Court Opinion

ID: 9676594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:28:16.613175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:49.696679
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority has failed to place this case in its proper perspective. This was a jury trial. The jury answered all factual issues against appellant. Appellant’s first three points of error complain of the trial court’s failure in denying appellant’s Motion for Judgment N.O.V.. The next two points of error allege the trial court erred in entering a judgment based on the jury’s verdict because there is no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the jury’s answer to special issue no. 1. The final point of error, an alternative point, is that, in the event the trial court was correct in entering judgment in favor of Southern County Mutual, then the trial court erred in not granting appellant’s Motion for Judgment N.O.V. against the other appellees based upon a violation of TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 1.14-2 (Vernon 1981). The majority *83goes further than appellant requests and renders a judgment against all appellees. Even appellant seems to recognize that if the judgment is to be entered against Southern County Mutual on the basis of a valid binder in effect at the time of the loss, then there can be no recovery based upon the statutory violations.
Appellant has a heavy burden when complaining of the trial court’s denial of the Motion for Judgment N.O.V.. When considering such a motion, all testimony must be considered in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. Dowling v. NADW Marketing, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.1982). Only the evidence and inferences therefrom that support the jury’s findings should be considered, with all contrary evidence and inferences being rejected. Dodd v. Texas Farm Products Co., 576 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.1979). A judgment n.o.v. is proper only when the rendition of a directed verdict would have been proper. TEX.R.CIV.P. 301.
Appellant sought to recover on various theories. The first theory was that a valid binder issued by Southern County Mutual Insurance Company existed on the date of the loss. The jury was asked, without objection, this very issue:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that a valid binder of insurance existed between Melvin Kraehnke, with First Bank and Trust as leinholder [sic] and Southern County Mutual Insurance on July 2, 1982?
Answer “We do” or “We do not”
ANSWER: We do not
Under the appropriate standard of review, I do not fathom how the majority can hold, as a matter of law, that there was such a valid binder. In reviewing the evidence in support of the jury’s verdict one finds that no one, either on behalf of Melvin Kraehnke or on behalf of Southern County Mutual intended for the binder of May 27 to be renewed on June 27. At best, it was a unilateral mistake by Mrs. Davis when she typed in the name of Southern County Mutual on the renewal. There may have been negligence on someone’s part, but such negligence cannot create a contractual relationship between Southern County and Kraehnke. I dissent, therefore, to the majority’s reversing the jury’s finding and rendering a judgment against Southern County Mutual Insurance Company.
Next, I dissent to the majority’s rendering a verdict against the remaining appel-lees. The majority reaches such a result based upon statutory violations. In the first place, I believe there are factual issues which should have been presented to the fact finder regarding these alleged violations. This court cannot now find those facts. My main disagreement, however, is the inclusion of appellant as an “insured” under the statute. I must assume that the Texas Legislature knows what an “insured” is and knows what a “loss payee” is. I also must assume they recognize there is a difference between the two. I must further assume that if the legislature had intended to include “loss payee” in the statute, they would have either defined “insured” to include a “loss payee” or would have specifically included “loss payee”. They did not nor would I.
Therefore, for all the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent and would affirm.