Court Opinion

ID: 9838185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 16:12:11.531739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:10.446908
License: Public Domain

J-S19013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                     Appellant           :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 AARON NADAE YOUNG                       :   No. 1479 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 3, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-41-CR-0001488-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                  FILED SEPTEMBER 5, 2023

      The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s October 3, 2022 order

granting Aaron Nadae Young’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized,

and statements he made, during a traffic stop of his vehicle. After careful

review, we affirm.

      The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history of this

case, as follows:

      [Young] was charged with possession with intent to deliver,
      possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
      paraphernalia, and a summary traffic offense. The charges
      [arose] from police conducting a traffic stop of [Young’s] car in
      the parking lot of an apartment complex. [Young] filed this
      omnibus pretrial motion on February 25, 2022. This court held a
      hearing on the motion on May 17, 2022.

      In his omnibus motion, [Young] first argues that the warrantless
      search of his vehicle was based on coerced consent[,] and the
      evidence seized and statements made as a result must be
      suppressed. Secondly, [Young] argues that the traffic stop was
      extended into a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion
      and all evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful investigation
J-S19013-23

     should be suppressed. Thirdly, [Young] maintains the search
     warrant obtained to search his vehicle is fruit of the poisonous tree
     and all evidentiary items seized from the vehicle pursuant to the
     warrant must be suppressed. This court ordered counsel to file
     briefs and [Young] filed his brief on July 12, 2022[.] … [T]he
     Commonwealth responded on August 16, 2022.

     Background and Testimony

     Officer Gino Caschera (Caschera) of the Williamsport Bureau of
     Police testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. On October 31,
     2021, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Caschera was on duty
     patrolling the area of Memorial Avenue and First Avenue in the
     city of Williamsport in a marked patrol unit with his partner, Officer
     [Nikita] Bonnell (Bonnell). Caschera observed a white Lincoln
     make a wide turn onto First Avenue from Park Place that caught
     his attention. Caschera positioned his patrol unit behind the
     Lincoln and watched as it turned onto Park Lane without utilizing
     a turn signal. The Lincoln immediately turned off … Park Lane into
     a parking lot, nearly striking a parked dump truck. Following this
     observation, Caschera activated his emergency lights and initiated
     a traffic stop on the Lincoln. At this point, Caschera had viewed
     three (3) separate traffic violations and was concerned the driver
     may have been intoxicated.

     The Lincoln pulled into a parking spot and Caschera made contact
     with the driver, later identified as [Young], who had rolled his
     window down approximately a third of the way.             [Young]
     immediately questioned Caschera why he was being stopped and
     Caschera “informed him that he had a turn signal violation, but
     not to worry[, Caschera] wasn’t looking to give him a citation.
     Again, [Caschera] just wanted to make sure he was not
     intoxicated.” Caschera further testified that he could immediately
     smell the odor of [raw] marijuana coming out of the vehicle.
     Caschera asked [Young] for his license and registration. [Young]
     provided his license but said that he did not have any paperwork
     in his vehicle.     Caschera asked if [Young] had electronic
     paperwork on his cell phone and [Young] said yes and began
     searching on his phone for his insurance information. While
     [Young] was looking on his phone, Caschera inquired where
     [Young] was coming from and [Young] simply replied[,
     “]Sheetz.[”] When Caschera asked [Young] what he purchased
     from Sheetz[, Appellant] did not respond.

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       Caschera noted that [Young] appeared to be shaking and
       breathing heavily as if he were nervous. Caschera repeated his
       question[,] asking [Young] what he bought from Sheetz[,] and
       [Young] said that he had changed his mind [and not purchased
       anything]. Eventually, [Young] found his insurance information
       on his phone and held it up to the window for Caschera to view it.
       As Caschera leaned in closer to the car to see better, he stated
       the odor of raw marijuana became stronger. Caschera asked
       [Young] to step out of his vehicle and speak with him in between
       [Young’s] car and the patrol unit. Caschera testified to three (3)
       reasons he wished to speak with [Young] out of the vehicle: (1)
       he believe[s] it makes people more comfortable during a traffic
       stop to speak face-to-face rather than have the officer speak down
       to them, (2) Caschera wanted to ensure [Young] was not impaired
       and watching him exit the vehicle would give Caschera a chance
       to observe his body language for impairment, and (3) Caschera
       wanted the entire interaction to be captured on the MVR footage
       and [Young’s] position in his parked car would not have made that
       possible. Caschera denied manipulating the MVR in any way [or]
       tampering with the settings. Caschera stated that the footage
       from the night in question is missing audio due to a lack of [an]
       out-of-car microphone in the unit.

