Court Opinion

ID: 9552472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:11:08.44044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:53.119686
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
This appeal falls clearly within the provisions of I.A.R. 11(c)(3), permitting the appeal of “an order granting a motion to dismiss an information or complaint,” and therefore this appeal should not be dismissed.
The majority declines to consider I.A.R. 11(c)(3) on this appeal because “[njeither party has briefed or argued the applicability of [that] rule,” and “[t]he state ... did not accept [the court’s] invitation to rely on that rule which was ‘offered’ at oral argument.” While it is true that neither party briefed the applicability of I.A.R. 11(c)(3), the balance of the statements are incorrect in two respects. First, the state in its oral argument did indicate that I.A.R. 11(c)(3) could be a basis of appeal in this case if the court found it applicable. Second, the respondent did oppose the application of I.A.R. 11(c)(3) in this case with a substantial argument. The applicability of I.A.R. 11(c)(3) is therefore presented to this Court for review.
The majority further indicates in footnote 2 that the state did not set forth I.A.R. 11(c)(3) as a jurisdictional basis for the appeal in its notice of appeal under I.A.R. 17(f). However, I.A.R. 17(f) was not raised in the briefs or argued at oral argument, and the facts of this case clearly reveal that the majority has not seriously reviewed that issue. Not only did the state fail to set forth I.A.R. 11(c)(3) as a jurisdictional basis for appeal in its notice of appeal, but it also failed to set forth any jurisdictional basis in the notice of appeal. If the majority were really choosing to review the applicability of I.A.R. 17(f) in this case, then the appeal should have been dismissed on the basis of 1.A.R. 17(f) and not upon the other grounds espoused by the majority. Clearly, the Court is not basing its decision on the appellant’s failure to comply with I.A.R. 17(f) in this case.
As to the merits of applying I.A.R. 11(c)(3) to this case, the district court dismissed the matter pursuant to I.C.R. 481 for the reason that such dismissal was in the interest of justice. I.C.R. 48(a)(2) provides that “the court, on notice to all parties, may dismiss a criminal action upon its own motion ... [if] the court concludes that such dismissal will serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court’s business.” The respondent argued that I.A.R. 11(c)(3) only applies to the granting of a motion to dismiss, and that here there was no motion. However, I.C.R. 48(a) clearly provides that the court may dismiss on “its own motion.”2 Therefore, when the court dismissed sua sponte, there was a motion made, albeit the court’s own motion, and I.A.R. 11(c)(3) is applicable.
Dismissal of an action is the same as dismissing the information. There was only one action or “matter” (as the district court termed it) before the court, and that was the charge contained in the information. The information was the “action” or “matter,” and that was the only thing which the court could dismiss. Thus, I.A.R. 11(c)(3) is clearly applicable to this case in that it permits the appeal of “an order granting a motion to dismiss an information or complaint.” I would hold that the dismissal appealed by the state was appealable as a *827matter of right under I.A.R. 11(c)(3) and would proceed to the merits of the state’s appeal. However, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that I.A.R. 11(c)(6) is not applicable to this appeal.
McFADDEN, J., concurs.

. The trial court entered the dismissal specifically under I.C.R. 48, contrary to the majority’s implication that it was entered pursuant to I.C. § 19-3504.

. I.C. § 19-3504, which the majority applies in justifying the dismissal, also provides for dismissal on the court’s “own motion.”