Court Opinion

ID: 9773346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:42:41.921756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:52.480813
License: Public Domain

Smith, J. (dissenting).
Education Law § 3020 (1) says: “No person enjoying the benefits of tenure shall be disciplined . . . except ... in accordance with the procedures specified” in Education Law § 3020-a or a collective bargaining agreement. The only question in this case is whether the fine that the New York City Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB) seeks to impose on petitioner is discipline. I see no escape from the conclusion that it is.
In common sense, of course an employee who is fined by his employer for acting unethically is being disciplined. “Discipline” is the word commonly used to refer to a punishment imposed by an employer on an employee for an infraction of the employer’s rules. (By contrast, criminal punishment is not commonly spoken of as “discipline.” Thus, the analogy that the majority draws between a criminal prosecution and a COIB proceeding [majority op at 432] is inapt.) The majority seems to suggest that only the Department of Education (DOE), not the City, is petitioner’s “employer” (majority op at 431), but that cannot be right. If petitioner were not an employee of the City, he would not be a “public servant” as that term is defined in section 2601 (19) of the New York City Charter, and the COIB would have no jurisdiction over him.
It seems self-evident to me that a fine imposed by one’s employer is a form of discipline, but if there were any doubt it *434would be resolved by Education Law § 3020-a, which is titled “Disciplinary procedures and penalties.” The “penalties” are listed in section 3020-a (4) (a), and “a fine” is among them.
A football player who is fined for breaking curfew has been disciplined. Why is the same not true of an assistant principal fined for the conduct at issue here? Suppose the COIB is successful in this case, and petitioner is required to pay a fine. If he is later asked if he has ever been disciplined, and says no, would anyone say that the answer was truthful?
Thus, the Education Law in plain terms gives petitioner immunity from the kind of proceeding the COIB is bringing in this case. Nothing in the City Charter provisions that empower and regulate the COIB alters that conclusion. Section 2603 (h) (2) of the Charter, which provides for hearings by the COIB, says that the COIB:
“shall refer the matter to the appropriate agency if the public servant is subject to the jurisdiction of any state law or collective bargaining agreement which provides for the conduct of disciplinary proceedings, provided that when such a matter is referred to an agency, the agency shall consult with the [COIB] before issuing a final decision.”
This section, if anything, strengthens petitioner’s argument, for it implies that where a “state law or collective bargaining agreement” is applicable it is “the agency” (here, DOE) that should make the “final decision.”
The City relies, as does the majority, on section 2603 (h) (6) of the Charter, which says:
“Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the appointing officer of a public servant from terminating or otherwise disciplining such public servant, where such appointing officer is otherwise authorized to do so; provided, however, that such action by the appointing officer shall not preclude the board from exercising its powers and duties under this chapter with respect to the actions of any such public servant.”
The City reads this language—reasonably enough—to say that the decision of the DOE (“the appointing officer”) in this case not to proceed against petitioner does not “preclude” the COIB from doing so. While the provision says only that “action” by the appointing officer in terminating or otherwise *435disciplining the employee “shall not preclude” a COIB-initiated proceeding, it is fair to infer that a decision not to take such action also will not have preclusive effect. Here, however, no one is saying that the DOE’s choice not to proceed against petitioner is preclusive. What precludes discipline by the COIB is the plain language of Education Law § 3020. The Charter provision does not say, and cannot plausibly be read to imply, that the Education Law provision is inapplicable to discipline imposed by the COIB.
As the majority suggests, it may well be more efficient—it may on the whole be highly desirable—for the COIB to be able to proceed against a tenured DOE employee, regardless of whether the DOE thinks discipline is justified. If that is so, then the Legislature made an unwise choice in providing that such employees may be disciplined only as provided in the Education Law or a collective bargaining agreement. But the Legislature did make that choice, and expressed it in plain language, and we should apply the statute as written.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo and Pigott concur with Judge Read; Judge Smith dissents in a separate opinion in which Judge Jones concurs.
Order reversed, etc.