Court Opinion

ID: 9490111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:33:05.640283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:54.080760
License: Public Domain

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.
TATEL, Circuit Judge:
A jury awarded Carole Kolstad back pay after finding that her employer had violated her rights under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by denying her a promotion because she is a woman. The district court entered judgment against the employer in the amount of the jury award, but denied Kolstad further relief. Because the jury could reasonably find from the evidence that Kolstad’s employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of sex, we hold that the district court properly denied the employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, but that it erred in refusing to instruct the jury on punitive damages. We thus remand the case for trial on Kolstad’s punitive damages claim and for reconsideration of her claims for further equitable relief and attorney’s fees.
I
A Chicago-based professional association, the American Dental Association (ADA) maintains an office in Washington, D.C. to represent its members’ interests before Congress and various federal agencies. In September 1992, Jack O’Donnell, the second-highest ranking employee in ADA’s Washington office, announced his retirement at year’s end. O’Donnell held the dual-titled position of Director of Legislation and Legislative Policy and Director of the Council on Government Affairs and Federal Dental Services. His responsibilities included developing and communicating ADA’s positions on federal legislation and regulations affecting its membership, and managing tri-annual meetings of the Council on Governmental Affairs, a policy-making body composed of ADA members.
Upon learning of O’Donnell’s retirement, appellant Carole Kolstad, then serving as ADA’s Director of Federal Agency Relations, and Tom Spangler, then ADA’s Legislative Counsel, each expressed interest in O’Donnell’s job. A lawyer, Kolstad had handled federal regulatory issues at ADA for four years, consistently receiving “distinguished” performance evaluations from the Director of ADA’s Washington office, a position held in 1992 by Leonard Wheat. Earlier in her career, Kolstad had spent six years in the General Counsel’s office of the Department of Defense, where she drafted proposed legislation, prepared testimony for Congressional hearings, and represented the Department’s interests on Capitol Hill. Also a lawyer, Spangler had worked at ADA for twenty months, focusing on legislative issues facing the organization. He too had received “distinguished” performance evaluations from Wheat. Prior to joining ADA, Spangler had spent five years lobbying Congress on behalf of the National Treasury Employees Union. Kolstad and Spangler each had experience working with O’Donnell, with Spangler principally supporting his lobbying efforts and Kolstad, his management of the Council.
Although Wheat had the authority to name O’Donnell’s replacement, he asked Dr. William Allen, ADA’s Executive Director in Chicago, to make the appointment. After consulting with Wheat, Allen drafted a revised “Position Description Questionnaire” for O’Donnell’s job that incorporated verbatim many of the job responsibilities recorded on the Position Description Questionnaire that had been used to hire Spangler for the Leg*1435islative Counsel position in 1991. In October 1992, three months before O’Donnell’s retirement, Wheat signed a performance evaluation of Spangler that listed as one of Span-gler’s 1993 goals to “provide management and administrative support ... for the Council on Government Affairs,” work that O’Donnell was then performing.
Spangler formally applied for O’Donnell’s position once it was posted in mid-November 1992. After writing Allen that Wheat had refused for several weeks to meet with her to discuss her interest in the position, Kolstad also applied. Following interviews with both Spangler and Kolstad, Wheat recommended Spangler for the job. Allen then offered Spangler the promotion, which he accepted. Informing Kolstad of the decision, Allen explained that she lacked experience with health care reform and was too valuable to ADA in her current position to take on O’Donnell’s job.
After exhausting her administrative remedies before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Kolstad filed suit, charging ADA with unlawful employment discrimination and seeking equitable relief, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l), and damages, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). In her complaint, Kolstad demanded a jury trial on all claims. Prior to opening arguments at trial, Kolstad informed the district court that the parties had agreed to try her claims for equitable relief to the court, with the jury rendering an advisory verdict on back pay pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c). The court agreed to try to the bench Kolstad’s claim for the equitable remedy of instatement, but declined to rule on whether the jury would render an advisory verdict on the back pay claim. Kolstad proceeded to try her case to the jury, introducing evidence to support an award of back pay. At the close of evidence, the district court denied ADA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, but dismissed Kolstad’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages, finding insufficient evidence to support them. With respect to back pay, the court stated, “I am going to put it to the jury and we can leave until after the fact whether it’s advisory or binding.”
