Court Opinion

ID: 9942958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 15:07:35.80048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:39.350271
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0864-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KEVIN LAMBERT,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued January 9, 2024 – Decided February 22, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple, Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 19-05-
                   0749 and 21-06-0523.

                   Rachel A. Neckes, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
                   Public Defender, attorney; Rachel A. Neckes, of
                   counsel and on the brief).

                   David Michael Liston, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
                   cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; David Michael Liston, of
                   counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Kevin Lambert appeals from a December 17, 2019 order

denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a motor vehicle stop. He

also challenges his convictions and consecutive sentences under two judgments

of conviction (JOCs) dated October 6, 2021. One JOC resulted from a 2021 jury

trial; the other was based on defendant's guilty plea to a charge under a 2021

indictment. We affirm the December 17 order and the October 6 JOC based on

the guilty plea. However, we reverse the conviction resulting from defendant's

jury trial, and remand for a new trial. We also vacate the sentence imposed

under the October 6 JOC related to defendant's trial conviction.

                                       I.

      On May 7, 2019, a Middlesex County grand jury returned Indictment No.

19-05-00749, charging defendant with third-degree possession of a controlled

dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1).         His co-defendants,

Shaiwan, Tashien, and Leonard Edwards were charged under the same

indictment.1

      Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence that was recovered on the

1
   Because the co-defendants share the same surname, we refer to them by their
first name. We intend no disrespect by doing so. None of the co-defendants are
involved in this appeal.
                                                                        A-0864-21
                                       2
date of his arrest following a motor vehicle stop. On December 17, 2019, the

trial court conducted a testimonial hearing on the motion. The State called

Officers Justin Miller and Jose Gomez to testify. Defendant testified on his own

behalf.

      Officer Miller testified he was working for the New Brunswick Police

Department (NBPD) and handling narcotics investigations in the Street Crimes

Unit (SCU) on the day of defendant's arrest. He estimated he conducted over

100 such investigations. One investigation by the NBPD led to the issuance of

a search warrant for Apartment 3A at 55 Reservoir Avenue in New Brunswick,

and another search warrant for Leonard.

      On the morning of February 15, 2019, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Miller

initiated surveillance in an unmarked vehicle at the apartment complex at 55

Reservoir Avenue. Miller had "received information that . . . drug activity would

begin around six o'clock in the morning" outside Apartment 3A. Two officers

from his squad were parked in an unmarked vehicle within two blocks of the

complex; two other officers were stationed in an unmarked vehicle the same

distance away, but in the opposite direction.

      Miller testified that after he began surveilling the apartment complex, he

saw Leonard's son, Shaiwan, conduct multiple hand-to-hand transactions with

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                                       3
people whom Miller suspected were buying drugs. Miller noted the transactions

were "very short" in duration.

      Miller also testified he observed a maroon Ford Expedition drive up to the

"main entrance door that . . . [led to] Apartment 3A," where "Shaiwan was

waiting" in the foyer. Miller stated he could see into the Expedition, noting

"[t]he sun was out" and the weather was "[d]ry and clear." Miller recognized

defendant as the driver of the vehicle because defendant "was . . . known to

[him]."

      Next, Miller testified he saw Shaiwan exit the building, enter defendant's

car from the passenger side, "lean over toward . . . [defendant] as if he[ was]

handing [defendant] something, and [Shaiwan and defendant] exchange[d] a

couple of words." Shaiwan then exited the Expedition and defendant drove

away. Miller estimated the two men were together for "[t]hirty seconds to a

minute," which he considered "a short period of time." Miller stated he could

not see "what, if anything, [wa]s actually . . . handed off" between Shaiwan and

defendant, but he saw Shaiwan's "body move over, as if he[ was] leaning . . .

towards the driver."

      After Shaiwan went back inside the apartment building, Miller informed

two of his squad members, Sergeant William Oels and Officer Jose Gomez,

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                                       4
about his observations. Miller also told them defendant's car was heading in

their direction. Sergeant Oels and Officer Gomez immediately effectuated a

motor vehicle stop and reported back to Miller "that they found heroin in the

vehicle."

