Court Opinion

ID: 9401794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 06:08:35.853178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:55.312898
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed June 9, 2023

                                     In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                              No. 05-22-00295-CV

        DAVID S. LOPEZ AND RICHARD HUMPHREY, Appellants
                               V.
                    FRANCISCO SOSA, Appellee

                On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-02681-E

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
              Before Justices Molberg, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle
                           Opinion by Justice Molberg
      Appellant David Lopez, in his official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of

Parkland Health & Hospital System, and appellant Richard Humphrey, in his official

capacity as Chief Financial Officer of Parkland, appeal the trial court’s denial of

their second amended pleas to the jurisdiction, no evidence motions for summary

judgment, and Texas Medical Liability Act motion to dismiss. Because we conclude

the trial court did not err in denying the pleas and motions, we affirm in this

memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
                                I.     Background

      In 2018, appellee Francisco Sosa was taken to Parkland’s emergency

department following a car accident. Sosa was billed $53,233.81 for the treatment

he received at Parkland and his insurer paid $31,877.03 of the invoice. In March

2019, Parkland filed a hospital lien pursuant to Chapter 55 of the Texas Property

Code “upon any and all rights of action, suits, claims, counterclaims and demands

of [Sosa] on account of personal injuries received.” The lien listed the “name of

party or parties alleged to be liable for damages arising from the injury” as unknown.

An affidavit attached to the lien stated the unpaid amount was $6,323.15.

      Sosa originally brought suit in May 2019 against Parkland and its Chief

Operating Officer, Lopez, for claims arising out of his visit to Parkland’s emergency

department. Sosa alleged Lopez authorized Med-Data, Inc. to act as Parkland’s

agent and authorized Parkland employees to provide information to Med-Data “for

the purpose of filing hospital liens[.]” Sosa alleged a $6,323.15 hospital lien was

filed against him by Parkland on or about March 4, 2019. Sosa argued Lopez “acted

without legal or statutory authority by filing said lien,” as it was not in compliance

with Chapter 55 of the property code in several respects, and accordingly, he sought

a declaratory judgment that Parkland’s hospital lien was invalid.

      Parkland and Lopez filed pleas to the jurisdiction and motions to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which were denied by the trial court. They

appealed to this Court, and we reversed as to Parkland and dismissed Sosa’s claims

                                         –2–
against the hospital but affirmed the denial of Lopez’s plea to the jurisdiction,

finding Sosa properly pleaded ultra vires claims against Lopez. See Dallas Cnty.

Hosp. Dist. v. Sosa (Sosa I), No. 05-19-01164-CV, 2020 WL 4581666, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Aug. 10, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      On August 31, 2021, Sosa filed a second amended petition. He reiterated his

claims against Lopez and made the same claims for the first time against Humphrey,

Parkland’s Chief Financial Officer. Sosa alleged Humphrey and Lopez authorized

Med-Data to act as Parkland’s agent “for purposes of collecting additional monies

for services provided to” Sosa and they authorized Parkland employees to provide

Sosa’s patient account information to Med-Data “for the purpose of the filing of a

hospital lien, which was performed on or about March 12, 2019.” Sosa alleged

Humphrey and Lopez, each in his official capacity, without legal or statutory

authority, “authorized or permitted a hospital lien to be filed as Plaintiff was an

insured patient;” “authorized or permitted the transfer of Plaintiff s account to

MedData for the purpose of filing a hospital lien on behalf of Parkland,

approximately six months after Parkland received payment from Plaintiff’s health

insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield;” “authorized or permitted the filing a hospital lien

despite Plaintiff not having been admitted into Parkland;” “authorized or permitted

a hospital lien in the sum of $53,233.81, to be filed, said lien amount greatly

exceeded the usual and customary charges for the services Plaintiff received in

contravention to the Texas Hospital Lien Statute;” “authorized or permitted the

                                        –3–
acceptance of the amount paid by Plaintiff’s health insurer, $31,877.03, which

exceeded the regular and reasonable rate customarily charged for services rendered

to Plaintiff as permitted under the Texas Hospital Lien Statute;” and “the amount

received by Parkland on Plaintiff’s behalf, $31,877.03, was more than 50% of

Plaintiff‘s third-party settlement of $57,485.98.” Sosa sought a declaration that the

hospital lien authorized by Humphrey and Lopez was invalid pursuant to §§ 55.002

and 55.004 of the property code.

