Court Opinion

ID: 9964238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 15:01:07.946105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:14.686031
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-2102    Document: 18    Page: 1   Filed: 04/29/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                TOMMY WESLEY SCOTT,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2023-2102
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:22-cv-01603-SSS, Judge Stephen S. Schwartz.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: April 29, 2024
                 ______________________

    TOMMY WESLEY SCOTT, Helena, OK, pro se.

     ANDREW MARSHALL BERNIE, Environment and Natural
 Resources Division, United States Department of Justice,
 Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented
 by TODD KIM.
                 ______________________

      Before DYK, BRYSON, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
 BRYSON, Circuit Judge.
Case: 23-2102    Document: 18      Page: 2    Filed: 04/29/2024

 2                                                SCOTT v. US

     Appellant Tommy Wesley Scott was convicted of first-
 degree murder and is serving two consecutive life sen-
 tences in an Oklahoma state prison. He contends that he
 is a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and that the
 crimes of which he was convicted were committed on the
 Cherokee Reservation. Because the Major Crimes Act, 18
 U.S.C. §1153(a), grants the United States exclusive juris-
 diction over certain crimes, including murder, committed
 by Indians on Indian reservations, he argues that the State
 of Oklahoma improperly exercised criminal jurisdiction
 over him.
      Mr. Scott filed an action in the Court of Federal Claims
 (“the Claims Court”) seeking relief from the United States
 for his improper incarceration in the form of a monetary
 award. The Claims Court dismissed his complaint for lack
 of jurisdiction. We affirm.
                               I
     Mr. Scott’s conviction was based on a plea of guilty that
 he entered in 1993. JA 11. He did not seek to withdraw
 his plea or appeal his conviction. In 2020, he filed an ap-
 plication for post-conviction relief in Oklahoma state court.
 He contended that under the Supreme Court’s decision in
 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), the Oklahoma
 state courts lacked jurisdiction over him because he is an
 Indian and his crime occurred in “Indian Country.” Under
 McGirt, he argued, the United States had exclusive juris-
 diction over his offense, and his conviction therefore had to
 be vacated.
     The state court denied his request for relief. Citing
 Tenth Circuit law, the court held that the McGirt case
 should not be given retroactive application to void a final
 state conviction, such as Mr. Scott’s. App. 11-16. Mr.
 Scott’s appeal from that decision was dismissed as un-
 timely. App. 17–18.
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 SCOTT v. US                                                3

     Mr. Scott then sought habeas corpus relief from a fed-
 eral district court in the Northern District of Oklahoma.
 That court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was
 barred by the one-year statute of limitations for federal ha-
 beas corpus petitions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). App. 20–
 21.
     Shortly thereafter, Mr. Scott filed this action in the
 Claims Court. In his complaint, he based his claim for
 damages on two treaties entered into between the United
 States and the Muskogee (Creek) Nation, in 1832 and 1866.
 The 1832 treaty declared that no state or territory would
 have the right “to pass laws for the government of [the
 Creeks], but they shall be allowed to govern themselves, so
 far as may be compatible with the general jurisdiction
 which Congress may think proper to exercise over them.”
 Treaty with the Creeks, art. 14, 7 Stat. 366, 368 (1832).
 The 1866 treaty provided that the Creeks “agree to such
 legislation as Congress and the President of the United
 States may deem necessary for better administration of
 justice and the protection of the rights of person and prop-
 erty within the Indian Territory: provided, however, [that]
 said legislation shall not in any manner interfere with or
 annul their present tribal organization, rights, laws, privi-
 leges, and customs.” Treaty with the Creek Indians, art.
 10, 14 Stat. 785, 788 (1866).
     Mr. Scott alleged in his complaint that because he is an
 Indian within the meaning of federal law and was con-
 victed of crimes occurring within the boundaries of an In-
 dian reservation, those two treaties, together with the
 Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, and the Indian Civil
 Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §1301 et seq., gave rise to a guarantee
 that he would not be subject to state criminal jurisdiction
 for his offenses. 1 Based on those provisions, he argued that

