Court Opinion

ID: 9388859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 20:02:32.359762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.357562
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/21/23 De Anda v. Guillen CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 JOSEPHINE DE ANDA,                                                    B318392

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. BC680492)
           v.

 LISA GUILLEN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Office of Lorrie A. Walton and Lorrie A. Walton for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Park & Lim, S. Young Lim, Dennis McPhillips and
Jessie Y. Kim for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  ____________________________
       Defendant Lisa Guillen appeals from a judgment finding
her liable for financial elder abuse and other torts and breaches
against her grandmother, plaintiff and respondent
Josephine De Anda.
       Guillen and De Anda agreed to live together in a house
owned by De Anda, in exchange for Guillen paying to remodel the
house and caring for De Anda as she aged. The trial court found
Guillen deceived De Anda into believing De Anda had to grant
Guillen a joint tenancy in the house to obtain a construction loan
for the remodel. Guillen then misappropriated substantial
portions of the construction loan to pay her personal expenses
and debts and to support a failing restaurant business. By the
time De Anda’s children discovered what Guillen had done, the
construction funds were gone, the loan was in default, and the
remodel was incomplete.
       The trial court noted that De Anda did not call an expert or
otherwise provide evidence to establish the amount of her
damages. The court nonetheless concluded the amount of the
construction loan, $375,000, constituted an appropriate
approximation of De Anda’s damages, in addition to certain
smaller amounts to which the parties stipulated relating to
Guillen’s other acts of malfeasance.
       On appeal, Guillen argues the trial court’s factual findings
were insufficient to establish financial elder abuse, and further
argues the damages award cannot stand in light of De Anda’s
failure to provide supporting evidence. We reject these
challenges, and hold the evidence was sufficient to show financial
elder abuse. Harm having been established, the trial court was
entitled to approximate damages, particularly when Guillen’s

                                    2
own misconduct, including commingling funds and obfuscatory
recordkeeping, impeded a precise calculation.
      Accordingly, we affirm.

                         BACKGROUND
       De Anda, by and through Jo Anna De Anda, her guardian
ad litem, and Melinda Wilson, successor trustee to De Anda’s
living trust, filed a complaint against Guillen and others, and
twice amended it. Against Guillen, the second amended
complaint asserted causes of action for financial elder abuse,
quiet title, fraud through intentional misrepresentation,
rescission, conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud through
suppression of fact, conversion, breach of contract, accounting,
common count, cancellation of instrument, and declaratory and
injunctive relief.
       Following a bench trial, the trial court issued a statement
of decision. On appeal, Guillen largely does not challenge the
trial court’s factual findings, instead disputing that those
findings support the trial court’s legal conclusions. Accordingly,
we deem it unnecessary to summarize the evidence presented at
trial, and instead summarize the statement of decision in detail.
To the extent evidence not included in the statement of decision
is relevant to this appeal, we address it in our Discussion, post.

1.    Findings of fact
      In its statement of decision, the trial court found the
following facts:
      De Anda, born in 1931, is a widow who owned five or six
properties “free and clear.” Before the events underlying the
instant litigation, she had $240,000 in cash in a credit union
account. She “was quite self-sufficient,” at times living on her

                                    3
own and at other times living with “one or another of her five
children.”
       Guillen is De Anda’s granddaughter, and was employed as
a bookkeeper. Guillen had lost a home to foreclosure and told De
Anda she was being outbid whenever she tried to buy a new
house. Guillen and De Anda then orally agreed to remodel and
live together in one of De Anda’s homes in Pasadena (the
Pasadena home) that had sat vacant for many years. As part of
the agreement, Guillen would care for De Anda as she aged. Also
agreed was that Guillen “would pay for all the costs of the
remodel, the bills and utilities.” Guillen and De Anda also agreed
that Guillen would be allowed to live in the home indefinitely, or
that she would inherit the home entirely when De Anda died. To
which of these options the parties specifically agreed was an
issue of dispute at trial.
       Guillen “persuaded” De Anda that De Anda would not be
able to obtain a loan to finance the Pasadena home remodel
unless De Anda “deed[ed] half the house to [Guillen] as joint
tenants in common with the right of survivorship.” Accordingly,
De Anda executed a grant deed adding Guillen to the title in
April 2013. A year later, Guillen applied for, and obtained a loan
for approximately $375,000, with she and De Anda listed as co-
borrowers.
       The trial court noted evidence that De Anda could have
obtained the loan without adding Guillen to the home’s title,
contrary to Guillen’s assertions to De Anda. De Anda presented
evidence at trial of four loans for which she qualified “without her
having to forfeit half her equity in the property to [Guillen.]”
De Anda’s expert witness opined that deeding the property to
Guillen in fact “made no economic sense.” The court further

