Court Opinion

ID: 9897631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:19:12.33143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:36.445142
License: Public Domain

11/03/2023
                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                              AT KNOXVILLE
                                Assigned on Briefs October 2, 2023

                                            IN RE AIRIES S.

                       Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Scott County
                        No. 22-JV-21      Scarlett Wynne Ellis, Judge
                          ___________________________________

                                  No. E2023-00462-COA-R3-PT
                             ___________________________________

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by
clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination existed as to the mother:
(1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) persistent conditions; and (3) failure to manifest
an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The juvenile court
also found that the termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals.
We affirm.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.
MCCLARTY and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.

Mark Pienkowski, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ashley S.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Mara L. Cunningham, Assistant
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

                                                  OPINION

                              I.       FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       This matter involves the termination of parental rights of Ashley S. (“Mother”) to
her son Airies.12 Airies was previously in the custody of the Tennessee Department of
Children’s Services (“DCS”) until Mother adopted him. The adoption was finalized in

        1
          It is this Court’s policy to refrain from using the full names of children and other parties in parental
termination cases in order to protect their identities.
        2
          The parties’ briefs differ on the spelling of the child’s name. After examining the record, we
determine that the correct spelling is “Airies.”
November 2019. Mother is the only parent at issue in this case.

        In September 2020, DCS became involved with the family after receiving a referral
regarding allegations of a drug exposed child. According to the referral, Mother was a
“methamphetamine addict,” and Airies, then eight years old, was present when Mother was
using drugs. The referral further stated that Mother “lets [Airies] stay with drug addicts”
and “screams and hollers at [Airies] cause [sic] she’s under the influence and can’t take
care of him.” A case manager from DCS met with Mother in October 2020, and Mother
submitted to an oral drug screen.           The drug screen came back positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamine. Mother and the case manager completed a non-
custodial permanency plan, which stated that Mother will obtain an Alcohol and Drug
(“A&D”) assessment and that Mother will refrain from using any illicit substances. At that
time, Mother did not have a home of her own and was “staying with friends,” while Airies
was residing with Mother’s former paramour. In December 2020, DCS held a Child and
Family Team Meeting with Mother and her former paramour. Mother’s former paramour
stated that he did not mind caring for the Child, but he wanted a break and did not want to
be “tied down.” Mother’s former paramour also knew about Mother’s substance abuse and
suspected that Mother was using drugs before the adoption was finalized. On that same
day, Mother completed a urine drug screen and tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamine again. After an A&D assessment, Mother was recommended inpatient
treatment for drug addiction and was scheduled to be admitted in a rehabilitation facility
the next day. Mother also agreed to sign a power of attorney allowing her former paramour
to care for Airies. The next day, DCS confirmed with the rehabilitation facility that Mother
had admitted herself into the inpatient facility, but Mother did not sign the power of
attorney. DCS had a meeting with Mother’s former paramour to discuss non-custodial
placement of Airies in his home. He reiterated that he did not want to be “tied down” and
did not wish to have long-term custody of Airies. He also did not want to take any of the
necessary classes to become a foster placement for Airies.

       In December 2020, DCS filed a petition with the juvenile court seeking an
immediate protective custody order and temporary care and custody of Airies pending a
further hearing. DCS also asked the juvenile court to find at a final hearing that Airies is
dependent and neglected, that it is contrary to Airies’s best interest to remain in the home,
that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal of Airies or that reasonable efforts
were not required, and that there is no less drastic alternative to removal. The juvenile
court issued an ex parte protective custody order, finding that there was probable cause to
believe that Airies was dependent and neglected and subject to an immediate threat to his
health or safety to the extent that delay for a hearing on the matter would likely result in
severe or irreparable harm. Airies entered DCS custody in December 2020 and has
remained in DCS custody since. After Mother waived the preliminary hearing and
adjudicatory hearing and stipulated to dependency and neglect based on improper
supervision, the juvenile court ordered in February 2021 that DCS should retain temporary
custody of Airies and that Mother have telephone calls with Airies, with DCS and the
                                             -2-
guardian ad litem having the authority to modify visitation as appropriate.

