Court Opinion

ID: 9394938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 17:02:40.637807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.286925
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                    PERRY JEROME BRYARS, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0135
                               FILED 5-16-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2019-101287-001
              The Honorable Rosa Mroz, Judge, (deceased)
            The Honorable Jacki Ireland, Judge, Pro Tempore

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Diane L. Hunt
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jennifer Roach
Counsel for Appellant
                             STATE v. BRYARS
                            Decision of the Court

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1            Defendant Perry Jerome Bryars appeals his convictions and
sentences for attempted arson, attempted sexual assault, kidnapping, four
counts of aggravated assault, and six counts of felony endangerment.
Because Bryars fails to show reversible error, the convictions and sentences
are affirmed.

           FACTUAL1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            Bryars’ wife, M.Y.,2 had filed for divorce and obtained an
order of protection against Bryars when they attempted to reconcile in
December 2018. The next month, after reconciliation efforts failed, M.Y.
awoke one evening in her bed in Buckeye, Arizona, and saw Bryars
standing over her. Bryars threatened to kill M.Y. with a knife and prevented
her from leaving. At one point, Bryars took off his and M.Y.’s clothes, got
on top of her, grabbed her “down there,” and rubbed his penis against her
while “tracing” and “poking” her body with the knife. Bryars strangled
M.Y. “at least three or four times”—twice until she almost lost
consciousness—cut her neck and slapped her face. He told M.Y. “we’re
going to die together.” Eventually, M.Y. was able to escape when Bryars
became distracted.

¶3            M.Y. returned to the home about 30 minutes later but did not
go inside; she spoke with Bryars through a window of the home. Bryars
told M.Y. the house was “going to blow in five minutes,” and asked
whether she smelled “gas.” M.Y. called 9-1-1 and told the operator that
Bryars “said he was ready to die and as soon as you guys get here, he is
going to blow up the house.” Buckeye Police Officer E.C. soon arrived, and

1      The evidence and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light
most favorable to sustaining the verdicts. State v. Fuentes, 247 Ariz. 516, 520,
¶ 2 (App. 2019).

2      We use initials to protect the victims’ identities.

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                            STATE v. BRYARS
                           Decision of the Court

Bryars was in his truck parked in the driveway. After a brief standoff,
Officer E.C. and other officers were able to detain Bryars.

¶4           Meanwhile, a hazmat specialist with the Buckeye Fire
Department arrived and found natural gas was seeping out from the
“closed up” home. He turned off the main gas line to the home and
evacuated neighbors from the area.

¶5            Immediately upon opening the front door of the home, the
specialist extinguished a burning candle on the floor. He proceeded
through the house, and a “viscous material” on the floor by the candle
caused him to slip. The specialist noted an empty gasoline can and bleach
bottles scattered around the house, which raised “red flags” because
gasoline combined with bleach is dangerously flammable. The specialist
also saw that the doorbell wires were disconnected, which he later testified
was an attempt to prevent an “early” explosion before the house filled with
gas.3 He discovered a “gas hookup” in the kitchen was disconnected and
turned on, and the gas line to the water heater in the garage was
disconnected. The specialist measured a gas concentration in the air that,
although elevated, was insufficient to ignite.

¶6           After arresting Bryars, Officer E.C. interviewed him at the
police station. Bryars explained that he had “some background in
explosives,” and he admitted that he cut the doorbell wires and lit the
candle found burning on the floor.

¶7             The State charged Bryars with one count of attempted arson
of an occupied structure, one count of sexual assault, two counts of
kidnapping, four counts of aggravated assault, and six counts of felony
endangerment. Each endangerment count listed as a victim M.Y., Officer
E.C., or one of the four other police officers who responded to the scene and
was present when Bryars was arrested.

