Court Opinion

ID: 9370556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 01:00:21.166239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:22.225581
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40525        Document: 00516644592             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/13/2023

               United States Court of Appeals
                    for the Fifth Circuit                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                                                              February 13, 2023
                                       No. 21-40525                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Jose Villanueva-Cardenas,

                                                                 Defendant—Appellant.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 5:20-CR-2114-1

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
           Jose Villanueva-Cardenas pled guilty without a plea agreement to
   being unlawfully present in the United States after removal, in violation of
   8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court sentenced Villanueva-Cardenas within
   the Guidelines range to 27 months of imprisonment and imposed a three-year
   term of supervised release. 1 The district court imposed a special condition of

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            Villanueva-Cardenas’s revocation proceedings were held in conjunction with his
   sentencing hearing for the illegal reentry offense. The Federal Public Defender filed a
   motion to withdraw in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in the
   revocation matter, and this court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. See United
Case: 21-40525         Document: 00516644592              Page: 2       Date Filed: 02/13/2023

                                          No. 21-40525

   supervised release requiring that Villanueva-Cardenas be surrendered to
   immigration officials for deportation proceedings after his release from
   confinement and that, if officials decline to take custody of Villanueva-
   Cardenas, he immediately depart the United States and return to Mexico.
   Villanueva-Cardenas argues that the judgment should be amended to exclude
   the “self-deport” condition because the district court lacked the authority to
   impose this condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 2 United States v. Quaye, 57
   F.3d 447, 449–51 (5th Cir. 1995). The Government agrees.
           In a recent opinion, this court held that a district court “lack[s]
   authority under § 3583(d) to order [a defendant] to self-deport as a condition
   of supervised release.” United States v. Badillo, 36 F.4th 660, 661 (5th Cir.
   2022). Similarly here, the district court exceeded its authority by ordering
   Villanueva-Cardenas to self-deport as one of his conditions of supervised
   release.
           The judgment is VACATED in part and the case is REMANDED
   for the entry of a new written judgment without the special condition
   requiring that Villanueva-Cardenas depart from the United States.

   States v. Villanueva-Cardenas, 2022 WL 866292, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 2022)
   (unpublished).
           2
             Villanueva-Cardenas did not object to the condition of supervised release.
   Typically, when a defendant does not object to a condition of supervised release when the
   defendant has notice of the condition and an opportunity to object, we review the
   imposition of the condition for plain error only. See United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551,
   559–60 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Villanueva-Cardenas argues that de novo review should
   apply, because he challenged the district court’s authority on constitutional grounds. We
   decline to reach this argument since the judgment should be reformed regardless of the
   applicable standard of review.

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Case: 21-40525      Document: 00516644592           Page: 3     Date Filed: 02/13/2023

                                     No. 21-40525

   Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge, joined by James C. Ho, Circuit
   Judge, concurring in the judgment:
          In United States v. Badillo, 36 F.4th 660 (5th Cir. 2022), a panel of our
   court recently held that district judges lack authority to order an alien to self-
   deport as a condition of supervised release. Id. at 661. Because Badillo
   controls here, I concur in the judgment.
          I write separately, however, because Badillo’s holding is hard to
   square with the plain text of the governing statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
   That statute says that a district court can impose “any” condition it deems
   “appropriate,” as long as it makes the relevant findings specified by
   subsections (1)–(3). Id. § 3583(d) (emphasis added). It further explains that
   “[i]f an alien defendant is subject to deportation, the court may provide, as a
   condition of supervised release, that he be deported and remain outside the
   United States, and may order that he be delivered to a duly authorized
   immigration official for such deportation.” Ibid. Nothing about that language
   plainly excludes a district court’s authority to order self-deportation.
          Almost three decades ago, in United States v. Quaye, 57 F.3d 447 (5th
   Cir. 1995), this court observed that § 3583(d) only “authorizes district courts
   to ‘provide,’ not ‘order,’ that an alien be deported and remain outside the
   United States.” Id. at 449 (emphases added). This meant that district courts
   could only order that an alien be surrendered to immigration officials for
   deportation. Ibid. (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 923 F.2d 236, 237 (1st
   Cir. 1991) (per curiam)). It is then up to the immigration officials to decide
   whether to carry out the actual deportation. Ibid. Simply put, courts could
   not “order the Attorney General to deport the defendant if she chose not to
   do so.” Ibid. This holding was understandably rooted in separation-of-
   powers concerns; courts should not intrude on what has been traditionally
   regarded as an executive prerogative. See id. at 449–50.

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                                     No. 21-40525

          Badillo took this reasoning a step further, relying on Quaye to find that
   § 3583(d) does not authorize district courts to order that an alien
   “immediately depart the United States and return to Mexico,” in the event
   that immigration officials decline to take custody of him. Badillo, 36 F.4th at
   661. But ordering an alien to leave the country on his own power is different
   from ordering immigration officials to deport him. For one thing, it does not
   implicate Quaye’s separation-of-powers concerns; ordering an alien to
   remove himself from the country does not compel the Executive Branch to do
   anything. It is also not foreclosed by § 3583(d). Section 3583(d) authorizes
   district courts to (1) “provide” that immigration officials deport an alien, and
   (2) “order” the alien’s surrender to immigration officials. Nothing about
   that is inconsistent with an order that the alien remove himself from the
   country—especially where immigration officials, for whatever reason, fail to
   take custody of the alien. So, because an order to self-deport is consistent
   with both this text and with the separation of powers, I question whether
   Badillo was right to exclude such orders from a district court’s otherwise
   broad authority under § 3583(d) to impose “any” appropriate condition.
          Notably, in Badillo, the government “conceded error under Quaye.”
   Badillo, 36 F.4th at 661. The government’s concession obviously does not
   bind our court’s reading of the statute. Moreover, Badillo had argued that
   self-deportation was plainly erroneous because it was “not reasonably
   related” to the § 3553(a) factors. Ibid. I fail to see any error, much less plain
   error, in the self-deportation condition. Badillo spent three years in prison for
   illegally reentering the United States. Id. at 660. It is directly relevant to the
   § 3553(a) factors to require him—should immigration officials fail to do their
   jobs—to leave the country on his own steam. See, e.g., § 3553(a)(1)
   (sentencing court shall consider, inter alia, “the nature and circumstances of
   the offense”).

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