Court Opinion

ID: 9519659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:21:40.703466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:35.483886
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
White, J.
In determining whether the negative award is contrary to law, we are bound by the facts found by the Board, absent a convincing argument from the appellant that the Board ignored substantial evidence of probative value in failing to find a fact essential to appellant’s case or in finding against him on some essential fact issue. Transport Motor Express v. Smith (1972), Ind. App., 289 N.E.2d 737, 34 Ind. *389Dec. 42, transfer granted on other grounds, 311 N.E.2d 424, 42 Ind. Dec. 48.
Since there is here no challenge to the Board’s finding of facts, I agree that on the facts found the negative award is proper. Nevertheless I am disappointed in the want of specificity in the Board’s findings and cannot concur in many of the conclusions with which its statement of facts is interspersed.
For instance, after finding that on June 16, 1970, plaintiff felt a pain in his lower back while working, it concludes that on that date “there was no untoward event, accident, or accidental injury to plaintiff while employed by defendant”. (Emphasis added.)
In many instances the onset of pain, especially the sudden onset of severe pain, is an untoward event and most certainly is an “accident” so far as the person who suffers the pain is concerned. In many instances the sudden onset of severe pain is the manifestation of an injury which has just occurred at the site of the pain, i.e., the rupture of some body tissue, or the blockage of the coronary artery. Such an event is an “injury by accident arising ... in the course of the employment”, as required by §§ 2 and 73 of the 1929 Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 22-3-2-2 and 22-3-6-1 [Burns Code Ed., 1973]) but the injury is not compensable merely because it occurs in the course of the employment. Id. It must also arise “out of” the employment. That is the teaching of United States Steel Corporation v. Dykes (1958), 238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111. There the steadily deteriorating condition of decedent’s heart eventually reduced its functional ability to the point that it could not sustain life even when the work load was lighter than usual. Ergo, the employment did not cause the heart failure; it was caused by the deceased’s heart itself.
“The autopsy herein disclosed no rupture or detached plaques or clots in the coronary blood vessels. The myocardium was dark in color which indicates that the heart *390failed because of unoxygenated blood due to a long-standing coronary disease. The autopsy revealed no evidence of the sudden worsening or aggravation of that disease.” (Dykes, 238 Ind. at 608.)
The Industrial Board’s award of compensation was accordingly reversed, with the opinion suggesting that if there had been (as in Slaubaugh v. Vore [1953], 123 Ind. App. 497, 110 N.E.2d 299) some “extreme exertion” or some evidence of aggravation of a pre-existing condition by “unusual exertion” (as in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Douglas [1955], 125 Ind. App. 212, 123 N.E.2d 899), the award might have been affirmed. Although Dykes speaks of the heart attack in Slaubaugh and Douglas being preceded by “some type of untoward or unexpected incident” which was absent in Dykes’ heart attack, there is no express or implied statement that Dykes’ death was not an accident, merely that it was not caused by, i.e., did not arise out of, his employment.
Since there was no finding herein of facts which would lead inevitably to the conclusion that Rivera’s injury arose out of his employment, I concur in the affirmance.