Court Opinion

ID: 9487259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:12:02.69635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:10.357259
License: Public Domain

GARTH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I am compelled to dissent from the majority opinion as (1) the record convinces me that Reilly is entitled to a new trial on all charges, and (2) the record also requires that the false declaration charge against Dowd must be dismissed. I am also disturbed with the evidentiary analysis by which the majority sustains Reilly’s conviction. That analysis, which in my opinion is seriously flawed, not only affects this appeal, but, because it will become the law of this circuit, it necessarily infects all future trial and appellate proceedings on which it may impact. It is for these reasons — more fully expressed below — that I find it necessary to part company with my colleagues in the majority.
*1425I.
I am in accord with the majority that: (1) there was no ambiguity in the predicate questions underlying Reilly’s convictions for knowingly making false declarations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1628(a); (2) Reilly’s false declaration indictments adequately alleged the falsity of his purportedly perjurious responses; and that (8) the disputed radiotele-grams admitted into evidence against Reilly were properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence.
I am not in accord, however, with the majority’s analysis of the hearsay issues raised by Reilly. For the reasons which I will discuss in the following section, I disagree with the majority’s holding that 13 of the disputed radiotelegrams transmitted to the Khian Sea were admissible as non-hearsay admissions of Reilly. In my opinion, the district court erred in admitting those radio-telegrams, and that error necessarily undermined the entire trial process, thereby tainting Reilly’s jury conviction on the ocean dumping violation (33 U.S.C. § 1411(a)), as well as his false declaration convictions. Accordingly, rather than affirm Reilly’s conviction, as the majority holds, I would reverse Reilly’s conviction and remand his case to the district court for a new trial on all charges.
I also must disagree with the majority’s affirmance of Dowd’s conviction for knowingly making a false declaration before the federal grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). Unlike the majority, I am not convinced that the predicate question posed to Dowd before the grand jury was unambiguous. Based on the inherent ambiguity of the question to which Dowd was found to have responded falsely, I would reverse his conviction, and I would remand to the district court for dismissal of the § 1623(a) charge against Dowd. My disposition would obviate the need to address the sentencing issues raised by Dowd.
Inasmuch as I would reverse Reilly’s convictions on the hearsay issue, and Dowd’s conviction because of the ambiguity of the predicate question, I would not reach the improper prosecutorial comment issues raised by Reilly and Dowd. I hasten to add, however, that I would otherwise be in accord with the majority’s determination that neither Reilly nor Dowd was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s closing arguments to the jury, and that our holding in United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 999 (3d Cir.1989), does not require reversal per se in this case.
II.
I agree that the Government could establish by circumstantial evidence the authenticity of most, if not all, of the disputed radio-telegrams transmitted to and from the Khian Sea during its nearly two-year odyssey. Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(4) (authentication can be established by “[ajppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with other circumstances”); see also United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 329 (3d Cir.1992) (holding that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that notes were authored by the defendant, despite the government’s inability to establish fully the defendant’s authorship by expert opinion), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1388, 122 L.Ed.2d 763 (1993); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 71 (3d Cir.1971) (noting that, for authentication purposes, “the connection between a message (either oral or written) and its source may be established by circumstantial evidence”), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936, 92 S.Ct. 949, 30 L.Ed.2d 812 (1972).
A thorough review of the record persuades me that the Government satisfied its burden of establishing a prima facie case from which the jury could have inferred that the disputed radiotelegrams were what they purported to be, i.e., cable communications between the Khian Sea and Coastal Carriers and other onshore entities and individuals, including Reilly. As we have often said, “ ‘the burden of proof for authentication is slight. All that is required is a foundation from which the fact-finder could legitimately infer that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.’ ” Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 927 (3d Cir.1986) (quoting McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 928 (3d Cir.1985)) (additional citations omitted).
