Court Opinion

ID: 9636941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:50:20.229653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:51.447568
License: Public Domain

Justice ALBIN
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Defendant Richard Feaster, now known as Sean Padraic Kenney,1 was convicted of capital murder by a jury and sentenced to death. This Court upheld his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 18, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (Feaster I), cert. denied sub nom. Kenney v. New Jersey, 532 U.S. 932, 121 S.Ct. 1380, 149 L.Ed.2d 306 (2001), and on proportionality review, State v. Feaster, 165 N.J. 388, 393, 757 A.2d 266 (2000) (Feaster II), cert. denied sub nom. Kenney v. New Jersey, 532 U.S. 932, 121 S.Ct. 1380, 149 L.Ed.2d 306 (2001). Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Superi- or Court in which he alleged numerous grounds for reversal, centered primarily on the claim that at trial he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. After the PCR court rejected defendant’s petition, he sought review by this Court.
In this opinion, we address only one issue raised by defendant in his PCR petition. At the PCR hearing, defendant intended to *240call Michael Sadlowski, a key State’s witness who had recanted his trial testimony in a certified statement made to defendant’s attorneys. Before Sadlowski took the stand at the hearing, the prosecutor indicated to Sadlowski’s attorney that there would be “considerations” if he testified consistent with his recantation statement. When called as a witness, Sadlowski withdrew his certified statement and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s thinly veiled threat to prosecute Sadlowski for perjury if he testified in defendant’s favor deprived him of a critical witness. We agree. We will not theorize whether Sadlowski would have invoked the privilege even in the absence of a prosecutorial threat. We now hold that the prosecutor substantially interfered with Sadlowski’s decision to testify and, therefore, denied defendant a witness who might have supported his claim that he was wrongly convicted and sentenced to death. The prosecutor’s interference with that witness’s decision to testily violated defendant’s state constitutional due process and compulsory process rights.
I.
A.
We first provide a brief overview of the State’s case against defendant to place in perspective the importance of Sadlowski’s trial testimony. On the evening of October 6, 1993, the lifeless and bloodied body of Keith Donaghy was found lying on the office floor of the Family Texaco gas station in Deptford Township. Donaghy, the gas station attendant, died from a single shotgun blast to his head at close range. Police investigators had little success in breaking the case until defendant’s friend, Tina Shiplee, came forward one month later with information that implicated both defendant and his friend, Michael Mills, in the crime.
The next day, investigators questioned Mills, who led them to a sawed-off shotgun that ballistics tests later identified as the *241murder weapon. The investigators retrieved the shotgun from the bottom of a river along the route between the Family Texaco and the Columbia Café, a bar in National Park where Mills and defendant socialized on the night of the murder. Defendant was arrested shortly afterwards.2
At trial, defendant’s friends testified to defendant’s whereabouts on the night of October 6 and to incriminating statements he made after the murder. “The State’s case was based almost exclusively on the inculpatory statements made by defendant after the murder.” Feaster I, supra, 156 N.J. at 56, 716 A.2d 395. No direct physical evidence linked defendant to the murder.
The jury learned that two weeks before the murder, defendant borrowed a twenty-gauge sawed-off shotgun from his friend, Daniel Kaighn, for the purpose of collecting a debt from his employer. Defendant placed the shotgun in a blue gym bag and that same day returned the gun in the bag to Kaighn along with a $30 payment for the gun’s use. Around that time, Shiplee gave defendant permission to store a gym bag in the back of her ear after defendant explained that his parents had “kicked him out” of their home. Shiplee later felt the bag and suspected that it contained a gun, but never looked inside to confirm her suspicion.
On the night of the murder, defendant got together at the Columbia Café with a group of friends that included Sadlowski, Mills, Shiplee, and defendant’s girlfriend. That evening, Shiplee requested that defendant remove the gym bag from her car. Later, when Shiplee returned to her car, the bag was gone. At around 8:00 p.m., defendant and Mills borrowed a car and left the bar for about one hour. Before leaving, defendant told two of his friends that he needed to collect some money from his boss. At 8:30 p.m., Donaghy’s body was discovered at the Family Texaco gas station, approximately a twelve-minute drive from the Columbia Café. Shiplee testified that after defendant came back to the *242bar, she overheard him tell Mills and SadlowsM “that he can’t believe that he Mlled the guy and didn’t get any money.”
Another witness bolstering the State’s case was Kevin Wrigley, a jailhouse informant who shared a holding cell in the county jail with defendant for a brief time while defendant awaited trial. Wrigley testified that defendant described to him shooting a person in the head at “point-blank” range. Defendant explained that before he joined the Marines he wanted “to see what it felt like” to Mil a person.
SadlowsM offered some of the most damaging testimony against defendant. SadlowsM, who considered defendant to be a “good friend,” had played football and “partied” with defendant in high school. On the night of the murder, SadlowsM drove defendant and Mills to the Columbia Café, arriving between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. At the bar, defendant tried to borrow a car so that he could “get money off his boss.” Sometime before 9:00 p.m., defendant left the bar and did not return until shortly before 10:00 p.m., at which time he got into an argument with his girlfriend.
At about 10:00 p.m., SadlowsM and defendant drove to SadlowsM’s apartment. During the ride, defendant repeatedly urged SadlowsM “to watch the news” when they got to the apartment. Upon their arrival, they began drinMng beer. Later, Shiplee, who lived with SadlowsM, joined them, and all three watched television, flipping through the channels. When they switched to a channel with news about a “murder in South Jersey,” defendant told SadlowsM “to check this one part out” and to “turn it up a little bit.” Defendant was “focused on the news” about “a gas station attendant [who] was shot and killed” in Deptford.
After the news, defendant said, “I can’t believe I did this shit. I can’t believe this. Why me?” SadlowsM and defendant then made their way out to the apartment’s balcony where defendant continued, “I can’t believe I did this shit; why me?” Back in the apartment, defendant and SadlowsM drank more beer and played cards until SadlowsM decided to take his friend home.
*243After leaving the apartment, defendant was “all hyped up,” cursing at people in the street, making inflammatory remarks, and attempting to pick a fight. As they approached the car, Sadlowski asked defendant “what the hell is going on.” During the drive, defendant repeated “a couple of times” that “his brains went all over the place.” According to Sadlowski, defendant confided that “he shot the guy, you know, shot his brains all over the place.” When Sadlowski asked him if he was serious, he replied, “Yeah, man, his brains are all over the place.” While revealing these details, defendant had “tears in his eyes,” and said again, “I can’t believe I did this shit.” Sadlowski did not inquire where the shooting had occurred, having connected defendant’s grisly account with the news story about “the guy [who] got shot in Deptford.” Sadlowski dropped defendant off at his apartment and avoided contact with defendant thereafter.
