Court Opinion

ID: 9372835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:00.585895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.956955
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     CYRIL DAVID DANIEL ORAM, JR.,                   DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DC-4324-18-0042-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: February 15, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Cyril David Daniel Oram, Jr., Bellingham, Washington, pro se.

           Jana Pariser and Jane Brittan, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action under the Uniformed Services
     Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) (codified as
     amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335).         For the reasons discussed below, we

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and
     REMAND the case to the Washington Regional Office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The agency posted an announcement for GS-12 and GS-13 Information
     Technology (IT) Specialist positions in multiple locations, which were open
     during the period from August 4-11, 2017.        Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6
     at 29-42. The announcement identified the appointment type as “Temporary –
     Temporary NTE June 30, 2020,” and stated that it was open to “[c]urrent or
     former competitive service employees, including: Merit promotion; Career
     Transition (CTAP, ICTAP, RPL); Transfer.”          Id. at 29, 32.     The “Who May
     Apply” section of the announcement also stated that the positions were open to
     applicants who were eligible for “re-employment as a Federal annuitant; []
     (ICTAP) eligible in the commuting area; Persons eligible under the Veterans
     Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA).”            Id. at 34.    The appellant
     applied for the position during the open period and indicated on his application
     that he was entitled to veterans’ preference. Id. at 53, 57, 68-70.
¶3         On August 23, 2017, the agency sent the appellant separate emails about his
     GS-12 and GS-13 applications informing him that he was ineligible for
     consideration for the positions due to an “administrative error.”       Id. at 49-50.
     Elaborating, the emails stated, “VEOA mandates that eligible veterans be given
     career or career conditional appointments; temporary or term appointments cannot
     be offered,” and noted that the positions to which the appellant had applied were
     temporary or term appointments. Id.
¶4         The appellant emailed the agency’s human resources office requesting that
     the agency “reconsider both applications additionally competitively and
     noncompetitively as a current federal employee transfer,” but he did not receive a
     response. Id. at 46. Subsequently, the appellant filed a VEOA complaint with the
                                                                                      3

     Department of Labor (DOL).       Id. at 44.   After exhausting his administrative
     remedies for his VEOA appeal with DOL, id. at 24, the appellant filed a Board
     appeal in which he argued that the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights
     by failing to consider his application for the temporary/term IT Specialist
     position, which the administrative judge docketed as separate appeals under
     VEOA and USERRA. 2         IAF, Tab 1; see Oram v. Department of Homeland
     Security, MSPB Docket No. DC-3330-18-0041-I-1, Appeal File (0041 AF),
     Tab 1. The administrative judge docketed the VEOA appeal as MSPB Docket
     No. DC-3330-18-0041-I-1, and the instant USERRA appeal as MSPB Docket
     No. DC-4324-18-0042-I-1.
¶5        The administrative judge issued an order finding Board jurisdiction over the
     appellant’s claim of military-status discrimination under USERRA and setting a
     joint hearing on the appellant’s VEOA and USERRA appeals.             IAF, Tab 13
     at 4-7. After the appellant failed to connect to the conference call on the day of
     the hearing, the administrative judge held the hearing with only the agency and its
     witness and closed the record at the end of the hearing. IAF, Tab 32, Hearing
     Compact Disc (HCD). The administrative judge subsequently issued an initial
     decision on the USERRA claim holding that the appellant failed to submit any
     direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that his prior military status was
     a motivating factor in the agency’s decision not to select him for either of the

     2
       The appellant did not make any allegations related to USERRA in his complaint to
     DOL and has not alleged that he has exhausted his administrative remedies with DOL
     concerning his USERRA complaint. Cf. Becker v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     107 M.S.P.R. 327, ¶ 12 (2007) (noting that when an appellant files a USERRA
     complaint with DOL before filing an appeal with the Board, he mus t exhaust his
     administrative remedies with DOL prior to submitting his USERRA complaint to the
     Board). Unlike an appeal brought under VEOA, there is no requirement that an
     employee exhaust his remedies with DOL before filing a USERRA appeal with the
     Board. Id.
                                                                                            4

     vacancies at issue. 3       IAF, Tab 33, Initial Decision (ID) at 6; see Sheehan v.
     Department of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Consequently,
     the administrative judge denied the appellant ’s request for corrective action on
     his USERRA discrimination claim. ID at 7.
¶6           The appellant has filed a petition for review and a supplement to his
     petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-2. The agency has
     filed a response in opposition to the petition for review, and the appellant has not
     filed a reply. PFR File, Tab 4.

