Court Opinion

ID: 9619909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:34:51.972005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:04.313813
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Sutton
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent for the reasons hereinafter expressed. Clarice Redwine claimed that her personal injuries, which occurred in defendant Chapman’s grocery store, were caused by flying glass from what she believed and alleged to be an exploding bottle of pop which had been bottled by defendant Rocky Mountain Beverage, Inc., and placed by it on Chapman’s shelf.
The theory of her case as pled and tried was that of res ipsa loquitur. I. have examined the record before us and cannot agree with the statements made in the majority opinion to the effect that Mrs. Redwine’s evidence was incredible and insufficient to support any finding of the spontaneous explosion of a bottle on the rack or elsewhere. If the entire evidence were as set forth in that opinion it would be correct; however, when based upon the non-conflicting evidence before the court, most of which supports Mrs. Redwine’s thesis, and as determined by a jury, I believe the majority opinion to be incorrect.
Let me briefly review the evidence.
Both Mrs. Redwine and her husband testified to the events set forth in the opinion; however, in addition there were the following uncontradicted facts:
1. There is evidence that one of Chapman’s employees, a Mrs. Meade, at various times prior to the accident had moved, changed and dusted the pop bottles on the shelves next to where Mrs. Redwine was standing at the time of her injury.
2. The same type of control was exercised over the bottles by defendant Rocky Mountain Beverage, Inc.’s driver when he made his usual weekly deliveries.
*5253. The bottle was one furnished by Rocky- Mountain.
4. Almost immediately after the accident, before Chapman and the others who testified as to the location of the debris on the floor could check the shelves and area in question, a boy who worked for Chapman had swept up the mess.
5. A week or so after the accident a Rocky Mountain Beverage, Inc., delivery driver found the shelf from which it appeared the bottle had come to be “sticky and dirty” and washed it off.
6. The cashier as well as Mrs. Redwine and her husband testified as to the noise of a bottle breaking. -The only difference was as to whether it sounded like an “explosion” or a “crash.”
Weighing the evidence before the court was the duty of the jury under proper instructions. It did so, and there being support for its verdict it is not our function or power to set its solemn declaration aside because we may disagree therewith.
Based on all the evidence I cannot say that it was physically impossible or technically impossible for the bottle to have exploded. Evidently the jury was of the same view. Clearly Mrs. Redwine was in no position to establish the cause of the explosion or of the fall, whichever it was, that resulted in her injury. It seems to me that this is the type of case described in Fries v. Ritter, 381 Pa. 470, 473, 112 A. (2d) 189 (1955) (a truck accident case) where it was said:
“ * * * where circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove negligence the evidence must be such as to enable the jury to conclude — not by conjecture or guess but — as a reasonable and legitimate inference that the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant: In order to do so the evidence must clearly and sufficiently describe or picture the happening of the accident in such a manner that the only reasonable inference and conclusion from the facts and circumstances which were proved is that defendant.was negligent:”
*526The Pennsylvania court applied this same rule later in Klimczak v. 7 Up Bottling Co. of Philadelphia, 385 Pa. 287, 122 A. (2d) 707 (1956).
In Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 326, 93 A. (2d) 451 (1953) the court stated:
“Viewing realistically the situation presented by the circumstances of the present case, it is obvious that, so far as the evidence discloses, the wife plaintiff was not injured through any fault of her own, and therefore, if the occurrence of the accident was due to negligence on the part of either of the defendants, plaintiffs should be entitled to redress. It is clear too that the breaking of the bottle could have resulted only from a defect in the bottle itself, or from an excessive internal pressure due to overcarbonation, or from the subjection of the bottle to some extreme atmospheric or temperature changes or some mishandling, as, for example, the striking of it by a hard object. Manifestly it would be entirely beyond the ability of the plaintiffs to ascertain and establish which of these possibilities was in fact the cause of the accident, whereas the defendant Beverage Company could readily explain the equipment and the methods employed by it in bottling the ale and the defendant A. & P. Company was equally in a position to explain the manner in which it handled, displayed and protected the bottles placed on its shelves for sale. It would seem, therefore, notwithstanding the limitations on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and exclusive control previously referred to, that reason and justice alike should entitle plaintiffs to the benefits of those methods of establishing a prima facie case.”
The majority opinion indicates that perhaps the bottle fell or was knocked from the shelf and exploded as it hit. That might have happened but again I point out that this Court is not the trier of the facts. In this connection upon retrial it is said that the bottler should be dismissed from the suit and the case, if re-tried, should proceed on the res ipsa loquitur theory as against the *527store owner only. Naturally, taking the position that the judgment should be affirmed I cannot agree with any such limitation.
In this connection I point out that even though the normal type of joint control of the premises by the two defendants is not shown, nevertheless, the facts call for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as to both of them in this type of case. My reasons are:
1. The plaintiff was in no position to establish the cause of the explosion or fall of the bottle which resulted in her injury.
2. The bottler could show that the bottle did not explode, if such were the case, and, the store owner could show, if such were the case, that the bottle did not fall from the shelf because of safe construction, ample aisle width and so forth.
3. A suit against joint tort feasors, under the doctrine even though finally only one was held liable, has been upheld by our Court. Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P. (2d) 711 (1957), (doctor held liable when he, hospital and anesthetist were joined as defendants when a patient fell from an operating table). Compare Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. (2d) 486, 154 P. (2d) 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 (a doctor, nurse, hospital, patient case).
My position is that under the facts and pleadings of this case the jury was entitled to find that the bottle exploded and, in the absence of satisfactory proof exonerating them of negligence, could find both defendants liable.
It is well to point out here that the question of liability in cases of this type has been the subject of numerous lawsuits and at least seven theories of decision appear to range the spectrum according to Dean Roscoe Pound in his article on “The Problem of the Exploding Bottle,” Yol. XL, Boston University Law Review, No. 2, Spring 1960. Suffice it to say that some jurisdictions still deny the application of res ipsa loquitur holding that negligence must be proved; others that res ipsa loquitur cannot apply to the retailer; and, the doctrine of implied *528warranty has been advanced as has the theory of a dangerous instrumentality, together with variations in these theories.
Of course, if my view prevailed we would also have to rule upon other matters raised by the' writ of error and by thé assigned cross-error. As to these, and without further explanation, I can say I have examined the grounds urged and can see no reason to reverse the judgment; however, an affirmance would require a discussion of several issues raised.
To summarize, I am persuaded that Mrs. Redwine was, on this record, entitled to the presumptions afforded her under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as applied by the trial court under the holding in Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P. (2d) 88 (1958). The evidence showed her presence at the scene of the accident, on premises under the ownership and control of Chapman but serviced as well by Rocky Mountain who furnished the bottle in question; and, there is no evidence Mrs. Redwine knocked the bottle off or caused it to fall. This entitled her to invoke the benefit of the doctrine. Her belief that the bottle exploded is immaterial. Even if she had not shown prima facie evidence sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the bottle did explode, her evidence and pleadings did place the duty of explaining what happened on the defendants below. No such evidence being in the record I would affirm the judgment.