       In January 2021, DCS developed its first permanency plan, which was ratified by
the juvenile court.3 The permanency plan required the following actions to be taken by
Mother:

        1. Complete mental health assessment and comply with recommendations;
        2. Complete A&D evaluation and comply with recommendations;
        3. Complete drug screens, including a hair follicle test;
        4. Maintain stable and appropriate housing;
        5. Maintain stable and appropriate employment;
        6. Maintain legal and appropriate transportation or have a transportation plan;
        7. Pay child support in the amount of $100 per month;
        8. Have visitation as appropriate;
        9. Complete the “STOP Program”4;
        10. Complete parenting classes and any subsequent recommendations from the
            service providers; and
        11. Avoid criminal activity.

DCS developed four other permanency plans that were also ratified by the juvenile court
in June 2021, December 2021, May 2022, and October 2022. Throughout the permanency
plans, the statement of responsibilities did not substantially change.

       In February 2022, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to
Airies and alleged the following grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2)
persistent conditions; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume
custody or financial responsibility. DCS also alleged that it was in Airies’s best interest to
terminate parental rights. In response to the petition, Mother submitted a letter stating that
she opposed the termination. Mother later executed a surrender of her parental rights in
September 2022, but she subsequently revoked it. The juvenile court held a trial on the
petition in January 2023. At trial, Mother requested to be excused from the trial as she
“[was] not going to be contesting [the] matter.” The court told Mother that she did not
have to stay if she did not want to stay, but the juvenile court denied a request of Mother’s
counsel to be excused from the trial. Mother’s counsel also stated that he was advised not
to contest the termination.

       The juvenile court then heard testimony from Ms. Sheri Washam, who was a DCS
foster care worker managing the case. Ms. Washam expressed concern about Mother’s
history of substance abuse and relapse. She stated that Mother had tested positive for

        3
          The record does not contain this permanency plan.
        4
          Although it is not directly stated in the record what the “STOP Program” is, it is clear from the
context that it is a substance abuse rehabilitation program.
                                                   -3-
methamphetamine twice. An oral drug test was administered by DCS first, and Mother
tested positive for methamphetamine. In November 2021, Mother again tested positive for
methamphetamine in a hair follicle test. Additionally, there were four drug tests for which
Mother failed to appear, and these screens were considered failed under DCS policy. Ms.
Washam would notify Mother via phone calls or text messages that the drug screens were
approved and would request that Mother come in at a specific time and location to take the
tests. Mother would either fail to respond or reply “okay” to the text messages. Ms.
Washam also testified that Mother admitted to recent substance abuse in a meeting. The
STOP program had also reported to Ms. Washam that Mother had relapsed. Due to the
relapses, DCS required Mother to complete another A&D assessment, but Ms. Washam
had no proof that Mother completed this assessment.

       Ms. Washam also testified concerning Mother’s compliance with the permanency
plans developed by DCS. Mother had acquired a job, and this employment lasted for five
or six months out of the twenty-four months since Airies had been in DCS custody. Mother
had also obtained transportation. Mother completed a mental health evaluation and it was
recommended that she undergo individual counseling but she declined. Mother had gained
stable housing with her former paramour and provided DCS with a lease, but DCS was not
ready to move forward to bringing Airies to the home. Mother’s former paramour tested
positive for methamphetamine, and DCS would not let Airies go home to live with an
active drug user. Ms. Washam also testified that that Mother received between six and
seven hundred dollars a month in adoption subsidies for six or seven months while Airies
was in the custody of DCS, but in the four months directly preceding the petition, Mother
paid zero child support, although the permanency plans required her to pay $100 per month.
However, Ms. Washam also stated that Mother did make two payments in child support
recently. DCS submitted printouts from the Tennessee Child Support Enforcement Service
into evidence confirming that Mother had paid $0.00 in child support in the four months
preceding the filing of the petition and that Mother subsequently paid $412.00 in
September 2022 and $275.00 in November 2022.

