Court Opinion

ID: 9946759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 15:00:56.007758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:38.919437
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13689   Document: 27-1    Date Filed: 03/01/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-13689
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       BARBARA BUCKHANON,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       OPELIKA HOUSING AUTHORITY,

                                                 Defendant-Appellee,

       MATTHEW MCCLAMMEY,

                                                          Defendant.

                         ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13689

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00893-ECM-KFP
                          ____________________

       Before JORDAN, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Plaintiff Barbara Buckhanon brought suit against her former
       employer, Opelika Housing Authority, alleging color-based
       discrimination in violation of Title VII. The district court granted
       summary judgment on Buckhanon’s claim in favor of Opelika. We
       affirm.
                                        I.
              Barbara Buckhanon, a dark-skinned black woman, worked
       for Opelika Housing Authority as a Housing Quality Specialist until
       she was fired. As an HQS inspector, Buckhanon was responsible
       for inspecting properties, recording failed inspections, and
       scheduling reinspection. While employed, Buckhanon was
       supervised by Julia Dowell, a light-skinned black woman. Dowell
       in turn reported directly to Matthew McClammey, a light-skinned
       black man.
             While she received positive reviews at first, Buckhanon’s
       work later declined. Buckhanon was repeatedly late on completing
       inspections and reinspections. In Buckhanon’s view, McClammey
       and Dowell failed to provide proper instruction on how to use the
       new inspection software system. When she requested additional
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       22-13689                  Opinion of the Court                              3

       training on the program, Dowell provided her with an online
       option. But Buckhanon still struggled to use the new program and
       continued her poor record on completing inspections and
       reinspections in a timely manner. In response, McClammey
       decided that Buckhanon could no longer perform inspections.
               Buckhanon filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination against
       Opelika. She alleged in that Charge that she was being excessively
       criticized and set up to fail at work, in part because of her skin color.
       EEOC later closed this Charge and sent her a Notice of Right to
       Sue letter. Two months later, McClammey fired Buckhanon.
              Buckhanon brought a color-based discrimination suit,
       alleging that Opelika discriminated against her based on the color
       of her skin. After discovery, Opelika moved for summary
       judgment. The district court granted the motion for summary
       judgment. Buckhanon appeals. 1
                                            II.
             “We review the district court’s decision to grant summary
       judgment de novo.” Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276
       F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). Summary

       1 Buckhanon also brought retaliation, failure to train, and due process claims

       under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an unpaid overtime claim under the Fair Labor
       Standards Act against Opelika, as well as a separate retaliation claim against
       McClammey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These claims were all either dismissed
       or resolved by the parties. So the only claim resolved at summary judgment,
       and thus the only claim before this Court today, is Buckhanon’s Title VII
       discrimination claim against Opelika.
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       4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13689

       judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
       dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
       judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
       issue of material fact exists “if the nonmoving party has produced
       evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in
       its favor.” Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279.
                                       III.
              Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful
       for an employer to intentionally discriminate against an employee
       with respect to her “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
       of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
       sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); see also
       McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973). Title
       VII discrimination claims can be categorized as either mixed
       motive or single motive. Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d
       1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016). For a single-motive theory, a plaintiff
       must show that discrimination was the but-for cause of the adverse
       employment action. Id. But under a mixed-motive theory, a
       plaintiff need only show that her gender was a “motivating factor”
       in the employer’s decision to take adverse employment action. Id.
       (quotation omitted). At summary judgment, the ultimate question
       for all Title VII intentional discrimination claims is the normal
       standard: whether a reasonable jury could infer that the reason for
       the adverse employment action was illegal discrimination. Tynes v.
       Florida Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2023).
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       22-13689               Opinion of the Court                         5

              The district court analyzed Buckhanon’s claims under a
       single-motive theory, finding that she failed to sufficiently plead or
       provide sufficient evidence to support a mixed-motive theory. It is
       true that Buckhanon’s complaint only generally states that her
       “color was a motivating factor, moving force, and/or otherwise
       influenced” her ultimate termination. But it is still an “open
       question in this Circuit” whether a defendant must actually plead a
       mixed-motive theory in her complaint. Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health
       Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1337 n.2 (11th Cir. 2023). We need not resolve
       that question today, though, because regardless of the theory
       applied, Buckhanon’s claims fail.
                                        A.
               We start with the single-motive theory. “There is more than
       one way to show discriminatory intent using indirect or
       circumstantial evidence.” Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc.,
       680 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012). One is via the “burden-shifting
       framework set out in McDonnell Douglas.” Id. This is an evidentiary
       tool used to “establish an order of proof and production.” St.
       Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993). It involves a
       three-step process for a plaintiff to show intentional discrimination.
       First, a plaintiff must establish a “legally mandatory, rebuttable
       presumption” of intentional discrimination by showing that she (1)
       belongs to a protected class, (2) suffered an adverse employment
       action, (3) was qualified for the job in question, and (4) was treated
       less favorably by her employer compared to another employee
       who was similarly situated in all material respects. Texas Dep’t of
       Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981); Tynes, 88 F.4th
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13689

