Court Opinion

ID: 9643033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:16:16.647461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:14.131608
License: Public Domain

*105LARSEN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the holding of the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court that Section 2514(16.1) of the Probate Code ameliorates “the inflexibility of the Ademption Rule only in situations of pre-death judicial adjudications of incompetence and not in situations where no pre-death determination has been made.” I register my dissent, however, to the affirmance of the dismissal of appellant’s objections alleging fraud.
The decedent, A. Carolyn Schofield, died on January 2, 1979 leaving a Last Will and Testament. The decedent was survived by her husband, Harry L. Schofield, by the appellant, Lawrence F. Hitchon, and by several other heirs. At the time the decedent and her husband married, they executed an ante-nuptial agreement containing, inter alia, the following provisions:
“1. The intended Wife agrees that she will give, devise and bequeath to the intended Husband the real estate known as 1019 Franklin Avenue, Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania, for and during the term of his natural life and the intended Husband agrees not to take against the existing Will or any other Will which the intended Wife may make provided said Will contains provisions conformable to this paragraph.”
2. Each of the parties hereby release unto the other all and any inchoate intestate rights and rights as heir of any kin in and to the property of the other either as husband, wife, surviving spouse, heir at law or otherwise.”
The agreement was executed on December 22, 1966 and the parties were married on January 23, 1967.
Subsequently, the decedent made certain changes in her will, and in conjunction with those changes the parties signed an additional agreement dated March 17, 1969 which provided:
“... H.L. Schofield does hereby covenant and agree that he has read and approved the Will of his wife of even date herewith and has no objections thereto and does *106hereby remise, release and discharge his right to take against the same.”
“In all other respects the aforesaid ante nuptial agreement of December 22, 1966 shall remain in full force and effect.”
The relevant portion of the decedent’s Last Will and Testament provides as follows:
“THIRD: I give, devise and bequeath my one-half (V2) interest in the real estate held by me as a tenant in common with Carmen L. Bauman, situate in New Stanton, Hempfield Township, Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, as more fully described in deeds of record, to LAWRENCE F. HITCHON, to be his absolutely and forever.
Prior to her death, by deed dated July 28, 1976, acknowledged on August 5, 1976 and recorded on August 13, 1976, the decedent joined by her husband and a co-tenant and spouse conveyed the New Stanton real estate to bona fide third party purchasers for the price of $225,000.00.1 The obvious resulting consequence of this conveyance was that at the time of her death the New Stanton property, which was the subject of a specific devise to the appellant, was not a part of the decedent’s estate.
“The general rule [in this Commonwealth] is that a specific devise will be adeemed if at testator’s death the testator no longer possessed an interest in the property devised and no contrary intention is set forth in the will. Estate of Taylor [480 Pa. 488, 391 A.2d 991 (1978)]; Nakoneczny Estate, 456 Pa. 320, 319 A.2d 893 (1974)”.
In Re Estate of Fox, 494 Pa. 584, 431 A.2d 1008 (1981).
“This Rule [of ademption] is equally applicable where the specifically devised or bequeathed property is re*107moved from testator during his lifetime by an involuntary act or by operation of law. (citations omitted).
Id., 494 Pa. at 587, 431 A.2d at 1010.
This asperous rule is based upon the mere fact that the property devised or bequeathed no longer exists as part of the Decedent’s estate. Nakoneczny Estate, supra; Estate of Taylor, supra.
The legislature, recognizing the harshness of the inflexible ademption rule has provided for certain exceptions:
Nonademption; incompetency. — If property of an incompetent specifically devised or bequeathed is sold or exchanged or if a condemnation award or insurance proceeds are paid to the estate of an incompetent as a result of condemnation, fire or casualty, the specific legatee or devisee has the right to the net sale price, the property received in exchange, the condemnation award or the insurance proceeds. This paragraph does not apply if subsequent to the sale, exchange, condemnation, or casualty, the testator has been adjudicated competent and survives the adjudication by one year.
Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, as amended 1976, July 9, P.L. 551, No. 135, § 13, 20 P.S. 2514(16.1). Additionally, legislative provisions have been made for nonademption in certain situations involving specifically bequeathed securities,2 and in certain instances where, upon death, *108there is a balance due the testator resulting from a change in the property specifically devised.3
On its face, the ademption rule, although harsh, is reasonable and rational. After all, if a testator, during his lifetime, divests himself of (or is involuntarily divested of) property which he had by will devised to a named beneficiary, the subject matter of the devise is no longer a part of his property. What a testator no longer has he cannot pass on to an heir. If, however, there is added the additional fact that the divestiture was procured by fraud and undue influence intended to enrich the fraudulent schemer, or his objects, to the detriment of the intended testamentary beneficiary, the logical appeal of the ademption rule evaporates. In the midst of such circumstances, nonademption is the more sensible approach.
It may be argued that a rule of nonademption in such cases will add an element of uncertainty to the administration of estates where specifically devised or bequeathed property was alienated prior to death. Nonetheless, I believe the situations where nonademption would apply because of fraud would be few and the strict standards of proof of fraud4 provide adequate protection against vexatious claims. Any inconvenience to an estate caused by *109nonademption in these circumstances is far outweighed by the interests of justice served. I would hold that specifically devised or bequeathed property is not adeemed where the property so devised or bequeathed is removed from the testator’s estate by fraud intended to deprive the specific beneficiary of his legacy. As in the case of nonademption by reason of incompetency (20 P.S. § 2514(16.1)), the intended beneficiary of the fraudulently removed property would have a right to any proceeds or property received by the decedent or his estate in exchange therefor.
The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court agrees with both the trial court and the Superior Court in concluding that the appellant, in his objections, failed to plead with specificity and particularity the fraud which he claims induced the sale of the New Stanton property and vitiated an ademption. The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court states: “Appellant merely raises a bald accusation of fraud which is insufficient to satisfy Pa.R. C.P. 1019(b)” (Slip Opinion p. 8).
Rule 6.10 of the Orphans’ Court Rules as adopted by this Court provides:
“Objections to an account or statement of proposed distribution shall be made or filed at such place and time, shall be in such form, and such notice thereof shall be given as local rules shall prescribe.” (emphasis supplied)
Rule 3, Section 10 of the Local Rules of the Allegheny County Orphans’ Court provides:
Objections to Account. Service.
Specific objections to accounts may be filed in the office of the Clerk of the Orphans’ Court Division as of course at any time after accounts have been confirmed nisi and before audit. If filed within five days after confirmation nisi, they will be noted on the printed audit list. Copies of all objections, when filed, must be served without delay on counsel for the accountant.
*110At audit objections may be made orally or in writing to all accounts and to all matters set forth in or arising out of Petitions for Distribution, (emphasis supplied)
The appellant, in his written objections to the account, averred that at the time of the sale the decedent was 80 years old and suffering from severe physical infirmities and mental illness; that she was unable to care for herself; that she no longer had the capacity to make responsible business decisions; that she was regularly sedated; that she was subjected to substantial pressures and the designing influences, including fraud, of individuals close to her; that she was the victim of several fraudulent acts; that she was subject to the influence of designing persons; that the sale of the New Stanton property was the initial step in the fraudulent scheme put into effect by Harry Schofield;5 and that the sale was procured as the result of undue influence.
The averments of the decedent’s physical and mental state at the time of the sale along with the allegations of designing influence, fraudulent acts and undue influence on the part of decedent’s spouse and the averments of intent on the part of decedent’s husband, considered as a whole, in the context of objections to the account, are sufficient to raise the issue of fraud and undue influence entitling appellant to a hearing. I would, in this part, reverse the order of the Superior Court and remand this case to the Orphans’ Court of Allegheny County for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NIX, C.J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.
McDERMOTT, J., joins in the dissenting portion of this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. The decedent’s share of the sale price was appropriated by her Husband, Harry L. Schofield, and eventually deposited into an account over which he had control and in which she had no interest. The proceeds were recovered by the estate after a lawsuit alleging fraud was initiated against Harry L. Schofield and others.