“The primary defense strategy was characterized by a sustained attack on the credibility of key State witnesses,” Feaster I, supra, 156 N.J. at 27, 716 A.2d 395, and the attack on Sadlowski was no exception. Sadlowski was cross-examined about the deal he struck with the State for testifying against defendant. Before defendant’s trial, Sadlowski entered into a plea agreement with the State to dispose of burglary and theft charges pending against him. In exchange for Sadlowski’s plea to the burglary charge, which carried a maximum potential sentence of five years, and his promise to “testify truthfully” in defendant’s ease, the State limited Sadlowski’s sentence to a custodial term not to exceed thirty days in the county jail and dismissed the theft charge. Sadlowski acknowledged that he would not have cooperated with the prosecution without a favorable plea agreement and that he had a penchant for using false names. Sadlowski also was impeached with his prior criminal record, including an aggravated assault charge filed just ten days before he gave his final statement to the police in this case.
Defense counsel probed Sadlowski’s ability to recall key events and his state of mind on the night of the murder. Sadlowski *244admitted that he had been “[d]rinking a lot” that evening, that he was “hammered,” and that he had possibly ingested cocaine. Defense counsel pointed out the discrepancies between Sadlowski’s testimony and his prior statements, particularly his failure to mention in his initial statements to the police that defendant confessed to “[blowing] somebody’s head off.”
B.
In 1996, a Gloucester County jury convicted defendant of capital murder, felony murder, first-degree robbery, possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and other lesser-included offenses. On the capital murder conviction, the jury sentenced defendant to death. On the robbery conviction, the court sentenced defendant to a consecutive twenty-year term of imprisonment with a ten-year parole disqualifier, and on the shotgun possession conviction to a concurrent five-year term of imprisonment. The felony murder and other lesser offenses were merged into the convictions for which defendant was sentenced.
In 1998, this Court upheld defendant’s capital murder, robbery, and gun possession convictions and sentences. Feaster I, supra, 156 N.J. at 93, 716 A.2d 395. In 2000, this Court upheld defendant’s death sentence after conducting proportionality review. Feaster II, supra, 165 N.J. at 393, 757 A.2d 266. In 2001, defendant filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief, alleging twenty-two separate grounds for reversing either his capital conviction or his death sentence. In 2003, the PCR court conducted a hearing and took testimony from witnesses. The PCR court denied defendant’s petition for relief and request for a new trial. In 2004, defendant appealed to this Court as of right. R. 2:2-1(a)(3).
C.
We now turn to the events surrounding defendant’s failed attempt to call Michael Sadlowski as a witness at the PCR hearing. In July 2001, defendant’s PCR counsel and a defense *245investigator met with Sadlowski in Bayside State Prison, where he was incarcerated. Sadlowski signed a certified statement in which he averred that important parts of his trial testimony against defendant were false and that he was induced to give that testimony because of threats and promises from the prosecutor’s office. The certified statement read:
Statement of Michael Sadlowski 7/10/01 — Bayside State Prison—
Michael Sadlowski, presently an inmate at Bayside State Prison — #286305/581123B certify [sic] as follows:
(1) I was a witness at the murder trial of [defendant] Richard Feaster in March of 1996.
(2) When I testified at the trial that Richard Feaster admitted the murder of Keith Donaghy to me, I was not telling the truth.
(3) Richard Feaster has never told me that he killed anyone.
(4) I testified at his trial that he admitted the killing because the prosecutor’s office said I would go to prison on a charge X had at the time and that they would charge me with conspiracy on the murder charge.
(5) The prosecutor’s investigator, ... and Assistant Prosecutor ... told me that if I testified against Richard Feaster they would help me with my charge and that I would not be charged with conspiracy.
(6) Before I testified, the investigator and the prosecutor asked me to work into my testimony as many bad things about Richard Feaster as I could think of. As a result, during my testimony I said Rich was a violent person who liked to beat people up.
I have read the above statement of seven [handwritten] pages and I certify that the foregoing statement is true. I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements are wilfully false I am subject to punishment.
Relying on that statement, in March 2002, defendant submitted a Notice of Motion for a New Trial based on newly discovered evidence. About one year after giving his statement, Sadlowski reaffirmed in a meeting with the defense investigator and defendant’s two PCR attorneys that he “stood by” the recantation of his trial testimony.
In August 2003, pursuant to a writ commanding his presence from state prison, Sadlowski appeared before the PCR court to give testimony. Defendant’s PCR counsel conveyed to the court that Sadlowski wished to consult with counsel before he testified. Louis Fletcher, Esq., later was assigned to represent Sadlowski at the PCR hearing. Fletcher sought both to retract Sadlowski’s *246certified statement and to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination without placing Sadlowski on the stand. Defendant’s PCR counsel insisted that any repudiation of the recantation had to come from Sadlowski himself, and “not from his lawyer.”
The PCR court permitted Sadlowski to take the stand for the limited purpose of withdrawing his certified statement and invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege. Fletcher engaged in the following colloquy with Sadlowski:
Q:[D]id you have the opportunity to speak with me before court today concerning your statement?
A: Yeah.
Q: Did you make a request to me to withdraw that statement on the record?
A: Yeah.
Q: It is your desire, then, to retract, withdraw that statement, is that correct, sir?
A: Yes.
Q: Is it your desire to invoke your Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination against any and all questions?
A: Yes.
Q: Did anybody force you, threaten you to withdraw this statement?
A: No.
Defendant’s PCR counsel objected to this procedure. He argued that Sadlowski waived his privilege against self-incrimination when he withdrew his certified statement on the stand and that defense counsel had a right to cross-examine him on the substance of his testimony. Defense counsel contended that it was unfair to allow Sadlowski to “say something in aid of the State’s case” and then hide behind the privilege. The PCR court concluded that Sadlowski had testified at defense counsel’s request and had not waived the privilege. The court also refused to strike Sadlowski’s testimony.
When PCR counsel inquired whether there had been a threat of prosecution against Sadlowski, the Assistant Prosecutor responded:
Judge, when I talked to — when I talked to Mr. Fletcher I gave him his statement and said this is his statement. If he testifies the way he does, then there are *247considerations. That’s all I said. Then Mr. Fletcher took that statement and talked to his client. I don’t know what he told him. So, there is no threat.
[(Emphasis added).]
