Court Opinion

ID: 9919241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:23.198984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.789692
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 In re K.J. CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 In re K.J., a Person Coming                                     B327992
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 Los Angeles County Department                                  (Los Angeles County
 of Children and Family Services,                               Super. Ct. No. 20LJJP00775A)

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 Kristen J.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Donald A. Buddle, Jr., Judge. Conditionally
affirmed and remanded with instructions.
      Seth F. Gorman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                   ____________________________

      Mother, Kristen J., appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights over her daughter, K.J., under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother contends the juvenile
court erred by denying her request for a contested hearing to
consider the parental benefit exception to termination of parental
rights. We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in finding mother made an insufficient offer of proof
and denying her request.
      Mother also argues the Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) and the juvenile court failed to comply
with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). The Department agrees, as do
we, that ICWA’s statutory requirements were not satisfied.
Accordingly, we conditionally affirm the order and remand the
matter to ensure compliance with ICWA and state law.

       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    Detention and Petition
      In September 2020, the Department received a referral
alleging mother had given birth to K.J. and was displaying
extensive mental health issues, including suicidal ideation and
major depression. Mother was allegedly hostile and aggressive

1      All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                  2
with the hospital staff and newborn. Mother’s adoptive father
disclosed mother was diagnosed with “bipolar [disorder],
[oppositional defiant disorder] and [attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder].” As a child, mother had been in foster care and was
placed with adoptive father in 2002 when she was two years old.
       K.J. remained hospitalized after her birth because she was
having trouble eating and receiving treatment for an infection.
She was released from the hospital to mother in October 2020
with a safety plan. Mother’s adoptive father’s female companion,
however, reported two days later that mother was not following
the safety plan. She also reported mother was not consistent in
giving K.J. medication to treat the infectious disease. The
Department thereafter obtained a court order for K.J.’s removal
from mother due to mother’s neglect of the child.
       In December 2020, the Department filed a section 300
petition on K.J.’s behalf alleging in pertinent part that K.J. was
at serious risk of physical harm because of mother’s mental and
emotional problems. The ICWA-010(A) inquiry form attached to
the petition stated that K.J. may have Indian ancestry. The
Department’s detention report also noted that ICWA did or might
apply, as mother indicated that there is Native American
ancestry on K.J.’s biological maternal grandmother’s side of the
family. However, mother also submitted a Parental Notice of
Indian Status form (ICWA-020) indicating KJ was ineligible for
membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe. Nonparty
father filed an ICWA-020 form denying Native American
ancestry.
       At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found a prima
facie case for jurisdiction over K.J. and ordered her detained in
shelter care with monitored visitation for mother. Based on

                                 3
mother’s ICWA-020 form, the court also found there was no
reason to believe ICWA applied to K.J. through mother.
      At the adjudication and disposition hearing in January
2021, the juvenile court declared K.J. a dependent and sustained
the petition, as amended by interlineation, under section 300,
subdivision (b). The court ordered K.J. removed from mother’s
care, and the Department was ordered to provide family
reunification services to mother. Thereafter, K.J. was placed
with mother’s godmother, M.T.
      The disposition hearing as to father was continued. At the
continued hearing, father was deemed K.J.’s biological father.
Father was incarcerated. The juvenile court denied him services
based on the length of his incarceration and the fact that he had
reunification services with regard to another child terminated
and still had not treated the underlying problems. At a later
hearing, the court noted father was not claiming Native
American ancestry and there was no reason to believe that ICWA
applied through father.

B.      Termination of Reunification Services
        Before the six-month review hearing, the Department
reported mother was allowed to have supervised visits three days
per week for four hours in M.T.’s home but mother was
“inconsistent” in her visits. M.T. indicated that mother
frequently missed visits and was often preoccupied during visits,
“i[.]e[.,] talking on the phone, videochatting, changing [K.J.’s]
outfits frequently to take photos.” M.T. felt mother was “not very
focused on [K.J.], but rather on showing her off to friends.” At
the six-month review hearing in July 2021, the juvenile court

                                4
found mother was in partial compliance with her case plan and
ordered continued reunification services.
      Mother left California in September 2021 and was residing
out-of-state. She said she left because she received death threats
from her late boyfriend’s (not father) family and friends. In early
January 2022, the Department reported mother had not visited
in-person since mid-September 2021. M.T. informed the
Department mother would contact M.T. through FaceTime two to
three times per week and speak to K.J. for approximately 15
minutes. At the 12-month review hearing in March 2022, the
juvenile court terminated reunification services based on
mother’s failure to make substantial progress with her case plan
and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a
permanent plan for K.J.

