Court Opinion

ID: 9793169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:43:51.70107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:31.890117
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ERICKSON
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part for the following reasons:
Search pursuant to a warrant is the rule and, in the absence of exigent circumstances, all searches without a warrant are unlawful. Chimel *57v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1976). Here, the trial judge specifically found that there were no exigent circumstances, and I cannot join the majority in concluding that the officers’ subsequent attempt to halt their search and to secure a warrant constituted a “means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). For that reason, I dissent from Part II of the majority opinion.
Testimony adduced at the suppression hearing established that prior to the defendant’s arrest the police officers had the necessary probable cause to secure a search warrant.1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). The record also shows, however, that the officers did not secure the warrant prior to their intrusion into the defendant’s premises. Rather, upon arresting the defendant, the police first searched the house, and confirmed that contraband was present. Only then did they secure the house and seek their warrant. After obtaining the warrant, the police returned to the house to seize the narcotics they had previously discovered and to conduct a more intensive search for other contraband.
The trial court made an explicit finding that there was no evidence in the record to suggest to the officers that a cohort of the defendant existed who might destroy evidence before the officers got back with a warrant. The court also concluded that the officers had no reasonable expectation that their personal safety was endangered. Accordingly, there is no justification for the conclusion that the purpose of the illegal first search was the discovery of persons, not contraband. Although the police made only a cursory search of the premises, they terminated that search after the discovery of some of the contraband sought in the warrant and then attempted to secure a warrant. The police effort to obtain a warrant after an illegal breakin cannot repair the original invasion of privacy.
In effect, the police in this case followed the same course of conduct which was condemned in Chimel v. California, supra. In Chimel, an arrest was made and a search, incident to the arrest, extended to the entire house that Chimel occupied. There, the police had facts which would have provided probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. In both this case and Chimel the police made their initial search without a search warrant. The search warrant, which was obtained at a later time in this case, did not, in my view, legitimize the illegal entry which was accomplished by force. The facts in this case differ only because the police obtained a warrant at a later time, and continued their search.
*58I.
The trial court found that the warrantless search was not constitutionally justified as incident to an arrest. Absent exigent circumstances, searches incident to lawful arrest may extend only to the area under the immediate control of the arrestee, that area in which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Roybal v. People, 166 Colo. 541, 444 P.2d 875 (1968); People v. Casias, 193 Colo. 66, 563 P.2d 926 (1977). A search without a warrant at another location is not incident to the arrest. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). See also, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979). Indeed, the holding in Vale v. Louisiana, supra, which suppressed evidence when the police searched the defendant’s house after an arrest was made on the front steps of the house, is dispositive of the issue.
The majority points out that the trial court found that no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) and other cases cited in the majority opinion. The record shows that the police were informed that the defendant was alone with his Doberman Pinscher in the house that was the subject of the search. At the supression hearing, the police officers testified that because they feared the animal, they attempted to separate the defendant from his dog and eventually made the arrest on the porch where the dog was not a threat. Consequently, it is inconceivable to me that the police entered the house to protect themselves from further attack after having undergone such precautions to avoid contact with the dog. Certainly the dog was not capable of destroying narcotics, and, with the Doberman Pinscher as the only known occupant of the house, there was little danger that anyone else would enter and destroy the narcotics.
Exceptions to the warrant requirement are “jealously and carefully drawn” and there must be a strong showing “that the exigencies of the situation made the course imperative.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 454-55. In my view, there is no room in either the Colorado or Federal Constitutions for the “normal” and “standard” procedure used by the officers in this case.
II.
Once it has been established that an illegal search has taken place, and the defendant can show a nexus between the evidence sought to be suppressed and the illegal search, the burden falls squarely on the prosecution to show that the evidence is sufficiently freed from the taint of the illegality. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed.2d 307 (1939); Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (per Tuttle, C.J.) (5th *59Cir. 1965). Cf. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In this case, the prosecution has not met that burden. I can find no constitutionally permissible way to distinguish the search activities carried out by the officers after the warrant was issued from those made by the same officers before receipt of the warrant.
The record shows that the police officers who conducted the initial illegal search had certain information at their disposal prior to the defendant’s arrest, and that only this information was used in securing their subsequent search warrant. While the majority relies upon the fact that such information was derived independently of the illegal search, that fact is not dispositive. The question is whether the acquisition of the information used as the basis for the warrant was accomplished in such a way as to purge the taint created by the initial illegal search. Cf. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Here, the police obtained no independent information after the illegal intrusion which could be used to establish probable cause for the search warrant. Instead, all of the information relied upon for the warrant was at their disposal prior to the illegal search. Given the fact that the officers could have and should have obtained a warrant prior to the initial search, it cannot be said that the subsequent use of that prior information purged the taint.
In United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050, 95 S.Ct. 626, 42 L.Ed.2d 645 (1974), the Sixth Circuit confronted a fact situation substantially similar to the present case. There, narcotics agents, possessing probable cause to search the defendant’s apartment, dispatched one of their number to procure a search warrant while they proceeded to the defendant’s apartment to secure it. The officers broke into the apartment and found a quantity of narcotics in plain view. Four hours later, a search warrant was brought to the apartment and the officers made a more thorough search. As in this case, the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not contain any facts discovered as a result of the illegal entry.
In rejecting the prosecution’s claim that the taint had dissipated because the officers initially had probable cause or the warrant, the court first emphasized that there was no constitutional justification for the initial warrantless entry. 502 F.2d at 961. The court then refuted the assertion that the discovery of the narcotics was inevitable without reference to the illegal entry:
“The assertion by police (after an illegal entry and after finding evidence of crime) that the discovery was ‘inevitable’ because they planned to get a search warrant and had sent an officer on such a mission, would as a practical matter be beyond judicial review. Any other view would tend in actual practice to emasculate the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”
*60Id. I submit that Griffin’s rational and holding should be applied in this case.
Condon v. People, 176 Colo. 212, 489 P.2d 1297 (1971), which involved facts similar to this case, also requires a result contrary to that set forth in the majority opinion. In that case officers, who had probable cause to obtain a search warrant, did not seek a warrant but instead illegally entered the defendant’s house. Upon finding narcotics and apparatus for the manufacture of narcotics, the officers then applied for a search warrant. Seizure of the contraband followed.
As in Griffin, this Court first noted that the initial entry was illegal. We then held: “The search was illegal at its inception and nothing intervening, including the last minutes obtaining of a search warrant can render any part of the search legal.” 176 Colo. at 219-20, 489 P.2d at 1301. Our holding in Condon cannot be reconciled with the majority’s opinion in this case.2
III.
In reaching its decision in this case, the majority overlooks the fundamental tenor of the exclusionary rule — its focus is forward.3 The exclusionary rule is designed both to deter unlawful police practices by depriving them of any benefit gained from an unlawful police search, and to keep the courts from countenancing illegal search practices by the police. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Courts must strive primarily to prevent violations of the Fourth Amendment and not to repair. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
An unavoidable implication of the majority holding is that where police suspect that contraband is present, and have probable cause necessary for the issuance of a warrant, they can first make a search to confirm their suspicions, and then obtain a warrant. If no contraband is found during *61the initial search, they are free to withdraw and seek a warrant at a later time, with the warrant requirement effectively circumvented.4
The fact situation which is before us may be expected to occur frequently. At the suppression hearing the police officers conceded that searches such as they made in this case were standard procedure. What was not stated, however, was that such practices will continue as long as the officers feel that they can avoid the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement with impunity. Under the majority view, the police have nothing to lose by conducting these types of warrantless searches — the later determination of probable cause will render their Fourth Amendment violation irrelevant. Thus, the Fourth Amendment mandate that a neutral and detached magistrate must determine probable cause before an individual’s privacy has been invaded is bypassed.
Such a position can not pass constitutional muster. In United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 489 (2d. Cir. 1962), the Second Circuit stated:
“Such a rule would relax the protection of the right of privacy in the very cases in which, by the government’s own admission, there is no reason for an unlawful search. The better the government’s case against an individual, the freer it would be to invade his privacy. We cannot accept such a result.”
As one commentator put it: “If the argument was accepted that the search was valid because a warrant would subsequently be issued, the protections of the fourth amendment would be a nullity.”5 Thus, the majority opinion makes substantial inroads into rights that are protected by the Fourth Amendment.
For these reasons, I dissent from Part II of the Court’s opinion, and would affirm the trial court’s ruling in its entirety.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY joins me in this concurrence and dissent.