*1426Hence, I am in accord with the majority’s holding that the disputed radiotelegrams were properly authenticated pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 901, by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 661 (3d Cir.1993) (“The scope of appellate review upon this issue is confined to determining whether the admission constituted abuse of judicial discretion in determining that a prima facie case had been made out”) (internal quotes and citations omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. --■, 114 S.Ct. 1660, 128 L.Ed.2d 377 (1994).
A.
A showing of authenticity, however, “is not on a par with more technical evidentiary rules, such as hearsay exceptions, governing admissibility.” Link, 788 F.2d at 928 (quoting United States v. Goichman, 647 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir.1976)); accord McGlory, 968 F.2d at 328-329. That is because, once a 'prima facie showing of authenticity is made, it is the jury, and not the court, which ultimately determines the authenticity of the evidence. Id.
In contrast, the determination of whether hearsay is admissible at all is a matter of law for the court to decide, not a condition of fact subject to jury resolution. The majority’s treatment of the hearsay issues raised by Reilly, however, effectively and impermissi-bly equates our evidentiary rules governing admissibility with the slight showing required for authentication.
Contrary to the majority view, I am convinced that 13 of the incoming radiotele-grams, while properly authenticated, should not have been admitted into evidence because they contain inadmissible hearsay. See McGlory, 968 F.2d at 331 (“Notwithstanding authentication, the [documents] would still have to be excluded if the assertions in them are hearsay that does not fall under any exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 802 precluding the admissibility of hearsay.”).
B.
For purposes of my analysis, I am willing to assume that the 18 outgoing radiotele-grams (i.e., those cable communications from the Khian Sea to onshore entities and individuals) were properly admitted by the district court. I therefore accept the majority’s position that the messages contained in those outgoing radiotelegrams were admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) as non-hearsay prior statements of prosecution witness Captain Fuentes, and that the outgoing radiotelegrams themselves were admissible under the Rule 803(6) hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted activity. See Majority at 1414. I also will allow that the admission of the four incoming radiotelegrams not linked to Reilly was harmless. See id. at 1414.
We thus are left with 13 incoming radio-telegrams: the 12 purportedly sent to the Khian Sea by Reilly in Annapolis; and the one purportedly sent by Kimon Berbillis, the shipping agent for Romo in Greece. The transmission of each of these incoming radio-telegrams involved the following three-step process: (1) a coastal station operator would receive a message from an onshore sender; (2) that operator would then note the date and time of the transmission and where the communication or message originated or was “Handed In”; and (3) the coastal station operator would then transmit that message in Morse Code to the Khian Sea, where the radioman onboard the Khian Sea would convert the incoming message from Morse Code into a typed message.
Reilly argues that the incoming radiotele-grams contained three levels of hearsay: (1) the communication between the onshore sender (the hearsay declarant) and the coastal station operator (the witness auditor); (2) the communication between the coastal station operator (the hearsay declarant) and the radio operator on the Khian Sea (the witness auditor); and (3) the radio operator’s written recordation of the message. The majority concedes “that the incoming radiotelegrams to the Khian Sea were the product of [these] three out-of-court ‘statements.’ ” Majority at 1409-1410. It concludes, however, that those three out-of-court “statements” are not inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 1410. In reaching that conclusion, I suggest that the majority has put the rabbit in the hat.
*1427c.
The majority’s hearsay analysis is fundamentally flawed because it is premised on the assumption that the 12 radiotelegrams allegedly sent by Reilly originated in Annapolis, where Reilly lived and worked. See Majority at 1401, 1405, 1406, 1407, 1408, 1409, 1410, 1411, 1414. Yet, the Government never adduced any evidence, apart from the disputed documents themselves, that the messages contained in the radiotelegrams had actually originated in Annapolis. Without such evidence, these radiotelegrams and all statements contained therein cannot be linked to Reilly.
