Court Opinion

ID: 9384311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 15:00:28.305476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.673981
License: Public Domain

20-3088
     Kai v. Garland
                                                                             BIA
                                                                       Navarro, IJ
                                                                     A206 636 123
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 3rd day of April, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 9                 Chief Judge,
10            STEVEN J. MENASHI,
11            EUNICE C. LEE,
12                 Circuit Judges.
13   _____________________________________
14
15   CHEN KAI,
16                    Petitioner,
17
18                    v.                                   20-3088
19                                                         NAC
20   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
21   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
22            Respondent.
23   _____________________________________
24
25
26   FOR PETITIONER:                   Troy Nader Moslemi, Esq.,
27                                     Flushing, NY.
28
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
 2                                  Attorney General; Cindy S.
 3                                  Ferrier, Assistant Director; Marie
 4                                  V. Robinson, Attorney, Office of
 5                                  Immigration Litigation, United
 6                                  States Department of Justice,
 7                                  Washington, DC.

 8          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is DENIED.

12          Petitioner Chen Kai, a native and citizen of the People’s

13   Republic of China, seeks review of an             August 14, 2020,

14   decision of the BIA affirming a July 12, 2018, decision of an

15   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

16   withholding    of   removal,   and   relief   under   the   Convention

17   Against Torture (“CAT”).       In re Chen Kai, No. A 206 636 123

18   (B.I.A. Aug. 14, 2020, aff’g No. A 206 636 123 (Immigr. Ct.

19   N.Y. City July 12, 2018).      We assume the parties’ familiarity

20   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

21          We have considered the decisions of both the IJ and the

22   BIA.    See Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 262 (2d

23   Cir. 2007).     The applicable standards of review are well

24   established.         See   8 U.S.C.      § 1252(b)(4)(B)      (”[T]he

25   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
                                 2
 1   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

 2   contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d

 3   Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination for

 4   substantial evidence); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510,

 5   513   (2d   Cir.    2009)    (reviewing     factual    findings     for

 6   substantial   evidence      and   questions     of    law,    including

 7   application of law to fact, de novo).

 8         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

 9   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

10   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

11   the applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the

12   applicant’s   or    witness’s     written     and    oral    statements

13   (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering

14   the circumstances under which the statements were made), the

15   internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency

16   of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and

17   any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without

18   regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

19   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other

20   relevant factor.”    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).           “We defer

21   . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the

                                       3
 1   totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable

 2   fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”

 3   Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008);

 4   accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.                The agency reasonably

 5   concluded     that     Kai     failed       to   meet   his   burden   given

 6   inconsistencies in his statements and evidence, his demeanor

 7   when questioned about those inconsistencies, and his failure

 8   to rehabilitate his claim with reliable documentary evidence.

9          Kai   alleged     that    he   was     arrested   and   detained    for

10   attending     an     underground     Christian      church.     The    agency

11   reasonably relied on Kai’s inconsistency about why and when

12   he was fired from his job, including the job’s relationship

13   to his church attendance.               Throughout his testimony, Kai

14   averred that he only had one job in China, a job at a

15   restaurant, and that being fired from that job is what caused

16   him   to    become    interested     in     Christianity.      However,   he

17   offered multiple inconsistent dates as to when he was fired

18   from that job.         In his application, he stated that he was

19   fired from the restaurant in January 2013 because he worked

20   too slowly, but elsewhere in the application he stated he was

21   fired after his month-long detention by police following a

                                             4
 1   raid of a church meeting — that is, in November 2013.           At his

 2   hearing, Kai initially testified that he lost his job in

 3   January 2010, but then said he was fired in October 2013.           As

 4   the BIA noted in its decision, these inconsistencies were

 5   significant given Kai’s statements that the event of his

 6   firing led him to attend his first church meeting.            Kai was

 7   not able to make sense of these discrepancies, only explaining

 8   that     his   “memories   were    not    that   sharp.”    Certified

9    Administrative Record 93.          The agency was not required to

10   credit this explanation.          See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d

11   77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer

12   a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to

13   secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-

14   finder     would    be compelled to        credit   his    testimony.”

15   (quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)).

16          Moreover, Kai was also inconsistent about whether he

17   spoke to the individual who introduced him to the church after

18   his release from detention.             While this inconsistency may

19   have been minor, when taken in aggregate with the other

20   considerations relied upon by the agency, it supports an

21   adverse credibility finding.            See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at

                                         5
 1   167 (“[A]n IJ may rely on any inconsistency . . . in making

 2   an adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality

 3   of the circumstances’ establishes that an asylum applicant is

4    not    credible.”       (quoting     8   U.S.C.   §   1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);

5    emphasis in original)).

 6          The adverse credibility determination is bolstered by

 7   the      IJ’s         demeanor      finding.           See      8     U.S.C.

 8   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).            The IJ noted long pauses when Kai was

9    asked why Chinese authorities would still pursue him and why

10   his    firing    dates     were    inconsistent.      We     defer   to   this

11   demeanor finding because the IJ “is in the best position to

12   discern, often at a glance, whether . . . a witness who

13   hesitated       in     a   response      was    nevertheless     attempting

14   truthfully to recount what he recalled of key events or

15   struggling to remember the lines of a carefully crafted

16   ‘script’; and whether inconsistent responses are the product

17   of innocent error or intentional falsehood.”                    Majidi, 430

18   F.3d at 81 n.1 (quotation marks omitted).

19          Finally, Kai’s lack of reliable corroboration further

20   undermined his claim.             See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d

21   268,    273     (2d    Cir.   2007)      (“An   applicant’s     failure    to

                                              6
 1   corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,

 2   because the absence of corroboration in general makes an

 3   applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already

 4   been called into question.”).        Kai produced inconsistent

 5   evidence of whether he had been baptized in the United States,

 6   he testified to minimal church attendance in the United

 7   States, and the letter from his church in China confirmed his

 8   membership on the date of the alleged raid, but did not

 9   mention the raid or any arrests.

10       Given the inconsistencies, the demeanor finding, and the

11   lack of corroboration, substantial evidence supports the

12   adverse credibility determination.    See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d

13   at 167; Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir.

14   2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien

15   from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.

16   Multiple   inconsistencies   would    so   preclude   even   more

17   forcefully.”).   That determination is dispositive of asylum,

18   withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three

19   claims were based on the same factual predicate.        See Paul

20   v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

21

                                   7
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3   stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  8