Court Opinion

ID: 9954866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 13:02:17.043765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:05.131591
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

         MARGARET CAPALONGO and RONALD CAPALONGO,

                               Appellants,

                                   v.

          DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as
            trustee for Morgan Stanley Capital 1 Inc. Trust
           2006-HE2, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
                           Series 2006-HE2,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D22-3750

                            March 27, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Kimberly Sharpe Byrd,
Judge.

Roland D. Waller of Law Office of Roland D. Waller, New Port Richey, for
Appellants.

Joseph G. Paggi III, and David B. Adamian of DeLuca Law Group, PLLC,
Fort Lauderdale; and Lindsay R. Rich and Branden M. Henderson of
First American Law Group, Tampa, for Appellee.

SLEET, Chief Judge.
     Margaret Capalongo (the Wife) and Robert Capalongo (the
Husband) appeal the final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company following a nonjury trial. We
affirm the judgment, but we write to address the Husband's valid waiver
of his homestead rights in the property.
     In 2000, the Capalongos purchased their home, owning it jointly as
tenants by the entirety. In 2005, the Wife sought to refinance the home
and obtained a mortgage loan with WMC Mortgage Corp. Pursuant to
the refinancing terms, the Husband was required to transfer his interest
in the home by deed to the Wife and sign a waiver of his homestead
rights. On December 23, 2005, the Husband executed a warranty deed
transferring the property to be exclusively in the Wife's name. Attached
to the warranty deed was a waiver titled "Borrower Spouse," which
provided:
     BORROWER(S)' SPOUSE(S): The undersigned hereby joins in
     this Security Instrument for the sole purpose of subordinating,
     conveying and/or waiving any current or potential interest in
     the Property. By signing below, the undersigned
     subordinates, conveys, and/or waives any and all rights,
     interest or claims in the Property, including, but not limiting
     to, homestead, dower, marital or joint-occupancy rights. No
     personal liability under the Note is hereby incurred by the
     undersigned joining spouse(s).
(Emphasis added.) The same day, the Wife executed the new note and
mortgage. All three documents—the deed, mortgage, and waiver—were
witnessed and notarized by the same notary public and were
subsequently filed in sequential pages in the Official Records Book of the
Public Records of Pasco County, Florida.
     In January 2012, the Wife failed to make the mortgage payments,
and following continued nonpayment, she was notified of the default in
November 2016. The mortgage was assigned to Deutsche Bank on

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March 12, 2012, which prosecuted this foreclosure action. The
Capalongos filed their answer and raised several affirmative defenses
including that the property was the Husband's homestead because he
did not execute or join the mortgage. On August 17, 2021, Deutsche
Bank moved for partial summary judgment on three of the Capalongos'
affirmative defenses. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the
Husband "validly and expressly joined in [the Wife's] mortgage and
waived his homestead rights in the [p]roperty." The parties then
proceeded to a nonjury trial, after which the trial court entered a final
judgment of foreclosure against the Wife. This appeal timely followed.
     The Capalongos argue on appeal that the trial court erred in
entering partial summary judgment as to their affirmative defense that
the Husband still maintained homestead rights in the property. They
maintain that because his waiver was not attached to the mortgage, it
was invalid. This argument is without merit.
     "Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760
So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). Here, the Capalongos do not argue that any
disputed issues of material fact remained. Rather, they argue that
Deutsche Bank was not entitled to partial summary judgment as a
matter of law. We review the trial court's ruling de novo. See Taylor v.
Maness, 941 So. 2d 559, 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (" 'Where no genuine
issue of material fact is shown to exist, the only question for the
appellate court is whether the summary judgment was properly granted
under the law.' Thus, '[a] trial court's ruling on a motion for summary
judgment regarding a pure question of law is reviewed de novo.' "
(citation omitted) (first quoting Yardum v. Scalese, 799 So. 2d 382, 383

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(Fla. 4th DCA 2001); and then quoting Fernandez v. Homestar at Miller
Cove, Inc., 935 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006))).
      Section 4 of article X of the Florida Constitution provides that a
homestead to the extent of 160 acres of contiguous land or the half of
one acre within the limits of a municipality "shall be exempt from forced
sale under process of any court." Art. X, § 4(a)(1), Fla. Const. Such
homestead rights are held inviolate and can be alienated only as provided
by the Florida Constitution. Particularly applicable to this case, article
X, section 4(c) allows for alienation by mortgage if the spouse joins.1 Art.
X, § 4(c), Fla. Const. ("The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the
spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or
gift . . . ." (emphasis added); see also Crawford v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n,
266 So. 3d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) ("Florida courts have
consistently interpreted this constitutional provision as requiring spousal
joinder in the execution of a mortgage on homestead property in order for
the mortgage to encumber the property and be enforceable in foreclosure,
even where only the signatory spouse is an owner of record on the
property's deed."). Here, in order for the Husband to have validly waived
his homestead rights, it must be established that he "joined" in the
mortgage.
      The Capalongos maintain that "join" means "to cause something to
be attached or fastened to another thing" and that because the
Husband's waiver was not physically attached or fastened to the
mortgage, he did not "join" the mortgage for purposes of waiving his
homestead rights. The Capalongos further suggest that even a waiver

      1 Article X, section 4(c) also provides that "[i]f the owner or spouse

is incompetent, the method of alienation or encumbrance shall be as
provided by law." Those circumstances are not applicable here.

