Court Opinion

ID: 9492870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:52:27.042232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:32.143745
License: Public Domain

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment of the Court:
I concur in Judge Calabresi’s (partial) majority opinion, except fpr Part III, and in the entirety of Judge Sotomayor’s (partial) majority opinion. Nevertheless, I write separately to express my view that we are required to defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) with respect to its construction of the phrase “single scheme of criminal misconduct” in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a.) (2) (A) (ii).
Before discussing my disagreement, however, I pause to offer some assistance to those who may be perplexed by the decision of my two colleagues to split the writing of a majority opinion, and the decision of one of them to write both a (partial) majority opinion and a (partial) dissent— with the extraordinary result that we publish today four opinions, one opinion more than there are judges on the panel. For the benefit of our hapless readers, I offer here a brief scorecard for the disposition of this case:
(1)Judge Calabresi, Judge Sotomayor, and I agree that Michel was not deprived of the right to representation at his removal hearings and that those hearings gave Michel more than the process he was due.
(2) The panel also agrees that Michel’s crimes did not constitute a “single scheme of criminal misconduct,” although I would further hold that the BIA’s definition of “single scheme of criminal misconduct” is entitled to our deference — thereby would avoid any suggestion that this issue remains a live one within this Circuit (more on this anon).
(3) Judge Sotomayor and I agree, contrary to the views of Judge Calabresi, that Michel, who was twice convicted of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree in violation of New York Penal Law § 165.40, was “convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude.”
(4) Accordingly, a majority of the members of this panel — namely, Judge Sotoma-yor and I — agree that the judgment of the BIA should be affirmed in its entirety, and we enter our judgment to that effect.
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With that, I turn to the substance of my disagreement with Judge Calabresi and Judge Sotomayor on the question of whether we are required to defer to the BIA’s definition of “single scheme of criminal misconduct.” As Judge Calabresi notes in his (partial) majority opinion, the phrase “single scheme of criminal misconduct” in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) in not defined by the statute or in its legislative history. See ante at 260. The BIA, however, has defined the phrase to mean “acts, which although separate crimes in and of themselves, were performed in furtherance of a single criminal episode, such as where one crime constitutes a lesser offense of another or where two crimes flow from and are the natural consequence of a single act of criminal misconduct.” In re Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506, 511, 1992 WL 195812 (B.I.A.1992). In my view, this definition— adopted by the agency with authority to enforce the statute at issue — is “eminently reasonable, even if not compelled.” Akindemowo v. INS, 61 F.3d 282, 286 (4th *267Cir.1995). Accordingly, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), I believe that we are obligated to accept it as “controlling.” See id. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (holding that “a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency”).
Judge Calabresi and Judge Sotomayor do not expressly disagree with this conclusion, but rather choose to defer the Chevron issue to another day on the ground that Michel’s crimes did not constitute a “single scheme of criminal misconduct” under either the BIA’s definition of the phrase or the definition adopted by this Court — a generation before Chevron — in Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223, 227 (2nd Cir.1968). See ante at 260-61. In my view, however, there is no reason to leave this issue, which is squarely presented for our decision, for another day. Thus, I would hold, as has every other Court of Appeals to consider the issue thus far, that the BIA’s definition of the phrase is entitled to deference, see Akindemowo, 61 F.3d at 284-87; Thanh Huu Nguyen v. INS, 991 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir.1993); Iredia v. INS, 981 F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir.1993); see also Balogun v. INS, 31 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir.1994)(per curiam),1 and I would expressly disavow our substitute definition in Nason.
Although my colleagues seek to justify their decision to avoid the Chevron issue on the venerable ground of judicial restraint, see ante at 260 n. 4, their decision to reaffirm a precedent clearly abrogated by the Supreme Court is, in my view, more akin to the judicial usurpation eschewed by the Supreme Court in Chevron. By their decision today, my colleagues effectively require the BIA to continue its general policy of applying this Court’s pr e-Chevron definition of the phrase “single scheme of criminal misconduct” within this Circuit, while applying the agency’s own interpretation in those circuits that dutifully have followed Chevron. See Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 510 (discussing the BIA’s decision to “follow [its] approach outside of those jurisdictions ... that have followed a more expansive interpretation”); see also Akindemowo, 61 F.3d at 286 (discussing the BIA’s policy). In so doing, my colleagues disregard “our frequently expressed concern to avoid disparate treatment situated aliens under the immigration laws,” Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2nd Cir.1996) (citing cases), and perpetuate a situation in which some aliens face removal and others not, depending solely on where they reside. Just as in Aguirre, where we concluded that “the interests of nationwide uniformity [in the administration of immigration laws] outweigh[ed] our adherence to Circuit precedent,” id., in this case I *268would hold that Nason is not longer good law.2
