Court Opinion

ID: 9583295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:37:13.47785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:55.819533
License: Public Domain

Archer, J.
I dissent.
This case is an interlocutory appeal. The automobile accident occurred in Ohio. Under Ohio1 and Michigan law, evidence of nonuse of a seat belt is presently excluded. This case, having been brought in Michigan, and Michigan’s jurisdiction not having been challenged, we apply Michigan law. Olm*477stead v Anderson, 428 Mich 1; 400 NW2d 292 (1987).
The Michigan Legislature addressed the seat belt issue by enacting a statute which required automobile manufacturers to install safety belts in automobiles. The statute, MCL 257.710b; MSA 9.2410(2), provided at the time:
No private passenger vehicle manufactured after January 1, 1965 shall be offered for sale in this state unless the vehicle is equipped with safety belts[2] for the use of the driver and 1 other front seat passenger. All safety belts and bolts and brackets used in the installation of the safety belts shall meet the minimum specifications of the society of automotive engineers as prescribed on April 1, 1963. This section shall not apply to trucks, buses, hearses, motorcycles or motor driven cycles.[3]
.Although the statute required that automobiles be equipped with seat belts, it imposed no requirement that seat belts be used.
The majority of states enacted such legislation, and federal statutes also required the installation of seat belts in automobiles. Following the passage of this legislation, defendants in automobile accident cases began raising the "seat belt defense.” Michigan case law has consistently held that evi*478dence that a plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt is inadmissible.
The Court of Appeals first addressed the seat belt issue in Romankewiz v Black, 16 Mich App 119; 167 NW2d 606 (1969). The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. In an affirmative defense, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s nonuse of a seat belt constituted contributory negligence. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to strike the affirmative defense, and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. After reviewing Michigan’s seat belt installation statute and cases in other jurisdictions, the Court held, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff had no duty to wear a seat belt. "The plaintiff’s failure to fasten his seat belt was not such negligence as to contribute to the cause of the accident. Unbuckled plaintiffs do not cause accidents.” Romankewiz, supra, p 126. (Emphasis in original.)
Regarding the issue of mitigation of damages, the Court stated: "If there is no duty to fasten a seat belt, such a failure cannot be held to be a breach of the duty to minimize damages.” The Court also held that "failure to use a seat belt is not appropriate as a damage-mitigating factor or under the doctrine of avoidable consequences.” The Court concluded, stating that "it is for the legislature, which in its wisdom has prescribed seat belts, to prescribe any required use thereof if it chooses. ” Id., p 127. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Court in Romankewiz prohibited the admission of evidence that the plaintiff did not use a seat belt to show contributory negligence or to mitigate damages.
One year later, the rule was applied in a products liability case. In Selmo v Baratono, 28 Mich App 217; 184 NW2d 367 (1970), lv den 384 Mich 834 (1971), the Court found no error in the trial *479court’s refusal to instruct the jury that it could consider the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt in determining damages.
When Romankewiz and Selmo were decided, Michigan still adhered to the doctrine of contributory negligence in tort cases. According to that doctrine, a plaintiff was completely barred from recovery of damages if there was proof of any negligence on the plaintiff’s part.4 Therefore, if a plaintiff had had a duty to wear a seat belt, proof that the plaintiff did not use a seat belt would bar a plaintiff from any recovery regardless of the defendant’s negligence in causing the accident.
Subsequently, the Court replaced the doctrine of contributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative negligence in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), reh den 406 Mich 1119 (1979).5 The doctrine of comparative negligence provided that proof of a plaintiff’s contributory negligence would only be a partial bar to the plaintiff’s recovery since the plaintiff could recover damages, but the amount of the damages would be reduced to the extent of the plaintiff’s negligent contribution.
Following this change, the Court of Appeals reviewed the rule barring admission of the plaintiff’s nonuse of a seat belt under the doctrine of comparative negligence in Schmitzer v Misener-Bennett Ford, 135 Mich App 350; 354 NW2d 336 (1984), lv den 422 Mich 852 (1985). In Schmitzer, the Court concluded that evidence of a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt was inadmissible as evidence of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence or of the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages.
The Court gave two reasons to support its hold*480ing. First, the Court noted that "[u]nder any interpretation of comparative negligence, no matter how, or to what, negligence is compared, the trier of fact must first find that the plaintiff was negligent.” Id., p 358. (Emphasis in original.) The Court added that negligence will not be found merely upon proof of an act which causes injury. Such a finding of negligence can be sustained only "where the person, in committing the injury-producing act, breached some legally cognizable duty.” Id. Second, the Court stated that no statute mandates seat belt use, so the defendants could not argue that nonuse was negligent per se. Moreover, the Court found that the common law fails to provide a basis for concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to wear seat belts was a breach of the duty to use ordinary care. The Court concluded that imposition of such a duty is an act more appropriately performed by the Legislature. Specifically, the Court observed:
[imposition of such a duty is an act more appropriately performed by the Legislature. The Legislature is better equipped to consider the various issues raised by a law mandating seat-belt use, e.g., the majority of the population’s disinclination to wearing seat belts, the contradictory studies regarding the efficacy of seat belts as safety devices, and the collateral problems associated with other types of safety devices. [Schmitzer, p 359.]
