Court Opinion

ID: 9702264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:04:06.377321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:35.928896
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I would dissent to that portion of the Majority Opinion holding that the police’s use of binoculars to view the *360appellant’s marijuana plants growing out of his greenhouse was violative of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against intrusion into one’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
The Majority recounts how the police officer initially spied the plants as he drove past the appellant’s residence, on routine patrol, and observed their growth without the aid of any artificial enhancement to his vision to make the sighting.
One must not forget that the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect people and not places. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). With the preceding in mind, my reading of the U.S. Constitution and cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment is not as restrictive as the Majority’s so as to proscribe the use of binoculars to peer into one’s home, especially when the glass enclosing the greenhouse invited the prying eye of anyone, including the police, to view its contents.
Like an undrawn curtain, the clear pane of glass enclosing the greenhouse prohibited no one from seeing what occurred inside. The fact that one had to use artificial means to secure a confirmation of what the officer at first believed to be a controlled substance growing out of the roof of the greenhouse does not brand the conduct “intrusive”. Therefore, I cannot endorse a finding by the Majority that the appellant had a “reasonable” expectation of privacy of the contents of his greenhouse.
If such were the case, then in no instance where the police used, e.g., an infra-red camera to video tape the conduct of criminals carried out under the cover of darkness would be admissible in a court of law. I do not believe the Fourth Amendment was intended to preclude the use of information obtained with artificial means (i.e., binoculars, infra-red cameras etc.), for what anyone does for all to see is not a matter which invokes the shield of the Fourth Amendment.
It would be as if an individual viewed the commission of a crime, be it through a telescope, and the law, under the *361Majority’s reading of the Constitution, would insulate the guilty party from prosecution because the information/evidence was tainted by its securement by artificial means. This would truly stretch the fibers of the parchment upon which the Constitution is written in giving refuge to those not entitled to the mantle of protection afforded by such a document.
Further, I cannot join in the Majority’s conclusion that the probable cause section of the search warrant was defective.
My reading of the warrant discloses its compliance with the “totality of circumstances” test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Accordingly, I would find the document passes constitutional muster.
Lastly, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that the appellant was not prejudiced when he was not permitted to cross-examine his co-defendant or present character witnesses who would testify to his truth and veracity. Both denials are unpardonable and require rectification in the form of a new trial.
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent in part.