Court Opinion

ID: 9790119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:46:21.775667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.357342
License: Public Domain

*1284RABINOWITZ, Justice,
with whom COMPTON, Justice, joins dissenting.
I dissent. In my view, the magistrate erred in denying Guidry’s motion to suppress.
As the majority notes, Wood and France, the Fish and Wildlife Protection officers involved in the case, changed into plain clothes so that Guidry would not be alerted to the fact of their official identities. For the same reason, they proceeded to Guidry’s residence in Wood’s personal vehicle. After they had arrived at Guidry’s residence, they engaged Guidry in a conversation which would lead him to believe they were prospective property buyers. It is under the foregoing circumstances that Wood and France gained access to the porch of Gui-dry’s home and ultimately to the interior of Guidry’s residence.
The majority concedes that the only exception to the warrant requirement here is Guidry’s purported consent to France’s and Wood’s entry into his house. In Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 515 (Alaska 1973), we said:
[Cjonsent to a search, in order to be voluntary, must be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, and is not lightly inferred. [Footnote omitted.]
I cannot agree that Guidry’s consent was voluntarily given since it was obtained as a result of the ruses employed by France and Wood. In short, I would hold that intelligent consent cannot be found here in the circumstances where Wood and France affirmatively misrepresented both their identity and purpose.
I reach this conclusion under the rule articulated in Nix v. State, 621 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Alaska 1981). In that case we said in part:
As we have observed in the context of entrapment, a special instance of police trickery, “[t]he question is really whether that conduct falls below an acceptable standard for the fair and honorable administration of justice.” [Citation omitted.]
In my view, Wood’s and France’s questioned actions fall below acceptable standards for the fair and honorable administration of justice in Alaska. The well-established exception to the warrant requirement at issue here requires that, for consent to be valid, it must be voluntarily given by one with proper authority. Nix v. State, 621 P.2d at 1348. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, absence of compulsion cannot be equated with free volition. “Knowing and intelligent” are generally regarded as essential concomitants to a valid consent, particularly when, as here, it involves the relinquishment of a constitutional right. As noted previously, we held in Erickson v. State that consent to a search must be intelligently given and is not lightly inferred. If law enforcement personnel gain entry to a home as they did here — by affirmative misrepresentation — I think it untenable to conclude that their presence was legitimated by “knowing” consent.1
In light of my conclusion that the absence of consent invalidated the search, it is unnecessary to discuss at length the privacy issue. I think it sufficient to state that Guidry’s right to privacy under the Alaska Constitution was violated when Wood and *1285France gained entry to his home without his valid consent.2

. Concerning the “validating” features of the search, I have the following observations. First, the subjective intention of the officers should be given no weight in determining whether this entry was valid. They were hardly dragged into the house and could surely have found it within their creative powers to decline the admittedly tempting invitation. It is indisputable that they gained entry through a ruse which they voluntarily initiated. Whether or not the outcome was foreseen is irrelevant; they should have discontinued the act before crossing the threshold of the dwelling. Second, the “plain view” exception is irrelevant if the initial presence is unlawful. Finally, the fact that the officers had some information which led them to the Guidry dwelling is irrelevant if it alone would not have been sufficient to constitute probable cause. In my view, the court’s opinion encourages officials with not quite enough information to risk crossing the line for additional evidence to “cure” the initial deficiency. Constitutional decisions and case law relating to searches and seizures are intended to discourage exactly this kind of conduct.

. Further, I think there is considerable merit in the amicus’ “bright line” test governing search and seizure questions where undercover law enforcement agents are involved.