Court Opinion

ID: 9961702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 16:00:54.177685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:22.657922
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KRISTIN HART, individually and as           No. 22-17008
co-successor-in-interest to Decedent
KYLE HART; E.H., individually and              D.C. No.
as co-successor-in-interest to Decedent     4:21-cv-02653-
KYLE HART; W.H., individually and                YGR
as co-successor-in-interest to Decedent
KYLE HART,
                                              OPINION
               Plaintiffs-Appellees,

 v.

CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, a
municipal corporation; DANIEL
MULHOLLAND, individually and in
his capacity as Chief of Police for the
CITY OF REDWOOD CITY;
ROMAN GOMEZ, individually and in
his official capacity as a Police Officer
for the CITY OF REDWOOD CITY;
LEILA VELEZ, individually and in
her official capacity as a Police Officer
for the CITY OF REDWOOD CITY,

               Defendants-Appellants.
2                 HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

       Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Northern District of California
     Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted February 12, 2024
                 San Francisco, California

                      Filed April 19, 2024

    Before: Eric D. Miller, Bridget S. Bade, and Lawrence
                  VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

                  Opinion by Judge VanDyke

                          SUMMARY *

             Deadly Force/Qualified Immunity

   The panel reversed the district court’s denial, on
summary judgment, of qualified immunity to City of
Redwood City Police Officer Gomez in an action alleging
constitutional and state law violations arising from the
deadly shooting of Kyle Hart.
    Officers Gomez and Velez responded to a call involving
a man attempting suicide with a knife in his backyard. When
they arrived, they found the man’s wife covered in blood and
frantically pleading for help. At her urging, the officers went
to the backyard, where they found Hart holding a

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                 HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                 3

knife. They told him to drop the knife, but instead of doing
so he began moving towards them with the knife raised. As
Hart neared the officers, Officer Velez deployed her taser,
but it was ineffective. With Hart approaching closely and
wielding a knife, Officer Gomez shot and killed him.
   As an initial matter, the panel held that it had jurisdiction
because both whether the disputed facts were material and
whether qualified immunity applied were questions of law
subject to the court’s jurisdiction.
    The panel held that Officer Gomez was entitled to
qualified immunity. Plaintiffs failed to show that Officer
Gomez’s conduct was objectively unreasonable and
therefore a violation of Hart’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Hart posed an immediate threat when he rapidly
approached the officers brandishing a knife and refusing
commands to drop it. Moreover, even if Officer Gomez’s
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, he would still be
entitled to qualified immunity because the conduct did not
violate clearly established law. None of the cases plaintiffs
identified would have put Officer Gomez on notice that his
actions in this case would be unlawful.

                         COUNSEL

Benjamin Nisenbaum (argued), John L. Burris, and Ayana
C. Curry, Burris Nisenbaum Curry & Lacy LLP, Oakland,
California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Kevin E. Gilbert (argued) and Carolyn M. Aguilar, Orbach
Huff & Henderson LLP, Pleasanton, California; Mark G.
Bonino and Donald L. Hall, III, Hayes Scott Bonino
Ellingson Guslani Simonson & Clause LLP, San Carlos,
4               HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

California; Stephen P. Ellingson, Hayes Scott Bonino
Ellingson & McLay LLP, Redwood City, California; for
Defendants-Appellants.

                         OPINION

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:

    Officers Gomez and Velez responded to a tragic call
involving a man attempting suicide with a knife in his
backyard. When they arrived, they found the man’s wife
covered in blood and frantically pleading for help. At her
urging, the officers went to the backyard, where they found
Hart holding a knife. They told him to drop the knife, but
instead of doing so he began moving towards them while
raising the knife. As Hart neared the officers, Officer Velez
deployed her taser, but it was ineffective. With Hart
approaching closely and wielding a knife, Officer Gomez
took action to protect himself and his partner, shooting Hart.
Medical assistance was called for Hart, but he ultimately
passed away in the emergency room. Hart’s family brought
suit alleging that Gomez, Velez, and the City of Redwood
City violated their and Hart’s constitutional and state law
rights. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, and as relevant here, the district court found that
Officer Gomez was not entitled to qualified immunity.
    We conclude that the district court erred in denying
qualified immunity.      As an initial matter, we have
jurisdiction over the case because both whether disputed
facts are material and whether qualified immunity applies
are questions of law subject to our jurisdiction. And Officer
Gomez is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs
                  HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                      5

