Court Opinion

ID: 9560986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:00:43.32213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:27.447474
License: Public Domain

Foster, J.
Appellant, plaintiff below, appeals from a judgment dismissing his action for damages resulting from a motor vehicle collision, but, because the sole issue concerns the effect of the repeal of the immunity proviso on prior injuries, Laws of 1939, chapter 41, § 2, p. 121, 123,2 by Laws of 1957, chapter 70, § 23, p. 279, a detailed statement of the evidence is unnecessary. There was a prior appeal, *226Hammack v. Monroe Street Lbr. Co., 49 Wn. (2d) 581, 303 P. (2d) 1095. It is sufficient to say that both appellant and his employer were engaged in extrahazardous industry as classified by the industrial insurance act, when appellant was injured in a traffic accident on April 4, 1955, with the respondent’s truck, which was then being operated by the respondent, áíso in the course of extrahazardous industry.
Under the statute in force on April 4,1955, a person classified as a workman under the industrial insurance act, who, at the time of the accident, was in the course of extrahazardous employment for an employer likewise so engaged, had no cause of action against a tort feasor or his employee who was likewise engaged in any. extrahazardous employment. Hand v. Greyhound Corp., 49 Wn. (2d) 171, 299 P. (2d) 554. That proviso was dropped in the recast of some of the sections of the industrial insurance act by the legislature in 1957.
By Laws of 1911, chapter 74, § 1, p. 345, which, so far as material, is set out in the margin,3 a workman’s right to sue for an injury sustained in the course of extrahazardous employment was abolished.
By § 3 of that act (the applicable portion of which is set out in Appendix A), if the injury took place off the employer’s premises, a workman injured by one other than his employer was afforded a choice of compensation under the industrial insurance act, or the right to sue such third party for the full damage sustained.
In 1927, a change in the statutory definition of “injury”4 *227made a corresponding change -in this section necessary, which, so far as material,' is set out in Appendix B. In the amendment, the requirement that the injury-occur away from the plant of the employer was deleted, so that, in all cases of injury to a workman by anyone other than his employer, he was given the choice of taking under the industrial insurance act or suing the third party.
Two years later, the right to sue a third party for an injury to a workman was withdrawn if the third party and his employee were in the course of any extrahazardous employment. That provision, so far as material, is as follows:
"... Provided, however, That no action may be brought against any employer or any workman under this act as a third person if at the time of the accident such employer or such workman was in the course of any extra-hazardous employment under this act. Any such cause of action assigned to the state may be prosecuted or compromised by the department, in its discretion. ...” Laws of 1929, chapter 132, § 1, p. 325, 327.
In Robinson v. McHugh, 158 Wash. 157, 291 Pac. 330, and Denning v. Quist, 160 Wash. 681, 296 Pac. 145, filed February 16, 1931, it was held that this statute applied to injuries occurring before its effective date. The legislature was in session when Denning v. Quist, supra, was filed, and, obviously, to overcome the effect of that decision and of Robinson v. McHugh, supra, it enacted Laws of 1931, chapter 90, in § 1, p. 268, of which it is provided:
“. . . This act shall not affect any cause of action existing at the time said chapter 132 of the Session Laws of 1929 became effective, or the right to take an appeal and/or bring an action thereon, or any appeal pending, or right of appeal existing at the time said chapter 132 of the Session Laws of 1929 became effective.”
A petition for rehearing in Denning v. Quist, supra, followed, pursuant to which this court modified its decision by directing dismissal of the first action without prejudice. We said, on the second appeal in that case, 172 Wash. 83, 19 P. (2d) 656:
“Following our decision denying recovery to Denning, as above noticed, and soon after the approval by the governor *228of chapter 90, supra, his counsel filed a petition for rehearing in that cause calling our attention to, and relying upon, the above quoted italicized language of that chapter as restoring to him the right to maintain an action in the courts seeking recovery for his injuries suffered in the course of his extrahazardous employment, as such right existed prior to the enactment of the amendatory chapter 132, Laws of 1929, p. 325. This court, upon consideration of the petition, amended its decision on May 14, 1931, and entered an order directing the superior court to dismiss the action ‘without prejudice;’ thus preventing the dismissal of the action from becoming res judicata as against Denning, but not deciding what his right might be under the above quoted italicized language of chapter 90, supra. . . . ”
The legislative disapproval of our decisions that the immunity proviso of 1927 should have a retrospective application was recognized in the second appeal in which the court concluded:
“Although the language above quoted is somewhat vague and uncertain, all parts of an act may be considered to ascertain the legislative purpose, and it is manifest by the title to the act that it was the purpose of the legislature to ‘reserve’ to all parties having causes of action existing at the time chapter 132, supra, took effect, ‘to bring and prosecute proceedings or action thereon,’ to restore or reserve to some person or persons having some kind of a right of action, such right. It would seem that the rights intended to be restored, or reserved, or not affected, were such as that of appellant here. It is a rule of statutory construction almost universal that it is the duty of the courts to give such construction to the language of a statute as will make it purposeful and effective, rather than futile and meaningless.
“Unless, as above indicated, it was the sole purpose of the legislature in enacting chapter 90, supra, to permit persons having causes of action against third parties to recover damages from them on account of their negligence, although that was a statutory action, or rather a statutory election, the legislation was meaningless and ineffective.”
Thus the law remained until 1957, when the right to sue any third party without restriction was restored. Laws of 1957, chapter 70, p. 272, amends the bulk of the industrial insurance act, and enacts, as basic law, the division, com*229bination and codification of the session law sections dealt with therein. Section 23, the one in question, so far as material, is as follows:
“If the injury to a workman is due to negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, the injured workman or, if death results from the injury, his widow, children, or dependents, as the case may be, shall elect whether to take under this title or seek a remedy against such other, . . . ” Laws of 1957, chapter 70, § 23, p. 279.
There is not, however, a sign, syllable or word indicating a legislative intention that the removal of the previous restriction should render anyone liable for an accident occurring before the effective date of the 1957 codification.
In 1814, Mr. Justice Story, in the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, No. 13,156, 22 Fed. Cas. 756, defined a retrospective law as follows:
“. . . Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective;
Seventy years later, the supreme court itself approved that definition in Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511, 519, 29 L. Ed. 240, 5 S. Ct. 1014. No American court has ever sustained a statute which created a liability for an act for which, at the time of its occurrence, there was no liability.
On the other hand, the cases are legion in which statutes have been held to be unconstitutional because of an attempt to impose liability for acts when, at the time of the occurrence, there was none. Some are collected in the margin.5
