Court Opinion

ID: 9775169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:46:48.876181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:22.128923
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge.
On motion for rehearing, the State contends for the first time that appellant waived his complaint to the search when he called two witnesses, after the State had rested, who testified regarding the fruits of the search to which he had previously objected.
Prior to calling his co-defendant, Sandra Chapman, appellant preserved his objection by expressly stating to the court that he was calling said witness only to refute the matters admitted over objection and not as a waiver of his constitutional rights. Consequently, we find no waiver since the constitutionally-based objection was held meritorious by this Court.
We now examine the testimony of the defense witness Dr. Ronald Lloyd Young. During direct examination appellant made use of State’s Exhibit No. 4 to show that no penetration had occurred. The State now argues that by making such use of the exhibit, appellant must be held to have waived his objection to the search.
Washington v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 484 S.W.2d 721, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921, 93 S.Ct. 1555, 36 L.Ed.2d 314, quotes the rule of law relied upon from Cook v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 409 S.W.2d 857, as follows:
“It is a general rule that an accused cannot complain of the admission of testimony when he later testified on direct examination to substantially the same facts.” (Emphasis added.)
This Court then applied the Cook rule to the facts in Washington, supra:
“The record reflects that the appellant testified to substantially the same facts contained in his remarks to the officer, to-wit, that he threw the gun away and that he shot his wife.” (Emphasis added.)
However, the rule in Cook and Washington relates to testimonial evidence rather than physical evidence. But even aside from this, the rule will not support the State’s argument since it is clear that the rule in Washington relies upon subsequent testimony of substantially the same facts, and not mere use. To better understand what a radical departure from past law would be accomplished by finding waiver of objection from subsequent mere use of the exhibit by appellant, we must examine such cases as concern application of the *174rule to searches rather than purely testimonial evidence.
The rule has been stated in 5 Tex.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error — Criminal, Sec. 446, as follows:
“Generally, the admission of improper evidence will not constitute reversible error, if the same facts were proved by other and proper testimony, as where defendant voluntarily gives testimony substantially the same as that improperly admitted over objection. Nor will a judgment be reversed because of the admission of testimony of officers respecting facts obtained on an illegal search where the same facts are testified to by other witnesses, or by the accused himself.”
Thus, even in search cases, the test is whether the same facts were subsequently testified to without objection. Consider Moulton v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 486 S.W.2d 334, cited in the State’s brief. Therein this Court found it unnecessary to determine the lawfulness of the challenged search. Nothing was seized in the search, but there was testimony as to what was observed, and a typewriter exemplar was introduced. The defendant’s testimony concerning the matter observed and the typewriter was “essentially the same“ as that of the officer who testified. The following rule was relied upon:
“. . . [T]he legality of the search need not be considered when the defendant testifies to or otherwise produces evidence of the same facts, or if such facts are in the record without objection.” (Emphasis added.)
Also cited is Williams v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 479 S.W.2d 300, wherein the defendant complained of the introduction into evidence of marihuana seized from him, claiming the seizure was unconstitutional. We held the question of the constitutionality of the search did not have to be determined because the defendant, “testifying in his own behalf at the trial, admitted having marihuana in his possession at the time in question.” We based that holding upon the same rule quoted above from Moulton.
It should be clear that the rule is based on the introduction of other evidence of the same facts without objection, and not merely the introduction of some evidence on the same subject, or some use of the exhibit. In contrast, the rule regarding the introduction of other evidence on the same matter, but not amounting to substantially the same facts, is to the contrary. In S Tex.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error — Criminal, Sec. 443, the rule is expressed as follows :
“Nor is the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence cured by the fact that the accused sought to meet, destroy, or explain it by the introduction of rebutting evidence.”
Although there are only four cases cited in support of this rule, the most recent of these, McLaughlin v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 307, 4 S.W.2d 54 (1928), takes care to distinguish the rule that evidence of the same facts renders improperly admitted evidence harmless, from the rule that evidence seeking to “meet, destroy or explain” improperly admitted evidence does not render it harmless. In distinguishing the latter rule, the court in McLaughlin, supra, used the following language, which was quoted with approval in Moulton, supra:
“None of those cases, and in fact no others known to us, hold that the accused can admit the truth of the very testimony to which he is objecting and thereafter claim injury or hurt of a reversible character arising by virtue of the admission of the testimony originally objected to.” 4 S.W.2d at page 55.
The distinction between the two rules should be clear from the discussion thus far: the improper admission of evidence over objection is rendered harmless by the unobjected-to admission of other evidence of substantially the same facts; whereas, the introduction of evidence seek*175ing to meet, destroy, or explain the erroneously admitted evidence does not render the error harmless. The rationale should be equally clear: if a fact be proven without objection, its erroneous proof over objection, although still error, is harmless error since the same facts have been proven without objection. On the other hand, presentation of other evidence which does not prove those facts erroneously admitted, but only tends to meet, destroy, or explain the erroneously admitted evidence, can hardly be considered to cure the error within the rationale of the first rule. Not falling within the harmless error rationale, if such rebuttal evidence is to be held to constitute a waiver of objection to the erroneously admitted evidence, some other reason must be advanced which would support such a new rule.
The true meaning of such new rule would be that a defendant against whom evidence has been admitted over objection could not attempt to rebut such evidence without waiving that objection. The absurdity of such a rule, when so expressed as to reveal its ultimate effect, is manifest. That the scope of such a rule would extend so far is clear: use of admitted evidence, including exhibits, includes within its meaning use in a hypothetical form as a predicate to rebuttal. Mere use would necessarily include all such rebuttal, and if use waives objection, how can rebuttal be attempted and objection preserved? Independent admission of evidence of the same facts without objection, it will be observed, is a concept wholly distinct from use, in that it is independent of the erroneous admission of evidence, whereas the use is dependent upon the prior evidence, inasmuch as it is an attempt to rebut it.
Having distinguished the rule by which the erroneous admission of evidence over objection is rendered harmless when substantially the same facts are subsequently shown without objection, from the rule by which a defendant may rebut evidence to which he has objected without thereby waiving his objection, there remains the question of which rule controls this case. Without unduly lengthening this opinion, suffice it to say that the testimony of Dr. Young makes it abundantly clear that appellant was not offering the subject exhibits or offering evidence of substantially the same facts as those previously objected to, but, quite to the contrary, was making use of the exhibits as a predicate for rebutting their incriminating effect, seeking thereby to meet and destroy the force of the objected to evidence of the prosecution.
The other contentions raised by the State, in its motion for rehearing, have been considered and are found to be without merit.
The State’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the results.