Court Opinion

ID: 9689591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:40:54.656726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:10.067567
License: Public Domain

UHLENHOPP, Justice
(dissenting).
In my view the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting cross-examination regarding sums received for prior injuries and regarding tax returns, or in admitting a doctor’s report into evidence. The collateral source rule is not involved; the case involves a question of causation.
I. Prior Claims, Settlements, Awards. The initial issue relates to the admissibility of prior claims and collections. The factual setting must be taken into account. The suit arises out of a motor vehicle collision on June 3, 1975. The first point is that plaintiff Nepple claims he sustained very serious injuries as a result of that collision; he seeks $247,000 in damages. A doctor testified, for example, that Nepple related the following history of his condition after this accident:
The patient then also told me that after he regained consciousness, at least that he was able to recollect, that he noticed some impairment in his eyesight, right. He has an artificial eye on the left. He also had at that time some laceration at the left forehead, and he told me that he had a broken right lower arm and also some injury to the right lower leg and — and he was complaining of pain sensation in the cheek on the left side; and also, he had some pain radiating into the right upper arm.
Furthermore, he told me that ever since this accident, he had been complaining of pain in the back of his head, but also frontal headaches; and he said that the pain in the back of the head is at the head-neck junction. When I asked him, furthermore, he said that he has considerable soreness and pain at the head-neck junction and also in the forehead area.
The doctor testified regarding a later examination:
Patient still has been complaining of the blurred vision off and on, and — and *735he said that his headaches, that it is mostly originating from the head-neck junction, is practically there constantly. I — I— He also is still complaining of pain in the right shoulder joint off and on and also is still noticing impairment of the range of motion of the right shoulder joint.
The doctor testified regarding subsequent treatment of Nepple:
I did an electrical denaturation to the area of the greater occipital nerves on both sides, which means I did a destruction with high frequency at the head-neck junction. And I did six destructive lesions on the right side and five destructive lesions on the left side, a total of eleven destructive lesions with high frequency.
This is a procedure in which an electrical needle is being placed underneath the skin over the occipital bone; and with a high frequency radio-frequency equipment, one is getting the — the wave activity into the tip of this electrical thermo-needle, and one is then destroying the— the particular area.
The second point is that Nepple sustained injuries on three prior occasions. The first was in 1969. He testified on direct examination regarding that incident:
Q. There’s been some discussion here that you were in an accident. Tell these people about it. A. Fell off of a ladder.

Q. How far did you fall? A. Ten foot.
Q. Well, what happened to you? A. I laid on the retaining wall. With my head I had a hard hat on.
And on cross-examination:
Q. Now, did you have any injuries prior to the time that you went to work for Rotert Construction Company? .
A. Yes, in ’69 I did. I had a — my skull was busted up here (indicating). .
Q. Your skull was fractured? A. Oh, yes.
The second injury was in the fall of 1973. Nepple testified with respect to that occasion:
Q. Now, while you were working for [Rotert] in the fall of ’73, were you riding in a pickup truck that was involved in a wreck? A. Yes. .
Q. And did you sustain any injuries in that accident? A. Neck injuries ....
Q. What part of your neck? A. At the base of the skull.
The third injury was in December 1973. Nepple testified on cross-examination;
Q. In December of ’73, did you consult a doctor regarding a freezing of your right hand? A. Yes, I did.
Q. And did you go off work by reason of that? A. Yes, I did.
Q. For how long a period? A. Three weeks, sir.
At this juncture the damage issue in the case comes sharply into focus: to what extent if any were Nepple’s present injuries attributable to the prior injuries and to what extent if any were they attributable to the 1975 collision on which this suit is based?
The third point is that Nepple endeavored to downplay his prior injuries rather than to seize the initiative and introduce the evidence about their aftereffects. For example, he testified that after the 1969 accident he was in the hospital a week or ten days, went back to work that fall, shingled, did finish work, and carried blocks — obviously endeavoring to create the inference that he was rehabilitated and without delineating the aftereffects he was suffering. The same is true regarding the injury in the fall. of 1973; he testified that he was in the hospital ten days, recuperated at home four to five weeks, and returned to work for Rotert Construction on hog confinements, again giving the impression of rehabilitation. Moreover, he was asked on direct examination whether he previously “injured” his right hand and responded, “No, I didn’t,” without mentioning the freezing incident which was of sufficient severity to enable him to collect compensation. He testified some of his prior injuries were only temporary and others he denied, contrary to *736his own doctor’s report set out infra. In sum, Nepple’s testimony would leave the impression that the effects of any prior injuries were a thing of the past at the time of the collision on June 3, 1975.
