Court Opinion

ID: 9576556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:25:59.517433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:51.017886
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent because the state and federal constitutions require appointment of counsel for a death penalty inmate who is pursuing his first habeas corpus petition and who is seeking to challenge his conviction and sentence on a basis not available on direct appeal.7 Counsel for this habeas petitioner is required in order to protect the constitutional guarantee of meaningful access to the courts because of the complexity of habeas corpus law and the importance of habeas review in ensuring fundamental fairness in capital cases.
The same counsel represented Gibson at trial and on direct appeal. This habeas petition is therefore Gibson’s first opportunity to challenge his conviction and sentence on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.8 The habeas court denied the motion of amicus for a continuance for obtaining pro bono counsel and conducted an *868evidentiary hearing over Gibson’s objection that he had no attorney. The record shows that Gibson has an eighth grade education and is in the “borderline range of intelligence” with an IQ between 76 and 82. Following the hearing, the court made an ex parte request of the state to prepare an order, which the court then adopted verbatim.
The. Georgia Constitution guarantees the right to seek habeas corpus relief.9 The right to seek habeas review includes the right to meaningful access to the courts to pursue the habeas challenge.10 As this Court recently stated, “[p]risoner access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions . . . cannot be unjustifiably denied or obstructed.” 11 The federal constitution provides similar protections.12 The question becomes whether meaningful access and fundamental fairness require appointment of counsel in a capital post-conviction proceeding that provides the first opportunity to raise a constitutional challenge to the conviction and sentence. This is a question that the United States Supreme Court has never addressed and has specifically left open.13
The majority’s reliance on Murray v. Giarratano14 and State v. Davis15 is unpersuasive because neither case involved a death penalty inmate who was forced to proceed at his first habeas proceeding without counsel. Giarratano was not a habeas proceeding, but was a civil rights case seeking broad prospective relief. As Justice Kennedy observed in casting the deciding vote in Giarratano, Virginia already provided institutional lawyers to assist in preparing postconviction petitions and “no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to represent him in post conviction proceedings.”16 Similarly, Davis was never without counsel; he was simply without compensated counsel.17 In Davis, this Court held only that the trial court erred in “appointing” the Prisoner Legal Counseling Project, and thus providing for payment.18 The Court noted that lawyers with *869the PLCP were already providing legal advice and representation on a volunteer basis.19
The first factor to consider in addressing the question of whether the constitution requires appointed counsel is the nature of the proceedings. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an attorney’s assistance in capital post-conviction proceedings is “crucial because of the complexity of. . . jurisprudence in this area.”20 As Justice Kennedy observed in Giarratano, post-conviction proceedings are a “central part of the review process for prisoners sentenced to death.”21 Troubling statistics confirm this: nearly half (46%) of all capital cases reviewed in federal habeas proceedings between 1976 and 1991 were found to have constitutional error.22 In 1996, this Court also recognized the importance of counsel when Chief Justice Benham sent letters to approximately 80 law firms across this state requesting that each firm agree to represent an individual in a capital post-conviction case on a pro bono basis. As this case demonstrates, however, reliance on pro bono counsel is no longer adequate. Recently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi recognized that such reliance is insufficient and granted a motion for appointed and compensated counsel for a death row inmate in state post-conviction proceedings.23 That court recognized that the uniqueness of death as a sentence and the complexity of post-conviction procedures require counsel in order to provide meaningful access to the courts.24
The need for counsel is even greater with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 2262-66, Georgia’s Death Penalty Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995, OCGA § 9-14-44, et seq., and Uniform Superior Court Rule 44. Together these enactments impose strict time limitations on habeas petitions in death penalty cases. A prisoner sentenced to die must file his or her federal habeas petition within one year of the conviction becoming final, with tolling allowed if state post-conviction proceedings are pending.25 In Georgia, Rule 44 requires that a habeas petitioner file all pretrial motions within 60 days of filing a petition and complete discovery within 120 days. Rule 44 also requires the evidentiary hearing to be conducted within 180 days of the filing of the petition. Failure to meet these requirements will result in the absence of any hearing on the merits for the habeas *870petitioner. Furthermore, as the State Bar of Georgia points out in its amicus brief, the strict time limits of this rule actually discourage lawyers from accepting the Chief Justice’s plea for pro bono assistance because the rules do not permit adequate time to become familiar with the Byzantine requirements of habeas corpus law.
