Court Opinion

ID: 9947508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 22:00:54.224605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:30.774172
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13891        Document: 37-1    Date Filed: 03/04/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eleventh Circuit

                              ____________________

                                    No. 21-13891
                              ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        LESLIE MEYERS,
        a.k.a. Les Meyers,

                                                      Defendant-Appellant.

                              ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00058-LAG-TQL-1
                            ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                     21-13891

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Leslie Meyers pleaded guilty to various counts involving
        dogfighting and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal,
        he argues that the district court erred when it found at sentencing
        that he hanged his dog to death without requiring the government
        to establish that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. After
        careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we agree
        with Meyers that the district court erred in making its factual find-
        ing concerning the alleged hanging. We, therefore, VACATE and
        REMAND for resentencing.1
                                               I
                Meyers raised pit bulls. At least once, he entered one of his
        pit bulls in a fight in Sumter County, Georgia. A few hours into
        the event, law enforcement officials from various agencies exe-
        cuted a search warrant of the premises. The officers found—
        among other things—a dead pit bull terrier. Video evidence
        showed that it had participated in the fight, and it was later identi-
        fied as Meyers’s dog.
              More than a year later, law enforcement executed a search
        warrant at a property where Meyers lived with his girlfriend.
        Agents found 27 pit-bull-type dogs, one Great Dane, and one

        1 Meyers also challenges the district court’s sentence as substantively unrea-

        sonable. Because we agree with Meyers on his first challenge to the district
        court’s sentence, we needn’t address his substantive-reasonableness challenge.
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        21-13891                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

        German Shepherd. The pit bulls were chained and in physical con-
        ditions consistent with being used for dog fighting. Agents also dis-
        covered various equipment and paraphernalia related to dog-
        fighting. Agents seized the animals and surrendered the Great
        Dane and German Shepherd to local animal control officers.
              A grand jury charged Meyers in a multi-defendant indict-
        ment on 32 counts. Meyers pleaded guilty to five counts, and the
        government dismissed the other 27. 2 Meyers waived his right to
        appeal except in the event that the district court imposed a sentence
        higher than the guidelines range, and the government agreed to
        recommend a sentence of no longer than 72 months.
               A United States probation officer filed a presentence investi-
        gation report that discussed the five offenses. The PSI included an
        allegation from Meyers’s co-defendant Timothy White that Mey-
        ers hanged his dog to death because the dog refused to commit a
        “courtesy scratch”—an opportunity for the victorious dog in a fight
        to attack a wounded loser in order to further maim or kill it. Based
        on its consideration of the facts underlying the charges, Meyers’s

        2 The five counts to which Meyers pleaded guilty were: (1) conspiring to vio-

        late the Animal Welfare Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 in connection with
        7 U.S.C. § 2156(a), (b) and 18 U.S.C. § 49; (2) and (3) transporting a dog for use
        in an animal fighting venture in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(b) and 18 U.S.C. §
        49; (4) sponsoring and exhibiting a dog in an animal fighting venture in viola-
        tion of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 49; and (5) knowingly possessing
        a firearm after knowing he had been convicted of a felony in violation of 18
        U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(1).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13891

        criminal history, and his personal characteristics, the PSI concluded
        that Meyers’s sentencing range was 77 to 96 months.
               Meyers filed a written objection to the PSI pursuant to Fed-
        eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f) and Local Criminal Rule
        32.1(b). Meyers’s only objections were to two paragraphs in the
        PSI that discussed his prior criminal history. Meyers didn’t object
        to the allegation that he hanged his dog to death.
               At sentencing, Meyers told the court that he had the oppor-
        tunity to review the PSI, that he had no questions about it, and that
        he had reviewed his objections to the PSI with his counsel and had
        no further objections. The district court overruled Meyers’s writ-
        ten objections and asked the parties if there were any further ob-
        jections. Both parties replied that there weren’t, and the district
        court adopted the PSI as written. The district court heard from
        both parties’ counsel on the recommended sentence and took tes-
        timony from Meyers himself and his two nephews. At no point
        during this time did Meyers contest the allegation that he had
        hanged his dog to death.
               Finally, the district court discussed its sentencing considera-
        tions. Regarding the dog’s hanging, the district court said that the
        allegation “bl[ew its] mind” and that it had been “fighting for . . .
        months . . . to understand” Meyers’s conduct but said it had to “take
        that into account and incorporate that into the nature and circum-
        stance of the offense.” Doc. 561 at 23. At this point—for the first
        time—Meyers contested the allegation that he hanged his dog to
        death, stating that he “did not . . . hang that animal.” Id. Meyers
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        21-13891                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

