Court Opinion

ID: 9528048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:36:36.59+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:25.626868
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, C. J., Concurring.
I generally agree with the reasoning and conclusions in the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize a few points.
1. The Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death
As the majority opinion recognizes, this court promulgated the Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death, policy 3 (hereafter Supreme Court Policies), to facilitate and standardize the filing of petitions for writs of habeas corpus in capital cases. These Supreme Court Policies, announced in 1989 and since amended, established, inter alia, timeliness requirements for habeas corpus petitions related to death penalty cases.
As originally adopted, standard 1-1 stated: “Appellate counsel in capital cases shall have a duty to investigate factual and legal grounds for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. . . .” (Supreme Court Policies, supra, policy 3, former std. 1-1.) Today’s opinion clarifies the intended scope of *800that duty, making clear it arises only if counsel has become aware of “triggering information” that would lead a reasonable attorney to initiate an investigation. In order to avoid confusion, we have also simultaneously modified standard 1-1 to reflect that clarification.
A hypothetical may prove helpful in illustrating the kind of information that would trigger the duty to investigate. For example, when, on review of the appellate record, counsel becomes “aware” that trial counsel presented no evidence in mitigation, this constitutes information that indicates a factual basis for a claim of ineffective trial counsel, and which triggers a duty to investigate (and, it follows, to discover facts concerning whether trial counsel was ineffective in that regard). The standard does not allow counsel to stand by until he or she happens to discover facts confirming that trial counsel conducted no penalty phase investigation, or until counsel happens to discover actual mitigating evidence that might have been presented at trial; instead, the standard requires that counsel act on “triggering information.”
As originally adopted, standard 1-1.2 measured delay in raising a claim from the time petitioner or counsel “became aware of information indicating a factual basis for the claim and became aware, or should have become aware, of the legal basis for the claim.” (Supreme Court Policies, supra, policy 3, former std. 1-1.2, italics added.) The italicized phrase was designed to make clear that delay is measured from the time counsel became aware of information, i.e., ‘triggering facts,” that would support investigation and eventual development of a claim. Today’s opinion, which measures delay in presentation of a claim from the time petitioner or counsel “should have known” of the facts supporting a claim, again merely clarifies the prior formulation. (One who “became aware of information” that would support investigation and eventual development of a claim “should have known” of the facts supporting that claim.) Accordingly, in order to avoid any confusion, we have further clarified standard 1-1.2 by adopting explicitly the “should have known” formulation employed in today’s opinion.
2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice
I agree that for unjustifiedly delayed or successive habeas corpus petitions, only those petitions alleging a fundamental miscarriage of justice should be heard. I have, however, some reservations regarding the majority opinion’s articulation of the meaning and application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.
The majority opinion states that the individual’s interest in maintaining an avenue of relief outweighs the state’s interest in the finality of its criminal *801judgments in the following cases: “(1) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner; (2) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which he was convicted; (3) that the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority which had such a grossly misleading profile of the petitioner before it that absent the error or omission no reasonable judge or jury would have imposed a sentence of death; or (4) that the petitioner was convicted under an invalid statute.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 759; see also id., at pp. 797-798.)
At the threshold, I note that the majority opinion appears to permit a habeas corpus petitioner to gain review of an otherwise defaulted petition by simply “alleg[ing] facts which, if proven, would establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred. . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 797.) I would instead place a greater burden on such a habeas petitioner and require a person filing a delayed or successive petition—with no justification—to state at the beginning of the petition why a court should consider the petition at all, i.e., under which of the four exceptions the petition falls. In this way, such petitions can be more quickly evaluated, lessening the burden on the judiciary of reviewing petitions that are procedurally defaulted.
I also agree with the majority opinion that a petitioner who can show a fundamental constitutional error, as narrowly defined in the majority opinion, should be entitled to present the claim in an otherwise defaulted petition. I am, however, concerned that merely requiring the demonstration of a prima facie case of such error fails to give sufficient weight to the state’s strong interest in the finality of its criminal judgments. We are, by definition, concerned here with litigants who had a chance to present a claim at trial, on appeal, and (usually) in a first habeas corpus petition. In such circumstances, I would apply a higher standard of proof. Thus, I would elevate the standard of cognizability for successive or delayed petitions and require the petitioner to allege facts demonstrating a fundamental constitutional error by clear and convincing evidence. (Cf. Sawyer v. Whitley (1992) 505 U.S. _, _ [120 L.Ed.2d 269, 285, 112 S.Ct. 2514].) By insisting on a higher degree of certainty, we both give proper weight to the state’s interest in finality, and more easily eliminate the frivolous petitions while still retaining an avenue of relief for those who have legitimate legal claims.
I otherwise agree with the reasoning and conclusions of the majority, including the decision to discharge the order to show cause and deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.