Court Opinion

ID: 9439226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:25:58.51313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:14.144446
License: Public Domain

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In 1993, as part of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub.L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) ("Brady Act"), Congress empowered the Attorney General to "establish a national instant criminal background check system" ("NICS") for determining whether purchasers of firearms from federal licensees are lawfully entitled to make such purchases. Id. § 103(b), 107 Stat. at 1541. Under the authorizing statute, with respect to legal transfers of firearms, the "system" initiated by the Attorney General is to "(A) assign a unique identification number to the transfer; (B) provide the licensee with the number; and (C) destroy all records of the system with respect to the call (other than the identifying number and the date the number was assigned) and all records of the system relating to the person or the transfer." 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(2) (1994). In purported reliance on the statutory provision, the Attorney General has promul-gathd regulations which require the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to *139maintain an automated audit log of all incoming and outgoing transactions passing through the system including records of the “type of transaction ..line number, time, date of inquiry, header, message key, ORI [originating agency identification number], and inquiry/response data (including the name and other identifying information about the prospective transferee and the NTN [NICS transaction number] ),” inter alia. 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(1) (1999). In the case of lawful transfers, the regulations require the FBI to.retain such records in the audit log for six months after the date of each such transfer. See id. The National Rifle Association, the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, and various John and Jane Does (collectively “the NRA”) sued to enjoin the operation of these regulations. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General. Because the Attorney General in the promulgation of these regulations has not only exceeded the authority granted her under the cited section of the statute, but has also violated express prohibitions of other statutory sections, I would reverse.
I. Statutory Authorization
The Attorney General’s authority to deal with the subject matter of preclearance of handgun purchasers depends entirely upon congressional grant. She does not and cannot claim any inherent power over the subject matter from constitutional or other sources. Therefore, unless the Brady Act empowers her to do what she has done, the regulations are invalid. Cf. American Petroleum. Inst. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119-20 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“API”); Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. National Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 670-71 (D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc). The statute is unambiguously limited in the extent of the grant of authority to the Attorney General, and authority to be delegated to the NICS over transfers to citizens lawfully entitled to receive firearms. That authority is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(2) which, as expressed above, requires that the NICS “shall ... assign a unique identification number ... [;] provide the licensee with the number; and ... destroy all records of the system with respect to the call .(other than [the assigned number and the date])” along with “all records of the system relating to the person- or the transfer.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(2) (emphasis added). Nothing in the Brady Act empowers the Attorney General to do more than these three things with respect to lawful transfers of firearms: (1) assign, (2) provide, and (3) destroy. When she, or the system to which she has delegated the authority, adds to those three by retaining instead of destroying, she and the system exceed the statutory grant of authority. The regulation requiring the reténtion in the “audit log” is such an excess; it is unlawful; and it should be enjoined.
The Attorney General’s claimed authority for her unlawful accretion of power to the FBI and the NICS in the regulation is her “responsibility for .administering the National Instant Criminal Background Check system.” Br. for Appellee at 11. This reliance on general authority to administer an area of statutory regulation cannot sustain a federal • actor’s reaching beyond eongressionally granted authority. We have repeatedly, held that federal agencies cannot seize additional powers by substituting their own determination of the appropriate means for accomplishing statutory goals in place of that determined by the Congress.
For example, in API, the Environmental Protection Agency had been empowered by Congress to promulgate regulations for reformulated gasoline for use, in “nonat-tainment areas.” See 52 F.3d at 1115 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(l) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The empowering statute provided that the regulations were to “require the greatest reduction in emissions of ozone forming volatile organic compounds ..., taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reductions, *140any nonair-quality and other air-quality related health and environmental impacts and energy requirements.” 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(l). The EPA included in its regulations the-mandate for the inclusion of “renewable oxygenates” in the reformulated gasoline. As justification for this additional assertion of regulatory authority EPA asserted its duty to achieve other goals under the Clean Air Act. We struck down the challenged regulations, holding that the broad general grant of authority did not “authorize EPA to mandate the manner of compliance or the precise formula for compliance without additional explicit authority.” API, 52 F.3d at 1121. Just so here. Congress has explicitly authorized the Attorney General to regulate the activities of citizens in a certain fashion. Her general authority to administer the statutory programs created by the Brady Act do not empower her to take on additional powers over citizens not delegated to her by the legislature.
Also, in Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180 (D.C.Cir.1997), we considered the claimed authority of the Secretary of the Department, of Transportation -to delegate certain responsibilities under the Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960, 46 U.S.C. § 9301 et seq.,. to the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. By statute, the Secretary was empowered to “delegate the duties and powers conferred by [the relevant] subtitle to any officer, employee, or member of the Coast Guard.... ” 46 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1994). That statute did not empower the Secretary to delegate such duties and powers to anyone outside the Coast Guard. The Secretary relied upon a general delegation grant in 49 U.S.C. § 322(b) to assert the authority to delegate that power to any officer or employee of the department. Once more, we held that general statutory goals and grants cannot “override the limiting language” of a statute specifically empowering a federal agency to act. Halverson, 129 F.3d at 186, 187. Again, in the present controversy, we have before us a statute conferring specific powers upon a cabinet officer (the Attorney General), and an agency (the NICS) under that officer. General goals cannot add limitless power to the limited power delegated by Congress.
