Court Opinion

ID: 9917471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:10:21.212955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:06.257962
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jesse R. May,                             :
                    Petitioner            :
                                          :
             v.                           :   No. 1511 C.D. 2022
                                          :
Dana Corporation (Workers’                :   Submitted: December 4, 2023
Compensation Appeal Board),               :
                  Respondent              :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
             HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                   FILED: January 12, 2024

             Jesse R. May (Claimant), pro se, petitions for review from the November
9, 2022 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which denied his
petition for rehearing. In his petition, Claimant sought a rehearing of the Board’s
March 31, 2021 order affirming a decision and order of the Workers’ Compensation
Judge (WCJ), which denied Claimant’s pro se penalty petition, petition to review
compensation benefits, and petition to review medical treatment and/or billing
(collectively, Petitions). After careful review, we affirm.
                           I. Facts and Procedural History
             This Court has already issued a final order, disposing of Claimant’s prior
appeal on the merits; therefore, we cite to our July 21, 2022 opinion and summarize the
facts as follows:
On August 1, 2018, Claimant, pro se, filed the Petitions
against Dana Corporation (Employer), which were
consolidated and assigned to a WCJ. By interlocutory order
dated November 6, 2018, the WCJ granted the motion to
withdraw that was filed by Claimant’s former counsel, with
Claimant’s agreement and decision to proceed pro se.
Notably, at all times relevant to the history surrounding these
proceedings, Claimant was represented by his former counsel
and, with the assistance of said counsel, executed four
Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreements in 2003. The
C&R Agreements were approved by a WCJ after the WCJ
confirmed, at hearings and based on Claimant’s own credible
testimony, that Claimant entered the agreements with full
understanding of their terms, conditions, and legal
significance. In the four C&R Agreements[,] . . . Claimant
agreed to resolve wage loss benefits for work-related injuries
that he sustained on four different dates, January 29, 1990,
September 15, 1990, October 8, 1993, and March 11, 1999.
However, Claimant reserved the right to receive
continuing payment from Employer for medical expenses
for these injuries, with the exception of the C&R
Agreement pertaining to his 1993 work-related injury.
Essentially, in his Petitions, Claimant alleged that Employer
failed to pay certain medical bills under the C&R
Agreements and sought to set aside or otherwise void the four
C&R Agreements.
[T]he WCJ denied the Petitions. In so doing, the WCJ first
acknowledged that Employer technically failed to pay a few
medical expenditures that were covered under the C&R
Agreements, but the WCJ found that the missed payments
were inadvertent and may have been due to improper coding.
Otherwise, the WCJ determined that the remaining medical
bills that Claimant submitted were for injuries that were not
acknowledged or were terminated as a result of the C&R
resolution. . . .
Concerning Claimant’s contention that the C&R Agreements
should be voided, the WCJ correctly cited case law from this
Court explaining that, in order to set aside a C&R agreement,
the moving party, here Claimant, must show that the
agreement was entered into through mutual mistake, or that
he was the victim of fraud, duress, misrepresentation,
concealment, or deception. [The WCJ] determine[ed] that

                              2
               Claimant failed to satisfy his burden of proof in this
               regard. . . .
               ....
               [T]he WCJ denied the Petitions, concluding that Claimant
               failed to establish that Employer intentionally failed to pay
               reasonable and necessary medical bills, that Employer
               violated the [Workers’ Compensation Act, Act of June 2,
               1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-
               2710], or that the C&R Agreements should be set aside.
               Thereafter, Claimant appealed to the Board, arguing that the
               WCJ did not issue a reasoned decision because the WCJ
               failed to adequately explain why he rejected Claimant’s
               testimony that he was deceived into signing the C&R
               Agreements and/or signed them under duress or coercion. . . .
               After recounting Claimant’s testimony and arguments
               related thereto, the Board concluded that the WCJ issued a
               reasoned decision, pursuant to section 422(a) of the Act, 77
               P.S. § 834[.][1]
               ....
               In addition, the Board rejected Claimant’s assertion that the
               C&R Agreements should be voided as a result of fraud . . .
               determining that Claimant failed to submit sufficient,
               credible evidence to establish this contention. Next, the
               Board addressed Claimant’s argument that he only signed the
               C&R Agreements based on his belief that they were not
               binding, and Employer would continue to remain liable for
               medical expenses in connection with his 1993 work-related
               injury. In dismissing these assertions, the Board noted that
               the WCJ who approved the C&R Agreements in 2003
               specifically found that Claimant understood the C&R
               Agreements after hearing Claimant’s live testimony in 2003

       1
         Section 422(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
               All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to a reasoned
               decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon
               the evidence as a whole which clearly and concisely states and explains
               the rationale for the decisions so that all can determine why and how a
               particular result was reached.
77 P.S. § 834.