The fourth point is that according to his own treating doctor, Nepple was still suffering from prior injuries about five weeks before the present collision, of the same nature as he now asserts. The report of his doctor, Horst Blume, admitted into evidence on defendants’ offer over Nepple’s objection, states:
A. Date, 4-28th of 1975. The patient still has difficulties with his memory, and he said when he has head pain, then he has memory lapses. When his fore— when his foreman tells him what to do, then he cannot follow the instructions all the way through.
When he feels good, then he has four or five men working for him. The patient said during the last month when he had four — there have been four times they could not tell him what to do so that he would understand, and there are two days when he did not work. The patient said when he has the pressure at the back of the head on the right side, then he cannot follow orders.
If the pain at the back of the head is intense, then he has pain in the right eye. The patient also notices ringing of both ears when he has the headaches. He takes two aspirin every four hours until the pain subsides, but never more than eight aspirin a day.
The patient said the medication I prescribed helped him while he was on it, but when he was off the medication, the pain was back again. The patient received about two dozen treatments at a local hospital, which did not help him. The patient still cannot hold the hammer in his right hand because of inability to control the hand. He does not drive company vehicles because of the dizziness.
The patient has trouble with his balance and is frequently running into doorways because of unsteadiness. The patient has requested not to be on ladders at work because of the unsteadiness. The patient cannot hold securely with the right hand, so when striking with a hammer, it flies out of his hand. The patient thinks the rhizotomy helped him in the beginning, but not in the long run.
When I asked the patient about his impaired memory and said this may be related to his age, the patient definitely denied it. The patient said he had no mental impairment from the accident in 1969.
When the patient has the headaches, then it is worse in regard to his mental function, but he also notices impairment of his mental function without any headaches, but it is not bothering him as much. The patient said that his memory is impaired even when he does not have headaches. He has also noticed the hearing is impaired, and he thinks the right side is the worst.
Examination of the cervical spine revealed considerable local tenderness at the head-neck junction, right; otherwise, no significant local tenderness over the spine observed. The range of motion on the cervical spine is close to normal and does not cause any pain on movements. Sensory examination of the upper extremities revealed normal sensation in the hands and arms. The patient is able to squeeze 70 pounds with the left hand and 40 pounds with the right.
The patient is right-handed, but now works with the left as the right is now supporting him — is not supporting him properly. No evidence of stereodysgno-sia. The patient can hear whispering at two yards in the right and five yards left. The right eardrum shows minimal scarring with a short reflex; also, considerable scarring seen left.
I would advise the patient to have another denaturation-rhizotomy procedure on the right side, since it helped in the beginning. I would be — he would be a good candidate for a repeat procedure since the first time I only made two lesions.
*737The patient agreed to have the procedure repeated in order to try to control most of his pain, even though he was told 25 percent of the patients may not improve' at all. The patient should have a hearing test at the Rehabilitation Center.
To take one example from this report, Nepple introduced evidence, already quoted, of electrical denaturation of the area of the greater occipital nerves after the present collision. The doctor’s report discloses the doctor had performed a similar procedure before this collision and was then contemplating a repeat of it: “I would advise the patient to have another denaturation-rhizo-tomy procedure on the right side, since it helped in the beginning. I would be — he would be a good candidate for a repeat procedure since the first time I only made two lesions.”
The fifth point is that Nepple’s testimony creating the impression of rehabilitation from prior injuries and his doctor’s report of continuing physical difficulties before this collision made the nature, extent, and seriousness of the three prior injuries highly relevant in order to allocate Nepple’s present problems between the prior injuries and the injuries in the 1975 collision. I think that defendants should be permitted to establish the nature and extent of the prior injuries in any relevant way. Thus the tort damages and compensation benefits Nepple claimed and collected are relevant regarding the nature, extent, and duration of the prior injuries as he claimed them to be at the time. When the nature of a person’s prior injuries becomes the inquiry in a case, the person’s prior claims and collections regarding those very injuries constitute admissions by him as to how he regarded' the injuries at the time, despite his present protestations. Any other rule would permit a claimant who has received a substantial sum on a large claim for a prior injury to minimize that injury while testifying, secure in the knowledge that he could not be compelled to disclose his prior claims and collections for that injury. The jurors should be allowed to know the full facts about relevant prior injuries and the position the claimant took about them at the time, to the end that they can sift out the truth and find how much if any of the claimant’s present difficulties are attributable to the accident in suit.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota aptly stated in Kelsey v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 264 Minn. 49, 55, 56, 117 N.W.2d 559, 563:
Plaintiff urges that the order granting a new trial should be sustained on the ground that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the amount of money plaintiff received in settlement of an earlier, similar injury. It was established that in 1958, plaintiff had been in defendant’s employ and that as a result of an injury, plaintiff resigned from his employment and was paid $15,000 in settlement of all claims arising out of that earlier injury. The earlier injury was to the same area of plaintiff’s back as the injury for which he now claims recompense. .
