Court Opinion

ID: 9699408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:22:43.2888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:49.848602
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
dissenting and concurring in part. I am convinced that this defendant’s confession was involuntary and join in Point I of Judge Conford’s dissent.
I conclude that B. 1:8-2 (d), providing for the substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror after deliberations have begun, is constitutionally valid on its face. So long as the members of the original jury are specifically instructed to begin deliberations anew when a substitution is made, the defendant is not prejudiced, and the spectre of a mistrial at such a late stage is avoided. It should be noted that the judicial economies made possible by this procedure will redound to the benefit of numerous defendants whose cases will not he put off by the unnecessary *433retrial of a time-consuming case. Thus, I concur in the conclusion of the majority, see ante at 405-406' on this point.
However, I am unable to accept thé premise that the failure of the alternate juror to hear a recharge differentiating first and second degree murder was harmless. All jurors — both deliberating and alternate — must hear the same orders and instructions of the court. I join in Judge Halpern’s dissent, see ante at 431-432 on this point.
For reversal and reinstatement of conviction — Justices Sullivan, Clifford, Scheeiber and Handler — 4.
For affirmance — Justice Pashman and Judges Conford and Halpern — 3.