Court Opinion

ID: 9407199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 06:00:15.933784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:36.219064
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     WILLIAM COY,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DC-0752-18-0528-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,                     DATE: July 5, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Alexis N. Tsotakos, Esquire, and Christopher H. Bonk, Esquire, Silver
             Spring, Maryland, for the appellant.

           Christopher Sterbenz, Gabriel A. Hindin, and Michael Morelli,
             Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross
     petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal
     on due process grounds and concluded that the appellant did not prove any of his
     reprisal claims.   For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the petition for

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     review and the cross petition for review. We AFFIRM the administrative judge’s
     decision to reverse the removal on due process grounds. We further MODIFY the
     administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s claim         of reprisal for
     whistleblowing disclosures and protected activity (filing Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC) complaints), still finding that the appellant did not prove these
     claims.   We VACATE the administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s
     claims of reprisal for prior equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity and for
     filing an appeal pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and
     Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), and we REMAND these claims to
     the Washington Regional Office for notice and further adjudication in accordance
     with this Remand Order. We also DENY the appellant’s petition to enforce the
     administrative judge’s interim relief order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The following facts, as recited in the initial decision, are generally
     undisputed.   Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 38, Initial Decision (ID).       The
     appellant filed a USERRA appeal in which he asserted that his starting salary as a
     Supervisory Human Capital Specialist (Director of Compensation and Benefits),
     should have been increased because of his status as a military veteran. ID at 3;
     Coy v. Department of the Treasury, MSPB Docket No. DC-4324-17-0272-I-1.
     During the appellant’s sworn deposition in the USERRA appeal, the agency
     learned that he used his status as an agency employee to acce ss agency electronic
     systems to misappropriate confidential employee data, which he emailed to his
     home computer and used to prosecute lawsuits against the agency. ID at 3 -4.
     The administrative judge dismissed the USERRA appeal as withdrawn in
     May 2017.     ID at 4.    However, the agency determined that the appellant’s
     admission of such misconduct had formed the factual basis for a removal action,
     and it removed him on a single charge of misuse of Government property
     supported by three specifications. ID at 3-4.
                                                                                        3

¶3         The appellant filed a Board appeal and raised claims of a due process
     violation, harmful procedural error, and reprisal for prior EEO activity, for his
     OSC complaints, and for his prior USERRA appeal. ID at 4; IAF, Tab 1. He
     subsequently withdrew his hearing request. ID at 1-2; IAF, Tabs 29-30. In the
     initial decision, the administrative judge reversed the removal action on due
     process grounds. ID at 4-13. In particular, the administrative judge noted that
     the deciding official, in her deposition, identified numerous facts regarding the
     appellant’s alleged performance deficiencies that she considered in the penalty
     analysis that were not specifically articulated in the proposal notice or decision
     letter. ID at 9-13. The administrative judge determined in the alternative that the
     appellant proved his claim of harmful procedural error.              ID at 13.   The
     administrative judge further found that the appellant did not prove any of his
     reprisal claims. ID at 13-18. The administrative judge ordered the agency to
     cancel the removal action and retroactively restore the appellant, effective
     April 13, 2018, and pay him the appropriate amount of back pay with interest and
     other adjustments. ID at 19. The administrative judge also ordered the agency to
     provide interim relief if either party filed a petition for review. ID at 20.
¶4         The agency has filed a petition for review, and the appellant has filed a
     response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. The appellant has filed a
     cross petition for review, to which the agency has filed a response. PFR File,
     Tabs 3, 7. The appellant has also filed a petition to enforce the interim relief
     order, the agency has responded to this petition, and the appellant has replied.
     PFR File, Tabs 5-6, 8-10.
¶5         While this matter was pending on review, the agency removed the appellant
     based on the same misuse of Government property charge and specifications,
     effective December 28, 2019, and a different administrative judge sustained this
     second removal action.      Coy v. Department of the Treasury, MSPB Docket
     No. DC-0752-20-0325-I-1, Initial Decision (Apr. 15, 2021). The U.S. Court of
     Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) found that the second removal
                                                                                        4

     action was permissible while the first removal action was still pen ding before the
     Board because the second removal action cured the procedural deficiency of the
     first removal action and did not “evade” the first decision, and it upheld the
     removal. Coy v. Department of the Treasury, 43 F.4th 1334, 1337-40 (Fed. Cir.
     2022).

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     We affirm the administrative judge’s decision to reverse the removal on due
     process grounds.
¶6         In the initial decision, the administrative judge made the following findings:
     (1) the deciding official’s consideration of the appellant’s subordinates’ concerns
     about his management style and/or competence and the deciding official’s own
     concerns about his performance deficiencies were not raised in either the proposal
     or decision letters; (2) the appellant never had a chance to respond to or address
     these considerations before the removal was effected; (3) these considerations
     were not cumulative; and (4) they were the type of information likely to result in
     pressure on the deciding official to rule in a particular manner. ID at 9 -12. The
     administrative judge therefore concluded that the deciding official’s consideration
     of such information without notice to the appellant violated his due process
     rights.   ID at 4-13.   She also determined in the alternative that the deciding
     official’s consideration of such evidence amounted to harmful procedural error.
     ID at 13.
¶7         In its petition for review, the agency argues that the administrative judge
     erred when she determined that the deciding official violated the appellant’s due
     process rights when she considered his job performance in setting the penalty, the
     appellant knew that the deciding official would consider his job performance
     because the proposing official told him so, and the administrative judge
     incorrectly applied the rule on ex parte communications. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6 -7.
     The agency also contends that the administrative judge’s harmful procedural er ror
     analysis was erroneous. Id. at 7-8.
                                                                                         5

