Court Opinion

ID: 9927313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 19:03:38.231057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:42.533839
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                                                 Electronically Filed
                                                 Intermediate Court of Appeals
                                                 CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                 26-JAN-2024
                                                 08:25 AM
                                                 Dkt. 183 SO

                          NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

                IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
                        OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

              STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
                JOSHUA PULLIAM, Defendant-Appellee,
               and ISAIAH MCCOY, Defendant-Appellant

         APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                   (CRIMINAL NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

                    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
 (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)

           Defendant-Appellant Isaiah McCoy (McCoy) appeals from

the October 26, 2021 Judgment of Conviction and Sentence Notice

of Entry (Judgment) entered by the Circuit Court of the First

Circuit (Circuit Court)1 in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, the

State of Hawai<i (State).     On September 5, 2019, McCoy was

indicted on one count of Robbery in the Second Degree in

violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-841(1)(a)

(2014).2   On May 3, 2021, a jury found McCoy guilty as charged.

     1
           The Honorable James S. Kawashima presided.
     2
           HRS § 708-841 provides, in pertinent part:

                 § 708-841 Robbery in the second degree. (1) A person
           commits the offense of robbery in the second degree if, in
           the course of committing theft or non-consensual taking of a
           motor vehicle:
                                                               (continued...)
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On August 3, 2021, McCoy was sentenced to a maximum term of ten

years imprisonment and was ordered to pay restitution in the

amount of $6,256.64.

           McCoy raises seven points of error on appeal,

contending that the Circuit Court:        (1) abused its discretion by

increasing bail from $20,000.00 to $100,000.00, revoking bail

altogether, and denying McCoy's requests to reinstate bail while

jury trials were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic; (2)

erred in not suppressing field show-up evidence; (3) abused its
discretion in denying McCoy's motion to dismiss his indictment

(Motion to Dismiss); (4) erred in denying McCoy's motion to allow

a key mainland witness to testify at trial virtually; (5) erred

in denying McCoy's motion for judgment of acquittal based on

insufficient evidence; (6) erred in denying McCoy's various

requests for jury instructions; and (7) abused its discretion in

sentencing McCoy to a ten-year prison term while co-defendant

Joshua Pulliam (Pulliam) was given probation.

           Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we

resolve McCoy's arguments as follows:

           (1) McCoy argues that the Circuit Court abused its

discretion in setting McCoy's bail at $100,000 after McCoy's

     2
      (...continued)
                 (a)   The person uses force against the person
                       of anyone present with the intent to
                       overcome that person's physical resistance
                       or physical power of resistance[.]
           . . . .
                 (2)   Robbery in the second degree is a class B
                       felony.

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indictment,3 rather than maintaining McCoy's bail at the lower

amount that was set upon McCoy's arrest.        We conclude, however,

that this issue is moot because the bail in question was revoked,

upon the State's motion, after McCoy was arrested at the airport

for attempting to flee Hawai<i.     The Circuit Court found, after

an October 10, 2019 evidentiary hearing, that McCoy intentionally

violated the bail condition that he may not leave the

jurisdiction.

          McCoy also argues that the Circuit Court erred when it
denied a motion for reinstatement of bail following a November

15, 2019 hearing.    First, the premise of this argument is wrong

as it appears that his eligibility for bail was reinstated prior

to that hearing, and McCoy's complaint in fact relates to the

amount of bail he was required to post.        McCoy contends that he

provided ample testimony that, although he had been arrested

while trying to board a plane to Los Angeles, he had attempted to

seek permission from his bail bondsman ahead of time.       It appears

that he contends that this "attempt to seek permission" entitled

him to a lower bail.    This contention is without legal support

and without merit.

