Court Opinion

ID: 9382045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 18:01:07.122833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.612910
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30713        Document: 00516687665             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/24/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-30713
                                    Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                                                               March 24, 2023
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
   Jimmy Douglas,                                                                    Clerk

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   CLK MultiFamily Management; C-K Forestwood, L.L.C.;
   C-K Forestwood Realty Corporation,

                                                                Defendants—Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 3:20-CV-677

   Before Smith, Elrod, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Jimmy Douglas (“Douglas”) appeals from the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment to CLK MultiFamily Management, L.L.C.; C-K
   Forestwood, L.L.C.; and C-K Forestwood Realty Corporation (collectively,
   “Defendants”). We AFFIRM.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30713      Document: 00516687665          Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/24/2023

                                    No. 22-30713

          Douglas tripped and fell while walking down concrete steps leading to
   the parking lot outside of an apartment building owned and operated by
   Defendants. He filed this premises-liability action against Defendants in
   Louisiana state court, seeking to recover for personal injuries; the action was
   removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.
          Louisiana’s substantive law applies in this diversity action. In re
   Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007). “Under
   Louisiana law, liability for damages caused by defective things in one’s
   custody or garde is governed by articles 2317 and 2317.1 of the Louisiana Civil
   Code.” Renwick v. PNK Lake Charles, L.L.C., 901 F.3d 605, 616 (5th Cir.
   2018) (footnotes and citation omitted). “To recover for damages caused by
   a defective thing, a plaintiff must prove [1] that the thing was in the
   defendant’s custody, [2] that the thing contained a defect which presented
   an unreasonable risk of harm to others, [3] that this defective condition
   caused damage and [4] that the defendant knew or should have known of the
   defect.” Id. (quoting Luquette v. Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC, 209 So.
   3d 342, 348 (La. Ct. App. 2016)) (alteration in original). This appeal
   concerns the second element.
          Douglas fell when his right foot became stuck in a hole in the retaining
   wall abutting the steps that separated the steps from the surrounding grass.
   At his deposition, he testified both that he did not remember if he was looking
   down while descending the steps and that he was not looking down when he
   fell. After discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing,
   inter alia, that Douglas had failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact
   concerning whether there was a defect in the steps which presented an
   unreasonable risk of harm; Defendants contended that the condition of the
   concrete steps was “open and obvious” and therefore not unreasonably
   dangerous. The district court agreed that the allegedly defective condition
   was not unreasonably dangerous and granted summary judgment for

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                                      No. 22-30713

   Defendants. We affirm, as explained below, essentially for the reasons set
   forth in the district court’s thorough summary-judgment ruling. Douglas v.
   Forestwood Apartments/Baton Rouge Ltd., No. 3:20-CV-677, 2022 WL
   10655711 (M.D. La. Oct. 18, 2022).
          “This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary
   judgment, applying the same standard as the district court.” Austin v. Kroger
   Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Summary
   judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact
   exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
   for the non-moving party.” Austin, 864 F.3d at 328 (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted). “All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to
   the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in that party’s
   favor.” Id. at 328–29 (citation omitted).
          “Louisiana courts employ a risk-utility balancing analysis to
   determine whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm.” Renwick,
   901 F.3d at 617 (citing Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So. 2d 362, 365 (La.
   1998)).     A “pertinent factor[]” to this analysis is “the likelihood and
   magnitude of harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the
   condition.” Broussard v. State ex rel. Off. of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175, 184
   (La. 2013) (citing cases). “Under Louisiana law, a defendant generally does
   not have a duty to protect against an open and obvious hazard.” Id. (citation
   omitted).
          Whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm is an “issue
   of mixed fact and law or policy that is peculiarly a question for the jury or trier
   of the facts.” Renwick, 901 F.3d at 617 (citation and internal quotation marks
   omitted). Importantly, however, “the unreasonable harm determination may