Answering two special interrogatories, one on liability and the other on “damages,” the jury found that ADA had unlawfully discriminated against Kolstad on the basis of sex, awarding her $52,718, precisely the amount she sought as back pay. Kolstad then moved for instatement into the position occupied by Spangler and for attorney’s fees. ADA renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law. In a memorandum opinion, the district court denied both motions. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 912 F.Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1996). After concluding that the jury could properly find unlawful discrimination from the evidence, and that the jury’s award of back pay was “conclusive” under Rule 39(c), the court held that Kolstad was not entitled to further equitable relief or attorney’s fees because she had faded to prove “to the Court’s satisfaction” that she was a victim of sex discrimination. Id. at 14 n. 1, 15-16. The court entered judgment against ADA in the amount of the jury award.
On appeal, Kolstad challenges the district court’s refusal to allow the jury to consider an award of punitive damages, as well as the court’s denial of her claims for instatement into the Director’s job and attorney’s fees. ADA cross-appeals the court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law and the court’s ruling that the jury’s verdict was binding.
II
We begin with ADA’s challenge to the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Reviewing the district court’s ruling de novo, we ask whether the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to have reached the challenged verdict. Mackey v. United States, 8 F.3d 826, 829 (D.C.Cir.1993).
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(i) to fail or refuse to hire ... or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex-
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 *1436S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the Supreme Court set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof in Title VII cases alleging discriminatory treatment, as the complaint does in this case. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Where sex discrimination in promotion is alleged, a plaintiff proves her prima facie case by showing that she is female, that she was refused a position for which she applied and was qualified, and that the employer filled the position with a male. See Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 63 (D.C.Cir.1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C.Cir.1981). If established, the prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination that the employer may rebut with evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of persuading the jury of intentional discrimination, which she may satisfy by proving that the defendant’s proffered reasons were pretexts for unlawful discrimination. Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C.Cir.1995), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 805, 133 L.Ed.2d 752, cert. dismissed, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1037, 134 L.Ed.2d 113 (1996); see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-805, 93 S.Ct. at 1824-26.
As in the district court, ADA concedes that Kolstad “met the paper qualifications for the vacancy,” Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Br. at 37, and that the jury could have reasonably found that, despite her qualifications, “Kolstad never was in the running” for the Director’s job because Executive Director Allen had decided, before the vacancy was posted,that Spangler was the best candidate to replace 0’Donnell.Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Reply Br. at 10. ADA argues, however, that even assuming Spangler’s preselection for the position, no reasonable jury could have concluded that Kolstad was a victim of sex discrimination because the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Kolstad’s rejection. We disagree.
An employer’s preselection of a job candidate, in violation of its own procedures requiring fair consideration of qualified applicants, is “undeniably relevant to the question of discriminatory intent,” Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 709 (D.C.Cir.1984), and “operates to discredit the employer’s proffered explanation for its employment decision,” Goostree v. State of Tenn., 796 F.2d 854, 861 (6th Cir.1986); see also Krodel, 748 F.2d at 709 (improper selection procedures relevant to determination that employer’s nondiserim-inatory explanation unworthy of belief). Here, evidence that Allen “eut-and-paste” Spangler’s job responsibilities into the Position Description Questionnaire for O’Donnell’s position, that Office Director Wheat agreed that Spangler’s goals for 1993 included performing portions of O’Donnell’s job, and that Spangler began meeting extensively with O’Donnell as soon as his retirement was announced permitted the jury to conclude that ADA had selected Spangler to succeed O’Donnell before the posting of the position in November 1992. From evidence that Allen did not review Kolstad’s performance evaluations or resume, failed to interview Kolstad for the position, and gave Kolstad a different explanation for her rejection than the one subsequently offered by ADA, the jury could also have reasonably found that ADA’s claimed nondiscriminatory reasons for choosing Spangler over Kolstad — that Kol-stad lacked recent legislative experience and strong writing skills — were after-the-fact rationalizations unworthy of belief.
