Court Opinion

ID: 9378843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 19:00:40.231481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.662358
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11430   Document: 27-1    Date Filed: 03/13/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                        ____________________

                              No. 22-11430
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                        ____________________

       DANNY K. HO,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
       GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA,
       COMMISSIONER OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW
       ENFORCEMENT,
       CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF FLORIDA,
       FLORIDA COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE, et al.,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                   22-11430

                             ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02309-MSS-CPT
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Danny Ho, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district
       court’s order granting the Defendants’ 1 motion to dismiss his pro
       se amended complaint raising a claim pursuant to the Equal Pro-
       tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, he ar-
       gues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his
       amended complaint with prejudice. He also contends that the dis-
       trict court abused its discretion by denying his motions for recusal.
       For the following reasons, we affirm.
                                           I.
              On July 12, 2021, Ho filed a complaint against the Defend-
       ants, purporting to raise three claims: (1) a “procedural error” at
       Tampa International Airport (“TPA”); (2) a violation of the United
       States District Court for the Middle District of Florida’s former

       1 The Defendants in this case are the Florida Attorney General, Governor of
       Florida, the Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement,
       the Chief Financial Officer of Florida, and the Florida Commissioner of Agri-
       culture.
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       22-11430               Opinion of the Court                         3

       Local Rule 1.03(b) by the clerk and a district court judge; and (3) a
       failure to prosecute. From our reading of that complaint, Ho’s
       claims are based on his suspension from a job at TPA due to prob-
       lems with his security badge application and his Federal Bureau of
       Investigation background report. The Defendants moved for a
       more definite statement, arguing that Ho’s complaint was ambig-
       uous and vague. Ho opposed that motion. Ho also filed a motion
       labeled as one for summary judgment, as well as a motion arguing
       for recusal of Judge Scriven, the district court judge assigned to his
       case.
              On October 28, 2021, the district court granted the Defend-
       ants’ motion and dismissed Ho’s complaint without prejudice, rea-
       soning that the complaint was so vague and ambiguous that the
       Defendants could not reasonably prepare a response, that the basis
       of jurisdiction was unpled, and that the claims were impermissibly
       lumped together. The court stated that Ho had fourteen days to
       file an amended complaint to cure these defects, “including, but
       not limited to, removing any Defendant having no involvement in
       his claimed injury and removing any judge sued for actions based
       solely on his or her exercise of duties as a judicial officer.” The
       district court also denied Ho’s motion for recusal in a separate or-
       der.
              Ho subsequently filed an amended complaint suing the
       same five defendants. Ho asserted a claim pursuant to the Equal
       Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the Defend-
       ants’ failure to prosecute the clerk’s violation of former Local Rule
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                22-11430

       1.03(b). He also claimed that he was a crime victim protected by
       the Crime Victims’ Right Act (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771. As to
       the five defendants, Ho did not provide any further specific allega-
       tions against them besides asserting that they had put his case on
       hold by moving for a more definite statement. Ho also purported
       to add additional defendants in the body amended complaint, in-
       cluding Judge Scriven and two other district court judges, the clerk,
       Chief Executive Officer of Tampa International Airport Joe
       Lopano, and Hillsborough County Aviation Authority Chairman
       Robert Watkins, and raised various grievances against them. Ho
       also filed another motion for recusal against Judge Scriven.
               The Defendants moved to dismiss Ho’s amended complaint
       with prejudice, arguing that it was a shotgun pleading because it
       contained pages of irrelevant facts, commingled the allegations
       against the defendants and non-parties, and failed to separate each
       cause of action into different counts. They also argued that they
       were entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity and that Ho
       failed to state a claim against them.
              The district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss
       with prejudice. The court explained that Ho had not even tried to
       comply with its prior instructions to remove from his complaint
       defendants with no involvement in his claimed injury and judges
       sued solely pursuant to their acts as judicial officers. The court also
       noted that Ho had been designated a vexatious litigant in a different
       case and warned Ho that continued submission of future frivolous
       or actions may result in the imposition of monetary sanctions. The
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       22-11430                   Opinion of the Court                                5

       district court also denied Ho’s motion for summary judgment2 and
       motion for recusal.
               This appeal ensued.
                                             II.
               We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint as a
       shotgun pleading for abuse of discretion. Barmapov v. Amuial, 986
       F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021). A complaint is a shotgun pleading
       if it contains pervasive conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not
       connected to a specific claim. Id. at 1324–25. A court should pro-
       vide a plaintiff one opportunity to amend his shotgun complaint
       before dismissing his action. See Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878
       F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018). “In the repleading order, the dis-
       trict court should explain how the offending pleading violates the
       shotgun pleading rule so that the party may properly avoid future
       shotgun pleadings.” Id. But if the plaintiff files an amended com-
       plaint without substantially fixing the deficiencies in the original
       complaint, dismissal with prejudice is warranted. Jackson v. Bank
       of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358–59 (11th Cir. 2018).

       2 Ho has abandoned any argument that the district court erred by dismissing
       his motion for summary judgment. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
       739 F.3d 678, 681, 683 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that An issue is abandoned
       if it is (1) not prominently raised on appeal, (2) raised without supporting ar-
       guments and authorities, or (3) raised for the first time in a reply brief). As a
       separate note, we find that his challenges related to his other district court
       cases are not within the scope of this appeal and do not address them.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                22-11430

               Here, even construing Ho’s amended complaint liberally
       given his pro se status, see Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382,
       1386 (11th Cir. 1998), the district court did not abuse its discretion
       by dismissing the amended complaint as a shotgun pleading. The
       amended complaint contained many conclusory and vague allega-
       tions, largely raised allegations about the actions of non-parties,
       and failed to raise specific allegations related to the defendants. See
       Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1324–25. The district court was also within
       its discretion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice af-
       ter it gave Ho one opportunity to fix these deficiencies, which the
       court explained to Ho in its order dismissing the original com-
       plaint, but Ho failed to do so. See Vibe Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at
       1296; Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1358-59. And “ even in the case of pro
       se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de
       facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient plead-
       ing in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,
       760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v.
       County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)).
             Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
       amended complaint.
                                        III.
              We review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of dis-
       cretion. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 779 (11th Cir. 1994)
       (en banc). Federal law requires judges to disqualify themselves if
       their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, where they have
       personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, or where they
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       22-11430                     Opinion of the Court                               7

       have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
       of the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455. An allegation of bias must be
       personal, rather than judicial, in nature, and generally cannot be
       based on the judge’s rulings in related cases. Phillips v. Joint Legis.
       Comm. on Performance & Expenditure Rev. of Miss., 637 F.2d
       1014, 1020 (5th Cir. 1981) 3; accord Loranger, 10 F.3d at 780 (ex-
       plaining that, for a bias to be personal, it must stem from an extra-
       judicial source).
              Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny-
       ing Ho’s motions for recusal. As an initial matter, there is no indi-
       cation in the record that Ho’s motions for recusal were tampered
       with, as he alleges. Additionally, as the district court concluded,
       the motions did not coherently establish any grounds for recusal
       under § 455. Indeed, Ho based his requests for recusal on actions
       the judge had previously taken in her judicial capacity. See id. Ac-
       cordingly, we affirm the denial of Ho’s motions for recusal.
                                               IV.
             For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s orders
       dismissing Ho’s amended complaint and denying his motions for
       recusal.
                 AFFIRMED.

       3 In   Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
       this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
       cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.