Court Opinion

ID: 9492774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:50:15.945649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:29.428281
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in I, II, III, IV-B and V-B; dissenting to IV-A and V-A:
I join in Parts I, II, III, IV-B and V-B. However, because the regulation promulgated by the Bureau of Prisons (“Bureau”) directly contravenes the plain language of the governing statute by categorically excluding prisoners expressly declared eligible by Congress, I respectfully dissent from Parts IV-A and V-A and reversing the district court’s decision as to the Gavis Group.
As it pertains to the Gavis Group, this appeal presents the question of whether the Bureau may avoid the Congressional directive that non-violent offenders be eligible for sentence reductions by categorically excluding inmates convicted of certain non-violent crimes under the guise of exercising its discretionary authority to grant sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). The majority answers this question in the affirmative. I would join the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in concluding otherwise.
Faced with a burgeoning federal prison population incarcerated for drug-related offenses1 and evidence that prison substance abuse treatment programs sharply reduce recidivism,2 Congress has required the Bureau to provide substance abuse treatment to federal inmates for whom the Bureau determines has a treatable condition of substance addiction or abuse. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Concerned by an apparent lack of program interest, Congress amended the statute in 1994 to provide an incentive to inmates to enter and participate in a substance abuse treatment program. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322,108 Stat. 1796 (1994). The carrot Congress provided, which is the subject of this litigation, allows the Bureau to reduce by up to one year the period that a prisoner “convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
From the inception of the early release program, the Bureau has pertinaciously insisted that inmates who possessed, carried, or used a firearm during the commission of their crime or who received sentence enhancements because of firearm possession should not be eligible for early release. At first, the Bureau implemented this position by adopting a regulation after public notice and comment excluding from early release eligibility any prisoner whose offense was a “crime of violence” as set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). See 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 (1995). In subsequent program statements, the Bureau interpreted “crime of violence” to include both felon firearm possessors and prisoners whose sentences were enhanced because of firearm possession. See Davis v. Crabtree, 109 F.3d 566, 569 (9th Cir.1997); Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662, 668-69 (9th Cir.1996).
Upon challenge, however, we found the Bureau’s position to be untenable by hold*1226ing that the Bureau cannot define “nonviolent offense” to include firearm possession, either as an element of the criminal offense or for sentence enhancement. See Davis, 109 F.3d at 569; Downey, 100 F.3d at 667-68; compare Warren v. Crabtree, 185 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir.1999) (Bureau properly determined inmates convicted for use or carrying of a firearm in relation to drug trafficking crime categorically ineligible for a sentence reduction). In part, we so held because “parity of reasoning” from our prior case law dictated that inmates convicted of firearm possession could not be denied sentence-reduction eligibility on the grounds that their offense was not nonviolent. See Davis, 109 F.3d at 569 (quoting Downey, 100 F.3d at 667).
In response to Davis and Downey, the Bureau issued an operations memorandum instructing its staff that it could not restrict early release eligibility based on sentence enhancement factors or on an interpretation of “crime of violence” to include felon firearm possession. See Federal Bureau of Prisons Operations Memorandum No. 038-97 (5330) (May 30,1997).
The Bureau subsequently amended its regulation and program statement defining an inmate’s eligibility for early release under § 3621(e). Rather than relying on an interpretation of the phrase “nonviolent offense,” the Bureau elected to circumvent the statute, and our decisions interpreting it, by declaring the very same categories of offenders ineligible through the purported exercise of its discretion. See Federal Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5162.04 §§ 1-2, § 5-6.3
It is clear that throughout these amendments the Bureau changed its substantive position “not a whit.”4 Kilpatrick v. Houston, 36 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1329 (N.D.Fla.1999), aff'd, 197 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir.1999); accord Ward v. Booker, 202 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir.2000). And the Bureau freely admits that the premise for the amendment to its regulation was to evade the import of this Court’s rulings in Davis and Downey.5 The majority’s holding places this Circuit in conflict with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, which have relied on cases paralleling this Court’s decisions in Davis and Downey to hold that the Bureau exceeded its discretionary authority in amending its regulations. See Ward, 202 F.3d at 1254-55 (citing Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d 627, 631 (10th Cir.*12271998)); Kilpatrick, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1329 (citing Byrd v. Hasty, 142 F.3d 1395, 1398 (11th Cir.1998)); compare Bellis v. Davis, 186 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir.1999), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 99-7504 and 99-7558 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1999).
To be sure, the Bureau is accorded broad discretion over all aspects of the substance abuse treatment process, but it must exercise its discretion within the prescribed parameters of its statutory authority. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118, 98 S.Ct. 1702, 56 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (court charged with determining whether agency’s exercise of discretion consistent with scope of statutory authority). This is especially true here because “[a] prisoner’s right to consideration for early release is a valuable one that we have not hesitated to protect.” Cort, 113 F.3d at 1085 (citing U.S. v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir.1993)). When the Bureau has rationally and validly exercised the discretion Congress vested in it, we have not hesitated to affirm the Bureau’s position. See, e.g., McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1182—84 (9th Cir.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 814, 145 L.Ed.2d 685 (2000). We have even supported the notion that the Bureau may exercise discretion in a categorical fashion. See Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 985-86 (9th Cir.1997). However, a discretionary decision that conflicts with the plain and unambiguous language of the statute merits no deference. See McLean, 173 F.3d at 1182-83. An agency cannot legally renounce the express will of Congress by cloaking its repudiation under the cloth of discretion.
The majority correctly observes that an agency may often reach the same regulatory result employing a different rationale. See Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 816 F.2d 1366, 1373 (9th Cir.1987). But achieving similar results using corrected means is far different from attaining ends by evading statutory commands. The power to regulate does not include the power of statutory amendment. See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 134, 56 S.Ct. 397, 80 L.Ed. 528 (1936).
It may well be that the Bureau’s position is good public policy, but that is not for the Bureau — or this Court for that matter — to decide. That is a judgment reserved to the wisdom of Congress. The Bureau cannot categorically declare ineligible those inmates that Congress categorically declared eligible. Thus, I respectfully dissent from the judgment as it applies to the Gavis Group.