There was no testimony from any of the intermediate coastal stations that the radio-telegrams were, in fact, “Handed In at ANNAPOLIS,” as asserted by the coastal station operators in the radiotelegrams. No coastal station operator, employee, or representative ever testified that the originating stations, and the dates asserted in the radio-telegrams were, in fact, the originating stations from which, and the dates on which, the messages from the unidentified onshore de-clarants were received and/or transmitted by the coastal stations. Moreover, even though the district court acknowledged that “there may be significant transmission errors,” R. app. 1297-98, there was no evidence presented that the coastal stations accurately transcribed the messages they received from the unidentified onshore declarants, or that the coastal stations accurately transmitted those messages, in Morse Code, to the Khian Sea.
Hence, the “statements” contained in the radiotelegrams can only be viewed as “[hjearsay included within hearsay.” See Fed.R.Evid. 805. We have the hearsay of unidentified onshore declarants transmitted by unidentified coastal operators, who also transmitted additional hearsay specifying the point of origin and the date to the Khian Sea radioman, who ultimately translated all of that hearsay from Morse Code into a written recordation. As “[hjearsay included within hearsay,” the incoming radiotelegrams thus are subject to Rule 805, which requires for admissibility that “each part of the combined statements [must] conform[ ] with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.” The majority’s layered approach to the hearsay analysis,” see Majority at 1411 n. 14, does not satisfy that criterion for admissibility of the incoming radiotelegrams.
Significantly, the majority fully acknowledges that the point of origin and destination of each radiotelegram, and the date on which each radiotelegram was sent, “were introduced to prove their truth, ie., to prove that the radiotelegrams were sent from the point of origin to the destination on the designated date.” Majority at 1411. It further recognizes that the Government did not produce a coastal station operator as a witness, thereby complicating its hearsay analysis. Id. at 1411 n. 14. The majority then attempts to finesse the absence of any testimony from the coastal stations which arguably could have bridged the gap in the hearsay communications between the unidentified onshore declarants and the radioman onboard the Khian Sea. It declares, in effect, that, while it would have been nice for the district court to have heard from a coastal station operator at trial, that testimony is not really necessary for our purposes because we can assume, through other evidence, that the radiotele-grams were “handed in at Annapolis,” and therefore had to come from Reilly. I disagree.
The majority is remitted to “assembling” evidence from Captain Fuentes and Coastal Carriers’ secretary, Clare Dobbins, to substantiate its theory that Reilly authored and sent the radiotelegrams from Annapolis to the Khian Sea, and that Reilly authorized Berbillis to do the same. The difficulty with this analysis is that it necessarily must rely on the dates and places of origin of each radiotelegram. However, no coastal station operator ever testified to those essential components of the radiotelegrams, and thus the evidence which the majority seeks to weave into a hearsay exception fails, because it lacks the critical links that only the coastal station operators could have supplied. Hence, none of the trial evidence, set forth in the majority’s opinion, established that these 12 incoming radiotelegrams actually originated in Annapolis, let alone that Reilly sent them. See Majority at 1411 n. 14 and 1411-1412 n. 16, 1412 n. 17, and 1413 n. 18. Nor *1428did it establish, as I point out later, that Reilly ever authorized Berbillis to send the 13th incoming radiotelegram.
Reilly testified at trial that anyone who knew the telex billing number for his Annapolis-based company, Coastal Carrier, could call a coastal station from anywhere in the world and send a shore-to-ship transmission, which would be identified as having originated in Annapolis. That testimony was uncon-troverted, and there was no evidence presented by the Government, apart from the radiotelegrams themselves, that it was Reilly, and not someone else who knew Coastal Carriers’ billing number, who sent the 12 incoming radiotelegrams which the Government attributed to Reilly.
