Court Opinion

ID: 9534868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:43:16.488485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:32:59.889382
License: Public Domain

CHASANOW, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the Court’s holding that Garcia is a domiciliary of the State of Maryland. My reasons for writing separately are twofold. First, the majority acknowledges that the issue is whether Garcia was a domiciliary of Maryland on the date of the accident, December 13, 1991,1 but then in concluding he was a domiciliary on that date, the majority apparently relies on subsequent presidential directives which occurred long after Garcia’s accident and which could not háve been anticipated by Garcia in 1991.2 Second, the majority fails to *490recognize the importance of uniformity in determining when a citizen of another country can become a domiciliary in this country. No attempt is made to explore how other jurisdictions have decided this issue.
Garcia entered this country illegally approximately 21 months before his accident. Several months before the accident, he applied for, and received, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and a temporary work permit. Garcia’s TPS was due to be terminated and in fact was terminated on June. 30, 1992, 6 months after the accident. Provision was made in the TPS statute for extensions of TPS from 6 to 18 months in the discretion of the Attorney General, see 8 U.S.C.S. § 1254a(b)(2) & (3) (1987, 1994 Cum.Supp.), but the Attorney General never extended TPS. Garcia was apparently not eligible for either political asylum, see 335 Md. at 478 n. 1, 644 A.2d at 500 n. 1, or for permanent resident status,3 see 335 *491Md. at 488, 644 A.2d at 504. Thus, Garcia’s TPS immigration status expired, as per the act conferring that status, approximately 6 months after the accident. The only reason Garcia did not revert to his status as an illegal alien subject to immediate deportation was because of presidential directives which could not have been anticipated by Garcia and which changed his status from TPS to Deferred Enforced Departure (DED). These subsequent unanticipated presidential directives should not nunc pro tunc modify Garcia’s status or intent as of December 13,1991. Although I do not believe the Court should determine Garcia’s domicile on December 13, 1991 by using subsequent unanticipated events, there are other valid reasons for concluding that Garcia was a domiciliary of Maryland on that date.
There could be severe consequences when we require aliens to maintain a foreign domicile in countries to which they never wish to return and deny them domicile in states where they reside and fervently hope to make their permanent homes. The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1988 Revisions) point out the importance of domicile:
“The functions served by domicil in Conflict of Laws fall into three broad categories. These are judicial jurisdiction; choice of law, particularly in matters where continuity of application of the same law is important, as family law and decedents’ estates; and governmental benefits and burdens.
A state may exercise judicial jurisdiction to render through its courts a personal judgment against its domiciliaries whether or not they happen to be within its territory ■ at the time of service of process (see § 29). The state where at least one of the spouses is domiciled at the time of *492suit may terminate their marriage by divorce (see § 71); such a state may likewise issue a decree of judicial separation (see § 75) or of annulment (see § 76). In the area of choice of law, the law of a person’s domicil may determine such matters relating to his personal status as the validity of his marriage (see § 283) and his legitimacy (see § 287). The same law governs the transfer of his movable property upon death; it determines the validity of his will with respect to such property (see § 263) or its distribution in the event of intestacy (see § 260). * * * ”
§ 11 cmt. c at 1-2 (commenting on subsection 1). See, e.g., Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.), Family Law Article, § 7-101 (nonresidents may be denied access to the courts for divorces).
There is an obvious benefit to uniformity in the determination of whether aliens who reside in and intend to remain in this country may become domiciliaries in this country. For this reason I believe it is important to examine and be guided by what federal and other state courts have decided in analogous cases.
In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause was applicable to illegal aliens. In doing so, the Court noted the plight of illegal aliens as follows:
“Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’ of illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our borders. This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.” (Footnotes omitted).
*493Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2395-96, 72 L.Ed.2d at 800.
In addition to holding that illegal aliens are entitled to equal protection under the law, the Supreme Court made some observations which indicate illegal aliens should be able to establish domicile even though potentially subject to immediate deportation:
“To be sure, like all persons who have entered the United States unlawfully, these children are subject to deportation. But there is no assurance that a child subject to deportation will ever be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen. In light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular [illegal alien] will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been completed.” (Citations omitted).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226, 102 S.Ct. at 2399, 72 L.Ed.2d at 805. In interpreting the impact of the Plyler case, a recent article stated that “in Plyler v. Doe, the Court recognized that the alien’s lack of initial immigration approval did not undercut her ability to participate in and become integrated into the society.... Indeed, the Court’s analysis exemplified the premise that modern jurisprudence holds for further extending the positive rights of participation due the alien.” Developments in the Law—Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 Harvard L.Rev. 1286, 1311 (1983) (footnote omitted).
