Court Opinion

ID: 9930281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 16:19:11.63276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:11:09.498499
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges Humphreys,* Athey and Fulton
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

            LAWRENCE W. NALLS, III
                                                                                 OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 1536-22-1                                  JUDGE CLIFFORD L. ATHEY, JR.
                                                                              FEBRUARY 6, 2024
            COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ACCOMACK COUNTY
                                           W. Revell Lewis, III, Judge

                           (Tucker L. Watson, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
                           on brief.

                           Suzanne Seidel Richmond, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                           Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                   The Circuit Court of Accomack County (“circuit court”) found Lawrence W. Nalls, III

            (“Nalls”) in violation of his probation and revoked and resuspended all but four years of his

            previously suspended sentences. Nalls appeals, arguing that the circuit court failed to abide by the

            sentencing limitation of Code § 19.2-306.1. Specifically, he argues that despite two previous

            technical violations of probation, he could not be sentenced to more than 14 days of incarceration

            because this was the first time he had violated his probation by absconding. For the following

            reasons, we disagree and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

                                                      I. BACKGROUND

                   On October 25, 2018, the circuit court sentenced Nalls to three years’ imprisonment, with

            two years and six months suspended, for shoplifting, third or subsequent offense. On that same

                   *
                     Judge Humphreys participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to the
            effective date of his retirement on December 31, 2023.
date, the circuit court also sentenced Nalls to three years’ imprisonment, with two years and six

months suspended, for an additional shoplifting conviction and 12 months, all suspended, for

possession of buprenorphine. Also on October 25, 2018, the circuit court sentenced Nalls to a total

of six years’ imprisonment, with five years and seven months suspended, for receiving a stolen

firearm and for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Before the present case arose, Nalls

had twice before been found in violation of his probation, and the circuit court revoked and

resuspended his previous sentences, in part, in 2019, and again in September of 2021.

        In June of 2022, Probation Officer Joseph Hullihan (“Officer Hullihan”) filed the current

major violation report (“MVR”) alleging that Nalls had violated Condition 6 of his probation by

failing to report to the probation office on two occasions despite being instructed by his probation

officer to do so. The MVR also alleged that he violated Condition 10 of his probation by moving

without informing probation and parole of his change of address as well as Condition 11 of his

probation by absconding from supervision. As a result, the circuit court issued a capias for Nalls’

arrest and Nalls was arrested on June 25, 2022.

        At a subsequent revocation hearing, Nalls admitted the alleged violations. Officer Hullihan

also testified that these offenses constituted Nalls’ third technical violation of probation but that this

was the first time he had absconded from supervision. Officer Hullihan then testified that it was his

understanding that the first absconding violation took precedence over the third technical violation

per Code § 19.2-306.1 and therefore the potential sentence was capped at 14 days. The circuit court

concluded that the sentencing guidelines, which recommended a maximum sentence of 14 days,

were only advisory and that because of Nalls’ history a lengthier sentence was appropriate. The

circuit court revoked Nalls’ suspended sentences and resuspended all but four years, which he was

required to serve. Following the hearing, the Commonwealth’s Attorney expressed concern to the

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circuit court about the court’s authority to impose a greater than 14-day sentence under Code

§ 19.2-306.1. Therefore, the circuit court stayed its order and reset the matter for another hearing.

        At the second hearing, Officer Hullihan testified that when he originally prepared the

sentencing guidelines, he checked the box on the form indicating a third technical violation and

another box for a technical violation based on absconding. He further stated that when the

sentencing guidelines were prepared in this manner, the recommended sentencing range was 0 to 14

days of incarceration. He also testified that in preparation for the second hearing, he produced a

second set of guidelines and that he did not check the absconding violation box, only the third

technical violation box. These guidelines produced a recommended sentencing range of one year to

one year six months’ incarceration.

