Court Opinion

ID: 9760258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:44:58.361132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.844641
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Judge,
concurring in result.
While I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that “the testimony complained of was hearsay and not admissible, and the court erred in overruling the appellant’s objection.” (Emphasis added). (See p. 661).
Under the circumstances here, State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. banc 1972), is inapposite. In the case at bar a police officer’s custodial interrogation of appellant led to appellant’s confession. During that interrogation the officer made certain “utterances” to appellant. When called to testify in this cause, the police officer was asked to relate the circumstances surrounding appellant’s confession, which would include the “utterances” the officer had made to appellant before he confessed. The police officer testified as follows:
After he [appellant] denied any involvement in the robbery, I advised him that we had received information, and he was involved in the robbery, and that his picture had been picked out by the two witnesses as a suspect who had committed the robbery.
The officer’s testimony was not hearsay. An analysis of the character of such testimony demonstrating it to be other than hearsay is succinctly set forth in 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 193 (1964) as follows:
Testimony by a witness as to a matter within his knowledge is not hearsay; a statement in court by a witness, not of what someone else did or said out of court, but of what he himself did, is not hearsay testimony. The hearsay rule applies only where out-of-court, or extra-judicial, utterances are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, and not where they are offered for some other purpose. (Footnotes omitted).
The majority overlooks well established law that the key question in hearsay analysis is whether the out-of-court declaration is being offered for the truth or falsity of the matters therein asserted. As stated in 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 497 (1967),
The hearsay rule, however, does not operate, even apart from its exceptions, to render inadmissible every statement repeated by a witness as made by another person. It does not exclude evidence offered to prove the fact that a statement was made or a conversation was had, rather than the truth of what was said. (Footnotes omitted).
More precisely,
Wherever an utterance is offered to evidence the state of mind which ensued in another person in consequence of the ut*663terance, it is obvious that no assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of it, and the utterance is therefore admissible, so far as the hearsay rule is concerned. 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1789 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
As an example in point under the subheading Utterances and writings offered to show effect on hearer or reader, McCormick notes:
When it is proved that D made a statement to X, with the purpose of showing the probable state of mind thereby induced in X, such as being put on notice or having knowledge, or motive, or to show the information which X had as bearing on the reasonableness or good faith of the subsequent conduct of X, or anxiety, the evidence is not subject to attack as hearsay. (Footnotes omitted). McCormick on Evidence § 249 at 589-90 (2d ed. 1977).
These utterances in the case at bar were not offered to prove the truth of the matters therein asserted, i.e. that two witnesses had identified appellant as being involved in the robbery, but rather to accurately show what was uttered and reveal what prompted appellant to confess. Accordingly, the offered utterances show the motivation for the listener’s subsequent actions and do not fall within the proscriptions of the hearsay rule. For example, the officer might have uttered to appellant, “John Doe said he would shoot you if you don’t confess,” when John Doe made no such statement. If later during testimony the officer relates what he “uttered”, that testimony would not be to prove John Doe did say he would shoot appellant, but instead, to show what the utterance was and how it might have effected the confession. The testimony would be admissible.
The principal opinion confuses the law surrounding hearsay by misdefining the term. Rather than a situation akin to State v. Degraffenreid, supra, where the complained of testimony was clearly proffered and relevant only for its truth, the circumstances in the case at bar are more analogous to several recent decisions finding similar utterances not hearsay.
In State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Mo. banc 1981), the victim’s testimony that a friend had stated “He’ll [the defendant] rape you” was determined not to be hearsay, as the statement was offered not for its truth, but to show its effect on the victim (the motivation for her subsequent actions in appearing to acquiese to the rape).
In State v. Brooks, 618 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo. banc 1981), this Court concluded the officer’s testimony that an informant stated the defendant was selling drugs was admissible to explain the officer’s (listener’s) subsequent conduct in investigating the defendant. The testimony was not hearsay in that it was not offered to prove that defendant was in fact selling drugs.
An officer’s testimony that a person apprehended had identified the defendant as his accomplice was found not to be hearsay in State v. Giannini, 606 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Mo.App.1980). Again, the statement was offered to show its effect on the listener (officer) to explain his subsequent conduct, not for the fact the defendant was the accomplice.
