Court Opinion

ID: 9771825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:54:44.381424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:37.583255
License: Public Domain

VOLLERS, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority reverses this cause because it finds that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s challenge for cause to venireman James Whorton. It is the majority’s conclusion that voir dire examination of juror Whorton revealed that he would vote to impose the death penalty in all cases where the accused was found guilty of capital murder, unless the accused proved he was insane at the time of the offense. I cannot agree with this conclusion. The record in this cause simply presents another instance where questioning on voir dire managed to confuse a layman and led him into making apparently contradictory answers to questions which are now used as a basis for reversal of this case.
An examination of the entire voir dire in this case reveals that the juror Whorton apparently believed that the definition of capital murder included answering the questions at the punishment phase of the trial “yes.” This is apparent even from the limited amount of voir dire testimony set out in the majority opinion, where it reflects that:
“Q. And you have answered yes to each of the punishment questions, then if you have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the intentional killing of another person, capital murder?
A. Yes, sir, I believe I would.
Q. And under no circumstances, then, would you answer no to the question?
A. I wouldn’t say under no circumstances, I can’t think of none offhand.
Q. You can’t visualize anything that would permit you to answer no to those questions unless the defendant was insane?
A. I can’t think of anything, no.” (Emphasis added.)
There can be no question but that the questions to the prospective juror in this case were misleading and his answers were apparently contradictory.
Upon reexamination of this juror by the State, the juror indicated that he would require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the questions at the penalty stage of the trial should be answered “yes” before he would so answer them. The trial judge recognized the confusion by the juror and entered into the examination. The following examination by the trial judge illustrates his concern over the confusion evidenced by the juror:

“QUESTIONS BY THE COURT:

Q. Mr. Whorton, what is it you’d require the defendant to prove? His insanity? Is that what you said?
A. If he was found guilty of a capital crime, and other than insanity, I can’t think of anything that would.
Q. Is that what you meant when you answered Mr. Gray’s question, you just couldn’t conceive of a case where you couldn’t answer either of those questions Mr. Sandel directed to you no?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You understand the State has a burden to prove — it is their burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you should answer these two questions yes.
A. Right. I understand that.
Q. If they don’t do that—
A. You answer them no.
Q. You have to answer them no under your oath as a juror.
A. Right.
*547Q. In that case, you wouldn’t be requiring the defendant to do anything, so your answers to the two lawyers involved here are opposed. Have we thoroughly confused you?
A. Well, you have, other than the fact if the evidence presented by the State were to prove this man incompetent or whatever, then I wouldn’t recommend it.
Q. I’d like to clear up one point. If the evidence shows he’s incompetent or sanity is a defense in the trial, that’s an entirely different concept. Now, setting that aside for the moment, unless it’s involving your concern with regard to answering these questions here, well, then, it’s not relevant to this inquiry that Mr. Gray has directed to you and, that is, it is your attitude with regard to assessing the death penalty which can only be done if you answer those two punishment questions yes.
A. Right. And I would have to be convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt.
Q. Beyond a reasonable doubt before you would answer them yes?
A. Right.
Q. If you answer either of them no, then the Court is obligated to assess life in the penitentiary.
A. Right. Okay.
Q. Now, you are not either called upon to conceive in your own mind any set of facts to what you’d do under any circumstances in a criminal case, but if you have some propensity to assess one punishment, you know the affect of the answers on the punishment questions, would you answer them based on the evidence, or would you answer them based upon your attitude concerning the death penalty or some other?
A. Based on the evidence.
Q. As to what punishment should be—
A. I’d base it on the evidence.
Q. So your answer to Mr. Gray would be different ?

A. Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Overrule the juror’s challenge.” (Emphasis added.)
From this it is apparent that the prospective juror was confused and gave conflicting answers. The trial court resolved this conflict by his questioning. We must keep in mind that the trial judge is the person who is listening to the prospective juror and we are only looking at a cold record. I still firmly believe that trial judges are vested with some authority to resolve such conflicting answers by prospective jurors, and this record certainly shows no abuse of discretion by the trial judge (see Smith v. State, 573 S.W.2d 763 (No. 57,072, delivered December 7, 1977, dissenting opinion). No abuse of discretion is reflected by this record and this cause should not be reversed.
I dissent.
ONION, P. J., and DOUGLAS and W. C. DAVIS, JJ., concur.