Because, as I also point out later, the Government failed to lay the proper foundation for admission of the radiotelegrams pursuant to the business records exception of Rule 803(6),1 and because the radiotelegrams themselves do not meet the requirements of any other exception to the hearsay rule, there is no admissible evidence establishing that the 12 radiotelegrams were sent from Annapolis. See Fed.R.Evid. 806. Consequently, the “statements” contained in those radiotelegrams — which the majority links to Reilly through inadmissible hearsay (e.g., “Handed In at ANNAPOLIS”) — cannot be deemed admissible as non-hearsay admissions of Reilly.
Statements attributed to Reilly would, by themselves, of course, be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), which provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party, and is the party’s own statement in either an individual or representative capacity. Without the requisite foundational testimony from a coastal station representative, however, there simply is no admissible evidence establishing Reilly as the onshore declarant who transmitted the radiotelegram instructions to the Khian Sea. That being so, any “statements” allegedly made in the radiotelegrams by Reilly, either directly or indirectly, were not admissible as non-hearsay admissions of a party-opponent. See Fed.R.Evid. 805; Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 860 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir.1988) (“That part of [the hearsay included within hearsay] which contains a reiteration of what someone told him is not admissible as an admission by party-opponent since the author of the statement is unknown.”) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
By the same token, the message contained in the radiotelegram purportedly sent to the Khian Sea by Berbillis from Greece2 is inadmissible hearsay because no coastal station operator ever established Berbillis as the onshore declarant. Id. Nor can that out-of-court statement be deemed to be an admission authorized by Reilly under Rule 801(d)(2)(C). That Rule of Evidence excludes from the definition of hearsay a statement introduced against a party which that party authorized another person to make concerning the subject.
Independent proof of the existence of an agency relationship and its scope would be required to show that Reilly authorized Ber-billis to send any radiotelegram to the Khian Sea. See United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 200 n. 4 (3d Cir.1992). Contrary to the majority’s position, there is no such proof to establish that Berbillis, an employee of Romo and not of Coastal Carriers, “was acting on *1429behalf of Reilly or at his behest.” See Majority at 1407. The majority opinion nevertheless appears to assume that Reilly had authorized Berbillis to make the statement which appeared in the radiotelegram Berbil-lis allegedly sent to Captain Fuentes. However, apart from Fuentes’ testimony that “Reilly told him that ... Kimon Berbillis would give him [Fuentes] instructions,” see Majority at 1412, the majority points to no evidence establishing that Berbillis was authorized by Reilly to send any radiotelegram to Captain Fuentes pertaining to the ash. Nor does the majority refer us to any evidence whatsoever that links Reilly to Romo.
For the same reason that no agency relationship or authorization appears in the proofs, the “statements” of the coastal operators (i.e., time, date, and place of origin of the radiotelegrams) and the “statements” of the Khian Sea radioman (i.e., the recordation of the incoming hearsay) could not be admitted as non-hearsay authorized admissions of Reilly pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(C), although the majority holds otherwise. See id. at 1412.
In Carden, we cautioned district courts against admitting declarations of unidentified persons into evidence. 850 F.2d at 1003. Here, the Government failed to establish the identity of two groups of out-of-court declar-ants: (1) the unidentified onshore declarants (alleged here but not proved to be Reilly in Annapolis and Berbillis in Greece) who transmitted messages to the coastal station operators; and (2) the unidentified coastal station operators who in turn transmitted those original messages in Morse Code and then added further hearsay allegedly establishing the place of origin and the date of the original message.
We also reiterated in Carden another well-established rule of law: that the proponent of evidence bears a heavy burden to satisfy trustworthiness requirements. Id. Significantly, the district court in the instant ease recognized the “risk that the [onshore] sender may have been someone else other than Reilly.” R.supp.app. 1297. Yet, the Government never admitted any evidence, except for the inadmissible documents, that Reilly authored the statements in the radiotelegrams. Notwithstanding that omission, the district court admitted the radiotelegrams anyway, without offering any explanation or rationale for its decision. The majority compounds that error with its tortured hearsay analysis.
D.
