Court Opinion

ID: 9418896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:42:22.059107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:08.900952
License: Public Domain

Me. Chief Justice Hughes,
dissenting.
I am unable to concur in the opinion in this case. In view of the difference between .the statutes involved, I *619cannot agree that the case should be regarded as controlled by Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525. And I can find nothing in the Federal Constitution which denies to the State the power to protect women from being exploited by overreaching employers through the refusal of a fair wage as defined in the New York statute and ascertained in a reasonable manner by competent authority.
First.—Relator in his petition for habeas corpus raises no question as to the fairness of the minimum wage he was required to pay. He does not challenge the regularity of the proceedings by which the amount of that wage was determined. We must assume that none of the safeguards of the statute was ignored and that its provisions for careful-and deliberate procedure were followed in all respects. It is important at the outset to note the requirements of that procedure, as they at once dispose of any question of arbitrary procedural antion.
The statute states its objectives. It- defines an “oppressive and unreasonable wage” as one which “is both less than the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered and less than sufficient' to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health.” It defines a “fair wage” as one “fairly and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service or class of service rendered.” It relates to an industry, trade or business, other than domestic service or labor on a farm. The industrial commissioner is authorized to investigate and ascertain the wages of women and'minors. If he is of the opinion that any substantial number of women or minors are receiving “oppressive and unreasonable” wage's, he must appoint a wage board to make report. That board is to- be composed of not- more than three representatives of employers, an equal number of representatives of employees, and not more than three disinterested persons representing the public. The wage board is fully equipped with *620authority to conduct a comprehensive investigation. It may differentiate and classify employmentsi in any occupation according to the nature of the service renddered. It may recommend minimum fair wage rates varying with localities. It may recommend a suitable scale of rates for learners and apprentices which may be less than those recommended for experienced women or minor workers. The wage board may take into account all relevant circumstances • affecting the value of the service or class of service. It may be guided by such considerations as would guide a court in a suit for the reasonable value of services rendered. It may consider the wages paid in the State for work of like or comparable character by employers who voluntarily maintain minimum fair wage standards.
The commissioner may approve or disapprove the report of the wage board. If the commissioner disapproves, he may resubmit the matter to the same or a new board. In case the report is approved, the commissioner is to make a “directory order” which defines minimum “fair wage rates” and is to include appropriate administrative regulations. The latter may embrace regulations governing learners, apprentices, piece rates or their relation to time rates,, over time or part-time rates, bonuses or special pay for special or extra work, deductions for board, lodging and other items or services supplied by the employer, and other special conditions. Special licenses, authorizing employment at lower rates, may be issued to a woman or minor whose earning capacity is impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency or injury.
If the commissioner has reason to believe that an employer is not observing the provisions of the “directory order,” he may, upon notice, summon the employer to show cause why his name should not be published as having failed to comply with the order. And, after hearing and in case of a finding of non-observance, the com*621missioner may cause the name of the employer to be published. After a “directory minimum fair wage order” has been in effect for nine months, if it appears that there has been persistent non-observance, notice may be given of the intention to make the order mandatory and of a public hearing at which all persons in favor of, or opposed to, such a mandatory order may be heard. And it is after such hearing that the commissioner may make the previous directory order or any part of it mandatory and publish it accordingly.
It is disobedience to such a mandatory order which is punished by fine or by imprisonment. It is the violation of such an order, made after the inquiries, report, the tentative order, and the hearings which the statute enjoins, that is the basis of the prosecution in the case at bar.
Second.—In reaching its conclusion, the state court construed • the opinion in the Adkirts- case and deemed that ruling applicable here. That, however, is a construction of the decision of this Court. That construction is not binding upon us.
