Court Opinion

ID: 9705623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:14:18.79221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.074092
License: Public Domain

McWilliams, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion.
I remain convinced that the deed from Moss to Strawn created a condition subsequent, that there was a breach of that condition resulting in a forfeiture and that Moss subsequently conveyed a fee simple title to the Harmons, subject, of course, to his life estate.
The majority, invoking the “rule” which permits the Court to ignore any point not argued either orally or in the brief, declined to consider whether a condition subsequent had been created. This “rule” is as much honored in the breach as in the observance. The Court has never hesitated to consider questions it has thought necessary or desirable to consider whether or not they have been argued by counsel orally or in the brief. The cases cited in the majority opinion, when subjected to close scrutiny, reveal nothing more than a discretion which the Court may exercise at will. Nowhere will there be found a preC' edent which precludes the Court from considering cmy point or question tried or decided by the lower court or, indeed, any point or question which was presented, but not decided. The Court is surely not estopped from considering questions of importance ; surely it is not required to close its eyes to that which is apparent; nor should any such “rule” be so inflexible that the Court would be powerless to prevent a miscarriage of justice L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 41 N. E. 2d 195 (1942) ; Gleason v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Company, 331 Mass. 703, 122 N. E. 2d 381 (1954) ; State v. Apodaca, 42 N. M. 544, 82 P. 2d 641 (1938) ; 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error, § 693 (1962) ; 5B C.J.S., Appeal & Error, § 1802 (1958). See Goldman v. Johnson Motor Lines, 192 Md. 24, 31, 63 A. 2d 622 (1949) ; Mullen v. Brydon, 117 Md. 554, *35561, 83 Atl. 1025 (1912) ; Desche v. Gies, 56 Md. 135 (1881) ; Maryland Rule 846 f.
Judge Pugh devoted a substantial portion of his opinion to his reasons for deciding that a condition subsequent had not been created. I believe he was wrong and I think that this Court, in order to prevent what seems to me to be an obvious miscarriage of justice, should have reversed his decision. I have set forth the reasons why I think so.
But for the magic touch of the State Roads Commission this dispute might have slumbered on for years, and, indeed, might never have awakened. At stake are part of a one acre lot,1 in Prince George’s County, and the avails ($5110.60) of a proceeding 2 to acquire the balance by condemnation.
The lot, most of which is now occupied by the Capital Beltway, was bought in October of 1938 by William J. Moss, a 60 year old, illiterate widower. On 30 November 1944 he conveyed the lot to Omar C. Strawn, reserving to himself a life estate, the consideration being, in addition to the usual $10, “other valuable considerations,” “and also the payment hereafter by the said Strawn, grantee, of all taxes, assessments if any, and insurance premiums in connection with the improvements on the property hereinafter described * * (Emphasis supplied.) Although there is no evidence that any insurance premiums were ever paid, it seems to be agreed that Strawn, or someone in his behalf, paid the taxes up to and including 1949. In the spring of 1951 the property was advertised for sale because the taxes for the year 1950 had not been paid. Flossie Harmon (the daughter of Moss) and Mark M. Harmon, her husband (the appellants), claiming that Strawn and his son, Floyd Strawn, refused the request of Moss and themselves to pay the taxes, redeemed the property from the tax sale and continued thereafter to pay the taxes.
Strawn died in Miami in June 1951, leaving a widow (since deceased), two sons, Faber W. Strawn and Harry O. Strawn, a daughter, Ella Strawn Tucker, and Zoe Webster, the daugh*36ter of a deceased son, Floyd L. Strawn, whose widow intervened in the court below. His will, probated in Florida, although mentioning Florida real estate, makes no reference to realty in Maryland. Faber Strawn was named executor and, in September 1955, he was appointed ancillary administrator by the Orphans’ Court for Prince George’s County.3 All of the aforementioned, in addition to the State Roads Commission, the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission and the County ■Commissioners for Prince George’s County are the appellees.
On 7 May 1953, Moss conveyed the property, again subject to a life estate in himself, to the Harmons (appellants). He had occupied the property continuously from 1938 and continued to do so until his death on 21 April 1961. After long and unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the parties,4 the State Roads Commission, on 6 March 1963, filed the usual condemnation petition, depositing with the clerk its estimate of the value of the part taken plus the damages to the remainder ($4000).
