Court Opinion

ID: 9893136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 21:04:00.320085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:42.014898
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/25/23
                             CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   (Placer)
                                     ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                        C097431

                 Plaintiff and Respondent,                (Super. Ct. No. 62-178455A)

         v.

 JEFFREY NELS MICHAEL LAROCHE,

                 Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Placer County, Steven J.
Howell, Judge. (Retired judge of the Butte Super. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed as modified.

      Francine R. Tone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Ismah
Ahmad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                             1
       A mounted ram’s head, with large double curling antlers creates an impressive
image. Defendant Jeffrey Nels Michael LaRoche deprived Antonio Davila of such a
hunting trophy and now seeks to challenge the amount of restitution ordered to Davila for
its loss. Entitled to restitution for economic loss resulting from defendant’s criminal
conduct, Davila claimed the loss of the ram’s head amounted to $7,500, which included
the cost of the associated hunting trip, taken approximately 10 years prior. We agree
with defendant that the trial court erred when it included the hunting trip as an economic
loss because the experience was not property lost as a result of defendant’s criminal
conduct. While the statutory framework for victim restitution is broad, we conclude it is
not so broad as to include costs attendant to the acquisition of the stolen property.
                      LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       Following the filing of a felony complaint, defendant entered a plea agreement
wherein he agreed to plead no contest to three counts in exchange for a stipulated
sentence and the dismissal of additional charges.1 Following the plea, he was convicted
of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1))2 (count one),
receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496, subd. (a)) (count three), and second degree burglary
(§ 459) (count seven). Pursuant to the agreement, he was sentenced to an aggregate term
of two years eight months in state prison.

1       Defendant was charged with an additional five offenses including possession of
ammunition, two counts of receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled
substance, and another count of receiving stolen property (counts two, four, five, six, &
eight, respectively). These were dismissed as part of the stipulated plea, subject to a
waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.
2      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2
       At the subsequent restitution hearing, two victims came forward: Davila and his
father, Adalberto Davila.3 Davila kept property in his father’s garage, including the
mounted ram’s head, which defendant allegedly stole. The ram’s head was among
property that was never recovered.
       Davila acquired the ram’s head from a hunting trip in Texas between 2010 and
2012. Davila testified it cost $7,500 to procure the mounted ram’s head. This total
included $6,000 for travel to and from the Texas ranch, accommodations, food, the actual
hunt itself, and an additional $1,500 to taxidermize and mount the head. Davila testified
he could not purchase a replacement, as the ram was “one of a kind” and it was illegal to
trade in taxidermied animals. Because the ram’s head was irreplaceable, the People
argued Davila should be reimbursed for the entire amount of $7,500.
       Defense counsel argued that Davila failed to present adequately detailed
information to establish the restitution amount Davila was requesting. Because the
victim failed to make a prima facie showing of an economic loss, defense counsel argued,
the burden did not shift to him to counter the amount of the claimed loss. The trial court
rejected that argument, finding the $7,500 represented the full value of the claimed loss
and that defense counsel did not sufficiently show the true amount of restitution should
have been less than what the victim alleged.
       Defendant timely appealed.
                                      DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                        Forfeiture
       The People initially argue that defendant forfeited the restitution issue because
trial counsel only objected to a lack of documentation and not to the restitution amount

3     Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s order of restitution to Adalberto
Davila.

