Court Opinion

ID: 9628395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:19:00.961089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:41.093956
License: Public Domain

BILLINGS, Judge:
In this divorce action, defendant/appellant, Clifford G. Sorensen (“Dr. Sorensen”) appeals the trial court’s property valuation and distribution, award of attorney fees to Mrs. Sorensen, and the allocation of expert witness fees. We affirm the property distribution and allocation of expert witness fees but reverse the award of attorney fees.
FACTS
The parties were married on April 10, 1975. Mrs. Sorensen was a registered nurse. Dr. Sorensen was a dentist and had practiced in Roy, Utah for approximately six years prior to the marriage. The parties have four children, ages 10, 9, 6, and 3 at the time of trial. There is no dispute as to custody, child support, or alimony.
During the marriage, Dr. Sorensen continued to practice as a dentist in Roy. Mrs. Sorensen returned to school and received her masters degree in nursing and also completed all the necessary courses for a Ph.D. in public health.
At trial, Mrs. Sorensen claimed Dr. Sor-ensen’s dental practice, a professional corporation, was a. marital asset subject to valuation and distribution by the court. Mrs. Sorensen called Dr. Richard Austin as an expert witness. Dr. Austin had been a dentist in Utah for four and one-half years. Dr. Austin also worked for a Denver company that brokered the purchase and sale of dental practices. His brokerage company had appraised and sold approximately 250 dental practices. Dr. Austin had participated in 12 appraisals and 7 sales of dentistry practices. Six of the 7 sales occurred in the Salt Lake City area.
*822Dr. Austin testified that the fair market value of Dr. Sorensen’s dental practice was $100,060 and that dental practices in Utah generally sold for 90 to 95 percent of their appraised value. In connection with his testimony, Dr. Austin presented the trial court his written valuation of Dr. Soren-sen’s dental practice. Dr. Austin’s valuation was based on unaudited information previously provided by Dr. Sorensen through discovery. Dr. Austin’s calculation was the combined value of three components: 1) tangible assets, i.e., furniture and equipment — $15,330, 2) accounts receivable — $22,170,1 and 3) intangible assets or “goodwill” — $62,560, for a total market value of $100,060. Dr. Austin further testified “[i]t is important to realize that this evaluation has been made [according to] the standards that are currently acceptable for this purpose. Existing market trends in the state of Utah for the disposition of dental practices were given consideration.”
To determine the goodwill value, Dr. Austin reviewed the income and expenses of Dr. Sorensen’s practice for a three year period, 1983 through 1985. During this time, Dr. Sorensen averaged $184,000 in gross receipts. Dr. Austin testified that the “goodwill” value of dental practices he had appraised in Utah ranged from 15 to 80 percent of their gross receipts depending on a number of factors. These factors include: the length the practice had been operating, location, number of patients, profitability, currency of accounts receivable, and an evaluation of the transferability of profit to a prospective buyer. Applying the foregoing factors to Dr. Sorensen’s practice, Dr. Austin concluded the goodwill value was 34 percent of the gross receipts for a total of $62,560. Specifically, Dr. Austin testified:
The age of a dental practice plays an important role in determining its value. Dr. Sorensen has been practicing in the community for a number of years and has established a good reputation for family dental care. The number of patients of record and the maintenance of healthy production figures attest to this. Dr. Sorensen’s practice location is on a very highly traveled street and is in an excellent location for visibility and public exposure. Parking is convenient. The office space is adequate and functional. However, updating equipment and leasehold improvements would increase the value of this practice.
The aging of the accounts receivable indicates that the practice has a healthy collection policy and that the receptionist is doing a good job of collecting.
The community of Roy has a healthy, growing economy. The influx of new dentists into the area quickly absorbs patients seeking new dentists.
In response to Dr. Austin’s testimony, Dr. Sorensen called two expert witnesses: Mr. Gerald Deters, his accountant, and Mr. Roger Nuttal, a CPA. Mr. Deters compared the respective income, expenses, and profit of Dr. Sorensen’s dental practice for the years 1974 and 1986, and concluded that since the date of the marriage, Dr. Sorensen’s practice was “a little bit bigger, a little better.” Mr. Deters further testified that goodwill had never been shown as an asset of Dr. Sorensen’s professional corporation.
