Court Opinion

ID: 9633759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:58:55.932891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:41.745532
License: Public Domain

Justice QUINN
dissenting:
I dissent from the sanction imposed in this case. The respondent was convicted of the felony of vehicular assault, the misde*589meanor of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the class 1 traffic offense of failing to maintain liability insurance, and the class 2 traffic offense of reckless driving, all of which arose out of his driving a motor vehicle into another motor vehicle occupied by three persons, two of whom were seriously injured. It thus is undisputed that, for purposes of discipline, the respondent engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law, DR 1-102(A)(6), by violating the criminal laws of this state. The majority acknowledges that respondent engaged in “serious misconduct,” maj. op. at 588, but apparently concludes that his “serious misconduct” does not “seriously adversely reflect” on his fitness to practice law. Id. With this conclusion I disagree.
A lawyer is an officer of the court and is obliged to conduct his personal and professional life in a manner that will not bring the legal profession into disrepute. The source of a lawyer’s misconduct resulting in discipline need not originate from the practice of law. See, e.g., People v. Grenemyer, 745 P.2d 1027 (Colo.1987) (disbarment for attorney convicted of sexual assault on child); People v. McPhee, 728 P.2d 1292 (Colo.1986) (three-year suspension for attorney convicted of cultivation of marijuana). A lawyer who recklessly operates an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and without any liability insurance manifests an extreme disregard of basic legal obligations. When the lawyer’s misconduct causes serious bodily injury to others, as here, the misconduct reaches the level of moral culpability that to a serious degree adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate sanction under such circumstances. America Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 5.12 (1986); see In re Carr, 46 Cal.3d 1089, 252 Cal.Rptr. 24, 761 P.2d 1011 (1988) (where attorney pled no contest to two counts of drunken driving, and circumstances surrounding offenses involved other misconduct not amounting to moral turpitude, two-year suspension from practice of law was appropriate sanction); Kentucky Bar Association v. Jones, 759 S.W.2d 61 (Ky.1988) (attorney’s conviction for reckless homicide for death of two people resulting from drunken driving warranted a two-year suspension); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Michaels, 38 Ohio St.3d 248, 527 N.E.2d 299 (1988) (attorney’s conviction for manslaughter by causing death of another while driving automobile while intoxicated, and also for reckless driving, warranted eighteen-month suspension); In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (1964) (attorney’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter, resulting from driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, justified indefinite suspension); In re Enright, 160 Or. 313, 85 P.2d 359 (1938) (lawyer twice convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor disciplined by six-month suspension), (overruled in part on standard for determining felony or misdemeanor, State v. Commedore, 239 Or. 82, 396 P.2d 216 (1964)).
In the absence of exceptional mitigating circumstances, I believe a suspension for a period of two to three years would be appropriate in this case. I agree with the majority, however, that there are present several mitigating circumstances, including the absence of a prior disciplinary record, voluntary disclosure to the Grievance Committee of the misconduct, and a timely good faith effort to make restitution in order to rectify the consequences of the misconduct. Given the extent of mitigating circumstances, I believe a suspension for a period of one year would be the appropriate sanction in this case. Anything less, in my view, unduly depreciates the wrongfulness of the respondent’s conduct in the eyes of both the public and the legal profession.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON joins in this dissent.