For these reasons, I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ choice not to decide the looming Chevron issue concerning the phrase “single scheme of criminal misconduct.” Instead, I would hold that the BIA’s definition is entitled to deference, and I would expressly disavow the substitute definition we adopted in Nason. Because Michel’s crimes — committed two months apart — plainly were not part of a “single scheme of criminal misconduct” under the BIA’s definition, and because I otherwise agree with my colleagues’ majority opinion, I concur in the judgment of the Court of affirm the judgment of the BIA in its entirety.
CALABRESI, Circuit Judge,
dissenting from Part IV.C of the majority opinion and from the judgment of the Court:
I agree with the majority that because Congress has not, in 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), directly addressed the question of what crimes involv[e] moral turpitude, we must determine only whether the agency’s reading of the law is reasonable. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. And, as the majority also makes clear, [i]t is not necessary that we conclude that the agency’s interpretation of the statute is the only permissible interpretation, nor that we believe it to be the best interpretation of the statute in order to uphold it. Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113 F.3d 330, 336 (2d Cir.1997). But this does not change the fact that statutory interpretation is, in the final analysis, a matter for the courts, Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220, 222 (2d Cir.1992), that our review is not merely for minimum rationality, Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir.1990), and that [administrative agencies must articulate a logical basis for their decisions, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962))..
This means that under Chevron, we may defer to an agency interpretation only if the agency has adequately explained its rationale and the factual basis for its decision. See Detsel, 895 F.2d at 63. Conversely, we should not accept an agencys decision simply because it is possible to conceive of a basis for the agencys action. Our inquiry should be more searching, see id., and, at the least, in order to find that the agencys construction is reasonable, we should be able to point to evidence that it considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778.
In this case, the BIA said two things and only two things when it was asked whether Michels crimes involved moral turpitude: (1) that it has always held possession of stolen property (with the knowledge that it is stolen) to be a crime involving moral turpitude and (2) that neither the seriousness of the crime nor the severity of the sentence is determinative of whether a crime involves moral turpitude. See R. at 4. These were the sole responses that the agency gave to Michel’s request that it consider the fact that his crimes were seemingly minor ones. In my view, they are not enough to qualify the BIA’s holding as adequately explained for the purposes of Chevron.
*269The BIA’s statement that the seriousness of the crime is not determinative does not tell us why the agency did not consider Michel’s claim that his convictions, given their allegedly trivial nature, were not for crimes involving moral turpitude. To say that something is not determinative is obviously not the same as saying that is irrelevant and hence is not to be weighed at all. Thus, while I can understand and can agree with what the BIA said — that the gravity of the offense should not decide the question — I cannot, without more explanation, accept the statement as justifying what it did, which was to treat the alleged triviality of the conduct as irrelevant to its decision.
On this issue, the majority purports to read the BIA’s language “in context” and holds that it is clear that what the BIA meant to say was that “Michel’s triviality argument was irrelevant.” In other words, the majority permits the BIA to equate irrelevant with not determinative. But saying the irrelevant is the same as not determinative-is like saying green is puce; it isn’t, and no amount of talk will make it so. Words matter. And I cannot subscribe to an approach that, in order to affirm a result the court deems desirable, allows an agency to employ language in ways that are at war with the words it uses. I believe instead it is the job of the courts to make agencies describe exactly what they are doing. I believe this because only in this way can agencies be held responsible to Congress and ultimately to the people.
Suppose a group of constituents seeks to make sure that triviality of crimes is a matter that is considered in deportation cases. The group goes to talk to a Senator. The Senator reads that the BIA has consistently said that the seriousness or triviality of a crime is not determinative of the issue of moral turpitude. That Senator may well conclude that the BIA position is perfectly sensible. Indeed, we all agree that it would be. But the Senator might react very differently, as might the public, if the BIA had said clearly and expressly what the majority says it means to say in this case, that the seriousness or triviality of a crime is irrelevant to moral turpitude.
