Court Opinion

ID: 9677249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:47:28.190746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:54.724103
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, Justice,
concurring.
In a criminal case, appeal is perfected by timely filing a written notice of appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 25.2. If, as here, the appeal is from a judgment rendered on the defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere under Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.15, and the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant, the notice must: (1) specify that the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect; (2) *709specify that the substance of the appeal was raised by written motion and ruled on before trial; or (3) state that the trial court granted permission to appeal. Tex. R.App. P. 25.2(b)(3). Appellant’s notice of appeal satisfied none of these requirements.
Relying on this Court’s decision in Gomes v. State, the majority holds there was “substantial compliance” with Rule 25.2(b)(3) because both the judgment and the docket sheet indicate appellant was attempting to appeal from an adverse ruling on his motion to suppress. 9 S.W.3d 170 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. refd) (en banc). The scenario in Gomes, however, was distinctly different than the one presented here. There the notice of appeal bore a hand-written notation: “Motion to Suppress Only.” We were aided in our interpretation of this handwritten notation by similar expressions contained in extrinsic documents, namely, the judgnent and docket sheet, which confirmed our belief that Gomes was appealing from a written motion raised and ruled on before trial. Thus, we derived our jurisdiction in Gomes from his notice of appeal. While no model of clarity, the notice of appeal substantially complied with Rule 25.2(b)(3)(B).
Here, appellant filed only a general notice of appeal; it contains no cryptic notation, phrase, or other language that might reasonably be construed as a substantial satisfaction of Rule 25.2(b)(3). Thus, we derive our jurisdiction here not from appellant’s notice of appeal, but solely from extrinsic documents. While extrinsic documents may be used as aids in interpreting sloppy or confusing language in a notice of appeal, I question whether we may look to extrinsic documents as the source of our jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals authorized just such a procedure in Riley v. State, 825 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). There the defendant filed, as here, a general notice of appeal. Included in the record was an order by the trial court granting permission to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. Although the notice of appeal did not refer to the order or incorporate it by reference, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that where information required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure can be located in some extrinsic document within the record, jurisdiction is established. Thus, I concur in the majority’s conclusion regarding our jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
With regard to the merits of the search and seizure issue, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the officers lacked probable cause to believe appellant was in possession of a controlled substance. The officers were informed by a citizen that he had seen appellant processing what he knew to be crack cocaine. The police investigated the allegation. While standing in a public area beyond appellant’s fence, the officers saw a triple beam scale and a box of baking soda through appellant’s kitchen window. Triple beam scales are not commonly found in homes because their accuracy is not generally required for domestic use. They are, however, commonly used in laboratories — legitimate and clandestine. Moreover, the officers knew from them experience that baking soda is used in the manufacture of “crack” cocaine. I believe this knowledge, coupled with their observations, sufficiently corroborated the informant’s allegation that he had seen appellant making what he recognized to be crack cocaine. Thus, I would find the officers possessed probable cause.
However, the existence of probable cause does not, by itself, authorize police to conduct a search or seizure. Probable cause constitutes a sufficient basis for a search only when accompanied by a war*710rant or exigent circumstances. McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Here, the police did not have a warrant, but claimed the search was supported by an exigent circumstance, namely, danger to Deputy Gordy. According to Deputy Bowdoin, he and his partner had decided that Deputy Gordy would knock on appellant’s front door to see what would happen. The plan was frustrated when Bowdoin was observed by appellant before Gordy could reach the front door. However, the physical danger to Gordy would have been very nearly the same if Bowdoin had not been seen. Although drug dealers are frequently armed, Gordy was prepared to confront appellant, whom he believed was presently manufacturing contraband, at the door of his own home, without a warrant, to see what would happen. Police cannot place themselves in physical danger by design and then claim an exception to the warrant requirement.
With these observations, I respectfully concur.