Court Opinion

ID: 9895485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 16:00:32.052804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:54.229219
License: Public Domain

22-3008
Williams v. Olsen

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                        SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

      At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 7th day of November, two thousand twenty-three.

        PRESENT: RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
                         WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
                         BETH ROBINSON,
                                 Circuit Judges.
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        ELLAZAR WILLIAMS,

                         Plaintiff-Appellee,

                    v.                                                       No. 22-3008

        JAMES OLSEN, CITY OF ALBANY
        POLICE DETECTIVE,
        CHRISTOPHER CORNELL, CITY
        OF ALBANY POLICE DETECTIVE,
        LAWRENCE HEID, CITY OF
        ALBANY POLICE DETECTIVE,

                                                    1
                      Defendants-Appellants,

      JOHN DOES 23-25, CITY OF ALBANY,

                       Defendant.
      ------------------------------------------------------------------

      FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:                                   Julie A. Nociolo, James C.
                                                                Knox, E. Steward Jones Hacker
                                                                Murphy, LLP, Troy, NY

      FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS:                                Stephen J. Rehfuss, The
                                                                Rehfuss Law Firm, P.C.,
                                                                Latham, NY

      Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn, Judge).

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the order of the District Court is REVERSED in part, the

appeal is DISMISSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this order.

      Appellants Detective James Olsen, Detective Christopher Cornell, and

Detective Lawrence Heid appeal from a November 1, 2022 order of the United

States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Kahn, J.) denying

Appellants’ motion for summary judgment premised on a qualified immunity

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defense and permitting Plaintiff-Appellee Ellazar Williams’ § 1983 claims of

excessive force and false arrest to proceed. On interlocutory appeal, Appellants

argue that the District Court incorrectly determined that genuine disputes of

material fact exist as to whether Appellants used constitutionally excessive force

against Williams and had probable cause, or at least arguable probable cause, to

arrest him. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the

record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our

decision to reverse in part and dismiss in part.

                                    DISCUSSION

        We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo and in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep't, 706

F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate “only if there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

   I.      Excessive Force

        Appellants first argue that, contrary to the District Court’s order, they are

entitled to qualified immunity on Williams’ excessive force claim. We have

“jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order denying qualified immunity so

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long as defendants pursue the appeal on stipulated facts, or on the facts that the

plaintiff alleges are true, or on the facts favorable to the plaintiff that the trial

judge concluded the jury might find.” Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 139 (2d Cir.

2019) (quotation marks omitted). But we lack “jurisdiction to review a denial of

qualified immunity to the extent it is based on a district court’s finding that there

is enough evidence in the record to create a genuine issue as to factual questions

that are, in fact, material to resolution of the qualified immunity claim.”

Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 352 (2d Cir. 2011).

      We lack jurisdiction to consider the District Court’s order relating to the

excessive force claim because Appellants’ entitlement to qualified immunity as to

that claim turns on disputed facts. As the District Court noted, the parties

dispute the following facts, among others: whether Williams was holding a

weapon in his hand such that it would have been visible to the officers at any

point during the pursuit, ignored Detective Olsen’s instructions to get on the

ground and drop the weapon, and ran toward Detective Olsen at any point. On

appeal, the parties also continue to dispute the distance between Detective Olsen

and Williams when Detective Olsen shot Williams. Appellants thus have not

argued that they would be entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law

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under Williams’ version of the facts. See Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 194 (2d

Cir. 1998) (noting that for the court of appeals to have appellate jurisdiction, a

defendant must show that “he is entitled to qualified immunity even under

plaintiff’s version of the facts”). We therefore dismiss the appeal with respect to

Williams’ excessive force claim for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

   II.      False Arrest

         Appellants next contend that the District Court erred in denying summary

judgment on Williams’ false arrest claim. We agree. Because Appellants invoke

a qualified immunity defense, they need only show “arguable” probable cause

for Williams’ arrest. Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2016). Arguable

probable cause to arrest exists “if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the

officer[s] to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable

competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted).

         Here, it is undisputed that Appellants had knowledge of a 911 call in

which a witness reported that a man wearing a “grey hoodie and dark faded

jeans,” who had a gun, “was threatening people” outside of a store “and threw

glass and water bottles at the front door” of the store. App’x at 27. It is also

                                          5
undisputed that Williams matched the physical description of the suspect; that

Williams was seen by the officers on a street corner near the store shortly after

the 911 call; that Williams ran away when the officers approached him; that the

officers later learned before arresting Williams that the store owner and another

store employee each made a statement to police that the suspect flashed a gun

and told the store owner that he would “put a burner in [him],” id.; and that the

store owner later identified Williams in a photo lineup as the suspect. We

conclude that these facts gave officers at least arguable probable cause to arrest

Williams for criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree based on his

threatening the store owner with a gun under New York Penal Law § 265.01(2),

which provides in relevant part that a person is guilty of that offense when “[h]e

or she possesses any . . . dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon with intent

to use the same unlawfully against another.” N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01(2); see

Triolo v. Nassau County, 24 F.4th 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2022). And because this

determination is based solely on undisputed facts, we have jurisdiction over this

aspect of the appeal. See Francis, 942 F.3d at 139. We therefore reverse the

judgment of the District Court denying summary judgment to Appellants on

Williams’ false arrest claim.

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                                CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court is REVERSED in

part, the appeal is DISMISSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this order.

                                     FOR THE COURT:
                                     Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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