Court Opinion

ID: 9955332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 14:00:57.271561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:33.741757
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11846   Document: 18-1      Date Filed: 03/28/2024     Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                   In the

                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11846
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       LUCRECIA MARINA LUCAS MAZERIEGOS,
       JOSE MANUEL CIFUENTES LUCAS,
                                                               Petitioners,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                          ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A206-442-069
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       2                        Opinion of the Court                    23-11846

                              ____________________

       Before JORDAN, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             Lucrecia Marina Lucas Mazeriegos, a native and citizen of
       Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
       Appeals’s ﬁnal order aﬃrming the immigration judge’s denial of
       her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
       under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
       Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 1 We
       deny the petition.
                                            I.
              Lucas ﬁrst argues that the Board failed to give reasoned
       consideration to her application for asylum and withholding of
       removal. Speciﬁcally, Lucas argues that the Board erred by
       declining to remand her case for a new hearing after an intervening
       change in the law governing her asylum claim. As a result, Lucas
       contends that the Board’s order aﬃrming her removal
       mischaracterized the immigration judge’s factual ﬁndings and
       impermissibly engaged in its own factﬁnding. We ﬁnd no error.
              When Lucas was ﬁrst placed into removal proceedings in
       2015, the governing precedent on asylum cases involving domestic
       violence was Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).

       1 Lucas’s petition for review is filed on behalf of herself and Jose Manuel

       Cifuentes Lucas, her son and derivate asylum applicant.
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       23-11846               Opinion of the Court                          3

       This decision found that a particular social group composed of
       “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
       relationship” was cognizable for asylum purposes. Id. at 392–95.
       Lucas initially planned to claim membership in this social group for
       her asylum application. But in 2018, the Attorney General
       overruled Matter of A-R-C-G- in Matter of A-B- (Matter of A-B- I), 27 I
       & N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). Thus, at Lucas’s removal hearing in
       2019, her counsel conceded that she could no longer pursue her
       asylum claim based on her original particular social group, which
       relied on Matter of A-R-C-G-. She reframed her particular social
       group as “women facing fear in Guatemala because of domestic
       violence,” which the immigration judge ruled was not a cognizable
       social group for asylum purposes.
              Between her hearing and her appeal to the Board of
       Immigration Appeals, the Attorney General changed course. In
       Matter of A-B- (Matter of A-B- III), 28 I & N Dec. 307, 307–09 (A.G.
       2021), the Attorney General vacated Matter of A-B- I, thereby
       restoring Matter of A-R-C-G- as governing law. Accordingly, Lucas
       requested that the Board remand her case back to the immigration
       judge for renewed factﬁnding under the appropriate legal standard.
              The Board was not obligated to remand. In Lucas’s initial
       hearing, the immigration judge had speciﬁcally found that Lucas
       “was able to leave her husband.” The Board’s decision identiﬁed
       that Matter of A-B- III had restored Matter of A-R-C-G- but stated that
       Lucas could not show membership in even her original particular
       social group because the immigration judge had found that Lucas
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                23-11846

       “was able to leave her abusive husband.” Therefore, remand was
       not necessary because the immigration judge had made the
       necessary factual ﬁndings to support denial of asylum, even after
       the intervening change in the law. And the Board did not
       mischaracterize the immigration judge’s factual ﬁndings, nor did it
       engage in its own factﬁnding. Lucas’s reasoned consideration
       challenge to the Board’s denial of her asylum and withholding of
       removal claims fails.
              Our dissenting colleague contends that we “cannot say
       whether the legal error on the applicable standard aﬀected the
       immigration judge’s factual ﬁnding.” Dissent at 2. With respect,
       we disagree. Agency guidance instructs immigration judges to
       “make comprehensive ﬁndings of fact . . . rather than just those
       ﬁndings pertinent to one issue that the Immigration Judge may
       deem dispositive of the case” in order to avoid unnecessary
       remands for additional factﬁnding after “unforeseen change[s] or
       interpretation[s] of law.” In re S-H-, 23 I & N Dec. 462, 465 (B.I.A.
       2002). The immigration judge here heeded that advice. She stated
       on the record that she viewed Lucas’s newly proposed particular
       social group as indistinguishable from the one advanced in Matter
       of A-R-C-G- and rejected in Matter of A-B- I. That alone supported
       her decision to deny relief under the then-prevailing legal standard.
       But the judge then found, in the alternative, that Lucas was not a
       member of her proposed, Matter of A-R-C-G- based social group
       anyway because she could leave her husband. Remand was thus
       unnecessary because the intervening change in the law did not
       aﬀect this alternative factual ﬁnding, adopted by the Board.
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       23-11846               Opinion of the Court                         5

