Court Opinion

ID: 9663277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:33:53.89789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:47.362434
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority's affirmance of the summary judgment in favor of St. Mary's Hospital Medical Center and Dr. W.C. Mussey. The trial court applied the wrong standard in *379deciding the plaintiffs request to name a medical liability expert. Applying the correct legal standard, I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs request. Applying the incorrect standard — excusable neglect — I nonetheless conclude that the plaintiffs were entitled to their motion.
I.
APPLICATION OF SEC. 801.15(2)(a), STATS.
Section 801.15(2)(a), Stats., provides in part:
When an act is required to be done at or within a specified time, the court may order the period enlarged but only on motion for cause shown and upon just terms .... If the motion is made after the expiration of the specified time, it shall not be granted unless the court finds that the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
This provision does not apply to calendar practice under sec. 802.10, Stats. Section 802.10(3)(b) provides:
The judge shall issue a written order which recites the schedules established. Such order when entered shall control the course of the action, unless modified as herein provided. If at any time it appears that such schedules cannot reasonably be met, the judge may amend the order upon timely motion of any party. Whenever the judge shall determine that he [she] cannot reasonably meet the pretrial date or trial date established, he [she] may amend the order on his [her] own motion. [Emphasis added.]
A scheduling order may therefore be modified by the trial court under the following circumstances:
(1) Upon timely motion of any party, if it appears that such schedules cannot reasonably be met; and
*380(2) Whenever the judge determines that he or she cannot reasonably meet the pretrial date or trial date.
The pretrial and trial scheduling procedures are self-contained in sec. 802.10(3), Stats.; sec. 801.15(2), Stats., has no application. Thus, the trial court erred in applying to the plaintiffs' motion the "excusable neglect" standard of sec. 801.15(2)(a). The court should have determined whether the scheduling order could reasonably be met. Of course, the trial court was free to impose sanctions for violation of the scheduling order. "Violation of a scheduling order is subject to s. 805.03." Sec. 802.10(3)(d), Stats. Under sec. 805.03, Stats., the trial court may make such orders "as are just." If the trial court, upon a party's or its own motion, wishes to go beyond a motion to amend a scheduling order and sanction a party or an attorney, it may do so if it applies the standard of egregious conduct required under sec. 805.03. See Judicial Council Committee's Note, Wis. Stats. Ann. sec. 805.03, (West 1977) and my dissent in Monson v. Madison Family Institute, et al., No. 89-0314 unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. March 15, 1990).
We review the grant or denial of a motion to amend a scheduling order for abuse of discretion. Alexander v. Riegert, 141 Wis. 2d 294, 295, 414 N.W.2d 636, 637 (1987). "Abuse of discretion" is an unfortunate term. Abuse of discretion does not necessarily mean ulterior motive, arbitrary conduct, or willful disregard of the rights of a litigant. Schneider v. Ruch, 146 Wis. 2d 701, 704, 431 N.W.2d 756, 757-58 (Ct. App. 1988). A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to apply the principles of law applicable to a situation. Id.
In Alexander the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying successor counsel's motion to amend the scheduling order "because it failed to consider the plaintiffs' interest in having a fair pres*381entation of their case." 141 Wis. 2d at 295, 414 N.W.2d at 637. The court did not require the Alexanders to show that their failure to timely name expert witnesses was the result of "excusable neglect," the standard which the trial court, and the majority, apply to the Schnellers' motion. The Alexander court reasoned:
A new situation [substitution of counsel] developed which was not contemplated in the original scheduling order.
The constraints of the scheduling order should yield to permit a trial of the true controversy between the parties with full exposition of all available relevant facts. The trial court has the authority to assess costs, if appropriate, against the parties seeking to amend the scheduling order, including additional attorney's fees caused by an amendment.
141 Wis. 2d at 299, 414 N.W.2d at 639.
The supreme court got it exactly right: a scheduling order is merely a device to control the flow of the case; its constraints must yield to permit the case to be heard. Imposing sanctions is another matter entirely.
The defendants attempt to distinguish Alexander because there, the trial court substituted counsel to avoid a potential conflict of interest. Here, counsel may have recognized that a real conflict of interest existed and voluntarily withdrew. Counsel knew that it was facing a possible malpractice suit if the trial court denied its motion to name an additional medical expert. The sine quo non of Alexander was not the disqualification of counsel by the court, but the development of a new situation not contemplated by the scheduling order.
