Court Opinion

ID: 9747453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:15:49.225363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:23.843784
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
Dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s reversal of appellant’s sentence of death and holding that “victim impact” testimony is not admissible during the penalty phase of a capital case. Instead, I agree with the concurring opinion’s determination that “victim impact” testimony is a relevant consideration for a jury during the penalty phase of a capital case. I write separately, however, because I believe that even if the challenged testimony did constitute “victim impact” testimony, the trial court’s instructions in the case sub judice were adequate to advise the jury of the proper light in which it would consider such evidence. Hence, I would affirm appellant’s sentence of death.
In addition to holding that “victim impact” testimony is per se, inadmissible, the majority also speculates that the jury was confused about the effect the “victim impact” testimony was to play in their deliberations upon the sentence.1 The majority asserts that the jury may have believed that the “victim
*277impact” testimony was to be weighed equally in their deliberations with the submitted aggravating and mitigating factors, or that the testimony was to be considered evidence of another aggravating circumstance. The majority contends that this confusion resulted from the trial judge’s instruction to the jury which “mischaracterized” the victim’s testimony as evidence counteracting appellant’s mitigating evidence.
However, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the trial judge’s charge to the jury did not in any way instruct the jury to consider the victim’s testimony as evidence of an aggravating circumstance. The words “aggravating circumstance” were never used in the context of “victim impact” testimony. Rather, the trial judge instructed the jury that in considering the “victim impact” testimony and the Commonwealth’s interest in counteracting the defendant’s mitigating evidence, they should consider that “just as the murderer should be considered an individual, so too the victim, Linda Rowden, is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and, in particular, to her family.” •
It is well settled that there is a presumption in the law that a jury will follow the court’s instructions, thus, I believe any confusion that the majority speculates the jury may have suffered was cured by the additional information provided to the jury by the trial judge after the jury presented its question regarding the testimony during their deliberations. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 528 Pa. 125, 142, 595 A.2d 575, 583 (1991). The trial judge adequately instructed the jury that such testimony was not to be considered evidence of an aggravating circumstance but rather, it should only be considered mentally in their deliberations. The judge’s answer adequately ensured that the jury understood the manner in which they would consider the “victim impact” testimony.
*278Moreover, the majority’s reversal of appellant’s death sentence on the basis of speculation regarding the jury’s deliberations is unnecessary because the aggravating circumstance found by the jury was wholly unrelated to the “victim impact” testimony. The jury found that appellant murdered the victim, his ex-girlfriend, because he believed she was providing the police with information concerning appellant’s alleged previous involvement in another murder. See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(15).2 This aggravating circumstance is not related in any manner to the substance of the testimony of the victim’s mother, Betty Rowden. Ms. Rowden’s testimony concerned how the murder of her daughter devastated her life and the close relationship her family had enjoyed before her daughter was murdered by appellant. Such testimony did not provide any evidence that the victim was providing the police with any information regarding appellant’s criminal activities; thus, even if the jury was confused about the effect the “victim impact” testimony was to play upon their deliberations, such confusion resulted only in harmless error. The jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating evidence mandates that the death penalty be imposed. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(l)(iv). There is simply no indication in this case that the jury, following the trial judge’s accurate instruction and his subsequent curative answer to their question, improperly considered the “victim impact” testimony during their deliberations or in determining that the aggravating circumstance was proven beyond a reasonable doubt and outweighed the mitigating evidence presented. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988); Commonwealth v. Young, 524 Pa. 373, 572 A.2d 1217 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1389, 128 L.Ed.2d 63 (1994). Accordingly, I dissent from the majority and would affirm the sentence of death.
NEWMAN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. I do not believe that the jury’s single question during deliberations inquiring whether the effect of the victim’s death on the victim's family should be used as an aggravating circumstance proved confusion. As discussed infra, in response to the question, the trial court gave a clear instruction that the jury was not to place the effect of the victim's death on the victim's family on the verdict form, but rather the jury must only consider it mentally in their deliberations. Furthermore, appellant’s *277counsel did not at any time poll the jury or attach affidavits from the jurors to substantiate the allegation that the jurors were still confused about the use of the “victim impact” testimony, assuming such confusion existed, which would arguably give the majority a basis for its present ruling on this topic. Commonwealth v. Patrick, 416 Pa. 437, 440, 206 A.2d 295, 296 (1965)(a defendant has an absolute right to poll the jury; however, such a right is dependent upon the defendant to make such a request).

. The Comiiionwealth presented evidence that appellant believed the victim was providing the police with evidence implicating appellant in a conspiracy which resulted in the murder of a federal narcotics witness.