a firearm on a public street or public property in Philadelphia,

and recklessly endangering another person (REAP).3 See id.

        On June 30, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At Docket

No. 521-2020, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of twenty-six and

one-half to fifty-three years’ incarceration.4 At Docket No. 522-2020, the trial

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108, and 907(a),
respectively.

3   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), 6108, and 2705, respectively.

4 At Docket No. 521-2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to consecutive
terms of twenty for forty years of incarceration for third-degree murder, one
to two years of incarceration for carrying a firearm by a prohibited person,
three and one-half to seven years for carrying a firearm without a license, one
to two years of incarceration for carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia,
and one to two years of incarceration for PIC. See N.T., Sentencing, 6/30/22,
at 49-50.

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court imposed an aggregate term of five and one-half to eleven years of

incarceration.5 The trial court ordered the sentence at Docket No. 522-2020

to run consecutive to the sentence at Docket No. 521-2020, resulting in a total

aggregate sentence of thirty-two to sixty-four years of incarceration.         See

N.T., 6/30/22, at 49-50.

       Appellant filed post-sentence motions at both trial court dockets which

the trial court denied. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal at each trial

court docket, and both the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.6

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

       Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to
       an aggregate sentence [of] 32 to 64 years of incarceration
       because the sentencing court did not adequately consider
       appropriate retribution, Appellant’s rehabilitative needs . . . , and
       specific and general deterrence and there were multiple statutory
       maximum sentences for Murder in the Third Degree and VUFA §
       6106 without adequate justification of guideline maximums
       thereby effectively making Appellant’s sentence a life sentence
       also without adequate justification?
____________________________________________

5 At Docket No. 522-2020 , the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of
one to two years of incarceration for carrying a firearm by a prohibited person,
three and one-half to seven years of incarceration for carrying a firearm
without a license, and one to two years of incarceration for REAP. See id. at
50. The trial court also imposed a sentence of one to two years of
incarceration for carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, to run
concurrently with Appellant’s sentence for carrying a firearm without a license.
See id.

6Appellant filed a motion to consolidate the appeals at 2502 EDA 2022 and
2504 EDA 2022 on October 18, 2022, which this Court granted. See Order,
1/3/23.

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Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      “[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such

claims, we must determine:

      (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
      his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
      2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
      allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
      sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
      substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
      sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted). “To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247,

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal”).   Here, Appellant filed a timely post-

sentence motion, a timely appeal, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in

his brief. Accordingly, we must next determine whether Appellant has raised

a substantial question for review. Corley, 31 A.3d at 296.

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d

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1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).      “A substantial question

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d

793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      We note that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (en banc) (citations omitted). Further, this Court has held that

an appellant’s “challenge to the imposition of his consecutive sentences as

unduly excessive, together with his claim that the court failed to consider his

rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors upon fashioning its sentence,

presents a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333,

340 (Pa. Super. 2015).

      In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant argues that the sentence was

manifestly excessive.    Appellant asserts that that the trial court failed to

consider mitigating factors and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, abused its

discretion by imposing consecutive sentences, and imposed “an effective life

sentence.” See Appellant’s Brief at 9-11. We conclude that Appellant has

raised a substantial question for our review. See Swope, 123 A.3d at 340;

Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770.       Accordingly, we will review the merits of

Appellant’s underlying claim.

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      Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).   Additionally, “[w]e cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and

impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court.” Commonwealth

v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

      “When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,

[the] gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and

[the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892

A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted and formatting altered).

      “[T]he trial court is required to consider the particular circumstances of

the offense and the character of the defendant[,]” including the defendant’s

“prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for

rehabilitation.”   Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.

Super. 2009) (citation omitted).       This Court has held that “where the

sentencing judge had the benefit of a [PSI report], it will be presumed that he

or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory

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factors.” Id. (citation omitted). This Court may only disturb a standard-range

sentence if we find that the circumstances of the case rendered the application

of the guidelines “clearly unreasonable[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).

      It is well settled that “Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court

discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other

sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed.”

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation

omitted).   Further, this Court has explained that “defendants convicted of

multiple offenses are not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on their aggregate

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 434 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v.

Felder, 269 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2022).

