Court Opinion

ID: 9532112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:18:18.416911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:40.747057
License: Public Domain

McGregor, P. J.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Smith has accurately set forth the operative facts and, in our view, correctly resolved all issues raised by defendant save one. We will, therefore, *318limit our discussion to the one point with respect to which our views differ from those expressed by Judge Smith, to wit:
Whether the trial court erred in failing sua spon te to instruct the jury that the defendant was not obligated to retreat if in his own dwelling at the time of the fatal confrontation.
Viewing the facts most favorably to the defendant, the testimony adduced at trial indicates that defendant was in his home when he noticed the decedent was throwing rocks and pieces of concrete against his (defendant’s) house and car; the defendant went to his front porch and was struck on the leg by a piece of concrete hurled by the decedent; that defendant came off the porch, grabbed a baseball bat and approached the decedent who was holding another piece of concrete at the time; and that defendant struck the decedent with the bat twice, whereupon the decedent fell to the ground. Although the decedent’s body was found on his property, there was conflicting testimony presented regarding on which side of the lot line the fatal confrontation occurred.
The plea of self-defense is based on necessity; the law will condone a defendant’s act of killing only where that act was, under the particular circumstances, the only available avenue by which the defendant could escape from a reasonably perceived threat of death or great bodily harm. As Justice Campbell noted in a leading case of Pond v People, 8 Mich 150, 173 (1860):
"Human life is not to be lightly disregarded, and the law will not permit it to be destroyed unless upon urgent occasion.”
The general rule requiring retreat where practicable prior to utilization of deadly force is thus *319simply one facet of this overriding premise, that necessity is the basis of any plea of self-defense.
To this retreat requirement there has been en-grafted a well established exception—which is beyond our power as an intermediate level appellate court to disturb—that a "man is not, however, obliged to retreat if assaulted in his dwelling, but may use such means as are absolutely necessary to repel the assailant from his house, or to prevent his forcible entry, even to the taking of life”. Pond v People, supra, 177.
The justification for this exception to the general rule is difficult to pinpoint. Justice Cardozo, in People v Tomlins, 213 NY 240, 243; 107 NE 496, 497 (1914), observed:
"It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home.” See People v McGrandy, 9 Mich App 187; 156 NW2d 48; 26 ALR3d 1292 (1967).
Dean Prosser has suggested that the no retreat rule is based on " 'an instinctive feeling that a home is sacred, and that it is improper to require a man to submit to pursuit from room to room in his own house.’ ” Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 19, p 111, quoting from Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft, Commentary to § 84.
On a more pragmatic level it can be argued that one’s own dwelling is presumptively the safest haven from attack and retreat therefrom would correspondingly increase the risk of harm and thus be impractical and unnecessary.
Whatever may be the present-day validity of these suggested justifications for the "no retreat in *320dwelling” rule, the rule itself is well established in Michigan. Our only legitimate function, therefore, is to consider its applicability here in light of the facts outlined above.
Was the defendant in his dwelling at the time of the fatal assault? If so, the trial court was obliged to sua spopte instruct the jury with respect to the no retreat rule. People v Paxton, 47 Mich App 144; 209 NW2d 251 (1973). If not, the trial court’s failure to so instruct was, of course, not reversible error.
Michigan case law provides no precise definition of "dwelling” for purposes of the no retreat rule. Pond, supra, is frequently cited for the proposition that the term "dwelling” embraces the curtilage of a house and correspondingly extends the area within which one is not obliged to retreat beyond the mere physical structure utilized as an abode. See, for example, 52 ALR2d 1458, Annotation, Homicide: Extent of Premises Which May Be Defended Without Retreat Under Right of Self-Defense, § 2, and 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide, § 168, p 455, footnote 4. In our judgment, however, such a reading of Pond is unjustifiably expansive. In that case the killing took place in a net house, located on defendant’s property, but approximately 36 feet from his actual home. The court noted:
"A question was raised whether the net-house was a dwelling or a part of the dwelling of Pond. We think it was. It was near the other building, and was used not only for preserving the nets which were used in the ordinary occupation of Pond, as a fisherman, but also as a permanent dormitory for his servants.” (Emphasis added.) 8 Mich 150, 181.
The fact that the net house was utilized "as a permanent dormitory for [the defendant’s] servants,” serves to undermine the argument that *321Pond extends the right of self defense without retreat to any portion of the curtilage of a defendant’s home. We read Pond as extending that right only to inhabited outbuildings located within the curtilage of the home. Indeed, in this day of small city and suburban residential lots, the contrary rule—that a man may utilize deadly force without retreat whenever attacked in the curtilage of his home—would effectively limit the applicability of the prevailing retreat requirement to situations in which the defendant was on another’s property. Such a result, to us, is both an unwarranted extension of Michigan law and inconsistent with the high value placed on human life by any enlightened society.
In this case, all the testimony adduced at trial indicated that the fatal blows were inflicted by the defendant on or near the lot line separating his property from that of the deceased. Further, the police officer investigating the homicide testified that the decedent’s body was found one foot on his side of the lot line. In these circumstances and in light of our discussion above, we are of the opinion that the defendant was not, as a matter of law, in his dwelling at the time of the killing and, therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury with respect to the "no retreat in dwelling” rule.
Affirmed.
R. B. Burns, J., concurred.