Court Opinion

ID: 9722438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:31:49.023632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:57.998535
License: Public Domain

NARES, J.
I respectfully dissent from part 2 of the majority opinion for several reasons, not the least of which is the Attorney General has conceded the court erred in not instructing with CALJIC No. 4.21. The Attorney General does not state the court correctly failed to give CALJIC No. 4.21, but instead asserts there was no prejudicial error because, in the context of the evidence and counsels’ closing arguments, “the jury would surely know that an issue before it was whether appellant’s drug ingestion caused him to lack the requisite specific intent for burglary.”
Rather than accepting this admission and assessing the prejudicial impact of the error, the majority not only ignores the admission but stands it on its head, asserting, “Not only was the sua sponte giving of the instruction not required, but on the facts of this case it may have been error to give it even if requested.”
There are few circumstances which justify relieving any party, much less the Attorney General, from an admission in its brief. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, reviewing courts do not, and in Bell v. Tri-City Hospital *993Dist. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 438 [241 Cal.Rptr. 796] this court did not, hold counsel’s admissions are never to be treated as controlling. “An express concession or assertion in a brief is frequently treated as an admission of a legal or factual point, controlling in the disposition of the case.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 482, p. 472, italics in original.) “ ‘[W]hile briefs and argument are outside the record, they are reliable indications of a party’s position on the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing court may make use of statements therein as admissions against the party.’ ” (DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1019, fn. 3 [242 Cal.Rptr. 368], quoting 9 Witkin, supra, at § 251, p. 258, italics added.) The Supreme Court has relied upon statements at oral argument to show that the only proper ground for an action does not exist. (Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 593, 599 [107 P.2d 1, 131 A.L.R. 276].) In Bell, this court recognized admissions are frequently binding, but declined to apply that rule where it would inequitably operate in favor of the government in a Tort Claims Act case. (Bell v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 449-450.) Unlike the situation in Bell, here the majority relieves the government of its admission in a situation not at all analogous to the claim filing requirements of a Tort Claims Act case. In any event, given the infrequency with which the Attorney General concedes trial court error, at the very least it should strongly caution against a different result. Moreover, even if we were prepared to ignore the admission, in my view the court should have given a sua sponte instruction on voluntary intoxication.
Cox’s defense was he did not have the specific intent to rape. CALJIC No. 4.21 should be given where drug intoxication evidence supports a defense of lack of specific intent. (People v. Reza (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 129, 132 [175 Cal.Rptr. 126].) It must be given sua sponte where there is an evidentiary basis for the defense. (People v. Robinson (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 43, 48 [84 Cal.Rptr. 796].)
Without any authority or analysis the majority declares “intoxication,” as it appears in CALJIC No. 4.21, “means a state of drunkenness” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 989) and would refuse the instruction to Cox because he was not drunk and offered no evidence about any effects of methamphetamine. The majority’s assumption that “ ‘intoxication’ ordinarily means a state of drunkenness” (ibid.) is unfounded and too narrow. Intoxication describes the debilitating effect of drugs (including alcohol) on the mind and body. A person intoxicated from alcohol might stumble and stammer; one intoxicated from methamphetamine might be able to walk a straight line and normally converse, all while hallucinating he is about to meet God. The fact Cox displayed none of the symptoms normally associated with alcohol intoxication is irrelevant because he was not and never claimed to be “drunk.”
*994Citing People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587], the majority would deny Cox the voluntary intoxication instruction because “it would have been pure speculation for the jurors to determine” the impact of Cox’s having thrice injected himself with methamphetamine on the day of the offense. I agree with the majority that CALJIC No. 4.21 need not be given sua sponte where the evidence would only lead a jury to speculate about the effect of the drug upon the defendant’s ability to form the requisite specific intent. However, on this record, there was ample evidence about the effect of methamphetamine to require giving the instruction.1
