Court Opinion

ID: 9487689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:23:56.744644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:26.053802
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in this court’s affirmance of the district court. However, I write separately because I believe the district court correctly found Agent Alvarado’s stop of the Thunderbird was founded upon reasonable suspicion. I would affirm that finding for the reasons that follow.
This court correctly notes that we must employ a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to determine whether the stop was based on reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585-86, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, we consider whether the articulated facts in aggregate support the stop. See id. at 9, 109 S.Ct. at 1586. Even if each fact, viewed separately, “is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct,” the facts considered as a whole may nonetheless “amount to reasonable suspicion.” Id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (noting that “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself ... taken together warranted further investigation”). Therefore, in employing the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, we do not “pigeonhole each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious.” United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1484 (10th Cir.1994). Rather, we consider whether the individual facts in aggregate yield reasonable suspicion. Id.
In the instant case, the government articulates three facts in support of the stop: 1) Defendant displayed unusual interest in the van and border patrol vehicle; (2) the Thunderbird' bore out-of-state license plates; and (3) Agent Alvarado did not recognize the Thunderbird as a local vehicle.
Purporting to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, this court individually discredits each fact articulated by the government, and ignores the sum of the three. Indeed, this court simply “pigeonhole[s] each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious,” id., in contravention of the totality-of-the-eircum-stances analysis. I conclude that each fact supports the stop and, in aggregate, yields reasonable suspicion.
First, this court acknowledges Defendant’s interest in the van supported the stop. This court characterizes the support as “slight,” however, reasoning that Defendant’s interest in the van “is at least equally consistent with the reaction that might be expected from one whose car had broken down and who was hoping for some assistance.” Op. at 909. This reasoning is purely hypothetical, however, and discounts the ability of a trained law enforcement officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585-86 (law enforcement officers entitled to make “common-sense conclusions about human behavior”) (quoting U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)); Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d at *9131484 (“Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged law enforcement officers’ prerogative to perceive and articulate meaning in actions that, to the untrained observer, appear innocuous.”) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 & n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 n. 2, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)). Based on his experience as a law enforcement officer and his on-the-scene observations, Agent Alvarado determined that Defendant’s above-average interest in the van was suspicious. Under Sokolow, Agent Alvarado was entitled to draw such a conclusion, and I believe his on-the-scene determination provides much support for the stop.
Next, this court concludes the fact that the Thunderbird bore out-of-state plates “adds little to the reasonable suspicion equation.” Op. at 909. Further, this court dismisses out-of-hand the fact that Agent Alvarado did not recognize the Thunderbird as a local vehicle. To dismiss both facts, this court subsumes them into one fact saying they “are actually two different formulations of the same fact_” Op. at 910. As a result, this court considers only the Thunderbird’s out-of-state license plates, which appears rather benign standing alone. This analysis misapplies the totality-of-the-circumstances test.
When both facts are considered together, it is clear Agent Alvarado was properly suspicious of the facts that the Thunderbird bore out-of-state plates and that he did not recognize the Thunderbird as a local vehicle. These two facts, considered together with Defendant’s interest in the van, support the stop. See United States v. Leyba, 627 F.2d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir.) (“That the vehicle bore out-of-state plates ... is ... entitled to some limited consideration because agent Martinez did not recognize the vehicle as local traffic from the area.”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 406, 66 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980).
In sum, this court purports to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test. However, in doing so the court gives too little weight to each fact and no weight to the sum of the three. See Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d at 1487 (considering facts in isolation “ignores the Supreme Court’s direction to examine ‘the whole picture’ ”). When all three articulated facts are considered together, as they must be under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, and viewed in the light most favorable to the government, they provide ample support for Agent Alvarado’s decision to stop the Thunderbird. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885, 95 S.Ct. at 2582 (driver’s behavior and aspects of vehicle are factors that may justify reasonable suspicion). Thus, I believe the district court did not err in concluding Agent Alvarado based his decision to stop the Thunderbird upon reasonable suspicion. I would affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the Thunderbird. I would therefore not reach the harmless error analysis. I concur in the result.