Court Opinion

ID: 9475490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:28:51.233575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:44.790210
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
In this case, the trial record does not show that the defendant and defense counsel actually desired to confer during the pertinent recess and would have conferred but for a restriction placed upon them by the trial judge. Consequently, the trial record in this case shows no deprivation of *1119defendant’s right to counsel.1 See Bailey v. Redman, 657 F.2d 21 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153, 102 S.Ct. 1024, 71 L.Ed.2d 310 (1982); Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907, 103 S.Ct. 1879, 76 L.Ed.2d 810 (1983). To the extent Judge Hatchett’s opinion recognizes this, I agree with his opinion. I also concur in the judgment to reverse and to remand. I share, in part, the views expressed in Judge Tjoflat’s concurring opinion, especially Part H.A.; but I speak for myself on two points.
1.
THE PROBABILITY OF IMPROPER COUNSELING IS LOW, AND TRIAL COURTS OUGHT NOT INTERFERE WITH ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS DURING TRIAL RECESSES
If so-called “coaching” of witnesses means improper attempts to influence the testimony of a witness, I agree that “coaching” of defendants is a valid concern of trial judges; but such improper counseling seems rare. Consequently, concerns about “coaching”, in general, cannot constitutionally support an order barring communication — even bearing on the defendant’s testimony — between a defendant and his lawyer during brief, routine recesses during the trial day in criminal cases. See generally Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 93, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1337-38, 47 L.Ed.2d 592, 602 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring); United States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641, 644 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630, 633 (4th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) .
At trial, defense counsel is the adversary of the government prosecutor; but absent clear evidence to the contrary, courts ought to assume that lawyers perform their duties ethically. While suggesting fraud or perjury is unethical,2 there is nothing unethical or, otherwise, wrong with lawyers counseling their clients at every recess concerning the anticipated direction of the prosecutor’s questions and the best manner in which the client can present the facts most favorably to the defense. To the contrary, such counseling is entirely proper.
In criminal cases, judicial orders barring defense attorney-client communications during brief, trial recesses violate the Constitution if that interference has a likely effect on the trial’s outcome. Because such interference entails considerable risk of constitutional error, it is ill-advised and unseemly and ought to be avoided unless expressible, extraordinary circumstances justify it in each particular instance. Briefly stated, the cost outweighs the benefit.
2.
PER SE REVERSALS ARE INAPPROPRIATE WHERE TRIAL COURTS INTERFERE WITH ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS DURING BRIEF TRIAL RECESSES
As indicated above, I am of the opinion that orders barring communications (even dealing with the defendant’s testimony) between a criminal defendant and his lawyer during brief, routine trial recesses (including recesses during the cross-examination of the defendant) can violate the sixth amendment if the trial record shows that the lawyer or defendant actually wished to confer during that recess. I believe, however, that such constitutional violations occur very occasionally: not every interference of this sort with counsel’s assistance results in a breakdown in the adversary *1120process that renders the trial’s outcome unreliable. If there is no such breakdown, there has been no sixth amendment violation.3 Although such a breakdown may be presumed in certain extreme circumstances, the facts and circumstances of most cases do not warrant such a presumption.
Accordingly, sixth amendment claims in the context of brief, routine recesses during the trial day ought to be subject to a requirement that the defendant affirmatively assert and demonstrate prejudice as a condition to post-conviction relief.4 See United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 148-49 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1427, 71 L.Ed.2d 648 (1982); State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 299 S.E.2d 324, 325-26 cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908, 103 S.Ct. 1881, 76 L.Ed.2d 811 (1983); cf. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976) (interference with counsel by order not to consult with defendant during overnight recess denied right to the effective assistance of counsel). See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (usually sixth amendment claims require defendants to show prejudice); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 n. 31, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2049 n. 31, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (fact that accused can attribute deficiency in his representation to the court does not justify reversal absent an actual or likely effect on the trial process).
I disagree with those who think that this standard places an impossible burden on the defendant. Both the Supreme Court and this Circuit have already placed this burden on defendants alleging a myriad of constitutional violations. See Morris v. Matthews, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 1032, 1038, 89 L.Ed.2d 187 (1986) (jeopardy barred conviction reduced to conviction for lesser included offense that is riot jeopardy barred); United States v. Bagley, --- U.S. ---, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3381, 3384, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (evidence favorable to defendant withheld by government); Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621, 623 (11th Cir.1985) (improper prosecutorial argument), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 2258, 90 L.Ed.2d 703 (1986); Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535, 1546-47 (11th Cir.1985) (delay between crime and indictment).5
Neither am I convinced that this prejudice standard would infringe too much on attorney-client relations. To prove prejudice, truly privileged communications may be neither necessary nor relevant. Standing alone, the circumstances of the pertinent recess and pertinent order can establish prejudice. If in a particular case the circumstances (length of recess, restrictiveness of the order, the point in the trial at which the recess is taken, etc.) are, by themselves, not enough, the defendant seeking review may choose to disclose the intended nature of the barred communication. Even these are communications that never, in fact, occurred; and, thus, the usual attorney-client privilege rules hardly seem to control. Perhaps sometimes, how*1121ever, privileged communications may be relevant. Although the attorney-client privilege, in particular, and attorney-client confidentiality, in general, are important concerns due genuine deference, courts have never treated them as inviolable. When a defendant has challenged his conviction by asserting an issue that makes privileged communications relevant, he waives the privilege in respect to those communications. See, e.g., Smith v. Estelle, 527 F.2d 430, 434 n. 9 (5th Cir.1976) (whether defendant would have testified but for admission of constitutionally invalid confession).6
We must recall that these challenges are presented to us by persons already convicted of a crime. Those convictions are presumptively valid. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3392, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983); cf. United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1380 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 2305, 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982). The courts remain open to such persons, but it is right that the challengers bear the burden of establishing that their convictions were inconsistent with the requirements of the Constitution.
Many of the brief recesses during a trial day are not critical stages of the criminal proceeding. If the category of sixth amendment cases in which prejudice will be presumed is to be extended to instances of interference with defense counsel during a brief, routine recess, the nation’s highest court should take that step first. Per se reversal rules are not favored. See Rose v. Clark, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). Nor should they be. To the extent that United States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641 (5th Cir.1980), and Judge Hatchett’s opinion mandate per se reversals in this circuit, they are, in my opinion, mistaken. The social costs of crime are too great to allow the proliferation of per se reversal rules.

