Court Opinion

ID: 9669154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:41:04.411806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:53.030380
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDS, Justice.
The Commonwealth was granted discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision which reversed two of the four convictions of appellee, Treva Lynn Grubb. Grubb was found guilty of four counts of trafficking in a Schedule II controlled substance and sentenced to imprisonment for six years and three months.
Undercover police officers, at midafter-noon on January 9, 1990, purchased twelve pills (Schedule II narcotics) from appellee, ten of which were Percodan and two were Dilaudid. That evening officers, pursuant to a search warrant, returned to the Grubb residence and recovered additional drugs. She was subsequently indicted and tried on several charges which included the four enumerated herein and which are the subject of appeal:
Count 2) Trafficking in Percodan, a Schedule II narcotic (sale);
Count 8) Trafficking in Dilaudid, a Schedule II narcotic (sale);
Count 4) Trafficking in Dilaudid, a Schedule II narcotic; and
Count 5) Trafficking in Percodan, a Schedule II narcotic.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of Counts 3 and 5 and held the double jeopardy clause of the Kentucky Constitution forbids conviction of more than one offense when all the drugs involved are contained (listed) within the same statutory schedule of controlled substances. The issue articulated by the Court of Appeals is whether multiple sentences for drug trafficking may be imposed under the “compound consequences” prong of the Ingram test (arising from Ingram v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 321 [1990]), when the defendant has trafficked in different named substances but which are criminalized in the same schedule (statute).
KRS 218A.060 and 218A.070 places the substances Percodan and Dilaudid in Schedule II as being of high potential for abuse. KRS 218A.140 (prior to the amendments to KRS 218A) prohibits acts relating to controlled substances and specifically states, “No person shall traffic in any controlled substance except as authorized in this chapter.” KRS 218A.990 establishes the penalties for trafficking in “a controlled substance classified in schedules I or II_” The language of the statutes reflects that the legislature did not create a separate crime with respect to each forbidden substance contained in the same schedule. Certainly a punishment must be fixed clearly and without ambiguity and any doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955).
KRS Chapter 218A is titled “Controlled Substances” and proscribes the dealing and administration of drugs. The criteria for imposition of penalties does not specifically state that the penalties are intended to be additive when different substances are classified in the same controlled schedule and are involved in a single transaction.
A single sales transaction between the same principals at the same time and place which violates a single statutory provision does not justify conviction or a sentence for separate crimes, even though more than one item of a controlled substance (of the same schedule) is involved.
Said otherwise, the simultaneous unlawful possession (sale) of the same scheduled narcotic drugs giving rise to separate offenses results in fractionalizing the statute. We would soon arrive at the threshold of declaring that a single criminal transaction could be broken into multiple offenses based upon the total number of pills that were recovered, a manifestly absurd result.
The issue of simultaneous possession of more than one of the controlled substances, enumerated in the same schedule, has been considered in other jurisdictions with similar statutes. There are opinions from other jurisdictions that view possession of two different drugs at the same place and time as *885constituting but a single offense. Duncan v. State, 274 Ind. 457, 412 N.E.2d 770 (1981); State v. Flaherty, 33 Or.App. 251, 576 P.2d 31 (1978); State v. Butler, 112 N.J.Super. 305, 271 A.2d 17 (1970); People v. Manning, 71 Ill.2d 132, 15 Ill.Dee. 765, 374 N.E.2d 200 (1978). Jurisdictions holding to the contrary and where it was determined, clearly, that the statute indicated that each separate substance possessed was an unlawful act, include State v. Collier, 567 S.W.2d 165 (Tenn.1978) and State v. Williams, 542 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. App.1976).
The appellant maintains that the analysis of the drug statutes enunciated in Collier, supra, and Williams, supra, disclosed legislative intent to create multiple offenses for the possession of each controlled substance. A decisional revelation of intent finds itself on a rocky shore by divining that the word “any” indicates a separate offense when utilized in KRS 218A.140 — “any controlled substance.” “Any” is a flexible word and has a diversity of meanings. 3A Words and Phrases, p. 53 (1956). Its meaning should be restricted by the context of the statute. Although the Commonwealth argues to the contrary, we do not think multiple offenses are clearly signified or gleaned from the word “any.” To say it simply, the use of this word means that if the defendant under the required circumstances should be found in possession of any of the scheduled drugs, that she would be guilty. However, if the statute does not fix the punishment for an offense clearly and without ambiguity, any doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. See, Bell, supra. The parties demonstrated argumentative skill and the Court could reach either conflicting construction, but where there is an apparent ambiguity, it should be resolved in favor of lenity. This is not done out of sympathy or a lessening of any resolve proscribing drug conduct; it is but to settle any doubts in the enforcement of punitive statutes against the imposition of multiple punishments developing from a single episode.
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958), is clearly distinguishable in that three separate crimes committed under the auspices of a single sale of narcotics were clearly intended to be classified as separate crimes, and punishment to be imposed for each commission. Therein Gore was sentenced for separate offenses and not merely different descriptions of the same offense.
The Commonwealth would seek to expand Kroth v. Commonwealth, Ky., 737 S.W.2d 680 (1987), however, the conviction of Kroth did not constitute double jeopardy as his conviction stemmed from the possession with intent to sell stolen drugs and constituted a violation of two separate and distinct statutory provisions, being a violation of KRS 218A.080 and also KRS 218A.100. The enumerated differences between Schedule III and Schedule IV types of controlled substances are self-evident.
A more recent decision of this Court, Ingram, supra, made clear that it has adopted a broader view of double jeopardy. Resultantly, Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution would permit the Commonwealth to carve out of a single criminal episode the most serious offense, but not to punish a single episode as a multiple offense. In effect that case, as this one, presents a single impulse act having no compound consequences. We have determined that it may be justifiable, as in Kroth, supra, to impose separate punishments for the possession of different classes (schedules) of drugs on the ground that different items clearly present different threats to society. For example, KRS 218A.990 so provides as to the attendant penalties. A single act, under circumstances not found herein, could, however, threaten compound consequences.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
STEPHENS, C.J., BURKE, Special Justice, LAMBERT and SPAIN, JJ., concur.
LEIBSON, J., concurs by separate opinion.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion.