Court Opinion

ID: 9461416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:14:10.04977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:03.295416
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I agree with the majority that the District Court did not err in holding that the 1973 redistricting plan was not shown to be racially motivated. I am not able to agree that the District Court correctly considered the plaintiffs’ alternative theory of “dilution” of the black vote, that is, that redistricting, even if not racially motivated, had the effect of minimizing or cancelling out the voting strength of black citizens.
The District Court’s brief discussion of the dilution issue states that the plaintiffs’ case was “principally based” on the testimony of a political analyst who projected future black population growth in Dallas County and concluded that in neither district three nor district four would there be a black majority within ten years. Having referred only to this statistical evidence of future demography, the District Court concluded: “There is no evidence that in the elections to be held in 1974 or 1976 that the 1973 plan would operate to minimize, cancel or dilute the voting strength of black voters.” [emphasis added.]
A redistricting plan not devised with a discriminatory motive may nevertheless be unconstitutional. The test is whether the plan, combined with a past history of racial discrimination and present political realities, gives minority group members “less opportunity than . . . other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice,” White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 2339, 37 L.Ed.2d 314, 324 (1973), aff’g in part, rev’g in part Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704, 732 (W.D.Tex., 1972). The rule is a judicial recognition of what common sense commands — that the effect or impact of a redistricting plan cannot be evaluated accurately when considered in isolation but only when examined against the backdrop of racial discrimination in the community, past and present.
We have followed White v. Regester in a series of cases. Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (CA5, 1973); Moore v. LeFlore County Board of Election Commissioners, 502 F.2d 621 (CA5, 1974); and Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674 (CA5, 1974). Cf. Taylor v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893 (CA5, 1974); Reese v. Dallas County, Alabama, 505 F.2d 879, (CA5, 1974); and Bradas v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 508 F.2d 1109 (CA5, 1975). White v. Regester itself was an affirmance of a three-judge district court decision from this circuit originally styled Graves v. Barnes. In its affirmance the Supremé Court relied heavily on the factual history and existent practices of discrimination found by the District Court to exist in Dallas County, Texas, the very geographical area here under consideration. 412 U.S. at 765-769, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d at 324-325.
The three-judge court in Graves v. Barnes held that “a multi-member [state legislative] district in Dallas County tends to dilute or cancel out the vote of Dallas County’s Negro minority,” and was therefore unconstitutional. The undergirding facts to which the court gave *1396weight are set out in 343 F.Supp. at 724 — 27. They are:
1. The strict “majority” rule that requires a majority vote as a prerequisite to nomination in a primary election.
2. The “place” requirement that limits candidates for legislative office to a specified “place” on the ballot, the ultimate effect of which is to highlight the racial element where it exists.
3. The absence of a provision for at-large candidates running from particular geographical sub-districts.
4. The “rather colorful history of racial segregation” in Texas, consisting of “innumerable instances, covering virtually the entire gamut of human relationships, in which the State has adopted and maintained an official policy of racial discrimination against the Negro.”
5. The statistical disproportion between the number of black residents who have been legislators and the number of black ghetto residents.
6. The fact that the black community has been effectively excluded from participation in the Democratic Primary selection process.
7. The exclusion of black community leaders from the affairs of the Dallas Committee for Responsible Government, without whose endorsement it is difficult to secure a legislative seat or the Democratic Primary nomination. The DCRG decides how many black candidates, if any, it will slate, and then requests black leaders to recruit the candidates.
8. Negroes in Dallas County are permitted to enter the political process in a meaningful manner “only through the benevolence of the predominant white majority.”
