Court Opinion

ID: 9624452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:03:23.109101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:46.887532
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Justice
(dissenting):
In addition to Mrs. Craig’s difficulties at the office, the testimony at the hearing presented a picture of domestic disharmony. Respondent and her husband argued frequently, often concerning his drinking habits. She encountered difficulties in relating to her daughters, and her mother’s death caused additional internal pressures. On the evening of September 25, 1975, the Craigs again argued, following which she took the overdose of medication. The psychiatrist who first evaluated Mrs. Craig upon her admission to Camelback Hospital testified, in part:
“Q. And there was no sudden unexpected or sudden injury-causing event on September 25th that you put your finger on, was there?
“A. I think the stresses were building up from work over a period of time, from the history I got. It was my feeling that the hospitalization was brought on by the fight that occurred with her husband the night before”.
Although the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed to meet its intended purpose, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Act was not intended to be a general health and accident insurance substitute. See, e. g., Cavness v. Industrial Commission, 74 Ariz. 27, 243 P.2d 459 (1952). Without question, the majority announces a logical extension of the workmen’s compensation case law represented by Paulley v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 266, 371 P.2d 888 (1962), and Brock v. Industrial Commission, 15 Ariz.App. 95, 486 P.2d 207 (1971). However, I believe this is a step which should be taken by the Legislature, rather than by further judicial modification of the terms “injured by accident arising out of and in the course of employment”. A.R.S. § 23—1021(B).
Today’s approval of the award for a mental condition brought about by the gradual build-up of emotional stress over a period of time, without an injury causing event, paves the way for tomorrow’s abuses of the workmen’s compensation system. In my opinion, the potential for mischief in this area is too great to abandon the concrete standard established by Shope v. Industrial Commission, 17 Ariz.App. 23, 495 P.2d 148 (1972) and followed in Verdugo v. Industrial Commission, 114 Ariz. 477, 561 P.2d 1249 (App.1977); and Muse v. Industrial Commission, 27 Ariz.App. 312, 554 P.2d 908 (1976). Therefore, I would draw the line for compensation of mental “injuries” at Brock v. Industrial Commission, 15 Ariz. App. 95, 486 P.2d 207 (1971). Brock indeed represents the correct view that physical exertion or impact is not necessary, so long as there is a work-connected, unexpected, injury causing event. Absent this crucial element, I do not believe that this type of claim satisfies the language of A.R.S. § 23-1021(B).
I respectfully dissent.
HAYS, Justice (concurring):
I concur in the dissent.