Court Opinion

ID: 9954159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:12:55.647958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.577155
License: Public Domain

J-S08044-24

                                   2024 PA Super 56

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOHN WILLIAM WILLIAMS                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 853 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 16, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-21-CR-0003640-2017

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                    FILED: MARCH 25, 2024

       Appellant, John William Williams, appeals from the order entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County dismissing his first petition

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)1 after we had vacated the PCRA

court’s prior order and remanded with instructions directing it to either appoint

counsel or conduct a proper Grazier2 colloquy before permitting him to

proceed pro se. He contends the PCRA court erred when, after it completed

the colloquy, it forwent a new evidentiary hearing in favor of relying on the

record of his pro se testimony offered at the pre-remand evidentiary hearing.

After careful consideration, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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      This Court previously has set forth the relevant procedural history as

follows:

      By way of background, a jury convicted Appellant of kidnapping,
      robbery, and related offenses in 2019. On June 18, 2019, the trial
      court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of fourteen to
      twenty-eight years’ incarceration. Although Appellant filed a pro
      se notice of appeal, he subsequently filed an application to
      discontinue his direct appeal, which this Court granted on
      February 7, 2020. See Order, 1184 MDA 2019, 2/7/20.

      On September 22, 2021, Appellant filed [a] pro se PCRA petition,
      his first. In the petition, Appellant claimed, among other issues,
      that the trial court, the Commonwealth, and the Department of
      Corrections violated his due process rights by interfering with his
      direct appeal. Pro Se PCRA Pet., 9/22/21, at 4-12. Appellant also
      claimed that his petition was timely under the government
      inference and newly discovered facts exceptions to the PCRA's
      one-year time bar under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii). Id.
      at 4, 12, 21-23. Appellant also requested that Attorney Jividen be
      reappointed as his standby counsel for the PCRA proceedings. Id.
      at 21.

      The PCRA court appointed William Braught, Esq. (“PCRA counsel”)
      to represent Appellant. PCRA counsel subsequently filed a motion
      to withdraw as counsel, and Appellant filed a motion to proceed
      pro se captioned “[Appellant's] motion for leave to proceed self-
      represented in post-conviction proceedings.” On November 4,
      2021, the PCRA court filed an order that granted Appellant's
      motion to proceed pro se, allowed PCRA counsel to withdraw, and
      appointed Attorney Jividen as standby counsel. Appellant filed a
      motion requesting that the entire Court of Common Pleas of
      Cumberland County recuse itself on November 19, 2021.

      The PCRA court held a hearing on December 21, 2021, at which
      Appellant testified. N.T. PCRA Hr'g, 12/21/21, at 5-22. On January
      19, 2022, the PCRA court denied Appellant's PCRA petition.
      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not
      order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
      Nevertheless, Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on April 4,
      2022. The PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion concluding

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      that Appellant's PCRA petition was untimely filed. PCRA Ct. Op.,
      6/28/28, at 3-5.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 293 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. 2023) (non-

precedential decision at *1) (footnotes omitted).

      In this Court’s memorandum decision of February 22, 2023, we vacated

the PCRA court’s order denying PCRA relief because the PCRA court had

allowed Appellant to waive his right to counsel and to proceed pro se at his

PCRA evidentiary hearing without having received a proper Grazier hearing.

Williams, 293 A.3d 632 at *3. We thus remanded the case and directed the

PCRA court “to conduct a Grazier hearing to determine whether Appellant is

indigent and if he wishes to proceed with appointed counsel.” Williams, 293

A.3d 632 at *4.

      We continued, “If Appellant is indigent and he does not waive his right

to counsel, the PCRA court shall appoint new counsel to represent Appellant.

The PCRA court must also provide appointed counsel with a reasonable

opportunity to prepare for an amended petition and for a new evidentiary

hearing.” Id. Significantly, we did not direct a new evidentiary hearing be

held in the event Appellant continued to proceed pro se, which he has done.

      On remand from this Court’s order, the PCRA court held the hearing of

April 25, 2023, in which it initially advised Appellant, inter alia, that if he

wished to exercise his right to counsel then the court would appoint one and

provide Appellant with a new PCRA evidentiary hearing. Appellant, however,

voiced his preference to proceed pro se, prompting the PCRA court to conduct

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an on-the-record Grazier colloquy to ensure his waiver of counsel was

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily tendered. N.T., 4/25/23, at 2-5.

      After completing the Grazier colloquy, the PCRA court adjourned the

proceeding with the understanding that Appellant would proceed with the

present appeal on the evidentiary record as it existed. In the PCRA court’s

subsequent order to this effect, it amplified that it was relying on the record

of the December 21, 2021, evidentiary hearing because it had discerned

nothing from the Grazier hearing to suggest that Appellant’s new pro se

testimony would deviate from his pro se testimony previously given.

      Moreover, Appellant did not request a new evidentiary hearing, nor did

he make an offer of proof as to what he would add to his prior testimony,

which he had given under oath, especially regarding any matter that would

likely change the outcome of the PCRA court’s decision. This timely appeal

followed.

      Appellant raises for this Court’s consideration the following issues on

appeal:

      1. Whether Petitioner’s waiver of counsel at the [April 15, 2023]
         Grazier hearing was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when
         the [PCRA] Court failed to inquire about the Petitioner’s
         background in order to determine if he understood the
         implications of waiving counsel; and

      2. Whether Petitioner’s waiver of counsel Grazier hearing held
         after the PCRA [evidentiary hearing of December 2021, in
         which he testified while deprived of his right to counsel,] can
         be retroactively applied to the PCRA hearing?