C.     The Department’s Section 366.26 Report
       Prior to the section 366.26 hearing, the Department
reported mother returned to California. Regarding visitation,
mother claimed she saw K.J. three times a week since K.J. was
placed with M.T. and “‘missed visits when [mother] was sick, had
therapy, or had something that [she] had to do.’” However, M.T.
told the Department, “‘[Mother] doesn’t come to her visits a lot.
[Mother and K.J.] do [FaceTime] about twice a week. They might
be on the phone a good 30 or 40 minutes. Overall, their
relationship is ok. It is not like a mommy and daughter
relationship, but it is ok. As long as [mother] don’t try to take
[K.J.] out of the house, she’s straight. [K.J.] wants to be around
me and my family. If I’m not going, [K.J.] won’t go.’” M.T. opined
that K.J. was “‘not really into [mother].’”

                                 5
       The social worker observed a monitored visit on March 9,
2022. The social worker saw mother raise her voice and exclaim,
“‘I’m going to get my baby back and when I do, I am leaving back
home to Washington.” M.T. then told mother the visit would end
if mother continued to raise her voice in K.J.’s presence. K.J.
appeared to be scared of mother’s behavior and was hiding
behind M.T.
       The social worker also observed a visit on April 6, 2022.
The social worker saw mother attempt to hold K.J., but K.J. ran
away from mother. K.J. ran to M.T. and asked to be held. When
M.T. redirected K.J. to mother, K.J. shook her head, no. Mother
then told K.J. to go to her, but K.J. hid behind M.T.
       As noted in a Review of Permanent Plan report filed in
August 2022, M.T. later informed the Department that between
March and August 2022, mother visited 34 times but missed 35
visits. M.T. also stated mother arrived up to an hour late on
several occasions. M.T. opined that K.J. was “not bonded to
mother during their visits” and K.J. did not like to be around
mother.
       M.T. subsequently notified the Department that between
September 2022 and February 2023, mother attended 21 visits
with K.J. but failed to attend 35 visits. M.T. reported K.J. still
did not like being around mother and continued to run away from
mother to go with M.T. during visits.
       In a supplemental report, the Department assessed there
were “no impediments for the adoption planning[,] and adoption
readiness [was] complete.” M.T. was committed to adopting K.J.,
and the Department was in agreement with the permanent plan
of adoption if and when parental rights were terminated.

                                6
D.     Mother Informs the Department of Native American
       Ancestry
       In February 2023, mother again reported to the
Department that K.J.’s biological maternal grandmother and
biological maternal great-grandmother have Native American
ancestry. She told the social worker she did not know if they
were registered with a tribe. Mother explained she only had
contact with biological maternal grandmother three times in her
life.
       Mother referred the social worker to her adoptive father for
more information. Mother’s adoptive father reported that the
biological grandmother and great-grandmother have Native
American ancestry. He told the social worker he had a copy of
mother’s birth certificate and would send it to the social worker
when he located it. He had no further information regarding the
tribe or if they were registered with a tribe.
       In a last minute information for the juvenile court filed in
February 2023, the Department summarized a November 2000
jurisdiction report from mother’s childhood dependency case.
Mother’s biological mother, R.B., reported that she had Indian
ancestry. R.B. said her father “was part Indian,” as his maternal
great-grandmother was Cherokee. R.B. stated the family came
from West Virginia, and the Department attempted to locate the
Cherokee tribe there but was unable to find one. The dependency
investigator for the case contacted the Cherokee Nation in
Oklahoma and was told to call the Indian Bureau in West
Virginia. “Upon doing so the [investigator] learned that the
telephone directory operator could not provide a number for the
Indian Bureau unless the [investigator] had a specific city.” No
specific city was known, and no notice was given to a tribe.

                                7
E.     Section 366.26 Hearing
       The juvenile court held the section 366.26 hearing on
March 8, 2023. Mother asked for the matter to be set for a
contested hearing. The court responded by observing that
mother missed “various visits,” and her “visitation left much to be
desired throughout” the whole reporting period. The court then
noted that “the first prong of Caden C.[2] speaks to consistent
visitation, high quality visitation.” Mother’s counsel replied,
“[F]or offer of proof, mother would like to testify as to visitation
and parental bond for the contested [366].26.” The juvenile court
inquired further into what the offer of proof was and what mother
anticipated providing to the court. Mother’s counsel responded,
“[M]y notes indicate that we have further information about
visits outside of the [Review of Permanent Plan] report filed in
August [2022] and other visits have happened since August that
the court is not aware of.” Based on mother’s offer of proof, the
court indicated it was denying mother’s request for a contested
hearing.
       Father’s counsel then asked to be heard and joined in the
request to set the matter for a contested hearing. Father’s
counsel contended that while there were “some lapses,” mother
had consistently visited over the past six months. The court
denied the request and proceeded with the section 366.26
hearing.
       Mother’s counsel argued the juvenile court should apply the
parental benefit exception to adoption. The court found by clear

2      In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (discussing required
elements of the parental benefit exception to termination of parental
rights).