¶8        The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that, “[t]he
     introduction   of   new   and   material   information   by   means   of   ex   parte
     communications to the deciding official undermines the public employee ’s
     constitutional due process guarantee of notice (both of the charges and of the
     employer’s evidence) and the opportunity to respond.” Stone v. Federal Deposit
     Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Not every ex parte
     communication is a procedural defect so substantial and so likely to cause
     prejudice that it undermines the due process guarantee and entitles the claimant to
     an entirely new administrative proceeding; rather, only ex parte communications
     that introduce new and material information to the deciding official will violate
     the due process guarantee of notice. Id. The Board will consider the following
     factors, among others, to determine whether an ex parte contact is constitutionally
     impermissible:      (1) whether the ex parte communication merely introduces
     “cumulative” information or new information; (2) whether the employee knew of
     the error and had a chance to respond to it; and (3) whether the ex parte
     communications were of the type likely to result in undue pressure upon the
     deciding official to rule in a particular manner.    Id. at 1377. Ultimately, the
     inquiry of the Board is whether the ex parte communication is so substantial and
     so likely to cause prejudice that no employee can fairly be required to be
     subjected to a deprivation of property under such circumstances. Id. The Board
     has held that this analysis applies to penalty considerations.             Wilson v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 120 M.S.P.R. 686, ¶ 9 (2014), aff’d,
     595 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2015). For the following reasons, we agree with the
     administrative judge that the agency violated the appellant’s due process rights.
¶9        In the proposal notice, the proposing official advised the appellant that she
     considered his job performance, among other things. IAF, Tab 5 at 83. In the
     decision letter, the deciding official noted that she considered the appellant’s
     “lack of any prior disciplinary record,” “[his] record of job performance,” and
     “[his] 15 years of Federal service.” Id. at 15. However, during her deposition,
                                                                                          6

      the deciding official testified that she considered that his “direct reports were all
      very, very upset,” “had significant concerns about [him],” and “many felt very
      demoralized by him, not supported, no engagement on actually understanding the
      programs and . . . what our processes are.” IAF, Tab 32 at 311 -12 (deposition
      testimony of the deciding official).
¶10         We have considered the agency’s contention that the appellant had notice
      that his job performance would be considered. We agree that the appellant did
      have general notice that his job performance would be considered, and he stated
      in his response to the notice of proposed removal that he had a “sterling” 15 -year
      record of Federal service and noted that his supervisors across “multiple
      agencies . . . unanimously elected to rate him at the highest performance level
      available.” IAF, Tab 5 at 50. However, there is little, if any, evidence that the
      appellant had any meaningful knowledge of any of the subordinates’ stated
      concerns or that the agency would rely on such concerns in its decision. Notably,
      it is undisputed that the appellant did not have an annual performance appraisal
      due to his short tenure at the agency. IAF, Tab 32 at 315 (deposition testimony of
      the deciding official), 492 (sworn declaration of the appellant). Moreover, in his
      declaration, made under penalty of perjury, the appellant stated that his midyear
      evaluation was “meets performance standards,” 2 at no point did the proposing
      official (who was also his first-line supervisor) or the deciding official ever tell
      him that they had any concerns about his performance, and the first t ime he
      became aware of performance concerns was after he reviewed the deciding
      official’s deposition. IAF, Tab 32 at 492.
¶11         We have considered the proposing official’s deposition testimony that she
      held “at least four” meetings between February 2017 and Apr il or May 2017 with
      the appellant and the two subordinate managers who complained about him, and

      2
        According to the appellant, the two rating options for the midyear review were
      something to the effect of “meets performance standards” and “does not meet
      performance standards at this time.” IAF, Tab 32 at 492.
                                                                                             7

      she suggested that the appellant retain an executive coach.              IAF, Tab 32
      at 134-35, 139-40 (deposition testimony of the proposing official). However, the
      agency presented no documentary evidence or written communications that would
      advise the appellant that the agency had any significant concerns about his
      performance. 3 Therefore, we are not persuaded that the appellant had sufficient
      notice that any such concerns would be considered in this removal action.
      Indeed, the Board has found that a deciding official’s similar consideration of
      performance-related information not specified in the decision letter constituted a
      due process violation.      See, e.g., Howard v. Department of the Air Force,
      118 M.S.P.R. 106, ¶ 6 (2012) (finding that a deciding official’s consideration of
      ex parte information regarding the appellant’s audit production numbers being
      lower than the agency’s individual production goal for a single year and his
      general poor performance was not cumulative because it concerned specific
      information of alleged performance deficiencies); Silberman v. Department of
      Labor, 116 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 12 (2011) (explaining that ex parte communications
      are plainly material when the deciding official has admitted that the information
      influenced her penalty determination).
¶12         Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s decision to reverse the
      removal on due process grounds. We need not reach the issue of whether the

      3
        In its petition for review, the agency includes an unsigned, undated document, entitled
      “Notes on [the appellant],” which appears to have been written by the proposing official
      and which appears to document a summary of meetings that purp ortedly occurred
      between managers, the proposing official, and the appellant about his competency and
      management style. PFR File, Tab 1 at 32-33. The agency indicates that it provided
      such evidence to the appellant during discovery. Id. at 21-22 & n.65. Under 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.115, the Board will not generally consider evidence submitted for the first time
      with the petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record
      was closed despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service,
      3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). We are not persuaded that this unsigned and undated
      document, in the absence of any corresponding contextual information, warra nts any
      further consideration.
                                                                                               8

      agency also committed harmful procedural error. 4             Alford v. Department of
      Defense, 118 M.S.P.R. 556, ¶ 7 & n.4 (2012); Silberman, 116 M.S.P.R. 501,
      ¶ 4 n.3.