       Caschera brought [Young] to the front of his patrol car and
       explained that he could smell raw marijuana emitting from
       [Young’s] vehicle. [Young] admitted to smoking marijuana earlier
       that day. Caschera testified he was familiar with the Medical
       Marijuana Act and knew that the Act prohibited those carrying a
       medical marijuana card to smoke medical marijuana.[1] For this
       reason, Caschera said he was concerned that illegal marijuana
       was located in [Young’s] car. Caschera asked [Young] for consent
       to search the vehicle and [Young] “stated he was unsure, and …
       he didn’t feel there was a reason for [the officer] to search his
       vehicle.” Caschera … repeated his reasoning to [Young], namely
       the smell of marijuana, and [he] explained to [Young] that “[the
       officer] can’t just search his vehicle based on the odor of
       marijuana. New case law … states that [Caschera] would have to
____________________________________________

1  Under the Medical Marijuana Act, “dry leaf or plant medical marijuana is
available to certified patients and can be consumed by way of vaporization.”
Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 41 (Pa. 2021). “It, however, remains
illegal to smoke this product.”        Id. at 41 n.13 (citing 35 P.S. §
10231.304(b)(1)).

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     get a search warrant, tow the vehicle, obtain a search warrant for
     the vehicle, and go that route.”

     Caschera also told [Young] that he was not concerned about a
     small amount of marijuana, but he wanted to make sure nothing
     else illegal was in the car. While Caschera was explaining all of
     this to [Young], [Young] told Caschera to go ahead and unlocked
     his vehicle. Caschera told [Young] that he did not have to consent
     to his car being searched and if he denied consent to search he
     would not face additional consequences. [Young] repeated, “go
     ahead” and unlocked the vehicle again with the key fob.

     Bonnell began searching the car while Caschera continued to
     speak with [Young]. [Young] was pacing back-and-forth but
     Caschera did not think anything was out of the ordinary.
     However, Caschera stated that [Young] had trouble answering
     normal questions, such as his place of employment, which made
     Caschera believe that he was very nervous. [Young] was “fixated”
     on Bonnell while searching the vehicle, was not making eye
     contact with Caschera, and appeared to walk towards the door of
     an apartment building to the extent that Caschera had to
     reprimand him to come back towards the car or have a seat.
     Caschera believed the interaction to be casual but thought
     [Young] was exhibiting signs of nervousness.            During his
     conversation with [Young] while waiting for Bonnell to conduct the
     search, Bonnell told Caschera to place [Young] in handcuffs.
     Caschera did so and searched [Young] incident to the arrest and
     located a black container containing raw marijuana in the pocket
     of his hoodie. After [Young was] … placed in the patrol unit,
     Bonnell returned to [Young’s] car and retrieved a brick of heroin
     and held it up for Caschera to see. [Young] then said, “they placed
     that bag of heroin in the car.” Caschera further testified that
     neither he nor Bonnell had mentioned that there was heroin
     involved prior to [Young’s] statement.

     At this point, Caschera asked his supervisor if they could tow
     [Young’s] vehicle in order to get a search warrant. Since [Young]
     was in custody and a suspected controlled substance had been
     found, Caschera thought [Young’s] consent would have been
     coerced so he decided to proceed with caution. At the direction
     of the attorney for the Commonwealth, Caschera had returned to
     the Schoolhouse Apartment Complex where the incident had
     taken place in order to capture photographs of the scene prior to
     testifying at the hearing on this motion. The Commonwealth
     introduced these photographs, marked as Commonwealth’s

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     Exhibits 1 through 3, which detailed the parking lot and entrances
     to the apartment building.       [Young] told Caschera that his
     girlfriend lived in this apartment complex.

