Court Opinion

ID: 9564510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:02:01.259754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:28.085529
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Chief Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the analysis and result but write separately because I believe that, for purposes of retrial, it is important to sound a note of caution concerning admission of the hearsay from Kate Koester, another bar employee.
The trial judge overruled Defendant’s objections to Koester’s testimony that the vic*324tim said she did not need help closing the bar because “she would be fine, ... Ray was gonna close with her____ That he was gonna close with her. He was gonna come down that night.” The state offered this evidence, I presume, as tending to prove the victim’s state of mind—that she intended to stay at the bar until closing. It was admissible for that purpose under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Ariz.R.Evid. 803(3).
The evidence, however, not only tended to prove that the victim intended to stay at the bar but also could be used as evidence to show the conduct of “Ray,” presumably referring to Defendant. When used to prove Ray’s intent or conduct, however, the evidence is not a statement of the declarant’s state of mind but merely the declarant’s statement of her expectation of Ray’s future conduct. Further, the statement lacked any foundation about the basis for that expectation. Did the victim expect Ray because of something he said, something someone else said, some speculation on her part, or because Ray looked furtively at her the night before? We do not know and she did not say.
Standing alone, the statement more closely resembles a declaration of the victim’s belief admitted to prove the fact believed—that someone named “Ray” was “gonna come down that night”—a use that Rule 803(3) specifically prohibits.1 Thus, use of the coworker’s testimony to prove Ray’s conduct is questionable under the hearsay rule. Compare State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 257, 665 P.2d 972, 979 (summarily approving admission of similar statements), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 204, 78 L.Ed.2d 178 (1983) with State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 121, 704 P.2d 238, 251 (1985) (approving admission of hearsay when “primary purpose” was “to show that [the] declarant acted in accordance with his stated intention to be at a certain place at a certain time”), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, 106 S.Ct. 1268, 89 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986). See John W. Strong et al„ 2 McCormick on Evidence § 275, at 236-37 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that the “danger of unreliability” with such statements has “prompted some courts to impose additional limitations, restrictions, or requirements”); see also State v. Engweiler, 118 Or.App. 132, 846 P.2d 1163, 1164-65 (1993) (holding that “statements by a declarant are admissible under 803(3) only to prove the declarant’s future conduct, not the future conduct of another”); State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1993) (stating that “limiting instructions are a per se requirement”); United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 104 (2d. Cir. 1982) (approving admission because other evidence showed defendant’s involvement and because “the statements [were] supported by a ring of reliability”).
We cannot make any final decision on the admissibility of the statement at retrial. For instance, we do not know whether the statement will be needed and really be offered for its undoubtedly permissible use—to prove the declarant’s state of mind—or for its potentially impermissible use—to prove her expectation of Ray’s conduct. We raise the question and leave it to the trial judge to decide on the complete record available at retrial.

. Under Rule 803, "[t]he following are not excluded by the hearsay rule ...: A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind ... but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed____” Ariz.R.Evid. 803(3).