Court Opinion

ID: 9574985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:10:28.981021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:43.576488
License: Public Domain

Weaver, C.J.
The defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit arson1 and arson of a dwelling.2 He was sentenced to eleven months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that the defendant was improperly precluded from attacking the credibility of the officer in charge of the case. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Defendant’s convictions are reinstated.
i
During the early morning hours of September 9, 1993, there was a fire at a house in Three Rivers that the defendant was buying on a land contract. Expert testimony established arson as the probable cause of the fire.
The prosecutor’s theory was that the defendant had induced Raymond Turner to set the fire. There was some evidence tending to suggest that the defendant had a financial motive for burning the house. However, the critical evidence linking defendant to the crime was the testimony of two relatives of Raymond, who was deceased at the time of trial.3 Raymond’s *459wife, Deanna Turner, testified that on the day before the fire, her husband and defendant drove to the defendant’s house for a conversation and returned about fifteen minutes later. Raymond told her that defendant had asked him to bum down a house in Three Rivers. Deanna unsuccessfully tried to persuade him not to do so, but he said he was going to because he needed the money. Deanna testified that her husband said defendant had given him money to buy gasoline with which to start the fire.
The other witness was Raymond’s brother, Scott Turner. He testified that on the night of the crime Raymond picked him up and drove to Three Rivers. Raymond later told Scott that he was going to bum down a house and instructed Scott to drop him off and then pick him up fifteen minutes later. Scott said that he tried to persuade Raymond not to commit the crime, but was unsuccessful, and he eventually dropped Raymond off. When he returned and saw the house on fire, a police car was present, and he drove off without seeing his brother again. Scott said that he was testifying under an agreement with the prosecutor that he would plead guilty to his role in the crime in return for an agreement that the sentence would be two years probation with one year in jail.
Sgt. Earl Stark of the Three Rivers Police Department was the officer in charge of the case. He testified regarding his investigation of the fire and the finding of Raymond’s body. He also said that he had obtained statements from both Deanna and Scott implicating defendant in the arson.
*460At trial, the defense theory was that Stark had a personal dislike for the defendant and had threatened Scott into impheating defendant in the crime and also convinced Deanna to accuse the defendant of asking Raymond to commit the arson.
The jury found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses of conspiracy and arson.
n
The trial court excluded challenges to Stark’s credibility offered under MRE 608(a) and (b). When reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary decisions our review is limited to abuse of discretion. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). We are mindful that a “decision upon a close evidentiary question by definition ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion.” People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 322; 319 NW2d 518 (1982).
A
Pursuant to MRE 608(a), testimony of Stark’s fellow police officer, Michael Costello, regarding Stark’s reputation for truthfulness, and Costello’s opinion regarding Stark’s veracity4 was offered to rebut Stark’s testimony on cross-examination that he had a reputation for truthfulness. There is no dispute that, as the lead police investigator in the case, evidence of Stark’s reputation for truthfulness and opinions regarding his veracity would be relevant under MRE *461608(a) and, therefore, admissible at the discretion of the trial court. MRE 608(a) states in pertinent part:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ....
However, we find that the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence did not amount to an abuse of discretion under MRE 403. MRE 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court appropriately balanced the probative value of the evidence against its danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
The trial court recognized numerous harmful consequences that could result from Costello’s reputation testimony. Costello’s testimony regarding Stark’s reputation for truthfulness arose from a separate case filed by Costello against the police department and would have required testimony of a number of fellow officers. The trial court gave weight in its decision to exclude the testimony to the fact that Costello indicated his fellow officers would be unwilling to testify about Stark’s reputation. In excluding the evidence, the trial court further commented on the special record: “I don’t want to get into any personal vendettas within the factory. We have that all the time.” Thus, further tipping the scales in favor of excluding *462the evidence was the legitimate concern that aspects of Costello’s pending litigation against the police department would become intertwined with the proofs of the case at hand, creating confusion of the issues for the jury. When the defense moved for a mistrial on the basis of the exclusion of Costello’s proposed testimony, the trial court denied the motion concluding: “You call this an important witness. I call it a matter which is collateral. This whole thing is collateral to the issue. Is the client innocent, or is he guilty . . . ?” Finally, the trial court found that allowing the challenge would have the effect of trying a separate case and instead of enhghtening the jury, “would have confounded and confused them . . . .”