                                     ***
     Caschera believed he had probable cause to obtain a search
     warrant for [Young’s] car because of the odor of marijuana,
     [Young’s] confession to smoking marijuana earlier that day,
     [Young’s] displaying deceptive behaviors, “such as telling me he
     was coming from Sheetz but having … no items from Sheetz in his
     vehicle. I asked him what he purchased at Sheetz, and he just
     said[, ‘I changed my mind.[’] He was dismissive and didn’t want
     to answer questions, and was very apparently nervous. When I
     got him out of the car it was the same … type of behavior, which
     to me usually leads to someone who’s nervous about what’s in the
     vehicle.” Caschera agreed that [Young] did not agree to the
     search of his car until Caschera mentioned towing it, but [he] did
     not believe it was a direct correlation. Caschera could not recall
     how long it was before he returned [Young’s] license, but he did
     remember giving it back to him after a considerable amount of
     time.

     Officer … Bonnell … of the Williamsport City Police also testified on
     behalf of the Commonwealth. Bonnell testified that she has been
     partners with Caschera for approximately three (3) years and they
     routinely operate vehicle 68. This unit is one of the oldest vehicles
     in the department and is missing a recording device that allows
     for audio to be recorded outside the vehicle. Bonnell stated that
     she has touched the MVR camera occasionally[,] but only to rotate
     it. Bonnell was not aware of the camera’s zoom settings, if any
     existed. On October 3[1], 2021, Bonnell came in contact with
     [Young] after watching a white Lincoln make a wide turn onto First
     Avenue. The vehicle then turned onto Park Lane without using a
     turn signal. The car entered a parking lot for an apartment
     complex and nearly struck a parked dump truck. Caschera
     activated the emergency lights and conducted a traffic stop.
     Bonnell approached the vehicle on the passenger side while
     Caschera made primary contact with [Young].

     While Caschera spoke with [Young], Bonnell used a flashlight to
     look into the car. Bonnell said it is standard procedure for them
     to remove a driver from their vehicle during a traffic stop for safety
     in order to capture the stop on the MVR[,] as well as make citizens
     more comfortable during the interaction. Bonnell was able to
     observe [Young] when he was outside of his vehicle interacting

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      with Caschera at the front of the patrol unit. Bonnell stated that
      [Young] was pacing in circles and would stare at his car while
      speaking with Caschera.        Bonnell believed that [Young’s]
      demeanor appeared to be very nervous. Following [Young’s]
      consent to search the vehicle, Bonnell put gloves on and began
      searching the passenger side first. Upon opening the front
      passenger door, Bonnell immediately noticed that the “center
      panel where the radio would be right under the center console
      panel was completely pulled off of the plastic part.” Bonnell
      looked in the panel but did not find anything there.

      However, upon looking in the passenger side panel door, Bonnell
      discovered a green vial containing flakes of marijuana. While on
      the driver’s side, Bonnell noticed the center console panel was also
      disconnected, similar to the passenger side. Bonnell pulled on this
      panel slightly and observed a clear baggie containing a brick of
      heroin. Bonnell removed the heroin and placed it on the front
      seat. Bonnell quickly walked over to Caschera and advised him
      that [Young] would need to be handcuffed. Bonnell returned to
      the vehicle and took possession of the suspected heroin. Bonnell
      could not remember if she showed the seized evidence to the MVR
      camera. Bonnell indicated that once the brick was counted,
      seventy (70) bags of heroin were contained in the bundle.
      [Young’s] car was towed and a search warrant for the car was
      obtained. When executing the search warrant, no additional
      evidence was located in the vehicle. Bonnell later clarified that
      she misnamed the area of [Young’s] car where the heroin was
      found by calling it the center console when in reality it was
      considered a “side panel[,]”[] under the radio.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/3/22, at 1-7 (citations to the record omitted).

