Court Opinion

ID: 9482234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:44:17.190591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:51.254542
License: Public Domain

CYR, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Although the majority makes a respectable case that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), as interpreted, violates the due process clause, I cannot accede to its failure to observe governing rules of statutory construction which warrant an interpretation more consonant with the CERCLA statute and the Constitution.
We are required to start with the well-settled theme that a court “will construe [a] statute to avoid [constitutional] problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. De Bartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988) (emphasis added). Recognizing “that Congress, like [the judiciary], is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution^] [t]he courts will ... not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.” Id. Of course, the corollary “is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” Id. quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. 207, 211, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895) (emphasis added). Thus, the ultimate demonstration the majority must make is that every other reasonable interpretation of the terms “enforcement activity related to” a “removal or remedial action selected under section 9604” is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. De Bartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575, 108 S.Ct. at 1397.
We are required to respect a second settled tenet in determining whether there is an alternative interpretation more consonant with the Constitution. “[T]he ‘starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself,’ Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1935, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) ... [but] ' “ ‘[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’ ” ’ ” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43, 107 S.Ct. 353, 357, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2493, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (in turn quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285, 76 S.Ct. 349, 359, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956) (in turn quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1849))).
Although sections 9613(h) and 9601(25), considered in isolation, might bear it, the interpretation adopted by the panel is unacceptable, as there exists an alternative at once constitutional and consistent with CERCLA’s language, structure, policy and history.
Section 9613(h) provides in relevant part: No Federal court shall have jurisdiction ... to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except one of the following:4
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Under amended section 9601(25), “[t]he terms ‘respond’ or ‘response’ means remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action, all such terms (including the terms ‘removal’ and ‘remedial action’) include enforcement activities related thereto” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1986) (emphasis added). The panel concludes that section 9613(h) bars preenforcement review because its language, history and purpose make clear that a CERCLA lien is itself an “enforcement activity” within the meaning of amended section 9601(25). I am unable to agree, since some of the same considerations which prompt the panel to construe the statute as unconstitutional seem to me *1525to point to a reasonable interpretation consistent with the Constitution.5
First, the panel adopts what it considers the “ordinary meaning” of the term “enforcement activity,” as including a CERC-LA lien. Whatever other arguments there may be for such an interpretation, I must confess that I cannot think that “ordinary meaning” is among them. Under any ordinary understanding, CERCLA liens created by statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(Z), no more resemble “enforcement activities” than a mechanic’s lien resembles a credit purchase of construction materials. Instead, I suggest, under any ordinary meaning “enforcement activities related” to “a removal or remedial action” are activities undertaken to enforce the removal of a contaminant or the remediation of its effects. It seems to me quite extraordinary to characterize a statutory lien as an activity of any kind, let alone as an activity to enforce a removal or remedial action.
The panel conclusion that “a lien on property to secure payment of [the costs of removal and remedial actions] ... can reasonably be described as seeking to enforce the liability provision,” at 1512 (emphasis added), while true, is predicated on a misapprehension of the section 9613(h) bar, insofar as the panel fails to inquire whether a CERCLA lien is an activity related to the enforcement of a remedial or removal action, the only enforcement activities precluded from preenforcement review by virtue of section 9613(h). Although there surely is a “cause and effect” relationship between a removal or remedial action and the response costs it entails, to suggest that a CERCLA lien contingently securing the recovery of response costs enforces the removal or remedial action is to argue that aging enforces the passage of time.6
Second, the panel opinion correctly notes that the primary purpose of section 9613(h) is to prevent delay in the cleanup of hazardous substances which could endanger the public health. The panel concedes that preenforcement review of the validity of a CERCLA lien would in no way delay cleanup. The panel nevertheless concludes that a secondary purpose served by section 9613(h) — the prevention of piecemeal review — would be hindered if section 9613(h) were interpreted to permit preen-forcement review of a CERCLA lien. It is nonetheless clear, however, that the constitutional challenge the panel entertains as a necessary consequence of its construction of the statute ensures no lesser incidence of piecemeal review. Unless the panel *1526means to suggest that Congress has precluded any constitutional challenge to sections 9601(25) and 9613(h) however construed,7 its interpretation would not prevent piecemeal litigation, since the panel entertains the present preenforcement challenge on constitutional grounds without apparent prejudice to a later challenge to the merits of a cost recovery action under sections 9607 and 9613(g)(2) & (h)(1).
