Court Opinion

ID: 9675364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:50:45.253938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:33.560954
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR
BYERS, Judge.
The state has filed a petition to rehear asserting this Court erroneously granted a new trial to the defendant because we found the trial judge should have granted a challenge for cause. The state correctly points out that unless the record shows a defendant has excused all available peremptory challenges they may not prevail on the denial of a challenge for cause.
In our original opinion, we said “there is no proof in the record regarding the use of peremptory challenges by the defendant.”
This statement was in error. On June 2, 1989, this Court entered an order to enlarge the record to include therein the list of challenges to the jury, required to be kept by the trial judge by reason of Rule 24(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. These were filed on June 12, 1989. The challenge slips show the defendant exercised eight peremptory challenges.
Rule 24(d) provides a defendant is entitled to fifteen peremptory challenges if the offense is punishable by death. If the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, the defendant is entitled to eight peremptory challenges.
In this case, the state announced from the outset that they were not seeking the death penalty, and the defendant was permitted eight peremptory challenges.
The defendant exercised eight peremptory challenges prior to the juror in question being called. The record further reflects defense counsel addressed the trial judge on the matter of peremptory challenge and observed he had exhausted his challenges. The trial judge agreed counsel had done so. In this stance, the requirement of exhausting all of the peremptory challenge as a pre-condition to prevail on the seating of a juror who should have been excused is not applicable in this case. The defendant had in fact exhausted all the peremptory challenges available to him.
We reiterate that in our view of this record the juror in question was so far aware of the circumstances of this case and the past history of the defendant, that it cannot be said the defendant was afforded a fair and impartial jury to which an accused is constitutionally entitled.
We therefore deny the petition to rehear.
DAUGHTREY, J., and HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, Special Judge, concur.