Court Opinion

ID: 9528705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:16.118394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:13.982394
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, specially concurring: While I agree that summary judgment was not proper in this case, I fear some of the language of the opinion may be too broadly interpreted to conform to what I perceive as the permissible use of evidence of specific acts of negligence in conjunction with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. I therefore write this concurring opinion. The opinion of the court states that our appellate court has consistently permitted a plaintiff to introduce evidence of specific acts of negligence without depriving him of his right to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where such evidence does not conclusively establish the cause of injury. The opinion cites Collgood, Inc. v. Sands Drug Co. (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 910, 916. The Collgood opinion, however, does not use the word “conclusively” but instead requires the plaintiff to “unequivocally” prove the instrumentality which caused the injury before he would be precluded from relying on res ipsa loquitur. I am bothered by the use of the words “conclusively” and “unequivocally.” They do not convey an understanding of any accepted standard of proof and are of little help in guiding a trial judge in determining when the jury should be given a res ipsa loquitur instruction. In Turner v. Wallace (1966), 71 Ill. App. 2d 160, the court held that it is not the function of res ipsa loquitur, where the evidence discloses a physical cause of the injury, to permit an inference of some other unknown source or fault as constituting negligence. The court stated that a res ipsa loquitur instruction is to be used only where the evidence failed to reveal the actual specific sources which produced the injury. Freer v. Rowden (1969), 108 Ill. App. 2d 335, reached the same conclusion. We do not know at this time what evidence will be introduced in the trial court. If when the case is tried the plaintiff calls his expert witness, Dr. Fox, who testifies that in his opinion plaintiff’s injuries were the result of the forcing of the bone “plug” against the spinal cord after the disc was removed, I would hold that the plaintiff would be bound by this testimony of his witness and any inference of negligence on the part of the defendant hospital would have to be consistent with this evidence as to the specific cause of the injury. The jury should not be permitted to speculate that the plaintiff’s injuries did not result from this cause but possibly were caused by the plaintiff falling off the hospital cart or by some other negligent act by the hospital. However, inferences that the hospital failed to properly monitor the plaintiff’s condition following surgery, or failed to take proper corrective measures or to notify the surgeon once it became apparent that plaintiff was not properly responding, could be drawn as being consistent with the testimony of Dr. Fox, provided the proper bases for applying res ipsa loquitur under these conditions are established. If, however, the plaintiff does not call Dr. Fox as a witness, but relies on the general inference of negligence and the defendant produces the testimony of Dr. Fox, then the general inference of negligence must be weighed by the jury against the testimony of Dr. Fox and the other evidence offered by the defendant. Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 446, 449. Professor Prosser summarizes my position, which I view as more restrictive than the position stated in the opinion of the court: “Plaintiff is of course bound by his own evidence-, but proof of some specific facts does not necessarily exclude inferences of others. When the plaintiff shows that the railway car in which he was a passenger was derailed, there is an inference that the defendant has somehow been negligent. When he goes further and shows that the derailment was caused by an open switch, he destroys any inference of other causes; but the inference that the defendant has not used proper care, in looking after its switches is not destroyed, but considerably strengthened. If he goes further still and shows that the switch was left open by a drunken switchman on duty there is nothing left to infer; and if he shows that the switch was thrown by an escaped convict with a grudge against the railroad, he has proved himself out of court. It is only in this sense that when the facts are known there is no inference, and res ipsa loquitur simply vanishes from the case. On the basis of such reasoning as this, it is quite generally agreed that the introduction of some evidence which tends to show specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant, but which does not purport to furnish a full and complete explanation of the occurrence does not destroy the inferences which are consistent with the evidence, and so does not deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of res ipsa loquitur.” (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Prosser, Torts sec. 40, at 232 (4th ed. 1971). The italicized material, in my opinion, requires a court to hold that the plaintiff is bound by the evidence of specific acts which he produces. However, if the evidence does not purport to furnish a complete explanation of the occurrence, inferences of negligence consistent with the evidence of specific facts established by the evidence are permissible. I feel that this limitation must be placed upon the use of the res ipsa loquitur principle in order to have any meaningful factual determination and in order to prevent pure speculation and conjecture. MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this special concurrence.