Court Opinion

ID: 9909168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 17:09:42.71426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:13.209333
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN RE: ADOPTION OF M.J., A MINOR         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: A.J., FATHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 556 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered April 10, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Orphans' Court at
                         No(s): 002-ADOPT-2023

 IN RE: ADOPTION OF M.J., A MINOR         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: R.G., MOTHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 576 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered April 10, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Orphans' Court at
                         No(s): 002-ADOPT-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                       FILED: December 12, 2023

      A.J. (“Father”) appeals from the April 10, 2023 order that involuntarily

terminated his parental rights to his biological son, M.J., born in January 2021.
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Separately, R.G. (“Mother”) has appealed the same order that simultaneously

terminated her parental rights to M.J.1 We affirm.

       We gather the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter

from the certified record. Mother and Father (“Parents”) cohabitate and are

married. Armstrong County Children & Youth Services (“CYS”) first became

involved with this family immediately after M.J. was born addicted to

methamphetamines. See N.T., 3/28/23, at 9. Mother admitted to abusing

methamphetamines and overdosing on heroin during her pregnancy with M.J.

Id. at 11-12. On January 7, 2021, CYS was granted temporary protective

custody of M.J., until he was returned to the legal and physical custody of

Father on February 5, 2021. Thereafter, CYS provided in-home services until

court supervision was terminated in July 2021.

       On July 1, 2022, officers of the Ford City Police Department and the

Armstrong County Sheriff’s Department attempted to execute a warrant for

Mother’s arrest at Parents’ home on unrelated criminal charges and discovered

Parents’ home to be in a “deplorable condition.” Order of Adjudication and

Disposition, 8/1/22, at ¶ 1(3)-(4). M.J. was removed to a temporary kinship

placement until July 7, 2022, when Parents’ home had been cleaned and he

was returned to Father’s custody. See N.T., 3/28/23, at 11. At this point in

time, Mother was alleged to be residing in Chicago, Illinois and Father began

____________________________________________

1 As both appeals stem from the same order, we consolidated these cases
for disposition pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513.

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to demonstrate a “lack of cooperation” with CYS. Order of Adjudication and

Disposition, 8/1/22, at ¶ 1(9)-(10).

      On August 1, 2022, M.J. was adjudicated dependent.        See Order of

Disposition, 9/8/22, at ¶ 1(14). Two weeks later, CYS filed an application for

protective custody of M.J. after learning that he had been living apart from

Parents with another family member for several days due to the deplorable

conditions of the family residence. The agency could not locate Mother and

Father.

      The court awarded CYS custody of M.J. that same day and confirmed its

holding at a shelter care hearing on August 19, 2022. Upon re-establishing

contact with CYS shortly thereafter, Mother tested positive for the opioid

suboxone, for which she did not have a prescription, and Father confessed to

using cocaine. See Order of Disposition, 9/8/22, at ¶ 1(15)-(16); see also

N.T., 3/28/23, at 17-18. Beginning in August 2022, M.J. was placed in a pre-

adoptive kinship foster home with B.G. and C.G. (“Foster Parents”), where he

has remained. See N.T., 3/28/23, at 7, 36-37.

      In connection with these proceedings, Mother and Father were each

assigned several permanency goals, namely to: (1) undergo a drug and

alcohol assessment and follow-up on recommended treatment; (2) submit to

a mental health assessment and follow-through on recommended treatment;

(3) obtain and maintain suitable housing; (4) comply with random drug

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screens; and (5) cooperate with CYS and related services. See Permanency

Review Order, 12/6/22, at 1; see also N.T., 3/28/23, at 18-19, 22-23.

       Between     August     2022    and      February   2023,   Parents’   respective

compliance with these directives was minimal.               Additionally, there is no

evidence that Parents addressed the underlying substance abuse and mental

health problems.       See N.T., 3/28/23, at 18-28, 66, 71.          Both repeatedly

refused to submit to random urine screens and, when they did acquiesce to

such tests, both tested positive on multiple occasions for various illicit

substances including, inter alia, methamphetamines. See N.T., 3/28/23, at

20-25. Parents also failed to provide access to their home for evaluations

performed by CYS and other providers. Id. at 25-28, 63-65.

