Court Opinion

ID: 9963796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 12:13:40.643627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:00.053212
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                               TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                       No. 10-23-00374-CV

               IN THE INTEREST OF D.L. AND D.L., CHILDREN

                                 From the 77th District Court
                                  Limestone County, Texas
                                  Trial Court No. CPS-401-A

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Following a bench trial, Mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights

to D.L.-1 and D.L.-2, and Father appeals the order terminating his parental rights to D.L.-

2.1 Mother and Father both challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to

support their respective predicate grounds for termination and that termination was in

the best interest of the children.

1The alleged biological father of D.L.-1 was dismissed in the trial court’s final order because he was not
served with citation and notice of the suit. His parental rights to D.L.-1, if any, were not terminated in
this case.
                                             Background

        Mother has three biological children – D.J., D.L.-1, and D.L.-2. Mother’s rights to

D.J. were terminated in a separate proceeding. Regarding D.L.-1 and D.L.-2, based on

another prior case with the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the

Department”), W.M. was named the permanent managing conservator of the children

and Mother was named their possessory conservator with supervised visitation. Less

than a year after Mother was restricted to supervised visits, the Department learned that

Mother was having extensive unsupervised contact with both children, including that the

children were living with Mother and her boyfriend, “David,” in an apartment where

marijuana and drug paraphernalia were found by the Mexia Police Department. The

Department filed its petition for conservatorship and termination of parental rights of

Mother as to D.L.-1 and D.L.-2, and Father as to D.L.-2.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency in cases involving the

termination of parental rights are well established and will not be repeated here. See In

re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344-45 (Tex. 2009); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-68 (Tex. 2002);

see also In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373, 381-82 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 304

(Tex. 2021). If multiple predicate violations are found by the factfinder, we will affirm

based on any one finding because only one finding is necessary for termination of

parental rights when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                               Page 2
In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); see In re J.S.S., 594 S.W.3d 493, 503 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2019, pet. denied). But if one of the predicate grounds is based on endangerment

under Subsection D or E, we are required to fully address that ground, if presented on

appeal, based on future collateral consequences of such a finding. See In re N.G., 577

S.W.3d 230, 234-37 (Tex. 2019). We give due deference to the factfinder’s findings and

must not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105,

108 (Tex. 2006). The factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witness and the

weight to give their testimony. Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).

                                             Predicate Grounds

        Mother contends that her predicate findings under Texas Family Code Sections

161.001(b)(1)(D), 161.001(b)(1)(E), and 161.001(b)(1)(M) are not supported by legally and

factually sufficient evidence. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E),

(b)(1)(M). Father asserts that his predicate findings under Texas Family Code Sections

161.001(b)(1)(E) and 161.001(b)(1)(Q) are not supported by legally and factually sufficient

evidence. Id. at §§ 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(1)(Q).

APPLICABLE LAW

        Termination under both Subsections D and E require proof of endangerment,

which means to expose the child to loss or injury, to jeopardize. Tex. Dep't. of Human

Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).            The endangerment analysis under

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                              Page 3
Subsection D focuses on evidence relating to the child’s environment to determine if the

environment was a source of endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-

being. In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). The

relevant inquiry under Subsection E is whether sufficient evidence exists that the

endangerment of the child's well-being was the direct result of the parent's conduct,

including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2015, pet. denied). The factfinder may consider conduct that occurred before and

after the child's birth, in the child's presence and outside the child's presence, and before

and after removal by the Department. See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. Additionally, a

parent's past endangering conduct may create an inference that the parent's past conduct

may recur and further jeopardize the child’s present or future physical or emotional well-

being. J.S.S., 594 S.W.3d at 505.

MOTHER’S PREDICATE FINDINGS

        Subsection D

        A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger which

the parent is aware of but consciously disregards. See Interest of S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). The trial court noted the harmful

environment created by Mother and David’s drug use in the home. Mother’s chronic

marijuana use is a primary reason for the Department’s involvement in her life for the

last several years. Mother admitted at trial that she kept her marijuana in the home and

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                             Page 4
would smoke it on the porch, though she stored it in a cabinet so the children were less

likely to access it.       Mother also admitted that she knew David would often use

methamphetamine in their apartment, even while the children were home. She testified

that David would be “cooped up” in the children’s room smoking methamphetamine

“mostly all night,” though he would not use the drug directly in front of her or the

children. Mother described how she learned to tell when David had been smoking

methamphetamine in the apartment based on the presence of a towel under the children’s

bedroom door, open windows, and the “different smell” in the apartment. She explained

that she would argue with David about finding his drug paraphernalia in the apartment

and in her car. Based on Mother’s testimony, she knowingly allowed her children to be

exposed to methamphetamine for approximately two months before she moved them out

of the apartment. Shortly after removal, D.L.-1 tested positive for methamphetamine,

and Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana.

