Court Opinion

ID: 9399779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 14:13:21.904521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:24.030184
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Beales, Fulton and Lorish
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia

              DEFONTIES MANDELE ANDERSON
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0660-22-4                                   JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES
                                                                                   JUNE 6, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
                                              Louise M. DiMatteo, Judge

                              Marissa Ulman (Office of the Public Defender, on briefs), for
                              appellant.

                              Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Defonties Anderson appeals his sentence of eight months of active incarceration for

              violating the terms of his probation. In his sole assignment of error on appeal, Anderson argues that

              “[t]he Circuit Court erred in imposing a sentence for a technical violation that exceeded the

              limitations established in Va. Code § 19.2-306.1 and was disproportionate to similarly situated

              defendants, in violation of the 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments.”

                                                      I. BACKGROUND

                     In 2015, upon his plea of guilty, the Circuit Court of Arlington County convicted Anderson

              of burglary. The circuit court sentenced Anderson to ten years of imprisonment with six years

              suspended. It also ordered Anderson to submit to four years of supervised probation upon his

              release from prison.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
       Anderson was released from prison in 2019 and did not violate any of the terms of his

probation until September 16, 2021. In the major violation report filed on November 4, 2021,

Anderson’s probation officer stated that Anderson had violated the terms of his probation by

failing to obey local laws and by using a firearm while on probation. The report indicated that

Anderson was arrested in Washington, D.C., on September 16, 2021, on the charge of possession

of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. According to an affidavit submitted by a

D.C. police officer, video footage showed Anderson “producing what appeared to be a firearm

and firing the weapon.” The major violation report also indicated that the D.C. trial court had

released Anderson on bail before his case went to trial. While he was out on bail for his pending

charge in D.C., the Arlington County Sheriff’s Office arrested Anderson on January 10, 2022,

for violating his probation in Virginia.

       At Anderson’s February 25, 2022 revocation hearing, the circuit court found that

Anderson was in violation of his probation because he possessed a firearm in D.C. while on

probation. The trial judge noted, “Clearly he was in possession of a firearm” given what the

D.C. police officer stated in his affidavit. Anderson argued that the circuit court could not

impose any active time of incarceration because Anderson’s conduct constituted a first technical

violation under Code § 19.2-306.1. The Commonwealth initially argued that Anderson violated

a special condition by unlawfully possessing a firearm, but the prosecutor then stated that “it

seems that it is a technical violation” after referencing Code § 19.2-306.1(A). The trial judge

responded by saying, “It’s ridiculous, is what it is.” Despite the Commonwealth’s decision to

proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 and Anderson’s agreement to be sentenced under that statute,

the trial judge reasoned that Code § 19.2-306.1(A) did not limit Anderson’s sentence in this case.

The circuit court then revoked Anderson’s sentence and resuspended all but eight months of

Anderson’s original sentence “for the possession of a firearm.”

                                                -2-
                                          II. ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Anderson only challenges the sentence he received as a result of his probation

violation.1 “A sentencing decision will not be reversed unless the trial court abused its

discretion.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 733, 735 (2007). However, “[a circuit] court by

definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Porter v. Commonwealth, 276

Va. 203, 260 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100

(1996)). Furthermore, whether the circuit court here erroneously interpreted Code § 19.2-306.1

is an issue of statutory interpretation that “is a pure question of law which we review de novo.”

Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104 (2007).

       Code § 19.2-306 provides the statutory authority for a circuit court to revoke a

suspended sentence. “Effective July 1, 2021, Code § 19.2-306(C) was ‘amended and reenacted’

to provide that ‘[i]f the court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has

violated the terms of suspension, then the court may revoke the suspension and impose a

sentence in accordance with the provisions of § 19.2-306.1.’” Green v. Commonwealth, 75

Va. App. 69, 78 (2022) (alteration in original) (quoting 2021 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I c. 538).