Certainly a person with TPS is in a better position to acquire domicile than an illegal alien who is subject to deportation immediately upon discovery. Although we need not, and should not, decide whether all classes of illegal aliens may establish domicile in this country, several courts have declared that an illegal alien can establish domicile within this country. For example, in United States v. Otherson, 480 F.Supp. 1369 (S.D.Cal.1979), the federal district court stated the following:
*494“The law is well-established that a person acquires a legal ‘domicile’ when he is physically present in a location with the intent to remain for the indefinite future. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 15 (1971). The aliens seemingly had the requisite intent. As for the requirement of physical presence, it has been held that the presence of illegal aliens is sufficient to enable them to establish a legal ‘domicile.’ Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431 (D.C.App.1972); Seren v. Douglas, 30 Colo.App. 110, 489 P.2d 601 (1971). A fugitive from justice can establish a legal ‘domicile’ where he is in hiding. Young v. Pollak, 85 Ala. 439, 5 So. 279 (1888). Additionally, many cases hold that the individual need only be present for a moment. E.g., Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 388, 91 N.E. 394 (1910); White v. Tennant, 31 W.Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 16 (1971).”
480 F.Supp. at 1371 n. 4.
In St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 142 Ariz. 94, 688 P.2d 986 (1984), the Supreme Court of Arizona held that even an illegal alien who was subject to deportation when caught could establish domicile in Arizona. The Arizona court quoted the following from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Plyler v. Doe:
“ ‘In light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented [person] will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been completed.’ Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2399, 72 L.Ed.2d 786[, 805] (1982) (the bracketed words are substituted for the words ‘child’ or ‘children’ in the original).”
St. Joseph’s Hosp., 142 Ariz. 94, '688 P.2d at 991. The St. Joseph’s Hosp. court went on to conclude:
“Given these words from the nation’s highest court concerning a field of federal legislation, it is unnecessary to pursue the matter further. There is no federal impediment to an undocumented alien becoming a resident of an Arizona *495county. We have been cited to no state law which would create such an impediment.”
St Joseph’s Hosp., 142 Ariz. 94, 688 P.2d at 992. See also Cabral v. State Bd. of Control, 112 Cal.App.3d 1012, 169 Cal.Rptr. 604, 607 (Cal.Ct.App.1980) (holding that an alien who entered this country illegally from Mexico could establish domicile).
Many other state courts have held that aliens in situations analogous to Garcia’s have established domicile in this country. In In re Marriage of Dick, 15 Cal.App.4th 144, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 743 (Cal.Ct.App.1993), a California court recently held that a nonimmigrant alien in this country on a tourist visa, who was required by his visa to leave the country within six months, although permitted to re-enter, could nevertheless establish domicile in the State. The court noted the following as to the state of the law:
“[T]he cases cited to us, and those which we have found, from other jurisdictions hold that immigration status is, at most, evidence of domiciliary intent, but not dispositive of the residency issue as a matter of law. These cases hold that a party’s nonimmigrant alien status does not bar that party from establishing domicile for purposes of a dissolution statute. (Alves v. Alves (D.C.App.1970) 262 A.2d 111; Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski (D.C.App.1972) 296 A.2d 431; Cocron v. Cocron (1975) 84 Misc.2d 335, 375 N.Y.S.2d 797; Abou-Issa v. Abou-Issa (1972) 229 Ga. 77, 189 S.E.2d 443; Bustamante v. Bustamante (Utah Sup.Ct.1982) 645 P.2d 40; Nicolas v. Nicolas (Fla.App.1984) 444 So.2d 1118; Pirouzkar v. Pirouzkar (1981) 51 Or.App. 519, 626 P.2d 380; Williams v. Williams (D.St.Croix 1971) 328 F.Supp. 1380). We agree with the reasoning of these cases on this issue.”
In re Marriage of Dick, 15 Cal.App.4th 144, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d at 746-47.
Bustamante v. Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982), is a case quite similar to the instant case. The plaintiff was a Salvadoran citizen who came to this country on a visitor’s visa which was due to expire on June 21,1980, but was extended to *496December 31, 1980. The issue in the case was whether the plaintiff was a domiciliary of Utah on July 14, 1980, when she filed a divorce action. She testified she intended to live in this country for the rest of her life, and after filing for divorce, stated that she sought to change her status to that of political asylum. The Utah Supreme Court
“emphasize[d] that a visa application or renewal form indicating a date certain for return to one’s home country is not necessarily inconsistent with an actual conditional intent to establish permanent residency in the United States, if possible, by means of renewals and extensions of one’s nonimmigrant status or attainment of immigrant status.
