Court Opinion

ID: 9425828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:15:54.636331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:56.278076
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Marshall,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Stewart join,
concurring in the judgment.
The Court is today called upon to construe the provision of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U. S. C. § 5005 et seq., defining the circumstances under which a youth offender may be sentenced as an adult. The Youth Corrections Act (YCA) provides a comprehensive sentencing scheme for offenders between the ages of 18 and 22, affording trial judges four options for sentencing such offenders. The judge may suspend imposition or execution of sentence and place the offender on probation. 18 U. S. C. §5010 (a). Alternatively, the judge may sentence the offender for treatment and supervision at a special youth facility, to be discharged in no more than 6 years, 18 U. S. C. § 5010 (b), or he may cpmmit the offender to a youth institution for a term whiéh may exceed 6 years, up to the maximum period authorized by law for the offense. 18 U. S. C. § 5010(c).1 Finally, the judge may sentence the offender as an adult, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 5010 (d), which provides that:
“If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.”
I agree with the Court's holding that § 5010 (d) requires an explicit finding of “no benefit” as a condition precedent to sentencing an eligible offender as an adult, *446ante, at 444, but I find that holding patently inconsistent with the Court’s assertion that a sentencing judge need only be aware of the applicability of the Act and choose to reject it in order to satisfy the clear admonition of § 5010 (d). As construed by the Court, the “no benefit” finding is not a finding at all.
I am convinced that the Act was meant to “provide a 'preferred sentencing alternative which must be used in sentencing a youthful offender unless, in the language of § 5010 (d), 'the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment . . ” under the Act. Cox v. United States, 473 F. 2d 334, 337 (CA4 1973) (en banc) (emphasis added). And, I fundamentally disagree with the Court’s holding that merely by tracking the statutory “no benefit” language a sentencing judge can satisfy the “finding” requirement of § 5010 (d). I would require that the explicit “no benefit” finding be augmented by a statement of the reasons for imposing an adult sentence.
I
I find no basis in either the language or history of the YCA to support the Court’s observation that the Act was intended to “preserve unfettered” the discretion of the sentencing judge. Ante, at 437. The YCA was the product of more than 10 years of study by various groups and was modeled after the English Borstal system, which had achieved substantial success in rehabilitating young offenders.2 The initial legislative proposal, .an American Law Institute model Act, removed the power to sentence eligible offenders from the trial judges altogether and reposed that power in a correctional authority.3 Not surprisingly, that proposal *447brought swift and sharp criticism from the judges whose power was to be sharply curtailed. The next proposal, by the Judicial Conference, involved shared sentencing powers between trial judges and correctional authorities.4 It met with similar criticism. The 1949 proposal, which was finally enacted into law, retained sentencing power in the trial judge. As the Court today points out, the drafters of the Act repeatedly emphasized that the legislation “ ‘does not interfere with the [sentencing] power of the judge Ante, at 437.
But even the very first Judicial Conference proposal contained a provision specifically requiring the trial judge to make a finding that a youth offender would not benefit from treatment and should not be committed under the Act, before sentencing him under any other penalty provisions.5 This finding requirement was adapted from the similar Borstal provision which disallows a sentencing court to “impose imprisonment on a person under twenty-one years of age unless ... no other [Borstal] method of dealing with him is appropriate . ...” 6 The finding requirement of the Judicial Conference draft was not subject to the same criticism as the provisions which actually removed, rather than limited, the exercise of trial judges’ sentencing discretion, and the finding requirement was ultimately enacted into law as § 5010(d).
The finding requirement is an integral part of the YCA scheme. The stated premise of the Act is that young people between the ages of 18 and 22, especially, are promising subjects for rehabilitation.7 The purpose of the legislation was, for those offenders, *448to “substitute for retributive punishment methods of training and treatment designed to correct and prevent antisocial tendencies. It departs from the mere punitive idea of dealing with criminals and looks primarily to the objective idea of rehabilitation.” H. R. Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1950) .8 It is clear that from its very inception, the youth corrections program was intended to establish among the goals judges could consider in sentencing eligible offenders, one as paramount— that of rehabilitation.9 And, in this limited sense, the sentencing discretion of trial judges is necessarily circumscribed in regard to youth offenders. The finding requirement of § 5010 (d) effectuates this policy by permitting eligible offenders to be deprived of the rehabilitative treatment provided under the Act only where they would not benefit therefrom.
The Senate Report accompanying the bill explained the circumstances under which adult sentencing would be proper:
“If . .. the judge is convinced the youth is incorrigible and would derive no help from the program, he may sentence him under any applicable provision of law.” S. Rep. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1949).
Other aspects of the legislative history underscore Congress’ intention that the Act provide a preferred sentencing alternative for eligible offenders. Senator Kilgore, one of the sponsors of the legislation, observed that given the requisite finding “only about 10 percent of [eligible *449offenders would] eventually have to [be] sentence[d as adults], or less.” Hearing on S. 895 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1943). The House Report concluded that even given the instances in which YCA rehabilitative treatment would fail “more than 70 percent [of eligible youth offenders] can be rehabilitated” under the Act. H. R. Rep. No. 2979, supra, at 10. The panoply of treatment options10 available under the Act is but further evidence that the YCA program was intended to be sufficiently comprehensive to deal with all but the “incorrigible” youth.
This congressional intent finds clear expression in the words of the statute. Section 5010 (d) does not say the sentencing court must merely consider the treatment option provided by the Act; it says in the most uncompromising terms that the court must find the youth “will not benefit” from YCA treatment as a prerequisite to imposing an adult sentence. The use of the words “shall find” emphasizes the mandatory nature of that finding. The specific quality of the finding is underscored by § 5010 (e) which provides for an eligible offender to be temporarily committed for observation and study for the purpose of providing the sentencing court with a report on the particular question defined by § 5010 (d)— whether the youth offender would benefit from treatment under the Act.11