        Nalls’ counsel argued that Code § 19.2-306.1(C) limited the circuit court to imposing at

most a 14-day sentence because the statute includes the provision: “a first technical violation based

on clause (viii) or (x) [which addresses absconding from probation] of subsection A shall be

considered a second technical violation, and any subsequent technical violation also based on clause

(viii) or (x) of subsection A shall be considered a third or subsequent technical violation.” Since

this was the first time Nalls had absconded from probation, his counsel argued that this language in

subsection C controlled and despite his other third technical violations of probation, the circuit court

was limited to imposing 14 days. The circuit court rejected this argument and affirmed its previous

order. Nalls appealed.

                                             II. ANALYSIS

             A. Standard of Review

        “On appeal, ‘[w]e view the evidence received at [a] revocation hearing in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, including all reasonable and legitimate

inferences that may properly be drawn from it.’” Green v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 69, 76

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(2022) (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth,

296 Va. 266, 274 (2018)). “[T]he trial court’s findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed

unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting

Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013)). “However, ‘[u]nder well-established

principles, an issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law which we review de novo.’”

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96,

104 (2007)).

             B. The circuit court was permitted to sentence Nalls for a third technical violation of
                probation.

       Nalls contends that Code § 19.2-306.1 limited his term of incarceration to 14 days, because

despite his previous probation violations, this was the first time he had violated clause (x) of Code

§ 19.2-306.1(A) and Code § 19.2-306.1(C) dictates that a first technical violation based upon clause

(x) shall be treated as a second technical violation. We disagree.

       Code § 19.2-306.1 contemplates non-technical and technical violations of probation. A

violation is technical when it is based on a probationer’s failure to do one of ten actions

enumerated by Code § 19.2-306.1(A). Clause (x) of Code § 19.2-306.1(A) makes it a technical

violation to fail to “maintain contact with the probation officer whereby his whereabouts are no

longer known to the probation officer,” or in other words, to abscond from probation. Code

§ 19.2-306.1 also limits the circuit court’s sentencing power related to technical violations of

probation:

               The court shall not impose a sentence of a term of active
               incarceration upon a first technical violation of the terms and
               conditions of a suspended sentence or probation, and there shall be
               a presumption against imposing a sentence of a term of active
               incarceration for any second technical violation of the terms and
               conditions of a suspended sentence or probation. However, if the
               court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant
               committed a second technical violation and he cannot be safely
               diverted from active incarceration through less restrictive means,
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               the court may impose not more than 14 days of active incarceration
               for a second technical violation. The court may impose whatever
               sentence might have been originally imposed for a third or
               subsequent technical violation. For the purposes of this
               subsection, a first technical violation based on clause (viii) or (x)
               of subsection A shall be considered a second technical violation,
               and any subsequent technical violation also based on clause (viii)
               or (x) of subsection A shall be considered a third or subsequent
               technical violation.

Code § 19.2-306.1(C).

       It is well settled that “[w]hen construing a statute, our primary objective is ‘to ascertain

and give effect to legislative intent,’ as expressed by the language used in the statute.”

Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425 (2012) (quoting Commonwealth

v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418 (2011)). “When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are

bound by the plain meaning of that language.” Id. (quoting Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va.

347, 349 (2011)). Further, we “consider[] . . . the entire statute” so as to “place its terms in

context” “because ‘it is our duty to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and

harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.’” Id. (quoting Eberhardt v. Fairfax

Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs., 283 Va. 190, 194-95 (2012)). We are not to interpret a statute

“by singling out a particular phrase.” Id. at 426 (quoting Eberhardt, 283 Va. at 195). We are “to

give effect, if possible, to every word of the written law.” Heart v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App.

453, 468 (2022) (quoting Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 788 (1953)).

       Nalls contends that because Code § 19.2-306.1(C) states that “a first technical violation

based on [absconding] . . . shall be considered a second technical violation,” and the evidence

indicated this was the first time Nalls had absconded from probation, he could only be sentenced

to a maximum of 14 days’ incarceration. He interprets the statute to require a court to ignore

previous technical violations of probation when one absconds from probation for the first time.