      We modify the initial decision to supplement the administrative judge’s analysis
      of the appellant’s claim of reprisal for filing OSC complaints, but a different
      outcome is not warranted.
¶13         In his cross petition for review, the appellant reiterates that his
      December 2016 OSC complaint was protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B) and
      his November 30, 2017 OSC Complaint, which he filed after the agency proposed
      his removal, was protected by section 2302(b)(9)(C). PFR Fil e, Tab 3 at 23; IAF,
      Tab 32 at 531-42. The administrative judge gave the appellant proper notice of
      his burden to prove this claim of reprisal, and the record is fully developed on
      these issues; therefore, it is appropriate to address these arguments on review.
      Based on our review of the record, as explained below, we affirm the
      administrative judge’s finding that the December 2016 OSC complaint was not
      protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B). 5          We modify the initial decision to
      alternatively consider whether the appellant’s December 2016 OSC complaint is
      protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) 6 and to evaluate his claim regarding his

      4
        In addition, because we are reversing the agency’s action on due process grounds we
      need not determine whether the agency proved the charge or make other merits
      findings, as those issues are not material.
      5
        Section 2302(b)(8)(B) makes it a prohibited personnel practice “to t ake or fail to take,
      or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any employee or
      applicant for employment because of any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the
      Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the
      agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the employee or applicant
      reasonably believes evidences . . . any violation (other than a violation of this section)
      of any law, rule, or regulation, or . . . gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
      abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety .”
      6
        Section 2302(b)(9)(C) makes it a prohibited personnel practice “to take or fail to take,
      or threaten to take or fail to take, any personnel action against any employee or
      applicant for employment because of . . . cooperating with or disclosing information to
      the Inspector General (or any other component responsible for internal investigation or
                                                                                          9

      November 30, 2017 OSC complaint.           For the following reasons, a different
      outcome is not warranted.

            December 2016 OSC Complaint
¶14         The administrative judge determined that the appellant’s December 2016
      OSC complaint, in which he alleged that the agency violated the Equal Pay Act
      and its own internal processes in its salary-setting decisions, did not constitute a
      whistleblowing disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B).         ID at 14-18; IAF,
      Tab 32 at 531-42. She noted that the agency’s failure to set his pay consistent
      with salary-setting policy decisions is not a claim that the agency violated a law,
      rule, or regulation.      ID at 18.   Additionally, she concluded that he did not
      reasonably believe that the agency violated the Equal Pay Act because his salary
      was set at a rate less than his peers in the private sector and that his allega tions
      were conclusory.    Id.    She found in the alternative that, even if the appellant
      satisfied his prima facie burden, the agency proved by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have removed him in the absence of any protected
      disclosure. ID at 14-18.
¶15         We discern no error with the administrative judge’s evaluation of the
      December 2016 OSC complaint pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B). Notably,
      the Equal Pay Act, found at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1),expressly prohibits wage
      discrimination between employees on the basis of sex. The appellant’s contention
      that his pay was set at a rate lower than “national and local rates paid by
      employers in the private sector,” IAF, Tab 32 at 533, does not demonstrate that
      he had a reasonable belief that he was disclosing a violation of the Equal Pay Act.
      The appellant’s petition for review does not persuade us that the administrative
      judge erred in her findings regarding this claim.

      review) of an agency, or the Special Counsel, in accordance with applicable provisions
      of law.”
                                                                                                          10

¶16          Although not raised by the appellant below or on review, IAF, Tab 32 at 34;
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 23, we have considered whether the appellant’s December
      2016    OSC    complaint     could     constitute     activity       protected      by     5    U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C), which states that it is a prohibited personnel practice to, among
      other things, take a personnel action against any employee because of “disclosing
      information to . . . the Special Counsel, in accordance with applicable provisions
      of law.” In contrast to the provision at subsection 2302(b)(8)(B), which requires
      proof of a disclosure to OSC of a reasonable belief of any violation of any law,
      rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
      authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health of safety to be
      protected, section 2302(b)(9)(C) imposes no requirements on the content of the
      appellant’s communications with OSC,                  see, e.g., Pridgen v. Office of
      Management        and   Budget,   2022      MSPB         31,      ¶ 62   (finding     that     section
      2302(b)(9)(C) covers employee disclosures to OSC regardless of content). We
      conclude that the appellant’s December 2016 OSC complaint is protected by
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C).
  ¶17        We next consider whether the protected activity was a contributing factor in
      the removal action.       One way of proving that an appellant's prior protected
      activity    was     a   contributing       factor   in        a    personnel     action        is   the
      “knowledge/timing”        test.      See    Shibuya      v.       Department     of      Agriculture,
      119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 22 (2013). Under this test, an appellant can establish that
      his prior protected activity was a contributing factor in the challenged action by
      showing that the deciding official knew of the protected activity and took the
      personnel action within a period of time such that a reasonable person could
      conclude that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the action. Id.;
      See also Alarid v. Department of Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 13 (2015).
¶18          The appellant asserted below and on review that OSC contacted the agency
      as part of its investigation into his December 2016 complaint, and he speculated
      that the proposing and deciding officials had knowledge of this complaint. IAF,
                                                                                             11

