Court Opinion

ID: 9777521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:14:41.398234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:55.696975
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Justice,
dissenting.
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution may not necessarily bar the use of new aggravating circumstances at resentencing, I conclude that Article 1, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and our state’s fundamental fairness jurisprudence demand that, in those instances in which the death penalty has been set aside on appeal, the state may rely upon and prove only those aggravating circumstances which were presented to and found by the jury at the original sentencing.1 Accordingly, I dissent.
I.
Relying on Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), the majority concludes that “resentencing in these consolidated cases [presumably based on new aggravating circumstances] is not prohibited by either the state or federal constitutional provision against double jeopardy.” While I acknowledge the federal interpretation of the double jeopardy clause that leads to such a conclusion and accordingly base my dissent on the more fundamental constitutional principle of due process, I do not wholeheartedly accept the analysis behind the cases relied on by the majority.
In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that in sentencing proceedings that are akin to guilt determinations “the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available ... with respect to the death penalty, at ... retrial.” 451 U.S. at 446,101 S.Ct. at 1862. If the state fails to convince the jury that the death penalty is warranted, defendant has been “acquitted” of that punishment. On retrial, the state may not seek the death penalty. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 2310, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). Once the jury has refused the state’s demand for the death penalty, retrial on that issue is barred even if the conviction is set aside due to legal error, notwithstanding that the legal error may affect the accuracy of the determination. “[T]he fact that ‘the acquittal [resulted] from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles, ... does not alter [the] essential characteristic [of the acquittal].’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978)). Thus, if the jury rejects the sole aggravating circumstance relied upon by the state at the first trial, on retrial the state may only seek a life sentence. The state may not allege aggravating circumstances which were not asserted originally.
Nonetheless, if the state originally asserted more than one aggravating circumstance and less than all of those asserted were rejected by the jury, the fifth amendment has been construed to allow the assertion of different aggravating circumstances on retrial. Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. at 156-57, 106 S.Ct. at 1755-56. Why? The high court has reasoned that finding or rejecting aggravating circumstances does not constitute convicting or acquitting. While that distinction certainly delineates between the case in which all aggravating circumstances are rejected at the first trial and the one in which only some are rejected, it does not distinguish between the ease in which the sole aggravating circumstance is rejected and the case in which one of two circumstances is rejected. In that context, it is, respectfully, a distinction without a difference. Nonetheless, we are bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal constitutional provisions. Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tenn.1979).
*333II.
We are not, however, so restricted in viewing our own Constitution. We, as the Supreme Court of Tennessee, have the foil and final power to interpret our state constitution. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975). Tennessee, and every state, has the “sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.” Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d at 760. “It is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections ... than the Federal Constitution requires.” California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983).
The sovereignty of the individual states and the institutional constraints of the United States Supreme Court oblige each state to define those distinctive and independent fundamental rights found within its own constitution. The function of the United States Supreme Court is to define the limits of what states can do, not to dictate what a state should do. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188, 195-95 (1987) (J. O’Hem, concurring). As has been noted: “The real question for [state supreme courts] is not what the State can do, but rather what [the state] should do in the just exercise of [the] common law supervisory power over criminal practice within [the] jurisdiction.” Id. at 295.
In interpreting our state constitution, we have frequently acknowledged its authority to provide protections beyond that of the comparable federal constitutional guarantees. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 189 (Tenn.1991). We have not shunned our obligation to recognize independent protections afforded under our state constitution. See e.g. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.1989) (test for sufficiency of search warrant affidavits); Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn.1979) (five step ex post facto analysis). See also State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn.1992) (self-incrimination); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn.1991) (Eighth Amendment issues); Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn.1988) (due process).
In concluding that our Constitution disallows the state’s reliance upon new aggravating circumstances in capital resentencing hearings, we do not conclude that the use violates double jeopardy under the Tennessee Constitution. Rather, we focus on the “law of the land” clause2 of our state Constitution which, while similar to the due process provisions of the United States Constitution, has a “quality independent of the United States Constitution_” Sneed v. State, 872 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993). See State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn.1992); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.1989).
