Court Opinion

ID: 9865339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:32:10.811263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:29.446307
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Bouck,
dissenting.
I am constrained to dissent from so much of the majority opinion and decision as denies a part of the exemption claim here involved.
A dissenting opinion was filed by me in case No. 14,103, Hanagan v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias, decided simultaneously with the case at bar; and that opinion I adopted in the case at bar, by reference, to avoid unnecessary repetition. A rehearing has since been granted in the Grand Lodge case. This automatically withdrew my dissenting opinion there on file. It is therefore fitting that I should indicate the basis of my present dissent.
Section 1 of article XVIII in the Constitution of Colorado tersely says: “The general assembly shall pass liberal homestead and exemption laws.” To- that mandate the General Assembly has steadfastly rendered obedience.
The constitutional provision here involved was section 5 of article X, as it then appeared in C. L. ’21, p. 59. It *550declared: “Lots, with, the buildings thereon, if said buildings are used solely and exclusively for religious worship, for schools, or for strictly charitable purposes, also cemeteries not used or held for private or corporate profit, shall be exempt from taxation, unless otherwise provided by general law/’ The General Assembly itself enacted appropriate legislation, for example ’35 C. S. A., c. 142, §22. The meaning of these.provisions is not obscure. Ever since Colorado attained statehood in 1876 this court has on many occasions interpreted them always in the spirit of liberality as originally declared, never until now along the line of narrow or strict construction. See especially McGlone v. Baptist Church, 97 Colo. 427, 50 P. (2d) 547, where the leading Colorado cases are analyzed. I shall not take the time to discuss them individually here.
Creel v. Masonic Ass’n, 100 Colo. 281, 68 P. (2d) 23, cited in the majority opinion as supporting the disposition made of the present case, is not analogous to it. The five-story building which was there involved included a single floor devoted to charitable purposes, the purely commercial uses made of the other four floors greatly predominating. Here, on the other hand, the building was small. Meetings of charitable organizations having a ritual, as for instance the Knights of Pythias (who appear here), the Masonic Order, the Knights of Columbus, and the like, are customarily held in the seclusion and privacy of an upper story. The erection of a two-story building by such a charitable organization would seem to be a reasonable method of securing the proper use of its realty, with full tax exemption when the incidental income from the ground floor is comparatively small and devoted altogether, as here, to charitable purposes. This is the inference we naturally draw from our own decisions such as Kemp v. Pillar of Fire, 94 Colo. 41, 27 P. (2d) 1036, followed in Tax Com. v. Bible Institute, 94 Colo. 402, 30 P. (2d) 870, in both of which cases the incidental income was not permitted to defeat the spirit of *551our exemption laws. As regards the “equitable division” of the lot itself for taxing’ and exemption purposes, certainly the second story, employed here altogether for legitimate charitable purposes, required the entire lot for its support as surely as- if it were the ground floor with nothing else in connection. I do not see why any portion of the lot should in these circumstances have been denied the exemption. If a less liberal interpretation is to be introduced I submit it can properly be done either by constitutional amendment or by express legislation, and not by this court. Until then we ought to consider ourselves bound by our own uniform holdings for over three score years. These holdings have governed our definition and application of exemptions. They have been acted upon accordingly. We ought to respect the findings of the trial court. .
For the reasons stated I respectfully dissent.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur in this opinion.