Court Opinion

ID: 9567474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:54:19.462954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:37.920053
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice EXUM
dissenting as to sentence.
I concur in the majority’s treatment of the issues in the guilt phase of this case. Because I believe that roost of the evidence of*200fered at the sentencing phase, much of it over defendant’s objection, was incompetent, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that no error was committed in that phase and vote to remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing.
I.
The state had evidence of only one statutorily permitted aggravating circumstance — defendant’s conviction in 1966 of murder in the first degree, a capital felony. To prove this circumstance the state properly offered into evidence a certified copy of the court records of this conviction. These records showed that at the November 1966 Session of Superior Court, Hoke County, defendant pled guilty to the charge of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The state then proceeded to call an eyewitness to the 1966 murder and elicited from her a graphic, detailed description of how the defendant committed that crime. The witness was permitted to testify that in 1966 she was riding as a passenger in the front seat of an automobile being operated by the victim, Otis Bryant. Defendant was in the back seat. When Bryant refused to turn left as instructed by defendant, defendant shot him three times in the back with a .22-caliber pistol. After the first shot the victim fell into the witness’s lap. Defendant shot him two more times. The witness then testified that she begged defendant not to shoot her. Defendant said, “I’m not going to bother you,” and left the scene of the crime.
After offering a stipulation that defendant had been paroled from prison in 1984, the state rested.
Defendant was called to testify in his own behalf. Almost all his testimony dealt with his family and work history, including work he had done while in prison, his various paroles from prison, and his treatment for alcoholism. With regard to his conviction of the 1966 murder, defendant testified only that on the day of the murder he and the victim had drunk “pretty near a half gallon jar” of white liquor.
Thereafter, the state cross-examined defendant at length concerning the extent to which he could recall the details of the former murder, his motive for shooting his victim on that occasion, and his culpability for the murder notwithstanding his consumption of alcohol.
*201The state then proceeded to cross-examine defendant at length regarding other convictions and other imprisonments. This cross-examination established that defendant had been previously convicted and served time for breaking and entering and driving under the influence. It also established that he had escaped from prison three times and once from jail while awaiting trial on the instant murder charge. The cross-examination ranged from the details of defendant’s various transfers from one prison unit to another, his several escapes from prison, the manner in which these escapes were effected, and defendant’s activities during the time he was an escapee. The flavor of some of this cross-examination may be gained from this sample:
Q. Well, after you spent a certain amount of time at McCain they sent you down to Lumberton; isn’t that so?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And you promptly escaped again when you got to Lumberton?
Mr. Bodenheimer: Objection.
The COURT: Overruled.
Q. Sir, isn’t that right?
A. Let’s see. I believe it is.
Q. Sir?
A. I believe it is.
Q. Where did you escape from this time? Did you go through the fence or walk off the job, or what?
Mr. Bodenheimer: Object.
The Court: Overruled.
Q. Sir?
A. It’s been so long I can’t remember.
Q. You remember swimming the river where one of the fellows drowned in the river? The two of you on escape.
Mr. Bodenheimer: Object.
The Court: Overruled.
*202A. Yes.
Q. Six of you on escape. You remember that?
A. Yes sir.
Q. You didn’t physically yourself drowned that fellow in the river, did you?
Mr. BODENHEIMER: Objection.
The Court: Sustained.
A. I went—
The COURT: You don’t have to answer that.
Mr. BODENHEIMER: Move to strike.
The COURT: Move to strike. The question is allowed. Question.
Q. All right. Well, now you certainly remember that, don’t you, sir?
The COURT: Just a second, Mr. Britt.
Mr. BODENHEIMER: Request an instruction on that, Your Honor.
The COURT: Members of the jury, do not consider it. Strike it from your minds.
Q. What time of the day did you escape on that occasion?
A. I just don’t remember.
Q. Well, was it in the nighttime?
A. It was daytime.
Q. Did you go through the fence or just walk off the job or how did you escape?
The COURT: I believe he said he didn’t remember that.
Mr. Britt: He now remembers some other things now, Your Honor, like —
Mr. BODENHEIMER: Object.
The COURT: Just give him a question.
*203Q. How many of you escaped on this occasion?
A. There was six I believe.
Q. Now, you remember where the six escaped from, don’t you?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Where?
A. I believe that time we went over the fence.
Q. Sir?
A. Went over the fence.
Q. Went over the fence?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Have you escaped so many times that you can’t remember all the details of all the times?
Mr. BODENHEIMER: Object.
THE Court: Sustained.
Mr. BODENHEIMER: Move to strike.
The COURT: Motion to strike is allowed. Members of the jury, do not consider it.
Q. How did the six of you get over the fence?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Sir?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Did you cut through the fence or did you go over the fence?
Mr. BODENHEIMER: Object.
THE Court: Overruled.
A. Over it.
Q. Well, did you form a human pyramid and climb up that way or did you have a ladder or what did you do?
*204Mr. BODENHEIMER: Object.
THE Court: Sustained.
Q. Where were you captured on this escape?
A. (No response.)
Q. Tennessee, wasn’t it?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Whereabouts in Tennessee did they catch you?
A. In Chattanooga.
Q. Chattanooga?
A. Yes sir.
Q. How had you gotten from Robeson County, North Carolina to Chattanooga, Tennessee?
Mr. BODENHEIMER: Object.
THE Court: Overruled.
Q. Sir?
A. How did I?
Q. Yes.
A. By bus.
Q. Where did you get the money for the bus?
Mr. BODENHEIMER: Object.
