Court Opinion

ID: 9370902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 23:02:21.580309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:24.605312
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/14/23 Van Voorhis v. Yee CA1/2

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
        California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
        certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
        been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

            BRUCE VAN VOORHIS,
            Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                      A161350
            v.
            BETTY YEE et al.,                                         (Contra Costa County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No.
            Defendants and Respondents.                               MSC19-00021)

        Appellant Bruce Van Voorhis is a former Superior Court judge with
retained pension rights under the Judges’ Retirement System Law (Gov.
Code,1 § 75500 et seq.). As such, he was a beneficiary of the celebrated
Mallano litigation that concluded in 2018, the result of which was that
judges, including retired judges, received significant five-figure payments for
past years where raises required by the governing legislature had not been
paid.
        Van Voorhis thought he was entitled to more, and in January 2019,
filed a lawsuit alleging nine causes of action, all styled for “declaratory relief
including monetary recovery.” The trial court granted summary adjudication

        Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory references are to
        1

this code.

                                                              1
against Van Voorhis on some issues, and later summary judgment, holding
that none of his causes of action had merit. We affirm.
                                 BACKGROUND
      The Mallano Litigation and the Legislation
      In early 2014, then-Justice Robert Mallano filed a class action lawsuit
in Los Angeles County on behalf of a class of current and retired judges. The
lawsuit named three defendants, the State Controller, Judges’ Retirement
System (JRS), and Judges’ Retirement System II (JRS II), and alleged that
defendants had not raised judicial salaries as required by the governing
legislation, section 68203.2 As Van Voorhis would later put it is his
complaint, he “was eligible for and was automatically included as a member
of the class in this class action lawsuit.”
      Mallano did not name the Department of Human Resources (CalHR) as
a defendant, or allege any wrongdoing on its part. To the contrary, Mallano
adopted CalHR’s figures as the presumptively correct calculation of the
“average percentage salary increase” under section 68203. Instead, Mallano’s
quarrel was with the Controller, JRS, and JRS II, alleging that since 2008,
they had not raised judicial salaries despite having actual knowledge of
CalHR’s calculations—and thus not raised judicial salaries as required.
Mallano argued that under section 68203 as it then existed, the transmission
of a pay letter from CalHR to the Controller was not required to implement

      2 Judges who entered service before November 9, 1994 are generally
members of JRS. (§ 75100 et seq.) Judges who entered service on or after
November 9, 1994 are generally members of the Judges’ Retirement System
II. (§ 75500 et seq.; see § 75502.)

                                         2
CalHR’s calculations, when the Controller had actual knowledge of CalHR’s
calculations.3
      Mallano won, and the superior court ordered the defendants to
implement CalHR’s calculations of the “average percentage salary increase”
for fiscal years 2008−2009 to 2015−2016. In an unpublished opinion the
Court of Appeal affirmed. (Mallano v. Chiang (Apr. 5, 2017, Nos. B272124 &
B276842 [nonpub. opn.]); 2017 WL 1247811 (Mallano I.) The appellate court
emphasized the Controller’s actual knowledge of CalHR’s calculations. And,
describing testimony that “the Controller’s office ‘is well aware’ of CalHR’s
salary increase calculations . . . ,” the Court held that when they had actual
knowledge of CalHR’s calculations, the Controller, JRS, and JRS II were
required to implement those calculations, even if they had not received a pay
letter from CalHR or obtained a separate appropriation to pay for the judicial
salary increases. (Id. at *8.) Like Mallano and the trial court, the Court of
Appeal accepted CalHR’s calculations of the “average percentage salary
increase” as presumptively correct. (Id. at *7.) A second unpublished
opinion was filed in 2018: Mallano v. Chang (June 26, 2018, B285285
[nonpub. opn.]; 2018 WL 3121536 (Mallano II).
      The Mallano litigation resulted in a judgment directing payment of
arrearages and benefits for the years 2008−2016. (See Mallano I, supra, 2017
WL 1247811.)

      3 The Department of Human Resources was created in 2012 in a
governmental reorganization. It absorbed the functions of a number of
former agencies, one of which was the Department of Personnel
Administration (DPA), one of whose duties CalHR assumed was generating
pay letters.

