Court Opinion

ID: 9407450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 14:06:37.276446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:37.288328
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 30, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2022-CA-0383-MR

MICHAEL S. BRANHAM AND
METELECTRIC ENERGY, LLC                                          APPELLANTS

                APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CI-00671

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
CABINET                                                             APPELLEE

                                  OPINION
                                 AFFIRMING

                                ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ECKERLE, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: This case concerns the breach of an agreement about mining

operations. Appellants are Michael S. Branham (Branham), and MetElectric

Energy, LLC (MetElectric). Appellee is the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Energy

and Environment Cabinet (Cabinet). MetElectric is a surface coal mining
permittee located in Floyd County, Kentucky. Branham is its sole member-

manager.

                Due to failure to follow Kentucky’s rules and regulations governing

mining operations, the Cabinet cited and fined Appellants for various violations,

including coal mining reclamation requirements. Reclamation “means the

reconditioning of the area affected by surface coal mining operations under a plan

approved by the cabinet[.]” KRS1 350.010(12). The parties eventually entered

into a twenty-nine page amended agreed order in September of 2019 (Agreed

Order). The signatories to the Agreed Order include the present parties and the

reclamation bond surety, Lexon Insurance Company.

                Appellants breached the Agreed Order for failure to comply with its

requirement to pay reduced monthly civil penalty installments of $25,000. After

receiving notice of their breach, Appellants failed to cure within a fourteen-day

period provided by the Agreed Order. As a result, the Cabinet filed suit in Franklin

Circuit Court. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Cabinet, thereby

enforcing the terms of the Agreed Order, including the pecuniary penalties for

breach. In addition to finding that Appellants failed to make the necessary

payments pursuant to the Agreed Order, the court also concluded that “there is no

dispute that the amount of highwall reclaimed falls short of the amount that is

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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required . . . .” Appellants filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate that order,

which was denied.2 Appellants now appeal the summary judgment as a matter of

right. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” CR3 56.03. The Kentucky Supreme Court further explained this summary

judgment standard in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.:

                While it has been recognized that summary judgment is
                designed to expedite the disposition of cases and avoid
                unnecessary trials when no genuine issues of material
                fact are raised, . . . this Court has also repeatedly
                admonished that the rule is to be cautiously applied. The
                record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
                party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all
                doubts are to be resolved in his favor. Even though a
                trial court may believe the party opposing the motion
                may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary
                judgment if there is any issue of material fact. The trial
                judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue
                of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. It clearly is

2
  In its order denying post-judgment relief, the court indicated that Appellants’ counsel “made a
vigorous argument that Mr. Branham acted in good faith . . . .” The court also indicated that it is
“mindful that this dispute dates back many years, and the Cabinet has showed flexibility and
leniency many times before, which resulted in the present Agreed Order. While the result may
be harsh, the Cabinet is within its rights to enforce the Agreed Order.”

3
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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             not the purpose of the summary judgment rule, as we
             have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of
             trial if they have issues to try.

807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted). “Because no factual issues

are involved and only a legal issue is before the court on the motion for summary

judgment, we do not defer to the trial court and our review is de novo.” Univ. of

Louisville v. Sharp, 416 S.W.3d 313, 315 (Ky. App. 2013) (citation omitted). With

this standard in mind, we return to facts and issues in the present case.

                                     ANALYSIS

             Appellants’ sole argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred in

granting the Cabinet’s motion for summary judgment because numerous genuine

issues of material facts exist. They specifically assert that MetElectric sent the

Cabinet a “COVID 19 Application for Temporary Regulatory Flexibility,”

requesting an extension of the curative period. The reasoning behind this request

is unspecified, and there is no indication that the appropriate department received

the form. What is clear, however, is that pursuant to the Agreed Order:

             [The] fourteen (14) day period may be extended by the
             Cabinet if MetElectric is actively pursuing a cure for the
             breach and requests, in writing, additional time.

(First emphasis added.) Therefore, the circumstances surrounding Appellants’

alleged request for an extension are of limited relevance here. The Agreed Order is

not an instrument of equity, and any decisions concerning extensions of the

                                          -4-
curative period are the discretion of the Cabinet. Furthermore, the Agreed Order

was a product of previous written agreements between the parties. And the parties

here involve sophisticated individuals and entities, presumably well-versed in

contractual obligations. In any event, Appellants have not presented any genuine

issue of material fact that would require reversal.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Franklin Circuit Court’s

order entered on January 24, 2022.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Billy R. Shelton                          Lance C. Huffman
 Lexington, Kentucky                       Leilani Martin
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

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