Court Opinion

ID: 9946967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 20:05:11.580926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.022691
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 221607-U
                                            No. 1-22-1607
                                      Order filed March 1, 2024
                                                                                       Fifth Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                               IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                          FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )
                                                                )   Appeal from the
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  )   Circuit Court of
                                                                )   Cook County.
     v.                                                         )
                                                                )   No. 19 CR 16971
 VERTIS PETERSON,                                               )
                                                                )   Honorable
           Defendant-Appellant.                                 )   William H. Hooks,
                                                                )   Judge presiding.

           JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices Mikva and Lyle concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1        Held: The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with
                specific intent to kill. Affirmed.

¶2        Following a bench trial, defendant, Vertis Peterson, was found guilty of attempted murder

and aggravated battery with a firearm. He was sentenced to 31 years in prison. On appeal,
No. 1-22-1607

defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific

intent to kill, and therefore the conviction should be reversed. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶4     Defendant was charged with five counts of attempted first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-

1(a)(1) (West 2018)), and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-

3.05(e)(1) (West 2018)). The following evidence was presented at a bench trial.

¶5     The victim, Warner Charles, testified that on November 9, 2019, he was delivering

groceries to his brother at about 1 p.m. When his brother did not answer the door, Charles began

to leave the porch when he encountered defendant. Defendant lived with his grandmother two

doors down from Charles’s brother, and the two had spoken before. Defendant accused Charles of

stealing his bicycle, an accusation he had made in the past.

¶6     Charles testified that after about one to three minutes of arguing, defendant pulled a gun

out of his pocket and fired six shots at him from less than two feet away. One of the bullets hit him

in the abdomen, four of the bullets hit him near the elbow area of his left arm, and one of the bullets

was found in his sweater. Charles walked away and flagged down Sergeant Renee Whittingham,

of the Chicago Police Department, who was responding to a call about gunshots in the area. Charles

lifted his sweater to show Sergeant Whittingham that he had been shot. The footage of that

interaction was captured on Sergeant Whittingham’s body camera and played for the trial court.

¶7     Charles was taken to the hospital where he told the police he did not know the name of the

person that shot him but knew where he lived. The next day, Detective Jonathan Janas visited

Charles in the hospital and showed him a photo array. Charles identified defendant as the shooter.

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No. 1-22-1607

¶8     Charles underwent surgery to repair damage to his abdomen as a result of the injuries he

sustained from the gunshots. The surgery resulted in the removal of a segment of the small

intestines and two segments of his colon. Charles spent 16 days in the hospital.

¶9     As a result of his gunshot wounds, Charles required a colostomy bag for approximately

eight months. A bullet remains lodged near Charles’ kidney, and another one in his hip. He suffered

a fracture to the top portion of his pelvic bone. He testified that his stomach starts “leaking” every

time he bends over to tie his shoes. He was taking medication to manage his pain and was still

experiencing shortness of breath. At the time of trial, he was awaiting his sixth abdominal surgery

to remedy issues caused by the gunshot wounds.

¶ 10   At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for a directed finding, arguing

that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite mental state to

support the attempted murder charges. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 11   After closing arguments, the trial court found that Charles was largely credible and that

defendant’s act of shooting Charles five times at close range was sufficient to establish the

necessary intent to find defendant guilty of attempted murder. The parties stipulated to the

surgeries performed on Charles, and the trial court noted that each of these surgeries carried a risk

of death.

¶ 12   The court found defendant guilty on counts 1-4, which were attempted murder charges. It

did not find defendant guilty on count 5, stating that it did not hear evidence of any permanent

disfigurement to Charles. The court also found defendant guilty of count 6, which was aggravated

battery with a firearm.

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No. 1-22-1607

¶ 13    At sentencing, defense counsel requested the minimum sentence of 31 years (6 years plus

a mandatory 25-year add-on for the use of a firearm). The trial court sentenced defendant to 31

years in prison. Defendant now appeals.

¶ 14                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15    On appeal, defendant contends that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he had the specific intent to kill Charles. Defendant relies on the fact that Charles was shot in the

arm and abdomen, and that defendant was close enough to Charles that if had intended to kill him,

he had the opportunity to do so. Defendant argues that at most, the evidence established that he

committed the offense of aggravated battery with a firearm. The State responds that it proved

specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence showed defendant deliberately fired

six shots at Charles at close range. We agree.

¶ 16    When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106

Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). This standard of

review does not allow an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder on

questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. People v.

Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1992). A conviction must be reversed when the evidence is so

unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s

guilt. Id.

