Court Opinion

ID: 9376060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 19:00:41.319976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:04.083030
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60857        Document: 00516660898            Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/01/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                     March 1, 2023
                                       No. 21-60857                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                          Clerk

   Ahmed Hussain Mana,

                                                                               Petitioner,

                                            versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                             Respondent.

                         Petition for Review of an Order of the
                             Board of Immigration Appeals
                               Agency No. A043 308 602

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Ahmed Hussain Mana seeks review of the Board of Immigration
   Appeals’ (BIA) decision, adopting and affirming the Immigration Judge’s
   (IJ) decision, which denied Mana’s application for cancellation of removal
   and for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
   We DISMISS IN PART and DENY IN PART Mana’s petition for
   review.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-60857      Document: 00516660898          Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/01/2023

                                    No. 21-60857

                                         I.
          Ahmed Hussain Mana, a native and citizen of Yemen, became a lawful
   permanent resident of the United States in 1992. In February 2015, he was
   convicted in Louisiana state court of distributing a controlled substance,
   namely hydrocodone, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1) and was sentenced
   to five years in prison.
          In March 2020, Mana was charged with being removable under 8
   U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(1) for having been convicted of a violation of state or
   federal law relating to a controlled substance, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802,
   other than a single offense of possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less
   of marijuana. Through counsel, Mana admitted the charge and was found to
   be removable based on his 2015 state drug distribution conviction. He
   applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) as well as
   protection under the CAT based on his fear of being harmed in Yemen by the
   current government or due to the general violence there.
          The IJ denied Mana’s applications for cancellation of removal and
   CAT protection, ordering his removal to Yemen. The IJ determined that
   Mana was not credible due to inconsistent and implausible statements within
   his testimony; inconsistencies between his testimony, his 1996 naturalization
   application, and his CAT application; and his failure to provide reasonably
   available corroborating evidence from his relatives. The IJ determined that
   Mana was not entitled to cancellation of removal or CAT protection due to
   his lack of credibility.   Alternatively, the IJ concluded that Mana was
   statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because his 2015 state drug
   distribution conviction constituted a disqualifying aggravated felony under
   the drug-trafficking-crime prong, or, alternatively, under the illicit-
   trafficking-in-a-controlled-substance prong, of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
   Additionally, assuming arguendo that Mana testified credibly, the IJ

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   nevertheless denied his claim for CAT protection based on his failure to
   demonstrate that such relief was warranted.
          Mana filed a counseled appeal to the BIA. He asserted that he was
   eligible for cancellation of removal because his 2015 conviction was neither a
   drug trafficking crime nor illicit trafficking in a controlled substance and thus
   did not constitute a disqualifying aggravated felony. He argued that the state
   offense was broader than the federal offenses and that the IJ erred by
   considering that the specific facts of his case involved commercial dealings.
   Additionally, Mana asserted that he had presented sufficient evidence to
   show that he faced a likelihood of future torture in Yemen and was thus
   entitled to CAT protection.
          The BIA dismissed Mana’s appeal and ordered his removal.
   Specifically, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Mana’s 2015
   conviction constituted both a drug trafficking crime and illicit trafficking in a
   controlled substance and was thus an aggravated felony that disqualified him
   from cancellation of removal. Additionally, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial
   of CAT protection, “assuming without deciding [Mana’s] credibility.” The
   BIA concluded that the IJ’s “assessment of the evidence support[ed] her
   determination that [Mana] did not meet his burden and demonstrate—either
   by testimony or by means of country conditions evidence in the record—that
   it is more likely than not that he would be subjected to torture if returned to
   Yemen, inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
   acquiescence (including willful blindness) of an official or other person acting
   in an official capacity.”
          Mana filed a timely petition for review, reiterating his argument that
   his 2015 state conviction was not a disqualifying aggravated felony and
   additionally arguing the BIA’s denial of CAT protection was not based on
   substantial evidence.