Dr. Sorensen also called Mr. Roger Nut-tal, who evaluated the Sorensen’s entire financial situation, both business and personal. Mr. Nuttal testified that he believed some goodwill existed, but found Dr. Austin’s calculations “very questionable.” He further testified that Dr. Austin failed to consider $10,129 in accounts payable. Thereafter, relying primarily on Dr. Austin’s calculations less the amount for accounts payable, Mr. Nuttal testified that Dr. Sorensen’s dental practice was worth approximately $87,096.
With reference to the dental practice, the trial court concluded with our emphasis:
[Defendant has continued to practice dentistry in Roy, Utah, during the course of the marriage and has an office with an *823excellent location; has continued to build his clientele; has a good fee collection record and a good reputation in the community.
The Court finds the total value of the practice to be $100,000 including accounts receivable and all equipment with the exception of the computer.
That dental practices usually sell for approximately 90 percent of the appraised value....
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The defendant should be awarded the dental practice including all equipment and accounts receivable the Court feeling that the large portion of the value of the practice has to do with good will and reputation built up in the practice over the years of marriage. The only reasonable way to value said practice is to proportion it based upon the years the parties have been married during the practice. Based on their eleven years of marriage over sixteen years of practice for the purpose of distribution, the Court values the practice at 69 percent of the value as found above for a total of $62,-100.
The trial court then ordered essentially an equal division of the parties’ property crediting $62,100 to Dr. Sorensen for his practice and an equal amount of offsetting property to Mrs. Sorensen.
The trial court also ordered Dr. Sorensen to contribute $2,000 toward Mrs. Soren-sen’s attorney fees. Mrs. Sorensen testified she had incurred fees, but she had no present income to pay those fees. Mrs. Sorensen’s attorney proffered an exhibit reflecting the time spent and the rates charged. Dr. Sorensen’s counsel stipulated that the proffer could be received but expressly refused to stipulate that the fees were reasonable.
The trial court also ordered the parties to bear the expense of their own expert witnesses, with the exception of Allan Heiska-nen, a real estate appraiser, whose fees the parties were ordered to split. The Soren-sens, by pretrial stipulation, agreed to have their real property appraised by Mr. Heis-kanen. The stipulation provided that the expense of the appraiser was to be paid initially by Dr. Sorensen with the ultimate responsibility for payment to be determined by the trial court.
Dr. Sorensen raises three issues on appeal. First, he claims the trial court erred in its valuation of his dental practice by, 1) determining that “goodwill” was a marital asset subject to equitable distribution, 2) including Dr. Sorensen’s accounts receivable in the valuation of the dental practice, and 3) failing to consider accounts payable in its evaluation of the practice. Second, Dr. Sorensen claims the trial court erred in awarding Mrs. Sorensen a portion of her attorney fees. Finally, Dr. Sorensen claims the trial court erred by ordering him to pay a portion of Mr. Heiskanen’s expert witness fee.
I. VALUATION OF DENTAL PRACTICE
In a divorce proceeding, “determining and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial court and this Court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah Ct.App.1987). “In making such orders, the trial court is permitted broad latitude, and its judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so long as it exercises its discretion in accordance with the standards set by this Court.” Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). An appealing party bears the burden of establishing that the trial court violated those standards “or that the trial court’s factual findings upon which the [property] division is grounded are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).” Id. Furthermore, assessing the weight and credibility of expert witness testimony is a matter for the trier of fact. See Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) (“it is within the province of the fact finder to believe those witnesses or evidence it chooses”).