                                   8
and convincing evidence that K.J. was adoptable and there were
no legal impediments to adoption. Further, the court determined
mother did not maintain regular visitation and did not establish
a bond with K.J. and that it would be detrimental to K.J. to be
returned to mother. The court concluded no exception to
adoption applied and terminated parental rights. Lastly, the
court found there was no reason to know or believe that ICWA
applied to K.J. through mother or father.
      Mother timely appealed the order.

                          DISCUSSION
A.   The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
     Denying Mother’s Request for a Contested Hearing
     Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her
request for a contested hearing in her attempt to establish the
parental benefit exception to adoption. We are not persuaded.

      1.     Legal Principles
             i.     Parental Benefit Exception
      “If the court cannot safely return a dependent child to a
parent’s custody within statutory time limits, the court must set
a hearing under section 366.26.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) The goal at the section 366.26
hearing is “‘specifically . . . to select and implement a permanent
plan for the child.’” (Ibid.) If the juvenile court has decided to
end reunification services, adoption is the legislative preference.
(§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) Once the juvenile court finds the child is
adoptable, “the court must order adoption and its necessary
consequence, termination of parental rights,” unless a parent can
demonstrate one of the statutory exceptions set forth in section

                                 9
366.26 applies. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53; see also
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625.)
       One of these is the parental benefit exception. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In order to establish this exception applies, a
parent must prove three elements: (1) “regular visitation and
contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation
permitted”; (2) that “the child has a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship”; and (3) that terminating the parent-child
attachment “would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) “The burden is
on the parent asserting the parental [benefit] exception to
produce evidence establishing that exception.” (In re A.G. (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 973, 996.)

             ii.   Offer of Proof
       “A parent has a right to due process at a section 366.26
hearing resulting in the termination of parental rights, which
includes a meaningful opportunity to be heard, present evidence,
and confront witnesses.” (In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
605, 612 (Grace P.).) But a parent’s right to a contested
evidentiary hearing to establish an exception under
section 366.26 is not automatic. (In re A.G., supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 998.) Due process does not compel a court to
hold a contested hearing if it is not convinced the parent will
present relevant, admissible, and probative evidence. (Grace P.,
at p. 612.) “‘The trial court can therefore exercise its power to
request an offer of proof to clearly identify the contested issue(s)

                                 10
so it can determine whether a parent’s representation is
sufficient to warrant a hearing involving presentation of evidence
and confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.’” (Ibid.;
see also In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 998 [juvenile court
“may require, without violating due process, that the parent
provide an offer of proof in support of the adoption exception
before setting a contested hearing”].)
       The parent’s offer of proof “must be adequate in scope and
must be specific.” (In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) A
legally sufficient offer of proof must set forth “‘the actual evidence
to be produced, not merely the facts or issues to be addressed and
argued.’” (Ibid.) Further, “[t]he offer of proof must consist of
‘“testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented
to the senses.”’ [Citation.] It may not consist of simply ‘the
substance of facts to be proved . . . , since facts do not constitute
evidence.’ [Citation.] The material in the offer of proof must be
admissible, and it ‘“must be specific in its indication of the
purpose of the testimony, the name of the witness, and the
content of the answer to be elicited.”’” (Id. at pp. 1006–1007.) In
the context of the parental benefit exception, a parent’s offer of
proof must provide specific evidence of the first two components
of the exception: regular visitation and the existence of a
beneficial parent-child relationship. (Id. at pp. 1005–1006.) “[I]f
the parent’s offer of proof addresses regular visitation and the
existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship, it is for the
court to then weigh the importance of that relationship against
the benefits of adoption.” (Id. at p. 1005.)
       We review the denial of a contested hearing following an
offer of proof for abuse of discretion. (In re A.G., supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 1003, citing Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at

                                 11
p. 611.) “‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court
has exceeded the bounds of reason by making an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd determination. [Citation.]’” (In re
A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.)

