Court Opinion

ID: 9402792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 21:00:38.855366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.535718
License: Public Domain

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                                           UNPUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-1771

        JANE DOE-2,

                            Plaintiff – Appellant,

                     v.

        SHERIFF OF RICHLAND COUNTY, in his official capacity doing business as
        Richland County Sheriff’s Department; SHERIFF LEON LOTT; CAPTAIN JOHN
        E. EWING,

                            Defendants – Appellees,

                     and

        RICHLAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 2; JEFF TEMONEY,

                            Defendants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (3:20-cv-02274-CMC)

        Argued: December 8, 2022                                       Decided: June 15, 2023

        Before HARRIS and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and Patricia Tolliver GILES,
        District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. District Judge Giles wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Harris and Judge Richardson joined.
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        ARGUED: Scott Christopher Evans, EVANS MOORE, LLC, Georgetown, South
        Carolina, for Appellant. Andrew Lindemann, LINDEMANN & DAVIS, P.A., Columbia,
        South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Kathleen C. Barnes, BARNES LAW FIRM,
        LLC, Hampton, South Carolina; James B. Moore, III, EVANS MOORE, LLC,
        Georgetown, South Carolina, for Appellant. Robert D. Garfield, CROWE LAFAVE, LLC,
        Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        GILES, District Judge:

               From fall 2015 to spring 2016, Deputy Jamel Bradley, a school resource officer

        employed by the Richland County Sheriff’s Department at Spring Valley High School,

        engaged in sexual activity with Jane Doe-2, a seventeen-year-old female student at the high

        school. In December 2015, Sheriff Leon Lott and Captain John Ewing of the Richland

        County Sheriff’s Department learned that Bradley had arranged to meet Jane Doe-2 late at

        night, off school premises. Beyond brief questioning of Bradley and Jane Doe-2 about the

        incident, no further investigation was done, and the relationship continued. In May 2016,

        Jane Doe-2 terminated the relationship with Bradley and graduated from Spring Valley

        High School. Two years later, another minor female student at Spring Valley High School,

        Jane Doe-1, sued the Richland County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Lott, and Captain

        Ewing alleging that Bradley had sexually assaulted her and that the defendants were liable

        for failing to protect her and to properly supervise Bradley.

               Jane Doe-2 contends that, during Jane Doe-1’s case, she learned she had similar

        causes of action against the same defendants. Accordingly, in June 2020, Jane Doe-2 filed

        suit alleging that Bradley had sexually assaulted her and that the Richland County Sheriff’s

        Department, Lott, and Ewing were liable under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing

        to protect her and to properly supervise Bradley, and for concealing their knowledge about

        Bradley’s history of inappropriate behavior with minor female students. The district court

        granted summary judgment in favor of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department, Lott,

        and Ewing, finding that Jane Doe-2 had initiated her case too late, past the expiration of

        the applicable statutes of limitations, and that equitable tolling, on the basis of fraudulent

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        concealment or otherwise, did not apply. Jane Doe-2 appeals that decision. For the reasons

        that follow, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                                     I.

                                                     A.

               During the 2015 to 2016 school year, Appellant Jane Doe-2 was a seventeen-year-

        old student at Spring Valley High School (“SVHS”) in Richland County, South Carolina.

        J.A. 10, 732–34. Deputy Jamel Bradley was a thirty-six-year-old man, employed by

        Appellee Richland County Sheriff’s Department (“RCSD”) and assigned to SVHS as a

        school resource officer (“SRO”). J.A. 13–14, 100. In approximately November 2015,

        Bradley commenced a sexual relationship with Jane Doe-2. J.A. 100–06, 115–17. Bradley

        and Jane Doe-2 emailed and texted, and arranged meetings to have sex, including in

        Bradley’s school office and on two occasions at Bradley’s home. J.A. 103–05, 116–23,

        377–86, 500–02.

               On December 3, 2015, Bradley and Jane Doe-2 met in a parking lot behind a Target

        store at 10:30 p.m. J.A. 16, 342. Two RCSD officers, who were in the Target parking lot

        on an unrelated matter, observed the meeting and reported the incident to the SRO Captain,

        Appellee John Ewing. J.A. 303–04. The next morning, Ewing “skipped the Chain of

        Command” and informed Appellee Sheriff Leon Lott directly about the incident. J.A. 306.

        Neither Lott nor Ewing reported the incident to the RCSD Internal Affairs Division.

        J.A. 331. Ewing interviewed Bradley and Jane Doe-2 separately to “find out if their stories

        matched up.” J.A. 315.

