Court Opinion

ID: 9916444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 00:02:22.991793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:27.100549
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/9/24 In re D.J. CA2/5
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

In re D.J. et al., Persons Coming                              B329237
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                               (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP01149)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

        Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.J.,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed
      Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
      C.J. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating
her parental rights to her daughters D.J. and V.J. (collectively,
Minors).1 We are asked to decide whether the juvenile court
erred in declining to apply the parental benefit exception to law
that otherwise requires terminating parental rights. Specifically,
we chiefly consider whether the juvenile court erred by not
expressly stating the reasons for its ruling on the record and by
considering improper criteria in making that ruling.

                         I. BACKGROUND
      A.     Investigation, Removal, and Assumption of
             Jurisdiction
      In February 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) received a
referral alleging Mother was using drugs. At the time, five-year-
old D.J. and three-year-old V.J. were living with Mother and
maternal grandmother J.J. (Maternal Grandmother).
      A Department social worker visited the family home.
Maternal Grandmother reported Mother was in and out of the
house and was currently using marijuana and “speed.” She
reported Father also used drugs. D.J. reported Maternal
Grandmother “smokes from glass in the house,” Mother “smokes
every[ ]day,” and Father also “smokes.” V.J. described smoking

1
       D.J. and V.J. share the same father, V.C. (Father), but he is
not a party to this appeal. We therefore only discuss Father and
his role in the proceedings to the extent they are relevant to
Mother’s appeal.

                                 2
by Maternal Grandmother, Mother, and Father in nearly
identical terms.
       When questioned by a social worker, Maternal
Grandmother admitted she smokes marijuana and had used
crystal methamphetamine that day. The social worker took
Minors into protective custody based on exigent circumstances
and they were later placed with paternal grandparents R.L. and
V.C. (collectively, Paternal Grandparents); paternal aunt K.C.
also lived in their home.
       In subsequent conversations with Department personnel,
Mother admitted she began using methamphetamine in mid-2018
and continued using two to three times per week since then.
Father, who was incarcerated at the time, admitted he was a
recovering addict and had struggled with methamphetamine and
marijuana abuse.
       The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over
the children in June 2020 based on the substantial risk of serious
physical harm presented by Mother, Father, and Maternal
Grandmother’s ongoing substance abuse—which prevented them
from providing Minors with ongoing care and supervision.
Mother was ordered to participate in services including a drug
program, random drug testing, a parenting course, and
individual counseling. She was granted three hours of monitored
visitation at least two times per week.

      B.    Mother’s Visitation and Eventual Termination of
            Reunification Services
      In December 2020, the Department reported Minors were
being well cared for by Paternal Grandparents. Minors told a

                                3
social worker that they wanted to have visits with Mother and
Father but did not want to live with them.
       Paternal Grandmother reported Mother’s visits were
scattered and Mother was mostly on her phone during visits.
Minors also stated Mother did not want to play with them.
Minors referred to Mother by her first name and did not seem
distraught when she did not visit.
       Mother enrolled in an inpatient drug rehabilitation
program in July 2020, but she checked herself out of the facility
approximately four days later. Mother did not appear for weekly
drug testing and had not participated in parenting classes or
individual therapy.
       Mother visited Minors for an hour on Christmas Eve in
2020, was on her phone the entire time, and did not engage with
the children. In February 2021, Minors’ babysitter reported D.J.
had thrown an object and was upset because of a visit with
Mother. The babysitter also said Mother reinforces D.J.’s bad
behavior toward Paternal Grandmother, explaining Mother gave
D.J. a “thumbs up” when she misbehaved. Around the same
time, Mother told a social worker that she had been sober for a
month and was inquiring about rehab, but she also stated she
was not willing to participate in an inpatient program.
       In late March 2021, Paternal Grandmother informed the
social worker she was willing to adopt Minors. When Paternal
Grandmother informed Mother, Mother told Paternal
Grandmother to return the children to her after Paternal
Grandmother adopted them. When Paternal Grandmother said
she would not do so, Mother ceased visiting for some period of
time.

                                4
       A few months later, Mother claimed to have enrolled in an
outpatient drug treatment program. When contacted, however,
the program advised Mother had participated in walk-in services
but was not enrolled in any programs.
       At a September 2021 status review hearing, the juvenile
court found Mother’s progress had been minimal. But the court
also found the Department had not complied with the case plan
by making appropriate efforts to provide reasonable services, and
the court ordered continued reunification services.
       Mother did not call or visit Minors at all from October 31 to
December 23, 2021. When Mother did make contact, she usually
visited Minors two to three times per month. Mother would
sometimes call Paternal Grandmother at 8 p.m. on a school night
saying she wanted to visit, and Paternal Grandmother would
have to tell Mother that Minors were already preparing for bed.
       By late February 2022, Mother had not provided proof of
participation in any court ordered services. The juvenile court
terminated reunification services for both Mother and Father in
March 2022.

