Court Opinion

ID: 9855920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:34:23.949509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:17.672779
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 87. (dissenting). I write because the majority opinion's discussion of the Hansen discovery rule is internally inconsistent and the holding is irreconcilable with the court's prior cases relating to the application of the discovery rule, statutes of repose and Wis. Const, art. I, § 9, which provides that "every per*286son is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive." Furthermore, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.37 violates the equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin and federal Constitutions.
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¶ 88. The majority opinion states that in adopting a statute of repose "the legislature may.. .choose to employ no discovery rule at all." Majority op. at 258. It further states its holding as follows: "We hold that the judicially-created Hansen discovery rule cannot be applied to a statute of repose." Majority op. at 260. I conclude that the majority opinion sub silentio overrules the mandate in Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997).
¶ 89. Contrary to the majority opinion's position, the holding in this case is, in my opinion, inconsistent with Justice Steinmetz's lead opinion and Justice Crooks's concurrence in Makos. These justices concluded that the statute of repose, which did not take into account the date of discovery of the injury, violates art. I, § 9. See Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 44 (Steinmetz, J.), 211 Wis. 2d at 60 (Crooks, J., concurring).
¶ 90. The holding in this case is, in my opinion, consistent with Justice Bradley's dissent in Makos, which I joined. The dissent in Makos upheld the legislature's power to enact a statute of repose without regard to the date of discovery of the injury.
¶ 91. The legal and factual scenarios in Makos and this case are virtually identical.
¶ 92. Makos involved Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b), a statute of repose requiring medical malpractice actions to be commenced within one year from the date the *287injury was discovered but not later than five years from the date of the act or omission. In this case the statute of repose provides that no action for negligence, errors or omission in the making of any survey may be brought against an engineer or a land surveyor more than six years after completion of the survey.
¶ 93. In Makos the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against her physician after the statute of repose had run. In this case the plaintiffs filed a negligence action against their land surveyor after the statute of repose had run.
¶ 94. Despite the nearly identical factual and legal scenarios, the end results of the two cases are significantly different. In Makos this court remanded the cause for trial, thereby allowing the plaintiff to pursue the medical malpractice action. In this case the court bars the plaintiffs' negligence action as untimely, thereby closing the courtroom doors to the plaintiffs without giving them a day in court.
¶ 95. In my view had the majority's reasoning in this case been applied to Makos, the estate of Makos should have been barred, by a 4-2 vote, from pursuing the medical malpractice action. The majority opinion should acknowledge that it is adopting the dissenting position in Makos regarding the discovery rule, statutes of repose and art. I, § 9.
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¶ 96. I also conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.37 violates the equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin and federal Constitutions.
¶ 97. The issue presented is whether the classification in Wis. Stat. § 893.37 is reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose. If there is no reasonable relationship between the legislative classification and the *288legislative purpose, then § 893.37 violates the equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin and federal Constitutions.
¶ 98. What is the rational basis for the distinction between land surveyors and property owners? The majority opinion attempts to salvage Wis. Stat. § 893.37 from an equal protection challenge by stating that "there is a substantial distinction between surveyors and landowners in that the latter class is afforded the protections of adverse possession to lessen the likelihood of long-term liability." Majority op. at 273.
¶ 99. The fundamental flaw in the majority opinion's analysis is that the adverse possession laws do not protect all property owners from long-term liability. Under Wisconsin law there are several prerequisites for adverse possession, and a landowner may not be able to meet them. In this case the Tomczaks are liable to the abutting property owners but cannot seek contribution or indemnification from the land surveyor who caused the damage.
¶ 100. Furthermore, the majority opinion contravenes Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989), in which this court struck down a statute of repose that distinguished property owners, occupants, and tenants from builders, material suppliers, and land surveyors. The statute of repose immunized the latter group from liability upon negligence actions not brought within six years after substantial completion of construction. This court held that the statute violates equal protection and specifically rejected the legislature's justification for the statute — that owners, occupants, and tenants have post-construction control over the premises while builders, material suppliers, and land surveyors do not. See id. at 77, 74.
*289¶ 101. I see no basis for distinguishing the statute of repose in Funk from the statute at issue here.
¶ 102. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
¶ 103. I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh Bradley joins this dissent.