Court Opinion

ID: 9775666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:06:31.463661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.094885
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing
All parties have filed motions for rehearing.
Appellant contends that this Court erred in holding that appellees are entitled to compensation for the damage, if any, sustained by them by reason of the construction of a bridge over property previously conveyed by appellees, in which convey-*387anee there was a covenant prohibiting the erection of above-ground structures. Appellant contends that such damage cannot be recovered in a condemnation proceeding, but can be recovered, if at all, only in a suit for damages. They call attention to City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston, 1925), affirmed and writ refused in a per curiam opinion in 115 Tex. 255, 281 S.W. 544; City of River Oaks v. Moore, 272 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.Civ.App.—Ft. Worth 1954, ref., n.r.e.); Palafox v. Boyd, 400 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso, 1966) and other cases cited in our opinion.
While the language used in some of the cases seems to support appellant’s contention, it is believed that they can be reconciled when the distinction between a “taking” and a “damaging”, is recognized.
The term “property”, as used in Article 1, Section 17, of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon’s Ann.St., includes the fee simple title to land. The term “taken” includes the appropriation of the land, or of some interest or estate in it, by actual physical possession. Property may not be taken for public use unless adequate compensation shall be first made. An injunction will lie to prevent a taking where it is attempted without such compensation. The words “damaged or destroyed” were inserted into the Constitution to include effects upon private property which are not “takings”. The owner of property which is damaged, but not taken, must be compensated, but it is not required that the compensation be paid in advance, thus an injunction will not lie to prevent damage. Art. 1, Section 17, Constitution of Texas; McCammon & Lang Lumber Co. v. Trinity and B. V. Ry. Co., 104 Tex. 8, 133 S.W. 247 (1911); Ft. Worth Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of Ft. Worth, 106 Tex. 48, 158 S.W. 164 (1913); Duvall v. City of Dallas, 27 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1930).
In Ft. Worth Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of Ft. Worth, supra, the Supreme Court said;
“In the construction of legally authorized public works, it is inevitable that benefits will accrue to the property of some persons and injury result to that of others. If the injury that thus results from the improvement be only of such nature as is suffered from that cause in common with other property in the same community or section, the damages thus accruing are deemed merely consequential, and no right of action exists.”
In this case the negative easement was created by deed for the benefit of appellees’ adjoining property. It is alleged that this property has been diminished in value by reason of the extinguishment of the negative easement by the taking of the easement for road purposes in the property burdened and the construction of the bridge. The damage alleged is not merely consequential. We remain of the opinion that while appellees’ property has not been “taken”, it has been “damaged”, as those terms are used in the Constitution, and that the damage suffered may be recovered in a condemnation proceeding if a suit for that purpose is instituted by the condemning authority.
The motions for rehearing are overruled.