Court Opinion

ID: 9952441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 20:01:24.012286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:19.620776
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-3173     Document: 010111018526       Date Filed: 03/19/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                        PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         March 19, 2024

                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 22-3173

  JAMARYUS MOORE,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the District of Kansas
                          (D.C. No. 6:18-CR-10073-JWB-2)
                        _________________________________

 Jacob R. Rasch-Chabot, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal
 Public Defender, and Grant R. Smith, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on the briefs),
 Office of the Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant – Appellant.

 Bryan C. Clark, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas (Kate E. Brubacher, U.S.
 Attorney, James A. Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Chief Appellate Division, and Molly
 M. Gordon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, on the brief), District of Kansas,
 for Plaintiff – Appellee.
                           _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

 MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________
Appellate Case: 22-3173     Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024     Page: 2

                                    I. INTRODUCTION

        Jamaryus Moore robbed a liquor store at gunpoint. He pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act

 robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Although he faced an advisory Sentencing Guidelines

 range of 51 to 63 months, he requested a downward variance to a term of probation. The

 district court gave Moore a choice: accept a 51-month sentence of imprisonment or

 commit to a term of probation with the understanding that a violation of its terms of

 supervision would result in an 84-month sentence. Moore chose probation. When he

 violated the terms of his probation, the district court imposed the previously promised 84-

 month sentence. Moore appealed and this court reversed. United States v. Moore, 30

 F.4th 1021, 1022 (10th Cir. 2022). Moore concluded the district court plainly erred “by

 employing its sentence-in-advance system.” Id. at 1025. Instead, according to Moore,

 upon revoking a sentence of probation, district courts commit themselves “to a two-step

 process.” Id. at 1026. Moore described the required two-step process in some detail. Id. at

 1026-27. On remand, the district court, without any objection from Moore, utilized

 Moore’s two-step process and imposed a sentence of 80 months’ imprisonment.

        Moore appeals, asserting the district court plainly erred in calculating his sentence

 using Moore’s two-step process. In so arguing, he contends the law of the case doctrine

 has no impact on the existence of error or on that asserted error’s plainness because (1)

 Moore’s discussion of the mandated two-step process is dicta and, in any event, (2) its

 two-step process falls within the exception to the doctrine for decisions that are clearly

 erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. This court concludes the discussion in

 Moore of the required two-step process upon revocation of probation is not dicta. Instead,

                                               2
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024       Page: 3

 it is a critical component of Moore’s conclusion that the district court erred in employing

 a “sentence-in-advance system.” Id. at 1024-25. Furthermore, although this court is not

 without some doubt as to the correctness of Moore’s mandatory two-step process, the

 decision is not so clearly erroneous that this panel is entitled to disregard it in evaluating

 whether the district court plainly erred. In any event, Moore has not demonstrated that

 adhering to the rule of law set out in Moore would work upon him a manifest injustice.

 Thus, exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this

 court affirms the district court’s judgment.

                                     II. BACKGROUND

        In 2018, Moore walked into a liquor store, pointed a handgun at the store clerk;

 and demanded money. The clerk placed $100 in a plastic bag and gave the bag to Moore.

 Authorities apprehended Moore shortly thereafter. Eventually, Moore pleaded guilty to a

 single count of violating § 1951(a). A United States Probation Officer prepared a

 Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR); the PSR concluded Moore was subject to an

 advisory sentencing range of 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment. Despite facing an advisory

 sentencing floor of 51-months’ imprisonment, Moore requested a non-custodial sentence.

 The district court initially hesitated at Moore’s request, but ultimately gave him a choice:

 accept a 51-month sentence of incarceration or commit to a term of probation with the

 understanding a violation of the terms of supervision would result in an 84-month

 sentence of incarceration. Moore chose probation.

        About ten months after he was sentenced, Moore violated the conditions of his

 probation. A United States Probation Officer concluded Moore’s violations were of the

                                                3
Appellate Case: 22-3173     Document: 010111018526         Date Filed: 03/19/2024     Page: 4

 Grade C variety—the least serious type set out in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a)—and

 recommended an advisory sentencing range of 5 to 11 months’ imprisonment. The parties

 agreed with this recommendation. Nevertheless, focusing on the bargain it previously

 struck with Moore, the district court revoked Moore’s probation and sentenced him to an

 84-month term of imprisonment. Moore appealed, challenging the procedural and

 substantive reasonableness of his 84-month sentence.

