Court Opinion

ID: 9705716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:17:40.594853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:14.222839
License: Public Domain

Lampron, J.,
dissenting: I agree with the majority opinion that the state of most significant relationship should determine the rights of the parties in this case. I disagree, however, with its holding that on the issue of the standard of conduct which should govern their rights and liabilities arising from their status as guest and host Massachusetts and not New Hampshire is the state where this relationship is centered.
In our recent decision of Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N. H. 30 (decided January 31, 1966), this court applying the Massachusetts rule of interspousal immunity denied to a wife domiciled there with her husband the right to recover damages in a tort action against him brought in New Hampshire based on an accident which occurred here. That decision was reached after considering the respective law on that issue, that of Massachusetts which bars such an action and that of New Hampshire which permits recovery, and the effect on those laws of the result reached by this court.
In like manner consideration should be given in this case to the effect of applying our law which permits a guest to recover for his host’s lack of ordinary care instead of the Massachusetts law which denies recovery to a guest unless the host is guilty of gross negligence. The latter law is not statutory as is the case in most states having such a rule. On the contrary it originated when the courts of that state applied the rules of liability of a gratuitous bailee to the conduct of one who undertakes the gratuitous transportation of a passenger in his automobile. West v. Poor, 196 Mass. 183; Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487.
Surely it cannot be considered a disservice to Massachusetts to impose on a New Hampshire host driving a New Hampshire guest in that commonwealth the duty to use due care in the operation of his automobile on their highways. Furthermore, as in the case of a husband and wife (Johnson v. Johnson, supra), this makes for a simple rule by which, in most cases, the duty of the *75host to his guest would remain constant as they travel from state to state instead of being subject to change at each state boundary for no other reason, in many instances, than pure geography. Such a rule would not affect in any way the laws regulating the host’s manner of driving in each state journeyed as this would be governed by the local rules of the road. Wilcox v. Wilcox 26 Wis. 2d 617, 631; Freund v. Spencer, 260 N. Y. S. 2d 149, 151 (Sup. Ct.).
Plaintiff Brenda, then 4 years of age, her parents, and the defendant were all residents of Seabrook in this state at the time of this one car accident. The automobile involved was registered and garaged in New Hampshire. The mishap occurred in the course of a trip which began and was to end in this state. Its purpose was to pick up Brenda and a younger brother who were visiting in adjoining Salisbury, Massachusetts and return them to their home in Seabrook. The accident happened approximately one mile from the New Hampshire line. These facts demonstrate conclusively, in my opinion, that the relationships of these parties were centered in New Hampshire. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N. Y. 2d 473.
Massachusetts having no overriding interest in having its law on the issue of guest-host liability applied under those circumstances, the guest should be allowed recovery for lack of due care by the host in accordance with the principles applied by this court in Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N. H. 86 and Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N. H. 30. I would so hold in this case and sustain plaintiffs ’ exceptions to the denial of their motions to this effect. Babcock v. Jackson, supra; Steinberg v. Fischman, 260 N. Y. S. 2d 403; Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws (Tentative Draft No. 9), 5. 379, comment (3)(d) Goodrich-Scoles, Conflict of Laws, s. 94, p. 174 (1964); 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212, 1245, 1249, 1254.
I agree with the majority opinion when it says that considering the record as a whole, the evidence construed most favorably to the plaintiff did not warrant a finding that the defendant was grossly negligent within the meaning of the law of Massachusetts. However applying the standard of ordinary negligence to defendant’s conduct I would hold that her motion for a nonsuit was improperly granted and remand the case for a new trial for the reasons hereinafter stated.
There was evidence that about one month before the accident the defendant brought her ten-year-old car to a garage whose *76owner testified that as a result of a discussion with her he repaired the lock on the right rear door “so it would close.” Plaintiff’s mother testified that two or three weeks after the accident the same right rear door of defendant’s car “was ajar, Mrs. Larrabee’s daughter opened the door and then she gave a good bang, then she pulled on the door and it came open. Then she banged it again, when she tried it the next time it stayed closed.” There was no evidence the condition of the automobile had changed since the accident. On this evidence the jury could properly find that the defendant knew the lock on that right rear door had not been operating properly about a month before the accident; that because it was operating improperly a few weeks after the accident it prob - ably was in that condition at the time of the accident; and that the defendant knew or should have known of this defect, advised plaintiff’s mother of it and taken it in consideration in the operation of her car. Prokey v. Hamm, 91 N. H. 513, 515; Marcoux v. Collins, 94 N. H. 345, 347; Curtin v. Benjamin, 305 Mass. 489; 2 Wigmore Evidence (3d ed.) s. 437, p. 413.
There was further evidence that Brenda’s mother from her position in the front seat could have seen her 4-year-old daughter Brenda if she had moved around and that she did not recall her doing so while they were riding. The mother testified that she banged the right rear door shut after placing the children in the car and that during the trip it was found opened and Brenda wafe on the highway. To open this door, which opened from the front towards the back, the inside handle would have to be pulled up. I would hold that the jury could find on this evidence that Brenda’s fall was caused by the opening of the right rear door due to a defect in its mechanism. Zellers v. Chase, 105 N. H. 266, 268; Manning v. Freeman, 105 N. H. 272, 275.