Court Opinion

ID: 9383747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 00:00:27.272887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.681021
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50644        Document: 00516695174             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/30/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                                                                FILED
                                                                           March 30, 2023
                                       No. 21-50644
                                                                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                Clerk

   Symon Mandawala,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Struga Management, doing business as Vineyards
   gardens; Consuelo Corona, Supervisor; Juan Martinez,
   Principal Maintenance; Reven Ricco, Subject Property
   Agent; David R. Fritsche; Traves Miller,

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                              USDC No. 5:19-cv-00635

   Before Jones, Smith, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
           Pro se plaintiff Symon Mandawala appeals the district court’s bench
   trial ruling in favor of the defendants, as well as several other ancillary
   decisions made by the district court. Mandawala alleges that the company in
   charge of managing his former apartment building, Struga Management, and

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-50644      Document: 00516695174          Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/30/2023

                                    No. 21-50644

   some of its staff denied him his right to fair housing because of his race and
   engaged in a conspiracy to violate his civil rights by refusing to deliver his
   packages. For the following reasons, we affirm.
                                         I.
           Mandawala is a black resident of San Antonio, Texas. In May 2016, he
   moved into an apartment building at Vineyard Gardens that is run by Struga
   Management. On December 17, 2017, Mandawala moved into another
   apartment within the complex. He moved in with existing tenants, S. John
   Smith and Elizabeth Smith. Mandawala asserts that the Smiths and he “paid
   a joining fee of $40” to Struga, and one of Struga’s employees purportedly
   consented to the arrangement by signing a “receipt.” However, three
   months after moving in with the Smiths, things between Struga and
   Mandawala started to go bad. Mandawala claims that Struga informed the
   Smiths that he was not on the lease, he was not authorized to live in the unit,
   and that he had to leave immediately, or it would not renew the Smiths’ lease.
          Tensions further grew in March 2019 when, according to Mandawala,
   Consuela Corona, Raven Rocco, and Juan Martinez—employees of Struga—
   began withholding his mail and packages, and then initiated eviction
   proceedings against the Smiths due to their housing of an unauthorized
   occupant. A few months later, Mandawala alleges he was forcibly removed
   from the premises. He then filed this action on June 7, 2019.
          Mandawala’s Second Amended Complaint asserted eleven causes of
   action: (1) racial discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act
   (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3535(d), 3600-3620 (“Counts 1-3”); (2)
   fraudulent practices in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) and (b), Texas
   Property Code § 92.004, and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
   Texas Business & Commerce Code § 17.46 (“TDTPA”) (“Counts 4–6”);
   (3) deprivation of rights under “color of law” in violation of the FHA,42
   U.S.C. § 1981(c) and § 1983 (“Count 7”); (4) intentional infliction of
   emotional distress (“IIED”) (“Count 8”); (5) conversion (“Count 9”); (6)

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   conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (“Count
   10”); and (7) conspiracy to commit these named violations under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1986 (“Count 11”).
          The parties filed dispositive motions in January and March of 2020.
   The district court denied Mandawala’s motion for summary judgment and
   granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
   Relevant here, the district court dismissed all claims against Corona, Rocco,
   and Martinez except for the claim of conversion and concluded that
   Mandawala failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, and for
   IIED because he failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a conspiracy
   or identify any conduct rising to the level of an IIED claim.
          Pursuant to these orders, the following causes of action remained
   against the defendants:(1) racial discrimination in violation of the FHA, (2)
   fraudulent practices in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) and (b) and TDTPA,
   and (3) conversion.
          Nearly three weeks after the rulings on the defendants’ motions to
   dismiss, the defendants filed their first answers. Mandawala then moved to
   strike these affirmative pleadings because they were almost a week late,
   according to Rule 12(a)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of the Civil Procedure.1
   However, the district court denied the motion concluding that there was
   good cause to extend the deadline.
           In July 2021, the remaining claims were tried. Following a two-day
   bench trial, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. Of
   significance to the issues presented in this appeal, the trial court determined
   that Mandawala’s FHA claim failed because he did not establish his prima

           1
             Under this rule, a timely Rule 12 motion tolls the responsive pleading deadline
   until fourteen days after the motion is decided. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A) (“[I]f
   the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until trial, the responsive pleading
   must be served within 14 days after notice of the court’s action.”).