        Employing plain error review, this court reversed and remanded. We held that the

 district court’s “sentence-in-advance system [was] procedurally unreasonable.” Moore,

 30 F.4th at 1025. In reaching this conclusion, Moore began by recognizing the provisions

 of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) give district courts two options when a defendant violates “a

 condition of probation.” Id. at 1026. District courts can (1) continue a defendant “on

 probation with or without modifications to the term or conditions” or (2) revoke

 probation and “resentence” the defendant under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 to

 3559. Id. Because it revoked Moore’s probation, Moore held the district court

 “committed itself to a two-step process under § 3565(a)(2).” Id. After describing how that

 two-step process operates, id. at 1026-27, Moore summarized it as follows:

        In short, when revoking probation and resentencing under § 3565(a)(2), the
        Sentencing Guidelines and [United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1306
        (10th Cir. 2004)] require district courts to undertake a two-step analysis.
        First, they must consider the recommended guideline range in a PSR and
        impose a sentence for the originally charged crime based only on a
        defendant’s pre-probation conduct.[1] And second, they must consider

        1
         Moore explained that the first step of the required process originated from the
 statutory language of § 3565(a)(2) and the prefatory language of Chapter 7 of the
 Sentencing Guidelines:

                                              4
Appellate Case: 22-3173     Document: 010111018526         Date Filed: 03/19/2024     Page: 5

        Chapter 7’s policy statements and sentence a defendant for the probation
        violation based only on the defendant’s post-probation conduct.[2]

 30 F.4th at 1027.

        Applying that process to the facts of Moore’s case, Moore held that, at step one,

 the district court “locked itself into 51 months’ imprisonment.” Id. at 1026. This was so

 because “the district court had already announced that a 51-month sentence of

 imprisonment was the appropriate sentence for” Moore’s crime and had done so “after

 considering [] Moore’s pre-probation-sentence conduct and the § 3553(a) factors. Id. At

 step two, Moore recognized the sentencing grid set out in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 “yielded [a]

                [A]s the word “resentencing” suggests, a district court must
        reevaluate the case as it stood when [it] imposed probation. Under
        § 3553(a)(4)(A), that takes the court back to the probation office’s
        recommendations, the parties’ objections, and the § 3553(a) factors,
        including a defendant's history, characteristics, and conduct pre-
        probation-sentence. The Introduction to Chapter Seven of the
        Sentencing Guidelines Manual sums it up well: “Under current law, if
        the court finds that a defendant violated a condition of probation, the
        court may . . . revoke probation and impose any other sentence that
        initially could have been imposed.” U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, background.

 30 F.4th at 1026 (emphasis in original).
        2
         Moore held that the second part of the required process originated from the
 provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), as that provision was interpreted in Kelley:

               At the second step, and separately, as laid out in [Kelley, 359 F.3d at
        1306], a district court must apply the policy statements in Part B . . . of
        Chapter Seven . . . to impose any penalty “for the violation of the judicial
        order imposing supervision.” U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. B, introductory cmt. Indeed,
        Chapter Seven . . . provides its own sentencing grid . . . . So at this second
        step, the district court must consider the § 7B1.4 sentencing grid for the
        probation violation—not the sentencing guidelines for the underlying offense.

 30 F. 4th at 1026 (emphasis in original).
                                              5
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526         Date Filed: 03/19/2024       Page: 6

 5-to-11 month advisory term for [] Moore’s probation violation.” Id. With all this in

 mind, Moore concluded the district court erred because “nothing in the record suggests

 that either [it] or the parties undertook the needed two-step analysis.” Id. at 1027.

 Furthermore, this error affected Moore’s substantial rights because it was “unclear what

 sentence the [district] court would have imposed after explaining its two-step analysis at

 sentencing. Id. Moore did not seek panel or en banc rehearing.

        On remand, the district court conducted a new sentencing hearing. It summarized

 the history of the case and explained its understanding of Moore’s mandate:

        [T]he Court of Appeals basically described the process [district courts are]
        supposed to follow when revoking a sentence of probation and described
        that the process is a two-step process in which [district courts are] at the
        first step is to reevaluate the case as it stood when the [district court]
        imposed probation . . . .

               ....

                Then there’s a second step in the process at which [district courts
        are] to follow the policy statements in Part B of Chapter 7 of the sentencing
        guidelines to determine what additional sanction should be imposed on top
        of that base sentence for the breach of trust associated with the probation
        violations.