Defense counsel argued that it was “fundamentally unfair” for the State to raise the specter of a perjury prosecution with the recanting witness, thus threatening him into silence. Counsel noted that “the State has no real means of discerning the truth or falsity of the recantation as opposed to trial testimony. Although, in its opinion the State may feel they know the difference.” That being so, counsel submitted that “[t]o threaten the witness if he recants ... to me seems like the height of unfairness.” Defense counsel requested that the State or the PCR court grant Sadlowski immunity “so [Sadlowski] can come to court and tell [whether] the truth is” what he said at trial or in his certified statement.
The prosecutor refused to grant Sadlowski immunity, asserting that the State had done nothing “inappropriate.” The court then granted counsel time to brief the issue and excused Sadlowski without requiring him to explain his reasons for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.
When the hearing resumed six days later, defendant moved to have the court compel Sadlowski to testify. In denying the motion, the court observed that “it’s clear on its face as to why he invoked his privilege.” The court noted that Sadlowski invoked the privilege because he was subject to “a possible perjury charge.” The judge recognized that “the considerations that the prosecutor was alluding to [were] the possibility of perjury charges____” (Emphasis added). The court, nevertheless, concluded that the prosecutor’s warning to Sadlowski’s attorney did not influence Sadlowski’s decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment because he “knew he had some criminal exposure.” In denying defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief, the court did not consider Sadlowski’s certified statement recanting his trial testimony.
*248II.
A.
In his certified statement, Sadlowski averred that he had given false testimony against defendant as a result of prosecutorial inducements. The State, both in its brief and at oral argument, did not dispute that the assistant prosecutor’s warning to Sadlowski was intended to convey the message that he might face a perjury or false swearing prosecution if he disavowed his trial testimony and testified consistent with his statement to PCR counsel. In the wake of the prosecutor’s warning, Sadlowski “withdrew” his certified statement and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questioning by his attorney.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the PCR judge never should have permitted Fletcher, an attorney who did not represent a party in the case, to question a defense witness. Fletcher had no role in the proceedings other than to advise his client. The judge then compounded that error by accepting Sadlowski’s testimony after he invoked the privilege as a shield against cross-examination.
When a witness’s direct testimony concerns a matter at the heart of a defendant’s ease, the court should strike that testimony if the witness relies on the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent cross-examination. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 82 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 907, 117 S.Ct. 267,136 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996); Dunbar v. Harris, 612 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir.1979); United States v. Rogers, 475 F.2d 821, 827 (7th Cir.1973); Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624, 628 (5th Cir.1967), cert. denied sub nom. Marshall v. United States, 390 U.S. 1005, 88 S.Ct. 1246, 20 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968); United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822, 84 S.Ct. 60, 11 L.Ed.2d 55 (1963). One of the essential purposes of cross-examination is to test the reliability of testimony given on direct-examination. See State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 348, 865 A.2d 673 (2005); see also Neighbour v. Matusavage, 128 N.J.L. *249331, 333, 25 A.2d 868 (E. & A.1942). Generally, direct testimony cannot be deemed reliable unless tested in the “crucible of cross-examination.” Branch, supra, 182 N.J. at 348, 865 A.2d 673. We recognize the fundamental unfairness of permitting such testimony to be considered by the trier of fact.
Here, Sadlowski’s testimony was not collateral. Indeed, his testimony went to the core of defendant’s motion for a new trial. Defendant was denied the opportunity to determine why Sadlowski certified under penalty of perjury that his trial testimony was false, why he withdrew that certification, and, more particularly, whether that withdrawal was directly related to the prosecutor’s threat.
We can never know whether Sadlowski would have invoked the privilege in the absence of the prosecutor’s threat. We must presume that Sadlowski understood the nature of the threat and that it caused him to invoke the privilege. We, therefore, hold that the prosecutor substantially interfered with Sadlowski’s decision to testify in this capital case, thereby violating defendant’s state constitutional due process and compulsory process rights.
Post-conviction relief is a defendant’s last opportunity to raise a constitutional challenge to the fairness and reliability of a criminal verdict in our state system. State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 18, 811 A.2d 425 (2002). A PCR hearing in a capital case is not a pro forma exercise, but a meaningful procedure to ensure that the trial that led to a sentence of death was as fair as the lot of humanity permits. Ibid. Not only the defendant, but the “ ‘state and its citizens have an overwhelming interest in insuring that there is no mistake in the imposition of the death penalty.’ ” State v. Martini, 144 N.J. 603, 617, 677 A.2d 1106 (1996) (Martini III) (quoting State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 332, 548 A.2d 939 (1988) (Koedatich II), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L.Ed.2d 803 (1989)). Indeed, our interest in the reliability of death sentences carries such weight that we do not permit a capital defendant to waive his right to post-conviction relief. Martini III, supra, 144 N.J. at 616-17, 677 A.2d 1106.
*250This Court’s jurisprudence has underscored the importance of fair play at every stage of a capital proceeding. We are mindful that a death sentence is “ ‘profoundly different from all other penalties,’ ” State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 326, 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990 (1978) (plurality opinion)), cert. denied sub nom. Ramseur v. Beyer, 508 U.S. 947, 113 S.Ct. 2433, 124 L. Ed.2d 653 (1993), and of the heightened “ ‘need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 (1976)). The prosecutor has a “special duty to seek justice” in a capital case, and “conduct that falls short” of that duty must be “scrupulously reviewed.” Feaster I, supra, 156 N.J. at 59, 716 A.2d 395 (citing State v. Biegenwald 106 N.J. 13, 40, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (Biegenwald II)).
An accused in a criminal case has a constitutional right to present witnesses in his defense, pursuant to the due process and the compulsory process provisions of the federal and state constitutions. N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ l,3 10; see also U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV § 1. “The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, ... is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L. Ed.2d 1019, 1023 (1967). In a capital case, the need for compulsory process of a recanting witness at a post-conviction relief hearing should be self-evident. See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. The suggestion that even a well-intentioned prosecutor intimidated a key defense witness in a *251capital case into refusing to testify at a PCR proceeding requires close examination.4
