Court Opinion

ID: 9833147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:29:35.223179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:00.129171
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[16] Both appellants and appellees file motion for rehearing. The appellees, in their motion for rehearing, assert error in the opinion of this court in holding as self-serving that which Oon Sehrimsher testified he told Ewing about his intention to move back on the property. Appellees say the testimony was res gestae, but very frankly admit the statement contained in appellants’ brief is incorrect, and does not properly show the record, and they might have added that by their brief filed in this court they nowhere in their statement assail the statement in appellant’s brief. As it appeared to us from the statement, the evidence was clearly self-serving. If it was res gestae, appellees could contend with some degree of plausibility that it was not objectionable. We held he could testify to his intention with reference to a return to the property. It, however, may be a very serious question, even as res gestae whether he could tell Tom, Dick, and Harry that he intended to return to the property and occupy it as a homestead, and then, in order to prove such intention, take the stand and testify to what he told them. By that method he could prove his intention without being put to his oath on such intention, or without introducing the parties to whom he told it, giving himself the advantage of making the statement appear spontaneous and unpremeditated. It certainly ought to receive its setting from some other source; *172at least a court would feel less hesitancy receiving it.
[17] If lie told others under such circumstances as will bring it within the rule of res gestae, we think the witness to whom he made the statement should be produced. He takes this method of bolstering his testimony as to his intention by testifying to what he told others. Prom Caesar he appeals to Caesar.
[18] Appellees also are very insistent that our holdings that the appellees’ plea of fraud, etc., as to the declaration contained ih the deed with reference to his homestead did not authorize him to prove by parol that he did not, in fact, make such a deed. We did not hold this plea bad on the ground of estoppel, as appellees seem to think. We held it on the old rule that- testimony cannot be introduced to vary or contradict a written instrument without sufficient and specific allegations of fraud, and the like. When a man reduces to writing his obligation and declaration, he is supposed to have done so with full knowledge of its contents. Under the rule as it is, the impeachment of written instruments is quite frequent enough. It has about come to pass as useless waste of time and paper to reduce an agreement to writing. In this case two witnesses swear Schrimsher knew of the clause in the deed, .while he alone swears he did not, and the jury, in the exercise of their prerogative, acr cepted his statement.
[19] It is urged that this deed is void because on a homestead, and therefore it amounts, we presume, to no deed. That is assuming the very fact to be proven. Appellees, as a preliminary, to prove the fact sought, -endeavored to get the deed out of the way as a fact showing the lots were not homesteaded. But appellees say the ' jury found that the property was the homestead. Doubtless the appellees persuaded the jury that Parker surreptitiously inserted the clause which thereby contributed in obtaining the verdict. In other words, Schrimsher negligently wrote in the deed this clause, or permitted it to be done, and then, on his negligence, pleads innocence, and stands as the victim of a cunning adversary, thereby getting all its force in favor of his homestead claims, which evidently aided in securing the verdict Ordinarily the rules would permit a party to explain whether he made a statement or not, or why he made it; but there is another rule, where a party with all the solemnity of the law makes a deed containing such a declaration, he will not be heard to say he did not make* it, unless he is induced thereto by fraud which disarmed him and prevented him from reading or knowing its contents. He cannot negligently close his eyes. They must have been plastered down by fraud. The latter rule, we think, should prevail in this case. One potent reason therefor is that the husband, as the head of the family, has the right to select and designate the home. Whether he has abandoned the old or acquired a new alone rested in his mind — especially so in this case. He occupied the Jackson place for a season, and then the lots in question, and again the Jackson place. How could a creditor know which was the homestead? We have gone, we think, as far as we ought when we permit appellees to prove the declaration in the deed was false. They ought not, under the pleadings, be permitted to say he did not make them in the face of his deed and prove that the declaration is that of his adversary. From this holding it must be apparent to appellees that we did not hold the plea bad and the evidence inadmissible on the ground of estoppel. We held the deed did not estop, if, in fact, no new home had been acquired, and if, in fact, the property was then the homestead, as the wife did not join in any such representation.
