Court Opinion

ID: 9672287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:52:11.940326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.231508
License: Public Domain

WALKER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
For the following reasons I feel I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s disposition of point of error two. The majority is entirely correct in setting out Ex parte Pharr, 897 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); and LaPorte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), as the seminal cases on the issue of the proper assessment of concurrent versus consecutive sentences. My departure from the majority’s analysis of the instant case stems from their conclusion that a “single criminal action” took place at the plea proceeding. An examination of the statement of facts of the plea proceeding reveals that the trial court called the cases separately, that appellant entered separate “no contest” pleas to each individual charge, that appellant executed separate written waivers, stipulations of evidence, and judicial confessions, and that the trial court accepted the appellant’s plea and accepted appellant’s judicial confession in each case.
Although I do not ignore the fact that the trial court appeared to combine the art. 26.131 admonishments, it is clear that the *273trial court intended separate proceedings from the following exchange:
THE COURT: You understand when we come back on October 31st I can find you guilty in each one of these cases, give you 10 years in the penitentiary, stack it on top of it and that’s 20 years in the penitentiary. You understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You still want to plead no contest?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
I also recognize that the trial court combined the range of punishment admonishment given to appellant. This is certainly explained by the fact that both charges against appellant were third degree felonies ■with identical punishment ranges.
While the majority’s view of the record and my view of the record may differ only in the slightest degree, I am simply unable to say that what took place at the plea proceeding was a “single criminal action” so as to entirely preclude the trial court from exercising its discretion in cumulating appellant’s sentences. For these reasons, I must dissent.

. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 26.13 (Vernon 1989 & Supp.1996).