Court Opinion

ID: 9732552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:25:43.847477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:29.252167
License: Public Domain

Billings, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I must dissent from the majority’s reversal of the defendant’s DUI conviction. I do not think the legislature, in enacting the implied consent law, intended to eviscerate 23 V.S.A. § 1201 (a) (2), which before now allowed prosecution for driving while under the influence based on “ [e] vidence of objective symptoms supporting the existence of that state.” State v. Jacques, 130 Vt. 427, 430, 296 A.2d 246, 249 (1972). Today’s decision bars any prosecution at all, notwithstanding the existence of probable cause, if the suspected drunk driver is stopped by a state police officer or certified law enforcement officer who does not ask the suspect to take a breath test. This contravenes the primary purpose of 23 V.S.A. § 1201; namely, the protection of the public from drunk drivers.
If an arresting officer reasonably believes a suspect is intoxicated, but the observable symptoms are few or subtle, then the evidentiary results of a chemical analysis are preferable if *180prosecution is to be successful. But when, as in the instant case, the suspect is clearly intoxicated, to disallow a prosecution based on the multitude of objective symptoms exhibited by this defendant, merely because a chemical test was not offered, is unreasonable and unsound statutory construction. Whitcomb v. Dancer, 140 Vt. 580, 586-87, 443 A.2d 458, 461 (1982).