Court Opinion

ID: 9840890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 16:14:35.737656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:31.295423
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              September 20, 2023
                                                                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                                  OF WEST VIRGINIA

                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Lacy B.,
Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 22-0128 (Marion County 21-DV-245)

Chase W.,
Respondent Below, Respondent

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Lacy B. appeals the January 12, 2022, order of the Circuit Court of Marion
County refusing her appeal of the November 24, 2021, order of the Family Court of Marion
County, which denied her petition for a domestic violence protective order against respondent
Chase W. 1,2 Upon our review, we determine that the family court abused its discretion by failing
to make necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law justifying its decision to deny the
domestic violence petition, which requires that the decision be vacated. Because this case presents
no substantial question of law, we find that it satisfies the “limited circumstances” of Rule 21(d)
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and is appropriate for disposition by a memorandum decision
rather than an opinion.

        Petitioner filed a domestic violence petition against respondent in the Magistrate Court of
Marion County, claiming that respondent sexually assaulted her and that, “[b]efore leaving, [he]
put his arm around [her] neck, flexing it, and said he would do this to [her] every night.” The
Magistrate Court of Marion County entered a domestic violence emergency protective order and
scheduled a final hearing on the petition in the Family Court of Marion County.

        At the final hearing, petitioner testified that respondent, without her consent, penetrated
her with his fingers and his penis, pulled her hair, “choked” her, and “held [her] hands behind [her]
back at one point.” She asserted that she did not tell him to stop because she “was in shock.” She
stated that, following the sexual encounter, respondent “took his arm and put it around [her] neck
and started flexing it” while the two stood in front of a mirror, telling her that “he would come
over and do this to [her] every night,” which petitioner claimed put her in fear of respondent.

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Courtney Klus, Molly Russell, and Michael D. Crim.
Respondent appears by counsel Christopher M. Wilson.
       2
        We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
                                                 1
Respondent disputed petitioner’s claim that the sexual contact was not consensual. He admitted to
pulling petitioner’s hair and to putting his hands around her throat, testifying, “[S]he made no
reason to feel like it felt uncomfortable for her or to feel like I shouldn’t have been doing it, so it
just felt like it was natural and that’s just how things went along.” Respondent stated that, after the
sexual encounter, they stood up and he “just casually hugged her” while they looked in a mirror
and told her that he wished they could “hang out again.” He denied having his arm around her neck
at any point.

        At the conclusion of the hearing, the family court judge told the parties, “I don’t think that
it was proven in this case that there was a sexual assault . . . , and the main reason for that is the
fact that the Petitioner says she never said no and never tried to alert [her] roommate.” The family
court entered an order on November 24, 2021, denying the domestic violence protective order and
terminating the emergency protective order. The family court concluded that the evidence did not
show that respondent committed domestic violence, finding that “[t]he testimony presented by
both parties indicated that the Petitioner did not tell the Respondent that the contact was
unwelcomed” and that “[t]here [was] no evidence that the Petitioner attempted to extricate herself
from the situation or notify her roommate of the situation.”

        Petitioner appealed the family court’s decision to the Circuit Court of Marion County,
arguing that “[t]he Family Court did not utilize the analysis under W.Va. Code § 61-8B(1) [sic]
for ‘forcible compulsion’ and ‘resistance,’” and that “Respondent committed numerous acts of
domestic violence during the incident which took place on November 10, 2021, and Petitioner
remains in fear of Respondent.” By order entered on January 12, 2022, the circuit court refused
the appeal.

         Petitioner appeals the circuit court’s order, repeating the arguments she made to the circuit
court.

                 “In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court judge upon a review
         of, or upon a refusal to review, a final order of a family court judge, we review the
         findings of fact made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous
         standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion
         standard. We review questions of law de novo.” Syllabus, Carr v. Hancock, 216
         W.Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004).

Syl. Pt. 1, Thomas v. Morris, 224 W. Va. 661, 687 S.E.2d 760 (2009); cf. Syl. Pt. 1, John P.W. ex
rel. Adam W. v. Dawn D.O., 214 W. Va. 702, 591 S.E.2d 260 (2003) (“Upon an appeal from a
domestic violence protective order, this Court reviews the circuit court’s final order and ultimate
disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We review challenges to findings of fact under
a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.”).