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               During school hours, Ewing asked a vice principal to get Jane Doe-2 so that he could

        interview her.    J.A. 595.     Prior to the interview, the vice principal attempted,

        unsuccessfully, to contact Jane Doe-2’s parents. J.A. 595–96. Ewing proceeded to

        interview Jane Doe-2; Jane Doe-2’s parents were never notified of the incident. J.A. 306,

        342–43, 595–96. Ewing told Jane Doe-2 that he was aware she was texting an SRO and

        asked why she met with Bradley at the Target the night before. J.A. 306–07, 342. Ewing

        did not indicate that RCSD officers had seen her meeting Bradley at the Target. J.A. 342.

        Jane Doe-2 stated she had met with Bradley to get dating advice and denied that Bradley

        made her feel uncomfortable or that their conversations turned into anything sexual.

        J.A. 306–07, 342. Jane Doe-2 also denied that “there was anything going on” with Bradley.

        J.A. 342. When Ewing questioned Bradley, Bradley stated that he had met with Jane Doe-

        2 to talk about issues with her friends.      J.A. 307, 315.    Ewing stated that it was

        “inappropriate” to meet a student after school hours and “[i]t looked even worse since it

        was a female.” J.A. 307. Ewing told Bradley “to never meet anyone again after school

        hours” unless it was an emergency, and “to take another Deputy with him” if a female

        student was involved. Id. Ewing did not access Bradley’s school cell phone or emails and

        did not investigate the incident further. J.A. 297, 316–18.

               In May 2016, a parent reported to the school district that Bradley was having an

        “affair” with an unidentified minor female student. J.A. 399. The parent stated that she

        had an audio recording of her daughter and the unidentified student discussing her

        relationship with Bradley and pictures that Bradley had sent. Id. Although the parent did

        not identify the female student, it was Jane Doe-2. J.A. 343, 503–04. RCSD Internal

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        Affairs Division tried several times to contact the parent who made the report, but she did

        not respond to their inquiries. J.A. 399. Internal Affairs questioned Bradley briefly and he

        denied having a sexual relationship with or sending sexual text messages, including

        pictures, to any student at SVHS. J.A. 399–400. The investigation was closed as “non-

        sustained” in June as Internal Affairs decided “insufficient evidence exist[ed] to reasonably

        prove or disprove the allegation” against Bradley. J.A. 397, 420.

               Jane Doe-2 ended her relationship with Bradley shortly before her graduation from

        SVHS, in May 2016. J.A. 343, 734. In July 2016, Jane Doe-2 turned eighteen. J.A. 732.

                                                     B.

               In March 2018, another female student at SVHS (“Jane Doe-1”) contacted school

        administrators about a rumor circulating among students that she was pregnant with

        Bradley’s child. J.A. 426, 432. When notified about the pregnancy rumor, Ewing

        determined that no further action was needed as there was “no actual complaint and it was

        only [a] rumor.” J.A. 426. In April 2018, Jane Doe-1 again contacted school administrators

        with a “hypothetical story” about Bradley sexually assaulting a student, “Ashley.”

        J.A. 427, 433–34. It was later determined that “Ashley” was Jane Doe-1. J.A. 243. Ewing,

        again, determined that nothing could be done because there was “no actual complaint” and

        this was a “rumor” and “hypothetical story.” J.A. 427. Ewing discussed the incident with

        Bradley and warned him to stay away from Jane Doe-1. Id. Later that month, Jane Doe-

        1’s mental health provider contacted SVHS with an additional report about Jane Doe-1’s

        story about “Ashley”; the report was referred to the RCSD Office of Internal Affairs and

        Criminal Investigation Division. J.A. 427–28, 434–35. A criminal investigation was

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        initiated in April but was abruptly closed in May. J.A. 244–46.

              In May 2018, Jane Doe-1 submitted a records request to RCSD Chief Legal Counsel

        pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 30-4-10 to -165,

        seeking, in relevant part:   Bradley’s personnel and supervisor file; any polygraph

        examinations Bradley had been subject to; any complaints and investigative findings

        pertaining to Bradley; and policies and procedures for investigating SROs at SVHS. J.A.

        455–56. RCSD produced some documents in September 2018, and a court ordered RCSD

        to produce additional documents in January 2019. J.A. 456–59.

              On October 8, 2018, Jane Doe-1 brought a federal civil lawsuit alleging negligence

        and supervisory liability against Lott, Ewing, and RCSD based on her sexual assault by

        Bradley earlier that year. J.A. 567–90. Jane Doe-1’s lawsuit detailed a history of

        complaints to RCSD of Bradley’s inappropriate behavior with minor female students.

