Court Opinion

ID: 9910424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 17:07:08.776494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:51.580591
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Shutway v. Melvin, 2023-Ohio-4564.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

 JOHN ANTHONY SHUTWAY                                :
                                                     :
       Appellant                                     :   C.A. No. 2023-CA-17
                                                     :
 v.                                                  :   Trial Court Case No. 22 CV 0029
                                                     :
 MATTHEW MELVIN, ET AL.                              :   (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                     :   Court)
       Appellees                                     :
                                                     :

                                                ...........

                                                OPINION

                                   Rendered on December 15, 2023

                                                ...........

JOHN ANTHONY SHUTWAY, Appellant, Pro Se

JEFFREY C. TURNER, DAWN M. FRICK and GABRIELLE E. KARL, Attorney for
Appellee Tri County Regional Jail

ANGELICA M. JARMUSZ, Attorney for Appellees Matthew Melvin, Matthew Larmee,
Josh Welty, Zac Prickett, Deputy Kemp, John McNeely, and Deputy Finfrock

PATRICK KASSON, THOMAS N. SPYKER and MAC MALONE, Attorneys for Appellees
Gregory Nelson, Chad Duncan, Champaign County Dispatch Center, Steve Molton, Mark
Feinstein, Roger Steffan, and Gil S. Weithman

                                               .............

WELBAUM, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, John Anthony Shutway, appeals pro se from six judgments of the
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Champaign County Court of Common Pleas that granted the appellees either judgment

on the pleadings or summary judgment on all of Shutway’s civil claims. The appellees

are comprised of the following individuals and institutions.

          1. “County Officers”:
              Champaign County Sheriff Matthew Melvin and Champaign County
              Sheriff’s Deputies Matthew Larmee, Josh Welty, Zac Prickett, John
              McNeely, and Deputy Kemp, and Logan County Sheriff’s Deputy Finfrock

          2. “Tremont City Officers”:
              Tremont City Police Chief Gregory Nelson and Tremont City Police
              Sergeant Chad Duncan

          3. “Dispatch Center”:
              Champaign County Dispatch Center and dispatcher Steve Molton

          4. “Prosecutors”:
              Champaign County Prosecutors Roger Steffan and Mark Feinstein

          5. “Tri-County Jail”:
              Tri-County Regional Jail

          6. “Judge Weithman”:
              Champaign County Municipal Court Judge Gil S. Weithman

       {¶ 2} For the reasons outlined below, all six of the trial court’s judgments granting

the dispositive motions of the appellees will be affirmed.

                           Facts and Course of Proceedings
                                                                                            -3-

       {¶ 3} On March 3, 2022, Shutway filed a civil complaint in the Champaign County

Court of Common Pleas against the County Officers, Tremont Officers, Dispatch Center,

Prosecutors, Tri-County Jail, and Judge Weithman. The allegations of the complaint

sounded in tort, vicarious liability, and civil conspiracy. All of the allegations were related

to events surrounding Shutway’s arrest in Champaign County, Ohio, on March 20, 2018,

and his arrest in Logan County, Ohio, on May 9, 2018.

       {¶ 4} On March 20, 2018, Shutway was arrested after he failed to pull his vehicle

over for a speeding violation in Tremont City, Clark County, Ohio, and led police officers

on a chase that ended in Champaign County.             Following his arrest, Shutway was

charged in the Champaign County Municipal Court for several offenses and was released

on bond. The State thereafter dismissed the municipal court charges subject to the

jurisdiction of the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas, wherein Shutway was

indicted for the same incident on charges of failure to comply with the order or signal of a

police officer and obstructing official business. Because Shutway failed to appear at his

arraignment, a capias was issued for his arrest. Shutway was thereafter arrested on

May 9, 2018.

       {¶ 5} Following a jury trial, Shutway was convicted of the indicted charges. On

appeal, this court affirmed Shutway’s convictions. State v. Shutway, 2d Dist. Champaign

No. 2018-CA-39, 2020-Ohio-5035. Shutway thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court

of Ohio, but the supreme court declined to review Shutway’s criminal appeal. State v.

Shutway, 161 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2021-Ohio-375, 162 N.E.3d 829.