      On November 9, 2021, Lopez filed a second amended plea to the jurisdiction,

arguing among other things that, following Lopez’s deposition, Sosa could not

maintain a viable ultra vires claim against him. Humphrey filed a second amended

plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the discretionary decisions alleged by Sosa did

not amount to an ultra vires claim. Lopez and Humphrey also, in the alternative,

presented their jurisdictional challenges through no evidence motions for summary

judgment. Additionally, Lopez and Humphrey jointly filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to § 74.351(a) of the civil practice and remedies code, arguing Sosa’s suit

alleged health care liability claims requiring an expert report, which Sosa failed to

serve on them. The trial court denied the two pleas to the jurisdiction, the no

evidence motions for summary judgment, and the Chapter 74 motion to dismiss.

This appeal followed.

                                   II.   Discussion

                                         –4–
      Lopez argues he had no role in the actions challenged by Sosa, and that his

deposition, given subsequent to our prior opinion in this case, confirms he did not

have authority over the actions that form the basis of Sosa’s claims. Lopez and

Humphrey also argue Sosa’s allegations cannot support an ultra vires claim because

they involve the exercise of discretion. They argue the filing of a hospital lien,

determining how a patient account is handled, determining whether a patient was

admitted to the hospital, and setting hospital charges are all discretionary actions.

They further argue Sosa did not allege an ultra vires claim because it was a “practical

impossibility” for a lien to have been filed in violation of Chapter 55 in the manner

alleged by Sosa. Alternatively, Lopez and Humphrey argue the trial court erred in

denying their motions for summary judgment because Sosa presented no evidence

establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, Lopez and Humphrey argue the

trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss under the Texas Medical

Liability Act.

                      A. Pleas to the jurisdiction and no evidence
                                summary judgment motions

1. Applicable law

      Generally, immunity from suit implicates courts’ subject matter jurisdiction

and is therefore properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Houston Belt &

Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016). Because

subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we review de novo a trial court’s

                                         –5–
ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458

S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015). Jurisdiction may also be challenged by a no evidence

motion for summary judgment. See Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d

544, 552 (Tex. 2019). “After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting

summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that

there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which

an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

The motion should be granted unless the nonmovant produces evidence raising a

genuine issue of material fact. Id. We view the jurisdictional evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmovant. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d at 552. The plaintiff has

the burden to demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson

Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012).

      Sovereign immunity protects the state and its agencies from suit and liability,

while governmental immunity provides a similar protection to the political

subdivisions of the state. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54,

57–58 (Tex. 2011).      This immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter

jurisdiction for suits where certain governmental units have been sued, unless the

state has consented to suit. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

217, 224 (Tex. 2004). Immunity does not, however, bar an ultra vires suit, which is

brought against a government officer for acting outside his or her authority or for

failure to perform a purely ministerial act. Houston Belt, 487 S.W.3d at 161.

                                        –6–
Governmental immunity does not protect every act by a government officer that

requires some exercise of judgment or discretion; an officer with some discretion

may nevertheless act ultra vires “if he exceeds the bounds of his granted authority

or if his acts conflict with the law itself.” Id. at 158. This exception to governmental

immunity is justified because acts made without legal authority should not be

considered acts of the state at all. Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex.

2017). Thus, ultra vires suits properly understood do not seek to control the state

but “‘to reassert the control of the state’ over one of its agents.” Id. (quoting City of

El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009)).

2. Analysis

      Lopez first argues that his deposition testimony made clear he had no

involvement with or authority over the actions forming the basis of Sosa’s claims.

In pertinent part, Lopez testified that, though he was no longer employed at Parkland,

his former responsibilities as Chief Operating Officer were “very broad” and

included overseeing the management of departments such as radiology, pharmacy,

laboratory, respiratory care, facilities, housekeeping, and nutrition services, but did

not include finance and nursing. Lopez said the finance department was in charge

of setting prices for services. Lopez did not know why Parkland switched collection

services from Meridian Services to MedData, and he was unfamiliar with the

relationship between Parkland and MedData.            He said Humphrey—as Chief

Financial Officer—or “his designee responsible” would be the person to speak with

                                          –7–
regarding how Parkland’s patient billing files are transferred to MedData. Thus,

Lopez argues, he was a “nominal, apex representative” who had nothing to do with

the action and an ultra vires action could not be brought against him. See Hall, 508

S.W.3d at 240. Sosa responds that this question was resolved in the appeal of the

denial of Lopez’s first plea to the jurisdiction.

