Court Opinion

ID: 9624326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:58:19.401394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:43.548154
License: Public Domain

Thompson, C. J.,
concurring:
Harper stands convicted of first degree burglary. His appeal asserts a violation of Fourth Amendment rights since the trial court received evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a stolen automobile in which he had been riding as a passenger. I agree with my Brothers that the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment were not offended, but am puzzled why they deem it necessary to discuss this issue in view of their conclusion that Harper lacks standing to raise it. Accordingly, I prefer to state my views separately.
1. The law is not clear as to whether a thief in possession of a stolen car has standing to object to a search thereof. The circumstances of each case must be examined. In the case at hand the search preceded receipt of radioed information that the car was stolen, and occurred at a time when the police did not have lawful custody. Cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). In these circumstances the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the thief has standing to invoke Fourth Amendment protections. Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9 Cir. 1967). That court wrote: “It has been repeatedly held, in substance, that an automobile has the status of a house, so far as the protection of the Fourth Amendment is concerned, subject to certain limitations arising from its mobility. (Citations.) And the rule that one whose possession is wrongful is entitled to protection against all who do not have a paramount right to possession is equally applicable to chattels, such as a car. * * * The question here is as to the standing of a thief who had possession of it and claimed it as his own to object to a search of the car. We hold that he has such standing.” Id. at 391.
Since the validity of a state conviction is subject to federal review and control when challenged upon federal constitutional grounds [Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85; Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; Brown v. Allen, *242344 U.S. 443 (1953); Walker v. Fogliani, 83 Nev. 154, 425 P.2d 794, 796, 797 (1967)], it is best, I think, that we defer to the federal court of appeals for our circuit when it has clearly expressed its opinion on the issue, and that expression is consonant with hints flowing from the United States Supreme Court. I cannot agree with my Brothers that the Cotton case is out of step with the Supreme Court opinion of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The matter of standing in Jones was decided with reference to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and concerned the search of an apartment which the accused had occupied with the permission of the tenant. The Court suggested, inter alia, that one enjoys standing under Rule 41(e) when the victim of the search is the person against whom the search is directed. Furthermore, the Court stated its view that if the prosecution turned on illicit possession the accused automatically enjoys standing. Id. at 263. Here, the search of the car and trunk was directed to the occupants of the car, and it cannot be denied that the subsequent prosecution of Harper for burglary may well have turned upon proof of possession of the items stolen. Thus, two hints supporting standing are satisfied.
On March 18, 1968, in the case of Simmons v. United States, the High Court ruled that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt, since to allow such to happen would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Simmons involved robbery, a non-possessory offense, and the Court’s holding, by necessary implication, extended the rationale of Jones to non-possessory crimes in which conviction might in large part depend upon introduction in evidence of the property seized. Standing to object to the search was assumed in such circumstance.
In any event, the search took place at a time when the police did not have lawful custody of the car [cf. Cooper v. California, supra; Harris v. United States, supra] and while investigating only traffic irregularities. The overwhelming weight of case law holds that a car may not be searched for an ordinary traffic offense. People v. Blodgett, 293 P.2d 57 (Cal. 1956); People v. Mayo, 166 N.E.2d 440 (Ill. 1960); People v. Zeigler, 100 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1960); Barnes v. State, 130 N.W.2d 264 (Wis. 1964). The occupants of the car, although stolen (which fact the officers did not then know), had a paramount right to possession and were entitled to object to the search.
My Brothers appear to rely heavily upon the driver’s consent *243to the search. The case before us is not the driver’s case. The passenger (Harper) did not consent to anything. His constitutional rights are his alone and may not be obliterated by the conduct or words of a companion. In my view, the only significant issue in this case is whether the search may fairly be deemed incident to the felony arrests which soon followed. I turn to consider that subject.
2. The prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment are enforcible against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Warrants for either searches or arrests shall not issue except upon probable cause. NRS 171.235 suits the constitutional standard since it restricts the authority of an officer to make a felony arrest without a warrant to offenses committed in his presence, or to instances where he has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony. The validity of an arrest for a felony not committed in the officer’s presence depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest is made, he had probable cause to make it. Such cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that a felony has been committed by the person arrested. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Nootenboom v. State, 82 Nev. 329, 418 P.2d 490 (1966).
