Court Opinion

ID: 9750157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:25:44.975954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:08.488165
License: Public Domain

DAWSON, J.,
Dissenting. — I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch and Central Sierra Environmental Resource Center (plaintiffs) were not “qualitatively” successful parties in this litigation. I believe they were partially successful, which is enough.1 I also believe their success involves issues of significant concern both to the general public and to those who seek to enforce the goals of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) and its incarnation applicable to forest lands, the Z’berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 (Pub. Resources Code, § 4511 et seq.). For those reasons, as more fully explained below, and to encourage a vigilance toward protection both of the environment and informed self-government, I believe plaintiffs are entitled to recover some of their attorney fees.2
I. Background
Plaintiffs won three legal issues decided by the California Supreme Court in Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 43 Cal.4th 936 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 239, 183 P.3d 1210] (Ebbetts Pass II), but obtained no actual relief. The reason plaintiffs obtained no relief was that both Sierra Pacific Industries (Sierra Pacific) and California’s Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) presented an adequate alternate analysis to their discussion that contained legal errors.
The timber harvest plans submitted by Sierra Pacific dealt with potential herbicide use in two ways. First, Sierra Pacific asserted herbicide use was not part of the project and, therefore, there was no requirement that such use be disclosed in the timber harvest plans. Second, as an alternative to its no-project approach, Sierra Pacific discussed the potential impacts of herbicide use as though that use were part of the project covered by the plans.
*390Plaintiffs convinced the California Supreme Court that Sierra Pacific’s no-project approach to herbicide use was wrong, but failed to convince the court that the alternate discussion of the impacts of herbicide use was inadequate.
Similarly, CDF’s response to public comments presented alternate analyses of herbicide use. Initially, CDF asserted it had no authority to address potential herbicide use and that compliance with the restrictions established by the Department of Pesticide Regulation would, as a matter of law, dictate a finding of no significant environmental impact. Alternatively, CDF provided an assessment of potential environmental impacts of herbicide use. (Ebbetts Pass II, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 957.)
Plaintiffs convinced the Supreme Court that CDF’s first alternative was erroneous, but failed to demonstrate CDF’s second alternative was wrong. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld CDF’s approval of the timber harvest plans.
The question presented in this appeal is whether plaintiffs’ victories on three legal issues decided by the Supreme Court satisfied the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Specifically, were plaintiffs successful parties in an action that resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest and that conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons?
The trial court answered this question in the negative, concluding that the lawsuit did not vindicate an important right affecting the public interest or achieve any of the benefits sought by plaintiffs in pursuing the mandamus petition. The court’s conclusion was based on certain determinations it labeled “Findings.”
II. Trial Court’s Erroneous Findings
I will begin by discussing the trial court’s findings I believe are wrong.
A. Ebbetts Pass II Is New Case Law
I believe the trial court erred in finding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ebbetts Pass II did not establish new case law. Though labeled a “finding,” this determination depends upon an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s opinion and existing case law, which is a question that can be decided as a matter of law and thus is subject to independent review on appeal.
1. CDF’s authority
The Supreme Court’s opinion set forth the legal principle that “as the lead agency evaluating timber harvests, CDF has not only the authority but also *391the duty to approve, disapprove, and impose mitigation measures on timber harvest plans, including measures to address the foreseeable use of herbicides in planned silvicultural operations.” (Ebbetts Pass II, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 957.) The Supreme Court cited no case that adopted this legal principle. Similarly, neither the trial court, CDF, nor Sierra Pacific cited any case that sets forth this principle regarding CDF’s authority.
Therefore, Ebbetts Pass II did establish new case law because it (a) resolved an issue disputed by the parties and (b) adopted a legal principle regarding CDF’s authority that had not been stated in any other published case.
