Court Opinion

ID: 9488613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:50:18.283212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:59.328704
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I am unable to join the majority’s interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841’s terms “mixture or substance” in the instant case. The majority concludes we are free to interpret § 841 as an issue of first impression because: (1) we have not previously done so; and (2) the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “mixture or substance” for purposes of § 841 in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) applies only to LSD cases. Op. at 1538 n. 10. I conclude we are bound by the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation of “mixture or substance” in all of § 841. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461-62, 111 S.Ct. at 1925-26. Further, the majority’s statutory analysis is flawed because it contravenes settled rules of statutory construction. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
In Chapman, the Supreme Court defined the terms “mixture or substance” for purposes of § 841. Specifically, the Court confronted the question whether the weight of blotter paper containing LSD or the weight of pure LSD alone should be used in determining a defendant’s eligibility for a mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(v). Under § 841(b)(l)(B)(v), a defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum five year term of imprisonment if he, inter alia, distributes “1 gram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of’ LSD. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(v) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court had to determine, therefore, whether the blotter paper and LSD distributed by the defendants constituted a “mixture or substance” for purposes of the statute.
The Court noted that, in addition to LSD, § 841 uses the terms “mixture or substance” in connection with a number of controlled substances, but does not define the terms. The Court therefore recognized that § 841 repeats the phrase “mixture or substance” numerous times, including in reference to methamphetamine. Although the Supreme Court interpreted “mixture or substance” in the context of a case involving LSD, it interpreted a statutory phrase used throughout § 841. Analyzing § 841 using time-honored principles of statutory construction, the Court concluded that because the statute did not define “mixture or substance,” the words had to be given their ordinary meaning. The Court determined:
A “mixture” is defined to include “a portion of matter consisting of two or more components that do not bear a fixed proportion to one another and that however thoroughly commingled are regarded as retaining a separate existence.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1449 (1986). A “mixture” may also consist of two substances blended together so that the particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other. 9 Oxford English Dictionary 921 (2d ed. 1989).
Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462, 111 S.Ct. at 1926.
Applying these definitions, the Court concluded that blotter paper and LSD constitute a “mixture” under the plain meaning of that term because the LSD crystals are diffused among the fibers of the blotter paper. Id. Because the blotter paper and LSD weighed 5.7 grams, the defendants distributed “1 gram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of’ LSD. As a result, the defendants were subject to § 841(b)(l)(B)(v)’s mandatory minimum five year term of imprisonment.
The Supreme Court therefore defined the terms “mixture or substance” in § 841 using *1539a familiar tool of construction: the plain language of the statute. In so doing, the Court authoritatively determined that the words “mixture or substance” wherever appearing in § 841 have their ordinary dictionary meanings. Thus, for purposes of § 841, a “mixture” is “two substances blended together so that the particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other.” Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462, 111 S.Ct. at 1926 (citing 9 Oxford English Dictionary 921 (2d ed. 1989)).
Applying the plain meaning of “mixture” set forth in Chapman to the instant ease, waste water and methamphetamine constitute “two substances blended together so that the particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other.” Id. Waste water and methamphetamine, therefore, constitute a “mixture or substance” for purposes of § 841. See id. Defendant possessed a thirty-two kilogram mixture of waste water and methamphetamine, containing twenty-eight grams of pure methamphetamine. Thus, Defendant possessed “1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(viii). Defendant is therefore subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. Id Because the statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum sentence under the applicable guideline range, Defendant must be sentenced to a minimum ten years imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(b); see United States v. Campbell, 995 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir.1993) (“Statutes trump guidelines where the two conflict.”).
The majority, however, concludes that Chapman does not control the instant case. Specifically, the majority asserts that in United States v. Killion, 7 F.3d 927 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1106, 127 L.Ed.2d 418 (1994), we held that Chapman “deeid[ed] only the LSD issue.” Op. at 1537 n. 9. This conclusion misreads Killion and consequently rejects controlling Supreme Court precedent.
In Killion, government agents found 66.3 grams of a yellow liquid containing 52.9 grams of Phenyl-2-Propanone (“P-2-P”) and 17.5 grams of a dark brown substance containing an unquantifiable trace of P-2-P at defendant’s house. Thus, the agents found a total of 83.8 grams of a substance containing P-2-P. The defendant pled guilty to manufacturing 83.8 grams of P-2-P. In computing the defendant’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, the district court included the entire 83.8 gram weight of the yellow liquid and dark brown substance. The defendant challenged the district court’s computation of his base offense level, contending that the court erroneously included the weight of unusable waste by-products in the yellow liquid and dark brown substance in determining his base offense level. The court rejected the defendant’s challenge, citing Tenth Circuit precedent and holding that the entire 83.8 gram weight should be used because the yellow liquid and dark brown substance contained a “detectable amount” of P-2-P. Id. at 931.
