Court Opinion

ID: 9872282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 20:57:59.604628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:26.158568
License: Public Domain

Kapsner, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 32] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and direct the district court to amend the judgments in Case No. 03-2014-CV-00090 and 03-2014-CV-00089 to provide the money paid to farm the disputed properties in 2015 and placed in Mr. Wang’s trust account was remedial between the parties during the pendency of the case and, in the event of redemption under the terms of the judgment, must be returned to the payors.
[¶ 33] There are two problems with the district court’s decision to unconditionally allow the estate to retain the money paid by Justin and Cynthia Beckstrand to rent the land during the 2015 growing season: 1) the district court did not cancel the contract, but instead allowed a period of redemption, and 2) it is contrary to the express intent of the testator who had made provision in his will for payments under the contracts for deeds. Those provisions are the other payments ordered under the judgments.
[¶ 34] In paragraph 12, the majority notes the general rule that a grantor who is entitled to the cancellation of a deed is also entitled to the fair rental value of the property, or the rents and profits of the land, for the time that the grantee was wrongfully in possession, including rents collected by the defendant while in possession and those accruing during the pen-dency of the suit. But this right of the grantor does not apply here, because ultimately it was determined by the court that the grantor was not entitled to cancellation; rather, the grantee was entitled to redeem the property.
[¶ 35] “Cancellation of a contract for deed by action is an action in equity.” Moch v. Moch, 1997 ND 69, ¶ 19, 562 N.W.2d 558.1 acknowledge that during the pendency of an equitable proceeding the district court has “the power to adjust the rights of the parties with regard to interest, rents and profits and make complete adjudication of all matters involved in the case,” as asserted .in paragraph 12 of the majority opinion, citing Arhart v. Thompson, 75 N.D. 569, 579, 31 N.W.2d 56, 62 (1948), See also Bendish v. Castillo, 2012 ND 30, ¶ 9, 812 N.W.2d 398. At the time the district court entered its order requiring payment in order to farm the property for the 2015 growing season, it was asserted that the grantee was in default and no decision had been made on' cancellation. That interim decision to maintain the equities pending the ultimate decision, however, does not permit the district court to make a final decision that is inconsistent with its determination on cancellation or with the testator’s intent'.
[¶ 36] Johnson v. Finkle, 2013 ND 149, ¶ 17, 837 N.W.2d 132, contains a succinct statement of the law on contracts for deed:
Under a contract for deed, the vendor retains the legal title to the property and holds it in trust for the purchaser and as security for the purchaser’s compliance with the conditions of the contract. See Security State Bank of Hannaford v. Harrington, 452 N.W.2d 72, 74 (N.D. 1990); Farmers State Bank v. Slaubaugh, 366 N.W.2d 804, 807 (N.D. 1985); Zent v. Zent, 281 N.W.2d 41, 45 (N.D. 1979); Sadler v. Ballantyne, 268 N.W.2d 119, 124 (N.D. 1978); United Accounts, Inc. v. Larson, 121 N.W.2d 628, 632-33 (N.D. 1963); In re Ryan’s Estate, 102 N.W.2d 9, 14 (N.D. 1960). The purchaser holds equitable title and generally has the right to the use and possession of the property. See Slaubaugh, at 807; Zent, at 45; United Ac*222counts, at 632-38; Ryan’s Estate, at 14. The equitable title merges in the legal title when the terms of the contract for deed have been completed and the warranty deed is entered. United Accounts, at 633. The full title in fee simple does not vest until the entire purchase price is paid and the terms of the contract have been met. Zent, at 45. The subsequent conveyance under the warranty deed after the terms of the contract for deed have been met does not create a new right, but rather perfects the right existing under the contract and gives effect to the parties’ intent by perfecting title relating back to the date of the contract. Ryan’s Estate, at 13-14.
By not cancelling the contract, but allowing for , redemption, the district court recognized Justin Beckstrand’s right to the use and possession of the property, conditioned upon his payment of the redemption costs. Therefore, if redemption occurs, an additional payment for the right to rent the property would be inconsistent with his existing interests under the contract for deed.
[¶ 37] As noted in paragraph 4 of the majority opinion, the will of John Beckst-rand made a specific bequest for the contracts for deed. Paragraphs 1 through 6 of the district court’s order, as recited in paragraph 6 of the majority opinion, reflected that disposition. Only paragraph 7 of the district court order, which allowed the estate to keep the rental payment regardless of redemption, was inconsistent with the remaining provisions.
[¶ 38] Section 30.1-01-02 of the Uniform Probate Code notes that its underlying purpose and policy is “[t]o discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of the decedent’s property.” Except for paragraph 7 of its order, the distinct court has given effect to the express intent of John Beckstrand with regard to the contracts for deed. I would reverse and direct the district court to amend its judgments to make the provisions of paragraph 7 conditional upon the failure of Justin Beckstrand to redeem to the property.
[¶ 89] Carol Ronning Kapsner
Lisa Fair McEvers