* * * * * *
Even if the plaintiffs professed intention to establish an actual and bona fide residency is inconsistent with the terms of her right of entry into the United States, she is not thereby disqualified from becoming a domiciliary for divorce purposes.”
Bustamante, 645 P.2d at 42. The court went on to hold that an alien may establish domicile based on a “ ‘dual intent’—to remain if that may be accomplished and at the same time an intent to leave if the law so commands.” Id.
In Babouder v. Abdennur, 41 Conn.Sup. 258, 566 A.2d 457 (Conn.Super.Ct.1989), at issue was whether the plaintiff was a domiciliary of Connecticut when she filed her action for divorce. When the plaintiff came to the United States, she was required to swear that she was a resident of Lebanon and intended to return there when her visa expired. She was issued a “B-l Business Visa” with an authorized stay of six months. Abdennur, 41 Conn.Sup. 258, 566 A.2d at 460. One six-month extension is allowed for a B-l Business Visa, and the plaintiff had received this extension when her divorce proceeding was filed. The court held that the plaintiff was a domiciliary because she intended to reside in Connecticut permanently, even if her immigration status might not permit carrying out this intent. The court recognized the existence of a “ ‘dual intent,’ namely intent to remain if that could be *497accomplished, or intent to leave if required by law----” Abdennur, 41 Conn.Sup. 258, 566 A.2d at 461. Such “dual intent” was deemed sufficient to establish domicile for the purpose of filing for divorce.
In Williams v. Williams, 328 F.Supp. 1380 (D.C.V.I.1971), the federal district court stated:
“[W]here an alien has misrepresented his tree intent at the time he was granted entry to the country, the fact that he may be illegally in the country and deportable would not preclude him from forming an actual intent to make his home here. I see no reason to erect from the immigration laws an insuperable barrier of ‘constructive’ intent in divorce litigation that cannot be overcome even by proof of a person’s actual intent. The enforcement of immigration laws properly remains with those to whom it is entrusted by law and does not need in aid of enforcement the judicially created civil disability of exclusion from [establishing domicile for the purpose of divorce].”
Williams, 328 F.Supp. at 1383.
In Sinha v. Sinha, 341 Pa.Super. 440, 491 A.2d 899 (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 515 Pa. 14, 526 A.2d 765 (1987), the issue was whether the plaintiff was a domiciliary of Pennsylvania when he filed an action for divorce. The plaintiff was in this country on an H-l visa as a temporary worker. His visa required him to maintain a permanent residence abroad “which he [had] no intention of abandoning.” Sinha, 491 A.2d at 900. In determining that the plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary, the court said: “Even if [the plaintiffs] alleged intent to establish permanent residency in Pennsylvania is inconsistent with the terms of his right of entry into the United States, he is not automatically precluded from becoming a domiciliary of the Commonwealth.” Sinha, 491 A.2d at 901. Analogously, in Pirouzkar v. Pirouzkar, 51 Or.App. 519, 626 P.2d 380 (Or.Ct.App.1981), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was domiciled in Oregon, and it stated the following:
*498“Although it may be true, as husband contends, that wife may be deported by the immigration authorities at any time, that has apparently been her status for most of the time she has been in this state. The enforcement of the immigration laws is the function of the federal government. We have no way of knowing when, if ever, wife may be required to leave this country. In the meantime, we see no reason to deny her access to the courts of this state for the purposes of dissolution of the marriage between the parties.”
Pirouzkar, 51 Or.App. 519, 626 P.2d at 384.
In Das v. Das, 254 N.J.Super. 194, 603 A.2d 139 (N.J.Super.Ct.Ch.Div.1992), the court held that, even though the alien-plaintiffs visitor’s visa had expired, and she had withdrawn her request for political asylum, she could still establish domicile in this country. The court stated that, “[although an alien who fails to maintain the conditions attached to a status may be deportable, given the uncertainty of knowing when, if ever, deportation proceedings will be commenced, this court is persuaded that no legal disability precluding a change of domicile should exist.” Das, 603 A.2d at 142 (footnote omitted). The court also noted that “[t]he conclusion that federal immigration law does not preclude a state from allowing nonimmigrant aliens to establish a new domicile, is also in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions.” Id. (Citations omitted).
In Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431 (D.C.1972), overruled on other grounds by Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377 (1978), the issue was whether the plaintiff had established domicile in the District of Columbia. The plaintiff came to this country on a two-year visa as part of a cultural/scientific exchange program, and under that program, he was not permitted to remain for any indefinite future time. After his visa expired, the plaintiff filed a divorce proceeding in the District of Columbia where he claimed to be a domiciliary. The court held that, although the plaintiff was subject to immediate deportation, and his intent to remain in this country was a “floating intent or even contingent upon being allowed to stay in the United States,” Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d *499at 436 (footnote omitted), he was not precluded from being a District of Columbia domiciliary.