      Tab 32 at 490; PFR File, Tab 3 at 24. He does not cite to, and we are not aware
      of, any evidence that the proposing or deciding officials had any actual
      knowledge of the December 2016 OSC complaint; his speculatio n on this issue
      does not constitute preponderant evidence in this regard.
¶19           However, an appellant may show that his protected activity was a
      contributing factor by proving that the official taking the action had constructive
      knowledge of the whistleblowing disclosure or activity, even if the official lacked
      actual knowledge. Nasuti v. Department of State, 120 M.S.P.R. 588, ¶ 7 (2014).
      An appellant may establish constructive knowledge by demonstrating that an
      individual with actual knowledge of the disclosure or activity influenced the
      official accused of taking the retaliatory action. Id.
¶20           The Board’s electronic records reflect that the appellant filed an individual
      right    of   action   (IRA)    appeal   in   which   he   specifically   identified   his
      December 2016 OSC complaint as the relevant disclosure, and the appeal was
      dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in February 2017. Coy v. Department of the
      Treasury, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-17-0278-W-1, Initial Decision (Feb. 9,
      2017). The agency was represented by counsel in the IRA appeal, the proposing
      official testified in her deposition that she “worked with the legal office to put
      [the September 20, 2017 notice of proposed removal] together,” and the deciding
      official likewise testified in her deposition that she worked with the “attorneys”
      regarding questions about the notice of proposed removal and the process of
      drafting the decision to remove the appellant.         IAF, Tab 32 at 93 (deposition
      testimony of the proposing official), 264-65, 333 (deposition testimony of the
      deciding official). In fact, the deciding official testified in her deposition that the
      “attorneys . . . do a first version” of the decision letter, which she then edited. Id.
      at 297 (deposition testimony of the deciding official). Based on this evidence, we
      find for the purposes of our analysis that, through the agency’s counsel, the
      proposing and deciding officials had constructive knowledge of the December
      2016 OSC complaint.            See, e.g., Cahill v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
                                                                                            12

      821 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that “when read with an eye on
      likely inferences appropriate to the context, Mr. Cahill’s allegations are
      sufficiently specific and plausible to constitute nonfrivolous assertions that at
      least one, and perhaps three, of the officials charged with the personnel actions at
      issue attended the March 2012 meeting or at least knew what Mr. Cahill disclosed
      there.”); Jessup v. Department of Homeland Security, 107 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 10 (2007)
      (finding that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that his disclosure was a
      contributing factor in the agency’s decision to remove him based on his claim that
      the agency decision makers either knew of the disclosure via the C hief of Staff or
      were influenced by the Chief of Staff who knew of the disclosure). 7
¶21         Having found that the knowledge element is satisfied, we now turn to the
      timing element of the knowledge/timing test. The record reflects that the agency
      proposed the appellant’s removal on September 20, 2017, and his removal was
      effected on April 13, 2018. IAF, Tab 5 at 14, 82. The Board has held that a
      personnel action taken within approximately 1 to 2 years of the appellant’s
      disclosures satisfies the knowledge/timing test.         Mastrullo v. Department of
      Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21 (2015).           Accordingly, we conclude that the
      appellant has satisfied the knowledge/timing test, and therefore he has met his
      burden to show that his protected activity was a contributing factor in his
      removal.
¶22         In determining whether an agency has shown by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of
      protected activity, the Board will consider the following factors: the strength of
      the agency’s evidence in support of its action; the existence and strength of any
      motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the

      7
        Although Cahill and Jessup were individual right of action appeals, and the issue was
      whether the appellant had made nonfrivolous allegations of Board jurisdiction, we find
      that the principles articulated therein are equally applicable under the circumstances of
      this matter.
                                                                                      13

      decision; and any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against
      employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.
      Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
  ¶23      As explained below, the agency’s evidence in support of its action is
      generally strong. The misuse of Government property charge requires proof of
      unauthorized use. Diaz v. Department of the Army, 56 M.S.P.R. 415, 420 (1993).
      The agency’s charge included three specifications alleging that, on March 16,
      2017, during a sworn deposition, the appellant stated in pertinent part that he
      (1) accessed and downloaded personnel data from an Office of the Comptroller
      for Currency (OCC) system to include, among other things, names, titles, band
      levels, social security numbers, and service computation dates for 94 employe es
      “for [his] own personal use and without authorization”; (2) accessed and
      downloaded 80 pages of OCC new hire salary justification rollup information
      “for [his] own personal use and without authorization”; and (3) emailed the
      information described in specifications 1 and 2 to his personal email account and
      stored the information on his personal computer at home, and he was not
      authorized to remove OCC personnel information from the OCC, transmit such
      information outside of OCC’s networks, or store OCC per sonnel information on
      his personal computer. ID at 3; IAF, Tab 5 at 82. The administrative judge did
      not specifically evaluate whether the agency proved the specifications and charge
      by preponderant evidence; however, in the context of evaluating the app ellant’s
      affirmative defenses, the administrative judge stated that she would have
      sustained the charge and supporting specifications absent her findings on the due
      process and harmful procedural error issues. ID at 15-16.
¶24        In his cross petition for review, the appellant makes the following
      arguments: (1) he was authorized to access personnel data and new hire salary
      justification rollup information; (2) he did not email the data described in
      specifications 1 and 2 to his personal email address or store that information on
      his personal computer; and (3) his good-faith attempts to comply with the
                                                                                          14

      agency’s discovery demands cannot sustain the agency’s charge. PFR File, Tab 3
      at 11-18.
¶25         In his response to the agency’s discovery requests in the USERRA appea l,
      the appellant referenced as support for his claim an “OCC New Hire Salary
      Justification Excel Export” and a “Salary listing for all OCC employees who[] are
      in occupational series 0201, regardless of band level,” and he included as
      attachments “OCC New Hire Salary Justification Rollup from Sharepoint.pdf”
      and “OCC HC Employee Listing 20170214.pdf.” IAF, Tab 32 at 499 -500, Tab 33
      at 150-231, Tab 35 at 72-74. In his deposition in that matter, the appellant was
      questioned at length about these documents. IAF, Tab 5 at 124-36 (deposition
      testimony of the appellant). In pertinent part, the appellant explained that he had
      created the OCC New Hire Salary Justification Excel spreadsheet by “playing
      around in the [new hire salary justification SharePoint site,] ” “export[ing] all of
      the information into an Excel worksheet,” and adding additional columns of
      information, such as “recommended base salary including Geo[sic] pay,” and
      “percent increase.”     Id. at 124-25 (deposition testimony of the appellant).
      Regarding the salary listing chart, the appellant testified that it was a list of all
      employees in     the   agency in the       0201   Human Resources        Management
      Occupational Series, and the data itself came from the National Finance Center
      Reporting Center, which is a database that is accessible to certain Human Capital
      employees. Id. at 126-27 (deposition testimony of the appellant).
  ¶26       Neither party disputes that the appellant was authorized to access and
      review generally the personnel data in question as part of his duties. Rather, the
      ultimate question presented in specifications one and two is whether the
      appellant’s compilation and use of such personnel data for litigation against the
      agency was authorized. 8