While other jurisdictions have reached contrary conclusions when considering the admissibility of evidence of a plaintiff’s nonuse of a seat belt, Michigan’s rule of prohibiting the admissibility of such evidence is the better approach.6 Retaining *481the rule of inadmissibility of seat belt nonuse is particularly important in a products liability case because the types of conduct being considered are usually varied and different.
Historically, passengers in automobiles have been considered to be free of contributory or comparative negligence unless exceptional circumstances were present.
Furthermore, the injured plaintiff in this case was a passenger in the rear seat. The risks of nonuse of a seat belt for a rear-seat passenger are unclear, and even the Legislature has not required rear-seat passengers to use seat belts.
The Legislature, during its recent tort law reforms, addressed the issue of seat belt use. During its review, the Legislature was informed of the statistics relating to the effect of seat belt use on reducing injuries and deaths in automobile accidents.
The statute, MCL 257.710e; MSA 9.2410(5), provides in pertinent part:
(3) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this state shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened safety belt, except that a child less than 4 *482years of age shall be protected as required in section 710d.[7]
The statute also provides sanctions for failure to wear a safety belt:
(5) Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be considered evidence of negligence and may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. However, such negligence shall not reduce the recovery for damages by more than 5%.
After its evaluation, the Legislature did two things. First, the Legislature made seat belt use mandatory only for the driver and the front-seat passenger. The Legislature also provided that a plaintiffs recovery could not be reduced by more than five percent for his failure to wear a seat belt. Second, the Legislature was silent about the issue of seat belt use by rear-seat passengers.
Although Michigan’s mandatory seat belt statute has been criticized for failing to apportion the damages for injuries in collisions and for creating a windfall for plaintiffs, the seat belt defense "would soon result in windfalls to tortfeasors who would pay only partially for the harm their negligence caused.”8
A majority of courts, including contributory negligence jurisdictions, prohibit the introduction of a plaintiffs nonuse of a seat belt to reduce a plaintiffs recovery.9 Among the reasons cited are that a *483"defendant’s fault in causing the accident distributed risks to the world at large and was capable of causing some degree of damage to any plaintiff within the sphere of foreseeability. Conversely, a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt creates no risks to others, but merely exposes himself to a risk.”10
Turning to the facts of this case, the majority invites legislative action to affirm its decision.11 In reaching its results today, the majority has engaged in judicial legislation.12 The majority is imposing a duty on rear-seat passengers to wear seat belts or risk being found negligent and suffer a reduction in damages. The Legislature did not impose such a duty after it considered all of the facts and evidence presented regarding the use of the seat belts. Manufacturers, distributors, and parts suppliers certainly had the opportunity to address the Legislature on this issue. To the extent that the law regarding the use of seat belts should be changed, it is for the Legislature and not for our Court.
I believe that it is patently unfair to retroactively impose a duty on all rear-seat passengers in *484automobiles when clearly no such duty was declared or negligence issue recognized at common law or by statute. The public policy decision that rear-seat passengers have a duty to wear seat belts is best left to the Legislature.
Following the majority’s opinion, a trial judge or jury may reduce a plaintiffs damage award by any percentage up to one hundred percent when a rear-seat passenger was not wearing a seat belt, while the Legislature has limited the reduction of a damage award to not more than five percent for a driver and front-seat passenger who were not wearing seat belts.13 This result is inequitable because, at the time of the accident in this case, there was absolutely no duty declared or negligence issue recognized at common law or by statute to wear a seat belt. Moreover, the majority’s decision may require years of clarification to properly instruct a jury as to how to reach its decision if it chooses to reduce a plaintiffs damages.14
While I agree in part with the majority that in crashworthiness cases the vehicle should be consid*485ered as a whole, I would, nevertheless, bar testimony regarding the nonuse of seat belts subject to the applicability of MCL 257.710e; MSA 9.2410(5).
The Legislature enacted the mandatory seat belt law more than six years after the accident in this case. The statute, therefore, represents what the Legislature considered to be in the best interest of the citizens of this state.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Levin, J.
(separate opinion). The question whether 1985 PA 1 should be taken into consideration1 in deciding the comparative negligence and reduction of damages issues has not been briefed and argued. We would, because of the importance of the question, require, as we did in Camaj v S S Kresge Co, 426 Mich 281; 393 NW2d 875 (1986), further briefing concerning the import of Act 1 before deciding the comparative negligence and reduction of damages issues.
The question whether a decision of this Court changing a common-law rule should be given retroactive or prospective effect is a separate question from whether the common-law rule should be changed. There has been no briefing or advocacy *486on whether the new rule should be given retroactive or prospective effect. That question, too, should not be decided without briefing and advocacy.2
*485[Ante, p 475.]
*4861 agree with the view expressed in the lead opinion that evidence concerning the seat-restraint system may be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether a motor vehicle was defective in design where the plaintiff asserts the crashworthiness doctrine as a theory of liability.
