Court Opinion

ID: 9400680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 19:14:08.538488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.227654
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                                                            FILED
                               January 2023 Term                       June 8, 2023
                                                                         released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                     EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                     SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                          OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                  No. 21-0888

EDWARD S., ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATES OF T.S. AND A.K., EDWARD
   S. AND RACHEL K., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS OF J.K.,
                       Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners,

                                       v.

                  RALEIGH COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY,
                           Defendant Below, Respondent.

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court of Summers County
                        The Honorable Robert Irons, Judge
                           Case No. CC-45-2019-C-20

                           REVERSED AND REMANDED

                             Submitted: May 9, 2023
                               Filed: June 8, 2023

W. Mark Burnette, Esq.               Jared C. Underwood, Esq.
MARK BURNETTE, P.A.                  Chip E. Williams, Esq.
Ocala, Florida                       Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown & Poe, PLLC
                                     Beckley, West Virginia
Jeffrey S. Rodgers, Esq.             Counsel for Respondent
Lewisburg, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioners

CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE WOOTON disqualified.
HONORABLE JOSHUA D. BUTCHER, JUDGE, sitting by temporary assignment.
                             SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.”

Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

              2.     “The ultimate determination of whether qualified or statutory

immunity bars a civil action is one of law for the court to determine. Therefore, unless there

is a bona fide dispute as to the foundational or historical facts that underlie the immunity

determination, the ultimate questions of statutory or qualified immunity are ripe for

summary disposition.” Syllabus Point 1, Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139,

479 S.E.2d 649 (1996).

              3.     “‘In the absence of an insurance contract waiving the defense, the

doctrine of qualified or official immunity bars a claim of mere negligence against a State

agency not within the purview of the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and

Insurance Reform Act, W. Va.Code § 29–12A–1 et seq., and against an officer of that

department acting within the scope of his or her employment, with respect to the

discretionary judgments, decisions, and actions of the officer.’ Syl. Pt. 6, Clark v. Dunn,

195 W.Va. 272, 465 S.E.2d 374 (1995).” Syllabus Point 7, West Virginia Regional Jail

and Correctional Facility Authority v. A.B., 234 W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (2014).

              4.     “A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly

expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full

                                              i
force and effect.” Syllabus Point 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488

(1951).

             5.     “Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain

meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.” Syllabus Point 2,

Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W. Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970).

             6.     The Raleigh County Housing Authority is a “political subdivision,”

as that term is defined in West Virginia Code § 29-12A-3(c) (1986).

                                            ii
WALKER, Chief Justice:

                Two children died in a house fire in Summers County in 2019; their father,

Edward S., and sibling were seriously injured in the fire. The family had rented the house

with assistance from the Raleigh County Housing Authority. After Edward S. 1 sued for

the wrongful deaths of the children and negligence, RCHA claimed immunity from liability

under the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, West Virginia Code §§

29-12A-1 to 18 (Tort Claims Act or Act) and immunity from suit under the common law.

The circuit court concluded RCHA was not a “political subdivision,” meaning that the Tort

Claims Act did not apply to this case; but the court granted summary judgment to RCHA

on qualified immunity grounds. To the contrary, we hold that RCHA is a “political

subdivision” as defined in the Tort Claims Act. So, the circuit court erred when it

concluded otherwise. And, for that reason, we reverse the order granting summary

judgment to RCHA and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with

this Opinion.

                    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                Edward S. and Rachel K. lived in a rental house with their three children in

Hinton, West Virginia. The family’s rent was subsidized with a Section 8 housing voucher

they obtained through RCHA, and which was funded by the U.S. Department of Housing

       1
        We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this
case. See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
                                           1
and Urban Development. The house caught fire on May 11, 2019. Two children, T.S. and

A.K., died in the fire. A third child, J.K., and Edward S. were seriously injured.

                Edward S. sued RCHA and the putative owners of the rental house as

administrator of the decedents’ estates, next friend and guardian to J.K., and on his own

behalf in July 2019. Rachel K. was also a named plaintiff, on her own behalf and as next

friend and guardian to J.K. Edward S. alleged that the owners of the rental house knew

that the house’s wiring was unsafe and that it lacked sufficient smoke and carbon monoxide

detectors.    Edward S. also alleged that RCHA inspected the house several times—

improperly—and knew of deficiencies but did little to ensure the house was “safe and

decent.” Edward S. alleged two counts of wrongful death and one count of negligence

against all defendants. In its answer, RCHA asserted immunity from suit under the Tort

Claims Act, plus any other common law immunities that might otherwise apply.

                RCHA moved for summary judgment in April 2020. It argued that it was a

“political subdivision” 2 shielded from liability for claims arising out of its “inspection

powers or functions” under the Tort Claims Act. 3 RCHA also argued that it did not owe a

legal duty to the plaintiffs.

