Court Opinion

ID: 9965033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 15:12:52.019839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:55.375862
License: Public Domain

No. 281              May 1, 2024                   361

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

       THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE
    WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION OF OREGON,
              Central Oregon Landwatch,
         Annunziata Gould, and Thomas Bishop,
                        Petitioners
                    Cross-Respondents,
                             v.
               DESCHUTES COUNTY,
                        Respondent,
                           and
   CENTRAL LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC;
   Pinnacle Utilities, LLC; and Kameron Delashmutt,
                       Respondents
                     Cross-Petitioners.
         Land Use Board of Appeals No. 2023038
                  Annunziata GOULD,
The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation
      of Oregon, Paul J. Lipscomb, Thomas Bishop,
            and Central Oregon Landwatch,
                        Petitioners
                    Cross-Respondents,
                             v.
               DESCHUTES COUNTY,
                        Respondent,
                           and
   CENTRAL LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC;
   Pinnacle Utilities, LLC; and Kameron Delashmutt,
                       Respondents
                     Cross-Petitioners.
         Land Use Board of Appeals No. 2023039
          CENTRAL OREGON LAND WATCH,
The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation
   of Oregon, Annunziata Gould, and Thomas Bishop,
                        Petitioners
                    Cross-Respondents,
362 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

                           v.
              DESCHUTES COUNTY,
                       Respondent,
                          and
  CENTRAL LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC;
  Pinnacle Utilities, LLC; and Kameron Delashmutt,
                      Respondents
                   Cross-Petitioners.
       Land Use Board of Appeals No. 2023041;
A183421(Control), A183430, A183431, A183432, A183436,
                   A183461, A183462

  Argued and submitted March 28, 2024.
   Josh Newton argued the cause for petitioner-cross-
respondent The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Reservation of Oregon. Also on the briefs were Ellen Grover
and Best Best & Krieger LLP.
   Carol Macbeth argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioner-cross-respondent Central Oregon Landwatch.
   Jennifer M. Bragar argued the cause for petition-
er-cross-respondents Annunziata Gould, Thomas Bishop,
and Paul J. Lipscomb. Also on the opening briefs were Jay
M. Harris and Tomasi Bragar Dubay. Also on the joint
cross-answering brief were Jay M. Harris, Tomasi Bragar
Dubay, and Carol Macbeth.
    Ken Katzaroff argued the cause for respondent-cross-pe-
titioners Central Land and Cattle Company, LLC, Pinnacle
Utilities, LLC, and Kameron DeLashmutt. Also on the brief
were Keenan Ordon-Bakalian, Megan Breen, and Schwabe,
Williamson & Wyatt, P.C.
  No appearance for respondent Deschutes County.
   Jeffrey B. Litwak filed the brief amicus curiae for
Columbia River Gorge Commission.
   Marcus M. Shirzad, Garrett Brown, and David J.
Cummings filed the brief amicus curiae for The Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, The Confederated
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                            363

Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and the Nez
Perce Tribe.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and
DeVore, Senior Judge.
   TOOKEY, P. J.
   Reversed and remanded to LUBA on petition of The
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of
Oregon, for consideration of Tribe’s first assignment of error
to LUBA; affirmed on cross-petition; otherwise affirmed.
364 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

          TOOKEY, P. J.
         This is a judicial review of an order of the Land Use
Board of Appeals, dated January 12, 2024, upholding in part
and remanding in part an order of the Deschutes County
Board of Commissioners (the board) approving an application
by Central Land and Cattle Company, LLC, Pinnacle Utilities,
LLC, and Kameron DeLashmutt (collectively, Thornburgh)
for an amendment to the Final Master Plan (FMP) for the
Thornburgh Destination Resort relating to mitigation mea-
sures for the development’s impacts on fish, which Thornburgh
submitted to meet Deschutes County’s “no net loss” standard
set forth in Deschutes County Code (DCC) 18.113.070(D).
Thornburgh seeks to change the FMP by replacing the Fish
and Wildlife Management Plan (FWMP) approved in 2008
(the 2008 FWMP) with a new plan (the 2022 FWMP), so as
to reduce the resort’s proposed annual water consumption by
eliminating one of the resort’s proposed golf courses.
         The five petitioners, The Confederated Tribes of the
Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon (the Tribe), Central
Oregon LandWatch (LandWatch), Annunziata Gould,
Thomas Bishop, and Paul J. Lipscomb (collectively, petition-
ers) contend that LUBA erred in rejecting their challenges
to the approval and raise different and sometimes overlap-
ping assignments of error. The Tribe also contends, among
other arguments, that LUBA erred in concluding that its
challenges to the BOCC’s failure to give sufficient weight to
the Treaty of 1855 were unpreserved.1
        Thornburgh has filed a cross-petition, challeng-
ing LUBA’s remand, contending that LUBA substituted its
judgment for that of the BOCC and weighed the evidence in
the record as the factfinder in the first instance, rather than
reviewing for substantial evidence, to find that the 2022
FWMP’s compliance provisions fail to meet the “no net loss”
standard.
       We review LUBA’s order to determine whether it is
“unlawful in substance or procedure.” ORS 197.850(9)(a). “A
    1
      Amici curiae—the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation,
the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and the Nez Perce
Tribe, and, separately, the Columbia River Gorge Commission—filed briefs in
support of the Tribe’s petition.
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                                365

LUBA order is unlawful in substance if it represents a mis-
taken interpretation of the applicable law.” Kine v. Deschutes
County, 313 Or App 370, 372, 496 P3d 1136, rev den, 369 Or
69, 499 P3d 1279 (2021).
On the Tribe’s petition, we conclude that LUBA erred in
determining that the Tribe did not preserve its arguments
relating to the applicability of the Treaty of 1855 in deter-
mining whether the “no net loss” standard has been met,
and we therefore remand the order to LUBA for consider-
ation of that argument. We affirm LUBA’s order in all other
respects on the petitions and cross-petition.
                           I. BACKGROUND
         This case is the latest in a long string of challenges
to the development of the resort. We described the back-
ground facts of the resort in our recent opinion in Gould v.
Deschutes County, 322 Or App 11, 518 P3d 978 (2022), and
we set them out here again only as necessary to resolve the
issues raised on judicial review.
        Deschutes County provides for the development
of destination resorts by a three-step approval process
described in Deschutes County Code (DCC) 18.113.040. At
step one, a Conceptual Master Plan (CMP) for the resort is
processed for approval as though it were a conditional use
permit. DCC 18.113.040(A). At the second step, application
is made for a Final Master Plan (FMP). DCC 18.113.040(B).
The final step is a land division or site-plan review. DCC
18.113.040(C).2
       In 2008, the county approved an FMP for the resort,
and we upheld that approval on judicial review. Gould v.
Deschutes County, 59 Or LUBA 435 (2009), aff’d, 233 Or App
623, 227 P3d 758 (2010) (affirming the FMP). The FMP