      We agree with Sosa. Previously, we reviewed this claim when the trial court

had before it Lopez’s affidavit, in which he stated his responsibilities included

managerial oversight of the operations division but did not include “the setting of

the amount of charges for the various treatments and services offered by Parkland or

with the billing of Parkland’s charges.” He then stated he had no role in approving

Parkland’s charges for its services or in filing hospital liens, and had no contact with

Parkland’s “vendors responsible for the investigation and filing of hospital liens” or

any role in the business relationship between Parkland and the relevant vendors.

Lopez also stated he had no role specifically as to Sosa’s treatment, charges, billing,

or hospital lien. On those facts, we acknowledged Lopez “denied any role in the

instant lien and in general determining amounts of charges or filing or authorizing

the filing of hospital liens” but nevertheless observed that “nowhere in his affidavit

or job description does Lopez deny the legal authority to file or authorize the filing

of hospital liens, to determine charges for services and treatments provided by

Parkland, to cause other employees to confirm that charges for services are

‘reasonable and regular,’ or direct employees to file, release or reform a lien.” Sosa

                                          –8–
I, 2020 WL 4581666, at *5 (emphasis added). We concluded Sosa properly pleaded

ultra vires claims against Lopez. Id. at *6.

      Lopez’s deposition testimony effectively reiterated what he previously stated

in his affidavit. He testified that his responsibilities were broad but did not include

finance, and did not include overseeing the finance department. Thus, we again must

conclude that, although Lopez disclaimed any responsibility for setting prices,

billing patients, or filing hospital liens—and denied any role in the specific facts

alleged by Sosa—Lopez did not deny the legal authority to file or authorize the filing

of hospital liens, to determine charges for services and treatments provided by

Parkland, to cause other employees to confirm that charges for services are

“reasonable and regular,” or direct employees to file, release or reform a lien. See

id. at *5–6. We conclude Sosa properly pleaded ultra vires claims against Lopez.

      Second, Lopez and Humphrey argue the actions alleged by Sosa were

discretionary in nature and thus could not be the basis for an ultra vires suit. To

reiterate, Sosa seeks a declaratory judgment against Lopez and Humphrey,

specifically seeking a declaration that Parkland’s hospital lien is invalid under

§ 55.002 of the property code because he was not admitted to the hospital, and under

§ 55.004 because Parkland has received an amount for Sosa’s treatment that

exceeded the reasonable and regular rate for the services provided. Sosa generally

alleges Lopez and Humphrey authorized or permitted the lien to be filed against

                                         –9–
him.1 Lopez and Humphrey argue that the allegation they erred in authorizing the

lien claiming amounts that were not reasonable and regular implicates only a

“discretionary determination.”

        We reject Lopez and Humphrey’s contention. As the supreme court observed

in Houston Belt, “governmental immunity bars suits complaining of an exercise of

absolute discretion but not suits complaining of either an officer’s failure to perform

a ministerial act or an officer’s exercise of judgment or limited discretion without

reference to or in conflict with the constraints of the law authorizing the official to

act.” 487 S.W.3d at 163. Here, Sosa’s allegations complain of Lopez’s and

Humphrey’s exercise of limited discretion in authorizing or permitting the hospital

lien to be filed, arguing their actions conflicted with the constraints of the law

authorizing them to act.