       2
           See W. Va. Code § 29-12A-3(c) (1986).
       3
           See id. § 29-12A-5(a)(10) (1986).

                                               2
                In August 2020, Edward S. moved to amend his complaint to include more

detailed allegations about RCHA, its employees, and its operations. Edward S. claimed

that RCHA did not employ enough inspectors to inspect its Section 8 clients’ units to ensure

that they met housing quality standards set by HUD. He claimed that RCHA did not

adequately train or supervise the few inspectors that it did employ. He also claimed that

his rental house was improperly inspected five times before the 2019 fire. Edward S.

restated the wrongful death claims and negligence claim against all defendants and added

claims of negligent training and negligent supervision against RCHA. 4

                Edward S. responded to RCHA’s motion for summary judgment in

September 2020 and argued that housing authorities like RCHA are not political

subdivisions immunized from liability for certain claims and losses under the Tort Claims

Act. He argued in the alternative that even if RCHA was a political subdivision, his claims

entailed more than flawed inspections, so RCHA was not immunized from liability by the

Act. Finally, Edward S. asserted that RCHA owed him, his children, and Rachel K. a duty

to provide a safe home.

                RCHA filed a renewed motion for summary judgment in March 2021. There,

it reiterated its argument that it was a “political subdivision,” as defined in the Tort Claims

Act, and shielded from liability for claims arising from its inspection powers or functions.

       4
           All defendants other than RCHA have since settled Edward S.’s claims.

                                              3
RCHA also made a new argument: that if the circuit court concluded that it was not a

political subdivision which the Tort Claims Act immunized from liability for claims arising

from its inspection powers or functions, then it was a “governmental agency” and

qualifiedly immune from suits for mere negligence. And, according to RCHA, if the circuit

court concluded that “certain claims asserted by [Edward S. did] not fall under the [Tort

Claims Act], then [RCHA] would be entitled to qualified immunity with regard to those

specific claims.” 5

              Edward S. responded and restated his argument that the Tort Claims Act did

not apply to RCHA. As to qualified immunity, Edward S. argued that (1) RCHA was not

a “State agency” entitled to common law, qualified immunity; (2) RCHA’s alleged

negligence (and that of its non-party employees) related to ministerial duties, not

discretionary functions; and (3) RCHA violated clearly established constitutional and/or

statutory rights of which a reasonable official would have known. Finally, Edward S.

argued that RCHA did, in fact, owe a legal duty to him, his children, and Rachel K. 6

       5
         RCHA also argued that even if it did owe Edward S., his children, and Rachel K.
a duty to inspect their rental unit and to provide safe and sanitary housing, inspecting is a
discretionary function. So, RCHA argued, it was immune from Edward S.’s negligence
claims because he had not established that any alleged failing in its inspection process
violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonable
person would have known.

       The circuit court heard argument on RCHA’s renewed motion for summary
       6

judgment on June 4, 2021.

                                             4
              The circuit court granted RCHA’s renewed motion for summary judgment in

October 2021. To structure its analysis of RCHA’s immunity defenses, the court relied on

our recent decision in West Virginia Regional Jail & Correctional Facility Authority v.

Estate of Grove. 7 In Grove, we stated that,

              whenever a defendant raises the issue of qualified immunity in
              a motion to dismiss, the circuit court must look to our qualified
              immunity body of law and follow the steps this Court expressly
              has outlined to make the determination of whether qualified
              immunity applies under the specific circumstances of that
              particular case. Specifically, these steps include whether: (1) a
              state agency or employee is involved; (2) there is an insurance
              contract waiving the defense of qualified immunity; (3) the
              West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance
              Reform Act, W. Va. Code § 29-12A-1 et seq. would apply; (4)
              the matter involves discretionary judgments, decisions, and/or
              actions; (5) the acts or omissions are in violation of clearly
              established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a
              reasonable person would have known or are otherwise
              fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive; and (6) the State
              employee was acting within his/her scope of employment.[8]

              In its order, the court first recounted the claims in the amended complaint,

then concluded that Edward S. had “presented no evidence . . . indicat[ing his] case against

RCHA is based upon anything other than negligence.” Consequently, the court found “this

matter to involve a claim of ‘mere negligence’ as contemplated by the doctrine of qualified

       7
        W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. Est. of Grove, 244 W. Va. 273, 852
S.E.2d 773 (2020).

       Id. at 283, 852 S.E.2d at 783 (citing W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Fac. Auth. v. A.B.,
       8

234 W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (2014)).

                                               5
immunity.” The court next concluded that “RCHA is a governmental agency within the

purview of qualified immunity.” 9 It then concluded that RCHA was not a political

subdivision as defined in the Tort Claims Act because it had been established by the West

Virginia Legislature, not the Raleigh County Commission. 10 The court reasoned further

that, although RCHA is a public body charged with the performance of a government

function, it did not have coextensive jurisdiction with one or more counties, cities, or towns

so, again, it did not qualify as a political subdivision and the Tort Claims Act did not

apply. 11 The circuit court went on to conclude that Edward S. had alleged negligence by

RCHA in the performance of its discretionary functions, and that RCHA’s alleged acts and

omissions had not violated Edward S.’s clearly established constitutional right or laws of

which a reasonable person would have known. 12

              Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that:

              RCHA is not protected by the [Tort Claims Act] because it is
              not a political subdivision as defined thereby.

