Court Opinion

ID: 9370715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 17:08:31.025619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:23.315572
License: Public Domain

J-A25021-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 FRANKLIN RAY MARTIN, JR.                :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :   No. 138 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 18, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001664-2015

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                      FILED: February 14, 2023

      Appellant Franklin Ray Martin, Jr. appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of rape and related offenses.

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding

proposed impeachment evidence. Following our review, we affirm.

      A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant facts and procedural

history of this case as follows:

      The victim in this case, M.K., was thirteen years old when the
      sexual abuse by Appellant began. M.K.’s mother, Amanda Martin,
      testified that she started dating Appellant in 2011 or 2012, and
      [Appellant] moved into her residence sometime in 2012. The two
      married on July 27, 2013. M.K. informed the jury that the abuse
      started shortly after Appellant moved in. One day, Appellant
      asked for a backrub while Ms. Martin was at work. Afterwards,
      Appellant asked her to touch his penis. When she refused,
      Appellant grabbed her hand and put it on [Appellant’s] penis. She
      ran to her bedroom and locked the door. About a month later,
      Appellant again asked her to touch his penis. When M.K. again
      refused, Appellant forced her to kneel and perform oral sex on
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     him. Similar incidents with Appellant continued over the next two
     years, escalating to forcible vaginal penetration.      Appellant
     threatened to kill [M.K.] or her family if she told. The abuse
     continued unabated until approximately March of 2015, when she
     told Appellant that he had to stop as she had a boyfriend.

     Around this same time, M.K. attempted to run away from home
     on at least two occasions. On March 12, 2015, Ms. Martin called
     the police to report M.K.’s absence. Sergeant Paul Manke of the
     New Kensington Police Department responded to the residence.
     Ms. Martin told him that M.K. had tried to run away about two
     weeks before, and suggested that she was headed to her
     boyfriend’s house. Sergeant Manke located M.K. and transported
     her back home.

     Ms. Martin testified that she asked M.K. what was going on, and
     M.K. showed her a series of text messages, sent by Appellant,
     indicating sexual contact. Ms. Martin told M.K. to leave, as
     Appellant would be home from work later that evening. Once
     Appellant arrived, Ms. Martin confronted him and asked, “have
     you been messing around with [M.K.]?” [N.T. Trial, 8/2/16, at
     171]. Appellant reacted angrily, prompting Ms. Martin to take
     [Appellant’s] cell phone. Ms. Martin called Sergeant Manke back,
     and [Sergeant Manke] referred the matter to detectives for further
     investigation.

     M.K. provided her cell phone to Detective Thomas Klawinski, and
     it was searched for text messages.          The Commonwealth
     introduced a set of text messages, dated March 12, 2015, between
     M.K. and a number listed as “dad.” Detective Klawinski read the
     contents of those messages to the jury:

       M.K.: What did you whisper in my ear last night?

       Dad: What? Don’t call. I hate talking on the phone plus
       everyone is sleeping.

       Dad: I said you gotta make up your mind. I can’t keep doing
       this. One day we are good, the next we ain’t.

       Dad: Um, hello?

       M.K.: What is that supposed to mean?

       Dad: The day before yesterday you were playing and all up
       on me, then yesterday you didn’t even want a hug before
       bed. I’m very confused.

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           M.K.: Well, I said I’m done. I have a BF. I don’t wanna do
           it anymore.

           Dad: So then, don’t tease me. No more touching, tickling,
           holding hands, poking, groping, nothing!

           M.K.: I never did and you do the same. Shit.

           Dad: You were pushing your ass on me in the kitchen, pokin’
           my ass and grabbin’ for my cawk. Don’t do that no more.

           M.K.: No I wasn’t. Don’t come onto me either.

           Dad: Fine. We are done. I’m finished with it, too. It was
           fun but I don’t need you no more.

           M.K.: You never needed me to begin with.

           Dad: If it makes you feel better then keep telling yourself
           that. You were the only thing keeping me home for a long
           time. You were the reason I smiled in the mornings and
           slept good at night.

           You were my sunshine and now you make me feel dirty and
           sick. I hope you heard me say I love you this morning. You
           won’t hear it [sic] again.

        Id. at 192-94.

        Detective Klawinski did not execute any search warrants on
        Appellant’s phone. On cross-examination, the detective admitted
        that the designation “dad” meant only that M.K.’s phone gave the
        corresponding phone number that label. The detective conceded
        that the authorities did not link that phone number to Appellant.

