Court Opinion

ID: 9649083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:41:42.876413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:07.546193
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Chief Justice SEERDEN.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that improper jury argument requires a reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
The majority focuses on two isolated statements by the prosecutor during closing argument. Both occurred when the prosecutor discussed the credibility of the complainant when he accused Reed of molesting him. One of those comments was:
“[Complainant] wanted the world to know that Sam Reed was doing this to the children in his community.”
The majority concludes that, by using the plural “the children,” rather than restricting it to “a child,” the prosecutor implied that Reed was guilty of molesting other children as well, and thus improperly alluded to extraneous offenses not before *366the jury. I do not find this to be such an implication in the necessary statement.
People often generalize from a single instance of certain behavior to describe the actor as one who generally engages in such behavior. In the present case, the complainant was one of the “children in [Reed’s] community.” Thus, if Reed molested him, it would not be unusual in common parlance to speak of Reed as one who molests the children in his community.
Using such an expression does not necessarily accuse the defendant of an extraneous offense, nor does it invite the jury to speculate about other offenses.
The other comment Reed complains about was:
“Even the story about seeing somebody else being raped. Looking through the window, that also, was a scream,.... ”
This statement does imply that the complainant told someone that he had seen someone else being raped while looking through a window. In context, the implication is that complainant saw Reed rape someone else. But, we have no further details of this story. While I agree that the remark was improper, I do not believe that it was harmful.
Formerly, improper jury argument amounted to reversible error “unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” See prior Tex.R.App. P. 81(b)(2). Under the 1997 Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the standard for harm analysis changed. With regard to non-constitutional error in criminal cases, which includes improper prosecutorial argument, we now disregard the error unless it “affects substantial rights.” Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b); see Maibauer v. State, 968 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tex.App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref'd); Coggeshall v. State, 961 S.W.2d 689, 643 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd) (citing numerous federal cases interpreting similar harm analysis in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52). A substantial right is thus affected when the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)).
Under prior harm analysis of Old Rule 81(b)(2), an instruction to disregard had a substantial impact on whether the error was considered harmful. Accordingly, when the trial court sustained an objection and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s improper remark, any potential harm was presumably cured, unless the remark was so inflammatory that its prejudicial effect could not have been reasonably removed by the instruction to disregard. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). We have tacitly applied these same principles to harm analysis under New Rule 44.2(b). See Zayas v. State, 972 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. ref'd). Nor do I see any reason not to continue to apply them under the new “substantial rights” harm analysis.
Therefore, in the present case, unless the prosecutor’s remark concerning the complainant’s story about seeing someone else being raped was so inflammatory that its prejudicial effect could not have been reasonably removed by the trial court’s instruction to disregard, it does not affect a substantial right or require reversal.
There was no indication when or where the alleged rape took place, who was raped, or how the complainant happened to be looking through the window at the time. Without any further details of the alleged extraneous rape, the remark was nothing more than a passing comment easily disregarded and forgotten by the jury. Vague implications of this nature, that do not suggest any of the circumstances surrounding the alleged extraneous offense, do not generally rise to the level of substantial or injurious influence upon the *367jury sufficient to find harmful error. See Holmes v. State, 962 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tex.App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref'd, untimely filed).
Moreover, as the complainant was the primary witness against Reed concerning the charged offense, his own credibility is not necessarily enhanced because he told a “story” concerning some other rape. In other words, if the complainant had lied about the charged offense, he was just as likely to have also fabricated the extraneous rape. In short, I do not believe that the prosecutor’s improper remark was so inflammatory that its prejudicial effect was not reasonably removed by the trial court’s instruction to disregard, and thus it did not have such a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict as to rise to the level of reversible error under Rule 44.2(b).
I would overrule point six and address the remaining points of error.