      Emphasis in original. Edward S. did not assert that an insurance contract waived
       9

RCHA’s defense of qualified immunity.
       10
         See W. Va. Code § 29-12A-3(c) (a “political subdivision” includes “any separate
corporation or instrumentality established by one or more counties or municipalities, as
permitted by law”).
       11
         See id. (a “political subdivision” includes “any public body charged by law with
the performance of a government function and whose jurisdiction is coextensive with one
or more counties, cities or towns”).
       12
          Because Edward S. did not name any RCHA employees as defendants, the court
did not reach the “scope of employment” inquiry.

                                              6
                       Nevertheless, RCHA is entitled to qualified immunity
                from this lawsuit because the Plaintiffs’ claims are of mere
                negligence against RCHA, alleging acts or omissions related
                to discretionary judgments that do not amount to violations of
                clearly established rights or laws.

                Having concluded that RCHA was qualifiedly immune from Edward S.’s

suit, the circuit court granted summary judgment to RCHA. Edward S. now appeals.

                              II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

                Under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is

proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” “A circuit

court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo,” 13 which means

                [a]new; afresh; a second time. We have often used the term “de
                novo” in connection with the term “plenary.” Perhaps more
                instructive for our present purposes is the definition of the term
                “plenary,” which means “full, entire, complete, absolute,
                perfect, unqualified.” We therefore give a new, complete and
                unqualified review to the parties’ arguments and the record
                before the circuit court.[14]

       13
            Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
       14
         Gastar Expl. Inc. v. Rine, 239 W. Va. 792, 798, 806 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2017)
(cleaned up).

                                                7
                Likewise, we review de novo “issue[s] on an appeal from the circuit court”

that are “clearly a question of law or involv[e] interpretation of a statute . . . .” 15 Finally,

                       [t]he ultimate determination of whether qualified or
                statutory immunity bars a civil action is one of law for the court
                to determine. Therefore, unless there is a bona fide dispute as
                to the foundational or historical facts that underlie the
                immunity determination, the ultimate questions of statutory or
                qualified immunity are ripe for summary disposition.[16]

                For those reasons, resolution of Edward S.’s appeal requires the “new,

complete, and unqualified review of the parties’ arguments and the record before the circuit

court” 17 at the summary judgment stage. 18

                                      III. ANALYSIS

       15
            Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415
(1995).
       16
            Syl. Pt. 1, Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649
(1996).
       17
            Gastar, 239 W. Va. at 798, 806 S.E.2d at 454.
       18
          Edward S. asserts that the question of RCHA’s nature as a “political subdivision”
is not properly before the Court because RCHA did not cross-assign error on this point.
But as discussed above, we review de novo the grant of summary judgment and that entails
review of the record, the parties’ arguments to the circuit court, as well as the court’s legal
analysis. The political-subdivision question was argued exhaustively by the parties at the
summary judgment stage and ruled on by the circuit court. In addition, the circuit court
decided the question in the course of granting RCHA judgment on its qualified immunity
defense, the subject of Edward S.’s appeal.

                                                8
               Edward S. assigns only one error to the proceedings below: “The [c]ircuit

[c]ourt erred in granting summary judgment to [RCHA] on the basis that it has qualified

immunity from suit.” Regarding the scope of qualified immunity under West Virginia law,

we have held that

                      “[i]n the absence of an insurance contract waiving the
               defense, the doctrine of qualified or official immunity bars a
               claim of mere negligence against a State agency not within the
               purview of the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and
               Insurance Reform Act, W. Va.Code § 29–12A–1 et seq., and
               against an officer of that department acting within the scope of
               his or her employment, with respect to the discretionary
               judgments, decisions, and actions of the officer.” Syl. Pt. 6,
               Clark v. Dunn, 195 W.Va. 272, 465 S.E.2d 374 (1995).[19]

               We “unpacked” that syllabus point in Grove, expanding on the analysis a

court must undertake to determine whether qualified immunity applies in a particular case:

               [W]henever a defendant raises the issue of qualified immunity
               in a motion to dismiss, the circuit court must look to our
               qualified immunity body of law and follow the steps this Court
               expressly has outlined to make the determination of whether
               qualified immunity applies under the specific circumstances of
               that particular case. Specifically, these steps include whether:
               (1) a state agency or employee is involved; (2) there is an
               insurance contract waiving the defense of qualified immunity;
               (3) the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance
               Reform Act, W. Va. Code § 29-12A-1 et seq. would apply; (4)
               the matter involves discretionary judgments, decisions, and/or
               actions; (5) the acts or omissions are in violation of clearly
               established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a
               reasonable person would have known or are otherwise

      19
           Syl. Pt. 7, A.B., 234 W. Va. at 492, 766 S.E.2d at 751.

                                              9
                fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive; and (6) the State
                employee was acting within his/her scope of employment.[20]

In this case, we focus on one portion of the inquiry described in A.B. and Grove: whether

the Tort Claims Act applies.

