Court Opinion

ID: 9685039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:21:33.756475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.900632
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and I would affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.
I agree with the rules set forth in the majority opinion that when courts are called upon to ascertain the meaning of a deed, every part of the deed must be given effect if it is possible even though different parts may appear to be contradictory or inconsistent. But, attempts to harmonize the whole should not produce a construction which destroys the key expression of intent. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Masterson, 160 Tex. 548, 334 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex.1960). When there is a repugnance between clauses in a conveyance, the granting clause prevails. Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex.1963); Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342,312 S.W.2d 231,234 (Tex.1958). It is not the intention which the parties may have had but failed to express, but the intention which the instrument does express to which we should give effect. Canter v. Lindsey, 575 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
With these rules in mind, I am of the opinion that a conflict exists between the first and third clauses of the Koncaba-Mang deed. Appellants argue that the use of a double fraction in the granting clause “one half of the one-eighth interest” is ambiguous. Use of a double fraction in a deed is not ambiguous; the reader may calculate the interest very simply. Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1945). Thus, it is clear that the first clause of the deed before us granted a ½6 interest in the minerals. The majority so holds and I agree with the majority’s construction of the first clause.
But, the third clause which deals with the situation after the Cranfill-Reynolds lease terminates is not as simple to understand. It does provide for a joint interest by the Roncabas and Mang. Although the majority attempts to adopt a construction of this clause which is harmonious with the granting clause, I do not believe this is possible. The third clause is confusing because of the way it seems to equate “lease interests and all future rentals” with a mineral interest, but it does appear to be an attempt to convey a one-half interest in the minerals. Although I would do so only as a last resort, McBride v. Hutson, 157 Tex. 632, 306 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Tex.1957), I would reject one of these clauses, because I believe there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two.
Since there is a rule of construction favoring the granting clause, which I have noted above, I would resolve the conflict in favor of the granting clause and hold that the deed conveyed a perpetual Vie mineral interest to Mang. My decision is based not only on this rule of construction, but also upon my conclusion that the first clause is clear and the third clause ambiguous. If the grantors intended to convey a greater amount, they failed to expressly say so. I would affirm the trial court.