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   facie case of discrimination and because he did not present any evidence to
   rebut the defendants’ non-discriminatory reason for its conduct. In addition,
   the district court found that Mandawala’s fraudulent practices claims failed
   because he did not produce any evidence that the defendants engaged in false
   or misleading conduct.
         The district court then entered a take-nothing judgment. Mandawala
   now appeals.
                                                II.
           “The standard of review for a bench trial is well established: findings
   of fact are reviewed for clear error and legal issues are reviewed de novo.”
   Preston Expl. Co., L.P. v. GSF, L.L.C., 669 F.3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 2012) (ci-
   tation omitted). Similarly, we review Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo. Lamp-
   ton v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2011). Lastly, this court looks for an abuse
   of discretion in rulings regarding extensions for late filings. In re Deepwater
   Horizon, 716 F. App’x 373, 374 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Geiserman v. MacDon-
   ald, 893 F.2d 787, 793 (5th Cir. 1990)).
                                               III.
           On appeal, Mandawala raises four issues; we address each in turn. 2
          First, Mandawala argues that the district court erred in finding that
   the defendants’ answers and motions to dismiss were timely filed. He
   contends that motions for a more definite statement are not responsive
   pleadings, and notes that the defendants’ pleadings were filed beyond the

           2
              Mandawala raises several other arguments in his brief, but they are raised for the
   first time on appeal, and therefore are not properly before this court. See Celanese Corp. v.
   Martin K. Eby Const. Co., 620 F.3d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The general rule of this court
   is that arguments not raised before the district court are [forfeited] and will not be
   considered on appeal.”).

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   date set in the district court’s November 15, 2019 Order—December 13,
   2019. He also points out that the defendants’ answers were filed outside the
   fourteen-day response time following the court’s ruling on the defendants’
   motions to dismiss in violation of Rule 12(a)(4)(A).
         These arguments are incorrect and flatly contradicted by the record.
   Contrary to Mandawala’s assertions, the district court did not treat the
   defendants’ Rule 12(e) motion as a responsive pleading.
         After Mandawala amended his original Complaint, the district court
   denied all related pending motions as moot and required the defendants
   “answer or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint by December 13,
   2019.” The defendants did so by filing a motion under Rule 12(e) on
   December 6, 2019.
          The district court subsequently dismissed this motion without
   prejudice to the submission of motions under Rules 12(b)(1), (12)(b)(6), and
   (12)(c). In doing so, the court concluded that “any defect in Plaintiff’s
   pleadings is better addressed” through dispositive motion practice. That
   same day the district court granted in part the defendants’ motion to modify
   the scheduling order, and set May 8, 2020, as the deadline for all dispositive
   motions. In accordance with this date, the defendants filed their 12(b)(6)
   motions on January 22, 2020, and January 23, 2020, respectively. Thus, the
   defendants’ Rule 12 motions were timely.
           Mandawala’s arguments regarding the defendants’ answers fare no
   better. On August 20, 2020, the district court granted in part and denied in
   part the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions. Pursuant to Rule 12(a)(4)(A), the
   defendants’ answers were due within fourteen days of the entry of these
   orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). However, the defendants did not
   file their answers until September 9, 2020. Nevertheless, this fact is not fatal.
          Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the trial court has broad
   discretion to accept late-filed answers “where the failure to act was the result
   of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). “The rule’s requirements