Nor does the BIA’s other explanation for its decision suffice. Here, too, more is needed under Chevron. I agree completely with the majority’s view that a categorical approach under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)(one that would not require an analysis of moral turpitude as to each criminal law violated but instead allowed such decisions to be made broadly with respect to whole categories of crimes) could constitute a possible and not unreasonable interpretation of the statute. But we can only defer to such a reading of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) if an adequate justification for this approach is provided by the BIA. To describe a practice, moreover, is not to justify it or to explain it. As a result, to say, as the BIA did, that it has consistently held that knowing possession of stolen property constitutes moral turpitude, even if true, in not enough. And the fact that the majority thinks that a categorical approach to moral turpitude is a good one, and spends considerable time explaining why, is of no help either. It is the BIA that must explain why it chooses to adopt an approach, not us. Indeed, I dissent from the majority’s holding precisely because, regardless of how much we as judges may like the categorical approach, the BIA has not itself justified what it appears to be doing in this case.
In support of its position that the BIA has adequately told us why it has decided to employ a broad categorical approach, the majority points to In re Pichardo-Sufren, 1996 WL 230227 (BIA 1996). But that case stands for the unremarkable proposition that the BIA will not look “behind the record of conviction” when determining whether a particular person’s crime involve moral turpitude. Moreover, the BIA in Pichardo-Sufren well explained the reasons for this position. In doing so, it echoed what this Court and others, long before Chevron, had said in also holding *270hat the singular circumstances of an individual petitioner’s crimes should not be considered, and only the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant to a determination of whether the violation at issue involved moral turpitude.1 See United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2nd Cir.1939); see also Hamdan, 98 F.3d at 189.
The issue here, however, it not whether the BIA should consider Michel’s particular circumstances (why and how he violated this particular statute) but rather whether the BIA has justified an approach that, instead of analyzing moral turpitude as to each statute violated, allows such decisions to be made broadly with respect to whole groups of crimes, i.e., all crimes involving the possession of stolen property. As noted above, the BIA, in cases like In re Pichardo-Sufren, has explained why it is unwise to look to the individual circumstances to each wrongdoing. I, therefore, agree that the particular events underlying Michel’s crime should not be considered here, but hat in no way indicates that the BIA has adequately explained why deciding moral turpitude by broad categories of crimes is the proper approach.
Aside from not justifying its categorical approach or explaining how not determinative can equal irrelevant, the BIA’s decision, in fact, violates its own long-standing definition of “moral turpitude.” That definition provides that:
[mjoral turpitude refers generally to conduct that shocks the conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general. Moral turpitude has been defined as an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral turpitude. Among the tests to determine if a crimes involves moral turpitude is whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind.
Hamdan, 98 F.3d at 186 (citations omit-tedXquoting from the BIA decision in Hamdan). Given the fact that this definition of “moral turpitude” appears to require some analysis of whether a particular crime is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, or contrary to the accepted morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general,” it is hard to understand how the gravity of the crime can play no part in the inquiry. And it is even more difficult to see how this definition can be applied in an approach that looks solely to broad categories of crimes.
Let me be absolutely clear. I am not saying that the alleged triviality in this *271case forecloses moral turpitude. The BIA can surely seek to show that the stealing of transfers (or whatever behavior it determines constitutes the minimum conduct for violating the statute), even if seemingly a trivial act, in an “inherently base, vile, or depraved” crime. Nor am I contending that the BIA cannot abandon its Hamdan definition and (after explaining why the change is appropriate) adopt a definition of moral turpitude that relies solely on broad categories of crimes, such as possession of stolen property if one knows that it is stolen. I am only saying that in the case before us, the BIA has done neither of these.2
The majority believes that the categorical approach employed by the BIA here— any crime that involves “corrupt scienter” involves moral turpitude — has been adequately justified by the agency. It does so, at least in part, because the majority deems such a result to be “sound.” I, instead, am not satisfied that the BIA has considered, let alone explained, its decision in the detailed fashion that is required by Chevron, a fashion that is an essential element of our obligation to defer to what the agency decides is “sound.” Accordingly, I would remand the case to the BIA for a fuller explanation and therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s denial of Michel’s petition.3