In an adversarial criminal proceeding, the “search for truth” is not well served when the State attempts to fortify its case “by sealing the lips of witnesses.” State v. Fort, 101 N.J. 123, 131, 501 A.2d 140 (1985). The basic premise of our judicial system is “ ‘that the fullest disclosure of the facts will best lead to the truth and ultimately to the triumph of justice.”’ State v. Jamison, 64 N.J. 363, 375, 316 A.2d 439 (1974) (quoting In re Richardson, 31 N.J. 391, 396, 157 A.2d 695 (1960) (internal quotations omitted)). With that principle in mind, a defendant’s due process rights are violated when there is “substantial government interference with a defense witness’ free and unhampered choice to testify____” United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir.1979) (internal quotations omitted), reh’g granted, 605 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir.1979) (modifying remand to permit defendant to choose between having new trial or accepting prior judgment); see also Newell v. Hanks, 283 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir.2002) (same); United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir.1998) (same); cf. Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 260 (3d Cir.2004) (“In order to violate the Constitution, the government’s conduct must have ‘substantially interfered’ with a witnesses’s [sic] choice to testify.”).
We have admonished both trial judges and prosecutors when they have improperly interfered with a defendant’s right to call witnesses in his own defense. In Jamison, supra, the trial court substantially interfered with a defense witness’s decision to testify. 64 N.J. at 374-77, 316 A.2d 439. The witness, who had previously given a statement to the prosecutor implicating the defendant, was prepared to confess to the crimes for which the defendant was on *252trial. Id. at 368-69, 316 A.2d 439. The trial judge advised the witness, while sworn and on the stand, “(a) that his statements would be used against him; (b) that he had a right to assigned counsel; (c) that he had a right to remain silent; and (d) that he could receive 21 years for the offenses and would ‘probably' be so sentenced if before the judge.” Id. at 369, 316 A.2d 439. The judge also “directed that a public defender” represent him. Id. at 369-70, 316 A.2d 439. After consulting with assigned counsel, the witness had a change of heart and denied that he had committed the crime. Id. at 370, 316 A.2d 439. When the defendant called the witness to testify, he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 371-73, 316 A.2d 439.
We disapproved of the trial judge’s interference and held that the “first concern of the court should have been the free flow of evidence for the enlightenment of the jury in that trial.” Id. at 376, 316 A.2d 439. We further noted that “the wise judicial course would have been, and ordinarily will be, to leave the matter of suspicion of criminality attendant upon the actions of the prospective witness to the prosecutor, for such attention at the conclusion of the case as he might deem warranted.” Ibid, (emphasis added). In reversing the defendant’s conviction, we observed that “there should have been weighed in the balance the more immediate interests of the defendant on trial and those of the general public to the fullest disclosure of the relevant evidence before the trial jury before any solicitude for protection of the volunteering witness.” Id. at 377, 316 A.2d 439.
We now turn to the specific issue raised in this case: improper prosecutorial interference with a defendant’s right to call a witness. In Fort, supra, we condemned the prosecutorial practice of placing a provision in a plea agreement barring a codefendant from testifying for a defendant. 101 N.J. at 130-31, 501 A.2d 140. In that case, the two defendants and two eodefendants were arrested in an apartment and charged with various offenses related to drug distribution activities. Id. at 125-26, 501 A.2d 140. The two codefendants entered into plea agreements with the State *253in exchange for recommendations for lenient sentences. Id. at 126, 501 A.2d 140. As part of the deal, the codefendants “were required by the prosecutor not to testify for defendants.” Id. at 124, 501 A.2d 140. At the time of her plea, one codefendant made a statement that ostensibly supported the defendants’ elaim of innocence. Id. at 126, 501 A.2d 140. Both eodefendants indicated to defendants’ counsel that they would not violate their plea agreements “by testifying for defendants.” Id. at 126-27, 501 A.2d 140. The defendants did not call the codefendants to testify and were found guilty of the drug offenses. Id. at 127, 501 A.2d 140.
We concluded that the State’s “ ‘no testimony’ agreement” with the eodefendants “violated defendants’ constitutional rights to due process and to present witnesses in their favor.” Id. at 131, 501 A.2d 140. We also rejected the State’s argument that its conduct was harmless because the codefendants, who had yet to be sentenced, inevitably would have invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege and avoided testifying. Id. at 130-31, 501 A.2d 140. As a result of the State’s extracting a “no testimony” agreement from the eodefendants, it was “practically impossible to determine whether a witness refused to testify because of the privilege against self-incrimination or because of a desire to perform the promise.” Id. at 131, 501 A.2d 140.
In reversing the defendants’ convictions in Fort, supra, 101 N.J. at 129, 501 A.2d 140, we relied on Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (per curiam), which focused on judicial interference with a defense witness’s decision to testify. In Webb, supra, the United States Supreme Court reversed a state court conviction on due process grounds “because the trial judge had used such ‘unnecessarily strong terms’ in warning a defense witness about perjury that he ‘effectively drove the witness off stand____’” Fort, supra, 101 N.J. at 129, 501 A.2d 140 (quoting Webb, supra, 409 U.S. at 98, 93 S.Ct. at 353, 34 L.Ed.2d at 333). The Court reasoned that the judge “coerce[d] the only defense witness into refusing to testify” by threatening the wit*254ness that if he lied he would be indicted for perjury. Webb, supra, 409 U.S. at 96-98, 93 S.Ct. at 352-53, 34 L.Ed.2d at 332-33. We also noted approvingly in Fort, supra, authority from other federal and state courts condemning governmental threats to defense witnesses that “impinged on a defendant’s right to offer witnesses in his favor.” 101 N.J. at 129-30, 501 A.2d 140.5
Several of those eases provide useful comparisons to the present facts. In United States v. Morrison, an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) sent at least three messages through defense counsel to the defendant’s juvenile witness, warning her that if she testified to exculpate the defendant and implicate herself in the crime, she could be subject to prosecution on drug and federal perjury charges. 535 F.2d 223, 224-25 (3d. Cir.1976). The AUSA then subpoenaed the witness to his office, and there, in the company of three law-enforcement officers, “he once again impressed upon her the dangers of testifying” with a new “barrage of warnings.” Id. at 225-26. Although the witness answered some questions when called to testify, she invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on at least thirty occasions, thereby depriving the defendant of her exculpatory testimony. Id. at 226.