Our “law of the land” clause recognizes that fundamental fairness and substantial justice are components of due process.3 See Van Zandt v. State, 218 Tenn. 187, 402 S.W.2d 130, 135 (1966); Vaughn v. State, 3 Tenn.Cr.App. 54, 456 S.W.2d 879, 883, cert. denied, (Tenn.1970). The bedrock principle in our law is that “fundamental fairness [is] essential to the very concept of justice.” Scott v. State, 216 Tenn. 375, 392 S.W.2d 681, 685 (1965). We have applied the concept of fundamental fairness throughout the years to issues as diverse as the identity of a confidential informant,4 the fairness of administrative proceedings,5 the statute of limitations in products liability actions,6 the use of
*334non-attorney judges in juvenile proceedings,7 and the evidence of uncharged crime admitted in death penalty sentencing.8 Nowhere is the principle more crucial than in issues relating to capital sentencings.
[T]he penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice. Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, [it cannot] be imposed under sentencing procedures that create[] a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 158, 158, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2918, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).
Because death is different from all other penalties and because it is severe beyond rectification, capital sentencing procedures must satisfy the imperatives of due process. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358-59, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204-05, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). The qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires procedures that withstand “a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny.” California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3452, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). See also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 1204-05; State v. Terry, 813 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn.1991). Thus, we consider the use of aggravating circumstances at resentencing with a heightened regard for the imperatives of fundamental fairness and substantial justice as required by Tennessee’s Constitution.
III.
While we have never addressed directly the issue presented by these two eases, our decision in State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn.1993), is instructive. In Branam, defendant, as appellants here, was convicted of felony murder committed during the perpetration of a robbery. State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d at 565. At sentencing, the jury found that the state had proven two aggravating circumstances: murder in the commission of another felony and murder committed to avoid, interfere with, or prevent lawful arrest or prosecution. Id. at 569. On appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction but found that “there was not a shred of evidence” to prove that the murder was committed to avoid, interfere with, or prevent the lawful arrest or prosecution of defendant or another. Id. at 570.
After holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove the first aggravating circumstance, the Court addressed the remaining aggravating circumstance and the remedy:
In the past, when this Court has set aside one of a number of aggravating circumstances as improperly submitted, we have generally held that the case must be remanded for a new hearing on punishment. T.C.A § 39-13-204(k) (1991) (citations omitted). In this case, however, the only remaining aggravating circumstance — murder committed in the course of another felony — cannot be considered upon remand, under the rule recently announced by the Court in State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tenn.1992). It follows that under state law, the defendant cannot be sentenced to death and his sentence must be set at life imprisonment.
Id. (emphasis added).
The state argues that the Court modified the sentence in Branam because it found the death penalty to be disproportionate.9 While *335perhaps a reason for the modification, dis-proportionality was clearly not the sole reason. After considering federal requirements, the Court concluded that “the same result is required by federal law” and that the death sentence, “under these facts would, in our judgment, constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. at 570-71. Accordingly, the Court held:
Based on our conclusion that capital punishment is precluded in this case by both the state and the federal constitutions, we reverse the penalty portion of the trial court’s judgment and order that, upon remand the defendant be resentenced in accordance with this opinion.
Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
The result in Branam would have been the same even had the death penalty been proportionate under federal constitutional law. State law required that the death sentence be modified to a sentence of life imprisonment in light of the conclusion that both aggravating circumstances were nullified. The state would not be given a second chance to prove that aggravating circumstances existed.10
Furthermore, our death penalty procedure is explicit, unambiguous, and mandatory. Rule 12.3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the state by written notice filed not less than thirty (30) days before trial:
shall specify that the State intends to seek the death penalty and the notice shall specify those aggravating circumstances the State intends to rely upon at a sentencing hearing.
Tenn.R.Crim.P. 12.3(b) (emphasis added). After a capital jury finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, they must determine whether the state has proved any of the specified aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. If so, the jury must determine whether the circumstances which were proved outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(f) (1991 Repl.). Their verdict represents an acceptance or rejection of facts and a weighing of all circumstances presented. Implicit in the procedure is a recognition that the jury will be given all the relevant evidence essential to the determination of life or death.
