Court Opinion

ID: 9373423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:55.975463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.411749
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SHARON C. SWAPSY,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         CH-0353-13-0311-I-2

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: September 13, 2022
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Donna L. Drake, Markham, Illinois, for the appellant.

           Deborah W. Carlson and Rebecca Heeter, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her appeal of the agency’s denying her request
     for restoration. For the reasons set forth below, we DENY the petition for review
     and AFFIRM the initial decision, MODIFYING the administrative judge’s

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     analysis of the dispositive jurisdictional issue in this case and VACATING her
     findings regarding the appellant’s allegations of discrimination.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        After the appellant suffered a work-related injury to her knee, the agency
     placed her in a limited-duty assignment. Swapsy v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB
     Docket No. CH-0353-13-0311-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 7,
     ¶¶ 3c-3d, 3f-3h, 3j. Shortly thereafter, however, the appellant submitted revised
     medical restrictions that limited her to no more than 500 feet of walking per day;
     no running, squatting, kneeling, or crawling; no ladders or stairs; and no lifting,
     carrying, pushing, or pulling more than 10 pounds.         Id., ¶ 3j.   Because the
     requirements of the appellant’s limited-duty assignment exceeded her revised
     medical restrictions, the agency withdrew the offer on October 4, 2011, and sent
     her home. Id.
¶3        After a second-opinion medical evaluation revised the appellant’s medical
     restrictions, the agency on April 13, 2012, offered the appellant a new modified
     job that provided for no lifting or carrying more than 20 pounds, sitting for more
     than 4 hours, and standing for more than 4 hours. Id., ¶¶ 3l-3n. The appellant
     rejected the offer. Id., ¶ 3o. However, the Office of Workers’ Compensation
     Programs (OWCP) determined that the job offer was suitable. Id., ¶ 3p.
¶4        The appellant filed a Board appeal of the agency’s alleged denials of
     restoration, which the administrative judge dismissed without prejudice at the
     appellant’s request.   IAF, Tabs 1, 8.      Upon refiling, and after holding the
     requested hearing, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to show by preponderant evidence
     that the agency’s denying her request for restoration on October 4, 2011, was
     arbitrary and capricious and that the appellant failed to show that the agency
     denied her request for restoration on April 13, 2012.       Swapsy v. U.S. Postal
     Service, MSPB Docket No. CH-0353-13-0311-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 45
                                                                                         3

     Initial Decision (ID) at 10-22.      The administrative judge also found in the
     alternative that the refiled appeal was untimely filed without a showing of good
     cause. ID at 22-26.

                                         ANALYSIS
¶5         Agencies are required to make every effort to restore in the local
     commuting area an individual who has partially recovered from a compensable
     injury and who is able to return to limited duty. 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d). Partially
     recovered employees may appeal to the Board for a determination of whether the
     agency is acting arbitrarily and capriciously in denying restoration.       5 C.F.R.
     § 353.304(c). To establish jurisdiction over a restoration appeal as a partially
     recovered individual, the appellant must prove the following by preponderant
     evidence 2: (1) she was absent from her position due to a compensable injury;
     (2) she recovered sufficiently to return to duty on a part-time basis or to return to
     work in a position with less demanding physical requirements than those
     previously required of her; (3) the agency denied her request for restoration; and
     (4) the denial was arbitrary and capricious. Bledsoe v. Merit Systems Protection
     Board, 659 F.3d 1097, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2011), modified in part by regulation as
     stated in Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2016); Latham
     v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶ 10 (2012), overruled on other
     grounds by Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶¶ 20-21; 5 C.F.R.
     § 353.304(c).

