Court Opinion

ID: 9756456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:29:40.064498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:22.995097
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
dissenting.
In this appeal, as in Kaman v. Montague Township Committee, 158 N.J. 371, 730 A.2d 309 (1999), also decided today, a municipal tax assessor in political disfavor with the governing body of the municipality was removed from office on the basis that his status as a “holdover” tax assessor, who was neither reappointéd nor replaced after the expiration of his four-year statutory term, rendered him removable at will. In both cases, the Court upholds the municipality’s removal of the assessor. I believe that the *356Court’s dispositions frustrate the Legislature’s clearly articulated objective, evidenced by a fixed statutory four-year term for assessors that does not authorize holdover status, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-148, to protect tax assessors from politically-inspired removal. The appropriate disposition, in my view, is to set aside the municipality’s removal of the assessor, reinstate him, and permit him to serve out the balance of his statutory term.
I
The critical facts are essentially undisputed. In 1987, when the duly appointed tax assessor died, plaintiff Peter Casamasino was employed by Jersey City as an assistant tax assessor. In a letter dated April 27, 1987, addressed to the president and the members of the City Council, Mayor Cucci appointed plaintiff “as the Tax Assessor to complete the term of office of the late Margaret Jeffers expiring on June 30,1987. Upon expiration of said term, I hereby appoint Mr. Casamasino to a full four-year term commencing July 1,1987 and expiring June 30,1991.”
Jersey City was a Faulkner Act municipality that had adopted the mayor-council form of government. Accordingly, the Mayor’s appointment of Casamasino as tax assessor required the advice and consent of the council. See N.J.S.A. 40:69A-43(b). Ignoring the statute, the City Council of Jersey City never took action concerning the Mayor’s appointment of Casamasino as tax assessor.
Pursuant to the Mayor’s letter appointing him tax assessor, Casamasino signed his oath of office on April 28,1987. His salary was immediately increased from $38,150 annually as assistant tax assessor to $65,000 as assessor. He proceeded to discharge the duties of the office until June 30, 1987, the last day of Ms. Jeffers’ term, and continued in office for the full four-year statutory term commencing July 1, 1987 to which he had been “appointed” pursuant to Mayor Cucci’s letter. See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-148 (providing that “[ejvery municipal tax assessor ... shall hold his office for a term of 4 years from the first day of July next following his appointment.”). The record before us does not reflect any chai*357lenge to Casamasino’s exercise of the powers of his office during that period despite the City Council’s failure to act on his appointment.
At the completion of plaintiffs initial four-year term as assessor on June 30,1991, the then mayor Gerald McCann took no action to reappoint plaintiff, and Casamasino took no action to secure reappointment. For the next two years plaintiff continued to discharge all of the duties of the office of the tax assessor, and Jersey City continued to pay his salary. According to the certification of Joanne Monahan, who served as Acting Corporation Counsel to Jersey City from December 1991 to June 1992, she informed Casamasino that in her opinion he had not acquired tenure as tax assessor by virtue of his holdover status following his full four-year term, and recommended that he seek reappointment by the Mayor and confirmation by the City Council. According to Monahan’s certification, Casamasino and his counsel declined to take any action to obtain his formal reappointment.
In the spring of 1992, Mayor McCann forfeited his office because of his conviction of a federal crime. Bret Schundler was elected in November 1992 to fill McCann’s unexpired term, and in May 1993 Schundler was re-elected to a new four-year term as mayor. On June 30, 1993, Mayor Schundler fired plaintiff as tax assessor, sending him a letter stating that he was asserting his “mayoral prerogative not to reappoint plaintiff as assessor. Effective herewith, you are relieved of your duties.”
