Court Opinion

ID: 9492229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:35:42.719232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:11.671638
License: Public Domain

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree that the judgment should be affirmed, and I also concur in almost all of the Court’s opinion. One point causes me to write separately. It has to do with the burden-shifting process under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The Court, ante at 908, makes the following statement:
If the employer meets [the] burden of production, then the plaintiff must show that the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual, and that discrimination “was the real reason” behind the discharge decision.
I cannot agree to this formulation. In my view, once the plaintiff has introduced evidence which, if believed, would justify a rational jury in finding that the reason given by the employer was not the real reason, the plaintiff will always (with an exception not here relevant) be able to survive summary judgment, or to get her case to the jury, as the case may be. In other words, evidence of pretext would, in and of itself, justify the ultimate finding, which the trier of fact must always make, that discrimination was the real reason behind the discharge decision.
The Court en banc so held in Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc), as I read that opinion. Since Ryther, panels of this Court have gone both ways on the issue. Compare, e.g., Brandt v. Shop 'n Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 108 F.3d 935 (8th Cir.1997), with, e.g., Maschka v. Genuine Parts Co., 122 F.3d 566 (8th Cir.1997).
In the present case, the difference is theoretical only and would not affect the result, because the plaintiff did not introduce any substantial evidence of pretext. On this understanding, I concur in the judgment.