        Regarding Mother’s relationship with Airies, Ms. Washam testified that Airies
thought of Mother “as his mother,” but Mother and Airies had “an interesting relationship.”
She gave an example of an incident when she tried to get Airies to make a Mother’s Day
card, and Airies responded “Eh, I’ll do it tomorrow.” She further stated that Airies is
actually closer to Mother’s former paramour but that “he’s always responded better to
men.” Ms. Washam also expressed concern about disclosures of sexual abuse that Airies
made regarding Mother’s nephew who touched him inappropriately and showed him
pornography. She further stated that Mother did not believe these disclosures, and she had
to “beg” Mother to stop talking about her nephew on phone calls with Airies. At the
conclusion of Ms. Washam’s testimony, she stated that there was consistent supervised
visitation between Mother and Airies.

      In March 2023, the juvenile court entered an order terminating parental rights and a
                                          -4-
final decree of full guardianship. The juvenile court found that DCS had proven the
following grounds against Mother: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) persistent
conditions; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or
financial responsibility. The juvenile court further found that termination of Mother’s
parental rights was in the best interest of Airies. Mother subsequently appealed.

                                 II.    ISSUES PRESENTED

       Mother presents the following issue for review on appeal, which we have slightly
restated:

       1. Whether the juvenile court erred by finding that termination of Mother’s parental
          rights is in the best interest of the child.

   For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

                                III.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

        It is well established that “[a] parent’s right to the care and custody of [his or] her
child is among the oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.” In re
Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 521-22 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)). “Parental rights have been described as
‘far more precious than any property right.’” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674 (Tenn.
2020) (quoting In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522). Despite being fundamental and
constitutionally protected, however, parental rights are not absolute. In re Carrington H.,
483 S.W.3d at 522 (citing In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010)). The
decision to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child “has the legal effect of reducing
the parent to the role of a complete stranger and of severing forever all legal rights and
obligations of the parent or the guardian of the child.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at
522 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)). Thus, such a decision is one of the most
serious decisions courts are called upon to make. In re Mariah K.D., No. M2011-02655-
COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 3090313, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2012). Accordingly, “[n]o
civil action carries with it graver consequences than a petition to sever family ties
irretrievably and forever.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 556 (Tenn. 2015) (citing
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)).

       Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113 “sets forth the grounds and procedures
for terminating the parental rights of a biological parent.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at
546. Pursuant to this statute, the petitioner seeking termination of parental rights must
prove two elements. Id. at 552. First, the petitioner must prove the existence of at least
one of the statutory grounds for termination as provided in section 36-1-113(g). Id.
Second, the petitioner must prove that termination of parental rights is in the best interest
                                             -5-
of the child under the factors set forth in section 36-1-113(i). Id. Due to the constitutional
dimension of the rights at stake, the petitioner seeking termination must prove both
elements by clear and convincing evidence. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn.
2010); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). “Clear and convincing evidence enables the
fact-finder to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts[.]” In re
Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2005)). It also “eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of
these factual findings.” In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citing In re Valentine, 79
S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002); State, Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Mims (In re N.B.), 285
S.W.3d 435, 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)).

       Due to the heightened burden of proof applicable in parental termination cases, we
adapt our customary standard of review on appeal. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861.
We review the trial court’s factual findings de novo in accordance with Rule 13(d) of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and presume each factual finding to be correct
unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524. We
then make our own determination “as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court
or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing
evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.” Id. (citing In re Bernard
T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97). “The trial court’s ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports
termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law, which appellate courts review de novo
with no presumption of correctness.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524 (citing In re
M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009)).

                                      IV.    DISCUSSION

        On appeal, Mother presents the sole issue of whether the juvenile court erred in
finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of Airies.
Nevertheless, “in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights [we] must review the
trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in
the child’s best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings on
appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525-26. Therefore, we review each of the
three grounds for termination found against Mother and whether termination was in
Airies’s best interest.