Plaintiff contends that his termination from office resulted from Schundler’s personal animosity toward him, dating back to a history of incidents in the late 1980s, before Schundler was mayor. Furthermore, in January 1993, Mayor Schundler wanted to implement a plan to reassess residential properties in Jersey City through the use of an outside appraisal firm whose methodology would focus on a comparison of 1988 residential assessments and 1992 residential sales. Plaintiff opposed the Mayor’s plan because he believed the proposal violated the State Division.of Taxation’s requirements regarding the use of outside appraisal firms. More*358over, plaintiff maintains, the plan was unsupportable because it involved only residential properties, it did not require physical inspections, and the proposed reassessment methods were improper. Plaintiff wrote to the Director of the Division of Taxation, who confirmed the impropriety of the Mayor’s plan. Plaintiff voiced his opposition to the reassessment plan both privately to the Mayor, and at a council meeting at which he was requested to state his opinion regarding the proposal. Plaintiff alleges that at the January 25, 1993 council meeting, the Mayor confronted plaintiff and threatened, “I’m going to get you, I’m going to embarrass you every chance I get.” Subsequently, at the council meeting on February 3, 1993, the City Council rejected the Mayor’s proposal.
In another incident, Jersey City’s Director of Finance issued a two-day suspension to plaintiff, forcing him to seek reinstatement by court order. After a judge vacated the suspension on March 30,1993, the City Council adopted a resolution authorizing the city to reimburse plaintiff $8079.14 in legal expenses. Plaintiff claims that he never recovered that money because the funds were never encumbered and, shortly thereafter, a newly constituted city council voted to rescind the prior resolution, finding that it lacked statutory authorization. Plaintiff asserts that defendant Jersey City also refused to implement an order by the same judge to establish a department for the tax assessor separate from the department of finance. Finally, plaintiff maintains that, subsequent to his termination, Mayor Schundler defamed him on a local call-in television program.
In July 1993, plaintiff filed an action in the Law Division seeking reinstatement as tax assessor and asserting numerous other claims against defendants including civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violations of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8; and violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42. At the conclusion of the hearing on plaintiffs order to show cause why the removal should not be vacated, the Law *359Division reinstated plaintiff as tax assessor and granted him tenure. The court noted that, although the Council had failed to confirm plaintiffs initial appointment as tax assessor, “plaintiff occupied his office in an open and notorious manner, and there is no contention that the City Council was unaware of that fact.” The court concluded that the Council’s inaction, combined with its obvious acquiescence to plaintiffs performance of the duties of tax assessor, constituted a ratification of the Mayor’s attempted appointment of plaintiff as tax assessor. The court further concluded that the Mayor and Council’s inaction after the expiration of Casamasino’s four-year statutory term, which permitted him to continue in office for two additional years, constituted a reappointment that “gave rise to tenure.” Rejecting the City’s contentions that plaintiffs holdover status rendered him removable at the will of the governing body, the court observed:
Defendant’s contention would give municipalities license to subvert the clear legislative intent that assessors serve for fixed four-year terms. It would contravene the legislative intent to allow an appointing authority to create an at-will situation by simply failing to appoint an assessor but allowing him or her to continue in office and serve effectively at the whim or caprice of the appointing authority. That is precisely what the Legislature intended to avoid.
Plaintiffs remaining claims were dismissed on defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
In a published opinion, 304 N.J.Super. 226, 699 A.2d 697 (1997), the Appellate Division affirmed Judge D’ltalia’s reinstatement of plaintiff as tax assessor and the grant of tenure to plaintiff, essentially for the reasons expressed by Judge D’ltalia in his oral opinion. The Appellate Division also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs related claims. Id. at 234-46, 699 A.2d 697.
II
Because the statute governing the term of office of tax assessors provides only for a fixed four-year term and does not authorize or contemplate holdover status, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-148, our resolution of the dispute over whether plaintiffs holdover status subjects him to removal without cause depends on which interpretation of that *360statute best implements the underlying legislative purpose. That purpose can best be discerned by an examination of the overall legislative scheme relating to the assessment of real property.
Although tax assessors are appointed by the governing body or chief executive of a municipality, depending on the form of government, see N.J.S.A. 40A:9-146, the tax assessor’s governmental function is authorized by the Legislature and is performed as an agent of the Legislature, not of the municipality. Arace v. Irvington, 75 N.J.Super. 258, 266, 183 A.2d 104 (Law Div.1962); Ridgefield Park v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 61 N.J.Super. 170, 181, 160 A.2d 316 (Law Div.), rev’d on other grounds, 33 N.J. 262, 163 A.2d 144 (1960).
