Court Opinion

ID: 9543109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:42:15.617977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:39.955151
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I find that once again, I must in part concur with and in part dissent from the majority in its decision concerning the proper disposition of a case involving the commission of a first degree murder. See, State v. Holtan, 205 Neb. 314, 287 N.W.2d 671 (1980); State v. Williams, 205 Neb. 56, 287 N.W.2d 18 (1979); State v. Otey, 205 Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d 36 (1979); State v. Peery, 205 Neb. 271, 287 N.W.2d 71 (1980); State v. Rust, ante p. 320, 303 N.W.2d 490 (1981).
I concur with the majority’s finding that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, and likewise concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err regarding the admitting into evidence of certain statements made by the appellant. I likewise concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing to declare a mistrial because of allegedly improper comments by the prosecutor in closing argument.
With regard to the matter of the admissibility of the evidence of the 1975 gunshot assault, I likewise concur with the majority that in the instant case the evidence of the 1975 gunshot assault was relevant to prove motive and, therefore, admissible under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404 (Reissue 1979). I do not, however, believe that we should leave the impression that merely because evidence may in some manner be relevant to any one of the various noted exceptions, though the prosecution does not know which one, such evidence of prior or subsequent crimes is always admissible. See dissent of Krivosha, C.J., in State v. Ellis, ante p. 379, 399, 303 N.W.2d 741, 753 (1981).
*581It is with regard to the imposition of the death penalty in this case that I must dissent. My disagreement with the majority is not because I do not believe the crime committed to be atrocious and deplorable. Quite to the contrary, I believe the crime to be flagrant and shocking. But emotions may never cancel the Constitution.
I remain firm in my view that the imposition of the death penalty is not, per se, cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1976). I likewise remain firm in my belief that the imposition of the death penalty is not immoral or unethical. See dissent in State v. Williams, supra.
Moreover, I am now convinced that there are indeed some instances, though extremely limited, when the imposition of the death penalty is constitutionally permissible. I believe that “killers for hire” may be executed as a consequence of their conviction. See State v. Anderson and Hochstein, 207 Neb. 51, 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980). There may be other limited categories which have not as yet been presented to the court for consideration. As to those, I shall reserve comment at this time.
However, I have now concluded that under the limitations imposed upon courts by both the federal and state Constitutions, the imposition of the death penalty as now applied in most other instances is arbitrary and capricious and not permitted.
As I noted in my dissent in State v. Rust, supra, even disregarding the provisions of 1978 Neb. Laws, L.B. 711, now Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2521.01 et se_q. (Reissue 1979), the death penalty is generally in violation of one’s constitutional rights prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious fhanner. '
In State v. Rust, supra at 327, 303 N.W.2d at 495, I observed: “A reading of the various opinions rendered in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 *582S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), makes it manifestly clear that the adoption of statutes such as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2522 (Reissue 1979), and the provisions of L.B. 711, are simply a response to the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that it is a violation of an individual’s constitutional rights when the decision to execute is arrived at in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. The fact that we may create criteria to aid us in imposing the death penalty- does not overcome the constitutional prohibition if, after applying the formula, we nevertheless continue to impose the penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I believe that the language of the majority opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976), though not reaching my present conclusion, does in fact support that conclusion. It reads in part as follows: “While Furman did not hold that the infliction of the death penalty per se violates the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, it did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice. Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. . . . ‘[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.’ [Citation omitted.]
“Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Id. at 188-89.
As I have noted, examining a host of cases decided *583within this jurisdiction makes it clear to me that the imposition of the death penalty in most cases in this state is indeed arbitrary and capricious. See analysis of cases in dissent, State v. Williams, supra, and State v. Rust, supra.
Not only does an analysis of those cases referred' to in Williams and Rust lead one to the inescapable conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty is arbitrary and capricious, but a further examination of those cases in which a charge of second degree murder is filed, rather than first degree murder, likewise makes it clear that by the time a case comes to this court for examination there have been a sufficient number of arbitrary decisions made so as to make impossible the imposition of the death penalty in anything other than an arbitrary and capricious manner. While I do not for a moment question the right of the prosecutor to elect the charge to be filed, nor do I for a moment urge any change in that process, I likewise cannot ignore its existence in attempting to rationally analyze whether the death penalty can be imposed in anything other than an arbitrary manner except in very rare instances. I am not unmindful of the fact that this argument has already been rejected by the majority in the Gregg case. Nevertheless, I believe that in this respect the majority in Gregg is totally in error.
One need only examine two of the cases released by this court this day to note how the matter of prosecutorial discretion of necessity results in the death penalty being arbitrarily imposed. In addition to this case where the penalty of death was imposed, we have this day also announced our decision in the case of State v. Stranghoener, post p. 598, 304 N.W.2d 679 (1981). In that case we have affirmed a sentence of 20 years given to Stranghoener for second degree murder. The facts of the case, however, indicate to me that the appellant was, indeed, guilty of first degree murder. The facts in the Stranghoener case *584disclose that Stranghoener, together with several other individuals, carefully, cruelly, and viciously planned the execution of one Jim Goslee, a member of their “family,” for no other reason except to test the loyalty of another member of the “family.” Stranghoener, though originally charged with first degree murder, was permitted as a part of a plea bargain to plead to the lesser charge of second degree murder and was sentenced to prison for 20 years. While one does not question or quarrel with the right of either the prosecution or the trial court in Stranghoener, it is impossible to set this case alongside those cases in which the death penalty has been imposed and discern a rational distinction.
