Court Opinion

ID: 9744060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:52:43.1459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.458024
License: Public Domain

RATLIFF, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree that the inability to produce or reconstruct the record of the guilty plea mandates reversal unless the state has sustained its defense of laches. However, I disagree with the majority's resolution of the laches issue.
In Lacy v. State (1986), Ind., 491 N.E.2d 520, our supreme court held the state's evidence was insufficient to establish prejudice even in the face of an eleven year delay in seeking post-conviction relief. In Lacy, our supreme court stated:
"However, for the State to prevail in its defense of laches, there must also be sufficient evidence of resulting prejudice. Upon this issue, the evidence at the post-conviction relief hearing consisted primarily of testimony of the manager at the Marion County prosecutor's office. She stated that the prosecutor's case files which are more than ten (10) years old are destroyed, and that no record is kept, but that she had not investigated to determine whether the prosecutor's file for this case was still in existence. There was also testimony from the deputy prosecutor that she had obtained names of witnesses from the court's file, but was unable to find a listing for any of them in the phone directory. This is an extremely small quantum of evidence upon which to infer prejudice. It falls far short of the evidence which supported the finding of laches in Pinkston v. State (1985), Ind.App., 479 N.E.2d 79; Horrington, supra; and Dillon v. State (1985), Ind.App., 479 N.E.2d 610 (rehearing granted, explaining scope of appellate review 482 N.E.2d 747). The State failed to present any evidence regarding the availability or recollection of the investigating officers or the existence or content of the police investigative file. There was also no showing of reasonable diligence used in attempting to locate the witnesses shown on the back of the information. Further, there is no evidence that any attempt was made to locate the prosecutor's notes or to determine whether they had actually been destroyed in accordance with office policy of discarding files more than ten years old.
The State has thus failed to provide any evidence upon which a reasonable inference of prejudice may be drawn. Given the length of delay, we can only speculate that significant prejudice may exist. However, because of the failure of proof, we are compelled to grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and remand to the postcon-viction trial court for it to grant Lacy's petition for post-conviction relief ..."
491 N.E.2d at 521-22.
In his concurring opinion in Woodford v. State, (1985), Ind.App., 484 N.E.2d 563, Justice Shepard observed:
"While the trial judge might well have found that the appellant's delay in filing his petition was unreasonable under circumstances permitting diligence, the evidence offered by the prosecutor on the question of prejudice to the State was insufficient to establish an equitable bar. Other than the passage of time, the only specific prejudice cited in the State's brief or, apparently, offered at trial has been the disposal of those items of physical evidence kept in the Indianapolis Police Department property room. How the loss of these items damages the State's case is unexplained. Whether the other items of tangible evidence which were kept elsewhere are still available is also unexplored. We are not provided with any testimony about the availability of the witnesses or the investigating officer."
484 N.E.2d at 566.
Lacy lays down a strict standard which the state must meet to establish the preju*1180dice component of a defense of laches to a postconviction remedy proceeding. In my view, that standard has not been met.
To the extent the majority opinion deals with the effect of the lapse of time on the ability to reconstruct the record of the guilty plea hearing, it misses the mark. The point is not whether the state has been prejudiced in its ability to reconstruct the guilty plea hearing. Rather, the question is whether the state has been prejudiced in its ability to prosecute the charge. The majority opinion clearly discloses the state is not impaired in its prosecution of the charge. The victim of the theft is available and can testify his tractor-mower was stolen. The purchaser is available and able to testify he purchased the tractor mower from Wilburn. The tractor- mower still exists. Thus, the state can make its case against Wilburn. The inability to produce the confidential informant does not reduce the state's case to impotency.
The majority further relies upon White v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 893, for the proposition that long delays are enough, standing alone, to constitute prejudice. I believe the majority extends the rationale of White beyond that expressed by our supreme court. White dealt with a situation where a post-conviction petitioner proved only failure of the trial judge to advise him as required by statute, prior to accepting his guilty plea. White and recent decisions following have held such a defendant must prove not only an omitted advisement, but also that had the advisement. been given such would have changed his decision to plead. See e.g., Simpson v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 205; Reid v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 207; Merriweather v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 209. The court, in White, said it would look to the entire record to see if the defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Here, there is no record. Thus, we do not know if Wilburn knew or was advised of his Boykin rights. Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. Our supreme court in White made it clear that unless the record revealed the defendant knew or was advised of his Boykin rights, his guilty plea must be vacated. Thus, White has no application to the facts of this case.
The state can prevail only if it has succeeded in proving laches. The burden of proof on that issue is upon the state. Twyman v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 705. Under the holding in Lacy, the state has not met that burden. The majority's attempt to use the decision in White to shift the burden to Wilburn is an erroneous interpretation and application of White.
I would reverse the judgment with instructions to grant Wilburn's petition and remand for trial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.