Court Opinion

ID: 9862890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:25:20.2446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:33.351895
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
dissenting.
The defendant is a homosexual suffering from a serious psychosis, a symptom of which was a sexual fantasy in which he would stab or strangle a man and then sodomize the corpse. Tragically, defendant attempted to act out his psychotic fantasy. He was driving to work one morning when he saw a young man sunbathing. Defendant stopped his car, approached the man, and after a brief exchange of words, stabbed him in the chest. However, the victim, a physician, managed to escape to his car and drive himself to the hospital, where he died of a stab wound to the heart.
Defendant was charged with intentional murder, unlawful possession of a knife, and possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose. Prior to trial, defendant moved to waive trial by jury pursuant to court rule. In support of his motion, he contended that a jury might be biased against him because of his homosexuality and prejudiced against accepting a psychiatric defense based on a bizarre psychotic disorder. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, stating that “this is the kind of case that is appropriate to have the community decide” and that “a more elaborate type of voir dire” would address defendant’s concerns.
*321The prosecution proceeded with a jury, which, disbelieving defendant’s psychiatric defense, returned a verdict of guilty on each charge. The court sentenced defendant to the mandatory minimum term of thirty years without possibility of parole. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, which the Court now affirms. I disagree with the reasoning and rationale of the Court and dissent from its judgment.
I.
Waiver of jury trial in criminal causes is covered by Rule 1:8-1. That rule is couched in general terms that do not indicate specific factors that govern the waiver of a jury trial. It provides only: “Criminal actions required to be tried by a jury shall be so tried unless the defendant, in writing and with the approval of the court, after notice to the prosecuting attorney and his opportunity to be heard, waives a jury trial.” In State v. Belton, 60 N.J. 103, 109-10, 286 A.2d 78 (1972), this Court upheld Rule 1:8-1 against a constitutional challenge to the restriction conditioning defendant’s waiver of a jury trial on court approval. The Court, now, however, construes the Rule so that a defendant cannot waive a trial by jury except in the most extraordinary circumstances, which the Court neither explains nor illustrates. According to the Court, a criminal defendant may dispense with a jury if the trial court is satisfied that defendant “in good faith” seeks the waiver not “as a stratagem to procure an otherwise impermissible advantage” and does so “voluntarily, knowingly, and competently” “with advice of counsel.” Ante at 317-318, 590 A.2d at 1150-1151. The Court would also require the trial court to provide “an accompanying statement of reasons” that have moved the court to grant or deny the defendant’s request “in the circumstances of the case.” Ibid. The Court does not illuminate “the reasons” that will justify the grant or denial of a request to dispense with a trial by jury. It states simply that the “gravity” of the offense is relevant, briefly lists several factors that could “tip the scale,” but quickly adds that it “repose[s] the *322greatest confidence in trial judges to exercise” their discretion. Ante at 317-318, 590 A.2d at 1150-1151. The Court’s additional observation that “[t]he sources of principled decision-making will remain rooted in a statement of reasons that will accompany the decision,” ante at 317, 590 A.2d at 1151, does not supply guidance.
The Appellate Division, in determining that defendant here was not entitled to waive a jury, relied primarily on two of its own decisions, State v. Davidson, 225 N.J.Super. 1, 541 A:2d 700 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 594, 546 A.2d 518 (1988), and State v. Fiorilla, 226 N.J.Super. 81, 543 A.2d 958 (App. Div.1988). In Davidson, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to a bench trial despite what the defendant characterized as the “emotional issue” of “racial bigotry” in the case. 225 N.J.Super. at 7-10, 541 A.2d 700. In Fiorilla, a Medicaid fraud case decided one month after Davidson, the court upheld the waiver of a trial by jury, reasoning that the complexity of the issues militated in favor of a trial by the judge alone. 226 N.J.Super. at 84, 94, 543 A.2d 958.
Those decisions leave the impression that a jury may be waived in a case involving “complex” or “difficult” technical issues, but not in cases presenting “emotional” issues such as “racial bigotry.” The Court appears to endorse the rationale of those decisions but, ironically, fashions a standard that is less precise than the decisions from which it draws support.
