Court Opinion

ID: 9955154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 19:02:16.90507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:17.740625
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/27/24 In re M.S. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

In re M.S. et al., Persons                                B326996
Coming Under the Juvenile                                 (Los Angeles County
Court Law.                                                Super. Ct. No. 22LJJP00421)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

T.F.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge Pro Tempore. Reversed in
part and affirmed in part.

                                                    1
      Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       ____________________________
      T.F. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and
disposition orders concerning the dependency of two of her
children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b) and (j),1 contending substantial evidence
supports neither the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings on
substance abuse and physical abuse counts nor its dispositional
orders. We agree only as to jurisdiction based on Mother’s
physical abuse. In all other respects, we affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
A.    Prior Dependency Proceedings
      Four prior section 300 petitions concerning four of Mother’s
other children were sustained in 2007 and 2009.
      In January 2007, a section 300 petition concerning sibling
T.F. was sustained based on gang activity at Mother’s residence
and her “mental and emotional problems, including a diagnosis of
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,” and based on her
failure to take prescribed psychotropic medication.
      In 2009, a section 300 petition was sustained concerning
sibling T.S. based on domestic violence between Mother and her
male companion and based on Mother’s substance abuse history.
Reunification services were bypassed.

      1 Unless indicated otherwise, statutory references are to

the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                2
      Also in 2009, a petition was sustained regarding sibling
D.F. after the child was born with a positive toxicology screen for
methamphetamines. Neither parent was granted reunification
services, and their parental rights were terminated.
      A 2009 petition regarding sibling H.F. was also sustained
based on Mother’s substance abuse, which included current abuse
of methamphetamine and opiates, her drug use while pregnant,
and positive toxicology screen for methamphetamines and opiates
at H.F.’s birth. In January 2012, the court terminated parental
rights.
B.    Present Proceedings
      The family currently comprises Mother, her six- and eight-
year-old sons, M.S. and M.F., M.S.’s father David S. (Father), and
M.F.’s father, Carl C. Neither father is party to this appeal.
      On August 8, 2022, a concerned party performing a
wellness check reported that Mother was under the influence of
an intoxicant and did not know where her children were.
      M.S. reported that Mother “whoops him with a black belt
on his bottom,” and one time, about a year prior, hit him with a
“shoe on the face” because she was angry that he had gone
outside without permission. He reported that it hurt but he did
not cry and did not receive any marks from the shoe.
      V.B., a maternal aunt who was raising a child removed
from Mother due to her methamphetamine use, reported that
M.S. once told her that Father punched him in the stomach for
dropping his phone about one year prior, and also that Mother
gave him “whoopings” and he did not want to go back home.
      M.F. reported that Mother spanked him twice with a belt,
but could not remember when.

                                3
      Father, who lived out of the area, reported that the
children would live with him for weeks at a time. Father denied
the corporal punishment allegations, and denied that Mother
currently used drugs or was unable to care for the children. After
the initial interview with the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS or the department), M.S. went to live with
Father.
      Mother admitted to lightly spanking the children on prior
occasions with an open hand on the buttocks area two or three
times but denied using a belt, leaving marks or bruises on the
children, or hitting M.S. with a shoe.
      V.B., the maternal aunt, reported that she had asked
Mother to enter into drug rehabilitation, but Mother was in
denial. She stated, “Based on past behavior in the month of
August, [Mother] seemed to be under a narcotic. Her behavior
was not normal that day. I have seen her on two occasions where
I could tell she is under the influence of drugs.” V.B. reported
that the last time she had contact with Mother, her “eyes were
dilated and she didn’t look like herself. She didn’t know where
the children were. . . . Her behavior was off.”
      Mother at first denied but later admitted having a drug
history, and admitted to currently smoking marijuana outside
the children’s presence. She also admitted to taking Norco,
which was not prescribed and which she purchased on the street,
for migraines, but denied taking any other drugs. Mother
admitted the children were not enrolled in school.
      DCFS reported Mother was not taking her sons to their
doctor appointments; her sons had asthma; and Mother had said
she used one Albuterol inhaler for herself and both children.

