Court Opinion

ID: 9723415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:14:02.54711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:48.636634
License: Public Domain

SONENSHINE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s decision the proceedings here were unmistakably criminal in nature. I disagree, however, with the majority’s holding the trial court correctly denied the motion for nonsuit. As we said in our original opinion (In re Feiock (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 649 [225 Cal.Rptr. 748]), Code of Civil Procedure section 1209.5 unconstitutionally lessens the moving party’s burden of proof.
The majority contends our original analysis was incorrect because “ability to pay” is an affirmative defense to this type of contempt, and not an element of the offense. We were not wrong. As I shall explain, the ability to comply with the court’s order is a necessary element of proving contempt of a court order; the moving party bears the burden of proving that element.
Petitioner was alleged to have violated the general contempt statute: Code of Civil Procedure section 1209. “Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court” constitutes contempt under Code of Civil Procedure section 1209, subdivision (a)(5). Section 1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure outlines the procedure for initiating this type of contempt: “When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or of the judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt *150. . . .” “The affidavit is like a complaint in a criminal case; it frames the issues and must charge facts which show a contempt has been committed. [Citations.]” (Reliable Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 604, 616 [204 Cal.Rptr. 786].)
Examining the affidavit here, we note the moving party used a form adopted by the Judicial Council. (Rule 1285.60, Cal. Rules of Court [eff. Jan. 1, 1980].) Specifically, the form “Order to Show Cause and Declaration for Contempt” filed by the county district attorney alleged petitioner “has willfully disobeyed certain orders of this court as set forth in this declaration ... (a) Citee had knowledge of the order in that... He was present in court on June 22, 1984, and was served a copy of Order/stipulation re Support/paternity/welfare Reimburse- ment . . . (b) Citee was able to comply with each order when it was disobeyed.” The declaration delineated each order disobeyed.
Significantly, the form affidavit includes the allegation that petitioner “was able to comply with each order when it was disobeyed.” From this we know the Judicial Council acknowledges ability to comply with the court’s order is a necessary element of the offense. More importantly, this illustrates the fallacy of the majority’s statement that “[f]or many years in California ability to pay has been considered, without much analysis, to be a matter of defense in contempt proceedings.” (Ante, p. 146.) Rather, the contrary is true.
Only one of the cited cases stands for the majority’s statement that ability to pay is a matter of defense, In re McCarty (1908) 154 Cal. 534 [98 P. 540]. The McCarty court, however, reached that conclusion in the context of a civil contempt. (See fn. 1, post, p. 154.) The court concluded McCarty bore the burden of proving inability to pay in order to purge himself of the contempt for failure to pay alimony. The procedure is different in the context of a criminal contempt.
The other cases listed do not support the proposition for which they are cited. In Lyon v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 446, 451 [67 Cal.Rptr. 265, 439 P.2d 1], the court upheld contempt orders despite the argument the trial court had failed to specifically delineate its contempt findings. In rejecting that argument the Lyon court quoted from a 1959 South Dakota case which said, “We are of the opinion that unless a defendant shows he has complied with the court’s order to the fullest extent of his ability his defense of inability fails.” The quoted language was not at issue and not the language of our Supreme Court.
Galland v. Galland (1872) 44 Cal. 475 is similarly miscited. The trial court had refused to find Galland in contempt for failure to pay alimony. *151And the Supreme Court affirmed that order as it was not claimed he had the ability to pay the money due, or that he had “contumaciously rendered himself unable to pay it.” (Id., at p. 478.) Similarly, Lyons v. Municipal (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 829 [142 Cal.Rptr. 449] is inapposite. Lyons involved a father’s claim he should have been charged in superior court with contempt rather than with the misdemeanor failure to support offense (Pen. Code, § 270). The Lyons court never described ability to pay as an affirmative defense. It merely paraphrased the statute at issue here—section 1209.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure—as a statute shifting the burden of producing evidence to the contemner. Next, Martin v. Superior Court (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 412 [95 Cal.Rptr. 110] is the case with which we disagreed originally. Martin found Code of Civil Procedure section 1209.5 constitutional, utilizing case law no longer applicable. Martin does not hold that ability to pay is an affirmative defense. Rather, at the cited page, it lists various crimes where statutes can constitutionally shift the burden of proof or of going forward with the evidence. (Id., at p. 417.)
