Court Opinion

ID: 9559514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:30:29.879475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:15.933446
License: Public Domain

SCHROEDER, Presiding Judge,
dissenting:
The majority concludes that the due process principles enunciated in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973), required disclosure only of rebuttal alibi witnesses in this case and not of Nadine Bell. I disagree. In my opinion, the trial court erred in its interpretation of Wardius, and this error, coupled with the error permitting the use of hearsay impeachment evidence, should require reversal.
Wardius stands for the general principle that the State must make discovery to the defense on the same basis that the defense is required to make discovery to the State. Thus if the defense must disclose all of its witnesses to the State, the State must disclose all of its witnesses to the defense. This principle of reciprocity was recognized by our Supreme Court in Wright v. Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 265, 517 P.2d 1261 (1974). While that case like Wardius was concerned specifically with alibi problems, the court’s recognition of general principles of reciprocity was expressed as follows: “In those area[s] in which discovery of the defense’s case is permitted, it is clear that Wardius requires that there be a corresponding opportunity for discovery by the defense of the prosecution’s case.” (110 Ariz. at 268, 517 P.2d at 1264). In this case, the State clearly could have disclosed Bell as a rebuttal witness several days in advance of her testimony. There has never been any serious suggestion that the defense failed adequately to request all of the discovery materials to which it was otherwise entitled. The trial court did not regard any last minute interview of the witness as a substitute for discovery.
The only issue here, therefore, should be whether the defense was required to make discovery of all of its witnesses to the State. I believe such a requirement was imposed by Rule 15.2(c) which at all relevant times required that simultaneously with the notice of defenses, the defendant make available to the prosecutor “[t]he names and addresses of all persons, other than the defendant himself, whom he will call as witnesses at trial, together with all statements made by them in connection with the particular case.” (Emphasis supplied). The comment to Rule 15.2(b) discusses the “notice of defenses” and describes the broad discovery obligations placed upon the defendant:
“It is intended that the ‘notice of defenses’ to be a broad disclosure of the defendant’s ease, including his rebuttal of the state’s case as well as his own ‘casein-chief.’ It is to include all matters which he will present at trial, including *451those which he intends to introduce by his own testimony.
“The disclosure requirement goes considerably beyond notification of ‘affirmative defenses’ . . .
Apart from the requirements imposed by Rule 15, the court specifically ordered the defendant in this case to make the names of all of his witnesses available to the prosecutor.
To require the defense to make available the names and statements of all of its witnesses, but to permit the State to withhold the name and statement of a rebuttal witness, violates the principles of due process established in Wardius.
In my view, this is recognized by the addition in 1975 of Rule 15.1(f) requiring the State to “disclose the names and addresses of all persons whom the prosecutor will call as rebuttal witnesses together with their relevant written or recorded statements.” (Emphasis supplied). The majority suggests this does not mean that all witnesses must be listed, but only those relating to specific defenses listed by the defendant. Such an interpretation is contrary to the language of the amended Rule itself, and is in violation of Wardius due process requirements.
In sum, under our discovery rules, the defendant must list not only his defenses under Rule 15.2(b), but under Rule 15.2(c), must disclose the names of all witnesses he will call at trial. I believe no lesser requirement can constitutionally be imposed upon the State and I must therefore respectfully dissent.