The Legislature has prescribed that a tax assessor’s fundamental responsibility is, “after examination and inquiry, [to] determine the full and fair value of each parcel of real property situate in the taxing district at such price as, in his judgment, it would sell for at a fair and bona fide sale by private contract.” N.J.S.A. 54:4-23. That the assessor must perform that assessment function independently, and free of any direct or indirect municipal control, is well settled. Ream v. Kuhlman, 112 N.J.Super. 175, 190, 270 A.2d 712 (App.Div.1970), certif. denied, 59 N.J. 267, 281 A.2d 529 (1971); Arace, supra, 75 N.J.Super. at 269, 183 A.2d 104.
To assure the independence of tax assessors and the integrity of the tax assessment process, the Legislature has established county boards of taxation in each county whose members, “chosen because of their special qualifications, knowledge and experience in matters concerning the valuation and taxation of property,” are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. N.J.S.A. 54:3-2. Each county tax board is required to review the tax lists prepared and submitted by the assessors in their county, N.J.S.A. 54:4-35, and to revise and correct the assessments where appropriate. N.J.S.A. 54:4-46 to —48. On or before May 13 of each tax year, the county tax boards must certify to each municipality the assessments, as revised, on the municipal tax list. N.J.S.A. 54:4-55. That certification by the county boards of *361taxation completes the assessment process, to the end that any further changes in assessments can be achieved only by means of appellate review. Woodstown Borough v. Lower Alloways Creek Township, 124 N.J.Super. 347, 352-54, 307 A.2d 107 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 64 N.J. 154, 313 A.2d 214 (1973). Accordingly, a municipality aggrieved by an assessor’s valuation of property within the municipality may appeal the assessment to the county tax board. N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. Thus, the county boards of taxation — not the municipal governing bodies — are the legislatively designated agencies directly responsible for reviewing the work of tax assessors, both administratively and though the tax appeal review procedure.
The ultimate authority over tax assessors is lodged with the Director of the Division of Taxation (Director), who is empowered to remove a municipal tax assessor for cause, N.J.S.A. 54:1-36, or to bring an action in Superior Court to compel an assessor’s removal. N.J.S.A. 54:1-37. That the Legislature entrusted to the Director the authority to remove assessors for cause clearly reflects a legislative determination that municipal governing bodies or officials should not be empowered to influence or intimidate assessors by removal or threats of removal prior to the expiration of their terms in office.
In 1967 the Legislature enhanced the status and independence of assessors by creating a comprehensive examination and certification process. L. 1967, c. 44. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.30, only individuals holding an assessor’s certificate could be appointed or reappointed to the office of tax assessor, and issuance of the certifícate was limited to applicants who were college graduates or possessed commensurate full-time experience as appraisers or assessors, and who passed an examination administered by the Director. N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.25. The statute also empowered the Director to revoke or suspend an assessor’s certificate for cause. N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.29. In addition, the 1967 legislation established that an assessor who had received a tax assessor’s certifícate, had served as or performed the duties of tax assessor for four consecu*362tive years, and was reappointed as assessor, would be entitled to tenure. N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.31 provides in part as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, every person
.(1) who, upon reappointment or re-election subsequent to having received a tax assessor certificate and having served as tax assessor or performed the duties of assessor for not less than 4 consecutive years immediately prior to such reappointment or re-election, or
(2) who, on or before June 30,1969, shall have received a tax assessor certificate while actually in office as assessor or performing the duties of an assessor, and who, on or before June 30, 1969, shall have served as assessor or performed the duties of assessor for not less than 4 consecutive years,
shall hold his position during good behavior and efficiency notwithstanding that such reappointment or re-election was for a fixed term of years, and he shall not be removed therefrom for political reasons but only for good cause shown and after a proper hearing before the director or his designee after due notice.