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   be subject to summary judgment ‘in cases where the plaintiff is unable to
   produce factual support for his or her claim that a complained-of condition
   or thing is unreasonably dangerous.’” Id. (quoting Allen v. Lockwood, 156 So.
   3d 650, 653 (La. 2015)) (emphasis in original). As the district court here
   correctly determined, summary judgment is appropriate because there is no
   genuine dispute of material fact that the condition of the concrete steps was
   “open and obvious” and therefore not unreasonably dangerous.
          Douglas argues the following evidence supports his claim that the
   defect presented an unreasonable risk of harm and was not open and obvious:
   (1) photographs of the steps and retaining wall; (2) deposition testimony from
   Defendants’ property manager; (3) deposition testimony from Defendants’
   expert; and (4) Douglas’ expert’s report. Viewed in the light most favorable
   to Douglas, however, this evidence does not create a genuine dispute of
   material fact regarding whether the alleged defect in the steps was open and
   obvious.
          First, the photographs clearly show that the condition presented by
   the steps and the surrounding area is obvious and apparent.            At his
   deposition, Douglas identified the place where he fell by hand-marking a
   photograph of the steps. He testified that he was walking on the right side of
   the steps and that his foot was on both concrete and grass when it got stuck,
   causing him to fall. In his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary
   judgment and on appeal, however, he asserted that the “chipped block” of
   the retaining wall abutting the concrete steps that he identified at his
   deposition was not the defective condition that caused his fall—and, further,
   he now concedes that the previously-identified condition was “obvious.”
   Instead, Douglas now asserts that the defective condition was “a hole in the
   retaining wall and the nail protruding from that hole.” Thus, Douglas
   attempts to argue that there is a genuine dispute regarding the “nature” of
   the defect which precludes summary judgment. We agree with the district

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                                    No. 22-30713

   court that Douglas’ attempt to re-characterize his testimony and the nature
   of the condition does not create a fact issue. See Badeaux v. Louisiana-I
   Gaming, No. 22-30129, 2023 WL 334783, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 20, 2023)
   (explaining that a sprinkler head was an “open and obvious” hazard because
   “multiple photographs” showed that “the sprinkler head was located in a
   grassy, landscaped area that was separated from the parking lot by a raised
   curb” and “there were working lights in the parking lot on the night of
   [plaintiff’s] fall”).   Moreover, the photographs do not provide factual
   support for his assertion that a nail was “protruding” from a hole into the
   path of egress.
          Second, Douglas argues that deposition testimony from Defendants’
   property manager that she never noticed a problem with the concrete steps
   “allows one to question whether the defect was open or obvious.” But in the
   same section of his brief, Douglas himself characterizes the property
   manager’s inspections as done in a “cursory manner,” and in her testimony
   the property manager admits that she never performed any close-up
   inspections of the concrete steps, but instead inspected the property while
   driving a golf cart. Even viewed in the light most favorable to Douglas, this
   evidence does not create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether
   any condition was open and obvious.
          Last, Douglas points to deposition testimony from Defendants’
   expert, Hal Cain, that the steps were not constructed pursuant to applicable
   building codes, and to his expert Fredrick Embaugh’s report, which includes
   the opinion that the steps should have had a handrail and painted markings
   along the edge of each step. But even if the steps violated the building code,
   a “technical violation of a [building] code does not necessarily make the thing
   unreasonably dangerous.” Laffitte v. D&J Com. Properties, LLC, 278 So. 3d
   460, 466 (La. Ct. App. 2019) (citing cases). More to the point, code
   violations and the absence of a handrail and painted markings does not create

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                                    No. 22-30713

   a fact issue as to whether the condition that Douglas identified—the steps,
   retaining wall, and surrounding area—was open and obvious.
          In sum, after a de novo review of the record, we agree with the district
   court that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the condition
   presented was open and obvious and was not unreasonably dangerous.
   “[O]ne cannot expect paved surfaces of streets, sidewalks, and parking lots
   to be free of all deviations and defects.” Reed, 708 So. 2d at 365. “A
   pedestrian has a duty to see that which should be seen and is bound to observe
   whether the pathway is clear.” Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council
   No. 5747, 866 So. 2d 228, 235 (La. 2004) (citation omitted). The district
   court’s conclusion that a person exercising ordinary care in descending the
   steps would not have walked so close to the edge of the steps as to catch their
   foot on the retaining wall was correct. Because a premises owner “is not
   liable for an injury which results from a condition which should have been
   observed by the individual in the exercise of reasonable care,” summary
   judgment for Defendants was appropriate. Id.
          AFFIRMED.

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