Court Opinion

ID: 9594886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:33:43.087939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:25.239670
License: Public Domain

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Though I agree with the balance of the majority’s opinion, I write separately to offer a plausible alternative view to the majority’s suggestion that a district court may render harmless an incorrect Guidelines range by stating that “its resolution of the issue” that caused the miscalculation did not “affect[ ] its ultimate determination of a reasonable sentence,” ante at 1121, an important issue not briefed or argued to the panel and unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.
Gall v. United States, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) calls for an appellate court to conduct two layers of review, first for procedural soundness, and then for substantive reasonableness. Id. at 597. To determine whether a sentence is procedurally sound, appellate courts must, among other things, “ensure” that the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range because the failure to do so is a “significant procedural error.” Id. However, the Supreme Court did not provide us with one key piece of the sentencing review puzzle: what to do with a significant procedural error?
The majority takes the position that there are two kinds of significant procedural errors — harmless errors that do not require resentencing and nonharmless errors that call for resentencing. But see United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 218 (3d Cir.2008) (“The dissent urges that we resolve the issue before us by looking to see if the correct range seems close enough to the actual sentence imposed. If so, the argument goes, the sentence is ‘reasonable.’ However, this ignores the fact that the failure to start with the correct Guideline range is legal error that thwarts reasonableness review — that is, it cuts off our review process before we even reach the issue of reasonableness.”). Another view is that any sentence premised on any significant procedural error must be vacated and remanded for resentencing. The majority’s contrary position, that, de*1123spite a sentence s procedural unsoundness, we can proceed to review its substantive reasonableness may improperly blur the distinct levels of review mandated by Gall. See United States v. Allen, 516 F.3d 364, 372 (6th Cir.2008) (“[W]e find the sentencing decision procedurally unreasonable, and therefore, we do not reach the question of substantive reasonableness ....”) (internal citation omitted) (citing Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597; Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2462); Langford, 516 F.3d at 218 (same); see also United States v. Pepper, 518 F.3d 949, 951 (8th Cir.2008) (“Before reaching the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we ‘must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error ....’” (quoting Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597)). These cases suggest that, under Gall, once an appellate court finds a sentence to be procedurally unsound, it cannot proceed to review the sentence’s substantive reasonableness. The majority’s contrary submission that a district court can somehow unring the “significant procedural error” bell arguably undercuts the rigorous procedural review Gall demands of appellate courts. 128 S.Ct. at 597.
In summary, I am reluctant to suggest with certainty that an incorrect Guidelines range does not require remand, even if the district court states that such error did not affect its imposition of the sentence. I write only to offer a tenable interpretation of Gall’s mandate to appellate courts in the event of significant procedural error that differs from that proffered by the majority. With this reservation, I join the majority’s opinion and concur in its judgment.