have failed to show either that his conduct was objectively
unreasonable, and therefore a violation of Hart’s Fourth
Amendment rights, or that such rights were clearly
established by precedent existing at the time of the conduct.
                                  I.
    On December 10, 2018, plaintiff Kristin Hart (Plaintiff,
and together with her children, Plaintiffs) heard one of her
two children crying and called out to her husband Kyle Hart
(Hart) to help comfort the child. When she did not hear a
response, Plaintiff went into the kitchen to check on Hart and
found him using a “serrated utility knife” to cut at his own
throat while their son watched. Plaintiff told Hart “many
times” to stop cutting himself; Hart lowered the knife several
times, but each time resumed cutting himself.
    Eventually, Plaintiff managed to take the knife from
Hart. She began searching for her cell phone to call 911, but
when she could not find it, Hart gave her his phone. She
called 911, but as she did Hart retrieved a different knife and
again began cutting at his throat. Plaintiff told the 911
dispatcher that her husband was committing suicide by
cutting his throat and his wrists. While she was on the
phone, her husband went into the backyard, and continued to
cut himself on the throat, arms, and chest.
    Officers Roman Gomez and Leila Velez were the first to
arrive on the scene. Plaintiff met them in the front yard,
uninjured, but covered in blood and frantically pleading for
them to help Hart. Because Gomez was senior, he took the
lead and instructed Velez “to go less lethal with the taser”
while he “would go lethal with [his] firearm.” 1 The officers

1
 Another officer was enroute with a “40 millimeter less lethal” weapon
but did not arrive until some time later.
6               HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

asked Plaintiff where Hart was and immediately ran in the
direction she pointed.
    The officers took a narrow, muddy path on the left side
of the house to reach the backyard. Gomez took the lead,
holding his firearm “low ready” while Velez came behind
him with her taser. Plaintiff followed behind them. While
the parties agree on the broad strokes of what happened next,
their testimonies vary regarding certain details.
    Gomez stated that he approached the backyard from the
“middle left” side of the pathway to give himself a better
view of the yard as he rounded the corner. Although he did
not look to see Velez’s position behind him, he assumed that
because he was to the left, she was behind him and to his
right. Velez, on the other hand, stated that she was on
Gomez’s left side, rather than his right. They found Hart
standing in the backyard holding a knife. Plaintiff stated that
Hart was standing in the back corner of the backyard,
holding the knife to his throat. Gomez said that the first time
he saw Hart, the man was standing on the other side of some
patio furniture and a small child’s play structure, facing
away from them and holding the knife down from his side.
Velez indicated that Hart was facing them and holding the
knife out at shoulder height.
    Gomez yelled “drop the knife” twice. Instead of
dropping the knife, Hart began moving towards the officers
while still holding the knife. Plaintiff remembered seeing
Hart move toward the officers, but at that point she realized
her children were unattended, so she left to check on them.
Plaintiff did not see the shooting. Gomez said that Hart came
towards them at a slow run, holding the knife out towards
the officers, going from thirty feet away to eight or ten feet
away in “approximately five seconds.” Velez characterized
                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                 7

Hart’s pace as a “brisk walk.” What is not disputed—and
was recognized by Plaintiffs’ own expert—is that Hart went
from his starting position across the yard to where he
eventually ended up only a few feet from the officers in less
than 5.9 seconds.
     The officers did not warn Hart that they would shoot, but
with him approaching and wielding a knife, they took action
to protect themselves. Velez testified that she fired her taser
at Hart before any shots were fired. She said that Hart was
still upright and holding the knife up at them when she fired
the taser. One taser probe struck Hart on the left side of his
head, and the other missed, passing Hart and landing 17 feet
away from the officers. Because contact with both probes is
required for the taser to function, the taser had no effect on
Hart.
    Velez testified that Gomez only fired after the taser
failed to make contact with Hart. Gomez, however, stated
that he fired his “firearm simultaneously to when Officer
Velez fired her taser.” Regardless of the timing, the taser
was ineffectual, and Gomez fired five shots, striking Hart
three times in the upper torso. Velez stated that, after Hart
was shot, he fell to the ground five feet to her left; Gomez
stated that Hart fell at his feet. Paramedics were already
enroute when Gomez requested medical assistance. The
paramedics transported Hart to an emergency room, but he
was ultimately pronounced dead.
    While there are some discrepancies regarding the details
of the incident, the material facts are not in dispute. When
Officers Gomez and Velez arrived at Hart’s residence,
Plaintiff was covered in blood and frantic. At her urging, the
officers went along the side of the house to the backyard,
where they found Hart holding a knife. Gomez told Hart to
8                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

“drop the knife.” Instead of complying, Hart began moving
towards the officers while still holding the knife. As
corroborated by the officers’ testimony, Plaintiffs’ expert,
and the 911 call recording, Hart crossed the backyard to
within a few feet of the officers in less than 5.9 seconds.
Viewing Hart—who advanced on them with a knife—as an
imminent threat, 2 Velez fired her taser, but this was
ineffective because only one probe made contact with Hart.
Gomez fired five shots, striking Hart three times in the upper
torso. Hart fell to the ground near the officers, was provided
emergency medical assistance, but was pronounced
deceased upon arrival at an emergency room.
    In April 2021, Plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging
that Gomez, Velez, their chief of police, and the City of
Redwood City (collectively, Defendants) violated their and
Hart’s constitutional and state law rights. The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, which the district
court denied except as to certain claims asserted against
Velez under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Relevant to this appeal, the
district court found that the officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity.
    In making this determination, the district court relied on
this court’s previous statement that “[e]very police officer
should know that it is objectively unreasonable to shoot …
[1] an unarmed man who: [2] has committed no serious
offense, [3] is mentally or emotionally disturbed, [4] has
been given no warning of the imminent use of such a
significant degree of force, [5] poses no risk of flight, and
[6] presents no objectively reasonable threat to the safety of
the officer or other individuals.” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272

