Court Opinion

ID: 9953861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 21:01:51.030028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:53.535868
License: Public Domain

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                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-12862
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        ANGELO BERNARD BANKS,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        WARDEN, et al.,

                                                            Defendants,

        DOCTOR EDWARD AIKENS,
        NURSE MARY HUGHES-TERRY,
        MARTEKA CHITTY,
        former oﬃcer,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-12862

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00010-CDL-MSH
                           ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Angelo Banks, proceeding pro se, sued several former
        employees of Rutledge State Prison (the “prison”), claiming that
        the employees’ conduct surrounding his medical care and an
        inmate attack violated his Eighth Amendment rights. On appeal,
        Banks challenges the district court’s discovery and recusal orders,
        as well as its grant of summary judgment in favor of
        defendants-appellees. Banks also challenges the failure of the
        district court to enter a default judgment against one defendant in
        his favor. After review, we affirm.
                       I.     FACTUAL BACKGROUND
               In a second amended complaint, Banks raised two claims
        under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relevant to this appeal. First, Banks claimed
        that two prison medical employees—Dr. Edward Aikens and nurse
        Mary Hughes-Terry—were deliberately indiﬀerent to his serious
        medical needs in treating his gastrointestinal disorders. Second,
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        21-12862                 Opinion of the Court                              3

        Banks claimed that prison guard Marteka Chitty violated his Eighth
        Amendment rights by coordinating an inmate attack on Banks in
        2017. Banks also raised claims against several other prison
        employees, including Tiﬀany Price, but these claims were
        dismissed after a preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C.
        §§ 1915(e), 1915A(a).
        A. Motion to Amend and Request for Clerk’s Entry of Default
              Defendants Dr. Aikens and Hughes-Terry answered Banks’s
        second amended complaint, and defendant Chitty ﬁled a motion to
        dismiss. Banks then ﬁled a motion to amend his second amended
        complaint to add Chitty’s ﬁrst name and to add a claim for
        compensatory damages.
               The magistrate judge issued an order and report (“the ﬁrst
        report”) (1) granting Banks’s motion to amend as to defendants Dr.
        Aikens, Hughes-Terry, and Chitty and incorporating his proposed
        amendments into the second amended complaint;
        (2) recommending that defendant Chitty’s motion to dismiss
        should be denied in part; and (3) recommending that all defendants
        should be relieved of the requirement to answer the newly
        “incorporated” second amended complaint under Federal Rule of
        Civil Procedure 15(a)(3). 1 Banks did not object to the ﬁrst report,
        which the district court adopted.

        1 For clarity, throughout this opinion, we refer to the “incorporated” second

        amended complaint as simply the second amended complaint.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-12862

               Subsequently, Banks ﬁled an application for a clerk’s entry of
        default against the defendants and a motion to stay discovery
        pending his request for entry of default. In support of his request
        for a clerk’s entry of default, Banks asserted that Chitty failed to
        answer the second amended complaint.
               Without ruling on Banks’s request for a clerk’s entry of
        default, the magistrate judge denied Banks’s motion to stay
        discovery. In its order, the magistrate judge noted that (1) it had
        relieved the defendants of the requirement to answer the second
        amended complaint, (2) its order failed to clarify, however, that
        Chitty had not yet ﬁled an answer, and (3) that Chitty needed to do
        so. The magistrate judge thus ordered defendant Chitty to ﬁle an
        answer within 21 days, which Chitty did. After the magistrate
        judge’s order, the clerk declined to enter default.
               Banks ﬁled objections to the magistrate judge’s order. Banks
        also objected to (1) the denial of his motion to stay discovery,
        (2) the clerk’s failure to enter default under Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 55, and (3) the “ongoing acts of bias and personal
        prejudices by this clerk of court.”
               At this time, the district court did not address Banks’s
        objections.
                   B. Period from 2/28/2020 to 10/30/2020
              Although the magistrate judge initially provided 90 days for
        discovery, the discovery period ultimately ran for 8 months from
        February 28, 2020 until October 30, 2020.
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        21-12862              Opinion of the Court                      5