The majority discusses the Appellate Division’s three-prong test for determining when a court should grant a defendant’s motion to waive a jury. Ante at 312-315, 590 A.2d at 1149-1150. In Fiorilla, 226 N.J.Super. 81, 543 A.2d 958, the Appellate Division enumerated three relevant factors:
Approval of a jury waiver request should not be withheld unless the trial judge has determined that: (1) a defendant has not voluntarily, knowingly and competently waived his constitutional right to jury trial with advice of counsel; or that, (2) the waiver is not tendered in good faith, but as a stratagem to procure an otherwise impermissible procedural advantage; or that (3) consequential, overriding, demonstrable and articulated reasons exist to require a *323jury trial, which outweigh the reasons and record provided by the defendant in support of the waiver. [226 N.J.Super. at 92, 543 A.2d 958.]
The Court rejects the third Morilla prong and replaces it with the requirement that the trial court simply state the “reasons” why a jury trial is preferable in the circumstances of the case. Ante at 314-315, 316-317, 590 A.2d at 1149-1150, 1151. The Court’s holding represents a significant change. It clearly places the burden of securing a waiver on the defendant and it makes that burden an onerous one because the “reasons” that can be used to deny the waiver need not be “consequential,” “overriding” or “demonstrable.”
One is hard pressed to find within the Court’s opinion sound or persuasive considerations that support its determination to make it so hard for a criminal defendant to obtain a trial without a jury. The majority relies heavily on federal law. Ante at 309-311, 590 A.2d at 1146-1147. I believe it misperceives and misapplies that law. The Court, focusing on Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298, 50 S.Ct. 253, 258, 74 L.Ed. 854, 863 (1930), gives inordinate weight to Justice Sutherland’s closing personal observations on the value of jury trials to extrapolate “principles that remain of enduring guidance.” Ante at 310, 590 A.2d at 1147. The majority seems oblivious to Patton’s holding that the constitutional right to a trial by jury “was meant to confer a right upon the accused which he may forgo at his election,” that “the right of trial by jury [is] primarily for the protection of the accused,” and that the framers did not intend to establish the jury in criminal trials as an “integral and inseparable part of the court.” 281 U.S. at 297-98, 50 S.Ct. at 257-58, 74 L.Ed. at 862-63. Ante at 310, 590 A.2d at 1147.1
*324The Court also cites Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965), in which the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the federal rule, Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(a), which requires the consent of the prosecution and the approval of the Court before a defendant can waive a jury. Ante at 311-312, 590 A.2d at 1147. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the rule’s requirement of prosecutorial consent, stating that while the sixth amendment guarantees a right to trial by jury, “there is no federally recognized right to a criminal trial before a judge sitting alone____” But the Court added:
We need not determine in this case whether there might be some circumstances where a defendants’ reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government’s insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial. Petitioner argues that there might arise situations where "passion, prejudice ... public feeling” or some other factor may render impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by jury. However, since petitioner gave no reason for wanting to forego jury trial other than to save time, this is not such a case, and petitioner does not claim that it is. [380 U.S. at 34, 37-38, 85 S.Ct. at 789, 791, 13 L.Ed.2d at 637, 639.]
Seizing on that language, on at least two occasions federal district courts have granted a defendant’s motion to waive jury trial without the consent of the prosecution. E.g., United States v. Braunstein, 474 F.Supp. 1, 13-14 (D.N.J.1978) (in complex medicare fraud cause with numerous witness, voluminous exhibits, and five separate defendants, the risk of prejudice posed by a jury trial “is extremely high and compelling”); United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F.Supp. 247, 250 (D.R.I. 1976) (complex medicare fraud case “is the kind of case where ‘the practical and human limitations of [a] jury ... cannot be ignored.’ ” (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 485 (1968)).