i
We agree with the admonitions in the lead opinion regarding expressions of opinion on issues that have not been raised, briefed, or argued. An appellate court ordinarily is not justified in raising an issue regarding the application in the cause under consideration of an established rule of law that has not been noticed by the litigants, that need not surface in the Court’s opinion, and that, if raised and decided, would affect only the outcome of the cause under consideration.
The lead opinion does not, however, speak only to the outcome of the instant case. It states: "Our decision in this case is to be given limited retroactive effect, applying to cases tried after the date this opinion is issued and those cases pending on appeal in which issues concerning the admissibility of seat belt evidence have been properly preserved.”3
The lead opinion states that Act 1 is ”inapplica*487ble in the instant case because: (1) the accident occurred prior to the statute’s effective date, (2) plaintiff was a rear-seat passenger to whom the statute, by its terms, would not have applied . . . .”4 The lead opinion will, I expect, be perceived by the bench and bar as deciding the possible effect of Act 1 on cases that arose before its enactment.5
It is one thing to say that Act 1 will not be applied in the instant case because no issue concerning the present or future effect of Act 1 has been raised by the parties in this Court. It is quite another to say that Act 1 is not applicable because the accident occurred before the effective date of Act 1 and because Act 1 by its terms does not apply to a rear-seat passenger. The latter statements in effect say, in contrast with what this Court did in Kovacs v Chesapeake & O R Co, 426 Mich 647; 397 NW2d 169 (1986), discussed in part m infra, that the enactment of Act 1 does not impede this Court from changing the common-law rule applicable to the period before enactment of Act 1.
The question of the import of Act 1 affects not only the plaintiff in the instant case, but countless, perhaps tens of thousands of "cases tried after the date this opinion is issued,”6 which means, in effect, every case not yet tried where the accident occurred before July 1, 1985, and every case in*488volving a rear-seat passenger whether the accident occurred before, on, or after that date.
The question of the import of Act 1 is addressed in this opinion only because the lead opinion addresses the question.7 The discussion of the question in the lead opinion cannot be justified on the basis that another opinion addresses the question. It is one thing for a dissenting or concurring opinion to advert to or discuss an issue neither briefed nor argued, and quite another for a plurality or majority of the Court to do so. Discussion of an issue in a dissenting or concurring opinion cannot be read by the bench or bar as deciding the question.
When a dissenting or concurring opinion raises an issue, the majority has several options. The majority can respond, if it wishes to respond at all, by simply noting that the issue has not been raised, briefed, or argued, and that no opinion is intimated thereon. A tentative opposing view might even be expressed. A plurality or majority should not, however, purport to decide the issue without briefing or argument. The issue should be left open to be decided after briefing and argument.
Another option open to a majority, or a plurality with the vote of dissenting or concurring justices, is to order further briefing and argument so that the issue can be decided after adversary presentation. That is the course that we respectfully suggest the Court should have adopted in this case.
*489II
Because we read the lead opinion as expressing, in part v of that opinion, a view regarding the import of Act 1, and because of the importance of this question — it potentially affects approximately one-third of the injury actions8 — we believe it is incumbent upon us to express our disagreement with what we perceive to be the analysis of the lead opinion on this question.
After this cause was argued in the Court of Appeals, the Legislature enacted Act 1, generally requiring the driver and front-seat passenger of a motor vehicle to wear seat belts. No such obligation is imposed on rear-seat passengers. The act provides that "[f]ailure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be considered evidence of negligence and may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. However, such negligence shall not reduce the recovery for damages by more than 5%.”9
The act was approved March 8, 1985, and provides that it shall take effect on July 1, 1985. The *490accident in the instant case occurred over six years earlier, on April 18, 1979.
However, ten years before the accident, the Court of Appeals, in Romankewiz v Black, 16 Mich App 119; 167 NW2d 606 (1969), held that there is no duty to wear a seat belt, and that the failure to use a seat belt was not contributory negligence. The following year, in Selmo v Baratono, 28 Mich App 217; 184 NW2d 367 (1970), the Court of Appeals, in a products liability action against General Motors, adhered to Romankewiz and held that the trial court had not erred in refusing to instruct a jury that it could consider the failure to wear a seat belt in determining the amount of damages. Four years later, in Placek v Sterling Heights, 52 Mich App 619; 217 NW2d 900 (1974), the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial because *491the plaintiff had been questioned concerning her failure to use a seat belt at the time of the accident.
Nine months before Act 1 was enacted, the Court of Appeals again adhered to the rule of Romankewiz, Selmo, and Placek, in DeGraaf v General Motors Corp, 135 Mich App 141, 142; 352 NW2d 719 (1984), a products liability action where the driver claimed that she had suffered enhanced injuries because the steering column failed to collapse adequately upon impact with her body. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that if it found that the driver’s "failure to wear her seat belt was the sole proximate cause of her enhanced injuries it should render a verdict for defendant.”