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   are quite flexible, and the district judge enjoys broad discretion to grant or
   deny an extension.”4B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
   Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1165, at 523-29 (3d ed.
   2002). “Excusable neglect is intended and has proven to be quite elastic in
   its application. In essence it is an equitable concept that must take account of
   all relevant circumstances of the party’s failure to act within the required
   time.” Id. at 533-34.
           In this case, the district court concluded that there was good cause to
   extend the deadline in light of the reasons put forth in the defendants’
   response to the plaintiff’s motion to strike. Most pertinently, just a few weeks
   prior, the district court issued an order granting in part and denying in part
   the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions, which for the first time clarified the scope
   and substance of Mandawala’s claims. This reasoning is perfectly sound and
   is consistent with the broad latitude district courts have to control their
   dockets. See Shepherd on behalf of Est. of Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920
   F.3d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 2019).
           Mandawala makes no attempt to challenge the district court’s finding
   of good cause. Since Mandawala points to no abuse of discretion by the
   district court, and we find none, we affirm on this issue.
          Second, Mandawala argues that the district court erred by dismissing
   his § 1985 and IIED claims because the defendants unlawfully withheld his
   mail and packages. Upon review, we can easily determine that the district
   court did not err in concluding that there was no basis for these claims.
   Mandawala’s allegations that the defendants withheld his packages, without
   more, do not rise to the level of outrageous conduct required under Texas
   law. See GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999)
   (“Generally, insensitive or even rude behavior does not constitute extreme
   and outrageous conduct . . . Similarly, mere insults, indignities, threats,
   annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities do not rise to the level of
   extreme and outrageous conduct.”) (citations omitted). Moreover,
   Mandawala does not provide specific facts supporting his allegations that the

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   defendants conspired to withhold his packages in order to deprive him of his
   civil rights. See Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir. 1989)
   (holding that plaintiffs must “plead the operative facts upon which his claim
   is based, more than conclusory allegations” in order to prove a conspiracy
   claim under § 1985).
           Third, Mandawala argues that the district court erred in finding that
   he failed to make out his claim of disparate treatment under the FHA. Under
   the FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms,
   conditions, or privileges of sale . . . of a dwelling . . . because of race.” 42
   U.S.C. § 3604(b). To prevail on a claim of disparate treatment under the
   FHA, Mandawala must show “(1) membership in [a] protected class, (2) that
   [he] applied and was qualified to rent or purchase housing[,] (3) that [he] was
   rejected, and (4) that the housing thereafter remained open to similarly
   situated applicants.” Crain v. City of Selma, 952 F.3d 634, 640-41 (5th Cir.
   2020) (citations omitted).
            Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, courts
   employ the McDonnell–Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. at 641. First,
   the defendant is given a chance to put forth a “legitimate, non-discriminatory
   reason for the rejection.” Inclusive Comms. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co.,
   920 F.3d 890, 911 (5th Cir. 2019). “The burden then shifts back to the
   plaintiff to rebut the reason offered . . . by showing it is a pretext for
   discrimination.” Id. Under a disparate treatment theory, “there can be no
   liability without a finding that the protected trait (e.g., race) motivated the
   challenged action.” Id. at 910. The ultimate burden, however, remains with
   the plaintiff. See Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 468 (5th Cir.
   2002).
          Although Mandawala is in a protected class, documentary and
   testimonial evidence clearly demonstrates that he did not complete the
   application requirements for Vineyard Gardens. On appeal, Mandawala does
   not point to any evidence to the contrary. The district court further found
   that even assuming Mandawala could establish his prima facie case, the

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   defendants put forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying his
   application: under Struga’s rental selection criteria, each applicant was
   required to present verifiable proof of income, but Mandawala did not do so.
   Thus, our review of the record confirms that there is nothing to indicate that
   a discriminatory reason motivated the defendants’ decision not to rent to
   Mandawala or that the defendants’ explanation is unworthy of credence. We
   therefore affirm the district court’s finding.
           Lastly, Mandawala contends that the district court incorrectly
   assessed “the mirepresentation [sic] of documentation evidence” regarding
   his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and TDTPA. We have reviewed the record
   and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we
   AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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