    2
      Thornburgh has completed the three-step approval process for: (1) a golf
course site plan; (2) a tentative plan for Phase A-l of development; and (3) a site
plan for 80 overnight lodging units (OLUs). Those approvals were challenged and
ultimately affirmed on judicial review. See Gould v. Deschutes County, 314 Or App
636, 314 P3d 357 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 211 (2022) (affirming the approval of a
golf course site plan); Gould v. Deschutes County, 322 Or App 11, 518 P3d 978,
rev den, 370 Or 694 (2022) (affirming the approval of the site-plan review for 80
OLUs); Gould v. Deschutes County, 322 Or App 571 (2022) (nonprecedential mem-
orandum opinion affirming the approval of the tentative plan for Phase A-l).
366 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

provides for phased development. Both the CMP and the
FMP included Condition 1, which provides:
   “Approval is based upon the plan as submitted. Any sub-
   stantial change to the approved plan will require a new
   application.”
The board has determined that “substantial changes” has
the meaning as the term is defined in DCC 18.113.080, “an
alteration in the type, scale, location, phasing or other char-
acteristic of the proposed development such that findings
of fact on which the original approval was based would be
materially affected.” 3
          The CMP for the resort approved three golf courses
and required at least one golf course to be constructed in
the first phase. The approval was supported by an economic
benefits analysis (Benefit Study) explaining that golf course
facilities would be an important source of new jobs with a
total of 125 newly created jobs and 3.9 million dollars in
employee compensation. Based on the Benefit Study, the
county found that the resort “will generate a large number
of full-time positions that will have a positive effect on the
Deschutes County economy.”
         The sole source of water for the resort is groundwa-
ter to be pumped from the Deschutes River Basin aquifer.4
There has been significant litigation around the adequacy
of the resort’s ability to provide the necessary groundwa-
ter as well as to satisfy the “no net loss” standard of DCC
18.113.070(D), which is a county criterion for destination
resort development that requires that “[a]ny negative impact
on fish and wildlife resources will be completely mitigated so
that there is no net loss or net degradation of the resource,”
but those disputes have thus far been resolved favorably to
Thornburgh.
   3
     DCC 18.113.080 relates to modifications of a CMP and provides:
        “Procedure for Modification of a Conceptual Master Plan. Any substan-
   tial change, as determined by the Planning Director, proposed to an 322An
   insubstantial change may be approved by the Planning Director. Substantial
   change to an approved CMP, as used in DCC 18.113.080, means an alteration
   in the type, scale, location, phasing or other characteristic of the proposed
   development such that findings of fact on which the original approval was
   based would be materially affected.”
   4
     No surface water runs through the resort property.
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                          367

         The FMP for the resort includes a fish and wildlife
habitat mitigation plan (FWMP) to satisfy the “no net loss”
standard. In 2008, Deschutes County approved the 2008
FWMP for the resort, and we ultimately upheld that determi-
nation. See Gould v. Deschutes County, 233 Or App 623, 636-
43, 227 P3d 758 (2010) (describing 2008 FWMP litigation).
         The litigation involved in these petitions and the
cross-petition concerns Thornburgh’s request to modify the
originally approved FMP and 2008 FWMP so as to reduce
its groundwater consumption through reduced pumping of
groundwater from the aquifer, for the stated purpose of com-
plying with the “no net loss” standard. Thornburgh proposed
to reduce the resort’s annual groundwater pumping from
2,129 to 1,460 acre feet, an approximate 30 percent reduc-
tion, and an approximately 35 percent reduction in water
consumption, from 1,356 to 882 acre feet, in part, by not
developing one of the approved golf courses.5 The applica-
tion proposed that, as a modification of the 2008 FWMP and
in order to satisfy the “no net loss” standard, Thornburgh
would acquire water rights to provide fish habitat benefits
or would cancel other water rights.
         After a public hearing, a Deschutes County hear-
ings officer rejected the application, based primarily on
Thornburgh’s failure to provide a sufficient plan for com-
pliance with the “no net loss” standard. On Thornburgh’s
and Gould’s appeal, the board held a de novo public hearing.
The Tribe, which had not previously been given notice of or
participated in the proceedings, requested to be added as a
party and participated. The board’s order summarized the
evidence that had been submitted and found:
   “According to the science and technical reports, there is gen-
   erally no scientific or biological significance in the impacts
   under the 2022 FWMP and, as a whole, the plan provides
   benefits to habitat for fish and aquatic species. Given this
   context, we find that the 2022 FWMP plan meets the No
   Net Loss Standard.”
Over objections by petitioners and the Oregon Department of
Fish and Wildlife (ODFW), the board approved Thornburgh’s
   5
     LUBA’s order explains that “consumptive use” means the amount of ground
water appropriation that will not return to surface water flows.
368 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

request for modification, rejecting contentions that the “no
net loss” standard required ODFW and the Tribe’s concur-
rence and concluding that Thornburgh’s experts had pro-
vided credible, substantial evidence that the 2022 FWMP
satisfies the “no net loss” standard:
   “The 2022 FWMP and its extensive technical evidence
   shows that stream flows will increase and temperatures
   decrease as a result of implementation of the 2022 FWMP.
   As such, we find that methods provided by the groundwa-
   ter mitigation program, including the methods relied upon
   by the 2022 FWMP, are sufficient to meet the no net loss
   standard.”
The board approved the 2022 FWMP as a modification of
the 2008 FMP.
         LUBA upheld the board’s approval as against all of
the petitioners’ challenges in most respects but remanded
the board’s order for reconsideration of those issues that
LUBA concluded required further analysis, one of which we
address on the cross-petition. We consider the various peti-
tions in the order that we conclude makes logical sense.
 II. LIPSCOMB’S PETITION, CHALLENGING LUBA’S
 DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD’S CONSTRUCTION OF
“SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE” AS USED IN CONDITION 1
         Lipscomb raises two assignments of error on judi-
cial review relating to the BOCC’s construction of the text of
Condition 1 of the CMP and FMP, which provides that “[a]ny
substantial change to the approved plan will require a new
application.” Lipscomb asserts in his first assignment that
the board’s construction of “substantial change,” as used in
Condition 1 is not entitled to deference, because Condition
1 is not an ordinance for which the board’s construction is
entitled to deference. Siporen v. City of Medford, 349 Or 247,
259, 243 P3d 776 (2010) (setting forth standard of deference
to local government’s plausible construction of its own zon-
ing ordinances). However, as we understand LUBA’s order,
LUBA concluded that the board’s construction was of the
ordinance itself and not Condition 1. As LUBA concluded,
the board’s conclusion that the definition of “substantial
change” in DCC 18.113.080 applies to Condition 1 is a
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                             369

plausible construction to which deference is owed. LUBA did
not err.
         Lipscomb’s second assignment focuses on Condition
1’s requirement that “[a]ny substantial change to the
approved plan will require a new application.” (Emphasis
added.) Lipscomb argues in his second assignment that the
requirement for a “new application” means that, upon a sub-
stantial change, the application process must begin anew,
with a new CMP. Thus, Lipscomb contends that LUBA erred
in affirming the board’s determination that it was sufficient
for Thornburgh to file an application to modify only the
aspect of the approval that is proposed to be changed. LUBA
concluded that that construction of the DCC was a plausi-
ble one entitled to deference. We have reviewed the rele-
vant provision of the DCC and agree with LUBA that the
board’s construction of the DCC is a plausible one to which
deference is owed. And assuming that the proposed changes
are “substantial,” within the meaning of DCC 18.113.080,6
LUBA correctly held that the board could plausibly construe
the DCC to not require that the proposed changes start the
application process from scratch but, rather, be addressed
through an application for modification of the FMP. That
concludes our discussion of Lipscomb’s petition, with the
exception of Lipscomb’s concurrence with an argument
made by Gould, which we discuss later.
   III. LANDWATCH’S PETITION, CHALLENGING
 LUBA’S DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD’S CONSTRUC-
 TION OF “SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE” AS LIMITED TO
  CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED MODIFICATION
        In approving the 2022 FWMP, the board found that
the CMP and FMP approvals did not depend on or require
the planned resort to use all of the water predicted as