We have related the circumstances leading up to the arrests of appellant. Without question, the officers had probable cause to arrest for a felony after receiving the first radioed information from police control. The thrust of appellant’s contention, however, is that the arrest occurred the moment the car was stopped and the occupants detained, at which instant the police officers did not have reasonable cause to believe that the occupants had committed a felony, or were then committing one, because the irregular driving, absence of license plates, and the occupants’ glances to the rear did not supply probable cause for a felony arrest. This contention is wide of the mark, since it fails to recognize the distinction between probable cause to stop and detain for investigation and probable cause for arrest. Although it is true that the Supreme Court in Henry v. United States, supra, held that an arrest occurs when an automobile is stopped during the course of a criminal investigation — and if the officer does not have reasonable cause to arrest the occupant at that time, the arrest is unlawful — the Court took care to limit its holding to the “purposes of this case.” 361 U.S. at 103. The Court did not pretend to establish the moment of arrest for all car stopping cases in all circumstances, nor may *244that opinion sensibly be read to outlaw, in appropriate circumstances, the right of the police to stop a car and make inquiry incident to a legitimate investigation.
The distinction between probable cause to stop and detain for legitimate investigation, and probable cause for arrest, is clearly expressed in People v. Mickelson, 380 P.2d 658 (Cal. 1963). In noting that the Henry conclusion was neither constitutionally compelled by the Fourth Amendment nor preventative of reasonable state rules consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the California court stated: “* * * circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may still justify an officer’s stopping pedestrians or motorists on the streets for questioning. * * * Should the investigation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, the officer may arrest the suspect and conduct a reasonable incidental search.” Id. at 660.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid brief detention for limited inquiry. Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9 Cir. 1965); Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9 Cir. 1966); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9 Cir. 1966); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9 Cir. 1967). In Wilson, supra, the court wrote: “Granting that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures makes no distinction between informal detention without cause and formal arrest without cause, there is a difference between that ‘cause’ which will justify informal detention short of arrest and the probable cause standard required to justify that kind of custody traditionally denominated an arrest. * * * We take it as settled that there is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purposes of limited inquiry in the course of routine police investigations. * * * [D]ue regard for the practical necessities of effective law enforcement requires that the validity of brief, informal detention be recognized whenever it appears from the totality of the circumstances that the detaining officers could have had reasonable grounds for their action. A founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing.” 361 F.2d at 415.
Here, the erratic driving, absence of plates, and furtive glances to the rear gave the officers ample cause to stop the car and inquire further. Cf. People v. Reulman, 396 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1964). Their inquiry- — did the driver have a license and a dealer’s report of sale — produced neither and prompted the officers to run a check on the ownership of the car. The radioed *245information from police control furnished ample cause for the larceny arrests which were then made. Schnepp v. State, 82 Nev. 257, 415 P.2d 619 (1966); Gordon v. State, 83 Nev. 177, 426 P.2d 424 (1967); Foy v. State, 84 Nev. 76, 436 P.2d 811 (1968).
A search and seizure without a warrant and unrelated to the arrest both as to time and place is unlawful since it is not incident to the arrest. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Thurlow v. State, 81 Nev. 510, 406 P.2d 918 (1965); Whitley v. State, 79 Nev. 406, 386 P.2d 93 (1963). On the other hand, if the search is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest, it is deemed to be incident to the arrest and constitutionally permissible. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
Here, the search of the car and trunk were substantially contemporaneous with the arrest made, confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest, and within constitutional limits.1 The items then seized were admissible at trial.
The appellant’s status as a passenger does not insulate him from the consequences flowing from the initial stopping of the car. Although probable cause to stop and detain for the traffic violation ran only to the driver, the passenger is also subject to arrest if an independent ground exists therefor. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 591 (1948). That ground was established upon receipt of the radioed information.
At the time of booking the police took the appellant’s sweater and a checkbook found on his person. These items were properly received in evidence upon the authority of Nootenboom v. State, 82 Nev. 329, 418 P.2d 490 (1966), and Arabia v. State, 82 Nev. 453, 421 P.2d 952 (1966). In Nootenboom we observed that arresting officers are not obliged to undress the subject in public in order to secure his clothes and other identifying objects. In Arabia, we noted that during the period of police custody, an arrested person’s personal effects, like his person, are subject to reasonable inspection, examination, and test. The purposes of the Fourth Amendment are not offended by the sequestration of property at the time of booking. It is my opinion that Fourth Amendment protections were not violated.

Tn Wyatt v. State, 77 Nev. 490, 367 P.2d 104 (1961), we stated: “* * * but a search incident to an arrest made before or after the arrest is reasonable.” Id. at 502.