*450Thus, while the Act does not remove a trial judge’s responsibility or discretion for the sentencing determination, it does provide a preferred disposition for eligible offenders. A sentencing judge is not required to sentence a youth offender under the Act; the judge can still exercise his “sound discretion to deny such rehabilitative treatment to those youths in the exceptional cases where the judge determines that the special youth treatment afforded by the Act would be of no value.” United States v. Waters, 141 U. S. App. D. C. 289, 291, 437 F. 2d 722, 724 (1970). The legislative history relied on by the Court merely emphasizes this point — that the Act was intended to be another sentencing alternative available to the trial judge and that the decision as to whether it should be employed in a particular case remains a decision committed to his discretion. That history is not, however, inconsistent with what seems to me the plain meaning of the words of the statute— that the sentencing judge’s discretion is circumscribed by the affirmative finding requirement of § 5010 (d).12 The YCA “provides a preferred sentencing alternative” which must be used in sentencing a youth unless the facts of the individual case meet the statutory requirement — • *451unless, in the language of § 5010 (d), the court finds that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under the Act.13 Cox v. United States, 473 F. 2d, at 337; United States v. Waters, 141 U. S. App. D. C., at 292-293, 437 F. 2d, at 725-726. Every Court of Appeals which has considered the issue, except the court below, has agreed that the manner in which the sentencing judge exercises his discretion is thus limited. Brooks v. United States, 497 F. 2d 1059 (CA6 1974); United States v. Kaylor, 491 F. 2d 1133 (CA2 1974) (en banc); United States v. Schenker, 486 F. 2d 318 (CA5 1973); United States v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 205, 476 F. 2d 1152 (1973) (en banc); Cox v. United States, supra; Williams v. United States, 476 F. 2d 970 (CA3 1973); see United States v. MacDonald, 455 F. 2d 1259, 1265 (CA1 1972);14 cf. Small v. United States, 304 A. 2d 641 (DC Ct. App. 1973).
In a sense, the Court today also recognizes the inherent limitation on the judge's discretion imposed by § 5010 (d) by requiring an explicit “no benefit” finding as a prerequisite to adult sentencing. As conceived by the Court, however, the required “no benefit” finding is no finding at all, but merely a ritualistic invocation of the statutory language. In explaining why the “no benefit” finding *452must be explicit, the Court notes that “ [t] o hold that a 'no benefit' finding is implicit each time a sentence under the Act is not chosen would render § 5010 (d) nugatory.” Ante, at 444. Despite these protestations, the Court today renders the finding requirement of § 5010 (d) a nullity. By holding that the Act was intended to preserve “the unfettered sentencing discretion of federal district judges,” ante, at 437, and that sentencing judges need only have “considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it,” ante, at 443, the Court effectively reads the unambiguous mandate of a “no benefit” finding out of the Act. A mere parroting of the statutory language is hardly an affirmative finding. The Court’s opinion seems to indicate that the sentencing judge need not mean what he says when he pronounces the “no benefit” litany. Although the Court requires him to go through the charade of saying that the offender would not benefit from treatment under the Act, it apparently does not require that the judge actually find no benefit but only that he be aware of the Act and reject it. I think it remarkable that this Court should approve such an emptv and duplicitous ritual.
II
If the Court were to hold that the Act limited a trial judge’s discretion by requiring that he actually find a youth offender would not benefit from YCA treatment before sentencing him as an adult, I would think that more than a mere recitation of the conclusory finding of “no benefit” should be required. To say that simply invoking the words of the statute satisfies the mandate of § 5010 (d) affords far too little credence both to Congress’ deep concern for the rehabilitative potential of young offenders and to its obvious intention that eligible offenders be sentenced under the Act if they would benefit from its rehabilitative programs. To give effect to these concerns, I would require that the trial judge include, on the *453record, a statement which makes clear that he considered the provisions of the Act, weighed the treatment option available, and decided in light of his familiarity with the offender that he would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act.15
The mere recitation of the “no benefit” litany can hardly bear the weight of demonstrating such compliance. By taking the unusual step of requiring a specific finding in this limited but highly important area of sentencing, Congress mandated a reasoned determination that the offender would not benefit from the rehabilitative treatment available under the Act. Accordingly, in my view, a statement of the factors which informed and shaped the sentencing decision must accompany the conclusory finding of “no benefit” if that congressional purpose is to be served.
The Borstal system, which provided the model for the youth corrections scheme in general and the requirement of § 5010 (d) in particular, envisions a trial judge stating his reasons for sentencing an eligible offender as an adult.16 Similarly, most of the Courts of Appeals which *454have faced the issue have required a statement of reasons as a necessary concomitant of the § 5010 (d) finding. A unanimous en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and a near-unanimous en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit17 have found a statement of reasons supporting the “no benefit” finding to be “ ‘essential to a knowledgeable administration of the Act..." United States v. Kaylor, 491 F. 2d, at 1139; United States v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 210, 476 F. 2d, at 1157. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has, more recently, held that a statement of reasons accompanying adult sentencing is “necessary to insure that the sentencing court . . . has deliberately considered whether a youth offender may benefit from the treatment provided for in the Act . . . .” Brooks v. United States, 497 F. 2d, at 1063. Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently remanded a case for consideration of whether treatment under the Act would be beneficial to the offender and specifically ordered the trial judge to state the reasons for his conclusion. Cox v. United States, 473 F. 2d, at 337. In fact, the court below is the only Court of Appeals to specifically disavow a requirement of reasons for a § 5010 (d) sentence.18
