Court Opinion

ID: 9835271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 02:16:54.763462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:00.897252
License: Public Domain

Andrias, J.,
dissents in a memorandum as follows: Because I believe that the motion court correctly granted summary judgment to defendant Joseph Skoler under the assumption of risk doctrine, I respectfully dissent.
In March 2011, Skoler, with the help of plaintiff Alan Zelkowitz, his 43-year-old cousin, built a zip line in the woods behind the two bungalows he leased from defendant Country Group, Inc., of which he was a 50% owner. The zip line was intended for private recreational use, and traversed a 220-foot span between two trees.
The zip line was equipped with a seat that was attached by a rope to its “trolley mechanism,”, but no safety harness. The zip line also had a braking system, which consisted of a black box placed on the line between the halfway point and the end point, and a bungee cord that ran from the box to an anchor tree. When the rope attaching the seat to the trolley mechanism hit the black box, the bungee cord would stretch and become taut, slowing down the rider.
Skoler purchased the zip line and other materials on the Internet; he had no formal training in physics or engineering. Plaintiff was present for the entire installation, and assisted Skoler in the construction by carrying materials, handing him tools, and holding the work ladder. Plaintiff was aware that Skoler was not an engineer or a professional mechanic or zip line installer or instructor and that he had purchased the materials online. Although plaintiff professes to know little *430about zip-lines and claims that he was only a “schlepper,” at his deposition he was able to describe the zip line’s components and how they were installed, including the braking mechanism. He was also able to describe how the braking mechanism worked.
Skoler first tested the zip line with a big log, then successfully rode it himself. Plaintiff, who had never used a zip line before, then took a turn, and completed a “slow and smooth” ride without incident, observing the “[b]oulders, leaves, dirt[,] [b]ranches [and] forest debris” under the zip line.
On April 26, 2011, plaintiff visited Skoler again. After Skoler successfully tested the zip line by riding it himself, plaintiff took his turn. However, this time it seemed faster and three-quarters of the way through, as the ending tree was coming closer, plaintiff began getting a “little nervous.” When he hit the brake box, which, according to plaintiff, Skoler had just adjusted by moving the black bungee line forward towards the end tree, the brake box slowed him down a little, but not as much as it had Skoler. Fearing that he was going to crash head first into the tree at the end of the line, plaintiff put his feet out in front of him, and they slammed into the tree, throwing plaintiff backwards off the seat and onto the ground, where he struck a boulder. Skoler testified that he did not recall making any adjustments to the brakes after his ride.
Plaintiff alleges that Skoler negligently installed and adjusted the zip line, causing the brake system to fail when he used it. Skoler moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff assumed the risk when he voluntarily rode the self-constructed zip line without a harness, including the risk of trying out an imprecise braking system.
Under the doctrine of assumption of the risk, “[a] [person] who voluntarily participates in a sporting or recreational event generally is held to have consented to those commonly-appreciated risks that are inherent in, and arise out of, participation in the sport” (Valverde v Great Expectations, LLC, 131 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2015]). “If a participant makes an informed estimate of the risks involved in the activity and willingly undertakes them, then there can be no liability if he is injured as a result of those risks” (Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 437 [1986]).
“Whether it can be concluded that a plaintiff made an informed estimate of the risks involved in an activity before deciding to participate depends on the openness and obviousness of the risk, plaintiff’s background, skill, and experience, plaintiff’s own conduct under the circumstances, and the *431nature of defendant’s conduct” (Lamey v Foley, 188 AD2d 157, 164 [4th Dept 1993] [footnote omitted]). A plaintiff is deemed to have assumed those risks that are known and fully comprehended, open and obvious, inherent in the activity, and reasonably foreseeable consequences of the activity (Turcotte, 68 NY2d at 439).
Applying these principles, Supreme Court correctly granted Skoler’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against him. Skoler established prima facie that plaintiff, a middle-aged adult, not an immature teenager, who was six feet, four inches tall and weighed approximately 215 pounds, assumed the risks of riding a zip line, an inherently dangerous activity, which include traveling at high speeds and crashing and/or falling off. Plaintiff voluntarily rode the homemade zip line, which he helped build, fully aware that Skoler was not an engineer or zip line expert, that the zip line was not equipped with a safety harness, and that there were rocks, tree stumps and other debris on the ground beneath the zip line (see Marcano v City of New York, 99 NY2d 548, 549 [2002] [plaintiff assumed the risk of injury when he swung on and subsequently fell off parallel exercise bars over a concrete floor]). Furthermore, under these circumstances, “where the risk is open and obvious, the mere fact that a defendant could have provided safer conditions is irrevelant” (Sajkowski v Young Men’s Christian Assn. of Greater N.Y., 269 AD2d 105, 106 [1st Dept 2000]).
The fact that this was only the second time that plaintiff had used the zip line does not mandate a different result (see Rosenblatt v St. George Health & Racquetball Assoc., LLC, 119 AD3d 45, 56 [2d Dept 2014] [plaintiff, who voluntarily sat on an exercise ball during a body sculpting class, assumed the inherent risk that the ball would roll or rotate and cause her to fall, despite her claim that she had never used an exercise ball before]). Nor does the fact that plaintiff may not have anticipated the exact way in which he could be injured warrant the denial of summary judgment. “It is not necessary to the application of assumption of risk that the injured plaintiff have foreseen the exact manner in which his or her injury occurred, so long as he or she is aware of the potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results” (Maddox v City of New York, 66 NY2d 270, 278 [1985]).
Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the injury-causing event resulted from Skoler’s negligence, which plaintiff contends created unique and dangerous conditions beyond those inherent in the sport. The affidavit by *432plaintiff’s expert was conclusory and speculative (see Schwartz v Kings Third Ave. Pharmacy, Inc., 116 AD3d 474, 475 [1st Dept 2014]). Among other things, the expert’s statement that the slope was too steep based on alleged “[applicable standards,” rather than mandatory guidelines, is insufficient to raise an issue of fact (see e.g. Merson v Syosset Cent. School Dist., 286 AD2d 668, 670 [2d Dept 2001]).
While plaintiff asserts that he held Skoler back with a restraining rope for the first 30 feet of his ride to reduce his momentum, and that Skoler did not do the same for him, plaintiff did not ask Skoler to do so, and there is no evidence that the absence of the rope in any way caused plaintiff to collide with the tree at the end of the 220-foot span. Nor did plaintiff establish that any risks were unreasonably increased or concealed.
The majority disagrees, assuming for the purposes of the motion that the braking mechanism malfunctioned, because plaintiff testified that he failed to slow down to the same extent that Skoler had done only moments before, which enhanced the danger of riding the zip line. However, the majority fails to give due consideration to the facts that plaintiff’s physical characteristics were not identical to Skoler’s and that part of the allure of riding a zip line is the enhanced height, speed and potential danger. Plaintiff, who knew that Skoler’s knowledge of zip line construction was limited at best, and that Skoler was not a professional zip line instructor, and who helped build the zip line with materials purchased from the Internet, should have appreciated that crashing and falling are inherent risks of riding a homemade zip line that was not equipped with a safety harness and that had an imprecise braking mechanism that was subject to adjustment by trial and error.
Accordingly, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment in Skoler’s favor.