Court Opinion

ID: 9411565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 00:01:58.356171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:07.164472
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20560        Document: 00516835219             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/26/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                            FILED
                                     ____________
                                                                                     July 26, 2023
                                      No. 21-20560                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Luis E. Class,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   Correctional Institutions Division; Kimberly Klock; Kelly L.
   Strong; Christopher S. Lacox; Lisa M. Nichols; Candy
   L. Montgomery; Cesar Trevino; Isaac J. Clark,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:20-CV-3440
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Stewart, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Luis E. Class, Texas prisoner # 2303801, filed a pro se civil action
   against eight officials of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
   (“TDCJ”). He alleged violations of his rights as a person with a disability
   under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-20560         Document: 00516835219              Page: 2       Date Filed: 07/26/2023

                                          No. 21-20560

   (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
   (“RA”). He also sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations
   of his Eighth Amendment rights. 1 The district court sua sponte dismissed his
   claims against some of the defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
   later granted the remaining defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The suit was dismissed with
   prejudice, and Class appealed. 2
           For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   dismissal of Class’s claims. However, given that this appeal involves his
   original complaint, we VACATE the portion of the district court’s order
   dismissing the aforementioned claims with prejudice, and REMAND with
   instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice so that Class can have
   an opportunity to replead his claims with sufficient factual allegations that
   may satisfy the pleading standard.
                                                I.
           We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a claim under
   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and section 1915A(b)(1) for failure
   to state a claim. Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2016).
   “Under that standard, a complaint will survive . . . if it contains sufficient
   factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
   its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Class
   has counsel now on appeal, he proceeded pro se at the district court, and thus

           _____________________
           1
            Class’s complaint also includes several allegations against TDCJ officers for
   mishandling his grievances. These allegations are not pertinent here since the district court
   dismissed them upon screening, and Class does not challenge their dismissal on appeal.
           2
            Although Class proceeded in the district court pro se, he is represented by counsel
   on appeal.

                                                2
Case: 21-20560       Document: 00516835219          Page: 3    Date Filed: 07/26/2023

                                     No. 21-20560

   he is entitled to a liberal reading of his complaint. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
   97, 106 (1976).
                                         II.
          In his complaint, Class stated that he has a back injury that he
   sustained in 2011 while serving in the military. Over a decade later, his
   mobility is still limited as he currently walks with a cane. The alleged events
   arise from two separate incidents which, according to Class, aggravated this
   injury. Neither incident, however, amounts to a violation of his Eighth
   Amendment rights or his rights under the ADA and RA.
          The first incident involved TDCJ officer Candy Montgomery. Class
   alleged that she violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
   and unusual punishment when she forced him to sit on the floor, along with
   other inmates, during an emergency incident. When he could not comply, he
   told her about his injuries, but she nonetheless threatened and punished him
   with six hours in administrative segregation where he had no mattress and no
   utensils or kitchenware. The district court held that Class failed to state a
   claim because mere threats do not amount to a constitutional violation, and
   the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons. On appeal, Class
   alleges that the district court improperly minimized his claims because the
   crux of his suit was not that his cell was uncomfortable, but that he was forced
   to perform an act beyond his physical capabilities.
          Although we do not agree with the district court’s reasoning, we agree
   with its outcome. See Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 304
   F.3d 476, 486 (5th Cir. 2002). The Eighth Amendment prohibits a prison
   official from acting with “‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of
   serious harm to an inmate.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
   This is an “extremely high standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim.
   Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). Class must show an objective