The 13,086 square feet remaining after the taking by the State Roads Commission was sold for non-payment of the 1963 taxes on 2 March 1964 to Raphael G. Urciolo. Since Mr. Urciolo entered his appearance in this case for Mrs. Harmon on 10 December 1963, it will be assumed that he was acting in her interest when he became the tax sale purchaser. As to whether there was any effort by or on behalf of the Strawns to redeem the property, the record is silent.5
Both the Harmons and the Strawns claimed the fund and on 25 January 1965 evidence was produced before Judge Pugh in support of their respective contentions and he considered whether the language used in the deed from Moss to Strawn created a condition subsequent. After deciding it did not, he declared that, even if a condition subsequent had been created, *37neither Moss nor the Harmons took action sufficient to accomplish a forfeiture.
That the condition subsequent is an unpopular stepchild is. well established. In Sands v. Church, Etc., 181 Md. 536, 542, 30 A. 2d 771 (1943) we said:
“It is a familiar maxim that conditions subsequent are not favored in law, for the breach of such a condition causes a forfeiture, and the law is adverse to forfeitures.”
The same language will be found, either in totidem verbis or in close paraphrase, in dozens of textbooks and in countless decisions. It must not be supposed, however, because this stepchild is disliked, that it has been forsaken. In Trustees St. Charles Col. v. Carroll, 121 Md. 464, 478, 88 Atl. 277 (1913), after stating the language of Sands supra, set forth above, we said:
“But they [conditions subsequent] may be annexed to grants and when the intention of the parties is clear the Court is bound to respect it.”
Professors Simes and Smith indicate a class of cases into which this case very readily fits:
“The judicial dislike for forfeitures, because of their harshness, is manifested in several ways. First, as we have seen, the courts go to great lengths to avoid a construction of language which will result in a finding that a condition subsequent has been created. Second, even after they have been forced to admit that a condition subsequent has been created, they seek to avoid finding that there has been any breach. Thus, where the condition requires the grantee to do an affirmative act, the court will allow a reasonable time for its accomplishment, and will extend the time when war conditions have rendered performance difficult. Moreover, courts of equity as a rule refuse to declare a forfeiture or to assist the holder of a right of entry for breach of condition in securing possession when there has been a breach. In rare instances, however, where the equities are all in favor of the creator of the *38right of entry, it appears that a court of equity will aid him in forfeiting the estate for breach.” (Emphasis supplied.) 1 Simes & Smith, Future Interests, § 257 (2nd Ed. 1956).
There seems to be no foolproof formula for either the creation or the determination of an estate on condition. As Mr. Tiffany puts it:
“While certain words are said to be appropriate for the creation of a condition, such as ‘on condition/ ‘provided/ ‘so that/ no particular words are required, it being purely a question of the intention of the grantor or testator as gathered from the whole instrument.”
1 Tiffany, Real Property, § 190, at 305-06 (3rd Ed. 1939).
And it has been said that the intention of the parties may be gathered not only from the whole instrument but from their acts and the surrounding circumstances as well.- In the Restatement of Contracts, § 45 g (1936), it is said:
“Among the considerations pertinent to the determination of whether an estate in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is created are the language of the limitation, the language in other parts of the instrument, such as the consideration stated and the recitals, if any, and relevant facts external to the instrument, such as the actual consideration, the relation of the parties and the purpose of the conveyance.”
In Brown v. Whitefield, 225 Md. 220, 225, 169 A. 2d 920 (1961) Judge Sybert, for the Court, said:
“It is well settled that in construing a deed, the effect which most nearly accords with the intention of the parties is given the first consideration unless to do so would violate some rule of law. Adams v. Parater, 206 Md. 224; 111 A. 2d 590 (1955) ; Weiprecht v. Gill, 191 Md. 478, 62 A. 2d 253 (1948). Thus, we must .look to the intent of the parties here: to determine what land they meant to convey. Whittington v. *39Mann, 211 Md. 199, 126 A. 2d 617 (1956) ; Jay v. Michael, 82 Md. 1, 33 Atl. 322 (1895). In essence what we must do is to place ourselves, to the degree possible, in the same situation and circumstances as the parties—to occupy their seats, so to speak—at the time the instrument was executed, and in this vicarious role to seek the result intended by the parties. Whittington v. Mann, supra; Hodges v. Owings, 178 Md. 300, 13 A. 2d 338 (1940); Restatement, Property, § 241. The language used by the parties will of course be of utmost importance in ascertaining their intent. Whittington v. Mann, supra; Weiprecht v. Gill, supra; Maryland State Pair v. Schmidt, 147 Md. 613, 128 Atl. 365 (1925).”
