Court Opinion

ID: 9582790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:31:22.531953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:30.881369
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur in Division 1, holding that the applicable standard of care is that of extraordinary diligence owed by common carriers, established at OCGA § 46-9-1. I also fully concur in Division 3, distinguishing the whole court decision in Ellis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 193 Ga. App. 797, 798 (2) (388 SE2d 920) on the basis of that defendant’s actual knowledge of the hazard because that plaintiff’s husband had already informed an employee of the malfunctioning escalator. But with respect to Division 2 and the judgment affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) and Millar Elevator Service Company (Millar), I respectfully dissent.
“The rule applicable in common carrier cases is that whenever a carrier, through its agents or servants, knows or has, [an] opportunity to know of a threatened injury, or might have reasonably anticipated the happening of an injury, and fails or neglects to take the proper precautions or to use proper means to prevent or mitigate such injury, the carrier is liable. It is the common carrier’s duty to use proper care and vigilance to protect passengers from injuries . . . that might reasonably have been foreseen and anticipated. Knowledge of the passenger’s danger, or of facts and circumstances from which that danger may reasonably be inferred, is necessary to fix the carrier’s liability in this class of cases. The carrier is not regarded as an insurer of his passenger’s safety against every possible source of danger; but he is bound to use all such reasonable precautions as human judgment and foresight are capable of, to make his passenger’s journey safe and comfortable.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Southeastern Stages v. Stringer, 263 Ga. 641, 642 (437 SE2d 315). The evidence, as recited by the majority, indicates that, in addition to regularly scheduled maintenance, there were seven times in the preceding two months when this particular escalator required emergency maintenance service. On August 5, 1992, there was a reported complaint of: “Handrail not working.” *772This problem with the handrail required defendant Millar to “replace an axle bearing and a 1400 belt to the handrail drive system.” Another handrail problem was reported on August 14, 1992. In the experience of Paul J. Gibbs, it is foreseeable that “if the handrail belt slips, that handrail belt can slip pretty quickly,” while the escalator is moving. A maintenance provider is faced with “a couple of ways of doing that [i.e., repairing bad bearings]. When you go in, you can replace everything in there and not just change one [bearing] that goes out. . . . Then you have a better time of running [between foreseeable repairs].” “If you don’t repair the whole thing, then there’s going to be more of a chance that it’s going to break down sooner.” The evidence in this case indicates that defendants “just fixed what was wrong ... as opposed to going in and . . . replacing the entire bearing structure or fixing the entire escalator.” Gibbs affirmed that “if there were passengers on these escalators when these escalators break down, that could pose a danger to these passengers.” Accordingly, this record contains ample evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that defendants deliberately and consciously elected a repair program to do the least that was necessary, with foresight of the likely risks posed to its passengers. In my view, a jury and not this Court should determine whether defendants’ minimalist repair, program constituted the use of all such reasonable precautions as human judgment and foresight are capable of. As my colleagues in the majority would nevertheless affirm the unwarranted grant of summary judgment, I respectfully dissent from Division 2 and the judgment.
Decided December 4, 1996.
Eric D. Miller, for appellant.
Lokey & Smith, G. Melton Mobley, for appellees.