Court Opinion

ID: 9829618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:28:44.649386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:03.532479
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[10-12] In his motion for rehearing the ap-pellee asked for more specific rulings upon the sufficiency of the evidence. It is neither our purpose nor province to anticipate defenses that might be interposed to an amended original petition seeking a recovery upon an implied contract to pay the value of the services rendered by the appellee to East-ridge. We mean in this ease merely to hold that the evidence was insufficient to establish an express contract of any kind to reimburse the appellee for the services he had rendered. This, of course, does not mean that the appel-lee would not be entitled to reimbursement upon an implied agreement that he was to be paid the value of those services. Testimony sufficient to show that the services were not rendered gratuitously would, in connection with evidence of their value, support a judgment for such compensation. In applying the rules of law we must bear in mind the distinction between those eases where the parties had no express agreement of any kind and those where there was an express contract to pay for the services by will without specifying what the compensation was to be. In the former class of cases the bar of limitation would be determined by the law applicable to claims generally against the estates of deceased persons; while in the latter limitation would not begin to run till after the death of the party liable. Had the appel-lee in this suit established a contract on the part of Eastridge to compensate him for his services by some indefinite provision in his will, limitation clearly would not have commenced to run until the failure of Eastridge to comply with his agreement occurred.
[13] In view of the probability of another trial, we deem it proper to say that the rule laid down by this court in Wells v. Hobbs, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 375, 122 S. W. 451, should be followed in determining the admissibility of the testimony of the appellee. The rule as there announced is that he may testify as to what he did in the service of the decedent when the latter was not present or a party to the transaction.
We have carefully considered the questions raised in the motion, but feel that we should adhere to the original conclusions announced.
The motion is therefore overruled.