                                               3
victim testified to. However, objecting to the lack of documentation to prove the value of
an item, as well as arguing the People failed to meet their burden, is the equivalent of
objecting to the prima facie showing of the value of the item itself. (Sargent Fletcher,
Inc. v. Able Corp. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1667-1668 [clarifying that once a party
produces evidence sufficient to make its prima facie case, the burden of producing
evidence shifts to the other party]; see People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539,
1543 [indicating the defendant has the burden “to prove the amount claimed exceeds the
repair or replacement cost of damaged or stolen property”].) We conclude defense
counsel’s objection to the value asserted was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
In addition, in their briefing the parties have substantively addressed the propriety of the
restitution amount awarded, which allows us to reach the merits of the claim.
                                               II
                                           Analysis
       The California Constitution dictates that restitution be ordered from the convicted
wrongdoer “in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a
crime victim suffers a loss.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).) The right to
victim restitution “ ‘is to be broadly and liberally construed.’ ” (People v. Baudoin
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1191.) Defendant contends the trial court abused its
discretion when it ordered that the victim could recuperate the $6,000 he spent on the
hunting trip itself. He argues that the trip was not “property” lost as a result of his
criminal conduct and therefore cannot be considered an “economic loss” under the
restitution statute. Rather, the hunting trip was an experience from the victim’s past that
he was not deprived of by defendant’s criminal conduct. We agree.
       Ordinarily, and as the parties both point out, “ ‘[a] trial court’s determination of
the amount of restitution is reversible only if the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] In determining the amount of restitution, all that is
required is that the trial court “use a rational method that could reasonably be said to

                                               4
make the victim whole, and may not make an order which is arbitrary or capricious.”
[Citations.] The order must be affirmed if there is a factual and rational basis for the
amount. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682, 689-690, quoting
People v. Akins (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1382.) However, where, as here, “ ‘the
propriety of a restitution order turns on the interpretation of a statute, a question of law is
raised, which is subject to de novo review on appeal.’ ” (People v. Henderson (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 467, 470, quoting People v. Williams (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 142, 146.)
       Whether costs a victim incurs in acquiring the property deprived by the
defendant’s criminal conduct constitutes an economic loss under section 1202.4 is a legal
issue of statutory construction. (Cf. People v. Saint-Amans (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1076,
1084 [whether a bank can be a “direct victim” under § 1202.4 is a legal issue of statutory
construction, which is reviewed under an independent or de novo standard].) To answer
that question, we give the statutory language its plain and commonsense meaning.
(Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 381, citing Coalition of
Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.)
       Here, Davila testified to the amounts paid for both the hunting experience
($6,000), as well as the cost to taxidermize and mount the ram’s head ($1,500).
Defendant does not take issue with awarding $1,500 for the loss of the mounted ram’s
head resulting from his criminal conduct. Rather, defendant argues that unlike the
taxidermied ram’s head, the hunting trip does not constitute an economic loss or property
so he should not be ordered to reimburse Davila for the expenses associated with the
experience in obtaining it. The People argue that the “ ‘one of a kind’ ” ram mount is
impossible to replace, and thus the replacement cost of the ram mount necessarily
includes the costs associated with procuring it. Defendant has the better argument.
       We need only focus on the plain language of section 1202.4, which provides that
to make the victim whole, restitution must be paid for “economic loss,” including
“property.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3), (f)(3)(A).) Subdivision (f) of section 1202.4

                                               5
instructs: “[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the
defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the
victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss
claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. . . . The court shall
order full restitution.” (Italics added.) Finally, subdivision (f)(3) details: “To the extent
possible, the restitution order shall . . . be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully
reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result
of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
[¶] (A) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of
stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual
cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.” (Italics added.) Lastly, “A
restitution order is intended to compensate the victim for its actual loss and is not
intended to provide the victim with a windfall.” (People v. Chappelone (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172.)
       While a victim’s right to restitution is to be broadly and liberally construed, the
Legislature has imposed a limitation on victim restitution that the loss must be an
“economic loss” incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. (See People v
Williams, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 147.) Here, defendant’s criminal conduct that
deprived Davila of the ram’s mount did nothing to deprive Davila of the financial value
of the hunting trip itself. We do not construe the statute’s reference to losses resulting
from the defendant’s criminal conduct so expansive as to encompass the costs of the
experience in procuring the stolen property. We thus hold that the value of the property
in this case, i.e., the “economic loss,” does not include the costs attendant to procuring
the ram; the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

                                                6
                                   DISPOSITION
      The judgment is modified to reduce the restitution award to Antonio Davila to
$1,500. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                     /s/
                                                 EARL, P. J.

We concur:

    /s/
HULL, J.

    /s/
ROBIE, J.

                                          7