Court Opinion

ID: 9538329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:34:56.341039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:45.026277
License: Public Domain

*698BUTTLER, J.,
concurring opinion.
I concur in the majority opinion because I agree that the trial court’s supplemental instruction defining the word, "transverse,” deprived defendant of an opportunity to explain, either by testimony or by argument, that the word’s use in the operating records — "transverse plane osteotomy”— was not inconsistent with defendant’s testimony that he used the "Austin procedure.” Absent that opportunity, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant was not truthful. Whether defendant’s explanation, if any, would be persuasive, would be for the jury, but as the matter was left here, the jury was given the impression that the two procedures were different.
Because I agree that the judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial, the other assignments of error become important. The focus of most of the defendant’s claims of error is on the proposition that his performance, as a podiatrist, is to be judged by the degree of skill and care required by an ordinary podiatrist in Eugene or similar community under similar circumstances. The majority agree with that proposition. 48 Or App at 693.1 do not. If the majority is correct on that point, it would seem to follow that the orthopedic surgeons who testified for plaintiff were not competent to do so because they could not say they were familiar with the standard of skill required of an ordinary podiatrist in Eugene or a similar community.
In agreeing with defendant, the majority state (note 3) that they cannot reconcile the holding in Sutton v. Cook, 254 Or 116, 458 P2d 402 (1969) with Dowell v. Mossberg, 226 Or 173, 355 P2d 624, 359 P2d 541 (1961). However, there is a clear distinction, and the Supreme Court has made it. Sutton is the same kind of case as Sheppard v. Firth, 215 Or 268, 334 P2d 190 (1959), relied on by the court in Sutton. In both cases, the plaintiff consulted a chiropractor for a skeletal problem and received manipulative treatments for which chiropractors are trained and known, *699and in each case the court held that the defendant was entitled to have his method of treatment tested by the standards of care and skill applicable to the school to which he belonged. Sheppard was decided in 1959 and Sutton was decided in 1969; between those two decisions, the Supreme Court decided Dowell in 1961 wherein the defendant chiropractor held himself out as a general diagnostician, but misdiagnosed the plaintiff’s diabetes. The Court stated the general rule as set forth in Sheppard, but then pointed out the exception that arises when the methods of treatment for a particular ailment are generally the same in either school of medicine. Much of the Court’s language is quoted in the majority opinion. 48 Or App at 690-91.
Although there is language in Dowell which might be confusing, it must be remembered that defendant was appealing and only assigned error to the admission of testimony from medical doctors, not to the jury instructions.1 The Court affirmed, saying:
"* * * So long as a chiropractor claims competence to diagnose diabetes, there is no reason in law or logic why he should not be held to the same degree of skill and care as medical doctors in that diagnostic procedure.” 226 Or at 186.
The plaintiff in Sutton relied on Dowell for the proposition just quoted. The Court, however, pointed out the distinction between Dowell and Sheppard, holding that Sheppard controlled there because the defendant chiropractor did not hold himself out as anything other than a practitioner of chiropractic.
*700Here we have a Dowell type case. The defendant held himself out as a "surgical podiatrist,” and the surgical procedures employed were those employed by orthopedic surgeons in performing a bunionectomy. Under these facts, the defendant must exercise the same degree of care and skill as those with whom he seeks to compete. Dowell, supra, at 186. Having come to that conclusion, I have no problem with the admission of the testimony of the two orthopedic surgeons.
As the majority opinion stands, on retrial the jury will be instructed that defendant’s performance is to be judged by the degree of skill and care required by an ordinary podiatrist in Eugene or similar community under similar circumstances. If plaintiff loses, we will have the question squarely presented to us, and there is no reason not to face the issue now.

 The Court in Dowell, after deciding that a chiropractor, under the circumstances related, should be held to the same degree of skill and care as medical doctors, stated:
"The jury found that the defendant did not exercise that degree of skill and care required of an ordinary chiropractor in the community.” 226 Or at 186.
Because the defendant was appealing, obviously he did not complain about an instruction which fixed the standard of care he must meet; it appears that the trial court had instructed the jury that the standard was that of an ordinary chiropractor in a community.