Court Opinion

ID: 9761035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:29:52.19321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:19.785001
License: Public Domain

CADENA, Chief Justice,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I would reverse the judgment because of the fundamentally erroneous charge which, in effect, required appellant to prove his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Since I cannot agree that the evidence is insufficient, I would not order the entry of an order of acquittal, but would remand the cause for a new trial.
The court’s opinion, after following the customary practice of referring to the various formulae to be used in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, purports to detail “the State’s evidence relevant to this issue ...” Presumably, the phrase “this *691issue” refers to the “exclusion of reasonable hypotheses” test.
The review of the evidence is unusually selective. This review may be summarized, insofar as it is relevant, as follows:
1. At approximately 1:00 P.M., McCro-han placed her purse, containing the wallet with approximately $250.00 in cash, under the counter. This is undisputed.
2. There is no evidence that appellant and his companion, Dents, were the only customers who had been in the store between 1:00 P.M. and 4:00 P.M., when the theft of the wallet was discovered.
3. There is no evidence that appellant or Dents took the wallet.
4. The money found in the possession of appellant and Dents was not identified.
5. There is no fingerprint evidence.
The summary, insofar as evidence of guilt is concerned, of course supports the conclusion that it raises no more than a strong suspicion of guilt. In fact, if we accept the summary as accurate, there may not even be grounds for suspicion. But if, as we must, we consider the entire record, the strange nature of the summary is revealed and, if we view the entire evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the conclusion that it raises only a “strong suspicion” is exposed as untenable.
Each part of the summary must be evaluated in the light of all of the evidence.
1. Location of the purse. It is true that McCrohan placed her purse under the counter at 1:00 P.M., some three hours before Dents and appellant entered the store. The evidence establishes that the purse under the counter was not visible or accessible to a person standing on the customer’s side of the counter.
2. Failure to negate presence of other customers. While McCrohan did not testify that no other persons entered the store between 1:00 P.M. and 4:00 P.M., her testimony establishes that when she was lured into the walk-in cooler by appellant, she saw Dents walk behind the counter. When, despite appellant’s efforts to keep her in the cooler, she left the cooler, she saw Dents walk from the back of the counter to the customers’ side. No other persons were present in the store.
3. Lack of evidence that appellant or Dents took the wallet. It is clear that appellant did not take the wallet. But the evidence establishes (a) the wallet was in the purse behind and under the counter; (b) when McCrohan was lured to the cooler in back of the store, Dents walked behind the counter; (c) when McCrohan finally managed to elude appellant and returned to the counter, the purse, unzipped, was lying atop the opposite end of the counter; (d) the vehicle in which appellant and Dents were riding headed north on Highway 87, away from Mason and toward Brady; (e) when the vehicle was seen by police officers, it was proceeding north on Highway 87 and then turned onto Highway 71 before it was stopped by officers; (f) the wallet was found in a ditch on Highway 87 between Mason, the scene of the theft, and Brady.
The evidence points so overwhelmingly to the theft of the wallet by Dents as to compel the conclusion that Dents removed the wallet from the purse. No other conclusion, rational or otherwise, is justified. There is no evidence supporting or even suggesting an inference other than the guilt of Dents.
4. Lack of identification of the money. There is no requirement that a person from whom money has been stolen be able to identify the actual bills and coins which were taken in the theft. It would, indeed, be a rare case in which the victim could identify the money. If such identification were required, few, if any, persons charged with theft of money could ever be convicted.
5. Lack of fingerprints. Fingerprint evidence is not a prerequisite to conviction. If the absence of fingerprints were decisive, we would have to conclude that nobody took the wallet which was later found several miles from the scene of the crime.
At another point in the court’s opinion, it is asserted that there is no “direct” evi*692dence that appellant solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Dents in committing the theft. A finding of guilt as a party is not required to rest on “direct” evidence. Participation as a party may be established by circumstantial evidence. The court’s opinion notes, but ignores holdings, as in Harris v. State, 645 S.W.2d 447, 457-8 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), that we may look to events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense, and appellant’s actions which show he understood what was happening and participated in the common design to commit the crime.
We need look only to appellant’s actions just prior to and during the theft.
Appellant’s actions were rather strange and not typical of the usual customer. His additional demands for change, after McCrohan had completed with his original request, certainly support the conclusion that he was attempting to divert her attention. Although his request for mixed cartons of soft drink was not unreasonable, his inability to decide the nature of the mixture can rationally be interpreted as establishing an intent to keep McCrohan away from the counter as long as possible. When, after seeing Dents walk behind the counter, she told appellant to make up his own assortment because she had to get back to the front, he demanded that she stay and “mix” the drinks. When she attempted to leave the cooler and return to the counter, he assaulted her, threw her against a stack of soft drinks, continued to attempt to prevent her return to the corner and repeated his insistence that she remain in the cooler and prepare the mixed cartons. When she finally eluded him and returned to the counter, he abandoned his plans to purchase mixed cartons.
The evidence abundantly supports the conclusion that appellant’s bizarre behavior, including his efforts to prevent, by resort to physical violence, McCrohan’s return to the counter, was designed to facilitate theft of the wallet by Dents. The evidence, in fact, is such as to justify label-ling the inference of any other intent as falling far short of rational.
It may be true that appellant did not direct or solicit Dents to commit the theft. But the evidence that he knew that Dents was going to commit the crime of theft and that he aided Dents by giving Dents as much time as possible and trying to prevent immediate discovery of the theft is so overwhelming that the order of acquittal cannot be defended.
The case should be remanded for a new trial.