The Court of Appeals found that the “pressure brought to bear on [the witness] by the [AUSA] interfered with the voluntariness of her choice and infringed defendant’s constitutional right to have her freely-given testimony.” Id. at 228. Given that the prosecutor’s threats “prevented the defendant’s witness from testifying freely before the jury,” the court was unwilling to indulge in the *255assumption that “the jury would not have believed the [witness’s] testimony or that the error [was] harmless.” Ibid.6 Additionally, the court noted that the AUSA’s “good faith” was not “relevant to an inquiry into whether a defendant was denied his constitutional right.” Id. at 227 (emphasis removed).7
The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, and fashioned a remedy to ensure a fair trial on remand. Id. at 228-29. The court took into consideration that the AUSA’s conduct “caused the defendant’s principal witness to withhold out of fear of self-incrimination testimony which would otherwise allegedly have been available to the defendant,” and that continuing fear might induce her to withhold her testimony at a new trial. Id. at 229. The court’s remedy returned the defendant to the position closest to where he stood before the prosecutorial threats, giving the *256government the option of granting immunity to the witness as an alternative to dismissal:
At the new trial, in the event that the defendant calls [the witness] ..., if [the witness] invokes her Fifth Amendment right not to testify, a judgment of acquittal shall be entered unless the Government, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003, requests use immunity for her testimony.
[.Ibid.]
Likewise, in People v. Shapiro, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for promoting prostitution and other related offenses because of the prosecutor’s “unveiled threats” to several “prospective” defense witnesses. 50 N.Y.2d 747, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 409 N.E.2d 897, 903-05 (1980). The prosecutor warned the witnesses that if they testified differently from their testimony in prior judicial proceedings, they would face perjury prosecutions. Id. at 902-04. Consequently, each witness refused to testify unless given immunity. Id. at 904. The “ultimate effect” of the prosecutor’s warnings “was to deprive defendant of any direct witnesses to his side of the story.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals held that it was improper for the prosecutor to insist in “menacing terms” that the witnesses be consistent with their previous testimony or face the penalty of perjury. Id. at 905. Moreover, the court determined that “the only way” to remove the resulting prejudice was “to require that the defendant’s witnesses be granted immunity as a condition to subjecting the defendant to a new trial.” Id. at 906 (citations omitted).
In United States v. Hammond, supra, the Fifth Circuit similarly held that prosecutorial threats to a defense witness, though couched in code words and not harshly conveyed, were sufficient to constitute a due process violation. 598 F.2d at 1012-13. In that case, a defense witness had been indicted on an unrelated matter in a different state. Id. at 1012. During a recess in the witness’s testimony, a federal agent told him “that he knew about the ‘situation in Colorado’ ” and “that if [the witness] ‘continued on,’ he would have ‘nothing but trouble’ in Colorado.” Ibid. After receiving that warning, the witness refused to resume his testimony, telling the judge that he feared the “government would hurt *257him in his Colorado trial.” Ibid. To compound matters, another defense witness refused to testify after learning of the agent’s threat. Ibid.
In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeals observed that “it was certainly reasonable for [the defense witness] to interpret [the agent’s] comments as threats to retaliate if [the witness] continued to testify.” Id. at 1013. The court held that the agent’s comments amounted to “substantial governmental interference” with the witness’s “free and unhampered choice to testify” and therefore “deprived the defendant of his due process right to present his witnesses.” Ibid, (internal quotations omitted). The court “could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced by the due process violation.” Id. at 1014.
In addition, a number of other jurisdictions have strongly condemned prosecutorial intimidation of defense witnesses.8 Un*258derlying those federal and state eases is the notion that a prosecutor should not substantially interfere with a defense witness’s decision to testify. See Fort, supra, 101 N.J. at 130, 501 A.2d 140.
B.
We now apply those principles to this capital ease. The State maintained at oral argument that it was “absolutely appropriate” for the assistant prosecutor to advise Sadlowski that he could be prosecuted for perjury or false swearing if he recanted his trial testimony. The State insisted that the prosecutor had an obligation to give that warning even though Sadlowski had an appointed attorney. The State proffered that without such a warning “the witness most likely could not be prosecuted for perjury.”9
We disagree. The State has no affirmative duty to tell a witness, subpoenaed by the defense, that he could be prosecuted if his testimony is different from his previously sworn testimony and inconsistent with the State’s theory of the case. We do not find that such warnings by the State are a pre-condition to a perjury or false swearing prosecution. In other words, a witness does not have to be told that if he testifies falsely he will be subject to prosecution.
*259The State does not claim that Sadlowski misunderstood the transparent meaning of the prosecutor’s message: if Sadlowski disowned his trial testimony there would be “considerations,” i.e., penal consequences. The PCR prosecutor did not deliver the message in the heavy-handed way of the trial judge in Jamison, supra, or in the repeated and overtly threatening way of the prosecutor in Morrison, supra. Here, the warning resembled the one in Hammond, supra, in which the FBI agent cautioned a defense witness under indictment that his continued testimony would bring him “nothing but trouble” and in Shapiro, supra, in which the prosecutor demanded that the witnesses hew to their previous statements. Whether the threat of a perjury prosecution is delivered conversationally, in transparently coded language, or loudly, in pointedly brash language, the effect is likely to be the same on the witness, even if the conduit is his attorney. The message to Sadlowski was clear enough. We accept for the purpose of this discussion that the PCR prosecutor acted in good faith. Even crediting the PCR prosecutor with the best possible motives, defendant nonetheless was deprived of his most essential witness at the PCR hearing.
One of the purposes of a trial is the search for truth. That pursuit is never more important than in a capital case when the stakes are life and death. Our jurisprudence has emphasized the heightened requirement of reliability that attaches to a death verdict. With that in mind, it is not the function of the State to save a defense witness from himself or to spare the court a supposed falsehood, at the expense of denying the court critical testimony.10 To the extent possible, the PCR court was entitled to the testimony of every witness. The State may think that it alone *260knows the truth, but it is for the court to decide the truth, after both sides have presented their cases. If falsehood is to be exposed, the State has a fair opportunity to do so on cross-examination.