     1 The Major Crimes Act provides that certain crimes
 committed by Indians in Indian territory fall within
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 4                                                 SCOTT v. US

 the federal government had the duty to remedy what he
 characterizes as his illegal detention by the Oklahoma De-
 partment of Corrections.
     The Claims Court dismissed Mr. Scott’s complaint for
 lack of jurisdiction. At the outset, the court characterized
 Mr. Scott’s complaint as raising, in essence, a collateral at-
 tack on his state court conviction, since his request for mon-
 etary relief was based on his claim that his conviction was
 invalid. The Claims Court rejected that contention on the
 ground that the Court of Federal Claims is not authorized
 to grant habeas corpus relief or to review the judgments of
 state and federal courts with regard to the validity of state
 court convictions or the lawfulness of state court incarcer-
 ation. App. 2.
     The Claims Court further held that Mr. Scott’s claim
 was not within the court’s jurisdiction because it was not
 based on a “money-mandating” law, i.e., a law that can
 fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
 federal government for damages sustained. Id. In partic-
 ular, the court held that neither the Indian Civil Rights Act
 nor the Major Crimes Act is a money-mandating statute.
 Id. Although the court noted that it has jurisdiction to en-
 force the federal statute proving a monetary remedy for
 claims of unjust conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1), that
 statute applies only to federal prisoners, and not to state
 prisoners such as Mr. Scott.

 exclusive federal jurisdiction. The Indian Civil Rights Act
 acknowledges “the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
 recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction
 over all Indians,” 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), and contains various
 provisions affecting the allocation of criminal jurisdiction
 among state, federal, and tribal courts, see id. §§ 1301(f),
 1303, 1304, 1321, 1323–26.
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 SCOTT v. US                                                 5

     Finally, the court held that none of the treaty language
 on which Mr. Scott relies could be interpreted as requiring
 the federal government to provide monetary relief for un-
 lawful state imprisonment. App. 3. 2
                               II
     The Claims Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. The
 jurisdictional statute that applies to this case is the Tucker
 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), which grants the court jurisdic-
 tion over claims against the United States “founded either
 upon the Constitution, or an Act of Congress or regulation
 of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
 contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
 unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 3 As
 the Claims Court observed, in order for the court to have
 jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, the plaintiff must be
 able to point to a “money-mandating” statute or other pro-
 vision that requires the federal government to compensate
 the plaintiff for an injury other than one sounding in tort.

     2   In the aftermath of the McGirt decision, the Claims
 Court has addressed several other claims from Oklahoma
 state inmates similar to Mr. Scott’s and has resolved them
 all consistently with the Claims Court’s ruling in this case.
 See Cramer v. United States, No. 23-37C, 2023 WL 3072541
 (Ct. Fed. Cl. Apr. 25, 2023); Greene v. United States, No.
 22-1064, 2023 WL 3072565 (Ct. Fed. Cl. Apr. 25, 2023);
 Williamson v. United States, No. 23-263C, 2023 WL
 3032952 (Ct. Fed. Cl. Apr. 20, 2023); Moore v. United
 States, 163 Fed. Cl. 591 (2022).
      3  In his complaint, Mr. Scott invoked the so-called
 Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which provides the
 Claims Court with jurisdiction, concurrent with district
 courts, over certain damages actions, not sounding in tort,
 “not exceeding $10,000 in amount.” Because Mr. Scott has
 sought a much greater recovery than that, we treat his
 complaint as having invoked the Tucker Act instead.
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 6                                                 SCOTT v. US

 See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 US. 287, 290
 (2009) (To establish jurisdiction, a plaintiff must identify a
 separate source of law that “can fairly be interpreted as
 mandating compensation by the Federal Government.”
 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)).
     Mr. Scott’s theory is that he is not pursuing a collateral
 attack on his conviction, but is alleging the breach of a
 “treaty/contract that [he] would not be subject to state law
 when a crime occurs on an Indian reservation.” App. 5.
 Referring to four nineteenth century treaties with the
 Creek and Cherokee tribes, 4 he argues that “the treaties’
 provision can fairly be interpreted as ‘money-mandating’
 when viewed through the lens of treaty interpretation.” Id.
 at 5–6.
     In effect, Mr. Scott contends that the treaty language
 on which he relies constitutes a promise by the United
 States that persons in Mr. Scott’s position would not be
 subject to state prosecution, and that in the event of a
 breach of that promise, the federal government would be
 required to compensate the affected individuals for the re-
 sulting injury.
     Mr. Scott’s theory is unpersuasive. The Claims Court
 can assert jurisdiction over claims grounded in treaties be-
 tween the United States and Indian nations, which are re-
 garded as “essentially a contract between two sovereign
 nations.” Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fish-
 ing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979); Tsosie v. United