When the opinion, of the state court is examined in order to ascertain what construction was placed upon the statute, we find little more than a recital of its provisions. The state court says: “The New York act, as above stated, prohibits an. oppressive and unreasonable wage, which means both less than the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered and less than sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health.”' This is a repetition of the words of the statute in subdivision 7 of § 551 defining an “oppressive and unreasonable wage.” The court adds: “The act of Congress [in the Adkins case] had one standard, the living wage; this State act has added another, reasonable Value. The minimum wage must include both. What was vague before has not been made any clearer. One of the elements, *622therefore, in fixing the fair wage is the very matter which was the basis of the congressional act.” But the court expressly recognizes that a wage is not denounced by the New York act ás “oppresive and unreasonable” unless it is less than the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered. The statute also provides in explicit terms that the “fair wage” which is to be prescribed is one that is “fairly and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service or class of service rendered.” I find nothing in the opinion of the state court which can be taken to mean that this definite "provision of the statute is not obligatory upon the authorities fixing a fair wage. Certainly, the court has not said so, and I think that we must assume that the standard thus described is set up by the New York act. And there is no suggestion that the “fair wage” as prescribed in the instant case was not commensurate with the reasonable value of the service rendered by the employees.
When the opinion of the state court goes beyond the statement of the provisions of the act, and says that the setting up of such a standard does not create a material distinction when compared with the Act of Congress in the Adkins case,-the state court is not construing the state statute. It is passing upon the effect of the difference between the two acts from the standpoint of the Federal Constitution. It is putting aside an admitted difference as -not controlling. It is holding, as the state court says, that “Forcing the payment of wages at a reasonable value does not make inapplicable the principle and ruling of the Adkins case.”
That, it seems to me, is clearly a federal and not a state question, and I pass to its consideration.
Third.—The constitutional validity of a minimum wage statute like the New York act has not heretofore been passed upon by this Court. ' As I have said, the required correspondence of the prescribed “fair wage” to *623•the reasonable value of the service which the employee performs stands.out.as an essential feature of the statutory plan. The statute for the District of Columbia which was before us in the Adkins case did not have thafeature. That statute provided for a minimum wage ad,equate “to supply the necessary cost of living to women workers” and “to maintain them in health and to protect their morals.” 40 Stat. 963. The standard thus set up did not take account of the reasonable value of the service rendered. As this Court said, it compelled the employer “to pay at least the sum fixed in any event, because the employee needs it, but requires no service of equivalent value from the emplqyee.” In the cases of Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U. S. 530, and Donham v. West-Nelson Co., 273 U. S. 657, the statutes of Arizona and Arkansas, respectively, were of a similar character, and both these cases were decided upon the authority of the Adkins case. New York and other States have been careful to adopt a different and improved standard, in order to meet the objection aimed at the earlier statutes, by requiring a fair equivalence of wage and service.
That the difference is a material one, I think is shown by the opinion in the Adkins case. That opinion contained a broad discussion of state power,- but it- singled out as an adequate ground for the finding of invalidity that the statute gave no regard to the situation of the employer and to the reasonable value of the service for which the wage was paid. Upon this point the Court said (261 U. S. pp. 558, 559):
“The feature of this statute which, perhaps more ,-than any other, puts upon it the stamp of invalidity is that it exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no causal connection with , his business, or the contract or the work the eim ployee' engages to do. The declared basis, as already *624pointed out, is .not the value of the service rendered, but the extraneous circumstance that the employee needs to get a prescribed sum of money to insure her subsistence, health and morals. The ethical right of every worker, man or woman, t.o a living wage may be conceded. One of the declared and important purposes of trade organizations is to secure it. And with that principle and with every legitimate effort to realize it in fact, no one can quarrel; but the fallacy of the proposed method of attaining it is that it assumes that every employer is bound at all events to furnish it. The moral requirement implicit in every contract of employment, viz, that the amount to be paid and the service to be rendered shall bear to each other some relation of just equivalence, is completely ignored. . . . A statute requiring an employer to pay in money, to pay at prescribed and regular intervals, to .pay the value of the services rendered, even to pay with fair relation to the extent of the benefit obtained from the service, would be understandable. But a statute which prescribes payment without regard to any of these things and solely with relation to circumstances apart from the contract of employment, the business affected by it and the work done under it, is so clearly the product of a naked, arbitrary exercise of power that it cannot be allowed to stand under the Constitution of the United States.”