               In May 2020, Banks submitted a discovery request for,
        among others, documents related to defendants’ mistreatment of
        other inmates. In June 2020, Banks also submitted interrogatories
        regarding the defendants’ and other prison staﬀ members’ duties,
        and prison procedures regarding inmate assaults and inmate
        medical care.
              On September 7, 2020, Banks ﬁled a motion to compel,
        arguing that the defendants failed to timely respond at all to his
        discovery requests. Although the defendants had not yet formally
        responded, Banks noted that the defendants objected to the
        production of documents related to defendants’ mistreatment of
        inmates. Banks sought to compel the production of only this
        category of documents, which he argued was relevant.
              On October 15, 2020, defendants responded to Banks’s
        discovery requests. In response to Banks’s motion to compel,
        defendants stated that their untimely response was due to the
        COVID-19 pandemic and other delays in obtaining the requested
        information. Defendants also objected to Banks’s request for
        documents relating to defendants’ mistreatment of inmates as
        overbroad and irrelevant and asked the court to deny the motion
        to compel.
              On October 28, 2020, the magistrate judge granted in part
        Banks’s September 7 motion to compel. The magistrate judge
        determined that Banks’s motion to compel sought relevant
        documents, speciﬁcally documents related to defendants’
        mistreatment of inmates. Because the defendants’ responses were
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        6                     Opinion of the Court               21-12862

        untimely, the magistrate judge determined that defendants waived
        their objection to the production of documents related to the
        mistreatment of inmates.        The magistrate judge ordered
        defendants to produce within 21 days (1) documents relating to
        inmate complaints against defendant Chitty for failing to protect
        inmates or encouraging inmate-on-inmate attacks; and
        (2) non-privileged documents relating to inmate complaints against
        defendants Dr. Aikens and Hughes-Terry for deliberate
        indiﬀerence to serious medical needs.
                Also on October 28, 2020, the defendants took Banks’s
        deposition. Among other things, Banks noted that he had received
        at least some of the defendants’ discovery responses submitted on
        October 15, 2020.
               Discovery closed on October 30, 2020. Banks did not request
        an extension of discovery.
                  C. November 25, 2020 Motion for Sanctions
                On November 25, 2020, after the close of discovery, Banks
        ﬁled a motion for discovery sanctions, asserting that defendants
        failed to produce timely the documents subject to the magistrate
        judge’s compulsion order. Banks did not seek to reopen discovery.
               Defendants responded that they mailed their discovery
        responses to Banks within 21 days of the magistrate judge’s order.
        Defendants also noted that they responded to another request for
        documents and interrogatories that Banks submitted on November
        3, 2020, after discovery closed.
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        21-12862                  Opinion of the Court                                 7

              The magistrate judge denied Banks’s motion, ﬁnding that
        defendants timely complied with the October 28, 2020 order
        compelling production of certain documents related to the
        defendants’ mistreatment of inmates.
            D. Summary Judgment and Further Discovery Disputes
            On December 30, 2020, the defendants ﬁled a motion for
        summary judgment.
               On January 11, 2021, Banks sought leave to ﬁle a third
        amended complaint to add three more defendants who were prison
        employees: (1) Tiﬀany Price, who was dismissed after a preliminary
        screening of the second amended complaint; (2) James Herron; and
        (3) Steven Lopes. Although Banks sought to add three defendants
        to the case, his motion for leave to amend did not seek to reopen
        the discovery period.
               On February 23, 2021, Banks ﬁled a motion to reopen
        discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d),
        asserting that he did not receive defendants’ responses to the
        October 28, 2020 order until January 2021. Banks argued that
        defendants intentionally sent those responses to his prior prison
        address, which delayed his receipt of the documents. 2 Banks also
        listed numerous topics on which he hoped to seek further
        discovery, including discovery related to the three defendants he
        sought to add in his proposed third amended complaint.

