Court Opinion

ID: 9895981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 00:03:14.679111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:11.459199
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 P. v. James CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061993

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. RIF1105740)

 DAVIA DAMANIQUE JAMES,                                                OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed. Respondent’s request for judicial notice.
Granted in part.
                   Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Alan L.
Amann and Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
              Davia Damanique James appeals from the denial of her petition for
resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 She
contends the court violated her statutory and constitutional rights when it denied her
petition without reviewing the record of conviction and by not providing a meaningful
statement of reasons for its denial. The Attorney General concedes the court did not
follow the procedure set out in section 1172.6 when it denied James’s petition at the
prima facie hearing, but the Attorney General asserts the error was harmless because
James is ineligible for resentencing under the statute as a matter of law. We agree James
is ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and therefore,
she was not prejudiced by the court’s errors. We affirm the order denying James’s
petition.

                                     BACKGROUND
              In 2012, a jury convicted James of the second degree murder of her son
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and inflicting great bodily injury upon him (§ 273a, subd. (a)). The
court sentenced James to prison for an indeterminate term of 15 years to life.
              In 2022, James filed a petition for resentencing under former section
1170.95. The court appointed counsel to represent James, and a status conference was
scheduled to be held about a month later. The prosecution did not file a response to
James’s petition. At the status conference, the prosecution made an oral motion to
dismiss the petition, asserting James was statutorily ineligible for resentencing relief
because she was not convicted of murder under either felony murder or a natural and
probable consequences theory. James was not present at the hearing, but her appointed
counsel was. James’s counsel represented to the court he had “confirmed” James was not

1 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6,
with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All further statutory references are to
the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

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convicted of murder under theories of natural and probable consequences, felony murder,
or aiding and abetting. The trial court denied James’s petition and stated, “[t]he
defendant is statutorily ineligible.” James timely appealed the denial.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                             I.
                                      SECTION 1172.6
              Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015 (Senate
Bill 1437)) “transformed the law of accomplice liability for murder.” (People v. Langi
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 978.) It amended the felony-murder rule and eliminated
“‘the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959
(Lewis); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707, fn. 1 (Strong).) A few years later,
these changes were expanded to include defendants convicted of attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine and defendants convicted of murder
under any “other theory under which malice [was] imputed to [them] based solely on
[their] participation in a crime[.]” (Former § 1170.95, subd. (a), as amended by Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 2; People v. Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 978.)
              “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those
convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended.”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) This procedure is now set out in section 1172.6.
Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a), “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” may file a
petition with the court to have his or her murder conviction vacated. The petitioner is

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entitled to relief and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when three conditions are
satisfied. The first condition is the prosecution proceeded under a now prohibited theory
of murder or attempted murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) Second, “[t]he petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial . . . .” (Id.,
subd. (a)(2).) Third, “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(Id., subd. (a)(3).)
               To obtain the relief provided by section 1172.6, a petitioner must file a
petition with the original sentencing court and serve the petition on the prosecuting
agency, among others. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1).) The petition must contain: (1) a
declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief under section 1172.6;
(2) “[t]he superior court case number and year of the petitioner’s conviction”; and (3) a
statement as to whether the petitioner requests the appointment of counsel. (Id., subd.
(b)(1)(A)–(C).) Upon receiving a facially sufficient petition, the court must appoint
counsel if requested by the petitioner. (Id., subd. (b)(3).)
               Within 60 days after service of a petition, the prosecutor must file a
response. The petitioner may then file a reply within 30 days. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
“After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.”
(Ibid.) At this hearing, the court may review the record of conviction to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971 [interpreting the prima facie requirement as originally codified in former
§ 1170.95].) In conducting the prima facie inquiry, “‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the
petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an

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evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court
is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Ibid.)
                 “If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled
to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) However, if
the record conclusively establishes the petitioner is ineligible for relief, the court may
dismiss the petition without issuing an order to show cause. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) If the court does not issue an order to show cause, “it shall provide a statement
fully setting forth its reasons . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
                 When a court does issue an order to show cause, an evidentiary hearing is
held, at which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the petitioner is
guilty of murder under the amended law, unless the parties stipulate the petitioner is
eligible for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d); Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 708–709.)
If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden, the court must vacate the petitioner’s murder
conviction and resentence the petitioner on the remaining charges. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)

                                                II.
              JAMES IS INELIGIBLE FOR RESENTENCING AS A MATTER OF LAW
                 The court denied James’s resentencing petition at the prima facie hearing.
“‘“A denial at that stage is appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates that
‘the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.’ [Citations.] This is a purely
legal conclusion, which we review de novo.”’” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1, 14.)
                 James argues the court violated her statutory and constitutional rights by
denying her petition at the prima facie hearing without considering the record of
conviction and by not providing a substantive statement of reasons for denying her