Moreover, the Stranghoener case is not an isolated instance. An examination of only a few cases decided since 1973 establishes clear examples of how the imposition of the death penalty in a particular case is mere happenstance. In the case of State v. Wredt, ante p. 184, 302 N.W.2d 701 (1981), the defendant was permitted to plead guilty to second degree murder of his father. The evidence discloses that the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. On the evening of the murder the defendant took a .45-caliber revolver outside and waited for his father to come home, which he did shortly after 6 p.m. After the father got out of his truck and started walking toward the house, the defendant stepped out from the corner of the house, aimed and cocked the revolver, and fired one shot into his father’s chest which killed him instantly.
In State v. Rouse, 206 Neb. 371, 293 N.W.2d 83 (1980), the defendant was permitted- .to plead guilty to second degree murder as a result bf a plea bargain arrangement and was sentenced to* a term of 16 to 20 years in the penal complex. Defendant had originally been charged with six felony counts, including one count of first degree muhder, one count of felony murder, three counts of burglary, and one count of *585escape. The killing was of a police officer apparently seeking to apprehend defendant in connection with the burglary.
In State v. Thompson, 199 Neb. 67, 255 N.W.2d 880 (1977), the defendant was permitted to plead guilty to a charge of second degree murder after the State amended the complaint originally charging the defendant with first degree murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant had attended a party at the home of his sister. During the evening an argument developed, a fight broke out, and several guests subdued the defendant by getting him down on the floor. The defendant worked until noon the following day, purchased a .22-caliber semiautomatic rifle and some ammunition, and then returned to his apartment. At about 8 p.m. his niece and sister came to see him. The defendant told them he was going to kill someone, whom he described. Later that evening the defendant walked into his sister’s house, carrying the loaded rifle. There were a number of people in the house, including the victim. The defendant pointed the gun at a Mrs. Hicks and said he wanted to talk to her about what had happened the night before. He also pointed the rifle at several other persons in the room. A brief fight ensued, and after it was broken up the victim started to leave the room when the defendant shot him, striking him in the chest near his right shoulder, severing his trachea and several arteries. The victim died almost instantaneously.
In State v. Laravie, 192 Neb. 625, 223 N.W.2d 435 (1974), the defendant was charged with first degree murder and pled guilty to a reduced charge of second degree murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The evidence discloses that the defendant broke into a residence in the early morning, picked up a knife from the kitchen table, then entered the bedroom of a 2-year-old child. When the 2-year-old cried out, the defendant stabbed him twice in the chest, causing his death.
*586In the case of State v. Reyes, 192 Neb. 153, 219 N.W.2d 238 (1974), the defendant was permitted to plead guilty to second degree murder pursuant to a plea bargain. He was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for the killing. The evidence discloses that the defendant approached the victim on a street corner where he had been standing with a 6-pack in each hand. The defendant shot the victim five times, killing him instantly.
The cases cited above are simply those which were appealed to this court and therefore found in the Nebraska Reports. We have no quick way of determining how many more cases of this nature can be found by examining the various District Court records. To be sure, the appealed and reported cases are not the only instances where this disparity occurs.
While I have already acknowledged that such variances and discretion are not within the control of the courts, and should not be within the control of the courts, I, nevertheless, cannot ignore the reality of those matters in attempting to determine whether the death penalty is imposed in a nonarbitrary and noncapricious manner in this state.
The words of Mr. Justice Stewart in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), seem most applicable to this analysis. At 309-10, he said: “These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.... I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed.” I likewise must conclude that the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of *587Nebraska cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed. Recognizing the system to be what it is, and further recognizing that the system must at least for the present remain as it is, I find no other alternative but to conclude that the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Nebraska preclude the imposition of the death penalty except in but a few extremely isolated cases.
However, I wish not to be misunderstood by what I have said here. I do not believe that persons convicted of murder should be quickly forgiven and returned to society. Quite to the contrary, I believe that having acted like an animal in the commission of the crime, they should now be restrained as an animal during the balance of their lives. If it is indeed punishment we seek to impose, and I find no fault with that, then requiring them to live out the balance of their lives in a 9- x 6-foot cell, isolated from civilization and any of the benefits of freedom, would indeed be an appropriate punishment.
For me, the question is not whether the convicted should be punished but, rather, whether the form of punishment is permitted under the Constitution. Having now attempted for more than 2 years to glean any reasonable pattern in which one is either selected to be charged with first degree murder or selected to be executed, and being unable to do so, I must conclude our selection process is arbitrary and capricious and therefore invalid. The fact that we act arbitrarily in accordance with standards which we have established to aid us in making our decision, but which in fact repeatedly fail, does not cure the constitutional defects in the scheme.
Concluding, as we have, that all persons who have been ordered executed are treated alike does not address the issue. Discrimination is determined by examining the entire class and not just those who are discriminated against. The class is persons who *588have unlawfully killed and not persons sentenced to death. That is what §§ 29-2521.01 et seq. seek to address.
I would sentence the appellant herein to be incarcerated in the penal complex for the balance of his natural life, and- I would hope that the Board of Pardons would not commute the sentence so as to make him eligible to be released.