Court Opinion

ID: 9787001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:07:57.119977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.069483
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
concurring in part and specially concurring in part.
I agree with the majority that there is nothing in the language of H.B. 1288 that overcomes the presumption in favor of prospective application of statutory changes. Maj. op. at 466. For me, the case ends there: H.B. 1288 is prospective in nature and does not apply to pending cases like the one before us. The majority goes on, however, to examine the legislative history surrounding the passage of H.B. 1288 in order to determine if there is anything there "to assist Petitioners in overcoming the presumptive hurdle of prospective application." Id. at 466. The majority's analysis suggests that if the Petitioners were able to demonstrate that the legislative history supports retroactive application, they might prevail on the point-despite the statutory language. The majority's approach is problematic, however, because as judges we are tasked with interpreting statutory language, not the views of individual legislators or witnesses. Seq, eg., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820) ("The intention of the legislature is to be collected from *469the words they employ.") (opinion of Marshall, C.J.).
The pitfalls of interpreting legislative history are well illustrated by the majority's opinion today. The majority points to statements of the bill's sponsor, Representative Matt Smith, essentially "claim[ing] that H.B. 1288 merely codified] the original intention of the 1971 legislature in passing the [Colorado Governmental Immunity Act]." Maj. op. at 467. See also id. at 466-67 (detailing statements). Representative Smith's statements, according to the majority, would support a finding of retroactivity because they suggest that the legislature was simply restoring the statutory language to what it meant before we intervened with our interpretation of it in Powell I and Henry-Hobbs I. See id. at 466-67, 468. The majority then points to a statement by David Brougham, a witness before the House Judiciary Committee, in which he describes H.B. 1288 as "redefin[ing]" the statutory language; the majority suggests that his use of the term "redefin[el" demonstrates that the legislation was understood to be making a change in the law, a factor supporting prospectivity. Id. at 467. The majority concludes from these and other passages that the legislative history is at "cross-purposes" and is ultimately "inconclusive." Id.
But why make that conclusion? Why wouldn't Representative Smith's statements-statements by the bill's sponsor that are more complete and specific to the point-prevail over a witness' use of the term "redefine"? Indeed, Mr. Brougham's testimony, when read in context, would seem to support rather than undermine Petitioners' retroac-tivity argument. After all, Mr. Brougham represented one of the Petitioners, the City of Longmont, in Henry-Hobbs I and continues that representation before us today. In a passage not identified by the majority, Mr. Brougham testified that H.B. 1288 would take Colorado law "back to square one-that is, back to Mr. Brougham's view of Colorado law prior to this court's decisions in Powell I and Henry-Hobbs I. To Mr. Brougham, it was our decisions that changed the law, not H.B. 1288. In the end, this case demonstrates that legislative history raises more interpretive questions than it answers.
Aside from pointing out the perils of interpreting legislative history, I write separately to note that the rationale adopted by the majority today is far narrower than that adopted by the court of appeals below. The court of appeals began by employing the same analysis adopted by the majority today and arrived at the same conclusion-that H.B. 1288 is prospective in operation. However, it then went on to discuss, at length, its concern that any other conclusion would raise "grave constitutional issues" involving separation of powers. Powell v. City of Colorado Springs, 131 P.3d 1129, 1134-35 (Colo. App.2005). While the majority does not address this portion of the court of appeals' decision, its silence should be interpreted not as an endorsement of the court of appeals' analysis, but rather as a decision to leave the separation of powers questions for another day. With this understanding, I join the majority's opinion with the exception of Section III B.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE COATS joins in this opinion concurring in part and specially concurring in part.