   6
     DCC 18.113.080 provides:
        “Procedure for Modification of a Conceptual Master Plan. Any substan-
   tial change, as determined by the Planning Director, proposed to an approved
   CMP shall be reviewed in the same manner as the original CMP. An insub-
   stantial change may be approved by the Planning Director. Substantial
   change to an approved CMP, as used in DCC 18.113.080, means an alteration
   in the type, scale, location, phasing or other characteristic of the proposed
   development such that findings of fact on which the original approval was
   based would be materially affected.”
370 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

consumptive use in the FMP. Thus, the board found that
Thornburgh’s commitment in the 2022 FWMP to use less
water than contemplated in the FMP and to forego develop-
ing a golf course that had been approved in the FMP did not
change the approved resort in a manner that would materi-
ally affect the CMP/FMP findings as to the satisfaction of a
county code requirement that adequate water be available
for all proposed uses.7 LUBA agreed.
         LandWatch raises three assignments of error.
LandWatch’s first assignment, like Lipscomb’s, relates to
“substantial change.” LandWatch asserts that LUBA erred
in deferring to the board’s conclusion that the determina-
tion whether there has been a “substantial change” is lim-
ited to consideration whether the proposed modification
gives rise to a “substantial change.” In LandWatch’s view, a
“substantial change” is any change that materially affects
the findings of fact on the which the CMP or FMP approv-
als rely. LandWatch asserts that the evidence shows that
Thornburgh has no water available to supply the resort,
primarily through the expiration of Water Right Permit
G-17036, and that that is a substantial change that should
have been addressed by the board. LandWatch contends
that LUBA’s order is unlawful in substance in not deciding
whether Thornburgh’s loss of the available water to supply
to the resort constitutes a Condition 1 substantial change,
and, like Lipscomb, asserts that LUBA erred in failing
to reverse the board’s order and require that Thornburgh
begin the application process anew.
        LUBA reasoned that the question of the availabil-
ity of water to the resort was not a required aspect of the
board’s consideration in determining whether the changes
proposed by Thornburgh to the FMP and the FWMP met
     7
       DCC 18.113.070(K) is a resort approval criterion that requires the county
to find:
     “Adequate water will be available for all proposed uses at the destination
     resort, based upon the water study and a proposed water conservation plan.
     Water use will not reduce the availability of water in the water impact areas
     identified in the water study considering existing uses and potential devel-
     opment previously approved in the affected area. Water sources shall not
     include any perched water table. Water shall only be taken from the regional
     19 aquifer. Where a perched water table is pierced to access the regional
     aquifer, the well must be sealed off from the perched water table.”
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                                371

the “no net loss” standard. Under the board’s interpretation
of the “substantial change” inquiry, to which LUBA properly
deferred, that conclusion was correct.8 The board identified
its task as determining whether the changes proposed by
Thornburgh were substantial, not whether circumstances
outside of the application had substantially changed. And as
Thornburgh correctly responds, the record does not estab-
lish that Thornburgh has no water rights available to it.
See Gould v. Deschutes County, 322 Or App at 18 (affirming
LUBA’s determination that Thornburgh had met the docu-
mentation requirement of FMP Condition 10 pertaining to
water rights and mitigation).
         LandWatch further argues that LUBA erred in fail-
ing to decide that issue, in violation of ORS 197.835(11)(a):
    “Whenever the findings, order and record are sufficient
    to allow review, and to the extent possible consistent with
    the time requirements of ORS 197.830(14), the board shall
    decide all issues presented to it when reversing or remand-
    ing a land use decision described in subsections (2) to (9) of
    this section or limited land use decision described in ORS
    197.828 and 197.195.”
In fact, LUBA did consider LandWatch’s argument and
explicitly rejected it, based on its deference to the county’s
decision to interpret “substantial change” to have the mean-
ing that it does in DCC 18.113.080.
         LandWatch, like Lipscomb, contends that LUBA
erred in deferring to the county’s interpretation of Condition
1 as to the meaning of “substantial change,” because no def-
erence is owed to the interpretation of a condition, as opposed
to a code provision. LandWatch further argues that, textu-
ally, “substantial change” should not mean the same thing
in Condition 1 as it does in DCC 18.113.080:

    8
      LUBA said: “The county has interpreted ‘substantial change’ in Condition
1 to have the same meaning as the term is used in DCC 18.113.080, which is
‘an alteration in the type, scale, location, phasing or other characteristic of the
proposed development such that findings of fact on which the original approval
was based would be materially affected.’ Thus, Thornburgh must submit a new
application for any proposed modification that will alter a characteristic of the
approved resort development such that any finding of fact supporting the CMP or
FMP approval would be materially affected.”
372 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

   “The definition of ‘substantial change’ in DCC 18.113.080
   is limited to that section. It is not a global definition of the
   term ‘substantial change.’ DCC 18.113.080 does not define
   a ‘substantial change’ as a ‘modification.’ Rather, DCC
   18.113.080 defines a ‘substantial change’ as an ‘alteration.’
   In DCC 18.113.080, some CMP modifications are substan-
   tial changes, and some substantial changes are CMP mod-
   ifications, but it does not follow that all substantial changes
   must be CMP modifications.”
In LandWatch’s view, DCC 18.113.080 does not mandate
that all “substantial changes” be defined as in that sec-
tion of the DCC. LandWatch therefore contends that LUBA
should have interpreted “substantial change” as a matter
of law. The county’s construction is plausible. LUBA there-
fore did not err in deferring to the county’s conclusion that
the meaning of “substantial change” as defined in DCC
18.113.080 should apply to Condition 1.
        In its second assignment, LandWatch makes the
same argument as Lipscomb relating to the board’s conclu-
sion that Thornburgh was not required to begin the appli-
cation process anew but could seek approval for the pro-
posed changes through a modification application. We reject
LandWatch’s assignment for the same reason we reject
Lipscomb’s.
        In its third assignment of error, LandWatch con-
tends that LUBA erred in affirming the board’s determi-
nation that CMP Condition 28 has been superseded by
Condition 37. Condition 28 provided:
   “Applicant shall abide at all times with the [Memorandum
   of Understanding] with BLM, dated September 28, 2005,
   regarding mitigation of impacts on surrounding federal
   lands, to include wildlife mitigation and long range trail
   planning and construction of a public trail system. The mit-
   igation plan adopted by Applicant in consultation with Tetra
   Tech, ODFW and the BLM shall be adopted and imple-
   mented throughout the life of the resort.”
(Emphasis added.) After litigation determining that
Condition 28 was legally insufficient because it failed to pro-
vide an opportunity for public participation in the board’s
decision on whether Thornburgh’s mitigation plan satisfied
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                373

