Court Opinion

ID: 9679081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:40:24.109453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:09.262757
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). Clayton and Elizabeth Richardson learned during the evening of July 11, 1965, that their young grandchildren (the children of Mrs. Richardson’s daughter, Jo Anne Julian) were on the street unattended. Searching for the children, Elizabeth Richardson and a daughter-in-law knocked on the door of a neighborhood apartment where the children were last seen. The door was answered.by the defendant, John Keys, whom the Richardsons believed to have been “messing around” with Mrs. Julian. Mrs. Richardson testified she greeted the defendant as follows: “Where is my daughter, you black nigger?”1 Mrs. Richardson and her daughter-in-law, Juanita Marlow, testified the defendant made no audible reply; instead he left the house and headed for a parked automobile.
Mr. Richardson appeared on the street and found his wife “screaming and yelling.” He testified:
*494“I went to the corner and I said, ‘Where is John [the defendant] at?’ Well, John wasn’t there. He had already got out of the house and went inside of a car about three car lengths from where I was standing at and the car was parked and he pulled up to the corner and said, Who is looking for John?’ I said, ‘I am looking for John. I will knock his damn block off.’ So he was right there by the corner before you go around the corner, just up to the corner and stop. And he reached by the glove box or something. He pulled out a gun and he said he got something for me and something for my son-in-law.2 He reached over the top of the girl’s3 arm. My wife said, ‘He got a gun.’ I didn’t see it. So she started running and I backed up and he shot.
“Q. How many times ?
“A. One shot he fired, sir.
“Q. And what happened then ?
“A. Well, he drove away.”
There was other testimony that the defendant aimed and fired the gun at Mr. Bichardson.
The defendant drove the car; beside him sat Brenda McCullough, who had been babysitting for Mrs. Julian. Miss McCullough testified, contrary to the Bichardsons’ testimony, that Baymond Marlow, Mrs. Bichardson’s son, was also present. Marlow, said Miss McCullough, told the defendant “that they had something for him and told him that Dallas [Julian] had a gun and John [the defendant] said, Well, that’s nothing. I have one too.’ ” She said that Marlow ran across the street to Mrs. Julian’s house and returned with a butcher knife in each hand, whereupon the defendant took the gun out of the glove compartment, fired across her into the air and drove away. Miss McCullough said Mr. Bich*495ardson did not appear until after the gunshot. The defendant, who related fundamentally the same events as Miss McCullough, said he fired the shot because he was “afraid” and “wanted to get away from the corner.” He wanted “Raymond and them to know that I had something too.”
As the majority opinion notes, the trial judge correctly charged the jury that if it determined the defendant did not feloniously assault Mr. Richardson, it should return a verdict of not guilty, the offense charged being felonious assault against Mr. Richardson. CL 1948, § 750.82 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.277). The allegation of error concerns the portion of the charge which immediately followed:
“Now, the defendant sort of claims that if4 5he did shoot he shot in self-defense. But he can’t claim self-defense in this case because he denies he ever shot in the direction of the complaining witness. Therefore self-defense would not be available in this particular case because of the defendant’s own contention.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The defendant never claimed he fired in self-defense in the direction of Mr. Richardson. The nature of his defense is revealed by his and Miss McCullough’s testimony and this portion of the defendant’s opening statement :5
“at the time that John Keys fired the shot he was not firing at the complainant. He was in fear of his life or injury, — injury, not his life. He was firing to clear the street so he could drive away. If he had not fired he would not have been able to escape and avoid serious consequences for maybe both he and the complainant. And he was actually attempting to escape and it was an act of self-defense.”
*496Many phrases are used without regard to their origin or literal meaning. For example, “Hobson’s choice” is no choice at all, the “lion’s share” is not a part but the whole, and so on. Looking beyond our jargon, the gist of “self-defense” is the claim that the defendant’s actions were justified under the circumstances in which he acted.
In convicting the defendant, the jury must have concluded he feloniously assaulted Mr. Richardson. The jury should have been instructed that if it reached that conclusion, it must consider the defense of justification before rendering a guilty verdict. That should have been the instruction even though the defendant refused to concede his actions constituted a felonious assault on, or were directed at, Mr. Richardson. Not only did the trial judge fail so to charge, but he also charged that because the defendant refused to admit he fired in the direction of Mr. Richardson the shot admittedly fired, the jury could not consider his defense.
Our Court recently stated on the authority of People v. Doud (1923), 223 Mich 120, 129, that in a prosecution for felonious assault with a gun it is not necessary to prove the gun was loaded. People v. Williams (1967), 6 Mich App 412, 418. Compare State v. Herron (1892), 12 Mont 230 (29 P 819, 30 P 140), adopted in People v. Doud, supra. If it were not necessary to prove the defendant’s gun was loaded, then the defendant could have been convicted of felonious assault without proof that he fired at all and, likewise, without proof that he fired in the direction of Mr. Richardson. Since he could be convicted without proof he fired in the direction of Mr. Richardson then, contrary to the judge’s charge, he need not have admitted he fired in the direction of Mr. Richardson to offer his defense of justification.
The judge’s charge that self-defense could not be asserted because the defendant denied shooting in *497the direction of Mr. Richardson was palpably wrong. It is clearly incorrect to charge that a defendant may not plead that he acted reasonably under the circumstances if he shoots in the air, but only if he shoots in the direction of his assailant. It was the defendant’s duty to use the least force necessary to repel the alleged assault by Mr. Marlow armed with butcher knives.