     2
       Because the appellant filed her Board appeal prior to March 30, 2015, we apply the
     “preponderant evidence” standard rather than the current “nonfrivolous allegation”
     standard. See Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 5 n.2 (2016)
     (explaining that the Board adopted a nonfrivolous allegation standard for restorati on
     appeals by regulation effective March 20, 2015), aff’d, 679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir.
     2017). Preponderant evidence is the degree of evidence that a reasonable person,
     considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
     fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                           4

     The appellant failed to establish Board jurisdiction over                the agency’s
     October 4, 2011 denial of her request for restoration.
¶6         Regarding the appellant’s claim that the agency denied her request for
     restoration when it withdrew her limited-duty assignment on October 4, 2011, the
     administrative judge found, and it is not disputed, that the appellant satisfied the
     first three jurisdictional elements.   ID at 10; see Scott v. U.S. Postal Service,
     118 M.S.P.R. 375, ¶ 9 (2012) (stating that an agency’s rescinding a previous
     restoration or discontinuing a limited-duty assignment may constitute an
     appealable denial of restoration). In considering the fourth element, whether the
     agency’s denial of restoration was arbitrary and capricious, the administrative
     judge first found that the agency proffered documentary evidence showing that it
     searched for vacancies within the local commuting area as required by 5 C.F.R.
     § 353.301(d), and that therefore its search was geographically adequate, noting
     that the appellant did not challenge that evidence. ID at 10-11; I-2 AF, Tab 32
     at 73-89. The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to
     show that the agency’s denial was due to a failure to perform its obligations under
     5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d), ID at 10-11, and thus, the appropriateness of the agency’s
     search is not a basis for finding that the agency’s actions in this case were
     arbitrary and capricious.
¶7         The administrative judge went on to consider whether the agency’s failure
     to adhere to its own internal restoration obligations, as set forth in its Employee
     and Labor Relations Manual (ELM) § 546 and EL-505, chapters 7 and 11, 3
     rendered the denial per se arbitrary and capricious, concluding that it did not. ID
     at 11-16.   In this analysis, the administrative judge relied upon the Board’s
     decision in Latham, wherein, in deference to the Office of Personnel
     Management’s interpretation of 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d), a majority of the Board

     3
       These provisions require the agency to offer modified assignments to partially
     recovered individuals whenever work is available and within their medical restrictions ,
     regardless of whether the tasks comprise the essential functions of an established
     position. Latham, 117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶¶ 3, 26.
                                                                                        5

     found that it has jurisdiction over appeals concerning the denial of restoration to
     partially recovered individuals when the denial results from the agency’s
     violating its own internal rules. Latham, 117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶ 13.
¶8        However, in Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20, the Board overruled Latham and
     its progeny, concluding that, to establish jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c),
     an appellant must, inter alia, make a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency failed
     to comply with the minimum requirement of 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d), i.e., to search
     within the local commuting area for vacant positions to which it can restore a
     partially recovered employee and to consider her for such vacancies , but that an
     agency’s failure to comply with self-imposed obligations to undertake further
     restoration efforts, including those set forth in the age ncy’s ELM, cannot
     constitute a violation of 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d) such that a resulting denial of
     restoration would be rendered “arbitrary and capricious” for purposes of
     establishing Board jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. 353.304(c).      Id.   Therefore, the
     administrative judge’s analysis of whether the agency’s failure to comply with its
     ELM provisions regarding the restoration rights of partially recovered employees
     was “arbitrary and capricious” for purposes of establishing Board jurisdiction was
     improper under Cronin, and we therefore vacate that part of her analysis.
¶9        The appellant asserts that the October 4, 2011 restoration denial was
     arbitrary and capricious because the agency could have accommodated her
     medical restrictions in a way that would have allowed her to continue working in
     the limited-duty assignment that it discontinued. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tab 3 at 18-19.    Again citing Latham, the administrative judge addressed but
     rejected this claim, as well as the appellant’s claim that the agency acted
     arbitrarily and capriciously by discriminating against her based on race, sex, age,
     and prior equal employment opportunity activity.       ID at 12-19.    However, in
     Cronin, the Board further found that claims of prohibited discrimination or
     reprisal for protected activity also do not serve as independent means of showing
     that a denial of restoration was arbitrary and capricious for purposes of
                                                                                             6

      section 353.304(c), Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 21, and we therefore vacate that
      portion of the administrative judge’s analysis as well.