                                       3
      As noted, the two Mallano opinions were not certified for publication.4
Despite that, this court granted Van Voorhis’s motion to take judicial notice
of them. The reason for our ruling appears to have been that judicial notice
was taken by the trial court. (See Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a) [“The
reviewing court shall take judicial notice of . . . each matter properly noticed
by the trial court”].) While the trial court gave no reason for its ruling,
simply noting the absence of opposition, in its written decision the trial court
noted that it previously concluded that “all of [Van Voorhis’s] claims for fiscal
years before 2016-17” were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. As
will be seen, the trial court order went on to discuss and quote from the first
Mallano opinion, as it was deemed relevant to applying the doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata. This is proper and does not violate rule
8.1115. (See Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
1092, 1106.) This especially true if, as here, the unpublished opinion is not
being cited as legal authority but merely to establish the legal and factual
background to this action. (See The Utility Reform Network v. Public Utilities

      4    Rule 8.1115 of the California Rules of Court provides in part as
follows:
       “(a) Except as provided in (b), an opinion of a California Court of
Appeal . . . that is not certified for publication or ordered published must not
be cited or relied on by a court or party in any other action.
      “(b) An unpublished opinion may be cited or relied on:
       “(1) When the opinion is relevant under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or
      “(2) When the opinion is relevant to a criminal or disciplinary action
because it states reasons for a decision affecting the same defendant or
respondent in another such action . . . .”

                                          4
Com. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 945, 951, fn. 3; Pacific, Gas & Electric Co. v.
City and County of San Francisco (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 897, 907, fn. 10.)
       Meanwhile, shortly following the judgment in favor of the Mallano
class, in apparent response to it the Legislature enacted, and the Governor
signed, Senate Bill No. 848, which amended section 68203 (Stats. 2016,
ch. 35, §22). And by the time Mallano became final, in mid-2018, section
68203 had been amended, including with language that provides:
       “(a) On July 1, 1980, and on July 1 of each year thereafter, the salary
of each justice and judge named in Sections 68200 to 68202 [5], inclusive, and
68203.1 shall be increased by the amount that is produced by multiplying the
then current salary of each justice or judge by the average percentage salary
increase for the current fiscal year for California state employees; provided,
that in any fiscal year in which the Legislature places a dollar limitation on
salary increases for state employees the same limitation shall apply to judges
in the same manner applicable to state employees in comparable wage
categories.
       “(b)(1) For the purposes of this section, average percentage salary
increases for California state employees shall be those increases as reported
by the Department of Human Resources to the State Controller in a pay
letter.”
       The Proceedings Below
       On January 8, 2019, representing himself, Van Voorhis filed a
complaint styled “For Declaratory Relief And Monetary Recovery.” It named
three defendants: Betty Yee, the State Controller, JRS, and the Board of
Administration of the Public Employees Retirement System of California
(CalPERS) (when referred to collectively, respondents). Van Voorhis alleged

       5   Section 68202 specifies the salary for judges of the Superior Court.

                                          5
that he named CalPERS because it allegedly “administers JRS and has the
duty to demand that the Controller draw warrants (make payments) from the
Judges’ Retirement Fund . . . for judicial retirement benefits lawfully owed to
Plaintiff.”
      The complaint was, as noted, for “declaratory relief, including monetary
recovery.” And it went on to allege nine causes of action, also styled for
declaratory relief, seeking the ordering of “increased judicial salaries” and
“increased judicial retirees’ benefit payments that correspond . . . to the
increased judicial salaries.” The first four causes of action alleged that the
Controller had in the previous three years not complied with section 68203 in
calculating judicial salaries and “retiree benefits,” thereby warranting
numerous forms of declaratory relief. And causes of action five through nine
alleged that the Controller and JRS have an independent duty to calculate,
verify, or correct CalHR’s calculation of the “average percentage salary
increase.” Despite attacking CalHR’s calculations of the “average salary
increase,” Van Voorhis did not name CalHR as a defendant.6
      The case was assigned for all purposes to a most experienced superior
court judge, the Honorable Edward Weil, in a complex department. Early in
the litigation Judge Weil directed the parties to “file cross-motions . . . related
only to the issue of to what extent Mallano v. Chiang . . . and related
appellate cases . . . have claim-preclusive or issue-preclusive effect in this

      6 It is clear from the language of section 68203 that CalHR has an
integral, indeed, pivotal, role in fixing judicial salaries and retirement
benefits. Subdivision (b)(1) provides that it is CalHR that commences the
annual process by communicating the “average percentage salary increase” in
a pay letter to the Controller. Van Voorhis seemed to accept this
relationship, insisting that he “must be enabled to verify the accuracy of . . .
[CalHR’s] pay letters.”

