Court Opinion

ID: 9471317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:29:00.680078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:20.957032
License: Public Domain

CONTIE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority opinion concludes that because the defendant Crowder made an ex*174culpatory statement rather than remaining silent after having been given Miranda warnings, this case is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980), rather than by the Court’s holding in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Since I am of the opinion that Crowder did nothing more than to invoke his constitutional right to remain silent and since I further believe that the government’s sole purpose in inquiring about the defendant’s post-warning conduct was to imply guilt from his silence, I must dissent in part. I agree with the majority that the Sandstrom instruction was harmless error because the instruction only created a presumption that the defendant intended to help the truck driver return the truck and trailer to the highway so that the driver could proceed. Crowder himself testified that such was his intent. Thus, the instruction in question could not have been used by the jury to supply an intent to transport stolen vehicles across state lines and to receive, conceal and store those vehicles. J do not agree, however, that the instruction was harmless error because of overwhelming evidence.
As indicated by the majority, Crowder told an exculpatory story to Detective Winn at the scene where the stolen vehicles were recovered. Although the admissibility of this statement is beyond dispute, such is not the case concerning Crowder’s response to questioning after he had surrendered himself and been advised of his constitutional rights. The record reflects that after Agent Sledd informed the defendant of the outstanding arrest warrant, the latter consulted an attorney before going to FBI headquarters. The attorney counseled Crowder not to discuss the case. When asked by Agent Sledd the next day whether he wished to talk about the charges, Crowder responded that he did not wish to discuss the matter and that he would stand by the statement previously made to the state police. The government introduced this remark through the testimony of Agent Sledd during its case-in-chief and questioned Crowder about the response on cross-examination.
Although a waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred from a defendant’s words and actions, the burden of proof rests upon the government. Waiver of constitutional rights is not to be presumed. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471, 100 S.Ct. 652, 653, 62 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1759, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). In the present case, a waiver would consist of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of the constitutional right to remain silent. See Tague, 444 U.S. at 470, 100 S.Ct. at 653; Butler, 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In determining whether a waiver has occurred, a court must examine “the background, experience and conduct of the accused.” Butler, 441 U.S. at 374-75, 99 S.Ct. at 1758; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Under these standards, Crowder did not waive the right to remain silent.
The record does not indicate that Crowder possessed any legal training or significant experience with the criminal justice system when the events in question transpired. When notified of his impending arrest, the defendant sought legal counsel, who advised him not to discuss the case. Under these circumstances, the most reasonable inference is that Crowder’s response to Sledd’s question was merely an attempt to follow his attorney’s instruction to remain silent and was not a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right. Furthermore, any doubt about the matter should be resolved against the government.
The defendant in Anderson v. Charles said much more than Crowder said here. When questioned about a stolen automobile which had belonged to a murder victim, Charles gave a detailed account about the place from which he had taken the auto. That location was not near the murder scene. In contrast, Crowder in effect indicated that he would say no more than he had already said. He made absolutely no *175attempt to relate the specifics of a favorable version of what had occurred on July 1, 1980. Although persons skilled in the criminal law might not have used the verbal formulation used by Crowder in order to assert Fifth Amendment rights, the defendant’s response to Sledd’s question was a layman’s way of achieving the same result. Since Crowder did not relate the details or substance of an exculpatory story to agent Sledd, neither his words nor his conduct demonstrates a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to remain silent. Crowder made no statement and his silence should not have been introduced during the government’s case-in-chief or during cross-examination.
Secondly, and as noted by Judge Peck in his dissenting opinion, the government was able to introduce the substance of the defendant’s exculpatory story through the testimony of Detective Winn, who had questioned Crowder at the recovery scene. The defendant’s later response to Agent Sledd’s question no more than mentioned the prior statement and was not inconsistent with that statement. Unlike the situation in Anderson v. Charles, the defendant’s response was useless for impeachment purposes. Consequently, the government’s purpose in introducing the response must have been to place before the jury the defendant’s election to remain silent. Implying that a defendant is guilty because he declined to talk to law enforcement officials after having been given Miranda warnings is precisely the tactic that Doyle v. Ohio found to be fundamentally unfair.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and grant the writ.