Court Opinion

ID: 9897375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:47.893356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:15.583152
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Jun 12 2023, 11:09 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Victoria Bailey Casanova                                   Theodore E. Rokita
Casanova Legal Services                                    Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                           Steven J. Hosler
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Harrison Raymond Addis,                                    June 12, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-2645
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Noble Circuit
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Michael J. Kramer,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           57C01-2104-F4-8

                                  Opinion by Judge May
                            Judges Mathias and Bradford concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2645| June 12, 2023                                   Page 1 of 9
[1]   Harrison Raymond Addis (“Addis”) appeals his aggregate nine-year sentence

      following his convictions of two counts of Level 4 felony sexual misconduct

      with a minor1 and one count of Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor.2

      Addis raises a single issue for review, which we restate as whether the trial

      court abused its discretion when it did not find his autism spectrum disorder

      (“ASD”) diagnosis to be a mitigating circumstance at sentencing. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Fourteen-year-old K.B. lived with her father, S.B., and father’s girlfriend, C.S.

      K.B. also spent time with her mother, who lived with K.B.’s grandmother,

      aunt, and cousin, Addis. When K.B. stayed with her mother on July 8, 2020,

      July 20, 2020, and July 30, 2020, Addis took K.B. into his room and engaged in

      sexual acts with K.B. Addis, who was twenty-three years old at the time, knew

      K.B. was only fourteen years old.

[3]   In August 2020, C.S. found letters in a notebook while cleaning K.B.’s room.

      The letters were “boyfriend and girlfriend kinda notes back and forth and it said

      to Harrison at the bottom it said your girlfriend [K.B.].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 124.) A

      few days later, C.S. “went further in depth and went looking for that notebook”

      and “found some disturbing things,” including a letter by Addis that listed sex

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a).
      2
          Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(b)(1).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2645| June 12, 2023          Page 2 of 9
      acts he wanted to perform with K.B. (Id.) K.B.’s father reported the letters to

      the police, who began an investigation. During a forensic interview on August

      21, 2020, K.B. disclosed the sexual conduct that had occurred between her and

      Addis.

[4]   On April 9, 2021, the State charged Addis with two counts of Level 4 felony

      sexual misconduct with a minor and one count of Level 5 felony sexual

      misconduct with a minor. Questions arose regarding Addis’s sanity and

      competence to stand trial, so the trial court appointed Dr. Stephen Ross and Dr.

      Rebecca Mueller to conduct evaluations of Addis. Dr. Ross did “not see a lack

      of intelligence” and found that Addis’s responses were “indicative of clinical

      narcissism.” (App. Vol. 2 at 60.) Addis told Dr. Ross that he waited until K.B.

      was fourteen to begin a sexual relationship because he believed fourteen was the

      age of consent. Dr. Ross found Addis to be sane and competent to stand trial.

      During Addis’s evaluation with Dr. Mueller, Addis admitted acts of sexual

      misconduct with K.B. going back to June 8, 2019. Dr. Mueller determined that

      Addis was competent to stand trial, but “unable to appreciate the wrongfulness

      of his conduct at the time of the alleged offense due to suffering from a

      Pervasive Development Disorder, Autism. He was insane.” (Id. at 70.)

[5]   On December 13, 2021, Addis’s attorney requested a third psychological

      evaluation because the first two evaluators had different opinions. The trial

      court appointed Dr. James Cates. During Addis’s evaluation with Dr. Cates,

      Addis blamed K.B. for the incidents because “he felt compelled to agree to her

      advances.” (Id. at 75.) Addis told Dr. Cates that he believed the age of consent

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2645| June 12, 2023            Page 3 of 9
      was sixteen and he knew K.B. is fourteen, but he “argued that the law was

      unfair.” (Id. at 78.) Dr. Cates found Addis to be “sane . . . at the time of the

      commission of the alleged crime(s) and competent to stand trial.” (Id.)

[6]   The trial court held a jury trial on September 14 and 15, 2022. A jury found

      Addis guilty of all three charges, and the trial court entered the convictions

      accordingly. On October 17, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. As

      aggravators, the trial court found that Addis was “grooming [K.B.] over a

      number of years” and it was a “relationship with the position of trust.” (Tr.

