Court Opinion

ID: 9950173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 15:05:25.313937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:58.584319
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                            K.M., the mother,
                               Appellant,

                                    v.

                             K.B., the father,
                                Appellee.

                            No. 4D2023-2158

                            [March 13, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Kirk C. Volker, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2022-DP-000346-
XXXX-MB.

   Angela E. Gerlach of Gerlach Law, PLLC, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

   Jessica L. Underwood and Robin Bresky of Schwartz Sladkus Reich
Greenberg Atlas LLP, Boca Raton, for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

    K.M. (“the mother”) appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her
private petition for termination of parental rights against K.B.
(“the father”). The mother’s petition was based on section 39.806(1)(d),
Florida Statutes (2023), which allows termination of parental rights under
certain conditions when the parent is incarcerated. In dismissing the
petition, the trial court concluded the father’s placement on home
confinement did not constitute “incarceration.” We affirm the dismissal
order in all respects and write only to address why we reject the mother’s
argument that home confinement constitutes incarceration for purposes
of termination of parental rights proceedings.

    By way of background, the father was convicted on federal healthcare
fraud charges and sentenced to 72 months in federal prison. The mother
filed a private petition to terminate the father’s parental rights based on
his incarceration. While the petition was pending, the father was released
from federal prison and placed on federal home confinement for the
remainder of his sentence. The mother thereafter filed a motion asking
the trial court to determine whether the father’s placement on home
confinement qualified     as   “incarceration”   for   purposes   of   section
39.806(1)(d).

   At the ensuing hearing, the father testified as to his home confinement
terms.    In relevant part, the father testified that, while on home
confinement, he is permitted, with prior approval, to do the following: take
the child to and from school and the mother’s house; take the child to
doctor appointments and extracurricular activities; have the child over to
his home; and go to the grocery store. The father also testified that he was
permitted to take the child to the hospital in an emergency without first
seeking prior approval. Based on this testimony, the father argued he was
completely available to parent the child and therefore was not
“incarcerated” within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(d). Following the
hearing, the trial court concluded the father was not “incarcerated” as it
relates to section 39.806(1)(d) and dismissed the mother’s petition. In so
doing, the court referenced the father’s otherwise unrebutted testimony
and concluded the home confinement terms permitted the father to “act
as a parent for the child.”

   On appeal, the mother argues the father’s placement on home
confinement as part of his federal prison sentence constitutes
incarceration for purposes of section 39.806(1)(d). In support thereof, the
mother relies on Black’s Law Dictionary which broadly defines
incarceration as “[t]he act or process of confining someone.” Incarceration,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Based on this definition, the
mother argues the father is “incarcerated” as he is confined to his home.

   The father counters that, in looking at the plain and ordinary meaning
of “incarceration” and section 39.806(1)(d)’s legislative intent, his
placement on home confinement does not constitute “incarceration.” The
father further argues that several district courts, including this court, have
clearly held that house arrest or home confinement is not equivalent to
incarceration.

    Sections 39.806(1)(d)1. and 3. state that termination of parental rights
is appropriate when the parent is incarcerated and either:

      1. The period of time for which the parent is expected to be
      incarcerated will constitute a significant portion of the child’s
      minority. When determining whether the period of time is
      significant, the court shall consider the child’s age and the
      child’s need for a permanent and stable home. The period of
      time begins on the date that the parent enters into
      incarceration;

                                      2
      ....

      3. The court determines by clear and convincing evidence
      that continuing the parental relationship with the
      incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, for this
      reason, that termination of the parental rights of the
      incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the child. When
      determining harm, the court shall consider the following
      factors:

         a.   The age of the child.

         b.   The relationship between the child and the parent.

         c. The nature of the parent’s current and past provision
         for the child’s developmental, cognitive, psychological, and
         physical needs.

         d. The parent’s history of criminal behavior, which may
         include the frequency of incarceration and the
         unavailability of the parent to the child due to
         incarceration.

         e.   Any other factor the court deems relevant.

§ 39.806(1)(d)1., 3., Fla. Stat. (2023).

   Although section 39.806 does not define “incarceration,” we have
previously defined “incarceration” as being confined in a “governmental
institution” and held that house arrest is not equivalent to “incarceration”:

      [I]ncarceration has been defined [as] confinement in a
      governmental institution such that a defendant’s liberty is
      circumscribed to the functional equivalent of custody in the
      county jail. A house arrest program in which the defendant
      wears an electronic bracelet used for monitoring his
      whereabouts, and checks with a supervisor daily by telephone
      and weekly in person, imposes restraints on the defendant’s
      liberty prior to trial, but the conditions do not impose on the
      defendant restraints which are so onerous as to be equivalent
      to incarceration in the county jail or the forensic ward of a
      mental hospital.

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Licata v. State, 788 So. 2d 1063, 1063–64 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting
McCarthy v. State, 689 So. 2d 1095, 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)).

   While Licata involved the issue of pre-trial house arrest, we hold the
definition of “incarceration” espoused in that case applies equally to a
home confinement sentence. We further hold that when a parent is placed
on home confinement with terms which enable the parent to be involved
in the child’s care and well-being, the parent is not “incarcerated” under
section 39.806(1)(d).     Such a holding is consistent with section
39.806(1)(d)’s purpose of protecting the child’s need for a permanent and
stable home.

   Accordingly, as the trial court in this case expressly found that the
terms of the father’s home confinement permitted the father to act as a
parent to the child, we affirm the court’s dismissal of the mother’s petition.

   Affirmed.

CIKLIN and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                            *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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