Goodwill

In its property distribution, the trial court credited Dr. Sorensen with $62,100 *824which represents the trial court’s assessment of the total value of Dr. Sorensen’s dental practice. As part of its calculations, the trial court assigned a substantial value to the goodwill of Dr. Sorensen’s professional dental corporation. On appeal, we must first determine whether goodwill is properly considered a marital asset subject to distribution, and if so, whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding as to the goodwill value of Dr. Sorensen’s professional corporation.
In a divorce action, trial courts should distribute marital property and income in order that “the parties may readjust their lives to their new circumstances as well as possible.” Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). “[Mjarital property ‘encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived_’” Id. at 1079 (citation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized:
[Wjhether a resource is subject to distribution does not turn on whether the spouse can presently use or control it, or on whether the resource can be given a present dollar value. The essential criterion is whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during the marriage.
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added).
The question of whether the goodwill of a professional corporation is a marital asset, properly subject to equitable distribution in a divorce action, is one of first impression for this Court,2 although the Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the issue indirectly in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). In Gardner, the trial court awarded Dr. Gardner his retirement account and medical assets without assigning them a present value. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings for a valuation of the medical assets and retirement account. In considering the valuation and distribution of the doctor’s medical assets, the Court stated “[t]he ability of a business to generate income from its continued patronage is commonly referred to as good will. Good will is properly subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.” Id. at 1080 n. 1 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The dissent chastises us for our reliance on the language in Gardner claiming Justice Stewart intended to limit his endorsement of goodwill as a marital asset to multi-membered professional corporations. However, Justice Stewart does not make a distinction as to the “type” of business entity and in fact, in Gardner, the Utah Supreme Court relied on Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983), and In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979), to support its conclusion that the goodwill of a professional corporation is subject to distribution in a divorce proceeding. See Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1080 n. 1. Both decisions involved solely owned or operated professional practices.
The prevailing view among 20 other jurisdictions is that the goodwill of a professional practice or business is a marital asset, subject to valuation, and therefore, should be considered in a divorce proceeding.3 Jurisdictions holding to the contrary *825include Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Texas, and Tennessee.4
The most common legal definition describes “goodwill” as:
[T]he advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.5
In the accounting field, goodwill is referred to generally as " ‘the summation of all the special advantages, not otherwise identifiable, related to a going concern. It includes such items as a good name, capable staff and personnel, high credit standing, reputation for superior products and services, and favorable location.’ ”6
“There can be no doubt that goodwill exists. It is a legally protectable interest.”7 Goodwill has been held to constitute “property” within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment due process clause8 and is subject to being bought and sold.9 Goodwill may be present whether the business form is a sole proprietorship, partnership,10 association, joint venture, or corporation.11
*826The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions considering the issue find that goodwill is a property interest, and as such, it must be considered in divorce proceedings. Whether goodwill exists and has value in a particular case, is a question of fact. Accordingly, we agree with the majority of jurisdictions and the dicta in Gardner v. Gardner, and hold that the goodwill of a professional practice is a marital asset subject to valuation and distribution in the appropriate circumstances.
Judge Jackson, in his dissent, criticizes the approach taken by the Washington and California courts in valuing goodwill before they address whether it exists at all. Judge Jackson adamantly asserts that any approach to valuing goodwill should involve a two-step inquiry: does goodwill exist in this particular entity, and if so, what is its value. Although some courts do go directly to the valuation issue, a conclusion that a value exists implicitly answers the first inquiry in the affirmative. More importantly, however, we think our opinion clearly directs trial courts to engage in the two-part approach.
We concede that there is a split of authority on this issue, but we find those jurisdictions holding to the contrary unpersuasive. Courts that refuse to recognize goodwill as a marital asset base their conclusions, generally, on three grounds. First, opponents contend that goodwill is not an asset separate and apart from the individual practitioner and in this respect, goodwill is analogous to a professional degree.12 Second, they claim that goodwill is indistinguishable from future earning capacity and is valuable to the individual only to the extent that it assures substantial earnings in the future.13 Finally, opponents assert that goodwill is difficult to value, hence it should not be considered in divorce settlements.14 We address each of these arguments separately.
In Holbrook v. Holbrook, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed the view that goodwill does not “bestow on those who have an ownership interest in the business, an actual, separate property interest.” 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (Ct.App.1982). Accordingly, the Wisconsin Court determined that goodwill is more analogous to a professional degree than a property interest. Id.
We disagree with Wisconsin’s rationale. There are significant and distinctive differences between the goodwill of a professional practice and a professional degree.15 Unlike a professional degree, goodwill is traditionally defined as an intangible “property right.”16 It is a separate and distinct asset, not merely a factor contributing to the earning capacity of the practitioner. See In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 178 (1984). The theory underlying goodwill is that an ongoing business has a value beyond mere tangible assets. These intangible assets are independent of the proprietor, and as such, can be sold on an open market. In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1979). In Nichols, the Colorado Court of Appeals stated:
*827While we recognize that professional goodwill is not an asset which has an independent market value, it can, in conjunction with the assets of the practice, be sold. This limited marketability distinguishes professional goodwill from the advanced educational degree, which, because it is personal to its holder and is non-transferable, [is] held not to be property—

Id.

