Court Opinion

ID: 9737501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:27:10.082239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.413237
License: Public Domain

DAVIES, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Appellant was 21 years old, had no criminal history, and worked as a security guard. He apparently has no alcohol or drug problem. He was drawn to the scene by others. He discharged a handgun, bought for use on his job, a dozen times in less than a minute. The shots were in the open, directed pointlessly at scattered strangers. He testified that he stopped firing when “I came around to my senses until I finally realized * * * what actually I had done.”
A sentence of ten years is clearly disproportionate measured by his conduct alone. The trial court may have been led to depart because of the racial overtones of the incident. That has not been recognized as a basis for departure and it would be ironic beyond acceptance were it to be approved as a reason for departure against this young black man.
Unfortunately, appellant hit two people, injuring one seriously, changing his actions into a first degree assault as to that person. He was convicted of that crime, and second degree assault as to another person.1 The jury acquitted appellant of attempted murder, thus negating any intention to cause death. Absent death or an intent to cause death, appellant was convicted of the most serious possible charges.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were instituted to ensure consistency and equity in sentencing. Minn. Sent. Guidelines I.2 To achieve these purposes, it is necessary that those convicted of similar actions receive similar sentences and that only “felons substantially different from a typical case” receive longer sentences. Id. (emphasis added). Nearly any extreme behavior can support a departure from the sentencing guidelines,3 but nothing here *556was extreme — except the aura of unreality. None of the usual criteria for durational departures exist.
An element of a crime may not be used as an aggravating factor. State v. Pierson, 368 N.W.2d 427, 435 (Minn.App.1985). The trial court claimed unusual cruelty. But all cruelty here arose from the severe and permanent injuries — and that was an element of the crime. The trial court also referred to greater than normal danger to the safety of others. Appellant shot a dozen times in succession. Appellant hit two of the six people in the general area and was given consecutive sentences as a result. Had he not created “greater than normal danger,” he could not have committed the two crimes of which he was convicted.
The underlying principles of the sentencing guidelines are severity of the offense and criminal history. This appellant had no criminal history. He was deprived of the opportunity to show remorse by his reliance on the defense of self defense. Primarily because one person was seriously and permanently injured, which is an element of first degree assault, a double dura-tional departure was imposed. Because two people were injured, consecutive sentences were imposed. Cumulatively, these decisions result in a 122-month (ten-year) sentence, which is in the same range as the presumptive sentences for first and second degree attempted murder. He was found innocent of those crimes. Durational departures in cases such as this reduce the utility of the guidelines. I would reverse the durational departure.

.Minn.Stat. §§ 609.221-.222 (1988). Second degree assault is an assault “with a dangerous weapon” and first degree assault is an assault which “inflicts great bodily harm." Id. Great bodily harm is:
bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent * * * impairment of the function of any bodi ly member or organ or other serious bodily harm.
Minn.Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (1988) (emphasis added).

. It is worth remembering also that the guidelines were part of a reform that took responsibility for sentence dur ' i away from a state parole board and returned it to the judicial system. The judiciary must exercise that responsibility with care.

. See, e.g., State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn.1983) (extreme negligence); State v. Schmit, 329 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn.1983) (violation of trust and authority); State v. Vogelpohl, 326 N.W.2d 635, 636 (Minn.1982) (cruelty to victim); State v. Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d 633, *556635 (Minn.1982) (invasion of a person’s zone of privacy); State v. Profit, 323 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Minn.1982) (cruelty to other than victim); State v. Stumm, 312 N.W.2d 248, 249 (Minn. 1981) (vulnerability of victim); State v. McClay, 310 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Minn.1981) (greater than normal danger to the safety of others).