       {¶ 6} After the supreme court declined to review Shutway’s criminal appeal,
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Shutway filed his civil complaint against the appellees. The supreme court assigned

retired Judge Linton D. Lewis to preside over the matter as visiting judge after Champaign

County Common Pleas Court Judge Nicholas A. Selvaggio recused himself. Following

his assignment, Judge Lewis issued a journal entry ordering his certificate of assignment

to be filed in Shutway’s civil case. The certificate of assignment was filed on April 11,

2022.

        {¶ 7} Between April and June 2022, all of the defendants/appellees named in

Shutway’s complaint, excluding Judge Weithman, filed either a motion for judgment on

the pleadings or a motion for summary judgment arguing for the dismissal of Shutway’s

civil claims.   In the motions, the defendants/appellees raised several arguments,

including that Shutway failed to state a claim, that the defendants/appellees were entitled

to immunity, and that Shutway’s claims were barred by res judicata, claim preclusion, and

the applicable statute of limitations.

        {¶ 8} Before Judge Lewis ruled on the aforementioned motions, on August 4, 2022,

Shutway filed an affidavit of disqualification with the Supreme Court of Ohio that sought

to remove Judge Lewis from his case. In the affidavit, Shutway alleged that Judge Lewis

had failed to file an oath of office for his appointment as visiting judge. Shutway also

claimed that Judge Lewis’s certificate of assignment was not filed by the administrative

judge as required by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Guidelines for Assignment of Judges.

Shutway claimed that these failures warranted Judge Lewis’s removal because they

violated the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Revised Code, and the aforementioned

guidelines.
                                                                                      -5-

      {¶ 9} On August 15, 2022, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied Shutway’s affidavit

of disqualification and allowed the case to proceed before Judge Lewis.           In re

Disqualification of Hon. Linton Lewis, Supreme Court of Ohio Case Nos. 22-AP-090 and

22-AP-091. In reaching that decision, the supreme court explained that “the

implementation of an oath requirement for retired assigned judges has been delayed.”

The supreme court also found that “[n]othing about the assignment process here

suggests that Judge Lewis would be unable to fairly and impartially preside over the

underlying matters.” Id.

      {¶ 10} Following the denial of Shutway’s affidavit of disqualification, between

September 6, 2022, and October 3, 2022, Judge Lewis issued separate judgments

granting each of the motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment filed

by the defendants/appellees. On October 19, 2022, Judge Weithman also filed a motion

for judgment on the pleadings, which Judge Lewis granted on April 10, 2023. As a result

of these judgments, all of Shutway’s civil claims against the defendants/appellees were

dismissed.

      {¶ 11} Prior to that, Shutway filed a second affidavit of disqualification for the

removal of Judge Lewis on February 7, 2023. In the second affidavit, Shutway raised

the same arguments that were raised in his first affidavit. Shutway additionally argued

that Judge Lewis had demonstrated bias in favor of certain parties by accepting untimely

filings and by allegedly failing to require one of the parties to answer his complaint.

Judge Lewis filed a response denying any bias, prejudice, or favoritism toward any party

or attorney in Shutway’s case. Judge Lewis also submitted a copy of his retired assigned
                                                                                          -6-

judge oath of office. On February 23, 2023, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued a decision

rejecting Shutway’s claims and denying his second affidavit of disqualification.

      {¶ 12} After   the   supreme    court   denied   Shutway’s    second    affidavit   of

disqualification, and after Judge Lewis had granted all of the dispositive motions filed by

the defendants/appellees, on May 10, 2023, Shutway filed a timely notice of appeal from

each of the trial court’s judgments granting the dispositive motions. In support of his

appeal, Shutway filed an appellate brief raising four assignments of error for review.

Shutway’s assignments of error do not challenge the merits of the trial court’s judgments,

but rather raise arguments pertaining to alleged procedural deficiencies in Judge Lewis’s

assignment to his case and alleged errors committed by the Champaign County Clerk of

Courts.

