Court Opinion

ID: 9603810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:09:53.595969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:08.505848
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The State asks this court to declare that a police officer’s discovery of a concealed compartment in a pickup truck gives rise to probable cause to search as a matter of law. The State’s position is that it is so common for concealed compartments to be used to hide contraband that the discovery of such a compartment, without any other indicia of criminal activity, gives an officer probable cause to search without a warrant. In the alternative, the State argues that a totality-of-circumstances analysis requires reversal, even without a per se rule, on the facts of this case. The majority has essentially acceded to both of these arguments.
To determine whether the discovery of a concealed compartment in a pickup truck gives rise to probable cause to continue a warrantless search, it is necessary to review our case law under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Article I, section 14 is implicated if we find that “ ‘a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched.’ ” State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (quoting United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Cir.1985)). This court in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990),1 applied this expectation-of-privacy concept to vehicles, saying that “a constitutional privacy interest exists in the interior of an automobile.” Id. at 466. In the instant ease, I conclude that defendants had reasonable expectations of privacy. Wood produced not only a driver’s license and a valid registration, but also an authori*538zation letter from the vehicle’s owner. The protections of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution therefore apply to this case.
Once article I, section 14 is implicated, the next inquiry is whether a warrant is required. In applying article I, section 14 to vehicle searches, this court requires warrants whenever possible. Id. at 469-70. When a warrantless search is reviewed for validity, this court has historically “required both probable cause and exigent circumstances.” Id. at 470. The State argues that probable cause was established as a matter of law by Mangleson’s testimony before the trial court that during his extensive training and experience in drug interdiction, he has learned that hidden compartments in vehicles are frequently used to conceal contraband. Such testimony, with no empirical data to support it, is insufficient to support a rule of law. This court has no principled basis on which it may conclude that hidden compartments in vehicles are used exclusively or even frequently to conceal contraband. That is an assertion of statistical fact susceptible to verification. It seems equally likely to me that open-bed vehicle owners use hidden compartments to secure their jewelry, hunting equipment, cameras, tools, and other valuables since there is typically little or no other storage space for such items in these vehicles. A concealed compartment in the bed of a pickup truck would seem to perform the same function as a trunk in a passenger vehicle. In any event, the anecdotal testimony of one police officer does not amount to sufficient proof to the contrary.2
The State cites to, and the majority relies on, a number of federal cases holding that the observation of a concealed compartment in a vehicle was sufficient to establish probable cause to search further. These cases primarily deal either with border searches for illegal aliens where the courts relied on the totality of circumstances and the plain-view exception or with standard procedure boat searches by the U.S. Coast Guard where there was similar reliance on the totality of circumstances, the plain-view exception, and reduced expectations of privacy. The State erroneously asserts that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that an officer’s lawful discovery of a concealed compartment large enough to hold and conceal illegal aliens, standing alone, suffices to establish probable cause to search the compartment. My review of these cases reveals that in all instances, the discovery of the compartment was only one of several factors required to establish probable cause to search the concealed compartment itself. In United States v. Price, 869 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.1989), for example, the case did not turn solely on the discovery of a hidden compartment, but rather on several factors: the border patrol agent’s previous experience with El Camino hidden compartments, the driver’s hesitancy to answer citizenship questions, the admitted lack of vehicle ownership, and observations made in plain view during a legal visual inspection,3 including such things *539as a spare tire removed from its normal location, a foam pad wall behind the front seat, burn marks on the corners of the truck bed revealing bare steel, a secret compartment, and a hole in the compartment that revealed what appeared to be wrapping tape. Id. at 803.
In United States v. Garcia, 616 F.2d 210 (5th Cir.1980), a border patrolman conducted a visual inspection of a truck at a checkpoint and in plain view discovered, in addition to a concealed compartment large enough to hold a human being, a floor mat between the cab and the bed of the truck, four new bolts in the truck bed, brick shapes seen through cracks in the compartment, and a plastic trash bag hanging from the bottom of the truck. When he touched the bag, he saw seeds and smelled marijuana. Id. at 211-12. Again, the compartment alone did not establish probable cause to search further. And importantly, while the officer conducted a lawful visual border search, his discovery and subsequent search of the secret compartment were justified under the plain-view doctrine. Id. at 212 (citing United States v. Arredondo-Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir.1978)). In the instant case, arguably even the compartment itself was not in plain view because Mangleson had to take measurements and remove items from the truck bed to confirm his suspicion, and it is not established that the existence of the hidden compartment would have been visible to any curious passerby. See id.
In United States v. Arredondo-Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir.1978), a border patrolman premised his decision to search an inadvertently discovered hidden compartment 4 on three factors: a structural discrepancy in plain view large enough to conceal a person, a major concern about illegal entries through a permanent checkpoint stop, and his professional experience. Id. at 1315. Even Arredondo-Hemandez required more than the discovery of a concealed compartment and the officer’s experience to satisfy the totality-of-circumstanees test. Probable cause was found because the patrolman’s training in detecting structural discrepancies was supported by the fact that the detection event took place near a border “that has served as a point of illegal entry for many aliens in the past.” Id. at 1315 n. 3.
In United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924, 111 S.Ct. 1318, 113 L.Ed.2d 251 (1991), after stopping a truck driver for speeding and then questioning the driver about the identity of the registered owner, the officer suspected that the vehicle was stolen. With the driver’s consent, the officer then searched the truck and discovered that the truck bed had been modified. Id. at 443. Even if the defendant had not consented to the search, the officer’s search was valid because the defendant could not show that he had gained lawful possession of the truck from the registered owners and thus lacked standing to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 445. This is not the case here, where defendants had lawful possession of their truck and hence a reasonable expectation of privacy. In contrast to Arango, Bushnell and Mangleson continued their search of the hidden compartment after defendants withdrew their consent.
Finally, in United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991), and United States v. Lopez, 761 F.2d 632, 636-37 (11th Cir.1985), the permissibility of searches into hidden compartments was based on findings that there was no expectation of privacy to prevent searches conducted pursuant to legitimate safety inspections. In *540the instant case, defendants were justified in their expectation of privacy.
I would therefore reject the State’s request to formulate a per se rule of probable cause to search any concealed compartment in a pickup truck, which I think the majority opinion accomplishes de facto. I likewise reject the majority’s assertion that the facts in this case establish probable cause after an evaluation of all available information in light of the existing circumstances. See State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The search occasioned by the initial suspicion of a DUI offense uncovered no supporting evidence that would lead a “ ‘prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer ... guided by his experience and training’ ” to believe that he should continue a search. Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088 (quoting United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C.Cir.1972)). As defendants point out, the officers determined that the driver was tired and that the steering in the vehicle was loose, both plausible explanations for the “weaving” of the vehicle that occasioned the stop. On further investigation, neither weapons, odors, nor any visible evidence of any contraband was discovered. Under these circumstances, I conclude that the discovery of a concealed compartment, without more, would have led a prudent, reasonable, and cautious police officer to release defendants.
Probable cause for this search did not exist. I would affirm.

. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart criticizes my citation to State v. Larocco on the ground that the views expressed in that opinion do not represent the views of a majority of this court. While it is true that the lead opinion in Larocco was joined only by me and Justice Zimmerman, the views expressed in that opinion have since been adopted by a majority of the court. In State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), a four-member majority of the court cited Larocco with approval and specifically endorsed the exclusionary rule recognized in Larocco. Id. at 416, 418-19 (holding that article I, section 14 protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures of bank records and that illegally seized records must be suppressed). Moreover, the Thompson court stated that it was entirely appropriate "to give article I, section 14 a different interpretation from that given the fourth amendment.” Id. at 416 (citing State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988)).

. The majority takes comfort in the following additional circumstances: (1) The truck had a "significant and unusual” alteration in its bed which concealed a secret compartment; (2) it was traveling a known drug trafficking route; (3) the officer had seen other "false beds” that have contained contraband; (4) a passenger possessed a large amount of cash; (5) defendants seemed nervous; and (6) a wrench in the truck’s cab fit the bolt to the hidden compartment. My response to those circumstances is that they are entirely neutral in their impact on probable cause. (1) If the truck's alteration was so obvious, it did not in fact conceal the presence of the compartment. (2) The highway in question is the only major route available to anyone traveling between Utah and southern California. It may be heavily used by drug traffickers, but it is also used by all innocent drivers moving between those destinations. (3) Officer Mangleson’s testimony that other similar false beds contained contraband in his experience was simply not probative. I assume officers consistently find contraband in back seats, automobile trunks, and back-packs on the floor. That fact, by itself, cannot give rise to probable cause to search a particular car, trunk, or pack. (4) Most travelers carry cash. (5) Most people are nervous when stopped by highway patrol officers. (6) The officers claimed to be able to discern the existence of the hidden compartment from the construction of the truck bed; it should be no cause for surprise that a tool existed for accessing it. This is just another justification for warrantless searches of any "hidden compartment,” a result which I believe the majorily opinion will permit.

. In United States v. Price, 869 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir.1989), the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the border patrol agents lacked probable cause to search his vehicle. The court stated that “the Supreme Court held that a border *539patrol agent stationed at a permanent immigration checkpoint may stop a vehicle at the primary inspection site, question its occupants concerning their citizenship and conduct a visual inspection of the vehicle without any individualized suspicion that the car or its occupants are involved in a crime.” Id. at 803 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-62, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083-85, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)). Unlike a vehicle stop requiring articulable suspicion to detain, a border agent is permitted to visually inspect the vehicle beyond the initial purpose of the detention and without consent.

. The court stated, "There is no suggestion that his observation of the structural discrepancy was anything but inadvertent.” United States v. Arredondo-Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1312, 1315 (5th Cir. 1978). Mangleson’s discovery of the hidden compartment in this case cannot be characterized as inadvertent.