Court Opinion

ID: 9454119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:36:57.000948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:58.776421
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
Petitioner, a Nevada resident, gave testimony before a Grand Jury in the District of Columbia. He was subsequently indicted for perjury. Relying on Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, petitioner sought a transfer of his trial to the District Court in Nevada or some other nearby district.1 *1244The District Judge declined to transfer the case. United States v. Jones, 43 F.R.D. 511 (D.D.C.1967).
Petitioner’s transfer motion was supported by an affidavit giving the names and addresses of twenty-nine persons all of whom are residents of Nevada or California and each of whom was alleged to be “absolutely essential * * * for the development of my defense upon the merits.” Additionally, the affidavit set forth the names and addresses of forty potential character witnesses, including the Governor of Nevada, the Mayor and Chief of Police of Las Vegas, Nevada, and a Justice of Nevada’s Supreme Court. Several of these character witnesses, including Nevada’s Governor, submitted letters stating that a trial in Washington would be a severe inconvenience and might preclude their appearance. At oral argument before the District Judge, petitioner’s counsel estimated that the cost of transporting these witnesses to Washington would be fifteen thousand dollars.
The Government opposed a transfer asserting, inter alia, that it would call twenty unidentified witnesses, thirteen of whom were District of Columbia residents.
The District Judge dismissed petitioner’s claim that “the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and * * * the interest of justice” required a transfer because petitioner had not “disclose[d] the nature of [the] expected testimony nor does he provide an adequate basis to enable the court to determine whether these individuals may even be properly classified as ‘witnesses.’ ” 43 F.Supp. at-513. Both in the District Court and here, petitioner has maintained that a criminal defendant is not required to disclose his defense in order to secure a transfer. Alternatively, however, his counsel represented:
as an officer of this Court, in my honest judgment, [that] we will need the witnesses that we have represented we will need. Now, if that is not enough, and the Court feels that I should go on and delineate at great length what our defense is going to be, I shall be pleased to do it. (Emphasis added.)
With all respect, I am uncertain whether this court rules that (a) although petitioner’s showing of the relevance and materiality of his witnesses may have been sufficient disclosure, denial of transfer was not an abuse of discretion (see Part III); or, (b) that petitioner’s disclosure was insufficient in respects which are not specified. Since I dissent from either view, it is unnecessary for me to consider other issues reached by this court.
I
It seems clear from the District Court’s opinion that it struck all of petitioner’s 29 non-character witnesses from consideration because he had not overcome the court’s “doubt whether these 29 individuals will all be necessary witnesses to matters of relevance for the defense.” If furnishing the names, addresses and occupations of the witnesses together with “a general showing on the materiality of the testimony of most of the witnesses named” is sufficient, and I am inclined to think that it is, I suggest we are bound to remand with directions to apply this view. Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 84 S.Ct. 769 (1964).
Moreover, I think the role of character witnesses is entitled to specific consideration in the balancing process. Of course, a trial court has broad discretion to limit the number of character witnesses that may be called. But I take it as settled that the court cannot prevent the defense from presenting a reasonable number of these witnesses, particularly in a perjury case where this testimony is of unusual importance. In this connection, it is reasonable to consider not only the expense and inconvenience of *1245transporting character witnesses across the country, but the unavoidable dilution of their testimony which naturally attends trial in a distant location. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 279, 65 S.Ct. 249, 89 L.Ed. 236 (1944) (concurring opinion).
Finally, I question whether the Government’s claim of countervailing inconvenience is supported by the record. The District Court relied on the Government’s statement that it will call 20 witnesses to prove its case, 13 of whom are District of Columbia residents. But it appears that the presence of all may not be required:
THE COURT: How many witnesses would the Government have?
MR. BITTMAN: Approximately 20, and several of these relate only to documents. Some of the Las Vegas people will have to be called only to put in the vouchers and the checks relating to the First Western transaction.
This probably could be disposed of by stipulation. The witnesses have already testified in the Baker case and the exhibits already entered in the Baker case.
Another witness would be the Court reporter that transcribed Clifford Jones’ grand jury testimony. The only witness of any length that I believe would testify would be Wayne Brom-ley.
On rebuttal, however, petitioner’s counsel stated:
Now, Mr. Bittman made a reference here to the fact that he had a great many witnesses that he could get through with in a great hurry, those who had formal matters to care for, like the reporter at the Grand Jury.
That is no problem. I will stipulate with you on that.
The records you talk about, the checks, I will stipulate with you on that. Sure the checks were issued, no question about it. If that will eliminate the great bulk of your witnesses, fine.
About the only witness I heard him mention — and this comes as no surprise of course — was Mr. Wayne Brom-ley. I would concede the Government is going to have Mr. Wayne Bromley in connection with this case. If it is transferred, they might have to transport one witness out of the District of Columbia.
In sum, petitioner says he has a large number of California and Nevada residents who will testify; the Government says it has some “Las Vegas people” who will testify together with a number of District of Columbia residents; and the petitioner has offered to stipulate as to formal matters which may eliminate the bulk of the "Government’s District of Columbia witnesses. Since the District Court did not even mention this proffer in its carefully written effort to strike the “balance sheet of convenience,” it is conceivable that the court inadvertently overlooked the proffer.2 I would, therefore, remand for reconsideration.
II
On the other hand, if the court believes the disclosure of name, address, occupation and a general showing of materiality is insufficient, I respectfully suggest that there is need to lay down the principles which require more.
Whatever may be the merit of incorporating the open disclosure contemplated by the civij rules, such a policy has not yet found its way into the criminal process 3 and, generally speaking, nei*1246ther the prosecutor nor the defendant is required to disclose his case in advance of trial.4 Whether, in order to prevail on a Rule 21 transfer motion, a defendant must disclose the nature of his defense is a question I find exceedingly difficult. On the one hand, it may fairly be argued that frivolous and dilatory transfer requests are deterred by a disclosure requirement.5 On the other hand, a disclosure requirement, with its constitutional ramifications,6 raises troublesome problems. A not dissimilar dilemma arose under Rule 17’s requirement of “a satisfactory showing * * * that the presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate defense” before an indigent could obtain a subpoena. See Greenwell v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 317 F.2d 108 (1963). That rule was amended for the express purpose of obviating these difficulties7 to permit the defendant to make the necessary showing ex parte.
In any event, I do not think the District Court may remain. silent during petitioner’s explicit offers to disclose the nature of his defense,8 and then deny the motion because disclosure had not been made. As I have said, the court’s failure to even refer to these proffers in its written opinion allows speculation that they were inadvertently overlooked.9
Petitioner is free to subpoena these witnesses to a Washington trial. But exercise of his right to compulsory process carries a price tag estimated at fifteen thousand dollars. Rule 21 seems to me designed to eliminate that type of expense and the resulting inconvenience to the witnesses. I fully agree that we are not at liberty to disturb the District Court’s ruling simply because, had the discretion been ours, we might have exercised it differently. But we have a duty to ensure that the court applied “appropriate criteria” in exercising this discretion. Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra. On the record before us I think that duty requires a remand for further proceedings.

