Court Opinion

ID: 9581187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:12:25.791769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:45.929360
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, P.J.
(dissenting). I must dissent in this case for several reasons.
Plaintiff seeks to recover personal injury protection benefits for injuries incurred when his motorcycle collided with a parked automobile owned by Irish Gaines. Plaintiff relies upon the exclusion to the "parked car” exception to the no-fault act, MCL 500.3106(l)(a); MSA 24.13106(l)(a), which allows recovery for injuries arising out of a collision with a motor vehicle "parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred”. On briefs and depositions, the trial court found that Gaines had parked his automobile in a manner that caused unreasonable risk of harm to others and allowed recovery for plaintiff.
The majority finds that the question of whether Gaines’s motor vehicle was parked so as to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others constitutes a question of law since the parties do not dispute any of the underlying facts. In support of their position, the majority cites Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held that where there is no factual dispute over the extent of injuries suffered, the question of whether a person has suffered "serious impairment of body function” is a question of statutory construction and is therefore a question *596of law. I believe that the majority’s analogy between the serious impairment question and the parked car question constitutes a significant expansion of the rule announced in Cassidy. I also believe that the analogy is premature and unnecessary in this case.
The parties did not argue at trial and the court did not address whether the Cassidy rule applied to the parked car question. More importantly, neither party has raised or briefed this issue on appeal. I am thus reluctant to join in the majority’s extension of the Cassidy rationale. I merely note at this time one important distinction that I see between the serious impairment question and the parked car question. Unlike the term "serious impairment of body function”, the term "parked in an unreasonable manner” is one that I would expect juries to clearly understand. In negligence actions, for example, reasonableness as a standard of care has always been reserved for the trier of fact. See Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 434; 254 NW2d 759 (1977); Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 140; 243 NW2d 270 (1976); Samson v Saginaw Professional Building, Inc, 393 Mich 393, 407; 224 NW2d 843 (1975).
In any event, I do not believe that the Cassidy issue need be reached in this case. My own review of the record in this case leads me to conclude that the trial court justifiably treated the issue of whether Gaines’s automobile was parked in an unreasonable manner as a question of fact. Since the trial court and not a jury sat as the trier of fact in this case, I would apply the clearly erroneous standard to the court’s findings. Tuttle v State Highway Dep't 397 Mich 44; 243 NW2d 244 (1976); Kurczewski v State Highway Comm, 112 Mich App 544, 552; 316 NW2d 484 (1982) lv den 414 Mich 957 (1982); GCR 1963, 517.1.
*597There is evidence in the record to show that Gaines parked his automobile in the far left lane of a four-lane highway. During the day, the two outside lanes were reserved for parking. During late night hours, however, the two outside lanes were not reserved for parking and were therefore open for traffic. I believe that an automobile parked after dark in a lane opened for traffic could be perceived as parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of injury to others. Indeed, the majority itself suggests in footnote 4 of their opinion that a vehicle parked in a nonparking lane during rush hour traffic on a busy street may come under the exclusion to the parked car exception in the no-fault act. I find little distinction between the majority’s hypothetical and the facts of this case. I also note that plaintiff’s inability to recall the circumstances preceding the accident is attributable to the brain damage he suffered from the accident, resulting in his loss of memory.
While I agree that the trial court’s findings could have been more clearly stated, I nevertheless find that the evidence in this case supports the court’s finding that Gaines’s car was parked so as to cause unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff.
I would affirm.