      Vol. 2 at 215.) The trial court also noted Addis lacked remorse and “blamed

      [K.B.] for [his] crime.” (Id.) Further, the court was concerned with Addis’s

      “full intention to continue this relationship even though she’s [his] first cousin.”

      (Id.) As mitigators, the trial court found Addis’s lack of criminal history and

      cooperation with law enforcement during interviews at his home and the jail.

      The trial court found “the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.”

      (Id.) The court-imposed sentences of nine years for each of the Level 4 felonies3

      and four years for the Level 5 felony,4 and it ordered all three sentences served

      concurrently.

      3
        “A person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and twelve
      (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5.
      4
        “A person who commits a Level 5 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) shall be imprisoned
      for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” Ind.
      Code § 35-50-2-6.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2645| June 12, 2023                                    Page 4 of 9
      Discussion and Decision
[7]   Addis argues the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing because it did not

      recognize his ASD as a mitigating circumstance. A trial court may abuse its

      discretion at sentencing by: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement, (2)

      entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons for imposing a sentence

      that are unsupported by the record, (3) leaving out factors advanced for

      consideration and supported by the record, or (4) providing reasons that are

      improper as a matter of law. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind.

      2007), clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007) (regarding treatment of guilty plea

      as a mitigator). To support the allegation that the trial court failed to find a

      valid mitigating circumstance, a defendant must demonstrate that “mitigating

      evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record[.]” Id. at 493.

[8]   We begin our analysis by noting that, in argument at the sentencing hearing,

      Addis did not request his ASD be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

      Typically, failure to assert the existence of a mitigator before the trial court

      results in waiver of that mitigator on appeal. See Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475,

      479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (waiving argument regarding failure to find mitigator

      when mitigator was not presented to the trial court), trans. denied. However,

      Addis did present testimony at sentencing from his mother, who discussed the

      impact ASD had on Addis’s life and asked the court to show leniency on Addis.

      Given that fact and the necessity of competency evaluations of Addis prior to

      trial, we decline to waive this issue for appeal. See Roberts v. Cmty. Hospitals of

      Indiana, Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008) (appellate court prefers to address

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2645| June 12, 2023             Page 5 of 9
       issues on the merits when possible); and see Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 220

       (argument that trial court abused its discretion by not finding guilty plea as a

       mitigator was not waived for appeal, despite not being argued at sentencing,

       because “a sentencing court is inherently aware of” the guilty plea).

[9]    Both Addis and the State direct our attention to a test first applied in Weeks v.

       State, 697 N.E.2d 28 (Ind. 1998). In Weeks, our Indiana Supreme Court was

       asked to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion when it failed to

       find a mitigator in Weeks’s mental illness after he was “found guilty but

       mentally ill.” Id. The Court set out a four-factor test to evaluate whether a trial

       court erred by not finding mental illness to be a mitigator at sentencing.5 Id. at

       31. We must consider “(1) the extent of the defendant’s ability to control his or

       her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on

       functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any

       nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime.”

       Weeks, 697 N.E.2d at 31.

[10]   As to the first factor of the Weeks test, the extent to which Addis had control

       over his behavior, Addis was able to control his behavior to some extent as

       evidenced by the fact that he waited to engage in a sexual relationship with

       K.B. until she was fourteen years old because “he believed that 14 years of age

       5
         Addis notes ASD is a developmental disability, rather than a mental illness, and questions the
       appropriateness of applying the test from Weeks, (Appellant’s Br. at 12), but we believe application of the
       Weeks test is appropriate in this circumstance because concerns about Addis’s functioning necessitated pre-
       trial competency evaluations.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2645| June 12, 2023                                   Page 6 of 9
       was the age of consent.” (App. Vol. 2 at 53.) Despite telling Dr. Ross that he

       believed the age of consent was 14, Addis told Dr. Cates that he “understood

       the age of consent as 16 in the state of Indiana, and further understood that his

       sexual partner was 14 years old.” (Id. at 78.) Addis further disclosed to Dr.