A.     The Tort Claims Act

                The Tort Claims Act immunizes “political subdivisions” from liability for

“damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused

by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political

subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function . . . .” 21 Even so,

the Act allows that “[p]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons

or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by their employees while acting

within the scope of employment.” 22 But the Act then takes another twist when, in West

Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(1) to (17) (1986), it “lists seventeen specific types of acts or

omissions covered by the tort immunity available under the Act to a political

subdivision.” 23 In other words, while a political subdivision may face liability for damages

       20
         Grove, 244 W. Va. at 283, 852 S.E.2d at 783 (citing A.B., 234 W. Va. at 492, 766
S.E.2d at 751).
       21
            W. Va. Code § 29-12A-4(b)(1) (1986).
       22
            Id. § 29-12A-4(c)(2).
       23
         Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dep’t, 186 W. Va. 336, 341, 412 S.E.2d 737, 742
(1991) (citing W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a)(1) – (17) (1986)).

                                             10
caused by an employee’s negligent acts occurring within the scope of his or her

employment, the political subdivision is immune from liability under the Act if the injured

party’s loss or claim results from any one of the seventeen specific types of acts or

omissions listed in West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a). These include losses or claims

resulting from the “[n]atural conditions of unimproved property of the political

subdivision,” 24 for example, as well as losses or claims resulting from a political

subdivision’s “[i]nspection powers or functions . . . .” 25

                The Act defines a “political subdivision,” as

                any county commission, municipality and county board of
                education; any separate corporation or instrumentality
                established by one or more counties or municipalities, as
                permitted by law; any instrumentality supported in most part
                by municipalities; any public body charged by law with the
                performance of a government function and whose jurisdiction
                is coextensive with one or more counties, cities or towns; a
                combined city-county health department created pursuant to
                article two, chapter sixteen of this code; public service
                districts; and other instrumentalities including, but not limited
                to, volunteer fire departments and emergency service
                organizations as recognized by an appropriate public body and
                authorized by law to perform a government function: Provided,
                That hospitals of a political subdivision and their employees
                are expressly excluded from the provisions of this article.[26]

       24
            W. Va. Code. § 29-12A-5(a)(7).
       25
            Id. § 29-12A-5(a)(10).
       26
            Id. § 29-12A-3(c) (emphasis added).

                                               11
Our Legislature has not amended the definition of “political subdivision” since enacting

the Tort Claims Act in 1986.

B.     RCHA and the Housing Act

              Before considering whether RCHA is a “political subdivision” for purposes

of the Tort Claims Act, we describe RCHA plus pertinent parts of the West Virginia

Housing Act, West Virginia Code §§ 16-15-1 to 25. In 1979, the Raleigh County

Commission resolved under West Virginia Code § 16-15-3 (1941) 27 to “create” RCHA to

improve the supply of safe, sanitary, and affordable housing for the citizens of Raleigh

County. 28 The County Commission appointed five commissioners to RCHA and reserved

to itself the power to remove a commissioner for malfeasance or dereliction of duty. The

Commission also required the newly-established RCHA to provide annual reports of its

activities and expenditures and vested RCHA with all powers available under the Housing

Act. 29 Today, RCHA operates a public housing program and administers the HUD-funded

       27
         The Legislature amended § 16-15-3 (1941) in 1998. See 1998 W. Va. Acts 176.
The amendments to § 16-15-3 did not alter the substance of the statute pertinent to our
discussion, so we quote the current, 1998 version of the § 16-15-3 in this Opinion.
       28
          The resolution states, “Be it resolved, that pursuant to WV Code § 16-15-3, there
is herewith created a Raleigh County Housing Authority . . . .” RCC’s use of the word
“create” in the resolution does not trump the effect of the adoption of the resolution under
§ 16-15-3—the “establishment” of a housing authority by a county. See W. Va. Code §
16-15-3(c) (1998).
       29
         See W. Va. Code § 16-15-7 (2004) (housing authority “is a body both corporate
and politic, exercising public powers, and having all the powers necessary or convenient
to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of this article, including” for
(continued . . .)
                                            12
Section 8 rental assistance program in nine West Virginia counties, including Summers

County where Edward S.’s home was located. 30 According to the former executive

director of RCHA, its mission is to “serve low-income families to find safe, decent, sanitary

housing at a cost they can afford.” RCHA does not receive money from the State of West

Virginia; instead, it is funded primarily by administrative fees collected from HUD,

attendant to the Section 8 rental assistance program. RCHA continues to provide annual

reports to the Raleigh County Commission.