        2 Banks filed a notice of change of address with the court in August 2020.
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                21-12862

              The defendants responded that they inadvertently
        overlooked Banks’s notice of change of address, but they
        conﬁrmed with the prison that Banks’s mail would have been
        automatically forwarded to his new prison address. Defendants
        also argued that Banks sought to reopen discovery to seek
        information relating to the three defendants he added in his
        proposed third amended complaint, and that Banks could have
        sought this information prior to the close of discovery.
                The magistrate judge denied Banks’s motion for leave to
        amend to ﬁle a third amended complaint based on undue delay and
        futility. The magistrate judge reasoned that Banks (1) ﬁled his
        motion to amend after the close of discovery and after defendants’
        summary judgment motion; (2) sought to add two new defendants,
        Lopes and Herron, even though his action was pending for two
        years; and (3) sought to raise a new claim against Price, who was
        dismissed from the action seventeen months prior. The magistrate
        judge noted that Banks delayed in seeking to add these three new
        parties, even though his deposition testimony and allegations in his
        second amended complaint referred to these parties or their
        conduct underlying his now-proposed claims against them.
        Regarding futility, the magistrate judge determined, among other
        things, that the proposed claims against Price, Lopes, and Herron
        were based on the January 2017 inmate assault on Banks and would
        be barred under the applicable statute of limitations.
              As to Banks’s motion to reopen discovery, the magistrate
        judge found that defendants’ failure to notice Banks’s change of
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        21-12862               Opinion of the Court                         9

        prison address, while “careless and unfocused,” was not intentional
        misconduct. The magistrate judge also determined that reopening
        discovery was unwarranted because (1) Banks testiﬁed at his
        October 28, 2020 deposition that he received defendants’ responses
        to his initial discovery requests; (2) Banks’s subsequent motion to
        compel sought only documents related to defendants’
        mistreatment of inmates, which the court ordered produced;
        (3) Banks’s November 25, 2020 motion for sanctions raised only
        defendants’ failure to produce timely those documents and did not
        seek to extend or reopen discovery; (4) Banks conﬁrmed that he
        received the documents subject to the October 28, 2020 order in
        January 2021; (5) defendants responded to additional discovery
        requests made by Banks after discovery closed; and (6) Banks
        indicated in his motion to reopen that he wished to pursue lines of
        discovery that he did not raise in his previous motions to compel
        and for sanctions. The magistrate judge denied Banks’s motion to
        reopen discovery but gave Banks 21 days to respond to the
        defendants’ summary judgment motion. That 21-day period ended
        on April 26, 2021.
               Instead of ﬁling a summary judgment response, Banks on
        April 13, 2021 ﬁled (1) a motion to recuse the magistrate judge; (2) a
        motion to set aside the denial of his motion to reopen discovery;
        and (3) a motion to stay a summary judgment ruling pending his
        motion to set aside the discovery ruling. Regarding discovery,
        Banks asserted that (1) he had not received any of defendants’
        discovery responses until January 2021, and (2) the defendants
        intentionally sent their discovery responses to the wrong address.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                21-12862

               Regarding recusal, Banks asserted that the magistrate
        judge’s bias against him was evidenced by its failure to hold the
        defendants accountable for their intentional misconduct.
               On May 24, 2021, the magistrate judge issued an order and
        report (“the second report”) (1) recommending that the
        defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted, and
        (2) denying Banks’s motions to set aside its prior discovery ruling,
        to recuse, and to stay summary judgment. Regarding Banks’s
        motion to recuse, the magistrate judge found that Banks’s
        assertions of bias arose entirely from adverse rulings in the instant
        case, which did not warrant recusal.
               As to Banks’s motion to set aside its discovery rulings, the
        magistrate judge found that Banks largely restated arguments from
        his earlier discovery motions and that he suggested—for the ﬁrst
        time and contrary to his October 28, 2020 deposition testimony—
        that he failed to receive any discovery responses until January 2021.
        The magistrate judge also concluded that, despite the defendants’
        mailing error, Banks received defendants’ discovery responses prior
        to the deadline for ﬁling dispositive motions but waited until after
        the defendants’ summary judgment motion to seek an extension
        of discovery.
                Although Banks failed to respond to the defendants’
        summary judgment motion, the magistrate judge reviewed the
        record, determined there were no genuine disputes of material
        fact, and recommended summary judgment be granted in favor of
        the defendants. The magistrate judge found that Banks’s claim
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        21-12862               Opinion of the Court                       11