               ....

               I don’t think I’m supposed to revisit the 51 months that I previously
        determined would have been an appropriate sentence for the armed robbery
        conviction[3] but I am supposed to reevaluate the additional component of
        the sentence associated with his probation violation and then ultimately

        3
          The district court took care to clarify that if it misinterpreted Moore and was
 entitled to reconsider the step-one 51-month sentence for the robbery conviction, it
 “would not go any less than 51 months.” It would, however, consider a step-one
 component of more than 51 months’ imprisonment.

                                               6
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024       Page: 7

        describe all that and make a record on it and combine those two for a total
        sentence that would be imposed today.

 The parties agreed with the district court’s assessment of the procedural posture of the

 new sentencing proceeding. In so agreeing, Moore noted as follows: “This is not how [I]

 had suggested it should happen before the Tenth Circuit. [I] had proposed a different way

 of analyzing it under some different statutes but the Tenth Circuit has said this is what we

 need to do and this is where we are.”4

        Given that all parties agreed the appropriate focus of the new sentencing

 proceeding was Moore’s second step—utilizing Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines

 to arrive at an appropriate sentencing component for Moore’s violations of the terms of

 his probation—the district court turned to that task. It noted that, at the prior hearing,

 Moore was placed under oath and admitted the violations. Although it did not see any

 need to revisit Moore’s admissions, it was concerned the record did not adequately

 establish the “significance of some of those violations.” Accordingly, at the district

 court’s direction, the government adduced evidence as to the seriousness of Moore’s

        4
          This court has taken judicial notice of the briefs Moore filed in his previous
 appeal. Binford v. United States, 436 F.3d 1252, 1256 n.7 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The
 court is permitted to take judicial notice of its own files and records, as well as facts
 which are a matter of public record.” (alteration and quotation omitted)). A review of
 those briefs makes clear that argument Moore raised in his first appeal, but gave up
 (i.e., abandoned) on remand, is not in any way similar to the argument he now raises
 in this appeal. See infra Section III.B. (concluding the argument Moore advanced in
 this appeal is forfeited but not waived). Instead, in his prior appeal, Moore argued the
 district court erred in relying on the “sentencing bargain” it reached with Moore in
 arriving at a post-probation-revocation sentence because such bargains did not fall
 within any of the sentencing factors set out in § 3553(a).

                                               7
Appellate Case: 22-3173     Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024        Page: 8

 violations of the conditions of his probation.5 In addition, Moore testified on his own

 behalf and the parties were given a chance to make their sentencing recommendations.

 Finally, Moore made a statement to the court on his own behalf.

        The district court then imposed sentence. It indicated it considered “the nature and

 circumstances of” Moore’s violations of the terms of his probation, Moore’s

 characteristics, the statutory sentencing objectives, Chapter 7’s non-binding policy

 statements, and Moore’s mandate. It reiterated that it was locked into a 51-month

 sentence as to step one concerning the Hobbs Act robbery. As to step two, the district

 court recognized that § 7B1.4 provided an advisory sentencing range of 5-11 months’

 incarceration. It nevertheless varied upward significantly from the advisory range,

 making a specific and detailed record as to its reasons for doing so.6 Ultimately, the

        5
          A probation officer testified about Moore’s violations. She testified Moore was
 pulled over in Seattle, Washington, in a stolen van with two ski masks and three other
 people, two of whom were arrested at the scene on felony warrants. Moore refused to
 give his name and, ultimately, gave a false name during this encounter. Moore had
 contact with the police again the following day and was taken into custody due to an
 outstanding federal warrant. Before he left Kansas for Washington state, Moore knew he
 had a federal court hearing regarding other violations of the conditions of his parole.
 Instead of appearing for that hearing, he absconded.
        6
           Relying on Application Note 4 to § 7B1.4, the district court recognized Moore
 received a substantial downward variance at his initial Hobbs-Act-robbery sentencing
 proceeding. Although Moore committed an armed robbery and was facing an advisory
 sentencing range of 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment, he received a sentence of probation.
 Noting this sentence amounted to the largest downward variance it had ever granted, the
 district court relied on Application Note 4 to conclude Moore’s current violation was a
 “stunning breach of trust.” It concluded an upward variance of 12 months to the advisory
 range in § 7B1.4 was an appropriate adjustment to the step-two sentence.

