Court Opinion

ID: 9766767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:58:12.038918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:25.874386
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent to the reversal of this conviction. At no time did the appellant ask for a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the voluntariness of the confession. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, which holds that hearings on the voluntariness of confessions be held outside the presence of the jury was decided in 1964. Article 38.22, V.A.C.C.P., was passed in 1965, and was of common knowledge before this case was tried. If appellant thought that a hearing outside the presence of the jury should have been held, he could have asked for one.
No evidence was offered before the jury on the voluntariness of the confession and no contention is made that he was refused the right to do so. No proffered testimony was submitted at any time on the voluntariness of the confession which could have been done under Article 40.09, Section 6 (d) (1), V.A.C.C.P.
Objections of counsel do not constitute proof of the facts stated, and the fact that appellant’s counsel stated that the confession was given involuntarily did not make an issue for the jury.
Since there was no evidence before the jury on the involuntariness of the confession, an instruction thereon was not called for. Gaston v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 435 S.W.2d 858. Such an instruction would have been improper under the facts of this case.
As long as we have an adversary system and where the law has been spelled out, as in this case by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jackson v. Denno, supra, and by the Legislature in Article 38.22, supra, the appellant should have requested a hearing out of the presence of the jury in order to obtain a reversal.
In Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31, the Supreme Court of the United States stated, “This Court has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances * * * ” and, “Hence, because a disputed confession may be found involuntary and inadmissible by the judge, it would seem prudent to hold voluntariness hearings outside the presence of the jury.”
Apparently the court did not disapprove, and it might be argued that it approved, the rule of the New Jersey Supreme Court which provides for hearings outside the presence of the jury upon request when it inserted in a footnote the following:
“The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently announced that from September 11, 1967, hearings on admissibility shall be outside the presence of the jury if the defendant so requests. See State v. Broxton, 49 N.J. 373, 386, n. 2, 230 A.2d 489, 496, n. 2 (1967).”
The Supreme Court noted that the respondent (Pinto) stated that he had no objection to the testimony being taken in the presence of the jury,' and then held:
“Since trial counsel consented to the evidence on voluntariness being taken in the presence of the jury, and the judge found the statement voluntary, respondent was deprived of no constitutional right.”
Mr. Justice Fortas concurred because the respondent agreed to the hearing before the jury. He noted that Jackson v.- Denno means that the judge and jury must each make an independent judgment on the voluntariness of the confession and that on hearing the evidence simultaneously with the judge, the jury is not apt to approach disagreement with him.
In the present case neither the judge nor the jury heard any evidence on voluntan*179ness, and one could not have influenced the other because there was no evidence before either upon which to make a finding.
The Supreme Court of the United States held in Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 91 S.Ct. 485, 27 L.Ed.2d 524, a habeas corpus proceeding, that the failure to allege facts that would establish involuntariness of his confession bars the granting of a new hearing on voluntariness even though the state trial court did not comply with Jackson v. Denno, supra.
Again in the present case, appellant does not show facts that would entitle him to a reversal. He does not contend that it was reversible error because he did not get a hearing.
Because the appellant did not request a hearing outside the presence of the jury or make an offer of proof to make an issue of voluntariness, no reversible error has been shown.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.