      8
       We reject the appellant’s contention that specifications 1 and 2 were “limited to
      whether or not Appellant was authorized to access certain data.” PFR File, Tab 3 at 13.
                                                                                      15

¶27         Importantly, the agency’s Appropriate Use of OCC Infor mation Technology
      (IT) Manual specifically stated that “[a]uthorized purposes are those for which
      OCC IT resources are issued (e.g., job-related tasks) or those functions authorized
      in accordance with law or regulation.” 9 IAF, Tab 33 at 136. We have considered,
      as described in the attachment to this Manual, that the agency “has a longstanding
      practice of allowing employees limited use of government IT equipment . . . for
      personal, nongovernmental purposes during non-work time.”        Id. at 143.   The
      agency provided several examples of authorized limited personal use of OCC IT,
      including such minor tasks as using a calculator or spreadsheet for personal
      finances, composing or printing a résumé or job application, exchanging emails
      with friends or family, making internet purchases on a personal charge card, and
      checking websites for information on personal interests, weather, job vacancies,
      news, or sporting events. Id. The agency also provided examples of unauthorized
      personal use, which include using OCC IT to gain unauthorized access to OCC
      and other information systems, and creating, downloading, viewing, or storing
      sexually explicit, threatening, or harassing material. Id.
¶28         The appellant’s decision to compile and use the personnel data as described
      above to support his litigation against the agency was not a job-related task nor
      was it authorized in accordance with any law or regulation.         Moreover, the
      appellant’s compilation and use of such information for litigation purposes
      against the agency does not align with the authorized limited personal uses
      described above. Finally, we have considered the appellant’s argument that his
      reference to and production of these documents constituted a good -faith attempt
      to comply with the agency’s discovery demands, PFR File, Tab 3 at 17-18, but we
      are not persuaded that a different outcome is warranted. The appellant has not
      cited, and we are unaware of, any exception to the agency’s authorized use policy

      9
        The appellant does not contend that he was unaware of this policy or any other
      relevant policies.
                                                                                         16

      involving discovery requests in an ongoing litigation matter. Fo r these reasons,
      we find the evidence in support of specifications 1 and 2 to be strong.
¶29         We now turn to specification 3, which alleged that the appellant testified in
      his deposition that he emailed the information described in specifications 1 and 2
      to his personal email account and stored the information on his personal computer
      at home, but he was not authorized to remove OCC personnel information from
      the OCC, transmit such information outside of OCC’s networks, or store OCC
      personnel information on his personal computer. IAF, Tab 5 at 82.
¶30         The appellant testified in his March 16, 2017 deposition that he submitted
      his   response   to   the   agency’s   discovery   requests,    which   included   the
      aforementioned documents, to the agency by email.              Id. at 134 (deposition
      testimony of the appellant). The appellant explained that he originally sent his
      discovery responses to the agency from his “personal email address,” but because
      the agency attorney did not receive it, he forwarded the documents to the agency
      attorney from his “OCC email [address].”           Id. (deposition testimony of the
      appellant); IAF, Tab 32 at 499-500.       The appellant admitted that he was “at
      home” when he sent the documents to the agency attorney from his OCC email
      address. IAF, Tab 5 at 134 (deposition testimony of the appellant). The appellant
      further testified that the electronic version of the files in question were on his
      OCC computer and his home computer. Id. at 135 (deposition testimony of the
      appellant). The appellant was asked about how the do cuments ended up on his
      home computer, and he answered, “I believe I emailed them to myself.”              Id.
      (deposition testimony of the appellant). Upon further questioning, he indicated
      that he “[did not] remember how [he] sent them to [him]self,” but he “believ e[d]
      [he] emailed them . . . because [he] [did not] have a thumb drive.” Id. at 136
      (deposition testimony of the appellant). The appellant further testified that he
      “[did not] recall” if he emailed the documents from his OCC email address. Id.
      (deposition testimony of the appellant). When asked if he emailed any other OCC
      documents to his home email address, he acknowledged that he emailed his
                                                                                           17

      résumé, but he stated that he did not “believe [that he] emailed any OCC
      documents to [him]self.” Id. (deposition testimony of the appellant).
¶31         More than 7 months after his deposition, in his response to the notice of
      proposed removal in this matter, the appellant submitted an October 19, 2017
      declaration made under penalty of perjury in which he stated that, aft er the
      deposition, he “reviewed [his] recently sent email traffic and was unable to locate
      any instance of [him] emailing the OCC documents and information referenced in
      [the] Notice of Proposed Removal[] to [himself] to either [his] home computer or
      [his] personal email address.” 10     IAF, Tab 5 at 54.      In sum, the appellant’s
      deposition testimony regarding how he obtained and where he stored the
      documentation in question is not consistent with his subsequent declaration made
      under penalty of perjury. 11
¶32         Even if there was some question as to the accuracy of the appellant’s
      original deposition testimony, there is preponderant evidence that the appellant
      removed OCC personnel information and transmitted OCC personnel information
      10
          During the pendency of this removal appeal, the appellant submitted a second
      declaration made under penalty of perjury, on March 14, 2019. IAF, Tab 32 at 490-93.
      In this second declaration, the appellant largely reiterated the statements m ade in the
      first declaration. Id. With respect to the strength of the agency’s evidence, however,
      the Board considers the weight of the evidence as it existed before the agency when it
      acted. Social Security Administration v. Carr, 78 M.S.P.R. 313, 335 (1998), aff’d,
      185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Moreover, to the extent relevant facts are developed on
      appeal to the Board that the agency had no prior reason to know, such facts would not
      undercut the agency’s otherwise sufficiently clear and convincing evidence that, at the
      time of the action, its decision would have been the same in the absence of
      whistleblowing. See Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affiars, 84 M.S.P.R. 78, 82, 84,
      85 (1999), aff’d, 242 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, while we consider the
      appellant’s first declaration, which was submitted before the agency issued the decision
      to remove the appellant, we find that the second declaration is not relevant to our
      determination of the strength of the evidence.
      11
         The appellant declared under penalty of perjury that he was not given an opportunity
      to review his deposition testimony, IAF, Tab 5 at 53, and he argues on review that he
      was unable to correct or clarify any of his deposition testimony, PFR File, Tab 3
      at 15-17. There appears to be some support in the record for this contention. IAF,
      Tab 32 at 624. Although we have considered the appellant’s declaration and argument
      on review, it does not warrant a different outcome.
                                                                                            18

