Court Opinion

ID: 9779154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:38:32.112163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:22.469786
License: Public Domain

OPINION
CANNON, Justice.
On motion for rehearing, we withdraw our opinion of March 12, 1987 and substitute this opinion.
This is an appeal from a bench trial. The court found appellant, Christopher Henley Granberry, guilty of the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated and assessed punishment at 120 days in the Harris County Jail, probated for two years, *35plus a $250.00 fine. Appellant’s complaint focuses on the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the results of the breath test and the video portion of the videotape made of him at the police station after his arrest. In three points of error, appellant contends that the action of the court below violated his right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; his right to remain silent during custodial interrogation after requesting counsel guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and his right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and by article 1, section 19 of the Texas Constitution. We find no error and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court below.
On June 22, 1985, appellant, an eighteen-year-old man, was arrested for driving while intoxicated. He was taken to the police station where he was videotaped while performing certain coordination exercises. He then took a breath test, which revealed a .19 alcohol concentration in his breath. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the videotape and the results of the breath test. The court granted the motion with respect to the audio portion of the videotape pertaining to all interrogations that did not relate to the conducting of the field sobriety tests on the videotape. The court denied the motion with respect to the video portion of the videotape; also, with respect to the audio portion of the tape wherein the officer requested performance of the field sobriety test; and further, with respect to the results of the breath test.
In order to address the issues presented on appeal, we will first review the events as they occurred on the videotape made at the police station. We will then engage in a step-by-step application of the law to the facts as they occurred.
The videotape began with appellant entering the videotaping room at the police station. An officer in the room began introducing the other officers in the room. Appellant interrupted and asked, “Can I call my lawyer?” He was told, “Wait a minute.” The officer finished his introductions and then informed appellant that he was being videotaped. The officer next read appellant his Miranda warnings, stopping after each warning to ask appellant if he understood what was just read. Appellant indicated that he did. After reading the warnings, the officer then informed appellant that he could call a lawyer. Appellant asked if he could call his father because he did not know who his lawyer was. Appellant was told “no” and that he could call his father later. He was also told that he could use the phone book to find a lawyer. Appellant then asked, “What do I have to do here now?” The officer requested him to perform and, he in fact did perform, various physical coordination tests. He also read a passage from a piece of paper at the officer’s request.
After these tests were performed, appellant was again read his Miranda rights. While the officer was reading the rights, the following conversation ensued:
OFFICER: You have the right to terminate this interview at any time.
APPELLANT: I will terminate it now.
OFFICER: You want to terminate it right now?
APPELLANT: No. Keep advising me, but I won’t say anything.
OFFICER: Well, that’s all your legal rights.
APPELLANT: That’s it?
OFFICER: That’s it.
APPELLANT: O.K.
OFFICER: O.K.? Now, with those rights in mind, will you waive those rights and answer a few questions for me?
APPELLANT: Would you consider me undrunk from the test here?
OFFICER: I don’t judge this.
APPELLANT: What is this?
OFFICER: This is just a series of tests that we place you through.
APPELLANT: Would you consider me more than average?
OFFICER: More than average drunk?
APPELLANT: Yeah.
APPELLANT: I asked you a question.
OFFICER: No, I don’t think so.
APPELLANT: Am I drunk?
*36OFFICER: Well, that’s not for me to prove at this time.
APPELLANT: Well, you tested me here. Did I pass all the tests?
OFFICER: Yeah, you did fine.
OFFICER: Now, Mr. Granberry, will you waive those rights I just read to you and answer a few questions?
APPELLANT: If you ask me the right questions.
At this point in the conversation, the officer began to question appellant. Some of the questions were inculpatory, such as, “Have you been drinking?”; “What were you drinking? ”; “How many beers did you have? ”; and “Are you under the influence of alcohol now?” At one point, the officer asked, “Where were you last, at the friend’s house?” Appellant responded, “I refuse to say.” The questioning continued and appellant continued to respond.