        First, we address petitioner’s argument as to the family court’s analysis of her sexual
assault allegation. Under West Virginia Code § 48-27-202(4), a person commits domestic violence
by “[c]ommitting either sexual assault or sexual abuse as those terms are defined in articles eight-
b and eight-d, chapter sixty-one of this code.” Petitioner alleges that respondent subjected her to

                                                  2
second-degree sexual assault. 3 West Virginia Code § 61-8B-4(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that
a person is guilty of second-degree sexual assault when that person “engages in sexual intercourse
or sexual intrusion with another person without the person’s consent, and the lack of consent results
from forcible compulsion[.]” West Virginia Code § 61-8B-1(1) explains that forcible compulsion
means “[p]hysical force that overcomes such earnest resistance as might reasonably be expected
under the circumstances” or “[t]hreat or intimidation, expressed or implied, placing a person in
fear of immediate death or bodily injury to himself or herself or another person . . . .” Thus, in
determining whether respondent committed domestic violence by committing second-degree
sexual assault, the family court was required to make findings as to whether petitioner consented
to the sexual contact and, if not, whether the lack of consent resulted from forcible compulsion.
The family court did not make a finding as to whether petitioner’s lack of consent was the product
of forcible compulsion. 4 Without that necessary finding, we cannot determine whether the family
court considered forcible compulsion and, ultimately, whether the family court abused its
discretion in concluding that respondent did not commit domestic violence. The circuit court
abused its discretion by failing to remand the matter to the family court to address this issue.

        Regarding petitioner’s argument that respondent committed numerous acts of domestic
violence aside from the alleged sexual assault, we find a similar infirmity. While most of the acts
that petitioner claims constituted domestic violence were part and parcel to the alleged sexual
assault, petitioner described one event independent of the alleged sexual assault: the incident in
front of the mirror where respondent allegedly put his arm around petitioner’s neck. Under West
Virginia Code § 48-27-202(2), a person commits domestic violence by “[p]lacing another in
reasonable apprehension of physical harm.” The family court made no findings as to whether this
alleged event occurred as described by petitioner, and if it did, whether it placed her in reasonable
apprehension of physical harm. By denying the domestic violence petition without making
findings or conclusions as to whether this event constituted domestic violence, the family court
abused its discretion. Likewise, the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to reverse the
family court’s order and remand the case to allow the family court to make the necessary findings
and conclusions as to this issue.

       To be clear, we are not deciding that the family court’s ultimate determination that
respondent did not commit domestic violence was incorrect, nor are we suggesting that any
additional hearings need to take place. Rather, we simply require entry of a new order by the family
court containing the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing each allegation

       3
         While the domestic violence petition alleged simply that respondent “sexually assaulted”
her, she specifies in this appeal that the assault was second-degree sexual assault. Petitioner does
not argue that her evidence established respondent committed either first-degree or third-degree
sexual assault or that the family court failed to consider any specific element of either crime.
       4
          While the circuit court decided that it was “not satisfied by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Respondent used forcible compulsion (W.Va. Code § 61-8B-1) to overcome the
Petitioner’s resistance,” this finding does not cure the problem with the family court’s order
because the circuit court is not empowered to make de novo findings of fact on appeal from the
family court in domestic violence cases. See W. Va. Code § 48-27-510(d) (setting forth the circuit
court’s standard of review in appeals from family court of domestic violence cases).
                                                 3
raised by petitioner such that an appellate court may fully and fairly review the family court’s
decision should either party choose to pursue an appeal of the decision. 5

       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s January 12, 2022, order and
remand the matter to the circuit court with directions to vacate the family court’s November 24,
2021, order and remand the matter to the family court.

                                                         Reversed and remanded with directions.

ISSUED: September 20, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

       5
         The Court acknowledges that the space for findings of fact on the domestic violence form
orders for family courts is limited. Should additional space be needed, family courts are directed
to use the “Domestic Violence Continuation Sheet” form available on the Court’s intranet and on
the           Court’s             website           at           http://www.courtswv.gov/public-
resources/domestic/DVforms/MDVCONT-ContinuationSheet.pdf.
                                                4