Court Opinion

ID: 9948016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 07:13:24.196443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:54.045845
License: Public Domain

REVERSE and REMAND and Opinion Filed February 27, 2024

                                               In The
                                   Court of Appeals
                            Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                      No. 05-22-00544-CR

                         THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT

                                                  V.

             MARTIN EDUARDO VELASQUEZREYES, APPELLEE

                  On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1
                               Dallas County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. M1922423

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
             Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Carlyle, and Justice Garcia
                            Opinion by Chief Justice Burns

        In this case, the State appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion to

suppress. Appellee Martin Eduardo Velasquezreyes was charged with driving

while intoxicated arising from a traffic stop based on a failure to maintain a single

lane of traffic and unconfirmed insurance.1 Appellee filed a motion to suppress the

        1
         We note the violation for failure to maintain proof of financial responsibility for a vehicle is
titled “Requirement of Financial Responsibility.” See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ann. § 601.051. Throughout
the hearing and in the briefing, however, the witnesses and parties continually used the commonly known
vernacular of “driving without insurance” to refer to this section of the transportation code.

                                                   1
fruits of the stop of his vehicle averring the police officer did not have reasonable

suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. After a hearing, the trial court granted the

motion and suppressed all evidence derived from the traffic stop. We reverse the

trial court’s suppression order and remand this cause to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                         I.       Background

        Officer Nickolas Delgado has been a police officer with the city of Farmer’s

 Branch for five years. Before moving to Texas, he was a sheriff’s deputy in

 California for six years. On the day of this stop, Officer Delgado’s trainee entered

 appellee’s license plate into the in-car computer system and saw that appellee’s

 car’s insurance was “unconfirmed.” Officer Delgado pulled appellee over due to

 the unconfirmed insurance. Appellee was eventually arrested for driving while

 intoxicated.

        Appellee filed a motion to suppress claiming that the officers did not have

 reasonable suspicion to stop him. At the hearing, appellee argued Officer

 Delgado’s testimony was essentially that appellee “may or may not have had

 insurance,” and that this was not enough for reasonable suspicion.

         We also note that the State does not rely on appellee’s failure to maintain a single lane of traffic
as support for the officer’s stop of his car. After the suppression hearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals
held that a driver’s failure to maintain a single lane is no longer a traffic offense in itself. See generally
State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

                                                      2
      At the suppression hearing, Officer Delgado testified to his eleven years of

law enforcement experience and his five years of traffic enforcement in Farmer’s

Branch. Officer Delgado testified that he uses his in-car computer system “every

single day,” and he runs a registration and insurance check on “every single”

vehicle he pulls over. In his experience, the information he receives from the

computer database is reliable. He explained that, typically, unconfirmed “means

that the insurance information on file is either out of date or expired, or there is no

insurance.” Further, he explained that a return of “confirmed” means “there is

valid insurance . . . associated with the vehicle.”

      During his testimony Officer Delgado admitted, however, he did not know

everything about the computer system in his patrol car. He referred to the in-car

computer system as “CAD,” but on cross-examination, he conceded he could not

remember what the “A” stood for. Additionally, he testified he was aware the

computer accessed various databases, and the insurance information came from

the state, but he did not know who entered the data into the state insurance

database or what the security requirements for the database were. Ultimately,

Officer Delgado testified that in his experience, the database had proven to be

reliable.

      The trial court subsequently issued an order granting the motion to suppress,

along with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that

                                          3
Officer Delgado and his trainee learned from the in-car computer system that

appellee had “unconfirmed” insurance. The court further found that Officer

Delgado believed he had reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop based on the return

of unconfirmed insurance.

      In its conclusions of law, however, the trial court concluded that the officers

did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The trial court concluded that

“Officer Delgado did not testify to the requisite knowledge and experience to say

that the in-car computer system is reliable enough to establish reasonable suspicion

for a traffic stop for unconfirmed insurance.” Based on this conclusion, the court

ordered “all evidence derived from the traffic stop” suppressed.

                             II.   Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated

standard of review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion—

meaning we give almost total deference to the trial court’s resolution of issues of

historical fact and credibility determinations so long as they are supported by the

record. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). However,

we review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.

      Here, as set out above, the trial court ultimately concluded that “Officer

Delgado did not testify to the requisite knowledge and experience to say that the

                                           4
in-car computer system [was] reliable enough to establish reasonable suspicion for

a traffic stop for unconfirmed insurance.” This is a legal conclusion—a conclusion

about the legal significance of the facts as the trial court found them to be.

Accordingly, the ultimate question of whether Officer Delgado had reasonable

suspicion to stop appellee’s car is an issue that we review de novo. Id.

                               III.   Applicable Law

      A.     Reasonable Suspicion to Conduct a Temporary Detention

      The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against

unreasonable searches and seizures. Atkins v. State, 882 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Yet, not

every encounter between law enforcement officers and citizens implicates

constitutional protections. Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997). Interactions between law enforcement officers and citizens are often

characterized as consensual encounters, investigative detentions, or arrests. State v.

Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Crain v. State, 315

S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Arrests require either a warrant or probable

cause, while investigative detentions constitute brief seizures that are less intrusive

than arrests and require only reasonable suspicion. Derichsweiler v. State, 348

S.W.3d 906, 914–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872,

878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

                                          5
      Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the

circumstances, an officer has specific, articulable facts that when combined with

rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a

particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Ford v.

State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion is a

lower measure of suspicion than probable cause, and probable cause “falls far short

of a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367,

371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Reasonable suspicion is also an objective standard

that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely

to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492.

             1. Information obtained from a police officer’s check of a
                vehicle’s license plate may form reasonable suspicion.

      Generally, an officer may use information obtained from checking a

vehicle’s license plate in a computer database to form reasonable suspicion that the

driver has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. See Delk v. State, 855

S.W.2d 700, 709–10, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (concluding officers had

reasonable suspicion to question defendant after officer “ran a license check on a

vehicle” in law enforcement database, and computer indicated car had been stolen

from homicide victim); Villarreal v. State, 631 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (holding that officer’s testimony showing

reliability of databases and his experience with them was sufficient to show
                                         6
reasonable suspicion that vehicle was unregistered based on no record return).

Moreover, “[t]he State is not required to show a traffic offense was actually

committed, but only that the officer reasonably believed a violation was in

progress.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2001, no pet.); accord Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2001).

                 2. The possibility of an innocent explanation for the conduct does
                    not negate an officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal
                    conduct.

      The Supreme Court has held that the possibility of an innocent explanation

for conduct does not prevent an officer from entertaining reasonable suspicion of

criminal conduct. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014). Specifically,

the Supreme Court stated, “[e]ven in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was

ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation.”2 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528

U.S. 119, 125 (2000). Further, the Court stated:

      In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may
      stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk
      in connection with more drastic police action; persons arrested and
      detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a crime
      may turn out to be innocent. The Terry stop is a far more minimal
      intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate further. If
      the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause,
      the individual must be allowed to go on his way.

      2
          See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

                                                  7
Id. at 126. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has said the same. See Woods v.

State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“[T]he ‘as consistent with

innocent activity as with criminal activity’ construct is no longer a viable test for

determining reasonable suspicion.”). Later, in Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016), the Court of Criminal Appeals further discussed the issue

of reasonable suspicion and the possibility of innocent conduct. When analyzing

whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, the Court of

Criminal Appels held:

        A determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out
        the possibility of innocent conduct. “The possibility of an innocent
        explanation does not deprive the [detaining] officer of the capacity to
        entertain reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Indeed, the
        principal function of his investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity
        and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal[.]”

Id. at 562 (internal citations omitted).

        The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the Court of Criminal Appeals’s

holdings in Woods and Leming when it decided Villarreal v. State. In Villarreal, a

police officer initiated a traffic stop based solely on the fact that the officer’s in-car

computer search of a truck’s registration indicated “no record.” 631 S.W.3d at 202.

After holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck, the Court

held:

        The possibility of an innocent explanation for the “no record” return
        (e.g., that the truck was newly registered) did not prevent the officer
        from reasonably suspecting that the vehicle was unregistered based on
                                            8
      the “no record” return. The officer justifiably stopped appellant to
      resolve the ambiguity.

Id. at 205 (internal citations omitted). As the Court of Criminal Appeals pointed

out, the purpose of the detention is to investigate. “It is, after all, only an

‘investigative’ detention. So long as the intrusion does not exceed the legitimate

scope of such a detention and evolve into the greater intrusiveness inherent in an

arrest-sans-probable-cause, the Fourth Amendment will tolerate a certain degree of

police proaction.” Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916.

      Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether a police

officer who stopped a vehicle after his in-car computer insurance search returned

as “unconfirmed” had reasonable suspicion to do so. United States v. Broca-

Martinez, 855 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. 2017). After holding that the officer had

reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on the unconfirmed return, the Court

pointed out:

      Even if [the officer] was not positive Broca-Martinez was uninsured,
      he cleared the bar for reasonable suspicion. An officer does not have
      to be certain a violation has occurred. “This would raise the standard
      for reasonable suspicion far above probable cause or even a
      preponderance of the evidence, in contravention of the Supreme
      Court’s instructions.”

Id. at 681 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo,

827 F.3d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Reasonable suspicion . . . does not require the

officer to rule out all innocent explanations of what he sees.”).

                                           9
        B.      Traffic Stops Based on “Unconfirmed Insurance” Returns

        Drivers in Texas must maintain proof of financial responsibility for their

vehicles.3 See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ann. § 601.051. Operating a vehicle for which

financial responsibility has not been established is a misdemeanor punished by a

fine. See id. § 601.191. Therefore, a police officer may conduct a traffic stop when

the officer’s in-car database indicates that a driver may be operating the vehicle

without insurance. See e.g., Blankinship v. State, No. 05-19-01436-CR, 2022 WL

336560 at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 4, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication); Ellis v. State, 535 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017,

pet. ref’d); Oliva-Arita v. State, No. 01-15-00140-CR, 2015 WL 7300202 at *3

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 19, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication).

        The Fifth Circuit has joined other federal circuit courts in holding that “a

state computer database indication of insurance status may establish reasonable

suspicion . . . as long as there is either some evidence suggesting the database is

reliable or at least an absence of evidence that it is unreliable.” Broca-Martinez,

855 F.3d at 680 (emphasis added); see also Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d at 669–

        3
         We note the violation for failure to maintain proof of financial responsibility for a vehicle is
titled “Requirement of Financial Responsibility.” See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ann. § 601.051. Throughout
the hearing and in the briefing, however, the witnesses and parties continually used the commonly known
vernacular of “driving without insurance” to refer to this section of the transportation code.

                                                   10
70; United States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007); United

States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2004).

      Cases involving these types of stops fall into two categories: (1) those in

which courts have held an officer did not have reasonable suspicion because the

evidence was not developed to determine the database’s reliability and (2) those in

which courts have held that reasonable suspicion existed when the officer, through

experience or training, had additional information about what the ambiguous

answer from the database meant and “some idea” regarding the data’s reliability.

Blankinship, 2022 WL 336560, at *3; Ellis, 535 S.W.3d at 214.

      To resolve the issue before us, we must review the two different lines of

cases examining reasonable suspicion in the context of an “unconfirmed” response

to an officer’s vehicle insurance inquiry.

      C.     A Review of Courts of Appeals Cases

      The two leading cases that fall into the first category, and on which appellee

relies for his argument, are Contraras v. State, 309 S.W.3d 168 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d) and Gonzalez–Gilando v. State, 306 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d). The two cases arise out of the same traffic stop.

In these cases, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the information the officers

obtained from the computer database system did not give rise to reasonable

                                             11
suspicion to make the traffic stop. Contraras, 309 S.W.3d at 172–73; Gonzalez–

Gilando, 306 S.W.3d at 896–97.

