Court Opinion

ID: 9746799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:38:45.412254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:16.964172
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. I find no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s granting of the petition of appellee, City of Philadelphia. The approach that should be taken in this case was detailed by our Supreme Court in Kraynick v. Hertz, 443 Pa. 105, 277 A.2d 144 (1971). The court explained that default judgments are subject to being opened if equitable considerations so demand, that is,
In determining whether a judgment by default should be opened, we must ascertain whether there are present any equitable considerations in the factual posture of the case which require that we grant to a defendant against whom the judgment has been entered an opportunity to have his *307“day in court” and to have the cause decided upon the merits. In so doing, we act as a court of conscience.
Id., 443 Pa. at 111, 277 A.2d at 147.
As the majority notes, our review of a lower court’s ruling on a petition to open judgment is limited to a determination of whether the lower court abused its discretion in making its decision.
In supporting its conclusion that such an abuse occurred in this case, the majority likened the present facts to those in Jenkins v. Murray, 250 Pa.Super. 519, 378 A.2d 1269 (1977). In that case, the court held that the defendant had not provided the court with an excuse that met the standard established by our court in Barron v. William Penn Realty Co., 239 Pa.Super. 215, 361 A.2d 805 (1976). In Barron, the only excuse offered for failure to file a timely appearance was that the failure was the result of “oversight and/or inadvertence.” The court held that such an allegation of negligence or mistake will not alone satisfy the requirement that petitioner “explain, excuse or justify” his failure to appear. To obtain relief, the petitioner must advance a factual basis to support his plea for relief. Id., 239 Pa.Super. at 218, 361 A.2d at 807.
The petitioner in Jenkins had not completed his research and investigation within the requisite period. However, it was not the incomplete investigation that he used as an excuse for his tardiness. What that petitioner sought was an extension of time in which to complete his investigation. He failed to ask for that extension because of clerical error, not because his research was ongoing.
On the other hand, appellee in the present case sought to excuse his tardiness by explaining the logistical problems it encountered in dealing with appellant’s claim. In its effort to ascertain the merits of that claim, appellant sought information from several of its departments.
It was within the discretion of the trial court to decide that this excuse was adequate and reasonable. The city explained that because of unusual circumstances a procedure *308was followed in this case that differed from its usual modus operandi. More than negligence or mistake was alleged.
Consequently, I dissent.