Court Opinion

ID: 9589098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:41:24.76286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:48.692889
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, J.,
dissenting.
Under Code § 18.2-53.1, a person who uses a firearm in the commission of certain enumerated felonies is guilty of “a separate and distinct felony.” In Cortner v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 557, 281 S.E.2d 908 (1981), we affirmed a conviction of an accused who never actually possessed the firearm used in a robbery but who acted in concert with the user. In Cortner, however, the defendant knew, throughout the execution of the underlying felony, that his confederate had and was using the firearm.
In the present case, there is no evidence that Carter knew or reasonably could have foreseen that his accomplice would use a firearm. Nevertheless, the majority affirms Carter’s conviction of *129use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, relying upon the doctrine of vicarious responsibility. Because there is no evidence proving either guilty knowledge or foreseeability, I would reverse the conviction.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that vicarious responsibility for use of a firearm during the commission of a felony requires at least circumstantial evidence that the accessory knows or can reasonably foresee that the principal will use a firearm. See United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the principle that a conviction of aiding and abetting the carrying of a firearm during the commission of a felony requires evidence giving rise to an inference that the accessories could reasonably foresee that the principal would carry a firearm); People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich. App. 470, 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979) (requiring evidence sufficient to support an inference that the accessory knew his confederates were armed before affirming a conviction of aiding and abetting possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony).
Code § 18.2-53.1, a penal statute, must be construed strictly against the Commonwealth and “any ambiguity or reasonable doubt as to its meaning must be resolved in [an accused’s] favor.” Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979). The majority, however, gives the statute a most sweeping construction. Because I believe the majority applies Code § 18.2-53.1 too broadly, I respectfully dissent.