Court Opinion

ID: 9660458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:14:08.32423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:19.639408
License: Public Domain

*618Gerrard, J.,
concurring.
I concur. However, I write separately to further address the effect of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy and the existence of an automatic stay on the tax sale certificates in the instant case.
The majority correctly notes that Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-1856 (Reissue 1990) and 77-1902 (Reissue 1986) provide that a tax sale certificate which is not foreclosed within 90 days of the certificate’s expiration ceases to be valid. Appellee contends, however, that this limitation period was tolled by an automatic stay in bankruptcy. Thus, we are confronted with the question of whether an automatic stay extends the statutory time period within which a tax sale certificate must be foreclosed.
The Federal Bankruptcy Code protects claimants from having potential claims expire during the pendency of a bankruptcy stay. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1994) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy law ... fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor . . . and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of—
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under section 362, 922, 1201, or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect to such claim.
Section 108(c) evidences the basic principle that valid claims against the debtor that exist at the time bankruptcy proceedings are commenced will be preserved. See, In re Coan, 96 B.R. 828 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); Diamond Hill Inv. Co. v. Shelden, 767 P.2d 1005 (Wyo. 1989).
Section 77-1856 is not a statute of limitation which merely limits the period during which the remedy to enforce the lien may be exercised, but is a limitation on the underlying substantive right itself. We have held that upon the expiration of the *619statutory period, the lien itself is extinguished absolutely. See Alexander v. Shaffer, 38 Neb. 812, 57 N.W. 541 (1894).
However, the application of § 108(c) is not limited to statutes of limitation. The statute, by its plain language, applies not only to statutes of limitation, but to any “applicable nonbankruptcy law.” § 108(c). Other jurisdictions have considered the application of § 108(c) to lien enforcement periods and have concluded that § 108(c) does apply to the time period during which a creditor must bring an action to enforce a lien. See, e.g., In re Hunters Run Ltd. Partnership, 875 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1989) (mechanic’s lien); In re Decker, 199 B.R. 684 (B.A.R 9th Cir. 1996) (tax lien). See, also, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 108.04[1] (Lawrence R King ed., rev. 15th ed. 1997). I agree and would similarly hold that § 108(c) applies to tax sale certificates under §§ 77-1856 and 77-1902. To hold otherwise would be to permit debtors to “unilaterally shorten limitations periods by the strategic filing of a bankruptcy petition.” In re Decker, 199 B.R. at 688.
The effect of § 108(c) is not to toll the applicable limitations period. Rather, “[i]f the limitations period expires while the bankruptcy stay is in effect, then section 108(c) provides creditors with an extra thirty days to pursue a claim once the creditor receives notice that the bankruptcy stay has been lifted.” Thurman v. Tafoya, 895 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Colo. 1995).
However, I agree with the majority that the record in the instant case does not sufficiently demonstrate that appellee timely foreclosed the tax sale certificates. First, there is no evidence of when the bankruptcy petition was filed. If the 90-day period following the expiration of the certificates had passed prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the imposition of the automatic stay, then § 108(c) does not extend the time available. By its terms, § 108(c) applies only when “such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition.” Second, even if the stay had been in place prior to the expiration of the period for foreclosure, the foreclosure action was not brought within 30 days after the lifting of the stay. Appellee’s petition alleges that relief from stay was entered on July 24, 1991. However, the petition for foreclosure was not filed until *620September 16, 1991. This filing is outside the extended period provided by § 108(c), and, thus, the action was not timely filed.
For these reasons, this court, as did the district court, lacks jurisdiction to consider the instant cause, and I concur in the result reached by the majority.
Wright and Stephan, JJ., join in this concurrence.