The next cited case, Sorell v. Superior Court (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 157 [56 Cal.Rptr. 222], relied on McCarty, but involved a wholly different type of order. Sorell was ordered to pay $100 for attorney fees in addition to $200 previously ordered to be paid. Implicit in the order was a requirement the payments be made forthwith. The court found an ability to pay at the time the orders to pay were made. And the court concluded the moving party did not have the burden to prove present ability to pay at the time of the contempt hearing two years later. That has nothing to do with whether the moving party has to prove ability to pay if the money is due at a later time. Indeed, the Sorell court recognized ability to comply with the order was an element of contempt. The court found the original order, which required payment forthwith, was proof enough of ability to pay. The question here is different because petitioner was directed to pay monies on certain specific dates in the future. Only his ability to pay on those dates is at issue.
Mery v. Superior Court (1937) 9 Cal.2d 379 [70 P.2d 932] refused to apply the McCarty rule, because the original order to pay was 10 years old. “The unreasonableness of such a rule in a case such as is presented here, where the affidavit in question was filed more than ten years after the order, must be obvious, because an adjudication of the defendant’s ability to pay in 1926 is no sound proof of that fact under the conditions existing in 1936.” Warner v. Superior Court (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 821 [273 P.2d 89] is in accord with Mery. Warner’s contempt was annulled because the moving party’s affidavit did not allege ability to pay; therefore the court had no jurisdiction (lacking an essential element): “If mere evidence that petitioner was in arrears would support an adjudication of contempt the burden would *152be cast upon him to overcome that evidence or to justify each and every failure to meet the payments. He would thus be required to affirmatively establish his innocence. ... If the evidence against him does not establish his guilt the accused has nothing to controvert or explain.” (Id., at p. 826.)
In sum, the cases cited by the majority do not support its assertion ability to pay has “for many years” been considered “a matter of defense.” Indeed, my research compels the opposite conclusion. As explained in Warner, “[t]he facts essential to establish jurisdiction [to punish disobedience of a court order by contempt are]: (1) the making of the order, (2) knowledge of the order, (3) ability of the respondent to render compliance, and (4) willful disobedience of the order.” (126 Cal.App.2d at p. 824.) These elements of contempt apply across the board to any alleged contempt for violating a court order. The most recent case discussing this principle is Coursey v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 147 [239 Cal.Rptr. 365], Coursey was found in contempt for disobeying an order that her daughter visit Coursey’s ex-husband, the child’s father. The court annulled the contempt because there was no evidence Coursey could comply with the order; the daughter was 14 years old and there was no evidence the mother could make her visit the father.
After noting the general principles of a criminal contempt, the Coursey court remarked “the movant bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt [citation] which it must meet unaided by the proposed contemnee.” (194 Cal.App.3d at p. 153.) “The facts essential to establish jurisdiction in the contempt proceeding, and thus to enable the trial court to punish the accused, are: (1) the making of the order; (2) the accused’s knowledge of the order; (3) the accused’s ability to render compliance, and (4) the accused’s willful disobedience of the order.” (Id., at p. 154.) In this particular case the trial court found no justification for not complying with the visitation order. “In so finding the trial court erred. As noted, the burden of proof is on the movant to prove contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] By deducing the ability to comply from the absence of proof of substantial justification, the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden to Loretta to establish her inability to comply.” (Id., at p. 156.)