      outside of OCC’s networks. The agency points out that the appellant’s March 15,
      2017 email, which he sent to agency counsel from his OCC work account, had
      embedded within it a March 14, 2017 email from his personal email account that
      included as PDF attachments the documents described in specifications 1 and 2.
      IAF, Tab 35 at 52-53. The appellant’s claim in his declaration that he was unable
      to locate a personal email in which he sent these documents to himself is not
      credible in light of the appellant’s deposition testimony, which was cl oser in time
      to the events at issue, and this unrebutted documentary evidence. Accordingly,
      we find that it is more likely than not that the appellant removed OCC personnel
      information and transmitted the information outside OCC’s networks as charged
      by the agency. Thus, we find that specification 3 was also supported by strong
      evidence. 12
¶33         In sum, we find that the agency was in possession of strong evidence that
      the appellant committed the conduct underlying the charge of misuse of
      Government property. 13      In addition, we find that the misconduct was very

      12
         However, the agency did not clearly show that the appellant stored OCC personnel
      information on his personal computer, and the appellant’s statements on this issue are
      inconsistent. Thus, the agency’s evidence regarding the portion of specification 3 that
      charged the appellant with storing OCC personnel information on his home computer
      was relatively weak. IAF, Tab 5 at 82. Nonetheless, overall, the agency’s evidence in
      support of this specification was solid. Cf. Taylor v. Department of the Army,
      107 M.S.P.R. 638, ¶ 17 & n* (finding no error in sustaining a specification when the
      agency proved the essence of the specification); Brown v. U.S. Coast Guard,
      10 M.S.P.R. 573, 578 (1982) (sustaining specification 4B because the agency proved by
      preponderant evidence the essence of this specification).
      13
         Specification 3 contained the same allegations in the first and second removal
      actions, and the Federal Circuit upheld the administrative judge’s decision to sustain
      specification 3 in the second removal action in its entirety. Regardless of whether the
      elements of collateral estoppel are met, we decline to apply that doctrine in these
      circumstances. See Kroeger v. U.S. Postal Service, 865 F.2d 235, 239 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
      (stating that it would not be error to decline to apply collateral estoppel even when its
      requirements are met); Hay v. U.S. Postal Service, 103 M.S.P.R. 167, ¶ 9 (2006)
      (explaining that the Board may refrain from applying collateral estoppel, even when the
      requirements have been met, if its application would result in injustice or compromise
      public policy); Tanner v. U.S. Postal Service, 94 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 15 (2003) (noting that
                                                                                     19

      serious, particularly considering the appellant’s position as Director of
      Compensation and Benefits, his access to confidential personnel data, and his
      awareness of agency policies regarding the authorized use of such data.        ID
      at 14-17. Thus, this Carr factor strongly favors the agency.
  ¶34       Regarding the second Carr factor, the administrative judge found “no
      evidence” of a retaliatory motive by any of the managers involved in this action.
      ID at 15. We modify the initial decision because, even if the proposing and
      deciding officials had no actual knowledge of the OSC complaint in question,
      there can still be some motive to retaliate because the appellant’s disclosure
      reflects poorly on the agency.         See, e.g., Whitmore v. Department of Labor,
      680 F.3d 1353, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Those responsible for the agency’s
      performance overall may well be motivated to retaliate even if they are not
      directly implicated by the disclosures, and even if they do not know the
      whistleblower personally, as the criticism reflects on them in their capacities as
      managers and employees.”). Thus, this factor slightly favors the appellant.
¶35         Regarding the third Carr factor, the deciding official testified in her
      deposition that she could not recall any cases involving similar unauthorized
      access of OCC information. IAF, Tab 32 at 324 (deposition testimon y of the
      deciding official).   The record does not contain any other evidence showing
      agency treatment of employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise
      similarly situated to the appellant.
¶36         The Federal Circuit has stated that Carr “imposes no affirmative burden on
      the agency to produce evidence for each of the three factors.”           Rickel v.
      Department of the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2022); see also Staley v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 2020-2127, 2021 WL 2965007, at *2 (Fed.
      Cir. July 15, 2021) (per curiam). It has further held that “the absence of any

      considerations of public economy and private repose that underlie the doctrine of
      collateral estoppel must be balanced against the competing interest of fundamental
      fairness and due process).
                                                                                       20

      evidence relating to Carr factor three can effectively remove that factor from the
      analysis,” but that the failure to produce such evidence if it exists “may be at the
      agency’s peril,” and “may well cause the agency to fail to prove its case overall.”
      Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374-75.       Under the circumstances here, in which the
      agency addressed this issue but had no evidence to present, we find that this
      factor is largely neutral.
¶37         After balancing all of the evidence bearing on the appellant’s claim that the
      action was taken in retaliation for her protected activity, we conclude that the
      agency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it would have removed
      the appellant absent his December 2016 OSC complaint.

