Court Opinion

ID: 9684918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:18:45.685155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.039714
License: Public Domain

Spencer and Boslaugh, JJ.,
dissenting.
While we are in agreement with many of the general statements in the opinion, it is our conviction that we should not emasculate discovery by thwarting its purpose by an unduly strict construction.
It is pertinent to observe that section 25-1267.39, R. R. S. 1943, reads in part: “* * * the court in which an action is pending may * * (Italics supplied.) This can only be interpreted as importing a broad discretion in the trial court.
The purpose and intent of discovery statutes is to leave their application to the sound discretion of the trial court. Sound discretion is one controlled and governed not only by the statutory enactments but also by considerations of policy, necessity, propriety, and expediency in the particular case at hand. Necessarily the trial judge is in a better position to judge these matters than an appellate court.
Does the record before us show an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court? In our judgment it does not. We recognize that Brandt’s statement is in the category of a witness, but his statement in this sitúa*200tion is akin to that of a party to the litigation. While there is no unanimity in the various jurisdictions, statements obtained from the parties are frequently considered to be in a different category than those of a mere witness.
In Pasterak v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 28 F. R. D. 383 (1961), where the court specifically found that there was no allegation or insinuation that the plaintiff was in any way misled or taken advantage of by the defendant’s representative in taking a statement where he was not represented by counsel and was not furnished with a statement, the court said: “The plaintiff maintains simply that under these circumstances in which a party has given a statement to an adverse party, he is entitled to be furnished with a copy of such statement. The weight of authority supports the plaintiff’s position. Neff v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D. C. E. D. Pa. 1948, 7 F. R. D. 532; Hayman v. Pullman Company, N. D. Ohio 1948, 8 F. R. D. 238; Moore’s Federal Practice, Vol. 4, pp. 1147 through 1149. Cf. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Reynolds, 1949, 85 U. S. App. D. C. 194, 176 F. 2d 476.”
It is apparent to us that the trial court could readily have determined that there is present in this case a special circumstance which distinguishes it from the ordinary situation where the plaintiff and counsel would like to examine statements taken on behalf of the opposing party. Where, as here, an employer to whom an employee’s negligence may be imputed seeks to' see a statement that the employee may have incautiously, ignorantly, or inadvisedly signed, particularly where that statement is in narrative form, where the statement is taken the day of the accident by a representative of a claim adjustment service, and particularly where the employee was not given a copy of it, it would appear to us different considerations are involved.
The majority opinion summarily brushes off these considerations because a statement was given to the employer 3 days after the accident. The employer cannot *201possibly know the particular phraseology used by the investigator in a narrative statement secured at a time when the employee may still be suffering from the effects of the accident. This particular phraseology, which would be that of the investigator, unexplained could be very prejudicial. It is not a question of impeachment. Its purpose is to accomplish the very thing for which discovery statutes were adopted.