It is also important to consider the claims being raised in the habeas petition. In this case, Gibson is seeking to challenge the effectiveness of his trial counsel, an issue that he has not been able to assert previously. It is well-established that indigent defendants are entitled to counsel for the direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence.26 A state that permits a defendant to raise a constitutional challenge to his death sentence only after the right to counsel has expired is treading heavily on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, especially in light of the unusual importance of post-conviction proceedings in capital cases. Repeated reversals of convictions and death sentences in habeas proceedings demonstrate that the protections given in the trial and direct appeal stages of death penalty cases are often not sufficient to assure their reliability.27 The fact that death sentences are not reimposed following a successful habeas petition underscores the importance of the habeas proceed*871ing.28 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has previously recognized that due process may require appointment of counsel in circumstances where the risk of an erroneous decision is not nearly so great as in death penalty litigation: in proceedings to terminate parental rights,29 adjudicate juvenile delinquency,30 transfer prisoners to a state mental hospital,31 and revoke parole,32 and to misdemeanor criminal trials where even one day of imprisonment is imposed.33
In determining the requirements of “fundamental fairness,” another relevant inquiry is the contemporary practice.34 The federal government35 and all other states provide a right to counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings.36 Georgia is the only jurisdiction that *872fails to provide a right to counsel in capital post-conviction cases.37 While it is true that the mechanism for appointed counsel in capital habeas proceedings usually has come about through the state legislature, this fact is irrelevant for constitutional analysis. If, as the majority concedes, contemporary practice is relevant to determining the constitutional requirements, then there is no rational basis for distinguishing the source.38 The fact that other state legislatures have provided for counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings may be a strong policy consideration for Georgia’s legislature, but it is a weak excuse for this Court to evade its responsibility to ensure the guarantees of the constitution.
The ultimate consideration and the one that underlies all these arguments is that death is different. Its finality as punishment demands special consideration.39 The majority’s response to the reality that “death is different” is to focus on the facts of this case and make the subjective determination that Gibson deserves the death penalty. That decision is never appropriate for this Court to make; it is the province of the jury. Even if it were an appropriate determination for this Court, it cannot justify the denial of due process. The majority’s subjective conclusion that Gibson deserves the death penalty ignores the tenet that “fundamental fairness is the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus.”40 When a petitioner is on death row and pursuing his first habeas petition, there can be no glimmer of hope that fundamental fairness will prevail in the absence of counsel and, without a procedure for appointed counsel, the right to meaningful access to habeas review under the Georgia Constitution is lost.
For all these reasons, I conclude that meaningful access to the right to seek habeas relief and fundamental fairness in those proceedings demand appointment of counsel for Gibson and I would reverse and would order a new habeas hearing following appointment of counsel.
*873Decided February 22, 1999 —
Reconsideration denied April 9,1999. .
King & Spalding, Joseph R. Bankoff, for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paige Reese Whitaker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Emmet J. Bondurant, Rogers & Hardin, C. B. Rogers, Alston & Bird, G. Conley Ingram, Kilpatrick Stockton, Miles J. Alexander, Gambrell & Stolz, Linda A. Klein, David A. Webster, Gerald R. Weber, Jr., amici curiae.
Because the Court has not granted the certificate for probable cause to appeal, nor given the parties the courtesy of an opportunity to submit briefs on the alleged constitutional errors during the trial, I further believe that it is inappropriate to consider those issues as the Court does in division 2.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham and Justice Sears join in this dissent.