      Prior to defendant testifying, his attorney advised the court that defendant

only challenged the lawfulness of the stop, not the location of the drugs found

in his vehicle. When his direct examination commenced, defendant admitted he

drove to 55 Reservoir Avenue on February 15, 2019, explaining he went there

"to go tell him about a job." Defense counsel asked defendant to clarify who

defendant spoke to about a job. Defendant answered, "I forgot his name. I . . .

just met him, and he told me where he live[d]." Defendant continued, "I don't

know his name. I can't remember his name." He added:

            all I know[,] . . . that's his father. He came to me one
            day. He wanted a job. . . . I got information. The job
            said they w[ere not] hiring. . . . I went to his house[
            and] I told him that. He got in the car. He got out. I
            drove off. The police pull[ed] me over.

      On cross-examination, defendant conceded he phoned Shaiwan before he

arrived at the Reservoir Avenue apartment complex and told Shaiwan that he

was "on [his] way." Defendant testified, "that[ is] why [Shaiwan] knew to come

out when" defendant arrived at the complex. When the assistant prosecutor

                                                                            A-0864-21
                                        5
asked defendant if he "could have told [Shaiwan] about the job on the phone,"

defendant answered,

             I could have told him about the job on the phone, but I
             did[ not] want to . . . . I just said, come out, I'm going
             to tell you about the job. . . . I could have d[one] a lot
             of things on the phone, but I did[ not] want to tell him
             on the phone.

      Officer Gomez testified on rebuttal.          He stated that based on his

assignment to the NBPD's SCU, his unit was "conducting a search warrant at 55

Reservoir Avenue" on the morning of February 15, 2019. He recalled that he

and Sergeant Oels were parked "a couple of blocks away[,] . . . waiting for

further . . . instructions" while Officer Miller was surveilling the apartment

complex. Gomez testified Miller subsequently informed him "that he [had] just

seen a transaction between [defendant] and . . . Shaiwan . . . and that [defendant]

was heading towards [Gomez's] direction." Gomez and Sergeant Oels promptly

effectuated a motor vehicle stop of defendant's vehicle.

      Oels asked defendant for his license, registration, and insurance.

According to Gomez, Oels then saw defendant reach with his right hand toward

the glove box to retrieve his documents, while using "his left hand . . . [to] stuff[]

a brick of heroin between the seats and the center console." Oels ordered

defendant out of the vehicle. While Gomez detained defendant, Oels recovered

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                                          6
the brick of heroin "[f]rom . . . between the center console and . . . the driver's

seat."

         On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Gomez if he recalled what

Officer Miller told him before Gomez and Oels effectuated the motor vehicle

stop. Gomez testified he "remember[ed] clearly that Miller saw a transaction

between [defendant] and . . . [NBPD's] target." Gomez also stated he did not

"know what . . . Miller saw" because Gomez "was[ not] there."

         The judge credited the testimonies of Officers Miller and Gomez, noting

their statements were, "in part, corroborated by the testimony of [defendant] in

terms of what the officers ultimately observed." The judge found that on the

date of defendant's arrest, the officers were "conducting surveillance . . . based

upon information . . . they had been provided" about activity "in the area of 55

Reservoir Avenue, more specifically Apartment 3[]A." Further, she determined

"the reason for the early surveillance was based upon . . . information that there

was, in fact, drug activity or suspected drug activity that began around that

hour." Additionally, the judge found Officer Miller "observed what he believed

to be a hand[-]to[-]hand transaction . . . based upon what he saw to be body

movements within [defendant's] vehicle and there was some conversation that

was relatively short[,] . . . anywhere from [thirty] seconds to a minute," between

                                                                             A-0864-21
                                        7
Shaiwan and defendant.

     Moreover, the judge credited Officer Miller's testimony that he believed

Shaiwan "was, in fact, selling drugs from that particular location." She also

accepted Miller's testimony that NBPD's SCU

           received a call from a concerned neighbor . . . informing
           [the police] that [between] approximately . . . six and
           seven [a.m.,] there were a lot of individuals selling and
           purchasing narcotics from that . . . location. That
           time . . . and location correspond[ed] with the time and
           location that . . . defendant's Ford Expedition was in the
           area, and . . . the officer[] observed Shaiwan . . . getting
           in and out of . . . defendant's vehicle in a very short
           period of time.

                 ....

                  . . . [T]he observations of the police . . . were
           consistent with[—]based upon their training and
           experience[—]narcotic[]s activities, buyers[] and
           sellers exchanging narcotics[,] and that interaction
           [was] a relatively short one, which was what
           [defendant] also described.