[20] At this point it may be well to notice appellees’ position that there could be no estoppel, for the reason that Parker or the bank lost nothing; that the deed was given to secure a pre-existing debt. -We did not notice this contention originally, because we did not think it important under our holding; neither do we think so now; but, as appellees seem to rest their rights, to some extent at least, by their argument on that question, we will express briefly our views: Conceding the facts show a pre-existing debt, which is not admitted by appellants, yet from this record it cannot be said the bank and Parker were not placed in a worse condition or injured by the declaration as to the homestead. The evidence indicates at the time the deed was executed the debt was extended and additional money obtained on the faith of the mortgage. As creditors, appellants had the right to look to the property of Schrimsher for the payment of the claim. If they had not been told the property in question was not the homestead, then they would have been entitled to go on or-look to the Jackson property. Assuming the lots were the homestead, the representation that they were not enabled the appellee to hold the Jackson property out and to dispose of it, and, after it was disposed of, defeat the mortgage on the ground that it was given on the homestead, and therefore void. We cannot well conceive of circumstances which would put a creditor in a worse condition. Simkins on Equity, p. 672 et seq., Steffian v. Milmo National Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 6 S. W. 824.
[21] We sustained the twenty-sixth assignment because the witness Black made the statement on a former trial that the said McBride, a tenant, was in the building on June 10th, the day of the last mortgage. He did not state on this trial that he saw the tenant in the building, and, when asked if he had not on the former trial so stated, he admitted that he had, but that he went back on *173the stand during that trial and corrected it. The other fact sought to be impeached was that he said on this trial that:
“I say 'now, as I said on the former trial, that I am not positive that I saw Mrs. Schrimsher at the Garland place on June 10, 1910, and that on the former trial I testified I went into the house, but I came bach on the stand and corrected that error.”
And he never said that he thought he saw Mrs. Schrimsher there, appellees then introduce the court stenographer and reproduce the testimony of this witness at the former trial, and did so at great length. We held in our opinion that, when a witness admits to making the statement inquired about, it would be improper to introduce those statements for the purpose of impeachment. The appellees not only introduced this particular evidence, but miuch more. In addition, a proper predicate was not laid- for the introduction of the other testimony given by Mm on the former trial. We think the particular fact upon which impeachment is desired must be specifically asked the witness, and he given a chance to explain. We do not gather from the record that this was done. We not only think we were correct in our holding on the ground stated in the opinion, but also because no proper predicate was laid for the introduction of the long excerpt from the evidence of the witness at the former trial. Much of this evidence was not hurtful, but some of it, unexplained, was calculated to injure. We believe the rule should be followed in these matters. We desire again to say we followed the statement made by appellant in his brief. Appellees, in their brief, did not see proper to correct or even to object to the statement in appellants’ brief as being incorrect and until this motion, where with great care he sets out excerpts from the record. What is said with reference to the testimony of Black is equally applicable to Parker’s testimony.
As we understand appellees, it is not seriously contended that we were in error in sustaining the first assignment of error, with reference to the question propounded to each juror on his voir dire, but it is asserted that as we held the deed was not an estoppel, and as appellees set out specially the homestead character of the property, and appellants having failed specially to allege abandonment of the home or the acquisition of the new one and only pleaded estoppel by deed, that the question, under the then state of the pleadings was proper and, if error, harmless.
[22] In this cause the appellees brought suit for the land, setting up appellants asserted a claim by virtue of a deed of trust and foreclosure thereunder; that it was void because at the time of executing the deed the lots were a homestead. Appellants pleaded general denial, not guilty, and specially by estoppel. When appellees brought suit they put their claim under judicial investigation, and appellant had the right to defeat their claim, wMch would have adjudicated their rights. There was no affirmative action required on the part of the court, and none was necessary to be pleaded. Barnes v. Patrick, 105 Tex. 146, 146 S. W. 154; Barnes v. Williams, 102 Tex. 444, 119 S. W. 89. Where the defendant, in an action of trespass to try title, pleads general denial and not guilty, and also a special defense, he may prove any fact in rebuttal of plaintiff’s testimony, but cannot introduce evidence in confession and avoidance, except as specially pleaded. Koenigheim v. Miles, 67 Tex. 113, 2 S. W. 81. Judge Gaines, speaking for the court, in the above case said:
“The effect of the decisions upon this subject is to place a defendant in trespass to try title upon the same footing as to pleading and evidence as defendants in other cases, in the event he pleads specially. * * * If this be correct, it would follow that, if he has pleaded a general denial and not guilty, as well as specially, he could show any fact in rebuttal of plaintiff’s testimony, but could not introduce evidence in confession and avoidance or in bar of the action, except as specially pleaded.”