        These allegations included the following:

              • In 2010, RCSD “verbally counseled” Bradley after he was discovered
                giving female students rides home in his patrol vehicle. J.A. 280.
              • In 2011, a cheerleading coach at another high school reported that
                Bradley “may be having a personal relationship with” a female student
                after the coach observed Bradley and the student talking after football
                games. J.A. 178, 281. The student told the coach that she and Bradley
                communicated on Facebook, that it “won’t be long before she is
                eighteen,” and that Bradley was “married to a white woman and no white
                woman can satisfy a black man the way a black woman can.” J.A. 178,
                281. Bradley denied communicating with the student on Facebook, but
                admitted that he gave her information about his personal life. J.A. 179,
                280. Both Bradley and the student denied having an inappropriate
                relationship. J.A. 178–79. Bradley was “counseled on creating situations
                where others may perceive a relationship as inappropriate.” J.A. 179.
              • In November 2011, while citing a female student for a dress code
                violation, a female school administrator told a female student that her

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                  dress “was too short and sheer.” J.A. 178. Bradley then commented in
                  front of the student that “the dress didn’t appear too short or sheer.” Id.
                  The administrator told Bradley to leave dress code violations involving
                  female students to the school administration, particularly because “she
                  didn’t want parents upset or accusing him of inappropriately looking at
                  female students.” Id.

               Lott was deposed in July 2019 in connection with the Jane Doe-1 litigation. When

        asked if he thought Bradley “exercised the appropriate judgment to be an effective [SRO]”

        Lott testified that Bradley was “a good [SRO], he’s done a good job as a [SRO].” J.A. 324.

        Lott also confirmed that he thought Bradley “exercise[d] the appropriate judgment to safely

        interact with teenage girls.” Id. However, several months later in November 2019—after

        Bradley had been arrested—Sheriff Lott made a statement to the press condemning

        Bradley. Lott stated, “I’m sorry that we had someone that I call a sexual predator. . . . And,

        unfortunately, we had a monster that worked among us and that we did not know about.

        But we do now know, and he has been arrested.” J.A. 389.

               Bradley was fired from RCSD in October 2019, and subsequently was criminally

        charged with sexually assaulting Jane Doe-2. J.A. 23, 464.

               In November 2019, Jane Doe-2 was served with a subpoena and deposed in the Jane

        Doe-1 case. J.A. 343.

                                                     C.

               On June 16, 2020, Jane Doe-2 filed a complaint in the United States District Court

        for the District of South Carolina. She alleged, in relevant part, that Appellees had

        knowledge of Bradley’s propensity to engage in inappropriate sexual behavior with minor

        students but concealed that knowledge; failed to properly investigate allegations of

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        Bradley’s numerous instances of inappropriate sexual behavior; and allowed Bradley to

        continue working as an SRO, which enabled him to sexually assault her. Jane Doe-2

        alleged that Appellees deliberately concealed their knowledge of Bradley’s history of

        inappropriate behavior, and that she did not know of Appellees’ knowledge or failure to

        act until she was deposed in connection with Jane Doe-1’s case. Jane Doe-2 pleaded claims

        for negligence and gross negligence, and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention under

        state law against RCSD. She also pleaded a supervisory liability claim under 42 U.S.C. §

        1983 against Lott and Ewing. Jane Doe-2 alleged that her claims were timely because S.C.

        Code Ann. § 15-3-555 tolled the statutes of limitations for her claims. 1 Appellees moved

        for summary judgment, contending that the applicable statutes of limitations barred Jane

        Doe-2’s claims.

               On June 22, 2021, the district court entered an order granting summary judgment in

        favor of Appellees and dismissing the case with prejudice. The district court found that

        the two-year statute of limitations for Jane Doe-2’s state law claim against RCSD had

        expired in 2018 and the three-year statute of limitations for her section 1983 claim against

        Lott and Ewing had expired in 2019. The district court found that the statute of limitations

        in S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-555 did not apply, and thus, held that Jane Doe-2’s claims were

        barred by the statutes of limitations. The district court also held that Jane Doe-2 failed to

               1
                Section 15-3-555 provides that an action for injury “arising out of an act of sexual
        abuse [] must be commenced within six years after the person becomes twenty-one years
        of age or within three years from the time of discovery by the person of the injury and the
        causal relationship between the injury and the sexual abuse [], whichever occurs later.”
        S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-555(A).

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        present sufficient evidence showing she was entitled to tolling of the limitations periods

        based on Appellees’ fraudulent concealment.

                                                     II.

               “Orders granting summary judgment are reviewed de novo[.]” Perini Corp. v.

        Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate

        where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

        judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of

        Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). A genuine

        dispute about a material fact exists if “after reviewing the record as a whole, a court finds

        that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Dulaney v.

        Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). All inferences must be made

        in favor of the nonmoving party. Hawkins v. McMillan, 670 F. App’x 167, 168 (4th Cir.

        2016). A party survives summary judgment by “citing to particular parts of materials in

        the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits

        or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),

        admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

                                                    III.

                                                     A.

               Jane Doe-2 raises two questions on appeal with respect to her section 1983 claim

        against Appellees Lott and Ewing: (1) whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as

        to whether she knew or should have known of her section 1983 claim prior to the expiration

        of the three-year statute of limitations; and (2) whether S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-555, the

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        sexual abuse statute, tolls the statute of limitations for her section 1983 claim. The Court

        turns to those arguments first.

                                                     1.

               In sum, Jane Doe-2 argues that the district court erred in finding that her section

        1983 claims were time barred because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until

        she was deposed in November 2019 as part of the Jane Doe-1 litigation. We find that there

        is no genuine dispute over the fact that Jane Doe-2 knew or should have known of her

        section 1983 supervisory liability claim against Lott and Ewing when Ewing interviewed

        her about Bradley and when the sexual relationship with Bradley continued.

               “Under federal law a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses sufficient

        facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.”

        Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Nasim v.

        Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995)). “[T]o determine when a

        claimant possessed sufficient facts to know or have reason to know of the alleged injury,

        we may look to the common-law cause of action most closely analogous to the

        constitutional right at stake as an ‘appropriate starting point.’” Id. (quoting Heck v.

        Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994)). For most common law torts, a plaintiff’s cause of

        action accrues, and the limitations period commences, when the plaintiff knows or has

        reason to know of her injury. Owens v. Balt. City State’s Atty’s Off., 767 F.3d 379, 389

        (4th Cir. 2014). Thus, “‘the standard rule [is] that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a

        complete and present cause of action’ against a defendant—that is, when the plaintiff

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        knows or has reason to know of his injury.” Id. (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

        388 (2007)).

               To establish supervisory liability under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that

        (1) the supervisor was actually or constructively aware that his subordinate’s conduct

        posed a “pervasive and unreasonable” risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor was

        deliberately indifferent to that risk; and (3) there was an “‘affirmative causal link’ between

        the supervisor’s inaction” and the plaintiff’s constitutional injury. Wilkins v. Montgomery,

        751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir.

        1994)).

               Thus, to determine whether Jane Doe-2 knew or had reason to know of her injury

        before her section 1983 claim expired, the Court must assess what facts Jane Doe-2 knew

        and when she learned those facts. Jane Doe-2 contends that she did not know or have

        reason to know of her injury until November 2019, when she was deposed in Jane Doe-1’s

        case. Jane Doe-2 contends that “[u]ntil November 2019, Jane Doe-2 knew only that

        Bradley sexually assaulted her, Ewing and the vice-principal knew they met behind Target,

        and after she denied a sexual relationship, nothing was done to remove Bradley from his

        job as a resource officer.” Appellant’s Op. Br. at 30. Thus, Jane Doe-2 was aware that:

        Ewing knew she and Bradley had been communicating via phone and that they had met at

        night, off school premises, an incident that was cause for her to be called in for questioning

        at school; Ewing did not follow up with her or her parents about the incident after this

        meeting; Bradley remained in his SRO position; and her involvement with Bradley went

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        on until she ended things shortly before graduation in May 2016. 2 J.A. 343. Jane Doe-2

        became aware of these facts between December 2015—when she was interviewed by

        Ewing—and when the relationship continued shortly thereafter.                 J.A. 306, 342.

        Accordingly, these facts alone put Jane Doe-2 on notice as to her supervisory liability claim

        under section 1983.

               As Jane Doe-2 was still a minor during this period, the limitations period was tolled

        until she turned eighteen in July 2016. 3 Regardless of Jane Doe-2’s minority, section 15-

        3-40 “does not provide that it is tolled when the plaintiff[’s] action has accrued, yet the

        plaintiff does not realize the full extent of his injuries.” Doe v. R.D., 417 S.E.2d 541, 542

        (S.C. 1992) (emphasis added) (holding that a plaintiff who was objectively aware of sexual

        abuse when it was occurring should have known at that time that he had a cause of action);

        see also Doe v. Crooks, 613 S.E.2d 536, 538 (S.C. 2005) (same); Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955

        (4th Cir. 1995) (“Accrual of a claim does not ‘await awareness by the plaintiff that his

        injury was negligently inflicted.’” (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123

        (1979))). In other words, just because Jane Doe-2 did not (or, due to her minority, could

        not) appreciate the legal significance of the facts underlying the circumstances, does not

               2
                Jane Doe-2 testified that, after she was interviewed by Ewing, she and Bradley
        decided to take a “short break” but then continued the sexual relationship. J.A. 342.
               3
                 Claims brought pursuant to section 1983 are subject to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-40,
        which states that if a cause of action accrues while a person is “within the age of eighteen
        years[,] . . . the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement
        of the action[.]” Thus, the district court correctly found that “once Jane Doe-2 reached the
        age of majority in 2016, she had three years and more than sufficient information to discuss
        potential claims with an attorney and bring a timely lawsuit.” J.A. 535.

