Court Opinion

ID: 9777709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:20:57.228563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:59.993462
License: Public Domain

OPINION
HEDGES, Justice.
A jury found appellant guilty of possession of cocaine weighing more than one gram and *755less than four grams. The trial judge sentenced him to 35 years in prison. In a single point of error, appellant asserts that the trial judge erred in allowing the State to impeach him with evidence of a 1977 felony conviction. We reverse and remand.
Generally, when a defendant testifies, prior convictions for felonies or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude may be admitted in evidence as impeachment. Tex.R. Evid. 609(a).1 The trial judge should conduct a balancing test to determine if the probative value of the prior conviction is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. In a standard 609(a) balancing analysis, the following factors should be considered: (1) the prior conviction’s impeachment value; (2) its temporal proximity to the crime on trial, and the defendant’s subsequent criminal history; (3) the similarity between the prior offense and the present offense; (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the importance of the credibility issue. Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). The trial court has wide discretion in deciding the question of admissibility, and its decision will not be reversed unless an appellant shows a clear abuse of that discretion. Id.
The Rules of Evidence provide a separate analysis standard if the conviction is more than 10 years old. Tex.R. Evid. 609(b).2 Such a conviction is not admissible “unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” The drafters of these rules provided heightened protection against prejudice when a conviction is statutorily deemed remote (more than 10 years old). The State must demonstrate that the probative value “substantially outweighs,” not merely “outweighs,” the prejudicial effect. In instances in which remoteness is an issue, we look exclusively to the strictures of rule 609(b), not to the multiple factors of Theus. That case, which did not involve a remote conviction, interprets rule 609(a), not 609(b).
The State impeached appellant with evidence of his 1977 felony conviction of delivery of marihuana. Because the conviction is more than 10 year’s old, it is inadmissible unless the State demonstrates that in the context of its prosecution, the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect. In making this determination, we take into account that after his 1977 conviction, appellant was convicted of five misdemeanors: criminal trespass in 1979, carrying a weapon in 1983, possession of a controlled substance in 1985, possession of marihuana in 1990, and driving while intoxicated in 1995.
In evaluating whether to admit a remote conviction, Texas courts have historically looked at subsequent convictions of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Such convictions indicate a lack of reformation, which is thought to attenuate prejudice interposed by a distant conviction. McClendon v. State, 509 S.W.2d 851, 855-57 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); Sinegal v. State, 789 S.W.2d 383, 388 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd). If a defendant demonstrates a failure to reform as witnessed by later criminal behavior, remote convictions are more palatable.
In evaluating a complaint about the admission of a prior conviction, an appellate court has several options. It may find that the prior conviction is not remote (less than 10 years old) and analyze its evidentiary impact under 609(a) and Theus. It may find that it is more than 10 years old but that subsequent convictions of felonies or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude remove the taint of its distance. Under that circumstance, the 609(a) standard is appropriate because the “tacking” of the intervening convictions causes a conviction older than 10 years to be treated as not remote. Crisp v. State, 470 S.W.2d 58, 59-60 (Tex.Crim.App.1971); accord McClendon v. State, 509 S.W.2d 851, 855-56 (Tex.Crim.App.l974)(op. *756on reh’g). The court may find that the prior conviction is remote but that under rule 609(b) its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect, in which case the evidence is admissible. Finally, if a court finds that its probative value does not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect, and its admission is error, a harm analysis must be conducted.
Appellant’s subsequent convictions are neither felonies nor misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. A conviction of a misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude is not considered a lack of reformation. Davis v. State, 545 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). As such, it cannot be “tacked onto” a remote conviction and cause it to be treated as less than 10 years old. Therefore, appellant’s five subsequent misdemeanor convictions do not overcome his remoteness objection. This record does not demonstrate specific facts and circumstances showing that the probative value of the prior conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect, as required by rule 609(b). We conclude, therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the 1977 conviction.
We next review the record to determine whether the error affected one of appellant’s substantial rights. Tex.R.App. 44.2(b).3 “A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) citing with approval Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). In Kotteakos, the Supreme Court stated:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or but had very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that has happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.
328 U.S. at 764-65, 66 S.Ct. at 1247-48 (citation omitted).
The State’s case against appellant included the testimony of two police officers, one of whom observed the other remove the cocaine from appellant’s possession. One police officer testified that one of the occupants of the room held a marihuana cigarette in his hand. There was a strong smell of marihuana in the room. Appellant and the other two individuals were sitting around a metal tray on which the police officer saw marihuana-like substance, rolling paper, and a lighter.
Appellant testified that neither he nor anyone else in the room was smoking marihuana'. He denied seeing the metal table or any leafy substance placed on it. He admitted that he smelled something, but, although he was acquainted with the smell of marihuana, he could not identify the odor in the room. He denied possessing cocaine and theorized that one of the police officers put the cocaine into his coat pocket.4 Neither of the other two suspects testified at trial.
The jury was instructed not to consider the 1977 conviction as any evidence of guilt, but to consider it only in weighing appellant’s testimony. In closing arguments, there were three references to appellant’s prior conviction. Defense counsel stated: “Remember this: 19 years ago he was convicted of something the Judge tells you to consider [sic] that if you wish to as to determine his credibility.” The State referred to the 1977 conviction twice, first stating: “Mr. Hernandez came in and he testified — you can consider, you know, the facts that came out about him in his past. The Judge instructed you, you can.” Later the State argued: “And also you know something else and this is some*757thing you can consider when judging his credibility. You know that this man has previously — is a convicted felon and previously been convicted of [sic] felony offense of delivery of marihuana. He wants you to believe that he smelled something but he didn’t know what he smelled, didn’t know what it was.”
Appellant’s entire defense rested on the jury’s believing his testimony and disbelieving the State’s witnesses. The State’s entire case rested on the jury’s believing the officers and not believing appellant. Therefore, the probative value of the prior conviction probably equaled, but did not substantially outweigh, its prejudicial value. We conclude that the evidence of his prior conviction had a substantial and injurious influence in the determination of the jury’s verdict.
We sustain appellant’s sole point of error.
We reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court.
COHEN, J., concurs.
WILSON, J., dissents.
En banc consideration was requested. A majority of the Justices of the Court voted to overrule the request for en banc consideration.
TAFT, J., dissents from the overruling of the request for en banc consideration.

. This rule, effective March 1, 1998, is substantially identical to former Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 609(a).

. This rule, effective March 1, 1998, is identical to former Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 609(b).

. “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded." TexR.App. P. 44.2(b). Rule 44.2(b), effective September 1, 1997, is taken from Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) without substantive change.

. The cocaine taken from appellant's pocket was inside small baggies, which were inside a large plastic envelope.