                                        II.
              Next, Lucas argues that the Board’s determination that
       Lucas was not a member of the particular social group of “married
       women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”
       was unsupported by substantial evidence. In reviewing for
       substantial evidence, we will aﬃrm the Board’s decision if it is
       “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
       the record considered as a whole.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022,
       1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quotation omitted). A ﬁnding of
       fact will be reversed only when the record “compels” it, not just
       because the record “may support a contrary conclusion.” Id.
             The record shows that, although Lucas remains legally
       married to her husband, she left their shared home and lived
       separately from him at her parents’ house for sixteen years prior to
       seeking asylum in the United States. Although she had been
       physically abused during her marriage, after their separation, her
       husband never harmed her again. About annually, her husband
       would show up at her parent’s house, armed, and demand her
       return. But he never used the weapon and was always successfully
       turned away without incident by Lucas’s mother. And Lucas never
       sought police intervention, at any point. Based on this, the Board’s
       conclusion that Lucas was able to leave her abusive relationship was
       supported by more than enough evidence.
                                        III.
            Finally, Lucas argues that the Board failed to give her
       Convention Against Torture claim reasoned consideration. We
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11846

       disagree. On a reasoned consideration challenge, “the Board does
       not need to do much.” Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 931 F.3d 1327, 1333
       (11th Cir. 2019). It “need not address speciﬁcally each piece of
       evidence the petitioner presented.” Id. (alteration adopted)
       (quotation omitted). We have held that the Board does not give
       reasoned consideration in three types of circumstances: when it
       “misstates the contents of the record, fails to adequately explain its
       rejection of logical conclusions, or provides justiﬁcations for its
       decision which are unreasonable and which do not respond to any
       arguments in the record.” Id. at 1334 (quotation omitted).
       Ultimately, for the Board’s decision to exhibit a lack of reasoned
       consideration, it must “force[] us to doubt whether we and the
       Board are, in substance, looking at the same case.” Id.
              Here, the Board identiﬁed the correct legal standard,
       explaining that Lucas failed to show that she was more likely than
       not to be tortured if returned to Guatemala by or with the
       acquiescence of a government oﬃcial. It then explained that Lucas
       was unable to show a probability of harm rising to the level of
       torture because she could successfully relocate within Guatemala
       away from her husband—as evidenced by the fact that she had
       resided at her parent’s home for sixteen years prior to seeking
       asylum in the United States.
              That was enough to generate a decision reviewable by this
       Court. Although Lucas faults the Board for not discussing evidence
       relevant to the government acquiescence prong of the torture
       standard, the Board was not required to discuss “each piece of
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       23-11846               Opinion of the Court                        7

       evidence” in the record. Id. at 1333 (quotation omitted). And
       because the Board found that Lucas did not establish that it was
       more likely than not she would suﬀer harm rising to the level of
       torture if returned to Guatemala, it was not also required to rule
       speciﬁcally on the separate requirement of government
       acquiescence. See Farah v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 1312, 1326 (11th
       Cir. 2021).
                                  *     *      *
             PETITION DENIED.
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       23-11846              JORDAN, J., Dissenting                      1

       JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
             I would send this matter back to the BIA for further
       proceedings. With respect, I dissent from the court’s denial of Ms.
       Lucas’ petition for review.
              When the immigration judge resolved the asylum claim, the
       governing standard for cases involving domestic violence was the
       one articulated in Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
       As a result, Ms. Lucas’ original proposed group—married women
       in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship—was not
       then cognizable. In addressing asylum, the immigration judge
       understandably followed Matter of A-B- and focused only on Ms.
       Lucas’ alternative proposed group—women facing fear based upon
       domestic violence. See App. 222-23. So when the immigration
       judge made a factual ﬁnding that Ms. Lucas was able to leave her
       husband, see App. 223, that ﬁnding was made under the asylum
       standard articulated in Matter of A-B- and was not geared towards
       the group that Ms. Lucas had initially proposed.
              By the time the asylum claim got to the BIA, the asylum
       standard had changed again and was back to the one set out in
       Matter of A-R-C-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). See Matter of
       A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021). As a result, Ms. Lucas’
       original proposed group was again cognizable. In my view, the BIA
       should not have relied on a factual ﬁnding made by the
       immigration judge under a now-incorrect standard (and pursuant
       only to an alternative proposed group) to reject Ms. Lucas’ asylum
       claim. See Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 301 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The
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       2                      JORDAN, J., Dissenting                23-11846

       BIA’s substitution of the proper [legal] standard at the intermediate
       appellate level without considering how the error may have colored
       the [immigration judge’s] factual ﬁndings of fact cannot plausibly
       be read to support the conclusion . . . that ‘the [BIA] has considered
       the issue[.]’”) (citation omitted). Because I cannot say whether the
       legal error on the applicable standard aﬀected the immigration
       judge’s factual ﬁnding, i.e., whether the error was harmless, I
       would vacate the BIA’s order and send the matter back for further
       proceedings before the immigration judge under the correct
       asylum standard and pursuant to Ms. Lucas’ original proposed
       group. Cf. United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019)
       (explaining that “[i]f a district court applies an incorrect legal
       standard in reaching a factual conclusion, the resulting ﬁnding is
       not insulated by the clear error standard,” and the appropriate
       remedy is to remand if we “cannot say” whether the erroneous
       legal standard aﬀected the factual ﬁnding).
              I recognize that the immigration judge also made an adverse
       credibility ﬁnding against Ms. Lucas and concluded that this ﬁnding
       was suﬃcient to foreclose all of the relief she requested. See App.
       216-19. But the BIA did not adopt this portion of the immigration
       judge’s order, see App. 2, and that means that the adverse credibility
       ﬁnding is not properly before us. See, e.g., Lingeswaran v. U.S. Atty.
       Gen., 969 F.3d 1278, 1287 n.12 (11th Cir. 2020). I would allow the
       BIA to decide on remand whether to adopt the immigration judge’s
       adverse credibility ﬁnding, and if does so to then address (a)
       whether that ﬁnding is adequately supported by the record and (b)
       whether it suﬃces to deny Ms. Lucas all forms of requested relief.