                                         6
case.” In August 2019, both sides filed such motions, Van Voorhis for
summary adjudication, and respondents for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication.
      On September 30, Judge Weil denied Van Voorhis’s motion and granted
in part respondents’ motion on preclusion issues, holding that “all claims
based on retirement payments for the years 2008−[20]09 through
2015−[20]16 [i.e., the fiscal years covered by the Mallano judgment] . . . are
barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” For fiscal years
2016−2017 and later, Judge Weil denied respondents’ motion without
prejudice to it being asserted later with additional supporting evidence,
determining that the Legislature’s amendment of section 68203 in response
to Mallano meant there might be “new calculation practices that went into
effect during the 2016−[20]17 fiscal year or later” that could not have been
challenged in Mallano—and therefore not claim-precluded.
      In April 2020, respondents moved for summary judgment. The motion
was accompanied by four lengthy declarations of: Jennifer Watson, Dave Ide,
Lisa Dean, and Manpreet Singh. Ide was a personnel program manager of
CalHR, a position he held since 2013, having begun his employment at
CalHR in 2001. From 2003 to 2008 his job responsibilities included the
calculation of the average state employees pursuant to section 68203; and in
2007 his responsibilities shifted to verifying the accuracy of the calculations.
And, he testified, from 2003 to 2020 the calculations were correctly made
each year.
      Watson, the assistant division chief at CalPERS, testified that it
implemented the Mallano decision. Dean was the analysis bureau chief in
the office of the Controller, and supervised the implementation of the

                                        7
Mallano judgment on her behalf. And Singh, in the personnel management
division of CalHR, testified in detail about the preparation of the pay letters.
      On June 15, Van Voorhis filed his opposition to the motion, which
included what he called his “Evidence in Opposition.” That “evidence” lists
10 exhibits, four of which were listed as “declarations,” including a 67-page
supplemental declaration of Van Voorhis. The three other items identified as
“declarations” are of: (1) “Van Voorhis,” (2) “Konopasek,” and (3) “Elections
Department Declarations.” The original Van Voorhis declaration is not in the
record. The Konopasek “declaration” is a two-lines long letter, from the
Assistant Registrar of Voters, not under penalty of perjury, addressed “to
whom it may concern,” about the term of Contra Costa County Superior
Court Judge Fenstermacher. And the Elections Department “declarations”
are two short statements by elections officers reporting on judge openings in
Marin and Los Angeles Counties.
      As indicated, Van Voorhis’s “evidence” consists mostly of Van Voorhis’s
67-page supplemental declaration, a “declaration” that was for the most part
a mix of argument, opinion, and speculation, which is most inappropriate. As
the leading practice treatise puts it: “[9:49.5] Declarations limited to
facts, not legal arguments: It is improper to include legal arguments in a
declaration. (E.g., ‘the interests of justice require . . .’ or ‘the following
matters constitute “good cause” . . . .’) As noted by one court, this is ‘a sloppy
practice which should stop . . . . [I]t makes a mockery of the requirement that
declarations be supported by statement made under penalty of perjury.’ ([In
re] Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 C[al.]A[pp.]4th 28, 30 . . . , fn. 3) . . . .” (Weil
& Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter
Group 2022) ¶ 9:49.5, p. 9(I)-30.)

                                          8
      But beyond that, Van Voorhis provided no evidence contradicting the
testimony of any of respondents’ four witnesses.
      The motion was scheduled for hearing on September 3, prior to which
Judge Weil had issued a tentative ruling granting the motion. Van Voorhis
did not contest it, and Judge Weil entered his order granting the motion—a
comprehensive order indeed, 10-pages long, carefully and thoughtfully
analyzing Van Voorhis’s complaint in detail. Specifically:
      The order began with Judge Weil granting Van Voorhis’s request for
judicial notice, followed by his exposition of the law of res judicata. Judge
Weil then turned to a discussion of “terminology,” going on for several pages
demonstrating his deep understanding of this rather arcane subject. After all
that he turned to Van Voorhis’s complaint, demonstrating his clear
understanding of it as well, proceeding to analyze the complaint on a cause of
cation-by-cause of action basis, addressing the first and second causes of
action together, the third and fourth causes of action together, and the fifth
through ninth causes of action together. Doing so, Judge Weil held as
follows:
      “The First and Second Causes of Action.
      “Defendants’ Alleged Wrongful Conduct.
      “Defendants’ Role in Implementing Salary Increases.
      “Section 68203, as amended, now reads in pertinent part as follows:
      “(b)(1) For the purposes of this section, average percentage salary
increases for California State Employees shall be those increases as reported
by the Department of Human Resources to the Controller in a pay letter.
      “Defendants argue, in the alternative, that there can be no genuine
dispute between plaintiff and defendants concerning defendants’ obligations
under section 68203, because defendants have implemented the salary

