Court Opinion

ID: 9514502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:59.216956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.385515
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Justice
(concurring).
[¶ 25.] What at first glance appears to be merely a case of alleged vague draftsmanship of a court order in reality requires a consideration of the nature of a parent’s obligation to support their children as defined by our statutes. Before we reach the issue of whether the order was drafted to be self-executing, a more fundamental question must be addressed, that being whether the order could even legally be self-executing.
[¶ 26.] It is clear that in one instance support obligations automatically cease and thus are. self-executing, that being where the only child receiving support reaches the age of eighteen or reaches the age of nineteen if he or she is a full-time student in a secondary school. SDCL 25-5-18.1. At that point, jurisdiction of the trial court to order additional support does not exist.
[¶ 27.] However, the issue now before us is in those instances where there is more than one child awarded support in the trial court’s order of support. In Vander Woude v. Vander Woude, 501 N.W.2d 361, 363-64 (S.D.1993), we interpreted SDCL 25-7A-17 to allow stipulations between parents relieving a *712parent of a duty of support or responsibility for past, present, or future support on the conditions that: (1) it not infringe on any rights of the Department of Social Services, (2) it be in writing and (3) “the agreement has been approved by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
[¶ 28.] In 1987 the Legislature may have limited the authority of a trial court to approve an agreement to reduce past due child support by the enactment of SDCL 25-7-7.8 which states:
Any past due support payments are not subject to modification by a court or administrative entity of this state, except those accruing in any period in which there is pending a petition for modification of the support obligation, but only from the date that notice of hearing of the petition has been given to the obligee, the obligor, and any other parties having an interest in such matter.
(Emphasis added). Vunder Woude seems to suggest that SDCL 25-7A-17 is not limited by the requirements of SDCL 25-7-7.3.4 Whether the parties can by stipulation agree to reduce past support in light of SDCL 25-7-7.3 need not be answered to adjudicate this case as there is no such agreement in exis-One Child Two Children Three Children tence. However, in either case it does show the limited nature of the extent to which reductions in past child support may be considered under SDCL 25-7A-17.
[¶ 29.] The trial court in this case deemed its prior order of support to be self-executing. However, that does not comport with the dictates of the applicable statutes. Based on a 1992 order of the trial court, the parties stipulated in February of 1993 that James would pay Vera $469 per month in child support commencing back to the date of the 1992 court order. That stipulation also contained the now disputed language that this obligation was to continue “until the minor children reach of age of nineteen (19) or graduate from high school, whichever occurs first.” The trial court approved this stipulation on February 23,1993.
[¶ 30.] Contrary to the view of the trial court, under the statutes this agreement cannot be self-executing. The child support tables found in SDCL 25-7-6.2 do not contain a pro rata reduction when a child reaches the age of majority. For example, if the parents have a combined income of $1,450 the child support tables (as they existed in 1993) are as follows:
Four Children Five Children Six or more
257 384 437 471 494 519
Thus, James self-help attempt at child support reduction on a pro rata basis violates the child support guidelines. The only way a pro rata reduction could be accomplished is to have the trial court make specific findings that such a deviation from the guidelines is appropriate pursuant to SDCL 25-7-6.10 which was not done in this case.
[¶ 31.] As the children either reached nineteen or graduated from high school, all other variables were not frozen in time. For the trial court to re-calculate James child support, at a minimum it needed the current income of James and Vera on the date the child was no longer entitled to support. Also, both parents had the opportunity at that time to request a deviation based on their current circumstances. SDCL 25-7-6.10. As such the agreement could not be self-executing.
[¶32.] The legality of the self-execution issue aside, I cannot agree with the trial court that the language of the order invoked self-execution. To me “the minor children” means all “the minor children” because all “the minor children” are subject to the child *713support laws of this state and the language of the stipulation and subsequent implementing order in no way attempts to limit this by designating “some of the children” or a specific number indicating less than all four children such as one, two, or three of them.
[¶ 33.] Factually, in 1994 James sought an informal reduction in this child support from Vera because two of the children were no longer entitled to support under our statutes. Vera correctly pointed out to James at that time this could not be accomplished without a hearing to re-calculate their current incomes. We have held in Americana Healthcare Center v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566 (S.D.1994), that a statute requiring financial support of an adult family member (a parent) is constitutional. Thus, any right of James to be relieved of child support is statutory only. While the trial court had no jurisdiction to require continued child support beyond that contained in the statute, since there was more than one child, James had the initial obligation of protecting his rights by petitioning the trial court for a determination of the child support due on the balance of the minor children.5 As he did not do this, (1) based on the requirements of SDCL 25-7-7.3 and (2) the language to which he agreed in the 1993 support decree, his argument cannot be upheld under either point. As such, I would reverse the trial court and join with the majority opinion.

. However, compare with the language in Vellinga v. Vellinga, 442 N.W.2d 472, 474 (S.D.1989), interpreting the scope of SDCL 25-7-7.3:
The legislature’s intent to prohibit modification in all but very limited circumstances plainly appears on the face of the statute. A narrow window is provided for modification of past due payments which accrue after notice of hearing is given to the obligee. Any other past due support payments are not subject to modification. The use of the term any, understood in its ordinary sense, clearly encompasses both past due support payment which accrued after the effective date of the statute and those which accrued prior to July 1, 1987.
(Emphasis original).

. This should cause no undue hardship. Where both parties agree to the amount of their current incomes by stipulation they can calculate the amount of child support due the remaining minor children. The stipulation then becomes the basis for the amended order of support by the trial court.