Court Opinion

ID: 9543654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:47:49.205525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:51.330078
License: Public Domain

PALLADINO, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s continued expansion of the principles set forth in O’Connell.1 The majority holds that even when no Miranda2 warnings are given, a Licensee’s mere request to speak to an attorney when asked to submit to chemical testing, constitutes an overt manifestation of confusion regarding the right to counsel triggering the O’Connell warnings. Majority Opinion at 145, 629 A.2d at 219.
In O’Connell, the supreme court held that where an licensee requests to speak to or call an attorney, when requested to take a breathalyzer test, in addition to telling the licensee that his license will be suspended for one year if he refuses to take a breathalyzer test, the police must instruct the licensee that such rights are inapplicable to the breathalyzer test and that the licensee does not have a right to consult with an attorney or anyone else prior to taking the test.
*149In this case, Licensee was requested to submit to an intoxilyzer test pursuant to Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code3 and given the implied consent warnings. Licensee stated he would not submit to the test until he spoke to his attorney. The police officer then told Licensee that he was not entitled to speak to his attorney. Majority Opinion at 219. Thus, the specific requirements set forth in O’Connell were satisfied.
Once PennDOT presents its prima facie case,4 the burden shifts to the licensee to prove that he was not capable of making a knowing and conscious refusal to take the test. O’Connell, 521 Pa. at 249, 555 A.2d at 876. Under the majority’s holding today, all a licensee must do in order to satisfy his burden is continue to ask for an attorney after he has been informed by the police that he is not entitled to one. This expands the application of the knowing and conscious refusal beyond the standard of O’Connell.
Moreover, this court continues to adhere to the position that “where no Miranda warnings are given and there is no overt manifestation of confusion, no O’Connell warning is required.” Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Sorg, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 82, 606 A.2d 1270, 1274 petition for allowance of appeal denied, 531 Pa. 657, 613 A.2d 561 (1992). Whether a licensee exhibits an overt manifestation of confusion, rendering him incapable of making a knowing and conscious refusal to take the test, is not a question of law; it is a factual determination to be made by the trial court. O’Connell.
As noted previously, no Miranda warnings were given in this case. In addition, the trial court specifically found that there was no indication in any of the testimony presented that Licensee exhibited overt manifestations of confusion. Trial Court Opinion at 2-3. Because I find substantial evidence of record to support the trial court’s finding, I submit that no O’Connell warning was required. The police officer’s repeated advisement to Licensee that he was not entitled to an *150attorney adequately explained Licensee’s rights under Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the trial court, dismissing Licensee’s appeal and sustaining his license suspension.

. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O'Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989).

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547.

. Licensee does not contend that PennDOT failed to meet its burden of presenting its prima facie case.