Court Opinion

ID: 9900491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:23:58.782811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.513817
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                     CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                     E-filed: Aug 25 2023 08:08PM
                                                     Clerk Review: Aug 25 2023 08:08PM
                                                     Filing ID: 70715709
                                                     Case No.: 2022-SCC-0006-CIV
                                                     NoraV Borja

                        IN THE
                  Supreme Court
                        OF THE

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

         COMMONWEALTH CASINO COMMISSION,
               Respondent-Appellee,

                           v.

     IMPERIAL PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL (CNMI), LLC,
                  Petitioner-Appellant.

         Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0006-CIV

                     SLIP OPINION

                  Cite as: 2023 MP 8

                Decided August 25, 2023

         CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
         ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
           ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS

             Superior Court No. 21-0173-CV
       Associate Judge Wesley M. Bogdan, Presiding
            Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

INOS, J.:
¶1     Petitioner-Appellant Imperial Pacific International (CNMI), LLC (“IPI”)
 appeals the trial court order upholding Respondent-Appellee Commonwealth
 Casino Commission’s (“CCC”) decision suspending its casino license and
 imposing fines. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part,
 and REMAND this matter to CCC for further proceedings consistent with this
 opinion.
                      I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2      In 2014, the Commonwealth Lottery Commission entered into an
 exclusive Casino License Agreement (“CLA”) with IPI. The CLA granted IPI
 the right to operate as the exclusive licensee. Under the CLA, “[t]he continuing
 validity of this License is conditional upon the Licensee’s compliance with
 applicable laws, rules, and regulations of the Commonwealth and the United
 States.” CLA cl. 17. Additionally, the agreement provides that “[f]ailure to pay
 any amount due and payable hereunder upon the date when such payment is due”
 is a material breach that permits suspension or revocation of the exclusive
 license. CLA cl. 31. Since its formation, the CLA has been amended nine times.
 CCC is the regulatory agency responsible for overseeing the casino licensee and
 enforcing the CLA’s provisions. 4 CMC § 2314. Clause 25 of the CLA deals with
 force majeure.
¶3      Under the agreement, IPI must comply with multiple contractual,
 statutory, and regulatory requirements. These include paying the $15 million
 Annual License Fee1 and the annual $3 million Casino Regulatory Fee.2 IPI was
 also required to contribute $20 million annually to a Community Benefit Fund.3
¶4     IPI failed to make the Community Benefit Fund contributions for 2018
 and 2019. In March 2020, shortly after the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic
 (“COVID-19”), IPI closed the casino.
¶5     Following IPI’s closure, CCC initiated five complaints over the course of
 2020:
        (1) Complaint 001—failure to pay the 2018 and 2019 Community
             Benefit Fund contributions.
        (2) Complaint 002—failure to pay the Annual License Fee due
            August 12, 2020.
        (3) Complaint 003—failure to maintain the required cash or cash
            equivalents in a CNMI or United States bank.

1
    CLA cl. 5; 4 CMC § 2306(b).
2
    4 CMC § 2309.
3
    CLA cl. 16; Amendment No. 9.
          Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

        (4) Complaint 004—failure to pay accounts payable that were over
            89 days old.
        (5) Complaint 005—failure to pay the Casino Regulatory Fee due
            by October 1, 2020.
¶6     In December 2020, following CCC’s complaints, IPI and the
 Commonwealth Lottery Commission signed Amendment No. 9. Amendment
 No. 9 addresses, in part, COVID-19’s impact on IPI’s ability to make the
 Community Benefit Fund contributions and extends deadlines on the 2018 and
 2019 contributions to 2025.
¶7      On February 25, 2021, CCC conducted an evidentiary hearing for
 Complaints 001 and 002. In response to Complaint 001, IPI argued that
 Amendment No. 9 extended the payment dates to 2025. In response to Complaint
 002, IPI invoked the force majeure clause in its answer, citing the devastating
 effects of the pandemic on the tourism industry.
¶8     On March 2, 2021, CCC conducted an evidentiary hearing for Complaints
 003, 004, and 005. IPI did not dispute the violations and did not raise any
 affirmative defense.
¶9     On April 22, 2021, CCC met with an IPI representative. At this meeting,
 CCC commissioners asked about IPI’s parent company’s 2020 annual report,
 which included information regarding its financial situation. The commissioners
 then unanimously voted to find clear and convincing evidence supported
 suspending IPI’s exclusive casino license and issuing monetary sanctions.
¶ 10    CCC imposed the following sanctions and conditions:
        (1) Complaint 001—$100,000 fine and a license suspension of six
            months.
        (2) Complaint 002—$1.5 million fine and an indefinite license
            suspension conditioned on paying the Annual License Fee in
            full. CCC found that force majeure did not apply as an
            affirmative defense because the Annual License Fee was
            statutorily required. It also determined that IPI had not
            adequately demonstrated that COVID-19 was the proximate
            cause of its failure to pay the Annual License Fee.
        (3) Complaint 003—$1.5 million fine and an indefinite license
            suspension conditioned on complying with Commission Order
            2020-003.
        (4) Complaint 004—$2 million fine and an indefinite license
            suspension conditioned on paying overdue accounts.
        (5) Complaint 005—$1.5 million fine and an indefinite license
            suspension conditioned on paying the Casino Regulatory Fee in
            full.
             Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

