Court Opinion

ID: 9847694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:05:26.088725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:27.456417
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland
specially concurring.
I am in whole-hearted accord with the views and determination of assigned errors as treated in the majority opinion, but I am amazed at the adroitness with which the majority of this Court still eschew the question of constitutionality of statutes that are constantly dogging the trail of murder trials involving the procedure under pleas of-insanity. I have expressed myself at length on the question of the constitutionality of these statutes on two former occasions, namely, Martin v. District Court, 129 Colo. 27, 272 P. (2d) 648 and Bauman v. People, 130 Colo. 248, 274 P. (2d) 591, and see no reason to- encumber our reports with a rediscussion thereof; however, since it is stated in the majority opinion, “The probability is true that the statute under consideration affords numerous opportunities to trial judges to commit error, and we are not unmindful of the fact that every case presented to this Court on writ of error involving procedures under this statute since its adoption has been reversed for one reason or another,” I think it is our duty, and has heretofore been our duty, to prevent a continuation of errors in these important cases from constantly arising under statutes that are unreasonable and in some respects wholly unconstitutional. I still cling to the statement of the court in earlier cases, “The test *367of the constitutionality of a statute is not what has been done, but what, by its authority, may be done under it.” I consider it the profound duty of courts to protect the citizens against the operation of unconstitutional statutes, and I do feel that there are exceptions to the rule, that only those affected by a statute can question its constitutionality. When we are confronted with questions that plague the trial court that arise under the statutes here involved, and it is apparent that the statutes are unconstitutional, we should not permit the rights of any citizen to be jeopardized in a trial under such statutes, «and it may be in some cases the victim who has been denied due process is not able to perfect an appeal. I refer to my comments in the case of Bauman v. People, supra, on the question of both issues being tried in separate trials by the same jury. In my way of thinking, due process involves more than can sometimes be expressed, at least it involves the right to a fair and impartial trial without being entrammelled by statutes that go beyond the question of procedure and reach squarely into the vital elements of liberty and right to a fair trial.
It is to be hoped that before more mischief occurs under these statutes that our Legislature will see fit to wipe these blots from our statutes.
Mr. Justice Bradfield concurs in this specially concurring opinion.