      2.     Mother’s Offer of Proof Did Not Warrant a Contested
             Hearing
       Mother contends the juvenile court erred by finding her
offer of proof insufficient to warrant a contested hearing prior to
terminating her parental rights. As an offer of proof, mother
initially proffered to testify “as to visitation and parental bond.”
This, by itself, was insufficient because it simply identified the
topics to be addressed. (See In re Tamika T. (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 1114, 1124 [offer of proof may not merely identify
issue to be addressed] (Tamika T.).) When asked for further
clarification as to the offer of proof and what mother anticipated
providing to the court, mother’s counsel stated mother had
“further information about visits outside of the [Review of
Permanent Plan] report filed in August [2022]” and other visits
that happened since August 2022 “the court is not aware of.”
       Mother’s offer of proof did not identify, with any precision,
the specific evidence she would present at a contested hearing.
Mother did not state she would testify regarding the frequency of
visitation she had with K.J., nor did mother’s proffer set forth
actual evidence regarding such. (Tamika T., supra, 97
Cal.App.4th at p. 1124 [offer of proof “must be specific, setting
forth the actual evidence to be produced, not merely the facts or
issues to be addressed and argued”]; In re A.G., supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 996 [“The judge may properly reject a general
or vague offer which does not indicate with precision the evidence

                                12
to be presented and the witnesses who are to give it”].) Mother
did not identify the quantity or dates of visits that occurred
outside or after August 2022 or how such visits would address
regular visitation in the more than two years the case had been
pending.
       Similarly, mother’s proffer did not include any specific
evidence about the existence of a beneficial parent-child
relationship. A vague reference to mother addressing a “parental
bond” did not allow the juvenile court to assess whether there in
fact was relevant and probative evidence to be provided. “[A]
proffer identifying a witness who would testify to a close parent-
child bond, without including enough specifics of the substance of
that testimony to establish both that the witness has evidence to
offer and that he or she is competent to so testify, would also not
meet the threshold of a valid offer of proof.” (In re A.G., supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 1007.) Moreover, as to mother’s assertion that
the juvenile court erred in crediting the Department’s evidence
without allowing mother an opportunity to present evidence in
response, mother did not describe any specific evidence to
contradict the Department’s evidence regarding visitation or
mother’s relationship with K.J.
       Mother’s reliance on Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th 605
and In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th 973 is misplaced. In Grace
P., the juvenile court recognized that the father consistently
visited and maintained contact with his three children. (Grace
P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 609–610, 614.) The father offered
to testify that during his regular visits with the children, he
talked to them about school, redirected their behavioral issues,
brought food for them, played with them, and told them he loved
them. (Id. at p. 610.) The father further stated that one of his

                                 13
children would testify that she enjoyed the visits, that she
wanted the visits to continue, and that she saw father as a
parental figure. (Ibid.) Since the father maintained regular
contact with the children, the offer of proof was probative of the
other elements of the parental benefit exception and was
sufficient to warrant a contested hearing. (Id. at pp. 613–614.)
       In In re A.G., there was no dispute “mother [had]
maintained regular visitation with [the minor].” (In re A.G.,
supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) To show the parental benefit
exception applied, mother identified nine witnesses who would
testify to topics including her continuous contact with the minor,
her relationship with him from his birth until detention, and the
activities they engaged in during visits. (Id. at pp. 1012–1013.)
The mother also offered photographs and videotapes as evidence
of the closeness of the parent-child bond. (Id. at p. 1013.) Thus,
while the offer of proof was general in some respects, it also
contained specifics. (Id. at p. 1014.) After the trial court denied
her request for a hearing, the mother appealed. The appellate
court held the mother’s offer of proof had to address two
components of the parental benefit exception: regular contact
and a beneficial parent-child relationship. (Ibid.) It did not have
to address the additional component of whether there was a
compelling reason why termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child. (Ibid.) Because the mother maintained
regular contact with the minor, and it was unclear from the
record whether the juvenile court improperly required her offer of
proof to include evidence for all three components of the parental
benefit exception, the court remanded the case for the juvenile
court to further consider the legal sufficiency of the mother’s
proffer. (Ibid.)

                                14
       Unlike in Grace P. and In re A.G., where the parents
clearly maintained regular contact with the child, mother’s offer
of proof, in this case, did not set forth specifics about the
substance of proposed testimony by any witness. Because mother
failed to state with specificity the evidence she would produce
concerning regular visitation and the existence of a beneficial
parent-child relationship, the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying mother’s request for a contested hearing. (In re A.G.,
supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1010 [“A parent’s failure to set forth
specific evidence, especially with a record negating the parent’s
regular visitation of the minor, will justify the denial of a
hearing”].)
       Mother also argues remand is necessary because it is
unclear whether the juvenile court required an offer of proof
beyond the issues of regular visitation and the existence of a
beneficial parent-child relationship. However, the court’s
questions to mother’s counsel made clear the court was seeking
an offer of proof regarding regular visitation. Before requesting
the offer of proof, the court expressed mother’s visitation “left
much to be desired” and specifically noted the first prong of
Caden C. speaks to “consistent visitation.” Mother’s counsel
acknowledged this and stated mother would testify as to
“visitation and parental bond.” There is no indication in the
record to suggest that the juvenile court improperly required
mother to make an offer of proof as to any matter on which she
did not bear the burden of proof. (See In re A.G., supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1005–1006.)

