Court Opinion

ID: 9633471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:48:30.990327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:59.810482
License: Public Domain

Rose, J.,
with whom Springer, J., agrees,
concurring:
I am concurring in the result reached by the majority because I do not think the conduct of the law enforcement officers violated the Franklin rule. The granting of the writ of habeas corpus should be reversed on that basis rather than overruling the Franklin decision.
*672In Franklin v. State, 94 Nev. 220, 577 P.2d 860 (1978), this court balanced the reliability of accomplice testimony with the strong desire of law enforcement to use such testimony, even when the accomplice was given express or implied direction to testify in a specific way. We concluded that an executory plea bargain agreement in which the state bargains for specific testimony is improper, and the accomplice should not be permitted to testify. According to Franklin, whether the agreement was a bargain for specific testimony would depend on the express agreement between law enforcement and the accomplice, and the circumstances of the entire transaction. Franklin was a reasonable decision to help ensure that truthful testimony would be presented at trial.
The State attempts to distinguish this case from Franklin by arguing that the Franklin rule should be limited to accomplice testimony and not to other informants. However, informant testimony presents the same reliability concerns as accomplice testimony. Logic and our dicta in State Bar of Nevada v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 756 P.2d 464 (1988), would indicate that the Franklin rule should apply to informant as well as accomplice testimony.
In this case, law enforcement bargained for Crawford’s cooperation, not his testimony. The agreement was that Crawford would attempt to purchase drugs from Acuna, and law enforcement would then recommend that Crawford receive probation for his involvement in a prior drug sale. Crawford then made a controlled purchase of marijuana from Acuna. Since this transaction with Acuna was monitored, there is a minimum chance of Crawford’s fabrication for or against law enforcement. Crawford then testified at trial about this purchase from Acuna.
While it is true that the agreement with Crawford was execu-tory to the extent that he had not been charged with or sentenced for any felony, I do not believe this transaction violated Franklin. First, it was a bargain for cooperation, not testimony. When the bargain was struck, there was no testimony to bargain for, since the transaction had not even occurred. Second, there is no suggestion that Crawford was obligated to testify in any particular manner. And, since the transaction Crawford testified about was closely monitored, there is minimum chance of fabrication. For these reasons, I do not believe such testimony would be prohibited by our prior ruling in Franklin.
The majority elects to overrule Franklin, rather than decide the case on this basis or limit the Franklin ruling to accomplice testimony, even though nothing has transpired to diminish the concern for the reliability of this type of testimony since Franklin *673was decided in 1978. In fact, many situations have come to light that justify our suspicions. For example, in the celebrated case of Leslie Vernon White, the Los Angeles district attorney’s office found itself in a difficult situation. White admitted that he frequently lied on the witness stand when testifying as a jailhouse informant, which resulted in the convictions of many possibly innocent people.1 Such revelations are all too frequent and confirm our concern about accomplice and informant testimony.
“When a rule of law has once been settled, contravening no statute or constitutional principle, such rule ought to be followed unless it can be shown that serious detriment is thereby likely to arise prejudicial to public interests.” Zgombic v. State, 106 Nev. 571, 580, 798 P.2d 548, 554 (1990) (Justice Steffen, dissenting, quoting Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Ill. 1968)). I see no compelling reason to overrule Franklin rather than limit its applicability in some situations. The Franklin rule recently has been changed by legislation. See Chapter 175 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. However, we should avoid overturning a long standing decision by judicial fiat, without compelling reason.

Over the past decade, Leslie White has testified against at least a dozen California inmates whom he claimed confessed their guilt to him. However, he later disclosed that at least some of the information he passed on to lawmen was nothing but lies. He demonstrated how easy it is for a “snitch” to concoct a false confession simply by using a telephone in the prison chaplain’s office. Identifying himself as a bail bondsman, White called the sheriff’s document-control center and got an accused murderer’s case number and date of arrest. Then, he called the district attorney’s records bureau, identifying himself as a deputy district attorney to obtain names of witnesses and the prosecutors handling the case. In order to obtain details of the murder, White called the coroner’s office and told them he was a police officer.
After he falsely testified about a confession or damaging admission made in jail by the defendant which would be consistent with the facts he had learned, White would receive special privileges, including early release from his frequent prison terms. As a result of White’s revelations of fabricated testimony, Los Angeles is having to review more than 130 cases from the past ten years for possible taint. A Snitch's Story, Time Magazine, December 12, 1988.
Furthermore, there is some indication that informants are more frequently used when a case is weak, and therefore, the risk of convicting innocent people is increased. Use of Jailhouse Informers Reviewed in Los Angeles, New York Times, January 3, 1989. Of the 225 people convicted of murder and other felonies as a result of Mr. White and other jailhouse informers’ testimony over the last 10 years in Los Angeles, 30 are on death row. California Shaken over an Informer, New York Times, February 16, 1989.