¶8           At trial, the superior court granted Bryars’ motion for
judgment of acquittal as to the sexual assault charge but allowed the State
to proceed with an amended charge of attempted sexual assault. The court

3      The hazmat specialist explained at trial that natural gas is “lighter
than air,” and it therefore accumulates from the top of a closed structure
downward. If the only ignition source is near the ground level, the
concentration of gas becomes so great by the time the gas ignites that a
“catastrophic” explosion results.

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                             STATE v. BRYARS
                            Decision of the Court

denied Bryars’ motion for judgment of acquittal as to all other charges. The
court later dismissed one of the kidnapping charges on the State’s motion.

¶9            The jury found Bryars guilty on all counts, additionally
finding that seven counts (attempted sexual assault, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, and one count of endangerment) were domestic
violence offenses. The jury further found that the kidnapping, attempted
sexual assault, attempted arson of an occupied structure, and one of the
aggravated assault convictions were dangerous offenses. The court then
imposed concurrent presumptive sentences ranging from one year to ten
and a half years for all counts except one and applied the appropriate
presentence incarceration credit. On the arson count, Bryars was sentenced
to a consecutive presumptive sentence of seven and a half years with no
credit. Bryars timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) Sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

                                DISCUSSION

   I.      Sufficiency of Evidence: Endangerment

¶10           Bryars argues the court erred by denying his motion for a
judgment of acquittal on the endangerment counts, and that insufficient
evidence supported those convictions. Although Bryars argues these issues
separately, the analysis under both is the same. A judgment of acquittal is
only appropriate if there is “no substantial evidence to support a
conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“Rule”) 20(a)(1); State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz.
485, 493, ¶ 24 (1999). Likewise, review of the sufficiency of evidence
underlying a conviction is limited to determining “whether substantial
evidence supports the verdict.” State v. Sharma, 216 Ariz. 292, 294, ¶ 7 (App.
2007). Therefore, these arguments are reviewed together.

¶11           A claim of insufficient evidence is reviewed de novo. State v.
West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). The denial of a Rule 20 motion for a
judgment of acquittal or a jury’s guilty verdict will be affirmed unless
“there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s]
conclusion.” State v. Johnson, 215 Ariz. 28, 29, ¶ 2 (App. 2007); State v. Miles,
211 Ariz. 475, 481, ¶ 23 (App. 2005). Sufficient evidence may be direct or
circumstantial and “is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as
adequate” to “support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, 487, ¶¶ 9, 11 (App. 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence, we assess the evidence “against the statutorily

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                             STATE v. BRYARS
                            Decision of the Court

required elements of the offense.” State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505, ¶ 8 (App.
2005). The Court does not “reweigh the evidence to decide if it would reach
the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” Borquez, 232 Ariz. at 487, ¶ 9
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

¶12            As charged here, “[a] person commits endangerment by
recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent
death or physical injury.” A.R.S. § 13-1201(A). “‘Recklessly’ means . . . a
person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.”
A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(c).

¶13           Bryars argues that, because the evidence failed to establish the
gas had reached a sufficient concentration in the house to ignite and
explode, the victims were not in actual substantial risk of imminent death.
See State v. Morgan, 128 Ariz. 362, 367 (App. 1981) (“[O]ne of the required
elements of endangerment is that the victim must be placed in actual
substantial risk of imminent death or physical injury.”). But the State was
not required to show that the gas concentration reached a combustible level
because, had that level been attained, the lit candle would have ignited the
gas, causing a large explosion and potentially killing the victims. Requiring
the State to prove a particular level was attained would run counter to the
endangerment statute’s purpose. See State v. Dominguez, 236 Ariz. 226, 229,
¶ 5 (App. 2014) (noting that, compared to homicide, the felony
endangerment statute “criminalizes conduct posing a substantial risk
rather than creating an observable result.”).