The majority also fails to support its position that the statements attributed to Reilly would be admissible as nonhearsay, on the theory that those statements were not offered by the Government to prove that their substance was either true or false. The ra-diotelegrams were offered more than merely “ ‘to prove the fact that the certain instructions had been given,’ ... and as circumstantial evidence of Reilly’s state of mind, namely his knowledge of the ash dumping operation,” as the majority holds. See Majority at 1409-1410. Regardless of the distinctions sought to be drawn by the majority between instructions and statements of fact, the “instructions” here, even if relevant to the hearsay analysis, have extraordinary hearsay implications. Compare Crawford v. Garnier, 719 F.2d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court’s admission into evidence of nonparty’s out-of-court instructions “which carried no hearsay implications”).
The “instructions” attributed to Reilly— e.g., “ARRIVE COLOMBO ... WITH ONLY 500 TONS BALLAST” and “DISPOSE 500 BALLAST PRIOR ARRIVAL SINGAPORE” — are vastly different from any of the instructions or orders in the cases cited by the majority. See Majority at 1410 (citing Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 n. 8, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 2260 n. 8, 41 L.Ed.2d 20; Crawford, 719 F.2d at 1323; United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 833-34 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972, 103 S.Ct. 305, 74 L.Ed.2d 285 (1982); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 558 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 1481, 47 L.Ed.2d 746 (1976)). None of the instructions in the Supreme Court case of Anderson, or in the courts of appeals decisions in Crawford, Gibson, and Keane, carried hearsay implications, and none was admitted in the egregious context that these “instructions,” if indeed one can call them that, were admitted in the instant case.
*1430Of even greater import, however, is the fact that the messages, even if called instructions, were nevertheless made known to the jury and could not have helped but influence the jury because of their contents. The district court never instructed the jury on how this evidence was to be considered; hence, the jury was never told that it could consider the messages attributed to Reilly only for the limited purpose of establishing that certain instructions had been given and as circumstantial evidence of Reilly’s state of mind, and not as direct proof of Reilly’s guilt.
We have many times expressed our disapproval of any admission of statements “which are not technically admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, whenever the matter asserted, without regard to its truth value, implies that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.” McGlory, 968 F.2d at 332. There is little doubt in my mind that the Government offered the incoming radiotele-grams to Reilly to prove, by their contents, that Reilly not only had ordered Captain Fuentes to dump the ash in the ocean, but that Reilly also lied about the ash dumping operation when he responded to questions at the contempt proceeding and again before the federal grand jury. I do not believe that our cases permit the admission of such “circumstantial evidence” of guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 103-04 (3d Cir.1988) (holding statement inadmissible because it was offered to “prove the truth of the assumed fact of defendant’s guilt implied by its content.”).
The evil in the majority’s opinion is that it distorts established evidentiary jurisprudence in order to embrace the Government’s actions, actions which are not authorized by any Rule of Evidence. To accept the majority’s ruling as the law of this court will affect not only Reilly; it will, in effect, dismantle the hearsay provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Despite the attempts by the majority to cabin the district court’s ruling within the doctrines of Anderson and McGlo-ry, the majority’s opinion eviscerates the very safeguards that the hearsay rule and its limited exceptions were designed to protect.
The messages attributed to Reilly should not, in any event, be considered in the hearsay calculus. That is because their admissibility is not independent of the radiotele-grams themselves. Whatever the messages contained in the radiotelegrams, the hearsay elements of the radiotelegrams which involved the location and date of the radiotele-grams were never satisfied by competent proof. The failure of the Government to establish through the coastal station senders’ testimony that Reilly was the sender from Annapolis on the particular date created the threshold hearsay problems, and the radio-telegrams “linked” to Reilly only because of the location and date shown could not, on this record, satisfy any exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed.R.Evid. 805. The majority’s attempt to overcome this problem, in my view, never succeeds.