As the New York act is free of that feature, so strongly denounced, the question comes before us in a new aspect. The Court was closely divided in the Adkins case, and that decision followed an equal division of the Court, after reargúment, in Stettler v. O’Hara, 243 U. S. 629, with respect to the validity of the minimum wage law of Oregon. Such divisions are at times unavoidable, but they point to the desirability of fresh consideration when there are material differences in the cases presented. The fact that in the Adkins case there were dissenting opin*625ions maintaining the validity of the federal statute, despite the nature of the standard it set up, brings out in stronger relief the ground which was taken most emphatically by the majority in that case, and that there, would have been a majority for the decision in the absence of that ground must be a matter of conjecture. With that ground absent, the Adkins case ceases to be a precise authority.
We have here a question of constitutional law of grave importance, applying to the statutes of several States in a matter of profound public interest. I think that we should deal with that question upon its merits, without feeling that we are bound by a decision which on its facts is not strictly in point;
Fourth.—The validity of the New York act must be considered in the light of the conditions to which the exercise of the protective power of the State was-addressed.
The statute itself recites these conditions and the State has submitted a voluminous factual brief for the purpose of showing from various official statistics that these recitals have abundant support. Judge Lehman, in his dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals,- states that the relator “does not challenge these findings of fact by the Legislature, nor does he challenge the statements in the ‘factual brief’ submitted by the respondent to sustain and amplify these findings.” The majority opinion in the Court of Appeals has nothing to the contrary. Nor is the statement of the conditions which influenced the legislative action challenged, or challengeable, upon the record here. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-80; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 294; Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 397; O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251, 257, 258; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 530; Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 209.
*626The Legislature finds that the employment of women and minors in trade and industry in the State of New .York at wages unreasonably low and not fairly commensurate with the value of the services rendered is a matter of vital public concern; that many women and minors are not as a class upon a level of equality in bargaining with their employers in regard to minimum fair wage standards, and that ‘freedom of contract’ as applied to their relations with employers is illusory; that, by reason of the necessity of seeking support for themselves and their dependents, they are forced to accept whatever wages aré offered; and that judged by any reasonable standard, wages in many instances are fixed by chance and caprice and the wages accepted are often found to bear no relation to the fair value of the service. The Legislature further states that women and minors are peculiarly subject “to the overreaching of inefficient, harsh or ignorant employers,” and that, in the absence of effective minimum fair wage rates, the constant lowering of wages by unscrupulous employers, constitutes a serious form of unfair competition against other employers, reduces the purchasing power of the workers and threatens the stability of industry. The Legislature deemed it essential to seek the correction of these evils by the exercise of the police power “for the protection of industry and of the women and minors employed therein and of the interest of the community at large in their. health and well-being and in .the prevention of the deterioration of the race.” § 550.
In the factual brief, statistics are presented showing the increasing number of wage earning women, and that women are in industry and in other fields of employment because they must support themselves and their dependents. Data are submitted, from reports of the Women’s Bureau of the United States Department of Labor, showing such discrepancies and variations in wages'paid for *627identical work as to indicate that no relationship exists between the value of the services rendered and the wages paid. It'also appears that working women are largely unorganized and that their bargaining power is relatively weak. The seriousness of the social problem is presented. Inquiries by the New York State Department of Labor in cooperation with the Emergency Relief Bureau of New York City disclosed the large number of women employed in'industry whose wages were insufla cient for the support of themselves and those dependent upon them. For that reason they had been accepted for relief and their wages were being supplemented by payments from the Emergency Relief Bureau. Thus the failure of overreaching employers to pay to women the wages commensurate with the value of services rendered has imposed a direct and heavy burden upon the taxpayers. The weight of this burden and the necessity for taking reasonable measures to reduce it, in the light of the enormous annual budgetary appropriation for the Department of Public Welfare ,of New York City, is strikingly exhibited in the brief filed by the Corporation Counsel of the City as an amicus curiae.
We are not at liberty to disregard these facts. We must assume that they exist and .examine respondent’s argument from that standpoint. That argument is addressed to the fundamental postulate of liberty of contract. I think that the argument fails to take account ©f established principles and ignores the historic relation of the State to the protection of women.
Fifth.—We have had frequent occasion to consider the limitations of liberty of contract. While it is highly important to preserve that liberty from arbitrary and capricious interference, it is also necessary to prevent its abuse, as otherwise it could be used to override all public interests and thus in the end destroy the very freedom of opportunity which it is designed to safeguard.