Thus, established precedent and procedure guide the consideration of what fundamental fairness requires in these circumstances. The requirements of due process, by definition, vary with the nature and importance of the interests involved. The state’s interest in imposing the ultimate penalty is significant. Its interest in mustering only a partial list of aggravating circumstances for which to seek that penalty is nonexistent. Conversely, the accused, society, and the system have an important interest in assuring that procedures in capital cases are fair and consistent. Anything less leads to a disrespect for the integrity of the system. Since due process requirements are heightened in capital cases and since the state has no interest in withholding notice of aggravators, fundamental fairness dictates that the state be limited in any capital sentencing to the aggravating circumstances claimed before the first trial.
That was the decision reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals in these cases. Upon striking the sole aggravating circumstance originally relied upon, none remained to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Therefore, based on Branam and Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-13-206(d)(2), the Court of Criminal Appeals modified appel*336lants’ sentences to life imprisonment. See State v. Timothy D. Harris, No. 02C01-9211-CR-00259, 1994 WL 123647 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, April 13,1994); State v. Craig D. Thompson, No. 02C01-9208-CR-00195, 1994 WL 85880 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Mar. 9, 1994).
The state challenged these sentence modifications in petitions to rehear. While the intermediate appellate court held that the state had waived the issue in Thompson, the court nonetheless concluded that the state was not entitled “to another chance at the death penalty on the basis of aggravating factors it had withheld in the initial proceeding.” State v. Craig D. Thompson, supra, slip op. at 3. Sound judicial policy, the panel explained, required the court
to guard against piecemeal litigation in the sentencing phase of capital eases. The prosecution should not “hold back” but should, instead, apprise the jury of all possible aggravating factors at the first opportunity. Judicial economy demands adherence to this policy.
State v. Craig D. Thompson, supra, slip op. at 6. See also Timothy Harris, Order Denying Petition to Rehear, supra,, slip op. at 7.
Implicit in all of these holdings is the recognition that allowing the state to submit new aggravating circumstances at resentenc-ing in death penalty cases offends notions of fundamental fairness and undermines sound judicial policy. Fundamental fairness is obviated when the state is placed in a better position after a successful defense appeal. Precepts of justice are sacrificed when the system encourages the state, whose duty is to act fairly and indiscriminately, to withhold evidence. Fairness and justice, as well as efficiency and economy, require the state to advance all aggravating circumstances upon which it intends to rely in the original death penalty trial. See State v. Carter, 890 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994). Principles of fundamental fairness are inconsistent with allowing the state repeated, supplemented attempts to get a death sentence. The trauma of such an ordeal is, at least, the equivalent of that experienced by a noncapi-tal defendant on retrial in which no additional charges can be made. See Tenn.R.Crim.P. 8. If we are true to our commitment to recognize the uniqueness of the penalty of death, we must protect the capital defendant at resentencing at least to the same extent we do the noncapital defendant on retrial.
Death is different. We must employ procedures that assure that the parties mete out the life-death controversy on a level playing field. The time and expense — financially and emotionally — of a death penalty sentencing hearing demands that the state with all its resources, investigate, develop, and organize its proof before the initial trial. Having failed to accomplish a legally supported death sentence on the circumstances relied upon, we cannot allow the state to try again with formerly non-claimed circumstances. To do so would encourage less than devoted preparation by prosecutors. We do not imply that the state, as a general practice, would hold back evidence of aggravating circumstances in case a death sentence were set aside on appeal. As the assistant attorney general noted at oral argument, the state has little reason not to assert all known aggravating circumstances in a capital proceeding. Therefore, a rule requiring that the state give notice of all known aggravating circumstances prior to the original trial does not unduly prejudice the state or obstruct the state’s effort to seek the death penalty in appropriate cases.11
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, I would hold as follows:
1. If the jury rejects an aggravating circumstance or an appellate court finds it is unsupported by the evidence, the state may not rely on that circumstance at resentencing.
2. At resentencing or in sentencing after a retrial, the state can rely only upon those aggravating circumstances relied upon by the state and found to exist by *337the original sentencing jury that were not otherwise eliminated on appeal. However, the aggravating circumstance in Section B9 — 13—204(i)(2) may be asserted at resentencing as a new aggravating circumstance on those rare occasions in which a new felony conviction for a violent crime has been entered against defendant after the original sentencing but prior to the second.
3. If the jury finds one or more aggravating circumstances, and on appeal all circumstances are eliminated, the case must be remanded to the trial court to determine whether the sentence should be life imprisonment or life without parole.
4. In case of mistrial, the state may not allege any aggravating circumstance not included in its original notice to defendant unless a new felony conviction for a violent crime has been entered against defendant after the date of the mistrial but prior to the commencement of the second trial.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cases for the imposition of life sentences.
REID, J., concurs.