        The district court then turned its focus to the probation violation of leaving the
 District of Kansas. Although categorized as a Grade C violation, the district court
                                               8
Appellate Case: 22-3173     Document: 010111018526         Date Filed: 03/19/2024     Page: 9

 district court concluded the appropriate step-two advisory sentencing range was 32 to 38

 months’ imprisonment. This range, when combined with the 51-month term of

 imprisonment from step-one, resulted in a total advisory range of 83 to 89 months’

 incarceration. The district court sentenced Moore to an 80-month term of imprisonment.

                                      III. ANALYSIS

 A. Introduction

        Moore asserts the district court erred when it utilized Moore’s two-step process to

 arrive at his sentence upon revocation of probation. He contends the provisions of the

 United States Code governing criminal sentencing do not authorize a two-step procedure.

 Instead, Moore claims that, upon revocation of probation, district courts must sentence

 defendants in accordance with §§ 3551 to 3559. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (providing that

 explained why the violation was more serious than it appeared. Moore traveled to
 Washington state, removing any question as to the intentional nature of his violation. He
 was caught in a stolen car in the company of three other felons, two of which were
 immediately arrested on outstanding warrants. There were ski masks in the car and
 Moore lied to the officers to conceal his identity. Moore’s trip to Seattle came after he
 was alerted to an upcoming hearing to address his violations. Thus, the district court
 concluded Moore’s actions amounted to absconding. It also found Moore’s testimony
 about the trip lacked credibility. The district court concluded an additional 9-month
 upward variance to § 7B1.4’s advisory sentencing range was appropriate based on these
 considerations.

         Finally, the district court determined an adjustment to § 7B1.4’s advisory
 sentencing range was necessary because Moore repeatedly lied to the court and his
 probation officer. These lies included getting kicked out of a residential facility, lying
 about a police encounter and claiming it was his brother, lying about the reasons for his
 prohibited visits to Wichita, and lying about the reasons for absconding to Seattle. The
 district court viewed Moore’s behavior as “deceptive conduct and the nature of
 obstruction of justice to help minimize or avoid detection on some of these violations, or
 minimize the significance of it.” Given this conduct, the district court varied upward an
 additional 6-months from § 7B1.4’s sentencing grid.
                                              9
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024      Page: 10

  upon revocation of probation, district courts must resentence defendants under

  Subchapter A of Chapter 227 of Title 18). Moore notes that, in relevant part, Subchapter

  A requires courts to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to

  comply with the purposes” of the sentencing factors set out in § 3553(a). According to

  Moore, § 3553(a) speaks in the singular of “a sentence,” making no mention of a two-

  step procedure whereby a court fashions one sentence based on pre-probation facts and

  one sentence based on post-probation facts. Moreover, Moore argues, § 3553(a)(4)

  requires district courts, “in the case of a violation of probation,” to consider the Chapter 7

  sentencing ranges and policy statements before imposing a sentence. In contrast to this

  statutory command, Moore claims the district court conducted two distinct § 3553(a)

  analyses, one based on the original advisory Sentencing Guidelines for Hobbs Act

  robbery—i.e., Chapters 2 through 5—and a second based on Chapter 7’s sentencing

  ranges and policy statements.

         Moore submits that the Sentencing Guidelines confirm that district courts are not

  empowered to fashion two different sentences based on pre-probation and post-probation

  facts respectively. He notes that Chapter 7, like § 3553(a), speaks in the singular when it

  refers to “the sentence imposed upon revocation,” “a term of imprisonment,” and “the

  applicable range of imprisonment.” See U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A.3; § 7B1.3(b), (e). Chapter 7

  also provides a comprehensive list of considerations the court must weigh when

  fashioning the appropriate probation revocation sentence. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. nn.1-6.

  Moore declares that nowhere in this list of considerations is there any hint district courts

  are entitled, let alone obligated, to make two siloed sentencing determinations based on

                                               10
Appellate Case: 22-3173     Document: 010111018526         Date Filed: 03/19/2024        Page: 11

  pre-probation and post-probation facts. In that regard, Moore asks this court to recognize

  that when the Sentencing Commission intends to impose complex, multi-part procedures,

  it methodically describes those procedures. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1. Further

  undermining any notion that there exists a rigid pre-probation/post-probation division

  upon revocation, Moore observes that the Sentencing Guidelines expressly detail how the

  original sentence should factor into the district courts’ probation-revocation-sentencing

  decisions. Application Note 4 to § 7B1.4 explains courts should consider the amount of

  leniency given at original sentencing hearings when fashioning probation revocation

  sentences. Specifically, if the original sentence was a result of a downward departure, an

  upward departure might be appropriate for the probation violation. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt.

  n.4.