                                          3
Case: 21-20560      Document: 00516835219           Page: 4    Date Filed: 07/26/2023

                                     No. 21-20560

   exposure “to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Lawson v. Dall. Cnty., 286
   F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). He must then
   show that the defendant: “(1) was ‘aware of facts from which the inference
   could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’; (2) subjectively
   ‘dr[e]w the inference’ that the risk existed; and (3) disregarded the risk.”
   Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).
          Class fails to show an objective exposure to a substantial risk of serious
   harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. His allegations of pain from attempting to sit
   on the ground during an emergency incident are vague and they do not
   exemplify a risk “so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency
   to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
   25, 36 (1993) (emphasis in original); Martin v. Seal, 510 F. App’x 309, 316
   (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (emphasizing that the plaintiff did
   “not identif[y] with any specificity the ailments or symptoms (aside from
   asthma and a vague reference to back pain) he claims were caused by
   Appellants’ alleged deliberate indifference”).
          Likewise, Class fails to meet the high deliberate indifference standard
   on his individual capacity claim against TDCJ Officer Cesar Trevino. Class
   alleges that he was relocated four times over the course of several days after
   he developed a high temperature during the COVID-19 pandemic.
   Throughout each relocation, he was forced to walk the stairs “up and down,
   without help,” with his cane, and carry all of his belongings, including a
   mattress weighing “more than 20 pounds.” After the third relocation, Class
   alleged that he told a sergeant about his disabilities. That sergeant spoke with
   Trevino who responded that there were no restrictions allowed and
   threatened him with disciplinary action.
          Here, Class fails to allege that Trevino knew of the risk associated with
   requiring him to take the stairs or that he “drew the inference” that such a

                                          4
Case: 21-20560        Document: 00516835219              Page: 5       Date Filed: 07/26/2023

                                         No. 21-20560

   risk existed. Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 676. Class attached a medical form to his
   complaint showing that during the time of the second incident, he was
   restricted to the ground floor only and from lifting more than 20 pounds.
   However, he does not allege that he informed the sergeant that talked to
   Trevino that he (Class) had this medical form, and it is also unclear whether
   Trevino knew of Class’s injuries, restrictions, or use of a cane. Thus, Class’s
   Eighth Amendment claims against Trevino and Montgomery were properly
   dismissed. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
                                              III.
           In addition to his Eighth Amendment claims, Class appeals the
   dismissal of his ADA and RA claims for damages against TDCJ officials Lori
   Davis,3 Kelly Strong, Christopher Lacox, Trevino, and Montgomery in their
   official capacities. 4 These allegations likewise fail to state a claim upon which
   relief may be granted. Because the “[t]he language in the ADA generally
   tracks the language set forth in the RA” these claims are usually addressed
   together. Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002)
   (quotation omitted). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Class
   must show:
           (1) that he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the
           ADA; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or
           being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for

           _____________________
           3
          Bobby Lumpkin, the new director of the Correctional Institutions Division of the
   TDCJ has been substituted for Davis as a defendant in this action.
           4
              Class also alleges that his ADA and RA claims are not subject to dismissal under
   Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Defendants do not dispute this. It is unclear whether
   the district court dismissed Class’s ADA and RA claims when it broadly dismissed his
   official capacity claims on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity because it went on
   to address these claims on the merits. Nonetheless, because we find that Class has failed to
   state a claim under the RA and ADA, we need not address this issue on appeal.

                                                5
Case: 21-20560         Document: 00516835219              Page: 6       Date Filed: 07/26/2023

                                          No. 21-20560

           which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being
           discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such
           exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of
           his disability.
   Melton v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2004). 5
           The parties do not dispute the first prong—Class has a qualifying
   disability. Nevertheless, Class fails to meet the second prong as to the
   incident where he was placed in segregation for not sitting on the floor. Class
   argues that he was denied the benefit of safe prison housing. He relies on
   Epley v. Gonzalez, a case in which this court held that a plaintiff with PTSD
   and a single-cell medical restriction was denied the benefits of safe prison
   housing when officials placed him in a multi-occupancy cell. 860 F. App’x
   310, 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished). That case is
   inapposite because Class fails to show that, like the plaintiff in Epley, his
   temporary placement in a segregation unit amounted to a denial or exclusion
   from any benefits or services. See Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 290 (5th
   Cir. 2021).
           As to the incident where Class was forced to climb multiple flights of
   stairs, we assume arguendo that he has met the second prong. See Cadena v.
   El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[A] disabled inmate’s right
   to mobility within a prison is well-established.”). However, Class’s
   allegations do not overcome the third prong, which can be satisfied by a
   showing that a defendant failed to make a reasonable accommodation.