Two weeks later, in Schmitzer v Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc, 135 Mich App 350; 354 NW2d 336 (1984), the Court of Appeals addressed its prior holdings that evidence of failure to use a seat belt was not admissible on the issue of contributory negligence in light of the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence. The Court of Appeals reiterated the view expressed in its earlier decisions, and held that evidence of failure to use a seat belt was not admissible as evidence of the injured person’s failure to mitigate damages.
Leave to appeal was not sought in Romankewiz. Leave to appeal was denied in Selmo, 384 Mich 834 (1971), in Placek, 392 Mich 811 (1974), and, twenty days after Act 1 was enacted, in DeGraaf and Schmitzer, 422 Mich 852 (1985).
The enactment of Act 1 should be viewed in the context of the consistent fifteen-year adherence by the Court of Appeals to the view that the failure to use a seat belt was not evidence of contributory or comparative negligence and could not be used in either an ordinary automobile negligence case *492or in an automobile products liability case to reduce the damages otherwise to be awarded to an injured person, and in light of this Court’s decisions to decline to review those decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Although Act 1 was not by its terms effective until July 1, 1985, it codified the common-law rule,10 established by the Court of Appeals, that damages may not be reduced for failure to wear a seat belt with a "narrow exception”11 permitting reduction of a damage award by not more than five percent for failure of a front-seat occupant to wear a seat belt.
The July 1, 1985, effective date of Act 1 was the date selected by the Legislature on which the narrow five-percent exception for front-seat occupants was to become effective, not the date on which a possible one hundred percent reduction of damages was to be reduced to no more than five percent. The lead opinion turns the July 1, 1985, effective date into a date on which relief from a possible one hundred percent reduction takes effect. That does not appear to be consonant with the legislative decision.
The Legislature, like bench and bar,12 may con*493sider and rely on the decisions of the trial and appellate courts of this state when enacting new legislation. At times the common law is uncertain, and it may not be appropriate to attribute to the Legislature any particular reading of the common law. Where the common law is well-established and uncontradicted, however, and the Legislature essentially accepts the common-law rule,13 a proper respect for legislative supremacy on substantive issues requires, in our opinion, that the judiciary ordinarily defer to the legislative decision to enter the field, abide by the legislative solution, and *494refrain from further and belated refinement of the substantive law.
iii
On the authority14 of Kovacs v Chesapeake & O R Co, supra, we would hold that, in light of the enactment of Act 1 in the context of the Court of Appeals having previously established as the common law of this state that the failure to use seat belts may not be considered to reduce the injured person’s recovery for damages and this Court’s denial of leave to review those decisions, it is not appropriate for this Court to change retroactively the common law of this state to provide that if a front- or rear-seat occupant fails to wear a seat belt, the damages otherwise to be awarded may be reduced one hundred percent for accidents that occurred before July 1, 1985, and, it would appear from the analysis of the lead opinion, one hundred percent before, on, and after that date for a rear-seat occupant.
In Kovacs, this Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether to increase from five percent to as much as twelve percent the interest rate stated in the standard jury instruction15 concerning reduction to present value. After the cause was argued, but before decision, the Legislature enacted 1986 PA 178, providing that after a verdict had been rendered by a trier of fact in favor of a plaintiff, the court was obliged to enter a judgment for all future economic and all future noneconomic damages "reduced to gross present cash value,” which latter term is defined as meaning "the total amount of future damages reduced to present *495value at a rate of 5% per year for each year in which those damages accrue . . . .”16
In Kovacs, this Court said that "[although the amendatory provision is not effective except as to cases filed on or after October 1, 1986,[17] we conclude, in light of the legislative action, that no further consideration should be given to the reduction to present-value issue.”18 The Court also said: "The Legislature thus has opted for the five percent rate.”19
Thus, in Kovacs, this Court in effect said that because the Legislature had opted for the five-percent rate as to cases filed on or after October 1, 1986, it would not have been appropriate for this Court to consider changing the common-law rule for cases, such as Kovacs, that had been filed before that date.
The same view was expressed regarding another issue in Kovacs. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company had asked the judge to charge the jury that any sum of money awarded the plaintiff is not subject to income tax. There were no controlling decisions of this Court or indeed of the Court of Appeals. It had not, however, this Court observed, "been the practice to charge the jury regarding income tax consequences.”20 Act 178 had not expressly dealt with the question, but had dealt with other related questions, requiring the reduction of a judgment for past economic damages by the amount of collateral source payments.21 This Court said that "[u]nder the circumstance that the Legis*496lature has recently considered whether a judgment should be reduced by other benefits accruing to the plaintiff, we conclude that it would not be appropriate for this Court to address the question” whether the jury should be instructed "to reduce the amount that it might otherwise award the plaintiff by the amount that would be payable as income tax if the damages assessed by the jury were subject to income tax.”22
The analysis in Kovacs suggests that in the instant case, the Legislature having spoken in Act 1, this Court should not speak to the question whether the damages to be awarded an injured person may be reduced because of a failure to use seat belts before July 1, 1985. There is no significant difference between Kovacs and the instant case. In both Kovacs and this case there was a well-established common-law rule announced and consistently adhered to by the appellate courts of this state: in Kovacs, that the interest rate for purposes of reduction to present value was five percent, and, in the instant case, that the amount of damages to be awarded to the injured person shall not be reduced for failure to use a seat belt.