                                15
B.    ICWA Inquiry
      Mother argues that the Department violated its duty of
inquiry required by ICWA. The Department concedes further
inquiry is necessary and remand is appropriate in this case. We
agree.

       1.     Governing Law
       “ICWA was enacted to curtail ‘the separation of large
numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes
through adoption or foster care placement’ [citation], and ‘to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by
establishing . . . standards that a state court . . . must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family’
[citations].” (In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 780, review
granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578 (Dezi C.).) Whether ICWA
applies depends on whether the child who is the subject of the
custody proceeding is an Indian child. (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1
Cal.5th 83, 90.) Both ICWA and state statutory law define an
“Indian child” as a child who is either a member of an Indian
tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4); accord, § 224.1, subds. (a), (b).)
       Under state law, the juvenile court and the Department
have “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a
child for whom a petition under [s]ection 300 . . . may be or has
been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see
also In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 1, 9, 11–12.) If the initial
inquiry creates a “reason to believe” a child is an Indian child, the
Department is required to “make further inquiry regarding the
possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as

                                 16
soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); In re D.S. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052.) If the further inquiry gives the
Department a “‘reason to know’” the child is an Indian child, then
the formal notice requirements set forth in section 224.3 apply.
(§§ 224.2, subd. (d), 224.3, subd. (a); In re D.S., supra, 46
Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.) The court may make a finding that
ICWA does not apply where the Department’s “‘proper and
adequate’” further inquiry reveals “no ‘reason to know’” the child
is an Indian child. (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050.)
“We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Indian
ancestry for substantial evidence.” (In re H.V. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 433, 438.)

      2.    Further Inquiry was Required in this Case
      While mother indicated in her ICWA-020 form that she did
not have any known Native American ancestry, mother informed
the social worker at least twice that K.J.’s biological maternal
grandmother and biological maternal great-grandmother have
Native American ancestry. Mother was formerly in foster care
and only had contact with biological maternal grandmother three
times in her life. Mother referred the social worker to her
adoptive father for more information, who also reported that
biological maternal grandmother and great-grandmother have
Native American ancestry. However, neither mother nor
adoptive father knew if biological maternal grandmother or
great-grandmother were registered with a tribe or what tribe
that would be.
      Additionally, a jurisdiction report in the dependency case
from mother’s childhood indicated mother had Cherokee
ancestry. In 2000, the Department attempted to trace mother’s

                                17
ancestors to a Cherokee tribe in West Virginia. In the recent
dependency case concerning K.J., the record does not
demonstrate any attempt to contact a Cherokee tribe or mother’s
biological extended family members.
       The Department concedes it did not conduct a proper
inquiry, as it should have contacted the Cherokee tribes and
provided them with the information it had gathered regarding
mother’s biological relatives. The duty of inquiry required the
Department to further investigate mother’s claims regarding
K.J.’s possible Native American ancestry, especially as mother
was a former foster child who had limited contact with her
biological mother. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Furthermore, the
Department concedes the matter should be remanded for further
inquiry regarding the reported Cherokee heritage in mother’s
biological family. We agree and remand for the Department and
the juvenile court to conduct further investigation into K.J.’s
possible Native American ancestry through mother.

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                         DISPOSITION
      The order terminating mother’s parental rights is
conditionally affirmed.3 The matter is remanded with
instructions to the Department and the juvenile court to conduct
further ICWA inquiry as soon as practicable. If that inquiry
reveals evidence of Native American heritage, then the
Department and the court must comply with the additional
ICWA requirements, including, if applicable, the notice
requirements of section 224.3. If it does not, then the order shall
stand.

                                            MORI, J.

      We concur:

            COLLINS, Acting P. J.

            ZUKIN, J.

3      Mother asserts that conditional reversal is needed to allow the
juvenile court “full jurisdiction” to ensure compliance with ICWA.
However, mother does not articulate any reason why conditional
affirmance would prohibit the juvenile court from having the necessary
jurisdiction to ensure ICWA’s requirements are satisfied.

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