The defendants suggest that the substitution of counsel may have been a ploy on the part of the Schnel-lers and their counsel to fit themselves into the Alexander framework. There is no evidence in the record to *382support this assertion and we must reject it. See McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 789-91 (5th Cir. 1988) (in the absence of evidence that plaintiff fired her counsel as a delaying tactic, delay caused by change of counsel did not warrant dismissal with prejudice).
The trial court therefore abused its discretion when it made the error of law of applying the sec. 801.15(2)(a), Stats., standard to a motion to amend a scheduling order.
hH t — I
OTHER ABUSES OF DISCRETION
The trial court abused its discretion in several other critical respects. First, it failed to consider the Schnel-lers' interest in having a fair presentation of their case. Second, it failed to weigh the probative value of the proposed medical expert's testimony against the prejudice to the defendants.
Forbidding a party to call a witness is a drastic measure in a trial, where truth is sought. . .. "The object of the rule requiring the disclosure of the names of witnesses before trial is to enable the parties to discover the truth and to eliminate surprise, and the policy of discovering all the truth would be furthered by permitting the witness to testify after the court has postponed the testimony until the element of surprise has been eliminated."
Fredrickson v. Louisville Ladder Co., 52 Wis. 2d 776, 784, 191 N.W.2d 193, 196-97 (1971) (quoting Annotation, 27 A.L.R.2d 737, 738, 739 (1953)). In Fredrickson there was no scheduling order, but there was an oral order of the judge requiring the respondents to reveal the name of their expert. They did not do so until the first *383day of trial. The trial court ordered that the witness be made available to allow plaintiffs counsel to take his deposition, which was taken during trial.
The court recognized that a trial court has discretion to exclude the testimony of a witness if a party is prejudiced by opposing counsel's failure to inform him or her of the intent to call that witness. Fredrickson, 52 Wis. 2d at 782, 191 N.W.2d at 196. The court found, however, that the probative value of the witness's testimony outweighed any prejudice to the appellants. Here, there is nothing like the potential prejudice to the appellants in Fredrickson. No trial date had yet been set and the settlement conference was four months away from the time when the plaintiffs first identified their medical liability witnesses.
The trial court further abused its discretion when it based its decision on a finding of fact which is clearly erroneous. In its amplification of its findings and conclusions the court found that there was no arguable basis for the Schnellers' claim. Yet, in its findings of fact entered on February 2, 1989 the trial court found that the plaintiffs alleged that,
The vaginal delivery of plaintiff Daniel Schneller on December 30, 1978 involved the use of forceps and a delay in time during which Daniel Schneller suffered severely from anoxia. Plaintiffs further allege that all the defendants . . . were negligent in that they failed to accurately diagnose the pre-delivery position and presentation of Daniel Schneller in a timely fashion, failed to adequately monitor the fetus'[s] vital signs; failure to timely perform a cesarean section on plaintiff Cheryl Schneller; failed to use appropriate delivery techniques and failed to adequately train, supervise and prepare resident doctors for delivery.
*384If proved at trial, these allegations would certainly form a basis for a malpractice claim.
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the drastic effect of denying the Schnel-lers' request to present at trial medical liability expert testimony. "The interests of justice require the circuit court to be aware of the effects of an order denying or granting relief." Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 469, 326 N.W.2d 727, 731 (1982). The effect of denying the Schnellers the right to present an expert medical liability witness was to make it impossible for them to litigate their claim, and resulted in their action being dismissed.
The effect of the trial court's denial of the Schnel-lers' motion was to dismiss their action with prejudice for a violation of the scheduling order. The trial court was therefore required to apply to its decision sec. 805.03, Stats. The trial court made no finding that the conduct of either the Schnellers or their counsel had been egregious.