        The trial court also expressed concern over persistent domestic violence in the

home. Abusive conduct by a person who lives in the child’s home or with whom the

child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in the home is part of the “conditions

and surroundings” of the child’s home. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 721. A parent’s failure to

remove herself and her children from a physically violent or abusive relationship may

support a finding of endangerment. In re G.M., 649 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2022, no pet.). Evidence developed at trial established a cycle of abuse and reconciliation

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                           Page 5
between David and Mother. David received a four-year prison sentence for assaulting

Mother in 2020, which she testified was based on David dragging her by her hair. After

this assault, Mother reconciled with David. Mother testified that David was “very, very

abusive” to her and would become “real violent” when he smoked methamphetamine.

While Mother testified that David would not assault her in front of the children, she

described a recent assault when the children were in her care, during which David kicked

in a door and shoved her into a wall. The force of this contact caused Mother’s body to

create a sizeable hole in the wall, a photo of which was entered into evidence at the

hearing. Even after Mother was awarded a monitored return from the trial court, with

the stipulation that the children not be permitted to have contact with David, Mother

violated the court order by taking the children to the jail to visit him. Mother testified

that she had no plans to rekindle her relationship with David when he was released from

custody. However, the trial court could reasonably disbelieve her testimony based on

her past relationship pattern with David, as well as her testimony that she considered

David to be the father of D.L.-1 and D.L.-2.

        We find the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s

finding that Mother placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or

surroundings that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. Because

we find the evidence sufficient under Subsection D, we do not need to address

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                              Page 6
Subsections E and M. See Interest of R.A., No. 10-21-00022-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 4211,

at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

FATHER’S PREDICATE FINDINGS

        Subsection E

        Domestic violence, want of self-control, and propensity for violence may be

considered as evidence of endangerment. In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Evidence of domestic violence is relevant even if it is

not directed at the child. Interest of P.W., 579 S.W.3d 713, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2019, no pet.). At the final hearing, Father admitted to multiple arrests and

convictions for assaultive conduct, including domestic violence. Father’s most recent

judgment of conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, for which he was

still in prison at the time of trial, was admitted into evidence. He also discussed a separate

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction, which was based on a domestic

violence incident against the mother of one of his other children. Father additionally

admitted to having an assault on a public servant charge and two misdemeanor family

violence charges in his criminal history.

        While neither a conviction nor imprisonment, standing alone, will constitute

engaging in conduct that endangers the emotional or physical well-being of a child, both

are appropriate factors to weigh when considering endangerment. Interest of J.F.-G., 627

S.W.3d at 312-13. A parent’s criminal history—considering the nature of the crimes, the

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                              Page 7
duration of incarceration, and whether a pattern of escalating, repeated convictions

exist—is relevant and can support a finding of endangerment. Id. at 312–315. Father,

who was 35 years old at the time of the hearing, listed his criminal history as including

theft, two misdemeanor assault family violence charges, criminal mischief, assault on a

public servant, and two aggravated assault with a deadly weapon convictions. His

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon convictions resulted in a ten-year prison

sentence and a five-year prison sentence. Though the record was not developed as to the

timing, status, and any related sentences associated with the other criminal charges, they

show a pattern of repeated criminal behavior that endangers D.L.-2’s emotional well-

being by exposing him to a life of uncertainty and instability. See Interest of M.T.R., 579

S.W.3d 548, 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Further, when a parent

is incarcerated, he is absent from the child’s daily life and unable to provide support to

the child, negatively impacting the child’s living environment and emotional well-being.

M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d at 503. D.L.-2 was three years old at the time of the final hearing,

but Father had never met the child. Father was incarcerated when D.L.-2 was born and

had only seen him in pictures, and he was unable to provide financial support for D.L.-2

due to his incarceration.