The Attorney General attempts to bolster her claim of power beyond the statutory grant by a repair to the analytical framework of Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Under the familiar rubric of that decision, when we review an agency’s interpretation of a statute entrusted to the agency's administration, we undertake a two step analysis. We first “determine whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue.” Halverson, 129 F.3d at 184 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1125 (D.C.Cir.1995) (applying Chevron)). If so “that interpretation must be given effect.” Id. If not, that is, “[i]f ... the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, then the court will defer to a 'permissible agency construction of the statute.” Id. The Attorney General contends that, under the second step of Chevron, we should uphold her assertion of the power to establish and retain records on lawful conduct of citizens where the words of the statute do not grant that power on the theory that her interpretation of the statute is a permissible one, that is to say a reasonable one. In fact, however, we should not even reach the second stage of Chevron. The absence of a grant of statutory power is not an ambiguity or silence on the question of whether Congress has granted such a power. We have disposed of that line of argument repeatedly in the past. As we stated in Railway Labor Executives’Association:
To suggest, as the [government actor] effectively does, that Chevron step two is implicated any time a statute does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative power (i.e. when the statute is not written in ‘thou shall not’ terms), is both flatly unfaithful to *141the principles of administrative law ... and refuted by precedent.... Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron and quite likely with the Constitution as well.
29 F.3d at 671 (citations omitted); see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, 983 F.2d 259, 266 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“[I]t is only legislative intent to delegate such authority that entitles an agency to advance its own statutory construction for review under the deferential second prong of Chevron.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Kansas City v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 191-92 (D.C.Cir.1991)); API, 52 F.3d at 1120.1
The statute is not ambiguous on whether it grants the Attorney General the power to retain the records which the statute empowers her to destroy. The statute simply does not grant her that power. Indeed, the denial of power is even stronger than that considered in the cited cases. Those statutes did not include “thou shall not” provisions. The Brady Act does. In the cases discussed above, the federal agency was seizing power not granted by Congress. Here, the Attorney General is not only making such an unauthorized power grab, but is taking action expressly forbidden by Congress.
II. “Thou Shall Not”
The Brady Act contains an express provision headed “Prohibition Relating to Establishment of Registration Systems with Respect to Firearms.” Pub.L. No. 103-159, § 103(i), 107 Stat. at 1542. That section provides that
No department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States may—
(1) require that any record or portion thereof generated by the system established under this section be recorded at or transferred to a facility owned, managed, or controlled by the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof....
Id. By its clear words, this statute establishes that Congress has unambiguously told the Attorney General that she shall not do what she is doing in the regulations. That is, she is forbidden to require the FBI, the NICS, or any other department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to require that records generated by the NICS be recorded at or transferred to any facility. There is no exception for an audit log, and there is no exception for a six-month grace period. Congress has simply forbidden her to do it. She is doing it anyway. The regulation must fall. There is no ambiguity calling for the invocation of Chevron.
The Attorney General argues that “[w]ithout an audit log, the FBI would simply be incapable of achieving the level of oversight deemed essential by the Attorney General.” Br. for Appellee at 17. I fail to see the relevance of that argument. Congress, not the Attorney General, makes the laws. Congress did not authorize the maintenance of an audit log in violation of its explicit command not to retain records. Neither did it empower the Attorney General to take its place in the making of law any time she deems essential a level of oversight neither required nor permitted by statute.
*142. III. Conclusion
The Attorney General’s ultimate fallback argument is that Congress and the statute could have but did not include the adverb “immediately” before the verb “destroy” when it commanded her to “destroy all records of the system” with respect to the contact in the case of lawful transfers of firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(2). Specifically, she notes that it did not adopt an amendment offered in the House of Representatives to the effect of including that word. I fail to see that this avails her anything. Courts are reluctant “to draw inferences from Congress’ failure to act,” Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306, 108 S.Ct. 1145, 99 L.Ed.2d 316 (1988). In no case has a court held that power has been granted to a federal agency by Congress’s failure to enact a limitation to a directly contradictory statutory command. Congress said, “destroy all records.” Congress said, do not “require that any record ... be recorded.” Brady Act § 103(i), 107 Stat. at 1542. The Attorney General asserts, “Congress did not say that I have to destroy the records immediately. Therefore I am empowered to retain the records.” The Attorney General’s position strikes me as reminiscent of a petulant child pulling her sister’s hair. Her mother tells her, “Don’t pull the baby’s hair.” The child says, “All right, Mama,” but again pulls the infant’s hair. Her defense is, “Mama, you didn’t say I had to stop right now.”
I do not think that the parent’s command to the child is ambiguous, nor that of Congress to the Attorney General. I do not find the child’s response reasonable; nor is that of the Attorney General.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of my colleagues to uphold the Attorney General’s regulations.

. Christensen v. Harris County,- U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000), cited by the majority, is not to the contrary. Indeed, the majority’s analysis turns Christensen on its head. The Supreme Court not only did not decide that legislative silence empowered a federal agency to act, it did quite the opposite. The County, whose ability to control leave time scheduling was in question, appeared before the Court as the regulated entity asserting a limitation on federal power, not as the federal actor asserting a grant of power. See id. at 1659. Because the statute in question was silent or ambiguous on the issue, the regulated entity did not lose an ability that was inherently its own. See id. at 1660-62. That is, the silent or ambiguous statute did not empower the federal actor to do that which was not expressly forbidden to it. Just so here.