                                        9
increases reported in the pay letters issued by CalHR for the 2016−[20]17
fiscal year forward.
      “The Court finds that this argument has merit. Plaintiff has neither
alleged that, nor offered any evidence supporting the proposition that, there
is any discrepancy between the pay letters issued by CalHR and the salary
increases implemented by defendants. Nor is it likely that any such
discrepancy could ever arise: the pay letters explicitly state the precise dollar
amount of the salary increases, leaving nothing for defendants to calculate or
interpret. The statute gives defendants no discretion and explicitly sets forth
the narrow scope of their ministerial duty: to implement what the pay letters
state the salary increases ‘shall be.’ [¶] . . . [¶]
      “The Court grants summary adjudication of the First and Second
Causes of Action. [¶] . . . [¶]
      “The Third and Fourth Causes of Action.
      “Claim Preclusion.
      “The Third and Fourth Causes of Action are based on an alleged
calculation error that is distinct from that alleged in the First and Second
Causes of Action. Plaintiff here alleges as follows:
      “. . . [T]he formula erroneously calculated the average increase (which
involves size of increase) instead of the average percentage increase (which
involves rate of increase) for California state employees. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ calculation was the wrong ratio calculating the percentage
increase in judicial compensation payable. (Emphasis added.)
      “The Court finds that these causes of action are barred by claim
preclusion, because defendants’ uncontradicted evidence shows that CalHR
has used the same methodology for calculating the average percentage
increase since 2003. Plaintiff was a class member in the Mallano class

                                          10
action, and the class representative could have raised the ‘wrong ratio’ theory
in that action, but chose not to do so.
      “The Court grants summary adjudication of the Third and Fourth
Causes of Action on this ground.
      “Defendants’ Alleged Wrongful Conduct.
      “As a second, fully independent ground for granting summary
adjudication of the Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the Court finds that
the analysis . . . above applies with equal force to these causes of action.
There can be no genuine dispute between plaintiff and defendants concerning
defendants’ obligations under section 68203, because defendants have
implemented the salary increases reported in the pay letters issued by CalHR
for the 2016−[20]17 year forward.
      “The Fifth Through Ninth Causes of Action.
      “The Fifth through the Ninth Causes of Action are what the Court will
refer to as the ‘duty’ causes of action. While the First through the Fourth
Causes of Action are based on the premise that defendants themselves are
directly responsible for making calculation errors, the Fifth through the
Ninth Causes of Action are based on the premise that defendants had various
duties to independently assess the calculations made by CalHR, to respond to
claims of errors in those calculations received from judicial officers, and to
correct any errors made by CalHR.”
      Then, after quoting the allegations in the fifth and sixth causes of
action, Judge Weil continued on:
      “The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of Action are all variations on
this ‘duty’ theme.
      “The Court grants summary adjudication of these duty causes of action
under the same rationale set forth . . . above.”

                                          11
      Then, after again quoting section 68203, Judge Weil held that: “None
of the supposed duties that are the subject of the Fifth through the Ninth
Causes of Action can fairly be read into this statutory language. The statute
gives defendants no discretion: the pay letters state what the salary
increases ‘shall be,’ and the defendants’ only duty under the statute is to
implement those salary increases.”
      Finally as to these causes of action, Judge Weil observed: “The Court
notes the seeming chaos and duplicative effort that imposing plaintiff’s
alleged additional duties would create. The State Controller, the JRS, and
the Board would all have to hire the same kind of accounting staff already
employed by CalHR, and each of those entities would have to perform an
independent ‘audit’ of CalHR’s work. How would any discrepancies between
CalHR’s calculations and defendants’ calculations be resolved? How would
any discrepancies among the three defendants’ calculations be resolved?
      “The Court cannot find that the Legislature intended to create such a
scenario when it amended section 68203 in 2016. Rather, the Legislature
intended to rectify the comparative confusion that was present during the
Mallano era. The parties’ respective duties are now clear: CalHR calculates,
and defendants implement.”
      In sum, for the first through fourth causes of action—which alleged
deficiencies in the calculation of the “average percentage salary increase”—
Judge Weil determined that these claims could not be established because
there was no evidence that the Controller or JRS had failed to implement the
pay letters they received from CalHR. And as to the fifth through ninth
causes of action—which alleged that the Controller and JRS had an
independent duty to verify and correct CalHR’s calculation of the “average
percentage salary increase”—he held that these claims failed because under