*230 Such decisions are well exemplified by Ford v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321 P. (2d) 589 (February 10, 1958). That was an appeal from a judgment of dismissal after a general demurrer had been sustained. A minor sued for personal injury. At the time of the injury, the city of Caldwell was protected against liability by sovereign immunity.’ Thereafter, the legislature of Idaho enacted a statute waiving sovereign immunity, upon which the.minor relied. The supreme court of Idaho affirmed the trial court in its conclusion that the legislature could not constitutionally impose a liability for a past act for which, at the time of the occurrence, there was no liability. The court expressed that view in lánguáge so plain that it is incapable of misunderstanding. It said:
“A statute will not be given a retroactive construction by which it will impose liabilities not existing at the time of its passage. United States v. Nez Perce County, D. C. C. D. Idaho 1936, 16 F. Supp. 267, remanded 9 Cir., 1938, 95 F. 2d 232, rehearing denied 9 Cir., 1938, 95 F. 2d 238; Massa v. Nastri, Conn., 3 A. 2d 839, 120 A. L. R. 939; Micamold Radio Corporation v. Beedie, 156 Misc. 390, 282 N. Y. S. 77; In re Karnbach’s Estate, 208 Misc. 693, 144 N. Y. S. 2d 872; Scamman v. Scamman, Ohio Com. Pl., 90 N. E. 2d 617; 82 C. J. S. Statutes § 418, p. 995. «
“A statute affecting vested rights will be construed as operating prospectively only, and not retrospectively. ‘ A right of defense, not technical, but substantial, resulting in immunity from liability, which has fully vested, is as sacred and as important as a right of action, and is protected from any retroactive legislation in like manner as a vested right of action.’ International & G. N. R. Co. v. Edmundson, Tex. Com. App., 222 S. W. 181, 186. See also Massa v. Nastri, supra; Scamman v. Scamman, supra; In re Karnbach’s Estate, supra; Ohlinger v. United States, D. C. S. D. Idaho 1955, 135 F. Supp. 40; United States v. Nez Perce *231County, Idaho, supra; Application of Rauer’s Collections Co., 97 Cal. App. 2d 248, 196 P. 2d 803; Monacelli v. Grimes, 9 Terry, Del. 122, 99 A. 2d 255; Sowma v. State, 203 MisC. 1105, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 468; Pope v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. I. Co., 176 Pa. Super. 276, 107 A. 2d 191; 82 C. J. S. Statutes § 417, p. 994.”
The argument is made that the amendment of 1957 relates to the remedy and not to the right, and, therefore, is procedural, but this argument completely overlooks the distinction between rights and remedies. That distinction, however, is too fundamental to be misunderstood. The United States supreme court in Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 384, 62 L. Ed. 1171, 38 S. Ct. 501, explained it in two sentences:
“The distinction between rights and remedies is fundamental. A right is a well founded or acknowledged claim; a remedy is the means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury. . . . ”
Judge Neterer, in Mikkelson v. Pacific S. S. Co., 46 F. (2d) 124, 125, made it equally clear. He said:
“Right is a legal consequence which applies to certain facts, and under the new rules a new right is created and based on negligence. Remedy is a procedure prescribed by law to enforce a right. ...”
One of the most gifted law writers of all time, Judge Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, speaking for the New York court of appeals (afterwards Mr. Justice Cardozo of the United States supreme court), described, with his characteristic simplicity, the difference between statutes dealing with substantive rights and those dealing with procedural matters in Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N. E. 837, as follows:
“The general rule is that statutes are to be construed as prospective only. ... It takes a clear expression of the legislative purpose to justify a retroactive application. . . . Changes of procedure, i.e., of the form of remedies, are said to constitute an exception . . . , but that exception does not reach a case where before the statute there was no remedy whatever. ... To supply a remedy where previously there was none of any kind, is to create *232a right of action. ...” (Authorities cited in the original opinion omitted.)
It cannot be said that the statutory rearrangement of 1957, in which the third-party immunity proviso was dropped, relates to procedure. On the contrary, it deals exclusively with substantive rights. It creates a right of action where before there was none. Indeed, the line of demarcation can never be sharper. To give it a retrospective application would be to give the appellant a cause of action when, at the time of the accident, he had none. It would impose liability upon the respondent when, at the time of the occurrence, there was complete immunity. No twilight zone exists. It is clear and distinct.
In whatever light the matter is viewed, the fact remains that, at the time of this automobile accident, the respondent was immune from liability for it. Any attempt, therefore, to impose liability after the occurrence would be unconstitutional, but we do not have to reach this question because the legislature has not attempted to make the statute retrospective. It will be time enough to pass upon that question when the legislature attempts to do so.
 Even if the 1957 recast of the statute contained language from which it could be argued that a retrospective operation was intended, we should avoid that construction if it were at all possible. The United States supreme court in United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401, 60 L. Ed. 1061, 36 S. Ct. 658, said:
“A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score. . . . ”
This court itself announced the same view in Soundview Pulp Co. v. Taylor, 21 Wn. (2d) 261, 268, 150 P. (2d) 839, in the following sentence:
“ . . . In such cases the rule is that, where a statute is open to two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional or open to grave doubt in this respect, the former construction and not the latter is to be adopted. ...”
*233Moreover, the repeated decisions of this court hold that a statute will operate only in futuro unless the legislature has plainly declared its intention that it shall operate retrospectively. In re Wind’s Estate, 32 Wn. (2d) 64, 200 P. (2d) 748; Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., 197 Wash. 341, 85 P. (2d) 264; State ex rel. Chapman v. Edwards, 161 Wash. 268, 295 Pac. 1017; In re Ziegner’s Estate, 146 Wash. 537, 264 Pac. 12; Teed v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 111 Wash. 367, 190 Pac. 1005; East Hoquiam Co. v. Hoquiam, 90 Wash. 210, 155 Pac. 754; Graves v. Dunlap, 87 Wash. 648, 152 Pac. 532, L. R. A. 1916C, 338, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 944; Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup, 7 Wash. 29, 34 Pac. 164.
In the absence of a legislative declaration, for a court to impose liability for a previous act for which, at the time of its occurrence, the legislature had expressly provided there should be no liability, would, indeed, be judicial legislation. The judicial branch of the government is not endowed with that power.
This disposition of the appeal renders a consideration of the other assignments of error unnecessary.
The judgment is affirmed.
Weaver, C. J., Mallery, Hill, Donworth, and Ott, JJ., concur.
APPENDIX A
“ . . . Provided, however, That if the injury to a workman occurring away from the plant of his employer is due to the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, the injured workman, or if death result from the injury, his widow, children, or dependents, as the case may be, shall elect whether to take under this act or seek a remedy against such other, . . . ” Laws of 1911, chapter 74, § 3, p. 346, 348.
APPENDIX B
“ . . . Provided, however, That if the injury to a workman is due to the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, the injured workman, or if death result from the injury, his widow, children, or dependents, as the case may be, shall elect whether to take under this act or seek a remedy against such other, such election to be in advance of any suit under this section; ...” Laws of 1927, chapter 310, § 2, p. 815, 816.