Brief of Appellant, at 4.

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     Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the record evidence supports the court's determination

and whether the court's decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. H.

Ford, 947 A.2d 1251 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 59 A.2d 319 (Pa.

2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if

the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd,

923 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 932 A.2d 74 (Pa. 2007). We

give no   such deference, however, to        the court's    legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. J. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190 (Pa. Super. 2012).

     “[A] petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the

PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue

concerning any material fact and the petitioner is not entitled to post-

conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served by any further

proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 121 A.3d 1049, 1052 (Pa. Super.

2015); Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). “A reviewing court on appeal must examine each

of the issues raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record in order to

determine whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there were no

genuine issues of material fact and in denying relief without an evidentiary

hearing.” Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super.

2007).

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       In Appellant’s first issue, he maintains that the PCRA court’s Grazier

colloquy was deficient despite adhering to the dictates of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1213

because it otherwise failed to inquire about his age, educational background,

and basic comprehension skills to ensure that he possesses the ability to

understand the questions posed to him during the waiver colloquy.             See

Commonwealth v. McDonough, 812 A.2d 504, 507 n.1 (Pa. 2002)

(observing, a “waiver colloquy must, of course, always contain a clear

demonstration of the defendant’s ability to understand the questions posed to

him during the colloquy.”).

____________________________________________

3 This Court has observed,

       [Pa.R.Crim.P. 121] indicates that if a defendant seeks to waive his
       right to counsel, six areas of inquiry must be explored and
       explained to the defendant to “ensure that the defendant's waiver
       of the right to counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent[.]”
       Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2). In [Commonwealth v. Meehan, 628
       A.2d 1151 (Pa. Super. 1993)] we noted that some of the precepts
       regarding waiver of counsel in the trial setting were inapplicable
       in the PCRA area. We did hold, however, that if a post-conviction
       waiver of counsel is requested by the defendant, the PCRA court
       must ascertain that “the defendant understands: (1) his right to
       be represented by counsel; (2) that if he waived this right, he will
       still be bound by all normal procedural rules; and (3) that many
       rights and potential claims may be permanently lost if not timely
       asserted.” Id. at 1157; see also Commonwealth v. Powell,
       787 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2001). While we concluded that
       the colloquy conducted therein was sufficient, that case clearly
       indicates four of the six areas of inquiry contained in Rule 121
       apply in the PCRA context.

Commonwealth v. Stossel, 17 A.3d 1286, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2011).

                                           -6-
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      The record belies Appellant’s contention, as it shows that the PCRA court

had ample opportunity prior to the Grazier hearing to witness Appellant’s

articulate and capable pro se presentation of his case through testimony and

argument at the 2021 PCRA evidentiary hearing.         Appellant continued to

demonstrate his ability to understand at the colloquy, where he provided

appropriate and varied responses confirming his comprehension of both his

rights and the nature of the proceedings bearing on his right to counsel. Given

this record, we reject Appellant’s contention that the PCRA court failed to

ensure that he possessed the ability to understand the questions put to him.

      Appellant contends in his second issue that the PCRA court erred at the

conclusion of the Grazier hearing when, after it entered its order

acknowledging Appellant may self-represent, it did not schedule a new PCRA

evidentiary hearing.   Specifically, Appellant charges error with the PCRA

court’s continued reliance on the pro se testimony he offered at the 2021 PCRA

evidentiary hearing when a proper Grazier hearing did not precede it.

      Notably, however, Appellant failed to raise this issue through a timely

objection to the PCRA court’s stated intention to offer a new evidentiary

hearing only if Appellant elected to be represented by newly appointed

counsel. N.T., 4/25/24, at 3. Indeed, prior to that moment, Appellant had

received the PCRA court’s Grazier colloquy admonishment that he would be

bound by all normal rules of procedures, may have rights that if not timely

asserted could be lost permanently, and may lose the right to obtain remedy

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for alleged court errors to which he failed to timely object while acting pro se.

N.T. at 3.    On this basis, alone, may we deny the relief he seeks.        See

Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 611 (Pa. 2013) (finding claims

waived for failure to present them to the PCRA court); Commonwealth v.

Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 601 (Pa. 2007) (“Any claim not raised in the

PCRA petition is waived and not cognizable on appeal.”); Commonwealth v.

Bethune, No. 283 MDA 2023, 2024 WL 511043 (Table) (Pa. Super. filed

February 9, 2024) (non-precedential decision at *5, fn. 10) (“Ordinarily,

failure to raise a claim before the PCRA court results in waiver.”).4       See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 5

       Accordingly, as Appellant’s challenges to the PCRA court’s order afford

him no relief, we affirm.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

4See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating, non-precedential decisions of the Superior
Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value.

5  Relatedly, we observe that Appellant made no offer of proof to the PCRA
court explaining how additional pro se testimony would differ in any
substantive, meaningful way from his previous pro se testimony or would
likely change the outcome of the PCRA court’s decision. As such, he
demonstrates neither merit to his present claim nor, in the alternative, harm
from the PCRA court’s decision to forgo a second evidentiary hearing.
Furthermore, we acknowledge the PCRA court’s legitimate interest in avoiding
waste of judicial resources by holding multiple hearings which involve
duplication of effort and information.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/25/2024

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