the “no net loss” standard, Gould v. Deschutes County (Gould
II), 216 Or App 150, 159, 171 P3d 1017 (2007), the BOCC
adopted Condition 37:
   “Applicant shall demonstrate compliance with DCC
   18.113.070(D) by submitting a wildlife mitigation plan to
   the County as part of its application for Final master plan
   approval. The County shall consider the wildlife mitigation
   plan at a public hearing with the same participatory rights
   as those allowed in the CMP approval hearing.”
LandWatch asserts that under Condition 28, the ODFW
must approve Thornburgh’s mitigation plan. LandWatch
further asserts that, contrary to LUBA’s holding, Condition
37 does not supersede Condition 28. Thus, LandWatch
asserts, LUBA erred in affirming the board’s approval of
the 2022 FWMP, which was not approved by the ODFW.
        LandWatch’s contention is answered by the fact
that, as a textual matter, Condition 28 does not require
ODFW’s approval of a mitigation plan; it requires that the
plan be developed in consultation with ODFW. There is no
dispute that the 2022 FWMP was developed in consulta-
tion with the ODFW. LUBA did not err in concluding that
the board’s approval of the 2022 FWMP did not require the
approval of ODFW.
  IV. GOUD’S PETITION, CHALLENGING LUBA’S
 REJECTION OF CONTENTION THAT UNDERLYING
                CMP IS VOID
         In her first assignment of error, in which Lipscomb
joins, Gould contends that the board lacked authority to con-
sider Thornburgh’s request for a modification of the FMP,
because the underlying CMP had become void and no new
CMP has been initiated. In rejecting that argument, LUBA
deferred to the board’s conclusion that the CMP had been
incorporated into and superseded by the FMP. We agree
with LUBA that the board’s conclusion represents a plausi-
ble construction of the DCC and that deference was there-
fore appropriate.
        Additionally, as LUBA held, Gould’s contention has
been rejected by LUBA in Central Land and Cattle, LLC v.
Deschutes County, 74 Or LUBA 326, aff’d without opinion,
374 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

283 Or App 286, 388 P3d 739 (2016), rev den, 361 Or 311
(2017). Gould challenges LUBA’s determination that Gould
is attempting to litigate an issue that has previously been
determined in Central Land and Cattle, LLC, contending
that LUBA incorrectly relied on the law of the case, which
it argues applies only to appellate decisions. We need not
resolve whether LUBA properly referred to law of the case,
because, as we said in Gould v. Deschutes County, 322 Or App
at 23, a party is not entitled to relitigate issues that have
been resolved on review of previous phases of the same land
use litigation. Beck v. Tillamook, 313 Or 148, 153, 831 P2d
678 (1992). LUBA’s prior holding is conclusive of the issue.9
         In her second assignment of error, Gould argues,
similarly to LandWatch, that water availability conditions
have changed significantly since the original CMP was
approved and that a new CMP therefore must be initiated
pursuant to DCC 18.113.070(K). For the same reason that
we reject LandWatch’s first assignment of error, we reject
this assignment.

    9
       LUBA held:
        “For purposes of this appeal we will assume without deciding that the
    CMP approval has become ‘void’ under DCC 22.36.010(B)(1). However, even
    if we assume the County’s CMP approval became void on November 18, 2011,
    we conclude below in addressing the third cross-assignment of error that the
    FMP remand proceedings were initiated by Thornburgh Resort on August
    15, 2011, which was before the CMP became void. The county’s first FMP
    approval decision found, with only two exceptions, that the FMP fully com-
    plies with the CMP. Those two exceptions have to do with the no net loss/deg-
    radation standard that normally applies at the time of CMP approval. The
    county’s decision to defer its finding on the DCC 18.113.070(D) no net loss/
    degradation standard until FMP approval was affirmed in Gould v. Deschutes
    County, 57 Or LUBA 403 (2008), aff’d, 227 Or App 601, 206 P3d 1106 (2009).
    As Gould correctly notes, the CMP potentially remains a relevant source of
    FMP approval considerations because at least some of the CMP conditions
    of approval effectively cannot be performed until after FMP approval. But
    those conditions of approval were carried forward in the county’s first FMP
    approval decision and remain part of the current FMP approval decision.
    All requirements of the CMP approval are now requirements of the county’s
    FMP approval. The FMP approval has effectively incorporated and displaced
    the CMP approval. In these unusual circumstances, where the only remain-
    ing questions on appeal concern two issues that were expressly deferred to
    the FMP decision, we conclude it was not error for the county to proceed to
    determine on remand whether the errors identified by LUBA in the FMP
    could be corrected and the FMP approved for a second time, even though the
    CMP approval has become void.”
74 Or LUBA at 346 (footnote omitted).
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                               375

  V. BISHOP’S PETITION, CHALLENGING SUFFI-
CIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF THE BOARD’S BASELINE
DETERMINATION AND LUBA’S DEFERENCE TO THE
  BOARD’S CONSTRUCTION OF DCC 18.113.070(D)
         DCC 18.113.070(D) requires that a destination
resort mitigate all negative impacts such that there is no
net loss or degradation of fish and wildlife resources, and
provides:
      “In order to approve a destination resort, the Planning
   Director or Hearings Body shall find from substantial evi-
   dence in the record that:
          “* * * * *
           “D. Any negative impact on fish and wildlife
   resources will be completely mitigated so that there is no
   net loss or net degradation of the resource.”
On judicial review of the 2008 FMP approval, we inter-
preted the meaning of “fish and wildlife resources” in DCC
18.113.070(D) to “refer[ ] not to species of fish and wildlife,
but to the habitat that supports fish and wildlife.” Gould v.
Deschutes County, 233 Or App 623, 631-633, 227 P3d 758
(2010). In that opinion, we accepted the parties’ understand-
ing that DCC 18.113.070(D) requires, first, an assessment of
fish and wildlife resources before development and, second,
mitigation to make up for negative impacts caused by devel-
opment. Id. at 631. We determined that “fish and wildlife
resources” could be measured by the habitat that supports
fish and wildlife, and a plan could satisfy the standard if
it “will completely mitigate any impact on the habitat that
supports fish and wildlife, without showing that each indi-
vidual species will be maintained or replaced on a one-to-
one basis.” Id. at 631-634. Thus, the first part of the “no net
loss” analysis requires an “assessment of fish and wildlife
resources before development.” Id. at 631. The parties and
LUBA refer to the status of fish and wildlife resources before
development as the “baseline.” Once a baseline condition is
established, and once the negative impacts are quantified,
the applicant is tasked with presenting a plan that will
ensure that the impacts are completely mitigated for the life
of the resort. The negative impacts are measured from the
376 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

baseline conditions, for example the baseline temperatures
and flow rates.
         Thornburgh presented, and the board relied on, evi-
dence of streamflow data from the 2016 hydrological year,
as a typical hydrological year, for determining baseline
flows for purposes of measuring fish habitat impacts. The
board further determined the “no net loss” standard only
requires a resort to mitigate its own impacts, not the cumu-
lative impacts of drought or other basin-wide water policy
and management issues.10 Bishop argued to LUBA that
habitat modeling should account for impacts to the stream
system habitat that are “identifiable, predictable, measur-
able, and reasonably likely to occur,” such as drought and
changed stream flows in response to implementation of the
Deschutes Basin Habitat Conservation Plan (DB HCP), a
basin-wide plan that requires eight irrigation districts and
the City of Prineville to manage irrigation activities in the
Deschutes River Basin to provide habitat protections for
endangered fish and wildlife. LUBA reasoned that Bishop’s
construction is one plausible reading of DCC 18.113.070(D).
   10
      The board found:
        “Many of the arguments and issues related to Thornburgh’s 2022 FWMP
   are related to drought and regional well decline. Opponents assert that these
   are relevant issues and should lead to denial. We disagree. The No Net Loss
   Standard requires a resort to mitigate its own impacts, not the cumulative
   impacts of drought or other basin wide water policy and management issues.
   The No Net Loss/degradation test is limited to addressing potential negative
   impacts of resort development. Impacts to habitat caused by other persons or
   environmental conditions are not attributable to [the resort’s] use of water or
   the impacts of [resort’s] use.
        “Thornburgh has quantified its impacts on water quality and quantity
   and the locations where these impacts will occur. It has studied waterway
   conditions in a typical year, and it has also provided expert evidence that
   shows the benefits of mitigation are enhanced during periods of drought.
   This approach properly accounts for issues of drought and the low flow con-
   ditions opponents argue make the results of Thornburgh’s expert analysis of
   aquatic habitat unreliable.
        “Opponents, ODFW, and the Tribe have also raised issues that pend-
   ing litigation regarding flow requirements and the [DB HCP] related to
   the Spotted Frog may lead to additional constraints on live flows. These
   issues are outside of the scope of the [resort’s] impacts and [the resort] is not
   required to mitigate for them.
        “Thornburgh must mitigate for its impacts, alone. Further, Thornburgh’s
   plan relies primarily upon groundwater water sources, and its technical
   analysis shows that the 2022 FWMP will result in increased surface flows
   which are beneficial to fish and wildlife.”
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                     377

But LUBA concluded that the board’s construction is also
plausible, reasoning that the board’s construction that “any
negative impact” may be analyzed based on a baseline flow
that represents a typical water year, measured only by the
resort’s impact on the system,
   “is not expressly inconsistent with the language of DCC
   18.113.070(D) or the underlying policy—which is to hold
   a proposed resort accountable to completely mitigate the
   resort’s impacts so that there is no net loss of fish resources.”
LUBA thus deferred to and upheld the board’s interpretation.
         Bishop’s assignments of error focus on the “no net
loss” standard and relate primarily to the sufficiency of
Thornburgh’s evidence with respect to the “baseline” from
which to determine a mitigation plan’s impact on existing
habitat and whether the 2022 FWMP satisfies the “no net
loss” standard. In his first assignment, although Bishop char-
acterizes LUBA’s error as “shift[ing] the burden to Petitioners
to properly define the baseline for study of whether the resort
can meet the no net loss or degradation of fish and wildlife
resources standard,” underlying the assignment is Bishop’s
view that the evidence on which the board relied to establish
a baseline was simply legally insufficient, because it failed to
take into account basin-wide circumstances such as drought,
groundwater decline, well deepening, and changed flows
resulting from implementation of the DB HCP, affecting fish
habitat beyond the resort’s uses and impacts.
          We are not persuaded that LUBA erred in deter-
mining that the board’s narrow construction of DCC
18.113.070(D) is plausible and entitled to deference. As
LUBA concluded, it is not contradicted by the text of the
code provision. Nor are we persuaded that the county’s con-
struction is inconsistent with our holding in Gould, 233
Or App at 633, that “DCC 18.113.070(D) allows a focus on
fish and wildlife habitat [as opposed to each individual spe-
cies of fish] to establish that ‘[a]ny negative impact on fish
and wildlife resources will be completely mitigated so that
there is no net loss or net degradation of the resource.’ ”
       LUBA further determined that the board’s deter-
mination of a baseline flow using the 2016 hydrological year
378 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

was supported by substantial evidence. Bishop contends
that LUBA erred, because the analysis of the board ignores
pertinent changes in flows that have occurred since 2016
and that impact habitats, including drought, groundwater
decline, well deepening, and changed flows resulting from
implementation of the DB HCP. In reviewing LUBA’s sub-
stantial evidence determination, our role is not to reweigh
the record but to determine whether LUBA properly stated
and applied the substantial evidence standard of review.
Citizens for Responsibility v. Lane County, 218 Or App 339,
345, 180 P3d 35 (2008). LUBA did not err.
         Also under his first assignment of error, Bishop
contends that LUBA erred by shifting the burden of proof
in assigning to petitioners responsibility to present the
all the factors that must be considered in determining the
proper baseline, rather than requiring the board to require
Thornburgh to provide a complete assessment. We do not
view LUBA’s analysis to have shifted the burden; rather,
LUBA determined that substantial evidence supported the
board’s findings.
         The 2022 FWMP includes a provision relating to
“compliance”—conditions that Thornburgh must adhere
to in order to ensure that the 2022 FWMP meets the “no
net loss” standard.11 The board determined that “the 2022
FWMP ensures ongoing compliance with the No Net Loss
    11
       Section D of the 2022 FWMP compliance provision describes the methods
by which Thornburgh can establish compliance:
    “Compliance: The purpose of this section is to clarify what constitutes com-
    pliance with this updated 2022 FWMP, whether during the review of Resort
    land use applications, as reported as part of annual monitoring, or for any
    other purpose. As noted above Thornburgh owns 1,211 AF of water rights to
    be used for pumping or mitigation and pumping at the point of diversion or
    appropriation of the certificate has been discontinued. For the reasons dis-
    cussed herein compliance with this FWMP has been met for rights b-f, and
    will be met for the TSID water (g) in the manner discussed in this Section,
    1b below. For any additional water rights that are acquired compliance will
    be met as described herein.
    “1. Compliance with this FWMP will occur differently for water appropri-
    ated from a surface water Point of Diversion (POD) versus a groundwater
    Point of Appropriation (POA) or for a mitigation credit as follows:
    “a. POA - Groundwater: For any future rights that may be acquired, com-
    pliance occurs upon the cessation of pumping of the rights and along with
    any of the following: deed evidencing the transfer of ownership, a submittal
    to OWRD of any of the following: (i) an assignment of the water right to
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                                    379

Standard and sufficient monitoring is required by the 2022
FWMP and FMP Condition 40.”12
         LUBA disagreed with the board with respect to the
compliance provision’s sufficiency and remanded the 2022
FWMP compliance provision to the board, concluding that
the compliance provision’s reliance on OWRD applications
for groundwater permits was not sufficient. LUBA agreed
with Bishop’s contention that the county must require proof
of completion of each alternative OWRD process, rather than
mere ownership of a certificate and submittal of an applica-
tion to OWRD, before the county may conclude that the “no
net loss” standard has been satisfied. LUBA agreed with
Bishop’s contention that, under the 2022 FWMP, the county
has no way to determine if fish habitat mitigation water will
be available before approving actual buildings on site under
a third-stage approval. LUBA also concluded that the 2022
FWMP reporting requirements are not sufficient to make
up the shortcoming of the compliance provisions to demon-
strate “no net loss.” Thus, LUBA issued a narrow remand,
relating to the sufficiency of the compliance conditions of the
2022 FWMP with respect to groundwater permits.13
        In his second assignment of error, Bishop contends
that the entire compliance section—not just that related to

