Court Opinion

ID: 9831415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:05:26.261515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:34.627917
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On this motion we have had the benefit of oral argument by both parties, and also extensive written argument, and have given appellee’s contention that we erred in our holding upon original hearing careful consideration. The earnestness of counsel for appellee bespeaks their sincerity, and the extensive citation of authorities and the rather copious extracts therefrom, their industry and research; but we are unable to reach a conclusion different from that expressed in our original opinion. Under the circumstances of this case, with an admitted liability, we believe that the arguments of counsel were reasonably calculated to, and, considering the large verdict, very probably did, have an undue influence upon the jury, and induced them to award plaintiff much larger damages than they would have if such improper argument had not been used.
[11] But it is earnestly urged that, even if the argument of counsel is. conceded to be improper and shows error which would otherwise be deemed prejudicial, yet it could only affect the amount of damages awarded, and, unless this court should determine the verdict to be excessive, such error would be harmless; and that, should this court determine the verdict to be excessive, it should state in what amount the verdict is excessive and permit a remittitur. In support of the latter contention, counsel cite us to the cases of Railway v. Swann, 127 S. W. 1164; Railway v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 27; Producers’ Oil Co. v. Barnes, 120 S. W. 1023; De La Vergne Co. v. Stahl, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 471, 60 S. W. 319; Tel. Co. v. Perry, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 243, 70 S. W. 439; Railway v. Syfan, 91 Tex. 568, 44 S. W. 1064; Railway v. Marshall, 140 S. W. 509; Railway v. Stevens, 94 S. W. 397; Railway v. Conway, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 76, 98 S. W. 1070.
The citations noted certainly present a very respectable array of authority justifying the course suggested, and the writer personally would be inclined to follow such course in this case, but the majority do not agree with this view. They are of opinion that for this court to fix the amount of excess entering into the damages awarded, and to permit a remittitur for such amount as a condition of affirmance, would be in effect the substitution of the judgment of this court for the verdict of the jury, and the judgment of the trial court. This is not a case where the only question is the excessiveness of the verdict, and no other error is presented. In that instance our duty is defined by statute. But in this case there is other error presented, to wit, the improper argument. The authority of an appellate court to require a remittitur as a condition of affirmance is, in cases where the measure of damages is not fixed by law, a restrictive supervisory power and should be exercised only when the single question presented is that of an excess. In the words of Justice Gill of the First District in Railway Co. v. Nesbit, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 209, 88 S. W. 891:
“In cases of this sort involving elements of damage incapable of accurate measurement in dollars and cents, the field of the jury’s discretion is broad indeed, and a verdict can he disturbed by this court as excessive only when, by its size compared with the injury suffered, it is manifestly the result, not of a sound discretion temperately exercised, but of passion and prejudice. Appellate courts may exercise the power to require a remitter only in those cases where, in the absence of the statute conferring the power, the judgment would have been reversed and remanded as excessive. It is therefore plain that the power of this court to require a remitter in such cases is not to he considered in the trial courts for any purpose. The parties plaintiff and defendant had the right to the untrammeled judgment of the jury on the question of tho amount of damages. The task of revising jury verdicts in matters of amount is both difficult and delicate, and it ought not to be rendered more so by an invitation to the jury to resolve all doubts in favor of a large verdict, thus passing up to the trial judge and to this court a duty which is not only primarily but finally theirs. The court has rarely disturbed a verdict in amount except over the bitter protest of the winning party, and an eloquent warning against the danger of encroaching upon the province of the jury as the final arbiter of the facts. * * * But the conclusive reason for holding such argument reprehensible is that it is impossible to determine the extent to which a verdict may be affected thereby, and the evil cannot therefore be cured by requiring a remit-ter.”
In the cited case counsel bad argued to the jury not to give a small verdict, because such verdict could not be raised, but that, if it should render a verdict held to be too large, the appellate court would correct the same 'by cutting it down.
If we are correct in our conclusion that the language of the counsel in the closing argument was reasonably calculated to and probably did arouse in the minds of the jury passion or prejudice directed against the defendant, then in such condition of mind they would naturally be inclined not only to assess excessive damages for the injuries, which in the clear light of dispassionate and unbiased consideration were shown to have been inflicted, but would also have been inclined to give undue weight to the testimony with reference to the nature and extent of such injuries, and especially as to whether or not the plaintiff would be, by reason thereof, totally incapacitated in the future to labor and earn mnney; and be inclined to award damages punitive in character, because of the gross negligence and other reprehensible acts of defendant charged and insinuated in the argument, though such damages were not permitted by the charge of the court. In this cash both parties were entitled to the fair and unbiased consideration by the jury of both questions: First, as to the nature, extent, and future effect of the injuries suffered by plaintiff; and, second, as to what would be the *219reasonable compensation therefor. As has been said heretofore, the majority do not feel that the requiring of a remittitur as a contion of affirmance would, in the instant case, be the proper exercise of the function of this court under article 1631, Vernon’s' Sayles’ Texas Civil Statutes. Moreover, the majority gravely doubt that the statute referred to has any application in this character of case where the amount of damages as a whole is uncertain and the determination thereof is by the Constitution and statute placed in the exclusive province of the jury, and where the remittitur required would be binding upon one party at all events, and not binding upon the other except at his option; both parties alike being entitled, under constitutional provision, to the verdict of a jury on that issue. For the reason heretofore given the majority, at least, believe that the motion of appellee for additional findings, to wit, the amount of excess held to enter into this verdict, should be overruled, and it is so ordered. The majority do not wish to be understood as passing upon the specific question as to whether or not the verdict was excessive. They only hold that the argument complained of probably did have that effect.
For the reasons given, the motion for rehearing is overruled.
BUCK, J., dissents as indicated in conclusions.