The majority, without testimony that Reilly sent the radiotelegrams from Annapolis, seeks to gloss over this omission by what it calls “circumstantial evidence.” But what evidence is disclosed in the record? None, because the coastal station operator who could have testified as to who sent the dis-patchs, and from where and when they were sent, never testified at trial.
In other words, the majority would relieve the Government from the requirements of Rule 805, and of the foundational requirements of Rule 803(6), while at the same time it disregards our own jurisprudence. I could not disagree more.
E.
The Government argues that “[ejven if the radiotelegrams were hearsay, they were properly admitted under the exception for records of regularly conducted activity.” U.S. br. at 33. Despite this argument, the majority has now acknowledged that, because the coastal station operators had not testified to lay the foundation for the introduction into evidence of their “statements” pursuant to the business records exception of the hearsay rule, “the radiotelegrams were not introduced as business records of the coastal sending station.” Majority at 1411 n. 14. The majority, apparently concerned about the admissibility of the radiotelegrams allegedly sent by Reilly and Berbillis, none*1431theless finds support for their admission in the business records exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6). See Majority at 1413-1414.
The requirements of Rule 803(6) can be shorthanded as (1) knowledge, (2) contemporaneous recordation, (3) in the regular course of business, (4) which requires such records regularly to be kept. There can be no question that the four foundational requirements of Rule 803(6), identified and discussed by the majority ante at-(Majority at 1413), were not satisfied in the instant case.
Notwithstanding the testimony of the Khi-an Sea radio operator, Carcamo, about his documenting of the incoming radiotelegrams, those incoming radiotelegrams cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 803(6) because no “qualified witness” for the coastal stations ever attested at trial that
(1) the declarants in the records had knowledge to make accurate statements; (2) that the declarant[s] recorded statements contemporaneously with the actions which were the subject of the reports; (3) that the declarant[s] made the record in the regular course of the business activity; and (4) that such records were regularly kept by the business.
Console, 13 F.3d at 657 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Without this crucial testimony from the coastal station operators, who were the intermediaries in the transmissions between the onshore declarants and Carcamo, the incoming radiotelegrams could not be admitted in evidence.
I therefore suggest that the majority’s reliance on Careamo’s testimony, see Majority at 1413-1414, is clearly misplaced. As I point out below, Carcamo was in no position to testify as to who the declarants were, the origin of the radiotelegrams, or the date they were transmitted by the onshore declarants. The fact that Carcamo may have kept files of these messages cannot supply the foundational requirements that only the coastal station operators could have furnished.
Rule 803(6) requires each person transmitting recorded information to “verify the information provided, or [else] the information transmitted [must meet] the requirements of another hearsay exception, Fed.R.Evid. 805.” Console, 13 F.3d at 657. No coastal station operator ever verified the “statements” contained in the radiotelegrams, and those “statements” ultimately recorded by Carca-mo onboard the Khian Sea were inadmissible because they do not satisfy the requirements of any other exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed.R.Evid. 805.
The principal precondition to admission of documents as business records is that the records have sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be considered rehable. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) (authorizing admission of records of regularly conducted activities “unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.”) (emphasis added). Here, the record reveals that the precondition of trustworthiness was not satisfied. The only evidence even remotely bearing on this issue was Carcamo’s testimony that he never had any complaints about the accuracy of his translation of Morse Code. Carcamo did not, and could not, testify about the accuracy of the coastal station operators’ translation of the original message into Morse Code and their transmissions of those coded messages to the Khian Sea, let alone concerning “the source of information,” as required by Rule 803(6).
Indeed, the district court explicitly recognized that “there may be significant transmission errors in particular documents,” R. supp. app. 1297-28, and the Government never presented any evidence from the coastal station operators to quell that concern. For this reason alone, the incoming radiotele-grams themselves could not be admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that telex containing many inaccuracies failed to satisfy requirements of Rule 803(6)).
F.