                                      Jurisdiction

      {¶ 13} Before discussing Shutway’s assignments of error, we will first address

jurisdictional claims raised by some of the appellees herein. The first claim is that the

Supreme Court of Ohio’s rulings on Shutway’s affidavits of disqualification divested this

court of jurisdiction to address Shutway’s claims on appeal since all of his claims pertain

to Judge Lewis’s assignment. The appellees also argue that Shutway’s appeal must be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Shutway cannot enforce the authorities that he

cites and because he has not presented a reversible error.

      {¶ 14} This court recently addressed the exact same jurisdictional arguments in

Shutway v. Talebi, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2023-CA-14, 2023-Ohio-3818. In Talebi,
                                                                                        -7-

Shutway filed a civil complaint against Prosecutor Kevin S. Talebi, Magistrate Scott

Schockling, Assistant Prosecutor Samantha B. Whetherholt, and Judge Selvaggio. Id.

at ¶ 4. The Supreme Court of Ohio assigned Judge Lewis to that case as well and

Shutway attempted to have Judge Lewis removed by filing the same affidavit of

disqualification that he filed in this case on August 4, 2022. Id. at ¶ 5 and ¶ 12.

       {¶ 15} Like the present case, Shutway was unsuccessful at having Judge Lewis

removed, and Judge Lewis thereafter granted summary judgment to Talebi, Schockling,

and Whetherholt, and a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal to Judge Selvaggio. Id. at ¶ 12-15.

Shutway appealed from those judgments and only raised claims pertaining to Judge

Lewis’s assignment as visiting judge. Id. at ¶ 17-18. In response to the appeal, the

appellees in Talebi raised the same jurisdictional arguments that are raised herein. Id.

at ¶ 28.

       {¶ 16} When addressing the jurisdictional arguments, we noted in Talebi that “this

appellate court has subject matter jurisdiction over appeals from civil actions brought in

the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas.” Id. at ¶ 31, citing Ohio Constitution,

Article IV, Section 3; R.C. 2501.02(C). Similar to Talebi, the instant appeal is from the

trial court’s judgments granting judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment on

claims in a civil action.

       {¶ 17} We also recognized in Talebi that “[w]hether an assigned judge has

authority to preside over a case generally may be raised on direct appeal.” Id. at ¶ 33,

citing State ex rel. Smith v. Triggs, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3098, __ N.E.3d __,

¶ 7 (“Smith could have raised any issue regarding the transfer of his criminal case from
                                                                                          -8-

Judge Ruehlman to Judge Schweikert in a direct appeal, which constitutes an adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”); State ex rel. Key v. Spicer, 91 Ohio St.3d 469,

470, 746 N.E.2d 1119 (2001) (“[A] claim of improper assignment of a judge can generally

be adequately raised by way of appeal.”); State ex rel. Harris v. Turner, 160 Ohio St.3d

506, 2020-Ohio-2901, 159 N.E.3d 1121, ¶ 13; see also In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205,

2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 8.

       {¶ 18} Some of the appellees in this case argue that the decision in Lloyd v.

Thornsbery, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2019-P-0080, 2021-Ohio-239, supports their claim

that we lack jurisdiction to review a visiting judge’s assignment. In Talebi, we rejected

this argument on the following grounds:

              [T]he Eleventh District [in Lloyd] relied on the law of the case doctrine

       articulated in Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984).

       Lloyd at ¶ 11. The law of the case doctrine functions to compel inferior

       courts to follow the mandates of reviewing courts. State v. W.T.D., 2d Dist.

       Montgomery No. 29238, 2022-Ohio-632, ¶ 18, citing Nolan at 3. It provides

       that “the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case

       on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case

       at both the trial and reviewing levels.” Nolan at 3. Therefore, “[a]bsent

       extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the

       Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate

       of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.” Id. at syllabus. The

       law of the case doctrine does not deprive the inferior court of jurisdiction to
                                                                                        -9-

      address the claim, such that the case must be dismissed.

(Emphasis added.) Talebi at ¶ 34.

      {¶ 19} In addition, we explained in Talebi that:

              “The constitutional and statutory responsibility of the Chief Justice

      in ruling on an affidavit of disqualification is limited to determining whether

      a judge in a pending case has a bias, prejudice, or other disqualifying

      interest that mandates the judge’s disqualification from that case.” In re

      Disqualification of Kate, 88 Ohio St.3d 1208, 1209-1210, 723 N.E.2d 1098

      (1999), citing Ohio Constitution, Art. IV, Section 5(C), and R.C. 2701.03.