      In these cases, two Department of Public Safety troopers were on patrol on a

highway known as a main route for drug trafficking when they observed a vehicle

pass them in the opposite direction and decided to turn and follow it. See

Contraras, 309 S.W.3d at 169; Gonzalez–Gilando, 306 S.W.3d at 895. When the

troopers checked their in-vehicle computers, their respective databases gave them

information that the vehicle’s registration was current, but the insurance

information was “unavailable.” Id. Based on this information, the vehicle was

stopped, resulting in the discovery of the controlled substances underlying the

defendants’ convictions. See Contraras, 309 S.W.3d at 170; Gonzalez–Gilando,

306 S.W.3d at 895. The defendants subsequently filed motions to suppress which

the trial court denied. See Contraras, 309 S.W.3d at 169; Gonzalez–Gilando, 306

S.W.3d at 894.

      On appeal, the court of appeals rejected the State’s contention that the

officers had reasonable suspicion that the driver, Gonzalez–Gilando was driving

without insurance. See Contraras, 309 S.W.3d at 172; Gonzalez–Gilando, 306

S.W.3d at 896–97. Although noting that modern technology has given police

officers the means to assess a driver’s compliance with the requirement that he

maintain proof of financial responsibility, the Gonzalez–Gilando court stated that

                                       12
the information obtained by the officers “was hardly suggestive of anything other

than the unknown.” Gonzalez–Gilando, 306 S.W.3d at 896. In particular, the court

noted that, although the officer initiating the traffic stop stated that the

“unavailable” status led him to believe that the vehicle was uninsured,

      without other evidence [1] developing the source of the information
      comprising the database, [2] explaining what was meant when
      insurance information was unavailable, [3] explaining why such
      information would be unavailable, [4] illustrating the accuracy of the
      database, [5] establishing the timeliness of the information within the
      database, [6] depicting how often those using the database were told
      that insurance information was unavailable, [7] proving that the
      program through which the database was accessed was even operating
      at the time, and the like, we cannot accept the deputy’s inference as
      reasonable.

Id. at 897. Similarly, the Contraras court stated that the terms “unavailable” and

“undocumented” were not self-explanatory and that, with “no explanation of their

meaning, we are unwilling to speculate on them.” Contraras, 309 S.W.3d at 172–

73.

      The State, on the other hand relies on the second category of cases—cases in

which the appellate courts held reasonable suspicion existed because the officer

who made the stop, through experience or training, had additional information

about what the ambiguous answer from the database meant and had “some idea”

regarding the data’s reliability. The State points to this Court’s recent analysis of

an “unconfirmed insurance” return in Blankinship v. State, in which we held that

the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. 2022 WL 336560 at *4.
                                         13
Initially we noted that the officer who made the stop did not testify that the return

showed “unavailable” as the officers did in Gonzalez–Gilando and Contraras. Id.

The officer testified that his in-car computer showed “unconfirmed insurance, no

match within 45 days on the vehicle.” Id. Further, the officer testified that the

computer’s message meant it “showed no insurance” and “no vehicle coverage

within 45 days.” Thus, this Court held contrary to Contraras and Gonzalez–

Gilando, in which the record did not explain the meaning of the database response,

the officer’s testimony in Blankinship was not ambiguous or inconclusive or “as

likely to support a finding of compliance as it was for violation.” Id. Further, we

stated that nothing in either Contraras or Gonzalez–Gilando suggested that

information that insurance is “unconfirmed” is insufficient to support reasonable

suspicion. Id. Finally, we noted that the officer testified that he used the database

regularly and it had been reliable, although he acknowledged on cross-

examination, that the database had been wrong “at times.” Id.

      The State further relies on the Second Court of Appeals’s holding in Ellis v.

State. 535 S.W.3d at 209. In Ellis, a police officer for the City of Euless, stopped a

driver solely because the patrol car’s computer indicated that liability insurance on

the driver’s Jeep was “unconfirmed.” Id. at 211. At the suppression hearing, the

officer testified he had used the database “[t]ens of thousands” of times; only “a

handful” of the “[h]undreds, if not thousands” of returns of “unconfirmed” he

                                         14
received from the database were in error; and the database was “very” accurate

based on his experience. Id. at 215. He further testified the insurance return from

the database showed the Jeep’s insurance status was “unconfirmed per the State of

Texas,” which meant that the Jeep was “not showing to have current insurance as

required by Texas state law.” Id. at 211. Moreover, he testified the return from the

database would have said “insurance confirmed” if the Jeep had been insured and

that his training and experience led him to conclude that the Jeep was uninsured.

Id. As for the database, the officer testified he did not know how the database

worked; he did not know if the database was web-, internet- or cloud-based; he did

not know the database’s requirements for accuracy; as far as he knew, the database

“could be 99 percent accurate” or “50 percent accurate”; he did not know how

often insurance companies reported information or how often they were required to

report information to the database; and he did not know how insurance companies

reported information to the database. Id. at 211–12. When questioned if he knew

how accurate the database was, the officer answered, “I have to take it as being

accurate.” Id. at 212. The officer stated police officers “take it on good faith that

the information that is provided . . . [by the database] is valid information.” Id. The

officer admitted the possibility that other “unconfirmeds” could be shown to be

false when a person cited for not having insurance subsequently showed proof of

insurance to a judge. Id.

                                          15
      At Ellis’s suppression hearing, he argued the officer’s “only knowledge of

the database’s accuracy was with his own experience as a user” and contended that

his knowledge was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Id. at 215. The

Fort Worth Court, however, rejected the contention that an officer must possess the

quantum of knowledge set out by the Gonzalez–Gilando Court and held the

officer’s testimony that he had used the database “[t]ens of thousands” of times,

received only a handful of errors from the database, and believed the database was

“very” accurate was enough to establish reasonable suspicion based on the

“unconfirmed” insurance return. Id. at 215–16.

      Moreover, the Court drew a distinction between conducting an investigation

based on information obtained from the database versus securing a conviction

based on information obtained from the database. The Court stated:

      We note that it would be helpful to have objective information about
      the database—how it worked, the timeliness of the information placed
      in it, and the error rate, for example—and essential if we were
      reviewing a conviction based on information yielded from the
      database rather than whether a police officer with a great deal of
      experience using the database had reasonable suspicion to stop a
      motorist based on a return of “unconfirmed” from that database.

Id. at 216–17 (internal citations omitted).

      Additionally, the State cites the Waco Court of Appeals’s opinion in

Morning v. State, No. 10-18-00051-CR, 2018 WL 5662228, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Waco Oct. 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), another

                                          16
case in which the court of appeals rejected the Gonzalez–Gilando Court’s holding

regarding the quantum of information an officer must possess about an in-car

database to rely on it for reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative

detention. In Morning, a patrol officer conducted a license-plate check on a

vehicle, and the insurance status came back as “unconfirmed.” Id. at *2. At the

hearing on Morning’s motion to suppress, the officer acknowledged that he

stopped Morning solely because of the “unconfirmed” insurance status. Id. at *3.

      On appeal, Morning contended his case belonged in the category of cases in

which courts have held the police lacked reasonable suspicion based on the word

“unconfirmed” and no other information. See Contraras, 309 S.W.3d at 173;

Gonzalez–Gilando, 306 S.W.3d at 896–97. The Court of Appeals, however,

pointed out the officer testified he had regularly conducted license-plate checks

during his three-and-a-half years as a peace officer and that, based on his

experience, the database was “very accurate that insurance is not able to be

provided.” Morning, 2018 WL 566228 at *3. Additionally, the Court pointed out

the officer stated he believed the database to be “[v]ery accurate” and reliable; that

he did not have any problems with the database on the night in question; and that

an “unconfirmed” return meant that the vehicle was not insured. Id. Ultimately, the

Court held the officer’s testimony was “enough” to demonstrate he had sufficient

specific, articulable facts upon which to base his inference that the vehicle

                                         17
Morning was driving was uninsured. Id. As to the quantity of knowledge an officer

must possess about his in-car computer system pursuant to Gonzalez–Gilando, the

Morning Court stated, “[W]e are not persuaded by any suggestion that the State

was required to proffer evidence in support of all or most of the factors mentioned

by the Gonzalez-Gilando Court.” Id. at *4 (emphasis added).

