Court Opinion

ID: 9954812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 00:00:35.891338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.324987
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10648            Document: 96-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/26/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                                   ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                    March 26, 2024
                                    No. 23-10648                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                   ____________                                           Clerk

In the Matter of 2999TC Acquisitions, L.L.C.

                                                                                    Debtor,

Timothy Barton,

                                                                              Appellant,

                                          versus

HNGH Turtle Creek, L.L.C.,

                                                                                   Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 3:22-CV-2186
                   ______________________________

Before King, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
       Timothy Barton was a stranger to the litigation in the district court.
After the parties settled and the district court dismissed the case, Barton
nonetheless attempted to appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-10648           Document: 96-1           Page: 2      Date Filed: 03/26/2024

                                       No. 23-10648

                                              I.

         The underlying dispute arises from bankruptcy.1 An entity called
2999TC Acquisitions, LLC filed for bankruptcy protection. One of
2999TC’s creditors, HNGH Turtle Creek, sought an order from the
bankruptcy court that it was entitled to certain property. The bankruptcy
judge issued an order in favor of HNGH. 2999TC appealed to the district
court.
         In a related proceeding, the district court appointed a receiver to act
on behalf of 2999TC. The receiver and HNGH reached a settlement in the
matter related to 2999TC’s property. 2999TC and HGNH, as part of their
settlement, agreed to voluntarily dismiss the proceeding in the district court
by a joint stipulation under Bankruptcy Rule 8023(a).
         Barton then filed a pro se notice of appeal. But Barton was never a
party, nor had he moved to intervene as one, in the 2999TC/HNGH dispute.
Barton nonetheless argues that the stipulated voluntary dismissal between
2999TC and HNGH was an adverse “final judgment” that he can appeal.

                                             II.
         Barton invokes our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But there are
multiple potential jurisdictional grounds upon which to dismiss this case.

         _____________________
         1
          Barton failed to timely designate any records from the bankruptcy court or the
receivership proceeding. This court denied his untimely motion to supplement the record.
Accordingly, this background section is based on the parties’ representations in their briefs,
the publicly available docket in the receivership case, and HNGH’s 28(j) letter.

                                              2
Case: 23-10648        Document: 96-1        Page: 3    Date Filed: 03/26/2024

                                  No. 23-10648

       Barton’s lack of appellate standing is sufficient to dispose of this case.
As we have noted:
       “The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly
       become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well
       settled.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988); see also
       Bayard v. Lombard, 50 U.S. 530, 546 (1850) (holding that a writ
       of error “cannot be sued out by persons who are not parties to
       the record, . . . [or] by strangers to the judgment and
       proceedings . . . ”); Payne v. Niles, 61 U.S. 219, 221 (1857)
       (“[I]t is very well settled in all common-law courts, that no one
       can bring up, as plaintiff in a writ of error, the judgment of an
       inferior court to a superior one, unless he was a party to the
       judgment in the court below . . . .”); United States ex rel. La. v.
       Boarman, 244 U.S. 397, 402 (1917) (describing the principle
       proscribing nonparty appeals “as a subject no longer open to
       discussion”).
       The courts of appeals have recognized limited exceptions to
       this rule. The Supreme Court has regarded these exceptions
       with, at best, skepticism. See Marino, 484 U.S. at 304 (“The
       Court of Appeals suggested that there may be exceptions to
       this general rule, primarily when the nonparty has an interest
       that is affected by the trial court’s judgment . . . . We think the
       better practice is for such a nonparty to seek intervention for
       purposes of appeal; denials of such motions are, of course,
       appealable.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
       United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928,
       933 (2009) (“The Court has further indicated that intervention
       is the requisite method for a nonparty to become a party to a
       lawsuit.”).
United States v. Slovacek, 699 F.3d 423, 426–27 (5th Cir. 2012) (parallel
citations omitted); see also In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d 244, 249
(5th Cir. 2009) (“Non-parties are generally not permitted to appeal a ruling
in which they did not participate.”).

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Case: 23-10648        Document: 96-1       Page: 4    Date Filed: 03/26/2024

                                 No. 23-10648

       Barton is not a party to the underlying dispute—the stipulated
voluntary dismissal is between 2999TC and HNGH. Nor has he moved to
intervene. Therefore, under Marino and our precedent, he cannot appeal as
a stranger to the proceeding below.
       Barton’s only contention to the contrary is that he should not be
considered a stranger because he has a financial interest in the
2999TC/HNGH dispute. True, we have allowed a non-party to appeal after
Marino v. Ortiz. See Castillo v. Cameron County, 238 F.3d 339, 349 (5th Cir.
2001) (adopting “a three-part test, analyzing whether the non-parties
actually participated in the proceedings below, the equities weigh in favor of
hearing the appeal, and the non-parties have a personal stake in the outcome”
(internal quotations omitted)). But it is not clear that Castillo remains good
law after City of New York. See 556 U.S. at 933 (appearing to abrogate non-
party appellate standing). And in any event, none of the Castillo factors are
present here. Barton did not personally participate in the proceeding below.
He is not personally the owner of the property at issue. And we have no way
to assess the equities because Barton failed to file a complete record with this
case or make a motion to intervene. See supra n.1. Moreover, he did not
invoke the Castillo rule as a basis for jurisdiction. Cf. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006) (“[T]he party asserting federal
jurisdiction when it is challenged has the burden of establishing it.”).
       Dismissed.

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