In finding the defendant feloniously assaulted Mr. Richardson, the jury did not necessarily determine the defendant’s actions were not a similar assault upon Mr. Marlow, against whom the defendant and Miss McCullough testified the actions were directed. The jury could have found defendant’s actions had been directed at more than one person, and, thus, there is no inconsistency6 between defendant’s assertions that he did not assault Mr. Richardson and that his actions were justified.
Even if the jury believed that Mr. Richardson rather than, or in addition to, Mr. Marlow was at the scene when the gun was fired, it could still properly bring in a verdict of not guilty of felonious assault if it believed the gun was justifiably fired. Defendant need not have abandoned his claim that Mr. Marlow assaulted him, or accepted the Richardson-Marlow version of what occurred, in order to assert that the *498shot was justifiably fired. These disputed questions of fact were for the jury’s, not the judge’s, resolution.
The charge to the jury that “self-defense would not be available in this particular case,” was tantamount to an instruction that the jury could not believe the defendant’s and Miss McCullough’s testimony. Defendant claimed he shot the gun into the sky to protect himself from injury and to facilitate a safe retreat. It is undisputed that the defendant was not the initial aggressor at the time of the incident. He retreated once in the face of an incendiary expletive. Whether he was justified in firing the gun, i. e., whether there was an assault against him by either Mr. Richardson or Mr. Marlow, and whether that show of force was necessary to repel it, was for the jury to decide.
In People v. Wright (1906), 144 Mich 586, 589, 590, the court set aside defendant’s conviction of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and ordered a new trial, holding it was error to instruct the jury that if it should find the complainant had no knife, it must reject the claim of self-defense (p 590):
“The charge was erroneous in making the question of self-defense turn wholly upon the question of whether Penny [the complainant] had a knife. The rule that the respondent had the right to act upon the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to him was recognized in one portion of the charge, but this portion of the charge ignores this rule.”7
In this case, one portion of the charge was correct, but the. subsequent portion was clearly incorrect because, for all practical purposes, it withdrew the defense offered from the jury’s consideration.
*499“"Where conflicting instructions are given, one erroneous and the other correct, we must presume that the jury followed the erroneous instruction.” People v. DeWitt (1925), 233 Mich 222, 226, quoted approvingly in People v. Kanar (1946), 314 Mich 242, 253, and People v. Clark (1954), 340 Mich 411, 418.
The prosecution relies on the failure of defendants’ trial counsel to object to the charge, even though given an opportunity to do so. In a number of jurisdictions operating under provisions requiring the trial judge to instruct the jury concerning the law, it has been held that where the defendant raises and supports with evidence the issue of self-defense, the trial judge must correctly charge the jury concerning that issue even if such charge is not requested. State v. Brice (1939), 190 SC 208 (2 SE2d 391, 392) (constitutional provision); in the following, the provision is statutory: Collegenia v. State (1913), 9 Okla Crim 425 (132 P 375, 378); State v. Browers (1947), 356 Mo 1195 (205 SW2d 721, 723); State v. Bryant (1938), 213 NC 752 (197 SE 530, 533). See, also, King v. Commonwealth (1920), 187 Ky 782 (220 SW 755, 757) (dictum, but no reference to any statutory or constitutional provision).
In People v. Guillett (1955), 342 Mich 1, the Court reconciled the following sentences in the governing statute (CL 1948, § 768.29 [Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1052]) :
“The court shall instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case,” and
“The failure of the court to instruct on any point of law shall not be ground for setting aside the verdict of the jury unless such instruction is requested by the accused,”
in these words (p 7): “even with the request absent, a case may still be reversed because the charge omits a legally essential ingredient.”
*500In an early ease, the court observed:
“Without any requests from counsel it is the duty of the circuit judge to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide, and he should state to them fully the law applicable to the facts. Especially is this his duty in a criminal case. In this case it was not so done. Too much reliance is often placed upon counsel by the court in this respect for requests; but this should not be done. The court must do its duty in a criminal case, whether counsel do so or not. It is to the court that the accused has a. right to look to see that he has a fair trial.” People v. Murray (1888), 72 Mich 10, 16.
Accord: People v. Macard (1888), 73 Mich 15, 26, where the factual dispute concerned, as it does here, self-defense.
In this case, the crux of the entire case was whether the defendant’s admitted show of force and firing of the shot was justified. It was of fundamental importance that the trial judge correctly charge on that issue and, therefore, he had a duty to do so without regard to whether there was a request therefor.8
Recently in People v. Liggett (1967), 378 Mich 706, 714, the Supreme Court ruled that “without a request, a case may be reversed because of an erroneous or misleading charge,” and in determining whether a charge is “erroneous or misleading” a “reasonable doubt” standard is to be applied. (Emphasis supplied.)
The defendant admitted he fired a shot. Under such circumstances it was misleading for the trial judge to advise the jury, first, it could not convict unless it found .the shot was in fact fired at Mr. *501Richardson, or he was otherwise feloniously assaulted, and, second, that the defendant could not claim self-defense because he refused to admit he fired in the direction of Mr. Richardson. The jury was in effect told to reject the defense offered. These instructions were both erroneous and misleading. In my opinion “it has not been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial judge’s instructions did not contribute to defendant’s conviction.” People v. Liggett, supra, p 717.9
I would reverse and order a new trial.

