Court Opinion

ID: 9579062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:51:08.733228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:15.191124
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment reversing the trial court, but for reasons different than those relied upon by the majority.
It has long been established that “suits respecting the person or estate of a [prisoner] must be instituted in the name of his [or her] committee.” Merchant’s Adm’r v. Shry, 116 Va. 437, 448, 82 S.E. 106, 110 (1914). The present committee statutes, Code § 53.1-221 et seq., “are an outgrowth of an earlier statute designed to alleviate the consequences of the common law rule which permitted one convicted of a felony to be sued but not to appear in court to defend his case.” Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1972). The committee statutes were intended inter alia to provide a mechanism for the prisoner to have a personal representative present in court acting on his or her behalf. To that end, Code § 53.1-223 unambiguously states that “[n]o action or suit on any claim or demand shall be instituted against a prisoner after judgment of conviction and while he is incarcerated, except through his committee.” Although a prisoner may waive the appointment of a committee, Dunn v. Terry, 216 Va. 234, 239, 217 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1975), if the prisoner does not waive the appointment, the requirements of Code § 53.1-223 are mandatory. See Shry, 116 Va. at 448, 82 S.E. at 110; see also Scott v. Nance, 202 Va. 355, 357, 117 S.E.2d 279, 280 (1960).
I believe that the majority’s conclusion that Code § 53.1-223 did not require the appointment of a committee for Ruffin is based upon a misinterpretation of a discussion concerning a “claim or demand” found in a footnote in Stamie E. Lyttle Co. v. County of Hanover, 231 Va. 21, 341 S.E.2d 174 (1986). The Supreme Court in Lyttle Co. concluded that the ordinary dictionary definitions of “claim” and “demand” did not encompass settlement offers. Id. at 26, 341 S.E.2d at 178. The Court, however, framed its references to the definitions to be “inter alia’’'’ and in so doing implicitly recognized that its references were not the exclusive definitions of those words. Id. at 26 n.4, 341 S.E.2d at 178 n.4. Nowhere in that footnote or in Lyttle Co. is it stated, as the majority state in this appeal, that whenever “claim” and “demand” appear in a statute *497their meanings are to be limited to “a call for payment of an amount alleged to be due.”
On the contrary, Lyttle Co. states that “[a] ‘claim’ is defined as, inter alia, ‘an authoritative or challenging request,’ ‘a demand of a right or supposed right,’ or ‘a calling on another for something due or supposed to be due.’ ” Id. Nothing in that definition or in the definition of “demand,” see id., limits either term to a suit for money or tangible property. It should be noted that in Lyttle Co. the Supreme Court “narrowly construed” the words “claim” and “demand” only to give effect to the public policy which “favors the compromise and settlement of disputes without litigation.” Id. at 26, 341 S.E.2d at 178. No such policy suggests that the coverage of the committee statute should be narrowed. Code § 53.1-223 contains an explicit restriction that “[n]o action or suit on any claim or demand shall be instituted against a prisoner . . . except through his [or her] committee.” (emphasis added).
The filing of an information in the circuit court to require “the person named therein, to show cause why he [or she] should not be barred from driving a motor vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth,” Code § 46.2-354, is an “action or suit on . . . [a] claim or demand.” Code § 53.1-223. Thus, the action was required to be instituted against Ruffin “through his committee.” Id. Unlike the prisoner in Dunn, Ruffin did not engage his own attorney to defend him in the habitual offender action and was not “represented by counsel of his own choosing.” Dunn, 216 Va. at 238, 217 S.E.2d at 853. Barker was appointed by the trial court to act as Ruffin’s guardian ad litem pursuant to Code § 8.01-9. Barker did not act as Ruffin’s legal counsel and his actions in the trial court cannot be deemed a waiver by Ruffin of his right to the appointment of a committee pursuant to Code § 53.1-221 et seq.
I concur with the majority that Barker’s conduct as guardian ad litem did not adequately represent Ruffin’s interest. Although I agree with the majority that Barker’s inaction was sufficient to cause a reversal of the decision, I believe that the failure to sue Ruffin through a committee was fatal.