Court Opinion

ID: 9945081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 23:27:10.266054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:21.672060
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 KEYBANK, NA,
                                                  No. 85097-1-I
              Respondent,                         (consolidated with
                                                  No. 85256-6-I)
              v.
                                                  DIVISION ONE
 GINGER ATHERTON,
                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
              Appellant,

 HENRY DEAN, as trustee for the
 Sharon Graham Bingham 2007 Trust;
 ESTATE OF SCOTT BINGHAM;
 KELLY BINGHAM; UMPQUA BANK;
 OPUS BANK, as successor-in-interest
 to Cascade Bank; WASHINGTON
 FEDERAL, NA, itself and as
 successor-in-interest to Horizon Bank,
 WASHINGTON FEDERAL NA;
 WASHINGTON TRUST BANK; FIRST
 CITIZENS BANK AND TRUST CO., as
 successor-in-interest to Venture Bank;
 STATE OF WASHINGTON; DEPT. OF
 REVENUE; CENTRUM FINANCIAL
 SERVICES, INC., MUFG UNION
 BANK, NA, itself and as successor-in-
 interest to Frontier Bank; PEARLMARK
 REAL ESTATE PARTNERS;
 PEARLMARK MEZZANINE REALITY
 PARTNERS II LLC; LVB-OGDEN
 MARKETING, INC., LLC,

              Defendants.

      BIRK, J. — Following Ginger Atherton’s last appeal to this court, the superior

court allowed the prevailing party in that appeal, KeyBank, NA, to be reimbursed
No. 85097-1-I (consol. with No. 85256-6-I)/2

its expenses out of Atherton’s supersedeas bond pursuant to RAP 8.1. In this

appeal, Atherton argues that the parties’ previous settlement agreement

foreclosed that relief, and further that because that question turns on interpretation

of the settlement agreement, it must be submitted to arbitration. We conclude the

settlement agreement and its arbitration clause do not extend to or waive RAP 8.1

relief and affirm.

                                             I

       The parties’ dispute is a long running one more fully described in our last

opinion, KeyBank, NA v. Atherton, No. 83104-6-I, slip op. at 2-4 (Wash. Ct. App.

Jul. 25, 2022) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/831046.pdf,

review denied, 200 Wn.2d 1024, 522 P.3d 48 (2023). It stems from loans secured

by deeds of trust on real property that KeyBank made to Atherton’s predecessors

in interest and on which it sought to foreclose. KeyBank, No. 83104-7-I, slip op. at

2-3. KeyBank suggests Atherton and her husband lived in the property rent free

for nearly a decade, from 2014 until 2023 when KeyBank acquired the property as

the successful bidder at a sheriff’s sale.

       In 2019, KeyBank and certain parties described as “the Bingham Parties”

entered into two agreements under which the validity of KeyBank’s liens was

acknowledged, KeyBank was permitted to proceed with foreclosure and sale of the

property, and the Bingham Parties were granted a redemption right. Under the

redemption agreement, if KeyBank acquired the property at the sheriff’s sale, the

Bingham Parties could redeem the property by paying $1.6 million, but if KeyBank

did not prevail at the sheriff’s sale, then KeyBank would retain $3 million and pay

                                             2
No. 85097-1-I (consol. with No. 85256-6-I)/3

the Bingham Parties any additional funds that it received from the sale. Henry

Dean was trustee for the Bingham Parties, and in that capacity, in 2020, conveyed

to Atherton, his wife, the right, title and interest in the settlement and redemption

agreements. KeyBank, No. 83104-7-I, slip op. at 2-3.

       KeyBank sought to foreclose pursuant to the settlement agreement.

Atherton sought to stay the foreclosure. The settlement agreement included an

arbitration clause providing as follows:

       Any disputes related to or arising under this Agreement will be
       arbitrated before Stew Cogan, or if he is unwilling or unavailable to
       serve, then selected according to the procedure described in the
       Prior Settlement. Arbitration will include only the terms of this
       Agreement, exclusive of testimony or other extrinsic evidence about
       the Parties’ rights and obligations, and will conclude no later than 30
       days from submission to the arbitrator or as soon thereafter as the
       arbitrator’s schedule allows. The arbitrator’s decision under this
       Section is binding on the Parties and cannot be appealed.

Atherton argued among other things that under the arbitration clause she was

entitled to compel arbitration to determine the “validity” of the Bingham Parties’

“stipulation” in the settlement agreement, we presumed referring to the

acknowledgement of the validity of KeyBank’s liens. The superior court denied

this relief, and we affirmed. KeyBank, No. 83104-7-I, slip op. at 8, 11.

