Court Opinion

ID: 9420499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:54:53.055425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:25.475365
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Clark,
with whom Mr. Justice Black concurs, dissenting.
Since the duty sought to be enforced in this action attached to the office of Paymaster General and rested upon Admiral Buck only so long as he held the office, it is clear that petitioner’s claim is against Buck in his representa-*33five capacity, not personally. After his retirement it was not within his power to comply with the District Court’s injunction, and the judgment ceased to be enforceable against him.1 Consequently Buck lacked standing to obtain review of the judgment on appeal.2 Thus far I agree, with the conclusions of the Court.
But I think that when the attorney for the Government called to the Court of Appeals’ attention — after this suit had been pending there for more than a year — that the appeal had been taken by Buck after his retirement and that no appeal had been perfected by or on behalf of his successor, the court should have dismissed the appeal on its own motion.3 That is the action which this Court took in Davis v. Preston, 280 U. S. 406 (1930), when review had been allowed at the instance of a federal officer who, it later appeared, because of separation from office had *34not had standing to petition for certiorari. A unanimous court dismissed the writ as impróvidently granted, stating:
“A motion is now made by Andrew W. Mellon, as Federal Agent, for his substitution in the present proceeding in the place of Davis. But the motion must be denied. The succession in office, as now appears, occurred before there was any effort to obtain a review in this Court. After the succession Davis was completely separated from the office and without right to invoke such a review .... Therefore his petition must be disregarded. The time within which such a review may be invoked is limited by statute and that time has long since expired. To grant the motion in these circumstances would be to put aside the statutory limitation and to subject the party prevailing in the [court below] to uncertainty and vexation which the limitation is intended to prevent.” Id. at 408.4
*35This Court now concludes that Davis v. Preston is in-apposite because in that case, unlike the situation before us, applicable legislation prevented abatement of- the suit against Davis following his separation from office. But the point made in the Davis case was simply that the succession in office had preceded Davis’ effort to obtain review by this Court and pertinent statutes did not enable the former federal officer to invoke review of a judgment which was of no legal concern to him. And in this case since an appeal was not properly taken within the time allowed, it does not matter at this time whether the District Court judgment could be enforced by plaintiff against Buck’s successor, by substitution of the latter as defendant or by other action.5
It is the decision of this Court that the failure of the appellee to substitute the judgment defendant’s successor under § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1925 excuses the Government’s prior failure to perfect a valid appeal from a final judgment against one of its officers. In short, the Court places on an appellee the burden of correcting his adversary’s error. From this result I dissent.

 Cf. Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U. S. 624, 627 (1879); United States ex rel. Emanuel v. Jaeger, 117 F. 2d 483, 488 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1941).

 Davis v. Preston, 280 U. S. 406 (1930).

 In re Michigan-Ohio Bldg. Corp., 117 F. 2d 191 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1941); United Porto Rican Sugar Co. v. Saldana, 80 F. 2d 13 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1935).
Appeal from the District Court in the instant case was governed by Federal Rule 73 (1946) which provided at all relevant times as follows:
“ (a) . . . When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to a circuit court of appeals the time within which an appeal may be taken shall be 30 days from the entry of the judgment appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by law, except that in any action in which the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party the time as to all parties shall be 60 days from such entry, and except that upon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment the district court in any action may extend the time for appeal not exceeding 30 days from the expiration of the original time herein prescribed. . . .
“A party ffiay appeal from a judgment by filing with the district court a notice of appeal. Failure of the appellant to take any of *34the further steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed from does not affect the validity of the appeal ....
“ (b) . . . The notice of appeal shall specify the parties taking the appeal . . . .”
It has been held that under Federal Rule 73 timely and proper notice of appeal goes to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, United Drug Co. v. Helvering, 108 F. 2d 637 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1940); Lamb v. Shasta Oil Co., 149 F. 2d 729 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1945); Marten v. Hess, 176 F. 2d 834 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1949); Tinkoff v. West Pub. Co., 138 F. 2d 607 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1943); St. Luke’s Hospital v. Melin, 172 F. 2d 532 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1949); Spengler v. Hughes Tool Co., 169 F. 2d 166 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1948); Walleck v. Hudspeth, 128 F. 2d 343 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1942); see Maloney v. Spencer, 170 F. 2d 231, 233 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1948); and that this requirement cannot be dispensed with by waiver or consent of the parties. See Lamb v. Shasta Oil Co., supra, at 730; Marten v. Hess, supra, at 835; St. Luke’s Hospital v. Melin, supra, at 533. Compare Crump v. Hill, 104 F. 2d 36 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1939) with Piascik v. Trader Navigation Co., 178 F. 2d 886 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1949).

 Accord, Nudelman v. Globe Varnish Co., 312 U. S. 690 (1941).

 It seems that plaintiff would not be without a remedy which would give life to her judgment obtained in a court of competent jurisdiction against a federal officer who at the time of judgment had full authority in the premises. In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 402-403 (1940), the Court said: “There is privity between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government. See Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 289 U. S. 620. The crucial point is whether or not in the earlier litigation the representative of the United States had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the issue in controversy.”