Court Opinion

ID: 9412820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 18:01:35.811975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:33.125125
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20592        Document: 00516841788             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/01/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                                            FILED
                                                                                       August 1, 2023
                                      No. 22-20592
                                     ____________                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                            Clerk
   Maria Francia Neptune,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Indian Harbor Insurance Company; John Doe; Travelers
   Casualty and Surety Company,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:21-CV-1357
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Elrod, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Maria Neptune sought coverage for injuries she sustained from a car
   accident while working as a Lyft driver. Lyft’s insurer, Indian Harbor
   Insurance Company, denied coverage. Neptune sued, and the district court
   granted summary judgment for Indian Harbor, holding that Neptune’s
   accident was not covered. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-20592     Document: 00516841788          Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                   No. 22-20592

                                         I
          In the early hours of April 22, 2019, Maria Neptune, while working as
   a Lyft driver, accepted a request for a short ride from Houston to Cypress.
   At the pick-up spot, a young man got into her SUV. As was her practice,
   Neptune then locked the doors. But before she could begin driving, a man
   wearing a hoodie tried to get into the SUV. Neptune had noticed the man
   walking behind the passenger but at a distance, so she asked her passenger
   “if he was coming with someone.” The passenger answered no and told her
   to drive away quickly. As she did, the man in the hoodie began shooting at
   her SUV, ultimately breaking her back window.
          Neptune drove straight to the drop-off location, a gated apartment
   complex. But her passenger did not have the correct gate code. Neptune
   drove around the complex trying the various gates. While trying a gate at the
   front of the complex, a vehicle pulled behind hers and began shooting at her,
   hitting one of her tires. Fortunately, Neptune managed to do a U-turn and
   drive away. About two miles from where she last saw the shooter, while trying
   to get to the highway, Neptune hit an “island or sidewalk before crashing into
   a wall.” Neptune and her passenger hid in the grass and waited for police.
          Texas law requires Lyft to have uninsured/underinsured motorist
   coverage for its drivers. See Tex. Ins. Code § 194.053. Lyft had coverage
   through Indian Harbor. The policy stated:
          We will pay damages which an “insured” is legally entitled to
          recover from the owner or operator of an “uninsured motor
          vehicle” because of “bodily injury” sustained by an “insured”
          or “property damage” caused by an “accident.” The owner’s
          or operator’s liability for these damages must arise out of the
          ownership, maintenance, or use of the “uninsured motor
          vehicle.”

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Case: 22-20592              Document: 00516841788            Page: 3     Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                              No. 22-20592

   The policy in part defines “uninsured motor vehicle” as, “A land or motor
   vehicle or ‘trailer’ of any type . . . Which is a hit-and-run vehicle whose
   operator or owner cannot be identified. The vehicle must hit an ‘insured’, a
   covered ‘auto’ or a vehicle an ‘insured’ is occupying.”
               Neptune sued Indian Harbor and the unidentified driver in state
           1
   court. Neptune sought in part a declaratory judgment that Indian Harbor’s
   policy covered the accident. Indian Harbor removed the case to federal court
   and, after discovery, moved for summary judgment.
               The district court granted the motion, explaining that the policy’s
   plain language only covered uninsured motorist accidents if the uninsured
   motorist hit the insured or the insured’s car. Finding that Neptune produced
   no evidence that the shooter’s vehicle hit hers, the court concluded her
   coverage claim failed as a matter of law. The district court secondarily held,
   “To the extent that Doe’s driving enabled him to shoot at Plaintiff’s vehicle
   ultimately causing her injuries, those injuries did not ‘arise out of’ Doe’s use
   of a motor vehicle” under Texas law.
               Neptune filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied,
   and then filed this timely appeal.
                                                   II
               “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” Guzman v.
   Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 160 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
   Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine [dispute] of material

               _____________________
               1
                   Neptune also sued Travelers Casualty and Surety Co., but ultimately nonsuited
   them.

