Court Opinion

ID: 9778880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:24:49.396335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:15.187421
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Accepting obiter dictum of Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, at 55-57 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (“[W]e will follow in full the Strickland standards in determining effective assistance of counsel and prejudice resulting therefrom.”), today the majority purports to undertake to make dual determinations prescribed in Strickland. As *276Judge Teague demonstrates, we should address the issues conformably to the Constitution and law of this State.
Having deplored “gratuitous abdication of the duties of responsibilities of this Court” by the majority in Hernandez v. State, supra, (Concurring Opinion, 59, at 64), I merely observe that throughout its opinion in the instant cause the majority does not measure claimed failings of counsel by “an objective standard of reasonableness;” rather, it surmises theoretical “tactical decisions” perhaps justifying them or lack of “showing” of actual basis for a decision. Moreover, overall it makes much the same mistake in its application of the Strickland “standards” as the Hernandez majority did, viz:
“... Point by point, the majority isolates each failing of trial counsel and concludes that that particular failure did not undermine confidence in the result of the trial[.] * * * * But this is not the way to test appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance, even under Strickland. Under that standard, appellant ‘must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional %Errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ 104 S.Ct. at 2068. It is the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors that must be evaluated, not the effect of each individual error. ”
Id., at 63 (my emphasis).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.