              The Legislature created housing authorities like RCHA in each West

Virginia city and county in 1933 through the Housing Act. This Act was amended in 1941,

then again in the 1990s and 2000s. 31 In discussing the Housing Act, we rely on the current

example, to “investigate living and housing conditions in the authority’s area of operation
and the means and methods of improving the conditions” and to “form and operate
nonprofit corporations and other affiliates of every kind and description, which may be
wholly or partially owned or controlled, for carrying out the purposes of” the Housing Act).
       30
         According to Tony Bazzie, the former executive director of RCHA, it does not
administer the Section 8 rental assistance program in the City of Beckley because that is
administered by the Beckley Housing Authority. Mr. Bazzie also testified that “there are
about [thirty] housing authorities in West Virginia.”
       31
         For example, West Virginia Code § 16-15-3 was enacted in 1933, then amended
in 1941 and 1998. See 1941 W. Va. Acts 49; 1998 W. Va. Acts 176. And West Virginia
Code § 16-15-7 (setting forth the powers of housing authorities) was enacted in 1933, then
amended in 1998 and 2004. See 1998 W. Va. Acts 176; 2004 W. Va. Acts 134.

                                             13
version of its various sections. Where our analysis requires us to consider a prior version,

we say so.

                The Housing Act includes this “Legislative declaration of necessity for

creation of housing authority corporations”:

                It is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination
                that in order to promote and protect the health, safety, morals
                and welfare of the public, it is necessary in the public interest
                to provide for the creation of public corporate bodies to be
                known as housing authorities, and to confer upon and vest in
                said housing authorities all powers necessary or appropriate in
                order that they may engage in low and moderate cost housing
                development and slum clearance projects; and that the powers
                herein conferred upon the housing authorities, including the
                power to acquire and dispose of property, to remove unsanitary
                or substandard conditions, to construct and operate housing
                developments and to borrow, expend and repay moneys for the
                purpose herein set forth, are public objects essential to the
                public interest.[32]

                The Legislature elected not to create a single, statewide entity to pursue those

goals and exercise that authority. Instead, in West Virginia Code § 16-15-3(a), it created

a “public body corporate and politic” in each city and county in the State:

                [i]n each city and in each county there is hereby created a
                housing authority which shall be a public body corporate and
                politic. No authority hereby created shall transact any business
                or exercise its powers hereunder until or unless the governing
                body of the city or the county, by proper resolution, determines
                that there is need for an authority: Provided, That nothing
                contained herein shall be construed as creating an additional

       32
            W. Va. Code §16-15-2 (1998).

                                               14
                housing authority in a city where a housing authority has been
                created pursuant to prior law, but each housing authority shall
                continue as a public body corporate and politic and shall have
                the area of operation defined in section one of this article for a
                city or county housing authority. Each housing authority
                created pursuant to this section shall adopt a name for all legal
                and operating purposes.[33]

                In Subsection (c) of § 16-15-3, the Legislature specified that:

                [i]n any suit, action or proceeding involving the validity or
                enforcement of or relating to any contract of the authority, the
                authority shall be conclusively deemed to have become
                established and authorized to transact business and exercise
                its powers hereunder upon proof of the adoption of a resolution
                by the governing body declaring the need for the authority.[34]

For purposes of the Housing Act “‘[g]overning body’ means, in the case of a city, the

council of the city, and in the case of a county, the county commission.” 35

                Once a governing body adopts the requisite resolution, the city council or the

county commission appoints five commissioners. 36 “The powers of each authority [are]

       33
            Id. § 16-15-3(a) (emphasis added).
       34
            Id. § 16-15-3(c) (emphasis added).
       35
            Id. § 16-15-1(17) (2006).
       36
          Id. § 16-15-3(d) (upon adoption of proper resolution determining need for housing
authority, governing body to appoint five commissioners to “serve for terms of one, two,
three, four and five years, respectively, from the date of their appointment,” and to “term[s]
of office of five years,” thereafter).

                                               15
vested in its commissioners,” 37 and they must file annual reports of their activities to “the

mayor, or the county commission, as appropriate . . . .” 38 The city council or county

commission may remove a housing authority commissioner for “inefficiency or neglect of

duty or misconduct in office.” 39

                With that review of RCHA and pertinent sections of the Housing Act, we

turn to the question of whether RCHA satisfies the definition of “political subdivision”

within the Tort Claims Act.

C.     RCHA is a “Political Subdivision” Under the Tort Claims Act

                In its renewed motion for summary judgment, RCHA argued that it is a

political subdivision under the plain language of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-3(c)

because it is a public corporation established by the Raleigh County Commission pursuant

to West Virginia Code § 16-15-3. RCHA argued in the alternative that it is a public body

charged with performance of a public function—the provision of safe, sanitary, and

affordable housing—with jurisdiction coextensive with Greenbrier, Monroe, and

Pocahontas Counties, among others. RCHA also cited authority from the United States

       37
            Id. § 16-15-3(e).
       38
            Id. § 16-15-12 (1998).
       39
            Id. § 16-15-3(e).

                                             16
District Court of the Southern District of West Virginia 40 and an Ohio court 41 to support

its contention that it is a “political subdivision” under the Tort Claims Act.