      C.      Visitation and Other Events After Termination of
              Reunification Services
       Mother visited Minors for about 30 minutes once in June of
2022 and then did not visit again until the end of August. In the
six months preceding September 2022, Mother visited Minors a
total of six times.
       Before the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court
ordered the Department to submit a report addressing the
considerations identified in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
a case in which our Supreme Court provided guidance regarding

                                 5
what must be shown to qualify for the parental benefit exception
to law otherwise requiring termination of parental rights.
       From late August 2022 through January 2023, Mother
attended approximately three out of four scheduled visits. From
January 2023 through mid-April 2023, Mother either attended or
made up all scheduled visits. By March 2023, Mother was
visiting Minors on Sundays for approximately two to three hours.
The visits were positive. Minors expressed happiness during
Mother’s visits because they spent time catching up, talking,
watching movies, and playing outside.

       D.    The Department’s Caden C. Report
       The Department filed a status report in April 2023 to
respond to the juvenile court’s request for a Caden C. analysis.
The report summarized Mother’s recent, increased visitation. It
stated that, starting in September 2022, the visits consisted of
watching movies, talking about how the children are doing, and
playing games. Mother sometimes also brought Minors birthday
gifts including toys and snacks.
       Addressing whether there was consistent and regular
contact between Mother and Minors, the report stated Mother
and Father raised Minors at the Paternal Grandparents home
until 2019, when the parents separated. Mother and Minors then
lived with Maternal Grandmother until the Department
intervened and removed Minors from the home. From 2020 to
2022, Mother’s visits were infrequent and inconsistent. Mother
was also arrested and in custody for 11 days in August 2022.
       Regarding whether there was a beneficial parent-child
relationship between Mother and Minors, the report stated the
relationship was inconsistent from 2020 to 2022 due to Mother’s

                               6
unresolved substance abuse issues and incarceration. D.J. was
eight years old at the time of the report, and had been five years
old when placed with Paternal Grandparents. V.J. was seven
years old at the time of the report, and had been four years old at
the time the proceedings started. The social worker opined there
were concerns due to Mother’s unresolved substance abuse
history, absence from Minors’ lives, and incarcerations.
According to the Department’s report, Minors expressed
happiness when Mother visited but they did not demonstrate a
significant connection with Mother because they did not ask for
Mother or ask to speak to Mother when she was not present. D.J.
said she liked when she and Mother cuddled together. She also
said she felt she had a good relationship with Mother because
Mother played with her when she visited and ate popcorn with
her. V.J. said she felt like she was close to Mother.
       The social worker opined Mother did not meet Minors’
emotional, social, physical, and psychological needs. The social
worker also opined Mother does not provide significant comfort to
Minors, but rather supplies them with fun visits. D.J. views
Mother as someone with whom she watches movies. V.J. views
Mother as a good parent because Mother brought her shampoo
and conditioner, balloons, and a bracelet kit.
       D.J. reported she would feel sad if she did not have visits
with Mother, but she said she would not act out and would
continue being the same person without them. V.J. similarly said
she would be nice and not act out without the visits. The social
worker opined adoption would create a new sense of stability for
Minors and a plan less than adoption would be harmful because
it would be revocable. The Department concluded termination of

                                7
parental rights remained appropriate and adoption would be
beneficial.

       E.    Termination of Parental Rights
       The juvenile court held a permanency planning hearing in
May 2023. Mother testified at the hearing. Mother stated she
had an in-person visitation schedule and had been consistently
attending her visits every week. According to Mother, Minors
screamed “Mommy’s here” when she arrived. She denied they
ever called her by her given name. Mother stated that during her
visits with Minors they watch movies, play outside, eat together,
or do their homework. She described her emotional bond with
Minors as strong, explaining they love her and her absence would
make them sad. She asserted they always ask her to stay longer
at the end of their visits and are sad when she has to leave. She
believed it would be detrimental to Minors to terminate her
parental rights.
       Following Mother’s testimony, her attorney argued there
had been consistent, regular visitation; there was a beneficial
emotional attachment between Mother and Minors; Minors would
experience a severe loss if Mother were cut from their lives; and
it was in Minors’ best interest to maintain their relationship with
Mother. Mother asked the court to order a permanent plan of
legal guardianship so Mother could maintain her parental role.
       The Department argued the Caden C. standard for
invoking the parental benefit exception was not met because even
though Mother’s recent visits had been consistent, the visits
overall had been sporadic. The Department further argued that
even if visitation were sufficient, a beneficial relationship
between Minors and Mother did not exist because there was no