On appeal, we noted that our precedent construed § 2D1.1 as requiring the entire weight of a mixture containing a detectable amount of a controlled substance be used in determining a defendant’s base offense level. The defendant urged us to reconsider our position in light of Chapman. Specifically, the defendant contended Chapman adopted a “market-oriented” approach, whereby a defendant is punished only for usable, marketable parts of a drug mixture. We refused to depart from our precedent, however. We concluded that Chapman’s “market-oriented” approach discussion1 was specifically di*1540rected to the LSD sentencing issue before the Court.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, however, we did not conclude that Chapman’s plain meaning interpretation of “mixture or substance” was limited to LSD eases. Id. at 931, 934. Instead, we noted that the Court “analyzed the meaning of the term ‘mixture or substance’ in 21 U.S.C. § 811 ” — i.e., for purposes of the entire statute. Id. at 931 (emphasis added). Thus, the majority’s conclusion that “[w]e have held that Chapman was deciding only the LSD issue,” op. at 1538 n. 10, is overbroad and erroneous as applied to the instant case. As a simple reading of Killion demonstrates, we have already recognized that Chapman sets forth the controlling definition of the terms “mixture or substance” wherever they appear in § 841. See id. at 931. Because the majority misreads Killion, it fails to apply controlling Supreme Court precedent in the instant case and thereby reaches the wrong result.
II.
In addition to ignoring controlling precedent, the majority’s interpretation of § 841 contravenes elementary principles of statutory construction. In interpreting statutes, our first and primary task is to “determine congressional intent, using ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’ ” NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 413, 421, 98 L.Ed.2d 429 (1988) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1221, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)) (emphasis added). We examine the plain language of the statute. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 4 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir.1993). We assume that Congress’ intent is expressed in the ordinary meaning of the words it uses. Park N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194, 105 S.Ct. 658, 661-62, 83 L.Ed.2d 582 (1985). Thus, when the statute does not define particular terms, the terms “must be given their ordinary meaning.” Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462, 111 S.Ct. at 1925; see also Bartlett v. Martin Marietta Operations Support, Inc., 38 F.3d 514, 518 (10th Cir.1994) (“The court is obliged to give terms their plain meaning whenever possible.”). We give “full effect” to the plain meaning of the words chosen by Congress. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2533-34, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). “[W]e will not restrict the plain meaning of the language chosen by Congress absent ‘clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.’ ” Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1555 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 101 S.Ct. at 2527). “The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare eases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1031, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)). If Congress’ intent is clear from the statutory language, we give effect to that intent, our inquiry is complete, and we do not turn to an agency construction. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
Applying these principles, we first examine the plain language of § 841. Because § 841 does not define the terms “mixture or substance,” they “must be given their ordinary meaning.” Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462, 111 S.Ct. at 1925. Moreover, we must give “full effect” to the plain meaning of § 841’s terms “mixture or substance” and not restrict their plain definitional scope unless we: (1) find clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 101 S.Ct. at 2527; or (2) conclude that this is a “rare case” where a literal application of § 841’s terms “will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242, 109 S.Ct. at 1031.
The majority concludes this is a “rare case” where a literal application of § 841’s terms will produce a result demonstrably at odds with Congress’ intentions. The majority, therefore, must demonstrate that Congress did not intend § 841 to convey its literal meaning — i.e., instead of “a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of’ a controlled substance, the majority must show that Congress really intended § 841 to read “a [usable] mixture or substance con-*1541tabling a detectable amount of’ a controlled substance. To support its contention that the word “usable” should be read into the statute, the majority cites Chapman’s discussion of the legislative history to § 841. Specifically, the majority reasons that “Chapman’s recognition of Congress’ ‘market-oriented’ approach dictates that we not treat unusable drug mixtures as if they were usable.” Op. at 11.