The approaches of the various states are so diverse they provide no clear direction. See Annotation, “Eight of Accused, in State Criminal Trial, To Insist, Over Prosecutor’s or Court’s *325Objection, on Trial By Court Without Jury,” 37 A.L.R.4th 304 (1985). Some states require that a defendant’s motion to waive jury trial be granted if the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently and for more than merely tactical reasons. E.g., State v. Duchin, 12 N.Y.2d 351, 239 N.Y.S.2d 670, 190 N.E.2d 17 (1963). Other states give the trial judge broad discretion in determining whether to grant a defendant’s motion to waive a jury. E.g., State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1366-67 (Me.1981); Commonwealth v. Collins, 11 Mass.App.Ct. 126, 139-41, 414 N.E.2d 1008, 1016 (1981). Still other jurisdictions require approval of both the judge and the prosecution. E.g., Cal. Const. art. 1, § 16; Mich.R. Crim.P. 6.401. Ten states, including New Jersey, provide either by constitutional provision, statute, or court rule that a criminal defendant may waive trial by jury with consent of the trial court. E.g., Mass.R.Crim.Pro. 19(a); N. Y. Const, art. 1, § 2; Penn.R. Crim.P. 1101. Several states, while providing by statute or case law that a criminal defendant may waive a jury trial, do not make clear the circumstances under which a request for waiver is to be granted or denied. E.g., Kerr v. State, 738 P.2d 1370 (Okla.Crim.App.1987); State v. Black, 551 P.2d 518 (Utah 1976). The supreme courts of two states have held that a criminal defendant may never waive trial by jury in a felony case. State v. Scalise, 131 Mont. 238, 309 P.2d 1010 (1957); State v. Underwood, 283 N.C. 154, 195 S.E.2d 489 (1973). Several states, the statutes of which do not explicitly condition waiver on the consent of the court or prosecutor, have interpreted those statutes to give criminal defendants an absolute right to waive a jury trial (provided the waiver is knowing and intelligent). E.g., Garcia v. People, 200 Colo. 413, 615 P.2d 698 (1980); State v. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Iowa 1984).
Most of the states that, like New Jersey, condition a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial on consent of the trial court, give the trial courts wide latitude in determining whether to accept a defendant’s request for waiver. E.g., State v. Linder, 304 N.W.2d 902, 904-05 (Minn.1981) (“The burden is upon defendant *326to show that refusal of the waiver was so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”); State v. Goree, 762 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Mo.1988) (en banc) (“By the unambiguous language of the constitution, the right is conditioned upon the assent of the court. Failure to sustain a motion to waive a jury trial is not an abuse of discretion.”).
The Court’s reasons in support of a rule that drastically curtails the ability of a criminal defendant to waive a jury are not persuasive. The Court, having confirmed the absence of a federal constitutional right to waive a jury finds no corresponding entitlement under the New Jersey Constitution to waive a jury: “[Njothing in New Jersey’s history or tradition suggests any implied correlative right on the part of a defendant to demand trial by a judge and not by jury.” Ante at 312, 590 A. 2d at 1148. It may be that there is no federal or state constitutional right to a bench trial; it does not ineluctably follow that a criminal defendant has no protectable interest in or entitlement to the waiver of a jury.
Under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution, trial by jury is a right specifically bestowed upon “the accused.” Under our state constitution, trial by jury is provided for in article I, which enumerates the “Rights and Privileges” of citizens. Paragraph 10, entitled “Rights of persons accused of crime,” specifies trial by jury as a right belonging to the “accused.” (Emphasis added.) The language of article I, paragraph 10 is virtually identical to its predecessor provision in the New Jersey Constitution of 1844. N.J. Const. of 1844 art. I, para. 8. Our rules governing criminal practice, which reflect developing concepts of due process, recognize that the right to the waiver of “trial by jury” is one of many rights of which a defendant charged with an indictable offense must be specifically informed by the committing judge following arrest and the filing of a complaint. R. 3:4-2. As the United States Supreme Court concluded in Patton, supra, the constitutional standard, which undergirds trial by jury, “was meant to confer a right upon the accused which he may forego upon his election. *327To deny his power to do so is to convert a privilege into an imperative requirement.” 281 U.S. at 298, 50 S.Ct. at 258, 74 L.Ed. at 863.
A few states share the understanding that the defendant’s right to waive trial by jury is protectable. In People v. Duchin, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the provision of the state constitution, which states that a criminal defendant can waive a jury trial “ ‘with the approval of a judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction to try the offense.’ ” 12 N.Y.2d at 353 n. 1, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 671 n. 1, 190 N.E.2d at 17 n. 1 (quoting N. Y. Const. art. 1, § 2). The court stated that “[t]he provision is designed for the benefit of the defendant” and accordingly held that the defendant
is entitled to [a waiver of a jury trial] as a matter of right once it appears to the satisfaction of the court having jurisdiction that, first, the waiver is tendered in good faith and is not a stratagem to procure an otherwise impermissible procedural advantage — such as for instance, a separate trial on an indictment involving several defendants jointly charged with the commission of crime— and, second, that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of the choice he is making. [Id. at 353, 239 N.Y.S.24 at 671, 190 N.E.24 at 17-18 (citations omitted).]