When goodwill exists, it may well be regarded as “the most lucrative asset of some enterprises.”17
It is the property attributes of goodwill that distinguish it from a professional degree, which we have held on prior occasions does not constitute marital property subject to distribution.18
Several courts have found that “[t]he better analogy is to pension rights which are marital property.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987) (and citations therein). Both are property rights acquired during the marriage although their enjoyment and benefits are deferred. Id. Our Supreme Court has stated that marital property encompasses pension funds. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982).
In Woodward, the Court declared with our emphasis:
[Appellant’s] argument fails to recognize that pension or retirement benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the employer. If the rights to those benefits are acquired during the marriage, then the court must at least consider those benefits in making an equitable distribution of the marital assets. ‘The right (emphasis in the original) to receive monies in the future is unquestionably ... an economic resource, subject to equitable distribution based upon proper computation of its present dollar value.’ 19
Similarly, if goodwill can be shown by competent credible evidence to exist at the time of dissolution and that it was acquired or accrued during the marriage, trial courts must “at least consider those benefits in making an equitable distribution of the marital assets.” Id. See also In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58, 68 (1974).
The second major criticism of treating goodwill as a marital asset is that goodwill is indistinguishably tied to personal future earnings. Thus, if the practitioner dies or retires, “nothing remains.”20
We believe to the contrary. We note at the outset, that goodwill is and must be distinguished from a professional practitioner’s future earning capacity, an issue more fully addressed below. A number of jurisdictions have held that goodwill is not, however, per se synonymous with future earning capacity.21
In addition to those jurisdictions, one commentator opined that “[t]here is no val*828id basis for the argument that since goodwill is essentially a measure of future earnings, it cannot properly be treated as a marital asset_” 2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, § 23.05[2] at 23-69 (1988). The commentator further declared that “[i]t is an economic truism that the value of any income-producing asset is its capacity to produce future income. In this regard, goodwill is just like any other asset. Goodwill differs only insofar as, unlike a stock or bond, it will not produce income by itself.” Id.
The argument that goodwill disappears in a case where the practitioner dies or retires is also unpersuasive. The possibility of continued patronage, despite the absence of the selling practitioner, has present value to a prospective buyer of a professional practice. See In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1979). Moreover, the value of goodwill frequently remains notwithstanding the practitioner’s death, resignation, or disability. See In re Marriage of White, 98 Ill.App.3d 380, 53 Ill.Dec. 786, 789, 424 N.E.2d 421, 424 (1981). “If it were otherwise, we are unable to conceive the basis for the popular practice of retaining the names of deceased or withdrawn members in many professional firms long after their death or withdrawal.” Id. The possibility of death or retirement of the practitioner may reduce the value of goodwill, but it does not in all circumstances eliminate its existence. In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 178 (1984).
When a professional retires or dies, his earning capacity also either retires or dies. Nevertheless, the goodwill that once attached to his practice may continue in existence in the form of established patients or clients, referrals, trade name, location and associations which now attach to former partners or buyers of the practice_ [A] professional can transport all of his skill (earning capacity) to a new town, but patients or clients, reputation and referrals (goodwill) cannot always be transported.
Id. If the facts in a particular case demonstrate that there is no goodwill value remaining in the absence of the practitioner, then a trial court may properly declare in its determination of a practice’s worth, that there is no value attributable to goodwill.
The third and most unpersuasive argument is that goodwill is difficult to value, therefore, it should not be considered in the distribution of marital assets. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (Ct.App.1981). This also seems to be the position taken by the dissent.
We concede that in some cases, valuing goodwill is difficult. Even so, if a party’s expert witness cannot adequately demonstrate that goodwill has a present value, then there is simply an evidentiary defect and goodwill should not be considered. However, the mere fact that goodwill may be difficult to value or elusive in nature, does not justify ignoring or disregarding it altogether in the valuation of marital property. In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1316 (1980); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987). As in Mitchell, “[w]e prefer to accept the economic reality that the goodwill of a professional practice has value, and it should be treated as property upon dissolution of the community, regardless of the form of business.” Mitchell, 732 P.2d at 212. We are mindful that not every professional practice necessarily has goodwill. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hall, 692 P.2d at 179. Some courts, however, hold that sole proprietorships per se do not have goodwill because the business’s existence depends exclusively on the professional spouse’s continuing efforts. See, e.g., Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.1972). We are not prepared to rule so broadly. Instead, we emphasize that the issue is one of proof, and not the particular form the business takes. “It would be inequitable to hold that the form of the business enterprise can defeat the community’s interest in the professional goodwill. Such a result ignores the contribution made by the non-professional spouse to the success of the professional....” Mitchell, 732 P.2d at 211.