[23] The general denial put in issue every fact necessary to establish a homestead on the lots at the time the deed of trust was executed. Proof which might be introduced to establish the fact alleged could be combated thereunder by showing abandonment on the acquisition of the new home. Altgelt v. Emilienburg, 64 Tex. 150; Insurance Co. v. Jefferson Ice Co., 64 Tex. 578. The effect of the authorities cited by appellees is that, when a homestead is shown to exist, it is presumed to continue, and the burden is on the adversary to show abandonment. The fact that- such is true does not necessarily require a special plea.
[24] At most, the proof by appellee of the once residence and home on the lots is but a prima facie case. This prima facie presumption can certainly be rebutted by the defendant under general denial. It is not a confessional avoidance or an affirmative matter,, but is proof that, in fact, the property was not then the homestead of appellees. The case of Mexia v. Lewis, 87 Tex. 208, 22 S. W. 397, cited and apparently relied on, is not authority on the question in hand. The Supreme Court simply held that a party seeking to recover on a title acquired after suit must set up the title by a plea. In that case a deed was executed to property while the homestead. After the suit was instituted, and while pending, the property was abandoned as a homestead. It was held that abandonment should be pleaded, the court saying:
“It is laid down in this court, as a general l'ule, that the plaintiff in an action of trespass to try title must recover upon his title as it existed at the time of the institution of the suit, and that, in order to avail himself of an after-acquired title, he must amend so as to avail himself of it as a new cause of action.”
Perhaps we should have dismissed the ap-pellees’ motion on this point, by stating that this is the first tim£ the position here con-*174appears in record. Appellees did not brief or notice assignment No. 1 originally. We think, however, this contention is not sound, and the fact that we held the deed, under the facts in this case, presented no estoppel, did not destroy its probative force as a fact, and the jury should consider it as a fact for what it is worth, without being pledged, beforehand that they would not do so.
[25] Perhaps in this connection we should notice assignments 28, 29, and 30. Mrs. Schrimsher testified, in effect, that when the lots in question were purchased her husband told her that they were to be used as a home, and when they left the lots they would return as soon as she was able. In the original opinion we treated the objection made as one on the ground that this testimony was not in rebuttal, which, in fact, was one of the objections, but there is the further objection made that it was self-serving. We believe this testimony admissible as part of the res gestas and as explanatory of the cause of the removal and upon the issue whether the removal was permanent or temporary, and whether it was the intention to acquire a new homestead on the place moved to. So far as we have been able to find, the courts uniformly sustain the introduction of such testimony. We mention this testimony in this connection lest we he understood upon another trial as holding the testimony inadmissible.
The appellants also insistently urge that we erred' in not rendering the case, instead of reversing it, and insist if we do not render we should modify the opinion so as to “declare the substantive law of the case.” The first proposition is:
“The court erred in this opinion in holding that the issue of estoppel as to Mrs. Schrimsher is raised by the facts of this case and ruling, in effect, that on another trial the defendant below, plaintiffs here, must show that Mrs. Schrimsher was estopped in some way by her acts or conduct to claim the property as a homestead.”
Upon a reading of this proposition we fail to recognize it as having the slightest acquaintance to anything we held. We held the deed of trust by the husband alone would not estop the wife from setting up a .homestead right, if, in fact, the property at the time of the execution of the deed was the homestead. We further found no fact showing that Mrs. Schrimsher signed the deed or was consulted about it or knew that her husband had executed the deed on the lot. We further held she could not be estopped unless she intentionally so conducted herself as that such conduct would be fraudulent. We held, if, in fact, the property was the homestead, the husband could not mortgage it, but we never held:
“That Mrs. Schrimsher was not and cannot be concluded from claiming the homestead rights in the property in controversy unless she is es-topped by her conduct from so doing.”
We said that, if there were no facts creating an estoppel:
“Then the only issue in the case is: Was the property the homestead, and if so was it abandoned or had Schrimsher acquired another homestead at the time of the execution of the deed of trust?”