                Edward S. responded that RCHA cannot be a “political subdivision” under

the Tort Claims Act because RCHA was created, i.e., established by the State (not the

Raleigh County Commission) under the Housing Act. Edward S. also argued the 1971

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v.

Barrett 42 established conclusively that only the State can create a housing authority like

RCHA, while the power of a city or county under the Act is limited to the appointment of

commissioners. Edward S. then argued that the Housing Act has consistently defined a

housing authority as a “body corporate and politic,” but never as a “political subdivision”—

a circumstance that he contends shows the Legislature’s intent that housing authorities are

not political subdivisions. Edward S. also argued that amendments made in 1998 to the

definitions of “city” and “county” in the Housing Act, along with the addition of sections

regarding regional housing authorities, further demonstrate the Legislature’s intent that

housing authorities are not political subdivisions.      Edward S. also claimed that the

       40
         Simmons v. Charleston Hous. Auth., 881 F.Supp. 225, 232 (S.D.W. Va. 1995)
(dismissing state law claims against housing authority where plaintiffs “failed to meet”
housing authority’s claim to immunity under the Tort Claims Act).

        Fuller v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 92270, 2009 WL 2894456 (Ohio Ct.
       41

App. Sept. 10, 2009).
       42
            442 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1971).

                                             17
Legislature cannot have intended housing authorities to be political subdivisions because

they (housing authorities) have such broad authority under the Housing Act. Finally, he

argued that housing authorities do not fit the common law definition of “political

subdivision” set by this Court in Kucera v. City of Wheeling in 1969. 43

                These arguments call for an analysis of both the Tort Claims Act and Housing

Act. Neither party contends that the pertinent provisions of those laws are ambiguous;

rather, the parties disagree about what those provisions mean when applied to RCHA. We

have held that “[a] statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly

expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full

force and effect.” 44 Put another way, “[w]here the language of a statute is free from

ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to

interpretation.” 45 We recently synthesized our law regarding this Court’s responsibility to

apply, rather than interpret, an unambiguous statute:

                “A statute is open to construction only where the language used
                requires interpretation because of ambiguity ....” Hereford v.

       43
          153 W. Va. 531, 170 S.E.2d 217 (1969). We decline to address Edward S.’s
argument regarding RCHA’s status as a “political subdivision” under the common law
because the Legislature has defined the term “political subdivision” for purposes of the
Tort Claims Act. See Dotts v. Taressa J.A., 182 W. Va. 586, 589, 390 S.E.2d 568, 571
(1990) (observing that Tort Claims Act defines “political subdivision” for purposes of that
Act, but that where the phrase “political subdivision” is undefined, e.g., the Motor Vehicle
Responsibility Law, the Court “resort[s] to our case law interpretation of the term”).
       44
            Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951).
       45
            Syl. Pt. 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W. Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970).

                                              18
               Meek, 132 W. Va. 373, 386, 52 S.E.2d 740, 747 (1949). When
               we encounter a “clear and unambiguous” statute that “plainly
               expresses the legislative intent[,]” our role is simply to give the
               statute “full force and effect.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v.
               Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951). In such cases,
               our “duty ... is not to construe but to apply the statute,”
               assigning to “its words ... their ordinary acceptance and
               significance and the meaning commonly attributed to them.”
               Id. at 884, 65 S.E.2d at 492. . . .

               . . . . What we refuse to do, however, under the guise of
               interpretation or construction, is to “look for or impose another
               meaning” when the text of the statute, itself, is “plain and
               unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning[.]”
               Hereford, 132 W. Va. at 386, 52 S.E.2d at 747 (quoting 50 Am.
               Jur., Statutes, § 225). We “presume that a legislature says in a
               statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”
               Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54, 112
               S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992).[46]

               We refer back to the relevant definition of “political subdivision” in the Tort

Claims Act: “political subdivision” means “any separate corporation or instrumentality

established by one or more counties or municipalities, as permitted by law . . . .” 47 In

response to RCHA’s renewed motion for summary judgment, Edward S. did not contend

that RCHA is not a “separate corporation.” Rather, this was his argument: “RCHA was

not established by [the Raleigh County Commission]. Instead, it was established by the

State of West Virginia. All housing authorities in West Virginia were established with the

      46
           Beasley v. Sorsaia, 247 W. Va. 409, ___, 880 S.E.2d 875, 878−79 (2022).
      47
           W. Va. Code § 29-12A-3(c).

                                               19
enactment of the [Housing Act].” 48 Edward S. concluded that because RCHA was

“established” by the State 49 —not by the County Commission—RCHA cannot be a

“political subdivision” under the Tort Claims Act.

