Court Opinion

ID: 7826671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 18:08:41.499547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:52.985424
License: Public Domain

W.H. “Dub” Arnold, Chief Justice. This case involves a salary dispute between the appellants, P.A. Stricklin and other North Little Rock firefighters, and the City of North Little Rock, of which appellee Patrick Henry Hays serves as mayor. Resolution of this appeal requires our interpretation of an initiated ordinance, adopted by popular vote in the November 1990 general election, which provides that North Little Rock firefighters and police officers are to receive salaries and benefits commensurate with Little Rock firefighters and police officers after considering rank, seniority, time in grade, and service. The trial court found that the initiated ordinance was valid but had lapsed, and thus concluded that the city no longer had any obligation to provide “parity pay” to the firefighters. Because we agree with the firefighters that the trial court erred in interpreting the initiated ordinance, we reverse and remand. A procedural review of the history of the initiated ordinance is as follows. On June 18, 1980, an initiative petition was filed in the office of the North Little Rock City Clerk’s office. The text of the proposed ordinance read as follows: “AN ORDINANCE TO PROVIDE THE NORTH LITTLE ROCK POLICE AND FIREMEN WITH SALARIES AND BENEFITS COMMENSURATE WITH THOSE OF THE LITTLE ROCK POLICE AND FIREMEN.” BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS: SECTION 1. That the North Little Rock Police and Firemen are to be provided with salaries and benefits commensurate with or greater than those of the Little Rock Police and Fire Departments, rank, seniority, time in grade and service considered. SECTION 2. That the number of employees, ranks, and positions within each rank for the North Little Rock Police Department and Fire Department shall not be reduced to a level below that authorized as of January 1, 1980, except in case of extreme emergency. After the citizens of North Little Rock approved this initiated ordinance in the November 1980 election, the city council passed Ordinance No. 5203 on January 5, 1981, adding the following two sections: SECTION 3. That the sum of $700,000 is hereby appropriated from the general fund of the City of North Little Rock to fund the provisions of this ordinance. SECTION 4. That the present salaries and benefits of the North Little Rock police and firemen have caused many of the policemen and firemen in the City to seek higher paying jobs leaving a serious shortage of trained police and firemen, therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Ordinance being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force retroactive to January 2, 1981. In December 1981, the city council passed Ordinance No. 5363, which directed the mayor to negotiate with each department head and assistant department head in the city to establish a salary. The ordinance contained a repealer clause, specifically repealing Ordinance No. 5203. Thereafter, Police ChiefWilliam Younts and his assistant filed suit against the city in Pulaski County Circuit Court, alleging that the city had considered factors other than rank, seniority, time in grade, and service in determining their salaries. The trial court found that the city council had not complied with Ordinance No. 5203, and that Ordinance No. 5363, purportedly repealing Ordinance No. 5203, was void. This court affirmed in Thompson v. Younts, 282 Ark. 524, 669 S.W.2d 471 (1984). In 1983, the city council passed Ordinance No. 5494, amending Ordinance No. 5203 to exclude the Police Chief, Assistant Police Chief, and Fire Chief from the parity-pay obligation. Later in 1983, the city council referred to the voters Resolution No. 2521, a proposal to repeal parity pay, and, specifically, Ordinance No. 5203. At a special election held on February 7, 1984, the voters defeated this proposal. In 1994, the requirements of the parity-pay ordinance were met by an agreement between the city and the firefighters’ union. This agreement expired by its own terms on December 31, 1994. The agreement renewed automatically for one year and expired on December 31, 1995. After the parties were unable to reach a new agreement, the firefighters filed the present complaint in Pulaski County Circuit Court on January 15, 1996, claiming that their salaries and benefits are not commensurate with or greater than those firefighters in Little Rock. The parties agreed to file motions for summary judgment on the issue of the validity of the initiated ordinance. The city maintained in its motion that, when it provided the increases by making the $700,000 appropriation in Ordinance No. 5203 in 1981, it met its obligation under the initiated ordinance regarding parity pay. The city further claimed that it had no “continuing obligation” to provide further parity-pay increases after the increases it provided in January 1981. In the firefighters’ motion for summary judgment, they argued that the city’s interpretation was inconsistent with its own previous treatment of the ordinance, and that the ordinance contained no language that parity-pay requirement was a “one-time-only” obligation. The trial court agreed with the city and dismissed the firefighters complaint. The firefighters appeal that decision.  We apply the same statutory construction rules to ordinances as we do to statutes. Tackett v. Hess, 291 Ark. 239, 723 S.W.2d 833 (1987). In interpreting a statute, we will give the words in the statute their ordinary meaning and common usage. Burcham v. City of Van Buren, 330 Ark. 451, 954 S.W.2d 266 (1997). If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, our analysis need go no further. Id.  In reviewing the text of the initiated ordinance in question, we observe that it does not contain a “sunset provision,” whereby the ordinance would expire on a certain date. See Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996). Were we to agree with the trial court’s interpretation that the ordinance has “lapsed,” we would be “resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of limiting or extending the meaning.” Thompson v. Younts, 282 Ark. at 527, citing City of North Little Rock v. Montgomery, 261 Ark. 16, 546 S.W.2d 154 (1977); Hicks v. Ark. State Medical Board, 260 Ark. 31, 537 S.W.2d 794 (1976). Moreover, as the firefighters point out in their brief, the city’s interpretation of the ordinance in question is inconsistent with its previous interpretations of the measure. Particularly, the city observed the obligation under Ordinance No. 5203 as continuing when it referred Resolution No. 2521 to the people in 1984, proposing to repeal the ordinance and the parity pay requirement. As we have recognized, “[a] cardinal rule in dealing with a statutory provision is to give it a consistent and uniform interpretation so that it is not taken to mean one thing at one time and something else at another time.” Morris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993). It is also significant that the voters rejected the proposal to repeal Ordinance No. 5203 and parity pay. As any doubtful interpretation of the initiated ordinance must be resolved in favor of the popular will, see Thompson v. Younts, supra, we must conclude that the trial court erred in accepting the city’s interpretation that the initiated ordinance had lapsed and that the city no longer had an obligation to provide parity pay to the firefighters. The dissent raises an interesting issue; however, it was not developed below and the trial court did not consider it. While it might be appropriate for future consideration, under these circumstances, we will not consider it at this time. Reversed and remanded for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. Corbin, J., dissents.