Court Opinion

ID: 9838349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 06:10:08.452723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:52.193153
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed August 31, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00824-CR

                        DELONZE ALLEN, Appellant
                                   V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F21-34145-N

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
               Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Miskel
                        Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
      In one issue, appellant Delonze Allen argues the trial court committed

reversible error when it failed to properly instruct the jury regarding good conduct

time during the punishment phase of his trial. We affirm.

                                BACKGROUND

      Allen was indicted for aggravated robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03. He

was charged with robbing complainant, Gabriel Hernandez, of his vehicle, cell

phone, and wallet at gunpoint. Hernandez reported his vehicle stolen and it was seen

on a license-plate scanner in Tyler, Texas. Later, surveillance video of a purse-
snatching incident in Tyler showed Allen grabbing a purse and fleeing in

Hernandez’s vehicle. The purse was later found in Smith County, Texas.

Hernandez’s Costco membership card was found in the stolen purse. Allen was also

seen on surveillance video in Smith County in Hernandez’s vehicle and Allen’s

brother was arrested while driving Hernandez’s vehicle near the Houston area. Later,

Allen was involved in multiple other robberies after he stole Hernandez’s vehicle.

As police were investigating robberies near an Irving hotel where Allen was a

suspect, they also located Hernandez’s wallet.

      The jury convicted Allen of aggravated robbery. In the punishment phase, the

jury charge presented the jury with information regarding community supervision if

it wished to recommend it for Allen and what possible restrictions he would be

required to abide by. After explaining other general evidentiary instructions and

rules for the jury, the charge stated:

      Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a
      term of imprisonment, may earn time off the period of incarceration
      imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities
      may award good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good
      behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and
      attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison
      authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct time
      earned by the prisoner.

      The length of time for which a defendant is imprisoned may be reduced
      by the award of parole.

      Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a
      term of imprisonment, the defendant will not become eligible for parole
      until the actual time served equals one-half of the sentence imposed or

                                         –2–
      30 years, whichever is less. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee
      that parole will be granted.

      It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law might be applied
      to this defendant if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the
      application of that law will depend on the decisions made by parole
      authorities.

      You may consider the existence of the parole law. You are not to
      consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this
      particular defendant.

Allen did not object to the jury charge. After final argument and deliberation, the

jury assessed eleven years’ imprisonment. Allen’s appeal followed.

                                    ANALYSIS

      In his sole issue, Allen argues the trial court committed error in its instruction

to the jury regarding good conduct time.

      The purpose of the trial court’s jury charge is to instruct the jurors on the law

applicable to the case. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14. The charge is the

instrument with which the jury convicts; therefore, it must be an accurate statement

of the law and set out the essential elements of the offense. Fields v. State, ––

S.W.3d––, ––, No. 01-20-00280-CR, 2022 WL 3268525, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 11, 2022, pet. ref’d). A jury charge that improperly states

the law or the elements of an offense is erroneous. Id.

      All alleged jury-charge error must be considered on appellate review

regardless of preservation in the trial court. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Appellate review of purported error in a jury charge

                                         –3–
involves a two-step process. Id. First, we determine whether the jury instructions are

erroneous. Id. Second, if error occurred, then an appellate court must analyze the

error for harm. Id. The issue of error preservation is not relevant until harm is

assessed because the degree of harm required for reversal depends on whether error

was preserved or not. Id.

      The failure to preserve a jury-charge error is not a bar to appellate review but

rather establishes the degree of harm necessary for reversal. Warner v. State, 245

S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Neither the State nor the appellant bears

the burden on appeal to prove harm. Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013). Harm is assessed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the

evidence, including contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence, the

parties’ arguments, and all other relevant information in the record. Alcoser v. State,

663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

      If the “defendant never presents a proposed jury instruction (or fails to object

to the lack of one), any potential error in the charge is reviewed only for ‘egregious

harm’ under Almanza.” Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op.

on reh’g)). When an “appellant d[oes] not object to the charge, the error does not

result in reversal ‘unless it was so egregious and created such harm that appellant

was denied a fair trial.’” Warner, 245 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d

                                         –4–
at 171). “Errors that result in egregious harm are those that affect the ‘very basis of

the case,’ ‘deprive the defendant of a valuable right,’ or ‘vitally affect a defensive

theory.’” Id. at 461–62 (quoting Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996)). To establish egregious harm, the “appellant must have suffered actual,

rather than theoretical, harm.” Id. at 461.

        Allen alleges the trial court’s jury instruction was “required to include the

parole law instruction . . . pursuant to article 37.07, section 4(b)” of the code of

criminal procedure because he was “convicted of an offense listed under Article

42A.054(a).”

        However, Allen was found guilty of aggravated robbery, an offense which

falls within article 42A.054(a). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, § 4(b).

Offenses contained in article 42A.052(a) are excluded from the jury instruction

found in article 37.07, section 4(b) and require the instruction found in article 37.07,

section 4(a). Article 37.07, section 4(a) requires the trial court to instruct the jury

with:

        The length of time for which a defendant is imprisoned may be reduced
        by the award of parole.

        Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a
        term of imprisonment, the defendant will not become eligible for parole
        until the actual time served equals one-half of the sentence imposed or
        30 years, whichever is less. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of
        less than four years, the defendant must serve at least two years before
        the defendant is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not
        guarantee that parole will be granted.

                                          –5–
      It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law might be applied
      to this defendant if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the
      application of that law will depend on decisions made by parole
      authorities.

