Court Opinion

ID: 9649867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:11:52.169056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:21.750003
License: Public Domain

JONES, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. In finding that the trial court had no jurisdiction the majority has fallen into error. They have “confused the question of the jurisdiction of the court with plaintiff’s right to obtain the aid of that court in his quest for what he deems to be his legal right. Judges and lawyers sometimes use the words ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘power’ in relation to courts as interchangeable. ... [A court’s] jurisdiction is not limited to cases in which a good cause of action is presented. . . . Jurisdiction relates to the field of litigation in which a court has authority to adjudicate. Power refers to what a court can do in that field under a given set of circumstances.” Hellertown Borough Referendum Case, 354 Pa. 255, 258-260, 47 A.2d 273, 275-276 (1946).
*161By the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 13, 17 P.S. § 282, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County was vested with the power and jurisdiction of courts of chancery so far as relates, inter alia, to the “prevention or restraint of the commission or continuance of acts contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community or the rights of individuals.” Cognizant of this statutory grant, Mr. Justice Stern aptly stated in Main Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Columbia Super Cleaners, Inc., 332 Pa. 71, 75, 2 A.2d 750, 751 (1938):
“There is thus established a general class of cases in which the court is vested with jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. The fact that a labor dispute may be involved does not take the litigation out of this jurisdictional class. All that the Act of June 2, 1937, P.L. 1198 [Labor Anti-Injunction Act, 43 P.S. § 206a et seq.], in effect provides is that, in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the court shall not have the power to issue injunctions to prohibit the particular acts specified in sections 6 and 7.”
See also McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644, 179 A.2d 222 (1962); Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Philadelphia Warwick Co., 355 Pa. 637, 50 A.2d 684 (1947); Zerbe Township School District v. Thomas, 353 Pa. 162, 44 A.2d 566 (1945).
In the instant case, as in Main Cleaners & Dyers, the Court of Common Pleas was vested with jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief pursuant to the Act of June 16, 1836, supra. Section 1003 of Act 195 does not define the scope of the chancellors jurisdiction, as contended by the majority; rather this section merely limits the power of the chancellor to enjoin strikes by public employes after negotiation and mediation procedures have been exhausted.1 Since the court below had both jurisdiction *162and power to grant an injunction on January 8, I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court affirming the chancellor’s decree.2
In view of my resolution of the jurisdiction issue and since I feel the contempt proceeding stemming from the violation of that injunction properly conformed with Sections 1005-1010 of Act 195, 43 P.S. § 1101.1005-1101.-1010, I would affirm the judgments of sentence in Nos. 317 and 318.
O’BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ., join in this dissent.

. Since the chancellor refrained from granting an injunction until January 8, the question of his power to grant an injunction antecedent to the occurrence of a strike is not presently before this *162Court. I for one, however, do not think that this question is addressed in Section 1003. The majority has italicized certain language in support of the conclusion that this section limits a court’s injunctive power to cases where a strike is actually in progress. In my opinion, this language is merely descriptive of the types of strikes covered by Section 1003, in contrast to those covered by Section 1002, the proper venue for an action, and the clear and present danger to be applied. A party need not await the consummation of a threatened injury if the act which is sought to be enjoined is a practical certainty. See, e. g., Kelly v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 115 A.2d 238 (1955). I can think of no potential occurrence more practically certain of becoming a reality than the commencement of a strike following a vote to that effect by the union membership.

. Even if Section 1003 is held to be jurisdictional and the exclusive remedy under the circumstances and unavailing until an actual strike, the school board will not be relegated to this statutory remedy if it is not adequate and complete or if its pursuit would work irreparable harm. In such cases, equity has jurisdiction and will afford relief. Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Township, 377 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954).