Court Opinion

ID: 9730509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:14:29.245903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.042391
License: Public Domain

R. B. Martin, J.
(concurring). I agree with the results of the majority opinion but for slightly *605different reasons. 1925 PA 389 amended the public nuisance law to include not only "[a]ny building * * * used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes * * *” but to include buildings "used by, or kept for the use of * * * other disorderly persons”. Reading the language as it is written, it would seem the Legislature was aiming the padlock law at disorderly persons other than prostitutes and gamblers.
Our prior appellate cases have never really addressed the question as to whether the "other disorderly persons” referred to those described as disorderly by the disorderly person statute, MCL 750.167; MSA 28.364. The issue was not raised in State ex rel Wayne County Prosecutor v Diversified Theatrical Corp, 396 Mich 244; 240 NW2d 460 (1976); State ex rel Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v Levenburg, 406 Mich 455; 280 NW2d 810 (1979); State ex rel Saginaw Prosecuting Attorney v Bobenal Investments, Inc, 111 Mich App 16; 314 NW2d 512 (1981), or People, ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Sill, 310 Mich 570; 17 NW2d 756 (1945). Diversified, supra, even cited with approval Harmer v Tonylyn Productions, Inc, 23 Cal App 3d 941; 100 Cal Rptr 576 (1972), wherein the California red light abatement law by judicial construction was applied to lewd live stage shows and exhibitions but not to still or motion pictures limited to closed theaters. DiversiGed, Bobenal and Levenburg dealt with the question of whether the words "lewdness” and "assignation” referred to acts separate and apart from prostitution. These cases did not question whether "other disorderly persons” could be someone other than prostitutes or gamblers.
There need be no fear that including statutorily defined disorderly persons in the nuisance abate*606ment statute would cause absurd results such as padlocking public places where intoxicated individuals sometimes gather and cause public disturbances. State, ex rel English v Fanning, 97 Neb 224, 228; 149 NW 413, 414 (1914), cited in Diversiñed, indicates our courts in applying the abatement law look at the principal purpose of the places involved:
"The statute is not intended as a means of regulating the morals of private individuals, nor to prevent immorality in hotels, mainly devoted to the accommodation of families and moral, well-behaved people.”
In our case the principal if not the sole use of the premises was for nude dancing which allegedly became obscene when the proprietor thought police were not present. See also State ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Weitzman, 21 Mich App 705; 176 NW2d 463 (1970).
The real difficulty with saying that the Legislature intended to control disorderly persons other than prostitutes and gamblers with the nuisance abatement statute is the fact that the nuisance statute makes no provision whatsoever to protect the allegedly disorderly person’s First Amendment rights if the person is accused of using premises for indecent or obscene conduct in a public place. Live non-obscene nude dancing is a form of protected expression under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Schad v Mt Ephraim, 452 US 61; 101 S Ct 2176; 68 L Ed 2d 671 (1981). The United States Supreme Court has always severely frowned on prior restraints of protected speech. Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697; 51 S Ct 625; 75 L Ed 1357 (1931); Spokane Arcades, Inc v Brockett, 631 F2d 135 (CA 9, 1980), aff'd 454 US 1022; 102 S Ct 557; 70 L Ed 2d 468 (1981).
*607In our cases ex parte restraining orders were issued on the days the complaints were filed and temporary injunctions were later signed. While the injunctive order in Beech Plaza was specific in defining the enjoined obscene conduct, the fact questions of what occurred in the defendants’ places of business have never been resolved by trial although the injunctive orders continue.
It is true that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment:
"This Court has consistantly held that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment as a limitation on the state police power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 413 US 49, 54; 92 S Ct 2628; 37 L Ed 2d 446 (1973).
"This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.” Miller v California, 413 US 15, 23; 93 S Ct 2607; 37 L Ed 2d 419 (1973).
However, the United States Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to permit ex parte procedures to stifle written material even if it is later found to be obscene. A Quantity of Copies of Books v Kansas, 378 US 205; 84 S Ct 1723; 12 L Ed 2d 809 (1964).
Again we recognize, as appellees argue, that when we consider nonverbal performances as compared to written works, the state is permitted more latitude in controlling it.
"But as the mode of expression moves from the printed page to the commission of public acts that may themselves violate valid penal statutes, the scope of permissible state regulations significantly increases. States may sometimes proscribe expression that is di*608rected to the accomplishment of an end that the State has declared to be illegal when such expression consists, in part, of 'conduct* or 'action’ * * California v LaRue, 409 US 109, 117; 93 S Ct 390; 34 L Ed 2d 342 (1972).
If the state is to have restraints on possible First Amendment rights prior to full judicial review, certain safeguards are essential: (1) The burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of proving that material is unprotected must rest on the censor; (2) Any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief time and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo; and (3) A prompt judicial determination of obscenity must be assured. Freedman v Maryland, 380 US 51; 85 S Ct 734; 13 L Ed 2d 649 (1965). Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v Conrad, 420 US 546; 95 S Ct 1239; 43 L Ed 2d 448 (1975).
Neither the Michigan public nuisance statute nor the disorderly person statute explicitly provides for such safeguards. Note that in our cases temporary injunctions unfettered by statutory safeguards have lasted well over one year and judicial determination of the factual situation has not yet occurred.
If the Legislature had wanted conduct described as disorderly in the disorderly person statute to be subject to abatement by the use of the public nuisance statute, the Legislature would have had to give some consideration to the impact of the federal and state constitutions on prior restraints of conduct which might be considered obscene by prosecutors but would be protected by the First Amendment according to the courts. There is no legislative history indicating this was considered in 1925 or at any time subsequent thereto. Certainly if the Legislature wanted obscene nude *609dancing to be subject to the abatement statute, it could easily have been specific and could have provided the necessary safeguards of the First Amendment rights as required by our United States Supreme Court. Apparently since 1925 no action other than these two commenced in 1984 has attempted to combine these statutes. Therefore, it might well be concluded that no prosecutor from 1925 to 1984 thought that the disorderly person statute applied to the padlock law and no appellate court in any of the multitudinous abatement, disorderly person or obscenity cases even hinted it could be applied.
The Legislature did not envision the use of the public nuisance statute as a means of abating conduct described by the disorderly person statute.