        against defendant Dr. Aikens relied solely on Dr. Aikens’s failure to
        follow the recommendations of Banks’s prior prison doctor. The
        magistrate judge concluded that this diﬀerence in medical opinion
        was insuﬃcient to support Banks’s deliberate indiﬀerence claim.
        The magistrate judge also noted record evidence that Dr. Aikens
        treated Banks’s stomach condition by prescribing medication
        shortly after Banks’s arrival at the prison and that Banks later
        refused to cooperate with Dr. Aikens’s eﬀorts to examine Banks
        and to have Banks referred to a specialist.
               Next, the magistrate judge found that Banks’s claim against
        defendant nurse Hughes-Terry relied on his assertions that she
        (1) refused to give him unprescribed medication and (2) would not
        allow him to see Dr. Aikens to get new medication prescribed.
        However, the magistrate judge concluded that it was undisputed
        (1) that Hughes-Terry, as a nurse, could not prescribe medication
        herself or issue unprescribed medication, and (2) that
        Hughes-Terry had not deprived Banks of access to Dr. Aikens.
        Instead, the magistrate judge pointed out that Banks admitted at
        his deposition that Hughes-Terry told him to request a sick call to
        see Dr. Aikens to have new medication prescribed.
                The magistrate judge then construed Banks’s claim against
        defendant Chitty as proceeding under a failure-to-protect and an
        excessive-use-of-force theory, but it determined that both theories
        failed. As to Banks’s failure-to-protect theory, the magistrate judge
        found there was no evidence that Chitty subjectively knew of any
        risk to Banks posed by the inmates involved in the attack. The
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                21-12862

        magistrate judge stated that Banks’s excessive-use-of-force theory
        failed because Banks relied on only speculation that Chitty
        encouraged the inmates to attack Banks. The magistrate judge
        noted that Banks testiﬁed at his deposition that Chitty called one
        of the inmates to her oﬃce prior to the attack. However, Banks
        testiﬁed at his deposition that he did not know what Chitty and the
        inmate spoke about.
               Banks ﬁled objections to the magistrate judge’s second
        report. Among other things, Banks renewed the arguments in his
        discovery and recusal motions, and he asserted that the magistrate
        judge lacked the authority to consider those motions.
              The district court adopted the second report, aﬃrmed the
        magistrate judge’s denial of Banks’s motions, and entered
        summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court
        considered Banks’s objections to the second report but found that
        his objections lacked merit. Speciﬁcally, the district court
        concluded that the magistrate judge had authority to determine
        Banks’s discovery motions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and that
        the magistrate judge’s rulings on those motions were not clearly
        erroneous or contrary to law. Banks timely appealed.
                  II.    ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
              On appeal, Banks argues the district court should have
        entered a default judgment in his favor.
               We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion
        for default judgment. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
        294 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002). To obtain a default judgment,
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        21-12862                   Opinion of the Court                               13

        a party must ﬁrst apply to the clerk of the court for an entry of
        default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). The clerk must enter default if the
        party against whom relief is sought failed to plead or otherwise
        defend against suit and this failure is shown by aﬃdavit or
        otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, if a plaintiﬀ’s claim is not
        for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by
        computation, the plaintiﬀ must apply to the court for a default
        judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
               As to default judgment, Banks argues that the district court
        abused its discretion by denying his motion for default judgment.
        Banks contends defendant Chitty did not timely respond to the
        second amended complaint and the district court improperly
        denied his motion based on “its familiarity with the credability [sic]
        of the material allegations.”
               But Banks never ﬁled—and the district court never ruled
        on—a motion for default judgment.3 Instead, Banks ﬁled a request
        for a clerk’s entry of default under Rule 55(a), which was never
        entered. The magistrate judge noted, but did not rule on, Banks’s
        request for a clerk’s entry of default when it denied his
        contemporaneously ﬁled motion to stay discovery pending his

        3 In their response brief, the defendants interpret Banks’s argument as referring

        to his motion for sanctions, which referenced, but did not request, default
        judgment. Instead, Banks’s motion for sanctions requested that certain,
        unspecified facts “be deemed admitted and established as evidence.” Banks
        appears to confirm that the defendants misinterpret his argument, stating in
        his reply brief that the defendants’ “brief clearly and convincingly seeks to
        ‘mislead’ this Court’s review of the issue of default judgment.”]
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                21-12862