          In addition, McCoy contends that the Circuit Court

abused its discretion and erred because the circumstances of the

COVID-19 Pandemic warranted reinstating his bail, citing In re

Individuals in Custody of State, SPCW-XX-XXXXXXX, 2021 WL

4762901, *22 (Haw. Oct. 12, 2021) (McKenna, J., concurring and

dissenting in part).    However, the Hawai#i Supreme Court in In re

     3
          The Honorable Shirley M. Kawamura presided.

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Individuals in Custody of State held that, regardless of the

pandemic, trial courts retained discretion in setting bail and

imposing conditions on release and that the pandemic was not

enough to permit the release of all detainees who did not pose a

risk to public safety or flight.        2021 WL 4762901, at *4, *5.      As

McCoy makes no particularized argument regarding his

circumstances during the pandemic based on the record in this

case (or otherwise), we conclude that this contention is without

merit.
          (2)   McCoy contends that the Circuit Court erred in

denying his motion to suppress the field show-up identification

of McCoy by two witnesses.

          In State v. Kaneaiakala, 145 Hawai#i 231, 450 P.3d 761

(2019), the supreme court held:
                A defendant is denied due process of law when the
          procedure used to obtain an eyewitness identification
          admitted at trial is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
          to irreparable mistaken identification. We have held,
          however, that an eyewitness identification is not
          inadmissible merely because the identification procedure was
          impermissibly suggestive. Rather, whether an eyewitness
          identification obtained through an impermissibly suggestive
          procedure is admissible depends upon the reliability of the
          identification.

145 Hawai#i at 240, 450 P.3d at 770 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

          The supreme court held that trial courts must consider

the same thirteen factors as set forth for jurors (in Hawai#i

Standard Jury Instructions, Criminal (HAWJIC) 3.19)) when

evaluating the reliability of challenged eyewitness

identifications for admissibility purposes:
          [T]rial courts must, at minimum, consider any relevant
          factors set out in [HAWJIC] governing eyewitness and
          show-up identifications, as may be amended, as well as

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          any other relevant factors that may be set out in
          binding precedent in addressing whether, under a
          totality of circumstances, an impermissibly suggestive
          eyewitness or show-up identification is nonetheless
          sufficiently reliable to be admissible in evidence.

Kaneaiakala, 145 Hawai<i at 247, 450 P.3d at 777.

          Specifically, the trial judge must consider:
                (1) The opportunity of the witness to observe the
          person involved in the alleged criminal act; (2) the stress,
          if any, to which the witness was subject at the time of the
          observation; (3) the witness's ability, following the
          observation, to provide a description of the person; (4) the
          extent to which the defendant fits or does not fit the
          description of the person previously given by the witness;
          (5) the cross-racial or ethnic nature of the identification;
          (6) the witness's capacity to make an identification; (7)
          evidence relating to the witness's ability to identify other
          participants in the alleged criminal act; (8) whether the
          witness was able to identify the person in a photographic or
          physical lineup; (9) the period of time between the alleged
          criminal act and the witness's identification; (10) whether
          the witness had prior contacts with the person; (11) the
          extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain
          of the identification and whether the witness's assertions
          concerning certainty or uncertainty are well-founded; (12)
          whether the witness's identification is in fact the product
          of his/her own recollection; and (13) any other evidence
          relating to the witness's ability to make an identification.

Id. at 243, 450 P.3d at 773 (format altered).

          The supreme court further held that "[t]o counteract

possible effects of suggestive procedures on reliability, . . .

trial courts must also consider the effect of the suggestiveness

on the reliability of the identification in determining whether

it should be admitted into evidence."       Id. at 248, 450 P.3d at

778.

          Here, the State acknowledged in the proceedings before

the Circuit Court (and again on appeal) that the field show-up

was impermissibly suggestive.      The Circuit Court began its

analysis there, and then assessed the reliability of the

eyewitness identification utilizing each of the thirteen factors

set forth above, and reviewed whether the factor weighed in favor

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of granting or denying McCoy's motion to suppress (or neither).