. As of 1997, 63% of federal prisoners were imprisoned on drug-related offenses; more than a third admitted being under the influence of drugs or alcohol when they committed the crimes that caused their incarceration. See Christopher J. Mumola, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Substance Abuse and Treatment, State and Federal Prisoners, 1997, at 1-2 (1999).

. For example, preliminary results for a study conducted for the Bureau of Prisons indicates that inmates who completed prison substance abuse treatment programs were 73% less likely to be re-arrested with in the first six months after release than those who did not receive the treatment. See Federal Bureau of Prisons Office of Research and Evaluation, TRIAD Drug Treatment Evaluation Project: Six-Month Interim Report, at 1 (1998). Earlier studies had reported similar results. See, e.g. Dess A. Grangetto, Reducing Recidivism by Substance Abusers who Commit Drug and Alcohol Related Crimes, 10 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 383, 393 (1999).

. In this regulation, as it had previously, the Bureau listed several offenses, categorized as "crimes of violence,” that are excludable from early-release eligibility. See Federal Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5162.04 §§ 1-2, §§ 5-6, § 9. The Bureau separately denied early release eligibility to inmates who committed an offense falling within a category "identified at the discretion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” Id. at §§ 1-2, § 7; see 28 C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(l)(vi)(B). Among the offenses excludable under the Director's discretionary authority include, as before, inmates "whose current offense is a felony that ... involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives ..." Id. at § 7.

. As the majority points out, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau cannot now construe the phrase "nonviolent offense" to include felon firearm possession. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 294-95, 116 S.Ct. 763, 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996); NLRB v. Ashkenazy Property Mgmt. Co., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir.1987).

.In issuing its amendment, the Bureau states:
Because of differences in application of case law among the various Federal courts, a few crimes would not be clearly covered by the Bureau’s definition. This interim rule avoids this complication by using the discretion allotted to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons in granting a sentence reduction to exclude inmates whose current offense is a felony (a) that has as an element, the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) that involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm ..., or (c) that by its nature or conduct, presents a serious potential risk of physical force against the person or property of another
Drug Abuse Treatment and Intensive Confinement Center Programs: Early Release Consideration, 62 Fed.Reg. 53690 (Oct. 15, 1997) (interim rule) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. Parts 524 and 550) (emphasis added).