Court Opinion

ID: 9693230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:31:05.719747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:43.005154
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
(dissenting). The parties to this pro-ceeding are in agreement as to the material facts involved. Plaintiff entered the employ of defendant on May 11, 1954. Her work was clerical in nature, involving the performance of general office duties. On May 26th following, she left her place of employment, on the second floor of defendant’s building, -about 11:30 a.m., her lunch period being ordinarily from 11:30 to 12:30. She went to the third floor where she had her lunch, remaining there for a brief interval after finishing the meal. She then started to leave defendant’s building for the purpose of paying a bill for her mother at an office located in another building in the vicinity. In going down the stairs from the second floor to the main floor she slipped and sustained an injury to her back. Subsequently she filed claim for compensation under *99the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act.* The deputy commissioner before whom the proofs were taken made an award granting compensation to plaintiff for total disability from May 27, 1954, to August 31st thereafter, inclusive. It was found that plaintiff was able to return to work on September 1st of the year named. The appeal board affirmed the award and defendant, on leave granted, has appealed.
The question involved is primarily one of statutory construction. Counsel on both sides have discussed at some length the interpretation and application of part 2, § 1, of the compensation law as amended by PA 1954, No 175. Said section as so amended (CLS 1954, § 412.1 [Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp § 17.151]), reads as follows:
“An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by an employer who is at the time of such injury subject to the provisions of this act, shall be paid compensation in the manner and to the extent hereinafter provided, or in case of his death resulting from such injuries such compensation shall be paid to his dependents as hereinafter defined. The term ‘time of injury’ or ‘date of injury’ as used in this act shall in the case of a disease or in the case of an injury not attributable to a single event be the last day of work in the employment in which the employee was last subjected to the conditions resulting in disability or death.
“Every employee going to or from his work while on the premises where his work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his working hours, shall be presumed to be in the course of his employment.”
*100'The amendatory act was not in effect at the time of the accident in Avhich plaintiff sustained her injury, but became operative before the subsequent proceedings were taken. Whether it applies here depends on the construction given the provisions of the section quoted, including, specifically, the final clause which was added by said act. In accordance with recognized principles the section quoted must be construed to carry out the intention of the legislature as evidenced by the language employed, read in its entirety, and in conjunction with other pertinent provisions of the compensation law. In In re School District No. 6, Paris and Wyoming Townships, Kent County, 284 Mich 132, 143, 144, it was declared that the intention of the legislature' in a case of this character must be “drawn from an. examination of the language of the act itself, the subject matter under consideration, and the scope and purpose of the act. It is necessary to consider other statutes which may have preceded it or which relate to the same subject. The act should be so construed that all of its provisions may be rendered harmonious and recourse may be had to the history of the legislation upon the subject matter of the act.” See, also, Crawford v. School District No. 6, 342 Mich 564.
Was it the intention of the legislature, in adding the final sentence to the section quoted, to declare an absolute presumption that should control the right to compensation without reference to the actual facts, or was the purpose to create a rule of procedure that should be followed in the absence of proofs rebutting the presumption? It may be noted that the first sentence of the section, re-enacted at the' same time that, the last sentence was added,' grants the right to compensation in the event of an injury to an employee “arising out of-and'in the course of his employment.” Obviously the legisla-*101lure intended to preserve the prior established bases for an award for disability under part 2 of the act. However, if the presumption referred to in the final sentence is absolute, this application might well result in an award of compensation althoug’h the injury did not arise out of the employment or in the course thereof. The facts in Hickman v. City of Detroit, 326 Mich 547, suggest a situation of such character. The same comment may be made with reference to the case at bar.
A conclusion that the legislature intended to declare an absolute presumption of the nature indicated is inconsistent with the statement in the first •sentence of the amended section with reference to the origin of the injury essential to an award. It is the duty of the Court to construe the provisions of the section together and to harmonize them. Doing so requires that the presumption be regarded as rebuttable. It should be noted further as bearing on the interpretation and application of such presumption that it has reference only to “the, course of” the employment. It has no application insofar as the determination of whether the injury for which compensation is sought is one “arising out of” the employment. Under the specific language of the added clause the presumption is limited in its application to one of the basic essentials of the right of •compensation. Had it been the intention of the legislature that it should be absolute in such application, it must be assumed that appropriate language to that effect would have been used. "We are not at liberty to read into the amendatory clause added to the section by the legislature of 1954 an intent or purpose at variance with other provisions of the ■statute and not indicated by the phraseology employed. It is the duty of the Court to construe legislative enactments in accordance with their terms.
The legislative history of the 1954 enactment clearly indicates the intention of the legislature on *102final passage. As introduced and printed, the bill (S.B. No 1150) contained in part 2, § 1, the following language:
“Every employee going to and from his employment while on the premises of his employer shall be deemed to be performing a service arising out of and in the course of .his employment.”
In proceedings leading up to final action on the bill such provision was changed by amendment, there being substituted for it the final sentence above quoted in the section as enacted. Comparison of the substituted provision with that originally proposed clearly indicates that the legislature in the final passage of the bill did not intend to create an absolute presumption that should control in certain cases without reference to the actual facts involved.
If the 1954 amendment were construed as creating an absolute presumption, its application in the instant case might well be questioned. Under such theory it might plausibly be argued that it had created in plaintiff’s favor a cause of action that did not exist, in view of the facts involved, at the time of the accident. On the other hand, if such presumption is rebuttable it may properly be regarded as relating to a matter of evidentiary procedure. Under the latter view the general principles recognized in Rookledge v. Garwood, 340 Mich 444, apply. It being our conclusion that the amendment in question must be construed as creating a limited rebuttable presumption rather than an absolute one, we do not think it necessary to further consider this feature of the case.
As Mr. Justice Sharpe has pointed out in his opinion, the amendment in question is limited to employees going to and from their work while on the premises where the work is to be performed. At the *103time of her injury plaintiff, while in defendant’s building, was not on the second floor where she worked but was going down the stairway to the main floor with the intention of leaving the building and performing a service for her mother. She was not going to or from her work but was, rather, on an independent mission having nothing to do with her employment by defendant. Her injury, as a matter of fact, did not arise out of her employment. The statute is silent as to any presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, in this respect. In the face of the undisputed facts it may not be said that it occurred in the course of her employment by defendant. Any presumption in her favor, if such were deemed to exist, was clearly rebutted by her own testimony on the hearing before the deputy commissioner. The requirements essential to an award of compensation are lacking.
The case should be remanded to the appeal board with directions to set aside the award.
Sharpe, J., concurred with Carr, J.

PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10, as amended (CL 1948 and CLS 1954, § 411.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1950 Rev and Stat Ann 1955 Cum