       at 944 . The burden then shifts to the defendant, who has a chance
       to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
       actions.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir.
       2019) (en banc). Once the defendant has done so, the plaintiff can
       rebut the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason by showing that it is
       pretextual. Id.
              Of course, a plaintiff is not limited to McDonnell Douglas
       because the ultimate question is the normal summary judgment
       standard. Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946–47. We thus review all relevant
       direct and circumstantial evidence to determine if a convincing
       mosaic of evidence has been presented such that a reasonable juror
       could find intentional discrimination. Id. at 946; Hamilton, 680 F.3d
       at 1320. Probative evidence may include, “among other things, (1)
       suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, or other information
       from which discriminatory intent may be inferred, (2)
       systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees,
       and (3) pretext.” Tynes, F.4th at 946 n.2 (quotation omitted).
              Applying this approach to Buckhanon’s claim, we ask
       whether there is enough evidence such that a reasonable juror
       could infer intentional discrimination. Buckhanon presents the
       following evidence to support her Title VII discrimination claims:
       that she was fired two months after her EEOC Charge was closed,
       that her superiors began “secretly monitoring and taking notes” on
       her, and that similarly situated light-skinned employees received
       better treatment.
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       22-13689                  Opinion of the Court                                7

               Taken as a whole, Buckhanon’s evidence is insufficient to
       show discriminatory intent. Of all three of the employees she
       references, none had the same job title or job responsibilities (like
       performing inspections and reinspections), none had the same
       supervisor, and none committed the same misconduct as she did.
       As for her supervisors monitoring her and taking notes, Buckhanon
       never explains why a supervisor monitoring her, as supervisors
       often do, shows racial discrimination, particularly given that she
       had received poor reviews regarding her work. And with respect
       to her being fired two months after her EEOC charge, Buckhanon
       fails to show how being fired for filing an EEOC charge shows
       discrimination on the basis of race. 2
               So none of the evidence Buckhanon provides suggests that
       her skin color was the reason she was transferred or fired. See
       Ossmann v. Meredith Corp., 82 F.4th 1007, 1019–20 (11th Cir. 2023).
       She also does not dispute that she received warnings about her
       work product prior to her transfer and firing, and that she had failed
       to complete inspections and reinspections in a timely manner. The
       district court thus correctly concluded that a reasonable juror could
       not find that discrimination was the but-for cause of the adverse
       employment action.

       2 To be sure, filing an EEOC complaint is protected conduct, so an adverse

       employment action two months after an EEOC filing could be evidence of
       retaliation. See Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Georgia, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1135
       (11th Cir. 2020). But there is no retaliation claim here, and Buckhanon fails to
       provide an explanation connecting her claims regarding the EEOC charge to
       her claims of racial discrimination.
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       8                     Opinion of the Court                22-13689

                                       B.
              We now move to the mixed-motive analysis. Here, “a
       plaintiff need only show that a protected consideration contributed
       in some way to the outcome—even if it ultimately changed
       nothing.” Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1339. An employee can succeed under
       a mixed-motive theory by presenting evidence showing that
       discriminatory input factored into the decisional process that
       resulted in the adverse employment action. Quigg, 814 F.3d at
       1241. This can include evidence such as discriminatory statements
       by those involved in the decisional process. Id.
              Buckhanon seems to confuse the mixed-motive and
       convincing mosaic analyses. We thus rely on the same evidence
       analyzed for Buckhanon’s convincing mosaic argument to assess
       her claims under a mixed-motive theory. Buckhanon presents the
       following evidence: her superiors monitored her and took notes,
       she was fired two months after her EEOC Charge closed, and light-
       skinned employees received better treatment in comparison.
               This evidence is not enough to show discrimination under a
       mixed-motive theory. Buckhanon fails to show how any of the
       evidence provided suggests discriminatory input into the decision
       to fire her. Her claim that light-skinned employees received better
       treatment is unconvincing given that none of the employees she
       points to held the same position, were subject to the same
       supervisors, or committed the same misconduct. And she fails to
       adequately explain how her allegations of monitoring and
       notetaking and evidence that she was fired two months after the
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       22-13689             Opinion of the Court                      9

       EEOC Charge are connected to discrimination based on her skin
       color. Because none of the evidence she provides suggests
       discriminatory input into the decision-making process,
       Buckhanon’s claims fail under a mixed-motive analysis. See id.
                                *     *      *
              Under both the single-motive and mixed-motive analyses,
       Buckhanon failed to provide sufficient evidence of discriminatory
       intent. We AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment order.
             AFFIRMED.