The Circuit Court further considered the effect of the

suggestiveness of the identification procedure on the reliability

of the subject identifications in determining whether they should

be admitted.    After weighing all of its findings and applying

them to the Kaneaiakala factors, the Circuit Court concluded that

both Officer Enoka Lucas's and complaining witness Hideaki

Shibata's (Shibata's) identification of McCoy were sufficiently

reliable and worthy of presentation to the jury at trial, and
accordingly denied McCoy's motion to suppress identification.

          The Circuit Court considered and weighed the factors

affecting reliability, considered the effects of the suggestive

identifications, reviewed the totality of circumstances, and

concluded that the identifications should not be suppressed.

Upon our own review of the above and the record of the

suppression hearing, and the unchallenged findings in the order

denying suppression, we conclude that the Circuit Court did not

err in denying McCoy's motion to suppress.

          (3)    McCoy argues on appeal that the Circuit Court

erred by denying his motion to dismiss his indictment because the

prosecution withheld the following exculpatory evidence:      McCoy

did not physically take the watch; Shibata suffered only minor

injuries; McCoy's co-defendant, Pulliam, was the initial

aggressor; and after the initial altercation, Shibata followed

McCoy and Pulliam and reinitiated the altercation.

          It is well established that, when presenting its case

to a grand jury, the State must present any clearly exculpatory

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evidence that is known to the prosecution.     State v. Bell, 60

Haw. 241, 245, 589 P.2d 517, 520 (1978) (emphasis added); see

also Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 6(f).     However, the

State is not required to present any and all evidence "which may

have a tendency to exculpate the accused[.]"     Bell, 60 Haw. at

244, 589 P.2d at 519.

            With respect to exculpatory evidence, McCoy's December

10, 2020 Motion to Dismiss Indictment argued that there was

evidence that Shibata did not know who (McCoy or Pulliam) took
the watch off Shibata's wrist.     McCoy's Renewed Motion to Dismiss

for Prosecuting Attorney Misconduct argued that evidence not

shown to the grand jury demonstrated that Shibata "was not

seriously injured."

            McCoy's arguments concerning exculpatory evidence that

were not raised in his motions to the Circuit Court are waived.

See Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(4).

            In any case, upon review, we conclude that none of the

purported evidence was clearly exculpatory, and the Circuit Court

did not err in denying McCoy's motion to dismiss the indictment.

            (4)   McCoy argues that the Circuit Court erred in

denying his request to allow a bouncer named Shawn John Leroy

(Leroy) testify virtually at trial.     Leroy had relocated to the

mainland.    McCoy did not obtain an affidavit or declaration from

Leroy describing what he would have said at trial.      McCoy

contends that this "should be of no consequence" because Leroy's

testimony would have been the same as the testimony of McCoy's

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girlfriend, i.e., that Shibata was severely inebriated and had

gotten kicked out of a nightclub just prior to the incident.

           This argument is not supported by the record on appeal.

McCoy has not carried his burden to show that the Circuit Court

erred or abused its discretion in denying his request to allow

Leroy to testify virtually.

           (5)   McCoy argues that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction of Robbery in the Second Degree as it

failed to evince his intent to aid Pulliam in taking Shibata's
watch.   The State counters that there was sufficient

circumstantial evidence that McCoy intended to aid Pulliam as an

accomplice.

           A person is liable as an accomplice if they "'act with

the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the

crime,'" State v. Lauvao, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2022 WL 4114487, *12

(Haw. App. Sept. 9, 2022) (mem. op.) (quoting State v. Soares, 72

Haw. 278, 282, 815 P.2d 428, 430 (1991)), but mere presence alone

"does not make a person an accomplice to that offense," id.

(quoting State v. Acker, 133 Hawai<i 253, 286, 327 P.3d 931, 964

(2014)).   See HRS § 702–222 (2014).