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                                         II.
          Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), this court lacks jurisdiction to review
   a removal order where, as here, the alien was removed on account of his
   commission of a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C.
   § 1227(a)(2)(B). See Alexis v. Barr, 960 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2020).
   However, § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves this court’s jurisdiction to consider
   constitutional claims and questions of law. Id. at 730. Whether Mana’s 2015
   conviction for distributing hydrocodone in violation of La. R.S. §
   40:967(A)(1) constitutes an aggravated felony is a question of law over which
   this court has jurisdiction. See Shroff v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir.
   2018). Additionally, this court has jurisdiction to review Mana’s factual
   challenge to the agency’s denial of his request for CAT protection, as the
   Supreme Court has held that § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) do not preclude review
   of such challenges. Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1694 (2020).
          In evaluating a petition for review, this court considers the BIA’s
   decision, as well as the decision of the IJ to the extent that it influenced the
   BIA. Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2007). Factual findings are
   reviewed for substantial evidence, which means that the alien has “the
   burden of showing that the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable
   factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.” Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d
   1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006). “By contrast, this court reviews the BIA’s legal
   determinations de novo, including whether the [BIA] applied an
   inappropriate standard or failed to make necessary findings.” Ghotra v.
   Whitaker, 912 F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted).    “If this court determines that the BIA applied an
   inappropriate standard or neglected necessary findings, the court will vacate
   the decision and remand to the BIA.” Id.

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                            A. Cancellation of Removal
          When a long-term lawful permanent resident alien is inadmissible or
   deportable, the Attorney General may cancel the removal of the alien under
   8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) if he meets several requirements, one of which is that he
   “has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.” “An alien applying for
   relief or protection from removal has the burden of proof to establish” that
   he “satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements.”                 8 U.S.C.
   § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i); see Ochoa-Salgado v. Garland, 5 F.4th 615, 617 & n.2 (5th
   Cir. 2021). Mana argues that the BIA erred in finding his 2015 state
   conviction was a disqualifying aggravated felony. This court reviews de novo
   the legal questions whether a prior conviction constitutes an aggravated
   felony and whether an alien is statutorily eligible for discretionary relief in the
   form of cancellation of removal. Flores-Larrazola v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 234, 237
   (5th Cir. 2016).
          Courts employ a categorical approach to determine whether a state
   offense qualifies as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.
   Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013). Under the categorical
   approach, the elements of the state statute defining the crime of conviction,
   rather than the particular facts of the prior case, are examined to determine
   whether the state conviction categorically fits within the federal definition of
   an aggravated felony. Id.; see Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504-05
   (2016). The state conviction is not an aggravated felony if the minimum
   conduct criminalized by the state statute falls outside of the federal
   definition, as long as there is a realistic probability that the state would in fact
   apply its statute to that minimum conduct. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190-91.
          However, if the state statute has a divisible structure whereby its
   elements are listed in the alternative, that single statute essentially defines
   multiple crimes; in that circumstance, the modified categorical approach may

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   be utilized. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505. This approach permits a court to “look[]
   to a limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury
   instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with
   what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Id. at 505-06. “If those
   limited elements for the state statute are narrower than or equivalent to the
   elements that comprise the analogous federal law,” there is a match. United
   States v. Frierson, 981 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2020).
          The state statute at issue here, La. R.S. 40:967(A), prohibits
   “knowingly or intentionally” either (1) “produc[ing], manufactur[ing],
   distribut[ing], or dispens[ing] or possess[ing] with intent to produce,
   manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or
   controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II” or (2) “creat[ing],
   distribut[ing], or possess[ing] with intent to distribute, a counterfeit
   controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.” This court has
   explained that “[t]he fact that there are different punishments for different
   drugs and activities evidences that the types of drugs in Schedule II are
   elements and not merely a list of illustrative means,” and thus, § 40:967(A)
   is a divisible statute subject to the modified categorical approach. Frierson,
   981 F.3d at 318. The relevant documents in this case establish that Mana was
   convicted of violating § 40:967(A)(1) by distributing hydrocodone, which is
   a Schedule II controlled substance under La. R.S. 40:964.
          As relevant here, § 1101(a)(43)(B) defines “aggravated felony” as
   “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title
   21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title
   18).” Illicit trafficking in a controlled substance and a drug trafficking crime
   are two independent routes for a state drug felony to qualify as an aggravated
   felony. See Flores-Larrazola, 840 F.3d at 238; Arce-Vences v. Mukasey, 512
   F>3d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Daas v. Holder, 620 F.3d 1050, 1054