2
  At his deposition, Plaintiffs’ expert conceded that Hart posed an
imminent threat to the officers.
                 HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                  9

F.3d 1272, 1285 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court found,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, that
these factors were met because “Hart had committed no
offense, was suicidal, was not a flight risk, did not pose a
threat to others, and a dispute exists regarding whether an
adequate warning that force would be used by the officers
was given.” While it was undisputed that Hart was holding
a knife, the district court found that “he was not necessarily
‘armed’ as the term is commonly understood.” The district
court further concluded that, even if Hart was armed, under
the law at the time of the incident, it may have still been
unreasonable for Gomez to use lethal force on the basis that
Hart may have been mentally unstable. Vos v. City of
Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2018).
    Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal in December
2022, appealing only the Fourth Amendment claim. We
therefore do not address the state law claims.
                               II.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Courts
“normally have no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals
from the denial of summary judgment … [b]ut an exception
arises where the movant was denied summary judgment
based on qualified immunity.” Isayeva v. Sacramento
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations
omitted). Such denials of qualified immunity are considered
“final decisions” under the collateral order doctrine because
qualified immunity is immunity from suit itself and so would
not be properly vindicated by an appeal after final judgment.
Id. at 944–45. We review “the district court’s conclusions
regarding qualified immunity de novo” and consider
“disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Id. at 946.
10              HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

                             III.
    The district court erred in denying Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on the ground that Officer Gomez is
not entitled to qualified immunity. As an initial matter, we
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal even though a purported
dispute of material facts exists because determining the
materiality of disputed facts is a question of law over which
we have jurisdiction. And in light of the undisputed material
facts, Officer Gomez is entitled to qualified immunity
because Plaintiffs have shown neither (1) that Officer
Gomez’s conduct was objectively unreasonable and
therefore a violation of Hart’s Fourth Amendment rights, nor
(2) that such rights were clearly established by precedent
existing at the time of the conduct.
                             A.
    That a purported dispute of material facts exists is not
enough to divest us of our jurisdiction in this case. See
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312–13 (1996). If it were,
then every denial of summary judgment based upon
“controverted issues of material fact” would be
“nonappealable.”        Id.     But “summary judgment
determinations are appealable when they resolve a dispute
concerning an abstract issue of law relating to qualified
immunity,” even when the underlying conduct is
controverted. Id. at 313 (internal citation and quotations
omitted). “In other words, we have jurisdiction to review an
issue of law determining entitlement to qualified immunity—
even if the district court’s summary judgment ruling also
contains an evidence-sufficiency determination—but not to
accede to a defendant’s request that we review that evidence-
sufficiency determination on appeal.” Estate of Anderson v.
Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2021).
                 HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                11

    While appellate review “does not extend to claims in
which the determination of qualified immunity depends on
disputed issues of material fact,” “any issue of law, including
the materiality of the disputed issues of fact, is a permissible
subject for appellate review.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d
895, 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2001). Once the materiality of the
facts is determined, we “assume[] the version of the material
facts asserted by the non-moving party to be correct.” Id. at
905 (quoting Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th
Cir. 2000)). And in doing so, we may “consider facts offered
by the defendant that are uncontradicted by any evidence in
the record.” Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir.
2023) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Wilkinson v.
Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010)).
    So here we have jurisdiction to both (1) determine
whether the disputed facts are material and (2) consider
whether Office Gomez is entitled to qualified immunity when
the material facts are viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs.
                              B.
    Officer Gomez is entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit
unless “(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional
right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly
established at the time.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.
658, 664 (2012)). In this case, there are some factual disputes
(though not as many as Plaintiffs say). But as explained
below, they are not material. Ultimately, in the light of the
undisputed material facts, neither prong is satisfied.
12              HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

                              1.
    Officer Gomez’s actions were objectively reasonable. In
determining whether “the use of force is contrary to the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
seizures,” the Supreme Court has instructed us to inquire
“whether it would be objectively reasonable for the officer
to believe that the amount of force employed was required
by the situation he confronted.” Wilkins v. City of Oakland,
350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001)). To assess the reasonableness of
a particular use of force, we balance “‘the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests’ against ‘the countervailing government interests at
stake.’” Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.
2003) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989)).
    The nature of the intrusion here is a serious one. “The
intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is
unmatched.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
Because this is a clear intrusion of Hart’s Fourth
Amendment rights, our inquiry reduces to “whether the
governmental interests at stake were sufficient to justify it.”
Vos, 892 F.3d at 1031.
    The Supreme Court has provided three factors for
determining the strength of the government’s interest:
“[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at
396. The “most important” of these factors is “whether the
suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others.” Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1117
                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                13