Though the majority, in its efforts to reshape the law surrounding application of the hearsay rule, explains that the above “cases are distinguishable” in that “the testimony was offered to explain the subsequent conduct of the witness testifying ” (p. 660), the majority slights several cases revealing that such a distinction is without validity or merit. In State v. Hale, 371 S.W.2d 249 (Mo.1963), a corporal testified that a sergeant told the defendant that the defendant’s version of the shooting could not be true because the victim was shot from the back. The corporal’s testimony was held not to be hearsay because it was offered not as evidence of the fact asserted, but rather to establish that the statement was made by the sergeant. The defendant-listener, on whom the statement was intended to have an effect, was not the witness testifying.
In State v. Healey, 562 S.W.2d 118 (Mo.App.1978), an officer testified that he told the defendant’s girl friend that the defend*664ant was in jail and therefore could not harm her. By this, the officer had sought to persuade her to let him in the house to see the victim (a child who had been abused by the defendant). The officer’s testimony was not hearsay because it was offered to show that the statement had been made and for its effect on the woman, who was not the testifying witness to this statement.
Testimony by an officer that his partner told the defendant that the officer was interested in purchasing marijuana from the defendant was held not hearsay in State v. Gardner, 558 S.W.2d 395 (Mo.App.1977). No testimonial or assertive use was sought to be made of the utterance. Instead, it was offered to prove the state of mind which ensued in another person, in that it provoked a reply by the defendant (in the form of an admission that he was willing to sell marijuana) and explained the testifying officer’s subsequent activities. Again, the defendant-listener, from whom the statement was intended to motivate a response, was not the testifying witness as to the partner’s statement. See also, State v. Kern, 447 S.W.2d 571 (Mo.1969); State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410 (Mo.App.1979).
In my example above, the officer’s testimony that he told the accused John Doe had threatened to kill the accused unless he confessed, would clearly be admissible for the fact that the statement was made, i.e., to show the state of mind which ensued in the defendant-listener (who need not be testifying). Hinging admissibility on the fact that the statement is offered to explain the subsequent conduct of the testifying witness misstates the law and mocks precedent.
Finally, in State v. Dobson, 587 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Mo.App.1979), an officer was properly permitted to testify that the police sergeant had advised the defendant of “his rights”. The testimony was offered not to prove the inherent truth of the sergeant’s statement, but rather to show that the sergeant had warned the defendant. In other words, the nonjudicial declaration was relevant for the fact it was made (i.e., to show the state of mind which ensued in the accused, that he need not talk with the officers unless he wished), not for the truth or falsity of the utterances (i.e., that statements made by the accused would in fact be used in court against him, that the accused could in fact refuse to make a statement, etc.).1 Hence, the statement was not hearsay.
The officer’s utterances sub judice clearly were offered for their effect on the listener (appellant), i.e. to explain his subsequent conduct in making the confession.2 The statements were relevant to the voluntariness of appellant’s confession which, notwithstanding the majority’s assertions, is always an issue in a criminal case where the accused has confessed. Hence, as stated above, the statements were not offered for the truth of the matters therein asserted, and accordingly, were not hearsay nor inadmissible as such. As there was no error, a review for prejudice is inappropriate.

. While the majority characterizes the giving of Miranda rights as “an event that took place rather than testimony repeating what another said where the truth or falsity depends upon the credibility of the person not in court” (p. 661), it must be remembered that events may rise to the level of hearsay when conduct expressed is assertive in nature. McCormick on Evidence § 250 (2nd ed. 1977). See, State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. banc 1972). Again, the operative question in hearsay analysis turns on the genuine purpose for which admission of testimony is sought, not on characterization of the testimony as a statement, vis-a-vis conduct.

. The majority contends it is “highly speculative” that the challenged statement motivated defendant to confess, (p. 661). This I doubt, as, according to the officer’s sworn testimony, defendant first denied involvement then admitted complicity when advised that the police possessed evidence incriminating him. Nevertheless, if it were “highly speculative” that the statement produced its intended effect on the accused, the proper objection would be irrelevance, not hearsay. In general, the true thrust of the majority’s complaint about the officer’s testimony seems to be that its prejudice to the defendant outweighed its probative value in explaining the defendant’s confession. This raises a question of relevancy, i.e. the probative value of the testimony as against possible prejudice to be measured under the evidentiary rules concerning relevance not hearsay. (See p. 661).