*829
Valuation of Goodwill

Because we find that the goodwill of Dr. Sorensen’s dental practice was properly considered by the trial court in its property distribution, we next address Dr. Soren-sen’s contention that the trial court erred in the value it ultimately placed on the goodwill of his dental practice.
“It is a difficult task at best to arrive at a value for the intangible component of a professional practice attributable to goodwill.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 214 (1987). The valuation of goodwill is a question of fact and is dependent upon the particular circumstances.22 In order to establish that the goodwill of a divorcing spouse’s professional practice is a marital asset, a party must produce sufficient expert testimony to show that the goodwill constitutes a valued business asset, independent of the continued presence of the professional spouse.23 Trial courts may consider any legitimate valuation method “that measures the present value of goodwill by taking into account past results, and not post-marital efforts of the professional spouse_” Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C.App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266, 271 (1985).
Factors courts have frequently found to affect the value of goodwill include:
[T]he age, health, and professional reputation of the practitioner, the nature of the practice, the length of time the practice has been in existence, its past profits, its comparative professional success, and the value of its other assets.24
Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals observed that the value of goodwill may be shown in a number of ways. “ ‘Elements which may be considered are, length of time the business has been in existence; the nature and character of the business; its success or lack thereof; its average profits; and the probability of its continuance under the same name.’ ” In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729, 557 P.2d 46, 47 (1976) (quoting Levene v. City of Salem, 191 Or. 182, 229 P.2d 255, 263 (1951)). “ ‘Past profits may be established, and the value of the goodwill estimated therefrom as a basis, subject to being reduced by a showing of a depression in trade or other circumstances that would tend to make the business less valuable....’” Id.
Trial courts should make specific findings, first indicating whether goodwill exists under the particular circumstances of the case, and if so, its value. Findings should clearly state the evidence upon which the valuations are based, and preferably, the valuation method or methods on which the court relied. See Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C.App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266, 272 (1985).
We emphasize, however, one factor that clearly should not be considered in the valuation of goodwill is the professional spouse’s future earning capacity. Consistent with our position that professional degrees are not assets capable of distribution, we similarly hold that the future earning capacity of the divorcing professional should not be considered. To consider future earning capacity in the valuation of the professional corporation’s goodwill would have the effect of double counting, as earning capacity is also utilized in determining an appropriate alimony award. See, e.g., Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985).
In this action, Mrs. Sorensen called Dr. Austin, an expert witness emi*830nently qualified to appraise dental practices. Dr. Austin had practiced dentistry in Utah for approximately four and one-half years and worked for a firm which is in the business of appraising and selling dental practices. Dr. Austin’s brokerage firm has been in business over eighteen years and sold more than 250 dental practices. Dr. Austin has personally been involved in 12 appraisals and sold 6 practices in Utah.
Based on financial information supplied by Dr. Sorensen, Dr. Austin determined that the goodwill value of the corporation was $62,560. The procedure employed by Dr. Austin is one commonly used by his brokerage firm, and is also consistent with the methodologies recognized and approved in other jurisdictions previously discussed herein.25 The goodwill figure was derived by considering factors such as a history of the corporation’s earnings, the length of time Dr. Sorensen had been in practice, the number of his patients, the location of the practice, his facilities and equipment, accounts receivable, and an evaluation of the transferability of profits to a prospective buyer.
Dr. Austin further testified that the goodwill value of dental practices in Utah ranged from 15 to 80 percent of their gross receipts. Accordingly, based on an analysis of the factors previously described, Dr. Austin calculated a 34 percent factor for goodwill and then reduced Dr. Sorensen’s average gross receipts by 66 percent. The 34 percent goodwill factor was on the low end of the 15 to 80 percent which he testified had been used by his brokerage corporation to value and sell other Utah dental practices.
To refute Dr. Austin’s valuation, Dr. Sor-ensen called Mr. Deters, his accountant, and Mr. Nuttal, a CPA. Neither witness demonstrated expertise in appraising dental practices, and their testimony was virtually nonresponsive on the issue of a professional corporation’s goodwill. The trial court apparently chose to believe Dr. Austin, and we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). A trial court’s fundamental role in the adversary process is to judge the credibility of witnesses and he or she is free to choose among expert testimony. See Canning v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah Ct.App.1987). See also Lockwood v. Lockwood, 205 Neb. 818, 290 N.W.2d 636, 640 (1980). “[T]his court will give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and accepted one version of facts rather than the opposite.” Id.
Other jurisdictions have upheld a trial court choosing the testimony of one party’s expert over the other’s expert in the context of valuing goodwill. See, e.g., Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich.App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1986); In re Marriage of Hull, 712 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Mont.1986); Wright v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803, 808 (Del.Fam.Ct.1983). In Wright, the Delaware Court indicated that one of the important considerations for its decision to accept one expert’s testimony was that the husband’s expert had never been involved in the sale or liquidation of like practices. 469 A.2d at 808 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Kowalesky, a case involving the valuation of a dental practice, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s valuation, which seemed to favor the plaintiff, was not clearly erroneous. The trial court’s valuation was based on the plaintiff’s expert testimony, and the appellate court noted that plaintiff’s expert was “actively involved in the sale of dental practices and the valuation of those practices.” 384 N.W.2d at 115 (emphasis added). In Kowalesky, the court stated: “[defendant's expert, a certified public accountant who has a number of dentists as clients, did *831not have similar valuation experience [as plaintiff’s expert].” Id.
We find these cases analogous. Dr. Austin has considerable experience in the valuation and sale of dental practices. Conversely, Dr. Sorensen’s experts both candidly admitted that they were not involved in the sale and valuation of dental practices.
Our able colleague in dissent takes a novel approach to the review of expert testimony. He goes even further than rejecting the expert found more credible by the trial court and adopting another. He gives his own “expert” opinion on the valuation of Dr. Sorensen’s professional corporation, ignoring the testimony of all the experts and the findings of the trial judge. We think he simply believes that as a matter of law, the goodwill of any professional association should not be valued and distributed in a divorce action. We believe the overwhelming authority is to the contrary.
Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court’s valuation of the goodwill of Dr. Sorensen’s practice, relying on the testimony of Dr. Austin, was not an abuse of discretion.