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petition. She asserts the matter must be remanded to the superior court with directions to
issue an order to show cause or to conduct a proper prima facie hearing.
              The Attorney General does not argue the court followed the procedure in
section 1172.6 and Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 971 when denying James’s petition.
The Attorney General acknowledges the court summarily denied the petition without
reviewing James’s record of conviction, and the Attorney General does not address
whether the court provided a sufficiently detailed statement of its reason for denying the
petition. But the Attorney General argues any procedural errors by the court were
harmless because the record of conviction establishes James is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law as she was convicted of murder under a still valid theory.
              The Attorney General’s argument stutters at the start because James’s
record of conviction was not considered by the court below and is not part of the
appellate record. The Attorney General seeks to overcome this by asking this court to
take judicial notice of the record in James’s direct appeal (appellate case No. G049901)
under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d) and 459, subdivision (a).
              James opposes the motion for judicial notice. She argues the Attorney
General’s motion is deficient because it does not comply with California Rules of Court,
rule 8.252, which sets out the requirements for a motion requesting a reviewing court take
judicial notice of matters under Evidence Code section 459. The Attorney General’s
motion does not state: (1) whether the matter to be noticed was presented to the trial
court; and (2) “[w]hether the matter to be noticed relates to proceedings occurring after
the order or judgment that is the subject of the appeal.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.252(a)(2)(B), (D).) Nor did the Attorney General attach to its motion a copy of the
matter to be noticed or explain why it was impracticable to do so. (Id., rule 8.252(a)(3).)
James further asserts the Attorney General did not provide her a copy of the matter to be
noticed.

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              James also asserts the prior appellate record “is irrelevant to the issue on
appeal, it was not presented to the superior court and was not relied on by the trial court
in finding [her] ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law . . . .” She
contends, “[b]y accepting the prior appellate record to determine harmlessness, this Court
would effectively be undertaking the task assigned explicitly to the superior court rather
than reviewing the superior court’s actions for error.”
              We agree with James the Attorney General’s motion for judicial notice
does not comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(2)–(3).
But we nevertheless grant the Attorney General’s motion in part.
              Generally, where error has been shown, as here, the reviewing court must
determine whether the error was harmless or whether the appellant was prejudiced by the
error and reversal is required. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195–196
[discussing the standards used to evaluate different types of error].) Here, the issue is
whether James was prejudiced by the court’s procedural missteps at the prima facie
hearing. In this context, we must determine whether “‘there is a reasonable probability
that in the absence of the error [James] . . . would have obtained a more favorable
result,’” meaning the court would have issued an order to show cause and held an
evidentiary hearing on her petition. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974; People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We make this determination by reviewing portions of the
record of conviction.
              In Lewis, the Supreme Court explained the record of conviction informs the
prima facie inquiry as it permits “the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, at 11 Cal.5th p. 971.) The
instructions given the jury at James’s trial and the verdicts returned by the jury are part of
the record of conviction. (See People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 [jury
instructions and verdicts are portions of the record of conviction]; People v. Soto (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055 [jury instructions are part of the record of conviction],

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disapproved on another ground by Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961–962.) Thus, we
take judicial notice of the instructions given the jury at James’s trial and the jury’s
verdicts as these items are relevant to our determination of whether there is a reasonable
probability James would have obtained a more favorable result if the court had not erred.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.)
              James was charged with malice murder, not felony murder. The jury
instructions given in James’s trial establish as a matter of law James was not convicted of
murder under a now impermissible theory. The jury was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, felony murder, or any other theory of murder where
malice is imputed based solely on the person’s participation in a crime. The jury was not
instructed on aiding and abetting or any vicarious liability theory. The jury was
instructed on a single theory of murder—second degree implied malice murder, which
remains a valid theory of murder. (People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 232,
review granted June 9, 2021, S268405, review dismissed Jan. 19, 2022.) Under the
instructions given, the jury necessarily found James guilty of murder based on her own
actions and mental state, when it found her guilty of second degree murder. Thus, the
record of conviction demonstrates James is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law, and therefore, any procedural errors by the court in denying her petition
without an evidentiary hearing were harmless. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.)2

2 Nothing in this opinion should be read as relieving the prosecution and the court of
their obligations to comply with the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
Pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (c), the prosecution must file a written response
to a facially sufficient petition. If the prosecution believes the record of conviction
establishes the petitioner is ineligible for relief, the prosecution should provide the court
with those portions of the record of conviction that support its argument. At the prima
facie hearing, the court may then state, on the record, which portions of the record of
conviction it has reviewed in reaching its decision as to whether to issue an order to show
cause.

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                                  DISPOSITION
            The postjudgment order denying James’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

                                             MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

GOETHALS, J.

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