. On those rare occasions in which defendant was convicted of a violent felony after the original sentencing hearing but prior to resentencing, I would hold that the state could assert prior violent felony conviction(s) as a new aggravating circumstance under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-13-204(i)(2).

. The clause, found in Article 1, Section 8, provides: “No man to be disturbed but by law. That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” Tenn. Const. Art. 1, § 8.

. In Van Zandt, this Court, while considering the admissibility of a confession, stated: "The true test, it seems to us, is whether 'fundamental fairness’ and ‘substantial justice' which after all, are what is meant by 'due process of law’ ... are absent or present.” Van Zandt v. State, 402 S.W.2d at 135.

. Goines v. State, 572 S.W.2d 644 (Tenn.1978).

. McMinnville Freight Line, Inc. v. Atkins, 514 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn.1974).

. McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., et al., 524 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn.1975).

. State v. Williams, 547 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn.1976).

. State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn.1987).

. Although not raised as an issue in this appeal, under the authority of Branam, Harris’ sentence of death may be disproportionate. Our decision in Branam reiterated the holding of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). There, the United States Supreme Court held that imposition of the death penalty against one “solely for participation in a robbery in which another robber takes life,” without proof that defendant attempted or intended to kill, or intended the use of deadly force, violates the Eighth Amendment. This constitutional standard was refined in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 in which the Court allowed the imposition of the death penalty against a defendant who was a major participant in a felony that resulted in murder. There, the Court concluded that death was not a disproportionate punishment despite the absence of an intent to kill so long as defendant's mental state is shown to be at least one of reckless indifference.
As Justice Drowota noted in Branam, this Court has upheld a death sentence on only one non-trigger person case. 855 S.W.2d at 573; *335State v. Taylor, 774 S.W.2d 163 (Tenn. 1989). A comparison of the facts of that case with those here suggests death might be a disproportionate penalty in the case at bar.

. It is true that prior to Branam, this Court either remanded for a new hearing or applied a harmless error analysis in every case which Mid-dlebrooks affected. However, in all those cases, the original jury found at least one aggravating circumstance other than the felony murder ag-gravator. In those cases with additional aggra-vatmg circumstances, the Court either remanded for the jury to weigh the remaining aggravating factors against any mitigating factors and to determine whether the death penalty was still an appropriate punishment, see e.g. State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483, 490 (Tenn.1993), or conducted a harmless error analysis. See e.g. State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn.1993). These cases do not endorse the use of new aggravating circumstances at a second sentencing.

. Our conclusion is equally consistent with Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. That Rule provides that offenses that "are based upon the same conduct or arise from the same episode” if the offenses "are known to the appropriate prosecuting official” at the time the defendant is charged.