             Consistent with that limitation, we have previously held that “the

      disqualification of a judge of a court of common pleas for bias and prejudice

      is confided to the sole determination of the Chief Justice of the Supreme

      Court of Ohio, or a justice of the Ohio Supreme Court designated by the

      Chief Justice to perform that function.” E.g., Hanselman v. Hanselman, 2d

      Dist. Montgomery No. 21615, 2007-Ohio-183, ¶ 92.            We have further

      commented, however, that while we lack authority to determine whether a

      trial court judge should be disqualified for bias or should recuse himself,

      “[s]ome courts have recognized a distinction * * * where the question is not

      prospective disqualification or recusal but whether the judge’s conduct

      during trial deprived the defendant of his due process rights.” State v.

      Evans, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27178, 2017-Ohio-8184, ¶ 10, fn.3, citing

      State v. Payne, 149 Ohio App.3d 368, 2002-Ohio-5180, 777 N.E.2d 333,
                                                                                        -10-

       ¶ 11 (7th Dist.); Dibert v. Carpenter, 2018-Ohio-1054, 98 N.E.3d 350, ¶ 72.

Talebi, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2023-CA-14, 2023-Ohio-3818, at ¶ 35-36.

       {¶ 20} In light of the foregoing principles, and in conformity with our decision in

Talebi, which addressed the exact same jurisdictional issue raised herein, we reject the

appellees’ argument that we must dismiss the appeal due to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s

rulings on Shutway’s affidavits of disqualification. While those rulings may govern our

resolution of the issues that Shutway has raised on appeal, we do not find that the rulings

deprive us of jurisdiction over the appeal. See id. at ¶ 32.

       {¶ 21} We also reject the appellees’ argument that this court lacks jurisdiction due

to Shutway having “no ability to enforce the authorities he cites[,]” i.e., the Rules of

Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Guidelines for

Assignment of Judges, the Local Rules of the Champaign County Court of Common

Pleas, and the Ohio Constitution. As we explained in Talebi, “[w]hether Shutway can

enforce these rules goes to the merits of his assignments of error, not this appellate

court’s jurisdiction over the appeal.” Id. at ¶ 38.

       {¶ 22} We further reject the appellees’ claim that this court lacks jurisdiction

because Shutway “has not presented a reversible error.” In Talebi, we rejected this

argument because it “raises questions regarding the merits of [Shutway’s] claims, not this

court's jurisdiction to address them.” Id.

       {¶ 23} For all the foregoing reasons, the appellees’ claim that this appeal must be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction is not well taken.
                                                                                         -11-

                               First Assignment of Error

       {¶ 24} Under his first assignment of error, Shutway claims that the administrative

judge, Judge Selvaggio, erred by failing to have Judge Lewis’s original certificate of

assignment filed with the clerk of courts as required by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s

Guidelines for Assignment of Judges. Shutway claims that the certificate of assignment

filed by Judge Lewis on April 11, 2022, violated those guidelines and was void of authority.

Shutway also claims that Judge Selvaggio violated the constitution by failing to administer

an oath of office to Judge Lewis for his appointment as a visiting retired judge.

       {¶ 25} We addressed the exact same arguments in Talebi and rejected them.

Specifically, we found in Talebi that because Shutway had raised the same alleged

procedural deficiencies with Judge Lewis’s assignment in his August 4, 2022 affidavit of

disqualification, which was denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio, the law of the case

doctrine required this court to follow the supreme court’s ruling on the matter. Talebi, 2d

Dist. Champaign No. 2023-CA-14, 2023-Ohio-3818, at ¶ 40-42.

       {¶ 26} As previously discussed, “[t]he law of the case doctrine functions to compel

inferior courts to follow the mandates of reviewing courts.” Id. at ¶ 34, citing State v.

W.T.D., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29238, 2022-Ohio-632, ¶ 18. (Other citation omitted.)

“It provides that ‘the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case

on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial

and reviewing levels.’ ” Id., quoting Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410

(1984).