                 I don't find credible, however, . . . defendant's
           explanation as to why he was at that particular
           location. . . . [D]efendant[] show[ed] up at the very
           time that buyers [we]re essentially coming into the area
           to obtain drugs. I don't find that it's merely a
           coincidence that he happened to be there at that
           particular location at that particular time, and for that
           duration. It [is] . . . not credible.

                 The [c]ourt finds that based upon the
           observations of the officers, the fact that they were

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                                        8
            conducting surveillance for drug transactions when this
            defendant arrived on the scene, the totality of all of the
            circumstances that exist in this case, which are really
            not disputed, those circumstances provide[d] probable
            cause for the officer[s'] . . . stop and search of this
            defendant's vehicle.

                  Moreover, the circumstances giving rise to
            probable cause were unforeseeable. This defendant
            was, in no way, the target of the investigation that was
            happening separately when he just happened to drive
            into that particular area on that particular morning,
            essentially, . . . as the [c]ourt finds[,] . . . to, in fact,
            make a purchase.

                  So [the stop and search] was unforeseeable [and]
            spontaneous. The[ police] were not expecting this
            defendant to drive into that area, for Shaiwan . . . to
            enter and exit [defendant's] vehicle during their
            investigation. And, so, for all of these reasons[,] the
            motion to suppress is appropriately denied.

      In June 2021, a Middlesex County grand jury returned Indictment No. 21-

06-00523, charging defendant with:        third-degree possession with intent to

distribute CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3); and third-degree possession of CDS.

      Two months later, defendant's trial under Indictment No. 19-05-00749

commenced. The judge who presided over his suppression hearing also presided

over defendant's trial. Prior to opening statements, the State asked the judge to

grant its motion to admit defendant's prior convictions for the purpose of

impeachment. The judge stated she was "waiting for a response from the

                                                                            A-0864-21
                                         9
defense," but her "intentions were to allow [the State] only to use [defendant's]

most recent" conviction from 2017. The judge noted defendant had "priors

dating back to 1989," and asked if defense counsel wished to be heard on the

motion. Counsel stated the judge's decision was "fair," but he argued the 2017

conviction should be "sanitized" so the jury would be told only about the date

and degree of the 2017 conviction, as well as the sentence defendant received.

The State and the judge agreed to these requests.

      During the trial, Officers Miller and Gomez testified consistent with their

testimony at the suppression hearing. After the State rested, it asked the judge

to reconsider her decision to admit only defendant's 2017 conviction for the

purpose of impeachment if he testified. Specifically, the State argued the judge

should admit his convictions from the following JOCs:

            March 8, 1989 for third-degree theft from person,
            N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3;

            March 4, 1992, for third-degree possession of CDS,
            N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-degree possession with
            intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), N.J.S.A.
            2C:35-5(b)(3); and third-degree possession of CDS
            with intent to distribute in a school zone, N.J.S.A.
            2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7;2

2
  At defendant's March 4, 1992 sentencing, the two third-degree possession and
distribution charges were merged with the distribution in a school zone charge.
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                                      10
            November 4, 2002, for fourth-degree contempt,
            N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9;

            November 4, 2002, for third-degree possession of CDS
            with intent to distribute in a school zone;3

            June 7, 2007, for third-degree possession of weapons
            for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and

            July 7, 2017 for third-degree manufacture and
            distribution of a CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and
            2C:35-5(b)(3).4

      The State argued "every single conviction should come in, because there

[was] no" ten-year period in defendant's life when he was not "committing and

[being] convicted of crimes."      The judge responded, "I think I might be

persuaded by that argument." Defense counsel objected to any reconsideration

3
  The State also sought to include the JOCs from defendant's re-sentencings on
this conviction from August 2004 and December 2005.
4
   The 2017 conviction resulted from a 2012 jury trial. Following that trial,
defendant was convicted of various drug and weapons offenses. Defendant
successfully appealed from his convictions and sentence, and we ordered a new
trial. State v. Lambert, No. A-2698-12 (App. Div. April 9, 2015) (slip op. at
10). On remand, he pled guilty to third-degree possession of CDS with intent
to distribute and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited weapon, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-3(h). State v. Lambert, No. A-1996-15 (App. Div. June 5, 2017) (slip op.
at 2). He again appealed and we vacated the prohibited weapon conviction and
remanded for resentencing on the distribution charge. Id. at 3. Defendant was
resentenced for this offense in July 2017. Therefore, at defendant's August 2021
trial, the trial judge and counsel stipulated to treating this conviction as a 2017
conviction.