                                    4
implied that De Anda was in a stronger economic position to
obtain a loan than Guillen. In support of this conclusion, the
trial court compared De Anda’s ownership of multiple properties
and hundreds of thousands of dollars in the bank to Guillen’s
foreclosure, multiple debts, a prior judgment against her, and
virtually no cash or assets other than the joint tenancy she had
persuaded De Anda to grant her. Although Guillen claimed she
had assets of $192,000 from her deceased husband’s life
insurance payment, the court found the money “either never
existed or was spent before the period of time involved in this
matter,” noting, inter alia, that it was not listed as an asset on
the loan application.
       Guillen called her own loan broker as an expert witness.
Although the broker testified De Anda would not have qualified
without Guillen’s help, the court found his “conclusion and his
overall testimony” to be “suspect,” noting that the broker had
admitted he had not explained to De Anda the legal effect of
granting Guillen a joint tenancy, and the broker further stated he
was not sure if he had worked on the actual loan. The court also
noted Guillen’s misrepresentations on the loan application, in
which she omitted her foreclosure and claimed to be the full
owner of the Pasadena home.
       In any event, Guillen and De Anda obtained the loan and in
May 2014, the lender issued a check made out to Guillen and
De Anda for $358,920.55. Guillen “immediately obtained
[De Anda’s] signature and deposited [the check] into an
individual account she opened just days earlier.” Guillen “then
went on a spending spree,” using funds drawn from the account
for “vacations to Las Vegas, Palm Springs, Lake Havasu,
Temecula, Arizona, Hawaii, the Dominican Republic, and three

                                   5
weeks in Italy.” It is not clear whether there were funds in the
account apart from the construction loan funds—at a minimum,
Guillen commingled the loan funds with her other funds. Guillen
also used the construction loan proceeds to pay off her personal
debt and a prior judgment against her.
       All or most of Guillen’s vacations were taken between June
and December 2014, a period in which regulators had “ ‘red-
tagged’ ” the remodel waiting for Guillen to take further action.
During this same time, Guillen used the loan proceeds to pay the
monthly loan payments.
       In addition to the remodel, Guillen “was intensely involved
in saving a failing business with her mother-in-law.” The
business was called “Taco Factory.” Guillen “cajoled” De Anda
into loaning her $30,000 to help save Taco Factory. Guillen later
“misallocate[ed] thousands more of [De Anda’s] money” to
support Taco Factory, which ultimately went bankrupt in
March 2015.
       The court found, “Without any accounting, [Guillen]
commingled construction money, Taco Factory money, her
personal funds, [and] personal and business loans.” “Money was
transferred between different bank and credit union accounts,
and commingled amongst so many unrelated business interests
and private spending, the transactions were not meant to be
followed by anyone but the most sophisticated forensic
accountant. Unfortunately, [De Anda] did not retain an expert
[and thus] provid[es] little guidance as to damages. However,
ballpark estimations and balances show that two-thirds of the
[remodel] loan money had been spent before building permits had
been pulled.”

                                   6
       Without De Anda’s knowledge, Guillen also borrowed
$65,000 from Walt Marrs for Taco Factory, using the Pasadena
home as collateral. Guillen executed a deed of trust on the
Pasadena property to Marrs, on which Guillen forged De Anda’s
signature.
       Guillen ultimately obtained the necessary permits and
resumed the remodel. Rather than rehiring the original
contractor, Guillen and her then-boyfriend, Jason Smith, an
electrician without a contractor’s license, took over the
construction. At trial, Guillen testified Smith had given her
receipts and a weekly accounting of construction expenditures,
but Guillen had not kept them. At some point Guillen borrowed
$56,000 from Smith to fund the remodel, and executed a deed of
trust on the Pasadena home to Smith. The deed was signed by
Guillen only, not De Anda.
       The court surmised that Guillen’s “end game was to borrow
whatever money she could get to finish the remodeling so she
could refinance the entire house to cover all the various loans and
debt, [while] trying to avoid being discovered.” The court found
“substantial evidence” that Guillen kept her actions secret so her
aunts and uncles, De Anda’s children, would not know what she
was doing.
       In April 2016, De Anda’s children discovered the
Walt Marrs trust deed on which Guillen had forged De Anda’s
signature. They then checked De Anda’s credit union account
and discovered De Anda’s ATM card was missing as was over
$200,000. They further discovered that checks had been written
out of De Anda’s Chase bank account, which De Anda said were
forgeries, including one for $26,000.