      You may consider the existence of the parole law. You are not to
      consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this
      particular defendant.

      Here, the trial court provided the jury with a punishment charge which

contained outdated parole instruction with language concerning good-conduct time.

Because Allen’s jury charge occurred after the 2019 amendment to article 37.07 of

the code which removed mention of good conduct time credit, we hold there was

error instructing the jury regarding parole law using section 4(a)’s pre-amendment

language. Dixon v. State, No. 05-21-00847-CR, 2023 WL 4042600, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Dallas June 16, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);

see Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 770, § 2.08, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws

2321, 2366–68 (amended 2019) (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07,

§ 4(a)). However, Allen did not object to the inclusion of the language so we must

determine if there was egregious harm. See Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015).

      “An egregious harm determination must be based on a finding of actual rather

than theoretical harm.” Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Errors that result in egregious harm are those that affect “the very basis of the case,”

“deprive the accused of a ‘valuable right,’” or “vitally affect [a] defensive theory.”

                                          –6–
Id. To determine whether harm was egregious, we consider four factors on a case-

by-case basis: (1) the jury charge as a whole, (2) the state of the evidence, including

contested issues and the weight of probative evidence, (3) the parties’ arguments,

and (4) all other relevant information in the record. Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d

834, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

      We first consider the entire charge to the jury in the punishment phase of the

trial. See id. at 840. The five-page jury charge started by explaining probation

eligibility, the requirements if the jury recommends probation, and the possible fees

probation could require. It goes on to state Allen filed an application for probation

and what options the jury had if it wished to recommend probation. Following the

probation instruction, there was the paragraph which discussed the award of good

conduct time. Next was the language regarding parole and the eligibility

requirements. The final page contained general evidentiary instructions for the jury

to follow during its deliberation. Other than one erroneous paragraph, the jury charge

properly instructed the jury on the matters it was to consider. This factor weighs

against a finding of egregious harm.

      Next, we consider the state of the evidence. Under this factor, we determine

whether the evidence made it more or less likely the charge error caused the

appellant actual harm. Dixon, 2023 WL 4042600, at *8. We must determine the

“likelihood that the jury would in fact have reached a non-unanimous verdict on the

facts of this particular case.” Lehman v. State, No. 05-19-01367-CR, 2022 WL

                                         –7–
2155061, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication). Here, the evidence supported a prison sentence. The State put on

witnesses that described the additional criminal events which occurred after Allen’s

aggravated robbery of Hernandez. After robbing Hernandez, Allen was involved in

a purse theft in Tyler. He was arrested days later for burglary of a vehicle and

unlawfully carrying a weapon. A month later, Allen assaulted a woman while trying

to steal her vehicle and then assaulted another women in the process of trying to steal

her purse. The State also provided testimony Allen was on juvenile probation for

aggravated robbery while all these events occurred. The defense put on testimony

from Allen’s mother and his girlfriend, who asked for leniency. After hearing the

evidence, the jury sentenced Allen to the lower end of the punishment range at eleven

years. No evidence of good conduct time was offered during the guilt-innocence or

punishment phase of trial. We conclude the state of the evidence made it less likely

the jury charge caused the appellant actual harm. This factor weighs against the

finding of egregious harm.

      Third, we consider whether any arguments made by the State or appellant

exacerbated or ameliorated error in the charge. Dixon, 2023 WL 4042600, at *9.

Neither party discussed good conduct time in argument or urged the jury to assess a

greater or lesser sentence based on any potential good conduct time credit. See

Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Indeed, other than the

erroneous language in the charge, there was no mention of parole or good conduct

                                         –8–
time by anyone at any time. Because no arguments exacerbated the error, this factor

weighs against finding egregious harm. See Atkinson v. State, 107 S.W.3d 856, 860

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).

      Lastly, we consider any relevant information, such as whether the jury sent

requests for clarification during deliberations. Dixon, 2023 WL 4042600, at *9.

There was no indication a jury note or any question arose regarding parole or good

conduct credit. In cases where jury notes are sent regarding parole instructions, there

can be harm found. See Shamburger v. State, No. 05-20-00108-CR, 2021 WL

2430903, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 15, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (stating the Court found egregious harm by an erroneous good

conduct instruction where the jury sent a note asking about the payment of fines

“during his parole.”). However, the jury did not send a note or make any indication

it focused on parole or good conduct credit implications in determining its sentence.

See Dixon, 2023 WL 4042600, at *10.

      Weighing all of the factors, we conclude Allen did not demonstrate a

reasonable likelihood the jury assessed its sentence based on the erroneous

instruction and the record does not support a finding of egregious harm. See id.,

Taylor v. State, No. 05-20-00017-CR, 2022 WL 17335689, at *13–14 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Nov. 30, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(concluding erroneous good conduct instruction did not cause egregious harm);

Addison v. State, No. 05-18-01263-CR, 2020 WL 4251068, at *4 (Tex. App.—

                                         –9–
Dallas July 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

Allen’s sole issue is overruled.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Based on the record before us, Allen’s punishment jury charge did not

egregiously harm him. We overrule his sole issue and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                         /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
                                         ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
                                         JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
220824F.U05

                                      –10–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

DELONZE ALLEN, Appellant                      On Appeal from the 195th Judicial
                                              District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00824-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. F21-34145-N.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Kipness. Justices Reichek and Miskel
                                              participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 31st day of August 2023.

                                       –11–