                                       12
amended section 68203 “the pay letters state what the salary increases ‘shall
be,’ and [the Controller’s and JRS’s] only duty under the statute is to
implement those salary increases.”
      On September 16, Judge Weil entered his judgment, from which Van
Voorhis filed a notice of appeal.
                                    DISCUSSION
      Summary Judgment and the Standard of Review
      “A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if
it is contended that the action has no merit . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (a)(1) (Section 437c).) And summary judgment will be granted “if all
the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
(Section 437c, subd. (c).)
      A defendant “moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the
defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) And to prevail, a
defendant must show that one or more elements of the challenged cause of
action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to it.
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849; Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001)
26 Cal.4th 465, 476−477.)
      Our review is under well-settled principles: “On appeal ‘[w]e review a
grant of summary judgment de novo; we must decide independently whether
the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving
party as a matter of law. [Citations.]’ (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003)
30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.) Put another way, we exercise our independent
judgment, and decide whether undisputed facts have been established that

                                        13
negate plaintiff’s claims. (Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc., [(1996)]
14 Cal.4th [479,] 487.) As we put it in Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v.
Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320: ‘[W]e exercise an
independent review to determine if the defendant moving for summary
judgment met its burden of establishing a complete defense or of negating
each of the plaintiff’s theories and establishing that the action was without
merit.’ (Accord, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 945, 972.)
      “But other principles guide us as well, including that ‘[w]e accept as
true the facts . . . in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment
and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.’ (Morgan v.
Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 67.) And we
must ‘ “view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff[] as the
losing part[y]” and “liberally construe plaintiff[’s] evidentiary submissions
and strictly scrutinize defendant[’s] own evidence, in order to resolve any
evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff[’s] favor.” ’ (McDonald v.
Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 96−97.)”
(Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 253−254.)
      In addition to the above is the well-recognized admonition, set forth, for
example, in Claudio v. Regents of the University of California (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230 this way: “On review of a summary judgment, the
appellant has the burden of showing error, even if he did not bear the burden
in the trial court. (Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1140.) . . . ‘[D]e novo review does not obligate us to cull
the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the
requisite triable issues. As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the
appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore,

                                       14
to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are present by citation to
the record and any supporting authority. In other words, review is limited to
issues which have been adequately raised and briefed.’ (Lewis v. County of
Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116.)”
      The Summary Judgment Was Correct
      Introduction
      As we discuss below, our de novo review leads to the same conclusion as
the trial court—that none of Van Voorhis’s causes of action has merit and the
summary judgment was proper. Before turning to a demonstration of why,
we begin with some observations about Van Voorhis’s opening brief, the only
brief he has filed.
      Van Voorhis has filed a 79-page, 17,666-word Appellant’s Opening
Brief. The brief begins with a six-page “Table of Contents” that lists 31
items, a few of which might liberally be called arguments. However, there is
no “argument” section per se, which is hardly good appellate advocacy.7 The
leading appellate commentary has many paragraphs devoted to the subject of
“arguments,” which it addresses in the context of the “discussion” section of
an appellant’s opening brief. These include the following:
      “[9:148] Discussion: The discussion portion of the brief sets forth the
applicable law, applies the law to the facts of the case, and argues for the
desired disposition.
      “[9:149] PRACTICE POINTER: The discussion section is
fundamental to persuading the court to rule in your client’s favor . . . . Thus,
your arguments should be thoughtfully developed with sound reasons for the

      7 At page 13, before beginning to discuss the first of the items, the brief
has a single word, in normal type, saying “Arguments.”

                                       15
holding you desire. Support your arguments with applicable legal authority
(cases and statutes) as well as logic.
      “. . . [9:150] Use of Headings: [California Rules of Court, rule]
8.204(a)(1)(B) requires each ‘point’ in a brief to appear ‘under a separate
heading or subheading summarizing the point . . . .’ Thus, each issue should
be addressed independently under a separate heading in the discussion
section (¶9:91). Failure to do so may result in a waiver of the argument. (See
Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
467, 554−555 [forfeiture of argument made only in footnote and not clearly
set out with heading]; Provost v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294 [‘we do not consider all of the loose and disparate
arguments that are not clearly set out in a heading and supported by
reasoned legal argument’]; Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
1107, 1114 [‘there is no separate argument heading or analysis of the issues.
That alone is grounds to deem the argument waived’].) [¶] . . . [¶]
      “. . . [9:160] Scope of discussion: The discussion section of a brief
should address all issues to be raised on the appeal, incorporating sound
argument and supporting legal authorities.
      “. . . [9.160.1] Demonstrating ‘prejudicial’ or ‘harmless’ error:
For appellants, this includes tendering a proper prejudice argument, spelling
out in the opening brief exactly how the asserted error caused a miscarriage of
justice so as to amount to reversible error. (WFG Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894−895 [prejudice arguments
forfeited for failure to include citations to record]; Adams v. MHC Colony
Park Limited Partnership (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601, 614−615 [conclusory
argument that appellant was ‘clearly prejudiced’ by alleged error insufficient
to carry burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error]; Century

