Court Opinion

ID: 9389704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 06:07:40.25023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.204938
License: Public Domain

DENIED and Opinion Filed April 21, 2023

                                    S   In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 No. 05-23-00214-CV

                  IN RE ROBERT ARTHUR MOSES, Relator

          Original Proceeding from the 219th Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 219-81377-2015

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Molberg, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Breedlove
      In this original proceeding, Robert Arthur Moses has filed a “Notice of

Appeal” to compel the current judge of the trial court that convicted him to grant a

motion to recuse herself from his case for failing to rule on a pretrial application for

writ of habeas corpus he filed in 2015. Because relator’s “Notice of Appeal” seeks

what is properly characterized as mandamus relief, we construe the document as a

petition for writ of mandamus.

      The certificate of service on relator’s motion to recuse indicates relator mailed

it to the trial court on February 14, 2023. The trial court’s online docket sheet on

Collin County’s website shows entry of an order on March 2, 2023, with a comment

line: “Order of Referral on Motion to Recuse.” On March 28, 2023, the online docket
sheet shows a second order entered with the comment line “Order Denying Motion

to Recuse.” Thus, unless relator can show the trial court had a nondiscretionary,

ministerial duty to grant the motion to recuse, this case appears to be moot. See In

re Johnson, 599 S.W.3d 311, 311 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, orig. proceeding)

(dismissing as moot mandamus petition because trial court’s online docket sheet

showed relator had obtained requested relief.); see also State ex rel. Young v. Sixth

Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007) (explaining general rule that mandamus relief may not be used to compel the

trial court to rule a certain way on pending motion unless relator has a clear right to

relief sought).

       We conclude relator cannot show he has a clear right to relief. As a petition

for writ of mandamus, relator’s “notice of appeal” does not satisfy the rules of

appellate procedure in that it is not styled or structured as a petition, lacks a proper

case style, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, a list of issues

presented, and a proper certification. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.1, 52.3.

       Relator bears the burden to provide the Court with a sufficient record to

establish his right to mandamus relief. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex.

1992) (orig. proceeding). The record must contain certified or sworn copies of all

relevant orders and material documents that show the matter complained of or that

were filed in the underlying proceeding. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A),

52.7(a)(1).

                                           –2–
      Relator’s petition is supported by only one document—his motion to recuse

the trial court judge. There is no copy of the pretrial writ relator contends the trial

court has failed to adjudicate nor are there any documents providing context for

relator’s assertion that the trial court has a ministerial duty to grant his motion.

Relator’s failure to properly certify and support his petition is a sufficient ground to

deny his petition. See In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 758–59 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2008, orig. proceeding).

      Perhaps to buttress his meager record, relator has filed a motion requesting we

take judicial notice of procedural events that happened before his trial. Relator asks

us to take judicial notice that the State failed to bring him before a magistrate

following his arrest in 2015, that no magistrate determined his arrest was lawful and

based on probable cause, that relator filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas

corpus under code of criminal procedure article 11.08, and that the trial court failed

to rule on his pretrial writ application. Relator contends such matters are appropriate

for judicial notice because they are “known within this court’s territorial jurisdiction

as by cause no. 219-81377-2015.”

      None of these matters are proper subjects for judicial notice in this proceeding.

See Johnson, 599 S.W.3d at 311 n.1 (explaining use of judicial notice in mandamus

proceedings); See also Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837 (requiring relator to provide

record establishing right to mandamus relief); TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3, 52.7. We deny

the motion.

                                          –3–
      Even with a more complete record, relator cannot show he is entitled to

mandamus relief. Relator was convicted of murder in a jury trial and sentenced to

life in prison. This Court affirmed his conviction. See Moses v. State, No. 05-16-

01391-CR, 2018 WL 4042359 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 23, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused

his petition for discretionary review. Our mandate issued on January 24, 2019.

      Because relator was convicted, sentenced to prison, and his conviction is final,

any post-conviction habeas relief must be obtained under the procedures set forth in

code of criminal procedure article 11.07 and come from the court of criminal

appeals. See Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Judicial Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also In re

Dunsmore, No. 01-22-00943-CR, 2023 WL 138876, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Jan. 10, 2023 orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(after final conviction, a relator may not apply to appellate court for mandamus relief

asserting trial court has ruled improperly on motion for recusal). Whatever

ministerial duty the trial court owed to relator has been satisfied by the order of

referral and order denying recusal. See Dunsmore, 2023 WL 138876, at *2.

      To the extent that relator’s document could be considered a premature notice

of appeal anticipating an order denying his motion, we have no jurisdiction to review

this type of post-conviction order. Appeals in criminal cases must be specifically

authorized by statute. State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Crim.

                                         –4–
App. 2011). Generally, we may consider criminal appeals only after the trial court

enters a final judgment. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02; Abbott v. State,

271 S.W.3d 694, 697 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We are not aware of any authority

allowing relator to appeal the denial of a post-conviction order denying recusal. See

Abbott, 271 S.W.3d at 697; see also Scott v. State, No. 11-17-00015-CR, 2017 WL

469374, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 2, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (dismissing appeal from order denying motion to recuse judge from

post-conviction proceedings).

      Because relator has not shown he is entitled to mandamus relief, we deny his

petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a).

                                           /Maricela Breedlove/
                                           MARICELA BREEDLOVE
                                           JUSTICE

230214F.P05

                                        –5–