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        mean she was objectively unaware of those facts at that time. As the district court stated,

        Jane Doe-2 had the opportunity to bring suit once she reached the age of majority. Thus,

        the district court correctly found that Jane Doe-2’s June 2020 complaint, filed after the

        expiration of the three-year statute of limitations, was untimely. 4

                                                      2.

               Next, the Court considers whether S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-555 tolls the three-year

        statute of limitations for Jane Doe-2’s section 1983 claim. Jane Doe-2 argues that the

        district court erred by declining to apply section 15-3-555 as a tolling provision for her

        section 1983 claim and finding that it tolled the statute of limitations at least until Jane

        Doe-2 turned twenty-seven years old. We conclude, however, that the district court

        correctly found that section 15-3-555 did not apply to Jane Doe-2’s section 1983 claim.

               Section 15-3-555 is not a tolling provision, but rather a statute of limitations

        inapplicable to Jane Doe-2’s section 1983 claim. That section 15-3-555 imposes a statute

        of limitations is evident from its plain text, which provides:

               An action to recover damages for injury to a person arising out of an act of
               sexual abuse or incest must be commenced within six years after the person
               becomes twenty-one years of age or within three years from the time of
               discovery by the person of the injury and the causal relationship between the
               injury and the sexual abuse or incest, whichever occurs later.

        S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-555(A). The title of section 15-3-555—“Statute of limitations for

        action based on sexual abuse or incest”—identifies the provision as providing a statute of

               4
                Per S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5), the applicable statute of limitations for Jane
        Doe-2’s section 1983 claim is three years. See infra Section III.A.2.

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        limitations. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-555. The intent of state legislators also confirms that

        section 15-3-555 should be regarded as a statute of limitations. The title of the session law

        enacting section 15-3-555 stated it was

               an act . . . to amend Chapter 3, Title 15 [of the South Carolina Code] by
               adding section 15-3-555 so as to provide a statute of limitations for actions
               based on sexual abuse or incest of six years from the time a person becomes
               twenty-one or within three years of discovering the injury and the causal
               relationship between the injury and the abuse or incest and to provide that
               parental immunity is not a defense to this action[.]

        2001 S.C. Acts 102 (emphasis added). Thus, based on legislative intent and the plain text

        of the statute, it is evident that section 15-3-555 is a statute of limitations.

               The Supreme Court has specified that the statute of limitations in a section 1983

        action is borrowed from the state’s “general or residual statute for personal injury actions.”

        Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989) (emphasis added); see also Brooks, 85 F.3d at

        181 (noting that “[t]he parties agree that [] the state limitations period governing a claim

        for damages for personal injuries applies to a § 1983 action, regardless of the allegations

        in the complaint”). The Supreme Court clarified that a general provision “applies to all

        personal injury actions with certain specific exceptions” while a residual provision “applies

        to all actions not specifically provided for, including personal injury actions.” Owens, 488

        U.S. at 246–47. The Supreme Court reasoned that because “every State has one general or

        residual statute of limitations governing personal injury actions” that is “easily identifiable

        by language or application[,]” parties seeking to bring section 1983 claims would be able

        to “readily ascertain, with little risk of confusion or unpredictability, the applicable

        limitations period in advance of filing a § 1983 action.” Id. at 245–48.

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               In South Carolina, the general statute of limitations for personal injury actions is

        three years and is codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5). Jane Doe-2 does not dispute

        the district court’s finding that S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5) supplies the applicable statute

        of limitations for her section 1983 claim. Thus, because the applicable statute of limitations

        for Jane Doe-2’s section 1983 claim is set forth in section 15-3-530(5), the district court

        correctly found that the statute of limitations set forth in section 15-3-555 does not apply.

        Accordingly, as the district court correctly found, “once Jane Doe-2 reached the age of

        majority in 2016, she had three years and more than sufficient information to . . . bring a

        timely lawsuit” and, thus, her complaint filed in June 2020 is untimely. J.A. 535.