Accounts Receivable

Dr. Sorensen claims that the trial court improperly considered accounts receivable in the valuation of his dental practice. We disagree.
Dr. Sorensen relies on Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982). In Dogu, the trial court excluded $25,000 of accounts receivable in its consideration of the value of the defendant’s professional corporation. Finding the trial court had not abused its discretion, the Utah Supreme Court summarily stated “[t]he corporation’s accounts receivable represent deferred income from which respondent may meet his ongoing alimony and child support obligations to appellant.” Id. at 1309.
We are not persuaded that this statement from Dogu stands for the proposition that accounts receivable may never be considered in the valuation of a professional corporation. Dr. Sorensen has not cited additional authority for this proposition, and we note other jurisdiction’s commonly hold that accounts receivable may be considered in the property distribution.26 In fact, the Michigan Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to consider accounts receivable in its valuation of a dental practice. Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich.App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1986).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly considered accounts receivable in its valuation of Dr. Sorensen’s dental practice.

Accounts Payable

Dr. Sorensen claims that Dr. Austin’s valuation, which was apparently adopted by the trial court, failed to consider $10,129 in accounts payable. The record is ambiguous on this point, but even if the full amount of the accounts payable was not considered, we find the error was harmless.
Both parties to this action were awarded approximately $131,000 in marital assets. Property distributions in divorce actions need not be “equal” but rather “equitable.” See generally Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985). “While equality is a worthy goal, precise mathematical equality is not essential or required.” Canning v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah Ct.App.1987). Accordingly, we find that even if the trial court failed to consider the full amount of accounts payable in its calculations, such a mistake was harmless error considering the total property distribution.

*832
Conclusion

Based on Dr. Austin’s testimony, the trial court found that Dr. Sorensen’s practice was worth $100,000 which included tangible assets, accounts receivable, and goodwill. The trial court further found that dental practices sell for approximately 90 percent of their value, hence $90,000 was designated as the total value of the practice. The trial court then discounted this figure to account for the time the parties were married. The trial court found that Dr. Sorensen had been practicing for sixteen years, and the parties had been married for approximately eleven and one-half years. He further concluded the majority of the goodwill value of the practice had been established during the marriage.27 Thus, he reduced or multiplied 11.5/16 or 69 percent by $90,000 to arrive at $62,100, the total value he assigned Dr. Sorensen’s dental practice as a marital asset.
Having concluded, 1) the trial court properly considered accounts receivable and goodwill in its valuation of Dr. Sorensen’s dental practice, and 2) that failing to consider accounts payable in its entirety was harmless error, we find the trial court’s ultimate valuation of Dr. Sorensen’s professional dental corporation is supported by the record, and accordingly, the trial court’s valuation is affirmed.
II. ATTORNEY FEES
In order to recover attorney fees in a divorce action, the moving party must set forth evidence, 1) demonstrating that the award is reasonable, and 2) establishing the financial need of the requesting party compels the award.28 The relevant factors for determining the reasonableness of the request include, the necessity for the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the rates commonly charged for similar services in the community.29
In the instant case, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate Mrs. Sorensen’s financial need. However, counsel for Mrs. Sorensen concedes that no evidence was offered regarding the “reasonableness” of the attorney fees incurred to maintain this action. Instead, Mrs. Sorensen’s attorney proffered an exhibit reflecting only the time spent and the rates charged. Dr. Sorensen’s counsel stipulated that the proffer could be received, but expressly refused to stipulate to the “reasonableness” of the fees. No evidence was presented relating to the reasonableness of the number of hours, the usual hourly rate for divorce cases in the community, nor the overall reasonableness of the fee. See Talley, 739 P.2d at 84. Additionally, the court’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as the decree of divorce, make no reference to the reasonableness of the fees. Accordingly, we find the proffered testimony insufficient to sustain the award of attorney fees, and therefore, we reverse.
III. EXPERT WITNESS FEES
Ordinarily, a trial court cannot require one party to pay the other party’s expert witness fees in excess of the statutory rate.30 Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). See also Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1980). However, in this case the parties agreed by pretrial stipulation to have their real prop*833erty appraised by Mr. Heiskanan. They further agreed that his fee would be paid initially by Dr. Sorensen, with the ultimate responsibility for payment to be determined by the trial court. Stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties unless good cause is demonstrated warranting relief therefrom. Higley v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984). Dr. Soren-sen has not set forth adequate justification to discharge his obligations under the pretrial stipulation. Simply because Dr. Sor-ensen did not agree with the appraiser’s valuation of the parties’ real property, and instead chose to hire additional experts, does not constitute the requisite good cause. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s allocation of the appraiser’s fee.
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the parties’ property, and its allocation of expert witness fees. We reverse the award of attorney fees.
GARFF, J., concurs.