 One of the prosecution’s main contentions, which was supported by the trial court’s findings, was that the warrant that was finally issued was predicated only on information available to the police prior to the defendant’s arrest.

 Condon is not distinguishable by the facts that the officers based their affidavit for a warrant on facts discovered during the illegal search. Such a distinction is not tenable. In Condon, the Court noted that the officers initially had probable cause to search the premises for a decomposing body. During their warrantless search, the officers inadvertently discovered narcotics which provided the basis for the later issued warrant. To suggest that this fact alone distinguishes Condon from the present case would be to say that had the officers instead procured a warrant to search for a decomposing body — based on the facts available to them prior to the illegal entry — their second search and discovery of narcotics would have been constitutional. This would be sheer form over substance.

 See Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duke L. J. 391, 335 (1962).

 Cf. Pitler, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Revisited and Shepardized, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 579, 626-7 (1968), who discusses the situation where officers, having probable cause for an individual’s arrest, break into his home and search the premises prior to his return. Upon his return, the officers make the arrest and then rediscover the evidence found earlier as part of their search incident to the arrest.
“Such a rule would discourage the procurement of search warrants and significantly encourage illicit searches prior to arrests in order to procure incriminating evidence. If the police think they have probable cause to believe that a certain individual has committed crime, then it should be a simple matter to draft a search warrant for the evidence sought to be obtained. The exclusion of evidence discovered before an arrest but seized incidental to the arrest would encourage this practice while securing the right to privacy.”

 Note, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 137, 158 (1976).