Court Opinion

ID: 9409766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 14:08:00.75293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.154016
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                         In The Court of Appeals

             Jerome Campbell, Petitioner,

             v.

             State of South Carolina, Respondent.

             Appellate Case No. 2018-000464

                          Appeal from Charleston County
                     William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

                               Opinion No. 5999
                  Heard February 16, 2023 – Filed July 19, 2023

                                    AFFIRMED

             Clarence Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Petitioner.

             Assistant Attorney General Zachary William Jones, of
             Columbia, for Respondent.

GEATHERS, J.: In this post-conviction relief (PCR) action, Petitioner Jerome
Campbell (Campbell) seeks review of an order dismissing his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Campbell argues that the PCR court erred in finding that
Campbell's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the trial court's
mutual combat charge. We affirm.

                                      FACTS

      This case involves a convoluted web of familial and domestic quarrels, two
of which give rise to the following events.
       The first was a dispute between the husband of Campbell's niece, Anthony
German (Anthony), and Campbell's sister and mother. Campbell's sister and mother
called Anthony to ask if he and his wife would visit with their newborn child. They
refused. Campbell was made aware of Anthony's refusal and promptly informed
Anthony that he intended to kill him for not visiting his mother and sister with the
child.

       The second event arose from a marital dispute between Campbell's sister and
her husband, Michael Allen (Allen), later that day. Campbell's mother and Allen's
brother, Frank Haigler (Frank) were invited over to the apartment to mediate
tensions, but their efforts proved unsuccessful. Inexplicably, Anthony and his
brother Michael German then arrived and forced their way into Allen's apartment.
While inside the apartment, Michael German said to Campbell's mother that he was
going to kill her son. After Campbell's mother threatened to call the police, Allen,
Frank, and the German brothers left Allen's apartment and drove to Anthony's
apartment. Then, Campbell's sister and mother notified Campbell about the events.
In response, Campbell called Allen to let him know that Campbell would be stopping
by Anthony's apartment shortly.

       Later that afternoon, Campbell arrived at Anthony's apartment in his white
Chevrolet Impala accompanied by two individuals. As Campbell entered the
parking lot of Anthony's apartment complex, he approached Allen, Frank, and the
German brothers, who were standing outside. Campbell shouted at the men, and
Frank cautiously approached the vehicle. Campbell rolled down the rear side
window and aimed a pistol at Frank. Frank shouted, "[y]o, everybody back up
because he's got a gun." Anthony's mother—who was at Anthony's apartment at the
time—heard Frank and yelled "[g]et in the house, get in the house[,]" which
prompted Campbell to speed off. Frank testified that Allen received a number of
threatening phone calls from Campbell shortly after he left the complex. During one
of the calls, Campbell told Allen while on speaker phone, "[y]ou better not come
home. I'll be there soon."

       In response to Campbell's threats, Anthony retrieved his pistol, and Frank,
Allen, and the German brothers made their way to Allen's apartment complex to
confront Campbell. Instead of driving into the complex, they decided to park at a
gas station across the street. Allen and the German brothers stayed back at the gas
station while Frank crossed the street unarmed in an attempt to defuse the situation.
In the parking lot of Allen's apartment complex, Frank and Campbell had a brief
exchange that culminated in Campbell punching Frank in the face. Campbell then
gestured toward two unknown individuals who began to approach with shotguns.1
Frank darted down an alleyway adjacent to the apartment complex and crawled
towards the road in the direction of the gas station. Campbell and the two unknown
gunmen entered his white Chevrolet Impala and drove toward the gas station across
the street. Allen and the German brothers spotted the vehicle, dove to the ground,
and a fusillade of gunshots were fired in both directions.2 Michael German was
struck by gunfire and pronounced dead at the scene. The cause of death was
determined to be a gunshot wound to the left side of his head. That night, Campbell
surrendered himself to the police department.

      On January 23–27, 2012, Campbell was tried before a jury and convicted of
the murder of Michael German as well as three counts of assault with intent to kill
(AWIK). Campbell was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for murder and ten
years for each count of AWIK, to run concurrently. Campbell appealed, and this
court affirmed his convictions in an unpublished opinion.3 On May 12, 2014,
Campbell filed a PCR application. On January 9, 2018, his application was denied
and dismissed with prejudice. The PCR court found that "the trial court's instruction
on mutual combat was supported by the evidence presented at trial and any objection
would not have been successful." This appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

      "In a PCR case, [our appellate courts] will uphold the PCR court's factual
findings if there is any evidence of probative value in the record to support them."
Thompson v. State, 423 S.C. 235, 239, 814 S.E.2d 487, 489 (2018). "However, this
[c]ourt gives no deference to the PCR court's conclusions of law, and we review
those conclusions de novo." Id.

