Court Opinion

ID: 9576674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:27:00.648998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:09.674194
License: Public Domain

LANDAU, J.,
dissenting.
ORAP 5.45(2) provides that “[n]o matter assigned as error will be considered on appeal unless it was preserved in the lower court.” In this case, plaintiff did absolutely nothing to preserve the contentions it now asserts on appeal. The majority nevertheless holds that plaintiffs contentions were preserved. The majority errs in so holding and, in the process, significantly muddies the already murky waters of our preservation case law. See State v. Doern, 156 Or App 566, 576-81, 967 P2d 1230 (1998), rev den 328 Or 666 (1999) (Landau, J., dissenting).
The record consists solely of the trial court pleading file. That file reflects that defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff did not file any response to the motion. Plaintiff did show up for oral argument on the motion, but the proceedings were not recorded, so we cannot tell what was or was not said. (Plaintiff now says that, at oral argument, it did assert the arguments it now advances on *748appeal. Defendants, however, insist that plaintiff said nothing of the kind.) That is the entirety of the record as to plaintiffs contentions before the trial court. In other words, so far as the record reflects to us, plaintiff said nothing in response to the motion to dismiss.
The majority holds that saying nothing in response to a motion to dismiss is not a problem. The majority advances four reasons for that rather surprising assertion, none of which I find persuasive.
First, the majority states that “[b]y appearing at a hearing to oppose the motion, plaintiff raised its objection [to defendants’ motion] and identified both of the statutory sources for its objections.” 165 Or App at 742 (emphasis in original). With respect, the majority’s reading of the record is fancifid. All we know from the record is that plaintiff appeared at the hearing. That plaintiff said anything, much less that it identified the precise sources for its objections on appeal is sheer conjecture. In point of fact, defendants have asserted to this court that plaintiff did not identify the statutory sources for its arguments on appeal. Plaintiff contests defendants’ recollection of what transpired at the hearing. But without a record, we cannot tell who is recalling events correctly. The majority does not explain — and I do not understand — how we can resolve that factual dispute without a record. It seems to me that one of the purposes of preservation is to prevent the court from being put in precisely this position, that is, of having to speculate whether the parties and the trial court were given a fair opportunity to address the concerns that are being raised on appeal.
Second, the majority observes that the issue in contest involves merely a matter of statutory construction and that, under Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 948 P2d 722 (1997), requiring more of plaintiff than the mere fact of his appearance at a hearing “would exalt the form over the substance of the preservation doctrine.” The majority, however, stretches the court’s holding in Stull well beyond what a fair reading of the case will support. At issue in Stull was whether the court can be required to choose between competing incorrect constructions of a statute. The court held that it cannot; that is to say, the court cannot be limited to merely choosing between *749multiple incorrect constructions of a statute. Stull, 326 Or at 77; see also State v. Williams, 161 Or App 111, 116, 984 P2d 312 (1999) (citing Stull for the rule that we are not bound by parties’ interpretations of statutes, because “if we accept the parties’ formulation of the issues presented we would be forced to misinterpret a statute”). That is not the problem in this case. The problem in this case is whether to construe a statute at all. It is not that the appealing party made a bad argument below, but that the appealing party apparently made no argument at all.
Moreover, in my view it is the majority that is forgetting the practical underpinnings of the preservation rule. Among the principal justifications of that rule is providing the trial court with a fair opportunity to make the correct decision. See, e.g., Davis v. O’Brien, 320 Or 729, 737, 891 P2d 1307 (1995) (“rules pertaining to preservation of error in trial courts are intended to advance goals such as ensuring that the positions of the parties are presented clearly to the initial tribunal”); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 356, 800 P2d 259 (1990) (rationales for preservation rule include ensuring that trial court had an opportunity “to understand and correct any error”); State v. Cruz-Aguirre, 158 Or App 15, 18, 972 P2d 1206 (1999) (“The purpose underlying ORAP 5.45(2) is that the preservation of an issue permits a trial court to understand and correct any error and to avoid the necessity of appeal.”). In this case, the trial court had no such opportunity. Indeed, for all we know, had plaintiff actually made the arguments to the trial court that it now makes to this court, the trial court could well have understood the error of defendants’ position and avoided the ruling that the majority now reverses. Preservation is supposed to avoid that possibility.
Third, the majority observes that the “trial court’s decisions indicates that it actually considered the statutory provisions argued on appeal.” 165 Or App at 742. In making that observation, however, the majority again demonstrates that it has missed one of the key policies of preservation. The fact that the trial court heard defendants’ arguments about the meaning of the statute hardly means that the trial court was aware of the plaintiffs arguments. And it is the trial court’s awareness of plaintiffs arguments that establishes whether those arguments were preserved. In this case, the *750record reflects absolutely nothing about the nature of plaintiffs arguments, indeed, whether it made any at all. The majority’s observation about the trial court’s awareness of the statute makes no sense.
Finally, the majority points out that the record is sufficient for review. 165 Or App at 743. The majority never explains what that has to do with plaintiffs failure to preserve its claim of error. The fact that an appellant designates a record sufficient to demonstrate reversible error does not mean that appellant also has demonstrated that the claim of error was preserved. Again, the majority ignores the point of preservation that, however complete the record of error, the trial court must have been given a fair opportunity to avoid making it.
Aside from the fact that the majority’s opinion offers no persuasive justification for addressing plaintiffs contentions, I am troubled by its implications for future cases. Just how far does the majority’s reasoning extend? The majority holds that the mere fact that plaintiff appeared at a hearing on defendants’ motion suggests that plaintiff opposed it and that such opposition suffices when the sole issue is one of law. 165 Or App at 742-43.1 foresee much future mischief in such a holding. Indeed, if the majority’s holding is correct, then much current preservation law is not. We have held, for example, that doing more than merely showing up at a hearing-even mentioning a specific source of authority to the trial court — may be insufficient to preserve a claim of error if what the appealing party did below was not sufficient to fairly apprise the trial court of the nature of its error. See, e.g., State v. Riggs, 143 Or App 427, 431, 923 P2d 683 (1996), rev den 325 Or 247 (1997) (citing Article I, section 12, of Oregon Constitution, not sufficient to preserve state double jeopardy claim).
I would hold that plaintiff failed to preserve its claim of error in this case. The record provides no basis for concluding that any of the arguments it asserts on appeal were made to the trial court. I would affirm on that basis and would not address the merits of the sufficiency of the complaint. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to the contrary.
Deits, C. J., joins in this dissent.