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   (9th Cir. 2010). The BIA determined Mana’s 2015 state conviction met both
   definitions. We address each in turn.
          “[I]llicit trafficking” in a controlled substance is “any state, federal,
   or qualified foreign felony conviction involving the unlawful trading or
   dealing in a controlled substance as defined by Federal law.”             Flores-
   Larrazola, 840 F.3d at 240 (quoting Matter of L–G–H–, 26 I. & N. Dec. 365,
   368 (BIA 2014)). A violation of § 40:967(A) is a felony, as it is punishable by
   imprisonment at hard labor, see La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 933, and
   hydrocodone is a controlled substance under federal law, 21 U.S.C. § 812(a);
   21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(1)(vi). The only question remaining is whether
   Mana’s state conviction involved the “trading or dealing” of hydrocodone.
          “Trading or dealing” requires “some sort of commercial dealing.”
   Arce-Vences, 512 F.3d at 171; see also Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006).
   Under Louisiana law, “distribute” means to “to deliver a controlled
   dangerous substance,” La. R.S. 40:961(15), and the Louisiana Supreme
   Court has held that delivery means simply “to transfer possession or
   control,” State v. Martin, 310 So. 2d 544, 546 (La. 1975). “[W]ith regard to
   distribution, the law does not distinguish between selling the drugs, giving
   them away, or sharing them.” State v. Smith, 2007-847, p. 10, (La. App. 3
   Cir. 1/30/08), 974 So. 2d 883, 888. Thus, Mana argues—and we agree—
   that because § 40:967(A) does not require commercial dealing, it is broader
   than the generic offense of “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” The
   BIA relied on Mana’s testimony at his immigration hearing that he bought
   pills from one person and sold them to another to satisfy the commercial-
   dealing component of “illicit trafficking,” but—as the Government
   concedes—this was error, as a reviewing court must “examine what the state
   conviction necessarily involved, not the facts underlying the case.”
   Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190-91.

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          Instead, the Government argues Mana’s state conviction nevertheless
   qualifies as a drug trafficking crime. A drug trafficking crime is defined as
   “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act [CSA] (21
   U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21
   U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2);
   Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2014). As relevant here, the
   CSA makes it unlawful for any person “knowingly or intentionally” to
   “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with the intent to
   manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C.
   § 841(a)(1). A violation of § 841(a)(1) involving a Schedule II controlled
   substance like hydrocodone is a federal felony carrying a maximum prison
   sentence of twenty years under § 841(b)(1)(C). See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5)
   (requiring a maximum prison sentence of more than one year to be a felony
   under federal law); Lopez, 549 U.S. at 60 (holding a state offense constitutes
   a felony punishable under the CSA only if it proscribes conduct punishable
   as a felony under that federal law).
          Mana again argues that distribution under § 40:967(A) is broader than
   distribution under § 841(a) because remuneration is not required for his state
   offense but is necessary for the federal offense. To the contrary, we have
   concluded that “a ‘sale’ is not required” to constitute “‘distribution’ under
   21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).” United States v. Workopich, 479 F.2d 1142, 1147 (5th
   Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Ward, 482 F. App’x 922, 926 & n.1 (5th
   Cir. 2012) (same); Jacob v. Holder, 335 F. App’x 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (“Remuneration is not required in order to satisfy the requirements of
   ‘delivery’ or ‘distribution’ of a controlled substance under the federal
   statute.”).   Thus, employing the modified categorical approach and
   reviewing the elements of each offense, Mana’s state offense consists of
   elements sufficiently narrow to fall within the generic federal crime. Cf.
   Frierson, 981 at 318 (concluding possession with intent to distribute cocaine