       Parents were granted supervised, one-hour visitations with M.J. twice

per month. Id. at 30. Out of thirteen total joint visits that were offered,

Father participated in five, while Mother attended six.                Id. at 30-31.

Accordingly, Parents have enjoyed approximately five to six hours of total

contact with M.J. since his removal from their care in August 2022.

       On February 23, 2023, CYS filed a consolidated petition seeking to

involuntarily terminate Parents’ respective parental rights to M.J. pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) and (b), at which time M.J. was two years old.2 The

____________________________________________

2 The record is silent concerning the appointment of legal interest counsel for
M.J. as contemplated by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). Paula LaStrape, Esquire, was
appointed to serve as M.J.’s guardian ad litem and advocate for his best
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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orphans’ court held a joint termination hearing on March 28, 2023, wherein

CYS adduced testimony from the CYS caseworker assigned to this matter,

Brenna    Irvin,   and    family    resource     specialist   Brittany   Marshall   from

JusticeWorks Youth Care of Armstrong County (“JusticeWorks”). Mother was

not present at the hearing, although she was represented by Lisa Peluso,

Esquire, who acted as stand-by counsel because Mother’s appointed counsel,

Kimberly N. Ferringer, Esquire, was unavailable. Father attended the hearing

and was also represented by separate counsel. Parents did not testify, nor

did they present any evidence on their own behalf. On April 10, 2023, the

orphans’ court filed a memorandum and order involuntarily terminating

Parents’ rights to M.J.3

____________________________________________

interests during these proceedings. See Order of Court, 2/27/23. Insofar as
M.J. was two years old at the time of the proceedings and incapable of
articulating a preference with respect to the termination of parental rights, we
observe no structural defect in this case. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080,
1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (holding that “if the preferred outcome of a child is
incapable of ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-verbal,”
then § 2313(a) “is satisfied where the court has appointed an attorney-
guardian ad litem who represents the child's best interests during such
proceedings.”).

3  We note that the orphans’ court initially filed a decree terminating Parents’
rights to M.J. on March 28, 2023. See Decree, 3/28/23. However, there is
no indication in the certified record that the court provided notice of this filing
to the parties. Thereafter, on April 10, 2023, the orphans’ court filed the
instant order and memorandum, which was served on the parties.

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      Mother and Father both filed timely notices of appeal to this Court along

with concise statements of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

We outline their respective issues thusly.

      Mother presents the following issues for our consideration:

      1.   Whether Mother’s due process rights were violated when her
           attorney at the termination of parental rights hearing
           represented her even though there was a conflict of interest,
           namely the attorney represented the father of Mother’s other
           child in a different dependency proceeding, which was
           disclosed by Mother to the attorney?

      2.   Whether the court committed an error of law in finding clear
           and convincing evidence that Mother’s conduct met the
           statutory requirements for termination, despite the following:

            a.   Mother attended all of [M.J.’s] medical
                 appointments, except one, during the pendency
                 of the child’s placement;

            b.   Mother regularly and consistently attended all of
                 her supervised visitation with [M.J.];

            c.   Mother admitted herself into a drug rehabilitation
                 program in December 2022 and was sober for a
                 period of time; and

            d.   Mother admitted herself into inpatient psychiatric
                 facility;

           all of which were a part of and in compliance with the
           permanency plan.

Mother’s brief at 5-6 (cleaned up).

      Concomitantly, Father has framed his appellate issues, as follows:

      1. Whether the court abused its discretion in finding clear and
         convincing evidence that Father would not or could not remedy
         his housing situation and therefore involuntarily terminated
         his parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) despite

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          Father showing in the past a willingness and ability to remedy
          said housing issues?

       2. Whether the court abused its discretion in finding clear and
          convincing evidence that it would be in the best interest of
          [M.J.] to involuntarily terminate the rights of Father despite
          the testimonial evidence of a bond between Father and [M.J.]?

Father’s brief at 5-6 (cleaned up).

