Court Opinion

ID: 9760658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:07:21.888639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:15.486554
License: Public Domain

*138Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
In an incident that lasted over thirteen hours, defendant Diego Vallejo repeatedly assaulted his paramour while keeping her confined in a locked room. The victim ultimately was able to escape, the police were called, and defendant was tried and convicted for those events. Defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied and, in an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence.
Rejecting the reasoning, analysis and findings advanced by the Appellate Division, the majority concludes that defendant’s “brief trial was poisoned by the recurring admission of evidence of other crimes and wrongdoings by defendant, and by reference to the domestic violence restraining order against him.” Ante at 124, 965 A.2d at 1182. The majority also concludes that “[t]he trial judge’s curative instruction was too little, too late.” Ibid. Based on those conclusions, the majority holds that “defendant was denied the fair trial to which all defendants, regardless of the strength of the case against them, are entitled[, and therefore, a new trial is required.” Ibid. I respectfully dissent.
It is telling that defendant did not object to the testimony of alleged prior bad acts elicited from the prosecution’s witnesses, testimony that centered in large measure on the fact that defendant had battered his paramour on earlier occasions.1 It is also *139telling, as the Appellate Division noted, that it was “the judge [who] acknowledged the need for a curative instruction concerning the testimony about the prior alleged incidents, and said that he would give a curative instruction the next day.” Yet, as the panel also made clear, “[n]either side proposed any language for that instruction.” The trial court then charged the jury that
During the course of the trial, also, things were blurted out that have nothing to do with this case. You can’t use any of that blurted out information because that’s not part of this case. Do you understand what I am saying? It’s what you heard from the witness stand. Both parties have a right for you to consider only that which was dealt with in this courtroom relating to an incident that happened on May 21st, 2005 in North Brunswick. Nothing before this, nothing after this.
As the Appellate Division tersely noted, defendant “did not object to this instruction” and defendant never requested a mistrial on those grounds.
No doubt, the statements made concerning defendant’s prior assaults of the victim and the resulting restraining order entered against defendant likely should not have been admitted at this trial.2 However, as the Appellate Division aptly noted, “[w]hen inadmissible evidence ‘comes to the attention of the jury,’ it is within the discretion of the trial court to either issue a curative instruction or grant a mistrial.” (quoting State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 646-47, 477 A.2d 323 (1984)). Assessing whether the curative instruction given was sufficient, the panel noted that
“The adequacy of a curative instruction necessarily focuses on the capacity of the offending evidence to lead to a verdict that could not otherwise be justly reached.” Id. at 647 [477 A2d 323], Even in the context of an error of constitutional magnitude, the Court has stated that “not ‘any’ possibility can be enough for a rerun of the trial. The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.” Ibid. “Unless manifest injustice would result, the trial court’s decision will be affirmed.” State v. Hogan 297 N.J.Super. 7 [687 A.2d 751] (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 142 [693 A2d 111] (1997).
The panel concluded that, “[bjecause defendant did not object to the curative instruction, any error is not cognizable on appeal *140unless it was ‘clearly capable of producing an unjust result.’” (quoting State v. Bragg, 295 N.J.Super. 459, 468, 685 A.2d 488 (App.Div.1996); R. 2:10-2).
The Appellate Division then reasoned that “[w]hen determining whether a curative instruction is adequate, the ... focus[is] on when it was given and whether it was forceful or specific.” It concluded that, on the whole, the jury charge given “specifically directs the jury to only consider evidence about the day in question” and that, in those circumstances, “‘[w]e must assume that the jury understood and followed that instruction.’ ” (quoting State v. Mays, 321 N.J.Super. 619, 630, 729 A.2d 1074 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 132, 741 A.2d 99 (1999)). The panel further concluded that, “[e]ven if the trial court’s curative instruction was inadequate, it was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result in light of the overwhelming evidence in the record of defendant’s guilt.” (citing R. 2:10-2).
