Court Opinion

ID: 9390563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 19:03:09.196664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.340101
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/27/23 In re Erick R.G. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re Erick R.G.,                                              B319830

 a Person Coming Under the                                      (Los Angeles County
 Juvenile Court Law.                                             Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00374)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 A.G.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Dismissed.
     Erin Riley Khorram, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       ____________________

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION
      As this appeal is determined by a recent controlling
decision of our Supreme Court, In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266
(D.P.), we decide this matter by memorandum disposition. (Cal.
Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
      A.G. (Mother) appeals from a findings and order made by
the juvenile court at the adjudication and disposition hearing on
March 30, 2022, pursuant to which the juvenile court assumed
jurisdiction over her child, Erick R.G. (born in 2021). At that
hearing, the court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 300 petition regarding then seven-month-old Erick. As to
Erick’s father, Johnny R. (Father), the court sustained
allegations that Father committed domestic violence against
Mother (§ 300, subd. (b)(1); count b-1), and that Father’s drug use
posed a substantial risk to the child and rendered Father unable
to provide regular care to the child (§ 300, subd. (b)(1); count b-2).
The court also sustained an allegation that Mother failed to
protect Erick from Father’s drug use (§ 300, subd. (b)(1); count b-
2). Father has not appealed; thus, only the failure to protect
jurisdictional finding against Mother is at issue in this appeal.
      While this appeal was pending, at a section 364 hearing on
January 5, 2023, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction

      1Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to
the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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pending receipt of the custody order.2 On January 12, 2023, the
court entered a final juvenile judgment/custody order awarding
Mother sole legal and sole physical custody of Erick, with Father
having monitored visits a minimum of three times a week for
three hours each visit. Mother has filed a notice of appeal from
that order; that appeal (B326337) is still awaiting preparation of
the record and briefing.
       In light of the exit order awarding Mother sole custody,
DCFS urges us to dismiss this appeal as moot. Should we reach
the merits, DCFS argues substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding against Mother. Mother
argues her appeal is not moot because the failure to protect
finding against her could negatively affect her in possible future
dependency or family law proceedings, that even if her appeal is
moot, we should exercise our discretion to consider its merits, and
that there is not substantial evidence to support the
jurisdictional finding against her.
       We agree with DCFS that Mother’s appeal is moot and
decline to exercise our discretion to consider its merits. A case is
moot when it is “ ‘ “impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the
case in favor of [the] plaintiff, to grant [her] any effect[ive]
relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ . . . the plaintiff
must complain of an ongoing harm [that is] . . . redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the [appellant] seeks.
[Citation.]” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) Purely
speculative concerns about the finding’s possible effects in

      2 We granted a request by the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to take
judicial notice of this post-appeal proceeding.

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hypothetical future proceedings or other contexts and stigma
resulting from the challenged jurisdictional finding are all
insufficient to make such a showing and avoid mootness. (Id. at
p. 278.)
         Mother does not dispute that reversal of the challenged
jurisdictional finding could not have deprived the juvenile court
of jurisdiction over Erick; the jurisdictional findings based on
Father’s substance abuse and domestic violence were
independently sufficient to create jurisdiction over Erick and
have not been challenged on appeal. (See In re Jonathan B.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875 [“The reviewing court may affirm
. . . if the evidence supports the decision on any one of several
grounds”]; see also In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438,
451 [same].) Nor did the challenged jurisdictional finding
adversely impact Mother’s current rights regarding Erick in any
way. Prior to the dependency proceeding, there were no custody
orders. At the conclusion of the dependency proceeding, Mother’s
rights were not limited as she was awarded sole legal and sole
physical custody.
         Mother argues that her appeal is not moot because there is
a “specific legal or practical consequence that will be averted
upon reversal” of the challenged jurisdictional finding. (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283.) In particular, she claims the court’s
finding could potentially affect future dependency or family law
proceedings. She also claims it could prejudice her should she
come before a state agency that relies on juvenile court findings.
These arguments about potential future effects are based on
compound speculation. Mother currently has sole custody of
Erick pursuant to an order that is a “final judgment” and cannot
be modified in any family law proceeding “unless the court finds

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that there has been a significant change of circumstances since
the juvenile court issued the order and modification of the order
is in the best interests of the child.” (§ 302, subd. (d).) Mother’s
concerns about the unspecified effect of the challenged finding in
hypothetical future dependency or family law proceedings is
speculative and insufficient to find her appeal is not moot. (D.P.,
supra, at pp. 281-282.) Speculation about the impact of these
findings on unnamed state agencies in hypothetical future
proceeds is likewise insufficient to find her appeal is not moot.
       Where a dependency appeal is moot, “[an appellate] court
has discretion to decide the merits” of that moot appeal and
speculative concerns about possible future effects of a
jurisdictional finding may provide a basis for an appellate court
to exercise that discretion. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283.) In
D.P., our Supreme Court laid out a nonexhaustive list of factors
for assessing “whether a court should exercise discretionary
review of a moot appeal.” (Id. at p. 286.) Specifically, the court
noted that courts may consider (1) “whether the challenged
jurisdictional finding ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or
could potentially impact the current or future dependency
proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other consequences for [the
appellant], beyond jurisdiction” ’ ”; (2) “whether the jurisdictional
finding is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct”; and (3) “why the appeal became moot.” (Id. at pp. 285-
286.)
       After considering these factors, we decline to exercise our
discretion to consider the merits of Mother’s appeal. As to the
first factor, as explained above the possible future consequences
Mother identifies are highly speculative. As to the second factor,
although allegations that Mother failed to protect her child

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against Father’s drug abuse could be stigmatizing, we do not
consider it so stigmatizing as to weigh heavily in favor of review.
In so concluding, we do not mean to minimize the emotional and
physical harm such a failure to protect can cause a child. But we
must consider Mother’s conduct with our larger purpose in mind;
all conduct we assess in this analysis necessarily involves child
abuse and neglect, and thus all such conduct will be pernicious
and severe in the sense that it harms the most vulnerable
members of our society. Our assessment of the severity and
perniciousness of the alleged conduct is thus a relative one.
       Finally, we consider whether the reason the appeal has
been rendered moot weighs in favor or against discretionary
review. The Supreme Court noted that discretionary review may
be more appropriate where one parent appeals but not the other,
and the findings against the appealing parent are based on more
serious conduct. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.)
Discretionary review may also be appropriate where other
grounds exist for jurisdiction and the only finding challenged on
appeal is one that “involve[es] particularly severe conduct.”
(Ibid.) Neither is the case here; the more serious conduct and
related findings are against Father, not Mother.
       The third factor, mootness occurring “due to prompt
compliance by parents with their case plan” (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 286), is in play here with regard to Mother. As part
of the case plan, Mother was ordered to participate in individual
counseling, a domestic violence support group, and an Al-Anon
program. Mother’s laudable behavior in complying with the case
plan, which led to the prompt conclusion of the dependency
proceeding, favors discretionary review. But D.P. directs us not
to consider an individual factor in isolation. (Id. at p. 286 [“no

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single factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should
exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal”].) On balance,
after considering all of the pertinent factors and the totality of
the evidence in the record, we conclude that discretionary review
of Mother’s moot appeal is not warranted.
                          DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

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