Court Opinion

ID: 9756330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:24:07.976515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:39.007316
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that this seventeen-year old juvenile with a lower than average I.Q., illegally arrested and detained, and only informed of his Miranda rights after seven hours of uninterrupted, uncounseled interrogation during which he asked to see his family, did knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney.
The majority states that the “issue (in his case) is identical with that presented in Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A. 2d 285 (1971), and is controlled by that decision.” However, Marabel is plainly inapposite. In Marabel, appellant was arrested and questioned on three separate dates, May 6, May 15 and May 17. During the first two interrogations appellant was not advised of his Mirwida rights, but no confession was obtained. Appellant was released after each of these first two sessions. At the third session on May 17 he was given his Miranda warnings and then finally confessed when confronted with some particularly damaging evidence. This Court held the confession admissible because “there was a break in the ‘stream of events’ ” which insulated the confession from the taint of the prior unlawful interrogations, on May 6 and 17. Commonwealth v. Marabel, supra at 449, 283 A. 2d at 292.
Because the interrogation in Marabel occurred on three separate and distinct days the instant case dif-
*560fers markedly. Here there was no “break in the stream of events.” On the contrary appellant was in custody for seven consecutive hours during which he was subject to interrogation without being informed of his constitutional rights. Only after seven hours of this type of continuous custody was he advised of his rights, and a confession obtained. Thus the “break in the stream of events” theory cannot be applied to remove this confession from the taint of the prior unlawful interrogation. Moreover, in Marabel, the defendant was not a juvenile. The United States Supreme Court long ago required that the circumstances surrounding a juvenile’s confession must be examined with greater scrutiny than that of an adult. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1453 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53-54, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1212 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600, 68 S. Ct. 302, 303-04 (1948). Thus the circumstance of an adult’s confession in Marabel cannot serve as a yardstick to measure the validity of a juvenile’s confession in the instant case.
The case which is controlling on this record is Commonwealth v. Harmon, 440 Pa. 195, 269 A. 2d 744 (1970). In Harmon, an eighteen-year old juvenile was arrested and interrogated continuously for eleven hours before he finally confessed. During the questioning Harmon was denied permission to see his family and subjected to several polygraph tests. In addition Harmon’s family and his attorney were not permitted to see him during the interrogation. Despite the fact that Harmon had been given his Miranda warnings at the beginning of the questioning, and once more after about eight hours, this Court held in that factual setting a confession extracted from an eighteen-year old was inadmissible. The Court there stated “[t]he facts found by the lower court, . . . disclose the use of tactics in the securing of. the challenged statement which we *561cannot condone.” Id. at 199, 269 A. 2d at 746. Here appellant was not even advised of Ms rights prior to the initial questioning, as in Harmon; he was never released from custody, as in Marabel; he asked to see his relatives; and only after seven hours of uninterrupted interrogation was he advised of his rights.
Secondly, I disagree with the majority’s application of the totality of the circumstances test. See Gallegos v. Colorado, supra; Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 48, 271 A. 2d 257, 260 (1970); Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 407, 247 A. 2d 612, 613 (1968); Commonwealth v. Eperjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 471, 224 A. 2d 216, 224 (1966). The majority in its analysis of the circumstances appears to weigh only those favoring a voluntary confession. It ignores the fact that the seventeen-year old boy, with a lower than average I.Q., who had asked to see his relatives, was interrogated for a lengthy period of time while being held virtually incommunicado. Under these conditions there is serious doubt that this juvenile could actually understand the meaning of any Miranda warning given.* His confession tainted and influenced by the psychological effects of the preceding seven hours of unlawful custodial interrogation was clearly involuntary.

 In a very similar case I stated that “I cannot indulge in the assumption that a 15-year old boy of greatly impaired mental ability could, without the aid of counsel or any adult friend . . . have the understanding and full appreciation of the advice given him which is the necessary prerequisite of a free and knowing decision to confess.” Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 54, 271 A. 2d 257, 263 (1970) (Roberts, J., dissenting). See also Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A. 2d 131 (1971) (dissenting opinion by Roberts, J., in which O’Brien, J., joined).