      The appellant failed to establish Board jurisdiction over the agency’s
      April 12, 2012 alleged denial of her request for restoration.
¶10         The appellant also alleged that the agency denied her request for restoration
      when it offered her a limited-duty assignment on April 12, 2012.                Partially
      recovered employees may not appeal an improper restoration to the Board; they
      may only appeal to the Board to determine whether the agency’s actions were
      arbitrary and capricious. Trembly v. U.S. Postal Service, 85 M.S.P.R. 297, ¶ 3
      (2000). The Board lacks jurisdiction to review the particulars of the restoration.
      Foley v. U.S. Postal Service, 90 M.S.P.R. 206, ¶ 6 (2001). Nevertheless, when
      the agency has made a job offer to the appellant, the Board might, in appropriate
      circumstances, deem a restoration so unreasonable as to amount to a denial of
      restoration within the Board’s jurisdiction. Ballesteros v. U.S. Postal Service,
      88 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 8 (2001).
¶11         The administrative judge correctly found that the appell ant did not prove
      that the agency denied her request for restoration.       ID at 21-22.    The agency
      offered the appellant a limited-duty assignment that OWCP determined was
      suitable. IAF, Tab 5 at 129-31. The appellant alleges that OWCP later reversed
      its finding, but she submitted no evidence to substantiate her assertion.           In a
      May 20, 2013 letter, OWCP informed the appellant that “[her] case continues to
      be open for medical and . . . clarification regarding [her] current work-related
      restrictions.” I-2 AF, Tab 32 at 29. The appellant contended to OWCP that her
      medical restrictions were not “finalized,” and it appears that OWCP decided not
      to terminate her compensation payments until the conflicts about her medical
      restrictions were resolved, not because it reversed its suitability analysis.
¶12         An employee who rejects a suitable offer of restoration cannot show that the
      agency’s offer was so unreasonable as to amount to an appealable denial of
      restoration because OWCP, by finding the offer suitable, necessarily determined
                                                                                         7

      that it was reasonable. Trembly, 85 M.S.P.R. 297, ¶ 6 (finding that, when OWCP
      found the agency’s restoration offer suitable, the Board was precluded from
      finding that the offer was so unreasonable that it amounted to a denial of
      restoration).     Decisions on an offered position’s suitability are within the
      exclusive domain of OWCP and it is OWCP, not the employing agency and not
      the Board, which possesses the requisite expertise to evaluate whether a position
      is suitable in light of that employee’s particular medical condition.       New v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 142 F.3d 1259, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Bynum v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 403, ¶ 23 (2009), aff’d, 382 F. App’x 934 (Fed.
      Cir. 2010). Because the appellant rejected a suitable offer of employment, she
      has not shown by preponderant evidence that the agency denied a request for
      restoration. Therefore, we find that the administrative judge correctly found that
      the appellant did not establish jurisdiction over the April 13, 2012 alleged denial
      of restoration.

      The appellant’s remaining arguments on review do not warrant granting her
      petition for review.
¶13         As is usual, the administrative judge conducted a prehearing conferenc e in
      which she, inter alia, defined the issues for adjudication and ruled on witness
      requests. In her prehearing conference memorandum, the administrative judge
      identified the October 4, 2011 withdrawal of the limited -duty assignment and the
      April 13, 2012 limited-duty offer as the only two alleged requests for restoration
      at issue in this appeal. I-2 AF, Tab 34 at 2. The administrative judge afforded
      the appellant the opportunity to object to her identification of the issues, but the
      appellant did not preserve an objection for review. Id. at 2, 6; Hearing Transcript
      (HT) at 5 (statement of the administrative judge). To the extent the appellant
      discusses other alleged denials of restoration in her petition for review, those
      claims are not within the purview of this appeal.
¶14         The appellant contends for the first time on review that the agency failed to
      conduct a proper search, and she correctly points out that many of the agency’s
                                                                                       8

