Court Opinion

ID: 9459862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:33:30.251941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:21.888856
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Chief Judge
(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
I am in full agreement with the preservation of our decision in United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), and with the majority’s decision that any deviation from it will henceforth result in a reversal. However, I dissent from the majority’s failure to find reversible error by the district judge’s refusal to follow our mandate in Brown. The majority seems to excuse the judge by an allegedly vague sentence in the Brown opinion: “In order to avoid the potential for prejudice and coercion to which we have referred, district courts in this Circuit are required henceforth to charge deadlocked juries in both criminal and civil cases in a manner consistent with the recommended standards.” 411 F.2d at 934. After citing this sentence the majority says: “Although our 1969 language was designed to produce uniform practices within the circuit, it has not had that result, possibly because of the final words that deadlocked juries be charged ‘in a manner consistent with the recommended standards.’ Widespread deviations from and substantial supplements to the ABA standards have been considered to be ‘consistent with’ them and ‘complying’ with them. United States v. DeStefano, 476 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1973).” The citation of DeStefano is unfortunate. That case dealt with deviations from the Brown standards closely similar to those seen here and indulged in by the same judge. More important is the fact that a majority of this court agreed but were denied the opportunity to rehear it en banc, since the defendant DeStefano died prior to the rehearing. Therefore, I submit, the holding of the majority of the panel in DeStefano is a questionable precedent.1 However, if the reference to DeStefano should be interpreted as an assertion that “widespread deviations from and substantial supplements to the ABA standards” have occurred throughout the Circuit since Brown, there is *887scant support for such an interpretation, According to the appeals that have been heard, only two judges within the Circuit have deviated from the ABA standards mandated by Brown.2
That the district judge was confused or had difficulty with the alleged vagueness of the language in Brown is belied by the record. Because the point is important I quote a large portion of the colloquy between the judge and counsel which preceded the jury’s reception of the supplemental instruction.3
It is clear from the record that the trial judge — despite the lip service he paid to Brown and its requirement of a *888jury “charge ... in a manner consistent with the recommended standards”- — deliberately incorporated most of the Allen charge which had been condemned by this court in Brown. If it is true that our mandate in Brown of consistent adherence to the ABA standards is sufficiently ambiguous to authorize a range of equivalent jury charges, the broadest reasonable reading of Brown would not approve what the judge did here. To give, as the judge himself put it, “a modified charge, modified from the Allen charge,” was a clear violation of our direction in Brown (emphasis supplied).
The majority’s opinion on rehearing does not address itself to the coercive elements of the charge given in this case, nor to their likely prejudicial effect. Most of the coercive admonitions contained in the Allen charge were given. See note 5, majority opinion. Moreover, it does not deal with the untimeliness of the supplemental charge. After the jury had deliberated for fourteen hours on two successive days, the trial judge sua sponte advised counsel that he proposed to give the jury a supplemental charge. The jury, however, was deadlocked neither then nor after the judge and counsel had discussed the proposed supplemental charge, for the first opinion in this ease is in error in its assertion that the jury “had informed the judge that they were in fact deadlocked.” 4 Immediately before he put his proposal into effect, the judge asked the jury whether they had “yet arrived at a verdict.” He received a response of “not yet.” This phrase may hardly be taken to justify the elaborate charge which followed. In Brown we repeatedly laid stress on the fact that the ABA recital was to be given to deadlocked juries. It may be true, I admit, that an instruction following Brown is appropriate even if a jury has not deliberated to the point of deadlock, provided it has consumed in unsuccessful deliberation an amount of time which is patently out of proportion to the difficulty of the issues in the case before it and the amount of testimony taken at trial. When the proper time *889has passed, the trial judge should then make discreet inquiry of the jurors as to the status of their deliberations. If they estimate that a verdict is close at hand, their instruction under Brown is clearly inappropriate. This case — broad in its issues, arguably close on its facts, and lengthy in its trial5 — fails to fit the first formula after fourteen hours of deliberation, see United States v. Flan-nery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971), Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1966), but cf. Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1966), and the failure of the trial judge to ascertain the probable imminence of a verdict is unquestionably clear. The instruction modified from Allen, then, is not the only reason to reverse this case.

. Judge Fairchild dissented in the De-Stefano opinion and the order of this court dated April 20, 1973 reads in part:
It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed as moot and the district court is directed to enter an order vacating the judgment of conviction and dismissing the indictment as moot.

. The trial in Brandom v. United States, 431 F.2d 1391 (7th Cir. 1970), predated the Brown decision. DeStefano and the case at bar were tried by the same judge; one other deviation occurred in United States v. Baranski, No. 71-0-576, (N.D. Ill.).