     Thornburgh, (ii) an application that seeks OWRD approval of a transfer to
     pump at the Resort property, or (iii) a cancellation in-lieu of mitigation.
     “b. POD - Surface Water: Once acquired, Compliance occurs upon the cessa-
     tion of pumping at the source and submittal to OWRD, and OWRD issues a
     final order (or its equivalent) approving any of the following: (i) an application
     that transfers to pump at the Resort property, (ii) an application that trans-
     fers the water to an in-stream lease, (iii) the cancellation in-lieu of mitiga-
     tion, or (iv) an application to transfer to obtain mitigation credits, permanent
     or temporary.
     “c. Mitigation Credit: ln the event that Thornburgh acquires mitigation cred-
     its, compliance occurs when Thornburgh provides proof of ownership or proof
     of submittal to OWRD to use the credits as mitigation.
“Thornburgh also agrees to the following measures to provide mitigation bene-
fits over and above the benefits achieved by the mandatory measures described
above.”
     12
        Condition 40 provides: “Thornburgh shall comply with the 2022 [FWMP],
including its compliance and reporting mechanisms found in Section II of that
plan.”
     13
        We note that Thornburgh’s cross-petition, which we address later in this
opinion, challenges LUBA’s determination as to the sufficiency of the compliance
provisions.
380 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

groundwater—was legally insufficient, because it allows
Thornburgh to use all current listed water rights for con-
sumption, leaving compliance with the “no net loss” standard
to unidentified and not-yet purchased (or proven available)
water rights. Bishop asserts that the board’s finding that
such prospective purchase of water rights would result in no
net loss or degradation of fish and aquatic wildlife habitat has
no support in the record, or basis in law or fact. Thus, Bishop
contends, the 2022 FWMP “undeniably creates a loophole for
compliance that does not assure no net loss/degradation of
fish and aquatic wildlife habitat.” Bishop also argues that an
“instream water right” (ISWR) lease is insufficient as a form
of compliance for surface water rights used for mitigation.
         Thornburgh responds that Bishop’s arguments
under his second assignment as relating to ISWR leases and
surface water compliance provisions are not preserved—
that Bishop did not make those arguments to LUBA and
that LUBA’s remand relates only to the inadequacy of com-
pliance measures as to groundwater, and we agree. It is
apparent from LUBA’s order that Bishop did not present the
lease argument to LUBA and that the remand is limited
to compliance provisions relating to groundwater only.14 We
reject Bishop’s second assignment of error as unpreserved.

   14
      LUBA explained:
        “Thornburgh does not argue that the reporting requirements in the 2022
   FWMP are sufficient to demonstrate no net loss, and we do not see that they
   are. The required report might show that the quantities and quality of water
   assumed in the 2022 FWMP have been provided, or it might not. No addi-
   tional reporting is required during the review of any land use application
   related to the resort. As we understand it, the 2022 FWMP modeling assumes
   equal efficacy and reliability as between instream water right transfers and
   voluntary cancellation of water rights so that those legal processes have the
   same instream impacts on water quality and quantity. We agree with Bishop
   that the county’s findings are inadequate to explain why submittal to OWRD
   is sufficient to satisfy the no net loss standard with respect to groundwater
   sources for fish habitat mitigation. Indeed, Thornburgh and the county rely
   upon OWRD processes to ensure that voluntary cancellation of water rights
   consistent with OWRD rules and review processes will result in improved
   fish habitat. * * * The county has failed to explain how simple submittal of an
   application to OWRD permits the county to rely on those OWRD processes.
        “Thornburgh points to no evidence to support the county’s conclusion that
   the ‘2022 FWMP ensures ongoing compliance with the No Net Loss Standard
   and sufficient monitoring is required by the 2022 FWMP and FMP Condition
   40.’ * * * Thornburgh has not pointed to any evidence supporting a conclu-
   sion that ground water right certificate ownership, cessation of pumping, and
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                                  381

      VI. THE TRIBE’S PETITION, CHALLENGING
     LUBA’S CONCLUSION THAT ERROR RELATING
       TO IMPLICATIONS OF TREATY RIGHTS IS
                  UNPRESERVED
         Under the provisions of the treaty with the Tribes of
Middle Oregon, dated June 25, 1855 (1855 Treaty), the Tribe’s
predecessors ceded their traditional lands to the United
States. In exchange, they reserved the lands that became the
Warm Springs Reservation for their exclusive occupation and
use, and a non-occupancy interest in ceded lands. Specifically
with regard to fishery resources, the 1855 Treaty reserved to
the Tribe the exclusive right to take fish “in the streams run-
ning through and bordering [the Warm Springs Reservation]”
and at “all other usual and accustomed stations.” 1855 Treaty;
Anthony v. Veatch, 189 Or 462, 483, 220 P2d 493 (1950).
The substantial majority of the Deschutes Basin, including
Thornburgh Resort, lies within the lands used and occupied
by the Tribe since time immemorial, and the Tribe is a sover-
eign co-manager of the fish resources of the Deschutes Basin.
         The 1855 Treaty was enacted as federal law at 12
Stat 963 and is the “supreme law of the land.” US Const, Art
VI, § 2; Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 410 F3d
506, 512 (9th Cir 2005), cert den, 546 US 1090 (2006) (citing
Breard v. Greene, 523 US 371, 376, 118 S Ct 1352, 140 L Ed
2d 529 (1998). Thus, the State of Oregon, as well as its local
governments, must observe the 1855 Treaty.15 The interpre-
tation of the 1855 Treaty is a matter of federal law. State v.
Begay, 312 Or App 647, 652, 495 P3d 732 (2021); see Felix
Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 2.01(1),
109 (Nell Jessup Newton ed 2012) (explaining that federal
law governs the United States’ recognition of tribal status
and rights).