We have held that a jury’s “rejection of the employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons, while not sufficient to compel a finding of discrimination, nonetheless suffices to permit such a finding.” Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1277; see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749-50, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). As the Supreme Court has observed, “ ‘no additional proof of discrimination is required.’ ” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir.1992)). Thus, “a plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case and introduce evidence sufficient to discredit the defendant’s proffered nondiserimi-natory reasons; at that point, the fact finder, if so persuaded, may infer discrimination.” *1437Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1277. Because Kolstad introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude both that she had proven a prima facie case of discrimination and that ADA’s proffered reasons were pretextual, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Kolstad proved intentional sex discrimination.
As in Barbour, while we need not speculate about the jury’s reasoning, it could have inferred that Kolstad’s sex — and not her qualifications — motivated ADA’s actions. That inference could reasonably flow from Kolstad’s prima facie case and the evidence of Spangler’s preselection, as well as from Kolstad’s testimony, contested but not incredible, that Wheat ignored her efforts to discuss the promotion, denied her other career-enhancing opportunities, told sexually offensive jokes at staff meetings, and referred to several professional women as “bitches” or “battleaxes.” Although Wheat did not formally appoint O’Donnell’s successor, he had the authority to do so, recommending to Allen that Spangler and not Kol-stad get the job. Consistent with our eases and the evidence at trial, the district court properly denied ADA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Ill
Having decided that the jury could reasonably find that ADA intentionally discriminated against Kolstad, we next address Kolstad’s challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her claim for punitive damages.
Finding that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace,” 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (note) (1994) (Congressional Findings), Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, significantly expanding the monetary relief potentially available to victims of unlawful discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 252-55, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1490-92, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). The Act provides that a plaintiff who proves intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII may recover compensatory and punitive damages in addition to equitable relief available under prior law. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a). Punitive damages may be awarded “if the [plaintiff] demonstrates that the [defendant] engaged in a discriminatory practice ... with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l). The Act caps punitive damages, along with compensatory awards, at between $50,000 and $300,000, depending on the employer’s size. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
Relying on an excerpt from the Act’s legislative history, ADA argues that Congress intended Title VII plaintiffs to recover punitive damages only in “extraordinarily egregious cases,” suggesting that the quantum of proof necessary to sustain such an award is greater than courts have traditionally required. See 137 Cong. Rec. S 15473 (Oct. 30, 1991) (Interp. Mem. of Sen. Dole et al). In response, Kolstad points to legislative history expressly contradicting this assertion: “Punitive damages are available under [§ 1981a] to the same extent and under the same standards that they are available to plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” See 137 Cong. Rec. H 9527 (Nov. 7, 1991) (Interp. Mem. of Rep. Edwards). Decisive to us, however, is section 1981a’s plain language, which tracks the standard that courts had previously established for the proof required to sustain awards of punitive damages under other federal civil rights statutes. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) (plaintiff must prove “evil motive or intent, or ... reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others” for punitive award under § 1983); Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir.1987) (applying same standard under § 1981). That standard, in turn, is rooted in the common law. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) (1979) (“Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.”); see also Wade, 461 U.S. at 38-49, 103 S.Ct. at 1631-37. We think that if Congress had meant the courts to depart from well-established legal standards, it would have made that intention clear in the language of the Act. Because it did not do so, instead choosing language already laden with *1438meaning, and because we find no authoritative legislative history to suggest otherwise, we hold that the standard of proof required to sustain awards of punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is the same as that previously established for punitive awards under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.
As both the Supreme Court and this court have explained, “evidence that suffices to establish an intentional violation of protected civil rights also may suffice to permit the jury to award punitive damages, provided that the jury, in its ‘discretionary moral judgment,’ finds that the conduct merits a punitive award.” Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1277 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Wade, 461 U.S. at 52, 103 S.Ct. at 1638). In such cases, “[n]o additional evidence is required,” id., because “the state of mind necessary to trigger liability for the wrong is at least as culpable as that required to make punitive damages applicable.” Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 (1st Cir.1987). Having concluded that the jury could reasonably find from the evidence that ADA intentionally discriminated against Kolstad, the district court should have instructed the jury that upon the requisite finding— malice or reckless indifference to Kolstad’s rights — it could consider a punitive award. The evidentiary threshold having been reached, discretion to award punitive damages, within the limits set by statute, lay with a properly instructed jury, not the court.
Citing legislative history from the unadopt-ed House version of the 1991 Act and case law from other jurisdictions, our dissenting colleague argues that “something substantially more blameworthy” than “garden-variety” intentional race or sex discrimination should be required before a jury may consider a punitive award under § 1981a. Dissent at 1441, 1446. We note that the House Report on which the dissent relies states clearly that the new law “sets the same standard courts have applied under § 1981,” H.R.Rep. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 74, and cites the First Circuit’s decision in Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, as well as Smith v. Wade, cases which support, in our view, this court’s § 1981 jurisprudence. Consistent with our holding in Barbour and the Supreme Court’s reasoning that “society has an interest in deterring and punishing all intentional or reckless invasions of the rights of others,” Wade, 461 U.S. at 54-55, 103 S.Ct. at 1639, we can conceive of no principled basis for second-guessing the jury’s “discretionary moral judgement,” id., about which acts of intentional discrimination are sufficiently “outrageous” or “egregious” to merit punitive awards. Nor, as the dissent admits, do the cases from our sister circuits supply one, much less the smattering of state court cases which the dissent implies have worked some change in the common law since Wade. If, as the dissent suggests, something is missing from Kolstad’s case as a matter of law, what is it? Or, as the First Circuit put the question in a different context, “can it really be disputed that intentionally discriminating against a black man on the basis of his skin color is worthy of some outrage?” Rowlett, 832 F.2d at 206. Absent persuasive answers to these questions or further guidance from Congress, we leave the decision to award punitive damages for intentional civil rights violations to the jury.
By our decision today, we do not suggest that evidence sufficient to establish liability under Title VII for intentional discrimination will always sustain an award of punitive damages under section 1981a. Not every employment practice violating Title VII is “obviously the kind of conduct that society normally will not tolerate.” Hernandez-Tirado v. Artau, 874 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir.1989) (setting aside punitive damages in § 1983 case of politically motivated demotion of public official). Rather, it may be “conduct that sometimes is lawful and sometimes is not, depending on a complex set of legal rules ... that a particular [employer] might, or might not, actually understand.” Id. at 869-70. Thus, where an employer does not deny discrimination but defends on the ground that the discrimination is not unlawful, evidence sufficient to support a finding of liability might not also support a finding of malice or reckless disregard of federally protected rights. For example, evidence that an employer erroneously used religion, sex, or national origin as a “bona fide occupational qualification” for employment, see 42 U.S.C. *1439§ 2000e-2(e), may be insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Evidence that an employer overreached in its efforts lawfully to remedy the effects of past discrimination likewise might be insufficient to establish that the employer acted maliciously or recklessly. In such cases, although the challenged employment practice amounts to “intentional” discrimination, it may only be “negligent [as] to the existence of a federally protected right,” Hernandez-Tirado, 874 F.2d at 870. We also think that where intentional discrimination occurs outside the scope of the agency relationship between employer and employee — in a hostile work environment case, for example — evidence sufficient to support employer liability may not establish that the employer maliciously or recklessly permitted the offending conduct. See, e.g., Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 809-10 (5th Cir.1996); see generally Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C.Cir.1995) (discussing application of agency law to hostile work environment claims). In each of these kinds of cases, the district court may need to assess separately whether evidence sufficient to support a finding of intentional discrimination also suffices to instruct the jury on punitive damages.
This case does not present these or analogous circumstances. ADA neither attempted to justify the use of sex in its promotion decision nor disavowed the actions of its agents. Rather, it flatly denied Kolstad’s allegation of invidious sex discrimination, discrimination lying at the heart of Title VII that society no longer tolerates. Having produced evidence sufficient to prove her charge, Kolstad was entitled to have the jury consider whether ADA’s conduct warranted a punitive award. We thus remand the case to the district court for trial on Kolstad’s punitive damages claim.
This brings us to Kolstad’s argument that, in a trial of her claim for punitive damages, she should be permitted to introduce in evidence a consent decree settling a prior discrimination suit brought against ADA in which the association, although admitting no liability, conceded that “preselection of a favored candidate” is contrary to its personnel policies. The district court ruled the consent decree inadmissible at trial, finding its probative value as evidence of ADA’s preselection of Spangler substantially outweighed by its possibly prejudicial effect on the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. Athough finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling, see Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 554 (D.C.Cir.1993) (Rule 403 determination reversed only for abuse of discretion), we note the court’s suggestion that it would reconsider the decree’s admissibility to impeach the testimony of ADA’s witnesses. Because Kolstad did not offer the document for' impeachment purposes, we express no opinion on whether, or in what circumstances, the consent decree might now be admissible as evidence to support Kolstad’s claim for punitive damages. See Johnson v. WMATA, 883 F.2d 125, 130 (D.C.Cir.1989) (in Rule 403 balancing, court must consider probative value in light of other evidence at trial).
