Court Opinion

ID: 9760239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:43:49.583294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.613427
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In their motion for rehearing, appellants argue the proposition that the trial court had before it sufficient evidence to find that appellants should be allowed to prosecute the administrative appeal in lieu of their members doing so. So far as we are able to determine, such evidence is not contained in the record on appeal and, moreover, the evidence said to have been *207presented to the trial court manifestly does not address all of the elements we have held to be essential to the decision whether to allow an association to represent the members who are actually affected by the administrative decision.
In their motion for rehearing, appellants argue that seven of their members testified at the Commission hearing that they would be adversely affected by increased shipping rates. The hearing records of the Commission, made part of the appellate record, do not show that the individuals referred to were members of any of the appellant organizations. Moreover, there is in the record no indication of the shippers any appellant organization represents. Instead, appellant appends to its motion for rehearing a list of each appellant’s membership. While these three lists were also handed to us in oral argument, they were not included in the appellate record nor have the appellants made any motion to supplement the transcript in this respect. We therefore may not consider them on appeal.
Appellants next argue that the legal status of all three associations is made clear by the record on appeal, referring to our footnote comment that the trial court should inquire whether the appellants were legal entities entitled to appear in court as such. The record reflects, however, that only Texas Industrial Traffic League is identified as a membership non-profit corporation. The other two appellants, while listed as parties before the Commission, are not further identified or described in the record before us as membership associations entitled by the terms of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6133 (1970) to maintain a lawsuit.
Appellants desire that the court take “notice” of the documents tendered to us but which are not included in the appellate record. These matters are not, however, of a nature that the Court may, under the doctrine of judicial notice, assume to be true without proof.
Moreover, the record would not support an implied finding of standing even if the foregoing matters were included in the record on appeal or otherwise considered by us. While standing is usually presumed until challenged, once that challenge is made, as it was here, appellants must show that they are the proper parties to maintain the cause of action averred, here a statutory “appeal” from an administrative decision. Holland v. Taylor, 153 Tex. 433, 270 S.W.2d 219 (1954). Appellants have not, for example, presented evidence in the trial court with an attendant decision by it to the effect that appellants are authorized to represent their affected members on judicial review of the Commission decision; that the interests of these members sought to be protected are germane to the appellants’ organizational purposes; and that the nature of the issues to be decided in the administrative appeal does not require the participation of the individual members actually affected by the Commission decision.
Appellants contend in reply that we err in holding that they must meet additional tests before they may have standing under section 20 of the Motor Carrier Act. We disagree. While the judicial review provisions of that Act must be followed, in orchestration with section 19 of TAPTRA, the point made in this decision is that the legislature, by statutory enactment, may not confer upon the courts of the State the power to determine a political question or give an advisory opinion. Therefore, the overriding issue of constitutionality must also be orchestrated with section 19 of TAPTRA and any statute which gives the right of judicial review from the decisions of particular agencies, such as the Motor Carrier Act does in its section 20. Since appellants admit the obvious fact that they themselves are not affected by any rate increase ordered by the Commission, while attempting to invoke for themselves the provisions of TAPTRA section 19 and Motor Carrier Act section 20, we have placed upon these statutory provisions an interpretation which implements the legislative intent in a manner that in our view satisfies the constitutional limitations upon the judicial department. Hence, we have imposed the *208additional requirements spoken of by appellants. These requirements have the incidental effect of judicial economy in that they allow the simultaneous disposition of the numerous administrative appeals which might otherwise be taken separately by members who are actually affected by an agency action, at least to an extent sufficient to excite their interest in judicial review. Moreover, these additional requirements also have the incidental effect of allowing any affected members to share the cost of such judicial review by having their representatives, the associations, maintain the action, thereby avoiding the undesirable situation where no individual member feels able to pay the cost of judicial review of an erroneous agency order, with the result that an injustice is perpetuated by default. We therefore view the additional requirements as being essential to the constitutionality of section 20 of the Motor Carrier Act and TAPTRA section 19 and incidentally desirable for the aforesaid public policy reasons. Lately, we believe these decisions are in harmony with the decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas relative to standing, as discussed above at length.
Appellants refer us to Texas Highway Commission v. Texas Association of Steel Importers, supra, Director of Department of Agriculture and Environment v. Printing Industries Association of Texas, supra, and Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, supra, three decisions of our Supreme Court discussed in our opinion. Appellants do so to support their suggestion that the standing of a representative organization is based upon the same standing factors as are applicable to individuals. None of the three decisions, it should be pointed out, address the issue of representational standing. The appellants’ argument amounts to no more than this: because the Supreme Court omits to mention representational standing in a case where an organization is a party on appeal, and the question of representational standing thus could have been raised, such is tantamount to an affirmative declaration and holding on the legal rule, principle or proposition that an organization, not affected itself by an agency decision, may nevertheless within constitutional limits invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. We are, in fact, requested to infer from the Supreme Court’s silence in those three decisions the promulgation of a legal rule, principle or proposition to the effect argued for by appellants. We find this contention extremely illogical, and reject it. The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Reversed and Remanded on Motion for Rehearing.