Court Opinion

ID: 9548366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:02:23.487112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:51.580913
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that the existence of some plural and some single representative districts does not offend the *389federal equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 29 L. Ed. 2d 363, 91 S. Ct. 1858 (1971). As long as the ratio of elected representatives to the population is equal among all the districts, as plaintiffs concede it is here, the voting district plan will pass federal constitutional muster. This, however, as the majority admits, is not enough to resolve this case. The districting must also meet our state constitution's heightened protections. While the majority and I both agree these additional state claims are not barred by an earlier federal court's approval of the 1981 redistricting plan, I, unlike the majority, believe our state constitution does not allow such blatantly dissimilar voting districts. I dissent from the majority opinion. I would hold RCW 44.07B.009 unconstitutional, because it changes the boundaries of two representative districts, each containing approximately 80,000 citizens, into four legislative districts, each containing only 40,000 citizens.
Const, art. 1, § 12, often referred to as the privileges and immunities clause, states:
No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.
Our interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause has followed the federal interpretation of the equal protection clause. "The primary purpose of the equal protection clause is the protection of individuals' rights, including the right to vote." Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 668, 694 P.2d 641 (1985). Nevertheless, as a majority of this court held just 1 year ago, even if the federal equal protection clause did not require reversal of a voting plan, this does not mean it is acceptable under our state constitution. If our state constitution provides for additional protection beyond that found under the equal protection clause, then this court should provide for that additional protection. Seattle v. State, supra at 672-73. I believe article 1, section 19 and article 2, section 43(5) (amendment 74) provide for *390such additional protection.
Const, art. 1, § 19 states:
All Elections shall be free and equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.
This court, when called to interpret this clause 2 years ago in Foster v. Sunnyside Vly. Irrig. Dist., 102 Wn.2d 395, 687 P.2d 841 (1984), analyzed the history of this provision and the cases which have interpreted it. We held:
This history [of Const. art. 1, § 19] offers several principles applicable here. The right of all constitutionally qualified citizens to vote is fundamental to our representative form of government. In most instances any legislative act which qualifies this right must, under federal law, be based upon a compelling state interest and the state must demonstrate that no less restrictive measures are available to achieve this interest.
Foster, at 407-08. Thus, any justification for the four "single member representative districts" must meet this very high burden, because otherwise residents of these districts will have disproportionately fewer representatives in the Legislature.
I believe it is clear that the State cannot meet this burden. In Story v. Anderson, 93 Wn.2d 546, 549, 611 P.2d 764 (1980) we invalidated the disproportionate voting districts for county commissioners in Island County. We held that " district lines must not be drawn in such a way as to invidiously dilute the voting strength of a particular . . . political element of the voting population." Story, at 549. It is obvious that these single-member representative districts do dilute the voting strength of the residents involved. Rather than being able to elect two representatives, as in all other districts in this state, the residents of these districts can only elect one. Thus, only one representative is accountable to residents of these districts, which is especially relevant in matters of local concern.
Furthermore, the plain language of Const. art. 1, § 19 requires equality in voting. Equality is not merely mea*391sured by mathematical proportionality; equality requires uniformity in district population. This concept is further borne out by the recent amendment to the Washington State Constitution, transferring the power of redistricting to a commission. Const. art. 2, § 43(5) (amend. 74) mandates that in the future "[e]ach district shall contain a population ... as nearly equal as practicable to the population of any other district." This amendment directs the newly created commission to follow the mandates of Const, art. 1, § 19. Voting districts must be equal.
The majority recognizes that these split districts would have to be combined when the commission submits a redistricting plan in 1991. This is not only mandated by Const. art. 2, § 43 (amend. 74), but also by Const. art. 1, § 19. We should not abdicate our responsibility to uphold these provisions of the constitution in the interim.
Conclusion
RCW 44.07B.009, which created these four single-member representative districts, is unconstitutional and is void and of no effect. Article 1, section 19 guarantees equal sized voting districts and therefore these four "single member representative districts" should be combined into two "two member representative districts."
Utter, J., concurs with Dore, J.