*455Contrary to the Court’s assertion that appellate review is the only purpose to be served by a statement of reasons, that requirement serves a number of other important policies. First, it might well contribute to rationalizing the sentencing process and to decreasing disparities in sentences. Articulating reasons should assist a trial judge in developing for himself a consistent set of principles on which to base his sentencing decisions. Requiring “[s]uch a procedure would encourage the judge to clarify and justify, in his own mind, the grounds for the sentence he chooses. As a result, sentencing decisions would tend, on the whole, to be more carefully thought out.” United States v. Velasquez, 482 F. 2d 139, 142 (CA2 1973); accord, United States v. Brown, 479 F. 2d 1170, 1172 (CA2 1973).
The reasons may also be of use to correctional authorities in their handling of the prisoner after sentence. The kind of correctional and rehabilitative treatment an offender receives should take into account the reasons for his sentence.
A disclosure of reasons may also aid the defendant’s counsel to insure that the sentence is not premised on misinformation or inaccuracies in the material upon which the sentencing judge relies. “A Sphinx-like silence on the court’s part precludes anyone (including the parties, [and] the judge . . .) from learning whether he acted in error.” Id., at 1173; cf. United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972).
*456Moreover, an articulation of reasons may actually contribute to the offender’s rehabilitation by avoiding any feeling that his sentence was arbitrary.19 As Mr. Justice (then Judge) Stewart observed:
“Justice is measured in many ways, but to a convicted criminal its surest measure lies in the fairness of the sentence he receives. ... It is an anomaly that a judicial system which has developed so scrupulous a concern for the protection of a criminal defendant throughout every other stage of the proceedings against, him should have so neglected this important dimension of fundamental justice.” Shepard v. United States, 257 F. 2d 293, 294 (CA6 1958).
If reasons were articulated for the sentencing decision, an offender would be less apt to perceive his fate as being arbitrarily determined.20 Reasoned decisions may even enhance the legitimacy of the sentencing process as perceived by the general public for, as noted by the Report of the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice:
“It is hardly commanding of public respect for our system on the one hand to increase the alternatives of the sentencing judge so that he can shape his sentence to fit each case, and on the other hand to *457take the position that he need not explain why he selects a particular sentence . . . 21
Although these considerations apply to sentencing decisions generally,22 I do not mean to suggest that reasons are required in any other sentencing context. Contrary to the majority’s accusations, my view of the Act does not require wholesale abandonment of “traditional sentencing doctrine.” Ante, at 440. We are concerned here with only a limited, albeit important, area of sentencing for which Congress has established special rules. Congress’ urgent concern for the rehabilitative potential of young offenders and the specific-finding requirement of § 5010 (d) make the need for reasons particularly compelling in this context. Requiring a statement of reasons would encourage trial judges to direct their attention to the crucial questions of benefit and treatment, to take a hard look at the relevant factors, and to focus on value judgments inherent in their sentencing decision. See United States v. Phillips, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 217, 479 *458F. 2d 1200 (1973). It is clearly consonant with the Act to require such reasoned consideration. I must agree with the perceptive observations of Senior Judge Fahy of the District of Columbia Circuit that requiring a statement of reasons is essential to assure:
“firstly, that the District Judge manifest not only an awareness that the Act is applicable to the case, but also an accurate understanding of the scope of his discretion under the Act; secondly, that the District Judge has been informed of the pertinent facts relating to the individual defendant before him, either by evidence coming to his attention in the trial, by a presentence report, or by a recommendation and report made under section 5010 (e); and thirdly, that the District Judge, by his statement of reasons where required, has given consideration and related the facts of the individual case to the applicable law.” United States v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 210-211, 476 F. 2d, at 1157-1158 (footnote omitted).
Section 5010 (e) of the Act provides a mechanism for the trial judge to secure the expert assistance of correctional authorities in determining whether an eligible offender would benefit from treatment. I agree with the two Courts of Appeals which have passed on the issue that:
“[W]hen a judge has availed himself of the assistance afforded by § 5010 (e), that is to say, where he has ordered the youth offender committed ... for observation and study . . . and the Division has made its report to the court, and after considering the report has followed its findings or recommendation in imposing sentence, additional reasons are not required to be stated, although, of course, the *459judge is not prevented from stating his own reasons.” United States v. Kaylor, 491 F. 2d, at 1139.
Accord, United States v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 210, 476 F. 2d, at 1157. But the Act clearly intended that the ultimate sentencing decision remain with the trial judge. That decision should not pass by abdication to the correctional authorities who prepare the § 5010 (e) study. Thus, where a trial judge secures a § 5010 (e) report, he should adopt its reasons as his own only after assuring himself of the adequacy of the report and propriety of its recommendation.23
I see no reason to reach here the issue of appellate review of the District Court’s imposition of an adult sentence. I believe that the Youth Corrections Act provides a preferred-sentencing alternative which can only be abandoned on the basis of a finding that an eligible offender will not benefit from treatment under the Act. The District Court imposed sentence on the assumption that the YCA was not a preferred disposition and no finding was required. The Court today finds the District Court’s sentence invalid only for failure to make the required “no benefit” finding. Under either the Court’s view or my own, the appellate-review question is clearly not yet presented by this case.24
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court insofar as it reverses and remands because the District Court failed to make the requisite “no benefit” finding. I disagree, however, with the opinion of the Court inso*460far as it suggests that a merely conclusory statement of “no benefit” satisfies the statutory requirement and insofar as it purports to pass, albeit in dicta, on the question of appellate review of a § 5010 (d) adult sentence, an issue not before this Court.