        Moreover, a parent endangers his child by accepting the endangering conduct of

other people. See Interest of L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019 WL 1523124, at *20 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). One parent’s drug-

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                           Page 8
related endangerment may be imputed to the other parent who knowingly fails to protect

the child from the drug-abusing parent’s habits and behaviors. See In re F.E.N., 542

S.W.3d 752, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).             Father told the

Department that he knew Mother used methamphetamine, including while she was

pregnant. Though Father denied making these statements to the Department at the final

hearing, the trial court was free to disbelieve his testimony.

        We find the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support Father’s

termination of parental rights under Subsection E. It is therefore unnecessary to address

Subsection Q. See Interest of A.S., No. 02-19-004220-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1796, at *15

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 2, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                        Best Interest Findings

        Both Mother and Father assert that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient

to support the trial court’s finding that termination of their parental rights was in the

children’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). We disagree.

APPLICABLE LAW

        The non-exhaustive list of factors that have been consistently considered in

determining the best interest of the child were set out in the Texas Supreme Court’s

opinion, Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). These factors are: (1) the

child's wishes; (2) the child’s emotional or physical needs now and in the future; (3) the

emotional or physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parenting abilities

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                             Page 9
of the parties seeking custody; (5) programs available to help those parties; (6) plans for

the child by the parties seeking custody; (7) the stability of the proposed placement; (8)

the acts or omissions of the parent that indicate that the existing parent-child relationship

is not proper; and (9) any excuses for the acts or omissions of the parent. See Id. The

Holley factors focus on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent. In

re S.L., 421 S.W.3d 34, 38 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, no pet.). There is no requirement that

every factor must be proved as a condition precedent to parental termination, and the

absence of evidence about some factors does not preclude a factfinder from reasonably

forming a strong conviction that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re C.H.,

89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).

DISCUSSION

        In explaining the reasoning behind its best-interest finding, the trial court noted

Mother’s lack of protection from the illicit drug use and domestic violence in her home

for a prolonged period of time. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28 (considering evidence related to

the predicate grounds under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1) as relevant to a

best-interest determination); See Interest of O.J.P., No. 01-21-00163-CV, 2021 Tex. App.

LEXIS 7732, at *51-52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op)

(explaining that a child’s exposure to violence in the home undermines the safety of the

home environment and is relevant when considering the child’s best interest); See In re

D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 471-74 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (considering

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                             Page 10
children’s exposure to narcotics in a best-interest analysis).      The court recognized

Mother’s lack of improvement in areas of concern over the three-year period that her

family had been involved with this trial court. Regarding Father, the trial court pointed

to Father’s lack of effort in fostering a parent-child relationship with D.L.-2, remarking

specifically that Father did not take the opportunity to meet D.L.-2 when he was out of

custody for a few months between periods of incarceration. The trial court could have

reasonably concluded that the parent-child relationship between Father and D.L.-2

would continue to be non-existent once Father was released from custody. Further,

Father’s criminal activity shows a habit of engaging in violent behavior, and there is

nothing in the record indicating Father has taken any steps to address this area of concern.

        Moreover, permanence is of paramount importance in considering a child’s

present and future needs, and prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe

environment is presumed to be in the child's best interest. See In re M.C.T., 250 S.W.3d

161, 170 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.); See Interest of B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927

(Tex. App. – El Paso 2015, no pet.). The record reflects that the Department has been

involved with Mother and these two young children for several years, resulting in

removals and multiple different placements. In spite of the many efforts made to safely

return the children to Mother’s care, including a failed monitored return in this case, the

underlying concerns that precipitated the Department’s involvement have not been

resolved. Meanwhile, Father has spent a significant portion of D.L.-2’s life in custody

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                           Page 11
and has never provided a stable home for the child. He testified that he is up for parole

consideration in July of 2024, but as the trial court stated, there is no guarantee that parole

will be granted. See Interest of J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020,

pet. denied). The children are now with an adoption-motivated foster family who has

demonstrated a willingness to offer consistency and stability as well as proactively

address the children’s physical and emotional needs. We find the evidence is legally and

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s

parental rights to D.L.-1 and D.L.-2 is in the children’s best interest, and that termination

of Father’s parental rights was in D.L.-2’s best interest.

        We overrule Mother and Father’s issues on appeal.

                                             Conclusion

        Having overruled Mother and Father’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

                                                    STEVE SMITH
                                                    Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed April 25, 2024
[CV06]

In the Interest of D.L. and D.L., Children                                              Page 12