     4   In addition to the two treaties he identified in his
 complaint, the Treaty with the Creeks, 7 Stat. 366 (1832),
 and the Treaty with the Creek Indians, 14 Stat. 785 (June
 14, 1866), Mr. Scott in his brief on appeal has also referred
 to the Treaty with the Cherokees, 7 Stat. 478 (Dec. 29,
 1835), and the Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, 14 Stat.
 799 (July 19, 1866). App. 6.
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 SCOTT v. US                                                7

 States, 825 F.2d 393, 401 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (a treaty between
 the United States and Indian nations is “a species of con-
 tract.”). Because breach of contract claims generally carry
 “a presumption that money damages are available,” such
 claims normally fall within the reach of the Tucker Act.
 Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
 2014). But “[t]he government’s consent to suit under the
 Tucker Act does not extend to every contract.” Id. The con-
 tract “must be between the plaintiff and the government
 and entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of
 the government’s breach of that contract.” Ransom v.
 United States, 900 F.2d 242, 244 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
     Those requirements are not satisfied here, for several
 reasons. First, the treaty provisions Mr. Scott cites in his
 complaint are not money-mandating. The language from
 article 10 of the 1866 treaty on which Mr. Scott relies,
 Treaty with the Creek Indians, 14 Stat. 785, 788 (June 14,
 1866), permits Congress to enact legislation that it “may
 deem necessary for the better administration of justice and
 the protection of the rights of persons and property within
 the Indian territory,” provided that the legislation “shall
 not in any manner interfere with or annul their present
 tribal organization, rights, laws, privileges and customs.”
 Article 14 of the 1832 treaty on which he relies, Treaty with
 the Creeks, 7 Stat. 366, 368 (Mar. 24, 1832), provides that
 no state may “pass laws for the government of [the
 Creeks].” Nowhere do those treaties suggest that the fed-
 eral government must pay damages to individuals claiming
 injury from the breach of those provisions of the treaties. 5

     5 An example of a treaty provision that was held to give

 rise to an individual’s claim for money damages is found in
 the “bad men” provision of the 1868 treaties with various
 tribes, including the Navajo Nation. That provision, which
 was held to be money-mandating in Tsosie, 825 F.2d at 401,
 stated that “[i]f bad men among the white, or among other
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 8                                                 SCOTT v. US

     In his brief in this court, App. 6, Mr. Scott cites two
 other treaty provisions, article 5 of the Treaty with the
 Cherokees, 7 Stat. 478, 481 (Dec. 29, 1835), and articles 26
 and 27 of the Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, 14 Stat.
 799, 806 (July 19, 1866). In article 5 of the 1835 treaty, the
 United States promised that
     the lands ceded to the Cherokee Nation shall, in no
     future time, without their consent, be included,
     within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any
     State or Territory. But they shall secure to the
     Cherokee Nation the right by their national coun-
     cils to make and carry into effect all such laws as
     they may deem necessary for the government and
     protection of the persons and property within their
     own country belonging to their people or such per-
     son as have connected themselves with them.
 7 Stat. at 481. Articles 26 and 27 of the 1866 treaty pro-
 vided that the United States would protect the people of
 the Cherokee Nation from “all unauthorized citizens of the
 United States who may attempt to settle on their lands or
 reside in their territory,” and that it would be “the duty of
 the United States Indian agent for the Cherokees to have
 such persons, not lawfully residing or sojourning therein,
 removed from the nation.” 14 Stat. at 806.
     Even when viewed in light of the principle that ambi-
 guity or silence in agreements between the United States
 and a Native American tribe must be read to the tribe’s
 benefit, Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 423–24 (1994), the
 treaty provisions on which Mr. Scott relies cannot be said

 people subject to the authority of the United States, shall
 commit any wrong upon the person or property of the Indi-
 ans, the United States will . . . reimburse the injured per-
 sons for the loss sustained.” Navajo Treaty of June 1, 1868,
 15 Stat. 667–68.
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 SCOTT v. US                                                  9

