Court Opinion

ID: 9770782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:21:31.297922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.764007
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority opinion regarding damages for mental anguish. This cause of action is one for recovery of damages expressly and only under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann., art. 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1987) and (Vernon Supp. 1991). The Act is not a codification of the common law. See Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 619 (Tex.1980).
Appellants challenge finding of fact number 8:
Plaintiffs sustained extreme nervousness over the problems with the vehicle and worried about driving the car. Mrs. Zer-etzke had problems sleeping and tremendous headaches.
Appellants also challenge that part of conclusion of law number 6 which awards each plaintiff the sum of $7500.00 as damages for mental anguish. They argue there is no evidence or insufficient evidence that there was a knowing violation of the DTP A, upon which finding by the trier of fact an award for mental anguish damages must be grounded. Further, it is argued plaintiffs failed to establish as a matter of law that Jerry A. Zeretzke suffered mental anguish. Appellants also maintain that the court erred in considering, over their timely objection, Jerry’s testimony concerning mental anguish.
In its landmark decision, Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.1984) the supreme court held that if “grossly negligent” conduct is sufficient to allow the consumer to recover for mental anguish, then “knowing” conduct is also sufficient. The first inquiry is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that the complained-of conduct rises to the level of “knowing” conduct, and that is not addressed in the majority opinion, as it must be. Even if it is assumed that necessary element was proved, there is a second question: whether the evidence proves that Jerry actually suffered mental anguish.
In its findings of fact the trial court stated the basis of recovery to be § 17.-46(b)(5) and (7), (misrepresentations). A misrepresentation is not characterized as a negligent act under the DTP A, nor does negligence play a part in this case. In order to sustain a mental anguish damage award, the trial court had to find that the misrepresentations were made knowingly by the defendants. It is, therefore, significant that the trial court chose not to find the misrepresentations were made knowingly.
To further show that the trial court did not intend to make a finding that the misrepresentations were made knowingly, additional damages of $2000.00 were granted. In other words, the court did not treble the damages as it could have done. DTP A § 17.50 (Vernon Supp.1991) provides in pertinent part:
(b) In a suit filed under this section, each consumer who prevails may obtain:
*361(1) the amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact. In addition the court shall award two times that portion of the actual damages that does not exceed $1,000. If the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant was committed knowingly, the trier of fact may award not more than three times the amount of actual damages in excess of $1,000....
******
Section 17.45(9) defines “knowingly,” and the trier of fact must make a specific finding that the defendant acted “knowingly.” That was not done in this case.
With the decision in Luna the supreme court granted the consumer in a DTPA action the same basis, proof that the defendant acted “knowingly”, to support a damage award for mental anguish. I would hold that the evidence was factually insufficient to meet the requirement of proof of knowing conduct. See § 17.45(9).
Even if that requisite element of the DTPA action were met, the evidence that Jerry suffered mental anguish falls far short of necessary proof. Headaches, problems with sleeping, and not enjoying good times because of being upset do not support a finding of mental anguish. See Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ). I would agree that proof of mental anguish by Jerry was not established as a matter of law.
For these reasons and because the majority opinion holds that in this DTPA action appellants’ reliance on Luna is misplaced, and that case is “no longer the law with respect to the necessity to plead and prove that an act was committed willfully or knowingly to recover damages for mental anguish,” I respectfully dissent.