Nor is it necessary, as Judge Pugh seemed to think, that there be express words to the effect that the property shall revert to the grantor on forfeiture. 1 Simes & Smith, Future Interests, § 247, at 280 (2nd Ed. 1956); 1 Tiffany, Real Property, § 190 (3rd Ed. 1939). See Kiser v. Lucas, 170 Md. 486, 185 Atl. 441 (1936); Jenkins v. Horwitz, 92 Md. 34, 47 Atl. 1022 (1900); Bennett v. Humane Imp. Socy., 91 Md. 10, 45 Atl. 888 (1900) ; Stansbury v. Hubner, 73 Md. 228, 20 Atl. 904 (1890).
The case at bar is very much like those cases where the grantor conveys his property to a grantee in consideration of an agreement for support, maintenance and care. It has been said that such cases are sui generis, that they are peculiar in their character and incidents and that courts deal with them on principles not applicable to ordinary conveyances. Manning v. Street, 279 Ky. 253, 130 S. W. 2d 735 (1939); Russell v. Carver, 208 Ala. 219, 94 So. 128 (1922); 4 Thompson, Real Property, § 1880 (Repl. Vol. 1961); Annot, 76 ALR 742 (1932).
In Tibbetts v. Krall, 128 Ind. App. 215, 145 N. E. 2d 577 (1957) the grantor, at age 60 and after a serious illness, conveyed to her nephew a farm in Madison County, Indiana. The deed contained the following provision:
“This conveyance is made upon consideration that the grantees move into the dwelling house on said land *40and reside therein with grantor and provide a home therein for grantor as a member of their family and care for her in sickness and in health and all with kindness and consideration and all so long as said grantor shall live. Not however to provide nurse hire or Physician or medicines or wearing apparel. And grantees also• to keep all taxes on said land paid and the improvements insured and in reasonable repair.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Some years later she demanded the reconveyance of the property, and, upon the refusal of the grantees to do so, she filed suit. The language of the court, which affirmed the judgment in her favor, is particularly pertinent.
“There can be no question but that the agreement to care for the appellant ‘as a member of their family * * * in sickness and in health and all with kindness and consideration and all so long as said grantor shall live’, which was stated as a consideration for the deed in question, created a condition subsequent so long as such contract for support remained executory, as it is well settled that a grant of land in consideration of an agreement for the future support of the grantor, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, creates in the grantee an estate on the condition subsequent. Huffman v. Rickets, 1916, 60 Ind. App. 526, 111 N. E. 322; Lindsay v. Glass, 1889, 119 Ind. 301, 21 N.E. 897. Such contracts, in which aged and infirm persons convey their property to others in consideration of an agreement for support, maintenance, and care, are almost universally recognized by the courts as constituting a class by themselves in matters pertaining to their construction and interpretation, and, as has been reiterated in several decisions, until such contract is fully performed on both sides it is liable to be rescinded and the property reclaimed, leaving the parties to their remedies respectively for what may have been furnished under the contract.” Id at 581 (Emphasis supplied.)
*41The following quotation from a Rhode Island decision helps to explain the willingness of courts to lend their assistance in the enforcement of this kind of condition subsequent.
“While such contracts are not often in form a trust, they are usually in fact a trust. One under the stress of infirmity or age surrenders his property to another, for relief from care and anxiety, and receives in return an assurance of support. The result, so far as the donor is concerned, would be no different if he had made an express deed of trust. The parties do not contemplate a mere contract, but an obligation, binding on conscience as well as in law. The arrangement rests in confidence on the part of the grantor. It would, indeed, be a hard rule, when the feeble party has fully performed his part of the contract in the hope of security and quiet, to require him to spend the remainder of his life in lawsuits to compel performance by the other party.” Grant v. Bell, 26 R. I. 288, 58 Atl. 951, 951-52 (1904).