                                 LAW/ANALYSIS

    I.   Background on Mutual Combat

1
   It is unclear from the record whether these were the same individuals who
accompanied Campbell to Anthony's apartment earlier that day.
2
   There is conflicting evidence as to whether Anthony's pistol was ever fired.
However, a high level of gunshot residue was found on Michael German's hand. At
trial, Chris Robinson, a forensic consultant employed as an expert witness, stated, "I
can a hundred percent say [firing a weapon is] the only way in all my training that I
know that you can get [gunshot residue] levels that were [] that high[.]"
3
  State v. Campbell, Op. No. 2013-UP-338 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013 filed Aug. 7, 2013).
       "The doctrine of mutual combat has existed in South Carolina since at least
1843," but had fallen out of common use until its recent resurgence. State v. Taylor,
356 S.C. 227, 231, 589 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2003). To constitute mutual combat, there must
be "mutual intent and willingness to fight." State v. Graham, 260 S.C. 449, 450, 196
S.E.2d 495, 495 (1973). The intent to fight is "manifested by the acts and conduct
of the parties and the circumstances attending and leading up to the combat." Id.
Additionally, "[t]he State is required to prove the rival combatants were armed for
the mutual combat with deadly weapons and each combatant knew the others were
armed." State v. Young, 429 S.C. 155, 160, 838 S.E.2d 516, 519 (2020). In 2003,
our supreme court in Taylor revised the long-established doctrine by cementing
within our jurisprudence both the knowledge requirement between combatants and
the requirement that "the fight arise out of a pre-existing dispute[.]" 356 S.C. at 233–
234, 589 S.E.2d at 4–5.

      To illustrate a scenario in which a newly-revised mutual combat charge would
be warranted, the court in Taylor cited its reasoning in Graham:

             [t]here was ill-will between the parties. They had
             threatened each other[,] and it is inferable that they had
             armed themselves to settle their differences at gun
             point. Under these circumstances, the apparent
             willingness of each to engage in an armed encounter with
             the other[] sustained an inference that they were engaged
             in mutual combat at the time of the killing[] and required
             that the issue be submitted to the jury for determination.

Id. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 4 (quoting Graham, 260 S.C. at 452, 196 S.E.2d at 496).
The court in Taylor distinguished its facts from Graham in finding that "[t]here is
no evidence . . . that there was any pre-existing ill-will or dispute between [the
combatants], and there is no evidence that [the victim] was willing to engage in an
armed encounter with Petitioner." Id. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 5.

   II.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      "A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Taylor v. State, 404
S.C. 350, 359, 745 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2013). "To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, the PCR applicant must prove (1) counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the applicant sustained prejudice as a
result of counsel's deficient performance." Thompson, 423 S.C. at 239, 814 S.E.2d
at 489. "Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or
sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim." Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective
assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the [appellant]
makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697.

             A. Factual Basis for Mutual Combat Charge

     Campbell argues that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the
mutual combat charge because there was a lack of factual support for the charge.
We disagree.

      With regard to a showing of deficient performance, a PCR applicant "must
show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.

      In the present case, the evidence supports a jury instruction on mutual combat.
We believe the following set of facts gleaned from Graham resemble those before
us on appeal:

             Appellant and deceased had quarreled prior to the day of
             the killing. Both had made threats against the other[,] and
             appellant purchased a pistol on the night before the fatal
             encounter. They met in town shortly before the shooting
             and engaged in a heated discussion, during which
             appellant waved a pistol in the face of the deceased. The
             deceased, who apparently had no weapon at the time, then
             drove out of town in his truck, returning a short time later
             with his pistol. When the deceased returned, he parked his
             truck in front of a barber shop and got out with his pistol
             in his hand. As the deceased left his truck, appellant, who
             was in the barber shop and had observed the deceased's
             return, walked into the street, placing himself in a position
             where an encounter with the deceased could be expected.
             Appellant could see the weapon in the possession of the
             deceased, and the deceased knew that appellant was
             armed. As appellant entered the street from the barber
             shop, both parties fired at each other. The deceased was
             mortally wounded and died a short time thereafter.
260 S.C. at 451, 196 S.E.2d at 496.

       Here, the following events run parallel to those in Graham. Campbell
quarreled with and threatened Allen and Anthony prior to the fatal encounter.
Campbell met with Allen, Frank, and the German brothers before the shooting. At
this brief confrontation, Campbell flashed a pistol at Frank, who was unarmed at the
time. After a brief interval, Campbell along with two other individuals retrieved two
shotguns and headed to Allen's apartment. Anthony collected his firearm shortly
after and he, Frank and the German brothers went to gas station in close proximity
to Allen's apartment. Frank attempted to broker détente, but this went awry when
Campbell punched him in the face and the two men accompanying Campbell
approached with shotguns. Campbell and the unknown gunmen entered Campbell's
Impala and drove to the convenience store across the street, where Allen and the
German brothers were standing. Forensic evidence later supported a finding that
both sides fired at each other, resulting in Michael German's death.

