Court Opinion

ID: 9759745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:26:47.362104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:04.425603
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
In the last seven years, the United States Supreme Court has promulgated three opinions that may enlighten the issue before us today and each has suggested a different set of indicators by which to decide whether the government action in that case constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. These indicators have differed, primarily, because of the type of governmental action in each case. In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), the Court held that double jeopardy prohibits a civil sanction to be imposed in a separate proceeding against a defendant who has already been punished in a criminal prosecution when that sanction serves, at least in part, as a deterrent to or retribution for crime. The Court surmised that the size of the civil sanction in Halper, almost ten times the amount necessary to adequately compensate the government for both its actual loss and the costs incurred in investigating and prosecuting the person responsible for that loss, could only be explained as accommodating deterrent or retributive goals. As such, the sanction was not remedial but penal in nature and, therefore, prohibited by double jeopardy.
*162■ Four years later the Court faced the task of determining whether a Montana tax on illegal drugs might be characterized as punishment, a question the Court explicitly stated was different from that in Halper. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 776, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1944, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). While the Court found both the “high rate” and the “obvious deterrent purpose” of the tax indicative of a penalty, it ultimately concluded that its characterization of the tax as punitive followed primarily from the fact that the tax was “conditioned on the commission of a crime.” Id. at 780-83, 114 S.Ct. at 1946-48.
Finally, just this year, the Court again set out to determine whether a particular governmental action constituted punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. This time, however, the action in question was not a civil sanction or a tax, but a civil forfeiture— a difference the Court found central to' its analysis. United States v. Ursery, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996). This, because civil forfeitures, unlike civil penalties which serve to compensate the government or taxes which primarily serve to raise revenue, are designed to confiscate the instruments of an illegality. Id. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2145. In order to confiscate these instruments the action is brpught in rem, not in personam or, in other words, against the property, not the person. Id. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2140. After noting the character of a civil forfeiture action as in rem, the Court undertook a two-part analysis so as to decipher the nature of that action as civil or criminal:
First, we ask whether Congress intended [the] proceedings ... to be criminal or civil. Second, we ton to consider whether te proceedings are so punitive in fact as to “persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding[s] may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature.” Id. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2147, citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984).
The Court’s contemplation of Congress’ intent, however, did not involve a study of legislative history. Rather, because “actions in rem have traditionally been viewed as civil proceedings,” the Court allowed for the presumption that Congress intended them to be that way — a presumption that can only be overcome by the “clearest proof’ that the forfeiture proceeding is “so punitive in form and effect as to render [it] criminal ...” Id. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2148, citing 89 Firearms, supra, at 365, 104 S.Ct. at 1106, quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980).
It is within the context of this jurisprudence that we must determine whether appellant’s license revocation was intended to be a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Although none of these cases provide an exact blue-print by which to answer that question, they together set out a basic framework by which to resolve that issue. In short, in order to ascertain whether appellant’s license revocation was primarily a means of keeping him off the road or, instead, punishment for the crime of driving while intoxicated, we must look first to the legislature’s intent in passing the statute and then, if that intent seems even in part to serve remedial goals, we must ask whether the effect is so severe that it renders the statute punitive regardless of the legislature’s intent otherwise. See United States v. Ursery,—U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996).1
As to the first question, we can surely turn to the plain language of the statute as well as to legislative history in order to answer it. Notably, only those who have been arrested or convicted of driving while intoxicated come under the purview of art. 6687b-l, the statute at issue in this ease. But the fact that a statute only applies to those who have committed a crime, although pivotal to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Kurth Ranch, *163was found “insufficient to render the statute punitive” in the more recent Ursery. Kurth Ranch at 780-83, 114 S.Ct. at 1946-48; Ursery at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2149. Moreover, unlike Halper; where the government imposed an excessive civil sanction, and Kurth Ranch, where the government levied an exorbitant tax, this case in no way involves inordinate government action. Instead, art. 6687b-l merely mandates a license revocation of 60 to 180 days, depending on the driving record of the accused, and a $100 fee. On its surface, then, the statute appears to address the remedial goal of removing drunk drivers from the road and, additionally, the legislative history indicates that this is at least partly what was intended. A few excerpts from the legislative history illustrate the point.
And again, I want to just see what it is that we’re trying to do. We are trying to get drunk drivers off the road.
Rep. Wolens, Second Reading of SB1, May 25,1993.
I want to make sure that this piece of legislation is an effective tool in removing the drunk driver off the road.
Rep. Campbell, Second Reading of SB1, May 25,1993.
We need to take drunk drivers off the road.
Rep. Denver, Second Reading of SB1, May 25,1993.
Although the legislative history reflects that the legislature meant not only to take drunk drivers off the road but also to deter those who might otherwise drink and drive, the Supreme Court has long held that deterrence “may serve civil as well as criminal goals.” Ursery at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2149.
After looking at both the legislative history and the plain language of art. 6687b-l, then, I feel confident that the legislature intended the statute to be, at least in part, a remedial measure. I am equally confident, for some of the very same reasons, that the effect of the statute does not render it punitive. Again, and as the majority states, the statutory provisions allowing for a two to six month license revocation and a $100 fee do not exceed what is reasonably necessary to keep drunk drivers off the road.
For these reasons, I concur with the majority.

. The action in this case, although most like the forfeiture in Ursery, is not in rem. After all, and unlike the forfeiture in Ursery in which the government sued the property, the title of the cause here is Tharp v. State. Because of this critical difference, I would hesitate to indulge the presumption in Ursery that the legislature intended the given statute to be non-punitive, or civil, in nature and would, instead, turn to more traditional indicators of legislative intent to determine that intent.