Court Opinion

ID: 9959032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:06:08.253032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:24.195135
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 23-1552
                               Filed April 10, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF C.F., C.D., and N.H.,
Minor Children,

A.H., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Romonda Belcher,

Judge.

      A mother appeals a dispositional order denying modification of placement

in a child-welfare case. AFFIRMED.

      Teresa M. Pope of Pope Law, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Jami J. Hagemeier of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor children.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
                                          2

TABOR, Presiding Judge.

       “Biological ties are not the only ties that are important.” That’s how the State

summarized its argument for leaving six-year-old C.F., four-year-old C.D., and

one-year-old N.H. in the care of Melesa, a woman the children view as their aunt.1

Their mother, Alishia, asked the juvenile court to order placement of the children

with their maternal grandmother rather than fictive kin. The juvenile court declined,

and Alishia appeals. Like the juvenile court, we find disrupting the children’s

placement is not in their best interests. So we thus affirm the denial of the motion

to modify.2

       I.     Facts and Prior Proceedings

       The juvenile court adjudicated C.F., C.D., and N.H. as children in need of

assistance (CINA) in March 2023.         The court approved a request from the

department to remove them from parental custody one month later. Alishia and

N.H.’s father, Robert, had a history of substance use, and the department believed

that Robert was physically abusing Alishia. The court found that domestic violence

in the home posed a safety concern for the children. Alishia also had a no-contact

order against Brandon, C.D.’s father. Joshua, who was identified as C.F.’s father

in the CINA petition, also assaulted Alishia in C.F.’s presence, resulting in a

1 Our record includes various spellings for the placement’s name.    But this is the
spelling used in reports from the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services.
2 We generally review child-welfare proceedings de novo.           In re J.C., 857
N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014). Under that standard, we assess the facts and the
law; then “we adjudicate rights anew.” Id. But when the issue requires statutory
interpretation, we review for correction of legal error. Id. As always, our primary
concern is the children’s best interests. Id.
                                           3

founded child abuse assessment in 2017. After removal, the department placed

the children with Melesa, Joshua’s sister.

       In May 2023, the State notified the court that, although Joshua’s name was

on C.F.’s birth certificate, he is not the biological father. Instead, C.F.’s biological

father was Edward, as confirmed by a 2018 paternity test. The State amended its

CINA petition to name Edward as a party to the action.

       Meanwhile, the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) met with the children at

Melesa’s home. The GAL’s report referred to that placement as fictive kin and

described Melesa’s home as “the least restrictive environment” for the children.

The case plan noted that Melesa was “meeting all of the children’s needs and

engaged in services recommended by the department.” The GAL echoed that

sentiment in her July 2023 report: “The children are thriving in their current

placement and are very comfortable with their current caretakers.”

       By summer Alishia believed she was ready to resume custody. She moved

to modify placement, noting her no-contact order with Robert, her work with a

domestic-violence advocate, and her participation in substance-use treatment. In

the alternative, Alishia asked the court to place the children with their maternal

grandmother, Michelle.

       At a dispositional hearing on the motion, Michelle testified to her close

relationship with the children. She highlighted that she cared for the two older

children in 2020; that placement lasted for nearly a year. She also cared for all

three children for about a week in October 2022 when the department implemented

a safety plan. But she acknowledged having “minimal contact” with the children

when they returned to the care of Alishia and Robert. Michelle said she decided
                                           4

to “step back” and let Alishia “live her life and if the kids need anything, I’m always

there for them. I’m just a phone call away.” And even after the department placed

the children with Melesa, it still allowed Michelle to supervise visits with Alishia and

provide transportation for the children.

       Department case manager Callie Kueck offered a different perspective.

She testified that it was in the children’s best interests to stay in their current

placement. Kueck told the court that C.F. had “a significant bond” with Melesa and

“has reported to professionals that he feels safe with her.” Kueck expressed less

confidence about placing the children with Michelle: “There have been ongoing

concerns regarding the interactions supervised by grandma, that there are people

present that have not been approved by the department, there are also ongoing

concerns of inappropriate conversations still occurring.”