In order to dismiss an action under sec. 805.03, Stats., the trial court must find that the plaintiff was in some manner responsible for the delay or violation. Dismissal is an extreme sanction which should be reserved for cases of contumacious conduct for which the plaintiff is in some manner responsible. "[A] host of cases evidence a reluctance of the courts to bar a party from trial on the merits of his [her] claim because of the errors of his [her] legal representatives.'' Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, sec. 2369 at 196 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
*385HH h-1
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT STANDARD, IF APPLICABLE, APPLIES TO PLAINTIFFS
Even if the standard to be applied in this case is "excusable neglect" under sec. 801.15(2)(a), Stats., the plaintiffs were entitled to their motion. "Excusable neglect" under sec. 801.15(2)(a) applies to the party and not the party's attorney. See Paschong v. Hollenbeck, 13 Wis. 2d 415, 108 N.W.2d 668 (1961), cited with approval in Village of Big Bend v. Anderson, 103 Wis. 2d 403, 408, 308 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Ct. App. 1981). There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Schnellers were in any way responsible for their first attorney's failure to timely name a medical liability expert.
In Paschong the appellant sought relief under sec. 269.46(1), Stats, [sec. 806.07, Stats.], because of the attorney's negligence. The court reversed the trial court's failure to exercise its discretion to relieve the appellant from the order. The court said that "a client ought not lose the benefit of a valid defense as a consequence of his attorney's omission." 13 Wis. 2d at 421, 108 N.W.2d at 671. Nor should a client lose the benefit of a valid claim as a consequence of his or her attorney's omission. The court said, "A litigant is not to be penalized for the neglect or mistakes of his lawyer. Courts will relieve parties from the consequences of neglect or mistake of their attorney, when it can be done without substantial prejudice to their adversaries.” Id. at 422, 108 N.W.2d at 672 (quoting Duenow v. Lindeman, 27 N.W.2d 421, 429 (Minn. 1947)). The court further said:
[T]he rule is . . . that in some cases the particular . . . neglect, mistake, or omission of an attorney is not to be imputed to his client so as to bar him from *386relief from a judgment resulting therefrom and the latter rule prevails where the client used due care in the selection of an attorney to represent him. We see no distinguishing difference between mistake of law, ill advice, neglect, or other actions and omissions by an attorney in the application of sec. 269.46(1), Stats. [sec. 806.07(1)]. This is not to say that such conduct of 6m attorney is never to be imputed to his client. In applying this section the court is exercising equitable powers to secure a substantial justice between the parties under all the circumstances. This legal discretion may or may not call for imputation depending on the facts of the particular case.
Paschong, 13 Wis. 2d at 424, 108 N.W.2d at 673.
It makes no sense for a trial court to dismiss a plaintiffs claim for failure to timely comply with a pretrial order or for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff is blameless and may proceed under sec. 806.07(1)(a), Stats., to obtain relief from the judgment or order which has been entered against him or her. Section 806.07(1) "has reference exclusively to the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect of a party resulting in a judgment being entered against him which it might be inequitable to enforce." Sikora v. Jursik, 38 Wis. 2d 305, 308-09, 156 N.W.2d 489, 491 (1968). On a sec. 806.07 motion, the attorney's conduct is irrelevant unless it is so egregious that it is equitable to impute it to the client. In all cases where a plaintiffs claim is proposed to be dismissed for violation of a pretrial order or for failure to prosecute, the trial court should, therefore, hold an evi-dentiary hearing to determine whether the circumstances justify imputing the conduct of the attorney to the plaintiff. "In deciding whether to impute the negligence of the lawyer to the client, the trial court must exercise 'its equitable powers to secure substantial jus*387tice between the parties.' This discretion may or may not call for imputation, depending on the facts of each case." Charolais Breeding Ranches v. Wiegel, 92 Wis. 2d 498, 514, 285 N.W.2d 720, 728 (1979) (quoting Paschong, 13 Wis. 2d at 424, 108 N.W.2d at 673). If, after an eviden-tiary hearing, the trial court is satisfied that the plaintiff is blameless, the court should impose sanctions on the attorney which will protect the integrity of the judicial process without sacrificing the litigant's claim.
I conclude with the words of the Michigan court: "What are we to tell defendant beyond that he has lost his case? Must we merely express our sympathy and regrets as we turn him away?* Trial courts have ample power to rein in uncooperative counsel without turning blameless claimants away from the court's door. I therefore respectfully dissent.

 White v. Sadler, 87 N.W.2d 192, 199 (Mich. 1957), quoted in Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Relation, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1120, 1125 (1968).