Court Opinion

ID: 9463352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:03:51.286029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:02.829652
License: Public Domain

GEE, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
When confronted with the difficult task of determining whether appellant was tried without an adequate hearing in state court on the issue of his competency to stand trial, we turn for guidance to the test of a “full and fair hearing” set forth in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), and to our application of *181that test to state competency hearings in Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1973).
Much of the evidence introduced at appellant’s competency hearing related to his state of mind at the time of the offense rather than at the time of trial. Appellant complains of prejudice from the admission of these details of the crime and suggests that the jury did not understand as of when it was to determine his competency. He also asserts he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s closing remarks that unless he were found competent to stand trial he would be “back on the streets” menacing society.
In Bruce v. Estelle, supra, we determined that when a competency determination is collaterally attacked “it is the duty of a federal court to initially review the state court proceedings for the purpose of resolving whether they were conducted in a manner to fairly adduce the facts surrounding a petitioner’s claims 483 F.2d at 1038 [emphasis added]. The facts surrounding a claim of incompetency are the claimant’s ability at time of the hearing to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and his “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). But appellant’s hearing produced little evidence of his then current abilities and much about his state of mind at the time of the crime, which was at most indirectly relevant to the issue of ability to consult with a lawyer and to understand the proceedings contemplated. Thus, the competency hearing was not a fair one under the fundamental rule that the court must actually reach and decide the issues of fact presented by the defendant.1 In Bruce v. Estelle, supra, we held that the issue of criminal responsibility had been so confounded with the issue of competency to stand trial as to prevent the factfinder from focusing on the crucial factors necessary to determine competency. 483 F.2d at 1039. The confusion resulting from the introduction of evidence of appellant’s state of mind at the time of the offense also suggests that here the wrong constitutional standard was followed — the question of petitioner’s ability to know right from wrong at the time of the crime is distinct from his ability to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense. Townsend holds that application of the wrong constitutional standard likewise vitiates an evidentiary hearing.2
In finding the state determination of competency meaningless, I disregard entirely petitioner’s allegations of prejudice from the prosecutor’s closing remarks. Because these arguments are nowhere recorded, we cannot give weight to the “recollections” in petitioner’s brief, recollections so curiously reminiscent of the “back on the street” closing remarks condemned in Bruce. Without a record, this court cannot know if the remarks come from petitioner’s memory or were invented after a reading of Bruce.
Because the competency hearing below so plainly failed to find the relevant facts and so thoroughly confused the standard of criminal responsibility with that for competency to stand trial, I would not even require that petitioner address the hurdle required by Bruce to be cleared before this court may consider a claim of incompetence in a habeas corpus proceeding:
Courts in habeas corpus proceedings should not consider claims of mental incompetence to stand trial where the facts are not sufficient to positively, unequivocally and clearly generate a real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the petitioner to meaningfully participate and cooperate with counsel during a criminal trial. While the factual pattern will vary from case to case, the instant case illustrates the standard which should be met to sustain such a *182claim, viz. a history of mental illness, substantial evidence of mental incompetence at or near the time of trial supported by the opinions of qualified physicians and the testimony of laymen. The burden is on the petitioner to prove his allegations; such proof should be clear and convincing.
483 F.2d at 1043.
Although in Townsend the remedy for a meaningless hearing was a new evidentiary hearing, I have deep misgivings about the majority’s decision to remand to the district court for a nunc pro tunc competency hearing if practical. Although our circuit has countenanced such nunc pro tunc competency hearings,3 the Supreme Court has recognized the futility of a competency hearing conducted even one year after the fact,4 and it is now five years since petitioner’s trial. I would, therefore, follow the Court’s recommended course of action and grant this writ, subject to the holding of a new trial if petitioner be found presently competent at a full and fair hearing.

. “There cannot even be the semblance of a full and fair hearing unless the state court actually reached and decided the issues of fact tendered by the defendant.” 372 U.S. at 313-14, 83 S.Ct. at 757.

. Id., at 315 n. 10, 83 S.Ct. 745.

. Bruce v. Estelle, supra.

. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).