      Based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and the

arguments set forth by the parties in their subsequent briefs, the court issued

an order and opinion on October 3, 2022, granting Young’s motion to

suppress.   The court concluded that while Young’s initial detention to

investigate his possible impairment was lawful, that detention was unlawfully

extended into a drug investigation “the moment [Young] exited his car and

was asked for consent to search the vehicle….” Id. at 12. The court found

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that the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion that Young possessed

illegal narcotics based only on Young’s nervousness, reluctance to answer

Officer Caschera’s questions, and the smell of raw marijuana. Id. at 13. Thus,

the court concluded that Young’s detention was unlawful and, accordingly, his

subsequent consent to search the vehicle was involuntary.        Id. at 15-16.

Alternatively, the court determined that, even if Young’s detention was legal,

his consent to search the vehicle was coerced by Officer Caschera’s “implied

compulsion on [Young] to consent to the search based on the ramifications

[that] denying consent would bring[,]” namely, the seizure and towing of

Young’s vehicle.   Id. at 17.   Finally, the court concluded that the search

warrant obtained by Officer Caschera was fruit of the poisonous tree of

Young’s unlawful detention and/or his coerced consent to search the car and,

therefore, the warrant was likewise invalid. Id. at 17-18.

      The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal, certifying that the

court’s suppression order terminates or substantially handicaps Young’s

prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). The Commonwealth thereafter complied

with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal, and the court filed a Rule 1925(a) statement

indicating that it was relying on the rationale set forth in its October 3, 2022

opinion granting Young’s motion to suppress to support its decision.

      Herein, the Commonwealth states three issues for our review:

      I. Whether the suppression court committed an error of law when
      it failed to properly apply an objective standard when analyzing

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     whether the [o]fficers had reasonable suspicion to detain …
     [Young].

     II. Whether the suppression court committed an error of law when
     it found the officer’s explanation that he would seek a warrant,
     without additional factors, rendered … [Young’s] subsequent
     consent involuntary.

     III. Whether the suppression court erred when it held that the
     search warrant was “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 6.

     Preliminarily, we recognize:

     “When reviewing the grant of a suppression motion, we must
     determine whether the record supports the trial court’s factual
     findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
     are correct.” Commonwealth v. McCleary, 193 A.3d 387, 390
     (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “We may only consider
     evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Id. (citation
     omitted). “[B]ecause the defendant prevailed on this issue before
     the suppression court, we consider only the defendant’s evidence
     and so much of the Commonwealth’s evidence as remains
     uncontradicted when read in the context of the [suppression]
     record as a whole.” Id. (citation omitted).

     We are highly deferential to the suppression court’s factual
     findings and credibility determination.      Commonwealth v.
     Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 1206 (Pa. Super. 2019). “It is within the
     suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the
     credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their
     testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or
     none of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”
     Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super.
     2003) (citations omitted). If the record supports the suppression
     court’s findings, we may not substitute our own findings. Batista,
     219 A.3d at 1206. However, we give no deference to the
     suppression court’s legal conclusions and review them de novo.
     Id.

Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1122–23 (Pa. Super.

2021).

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       Additionally, we note that,

       an investigative detention is valid when it is supported by
       reasonable suspicion. In the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme
       Court:

          Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than
          probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest,
          and depends on the information possessed by police and its
          degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In
          order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to
          point to specific and articulable facts leading him to suspect
          criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the totality of the
          circumstances, courts must also afford due weight to the
          specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light
          of the officer’s experience and acknowledge that innocent
          facts, when considered collectively, may permit the
          investigative detention.

                                           ***

          The determination of whether an officer had reasonable
          suspicion that criminality was afoot so as to justify an
          investigatory detention is an objective one, which must be
          considered in light of the totality of the circumstances. It is
          the duty of the suppression court to independently evaluate
          whether, under the particular facts of a case, an objectively
          reasonable police officer would have reasonably suspected
          criminal activity was afoot.

       Commonwealth v. Holmes, … 14 A.3d 89, 95 and 96 ([Pa.]
       2011) (internal citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted).

Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 379 (Pa. Super. 2013).