                                                 3
            and, because Claimant did not appeal the WCJ’s 2003
            decision and order, the WCJ’s determination that Claimant
            understood the full legal significance of the C&R
            Agreements is final. To the extent that Claimant contended
            the C&R Agreements were the result of a mutual mistake of
            fact, the Board disagreed . . . . Finally, the Board noted that
            Claimant did not contest the WCJ’s determinations that he
            failed to demonstrate that Employer violated the Act in
            declining to pay for work-related medical expenses, and
            seemingly determined that these issues were waived. See
            Arnold v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Baker
            Industries), 859 A.2d 866, 871 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
            Accordingly, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s order denying
            Claimant’s Petitions. Subsequently, Claimant filed a pro se
            petition for review in this Court.

May v. Dana Corporation (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board) (Pa. Cmwlth., No.
575 C.D. 2021, filed July 21, 2022), slip op. at 1-3 (emphasis added).
            On review, we affirmed the Board’s order and concluded that the WCJ’s
decision was reasoned, the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported by substantial
evidence, and no error of law was committed by the WCJ in rendering his
determination. Additionally, we stated:
            [T]he WCJ determined that Claimant’s current testimony
            was directly contradicted by the transcript of the 2003
            hearing in which Claimant credibly testified that he
            understood the full legal significance of the C&R
            Agreements, and, also, the plain language of the C&R
            Agreements themselves.          See Benginia v. Workers’
            Compensation Appeal Board (City of Scranton), 805 A.2d
            1272, 1279 & n.14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Moreover, for
            essentially the same reasons, the WCJ found that Claimant
            failed to adduce credible evidence establishing that the C&R
            Agreements should be set aside due to fraud, duress, or
            deception, or that the parties committed a mutual mistake of
            fact. In short, the WCJ’s findings in these regards rested
            solely upon the WCJ’s determination that Claimant’s
            testimony was not credible. And, because this Court has no
            basis upon which to disturb the WCJ’s credibility
            determination, we cannot conclude that the WCJ erred in

                                          4
               failing to set aside the C&R Agreements. See Farner v.
               Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Rockwell
               International), 869 A.2d 1075, 1078-79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
               Consequently, the C&R Agreements remain valid and
               binding, and we agree with the Board that the WCJ did not
               err in denying Claimant’s Petitions.

Id., slip op. at 5.
               Claimant did not file a request for review of this Court’s opinion and order
to the Supreme Court. Instead, Claimant filed a rehearing petition with the Board on
September 30, 2022. Subsequently, the Board denied the rehearing petition and did
not specify reasons for the denial. This appeal followed.
                                           II. Issues
               Claimant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether the Board
exceeded its discretion by denying him the right to a rehearing, and (2) whether the
denial of a rehearing is a violation of his constitutional right to due process.
                                         III. Analysis
               The factual basis for all of the Petitions was Claimant’s contention that he
was not aware that the October 8, 1993 injury was not a part of the four C&R
Agreements executed by him with the help of his counsel. Claimant alleges that he
would not have testified that he understood the terms and conditions of the C&R
Agreements if he knew Employer would not be responsible for paying those future
medical bills.        Therefore, Claimant argues that the Board abused its discretion and
should have granted a rehearing on grounds of newly discovered evidence. Claimant
asserts that he is in possession of two newly discovered documents, allegedly
previously concealed from him, that warrant a rehearing: (1) the First Hearing Filing;

                                               5
and (2) Employer’s Answer to Claimant’s Petition to Review Medical Treatment
and/or Billing.2
               Claimant argues that, considering the humanitarian and remedial purpose
of the Act, this Court is empowered to permit the Board to conduct a rehearing and
relies upon Section 426 of the Act, which provides in pertinent part:
               The [B]oard, upon petition of any party and upon cause
               shown, may grant a rehearing of any petition upon which the
               [B]oard has made an award or disallowance of compensation
               or other order of ruling, or upon which the [B]oard has
               sustained or reversed any action of a [WCJ] . . . .
77 P.S. § 871. We disagree with Claimant’s assertion.
               While the Board has broad authority under Section 426 of the Act to grant
a rehearing, Izzi v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Century Graphics), 654
A.2d 176 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), that authority is divested in the event that this Court
issues a final order in the same case. Once this Court has entered a final order in a
case, the Board is divested of jurisdiction and cannot grant a rehearing even within the
18-month period allowed by the Act.                   Cantera v. Worley & Obetz (Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 835 C.D. 2020, filed July 13, 2021);
see also Smiths Implements, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board
(Leonard), 673 A.2d 1039 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); Kuriakose v. Workmen’s Compensation

