Court Opinion

ID: 9830455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:13:36.040948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:22.809821
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The Marathon Oil Company insists that, because the plaintiffs failed to introduce the charter of said company or certified copy thereof, and failed to make other competent proof of the fact that the Marathon Oil Company was really a corporation, the evidence was insufficient to overcome its plea of privilege, and cites in support thereof Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pinson & Guyger (Tex. Civ. App.) 273 S. W. 655, which seems to support the contention.
As said in the original opinion, the Marathon Oil Company filed its plea of privilege, expressly admitting that it was a foreign corporation with a permit to do business in the state of Texas.
In Texas-Bouisiana Power Co. v. Wells, 121 Tex. 397, 48 S.W.(2d) 978, 981, Judge Harvey held that section 23 of article 1995, R. S., was valid, and applied alike to foreign and domestic corporations, and further said: “The supporting affidavit attached to the company’s plea of privilege is not set out in the above certificate, but is set out in the transcript which is before us. The fact that said company is a corporation is expressly admitted in said supporting affidavit; consequently there was no need for the plaintiffs to introduce testimpny to prove this admitted fact.”
The effect of this holding is to overrule the Bain Peanut Company Case. The general rule is that it is not necessary for one party to plead facts admitted to be true in the pleadings of the opposite party.
By the second proposition, the Marathon Company insists that it was the duty of the appellees to prove the execution, according to the rules of common law, of the assignment of the lease made to it by the trustees of the Three D’s Company, and that this court erred in holding that such assignment, when considered in connection with the original lease, constituted a written contract on the part of the Marathon Oil Company performable in Lamb county, and asserts that the case of S. N. Johnson v. Dallas Cooperage & Wooden-ware Co., 120 Tex. 27, 34 S.W.(2d) 845, 847, sustains the proposition. That was a case where a partnership composed of Johnson and G. W. Derby was doing business in Webb county. The suit was instituted in Dallas county upon trade acceptances made payable in that county. It was shown that Derby had died and Johnson pleaded his privilege to be sued in Webb county. Johnson’s rights, of course, are not governed by subdivisions 23 and 27 of article 1995, and the right of Edwards to maintain this action in Lamb county does not depend upon the existence of a written contract performable in said county. It is therefore difficult to understand why the Johnson Case has any bearing upon the instant case. In that case the Dallas court certified several questions. The first two, being the only ones that were answered, are as follows:
“First Question: Is the sworn plea of privilege a sufficient denial under oath, under articles 2008, 2010 and 3734 of the Revised Statutes, to require the plaintiff to prove the execution of the trade acceptances sued on, and to require it to prove that appellee S. N. Johnson was a partner with G. W. Derby, before same could be offered in evidence?
“Second Question: Were said trade acceptances properly admitted in evidence in this case, over the objection that their execution had not been proved and that it had not been shown that S. N. Johnson and D. W. Derby were partners?”
In fact, the opinion by Judge Short answering the questions shows that the case has no application whatever to the instant case. He said that, when the controverting affidavit was filed, the only issue presented by the pleadings was whether Johnson, at the time he filed his plea of privilege as well as at the time the suit was brought and at the time he was served with process, resided in Webb county, and that at such times he had not contracted in writing to perform the obligation in Dallas county. No pleading has been filed in the instant case denying the execution of the lease or the assignment thereof. Judge Short further said that whether Johnson had contracted to perform the obligation was not necessarily in issue, and that such issue could arise only upon a trial of the case upon its merits and not elsewhere. It further appears in that ease that the controverting affidavit does not deny the fact that Johnson was entitled to be sued in Webb county, unless he had obligated himself in writing to pay in Dallas county, and the crux of the whole decision lies in this *662statement by Judge Short: “Had the original plaintiff upon the trial of this issue introduced in connection with the introduction of these instruments extraneous proof, either oral or written, tending to identify the defendant, S. N. Johnson, with the execution of these instruments, in such a way, as in the opinion of the court would have been sufficient to overturn the prima facie case made by the plea of privilege, then it would have been the duty of the trial court to have found in favor of the original plaintiff on this issue.”
He cites Bradley v. Trinity State Bank, 118 Tex. 274, 14 S.W.(2d) 810, wherein it was held that, in determining the question of venue, evidence of ownership of a note and validity of an obligation evidenced thereby were properly excluded. It appears that the person seeking the benefits of the plea had executed the note which purported to be an undertaking by this person to pay in the county where the suit was brought, and, to differentiate the two cases, says: “The certificate in this case does not show that these instruments in writing were executed by S. N. Johnson, the original defendant.”
No question is made in the ins'tant case as to the authenticity and genuineness-of the instruments sued on herein, nor is there any question as to the identity of the parties who executed the instruments or their authority to do so. The Marathon Company further cites the case of Greenville Gas & Fuel Co. v. Commercial Finance Co., 117 Tex. 124, 298 S. W. 550, 551. It appears that the Greenville Gas & Fuel Co. had indorsed certain notes made payable to the Finance Company in McLennan county. The indorsements had been made by Wise, who, it appears, was vice president and general manager of the Gas & Fuel Company. The authority of Wise to indorse the notes for the Gas & Fuel Company -was denied by proper pleadings. Nevertheless, the notes with their indorsements were introduced over the appellee’s proper objections, and the plea of privilege filed by the Gas & Fuel Company to be sued in Hunt county, the county of its domicile, was overruled.
This case does not sustain the appellant’s contention. . On the contrary, it is in line with the holding of this court in the instant case. Judge Harvey said: “As depriving the defendant company [Greenville Gas & Fuel Co.] of such privilege [to be sued in Hunt County] in the present case, the plaintiff, in its controverting affidavit, pleads a contract in writing by the defendant to perform, in McLennan county, the obligation sued on. This contract is alleged to consist of the in-dorsements themselves, the legal import of which indorsements is to impose upon the defendants the obligation to pay the notes in the county specified in the notes. In order, therefore, for the suit to be maintained in McLennan county, it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the execution of the indorsements is imputable to the defendant. In the absence of an affidavit by the defendant, denying the execution of the indorse-ments, the writings themselves would have supplied the required proof of this fact, by virtue of the provisions of Article 3734 of the Revised Statutes 1925. ■ But when the defendant filed its affidavit, in which it denies executing or authorizing the indorse-ments, the value of the writings, as evidence of their having been executed under the defendant’s authority, was destroyed; and the plaintiff became charged with the burden of proving, by extrinsic evidence, the authority of Wise to execute the indorsements in behalf of the "defendant.”
Edwards’ suit in this case is under R. S. art. 3784, which provides that, when any petition is founded in whole or in part upon any instrument in writing charged to have been executed by the otner party or his authority, such written instrument shall be received as evidence without the necessity of proving its execution, unless the other party shañl file his affidavit denying the execution thereof. So, under this article of the statute and the Greenville Gas & Fuel Co. Case, tne appellant’s second proposition is wholly without merit and is overruled. Propeck v. Farmers’ Mut. Ins. Ass’n (Tex. Civ. App.) 65 S.W.(2d) 390.
 The third proposition, wherein it is insisted that, m the absence of an express/ agreement on the part of an assignee of the/ unexpired term of a lease of real propérty to assume and pay the rentals contracted to be paid by the original lessee, the assignee is only liable to the lessor for the payment of rents during the time he occupies such premises, was discussed m tne original opinion in which we cited numerous cases holding that the assignee under such circumstances. becomes primarily liable for the debt, and the original lessee only secondarily liable. The lessee having enjoyed and exercised his right to dispose of such leasehold estate, the as-signee is held to take the estate subject to all the terms' and conditions expressed in the original lease contract, and is bound to the original lessor for the performance of the *663obligations which were imposed upon his assignor, or, in other words, he simply stands in the shoes of the original lessee. The Marathon Company, having acquired the lease and the possession of the premises from the Three D’s Products Company, could not avoid its liability by making an assignment to a third party, and is still liable until it has been released by the original lessor. We cite the following additional authorities: Gaddy v. Rich (Tex. Civ. App.) 59 S.W.(2d) 921 ; Stern v. Maxwell (Tex. Civ. App.) 44 S.W.(2d) 482; Gray v. Tate (Tex. Civ. App.) 231 S. W. 820; Le Gierse v. Green, 61 Tex. 128.