                                    7
       Confronted with these discoveries, Guillen refused to sign
the Pasadena home back to De Anda. De Anda’s children notified
the police, who arrested Guillen. Guillen ultimately pleaded
guilty to two counts arising from the forgery of the Marrs grant
deed. The district attorney chose not to proceed on the
allegations of the forged $26,000 check. The bank, however,
reimbursed De Anda the $26,000.
       Guillen never paid back the construction loan as she had
agreed with De Anda. As noted, Guillen initially paid back the
loan with the loan proceeds themselves, but later defaulted when
she missed payments in February and March 2017. At the time
of the trial court’s decision, the remodel still was incomplete and
De Anda and her children were making the loan payments.
Guillen and Smith had moved out of the Pasadena home.
De Anda had a stroke in 2018, and now suffers from dementia.
       An architect testified that the $358,000 check from the
construction loan lender could have been enough to complete the
entire remodel, including a pool and fireplace that were never
built. This estimate assumed “cheap” materials were used, and
indeed the portion of the remodel that was complete used “cheap”
materials. The architect estimated the remodel would take an
additional $120,000 to complete.

2.    Conclusions of law
      The trial court found De Anda had established financial
elder abuse, because the evidence showed Guillen “wrongfully
misappropriated her elderly Grandma’s monies and interest in
real property with an intent to fraudulently conceal that
misappropriation and by exerting undue influence on Grandma.”
The court found Guillen was in material breach of her oral
agreement with De Anda, in particular because Guillen “did not

                                    8
pay for the remodel, and [De Anda] is forced to repay the loan for
the construction.”
       The trial court also found Guillen liable for fraud, based on
her forgery convictions and other evidence. The court concluded
Guillen also had a fiduciary duty to De Anda “by way of promises
of future care, seizure and distribution of her construction loan
monies, and control over her bank and credit union accounts.
[Citation.] As such, [Guillen] clearly owed a duty to disclose
material facts concerning her commingling of monies and
manipulation of the Pasadena house interests, and her failure to
do so was done with the clear intent to defraud.”
       The trial court restored title in the Pasadena home to
De Anda alone, and cancelled any deeds bearing Guillen’s,
Smith’s, or Marrs’s names.
       As to the question of money damages, the trial court stated,
“There is no doubt the construction added value to [De Anda’s]
Pasadena house.” The court then explained the difficulties in
determining that added value. The court rejected a “drive-by
exterior-only appraisal” by an expert called by Guillen, because
“there was no reliable baseline prior to the commencement of the
project,” and “[a]ll properties in the area have increased
substantially in value.” Further, the appraisal assumed the
home was in a saleable condition, which it was not, and evidence
at trial indicated completing the remodel would cost an
additional $120,000. The court stated, “[Guillen] cannot prevail
by leaving Grandma having to advance more money and complete
more work.”
       Although Guillen offered her own accounting purportedly
establishing she “ultimately deposited more money [towards the
remodel] than she withdrew,” the trial court stated it was

                                    9
“unpersuaded by [Guillen’s] ex post facto re-creative accounting
and wild extrapolations about what she likely spent in cash on
the construction.” The court found Guillen not credible, noting
she admitted commingling funds, she misappropriated
construction money for other purposes, the timing of the
expenditures did not correlate with the construction work, the
balances in the accounts ran prematurely low relative to progress
on the remodel, Guillen was convicted of forgery, and she “left no
audit trail and to the contrary actively worked to prevent
financial oversight.”
      The trial court noted that De Anda herself had “provided
almost nothing” to calculate the amount of her damages.
“Grandma has serious losses, but the Court is not in a position to
take out a calculator, cull through thousands of pages, get
receipts from third-party vendors, and make a spreadsheet.”
      “However,” stated the trial court, “[M]aybe this is the
wrong approach.” Apparently implying that Guillen should not
be able to offset De Anda’s damages with the costs actually
expended on construction, the court noted that if Guillen and
Smith had themselves brought an action against De Anda to
recover for the construction costs, as unlicensed contractors they
would be ineligible to do so under Business and Professions Code
section 7031.
      The trial court acknowledged lawsuits by unlicensed
contractors might be a “poor analogy.” “[W]hat might be more
compelling is Grandma did not want any debt, and now she is
responsible for repayment of the $375,000 construction loan,
more than $90,000 of [which] was misappropriated to Taco
Factory. But for [Guillen’s] malfeasance, Grandma would not
have this debt that [Guillen] agreed to cover but is not and