The foregoing constituted the past history and practices, current through 1970, as found by the three-judge district court in 1972. The trial court in the case before us took judicial notice of these findings. There is additional evidence in the record of more recent political conditions in Dallas County, but to an appellate court it is conclusive neither .that the pre-1972 conditions have been eliminated nor that they retain sufficient vigor to render the proposed districting plan unconstitutional. Taken as a whole the evidence required the trial court to consider in detail whether the 1973 plan, when judged against the backdrop of the past history of racial discrimination and present conditions, is constitutional. But there is not in its opinion any finding, mention or even hint that the court gave consideration to the combination of past history as reflected in Graves v. Barnes and current practice, as it was required to do. To the contrary, it held — after discussing only the statistics of future demographic trends — that there is “no evidence” that the 1973 plan .would “minimize, cancel or dilute the voting strength of black voters.”
The result is that plaintiffs here have not been given a proper determination under currently recognized standards of whether their voting rights have been diluted by means of the challenged districting plan. I think the case should be sent back to the trial court for proper findings and rulings by the judge who heard all the testimony and evidence.
With deference to my brothers, I do not understand their determination to perpetuate a result at best dubious. Justice will not be harmed by a remand and entry of more precise findings that will dispel the cloud around this decision. The majority opinion seems to me to reveal on its face that the majority are neither confident nor even comfortable with what they have decided. Nor do I understand the methodology of the salvage effort. Judge Rives has searched the record to find illustrations of past and present practices of racial discrimination, including the judicially noticed facts of Graves v. Barnes. Recognizing that this evidence existed and was before the trial court for its consideration and that the court was bound to consider it, the majority opinion then concludes that the plaintiffs have brought no evidence to our attention (at the appellate level) to show that the District Court failed to consider what it was obligated to consider. I have two points in response:
1. One need read only what the District Judge said. After talking of the *1397future he said “there is no evidence” that the 1973 plan will produce dilution. There is evidence, substantial evidence, some of it bearing the stamp of approval of the Supreme Court. The majority’s recital of the evidence does not cure the error but more firmly establishes it.1
2. General conclusory statements that a burden of proof or standard has been met, vel non, are not adequate for judicial review under Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P.2 The requirement of adequate findings does not go to jurisdiction but to our discretion whether “a full understanding of the issues [can] be reached without the aid of [additional] findings.”3 The test is whether the findings provide “a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court’s decision [or] whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and perti*1398nent to the issues to provide a basis for decision.” (Citations omitted.)4 In the trial court’s opinion there is not a single specific reference to any of the facts relating to the dilution theory based on past discrimination and present political realities.5 It is true that we review judgments, not opinions, but a judgment is no better than the supporting facts properly found and the law properly applied.
This case is a classic illustration of the wisdom of Rule 52(a) requiring findings and of the Kelley principle. Here we are, in a case affecting the constitutionally-guaranteed rights of many thousands of black citizens and the political structure of a populous and important county, engaged in a 2 — 1 difference of view between appellate judges who are forced to try to divine what evidence the trial court considered and whether it had in view the correct governing law. Federal rules and practice intended to make this kind of argument as extinct as the dinosaur.
In our prior decisions we have sought to implement impeccably the mandate of the Supreme Court with respect to “benign” redistricting. This case departs from that tradition. I would reverse the decision and remand to the District Court with instructions to consider the issue of non-discriminatory redistricting in light of the prior history and current political practices and to enter findings accordingly. All will then know whether the chips have fallen where under the law and the facts they should.