 Although the posture of this case is a request for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, the issue of Gibson’s right to counsel has been fully briefed by both sides and the record of the habeas court is before us. Additionally, the Court has the benefit of amicus briefs.

 Castell v. Kemp, 254 Ga. 556, 558 (331 SE2d 528, 530) (1985).

 Ga. Const. Art. I, §. I, Par. XV.

 See Howard v. Sharpe, 266 Ga. 771, 772 (470 SE2d 678) (1996); Giles v. Ford, 258 Ga. 245 (368 SE2d 318) (1988); Johnson v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 548, 550 (192 SE2d 900) (1972).

 Howard v. Sharpe, 266 Ga. 771, 772 (470 SE2d 678) (1996).

 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (116 SC 2174, 2182, 135 LE2d 606) (1996) (state must provide “tools . . . inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally”); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-823 (97 SC 1491, 52 LE2d 72) (1977) (prisoners have constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts).

 See Coleman v. Thomas, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (111 SC 2546, 115 LE2d 640) (1991).

 492 U.S. 1 (109 SC 2765, 106 LE2d 1) (1989).

 246 Ga. 200 (269 SE2d 461) (1980).

 Giarratano, 109 SC at 2773 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

 Davis’ pro bono counsel continued to represent him through a second reversal in federal habeas proceedings and finally a guilty plea in exchange for a life without parole sentence. See Davis v. Kemp, 752 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1985); Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 221, 222 (403 SE2d 800) (1991); Metro and State in Brief, Atlanta CONST., May 29, 1993 at B2.

 246 Ga. at 201.

 Id.

 McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855 (114 SC 2568, 129 LE2d 666) (1994).

 492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

 McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1263 (114 SC 2785, 129 LE2d 896) (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

 Jackson v. State, No. 98-DP-00708-SCT, 1998 WL 469953 (Miss. Jan. 28,1999).

 Id.

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (83 SC 814, 9 LE2d 811) (1963).

 See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 263 Ga. 764 (438 SE2d 905) (1994) (referring to unpublished habeas decision reversing conviction and sentence); Nelson v. Zant, 261 Ga. 358 (405 SE2d 250) (1991); Ross v. Kemp, 260 Ga. 312 (393 SE2d 244) (1990) (per curiam); Birt v. State, 259 Ga. 800 (387 SE2d 879) (1990) (referring to unpublished habeas decision vacating death sentence); Curry v. Zant, 258 Ga. 527 (371 SE2d 647) (1988); Hardy v. State, 258 Ga. 523 (371 SE2d 849) (1988) (referring to unpublished habeas decision vacating death sentence); Stynchcombe v. Floyd, 252 Ga. 113 (311 SE2d 828) (1984); Zant v. Hamilton, 251 Ga. 553 (307 SE2d 667) (1983); Jarrell v. Kemp, 248 Ga. 492 (284 SE2d 17) (1981); Zant v. Gaddis, 247 Ga. 717 (279 SE2d 219) (1981); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (108 SC 1771, 100 LE2d 249) (1988); Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1998); Hill v. Turpin, 135 F.3d 1411 (11th Cir. 1998); Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501 (11th Cir. 1995); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994); Burden v. Zant, 24 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Zant, 972 F.2d 318 (11th Cir. 1992); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991); Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1991); Berryhill v. Zant, 858 F.2d 633 (11th Cir. 1988); Cervi v. Kemp, 855 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1988); Com v. Kemp, 837 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1988); Godfrey v. Kemp, 836 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1988); Dick v. Kemp, 833 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. 1987); Bowen v. Kemp, 832 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (reversing convictions of Charles Bowen and Horace William Dix); Brooks v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. Kemp, 800 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1986); Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621 (11th Cir. 1985); Ruffin v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1985); Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir. 1985); Wallace v. Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102 (11th Cir. 1985); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1985); Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984); Strickland v Francis, 738 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir. 1982); Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792 (11th Cir. 1982); Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d per curiam, 908 F.2d 695 (1990); Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Ga. 1987), aff’d by equally divided court, 887 F.2d 1407 (11th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Kemp, 615 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ga. 1985), aff’d per curiam, 781 F.2d 1482 (1986).