    In total, the fines amounted to $6.6 million.
¶ 11     IPI appealed CCC’s order to the Superior Court, arguing that COVID-19
  and other factors like Super Typhoon Yutu and changes in federal immigration
  law constituted force majeure events that excused all its performance obligations.
  Additionally, IPI claimed that CCC violated its due process rights by discussing
  IPI’s parent company’s annual report at the April 2021 meeting. IPI asserted that
  CCC improperly considered evidence outside the record, leading it to decide
  against IPI’s force majeure defense.
¶ 12      In an order affirming CCC’s decision to suspend IPI’s license and impose
  fines, the Superior Court did not decide the question of force majeure. The court
  instead found that while IPI had raised the issue of force majeure for Complaints
  001 and 002, it had not raised force majeure or any other defense to Complaints
  003–005, and thus CCC had properly suspended IPI’s license. The court further
  found no due process violation and held that CCC’s order was not arbitrary or
  capricious.
¶ 13      On appeal, IPI argues that the court erred in failing to address force
  majeure, asserting that COVID-19 and other occurrences are force majeure
  events excusing performance in all five complaints. IPI claims CCC should have
  found that force majeure applied to Complaint 002 and held that COVID-19 was
  the proximate cause of its failure to pay the Annual License Fee. IPI contends
  Amendment No. 9 constitutes a deferment of its obligations to pay the
  Community Benefit Funds, which Complaint 001 concerns. Finally, IPI argues
  that it suffered a due process violation which requires setting aside all sanctions.
                               II. JURISDICTION
¶ 14   We have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of the
  Commonwealth Superior Court. NMI CONST. art. IV, § 3; see also 1 CMC §
  9113 (governing appeals from judicial review under the Commonwealth
  Administrative Procedure Act (“CAPA”)).4
                              III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 15     We review de novo the Superior Court’s review of an agency action. Calvo
  v. Northern Mariana Islands Scholarship Advisory Bd., 2009 MP 2 ¶ 9. As a
  general rule, courts will “[h]old unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
  and conclusions found to be” arbitrary or capricious or “[c]ontrary to
  constitutional right.” 1 CMC § 9112(f)(2)(i)–(ii). However, a more stringent
  standard applies to this case because Commonwealth law provides that the casino
  license “shall not be suspended or revoked absent [sic] finding of clear and
  convincing evidence during a hearing pursuant to 1 CMC § 9101 et seq. by
  unanimous vote of the Commonwealth Casino Commission.” 4 CMC § 2314(h).
  When the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence and the alleged error

4
     1 CMC § 9113 states: “An aggrieved party may obtain a review of any final judgment
     of the Commonwealth Superior Court under this chapter by appeal to the
     Commonwealth Supreme Court. The appeal shall be taken as in other civil cases.”
          Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

 on appeal is that the evidence does not support the findings, “the standard of
 review is whether as a matter of law the findings are supported by competent and
 substantial evidence.” Salas v. Mafnas, 2010 MP 9 ¶ 19 (citing Off. of the Att’y
 Gen. v. Estel, 2004 MP 20 ¶ 23). Substantial evidence is a “more searching”
 standard than arbitrariness. Limon v. Camacho, 5 NMI 21, 30 (1996). This is in
 line with the general standard of review for administrative agency adjudications
 and hearings laid out in the Commonwealth Administrative Procedures Act,
 requiring a reviewing court to set aside an agency action that is unsupported by
 substantial evidence. 1 CMC § 9112(f)(v). “Substantial evidence” refers to “such
 relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a
 conclusion.” Owens v. Commonwealth Health Ctr., 2012 MP 5 ¶ 8. We examine
 the propriety of the agency’s action considering the evidence before it at the time
 the decision was made. See In re Blankenship, 3 NMI 209, 217 (1992).
¶ 16      We review de novo the legal question of whether an agency’s conduct
  satisfies statutory and constitutional due process protections. Premier Ins. Co. v.
  Commonwealth Dep’t of Lab., 2012 MP 16 ¶ 7. Finally, contract interpretation is
  a question of law reviewed de novo. Manglona v. Baza, 2012 MP 4 ¶ 11.
                                  IV. DISCUSSION
                                  A. Force Majeure
¶ 17     As force majeure is a key concept in this matter, we begin by discussing
  force majeure generally. Force majeure refers to “[a]n event or effect that can
  neither be anticipated nor controlled. The term includes both acts of nature (e.g.,
  floods and hurricanes) and acts of people (e.g., riots, strikes, and wars).”
  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (9th ed. 2010). “[I]n order to constitute a force
  majeure, an event must be the proximate cause of nonperformance of the
  contract.” Hong Kong Islands Line Am. S.A. v. Distrib. Servs., Ltd., 795 F. Supp.
  983, 989 (C.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 963 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1992). A force majeure
  clause is “[a] contractual provision allocating the risk of loss if performance
  becomes impossible or impracticable, [especially] as a result of an event or effect
  that the parties could not have anticipated or controlled.” BLACK’S LAW
  DICTIONARY 562 (9th ed. 2010). “What types of events constitute force majeure
  depend on the specific language included in the clause itself.” Entzel v. Moritz
  Sport & Marine, 841 N.W.2d 774, 778 (N.D. 2014) (citation omitted).
¶ 18      Force majeure is an affirmative defense. Id. The party invoking force
  majeure must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v.
  Mobil Oil Guam, Inc., No. 10-00006, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75799, at *26 (D.
  Guam July 27, 2010) (“Defendants shall have the burden of demonstrating by a
  preponderance of the evidence that the delay or anticipated delay has been or will
  be caused by a force majeure event.”); Rosello Cruz. v. Pedro Luís García, 116
  D.P.R. 511, 519 (P.R. 1985) (“To release himself from liability, the [defendant]
  . . . must, through a preponderance of the evidence, prove that . . . it was a case
  of force majeure.”); Western Distrib. Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053, 1059
  (Colo. 1992) (“Of course, the defendant bears the burden of proving by a
           Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