 to be money-mandating. The cited portions of the two trea-
 ties with the Cherokees guaranteed to the Cherokee Nation
 the right of self-government. But those passages do not
 provide for monetary compensation for a breach of the
 promises made by the United States. As such, the asserted
 breach of those provisions does not give rise to jurisdiction
 under the Tucker Act. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290.
     Second, to the extent the treaty provisions at issue are
 deemed contractual in nature, they reflect agreements be-
 tween the United States and the tribes. The agreements
 addressed the respective rights of sovereignty of the two
 contracting parties; they did not create contract-based
 rights in individuals, the breach of which could give rise to
 monetary remedies for those individual complainants. A
 treaty between the United States and an Indian Tribe “can-
 not provide a basis for the Tucker Act's contract-based ju-
 risdiction” where the plaintiff “has not alleged that he was
 a party to the alleged contract or in privity with a party
 that was.” Landreth v. United States, 797 F. App'x 521,
 524 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
     Mr. Scott has not identified any legal obligation owed
 by the United States to persons over whom Oklahoma has
 improperly exercised criminal jurisdiction. His incarcera-
 tion is the result of state prosecution, not the product of any
 action by the federal government. His theory, as expressed
 in his complaint, is that “the United States had an obliga-
 tion to protect [him] from state law.” Not having done so,
 he argues, the federal government must “remedy the illegal
 detention” to which he and others similarly situated are
 subject, and to do so by the payment of money damages.
     Nothing in the treaties on which Mr. Scott relies sug-
 gests that the federal government agreed to be held liable
 for damages in the event that a state sought to exercise
 criminal jurisdiction within Indian territories. See Arizona
 v. Navajo Nation, 599 U.S. 555, 564 (2023) (holding that a
 treaty which “set apart a reservation for the use and
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 10                                                 SCOTT v. US

 occupation of the Navajo tribe” did not impose a “duty on
 the United States to take affirmative steps to secure water
 for the tribe.”). In particular, there is nothing in the trea-
 ties to indicate that, if a state enacted legislation governing
 conduct in Indian territory, the federal government would
 be required to pay damages to individuals claiming injury
 from that action.
      Third, the claim at issue in this case arises in the con-
 text of a criminal proceeding. As this court has noted,
 “breach of contract arising out of the criminal justice sys-
 tem does not ordinarily give rise to an action under the
 Tucker Act for damages.” Sanders v. United States, 252
 F.3d 1329, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding no jurisdiction
 over a claim seeking money damages for an alleged breach
 by a federal prosecutor of a stipulated agreement not to ob-
 ject to the plaintiff’s continued release on bail); Podlucky v.
 United States, No. 2021-2226, 2022 WL 1791065, at *2
 (Fed. Cir. June 2, 2022). As this court explained in Sand-
 ers, “enforcing and policing the criminal law is assigned to
 the courts of general jurisdiction and not” the Claims
 Court. 252 F.3d at 1335.
     The Sanders line of cases is a specific application of the
 general principle that “Tucker Act jurisdiction may . . . be
 lacking if relief for breach of contract could be entirely non-
 monetary.” Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990, 993 (Fed.
 Cir. 2015). While the treaties at issue in this case can be
 regarded as contractual in nature, they are contracts in
 which any remedies for breach would be non-monetary in
 nature and would not be the form of remedy that the
 Claims Court is authorized to grant. 6

      6  An exception to that principle is found in 28 U.S.C.
 §§ 2513(a)(1) and 1495, which respectively create a cause
 of action for money damages against the United States for
 “unjust conviction and wrongful imprisonment” under
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 SCOTT v. US                                              11

     Because Mr. Scott’s claim does not fall within the reach
 of the Tucker Act, we agree with the Claims Court that it
 lacked jurisdiction to address his demand for damages
 from the United States attributable to his prosecution and
 incarceration by the State of Oklahoma.
                        AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.

 certain circumstances and confer jurisdiction on the Court
 of Federal Claims “for damages by any person unjustly con-
 victed of an offense against the United States and impris-
 oned.” That statute does not apply to state prisoners such
 as Mr. Scott.