Court Opinion

ID: 9625558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:44:46.042684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:10.948909
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the juvenile court code provides a specific exception to the requirement of a written order denying filing, I respectfully dissent.
On August 4, 2000, following Appellant’s divorce from her husband, a trial court awarded custody of the couple’s two daughters, aged 6 and 8, to husband. A custodial modification action is apparently pending in Cobb County.1 On June 10, 2002, Appellant and 29 other individuals presented to the Cobb County Juvenile Court for filing a petition for adjudication of deprivation, alleging that the daughters were being subjected to sexual abuse by their father. Attached to the petition as exhibits were (1) reports from two psychologists who interviewed the older child, (2) the report of a psychologist who reviewed a videotape interview of the children conducted by Cobb County Department of Family and Children Services and other records, (3) letters from five individuals, including personnel from the agency charged with supervising Appellant’s visitation with the children, (4) letters from two individuals who observed behavior on the father’s part that they considered suspicious, (5) a letter from an individual who states she observed the father’s inappropriate behavior with the younger daughter, (6) the September 2000 report of an out-of-state psychologist who interviewed the children, and (7) an April 2001 letter from jurors who acquitted Appellant of various charges in Cobb County stemming from her taking the children to see the out-of-state psychologist, stating, among other things, the jurors’ belief that the state’s experts who concluded that no abuse occurred were not credible.
An employee of the Juvenile Court refused to allow the filing, and no written order was issued. Within 30 days, Appellant filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of Appeals seeking to require the Juvenile Court to file the petition. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals refused to accept the petition for filing and returned the papers to Appellant by letter dated June 20, 2002.2 On July 9, 2002, Appellant filed a writ of mandamus in this Court, which was dismissed on the ground that an original writ of mandamus must be filed in superior court.3 On August 8, 2002, Appellant filed her petition in the Superior Court of Cobb County seeking a writ of mandamus to require the *464juvenile court to file the petition. The superior court concluded that the deprivation petition was really a custody challenge and dismissed the mandamus petition.
This Court has previously recognized that the legislature intended for the juvenile courts to have their own “distinctive rules of procedure.”4 In accordance with this legislative intent, we have long held that the Civil Practice Act is not generally applicable to juvenile courts.5 OCGA § 15-11-37 is a clear example of the unique procedural rules that govern juvenile courts. It requires that a petition alleging delinquency, deprivation, or unruliness shall not be accepted for filing unless the juvenile court “or a person authorized by the court has determined and endorsed upon the petition that the filing of the petition is in the best interest of the public and the child.” Because there is a specific requirement of an endorsement before filing, basic rules of statutory construction require the conclusion that nothing is required to refuse filing.6 The lack of a requirement for a written order denying filing is in keeping with the “basic philosophy that [juvenile] matters shall be handled informally, if at all possible.”7 It is also in keeping with the whole tenor of the Juvenile Court Rules, which provide for all manner of informal dispositions.8 I would not dispute that the requirement of a written order is desirable, but I believe it is up to the legislature to craft that change in the law.
Because I believe the decision to deny filing was appealable without a written order, the superior court did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus.9 Nevertheless, because of the unusual procedural circumstances of this case and in the interest of judicial economy, I would at this time consider the merits of Appellant’s contention that the Juvenile Court abused its discretion in denying filing.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins in this dissent.
*465Decided December 1, 2003 —
Reconsideration denied December 12, 2003.
Wendy J. Titelman, pro se.
Deborah L. Dance, Dorothy H. Bishop, for appellee.
Jones, Jensen & Harris, Richard E. Harris, Haynes & Boone, Alene R. Levy, Ann Al-Bahish, Mercy L. Carrasco-Lowe, amici curiae.

 No. 00-10-8035-33. A custody action pending in Harrison County Chancery Court of Mississippi, First Judicial District, No. 00-02200, has been dismissed.

 The clerk’s letter appears as an exhibit in the record of Titelman v. Cobb County Juvenile Court, S0201606.

 Titelman v. Cobb County Juvenile Court, S0201606 (July 18, 2002).

 English v. Milby, 233 Ga. 7, 9 (209 SE2d 603) (1974).

 Id.

 Morton v. Bell, 264 Ga. 832, 832-833 (452 SE2d 103) (1995).

 Lane v. Jones, 244 Ga. 17,19 (257 SE2d 525) (1979) (quoting official comment to prior version of OCGA § 15-11-37).

 See Juvenile Court Rules 4.1 (“intake officer may elect to informally adjust, divert, or recommend dismissing the case”), 4.2 (screening process may result in “other appropriate action”), 4.3 (intake officer may withhold filing of petition and proceed with informal adjustment).

 Barber Fertilizer Co. v. Chason, 265 Ga. 497 (458 SE2d 631) (1995).