 preponderance of the evidence any affirmative defense to the plaintiff’s
 contractual claim.”).
¶ 19    In the CLA, the parties anticipated the possibility of force majeure. The
  force majeure clause reads:
        Licensee shall not be in default for any failure or delay in
        performance due under this License Agreement if such failure or
        delay is due to causes beyond reasonable control including, but not
        limited to: Act(s) of God, war(s), strike(s) or labor dispute(s),
        embargo(es), act(s) of terrorism, fire(s), flood(s), or accident(s)
        without the fault or negligence of the Licensee (“Force Majeure
        Event”). Invocation of force majeure by the Licensee shall not
        excuse any payment obligations to the Commonwealth where the
        grounds and or purpose for such payments have already accrued.
        Where such Force Majeure Event results in failure in the
        performance or delay exceeding six (6) months of the performance
        due under this License Agreement, the Licensee may terminate this
        License Agreement forthwith provided that the Licensee shall not
        be excused from any payment obligations to the Commonwealth
        where the grounds and/or the purpose for such payments have
        already accrued.
        A change in law which prohibits performance of this agreement or
        makes such performance illegal shall result in a suspension of the
        performance of both Parties under this License Agreement until
        such prohibition no longer exists, provided that the Licensee shall
        have the option to terminate this License Agreement upon the
        adoption of the change in law pursuant to this section 25 as if such
        change in law is a Force Majeure Event.
        CLA cl. 25.
¶ 20     COVID-19 is the type of event that falls within the force majeure clause
  as an event “beyond the reasonable control of either party.” JN Contemp. Art,
  LLC v. Phillips Auctioneers, LLC, 29 F.4th 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal
  quotation and citation omitted). See also Lampo Grp., LLC v. Marriott Hotel
  Servs., No. 3:20-cv-00641, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148824, at *23 (M.D. Tenn.
  Aug. 9, 2021) (“[A] global pandemic is the type of ‘act of God’ that qualifies as
  a force majeure.”). Thus, the force majeure clause would serve as a defense if
  COVID-19 was the proximate cause of IPI’s noncompliance.
                         B. Failure to Rule on Force Majeure
¶ 21     We next consider whether the Superior Court adequately considered the
  issue of force majeure. In its order, the court found that IPI had raised the defense
  to Complaints 001 and 002 but did not raise it to Complaints 003–005. However,
  upon deciding that CCC properly suspended IPI’s license and imposed fines
  under the last three complaints, the court did not analyze whether force majeure
  was enforceable as to Complaints 001 and 002. Commonwealth Casino Comm’n
          Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

 v. Imperial Pac. Int’l (CNMI), LLC, No. 21-0173 (NMI Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2022)
 (Order Affirming the Casino Commission’s Suspension of Petitioner’s Exclusive
 Casino License and Monetary Penalties at 23–26). IPI claims the court erred by
 not considering force majeure’s applicability to Complaints 001 and 002 because
 CCC imposed fines of $100,000 for Complaint 001 and $1,500,000 for
 Complaint 002, in addition to suspending its license.
¶ 22    We agree with IPI. Each of the five complaints is separate and distinct
  from the others—attacking IPI’s violations under distinct provisions of the CLA,
  CMC, and NMIAC. Commission Order No: 2021-002, at ¶¶ 4, 8, 14–16. CCC
  weighed and meted out the penalties, specific to the violations in each complaint
  and independent of the other complaints. Id. at ¶¶ 5–7, 9–13, 17–33. Importantly,
  the penalties imposed for Complaints 001 and 002 included fines totaling $1.6
  million above and beyond the fines imposed for Complaints 003–005. Id. at ¶¶
  7, 13; see also at ¶¶ 23–24. Consequently, the Superior Court erred in not
  considering IPI’s force majeure defense on the grounds that the suspension of its
  exclusive license for the violations contained in Complaints 003–005 essentially
  mooted the issue of force majeure for Complaints 001 and 002.
                                  C. Complaint 001
             i. Whether IPI Properly Raised Force Majeure as a Defense
¶ 23     In response to IPI’s assertion of a force majeure defense regarding its
  failure to make the Community Benefit Fund contributions due in 2018 and 2019,
  CCC cites the NMI Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that IPI waived this
  affirmative defense by not raising it in its answer to Complaint 001. IPI counters
  that it raised the defense at the evidentiary hearing and that doing so was
  sufficient because the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to administrative
  proceedings. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.
¶ 24     We have held that under NMI R. CIV. P. 8(c), parties must assert
  affirmative defenses in their responsive pleadings; otherwise, they are generally
  waived. Sablan v. Elameto, 2013 MP 7 ¶ 17. For the waiver not to apply, the
  plaintiff must either have had notice of the unpled defense, or else not have been
  prejudiced by the lack of notice (“the notice-prejudice exception”). Id. “Notice
  can be delivered in a motion for summary judgment or a pre-trial conference. [I]f
  a plaintiff receives notice of an affirmative defense by some means other than
  pleadings, the defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 8(c) does not cause the
  plaintiff any prejudice.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
¶ 25    In the context of administrative procedures, the Montana Supreme Court
  provides helpful guidance:
        The purpose of requiring affirmative defenses to be pleaded is to
        give the opposing party notice of the defense and a chance to argue
        why imposition of the defense would be inappropriate . . . However
        . . . this is a function of the federal rules of civil procedure.
        Generally, the rules of civil procedure do not apply with equal force
        to administrative proceedings . . . The strict technical rules
          Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

        governing judicial procedure generally do not apply to
        administrative proceedings which are simpler, less technical, and
        less formal than court proceedings . . . . Administrative procedures
        need not conform to all procedural niceties that surround the judicial
        process.
        Thompson v. J.C. Billion, Inc., 294 P.3d 397, 400 (Mont. 2013)
        (internal quotations and citations omitted).
¶ 26     Federal courts also recognize that the “technical failure to comply
  precisely with Rule 8(c) is not fatal.” Allied Chemical Corp. v. Mackay, 695 F.2d
  854, 856 (5th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit, for example, has “liberalized the
  requirement that defendants must raise affirmative defenses in their initial
  pleadings.” Magana v. Northern Mariana Islands, 107 F.3d 1436, 1446 (9th Cir.
  1997). “The failure to assert an affirmative defense in an answer will not result
  in waiver if the opposing party has notice of the defense sufficient to avoid
  prejudice.” Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 924, n.9 (3d. Cir. 1997).
¶ 27     Taking into account the notice-prejudice exception and the relatively
  informal nature of administrative proceedings, we reject a hard rule in this
  instance. Parties can raise affirmative defenses for the first time at an agency
  hearing so long as the other party had notice or is not prejudiced.
¶ 28     Here, CCC had notice and was not prejudiced. IPI raised force majeure in
  its answer to Complaint 002, and since Complaint 001 and 002 were discussed
  at the same evidentiary hearing on February 25, 2021, CCC was on notice that
  the defense would be discussed. We hold that IPI did not waive force majeure as
  a defense to Complaint 001 by not raising it in its answer.
¶ 29    However, the record indicates that IPI did not raise force majeure at
  hearing:
        CCC Counsel: So -- so, the events complained of, in Complaint
        Number 1 -- Exhibit Number 1, um, have absolutely no applicability
        to a force majeure situation, which they’re not even allowed to raise
        anyway. This is for 2, not the first page. It doesn’t apply to the CBF
        (phonetic) one.
        IPI Counsel: Yeah.
        Unidentified Male: Right.
        IPI Counsel: Agreed.
        Id. at 27.
¶ 30    IPI agreed that force majeure was inapplicable to Complaint 001. When it
  next spoke, it stated it was not raising force majeure as a defense to Complaint
  001:
        The idea of force majeure as it has to do with the Community
        Benefit Fund is pulled from the language of Ex- -- plaintiff’s Exhibit
        5I. I was just pointing it out to the Commission, so that is in
             Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

          evidence as – as it’s been stipulated to. Uh, I was not making a force
          majeure argument in relations to [the] Community Benefit Fund. I
          was only bringing it up to - to show that there was a context for that
          agreement between the Lottery Commission and IPI.
          On the other hand, I was making a force majeure argument on
          behalf of, um – for Complaint 002, which is the license fee.
          Id. at 38–39 (emphasis added).
¶ 31    IPI stated that it was raising force majeure as an affirmative defense to
  Complaint 002 but not to Complaint 001. In administrative proceedings,
  affirmative defenses must be raised in an answer or alternatively at the agency
  hearing if the other party has notice or is not prejudiced. By failing to raise force
  majeure in its answer or at the hearing, we hold IPI waived that defense to
  Complaint 001.
                                 ii. Amendment No. 9
¶ 32     We ask next whether Amendment No. 9 affects the validity of CCC’s
  imposition of sanctions for IPI’s failure to make the required Community Benefit
  Fund contributions. Enacted after Complaint 001 was initiated, Amendment No.
  9 states, “Licensee shall be given a deferment until October 1, 2025 to complete
  [payment of the Community Benefit Fund contributions due in 2018 and 2019.]”
  Amendment No. 9 at 2–3.
¶ 33   IPI argues that this deferment made Complaint 001’s sanctions improper,
  and we agree. The United States Supreme Court has ruled:
          [W]hen the legislature repeals a criminal statute or otherwise
          removes the State’s condemnation from conduct that was formerly
          deemed criminal, this action requires the dismissal of a pending
          criminal proceeding charging such conduct. The rule applies to any
          such proceeding which, at the time of the supervening legislation,
          has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized
          to review it.
          Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 230 (1964).
    While this case is not criminal in nature, the same principle applies. Amendment
    No. 9 essentially operates as an intervening change in the law;5 once the

5
     At oral argument we questioned the Assistant Attorney General about the Office of the
     Attorney General’s seeming omnipresence in this case, but did not receive a satisfactory
     answer. The Office of the Attorney General was signatory to the original CLA, and to
     its amendments, approving each document as to form and content or legal sufficiency.
     CLA at 17; Amendment No. 9 at 4. The Assistant Attorney General was present at
     evidentiary and non-evidentiary hearings, appearing on behalf of the CCC Executive
     Director on at least five separate occasions. Appx. to Appellant’s Br. at 16, 77, 148,
     355, 442, 494. The Assistant Attorney General has represented CCC before the
     Superior Court and now before this Court. We note that the varying roles and, at-times,
     contradictory legal positions the OAG has adopted throughout this case give us pause.
          Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

 Community Benefit Fund contributions were no longer due in 2018 and 2019,
 CCC could no longer impose sanctions for IPI’s failure to pay them in those
 years. CCC conceded this at oral argument. Accordingly, we hold that CCC erred
 in finding IPI liable for the violations contained in Complaint 001 and imposing
 sanctions.
                                  D. Complaint 002
          i. Validity of Force Majeure in Light of Statutory Requirements
¶ 34    While IPI failed to raise force majeure as a defense to Complaint 001, it
  successfully raised the defense against the alleged violations in Complaint 002.
  But before we can discuss the merits of IPI’s asserted force majeure defense to
  Complaint 002, we must determine whether the force majeure clause is
  preempted by statute. CCC found that, as a matter of law, force majeure is
  inapplicable as a defense to statutory requirements. The Superior Court did not
  reach this issue because it held the undisputed and undefended violations in
  Complaints 003–005 constituted sufficient grounds to uphold the sanctions for
  Complaints 001 and 002.
¶ 35     It is well-established that contractual provisions cannot override statutes.
  Thayer v. Tandy Corp., No. 153, 1987, 1987 Del. LEXIS 1237, at *4 (Del. Sept.
  28, 1987) (“Where contractual provisions circumvent statutory law, the statute
  overrides the contract.”); United States v. Hampton Rds. Sanitation Dep’t, No.
  2:09-cv-481, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46984, at *13 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2012) (“The
  force majeure provision[’s] . . . invocation here does not circumvent federal and
  state laws.”). However, statutes themselves can contain force majeure clauses.
  See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Jamison, 815 F. Supp. 454, 470 (D.D.C.
  1992) (“Congress provided a statutory force majeure exception to the
  requirements that leaseholders mine commercial quantities of coal within ten
  years and each subsequent year.”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209E-14
  (LexisNexis 2023) (creating a force majeure exception to the requirements for
  agricultural businesses to be eligible for certain tax incentives).
¶ 36     Here, the legislature provided that, “After approving an application for the
  exclusive license, the Commonwealth Lottery Commission may negotiate the
  terms of the exclusive license before it is issued.” 4 CMC § 2317(a)(1)(i)(A). By
  granting the Lottery Commission this statutory authority, the legislature
  implicitly authorized standard contract provisions such as a force majeure clause
  that could excuse noncompliance with contractual requirements, even if those
  obligations were also statutory requirements. The Annual License Fee is set by
  statute, but it is also required in Clause 5 of the CLA. Thus, even though 4 CMC
  § 2306 does not expressly contain a force majeure clause, the force majeure
  clause nonetheless applies to the Annual License Fee by way of the broad
  authority the statute delegates to the Lottery Commission to negotiate license
             Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

