Court Opinion

ID: 9391883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 15:09:14.972093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:28.608546
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Mellinger, 2023-Ohio-1465.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                          C.A. No.        30338

        Appellee

        v.                                             APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                       ENTERED IN THE
KYLE MELLINGER                                         AKRON MUNICIPAL COURT
                                                       COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellant                                      CASE No.   22 TRC 3159

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: May 3, 2023

        STEVENSON, Judge.

        {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant Kyle Mellinger (“Mr. Mellinger”) appeals from the judgment

of the Akron Municipal Court denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

                                                  I.

        {¶2}      On March 26, 2022, at approximately 3:44 a.m., Trooper Adam Knowles observed

a red Jeep commit “a number of lane violations.” Trooper Knowles testified that the Jeep’s driver

“was unable to maintain the center of the roadway.” Trooper Knowles observed the Jeep commit

“two left of center lane violations,” “[o]ne on the north side of the bridge [on Arlington Street] and

one on the south.” Trooper Knowles observed the Jeep’s tires drive onto the double yellow line

such that he could “see the inside yellow line on the inside of his [the Jeep’s] tire.”

        {¶3}     Trooper Knowles initiated a traffic stop based on his observations. Mr. Mellinger

was identified as the driver of the Jeep. Mr. Mellinger was charged with violations of R.C.
                                                  2

4511.19(A)(1)(a), operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a blood alcohol content greater than

0.170, and R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), driving in marked lanes.

       {¶4}    Mr. Mellinger filed a motion to suppress all statements and evidence from the

March 26, 2022 traffic stop. Mr. Mellinger argued that the trooper did not have a reasonable

suspicion to stop his vehicle. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court made certain factual

findings on the record, including the finding that Mr. Mellinger’s “tires are on the yellow lines.”

This finding supports a marked lane violation. The trial court denied Mr. Mellinger’s motion to

suppress. Mr. Mellinger pleaded no contest to the charges and the trial court found him guilty of

operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). The court sentenced

Mr. Mellinger according to law and this appeal followed.

       {¶5}    Mr. Mellinger appeals the trial court’s judgment denying his motion to suppress,

asserting one assignment of error for review.

                                                 II.

                                   ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ARRESTING
       OFFICER HAD REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP
       MELLINGER FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION.

       {¶6}    Mr. Mellinger argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

We disagree.

       {¶7}    The Ohio Supreme Court has stated:

       Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.
       When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
       fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate
       the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial
       court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.
       Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently
       determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts
       satisfy the applicable legal standard.
                                                   3

(Citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. Pursuant to

Burnside, “[o]nce this Court has determined that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by

the evidence, we consider the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Iloba, 9th Dist.

Wayne No. 20AP0030, 2021-Ohio-3700, ¶ 7, citing Burnside at ¶ 8.

        {¶8}    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated * * *.” Article I, Section 14, of the Ohio Constitution contains nearly identical language.

The traffic stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 (1996).

        {¶9}    “[A] law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle when the officer has a reasonable

suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an occupant is or has been engaged in

criminal activity.” State v. Epling, 105 Ohio App.3d 663, 664 (9th Dist.1995). See also Dayton

v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996) (“where an officer has an articulable reasonable

suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic

violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.”) “Reasonable suspicion is something less than

probable cause.” Epling at 664, citing State v. VanScoder, 92 Ohio App.3d 853, 855 (9th

Dist.1994). In justifying the stop, the officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts

which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

        {¶10} When “analyzing whether reasonable suspicion existed, this Court looks to the facts

available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search and considers whether those facts

would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”
                                                 4

(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Blair, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24208, 2008-

Ohio-6257, ¶ 5. “Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances.” State v.

Bralek, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28727, 2018-Ohio-2496, ¶ 11, citing United States v. Cortez, 449

U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). The Court must consider “the totality of the circumstances as they were

known to [the police] prior to the time [the police] stopped [the defendant], together with

reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the circumstances ***.” State v. Tidwell, 165 Ohio

St.3d 57, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 40.

       {¶11} Mr. Mellinger has not challenged the trial court’s findings of fact. In denying Mr.

Mellinger’s motion to suppress, and addressing the narrow issue that was before it, the trial court

referenced the admitted pictures, dash cam recording, and Trooper Knowles’s testimony as to what

he observed. The trial court found that Mr. Mellinger’s tires were “on the yellow lines.”