                We disagree with Edward S.’s reasoning. Section 16-15-3(a) of the Housing

Act provides that: “In each city and in each county there is hereby created a housing

authority which shall be a public body corporate and politic.” Passive voice aside, through

that subsection, the State “created a housing authority which shall be a public body

corporate and politic” “[i]n each city and in each county” in West Virginia. At first glance,

that language supports the argument that RCHA cannot be a “political subdivision” under

the Tort Claims Act, the logic being that a public corporation created by the State (i.e., a

“housing authority” under the Housing Act) cannot also be a public corporation established

by a county (i.e., a “political subdivision” under the Tort Claims Act). Except, as Edward

S. acknowledged, that logic depends on the conclusion that the creation of a housing

authority is the same thing as the establishment of one. A more thorough reading of § 16-

15-3 demonstrates that is not the case.

                In whole, § 16-15-3(a) provides that

                [i]n each city and in each county there is hereby created a
                housing authority which shall be a public body corporate and

       48
            Emphasis in original.
       49
         See W. Va. Code § 29-12A-3(e) (defining “State” and specifying that “‘State’
does not include political subdivisions”).
                                           20
                politic. No authority hereby created shall transact any business
                or exercise its powers hereunder until or unless the governing
                body of the city or the county, by proper resolution, determines
                that there is need for an authority: Provided, That nothing
                contained herein shall be construed as creating an additional
                housing authority in a city where a housing authority has been
                created pursuant to prior law, but each housing authority shall
                continue as a public body corporate and politic and shall have
                the area of operation defined in section one of this article for a
                city or county housing authority. Each housing authority
                created pursuant to this section shall adopt a name for all legal
                and operating purposes.[50]

                Subsection (a) of § 16-15-3 states that, although the State has created a

housing authority in every city and county in West Virginia, those housing authorities

cannot “transact any business or exercise [their] powers [t]hereunder until or unless the

governing body of the city or the county, by proper resolution, determines that there is need

for an authority . . . .” In other words, although the State may have “created” a housing

authority in a city or county, that housing authority cannot do anything until the city council

or county commission acts, that is, until the governing body determines that the city or

county needs the housing authority and adopts a resolution saying so.

                Subsection (c) of 16-15-3 tells us what is happening when the city council or

county commission adopts a resolution determining that the city or county needs a housing

authority: it is establishing one. Subsection (c) states that:

       50
            Id. § 16-15-3(a) (emphasis added).

                                               21
                [i]n any suit, action or proceeding involving the validity or
                enforcement of or relating to any contract of the authority, the
                authority shall be conclusively deemed to have become
                established and authorized to transact business and exercise
                its powers hereunder upon proof of the adoption of a resolution
                by the governing body declaring the need for the authority. An
                adopted resolution shall be deemed sufficient if it declares that
                there is need for an authority and finds in substantially the
                foregoing terms (no further detail being necessary) that either
                or both of the above-enumerated conditions exist. A copy of a
                resolution duly certified by the clerk shall be admissible in
                evidence in any suit, action or proceeding.[51]

And while (c) speaks in terms of “any suit, action, or proceeding,” we see no reason why

proof of the “adoption of a resolution by the governing body declaring the need for the

authority” would not “conclusively deem[]” the housing authority to “have become

established and authorized to transact business and exercise its powers,” otherwise. 52

                “‘“[T]he Legislature is presumed to intend that every word used in a statute

has a specific purpose and meaning,” State ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson, 162 W. Va. 579,

582, 251 S.E.2d 505, 508 (1979)[.]’ Stone v. United Eng’g, a Div. of Wean, Inc., 197 W.

Va. 347, 355, 475 S.E.2d 439, 447 (1996).” 53 The Legislature used the word “created” in

§ 16-15-3(a) and the word “established” in § 16-15-3(c); the Legislature intended those

words to mean different things. So, “creation” of a housing authority by the State cannot

       51
            Id. § 16-15-3(c) (emphasis added).
       52
            Id. (emphasis added).

        Donna S. v. Travis S., 246 W. Va. 634, 640, 874 S.E.2d 746, 752 (2022) (quoting
       53

Bullman v. D & R Lumber Co., 195 W. Va. 129, 133, 464 S.E.2d 771, 775 (1995)).

                                               22
be equivalent to its “establishment.” Notwithstanding the passive voice employed by the

Legislature in § 16-15-3(c), that subsection is clear that a housing authority is “conclusively

deemed to have become established . . . upon proof of the adoption of a resolution by the

[city council or county commission] declaring the need for the authority . . . .” 54

                The State created a housing authority in Raleigh County with the passage of

the Housing Act in 1933. But that authority could not “transact any business or exercise

its powers . . . until or unless [Raleigh County], by proper resolution, determine[d] that

there [was a] need for an authority . . . .” 55 The Raleigh County Commission did that in

1979. And in so doing, RCHA became “established and authorized to transact business

       54
           W. V. Code § 16-15-3(c) (emphasis added); see also id. § 16-15-5 (1941) (“As
soon as possible after the establishment of an authority the commissioners shall organize
for the transaction of business by choosing from among their number a chairman and a
vice-chairman and by adopting bylaws and rules and regulations suitable to the purposes
of this article.”) (emphasis added); id. § 16-15-7b(b)(1) (“In the case of a housing authority
established by a city, the authority’s area of operation shall be the city and the area within
ten miles from the territorial boundaries thereof. Depending upon the geographical location
of the city, the area of operation may include portions of one or more counties. It may also
include areas lying within the territorial boundaries of cities outside the city establishing
the housing authority.”) (emphasis added); id. § 16-15-7b(b)(2) (“In the case of a housing
authority established by a county, the authority’s area of operation shall be all of the county
except that portion which lies within the territorial boundaries of any city in which a
housing authority has been established.”) (emphasis added).
       55
            Id. § 16-15-3(a).

