Court Opinion

ID: 9559801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:35:48.541109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:44.533347
License: Public Domain

Hill, J.
(dissenting)—Were the issue presented a matter of first impression in this court, I could follow the reasoning of the majority and the interpretation it now places upon RCW 4.20.010 [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 183, 183-2]. I recognize, too, that the common law is riot static, and that as conditions change the common law must change; as James Russell Lowell put it, “Time makes ancient good uncouth.”
But when the issue is the interpretation of a previously interpreted statute and the statute has not been changed, the interpretation placed upon it should remain the same.
Appellant’s contention here—which the majority now approves—that our wrongful death statute (RCW 4.20.010) gives a statutory right of action to beneficiaries of a decedent that deprives the defendant of all defenses except those relating to the wrong itself, was answered in Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire R. Co. (1919), 107 Wash. 678, 182 Pac. 630, where the court interpreted the same statute (then Rem. Code, § 183). In an En Banc decision, the court as then constituted, speaking through Judge Parker, said (p. 681):
■, “We regard it as well settled law that, while this is not á statute providing for the survival.of a cause of action *428possessed, by the deceased for the recovery for injuries resulting in his death, but is a statute giving to the heirs a new right of action not recognized by the comon law, it nevertheless gives a right of action to the heirs of the deceased which is dependent upon the right the deceased would have to recover for such injuries up to the instant of his death. In other words, dependent upon the right of the injured person to maintain an action for the damage resulting from his injury, had he survived. And this, we think, is the law governing the rights of the heirs, whether the statute expressly so provides or not. It appears that the original Lord Campbell Act did so provide in express terms, as does [sic] several of the state statutes of this country; while our statute, above quoted, those of the several states, and the Federal employers’ liability act, do not so provide in express terms. The words ‘wrongful act or neglect,’ used in statutes of this nature in defining the quality of the act causing the injury and death, it seems to be universally agreed by the courts, mean wrong or neglect as against the deceased; that is, in the sense that the deceased could have recovered damages for the injury resulting in his death.”
Referring to the decision in an earlier case construing the same statute, the court said that its conclusion (p. 684)
“ . . . must manifestly rest upon the theory that statutes of this nature give a right of action to the personal representatives of the deceased only when the deceased might have successfully maintained an action to recover damages for the injury resulting in his death, and that all defenses available to the defendant, if the action had been brought by the person injured, prior to his death, are available to the defendant in an action brought by his personal representatives to recover damages for his death.”
Since it seems to be conceded that Anna C. Ottomeier could not have successfully maintained an action against Antone J. Ottomeier or his estate for her injuries had she lived, the trial court, following the interpretation we placed upon the statute in the Ostheller case and the cases following it, dismissed the petition in the instant case.
The majority has sought to distinguish the Ostheller case or to label it dictum as applied to the facts of this case. There the court obviously undertook to formulate a general rule and, after stating that rule, turned to the facts in the *429particular case to see whether they brought the case within that rule, and said (p. 684):
“Manifestly the defense of contributory negligence is as available to the defendant as the defense of settlement and satisfaction by the deceased before his death. Both equally take away the right of the deceased to successfully maintain an action for his injuries.” (Italics mine.)
It seems to me that we afford very little help to the bench, the bar, the legislature, and the public in the field of statutory interpretation, when we say that' any interpretation is to be limited to the particular state of facts then before the court and that, if a particularly appealing state of facts can be presented, we may change our interpretation.
If in the Ostheller case the court failed to grasp the meaning and intent of the legislature, as appellant urges here, there have been opportunities in the intervening seventeen regular sessions and the extraordinary sessions of the legislature to make that meaning and intent clear. Appellant’s, argument should have been directed to the'legislature.
The trial court correctly applied the statute as we have interpreted it, and should be affirmed.