. To arrive at a dollar value attributable to accounts receivable, Dr. Austin excluded all accounts unpaid over 120 days, and discounted the resulting amount by 12 percent to account for uncollectibles.

. In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct.App.1988), Judge Jackson, writing for this Court, found that the appellant confused “goodwill” with "going concern value,” and failed to prove the existence of goodwill by competent evidence. Id. at 956-57.

. See, e.g., Rostel v. Rostel, 622 P.2d 429 (Alaska 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 749 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988) (close corporation — husband and wife sole shareholders); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208 (1987) (partnership); Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987) (professional corporation); In re Marriage of Watts, 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 217 Cal.Rptr. 301 (1985) (professional corporation); In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979) (professional association); Wright v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803 (Del.Fam.Ct.1983) (sole practitioner); In re Marriage of White, 98 Ill.App.3d 380, 53 Ill.Dec. 786, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981) (professional corporation); Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky.Ct.App.1984) (professional corporation); Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich.App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112 (1986) (professional corporation); Roth v. Roth, 406 N.W. 2d 77 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (sole practitioner); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo.1987) (partnership); In re Marriage of Hull, 712 P.2d 1317 (Mont.1986) (professional corporation); *825Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721, 386 N.W.2d 851 (1986) (professional corporation): Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983) (sole practitioner): Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983) (professional corporation); Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C.App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (1985); Jondahl v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.1984) (sole practitioner); In re Marriage of Reiling, 66 Or.App. 284, 673 P.2d 1360 (1983) (sole practitioner); Fait v. Fait, 345 N.W.2d 872 (S.D.1984) (professional association); In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984) (professional corporation).

. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982); Pearce v. Pearce, 482 So.2d 108 (La.Ct.App.1986) (expert testimony failed to prove sole proprietorship had goodwill value); Carter v. Carter, 616 S.W.2d 543 (Mo.Ct.App.1981); Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa.Super. 20, 518 A.2d 545 (1986); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Ct.App.1981); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.1972) (no goodwill in sole proprietorship). But see Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Civ.App.1978) (goodwill of professional corporation is' marital asset). See also, Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985).

. Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional Goodwill or Community Property at Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 Tul.L. Rev. 313, 314 (1981) (quoting J. Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnerships § 99, at 170 (6th ed. 1868)). See also Hanson v. Hanson, . Mitchell v. Mitchell: The Division of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolution, 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 147, 149 (1988); and Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (1966).

. Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1, 4 (1983) (quoting J.M. Smith and K.F. Skousen, Intermediate Accounting 283 (7th ed. standard vol. 1982)).

. Dugan, 457 A.2d at 4.

. McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 F.Supp. 855, 857 (D.Wash.1933) (and citations therein).

. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (1966).