                             A.     Grounds for Termination

                      1.      Abandonment by Failure to Support

       The first ground on appeal is abandonment by failure to support. The juvenile court
found that there was clear and convincing evidence for this ground supporting termination
of Mother’s parental rights. This ground exists when a parent or guardian has abandoned
his or her child, as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A). Tenn.
                                           -6-
Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1).5 Within section 36-1-102(1)(A) are “five alternative
definitions for abandonment as a ground for the termination of parental rights.” In re Ciara
O., No. E2022-01179-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3337215, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10,
2023) (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 863)). As relevant in this case, abandonment
by failure to support is defined as follows:

        For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing
        of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition to terminate the
        parental rights of the parent . . . of the child who is the subject of the petition
        for termination of parental rights or adoption, that the parent . . . either have
        failed to visit or have failed to support or have failed to make reasonable
        payments toward the support of the child[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i).6 The statute further defines failure to support as the
failure “to provide monetary support” or “to provide more than token payments toward the
support of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(D). “Token support” is support that
“under the circumstances of the individual case, is insignificant given the parent’s
means[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(B).

        Here, DCS filed the petition to terminate parental rights on February 22, 2022.
Therefore, the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition ran from
October 21, 2021 to February 21, 2022. The permanency plans required that Mother pay
a total of $400.00 in these four months; however, it is undisputed that Mother did not pay
any amount of money in child support during this period. We recognize that Mother made
significant payments of child support in September 2022 and in November 2022.
Nevertheless, “[a]bandonment may not be repented of by resuming . . . support subsequent
to the filing of any petition seeking to terminate parental . . . rights . . . [.]” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(F). Therefore, the payments do not negate this ground based on her
failure to pay child support during the relevant four-month period preceding the filing of
the petition. See In re Zakary O., No. E2022-01062-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5215385, at
*6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2023) (“[A]lthough Mother later largely paid her arrearage on

        5
           Since the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, the termination statute has been
amended. All quotes and references to the termination statute in this opinion are to the version of the statute
in effect when the petition was filed in February 2022. See In re J.S., No. M2022-00142-COA-R3-PT,
2023 WL 139424, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2023) (“This court applies the versions of the parental
termination statutes in effect on the date the petition was filed.”).
         6
           A parent may raise the affirmative defense of absence of willfulness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
102(1)(I). Here, however, Mother did not raise this affirmative defense in an answer to the petition.
Furthermore, Mother did not raise absence of willfulness as a defense at trial. Therefore, Mother waived
that affirmative defense. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.08 (specifying that affirmative defenses not raised by
motion or answer are waived). See also In re Leah T., No. M2022-00839-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 4131460,
at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 22, 2023) (finding that a parent who did not raise lack of willfulness as an
affirmative defense in the answer to a petition and amended petition to terminate parental rights waived it
as a defense to abandonment by failure to support).
                                                    -7-
child support following the filing of the termination petition, this late payment does not
absolve Mother of her failure to pay during the relevant time period.”). Thus, the juvenile
court correctly determined that Mother’s abandonment by failure to support was a proper
ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

                               2.      Persistent Conditions

      We next address whether the juvenile court erred in finding clear and convincing
evidence to support the ground of persistent conditions. This ground applies when:

      (3)(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal
      custody of a parent . . . for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered
      at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile
      court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

      (i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, preventing the
      child’s safe return to the care of the parent . . . , or other conditions exist that,
      in all reasonable probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further
      abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent .
      ..;

      (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early
      date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent . . . in the near future;
      and

      (iii) The continuation of the parent . . . and child relationship greatly
      diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and
      permanent home;

      (B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the termination
      of parental rights petition is set to be heard[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). Each element must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 550.

       This Court has explained that “[t]he necessary order of removal is ‘the threshold
consideration’ for this ground.” In re Lucas S., No. M2019-01969-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL
710841, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2021) (quoting In re Alleyanna C., No. E2014-
02343-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 4773313, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015)). As
previously stated, in December 2020, DCS filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging
that Airies was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court then entered an ex parte
protective custody order finding probable cause to believe that Airies was dependent and
neglected. The court then removed Airies from Mother’s legal custody and awarded legal
                                           -8-
custody to DCS. In February 2022, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental
rights, and the trial was held in January 2023. Therefore, more than two years had passed
from the time Airies was removed from Mother’s custody until the time the trial was held,
which well exceeded the necessary period of six months for this ground. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(g)(3)(B).

