Court Opinion

ID: 9630162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:03:23.071274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:34.149834
License: Public Domain

Henderson, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion, in which Hammond, J., concurred.
I hold no brief for the business of dismantling and disposing of the time-worn and mutilated carcasses of motor vehicles. As the late Judge Dennis once said of the undertaking business, it is a “gloomy but essential trade.” Nevertheless, the County Commissioners of Howard County, the legislative body adopting the Zoning Ordinance, has declared that this is a permissible use in an M-2 zone, subject only to the grant of a permit therefor by the Board of Zoning Appeals. The Board has no power to rezone or alter the legislative determination of appropriate uses in general. An applicant is entitled to a permit unless the Board finds that the proposed use would “menace the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community or would prevent the most *26appropriate use of land * * I think the Board’s refusal in the instant case was arbitrary, because based on grounds that would seem to bar such use in any M-2 zone.
In its opinion filed, the Board stated that there was “a definite trend * * * towards cleaning up the entire Washington Boulevard.” This is hardly consistent with the fact that both sides of the Boulevard are zoned M-l to a depth of 300 feet, and on the east side, beyond the 300 feet, the whole area is zoned M-2. The “junk yard” operation proposed is confined wholly to the M-2 zone, and appropriately screened. The Board noted that it would be necessary to burn the wrecked vehicles periodically, and this would cause “undesirable and uncontrolled smoke.” If burning is a necessary part of the business, it would seem to be equally true regardless of the location.
We noted in Feldstein v. Kammauf, 209 Md. 479, that an automobile junk yard is not a nuisance per se. Smoke is a necessary incident of many manufacturing operations. The Board felt that a junk yard would “tend to depreciate the surrounding properties.” This, of course, falls short of a determination that it would constitute a menace to the public health or safety, and overlooks the Board’s power to impose reasonable safeguards and conditions to protect surrounding properties. The Board said: “We finally feel that to establish a junk yard on one of our main arteries of transportation could not possibly be construed as the most appropriate use of the land involved.” Yet the legislative body has decided otherwise, as a general proposition, and there was no testimony as to any more appropriate use of the property in question.
The case of Gilmor v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 205 Md. 557, relied on in the majority opinion, does not support the Board’s action in the instant case. There, the Board granted a permit for a billboard in a first commercial use district, and we affirmed, despite the contention of nearby property owners that the proposed use would depreciate the value of their properties. We said (p. 565) : “The legislative branch of the government in allowing billboards to be erected in such areas, has said, in effect, that *27the likelihood that their presence will bring about the dire consequences foreseen by the appellant, is not great enough to forbid generally the use of property to accommodate them. It has added a safeguard for the instances contrary to the general rule in the procedures required * * * whereby the Board, as a legislative agent, may determine in any particular instance that the public health, safety, welfare, security and morals will be adversely affected—not in the deterioration of the neighborhood over a period of time because of the presence of the billboards, but because of some immediate fact, circumstances or condition which would bring about the evils guarded against.” See also Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 287. Without laboring the point, I agree with the trial court that the evidence in the instant case fell short of a showing necessary to support the refusal of a permit in the exercise of the police power.
Judge Hammond concurs in the views here expressed.