Court Opinion

ID: 9856839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:01:25.408218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:01.303493
License: Public Domain

WYNN, Judge,
dissenting.
In light of my reconsideration of this matter upon rehearing, I am inclined to dissent and afford our Supreme Court the opportunity to address the issue of first-impression presented by this case: What remedy is Petitioner entitled to where a law enforcement officer fails to follow the statutory mandate to “execute an affidavit(s) stating that: . . . the person willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis”? N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2 (cl) (2009). The majority concludes that because the Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) did not receive a properly executed affidavit as mandated by the statute, the DMV was without authority to revoke Petitioner’s driving privileges.
The issue here is what remedy Petitioner is entitled to for the error alleged. While the statutory provision here construed employs the word “shall,” it does not prescribe the remedy for a violation, nor does it predicate the authority of the DMV on compliance with its terms. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(d)(2009). In determining the consequences of such an error, it is worth considering that our cases distinguish between violations of administrative procedure and those affecting the process due to a petitioner.
This distinction was recognized in Rice v. Peters, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 48 N.C. App. 697, 269 S.E.2d 740 (1980). The petitioner in Rice directed this Court to the statutory provision requiring the arresting officer to request that the person arrested submit to a breathalyzer test. Id. at 700, 269 S.E.2d at 742. Although the trial court’s order indicated that petitioner refused to take the breathalyzer test, the petitioner argued that the trial court erred because its order lacked a “finding that he was requested to submit to the breathalyzer test after being informed of his statutory rights.” Id. This Court affirmed the revocation, stating “[w]e do not believe the North *389Carolina General Assembly intended by its enactment of G.S. 20-16.2(c) to prescribe such a rigid sequence of events as contended by [petitioner].” Id.
The administrative procedures provided for in G.S. 20-16.2 are designed to promote breathalyzer tests as a valuable tool for law enforcement officers in their enforcing the laws against driving under the influence while also protecting the rights of the State’s citizens. We hold the purpose of the statute to be fulfilled when the petitioner is given the option to submit or refuse to submit to a breathalyzer test and his decision is made after having been advised of his rights in a manner provided by the statute.
Id. at 700-01, 269 S.E.2d at 742 (citations and emphasis omitted).
We faced a similar problem in In re Suspension of License of Rogers, 94 N.C. App. 505, 380 S.E.2d 599 (1989). “Under G.S. 20-16.2(a)(6), petitioner had the right to select a witness to view the testing procedures . . . .” Id. at 507, 380 S.E.2d at 600. The record in Rogers showed that, although the actual testing occurred in the presence of the witness, the breathalyzer operator performed a simulator test prior to the witness’s arrival. Id. The superior court ruled that “this statutory provision required the breathalyzer operator to perform the simulator test in the witness’s presence and the failure to do so precluded respondent from revoking petitioner’s license for her refusal to take the test.” Id.
This Court disagreed, citing Rice. “In reviewing this revocation, the trial court could properly consider only those issues specified in G.S. 20-16.2(d) . . . .” Id. at 508, 380 S.E.2d at 600. We acknowledged that “notification of a right is of little value if there is no remedy for the denial of the right. In the present case, however, any violation of petitioner’s rights was unrelated to her alleged decision to refuse the test.” Id.
Considerations of fairness and accuracy are not present... when a motorist refuses to take a test for wholly unrelated reasons. Under G.S. 20-16.2(a), a motorist impliedly consents to chemical analysis if he is charged with impaired driving. Revocation under the statute is a penalty for failing to comply with a condition for the .privilege of possessing a license; it is not punishment for the crime for which the motorist was arrested.
*390Id. at 509, 380 S.E.2d at 601.
We again addressed the issue in Ferguson v. Killens, 129 N.C. App. 131, 497 S.E.2d 722, appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 496, 510 S.E.2d 382 (1998). The petitioner in Ferguson argued that, because the letter notifying him of the revocation was dated a full ninety days after the alleged refusal occurred, the “DMV did not ‘expeditiously notify’ him of his one-year license revocation as required by G.S. 20-16.2(d), [and] the revocation must be rescinded.” Id. at 141, 497 S.E.2d at 727. This Court found that the alleged error was not prejudicial.
Even if we assume that petitioner was not “expeditiously notified]” as required by the statute, petitioner has made no showing that his failure to be expeditiously notified has prejudiced him. In addition, G.S. 20-16.2(d) states that a license revocation for willful refusal must be sustained if the five conditions specified are met. None of these conditions has anything to do with “expeditious notice.” Petitioner’s argument fails.
Id. at 141, 497 S.E.2d at 727-28.
The result in Ferguson is directly at odds with the majority’s conclusion in the present case.9 We held in Ferguson that the DMV’s failure strictly to comply with the first sentence of subsection (d) — the same provision as is here construed — did not undermine the revocation of driving privileges when the petitioner could not demonstrate any prejudice. See id. Petitioner in the present case has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced in any way by the improperly executed affidavit that was received by the DMV.
Moreover, as we noted in Ferguson, the statute limits consideration at the hearing to specifically enumerated factors. Id. at 141, 497 *391S.E.2d at 728. “None of these conditions has anything to do with ‘expeditious notice.’” Id. Similarly, in this case, none of these conditions has anything to do with the sufficiency of the affidavit. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(d). It follows that Petitioner can not assert the insufficiency of the affidavit as a ground upon which to invalidate the proposed revocation of his driving privileges.
I conclude by pointing out that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(d) provides the right to a hearing. “Such a hearing satisfies the constitutional due process requirement.” Montgomery v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 455 F. Supp. 338 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff’d, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979). On the basis of the precedents considered above, I agree with the DMV hearing officer who first heard Petitioner’s case that “[e]ven if an employee of the Division checked the block for item fourteen as counsel contended, this is not a fatal error as the petitioner has a remedy through the hearing process.” Accordingly, because I would affirm the revocation of Petitioner’s driving privileges, I respectfully dissent and present to the Respondent the opportunity to appeal this issue as a matter of right to our Supreme Court.

. I read Ferguson differently from the majority primarily because the relevant statute prohibits the revocation of a driver’s license pending the hearing, if the driver requests such a hearing. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(d) (“If the person properly requests a hearing, the person retains his or her license, unless it is revoked under some other provision of law, until the hearing is held, the person withdraws the request, or the person fails to appear at a scheduled hearing.”). Thus, because the petitioner in Ferguson requested a hearing, his license could not have been revoked under the statute until the conclusion of that hearing. See Ferguson, 129 N.C. App. at 134, 497 S.E.2d at 724 (“Petitioner requested an administrative review by a DMV hearing officer.”). As in Ferguson, Petitioner in this case requested a hearing and thus retained his license pending a hearing. I therefore conclude that, like the petitioner in Ferguson, Petitioner suffered no prejudice except that attendant upon the hearing, at which he was given the opportunity to contest the revocation of his driving privileges on the basis of the willfulness of his refusal.