In Perez v. Perez, 164 So.2d 561 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1964), the Florida Supreme Court held that a refugee from communist Cuba who came to this country, and intended to remain here until Cuba is no longer communistic, may become a domiciliary of the State. The Perez court quoted two treatises as follows:
“ ‘Domicil, of course, cannot be changed by [a] forced exile, or by a change made necessary in order to secure safety in time of war, as in the case of the emigration of the nobles from France at the time of the French Revolution. But where one leaves his country because of his dislike for its political condition, hoping to return when he can do so as a free citizen, but without immediate expectation of such an event, these facts are compatible with the acquisition of a domicil in the country to which he goes.’ ” (Citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
164 So.2d at 563-64 (quoting 1 Joseph H. Beale, Conflict of Laws § 21.1 at 154 (1935)); and
“ ‘A person who resides in the country from which he is liable to be deported may lack the animus manendi because his residence is precarious. But if in fact he forms the necessary intention, he acquires a domicile of choice. This applies both where he is given permission to reside for a limited period but is liable to deportation and also where he is given permission to reside for a limited period which can be extended at the discretion of the authorities of the country in question. Once such a person has acquired such a domicile choice he does not lose it merely because a deportation order has been made against him; he only loses it when he is actually deported. * * * ’”
164 So.2d at 564 (quoting A.V. Dicey, Conflict of Laws, Rule 9.2 (7th ed.)).
Based on the persuasive authority of these cases as they relate to Garcia’s TPS immigration status, I concur in the holding that Garcia was a domiciliary of Maryland on Decern*500ber 13, 1991. The subsequent, unanticipated presidential directives conferring DED immigration status on Garcia seem to have little relevance to Garcia’s intent or how realistic that intent was on December 13, 1991.
Judge BELL has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed in this concurring opinion.

. Maryland cases clearly establish that, when determining whether a claimant is a "qualified person” under Maryland Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Article 48A, § 243(H)(a)(l), we must determine the claimant’s domicile as of the date of the accident. See, e.g., Hawks v. Gottschall, 241 Md. 147, 152-53, 215 A.2d 745, 748-49 (1966); Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172, 174, 186 A.2d 482, 482 (1962); Holly v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 29 Md.App. 498, 503, 349 A.2d 670, 674 (1975); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Craddock, 26 Md.App. 296, 300-02, 338 A.2d 363, 366 (1975).

. The majority seems to justify using post-1991 events to determine Garcia’s status in 1991 by stating: “With respect to the legal status component of the domicile issue, however, appellate courts decide cases according to the law in effect at the time of decision____” 335 Md. 475, 480, 644 A.2d 498, 501. I do not profess to understand what the "legal status component” of domicile is or why that component of domicile in 1991 is dependent on Garcia’s status in 1994. The majority *490goes on to state: "We cannot predict the outcome of political judgments that are yet to be made. We can only be guided by federal law as it stands on the date of our decision. Under that law and Maryland domicile law, Garcia’s intent is not an unrealistic subjective intent.” 335 Md. at 488, 644 A.2d at 504. This seems to imply that, in determining whether Garcia was a domiciliary in 1991, we look at his subjective intent in 1991, but also await future events—at least up through final appellate review—to assure that his intent was and still remains "realistic.”

. The Office of General Counsel, INS, in an opinion on March 4, 1991, opined that "[a]n alien who entered the United States without inspection is ineligible for adjustment of status.” 68 Interpreter Releases 483, 483 (Apr. 22, 1991). Relying on INA § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1987), General Counsel reasoned as follows:
"Section 245(a) provides that, in order to be eligible to adjust, the alien must have been 'inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.’ Since an alien who entered without inspection, by definition, cannot satisfy this requirement, the alien is ineligible for adjustment. In providing temporary protected status to El Salvadorans, Congress made specific requirements that the statutory protection would be limited to 18 months and specific rules were incorporated in the statute to ensure the removal of these aliens following termination of the designated period. As further evidence that Congress did not intend undocumented aliens granted temporary protected status to be able to adjust their status in the United States, [the Immigration Act of 1990] included a statutory limitation on the ability of Congress to consider legislation adjusting the status of any *491alien provided temporary protected status. INA § 244A(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a." (Citation omitted).
Id. at 485.
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(h), § 302(h) of the 1990 Act, provides in relevant part that, without a three-fifths vote of all of the senators "duly chosen and sworn,” it is not "in order” to consider any bill that "provides for adjustment to lawful temporary or permanent resident alien status for any alien receiving temporary protected status under this section....”