“The newly enacted Code § 19.2-306.1 limits the period of active incarceration that a circuit

court can impose for what the statute refers to as certain ‘technical violations’ enumerated under

the new statute.” Id. As is relevant to this case, Code § 19.2-306.1(A)(viii) states that a

probationer commits a “technical violation” if he fails to “refrain from the use, ownership,

possession, or transportation of a firearm.” However, “[i]f the court finds the basis of a violation

of the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence or probation is that the defendant was

convicted of a criminal offense that was committed after the date of the suspension,” then the

circuit court is not restricted—by the number of technical violations in subsection (A)—as to the

       1
         Anderson does not challenge on appeal the circuit court’s determination that he violated
the terms of his probation by possessing a firearm.
                                                -3-
amount of time in the suspended sentence that it can revoke and then impose as active

incarceration. Code § 19.2-306.1(B) (emphasis added).

       Here, the circuit court found that Anderson violated the terms of his probation because

“he was in possession of a firearm.” Anderson is charged with committing this offense on

September 16, 2021, but, according to the record before us on appeal, is not convicted of it. His

revocation hearing was held on February 25, 2022. Given that Anderson’s only probation

violation occurred after July 1, 2021, and given that all of Anderson’s revocation proceedings

occurred after July 1, 2021, Code § 19.2-306.1 must apply in this case to limit the sentence that

the circuit court could impose for Anderson’s probation violation. In addition, the

Commonwealth elected to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 during the revocation proceedings,

and Anderson clearly agreed to proceed under this new statute. See Heart v. Commonwealth, 75

Va. App. 453, 463 (2022) (holding that Code § 19.2-306.1 applies when the Commonwealth

proceeds under this statute and the defendant agrees to be sentenced under this statute); see also

Ruplenas v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 972, 978 (1981) (“We hold that the penalty in existence at

the time of the offense should be applied unless the Commonwealth first elects to proceed under

the new statute and obtains the consent of the defendant to do so.”).

       Applying Code § 19.2-306.1 to this case, it is evident that Anderson’s possession of a

firearm constitutes a “technical violation” under subsection (A)(viii). See Delaune v.

Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 372, 383 (2023) (“When the violation conduct matches the conduct

listed in Code § 19.2-306.1(A), it is, by definition, a ‘technical violation.’”). Despite this being

Anderson’s first technical violation, Code § 19.2-306.1(C) requires that “a first technical

violation based on clause (viii) or (x) of subsection A shall be considered a second technical

violation . . . .” Under Code § 19.2-306.1(C), “the court may impose not more than 14 days of

active incarceration for a second technical violation.” Furthermore, given that Anderson was

                                                -4-
only charged—not convicted—with possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a

felony, the circuit court could not rely on Code § 19.2-306.1(B) to revoke more of Anderson’s

sentence and to sentence him to an active sentence greater than fourteen days of active

incarceration. Therefore, the circuit court erred in imposing a sentence of eight months of active

incarceration for a violation that is treated as “a second technical violation.”

                                        III. CONCLUSION

       Code § 19.2-306.1 applies in this case because the conduct violating Anderson’s

probation took place after July 1, 2021, when Code § 19.2-306.1 went into effect. Furthermore,

the Commonwealth and Anderson agreed that they were proceeding under the new Code

§ 19.2-306.1. Given that Anderson’s charge of possessing a firearm is a probation violation that

is treated as “a second technical violation” under Code § 19.2-306.1, the circuit court could only

handle revocation of the suspended sentence so as to sentence Anderson to a maximum of

fourteen days of active incarceration in this case. Therefore, we must reverse the circuit court’s

decision imposing a sentence of eight months of active incarceration, and we remand to the

circuit court for it to reconsider the amount of the suspended sentence that it is revoking and

imposing as active incarceration so that the sentence of active incarceration imposed is no longer

than the fourteen days allowed under Code § 19.2-306.1.2

                                                                            Reversed and remanded.

       2
          Anderson never raised his constitutional argument in circuit court. Therefore, he has
failed to preserve this argument for appeal. See Rule 5A:18. However, even if it were preserved
for appeal, because we decide Anderson’s assignment of error based on the requirements of
Code § 19.2-306.1, we would not need to reach his constitutional argument here.
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