Court Opinion

ID: 9445056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:18:57.037346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:06.780759
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The ultimate question of whether the property was held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business seems to me a matter of logical inference from the evidentiary facts as to which the “clearly erroneous” rule is applicable. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7482(a); Rule 52(a), Fed.Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C.A.; United States v. United States Gypsum Company, 333 U.S. 364, 394, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Scottish American Co., 323 U.S. 119, 125, 65 S.Ct. 169, 89 L.Ed. 113; Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 295, 58 S.Ct. 932, 82 L.Ed. 1346; Galena Oaks Corporation v. Scofield, 5 Cir., 218 F.2d 217, 219; Burford-Toothaker Tractor Co. v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 192 F.2d 633, 635. I cannot say that the Tax Court’s finding of fact1 was clearly erroneous. It seems to me a logical and reasonable inference for reasons well expressed in the opinion of the Tax Court.
Further, the Supreme Court has recently and cogently set forth the reasons why the capital gain provisions of Section 117 should be narrowly construed. Corn Products Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52, 76 S.Ct. 20.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

. The Tax Court, after finding the evidentiary facts, concluded its findings of fact as follows:
“The 117 houses sold by petitioner (and his wife) in 1945 and 1946 were held by him primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.”