    OWRD submittal is sufficient to ensure fish mitigation water will be pro-
    vided as assumed in the 2022 FWMP.”
    15
       We reject Thornburgh’s contention that the Ninth Circuit in Skokomish
Indian Tribe held that local governments are not bound by tribal treaties. That
court held only that a tribe is not a “private person” under section 1983 and there-
fore cannot maintain a private action for damages under section 1983 against a
governmental entity that is not a party to the treaty for violation of fishing rights
reserved by the treaty. 410 F3d at 514. The court did not address whether local
governments are otherwise bound to comply with treaty provisions and the issue
was not before the court.
382 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

         The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has held that the 1855 Treaty secures to the Tribe
and its members a right to a harvestable population of fish in
the Deschutes Basin and to protect the habitat necessary to
sustain those fish. See generally United States v. Washington,
853 F3d 946 (9th Cir 2017), aff’d by an equally divided court,
584 US 837 (2018). The court has held that the amount of
instream water necessary to sustain that habitat is “at least
equal to” what is needed to satisfy any applicable Endangered
Species Act (ESA) obligations for listed-fish species, including
the Middle Columbia River steelhead and bull trout. Baley v.
United States, 942 F3d 1312, 1337 (9th Cir 2019).
          The Tribe argued in its first assignment of error
before LUBA that the board improperly failed to consider
whether approval of the 2022 FWMP violates the fishing
clause of the 1855 Treaty and improperly failed to consider
the Treaty in determining whether the 2022 FWMP satis-
fies the “no let loss” standard under DCC 18.113.070(D) that
the board was required to apply in considering Thornburgh’s
application. LUBA determined that the Tribe had failed to
adequately raise that issue before the board and therefore
had failed to preserve it for LUBA’s consideration; thus,
LUBA did not address the merits of the issue.
         In its petition for judicial review, the Tribe con-
tends that LUBA erred in determining that the Tribe failed
adequately to preserve before the board and to present
to LUBA whether the 1855 Treaty must be considered in
determining whether the 2022 FWMP satisfied the “no net
loss” standard. The Tribe points out that the right to fish
on its reserved lands, as well as in all “usual and accus-
tomed places,” including those places now located on ceded
lands, see United States v. Winans, 198 US 371, 381, 25 S Ct
662, 49 L Ed 1089 (1905) (“The right to resort to the fishing
places in controversy was a part of larger rights possessed
by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a
shadow of impediment, and which were not much less nec-
essary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere
they breathed.”), includes the right to have fish to harvest in
the usual and accustomed places of harvest. United States
v. Washington, 853 F3d 946, 964 (9th Cir 2017), aff’d by
an equally divided court, 584 US 837 (2018) (“The Indians
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                                  383

reasonably understood Governor Stevens to promise not only
that they would have access to their usual and accustomed
fishing places, but also that there would be fish sufficient to
sustain them.”). The Tribe asserts that its treaty-protected
right to fish is a resource as to which there must be “no net
loss” under DCC 18.113.070(D).16
         The issue before us on judicial review is not the
correctness of the Tribe’s assertion relating to the extent to
which the fishery resource guaranteed in the1855 Treaty
must be considered by the board in evaluating Thornburgh’s
application, but whether the Tribe preserved the issue
before the board for review by LUBA. As counsel for the
Tribe stated at oral argument,
    “If we weren’t stuck on the preservation issue, we might
    be before the Court deciding whether or not the Treaty
    imposes this positive obligation on the County or not. But
    that’s not the issue before the Court today. The issue before
    the Court today is has the Tribe made the requisite show-
    ing to even have its day in court.”
For the reasons below, we agree with the Tribe that it has
made the requisite showing.

         As the parties agree, “[a]n issue which may be the
basis for an appeal to the Land Use Board of Appeals shall

     16
        The Tribe asserted before LUBA that its treaty-protected fishery right is a
resource that is at risk of potential loss or degradation as a result of Thornburgh’s
project, which relies primarily on groundwater withdrawals. Those withdrawals,
the Tribe asserts, will drain aquifers underlying the project that have connectiv-
ity to surface water flows vital to the continued survival of at-risk fish species in
the Deschutes Basin. The Tribe doubts that Thornburgh’s proposal to mitigate
those negative impacts by buying and/or canceling existing water rights else-
where in the basin will sufficiently ensure that there will be enough water for fish
to survive in nearby streams, and to ensure that the water flow and temperature
will be sufficient to allow harvestable numbers of at-risk species of fish to survive
at the Tribe’s usual and accustomed fishing places during the proper time of year.
The Tribe asserts that the latter is necessary to sustain the fishery resource in
fulfillment of the Tribe’s treaty-protected right to that resource. The Tribe argued
before LUBA that despite multiple comments (including exhibits) and testimony
by the Tribe’s representative, Austin Smith Jr., providing indigenous knowledge
about the fish and wildlife resources of the Deschutes Basin, the board decision
concluded that the Tribe provided no “expert testimony” whatsoever, including
with respect to its treaty-protected fisheries and their associated habitats. The
Tribe asserted before LUBA that the board erred when it failed to consider the
Tribe’s treaty-protected right to the fishery resource in determining that there
would be no net loss or degradation as a result of Thornburgh’s proposed project.
384 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

be raised not later than the close of the record * * * before the
local government[.]” ORS 197.797(1). The Tribe preserved its
arguments relating to the impact of the 1855 Treaty on the
“no net loss” determination before the board. The record,
including the Tribe’s three comment letters addressed to
the board and the Tribe’s representative’s testimony at the
February 1, 2023, public hearing, reflects that the Tribe
brought to the board’s attention the importance of consider-
ing the Tribe’s fishery resource as an aspect of the “no net
loss” standard. In a letter of January 31, 2023, the Tribe’s
representative, Austin Smith Jr., General Manager of the
Tribe’s Branch of Natural Resources, raised concerns about
the potential impact of the proposed 2022 FWMP on ESA-
listed fish species and about Thornburgh’s lack of consul-
tation with the Tribe, despite the Tribe’s status as a sover-
eign co-manager of the fisheries resources throughout the
Deschutes Basin. Smith also observed that technical exper-
tise was required to properly evaluate the complex issues
implicated by the proposed 2022 FWMP and that, while the
Tribe possessed technical expertise, it needed time assess
the issues and to consult its co-managers, ODFW and the
OWRD. In his letters to the board, Smith specifically raised
the issue of the Tribe’s treaty-protected rights as implicat-
ing resources under the “no net loss” standard.17 We note,
further, Smith’s March 1, 2023, letter to the board:

   “[T]he Tribe does not currently have enough information
   to evaluate whether [Thornburgh] can * * * demonstrate
   that its water use and mitigation plan completely mitigates
   negative impacts on the fishery resource so that there is
   no net loss or net degradation of the resource. * * * Because
   the fishery resources at issue are both treaty-protected
   and vital to the Tribe’s cultural identity and existence, the
   Tribe urges the Commission to resolve these questions in
   favor of a more deliberate process.”

    17
       On January 3, 2022, Smith requested an extension of the record to allow
additional time for the Tribe, which had not previously received notification of
the application, to develop a response and provide additional information. With
Thornburgh’s agreement, the BOCC allowed an extension of the record for 30
days. The Tribe submitted materials to the BOCC, including a letter from Smith
on January 31, 2022, explaining the connection between the Tribe’s treaty-pro-
tected fishery resource and the “no net loss” standard. The hearing before the
BOCC occurred on the following day, February 1, 2023.
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                385