             November 30, 2017 OSC Complaint
¶38         The appellant’s November 30, 2017 OSC complaint involved allegations
      that the proposed removal was taken in retaliation for his earlier OSC complaint
      and his prior USERRA Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 18 -38, Tab 32 at 543-44.
      The administrative judge did not specifically address this complain t in the initial
      decision. We do so now. For the reasons explained above, we conclude that the
      appellant’s November 30, 2017 OSC complaint is also protected by 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C). Further, in his supplemental response to the notice of proposed
      removal, the appellant specifically advised the deciding official that he filed the
      OSC complaint and that the OSC investigation was ongoing, IAF, Tab 5 at 19,
      and OSC separately asked the agency’s Enterprise Governance Operations office
      to stay the removal pending an investigation, IAF, Tab 32 at 543 -44.           The
      removal was effected on April 13, 2018, IAF, Tab 5 at 14, which satisfies the
      timing element, Wadhwa v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 615,
      ¶ 13, aff’d, 353 F. App’x 435 (Fed. Cir. 2009).      As a result, we find that the
      appellant has satisfied his burden to prove contributing factor.
¶39         We also find that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that
      it would have removed the appellant absent his protected activity. As discussed
      above, the first Carr factor strongly favors the agency.       Our analysis of the
                                                                                         21

      second Carr factor, the existence and strength of the motive to retaliate, more
      strongly favors the appellant with respect to the November 30, 2017 OSC
      complaint because the deciding official was named in the complaint, she knew
      about it, and the appellant’s disclosure reflects poorly on her and the agency.
      Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1370. Our analysis of the third Carr factor remains the
      same. On balance, however, we conclude that the agency established by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the removal action absent this OSC
      complaint.

      We remand the appeal for further adjudication of the appellant’s claims of
      retaliation for his prior EEO activity and for his prior USERRA appeal.
¶40         In his cross petition for review, the appellant asserts that the administrative
      judge erred in finding that the agency did not retaliate against him for his
      USERRA appeal, for his OSC complaints, or for his prior EEO activity (alleging
      discrimination and retaliation based on disability, veteran status, race, and col or).
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 4, 20-26.
¶41         In the initial decision, the administrative judge identified the following
      standard to evaluate these claims:     the appellant has to prove by preponderant
      evidence that he engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
      (B), (C), or (D), and the protected activity was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action; if the appellant meets
      this burden, the agency is given an opportunity to prove by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the
      protected activity. ID at 13-14 (citing Fellhoelter v. Department of Agriculture,
      568 F.3d 965 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and Webb v. Department of the Interior,
      122 M.S.P.R. 248 (2015)).      Notably, however, Fellhoelter and Webb involved
      claims of retaliation for whistleblowing disclosures, not retaliation for filing a
      USERRA appeal or for prior EEO activity. In fact, the standard identified by the
      administrative judge, by its very language, does not include the appellant’s claims
                                                                                          22

      of reprisal for filing a USERRA Board appeal 14 or for his prior EEO activity
      because neither of them implicate 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
      Below, in the order and summary of prehearing conference, the administrative
      judge noted that the appellant raised claims of reprisal for his prior USERRA
      appeal and for prior EEO activity, but she did not identify any standard for the
      former and she utilized an outdated standard for the latter. IAF, Tab 31 at 2-4.
      Accordingly, because the administrative judge did not give the appellant proper
      notice of his burden to prove these claims, we remand them to the administrative
      judge for notice and adjudication.
¶42         We provide the administrative judge and the parties with guidance on
      remand for analyzing these claims. Below and in his cross petition for review,
      the appellant relied on a standard applied to claims arising under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), which makes it a prohibited personnel practice to “take . . .
      any personnel action against an employee . . . because of the exercise of any
      appeal . . . granted by any law, rule, or regulation . . . other than with regard to
      remedying a violation of [section 2302(b)(8)].” IAF, Tab 32 at 29 -33; PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 20-23. The appellant has cited to Mattison v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 8 (2016), for the proposition that to prevail on an
      affirmative defense pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), he must show that
      (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) the accused official knew of the activity,
      (3) the adverse action under review could have been retaliation under the
      circumstances, and (4) there was a genuine nexus between th e alleged retaliation
      and the adverse action. IAF, Tab 32 at 29-30; see PFR File, Tab 3 at 20-23
      (analyzing these elements).

      14
         By the appellant’s own admission, his prior USERRA appeal does not involve
      whistleblowing activity. PFR File, Tab 3 at 20-23 (stating that his appeal is protected
      by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii)).
                                                                                               23

¶43         However, we find that the appellant’s reliance on this standard is
      misplaced. 15 In Brasch v. Department of Transportation, 101 M.S.P.R. 145, ¶ 6
      (2006), the Board explicitly found that the four-prong test set out above is
      inapplicable to claims of retaliation for prior USERRA Board appeals. Instead,
      the Board found that the USERRA standard for retaliation claims is set forth in
      38 U.S.C. § 4311(b), (c)(2). Id. Consistent with this precedent, on remand, the
      administrative judge shall provide the parties with proper notice of the USERRA
      provisions for claims of retaliation. 16       Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b), an
      employer “may not discriminate against or take any adverse employment action
      against any person because such person . . . has taken an action to enforce a
      protection afforded any person under this chapter.” If an appellant engages in
      protected activity described in section 4311(b), an agency violates this section if
      the appellant’s protected activity “is a motivating factor in the employer’s action,
      unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the
      absence of such person’s [protected activity].” Burroughs v. Department of the
      Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 392, ¶ 7 (2013) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(2)).
¶44         Regarding the appellant’s claim of reprisal for prior EEO activity, the
      record   reflects   that   this   activity   involved    allegations   of   reprisal   and

