Court Opinion

ID: 9706059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:30:41.839797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:18.849195
License: Public Domain

Beasley, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
In this case, plaintiff seeks interpretation of MCLA 436.26c; MSA 18.997(3), which provides:
"No person shall maintain, operate, lease or otherwise furnish to other persons any premises or place which is not licensed under this act, wherein such other persons may engage in the drinking of alcoholic beverages, for a fee or for any other consideration including the sale of food, mixers, ice or other fluids used with alcoholic drinks or the storage of alcoholic liquors: Provided, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to any hotel nor to any licensee under the provisions of this act: Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not be construed to repeal or amend the provisions of section 26b of this act.”
Even a cursory reading of the above statute reveals plenty of room for differing interpretations. In a nutshell, plaintiff claims the statute prohibits unlicensed persons from furnishing premises for a fee where others engage in drinking alcoholic beverages on the premises.
Defendant says, an unlicensed person may furnish premises and food, including ice, mix and pop to another for a fee where the second person permits drinking of alcoholic beverages on the premises. An authoritative, binding interpretation of the statute should be made to resolve this issue.
*330Both at trial and on appeal, defendant urges that plaintiff is an improper party and lacks standing to bring this action. Defendant argues that violations of the Liquor Control Act are a crime, that plaintiffs position is essentially that defendant violates the Liquor Control Act by permitting and promoting liquor to be served in premises rented for a fee, that criminal activity may only be enjoined where it is either a public or private nuisance or where injury is caused to the property rights or pecuniary interests of another; that plaintiff does not have property rights in or pecuniary interests arising from a license, that, in addition, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, administrative remedies in the Liquor Control Commission must first be exhausted, and that plaintiff nonprofit association is a separate entity distinct from its members, pays no taxes, and does not and cannot suffer injury because of defendant’s operations. Defendant concludes that plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action.
The trial court rejected defendant’s claim that plaintiff lacked standing, finding that, under Bundo1 and Bisco’s,2 plaintiffs members possessed valuable property rights in their liquor licenses. The trial court reasoned that since a property right was involved, violations of the Liquor Control Act could be enjoined as private nuisances. The trial court rejected defendant’s argument that bringing this suit was ultra vires under plaintiffs articles of incorporation, indicating this suit was for the purpose of mutual benefit. The trial court also declined to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the Liquor Control Commission to the facts of this case.__
*331In analyzing the standing issue, I would start with the proposition that where, as here, there is a genuine justiciable issue, that is, the assertion of a claim of right against one who has an interest in contesting it,3 the law should favor that interpretation which grants standing to obtain resolution of the issue. Judicial review of justiciable issues should be freely available with the least judicial encumbrance.4
The justiciable issue is, does § 26c of the liquor law prohibit defendant from performing the acts delineated in the stipulated facts?5
If standing is denied plaintiff, then who can raise the question as to whether defendant’s business is in violation? It is assumed that the police agencies listed in the statute are empowered to see that the law is enforced. It would also be assumed that a liquor licensee who was in economic competition with this unlicensed defendant would have standing to seek determination of whether this defendant is in violation of the liquor control law.6 But, plaintiff is neither. Plaintiff is a nonprofit corporation holding no liquor license of its own, but representing some 2,902 licensees statewide.
On appeal, the majority conclude that plaintiff lacks "standing” to bring this action. In Michigan, the leading case dealing with the subject of standing is White Lake Association v Whitehall,7 In that case, Judge (now Justice) Levin indicated that the standing of nonprofit corporations to challenge *332proposed action of administrative agencies has been recognized. Among other things, he said:
"No constructive purpose would be1 served by requiring the members of the plaintiff association who are riparian owners to maintain this action individually and thereby require that they seek in some other fashion financial and other support from the other affected landowners. Additionally, allowing the landowners to associate together for this purpose may avoid a multiplicity of suits; the difficulties that are likely to be encountered where there are a large number of plaintiffs are all too familiar to anyone who has had experience in such litigation. The most expedient way for the riparian owners to obtain a determination on the merits is to allow them to combine and join together for this purpose with others of a like interest under a single banner both before and at the time of suit;