           Shibata testified, inter alia, that two men (identified

as McCoy and Pulliam) both attacked him, he was pretty badly

beaten, and his watch was taken.       Shibata testified that he was

kicked and punched by both, but he did not remember exactly which

guy hit him how many times, and Pulliam took the watch.      Viewing

the evidence in the strongest light for the prosecution, we

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conclude that there was substantial evidence to support McCoy's

conviction.

          (6)   McCoy argues that the Circuit Court erred in

instructing the jury with respect to accomplice liability based

on HAWJIC 6.01 rather than or to the exclusion of an instruction

crafted by McCoy.   Upon review, we conclude that the Circuit

Court correctly informed the jury, in understandable terms, what

the jury needed to find in order to conclude that accomplice

liability applied to this case.       McCoy fails to cite any
authority supporting his claim that his instruction was required

in this case.

          McCoy further argues that the Circuit Court erred with

respect to its instruction that the jury should not consider

statements, arguments, or actions of the lawyers presenting, but

did not give a similar instruction to disregard McCoy's non-

testimonial statements, arguments, and actions while acting as

his own lawyer.   McCoy points to no particular incident or

circumstance warranting a further instruction of this nature.

McCoy cites no authority requiring a separate instruction

specifically regarding a self-represented party's demeanor when

acting in the role of a self-advocate and, upon review, we

decline to conclude that failure to give such an instruction

rendered the jury instructions in this case to be prejudicially

insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent or misleading.

          Finally, McCoy argues that the Circuit Court plainly

erred in failing to further instruct the jury to clarify that the

offense of Theft in the Fourth Degree was an appropriate lesser-

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included offense.     Upon review, neither of the instructions

referenced by McCoy were wrong, and McCoy's argument that when

read together they are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous,

inconsistent or misleading is unsupported by legal authority or

the record in this case.

            (7) In his final point of error, McCoy challenges his

sentence.    McCoy argues that the Circuit Court abused its

discretion by imposing a harsher sentence on him than Pulliam.

McCoy further argues that the Circuit Court disregarded his
version of the events at the airport, that his "poor jail

performance" was due to a lack of medical treatment, and that he

was an "exemplary bailee."       McCoy also argues that his harsher

sentence was due to his zealous pro se advocacy.

            Robbery in the Second Degree is a class B felony,

subject to an indeterminate maximum term of ten years.               HRS

§ 706-660(1)(a) (2014).4      When imposing a sentence, a trial court

must consider:
            (1)   The nature and circumstances of the offense and
                  the history and characteristics of the
                  defendant;

     4
            HRS § 706-660 provides, in pertinent part:
                  § 706-660 Sentence of imprisonment for class B
            and C felonies; ordinary terms; discretionary terms .
            (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person
            who has been convicted of a class B or class C felony
            may be sentenced to an indeterminate term of
            imprisonment except as provided for in section
            706-660.1 relating to the use of firearms in certain
            felony offenses and section 706-606.5 relating to
            repeat offenders. When ordering such a sentence, the
            court shall impose the maximum length of imprisonment
            which shall be as follows:
                  (a)   For a class B felony--ten years[.[
                  . . . .
            The minimum length of imprisonment shall be determined
            by the Hawaii paroling authority in accordance with
            section 706-669.

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          (2)   The need for the sentence imposed:
                (a)   To reflect the seriousness of the offense,
                      to promote respect for law, and to provide
                      just punishment for the offense;
                (b)   To afford adequate deterrence to criminal
                      conduct;
                (c)   To protect the public from further crimes
                      of the defendant; and
                (d)   To provide the defendant with needed
                      educational or vocational training,
                      medical care, or other correctional
                      treatment in the most effective manner;
          (3)   The kinds of sentences available; and
          (4)   The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
          among defendants with similar records who have been    found
          guilty of similar conduct.

HRS § 706-606 (2014).

          The weight given to each of these factors may not be

uniform and is left to the discretion of the sentencing court.

State v. Kong, 131 Hawai<i 94, 101, 315 P.3d 720, 727 (2013).