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   under § 40:967(A)(1) was sufficiently narrow to fall within possession with
   the intent to distribute under § 841(a)). Accordingly, the BIA did not err in
   determining Mana had committed an aggravated felony and was thus
   ineligible for cancellation of removal.
                                              B. CAT
           To obtain deferral of removal under the CAT, “an applicant must
   show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to
   his home country.” See Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344-45 (5th Cir.
   2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 8 C.F.R.
   §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a). Torture is defined as “‘any act by which
   severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on a person’ by or with
   the acquiescence of a public official for informational, punitive, coercive, or
   discriminatory purposes.” Arulnanthy v. Garland, 17 F.4th 586, 597 (5th Cir.
   2021) (alteration in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)).                            In
   evaluating the likelihood of future torture, the agency must consider “all
   evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,” including “[e]vidence
   of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of
   removal.” Id. at 597 (quoting § 1208.16(c)(3)). “[E]vidence of past torture
   inflicted upon the applicant” must also be considered. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i).
           Mana argues the BIA’s determination that he is not likely to be
   tortured is not supported by substantial evidence in light of the country
   condition evidence he submitted recounting human rights violations in the
   Yemen civil war and the fact he was detained four times in 2007 or 2009. 1

           1
              Mana points to this evidence in the context of an overall substantial evidence
   challenge. However, to the extent Mana also argues 1) the BIA procedurally erred when it
   both failed to consider his previous detentions and glossed over the State Department’s
   reports of torture in Yemen, and 2) the BIA employed the wrong legal test by concluding
   that he failed to show that he is at risk of a particularized threat of torture, we conclude that
   because Mana failed to exhaust these claims, we lack jurisdiction to review them. Cf.

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   However, Mana has not shown “the evidence is so compelling that no
   reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.” See Chen, 470 F.3d
   at 1134.
           In Morales v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2017), we concluded
   that “Petitioner’s presentation of various news articles and reports
   describing El Salvador as particularly dangerous for unnamed women and
   children . . . [were] too general to warrant ‘relief under the Convention
   Against Torture,’” and “Petitioner’s assertion that she—specifically—will
   more likely than not be tortured ‘rests wholly upon surmise and
   speculation.’” Id. (first quoting Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343,
   351–52 (5th Cir. 2006); and then quoting Montgomery-Ward & Co. v. Sewell,
   205 F.2d 463, 468 (5th Cir. 1953)); see also Qorane v. Barr, 919 F.3d 904, 911
   (5th Cir. 2019) (“Generalized country evidence tells us little about the
   likelihood state actors will torture any particular person including Qorane.”).
           As in Morales, Mana’s country condition evidence does not compel
   the conclusion that he specifically will more likely than not be tortured. Cf.
   Morales, 860 F.3d at 818. Moreover, as the IJ noted, 2 based on Mana’s
   descriptions, his brief detentions did not rise to the level of severe pain or
   suffering to amount to torture. Cf. Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 590, 597 (5th
   Cir. 2006) (concluding two brief detentions during which the petitioner was

   Martinez-Guevara v. Garland, 27 F.4th 353 361 n.9 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Insofar as Martinez-
   Guevara contends only that the BIA erred procedurally, her claim that the BIA ignored
   relevant evidence is unexhausted because she did not first raise it in a motion for
   reconsideration.”); Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 757, 766 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Avelar-
   Oliva’s contention that the BIA misapplied the standard of review should have been
   presented to the BIA in a motion for reconsideration.”).
           2
             As here, where the BIA stated its agreement with the IJ’s assessment that the
   applicant failed to establish his case, the IJ’s decision affected the BIA’s decision and is
   thus reviewable. See Zhu, 493 F.3d at 593-94.

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   roughed up and questioned did not amount to torture). The BIA’s finding
   was supported by substantial evidence.
                                      III.
         The petition for review is DISMISSED IN PART as to Mana’s
   unexhausted claims and DENIED IN PART as to the remainder of his
   claims.

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