Court Opinion

ID: 9653381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:45:38.507621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:58.600679
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The record shows an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not award Mrs. Coote a share of the retirement benefits acquired after 18 years of marital effort. Therefore, the property division was manifestly unjust and unfair.
It is immaterial whether or not the trial court found the retirement benefits to be separate or community property. The fact that some portion of them was acquired in states which have a “common law” system does not ipso facto make them into separate property as that term is defined by the Texas Constitution. All but eleven months of them were acquired (by community effort, as we understand that term in Texas) while the couple were married, and they came into this state with Mrs. Coote’s equitable rights attached to them. “A decision that a change of domicile from a common-law jurisdiction to Texas divested the wife of all of her equitable rights in the property acquired by her in the state of origin of the property would deprive her of property rights without due course of law." Sampson, “Common Law Property in a Texas *56Divorce: After Eggemeyer, the Deluge?” 42 Tex.B.J. 131 at 134 (1979).
Given Mrs. Coote’s age, probable earning capacity, health, necessity of supporting her two children until they get out of high school (past their 18th birthdays when Coote’s support obligations end), and the childrens’ educational and emotional problems, it was an abuse of discretion to deny her a share of what I view as the principal asset of this marital estate. See Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 at 666 (Tex.1976).
While Mrs. Coote got the lion’s share of the marital property, she obviously was left out totally in the matter of the retirement benefits, (which the majority calls one of “the two community assets of real significance”). We should not ignore the fact that, even received on an if, as, and when basis, a military pension could yield several times the value of all the rest of the parties’ property. I believe the record is clear that Mrs. Coote’s retirement needs are as great as Coote’s. Further, in adjusting the equities on the retirement benefits which are contingent, the trial court could also balance them on the other property which is in hand (and where Lt. Col. Coote was on the short end).
This judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a more equitable property division. McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863 at 868 (Tex.1976).