(9th Cir. 2014); see also George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829,
838 (9th Cir. 2013).
                              a.
    Beginning with the most important factor, id., Hart posed
an immediate threat to Officer Gomez.                    “The
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490
U.S. at 396. So when determining whether Hart posed an
immediate threat to Officer Gomez, the perspective of an
officer on the scene must be considered.
    When Officers Gomez and Velez arrived, they walked
down a path to the backyard at the frantic urging of Plaintiff.
Plaintiffs emphasize minor differences in testimony between
Gomez and Velez as to where each stood relative to each
other on the path, i.e., whether Velez stood to Gomez’s right
or left. But which side of the path each officer stood on is
immaterial to the inquiry of whether Hart posed an immediate
threat to the officers.
     When the officers reached the backyard, they found Hart
standing in the yard holding a knife. Plaintiffs again attempt
to present a factual dispute, first noting that depending on
whose testimony is considered, Hart was either standing on
or behind a low dirt mound. But either way, Hart was initially
at most 37 feet away from the officers. Plaintiffs next dispute
how Hart was holding the knife. But they rely only on
testimony about how he was holding the knife when the
officers first encountered him. This is immaterial in light of
two undisputed facts: (1) Hart was holding a knife when they
first saw him and (2) Hart was holding the knife towards the
officers as he approached them. As Officer Gomez did not
employ lethal force until Hart approached them, how Hart
14                  HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

held the knife at that point is the material issue, and that issue
is undisputed in the record.
    Hart was non-communicative and failed to respond to or
comply with Gomez’s command to “drop the knife.” 3
Instead, he approached the officers, holding the knife out
towards them. Plaintiffs argue that whether Hart ran or
briskly walked towards the officers is material to whether he
posed a threat. But while this might be material under other
circumstances, whether Hart’s pace was specifically a run or
a brisk walk is immaterial given he crossed the yard to within
close range of the officers in less than 5.9 seconds. It is
undisputed that Officers Gomez and Velez literally had only
seconds to react to a non-responsive man quickly
approaching them with a knife. Officer Gomez’s decision to
fire was based on Hart’s failure to comply with commands,
his approach, and his possession of a lethal weapon.
Plaintiffs’ asserted factual disputes do not eliminate any of
these core, undisputed circumstances. These undisputed
facts are what led Officer Gomez to reasonably believe that
Hart posed an immediate threat to both himself and his
partner.
    This court has previously found it objectively reasonable
to view an individual as an immediate threat in similar
situations. For example, in Blanford v. Sacramento County,
this court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for an
officer to view an individual carrying a sword, attempting to
enter a home, and failing to comply with verbal commands

3
  Plaintiffs now contest whether Officer Gomez said this twice or only
once, based on the 911 dispatch recording. But Plaintiff herself testified
she heard Gomez say it twice, and it is difficult to hear the officers at all
on the 911 call recording. Regardless, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the
command was, in fact, given at least once.
                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                15

as an immediate threat, despite later determining that the
individual lived in that home and did not hear the officer’s
commands because he wore headphones. 406 F.3d 1110,
1116 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, Hart similarly wielded an edged
weapon and failed to comply with commands. And in Lal,
police officers were involved in a car chase that culminated
in a standoff where the individual, who had already hit
himself “with a stone,” approached them with a “football-
sized rock” held over his head. 746 F.3d at 1117. As here,
one officer requested less than lethal assistance, but they
were forced to take action before assistance arrived. Id. at
1114. This court held that the officers were justified in
believing that the individual approaching them with a blunt
weapon was an immediate threat. Id. at 1117. If anything,
here—where Hart carried a knife rather than a rock—the
threat was greater. If the individuals in Blanford and Lal
posed an immediate threat, it is difficult to conclude that
Hart did not.
    Plaintiffs make a number of arguments as to why Hart
did not present an immediate threat, but each is
unconvincing. Plaintiffs first argue that whether Hart was
running or briskly walking is critical to whether he presented
an immediate threat. But what is undisputed is that Hart
crossed the entirety of the “roomy backyard” in a matter of
seconds. So whether Hart was running or merely walking,
there is no dispute that he quickly closed the distance
between himself and Officer Gomez while wielding a lethal
weapon.
    In some tension with their argument that Hart was
moving too slowly to present a threat to the officers,
Plaintiffs also argue that the situation developed too quickly.
Plaintiffs argue that “constitutional violations” are routinely
found “when the shooting of an armed suspect happens
16              HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