The standard for preservation of an issue for review before
LUBA “requires no more than fair notice to adjudicators and
opponents, rather than the particularity that inheres in judi-
cial preservation concepts.” Boldt v. Clackamas County, 107
Or App 619, 623, 813 P2d 1078 (1991). Contrary to LUBA’s
conclusion, the letters of January 31, 2023, and March 1,
2023, were legally sufficient to assert before the board that
the county must apply the “no net loss” standard so as to
encompass recognition of the 1855 Treaty and the Tribe’s
fishery resource, as historically recognized by the Tribe, to
“include the right to have fish to harvest in the usual and
accustomed places of harvest.” Washington, 853 F3d at 964.
We conclude that the board had fair notice of the Tribe’s
assertion that an evaluation of the “no net loss” standard
implicated consideration of the Tribe’s treaty-protected fish-
ery resource and, therefore, that the Tribe sufficiently pre-
served the issue before the board.
         We further conclude that the Tribe sufficiently
raised the issue before LUBA. In its opening brief before
LUBA, the Tribe summarized its argument concerning
the Treaty: “[T]he County improperly construed the 1855
Treaty by failing to consider whether its approval of the
2022 FWMP violates the fishing clause in the 1855 Treaty,
which includes a right to fish habitat protection.” LUBA
viewed that argument as different from and insufficient to
raise the more precise argument that the Tribe stated in its
reply brief and at oral argument before LUBA, and which
it now raises on judicial review, that “proper application of
DCC 18.113.070(D) required the County to consider whether
the 2022 FWMP violates the fishing clause of the 1855
Treaty.” The Tribe’s argument in its opening brief before
LUBA was not so narrow. Implicit in the Tribe’s argument
that the board had approved the 2022 FWMP in violation of
the fishing clause of the 1855 Treaty was the contention that
the “no net loss” requirement of DCC 18.113.070(D) must be
construed to include consideration of the Tribe’s treaty fish-
ing rights. The Tribe made the latter point explicitly in its
argument under the second assignment:
   “The [board] cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that ‘sys-
   tem wide benefits’ (whatever that phrase may mean) sat-
   isfy the no net loss standard in DCC 18.113.070(D) without
386 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

   expressly finding that the 2022 FWMP does not violate
   either the 1855 Treaty or [other state law].”
Thus, we conclude that the Tribe adequately articulated
in its opening brief before LUBA that the treaty-protected
fishery resource is a resource to which there can be “no net
loss” or degradation under DCC 18.113.070(D), and that any
net loss to the Tribal fishery resource is a violation of DCC
18.113.070(D) and the 1855 Treaty. Further, in its reply brief
before LUBA, the Tribe clarified that position when it argued:
   “The [board] and parties had fair notice that Tribe asserted
   that the fish resources affected by the 2022 FWMP are
   protected by the 1855 Treaty. The Tribe also demonstrated
   that it understood that DCC 18.113.070(D) contains the
   applicable approval criterion, which requires no net loss or
   degradation of fish resources, including those protected by
   the 1855 Treaty. The Tribe asserted treaty rights in the fish
   resources of the Deschutes Basin, including an enforceable
   right to take fish through the basin and the right to fish
   habitat protection so that it would have fish to take.”
We conclude that the Tribe adequately preserved before the
board and presented to LUBA its arguments concerning the
relationship between the Tribe’s treaty rights and the “no
net loss” standard. LUBA erred in concluding otherwise.
         In its second assignment of error, the Tribe con-
tends that LUBA’s order misapplied the substantial evi-
dence standard of review and is unlawful in substance in
failing to consider evidence supplied by the Tribe based on
its indigenous knowledge. We have held that LUBA prop-
erly deferred to the board’s narrow construction of DCC
18.113.070(D) that negative impacts are to be measured
only by the resort’s impact on the system, not the cumu-
lative impacts of drought or other basin-wide water pol-
icy and management issues. As for indigenous knowledge
related specifically to impacts of the resort, in its briefing,
the Tribe argued that “indigenous knowledge,” to which
the Tribe asserts the county paid short shrift, consisted of
the entirety of the comments and materials submitted by
the Tribe, including exhibits, and testimony from Smith,
regarding the fish resources of the Deschutes Basin. At oral
argument before us, the Tribe argued that if the Tribe had
Cite as 332 Or App 361 (2024)                                387

had sufficient time for preparation for the hearing before the
board, it could also have presented as indigenous knowledge
evidence concerning the impact of the resort’s pumping on
very specific seasonal fishing grounds.
         On this assignment, we are guided by our standard
of review, under which we consider only whether LUBA
correctly applied the substantial evidence standard in its
determination that the county’s decision demonstrates that
the county considered the Tribe’s evidence concerning indig-
enous knowledge and weighed the Tribe’s evidence against
Thornburgh’s evidence. Given the limited record before the
county, we conclude that LUBA did not err.
          But, assuming that LUBA remands the case to the
board for consideration of the Tribe’s arguments relating to
the treaty-protected fishery resource on the first assignment
of error, we highlight that remand will allow an opportunity
for the Tribe to present evidence of indigenous expertise
and knowledge for the board’s consideration that the Tribe
asserts it did not have adequate time to present due to its
late involvement in the proceedings.
 VII. THORNBURGH’S CROSS-PETITION RELATING
  TO LUBA’S REMAND OF GROUNDWATER COMPLI-
               ANCE PROVISIONS
        In its cross-petition, Thornburgh challenges LUBA’s
order determining that groundwater compliance measures
and reporting requirements set forth in the 2022 FWMP
are insufficient. Thornburgh contends that LUBA’s order is
unlawful “in procedure,” because the board and weighed the
evidence in the record as the factfinder in the first instance,
rather than reviewing for substantial evidence.
       As to groundwater compliance, Section D of the
2022 FWMP provides:
   “For any future rights that may be acquired, compliance
   occurs upon the cessation of pumping of the rights and along
   with any of the following: deed evidencing the transfer of
   ownership, a submittal to OWRD of any of the following:
   (i) an assignment of the water right to Thornburgh, (ii)
   an application that seeks OWRD approval of a transfer to
388 Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Deschutes Cty.

   pump at the Resort property, or (iii) a cancellation in-lieu
   of mitigation.”
(Emphasis added.) LUBA agreed with Bishop’s contention
that the compliance provision was inadequate to meet the
“no net loss” standard to the extent that it permitted only a
“submittal” to OWRD of an application for an assignment of
a water right to Thornburgh, rather than an actual approval
of an assignment of the water right.
        LUBA said in its order, “We agree with Bishop that
the county’s findings are inadequate to explain why submit-
tal to OWRD is sufficient to satisfy the no net loss stan-
dard with respect to groundwater sources for fish habitat
mitigation.” LUBA further concluded, “Thornburgh has not
pointed to any evidence supporting a conclusion that ground
water right certificate ownership, cessation of pumping,
and OWRD submittal is sufficient to ensure fish mitigation
water will be provided as assumed in the 2022 FWMP.”
         Thornburgh contends in its cross-petition that
LUBA misunderstood the compliance provision. Thornburgh
asserts that there is much evidence in the record that it is
the cessation of pumping of any newly acquired groundwa-
ter interest that results in mitigation, by allowing the water
to remain in the aquifer in support of fish habitat, and
that the additional documentation required by an applica-
tion to the OWRD merely reinforces the cessation of use of
the water. We have reviewed the record and conclude that
LUBA correctly applied the substantial evidence standard
in its evaluation of the compliance and reporting require-
ments. We therefore reject Thornburgh’s contention on its
cross-petition.
        Reversed and remanded to LUBA on petition of The
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of
Oregon, for consideration of Tribe’s first assignment of error
to LUBA; affirmed on cross-petition; otherwise affirmed.