      Here, at sentencing, the trial court stated as follows:

      Thank you. All right. The first thing I’m going to do is say what
      I’m going to take into account in determining an appropriate
      sentence. I’ll take into account everything presented during the
      history of this case, everything presented during the trial,
      everything presented during the sentencing hearing, all of the
      materials that I received in preparation for sentencing, including
      the [PSI] report, the investigation, the prior record score and the
      mental health evaluation.

      I’ll take into account the statements that I heard today from
      [Appellant], [Appellant’s] father and his two friends who are in the
      courtroom. I’ll take into account the statement that I heard from
      the mother of the decedent in this case. I’ll take into account and
      consider carefully the sentencing guidelines, all of the mitigating
      factors that were highlighted by [Appellant’s counsel] on behalf of
      [Appellant].

      There are statutory factors I’m required to consider. One is the
      need for the protection of the public. I have grave concerns. The

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     problem is that I think [Appellant] summed it up how a typical
     person would react that may explain what happened on the 21st,
     but what happened on the 19th was a drive-by shooting in your
     car. You drove up and fired guns out of a window at a young man
     walking down the street who was shot in the head and killed and
     that I hope is not the typical way that people in the city will react
     to any kind of a threat and that’s never okay no matter what’s
     going on in your neighborhood to react with a drive-by shooting.

     What happened the next day I think was terrible, but nothing like
     what happened two days before that and what happened the next
     two days was terrible because people with ordinary sensibilities
     even after they’re threatened don’t fire off a gun down the street
     when it is a commercial corridor, whereas I have seen in my
     practice here you have people waiting at a bus stop or people
     crossing the street or a three-year-old in a carriage who winds up
     getting killed because someone thinks it’s okay to go out into the
     street and fire off their gun like you’re in the wild west at
     somebody whose car is down the road. That’s not how people can
     react in a civilized society, so because you think that’s okay, I
     have concerns for the protection of the public.

     Also, the gravity of the offense in relation to its impact by the
     victim and the community, I’ll start with the community. This kind
     of senseless use of guns -- I’m not talking about carrying a gun
     that’s unlicensed. That’s bad. All right. I’m talking about using
     a gun, pulling it out and shooting at somebody, that is the kind of
     thing that has had a horrible impact on our community and you
     contributed to that with your behavior on two different days in this
     case, also, its impact on the gravity of the offense, its impact on
     the victim and the family.

     This is a special young man who’s gone. He’s gone forever.
     Whatever happened to you, he doesn’t get another day on this
     earth and that’s a result of what you did in this case, and that’s
     just a terrible -- I’m also going to take into account your
     rehabilitative needs. There are some aggravating factors that I
     think are present in this case.

     This is not I think what I would consider to be garden variety third-
     degree murder, a drive-by shooting where a decedent takes a
     bullet in the head. That is the kind of shooting where this is a
     case that had this gone to a jury very well may have proven first-
     degree murder. It did not and I understand that’s not an issue in
     this case. You weren’t convicted of that.

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     I’m just saying ordinarily typical third-degree murder cases we
     don’t see a bullet to the back of somebody’s head. Whether you
     fired it or not, you were part of the team of people who pulled up
     in your car and fired bullets out -- you fired more than they did.
     You fired three times, he shot once, that’s an aggravating factor
     as well.

     Also, you did this while you were on probation for robbery
     adjudication while you were under the supervision of the court.
     You still thought it was okay to walk around with a gun with an 18
     round magazine and pull it out and use it. That’s an aggravating
     factor to me, the fact that you were on probation.

     There are mitigating factors here, too. I was moved by the
     support you have which I believe was sincere from your father
     who I think is a victim here almost as much as – not as much, but
     almost as much as a lot of the other people in this room because
     he has suffered and will suffer as a result of your behavior. Okay.
     But when he tells me it’s situational, as I said before, I’ll say it
     again: A drive-by shooting is never situational. It just doesn’t
     apply here. I’m going to take that into account and consider
     whatever is appropriate. . . .

     Every sentence I’m going to impose is in the standard range of
     the sentencing guidelines starting with the transcript for
     November 19, 2019 -- before I forget, I’m going to order
     restitution in the amount of $1,641 to be paid in accordance -- I
     should say to the victims outlined on the paperwork which has
     been handed up. That will be paid in accordance with [Appellant’s]
     ability to pay which will be determined by the Department of
     Corrections and that should be imposed on the murder transcript.