The Appellate Division’s reasoning and conclusions express a reasoned and measured view: if there was error in the admission of some of the testimony in this case, the absence of any contemporaneous objections requires that the case be viewed through the prism of plain error. See State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 312, 901 A.2d 363 (2006) (explaining that evidentiary determinations are subject to “harmless error” standard, to be disregarded unless “ ‘of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.’ ” (quoting R. 2:10-2)). The same result obtains if the focus shifts from the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence to the curative instruction thereafter given by the trial court:
Because defendant did not object to the jury instructions at trial, we must apply the plain error standard. R. 2:10-2; State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 [874 A.2d 1084] (2005). We will reverse on the basis of unchallenged error if we find error that was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. In the context of a jury charge, plain error requires demonstration of “[l]egal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.” State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 [688 A.2d 97] (1997) (citations omitted). We consider *141alleged error in light of “the totality of the entire charge, not in isolation.” State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 [901 A.2d 351] (2006). We have recognized that error in a jury instruction that is “crucial to the jury’s deliberations on the guilt of a criminal defendant” is a “ ‘poor candidatet ] for rehabilitation’ under the plain error theory.” Jordan, supra, 147 N.J. at 422 [688 A.2d 97] (citation omitted). Nevertheless, any alleged error also must be evaluated in light “of the overall strength of the State’s case.” Chapland, supra, 187 N.J. at 289 [901 A.2d 351].
[State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 341, 929 A.2d 1041 (2007).]
Thus, even if it was error to admit the statements concerning defendant’s prior assaults of the victim; and even if it was error to admit the concededly fleeting testimony concerning the domestic violence restraining order entered against defendant; and even if the curative instruction given somehow is deemed insufficient, the bedrock principles that rightly define the scope of appellate review nevertheless require that defendant overcome the overwhelming proofs of guilt in this case. In that context, one must conclude, as the Appellate Division did, that the strong independent evidence presented by the State—the victim’s “extremely detailed testimony about what happened that day[;]” the photographs of the victim’s bruises; the police officer’s testimony concerning the appearance of the bedroom where the victim was held against her will and assaulted, which corroborated the victim’s account; the victim’s “demeanor” when the police officer spoke with her; and the police officer’s observation of defendant when he grabbed the victim and preventing her from leaving—commands the conclusion that the complained-of errors were not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
In the final analysis, even if one “assume[s] that the jurors took into account all of what transpired at trial,” ante at 137, 965 A.2d at 1190, the majority’s conclusion that “we can have no confidence that defendant’s convictions for kidnapping, robbery, terroristic threats, and assault that arose out of this failed romantic relationship were based only upon admissible evidence[and, t]hus, a new trial is required[,]” ibid,., does not accord proper due to the strength of the proofs presented to the jury. When, as here, testimony is admitted without a contemporaneous objection; when, as here, defendant fails to tender any form of a curative *142instruction; and when, as here, defendant also fails to object to the curative instruction given, our polestar should be whether the end result of that trial was fair. Given the quantum and quality of the State’s ease, the conclusion is inescapable: defendant was fairly convicted of the crimes for which he stood charged. Those convictions should be affirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice RABNER and Justice LONG, LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, and HOENS—5.
For affirmance—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.

 On direct testimony, these consisted of the victim’s testimony that, when she telephoned her mother for help, her mother knew that something was amiss between defendant and the victim because they had had "incidents before;" the mother's subsequent tape-recorded 911 call, when, in response to the dispatcher’s inquiry as to whether "anything like this happened before," the victim’s mother replied "Oh ... many times[;]” the victim's statement, during direct examination, that "Okay, I got confused when you said May. I thought it was the incident in East Brunswick. All right, this is the one that happened in New Brunswickf;]” and, in response to the prosecutor's question whether, "as a result of this[,] did you get a restraining order against defendant,]” the victim replied "yes, and it was finalized.” Finally, on cross-examination, the responding police officer was asked whether the victim's mother was "encouraging [him] to arrest [defendant]” and he replied that the victim’s mother “was claiming that [defendant] had beaten [the victim] up in the past and things of that nature.”

 Defendant also asserts that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the testimony concerning the prior domestic violence restraining order.