. Change in securities. — If the testator intended a specific bequest of securities owned by him at the time of the execution of his will, rather than the equivalent value thereof, the legatee is entitled only to:
(i) as much of those securities as formed a part of the testator’s estate at the time of his death;
(ii) any additional or other securities issued by the same entity thereon and owned by the testator by reason of a stock dividend, stock split or other action by the entity, excluding any acquired by exercise of purchase options for more than a fractional share; and
(iii) securities of another entity received thereon or in exchange therefor and owned by the testator as a result of a merger, consolidation or reorganization of the entity or other similar change.
Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, as amended 1976, July 9, P.L. 551, No. 135, § 13, 20 P.S. 2514(17).

. Nonademption; balance. — A devisee or legatee of property specifically devised or bequeathed has the right to any of that property which the testator still owned at his death and;
(i) any balance of the purchase price or balance of property to be received in exchange, together with any security interest, owing from a purchaser to the testator at his death by reason of a sale or exchange of the property by the testator;
(ii) any amount due for the condemnation of the property and unpaid at the testator’s death;
(iii) any proceeds unpaid at the testator’s death on fire or casualty insurance on the property; and
(iv) property owned by the testator at his death as a result of foreclosure, or obtained in lieu of foreclosure, of the security for a specifically bequeathed obligation.
Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, as amended 1976, July 9, P.L. 551, No. 135, § 13, 20 P.S. 2514(18).

. Fraud must be proved by evidence that is "clear, precise and indubitable”. See: Scaife Co. v. Rockwell-Standard. Corp., 446 Pa. 280, 285, 285 A.2d 451, 454 (1971).

. Harry Schofield, the decedent’s spouse, was bound by the terms of the Ante Nuptial Agreement he executed on December 22, 1966 and re-confirmed in an additional agreement executed on March 17, 1969. He was fully aware of the provisions of decedent's will and that he would have no right to or claim in decedent’s New Stanton property specifically devised to the appellant.