Let us now “place ourselves” in the “same situation and circumstances” in which Moss found himself when he signed the deed to Strawn and “occupy * * * [his] seat(s), so to speak.” Brown v. Whitefield, supra. He was 67 years old, illiterate, alone and possessed of but two assets, his health and his property. He was able to raise and sell a few flowers, some fruit and vegetables and do odd jobs. Mrs. Harmon gave him money from time to time and it is likely he was receiving some public assistance.6 It may be assumed, therefore, that he was not unduly concerned about support and maintenance. It is quite possible, however, that he was concerned about one serious threat to his security and independence, namely, taxes and insurance, to pay for which, hard money was required. Since the property was unencumbered he would have nothing to fear if a hedge against tax sales and fire could be obtained. From whence came the suggestion that he deed the property to his *42old friend (Strawn) I do not know but it can readily be assumed that he considered it a solution of his problem. And so it was—for a while.
One can imagine, in the closing months of 1950, his anxiety and concern over Strawn’s refusal, after repeated requests, to pay the taxes; and his deepening concern and alarm when his property was advertised for sale early in 1951. The very dragon he thought he had slain was now about to devour his homestead. But the Harmons came to the rescue and thereafter continued to pay the taxes.
Appellees appear to excuse Strawn’s default by saying that he was ill. Perhaps he was, but there is no evidence of the nature of his illness or that it prevented him from attending to his business affairs. He was well enough, in 1950,7 to make an elaborate will, containing many bequests, referring to realty in Florida (but not in Maryland), and providing for a mentally incompetent wife. Since the property was assessed to him it must be assumed he received tax bills and had notice of the date and terms of sale, which he survived by about four months.
Despite knowledge, both actual and constructive, of the circumstances, .neither Strawn nor his son and executor, Faber Strawn, ever made the slightest effort after 1949 to pay the taxes or reimburse the Harmons for their payments. Neither of them made the slightest effort to rescue the property from the tax sale. That this was an oversight should, in my opinion, be rejected.
Faced with this breach of the condition and anticipating that the Strawns would not attempt to reestablish their status as remaindermen, Moss, after waiting two years, conveyed the property to the natural objects of his bounty, the Harmons, reserving a life estate for himself. Although no condition subsequent was written into the deed to the Harmons, it is probable that one was intended since they continued to pay the taxes ■ until the old man’s death. The question now is whether a forfeiture was accomplished.
No principle of law is more securely established than that which requires the enforcement of a breach of a condition sub*43sequent to be made by formal entry by the grantor, either by way of taking actual possession or by way of ejectment or some other appropriate legal proceeding. Dess well known but no less well established are the principles applicable to situations where the grantor is already in possession, as Moss was in the case at bar. There is substantial authority for the proposition that where the grantor is in possession the estate revests in him at once without any formal act on his part, There are, however, holdings that something more than mere possession is needed.
In support of the automatic revesting will be found both courts and authors of textbooks.
“* * * If the grantor is himself in possession of the premises when the breach happens, the estate revests in him at once without any formal act on his part, and he will be presumed, after the breach, to hold, for the purpose of enforcing a forfeiture, unless he waive the breach, as it is competent for him to do, and as he may do by his acts.” Washburn, Real Property, § 957, at 18 (6th Ed. 1902).
“Lydia Marwick, for whose use the condition was to be performed, was the heir-at-law of the testator, and she occupied the premises to the time of her decease. It is therefore insisted, that no formal entry was required of her to create a forfeiture of the estate.
“The law will presume, that a person, who cannot make a formal entry upon the estate of another for condition broken, because he is already in possession, intends to hold possession to enforce all his legal rights, unless there be some indication, that such was not his intention, by which the presumption of law may be rebutted.” Andrews v. Senter, 32 Me. 394, 397 (1851).
“* * * An estate upon condition subsequent, does not revert until entry for the condition broken. 4 Kent’s Comm. 122, et seq.-—2 Black, Comm. 155, 165. —Cross v. Carson, 8 Blackf. 138.-—Doe v. Cassiday, at the present term (1). But the evidence shows that J. A. Thompson remained in possession likewise, as his devisee. He could not enter upon his own posses*44sion, for condition broken; and, although he might, perhaps, under the circumstances, have proceeded by action to divest the estate of the grantee, it would have been a useless act, which the law does not require. The defendant set up her title in opposition to that of the plaintiff in this action, and we are of the opinion that that was sufficient.” Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Ind. 323, 329 (1857) (Emphasis supplied.)
