Court Opinion

ID: 9768808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:51:06.497212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:46.651414
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Justice
(dissenting).
On August 1, 1946, Teague, at that time in, appellee’s employment, leased appellant’s residence for one year, paying $1,600 cash in advance rentals (considerably above OPA ceiling price), the instrument reciting “$1,200 cash.” After some three months Teague’s employment terminated and he moved out of the property, assigning all rights in the unexpired lease term to Dearborn Stove Company, appellant Capíes resuming full possession. The suit is in part for a refund of the $1,200 of unearned rentals. Such 'amount was due Teague under express provisions of the lease and appellee’s judgment to that extent should be upheld.
Even assuming a breach of the lease contract by tenant Teague, I have found no case where the lessor has been permitted to reoccupy and use the' leased premises for remainder of the term without being required to account for its reasonable rental value. The lease agreement recites: “ * * * or lessor’s agent or attorney may resume possession of the premises and re-let the same for the remainder of the term at the best rent said agent or attorney may obtain, for account of the lessee. * * (Emphasis mine.) The courts uniformly hold a landlord to such an accounting. “If the landlord, after the tenant’s abandonment of the premises, occupies or makes use thereof, he must, in an action against the tenant to recover rental, account to the defendant for the value of such use.” 27 Tex.Jur., p. 312. See, also, Ogus, Rabinovich & Ogus Co. v. Foley Bros. Dry Goods Co., Tex.Com.App., 252 S.W. 1048, to the same effect.
Sole basis of the majority opinion rejecting appellee’s claim for refund of rentals appears to be that Teague’s chose in action for unearned rent i~ not assignable. The parties have stipulated in connection with the assignment of August 6, 1946 to Dearborn Stove Company that if Teague, the tenant, “ * * * were present upon the trial of this -cause as a witness, he would testify that in making such assignment it was his intention to assign and convey to Dearborn Stove Company all of his *676rights, title, and interest in and to stich lease, together- with all causes of action belonging to, or owned by him, or arising out of, or incident -to such lease and any transaction connected therewith.” Surely there is no doubt in Texas concerning assigna- ' bility of choses in action; In 5 Tex.Jur., p. 7, the rule is stated; “We have seen-that the strict rule of the ancient common law which asserts the nonassignability of -choses in action is no longer observed. The Texas courts have broadly stated that any ‘species of property is assignable,’ and ‘that everything which may be called a debt may be assigned, and the assignee may recover cither in his own name or in that of his assignor.’ ” And while the lease contract may not be assigned without the landlord’s assent, no such consent was necessary - to the assignment by Teague of his cause of action for prepaid rentals.
I further differ with the majority hold-' ing of no evidence in the record as to reasonable value of appellant’s occupancy and use of the premises for the uneXpired term, this Court finding in the meanwhile that “the amount of $1,200 seems not to be in controversy.” Ample evidence on rental value is reflected in the stipulations of fact, consisting of rent regulations and orders of OPA, one instrument being a report signed by Capíes involving the Teague lease, showing rental price to be' $100 per month exclusive of guest house and $135 per month inclusive of last-named unit (the Capíes lease expressly excluded this guest house, contrary to OPA requirements). Furthermore, the amount of rental agreed upon between the parties and actually paid by Teague to Capíes is evidence of probative force with respect to reasonable rental value “for such unéx-pired term.” At least in Hamilton v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 152 S.W. 1117, 1124, writ ref., precisely the same type of evidence was found competent in this connection. The court there held in part, “It is true3 that what Jeffreys paid is not necessarily the reasonable rental Value of the land, but it is a circumstance properly to be given in evidence, tending to show ■ such value ⅜ ⅜: ⅜ 3>
For another reason the judgment' of Judge Bush should be affirmed on this phase of the lawsuit. Appellant did not testify, the following facts, however, being undisputed: That following the written correspondence of August 1946, -and in October, Capíes came to the office of Mr. Norris, a Dearborn official, and in the ensuing conversation stated that his only concern was to secure a suitable tenant; wit-, ness Norris testifying to further statements made by Capíes, viz.: “He said he would be glad to contact Mr. Ballew (a tenant suggested by Norris), or maybe someone else, and lease the house to them, and that the amount of rental which he secured up to the end of this lease term would be paid to the Dearborn Stove Company * * *. Mr. Capíes continued and said that his only interest in the matter was to secure a tenant who would reasonably well take care of his house and property and the contents and so forth * * ⅜. Well, he just said he would pay the money that was' secured from them up to the amount of the lease, or the amount that we had paid Mr. Teague.” (Emphasis mine.) It is obvious that after above conference, Mr. Capíes simply decided to reoccupy the property himself rather than select a suitable tenant.
The amount of prepaid rent not being in dispute and appellant having reoccupied and used the leased property for the unexpired term, surely he is obligated in law as well as good morals to pay Teague’s assignee the amount of these unearned rentals. When a trial is to the court without findings of fact or conclusions of law, the judgment there rendered will be sustained on appeal if it can be done upon any'theory supported by the record. ■ Appellee is entitled to a recovery in amount of $1,200 and in this respect the 'judgment under review should be affirmed.