Court Opinion

ID: 9852179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:10.605176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:23.828852
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
concurring specially. I concur fully in the opinion in this case, but I wish to elaborate as to Division 1. At the beginning of this criminal case, defendant’s counsel sought to interrogate the jurors by inquiring as to whether each of them believed in that *118principle of law which says that the defendant is presumed innocent until the prosecution proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court advised counsel that at the beginning of the term of court, all of these jurors had been instructed by the court as to certain legal principles governing criminal cases, including the one counsel was seeking to propound, and the jurors had pledged themselves to be governed by such instructions. Counsel was then advised that he could not ask the question. Counsel insisted that he did not hear such instructions and response at the beginning of the term, and thereafter sought to propound certain other questions involving legal principles, and the court refused to allow him to do so.
Code Ann. § 59-705 (Ga. L. 1949, p. 1082; 1951, pp. 214, 215) gives to a defendant the right to an individual examination of each juror, after the administration of a preliminary oath, and "after the usual voir dire questions have been put by the court, and in such examination the counsel for either party shall have the right to inquire of the individual jurors,” etc. (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, it is in the interest of time and court efficiency to conduct the trial of criminal cases as the trial judge here did at the beginning of the term, and before the particular case is called. But this procedure does not comply with the statute. In Gunnin v. State, 112 Ga. App. 720 (1) (146 SE2d 131) this court holds: "Upon proper construction of the Act of 1951 (Ga. L. 1951, p. 214; Code Ann. § 59-705) the defendant has a right, after the usual voir dire questions have been put to the jury by the court, to individually question all jurors on the entire panel prior to interposing a challenge to any of them. The trial judge has no discretion in the matter and his denial of this right is reversible error. Blount v. State, 214 Ga. 433 (3) (105 SE2d 304); Ferguson v. State, 218 Ga. 173 (126 SE2d 798); Britten v. State, 221 Ga. 97, 100 (143 SE2d 176).”
*119While defendant’s counsel had the right to propound proper questions to the jury, he did not have the right to "ask technical legal questions in regard to the presumption of innocence, but should confine his questions to those which may illustrate prejudice of the juror against the accused or any interest of the juror in the cause.” See McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633, 636, supra. Although the trial court refused counsel for defendant the right to propound the questions for the untenable reason that the jury had already received instructions and had pledged themselves to abide thereby at the beginning of the term, yet the ruling will be affirmed for a different reason, to wit: improper questions were propounded. A judgment which is correct for any reason, though the wrong reason be given, will be affirmed. U S. Cas. Co. v. Richardson, 75 Ga. App. 496, 500 (43 SE2d 793); Hill v. Rivers, 200 Ga. 354, 356 (37 SE2d 386).