Court Opinion

ID: 9650107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:24:54.281743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:18.280144
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the order of the P.C.R.A. court and grant appellant, Cornell Galloway, a new trial on the charge of first degree murder in connection with the killing of Daniel Gebhard. The Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the pre-trial hypnosis of Dorothy Easley, its key witness, was a violation of the prosecution’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 *236L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) to disclose evidence favorable to the defense. The fact that Dorothy Easley had been hypnotized prior to appellant’s trial was relevant and material evidence which, if it had been disclosed, may well have been utilized by the defense to attack the credibility and reliability of Easley’s testimony. Therefore, I agree with the majority that appellant must be afforded a new trial on the charge that he murdered Daniel Gebhard during the early morning hours of August 2, 1969. See: United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2nd Cir.1969); Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F.Supp. 1025 (N.D.Ga.1975); People v. Angelina 649 P.2d 341 (Colo.App. 1982).
Having reached this conclusion, however, I am unable to agree with the majority that a different result should be reached with respect to appellant’s conviction for the murder of Barry Kimmet. After a careful reading of the record of appellant’s trial, I am not persuaded that appellant’s role as an accomplice in this murder was established by overwhelming evidence apart from the testimony of Dorothy Easley. In my judgment, Easley’s testimony that she observed appellant in possession of and firing a weapon, as well as her testimony as to inculpatory statements made by appellant following the killings of Gebhard and Kimmet, was crucial to the Commonwealth’s ability to prove that appellant acted with a specific intent to kill. Without this evidence a jury might well have been unable to find appellant guilty of first degree murder as an accomplice in the killing of Barry Kimmet. Cf. Commonwealth v. Huffman, 536 Pa. 196, 638 A.2d 961 (1994) (an accomplice must possess the specific intent to kill in order to be found guilty of first degree murder, as the guilt of an accomplice cannot be premised solely upon the mental state of the principal). I am constrained to conclude, therefore, that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the pre-trial hypnosis of Dorothy Easley was also material to the charge that appellant was an accomplice in the murder of Barry Kimmet. Accordingly, appellant should also be awarded a new trial on this charge.