In Commonwealth v. Wharton, 495 Pa. 581, 435 A.2d 158 (1981), an equally divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the striking down by a lower court of a legislative effort to grant the Commonwealth an absolute right to a jury trial on demand. In his opinion in support of affirmance, Justice Roberts wrote “that trial- by jury in criminal cases is a procedure designed for protection of the accused,” 495 Pa. at 589, 435 A.2d at 162, and quoted the United States Supreme Court in Adams v. United States ex rel McMann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80, 63 S.Ct. 236, 241-42, 87 L.Ed. 268, 275 (1942): “What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned into fetters____ To deny an accused a choice of procedure ... is to impair the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them as empty verbalisms.” Id. 495 Pa. at 598, 435 A.2d at 167.
*328The Illinois Supreme Court more than one-half century ago, in People v. Scornavache, 347 Ill. 403, 179 N.E. 909 (1931), believed that “[t]here is, of course, nothing in the Constitution conferring the right of jury trial on the state.” The court nevertheless affirmed the judgment, including a ruling that defendant was not entitled to waive a jury. It expressed the view: (1) that trial by jury has for centuries been the established mode of trial in criminal cases; (2) that “[t]he maintenance of a jury as a fact-finding body occupies that place in government, as we know it in America, which, in the absence of a statute so providing, requires that such trial be not set aside merely on the choice of the accused”; (3) that “[t]he long recognition by courts everywhere that trial in a criminal case means a jury trial has clearly given to the people the right to object to a trial by the court on waiver of a jury trial by the accused.” Id. at 415-16, 179 N.E. at 913-14. Justice DeYoung strongly disagreed:
[N]o attempt is made to sustain the announced construction of the Constitution by recourse to any of its provisions or even an implication arising therefrom. Indeed, it is conceded in the opinion that a jury trial is not an integral and inseparable part of the court, but rather an instrumentality, which may or may not be employed; that the Constitution does not confer upon the state the right to a trial in a criminal case; that the right to such a trial guaranteed by the Constitution is preserved as a right of the person accused, and that he may waive the right. These concessions, it seems to me, are fatal to the conclusion of the opinion. [Id. at 417-18, 179 N.E. at 914 (DeYoung, J., dissenting).]
Significantly, in 1941, the Illinois legislature, apparently in response to Scomavache, enacted a statute providing that in any case where the defendant pleads guilty or waives a jury, the case shall be heard and determined by the court without a jury. Interpreting that statute, the supreme court in People v. Spegal, 5 Ill.2d 211, 125 N.E.2d 468 (1955), relying on Justice DeYoung’s dissenting opinion, expressly overruled Scomavache, and held that the lower court had erred in refusing the defendant’s motion to waive a jury trial. Id. 5 Ill.2d at 217-22, 125 N.E.2d at 470-73.
In People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill.2d 209, 127 Ill.Dec. 791, 533 N.E.2d 873 (1988), the court struck down a statute that *329required the government’s consent for a defendant to waive a jury trial in certain narcotics prosecutions. The court held that the state constitution “encompasse[s] the right of an accused to waive trial by jury,” id. at 222, 127 Ill.Dec. at 797, 533 N.E.2d at 879, in contrast to the federal constitution, which characterizes the right to trial by jury as a right belonging to the accused only in the sixth amendment but not in article III, section 2 (“The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury.”). Id. at 214, 127 Ill.Dec. at 793, 533 N.E.2d at 875. The court determined therefore that the Supreme Court’s decision in Singer v. United States, supra, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630, was not helpful in deciding the issue before it. Id. 126 Ill.2d at 214-15, 127 Ill.Dec. at 793, 533 N.E.2d at 875; see also People v. Reed, 23 Ill.App.2d 546, 547, 319 N.E.2d 557, 558 (1974) (Singer is not dispositive in interpreting Illinois’s waiver statute, as the statute does not require consent of the government whereas the federal statute at issue in Singer did). By contrast, the Illinois Constitution always refers to the right to trial by jury as specifically belonging to the accused.