The State did not present direct physical evidence tying defendant to the murder and relied substantially on defendant’s own out-of-court admissions. Sadlowski’s testimony was the centerpiece of the case. According to Sadlowski, defendant urged him to watch the news the evening of the murder of Keith Donaghy. At Sadlowski’s apartment, while flipping channels on the television, defendant insisted that they check out a news report about the killing of a gas station attendant in Deptford Township. After the news, defendant repeatedly said, “I can’t believe I did this shit.” A short time later, as Sadlowski drove him home, defendant confessed, several times, that “he shot the guy” and blew “his brains all over the place.” Although defendant revealed Sadlowski’s plea deal with the State, Sadlowski’s testimony nevertheless was devastating.
Sadlowski had alleged in his certified statement to defendant’s attorney that he gave false testimony at defendant’s trial as a result of promises of favorable treatment by an investigator and assistant prosecutor. Given the nature of Sadlowski’s expected finger-pointing at the trial prosecutor and investigator, it was unseemly for the PCR prosecutor to issue a threat that had the effect of sealing Sadlowski’s lips. The State, obviously, believed *261that Sadlowski had completed the crime of perjury or false swearing when he signed his sworn recantation. The PCR prosecutor had the authority to deal with any indication of false swearing “at the conclusion of the case as [she] might [have] deem[ed] warranted.” Jamison, supra, 64 N.J. at 376, 316 A.2d 439. The prosecutor should have considered that the court was entitled “to the fullest disclosure of the relevant evidence ... before any solicitude for protection of the volunteering witness.” Id. at 377, 316 A.2d 439.
That the PCR prosecutor may have acted in good faith to spare Sadlowski a second round of false swearing is not a valid basis for choking off the “free flow of evidence for the enlightenment” of the court. Id. at 376, 316 A.2d 439. Such an approach does not advance the truth-seeking function of a trial or a PCR hearing. We have confidence that our courts and juries are capable of detecting falsehoods with the aid of the adversarial process. The State can prosecute those who commit perjury or false swearing; the State simply cannot threaten a defense witness to keep him off the stand.
The annals of the criminal law are filled with countless examples of witnesses who have recanted their trial testimony, despite the potential jeopardy in which they have placed themselves. See, e.g., State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 186-87, 850 A.2d 440 (2004); State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420, 426-27, 354 A.2d 627 (1976); State v. Puchalski, 45 N.J. 97, 99-100, 211 A.2d 370 (1965). We do not share the dissent’s absolute confidence that Sadlowski would have invoked the privilege regardless of the prosecutor’s comments, post at 276, 877 A.2d at 255, which both the PCR court and the State acknowledged conveyed the threat of a possible perjury prosecution. We cannot know whether Sadlowski would have testified consistent with the contents of his certified statement under different circumstances. Like the courts in Morrison, supra, and Shapiro, supra, we will not speculate that the witness would have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege regardless of the State’s threat. We, therefore, must presume that the PCR prosecutor’s threat made the witness unavailable to testify.
*262We hold that the State may not use threats or intimidating tactics that substantially interfere with a witness’s decision to testify for a defendant.11 Such conduct, even if motivated by good faith, cannot be tolerated, particularly in a capital case. We conclude that defendant’s due process and compulsory process rights were violated under our state constitution and that the outcome was not harmless to defendant.12
C.
Next, we consider the remedy. Defendant is entitled to a limited remand to the PCR court for the purpose of taking Sadlowski’s testimony. Should Sadlowski continue to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, to the extent possible, the State must return defendant to the same position he held before the PCR prosecutor caused the witness to invoke the privilege. When the prosecution threatens a critical defense witness at trial, thereby securing his silence, one remedy is to reverse the defendant’s conviction and to order the prosecutor either to grant immunity to the threatened witness at a new trial or face a dismissal. United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir.1983) (concluding that, on remand, “[i]f the district court finds such prosecutorial misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence, it should enter a judgment of acquittal for [the defendant] unless the prosecution ... ask[s] the district court to extend use immunity to [the defendant’s witness] at a new trial” (footnote omitted)); Morrison, supra, 535 F.2d at 228-29 (granting motion for new trial and *263ordering that “[a]t the new trial, in the event that the defendant calls [the woman threatened by the prosecution] as a witness, if she invokes her Fifth Amendment right not to testify, a judgment of acquittal shall be entered unless the Government ... requests use immunity for her testimony”); Shapiro, supra, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 409 N.E.2d at 906 (holding that “on a new trial, the only way in which the prejudice created by the prosecutor’s threats can be dispelled would be to require that the defendant’s witnesses be granted immunity as a condition to subjecting the defendant to a new trial”).13
We need not go quite so far. In this case, a reversal is unwarranted because on the record before us, we cannot say that defendant did not receive a fair trial. We do hold, however, that defendant did not receive a fair PCR hearing because the prosecutor’s conduct made Sadlowski unavailable as a defense witness.
Accordingly, the State will be given two options. First, the State may grant testimonial use immunity to Sadlowski at the remand PCR hearing if he renders himself unavailable to defen*264dant by invoking the privilege. The grant of immunity is not a license to commit perjury and would not protect Sadlowski if he swore falsely at the hearing. See N.J.S.A 2A:81-17.3; State v. Carminati, 170 N.J.Super. 1, 14, 405 A.2d 456 (App.Div.1979) (observing that immunized “testimony can ... be used as the basis for a charge of perjury or false swearing”). However, under a grant of use immunity, Sadlowski’s testimony could not be used to prove a past offense. At the hearing, the PCR court would proceed in the ordinary course, consider all the evidence (including any rebuttal evidence offered by the State), and determine what weight, if any, to give Sadlowski’s testimony. See Carter, supra, 69 N.J. at 427, 354 A.2d 627 (observing that our “[cjourts generally regard recantation testimony as suspect and untrustworthy”).14 The court then would decide whether defendant is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under the standard set forth in Ways, supra, 180 N.J. at 187-89, 850 A.2d 440. We do not presume a particular outcome.
We will not compel the State to grant Sadlowski testimonial immunity. If it does not, however, the second option will come into play. We will direct the PCR court to disregard Sadlowski’s trial testimony in full. The PCR court next must determine whether the absence of Sadlowski’s trial testimony “would have the probable effect of raising a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt” in the minds of the jury. Id. at 189, 850 A.2d 440. If the answer to that question is yes, defendant will receive a new trial. If the answer is no, we will review this issue along with the other remaining issues on appeal.
III.
For the reasons discussed, we hold that the State substantially interfered with Michael Sadlowski’s decision to testify in violation *265of defendant’s rights to due process and compulsory process under the New Jersey Constitution. Accordingly, we remand to the PCR court for a hearing consistent with this opinion, and retain jurisdiction.