After appellant answered these questions, the officer read the DWI statutory warnings and explained them to appellant. He asked if appellant was willing to submit to a breath test; appellant agreed. After the videotape interview had terminated and appellant was leaving the videotaping room to take the breath test, he asked, “Can I call my lawyer or something?” Appellant was told that he had not asked to call a lawyer; he had asked to call his father. Subsequently, appellant took the breath test, which revealed a .19 alcohol concentration in his breath.
We note at the outset that appellant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to counsel was not violated. The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment attached only upon or after formal initiation of judicial proceedings. McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Forte v. State, 707 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Here, the videotape and the breath test were taken prior to the filing of the complaint. Appellant’s right to counsel did not attach until the time the complaint was filed. Consequently, appellant’s right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was not violated. Point of error two is overruled.
In his first point of error, appellant asserts that he was denied his right to remain silent during custodial interrogation after requesting counsel under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As the court held in Miranda: “Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Thus, we must decide whether appellant exercised his right to remain silent by requesting an attorney or waived this right.
When appellant first walked into the videotaping room, he asked, “Can I call my lawyer?” The officer then read appellant his Miranda warnings and told appellant that he could call an attorney. However, he did not do so, nor did he even attempt to do so. Instead, he asked to call his father to find out who his attorney was. We do not regard an adult’s request to call his father as a request to call an attorney. Appellant was told that he could call an attorney. Rather than calling an attorney, appellant asked, “What do I have to do here now?”
Further, at the point in time when appellant received his Miranda warnings, he was still not subjected to custodial interrogation. Instead, he was asked to perform certain coordination tests that were nontestimonial in nature. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). Because Miranda only applies to custodial interrogation, any violation of Miranda may only be used to exclude verbal testimony. See McCambridge, 712 S.W.2d at 504.
After performing the coordination tests, appellant was again read his Miranda rights. While the officer was “mir-andizing” appellant for the second time, the officer stated, “You have the right to terminate this interview at any time.” Appellant replied, “I will terminate it now.” Thus, we must address the question of whether this statement was sufficient to invoke appellant’s right to remain silent *37such that any continued interrogation resulted in a violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). If we find an Edwards violation, then we must apply the rule of law announced in Jamail v. State, 713 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. pending).
At the time appellant asked to terminate the interview, the officer was still in the process of “mirandizing” appellant. No custodial interrogation had began. When the officer asked, “You want to terminate it now?”, appellant replied, “No. Keep advising me, but I won’t say anything.” The officer told appellant that that was all he had (with respect to reading appellant his rights). The officer then asked appellant if he would waive those rights and answer a few questions. Appellant responded, “If you ask me the right questions.” If appellant had responded to this question by saying “no” or by indicating a desire for counsel and custodial interrogation had nevertheless continued, an Edwards violation would have occurred. However, because appellant indicated his approval to be questioned, he encouraged the further questioning by the officer. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987). Consequently, we find no Edwards violation and thus Jamail is inapposite here.
At the conclusion of the custodial interrogation, the officer gave appellant the DWI statutory warnings pursuant to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701l-5, § 2 (Vernon Supp.1987). He then asked appellant if he would take a breath test. Appellant agreed. When preparing to leave the videotaping room to take the breath test, appellant inquired, “Can I call a lawyer or something?” This request for counsel came too late to exclude the responses given during the custodial interrogation. Further, at this point appellant had no Fifth Amendment right to request counsel prior to taking the breath test. Rodriguez v. State, 631 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Consequently, the court was correct in denying suppression of the breath test results. Moreover, we find no error in denying suppression of the video portion of the videotape. A soundless videotape is not testimonial in nature and hence, no Fifth Amendment rights were violated. Point of error one is overruled.
We note that during oral argument, appellant requested that we consider whether appellant’s right to counsel under article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution was violated. Because this point was not raised in appellant’s brief, we decline to do so.
In point of error three, appellant argues that his due process right to communicate with counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution was violated. Appellant failed to present this argument to the trial court in his motion to suppress. Thus, it is not properly before us for review. Point of error three is overruled.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.