                                                     B.

               The Court next considers the issue of fraudulent concealment. Jane Doe-2 contends

        that because Appellees fraudulently concealed facts comprising the bases of her section

        1983 claim against Lott and Ewing and her state law claim against RCSD, 5 she is entitled

        to tolling of the limitations periods for these claims. We conclude that the district court

        correctly found that Jane Doe-2’s evidence “fails to amount to a showing of fraudulent

        concealment,” and thus, her claims were not timely brought. J.A. 538.

               Under federal law, “the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine applies in situations

        ‘where the defendant has wrongfully deceived or misled the plaintiff in order to conceal

               5
                 The district court found that the two-year statute of limitations under S.C. Code
        § 25-78-110 applies to Jane Doe-2’s state law negligence claims against the RCSD, and
        that it was tolled until Jane Doe-2 turned eighteen years old in 2016. J.A. 526. Jane Doe-
        2 does not challenge this on appeal.

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        the existence of a cause of action.’” Edmonson v. Eagle Nat’l Bank, 922 F.3d 535, 549

        (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir.

        1987)). “Under this doctrine, because of the defendant’s wrongful acts of concealment,

        the plaintiff is not aware of the facts giving rise to his claim within the limitations period.”

        Id. Essentially, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the party pleading the statute of limitations

        fraudulently concealed facts that are the basis of the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) the plaintiff

        failed to discover those facts within the statutory period, despite (3) the exercise of due

        diligence.” Id. at 548 (quoting Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies,

        Inc., 71 F.3d 119, 122 (4th Cir. 1995)). On the first element, “a plaintiff must ‘provide

        evidence of affirmative acts of concealment’ by the defendants.” Id. at 553 (quoting

        Marlinton, 71 F.3d at 126. “A plaintiff satisfies its burden to allege an affirmative act of

        concealment if, for example, it alleges that the defendant employed ‘some trick or

        contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry.’” Id. (quoting Carrier

        Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 446–47 (6th Cir. 2010)); see Wood v. Carpenter,

        101 U.S. 135, 143 (1879) (“Concealment by mere silence is not enough. There must be

        some trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry.”).

               Under South Carolina law, a limitations period may be tolled if there are “deliberate

        acts of deception by a defendant calculated to conceal from a potential plaintiff that he has

        a cause of action, thereby inducing him to postpone institution of suit[.]” Strong v. Univ.

        of S.C. Sch. of Med., 447 S.E.2d 850, 852 (S.C. 1994) (quoting 1 David W. Louisell &

        Harold Williams, Medical Malpractice ¶ 13.03, at 13–67 (1993)). However, in most

        instances, silence without more does not amount to fraudulent concealment: “[n]on-

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        disclosure becomes fraudulent concealment only when it is the duty of the party having

        knowledge of the facts to make them known to the other party to the transaction.” Lawson

        v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank of S.C., 193 S.E.2d 124, 126 (S.C. 1972); see also Holly Hill

        Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 23 S.E.2d 372, 378 (S.C. 1942) (stating that a party “must limit

        himself to silence in order to escape the imputation of fraud” and “[i]f in addition to the

        party’s silence there is any statement, even in word or act on his part, which tends

        affirmatively to a suppression of the truth, or to a withdrawal or distraction of the other

        party’s attention or observation from the real facts, the line is overstepped, and the

        concealment becomes fraudulent”); Wilmington, Columbia & Augusta R.R. Co. v. Ling, 18

        S.C. 116, 120 (1882) (“Silence, merely, especially as to facts within the reach of proper

        inquiry by the sureties, will not be sufficient. . . . There must be an intent to deceive, not a

        mere passive omission to state everything within the knowledge of the creditor.”).

        “According to the South Carolina courts, there are three situations in which a duty exists

        to disclose information regarding one’s intentions:

               ‘(1) where it arises from a preexisting definite fiduciary relation between the
               parties; (2) where one party expressly reposes a trust and confidence in the
               other with reference to the particular transaction in question, or else from the
               circumstances of the case, the nature of their dealings, or their position
               towards each other, such a trust and confidence in the particular case is
               necessarily implied; (3) where the very contract or transaction itself, in its
               essential nature, is intrinsically fiduciary and necessarily calls for perfect
               good faith and full disclosure without regard to any particular intention of
               the parties.’”

        Cheney Bros. v. Batesville Casket Co., 47 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ardis v.

        Cox, 431 S.E.2d 267, 270 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)); see also Gordon v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of

        N.Y., 120 S.E.2d 509, 515 (S.C. 1961) (stating same).