In both Kovacs and the instant case, the Legislature essentially agreed with the common-law rule. The Legislature adopted, as to the issue considered in Kovacs, the judge-made rule of a five-percent rate, but provided a different procedure: the court rather than the jury reduces the award. As to the issue here being considered, the Legislature, by providing for a possible reduction of the damages to be awarded a front-seat occupant not exceeding five percent, adopted in the main (ninety-five percent) the judge-made rule that the damages to be awarded the injured person shall not be reduced for failure to use a seat belt.
*497In Kovacs, this Court could have said, in accordance with the analysis of the lead opinion in the instant case, that Act 178 did not preclude this Court from changing the common law concerning cases filed before October 1, 1986. Rather, the Court in Kovacs said in effect that it would not, in light of the legislative decision, be appropriate for this Court to change the common law after the Legislature has spoken and essentially adopted the common-law rule.
IV
We have considered the possible application of Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223; 393 NW2d 847 (1986), where the Legislature, in 1986 PA 175, adopted this Court’s construction of the governmental tort liability act, but amended the act for cases arising, after the effective date of the amendment, out of the operation of a hospital.23
*498In Hyde, this Court said24 that the Legislature, in enacting 1986 PA 175, "codified” the "broad immunity granted by Ross [v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984)],” with a "narrow exception” for a public general hospital or county medical facility. So, too, here, the Legislature in effect codified over ninety-five percent of the no-reduction-of-damages rule promulgated by the Court of Appeals in Romankewiz, Selmo, Placek, DeGraaf, and Schmitzer, with a narrow exception, permitting reduction not exceeding five percent of damages for front-seat occupants.
This Court had ruled in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183; 273 NW2d 413 (1978), that the operation of a general hospital was not a "governmental function” within the meaning of the governmental tort liability act. Subsequently, in Ross, this Court defined the term "governmental function” as "an activity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, or other law.”25
In Hyde, this Court considered whether Ross impliedly overruled "that portion of Parker which held that the day-to-day operation of a public general hospital is not a governmental function.”26 The Court held that "to the extent that the diagnosis, treatment, and care of patients at a public general hospital or medical facility are activities which are expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, or other law, the hospital or facility is entitled to immunity from tort liability,” and that "[t]o the extent that Parker held that such activities do not constitute *499the exercise or discharge of a governmental function, it was impliedly overruled by Ross."27
After Ross was decided, Act 175 was enacted, effective July 1, 1986, providing that the governmental tort liability act does not grant immunity with respect to the ownership or operation of a hospital or county medical care facility.28
This Court considered in Hyde the possible application of the 1986 amendatory legislation on the question whether Ross impliedly overruled Parker and said:
We suggested in Ross that plaintiffs’ arguments would be better addressed to the Legislature. Id., p 621. In response to Ross, 1986 PA 175 was enacted, effective July 1, 1986. The Ross definition of "governmental function” is codified in § 1(f). However, § 7(4) specifically allows tort liability to be imposed on a governmental agency which owns or operates a public general hospital or county medical facility. By adopting this narrow exception to the broad immunity granted by Ross and codified by 1986 PA 175, it is clear that the Legislature believed that Ross had impliedly overruled Parker.[29]
Thus, although Parker was not explicitly overruled until Hyde was decided, after the enactment of Act 175, this Court, in so explicitly overruling Parker, declared that Parker had already been "impliedly overruled by Ross,” and that it was "clear that the Legislature believed that Ross had impliedly overruled Parker. ”
In Hyde, this Court’s decision in Ross preceded the legislative amendment of the statute. This is a different case. Here, the Legislature has already acted before this Court, in the instant case, changes the prior common-law rule._
*500In the instant case, the Legislature, when it enacted Act 1, had no reason to suppose that the common-law no-reduction-of-damages rule that had been stated and restated in Romankewiz, Selmo, Placek, DeGraaf, and Schmitzer, might in effect be overruled by this Court two years after the enactment of Act 1. It is again noteworthy that this Court had declined to review those decisions of the Court of Appeals where further review by this Court had been sought.
Under the Court’s analysis in Hyde, this Court did not change the rule of1 Parker after the Legislature had adopted that rule because Parker had already been impliedly overruled by Ross before the Legislature acted, and the Legislature, clearly believing that Ross had impliedly overruled Parker, accepted that implied overruling by making Act 175 operative only from and after a future date, July 1, 1986. It cannot be said here that the Legislature, in making Act 1 effective July 1, 1985, accepted a change in the prior common-law rule that does not occur until the opinions in the instant case are announced, over two years after the Legislature enacted Act l.30
*501Archer, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Roberts v Bohn, 26 Ohio App 2d 50; 269 NE2d 53 (1971), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Suchy v Moore, 29 Ohio St 2d 99; 279 NE2d 878 (1972); Bertsch v Spears, 20 Ohio App 2d 137; 252 NE2d 194 (1969); Woods v City of Columbus, 23 Ohio App 163; 492 NE2d 466 (1985); Bantel v Herbert, 31 Ohio App 3d 167; 509 NE2d 981 (1987). The Ohio Legislature has enacted a mandatory seat belt statute. See Ohio Rev Code Ann, § 4513.26.3 (Page), effective May 6, 1986.

 The statute does not define what constitutes such a safety restraint device, nor does it indicate whether it refers to lap belts or lap belts with shoulder harnesses.

 1949 PA 300, § 710b, added by 1961 PA 163, § 1, effective September 8, 1961, as amended by 1963 PA 212, § 1, effective September 6, 1963.
The pertinent provision of the statute currently provides:
A private passenger vehicle manufactured after January 1, 1965 shall not be offered for sale in this state unless the vehicle is equipped with safety belts for the use of the driver and 1 other front seat passenger.

 See Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 65, pp 458-459.

 As of 1982, some forty states had adopted some form of comparative negligence. Prosser, supra, § 67, p 471.

 In Taplin v Clark, 6 Kan App 2d 66; 626 P2d 1198 (1981), the Kansas Court of Appeals considered whether evidence of a rear-seat passenger’s failure to wear a seat belt was admissible. The court held *481that such evidence was inadmissible. In rejecting the seat belt defense, the court quoted Hampton v State Hwy Comm, 209 Kan 565; 498 P2d 236 (1972):
"Plaintiff was therefore not violating any statutory duty [in not wearing a seat belt]. Neither, we believe, was he falling below the standard required of a reasonable, prudent man. We have nothing before us on which we could confidently base a finding that the accepted community standard of care requires one to buckle up routinely; experience dictates to the contrary.” [Id., p 67.]
The court in Taplin concluded that the change in Kansas to comparative negligence did not change the basic duties required of drivers and passengers to be considered in automobile tort litigation.

 1985 PA 1. This statute took effect more than six years after the accident in this case.

 Note, A compromise between mitigation and comparative fault? A critical assessment of the seat belt controversy and a proposal for reform, 14 Hofstra L R 319, 327, 338 (1986).

 Id., p 330.

 Id., p 328.

 While we are cognizant of the potential argument that the effect of the five-percent limitation could lead, potentially and perhaps anomalously, to the irrational result of protecting the recoveries of individuals whose failure to use seat belts was in violation of the statute, while not protecting the recoveries of those whose failure to use seat belts was not in violation of it, we are compelled to conclude that that effect is essentially a legislative concern. [Ante, p 469.]

 That the Legislature has not required rear-seat automobile passengers traveling outside the territorial boundaries of this state prior to the effective date of the seat belt usage law to "buckle up” does not persuade us to affirm an unsupportable exception to the common-law and the statutorily prescribed comparative negligence doctrine. [Ante, p 465.]

 Accordingly, we hold that whether failure to use a seat belt constitutes comparative negligence so as to require the proportionate reduction of a plaintiffs recovery is an evaluative issue appropriately within the province of the jury.
If competent evidence is proffered to establish that the failure to use an available and operational seat belt contributed to producing plaintiffs damages, then the issue of comparative negligence, including the accompanying issue of causation, should be submitted to the jury pursuant to the special verdict form ordinarily used in such cases. [Ante, p 462.]

 Our decision in this case is to be given limited retroactive effect, applying to cases tried after the date this opinion is issued and those cases pending on appeal in which issues concerning the admissibility of seat belt evidence have been properly preserved. We express no opinion concerning the future applicability of MCL 257.710e; MSA 9.2410(5) with regard to cases in which the injury occurred after the effective *485date of that statute and a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt was in violation of its provisions.24

 For the reasons discussed in part v, the mandatory seat belt usage law is inapplicable in the instant case. No issue concerning the present or future effect of that statute has been raised by the parties in this Court. Other than acknowledging our recognition of the potentially troublesome concern discussed in part v, we are not inclined to comment further.

 Compare Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich 41; 247 NW2d 512 (1976), with Kovacs v Chesapeake & O R Co, 426 Mich 647; 397 NW2d 169 (1986).

 See Camaj v S S Kresge Co, supra, 291 (Levin, J., concurring).
The rule is indeed well-established that a point not briefed and considered is not decided. [CSC v Dep’t of Labor, 424 Mich 571, 609; 384 NW2d 728 (1986).]

 Ante, p 475.

 Ante, p 463.

 The lead opinion also suggests that there may be a question regarding the future applicability of Act 1. It states:
We express no opinion concerning the future applicability of [Act 1] with regard to cases in which the injury occurred after the effective date of that statute and a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt was in violation of its provisions. [Ante, p 475.]

 Ante, p 475.

 If part v of the lead opinion and the second sentence, and accompanying footnote, of the penultimate paragraph (in part vn) of that opinion were withdrawn, this opinion would be withdrawn in its entirety except for the first three paragraphs of this opinion. And if the first sentence of the penultimate paragraph were withdrawn, the second paragraph of this opinion would be withdrawn.

 Annual Report of the State Court Administrator, Michigan 1986, p 29.

 MCL 257.710e(5); MSA 9.2410(5)(5).
A large majority of the statutes requiring adults to wear seat belts provide either that a violation cannot be grounds for reducing an award on the basis of comparative or contributory negligence, or limit the possible reduction to a small percentage of the award. Of the approximately twenty-six states other than Michigan that have statutes presently in effect, three follow Michigan in limiting the possible reduction to a small percentage. See Iowa Code Ann, § 321.445(4)(b)(2) (5%); La Rev Stat Ann, § 32.295.1(E)(4) (2%); Mo Ann Stat, § 307.178(3)(2) (1%).
Of the remaining twenty-three statutes, sixteen provide either that evidence of nonuse is not admissible in a civil action, or that it cannot be used to reduce an award. See Conn Gen Stat Ann, § 14-100a(c)(4); DC Code, § 40-1607; 111 Ann Stat, ch 9516, § 12-603.1(c); Ind Stat Ann, § 9-8-13-9; Kan Stat Ann, § 8-2504(c); Md Code Ann, § 22-412.3(g); Nev Rev Stat, § 484.641(3); NM Stat Ann, § 66-7-373(B); NC Gen Stat, § 20-135.2A(d); Ohio Rev Code Ann, § 4513.26.3(G) (Page); Okla Stat Ann, *490tit 47, § 12-420; Tenn Code Ann, § 55-9-604; Tex Rev Civ Stat Ann, art 6701d, § 107C(j); Utah Code Ann, § 41-6-186; Va Code, § 46.1-309.2(E); Wash Rev Code, §46.61.688(6). Only two of the statutes specifically allow evidence of nonuse to reduce an award. See Cal Veh Code, § 27315(0; NY Veh & Traf Law, § 1229-c(8) (McKinney). Four of the remaining five statutes do not specifically state whether evidence of nonuse can be used to reduce an award. See Hawaii Rev Stat, § 291-11.6; Idaho Code, § 49-764; Minn Stat Ann, § 169.686; NJ Stat Ann, § 39:3-76.2h. One statute provides that evidence of nonuse cannot be used as "prima-facie” evidence of negligence. See Fla Stat Ann, § 316.614(10).
The Michigan statute is also consistent with the overwhelming majority of statutes in restricting the duty to drivers and front-seat passengers. See Conn Gen Stat Ann, § 14-100a(c)(1); DC Code, § 40-1602; Fla Stat Ann, § 316.614(4)(a); Hawaii Rev Stat, § 291-11.6(a); Idaho Code, § 49-764(1); 111 Ann Stat, ch 9514, § 12-603.1(a); Ind Stat Ann, § 9-8-14-1; Iowa Code Ann, § 321.445(2); Kan Stat Ann, § 8-2503(b); La Rev Stat Ann, § 32.295.1(B); Md Code Ann, § 22-412.3(b); Minn Stat Ann, § 169.686(1); Mo Ann Stat, § 307.178(2); Nev Rev Stat, § 484.641(2); NJ Stat Ann, § 39:3-76.2f(a); NM Stat Ann, § 66-7-372(A); NY Veh & Traf Law, § 1229-c(3) (McKinney); NC Gen Stat, § 20-135-2A(a); Ohio Rev Code Ann, § 4513.26.3(B)(3) (Page); Okla Stat Ann, tit 47, § 12-417(A); Tenn Code Ann, § 55-9-603(b)(l); Utah Code Ann, § 41-6-182; Tex Rev Civ Stat Ann, art 6701d, § 107C(b)(2); Va Code, § 46.1-309.2(A). Only two states, California and Washington, require adult, rear-seat passengers to wear seat belts. See Cal Veh Code, § 27315(d); Wash Rev Code, §46.61.688(3). Only the California statute provides that evidence of nonuse by a rear-seat passenger may be used to show negligence or to mitigate damages.

 The Legislature did not indeed codify the common-law rule that there is no duty to wear a seat belt, but on the contrary changed that rule effective July 1, 1985, to require front-seat occupants to wear seat belts and to permit evidence of violation of that requirement to be considered as evidence of negligence. The tort consequence or remedy for failure to wear a seat belt was limited, however, to a reduction of damages by not more than five percent.
Act 1, viewed in terms of the tort significance and consequence of its enactment, in effect codified the common-law rule of no reduction of damages for failure to wear a seat belt with the narrow five-percent exception.

 See n 29.