                                   10
cannot.” The court continued, “What is the cost to Grandma,
age 90, to be encumbered with debt she never wanted in the first
place? While Grandma struggled through her testimony, she
made it very clear she did not want to have to pay any money.”
Accordingly, the court awarded De Anda $375,000 plus bank-
charged interest.
      The trial court awarded additional monetary damages
based on stipulations by the parties: $30,000 for the loan
De Anda had given Guillen for Taco Factory, and $13,000 for
money Guillen withdrew from De Anda’s credit union account
without permission. The total award therefore was $418,000,
plus interest of $218,250.
      The trial court entered judgment consistent with its
statement of decision, and Guillen timely appealed.

                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
       “In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law
de novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of
review to the trial court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this
deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally
construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson v.
Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) “It is not our role as a
reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to assess witness
credibility.” (Ibid.)

                                    11
                          DISCUSSION

A.    The Finding of Financial Elder Abuse Is Supported
      By Substantial Evidence
       Guillen’s first contention on appeal is that substantial
evidence does not support the trial court’s finding of financial
elder abuse.1
       Financial abuse of an elder occurs when a person or entity
“[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, or retains” the “real or personal
property of an elder” “for a wrongful use or with intent to
defraud, or both,” or “by undue influence.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 15610.30, subds. (a)(1), (3).) An “elder” is a person 65 years or
older. (Id., § 15610.27.)
       The evidence cited in the statement of decision indicates
that Guillen deceived De Anda into granting Guillen a joint
tenancy in the Pasadena home by convincing De Anda, falsely,
that this grant was necessary to secure a construction loan.
Guillen then encumbered that property with a $375,000 loan,
some of which the trial court found Guillen misappropriated,
using it for her own personal expenses and debts or to aid her
failing restaurant business. Guillen also used De Anda’s ATM
card to withdraw funds from De Anda’s credit union account
without De Anda’s permission. These findings are sufficient to
establish the Guillen took or appropriated De Anda’s property for

      1  Guillen does not challenge the findings that she also was
liable for fraud and breach of contract.

                                   12
wrongful use and with intent to defraud, thus establishing
financial elder abuse.2
       Guillen argues statements in the introduction of the trial
court’s statement of decision, entitled “Overview,” undercut the
trial court’s conclusion that Guillen appropriated De Anda’s
property in bad faith.
       Guillen notes the following sentence from the introduction
to the statement of decision: “What may have started quite
innocently as using one account to pay expenses for another, with
the idea that everything would work out in the end and nobody
would ever know or care, ended in hundreds of thousands of
dollars missing and misappropriated with friends and family
suffering the losses.” Guillen argues this amounts to a finding
that her conduct in obtaining the joint tenancy and the
construction loan was innocent, as opposed to wrongful or with an
intent to defraud.
       Also in the introduction, the trial court wrote, “As is often
the case, Guillen did not sneak away with the hundreds of
thousands of dollars that grandma and other friends are missing,
but through gross mismanagement and poor business decisions,
the money has likely been squandered.” Guillen argues this
finding “is more akin to a finding of negligence,” and precludes “a
finding that the taking was for a wrongful use or with the intent
to defraud or by undue influence.”
       Guillen’s interpretation of these introductory statements
overlooks the rest of the statement of decision, which makes clear
the trial court’s conclusion that Guillen deliberately

      2  Because either intent to defraud or wrongful use is
sufficient to establish financial elder abuse, we need not address
whether there was substantial evidence of undue influence.

