Court Opinion

ID: 9407606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 17:01:32.264685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.127107
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10646    Document: 65-1      Date Filed: 07/07/2023   Page: 1 of 30

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10646
                           ____________________

        DYLAN CAMPBELL,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        UNIVERSAL                 CITY                 DEVELOPMENT
        PARTNERS,                                              LTD.,
        d.b.a.
        Volcano                                                       Bay,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10646

                    D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00846-PGB-LHP
                           ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
               On a hot day, there’s nothing better than a cool, refreshing
        waterslide ride (except maybe following that up with some ice
        cream). Dylan Campbell wanted to enjoy that terrific feeling of
        carefreely careening down a waterslide with his son to celebrate his
        son’s seventh birthday. So he took his son to Universal’s Volcano
        Bay waterpark and got in line to ride its Krakatau Aqua Coaster—
        a waterslide version of a roller coaster. But as Campbell ap-
        proached the front of the line, Universal pulled him aside and told
        him he was “unfit” to ride the Aqua Coaster. Campbell was born
        with only one hand. And Universal doesn’t allow people without
        two natural hands to ride. So Campbell sued Universal for impos-
        ing an allegedly discriminatory eligibility criterion in violation of
        the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”).
                During the litigation, Universal stipulated that the Aqua
        Coaster’s manufacturer had identified “no specific risks” of riding
        to anyone like Campbell. But Universal declined to allow Camp-
        bell to ride, anyway, citing a cascading series of Florida laws, regu-
        lations, rules, and industry practices. In sum, this collection of
        commands required Universal to impose whatever rider-eligibility
        requirements that the ride’s manufacturer chose, regardless of
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        22-10646               Opinion of the Court                        3

        whether the manufacturer based those requirements on actual
        risks, on speculation, or even on discrimination.
              In its motion for summary judgment, Universal argued that
        complying with this morass of mandates was “necessary,” as the
        ADA uses the term, so the ADA authorized Universal to refuse
        Campbell a ride. The district court agreed and also concluded that
        the ADA did not preempt Florida law. It therefore entered sum-
        mary judgment for Universal.
               After a thorough review of the record, and with the benefit
        of oral argument, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
                The ADA prohibits imposing a discriminatory eligibility cri-
        terion unless the criterion is “necessary.” Universal argues that
        “compliance with state law” necessitates Universal’s discrimina-
        tory eligibility requirement. But to the extent that state law con-
        flicts with the ADA and requires disability discrimination, we hold
        that “compliance with state law,” in and of itself, cannot qualify as
        “necessary” under the ADA, or it would impermissibly preempt
        and effectively eviscerate the ADA. So “compliance with state law”
        does not relieve Universal of its obligation to follow the ADA. We
        therefore vacate the order granting summary judgment and re-
        mand for further proceedings. Universal must either show that re-
        fusing to permit Campbell to ride the Aqua Coaster is otherwise
        “necessary,” as the ADA contemplates, or it must allow him to ride.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10646

                              I. BACKGROUND
                               A. Factual Background
               Universal City Development Partners, Ltd. (“Universal”) op-
        erates Volcano Bay water park in Orlando, Florida. 1
               On May 10, 2019, plaintiﬀ Dylan Campbell visited Volcano
        Bay with his family. Campbell does not have a right forearm or
        right hand, nor does he use a prosthetic hand. When Campbell was
        visiting Volcano Bay, the park didn’t allow him to ride the Krakatau
        Aqua Coaster because he did not have two, natural, grasping hands.
        The Aqua Coaster is a waterslide version of a roller coaster. Riders
        sit back, one in front of the other, with their bodies inside a four-
        person raft vehicle that has handles on the sides of each seat, and
        they ride together through channels and tunnels. The Aqua
        Coaster’s “track” uses magnetic propulsion forces on the upward
        portions and gravity and moving water on the downward parts to
        move riders.
                Volcano Bay refused Campbell admission to the Aqua
        Coaster based on rider-eligibility requirements that the Aqua
        Coaster’s manufacturer, ProSlide, created. To determine the rider-
        eligibility requirements for the Aqua Coaster, ProSlide performed
        an “initial, internal hazard analysis” and also hired RAMS

        1The parties have generally stipulated to the facts as we relate them. Where
        they haven’t, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
        party, here, Campbell. St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. Am.’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198
        F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the actual facts may or may not be
        as stated.
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        22-10646                Opinion of the Court                            5

        Consultants, Inc., which specializes in “developing and document-
        ing hazard analyses for amusement rides and attractions.” A hazard
        analysis “describes all reasonably expected risks contemplated for
        the ride, excluding outlandish examples that are extremely unlikely,
        like a meteor hitting the ride. It assesses both the likelihood and
        severity of a particular risk . . . and diﬀerent ways to mitigate a risk.”
               Universal stipulated that “[a]side from identifying one risk
        that involves a potential hazard for a visually impaired patron . . .
        the hazard analyses performed by ProSlide and RAMS identiﬁed no
        speciﬁc risks for anyone with a limb diﬀerence or other physical
        disability.” In accordance with its analysis, ProSlide created a draft
        Operations Manual for the ride.
               When Universal received the draft Operations Manual, it
        created a “Rider Eligibility Chart” that allowed people with many
        combinations of limb diﬀerences—including individuals with no
        right forearm or right hand like Campbell—to ride. ProSlide
        pushed back on allowing people with prosthetic limbs to ride be-
        cause it was worried about safety, namely, the prosthetic limbs
        coming oﬀ on the ride and striking someone or the ride itself. It
        did not mention any concern about the ability of people without
        prosthetics—like Campbell—to ride safely. Rather, it said, simply
        and conclusorily, that it was “uncertain in the ability to use one arm
        or prosthetic can be achieved in all cases.” Ultimately, ProSlide “de-
        cided to maintain [its] position on the original Limb Chart markup
        after further Executive consultation internally. . . . [It felt] at this
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10646

