Court Opinion

ID: 9452976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:58:40.15356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:26.723355
License: Public Domain

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Sonja Stumo, plaintiff, appeals from an order of the district court entered September 27, 1966, granting motions to dismiss her complaint, filed by defendants United Air Lines, Inc., a Delaware corporation, “United”, E. S. Ritner, R. W. Hardesty, Carole McAnallen and Diane Robertson (as members of the United Air Lines System Board of Adjustment), Air Line Pilots Association-Stewardess and Flight Stewards Division,1 and Charles H. Ruby, as its president and individually.
Plaintiff’s complaint, in count I,2 alleged a cause of action against United for wrongful discharge, arising under the fifth and seventh amendments of the United States constitution and also the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181, 184, and 153 First (m) and (p), as conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1337; and § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, as amended.
From the complaint it appears that plaintiff was hired by United as a stewardess effective July 7, 1958, and was so employed until her discharge on March 14, 1966. Her supervisor, Mary Decker, then notified her by letter that she was discharged for violations of United’s travel policy on December 20 and 25, 1965. Pursuant to the labor contract in effect, she requested a hearing and an investigation, and hearings were held at United’s offices.
Count I charges that United willfully disregarded plaintiff’s rights in conducting hearings in reference to her and, in other respects, was guilty of improper handling of her rights, and that, as a direct result thereof, she was willfully and wrongfully discharged, for which she seeks both compensatory and exemplary damages.
In count II, plaintiff charges that United’s System Board of Adjustment— Stewardess Division received a Letter of Submission from the Union which conferred jurisdiction on the Board to hear plaintiff’s grievance of wrongful discharge, but the Union refused to offer legal aid to her, a nonunion employee, although all [Union] members are assigned a staff lawyer to represent them at such Board hearings. She also charges that defendant, Board members Ritner, Hardesty, McAnallen and Robertson, are employees of United, who are junior in rank to United’s officers, who had already denied plaintiff’s grievance, and that she “cannot get a fair hearing at the said System Board.”
Plaintiff’s suit, prays, inter alia, that defendants be enjoined from “prosecuting, hearing and/or deciding” her discharge grievance against United.
*789The following relevant facts occurring before this suit was instituted appear in an affidavit filed in support of United’s motion to dismiss:
In the letter from Mary Decker discharging plaintiff, she was told she was expected to reimburse United for $29.09.
Plaintiff appealed from her discharge to Stewardess Service Manager Hale by letter dated March 17, 1966 and requested “an investigation hearing” of the discharge, and decisions rendered. Hale replied on March 23, 1966 by letter, stating the charges.
In Hale’s office a hearing was held March 31, 1966. By letter dated April 8, 1966, he informed plaintiff that the charges were accurate and that she had a responsibility to acquaint herself with the proper procedures.
On April 15, 1966, plaintiff appealed from this decision to vice-president Dorsey, relying on the agreement between United and AUPA. W. L. Rich-man, staff representative, Employee Relations, and designee of Dorsey to hear plaintiff’s grievance, set April 28, 1966 for a hearing. There :'s nothing in the record from which the court can determine what statements, sworn or unsworn, were made at the hearing on April 28, 1966. The record merely shows that there were present besides plaintiff and Richman, the following: Miss Decker, Passenger-agent Voss, Stewardess Kaye and Marilyn Hollé (ALPA chairman of O’Hare Local).
At this point, attorney George F. Archer under date of April 29, 1966, wrote United vice-president Dorsey, stating that plaintiff had become his client and requested all pertinent information to be released in the future, as well as a copy of any decision based on the April 28th hearing.
By letter dated May 3, 1966, Rich-man notified plaintiff that her grievance was denied for the reason that she had failed to satisfactorily explain various questions which she had been asked.
Dorsey replied to Archer on May 4, 1966, enclosing copies of the letter of charges dated March 23, 1966, the Hale decision of April 8, 1966, and the Richman May 3,1966 decision. Dorsey requested that thereafter all correspondence be addressed to F. A. Brown, vice-president and general manager of United. Thereupon plaintiff on May 5, 1966 wrote Mr. Brown requesting “an appeal hearing, as provided in the Agreement” and asking that copies of hearing notices and decisions rendered be sent to her and attorney Archer. Whereupon vice-president and general manager of customer service, E. C. Westervelt (who had been appointed designee for Mr. Brown) replied by letter dated May 10, 1966 setting a hearing for May 18, 1966 in the stewardess office at O’Hare, a copy of which letter was sent to attorney Archer.
Under date of May 25,1966, Westervelt wrote plaintiff a letter in which he referred to the May 18, 1966 hearing, at which plaintiff, as well as Miss Hollé and stewardess Prato, Miss Decker and Mr. Hale were present. Westervelt concluded that plaintiff’s discharge was proper and therefore her grievance was denied.
On the same date, May 25, Archer wrote Brown, in part:
“ * * * the appeal ‘opinions’ have not been predicated upon the facts presented at the hearings; they have been prejudged, and the burden of proof has been shifted. * * * We further state that an arbitrary standard was imposed on Miss Stumo that has not been applied to United’s unionized employees.”
However, Brown replied on June 3, 1966, indicating that plaintiff was “required to make any further appeal to the System Board of Adjustment”.