Given that trial by jury is a right belonging to the defendant, the burden of the argument would seem to be on the proponents of limiting a defendant’s ability to waive that right. Most of the arguments in favor of curtailing a defendant’s ability to waive a jury trial, such as “community expectations,” “equal treatment of prosecution and defendant,” and “preservation of the role of the jury,” are imprecise and insubstantial. Such reasons for limiting a defendant’s ability to waive a jury are, in the words of the Supreme Court in Patton, “of vague and variable quality.” 281 U.S. at 306, 50 S.Ct. at 261, 74 L.Ed. at 867.
The argument that both the state and the defendant are parties to a trial, so that each should be given an equal voice concerning the method of trial, is sometimes advanced to inhibit a defendant’s ability to waive a jury. E.g., State v. Taylor, 391 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Mo.1965) (in considering whether to waive a *330jury trial the trial court must consider “that the rights of society, as well as the rights and privileges of the accused, are involved”); see 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-1.2 (2d ed. 1980) (3 ABA Standards) (“Both sides are treated equally or nearly equally on related matters in many jurisdictions — for example, challenges for cause and peremptory challenges — and thus it may be contended that the defendant alone should not control the method of trial.”) Of course, in most respects, the prosecution and defense are not treated equally, nor should they be. Trial by jury, unlike challenges for cause and peremptory challenges, is a constitutional right belonging to the accused and not the prosecution. This is evidenced by the amendment of our own jury-waiver rule, Rule 1:8-1, in 1969, which eliminated the requirement that the prosecution consent to defendant’s waiver of a jury trial. See Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment R. 1:8-1. Interestingly, the lesson to be derived from that amendment can be gleaned in part from an Iowa Supreme Court decision, State v. Henderson, 287 N.W.2d 583, 584 (1980). There the court held that its waiver statute for felony cases gives a defendant an absolute right to waive a jury and be tried by the court. The court so held partly on the basis of statutory construction. See id. at 586. The court also noted that the original draft considered in the legislature required the consent of the court and prosecutor, but that that requirement was subsequently struck, so that the statute conformed with Iowa’s rule permitting waiver of jury trial in misdemeanor cases. The court stated:
In eliminating the provision requiring consent of the court and prosecutor and in conforming the rule to the statute permitting a defendant to insist on a nonjury trial of a misdemeanor charge, the legislature manifested an intention to give defendants the unilateral right to waive a jury and be tried by the court. [Ibid.]
It is reasonable to infer that in amending our own rule to eliminate prosecutorial consent to waiver, the dominant intent was to strengthen defendant’s right to waiver and to assure the protections of the defendant in the exercise of that right through court approval.
*331An acceptable basis for refusing to waive a jury may involve situations in which the judge is biased, or, as in State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989), aff'd, 121 N.J. 527, 582 A.2d 1003 (1990), in which the judge may find it “difficult ... to remove inadmissible evidence from his mind, if he were the fact finder.” Id. 235 N.J.Super. at 571, 563 A.2d 856. In Radziwil, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion under Rule 1:8-1. The trial court “felt that if he excluded evidence as a result of the hearings, it would be difficult for him to remove inadmissible evidence from his mind, if he were the fact finder.” 235 N.J.Super. at 571, 563 A.2d 856. In addition, “the judge was concerned that the appearance of [] fairness might be blemished if he made a ruling that certain evidence was inadmissible and then made a finding of fact that seemed contradictory to that ruling.” Ibid.; accord Commonwealth v. Collins, supra, 11 Mass.App.Ct. at 139-41, 414 N.E.2d at 1016; Commonwealth v. Sorrell, 500 Pa. 355, 361-62, 456 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1983). Of course, the solution here may be simply to transfer the case to a judge who feels better able to discharge his or her duties. See 3 ABA Standards 15-1.2.
Many courts that impose restrictive conditions on the defendant’s privilege to waive a jury believe simply that there is a strong preference for a trial by jury. Community or public “expectations” are frequently invoked to deny a defendant the right to proceed to trial without a jury. The Court in this case appears to embrace that philosophy. Ante at 315-316, 319-320, 590 A.2d at 1149-1150, 1151-1152. That viewpoint is illustrated by State v. Thompson, 88 Wash. 2d 13, 558 P.2d 202, appeal dismissed sub nom. Thompson v. Washington, 434 U.S. 898, 98 S.Ct. 290, 54 L.Ed.2d 185 (1977). There, the Supreme Court of Washington, construing a waiver statute that the required the consent of the trial court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in giving the following reasons for denying a defendant’s waiver motion: “[T]he seriousness of the crime charged; a jury would prevent the appear*332anee of impropriety, lack of fairness or injustice; the verdict should represent the thinking of the community as represented by 12 jurors; and a jury would free the court from having to weigh the evidence.” Id. 88 Wash.2d at 15, 558 P.2d at 204.