quickly.” As Plaintiffs point out, this may be true when the
“officers themselves … unnecessarily create their own sense
of urgency,” S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1135
(9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and modifications
omitted), or where the police were quick to shoot despite
having significant time to plan their actions, see Vos, 892
F.3d at 1034. But here, the officers responded to an
emergency situation involving an armed individual. They
were immediately urged to help by the victim’s “very, very
upset” and “very animated” wife, who directed them to
Hart’s location. And Officer Gomez did not engage in lethal
force until Hart was approaching them with a knife held out
towards them. The officers were responding quickly to an
emergency, which led to a confrontation with a man who
approached them while wielding a knife and refused to drop
it when commanded. Nothing about the speed of events in
this case eliminated Hart’s immediate threat.
    Plaintiffs also argue that because Hart had already
harmed himself when the officers arrived, he presented less
of a threat. Plaintiffs cite Tan Lam v. City of Los Banos for
the proposition that one who is wounded may no longer
present an immediate threat. 976 F.3d 986, 999 (9th Cir.
2020). In Tan Lam, the individual stabbed an officer with
scissors. Id. The officer then shot the individual. Id. This
court found that first shot to be an objectively reasonable use
of force. Id. But then, after the individual “was injured and
was [no longer] approaching [the officer] with scissors,” the
officer shot him again. Id. (emphasis added). At that point,
this court determined that the individual was no longer an
immediate threat. Id. Perhaps if Hart’s injuries had made it
so he could no longer approach the officers with the knife,
then as in Tan Lam, Hart would not have been an immediate
threat. But it is uncontroverted that Hart was able to
                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                17

approach at least at a brisk walk, while wielding the knife in
front of him.
    Finally, Plaintiffs suggest that Hart was still “15 to 17
feet away” from the officers and falling to the ground when
they fired their weapons. This assertion is belied by the
record. Plaintiffs posit that because the taser probe that
missed Hart was found 15 to 17 feet away, Hart must have
been shot when he “was 15 to 17 feet away.” But the mere
fact that the errant barb landed 17 feet away is not evidence
that Hart himself was that far away. Consistent with the
officer’s testimony, Hart could have been significantly
closer and the taser barb simply flew past and landed beyond
him.
    Plaintiffs’ assertion that Hart was falling when the
officers first deployed their weapons likewise has no support
in the record. Plaintiffs appear to base this claim solely on a
misreading of the coroner’s report, but the coroner’s report
does not opine on the bullet’s trajectory in flight or Hart’s
position when struck. On the other hand, Defendants’ expert
opined without contradiction that “[t]he trajectory angle of
the wound is not consistent with someone whose back is
turned towards the officer,” and that Gomez “would have
stopped firing while Mr. Hart was still armed, still moving
towards them, and still upright.”
    In short, Hart was clearly an immediate threat to the
officers when he approached them while wielding the knife.
Plaintiffs’ own expert testified to this effect:

       Q. … Based upon your expert opinion and
          the information you reviewed, at any
          point did Mr. Hart pose an imminent
18                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

            threat to either Officer Veldez [sic],
            Officer Gomez, or anyone else?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And—let’s be more specific, then. At
           any point, did Mr. Hart pose an imminent
           threat to Officer Veldez [sic]?
        A. He—yes.
        Q. At any point, did Mr. Hart pose an
           imminent threat to Officer Gomez?
        A. Yes.
        Q. At what point did Mr. Hart pose an
           imminent threat to Officer Gomez and/or
           Officer Veldez [sic]?
        A. When Mr. Hart began to walk towards
           them, they could have viewed that as an
           imminent threat.

Plaintiffs point out that, notwithstanding this testimony, their
expert generally “was critical of the Officers’ conduct during
the incident.” But their expert’s other criticisms do not rebut
what he expressly acknowledged: “I believe [Hart] was a
threat to [the officers] when he had the knife in his hand. …
I believe that he presented an imminent threat to them.”
While the expert’s opinion that Hart posed an imminent
threat is not what makes it true, the larger point is that Hart’s
threat to the officers was so obvious that an adverse expert
had to concede it because a non-responsive individual
approaching while holding out a knife is unarguably an
immediate threat. This issue, which is the “most important
single element of the three specified [Graham] factors,”
Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1258 (9th Cir.
                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                19

2017) (quoting Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir.
1994)), renders Officer Gomez’s conduct objectively
reasonable, see Hayes v. County of San Diego, 736 F.3d
1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]hreatening an officer with a
weapon does justify the use of deadly force.”); Smith v. City
of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 704 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(stating that “where a suspect threatens an officer with a
weapon such as a gun or a knife, the officer is justified in
using deadly force”).
                              b.
    Even though the immediacy of the threat posed by Hart
as he approached with a knife is dispositive here, see Estate
of Hernandez by & through Hernandez v. City of Los
Angeles, No. 21-55994, 2024 WL 1203884, at *4–5 (9th Cir.
Mar. 21, 2024), the other Graham factors also arguably
support the reasonableness of Gomez’s conduct, and
certainly do not undermine it.
    The second factor is the severity of the crime at issue.
After encountering the police officers, Hart approached the
police officers while wielding a knife and refusing
commands to drop it. Hart’s approach while carrying a
deadly weapon may have constituted an assault on the police
officers. Cal. Penal Code §§ 217.1, 240 (defining “assault”
as “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to
commit a violent injury on the person of another”). He also
willfully resisted Officer Gomez’s commands to “drop the
knife,” a form of resisting arrest, and did so while exhibiting
20                 HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