       2
          Only Employer’s Answer to Claimant’s Petition to Review Medical Treatment and/or Billing
is part of the Reproduced Record. Both of these documents appear in the agency record. The First
Hearing Filing is a form that was filed by Employer’s counsel seeking to compel Claimant’s
attendance at an independent medical examination. The second document is Employer’s Answer to
Claimant’s Petition to Review Medical Treatment and/or Billing, in which Employer denied all
allegations in Claimant’s Petition to Review Medical Treatment and/or Billing, specifically that
Claimant’s condition had worsened, that there are unpaid bills, and that Claimant is entitled to review
all aspects of his settlement, which was conducted in a hearing before the WCJ in December 2003.
Both documents reference September 15, 1990, as the date of the injury. Claimant does not provide
any intelligible argument as to how either of these documents would have changed the outcome of
his case.

                                                  6
Appeal Board (J.F. Kennedy Hospital), 681 A.2d 1389 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (holding
that the entry of a final order by this Court divests the Board of jurisdiction to grant a
petition for rehearing). When this Court enters an order deciding an appeal, that order
is final. Such an order remains final until it is reversed by the Supreme Court.
Kuriakose, 681 A.2d at 1391-92.3
              Here, the Board issued its order on March 31, 2021, wherein it affirmed
the WCJ’s order and decision denying and dismissing Claimant’s Petitions. On July
21, 2022, this Court affirmed the Board’s order, and Claimant did not seek review in
the Supreme Court. Subsequently, Claimant filed his petition for rehearing with the
Board on September 30, 2022, at the point when the Board lacked jurisdiction to
entertain such a petition due to the final order of the Court disposing of the appeal on
the merits. Therefore, because this Court had entered a final order, the Board lacked
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for rehearing.
              Alternatively, even if Claimant’s petition for rehearing was filed at a point
when the Board did not lack jurisdiction to entertain such a petition due to the final
order of the Court disposing of the appeal on the merits, we still fail to see how the
allegations set forth warrant a rehearing.
              The grant or denial of a rehearing is generally within the discretion of the
Board, and the Board will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Cudo v.
Hallstead Foundry, Inc., 539 A.2d 792 (Pa. 1989); City of Philadelphia v. Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board (Harvey), 994 A.2d 1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Payne v.
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Elwyn, Inc.), 928 A.2d 377 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2007). A rehearing is not allowable (1) for the purpose of strengthening weak proofs

       3
        An order of the Commonwealth Court could also be reversed following reconsideration or
reargument before an en banc panel of this Court. Pa.R.A.P. 2543; Commonwealth Internal Operating
Procedure 291, 210 Pa. Code § 69.291.

                                               7
that have already been presented, (2) to permit a party to introduce previously available
evidence to attempt to cure a failure to satisfy a party’s burden of proof, or (3) for the
purpose of hearing additional testimony that is merely cumulative. Washington v.
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (National Freight Industries, Inc.), 111 A.3d
214 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); Paxos v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board
(Frankford-Quaker Grocery), 631 A.2d 826 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). Nonetheless, the
Board must grant a rehearing where justice requires. See Sun Oil Co. v. Workmen’s
Compensation Appeal Board (Thompson), 631 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)
(appropriate means to present after-discovered evidence is a rehearing petition;
decision to grant or deny rehearing is within the Board’s discretion; however, the Board
must do so when justice requires). The Board may grant rehearing to correct a mistake
of law or its misapprehension of an issue. 77 P.S. § 871; see also Izzi, 654 A.2d at 180
n. 1 (dissenting opinion).
               Here, Claimant argues that he could not have obtained the newly
discovered evidence by reasonable diligence as he was erroneously told that he did not
have access to the Workers’ Compensation Automation and Integration System
(WCAIS), where the documents were stored, until his daughter was able to log into the
system during the pandemic.4 (Claimant’s Brief at 7-2.) Additionally, Claimant asserts
that Employer’s counsel neglected to provide him with the requested documents. Id.
at 7-1. Claimant contends that this proves that the documents were concealed from
him. Claimant attempts to show how these two documents would have changed the
outcome of the case. First, with respect to “the First Hearing Filing,” which states,
“although indemnity has been resolved, Employer remains responsible for medical

       4
         This Court has spent a considerable amount of time trying to understand Claimant’s
argument. After concluding that the argument is intelligible, we provide direct quotes from his brief
to avoid misstating Claimant’s words.