                                   13
misappropriated De Anda’s property for her own personal use,
which would be “for a wrongful use” by itself. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court’s remarks quoted
by Guillen may have given her the benefit of the doubt that she
intended, at least initially, to restore the funds she
misappropriated so that no harm was done and none were the
wiser. That does not obviate the fact that she misappropriated
the funds and never returned them. If you deceive someone into
giving you funds, or take the funds without permission, it is no
excuse that you eventually intended to return the money, nor
does it matter that the reason you cannot return the money is
because of poor financial decisions as opposed to malice. The
misappropriation is still “for a wrongful use” and therefore
constitutes financial elder abuse. (Ibid.) Guillen cites no
authority to the contrary.
        Guillen relies on another sentence in the statement of
decision in which the trial court stated that the construction loan
was “highly controversial and is financial elder abuse in and of
itself.” Guillen argues the taking out of the loan by itself “does
not establish every element of ‘Financial Elder Abuse.’ ” Other
than this conclusory statement, Guillen does not explain why the
quoted sentence was in error. In any event, in the text following
that sentence, the trial court explains that its reference to the
taking out of the loan included Guillen convincing De Anda to
grant Guillen a joint tenancy in order to obtain that loan, which
as we have explained supports a finding of financial elder abuse.
        Guillen argues the evidence that she was included as a co-
borrower on the loan with De Anda and promised De Anda she
would repay the loan, and that she, in fact, made some payments
on the loan, negate any possible finding of bad faith. She notes

                                   14
the trial court concluded her “end game” was to finish the
remodel so she could refinance and pay off all outstanding debts
before she was discovered, which Guillen claims also establishes
she was acting in good faith. Again, that Guillen may have
intended to pay back the money eventually does not change the
fact that she misappropriated it in the first place. Adding herself
as co-borrower, promising to pay off the loan, and paying off some
of the loan does not as a matter of law establish good faith—a fair
contrary inference is that she was doing this to persuade
De Anda to grant her the joint tenancy, and to cover up her
misappropriation. Guillen misconceives our standard of review
in ignoring these fair inferences.
       Guillen argues the following purported testimony
establishes there was no trickery on her part: (1) it was
De Anda’s idea that Guillen and she move in together;
(2) De Anda, as owner of five properties, was “well versed in real
property law” such that she would understand the consequences
of a joint tenancy; and (3) De Anda had a similar joint tenancy
arrangement with one of her sons. These arguments again
misunderstand the standard of review. So long as there is
sufficient evidence to support the judgment, we “defer[ ] to the
trier of fact’s determinations as to the credibility and weight of
the evidence,” and “disregard evidence contrary to the judgment.”
(Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.)
       We note, even assuming arguendo the joint tenancy
initially was proper—that is, Guillen and De Anda entered into it
in good faith with eyes wide open—there is no dispute De Anda
agreed to the joint tenancy in exchange for a promise that Guillen
would pay for the remodel herself and would care for De Anda.
The trial court found Guillen breached that agreement by

                                   15
squandering the construction loan funds, defaulting on the loan,
and moving out of the house. Guillen does not dispute the trial
court’s finding of breach of contract, nor does she challenge the
voiding of the joint tenancy on that basis.
       We further note, even if Guillen obtained the joint tenancy
properly, the evidence that Guillen misappropriated the
construction loan would itself supply sufficient evidence of
financial elder abuse.3

B.    The Award of Damages Was Proper
      Guillen contends De Anda failed to establish she was
harmed by Guillen’s alleged malfeasance, thus precluding an
award of damages.
      The damages award had three components, not including
interest or attorney fees: $375,000 for the construction loan
Guillen failed to repay, $30,000 for the Taco Factory loan, and
$13,000 for money Guillen took from De Anda’s credit union
account. Although on appeal, Guillen argues she repaid some of
the Taco Factory loan, and moved money from the credit union
account with De Anda’s permission, she does not address or
contest the trial court’s finding that the parties had stipulated to
those two items of damages. We therefore do not discuss those
two damages items further.
      As to the $375,000 for the construction loan, the crux of
Guillen’s argument is that at least some of that loan was spent on

      3  Guillen argues reversal of the financial elder abuse
finding also requires reversal of any attorney fees award. There
is no attorney fees award in the record; the judgment recited that
award was yet to be determined. Regardless, because we do not
reverse the elder abuse finding, Guillen’s argument fails.