Another line of cases supports this analysis: In Ex parte Todd (1897) 119 Cal. 57, 58 [50 P. 1071], our Supreme Court voided a contempt based on a trial court finding the husband had failed to obtain employment though given ample opportunity to do so. “This order was clearly in excess of the power of the court, which cannot compel a man to seek employment in order to earn money to pay alimony, and punish him for his failure so to do.” Todd and its progeny are cogently gathered in In re Jennings (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 373 [184 Cal.Rptr. 53]. “Well-established case law provides that the courts may order support payments based upon the ‘ability to earn’ *153as distinguished from actual income where there is a deliberate attempt on the part of a spouse to avoid family financial responsibility by refusing to seek employment; however, these cases do not address the availability of contempt. [Citations.] ... ‘In this proceeding we are not concerned with the problem that might arise if the defendant should refuse to pay the amounts ordered by the trial court. Under an early decision of this court a deliberate refusal to work could not be punished by contempt [Todd\, but ordinary judgment remedies would be available and the judgment could be satisfied if defendant should inherit or otherwise obtain property. Moreover, the threat of execution upon any subsequently acquired property [] might be sufficient to induce defendant to work.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 383, fn. omitted, italics added.) The same logic applies here: We do not simply cast aside basic constitutional principles because collecting support payments is difficult.
Even assuming there was case authority to support the majority’s analysis, the end result is inconsistent. Indeed, if inability to pay is an affirmative defense, why did the Legislature enact Code of Civil Procedure section 1209.5? It is useless surplusage if the alleged contemner bears the burden of proving inability to comply with the court’s order.
It is true the Legislature may define the elements of contempt, just as it defines the elements of any crime. But Code of Civil Procedure section 1209.5 only affects certain types of contempt for disobeying a court order; to-wit, contempt for failure to obey child support orders. Labeling this a righteous legislative prerogative offends logic because it purports to change the elements of contempt for only a limited type of offender. By the same token, then, the Legislature could change the elements of murder if a husband shoots his wife. Why not say the husband bears the burden of proving he did not harbor malice? After all, domestic problems are a nationwide problem, requiring special treatment. The answer, of course, lies in our constitutional guaranty of equal treatment under the law. The elements of a crime cannot vary depending on the players. Elements are elements.
Similarly, if the majority is correct, why did our Supreme Court find a portion of Penal Code section 496 unconstitutional in People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302]? That decision invalidated the statutory presumption of “guilty knowledge” applicable to second-hand dealers charged with receiving stolen property. There, the Legislature had attempted to create a separate crime of receiving stolen property for a special class who, in the eyes of the Legislature, should bear the burden of proving they did not know the property was stolen. Because knowledge of the property’s stolen character is an element of the offense, however, the Legislature could not constitutionally shift that burden to the accused. (Id., at p. 504.) The same principle applies here. Before this court *154determines whether the Legislature can shift the burden, it must decide whether the issue to be shifted is an element which must be proven by the moving party.
As a former certified family law specialist and superior court family law judge, I am more than sympathetic with the problems created when parents fail to meet their support obligations. The situation has become a national blight adversely affecting not only our young but society as a whole. But recognition of the severity of the problem will not blind me to the unconstitutionality of the majority’s remedy.1
Ability to comply with the court’s order is an element of this type of contempt which must be proven affirmatively by the moving party. As we explained in our initial opinion, a statute which purports to shift that burden to the accused is unconstitutional. (In re Feiock, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d 649.)
I would annul the contempt.
Petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 25, 1990. Mosk, J., and Kaufman, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.

 Of course, I still find the presumption embodied in Code of Civil Procedure section 1209.5 applicable in civil contempt proceedings. In those proceedings the moving party would allege the same elements, but the statute would shift the burden of disproving ability to pay to the alleged contemner. In the absence of proof of inability to pay, the court could rely on the previous support order and make a contempt finding. Before putting the contemner in jail, however, to coerce payment of the overdue sums, the court would necessarily have to determine the contemner’s then-present ability to pay arrearages. That is a separate question, distinguishable from the contemner’s ability to pay sums when due. If the court finds present ability to pay a certain amount of what is past due, the contemner may be incarcerated until that amount is paid.
A constitutional remedy therefore still exists. Moreover, a criminal contempt could still be alleged. However, ability to pay would have to be established by the moving party.