       Following our mandate, KeyBank filed a motion for partial disbursement of

Atherton’s supersedeas bond to cover its attorney fees and other costs resulting

from Atherton’s appeal. It also filed a motion for renewed order of sale. Atherton

opposed disbursement from the supersedeas bond and moved to compel

arbitration. The redemption agreement states that “KeyBank will credit bid in the

full amount of the debt secured by the Deeds of Trust being foreclosed plus

                                           3
No. 85097-1-I (consol. with No. 85256-6-I)/4

accrued interest and attorneys’ fees and costs.” Atherton argued the arbitration

clause required arbitration of whether KeyBank was required to “credit bid the

amount of the post-judgment attorney fees at the time of sale” rather than obtain

reimbursement from the supersedeas bond. Atherton pointed to the superior

court’s August 10, 2021 order for judgment and decree of foreclosure and of sale,

which we affirmed in our 2022 opinion, KeyBank, N.A., No. 83104-7-I, slip op. at

4, and which stated, “Additional amounts for post-judgment sheriff and attorney

fees and costs will be determined and recovered at the time of sale.” Atherton

reasoned this language required any “post-judgment” attorney fees, including

KeyBank’s attorney fees on appeal, were to be recovered at the time of sale and

not, therefore, from Atherton’s supersedeas bond. Atherton filed a motion echoing

these same arguments and ostensibly challenging the superior court’s subject

matter jurisdiction in light of the arbitration clause and the federal and state

arbitration acts.   The superior court granted KeyBank’s motions and denied

Atherton’s.

       Dean filed a notice of appeal challenging two of the orders, and Atherton

filed a notice of appeal challenging the third. Atherton filed a brief addressing all

three orders. We therefore refer to Atherton as the appellant. In the meantime,

the sheriff’s sale proceeded, and KeyBank was the successful bidder. Atherton

acknowledges this mooted the appeal of the renewed order of sale.

                                         II

       The only remaining issues are whether the superior court erred by allowing

disbursement from the supersedeas bond and declining to compel arbitration.

                                         4
No. 85097-1-I (consol. with No. 85256-6-I)/5

Because the settlement agreement does not embrace or waive relief under RAP

8.1, the superior court did not err in either respect.

       A trial court’s decisions regarding a supersedeas bond are reviewed for

abuse of discretion. See IBEW Health & Welfare Tr. of Sw. Wash. v. Rutherford,

195 Wn. App. 863, 866, 381 P.3d 1221 (2016). A trial court abuses its discretion

when its decision is manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or

based on untenable reasons. State v. Dye, 178 Wn.2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192

(2013). This court reviews a superior court’s order granting a motion to compel or

deny arbitration de novo. Marcus & Millichap Real Est. Inv. Servs. of Seattle, Inc.

v. Yates, Wood & MacDonald, Inc., 192 Wn. App. 465, 473-74, 369 P.3d 503

(2016). In determining the arbitrability of the dispute, the proper question is only

whether the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration provision.      In re

Marriage of Pascale, 173 Wn. App. 836, 844, 295 P.3d 805 (2013).              RCW

7.04A.060(2) provides that the court “shall decide whether an agreement to

arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.”

       Neither the language in the settlement agreement that KeyBank will credit

bid an amount including accrued attorney fees, nor the language in the August 10,

2021 order that it may recover post-judgment attorney fees, embraces either

appeal or procedural remedies on appeal including RAP 8.1. And without deciding

whether either could validly do so, neither purports to exclude such remedies in

the event of future litigation making them available. KeyBank’s entitlement to RAP

8.1 relief arose out of Atherton’s pursuing her first appeal and delaying execution

of KeyBank’s rightful judgment, not the settlement and redemption agreements. It

                                           5
No. 85097-1-I (consol. with No. 85256-6-I)/6

follows that it was not error to allow KeyBank relief under RAP 8.1, and not error

to decline to find a dispute subject to arbitration “related to or arising under” the

settlement agreement. Atherton’s motion to compel arbitration cannot “ ‘fairly be

said to invoke a claim covered by the agreement.’ ” Marcus & Millichap, 193 Wn.

App. at 473 (quoting Heights at Issaquah Ridge Owners Ass’n v. Burton

Landscape Grp., Inc., 148 Wn. App, 400, 403, 200 P.3d 254 (2009)).

       KeyBank seeks reasonable attorney fees under the clause of the settlement

agreement providing, “The party prevailing in any action to enforce, interpret,

rescind, or terminate this Agreement will recover from the other party reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred, which amount will be made a party of any award

rendered.” KeyBank is the prevailing party in Atherton’s attempt to enforce or

interpret the settlement agreement, and is awarded reasonable attorney fees to be

fixed by a commissioner of this court subject to KeyBank’s compliance with RAP

18.1(d).

       In light of our disposition it is not necessary to reach any other issues raised

by the parties.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

                                          6