    terms. CCC erred in ruling that force majeure was inapplicable as a matter of law
    to Complaint 002.6
                    ii. Substantial Evidence for Force Majeure
¶ 37    Having determined that IPI’s force majeure defense to Complaint 002 is
  not invalidated by statute, we consider CCC’s rejection of the defense. When
  reviewing an administrative agency’s factfinding, we apply a “substantial
  evidence” standard. 1 CMC § 9112(f)(v); Pac. Sec. Alarm, Inc. v. CPA, 2006 MP
  17 ¶ 6. We have defined substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as
  reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Owens v.
  Commonwealth Health Ctr., 2012 MP 05 ¶ 8. Considering the administrative
  record, we ask whether the evidence before CCC was such that a reasonable mind
  would find it adequate to support CCC’s conclusion.
¶ 38     In rejecting the force majeure defense, CCC found that even if the defense
  was potentially applicable, IPI had failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove it.
  CCC went a step further, stating that “the Executive Director has established by
  clear and convincing evidence that the casino licensee’s failure to make the
  required annual license fee payment was not due to a force majeure reason.”
  Commission Order No: 2021-002 at ¶ 10. It claimed that the Executive Director:
          [O]ffered testimony that the casino licensee failed to pay the annual
          license fee not due to force majeure reasons; namely, that IPI had
          suffered large financial losses prior to the pandemic, that the casino
          licensee’s auditors expressed “going concern” issues prior to the
          pandemic, and that the then-CEO admitted to the Commission in a
          public meeting on July 20, 2020 that IPI has some funding to satisfy
          the annual license fee.
          Id. at ¶ 9.
¶ 39     However, this testimony is not all the evidence that was before CCC.
  Having found that CCC should have considered Amendment No. 9 with respect
  to Complaint 001, we similarly hold that CCC should have taken Amendment
  No. 9’s findings into account when considering COVID-19’s impact on IPI’s
  ability to pay the Annual License Fee. After all, the Lottery Commission
  acknowledged that COVID-19 negatively impacted IPI’s financial ability to pay
  the fee. Amendment No. 9, in relevant part, states:
          WHEREAS, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, an unexpected
          major unpredicted global event that has already lasted almost 6
          months and generally expected to last for many more months to
          come, Imperial Pacific’s current ability to make payments that are
          currently in arrears has been impacted. On or about March 17, 2020,

6
     CCC cites NMIAC §§ 175-10.1-640, 175-10.1-645, and 175-10.1-650 for the
     proposition that its regulations restrict the applicability of force majeure. However,
     these regulations were repealed prior to CCC sanctioning IPI. 42 Com. Reg. 44562
     (Dec. 28, 2020).
            Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

          Imperial Pacific closed the operation of its casino in CNMI, citing
          diminished tourists to the CNMI and the present unknown as to
          when tourism may properly resume.
          Amendment No. 9 at 1.
    In addition, IPI had paid the Annual License Fee every year until COVID-19
    began and IPI shut down, cutting off revenue.
¶ 40     IPI’s history of timely payment of the Annual License Fee until the advent
  of COVID-19 was known to CCC as enforcer of the CLA. The parties’ findings
  in Amendment No. 9, which represent the Commonwealth’s acknowledgment
  that IPI was in a force majeure situation, were also known to CCC. Considering
  the administrative record as a whole, the evidence that was before CCC when it
  rejected IPI’s force majeure defense was such that a reasonable mind would not
  accept its conclusion as adequately supported in the record. Substantial evidence
  does not support CCC’s finding that COVID-19 was not the proximate cause for
  the nonpayment of the Annual License Fee.7
¶ 41      Our finding that CCC’s rejection of IPI’s force majeure defense to
  Complaint 002 lacked substantial evidence does not disturb our finding that force
  majeure is an affirmative defense—the burden of proof for which lies with the
  party asserting it. Supra at ¶ 18. On the contrary, our review for substantial
  evidence holds IPI to its burden of proof while allowing additional deference for
  CCC’s adjudicatory authority. Indeed, if IPI met its burden of proof to
  demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that COVID-19 was the
  proximate cause of its default, CCC could still reasonably reject the defense
  provided that such a rejection was supported by substantial evidence. See
  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 481 (1951) (“[I]f what is called
  substantial evidence is found anywhere in the record to support conclusions of
  fact, the courts are said to be obliged to sustain the decision without reference to
  how heavily the countervailing evidence may preponderate.”) (internal
  quotations omitted); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014)
  (“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
  preponderance.”) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, our holding that CCC’s
  decision fails for lack of substantial evidence incorporates a finding that IPI met
  its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
             iii. Force Majeure Clause — Plain Meaning Interpretation
¶ 42    We now address the scope of the force majeure defense. CCC argues that
  even if the force majeure clause is valid, IPI has agreed that force majeure will
  not excuse its payment obligations that have already accrued. Appellee’s Br. at
  12. CCC also claims the Annual License Fee accrued upon executing the CLA
  in 2014 and remained accrued as long as IPI retains the license. Id. IPI contends
  that CCC’s interpretation contradicts the plain meaning of the clause and would