IV.   The Trial Court Had Sufficient Information to Conclude the Database
      Was Reliable for Purposes of Reasonable Suspicion

      On appeal, the State asserts Officer Delgado testified to enough familiarity

with the in-car computer system to understand what the “unconfirmed insurance”

return meant and to understand that the system was reliable. We agree.

      During the suppression hearing, Officer Delgado testified to five years of

experience using his in-car computer “every single day.” Additionally, Officer

Delgado testified as follows:

Q.    So what came back on the license plate check when you guys ran it?

A.    The registration showed to be valid and the insurance showed to be
      unconfirmed.

Q.    Okay. And what does unconfirmed mean?

A.    It typically means that the insurance information on file is either out of date,
      expired, or there is none on file.

Q.    Okay. And if it’s confirmed, what would that mean?

A.    That would mean that there is a valid regis -- no, I’m sorry. That there is a
      valid insurance that is not expired and associated with that vehicle.

                                         18
Q.   And do you run this check on most vehicles that you pull over?

A.   Every single one. Yes, sir.

Q.   Okay. And through your training and experience, do you know if the
     information you received from the computer database is reliable?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   And do you have a rough percentage for the number of people who don’t
     have insurance when the database check comes back as unconfirmed?

A.   I couldn’t tell you, sir, that.

Q.   Okay. No worries, no worries.

     During cross-examination, Officer Delgado testified:

Q.   Could the database be fifty percent accurate? Could it be seventy-five
     percent accurate? Could it be twenty-five percent accurate, or do you know?

A.   I don’t know, sir.

     On redirect, Officer Delgado testified:

Q.   Okay. I want to go back to the Computer Aided Dispatch. Do you use that
     on a day-to-day basis?

A.   Every single day, sir.

Q.   And what do you use that for?

A.   Anything from being dispatched to calls to checking a person for a valid
     driver’s license[,] whether they are wanted or not, listed as missing. We use
     it to check license plates for violations, valid registration and insurance,
     status of stolen or any warrants associated with tags. We can use it to check
     for stolen property if items are listed as stolen, or if people are listed as
     missing or wanted.

                                       19
Q.    Okay. So through your training and experience you would say that that CAD
      system is reliable.

A.    Yes, sir.

      As noted above, Officer Delgado testified he has regularly conducted

license-plate checks during his five years as a peace officer in Texas and based on

his experience, the database is “reliable.” Officer Delgado further stated that an

“unconfirmed” return means “the insurance information on file is either out of

date, expired, or there is none on file,” and that a “confirmed” return means “there

is a valid insurance that is not expired and associated with that vehicle.” Thus,

unlike Contraras and Gonzalez–Gilando, in which the record did not explain the

meaning of the database response, Officer Delgado’s testimony was not ambiguous

or inconclusive or “as likely to support a finding of compliance as it was of

violation.” Crawford v. State, 355 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2011, pet ref’d). Moreover, the only evidence adduced at trial was that the

database was reliable; there was no evidence to suggest that it was unreliable. See

Broca-Martinez, 855 F.3d at 680.

      Given the record before us, we conclude the State developed evidence

demonstrating that Officer Delgado had specific, articulable facts upon which he

could reasonably conclude that appellee’s vehicle was not insured. We sustain the

State’s single point of error. We reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the

                                        20
evidence in this case and remand this cause to the trial court for further

proceedings.

                                              /Robert D. Burns, III/
                                              ROBERT D. BURNS, III
                                              CHIEF JUSTICE

Justice Carlyle dissents without a separate opinion.

DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
220544F.U05

                                         21
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant                 On Appeal from the County Criminal
                                              Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00544-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. M1922423.
                                              Opinion delivered by Chief Justice
MARTIN EDUARDO                                Burns. Justices Carlyle and Garcia
VELASQUEZREYES, Appellee                      participating.

       Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

Judgment entered February 27, 2024

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