                                                                             A-0864-21
                                       11
of the judge's prior decision and argued "the prejudicial value [of admitting all

of defendant's prior convictions wa]s so much higher than the probative value,"

because defendant's convictions before 2017 were "very remote."

      The judge granted the State's reconsideration application. She explained

that although defendant's 1989 and 1992 convictions were remote, he had "a

number of convictions" between 1989 and 2017 and served prison sentences for

what she "perceive[d] to be serious charges." The judge also found defendant

served "sentences on crimes that were not only third-degree, but second-degree

offenses as well." Further, the judge concluded, "to suggest to the jury that

[defendant] had perhaps one prior in 2017, when in fact[,] he ha[d] a slew of

them and . . . continued to . . . pick up new offenses, . . . would not[,] in fact[,]

represent truly to this jury who [defendant] is." Thus, she stated, "all of these

offenses come in if [defendant] chooses to testify." However, the judge also

directed that defendant's prior convictions would "be sanitized" to reflect only

"the date [and] degree [of the offense] and the sentence."

      Defense counsel asked for time to speak with defendant, telling the judge

that her mid-trial ruling "kind of dera[iled defendant's] strategy," and counsel

was "surprised." Before counsel conferred with defendant, the judge advised

defendant he had the right to testify or "exercise [his] right not to testify."

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                                        12
Defendant told the judge he understood his options and "want[ed] to testify."

He reiterated that desire at least twice more and stated he was "not going to

change [his] mind." The judge advised defendant he was "not bound by anything

[he] just told [her]," and he "might want to have a talk with [his attorney] before

[he] ma[de his] decision."

      After speaking with counsel, defendant elected not to testify. He then

called John McMahon, a defense investigator, as his only witness. McMahon

testified he interviewed defendant's acquaintance, Ashley Chalfant, by phone

prior to trial, and Chalfant admitted she drove defendant's Expedition the night

before defendant was arrested in February 2019. McMahon also testified that

Chalfant admitted to purchasing heroin the night before defendant's arrest,

dropping a brick of heroin in the Expedition, and forgetting to remove the brick

before returning the car to defendant.        On cross-examination, McMahon

admitted he never met Chalfant face-to-face but used her birthdate and mailing

address to confirm her identity when the two spoke over the phone.

      During closing arguments on August 6, 2021, the assistant prosecutor told

jurors to "scrutinize" McMahon's testimony, just as defense counsel asked them

"to scrutinize the [S]tate's witnesses." The assistant prosecutor further informed

jurors that McMahon was "a biased witness" who received "all of his

                                                                             A-0864-21
                                       13
information from the defense and . . . did absolutely no investigation and no

follow up." Additionally, the assistant prosecutor stated that even if the jury

assumed Chalfant made the statements McMahon attributed to her, Chalfant did

"nothing more than giv[e] a statement to try to help out a friend ," which was

"not worthy of belief." Defense counsel did not object to these comments. Later

that day, the jury found defendant guilty of third-degree possession of CDS.

      On September 15, 2021, defendant pled guilty under Indictment No. 21 -

06-00523 to third-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS, in exchange

for the State's recommendation that the court dismiss his remaining three

charges and impose a four-year sentence to run consecutively to the sentence he

would receive under Indictment No. 19-05-00749. During his plea colloquy,

defendant testified he understood the terms of the plea agreement , he did not

"want to go to trial," he had a chance to "review . . . discovery with [his]

attorney," and he was "pleading guilty to th[e CDS] charge because [he was]

guilty of th[at] charge." Further, defendant stated he was satisfied with his

attorney's services. After defendant provided a factual basis for his guilty plea,

the judge found he entered the plea "freely and voluntarily," "understanding the

nature and consequences of the plea."

      On October 6, 2021, the judge sentenced defendant under both

                                                                            A-0864-21
                                        14
indictments. The judge found aggravating factors three (risk of reoffense), six

(criminal history), and nine (need to deter), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), (9),

which she "weighed heavily." Next, the judge rejected defendant's request that

she find mitigating factors eight (defendant's conduct was a result of

circumstances unlikely to recur), nine (defendant's character and attitude made

it unlikely he would commit another offense), ten (amenability to probationary

treatment) and eleven (excessive hardship), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b) (8), (9), (10),

and (11). She also found defendant "appear[ed] to have issues with substance

abuse," and that despite being indicted in 2019, he incurred additional charges

under a second indictment. She concluded such conduct was "a clear indication

that there's a risk of re[]offense." The judge sentenced defendant to a four-year

flat term on his trial conviction for third-degree possession of CDS and a

consecutive four-year flat term on his distribution charge, consistent with his

plea agreement.