                                         16
Sur Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 [court will not ‘act as
counsel for appellant by furnishing a legal argument as to how the trial
court’s ruling was prejudicial’].)” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil
Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶¶ 9:148–9:160.1 (Eisenberg).)
      Many of the 31 items in the table of contents appear to be musings of
one kind or another; others are apparent statements of fact, as Van Voorhis
would have them; and some defy description, illustrated, for example, by
Item 31, which is that “all of the duties alleged and remedies prayed for by
appellant should be declared in this appeal.”
      Moreover, in many places in his brief—on at least 13 separate pages
(24, 30, 43, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, and 77)—Van Voorhis requests
“findings” or “complete findings under Code of Civil Procedure section 909,”
which Van Voorhis attempts to support with his declaration, “business
records and official records,” “personal records,” and argument. This is
inappropriate, for at least two reasons.
      First, by order of January 29, 2021, over a year before his brief was
filed, we denied Van Voorhis’s request for factual findings.
      Second, any request for findings on appeal would be denied because
Van Voorhis fails to demonstrate any “exceptional circumstance” that would
allow such findings under section 909. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396,
405.) Again Eisenberg is apt: Code of Civil Procedure section 909 “is not
intended to usurp the trial court’s fact-finding authority,” and “the
circumstances under which appellate courts will receive new evidence are
very rare. . . . [¶] . . . [T]he proffered new evidence must enable the appellate
court to affirm the judgment, not lead to a reversal; and appellate courts will
not use [Code of Civil Procedure section] 909 to resolve conflicts in the

                                        17
evidence or to substitute their own factual determinations for those of the trial
court.” (Eisenberg, supra, ¶ 5:169.)
      In light of all this, it is difficult to discern precisely what, if any,
arguments Van Voorhis makes. But one thing his brief does assert is this:
“Please decide if the Van Voorhis dismissal was erroneous.” That we will do,
but against the background that Van Voorhis must do more than ask nicely.
He must demonstrate error, as held by many principles of appellate review,
principles ignored by Van Voorhis. The most fundamental principle is that a
judgment is presumed to be correct. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608−609.) “All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively
shown” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564), and any
ambiguity in the record is resolved in favor of the appealed judgment or
order. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624,
631.) Moreover, Van Voorhis bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption of correctness and must provide an adequate record
demonstrating the alleged error (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp.
608−609), failure of which requires that the issue be resolved against him.
(Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296; Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1362 [judgment affirmed where appellant failed to
present adequate record].)
      That he has not done. The summary judgment was correct.
      The First Through Fourth Causes of Action
      To briefly recap, the first four causes of action in Van Voorhis’s
complaint alleged that the “average percentage salary increase” called for by
section 68203 had been miscalculated in various ways, and sought
declaratory judgment about the meaning of the phrase. Judge Weil entered

                                         18
summary judgment on these causes of action, as the undisputed evidence
demonstrated that the Controller and JRS had done nothing wrong. Van
Voorhis has demonstrated nothing to the contrary.
      Section 68203 dictates that the salaries of active judges, to which the
pensions of retired judges are linked, are to be increased by multiplying
current judicial salaries by “the average percentage salary increase for the
current fiscal year for California state employees.” (§ 68203, subd. (a).) As
amended in 2016, section 68203 defines “average percentage salary increases
for California state employees” as “those increases as reported by the
Department of Human Resources to the State Controller in a pay letter.”
(Id., subd. (b)(1).) Thus, and as Judge Weil aptly observed, “section 68203
now explicitly requires CalHR to send [pay letters to] defendants,” whose
“only duty under the statute is to implement those salary increases.”
      In short, respondents presented undisputed evidence that CalHR, not
the Controller or JRS, has historically calculated the “average percentage
salary increase” under section 68203. Respondents’ witnesses also described
how CalHR has used the same method to calculate the “average percentage
salary increase” since at least 2003. This included Ide, who testified among
other things that “This method . . . has not changed since at least fiscal year
2003−2004.” The calculation method for individual pay letters “is the same
method that CalHR has previously used since at least 2003”; “for fiscal years
2016−2017, 2017−2018, 2018−2019, and 2019−2020, CalHR used the same
methodology to calculate the ‘average percentage salary increase’ under
section 68203 as in the prior fiscal years dating back to at least 2003.”
      The undisputed evidence also showed that for every year since the
Mallano judgment was entered, and section 68203 amended, CalHR
calculated the “average percentage salary increase” for state employees and