The movant asserts that this court is committed to the doctrine that the Marathon Company is not liable, in the absence of an express assumption upon its part to pay the rents by the holding of Associate Justice Jackson in the case of Hall v. Arnett et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) al S.W.(2d) 506. That case has no more application to the facts of the instant case than,* several others cited by the movant. Judge Jackson was considering a case involving the rights and liabilities of the assignee who had assumed in writing the obligations of the vendor. The rights of landlords, tenants, and assignees thereof are not even mentioned in the case. .,
We are requested in the motion to find as a fact that no testimony was offered or introduced upon the trial in the lower court showing that appellant was in fact a foreign corporation duly and legally incorporated, having a permit to do business in Texas. Such finding is unnecessary, in view of the admission by the Marathon Company in its plea of privilege.
 It is the duty of the court to take judicial notice of the pleadings filed in the case pending before it, Humphreys v. Young et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 293 S. W. 655, and also of the contents of said pleadings, Eggenberger v. Brandenberger, 74 Tex. 274, 11 S. W. 1099; Blair & Hughes Co. v. Short (Tex. Civ. App.) 271 S. W. 199; 7 Enc. Ev. 999, and the facts admitted by such party need not be proved, but such admission has the effect of withdrawing the issue of the existence of the admitted fact from the jury, and leaves no such issue to be submitted, Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Kezer (Tex. Civ. App.) 174 S. W. 661, 672; Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. De Walt, 96 Tex. 121, 70 S. W. 531, 97 Am. St. Rep. 877; 17 Tex. Jur. 576, § 240.
The further contention is made that, when the Marathon Company, which acquired the leáse from the Three D’s Company December 4, 1930, assigned the lease to T. D. Earley of Muleshoe, for $10, the ¡Marathón Company ceased to be liable for the rents.
The uncontradicted testimony is that Edwards knew nothing of this assignment until long after it had been made, and it was not shown that he ever consented to the assignment, nor is it shown that he ever recognized Earley as being rightfully in possession. The Marathon Company could not for a nominal sum by secret assignment, without the consent of the lessor Edwards, transfer the lease to Farley and relieve itself of its primary liability for the payment of the rents.
It is therefore unnecessary for us to make any finding with reference to Fariey, since Edwards testified that he thought Parley was running the business for the Marathon people and did not learn of the assignment to Farley until just prior to the filing of the suit.
After a careful review of the record, we find that by the first amended original petition Edwards set up the fact of the dissolution of the Three D’s Products Corporation, and alleged that the Three D’s Company was dissolved; that at the time of its dissolution it was the owner of and in possession of the property and assets which were subject to the payment of its obligations, and that W. T. Waggoner, A. B. Wharton, Jr., and E. A. Compton received and assumed control of assets belonging to said corporation which were subject.to and liable for the payment of plaintiff’s claim asserted herein. While the amended petition may be insufficient in some particulars, if challenged by a general demurrer (11 Tex. Jur. 132-134), it is clear from its allegations that Edwards is seeking to recover against Waggoner, Wharton, and Compton as trustees and directors of the defunct corporation and not against them as individuals. He could have sued them as such trustees or sued the defunct corporation by name. He could not have recovered against them as individuals unless it was shown that they had illegally converted the assets of the corporation. Since his suit is against them as trustees, their joint plea of privilege is wholly insufficient. The plea is made, verified, and filed by them as individuals. It fails to make any reference to the defunct corporation which by virtue of the suit is still in existence for the purposes of the suit or to negative any ground upon which the defunct corporation could be held to answer in this action filed in Lamb county. The result is that neither the Three D’s Products Corporation as a legal entity, nor its officers and directors as *664trustees, have filed any plea of privilege whatever, and the court was justified in overruling it upon that ground, Spurlock v. Dunaway Bros. (Tex. Civ. App.) 277 S. W. 758, and, even if it be admitted that the Marathon Company was entitled to a change of venue if sued alone, the court had jurisdiction of the other defendants, and to avoid a multiplicity of suits was entitled to retain jurisdiction of the Marathon Company, since the asserted cause of action against them was connected with, and grew out of, the same transaction.
For the reasons stated, both motions for rehearing, for additional findings of fact, and to certify are overruled.