 Part of the section is printed in RCW- 51.24.010.

 “. . . The State of Washington, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for workmen, injured in extra hazardous work, and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as otherwise provided in this act; and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this act provided.” Laws of 1911, chapter 74, § 1, p. 345.

 For a full history, see Windust v. Department of Labor & Industries, 52 Wn. (2d) 33, 323 P. (2d) 241.

 Weil v. Taxicabs of Cincinnati, Inc., 139 Ohio St. 198, 39 N. E. (2d) 148; Winfree v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 173 Fed. 65; In re Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 711, 134 N. E. (2d) 923; Phillips v. H. A. Marr Grocery Co. (Okla.), 295 P. (2d) 765; Swatek Constr. Co. v. Williams, 177 Okla. 305, 58 P. (2d) 585; Theodosis v. Keeshin Motor Express Co., 341 Ill. App. 8, 92 N. E. (2d) 794; Yaeger v. Delano Granite Works, 250 Minn. 303, 84 N. W. (2d) 363; Slate v. City of Fort Worth (Tex. Civ. *230App.), 193 S. W. 1143; Farmers Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks County Real Estate Co., 333 Pa. 390, 5 A. (2d) 94, 121 A. L. R. 905; Ross v. Lettice, 134 Ga. 866, 68 S. E. 734; Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark. 1010, 214 S. W. (2d) 212; State ex rel. Michaels v. Morse, 165 Ohio St. 599, 138 N. E. (2d) 660.