For all of the reasons which I have discussed — i.e., no proof that the radiotelegrams were sent by or authorized by Reilly, and no foundation for their admission under any exception to the hearsay rule, including the *1432business records exception — I would hold that the 12 incoming radiotelegrams purportedly sent to the Khian Sea by Reilly from Annapolis, the one radiotelegram purportedly sent by Berbillis from Greece, and all statements contained therein, were erroneously admitted into evidence by the district court.
There is no question in my mind that the erroneous admission of the 13 radiotelegrams was not harmless error. That evidence was crucial to the Government’s case against Reilly. It alone corroborated Captain Fuentes’ testimony that Reilly ordered the Khian Sea crew to dump the ash in the ocean, and that Reilly thus knew that the ash had been dumped in the ocean. Indeed, the Government indicated to the jury that the radiotelegrams, and not the testimony of Captain Fuentes, was “the” evidence against Reilly. R. app. 1109.3
Because those 13 incoming radiotelegrams were enormously prejudicial to Reilly, I would hold that it was reversible error for the district court to admit them into evidence. Accordingly, I would reverse Reilly’s convictions on all charges, and I would remand his case to the district court for a new trial.
III.
I also believe that the majority errs in holding that the predicate question forming the basis for Dowd’s conviction for knowingly making a false declaration before the federal grand jury was not fatally ambiguous. Rather, I am convinced that a reversal and a remand for dismissal of the false declaration charge against Dowd is required because the question which he is alleged to have answered falsely is so fundamentally ambiguous that it would be entirely unreasonable to expect that he understood it. United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d Cir.1977).
Before the federal grand jury, the following exchange took place:
A GRAND JUROR: Do you know what happened to the ash?
[DOWD]: No.
A GRAND JUROR: You have no idea?
[DOWD]: No, I don’t. I honestly have not been on that ship for two and a half years. * * *
A GRAND JUROR: Seeing how you had all this concern of not being able to unload this ash, you didn’t ask anybody where it went:
[DOWD]: Who is there to ask?
A GRAND JUROR: I guess you could start with asking the captain. He ought to know where it went.
[DOWD]: They say — he’s a funny guy. The first time I met him. Honduran person. He said “The ash is gone.” And I said—
A GRAND JUROR: Just said good, but you didn’t ask where it went? You didn’t want to know where it went?
[DOWD]: No, I didn’t ask and I don’t know. All right? Nor did he tell me.
(D. app. 475-76 (emphasis added.)
At trial, the jury was asked to answer special interrogatories with respect to the above-quoted testimony. Specifically, it was asked to decide the truth or falsity of Dowd’s negative responses to each of the following distinct questions:
(1) “Do you know what happened to the ash?”
(2) ‘You have no idea?”
(3) “[Y]ou didn’t ask where it went? You didn’t want to know where it went?”
*1433The jury acquitted Dowd of giving false testimony in response to question (3); that is, the jury found that Dowd did not ask where the ash went and did not want to know where the ash went. The jury did not return a verdict on question (1); thus it never decided whether Dowd answered falsely when he testified before the grand jury that he did not know what happened to the ash. With respect to question (2), the jury found that Dowd violated 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) by falsely stating, “No, I don’t,” in response to the question, “You have no idea?”
While I agree with the majority that a jury is “generally free to determine the meaning the defendant ascribed to a question,” I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the question “You have no idea?” is amenable to jury interpretation. See Majority at 1417-1418. The Government concedes that “if viewed in isolation, that question would be fatally ambiguous.” U.S. br. at 50. Unlike the majority, however, I am not persuaded by the Government’s argument that the ambiguity issue can be resolved in its favor and against Dowd because “viewed in context, the question posed to Dowd was ‘you have no idea [what happened to the ash]?’” See Majority at 1416-1417 (quoting U.S. br. at 51).