2. Compliance with label restrictions
The Supreme Court’s opinion also included the following conclusion of law: “Nor was CDF correct in concluding that any use of an herbicide in compliance with Department of Pesticide Regulation label restrictions necessarily ‘would not have a significant effect on the environment.’ (See Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Department of Food & Agriculture [(2005)] 136 Cal.App.4th [1,] 17 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 638] [‘Nor is there legal authority for the proposition that using registered pesticides according to their labels never results in significant adverse effects.’]; cf. Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman (9th Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 901, 905 [‘ “the mere fact that a program involves use of substances registered under FIFRA [federal pesticide law] does not exempt the program from the requirements of NEPA [federal environmental law]” ’].)” (Ebbetts Pass II, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 957.)
An indication that the Supreme Court’s opinion established a principle not set forth in other cases is its use of the introductory signal “see” in the citation that supports its conclusion. The California Style Manual states that “[citations to weaker support, however, should be introduced by the word ‘see.’ Thus, ‘see’ should precede citations to cases that only indirectly support the text, citations to supporting dicta, and citations to a concurring or dissenting opinion.” (Cal. Style Manual (4th ed. 2000) § 1:4, pp. 9-10.) I am aware of no basis for concluding that the court was mistaken in its use of the introductory signal.
Furthermore, no previously published case had rejected the proposition that the Department of Pesticide Regulation’s registration of herbicides excused CDF from assessing those herbicides’ use as part of a particular timber harvest plan (see Ebbetts Pass II, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 956) or in any other context.
Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Department of Food & Agriculture, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th 1 can be read as adopting the general *392principle that the existence of the Department of Pesticide Regulation’s registration program does not remove the environmental impacts of pesticide use from the proper scope of an environmental impact report or an environmental impact report equivalent. But even if the case is read as establishing this general principle, (a) the principle had never been applied to CDF or to timber harvest plans and (b) CDF did not concede its application in this case. Instead, the brief the Attorney General’s Office filed in the Supreme Court in Ebbetts Pass II, supra, 43 Cal.4th 936 on October 13, 2006, argued that “CDF’s statement, that use of registered pesticides in accordance with federal and state law would not or should not have a significant effect, is reasonable and supported by a fair reading of the Department of Pesticide Regulations program.”
Consequently, Ebbetts Pass II is new in the sense that it (1) resolved an issue disputed by the parties and (2) extended the principle contained in Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Department of Food & Agriculture to CDF and its review of timber harvest plans, which is a significantly different factual situation. (See Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1103 [240 Cal.Rptr. 569, 742 P.2d 1290] [petitioners entitled to attorney fees under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 where Supreme Court’s decision applied existing precedent to a distinct factual situation].)
3. Scope of the project
Sierra Pacific’s timber harvest plans stated that the use of herbicides after the proposed harvest to suppress competing vegetation (1) was not a project under CEQA and (2) was not part of the timber harvest plan project because the critical details of use were not yet known. In support of this assertion, the timber harvest plans asserted “there is no requirement in the [California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 895.1] definition of ‘reasonably foreseeable future projects’ that indicates that herbicide application is a ‘project’ as defined. Since the disclosure of activities in [California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 912.9] is tied to projects, disclosure of herbicide application activities is not required.” In addition, the timber harvest plans stated: “Some would contend that a [timber harvest plan] should contain an analysis of the impacts of potential herbicide spraying in the future. [Sierra Pacific] feels that the use of herbicides is entirely too speculative to be considered as part of a [timber harvest plan] project.”
The Supreme Court concluded that the timber harvest plans incorrectly stated that herbicide use was too speculative for present analysis. (Ebbetts Pass II, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 955.) This conclusion and the court’s subsequent analysis necessarily imply the plans were wrong in stating that potential herbicide use was not part of the project. In reaching this conclusion *393regarding the scope of the project, the Supreme Court resolved an issue of law. (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 382 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247, 160 P.3d 116] [whether an activity is a project is a question of law].)
