Court Opinion

ID: 9952539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 23:07:04.817265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:11.222355
License: Public Domain

03/19/2024

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                                                                       Case Number: DA 23-0638

                                        DA 23-0638

GEOFFERY D. WALTON AND SARAH L.
WALTON, WHISTLE CREEK PARTNERS LLC,
AND LYNN T. LABRIE AND ANN A. LABRIE,

   Petitioners, Counter-Defendants, and Appellees,
                                                                    ORDER
      v.

JAMES A. MIRRO AND LORETTA MIRRO,
                                                                                             PD
                                                                                    MAR 19 2024
   Respondents, Counterclaimants, and Appellants.                                 Bowen Greenwood
                                                                                Clerk of Supreme Court
                                                                                   State of Montana

       Appellees Geoffrey Walton, Sarah Walton, Lynn Labrie, Ann Labrie, and Whistle
Creek Partners LLC (collectively "Ditch Users"), move to dismiss this appeal on the ground
that it has become moot. Appellants James Mirro and Lorretta Mirro (Mirros) oppose the
motion.
       Mirros appeal an October 23, 2023 preliminary injunction order entered by the Sixth
Judicial District Court, Sweet Grass County, restraining the Mirros from interfering with
Ditch Users' easement rights to access Ellison Ditch and headgate via an existing access road
and driveway through the Mirros' property. The same order denied the Mirros' request to
restrain Ditch Users from commencing with replacement of the headgate until the merits of
the controversy were resolved. The court noted that the project was prepared to start in two
weeks' time "and should be done while the favorable fall weather allows" because delay
would prolong the risk that the headgate would fail and cause unwarranted expense. The
District Court denied the Mirros' motion to stay execution of its order, and we denied the
Mirros' motion for relief from the order denying a stay.
       The Ditch Users now seek dismissal of the appeal because construction associated
with the Ellison Ditch Headgate Project—the object of the competing motions for
preliminary injunction—has been completed. Except for restraining the Mirros from
                                                   secondary easement rights to access the
"prevent[ing] or interfer[ing] with [Ditch Users']
                                               as necessary to access the ditch and Ellison
Ellison Ditch and Ellison Ditch Headgate ...
                                                 ion and replacement of the Ellison Ditch
Ditch Headgate area, for purposes of construct
                                                   Court rnade no other substantive rulings in
Headgate[d" the Ditch Users contend, the District
                                                  event that the injunction was designed to
 its preliminary injunction order. Because "the
                                                  is no relief the Mirros seek on appeal that
 prevent already has occurred," they argue, there
                                                   rio Irrevocable Trust, 2014 MT 286,119,
 can be granted by this Court. (Quoting In re Oso
376 Mont. 524, 337 P.3d 87.)
                                                                   that this Court still rnay grant
        Mirros dispute the claimed mootness and contend
                                                      ve Direct Ins. Co. v. Stuivenga, 2012 MT
effective relief. They cite our opinion in Progressi
                                                        g that it is "wrong to suggest" that "the
75, ¶ 37, 364 Mont. 390, 276 P.3d 867, explainin
                                                        tions necessarily moots an appeal." We
inability to restore the parties to their original posi
                                                           f would be to restore the parties to their
 observed: "In some situations, the only effective relie
                                                        then the appeal is moot." Stuivenga;¶ 37.
 original positions, and if that is no longer possible,
                                                             it is possible to grant some form of
 But "the question, more accurately stated, is whether
                                                          Mirros point out that the Ditch Users'
 effective relief to the appellant." Stuivenga, ¶ 37.
                                                            aratory relief, also seeks attorney fees
 Complaint, in addition to seeking injunctive and decl
                                                              holding in Musselshell Ranch Co. v.
 pursuant to § 70-17-112(5), MCA. Mirros rely on our
                                                                 1212, that a prevailing party under
 Seidel-Joukova, 2012 MT 222, 366 Mont. 337, 286 P.3d
                                                               d pursuant to this statute.
  § 70-17-112(5), MCA, must prevail on all claims raise
                                                                       een the dorninant and servient
         Seidel-Joukova involved multiple claims for relief betw
                                                             lved in favor of the ditch user. See
  estate owners, not all of which ultimately were reso
                                                              on its claims pertaining to the 16-foot
  Seidel-Joukova, ¶ 19 ("the Ranch ultimately prevailed
                                                                the west end and unlimited access
  panels, the culvert and bridge, a replacement gate on
                                                               Joukova could not travel the gravel
  through both gates. It did not prevail on its claim that
                                                              The Complaint in this case seeks a
  road along the north bank of the Cooley ditch.").
                                                                  easement in and to the use of the
   declaration that Ditch Users have a "dominant primary
                                                              Headgate, free from interference by
   Ellison Ditch, including the use of the Ellison Ditch
                                                   2
Respondents Mirro, including activities associated with the Ellison Ditch Headgate
reconstruction project, and placement of the Ellison Ditch Headgate as necessary within the
bed and banks of the Boulder River." It seeks corresponding declaratory relief affirming
Ditch Users' secondary easement "as necessary for maintenance, repair, and cleaning of the
Ellison Ditch and Ellison Ditch Headgate, and for the Ellison Ditch Headgate reconstruction
project as reasonably necessary, free from interference by Respondents Mirro." There are
two claims for injunctive relief, one to enjoin Mirros from interfering with Ditch Users'
rights to access the Ellison Ditch and Headgate through and across Mirros' property as
necessary to repair and replace the headgate, and a second to require Mirros to remove their
alleged encroachments from the Ditch Users' secondary access route to the western side of
the Ellison Ditch and Ellison Ditch Headgate area.
       The Ditch Users' Complaint sought to enjoin Mirros "from continuing to interfere
with Petitioners' secondary easement rights to access the Ellison Ditch and Ellison Ditch
Headgate." The District Court's preliminary injunction in Ditch Users' favor does not
resolve the ultimate merits of that claim, which remains pending. The District Court's
preliminary injunction order concerns only the Ditch Users' right to access the ditch and
Ellison Ditch Headgate area for purposes of construction and replacement of the Ellison
Ditch Headgate. That is the only issue raised in Mirros' appeal of the preliminary injunction
appeal. The only effective relief from that order would be to restore the parties to their
original positions, which Mirros do not contend is now possible. Ultimate resolution of
merits of the dispute will determine the prevailing party for purposes of Ditch Users' claim
for attorney's fees. We agree with Ditch Users that this appeal is moot.
       IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal is DISMISSED without prejudice to
any party's right to appeal a final judgment in the case.
       The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to all counsel of record and to
the Clerk of the Sixth   dicial District Court, Sweet Grass County.
       DATED this           day of March, 2024.