       At the close of the hearing, Alishia’s counsel described Joshua as C.F.’s

“legal father” because his name is on the child’s birth certificate. Yet counsel

argued that Joshua’s sister, Melesa, is not a relative placement because she is

unrelated to C.D. or N.H.       Counsel advocated to modify placement to their

grandmother under Iowa Code section 232.102(1)(a) (2023), which prioritizes

adult relatives over fictive kin. Both the State and GAL resisted. The State argued:

       [Y]ou can’t ask a four-year-old or a baby, do you think this woman is
       your aunt, I mean, this is what I’m assuming [C.F.] calls [Melesa],
       that’s his aunt. The children feel comfortable there. The children are
       doing well there. They are in placement with their siblings and
       moving them is going to be difficult for them.

       The court denied Alishia’s motion to modify placement in September 2023.

It left “temporary legal custody with the department for purposes of foster care
                                          5

placement with relative for [C.F.] and suitable others for [N.H.] and [C.D.].” Alishia

appeals.3

       II.    Analysis

       In her petition on appeal, Alishia raises two telescoping issues. First, she

claims the court erred in finding that Melesa was C.F.’s relative, as defined in Iowa

Code section 232.2(56). Second, she argues that because Melesa was only fictive

kin, as defined in section 232.2(22), the court erred in failing to order placement

with the children’s maternal grandmother under section 232.102(1)(a). That code

section outlines the hierarchy for placement of children removed from their parents.

               After a dispositional hearing, the court may enter an order
       transferring the legal custody of the child to a parent of the child. If
       the court finds that custody with either of the child’s parents is not in
       the child’s best interests, the child’s custody shall be transferred to
       the department for placement of the child in any of the following
       categories in the following order of priority:
               (1) An adult relative of the child including but not limited to
       adult siblings and parents of siblings.
               (2) A fictive kin.
               (3) Any other suitable placement identified by the child's
       relatives.
               (4) An individual licensed to provide foster care pursuant to
       chapter 237. If the child is placed with a licensed foster care
       provider, the department shall assign decision-making authority to
       the foster care provider for the purpose of applying the reasonable
       and prudent parent standard during the child’s placement.
               (5) A group care facility, shelter care facility, or other
       residential treatment facility.

3 The GAL filed a response to the petition on appeal, which the State joined.   No
other parties weighed in on the appeal. Attorneys for Joshua and Brandon resisted
the motion to modify placement at the hearing. Counsel for Robert supported the
motion, asserting that it was “very concerning” to him that N.H. was with “a
stranger.” Counsel for C.F.’s biological father, Edward, advised the court that his
client no longer wished to be a party in the case.
                                           6

Iowa Code § 232.102(1)(a).          If the juvenile court identifies categories (2)

through (5) as the preferred placement for a child, it must make a specific finding

that placement with an adult relative is not in the child’s best interests.        Id.

§ 232.102(1)(c).

       In response to Alishia’s petition, the GAL contends there was clear and

convincing evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s determination that

Melesa was C.F.’s relative. As a back-up, the GAL urges that even if the court

wrongly decided that C.F. was in a relative’s care, the court did not err in refusing

to disrupt the children’s placement with fictive kin.

       We start with the relative-versus-fictive-kin distinction.

              “Relative” means an individual related to a child within the
       fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, by marriage, or through
       adoption. For purposes of subchapters III and IV [governing CINA
       and termination of parental rights], “relative” includes the parent of a
       sibling of the child if the sibling’s parent’s parental rights were not
       previously terminated in relation to the child.

Id. § 232.2(56).

       As cross-referenced in that definition of relative,

               “Parent” means a biological or adoptive mother or father of a
       child; or a father whose paternity has been established by one of the
       methods enumerated in section 252A.3, subsection 10, or by
       operation of law due to the established father’s marriage to the
       mother at the time of conception, birth, or at any time during the
       period between conception and birth of the child.

Id. § 232.2(45). “‘Fictive kin’ means an adult person who is not a relative of a child

but who has an emotionally positive significant relationship with the child or the

child’s family.” Id. § 232.2(22).

       Alishia maintains that the statutory definition of relative “does not

encompass the current placement.” Joshua is not C.F.’s biological father and was
                                           7

not married to Alishia at the time of C.F.’s conception or birth. From there, Alishia

reasons that Melesa is not C.F.’s relative. Alishia acknowledges that Joshua is

named as the father on C.F.’s birth certificate.4 But, in her view, that fact does not

mean that his sister is related to C.F. by blood, marriage, or adoption. She insists

that Melesa is “more appropriately defined as fictive kin.”