       {¶ 27} In this case, when denying Shutway’s first affidavit of disqualification, the
                                                                                        -12-

Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that Shutway had not established prejudice or bias on

Judge Lewis’s part. As noted in Talebi: “Although the focus of the [supreme court's]

review was for prejudice or bias, the supreme court expressly found that Shutway had not

established improprieties related to Judge Lewis’s assignment, and it permitted Judge

Lewis to continue to preside over the case.” Id. at ¶ 42.

       {¶ 28} When denying Shutway’s second affidavit, which raised the same alleged

procedural deficiencies in Judge Lewis’s assignment, the supreme court declined to

readdress the matter. See In re Disqualification of Hon. Linton Lewis Jr., Supreme Court

of Ohio Case No. 23-AP-014 (Feb. 23, 2023).           The supreme court also rejected

Shutway’s additional claim that Judge Lewis had demonstrated bias in favor of certain

parties. Id.

       {¶ 29} In Talebi, we explained that because the supreme court expressly found

that Shutway had not established improprieties related to Judge Lewis’s assignment,

“under the law of the case doctrine, we must follow the supreme court’s determination.”

Talebi at ¶ 42. We also found that even if “we could consider Shutway’s arguments

anew, we [would] conclude that no reversible error exists.” Id.

       {¶ 30} No reversible error exists because the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Guidelines

for Assignment of Judges “have not been adopted as rules and are not binding on Ohio

courts[.]”   (Citations omitted.)   Id. at ¶ 45. Therefore, although guideline 9.01(A)

(formally 5.01(A)) requires the administrative judge to “direct the original certificate of

assignment be filed with the clerk of court to which the assigned judge has been

assigned[,]” this court has recognized the validity of an assignment even when the
                                                                                           -13-

certificate of assignment has not been filed. Id. at ¶ 45, citing PNC Mtge. v. Guenther,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25385, 2013-Ohio-3044, ¶ 22, fn. 3. See also Marino v. Oriana

House, Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 23389, 2007-Ohio-1823, ¶ 9.

       {¶ 31} There is also no reversible error with regard to Shutway’s argument that

Judge Selvaggio violated constitutional obligations by failing to administer an oath of

office to Judge Lewis. Article XV, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution states that: “Every

person chosen or appointed to any office under this state, before entering upon the

discharge of its duties, shall take an oath or affirmation, to support the constitution of the

United States, and of this state, and also an oath of office.” R.C. 3.23 also requires each

judge to take the oath “on or before the first day of the judge’s official term” and it

addresses what the certificate of oath must contain, as well as when and to whom it must

be transmitted. However, in Talebi, we explained that “[n]either Article XV, Section 7 of

the Ohio Constitution nor R.C. 3.23 requires an additional oath of office to be administered

upon assignment as a retired judge.” (Citations omitted.) Talebi at ¶ 50. “ ‘[W]hen a

retired judge is assigned to active duty, that judge is resuming the duties in that office.

The judge’s original oath of office satisfies the requirement that a judge take an oath of

office before entering upon the discharge of his duties.’ ” Id., quoting State ex rel. Evans

v. Shoemaker, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-671, 2003-Ohio-757, ¶ 14.

       {¶ 32} The record in Talebi (and in the present case) also established that Shutway

had received an e-mail from the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Chief Legal Counsel wherein

“[c]ounsel indicated that a requirement that retired assigned judges take a one-time oath

of office was not yet in effect.” Id. at ¶ 51. The supreme court’s judgment entry denying
                                                                                           -14-

Shutway’s first affidavit of disqualification also specifically stated that “the implementation

of an oath requirement for retired assigned judges has been delayed.”                    In re

Disqualification of Hon. Linton Lewis, Supreme Court of Ohio Case Nos. 22-AP-090 and

22-AP-091 (Aug. 15, 2022).

       {¶ 33} Based on the foregoing, we held in Talebi that there was “no support for

Shutway’s assertion that Judge Lewis was required to take an oath of office when he was

assigned to this case.” Talebi at ¶ 51. We also found that “[e]ven if an oath requirement

existed for assigned retired judges, Shutway provides no authority for his contention that

Judge Selvaggio, who had recused himself from the case, had the responsibility to

administer the oath of office to Judge Lewis.” Id. at ¶ 52.