We tried to state what was meant by “acquire.” We think the trouble with counsel for appellants in this case is that he pleaded the deeds of trust as estoppel, briefed them as such, and argued orally in this court they estopped appellees from setting up the homestead. Under the Constitution and laws of this state, they were and are not such under the facts presented in this record, and we cited authorities to that point not, as counsel seems to think, for the purpose of showing the husband did not have the right to select and designate the home, but we expressly stated the husband has the right to select the home, and, if he in good faith exercises the right, he would have the power to convey or incumber the old home. If he acquired another, the right is vested in him to incumber the old. This right does not rest upon estoppel, but upon the simple fact that the old home is no longer the homestead. Hence appellants’ plea of estoppel amounted to nothing. The mere fact that the husband represented the property was not the homestead did not make it so. It does not estop the partnership husband and wife, or, if you please, the wife, from proving the true fact. The partnership had a vested right in it, and the Constitution expressly limits the power of the partner husband. The homestead cannot be disposed of unless both husband and wife join; neither can estoppel dispose of it unless both join in the acts estopping them. The wife’s right cannot be taken from her by a mere representation of the husband that there was no homestead interest. The authorities cited were to this point.
[26] The fact that the husband can select the home does not defeat the home established and vested until in good faith he has selected another or in good .faith has abandoned the old. If he did, in fact and in good faith, select the place upon which he was living when the deed was executed as the¡ homestead, then the deed was not void. That, in substance, is the point decided in the case of Slavin v. Wheeler-, 61 Tex. 654, upon which appellants rely. The Supreme Court approved the charge embodying the following: If Slavin “moved upon another place of his own with a view of abandoning his old homestead, and acquiring a new one,” the jury were instructed to find for Wheeler. The court said:
“There was evidence which showed that in good faith, with no desire to injure his wife, * * * he left the land with the intent never to use it again as a home, and that he established a home on the other land to which he had title.”
*175As will be seen, the question of abandonment and acquiring a new home was a question of fact. In Marler v. Handy, 88 Tex. 427, 81 S. W. 636, the same holding is made; the trial court having found' the facts. In cases where property is occupied as a homestead, and the husband alone makes a deed while so occupying it, and after its execution a new homestead is acquired, the grantee will take title by estoppel. This doubtless is the line of authorities appellants had in mind when they pleaded estoppel. Such was the Marler Case, as clearly appears from the opinion and as explained by the Supreme Court in'the case of Stallings v. Hullum, 89 Tex. 435, 35 S. W. 4, where the Supreme ■Court, in concluding its comment on the Marler Case, said:
“It is said in that case that the deed is not void; but it was not meant that it was valid as to the wife, or that it could in the slightest manner affect her rights before a new homestead was acquired.”
In this case appellant must recover upon the facts that when the deed was executed appellees or the husband in good faith had abandoned the property in question as a homestead or had acquired a new one upon which they were then residing. If the latter was the homestead, the husband could incumber the old; and, as above stated, estop-pel does not arise. The question, as presented by the record in this case, is one of fact. Residing on the last place and the execution of the deed by the husband alone is not conclusive, nor is his declaration. These facts are evidence, it is true, to be considered on determining whether the old was abandoned or a new homestead acquired or whether it was a temporary or a permanent removal, but this question of fact is not in our province to determine, and we cannot hold they are conclusive, in the face of the testimony of the husband and wife that it was only a temporary removal, with no intent to abandon one and to acquire the other; and especially can we not do so when other circumstances tend to show owing to the sickness of the wife they left the place, but with the purpose of returning when her health permitted.
We desire to say that we carefully examined the authorities cited by appellant before writing the original opinion, and expressed ourselves then as clearly as we could, and see no reason, upon a re-examination, to change it. The Hawes Cáse, 95 Tex. 185, 66 S. W. 209, was clearly decided on estoppel, .and the facts there clearly presented that issue. On this motion we feel we have said more than is really necessary; but for the apparent charge on the part of counsel for both appellees and appellant that the case has not been fully considered, we would not have taken up the time and space to answer what appears to be their positions.
The motions of both appellant and appel-lees will be overruled.