                                                 8
treatments that are causally related to four separate dates of injury and it is entitled to
have [C]laimant examined to determine the current status of [C]laimant’s injuries,”
Claimant argues that this language proves that Employer is still responsible for the
medical bills related to his October 8, 1993 injury, and in turn, it nullifies the WCJ’s
credibility determination in Finding of Fact No. 12. Id. Finding of Fact No. 12 states:

             Based upon the evidence of record, notwithstanding
             Claimant’s assertion that he did not understand and was
             railroaded into the [A]greements, there is no indication of
             that in the record before me except Claimant’s assertion. The
             [evidentiary] record from the C&R approval hearing and the
             four [A]greements with their specific and clear provisions
             belie that claim. His allegations are contrary to facts of
             record. I find that Claimant was aware of the full legal
             significance of the four [A]greements and their effect upon
             his rights when he testified on December 19, 2003.

(WCJ’s Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 12.) Additionally, Claimant argues that concealment
of this document allowed Employer’s counsel to make false and misleading statements
surrounding the case involving the injury at issue (October 8, 1993). (Claimant’s Brief
at 7-2.) Regarding “Employer’s Answer to Claimant’s Petition to Review Medical
Treatment and/or Billing,” Claimant asserts that the concealment of this document
“denied him arguing not only his case but questions how the court proceeded.” Id.
             We fail to see how the allegations set forth by Claimant warrant a
rehearing.   Particularly, it is difficult to decipher how Claimant alleges “after[-
]discovered” evidence would have impacted the credibility determinations of the WCJ.
Cisco v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (A&P Tea Co.), 488 A.2d 1194, 1196
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (stating that the Board cannot be said to have abused its discretion
in denying a request for a rehearing where a “[c]laimant has failed to show how the
newly discovered evidence could change the outcome of the case”). At all times
pertinent, Claimant was represented by counsel, Claimant executed every C&R

                                            9
Agreement and the stipulation, and testified at the December 19, 2003 hearing before
the WCJ that he understood the terms of each of the Agreements. (WCJ’s F.F. No. 8.)
The four Agreements resolved four work-related injuries that Claimant sustained on
four different dates, January 29, 1990, September 15, 1990, October 8, 1993, and
March 11, 1999.     Id. at 4.    The December 19, 2003 order approving the four
Agreements, was a custom order, which, inter alia, set forth that Employer would
remain responsible for reasonable and necessary medical expenses for all the injuries
with an exception of the October 8, 1993 injury. Id. at 5. The October 8, 1993
injury was not included in the order as remaining open for medical bills. Id. at 7.
The WCJ found that Claimant was aware of the full legal significance of the
Agreements and their effect upon his rights. Accordingly, the Board affirmed the WCJ
concluding no reversible error. Finally, and most importantly, this Court agreed with
the Board that the WCJ did not err in denying Claimant’s Petitions. More specifically
we stated:
             Here, we agree with the Board that the WCJ issued a
             reasoned decision in rejecting Claimant’s testimony as not
             credible. More specifically, the WCJ determined that
             Claimant’s current testimony was directly contradicted by
             the transcript of the 2003 hearing in which Claimant credibly
             testified that he understood the full legal significance of the
             C&R Agreements, and, also, the plain language of the C&R
             Agreements themselves. See [Benginia, 805 A.2d at 1279 &
             n.14]. Moreover, for essentially the same reasons, the WCJ
             found that Claimant failed to adduce credible evidence
             establishing that the C&R Agreements should be set aside
             due to fraud, duress, or deception, or that the parties
             committed a mutual mistake of fact. In short, the WCJ’s
             findings in these regards rested solely upon the WCJ’s
             determination that Claimant’s testimony was not credible.
             And, because this Court has no basis upon which to disturb
             the WCJ’s credibility determination, we cannot conclude that
             the WCJ erred in failing to set aside the C&R Agreements.
             See [Farner, 869 A.2d at 1078-79]. Consequently, the C&R

                                           10
             Agreements remain valid and binding, and we agree with the
             Board that the WCJ did not err in denying Claimant’s
             Petitions.

May, slip op. at 5.

                                  IV. Conclusion
             Based on the forgoing, we are unable to conclude that the Board erred in
denying Claimant’s rehearing petition. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                          ________________________________
                                          PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                                         11
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jesse R. May,                       :
                 Petitioner         :
                                    :
            v.                      :    No. 1511 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Dana Corporation (Workers’          :
Compensation Appeal Board),         :
                  Respondent        :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 12th day of January, 2024, the November 9, 2022
order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                        ________________________________
                                        PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge