Court Opinion

ID: 9739907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:23:22.76154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.699074
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 52. (dissenting). The majority declares that litigants seeking to overturn a probation revocation are not really requesting relief from a sentence but rather are merely seeking a return to probation. This is a distinction without a substantive difference. Why do litigants want to return to *497probation? The obvious answer is that they seek relief from a sentence.
¶ 53. Yet, the majority elevates form over substance to deny the petitioner his right of access to the courts of this state. Its rigid construction of probation revocations as civil proceedings subject to PLRA ignores the essence of such actions in the present context and also finds little support in the text or purpose of the statute. Rather, these sources reveal that a petitioner challenging probation revocation via a writ of certiorari does not fall under the definition of "prisoner" set forth in Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2 and therefore is not subject to PLRA's filing requirements.
¶ 54. Wisconsin Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.c provides that for the purposes of PLRA a prisoner does not include "[a] person bringing. . .an action for an extraordinary writ or a supervisory writ seeking relief from a judgment of conviction or a sentence of a court." This statute unambiguously exempts from its ambit writs of certiorari challenging probation revocations. Certiorari represents an extraordinary remedy, Tobler v. Door County, 158 Wis. 2d 19, 24, 461 N.W.2d 775 (1990), and challenges to probation revocation seek relief from the sentence that will be imposed upon a sustained revocation.
¶ 55. The majority unconvincingly endeavors to distinguish certiorari challenges to probation revocation by asserting that a petitioner instituting such a challenge does not seek relief from a sentence but rather seeks a reinstatement of probation. Majority op. at ¶'29. This is a formalistic distinction without a substantive difference.
¶ 56. As a practical matter, the sole reason to challenge a probation revocation is to seek relief from the sentence resulting from that revocation. A success*498ful challenge to the revocation invalidates the sentence and restores probation. In essence, a reinstatement of probation constitutes relief from the sentence that would be imposed upon a sustained revocation. State v. Balgie, 76 Wis. 2d 206, 208-09, 251 N.W.2d 36 (1977). Thus, the majority misses the mark in its attempt to create a palpable difference between the words of Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.c and probation revocation proceedings.
¶ 57. Admittedly, by its nature a probation revocation is a civil proceeding. State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 651, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999). As a constitutional matter, it is not a stage of a criminal prosecution. See State ex rel. Vanderbeke v. Endicott, 210 Wis. 2d 502, 513, 563 N.W.2d 883 (1997) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)). However, the label attached to a revocation of probation is a matter of semantics in the present context and obscures the essence of the interests at stake.
¶ 58. Probation revocations implicate a loss of liberty, and thus a probationer is entitled to due process of the law before probation may be revoked. Vanderbeke, 210 Wis. 2d at 513-14. See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). A probationer's personal liberty "includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the [probationer] and often on others." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
¶ 59. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that notwithstanding the general line drawn between civil and criminal cases, when a "fundamental interest [is] at stake" the State must provide civil litigants access to its judicial processes without regard to a litigant's ability to comply with filing requirements. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996) (court *499fees). Because a certiorari challenge to probation revocation implicates the fundamental right of personal liberty, due process is triggered.
¶ 60. Denying a revoked probationer's access to the courts for failing to meet a narrow 45-day filing limit would be antithetical to the guarantees of due process. It is doubtful that the legislature intended to foreclose the probationer's participation in the judicial process simply because a revocation is by nature a civil proceeding.
¶ 61. Indeed, the civil/criminal distinction forged by the majority to support its application of PLRA to probation revocations becomes particularly tenuous when the other exceptions under Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2 are examined. See State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 527, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). PLRA's reach does not extend to persons civilly committed under Wis. Stat. chs. 51, 55, or 980. Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.a, 2.e. The statute also does not apply to a person challenging the termination of parental rights. Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.b.
¶ 62. Both the institutional commitment of persons and the termination of parental rights are by definition civil actions. Yet, the legislature sheltered these civil proceedings from the requirements of PLRA in likely recognition that the requirements may infringe upon the fundamental rights implicated by such proceedings.
¶ 63. The majority's attempt to support the extension of PLRA to probation revocation challenges, which involve fundamental liberty interests, is therefore not compelling in light of the exemption of similar civil proceedings from the scope of PLRA. To the extent that the majority fears excluding certiorari challenges to probation revocations "would blur irrevocably the *500historical lines drawn between" civil and criminal proceedings, the majority fails to reconcile the expressed legislative intent to exclude a number of civil actions from the ambit of PLRA. Majority op. at ¶ 32.
¶ 64. PLRA's underlying purpose supports the interpretation that its provisions do not govern probation revocation challenges. As the majority concedes, the primary intent driving the passage of PLRA centered on deterring frivolous prisoner lawsuits relating to conditions of confinement because these civil lawsuits were considered a waste of time and money. See Majority op. at ¶ 38. Additionally, the legislature intended to conform the Wisconsin PLRA to the federal PLRA provisions. See Background Commentary to 1997 SB 388, Draft #7, p. 2-3, August 9, 1996 (original bill).
¶ 65. However, the majority claims that the Wisconsin PLRA expanded beyond the scope of the federal statute and was "not designed exclusively to restrict frivolous lawsuits, but rather to limit broadly prisoner litigation at taxpayers' expense." Majority op. at ¶ 40. It is perplexing that the majority apparently considers challenges to restriction of liberty tantamount to frivolous lawsuits that impose a heavy tax burden on the constituents of the state. Without justification, the majority raises fiscal and administrative convenience above the core liberty interests at issue in probation revocations.
¶ 66. Several federal courts have determined that the federal PLRA does not encompass habeas revocation challenges. See Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1998); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1998); McIntosh v. United States *501Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997).1 Although the state PLRA closely tracks the federal statute, the majority undertakes to distinguish these federal cases by emphasizing the label of the revocation challenge rather than examining the essence of the challenge.
¶ 67. The majority dismisses the persuasive authority of the federal cases by maintaining that habeas corpus represents the "usual mechanism for contesting" revocations in federal court, while a writ of certiorari represents the "common route" in Wisconsin. Majority op. at ¶¶ 47-48. The majority offers no cogent explanation as to how these two extraordinary writs differ to any substantive degree when both are issued to challenge revocations. This effort to create a stark disparity between the two writs is inconsistent with Wisconsin precedent recognizing that revocations may be reviewed via habeas corpus as well as through certi-orari. Vanderbeke, 210 Wis. 2d at 522-23.
¶ 68. Moreover, the majority's reliance earlier in its analysis on the per curiam decision in State ex rel. Marth v. Smith, 224 Wis. 2d 578, 592 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. *502App. 1999), weakens its effort to separate state certio-rari proceedings from federal habeas actions. Marth involved a Wisconsin probationer who filed a habeas petition claiming errors in his probation revocation proceeding. Id. at 581.
¶ 69. In reaching the conclusion that PLRA requirements applied to the probationer's habeas petition because he was a prisoner within the meaning of the statute, the court of appeals relied primarily upon a federal habeas case that applied PLRA's provisions to a habeas parole revocation review. See Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000). Newlin represented the minority view that habeas corpus is strictly a civil proceeding, and the case was subject to oft-cited criticism. See Davis, 150 F.3d at 489-90; Blair-Bey, 151 F.3d at 1039. By affirming the validity of Marth, majority op. at ¶ 30, the majority in turn implicitly validates Newlin.
¶ 70. It is ironic that the majority dismisses federal habeas case law that contradicts its interpretation of PLRA by asserting the distinction between writs of habeas corpus and writs of certiorari. Yet when, as in Newlin, such federal habeas law supports its statutory interpretation, the majority shelves the distinction between the two writs. To validate a case that relies upon federal habeas law while simultaneously asserting that the federal habeas cases provide no persuasive authority is inconsistent and undercuts the majority's legal analysis.2
*503¶ 71. Although certiorari challenges to probation revocations are civil proceedings by definition, they implicate fundamental liberty interests. A prisoner instituting a certiorari action is thus exempted from PLRA’s filing requirements under the words of the statute and in accordance with its underlying purposes. Because the majority emphasizes formalism over substance to hold otherwise, I dissent.
¶ 72. I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this dissenting opinion.

 A significant number of federal courts hold that the federal PLRA does not apply to habeas corpus petitions in general. See Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1998); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 1997); McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Levi, 111 F.3d 955, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 804-05 (11th Cir. 1997); Naddi v. Hill, 106 F.3d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1997); Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1996); Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853, 855 (7th Cir. 1996); Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds, Lindh v. Murphy, 520 U.S. 320 (1997); Frazier v. Hesson, 40 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).

 It is also worth noting that the federal PLRA's definition of prisoner is more expansive than the one adopted by the Wisconsin legislature. See 28 USC § 1915(h). Yet the federal courts that have interpreted the definition have exempted parole revo*503cation from the statute's requirements. See Davis, 150 F.3d at 490; Blair-Bey, 151 F.3d at 1039-40; McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 811.
Because the Wisconsin PLRA excludes a larger class of persons from the reach of PLRA's filing requirements, it is incongruous to conclude that the state statute provides more stringent filing requirements than does the federal statute. Rather, if the expansive definition of prisoner under the federal statute exempts challenges to probation revocations from statutory requirements, it is logical that a more limited definition of prisoner under the Wisconsin PLRA would thereby exclude probation revocation challenges.