       {¶12} Accepting the trial court’s findings of fact as true, this Court must independently

consider “whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,

2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8. This Court must independently consider whether Trooper Knowles had

“a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an occupant [Mr. Mellinger]

is or has been engaged in criminal activity.” Epling, 105 Ohio App.3d at 664. See also Erickson,

76 Ohio St.3d at 11-12.

       {¶13} Mr. Mellinger argues that, because the trial court found only that his “tires were on

the lines, not that he crossed them,” he did not commit a traffic violation and there was no basis

for the traffic stop. The state asserts that Trooper Knowles had a reasonable, articulable suspicion

to initiate a traffic stop after observing Mr. Mellinger commit multiple R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) marked

lane violations.
                                                  5

       {¶14} As previously set forth, the trial court made certain findings of fact on the record at

the conclusion of the suppression hearing. The trial court did not issue a written entry with factual

findings. This Court has recognized that, while it would be “ideal for the trial court to include its

factual findings” in a written entry, “trial courts may set forth their factual findings on the record

at the suppression hearing.” State v. Robinson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29689, 2021-Ohio-1053, ¶

13, citing State v. Thompson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011292, 2019-Ohio-2269, ¶ 11; State v.

Shinholster, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25328, 2011-Ohio-2244, ¶ 7.

       {¶15} Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop at issue in this case,

we conclude that Trooper Knowles had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr. Mellinger

committed marked lane traffic violations. The trial court found that Trooper Knowles observed

Mr. Mellinger’s vehicle drive onto the double-yellow line. This Court has concluded that an

officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop where the defendant

drove “onto the double-yellow line” in violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). State v. Kuhn, 9th Dist.

Medina No. 20CA0070-M, 2021-Ohio-2165, ¶ 12.

       {¶16} This Court has recognized that a “trooper’s observations must * * * be ‘viewed

through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events

as they unfold.’” Iloba, 2021-Ohio-3700 at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-

88 (1991). As the reviewing Court, we “must ‘give due weight’ to the officer’s training and

experience ‘and view the evidence as it would be understood by those in law enforcement.’” Iloba

at ¶ 14, quoting Andrews at 88.

       {¶17} Officer Knowles observed Mr. Mellinger commit “two left of center violations.”

While it was dark and the roads were wet, the dash cam recording shows that Mr. Mellinger’s Jeep
                                                 6

was in front of the cruiser and visible to Trooper Knowles. There is no evidence that there were

torrential downpours that evening or that there were gaping holes in the road.

       {¶18} While Mr. Mellinger argued that surrounding circumstances such as potholes,

darkness, and rain caused him to drive onto the yellow line, these issues are for trial not a

suppression determination. “Whether the subject of a stop can be convicted of the offense is a

different question than whether an officer acted reasonably in light of the facts and circumstances

known at the time of the stop.” State v. Rubsam, 9th Dist. Medina No. 18CA0089-M, 2019-Ohio-

2153, ¶ 8, citing Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, ¶ 14-15. As this

Court explained in Rubsam, “[t]he purpose of a suppression hearing related to a traffic stop is not

to determine whether the defendant is guilty of violating a criminal statute, but whether the officer

who conducted the traffic stop had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the

time.” Id., citing State v. Hatfield, 5th Dist. Morrow No. 10-CA-8, 2011-Ohio-597, ¶ 38.

Therefore, “an officer who reasonably suspects that a traffic violation has occurred need not

determine whether a driver’s conduct might be excused before initiating a traffic stop.” Id., citing

State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 16-17.

       {¶19} We conclude that based on the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Knowles had

an articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause to stop Mr. Mellinger for

a traffic violation. Epling, 105 Ohio App.3d at 664. The traffic stop of Mr. Mellinger’s vehicle

on the night in question was legally justified. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying

Mr. Mellinger’s motion to suppress.
                                                 7

                                                III.

       {¶20} This Court overrules Mr. Mellinger’s sole assignment of error.

                                                                               Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Akron Municipal

Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                       SCOT STEVENSON
                                                       FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, P. J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
                                          8

APPEARANCES:

SUSAN MANOFSKY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

EVE V. BELFANCE, Director of Law, and KIRSTEN L. SMITH, Assistant Director of Law, for
Appellee.