           _____________________
           5
              To recover compensatory damages, the plaintiff must also allege intentional
   discrimination. Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 574 (5th
   Cir. 2018). Such a showing is not completely defined but “intent requires that the
   defendant at least have actual notice.” Id. a 575. “Unlike other circuits, we have not held
   that deliberate indifference suffices” to meet this standard. Smith v. Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d
   311, 318 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Miraglia, 901 F.3d at 574).

                                                6
Case: 21-20560      Document: 00516835219           Page: 7    Date Filed: 07/26/2023

                                     No. 21-20560

   Windham v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d 229, 235–36 (5th Cir. 2017). To establish
   such a claim, the plaintiff has the burden “to specifically identify the
   disability and resulting limitations, and to request an accommodation in
   direct and specific terms” or show that “the disability, resulting limitation,
   and necessary reasonable accommodation were open, obvious, and apparent
   to the entity’s relevant agents.” Id. at 237. Class alleges that he was deprived
   of reasonable accommodations when he was ordered to sit on the floor and
   forced to climb stairs carrying his belongings because he had previously
   informed officials about his injuries.
          However, “[m]ere knowledge of the disability is not enough; the
   service provider must also have understood the limitations the plaintiff
   experienced . . . as a result of that disability.” Id. (quotation and internal
   marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Class does not allege that he requested
   any accommodations, such as assistance walking up the stairs, in direct and
   specific terms. His complaint also does not show that his resulting limitation
   and the accommodations that he needed were open, obvious, and apparent.
   He does not state that he informed anyone, including Trevino, of his medical
   restrictions or that Trevino saw him with a cane. Nor does he explain on
   appeal what sort of accommodations he believes should have been provided.
   Thus, even under the more liberal construction, he has failed to state a prima
   facie case to support his ADA and RA claims. See Windham, 875 F.3d at 238
   (holding that an official’s knowledge of the prisoner’s neck disability alone
   was not enough to meet the knowledge requirement).
                                            IV.
          Lastly, while the district court was correct in its holding, it is a close
   call as to whether the district court should have dismissed the case with
   prejudice. This issue calls the court to ask, “whether within the universe of
   theoretically provable facts there exists a set which can support a cause of

                                             7
Case: 21-20560     Document: 00516835219           Page: 8   Date Filed: 07/26/2023

                                    No. 21-20560

   action under this complaint, indulgently read.” Moawad v. Childs, 673 F.2d
   850, 851 (5th Cir. 1982) (quotation omitted). Having reviewed this
   complaint, we cannot say that there is no set of facts here that can support a
   well-pleaded claim such that a dismissal with prejudice is warranted. See id.
   (“If dismissal of a pro se complaint is warranted, it should be without
   prejudice to allow an inmate to file an amended complaint.”). Indeed, unlike
   when Class drafted the instant complaint, he now has counsel who has ably
   briefed and argued the case. Aided by counsel, if Class repleads the case, he
   may very well be able to further develop his claims to satisfy the pleading
   standard. Accordingly, the aforementioned claims should be dismissed
   without prejudice. See id.; cf. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 326–27 (5th
   Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint with
   prejudice because the plaintiff alleged his best case as the court could not
   perceive any viable claim that he could include in an amended complaint).
                                        V.
          In sum, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Class’s ADA
   and RA claims for damages against Montgomery, Trevino, Lumpkin, Strong,
   and Lacox in their official capacities and Eighth Amendment claims for
   damages against Montgomery and Trevino in their individual capacities.
   Because Class has abandoned all other claims, the district court’s rulings are
   AFFIRMED in all other respects. However, we VACATE the portion of
   the district court’s order dismissing the claims discussed in Sections II-IV
   with prejudice, and REMAND with instructions to dismiss those claims
   without prejudice.

                                         8