                                8
indication Minors were asking for additional visits or more time.
Their relationship with Mother appeared to be more of a
friendship. The Department further argued Mother’s testimony
indicated the termination of the relationship would be
detrimental to her, not Minors, particularly given the love,
support, and stability provided by Paternal Grandparents for the
past three years.
       Minors’ counsel argued Mother had not been consistent in
her visits during the pendency of the case, with the exception of
the time period from September 2022 to May 2023. In Minors’
counsel’s view, seven months of weekly visits did not make up for
the lack of regular contact over the preceding years.
       The juvenile court ruled it would terminate parental rights
“for the reasons argued by [Minors’ counsel] and [the
Department] and the In re: Caden C. analysis in the reports.”
The juvenile court remarked that Mother has a tendency to
disappear from Minors’ lives when she is abusing drugs and
elaborated: “I am not finding that her failure to complete a case
plan is . . . a reason to terminate[ parental rights], per se. What
I’m saying is Mother’s failure to achieve sobriety, and claims in
the past that turned out to not be true to be in rehab, leads her to
disappear from the children, and that risk remains.” The court
acknowledged Mother’s recent visits had been consistent, but it
also stated the chance of her disappearing at some point in the
next few years was still high because she had not completed
rehab. The juvenile court then found continued jurisdiction was
necessary, found Minors were adoptable, and found no exception
to adoption applied.

                                 9
                          II. DISCUSSION
       Mother’s arguments for reversal are at times difficult to
discern due to a lack of organizational focus (Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.412(a)(2), 8.204(a)(1)(B)), but we see no argument
meriting reversal of the parental rights termination order. The
juvenile court was not required to say more than it did on the
record to explain its finding that the parental benefit exception
did not apply. The court’s parental rights termination order,
which is predicated in part on an independently sufficient finding
that Mother had not maintained the requisite consistent
visitation with Minors, does not rest on consideration of criteria
that should not be part of a parental benefit exception analysis.
And Mother’s remaining arguments concerning legal
guardianship, Minors’ views on adoption, and the Indian Child
Welfare Act all lack merit.

      A.     The Juvenile Court Was Not Required to Further
             Explain Its Reasons for Finding the Parental Benefit
             Exception Inapplicable
       At a section 366.26 hearing, a juvenile court decides
“whether to terminate parental rights, making way for adoption,
or to maintain parental rights and select another permanent
plan.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 625.) “[I]f a court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be
adopted, the parent may avoid termination of parental rights by
establishing at least one of a series of enumerated exceptions.”
(Ibid.)
       One of these exceptions is the parental benefit exception.
The exception is “limited in scope” and applies where “‘[t]he court
finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would

                                10
be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following
circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
From th[is] statute, [our Supreme Court] readily discern[ed]
three elements the parent must prove to establish the exception:
(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the
continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 631, third, fourth, and fifth
alterations added.)
       A reviewing court uses the substantial evidence standard to
evaluate a juvenile court’s determination of the existence vel non
of a beneficial relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 639.)
“[T]he ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship
with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse
of discretion.” (Id. at 640.)
       In finding the parental benefit exception did not apply, the
juvenile court stated that “for the reasons argued by [Minors] and
[the Department] and the . . . Caden C. analysis in the reports, I
am going to terminate parental rights.” The court also made
further remarks on the record concerning Mother’s risk of again
disappearing from the children, as she had in the past. This was
more than adequate under the circumstances.
       “[W]e are aware of no requirement—and [Mother cites] no
authority supporting the proposition—that the juvenile court, in
finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, must recite
specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all of
the three elements of the exception. To the contrary, we infer

                                 11
from section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)—under which the
juvenile court is required to ‘state its reasons in writing or on the
record’ when it makes a finding that termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child—that the court is not
required to make findings when it concludes that parental rights
termination would not be detrimental.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156; see also In re Andrea R. (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 1093, 1109 [appellate record supported implied
finding by juvenile court that parents had failed to establish the
parental benefit exception].) Juvenile courts are encouraged to
explain their reasons to facilitate appellate review, but the
absence of such an explanation is not cause for reversal here—
particularly when the court ordered the Department to prepare a
report providing a Caden C. analysis and gave its reasons on the
record, albeit in shorthand by adopting arguments made by
others.2

      B.    Reversal of the Parental Rights Termination Order Is
            Not Required Because It Does Not, as Mother Asserts,
            Rest on Impermissible Considerations
      Mother contends the juvenile court erred by considering
various factors that Caden C. holds should not be part of a

2
      The absence of a more detailed statement of reasons is not,
as Mother appears to argue, an indication that the court was
unaware of factors bearing on whether the parental benefit
exception should apply. “Absent evidence to the contrary[, and
there is none here], we presume . . . the trial court knew the law
and followed it.” (See, e.g., People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th
983, 1042.)