 Follow-up research on the defendants whose cases are cited in n. 27 above shows that three were wrongly convicted, see Wallace v. State, 188 Ga. App. 77 (317 SE2d 914) (1988) (acquitted of murder at second trial); Special Update: Georgia’s Death Row, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 17,1996 at G8 (Gary Nelson was released after state withheld exculpatory information and did not retry him; Henry Arthur Drake was resentenced to life, but was released when it was learned that the state’s main witness had lied). None of the others are currently under a death sentence. See Young v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), (state barred from seeking death penalty in retrial); Brooks v. State, 262 Ga. 187 (415 SE2d 903) (1992) (following second trial in which the state sought the death penalty, he received a life sentence); see also Special Update: Georgia's Death Row, Atlanta Const., Nov. 17, 1996 at G8 (Victor Vemard Roberts and Eddie Lee Ross pled guilty and received life sentences; Walter Curry pled guilty and received a sentence of life without parole; David Alfred Jarrell’s second death sentence was reversed, see Jarrell v. State, 261 Ga. 880 (413 SE2d 710) (1992), and he pled guilty and promised not to seek parole; Tony Amadeo pled guilty and was sentenced to life after this Court reversed refusal to appoint previous counsel for retrial, Amadeo v. State, 259 Ga. 469 (384 SE2d 181) (1989); Janice Buttrum pled guilty and promised not to seek parole; Alphonso Morgan faced a second sentencing trial, see Morgan v. State, 257 Ga. 596 (361 SE2d 793) (1987), but was resentenced to life); Kenneth Hardy, John Michael Davis, Jimmie Burden, Jimmy Lee Horton, James Cunningham, Michael Gene Berryhill, Michael Albert Cervi, Charles Com, Robert Franklin Godfrey, Dennis Dick, Charles Bowen, Horace William Dix, Donald Wayne Thomas, Joseph Wilson, Jr., Judson Ruffin, Joseph James Blake, Shirley Tyler, Robert William Strickland, William Alvin Smith and Johnny L. Johnson were resentenced to life; Bobby Gene Gaddis awaits resentencing following the 1981 vacating of the death penalty; Billy Sunday Birt, Norman Darnell Baxter, Carzell Moore, and Brandon Jones await resentencing); Retrial like a ‘reunion’ in Cobb, Atlanta Const., Feb. 22, 1999 at B1 (Floyd Ernest Hill was released after state could not find rehable witnesses to retry case). Whether Terry Lee Goodwin and Joseph Edward Thomas have been retried and sentenced is unclear; whether Gary Michael Floyd, Roland Paul Hamilton, and Wilburn Wiley Dobbs have been resentenced is unclear.

 Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (101 SC 2153, 68 LE2d 640) (1981).

 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (87 SC 1428, 18 LE2d 527) (1967).

 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-497 (100 SC 1254, 63 LE2d 552) (1980).

 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791 (93 SC 1756, 36 LE2d 656) (1973).

 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (92 SC 2006, 32 LE2d 530) (1972).

 See Cooper v Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (116 SC 1373, 1380, 134 LE2d 498) (1996).

 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B).

 The Spangenberg Group, “An Updated Analysis of the Right to Counsel and the Right to Compensation and Expenses in State Post-Conviction Death Penalty Cases,” (American Bar Association Post-Conviction Penalty Representation Project, June 1996).

 Id. As of the date of the Spangenberg Group report, Wyoming also failed to provide counsel for death penalty inmates in post-conviction proceedings. However, Wyoming recently changed its law and now death penalty inmates are entitled to representation by the Wyoming state public defender in post-conviction proceedings. SEA 41, 55th Leg., 1999 Session (Wyo.) (to be codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(ii) (1999).

 Cooper, 116 SC at 1380 (In considering constitutionality of procedural rule, Court surveyed contemporary practice set forth in case law and statutes of the various states).

 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (105 SC 1087, 84 LE2d 53) (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“In capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not be required in other cases.”); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-999 (103 SC 3446, 77 LE2d 1171) (1983) (“qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination”).

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).