The Court here expresses the same strong preference for a jury determination, relying heavily on the notion that public acceptability attends only a verdict by a jury in a criminal case. Ante at 315-316, 590 A.2d at 1149-1150. The reason set forth by the trial judge in this case was that a jury verdict was a “community” determination. The reason given by the trial court in State v. Fiorilla for denying the defendants’ motions for jury waiver was that “when you go in to try a case such as this, the public and society expects [sic] there will be a fair and impartial trial by a jury of peers.” 226 N.J.Super. at 85, 543 A.2d 958. See also 3 ABA Standards, 15-1.2 (“if a jury is used, the community will be more likely to accept the result and much less likely to criticize the court”).
In a similar vein, it is often contended that “[t]he jury has been and still is the most trusted method of determining guilt or innocence.” 3 ABA Standards 15-1.2. See Patton v. United States, supra, 281 U.S. at 312, 50 S.Ct. at 263, 74 L.Ed. at 870; Singer v. United States, supra, 380 U.S. at 35, 85 S.Ct. at 790, 13 L.Ed.2d at 638; State v. Davidson, supra, 225 N.J.Super. at 9, 541 A.2d 700; Commonwealth v. Wharton, supra, 495 Pa. at 606-07, 435 A.2d at 171 (opinion of Larsen and Kaufman, JJ.). However, usually no evidence is offered to justify that conclusion or to support such a policy. Justice Otis, dissenting in State v. Linder, supra, complained that in denying waiver “the court assigned as its reason, without further explication, only a ‘preference’ to have a jury decide that issue.” 304 N.W.2d at 908. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Patton noted that the argument that public policy requires a jury trial is fallacious, observing that a defendant may plead guilty and thus dispense with trial altogether. 281 U.S. at 305, 50 S.Ct. at 260, 74 L.Ed. at 866.
*333Public expectations are often at odds with the procedural protections accorded criminal defendants. The community’s criticism or disapproval, like the community’s expectations, should not be used as a gauge for determining the protections available to criminal defendants. The Court, while claiming “never to fear public clamor over any decision,” ante at 316, 590 A.2d at 1150 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1255, 91 L.Ed. 1546, 1552 (1947)), again and again refers to the need for “public confidence.” Ante at 315-316, 319-320, 590 A.2d at 1149-1150, 1151-1152. The Court quotes the following language from In re Edward S., 118 N.J. 118, 148, 570 A.2d 917 (1990): “There is probably no determination that causes more concern and doubt in the minds of the public about the fair and sound operation of our criminal laws than a jury verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in a murder case.” (Emphasis added). Ante at 316, 590 A.2d at 1150. It difficult to fathom the Court’s conclusion with respect to “public confidence” from this ambiguous reference. The implication is that if the public does not like such verdicts from juries, they will react even more negatively when the verdicts come from judges.
Constitutional rights, however, are meant to protect the accused, not to promote relations between the judiciary and the public. “It would be ironic indeed if widespread public clamor for jury trial were routinely to serve as the principal basis for denial of its waiver by defendants who sense the same clamor, and wish to rely on the objectivity of an appointed jurist.” State v. Fiorilla, supra, 226 N.J.Super. at 93-94, 543 A.2d 958. See also Commonwealth v. Wharton, supra, 495 Pa. at 600, 435 A.2d at 167 (Roberts, J., opinion in support of affirmance) (“[T]here may be cases, such as those involving widespread publicity adverse to the accused, in which trial before a judge will be perceived as potentially more fair than a jury trial.”).