. In light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), the actions of the State of Florida are governed by the sixth amendment right to counsel.

. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.2(d), 3.3 & comment to Rule 1.2(d); ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7, DR 7-102(A)(4), (6), (7); Alabama Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7, EC 7-26 & DR 7-102(A)(4), (6), (7); Florida Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7, EC 7-26 & DR 7-102(A)(4), (6), (7); Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7, EC 7-26 & DR 7-102(A)(4), (6), (7).

. This is different from the concept of harmless federal constitutional error; thus, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), does not control.

. I specifically note that this case comes to us as an appeal by a state prisoner from the denial of federal habeas corpus relief by the district court. In the words of Justice Harlan, “I therefore put aside all other types of cases; in so doing, however, I wish to make it perfectly clear that I am by no means prepared to say that the constitutional issue should ultimately turn upon the nature of the particular case involved.” Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 590, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1663, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).

. For other cases applying a prejudice standard, see United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867-873, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446-49, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (government deportation of defendant’s witnesses; defendant must show testimony would have been material and favorable); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365-66, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) (agent meeting with defendant without counsel’s consent or presence; defendant must demonstrate at least threat of prejudice); Busby v. Holt, 771 F.2d 1461 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 826, 88 L.Ed.2d 798 (1986), opinion withdrawn in part, 781 F.2d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir.1986) (prosecutor calling coindictee to testify, knowing that he would invoke fifth amendment privilege; defendant must prove prejudice).

. For other examples of waiver, see United States v. Miller, 600 F.2d 498, 501-02 (5th Cir.) (criminal law securities case, issue of good faith reliance on attorney’s advice), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 434, 62 L.Ed.2d 327 (1979); Johnson v. United States, 542 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1976) (validity of guilty plea based on attorney’s advice); Bennett v. Mississippi, 523 F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir.1975) (waiver of right to appeal); Armstrong v. United States, 440 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.1971) (validity of guilty plea based on counsel's advice); United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1324-26 (5th Cir.1970) (en banc) (guilty plea based on counsel’s advice), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933, 91 S.Ct. 2262, 29 L.Ed.2d 712 (1971). See also Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1315 n. 20 (7th Cir.1984) (securities case); Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332 (8th Cir.1974) (defendant claiming attorney coerced him into testifying), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125, 95 S.Ct. 811, 42 L.Ed.2d 826 (1975). See generally Thornburg, Attorney-Client Privilege: Issue-Related Waivers, 50 S. Air L. & Com. 1039 (1985).