                        DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7           On review, the appellant challenges a number of the administrative judge’s
     rulings denying his discovery-related requests, asserting that the administrative
     judge     “appeared    to    subject   [him]   to   procedures   not   consistent   with
     requirements.” 4      PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6.       However, the appellant does not
     specifically challenge the administrative judge’s findings concerning his
     USERRA claim or even refer to his USERRA claim in any of his filings on
     review.
¶8           Regarding the appellant’s claim that the administrative judge’s rulings
     denying his discovery-related requests constituted an abuse of discretion, there is
     no merit to the appellant’s claim. Id. The appellant appears to be referring to an
     order the administrative judge issued denying his request that the administrative
     judge certify a discovery ruling for interlocutory appeal to the Board.             IAF,
     Tab 21 at 1. The disputed discovery ruling the appellant sought to certify was the
     denial of the appellant’s motion to compel as untimely. Id.

     3
       The administrative judge also issued a separate initial decision on the VEOA claim.
     0041 AF, Tab 37. A petition for review has been filed in that case and is being
     separately adjudicated.
     4
       The appellant also alleges error in the administrative judge’s decisions denying his
     request for recusal and his motion to quash, but those claims appear related to his
     separately docketed VEOA appeal, so we have not addressed them here. 0041 AF,
     Tabs 25-26, 28.
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¶9         The Board’s regulations provide for certification of a ruling for
      interlocutory review when (a) the ruling involves an important question of law or
      policy about which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and
      (b) an immediate ruling will materially advance the completion of the proceeding,
      or the denial of an immediate ruling will cause undue harm to a party or the
      public. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.92. Based on our review of the record, the appellant’s
      request does not meet the criteria for certification. Nothing about the discovery
      dispute at issue here involved an important question of law or policy that required
      an immediate resolution such that certification was necessary. See id.
¶10        Regarding the substance of the appellant’s discovery-related challenges, we
      similarly find no error. As the administrative judge noted in his ruling on the
      matter, although the appellant informed the agency that he intended to file a
      motion to compel discovery responses on December 20, 2017, he did not actually
      file the motion until January 11, 2018—well after the 10-day period for doing so
      had elapsed—and, therefore, his motion was untimely.             IAF, Tab 19 at 2-3;
      Tab 20 at 4, 11. Conversely, the agency filed its motion to compel within the
      proscribed timelines after the appellant made clear that he refused to engage in
      the discovery process. IAF, Tab 19 at 3.
¶11        To the extent the appellant is suggesting that the administrative judge
      exhibited bias by denying his discovery-related requests, it is well established
      that conclusory claims of bias that do not involve extrajudicial conduct do not
      overcome    the   presumption   of   honesty   and   integrity    that   accompanies
      administrative adjudicators.    Simpkins v. Office of Personnel Management,
      113 M.S.P.R. 411, ¶ 5 (2010).        The appellant’s conclusory assertions here,
      unsupported by any objective evidence, do not meet this standard. See Vaughn v.
      Department of the Treasury, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 18 (2013) (explaining that there
      is a presumption of honesty and integrity on the part of administrative judges that
      only can be overcome by a substantial showing of personal bias and that the
      Board will not infer bias based on an administrative judge’s case-related rulings);
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      Caracciolo v. Department of the Treasury, 105 M.S.P.R. 663, ¶ 14 (2007)
      (holding that the mere fact that the administrative judge made rulings with which
      the appellant disagrees does not support a recusal), overruled on other grounds by
      Brookins v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 3.

      The administrative judge erred by holding the hearing in the appellant’s absence.
¶12        On review, the appellant asserts for the first time that he had “technical
      difficulties” that prevented him from participating in the video hearing, that he
      informed the administrative judge of the difficulties, and that he was prejudiced
      by the administrative judge’s decision to hold the hearing in his absence. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 5-6. In a status conference summary order dated January 12, 2018,
      the administrative judge scheduled the prehearing conference for February 14,
      2018, and the hearing for February 20, 2018.           IAF, Tab 19 at 1-2.   In a
      January 30, 2018 order denying the appellant’s discovery-related motion, the
      administrative   judge   reiterated   that   the previously   scheduled telephonic
      prehearing conference remained scheduled for February 14, 2018.          0041 AF,
      Tab 29 at 1.     Both the agency and the appellant submitt ed their prehearing
      submissions on February 12, 2018, IAF, Tabs 28-29, and both parties were
      present on the prehearing conference call 2 days later, on February 14, 2018, IAF,
      Tab 30 at 1.
¶13        During the prehearing conference, the administrative judge discus sed
      logistics for the appellant’s participation in the hearing via video conference
      using GoToMeeting and directed the parties to attend a test call the following
      day, February 15, 2018. IAF, Tab 31 at 1. The appellant failed to appear for the
      test call on February 15, 2018, but submitted a filing 30 minutes before the
      scheduled time for the test call in which he addressed the agency’s prehearing
      submissions.     Id. at 2.   The administrative judge issued a memorandum
      documenting the appellant’s absence; stating that the February 20, 2018 hearing
      would continue as scheduled; and apprising the appellant that if he failed to
      appear, the hearing would continue in his absence and the record would close
                                                                                        7