Additional legislation intended to enhance the independence of tax assessors was enacted in 1982, L. 1981, c. 393, and the most significant provision mandated that the office of municipal tax assessor “not be assigned to a department of municipal government,” but subjected the tax assessor’s operations to municipal budgetary, personnel, accounting, purchasing and data processing procedures. See Senate County and Municipal Government Committee Statement on Senate Bill 3131 (L. 1981, c. 393). In addition, the statute exempted tax assessors from the removal power accorded to the municipal manager in the manager-council form of government, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-95(c).
Our decisional law, as well as our statutory law, has accorded consistent recognition to the need for tax assessors to be independent of municipal control and intimidation. Thus, in Arace, supra, 75 N.J.Super. 258, 183 A.2d 104, a municipal tax assessor sought to enjoin the municipality’s governing body from conducting an investigation of the assessor’s methods of assessing property in the community. In holding that the governing body was without power to investigate the assessor’s methodologies, the Law Division noted that the municipality had the right of appeal to the county board of taxation if it was aggrieved by any assessment of property. Id. at 264, 183 A.2d 104. The court also emphasized the statutory directive that assessors “exercise independent judg*363ment in valuing real property.” Id. at 266, 183 A.2d 104. Finally, the court concluded that an investigation by the governing body of the assessor’s methods is irreconcilable with the legislative objective of insulating assessors from municipal pressure or control:
It is the judgment of the municipal assessor which the Legislature has determined to be the method for determining the true value of the property within a single taxing district. In exercising said judgment, the assessor is exercising a gMosi-judicial authority as an agent of the Legislature, subject to the control and supervision of the county boards of taxation and the Director of the Division of Taxation in the manner provided by statute.
The assessor, in his relation to the municipality, is in much the same position as a magistrate. See Kagan v. Caroselli, 30 N.J. 371, 153 A.2d 17 (1959), wherein the court stated that “the power [of the municipality] to appoint did not make the functions of a magistrate a phase of local government. Rather, in exercising the appointive power, the governing body acts merely as a statutory agent.” In determining property values, assessors, like judges, should perform their duties without fear or favor. Their gatm-judicial duties should be exercised free of pressure and harassment. To insure this protection, they should not be called upon to explain or justify their methods of calculating assessments. Those who feel aggrieved or discriminated against as a result of local assessments are provided with a statutory method of appeal by which their grievances will be heard and determined. Complaints of inefficiency may also be lodged with either the •Director of the Division of Taxation or the county board of taxation. Accordingly, I find that the governing body is without authority to interrogate the plaintiff regarding his methods of assessment, such jurisdiction being vested by statute in the Director of the Division of Taxation and the county board of taxation.
[75 N.J.Super. at 269-70, 183 A.2d 104.]
In Ream, supra, 112 N.J.Super. 175, 270 A.2d 712, taxpayers instituted a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the tax assessor, who had been duly elected under the township committee form of government, and reappointed following adoption of the council-manager form of government, continued in office notwithstanding the enactment of local ordinances that purported to shorten his four-year statutory term. Holding that the municipal attempt to dimmish the assessor’s statutory term was unlawful, the court based its holding on the legislative objective of assuring independence to tax assessors:
After citing Clifton v. Zweir, supra [36 N.J. 309, 177 A.2d 545 (1962)], for the proposition that “£j]udieial resolution of such matters must be guided by only one principle: legislative intent,” we concluded that there can be no doubt that when the Legislature adopted the 1938 legislation “it intended that assessors in all municipalities thereafter have four-year terms, for the statute said so.” We *364further observed that the Legislature made its intent doubly plain by providing in N.J.S.A. 40:46-6.3 that 40:46-6.2 shall “be construed and applied to include tax assessors in all municipalities of this State, irrespective of the form of government under which such municipalities may operate....”
It follows that a municipality is without authority to establish any other term, either longer or shorter, than that fixed by the Legislature, and that once a valid appointment has been made, the office, in contemplation of law, has been filled for the statutory period.
The reasons for insulating a tax assessor with a fixed term of office are manifold. His office, an integral part of our state, county and municipal governments, is chargeable with the administration of a statutory system relating to the levy, assessment and collection of property taxes. He is an agent of the Legislature, and his discretionary judgment is reviewable only through the administrative and judicial processes provided by law. Although his jurisdiction is local, his powers and duties are prescribed by the Legislature, and it is of paramount importance that the integrity of his office be in no way diluted by local interference.