The Supreme Court’s resolution of this question of law is the first published decision to conclude that future herbicide use is part of the project covered by a timber harvest plan. The question was not resolved in the analysis of herbicide use set forth in Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1361-1364 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 808] (Ebbetts Pass I). Instead, that court appears to have concluded that any error did not exist or that it was unimportant (i.e., not prejudicial) because the timber harvest plans and CDF’s comments provided an extensive discussion of herbicide use and its potential impacts. Besides Ebbetts Pass I and Ebbetts Pass II, no other published decision mentions the question whether the potential use of herbicide in connection with a timber harvest plan is part of the project that must be addressed in the plan. Therefore, Ebbetts Pass IPs ruling on this legal issue is unique. Although the ruling can be viewed as the result of applying existing rules of law that define speculativeness and its opposite, foreseeability, to herbicide use, the conclusion in Ebbetts Pass II is new in the sense that it applies those definitions to a set of facts significantly different from those addressed in other published opinions.
4. Summary
I believe the Supreme Court’s decision created new law because it (1) set forth two new legal principles regarding CDF’s authority and its duty to review potential herbicide use and (2) reached a conclusion of law regarding the scope of the project covered by a timber harvest plan that had not been set forth in any other published decision.
B. Changes Resulting from the Litigation
I also believe the trial court erred in finding that “CDF’s behavior will not change prospectively as a result of the litigation.” This ex ante finding of fact was of sufficient concern that prior to oral argument this court sent counsel a letter stating they should be prepared to address the following issues:
“(1) Do CDF’s official responses to public comments to timber harvest plans continue to assert ‘ “we do not have the authority to approve or disapprove any project regarding the use of chemicals” ’? ([Ebbetts Pass II, supra,] 43 Cal.4th 936, 957 . . . .)
*394“(2) Do CDF’s official responses to public comments to timber harvest plans continue to include CDF’s conclusion ‘that any use of an herbicide in compliance with Department of Pesticide Regulation label restrictions necessarily “would not have a significant effect on the environment” ’? (Ebbetts Pass II, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 957.)
“(3) Do Sierra Pacific’s timber harvest plans continue to ‘incorrectly characterize[] herbicide use as “too speculative” for present analysis’? (Ebbetts Pass II, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 955.)”3
At oral argument, the deputy attorney general arguing on behalf of CDF conceded that CDF’s official responses to public comments no longer contain the erroneous statements explicitly identified by our Supreme Court. Also, counsel for Sierra Pacific did not assert that its timber harvest plans continue to characterize herbicide use as too speculative for present analysis. Furthermore, after reviewing the arguments that CDF presented to the California Supreme Court in its brief in Ebbetts Pass II, I am unconvinced by CDF’s claim that the present litigation did not lead to the change in its responses to comments.
Rather, I believe it was due to plaintiffs’ vigilance both during the administrative proceedings that led to this litigation and throughout the litigation itself that Sierra Pacific was not and will not be able to avoid consideration of the impact of herbicide use either in this or future timber harvest plans and CDF was not and will not be able to abdicate its responsibilities in connection with such.
III. Pragmatic Assessment of Gains Achieved, Importance and Significance A. Gains Achieved
Plaintiffs’ victories on the three legal issues did not result in any relief involving the three timber harvest plans that were the subject of this lawsuit. Consequently, from a pragmatic point of view, the gains achieved by plaintiffs will be the impact that resolution of the three legal issues has on future timber harvest plans.
One type of impact concerns the contents of the environmental review documents. Timber harvest plans will no longer contain the erroneous view *395that herbicide use is not part of the project. Similarly, CDF’s responses to public comments will no longer misinform the public that (1) herbicides used in accordance with label restrictions will not, as a matter of law, cause a significant environmental impact and (2) CDF lacks the authority to evaluate herbicide use and approve, disapprove, or impose mitigation measures on that use.
Another impact of the opinion in Ebbetts Pass II is that it narrows the options available to Sierra Pacific and CDF for addressing herbicide use in future timber harvest plans and responses to public comments. Without the decision in Ebbetts Pass II, Sierra Pacific or CDF could have chosen to rely exclusively on their erroneous approach to herbicide use and eliminated any alternative approach that assessed the environmental impact of the herbicide use.
I believe these gains establish the requisite success. I would not adopt a new legal standard that limits success under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 to cases where a plaintiff has proven facts that justify relief, particularly because (1) such a standard is difficult to square with the decision in Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1078 to award fees even though the facts of that case did not justify any relief and (2) it diverts the analysis from other types of gains that can be achieved by private litigants and from the importance and significance of those gains.