Following Brown’s suggestion, Archer on June 8, 1966 inquired of him the date of the next Board meeting, the names of its members and other information. Due to Brown’s *790absence, O. E. Wilkinson on June 13, 1966 furnished the names of the four board members and gave the name of Ritner as board chairman to whom plaintiff should submit her appeal. The Union by letter of June 15, 1966 submitted plaintiff’s grievance to the System Board.
On July 6, 1966, plaintiff filed her suit in the district court.
1. It is the basic contention of plaintiff that she was wrongfully discharged and that this is a common-law action arising therefrom. Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754, 85 L.Ed. 1089 (1941). She maintains that she could not obtain an impartial hearing before the Board, because of its makeup.3
This court now relies on Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 79 S.Ct. 1351, 13 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1959). But there petitioner Price knew that his union, with his consent, submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board his grievance against a railroad employer, which was dismissed by the Board, and therefore he was precluded from seeking damages for that dismissal in a common-law action. As the court pointed out at 602, 79 S.Ct. at 1352:
“This is a diversity common-law action brought by the respondent, a former employee of petitioner railroad, in the United States District Court * * * to recover damages from the railroad for allegedly wrongfully discharging him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between it and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. * * * ”
The court thereupon added:
“ * * * The validity of the discharge was previously challenged upon the same grounds before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, in a proceeding brought by the Brotherhood on respondent’s behalf under § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, seeking the respondent’s reinstatement with back pay. The Board rendered an award in favor of the petitioner. The question for decision here is whether the respondent may pursue a common-law remedy for damages for his allegedly wrongful dismissal after having chosen to pursue the statutory remedy which resulted in a determination by the National Adjustment Board that his dismissal was justified.” (Italics supplied.)
At 605, 79 S.Ct. 1351, the court pointed out that by its award and adjustment board denied the claim, and some three years later the damage suit was filed in court.
At 607, 79 S.Ct. at 1355, the court stated:
“ * * * Even if the procedure followed by the railroad constituted a proper investigation, the Board’s outright denial of the claim is explicable only on the ground that the Board also held that Article 32(b) did not justify the respondent in disobeying the dispatcher’s instruction to remain at Nipton. We conclude that both issues were decided by the Board against the respondent, and therefore reach the question whether the respondent, despite the adverse determination of the Adjustment Board, could pursue the common-law remedy for damages in the District Court.”
and at 608-609, 79 S.Ct. at 1355, the court added:
“ * * * Congress barred the employee’s subsequent resort to the common-law remedy after an adverse determination of his grievance by the Adjustment Board.”
*791Obviously in the case at bar, while plaintiff in good faith attempted to exhaust the available grievance procedures, it is a fact that the Board never made a final decision or award. It therefore follows, that (unlike Price), there having been no determination of her grievance by the Board, plaintiff was not thereby barred from proceeding with her common-law action.
Although plaintiff was discharged by United and she claims that the discharge was wrongful, defense counsel has not cited any case overruling the principles announced in Moore. Moreover, in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, at 244, 70 S.Ct. 577, at 580, 94 L.Ed. 795 (1950), Moore was cited as authoritative, the court saying:
“Our holding here is not inconsistent with our holding in Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754, 85 L.Ed. 1089. Moore was discharged by the railroad. He could have challenged the validity of his discharge before the Board, seeking reinstatement and back pay. Instead he chose to accept the railroad’s action in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to be an employee, and brought suit claiming damages for breach of contract. As we there held, the Railway Labor Act does not bar courts from adjudicating such cases. A common-law or statutory action for wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which the Board has power to provide, and does not involve questions of future relations between the railroad and its other employees. * * * ”
In addition, we have the benefit of the recent decision in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, at 179, 87 S.Ct. 903, at 911, 17 L. Ed.2d 842 (1967),4 where the court recognized the general rule that neither state nor federal courts have jurisdiction over suits directly involving activity subject to the National Labor Relations Act, citing San Diego Building Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, at 245, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775. However, the court in Vaca proceeded to say:
“This pre-emption doctrine, however, has never been rigidly applied to cases where it could not fairly be inferred that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie with the NLRB, * * *»
Further, 386 U.S. at pages 184-185, 87 S.Ct. at page 914, the court stated:
“ * * * For this reason, it is settled that the employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by the bargaining agreement. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580. However, because these contractual remedies have been devised and are often controlled by the union and the employer, they may well prove unsatisfactory or unworkable for the individual grievant. The problem then is to determine under what circumstances the individual employee may obtain judicial review of his breach-of-contract claim despite his failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial procedures.”