In Chapman, the Court examined the legislative history to § 841 and concluded that Congress adopted a “‘market-oriented’ approach to punishing drug trafficking.” Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461, 111 S.Ct. at 1925. The Court noted, however, that under the “market-oriented” approach adopted by Congress “the total quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length of the sentence.” Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 99-845, pt. 1,11-12,17 (1986)) (emphasis added). Based upon its review of the legislative history, the Court concluded that Congress intended “penalties for drug trafficking to be graduated according to the weight of the drugs in whatever form they were found— cut or uncut, pure or impure, ready for wholesale or ready for distribution at the retail level.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court recognized that Congress adopted the market-oriented approach because the reality of drug-trafficking is that drugs are often combined with other substances in a mixture. Congress intended to punish drug offenders who possess large quantities of drug mixtures more severely. Neither the Court, nor Congress, however, gave any indication that drug offenders should be sen-fenced for the total quantity of only usable drug mixtures. Thus, to the extent the circuit court eases cited by the majority draw a usable/unusable (marketable/unmarketable) distinction in interpreting § 841, their reading is not based in Chapman or in accord with clearly expressed congressional intent.2
An examination of Chapman and its discussion of the “market-oriented” approach reveals the Court did not find legislative history restricting the plain meaning of § 841’s terms “mixture or substance” to “usable” drug mixtures. The majority opinion in this case fails to identify legislative history evidencing such congressional intent. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in Chapman after examining § 841’s legislative history that, under the “market-oriented” approach, Congress intended to punish drug traffickers for the “total quantity” of drugs distributed “in whatever form they were found.” Id. (emphasis added). Chapman’s discussion of the “market-oriented” approach, therefore, demonstrates the fallacy of the majority’s conclusion that Congress intended to limit the plain meaning of the terms “mixture or substance” to “usable” drug mixtures. The legislative history to § 841 underscores the congressional intent expressed in the plain language of the statute to punish drug traffickers for the “total quantity” of drugs distributed “in whatever form they [are] found.” Id. Accordingly, Congress provided no restrictions on the phrase “mixture or substance” in § 841(b). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Thus, the discussion in Chapman of § 841’s legislative history and Congress’ “market-oriented” approach contradicts the majority’s *1542restrictive interpretation of § 841 in this case.
Because there is no record of congressional intent to otherwise restrict the plain definitional scope of § 841’s terms, we apply the terms in accord with their plain, dictionary meanings. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462, 111 S.Ct. at 1925-26; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 101 S.Ct. at 2527. Under the plain meaning of “mixture,” waste water and methamphetamine constitute “two substances blended together so that the particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other.” Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462, 111 S.Ct. at 1926 (quoting 9 Oxford English Dictionary at 921). Waste water and methamphetamine therefore qualify as a “mixture or substance” for purposes of § 841 because the particles of the methamphetamine are diffused among the particles of the waste water. As a result, Defendant possessed 32 kilograms of a “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(viii). He is therefore subject to § 841’s mandatory minimum ten years imprisonment. Because the statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum sentence under the applicable guideline range, Defendant must be sentenced to a minimum ten years imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b); Campbell, 995 F.2d at 175.
III.
Instead of applying time-honored principles of statutory construction and focusing on congressional intent, the majority applies a novel method of construction called the “congruent” approach, which focuses on the sentencing commission’s intent. Op. at 13. Under this “congruent” approach, the majority interprets the term “mixture or substance” in § 841 to exclude waste water in order to conform to sentencing guidelines commentary. In so doing, the majority ignores congressional intent, which is clear from the plain language of § 841, and essentially allows the Sentencing Commission to interpret a federal statute. This approach abdicates our uniquely judicial task to “say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and is flawed in several respects.
First, if congressional intent is clear from the face of a statute, we simply apply the statute in accord with that intent and do not reference the views of an agency. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82. Moreover, in any event, deference to commentary promulgated by the Sentencing Commission is unwarranted because commentary is not the Commission’s construction of a statute that it administers. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (court defers to agency construction of statute that it administers when congressional intent is unclear). Commentary performs three functions: (1) it interprets the guidelines and explains their application; (2) it suggests circumstances warranting departure from the guidelines; and (3) it provides background information to the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7. As such, commentary is “akin to an agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rules.” Stinson v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1919, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). Commentary does not, however, interpret federal statutes. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7. Thus, while commentary is authoritative and binding with respect to the meaning and application of the guidelines, Stinson, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1919, it is not authoritative as to the meaning of a federal statute and is therefore entitled to no deference by this court in statutory interpretation. See Smith v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2055, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) (dissent’s assumption that the sentencing guidelines are relevant to the interpretation of a federal criminal statute is “dubious”); United States v. Palacio, 4 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir.1993) (“[Ujnless the Sentencing Commission is construing its own authority as an agency ... its view of the substantive meaning of a criminal statute is unlikely to be entitled to any deference.”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1194, 127 L.Ed.2d 543 (1994).