[112 N.J.Super. at 188-90, 190, 270 A.2d 712 (citations omitted)(footnote omitted).]
In Municipal Assessors v. Mullica Township, 225 N.J.Super. 475, 542 A.2d 970 (Law Div.1988), a municipal tax assessor sought to compel his municipality to award him a salary increase commensurate with the increases awarded to other township employees. The assessor relied on N.J.S.A. 40A:9-165, which provided in part:
Salaries, wages or compensation fixed and determined by ordinance may, from time to time, be increased, decreased or altered by ordinance. No such ordinance shall reduce the salary of, or deny without good cause an increase in salary given to all other municipal officers and employees to, any tax assessor, tax collector or municipal clerk during the term for which he shall have been appointed.
The plaintiff further alleged that he had received a smaller salary increase because of his refusal to provide the mayor with weekly reports concerning his assessing activities. The township contended that it had complied with the statute simply by increasing the assessor’s salary, even though the increase was less that that provided to other employees. The court rejected the township’s argument, ordering that the plaintiff receive an increase commensurate with those awarded to other employees. The court observed:
*365Defendants’ arguments completely overlook the relationship between a municipality and its assessor and fail to recognize the obvious and overwhelming need of the assessor to be free from municipal interference in making his assessments and in carrying out his responsibilities as the assessor. Even in Horner v. Ocean Tp. Comm., supra, which held that a municipality has “the power to set reasonable hours for work for” assessors, the court recognized “the limited role the municipalities have with respect to the assessors.”
Municipalities have a limited role with respect to assessors so that assessors can carry out their responsibilities free from political pressure and secure in the knowledge that, if they perform their responsibilities as assessors honestly and completely, they need not fear reprisals nor retaliation from municipal officials. For example, the compensation of a tax assessor may not be reduced during his term of office. If a tax assessor is certified pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.25 and completes four years in office, he will attain tenure in office upon reappointment and hold his position during good behavior to be removed from office only for good cause after a hearing before the Director, Division of Taxation, or his designee, not before the municipality.
The purpose of the 1982 amendment to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-165 is to enhance the assessor’s independence. The amendment does not permit only a token increase in salary for an assessor when compared to the increases given to other municipal employees. The purpose of the statute would be frustrated unless an assessor was given an increase commensurate with increases given to other municipal employees, in the absence of good cause to the contrary. To accomplish the purpose of the statute, it should be interpreted by a mind sympathetic to its aims and which recognizes the difficulties inherent in formulating a precise expression of legislative intent.
The use of a salary ordinance to control an assessor is the very thing the statute sought to avoid and is the very thing the municipality did in this case. The municipality retaliated against the assessor by giving him a smaller increase than that given to other employees because he refused to file reports with the mayor. Such a refusal by the assessor is not good cause for a smaller increase----
The court concludes that N.J.S.A. 40A:9-165 requires an assessor to receive an, increase commensurate with increases given other employees unless there is good cause shown by a municipality why the assessor should not receive such an increase. Any other interpretation of the statute would make it meaningless and frustrate the often demonstrated legislative purpose of insulating the assessor from local government pressure.
[225 N.J.Super. at 481-83, 542 A.2d 970 (citations omitted).]
Ill
A.