 Neither the children nor Mrs. Julian were with the defendant at the time of the incident.

 Prom later testimony it appears the son-in-law referred to was Dallas Julian, husband of Mrs. Julian.

 The girl referred to was Brenda McCullough who was in the car beside the defendant.

 Parenthetically, I note the defendant did not deny shooting the gnn. To say “if he did shoot” is to suggest that he denied that which he elearly admitted.

 The closing jury arguments were not transcribed and were not part of the record on appeal.

 It lias been suggested, and the trial judge must have concluded, there is a logical inconsistency in denying the assault and asserting self-defense. Whether “self-defense” in an assault or any criminal case may be so cireumseribed, or whether defendants in criminal cases may plead “inconsistent claims or defenses” either because of GOB 1963, 111.9(2) which expressly provides therefor, or independently thereof, are questions whieh, in my opinion, need not be reached in order to decide this ease. Compare State v. Murphy (Mo Sup, 1967), 415 SW2d 758, where the defense was alibi and the court held defendant was, nevertheless, entitled to alternative instructions. See GOB 1963, 785: “The provisions of the rules of civil procedure shall apply to criminal cases, except as otherwise provided by rule or statute, and exeept when it clearly appears that they apply to civil actions only, or where statutes or special court rules provide a different procedure.”

 Compare People v. Giacalone (1928), 242 Mich 16, where the Court held the trial court erred in withdrawing from the jury’s consideration the defendant’s claim of self-defense.

 Compare People v. MacPherson (1949), 323 Mich 438, 452; People v. Guillett, supra; People v. Oberstaedt (1964), 372 Mich 521, 526.

 See, also, People v. Kanar (1946), 314 Mich 242, 253, where the court observed: “The rule is well settled in this State that if an erroneous instruction is given on a material matter and the error is not corrected or eured in the charge such error must be regarded as prejudicial.”