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that specifically references the mortgage is invalid if it is not affixed,
appended, or stapled to the mortgage document. This argument has no
basis under Florida law.
       The Capalongos do not cite, nor can we independently find, any
authority to support the argument that a waiver must be physically
attached to a mortgage to be effective. In fact, there are no constitutional
restrictions on how a spouse may join the mortgage for the purposes of
waiving homestead rights. And "[r]equiring that a waiver of the
homestead exemption be made in the context of a mortgage assures that
the waiver is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily." Chames v.
DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 850, 861 (Fla. 2007) ("[W]aivers [of constitutional
rights] must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.").
       Here, the undisputed facts are that the Husband executed the
waiver and deed on the same day the Wife executed the mortgage. The
waiver expressly stated that the Husband "joins in this [s]ecurity
[i]nstrument" and "waives any and all rights . . . to[] homestead." And
the Capalongos conceded at oral argument that the "security instrument"
referenced the mortgage executed by the Wife. Coupled with the fact that
the documents were recorded in sequential pages in the county record, it
is clear that the document signed by the Husband unequivocally
demonstrates his intent to waive his homestead rights. Accordingly,
Deutsche Bank was entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of
law.
       Affirmed.

LaROSE, J., Concurs.
ATKINSON, J., Concurs Specially.

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ATKINSON, Judge, Concurring specially.

      I join fully in the majority opinion. I write separately to point out
that the Capalongos' argument is not only unsupported by authority—as
the majority opinion ably points out—but is also antithetical to the
ordinary meaning of the language of the applicable constitutional
provision.
      In article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, the subject of the
verb "joined" is "the spouse." Citing a dictionary definition for support,
the Capalongos argue that the husband's waiver of his homestead rights
was not effectual because the document that would have effectuated that
waiver was itself not attached to or fastened to the mortgage. In so
doing, the Capalongos supplant the object of the verb "joined"—the
homestead owner—with an object not supported by the text—the
document a spouse might happen to sign in order to effectuate the
alienation of the homestead. See art. X, § 4, Fla. Const. ("The owner of
homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the
homestead by mortgage, sale or gift . . . .").
      The Capalongos myopically train their focus on one usage of the
word "join"—to fasten or attach—to the exclusion of another usage of the
word "join"—the joint participation of two individuals in a common
activity. While two physical objects can indeed be joined by fastening
them together or affixing one to another, two individual human beings
can be joined in a common enterprise or joint endeavor. See Join, The
American Heritage Dictionary 945 (5th ed. 2011) (including the following
among the definitions of "join": "To put or bring together so as to make
continuous or form a unit: join two boards with nails; joined hands in a
circle"; "To participate with in an act or activity: The committee joins me in
welcoming you"; "To engage in; enter into: Opposing armies joined battle

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on the plain"; "To act together; form an alliance: The two factions joined to
oppose the measure"; and "To take part; participate: joined the search").
     Dictionaries can be useful because, "in general, a dictionary may
provide the popular and common-sense meaning of terms." See Advisory
Op. to Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, the Voting Restoration
Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att'y
Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 So. 3d 786,
800 (Fla. 2014)). However, "the meaning of a word cannot be determined
in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used,"
and the fact that a term "can carry different meanings does not"
necessarily "render the phrase" in which it is used "susceptible to more
than one natural reading." Id. at 1079 (quoting in part Textron Lycoming
Reciprocating Engine Div., Avco Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace, Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., Int'l Union, 523 U.S. 653, 657 (1998))
(reasoning that the word "terms," when viewed in context of the
constitutional provision at issue, only had one natural meaning despite
the existence of different dictionary definitions). In the context of section
4, it is the spouse himself that does the joining, and not a piece of paper
that is joined to something else.
     To the extent that any additional indicia is needed to affirm that
the word "joined" does not refer to the physical affixation of one
document to another, the preposition "by" should be a giveaway. If the
term "joined" was being utilized to indicate the connection of two
documents, the preposition "to" would be more appropriate. However,
the provision uses the preposition "by," making it clear that the joining is
to be done by the human being that is the object of the prepositional
phrase—the spouse—and that who the spouse is joining in a common
endeavor is the homestead owner. See art. X, § 4, Fla. Const. (referring

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to "[t]he owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if
married").
      Understanding as we must that the subject of the verb "joined" in
section 4 is the spouse, and concluding as we should that the husband
cannot and need not staple himself to a document or a document to his
wife (the "owner of homestead real estate"), the conclusion that the
constitution is referring to an act of participation and not of physical
affixation is the only reasonable one. See Ham v. Portfolio Recovery
Assocs., 308 So. 3d 942, 947 (Fla. 2020) ("[T]he goal of interpretation is
to arrive at a 'fair reading' of the text" (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012))). Here,
the husband joined in the alienation of his homestead by executing the
waiver that said he was doing so by the security instrument to which it
referred.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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