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Case: 22-20592         Document: 00516841788       Page: 4   Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                    No. 22-20592

   fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
   verdict for the non-moving party.” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326,
   328 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “All evidence is viewed in the light
   most favorable to the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences are
   drawn in that party’s favor.” Id. at 328–29 (citation omitted). Still,
   “summary judgment remains appropriate if the non-movant’s evidence is
   ‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative.’” Certain Underwriters at
   Lloyd’s of London v. Lowen Valley View, L.L.C., 892 F.3d 167, 170 (5th Cir.
   2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 255 (1986)).
                                        III
          As we are sitting in diversity, we apply Texas law to this dispute.
   Lowen Valley View, L.L.C., 892 F.3d at 170; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
   64, 78–80 (1938). Texas courts construe and enforce insurance policies like
   contracts. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Arce, --- S.W.3d ---, 2023 WL 3134718, at *5
   (Tex. 2023). And, under Texas law, “[t]he insured bears the burden of
   establishing that its claim is covered by the policy.” Lowen Valley View,
   L.L.C., 892 F.3d at 170 (citing Wells v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 885 F.3d 885, 890
   (5th Cir. 2018)).
          Neptune argues that the district court erred in holding that she failed
   to establish Lyft’s Indian Harbor policy covered her injuries in two ways: (1)
   by concluding her claim did not involve the “use” of the uninsured vehicle
   and (2) by finding that she presented no evidence of physical contact between
   her vehicle and the unidentified driver. Because Neptune failed to show a fact
   dispute on whether her injures stemmed from the uninsured vehicle hitting
   hers, we affirm.
          As noted above, Lyft’s Indian Harbor policy covers accidents arising
   out of the use of an “uninsured vehicle.” The policy defines “uninsured
   vehicle” as a vehicle that “hit” an “insured,” a covered “auto,” or a vehicle

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                                    No. 22-20592

   an “insured” is occupying. The upshot of these provisions is that, to
   establish coverage, Neptune must show not only that her injuries stem from
   the “use” of the uninsured vehicle, but also that the uninsured vehicle hit
   her or her vehicle.
          Below, Indian Harbor presented evidence of Neptune’s repeated
   deposition testimony in which she stated that she crashed because she hit an
   island while trying to turn right. Indian Harbor also pointed to Neptune’s
   repeated statements that she did “not recall” the uninsured vehicle hitting
   her when she crashed, and that the uninsured vehicle was not around when
   she crashed.
          We agree with the district court’s assessment of the summary-
   judgment record. Neptune did not submit any rebuttal evidence in response
   to Indian Harbor’s motion. Neptune only stated in response that the
   “unknown Defendant driver hit Plaintiff’s vehicle from behind causing
   Plaintiff to lose control of her vehicle and crash which caused her to suffer
   serious and permanent bodily injuries.” But, as the district court held,
   statements in briefs, without supporting evidence, are insufficient to create a
   fact dispute on summary judgment. See Collins v. Jackson Pub. Dist., 609 F.
   App’x 792, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)).
   The district court also rightly held that her lone statement that “it’s
   possible” the vehicle hit her SUV was also not enough to survive summary
   judgment given her failure to mention any collision in her Second Amended
   Complaint and her consistent testimony that she does not recall any contact
   with the uninsured vehicle. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
   (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (A non-movant must point to more than “some
   metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” “conclusory allegations,”
   “unsubstantiated assertions” or “only a scintilla of evidence.”) (citations
   omitted).

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Case: 22-20592        Document: 00516841788              Page: 6       Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                         No. 22-20592

           Neptune points to her deposition testimony that there was damage to
   her rear bumper. But Neptune did not point the district court to this evidence
   below. Under the federal rules, the parties must point the court to any
   evidence pertinent to their position: “Rule 56 does not impose upon the
   district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support
   a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of
   Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006). Neptune also faults Indian Harbor
   for not including all of the exhibits to her deposition in support of its motion,
   arguing that its failure to do so means it failed to satisfy its summary judgment
   burden. But Neptune bore the burden of “designat[ing] specific facts
   showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for trial.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1079
   (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
           Even if the uninsured driver hit her at some point, Neptune presented
   no evidence connecting that contact to her crash. Cf. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of
   Tex. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. 1999). Indeed, Neptune testified
   to the opposite—that she last saw the uninsured vehicle at a point more than
   two miles from the accident location. Thus, Neptune failed to raise a genuine
   dispute of material fact on whether the uninsured vehicle hit her.
   Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for
   Indian Harbor.
         Because Neptune fails to show a genuine dispute of fact on the
   physical contact requirement of the insurance policy, we do not address her
   argument that the accident arose out of the use of a vehicle.2
           AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
           2
             Indian Harbor’s briefing also focuses on whether a drive-by shooting can satisfy
   the physical contact requirement for purposes of insurance coverage. However, Neptune
   stated that she is not asserting that the shooting caused her injuries. So we do not address
   this argument.

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