                                       II.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

            POINT I

            THE MOTION COURT'S DECISION MUST BE
            REVERSED AND THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
            SEIZED MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE
            OFFICER    LACKED     THE    REQUISITE

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                                      15
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATORY STOP.

POINT II

THE   TRIAL  COURT'S  LAST  MINUTE,
ERRONEOUS DECISION THAT DEFENDANT'S
DECADES-OLD PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE
ADMISSIBLE FOR IMPEACHMENT REQUIRES
REVERSAL.

     A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE IT
RELIED UPON INCORRECT INFORMATION,
INCLUDING CONVICTIONS VACATED ON
APPEAL AND DISMISSED CHARGES, TO ADMIT
FIVE     PRIOR   CONVICTIONS,      FATALLY
ALTERING THE [N.J.R.E.] 609 ANALYSIS.

    B. THE TRIAL COURT'S LAST-MINUTE
REVERSAL OF ITS [N.J.R.E.] 609 DECISION
VIOLATED MR. LAMBERT'S RIGHT TO PREPARE
A DEFENSE.

     C. THE ERROR IS NOT HARMLESS.

POINT III

THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN REVERSIBLE
MISCONDUCT WHEN SHE DISPARAGED THE
DEFENSE AND THE ONLY DEFENSE WITNESS.

POINT IV

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS
REQUIRES THAT MR. LAMBERT'S TRIAL
CONVICTIONS BE REVERSED.

                                             A-0864-21
                   16
              POINT V

              RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE
              TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FIND MITIGATING
              FACTORS ONE AND TWO AND, IN IMPOSING
              CONSECUTIVE     TERMS,    FAILED    TO
              ADEQUATELY EVALUATE THE YARBOUGH5
              FACTORS OR THE FAIRNESS OF THE OVERALL
              SENTENCE.

                  A. RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE
              THE COURT FAILED TO FIND MITIGATING
              FACTORS ONE AND TWO, WHICH WERE WELL-
              SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

                   B. RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE
              THE SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW
              THE MANDATES OF YARBOUGH AND TORRES6
              IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.

        First, we note the State concedes "[d]efendant is correct that his 1992

conviction[s] w[ere] reversed and the charge[s were] eventually dismissed." In

fact, we reversed defendant's March 1992 convictions and remanded for a new

trial in 1994. See State v. Lambert, 275 N.J. Super. 125, 134 (App. Div. 1994).

Moreover, the record reflects the charges resulting in the March 1992

convictions were dismissed at the State's request in August 1994. Accordingly,

we agree with defendant's contention under Points II.A and II.C that, when the

5
    State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
6
    State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021).
                                                                         A-0864-21
                                        17
judge conducted her Rule 609(b) analysis, she relied, in part, on misinformation

she received about the March 1992 JOC, and not only mistakenly considered

convictions that were reversed on appeal, but charges that were ultimately

dismissed. Because this was not harmless error, we are constrained to reverse

defendant's conviction under the 2019 indictment, vacate the corresponding

sentence imposed, and remand for a new trial. Based on this disposition, we do

not reach defendant's remaining arguments under Point II, nor the arguments

raised under Points III, IV and V, except to state that defendant's argument under

Point V.A lacks merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Accordingly, we confine our discussion

to defendant's suppression and Rule 609(b) arguments.

      An appellate court must uphold a trial court's findings on a suppression

motion if they are supported by "sufficient credible evidence in the record."

State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014). This deference is applicable regardless

of whether there was a testimonial hearing, or whether the court based its

findings solely on its review of documentary evidence. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J.

146, 161 (1964); State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). We typically will not

reverse a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous

or mistaken. S.S., 229 N.J. at 381. But a trial court's legal conclusions are

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                                       18
reviewed de novo. State v. Dorff, 468 N.J. Super. 633, 644 (App. Div. 2021)

(citing S.S., 229 N.J. at 380).

      "To lawfully stop a motor vehicle, 'a police officer must have a reasonable

and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle . . . is committing a motor-

vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense.'" State v. Nyema,

465 N.J. Super. 181, 190 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J.

20, 33-34 (2016)). "Accordingly, an investigatory stop is permissible 'if it is

based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545-46 (2019)). In

addressing whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an

investigatory stop, a trial court "must 'evaluate the totality of circumstances

surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in

effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from

unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" State v. Privott, 203 N.J.

