Court Opinion

ID: 9540317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:14:37.730716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:32.588294
License: Public Domain

CRAVEN, J., dissenting: The Illinois Structural Work Act is an Act to provide “for the protection and safety of persons in and about construction, repairing, alteration or removal of buildings, bridges, viaducts, and other structures,” as indicated by its title. (Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 48, § 60 et seq.) It was stated in the first case interpreting the Act that an examination of the entire Act “will clearly show that it was the intention of the legislature to require owners and contractors constructing, repairing, altering or painting the buildings and structures mentioned in the act, to provide for the protection and safety of the men engaged in the work.” Claffy v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 249 Ill 210, 94 NE 551 (1911). It is obvious that the legislature has recognized dangerous and extrahazardous occupations and has, by this legislation, attempted to reduce the hazard to the fullest extent possible (Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill 156, 106 NE 236 (1914); Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 Ill2d 431, 150 NE2d 134 (1958)). The language of the Act should be construed to give effect to this legislative intention, which is ascertainable not only from the language of the Act but from the evil to be remedied and the object to be obtained. Brackett v. Osborne, 44 Ill App2d 441,195 NE2d 8 (1963). In view of this expression of legislative purpose and the previous decisions mandating a liberal construction of the Act, I am unable to agree with the majority opinion that the roof involved in this case is excluded from the Act by reason of the fact that it is a part of the permanent structure of the building. To so hold frustrates, rather than effectuates, the purpose of the statute. The case of Thon v. Johnson, 30 Ill App2d 317, 174 NE2d 400 (1961), held that a form constructed to hold concrete for a landing at the top of a stairway from a garage to a basement, into which form the plywood bottom had not yet been placed and the concrete poured, was not a scaffold within the meaning of our Act. On the facts in Thon, the form was not furnished as a place to work. The plaintiff in that case, an electrician, made use of the form as a place to work and was injured. The court, in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, observed that a contrary holding “would be the equivalent to holding that each and every place where a workman chooses to stand thereby becomes a scaffold within the meaning of the statute.” Thon is substantially different from the facts in the instant case. Here the roof was furnished as a place to work and its temporary use as a place to work in the process of construction was obviously contemplated by all parties. The statutory language of “ ‘erected and constructed’ means furnished, and it was furnished.” Oldham v. Kubinski, 37 Ill App2d 65, 185 NE2d 270 (1962); Bounougias v. Republic Steel Corp., 277 F2d 726, CA 7th, Ill. I would agree that a workman cannot, by the use of a permanent part of a building for scaffold purposes, convert the same into a scaffold or other contrivance, within the scope of the statute, merely by so using it, as was held in Thon. See also Broderick v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 301 NY 182, 93 NE2d 629. However, when a permanent portion of a building or structure is furnished as a place to work for work that would otherwise require construction of a temporary scaffold or other contrivance, within the purview of the statute, it should not be excluded from this safety statute merely because it is a part of a permanent building. Thon is annotated at 87 ALR2d 973. At pages 983, 984 of that annotation, it is stated: “It has sometimes been argued, usually with little success, that the defective apparatus responsible for the injury is not a scaffold because it is part of the permanent building or structure under construction rather than the temporary platforms contemplated by the statute. “Where the defendant contended that an injury caused by a brick falling from a platform consisting of loose sheathing boards laid across the roof joists of a building to provide a working area for bricklayers could not provide a basis for recovery under the New York Scaffold Law because the platform was not a scaffold, since the loose boards forming it were intended to be a permanent part of the building and were to be ultimately nailed down by carpenters, it was held in Carpenter v. Burmeister (1925) 217 Mo App 104, 273 SW 418, that even though the boards were to be used permanently, they constituted a temporary scaffold for brick layers at the time of the accident. “Planking intended to be ultimately nailed down as part of the flooring in a coal trestle being constructed by the defendant and which at the time of the accident was laid loosely over the floor joists to permit workmen to walk back and forth was a scaffold, held the Court in Ross v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (1921) 231 NY 335, 132 NE 108, saying that the planks were not a permanent part of the flooring but were a temporary device to allow workmen to accomplish their jobs high above the ground.” As stated in Thon, there is little authority in Illinois as to what is or is not a scaffold within the meaning of the statute. Each case must necessarily be determined upon its own set of facts. The authorities in the cited ALE annotation suggest that, in making this determination, consideration should be given to the elements of danger contemplated by the statute, as well as the nature and use of the device. The temporary or permanent nature of the device or contrivance should be only a factor in determining whether it is within the statutory language, which includes “scaffolds,” “hoists,” “cranes,” “stays," “ladders,” “supports,” or “other mechanical contrivances,” erected or constructed, i. e., furnished, for the use in the erection, alteration, or removal of any house or building. Other issues presented by this appeal, relating to the question of whether or not the defendants were in charge of the work, were properly submitted to, and determined by, the jury under the authority of Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill2d 316, 211 NE2d 247 (1965). For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment entered upon the verdict.