        Chapter 55 of the property code grants a lien right to a hospital that treats an

individual for injuries caused by an accident attributed to the negligence of another

person. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 55.002(a). The property code limits a hospital’s

    1
      Sosa alleged Lopez and Humphrey, without legal authority, (1) authorized or permitted a hospital lien
to be filed against Sosa, who was an insured patient; (2) authorized or permitted the transfer of Sosa’s
account to MedData for the purpose of filing a hospital lien on behalf of Parkland, about six months after
Parkland received payment from Sosa’s health insurer; (3) authorized or permitted the filing a hospital lien
despite Sosa not having been admitted to Parkland; (4) authorized or permitted a hospital lien to be filed in
the sum of $53,233.81, which greatly exceeded the usual and customary charges for the services Sosa
received, in contravention to the Texas Hospital Lien Statute; (5) authorized or permitted the acceptance of
the amount paid by Sosa’s health insurer, $31,877.03, which exceeded the regular and reasonable rate
customarily charged for services rendered to Sosa as permitted under the Texas Hospital Lien Statute; and
(6) the amount received by Parkland on Sosa’s behalf, $31,877.03, was more than 50% of Sosa’s third-
party settlement of $57,485.98.
                                                   –10–
authority in filing such a lien in several ways. As pertinent here, under § 55.002(a),

“For the lien to attach, the individual must be admitted to a hospital not later than 72

hours after the accident.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 55.002(a). Additionally, a hospital

lien under § 55.002(a) does not cover “charges for other services that exceed a

reasonable and regular rate for the services[.]” Id. § 55.004(d)(1).

      In granting Parkland the authority to file a lien while constraining its authority

to do so in particular ways, Chapter 55 of the property code is similar to the statutory

schemes at issue in Henrich and Houston Belt. In Heinrich, the widow of an El Paso

police officer sued, among others, the officers’ pension fund’s board of trustees and

the mayor after the board reduced her monthly survivor benefits when her son

reached a certain age. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 369. She sought declaratory relief,

alleging the defendants violated the statute governing the pension fund by reducing

her benefits retroactively. Id. The supreme court concluded that “suits to require

state officials to comply with statutory or constitutional provisions are not prohibited

by sovereign immunity” while acknowledging ultra vires suits cannot complain of

exercises of discretion. Id. at 372. Instead, they must allege an officer acted without

legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. Id. The court stated that

the board, under the pertinent statute, had no discretion to retroactively lower

pensions. Id. at 379. The widow’s suit against the board members and the mayor in

their official capacities was therefore permitted to go forward. Id. at 380.

                                         –11–
      The court in Houston Belt summarized Heinrich as follows: “Heinrich alleged

that the officers, making the type of determination which they had authority to make,

made that determination in a way the law did not allow.” 487 S.W.3d at 162.

Similarly, in Houston Belt, the City of Houston’s Director of Public Works and

Engineering was given authority, by city ordinance, to administer a “pay-as-you-go”

drainage fee system. Id. at 158. The ordinance defined certain terms, such as

“benefitted property” and “impervious surface.” Id. at 159. After receiving notice

of proposed charges under the ordinance, Houston Belt eventually sued the city and

the director, alleging the director “had improperly proposed charges on properties

that were not benefitted and on surfaces that were not impervious.” Id. The supreme

court concluded that nothing in the ordinance suggested the director had absolute

discretion to make determinations about what was a “benefitted property” or an

“impervious surface.” Id. at 167–68. Accordingly, Houston Belt alleged viable ultra

vires claims against the director. Id. at 169.

      It is true, as Lopez and Humphrey argue, that not every legal mistake is an

ultra vires act. See Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 241. In Hall, the university system regent

plaintiff, Hall, sought a declaration that the chancellor defendant, McRaven, acted

ultra vires in refusing to provide him unredacted student records. Id. at 237. The

supreme court observed that an ultra vires suit could only compel McRaven to

follow his governing authority, not change it. Id. at 240. The court concluded Hall

failed to allege a proper ultra vires claim because an official making an error while

                                         –12–
staying within his or her authority is not an ultra vires act. Id. at 242–43. In

interpreting and applying federal privacy law, even if erroneously, McRaven was

not applying the law authorizing him to act, he was applying a collateral law; thus,

he was not acting without legal authority in erroneously applying a collateral

law. Id.

      The claim in Hall differed from the one in Houston Belt in two ways. First,

in Houston Belt, the director’s alleged misinterpretation was of the requirements of

the law authorizing him to act, so he allegedly exceeded the scope of what the city

permitted him to do. Id. at 241. On the other hand, McRaven’s interpretation did

not relate to his authority but to federal privacy law, which was merely collateral to

McRaven’s authority. Id. at 242. The court concluded that, in order to act without

legal authority in interpreting and applying the privacy law, McRaven must have

exercised discretion without reference to or in conflict with the constraints of the law

authorizing him to act. Id. Second, in Houston Belt, the director’s determination

was subject to explicit constraints, while McRaven’s only duty was to determine

whether a Regent may review information protected by privacy laws. Id. In other

words, McRaven’s discretion to interpret collateral federal privacy law was

“absolute” under the Houston Belt framework. Id. at 243.