           Q. So I could have – I could take a cell phone and I can put
           [in my name] Ken Noga[1] and when I get a text message in
           from that particular number that I saved with it, it will show
           Ken Noga, correct?

           A. That’s correct.

           Q. Is there anything about that information that tells you
           who owns that number or whose number that is?

____________________________________________

1   Ken Noga was Appellant’s trial counsel.

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        A. There is a phone number.           There is a phone number
        attached to dad.

        Q. So did you get that phone number?

        A. No, I did not. It was – the investigator would have
        probably talked to the girl who said, yeah, that’s dad’s
        number or that’s the number I know my dad uses as the
        phone so I did not.

                                  *      *    *

        Q. Now, in the course of your investigation, and you extract
        this data from the phone even though it says dad, there’s a
        cell phone number associated with it, correct?

        A. That’s correct.

        Q. You never checked who that cell phone number was listed
        with, correct?

        A. That’s correct, I did not.

     Id. at 196-98.

     The remaining direct evidence against Appellant was Ms. Martin’s
     testimony that the two were “a little touchy-feely, sitting very
     close on the couch at different times,” which led her to remark
     that “they acted more like they were married than him and I did.”
     Id. at 166-67. Additionally, the Commonwealth presented the
     testimony of two jailhouse informants, who indicated that
     Appellant made incriminating comments while incarcerated.

Commonwealth v. Martin, No. 1345 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 6191098, at *1-

2 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 28, 2018) (Martin I) (unpublished mem.) (footnote

omitted).

     On August 4, 2016, the jury convicted Appellant of four counts of

aggravated indecent assault, three counts of involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse (IDSI), two counts of rape/forcible compulsion, and one count

each of statutory sexual assault, sexual assault, endangering the welfare of

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children (EWOC), corruption of minors, and unlawful contact with a minor.2

On January 27, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

sentence of twenty-five to fifty years’ incarceration.            Sentencing Order,

1/27/17. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on February 1, 2017, and

following several continuances, filed a supplemental motion on July 17, 2017.

The trial court denied these motions on August 20, 2017.

       Appellant filed a timely3 notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant argued

that   the   evidence      was    insufficient   to   support   his   conviction,   the

Commonwealth committed a discovery violation regarding a jailhouse

informant who testified at trial, and that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying Appellant’s request to admit impeachment evidence against M.K.

Martin I, 2018 WL 6191098, at *2-3.               On January 10, 2019, this Court

vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded Appellant’s case for further

proceedings. Id. at *17. Specifically, this Court ordered the trial court to

conduct an in camera evidentiary hearing concerning the admissibility of

Appellant’s proposed impeachment evidence against M.K. consistent with

____________________________________________

218 Pa.C.S. §§ 3125(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(8); 3123(a)(1), (a)(2),
and (a)(7); 3121(a)(1), and (a)(2); 3122.1(b); 3124.1; 4304(a)(1);
6301(a)(1)(ii); and 6318(a)(1), respectively.

3 The prior panel of this Court noted that the trial court denied Appellant’s
post-sentence motion after the 150-day time period provided for in
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b) had expired. See Martin I, 2018 WL 6191098, at
*2 n.2. However, the prior panel concluded that this was a breakdown in the
trial court’s operations and declined to quash the appeal as untimely. See id.

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Appellant’s   constitutional   right   of   confrontation   guaranteed   by   the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id.

      After several continuances, the trial court conducted an in camera

evidentiary hearing on July 13, 2020. During the hearing, M.K. testified that

Appellant was her stepfather. N.T. Evidentiary Hr’g, 7/13/20, at 5. M.K. was

asked about a separate criminal case in which she had accused her cousin

Steffon Kilgore (Kilgore) of sexually abusing her. Id. M.K. stated that on one

occasion, Appellant told her that he would testify on Kilgore’s behalf. Id. at

5. However, M.K. stated that Appellant told her this only once, and she never

believed Appellant. Id. at 7-8. M.K. further testified that Appellant also said

that he would testify against Kilgore. Id. at 6. When Appellant testified at

the in camera evidentiary hearing, he stated that M.K. had lied about Kilgore

and that M.K. had to “fix this stuff,” or Appellant would inform the

Commonwealth that M.K. was lying about Kilgore. Id. at 24.