       We begin our review by briefly addressing Mother’s first claim for relief,

which asserts that Attorney Peluso, who represented Mother as stand-by

counsel during the termination proceedings, had an alleged conflict of interest

that   Mother   submits   should   have   disqualified   Attorney   Peluso   from

participating in the matter. See Mother’s brief at 13-14 (“[Attorney] Peluso

previously represented the [f]ather of Mother’s other child in a CYS

proceeding. . . . Because of [Attorney] Peluso’s past prejudices against Mother

due to the prior representation, [Attorney] Peluso could not zealously

represent Mother in this case.”). Specifically, Mother asserts that she first

learned of this alleged conflict of interest prior to the termination hearing

during a permanency review proceeding wherein Attorney Peluso also filled in

for Mother’s appointed counsel. Id. at 14. Despite learning of this apparent

conflict, neither Mother nor her regular attorney raised any issue with the

orphans’ court.

       Our standard of review concerning matters pertaining to disqualification

of counsel on ethical grounds is plenary. See Rudalavage v. PPL Electric

Utilities Corp., 268 A.3d 470, 478 (Pa.Super. 2022).

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      In support of this contention, Mother has invoked Pennsylvania’s Rule

of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2). Id. at 13. This Rule provides, in pertinent

part, as follows:

      (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not
      represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
      conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

      ....

         (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one
         or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
         responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
         person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

      (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
      interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

         (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be
         able to provide competent and diligent representation to
         each affected client;

         (2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

         (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a
         claim by one client against another client represented by the
         lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a
         tribunal; and

         (4) each affected client gives informed consent.

Rule of Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)-(b). As a general proposition, a court’s authority

to disqualify counsel based upon the Rules of Professional Conduct is “limited,”

and may be exercised only when it “is needed to ensure the parties receive

the fair trial which due process requires.”     Vertical Resources, Inc. v.

Bramlett, 837 A.2d 1193, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2003) (cleaned up).

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      Instantly, Mother did not file a motion seeking to disqualify Attorney

Peluso, nor did she otherwise bring this matter concerning her representation

to the orphans’ court’s attention prior to the taking of an appeal. Rather,

Mother raised this claim for the first time in her Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b)

concise statement of errors. See Concise Statement, 5/5/23, at ¶ 1. It is

well-established that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Furthermore,

a party is not permitted to “rectify the failure to preserve an issue” by

proffering it in a Rule 1925(b) concise statement, which “is not a vehicle in

which issues not previously asserted may be raised for the first time.” Hinkal

v. Pardoe, 133 A.3d 738, 746 (Pa.Super. 2016). This claim is waived.

      Moreover, even if we were to charitably overlook Mother’s waiver of this

issue, there is no documentation or testimony in the certified record speaking

to Attorney Peluso’s alleged conflict of interest. Rather, the only facts upon

which Mother has based this claim were asserted, for the first time, in her

brief to this Court. See Mother’s brief at 13-14.

      We remind Mother that “[f]or the purposes of appellate review, what is

not of record does not exist.”    Frank v. Frank, 587 A.2d 340, 342 n.5

(Pa.Super. 1991) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1921). We are only entitled to rely upon

facts that appear in the certified record. See In re J.I.R., 808 A.2d 934, 935

(Pa.Super. 2002).    We may not consider “unsubstantiated allegations” in

reviewing an appeal. K-B Bldg. Co. v. Sheesley Const., Inc., 833 A.2d

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1132, 1139 (Pa.Super. 2003). To the extent that Mother has attempted to

adduce new evidence and testimony in her brief concerning Attorney Peluso’s

representation of Mother, we are not permitted to consider such materials.

See Warfield v. Warfield, 815 A.2d 1073, 1076 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2003)

(“[T]he unsubstantiated assertions contained in the parties’ briefs do not

constitute record evidence.”). Lacking any arguable basis or support in the

certified record, this claim would also fail on the merits.    Based upon the

foregoing, no relief is due on Mother’s first issue.