. In Mitchell v. Mitchell, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that there is confusion in this area of the law, partly because the analysis of whether goodwill should be considered an asset often involves the dissolution of a partnership which is sometimes controlled by a partnership agreement, as opposed to the dissolution of a marriage. 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987). The Arizona Court described the dissolution of a marriage as follows:
A professional practice goes automatically to the spouse licensed to practice it. He is not selling out or liquidating, but continuing in business. Effectively, it is the case of the silent partner withdrawing from a going business. And, if such partner is to receive fair compensation for her share, or her enforced retirement, it should be so evaluated.

Id.

Such is the case in Jackson v. Caldwell, authority relied on by Dr. Sorensen for the proposition that goodwill should not be considered marital property subject to distribution in divorce proceedings. See Jackson, 415 P.2d at 670-71.

. See, e.g., Dugan, 457 A.2d at 4; Mitchell, 732 P.2d at 210-11; Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Ky.Ct.App.1984); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 435 (Mo.1987).

. See Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan.App.2d 456, 648 P.2d 218, 223 (1982); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (Ct.App.1981); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex.1972).

. See Powell, 648 P.2d at 223; Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d at 354; Nail, 486 S.W.2d at 764.

. See, e.g., Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d at 354.

. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987); In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1979); Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Ky.Ct.App.1984); Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1, 6 (1983).

. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Nichols, 606 P.2d at 1315. In addition to those authorities holding that goodwill is a marital asset, see note 3, supra, even those jurisdictions holding to the contrary, nonetheless find that good will is a property interest. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218, 222 (1982); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex.1972); Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d 545, 552 (Pa.Super.1986); Pearce v. Pearce 482 So.2d 108, 111 (La.Ct.App.1986). Instead, these cases typically find that the particular facts did not demonstrate that the goodwill had value, and therefore, goodwill per se should not be considered a marital asset. See Powell, 648 P.2d at 222-24; Nail, 486 S.W.2d at 764; Beasley, 518 A.2d at 552; Pearce, 482 So.2d at 111.

. Dugan, 457 A.2d at 5. See also In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729, 557 P.2d 46, 47 (1976).

. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah Ct.App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct.App.1987). In Petersen, we held that an educational degree is not encompassed within the broad views of the concept of "property.”
“It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged.... It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our view it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term.'
737 P.2d at 240 (quoting In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978)).

. Woodward, 656 P.2d at 432 (quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J.Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76, 78 (1981), quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff'd, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981).

. Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218, 223 (1982). See also, Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (Ct.App.1981) (goodwill is valuable only to the extent that it assures continued substantial future earnings).

. See, e.g., Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1, 6 (1983); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58, 67 (1974); In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 178 (1984).

. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640, 647 (1987); Carriker v. Carriker, 151 Ariz. 296, 727 P.2d 349, 350 (Ct.App.1986). Accord Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C.App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266 (1985); In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980).

. See Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721, 386 N.W.2d 851, 858 (1986); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Mo.1987).

. Poore, 331 S.E.2d at 271 (citing Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980)); Accord In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976). See also In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 179 (1984); Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169, 1174 (1983).

. Although not specifically stated by either party, Dr. Austin appeared to use in part a market value methodology to value Dr. Sorensen’s dental practice. A market value approach has been cited with approval in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 180 (1987); and in at least one jurisdiction, is the only acceptable methodology. See Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 435 (Mo.1987). Of the five methodologies, a market value approach often produces the most conservative estimate for goodwill. 2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, § 23.05[2][a] at 23-66 (1988).

. See, e.g., Kopplin v. Kopplin, 74 Or.App. 368, 703 P.2d 251, 253 (1985) (trial court did not err by discounting accounts receivable by 30 percent); In re Marriage of Reiling, 66 Or.App. 284, 673 P.2d 1360, 1365 (1983) (accounts receivable are property to be included in the valuation of a law firm); In re Marriage of Bayer, 687 P.2d 537, 538 (Colo.Ct.App.1984) (accounts receivable represent debts for services already rendered and therefore constitute marital property); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 120 Ariz. 23, 583 P.2d 1343, 1344 (1978) (trial court properly included accounts receivable as a marital asset).

.Although the record does not conclusively establish that the goodwill value of Dr. Soren-sen's practice increased at a constant rate throughout the marriage, there is also no controverting evidence establishing that it did not. In fact, Dr. Sorensen presented very little credible testimony regarding the goodwill value of his corporation. Based on the evidence before the trial court, its method of apportionment was not an abuse of discretion.

. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980); Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah Ct.App.1987).

. Kerr, 610 P.2d at 1384-85; Talley, 739 P.2d at 84.

. Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4(1) (1988), provides that “[e]very witness legally required or in good faith requested to attend ... [trial], is entitled to $14 per day for each day in attendance and 30 cents for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going only."