Court Opinion

ID: 9931636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 16:06:58.849595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:58.005103
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,860

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                        ISAAC LOUIS LITTLE,
                                            Appellant,

                                                    v.

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed February 9, 2024. Affirmed.

        Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney-at-Law, of Lawrence, for appellant.

        Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., COBLE and PICKERING, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: Issac Little appeals from the district court's summary denial of his
second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. In his present appeal, he contends that the district court
erred in summarily denying his most recent K.S.A. 60-1507. Based on our review of the
motion, files, and record on appeal, we find that the district court appropriately denied the
majority of the claims stated in his second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion on the ground that
they are successive. Further, although his claim that his first K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel was
ineffective is new, a review of the motion reveals that it to be conclusory and that there
has been no showing of prejudice. Thus, we affirm.

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                                           FACTS

       In 2010, a jury convicted Little of attempted second-degree murder, rape, four
counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, two counts of aggravated battery, two counts of
aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, criminal threat, and kidnapping for crimes
committed in May 2009. A panel of this court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal.
Moreover, the Kansas Supreme Court denied Little's petition for review. State v. Little,
No. 104,794, 2012 WL 3000342 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied
297 Kan. 1252 (2013).

       Subsequently, Little filed his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in which he asserted a
number of claims including ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Although the record is
thin regarding what occurred in relation to Little's first K.S.A. 60-1507, it does reveal that
his first K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel was successful in having the district court set aside his
kidnapping conviction, and the State did not appeal. Although he had partially prevailed
on his first K.S.A. 60-1507, Little appealed those rulings that went against him, and a
panel of this court affirmed the district court. Little v. State, No. 119,775, 2019 WL
3850608 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 312 Kan. 892 (2020).

       On March 31, 2021, Little filed a second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that is the subject
of this appeal. In this motion, he again asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective and
asserts an instructional issue. However, he does not attempt to show exceptional
circumstances to justify a successive motion. In addition, he claims that his first K.S.A.
60-1507 counsel was also ineffective but does not assert that he suffered prejudice or
claim that the result would have been different but for the alleged ineffectiveness of his
first K.S.A. 60-1507 attorney.

       The district court summarily denied Little's second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. In
doing so, the district court found the motion to be successive. Specifically, it found that

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some of the issues had been previously raised and those that had not been "could have
been raised in his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion." Little then filed a motion to reconsider
pointing out his claim that his first K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel was ineffective was new and
could not have been raised in his first motion. Finding this claim to lack merit, the district
court denied the motion to reconsider.

                                         ANALYSIS

       The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the district court erred in summarily
denying Little's second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. In reviewing a district court's summary
denial of a K.S.A. 60-1507, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the
motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled
to relief. Beauclair v. State, 308 Kan. 284, 293, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018). The movant—in
this case Little—bears the burden of establishing that an evidentiary hearing is warranted.
To meet this burden, the movant's contentions must be more than conclusory and must set
forth either an evidentiary basis to support those contentions or a basis must be evident
from the record. Noyce v. State, 310 Kan. 394, 398, 447 P.3d 355 (2019).

       Here, it is undisputed that Little previously filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. District
courts are not "required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on
behalf of the same prisoner." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-1507(c). The movant is presumed to
have listed all of the grounds for relief in the motion. As a result, a subsequent motion on
issues that were or could have been raised in the prior motion need not be considered
without a showing of exceptional circumstances justifying the original failure to list a
ground. State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, Syl. ¶ 2, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013). A movant bears
the burden of establishing exceptional circumstances—which are unusual events or
intervening changes in the law—to avoid dismissal of a successive K.S.A. 60-1507
motion. Beauclair, 308 Kan. at 304.

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       Based on our review of the motion, files, and record on appeal, we find that Little
fails to allege any exceptional circumstances to justify the inclusion of claims in his most
recent K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that were or could have been asserted in his first K.S.A.
60-1507 motion. Consequently, we conclude that the district court was correct in
summarily denying most of the claims asserted in Little's second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
on the grounds that they are successive. However, we do agree with Little that his claim
that his first K.S.A. 60-1507 attorney was ineffective is properly before us for review
under the standard of review as set forth above. See Kansas Supreme Court Rule 183(d)
(2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 243); Rowell v. State, 60 Kan. App. 2d 235, 239, 490 P.3d 78
(2021).

       An ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be established if the movant meets
the test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984). To prevail on an effective assistance of counsel claim and prove
reversible error, the movant must show both that: (1) counsel's performance was
deficient under the totality of the circumstances and (2) the defendant suffered prejudice
because of that performance. State v. Salary, 309 Kan. 479, 483, 437 P.3d 953 (2019).
When reviewing trial counsel's representation of the movant, an appellate court should be
deferential of counsel's performance and presume that counsel provided "'reasonable
professional assistance.'" Holmes v. State, 292 Kan. 271, 275, 252 P.3d 573 (2011).

       In the present case, we find that it is appropriate to first review the prejudice prong
of the Strickland test. As the United States Supreme Court has held, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim can be denied "solely on that ground if the defendant failed to
establish that [the movant] suffered prejudice." Edgar v. State, 294 Kan. 828, 843, 283
P.3d 152 (2012) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). In other words, if there has been no
prejudiced suffered because of the alleged ineffective performance of counsel, it is not—
as a matter of law—reversible error.

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       A review of the motion, files, and records reveals that Little made no claim that he
suffered prejudice as a result of the performance of his first K.S.A. 60-1507, nor do we
find prejudice to be evident in the record on appeal. In fact, we see in the record that
Little's first K.S.A. 60-1507 was successful in getting his kidnapping conviction set aside
and the State did not appeal. We also find that Little does not argue—much less show—
that the result of his prior motion would have been any different but for the alleged
ineffective performance by his first K.S.A. 60-1507 attorney. Instead, he merely makes
conclusory allegations and stops after noting the issues he believes his prior counsel
should have raised.

       In summary, we find that all of the claims asserted in Little's second K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion are barred on the ground that they are successive with the exception of his
claim that his first K.S.A. 60-1507 attorney was ineffective. As to that claim, we find that
the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant is not
entitled to relief. We, therefore, affirm the district court.

       Affirmed.

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