Remarkably, the Court virtually ignores the abundant legislative history and decisional law that illuminates the legislative purpose to protect tax assessors from the very kind of politically *366inspired removal that befell plaintiff. Disregarding almost completely the legislative interest in the independence of tax assessors, the Court focuses its attention instead on a mundane provision of the Faulkner Act, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-43(b), that requires appointment of the tax assessor to be made by the mayor with the advice and consent of the council. Ante at 342-44, 730 A.2d at 292-93. Characterizing the requirement of council confirmation of tax assessors as mandated by “separation of powers principles,” ante at 344, 730 A.2d at 293, the Court then proceeds, by virtue of a crabbed reading of our decisional law concerning implied ratification of governmental action, to the extraordinary determination that plaintiffs appointment as tax assessor was not ratified, by the Jersey City Council, ante at 350-54, 730 A.2d at 296-99, notwithstanding that plaintiff openly served as Jersey City’s tax assessor for a full four-year statutory term without a hint of objection by any member of the council. That conclusion leads the Court to characterize plaintiff as merely a de facto assessor who, as such, could not acquire tenure and who, therefore, was removable at will. Ante at 349-54, 730 A.2d at 296-98. In an unsuccessful effort to avoid in future cases the issue posed by this appeal, the Court declares that prospectively tax assessors will not readily be able to acquire defacto status, and that such status will be limited to cases “in which the assessor failed to take the oath of office or where he or she mistakenly continued in office after the expiration of a full term,.” Ante at 354, 730 A.2d at 299 (emphasis added). In my view, that questionable limitation on de facto status will encourage — not discourage — municipalities to postpone reappointment of assessors and will result in an increased number of assessors serving as “holdovers” and subject to political influence and manipulation.
B.
The preferred disposition of this appeal should be one that best protects tax assessors from local political intrigue and advances *367the clearly articulated legislative goal of tax assessor independence from municipal control. To that end, I would hold that plaintiffs initial four-year appointment was ratified by the Council when it took no action either to confirm him or to object to his services as tax assessor. Although, somewhat more difficult analytically, I would also conclude that the inaction of the Mayor and Council after expiration of plaintiffs first four-year term, combined with plaintiffs open and unchallenged service as tax assessor for two additional years, constituted an implied ratification of plaintiffs continued service as tax assessor for a second four-year term. Finally, I would hold that the lack of an express reappointment and confirmation precluded plaintiff from obtaining tenure, although his removal prior to the expiration of his second four-year term was unlawful.
The Court properly recognizes the settled principle that municipalities may impliedly ratify not only contracts, Johnson v. Hospital Serv. Plan, 25 N.J. 134, 140-41, 135 A.2d 483 (1957), but personnel appointments as well, Barkus v. Sadloch, 20 N.J. 551, 556, 120 A.2d 465 (1956). Ante at 345-47, 730 A.2d 294. Despite that recognition, the Court interprets the decisional law to hold, for purposes of this appeal, that the Council’s ratification of plaintiffs appointment depended on “an open, unequivocal act intended as a substitute for a formal resolution of the council approving the mayor’s appointment.” Respectfully, such a requirement is not to be found in the relevant cases, nor is it a sensible or practical standard for determining whether implied ratification of an appointment has occurred.
Two of our cases point the Court toward the correct decision here. In Ratajczak v. Board of Educ., Perth Amboy, 114 N.J.L. 577, 177 A. 880 (Sup.Ct.1935), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 162, 183 A. 214 (1936), Justice Heher pragmatically applied the doctrine of implied ratification to an appointment of a school janitor made by the chairman of the Board of Education’s building committee rather than by the Board itself. Ratajczak had been employed by the Board as janitor from 1928 to 1933 when the Board replaced him *368with Godlesky, prompting Ratajczak to appeal to the Commissioner of Education and rely on a statute protecting public school janitors from discharge except for cause established at a hearing. The Board argued that Ratajczak was merely an at-will employee, never having been duly appointed by the Board. But the proofs established that when Ratajczak’s predecessor, John Lynch, retired in 1930, the Board’s business manager obtained authorization from the Board’s building committee chairman to replace Lynch with Ratajczak, and that Ratajczak continued to function as janitor until his purported discharge in 1933. Responding to the contention that only the Board was authorized to hire janitors, Justice Heher observed:
But it is insisted that these officers of the local board had no authority to employ Edward in the capacity of a janitor, and that it was the invariable custom to accomplish that by resolution of the board. Even so, there was, in the circumstances here presented, indubitable ratification by the board of the act claimed to be an excess of authority, but in any event done or professedly done on the board’s account---- And there may be ratification by implication. Ratification may be implied from acts, words, or conduct on the part of the principal, which reasonably tend to show an intention to ratify the unauthorized acts or transactions of the agent. Of course, the principal must act in the premises with knowledge of the material facts.