                                       19
sent it in pay letters to the Controller and JRS. Other undisputed evidence,
this from Watson and Dean demonstrated that every year the Controller and
JRS implemented the pay letters they received from CalHR.8 And were all
this were not enough, the implementation was to the satisfaction of the Los
Angeles Superior Court.
      Van Voorhis asserts that CalHR’s “calculation charts are erroneous and
the math is erroneous under the formula and the database,” and argued that
Judge Weil should have issued an interpretation of the phrase “average
percentage salary increase,” despite that Van Voorhis did not sue CalHR. As
Van Voorhis put it below, it was not required “that plaintiff must sue
(CalHR) to compel CalHR to issue new and/or corrected pay letters.” Or as he
puts it here, “Appellant does not have to hunt, summon, or accuse . . .
CalHR.” In short, he requested the trial court to issue an advisory opinion.
To no avail.
      First, and fundamentally, Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, the
Declaratory Relief Act, deals with “cases of actual controversy.” And Code of
Civil Procedure section 1061 provides as follows: “The court may refuse to
exercise the power granted by this chapter in any case where its declaration
or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the
circumstances.” Thus, in declaratory relief actions courts are to decide only
actual controversies, and not issue advisory opinions. (California Charter
Schools Assn. v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1221,
1234.) The actual controversy requirement means that a court may not
adjudicate a controversy only if it is a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as

      8   Except for minor technical adjustments to their systems or staffing.

                                        20
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be on a
hypothetical state of facts. (See generally, Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of
Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582.)
      Beyond that, CalHR—whose interpretation of section 68203 is “entitled
to consideration and respect” (Mallano I, supra, 2017 WL 1247811, *7)—
would be severely prejudiced by having the correctness of its long-standing
interpretation and implementation of section 68203 adjudicated without it
being present. (Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a); Cook v. Superior Court
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 569, 578 [missing party needed because of “statutorily
required role in the process”]; Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL
Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1370−1372 [county necessary party
when “complex and value laden” policy judgments were required].)
      Van Voorhis argued below that if Justice Mallano could proceed against
the Controller, JRS, and JRS II without the participation of CalHR, he too
should have been able to obtain a declaration of the term “average percentage
salary increase” without the presence of CalHR. But, as Judge Weil
observed, Van Voorhis’s claims are different than Mallano’s: Mallano did not
challenge CalHR’s calculations, but treated them as presumptively correct;
by contrast, Van Voorhis alleges that CalHR has been miscalculating the
“average percentage salary increase” under section 68203.
      The Fifth Through Ninth Causes of Action
      Beginning with the fifth cause of action, Van Voorhis’s complaint seeks
a declaration that if CalHR fails to calculate the “average percentage salary
increase” under section 68203, or if CalHR errs in its calculations, then
section 68203 imposes an affirmative duty on JRS and the Controller to “do
the calculation correctly and/or see that the calculation is done correctly.”
The fifth cause of action is illustrative, where Van Voorhis alleged that this

                                       21
duty encompasses obligations to monitor, record, or use certain data, to
investigate and correct mistakes in the calculation, disclose how the
calculation is made, keep certain records, and/or not rely on CalHR’s
calculations. The complaint also broadly alleged that, even if CalHR were
primarily responsible for calculating the “average percentage salary increase”
under section 68203, injunctive and declaratory relief could still be sought
against the Controller and JRS because they had an independent duty to
calculate, verify, or correct CalHR’s allegedly erroneous calculations. 9
      The argument has no merit.
      To demonstrate a duty on the part of a public official or entity, Van
Voorhis must show “ ‘a ministerial duty to perform . . . .’ ” (Physicians Comm.
For Responsible Med. v. L.A. Unified School Dist. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 175,
184 (Physicians Comm.).) “A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is
required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of
legal authority,” without discretion. (Id. at pp. 184−185 [internal citations
and quotations omitted].) And a statute is deemed to impose a mandatory
duty on a public official only if the statute affirmatively imposes the duty and
provides implementing guidelines. (Cal. Assn. of Professional Scientists v.
Dept. of Finance (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236; Pich v. Lightbourne
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 480, 492.)
      Nothing in the plain language of section 68203 “affirmatively impose[s]
the duty” on the Controller or JRS to calculate the “average percentage
salary increase” or to ensure the correctness of CalHR’s calculations.

      9  In his brief here, Van Voorhis asserts that “Respondents have always
had a non delegated, justifiable duty to audit . . . Respondents were supposed
to be . . . double-checking . . .”; “Respondents have been rubber-stamping on
whatever CalHR says is judicial compensation”; “Respondents should have
been responsible for standards and safeguards.”

