Court Opinion

ID: 9755684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:46:56.506346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:10.126539
License: Public Domain

HOOD, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
This action is one to compel a father to support his illegitimate children. At common law a father was under no legal obligation to support his illegitimate child, and his present day obligation is strictly statutory. The only statute in the District of Columbia imposing such obligation is the Act of' January 11, 1951, entitled “An Act Relating to Children Born Out of Wedlock.” Code 1961, 11-951 et seq. Jurisdiction of “all cases” arising under the Act is conferred on the Juvenile Court.1 Specific provision is made for the time and manner of instituting and prosecuting such actions, for the order of support and for the method of enforcing such order. The support ceases when the child reaches the age of 16 years.
Despite the fact that the only obligation of the father is created by statute which expressly confers on the Juvenile Court jurisdiction over all cases under it, the majority of this court now holds that the Domestic Relations Branch of the Municipal Court has jurisdiction to compel the father to support his illegitimate children and, apparently, may exercise this jurisdiction without regard to the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Act creating the obligation.
It is true that in this case the father acknowledged his paternity, but such acknowledgment alone imposed no obligation on him nor conferred any jurisdiction on the court. Acknowledgment in the Juvenile Court, because of the statute, could have imposed an obligation on him. Under the statute the *920Juvenile Court may order support (1) when the father in open court acknowledges paternity, (2) after judicial determination of paternity,2 and (3) when the father voluntarily enters into an agreement for support of the child.3
The majority opinion bases its holding on the language of the statute creating the Domestic Relations Branch which confers on that branch “exclusive jurisdiction” of actions for “support and custody of minor children.”4 If the majority is correct in holding that such language embraces an action for support of illegitimate children, then it would seem logically to follow that, because the jurisdiction of the Domestic Relations Branch is exclusive, the Juvenile Court no longer has jurisdiction over any case for support of illegitimate children. The ultimate object of any action in the Juvenile Court under the Act of January 11, 1951, whether paternity is denied or acknowledged, is to provide support for the child.
Near the end of its opinion the majority says a court cannot make laws, but that is exactly what the court is doing. It is revising the law Congress enacted for the support of illegitimate children, and I believe this revision will bring about much confusion and uncertainty. For example, although the Juvenile Court can compel support of illegitimate children only until they are 16 years of age,5 and under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act the duty of a father to support an illegitimate child also ceases when the-child becomes 16 years of age,6 will the Domestic Relations Branch require this father to support his illegitimate children until they are 21 years of age?
The majority opinion itself raises a question as to how the order it affirms is to be enforced. There is no question about how an order of the Juvenile Court may be enforced. It has specific authority to commit to jail in default of payment.7 It seems strange to me that if Congress intended that the Domestic Relations Branch of the Municipal Court should have jurisdiction in a case of this sort, it did not provide the same method of enforcement.
In my opinion the trial court lacked jurisdiction and the order should be reversed.

. Code 1961, 11-951.

. Code 1981, 11-958.

. Code 1961, 11-960.

. Code 1961, 11-762.

. Code 1961, 11-958.

. Code 1961, 11-1620.

. Code 1961, 11-959.