[114 N.J.L. at 581, 177 A. 880 (citations omitted). ]
This Court also adopted a pragmatic, common-sense approach to the implied ratification doctrine in Barkus, supra, 20 N.J. 551, 120 A.2d 465. The plaintiff, Sophie Barkus, had been employed in the Garfield City Hall as a switchboard operator from October 21, 1952, to January 15, 1954, when her services were terminated by resolution of the City Council and one Helen Vancho appointed in her place. Relying on a statute that prohibited the firing of honorably discharged veterans except for cause after a hearing, Barkus challenged the legality of her termination. Id. at 553, 120 A.2d 465. The evidence established that Barkus had been hired by the Mayor, although only the City Council was authorized to hire employees. Id. at 554-56, 120 A.2d 465. She performed services as a switchboard operator, receptionist, information clerk, and as an assistant to the city clerk in posting payroll records. The evidence at trial indicated that the City Council regularly *369approved payrolls on which Barkus’ name appeared. Id. at 556, 120 A.2d 465.
Without any suggestion that some formal action of the council was a condition of ratification, this Court held that Barkus’ invalid appointment by the Mayor was ratified by the City Council simply on the basis of its knowledge that she had worked for the city for fifteen months:
[P]laintiff testified that she had been hired by the mayor of Garfield in October, 1952. The party occupying the office of mayor in 1952 testified that he had hired plaintiff and assigned her duties. Plaintiff performed these duties for a period of over two years in the conspicuous surroundings of the City Hall. Her name appeared on every payroll approved by resolution of the city council during this period.' She was informed that municipal economy dictated her discharge, but the defense did not rest upon this ground. Indeed, a replacement was appointed on the same day that the resolution discharging plaintiff was passed.
We find as a fact that plaintiff was hired by the mayor of Garfield for an indefinite term. Her appointment, although invalid in its inception, was ratified by the city council.
... As an honorably discharged veteran of the United States Army she is entitled to the benefits of the Veterans’ Tenure Act.
[20 N.J. at 556-57, 120 A.2d 465 (citations omitted).]
By analogy to the holdings in Ratajczak and Barkus, the conclusion is inescapable that the Jersey City Council ratified Mayor Cucci’s appointment of Casamasino to his initial four-year term. The Council was notified of the appointment by the Mayor, and took no action for the ensuing four years to confirm or to challenge the appointment, although fully aware that plaintiff was serving as • assessor. Moreover, that result has the virtue of consistency with the Legislature’s clear objective to restrict assessors to only four-year terms and to protect assessors from vulnerable holdover status.
With respect to the second four-year term, the facts closely resemble the Barkus case. In Barkus the appointing authority— the City Council — never appointed Barkus but was held to have ratified her unauthorized appointment by the Mayor. In this case the Mayor, who was the appointing authority, failed to reappoint plaintiff, and both the Mayor and the City Council permitted him to serve as tax assessor for two' additional years. The Court’s *370disposition renders plaintiff a de facto holdover assessor, vulnerable to political reprisals or removal in direct conflict with the Legislature’s clearly expressed objective. I would hold that the Mayor and Council’s acquiescence to plaintiffs unchallenged service as tax assessor for two full years constitutes an implied ratification of his “appointment” to a second four-year term. As a matter of law, I would construe N.J.S.A. 40A:9-148 to prohibit municipalities from willfully or inadvertently exposing tax assessors to the vulnerability of holdover status.
Nevertheless, I would not construe N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.31 to permit plaintiff to acquire tenure on the basis of a “reappointment” that was impliedly ratified rather than express. The significant additional protections accorded to tax assessors by the tenure statute should, in my view, be triggered only by an express decision by the appointing authority, accompanied by formal confirmation. That interpretation of the tenure statute, however, does not leave plaintiff subject to removal until completion of his second four-year term.
Accordingly, I would affirm but modify the judgment of the Appellate Division.
POLLOCK, J., joins in this dissent.
For reversal — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN — 5.
For affirmance and modification — Justices POLLOCK and STEIN — 2.