Court Opinion

ID: 9754835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:15:39.204469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:58.804603
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mb. Justice Bell:
I concur, for purely technical reasons, in opening tbe judgment, but vigorously disagree with tbe majority opinion. In view of tbe fact that this Court has affirmed tbe action of tbe lower Court in opening tbe judgment, it was entirely unnecessary to undermine tbe case of Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A. 2d 310. It seems to me to be especially inadvisable since tbe present majority opinion serves to cast doubt and confusion on an issue which is (practically) certain to be hereafter appealed to this Court on its merits.
Tbe majority opinion, if I correctly understand it, merely reiterates and adopts all tbe contentions which were made and which this Court rejected in the Waschak case, supra.
Tbe majority opinion states: “The testimony in tbe Waschak case was, by pretrial agreement and order, submitted to tbe trial judge as testimony on tbe question of tbe defendants’ liability.” It is crystal clear that tbe testimony and tbe facts in tbe present cases and in tbe Waschak case are identical and on such a record — unless tbe Waschak case (which, as we shall see, was approved by this Court only a few months *568ago) is reversed — the plaintiffs should have no illusions as to the final outcome of their cases when a decision is rendered on the merits. The Waschak case is, I repeat, identical with and under the principle of stare decisis is unquestionably determinative of the identical issues which these plaintiffs have raised in the present identical cases; and the Waschak case specifically bars recovery against these defendants.
In Waschak v. Moffat, supra, this Court held as a matter of law* that the invasion of plaintiff’s land by gas and fumes was clearly not intentional nor unreasonable, as those terms are used in the law. The Court said (pages 447-455) : “An invasion of an interest may be intentional or unintentional. If an owner of land erects a factory upon it, which he operates, his act is, of course, intentional when he ignites fires under the boilers which emit smoke or fumes and operate noisy machinery. Such intentional operations may become a nuisance and cause damage to an adjoining property, depending upon the method of operation, location of the premises and surrounding circumstances. Under varying conditions the harm caused by the emission of offensive odors, noises, fumes, violations, etc., must be weighed against the utility of the operation. And even where the invasion of property rights is unintentional, and without negligence, if the activity is ultrahazardous there will be imposed an absolute liability for damages. Thus in a blasting operation, recovery was had where the damage was due solely to vibration and concussion: Federoff v. Harrison Construction Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A. 2d 817. . . .
“Even if the reasonableness of the defendants’ use of their property had been the sole consideration, there could be no recovery here. Chief Justice Frazer, in *569Harris v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 304 Pa. 550, 156 A. 159, quoting from a previous case, said (p. 558) : '. . . As said in Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 158: “The plaintiffs knew, when they purchased their property, that they were in a mining region; they were in a [district] horn of mining operations, and which had become rich and populous as a result thereof. . . .” ’
“ 'Without smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a very pretty village.’ ... 'A coal mining company is not responsible in trespass for damage caused to plaintiff’s property by smoke, dust and gases from a burning “slate dump” on defendant’s property, the material having been placed on the dump in the course of operation of defendant’s mine and the fire having originated from spontaneous combustion, if there is no known method by which such fires can be extinguished.’ . . .
“Chief Justice Maxey said in Hannum v. Gruber, 346 Pa. 417, 423, 31 A. 2d 99, What is reasonable is sometimes a question of law, and at other times, a question of fact.’ Under the undisputed facts in this case the question is one of law. . .
“The Superior Court correctly refused to adopt the doctrine of absolute nuisance. It cited the Bestatement. Judge Hirt said: '. . . Section 822 of the Be-statement, Torts, sets forth some of the tests for determining liability resulting from a private nuisance . . .’ (Italics supplied) It is our view that Section 822 comprehensively encompasses the entire statement of principles of liability and is not restricted merely to some of them. We do not agree with the statement: . . .
“In applying the rule of the Bestatement, Torts, Sec. 822 (d), it is evident the invasion of plaintiffs’ land was clearly not intentional. And even if it were, for the reasons above stated, it was not unreasonable. *570On the contrary, since the emission of gases was not caused by any act of defendants and arose merely from the normal and customary use of their land without negligence, recklessness or ultrahazardous conduct, it was wholly unintentional, and no liability may therefore be imposed upon defendants.
“The judgment is reversed and is here entered in favor of defendants non obstante veredicto.”
The Waschalc case was reaffirmed a few months ago, to wit, on November 12, 1956, by a unanimous court in Burr v. Eidemiller, Inc., 386 Pa. 416, 420.
In Burtt Will, 353 Pa. 217, 44 A. 2d 670, the Court said (page 231) : “The doctrine of stare decisis still prevails in Pennsylvania ... This Court has always rigidly adhered to the rule of stare decisis. ‘. . . The doctrine of stare decisis is not confined to cases involving “rules of property.” See Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198, 210, and Commonwealth v. National Oil Co., Ltd., supra, “Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different”: Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 452, 118 A. 394.’ . . . . . Otherwise the law would become the mere football of the successively changing personnel of the court, and “the knowne certaintie of the law”, which Lord Coke so wisely said “is the safe-tie of all” would be utterly destroyed.’ ”
If a majority of this Court wish to abrogate or to ignore at will the doctrine or principle of stare decisis that is their privilege, but I must protest opinions or decisions which, as here, effectually undermine, demolish and pulverize, but leave still breathing, prior decisions of this Court. If we intend to reverse or no longer follow a prior decision or established principles, we should do so directly, clearly and specifically, *571instead of indirectly. The latter method leaves the law in a state of confusion. It perplexes Bench and Bar alike and it produces much irritating and expensive litigation, all of which the direct method of specific reversal would completely eliminate.

 Italics throughout, ours.