      search documents are dated 2013 or later and do not show that the agency
      conducted a proper search in late 2011. PFR File, Tab 3 at 18 -19; I-2 AF, Tab 32
      at 73-89. The agency supported its documentary evidence with hearing testimony
      that it conducted a search for available work in October 2011 before sending the
      appellant home. HT at 172-73 (testimony of the Health and Resources Manager).
      The agency further provided evidence that, during the relevant time frame, it used
      an electronic system known as Web ESP to conduct searches for work.            HT
      at 32-33, 173. However, Web ESP was discontinued in 2014 after a data breach
      and its files are no longer recoverable. HT at 33, 184. The only available Web
      ESP records are the ones for which someone happened to create a paper copy
      before the system was discontinued. The appellant did not conduct any cross
      examination at the hearing concerning the search when she had the opportunity to
      do so. The Board need not consider an argument raised for the first time in a
      petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evi dence
      not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Banks v. Department
      of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). Even if the Board were to consider
      this argument, we would find that the agency has provided a reasonable
      explanation for the lack of paper documentation of its search, and we agree with
      the administrative judge that the appellant failed to prove that t he search was
      improper. ID at 11.
¶15        The appellant repeats on review her allegation below that OWCP reversed
      itself and determined that the April 13, 2012 offer was not suitable.          The
      administrative judge found that the appellant introduced no evidence to
      substantiate her assertion. On review, the appellant identified her Exhibit T as
      proof that OWCP reversed its decision.          PFR File, Tab 3 at 20.         The
      administrative judge rejected a late-filed set of exhibits, including Exhibit T. We
      find that the appellant has not shown that the administrative judge abused her
      discretion by rejecting the appellant’s late-filed exhibits. If there is a document
      finding the position not suitable, it would have been sent to the appellant in the
                                                                                         9

      normal course of business and she already should have possessed a copy. Even if
      she kept incomplete records at home and had to request documents from OWCP,
      her appeal had been pending since February 23, 2013, by the time she finally
      submitted her exhibits on January 16, 2016. She did not state when she requested
      the documents; she merely made a bare allegation that she had just received them.
      Because she did not submit the rejected exhibits until after the deadline passed
      and only a few days before the hearing, and because she did not show why she
      could not have submitted them on time despite her diligence, we find that the
      administrative judge was within her discretion to reject the exhibits.
¶16         Even if the administrative judge abused her discretion, Exhibit T does not
      warrant reversal of the initial decision. The exhibit is a series of OWCP records
      of telephone contact. I-2 AF, Tab 35 at 49-66. One document is a statement that
      an employee informed the appellant that OWCP found some unidentified position
      not suitable. Id. at 64. Thus, it would have been hearsay evidence that OWCP
      found unsuitable a job offer that may or may not have been the offer at issue in
      this appeal. We do not know the job title of the person who took the appellant’s
      telephone call, so we do not know if she was the Claims Examiner handling the
      appellant’s case or a customer service representative working a phone bank and
      reading information from a computer screen.           The Board has found that a
      document missing indicia of reliability to a similar degree as the record of
      telephone contact in this appeal constituted at best a mere scintilla of evidence
      and did not rise to the level of even substantial evidence. Adamsen v. Department
      of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R. 331, ¶¶ 13-18 (2011).          Substantial evidence is a
      lesser standard of proof than preponderant evidence. Towne v. Department of the
      Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 6 (2013). Because we have found that evidence
      of this quality is insufficient to meet the substantial evidence st andard, we find
      that the appellant’s evidence here does not rise to the level of preponderant
      evidence.   Thus, even if the Board were to consider the appellant’s rejected
      Exhibit T, it is insufficient to establish Board jurisdiction.
                                                                                           10

¶17         Finally, in light of our dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we
      need not address the administrative judge’s alternative finding that the appeal was
      untimely refiled.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes t he
      Board’s final decision in this matter.     5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.       You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
      chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.
            (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
      judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U .S.
      Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       11

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving    a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. I f so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
                                                                                12

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs , or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
                                                                                     13

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our we bsite at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 201 7. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           14

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.