                                 12
parental benefit exception analysis. Specifically, Mother states
the court impermissibly considered her inability to provide a safe
home for Minors, her drug abuse history, the quality of her
“parental” relationship with Minors, and what Mother thinks is
speculation regarding the future effect of Mother’s unresolved
drug abuse.
       We do not read the record to demonstrate the juvenile court
considered impermissible factors, but even if Mother is right in
asserting the contrary, the consideration was still harmless. (In
re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60 [reversal warranted only if it
is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable
to the appellant but for the error].) In adopting the arguments of
the Department and Minors’ counsel, the juvenile court found
Mother did not satisfy the regular visitation element of the
parental benefit exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 636 [a
“parent asserting the parental benefit exception must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, three things,” one of which is
“regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account
the extent of visitation permitted”].) The facts that Mother
believed the court impermissibly considered are not relevant to
whether that regular visitation element was established—and
the juvenile court appropriately determined it was not.
       The dependency proceedings in this matter spanned more
than three years. For the first two and a half years, from March
2020, when Minors were placed with Paternal Grandparents, to
September 2022, Mother’s visitation was inconsistent and
scattered. In the six months preceding September 2022, for
example, Mother only visited Minors six times. There were at
least two periods, in late 2021 and in the summer of 2022, where
Mother fell out of contact and failed to visit for approximately two

                                13
months in a row.3 That sort of record of visitation cannot support
application of the parental benefit exception. (In re J.C. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 503, 531 [regular visitation not present when
there were significant lapses in visitation]; In re I.R. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 201, 212; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 554.)
       To be sure, Mother’s visits did later become more consistent
during the seven months from September 2022 to April 2023.
But we assess the regularity of the visitation throughout the
entire course of the dependency proceedings and, viewed through
that lens, the late improvement was too little. (C.F., supra, 193
Cal.App.4th at 554 [“[The mother] was more consistent with
visitation as the section 366.26 hearing neared, but we agree
with the . . . assessment that overall her visitation was sporadic.
Sporadic visitation is insufficient to satisfy the first prong of the
parent-child relationship exception to adoption”].) Because
Mother did not establish regular visitation, it matters not
whether the juvenile court made reference to her drug abuse
history, the quality of her “parental” relationship with Minors, or
other facts that would not change the determination of whether
there was regular visitation. In the absence of consistent
visitation, the parental benefit exception cannot apply.

3
      Apart from quantity, the quality of the visits that Mother
did attend during the first two-plus years was frequently subpar;
Mother reportedly spent much of the visits on her phone rather
than engaging with Minors.

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       C.       Mother’s Remaining Contentions of Error Fail
       Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in
terminating her parental rights because the Department did not
discuss legal guardianship with Paternal Grandparents (instead
of adoption), because the court failed to take the wishes of the
Minors into account, and because the court purportedly failed to
make a finding that ICWA and related California law did not
apply. All of these points are meritless.
       Mother did not object below to the social worker’s failure to
propose the alternative of legal guardianship to the Paternal
Grandparents when they expressed a desire to adopt Minors.
The argument made now that the social worker should have done
so is accordingly forfeited. (In re Carrie W. (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 746, 755.) In addition, even on the merits, Mother’s
contention runs contrary to the Legislative preference for
adoption. (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at 53 [‘“The Legislature
has . . . determined that, where possible, adoption is the first
choice . . . ‘because it gives the child the best chance at [a full]
emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’
[Citation.]”].)
       As for asking Minors about their preferences, the record
reflects the Department did inquire into their wishes and they
said they wanted to be adopted by Paternal Grandparents.
Mother apparently believes this was insufficient to ascertain
their true desires because the Department’s reporting did not
“indicate[ ] the children were actually app[rised] of what adoption
entailed, and that ‘adoption’ entailed more than just not having
visits . . . .” That, however, is not what the record reveals. A
status review report prepared by the Department states: “The
relative caregivers and the children continue to be committed to

                                15
[the] adoption process. The children mentioned that they
understand that their grandparents will be their parents and
make decisions about their education and medical [treatment].”
       Finally, Mother also contends the juvenile court never
made a definitive ICWA finding after ordering additional inquiry
efforts in 2023. That, again, is wrong on the record. At the
section 366.26 hearing in May 2023, the court stated: “[T]he
maternal grandmother and paternal grandparents have denied
Native American ancestry, so . . . based on the Department’s
reasonable and diligent inquiry, I find [ICWA] does not apply to
any of the children.”

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                         DISPOSITION
     The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                      BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

     MOOR, J.

     KIM, J.

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