Court Opinion

ID: 9469624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:45:21.389947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:28.928218
License: Public Domain

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, with whom LOGAN, Circuit Judge,
joins, concurring and dissenting:
I am in agreement with the result reached by the majority’s opinions1 in No. 79-2180, affirming the district court’s denial of Siviglia’s motion for dismissal or a new trial.2 However, I cannot agree with the majority’s ruling in No. 79-1004 that we are without jurisdiction to hear the merits of that original appeal because of an earlier order of remand entered to permit filing and consideration of the motion to dismiss or for a new trial.
The effect of the majority ruling in No. 79-1004 is to dismiss Siviglia’s original pending appeal without any consideration ever being given to the merits of the issues raised by that appeal of right. No sound reason for such a harsh result is given. First, the majority points to no criminal rule nor to any rule or decision of this court holding that after denial of the motions by the district court, consideration of the original appeal would be foreclosed unless the motion to remand were technically worded so as to avoid seeking an “unconditional” or “unqualified” remand, as the Siviglia I and II opinions state. Second, Siviglia’s motion to remand, made so that his motions to dismiss or for a new trial could be filed and considered by the district court, can in no way be read as intending to ask for a dismissal or outright abandonment of his original appeal. Thus applying this new procedural rule, now adopted, to Siviglia’s August 1979 motion to remand unjustly defeats consideration of a criminal appeal on its merits.
First, neither the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor the Rules of Court for the Tenth Circuit specify that to preserve the pending appeal, a motion must be made for a “conditional” or “qualified” remand, as now required by the majority. Moreover, the procedure for such a motion is not clearly staked out. As this court noted in Siviglia I, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 a federal district court may properly entertain a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence during the pendency of an appeal. However, the motion may be granted only on remand of the case. Id. at 835.
*839Rule 33 does not indicate that initial application should not be made in the appellate court for leave to file the motion in the district court.3 In short, I find that the various rules provided no mandatory sequence for the proper procedural steps in such circumstances. Indeed, if this court had adopted the procedure indicated in some other circuits, (see n.3, supra), it would have denied the motion to remand and directed that the Rule 33 motion be filed in the district court, thus preserving the merits of Siviglia’s appeal.4 Most importantly, I find no authority dictating the harsh result of treating Siviglia’s original appeal as abandoned upon the granting of his motion to remand.
Second, I must dissent because we cannot construe Siviglia’s motion to remand as intending to dismiss his original appeal. We cannot reasonably impute to his motion for remand an intent to abandon completely his appeal in No. 79-1004 and to pin all his hopes on persuading the district court to grant a new trial on newly discovered evidence. Such an interpretation of Siviglia’s motion is unjustified.5
A motion to remand, even when not worded as a request for a “conditional” or “limited” remand, is no more than a motion to remand. Yet, in effect, the majority has treated Siviglia’s motion as a motion to dismiss his appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 42(b). The Siviglia II opinion says that Siviglia’s motion stated that if the new trial were granted, further prosecution of the appeal in No. 79-1004 would be unnecessary and that Siviglia further said if the motion were *840denied, he would appeal that denial. The inference is drawn that he intended not to also pursue his original appeal if the new trial were denied. The inference is unjustified, in my judgment, and we should not infer such an intent without a clear basis. In fact, in Siviglia I, the panel earlier concluded (slip op. at 8, 686 F:2d 832 at 836):.
It seems absolutely clear, in the instant case, that Siviglia did not intend that his remand motion made in No. 79-1004 foreclose his future appeal on the merits. That was, however, the effect of the unconditional remand order. (Emphasis added).
I would not infer that Siviglia intended to foreclose pursuing the merits of his appeal in No. 79-1004 and would not hold that the remand order compels that result.
The authorities relied on by the majority do not support this harsh result. Siviglia I cites Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571, a civil case. There the Supreme Court vacated a judgment of the Eighth Circuit, 612 F.2d 377, and held that the court of appeals had improperly reached the merits of an order denying a motion to disqualify an attorney, which the Court held not to be a final decision as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We are not construing § 1291 and the finality rule. In 79-1004, Siviglia perfected an appeal from a final judgment in the district court. That judgment has been neither vacated nor reviewed in any manner and the appeal therefrom remains to be considered on its merits. Moreover, the reliance of Siviglia I on the statement in Firestone that “a jurisdictional ruling may never be made prospective only” is unpersuasive; the rule adopted by the majority here is itself unsound and is not supported by principles of retrospective or prospective application.
The opinions also cite International Union, United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 17 and 28 v. N.L.R.B., 468 F.2d 1139 (D.C.Cir.) and Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co., 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 1090, 63 L.Ed.2d 327 as support for their holding. In International Union, another civil case, the court of appeals had remanded, apparently without a motion from either party, to the Board. The Board conducted hearings and subsequently the court of appeals, sua sponte, ordered the case consolidated with another case for review. At that point, the court’s jurisdiction was challenged and the court stated that, as a result of the “unqualified” remand, the court was divested of jurisdiction. However, the court noted that there had been a new Board order dismissing the complaint and that no aggrieved party had yet appealed that new order. The case is thus unlike Siviglia’s case where the judgment of conviction has not been disturbed, the original appeal from it is not disposed of, and the purpose of the remand has been served by the ruling on the motions in the district court so that appellate jurisdiction can again be exercised.
Three J Farms, still another civil case, is also inapposite. There, the case was removed to the federal court and subsequently it remanded to the state court, which resulted in the federal district court’s loss of jurisdiction. The finality of such transfer of jurisdiction between court systems was indicated by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) which directs that “[a]n order remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise .... ” But cf. Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-46, 96 S.Ct. 584, 590-591, 46 L.Ed.2d 542. This statute furthers expeditious procedure as well as “. . . respect for the state court and ... recognition of principles of comity.” In re La Providencia Development Corporation, 406 F.2d 251, 252 (1st Cir.). We are not concerned with those policies as between the federal and state court systems in the instant criminal case, nor are we guided by such a statute.
I would hold that the order granting Siviglia’s motion to remand resulted not in abandonment of the original appeal, but merely in remand of the case to the district court to permit it to rule on the motion to *841dismiss or for a new trial.6 After that motion was disposed of — here by a denial — I would hold that it is in order for us to proceed to disposition of the merits of the original appeal, after notification of the district court’s ruling. See United States v. Fuentes-Lozano, 600 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.) (previously “remanded to permit the filing and consideration of the proposed motion [for a new trial]” at 580 F.2d 726). After the purpose of the remand has been served, there is no impediment to our re-exercising jurisdiction to decide the case. The procedure in Fuentes-Lozano is parallel to what happened in the instant case, as the wording of the remand order here shows. (See n. 6, supra). After disposition of the motion for a new trial in Fuentes-Lozano, the court of appeals decided the merits of the original appeal under the same docket number. 600 F.2d at 553. The original appeal in the main case and the appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial may be consolidated. See United States v. Butler, 636 F.2d 727, 729 n.** (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019, 101 S.Ct. 3010, 69 L.Ed.2d 392; United States v. Hays, 454 F.2d 274, 275 (9th Cir.).
Procedural rules should be construed to favor hearing criminal appeals on their merits, and not in a technical way which frustrates the statutory right of appeal. For these reasons I must dissent from the refusal to consider the merits in No. 79-1004.

. The panel’s opinion in the instant case, United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d 832 (10th Cir.), will hereinafter be referred to as Siviglia I while the court’s subsequent en banc opinion, United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d 832 (10th Cir.), will be referred to as Siviglia II.

. I am persuaded that the record supports the district court’s finding that it was not shown that the newly discovered evidence in question could not have been obtained in the first trial.

. A number of Circuits have indicated that the motion for a new trial should be made, in the first instance, to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 967 (3d Cir.); United States v. Frame, 454 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 925, 92 S.Ct. 1794, 32 L.Ed.2d 126; Knight v. United States, 213 F.2d 699, 702 (5th Cir.); Zamloch v. United States, 187 F.2d 854, 855-56 (9th Cir.); accord, United States v. Aguillar, 387 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir.); and see 2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 557, pp. 534-35. Our Tenth Circuit opinions and rules have not stated that view.
Thus, though Siviglia’s difficulty might have been circumvented by presenting his motion directly to the district court, see e.g., United States v. Ellison, 557 F.2d 128, 132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965, 98 S.Ct. 504, 54 L.Ed.2d 450; United States v. Hays, 454 F.2d 274, 275 (9th Cir.), our decisions did not require that he should do so. See our own precedent in Heald v. United States, 175 F.2d 878, 883-84 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 859, 70 S.Ct. 101, 94 L.Ed. 526 and United States v. Fuentes-Lozano, 580 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir.). “The purpose of the provision of Rule 33, which permits the hearing, but not the granting of the motion, in a case in which an appeal has been taken, is to expedite proceedings.” Rakes v. United States, 163 F.2d 771, 772 (4th Cir.). Indeed, it has been said that “as here, to avoid delay, the appellant may seek [from the court of appeals] a remand for the purpose of permitting the district court fully to entertain the motion.” United States v. Fuentes-Lozano, supra, 580 F.2d at 726.

. The appeal could then be held in abeyance until the trial judge certified to this court whether he would grant or deny the motion for new trial. See United States v. Smith, 331 F.2d 145, 146 (6th Cir.).

. Siviglia’s motion read in pertinent part as follows:

MOTION TO REMAND

Comes now Defendant-Appellant Joseph A. Siviglia, by and through his attorney of record, Hank Farrah, and respectfully moves this Court to remand to the District Court for the District of New Mexico the above-styled cause. As grounds therefore Defendant-Appellant would show the Court the following:
1. ) That Defendant-Appellant intends to file in the District Court a Motion for Dismissal of Charges or in the alternative for a New Trial, a copy of which is attached hereto, Labeled “Exhibit A”, and incorporated herein by reference. The basis for such motion is newly discovered evidence as more fully explained in the Motion itself.
2. ) If the District Court for the District of New Mexico were to grant Defendant-Appellant’s Motion for Dismissal, this Appeal would be unnecessary. However, if the District Court for the District of New Mexico denies Defendant-Appellant’s Motion for Dismissal, Defendant-Appellant would appeal such denial. Thus it would be expeditious and economical in terms of judicial time and expense if the above-styled appeal were Remanded to permit consideration of Defendant-Appellant’s Motion for dismissal in the Court below.
Defendant-Appellant has sought concurrence of counsel for the United States in this motion and concurrence has been denied.
Respectfully submitted,

. The order of remand was entered on September 7, 1979, by a single Circuit Judge of this court, the order stating that:
This matter comes on for consideration of appellant’s motion to remand the captioned cause to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico for the purpose of permitting the appellant to file with said court a motion for dismissal of the charges or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
Upon consideration whereof, appellant’s motion is granted.
The captioned case is vacated from this Court’s September Calendar on Friday, September 14, 1979, and counsel are excused from attendance at that time.
It is further ordered that the cause is remanded to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
The Clerk shall certify a copy of this order to the said court as and for the mandate.