. It is not our task to determine how the case got into its awkward posture. The most likely possibility seems to me to be that the District Court simply was not aware that a background of racial discrminatiori had any evidentiary relationship to dilution, but rather viewed dilution as a concept related only to the future. That is, he knew all the facts but considered only part of them to be significant (hence the discussion of future demography and the conclusion that there is “no evidence” of dilution). The trial judge employed the “operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength” [of minorities] language of Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439, 85 S.Ct. 498, 501, 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1963), but cited only Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966), and Howard v. Adams County Board of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455 (CA5, 1972), cert. denied 407 U.S. 925, 92 S.Ct. 2461, 32 L.Ed.2d 812 (1972). Neither of those cases contains any holding on the issue. White v. Regester and Turner v. McKeithen had spelled out the meaning of minimization or dilution. Neither was cited. Of course, the District Judge could not be aware of our more recent decisions defining those terms, Moore and Robinson, because they were handed down after his decision.

. The leading case is Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U.S. 415, 63 S.Ct. 1141, 87 L.Ed. 1485 (1943), from which Judge Rives quotes. The question there was whether a composition of debts of a bankrupt was “fair, equitable, and for the best interests of the creditors . . ..” The Court declined to reach the merits, holding that it must remand for
“findings, in such detail and exactness as the nature of the case permits, of subsidiary facts on which the ultimate conclusion of fairness can rationally be predicated.
"The findings in the present case fall short of that requirement. ... It may be that adequate evidence as to these matters is in the present record. On that we do not pass, for it is not the function of this court to search the record and analyze the evidence in order to supply findings which the trial court failed to make. Nor do we intimate that findings must be made on all of the enumerated matters or need be made on no others; the nature of the evidentiary findings sufficient and appropriate to support the court’s decision is for the trial court to determine in the first instance in the light of the circumstances of the particular case. We hold only that there must be findings, stated either in the court’s opinion or separately, which are sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the ultimate conclusion.” (Footnote omitted.)
319 U.S. at 420-422, 63 S.Ct. at 1145, 87 L.Ed. at 1488, 1489. See also Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 76 S.Ct. 745, 100 L.Ed. 1065 (1955), and Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 129-131, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796, 1804-1805 (1943) (dictum). This court has followed the same procedure where the trial court failed to enter findings of fact or provided only general conclusions as to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 500 F.2d 167, 176, 177 (CA5, 1974) (findings adequate on one issue, inadequate on another); Ellis Diesel Sales and Service, Inc. v. M/V On Strike, 488 F.2d 1095 (CA5, 1973) (summary vacation of judgment and remand for findings under Rule 52(a)); Acme Boat Rentals, Inc. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 407 F.2d 1324 (CA5, 1969) (same); Lettsome v. United States, 434 F.2d 907 (CA5, 1970) (conclusion that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent not adequate); Mladinich v. United States, 371 F.2d 940, 941 (CA5, 1967) (statement that government supported its case with clear and convincing evidence not adequate); Southland Corp. v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 333, 337-338 (CA 5, 1966). Accord, O’Neill v. United States, 411 F.2d 139 (CA3, 1969). See generally Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §§ 2577 and 2579, and 5A Moore’s Federal Practice fl 52.06 [2].

. Davis v. United States, 422 F.2d 1139, 1142 (CA5, 1970). Nor is a distinction drawn between subsidiary and ultimate facts. What the trial court should set out are those facts on which its decision is based and upon which this court probably will have to rule in review. See Kelley and O’Neill, supra, note 2.

. Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 515 (CA5, 1969). See also United States v. Northside Realty Associates, 474 F.2d 1164, 1171 (CA5, 1973) (court could not ascertain which facts were relied on or how law was applied, where reliance on one set of facts would have constituted constitutionally impermissible violation of free speech rights), and cf. United States v. Johnson, 496 F.2d 1131, 1138, n. 7 (CA5, 1973) (adopts Gulf King Shrimp test for adequacy of findings under Rule 23(c), F.R.Crim.P.).

. The trial court made adequate findings on facts related to the future dilution theory of the plaintiffs’ cause of action, while making no reference to facts relating to the alternate theory, of which the plaintiffs made a record by securing judicial notice of Graves v. Barnes. Rule 52(a) is not satisfied by hit- and-miss findings on parts of the suit. Moreover, both theories concerned what constitutes “dilution” of minority voting rights by means of non-racially motivated districting plans. In light of the fast development and recent uncertainty of the constitutional doctrines involved, it is especially important that the factual bases of these decisions be spelled out with clarity. The circuit courts and the Supreme Court should have concrete, substantial records and findings if they are to rule intelligently and with a sharp eye to reality in this area.