 The Legislature, like the litigants who relied on this Court’s decisions not to review Jolliff v American Advertising Distributors, Inc, 49 Mich App 1; 211 NW2d 260 (1973), lv den 391 Mich 780 (1974), and Buxton v Alexander, 69 Mich App 507; 245 NW2d 111 (1976), lv *493den 399 Mich 827 (1977), could justifiably proceed on the assumption that the law of Michigan was as stated by the Court of Appeals. In Gusler v Fairview Tubular Products, 412 Mich 270; 315 NW2d 388 (1981), this Court disapproved the rule of Jolliff, and in Putney v Haskins, 414 Mich 181; 324 NW2d 729 (1982), this Court disapproved the rule of Buxton. In both cases, however, the change in law was prospective only; we stated that to do otherwise would be to defeat the justifiable expectations of litigants who legitimately regarded this Court’s denial of leave to appeal as having significance.
In Gusler, this Court treated the interpretations of the workers’ compensation statute by the director of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, and the Court of Appeals, as controlling law so that "today’s holding is not unlike the announcement of a new rule of law. Its application therefore should be treated accordingly.” The Court continued: "In the interest of fairness we do not believe our holding should affect any disability compensation payments already made,” but only "benefits due and not yet paid or to be awarded after the date of this opinion.” Gusler, supra, p 298.
In Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350; 343 NW2d 181 (1984), this Court considered the effect of its decision in Putney disapproving the rule of Buxton. It noted that Buxton had "remained as the uncontradicted interpretation of the name and retain provision.” The Court addressed and rejected the argument that "any reliance by plaintiffs on Buxton was misplaced because it was a decision of the Court of Appeals, rather than one of this Court.” The Court said that "[t]his argument fails to take into account the structure of the Michigan appellate system,” and concluded that "[i]n light of the unquestioned status of Buxton at the time Putney was decided by this Court, it would be unjust to apply Putney retroactively to persons other than those before the Court in that case” and limited the applicability of Putney to cases where settlement agreements were entered into with the allegedly intoxicated person after the date of the decision in Putney. Tebo, supra, pp 362-364.

 See n 10.

 There were three opinions in Pittman v City of Taylor, supra (see n 1). No opinion was signed by a majority of those participating. See Negri v Slotkin, 397 Mich 105; 244 NW2d 98 (1976).

 SJI2d 53.03.

 MCL 600.6306; MSA 27A.6306, added by 1986 PA 178.

 1986 PA 178, § 3(3).

 Kovacs, supra, pp 649-650.

 Id., p 649.

 Id., p 650.

 MCL 600.6303, 600.6306; MSA 27A.6303, 27A.6306, added by 1986 PA 178.

 Kovacs, supra, p 650.

 (f) "Governmental function” is an activity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law. [MCL 691.1401(0; MSA 3.996(101)(f).]
(4) This act does not grant immunity to a governmental agency with respect to the ownership or operation of a hospital or county medical care facility or to the agents or employees of such hospital or county medical care facility. As used in this subsection:
(a) "County medical care facility” means that term as defined in section 20104 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being section 333.20104 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(b) "Hospital” means a facility offering inpatient, overnight care, and services for observation, diagnosis, and active treatment of an individual with a medical, surgical, obstetric, chronic, or rehabilitative condition requiring the daily direction or supervision of a physician. The term does not include a hospital owned or operated by the department of mental health or a hospital operated by the department of corrections. [MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4).]

 See text accompanying n 29.

 Ross, supra, p 620.

 Hyde, supra, p 230.

 Id., p 231.

 See n 23.

 Id., pp 245-246.

 Hyde also dealt with the question whether a change in the common law should be given full or limited retroactive or prospective effect. In holding that Ross should be given "limited retroactive effect,” this Court said that Ross did not overrule "clear and uncontradicted case law.” Rather, “[bjeginning with Parker, no single definition had been adopted by a majority of this Court. In addition, the case law in general was 'confused [and] often irreconcilable.’ Ross, 420 Mich 596. Given the uncertainty of the law in this area, the bench and bar should have realized that some of our prior decisions, including Parker, might not survive after Ross.” Hyde, supra, p 240.
The Court continued:
[T]he general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect. We often have limited the application of decisions which have overruled prior law or reconstrued statutes. Tebo, 418 Mich 360-361. Complete prospective application has generally been limited to decisions which overrule clear and uncontradicted case law. Id., pp 361-363.
*501We believe that Ross should be given the same limited retroactive effect that Parker was given by Murray [v Beyer Memorial Hosp, 409 Mich 217; 293 NW2d 341 (1980)]. We therefore hold that the rules articulated in Ross should be applied to all cases commenced after the date our opinion was issued (January 22, 1985), and to those cases pending either in trial or appellate courts on that date which properly raised and preserved a governmental immunity issue. [Hyde, supra, pp 240-241.]
It cannot be said that there was any "uncertainty of the law in this area” or that the decisions of the Court of Appeals were "confused [and] irreconcilable.” They were consistent and in full agreement, one with the other. See Parker v Port Huron Hosp, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960).