Court Opinion

ID: 9520441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:39:55.994738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:15.617742
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the judgment and sentence of the trial court but I dissent from that portion which remands for the purpose of conducting a sentencing hearing. By order dated July 23, 1986, the trial court stated all motions were to be filed and heard by September 12, 1986. A second order of September 10, 1986, extended the deadline of the first order by requiring all motions be set, noticed and resolved prior to the date set for trial, October 6, 1986. The second order also directed counsel to comply with the procedure of Ninth Judicial Circuit Court Rule G — 1. Rule G — -1 provides that notice as to the hearing on a motion be given eight days prior to the date of the hearing. Additionally, the second order stated motions “presented at or after” October 6, 1986, would not be heard by the court “except upon an express finding that new matter, not previously available to the parties, has been discovered necessitating the filing and presentation of said motion, and also upon the finding that said motion is not being filed for the purposes of delay.” On October 2, 1986, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements and indicated the motion would be heard on October 6, 1986. The defendant’s action violated Rule G — 1 because notice as to the hearing on the motion was not given eight days in advance of the hearing. Additionally, unless the defendant could establish new matter had been discovered necessitating the late date set for hearing his motion to suppress, the. defendant’s action violated the September 10, 1986, order of the court; if the motion was to be heard on the date set for trial, it is obvious the motion could not be resolved prior to the date set for trial. The defendant’s counsel could not be present on October 6, 1986, so co-counsel filed a notice of hearing on the motion for October 7, 1986, and proceeded to choose a jury. Again, the second notice of hearing violated Rule G — 1 since it was not given eight days in advance of the hearing. The problem with the motion itself had been worsened. Now, it was not to be heard until the day following the first day set for trial. On October 7, 1986, the trial judge, finding no reason justifying the late presentation of the motion, refused to hold a lengthy suppression hearing. The majority now holds the defendant is entitled to a suppression hearing. It states: “The trial court’s reliance on its September 10, 1986, order setting a cutoff date for hearing motions is not well placed in view of the fact that the court had permitted the State to supplement discovery until the eve of the trial and further heard motions filed by the State after September 12 and which were heard within a short time before trial.” 165 Ill. App. 3d at 206. Whether the State was allowed to supplement discovery until the eve of trial is irrelevant in regard to the defendant’s late presentation of his motion to suppress. The majority does not contend the supplemental discovery somehow necessitated the late presentation of the motion. Further, I fail to see how the fact that the State filed motions which were resolved prior to trial excuses the defendant’s actions. The State acted pursuant to the order of September 10, 1986, in setting, noticing and resolving its motions prior to trial. The defendant did not. The majority’s second reason for holding the defendant is entitled to a suppression hearing is that “the trial court’s reliance on a circuit court rule is too tenuous a reason to support the circuit court’s denial of a hearing on the motion to suppress.” It further states the circuit court rule limits the force and effect of section 114—11(a) of our Criminal Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 114—11(a).) I disagree on both points. Circuit courts have the power to enact and enforce rules regulating their calendars and dockets as long as the rules do not conflict with supreme court rules or statutory law. Valid circuit court rules of practice have the binding effect of a statute and are to be obeyed. (Martin Brothers Implement Co. v. Diepholz (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 283.) Section 114—11(a) states that prior to trial in a criminal case a defendant may move to suppress a confession as not voluntary. The circuit court’s order did not abrogate, limit or modify section 114—11(a); rather, it was in accordance with the section. The court allowed a total of 74 days from the issuance of its first order on July 23, 1986, until trial on October 6, 1986, for the setting, noticing and resolving of motions. This was certainly a reasonable amount of time for the defendant to resolve his motion to suppress. Trials cannot proceed in an orderly fashion when motions which can be filed and heard before trial, and which are ordered to be filed and heard before trial, are not so filed and heard. Failure to comply with reasonable local rulings and directions as to procedural deadlines by the trial judge serves to obstruct the timely administration of justice. As the trjal judge stated, the time to have a lengthy suppression hearing is not the morning of the jury trial. The trial judge had inherent power to rule as he did, his rulings were consistent with statutory law, were reasonable, and should be upheld. Finally, the majority opinion stresses that a hearing on the voluntariness of a confession is a constitutional right. So it is. Like all constitutional rights, however, it is subject to reasonable procedural requirements. Otherwise, there is nothing to prevent the defendant from raising such motions for the first time at the conference on jury instructions or even at the sentencing hearing. Throughout the entire fabric of the law, a thread of reasonableness is interlaced. Without reasonableness, the fabric unravels.