The trial court, glossing over the genuine complexity of the issues posed by this case, concluded that a jury would have no special difficulties with respect to assessing defendant’s crimi*334nal culpability in light of his homosexuality and psychotic delusions. It assumed that the matter — a bizarre murder or a murder committed by a bizarre defendant — is somehow intrinsically a preferred case for a jury. That view, endorsed by the Court, is based on the untested assumption that certain kinds of cases are best left to a jury. Cf. 3 ABA Standards 15-1.2 (there may be cases, for example, “where demeanor and veracity of witnesses are involved” that are better decided by “[tjwelve average persons, representing a cross-section of society,” than by a judge alone). The clear implication is that in this kind of case a criminal verdict by a trial judge would not be trustworthy, that a judge’s adjudication of crime would lack the integrity or cogency of a verdict rendered by a jury. I strongly disagree.
This Court itself has recognized the public’s skepticism toward the insanity defense, noting that “it is well established that many laypersons have a great deal of difficulty in understanding the insanity defense, and many people might not be able to consider it as a viable defense.” State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 453-54, 585 A.2d 864 (1991). See Hans, “An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense,” 24 Criminology 393 (1986) (89.2% of those polled believed that the insanity defense allowed guilty persons to go free). Justice Otis, dissenting in State v. Linder, put the matter right: “[T]he fact that mental illness was not only a crucial issue, but for practical purposes the only issue, was a compelling reason why the court should have honored the request to waive a jury.” 304 N.W.2d at 908. “This is precisely the kind of case,” according to Justice Otis, “where judges should do their duty ‘unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticisms’ as the judicial canons require, absent ‘substantial reasons why the defendant should not be allowed to waive a jury trial.’ ” Ibid, (quoting State v. Kilburn, 304 Minn. 217, 227, 231 N.W.2d 61, 66 (1975) (MacLaughlin, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)). Justice Otis further explained:
*335What constitutes “mental illness” as a defense in a criminal case is one of the most complex, difficult, and troublesome questions of law and fact which the legislature and the courts must confront. The bench and bar have for years been struggling with the problem of defining a comprehensible and rational rule for the guidance of factfinders in such cases. Determining the criminal responsibility of psychopathic offenders often draws on the experience and training of the medical profession, the legal profession, sociologists, and theologians. It is an inexact science to say the least. To expect twelve laypersons, without any particular exposure to these disciplines to better understand, weigh, and assess conflicting testimony of so-called experts is to blind ourselves to reality. While members of the judiciary profess no prescience or infallibility in these fields, it is only reasonable to assume that trial judges by education and experience are more likely to have an understanding and grasp of what is relevant than do laypersons. [Ibid.]
To say that only a jury’s verdict in certain kinds of cases will be accepted by the public may express an opinion-polling truism; it does not describe a legal precept that can be reconciled with due process and fundamental fairness. In State v. Kilburn, supra, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a trial court incorrectly denied a defendant’s motion to waive a jury trial. The defendant in Kilburn was a black man accused of killing a fifteen-year-old white girl during a sexual encounter. The defendant, arguing that the circumstances of the crime were incendiary, that there were few blacks in the county, and that there was considerable pretrial publicity, moved for a bench trial and a change of venue. The trial court denied both motions. Id. 304 Minn, at 221-22, 231 N.W.2d at 63-64. The supreme court upheld the trial court, stating that “[tjhere was no showing of pretrial publicity or prejudice____” Id. at 225, 231 N.W.2d at 65.
Justice Otis in dissent noted that “[t]he killing of a 15-year-old white girl by an adult black in the course of a sexual encounter is the most inflammatory and volatile set of circumstances imaginable.” Id. at 232, 231 N. W.2d at 69. He noted further that neither the Minnesota Constitution nor Minnesota’s waiver statute “attaches any conditions to the defendant’s right to waive a jury.” Id. at 234, 231 N.W.2d at 70. Justice Otis reasoned that waiving a jury
*336is a fundamental decision which only the defendant after consulting with counsel should be permitted to make since it bears directly on the right to an impartial hearing. Had the trial court advanced some compelling reason for refusing to try the case without a jury, the questions presented might be more difficult. [Id. at 228, 231 N.W.24 at 67.]