      We now turn to the remainder of Parents’ claims for relief, which

challenge the merits of the orphans’ court’s termination findings.           Our

standard of review in this context is well-established:

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
      accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
      determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
      orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
      an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
      unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

      An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
      reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
      facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
      may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
      of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
      courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
      hearings.

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’
      court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make
      decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her

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      child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
      protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
      significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
      child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
      party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
      evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
      convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
      without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of

the Adoption Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses upon

the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant

termination.   Id. at 830; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11).              If the

orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for

termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and convincing

evidence,” the court then assesses the petition pursuant to § 2511(b), which

focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). This Court need only

agree with the orphans’ court’s determination as to “any one subsection of

§ 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of

parental rights.” T.S.M., supra at 267.

      In the case sub judice, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental

rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(5) and (b). These sections provide, as follows:

      (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

            ....

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         (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
         for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
         to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
         the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
         a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
         reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
         the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
         child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
         the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
         of the child.

            ....

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (b).

      In order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(5), the petitioning

party must produce clear and convincing evidence to establish: (1) the child

has been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2) the

conditions that lead to the child’s removal or placement continue to exist; (3)

the parent(s) cannot or will not remedy the conditions which led to removal

or placement within a reasonable period of time; (4) the services reasonably

available to the parent(s) are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to

removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and (5) termination

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of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. See

In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa.Super. 2012).

      If a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination pursuant to

§ 2511(a), we then turn to § 2511(b), which requires that it “give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Our Supreme Court has advised that

Pennsylvania courts “should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,

placing [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

above concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085,

1105 (Pa. 2023). Such a determination “should not be applied mechanically,”

but “must be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must

determine each child’s specific needs.” Id. at 1106. There is no “exhaustive

list” of factors that must be considered. Id. at 1113 n.28.

      Nonetheless, our Supreme Court has mandated that a court’s § 2511(b)

analysis must include “consideration of the emotional bonds between the

parent and child.”   T.S.M., supra at 267.       Specifically, the court must

determine whether the “trauma” caused by sundering the parent-child bond

is “outweighed by the benefit of moving the child toward a permanent home.”

Id. at 253 (cleaned up). The recognized threshold for this finding is that the

court must determine whether termination will sever a “necessary and

beneficial relationship,” such that the child “could suffer extreme emotional

consequences.” K.T., supra at 1110. Our Supreme Court has emphasized,

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however, that such consequences must constitute more than mere proof of

“an adverse or detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond” in

order to preclude termination. Id. at 1113.

      The analysis mandated by § 2511(b) is not narrow but should include

consideration of “intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.”

T.S.M., supra at 267. Indeed, our Supreme Court has affirmed that “the

parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis.” K.T.,

supra at 1113. Thus, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with

the biological parent, but also examine the . . . love, comfort, security, and

stability the child might have with the foster parent.” K.T., supra at 1111

(emphasis in original; internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Specifically, Pennsylvania courts should also consider factors that naturally

arise due to the particular facts of a case, such as: (1) the child’s need for

permanency and length of time in foster care; (2) whether the child is in a

pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and (3) whether the foster

home meets the child’s needs. Id. at 1113.

      With these overarching legal principles in mind, we turn to Parents’

respective arguments concerning the orphans’ court’s § 2511(a)(5) findings.

Mother challenges the orphans’ court’s findings, arguing that she “was

complying with the permanency plan by attending supervised visits, admitting

herself to inpatient drug rehabilitation, and her past record of cleaning the

home.” Mother’s brief at 12. Concomitantly, Father argues that the orphans’

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court’s finding should be overturned since he allegedly addressed the concerns

regarding the unclean condition of Parents’ home. See Father’s brief at 10

(“The court abused its discretion in finding clear and convincing evidence that

the parental rights of Father should be involuntarily terminated despite

testimony before the factfinder of Father’s ability to meet the conditions

related to his housing[.]”). We find no merit in either line of argument.

      Preliminarily, we note that there is no dispute that M.J. had been

removed from Parents’ care for at least six months when CYS filed the

termination petition. Thus, the first aspect of § 2511(a)(5) is established.