                                   16
the remodel, thus increasing the value of the Pasadena home.
Guillen notes, as did the trial court, that De Anda did not provide
a forensic accounting or other evidence to establish how much of
the construction loan funds were misappropriated, or to show
that De Anda’s losses exceeded her gains. Thus, claims Guillen,
in setting damages the trial court “had to rely on rank
speculation.” (Boldface & italics omitted.)
       To the extent Guillen suggests De Anda had to provide an
exact accounting to establish damages, this is unsupported by the
case law. “ ‘Where the fact of damages is certain, the amount of
damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty.
[Citations.] The law requires only that some reasonable basis of
computation of damages be used, and the damages may be
computed even if the result reached is an approximation.’
[Citations.]” (Tufeld Corp. v. Beverly Hills Gateway, L.P. (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 12, 32.) “This is especially true where, as here, it
is the wrongful acts of the defendant that have created the
difficulty in proving the amount of loss . . . .” (GHK Associates v.
Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 874 (GHK
Associates).)
       Here, the fact of damages is certain. Guillen argues the
value she added to the Pasadena home through the remodel
exceeds any losses De Anda suffered, or at the very least De Anda
did not prove to the contrary. Guillen does not dispute, however,
the trial court’s finding that De Anda is now saddled with the
construction loan, which Guillen failed to pay off as promised.
Further, the remodel is incomplete and requires De Anda to
expend an additional $120,000 to finish. We agree with the trial
court when it stated, “[Guillen] cannot prevail by leaving

                                    17
Grandma having to advance more money and complete more
work.”
       Accordingly, the trial court was entitled to approximate the
damages, and the amount of the construction loan was a
reasonable basis to compute an award. This is particularly so
when, as the trial court found, Guillen’s commingling funds and
obfuscatory recordkeeping “created the difficulty in proving the
amount of loss.” (GHK Associates, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at
p. 874.)
       Guillen argues although she commingled construction
funds with other funds, De Anda provided no evidence as to what
money was spent on construction as opposed to other
expenditures, thus failing to prove that Guillen misappropriated
more money than she contributed to the remodel. The evidence
showed, however, that Guillen had spent two-thirds of the loan
funds before pulling any permits, which is strong circumstantial
evidence that she was spending the funds on something other
than the remodel. Guillen argues the remodel costs were more
expensive than anticipated, but contrary evidence from the
testifying architect established that the entire remodel could
have been accomplished with the $358,000 obtained from the
construction lender, including remodel features that never were
completed.
       Guillen contends she herself provided an adequate
accounting of expenditures. The trial court rejected her
accounting as not credible, a finding we cannot disturb on appeal.
(Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT,
Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 804–805 [“[W]itness credibility is
a matter within the exclusive province of the trial court, not
us.”].) Guillen argues the trial court “shockingly refused to take

                                   18
the time to review [the] evidence that supported [Guillen’s] claim
that the monies she obtained from the loan in fact went into the
remodel of the house.” Apart from stating it would not engage in
a detailed forensic analysis to calculate De Anda’s damages, there
is no indication the trial court did not consider Guillen’s evidence.
        Guillen cites marriage dissolution cases for the
requirement of adequate recordkeeping and record tracing when
commingled funds are at issue, and suggests that requirement
applies to the commingled funds in the instant case. The cited
cases involved determinations whether portions of commingled
funds were separate as opposed to community property for
purposes of distributing assets upon divorce where the law
imposes a tracing requirement. (See v. See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778,
784; In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 10, 25; In re
Marriage of Stoll (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 837, 841.) The cases
have no application here, where the issue is not community
versus separate property in a family law action, but damages in a
tort action. Guillen cites no authority applying a recordkeeping
or tracing requirement in the latter context.
       Guillen also cites cases in which parties utilized forensic
accountants, in arguing, “The law is clear—an accounting or
tracing of commingled funds is mandated under cases such as
this.” Apart from citing the cases and indicating, briefly, how
forensic accountants were used in each (e.g., to trace commingled
funds), Guillen identifies nowhere in the cases in which the
courts held that forensic accounting was “mandated” such that a
court could not assess damages without it. Such a rule,
moreover, would place the burden on De Anda to untangle the
web of Guillen’s commingling and recordkeeping, which would
contravene the principle that a court is entitled to approximate

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damages, particularly when the defendant’s own conduct renders
a precise calculation impracticable. (GHK Associates, supra,
224 Cal.App.3d at p. 874.)

                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Josephine De Anda
is awarded her costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             WEINGART, J.

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