Court Opinion

ID: 9929810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 14:02:15.243125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:54:42.999053
License: Public Domain

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  NATIONAL BANK TRUST v. ILYA YUROV ET AL.
                (AC 46023)
                     Alvord, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.

                                  Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 50a-34 (b) (3)), a foreign judgment need not be recog-
   nized if the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant
   to the public policy of this state.
The plaintiff bank, the majority of which was allegedly owned by the Central
   Bank of the Russian Federation, sought to enforce a foreign judgment
   against the defendant B, a shareholder of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed
   a certification of the foreign judgment in the Superior Court, alleging
   that the judgment had not been satisfied, that the enforcement of the
   judgment had not been stayed, and that B owned property in Avon. B
   filed a motion to open and either dismiss or stay the enforcement of
   the certified foreign judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the issuance of
   a federal executive order and a United States Department of the Treasury
   directive related to, inter alia, certain transactions involving the Central
   Bank of the Russian Federation prohibited the trial court from enforcing
   the foreign judgment pursuant to § 50a-34 (b) (3). The trial court denied
   B’s motion to open, and B appealed to this court. Held that the trial
   court properly denied B’s motion to open: B did not challenge on appeal
   the court’s determination that the cause of action on which the foreign
   judgment was based was not repugnant to the public policy of this state;
   moreover, this court rejected B’s claim that this court should interpret
   § 50a-34 (b) (3) to apply to the foreign judgment itself and not merely
   to the cause of action on which the judgment was based, as that interpre-
   tation was inconsistent with the plain language of § 50a-34 (b) (3).
     Argued December 6, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

                             Procedural History

   Action to enforce a foreign judgment, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Hartford, where the court, Baio, J., denied the
defendant Sergey Belyaev’s motion to open and dismiss
or stay the enforcement of the certified foreign judg-
ment, from which the defendant Sergey Belyaev
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Jeffrey Hellman, for the appellant (defendant Sergey
Belyaev).
  Kellianne Baranowsky, with whom, on the brief, was
Jeffrey M. Sklarz, for the appellee (plaintiff).
                          Opinion