      We now turn to the second statutory prong, which considers whether

the conditions that precipitated M.J.’s removal continue to persist. As noted

above, Parents have principally focused their respective arguments on their

attempts to maintain a clean and safe home, which they have framed as the

central issue in this case. See Father’s brief at 10; Mother’s brief at 12.

      Parents are correct to the extent that they recognize that the filthiness

and degradation of their home was one of the underlying reasons for M.J.’s

removal. Critically, however, there is no evidence that Parents have advanced

any appreciable efforts to address the other, more-serious conditions that also

caused M.J. to be removed from their care, i.e., Parents’ ongoing substance

abuse and mental health issues.      The evidence of record indicates those

conditions remain unresolved.

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      Parents’ substance abuse issues have persisted throughout CYS’s

involvement with this family. M.J. was born addicted to methamphetamines

and Mother overdosed on heroin at some point during her pregnancy. See

N.T., 3/28/23, at 9-12. At the time of M.J.’s removal, Mother tested positive

for the pharmaceutical opioid suboxone, for which she did not have a

prescription, while Father admitted to recently using cocaine. See Order of

Disposition, 9/8/22, at ¶ 1(15)-(16); see also N.T., 3/28/23, at 17-18. At

the termination hearing, Ms. Irvin and Ms. Marshall each confirmed that

Parents continued to abuse narcotics with impunity following M.J.’s removal.

See N.T., 3/28/23, at 18-25, 70-77.        Between August 2022 and February

2023, Parents’ respective urine screens each yielded multiple positive results

for methamphetamines and other illegal substances.         Id.     Parents also

conceded to additional illegal drug use beyond what was revealed by these

test results. Id.

      At most, the record establishes that Mother “self-reported” attending an

unidentified “inpatient rehab facility.”   Id. at 19, 65-66.     Ultimately, she

“signed herself out after two days” of purported treatment. Id. There is no

documentation in the certified record corroborating Mother’s bald assertions

that she sought treatment. Similarly, Ms. Irvin averred that Father promised

on multiple occasions that he would undergo a drug and alcohol assessment

and enter treatment, but there is no indication that he ever followed through

on such pledges in a verifiable fashion. Id. at 23.

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      In sum, there is no evidence in the certified record establishing that

either Mother or Father ever underwent their mandated drug and alcohol

assessments, or otherwise availed themselves of substance abuse treatment

services offered to them.   Moreover, the testimonies of Ms. Irvin and Ms.

Marshall at the termination hearing similarly reflect that neither Mother nor

Father ever completed their mandated mental health assessments. Id. at 18-

28, 65-66, 70-77. Even assuming, arguendo, that Parents have succeeded in

maintaining a clean and safe home environment, the most troubling aspects

of the conditions that caused M.J.’s removal remain unabated.

      Based upon the foregoing, we find that the second aspect of

§ 2511(a)(5) is also satisfied in this case. Furthermore, the evidence recited

above also readily establishes the third prong of § 2511(a)(5), namely, that

Parents’ well-documented inability to follow-through with assessments,

treatment, or sobriety evinces that these conditions will not be remedied

within a reasonable period. As detailed above, Parents’ serious mental health

and substance abuse issues have been an ongoing concern for several years,

i.e., the entirety of M.J.’s life. In the approximately seven months between

M.J.’s removal and the filing of a termination petition, Parents made no

appreciable progress in ameliorating these conditions.

      The fourth requirement of § 2511(a)(5) mandates a finding that the

services “reasonably available” to Parents are “unlikely to remedy the

conditions which led to removal or placement within a reasonable period of

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time.” B.C., supra at 607. In undertaking this assessment, Ms. Irvin detailed

the types of support and treatment offered to Parents during the course of

CYS’s involvement with the family, which began with “in-home services”

provided by Holy Family Safecare from January 2021 through July 2021. See

N.T., 3/28/23, at 11-13.      Although Ms. Irvin testified that these efforts

resulted in M.J. being temporarily restored to Father’s custody, any

improvement of circumstance was temporary and the underlying conditions in

this case again deteriorated to the point of M.J.’s second removal in August

2022.     Id. at 13-17.   At that time, Parents were unsuccessfully offered

visitation services, drug and alcohol management, and support services

through JusticeWorks. Id. at 20, 56, 61, 66-67. We gather from Ms. Irvin’s

testimony that Parents also had additional treatment options available through

at least one provider, Family ACTS, but never followed through on availing

themselves of such services. Id. at 18-20, 23-25, 44-45.