                                4
DCFS also reported the children’s immunizations were not up to
date, preventing them from enrolling in school.
      On September 9, Mother tested positive for high levels of
amphetamine (1535 ng/ml), methamphetamine (5520 ng/ml),
benzoylecgonine (>5000 ng/ml) and marijuana metabolite (126
ng/ml). Mother denied using anything but marijuana, but said
that Norco she purchased on the street might contain the other
substances without her knowledge.
      Two weeks later, on September 22, 2022, DCFS obtained a
protective custody warrant but could not serve it because Mother
refused to come to the door or answer her phone.
      DCFS filed a section 300 petition, alleging, as amended and
ultimately sustained, in counts (a)-1, (b)-3, and (j)-3 that Mother
physically abused M.S. by striking his face with a shoe, and in
counts (b)-1 and (j)-1 that Mother was a current abuser of
amphetamine, methamphetamine, Norco, hydrocodone and
marijuana, which rendered her incapable of caring for or
supervising the children and put them at substantial risk of
serious physical harm.
      M.S. was detained with Father, but the location of M.F.
was at first unknown. Although Mother reported he was with
Carl C., she purported not to know where Carl C. lived. M.F. was
ultimately placed with a maternal aunt.
      At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on January 17, 2023,
the court credited M.S.’s account of Mother throwing a shoe at
him and found that she failed to adequately address her
substance abuse issues.
      The court declared the children dependents and found
there were no reasonable means to protect them without removal
from Mother’s custody. It placed M.S. with Father and M.F. with
the maternal aunt. The court ordered reunification services for

                                 5
Mother and ordered monitored visitation for at least nine hours a
week.
      Mother appeals.
      After Mother filed her notice of appeal, the juvenile court
terminated dependency jurisdiction concerning M.S. and issued a
custody exit order awarding Father sole physical custody,
ordering that Mother have monitored visits nine hours per week,
monitored by an agreed upon monitor or a professional monitor
paid for by Mother. Mother appealed that decision. Regarding
M.F., the court ordered that Mother be provided additional family
reunification services and set a section 366.21, subdivision (f)
review hearing for January 17, 2024.2
                              DISCUSSION
A.    Jurisdictional Findings
      Mother contends no substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s true finding on the substance abuse and physical
abuse counts, and therefore the jurisdictional finding should be
reversed. We agree as to the substance abuse counts but
disagree as to the physical abuse counts.
      1.     Pertinent Law
      Subdivision (b)(1) of section 300 authorizes dependency
jurisdiction, in part, when (1) a child is at a substantial risk of
suffering serious physical harm or illness, (2) as a result of, (3) a
parent’s “inability . . . to provide regular care for the child due to
the parent’s . . . substance abuse.” A juvenile court may take
jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) only if there

      2 Neither of these developments moots the current appeal.

(See In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436 [issue not moot if
the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent
proceedings].)

                                  6
is a present risk of the child suffering serious physical harm or
illness in the future. (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377,
388; § 300, subd. (b).)
       “Substance abuse” means, “essentially, the excessive use of
drugs or alcohol.” (In re N.R. (Dec. 14, 2023, S274943) __ Cal.5th
2, 16, 42.) “[F]or dependency jurisdiction to exist due to
substance abuse pursuant to section 300(b)(1)(D), this abuse
must render a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care
for a child and either cause the child to suffer serious physical
harm or illness or place the child at substantial risk of suffering
such harm or illness.” (Id. at p. 2.)
       Subdivision (a) of section 300 authorizes dependency
jurisdiction when a child has suffered serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally by a parent.
       A parent has a right to reasonably discipline by punishing
a child. “Whether a parent’s use of discipline on a particular
occasion falls within (or instead exceeds) the scope of this
parental right to discipline turns on three considerations: (1)
whether the parent’s conduct is genuinely disciplinary; (2)
whether the punishment is ‘necessar[ary]’ (that is, whether the
discipline was ‘warranted by the circumstances’); and (3)
‘whether the amount of punishment was reasonable or
excessive.’ ” (In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 641.)
       A current risk of harm can be shown by evidence of past
conduct if there is a reason to believe the conduct will recur. (In
re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1394.)
       Subdivision (j) of section 300 authorizes dependency
jurisdiction when the child’s sibling has been abused or
neglected, as defined in subdivision (a) or (b), and there is a
substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected.

                                 7
       We review jurisdictional and dispositional orders for
substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘In
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.
[Citations.] ‘ “[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that
a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is
appropriate].” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       2.    Application
       Here, Mother had a history of sobriety and relapse. Ten
years after losing parental rights over two of her children due to
substance abuse, Mother appeared to V.B. to be under the
influence of an intoxicant, tested positive for drugs, admitted to
using marijuana, and was twice unable to disclose the location of
M.S. or M.F. or both. She denied using hard drugs and
attempted to blame the positive test on impurities in a street
drug she had purchased.
       The court could reasonably conclude from this evidence—
indeed from the positive drug test alone—that Mother was
currently abusing drugs.