a deadly weapon, both of which are also crimes in
California. 4 Cal. Penal Code §§ 148(a), 417.8.
    It is true that analyzing the severity of crimes committed
against the officers in a case like this ties this Graham factor
almost inextricably to the immediate threat factor. But that
is hardly surprising because many of the actions constituting
an immediate threat to others are also crimes. If someone is
actively murdering those around him, for example, he is both
committing a serious crime and posing an immediate threat
to anyone near him. The severity of the crime is thus very
often related to or the cause of the heightened and immediate
threat. See Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1258 (concluding that a
suspect posed an immediate threat in part because he was in
the process of committing burglary). This will often be the
case unless, unlike here, the crime committed is temporally
separate from the interaction with police. See Browder, 929
F.3d at 1136. Because the crimes Hart committed
contributed to the immediacy of his threat to Officers Gomez
and Velez, the second Graham factor does not weigh against

4
  California courts have concluded that California Penal Code Section
148 “penalizes even passive delay or obstruction of an arrest, such as
refusal to cooperate.” People v. Curtis, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 n.6 (Ct.
App. 1969), disapproved on another ground in People v. Gonzalez, 275
Cal. Rptr. 729, 750 (Ct. App. 1990). California courts have held that
Section 148 cannot be supposed to “criminalize[] a person’s failure to
respond with alacrity to police orders,” but where the suspect acts
defiantly, such passive obstruction has been held to satisfy Section 148.
In re Muhammed C., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21, 24 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation
omitted); see also In re J.C., 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503, 507 (Ct. App. 2014)
(concluding Section 148 was satisfied where the suspect “did not comply
with the officer’s order to sit down and calm down, or with his
subsequent order to submit peacefully to detention”). Here, Hart not
only failed to drop the knife when commanded, he affirmatively
approached the officers with the knife in defiance of that command.
                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY               21

the reasonableness of the use of force. See Ames v. King
Cnty., Washington, 846 F.3d 340, 348–49 (9th Cir. 2017)
(finding that the severity of the crime factor weighs in
defendant’s favor when the crime, even if minor in nature,
prolongs or exacerbates an ongoing emergency); Bernal v.
Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 73 F.4th 678, 692 (9th Cir.
2023) (same).
                              c.
    The final Graham factor is whether Hart was “actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. As discussed above, Hart failed
to comply with orders to drop the knife he carried. Plaintiffs
cite Bryan v. MacPherson in arguing that, while “passive
resistance” can support the use of force, “the level of force
an individual’s resistance will support is dependent on the
factual circumstances underlying that resistance.” 630 F.3d
805, 830 (9th Cir. 2010). We have also explained that “a
failure to fully or immediately comply with an officer’s
orders neither rises to the level of active resistance nor
justifies the application of a non-trivial amount of force.”
Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 881 (9th Cir. 2012).
    But here, Hart’s conduct objectively amounted to more
than mere “passive resistance.” Not only did Hart fail to
comply with the order to drop the knife, but importantly he
also approached the officers while brandishing that knife.
The circumstances in this case are therefore unlike Bryan
where the officer “was confronted with a half naked,
unarmed, stationary, apparently disturbed individual
shouting gibberish at a distance of approximately twenty
feet.” 630 F.3d at 828. Nor are they like those in Nelson,
where the plaintiff failed to leave when commanded, but
committed no other acts of aggression. 685 F.3d at 874.
22               HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

This case is also unlike Glenn v. Washington County, where
this court determined that the suspect did not actively resist
arrest because, although he “remained in possession of the
pocketknife despite officers’ commands to put it down,” he
“stayed in the same position from the time officers arrived
and took no threatening actions (other than noncompliance
with shouted orders).” 673 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir.
2011). Here, Hart was not simply holding a knife—he
approached the officers with the knife while failing to
comply with the officers’ commands. This active resistance
satisfies Graham’s final factor.
    Ultimately, it is the totality of the circumstances that lead
us to conclude that Graham’s standard is satisfied. See id.
at 872 (“We examine the totality of the circumstances and
consider whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a
particular case ….” (internal quotations and citation
omitted)). To repeat: if Hart had merely possessed a knife,
the use of deadly force would not have been justified here.
Likewise, Hart’s failure to comply with the officers’
commands, standing alone, would not have justified it. But
Hart failed to comply with the officers’ commands to drop
the knife and instead rapidly approached them while
wielding it. These facts, together, made Hart an immediate
threat to the officers and justified Officer Gomez’s use of
deadly force.
                               d.
    Besides the three Graham factors, Plaintiffs argue that
additional factors are relevant to the analysis, including the
officers’ pre-shooting conduct, the availability of less
intrusive alternatives, Hart’s apparent mental illness, and the
officers’ failure to warn that they would shoot.
                   HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                       23