. In Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.1990), a panel of the Ninth Circuit adhered to that Court’s pr e-Chevron definition of the phrase "single scheme of criminal misconduct" — a definition that is similar to the definition adopted by this Court in Nason. Nevertheless, there is no indication from the Gonzalez-Sandoval opinion that the panel in that case gave any consideration whatsoever to Chevron. See Iredia, 981 F.2d at 849 ("The only case decided after Chevron [that rejects the BIA’s definition], Gonzalez-Sandoval, does not address the issue.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, the BIA has considered the Ninth Circuit's definition, and has rejected in explicitly. In Adetiba, the BIA argued that the Ninth Circuit’s definition "would result in extreme absurdities” because it would "insulate from deportability individuals who formulate a plan at one time for criminal behavior involving multiple separate crimes, while making deportable those who commit only two such crimes without a plan.” 20 I. & N. Dec. at 511.
For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gonzalez-Sandoval is both an outlier and, in my view, incorrect. Therefore, rather than suggesting, as I believe my colleagues do, that we might follow the Ninth Circuit's dubious lead, I would follow the lead of every Court of Appeals to consider the issue in light of Chevron, and I would adopt the BIA's definition.

. Where, as in this case, on e of our previous decisions has plainly been abrogated by the Supreme Court, I do not believe we are required to seek “approval of all of the active judges of the court” to state as much. Ante at 260 n.4. Nevertheless, even assuming tht a "mini en banc” would be required to overrule Nason — as Judge Calabresi and Judge Soto-mayor suggest, see id. — my colleagues greatly exaggerate the significance of the procedure in this instance. For one thing, deferring the Chevron question to another day, as the majority has chosen to do, will not obviate the presumed need for a mini en banc — it will merely postpone the inevitable. In addition, I am confident that the other judges of this court would, without taking much time at all to review the matter, reach the conclusion that Nason does not survive Chevron.

. In this respect, I note that although Michel’s alleged behavior — possession of stolen bus transfers — may seem to constitute the least necessary to violate § 165.40, I would also ask the BIA, as part of a full explanation for its decision in this case, to consider whether in fact yet more minor wrongdoings would also contravene the statute. For example, would picking up a penny when one is a penny short of the amount needed for admission to a homeless shelter violate § 165.40, of the individual picking up the coin knows that the person who dropped it is aware of the loss and is looking for the penny? In my view, this is essential if the BIA employs a categorical approach because then the BIA must explain why this specific statute fits into the applicable category, given the minimum conduct needed to violate it. See Hamdan, 98 F.3d at 189 (“The general rule is that, absent specific evidence to the contrary in the record of conviction, the statute must be read at the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute.” (citing Guarino, 107 F.2d at 400)). Requiring the BIA to do this is not indulging in abstract hypotheticals as the majority suggests. It is simply asking the BIA to consider what the minimum conduct needed to violate a statute is, and to decide whether that conduct is morally turpitudinous That is precisely what Hamdan and Guarino mandate and correctly so, for only once that is done can the BIA say categorically that all violations of the statute entail moral turpitude.

. There are in fact at least three decisions involving specificity and moral turpitude that could be made. The first is whether the decision maker should consider the individual circumstances of the perpetrator or simply the crime committed. In Pichardo-Sufren, the BIA opted for the latter and justified that choice. The second involves whether the decision maker should consider the range of crimes the violated statute encompasses or focus instead on the actual statutory violation. On this point, courts have urged decision makers to look to the minimum conduct that is necessary to support a conviction under a statute when deciding whether the statute entails turpitude. See, e.g., Guarino, 107 F.2d at 400; cf. Hamdan, 98 F.3d at 187-89 (reversing the BIA's order of deportation because the petitioner had been convicted under a statute that included conduct that did not constitute moral turpitude and it was unclear whether the petitioner had been convicted under a section of the statute that involved moral turpitude or one that did not). Finally, the decision maker could employ a broader categorical approach. It could say, as the BIA did in this case, that any statute that fits into a wide range of laws — i.e., all those that prohibit possession of stolen property with the knowledge that it is stolen — connotes moral turpitude. And it could justify this position on grounds of administrative convenience.
In fact, any of these three possibilities could be justified if it was consistent with the BIA’s other pronouncements regarding moral turpitude and was adequately explained. But the choice made in this case is both hard to accept in the light of the Hamdan definition and made without any justification.

. Because I dissent from the disposition of case, I cannot ignore the INS's argument that the BIA can be affirmed on other grounds, i.e., the other crime allegedly committed by Michel. The short answer is that, as the BIA pointed out in its opinion, the IJ made no findings with respect to any such crime. See R. at 3. Since the alleged crime is neither part of the deportation notice sent to Michel nor of the record before us, we cannot treat it as relevant to the issue before us.