Court Opinion

ID: 9352354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 21:00:32.708542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:23.099838
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4069

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        QUINTON MARKIS CUTHBERTSON, a/k/a Quinton Marquis Cuthbertson,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:20-cr-00028-CCE-1)

        Submitted: November 7, 2022                                       Decided: January 4, 2023

        Before DIAZ and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Peter D. Zellmer, PETER D. ZELLMER, PLLC, Greensboro,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States Attorney,
        Nicole R. Dupre, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Quinton Markis Cuthbertson appeals his conviction following entry of a conditional

        guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized

        and statements made during a stop of the vehicle he was driving. We affirm.

               “When examining the denial of a motion to suppress, this [c]ourt reviews the district

        court’s legal determinations de novo and its factual conclusions for clear error.” United

        States v. Runner, 43 F.4th 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted),

        petition for cert. filed, No. 22-5996 (U.S. Nov. 4, 2022). “In conducting this review, th[is]

        [c]ourt evaluates the evidence in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment.”

        Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Cuthbertson asserts that the district court erred in not granting the motion to

        suppress because the stop was unlawful. A traffic stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure

        under the Fourth Amendment and is permissible if the officer has probable cause to believe

        that a traffic violation occurred. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996).

        Accordingly, when an officer observes even a minor traffic offense, a stop of the vehicle

        is permitted. United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993); see United

        States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008). We conclude that the district court

        did not err in determining that the officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle

        Cuthbertson was driving. The evidence the district court credited established that the

        vehicle was driven on the Interstate at speeds well over the posted limit, matters

        Cuthbertson does not dispute.

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               Rather, Cuthbertson argues that his speeding was induced by law enforcement, and

        the stop was therefore unlawful based on lack of supporting probable cause, because he

        reasonably believed the driver behind him intended to harm him based on his aggressive

        pursuit and he was thus justified in exceeding the speed limit to flee the driver. He cites to

        the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision in State v. Brown, 318 N.W.2d 370

        (Wis. 1982), to support this contention. Brown—which addresses the availability of

        defenses in a prosecution for speeding under Wisconsin state law—does not apply to

        Cuthbertson’s speeding in North Carolina, and Cuthbertson offers no argument on appeal

        grounded in North Carolina state law supporting the inducement and justification theory

        he advances. He thus fails to show reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that

        probable cause existed for the traffic stop.

               Cuthbertson’s remaining appellate arguments fare no better in establishing

        reversible error in the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. He claims that the

        district court clearly erred in finding that the officers here did not violate the Greensboro

        Police Department’s body worn camera policy. We reject this contention because, even if

        the district court erred in finding no violation of the policy, Cuthbertson proffers neither

        argument nor supporting legal authority connecting any such violation standing alone with

        the remedy of suppression.

               Cuthbertson further argues that the district court erred in failing to find a due process

        violation or spoliation where computer assisted dispatch records, police radio recordings,

        and full body worn camera recordings were not preserved and produced. We review these

        claims for plain error. United States v. Barringer, 25 F.4th 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2022). To

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        establish plain error, Cuthbertson must show there has been (1) an error, (2) that is plain

        and (3) that affects his substantial rights. Id. Even if these three requirements are met, our

        “authority to recognize plain error is permissive, not mandatory, and should be employed

        only to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We

        discern no error qualifying as plain in the district court’s failure to find a due process

        violation or spoliation.

               Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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