On September 27, 1999, the Superior Court, Law Division, entered a judgment authorizing defendant to assume the name of Sean Padraic Kenney, effective October 30, 1999.

 In June 1994, Mills committed suicide.

 Although our Constitution does not contain a due process clause, the right to due process is implicit in Article I, Paragraph 1. E.g., State v. Baker, 81 NJ. 99, 114 n.10, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).

 Despite the grisly nature of the crime, this Court — like all courts — has an obligation to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. We cannot subscribe to our dissenting colleague’s implication that threats to a defense witness at a PCR hearing are less objectionable than similar threats to a trial witness. See post at 279, 877 A.2d at 256-57.

 In Fort, supra, we cited the following cases with approval: United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 702-03 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1012-15 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 226-28 (3d Cir.1976); United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 335-36 (6th Cir.1973); Bray v. Peyton, 429 F.2d 500, 501-02 (4th Cir.1970); State v. Brown, 543 S.W.2d 56, 58-59 (Mo.Ct.App.1976); People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 409 N.E.2d 897, 903-05 (1980).

 Morrison, supra, held that, despite the absence of a general duty to warn witnesses of the privilege against self-incrimination, a trial court may in its discretion issue such a warning. 535 F.2d at 228. We strongly discourage our courts from providing such warnings to the detriment of defendants' due process rights. See, e.g., Jamison, supra, 64 N.J. at 375-76, 316 A.2d 439 (observing that judge’s "first concern ... should have been the free flow of evidence for the enlightenment of the jury in that trial”); see also Webb, supra, 409 U.S. at 98, 93 S.Ct. at 353, 34 L.Ed.2d at 333 (disapproving of trial judge’s "threatening remarks” that "effectively drove [the defendant's] witness off the stand”).

 See also United States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C.Cir.1973) ("Even if the prosecutor’s motives were impeccable, however, the implication of what he said was calculated to transform [the defense witness] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify, and that in fact was the result. We therefore conclude that the prosecutor's remarks were prejudicial.”); In re Martin, 44 Cal.3d 1, 241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374, 393 (1987) ("In order to establish a violation of his constitutional compulsory-process right, a defendant must demonstrate misconduct. To do so, he is not required to show that the governmental agent involved acted in bad faith or with improper motives."); Diggs v. State, 531 N.E.2d 461, 464 (Ind.1988) (“A prosecutor’s warning of criminal charges during a personal interview with a witness improperly denies the defendant the use of that witness’s testimony regardless of the prosecutor’s intentions.”), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1038, 109 S.Ct. 1939, 104 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989); State v. Finley, 268 Kan. 557, 998 P.2d 95, 103-04 (2000) (”[T]he good faith of the State is irrelevant where the actions coerce a defense witness into asserting his or her right not to testify.”).