    While California state law does factor pre-shooting
conduct into whether an officer acts “reasonably when using
deadly force,” Hayes, 305 P.3d at 256, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment is narrower and places less emphasis on pre[-
]shooting conduct,” Vos, 892 F.3d at 1037 (internal
quotations and modifications omitted). And though “[t]he
events leading up to the shooting, such as the officer’s
tactics, are encompassed in [the] facts and circumstances” a
court can consider, 5 Hung Lam v. City of San Jose, 869 F.3d
1077, 1087 (9th Cir. 2017), one cannot “establish a Fourth
Amendment violation based merely on bad tactics that result
in a deadly confrontation that could have been avoided,”
Billington v Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002),
abrogated on other grounds by County of Los Angeles v.
Mendez, 581 U.S. 420 (2017). Plaintiffs argue that pre-
shooting conduct is relevant to the Fourth Amendment
analysis, but when it comes to identifying what specific pre-
shooting conduct makes Officer Gomez’s conduct
objectively unreasonable, Plaintiffs simply argue that the
officers could have moved to a different location in the yard.
Plaintiffs point out that the backyard was roomy and had
patio furniture, and so the officers could have repositioned
and potentially put the patio table between themselves and
Hart. But even if they had repositioned within the backyard,

5
  While we sometimes consider pre-shooting conduct, other circuits do
not. See, e.g., Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 477 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“[T]he reasonableness of the officer’s actions in creating the dangerous
situation is not relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis; rather,
reasonableness is determined based on the information possessed by the
officer at the moment that force is employed.”); Gardner v. Buerger, 82
F.3d 248, 254 (8th Cir. 1996) (requiring that the plaintiff “must present
evidence that the seizure itself, not its prologue, was unreasonable”);
Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[P]re-seizure
conduct is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”).
24              HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

there is no evidence to indicate that Hart would have been
then unable to continue to approach them with the knife.
Plaintiffs cite their police practices expert, who opined that
“tactical repositioning is often utilized for officer safety.”
But the district court determined that the expert’s statement
that Gomez could have engaged in such “tactical
repositioning” was an impermissible opinion about the
“knowledge and state of mind of the officers,” and Plaintiffs
do not challenge this determination. Thus, Plaintiffs’
argument is based on speculation that repositioning in the
backyard was an available alternative in this case. This
speculation does not refute the officers’ testimony that the
condition of the side yard prevented them from retreating.
See Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create
a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment.”).
    Nor does Hart’s mental illness change the outcome in
this case. While “whether the suspect has exhibited signs of
mental illness is one of the factors the court will consider,”
this court has “refused to create two tracks of excessive force
analysis, one for the mentally ill and one for serious
criminals.” Crawford v. City of Bakersfield, 944 F.3d 1070,
1078 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Vos, 892 F3d at 1034 n.9).
Ultimately, that an individual who poses an immediate threat
may be mentally ill does not remove the case from the
Graham analysis performed above, and any mental health
crisis Hart experienced is considered in view of the
surrounding circumstances. Here, Hart approached the
officers while holding a knife after ignoring a command to
drop it. This case is therefore unlike Glenn, where our court
concluded that a jury could find an unreasonable use of force
when the mentally-ill suspect was holding a “pocketknife
with a three-inch blade, which he did not brandish at
                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY               25

anyone” and where that individual “stayed in the same
position from the moment the officers arrived and showed
no signs of attempting to move until after he was fired upon.”
673 F.3d at 873–74.
     Similarly, while “[o]ur cases demonstrate that officers
provide warnings, where feasible, even when the force used
is less than deadly,” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1284, a warning is
required only “where feasible,” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12;
see also Smith v. Agdeppa, 81 F.4th 994, 1006 (9th Cir.
2023). Here, given the speed at which the unfortunate events
unfolded, it was not unreasonable for Officer Gomez to
forgo a verbal warning and take action to protect himself and
his partner from an immediate threat.
                              2.
    Officer Gomez’s conduct did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, but even if it had, he would still be entitled to
qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly
established law. To deny qualified immunity, not only must
a constitutional right be violated, but that right must be
“clearly established” at the time. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62–63.
To be clearly established, there need not be “a case directly
on point, but existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). While in the “rare”
case a clearly established right may be obvious, clearly
establishing a right usually requires “‘controlling authority’
or a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’”
Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63, 64 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–
42). The burden is on Plaintiffs to make the showing,
Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 946, that “the right’s contours were
sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the
defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was
26               HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