      The same cannot be said here. Instead, as in Houston Belt, the law authorizing

Lopez and Humphrey to act also constrained them from acting in particular ways; as

in Heinrich, Sosa alleged that the officers, taking the type of action they had the

                                         –13–
authority to take, did so in a way the law did not allow. Section 55.004 states that a

hospital lien may include “the amount of a physician’s reasonable and necessary

charges for emergency hospital care services provided to the injured individual” but

does not include charges “for other services that exceed a reasonable and regular rate

for the services.” See TEX. PROP. CODE § 55.004(c), (d)(1). Thus, Sosa’s allegation

that Lopez and Humphrey erred in authorizing a hospital lien to be filed based on

rates that were not the reasonable and regular rates customarily charged is an

allegation that Lopez and Humphrey acted in conflict with the constraints of the law

authorizing them to act.2 See Sosa I, 2020 WL 4581666, at *7. Accordingly, we

conclude the trial court did not err in denying Lopez’s and Humphrey’s amended

pleas to the jurisdiction.

        For the same reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Lopez

and Humphrey’s no evidence motions for summary judgment. The evidence before

the trial court showed that Lopez had broad authority as Chief Operating Officer,

and Humphrey was Chief Financial Officer at Parkland. Nothing demonstrates

Lopez had no legal authority relating to hospital liens, and nothing before us

demonstrates that Humphrey or someone else had exclusive legal authority relating

to the filing of hospital liens. See id. Viewing the evidence in the light most

    2
      Because we conclude these allegations support an ultra vires claim, we do not need to address whether
the allegation that Lopez and Humphrey erred in authorizing the lien for treatment provided in the
emergency room or Sosa’s other allegations support an ultra vires claim. See Sosa I, 2020 WL 4581666,
at *7 n.9; TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
                                                  –14–
favorable to Sosa, we conclude fact questions exist about which officer may have

had legal authority relating to the authorizing and filing of hospital liens and Sosa’s

related allegations. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by denying

Lopez’s and Humphrey’s no evidence summary judgment motions challenging the

trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

                               B. TMLA motion to dismiss

      In their motion to dismiss pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability Act, Lopez

and Humphrey argued Sosa’s suit should be dismissed for failure to file an expert

report under § 74.351(a) of the civil practice and remedies code. We review a trial

court’s decision on a § 74.351 motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Bakhtari

v. Estate of Dumas, 317 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).

      A claimant must, in a health care liability claim, serve on the defendant or its

attorney, not later than the 120th day after the defendant’s original answer is filed,

one or more expert reports, with a curriculum vitae for each expert listed in the report

for each physician or health care provider against whom a liability claim is asserted.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351(a). A claimant is a person, including a

decedent’s estate, seeking recovery of damages in a health care liability claim. Id. §

74.001(a)(2). A health care liability claim is a cause of action against a health care

provider or physician “for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure

from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or

administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in

                                             –15–
injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant’s claim or cause of action

sounds in tort or contract.” Id. § 74.001(a)(13). The supreme court has divided this

statutory definition into three elements: (1) the defendant is a health care provider or

physician; (2) the claimant’s cause of action is for treatment, lack of treatment, or

other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, health care, or

safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care; and

(3) the defendant’s alleged departure from accepted standards proximately caused

the claimant’s injury or death. Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 2012).

      Sosa did not serve on Lopez and Humphrey an expert report relating to his

claims, so the question here is whether he was required to do so under § 74.351(a).

Sosa argues he was not required to file such a report because Lopez and Humphrey

are not health care providers; Sosa does not seek damages and thus is not a

“claimant” under Chapter 74; Sosa does not claim he suffered an injury; and his

claim does not implicate Lopez and Humphrey’s conduct during the course of Sosa’s

care, treatment, or confinement given that the hospital lien was filed about ten

months after Sosa’s emergency department visit.