With regard to Costello’s opinion testimony regarding Stark’s veracity, we note that the trial court erroneously precluded this evidence on the basis of a prior version of MRE 608(a) that, unlike the present version, did not allow opinion evidence to be used as an attack on witness character for truthfulness. However, the trial court nevertheless reached the right result for the wrong reason because, as with Costello’s reputation testimony, Costello’s opinion testimony was properly excluded pursuant to MRE 403. Specifically, the record reveals that defense counsel ably used other evidence to impeach Stark. The record also reveals that defense counsel consistently sought to shift the jury’s attention by putting Stark on trial. In light of this record, we conclude that any probative value of Costello’s opinion testimony was substantially outweighed by either the danger of confusion of the issues or the needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
*463Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and find that the trial court’s exclusion of Costello’s testimony regarding Stark’s reputation for truthfulness and that Costello’s opinion regarding Stark’s veracity was not an abuse of discretion.
B
The challenge offered pursuant to MRE 608(b) involved the defense’s attempt to cross-examine Stark regarding an alleged false statement he made in a probable-cause affidavit in an unrelated case. MRE 608(b) provides in pertinent part:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility .. . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony regarding the allegedly false affidavit.
The affidavit contained a statement regarding the movement of a police tracking dog. On special record, Stark agreed that the affidavit stated that “the tracking dog . . . followed the track of the suspect ... in the direction of 416 River Street. Further, that prior to the dog reaching that address . . . the dog lost the track and was unable to *464pick it up again.” On direct examination during a subsequent special record, Costello testified that the affidavit was false because the “dog didn’t go anywhere near” the suspect’s address. On cross-examination, Costello suggested that he believed the affidavit falsely stated that the dog had stopped upon reaching the suspect’s address. However, Costello ultimately admitted on cross-examination that the dog leapt out of the fenced yard of 1012 River Street and went in a westerly direction for a very short distance toward the suspect’s address before stopping. This concession was consistent with the content of the affidavit. Upon discovery that the content of the affidavit and Costello’s understanding of the actual events were consistent, the trial court excluded the evidence. The trial court reasoned: “Now, merely to say that . . . [Stark] is not a man of truthfulness or veracity, and to prove it by one specific event where the issue of that event is one of interpreting a statement made in a report, which is open to many interpretations ... is not sufficient background to attack the credibility of this witness.”
Under MRE 608(b) evidence of a specific instance of conduct is admissible only “if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” The trial court found that Costello’s admission demonstrated no inconsistency between the affidavit and the actual movement of the dog. Thus, the affidavit was not probative of Stark’s veracity, and the decision to exclude the evidence was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the trial court rightly expressed concern that a protracted excursion into the movements of a dog in an unrelated case could very well have confused the jury. Thus, exclusion of the evidence, even if it had been *465deemed relevant, would not have been an abuse of discretion under MRE 403. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding testimony regarding the allegedly false affidavit.
m
The trial court’s decision to exclude the offered credibility challenges was not an abuse of discretion, but, rather, demonstrates a careful balancing of the harmful consequences of admitting the evidence against its probative value under MRE 403 and the proper application of MRE 608(b). We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.5 Defendant’s convictions are reinstated.
Taylor, Corrigan, and Young, JJ., concurred with Weaver, C.J.

 MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1).

 MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267.

 Raymond Turner’s body was found in a river near the scene of the crime about two days later. A pathologist established the cause of death *459as drowning and opined that Turner had died two or three days before his body was found.

 The defense also sought to use Costello’s opinion testimony to criticize Stark’s investigative methods. We affirm the Court of Appeals unanimous affirmance of the trial court’s exclusion of Costello’s opinion testimony regarding the propriety of Stark’s investigative methods.

 The defendant’s application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant was held in abeyance pending decision on the issues on which leave to appeal was granted. That application is now considered, and it is denied, because we are not persuaded that the questions should be reviewed by this Court. Our resolution of the issues on which leave to appeal was granted makes it unnecessary to address additional issues regarding the Court of Appeals reasoning raised by the prosecutor.