         Moore thus argues the district court erred on remand in imposing any part of his

  post-revocation sentence on any factor other than those set out in Chapter 7 of the

  Sentencing Guidelines. That is, the district court erred in imposing a 51-month sentence

  at Moore’s step one based on pre-revocation, non-Chapter 7 considerations. See U.S.S.G.

  ch. 7, pt. A.2 (“The statutory authority to ‘suspend’ the imposition or execution of

  sentence in order to impose a term of probation was abolished upon implementation of

  the sentencing guidelines.”).7

         7
           To be precise, Moore breaks apart his claim of error into two components.
  First, he argues the district court erred, both at step-one and in imposing an overall
  sentence, by failing to consider Chapter 7. Second, he claims the district court erred
  in imposing two different sentences, one based entirely on pre-probation facts and
  one based on facts relating exclusively to his probation revocation. In this court’s
  view, these claims sufficiently overlap so that they can be treated together in
                                              11
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024      Page: 12

  B. Standard of Review

         Moore recognizes he did not raise before the district court the sentencing

  challenge he raises on appeal. Accordingly, he asserts this court should review the matter

  for plain error. For its part, the government contends Moore affirmatively waived his

  challenge to the propriety of the district court’s two-step sentencing process. This court

  can detect no indication in the record that Moore “intentional[ly] relinquish[ed] or

  abandon[ed] . . . a known right,” see United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270,

  1272 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted), when he conceded below that the district court

  was bound by Moore to utilize a two-step sentencing process. Thus, he forfeited, rather

  than waived, the issue he now raises on appeal.

         “Typically,” this court does “not address arguments raised for the first time on

  appeal.” EFLO Energy v. Devon Energy Corp., 66 F.4th 775, 792 (10th Cir. 2023). If a

  theory “simply [was not] raised before the district court,” it is forfeited and this court may

  reverse only if an appellant satisfies the rigorous plain error standard. Richison v. Ernest

  Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2011). On the other hand, when a party

  intentionally relinquishes or abandons an argument in the district court, this court

  “usually deem[s] it waived and refuse[s] to consider it.” Id. at 1127. Waiver “occurs

  when a party deliberately considers an issue and makes an intentional decision to forgo”

  resolving this appeal. Both rely on the same statutory and Sentencing Guidelines
  language to argue that a sentence imposed upon revocation of probation must be a
  single component sentence based on the provisions of § 3553(a) and sentencing
  considerations set out in Chapter 7. Furthermore, both rise or fall based on Moore’s
  ability to convince this court it can disregard Moore’s holding as to the requisite
  sentencing process district courts must undertake upon revocation of probation.
                                               12
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526         Date Filed: 03/19/2024      Page: 13

  raising it. United States v. Malone, 937 F.3d 1325, 1327 (10th Cir. 2019). Abandonment

  “requires some evidence that the waiver is knowing and voluntary.” United States v. Egli,

  13 F.4th 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2021). In summary, “waiver is accomplished by intent, but

  forfeiture comes about through neglect.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). Given

  such an exacting standard, this court “typically find[s] waiver in cases where a party has

  invited the error that it now seeks to challenge, or where a party attempts to reassert an

  argument that it previously raised and abandoned below.” United States v. Zubia-Torres,

  550 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008); see also id.at 1205-07 (discussing at length the

  cases in which this court has found a waiver).

         The government asserts Moore waived his appellate argument because he

  (1) failed to seek panel or en banc rehearing following the decision in Moore; (2) failed to

  object to the two-step procedure when the district court summarized that procedure at the

  beginning of the on-remand sentencing hearing, instead acknowledging “[t]hat is how the

  Tenth Circuit has said this needs to happen”; and (3) made an argument concerning the

  appropriate sentence under Moore’s two-step framework. In contrast to the government’s

  assertions, none of these actions demonstrate an intentional abandonment on Moore’s

  part. Although the failure to object certainly means the issue is not preserved, it only

  signifies an abandonment if it is accompanied by indications of knowing and voluntary

  intent. The only such purported evidence identified by the government is the failure to

  seek rehearing in Moore and a recognition at the on-remand sentencing proceeding that