      On January 18, 2022, the trial court filed an opinion and order

concluding that Appellant’s proposed testimony was inadmissible because its

probative value was outweighed by the danger of prejudice, and reinstating

Appellant’s judgment of sentence.       Trial Ct. Op. & Order, 1/18/22, at 22.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a timely court-ordered Rule

1925(b) statement.     The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) statement on

March 18, 2022, which adopted the reasoning of its January 18, 2022 opinion

and order.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for review:

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      1. Did the sentencing court abuse [its] discretion in twice denying
         [Appellant’s] attempts to admit impeachment evidence of
         [M.K.] falsely accusing another of similar crimes and
         [Appellant] testifying on behalf of that accused person?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      Appellant argues that the trial court denied him due process when it

denied his requests to introduce evidence to impeach the credibility of M.K.

Id. at 9-14. Appellant asserts that at the evidentiary hearing on remand, M.K.

testified that Appellant told her that he intended to testify against her in a

separate criminal matter where M.K. was the complainant and Kilgore was the

defendant. Id. at 9-11. Appellant further argues that he should have been

able to present evidence indicating that M.K. told Appellant that she had

falsely accused Kilgore to establish that she was lying about Appellant sexually

abusing her.    Id. at 13.    Appellant contends that the admission of this

impeachment evidence could have swayed the minds of the jury and that its

omission denied his right to a fair trial. Id. at 14.

      In reviewing a challenge to the admissibility of evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

      Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the
      sound discretion of the trial court and we will not reverse a trial
      court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an
      abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
      merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
      misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
      manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
      partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. If in reaching a
      conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies the law,
      discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court
      to correct the error.

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Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 78 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Woeber, 174 A.3d 1096, 1103 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (stating that “[t]he trial judge’s exercise of judgment in setting

[the] limits [of cross-examination] will not be reversed in the absence of a

clear abuse of that discretion, or an error of law” (citation omitted)).

      This Court has explained:

      Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence; evidence
      that is not relevant is not admissible. Commonwealth v. Cook,
      952 A.2d 594, 612 (Pa. 2008); Pa.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant
      if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends
      to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a
      reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.
      Our Rules of Evidence provide the test for relevance: evidence is
      relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
      probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact
      is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401.
      Further, “the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
      value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
      unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
      delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
      evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.

      Under Rule 607, “the credibility of a witness may be impeached
      by any evidence relevant to that issue.” Pa.R.E. 607(b). The
      Comment to Rule 607 further emphasizes that any evidence
      offered to impeach the credibility of a witness must be relevant
      under the Rule 401 relevancy test. In addition, Rule 608 provides
      that “a witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by
      testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character
      for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Pa.R.E. 608(a). However,
      “the character of a witness for truthfulness may not be attacked
      or supported by cross-examination or extrinsic evidence
      concerning specific instances of a witness’s conduct.” Pa.R.E.
      608(b)(1).

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Commonwealth v. Leap, 222 A.3d 386, 390-91 (Pa. Super. 2019) (some

citations omitted and formatting altered).

      Further, the Woeber Court explained that

      the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to
      confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses in order to ensure
      a fair and reliable trial. Cross-examination may be employed to
      test a witness’ story, to impeach credibility, and to establish a
      witness’s motive for testifying. A trial court has discretion to
      determine both the scope and the permissible limits of cross-
      examination. . . . It is certainly within the scope of cross-
      examination to ask the witness if she ever made a statement
      inconsistent with her testimony in court.

Woeber, 174 A.3d at 1103 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

      As this Court noted in Martin I:

      The [United States Supreme Court] has cautioned, however, that
      the defendant’s right of confrontation is not absolute.

         It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause
         of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from
         imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the
         potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary,
         trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation
         Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such
         cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
         things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the
         witness’ safety or interrogation that is repetitive or only
         marginally relevant.

Martin I, 2018 WL 6191098, at *12 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. 673, 679 (1986)); see also Commonwealth v. Rogers, 250 A.3d 1209,

1216 (Pa. 2021) (explaining that “[a]t the same time, the confrontation right

is not absolute. It guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination,

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not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever

extent, the defense might wish” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

     Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

     [T]he Superior Court noted that the United States Supreme Court
     has cautioned that the defendant’s right of confrontation is not
     absolute . . . .