Plaintiff contends that the admission of the recovery was inadmissible and prejudicial . . . . Defendant answers that the evidence was admissible on the issue of damages on plaintiff’s claim for an aggravation of a preexisting injury. We agree with defendant. The record is clear that such evidence was not injected to show fraud . . . nor was it unrelated to the amount of damages as in insurance recovery cases such as Prescott v. Swanson, 197 Minn. 325, 267 N.W. 251. The instructions of the trial court clearly submitted a claim by plaintiff for aggravation of a preexisting injury to his back. In view of this, it was perfectly proper for defendant to bring out before the jury, in mitigation of that claim, the nature and extent of plaintiff’s previous back injury. This would include the amount that he was paid in settlement therefor. What influence adverse to plaintiff this evidence may have had is indeed speculative since the jury need not have reached the question of damages. If there was any adverse influence, any such effect could have been diminished or erased if plaintiff had availed himself of the opportunity he had to explain the *738precise nature of his previous injury as well as the terms of the settlement. Applying the rule of relevancy in admitting evidence is an exercise of discretion by the trial court. We find no prejudicial abuse of such discretionary power which would justify a new trial in this case.
Cases in similar vein include LeBlanc v. Browne, 78 Cal.App.2d 68, 177 P.2d 347 (cross-examination regarding action for $18,000 for prior injuries and settlement for $2250); Ludwig v. J. J. Newberry Co., 78 Ga.App. 871, 52 S.E.2d 485 (cross-examination about claim for prior injuries); Jackson v. Thompson, 358 Mo. 1001, 218 S.W.2d 97 (cross-examination about payment for prior injury); Zimmerman v. Lindblad, 154 Neb. 453, 48 N.W.2d 415 (cross-examination about worker’s compensation award for prior injury); Twilleager v. Modin, 240 Or. 69, 398 P.2d 181 (cross-examination about litigation regarding prior injury); Jones v. St. John, 178 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.Civ.App.) (cross-examination regarding litigation pertaining to prior injury). These decisions enunciate a specific application of the general principle stated thus in 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 488 at 494-495:
It has generally been held or recognized, in a number of cases, that the plaintiff in a personal injury action may be cross-examined as to his previous injuries, physical condition, or claims or actions for injuries of a nature similar to those involved in the case at bar for the purpose of showing that his present physical condition is not the result of the accident sued on, but was caused, wholly, or partially, by an earlier injury or preexisting condition. The reasoning underlying this recognition of the propriety of such cross-examination is that such evidence is pertinent to the issue of the plaintiff’s present physical condition and is admissible in respect of the matter of damages, because the defendant is liable only for injuries produced by his negligence and the residual effect of a prior injury might materially reduce the amount of damages assessed against him.
This issue involves the relevancy of prior claims, payments, and awards on the question of the severity of prior injuries. We have said, “A determination as to the relevancy and materiality of evidence rests largely in the trial court’s discretion.” Hagenson v. United Tel. Co., 209 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa). The trial court here heard all the evidence and permitted this evidence regarding the prior injuries to be admitted. I am not willing to say the court abused its discretion.
II. Tax Returns. Nepple introduced some of his income tax returns into evidence and the parties got into a disagreement about medical expenses shown on them. Defendants desired to show that Nepple had medical expenses, as bearing on their contention that his prior injuries persevered. They wished to establish that such expenses were not shown on the returns because Nepple did not pay them himself. The trial court allowed defendants so to question Nepple on cross-examination as to 1974 and also 1975 up to June 3. Nepple answered over objection that such medical expenses were paid by workers’ compensation.
The governing principle, as with relevancy, is that “The scope and extent of cross-examination lie largely within the discretion of the trial court.” Berding v. Thada, 243 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Iowa). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this cross-examination. Testimony regarding medical expenses incurred for prior injuries was relevant as corroborating defendants’ contention regarding the severity of those injuries, and the returns alone would create the impression of absence of such expenses without a further explanation that such expenses existed but were paid by others.
III. Doctor’s Report. Nepple tried throughout the trial to keep out of evidence his doctor’s report of April 28, 1975, previously quoted.
The parties took Dr. Blume’s testimony by video-tape deposition prior to trial. At the deposition Nepple asked the doctor on redirect examination:
*739Q, Doctor, did this man ever have any injury to his hand before the accident of June 3rd, 1975, that you ever saw? A. No, he didn’t have.