B. Importance
The importance of the changes or gains achieved is assessed in terms of the relationship of the changes to the achievement of fundamental legislative goals. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 935 [154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200].)
The dual goals of California environmental legislation are protection of (1) the environment and (2) informed self-government. (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1123 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 231, 864 P.2d 502].) The latter goal is reflected in the provisions of Public Resources Code section 21003, subdivision (b), which state that it is the policy of California that environmental review documents be “written in a manner that will be meaningful and useful to decisionmakers and to the public.” Environmental review documents are meaningful and useful to the public insofar as informed self-government is concerned when they promote accountability. “If CEQA is scrupulously followed, the public will know the basis on which its responsible officials either approve or reject environmentally significant action, and the public, being duly informed, can respond accordingly to action with which it *396disagrees.” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 [253 Cal.Rptr. 426, 764 P.2d 278].)
As a result of Ebbetts Pass II, CDF will no longer be confused regarding the scope of its duties and can no longer deflect accountability for its conclusions by providing the public with the erroneous alternate explanation that (1) it has no authority to analyze herbicide use and (2) following label restrictions necessarily will adequately protect the environment. Also, timber harvest plans will be foreclosed from misinforming the public about the scope of the project covered. The elimination of this misinformation from the timber harvest plan review process is important because of its relationship to the fundamental legislative goal of protecting informed self-government.4
Another indication of the importance of the three issues is that the California Supreme Court decided to address them in its decision. Had the court thought the issues were unimportant or insignificant, it could have taken the analytical path used by the Third Appellate District in Ebbetts Pass I, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pages 1361-1364 and avoided discussing the issues. Instead, the Supreme Court made the effort to take a longer analytical route. Presumably, it made this effort for a reason, and I believe the reason was that the court (1) considered it important to correct CDF’s erroneous view of (a) its authority and (b) the effect of the Department of Pesticide Regulation’s restrictions and (2) wished to foreclose future assertions by CDF of the positions advocated in its Supreme Court briefs.
C. Significance
The legal principles on which plaintiffs prevailed before the Supreme Court will confer a significant benefit on the general public. CDF is a state agency that was mistaken on a fundamental question — its own authority. Furthermore, the authority in question — the regulation of herbicide use on forest land — has broad application in California, particularly with CDF’s approval of plantation silviculture. The Cedar Flat timber harvest plan states that California’s commercial timberland covers approximately 19 million acres. Thus, resolution of the question concerning CDF’s authority is more significant than the resolution of a question concerning a local government’s approval of a single development that will not be repeated in the future.
*397In addition, I believe the clarification of governmental authority is more significant to the public where an agency is vigorously denying the authority with which it has been entrusted.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s rejection of (1) Sierra Pacific’s attempt to exempt from the timber harvest plan process its use of herbicides in plantation forestry, (2) CDF’s position that it lacked authority to regulate herbicide applications in connection with plantation forestry, and (3) CDF’s position that such use of herbicides would have no significant environmental impact as a matter of law, so long as application of the herbicides complied with broad restrictions imposed by the Department of Pesticide Regulation but not targeted at forestry, will stand as a lasting and significant benefit to the general public.
IV. Benefit Sought
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s determination that plaintiffs failed to achieve some of the benefit they sought in bringing suit. (See Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292 [240 Cal.Rptr. 872, 743 P.2d 932].)
Plaintiffs’ verified petition alleged that CDF abused its discretion by failing to assess the potential significant impacts of herbicide use associated with Sierra Pacific’s three timber harvest plans. Plaintiffs could not have prevailed on this claim unless they prevailed on the foundational issues that (1) herbicide use was part of the project covered by the timber harvest plans, (2) CDF had the authority to evaluate the environmental impacts from the potential herbicide use and (3) the environmental impacts from the herbicide use could be significant even if the herbicides were applied in accordance with the restrictions imposed by the Department of Pesticide Regulation. In other words, the allegations and prayer for relief in plaintiffs’ petition necessarily encompassed the specific legal issues that were decided by the California Supreme Court in favor of plaintiffs. (Cf. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. (2009) 557 U.S._,_, fn. 1 [174 L.Ed.2d 119, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2348, fn. 1] [threshold issues are fairly included in the questions raised in the parties briefing].)