        went on to say, “as God is above” and offering to “put [his] hand
        on a Bible” or “even take a lie detector test,” that the allegation was
        a “complete lie” and that he left the dog with two hosts after the
        fight. Id. at 23–25. Even so, after listening to Meyers, the district
        court said that “the evidence in the case is that [the hanging by
        Meyers] did occur.” Id. at 25. The court also said that “[t]he evi-
        dence that has been presented up to this time in this case indicates
        to me and I am making a finding of fact that I do believe that you
        did, in fact, kill that dog as has been described in the record . . . .”
        Id. at 27.
               Taking that fact and Meyers’s criminal history into account,
        the district court determined that an upward variance was appro-
        priate and sentenced Meyers to 60 months for counts one through
        four to run concurrently and 63 months for count five to be served
        consecutively for a total of 123 months. Meyers objected to the
        sentence, arguing that it was excessive, pointing specifically to the
        government’s recommendation of a 72-month sentence.
                This appeal followed.3
                                                II
              A sentencing court can make ﬁndings of fact for purposes of
        sentencing “based on [1] evidence heard during trial, [2] facts

        3 We review legal questions concerning the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-

        dure de novo. United States v. Spears, 443 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2006); see
        also United States v. Beach, 113 F.3d 188, 189 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Because [the]
        appeal presents legal questions regarding the application of . . . rules of proce-
        dure, review is de novo.”).
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13891

        admitted by a defendant’s plea of guilty, [3] undisputed statements
        in the presentence report, or [4] evidence presented at the sentenc-
        ing hearing.” United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355, 1356 (11th Cir.
        1989). If a defendant disputes a fact in the PSI, a district court
        “must . . . rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnec-
        essary either because the matter will not aﬀect sentencing, or be-
        cause the court will not consider the matter in sentencing . . . .”
        Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). For a defendant to properly object to
        his PSI, his challenge must be made with “speciﬁcity and clarity,”
        so that the government and the district court know the mistake of
        which he complains. United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816,
        824 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Aleman, 832 F.2d 142,
        145 (11th Cir. 1987)). A defendant also needs to object in a timely
        manner. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f )(1). A district court has discretion to
        waive the timeliness requirement for good cause. United States v.
        Aguilar-Ibarra, 740 F.3d 587, 591 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R.
        Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(D). When a defendant “dispute[s]” a portion of
        the PSI, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B), “the Government has the bur-
        den of establishing the disputed fact by a preponderance of the ev-
        idence.” United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir.
        2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The government
        meets its burden by putting forth “reliable and speciﬁc evidence.”
        United States v. Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882, 890 (11th Cir. 1997) (quota-
        tion marks and citation omitted).
               Meyers contends that the district court erred under Rule
        32(i)(3)(B) when it found that he hanged his dog to death without
        requiring the government to establish that fact based on a
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        21-13891               Opinion of the Court                          7

        preponderance of the evidence. He concedes that his objection to
        the alleged fact was untimely under Rule 32(f )(1) but argues that
        the district court excused his untimeliness by resolving the objec-
        tion on the merits. The government asserts that the district court
        didn’t recognize that Meyers was asking to make a new objection
        or that he was asking for an exception to his untimeliness based on
        good cause. Meyers replies that his words and the context in which
        he interjected “made clear that he did not want the [sentencing]
        court to consider the disputed fact that he killed the dog in sentenc-
        ing him, on the ground that the allegation was not truthful.”
               We hold that Meyers satisﬁed the “speciﬁcity and clarity” re-
        quirements when he interjected at the sentencing hearing. In per-
        tinent part, Meyers told the court:
              Your honor, I was just going to address [the alleged
              fact about hanging the dog to death.] I don’t -- you
              might not feel that that’s the truth or whatever. And
              as God is above, I did not take oﬀ a belt oﬀ my waist
              and hang that animal. . . . [T]hat’s a complete lie. I
              didn’t do that. . . . I did not pull any -- I didn’t even
              wear a belt that night to that situation for me to pull
              a belt oﬀ my waist and hang the dog until it was dead.
              . . . I’ll put my hand on a Bible or whatever needs to
              be done or even take a lie detector test to determine I
              didn’t do that -- that it didn’t happen. I was supposed
              to address that before we got to this part, but it slipped
              my mind about it.