   ALVORD, J. The defendant Sergey Belyaev1 appeals
from the trial court’s denial of his second motion to
open and dismiss or stay the enforcement of a certified
foreign judgment filed by the plaintiff, National Bank
Trust. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly denied the motion to open the judgment
pursuant to General Statutes § 50a-34 (b) (3). We dis-
agree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
   The following procedural history, as set forth in a
prior opinion of this court, is relevant to the resolution
of the defendant’s claim on appeal. ‘‘On January 23,
2020, the Commercial Court of the Queen’s Bench Divi-
sion of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales
(UK court) issued a judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
finding that the plaintiff had suffered significant finan-
cial losses as a result of fraud perpetrated by the defen-
dant and certain of his codefendants.2 On June 30, 2020,
the plaintiff filed a certification of the judgment in the
Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 50a-33
and 52-605 (a).3 In the certification, which was signed
by counsel for the plaintiff, the plaintiff alleged that the
judgment had not been satisfied, that the enforcement
of the judgment had not been stayed, and that the
approximate amount due to the plaintiff, as of June 12,
2020, was $900 million. The certification also alleged
that the defendant owns property located at 85 Bishop
Lane in Avon.
   ‘‘On August 17, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to
open and either dismiss or stay the enforcement of
the certified judgment on the grounds that the foreign
judgment was not entitled [to] recognition because (1)
it was not a judgment of a ‘foreign state granting or
denying recovery of a sum of money’ as required by
[General Statutes] § 50a-31 (2); (2) it was not a ‘final and
conclusive’ judgment under [General Statutes] § 50a-32
because it was ‘in the process of being appealed’; (3)
the certification was signed by counsel for the plaintiff,
rather than the judgment creditor, as required by §§ 50a-
33 and 52-605; (4) the defendant was entitled to a stay
of the enforcement of the judgment because he was in
the process of appealing it; and (5) the UK court did
not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. On
September 29, 2020, the court summarily denied the
defendant’s motion.’’ (Footnotes in original.) National
Bank Trust v. Yurov, 210 Conn. App. 776, 778–79, 271
A.3d 171 (2022). The defendant filed an appeal with this
court and sought an articulation of the court’s denial
of his motion. Id., 779.
  ‘‘In its articulation, the court indicated that it had
considered and rejected all of the arguments raised by
the defendant in his motion to open and either dismiss
or stay the enforcement of the certified judgment. The
court held that the certified judgment was a final and
conclusive foreign judgment that granted the recovery
of a sum of money, that the plaintiff’s counsel was
not prohibited from signing the certification of that
judgment, that the defendant had waived the issue of
personal jurisdiction when he appeared before the UK
court, that the defendant did not dispute receiving a
copy of the filed certification, and that there was no
appeal pending of the certified judgment.’’ Id., 780. This
court affirmed the court’s denial of the defendant’s first
motion to open. Id., 788.
   While the first appeal was pending, on May 25, 2021,
the defendant filed a second motion to open the judg-
ment. The defendant argued, inter alia, that the judg-
ment should be opened in accordance with § 50a-34 (b)
(3) because, on April 15, 2021, President Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., had issued Executive Order No. 14,024 pursu-
ant to the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., the National Emergencies
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., § 212 (f) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (f), and 3
U.S.C. § 301 (Executive Order);4 see Executive Order
No. 14,024, 86 Fed. Reg. 20,249 (April 19, 2021), and the
Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States
Department of Treasury (OFAC) had issued a directive
pursuant to the Executive Order, titled ‘‘Directive 4
Under Executive Order 14,024: Prohibitions Related to
Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation [CBR], the National Wealth Fund of the Rus-
sian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the
Russian Federation,’’5 both of which the defendant
argued prohibited the enforcement of the judgment. In
support of this contention, he argued, inter alia, that
the court need not recognize a foreign judgment if either
the judgment, or its underlying cause of action, is repug-
nant to public policy.6
  On June 25, 2021, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the defendant’s second motion to open. The plaintiff
argued, inter alia, that the defendant’s second motion
to open should be denied because the cause of action
on which the judgment is based is not repugnant to the
public policy of the state of Connecticut as expressly
required by § 50a-34 (b) (3).
   The court, Baio, J., held oral argument on the defen-
dant’s second motion to open on October 11, 2022. On
November 2, 2022, the court issued a memorandum of
decision denying the defendant’s second motion to
open. In its conclusion, the court determined that the
language of the relevant statute, § 50a-34 (b) (3),
involves the consideration of whether the cause of
action on which the judgment is based would conflict
with the public policy of the state. The court concluded
that consideration of whether the resulting judgment
would conflict with public policy was outside the ambit
of § 50a-34 (b) (3). The court determined that ‘‘the plain-
tiff’s argument is correct that the defendant has pro-
vided no evidence of a public policy of the United States
or the state that is in conflict with the UK judgment.
The motion to open judgment on this basis is denied.’’
This appeal followed.
   We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘[I]ssues
of statutory interpretation constitute questions of law
over which the court’s review is plenary. The process
of statutory interpretation involves the determination
of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to
the facts of the case, including the question of whether
the language does so apply. . . . When construing a
statute, [the court’s] fundamental objective is to ascer-
tain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legisla-
ture. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a
reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language
as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the ques-
tion of whether the language actually does apply. . . .
In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes
§ 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute
itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such relationship,
the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratex-
tual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Commissioner of Public Health v. Colandrea, 221
Conn. App. 631, 654, 302 A.3d 370 (2023), cert. denied,
348 Conn. 932,        A.3d      (2024).
  We now turn to the defendant’s claim on appeal that
the court improperly denied his second motion to open
under § 50a-34 (b) (3).7 Section 50a-34, titled ‘‘Grounds
for nonrecognition,’’ is part of Connecticut’s Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, codified at
General Statutes § 50a-30 et seq., and provides in rele-
vant part: ‘‘(b) A foreign judgment need not be recog-
nized if . . . (3) The cause of action on which the judg-
ment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this
state . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 50a-
34 (b) (3). The defendant maintains that the trial court
adopted ‘‘a very restrictive view’’ of the statute and
argues that this court should interpret § 50a-34 (b) (3)
to apply ‘‘to the judgment itself and not merely the
cause of action.’’ We disagree.
   ‘‘[A] court must construe a statute as written. . . .
Courts may not by construction supply omissions . . .
or add exceptions merely because it appears that good
reasons exist for adding them. . . . The intent of the
