Court Opinion

ID: 9544549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:56:53.057798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:09.919889
License: Public Domain

*1258LAVENDER, Justice,
dissenting:
In this case the trial court correctly ruled that Appellee was entitled to credit for social security disability payments which were made to his former wife for the benefit of the minor children. Social security benefits are not gratuitous, but are earned, and they constitute, in effect, insurance payments substituting for lost earning power. Potter v. Potter, 169 N.J. Super. 140, 404 A.2d 352, 356 (Super.Ct.App.Div.1979); Horton v. Horton, 219 Ga. 177, 132 S.E.2d 200 (1963); Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 1315, 1319 (1977). It is therefore equitable to substitute social security disability benefits for child support for the period during which such benefits are paid. Potts v. Potts, 240 N.W.2d 680, 681 (Iowa 1976). Credit for social security disability payments should be allowed where, as here, there are no contrary provisions in the divorce decree. Binns v. Maddox, 57 Ala.App. 230, 327 So.2d 726 (1976); Horton v.Horton, supra; Andler v. Andler, 217 Kan. 538, 538 P.2d 649 (1975).
The cases1 from other jurisdictions which held that a father was not entitled to credit against his child support obligation for social security disability payments made to his former wife for the benefit of the children are not applicable. Those cases represent special instances where the determination of whether social security payments will be credited turns on financial circumstances. Potter v. Potter, supra.
The trial court’s order allowing credit for social security benefits toward the father’s child support obligation was an interpretation and construction of the divorce decree. It did not constitute a retroactive modification that operated to deprive the mother of accrued arrearages. The purpose and function of a court in construing a divorce decree is to give effect to that which is already latently in the judgment, and the court lacks warrant to add new provisions, substantive or otherwise, which were omitted or withheld in the first instance in the decree. Jones v. Jones, 402 P.2d 272, 275 (Okl.1965). In my view to now hold that the decree meant to provide for child support in addition to the social security benefits is to add new provisions to that decree.
The father’s duty to support is recognized in the divorce decree, but the support order does not say whether payments could be satisfied by social security disability payments made to the mother for the benefit of the children. When the wording of a judgment is not clear, it should be construed so as to carry out the purpose and intent of the action. Hicks v. Hicks, 417 P.2d 830, 832 (Okl.1966). The purpose of the support provision in the divorce decree — to provide for the support of the minor children — was not contravened by the trial court’s allowance to the husband of credit for the social security benefits paid by reason of his physical infirmities.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to. state that HAR-GRAVE, J., and OPALA, J., concur in the views herein expressed.

. Fowler v. Fowler, 156 Conn. 569, 244 A.2d 375 (1968); Chase v. Chase, 74 Wash.2d 253, 444 P.2d 145 (1968).