       Cates that “[h]e recognized that the behavior was wrong due to her age, but

       chose to [sic] engage in it anyway.” (Id. at 75.) “[Addis] argued that the law

       was unfair” and that he is being treated unjustly because, “[a]s the age of

       consent is 16, and he was sexually involved with a 14-year-old, the

       consequences he is facing are not in proportion to the chronological age

       difference.” (Id. at 78.)

[11]   As to the second Weeks factor, Addis’s overall limitations in functioning, Dr.

       Cates reported Addis has “high verbal intelligence, but . . . difficulty with

       empathy and . . . struggle[s] to understand basic interpersonal etiquette.” (App.

       Vol. 2 at 78.) Dr. Ross reported that Addis is “immature and self-defeating

       with chronically poor judgment and feelings of inferiority[,]” (id. at 55), but Dr.

       Ross did not attribute those characteristics to Addis’s ASD. Addis was

       originally diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder, but Dr. Cates explained that

       “was a previous diagnosis used for high-functioning persons on the autism

       spectrum that is no longer recognized.” (Id.) Addis dropped out of school in

       eighth grade due not to limitations but to his belief that “it was no longer

       important for him to go to school[,]” (id. at 52), and he quit work and remains

       unemployed due to his belief that he is “unfit to work[.]” (Id.) Addis’s IQ was

       tested twice as part of his evaluations before trial and he scored “average to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2645| June 12, 2023           Page 7 of 9
       above average performance on IQ testing” on the first test, (id. at 60), and “in

       the High Average to Superior ranges of intelligence” on the second test. (Id. at

       76.)

[12]   Regarding the third factor in Weeks – the duration of Addis’s condition – Addis

       was diagnosed with ASD at age four, and all three doctors performing

       examinations of Addis herein confirmed the diagnosis of ASD.

[13]   Finally, regarding the fourth Weeks factor, the nexus between Addis’s condition

       and his criminal actions, there is no clear nexus. Addis made a conscious

       decision to wait until K.B. was fourteen because he believed that was the age of

       consent. After his arrest, Addis repeatedly blamed K.B., not himself or his

       ASD. He told Dr. Cates that K.B. approached him and he “felt compelled to

       agree to her advances.” (App. Vol. 2 at 75.) Dr. Ross’s report states that

       “simply having met some of the criteria for an autistic disorder does not qualify

       as having a severe mental disorder that impairs perception.” (Id.) Dr. Mueller

       reported Addis was able to “state the arresting charges and explain the meaning

       of the offenses. He was able to describe the level of the defense [sic] and

       estimate the time served if guilty.” (Id. at 65-66.) Addis told Dr. Mueller that

       he believed his “best plan of defense was his mental illness.” (Id. at 65.) Dr.

       Mueller determined Addis was competent to stand trial but was “unable to

       appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct” due to his ASD. (Id. at 70.)

       Neither Dr. Ross nor Dr. Cates found Addis to be insane at the time of the

       alleged crime due to his ASD.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2645| June 12, 2023          Page 8 of 9
[14]   We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s decision.

       Silvers v. State, 114 N.E.3d 931, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Although Addis’s

       ASD could have been seen as a mitigating circumstance, the divergent evidence

       in the record did not conclusively demonstrate ASD made it impossible for

       Addis to control his actions or behavior. Nor was there a nexus between his

       ASD and his crimes against K.B. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion when it did not find Addis’s ASD to be a mitigating circumstance.

       See, e.g., Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding

       defendant’s mental illness was not a mitigating factor because there was no

       nexus between the defendant’s mental health and the crime and “no indication

       that his mental health was responsible for his decision-making process on the

       day in question”).

       Conclusion
[15]   Due to the divergent evidence from mental health professionals who evaluated

       Addis, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to

       identify Addis’s ASD as a mitigating factor during sentencing. Accordingly, we

       affirm.

[16]   Affirmed.

       Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2645| June 12, 2023          Page 9 of 9