Court Opinion

ID: 9390641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 05:07:37.170042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.946373
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

NORTH STAR SAIL CLUB,                                                UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     April 27, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 359707
                                                                     Macomb Circuit Court
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF HARRISON, NANCY                                  2020-003914-CZ
E. WERTHMAN, and DAVID WERTHMAN,

               Defendants-Appellees.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SWARTZLE and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Nancy and David Werthman entered into a consent judgment with the Township in a
separate case before a different judge concerning the zoning of the Werthmans’ property. Plaintiff
owns lots that are adjacent to the Werthmans’ property, and by this action, plaintiff attempts to
attack collaterally the consent judgment. The trial court granted defendants summary disposition.
We affirm.

        The Werthmans own two lots that were originally considered one parcel for zoning and
building purposes. To separate the parcel back into the two lots, Nancy filed an application for a
parcel split. The Township denied Nancy’s application, and it also informed her that she would
need a variance to build a single-family residential-use home on one of the lots since the lots were
zoned as waterfront property and too small for building requirements. Nancy sued the Township
in a separate case, requesting that the trial court in that case take superintending control over the
Township. She also claimed that the Township had violated her equal-protection rights. Nancy
and the Township entered into a consent judgment in that case that approved the parcel split as
well as granted a variance for single-family residential use on the property.

        After learning of this consent judgment, plaintiff sued defendants and complained that the
consent judgment was improper for several reasons. All parties moved for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and defendants argued that, among other things, plaintiff did not have
standing to attack the consent judgment from the earlier action in this collateral action. The trial
court agreed with defendants and granted summary disposition to them. Plaintiff now appeals.

                                                -1-
        “We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition.” Sherman v City of St Joseph, 332 Mich App 626, 632; 957 NW2d 838 (2020)
(cleaned up). This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “by considering the
pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Patrick v Turkelson, 322 Mich App 595, 605; 913 NW2d 369 (2018).
“Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sherman, 332 Mich App at 632.
Additionally, this Court reviews the construction of statutes and ordinances, as well as whether a
party has standing, de novo. Connell v Lima Twp, 336 Mich App 263, 281; 970 NW2d 354 (2021).

       In the seminal case regarding standing, our Supreme Court held that,

       a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action. Further, whenever
       a litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605, it is sufficient to establish standing
       to seek a declaratory judgment. Where a cause of action is not provided at law,
       then a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing. A
       litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right,
       or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from
       the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended
       to confer standing on the litigant. [Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487
       Mich 349, 372; 792 NW2d 686 (2010).]

        The issue in the instant matter is whether plaintiff has standing to attack collaterally the
consent judgment of another court. “[A] collateral attack occurs whenever a challenge is made to
a judgment in any manner other than through a direct appeal.” People v Howard, 212 Mich App
366, 369; 538 NW2d 44 (1995). “Collateral attacks, as opposed to direct appeals, require
consideration of the interests of finality and of administrative consequences.” People v Ingram,
439 Mich 288, 291; 484 NW2d 241 (1992). For that reason, collateral attacks on prior judgments
are highly disfavored. Id.

        A collateral attack is only permissible when challenging a void judgment. See Foster v
Foster, 509 Mich 109, 126; 983 NW2d 373 (2022); and also Workers’ Compensation Agency Dir
v MacDonald’s Indus Prod, Inc., 305 Mich App 460, 476; 853 NW2d 467 (2014). As our Supreme
Court has recognized, there is “a distinction between a judgment that is void and one that is
voidable.” Foster, 509 Mich at 124 fn 7. “[O]nly judgments entered without personal jurisdiction
or subject-matter jurisdiction are void and subject to collateral attack.” Id. at 126; see also
Workers’ Compensation Agency Dir, 305 Mich App at 477.

        Plaintiff does not argue that the original circuit court somehow lacked personal jurisdiction
over the parties. As for subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff argues that this was, in fact, missing
in the original action. “Circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction,” Papas v Gaming Control
Bd, 257 Mich App 647, 657; 669 NW2d 326 (2003), and they have “original jurisdiction to hear
and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the
constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by
the constitution or statutes of this state,” MCL 600.605.

                                                 -2-
        Relevant here, the circuit court is vested with the authority to resolve complaints regarding
constitutional violations, see Risko v Grand Haven Charter Twp Zoning Bd of Appeals, 284 Mich
App 453; 773 NW2d 730 (2009), zoning ordinances, Long v City of Highland Park, 329 Mich 146,
149; 45 NW2d 10 (1950), as well as authority to take superintending control, Const 1963, art 6,
§ 13. Consequently, the circuit court in the original case had subject-matter jurisdiction because
Nancy’s complaint requested that the trial court take superintending control over the Township to
grant a parcel split, and she complained that the Township had violated her equal-protection rights.

        Plaintiff raises several arguments regarding the merits of the separate case, as well as
defendants’ alleged impermissible actions when entering into that consent judgment. Indeed,
plaintiff may well have a viable argument that, under Vestevich v West Bloomfield Twp, 245 Mich
App 759, 761; 630 NW2d 646 (2001), it should be allowed to challenge the consent judgment as
a ruse that circumvented the zoning-ordinance procedures. Plaintiff ignores, however, that the
issue in the instant appeal is not whether it has standing to challenge the consent judgment in the
separate case, but whether it has standing in this case to attack the consent judgment of another
judge in a separate case.

        Even though the Vestevich court found that parties are not permitted to circumvent the
legislatively prescribed process for raising and deciding zoning issues by entering into consent
judgments, Vestevich, 245 Mich App at 764-765, the Vestevich court did not hold that consent
judgments allegedly induced through fraud vitiate a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over
the controversy.

        Because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the underlying trial court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction, it has also failed to demonstrate that the consent judgement is void.
Given the consent judgment from the prior action is not void (but potentially voidable), plaintiff’s
collateral attack on it in this separate action is improper. Foster, 509 Mich at 126. Thus, there is
no legal cause of action for plaintiff to attack collaterally the consent judgment. LSEA, 487 Mich
at 372. Therefore, plaintiff is without standing in this case, and the trial court did not err in granting
defendants summary disposition. Plaintiff also raises issues involving violations of its due-process
rights, but those issues are moot because plaintiff’s arguments concerning those issues involve the
merits of the consent judgment.

       To be clear, nothing in this appeal should be read to foreclose plaintiff from challenging
the consent judgment in the original action. Similarly, we take no position on whether such a
challenge would have merit or would be subject to dismissal based on a statute of limitation or the
like.

        Affirmed. Defendants, as the prevailing parties, may tax costs under MCR 7.219.

                                                                 /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                                 /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                                 /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

                                                   -3-