Court Opinion

ID: 9659647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:51:34.477573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:10.378797
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The reason for reversal given by the Beaumont Court of Appeals is: “We believe and find that when the State introduces a previous conviction and offers absolutely no proof of identification, the error is fundamental.”
To justify that significant statement of law neither the court of appeals nor the parties have found any case “precisely on point.” So we granted review to decide whether the statement is accurate, and, now that for the first time the State had discovered some evidence of that conviction, a majority wanted also to determine disposition of the underlying premise of appellant that, as stated by the court of appeals, “there was no evidence offered by *653the State to identify appellant as the person so convicted in [the exhibit].”
Both the State and appellant failed the court of appeals. Appellant did not comprehend the effect of his testimony admitting prior convictions; neither on original submission nor on motion for rehearing did the State refute his contention that there was no evidence of identity. The point is purely a factual issue that should have been, but was not, joined in the court of appeals. Having granted review and found testimony contrary to the premise for which appellant contended, we are confronted with resolution of a matter so poorly presented to the court of appeals.1
The power and authority granted this Court is to review “decisions of the courts of appeals.” Article V, § 5, Constitution of the State of Texas; Articles 4.04, § 2, 44.01 and 44.45, V.A.C.C.P. A decision flows from “the reason for such decision” set forth in a written opinion of a court of appeals. Article 44.24, id. Thus, the discretionary function of the Court is to determine whether “the reason for such decision” is correct in law. However, the majority expressly declines to address the reason given by the court of appeals for its decision to reverse the judgment of conviction in this cause, although review was granted for that very purpose. Instead, the majority favors the State with a sort of de novo determination of a claim that has not been presented to and decided by the court of appeals.2
Accordingly, the Court should review the significant statement of law given by the court of appeals as the reason for its decision, rather than dispose of the cause on a point that patently was not presented to that court nor decided by it. I will not approve such cavalier disregard of orderly exercise of power and authority in this Court to review decisions of courts of appeals and, therefore, do not join the majority opinion.
In my judgment, however, the reason given by court of appeals for its decision is not, in the circumstances shown by the record in this cause, “fundamental error.” Thus, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

. The supreme irony is that in the court of appeals the State urged that appellant had not properly preserved the error, but here it would have us reverse the court of appeals on a point the State failed to raise for consideration by the court of appeals. In accommodating the State the majority sets a dreadful precedent that bodes much ill for the constitutional declaration that the State shall have no right of appeal in criminal cases. Article V, § 26.

. Judge Teague takes his stand on firmer ground that is somewhat supported by recent precedent. See Szilvasy v. State, 678 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). There, without expressing any opinion as to ultimate disposition of ground of error, this Court vacated judgment of court of appeals and remanded cause for reconsideration because court erred in concluding that evidence was sufficient to corroborate testimony of an accomplice by considering testimony not adduced before jury.