Court Opinion

ID: 9850758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:32.538905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:42.920310
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I would reverse the trial court’s decision in the direct appeal because the Zobrists’ divorce decree did not cover the two life insurance policies at issue in this action.
The divorce decree provided:
Husband shall designate, irrevocably, the parties’ minor children as beneficiaries of the life insurance benefits currently available to husband through his employer. The parties recognize and acknowledge that the death benefits available under said insurance plan may fluctuate, depending upon husband’s income, from his employer; however, husband shall not voluntarily cause the amount of said coverage to be reduced.
At the time of the divorce, Mr. Zobrist was covered by two group life insurance policies that his employer provided. When his employer terminated his employment, it no longer provided this insurance to him and he exercised his right to obtain coverage under new policies providing individual whole life coverage. The policies were not life insurance benefits “available to husband through his employer” and were significantly different from the employer’s group insurance. Additionally, Mr. Zobrist paid substantially higher premiums for these new policies. And, contrary to the majority’s assertions, the policies were not replacement policies as in Curtis v. Curtis1 where the employer merely replaced one group policy with a group policy issued by another company.
*250Decided June 30, 1997 —
Reconsideration denied July 24, 1997.
Gilbert, Harrell, Gilbert, Sumerford & Martin, Wallace E. Harrell, for appellant.
Stephen G. Scarlett, James D. Benefield III, for appellee.
Because Mr. Zobrist’s employer canceled his group insurance coverage when his employment ended, he did not voluntarily cause the reduction in his benefits, and the divorce decree did not require him to purchase a new policy to replace the insurance benefits provided through his employer, I conclude that the new life insurance policies were not subject to the terms of the divorce decree. Therefore, the beneficiaries named in these policies were entitled to the life insurance benefits.21 respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley and Justice Hines join in this dissent.

 243 Ga. 611 (255 SE2d 693) (1979).

 See Larson v. Larson, 226 Ga. 209 (173 SE2d 700) (1970).