At 187, 87 S.Ct. at 915, the court went on to say:
“ * * * If a breach of duty by the union and a breach of contract by the employer are proven the court must fashion an appropriate remedy. * * *»
Moreover, under all the circumstances of this case, it would be unrealistic to contend that plaintiff’s bona fide endeav- or to obtain relief by the administrative process in and of itself barred her from filing her action for damages against United, on the theory that she had thereby elected to proceed solely with the administrative proceedings. While counsel for United argue that “if plaintiff were to abandon the grievance route in midstream, her right to recover under the contract for wrongful discharge would *792terminate according to its own terms”, they choose to ignore the frustration which overwhelmed her efforts to exhaust her administrative remedies.
2. Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot maintain her action for wrongful discharge in the federal courts because she has failed to satisfy the basic requirements of the Moore case. They note that Moore was based upon diversity of citizenship and that, in the case at bar, in her complaint plaintiff does not allege diversity. Thus defendants rely on Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653, 73 S.Ct. 906, 97 L.Ed. 1325 (1953) which was an action brought by a discharged employee for damages for wrongful discharge, and was based on diversity of citizenship. There plaintiff relied upon the law of Missouri.
It appears, however, that from its very nature the controversy involved in this ease is one which arose under the laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 and § 1337.5 International Ass’n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 684, 83 S.Ct. 956, 10 L.Ed.2d 67 (1963). The case before us is not a diversity action.
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, at 657, 85 S.Ct. 614, at 618, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965), the court said:
“ * * * Federal law governs ‘Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization * * ** * *» (Emphasis supplied.)
but recognized that Moore is not overruled. On the other hand, the court concluded that “the general federal rule” (underscoring mine) applies.
I agree with the logic of plaintiff’s counsel herein when he suggests that the rights of a litigant such as plaintiff visa-vis an interstate air carrier do not depend on the varying laws of the many states it crosses. I would hold that diversity of citizenship is not essential to plaintiff’s cause of action when asserted under federal law.
This principle of federal law was recognized by United itself when it recently filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division (62 C 2116), seeking to enjoin its pilots from ignoring certain training procedures for jet aircraft. Diversity of citizenship not being present, United based federal jurisdiction upon §§ 1331 and 1337, supra.
3. In its brief United declares that plaintiff cannot rely upon Machinists to sustain federal jurisdiction and at the same time “avoid the federal policy of exhaustion which governs federally en-forcible contracts”. But she does not seek to avoid that policy. Rather, in accordance with federal law, she made a bona fide attempt to comply with and exhaust her administrative remedies. When, because of the circumstances which confronted her, the Board’s action promised to be abortive, plaintiff was justified in filing the present suit for unlawful discharge.6 At the trial of her damage suit, the bona fides of her efforts to exhaust her administrative remedies will be an issue. The requirements of federal, not state, law will control. The guidelines in that respect were laid down in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, supra, 652, 85 S.Ct. 616:
“As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor *793policy requires that individaul employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress. * * * ”
I would hold that the record before us indicates that there is a sufficient showing that plaintiff at the trial of her damage suit could present evidence, under her complaint, from which the court could find that she had met the requirements of the policy stated in Maddox.
For these reasons, I would reverse the order from which this appeal was taken and would remand to the district court for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

. Sometimes referred to herein as the “Union” or “AUPA”.

. While count II asked for certain injunctive relief and for a declaration that parts of the Railway Labor Act are unconstitutional, for that purpose it is now not relied upon by plaintiff, and I would consider it abandoned as a basis for such relief.

. Plaintiff had been confronted with the reality of the situation including the presence on the Board of two employees of United who were junior in standing to the company officials against whom plaintiff’s grievances were directed. In addition there were two stewardesses on the Board, also employees of United, who were members of the union. As pointed out, plaintiff was not a member of the union. Cf. Arnold v. United Air Lines, Inc., 7 Cir., 296 F.2d 191, 195 (1961).

. Vaoa relies upon the doctrine developed in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944), which, in turn, involved the Railway Labor Act.

. § 1331(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy * * * arises under the Constitution, laws * * * of the United States.
§ 1337 provides said courts * * * shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and
commerce against restraints and monopolies.

. Scholarly treatises supporting this conclusion appear in Exhaustion of Remedies and Wrongful Discharge Under the Railway Labor Act, 25 U.Chi.L.Rev. 686, 688 (1958) ; Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 327, 329 (1963).