Court Opinion

ID: 9518544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:55:32.363571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:31.182287
License: Public Domain

Spencer, J.,
dissenting. Simmons, C. J., and Boslaugh, J., concurring in this dissent.
I am unable to agree with the majority opinion for three reasons: First, it to me patently ignores the intent of the testator and by an anachronistic rule of construction wholly foreign to Nebraska law actually defeats that intent; second, it in effect repeals section 76-117, R. R. S. 1943, which is section 17 of the Uniform *758Property Act; and, third, if a rule of construction is to be applied, the wrong one has been used.
The question in this case is whether the remainder is to be distributed per stirpes or per capita. In concluding that a part of the remainder is to be distributed per stirpes, the majority opinion brings into our law a rule of construction sometimes referred to as the English rule, which has been adopted in some states in this country which lean toward a stirpital construction. Stated briefly, this rule provides that a devise to life tenants as tenants in common with remainder to their children upon the death of the life tenant is to be construed not as it is written but as if the devise read to their respective children upon their respective deaths. As I will suggest later, this rule has no place in Nebraska law, and, in any event, it is not applicable to this will.
I believe that the intent of the testator, which is controlling in the construction of any will, is so evident in this case that it is unnecessary to resort to an arbitrary rule of construction in order to arrive at the meaning intended. I think it is clear that the testator intended that his children during their “natural lives,” or their spouses until their remarriage, should have the use and income of the property, and upon the “death” of the life tenants and the death or remarriage of the spouses, the remainder was devised to the children of Leonard and Harold and the natural-born children of Marie. I believe that the testator indicated an intent to treat all of the remaindermen equally and that no intention to the contrary is found in the will.
Until this case we have consistently held in Nebraska that the court, without much regard to canons of construction, would place itself in testator’s position, ascertain his intent, and, if lawful, enforce it. Judge Sullivan stated the rule as follows in Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455, 77 N. W. 1075: “No rule of law is better settled, or more in accord with good sense, than that which requires the intention of the testator to be ascer*759tained from a liberal interpretation and comprehensive view of all the provisions of the will. No particular words, no conventional form of expression, are necessary to enable one to make an effective testamentary disposition of his property. The court, without much regard to canons of construction, will place itself in the position of the testator, ascertain his will, and, if lawful, enforce it.” This exact language was repeated in Krause v. Krause, 113 Neb. 22, 201 N. W. 670, and In re Estate of Dimmitt, 141 Neb. 413, 3 N. W. 2d 752, 144 A. L. R. 704, and in other cases. It is found in substance in every will construction in our reports, including Bodeman v. Cary, 152 Neb. 506, 41 N. W. 2d 797, which is controlling herein but which the majority opinion, because of the assumption of a false premise and some judicial surgery performed on the testator’s intent, holds to be inapplicable.
I suggest further that the law followed is an anachronism. It is followed in this country only in those states which favor a stirpital distribution. Nebraska is not one of them. As we said in Douglas v. Cameron, 47 Neb. 358, 66 N. W. 430: “ ‘The rule of representation applies only from necessity, or where there are lineal heirs in different degrees.’ ” And again, in the same case at page 366, referring to an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts: “The point, however, we desire to impress is that at the time he wrote, representation in America was not presumed, but was only applied where the statute affirmatively provided therefor.” The reason for stirpital distribution in England and why it has not been generally adopted in America is discussed in that case.
An observation by the writer of an Annotation appearing in 16 A. L. R. 16 is illuminating: “It is a common remark that the decisions on the question as to when beneficiaries under a will are to take per capita, and when per stirpes, are in hopeless confusion. Analysis and comparison, however, show that their diver*760sity of result is due not to a difference as to the principles of construction, but as to the amount of evidence of a contrary intent which will overcome the general presumption that, where the proportions in which the beneficiaries are to take are not specified, they take per capita. The cause of this difference is due to the inclination of some courts — notably those of Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania — toward stirpital distribution wherever possible.” (Italics supplied.)
What the majority opinion is doing is reading into the will words which simply are not there, which in nowise reflect the testator’s intent, but on the contrary have the effect of destroying the very thought clearly expressed by the testator, especially so when the language used is given its generally accepted, literal, and grammatical meaning. In fact, the children of the testator themselves construed the will to create cross-remainders in the surviving children until the motion for rehearing. I quote from appellants’ original brief: “Martin F. Gaughen’s will (El:2) made certain bequests and the major portion of his property, consisting of 240 acres of farm land in Dodge County, was devised as follows: Life estates were devised to testator’s three children, Harold, Leonard, and Marie Mundy and their spouses, Mamie, Thelma, and Leo Mundy. On the death of the last of the above life tenants, the remainder was devised in the following manner: * * (Italics supplied.) They were correct in that interpretation, I believe, because there is nothing in the will which permits any enjoyment of the remainder interest prior to the demise of all the children, and the demise or remarriage of all the spouses, and any other interpretation does violence to the will itself.