16, 25-26 (2010) (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986)).

      The reasonable suspicion inquiry considers an officer's background and

training and permits the officer "to draw on their own experience and specialized

training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative

                                                                             A-0864-21
                                       19
information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'"

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). "Reasonable suspicion necessary to justify

an investigatory stop is a lower standard than the probable cause necessary to

sustain an arrest." State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002).

      "Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution

guarantee an individual's right to be secure against unreasonable searches or

seizures." State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012) (citing U.S. Const. amend.

IV; N.J. Const. art. 1 ¶ 7). "[S]earches and seizures conducted without warrants

issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable and therefore

invalid." State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022) (quoting State v. Elders,

192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007)).

      To overcome the presumption that a warrantless search is unlawful, "the

State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence not only

that the search or seizure was premised on probable cause, but also that it f[ell]

within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."

State v. Bryant, 227 N.J. 60, 69-70 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State

v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 552 (2008)). Evidence seized when found in plain

view following a lawful traffic stop is one such exception. State v. Gonzales,

                                                                            A-0864-21
                                       20
227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016). In fact,

            [f]ollowing the Court's decision in Gonzales, police
            may seize contraband in plain view and without a
            warrant if two requirements are met: (1) they are
            lawfully in the viewing area when observing and
            seizing the evidence; and (2) the incriminating nature
            of the evidence is "immediately apparent" to the
            officers.

            [State v. Washington, 475 N.J. Super. 292, 301-02
            (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Gonzales, 227 N.J. at 101).]

      Another exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception.

State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 319-20 (2023) ("'[W]hen the police have probable

cause to believe that [a] vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense

and the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and

spontaneous,' law enforcement may search the vehicle without first obtaining a

warrant.") (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409,

447 (2015)). Probable cause "requires 'a practical, common sense determination

whether, given all of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.'" State v. Myers, 442 N.J.

Super. 287, 301 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 46

(2004)).

      Governed by these standards, we discern no basis to disturb the trial

judge's December 17, 2019 order denying defendant's suppression motion.

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Thus, we affirm the suppression decision, in part, for the reasons expressed by

the judge and, in part, for other reasons. See State v. Heisler, 422 N.J. Super.

399, 416 (App. Div. 2011) (noting a reviewing court is free to affirm "on

grounds different from those relied upon by the trial court"). In short, while we

agree with the judge that the motor vehicle stop was lawful, we affirm based on

the lesser standard of reasonable and articulable suspicion governing the

investigatory stop and based on the totality of circumstances detailed at length

in the judge's comprehensive oral decision. We also conclude the subsequent

seizure of heroin from defendant's vehicle was lawful under the plain-view

exception, considering he did not challenge the location of the heroin Sergeant

Oels found in defendant's vehicle.

      Next, we consider the principles compelling us to reverse defendant's trial

conviction based on the judge's flawed analysis under N.J.R.E. 609(b). It is well

settled that we apply a deferential standard of review to a trial court's decision

to permit the State to use prior criminal convictions for impeachment. State v.

T.J.M., 220 N.J. 233-34 (2015). "However, we do not defer to a ruling that is

based on a mistaken interpretation of an evidence rule, or that misapplies the

rule." State v. R.J.M., 453 N.J. Super. 261, 266 (App. Div. 2018).

      "Only convictions of crimes may be used to affect credibility." State v.

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Burgos, 262 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1992). But "a conviction under appeal

may not be used to impeach [a] defendant's credibility at trial."        State v.

Williams, 299 N.J. Super. 264, 274 (App. Div. 1997) (citing State v. Blue, 129

N.J. Super. 8, 12 (App. Div. 1974)).       As the Blue Court reasoned, it is

"fundamentally unfair to permit the use of a prior conviction to impeach

credibility while the very credibility of this conviction itself is under attack

through the appellate process."     Blue, 129 N.J. Super. at 12.       "Likewise

inadmissible for impeachment purposes is 'evidence concerning criminal

charges that were dismissed as part of a plea agreement,'" because "a 'criminal

charge is more akin to an arrest since the defendant was never convicted of a

crime.'" Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 2 on

N.J.R.E. 609 (2023-2024) (quoting Burgos, 262 N.J. Super. at 5). Additionally,

pertinent to this appeal, "[i]f other crimes charged, but dismissed, are included

on a judgment of conviction, those other crimes charged may not be inquired

into for purposes of affecting credibility." Burgos, 262 N.J. Super. at 5.