N.T., 6/30/22, at 43-49.

     In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court further explained:

     Here, in fashioning an appropriate sentence, the court explicitly
     considered everything presented throughout the history of the
     case, during the trial and at the sentencing hearing. The court
     also explicitly considered the [PSI] report, the investigation of
     [Appellant’s] prior record score, his mental health evaluation, and
     the sentencing guidelines. The court took into account statements
     from [Appellant], [Appellant’s] father, [Appellant’s] two friends,
     and the victim impact statement from the decedent’s mother. The
     court also considered all of the mitigating evidence that was

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      presented on behalf of [Appellant].       In addition, the court
      reviewed and analyzed the required statutory sentencing factors,
      including the need for the protection of the public, the gravity of
      the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and on the
      community, and [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs. In addition,
      the court delineated and weighed both the mitigating and
      aggravating factors in the case.

      The sentences imposed by the court were manifestly reasonable.
      Contrary to [Appellant’s] averment in the Statement of Errors,
      every sentence imposed by the court was within the standard
      range of the sentencing guidelines. Moreover, the magnitude of
      [Appellant’s] criminal behavior establishes that the court was well
      within its discretion in running most of the sentences
      consecutively. In particular, and as the court noted in imposing
      sentence, this was not a typical third-degree murder case.
      [Appellant] participated in a drive-by shooting and fired multiple
      gunshots at the decedent, one of which killed the decedent by
      striking the back of his head. Moreover, [Appellant] participated
      in this murder while on probation for a robbery adjudication.
      Additionally, two days following the murder, after being fired upon
      by a group of individuals in a vehicle, [Appellant] chased the
      vehicle down the street of a commercial corridor and fired multiple
      gunshots down a busy public street, endangering many lives.
      Accordingly, the record demonstrates that the court’s aggregate
      sentence was fully commensurate with [Appellant’s] criminal
      conduct and in no way unreasonable. Finally, [Appellant’s]
      contention that the court’s sentence was “effectively . . . a life
      sentence” is frivolous.     [Appellant] was 21 years old when
      sentenced, and therefore will be eligible for parole when he is 53
      years old. Clearly, that is not a de facto life sentence. No relief
      is due.

Trial Ct. Op., at 6-8 (formatting altered and footnotes and citations omitted).

      After review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See

Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. The record reflects that the trial court thoroughly

considered the facts of this case, Appellant’s background, the PSI report, the

appropriate sentencing factors, and the mitigating evidence presented at the

sentencing hearing.    See Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1135.          The trial court

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concluded that an aggregate sentence of thirty-two to sixty-four years of

incarceration was appropriate in light of the context of this drive-by murder

case. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8. On this record, we have no basis upon which

to conclude that the trial court’s application of the guidelines was “clearly

unreasonable” or that the trial court abused its discretion in structuring

Appellant’s sentences consecutively.7 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2); Foust,

180 A.3d at 434; Austin, 66 A.3d at 808. For these reasons, Appellant is not

entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

7 As noted above, due to the consecutive nature of the sentences, Appellant
claims that the trial court imposed an effective life sentence. Appellant’s Brief
at 10. We find this claim meritless. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley,
237 A.3d 1131, 1140-41 (Pa. Super. 2020) (explaining that a defendant who
was forty-seven years old at the time of sentencing and who would be eligible
for parole at age sixty-four, fourteen years before he reaches the average life
expectancy of seventy-eight and one-half years, did not receive a de facto life
sentence). Here, Appellant asserts that his life expectancy is seventy-one and
three-fourths years. Appellant’s Brief at 10. However, as the trial court
explained, Appellant will be fifty-three years old when he becomes eligible for
parole, see Trial Ct. Op., at 8, and therefore, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that Appellant did not receive a de facto life sentence. See id.;
Bradley, 237 A.3d 1140-41. Moreover, to the extent that Appellant briefly
mentions that the trial court should have considered his maximum release
date rather than his minimum parole date, see Appellant’s Brief at 14,
Appellant fails to develop this argument in any meaningful way, and we
conclude that the issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985
A.2d 915, 924-25 (Pa. 2009) (stating that “where an appellate brief fails to
provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority[,] or fails
to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that
claim is waived. It is not the obligation of this Court, . . . to formulate [an
a]ppellant’s arguments for him.” (citations omitted)).

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/2023

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