. MR. SULLIVAN: With regard to the last part about the — another jury, you should not think that some other group—
THE COURT: All right.
MR. SULLIVAN: Now, that is not in the Brown case and I think it harkens back to the very kind of instruction that has been criticized and condemned.
THE COURT: No, the instruction that lias been criticized and condemned, and I have lifted this from that ease, the one that is condemned states that, “If you should fail to agree on a verdict, the case is left open — another jury must decide it.” That is the way that reads.
It has been suggested by the Court of Appeals that I use the phrase which I have, “is left open and undecided.”
MR. SULLIVAN: But all that follows that about other people and other — from the community, and you must not assume it is going to be tried differently or more evidence, in Brandom vs. United States, 431 Fed.2d 1391, decided last year—
THE COURT: Seventh Circuit?
See, we have a special rule in the Seventh Circuit. You can give the old Allen Charge in every other Circuit but here but [Brown] says that we are going to be unique ... I wouldn’t be surprised if no other Circuit follows the Seventh Circuit in regard to the Allen Charge. So I am conforming to the revised — you have the balance of this opinion ?
MR. SULLIVAN: It is all there, Judge. I tore off part of a page that deals with a different case.
THE COURT: This is the last sentence and this is what I was looking for, “In order to avoid the potential for prejudice and coercion, to which we have referred, the District Courts in this Circuit are required henceforth to charge deadlocked juries in both criminal and civil cases in a manner consistent with the recommended standard.” I have made a determination that this is consistent with the recommended standards and here is your last sentence of the opinion.
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, in the Brandom case—
THE COURT: From what Circuit?
MR. SULLIVAN: The Seventh. And as I understand this opinion, this was the original charge, not a recharge after the jury didn’t agree, the court said many of the same things that you have said; “If you fail to agree on the verdict, the ease is left open and undecided, and like all cases it must be disposed of some time. If the case is retried a future jury must be selected in the same manner and from the same source as you have been chosen.”
THE COURT: Is that condemned in the Brandom case?
MR. SULLIVAN: No, not outright condemned. I would like to read it to you so that we can all make a judgment.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. SULLIVAN: (Continuing) and from the same source as you have been chosen, and there is no reason to believe that the case would ever be submitted to twelve men or women more competent to decide this case than those of you who compose the present jury. There is no reason to believe that there will be more or clearer evidence produced at a future trial, therefore, I urge you to deliberate in this case with the disposition to be convinced — ”
THE COURT: I am not going to say that.
MR. SULLIVAN: All right. “Therefore, I urge you to deliberate in this case with the disposition to be convinced, at the same time directing you that your verdict must be a conscientious decision of each individual juror.”
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MR. LAPIDUS: The case was affirmed, your Honor. That instruction was affirmed, by the way, in that case.
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, here is what they said — they affirmed in Brown, too, but—
THE COURT: But for the reason that the instruction had heretofore been approved by the Seventh Circuit and then they turned turtle in the Brown ease.
*888MR. SULLIVAN: Right, but then as I say, this was not part of the supplemental charge.
In Brown the court held that “The defendant failed to show that the supplemental court charge was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. In the instant case the instruction in question was part of the trial court’s general instruction. Even more than in Brown the instruction here given before this court’s decision in Brown contains insufficient interference with the jury’s free deliberation so as to create a prejudicial atmosphere. We reaffirm the position taken in Brown that the Allen type charge may contain elements of potential coercion and is in conflict with the American Bar Association’s recommended instruction. Accordingly, we reaffirm the future use by the District Courts of this Circuit of the standards and practices set out in Brown.” End of Judge Will’s opinion.
THE COURT: The Court of Appeals, if necessary, will — the record will clearly demonstrate that I have been adequately warned by you of the consequences of the heinous thing that I am about to commit.

. The defendant was tried on ten counts of mail fraud and one of conspiracy. The trial encompassed ten days of testimony.

. The pertinent record, in its entirety, is as follows:
THE COURT: As of this moment, gentlemen, there has been no verdict returned.
I propose to give them a modified charge, modified from the Allen Charge, and I will tell you what I am going to say to them:
* * * -!- *
THE COURT: The Court of Appeals, if necessary, will — the record will clearly demonstrate that I have been adequately warned by you of the consequences of the heinous thing that I am about to commit.
Get the jury, Mr. Marshal.
(The following further proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: You may be seated, ladies and gentlemen.
Who is the foreman?
JURY FOREMAN: I am, sir.
THE COURT: I am going to ask you one question that can be answered yes or no.
Have you yet arrived at a verdict?
JURY FOREMAN: Not yet, sir.
..THE COURT: I have one further instruction for you ladies and gentlemen.