Court Opinion

ID: 9784679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:51:04.183303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:57.725168
License: Public Domain

CAROL M. HANSEN, J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 I agree with the majority’s statement of the applicable law, but disagree with its conclusion the trial court’s fact findings were clearly contrary to the weight of the evi*105dence. The majority’s review of the record lacks the deference to which the trial court’s findings are entitled under this standard of review. In an equity case, we must begin our review by presuming the trial court’s findings are correct. Baytide Petroleum, Inc. v. Whitmar Exploration Co., 18 P.3d 378, 380, 2000 OK CIV APP 120. We will then examine the entire record and reweigh the evidence, and will reverse the trial court’s judgment if its findings are clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence. In Re Estate of Pope, 1990 OK 125, 808 P.2d 640, 646. If, on the other hand, the evidence reasonably tends to support the findings of the trial court, we will not disturb the judgment on appeal. Boughan v. Herington, 1970 OK 125, 472 P.2d 434, 436.
¶2 The record in this ease contains evidence reasonably supporting the trial court’s findings as to the three-part test of In Re Burgess’ Estate, 1982 OK CIV APP 22, 646 P.2d 623, 625, for the validity of antenuptial agreements:
1. Is fair and reasonable provision made for the party opposing the contract?
2. If not, was a full, fair and frank disclosure of the other spouse’s worth made before execution of the contract?
3. If neither of the above, did the party opposing the contract in fact have a generally accurate knowledge of the other’s worth?
In determining whether the contract made fair and reasonable provision for the party opposing it, the court may consider whether the provision is grossly disproportionate to the interest that party would acquire by operation of law in case the marriage took place. In Re Cobb’s Estate, 1956 OK 299, 305 P.2d 1028, 1032. Although an antenup-tial waiver of the right to an equitable division of jointly acquired property is no longer void as against public policy, it may be relevant to the court’s determination of whether the contract made fair and reasonable provision for the party opposing the contract.
¶ 3 The antenuptial contract in the instant ease contained representations by each party that the schedules attached to the agreement listed all of his or her real or personal property and set forth the value of the property. Each party disclaimed forever any right in the other party’s separate property as scheduled, any income or gain therefrom, and any property or income the other party should acquire during the marriage. The contract provided that in the event of divorce, neither party would seek nor be entitled to alimony, support, division of marital assets, costs, attorney fees, or any other money or property from the other, except that John agreed to pay Polly a lump sum, the amount of which increased according to the length of the marriage. If the divorce occurred after five years but before ten years from the date of marriage, John would pay Polly $250,000.00; if it occurred after ten years, he agreed to pay $500,000.00.
¶4 The schedule of assets John attached to the agreement was entitled “Statement of Assets and Liabilities — Income Tax Basis, John W. Griffin Trust, January 31, 1991,” and represented his net worth at $2,578,563.74. In the transcript of the meeting in which the parties executed the contract, John’s attorney referred to the schedule four times as setting forth the “fair market value” of John’s assets. John’s accountant testified his firm generated the schedule of assets and liabilities, and it represented the income tax basis of the assets, not the book value or fair market value. Polly’s finance and economics expert witness testified tax basis was the amount paid for an asset, adjusted down for depreciation and up for improvements. He opined the fair market value of the television subsidiaries on John’s asset list at the time the antenup-tial agreement was signed was $20 million to $29 million, and John’s interest, including his beneficial interest in his father’s trust, was $12,620,400.24, rather than the $1.8 million shown on the schedule. He also testified the value of the publicly traded stocks on the asset list was understated.
¶ 5 Polly testified she believed John’s schedule of assets was accurate at the time she signed the antenuptial agreement and that it reflected the fair market value of the assets listed.
¶ 6 This record contains evidence from which the trial court could find the antenup-*106tial contract did not make fair and reasonable provision for Polly, John did not make full, fair and frank disclosure of his worth before execution of the contract, and Polly did not in fact have a generally accurate knowledge of John’s worth. The evidence is sufficient to meet Polly’s burden of proof on these issues. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.