THE Court: Overruled.
Q. Sir?
A. I don’t remember where I got the money from. I had some of my own.
Evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing occupies sixty pages of the trial transcript. Of these sixty, eighteen deal with defendant’s 1966 murder conviction, and of these eighteen only one page, on which defendant testified to his having drunk white liquor, was proffered by defendant. For twenty-two pages the *205state cross-examined defendant with regard to his other convictions, prison escapes, and his activities as an escapee. The remaining twenty pages, concerning defendant’s family and work history and his treatment for alcoholism were proffered by defendant.
II.
With regard to the 1966 murder conviction the sentencing hearing devolved, at the state’s instance, into nothing less than a retrial of this incident which neither our capital sentencing statute nor the United States Constitution permits. Our capital sentencing statute, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, provides that “[aggravating circumstances which may be considered shall be limited to the following . . . The statute then lists eleven circumstances, one of which is “[t]he defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony.” It seems clear to me that by this language the Legislature intended to permit essentially the fact of defendant’s prior conviction of a capital felony, not a retrial of the felony itself, to be considered as an aggravating circumstance by a capital sentencing jury.
I recognize the Court has said,
the better rule here is to allow both sides to introduce evidence in support of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which have been admitted into evidence by stipulation. If the capital felony of which defendant has previously been convicted was a particularly shocking or heinous crime, the jury should be so informed. Conversely, it could be to defendant’s advantage that he be allowed to offer additional evidence in support of possible mitigating circumstances, instead of being bound by the State’s stipulation.
State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 279, 283 S.E. 2d 761, 780 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1398, reh’g denied, 463 U.S. 1249, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1456 (1983). The Court has also said, “The defendant cannot by stipulation or otherwise foreclose the State’s proof by limiting the State to the bare record of the conviction.” State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 32, 316 S.E. 2d 197, 214 (1984). The Court’s holdings in Taylor and Maynard, however, were much narrower than the language used to support them. Taylor involved simply the testimony of the pathologist who performed the autopsy on the victim of the prior first degree murder. The testi*206mony was offered by the state to show that the murder was an especially heinous one. Maynard involved testimony showing the severity of a prior felonious assault offered by the state to rebut defendant’s contention that he had no significant history of prior criminal activity.
This Court has so far adhered to the principle that evidence at a sentencing hearing regarding a prior violent or capital felony should not be permitted to devolve into a “mini-trial” of that felony. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 22, 301 S.E. 2d 308, 321, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L.Ed. 2d 173 (1983) (“The proper exercise of [the trial judge’s discretionary] authority will prevent the determination of [the prior violent felony] aggravating circumstance from becoming a ‘mini-trial’ of the previous charge”); State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 275 S.E. 2d 450 (1981).
A mini-trial of defendant’s former conviction contravenes the intent of our capital sentencing statute and in this case, where the only aggravating circumstance available to the state is defendant’s prior conviction, violates defendant’s federal constitutional privilege against double jeopardy and denies him due process of law. One who has been convicted of a felony occupies a certain status, i.e., the status of a convicted felon. If he again commits a crime, it is altogether proper for a sentencing authority to consider his status as a convicted felon in determining the appropriate sentence for the later crime. But to permit a capital sentencing jury to consider the details concerning defendant’s manner of committing, motive and culpability for the prior crime invites the jury to impose the death penalty, not on the basis of his guilt for the crime being tried, aggravated by his convicted felon status, but on the basis of his guilt of the prior crime, committed in the past and for which defendant has already once been punished. This procedure does not accord defendant due process because it tends to confuse and distract the jury “by focusing too much of its attention on the question of defendant’s guilt or degree of culpability in [the] prior crime.” State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 38-39, 301 S.E. 2d 308, 330 (Exum, J., dissenting as to sentence); see also State v. McCormick, 397 N.E. 2d 276 (Ind. 1979).
III.
I see no basis for admitting into evidence, by way of the state’s extensive cross-examination of defendant, much of it over *207defendant’s objection, defendant’s prior, nonviolent felony and driving under the influence convictions, his several prison escapes and the details surrounding them. None of this evidence goes to prove any aggravating circumstance permitted by our capital sentencing statute. Neither was it offered to rebut the mitigating circumstance that defendant had no significant prior criminal history, a circumstance that was never proffered by defendant and indeed could not have been successfully proffered because of his admitted prior conviction of a capital felony. I can ascertain no other proffered mitigating circumstance which this evidence could reasonably rebut.
I recognize that although he objected to much of it at trial, defendant has not assigned as error or brought forward in his brief any argument regarding the admission of this latter category of evidence. But it has long been the practice of this Court to examine carefully the transcript of a capital case to determine, on its own motion, whether there is error prejudicial to defendant, notwithstanding defendant’s failure properly to preserve the error for appellate review. State v. Strickland, 290 N.C. 169, 225 S.E. 2d 531 (1976); State v. Warren, 289 N.C. 551, 223 S.E. 2d 317 (1976); State v. Waddell, 289 N.C. 19, 220 S.E. 2d 293 (1975); State v. Buchanan, 287 N.C. 408, 215 S.E. 2d 80 (1975); State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643, 185 S.E. 2d 227 (1971); State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E. 2d 241 (1969); State v. Fowler, 270 N.C. 468, 155 S.E. 2d 83 (1967); State v. McCoy, 236 N.C. 121, 71 S.E. 2d 921 (1952).