¶ 17    “To prove a defendant guilty of attempted murder, the State must prove: (1) that defendant

performed an act that constituted a substantial step toward committing a murder; and (2) that he

had the criminal intent to kill the victim.” People v. Teague, 2013 IL App (1st) 110349, ¶ 22.

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No. 1-22-1607

Defendant contends that the State did not meet the second element – that he had the criminal intent

to kill Charles.

¶ 18      “The question of [a] defendant’s state of mind at the time of the crime [is] a question of

fact to be determined by the jury ***.” People v. Pertz, 242 Ill. App. 3d 864, 903 (1993). “Mental

states, such as the intent to kill or to cause great bodily harm, are not commonly established by

direct evidence and may be inferred from the character of the defendant’s conduct and the

circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.” People v. Adams, 308 Ill. App. 3d 995,

1006 (1999). “These circumstances may include the character of the assault, the use of a deadly

weapon, and the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries.” People v. Carlisle, 2015 IL App (1st)

131144, ¶ 59. An intent to kill “may be inferred if one willfully does an act, the direct and natural

tendency of which is to destroy another’s life.” People v. Migliore, 170 Ill. App. 3d 581, 586

(1988).

¶ 19      Here, the evidence showed that defendant initiated an argument with Charles about a

bicycle, an argument they had had in the past, while armed with a firearm. He then fired six bullets

at Charles at close range, wounding him five times. Charles’s injuries were extensive. Charles

underwent five surgeries on his abdomen, removing 45% of his intestines, and causing Charles to

wear a colostomy bag for eight months. Two bullets remain lodged in his body. At the time of

trial, he was taking medication to manage his pain, waiting for a sixth surgery, and still experienced

shortness of breath. Looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational

trier of fact certainly could have found that defendant had the specific intent to kill Charles. See

Carlisle, 2015 IL App (1st) 131144, ¶ 59 (circumstances used to prove intent to kill include

character of assault, use of a deadly weapon, and the extent of the victim’s injuries).

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No. 1-22-1607

¶ 20   We are unpersuaded by defendant’s reliance on People v. Mitchell, 105 Ill. 2d 1 (1984),

and People v. Thomas, 127 Ill. App. 2d 444 (1970). In Mitchell, the court found that the

circumstances of the defendant striking her 16-month-old child, without more, were insufficient

to establish the required intent, particularly in view of the defendant’s explanations for her

behavior, the fact that she cared for the child afterward, and that she brought the child to the

hospital. Id. at 9-10. In Thomas, the circumstances of the defendant cutting the victim’s face with

a knife before raping her were insufficient to establish the required intent because the opportunity

for murder was such that there was insufficient proof that defendant attempted to commit that

crime. Id. at 456.

¶ 21   Unlike in Mitchell and Thomas, here the circumstances were not such that defendant had

the opportunity to kill Charles but chose not to. We are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument that

he was such a skilled marksman that he believed firing six shots at Charles’s abdomen and arm at

close range would not kill him. Rather, we find the circumstances of this case to be more in line

with those in People v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 683 (1995), and People v. Migliore, 170 Ill. App. 3d

581 (1988).

¶ 22   In Hill, the defendant threatened the victim, and then executed two drive-by shootings on

the victim’s house. 276 Ill. App. 3d at 688-89. The second time the defendant drove by, he looked

up at the victim in the second-story window and fired shots at him. Id. No bullets hit the victim,

yet the court found the circumstances were sufficient to prove intent to kill. Id. Similarly in

Migliore, the defendant expected the victim to be standing at his front door and fired shots at his

home, several shots hitting the door frame. Id. at 588. Although no bullets hit the victim, the court

found that the circumstances of the defendant’s dislike for the victim and the height and aim of the

fired bullets were enough to prove intent to kill. Id.

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No. 1-22-1607

¶ 23    Here, defendant fired six shots directly at Charles, hitting him five times. The injuries

Charles sustained required several surgeries, Charles experiences continued shortness of breath,

and two bullets remain lodged in his body. We find that the State proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that defendant had the intent to kill where he used a deadly weapon, had accused Charles of

stealing his bicycle, and where he fired six shots at Charles from less than two feet away, causing

serious, lifelong injuries. See Carlisle, 2015 IL App (1st) 131144, ¶ 59 (circumstances to prove

intent to kill may include the character of the assault, the use of a deadly weapon, and the nature

and extent of the victim’s injuries).