      upon completion of the hearing. Id. In the order, the administrative judge also
      instructed the appellant to contact him on the day of the hearing if he encountered
      any technical difficulties and provided the appellant with a telephone number. Id.
¶14        The scheduled hearing took place starting at 7:10 a.m. on February 20,
      2018. HCD; ID at 4. Agency counsel and the agency’s sole approved witness
      appeared before the administrative judge in person at the Board ’s Washington
      Regional Office, but the appellant failed to join the GoToMeeting conference at
      any point after the scheduled start of the hearing. HCD; ID at 4-5. The hearing
      concluded at 7:47 a.m. HCD; ID at 5. The appellant alleges, for the first time on
      review, that he “had substantial technical difficulties attending the hearing which
      he communicated to the Board,” although no such communication was
      documented in the hearing record, and the appellant has not provided any
      evidence of any such communication. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6.
¶15        An appellant who establishes jurisdiction over a USERRA appeal has an
      unconditional right to a hearing if he requests one. Kirkendall v. Department of
      the Army, 479 F.3d 830, 844-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, as the Federal
      Circuit has noted of the right to a hearing, “if the employee forfeits the right
      which Congress conferred, he must forego the benefits.” Callahan v. Department
      of the Navy, 748 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984). To strike a balance between
      these considerations, MSPB’s Administrative Judges’ (AJ) Handbook describes
      what an administrative judge should do in a circumstance when an appellant fails
      to appear at a scheduled hearing:
            If the appellant and the appellant’s designated representative (if any)
            fail to appear for the scheduled hearing, the hearing cannot proceed.
            The AJ should try to call the appellant, and if unsuccessful in making
            contact, wait a reasonable time before cancelling the hearing in case
            the appellant is merely tardy. If neither the appellant nor the
            appellant’s representative appears, the AJ must issue a show cause
            order that requires the appellant to show good cause for his or her
            absence. The AJ must then follow up with a second order either
            rescheduling the hearing if the appellant establishes good cause, or
            setting the date for the close of the record if the appellant fails to
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            respond to the order or if the response fails to show good cause. In
            the latter instance, the appeal must be adjudicated on the ba sis of the
            written record only. See Callahan v. Department of the Navy,
            748 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
      Merit Systems Protection Board, Judges’ Handbook, chapter 4, § 13(a). 5
¶16         Here, the record does not reflect that the administrative judge attempted to
      contact the appellant and then cancel the hearing after waiting a reasonable
      amount of time. The administrative judge also did not issue a show cause order
      providing the appellant with an opportunity to demonstrate good cause for his
      absence, and he did not reschedule the hearing or, alternatively, cancel the
      hearing entirely and adjudicate the case based on the written record.
¶17         Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge erred by holding the
      hearing in the appellant’s absence. Consequently, we vacate the initial decision
      and remand the appeal to the Washington Regional Office for a new hearing on
      the merits of the appellant’s USERRA claim and the issuance of a new initial
      decision on the merits of that claim.

      5
        The Board has held that “the [AJ] Handbook is not mandatory and failure to apply its
      provisions does not establish adjudicatory error.” Gregory v. Department of the Army,
      114 M.S.P.R. 607, ¶ 22 (2010). Similarly, Koehler v. Department of the Air Force,
      99 M.S.P.R. 82, ¶ 13 n.4 (2005), provides that the AJ Handbook only provides
      “guidance,” is not an independent source of authority for administrative judges, and
      “creates no greater substantive rights for appellants than that to which they are entitled
      by law, rule, or regulation, as developed through the Board’s own current case law and
      that of our reviewing court . . . .” As noted above, this particular procedure in the AJ
      Handbook was adopted to follow the Federal Circuit’s guidance in Callahan.
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                                          ORDER
¶18        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.