Court Opinion

ID: 9682223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:08:01.128808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.153588
License: Public Domain

LEE, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s judgment; however, I would hold that the letter order issued by the respondent in this ease meets the requirements of Rule 121.
The majority holds that, despite its unequivocal nature, the letter order signed by respondent and issued on court letterhead does not necessarily meet the requirements of Rule 121. Tex.R.App. P. 121(a)(2)(c) and 121(a)(4) require a petition for writ of mandamus to be accompanied by a certified or sworn copy of the order complained of. Based on the holding in Goff v. Tuchscherer, 627 S.W.2d 397, 398-99 (Tex.1982), the majority questions whether relator has met the procedural requirement of an “order complained of.”
Goff is inapplicable to an original proceeding. Rather than addressing what constitutes an order for purposes of seeking mandamus relief, Goff merely holds that appellate deadlines begin to run from the date an order is signed, and not from the date of a letter requesting the drafting of an order for court signature. 627 S.W.2d at 398. This holding is consistent with the rules concerning deadlines for filing post-judgment motions and for perfecting an appeal. See Tex.R.App. P. 306a; Tex.R.App. P. 41. Original proceedings are not appeals and are governed by different rules and timetables. See Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 792 n. 1 (Tex.1991).
Real parties in interest concede mandamus relief is available when a trial judge renders an oral ruling, see Davenport v. Garcia, 837 S.W.2d 73, 73 (Tex.1992), and when a trial judge refuses to act. Anderson, 806 S.W.2d at 793. Although no cases expressly address whether a letter order is sufficient under Rule 121, Champion Int'l Corp. v. Twelfth Court of App., 762 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex.1988) provides support by implication. In Champion, the trial court granted a mistrial in a signed letter order. Id. at 899. The supreme court upheld the trial court’s letter order and conditionally granted mandamus against the intermediate appellate court for their finding of an abuse of discretion. Id. Champion contains no discussion of the requirements of Rule 121, but, significantly, the court does not dismiss or deny relief for lack of a typical order.1
*851In his June 19, 1996 letter to counsel respondent unequivocally overruled relator’s objection in cause no. 75,981 and stated his reasoning therefor with citation of authority.2 It would be unreasonably technical to refuse to consider an order, contained in a letter on court letterhead, and signed by the judge with the unmistakable intention that it serve as a ruling on relator’s objection. Therefore, I would hold the letter met the procedural requirements of Rule 121.

. Although one could argue the court did not discuss procedural defects because no one raised these complaints, such complaints need not be raised; the courts determine sua sponte whether motions for leave and petitions for writ of mandamus meet the requirements of Rule 121. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (listing the many procedural defects in relator’s petition, but deciding to overlook these because relator was acting pro se).

. This letter was not only in writing but also issued on the court’s letterhead, and signed by the judge, although the copies of respondent’s letter submitted in this proceeding do not indicate whether it was formally filed in the case. Counsel for both sides in this proceeding attached a copy of this letter as an exhibit to their briefs and verified under oath that it was a true and correct copy thereof.