Court Opinion

ID: 9544843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:02:27.872646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:42.552971
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority holding under Section I and Section II, but disagree with the approach taken under Section III.
C.R.C.P. 55(e) provides:
“No judgment by default shall be entered against an officer or agency of the State of Colorado unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.”
The majority has elected to treat the State’s arguments as falling under that portion of C.R.C.P. 55(e) requiring “evidence satisfactory to the court.” I have more concern for that portion of the rule which requires the claimant to establish his “claim or right to relief.”
It seems elementary to me that, in order to establish a “claim or right to relief,” a litigant must show that a claim for relief exists, which, in the case of negligence, includes a showing that there was a legal duty which was breached. There was no such showing here, nor could there be, because no such duty runs from the State of Colorado to persons in the plaintiff’s class.
Plaintiff’s position is that § 35-46 — 111, C.R.S.1973, creates a duty in the State to *1104maintain fences for the benefit of owners of stock grazing on land adjacent to the highway. The attorney general counters that the imposition of such a duty is beyond the purpose of the statute and that the statute imposes a general public duty rather than creating a private cause of action.
The disputed statute is part of the Colorado Fence Law, §§ 35-46 — 101 et seq., C.R. S.1973. This law codified the common law of Colorado, which provided that livestock owners could range stock at will, and farmers could recover for damage to their crops caused by trespassing livestock only if the damaged land was enclosed by an adequate fence. SaBell’s, Inc. v. Flens, 42 Colo.App. 421, 599 P.2d 950 (1979) aff’d, Colo., 627 P.2d 750 (1981); § 35-46-102, C.R.S.1973. However, the Supreme Court has declined to extend the protection of the fence law to an action for personal injuries inflicted by trespassing animals, holding that the law “at most provides a defense to an owner of trespassing livestock [when] the claimant is unable to show that his land was enclosed by a fence of sufficient strength to turn ordinary cattle, and by its terms is limited to damages to [vegetation].” Robinson v. Kerr, 144 Colo. 48, 355 P.2d 117 (1960).
Among these statutes concerning, fence-building by property owners to protect against trespassing livestock is the statute relied upon by the plaintiff, § 35-46-111, C.R.S.1973, which provides:
“It is the duty of the division of highways to maintain right-of-way fences along and adjacent to all federal aid highways constructed by the division, where such highways are maintained by the division . .. . ”
The statute does not set forth the purpose for requiring the State to maintain right-of-way fences or the persons or class of persons to whom the State’s duty is owed. The plaintiff’s contention that the State’s duty is owed to the livestock owner to prevent injury to his livestock is not consistent with the remainder of the fence law, which aims at protecting a landowner from trespassing livestock.
The more likely purpose of § 35-46-111, C.R.S.1973, is to protect motorists on the highway from the danger of trespassing livestock wandering into their path and causing an accident. See Millard v. Smith, 30 Colo.App. 466, 495 P.2d 234 (1972). In light of the overall purpose of the fence law, it is my view that the right-of-way fence statute does not create a duty in the State owed to the owners of trespassing livestock. Absent this duty, there can be no breach constituting negligence for which the plaintiff can recover.
The State sought to set aside the default judgment under the provisions of both C.R. C.P. 55(e) and C.R.C.P. 60(b). I agree with the majority that the State’s actions did not constitute excusable neglect for purposes of C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). However, C.R.C.P. 55(e) affords an independent basis for relief from default judgment under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5). Since, under C.R.C.P. 55(e), a claimant cannot obtain a default judgment against the State without establishing his claim by evidence satisfactory to the court, the State must have an avenue of redress when the claimant fails to establish his claim. This avenue is provided by C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), which permits the default judgment to be set aside for “any other reason justifying relief.” See generally Sunshine v. Robinson, 168 Colo. 409, 451 P.2d 757 (1969). Unless so interpreted, noncompliance with C.R. C.P. 55(e) could go unchallenged.
Since § 35-46-111, C.R.S.1973, creates no duty in the State toward the plaintiff, and no other source of such a duty appears, the trial court erred in entering a default judgment against the State under C.R.C.P. 55(e), and erred in failing to set aside the default judgment under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5). See generally F & S Construction Co. v. Christlieb, 166 Colo. 67, 441 P.2d 656 (1968).