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               As to her section 1983 supervisory liability claim, Jane Doe-2 alleges that Lott and

        Ewing fraudulently concealed their knowledge that Bradley had engaged in conduct that

        posed a risk of injury to Jane Doe-2. 6 As to her negligent supervision state law claim, Jane

        Doe-2 alleges that RCSD fraudulently concealed that it knew or had reason to know of the

        necessity and opportunity to prevent Bradley’s harm to Jane Doe-2. 7 Jane Doe-2 presents

        the below facts as evidence of Appellees’ concealment:

               • “Ewing intentionally ‘skipped the chain of command’ in reporting
                 Bradley’s meeting with Jane Doe-2 behind Target. He went directly to
                 Sheriff Lott because of ‘the sensitivity of the issue and the fact that very
                 little people needed to know about this (because it could hurt the
                 investigation).’ The basis for hiding this information from others within
                 RCSD was that, if this information ‘got out around the RCSD, everyone
                 would be talking about it.’”
               • “RCSD intentionally did not conduct an official investigation, whereas
                 Sheriff Lott testified there was no reason not to report the incident to the
                 Office of Internal Affairs for investigation.”
               • “Appellees interviewed Jane Doe-2, a minor, during school hours without
                 a parent or legal guardian present, and never notified her parents of the
                 interview or that she met Bradley behind the Target store.”

               6
                 As noted above, under a theory of supervisory liability, a supervisor is liable where
        (1) the supervisor was actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury;
        (2) the supervisor was deliberately indifferent to that risk; and (3) an affirmative causal
        link exists between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury
        suffered by the plaintiff. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799.
               7
                 Under a theory of negligent supervision, an employer may be liable where “(1) his
        employee intentionally harms another when he is on the employer’s premises, is on
        premises he is privileged to enter only as employee, or is using the employer’s chattel;
        (2) the employer knows or has reason to know he has the ability to control the employee;
        and (3) the employer knows or has reason to know of the necessity and opportunity to
        exercise such control.” Doe v. Bishop of Charleston, 407 S.C. 128, 139 (2014).

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               • “[Ewing] never told Jane Doe-2 that RCSD officers saw her meet Bradley
                 at Target. . . . Appellees never told Jane Doe-2 about Bradley’s history
                 of inappropriate conduct with minor female students.”

        Appellant’s Op. Br. at 20–21 (brackets omitted). Even considered in the light most

        favorable to Jane Doe-2, this evidence does not show that Appellees committed

        “affirmative acts of concealment” to hide their knowledge that Bradley posed a risk of

        harming Jane Doe-2 or causing her constitutional injury. Edmonson, 922 F.3d at 553; see

        supra notes 6–7. As the district court correctly found, “[s]uch evidence . . . while perhaps

        indicative of negligence, fails to amount to a showing of fraudulent concealment.” J.A.

        538. While Appellees remained silent as to Bradley’s history, they did not affirmatively

        conceal their knowledge from Jane Doe-2 or misrepresent information to her either. See

        Lawson, 193 S.E.2d at 126; Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Est. Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 291 n.2

        (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that the district court “properly concluded that plaintiffs failed to

        ‘allege affirmative acts of concealment’ or affirmative steps to mislead and that ‘plaintiffs’

        allegations amount to no more than a failure to admit to wrongdoing, which does not

        suffice’” (quoting Boland v. Consol. Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517–

        18 (D.S.C. 2011))). Moreover, Jane Doe-2 does not allege that Appellees owed her a duty

        to disclose their knowledge, nor does she contend that the Court should infer a relationship

        of trust and confidence from this particular transaction that would mandate such disclosure.

        See Cheney Bros., 47 F.3d at 115. Thus, the Court finds that this evidence does not create

        a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellees committed affirmative acts to

        conceal their knowledge of Bradley’s conduct.

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              Jane Doe-2 also contends the following conduct, related to the Jane Doe-1 litigation,

        constitutes further evidence of Appellees’ fraudulent concealment:

              • “After Appellees learned of allegations that Bradley also sexually
                assaulted Jane Doe, they refused to timely produce Bradley’s personnel
                file in compliance with FOIA.”
              • “On July 30, 2019, Sheriff Lott testified in a deposition in Jane Doe’s
                action that Bradley’s ‘done a good job as a school resource officer’ who
                exercised appropriate judgment to safely interact with teenage girls. . . .
                In November 2019, . . . Sheriff Lott made a statement to the press during
                which he called Bradley ‘a sexual predator’ and ‘a monster that worked
                among us’ that Appellees ‘did not know about.’”

        Appellant’s Op. Br. at 21–22. Neither of these acts prevented Jane Doe-2 from bringing

        her action against Appellees within the limitations periods. Edmonson, 922 F.3d at 549.