. In response to the Government’s suggestion that it would not get a fair trial in Nevada — an argument which Mr. Justice Harlan has ruled “wholly out of bounds,” Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 246, 84 S.Ct. 769 (1964) (concurring opinion) — petitioner’s *1244counsel made it clear that lie was not insisting on Nevada and that another nearby district, such as Arizona, California or Utah, would substantially ameliorate the inconvenience and expense of a Washington trial.

. The Government’s opposition in this court, filed on behalf of the District Judge, stated: “As to the so-called offer to disclose testimony, government counsel does not recall such an offer nor does the opinion of the [district] court mention one.” We are advised that the court reporter who transcribed the argument in the District Court was ill, and the transcript of that argument was not filed until the District Judge had prepared and filed his memorandum opinion.

. See generally, Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest *1246for Truth?, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 279; Langrock, Vermont and Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732 (1967); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent? 49 Calif.L.Rev. 56 (1961); Traynor, Ground Lost and Pound in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 228 (1964).

. See United States v. Garsson, 291 P. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.1923) (L. Hand, Jr.). In this case, for example, the Government did not set forth the names or addresses of its witnesses in its opposition to petitioner’s transfer motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3432; Dean v. United States, 265 P.2d 544, 547 (8th Cir. 1959).

. Lindberg v. United States, 363 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1966), cited by the court, strikes me as such a case. There, the defendant “asserted 'tlját defense witnesses were located in the district to which transfer was sought, [but] the witnesses were not named or otherwise described and the nature of their expected testimony was not disclosed.” Id. at 438-439.

. See Mr. Justice Douglas' Statement on the Amendment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 86 S.Ct. 236 (1966).

. Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 17, P.R.Crim.P.

. After several offers to disclose the nature of the defense had been made, counsel stated, “As I say, I hope I am not going to be required to go into the defense here,” to which the judge replied, “Oh, no.” While a trial judge need not make “periodic announcements as to how well [counsel’s] points have been scored,” this does not meet the need for clarifying the apparent conflict between the court’s oral statement at trial that disclosure was not required and the court’s subsequent written opinion that it was required.

. The record shows that, in addition to trial witnesses, petitioner’s counsel candidly told the District Judge that a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds of wiretapping would be filed by his client and that the testimony of certain P.B.I. agents would be required on the hearing of that motion. This, of course, explains the presence of P.B.I. agents on petitioner’s witness list and I assume that the expense and necessity of summoning witnesses for a suppression hearing, no less than for a trial, is a factor properly to be considered in a transfer motion.