Court Opinion

ID: 9620215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:39:54.640885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:48.295501
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
concurring specially.
At the outset let us get the posture of this case clearly in mind. After filing suit, plaintiff served a request for admissions upon the defendant. The thirty days allowed by Code Ann. § 81A-136(a) came and went and the request was not answered. Several months later plaintiff moved for summary judgment based on defendant’s "admission” of the request by reason of his failure to timely answer. Defendant moved to withdraw the "admission” and to be allowed to deny the request, which denial was tendered.
The trial court declined to allow the defendant to withdraw the admission because he had not shown "providential cause” for his failure to answer. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 150 Ga. App. 869 (258 SE2d 686) (1979), and this court granted certiorari.
Based on the 1972 amendment to Code Ann. § 81A-136(b), this court propounds a two-prong test for deciding whether a party who has failed to timely answer *813requests for admissions should be allowed to withdraw the "admissions”: The court may grant a motion to withdraw or amend [1] "when the presentation of the merits will be subserved thereby and [2] the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.” The burden as to the first prong would be on the requestee as the movant, while the burden as to the second prong is on the requestor.
It should be kept in mind that we are not dealing here with a party who answered a request for admissions by admitting one and later learned that the admission was in error. We deal here with a party who did not answer at all for about eight months. (Personally, I would apply Code Ann. § 81A-106 (b) in cases such as this where the trial court has denied the motion to withdraw.)
In my view, it should not be assumed that the first prong of the test (the prong as to which the defaulting movant has the burden) can be perfunctorily satisfied. The requirement on the movant is to show that the presentation of the merits will be subserved thereby. It could be argued that this requirement is satisfied simply by the filing of the motion itself, which shows movant’s desire to raise an issue of fact to be tried. In my view, such a desire to require a trial, standing alone, does not satisfy the test.
The first inquiry should be this — who will have the burden of proof at trial as to the subject matter of the request? If the burden of proof as to the subject matter of the request will be on the defaulting movant, then movant should be required to show that the proferred denial of the request can be proved by admissible evidence having a modicum of credibility, and that the denial is not offered solely for the purpose of delay.
On the other hand, if (as may more often be the case) the burden of proof as to the subject matter of the request will be on the requestor, then movant should be required to show that the admitted request either can be refuted by admissible evidence having a modicum of credibility or is incredibile on its face, and that the denial is not offered solely for purposes of delay.
After the movant satisfies the court as to the first *814prong, then the requestor should be afforded the opportunity to satisfy the second prong.