        Airies was removed from Mother’s legal custody due to Mother’s drug use and lack
of supervision. Mother’s substance abuse continued, and though Mother has found housing
with her former paramour, the home is unsuitable because her former paramour has tested
positive for methamphetamine. Thus, this condition that led to the removal of Airies has
persisted, and it has prevented the safe return of Airies to Mother’s custody. Since Mother
did not cease to use drugs in the two years between the initial protective custody order and
the trial, there is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so
that Airies can be safely returned to Mother in the near future. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
113(g)(3)(A)(ii); Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. B.B.M., No. E2006-01677-COA-R3-PT,
2007 WL 431251, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2007) (“Given that Mother has been unable
to remedy these problems for many years, it is unlikely that these conditions would be
remedied at any time in the near future.”). Furthermore, we find the continuation of the
parent-child relationship would greatly diminish Airies’s chances of early integration into
a safe, stable, and permanent home. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(iii). Airies is
doing well in a stable environment of foster care and school, and no problems or concerns
have been reported. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding
that DCS had proven the ground of persistent conditions.

     3.     Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody or
                               Financial Responsibility

        We now turn to address the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness
to assume custody or financial responsibility. The juvenile court found that there was clear
and convincing evidence for this ground supporting termination of Mother’s parental
rights. This ground exists when “[a] parent . . . has failed to manifest, by act or omission,
an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody
would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the
child[.]” Id. § 36-1-113(g)(14). There are two elements necessary to prove for this ground.
In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 674.

        The first element “places a conjunctive obligation on a parent . . . to manifest both
an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
responsibility for the child.” Id. at 677. Therefore, if the petitioner “seeking to terminate
parental rights proves by clear and convincing proof that a parent . . . has failed to manifest
either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied.” Id. (citing In re
Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. June
                                               -9-
20, 2018)). A parent’s ability to assume custody or financial responsibility is evaluated
based “on the parent’s lifestyle and circumstances.” In re Zaylee W., No. M2019-00342-
COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 1808614, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020) (citation omitted).
As for willingness, it is common for parents to state that they are willing to assume custody
or financial responsibility; however, “[w]hen evaluating willingness, we look for more than
mere words.” In re Jonathan M., No. E2018-00484-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 5310750, at
*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2018). While Mother had completed some of the steps required
of her in the permanency plans, she did not sustain those efforts. By her relapses and failed
drug tests, Mother has not shown that she is able to remain sober, and further, she has not
shown that she is willing or able to complete the steps required for her to assume custody
of Airies. Mother also did not make the payments in child support required by the
permanency plans while she was collecting adoption subsidy payments. These failures to
complete the actions necessary to have Airies back in her home or make payments in child
support evince both a lack of ability and a lack of willingness on Mother’s part to assume
custody or financial responsibility of Airies.

       The second element requires the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that placing the child in the parent’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk
of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child. In re Neveah M.,
614 S.W.3d at 677 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14)). We have described this
ground before as follows:

       “[T]he use of the modifier ‘substantial’ indicates two things. First, it connotes
       a real hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant. Second, it
       indicates that the harm must be more than a theoretical possibility. While the
       harm need not be inevitable, it must be sufficiently probable to prompt a
       reasonable person to believe that the harm will occur more likely than not.”

In re Brianna B., No. M2019-01757-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 306467, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 2021). Further, “parents with a significant, recent history of substance abuse . . .
could lead to a conclusion of a risk of substantial harm.” Id. Mother’s history of relapsing
and continuing inability to maintain a home for Airies that is free of drug use mean that
returning Airies to Mother’s custody would pose a sufficiently probable risk of substantial
harm to Airies’s physical or psychological welfare. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14).
Therefore, the juvenile court correctly determined that Mother’s failure to manifest an
ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility was a proper ground
for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

                              B.     Best Interest of the Child

        We now turn to address Mother’s single issue as to whether the juvenile court erred
in finding that it was in the best interest of Airies to terminate her parental rights. The
Tennessee Supreme Court has summarized the law regarding the best interest analysis as
                                            - 10 -
follows:

        Facts considered in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a
        preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re
        Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861).
        “After making the underlying factual findings, the trial court should then
        consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they
        amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s
        best interest[s].” Id. When considering these statutory factors, courts must
        remember that “[t]he child’s best interests [are] viewed from the child’s,
        rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.
        Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective of the child is the common theme”
        evident in all of the statutory factors. Id. “[W]hen the best interests of the
        child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be
        resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of the child . . . .” Tenn.
        Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

        Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote examination”
        of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. And the best
        interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of statutory
        factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v. Moody, 171
        S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts and
        circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant each
        statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d
        at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a factually
        intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives
        individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are
        terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon the
        circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration
        of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis.” In re
        Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 194).

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).7 The twenty statutory best-
interests factors are:

        (A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s critical
        need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s
        minority;

        7
          Although the prior version of the best interest factors was in effect in In re Gabriella D., we have
recently stated that “we believe the Tennessee Supreme Court’s analysis applies to the amended version of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i), as well.” In re Skylith F., No. M2022-01231-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL
6546538, *19 n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2023).
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(B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to
have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition;

(C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting
the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;

(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental
attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the
parent can create such attachment;

(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with
the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive
relationship with the child;

(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household
trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic
symptoms;

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another
person or persons in the absence of the parent;

(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons
other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and
the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and
the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage;

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the
child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there
is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol,
controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render
the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable
manner;

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services,
or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent
in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of
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      the department;

      (M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing
      paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the
      circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe
      and not in the child’s best interest;

      (N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the
      home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or
      psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult;

      (O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child
      or any other child;

      (P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and
      specific needs required for the child to thrive;

      (Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to
      creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific
      needs and in which the child can thrive;

      (R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and
      safe for the child;

      (S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial
      support for the child; and

      (T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be
      detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and
      effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(A)-(T). “When considering the factors [above], the
prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in
the child’s best interest.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(2). The juvenile court found that
the majority of the applicable factors favored termination of Mother’s parental rights.

       We begin by addressing the interrelated factors concerning the child’s critical need
for stability and continuity of placement; the effect a potential change of caretakers and
physical environment would have on the child; and the parent’s demonstration of
continuity and stability in meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and
safety needs. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(A), (B), and (C). Being in the foster home
for more than two years has provided Airies with a stability at home and in school that he
did not experience for long while he was in the custody of Mother. As a child who was
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fostered and adopted before, Airies needs a stable home and continuity of placement
throughout the rest of his minority. Mother argues that nothing shows that the foster home
is pre-adoptive or “offered the prospective of permanency[,]” and that “[a] return of
custody to a future-rehabilitated [Mother] is one less transition than to an entirely new
custodian.” However, Mother has neither provided nor demonstrated that she can provide
stability in meeting Airies’s needs any time soon due to her continued drug use and living
situation. Although Mother may or may not have demonstrated sufficient continuity and
stability in meeting Airies’s needs while she fostered and adopted him, her actions have
proven that she cannot currently provide such continuity and stability. Therefore, we agree
with the juvenile court that factors (A), (B), and (C) weigh in favor of termination.

       Mother and Airies do not have a secure or healthy parental attachment, and there
was no reasonable expectation that she could create such attachment because Mother has
not completed enough action steps in the permanency plans to allow her a substantial
increase in visitation with Airies. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(D). The Child also
does not have an emotionally significant relationship with Mother or with any biological
family, and therefore there would not be a significant impact on the outcomes of the
relationship by terminating Mother’s parental rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(I).
While Airies thinks of Mother as his mother, testimony from Ms. Washam revealed that
the bond between Mother and Airies is not deep, and Airies has a closer bond to Mother’s
former paramour. Likewise, although Mother consistently attended visitation with Airies,
the visitation was not sufficient to create a positive relationship. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
113(i)(1)(E). Furthermore, Mother triggers Airies’s experience of trauma by continuing to
speak with him about Mother’s nephew who sexually abused him, despite Ms. Washam
begging Mother to stop. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(G). Therefore, we agree with
the juvenile court that factors (D), (E), (G), and (I) weigh in favor of termination.