      We also are mindful that prior to 2014, Rule 609 presumptively admitted

prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes "unless excluded by the

judge as remote or for other causes." State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431, 442 (2012)

(quoting N.J.R.E. 609 (2012)). The Court in Harris recognized a significant

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difference between the Rule and the Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.) 609,

which limited the use of any conviction that was more than ten years old. Id. at

444. The Court then referred "[t]he question of whether N.J.R.E. 609 should be

modified . . . to the Supreme Court Committee on Evidence." Id. at 445.

      The Committee on the Rules of Evidence recommended significant

changes to the Rule, which were subsequently adopted by the Court effective

July 1, 2014, and have remained largely unchanged since.7 See Biunno et al.,

cmt. 1 on N.J.R.E. 609. Under its current iteration, any witness's credibility may

be presumptively impeached through prior convictions under subsection (a) of

the Rule, subject only to exclusion under N.J.R.E. 403 or subsection (b).

      Admission of a conviction more than ten years old triggers a different

analysis under subsection (b), which provides:

      Use of Prior Conviction Evidence After Ten Years.

            (1) If, on the date the trial begins, more than ten years
            have passed since the witness's conviction for a crime
            or release from confinement for it, whichever is later,
            then evidence of the conviction is admissible only if the
            court determines that its probative value outweighs its
            prejudicial effect, with the proponent of that evidence
            having the burden of proof.

7
 Minor "restyling" amendments to the Rules of Evidence effective July 1, 2020,
do not affect our analysis, and we use the current version of the Rule in this
opinion.
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            (2) In determining whether the evidence of a conviction
            is admissible under subparagraph (b)(1) of this rule, the
            court may consider:

                   (i) whether there are intervening convictions for
                   crimes or offenses, and if so, the number, nature,
                   and seriousness of those crimes or offenses,

                   (ii) whether the conviction involved a crime of
                   dishonesty, lack of veracity, or fraud,

                   (iii) how remote the conviction is in time, [and]

                   (iv) the seriousness of the crime.

            [N.J.R.E. 609(b).]

"However, making findings as to those four factors is not enough. The court

must then engage in the weighing process under (b)(1), to determine whether

the State has carried its burden of proving that evidence of the remote conviction

would not be more prejudicial than probative." R.J.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 270

(citing N.J.R.E. 609 (b)(1)).

      Here, all of defendant's prior convictions—except for the inadmissible

reversed 1992 convictions and his 2017 conviction—were subject to subsection

(b) of the Rule because they were potentially admissible and more than ten years

old when the trial began. Thus, the judge was required to initially determine

whether the State demonstrated that the probative value of defendant's

potentially admissible and remote prior convictions "outweigh[ed] its

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prejudicial effect." N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1). To make this assessment, the judge

would have been guided by the non-exhaustive list of factors "the court may

consider" as set forth in N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2), the first of which is "whether there

are intervening convictions for crimes or offenses." N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(i). The

judge also could have considered "the number, nature, and seriousness of those

[intervening] crimes." N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(i). Through no fault of the judge, she

did not know the true number, nature, and dates of defendant's convictions. That

lack of knowledge triggered her flawed analysis under N.J.R.E. 609(b). On this

record, we cannot conclude this error was harmless, particularly given

defendant's professed desire to testify at trial before he consulted with counsel

and ultimately declined to do so.

      Our Supreme Court cautioned in State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234, 250

(2021) that "there can be situations, although likely unusual, in which an

erroneous N.J.R.E. 609 ruling may be deemed harmless even if that ruling

resulted in the defendant's deciding not to testify." (Emphasis added) (citing

State v. Whitehead, 104 N.J. 353, 359-60 (1986)). In reaching this conclusion,

the Court rejected the defendant's argument that "an erroneous ruling that pushes

a criminal defendant not to testify can never be harmless," id. at 247, and instead

reaffirmed "that in limine N.J.R.E. 609 rulings shall continue to be reviewed

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under the harmless-error standard," id. at 252. The Court said, "[t]o determine

whether admission of evidence constitutes harmless error, the relevant inquiry

is whether the purported error 'is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable

of producing an unjust result.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Kuchera, 198 N.J. 482,

501 (2009)).