        request for a clerk’s entry of default. And while Banks ﬁled an
        objection to the clerk’s failure to enter default, the district court
        never ruled on that objection. Unsurprisingly, we may not review
        non-existent orders or judgments of the district court. Cf. Bogle v.
        Orange Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 162 F.3d 653, 661 (11th Cir. 1998)
        (holding that a notice of appeal must designate an existing order or
        judgment).
               Alternatively, we liberally construe Banks’s brief as arguing
        that he was entitled to a default judgment, and thus the district
        court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of the
        defendants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (stating we must liberally construe pro se briefs). But that argument
        fairs no better. Banks was not entitled to a default judgment
        because Chitty timely responded to the second amended
        complaint. We explain why.
               After incorporating Banks’s amendments to the second
        amended complaint, the magistrate judge relieved the defendants
        of the requirement to answer the newly “incorporated” second
        amended complaint. Banks did not object to or appeal this ruling
        to the district court. Later, the magistrate judge clariﬁed that,
        unlike Dr. Aikens and Hughes-Terry, defendant Chitty had not ﬁled
        an answer to the second amended complaint. Instead, Chitty ﬁled
        a motion to dismiss, which was denied in part. The magistrate
        judge, therefore, ordered Chitty to answer the second amended
        complaint within 21 days, which Chitty did. Under Federal Rule of
        Civil Procedure 15(a)(3), a court may prescribe a diﬀerent
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        21-12862                 Opinion of the Court                         15

        timeframe for answering an amended complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P.
        15(a)(3). Because Chitty answered the second amended complaint
        within the 21 days prescribed by the court, her answer was timely
        and a default judgment in favor of Banks was unwarranted. See id.;
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
                          III.   SUMMARY JUDGMENT
               Banks also appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor
        of the defendants.
               We review de novo a district court’s entry of summary
        judgment. Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th
        Cir. 2005). An appellant abandons an issue on appeal by making
        only passing references to it or by raising it in a perfunctory manner
        without supporting arguments and authority. Sapuppo v. Allstate
        Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); Timson, 518 F.3d
        at 874 (stating issues not briefed by pro se appellants are deemed
        abandoned).
               First, Banks generally asserts that the district court
        improperly resolved genuinely disputed material facts in granting
        summary judgment. However, Banks fails to identify any such
        factual disputes. Banks had the responsibility, both in the district
        court and on appeal, to sift through the record and highlight the
        disputed material facts that precluded summary judgment on his
        claims. See Coleman v. Hillsborough Cnty., 41 F.4th 1319, 1328 (11th
        Cir. 2022) (“Apparently, he would like for us to dig through the
        record in an eﬀort to turn up facts that might make his case for him.
        But that is his job, not ours.”); Serendipity at Sea, LLC v. Underwriters
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                     21-12862

        at Lloyd’s of London Subscribing to Pol’y No. 187581, 56 F.4th 1280,
        1287 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e will not require the district court to
        undertake the proverbial hunt for the Red October submarine in
        the Atlantic Ocean in order to ﬁnd a disputed issue of fact in the
        summary judgment record.” (footnote omitted)).
                Although we liberally construe pro se ﬁlings, we cannot act
        as de facto counsel or rewrite an otherwise deﬁcient ﬁling to sustain
        an action. See Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir.
        2020). Even liberally construed, though, Banks’s brief contains
        nothing more than a recitation of the summary judgment standard
        under Rule 56(a)—and fails to identify the disputed material facts
        that preclude summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating
        a party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support this
        assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record”).
        “[A] pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under
        summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a
        genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert
        summary judgment.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir.
        1990). As a result, Banks has abandoned this summary judgment
        issue. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681; Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. 4

        4 To be clear, and as the magistrate judge correctly noted, Banks’s failure to

        respond to defendants’ summary judgment motion did not itself warrant
        summary judgment against him. See United States v. One Piece of Real Prop.
        Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Mia., Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004)
        (stating courts “cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact
        that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the
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        21-12862                Opinion of the Court                         17

