Court Opinion

ID: 9698426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:50:07.100216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:40.897453
License: Public Domain

*112FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
Although I agree with Mr. Justice Papadakos that there is a presumption of concurrent jurisdiction in state courts over actions arising under a federal statute, I disagree with his conclusion that concurrent jurisdiction does not apply in this case. The presumption of concurrent jurisdiction may be rebutted by
unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2875, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). The mere fact that legislative history, which is at best an ambiguous guide, mentions only the initiation of actions in federal court is hardly an “unmistakable implication ” from legislative history that PMPA actions may not be initiated in state courts.
Further, there is no incompatibility between state and federal interests caused by concurrent jurisdiction. It is true that state courts in different jurisdictions may interpret the statute differently, but then that is also true of district and circuit courts in the federal system. Presumably, the states will be guided by the federal courts in interpreting the statute, and if there is a conflict between the circuits, that may be resolved by the United States Supreme Court. In any event, I do not agree that the prospect of disagreement among the states is any more of an impediment to implementation of federal interests than is the prospect of disagreement among the federal circuits.
Additionally, the only provision of the act which mentions where suits may be initiated is § 2805, as follows:
If a franchisor fails to comply with the requirements of section 102 or 103, the franchisee may maintain a civil action against such franchisor. Such action may be brought, without regard to the amount in controversy, in the district court of the United States in any judicial district in which the principal place of business of such *113franchisor is located or in which such franchisee is doing business____
15 U.S.C. § 2805(a). (Emphasis added.) The majority observes that this language is included in the statute because in 1978, when it was drafted, there was a $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement which § 2805 eliminates. The majority then concludes that such a waiver would not have been necessary if the action were permitted in state courts as well. Quite to the contrary, the language was necessary because without it, only some actions — those exceeding $10,000 — would be able to be brought in federal court. All other actions, those under $10,000, would have to be brought in state court.
In sum, none of the arguments advanced by the majority is more than a possibility, and more than that is required to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. I therefore dissent and would permit the action to proceed in Pennsylvania courts.
NIX, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.