                                              23
and exercise its powers” under the Housing Act. 56 In other words, the State created a

housing authority in Raleigh County, and the County Commission established RCHA. 57

                With that resolved, we turn to RCHA’s status as a “political subdivision” for

purposes of the Tort Claims Act. Under the Tort Claims Act, a “political subdivision”

includes “any separate corporation . . . established by one or more counties or

municipalities, as permitted by law . . . .” 58 RCHA is a public corporation established by

the Raleigh County Commission under the Housing Act. Consequently, the Raleigh

County Housing Authority is a “political subdivision,” as that term is defined in West

Virginia Code § 29-12A-3(c) (1986), and we now so hold.

                As we have found that RCHA is a “political subdivision” under one

definition in § 29-12A-3(c), it’s unnecessary to address Edward S.’s arguments about the

others. Further, we do not find United States v. Barrett, persuasive on the issue before us.59

       56
            Id. § 16-15-3(c).
       57
         This distinction also makes sense considering that cities and counties have only
the authority granted to them by the State. See Robinson v. City of Bluefield, 234 W. Va.
209, 211, 764 S.E.2d 740, 742 (2014) (“‘A municipal corporation possesses only the power
and authority given to it by the legislature.’”) (quoting Miller v. City of Morgantown, 158
W. Va. 104, 109, 208 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1974)); Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Barbor v. Cnty. Ct. of
Mercer Cnty., 85 W. Va. 359, 101 S.E. 721 (1920) (“The county court is a corporation
created by statute, and possessed only of such powers as are expressly conferred by the
Constitution and legislature.”).
       58
            W. Va. Code § 29-12A-3(c).
       59
            Barrett, 442 F.2d at 642.

                                              24
In Barrett, the Fourth Circuit faced this narrow question: whether the City of Parkersburg

set up an additional housing authority in 1967 (an act beyond the City’s authority,

according to appellants in that case) or “reactivated” one that the City had set up decades

before? 60 The Fourth Circuit held, in part, that because the City purported to act in 1967

under the 1933 version of the Housing Act—rather than the 1941 version then in effect—

the City had merely “reactivated” the original housing authority. 61

                  The question answered by the Fourth Circuit in Barrett is different than the

one before us, so that case does not influence the outcome, here. Admittedly, in Barrett,

the Fourth Circuit stated that the 1941 version of the Housing Act (which controlled in

1979, too, when the Raleigh County Commission adopted its resolution) “vested in the

State legislature the power to create an Authority, [and] limit[ed] the municipality to the

appointment of members . . . .” 62 But, Barrett didn’t turn on that observation. Rather,

Barrett turned on this one: the 1941 version of the Housing Act “expressly preserved the

existence of any Authority established under the 1933 law.” 63 And, it does not appear the

Fourth Circuit considered the language in § 16-15-3(c), regarding the establishment of a

       60
            Id. at 645.
       61
            Id.
       62
            Id.
       63
            Id.

                                               25
housing authority, even though that language was also present in the 1941 version of the

Housing Act. 64

                  Edward S.’s remaining arguments do not persuade us that the circuit court

correctly concluded that RCHA is not a “political subdivision” for purposes of the Tort

Claims Act. It’s true that in 1998, the Legislature added the phrase “political subdivision”

to the definitions of “city” 65 and “county” 66 in the Housing Act but did not add that phrase

to the definition of “housing authority.” But that doesn’t change the fact that the Raleigh

County Commission established RCHA, a public corporation, as permitted by the Housing

Act so RCHA still meets one of the definitions of “political subdivision” in the Tort Claims

Act: a “separate corporation . . . established by one or more counties . . . as permitted by

law . . . .” 67 And while Edward S. is correct that housing authorities’ powers are broad, the

relevant definition of “political subdivision” in the Tort Claims Act does not contain a

carve-out premised on the scope of the powers of an otherwise-qualifying public

corporation. Certainly, the Legislature is free to amend the Tort Claims Act to add that

limitation, should it so desire.

       64
            W. Va. Code § 16-15-3 (1941).
       65
            See 1998 W. Va. Acts 176.
       66
            Id.
       67
            W. Va. Code § 29-12A-3(c).

                                              26
                                IV. CONCLUSION

             For the reasons discussed above, the order granting summary judgment to

RCHA is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

Opinion.

                                                               Reversed and remanded.

                                          27