                                 8
      The court could also reasonably conclude Mother’s drug
abuse endangered the children, because V.B. reported that on a
day in August 2022, Mother appeared to be intoxicated and did
not know where the children were. That Mother did not know
where the children were when she was apparently intoxicated
reasonably supports a nexus between her drug abuse and a risk
to the children. That Mother has failed to resolve longstanding
drug abuse issues which caused her to lose custody of two prior
children is of great concern with respect to her ability to care for
M.S. and M.F.
      However, no substantial evidence supported the allegations
that Mother’s physical abuse of M.S. endangered either child.
Although M.S. reported that Mother hit him in the face with a
shoe when he went outside without permission, and striking a
young child in the face with a shoe in response to his going
outside without permission is neither “disciplinary” nor
“warranted by the circumstances” nor “reasonable” (see In re
D.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 641), this isolated incident
occurred more than a year before the petition was filed, and no
evidence suggested it would reoccur (see In re A.L. (2017) 18
Cal.App.5th 1044).
B.    Disposition Orders
      Mother contends DCFS failed to properly state its
reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the children from her
home, and the juvenile court consequently erred by failing to
consider reasonable alternatives or to make explicit findings
regarding removal. She argues her visits should be unmonitored.
      1.       Applicable Law
      A juvenile court “may make any and all reasonable orders
for the . . . custody” of a dependent child. (§ 362, subd. (a).)

                                 9
       “[O]ur dependency system is premised on the notion that
keeping children with their parents while proceedings are
pending, whenever safely possible, serves not only to protect
parents’ rights but also children’s and society’s best interests.”
(In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530.) Removal “ ‘is a
last resort, to be considered only when the child would be in
danger if allowed to reside with the parent.’ ” (In re Dakota J.
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 619, 629.)
       Thus, the court may order that the child be removed from
the physical custody of a parent only if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger to
the physical health, safety, protection, or emotional well-being of
the child if he or she were returned to the parent, and reasonable
means exist to protect the child without removal. (§ 361, subd.
(c).) “ ‘The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not
have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The
focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.’ ” (In re A.S.
(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237 247.) In determining risk of harm, a
court may consider the parent’s past conduct as well as present
circumstances. (Ibid.)
       “Clear and convincing” evidence must be “so clear as to
leave no substantial doubt,” and “sufficiently strong to command
the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” (In re Angelia
P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919.) The difference between the two
burdens of proof may result in a reviewing court affirming a
jurisdictional order but reversing the dispositional order
removing the child from the home. (In re Haley T. (2012) 212
Cal.App.4th 139, 148.)
       If DCFS recommends removal of a child from the home, the
social study must include “A discussion of the reasonable efforts

                                 10
made to prevent or eliminate removal . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).)
       If a juvenile court orders a child removed pursuant to
section 361, “The court shall make a determination as to whether
reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need
for removal of the minor from his or her home”; and: “The court
shall state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is
based.” (§ 361, subd. (e).)
       If a child is removed from a parent, visitation between the
two must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-
being of the child. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “No visitation order
shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
       2.     Application
       Mother argues there was no substantial evidence of danger
to the children should they be retained in her care, nor evidence
that no reasonable alternatives to removal existed. We disagree.
       Here, there was evidence that Mother lost track of her
children at least once while intoxicated, and it was uncontested
that she later tested positive for high levels of
methamphetamine, amphetamine, benzoylecgonine, and
marijuana metabolites. Within two weeks of this positive test,
Mother concealed the children’s location from DCFS and law
enforcement, and when DCFS filed the instant petition, she
purported not to know where M.F. was.
       During it all, Mother denied using any drug except
marijuana and an illegal street drug, claiming the other drugs
were possible contaminants from the street drug.
       These facts, along with Mother’s troubling drug and
dependency history, including her pattern of relapse and denial,
were discussed at length in DCFS’s reports and by the juvenile

                                  11
court at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. They constituted
substantial evidence that no reasonable means existed to keep
the children safe in her unmonitored care.
      Mother argues that the alternative of “strict supervision,”
which she defines as including regular unannounced visits by
DCFS, would reasonably ensure the children’s safety. We agree
that strict supervision is required but disagree that the juvenile
court was obligated to find regular unannounced DCFS visits to
be strict enough. DCFS cannot be the arbiter of Mother’s drug
use—only she can. The department’s presence on the scene
during unannounced visits would leave the children at risk
during all the time DCFS could not be present. The court
reasonably concluded that the children could be adequately
protected only in the context of monitored visitation.
                           DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s orders are reversed as to the
jurisdictional findings based on counts (a)-1, (b)-3, and (j)-3 but
otherwise affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                                  CHANEY, J.

      We concur:

                   ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

                   WEINGART, J.

                                 12