Court Opinion

ID: 9469303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:37:05.12093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:19.360797
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately simply to express my concern that the government’s application for an order authorizing electronic surveillance and supporting affidavits do not establish probable cause to believe that the appellants had violated and were violating RICO. The application and affidavits allege a pattern of racketeering involving mail fraud conducted through the License Collector’s Office of the City of St. Louis. This Court, in affirming the district court’s finding of probable cause, implicitly assumes that the License Collector’s Office is an “enterprise” within the meaning of RICO’s prohibition against conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering. I disagree with this assumption because, in my view, governmental entities are not “enterprises” under RICO. I agree with Judge Peck, writing for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Thompson, 669 F.2d 1143, 1149 (6th Cir. 1982), that it is “a perversion of Congress’s intent to continue to allow the potent weapons created in RICO to be lifted casually against every instance of venality in state and local governments.”
As Judge Peck notes, passage of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976), of which RICO is a part, did result to some extent from Congressional concern with corruption of government by organized crime. It is clear, however, that RICO itself was aimed at the economic power of organized crime. The remarks of Senator Byrd are illustrative:
Another section of the bill which merits special attention, Mr. President, is title IX.
Recent studies of the phenomenon of organized crime, including that of the National Crime Commission, have identified its alarming expansion into the field of legitimate business as a major threat to our institutions. This penetration of legitimate business by organized crime poses two distinct but related dangers:
First, the economic strength of the underlying illegal operations of organized crime is perpetuated and made more profitable if tainted proceeds can be safely invested in legitimate enterprises, even if those enterprises are operated in a lawful manner.
*1240Second, the free channels of trade are threatened by organized crime’s propensity to obtain for itself monopoly control of its areas by whatever means are available, including brutal and strongarm tactics.
The techniques and methods used in such infiltration of legitimate business enterprises are many and varied. A few case histories will demonstrate how easily a business can fall captive to its awesome power. Hi * * * * *
The legislative proposals contained in title IX of this act, entitled “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,” constitute a carefully structured program which can drastically curtail — and eventually eradicate — the vast expansion of organized crime’s economic power which operates outside the rules of fair competition of the American marketplace. Broadly speaking, this title would create strict criminal penalties for using the proceeds of racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime to acquire an interest in businesses engaged in interstate commerce, or to acquire or operate such businesses by racketeering methods. *1244opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
*1240116 Cong.Rec. 606-607, quoted in United States v. Thompson, supra, 669 F.2d at 1147-1148.
Judge Peck further notes the anomalous result of applying the Act’s remedial provisions to violations involving governmental entities. The Act empowers the court, inter alia, to “[prohibit] any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in” and to “[order] dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976). It would, of course, be absurd to hold that Congress sub silentio granted the district courts such authority vis-a-vis state and local governments. I accordingly agree with Judge Peck’s conclusion that the presence of these remedies in the Act, and their apparent importance to its novelty and efficacy, reveal that “government entities are neither appropriate nor intended RICO ‘enterprises.’ ” United States v. Thompson, supra, 669 F.2d at 1148.
I am aware that this Circuit has held to the contrary in United States v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1264 (8th Cir. 1981). I find the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit’s Thompson decision more persuasive, however. The Clark Court concludes that because the pertinent statutory language does not distinguish between public and private “legal entities,” and because Congress failed to use terms such as “private,” “business” or “commercial” enterprises, the statute necessarily applies to governmental entities. In my view, this approach is overly simplistic and results in an extension of the Act beyond its intended scope.
Although I do not agree with the majority that probable cause existed to believe that RICO violations were being committed, appellant Sedovic did not challenge that probable cause finding in the court below. Accordingly, I join in the Court’s opinion upholding the use of mail fraud evidence obtained as a result of investigating the alleged racketeering offenses.