The panel relies in particular on Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir.1989). The primary concern in Voluntary Purchasing was that “[i]f [all potentially responsible parties] were allowed to file suits for declaratory judgment prior to cost recovery suits being filed by the EPA, much of the EPA’s time and resources could end up being allocated to litigation in this area.” Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 889 F.2d at 1390. But of course the concern over “crazy-quilt litigation” vanishes if the right to preen-forcement review is restricted to alleged innocent owners of properties encumbered by CERCLA liens.
A further legislative purpose supposedly served by barring preenforcement review is avoidance of the difficulty of litigating the innocent owner issue, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) & (b), early in the response action when all the necessary facts may not be known. The panel concern is illusory. Relief from the CERCLA lien would either be deferred or denied until the owner was able to carry the burden of proving, see id. § 9607(b), innocent ownership. In any event, there would be no delay or interference with any removal or remedial action. Furthermore, an alleged innocent owner’s preenforcement challenge to the validity of a CERCLA lien, see id. § 9607(1 )(1), as distinguished from the amount of damages and costs secured by it, see id. § 9607(a)(4) & (c), normally will present a very narrow and straightforward question. The CERCLA lien would be a valid encumbrance on the land as long as the owner could be liable for any damages or costs. See id. § 9607(1) {“All costs and damages for which a person is liable to the United States ... shall constitute a lien in favor of the United States upon all real property and rights to such property”). The litigation complexity to which the panel adverts consists in determining whether the Rear-dons are innocent owners as to any portion of their property “subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action.” See id. § 9607(i )(1)(B). The far more problematic liability issue — the assessment and apportionment of the actual costs to be borne by each potentially responsible party (“PRP”) — need not even be addressed in an action for review brought by an allegedly innocent owner.
Nor would preenforcement review impair the specific legislative purpose that prompted the amendment to section 9601(25), which was to “confirm the EPA’s authority to recover costs for enforcement actions taken against responsible parties.”8 H.R.Rep. No. 99-253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2848-2849 (emphasis *1527added). If a CERCLA lien is an “enforcement action,” as the panel believes, then the mere sending of a registered mail notice to the owner, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l )(1) & (2)(A) & (B), automatically triggers a CERCLA lien, see id. § 9607(Z)(1)(B), which remains uncontrovertible by the owner, at the option of EPA, until the expiration of the statute of limitations on a cost recovery action, see id. § 9613(g)(2). I cannot think the language of sections 9601(25) and 9613(h) so plainly evinces a congressional intent to include CERCLA liens as enforcement activities related to a removal or remedial action, when the effect would be to deny an innocent owner the right to obtain judicial review of an encumbrance on the entire property even though the only “activity” involved was the sending of a registered mail notice of lien to the owner.
Third, the panel relies on legislative history for its conclusion that section 9613(h) was intended to bar any preenforcement challenge to the validity of a CERCLA lien. But see supra note 7. The panel implicitly concedes that there is no evidence that Congress intended to bar an alleged innocent owner’s preenforcement challenge to the validity of a CERCLA lien when it amended the scope of “removal” or “remedial” actions to include “enforcement activities related thereto.” See id. § 9601(25). What the panel does not acknowledge is that there is no historical evidence that Congress ever considered whether or how section 9613(h) was to apply to a CERCLA lien challenge. See supra note 8 & accompanying text.
As the panel indicates, Congress did make clear its general purposes in enacting section 9613(h) and its intention to preclude PRP’s in general from mounting judicial challenges to “their potential liability for a response action” prior to the completion of the cleanup. See 132 Cong.Rec. S14929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (Sen. Thurmond); 132 Cong.Rec. H9582 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (Rep. Glickman) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, owners of properties encumbered by CERCLA liens comprise a tiny fraction of the total universe of PRP’s, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), whereas their property interests are burdened far earlier, longer and more severely than other PRP’s, see id. § 9607(Z)(1) & (2), who are nonetheless entitled to mount an immediate judicial challenge to their alleged liability for response costs as and when a recovery action is brought against them, see id. §§ 9613(h)(Z), (4) & 9607, and before there has been any deprivation of their property rights.