7
     Because we find that COVID-19 was a force majeure event, we do not discuss whether
     Typhoons Soudelor and Yutu and changes to federal immigration law are force majeure
     events.
          Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

 render it meaningless and absurd because no contracting party would negotiate
 for a term excusing performance in the event of an Act of God, while at the same
 time making performance obligatory regardless of future events. Appellant’s
 Reply Br. at 7–8. IPI interprets the clause to mean that its obligation to pay the
 Annual License Fee is fully excused because of force majeure, or alternatively,
 that its delay in making the Annual License Fee payments is excused during a
 force majeure event. Id.
¶ 43     We look to the plain language of the contract terms because, generally,
  they contain the parties’ intent. See Riley v. Pub. Sch. Sys., 4 NMI 85, 88 (1994).
  Also generally speaking, “[a] written contract must be read as a whole and every
  part interpreted with reference to the whole.” Isla Dev. Prop. v. Jang, 2017 MP
  13 ¶ 9. Put differently, “a document should be read to give effect to all its
  provisions and to render them consistent with each other.” Mastrobuono v.
  Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995). Additionally, we do not
  interpret a contract “in a way that will defy common sense or lead to absurd
  results.” Northern Marianas Housing Corp. v. BankPacific, Ltd., 2021 MP 07 ¶
  21 (citing Manglona v. Baza, 2012 MP 4 ¶ 36); see also RESTATEMENT
  (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (“[A]n interpretation which gives a
  ‘reasonable’ . . . meaning . . . is preferred.”)
¶ 44    The first sentence of the force majeure clause states that IPI:
        [S]hall not be in default for any failure or delay in performance due
        under this License Agreement if such failure or delay is due to
        causes beyond reasonable control including, but not limited to:
        Act(s) of God, war(s), strike(s) or labor dispute(s), embargo(es),
        act(s) of terrorism, fire(s), flood(s), or accident(s) without the fault
        or negligence of the Licensee.
        CLA cl. 25.
 Reading this sentence in isolation, the parties intended to excuse any failure or
 delay in performance caused by the force majeure event. The second sentence
 then follows with:
        Invocation of force majeure by the Licensee shall not excuse any
        payment obligations to the Commonwealth where the grounds and
        or purpose for such payments have already accrued.
        Id.
 Sentence two clarifies that the parties did not intend for the invocation of force
 majeure to excuse IPI’s payment obligations. Read together, sentence one
 protects IPI from default in the event of force majeure, while sentence two
 clarifies that this protection does not have the effect of excusing IPI’s payment
 obligations.
¶ 45    IPI’s contention that it would never have negotiated for a term excusing
  performance, while at the same time making performance obligatory, misstates
  what it agreed to in the CLA. The force majeure clause excuses IPI’s default in
          Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

 the event of force majeure, not its duty to perform as a whole. The term “default”
 refers to “the omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty.” BLACK’S
 LAW DICTIONARY 377 (9th ed. 2010). When a party to a contract defaults, that
 is, fails to perform their contractual duties when time comes to perform, they
 have breached the contract. Manglona v. Baza, 2012 MP 04 ¶ 13 (citing
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) (1979)). Non-payment of a
 lump sum required by the contract at the appropriate time set forth in the contract
 is a breach of the contract for which relief can be granted. Id. As such, were it
 not for the protection of the force majeure clause, IPI’s failure to pay the 2020
 Annual License Fee when time came due would normally constitute a default for
 which CCC, as enforcer of the Commonwealth’s interests under the CLA, could
 obtain appropriate relief. However, the force majeure clause has the effect of
 protecting IPI from the consequences of default during a force majeure event.
 Thus, because we have concluded that COVID-19 was a valid force majeure
 event that was the proximate cause of IPI’s failure to pay the 2020 Annual
 License Fee, CCC’s imposition of penalties under Complaint 002 was improper
 because the force majeure clause protects IPI from the consequences of default.
¶ 46      The penalties for IPI’s default on the 2020 Annual License Fee were
  improper because of force majeure. That being said, the force majeure clause
  plainly states that invocation of the defense, while excusing default resulting
  from a force majeure event, does not excuse payment obligations, “where the
  grounds and or purpose for such payments have already accrued.” CLA cl. 25.
  Notably, the CLA refers to where—not when—such grounds or purpose accrue.
  Id. The question, then, is not when IPI’s obligation to pay the 2020 Annual
  License Fee accrued, but whether it accrued. The grounds or purpose for payment
  of the 2020 Annual License Fee would appear simple: the maintenance of IPI’s
  status as exclusive licensee for the year 2020. By this measure, IPI’s obligation
  as Licensee to make the Annual License Fee payment each year accrues for the
  purpose of maintaining its status as Licensee. As such, every year that IPI
  continues as the exclusive licensee under the CLA, the grounds and or purpose
  of its obligation to pay the Annual License Fee accrue. While IPI would like us
  to find that the COVID-19 pandemic excused its obligation to pay outright, that
  would contradict the plain language of the CLA, which excuses IPI’s default
  during a force majeure event, but not its obligation to pay.
¶ 47    We similarly reject CCC’s interpretation that IPI’s obligation to pay each
  year accrued at the time the CLA was formed. After all, sentence three of the
  force majeure clause provides IPI with an escape route from its contractual
  obligations in the event of force majeure. It reads:
        Where such Force Majeure event results in failure in the
        performance or delay exceeding six (6) months of the performance
        due under this License Agreement, the Licensee may terminate this
        License Agreement forthwith provided that the Licensee shall not
        be excused from any payment obligations to the Commonwealth
          Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

