Court Opinion

ID: 9772493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:19:39.014988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:44.852679
License: Public Domain

George Rose Smith, J., dissenting. It should first be observed that this case does not involve a material deviation from the servant’s authorized route, as was true, for example, in Healey v. Cockrill, 133 Ark. 327, 202 S. W. 229, L. R. A. 1918D, 115. Here the home of Wilson’s father-in-law abutted the highway that Wilson was traveling in the course of his employment; he parked on the shoulder of the road in order to talk with his wife. Had Wilson started his truck after the conversation and negligently struck a stranger standing by the road, it goes without saying that the liability of the master would have been an issue for the jury. Here, however, the evidence indicates that Wilson acted willfully and maliciously, rather than with carelessness only, and the jury so found, by its award of punitive damages. This finding absolves the master of liability only if the undisputed evidence shows that Wilson’s intentional conduct was actuated solely by a personal motive. “An act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is employed. . . . It is the state of the servant’s mind which is material.” Rest., Agency, § 235. “The fact that the predominant motive of the servant is to benefit himself or a third person does not prevent the act from being within the scope of employment. If the purpose of serving the master’s business actuates the servant to any appreciable extent, the master is subject to liability if the act otherwise is within the service. . . .” Ibid., § 236. Mechem puts the matter accurately in § 1929 of his work on Agency: “It is obvious, therefore, that the question of the principal’s or master’s liability cannot always be determined merely by putting a label on the motive. Tlie motive is important, bnt it is important not so much, for the purpose of determining how the act was done as to aid in deciding whose act it was.” See also Prosser on Torts (2d Ed.), §63. I do not understand our oivn cases to be contrary to the views just mentioned; indeed, the majority’s quotation from Sweeden v. Atkinson Imp. Co., 93 Ark. 397, 125 S. W. 439, 27 L. R. A. N. S. 124, is fully in accord with the position taken by the textwriters on the subject. In this case I should agree with the majority if Wilson had simply pushed his wife violently from the truck; that conduct would undoubtedly have been actuated solely by a personal motive. But here Wilson said, ‘ ‘ G-et the hell out; I’m going,” and the starting movement of the vehicle contributed to the appellee’s injuries. Since I am unable to say positively and unequivocally that the purpose of serving his master’s business did not actuate Wilson “to any appreciable extent, ’ ’ I am of the opinion that the evidence presented a question for the jury. Millwee, J., joins in this dissent.