  Moore governed. The fact Moore was aware of, and thought the district court bound by,

  Moore’s two-step process does not evidence he was aware of, and consciously

                                               13
Appellate Case: 22-3173       Document: 010111018526           Date Filed: 03/19/2024       Page: 14

  disregarded, the issue with the two-step process he now raises on appeal. After all, as

  noted by Moore in his reply brief, he had nothing to gain by consciously electing to

  proceed under Moore’s two-step process. Under that process, he started at a 51-month

  step-one sentence, with much room to grow under step-two; under the process he presses

  on appeal, he starts at an advisory sentencing range of 5 to 11 months’ imprisonment with

  the further requirement that any deviations from the advisory range be hitched to

  Chapter 7 and § 3553(a). The relevant question is whether Moore identified the alleged

  contra-statutory basis of Moore’s two-step process during the district court proceedings

  and made a conscious decision to abandon the issue. There is no such evidence in the

  record. Thus, the issue he raises on appeal is forfeited, not waived.

         To obtain reversal on his forfeited claim of error, Moore must demonstrate the

  district court committed plain error. United States v. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d 1253,

  1258 (10th Cir. 2014). That is, he must “demonstrate: (1) an error, (2) that is plain, which

  means clear or obvious under current law, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If he

  satisfies these criteria, this Court may exercise discretion to correct the error if (4) it

  seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

  at 1258 (quotation and emphasis omitted). “[R]elief on plain error review is difficult to

  get, as it should be.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Accordingly, we will find plain error only

  when an error is particularly egregious and the failure to remand for correction would

  produce a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quotation omitted).

                                                 14
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024       Page: 15

  C. Merits

         As both parties recognize, Moore can only establish plain error on the part of the

  district court by identifying a justification for this court to disregard the two-step process

  set out in Moore. See In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (“We cannot

  overrule the judgment of another panel of this court. We are bound by the precedent of

  prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the

  Supreme Court.”); United States v. Monsisvais, 946 F.2d 114, 115 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The

  law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision

  should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”

  (quotation and citation omitted)). Attempting to do so, Moore argues this court is not

  bound by Moore because Moore’s discussion of the two-step process is dicta. In the

  alternative, assuming the relevant discussion in Moore is not dicta, Moore asserts this

  court can disregard Moore under an exception to the law of the case doctrine for

  decisions that are “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Monsisvais,

  946 F.2d at 117 (quotation omitted). As set forth more fully below, Moore’s discussion of

  the mandatory post-revocation sentencing process is not dicta. Furthermore, even

  assuming the clearly-erroneous/manifest-injustice exception to the law of the case

  doctrine could potentially allow this court to disregard Moore, Moore has not established

  either of the two required components of that exception.

         1. Dicta

         “A panel of this Court is bound by a holding of a prior panel . . . but is not bound

  by a prior panel’s dicta.” United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 1273 (10th Cir. 2017)

                                                15
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024        Page: 16

  (quotation and alteration omitted). “Dicta are statements and comments in an opinion

  concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to

  determination of the case at hand.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). Notably, this

  court has cautioned that adopting an “expansive view of what constitutes dicta” would

  interfere with bedrock principles of stare decisis. Thompson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 582

  F.3d 1125, 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). Given this standard, this court must reject Moore’s

  assertion that Moore’s mandated two-step sentencing process upon revocation of

  probation is dicta.

         Moore specifically held that when a district court revokes probation, it “commit[s]

  itself to a two-step process under § 3565(a)(2).” 30 F.4th at 1026. In concluding the

  district court’s error in failing to utilize that two-step process was plain, Moore held that

  the requisite two-step process flowed directly from the “plain” provisions of the United

  States Code relating to imposing criminal sentences; Chapter 7 of the Sentencing

  Guidelines; and this court’s precedents, particularly our decision in Kelley, 359 F.3d at

  1306. Moore 30 F.4th at 1026-27. Finally, Moore held that the plain error it identified

  affected Moore’s substantial rights because there existed a reasonable probability the

  identified error altered the sentence Moore received. Id. at 1027. That is, there existed a

  reasonable probability Moore would have received a different sentence upon revocation

  of his probation if the district court had properly employed the mandated two-step

  process set out in Moore. Id. (“Here, there is such a reasonable probability because it’s

  unclear what sentence the court would have imposed after explaining its two-step

  analysis at sentencing.”). Importantly, this court has previously held that when it is

