Court Opinion

ID: 9635068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:34:39.926426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:17.045449
License: Public Domain

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
In order to shoehorn construction work on a new home that had not been completed, permitted, or even ever occupied into the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20, the majority concludes that “plaintiff, which neither acted as the general contractor nor qualified as a builder of new homes, was engaged in the business of home improvements and subject to the remedies of the CFA.” Ante at 197, 966 A.2d at 1009. According to the majority, the CFA and the New Home Warranty and Builders’ Registration Act (the New Homeowners Warranty or HOW Act), N.J.S.A. 46:3B-1 to -20, are “designed to be understood and applied as an integrated scheme of protections for homeowners[J” Ibid. Because it concludes that failing to apply either statute in this setting “might leave these homeowners without the remedy that the Legislature intended be available to them[,]” ibid,., the majority then holds that a contractor who performs work in a new, unfinished, and unoccupied residence that lacks a certificate of occupancy is somehow engaged in home improvements falling under the purview of the CFA.
That analysis is faulty. Simply because the Legislature sought to cure one set of ills under the CFA and yet another set of ills under the HOW Act does not somehow mean that all claims involving the construction of a new home must fall under one statutory scheme or the other. In its analysis, the majority *211ignores our common law, which is designed to fill the gaps that may exist between the coverage of dissimilar statutes. See, e.g., Richard A. Pulaski Constr. Co. v. Air Frame Hangars, Inc., 195 N.J. 457, 460, 950 A.2d 868 (2008) (“Assuming, without deciding, that our common law may admit of a cause of action for prima facie tort, it is solely a gap-filler.”); Benjamin Moore & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Stir. Co., 179 N.J. 87, 97, 843 A.2d 1094 (2004) (explaining that, because general comprehensive liability policies of insurance “do not provide guidance on how to apportion liability for long-tail injury, common law must fill the gaps” (citing Rebecca M. Bratspies, Splitting the Baby: Apportioning Environmental Liability Among Triggered Insurance Policies, 1999 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 1215, 1218)); Negron v. Llarena, 156 N.J. 296, 315, 716 A.2d 1158 (1998) (Handler, J., concurring) (“ ‘When recognized, this common law right to recover for wrongful death has been utilized to fill in unintended gaps in present statutes or to allow ameliorating common law principles to apply.’ ”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 925 cmt. k (1979) (editing marks omitted)); LePore v. National Tool & Mfg. Co., 115 N.J. 226, 227, 557 A.2d 1371 (1989) (noting that “[o]ur recognition of a common-law cause of action for covered employees merely closes a narrow gap between the protection granted by the statute and our earlier decision in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980), which dealt with at-will employees”); Berkeley Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Rowe, 320 N.J.Super. 164, 171, 726 A.2d 1021 (Law Div.1999) (explaining, in land use context, that “[t]he common law principles described above fill in the gap”); cf. State v. Tate, 102 N.J. 64, 73, 505 A.2d 941 (1986) (explaining that, when considering a comprehensive statutory scheme, “[tjhis Court’s common-law gap-filling authority with regard to the criminal law should be exercised only when there is in fact a gap to be filled. There is none.”).
In so doing, the majority also ignores that which even the homeowners in this case readily acknowledge: there is no gap to be filled here, as the homeowners still retain their already pled claims for breach of contract, negligence, fraud, negligent infliction *212of emotional distress, conversion, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and unlawful possession of goods. Success on any one of these claims will provide the homeowners complete relief, although admittedly not the windfall of the additional penalties of treble damages and attorneys’ fees recoverable under the CFA. N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.
The vice evident in the majority’s conclusions arises from its reasoning. In order to reach the result it seeks, the majority must torture both the facts and the law to conclude that the work done by this contractor—who was contracted directly by the owner to perform the installation of custom kitchen cabinets, interior doors, a front door, and certain moldings in a brand-new, never-occupied, never-completed, and never-permitted home— somehow consists of a “home improvement” subject to the CFA’s reach. It does so even though the regulatory definition of a “home improvement” specifically provides that it “does not include the construction of a new residence [,]” N.J.AC. 13:45A-16.1A (emphasis supplied), and despite the fact that such interpretation flies in the face of a clear statutory injunction:
In the construction of the laws and statutes of this state, both civil and criminal, words and phrases shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language.
[N.J.S.A 1:1-1 (emphasis supplied).]
This Court consistently has hewed to that legislative mandate. See Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 964 A.2d 741 (2009) (citing statute); Livsey v. Mercury Ins. Group, 197 N.J. 522, 964 A.2d 312 (2009) (same); In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 86, 94, 935 A.2d 1184 (2007) (same); Soto v. Scaringelli, 189 N.J. 558, 570-71, 917 A.2d 734 (2007) (same); Mun. Council of the City of Newark v. James, 183 N.J. 361, 371, 873 A.2d 544 (2005) (same); DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, 183 N.J. 149, 163, 870 A.2d 259 (2005) (same); Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75, 861 A.2d 123 (2004) (same); Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 172 N.J. 504, 513, 800 A.2d 54 (2002) (same); Munoz v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwrit*213ing Ass’n, 145 N.J. 377, 388, 678 A.2d 1051 (1996) (same); Bd. of Educ. Of the City of Asbury Park v. Hoek, 38 N.J. 213, 231, 183 A.2d 633 (1962) (same); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Howell, 29 N.J. 116, 124, 148 A.2d 145 (1959) (same); Scatuorchio v. Jersey City Incinerator Auth., 14 N.J. 72, 87, 100 A.2d 869 (1953); General Pub. Loan Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 13 N.J. 393, 400, 99 A.2d 796 (1953) (same); Fischer v. Fischer, 13 N.J. 162, 170, 98 A.2d 568 (1953) (same); Grogan v. De Sapio, 11 N.J. 308, 323, 94 A.2d 316 (1953); Leeds v. Harrison, 9 N.J. 202, 213, 87 A.2d 713 (1952). Yet, today, that is of cold comfort indeed.
Other than engaging in a purely metaphysical discourse, it is well nigh impossible to imagine any plain meaning of the term “home improvement” that includes original construction. If the home is still under construction, where, pray tell, is the home that is to be improved? More concretely, how is one to improve a home that is not yet there? Applied in the context of this ease, the core notion advanced by the majority is internally and fatally contradictory.
In the end, the distinction the majority draws defies plain logic. According to the majority’s construct, if a home owner contracts with a general contractor to build a home, that general contractor, and his subcontractors, are immune from the CFA’s reach because the Legislature separately adopted the HOW Act, and the homeowner must look there for his remedies. However, if the homeowner chooses to forego paying premiums under the HOW Act and either acts as his own general contractor or instead hires a construction manager1 who contracts, on behalf of the owner, with *214each of the discrete trades, each of those trade contractors— although working on what is unquestionably the initial construction of a brand-new home—will be deemed to have engaged in “home improvements” and, hence, will be liable under the CFA. Remarkably, the end result in either instance is the same—the construction of a new home—yet the exposure to liability varies wildly. In a different but similar setting, we have held that a party proposing to construct a residence cannot better its legal position merely by electing to act as its own general contractor instead of retaining a general contractor; we made clear that by “having chosen to purchase the design and construction services individually ... [the homeowners] properly are bound by them choices: by electing to assume responsibility for their construction project [they] cannot be heard to complain as to the consequences of their choice.” Daidone v. Buterick Bulkheading, 191 N.J. 557, 569, 924 A.2d 1193 (2007). The same result must obtain here.
An illogieally pliable legal methodology—one that somehow metamorphoses what indisputably is the construction of new home *215into a home improvement—is unsustainable and does nothing but violence to our ordered system of laws. That, however, is the practical result of the majority’s reasoning. For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.
For affirmance as modification—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and HOENS—6.
For reversal—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.