       "Under [the circumstances in Graham], the apparent willingness of each to
engage in an armed encounter with the other[] sustained an inference that they were
engaged in mutual combat at the time of the killing[] and required that the issue be
submitted to the jury for determination." Graham, 260 S.C. at 452, 196 S.E.2d at
496. Similarly, in the present case, the apparent willingness of each combatant,
including Campbell, to engage in an armed encounter creates an inference of mutual
combat that necessitated a corresponding charge to be submitted to the jury.
Therefore, Campbell's trial counsel's decision not to object to the jury charge did not
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

             B. Permissibility of Burden Shifting

       Campbell additionally argues that his trial counsel's failure to object to the
mutual combat charge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because the
charge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on self-defense to Campbell.
Campbell's brief frames this as an issue of prejudice; however, the relevance of any
prejudice to Campbell is predicated on whether his trial counsel was deficient in
failing to object to the mutual combat charge. Thus, we must first determine whether
Campbell's trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the jury charge under
this alternative rationale before considering whether to undertake a prejudice
analysis. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ("[T]here is no reason for a court deciding
an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the
[appellant] makes an insufficient showing on one.").
       "Mutual combat relates primarily to the law of self-defense." State v. Bowers
(Bowers II), 436 S.C. 640, 647, 875 S.E.2d 608, 612 (2022).4 Self-defense
comprises four elements—the first of which relates to the doctrine of mutual combat.
See id. ("[Our supreme c]ourt has explained self-defense by referring to four
elements."); see also State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011)
(listing each of the four elements of self-defense). Termed the "'no fault' element of
self-defense[,]" the first element requires a defendant to be "without fault in bringing
on the difficulty." Taylor, 356 S.C. at 232, 235, 589 S.E.2d at 3, 5 (quoting State v.
Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984)). "[I]f a defendant is found to
have been involved in mutual combat, the 'no fault' element of self-defense cannot
be established." Id. at 232, 589 S.E.2d at 3. In other words, "mutual combat acts as
a bar to self-defense . . ." Id. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 4. A defendant may by word or
act withdraw from mutual combat and restore their right to self-defense, but this
action must be known to the opposing combatant. See Young, 429 S.C. at 161, 838
S.E.2d at 519 ("A combatant may withdraw from mutual combat if he 'endeavors in
good faith to decline further conflict[] and, either by word or act, makes that fact
known to his adversary.'" (quoting Graham, 260 S.C. at 451, 196 S.E.2d at 496)).

       Campbell takes issue with the circuit court's instruction that "[i]f the defendant
voluntarily participated in mutual combat for purposes other than protection, the
killing of the victim would not be self-defense." Specifically, Campbell believes the
instruction conflicts with his understanding of Taylor's holding "that it is improper
for a trial court to charge both self-defense and mutual combat." However, this
oversimplified interpretation of Taylor distorts its meaning. In Taylor, our supreme
court found that the burden of proof impermissibly shifted to the defendant to prove
self-defense when a self-defense "charge was negated by the court's unwarranted
charge on mutual combat." 356 S.C. at 235, 589 S.E.2d at 5 (emphasis added).5

4
  Our supreme court granted certiorari on State v. Bowers (Bowers I), 428 S.C. 21,
832 S.E.2d 623 (Ct. App. 2019), aff'd, 436 S.C. 640, 875 S.E.2d 608 (2022), but on
an issue different from the mutual combat issue before this court. See Bowers II, at
645–46, 875 S.E.2d at 611 ("The State does not challenge the court of appeals'
analysis of the evidence or its ruling that the doctrine of mutual combat is not
applicable. Rather, the State challenges whether the court of appeals' ruling on that
issue requires reversal of the ABHAN conviction.").
5
  In a similar misunderstanding, Campbell asserts that this court in Bowers I "found
that the mere charge as to mutual combat was prejudicial because it negated self-
defense." The Bowers court found "the erroneous charge on mutual combat was
prejudicial because the charge effectively negated Appellant's self-defense plea."
However, when evidence warrants a mutual combat charge, it may be charged to a
jury even when read alongside a self-defense charge. See State v. Jackson, 384 S.C.
29, 38 n.5, 681 S.E.2d 17, 21 n.5 (Ct. App. 2009) ("We do not suggest mutual combat
and self-defense are mutually exclusive; rather, in Taylor, there was no evidence that
the victim was willing to engage in mutual combat with [the defendant].").

       In the present case, the State presented evidence to support a jury charge on
mutual combat. Because the charge was warranted, Campbell's trial counsel was not
deficient in failing to object to its reading alongside the circuit court's jury charge on
self-defense. See Jackson, 384 S.C. at n.5, 681 S.E.2d at n.5 (clarifying that when
"there [is] no evidence [a] victim [is] willing to engage in mutual combat[,]"
charging mutual combat and self defense creates unfair prejudice; however, "mutual
combat and self-defense are [not] mutually exclusive" when mutual combat is
supported by the evidence).

                                   CONCLUSION

      Accordingly, the PCR court's dismissal of Campbell's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and VERDIN, J., concur.

Bowers I, 428 S.C. at 37, 832 S.E.2d at 632 (emphasis added). Like the description
of the charge in Taylor as "unwarranted," the operative word in Bowers was
"erroneous."