In my opinion, the question “You have no idea?” not only is imprecise and vague, it is susceptible to at least two possible meanings. That much is evident by the equally plausible constructions urged by Dowd and by the Government. As the Government argues, the question could be viewed as asking Dowd, “Are you certain that you have no knowledge of what happened to the ash?” Or, as Dowd contends, the question can be viewed as asking whether Dowd had “any idea — however far it may fall short of actual knowledge — concerning what happened to the ash?” D. rp. br. at 3 — 4.
It is impossible to say that “ ‘men of ordinary intellect could agree’ ” about the meaning of the question, “You have no idea?” See Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015, 1017 (citations omitted). That question can just as easily be understood to be asking whether Dowd had any actual knowledge of what happened to the ash, as it could be understood as asking Dowd whether he had any idea whatsoever about what happened to the ash, as Dowd contends.
Although the majority indicates otherwise, see Majority at 1417, the district court never rejected Dowd’s argument that the question, “You have no idea?” was fatally ambiguous.4 To the contrary, in granting Dowd a stay of sentence pending appeal, the district court recognized that “there is a substantial question about the ambiguity and the materiality of the question and answer that was the subject of the perjury conviction.” R. app. 302. I, too, believe that there is a substantial question about the ambiguity and materiality of the predicate question, and I would hold that that question must be resolved in favor of Dowd. See Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015; Slaw-ik, 548 F.2d at 86. I do not address materiality because the patent ambiguity of the question to which Dowd responded obviates any need to go beyond the issue of ambigu-ousness. Slawik, 548 F.2d at 86.
Because of the inherent ambiguity of the question “You have no idea,” I do not believe that the jury should have been allowed to consider Dowd’s answer to that question as a possible basis for conviction of the false swearing charge. See Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1017. Accordingly, I would reverse Dowd’s conviction for knowingly answering that question falsely before the grand jury, and I would not even reach the issue Dowd raises concerning the the materiality of that question.
*1434IV.
I again emphasize my concern that the majority’s unfortunate “hearsay” analysis, which results in sustaining Reilly’s conviction, will have ramifications that will extend far beyond the confines of this appeal, so long as it remains the law of this circuit.
For the reasons which I have expressed in the foregoing opinion, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the judgments of conviction and sentence against both Reilly and Dowd.

. Rule 803(6) provides:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method of circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.

. The radiotelegram purportedly sent on October 7, 1988 from Kimon Berbillis in Greece to the Khian Sea, contained the following message:
ATT A. FUENTES PLEASE DELAY YOUR ETA UNTIL NOON OCTOBER 14 STOP TRY ARRIVE WITH 500 TONS IN ONEHOLD STOP REILLY WILL CABLE YOU INFO YOU REQUESTED STOP BEST REGARDS
KIMON
R. app. 1214.

. In his summation to the jury, the prosecutor urged: “Ladies and gentlemen, look at the cables, this is the evidence." R. app. 1109. The prosecutor further argued that:
Captain Fuentes is not the key witness in this case. All of the evidence is what I am asking and I submit to you what you need to consider.... Not anyone, not anyone could have filled those cables out. When you read them, read through them and see how they fit together veiy well. See how they show what was going on at the time.
R. app. 1117-18. While acknowledging that the Government bore the burden of proof at trial, the prosecutor also told the jury that, "I guarantee you one thing, if [Reilly] had anything to say that would have discredited those cables, [he] would have brought them.... [Reilly] didn’t bring them because the cables are accurate.” R. app. 1122.

. Before trial, the district court rejected Dowd’s motion to dismiss the false declaration count on the ground that it was based on questions and answers too ambiguous or vague so as to be legally insufficient to support a perjury conviction. In doing so, the district court focused only on two of the three questions later submitted to the jury: "Do you know what happened to the ash?” and “[Y]ou didn’t ask where it went? You didn't want to know where it went?” United States v. Reilly, 811 F.Supp. 177, 180 (D.Del.1993). The district court never even considered the ambiguity of the question “You have no idea?” — the only question which Dowd was convicted of answering falsely. See id. at 180-181.