Congress’ reasoning regarding PRP’s in general simply does not have meaning for those whose property is encumbered by a CERCLA lien. Congress perceived no need to permit PRP’s to challenge their liability for costs and damages prior to the completion of the cleanup, because “plaintiffs concerned with the monetary consequences of a response can be made whole after the cleanup is completed by reducing the amount of the Government’s recovery.... Delay in the timing of suits seeking monetary damages does not diminish the court’s ability to grant later and adequate relief.” 132 Cong.Rec. S14898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (Sen. Stafford). The statement by Senator Stafford, a floor leader, demonstrates that Congress did not consider the plight of innocent owners indefinitely deprived of their property rights and the right to challenge an invalid CERCLA lien.
Innocent landowners whose property rights remain encumbered for years by a CERCLA lien are not seeking to challenge their potential liability for cleanup costs but to terminate the confiscatory effects of the invalid lien. Nor can an innocent owner be made whole by “reducing the amount of the Government’s recovery,” since the deprivation sustained by the innocent owner does not result from a recent assessment of unwarranted cleanup costs but from the inability to dispose of the encumbered property while awaiting EPA’s discretionary initiation of an in rem action to recover on an invalid CERCLA lien. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(Z)(4). Thus, it is beyond the court’s power to “grant later and adequate relief.” See Connecticut v. Doehr, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 2118, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (White, J., plurality opinion) (“the right to be compensated at the end of the case ... for all provable injuries caused by *1528the attachment is inadequate to redress the harm inflicted, harm that could have been avoided had an early hearing been held.”). The panel conclusion that the CERCLA lien provision is unconstitutional well demonstrates the great disparity between the interests and burdens of innocent owners and those of PRP’s generally.
The panel interprets section 9613(h) “to bar review of pre-enforcement challenges to liens” because (1) this interpretation is “consistent with the language and the purpose of the judicial bar”; and (2) the court “cannot give the definition [of ‘removal’ and ‘remedial’ action] inconsistent readings within the statute.” Slip op. at 12. The first point, even if correct, is not determinative unless any alternative interpretation is “plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” See De Bartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575, 108 S.Ct. at 1397. As to the second point, while the panel appropriately eschews changing interpretations of the term “removal” and “remedial” action, that is not the statutory term on which its conclusion hinges; instead, it hinges on the term “enforcement activities related to” a removal or remedial action. Moreover, the panel opinion does not demonstrate that excluding CERCLA liens from the undefined term “enforcement activities” would render the statute internally inconsistent. As I regard it more consistent with the language, purpose and history of the statute, see Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. at 43, 107 S.Ct. at 357, that a CERCLA lien not be considered an “enforcement activity,” I believe that constitutional interpretation must be accepted. See De Bartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575, 108 S.Ct. at 1397.
The constitutionality of the CERCLA lien provision depends on whether the notice of lien and the opportunity for judicial review satisfy the three part analysis articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). As most recently explained in Doehr, due process analysis requires that the court balance
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards”; and lastly, “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
Doehr, 111 S.Ct. at 2112 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903). As the Court has emphasized, the due process inquiry is fact specific. “Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. at 902. “[A]s applied to this case,” Doehr, 111 S.Ct. at 2109, I believe that due process is satisfied by according the Reardons prompt judicial review of their innocent ownership claim.
I agree with the panel that the adverse effects of a CERCLA lien, indefinitely extended without the right to judicial review, would work a “significant” deprivation. I disagree, however, that there is a substantial risk of any unwarranted deprivation in the instant case, due to the very different purposes served by a CERCLA lien and the attachment lien involved in Doehr. Finally, I cannot agree that the government has no significant interest in the Reardons’ property.
First, the Connecticut statute in Doehr permitted prejudgment attachment of the defendant’s home to secure recovery of any future damage award to the plaintiff in an as-yet untried tort action. Doehr, 111 S.Ct. at 2113. The Supreme Court assumed that the statute permitted an attachment to issue on a sufficient showing that there was “probable cause” to believe that judgment would be rendered for the plaintiff. Id. Ill S.Ct. at 2114.9 Since the “probable cause” determination in Doehr was based on the plaintiff’s “one-sided, self-serving, and conclusory submissions,” the Court *1529found the “potential for unwarranted attachment ... too great to satisfy the requirements of due process absent any countervailing consideration.” Id.
