Court Opinion

ID: 9459421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:19:57.653215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:09.279014
License: Public Domain

MURRAH, Circuit Judge
(concurring specially):
I readily concur in the ultimate result reached in this case but I am unable to agree with the reasoning by which my brethren reached that result. In my view the lawsuit is more simply stated and decided, and I am, therefore, constrained to briefly state my views.
When the bankrupt acquired his 13.2 acres of land, it was outside the city limits of Kansas City, Kansas. He was living on the land as his homestead and truck farm when it was annexed and brought within the city limits, and was so using it when this proceeding was commenced, although the land had been zoned for urban industrial use. He claimed all of the 13.2 acres as his homestead exemption. The referee and the trial court allowed only one acre under the provisions of the Kansas constitution and statute, which provide that “[a] homestead to the extent of one hundred sixty acres of farming land, or of one acre within the limits of an incorporated town or city, occupied as a residence by the family of the owner, together with all the improvements on the same, shall be exempted from forced sale under any process of law, ' . . . .”
In his brief the bankrupt concedes that the referee correctly stated the question involved, as follows: “Did the extension of the city limits, annexation and incorporation of the entire tract of *37413.2 acres into the city of Kansas City, Kansas, subsequent to the ownership and occupancy of the entire tract as a homestead by the bankrupt and his family outside the limits of an incorporated town or city, limit the homestead exemption to one acre?” The bankrupt answers that the extension of the city limits to include his homestead did not operate to “eliminate” or “alienate” his homestead rights in the 13.2 acres. His argument is not entirely clear, but, as we read it, it is twofold: (1) the land continued to be occupied and used for farming purposes, and was, therefore, exempt as farming land, although incorporated within the city limits and zoned for urban industrial use; and (2) any other construction of the Kansas constitution and laws would operate to deny him Fourteenth Amendment due process.
Indisputably the bankrupt is entitled to claim a homestead exemption prescribed by the law of the State of Kansas, but the power of the city to annex the property, even without the consent of the owner, is unquestioned. The question is, as the referee stated, whether inclusion in the city limits can be said to reduce the quantity of the homestead rights from 13.2 acres to one acre. As thus reduced the homestead admittedly remains inviolate.
The homestead provisions of the Kansas constitution and statutes came on for consideration before the Supreme Court of Kansas about one hundred-years ago in Sarahas v. Fenlon. In that case the lands claimed as a homestead exemption were partly within and partly without incorporated city limits. The lands within the city limits were sold on execution, and the question reaching the Supreme Court was whether the husband-wife owners could claim the city property as their homestead exemption. The Supreme Court held that they could not claim any of the city property as their homestead, simply because they did not live on it. But the court did not stop there. It went on to say that “even if the claimant lived on that part of the land within the city, he could hold but one acre as a homestead, exempt from execution, no. matter whether it was worth $10 or $10,000, or whether it was used for farming purposes or was covered all over with a palatial residence. One acre is all that is exempt as a homestead under the constitution. If he lived on that part in the city, that acre would be his homestead, and the residue of the city property as well as his land in the country would be subject to forced sale under execution. This is the plain letter of the constitution; it cannot be enlarged by construction or made plainer by argument.” As far as we can find this unequivocal dictum has never been repudiated or challenged in any court since its pronouncement.
After canvassing the legal effect of the use to which the land was put on the quantity of the exemption, the referee finally concluded that regardless of the value, the use or the zoning classification, the Kansas constitution controlled, and that it meant just what it said, to wit: Since at the time of bankruptcy the 13.2 acres were within the limits of an incorporated city, only one acre was exempt as a homestead. I agree that the mandate of the constitution is too clear for mistake or debate. In this view there is no justification whatsoever for abstention. This is a Meredith case, not a Kaiser Steel case. But even if there was any room for interpretation the word of the Kansas judge, recently of the Supreme Court of that State, is quite good enough for me. See United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir., filed Mar. 13, 1973). Beyond stating the point there is no argument in the brief on the due process question and I will leave it there.