          At McCoy's sentencing, the Circuit Court explained that

it looked not only at the HRS § 706-606 factors, but also at the

factors to be considered in imposing a term of probation, which

are set forth in HRS § 706-621 (2014).5        The court found that

     5
          HRS § 706-621 provides:

                 § 706-621 Factors to be considered in imposing a
          term of probation. The court, in determining whether to
          impose a term of probation, shall consider:
          (1)   The factors set forth in section 706-606 to the extent
                that they are applicable;
          (2)   The following factors, to be accorded weight in favor
                of withholding a sentence of imprisonment:
                (a)   The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused
                      nor threatened serious harm;
                (b)   The defendant acted under a strong provocation;
                (c)   There were substantial grounds tending to excuse
                      or justify the defendant's criminal conduct,
                      though failing to establish a defense;
                (d)   The victim of the defendant's criminal conduct
                      induced or facilitated its commission;
                (e)   The defendant has no history of prior
                      delinquency or criminal activity or has led a
                      law-abiding life for a substantial period of
                      time before the commission of the present crime;
                (f)   The defendant's criminal conduct was the result
                      of circumstances unlikely to recur;
                (g)   The character and attitudes of the defendant
                      indicate that the defendant is unlikely to
                      commit another crime;
                                                              (continued...)

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almost none of the factors supporting probation were satisfied in

this case.   The Circuit Court noted that it was unclear whether

McCoy's conduct was a result of circumstances that were likely or

unlikely to recur, but that all of the other considerations

weighed against probation.      In addition, the court noted that

beyond that, the court considered how McCoy behaved on supervised

release, that "if past is prolog [sic]," the court anticipated

numerous small violations, failures to appear, and the like.             The

court pointed to McCoy's disregard of prior release conditions
including not going to Waikiki, not leaving the State, and then

going to the airport after being told not to leave the State.

The Circuit Court noted the seriousness of the offense and the

horrific circumstances.      The Circuit Court also noted its review

of the presentence investigation report, including McCoy's prior

record, acknowledging that the prior convictions were more than

ten years earlier.     The court reiterated the lack of

circumstances supporting a probation sentence for McCoy.

           With respect to the disparate sentencing argument,

McCoy and Pulliam were both found guilty of Robbery in the Second

Degree for the incident involving Shibata.         However, at Pulliam's

sentencing hearing, the Circuit Court noted factors supporting

sentencing Pulliam to probation.          McCoy does not argue that he,

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      (...continued)
                 (h)   The defendant is particularly likely to respond
                       affirmatively to a program of restitution or a
                       probationary program or both;
                 (i)   The imprisonment of the defendant would entail
                       excessive hardship to the defendant or the
                       defendant's dependents; and
                 (j)   The expedited sentencing program set forth in
                       section 706-606.3, if the defendant has
                       qualified for that sentencing program.

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too, satisfied those probation factors.     "[A] disparity among

defendants' sentences does not establish that any particular

defendant's sentence is excessive."     State v. Kahapea, 111

Hawai<i 267, 281, 141 P.3d 440, 454 (2006) (citation and brackets

omitted).

            McCoy points to nothing in the record to support his

argument that his sentence was due to his zealous self-advocacy.

McCoy's assertion that he was an "exemplary bailee" is equally

unsupported by the record in this case.
            We conclude that McCoy's argument that the Circuit

Court "acted wholly in an arbitrary and capricious manner" here

is without merit, even in light of the difference in the

sentences imposed on McCoy and Pulliam.     We conclude that the

Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing McCoy to

an indeterminate ten-year term of imprisonment.

            For these reasons, the Circuit Court's October 26, 2021

Judgment is affirmed.

            DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, January 26, 2024.

On the briefs:                         /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
                                       Acting Chief Judge
Kai Lawrence,
(Kai Law LLC),                         /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
for Defendant-Appellant.               Associate Judge

Stephen K. Tsushima,                   /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,           Associate Judge
City and County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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