Court Opinion

ID: 9885740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:13:21.747406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:56.631991
License: Public Domain

Judge RUSSEL
dissenting.
There is no doubt that a court may seal records involving a charge of false reporting if that charge was "completely dismissed." See § 24-12-808(1)(a)(D), C.R.S.2009. And there is no doubt that the prosecution completely dismissed a charge of false reporting against Christopher Clark.
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the district court may not seal the records that relate to Clark's charge of false reporting because those records also pertain to a charge of failure to notify, a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense. I respectfully disagree with this conclusion.
I recognize, of course, that a court may not seal "records pertaining to ... [a] class 1 or class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense." § 24-72-308(8)(a)(I), C.R.S.2009. And I agree that the term "pertaining to" should be read broadly to encompass documents of all types. But I do not think that these observations foreclose the relief that Clark seeks. I think it is possible to seal a record insofar as it relates to one offense, even if that record must remain unsealed for other purposes.
I offer three observations in support of my view.
First, I see no practical impediment to offense-specific sealing. When a record is sealed under the statute, it is not expunged. Instead, its existence becomes a fact that legally may be denied. See § 24-72-308(1)(d), C.R.8.2009 ("Upon the entry of an order to seal the records, the petitioner and all criminal justice agencies may properly reply, upon any inquiry in the matter, that no such records exist with respect to such person."). If a record pertains to more than one charge, its existence may be denied in response to certain inquiries but admitted in response to inquiries that include class 1 or 2 misdemeanor traffic offenses.
Second, offense-specific sealing furthers legislative policy because it gives broad effect to the general rule set forth in section 24-72-308(1)(a)(I) without frustrating the exception set forth in section 24-72-308(8)(a)(D). Like *451the majority, I assume that the legislature adopted this latter provision because it wanted to avoid inundating the courts with petitions that arise from minor traffic cases. Unlike the majority, however, I think that offense-specific sealing would not generate a flood of petitions because minor traffic cases generally involve traffic charges only.
Third, the statute does not expressly prohibit offense-specific sealing. This is significant-more significant than the absence of express authorization-because the legislature expressly prohibited offense-specific sealing in a related statute. See § 24-72-308.5(2)(), C.R.S.2009 (f a case results in more than one conviction, records of a drug conviction may be sealed "only if the records of every conviction of the defendant resulting from that case may be sealed pursuant to the provisions of this section"). Because the express prohibition appears "in only one of two statutes that deal with closely related subject matter, it is reasonable to infer that the failure to include that provision in the other statute was deliberate rather than inadvertent." Troise v. Extel Communications, Inc., 345 N.J.Super. 231, 784 A.2d 748, 754 (App.Div.2001), aff'd, 174 N.J. 375, 808 A.2d 96 (2002); see People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 586 (Colo.App.2009).
I conclude that section 24-72-808(1)(a)(I) authorizes the relief that Clark seeks. Whether such relief is appropriate is a matter committed to the district court's sound discretion. I therefore would vacate the court's order and remand with directions to consider the merits of Clark's motion.