legislature, as this court has repeatedly observed, is to
be found not in what the legislature meant to say, but
in the meaning of what it did say. . . . It is axiomatic
that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accom-
plish a particular result. That is the function of the
legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marci-
ano v. Jiminez, 324 Conn. 70, 77, 151 A.3d 1280 (2016).
The defendant’s interpretation is inconsistent with the
plain language of § 50a-34 (b) (3), which directs the
court to determine whether ‘‘[t]he cause of action on
which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public
policy of this state.’’ Thus, we reject the defendant’s
proposed interpretation.8
   We also note that the defendant’s only claim on
appeal relates to whether the court properly interpreted
§ 50a-34 (b) (3). As the plaintiff recognizes in its appel-
late brief, the defendant does not challenge on appeal
the court’s determination that the cause of action on
which the UK judgment is based is not repugnant to
the public policy of this state. Accordingly, that issue
is not before this court.9
  On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the
court properly denied the defendant’s motion to open.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     Ilya Yurov, Nikolay Fetisov, Nataliya Yurova, Irina Belyaeva, and Elena
Pischulina also were named as defendants in this action, but they did not
appear in the trial court and are not participating in this appeal. Accordingly,
any reference herein to the defendant is to Sergey Belyaev only.
   2
     ‘‘The defendant and certain of the other defendants named in this case
were shareholders of the plaintiff and also owned the companies to which
they made fraudulent loans or conducted fraudulent transactions. The UK
court found those defendants liable for the financial ruin of the plaintiff.’’
National Bank Trust v. Yurov, 210 Conn. App. 776, 778 n.2, 271 A.3d 171
(2022).
   3
     ‘‘General Statutes § 50a-33 provides: ‘Except as provided in section 50a-
34, a foreign judgment meeting the requirements of section 50a-32 is conclu-
sive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of
a sum of money. The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner
as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit.’
   ‘‘General Statutes § 52-605 (a) provides: ‘A judgment creditor shall file,
with a certified copy of a foreign judgment, in the court in which enforcement
of such judgment is sought, a certification that the judgment was not obtained
by default in appearance or by confession of judgment, that it is unsatisfied
in whole or in part, the amount remaining unpaid and that the enforcement
of such judgment has not been stayed and setting forth the name and last-
known address of the judgment debtor.’ ’’ National Bank Trust v. Yurov,
supra, 210 Conn. App. 778–79 n.3.
   4
     Section 6 of the Executive Order provides in relevant part: ‘‘For the
purposes of this order . . . (b) the term ‘Government of the Russian Federa-
tion’ means the Government of the Russian Federation, any political subdivi-
sion, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation, and any person owned, controlled, or directed by, or
acting for or on behalf of, the Government of the Russian Federation.’’
Executive Order No. 14,024, Blocking Property With Respect To Specified
Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation,
86 Fed. Reg. 20,249, 20,251 (April 19, 2021). Section 8 provides in relevant
part: ‘‘The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation
of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President
. . . as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The
Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate
any of these functions within the Department of the Treasury. All depart-
ments and agencies of the United States shall take all appropriate measures
within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.’’ Id., 20,252.
   5
     The April 15, 2021 OFAC directive was amended twice; see 87 Fed. Reg.
32,303 (May 31, 2022); 88 Fed. Reg. 36,648 (June 5, 2023); both amendments
made technical, nonsubstantive changes that are not relevant to this appeal.
For purposes of clarity, we refer to the current revision of the OFAC direc-
tive.
   Accordingly, the OFAC directive provides in relevant part: ‘‘Pursuant to
sections 1 (a) (iv), 1 (d), and 8 of Executive Order 14,024, ‘Blocking Property
With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government
of the Russian Federation’ . . . the Director of [OFAC] has determined, in
consultation with the Department of State, that the [CBR and the two other
entities] . . . are political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities of the
Government of the Russian Federation, and that the following activities by
a United States person are prohibited, except to the extent provided by law,
or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by [OFAC]:
   ‘‘Any transaction involving the [CBR or the two other entities] . . . includ-
ing any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction
for or on behalf of such entities.
   ‘‘All other activities with entities determined to be subject to the prohibi-
tions of this Directive, or involving their property or interests in property,
are permitted, provided that such activities are not otherwise prohibited by
law, the [Executive] Order, or any other sanctions program implemented
by [OFAC].
   ‘‘Except to the extent otherwise provided by law or unless licensed or
otherwise authorized by [OFAC], the following are also prohibited: (1) any
transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding,
causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions of this
Directive; and (2) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions
of this Directive. . . .’’ Publication of Directive 4 (as Amended) Under Exec-
utive Order 14,024 of April 15, 2021, 88 Fed. Reg. 36,648, 36,649 (June 5, 2023).
   6
     The defendant also argued that, because the CBR is subject to the Execu-
tive Order and OFAC directive, and the CBR owns approximately 97 percent
of the plaintiff, the plaintiff also is subject to the Executive Order and
OFAC directive.
   7
     Specifically, the defendant argues that the court incorrectly determined
that the enforcement of the judgment will not be repugnant to the public
policy of this state on the basis of what he claims are erroneous findings
that (1) the plaintiff is not a sanctioned entity, (2) the sanctions on the CBR
do not prohibit the plaintiff’s collection activity, and (3) the funds collected
by the plaintiff will not fund Russian aggression in Ukraine.
   8
     The defendant argues that ‘‘[t]he new version of the [Uniform Foreign-
Country Money Judgments Recognition] Act which has been adopted by a
majority of states, including New York, Maine, and Rhode Island, makes
clear that it applies to the judgment itself and not merely the cause of
action. See Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
§ 4, comment 8 (2005). While Connecticut has not yet modernized its version
of the act, there is no reason to believe that the Connecticut legislature will
not adopt the new act. Moreover, as a uniform act, its interpretations are
meant to be uniform around the country. [General Statutes] §50a-38. Thus,
the restrictive interpretation used by the Superior Court that the cause of
action must be against the policy of the United States should not apply.’’
Because the court was required to interpret and apply the version of the act
adopted by our legislature, we decline to entertain the defendant’s argument.
   9
     Because we conclude that the court properly denied the defendant’s
second motion to open on the basis that the cause of action on which the
UK judgment is based is not repugnant to the public policy of this state;
see General Statutes § 50a-34 (b) (3); we need not address the defendant’s
remaining arguments that the court improperly determined that (1) the
plaintiff is not a sanctioned entity, (2) the sanctions on the CBR do not
prohibit the plaintiff’s collection activity, and (3) the funds collected by the
plaintiff will not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as those arguments
attack the judgment itself.