        time [that it wasn’t] prepared to take on these risks but [would]
        work to change the restrictions over time.”
                As a result, when Volcano Bay opened to the public, those
        like Campbell—without two hands—could not ride the Aqua
        Coaster (or certain other rides). Universal created a “rider eligibil-
        ity chart” for all its rides. Here is a snippet of what the ﬁnal eligi-
        bility chart looked like:

        Each row represents a ride. Each column in blue indicates a per-
        mutation of limbs. The chart continues down (listing more rides)
        and also across (listing other limb permutations).
                                 B. Procedural History
                Campbell sued Universal for imposing discriminatory eligi-
        bility criteria that weren’t “necessary” under Title III of the Amer-
        icans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) and the
        Florida Civil Rights Act, § 760.01, et seq.
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        22-10646                Opinion of the Court                          7

                Both sides moved for summary judgment. Campbell argued
        that Universal’s eligibility criterion—having two, natural grasping
        hands—wasn’t “necessary” for the ride’s safety. For its part, Uni-
        versal did not respond directly to this argument. Rather, it con-
        tended that its eligibility criteria were “necessary” because it had to
        comply with Florida law, and Florida law (through an interlocking
        series of provisions) required Universal to refuse Campbell service.
        Universal said that, under Florida law, Universal had to comply with
        industry standards (the “ASTM Standards”) and these standards re-
        quired Universal to comply with manufacturer recommendations,
        and manufacturer recommendations—here, ProSlide’s recommen-
        dations—forbade Campbell from riding. Put simply, Universal con-
        tended that it was “necessary,” as the ADA uses that term, for Uni-
        versal to comply with Florida law, so Universal’s refusal to allow
        Campbell to ride the Aqua Coaster comported with the ADA.
        Universal also argued that it was impossible (or at least, impracti-
        cal) for Universal to individually assess each guest’s ability to safely
        enjoy each attraction. In support of its position, Universal included
        a sworn expert report stating that compliance with ASTM required
        compliance with the manufacturer’s requirements.
               The district court granted Universal’s motion and denied
        Campbell’s. In so doing, the district court noted that the ADA’s
        prohibition on discriminatory eligibility criteria contains an excep-
        tion for “necessary” requirements. Essentially, the district court de-
        termined that compliance with Florida law requiring amusement
        parks to follow ASTM recommendations (which, in turn, requires
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10646

        compliance with manufacturer recommendations) was “neces-
        sary” under the ADA. Campbell now appeals.

                        II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review de novo the grant or denial of summary judg-
        ment. St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. Am.’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d
        815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999). In conducting our review, we view all
        evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

                             III. DISCUSSION
               Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we brieﬂy outline
        the governing law. Second, we recognize that the section of the
        ADA that we’re applying requires a burden-shifting analysis. Third,
        we ﬁnd that Campbell has satisﬁed his burden. And fourth, we con-
        sider whether Universal’s proﬀered rationales meet its burden.
                                   A. Background Law
                Title III of the ADA prohibits public accommodations from
        engaging in “discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–89. As the ADA
        deﬁnes the term, “discrimination” includes “the imposition or ap-
        plication of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out
        an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disa-
        bilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facili-
        ties, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”                    Id.
        § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). So the general rule prohibits public accommo-
        dations from imposing eligibility criteria that tend to preclude
        those with a disability from enjoying the public accommodation’s
        good or service.
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        22-10646                Opinion of the Court                          9

               But nearly every rule has its exception, and the ADA is no
        exception to that rule. A public accommodation may impose dis-
        criminatory eligibility criteria if “such criteria can be shown to be
        necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
        leges, advantages, or accommodations being oﬀered.” Id. (empha-
        sis added). We refer to this as the “necessity” exception.
                Putting the clauses together then, we observe that the ADA
        prohibits public accommodations from implementing discrimina-
        tory eligibility criteria unless the criteria are “necessary” for provi-
        sion of the good or service. Less helpfully, the ADA does not deﬁne
        what it means by “necessary.” See id. § 12181 (Deﬁnitions). We’ll
        return to what the “necessity” exception entails in Section III.D. See
        infra at 15.
               The ADA also precludes public accommodations from
        avoiding liability under the ADA through contractual delegation.
        It expressly states that public accommodations cannot “directly or
        through contractual or other arrangements, utilize standards or cri-
        teria or methods of administration” that have the eﬀect of discrim-
        inating on the basis of disability. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(D)(i). So for in-
        stance, if a vendor sets forth eligibility criteria for a product that
        are discriminatory and would not be permissible under the ADA if
        the public accommodation employed them, the public accommo-
        dation cannot avoid its responsibilities under the ADA not to dis-
        criminate by contracting with that vendor.
               Finally, the ADA has a “[r]elationship to other laws” provi-
        sion. Id. § 12201(b). In that section, the ADA provides that nothing
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10646

        in it should be construed to invalidate the “remedies, rights, and
        procedures of any Federal law or law of any State” that “provides
        greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disa-
        bilities.” Id. In other words, the ADA raises the ﬂoor for disabled
        rights, but it does not limit the ceiling.
               Having outlined how this portion of the ADA generally
        functions, we next turn to what an ADA claimant must prove to
        establish liability.
                                     B. The Burden
                We begin with determining where the burden lies in a “dis-
        criminatory eligibility criteria” case like one. We hold that, in this
        kind of case, the plaintiﬀ bears the initial burden of proof to show
        that (1) he or she has a “disability”; (2) the defendant is a place of
        public accommodation; and (3) the defendant imposed an eligibil-
        ity criterion that “that screen[ed] out or tend[ed] to screen out an
        individual with a disability,” id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)—the prima facie
        case. Once the plaintiﬀ makes or establishes a prima facie case, the
        burden shifts to the defendant to show that the eligibility criterion
        is “necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, priv-
        ileges, advantages, or accommodations being oﬀered.” Id.
               This burden-shifting standard comports both with the text
        of the statute and with how courts have interpreted parallel clauses
        of section 12182(b)(2)(A). The plaintiﬀ’s burden, of course, follows
        the text of subsection 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). And the burden-shifting
        portion mirrors how courts have interpreted other clauses of the
        same section.
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        22-10646                Opinion of the Court                           11

                For instance, in subsection 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)—one clause
        down from the one we’re construing—the ADA prohibits failure
        to modify policies, practices, or procedures to allow those with a
        disability to enjoy the public accommodation “unless such modiﬁ-
        cations would fundamentally alter the nature of such . . . facilities
        . . . .” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Like subsection 12182(b)(2)(A)(i),
        subsection (ii) imposes a general prohibition followed by an excep-
        tion. We have explained that in subsection (ii) cases, “[t]he defend-
        ant private entity bears the burden of proof on the fundamental
        alteration inquiry.” A.L. by & through D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks &
        Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.3d 1270, 1292 (11th Cir. 2018).
                Similarly, subsection 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) requires provision of
        auxiliary aids and services unless the public accommodation can
        demonstrate that taking such steps would “fundamentally alter”
        the nature of the facilities being oﬀered or would result in an “un-
        due burden.” It shares the same structure of a general prohibition
        followed by an exception. While we haven’t interpreted this sec-
        tion, some of our sister circuits have. And without exception, they
        have held that the public accommodation bears the burden of prov-
        ing either a fundamental alteration or an undue burden. McGann
        v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2017); Argenyi v.
        Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 451 n.3 (8th Cir. 2013); Ariz. ex rel. God-
        dard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 673 n.2 (9th Cir.
        2010).
               We’ve also noted this same type of burden-shifting analysis
        applies in ADA Title II cases. In Sailboat Bend Sober Living, LLC v.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10646

        City of Fort Lauderdale, 46 F.4th 1268, 1277 (11th Cir. 2022), we said
        that “[i]f a plaintiﬀ has made a prima facie showing of disparate
        treatment under the FHA or ADA, the burden of going forward
        shifts to the defendant to establish that the diﬀerential treatment is
        justiﬁed.”
                 This makes sense, of course, because the public accommo-
        dation or public entity is in a unique (and far better) position than
        the plaintiﬀ to know why compliance would “fundamentally alter”
        the nature of the facility it oﬀers (42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–
        (iii)), or why diﬀerential treatment would be justiﬁed (ADA Title II
        cases), or as in this case, would be “necessary.” Indeed, whether (1)
        a certain requirement is “necessary” to the facility, or (2) changing
        that requirement would “fundamentally alter” the defendant’s fa-
        cility, or (3) the diﬀerential treatment is “justiﬁed” turns on facts
        uniquely in the defendant’s possession. That is, all these determi-
        nations go to the core of the facility the defendant oﬀers. Not only
        that, but the public accommodation or public entity—not the plain-
        tiﬀ—is the party with the incentive to show why noncompliance
        would be “necessary,” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), why compli-
        ance would “fundamentally alter the nature of ” what is being of-
        fered, id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), or why compliance “would result in
        an undue burden,” id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
               To be sure, we’ve construed subsection 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)
        somewhat diﬀerently, understanding it to place the burden on the
        plaintiﬀ to show the public accommodation is able to comply with
        the general antidiscrimination rule, as opposed to requiring the
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        22-10646               Opinion of the Court                         13

        public accommodation to show that it cannot (as subsections (i),
        (ii), and (iii) demand). Gathright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc.,
        452 F.3d 1269, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2006). That is, subsection (iv) is
        the exception to the general rule we’ve just laid out. But as we’ve
        noted, just about every rule has its exception (and this rule is no
        exception, either). That exception does not govern here, though,
        because subsection (iv)’s unique text requires its unique construc-
        tion. And subsections (i) through (iii) do not share those same tex-
        tual characteristics.
               For starters, we must read subsection (iv) in conjunction
        with subsection (v), which expressly references subsection (iv).
        Subsection (iv) requires the removal of architectural barriers when
        removal is “readily achievable” unless (v) “an entity can demon-
        strate that the removal of a barrier under clause (iv) is not readily
        achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v). But in that case, subsec-
        tion (v) prohibits the failure to make goods, services, and accom-
        modations “available through alternative methods if such methods
        are readily achievable.” Id.
               Both subsections (iv) and (v) concern removal of barriers
        and provision of facilities through alternative methods that are
        “readily achievable.” That phrase requires a positive showing—
        that a public accommodation is able to avoid discrimination be-
        cause it is able to remove a barrier. In contrast, subsections (i)
        through (iii) require a negative showing—that a public accommo-
        dation is not able to avoid discrimination because discrimination is
        “necessary,” “would fundamentally alter the nature” of the
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10646

        accommodation, or “would result in an undue burden.” So the in-
        terest and incentive to show that removal of a barrier in subsection
        (iv) is “readily achievable” aligns naturally with the plaintiﬀ’s inter-
        est—unlike the interests to show that discrimination is “necessary,”
        “would fundamentally alter the nature” of the accommodation, or
        “would result in an undue burden.”
                Also unlike with the required showings in subsections (i)
        through (iii), the facts necessary to establish that removal of a bar-
        rier is “readily achievable” are not peculiarly within the public ac-
        commodation’s knowledge. Architectural experts on whether re-
        moval of a barrier is “readily achievable” are equally available to
        both plaintiﬀs and accommodations.
                And one last feature of subsections (iv) and (v) requires a dif-
        ferent burden placement than under subsections (i) through (iii).
        Once a plaintiﬀ shows that removal of a barrier is “readily achieva-
        ble,” subsection (v) provides the public accommodation with the
        opportunity to show that it is not. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v) (“where
        an entity can demonstrate that the removal of a barrier under
        clause (iv) is not readily achievable . . .”). In other words, subsection
        (v)’s text expressly anticipates two burdens: the plaintiﬀ’s in sub-
        section (iv) to show removal is “readily achievable,” and the public
        accommodation’s in subsection (v) to show removal is “not readily
        achievable.” Id. It would make no sense for a single party to bear
        the burden to show both that the removal was “readily achievable”
        and that it was “not readily achievable.”
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        22-10646                Opinion of the Court                          15

                In short, we must read subsection 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) to place
        the burden on the public accommodation to show that discrimina-
        tion is “necessary.” So if the plaintiﬀ shows that (1) he or she has a
        disability, (2) the defendant is a public accommodation, and (3) the
        defendant uses eligibility criteria that screen or (or tend to screen
        out) people with disabilities, then the burden shifts to the defendant
        to show that the eligibility criteria is “necessary.”
                              C. The Plaintiﬀ’s Burden
                Applying the burden-shifting analysis to this case, we easily
        conclude that Campbell has satisﬁed his burden. The parties stipu-
        lated that Campbell has a disability and that Universal’s park, Vol-
        cano Bay, is a public accommodation. Universal hasn’t contested
        that its two-hands-to-ride eligibility criterion screens out or tends
        to screen out those with disabilities. Universal has therefore for-
        feited any argument to the contrary. United States v. Campbell, 26
        F.4th 860, 872 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
              We turn, then, to what it means for an eligibility criterion to
        be “necessary.”
                          D. The Defendant’s Burden: Necessity
               As we’ve mentioned, the ADA’s prohibition on discrimina-
        tory eligibility criteria carves out an exception for those criteria that
        are “necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 12812(b)(2)(A)(i). But the parties disa-
        gree about what that term means. Universal says that “necessary”
        includes compliance with state law, reliance on manufacturers’ rec-
        ommendations because of their comparative advantage in dealing
        with equipment they sell, and avoiding undue administrative costs.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10646

        For his part, Campbell insists that discrimination qualiﬁes as “nec-
        essary” only if it is required for safety. We think that Campbell’s
        deﬁnition is too narrow and that Universal’s is too broad.
               We will start where the parties agree—answering whether
        “necessary” includes safety-related reasons—and then address Uni-
        versal’s reasons why its criteria qualify as “necessary.”
            1. “Necessary” Includes Legitimate Safety-Related Reasons
               Because this is a case about statutory interpretation, in de-
        termining whether what’s “necessary” under subsection
        12182(b)(2)(A)(i) includes anything more than what is required for
        safety reasons, we begin “with the text.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632,
        638 (2016). But ﬁrst we pause to explain why our analysis starts
        from the proposition that “necessary,” at a minimum, includes dis-
        criminatory eligibility criteria imposed to ensure safety.
               To be sure, no party has argued that prohibiting riders with-
        out two natural hands on the Aqua Coaster is either “necessary” or
        unnecessary for safety reasons. That said, the parties agree that
        safety falls within the meaning of what is “necessary.” And as it
        turns out, our later discussion of Universal’s assertion—that it is
        “necessary” to rely on manufacturers’ recommendations because
        of their comparative advantage in dealing with equipment they
        sell—implicates safety. Plus, on remand, the district court may
        need to consider whether Universal’s requirements are “necessary”
        for safety. So we take a moment to explain why, under subsection
        12182(b)(2)(A)(i), a prohibition is “necessary” if it is required for le-
        gitimate safety reasons.
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        22-10646                Opinion of the Court                         17

               The ADA does not deﬁne “necessary.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12181
        (Deﬁnitions). Without a statutory deﬁnition, we fall back to the
        baseline rule that “statutory terms are generally interpreted in ac-
        cordance with their ordinary meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S.
        369, 376 (2013) (quotation omitted). But the ordinary meaning of
        “necessary” doesn’t provide much guidance, either, on our speciﬁc
        question—whether “necessary” includes what is required for safety
        reasons. Black’s Law Dictionary deﬁnes “necessary” as something
        “[t]hat is needed for some purpose or reason; essential” and some-
        thing “[t]hat must exist or happen and cannot be avoided; inevita-
        ble.” Necessary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The
        ADA exempts only discriminatory eligibility criteria that are “nec-
        essary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
        advantages, or accommodations being oﬀered.” 42 U.S.C.
        § 12812(b)(2)(A)(i). At best, we can say that the eligibility criteria
        must be in some way “essential” or they “cannot be avoided” in
        oﬀering a facility.
                And to a certain extent, we can say that criteria to provide a
        safe user experience is “essential” in oﬀering a facility for public use
        because a public accommodation would go out of business quickly
        if the facilities it oﬀered to the public were dangerous.
               But we can do better than that. When we construe statutes,
        “we look to the entire statutory context.” United States v. DBB, Inc.,
        180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). And here, another subsection
        of § 12182 comes close to requiring the conclusion that “necessary”
        includes what is required for safety reasons. In particular,
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10646

        subsection (b)(3) speciﬁes that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall
        require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or beneﬁt
        from the . . . facilities . . . of such entity where such individual poses
        a direct threat to the health or safety of others.” 42 U.S.C.
        § 12182(b)(3) (emphasis added). It then continues, “The term ‘di-
        rect threat’ means a signiﬁcant risk to the health or safety of others
        that cannot be eliminated by a modiﬁcation of policies, practices,
        or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.” Id.
        (emphasis added). Put diﬀerently, subsection (b)(3) reﬂects con-
        gressional intent that, at a minimum, the safety of others is “neces-
        sary” under subsection (b)(2)(A)(i). It’s not a far leap to conclude
        that the customer’s own safety is likewise “necessary.”
                 And in any case, we cannot say that the term “necessary”
        unambiguously does not include a customer’s own safety. So even
        if, after we apply all the statutory-interpretation tools in our judicial
        toolbox, “necessary” is ambiguous as to whether it includes the
        customer’s own safety, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
        Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), requires us to defer to the administer-
        ing agency’s notice-and-comment-promulgated rule that answers
        this question, as long as “the agency’s answer is based on a permis-
        sible construction of the statute.”
               Here, the administering agency—the Department of Jus-
        tice—has promulgated a rule that is based on just such a construc-
        tion. Title 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(b) provides that “[a] public accommo-
        dation may impose legitimate safety requirements that are neces-
        sary for safe operation.” It continues, further specifying that
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        22-10646               Opinion of the Court                         19

        “[s]afety requirements must be based on actual risks and not on
        mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals
        with disabilities.” Id. We have no trouble concluding that this reg-
        ulation, which is at most a logical extension of the congressional
        intent to protect safety as reﬂected in subsection (b)(3), “is based
        on a permissible construction of the statute,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at
        843. In sum, we agree with the parties that safety-related reasons
        qualify as “necessary” under subsection (b)(2)(A)(i).
                That established, we consider the parties’ arguments about
        what, if anything, else the term “necessary” includes. Universal
        would extend the deﬁnition of “necessary” beyond safety. If “nec-
        essary” means only “safety,” it contends, then Congress’s exception
        in subsection (b)(3) for “direct threat[s] to . . . health or safety”
        would be surplusage. Put another way, Congress explicitly stated
        that the ADA did not require a public accommodation to allow par-
        ticipation that would constitute a “direct threat” to the health or
        safety of others. 42 U.S.C. § 12812(b)(3). So if only those eligibility
        criteria that are required for safety qualify as “necessary” under sub-
        section (b)(2)(A)(i), Universal says, “necessary” would be redundant
        of the “direct threat” provision.
               We agree with Universal that “necessary” includes more
        than what is required for safety. Nothing in Title III suggests that
        the general deﬁnition of “necessary” is limited to what is required
        for safety. And the “surplusage canon obliges us, whenever possi-
        ble, to disfavor an interpretation when that interpretation would
        render a clause, sentence, or word . . . superﬂuous, void, or
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10646

        insigniﬁcant.” In re Shek, 947 F.3d 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2020) (quota-
        tion omitted). Plus, even if we get to the Department of Justice
        regulation, it says only that safety is a permissible justiﬁcation for a
        discriminatory eligibility criterion, not that it is the only permissible
        justiﬁcation. 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(b). Still, though, this conclusion—
        that “necessary” must include more than safety concerns—does
        not tell us what else “necessary” includes.
                Universal says “necessary” includes at least three other justi-
        ﬁcations. First, Universal asserts that it is “necessary” to exclude
        Campbell from the Aqua Coaster (and other rides) because state
        law requires it. Second, Universal contends that it is “necessary” to
        follow manufacturers’ recommendations because manufacturers
        have a comparative advantage in identifying safety risks. And third,
        Universal argues that it is necessary to exclude Campbell for admin-
        istrative feasibility and uniformity reasons. None of these justiﬁca-
        tions are persuasive.
                   2. “Necessary” to Comply with State Law
            The ﬁrst reason Universal gives for why it must exclude
        Campbell is because state law requires it. We are not persuaded.
               Florida law acts in a somewhat attenuated (multiple-step)
        way to require Universal to bar Campbell from riding. First, Flor-
        ida requires amusement parks to follow some (undeﬁned) certain
        minimum safety standards for amusement rides. FLA. STAT.
        § 616.242. 2 Second, Florida directed the Florida Department of

        2This section technically exempts Universal because Universal employs over
        1,000 people and has full-time, in-house safety inspectors. FLA. STAT.
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        22-10646                   Opinion of the Court                                 21

        Agriculture and Consumer Services to adopt rules “which are the
        same as or similar to” national standards like the ASTM Interna-
        tional Committee F24 Standards on Amusement Rides and De-
        vices. Id. § 616.242(4)(a). Third, in response, the Department
        adopted the “F-24 Committee standards.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 5J-
        18.0011(1) ( Jul. 5, 2016). For their part, the F-24 standards require
        ride operators to comply with the manufacturer’s ridership eligibil-
        ity criteria. And ﬁnally, the manufacturer here—ProSlide—says
        that people with certain limb permutations cannot ride the Aqua
        Coaster.
               To recap, then, Florida law requires that amusement parks
        comply with ASTM standards. ASTM standards, in turn, demand
        compliance with manufacturer recommendations. And the manu-
        facturer here says that Campbell can’t ride because he doesn’t have
        two hands.
               As we’ve mentioned, Universal argues that the term “neces-
        sary” in subsection (b)(2)(A)(i) encompasses compliance with Flor-
        ida law. In other words, Universal says, it can impose discrimina-
        tory eligibility criteria when state law requires it to do so. Under-
        stood this way, no conﬂict arises between state law and federal law,
        even if state law requires discrimination without any legitimate
        reason for doing so: the ADA prohibits discrimination except
        where “necessary,” and compliance with state law is “necessary.”

        § 616.242(11)(a)(1). But Universal and all exempt entities still must file an affi-
        davit stating that they have complied with the section’s standards. Id.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10646

                But there’s one big problem with this interpretation: it con-
        ﬂicts with the “plain meaning of the statutory language” and “the
        context of the entire statute, as assisted by the canons of statutory
        construction.” Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir.
        2010). When we employ all the tools in our statutory-interpreta-
        tion toolbox, we must conclude that the text of the ADA precludes
        us from ﬁnding that it is “necessary” to comply with state law when
        state law otherwise requires a public accommodation to violate the
        ADA.
               We begin again from the recognition that the statutory text
        of subsection 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) does not answer the speciﬁc ques-
        tion here: that is, whether compliance with state law qualiﬁes as
        “necessary” under that subsection. As with the question of safety,
        though nothing in the deﬁnition of “necessary”—that which can-
        not be avoided, inevitable—forbids Universal’s answer that state
        law is “necessary,” nothing in the deﬁnition requires that result, ei-
        ther. But statutory context and the canons of construction both
        ﬁrmly counsel against adopting Universal’s deﬁnition.
                First, the statutory context: Universal’s proposed answer—
        that “necessary” includes what state law requires—would conﬂict
        with the ADA’s non-preemption provision when state law requires
        less discrimination protection for those with a disability than does
        the ADA. In this respect, the ADA explicitly provides that the ADA
        does not preempt state laws that provide greater protection to
        those with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (“Nothing in this chap-
        ter shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and
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        22-10646               Opinion of the Court                         23

        procedures . . . of any State . . . that provides greater or equal pro-
        tection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are af-
        forded by this chapter.”). So by implication, a state law that pro-
        vides less protection than the ADA to those with a disability is
        preempted. For instance, if a state passed a law that required public
        accommodations to discriminate against those with a disability—
        say, to get a business license—that law would be preempted by the
        ADA. But if the state passed a law requiring businesses to provide
        all accommodations (not just reasonable ones) to those with a disa-
        bility, that law would not be preempted by the ADA because it
        would provide greater protection to those with disabilities.
                So if compliance with state law qualiﬁed as “necessary”
        when it required discrimination that violates the ADA, it would
        conﬂict with the ADA’s preemption provision. And “a state law at
        odds with a valid Act of Congress is no law at all.” Barber ex rel.
        Barber v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1234 (10th Cir. 2009)
        (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). To paraphrase then-
        Judge Gorsuch, “the demands of the federal [ADA] do not yield to
        state laws that discriminate against the disabled; it works the other
        way around.” Id. (discussing the demands of the federal Rehabili-
        tation Act).
               Separate and apart from the ADA’s preemption provision,
        Universal’s construction of the ADA does not make sense. Con-
        gress passed a sweeping law to prohibit discrimination unless dis-
        crimination is “necessary.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). If
        compliance with state law were “necessary,” then any state could
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10646

        unilaterally nullify the ADA by enacting a state law requiring dis-
        crimination. That can’t be right. Belevich v. Thomas, 17 F.4th 1048,
        1053 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[E]ven if we agreed . . . that the statute is
        silent on this point, we would conclude that these speciﬁc defenses
        contravene the express purpose of the statute.”); A. Scalia & B. Gar-
        ner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 63 (2012)
        (“A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than
        obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored.”). As the Sec-
        ond Circuit put it when considering Title II of the ADA, “If all state
        laws were insulated from Title II’s reasonable modiﬁcation require-
        ment solely because they were state laws, ‘state law [would serve
        as] an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
        purposes and objectives of Congress’ in enacting Title II.” Mary Jo
        C. v. New York State & Loc. Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 163 (2d Cir. 2013)
        (alteration in original) (quoting Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165,
        177 (2d Cir. 2007)).
               Still, this analysis doesn’t prevent a state from regulating to
        ensure safety. After all, if a state imposed a requirement on busi-
        nesses that related to legitimate safety concerns, then compliance
        with that state law would be “necessary.” But compliance would
        be necessary because the rule promoted safety, not because the rule
        was a state law.
                Universal also resists the conclusion that compliance with
        state law does not qualify as “necessary” on the ground that if Uni-
        versal fails to follow Florida law, Florida will subject Universal to
        closure or criminal and civil penalties, or all those things.
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        22-10646                 Opinion of the Court                            25

                We don’t agree. If the ADA requires allowing Campbell to
        ride, then Universal doesn’t face criminal and civil penalties from
        Florida. The Supremacy Clause requires “a diﬀerent order of pri-
        ority.” Quinones v. City of Evanston, 58 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 1995);
        see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. If federal law requires Universal to
        allow Campbell to ride, and state law forbids it, then Universal must
        let Campbell ride. Quinones, 58 F.3d at 277 (“A discriminatory state
        law is not a defense to liability under federal law; it is a source of
        liability under federal law.”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. La-
        mone, 813 F.3d 494, 508 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he strong form of de-
        fendants’ argument—that the mere fact of a state statutory require-
        ment insulates public entities from making otherwise reasonable
        modiﬁcations to prevent disability discrimination—cannot be cor-
        rect.”). Instead, Universal can assert the ADA as a defense to an
        enforcement action by Florida or seek a declaratory judgment
        ahead of time.
                  Universal cites Brickers v. Cleveland Board of Education for the
        proposition that it faces what the Sixth Circuit has described as a
        “Hobson’s choice” of “subject[ing] itself to potential ADA liability
        . . . or . . . subject[ing] itself to potential penalties from the state[.]”
        145 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 1998).
                We respectfully disagree and decline to follow the Sixth Cir-
        cuit. Instead, we align with the other circuits that have correctly
        recognized that federal law—not state law—must be followed
        when the two conﬂict. Cf. Barber, 562 F.3d at 1233 (“Reliance on
        state statutes to excuse non-compliance with federal laws is simply
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10646

        unacceptable under the Supremacy Clause.”). As then-Judge Gor-
        such explained, “[s]tate oﬃcials who rely on their compliance with
        discriminatory state laws as evidence of their reasonableness will
        normally ﬁnd themselves proving their own liability, not shielding
        themselves from it.” Id. at 1234 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the
        judgment).
               We hold that compliance with state law does not qualify as
        “necessary” under subsection (b)(2)(A)(i) of the ADA. Therefore,
        it does not excuse from ADA liability a public accommodation that
        imposes discriminatory eligibility criteria because of state law.
                            3. Comparative Advantage
               Universal also says it is “necessary” to follow manufacturers’
        recommendations because manufacturers have a comparative ad-
        vantage in identifying safety risks. ProSlide, Universal points out,
        has thirty-ﬁve years of experience designing water slides and may
        have sold the same ride to multiple water parks, while Universal
        had only the one version of the ride.
               We disagree that the comparative advantage of a manufac-
        turer in identifying safety risks, in and of itself, qualiﬁes as “neces-
        sary” under subsection (b)(2)(A)(i) and excuses a public accommo-
        dation from otherwise complying with the ADA. The ADA ex-
        pressly prohibits the use of discriminatory eligibility criteria
        “through contractual or other arrangements.”                 42 U.S.C.
        § 12182(b)(1)(D). So the mere fact that a manufacturer has more
        experience and therefore a comparative advantage in identifying
        safety risks does not make complying with its recommendations
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        22-10646                Opinion of the Court                          27

        “necessary” when those recommendations are not, in fact, based
        on actual risks.
               Here, the manufacturer’s comparative advantage is relevant
        with regard to safety-related concerns. Universal doesn’t argue that
        the manufacturer has superior insight into any other way a require-
        ment could be “necessary.” As we’ve already mentioned, though,
        we agree that “necessary” includes safety. And we go one step fur-
        ther—only safety requirements addressing actual safety risks are
        “necessary” under the ADA.
               Congress enacted the ADA to address disability discrimina-
        tion based on stereotypes about disability. Id. § 12101(a) (“The
        Congress ﬁnds that—(1) physical or mental disabilities in no way
        diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society,
        yet many people with physical or mental disabilities have been pre-
        cluded from doing so because of discrimination; others who . . .
        are regarded as having a disability also have been subjected to dis-
        crimination[.]”). So it’s not surprising that the ADA expressly pro-
        hibits discrimination against people both with disabilities and
        against people because of a “perceived physical or mental impair-
        ment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit
        a major life activity.” Id. § 12102(3)(A) (emphasis added). Put
        simply, stereotypes about what people with disabilities can or can-
        not do don’t justify exclusion under the ADA.
               Applying that principle here, we hold that a manufacturer-
        imposed safety requirement is “necessary” only to the extent it is
        related to actual risks to the health and safety of guests. A safety
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10646

        requirement imposed because of a stereotype is not “necessary”
        within the meaning of the ADA, when we consider the context that
        the ADA’s deﬁnition of disability supplies. See DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d at
        1281. So a manufacturer’s eligibility requirement, without more—
        that is, a manufacturer’s eligibility requirement that is not based on
        actual safety risks—does not qualify as “necessary” under subsec-
        tion (b)(2)(A)(i) just because a manufacturer has a comparative ad-
        vantage compared to a public accommodation in designing eligibil-
        ity requirements.
               And, to the extent the term “necessary” is ambiguous, the
        regulations reinforce this conclusion. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. As
        we’ve said, 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(b) provides that “[s]afety require-
        ments must be based on actual risks and not on mere speculation,
        stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.”
               Here, the record reveals no “actual risks” to people like
        Campbell. To the contrary, the parties stipulated that “[a]side from
        identifying one risk that involves a potential hazard for a visually
        impaired patron . . . the hazard analyses performed by ProSlide
        and RAMS identified no specific risks for anyone with a limb differ-
        ence or other physical disability.” So when ProSlide recommends
        that Universal not let Campbell ride, it raises the question, why?
        Based on the parties’ stipulation, the recommendation identiﬁed
        no safety-related justiﬁcation. Nor does Universal posit a diﬀerent
        reason why ProSlide’s recommendation is “necessary” for the
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        22-10646                   Opinion of the Court                                29

        slide. 3 So Universal’s appeal to comparative advantage doesn’t save
        its discriminatory eligibility criterion here.
                    4. Administrative Feasibility and Uniformity
                Finally, Universal says it is “necessary” to exclude Campbell
        because making particularized safety determinations about the
        ability or inability of each guest to safely ride would be administra-
        tively infeasible. Rather, Universal asserts, a uniform rule is neces-
        sary. We think Universal overstates its concern on this record.
               Of course, administrative feasibility could be “necessary,”
        given a record that supports that conclusion. Even the ADA recog-
        nizes in subsection (b)(2)(A)(iii) that public accommodations need
        not make reasonable accommodations for those with disabilities if
        doing so would result in an undue burden on the public accommo-
        dation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). Similarly, we think that, if a
        public accommodation could not feasibly safely administer a facil-
        ity without employing a discriminatory eligibility criterion, that
        criterion could be said to be “necessary.”
              But at this point in this case, Universal hasn’t shown that ad-
        ministrative feasibility is relevant. Universal argues that it would

        3 And as we’ve explained, Universal can’t nullify the ADA by contract. For
        instance, if ProSlide oﬀered to sell its waterslide to Universal only if Universal
        agreed to discriminate without a legitimate reason under the ADA against
        people with a disability, that contract would not insulate Universal from liabil-
        ity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(D) (explaining that public accommodations
        cannot “directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize stand-
        ards or criteria or methods of administration” that have the eﬀect of discrimi-
        nating on the basis of disability.”).
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10646

        be burdensome to have to anticipate all possible variations of limb
        diﬀerences and other abilities. But Universal stipulated that “[a]side
        from identifying one risk that involves a potential hazard for a vis-
        ually impaired patron[,] . . . the hazard analyses performed by
        ProSlide and RAMS identiﬁed no speciﬁc risks for anyone with a
        limb diﬀerence or other physical disability.” In other words, Uni-
        versal has not identiﬁed a single speciﬁc risk to anyone with any
        type of limb diﬀerence. So it’s not as though ProSlide and RAMS
        found actual risks for people with certain limb diﬀerences but did
        not consider the risks speciﬁc to those with other types of limb dif-
        ferences because doing so would have been cost-prohibitive—Uni-
        versal stipulated that “ProSlide and RAMS identiﬁed no speciﬁc
        risks for anyone with a limb diﬀerence . . . .” (Emphasis added). And
        how a risk to a visually impaired rider has any relevance to risks for
        those with limb diﬀerences is not self-explanatory. In sum, on this
        record, Universal has not shown that the term “necessary” includes
        administrative eﬃciency or uniformity.

                             IV. CONCLUSION
               For the foregoing reasons, we vacate and remand the district
        court’s order for further proceedings consistent with this order.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.