Court Opinion

ID: 9629828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:50:40.079603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:29:08.437816
License: Public Domain

RAKER, J., dissenting, joined by BELL, C.J., and CATHELL, J.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court affirmed on the grounds that Taylor impliedly consented to the court’s action.
Judge James Eyler, writing for the panel, in the unreported opinion below, stated as follows:
“Unquestionably, the court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine issues of custody and visitation, and it had personal jurisdiction over the parties and the children. The court had statutory authority to appoint counsel for the children and apportion fees, and while it did not have authority to award fees against appellant, appellant consented to apportionment of fees, between the parties, by the court.
Appellant requested the court to appoint a guardian ad litem/counsel. After the court entered an order reserving for future determination the appropriate apportionment of fees between the parties, appellant not only failed to object *140but complied with the order by depositing $1,000 into an escrow account. Appellant impliedly consented to the apportionment of appellee’s fees.”
I agree.
Petitioner could have, and should have, asked the court to reconsider the order providing that each party advance to counsel of record the sum of $1,000 until further order apportioning counsel fees. The order was entered without a hearing and although petitioner paid the money pursuant to the court order, petitioner could not request the appointment of a guardian ad litem, pay the money, and then sit quietly, reap the benefits of the attorney, and then refuse to pay her fair share. She acquiesced and impliedly consented.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge CATHELL have authorized me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion.