Court Opinion

ID: 9569905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:18:26.589759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:14.269627
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority holds that a trial court instructing a jury on use of physical force in defense of a person, § 18-1-704, 8B C.R.S. (1986), also must tender an amplifying self-defense instruction concerning “no retreat” if the defendant is not the aggressor. I disagree. The statute, section 18-1-704, encompasses the “no retreat” doctrine and abrogates the need for any amplifying instruction. See Beckett v. People, 800 P.2d 74 (Colo.1990).
The defendant, Idrogo (defendant), and his girlfriend, Carol Babb (Babb), encountered William and Raymond Archuleta on September 6, 1986, at a liquor store in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Both Archule-tas appeared to be intoxicated. William Archuleta tried to convince the defendant to sell him some marijuana. The defendant refused and walked away. When William persisted, the defendant took out a knife and, according to Babb, said to William, “Get away. You don’t want to get cut. Just leave us alone.” William Archuleta backed off. The defendant and Babb continued to walk away by walking backwards, facing the direction of the liquor store. It was then, according to Babb, that Raymond Archuleta rapidly approached the defendant and Babb, making angry and threatening comments. The defendant still had the knife in his hand and continued .to walk backwards away from Raymond into a cul-de-sac.
According to the testimony of a second key eyewitness, Alan Daniels (Daniels), a customer at the liquor store who saw the events leading up to and immediately after the stabbing from across the street, Raymond Archuleta followed the defendant and began bobbing and weaving like he was going to go after somebody and hit them. Raymond then lunged toward the defendant with his fists raised like he was going to hit someone. Raymond went out of Daniels’ sight when he lunged at the defendant and was next seen by Daniels shortly thereafter, walking backwards with his hands on his chest, fatally wounded.
Babb testified that Raymond Archuleta had intercepted her and the defendant. Raymond struck the defendant with his fist two or three times in the shoulder and head area. The defendant had the knife raised in the air and was telling Raymond to get away if he did not want to get cut. Raymond hit the defendant again, at which time the defendant stabbed him once in the chest.
The defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, crime of violence, and as an habitual criminal. The defendant asserted the affirmative defense of use of physical force in defense of a person (“self-defense”). § 18-1-704. The defendant was convicted of reckless manslaughter, crime of violence, and as an habitual criminal. The court of appeals affirmed, and we accepted certiorari on the question of whether the trial court erred in not includ*758ing a jury instruction clarifying whether the defendant had a duty to retreat in order to claim the right to use deadly force in self-defense.
I.
Section 18-1-704(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986), is a codification of the common-law defense of self-defense. This section provides:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2)and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose.
Sections 18-1-704(2) and (3), 8B C.R.S. (1986), establish limits on the general rule set forth in section 18-1-704(1). These sections provide as follows:
(2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and:
(a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or
(b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or
(c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402 or 18-3-403, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203.
(3)Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force if:
(a) With intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person; or
(b) He is the initial aggressor, except that his use of physical force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force; or
(c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law.
A.
I agree with the majority that section 18-1-704 also represents legislative codification of our decisions with respect to non-retreat. Maj. op. at 755. The majority, however, then holds under the provisions of section 18-1-704(2) that an amplifying instruction on “no retreat” is required, contrary to our holding in Beckett v. People, 800 P.2d 74 (Colo.1990). In Beckett, we stated that the language of the self-defense statute, section 18-1-704, abrogated the need for a specific instruction on the doctrine of apparent necessity. Maj. op. at 756. The law of self-defense is emphatically the law of necessity. People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9, 13 (Colo.1984) (quoting Young v. People, 47 Colo. 352, 355, 107 P. 274, 275-76 (1910)). Under section 18 — 1— 704, the phrase, “a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose,” reflects the common-law “necessity” requirement in the context of self-defense. § 18-1-704(1).
In Beckett, we concluded that “reasonable belief” encompassed the principle of apparent necessity. 800 P.2d at 78. Retreat is also a necessity-based doctrine.1 *759P.H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 131(c), 77-81 (1984). Under section 18 — 1— 704, the issue of necessity, including whether it is necessary for a defendant to retreat or whether the danger is apparent, is adequately considered in the “totality of circumstances” that the trier of fact must consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the accused’s belief in the necessity of defensive action. See Beckett, 800 P.2d at 78 (quoting Jones, 675 P.2d at 14).
In the present case, evidence of the defendant’s ability or inability to retreat was adequately considered when the trier of fact considered the “totality of circumstances in evaluating the reasonableness of the accused’s belief in the necessity of defensive action.” Jones, 675 P.2d at 14. The jury was adequately apprised of its duty to consider the necessity-based doctrines, such as apparent necessity and the duty to retreat, by the language in the statute and the pattern jury instructions that stated a person may use “a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose.” § 18 — 1— 704(1) (emphasis added). See Beckett, 800 P.2d at 77-78. Under section 18-1-704(2), the statutory language encompasses the “no retreat” doctrine and abrogates the need for any amplifying instruction. See id. at 77-78.
II.
A careful review of the record reflects that section 18-l-704(3)(a), not section 18-1-704(2), is the proper focus for review in this case. The trial court gave the affirmative defense of self-defense instructions, CJI-Crim. 7:17, as instruction No. 20, which provided:
It is an affirmative defense to the crime(s) of second degree murder, manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide that the defendant used deadly physical force because
1. he reasonably believed a lesser degree of force was inadequate, and
2. had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, that he or another person was in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving “great bodily injury.”
The record further reflects the People raised the issue that the defendant, by waving the knife and holding it in plain view, provoked Raymond Archuleta to attack him. According to witnesses, the defendant had the knife in plain view from the time he pulled it out to ward off William Archuleta until the stabbing of Raymond Archuleta. Under the provisions of section 18-l-704(3)(a), these facts, if true, would defeat the defendant’s claim of self-defense. The trial court included, at the request of the prosecution, instruction No. 21, which reflects CJI-Crim. 7:68, special rule 7(13):
A person is not justified in using physical force if with intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provoked the use of unlawful physical force by that person.
In response to the People’s provocation theory under section 18-l-704(3)(a), the defense requested the instruction based on the language in Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 P. 419 (1896). Defense counsel stated that this instruction was “basically language about, if the Defendant didn’t provoke the fight, he’s not required to retreat, but may stand his ground.” The trial court rejected this instruction.
Thus, the record, and defendant’s comments, demonstrate that the court’s instruction and the defendant’s tendered instruction addressed the People’s contention that the defendant provoked the fight. Accordingly, our review of this case should be limited to whether section 18-l-704(3)(a) requires the instruction tendered by the defendant and not whether such an instruction is required by section 18-1-704(2) or some other section. However, under either section 18-l-704(3)(a) or section 18-1-704(2), the outcome is the same. The statute has abrogated the need for an amplifying instruction.
A.
At common law, a person had to retreat before countering the use of force with force. See People v. Watson, 671 P.2d 973, 974 (Colo.App.1983). In Colorado, at the *760turn of the century, this common-law retreat doctrine was modified. Harris v. People, 32 Colo. 211, 218, 75 P. 427, 430 (1904). The retreat doctrine was applicable only in cases “where the defendant voluntarily enters into a fight or where the parties engage in mutual combat, or where the defendant, being the assailant, does not endeavor in good faith to decline any further struggle before firing the fatal shot, and possibly in other similar cases.” Id. at 218-19, 75 P. at 430.2 Thus, under this early case law, the retreat doctrine was not applicable unless a defendant was blameworthy to some degree in instituting the incident that gave rise to the need to defend. In 1971, with the enactment of section 18-1-704, the General Assembly codified the principles developed by this court in earlier decisions. See maj. op. at 754. The defendant’s tendered instruction was based on language in a case decided by this court in 1896, Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 P. 419. The legislature was aware of the rule in Boykin when it enacted the statute, yet chose not to include any language in section 18-l-704(3)(a) of withdrawal or retreat.3
Under a plain reading of section 18 — 1— 704(3)(a), if the defendant provoked the attack, there would be no justification of the use of force, and thus no need to give an amplifying instruction of non-retreat. The trier of fact must determine whether the defendant did or did not provoke the encounter. If they find he did provoke the encounter, then whether he retreated or not is of no consequence. If the trier of fact finds that the defendant did not provoke the encounter, then the instruction given under his affirmative defense would be considered by the trier of fact without the need of any amplifying instruction of no retreat. See Beckett, 800 P.2d at 77-78. The record reflects from the testimony of an unbiased witness that this defendant was in a continuing state of retreat and the jury found his conduct to be reckless when he stabbed the victim. The facts of this case, applied to the clear meaning of the statute, do not support the conclusion that the defendant was entitled to an amplifying instruction on “no retreat.” I therefore respectfully dissent.

. In the context of self-defense, necessity can be actual, real, or apparent, Jones, 675 P.2d at 13-14, and under the common law, was subject to modification. P.H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 131(c), 77-81 (1984). The retreat rule was a "common modification of the necessity element in the use of defensive force.” Id.

. Thus, this court recognized a distinction between the application of the doctrine of retreat when the defendant was claiming a "justifiable” self-defense versus an excusable self-defense. See Tortia, II Wharton's Criminal Law § 126, at 132 (14th ed. 1979). If the defendant was acting in justifiable self-defense, i.e., the defendant was not at fault in bringing on the attack, the defendant did not need to retreat before countering force with force. See id. If the defendant was acting in excusable self-defense, i.e., the defendant was blameworthy in bringing on the attack, then the defendant needed to retreat before claiming self-defense. See id.

. Section 18-1-704 contains no language reflecting any intention by the General Assembly that § 18-l-704(3)(a) requires a special application of the doctrine of retreat. See maj. op. at 754 (Section 18-1-704(2) “contains no language reflecting any intention by the General Assembly to revive the doctrine of retreat.”). Section 18-l-704(3)(b) is the only section in the self-defense statute that expressly incorporates the common-law retreat doctrine and, consequently, is the only section that requires an alternate jury instruction. See maj. op. at 756 (stating that § 18-l-704(3)(b) expressly requires retreat before physical force is justifiable where the defendant is the initial aggressor). Under § 18-l-704(3)(b), if a defendant is the initial aggressor, his use of force is not justifiable unless he first withdraws. This express intent of the legislature, that the doctrine of retreat is applicable when initial aggressor status is at issue, is reflected in the pattern jury instruction. Pattern jury instruction 7:68, special rule 7(15), states:
7(15) Retreat to the Wall
Where the defendant is the initial aggressor he must, in order to rely on self-defense, have withdrawn from the affray and have communicated the desire to withdraw to his opponent. However, if the defendant was not the initial aggressor, and was where he had a right to be, he was not required to retreat to a position of no escape in order to claim the right to employ force in his own defense.
CJI-Crim. 7:68, Special Rule 7(15). Unlike § 18-l-704(3)(b), § 18-l-704(3)(a) contains no language reflecting the Boykin rule that if the defendant provoked the fight, a subsequent withdrawal would give the defendant the right to claim self-defense.