Also, plaintiffs’ opening appellate brief in the appeal on the merits filed September 10, 2003, included the following heading: “CDF Has the Legal Authority to Evaluate Herbicide Impacts on THPs.” (Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (Oct. 28, 2008, F042896) [nonpub. opn.].) Under that heading, plaintiffs attacked Sierra Pacific’s “project” based arguments as well as CDF’s position regarding its authority.
*398Thus, based on my comparison of plaintiffs’ pleadings and briefing to the issues on which they prevailed, I believe plaintiffs made it part of the way to achieving their primary goal regarding herbicide use and in so doing achieved part of the benefit they sought in bringing this lawsuit.
In Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1078, the California Supreme Court stated the petitioners were “the ‘successful’ party in that the impact of our decision is to vindicate the principle upon which they brought this action . . . .” (Id. at p. 1103.) Here, plaintiffs achieved a similar success because (1) the California Supreme Court’s decision vindicated some of the principles upon which they brought this action and (2) these principles would not have been vindicated outside of a private enforcement action, because both CDF and its counsel, the Attorney General’s Office, vigorously opposed the principles advocated by plaintiffs and adopted by the Supreme Court. Thus, like the petitioners in Harbor, it is not anomalous for plaintiffs to recover some of their attorney fees under the private attorney general fee doctrine despite their failure to obtain actual relief in this lawsuit.
Lastly, I am unable to discern how the public policies underlying Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 would be served by denying fees to plaintiffs who pursue environmental litigation on the ground that they did not separately plead every foundational issue that underlies their broader claim. I am concerned that the majority’s decision will have the unintended consequence of incentivizing plaintiffs in environmental litigation to specifically plead every foundational issue underlying their claims and perhaps include a request for declaratory relief on each of those issues. In my view, environmental litigation under California’s statutes is complex enough without applying the benefit-sought aspect of the private attorney general doctrine in a manner that incentivizes plaintiffs to increase the complexity of that litigation.
V. Conclusion
Where a state agency vigorously denies it is responsible for assessing the environmental impact of a particular activity, such as herbicide use, that will repeatedly come before it in connection with the proposals the agency must approve or disapprove, and is supported in this denial by the Attorney General’s Office, I believe a plaintiff that obtains a Supreme Court decision clarifying the agency’s authority is entitled to recover some of its attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
*399For all these reasons, I would remand this matter to the trial court for application of the lodestar adjustment method for determining the appropriate amount of attorney fees that should be awarded to the plaintiffs. (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 787-788 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 902].)
Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 11, 2010, SI86500. Baxter, J., did not participate therein.

 “Partial success is generally relevant only to the amount of fees, not to whether the party is entitled to fees .. .” and factors relating to the two questions should not be merged. (Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2008) § 2.19, pp. 57-58.)

 The amount awarded, of course, would reflect that plaintiffs were only partially successful and would not compensate them for their efforts on other issues. I recognized that too large an award in this case might have created incentives beyond those intended by the private attorney general doctrine. This concern, however, could have been addressed in the first instance by the trial court when it determined the amount of the award and in the second instance by a reviewing court.

 To encourage candid answers to these questions, our letter also asked whether the court should take judicial notice of the contents of a timber harvest plan and CDF’s related official responses that were before the court in Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (July 2, 2010, F058000) (nonpub. opn.). CDF’s official responses in that case were issued in October 2008, approximately five months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ebbetts Pass II. In view of counsels’ concessions at oral argument, judicial notice of the recent documents is unnecessary.

 I also believe the trial court was not entirely correct in finding that CDF’s misunderstanding of its responsibilities did not result in a dereliction of its duties under CEQA. It is true that CDF performed some of its duties, but CDF failed in its duty to provide accurate information to the public regarding which public officials are responsible for decisions affecting the environment.