      15
        Importantly, Mattison does not involve a claim of retaliation for a prior USERRA
      appeal; rather, it involves Information Security Office and Freedom of Information A ct
      appeals. Mattison, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶¶ 7-8.
      16
         In discussing his affirmative defenses, the appellant noted that he also alleged
      discrimination based on “veteran status.” IAF, Tab 32 at 36. Although unclear, we
      have considered whether the appellant intended to make a separate USERRA
      discrimination claim. Loggins v. U.S. Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 471, ¶ 16 (2009).
      The appellant should clarify on remand whether he intended to raise a USERRA
      discrimination claim in this matter, and the administrat ive judge should, if necessary,
      provide proper notice of the appellant’s burden to prove such a claim. See, e.g.,
      Sheehan v. Department of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013-15 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding
      that, in USERRA actions, an individual must initially show by preponderant evidence
      that the individual’s military status was at least a motivating or substantial factor in the
      agency action, upon which the agency must prove, also by preponderant evidence, that
      the action would have been taken for a valid reason despite the protected status).
                                                                                      24

      discrimination based on disability, race, and color. IAF, Tab 32 at 36, 504 -24.
      The Board’s analysis of these claims is governed by Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶¶ 45-47, which was issued after the initial decision in this matter. On remand,
      the administrative judge should provide notice of the parties’ burdens or proof as
      to these defenses as set out in Pridgen.
¶45        After the administrative judge provides proper notice of the appellant’s
      burdens, she may reopen the record to take evidence only related to these claims.
      She should issue a new initial decision that incorporates our findings herein and
      her analysis and conclusion regarding these reprisal claims.

      We deny the appellant’s petition to enforce interim relief.
¶46        When, as here, the appellant was the prevailing party in the initial decision
      and interim relief was ordered by the administrative judge, a petition for review
      filed by the agency must be accompanied by a certification that the agency has
      complied with the interim relief order, either by providing the interim relief
      ordered, or by making a determination that returning the appellant to the place of
      employment would cause undue disruption to the work environment.           Elder v.
      Department of the Air Force, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 18 (2016); 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.116(a). In its petition for review, the agency states that it complied with
      the interim relief order, it includes some documentation showing its efforts to
      comply with that order, and it advises that the appellant’s presence in the
      workplace presented an undue disruption.      PFR File, Tab 1 at 26 -30.    In the
      petition to enforce interim relief, however, the appellant asserts that the agency
      did not pay him dating back to September 11, 2019, the date that the initial
      decision was issued; rather, he was only paid from October 13 to 26, 2019. PFR
      File, Tab 5 at 4-7. In its response, the agency acknowledges that there were some
      processing delays associated with the payment, and it provides an ex planation and
      timeline for when benefits were restored. PFR File, Tab 6 at 5, 8 -14, 16. In his
      reply brief, the appellant argues that the agency did not comply with 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.183(a)(1). PFR File, Tab 8.
                                                                                       25

¶47        The appellant’s petition for enforcement is denied because the Board’s
      regulations do not allow for a petition for enforcement of an interim relief order.
      Elder, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 20. We may instead consider the appellant’s pleading
      as a challenge to the agency’s certification of compliance.          Id.; 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.116(b).   However, because we are affirming the administrative judge’s
      decision to reverse the removal on due process grounds, the appellant is receiving
      a final Board order on the merits in his favor, and the remanded issues have no
      effect on the appellant’s entitlement to appropriate relief in this regard, the
      agency’s compliance with the interim relief order is now a moot issue. Elder,
      124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 20; Cowart v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 572, ¶¶ 6-7
      & n.* (2012).       To the extent that there remain any issues of agency
      noncompliance with this final decision, the appellant may file a petition for
      enforcement in accordance with the instructions provided below.

                                           ORDER
¶48        For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the administrative judge’s
      decision to reverse the removal on due process grounds.         We also affirm as
      modified herein her decision that the appellant did not prove his claim of reprisal
      for his OSC complaints.     We remand the appeal to the Washington Reg ional
      Office for proper notice of his burden to prove his claims of reprisal for his prior
      USERRA appeal and for prior EEO activity, for reopening of the record limited to
      evidence relating to these claims only, and for further adjudication in accordance
      with this Remand Order.
¶49        Because we have reversed the appellant’s removal, despite the fact that the
      claims of reprisal for his prior USERRA appeal and for his prior EEO activity
      must be remanded for further adjudication, we ORDER the agency to cancel the
      removal and retroactively restore the appellant, effective April 13, 2018.      See
      Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The
                                                                                          26

      agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this
      decision.
¶50        We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision.   Because the court upheld the second removal action against the
      appellant, which became effective on December 28, 2019, Coy, 43 F.4th at 1340,
      the appellant’s entitlement to back pay and other benefits mu st end no later than
      December 28, 2019. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the
      agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due,
      and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carr y out
      the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest
      due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the
      undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶51        We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and to describe the
      actions it took to carry out the Board’s Order.     The appellant, if not notified,
      should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶52        No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcem ent
      with the office that issued the initial decision in this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
                                                                                  27

¶53        For agencies whose payroll is administered by eith er the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60–day period set forth above.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
     specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
     until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
     notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
     in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
     Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
     include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
     CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
     or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
                                                                                                       2

NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by the Merit
Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information describing
   what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
        a. Employee name and social security number.
        b. Detailed explanation of request.
        c. Valid agency accounting.
        d. Authorized signature (Table 63).
        e. If interest is to be included.
        f. Check mailing address.
        g. Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
        h. Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be collected
            (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday Premium,
   etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the type of
   leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave to
   be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and required
data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum Payment,
Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
        a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
        b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
        c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.

If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s Payroll/Personnel
Operations at 504-255-4630.