        As the nearly two years’ worth of services made available to Parents

have had no ascertainable improvement in the serious conditions that caused

M.J.’s removal from Parents’ custody, the record supports the orphans’ court’s

finding that Parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions within a reasonable

period of time. Accordingly, the fourth aspect of § 2511(a)(5) is also satisfied

in these cases.

        Finally, we must consider whether termination will best serve the needs

and welfare of M.J. pursuant to § 2511(a)(5).       See B.C., supra at 607.

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Although this inquiry is similar to the analysis that takes place pursuant to

§ 2511(b), this Court has identified the fifth element of § 2511(a)(5) as a

“‘discrete consideration’” as opposed to a “‘mere formality.’” In re Adoption

of B.J.R., 579 A.2d 906, 908 (Pa.Super. 1990) (quoting In re P.A.B., 570

A.2d 522, 525 (Pa.Super. 1990)).

      Instantly, we find that the record speaks definitively that termination of

Parents’ rights best serves the needs and welfare of M.J.      When M.J. was

removed from Parents’ care in August 2022, the child was nineteen months

old and had significant developmental delays. He was unable to walk or talk.

See N.T., 3/28/23, at 8.      Since his removal from Parent’s custody and

placement with Foster Parents, both Ms. Irvin and Ms. Marshall reported that

M.J. has successfully completed physical therapy and is “excelling” at

improving his “gross motor skills” and his communication abilities. Id. at 8,

71-72. Given M.J.’s dramatic improvement in a mere seven months out of

Parents’ custody and in Foster Parents’ care, we find that termination will best

serve his needs and welfare. Based upon the foregoing, we observe no abuse

of discretion or error of law in the orphans’ court’s findings pursuant to

§ 2511(a)(5). Accordingly, we agree that termination is warranted pursuant

to this subsection.

      We now turn our review to § 2511(b), under which we will consider

whether termination will best serve the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of M.J. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). As noted

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above, we are mandated to conduct a “bond analysis” as part of this review,

to ascertain whether termination of Parent’s rights will cause “extreme

emotional consequences” for M.J. K.T., supra at 1110. Parents’ arguments

on this point essentially allege that the orphans’ court overlooked the

existence of a strong parental bond between Parents and M.J. See Mother’s

brief at 14-16; Father’s brief at 13-17. We must disagree.

      Ms. Irvin reported that M.J.’s interactions with Parents reveal that he

has only a “slight” bond with them. Id. at 47. Assuming, arguendo, that

Parents possess some manner of bond with M.J., the testimony at the

termination hearing clearly evinces that it is not a “necessary and beneficial

relationship,”   such   that   the   child   “could   suffer   extreme   emotional

consequences.” K.T., supra at 1110. Rather, M.J.’s true parental bond is

with Foster Parents. As noted above, Ms. Irvin testified that M.J. has a “very

good relationship” with Foster Parents and has developmentally blossomed in

their care. See N.T., 3/28/23, at 36. Indeed, Ms. Marshall testified that M.J.

was “excited to leave” the visits with Parents and return to the care of Foster

Parents. Id. at 74 (“As soon as the foster mom walks in the door when time

is up, he is very excited. He runs to her. He would rather be with her[.]”).

This testimony indicates that the termination of Parents’ parental rights will

not cause undue trauma to M.J.

      Furthermore, the lack of a parental bond with Parents, coupled with the

dramatic improvements to M.J.’s ambulatory and communication skills since

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his placement with Foster Parents, evince that termination of Parents’ rights

will best serve M.J.’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare.   Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion or error law in the

orphans’ court’s findings pursuant to § 2511(b).

     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order involuntarily terminating

the parental rights of Mother and Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(5)

and 2511(b).

     Order affirmed.

 12/12/2023

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