"In other cases as well it has been recognized that a nonprofit corporation may have standing to maintain an action to vindicate the interests of its members.” (Footnote omitted.)8
The majority undertake to distinguish the within case from the White Lake case, saying that in the White Lake case the nonprofit association was constituted for solely representative purposes, while the corporate purpose of plaintiff nonprofit corporation is unrelated to that of a litigation representative.
Plaintiff was formed as a nonprofit corporation in 1946. Article II of the articles of incorporation provided:
"The purpose or purposes of this corporation are as follows: The purpose of educating licensees of the Michi*333gan Liquor Control Commission as to their responsibilities to the public from a moral, ethical and civic standpoint of view and for the purpose of mutual benefit that accrues from such an understanding.”
The by-laws of plaintiff provide, among other things, as follows:
"Therefore, we, the Michigan Licensed Beverage Association, pledge ourselves to labor unitedly in behalf of the following principles:
"1. To affiliate all licensees into one state organization.
"2. To establish and perpetuate an organization for the purpose of mutual improvement, protection and benefit to promote a moral, social, intellectual improvement of the liquor licensees of the State of Michigan.
"3. To encourage, sustain and assist in the just and equitable enforcement of laws, and in the effort to defeat oppressive legislation, to promote beneficial legislation, and to maintain and support the objects of the organization.”
For this nonprofit corporation to attempt to secure a binding adjudication as to whether catering halls, like defendant, must obtain liquor licenses would seem clearly to be for the "mutual improvement, protection and benefit” of its members and, thus, not outside the contemplation of the articles of incorporation and by-laws of plaintiff.
Under these circumstances, the bringing of the within cause of action by plaintiff does not appear to be an ultra vires action.
Contrary to the majority, I would incline to believe that, for the same reasons delineated in White Lake Association, supra, plaintiff has standing to bring this action. The majority suggest that since plaintiff does not hold a liquor license and, *334thus, has no direct interest in the outcome of this litigation, equitable relief is not available for plaintiff. However, the members of plaintiff nonprofit corporation do have a direct interest in the outcome of this litigation.
Judicial notice is taken that there is direct economic competition between the liquor licensees who comprise plaintiff and catering halls similar to defendant. In the within case, the form of relief sought by plaintiff is in reality twofold; a sweeping injunction to enjoin "Defendant from operating his establishment in violation of the Michigan Liquor Control Act”, and, implicitly, a declaration that the interpretation of § 26c of the liquor statute urged by plaintiff is correct.
The majority say that since violations of the liquor statute are punishable as criminal acts, injunctive relief is only available if public or private nuisance or injury to property rights is established. They maintain that there has been no such showing in the within case.
To the contrary, I would conclude that the members of plaintiff have a property right in their liquor licenses,9 that that property right would be injured by violations of the liquor control law and that plaintiff represents its members in seeking to prevent such injury.
However, with the majority, I would acknowledge that plaintiff in the within case has apparently made no evidentiary showing of pecuniary damages "directly traceable” to the alleged unlawful conduct of defendant.10 Without a showing of direct traceability, injunctive relief is not available *335to plaintiff. Therefore, I would agree with the majority that injunctive relief was not proper in the within case on the facts indicated in the record. However, I would treat plaintiff’s cause as an action for declaratory judgment11 and would find standing in plaintiff to seek an authoritative, binding interpretation of § 26c of the Liquor Control Act as it relates to the allegedly unlawful activities of defendant. I would address that issue as to the statute’s meaning; but since this is a dissent, no good purpose will be served by further comment.

 Bundo v Walled Lake, 395 Mich 679; 238 NW2d 154 (1976).

 Bisco’s, Inc v Liquor Control Commission, 395 Mich 706; 238 NW2d 166 (1976).

 Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed), p 1004.

 See, 75 Harvard L Rev 255, 257-258 (1961), citing FCC v Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 US 470; 60 S Ct 693; 84 L Ed 869 (1940).

 MCLA 436.26c; MSA 18.997(3).

 Kirkby v Public Service Commission, 320 Mich 608; 32 NW2d 1 (1948), In re Azarewicz, 163 Pa Super 459; 62 A2d 78 (1948).

 White Lake Improvement Association v City of Whitehall, 22 Mich App 262; 177 NW2d 473 (1970).

 Id. at pp 272-273.

 Bundo, supra and Bisco’s, supra.

 Glover v Malloska, 238 Mich 216; 213 NW 107 (1927), United-Detroit Theaters Corp v Colonial Theatrical Enterprise, Inc, 280 Mich 425; 273 NW 756 (1937).

 GCR 1963, 521, Kuhn v East Detroit, 50 Mich App 502, 504; 213 NW2d 599 (1973).