violating it,” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018)
(citation omitted). As discussed below, none of the cases
Plaintiffs identify would have put Gomez on notice that his
actions in this case would be unlawful.
    Plaintiffs first point to Deorle. As an initial matter, the
Supreme Court has “instructed [us] not to read [our] decision
in [Deorle] too broadly in deciding whether a new set of facts
is governed by clearly established law.” Id. at 1154. Even
looking beyond this rare instruction from the Supreme Court
about how to apply our circuit’s own precedent, “the
differences between [Deorle] and the case before us leap
from the page.” City and County of San Francisco v.
Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 614 (2015). In Deorle, a police
officer fired a beanbag round into the face of a man who was
“unarmed, … had generally obeyed the instructions given
him by various police officers, and had not committed any
serious offense.” 272 F.3d at 1275. By contrast, Hart was
armed with a knife, failed to drop the knife when
commanded, and approached the officers while brandishing
the knife. Additionally, the officers in Deorle had “thirty to
forty minutes” to plan their course of action, id. at 1276,
while Gomez and Velez were responding quickly to an
emergency suicide situation. In light of the extensive
dissimilarities between this case and Deorle, extending
Deorle here would be directly at odds with the Supreme
Court’s instruction to read Deorle narrowly.
    Plaintiffs next rely on Vos, but that case is also factually
distinguishable. In Vos, the officers saw Vos standing inside
a 7-Eleven, yelling and “pretending to have a gun.” 892 F.3d
at 1029. The officers had about twenty minutes to plan their
action. Id. at 1029–30. Then, the officers—one bearing “a
40-millimeter less-lethal projectile launcher” while the others
had traditional firearms—entered the 7-Eleven to engage
                 HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                27

Vos. Id. When they did, he approached them while holding
what they initially believed to be scissors, but what turned out
to actually be a “pronged metal display hook.” Id. One
officer told Vos to “[d]rop the weapon,” but when he failed
to comply, they fired at him with both the less-lethal and
lethal weapons, striking him four times and killing him. Id.
    Our court in Vos held that “a reasonable jury could [have
found] that the force employed was greater than [was]
reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 1034 (internal
quotations omitted). In doing so, we relied in part on both
the fact that one of the officers was armed with a 40-
millimeter less-lethal firearm and the extended timeline
available to “coordinate a plan for their use of force.” Id. at
1033–34. Here, while an officer armed with a 40-millimeter
less lethal weapon was en route, he did not arrive before the
officers engaged with Hart. And unlike the situation in Vos,
in which police officers had twenty minutes to develop a
tactical plan, Officers Gomez and Velez were responding to
an emergency suicide situation in which time was of the
essence. They had only seventeen seconds from when they
arrived on the scene until Hart advanced towards them with
a knife. As such, the factual scenario Officers Gomez and
Velez faced was sufficiently different from that in Vos that
Gomez would not have been on notice from that case.
    Plaintiffs next suggest that, if Deorle and Vos fail to
clearly establish Gomez’s violation, Browder nonetheless
decides the issue. As an initial matter, Browder was decided
after the events of this case, so it could not have informed
Gomez that his conduct was unlawful. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
at 741 (requiring “existing precedent” to put “the statutory
or constitutional question beyond debate” (emphasis
added)). And even if Browder were relevant to whether the
law at issue here was clearly established, the facts of that
28              HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

case would similarly fail to clearly control this one. In
Browder, an officer arrived on the scene after an individual
(Nehad) had reportedly threatened a store employee with a
knife. 929 F.3d at 1130. When the officer first saw Nehad,
he found Nehad fiddling with something but “told …
investigators that he had not seen any weapons.” Id. at 1131.
Within five seconds, the officer fatally shot Nehad, who
turned out to have been carrying a blue pen. Id. In contrast
to Hart’s active suicide attempts and rapid movement toward
the officers, Nehad had not harmed himself or others. And
even though the officer later changed his story to the effect
that he thought Nehad had been carrying a knife, this
testimony was disputed, even by his own earlier statements.
Id. at 1133. Here, it is undisputed that Hart wielded a knife
as he approached the officers. As such, Browder could not
be read to clearly establish that Gomez’s conduct violated
Hart’s rights.
    Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the law was
clearly established. Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 946. None of the
cases Plaintiffs have identified—Deorle, Vos, or Browder—
put the “constitutional question beyond debate” that the
“violative nature of [Gomez’s] particular conduct [was]
clearly established.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42. As such,
Plaintiffs have failed to show that Hart’s rights were “clearly
established.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62–63 (quoting Reichle,
566 U.S. at 664).
    Because Plaintiffs have not shown that Officer Gomez’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable and therefore a
violation of Hart’s Fourth Amendment rights or that such
rights were clearly established by existing precedent, Officer
Gomez is entitled to qualified immunity.
                HART V. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY               29

                             IV.
    We have jurisdiction over this case because both whether
disputed facts are material and whether qualified immunity
applies are questions of law subject to our jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs have shown neither (1) that Officer Gomez’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable and therefore a
violation of Hart’s Fourth Amendment rights, nor (2) that
such rights were clearly established by precedent existing at
the time of the conduct. The district court therefore erred in
finding that Officer Gomez was not entitled to qualified
immunity.
   REVERSED.