       In response, the GAL asserts that Joshua has generally been called C.F.’s

father throughout the CINA case and, by extension, C.F.’s “Aunt Melesa” was an

adult relative given notice of the removal under Iowa Code section 232.84. The

GAL also accuses Alishia of objecting to identifying Melesa as C.F.’s aunt to

“manipulate” the language in section 232.102(1)(a) which gives relatives priority

over fictive kin. What the GAL does not do is address how Melesa fits the statutory

definition of relative in section 232.2(56). Perhaps because she does not.

       That definition requires an individual to be related to the child within the

fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity,5 by marriage, or through adoption. Id.

§ 232.2(56). As Alishia asserts, Melesa did not meet any of those three criteria.

She is not a blood relative of C.F., nor is her spouse a blood relative of the child.

4 The GAL argues that Alishia did not contest Joshua’s status as C.F.’s legal father

in the CINA proceedings, so has not preserved error on that issue for appeal. At
the hearing, that issue was raised by Joshua’s attorney, who argued, “[I]f you’re
on the birth certificate, filed a paternity affidavit, then you’re the father. So that’s
what my client’s done . . .” And Alishia’s counsel described Melesa as “the sister
of the legal father.” But we do not read Alishia’s petition on appeal as disputing
Joshua’s status as legal father. Rather, she does not recognize his status as
pulling his sister within the definition of relative.
5 Our court has defined consanguinity as “kinship; blood relationship; the

connection or relation of persons descended from the same stock or common
ancestor.” In re J.C., No. 03-0949, 2003 WL 22345729, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 15, 2003) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 375 (rev. 4th ed.1968)). Affinity
means “the relationship which one spouse has because of the marriage to blood
relatives of the other.” State v. Allen, 304 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1981).
                                            8

She is not related to C.F. by marriage or adoption. Although Melesa was a blood

relative of Joshua, who is arguably C.F.’s legal father, the statutory definition does

not reach that relationship. We cannot expand the definition of relative to include

the sister of a legal father if the text of the statute shows it was not the legislature’s

intent to do so. See J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 502. We thus find the juvenile court erred

in finding Melesa was C.F.’s relative.

       But that finding is not the end of our analysis. It just puts C.F. in the same

posture as his half siblings. On this record, we find Melesa was fictive kin to all

three children.    She was not their relative but had “an emotionally positive

significant relationship” with them and their family. Iowa Code § 232.2(22). Even

if she was not fictive kin but only an “other suitable placement identified by the

child’s relatives” under section 232.102(1)(a), our measure of the children’s best

interests would be no different. See id. § 232.102(1)(c).

       Which brings us to the best interests of C.F., C.D. and N.H. In compliance

with section 232.102(1)(c), the juvenile court made a specific finding that changing

placement to the maternal grandmother’s home was not in the children’s best

interests and provided reasons for its finding.         The court acknowledged the

grandmother’s prior and ongoing involvement with the children and her willingness

to have them again placed in her care. But the court observed that Alishia and her

mother “have had a strained relationship” and highlighted the department’s

concerns about Michelle’s inability to set appropriate boundaries with her daughter.

The court also noted: “The department has raised concerns with the threat of

violence by an adult brother who was reportedly present while the maternal

grandmother was supervising the children.” Beyond those concerns, the court
                                           9

emphasized that “a disruption in placement” undermined the children’s best

interests because they were bonded to Melesa. Finally, the court addressed the

sibling bond, finding that separating the children [is] not in their best interests.

       In our de novo review of best interests, we reach the same conclusion as

the juvenile court. In affirming the juvenile court’s ruling, we do not disparage

Michelle’s commitment to her grandchildren. Nor do we underestimate the value

of maintaining family ties for children who cannot be safely in their parents’

custody. See generally Leonard Edwards, Relative Placement: The Best Answer

for Our Foster Care System, 69 Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 55, 58 (2018) (noting relative

placement is now considered best practice and often minimizes trauma). But

based on this record, we are persuaded by the GAL’s compelling argument against

disrupting the current placement:

       These three children have witnessed a lot of domestic violence,
       experienced their caretakers’ extreme emotional dysregulation, been
       exposed to dangerous substances . . . , been subjected to
       inappropriate discipline, been neglected and have been coached to
       not to tell people what is happening in the family home. Separating
       these children would only cause unnecessary additional trauma.

Bottom line, it is not in these children’s best interests to be moved to their

grandmother’s home for now. We affirm the juvenile court’s denial of Alishia’s

motion to modify placement.

       AFFIRMED.