¶14           Here, the hazmat specialist testified that gas would ignite at a
five percent concentration level and that, 45 minutes after gas began
dissipating and after he turned off the gas main to the house, the gas was
between one and two percent concentration. But the concentration levels
are secondary. Bryars took all the necessary steps to explode the house at
the time—opening all the gas pipes to fill the house and lighting a candle
near the front door to ensure ignition as public safety personnel were
arriving—not at some unknown time in the future. The evidence showed
that the endangerment victims were near the house just before the specialist
turned off the gas main. The jury could therefore reasonably determine the
victims were in actual substantial risk of being killed by an explosion that

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                             STATE v. BRYARS
                            Decision of the Court

testimony established would have been “catastrophic.”4 Cf. State v. Doss,
192 Ariz. 408, 412, ¶ 13 (App. 1998) (remanding for new trial on
endangerment counts that were based on defendant’s firing gun into a
house where record was “ambiguous” as to location of victims in house).
Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported the felony convictions.

    II.    Designation of Attempted Sexual Assault as a Domestic
           Violence Offense

¶15            Bryars argues that attempted sexual assault does not qualify
for designation as a domestic violence (“DV”) offense under A.R.S. § 13-
3601. Bryars did not raise this issue at trial, meaning he must demonstrate
fundamental error. Thus, to show reversible error, Bryars must
affirmatively establish that whatever error occurred was prejudicial or
otherwise so egregious as to deny him a fair trial. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz.
135, 140, 142, ¶¶ 12, 21 (2018). He fails to do so.

¶16             Bryars does not explain how the DV designation for the
attempted sexual assault conviction adversely affected his sentencing.
Instead, he argues: “Without the error, [there] would not [be] a domestic
violence conviction for Count 4. With each conviction for a domestic
violence offense, the risk to a person’s liberty increases.” Thus, Bryars
recognizes that he was convicted of other DV offenses in this case. And
although Bryars claims the DV designation for Count 4 alone poses a risk
to his liberty, he provides no supporting authority and does not explain the
risk. Bryars’ vague reference to a potential future risk of prejudice is
insufficient to satisfy his burden under fundamental error review. See State
v. Dickinson, 233 Ariz. 527, 531, ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (defendant “must
affirmatively ‘prove prejudice’ and may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry
his burden” under fundamental error review).

    III.   Sentencing

¶17           The trial court imposed presumptive sentences on all counts.
In doing so, the court noted the number of victims, the “serious danger”
posed to the victims and the community, and the “serious emotional
impact” on M.Y. “balance[d] . . . out” the mitigating factors regarding

4      The trial court properly instructed the jury that endangerment
requires proof that Bryars’ conduct did “in fact” create a substantial risk of
imminent death. Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. Statutory Criminal 12.01 (5th ed.
2019).

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                             STATE v. BRYARS
                            Decision of the Court

Bryars’ lack of prior felony convictions, his military service, and his possible
“substance abuse issue.”

¶18          Bryars argues the trial court fundamentally erred by using
aggravating factors not found by the jury to “negate” the mitigating factors.
But the requirement that a jury must find an aggravating factor only
becomes an issue when a court imposes an aggravated sentence, not
presumptive sentences as here. See State v. Johnson, 210 Ariz. 438¶¶ 12–13
(App. 2005) (jury findings only required for sentence greater than
presumptive to be imposed).

¶19            Bryars contends that his enhanced presumptive sentences did
not comply with Alleyne. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). In
that case, the United States Supreme Court held that “the fact triggering the
mandatory minimum sentence . . . must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 113.
But Bryars was not sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence. Rather,
Bryars received a presumptive sentence under A.R.S. § 13-704, which
provides enhanced sentencing ranges for dangerous offenders. And the
jury made the finding of dangerousness that triggered application of § 13-
704. Bryars does not challenge that finding, and the record supports it.

¶20            The trial court did not err in imposing the sentences here. See
State v. Cazares, 205 Ariz. 425, 427, ¶¶ 6, 8 (App. 2003) (sentencing decisions
are within trial court’s discretion). Accordingly, Bryars has shown no
fundamental error. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21 (“[T]he first step in
fundamental error review is determining whether trial error exists.”).

                               CONCLUSION

¶21           Bryars’ convictions and sentences are affirmed.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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