Court Opinion

ID: 9523537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:43:41.362373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:26.582330
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court: In July 2004, defendant, Thomas V. Ryburn, filed a petition under section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401 (West 2002)), seeking to set aside his multiple October 1999 guilty pleas. In August 2004, the trial court sua sponte dismissed defendant’s petition as frivolous and without merit. Defendant appealed, arguing, in part, that the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of his section 2 — 1401 petition was error. Specifically, defendant argued that the trial court did not have the authority to take that action. This court disagreed and affirmed with one judge dissenting. People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill. App. 3d 870, 841 N.E.2d 1013 (2005) (Ryburn III). On September 26, 2007, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied defendant’s petition for leave to appeal but directed this court to vacate our judgment and to reconsider in light of People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007). People v. Ryburn, 225 Ill. 2d 666, 873 N.E.2d 932 (2007) (nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal). In accordance with the supreme court’s directions, we vacate our prior judgment and reconsider it in light of Vincent to determine whether a different result is warranted. After doing so, we again affirm. I. BACKGROUND In October 1998, the State charged defendant with four counts each of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(1), 12— 13(a)(1), 12 — 16(d) (West 1998)). At defendant’s October 1999 guilty-plea hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant had agreed to plead guilty to three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12— 14(a)(1) (West 1998)). In exchange, the State agreed (1) to dismiss the remaining nine counts and other unrelated charges against defendant, (2) to recommend an aggregate sentence totaling no more than 60 years, and (3) that the court would not impose a fine on defendant. The State provided the following factual basis for defendant’s guilty pleas. On September 8, 1998, defendant appeared at the victim’s residence and asked to use the telephone. The victim, who was acquainted with defendant, allowed him to come inside. After looking through a telephone book for a few minutes, defendant sneaked up behind the victim, held a knife to her throat, and repeatedly sexually assaulted her. The trial court accepted the State’s factual basis. The court also fully admonished defendant, outlined the terms of the plea agreement, and determined that he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty. The court then accepted defendant’s guilty pleas. In November 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison on each count of aggravated criminal sexual assault, with those sentences to be served consecutively (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a) (West 1998)). The court also ordered that defendant pay the statutorily mandated $100 sexual-assault fine (730 ILCS 5/5 — 9—1.7(b)(1) (West 1998)). That same day, the circuit clerk imposed the statutorily mandated $25 fine under the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (725 ILCS 240/10 (West 1998)). In December 1999, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, alleging that he did not enter them knowingly and voluntarily. Following a February 2000 hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that (1) section 5 — 8— 4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a) (West 1998)), requiring the imposition of consecutive sentences in his case, was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000); and (2) the $25 fine imposed under the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act was improper because the circuit clerk, not the trial court, imposed it. This court affirmed defendant’s convictions and 60-year aggregate sentence, vacated the $25 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act fine, and remanded for the trial court, not the circuit clerk, to impose that fine. People v. Ryburn, No. 4 — 00—0117 (June 22, 2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Ryburn I). In January 2002, the trial court entered an order imposing a $25 fine under the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (725 ILCS 240/10 (West 1998)). In June 2002, defendant pro se filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 through 122 — 8 (West 2002)). The petition raised the following constitutional claims: (1) defendant received ineffective assistance of guilty-plea counsel in that counsel (a) failed to raise a speedy-trial claim, (b) failed to call certain alibi witnesses, (c) failed to present evidence to corroborate the purported alibi, (d) failed to obtain police records that allegedly showed that the victim had a motive to fabricate her complaint against defendant, and (e) stipulated that defendant was fit to plead guilty; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to raise on appeal the aforementioned issues. Later in June 2002, the trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit under section 122 — 2.1(a)(2) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 — 2.1(a)(2) (West 2002)). Defendant filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to serve as his counsel. In March 2003, OSAD moved to withdraw as counsel. (This court later granted OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel on appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition and affirmed that court’s judgment. People v. Ryburn, No. 4 — 02—0552 (July 29, 2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) {Ryburn II).) Also in March 2003, defendant filed a “Petition for a New Trial,” in which he alleged that he should not have to serve 85% of his 60-year aggregate prison sentence because the sentence was based on “tainted/perjuried [sic]” testimony in an unrelated case. Later that month, the trial court dismissed the petition, upon determining that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. In April 2003, defendant filed a motion entitled “Petition to Chief Administrative Judge for Rehearing En Banc with Substitution of Judge and Conduct Review of Judges.” Later that same month, the trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous, upon finding, inter alia, that defendant had been “engaging in a pattern of filing frivolous pleadings without factual or legal merit[,] all with the apparent end of obtaining relief from his convictions and sentences in [McLean County case No. 98 — CF—1062].” In July 2004, defendant filed the section 2 — 1401 petition at issue (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401 (West 2002)), seeking to set aside his October 1999 guilty pleas on the following grounds: (1) he received ineffective assistance of guilty-plea counsel in that counsel (a) “fraudulently concealed [the trial court’s] violation of the guilty plea” agreement when the court imposed fines and ordered that defendant pay restitution, (b) violated several rules of professional conduct, (c) did not consult with him about what issues he wanted to raise in his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, (d) filed a Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) certificate that was “suspect,” (e) “fraudulently concealed” defendant’s medical records, mental-health history, and certain exculpatory evidence, (f) failed to argue that his consecutive sentences were improper, and (g) failed to argue defendant’s “legal innocents [sic]” in