A CERCLA lien, however, is very different from the attachment lien in Doehr. The CERCLA lien encumbering the Rear-don property has been administratively determined to require priority cleanup. The Reardon property has been determined to be contaminated by large quantities of po-lychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and has been placed on the National Priorities List pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9605. Two hundred thousand dollars have been spent on the cleanup of the property, and total cleanup costs at the site are estimated at over $16 million. The preparedness of the lienor to commit such sums to clean up the Reardon property on a priority basis provides a substantial safeguard against any erroneous determination as to the presence or location of hazardous substances at the cleanup site. Unwarranted cleanup costs would not be recoverable from the property owner. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) & (i)(l). Similarly, the elaborate statutory safeguards the administrative procedures for selecting removal and remedial actions, see, e.g., id. §§ 9604, 9613(k) and 9621, afford extraordinary protection against any such egregious error as an unwarranted cleanup. Thus, it would seem almost fanciful to presume significant risk of an unwarranted CERCLA lien on property previously determined so severely contaminated as to require priority response action entailing a substantial investment of government resources.10
The danger of an unwarranted CERCLA lien is further reduced by the very different standards governing the enforceability of the CERCLA lien and the attachment lien involved in Doehr. The prejudgment attachment lien in Doehr would be unenforceable unless the plaintiff eventually prevailed on the tort claim as to which he bore the ultimate burden of proof. The CERCLA statute, on the other hand, makes the owner, see id. § 9601(20), liable under section 9607(a) for all costs and damages resulting from the cleanup, see id. § 9607(i)(l), unless the owner can show by a preponderance of the evidence, id. § 9607(b), that he is an innocent holder, an extremely difficult burden, see id. §§ 9607(b) & 9601(35). Thus, CERCLA imports a virtual statutory presumption that the lien is valid and enforceable absent a preponderance of evidence demonstrating not only the owner’s lack of responsibility and knowledge of the wrongful disposal, but the absence of any reason to believe the property is contaminated. See id. §§ 9607(b) & 9601(35). Given the extremely demanding criteria for establishing innocent ownership, the danger of an unwarranted CERCLA lien is insignificant in comparison with the risk presented in Doehr.
The lesser risk of unwarranted attachment similarly affects the evaluation of the sufficiency of the statutory safeguards. Given that a CERCLA lien encumbers only the real property rights of the owner of the contaminated property, see id. §§ 9601(20) & 9607(Z)(1), and that the ownership and location of property subjected to or affected by a response action are almost invariably ascertainable by recourse to EPA and real property records, a prompt postdepri-vation hearing at the instance of a putative innocent owner would provide adequate protection and remediation of the short term effects of any mistaken encumbrance. Moreover, an innocent landowner in whose property the government proposes to invest more than $16 million normally would realize property improvements far in excess of any loss occasioned by any short term erroneous deprivation. Similarly, the absence of an indemnity bond seems immaterial where the federal government improves the affected property and remains answerable in damages.11
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I cannot agree with the analysis of the gov*1530ernmental interest proposed by the panel. According to the panel, the government, like the plaintiff in Doehr, has no prior recognized interest in the liened property, slip op. at 29, because it has not yet been shown that the Reardons are liable for response costs.
First, the panel analysis overlooks the fact that property owners are answerable for response costs unless they can prove their innocence under the demanding standards prescribed in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b) & 9601(35). Second, the government has a legitimate interest in any incremental value occasioned by its cleanup of the Reardon property. Unlike the plaintiff in Doehr, whose “only interest in attaching the property was to ensure the availability of assets to satisfy his judgment if he prevailed on the merits of his action,” Doehr, 111 S.Ct. at 2115, the government has expended more than two hundred thousand dollars in its cleanup effort to date and expects to expend millions more — substantial expenditures which should benefit the affected property significantly. The importance of according protection to the government’s investment in the contaminated property is underscored by the fact that Congress amended the CERCLA statute to confirm EPA’s right to recover “all costs of removal or remedial action.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(25) & 9607(a)(4)(A).
The inability of the government to recover its costs from responsible parties would reduce the resources available for response actions at other contaminated sites. Congress enacted CERCLA to deal with “unfortunate human health and environmental consequences [of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites] ... amidst growing public and Congressional concern over the magnitude of the problem” and in recognition that “[e]xisting law [wa]s clearly inadequate to deal with this massive problem.” H.R.Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6119, 6120. Since the CERCLA lien provision significantly affects the EPA’s financial ability to cope with a health and environmental problem so massive that it hardly admits of cost quantification, the existence of a substantial governmental interest in recouping CERCLA response costs from the affected property appears manifest.
Due process analysis requires that we consider the effects of the CERCLA lien on the Reardons’ property rights, as applied in this case. In my opinion, considering the important governmental interests involved and the relatively insignificant risk of any unwarranted, uncompensable, short-term deprivation of the Reardons’ property rights, a prompt postdeprivation hearing at the instance of the Reardons would satisfy the due process analysis required by Doehr and Mathews. As I believe the statute is reasonably interpreted as permitting a prompt postdeprivation challenge at the instance of innocent landowners and is therefore constitutional, I respectfully dissent.

