Court Opinion

ID: 9653822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:56:22.856313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:02.252892
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I regret my inability to concur. In my (Opinion the conclusion reached by the majority would be sound in any jurisdiction which adheres to the principles of the common law as applied to the rights of recognized illegitimates. The Kansas Supreme 'Court has, within recent years, been confronted with two questions which involved the principal rights of recognized illegitimates; 'in each case, that court has acknowledged that the principles of the common law denied to the illegitimate the right claimed; in each •of the eases, that court has expressly declined 'to follow the unbroken current of common-law decisions, and has granted to the illegitimate the right claimed. In no instance has the' Kansas Supreme Court denied to a recognized illegitimate any right of a legitimate child. In a dictum in still a third ease, decided within the last two years, that court has expressly declared that, where the rights ■of illegitimate and adopted children are involved, the jurisprudence of Kansas has •crossed over to the civil law.
If this court is free to construe for itself the statutes of Kansas, set out in full in the majority opinion, I agree with the construetion placed thereon by that opinion. Moreover, I concede that there is no Kansas decision which holds or says that a recognized illegitimate has the status of a legitimate child. But our duty does not end when we have examined the.statutes.' It is conceded by both parties to this litigation, and by the majority opinion, that the status of the appellant must be determined by Kansas law. Local law arises in part by statute and in part by decisions of the highest court of the state. It is thoroughly settled that the courts of the United States, in ascertaining local law, will be governed by the decisions of the highest court of the state, where there is no applicable statute. In Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, at page 113, 35 S. Ct. 526, 529, 59 L. Ed. 856, there was no statute defining the rights of the parties, but there were decisions of the highest court of the state, and the Supreme Court said:
“These decisions constitute rules of property and must be accepted and applied in passing upon the complainants’ rights. McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23, 27, 19 L. Ed. 545, 546; Bucher v. Cheshire R. Co., 125 U. S. 555, 583, 8 S. Ct. 974, 31 L. Ed. 795, 798; Barber v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry., 166 U. S. 83, 99, 17 S. Ct. 488, 41 L. Ed. 925, 933.”
To the same effect, see Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400; City of Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 10 S. Ct. 1012, 34 L. Ed. 260; Blaylock v. Incorporated Town of Muskogee (8 C. C. A.) 117 F. 125; Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Tacoma (9 C. C. A.) 230 F. 389; Berlet v. Lehigh Valley Silk Mills (3 C. C. A.) 287 F. 769; Howell v. Witman-Schwartz Corporation (3 C. C. A.) 7 F.(2d) 513; City of Galveston v. Rowan (5 C. C. A.) 20 F.(2d) 501.
If the express words of the Kansas statutes alone are considered, an illegitimate child has but few rights. It may inherit from the mother, and from the father if openly recognized by him, and the father and mother may inherit from it. As far as I am advised, excepting for Kansas, it is the uniform rule that statutes granting rights to illegitimates, being in' derogation of the- common law, should be strictly construed. In 7 C. J. at page 690, the author, referring to statutes giving illegitimates certain rights of inheritance, states that the contention has frequently been made that such statutes should be liberally construed and should confer upon the illegitimate the status of a legitimate. But the author-states:
*469“But this view has been generally rejected; and the courts have generally held that legislation giving to illegitimate children the right of succession, being in derogation of the common law, should bo strictly construed.”
But the decisions of the Supreme Court of Kansas are exactly to the contrary. The Kansas statute is to the contrary, section 77—109 of the Revised Statutes of 1923, providing:
“ * * * But the rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof shall be strictly construed, shall not bo applicable to any general statute of this state, but' all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their object.”
The Kansas Supreme Court, in Smith v. Smith, 105 Kan. 294, 182 P. 538, which involved the statutes now in question, held that the statutes conferring rights upon recognized illegitimates should be liberally and not strictly construed.
Por convenience, we speak of the “status” of an illegitimate child. But I do not understand that “status” is in itself an end; rather, I consider “status” as a general word which is useful to describe a relationship upon which are attendant certain rights. If the law confers upon a recognized illegitimate all of the rights of legitimacy, it can be properly said to have the “status” of a legitimate child. Aside from property rights, the status of legitimacy carries with it the right to the name of the father, and parental care and affection. The petition in this case discloses that the father had bestowed these rights upon this appellant. . The law deals more frequently with material rights — the principal property rights which follow in the wake of legitimacy: (a) The right to inherit from the parents; (b) the right to inherit from collateral kindred of the parents; and (c) the right of support.
The express language of the Kansas statutes gives reciprocal rights of inheritance from the mother and the father and no more. Under the common-law jurisprudence, such statutes were strictly construed; illegitimates were given the rights set out in the statute and no more. Thus we find the rule laid down without qualification that a statute permitting inheritance from the mother “does not, however, allow him to inherit from her ancestors or from her lineal or collateral kindred.” 7 C. J. 961. The Kansas Supreme Court was confronted with this question of collateral inheritance. Notwithstanding the fact that the general rule of the common law was to the contrary, and notwithstanding the fact that the statutes did not in terms give the right of collateral inheritance, the Kansas court allowed the illegitimate the right of collateral inheritance. Smith v. Smith, 105 Kan. 294, 182 P. 538. It is true that the opinion is predicated upon the statutes; the fact still remains that the statutes conferred no such rights in terms, and the opinion discloses a determination to relieve, as far as possible, the circumstances of the unfortunate but innocent illegitimate child.