 The actual duration of the treatment period is determined by the Youth Correction authorities. 18 U. S. C. §\5017.

 H. R. Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3-6 (1950).

 ALI, Model Youth Correction Authority Act §§ 13 and 30 (Official Draft 1940); id., comment, at 35-36.

 H. R. 2140, Tit. II, §3, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).

 Id., Tit. Ill, §1 (c).

 Criminal Justice Act of 1948, § 17 (2), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58.

 H. R. Rep. No. 2979, supra, at 1-4.

 Although the rehabilitative model of corrections has recently been subject to criticism, the fact remains that Congress established a clear preference for the objective of rehabilitation in enacting the YCA.

 See, e. g., United States v. Kaylor, 491 F. 2d 1133, 1136 (CA2 1974) (en banc); United States v. Waters, 141 U. S. App. D. C. 289, 293, 437 F. 2d 722, 726 (1970); Carter v. United States, 113 U. S. App. D. C. 123, 125, 306 F. 2d 283, 285 (1962).

 Emulating the Borstal system, Congress authorized a comprehensive youth corrections system, making a wide range of treatment options available to youth offenders. It mandated that maximum, medium, and minimum security institutions be utilized, 18 U. S. C. § 5011, that long- and short-term treatment be provided, compare 18 U. S. C. § 5010 (b) with 18 U. S. C. § 5010 (e), and that a wide range of treatment services be available. 18 U. S. C. §§ 5011, 5015.

