Court Opinion

ID: 9687667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:41:26.457148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:29.816851
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part; dissenting in part).
Under this set of facts, a jury could justifiably find Myers guilty of DUI. His driving, under his intoxicated condition, was egregious. As the State expresses on page nine of its brief, “there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.” * I strongly agree. This quote is advocacy by the State to substantiate its position that the trial court properly denied defendant’s request for mistrial. I concur in that aspect of the majority decision which holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in' denying defendant’s motion for mistrial. Officer Schultz’ singular statement did not convict defendant; rather, it was the testimony of his driving to the gas station and, later on, slumping over the wheel — dead drunk. As Justice Dunn wrote for this Court in State v. Farley, 290 N.W.2d 491, 494: “The trial judge has wide discretion in determining the prejudicial effect of a witness’ statements, and it is only when this discretion is clearly abused that this Court will overturn a decision.” (citing State v. Winckler, 260 N.W.2d 356 (S.D.1977)).
Notwithstanding my views aforesaid, this conviction should be set aside and remanded to the trial court for a fair, new trial. My view is not because (obviously) I tolerate his conduct but, rather, due to the trial court’s failure to suppress the results of the blood test admitted into evidence. In State v. Lanier, 452 N.W.2d 144, 147 (S.D.1990), I set forth my views concerning the constitutionality of SDCL 32-23-10, which statute is not mentioned in this majority opinion. In Lanier and in State v. Heinrich, 449 N.W.2d 25 (S.D.1989), I took the position that said statute did not meet constitutional muster (and my position has not changed). It is the same statute which is used as a vehicle to handcuff, leg chain, and physically hold down (with 5 grown men) this defendant to forcibly extract blood from his body. Rather than to encumber this writing, I ask the reader to peruse my former writing on this same subject in Lanier. Suffice it to say, our state constitution is different than the national constitution. It expresses: No person shall be compelled in any criminal case *611to give evidence against himself_” Art. VI, § IX, State Constitution of South Dakota. Art. V of the United States Constitution is worded: “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” Therefore, a law passed to force a South Dakota citizen (in handcuffs — in chains — with 5 men holding him) “to give evidence against himself” is against the direct dictates of our state constitution. Furthermore, as I pointed out in the Lanier dissent, as well as Heinrich, valid state convictions should not be decided by a law enforcement officer on the highway or at a police station by a jailer. Rather, a judge should decide this in a court of law. Ah, the validity of convictions, where does the legal community ordinarily have these decided? If you took any lawyer and his client out on a highway or to a jail and had a detective or law enforcement officer make a decision as to the validity of a conviction, what would the lawyer say to you? — In all probability, he would say: “Go to h_. I want to go before a Judge with my client!” But this statute militates against judicial decisions; it empowers law enforcement to make the determination. I continue to embrace our state constitution, mentally hug it, and treasure it’s values. And with hope. Hope that it will become a foundation for future good judgments. In the year 2040 (hypothetically), what will this Court’s legacy be for the constitutional scholars of that day?
Now, to my last point (faced with a deterioration, via this decision, of past precedent on “unreasonable force”).
In Lanier the majority opinion essentially held that the blood extracted from him was vital because of “exigent circumstances.” And that the “use of force is permissible to obtain virtually the only direct evidence available of proof of alcoholic consumption.” Now, weigh that rationale against the facts before us in this case. Facts: (1) Myers slumped over the wheel— passed out; (2) Myers falls into the arms of the officer — dead drunk; (3) Officer smells alcohol all about Myers’ presence; (4) Myers’ speech was slurred; and (5) Myers’ pupils were dilated. In a nutshell, Myers was falling down drunk. Now, students, where are the “exigent circumstances” for the leg irons, handcuffs, five grown men to pin down the legs and arms? In dear old Schmerber, drawn upon in my dissent in Lanier, I quoted:
It bears repeating however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record. That today we hold that the Constitution does not forbid the State’s minor intrusion into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions and in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1836, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1967). (emphasis supplied mine).
Under this set of facts, the blood sample was the fruit of an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and viola-tive of Article VI, § IX, of our state constitution. Therefore, its results ought not to be admissible in a criminal prosecution under the exclusionary rule. State v. Habbena, 372 N.W.2d 450, 458 (S.D.1985). Was reasonable force used here? No. Myers did not physically resist. Reasonableness of the search and seizure is a substantive determination to be made by the trial judge from all of the facts and circumstances. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). A withdrawal of blood must be examined in light of the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200, 1208 (9th Cir.1989).
May evidence be secured at any cost? May zeal of law enforcement be elevated over constitutional mandate? Was the arsenal of force reasonable under the facts of this case? Is it now possible for law enforcement officers in South Dakota to totally ignore the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the mandate of our State Constitution? It appears to me that whatever force the law enforcement officers of this state use, under any circumstances, will be countenanced for this case, indeed, is the far end of the reasonableness spectrum. See, People v. Kraft, 3 Cal.App.3d 890, 84 Cal.Rptr. 280 *612(1970) for a similar case supporting this dissent. Acts of the law enforcement officials, in the case before us, are condemned per Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). Three cheers for the diversity of opinion in the courts of this land; competing thoughts are healthy for the law.

 So — the legal mind ponders: Why was he placed in leg chains, plus handcuffed, with a police officer and 4 jailers restraining him to take a blood sample? State had an overwhelming amount of proof at its command without the unreasonable use of force.