Assuming, however, that the testator created a tenancy in common in his children as the majority opinion holds, then certainly section 76-117, R. R. S. 1943, must be followed. This section is section 17 of the Uniform *761Property Act, and was intended to avoid exactly the thing the majority opinion creates. In 1939, when the Nebraska State Bar Association was considering the Uniform Property Act and what position to take with reference to it, an able real property lawyer reported on section 17 as follows: “Section 17 deals with the doctrine of cross remainders; and provides that when an estate is conveyed to two or more persons as tenants in common which is terminable at their deaths with an express remainder to the survivor of such persons or upon the death of all of the life tenants to another person, such conveyance creates cross limitations among the tenants in common so that the shares of those dying vest in the remaining tenants. We have no Nebraska statute and have had no Nebraska cases dealing with the rule of cross remainders. It suffices to say that a great deal of hair splitting and technicalities have been indulged in by the courts generally in dealing with this problem. It is bound to arise in Nebraska and it should be settled in such a manner as to avoid needless difficulties. This proposed section furnishes a statutory definition, clarifies the law, expresses a common sense view, does away with technicalities and settles the matter so that all may understand.” 18 Nebraska Law Review, No. 4, p. 145.
The majority opinion brushes aside section 76-117, R. R. S. 1943, by stating that it is inapplicable here because the will effectively manifests an intent not to create cross-remainders between the life tenants. I believe that not only is an opposite intent manifested in the will, but that the very purpose of the statute has been ignored. It is my opinion that the Legislature intended to avoid the operation of the so-called English rule by enacting section 76-117, R. R. S. 1943, which provides that none of the remaindermen shall go into possession until all of the life estates have been terminated. In arriving at the conclusion that an opposite intent is manifested in the will, the majority rely upon *762a rule which has never been in effect in this státe and which if it were, the statute abolished. In effect, the rule is used to void the statute and thus destroy its meaning and effect.
The matter to be decided in this case is whether the remainder is to be distributed per capita or per stirpes. The majority do hold under their construction that the remainder devised to the natural-born children of Marie is to be distributed per capita to the children of Leonard and Harold in the event there is a failure of issue to Marie. I cannot draw this fine a distinction. I believe that the testator intended the entire remainder is to be distributed per capita, and not one-third per capita and two-thirds per stirpes.
I suggest further that there are other rules of construction in England and those states which lean to a stirpital distribution which would be more logical than adding words to a will if the testator’s intent were not clear. Those constructions, however, would require a per capita distribution and not a stirpital one.
Under a bequest to children of several persons, the children take per capita and not per stirpes in the absence of words indicating a different intent. Abrey v. Newman (1853), 16 Beav. 431, 51 Eng. Rep. R. 845, 22 L. J. Ch. 627, 17 Jur. 153, 1 Wkly. Rep. 156. See the American and other English cases collected in 16 A. L. R. 61. If it were argued that this rule should not apply because of the language used in the instant will, I suggest that the cases do not bear out this assumption. As said in 3 Page on Wills (Lifetime Ed.), § 1082, p. 288: “It also applies where he describes them as separate classes, such as ‘the children of’ one named parent, and ‘the children of’ the other named parent,” which incidentally is our exact situation. As suggested by Page in the same article, this is the rule even if the parents are related to the testator in unequal degrees.
There is in the majority opinion the suggestion that if the parents are named, and the children are not *763named, a per stirpes distribution is intended. The. reference is supported by single Connecticut and Alabama cases, both of which jurisdictions- are states favoring stirpital distribution on the slightest pretext. I suggest the rule followed in 'most jurisdictions is otherwise. See the cases collected in 16 A. L. R. at page 31. To the same effect see 57 Am. Jur., Wills, § 1301, p. 861, which does not even mention the Connecticut and Alabama cases.
There is also the rule which is followed in both Eng-’ land and those states favoring a stirpital distribution that where there is a limitation over, the distribution is per capita and not per stirpes. A good illustration of these cases is the Kentucky case of Walters v. Crutcher, 15 B. Mon. 2, which I use because the Kentucky case of Dills v. Deavors, 266 S. W. 2d 788, has been cited in the majority opinion. That case holds the rule contended for in the majority opinion to be inapplicable where there is á limitation over in case of the death of any of the life tenants without children, since in such case an intention is apparent that all the children will take as one class. That is exactly the situation which we have in the instant case.
It will serve no purpose to extend this dissent further. I summarize by saying that to hold that the testator devised both a life estate and a remainder in thirds is to overlook these salient features of the will and the admitted facts appearing in the record: First, the testator designated, the objects of his bounty by their relationship to their living ancestors, thereby indicating that they are not to take in his or her place or by representation, but that the reference to the ancestors is solely for the purpose of designating the beneficiary. Second, all the remaindermen are of the same degree of kindred to the deceased, and if all of the children of deceased be dead, they would take equally under the statute of descent in the absence of a will. Third, if the decedent had intended a stirpital distribution, he could have *764easily stated so in his last will. He made no attempt to do so. Fourth, the testator on two occasions in the disputed paragraph decreed distribution on a share and share alike basis with nothing to- be found in the entire will indicating an intent contrary to the generally accepted meaning of the quoted words. Fifth, the provisions of the will itself, wherein the testator devised the remainder “upon the death of said life tenants or the remarriage of my children’s spouses,” indicates that the whole remainder goes over together instead of in separate shares.
Our first opinion in this case, Gaughen v. Gaughen, 171 Neb. 763, 107 N. W. 2d 652, is the correct one and should be adhered to.