                                  *     *      *

     Based on the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing,
     approximately two months before anyone was charged with any
     crime arising out of an alleged child sexual abuse, [Appellant]
     made a vague remark that he would testify in the Kilgore trial if
     M.K. said anything about the ongoing sexual relationship between
     [Appellant] and her.

     M.K. testified at the evidentiary hearing that, more than two years
     prior to the charges being filed against [Appellant], [Appellant]
     had said something to her, the exact nature of which, appears to
     be unclear and which, in any event, she didn’t believe, and which
     he never mentioned to her again, despite the passage of those
     years and even up to the time of the trial of the Kilgore matter.
     It is difficult to conceive how this vague, indistinct, and possibly
     misunderstood remark by [Appellant] is probative, but clearly, any
     probative value pales in comparison to the prejudice in such
     testimony in a case of child sexual abuse, such as the instant case.

     The [c]ourt notes that M.K.’s recollection of [Appellant’s] remark
     to her regarding her revelation of the ongoing abuse by
     [Appellant] was somewhat vague and contradictory. At one point,
     M.K stated, “[Appellant] told me he was going to testify on
     [Kilgore’s] behalf, but never really mentioned about what he
     was going to say.” [N.T. Evidentiary Hr’g, 7/13/20, at 5].
     (Emphasis added). At another point, when asked again by the
     Commonwealth what [Appellant] said, M.K. testified “[Appellant]
     was going to testify against [Kilgore] if I ever said anything
     about me and [Appellant].” [Id. at 5] (Emphasis added). That
     M.K. did not have a clear understanding about [Appellant’s]
     proposed Kilgore testimony is apparent. That the whole matter
     was somewhat vague is equally apparent.

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        [Weighed] against the probative value of this vague and
        somewhat contradictory testimony by the child victim, is the
        possibility, if not probability, of the possible inference against that
        victim that a jury might take, simply because the victim had
        accused two persons of sexual abuse. Moreover, once this subject
        begins to be explored, it is certainly conceivable that the jury
        might speculate about collateral matters.            By any analysis,
        whatever slight probative value this evidence might have on the
        question of the child’s motive or bias is clearly outweighed by the
        potential for prejudice presented by such evidence.

Trial Ct. Op. & Order at 19, 21-22 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

        Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court acted

within its sound discretion in that its determinations are supported by the

record.      See LeClair, 236 A.3d at 78; Woeber, 174 A.3d at 1103.

Additionally, the record reflects that the trial court found M.K.’s testimony

from the in camera evidentiary hearing to be credible and Appellant’s to be

incredible. See Trial Ct. Op. & Order at 16-18; see also Commonwealth v.

Page, 59 A.3d 1118, 1130 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that “[a] determination

of     credibility   lies   solely   within   the   province   of   the   factfinder.”);

Commonwealth v. Darush, 389 A.2d 1156, 1159 (Pa. Super. 1978) (holding

that, absent an abuse of discretion, the trier’s determination of credibility will

not be disturbed on appeal when supported by the record). Further, according

to M.K.’s testimony during the in camera evidentiary hearing, Appellant made

vague and contradictory statements to M.K. about whether he would testify

on Kilgore’s behalf or against Kilgore. See N.T. Evidentiary Hr’g, 7/13/20, at

5-6.      Significantly, the trial court noted that upon cross-examination,

Appellant testified that he never told the police that M.K. threatened him even

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after he was arrested on the charges in the instant matter and that he never

told them that she threatened to bring false charges against him. Id at 18.

      Further, we agree with the trial court’s analysis in that our Court has

concluded that the United States Supreme Court has “cautioned that the

defendant’s right of confrontation is not absolute[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 19 (citing

Martin I, 2018 WL 6191098, at *12 (some citations omitted)). Accordingly,

we conclude that the probative value of Appellant’s proposed impeachment

testimony did not outweigh the danger of undue prejudice and confusion that

such testimony could evoke in the minds of the jury. See Leap, 222 A.3d at

390-91. Therefore, the trial court did not violate Appellant’s Sixth Amendment

right of confrontation by precluding the subject impeachment cross-

examination of M.K.

      For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err nor abuse

its discretion by precluding Appellant’s proposed impeachment evidence. See

id.; see also LeClair, 236 A.3d at 78; Woeber, 174 A.3d at 1103.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2023

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