 An unsuccessful effort to remove these bonds on the discretion of sentencing judges was made in 1972, when a bill was introduced to amend 18 U. S. C. § 5010 (d) to provide that:
“Nothing in. this chapter shall be construed to preclude the court, in any case, from sentencing a youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.” S. 3290, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); see 118 Cong. Rec. 6776-6788 (1972).
The proposed amendment was not enacted.

 The requirement of a positive finding of “no benefit” to support an adult sentence under § 5010 (d) is merely the obverse of the requirement of 18 U. S. C. § 4209 that as a prerequisite to young adult offender sentencing the sentencing “court finds that there is reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant will benefit from [such] treatment . . . .” See United States v. Kaylor, 491 F. 2d, at 1137.

 Subsequently in United States v. Walker, 469 F. 2d 1377 (1972), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed that the Act precluded adult sentencing where the offender would derive benefit from treatment under the Act, but found it clear from the nature of the offenses involved that the defendant had no antisocial tendencies to be corrected, hence no benefit to be derived from YCA treatment. Id., at 1381 n. 4.

 See Brooks v. United States, 497 F. 2d 1059, 1062-1063 (CA6 1974); United States v. Kaylor, 491 F. 2d, at 1139; United States v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 205, 210-211, 476 F. 2d 1152, 1157-1158 (1973) (en banc).

 Criminal Justice Act of 1948, § 17 (3), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58. The Court asserts, ante, at 440 n. 14, that the reference to the English Borstal system made in drafting the Act “did not include the English view of the trial court’s discretion to make use of that system.” To support this claim, the Court relies on two general descriptions of American sentencing procedures made a decade after enactment of the legislation. Those comments were not directed to the administration of the YCA, hence their validity as indicia of con-gessional intent in this limited context is questionable at best.
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that the Borstal system did, in fact, provide a model on the question of the trial court’s sentencing discretion, not the least of which is the marked *454similarity between 18 U. S. C. § 5010 (d) and the Criminal Justice Act of 1948, § 17 (2), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, both of which require a no-benefit finding as a prerequisite to adult sentencing.

 Only Judge MacKinnon, of the 10 participating judges on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, dissented from that court’s en banc decision in Coefield, supra.

 The First Circuit in United States v. MacDonald, 455 F. 2d 1259, 1265 (1972), remanded a case to the District Court “to make the findings required by the Federal Youth Corrections Act,” leaving unclear whether those findings encompassed a statement of reasons. The Third Circuit specifically reserved the issue in Williams v. United States, 476 F. 2d 970 (1973). The Fifth Circuit, in its only case on the issue, remanded for appropriate findings under *455§ 5010 (d) without explanation as to whether an ultimate finding of no benefit was alone sufficient. United States v. Schenker, 486 F. 2d 318 (1973). A case specifically .dealing with the reasons requirement, Hoyt v. United States, No. 73-2435, is presently pending before the Fifth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit called for an express no-benefit finding but has not faced the question of whether reasons are required in support thereof. United States v. Jarratt, 471 F. 2d 226 (1972).

 A leading federal district judge has observed that “[t]he absence of any explanation or purported justification for the sentence is among the more familiar and understandable sources of bitterness among people in prison.” M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences, Law Without Order 42-43 (1972).

 There may, of course, be circumstances in which it would not be advisable to state the reasons underlying imposition of a particular sentence in the presence of the defendant, in which case those reasons could instead be committed to writing and made part of the record.

 American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Appellate Review of Sentences 2-3 (Approved Draft 1968).

 For a general discussion of the value of a statement of the reasons underlying the imposition of sentence, see United States v. Phillips, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 217, 479 F. 2d 1200 (1973); United States v. Velazquez, 482 F. 2d 139, 142 (CA2 1973); United States v. Brown, 479 F. 2d 1170, 1172 (CA2 1973); American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 5.6 (ii) and commentary (b), pp. 270-271 (Approved Draft 1968); id., Appellate Review of Sentences § 2.3 (c) and commentary (e), pp. 45-47 (Approved Draft 1968); M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences, Law Without Order 39-49 (1972); R. Goldfarb & L. Singer, After Conviction 191-195 (1973); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge’s Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1292-1293 (1952); Youngdahl, Remarks Opening the Sentencing Institute Program, 35 F. R. D. 387, 388 (1964); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 726 (1969); Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 561 (1966).

 See, e. g., United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp. 270 (DC 1974); United States v. Tillman, 374 F. Supp. 215 (DC 1974).

 Respondent agrees that should this Court determine that the YCA provides a preferred-sentencing alternative for eligible offenders, then the Court need not reach in this case the issue of appellate review since the District Court never considered itself bound by such a standard. Brief for United States 40-41.