his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; (2) the trial court violated several supreme court rules by failing to provide him with a free transcript of proceedings; and (3) his consecutive sentences violated Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348. In August 2004, the trial court sua sponte dismissed defendant’s section 2 — 1401 petition, upon finding that it was frivolous and without merit. Defendant appealed, and as earlier stated, this court affirmed. Ryburn III, 362 Ill. App. 3d 870, 841 N.E.2d 1013. In that opinion, we rejected defendant’s argument that his guilty pleas were void based on the trial court’s imposition of $125 in fines, deeming that argument “ridiculous.” Rybum III, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 875, 841 N.E.2d at 1017. Citing People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472-73, 806 N.E.2d 1251, 1254-55 (2004), we also concluded that the trial court possessed the authority sua sponte to dismiss defendant’s section 2 — 1401 petition if it finds that the petition is frivolous and without merit. This court also noted that defendant’s claim on appeal that his guilty pleas were void not only had no merit, but also that he failed to raise it in the section 2 — 1401 petition that was before us on appeal. Ryburn III, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 877, 841 N.E.2d at 1018. In response to defendant’s contention that he was not a “vexatious or frivolous litigator,” this court wrote the following: “In addition, defendant’s assertion that he is not a vexatious litigant who inappropriately burdens the court system with non-meritorious litigation is belied by (1) the sheer number of pleadings he has filed since his October 1999 guilty pleas in this case and (2) the trial court’s explicit finding in its April 2003 order that defendant had been ‘engaging in a pattern of filing frivolous pleadings without factual or legal merit[,] all with the apparent end of obtaining relief from his convictions and sentences in [McLean County case No. 98 — CF—1062].’ Defendant continued his practice of filing frivolous pleadings when he filed his July 2004 section 2 — 1401 petition now before us. Indeed, this defendant could be the ‘poster boy’ for why trial courts should have the inherent authority to sua sponte dismiss section 2 — 1401 petitions that are frivolous and without merit. Denying trial courts this authority would require them to squander scarce judicial resources. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court appropriately exercised its authority by sua sponte dismissing defendant’s petition.” Rybum III, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 877, 841 N.E.2d at 1018-19. As earlier stated, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied defendant’s petition for leave to appeal in Rybum III but directed this court to vacate our judgment and to reconsider in light of People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007). That reconsideration follows. II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN VINCENT The Third District Appellate Court recently had occasion to analyze the decision of the supreme court in Vincent. In People v. Malloy, 374 Ill. App. 3d 820, 821-22, 872 N.E.2d 140, 141-42 (2007), the Third District wrote the following: “In the recent case of People v. Vincent, our supreme court stated that a trial court’s dismissal of a petition for relief from judgment on its own motion may properly be characterized as either a grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State or a dismissal of the petition with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12[, 871 N.E.2d 17, 25-29] (2007). Such a dismissal is subject to de novo review on appeal. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at [14, 871 N.E.2d at 26]. Thus, we will apply a de novo standard of review to the dismissal in the present case. See Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at [15-19, 871 N.E.2d at 25-29]. Turning to the merits of defendant’s argument, defendant first asserts that the trial court may not dismiss a petition for relief from judgment, on its own motion, without first providing defendant with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Our supreme court addressed that exact issue in Vincent and ruled to the contrary. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13-14[, 871 N.E.2d at 25-27], The trial court’s authority to take such action comes from the Illinois pleading requirements and from well-settled principles of civil practice and procedure. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13-14[, 871 N.E.2d at 26]. *** Our supreme court has noted that the jurisdiction of the lower courts to restrain the maintenance of vexatious or harassing litigation is well established. People ex rel. Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Circuit Court, 31 Ill. 2d 170, 173-74, 201 N.E.2d 109, 111 (1964). In reaffirming the trial court’s authority to dismiss suit under civil practice principles, our supreme court in Vincent pointed out that adequate safeguards exist to protect a litigant from an erroneous dismissal. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13[, 871 N.E.2d at 25]. A litigant may file a motion for rehearing or an appeal or both. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13[, 871 N.E.2d at 25-26]. Based upon the supreme court’s ruling in Vincent, the law is now settled in Illinois that the trial court may dismiss a petition for relief from judgment on its own motion without first providing the defendant with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13-14[, 871 N.E.2d at 25-27].” We agree with the Third District’s analysis and further adhere to the views we expressed in Ryburn III, except, of course, to the extent that those views conflict with Vincent. Specifically, we acknowledge, as our dissenting colleague points out, that the supreme court disagreed with our statement that trial courts possess the authority to summarily dismiss section 2 — 1401 petitions that are frivolous and without merit, noting that “summary dismissals” are not recognized under the Code of Civil Procedure. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 11, 871 N.E.2d at 24. This acknowledgment, however, does not change our ultimate conclusion. Consistent with the standard set forth by the supreme court for reviewing a trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of a section 2 — 1401 petition, we conclude that the judgment of the trial court is correct because the allegations of defendant’s petition wholly fail to state a cause of action. As a court of review, we review judgments, not the reasons therefor. See People v. DeBerry, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1058, 868 N.E.2d 382, 383 (2007) (where this court held that “we will affirm the trial court on any basis supported by the record even if the trial court did not mention its reasons or reasoned incorrectly”). Accordingly, even though (as the supreme court held in Vincent) the reasons underlying the trial court’s judgment in this case were flawed, we can — and will — affirm if the record otherwise shows that judgment to be soundly based. That rule clearly applies here. The primary focus of the dissent appears to be its disagreement with the decision of the supreme court that the trial court should possess the authority to sua sponte dismiss a section 2 — 1401 petition. Nonetheless, Vincent resolves that issue, and our job on this appeal is to apply supreme court doctrine as set forth in Vincent. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Affirmed. MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.