Court Opinion

ID: 8753785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 11:37:29.527097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:07.217102
License: Public Domain

MORROW, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). The assignments of error relate solely to the action of the trial court in granting the defendants’ motion for a nonsuit. The only question for determination is, therefore, whether or not the evidence introduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to sustain the plaintiff’s case.
The negligence alleged in the complaint is the setting off of the blasts by the defendants at the particular time mentioned, when many persons were passing to and from the boat, and the failure of the defendants to give notice or warning to the plaintiff and others that they were about to do such blasting. It is admitted b)r counsel for plaintiff, in their brief, that the right of the defendants to blast in the prosecution of their work was paramount to the right of the public in using the river; and the Circuit Court of Appeals, upon the former hearing, established the law" of the case in this regard, when it agreed with the ruling of the trial court that “the plaintiff and his fellow passengers went Upon the premises where the blasting was being done with their eyes open. Their right there, whether it was a right by sufferance or license, implied or otherwise, was. subordinate to the right of the defendants to prosecute the work in which they were engaged.” The testimony sho-ws that it was the practice of the defendants to fire ,off *563blasts at the noon hour, when most of the workmen were at dinner, and again at the close of the day’s work. It was also the custom of the boat to arrive near the noon hour, and lie at the wharf for a period of time ranging from 45 minutes to 2 hours 'and more, during which time passengers were passing to and from the boat. The testimony is practically a unit in the statement that no cover was provided for the blasts, or any preparation made to prevent the rocks from flying in all directions. Under these circumstances the question of notice or warning to the general public that blasts were to be fired becomes of importance. Harry Martin testifies that he was in the employ of the defendants at the time in question, clearing up the beach at the lower end of the locks. He states that the “closest blasting was about 150 or 200 feet from the boat landing”; that he was about 125 feet from the blasting, and hurried to find shelter when the blast occurred; that he heard no word of warning given before the blasts were exploded, and saw no signal. Monroe Vallet testifies that he was on his way to the boat landing to take passage on the boat when the blasts occurred; that he was about 150 yards away, and heard no alarm given before the blasting. U. D. Kelly was on the boat as a passenger at the time, and was standing on the deck when he noticed a smoke beginning to rise from the works at the locks, about 150 feet distant, and, realizing that it indicated the touching off of a blast, immediately sought shelter in the cabin, and was near the plaintiff at the” time he was injured. This witness testified that he heard no outcry or warning before the blasts were touched off, and saw no signals given. William Ruffeno, the steward of the boat, testified that he went onto the boat some five minutes before the blasting, and could see the place where the blasting occurred while walking to the boat. He was in the purser’s office at the time of the accident, but heard no warning given, and saw no flag or signal as he came to the boat. John Young was a passenger on the boat, and was standing on the deck of the boat when the men employed at the locks went to dinner, and for 20 minutes before the blasting. 1 Ie testified that three or four men stayed at the work, and one of them said “Rook out!” in a moderately loud tone just as he touched off the blasts; that he did not wave his hands or give any other signal ; that this man and the others there then got under shelter of carts and machinery, and the blasts occurred. S. Mosher, a passenger on the boat, testified that he was on the deck of the boat, talking with the witness Young, when the workmen left the locks for dinner, and noticed two or three men remaining at the pits; that he saw the blasts set off and the men run to shelter, and when the rocks began to fall he hastened inside the cabin. He did not hear any warning cry or see any signal given. The plaintiff testified that at the time he went 011 board the boat he knewr nothing whatever about any blasting being done in the vicinity; that, after he had been on the boat for a little time, he heard something that he thought was blasting, but it seemed to‘ him quite a distance away; that after a little talk with the steward, ’nd a game of cards with some passengers, he sat down in the cabin on the upper deck, and fell into a doze; that while in that condition he was struck on the head by a rock, and rendered unconscious, with the injuries complained of resulting. *564Was this failure to give notice to the persons in the vicinity, that blasts were about to be fired, negligence on -the part of the defendants ? This court held, when the case was previously before it, that the defendants had a right to prosecute the work in which they were engaged, and that the passengers upon this boat assumed all risks necessarily incident to the prosecution of the work, when such work was prosecuted with skill and reasonable care. Did the exercise of reasonable care require timely notice to be given before firing the blasts? There is no fixed standard by which a court can say that any particular act or omission is or is not reasonable or prudent. It must be considered with relation to the surrounding circumstances in each case. As stated by the Supreme Court in Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 417, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 683, 36 L. Ed. 485:
“Ttoe policy of tlie law has relegated the determination of such questions to the jury under proper instructions from the court. It is their province to note the special circumstances and surroundings of each particular case, and then say whether the conduct of the parties in that case was such as .would be expected of reasonable, prudent men under a similar state of affairs. When a given state of facts is'such that reasonable men may fairly differ upon the question, as to whether there was negligence or not, the determination of the mattér is for the jury. It is only where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them that the question of negligence is ever considered as one of law for the court” — citing cases.
In our opinion, the question whether or not the defendants exercised reasonable care in the operation of blasting at the time and under the circumstances disclosed by the testimony was a proper one for the jury to determine, as well’ as the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The court below treated the testimon)'- of the plaintiff to the effect that he knew that blasting was going'on as conclusive against him on the question of notice. In this the learned judge fell into error, in our opinion. It is conceivable that reasonable men might say that in the prosecution of such work, under the circumstances disclosed by the record, some notice should be given of each separate and distinct blast fired in the immediate vicinity of people liable to be injured thereby.
For the reasons stated, we think the court erred in taking the case from the jury. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.