      The Hedgespeth Court further assessed whether "the jury's failure to hear

defendant's testimony could have produced an unjust result." Ibid. The Court

concluded the trial court's ruling that the State could impeach the defendant with

his two prior convictions was harmful error, explaining:

            The key testimony against defendant was that of two
            police officers who testified that they saw the gun in
            defendant's waist[]band and that a gun was later
            recovered by other officers near where defendant and
            others were apprehended. The State introduced the gun
            itself into evidence; however, there was no fingerprint
            or DNA evidence on the gun.

                   Had the trial court not erroneously admitted the
            prior convictions, defendant argues he could have more
            forcefully challenged the detectives' credibility as to
            whether they saw the gun on his waistband. By not
            testifying, defendant was only able to cast doubt on the
            officers' accounts through cross-examination; he was
            unable to effectively offer a counter theory of the case.
            Moreover, the jury was not able to consider
            Hedgespeth's demeanor and credibility in delivering his
            theory of the case.

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                   No doubt, the strongest evidence against
            defendant is that the State produced the gun in
            evidence. But, without indisputable evidence linking
            defendant to the gun—except through officer
            testimony—the admission of the gun did not
            necessarily cement the State's case against defendant.
            The mere fact that the State may characterize a potential
            defense theory seeking to explain away the gun as
            "implausible" is not reason to hold that the trial court's
            error was harmless. Determining implausibility "is in
            the sole province of the jury. Judges should not intrude
            as the thirteenth juror."

            [Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. at 252-53 (first and third
            emphases added) (quoting State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469,
            485 (2017)).]

      Considering the guidance provided by the Court in Hedgespeth, we are

persuaded that here, the judge's Rule 609(b) analysis was not only impermissibly

faulty, but deprived defendant of the opportunity "to effectively offer a counter

theory of the case," the effect of which is not for us to judge. 249 N.J. at 252.

Thus, the error was not harmless, and we are compelled to reverse defendant's

trial conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for a new trial.

      Finally, to the extent defendant informally contends a reversal of his trial

conviction entitles him to withdraw his guilty plea under Indictment No. 21-06-

523, we disagree. Defendant specifically argues he "decided to plead guilty" to

a distribution charge under the second indictment "only after he was convicted

on Indictment No. 19-05-749," and "he would not have pleaded guilty if he had

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not already been facing substantial prison time for his conviction, through a

flawed trial." Preliminarily, we note this argument was raised in two succinct

paragraphs in the latter section of defendant's brief, without a separate point

heading, contrary to Rule 2:6-2(a)(6). "This kind of presentation of an issue for

appellate review is improper." Mid-Atl. Solar Energy Indus. Ass'n v. Christie,

418 N.J. Super. 499, 508 (App. Div. 2011). Although we need not reach this

issue, for the sake of completeness, we briefly address it.

      Here, the record shows that the charges arising under defendant's second

indictment resulted from an incident entirely separate from the incident leading

to defendant's jury trial and conviction. Moreover, by the time defendant pled

guilty under the second indictment, he not only had failed to prevail on his

suppression motion under the first indictment, but had been convicted by a jury

under the 2019 indictment. Fully aware of these circumstances, defendant chose

to enter a guilty plea to the charge of third-degree possession of CDS with intent

to distribute, in exchange for the State's recommendation that he serve a four-

year prison term consecutive to the sentence he would serve on the 2019

indictment, with any remaining charges under the second indictment to be

dismissed. The judge sentenced defendant consistent with the negotiated plea

agreement after previously finding he knowingly and voluntarily entered into

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                                       29
the plea agreement.

      "A trial judge's finding that a plea was voluntarily and knowingly ent ered

is entitled to appellate deference so long as that determination is supported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Lipa, 219 N.J. 323, 332

(2014). "Once it is established that a guilty plea was made voluntarily, it may

only be withdrawn at the discretion of the trial court." Ibid.

      Here, the record is devoid of any evidence defendant formally moved to

withdraw his plea. See State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 150 (2009). Moreover,

there is no evidence the errors we have highlighted from defendant's August

2021 trial had any bearing on his pleading guilty in September 2021 to the

distribution charge under the second indictment. Thus, we discern no basis to

vacate defendant's guilty plea, notwithstanding our reversal of his trial

conviction.

      Affirmed in part; reversed, remanded, and vacated in part for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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