        In regard to factors (J) and (K), by her continued drug use and living with a known
drug addict, Mother failed to demonstrate a lasting adjustment of circumstances to make it
safe for Airies to be in her home and failed to take advantage of available programs and
services in order to make such a lasting adjustment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(J)
and (K). Though DCS developed a number of permanency plans, Mother either did not
follow many of the recommendations at all or simply did not sustain her initial efforts to
follow the recommendations. She continued to use drugs, and she moved in with an active
drug user. Though the juvenile court did not make an explicit separate finding regarding
factor (L), we find that this factor also weighs in favor of termination of Mother’s parental
rights. DCS made several efforts to assist Mother in making lasting adjustments while
Airies was in custody, but Mother did not effect lasting change. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
113(i)(1)(L). Mother’s failure to complete the recommended steps for addressing her
substance abuse and lack of a safe home also lead us to conclude that Mother had no sense
of urgency in establishing custody of Airies or in making a lasting adjustment of the
circumstances that make awarding custody to Mother unsafe and not in Airies’s best
interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(L) and (M). Thus, we agree with the juvenile
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court that factors (J), (K), and (M) weigh in favor of termination, and we further conclude
that factor (L) weighs in favor of termination of Mother’s parental rights.

       Regarding factors (P), (Q), and (R), Mother failed to demonstrate an understanding
of Airies’s needs, failed to demonstrate the ability and commitment to creating and
maintaining a home that met Airies’s needs, and did not have a physical environment in
her home that was healthy and safe for him. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(P), (Q),
and (R). Mother argues that there is no evidence that points toward the home being unclean
or structurally unsafe. However, even after Airies was taken from Mother for drug abuse
and lack of supervision, Mother continued to abuse drugs and moved back in with her
former paramour who tested positive for methamphetamine use, rendering her home unsafe
for Airies. See In re Robert H., No. E2022-00809-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3451534, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2023) (“Father’s sustained drug use during the Department’s
custodial period militates against concluding that he is able and committed to provide the
children with a safe home.”). We therefore agree that factors (P), (Q), and (R) weigh in
favor of termination.

       With regard to factor (S), Mother paid no more than token child support. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(S). Mother argues that the payments in total of $687.50 in
child support are equivalent to almost seven months of support payments and demonstrate
a significant effort to pay her child support obligation. These payments, however, were
made after the petition for termination of parental rights, almost two years after removal of
Airies from Mother’s custody. Therefore, we also agree that factor (S) weighs in favor of
termination.

        As to factor (T), it is evident that Mother’s mental and emotional condition from her
drug use would be detrimental to the Child and prevent her from parenting effectively.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(T). See In re Riley B., No. E2022-00684-COA-R3-PT,
2023 WL 3477216, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2023) (stating in the context of this
factor that “we are concerned with Mother’s ability to remain sober given . . . drug screens
showing her tendency to relapse”).              Furthermore, Mother did not follow the
recommendation of attending individual therapy after her mental health assessment. Thus,
we agree with the juvenile court that factor (T) weighs in favor of termination.

       Finally, we find that factors (F), (H), (N), and (O) are inapplicable. There is no
evidence in the record that Airies would fear living in a home with Mother. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(F). There is likewise a dearth of evidence in the record of any
healthy parental attachment Airies may have with another person or persons in the absence
of Mother. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(H). Although there was testimony that
Mother’s nephew had sexually abused Airies in the past, there is no indication that this
cousin currently resides in or frequents Mother’s home. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
113(i)(1)(N). Finally, there is nothing in the record that speaks to whether Mother ever
provided safe and stable care for Airies or any other child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
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113(i)(1)(O). Therefore, we do not consider factors (F), (H), (N), and (O).

       After reviewing these statutory factors, we agree that it is in the best interest of
Airies for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Accordingly, we conclude that the
juvenile court did not err in finding that the termination was in the Child’s best interest.

                                     V.     CONCLUSION

       For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court. Costs
of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Ashley S., for which execution may issue if
necessary.

                                                    _________________________________
                                                    CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

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