¶ 24    Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly considered certain facts outside the

record when discussing the extent of Charles’s injuries when determining defendant’s intent to

kill. Specifically, defendant takes issue with the following comments the trial court made: (1) that

Charles’s clothing saved his life, and (2) that surgeries generally carry a risk of death.

¶ 25    During a bench trial, a trial judge’s deliberations are “limited to the record made before

him or her during the course of trial.” People v. Dunn, 326 Ill. App. 3d 281, 286 (2001). In a bench

trial, we presume the trial court “considered only competent evidence in reaching its verdict, unless

that presumption is rebutted by affirmative evidence in the record.” People v. Simon, 2011 IL App

(1st) 091197, ¶ 91. In a bench trial, it is for the trial judge, sitting as trier of fact, to determine the

credibility of witnesses, to weigh evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom, and to

resolve any conflicts in the evidence. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009).

¶ 26    The trial court’s statements, in context, were as follows:

        “There’s nothing about that that justifies one citizen in the community taking a gun

        and shooting another citizen basically almost point blank but for the clothing of the

        victim in this case he would’ve died.”

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No. 1-22-1607

       ***

       “The defendant is lucky in this case in the sense that the victim did not die. The

       victim survived. The victim surviving a death, a slow death and I won’t say a death

       but a slow punishing result from the wounding that he had. He had to – he had a

       bag system, an elimination of waste from his body. He’s gone through numerous

       surgeries and therefore every time he goes under the knife he goes through

       numerous possibilities that he won’t come back out in terms of the surgery and the

       results of surgery.”

¶ 27   Defendant contends that these comments are similar to those that appeared in People v.

Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 131873. In Brown, the victim got into an argument with the defendant

and as she was leaving the room, she felt a punch to her back and then realized she was bleeding.

Id. ¶ 3. The treating physician testified that she had lacerations on her back that had penetrated her

skin, however there was no injury to underlying structures. Id. ¶ 5. He opined that it was possible

that the “area in which [the victim] presented wounds could have resulted in her death,” but stated

that the cuts turned out to be superficial and not life threatening. Id. The victim left the hospital

that same day. Id. The trial court found that the victim’s wounds were “near organs *** that could

have been life threatening,” and that the treating physician had testified that the “wounds could

have resulted in death.” Id. ¶ 9.

¶ 28   On appeal, the Brown court reversed the attempted murder conviction based in part on the

trial court’s erroneous recollection that the physician testified that the “wounds could have resulted

in death.” Id. ¶ 16. The court clarified that the physician was quite clear in his testimony that the

lacerations that the victim actually suffered turned out to be superficial and not life threatening. Id.

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No. 1-22-1607

¶ 29    Contrary to Brown, the comments made by the trial court here were not erroneous. The

trial court accurately summarized the circumstances of the shooting, the use of a deadly weapon,

and the extent of Charles’s injuries. Testimony was presented that defendant shot six bullets at

Charles. Charles was hit by five of those bullets. When he was taken to the hospital, testimony was

presented that a bullet fell out of Charles’ sweater. It can be reasonably inferred that the bullet was

unable to penetrate Charles’ body because of the clothing he was wearing. Accordingly, we find

that this comment was a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence presented, and not

erroneous. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228 (in a bench trial, it is for the trial judge, sitting as trier

of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh evidence and draw reasonable inferences

therefrom, and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.)

¶ 30    In terms of the comment about surgery carrying a risk of death, we note that in a bench

trial, a “trial judge does not operate in a bubble; [he] may take into account [his] own life and

experience in ruling on the evidence.” People v. Yarbough, 93 Ill. 2d 421, 429 (1982). Reversal is

only necessary when a trial court’s reliance on matters outside the record is prejudicial to one of

the parties. People v. Banks, 102 Ill. App. 3d 877, 882 (1981). “Reliance on information found

[outside] the record is not reversible error where there is no evidence that it either misled or entered

into the trial court’s determination.” Id.

¶ 31    Here, the comment about surgeries carrying a risk of death did not form the basis of the

trial court’s finding that defendant had the intent to kill Charles. Rather, this was a benign comment

about the general risks of surgery. See People v. Jenk, 2016 IL App (1st) 143177, ¶ 55 (affirming

defendant’s conviction where trial court’s “benign comment” regarding fact not in evidence “did

not form the basis of the court’s finding” of guilt). The record shows that the trial court thoroughly

summarized the testimony about the shooting, the use of a deadly weapon, and the resulting

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No. 1-22-1607

injuries, which formed the basis of the trial court’s determination of guilt. Accordingly, the

comments made by the trial court did not amount to error and did not prejudice defendant.

¶ 32                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 34   Affirmed.

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