               With regard to speciﬁcity, Meyers’s interjection was targeted
        solely at the allegation that he hanged his dog to death; it was an
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13891

        objection not to the PSI in general, but rather to a singular fact.
        And as to clarity, Meyers’s oﬀer to “put [his] hand on a Bible or do
        whatever needs to be done or even take a lie detector test” and his
        acknowledgement that he was supposed to bring this issue up ear-
        lier indicate that he was disputing that fact from the PSI.
              The sentencing court’s response, in turn, indicates that it
        recognized Meyers’s interjection as an objection to the PSI that
        would place the alleged fact in dispute. It said:
              [I]n making this [sentencing] determination, the
              Court has considered . . . the nature and circum-
              stances of the oﬀense, including the manner and
              death of one animal. And I am making a speciﬁc ﬁnd-
              ing. I hear what you’re saying now. The evidence that
              has been presented up to this time in this case indi-
              cates to me and I am making a ﬁnding of fact that I
              do believe that you did, in fact, kill that dog as has
              been described in the record . . . .

               Meyers met his burden of making a speciﬁc and clear objec-
        tion to the PSI—albeit an untimely one. The district court recog-
        nized his interjection as such and “ma[de] a speciﬁc ﬁnding” that
        Meyers did hang his dog to death. It said that “[t]he evidence . . .
        presented up to this time” supported that determination. The key
        question is whether suﬃcient evidence supported that ﬁnding. Re-
        call that a district court has four potential bases to make factual
        ﬁndings at sentencing: “[1] evidence heard during trial, [2] facts ad-
        mitted by a defendant’s plea of guilty, [3] undisputed statements in
        the presentence report, or [4] evidence presented at the sentencing
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        21-13891               Opinion of the Court                         9

        hearing.” Wilson, 884 F.2d at 1356. Because there was no trial in
        this case, the government conceded at oral argument that there
        was nothing in Meyers’s guilty plea admitting to the hanging, and
        no new evidence was presented at the sentencing hearing, Options
        1, 2, and 4 are out. That leaves only Option 3—“undisputed state-
        ments in the presentence report.”
               The problem is that by acknowledging Meyers’s objection
        and making the ﬁnding, the district court also—though perhaps
        unintentionally—acknowledged that the fact was disputed. At that
        point, the district court had two options under Rule 32(i)(3)(B): It
        could either rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling was un-
        necessary “either because the matter w[ould] not aﬀect sentencing,
        or because the court w[ould] not consider the matter in sentenc-
        ing.”
                The district court couldn’t take the second route because it
        had already stated that it had considered the matter in sentencing,
        and because it had said previously that the hanging of the dog
        “bl[ew its] mind” and that it “ha[d] been ﬁghting for the months
        that this case ha[d] been in front of [it] to understand it.” Doc. 561
        at 23. That left the ﬁrst route—ruling on the dispute. But that
        meant the district court had to require the government to establish
        the alleged fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Rodriguez, 732
        F.3d at 1305. What the court couldn’t do is rely on the now-
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        21-13891

        disputed portions of the PSI.4 But that’s what it did. In doing so,
        it erred. 5
                                                 III
               Because the district court erred when it made a factual ﬁnd-
        ing regarding a disputed fact without requiring the government to
        establish that fact by a preponderance of the evidence, we VA-
        CATE Meyers’s sentence and REMAND for the district court to
        allow the government an opportunity to establish the allegation
        that Meyers hanged his dog to death by a preponderance of the
        evidence.

        4 The district court could of course rely on undisputed statements in the PSI.

        See Wilson, 884 F.2d at 1356. Meyers’s specific objection to the PSI was that he
        didn’t hang his dog to death. But he didn’t dispute, for example, that he owned
        the dog that was killed, that he exhibited the dog in the first fight, or that the
        dog was found dead behind his car. Even so, we don’t think that the undis-
        puted portions of the PSI provide a sufficient basis for concluding by a prepon-
        derance of the evidence that Meyers hanged his dog to death. That Meyers
        owned the dog and entered it into a fight certainly doesn’t establish that he
        killed it; indeed, Meyers’s dog’s victory in the fight might more reasonably
        imply that he had no motive to do so. Nor do the remainder of any undisputed
        facts in the PSI satisfy the preponderance standard.
        5 We acknowledge that the district court could have overruled Meyers’s ob-

        jection on the ground that it was untimely under Rule 32(f)(1). Aguilar-Ibarra,
        740 F.3d at 591. But it didn’t. There is no hint in the sentencing transcript that
        the court rejected Meyers’s objection on timeliness grounds. Rather, the tran-
        script makes clear that the sentencing court resolved the dispute on the merits
        when it said, “I am making a specific finding. . . . The evidence . . . indicates
        to me and I am making a finding of fact that I do believe that you did, in fact,
        kill that dog as has been described in the record . . . .” Doc. 561 at 27.