Accord, Lincoln & Kennebeck Bank v. Drummond, 5 Mass. 321 (1809) ; Moore v. Wingate, 53 Mo. 398 (1873) ; Rollins v. Riley, 44 N. H. 9 (1862).
That something more than mere possession may be necessary is indicated by 4A Thompson, Real Property, § 1981, at 428-29 (Repl. Vol. 1961) :
“If the grantor is himself in possession when the condition is broken, the estate revests in him at once, and his possession is presumed to be for the purpose of holding under the forfeiture. If he is already in possession, it is, however, in some cases declared that the grantor must manifest an intention of holding by reason of the breach of condition; * * *”
Assuming that possession, without more, after breach of a condition, is sufficient to effect a revesting of the grantor’s estate, there can be little doubt that Moss’s possession was adequate, for, as I have already indicated, he was in actual, physical possession of his property from the day he bought it to the day he died. In any event, the execution, delivery and recording of the deed to the Harmons makes it unnecessary to go that far. This was a positive, definite and unequivocal manifestation of an intention to effect a forfeiture. It was constructive notice to the world, and, as it turned out, actual notice to the Strawns,8 that he claimed ownership of the property. Nor *45is there any evidence of subsequent conduct or statements on his part which could support a claim or inference of waiver.
In the opinion of the trial judge there is an observation that “no action appears to have been taken” by Moss or his “heirs” after Strawn’s death. If “action” is intended to mean some sort of court proceeding and, if it is inferred that such an action is essential to the revesting of Moss’s property, under the circumstances here presented, then, I must disagree. All that is required of the grantor is some appropriate act indicating his election to enforce the breach. 1 Simes & Smith, Future Interests, § 255a (2nd Ed. 1956); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 97 Mass. 188 (1867). Continued possession coupled with a subsequent conveyance have been declared to be a sufficient manifestation of intention. Blum v. Bush, 86 Mich. 206, 49 N. W. 142, 144 (1891). It occurs to me that perhaps the only action available to Moss would have been a bill to remove a cloud on his title. It can safely be assumed, however, that he was completely unaware of the existence of such a proceeding. Indeed as far as he was concerned, there was no cloud on his title. The Strawns were neither claiming nor exhibiting any interest, past, present or future in his property. He had deeded it to the Harmons ■and they were paying the taxes. To borrow an apt colloquialism, “He had it made.”
Looking at the case as a whole one could not say it would be unreasonable to conclude that a decision to abandon the future interest in the Moss property was made as early as 1950. Such a decision might very well reflect the exercise of good business judgment. There was the possibility that both the assessment and the tax rate would increase. The house might be destroyed. Moss might live for quite a long time. The end result might be a cumulative total expenditure in excess of the value of the property. Certainly there is no evidence (except claiming the stipulated damages) inconsistent with such a conclusion. The courts ought not help one who has abandoned the goose to run off with the golden egg.
I would have reversed Judge Pugh.

. Actually 40,000 sq. ft., of which 86,914 sq. ft. (including the dwelling) were taken, leaving 13,086 sq. ft. remaining.

. All parties in interest, by a stipulation filed in the proceedings, agreed on the amount.

. No mention of the property is made in the real inventory and at the time of trial (10 years after Strawn’s appointment) the ancillary administration had not been concluded.

. Faber Strawn was asserting his claim to the State Roads Commission as early as 1961.

. Faber Strawn said he did not know the property had been sold for taxes.

. Strawn testified his father “had contributed to his support a certain amount.”

. Except for the year, the will was undated.

. In his testimony Faber Strawn indicated he was aware of this deed at about the time of its execution. In paragraph 6 of an affidavit filed 8 Jan. 1964, in this case, by Faber Strawn, the following language appears. “That approximately ten years ago, after the recordation of the aforesaid deed (Liber 1606, Folio 202), the defendants, Flossie A. Harmon and Mark M. Harmon voluntarily commenced to pay State and County taxes on the aforesaid *45property, representing to the Strawn family that they were in a financial position to do so, and desired to do so as a gesture of friendship for the now deceased William J. Moss, the father of the defendant Flossie H. Harmon.” (Emphasis supplied.)