        Jane Doe-1’s FOIA request seeking Bradley’s personnel file and complaints against

        Bradley, among other documents, was submitted on May 22, 2018; RCSD produced

        Bradley’s personnel file, internal affairs file, videotaped interviews, and other documents

        on September 11, 2018; and a court ordered RCSD to produce additional relevant

        documents on January 25, 2019. J.A. 455–59. However, the Court does not find that

        RCSD’s failure to comply with the production deadlines for Jane Doe-1’s FOIA request

        amounts to an “affirmative act of concealment . . . intended to exclude suspicion and

        prevent inquiry” into Jane Doe-2’s potential claims. Edmonson, 922 F.3d at 553. Jane

        Doe-2 also points to Lott’s July 30, 2019 deposition testimony in the Jane Doe-1 case that

        Bradley had “done a good job as a school resource officer” as inconsistent with his

        statement a few months later in November 2019 that Bradley was “a sexual predator” and

        “a monster.” J.A. 324, 389. Lott’s statement, however, occurred after the statutes of

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        limitations for Jane Doe-2’s claims had already expired. On this basis alone, Lott’s

        statement could not constitute an affirmative act to conceal facts forming the basis of Jane

        Doe-2’s claims.

               Thus, Jane Doe-2 fails to present evidence establishing there is a genuine dispute of

        material fact as to whether Appellees committed affirmative acts to conceal their

        knowledge of Bradley’s history to exclude Jane Doe-2’s suspicion and prevent inquiry into

        Appellees’ conduct. Accordingly, there is no need to address the remaining elements of

        the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine. The Court affirms the district court’s grant of

        summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the issue of fraudulent concealment.

                                                     C.

               Lastly, the Court turns to the issue of whether the limitations periods for Jane Doe-

        2’s claims should be equitably tolled. On appeal, Jane Doe-2 contends that she is entitled

        to “equitable tolling” because Appellees’ “fraudulent concealment” was the “extraordinary

        circumstance” that stood in her way and prevented timely filing.

               The doctrine of equitable tolling “focuses on whether there was excusable delay by

        the plaintiff.” Edmonson, 922 F.3d at 549 (quoting Johnson v. Henderson, 314 F.3d 409,

        414 (9th Cir. 2002)). “Equitable tolling is appropriate ‘in those rare instances where—due

        to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct—it would be unconscionable to

        enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.’” Id. at 549

        (quoting Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc)).

        “Critically, however, equitable tolling ‘differs from [fraudulent concealment and equitable

        estoppel] in that it does not assume a wrongful—or any—effort by the defendant to prevent

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        the plaintiff from suing.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cada v. Baxter Healthcare

        Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990)). “[A] plaintiff seeking relief from a limitations

        period based on ‘equitable tolling’ must show ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

        diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented

        timely filing.’” Id. at 548 (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577

        U.S. 250, 255 (2016)).

               As an initial matter, Jane Doe-2 argues that the district court failed to consider her

        equitable tolling argument separately and conflated the “fraudulent concealment” and

        “equitable tolling” analysis. While the district court did not address the issues of fraudulent

        concealment and equitable tolling separately, we note that Jane Doe-2 did not make

        separate fraudulent concealment and equitable tolling arguments before the district court. 8

        We find that Jane Doe-2 relies on a single theory as to why she is entitled, as a matter of

        equity, to tolling of the limitations periods. As such, the district court’s focus on the

        fraudulent concealment doctrine is not a basis for remand or reversal.

               According to Jane Doe-2, the “extraordinary circumstance” that stood in her way

        and prevented timely filing was Appellees’ fraudulent concealment. As discussed in the

        previous section, Jane Doe-2 fails to present evidence establishing there is a genuine

        dispute of material fact as to whether Appellees fraudulently concealed their knowledge of

        Bradley’s history, and thus, her allegation that Appellees’ fraudulent concealment created

               8
                  The district court construed Jane Doe-2’s “brief[]” discussion of “deliberate
        concealment” as a basis for tolling the limitations period as an argument for tolling on the
        basis of fraudulent concealment. See J.A. 537 (citing J.A. 228).

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        an “extraordinary circumstance” is unavailing. Accordingly, Jane Doe-2’s fraudulent

        concealment allegations fail as a basis for equitable tolling. As Jane Doe-2 does not allege

        any additional bases on which equitable tolling may be granted, the Court finds that

        Appellees are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of equitable tolling.

                                                     IV.

               For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the Court affirms the district court’s order

        granting summary judgment to Appellees and dismissing this action.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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