IV
We turn finally to the parties’ respective challenges to the district court’s treatment of the jury’s verdict. ADA argues that the district court erred by ruling that the jury’s verdict was binding on the court. Because the parties had agreed that the jury would sit only in an advisory capacity with respect to back pay, and because back pay was the only claim for relief to reach the jury, ADA contends that the jury’s verdict was advisory in its entirety, and that we should remand the case to the district court for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. Kolstad disagrees, arguing that because she was entitled to a jury trial on her claims for compensatory and punitive damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c), the district court was bound to accept the jury’s verdict notwithstanding the dismissal of those claims. She thus contends that the district court erred in rejecting her claims for further equitable relief and attorney’s fees based on the court’s independent view of the evidence. Athough we agree that the district court erred in its treatment of the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the proper disposition of this case lies in between the parties’ competing positions.
*1440To begin with, we agree with Kolstad that the jury’s determination of liability must remain undisturbed. But for the court’s error in dismissing Kolstad’s punitive damages claim, the jury’s verdict would have been conclusive, as a claim for punitive damages capable of withstanding summary judgment entitled Kolstad to a jury trial. Furthermore, when the district court expressed its view that the evidence was insufficient to support an award of either compensatory or punitive damages, ADA neither moved to dismiss the jury nor expressly argued, as it does now, that the jury’s determination of liability could therefore only be advisory. Rather, ADA’s counsel suggested that “the issue for the jury, if the court were to have the jury provide an advisory verdict on damages, would be whether Ms. Kolstad is entitled to back pay-” As a result, the district court framed this question, “[A]re you agreed that if I allow the jury to deliberate on damages, it is an advisory verdict to the extent that it represents hack pay?” Although the record is not entirely clear on this point, it seems to us that both the parties and the court were operating on the assumption that the jury would conclusively decide the question of liability, regardless of whether the jury’s determination of the back pay award was only advisory.
As to the question of back pay, we agree with ADA that the district court was not bound by the jury’s verdict. Before voir dire, Kolstad represented to the district court that the parties had agreed “to the jury resolving questions in an advisory capacity with respect to the equitable relief,” including back pay, under Rule 39(c). Although that rule gives the district court discretion to try equitable claims with an advisory jury, Rule 52(a) requires in such cases that the court enter its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c), 52(a). Because the record does not reflect that ADA consented to a binding jury determination of Kolstad’s back pay award, the jury’s verdict was advisory on that score. On remand, the district court must therefore make its own findings as to the amount of back pay, if any, Kolstad should receive.
Finally, the district court must also reconsider Kolstad’s claims for further equitable relief and attorney’s fees. Consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s command that “no fact tried by a jury[ ] shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States,” U.S. Const, amend. VII, “when a case contains claims triable to a jury and claims triable to the court that involve common issues of fact, the jury’s resolution of those issues governs the entire case.” Bouchet v. National Urban League, Inc., 730 F.2d 799, 803 (D.C.Cir.1984); see generally Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962). As our sister circuits have uniformly held in cases involving allegations of intentional discrimination, the district court must therefore follow the jury’s factual findings with respect to a plaintiffs legal claims when later ruling on claims for equitable relief. See, e.g., Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dept., 971 F.2d 864, 873-74 (2d Cir.1992); Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 507 (9th Cir.1989) (citing additional cases). Contrary to this principle, the district court here denied Kolstad’s claim for instatement, as well as her petition for attorney’s fees, on the ground that she had not proven her claim of intentional sex discrimination “to the Court’s satisfaction.” Because we agree with the district court that the jury’s finding of intentional discrimination must be upheld, Kolstad is entitled to have her claims for equitable relief and attorney’s fees properly considered by the court in light of the jury’s verdict.
Affirming the district court’s denial of ADA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, we remand the case to the district court for trial on punitive damages and for reconsideration of Kolstad’s claims for equitable relief and attorney’s fees.

So ordered.