This reading abuses the language of the statute by treating “a first technical violation based on

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clause (viii) or (x) of subsection A” as a single unit. Code § 19.2-306.1(C). It is not a single

unit. Rather, “first technical violation” is a single grammatical unit modified by “based on

clause (viii) or (x) of subsection A.” Id.

        This is the plain meaning in light of the entirety of subsection C, which speaks

throughout of first technical violations (“The court shall not impose a sentence of a term of

active incarceration upon a first technical violation of the terms and conditions of a suspended

sentence or probation . . . .”), second technical violations (“[T]here shall be a presumption

against imposing a sentence of a term of active incarceration for any second technical violation

of the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence or probation.” “[I]f the court finds . . . that

the defendant committed a second technical violation . . . .”), and third technical violations (“The

court may impose whatever sentence might have been originally imposed for a third or

subsequent technical violation.”). Id.

        We are compelled to state the obvious by noting that “first” is defined as “[p]receding all

others in time, order, series, succession, etc.; earliest in occurrence, existence, etc. . . .” First,

Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed. 2002). “Second” is defined as “[c]oming next after

the first in time, order, series, succession, position, occurrence, existence, rank, importance,

excellence, etc.; that is number two in a series.” Id. (Second). “Third” is defined as “[n]ext in

order after the second, that is number three in a series.” Id. (Third). Here, Code § 19.2-306.1(A)

defines “technical violation” as “a violation based on the probationer’s failure to” and lists ten

particular actions. Thus, a first technical violation is the first time one violates probation by

committing an act proscribed by Code § 19.2-306.1(A). A second technical violation is the

second time one violates probation in this manner, and a third technical violation is the third time

one has violated probation in this manner.

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        The meaning of “first technical violation” is no different in the clause, “[f]or the purposes

of this subsection, a first technical violation based on clause (viii) or (x) of subsection A shall be

considered a second technical violation,” Code § 19.2-306.1(C), than elsewhere in the same

subsection. That clause is describing instances in which the first time a defendant has violated

probation is based upon a violation of clause (viii) or (x), not the first time a defendant violates

clauses (viii) or (x) regardless of how many times he has previously violated other technical

terms of probation.

        Any other reading not only contradicts the plain language of the statute, but also produces

an absurd result. This Court has previously acknowledged that the language upon which Nalls

relies treats violations based upon clauses (viii) and (x) as more serious than other technical

violations and therefore creates harsher penalties. Heart, 75 Va. App. at 469-70. Hence, we

explained that the statute “creat[es] a hierarchy within the categories of technical violations.” Id.

Thus, “the end of paragraph C emphasizes that certain technical violations are more serious, and

therefore skip the ‘first technical violation’ tier[,]” and, “[f]or these violations, a probationer gets

only one warning before facing the potential of a significant sentence.” Id. at 470.

        Nalls’ proposed reading of Code § 19.2-306.1(C) would have the same language that

creates an enhanced penalty under certain circumstances produce a lesser result under other

circumstances. The General Assembly considers technical violations based upon the use or

possession of firearms and based upon absconding to be so egregious that enhanced penalties are

appropriate after only one offense. Therefore, it is absurd to conclude that the General Assembly

intends the same particularly offensive conduct to produce a less harsh penalty when following a

train of previous violations. See Turner v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 257, 260-61 (2019)

(explaining that the absurdity canon of construction applies “when ‘the law would be internally

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inconsistent,’ and when the law would be ‘otherwise incapable of operation’” (quoting Covel v.

Town of Vienna, 280 Va. 151, 158 (2010))).

       We refuse to credit such an interpretation. A third technical violation, even if based upon

a first instance of the probationer’s absconding, may be punished as a third technical violation,

which is to say, “[t]he court may impose whatever sentence might have been originally

imposed.” Code § 19.2-306.1(C).

                                         III. CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

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