A construction manager is employed by an owner of a construction project and, on behalf of the owner, engages, supervises the work of, and pays independent contractors, and payment is made for those construction trades by the owner but through the construction manager. See, e.g., Del. River and Bay Auth. v. York Hunter Const, Inc., 344 N.J.Super. 361, 363, 781 A.2d 1126 (Ch.Div.2001) (describing construction manager functions). Unlike general contractors, construction managers perform no construction activities—save for supervisory work—with their own forces. Stated differently, “[tjhe owner, with the assistance of the construction manager, exercises the function of a general contrac*214tor. In a practical sense, however, the owner has delegated this function to the construction manager.” Port Liberte Partners v. Strober Bros., Inc., 228 N.J.Super. 155, 160, 549 A.2d 72 (Law Div.1988). In the abstract,
[a] construction manager is essentially a high level manager who focuses on ... coordinating the different needs of a project on a large scale. In particular, the construction manager is responsible for maintaining the relationship with all the contractors and subcontractors to ensure the smooth and timely completion of a project.
The most important aspect of the position is that of defining the structure of the project management team and assigning responsibilities to each member. Beyond this, the construction manager arranges and maintains project relationships with the trade contractors and designers associated with particular aspects of the project, including setting timetables for the completion of certain sections and resolving conflicts as they arise.
Beyond coordinating the internal workings of a project, the manager must develop plans to handle external concerns. These include handling equipment and materials suppliers, developing plans with local emergency and fire departments for on-site safety, and risk management.
[University of New Mexico, Department of Civil Engineering, What is Construction Management?, available at http://www.unm.edu/civil/ whatconstmgmt.html.]