                We recognize that Banks argues that the district court erred
        by also characterizing his sworn aﬃdavits and declarations as
        “unsupported allegations.” (Quotation marks omitted.) Although
        Banks appears to quote the magistrate judge’s or district court’s use
        of the words “unsupported allegations,” the second report and the
        district court’s order adopting that report never used those words.
        Regardless, in the second report, which the district court adopted,
        the magistrate judge properly gave evidentiary weight to Banks’s
        deposition testimony and allegations in his sworn complaint, and it
        assumed for the purposes of summary judgment that Banks’s
        version of events was true. See Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227,
        1232 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting facts alleged in a sworn complaint
        constitute evidence at the summary judgment stage).5 Banks has
        not shown any failure to consider his aﬃdavits, declarations, and
        allegations.
             Accordingly, we aﬃrm the district court’s summary
        judgment.
                                IV.    DISCOVERY
              Banks also appeals the various discovery rulings. Banks
        objected to the magistrate judge’s discovery rulings. The district

        motion”). Instead, the magistrate judge and district court based summary
        judgment on the merits of defendants’ motion.
        5 We note that Banks’s original second amended complaint was not sworn.

        But Banks’s subsequent amendments to the second amended complaint were
        sworn. Because the magistrate judge incorporated these two pleadings, we
        treat them as both sworn for purposes of this appeal.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                21-12862

        court overruled Banks’s objections and adopted the magistrate
        judge’s rulings.
                We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s
        discovery decisions. Lary v. Trinity Physician Fin. & Ins. Servs.,
        780 F.3d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir. 2015). The district court enjoys broad
        discretion in determining the scope and eﬀect of discovery. Avirgan
        v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1580 (11th Cir. 1991). We must aﬃrm under
        the abuse of discretion standard unless we determine that the
        district court made a clear error in judgment, even if we would
        have decided the issue diﬀerently had it been our choice. See In re
        Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994); MSP Recovery Claims,
        Series LLC v. Hanover Ins. Co., 995 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).
              On appeal, Banks argues that he did not have an adequate
        opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the entry of summary
        judgment.
               Before entering summary judgment, the district court must
        ensure that the parties had an adequate opportunity for discovery.
        Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316
        (11th Cir. 1990). After careful review of the record, we conclude
        that Banks had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery
        before the entry of summary judgment.
              The discovery period in this case extended from February
        28, 2020 to October 30, 2020. Banks ﬁled his initial discovery
        requests in May and June 2020, but defendants failed to timely
        respond. Even though Banks was aware that his discovery requests
        were outstanding, defendants’ responses were late, and discovery
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        21-12862              Opinion of the Court                       19

        was set to close at the end of October 2020, Banks did not seek an
        extension of discovery.
               Instead, in September 2020, Banks ﬁled a motion to compel
        the production of a single category of documents from his initial
        requests related to inmate mistreatment by the defendants, which
        the magistrate judge granted in part on October 28, 2020. Also on
        October 28, 2020, Banks was deposed and conﬁrmed that he had
        already received at least some of defendants’ responses.
        Presumably though, Banks had not yet received the documents
        subject to the magistrate judge’s October 28, 2020 discovery order,
        as that order was entered on the same day as his deposition.
               On November 25, 2020, Banks ﬁled a motion for sanctions
        for defendants’ failure to comply with the October 28, 2020 order.
        Banks, however, did not seek to extend or reopen the discovery
        period that had expired on October 30, 2020. Due to defendants’
        careless mailing error, Banks did not receive certain documents
        subject to the October 28, 2020 order until January 2021. In the
        meantime, defendants responded to additional discovery requests
        Banks made after discovery had closed, defendants ﬁled their
        motion for summary judgment, and the district court granted
        Banks an extension to respond to the summary judgment motion,
        giving him until February 26, 2021 to respond.
              Yet, it was not until February 23, 2021, three days before his
        summary judgment response was due, that Banks sought to reopen
        discovery. The magistrate judge denied Banks’s motion after
        noting that Banks conﬁrmed he received defendants’ discovery
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                21-12862

        responses and delayed in seeking additional discovery. The
        magistrate judge denied Banks’s February 23, 2021 motion to
        reopen discovery but again extended the time for Banks to respond
        to summary judgment to April 26, 2021.
               Instead of responding to defendants’ summary judgment
        motion, Banks ﬁled his April 13, 2021 motion to set aside the
        magistrate judge’s denial of his motion to reopen discovery. Banks
        also on April 13, 2021 asserted for the ﬁrst time—and contrary to
        his October 28, 2020 deposition testimony—that he did not receive
        any of defendants’ discovery responses until January 2021. This
        new assertion was directly at odds with Banks’s deposition
        testimony that conﬁrmed he received some discovery prior to his
        October 28, 2020 deposition. After noting Banks’s inconsistencies
        regarding when he received defendants’ responses, the magistrate
        judge declined to reopen discovery and proceeded to analyze
        defendants’ summary judgment motion.
                Based on these facts, we cannot say the district court abused
        its discretion in denying Banks’s motion to reopen discovery. Prior
        to the entry of summary judgment, Banks received defendants’
        responses to his initial discovery requests, the October 28, 2020
        order, and his out-of-time discovery requests. While defendants’
        responses to Banks’s initial requests and to the October 28, 2020
        order were late, Banks was aware of the October 30, 2020 discovery
        deadline and that defendants’ responses were outstanding, but he
        did not timely seek to extend or reopen discovery. Further, Banks
        conﬁrmed that he received the defendants’ responses by January
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        21-12862                Opinion of the Court                         21

        28, 2021, but he waited until February 23, 2021 to seek to reopen
        discovery. “Despite construction leniency aﬀorded pro se litigants,
        we nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural
        rules.” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002); see also
        Brooks v. Britton, 669 F.2d 665, 666-67 (11th Cir. 1982) (dismissing pro
        se litigant’s appeal where he failed to timely move for an extension
        of time to ﬁle his notice of appeal).
                Given the extent of discovery Banks was able to conduct, his
        receipt of defendants’ January 28 responses prior to the entry of
        summary judgment, and his failure to timely seek an extension or
        reopening of discovery, we conclude the district court did not abuse
        its discretion by denying his motion to reopen discovery.
                                  V.     RECUSAL
               Banks also appeals the denial of his motions to recuse.
               We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion
        to recuse. Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306,
        1319-20 (11th Cir. 2002). A judge “shall disqualify himself in any
        proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
        questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Section 455(a) imposes a
        self-enforcing obligation on judges to recuse where the proper legal
        grounds exist. Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001).
        A motion for recusal must show that the judge’s purported bias is
        personal rather than judicial in nature. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234,
        1239 (11th Cir. 2000). “[E]xcept where pervasive bias is shown, a
        judge’s rulings in the same or a related case are not a suﬃcient basis
        for recusal.” Id.
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                   21-12862

               At several points throughout the district court proceedings,
        Banks sought the “release” or recusal of the magistrate judge,
        asserting that the magistrate judge was biased against him, issued
        unfavorable rulings, and mischaracterized evidence. Each motion
        was denied.
               Here, Banks argues again that both the magistrate judge and
        the district court demonstrated “extra judicial bias,” which
        warranted recusal. Banks argues this bias is evidenced by the
        judges’ mischaracterization of his allegations and their unequal
        treatment of the parties. Banks also argues that the judges
        improperly limited his claim against Chitty to only a
        failure-to-protect theory.
                Suﬃciently put, however, the bases for recusal on which
        Banks relies are all judicial in nature and relate to the judges’ rulings
        in this case. See Story, 225 F.3d at 1239. These acts do not establish
        pervasive bias and are insuﬃcient to warrant recusal. See id.
        Additionally, it is clear from the second report, which the district
        court adopted, that the magistrate judge did not limit Banks’s claim
        against Chitty. Instead, the magistrate judge liberally construed
        Banks’s allegations against Chitty as raising both a
        failure-to-protect theory and an excessive-force theory. The
        magistrate judge analyzed Banks’s claim under both theories,
        concluding both failed. Accordingly, the magistrate judge and
        district court did not abuse their discretion in declining to recuse.
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        21-12862                   Opinion of the Court                                 23

                                   VI.     CONCLUSION
               For the above reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment, its denial of Banks’s discovery motions, and
        its denial of Banks’s motions to recuse. 6
                AFFIRMED.

        6 We deny Banks’s motion to file a supplemental brief, which seeks to raise,

        for the first time on appeal, the dismissal of his claims against defendant Leticia
        Bell-Burks. Absent certain exceptions not relevant here, an appellant who
        does not raise an issue in his opening brief may not do so in a supplemental
        brief. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Cypress, 814 F.3d 1202, 1210-11
        (11th Cir. 2015) (stating an appellant may raise a new argument in a
        supplemental brief when an intervening Supreme Court opinion overrules
        existing precedent).