Court Opinion

ID: 9604946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:28:46.278194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:30.901891
License: Public Domain

*594THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
From my review of this record and the authorities cited by both sides, I am convinced that claimant was an employe of Parents Home Service Institute, Inc., and as such was covered under the Oregon Workers’ Compensation Act. ORS 656.005(28); Woody v. Waibel, 276 Or 189, 554 P2d 692 (1976). I base this conclusion on the following.
First, the amount of control the employer was authorized to exercise over claimant’s work. Although the agreement between the parties indicated that claimant was an independent contractor, the record discloses significant direct evidence of control. The employe was specifically trained by the company and was given a prepared sales pitch to assist in making sales. She was directed to make daily reports to her employer and actually did so at least every other day. In addition, although the employes were not required to work specific hours, the job was advertised as full-time, and it is apparent that such an effort was expected. An employe such as claimant might have been able to work at other jobs, but that right was really nothing more than the opportunity of almost anyone in the work force to “moonlight.”
Second, the method of payment. Although the method of payment was couched in terms of commissions rather than a set wage during the initial period of employment, the employer’s sales representatives were being paid a specific salary. The income of $516 for the first 172 hours ($3 per hour) was guaranteed regardless of sales and is in reality an established salary.
Third, the furnishing of equipment. The employer provided all the materials and supplies necessary to solicit orders.
Fourth, the right to fire. The employer definitely had the right to fire claimant if she violated any of the terms of the agreement. This proviso definitely is not consistent with an independent contractor status.
Fifth, the relative nature of the work. As in Woody v. Waibel, supra, the employe’s sales solicitations formed an essential and regular part of the employer’s marketing *595enterprise. Certain aspects of the job required close cooperation between claimant and her employer. Claimant certainly did not hold herself out to the public or other perspective employers as performing an independent business service.
“If the worker does not hold himself out to the public as performing an independent business service, and regularly devotes all or most of his independent time to the particular employer, he is probably an employee, regardless of other factors.” 1B Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 45.31(a) at 8.109.
The above conclusion that the claimant was an employe for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation law is supported by an analogous line of cases involving similar claims of independent contractor status for purposes of the unemployment compensation law. See, e.g., Journal Pub. Co. v. State U. C. Com., 175 Or 627, 155 P2d 570 (1945), where the court denied the Journal’s assertion that newspaper carriers were independent contractors for purposes of the unemployment compensation laws. To the same effect, see Revlon Services, Inc. v. Emp. Div., 30 Or App 729, 567 P2d 1072 (1977); Mt. Jefferson Carpets v. Emp. Div., 25 Or App 375, 548 P2d 1354 (1976); Greater Port. Newcomers v. Morgan, 14 Or App 333, 513 P2d 493 (1973); but see Pam’s Carpet Service, Inc. v. Employment Div., 46 Or App 675, 613 P2d 52 (1980). Although the above cases involved a different statute, as well as slightly different language in the relevant definition section, the fundamental principle is identical.