      Because we conclude on the record before us that Sosa is not a “claimant”

within the meaning of the TMLA, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying

the Chapter 74 motion to dismiss. As stated above, claimant “means a person,

including a decedent’s estate, seeking or who has sought recovery of damages in a

health care liability claim.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.001(a)(2) (emphasis

                                         –16–
added). “Economic damages” and “noneconomic damages” are both defined by the

act to have the meaning assigned by § 41.001, see id. § 74.001(a)(6), (a)(20), which

defines economic damages as “compensatory damages intended to compensate a

claimant for actual economic or pecuniary loss; the term does not include exemplary

damages or noneconomic damages,” and noneconomic damages as “damages

awarded for the purpose of compensating a claimant for physical pain and suffering,

mental or emotional pain or anguish, loss of consortium, disfigurement, physical

impairment, loss of companionship and society, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment

of life, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind other than

exemplary damages[,]” see id. § 41.001(4), (12).

      Here, Sosa seeks declaratory relief; he does not seek to recover damages.

Consequently, he is not a claimant within the meaning of the medical liability act,

and he was not required to file the expert report required by § 74.351(a).

See McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. Gomez, No. 13-12-00421-CV, 2013 WL 784688, at *6

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(concluding plaintiff, with respect to his claim seeking a declaration that a hospital

lien was invalid, was not a “claimant” under TMLA because he sought “declaratory

relief, not an award of damages”). Notably, this is not a case in which the plaintiff

seeks damages and also seeks declaratory relief, which we previously concluded

compels a different result than the one we reach today. See Tinnard v. Dallas Cnty.

Hosp. Dist., No. 05-13-01161-CV, 2015 WL 273123, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan.

                                        –17–
22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (when plaintiff sued heath care providers under the

tort claims act seeking actual, statutory, and punitive damages, he was a claimant

seeking damages under the TMLA, and the “fact that [the plaintiff] also filed a claim

for declaratory relief does not alter the underlying nature of his lawsuit, and his claim

cannot be divided into both a health care liability claim and another type of claim”).

Sosa seeks only a judicial declaration under Chapter 37 that the hospital lien

allegedly authorized by Lopez and Humphrey is invalid, and he seeks attorney’s fees

under § 37.009—he does not seek to recover damages. E.g., CBIF Ltd. P’ship v.

TGI Friday’s Inc., No. 05-15-00157-CV, 2017 WL 1455407, at *15 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Apr. 21, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“attorney’s fees are not ordinarily

considered as an element of damages”).

      Lopez and Humphrey argue in their reply brief that supreme court precedent

forecloses the foregoing; they cite Coming Attractions Bridal & Formal, Inc. v. Tex.

Health Res., 595 S.W.3d 659, 666–67 (Tex. 2020). In that case, the plaintiff argued

that because it alleged economic damages and not physical injury, the TMLA did

not apply. Id. The supreme court rejected this argument, noting it had previously

held “that claims alleging the negligent provision of health care fall within the Act

when the alleged damages stem from health-care-related claims, regardless of the

type of injury alleged.” Id. (citing CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505

S.W.3d 528, 537 (Tex. 2016)). The act does not qualify the type of “injury” to which

it applies, and it does not limit the definition of injury to bodily injury. Id. We do

                                         –18–
not think this discussion of the meaning of “injury” within the definition of a “health

care liability claim” affects our analysis of whether, under the facts of this case, Sosa

is a “claimant,” which turns not on the type of damages alleged but on whether any

damages were alleged. Because Sosa does not seek damages, he cannot be a

“claimant” under the TMLA. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying

Lopez and Humphrey’s Chapter 74 motion to dismiss.

                                   III.   Conclusion

      Having overruled Lopez and Humphrey’s three issues on appeal, we affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

                                             /Ken Molberg/
220295f.p05                                  KEN MOLBERG
                                             JUSTICE

                                          –19–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

DAVID S. LOPEZ AND RICHARD                     On Appeal from the County Court at
HUMPHREY, Appellants                           Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-02681-
No. 05-22-00295-CV           V.                E.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice
FRANCISCO SOSA, Appellee                       Molberg. Justices Partida-Kipness
                                               and Carlyle participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee FRANCISCO SOSA recover his costs of this
appeal from appellants DAVID S. LOPEZ AND RICHARD HUMPHREY.

Judgment entered this 9th day of June 2023.

                                        –20–