Court Opinion

ID: 9537158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:13:35.15161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:08.000790
License: Public Domain

Green, J.
(dissenting)—A magistrate's probable cause determination is entitled to great deference. State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 366, 693 P.2d 81 (1985). The question of whether probable cause justifies the issuance of a search warrant should not be viewed in a hypertechnical manner. *111State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 904, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977); State v. Matlock, 27 Wn. App. 152, 155, 616 P.2d 684 (1980) . Reasonableness is the key and common sense must be the ultimate yardstick. State v. Patterson, 83 Wn.2d 49, 52, 515 P.2d 496 (1973). Here, the majority ignores the fact that the informant revealed his/her identity to the police officer and the intrinsic indicia of reliability which such disclosure is accorded. Consequently, I dissent.
Generally, citizen informants are deemed presumptively reliable sources of information. State v. Wakeley, 29 Wn. App. 238, 628 P.2d 835, review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1032 (1981) . As noted in State v. Chatmon, 9 Wn. App. 741, 748, 515 P.2d 530 (1973), relied upon by the majority:
To establish the reliability of a citizen informant, and thus to fulfill the second prong of the Aguilar [v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964)] test, it is only necessary for the police to interview the informant and ascertain such background facts as would support a reasonable inference that he is "prudent" or credible, and without motive to falsify. United States v. Harris, [403 U.S. 573, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 91 S. Ct. 2075 (1971)]. In making this determination, the police may justifiably assume that the ordinary citizen who has seldom or never reported a crime to the police may, in fact, be more reliable than one who supplies information on a regular basis. United States v. Harris, supra (see also the dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., 403 U.S. at 599).
A greater indicia of reliability is accorded a citizen informant who discloses his identity than one who refuses to do so. State v. Northness, 20 Wn. App. 551, 556-57, 582 P.2d 546 (1978). The grounds for according greater weight to an identified citizen informant are threefold:
(1) the report of an identified nonprofessional informant who is a victim or eyewitness of a crime substantially minimizes the danger of casual rumor or irresponsible conjecture which accompanies the report of an anonymous professional informant[,] (2) an identified citizen informant's report does not raise the spectre of the "anonymous troublemaker" which is always present in unidentified citizen informant situations!,] (3) an identi*112fied citizen informant's report is less likely to be colored by self-interest.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Northness, supra at 557.
The court in Chatmon distinguishes between a citizen informant who discloses his identity but requests anonymity from one who refuses to disclose his identity. It is only when the informant is anonymous that his reliability must be corroborated by a "description of him, his purpose for being at the locus of the crime, and the reason for his desire to remain anonymous." (Footnote omitted.) Chatmon, at 748. The majority incorrectly applies the rule in Chatmon with regard to anonymous informants to the identified citizen informant in this case. For the same reason, the majority incorrectly applies the rule in State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 720 P.2d 838 (1986) that anonymity of a citizen informant may be one factor for finding no showing of reliability. Huft concerned "anonymous" informants, not, as here, a citizen informant whose identity was revealed to the officer but who requested anonymity.
I agree with the majority's concurrence with State v. Berlin, 46 Wn. App. 587, 731 P.2d 548 (1987) where the court found the disclosure of the citizen informants' identities to the police was sufficient to satisfy a finding of credibility. In fact, the affidavit in Berlin is similar to the affidavit here. The Berlin affidavit states:
Affiant has checked and found that the concerned citizens involved had no criminal background, came forward voluntarily, gave the appearance of being an honest citizen, and gave to affiant his or her name, phone number, and address to affiant but wishes to remain anonymous for fear of retaliation.
Berlin, at 591. Here the affidavit similarly states:
Within the past 48 hours I have received confidential information regarding the defendant from a confidential and reliable informant. The confidential informant has requested to remain anonymous because he/she fears physical, social and emotional retribution, if her identity *113is known. It is also my experience that revealing the identities of the informants will hinder other citizens from disclosing confidential information to law enforcement officers.
I believe the informant to be credible and reliable because he/she is an upstanding citizen with no criminal record and whose only motive for supplying the police with the following information is to thwart a crime she/ he has information will be attempted.
The only distinguishing feature of the two affidavits is that in Berlin the informants' addresses and phone numbers were given to the officer. I do not see this as a critical flaw. I would apply the reasoning in Berlin to the affidavit here:
Unlike Chatmon the informants have divulged their names and addresses to the police. Detective Whetstine checked their backgrounds and determined they had no criminal record. He also gave a legitimate reason why the citizens wished to remain anonymous.
Berlin, at 591. Thus, Berlin would uphold the magistrate's issuance of the warrant here.
Further, the court may consider information in the affidavits, other than just the informant's background, to determine whether the informant is reliable. In State v. Riley, 34 Wn. App. 529, 663 P.2d 145 (1983), relied upon by the majority, there were two identified citizen informants. The first informant indicated the defendant was in possession of a stolen computer. There was no other information in the affidavit concerning the credibility of that informant. The second informant indicated he had seen a computer in the defendant's residence. Additionally, the officer was aware a computer matching the second informant's description had been stolen. In determining whether the first informant was reliable, the court reviewed the entire affidavit, concluding the additional corroborating information provided by the second informant and the police officer supported his reliability. The court held the affidavit *114was "intrinsically reliable and a reasonable inference could be drawn from it to establish probable cause." Riley, at 534. More recently, in State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986), a search warrant was based upon two "tips", the first from a professional police informant alleging that the defendant, Kennedy, regularly went to Smith's residence to purchase marijuana and describing the defendant's vehicle. The second "tip" was based upon complaints from Smith's neighbors that there was heavy pedestrian traffic in and out of the house and the visitors stayed for only a few moments. The court found the two independent sources of information each provided support for the other's veracity. Kennedy, at 8.
Here, the affidavit reflects that 7 days before receiving the identified informant's tip, the penitentiary had informed this officer that the defendant, Mrs. Franklin, had reportedly smuggled controlled substances to her husband during a recent visit, but by the time the penitentiary received the information (11 days later), it could not confirm it. Although this information, standing alone, would not support the issuance of a warrant, it may nevertheless be considered in determining the reliability of the identified informant. State v. Kennedy, supra; State v. Riley, supra. This information supports the credibility of this informant. When viewed together with disclosure of the informant's identity, the fact this informant had no criminal history and the affidavit is specific and based upon the informant's firsthand knowledge, I would affirm the trial court's determination the warrant was properly issued. It is quality, not quantity, that establishes probable cause. State v. Huft, supra at 212. The affidavit must be accepted on its face and any doubts should be resolved in favor of the warrant. State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 964, 639 P.2d 743, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982); State v. Partin, supra at 904 (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 85 S. Ct. 741 (1965)). Given the deference which must be accorded a magistrate's determination of probable *115cause, I would resolve the doubt, if any, in favor of the validity of the warrant and affirm.
Review denied by Supreme Court December 2, 1987.