Second, the majority’s interpretation of “mixture or substance” under its “congruent” approach ignores settled canons of construction and defies common sense. Under the majority’s rationale, “mixture or substance” has one meaning for LSD cases (Chapman) and another meaning for methamphetamine eases (the Sentencing Commission’s views).
*1543Under elementary maxims of construction, however, “[w]e must presume that words used more than once in the same statute have the same meaning.” Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir.1991) (citing Sutherland Stat. Const. §§ 46.05, 46.06 (4th ed. 1984)). The majority points to nothing in the statute, its legislative history, or interpretive case law to indicate that Congress intended the words “mixture or substance” have different definitions in different subsections of § 841. Indeed, an eclectic definitional scheme, whereby an identical phrase means what the dictionary says in one section of § 841 and what guideline commentary says in another, cannot be what Congress intended.
Third, the majority’s central focus on the “congruent” approach and sentencing commission intent in interpreting § 841, instead of on settled principles of statutory contraction and congressional intent implicates separation of powers concerns. Principles of statutory construction ensure that the courts, in exercising their unique role to declare what the law means, properly focus upon ascertaining the intent of Congress. Contrary to the majority’s approach, it is not the will of the Sentencing Commission — “an independent commission in the Judicial Branch of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) — or of this court, that holds paramount importance in statutory interpretation. Instead, it is the intent and will of Congress — the democratic body representing the will of the people — that counts. By applying principles of statutory interpretation, we ensure that we interpret and apply statutes in accord with congressional intent, regardless of what we think the statutes should say, and thus properly respect the unique roles of Congress and the federal courts in our trilateral system.
In sum, by following Chapman or applying time-honored principles of statutory interpretation, the majority would reach the same and right result — i.e., it would apply the plain meaning of “mixture or substance” to the facts and conclude Defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum ten years imprisonment. Instead, the majority disregards Supreme Court precedent and contravenes principles of statutory construction. The net effect of the majority’s decision results in the phrase “mixture or substance” in § 841 having one meaning in LSD cases and another meaning in methamphetamine cases. It will be interesting to see how “mixture or substance” will be defined in the six other subsections of § 841(b)(1)(A), which deal with heroin, cocaine, PCP and other controlled substances. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(l)(A)(i)-(iv), (vi), (vii).
Because the district court erred by failing to sentence Defendant to a minimum of ten years imprisonment in accord with the applicable statutory mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(l)(A)(viii), I would reverse. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. In Chapman, the Court noted that:
Congress adopted a "market-oriented” approach to punishing drug trafficking, under which the total quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length of the sentence. To implement that principle, Congress set mandatory minimum sentences corresponding to the weight of a “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of” the various controlled substances, including LSD. It intended the penalties for drug trafficking to be graduated according to the weight of the drugs in whatever form they were found — cut or uncut, pure or impure, ready for wholesale or ready for distribution at the retail level.
Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461, 111 S.Ct. at 1925 (citation omitted). In Killion, we held that the Court’s "market-oriented” approach discussion applied only in the context of the LSD question before the Court.

. The majority seeks to buttress its reading of § 841 by citing to other circuits that have drawn a usable/unusable distinction in applying § 841. See United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1007 (3d Cir.1992); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 136 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir.1991). None of these cases, however, cite language in § 841 or its legislative history that expresses that Congress intended to limit the plain definitional scope of § 841's terms "mixture or substance” to usable drug mixtures. Instead, these cases limit the plain scope of § 841 to usable drug mixtures on the grounds that Congress intended uniformity and proportionality in sentencing and therefore could not have intended unusable drug mixtures to be punished under § 841 because of the absurd results that follow from such a conclusion. See, e.g., Acosta, 963 F.2d at 554.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument that "mixture or substance” should be read to exclude carrier mediums to avoid illogical results in Chapman. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 458-59, 111 S.Ct. at 1923-24. Moreover, the analysis in Acosta and the other cases is flawed because it is not the function of the judiciary to re-write congressional statutes to fit our conception of what is the best or right sentencing policy. Congress is aware of the sentencing discrepancies that may follow from its sentencing scheme and will rectify those discrepancies if it so chooses.