Court Opinion

ID: 9627804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:55:23.731575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:46:07.469290
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting in part).
Although I agree with portions of the main opinion, there are parts thereof with which I find myself in disagreement.
I do not agree that because the contract was signed after the work had commenced and after the plaintiff had failed to furnish compressed air as agreed, the trial court reasonably could believe that Boyles had waived such failure. It is just as reasonable to believe that Boyles continued the work without waiving the breach, fully intending to hold Sprague accountable for the breach, which a party to a bi-lateral contract well may do.
I cannot agree that the court’s finding to the effect that Boyles’ being temporarily hampered by lack of air reasonably would be expected, is justified. If Sprague agreed to furnish air, failure to furnish it cannot be justified by saying such failure is to be expected, temporarily or otherwise. Rather, it reasonably could be expected that it would be furnished at all times as agreed.
I cannot agree that the court used an elementary word like “rescission” in a “loose” way, and that it therefore did not mean what it said. To suggest differently is to discredit the court’s competency.
I do not subscribe to the idea that data should be summarized and presented that way simply because it is so cumbersome that it “cannot be conveniently examined by the fact trier.” If it is too cumbersome conveniently to be examined by the fact trier, by the same token it is too cumbersome to be examined into by cross-examination.
I am not in accord with the conclusion that Boyles should be charged with any penalty arising out of a bond which Sprague obtained. Such penalty was not mentioned in the contract between Boyles and Sprague, and is completely foreign to damages that naturally would flow from a contract that did not mention it.