Court Opinion

ID: 9721112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:48:41.974833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:13.401648
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, J.
Concurring and Dissenting.—
“My object all sublime
“I shall achieve in time—
“To make the punishment fit the crime.”
Gilbert, The Mikado, or the Town of Titipu (1885), act n
The repulsiveness of defendant’s conduct notwithstanding, the Legislature has prescribed an additional three years to defendant’s sentence pursuant to *796Penal Code section 12022.3 only if defendant used a “deadly weapon” in carrying out his crime.1 This court has recognized in the past that when the Legislature uses the term “deadly weapon” to describe a firearm it does not mean an unloaded firearm that is not used as a club or bludgeon. (People v. Brookins (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1297, 1303-1308 [264 Cal.Rptr. 240].) Here, the majority seeks to transform the clear and unambiguous definition of “firearm” set forth in section 12022.3 into a mandate for additional punishment that the Legislature has seen fit not to impose. Since the evidence is uncontradicted that the firearm defendant used was unloaded and not used as a club or bludgeon, the jury’s finding regarding the section 12022.3 charged enhancement should be reversed. In all other respects I agree with the conclusions reached by the majority.
The trial court instructed the jury: “If you find the Defendant guilty of Counts I through VII, you must determine whether the defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of such crime. [1] The word “firearm” includes a handgun. The firearm need not be operable.”2 The facts presented regarding defendant’s use of a firearm established, without contradiction, that the firearm was unloaded and not used as a club or bludgeon. Under these circumstances the trial court erred in so instructing the jury, and there was no substantial evidence supporting the jury’s finding regarding the section 12022.3 enhancement.
At the time of defendant’s crimes, section 12022.3 read in pertinent part: “For each violation of Section 261, 264.1, 286, 288, 288a [forcible oral copulation] or 289, and in addition to the sentence provided, any person shall receive an enhancement (a) of three years if such person uses a firearm or any other deadly weapon in the commission of such violation or (b) of two years if such person is armed with a firearm or any other deadly weapon.” (Italics added.)
When a statute broadly proscribes the “use of a firearm” in the commission of a crime, it is settled that the prosecution need not establish that the gun was loaded in order to bring the defendant’s conduct within the statute. *797(See, People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 102 [192 Cal.Rptr. 748, 665 P.2d 520], interpreting section 12022.5; People v. Nelums (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 359-361 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201] [gun need not be operable to violate a proscription on the commission of a crime while “armed with a firearm”].) To prove a defendant “used a firearm” the prosecution need only establish “conduct which [actually] produces a fear of harm or force by means of display of a firearm in aiding the commission of one of the specified felonies.” (People v. Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672 [102 Cal.Rptr. 776, 498 P.2d 1024].) The display of a firearm in a menacing manner during the commission of a felony will constitute “use of a firearm.” (People v. Hays (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 534, 543-549 [195 Cal.Rptr. 252].)
When a statute proscribes use of a “deadly weapon,” this court has held that use of an unloaded gun not used as a club or bludgeon will not satisfy the statute. (People v. Brookins, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1308 [holding use of an unloaded gun in a robbery did not constitute a “robber[y] involving the use of. . . deadly weapon” for purposes of a section 667.7, subdivision (a) enhancement; see also People v. Orr (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 666, 671-672 [117 Cal.Rptr. 738] [“pointing an unloaded gun at another person with no effort or threat to use it as a bludgeon, is not an assault with a deadly weapon”]; People v. Brewster (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 750, 753 [81 Cal.Rptr. 237] [defendant armed with an unloaded gun is not in possession of a “deadly weapon” for purposes of probation eligibility]; People v. Raner (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 107, 111-113 [194 P.2d 37] [holding defendants who were armed with an unloaded gun during a robbery were not ineligible for probation under a statute which precluded probation when a defendant was armed with a deadly weapon].) When the Legislature wants to include unloaded firearms in the definition of “deadly weapon” for a particular statute, it has done so explicitly. (See People v. Brookins, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1307 [discussing former § 3024, subd. (f) and its predecessor statute, which defined “deadly weapon” for the limited purpose of that statute as “any . . . pistol, revolver or any other firearm”].) Absent such a special definition the term “deadly weapon” has not been used by the Legislature to include an unloaded firearm not used as a club or bludgeon.
Here, section 12022.3 provides that a defendant will receive a three-year enhanced sentence “if [such] person uses a firearm or other deadly weapon in the commission” of certain specified offenses. [Italics added.] The Legislature has elected not to define firearm in broad terms either without any limitation at all or by using the term “dangerous or deadly weapon.” Instead the Legislature, in enacting section 12022.3, chose to restrict firearm uses to *798those that constitute use of a “deadly weapon.”3 Where courts have construed the meaning of a particular word or expression, and the Legislature subsequently uses these exact words in the same connection, we presume that the Legislature used them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts. (In re Jeanice D. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 210, 216 [168 Cal.Rptr. 455, 617 P.2d 1087].) “Deadly weapon” is a term with an understood precise and technical meaning when used to define firearm. (People v. Brookins, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1303-1308.) An unloaded firearm not used as a club or bludgeon is not a “deadly weapon.” Since the express language of section 12022.3 limits its application to “firearms and other deadly weapons,” the jury’s finding on this enhancement should be reversed.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 30, 1992.

All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

The trial court mistakenly relied on the language of CALJIC No. 17.19.1 (1989 rev.). The comment to CALJIC No. 17.19.1 provides: “It appears to the Committee that operability of a firearm is immaterial, and not an element of this enhancement. In People v. Nelums (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 359, 182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 517, 644 P.2d 201, 203, the court approved the holding in People v. Jackson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 899, 155 Cal.Rptr. 305, not an element of the enhancement per Penal Code, § 12022.5 [s/c]. Since § 12022.3 uses the same language (use of a firearm), the same principle should apply.’’ In addition to being almost unintelligible, the comment fails to recognize that neither Nelums nor Jackson interpreted statutory language that defined the firearm at issue as a “deadly weapon.”

The majority puts undue emphasis on the Legislature’s decision to single out “firearm” as a subset of “deadly weapon.” The Legislature has frequently singled out certain weapons as examples of an broader category of weapons it is specifying. (See Pen. Code, §§ 12023, 12025, 12026, 12026.1, 12100, 12101, setting forth pistol and revolver as subsets of “firearm capable of being concealed upon the person”; 12090, prohibiting tampering with “the name of the maker, model, manufacturer’s number, or other mark of identification ... on any pistol, revolver, or any other firearm . . .” [italics added]; 12402, subd. (b), defining tear gas weapon as “[a]ny revolvers, pistols, fountain pen guns, billies, or other form of device, portable or fixed, intended for the projection or release of tear gas . . .” [italics added].)