*628We have repeatedly said that liberty of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right. “There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. . . . Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.” Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 567. The numerous restraints that have been sustained have often been recited. Id., p. 568. Nebbia v. New York, supra, pp. 526-528. Thus we have upheld the limitation of hours of employment in mines and smelters .(Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366); the requiring of redemption in cash of store orders or other evidences of indebtedness issued in payment of wages (Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13); the prohibition oí contracts for options to sell or buy grain or other commodities at a future time (Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425); the forbidding of advance payments to seamen-(Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169); the prohibition of contracts to pay miners employed at quantity rates upon the basis of screéned coal instead of the weight of the coal as originally produced in the mine (McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539); the regulation of the size and weight of loaves of bread (Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578; Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U. S. 570); the regulation of insurance rates (German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389; O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Insurance Co., supra); the regulation of the size and character of packages in which goods are sold (Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510); the limitation of hours of employment in manufacturing establishments with a specified allowance of overtime payment (Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426); the regulation of sales of stocks and bonds to prevent fraud (Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539); the regulation of the price of milk (Nebbia v. New York, *629supra). The test of validity' is not artificial. It is whether the limitation upon the freedom of contract is arbitrary and capricious or one reasonably required in order appropriately to serve the public interest in the light of the particular conditions to which the power is addressed.
When there are conditions which specially touch the health and well-being of women, the State may exert its power in a reasonable manner for their protection, whether or not a similar regulation is, or could be, applied to men. The distinctive nature and function of women—their particular relation to the social welfare— has put them in a separate class. This separation and corresponding distinctions in legislation is one of the outstanding traditions of legal history. The Fourteenth Amendment found the States with that protective power and did not take it away or remove the reasons for its exercise. Changes have been effected within the domain of state policy and upon an appraisal of state interests. We have not yet arrived at a time when' we are at liberty to override the judgment of the State and decide that women are not the special subject of exploitation because they are women and as such are not in a relatively defenceless position.
More than forty years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment; we said that it did not interfere with state power by creating “a fictitious equality.” Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 63. We called attention to the ample precedents in regulatory provisions for a classification on the basis of sex. We said—“It has been recognized with regard to hours of work. ... It is recognized in the respective rights of husband and wife in land during life, in the inheritance after the death of the spouse. Often it is expressed in the time fixed for coming of age. . . . The particular points at which that difference shall be emphasized by legislation are *630largely in the power of the State.” Id. Not long before the decision in the Quong Wing case, the question had received elaborate consideration in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, where a regulation of the working hours of women was sustained. We thought that the disadvantage at which woman was placed in the struggle for subsistence was obvious and we emphasized the point that she “becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.” We added that “though limitations upon ’ person and contractual rights may be removed by legislation,” woman will still be in a situation “where some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of right.” She therefore' still may be “properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained.” Muller v. Oregon, supra, pp. 421, 422. This ruling has been followed in Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671, Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, and Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U. S. 385, with respect to hours of work, and in Radice v. New York, supra, in relation to night work.
If liberty of contract were viewed from the standpoint of absolute right, there would be as much to be said against a regulation of the hours of labor of women as against the fixing of a minimum wage. Restriction upon hours is a restriction upon the making of contracts and upon earning power. But the right being a qualified one, we must apply in each case the test of reasonableness in the circumstances disclosed. Here, the special conditions calling for the protection of women, and for the protection of society itself, are abundantly shown. The legislation is not less in the interest of the community as a whole than in the interest of the women employees who aré paid less than the value of their services. That lack must be made good out of the public *631purse. Granted that the burden of the support of women who do not receive a living wage cannot be transferred to employers who pay the equivalent of the service they obtain, there is no reason why the burden caused' by the failure to pay that equivalent should not be placed upon those who create it. The fact that the State cannot secure the benefit to society of a living wage for women- employees by any enactment which bears unreasonably upon employers does not preclude the State-from seeking its objective by means entirely fair both to employers and the women employed.
In the statute before, us, no unreasonableness appears. The end is legitimate and the means appropriate. I think that the act should be upheld.
I am authorized to state that Me. Justice Beandeis, Me. Justice Stone and Me. Justice Cakdozo join in this opinion.