                                                16
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024      Page: 17

  necessary to define a legal standard to analyze the substantial-rights prong of plain error

  review, the explication of that legal standard is not dicta. United States v. Carillo, 860

  F.3d 1293, 1301 n.2 (10th Cir. 2017). Nor is it relevant Moore did not consider the

  arguments Moore now presses in resolving his prior appeal. Thompson, 582 F.3d at 1130

  (holding, in the context of rejecting an assertion a rule of law announced by a prior panel

  was dicta, that the question did not turn on “what might have happened had other

  arguments been made to the panel that decided the issue first”).

         The two-step sentencing process set out in Moore was integral to its holding that

  the district court plainly erred and that the error affected Moore’s substantial rights.

  Accordingly, that two-step process is not dicta but is, instead, binding Tenth Circuit

  precedent. See, e.g., Titties, 852 F.3d at 1273; Thompson, 582 F.3d at 1129-30.

         2. Law of the Case

         Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, “when a court decides upon a rule of law,

  that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same

  case.” Monsisvais, 946 F.2d at 115 (quotation omitted). “Law of the case rules have

  developed to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided

  during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.” Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1298

  (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). “Particularly with today’s crowded dockets, a

  litigant given one good bite at the apple should not have a second. In short, it is almost

  axiomatic that one panel of this court cannot overrule another panel.” United States v.

  Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation and citation omitted).

  Nevertheless, the law of the case doctrine is a rule of practice, not a limit on the power of

                                                17
Appellate Case: 22-3173     Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024      Page: 18

  the court. Monsisvais, 946 F.2d at 116. That is, the doctrine “is not an inexorable

  command, but is to be applied with good sense.” Id. at 117 (quotations omitted).

  “Nevertheless, the circumstances justifying a departure from the law of the case are

  narrow.” Id.

         This court has recognized three generalized exceptions to the doctrine’s

  applicability. Id. The only such exception raised by Moore on appeal is the one for

  decisions that are “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Id.; see also

  United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.12 (10th Cir. 2011). All three exceptions

  to the doctrine, specifically including the clearly-erroneous/manifest-injustice exception,

  are construed narrowly, requiring application of the doctrine “unless one of the

  exceptions specifically and unquestionably applies.” Monsisvais, 946 F.2d at 117

  (quotation omitted). Moore has not demonstrated Moore’s holding is clearly erroneous.

  Nor has he demonstrated the application of Moore’s holding to him would work a

  manifest injustice. Having failed to demonstrate both requirements of the clearly-

  erroneous/manifest-injustice exception, Moore has not provided this court with a valid

  justification for avoiding the law of the case set out in Moore. See Monsisvais, 946 F.2d

  at 117 (describing the two requirements of the clearly-erroneous/manifest-injustice

  exception in the conjunctive); see also United States v. Lake, 556 F. App’x 706, 708

  (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished disposition cited exclusively for its persuasive value)

  (holding that there was no need to decide whether a prior panel’s decision was clearly

  erroneous because there existed no manifest injustice); United States v. Nichols, 38 F.

  App’x 534, 542 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished disposition cited exclusively for its

                                              18
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024        Page: 19

  persuasive value) (“Because we find our prior rulings were not clearly erroneous, we

  need not consider whether those rulings worked a manifest injustice.”).

         This court notes at the outset that there is reason to doubt whether the clearly-

  erroneous/manifest-injustice exception empowers this court to disregard a prior panel’s

  legal ruling. See Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 600 F.3d 1275, 1281 n.5

  (10th Cir. 2010) (declining to resolve the issue but noting that reading the exception to

  empower such conduct would place it at odds with the Tenth Circuit’s strong mandate of

  stare decisis). It is unnecessary to resolve this question because the court cannot say the

  relevant holding in Moore is clearly erroneous. In trying to demonstrate the two-step

  post-revocation sentencing process set out in Moore is clearly erroneous, Moore faces a

  “formidable task.” Alvarez, 142 F.3d at 1247. Indeed, twenty-five years ago, this court

  noted that “while courts may often pay lip service to the clearly erroneous/manifest

  injustice exception, they rarely, if ever, invoke it.” Id. Alvarez cataloged the caselaw and

  noted that it could discover only one case, in the Ninth Circuit, “in which a panel used

  this exception.” Id. (citing Jeffries v. Wood, 75 F.3d 491, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1996)). And

  there, the en banc Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the panel erred in concluding the

  stringent clearly-erroneous/manifest-injustice standard was satisfied. Id. (citing Jeffries v.

  Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1492-93 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997)).

  Notably, Moore has not identified any additional such cases since this court decided

  Alvarez. The reason for this state of affairs is that to meet the “high burden” of the

  exception, an appellant must show the prior decision was “dead wrong” not “just maybe

  or probably wrong.” TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009).

                                               19
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526          Date Filed: 03/19/2024      Page: 20

         Moore has not satisfied this onerous burden. If presented with the issue as one of

  first impression, this panel might very well conclude Moore’s reading of the relevant

  statutes and Sentencing Guidelines is correct. Nevertheless, Moore cites to and analyzes

  all relevant statutes and Guidelines provisions, grapples with this court’s precedents, and

  sets out a reasoned and considered legal determination.8 The plausibility of the scheme

  set out in Moore is confirmed by Moore’s failure, through multiple additional procedural

  steps in this litigation, to arrive at the argument he now raises on appeal. See United

  States v. Hendrix, 673 F. App’x 850, 854-55 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished disposition

  cited exclusively for its persuasive value). Moore has not demonstrated the decision in

  Moore is so blatantly erroneous that this panel is entitled to be the first to employ the

  clearly-erroneous/manifest-injustice exception to disregard a prior legal determination by

  a panel of this court.

         Nor, under the particular facts of this case, can Moore demonstrate manifest

  injustice. Importantly, there is no doubt that even under the sentencing scheme advocated

  by Moore, he could receive the very same sentence the district court imposed on remand.

  Subpart 2 to Part A of Chapter 7 makes clear that upon revocation of probation, district

  courts are legally empowered to “impose any sentence that initially could have been

         8
          In concluding Moore’s relevant holding is not dead wrong, this court declines
  to undertake the kind of extensive comparative analysis suggested in Moore’s
  appellate brief. Such an approach would defeat the very purposes of the law of the
  case doctrine. Alvarez, 142 F.3d at 1247 (“This doctrine is based on sound public
  policy that litigation should come to an end and is designed to bring about a quick
  resolution of disputes by preventing continued re-argument of issues already decided.
  Of course, this rule also serves the purposes of discouraging panel shopping at the
  court of appeals level.” (citation and quotations omitted)).
                                               20
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526         Date Filed: 03/19/2024     Page: 21

  imposed.” The statutory maximum for a violation of the Hobbs Act is twenty years’

  imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). It is certainly true, as Moore argues, the district court

  would be obligated to consider the sentencing factors set out in Chapter 7, specifically

  including the 5-to-11-month advisory sentencing ranges set out in § 7B1.4(a), in

  fashioning his unified sentence under the scheme he advocates. Nevertheless, the district

  court would also be entitled to take into account each of the considerations set out in

  § 3553(a) in deciding whether to vary from §7B1.4(a) advisory sentencing ranges. The

  record in this case leaves absolutely no doubt the district court would not impose a lower

  sentence under the scheme advocated for by Moore. Nor, given the district court’s careful

  development of the record regarding the nature of Moore’s violations of the conditions of

  his probation, does there exist any reasonable probability this court would conclude on

  appeal that such a sentence, even though a truly substantial upward variance, is

  substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910, 915 (10th Cir.

  2018) (describing at length the exceedingly broad nature of the district court’s discretion

  in arriving at a substantively reasonable sentence). Indeed, although Moore argued in

  Moore that his sentence was unreasonable, 30 F.4th at 1024, he has made no such

  argument in this appeal.

         3. Conclusion

         Moore’s holding—that upon revocation of a term of probation district courts

  commit themselves to the two-part sentencing scheme set out therein—is not dicta. Nor

  can Moore escape that holding through the clearly-erroneous/manifest-injustice exception

  to the law of the case doctrine. Thus, in considering whether the district court committed

                                              21
Appellate Case: 22-3173      Document: 010111018526         Date Filed: 03/19/2024      Page: 22

  plain error in sentencing Moore on remand, this court is bound by the rule of law set out

  in Moore. Obviously then the district court did not err, let alone plainly do so, when it

  complied with Moore’s mandate.

                                     IV. CONCLUSION

         For those reasons set out above, the judgment of the United States District Court

  for the District of Kansas is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                               22