       {¶ 34} Upon review, we reach the same conclusions that we reached in Talebi.

That is, under the law of the case doctrine, we must follow the Supreme Court of Ohio’s

decision finding no impropriety with regard to Judge Lewis’s assignment. In addition, we

find that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Guidelines for Assignment of Judges are not binding

on this court, that there was no requirement for Judge Lewis to take an oath of office for

his assignment, and that Judge Selvaggio was not required to administer an oath of office

to Judge Lewis.

       {¶ 35} For all the foregoing reasons, Shutway’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

                              Second Assignment of Error

       {¶ 36} Under his second assignment of error, Shutway claims that Judge Lewis
                                                                                         -15-

erred and committed a fraud upon the court by exercising judicial duties before taking an

oath of office for his assignment as visiting retired judge. We reject this claim for the

reasons discussed under Shutway’s first assignment of error. As previously discussed,

Judge Lewis was not required to take an oath of office when he was assigned to this case.

Because no oath of office was required, Shutway’s claim that Judge Lewis erred and

committed a fraud upon the court by exercising judicial duties before taking an oath lacks

merit. Accordingly, Shutway’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                         Third and Fourth Assignments of Error

        {¶ 37} Shutway’s third and fourth assignments of error both concern alleged errors

committed by the Champaign County Clerk of Courts (“the clerk”).            Under his third

assignment of error, Shutway claims that the clerk erred by accepting entries from Judge

Lewis without first receiving his oath of office and an original certificate of assignment

from the administrative judge. In Talebi, we rejected the same argument and explained

that:

               [T]he clerk of courts lacked the discretion to reject documents from

        Judge Lewis for filing. “The clerk, as a ministerial officer of the court, has

        a duty by law to accept and file documents tendered to him or her.” State

        ex rel. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Defender v. Siroki, 108 Ohio St.3d 334, 2006-

        Ohio-1065, 843 N.E.2d 778, ¶ 10, quoting Rhoades v. Harris, 135 Ohio

        App.3d 555, 557, 735 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist.1999). The clerk of courts is

        authorized to refuse to accept for filing only documents submitted for filing
                                                                                        -16-

       by a vexatious litigator who has failed to obtain leave to proceed under R.C.

       2323.52. Id. at ¶ 10, citing R.C. 1907.20.

Talebi, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2023-CA-14, 2023-Ohio-3818, at ¶ 54.

       {¶ 38} Upon review, we reach the same conclusion that we reached in Talebi and

find that the clerk did not err by accepting Judge Lewis’s entries for filing.

       {¶ 39} Under his fourth assignment of error, Shutway claims that the clerk erred by

improperly labeling three praecipes on the court’s docket. The praecipes in question

were all filed by Shutway. In the praecipes, Shutway sought to order the clerk to obtain

a copy of Judge Lewis’s oath of office, to remove Judge Lewis’s existing entries from the

docket, and to refuse to accept future submissions from Judge Lewis.             The record

establishes that the clerk labeled all three praecipes as motions. By doing so, Shutway

claims that the clerk tampered with the record and improperly made judicial decisions.

       {¶ 40} In Talebi, we rejected the same argument and found that: “Even if the clerk

should have labeled Shutway's filings differently on the docket, we find no prejudicial

error.” Talebi, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2023-CA-14, 2023-Ohio-3818, at ¶ 53. We also

found that “Shutway had no authority to order the clerk of courts to reject filings from

Judge Lewis or to strike any of Judge Lewis’s filings.” Id.

       {¶ 41} Upon review, we agree with our analysis in Talebi and find no prejudicial

error with regard to how the clerk labeled Shutway’s praecipes on the docket. We also

agree that Shutway did not have authority to order the clerk to reject or strike Judge

Lewis’s filings.

       {¶ 42} For the foregoing reasons, Shutway’s third and fourth assignments of error
                                                                                       -17-

are overruled.

                                      Conclusion

      {¶ 43} Having overruled all of Shutway’s assignments of error, the trial court’s six

judgments granting the appellees’ dispositive motions are affirmed.

                                    .............

TUCKER, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.