Richard Rappaport, a psychiatrist, testified amphetamines produce both physical and psychological symptoms producing “behavioral changes” and distorting the user’s “way of thinking.” Moreover, here Cox’s behavior was so bizarre it alone would support giving the instruction. Cox testified he injected methamphetamine and, while naked and wet, sat on patio furniture outside the premises he had allegedly attempted to burglarize with the intent to rape, waiting to be led to God, all while an audible alarm sounded, took off his jewelry to rid himself of his “earthly possessions,” and calmly made small talk with the husband of his intended rape victim while police responded. At trial Cox testified he had been taking methamphetamine for five years, and two days before the incident he had seen “angels and Pegasus ... in the sky preparing for war.” John Hennessy, who was with Cox earlier that night, testified when Cox left Hennessy’s apartment “he was talking to me about good and evil and God and Satan and things of that nature and he was under kind of a paranoid trip.” While in the police department’s holding cell, on several occasions Cox “was making eagle sounds, trying to call up the Lord.”
Cox was either incredibly inept, or was intoxicated. For this reason, the majority’s reliance on People v. Young (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 891 [234 *995Cal.Rptr. 819] for a contrary result is misplaced. There, the defendant’s blood, breath and urine samples revealed no alcohol or drugs in the defendant’s body. (Id. at p. 896.) Moreover, with respect to the only drug he had taken, Triavil, the defendant testified it had no effect on him. (Id. at p. 897.) Not surprisingly, on these facts the court in Young properly refused to instruct on voluntary intoxication. In contrast, here Cox testified he injected methamphetamine and thereafter began hallucinating. Cox testified that when he injected methamphetamine he could “be flying with the best.” Accordingly, the court had a sua sponte obligation to give CALJIC No. 4.21 as well as No. 3.36. The evidence supported a theory Cox was intoxicated, even though his intoxication may not have risen to the level of a mental illness.
This result is so compelling the Attorney General commendably does not contend to the contrary. Instead he asserts the error was not prejudicial because it would “be ridiculous to suggest the jury would ignore this [intoxication] evidence in considering [Cox’s] mental state.”
In assessing prejudice, the instructions should be considered in light of their reasonable meaning and the evidence. Here, the jury could well have rejected testimony Cox was psychotic, but believed Cox was grossly intoxicated. Cox’s habitual methamphetamine abuse was undisputed. Although police testified to the contrary, the circumstances of the crime itself suggest Cox was in less than full command of his senses.
However, by instructing the jury only mental illness could negate specific intent, the jury would be compelled to convict despite a well-grounded finding that Cox’s voluntary intoxication prevented him from forming the specific intent to rape. Moreover, the prejudicial effect of only instructing with CALJIC No. 3.36 and not also with No. 4.21 is exacerbated by its negative implication. A jury expressly instructed to consider one factor— mental illness—to negate intent would reasonably conclude other factors— including voluntary intoxication not amounting to psychosis—could not be considered to negate intent.
Penal Code section 22, subdivision (a), states the general rule, “No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition.” Much like the incantation, “Ignorance of the law is no excuse,” I suspect jurors walk into court with an understanding of section 22, subdivision (a): being intoxicated is no excuse. Without an instruction specifically directing the jury it could consider voluntary intoxication, compounded by the negative implication of CALJIC No. 3.36 that nothing other than mental illness can be considered as affecting specific intent, the instructions were tantamount to those which *996told the jury to ignore, as legally irrelevant, evidence Cox was intoxicated but not mentally ill. Such error is prejudicial under any standard.
Based upon the foregoing, I would reverse without reaching the other issues addressed by the majority.

 Interestingly, the trial court in People v. Frierson did instruct the jury about the effect of voluntary intoxication upon the defendant’s ability to form the specific intent necessary for robbery. (People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 155 [“Taken as a whole, the instructions were fully adequate to focus the jurors’ attention upon the question whether defendant’s intoxication may have prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent to commit robbery.”].) People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221], also cited by the majority, is inapposite. There, the only relevant evidence was the defendant “may” have ingested LSD and was “making facial expressions,” was “jumpy” and was “changing the tone of his voice.” The defendant’s conduct—shooting his robbery victim— was nothing close to Cox’s behavior. The defendant’s conduct in Frierson was similar—he shot his robbery victim. As antisocial, depraved and criminal as such acts are, they are not bizarre or “odd” in the sense Cox’s conduct is. Contrary to the majority’s statement in footnote 3 of its opinion, in my view neither Frierson nor Williams have “rejected” the need to give CALJIC No. 4.21 where there is “consumption plus odd behavior” because neither of those cases involve “odd” behavior of the type at issue here.