 See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 168 F.3d 700, 702-03, 705 (4th Cir.1999) (vacating conviction, in part, because prosecutor told defendant’s wife that if she testified, she would be prosecuted federally for previously dismissed state charge); Vavages, supra, 151 F.3d at 1188, 1193 (reversing conviction because prior to trial, “prosecutor warned [the witness’s] attorney that he did not believe [the defendant's] alibi defense and that if [the witness] testified falsely, the government could bring perjury charges against her and withdraw from the plea agreement in firer] own criminal case”); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 991-93 (11th Cir.1997) (vacating conviction and remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine whether defense witness withheld exculpatory information due to prosecutorial threat of loss of immunity from prosecution), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077, 118 S.Ct. 1523, 140 L.Ed.2d 674 (1998); United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir.1983) (concluding that “defendant’s due process right to a fair trial warranted] further clarification” at evidentiary hearing to determine whether prosecutor told defense witness that decision to prosecute him would depend on his testimony); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 475, 479 (4th Cir.1982) (holding that "government’s 'suggestion’ destroyed the choice of [the witness] to testify freely" when prosecutor suggested to witness's attorney that "he would be well-advised to remind his client that, if she testified at [the defendant’s] trial, she could be reindicted if she incriminated herself during that testimony"); Martin, supra, 241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d at 392 ("Governmental interference violative of a defendant’s compulsory-process right includes, of course, the intimidation of defense witnesses by the prosecution.”); State v. *258Williams, 326 S.C. 130, 485 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1997) (reversing conviction when prosecutor told exculpatory witness’s attorney that permitting defense counsel to interview witness would not be in "best interest" of witness, who then refused to be interviewed and did not testify at trial); cf. United States v. Heller, 830 F.2d 150, 152-54 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that IRS agent’s intimidation of defendant’s accountant induced him to provide false testimony against defendant, entitling defendant to new trial).

 Our Appellate Division has held that "a wilfully false certification in lieu of oath [under Rule 1:4 — 4] will support a criminal prosecution for false swearing." State v. Kushner, 192 N.J.Super. 583, 585, 471 A.2d 803 (App.Div.1984) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a) ("A person who makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of such a statement previously made, when he does not believe the statement to be true, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.’’). Sadlowski’s certified statement was in the form required by Rule 1:4-4.

 We do not address the scenario in which the witness or his attorney initiates the discussion with the prosecutor and requests to know in advance the potential penal consequences that will follow from his testifying. A witness has a right to look after himself and make a reasoned decision weighing all the consequences. That said, a prosecutor must remember his obligation to do justice and not use *260his position as an "instrument[ ] of intimidation.” Shapiro, supra, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 409 N.E.2d at 905; see also Feaster I, supra, 156 N.J. at 59, 716 A.2d 395. A trial is best served by the uninhibited flow of information to the fact finder. See Jamison, supra, 64 NJ. at 375-77, 316 A.2d 439. Our reading of the record in this case persuades us that the prosecutor was not responding to an inquiry from Sadlowski's attorney when she advised the attorney that there would be "considerations” if his client testified consistent with his certification. The State has never suggested otherwise to the PCR court or to this Court in its brief or during oral argument. However, if the State should allege a different sequence of events, then the PCR court should resolve that issue at the remand hearing. For a discussion of the remand hearing, see Part II.C., infra at 262-65, 877 A.2d at 245-47.

 Defendant also argued that Sadlowski waived any right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination after his testimonial withdrawal of his sworn certification at the PCR hearing. We need not reach that issue in light of our disposition of this case.

 Although the prosecutor’s conduct in all likelihood violated the cognate provisions in the federal constitution, this Court's capital jurisprudence imposes heightened standards of reliability. We need not reach the federal question, having decided this case on an independent state ground.

 See also United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1192 (1st Cir.) (noting that when prosecution "intimidate[s] or harass[es] potential defense witnesses to discourage them from testifying — for example, by threatening them with prosecution for perjury or other offenses” and witness consequently refuses to testify for defendant, "a court may order the prosecutor to grant immunity to the witness or face a judgment of acquittal”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845, 111 S.Ct. 130, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1506 (9th Cir.1987) (noting that ”[i]f a prima facie showing of prosecutorial misconduct by preventing a defense witness from giving relevant testimony is shown, acquittal is required unless the prosecution requests immunity for the witness at a new trial”); State v. Nessim, 587 So.2d 1344, 1345-46 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (noting that prosecutor must either grant defense witness immunity or dismiss case when State’s confidential informant had allegedly destroyed exculpatory audiotapes and defendant’s “only remaining witness" refused to testify without immunity because prosecutor allegedly "instructed” him not to be witness for defendant); State v. Carlisle, 73 Wash.App. 678, 871 P.2d 174, 176 (1994) (”[I]f the court finds that prosecutorial misconduct intimidated a witness into not testifying for the defense, the defendant is denied the right to compulsory process, and hence due process. Dismissal is required at a new trial unless the prosecutor requests use immunity for the witness.”).

 As noted, recantation testimony is "a species of newly discovered evidence generally regarded as suspect and untrustworthy.” Ways, supra, 180 NJ. at 196-97, 850 A.2d 440 (internal quotations omitted). "[T]he burden of proof rests on those presenting such testimony to establish that it is probably true and the trial testimony probably false.” Carter, supra, 69 N.J. at 427, 354 A.2d 627.