Court Opinion

ID: 9833766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:00:17.552056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.555064
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It is suggested that our construction of articles 3447 andl 3452, Rev. Statutes, quoted in our original opinion, amounts to judicial legislation, and that we are in conflict with the case of Logan v. Gay, 99 Tex. 603, 90 S. W. 861, 92 S. W. 255, Hicks v. Oliver, 78 Tex. 233. 14 S. W. 575, De Cordova v. Rogers, 97 Tex. 63, 75 S. W. 16 and Bloom v. Oliver, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 120 S. W. 1101, and hence that the question should be certified to our Supreme Court for determination.
We disavow any purpose on our part to invade the domain of legislation or to substitute our judgment of what should be done for that for which the Legislature has made no provision. On the Contrary, our effort has been to ascertain as best we could the spirit of the legislative act and the intent' of the Legislature by construing the articles mentioned, together with all other articles relating to the same subject, in the light of the judicial construction previously given to the similar requirement that the county judge, upon approval of a claim by an executor, “shall also indorse upon such claim or annex thereto .a memorandum in writing, signed by him officially, and dated, stating the action of the court upon such claim,” etc. The only evidence on the trial below, tending to show that the county judge Swof-ford ever saw the claim under investigation is the testimony of the appellee himself, to the effect that he thought he remembered seeing Swofford make the entry of its approval upon the claim docket. There was no proof that such entry was in his handwriting, nor was Swofford offered as a witness, nor was it shown that any order of approval by the county judge or county court was entered upon the probate minutes, as required by article 3212 of the statutes. Appellee was a highly interested witness, and we cannot think that it was the purpose of the Legislature to leave an open door for such uncertainties in the matter of the county judge's approval of a claim. The Legislature specifically provided that such approval should be indorsed in writing by the county *897judge, signed by him officially, etc., upon the claim, and it is a settled rule that parol evidence is incompetent as proof of that which the law requires to he in writing. It is to he remembered that the proceeding in the matter of approval of the claim by the executor and the county judge is ex parte, and without actual notice to the parties most vitally interested, and in all such cases we think particularity in following the requisites of the law should be observed.
It is to be further observed that in article 3452, quoted in our original opinion, it is said that:
“The action of the court in approving or disapproving a daim shall have the force and effect of a final judgment,”
and that article 3454, also quoted in our original opinion, also provided that:
“When such daim has been entered upon the daim docket, and acted upon by the court as in other eases of daims, an appeal from the judgment of the court may be taken as in other eases.”
It is thus seen that by article 3452 some action of the court in approving a claim must ¡be shown in order to give an approval the force and effect of a judgment, and that it is only when such daim has been entered, not only upon the claim docket, but also acted upon by the court, as in other cases of .daims, that an appeal may be taken.
Other and better reasons, perhaps, might be given in support of our original conclusion, but we think what we have said will indicate the views we entertain, and we conclude that the motion for rehearing should be overruled. '
As to the contention that we are in conflict with the cases mentioned, we will say that-none of them, in our opinion, present'the question discussed and determined in this ease. In the case of Bloom v. Oliver, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 120 S. W. 1101, by the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals, the attack upon an account held to be final was upon the ground that the claim was barred by the statute of limitation at the time of its allowance by the administrator and its approval by the county court.
The case of Hicks v. Oliver, 78 Tex. 233, 14 S. W. 575, was an action to vacate the approval of the claim upon the ground that the distributees of the estate had no actual notice of the filing of the claim, which, it was alleged, was unjust, etc.
In the cases of Logan v. Gay and De Cordova v. Rogers, supra, it affirmatively appears that the approval of the county court upon the daim attacked was indorsed thereon. So that, as indicated, we think all of these cases are distinguishable from the one we have before us now, and that we are not in conflict therewith under the rules prescribed by our Supreme Court. See Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 90 Tex. 78, 37 S. W. 311; Yeates v. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 244 S. W. 503. In the case first dted, the Supreme Court says:
“The conflict between the decision of the court in question and that with which it is claimed to be in conflict must be of such a nature, that one would operate to overrule the other in case they were both rendered by the same court. In other words, the decisions must be based practically upon the same state of facts and announce antagonistic conclusions.”
In the other case the Commission of Appeals dted the foregoing decision with approval, and thus states the rule:
“The question of law dedded must be the same in each case, and the conflict must be of such a nature that the latter dedsion would necessarily overrule the former, if decided by the same court. The two decisions must be based on practically the same facts, and must announce antagonistic conclusions of law.”
We accordingly overrule both the motion for rehearing and the motion to certify.