       In this case, the Commonwealth first argues that the trial court erred

by concluding that Officers Caschera and Bonnell lacked reasonable suspicion

to continue their detention of Young beyond the initial traffic stop.2 According
____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth does not present any developed argument that the court

erred by concluding that Young’s initial detention — i.e., the traffic stop to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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to the Commonwealth, the court failed to properly assess whether an

objectively reasonable officer would have suspected criminal activity was afoot

and, instead, the “court improperly and repeatedly focuse[d] its attention on

the subjective intentions of both [o]fficers.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 16. In

support of its argument, the Commonwealth cites the court’s statements that

it “believes the officers were determined to search [Young’s] vehicle

regardless[,]” and that “neither Caschera’s nor Bonnell’s testimony indicate[s]

specific or particular facts that led them to believe criminal activity was afoot.”

Id. (citing TCO at 13; emphasis added).            The Commonwealth insists that,

“[a]t no point in its [o]pinion [did] the suppression court state a belief that an

objectively reasonable police officer would have (or would have not)

reasonably suspected that criminal activity was occurring.”        Id. (emphasis

added).

       Additionally, the Commonwealth contends that the court erred by

concluding the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Young possessed

illegal narcotics in order to detain him for further investigation.            The

Commonwealth points out that Officer Caschera testified that Young was

“shaking and breathing heavily[,]” the officer smelled “an odor of unburnt

marijuana that became stronger as [Officer Caschera] leaned closer to the

____________________________________________

investigate his possible impairment — was extended past its original purpose.
Thus, we do not address this conclusion by the court, but focus only on
whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to further detain Young
after he exited his vehicle to investigate whether he possessed illegal
narcotics.

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car[,]” and Young provided “somewhat unusual answers that [he] was coming

from Sheetz but changed his mind and didn’t purchase anything.” Id. at 15.

The Commonwealth does not explain how or why these circumstances

amounted to reasonable suspicion, nor does it cite or discuss any legal

authority to support such a conclusion. Instead, the Commonwealth states:

      Despite this testimony, the suppression court found that
      “[n]either Caschera’s nor Bonnell’s testimony indicate specific or
      articulable facts that led them to believe criminal activity was
      afoot.” [TCO] at 13. This is somewhat disingenuous, as the court
      addresses [Young’s] nervousness and the odor of marijuana in the
      next two sentences, noting that neither fact alone rises to the level
      of reasonable suspicion. This is an accurate statement of current
      caselaw. However, this is not a proper analysis of the totality of
      the circumstances.

Id.

      The Commonwealth’s undeveloped argument fails to convince us that

the court erred in concluding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that

Young possessed illegal narcotics. The Commonwealth does not cite or discuss

any legal authority to support its position that the totality of the circumstances

in this case rose to the level of reasonable suspicion. We decline to make such

an argument for the Commonwealth.

      We also disagree with the Commonwealth that the court failed to

objectively assess the entirety of the facts known to Officers Caschera and

Bonnell in determining that reasonable suspicion was lacking. In its opinion,

the court recognized that its “fundamental inquiry … is to objectively

determine ‘whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the

[intrusion] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action

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taken was appropriate.’” TCO at 10 (quoting Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751

A.2d 1153, 1156 (Pa. 2000)). Although the court mentioned the subjective

intent of Officer Caschera, we conclude that it ultimately conducted an

objective assessment of the totality of the circumstances in this case, finding

that they failed to establish that Officers Caschera and Bonnell had reasonable

suspicion to detain Young beyond the initial detention to investigate whether

he was impaired. Specifically, the court explained:

      The next question that the court must answer is whether the
      officers had reasonable suspicion to support [the] unreasonable
      extension [of Young’s initial detention to investigate his possible
      impairment]. Based on the testimony presented, the court
      believes this question must be answered negatively. The law
      requires reasonable suspicion to be more than an officer’s mere
      hunch or unparticularized suspicion. In the case sub judice, the
      record reflects that Caschera and Bonnell suspected [Young] had
      contraband in his vehicle, but the court fails to find support in the
      record to verify this suspicion. Neither Caschera’s nor Bonnell’s
      testimony indicate[s] specific or particular facts that led them to
      believe criminal activity was afoot. The Superior Court held that
      nervousness in someone subjected to a traffic stop does not rise
      to the level of reasonable suspicion.          Commonwealth v.
      Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 306 (Pa. Super. 2013). Moreover,
      following the enactment of the Medical Marijuana Act, it is no
      longer per se illegal to possess marijuana and the smell of
      marijuana alone does not amount to sufficient probable cause to
      permit the warrantless search of a vehicle. … Barr, 266 A.3d [at]
      41, 44…. As such, the smell of marijuana may only be considered
      as a factor when examining the totality of the circumstances. Id.
      at 44.