There is no reason why a judge’s determination cannot be rendered in a way that is understandable and acceptable to the public. There are several rules that require judges to set forth their findings in a bench trial. Rule 1:7-4 (Findings by the Court in Non-Jury Trials) provides in part: “In criminal, quasi-criminal and juvenile actions tried without a jury, the court shall make a general finding and shall, in addition, on request find the facts specifically.” The judicial responsibility to explain is readily understood and accepted in a variety of contexts. Eg., State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 366-67, 471 A.2d 370 (1984) (sentencing); State in the Interest of C.A.H., 89 N.J. 326, 446 A.2d 93 (1982) (court can assess psychiatric and psychological evidence in juvenile waiver hearing); see State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 414, 555 A.2d 559 (1989) (sentencing). Rule 3:29 provides: “The court shall place on the record the reasons supporting its decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment, accusation or complaint, or on an application for diversion, change or reduction of sentence, or other disposition of a criminal matter.” The “disposition of a criminal matter” under that rule would seem to require that a court set forth its reasons for an acquittal or judgment of guilt of a lesser-included offense.
II.
While I am reluctant to challenge what the majority believes to be “the wisdom of the ages” and “the experience of thousands of judges over hundreds of years,” ante at 319, 590 A.2d at 1151-1152, I am compelled to state what to me is obvious: there is no overriding public, legislative, or judicial policy that invests a priori greater integrity or intrinsic worth in a jury verdict in criminal prosecutions involving controversial issues and serious charges than can be invested in a verdict reached *337by a judge. Indeed, under our current criminal jurisprudence there is perhaps no more important, delicate, and sensitive decisional responsibility than that invoked in capital-murder prosecutions, that is, whether a guilty defendant deserves to die for the crime. Yet, lest there be any doubt on the part of judges, the Legislature expressly permits a capital defendant to waive sentencing by a jury. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(1). Our Court itself has recognized that a judge is fully competent to exercise that awesome decisional responsibility, and that the ultimate sentence, be it death or life, is one that society can be expected to accept. E.g., State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 571 A.2d 914 (1990).
In rejecting and replacing the third-prong of the Fiorilla test, the Court finds that “neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court tilt in favor of a non-jury triaj”; it contents itself with a new standard that leaves the court’s discretion totally unfettered and unguided. Ante at 314-315, 316-317, 590 A.2d at 1149, 1150-1151 (citing Fiorilla, supra, 226 N.J.Super. at 92, 543 A.2d 958). However, it is also fair to point out that neither the Constitution nor the Rules “tilts” toward forcing defendants to undergo a jury trial against their will. Given that trial by jury is a right “primarily for the protection of the accused,” Patton, supra, 281 U.S. at 297, 50 S.Ct. at 257, 74 L.Ed. at 862, and absent a legislative choice to the contrary, the burden should be on the court to articulate reasons why a defendant should be denied waiver of a jury trial. Under both the United States and the New Jersey Constitutions, trial by jury is a right belonging specifically to the defendant in a criminal trial. Thus, the defendant should, in most circumstances, be permitted to waive a jury trial.
In my opinion, this Court should adopt a modified version of the Fiorilla test. The first two factors should remain the same. A defendant’s request to waive a jury trial should not be denied unless the trial judge has determined that (1) a defendant had not voluntarily, knowingly and competently waived his constitutional right to jury trial with advice of counsel; or that, *338(2) the waiver is not tendered in good faith, but as a strategem to procure an otherwise impermissible procedural advantage. Fiorilla, supra, 226 N.J.Super. at 92, 543 A.2d 958. The third factor should be narrowed so that the trial judge can deny the defendant’s waiver motion only, in addition to the other two factors, if there are articulable reasons why, in the context of the case and the surrounding circumstances, a jury is inherently better able to hear the case than a judge, and those reasons outweigh the defendant’s reasons for waiving a jury trial. To make it more difficult for a defendant to waive the right to a jury would be, in the words of the Supreme Court, to turn “protections for the accused ... into fetters,” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, supra, 317 U.S. at 279, 63 S.Ct. at 242, 87 L.Ed. at 275 — precisely what the majority does today.
I dissent.
GARIBALDI, J., joins in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN and STEIN — 5.
Dissenting — Justices HANDLER and GARIBALDI — 2.

 During the earlier part of the century, most American jurisdictions were reluctant to allow a defendant in a criminal proceeding to waive his right to trial by jury. 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 21.2(h), at 702-3 (1984). However, following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Patton v. United States, supra, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854, holding that waiver of one’s right to a jury was permissible in a federal criminal trial, states *324generally liberalized their rules to permit criminal defendants to waive trial by jury.