To my mind, an even more significant decision is that of Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 P. 619, 30 A. L. R. 1065, decided in 1923. That case presented the' question of whether there was a nonstatutory obligation upon the father to support an illegitimate child. The common law, and the decisions of the various states which had been confronted with the same question denied any obligation upon the putative father to support his child. 7 C. J. 955. The Kansas court recognized this situation, and said:
“At common law the father of an illegitimate child was under no legal duty to support it. * * * The courts of this country apparently in every ease in which the question has been raised have held that without legislation on the subject the father of an illegitimate child cannot be required to provide for its support. * * * The common law with almost uniform consistency treated an offspring of parents not married to each other as nullius Alius — -the son of no one — of no father and no mother. That is to say, it closed its eyes to the fact of that relation and in legal aspeet ignored its existence.”
Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court of Kansas held the putative father to a nonstatutory obligation of support.
In a third ease, whore the rights of an illegitimate were not in issue, the Supreme Court has declared that, in matters involving adopted and illegitimate children, the law of Kansas has crossed over from the common law to the civil law. Riemann’s Estate, 124 Kan. 539, 262 P. 16. The statutes of adoption of Kansas are so dissimilar to the statutes of legitimation, that the decision itself is not in point. Many years ago, in Boaz v. Swinney, 79 Kan. 332, 99 P. 621, the Supreme Court adhered to the common law in its attitude toward adopted children. When the case of Riemann’s Estate was first decided (123 Kan. 718, 256 P. 1004), Boaz v. Swinney was followed by a divided court. A rehearing was granted and by a unanimous *470opinion, Boaz v. Swinney was overruled, and the civil law was followed with reference to adopted children. The court said:
“Not only may different statutes constrain different judicial conclusions on questions of law pertaining to the incidents and consequences attaching to the adoption of children, but .the hostile attitude of the common law towards the whole subject of legitimation and adoption of children is not unlikely to be reflected in the decisions of great American courts which adhere to the common law-tradition. Statute of Merton, 20 Hen. III, c. 9 (A. D. 1235); Doe d. Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 2 Cl. & Fin. 570, 5 Eng. Rul. Cases 748 (House of Lords, 1240); Keegan v. Geraghty [101 Ill. 26], supra; Frey v. Nielson, 99 N. J. Eq. 135, 132 A. 765. While the jurisprudence of this state, is greatly obligated to the common law, on this particular matter of adoptions, as well as on the law of intestate succession, our lawmakers deliberately crossed over to the side of the civil, law — -an historical fact which gives a keynote to the general trend of decisions of this court throughout its entire history.” 124 Kan. 542, 262 P. 16, 17.
We thus find that the law of Kansas has conferred upon a recognized illegitimate the important rights of support and collateral inheritance, which are not conferred even in common-law jurisdictions which have statutes of limited inheritance, and which were not conferred by the common law, but which were conferred by the civil law. We have moreover a- dictum that the Kansas court has rejected “the hostile attitude of the common law towards the whole subject of legitimation and adoption” and has “deliberately crossed over to the side of the civil law.”
In this state of the law of Kansas, I think we should look to the civil law, and not the common law, to determine the rights of an illegitimate child which has been recognized by the father as provided by the statute, recalling that it is conceded that the recognition here alleged conforms to the requirements of the Kansas- statute. The Roman law provided six methods of legitimation, which, as set out in 7 C. J. 947, and by Gibbons in his History of the Decline and Fall of Rome, were: (1) Subsequent marriage of the parents; (2) consecration of child to the use of the state; (3) adoption; (4) by the last will of the father; (5) by special dispensation from the emperor; and (6) by recognition of the father. In Brightly’s Notes, 5 Wheat. 262, 266, the author adds to the sixth the following: “As, if the father designated one of his natural children- as his child, in any public or private instrument.” The results that flowed from these acts, under the civil law, is not in dispute. Brightly .states:
“In all these eases, except the 2d, the children thus legitimated were in all respects placed upon the same footing as if born in lawful wedlock. (Œuvres de D’Aguesseau, tom. 7, p. 393, et seq.; Pothier, Pandect. in Nov. Ord. Redact., tom. 1, p. 27.)”
It is submitted that the Kansas court, by decision and dictum, has adopted the civil law jurisprudence as to illegitimate and adopted children; it is conceded that there has been a recognition under the Kansas statute; the civil law places sueh children “upon the same footing as if born in lawful wedlock.” Although I recognize room for doubt, my personal belief is that, under Kansas law, a duly recognized illegitimate has the status of a legitimate child. Under the law of Kansas, a recognized illegitimate has been granted the rights of a legitimate child in every ease that has arisen. No right has been denied it. I think the appellant is therefore entitled to the status of a legitimate child. The Oklahoma statute contemplates sueh a status where there has been a recognition in writing signed before a competent witness. No sueh recognition is here alleged, -but it is clear that the public policy of Oklahoma is not opposed to the existence of sueh a status.
It is therefore my opinion that we should determine the question of whether the will of the testator devised the fee or a life estate to the appellee.