Court Opinion

ID: 9643864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:42:07.348582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:04.750347
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, dissenting. The outcome of this trial was never seriously in doubt. Two eyewitnesses saw Clay Anthony Ford kill an Arkansas State Policeman in broad daylight, and the State had an abundance of other evidence which would justify any jury imposing the ultimate penalty. About all the defense could hope for in this case was to see that Ford obtained a fair trial. But the State, for some reason, had to go further and press its advantage. In my opinion it went too far. The jury was permitted to consider two items of evidence that were unnecessary, inadmissible and could only prejudice the jury. First, it was unnecessary for the State to show what convictions Ford had that resulted in his imprisonment. These convictions were totally irrelevant to this case and inadmissible for any reason. Only the fact that he was an escapee who had been serving a sentence for a felony conviction was relevant. Evidently the trial court felt that such evidence went to motive. Weinstein defines motive as it applies in such instances as follows: Motive has been defined as ‘supplying] the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent.’ Two evidentiary steps are involved. Evidence of other crimes is admitted to show that defendant has a reason for having the requisite state of mind to do the act charged, and from this mental state it is inferred that he did commit the act. Evidence of another crime has been admitted to show the likelihood of defendant having committed the charged crime because he needed money, sex, goods to sell, was filled with hostility, sought to conceal a previous crime, or to escape after its commission. 2 WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE par. 404[4]. In no way can it be said evidence of what crimes the convictions were for provided Ford any motive for this crime. Only the fact that he was an escapee would be relevant to motive and that was admitted. The State was also permitted to offer other prior convictions of Ford during the sentencing stage of the trial. These convictions were offered so the defense could not say in mitigation that Ford had no prior criminal record. These convictions were in addition to those mentioned in the opening statement by the prosecuting attorney that I addressed first. This was also prejudicial error in my judgment. These prior convictions were not admissible as an aggravating circumstance authorized by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1303 (3) (Repl. 1977) because none of them involved an element of which was the use or threat of violence, the risk of death or serious injury to another. The trial judge allowed the convictions so the jury would not find as a mitigating circumstance that the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1304 (6). In my judgment this was prejudicial error because the trial judge, when he learned of this prior criminal record, simply should not have submitted that mitigating circumstance to the jury. We held in Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 605 S.W.2d 430 (1980) that the trial judge should omit any aggravating or mitigating circumstance that is completely unsupported by any evidence. We said: The aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered by the jury in all applicable cases are set out in the statute, and are therefore not worded or tailored to fit the particular facts of the case just tried. As the statute does not indicate otherwise, the circuit judges of the state have been submitting to the jury in capital murder cases all seven of the enumerated aggravating circumstances and all six of the enumerated mitigating circumstances, regardless of the inapplicability of some of them. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1303 (Repl. 1977). The practice was perhaps also bolstered by our Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions, because none of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances are bracketed in the model instruction, to indicate they might be omitted. We think it a better practice, and less confusing to the jury, for the circuit judge to omit from submission any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that are completely unsupported by any evidence, and we take this opportunity to direct the circuit judges of Arkansas to hereafter allow this alternate procedure. [Emphasis added.] The trial judge simply should not have permitted that particular mitigating circumstance to be considered by the jury. It amounts to allowing the State to show evidence of aggravation by these prior convictions; evidence that was not admissible as an aggravating circumstance. The majority has approved by two new methods, heretofore unknown, the injection of a defendant’s previous criminal record into his trial for a separate offense. Laymen often wonder why such evidence is excluded but lawyers and judges know very well why such evidence is traditionally excluded. Because it is their role to preserve our system of justice. In Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W.2d 804 (1954), we said: No one doubts the fundamental rule of exclusion, which forbids the prosecution from proving the commission of one crime by proof of the commission of another. The State is not permitted to adduce evidence of other offenses for the purpose of persuading the jury that the accused is a criminal and is therefore likely to be guilty of the charge under investigation. In short, proof of other crimes is never admitted when its only relevancy is to show that the prisoner is a man of bad character, addicted to crime. That is exactly what the State was able to do in this case. Ford should pay for the crime he committed, but our system cannot allow him to pay a price that is not fairly set by an impartial jury considering only relevant evidence in an atmosphere devoid of passion and prejudice. I am also disturbed by the fact that the trial court did not comply with our rule on cameras in the courtroom. There is no evidence presented to us that the defendant was prejudiced because the trial court prohibited the defendant’s attorney from obtaining the video tapes in question. Since I would reverse for other reasons, I do not reach this issue.