                                       22
(Physicians Comm., supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 184.) On its face, section
68203 does not require the Controller or JRS “to perform any duty
whatsoever” with regard to the calculation of the “average percentage salary
increase.” (Cal. Assn. of Professional Scientists v. Dept. of Finance, supra,
195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.) JRS is not mentioned at all, and the Controller
is mentioned only once, as the recipient of the pay letters. (See § 68203,
subd. (b)(1).)
      As indicated, it is difficult to discern what, if any, arguments Van
Voorhis makes. Respondents’ brief identifies four of what they perceive to be
possible arguments, and address them. Van Voorhis has filed no reply brief
taking issue with respondents’ description, and thus apparently agrees with
their identification. Our review leads to no different conclusion, and thus we
briefly address the issues ourselves.
      The Mallano Judgment
      At various places in his brief Van Voorhis appears to contend that the
Controller, JRS or JRS II have not complied with the Mallano judgment.
(See AOB 29, 74 [“Mallano indebtedness”] 76 [same] and 77 [“compounding
and interest were not computed correctly regarding interest in Mallano”].)
Such argument was not adequately pleaded or developed, and could be
deemed waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Cahill v. San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“ ‘The absence of
cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the
contention as waived’ ”]; see Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342 (Tsemetzin) [unpleaded issues cannot
preclude entry of summary judgment].)
      But even if the argument were not waived, it would fail on the merits.
The Los Angeles Superior Court expressly “retain[ed] jurisdiction to enforce

                                        23
the terms of the [Mallano] judgment,” which it closely supervised. Moreover,
even if the trial court had jurisdiction to evaluate defendants’ compliance
with the Mallano judgment, Van Voorhis has identified no basis for enjoining
respondents’ performance of it. Finally, and as noted, the undisputed
evidence was that both the Controller and JRS II implemented the Mallano
judgment.
      Re-Litigation of Mallano
      At some places in his brief Van Voorhis appears to argue that he, as a
class member, should be allowed to re-litigate Mallano, because the class
attorneys should have challenged CalHR’s calculations directly, or obtained a
different amount of damages, or otherwise pursued different legal theories
and remedies. In other words, and while not clear, Van Voorhis appears to be
attempting to collaterally attack a favorable class judgment. Again, Van
Voorhis never pleaded such a collateral attack in the trial court, so this
argument is waived. (Tsemetzin, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342.)10
      Moreover, to the extent Van Voorhis is challenging the Controller’s or
JRS’s implementation of CalHR’s calculations before or during Mallano, such
claims would be claim-precluded and issue-precluded. The nature of the
Controller’s and JRS’s duties under the prior version of section 68203 was
exhaustively litigated in Mallano, where the trial court prescribed the
remedy that respondents implemented. Thus, under claim preclusion, the
two cases involve the same cause of action (the Controller’s and JRS’s duties),
the same parties (Van Voorhis, the Controller, and JRS), and a final
judgment. (See DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824;
Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896−897; see also Hi-

      10In fact, Van Voorhis relied on the Mallano judgment in his
complaint, and alleged that respondents were precluded by it.

                                       24
Desert Medical Center v. Douglas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 717, 734 [same
primary right from the enactment and enforcement of a statute].) Under
issue preclusion, the issue of the Controller’s and JRS’s duties under the
prior version of section 68203 was determined in Mallano.
      Delegation
      At one place Van Voorhis appears to argue that section 68203 is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch.
Van Voorhis did not separately plead non-delegation as a cause of action, and
never mentioned—let alone developed—any such theory in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. Again, this argument is waived. (Cal.
Restaurant Management Systems v. City of San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th
1581, 1593, fn. 7 [“When an argument is not asserted below in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment, it is deemed waived and will not be
considered for the first time on appeal to reverse and order granting
summary judgment”].)
      Effects of the 2016 Amendments to Section 68203
      Finally, Van Voorhis appears to briefly argue that the 2016
amendments to section 68203 cannot be applied to him. Van Voorhis did not
plead such a claim in his complaint, or allege how the 2016 amendments to
section 68203 actually harmed him. Therefore, this theory could not be relied
upon to defeat summary judgment. (Tsemetzin, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p.
1342.)
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on
appeal.

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                                     _________________________
                                     Richman, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________
Miller, J.

_________________________
Markman, J. *

Van Voorhis v. Yee (A161350)

       *Superior Court of Alameda County, Judge Michael Markman,
sitting as assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.

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