      In considering the totality of the circumstances as required, the
      court believes the officers were determined to search [Young’s]
      vehicle regardless. The only factors identified to support a finding
      of reasonable suspicion at the time the traffic stop was extended
      were [Young’s] alleged nervousness and reluctance to answer
      officer’s questions, the smell of raw marijuana, and [Young’s]
      confession to smoking marijuana earlier that day. Nevertheless,

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      the court is of the opinion that these factors are not sufficient to
      establish reasonable suspicion to support the unreasonable
      extension of the traffic stop. “It is the rare person who is not
      agitated to some extent when stopped by police, even if the driver
      is a law-abiding citizen…[.] Whether described as nervousness,
      apprehension, concern or otherwise, forced interaction with a
      police officer is not an everyday occurrence for the average
      citizen.” Cartagena, 63 A.3d at 306. Although the court
      acknowledges the smell of marijuana is a small factor, the
      remainder     of    the    record   demonstrates     the    officers’
      unparticularized suspicion that [Young] possessed contraband. As
      previously stated, Caschera testified that he was concerned
      [Young] possessed marijuana after smelling it upon approaching
      his vehicle, but [he] told [Young] he was not worried about finding
      a small amount of marijuana[,] just that he wanted to see if
      [Young] had anything illegal in the vehicle. If Caschera was not
      concerned with finding a small amount of marijuana as he
      indicated himself during testimony, this court struggles to
      determine what he was looking for in [Young’s] vehicle. Aside
      from [Young’s] purported nervousness, no other evidence
      suggests that [Young] may have possessed other controlled
      substances. It is apparent from these facts that Caschera had a
      mere hunch that [Young] hid other narcotics in his car and wanted
      to go looking for them. For these reasons, this court finds that
      the unreasonable extension of the traffic stop into a drug
      investigation was not supported by reasonable suspicion.

TCO at 13-14 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Herein, the Commonwealth does not provide any meaningful argument

to counter the court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion was lacking in this

case. In particular, the Commonwealth does not discuss the cases relied on

by the court in reaching its decision, or cite any other legal authority to support

its cursory conclusion that the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to

extend Young’s investigative detention based on his nervousness, strange

answer to Caschera’s question about where he was coming from, and the smell

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of raw marijuana.3       Accordingly, we conclude that the Commonwealth has

failed to demonstrate reversible error in the court’s decision that Young’s

detention was illegal.

       In light of our decision, we need not review the Commonwealth’s second

issue, which challenges the trial court’s alternative conclusion that Young’s

consent to search the vehicle was coerced and involuntary. See TCO at 14-

19. The court determined that “the Commonwealth has not demonstrated

that [the] search was not an exploitation of the unlawful investigative

detention and[,] therefore, [Young’s] consent is immaterial and the evidence

seized pursuant to the warrantless search of [Young’s] vehicle must be

suppressed.” TCO at 16; see also Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d

884, 889 (Pa. 2000) (“Where … a consensual search has been preceded by an

unlawful seizure, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence

obtained absent a demonstration by the government both of a sufficient break

in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure of evidence, thus

assuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of

voluntariness.”). The Commonwealth does not challenge this aspect of the

court’s decision, focusing only on attacking the court’s conclusion that Young’s

continued detention was illegal. Because we agree with the court that Young

was illegally detained, and that his consent to search was not separate from

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth makes no mention of Young’s statement that he smoked

marijuana earlier in the day.

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that unlawful detention, the fruits of that search were properly suppressed by

the court.

      Additionally, in its third issue, “[t]he Commonwealth concedes that, if

the suppression court has hitherto ruled correctly, anything seized pursuant

to the search warrant is properly suppressed.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 21.

Thus, no relief is due on the Commonwealth’s third and final claim.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/05/2023

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