        where the grounds and/or the purpose for such payments have
        already accrued.
        CLA cl. 25.
 If IPI, six months after COVID-19 forced the shutdown, had chosen to promptly
 exercise its right under the force majeure clause to terminate the license
 agreement, CCC’s interpretation of “accrual” would have the absurd result of
 terminating the CLA while requiring IPI to continue making Annual License Fee
 payments in perpetuity. We will not construe the CLA “in a way that . . . lead[s]
 to absurd results,” NMHC, 2021 MP 7 ¶ 21, so we reject CCC’s reading of the
 force majeure clause.
¶ 48     A reasonable interpretation of the force majeure clause, read with
  “reference to the whole,” and “giv[ing] effect to all its provisions, and to render
  them consistent with each other,” Isla Dev. Prop., 2017 MP 13 and Mastrobuono,
  514 U.S. 52 at 63, is that force majeure excuses any default in IPI’s payment
  during a force majeure event. At the same time, IPI remains obligated to pay the
  Annual License Fee for every year that the grounds or purpose for that fee, that
  is, IPI’s maintenance of its status as the exclusive licensee under the CLA,
  accrues. IPI’s failure to terminate the CLA under sentence three of the force
  majeure clause demonstrates IPI’s intention to remain the exclusive licensee
  under the CLA, with all the rights and duties thereof. Under the force majeure
  clause of the CLA, IPI’s default in paying the Annual License Fee is excused
  while force majeure is in effect, but its payment obligations continue to accrue
  each year. At oral argument, IPI agreed that the force majeure event has now
  ended, meaning that the unpaid fees are now due within a reasonable period of
  time as CCC determines.
                           E. Complaints 003, 004, and 005
¶ 49      Lastly, we turn to Complaints 003–005, asking whether substantial
  evidence supports CCC’s imposition of sanctions for these complaints. IPI asks
  us to find that force majeure “applies to each of the Enforcement Actions brought
  by the CCC.” Appellant’s Br. at 26. It says its invocation of force majeure with
  respect to Complaint 002 should be “applied broadly” because its “obligations,
  from which all of the Commission’s Enforcement Actions sprout, are derived
  from the same root: the exclusive casino license” and because its “inability to
  fulfill the various obligations that form the basis for the CCC’s Enforcement
  Actions also all derive from the same cause: IPI’s complete lack of revenue after
  the COVID-19 pandemic forced the Company to close its operations in March
  2020.” Id. at 26–27.
¶ 50    CCC’s order states that “[t]he casino licensee offered no defense to the
  claims alleged in Enforcement Actions 2020-003, 2020-004, and 2020-005.”
  Commission Order No: 2021-002 at ¶ 17. The court below agreed, finding that
  IPI “offered no defense and did not contest any of the claims alleged in
  Enforcement Actions 2020-003, 2020-004, or 2020-005.” Commonwealth
  Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l (CNMI), LLC, No. 21-0173 (NMI Super.
  Ct. Mar. 15, 2022) (Order Affirming the Casino Commission’s Suspension of
           Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

 Petitioner’s Exclusive Casino License and Monetary Penalties at 25) (emphasis
 omitted). It held that CCC met its evidentiary burden. Id. at 22.
¶ 51    The evidentiary hearing on Complaints 003–005 occurred on March 2,
  2021. After CCC explained what the complaints involved, IPI said, “We don’t
  dispute the charges against IPI as outlined by [CCC].” March 2, 2021 Tr. at 9.
¶ 52      After introducing a list of different stipulations in which IPI conceded
  that it had committed violations alleged in Complaints 003-005, CCC said, “If
  IPI will offer no defense, the Director moves for judgement on each claim of each
  complaint and is ready to argue for the appropriate penalty.” Id. at 14–15. IPI
  responded that it “will not be mounting a defense.” Id. at 15. When CCC
  discussed possible sanctions for IPI, it said:
        [T]he fact is the evidence shows that IPI has absolutely zero respect
        for you . . . If IPI respected the Commission, it would have done the
        bare minimum. They’re going to say “We have no money.” I’m
        assuming they’re going to say force majeure. They’re going to say
        “We have a federal receivership.”
        Id. at 24.
¶ 53    IPI responded:
        Um, it was -- it was mentioned dismissively about force majeure.
        Um, and I didn’t raise it as an affirmative defense in the defense
        section but wanted to just bring it up as a mitigating circumstance
        that I think this Commission ought to take into consideration when
        framing whatever plan that is that’s gonna [sic] be imposed on IPI.
        Id. at 34.
¶ 54      IPI continued, asking that CCC “create . . . systems of checks and balances
  and uphold IPI accountable but with the understanding of the economic crisis
  that it’s being faced with and its ability to incrementally make progress.” Id. at
  37–38.
¶ 55      IPI first said, “We don’t dispute the charges.” Id. at 9. Second, it stated
  that it “will not be mounting a defense.” Id. at 15. Third, it said that it “didn’t
  raise [force majeure] as an affirmative defense.” Id. at 34. Finally, it asked CCC
  to create “systems of checks and balances and hold [it] accountable.” Id. at 38.
¶ 56      Instead of contesting Complaints 003–005, IPI conceded the violations,
  seemingly in hopes of lessening the sanctions. When IPI discussed force majeure,
  it called it “a mitigating circumstance . . . to [be] take[n] into consideration when
  framing whatever plan that is that’s gonna [sic] be imposed.” Id. at 34. Seeking
  leniency in sanctions imposed by CCC on the basis of alleged economic
  constraints is not equivalent to arguing that force majeure excuses its
  performance.
¶ 57    Having previously chosen to ask for leniency instead of raising any
  defenses, IPI now adopts a different tactic by asserting force majeure excuses for
             Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

