Court Opinion

ID: 9709517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:49:24.525156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:49.630846
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority opinion has not only misinterpreted the plain and unmistakable language of the statute, but it has ignored the plain and unmistakable language in Wilcox v. Wilcox (1977), Ind.App., 365 N.E.2d 792.
*956Judge Lybrook underscored in Wilcox that “[T]here is nothing in the statute which lends itself to the interpretation that future income is ‘property’ and therefore divisible. . . . ” Yet, this is exactly what the majority opinion has attempted to accomplish with such specious reasoning as: “In formulating a property settlement pursuant to this statute, the trial court could properly consider property once held by (sic) parties but dissipated by the date of dissolution of the marriage. . . . Although Patrick’s educational achievement may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property, it has none of the attributes of property that can be valued upon dissolution of marriage ... An education is personal to the holder. Only Patrick will derive the benefits from his education. Consequently, the dissipation of marital property for Patrick’s sole benefit constituted a proper basis for the trial court to include $3,600 cash previously spent in the parties’ net worth. . . . ”
The majority opinion misinterprets subsection (d) of IC 1971, 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1977), which refers to the conduct guideline for the final disposition of marital assets. The conduct guideline can only affect the marital assets in which the husband and wife have a vested interest at the time of the dissolution. Wilcox v. Wilcox, supra. The statute excludes any consideration by the trial court of future income as property as noted by Judge Ly-brook in Wilcox.
The $3,600 award of the husband’s future income to the wife is above the total value of the marital assets and must constitute an award of either support or maintenance. However, it is clear from the trial court’s judgment that the $3,600 award was intended as neither support nor maintenance. There is no evidence that the wife was physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that she lacked the ability to support herself.
If the majority’s rationale is extended to future cases, it would effectively repeal the intent of the Legislature as set forth in the statute. The intent being that only present, vested interests be divided by the trial court upon a final dissolution of the marriage. Furthermore, the rationale used by the majority would cause endless confusion regarding the rights of the husband and wife to marital assets, since the only limitation would be the trial judge’s imagination. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment awarding $3,600 from the husband’s future income to the wife is reversible error, and its judgment should be reversed.