. The specific instances listed in § 9613(h) are not implicated in the instant appeal.

. The panel refrains from attempting to establish more than that the imposition of a CERCLA lien "can reasonably be described as [an enforcement activity].” More is required, however, "in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality." De Bartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575, 108 S.Ct. at 1397 (quoting Hooper, 155 U.S. at 657, 15 S.Ct. at 211 ("every reasonable construction must be resorted to”)).

. Serious difficulties confound the effort to lump together attorney fees and CERCLA lien costs as "enforcement activities,” on an “all or nothing” basis. See at 1514. First, since the CERCLA lien arises by operation of law, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(/ )(1), it entails only the de minim-is expense associated with providing the landowner with a registered mail notice, see id. § 9607(1 )(2)(B). The panel approach nonetheless assumes, absent historical evidence, that Congress considered recovery of these de min-imis costs so compelling a concern as to warrant depriving innocent landowners of significant property rights immediately, see id. § 9607(1 )(1) & (2), and indefinitely, see id. § 9613(g)(2), without due process of law, see id. § 9613(h).
I do not think it realistic to suppose that the congressional intent activating the 1986 amendment to § 9601(25) can be reliably determined without at least recognizing at the outset that CERCLA deprives no other potentially responsible party ("PRP”) of any significant property interest without due process. All other PRP’s are entitled to have any claim for response costs (and attorney fees) promptly determined by the court as part of the cost recovery action itself, see id. § 9613(g)(2). Nevertheless, and in stark contrast, the panel concludes that Congress clearly intended that an innocent landowner must wait years for the government to commence a cost recovery action before obtaining judicial review of the validity of the CERCLA lien encumbering his property. To suggest that Congress clearly intended that its amendment of § 9601(25) should be so interpreted merely because amended § 9601(25) was intended to permit recovery of attorney fees incurred in connection with a cost recovery action, utterly ignores the great disparity in the benefits and burdens at stake in these radically different contexts.

. Were this the case, of course, the court would lack jurisdiction to consider, sua sponte or otherwise, the constitutional difficulties posed by Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (1991). See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) ("No Federal court shall have jurisdiction ... to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604_") (emphasis added). The panel concludes, however, that since the statutes expresses no “clear congressional intent to preclude the type of constitutional claim the Rear-dons are making," a constitutional challenge to the lien provision is not barred by 9613(h), at 1514-1515. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2053-54, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) ("where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear”). The problem with the attempted distinction between constitutional and other preenforcement challenges is that § 9613(h) bars "any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604_” (emphasis added).

. Section 9613(h), as well as the amendment to § 9601(25), were enacted as part of the "Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.” P.L. 99-499. It is not altogether clear that an amendment meant to confirm, not change, existing law, should be applied to a lien provision added to the statute at the same time as the definitional change. Instead, it seems more likely that Congress may have focused exclusively on the confirmatory effect of the amendment on existing statutory provisions.

. The statute in fact was unclear as to the showing required. The Supreme Court determined, however, that even a “probable cause” showing would not prevent a substantial danger of erroneous deprivation. Doehr, 111 S.Ct. at 2114.

. The risk of unwarranted cleanup is even more fanciful in the instant case, as the Rear-dons admit ownership and do not contest the presence of contaminants on their property.

. An action for damages under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), would appear to provide an adequate compensatory remedy for loss or damage sustained due to any relatively brief, unwarranted deprivation resulting from a viola*1530tion of EPA regulations or the CERCLA statute. The Tucker Act provides:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department ... or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).