Q. After you treated him for the neck junction difficulty that he had before June 3rd of 1975, did you make notes in your records and your report dated May 3rd, 1976, which you and Mr. Kohorst have been talking about, as to when he started having the problems again in that area? And if so, what date did you say that it actually started over again? A. That’s the report of 5-3-1976 and — What are you referring to?
Q. My question was: do you have in your own notes when the pain started over again in reference to any date? Second paragraph from the bottom. A. Oh, I said, “Actually, he had the other accident on June 3rd, 1975, and it started over again,” referring to the pain at the head-neck junction.
Q. After you treated him for whatever difficulty he had in 1973, was he able to go back to work? A. Yes.
Q. And did he have any further difficulty that required your attention? A. No. (Italics added.)
On recross-examination at the deposition, defendants then brought forth Dr. Blume’s report of April 28, 1975, and asked him to read it. He read it aloud as previously quoted. Nepple did not conduct redirect examination regarding the report.
At trial Nepple introduced into evidence substantial portions of Dr. Blume’s deposition testimony, including the redirect examination just quoted. Defendants thereupon sought to introduce the recross-examination covering the April 1975 report, but the trial court upheld Nepple’s objection of improper recross-examination. Later in the trial, during defendants’ case-in-chief, the court permitted defendants to introduce the recross-examination covering the April 1975 report. As to cross-examination by Nepple at trial with respect to this testimony, the following occurred:
The Court: Mr. Wunschel [Nepple’s attorney], what is your wish in regard to cross-examination in this matter?
Mr. Wunschel: Of course, at this point I don’t know whether the doctor is or is not available, Your Honor, which you can appreciate. In all probability we will have none because I suspect he is very busy.
The Court: I didn’t hear what you said.
Mr. Wunschel: I suspect we will have none because I suspect he is very busy and unavailable.
The Court: Do you want some time to check that now?
Mr. Wunschel: No, I think we will just waive it at this point — or will not waive but we will just not try to do it because of the time element.
The Court: All right. Will there be any rebuttal?
Mr. Wunschel: I’m sorry?
The Court: Will there be any rebuttal?
Mr. Wunschel: No, I don’t think we’ll try to recall him or anything so I think we’ll just rest at this time, Your Honor. I think it would be unfair to him.
Nepple argues on appeal that the trial court should not have admitted into evidence the recross-examination regarding Dr. Blume’s report of April 28, 1975. That testimony was of course highly relevant as to whether Nepple was presently suffering from his prior injuries. Nepple’s failure to conduct further redirect examination at the deposition was his self-inflicted problem; he had his opportunity to examine further at the deposition and did not do so.
The trial court did not err in admitting the deposition recross-examination during defendants’ evidence at trial because the court could have permitted this testimony into evidence when offered originally by defendants on cross-examination during Nepple’s case-in-chief. This testimony dealt with the subject of Nepple’s direct examination of Dr. Blume. True, this was recross-examination, not original cross-examination. But trial courts have discretion to admit recross-examination on a subject dealt with on the direct examination even though the subject is not raised on redirect *740examination. 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 508 at 514 (“the privilege of recross-examination as to matters not covered on redirect examination lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed by a reviewing court unless the discretion has been abused”); 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 429 at 238-239 (“whether a party is to be granted the privilege of reopening on recross-examination a subject not reopened on redirect examination is within the discretion of the trial court, and the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may permit such a question”). See State v. Wheelock, 218 Iowa 178, 254 N.W. 313.
This case however goes a step farther: the subject of the recross-examination was also dealt with by Nepple on redirect examination. On redirect examination Nepple asked Dr. Blume whether his May 3, 1976 report notes when Nepple started having problems again in the neck area. Dr. Blume responded, “Oh, I said, ‘Actually, he had the other accident on June 3rd, 1975, and it started over again,’ referring to the pain at the head-neck junction.” Nepple then asked if he was able to go back to work after the 1973 difficulty, and Dr. Blume answered yes. Nepple thereupon asked, “And did he have any further difficulty that required your attention?”, and the doctor answered, “No.” This opened wide the door to recross-examination on Dr. Blume’s contradictory report that Nepple was having difficulty as of April 28, 1975.
Cross-examination need not merely parrot the direct or redirect examination. It may deal with the subjects of that examination. Avery v. Harms Implement Co., 270 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa). As we stated in the case of In re Estate of Poulos, 229 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Iowa), “A witness may be cross-examined on subjects directly and indirectly brought out on direct examination. This includes the right to rebut inferences and deductions sought to be established on direct examination.”
No error appears in the admission of Dr. Blume’s deposition recross-examination.
I think the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case and I would affirm the judgment.
LeGRAND and ALLBEE, JJ., join in this dissent.