    all its noncompliance. But IPI’s force majeure argument for Complaint 002
    cannot be so easily translated to Complaint 003–005 because to do so would
    ignore IPI’s consistent representations before the agency.
¶ 58     A party may change its mind or its theory of the case so long as it avoids
  judicial estoppel,8 but to permit IPI to raise force majeure at this stage as to
  Complaints 003–005 would violate four overlapping rules.
¶ 59    First, as a general matter, “[t]o preserve an issue for appeal from an
  agency’s decision, a party must raise the issue before the agency.” Doucette v.
  Mass. Parole Bd., 18 N.E.3d 1096, 1100 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014); see also Tejeda-
  Mata v. I.N.S, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[I]f a petitioner wishes to
  preserve an issue for appeal, he must raise it first in the proper administrative
  forum.”). Second, as already discussed, force majeure is an affirmative defense,
  and in administrative proceedings, affirmative defenses must be raised in an
  answer or at the agency hearing if the other party has notice or is not prejudiced.
  Supra, at ¶ 27. Because it did not, IPI waived force majeure as a defense to
  Complaints 003–005.
¶ 60     Third, “[o]urs is an adversarial system of justice. The presumption,
  therefore, is to hold the parties responsible for raising their own defenses.”
  United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 749 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Holsey v.
  Bass, 519 F. Supp. 395, 408 (D. Md. 1981) (“Generally, it is the duty of the
  defendant to plead affirmative defenses, and the court cannot raise such defenses
  sua sponte.”). While remaining silent would have been enough to waive force
  majeure, IPI affirmatively stated it was not raising the defense to Complaints
  003–005. CCC can hardly be faulted for not applying a defense that IPI explicitly
  waived.
¶ 61    Fourth, the goal of judicial review is to examine the propriety of the
  determination at the time it was made, not to allow a redo of what happened
  before the agency. See DOL, Licensing & Regul. v. Boardley, 883 A.2d 953, 960
  (Md. 2005) (“It is the function of the reviewing court to review only the materials
  that were in the record before the agency at the time it made its final decision.”);
  Fund for Animals v. Williams, 391 F. Supp 2d. 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Because
  the court’s review is confined to the administrative record at the time of the
  agency’s decision, it may not include some new record made initially in the

8
     Judicial estoppel is a doctrine that prevents parties from unfairly flip-flopping:
            Where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
            succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply
            because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position,
            especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the
            position formerly taken by him.
            KTT Corp. v. Tomokane, 2003 MP 17 ¶ 21 (quoting New Hampshire v.
            Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)).
          Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

 reviewing court.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). IPI states, “In its
 arguments before the Superior Court, IPI drew no distinction between the
 application of the force majeure defense to the various Enforcement Actions
 brought against it by the CCC.” Appellant’s Br. at 26. That is irrelevant because
 our review focuses on what happened before the agency, not the court below. See
 In re Blankenship, 3 NMI 209, 217 (1992).
¶ 62     In short, IPI admitted to the violations in Complaints 003–005, stated
  multiple times that it was not raising any defense, and even asked to be held
  accountable. CCC accepted as much and ruled accordingly. Unlike the evidence
  in the record contradicting the reasonableness of CCC’s rejection of IPI’s force
  majeure defense to Complaint 002, no such evidence is in the record to gainsay
  the reasonableness of CCC’s decision as to Complaints 003–005 in light of IPI’s
  admissions at hearing. Thus, we find that substantial evidence supports CCC’s
  sanctions for Complaint 003, Complaint 004, and Complaint 005.
                              F. CAPA & Due Process
¶ 63    Lastly, IPI claims that CCC violated CAPA and its due process rights by
  considering evidence outside the record. Specifically, IPI argues that CCC
  improperly considered the 2020 annual report released by IPI’s parent company
  when rejecting its force majeure defense. Because we have already reversed
  CCC’s decisions as to Complaints 001 and 002 on other grounds and found that
  CCC did not raise a force majeure defense as to Complaints 003–005, we need
  not address whether the CCC’s consideration of the annual report violated CAPA
  or due process.
                                    V. CONCLUSION
¶ 64     The Commonwealth Casino Commission improperly imposed sanctions
  against IPI for Complaint 001. The Lottery Commission approved Amendment
  No. 9, which, in effect, eliminated IPI’s default by altering the due dates of its
  obligation to make the required contributions to the Community Benefit Fund.
  CCC improperly imposed sanctions against IPI for Complaint 002. The record
  demonstrates that there was not substantial evidence to support CCC’s finding
  that COVID-19 was not the proximate cause of IPI’s failure to pay the Annual
  License Fee in 2020, excusing its default. The Annual License Fees for 2020 and
  the following years have accrued and continue to accrue, and CCC must now
  decide on a reasonable deadline for IPI to pay them. Finally, the sanctions CCC
  imposed against IPI for Complaint 003, Complaint 004, and Complaint 005—
  suspending its license and imposing fines—were proper. Substantial evidence
  supports them because IPI admitted to the violations and offered no defense. For
  the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED
  in part. This matter is REMANDED to the Commonwealth Casino Commission for
  further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

        SO ORDERED this 25th day of August, 2023.
            Commonwealth Casino Comm’n v. Imperial Pac. Int’l, 2023 MP 8

/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice

 /s/
JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
Associate Justice

/s/
PERRY B. INOS
Associate Justice

                                          COUNSEL

Kevin T. Abikoff, Washington, D.C. (pro hac vice); Joey P. San Nicolas, Saipan, MP, for
Appellant.

Keisha Blaise, Assistant Attorney General, Saipan, MP, for Appellee.

                                           NOTICE

This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any
event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication,
the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715,
fax (670) 236–9702, e–mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.
                                                                              E-FILED
                                                                              CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                                              E-filed: Aug 25 2023 08:08PM
                                                                              Clerk Review: Aug 25 2023 08:08PM
                                                                              Filing ID: 70715709
                                                                              Case No.: 2022-SCC-0006-CIV
                                                                              NoraV Borja

                                            IN THE

                                     Supreme Court
                                            OF THE

           Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

                          COMMONWEALTH CASINO COMMISSION,
                                Respondent-Appellee,

                                              v.

                    IMPERIAL PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL (CNMI), LLC,
                                 Petitioner-Appellant.

                          Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0006-CIV
                              Superior Court No. 21-0173-CV
                                         JUDGMENT

         Petitioner-Appellant Imperial Pacific International (CNMI), LLC appeals the trial court
order upholding Respondent-Appellee Commonwealth Casino Commission’s decision suspending
its casino license and imposing fines. For the reasons discussed in the accompanying opinion, the
Court AFFIRMS in part, REVERSES in part, and REMANDS this matter to CCC for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

        ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2023.

  /s/
NORA V. BORJA
Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court