Court Opinion

ID: 9680610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:35:07.969296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.613745
License: Public Domain

Oarleton Harris, Chief Justice, dissenting. I cannot agree that the court committed reversible error by denying appellant’s motion for a mistrial, because of reference to the pistol. It is true that counsel for appellant had, prior to the commencement of the trial, moved to suppress the evidence involving the clothing and revolver that were found in appellant’s apartment, on the ground that these items had been obtained illegally. I agree with that particular contention, since no search warrant had been secured. However, appellant’s counsel subsequently agreed that these articles could be admitted for purposes of identification, in counsel’s words, “for no other purpose.” Later, counsel reiterated his consent for that purpose. In Frazier v. Sewell, 241 Ark. 474, 408 S. W. 2d 597, the appellant requested an instruction, which was refused, and later appellant withdrew the request for the instruction. But on appeal it was contended that, in failing to give the instruction, the court had erred. We disagreed, saying: u* * * qipg withdrawal of the requested instruction actually meant that appellant no longer wanted that instruction, and she was thereby placed in the same status as though the instruction had never been requested. We have repeatedly held that a party cannot complain of a trial court’s failure to give an instruction unless same is requested.” : It seems to me that the same situation exists in the case before us. Counsel’s agreement for the articles to be offered, though only for a specific purpose, had the effect of withdrawing the motion to suppress. The articles were never exhibited to the jury; all were in a sack together, and every objection to their introduction as evidence was sustained by the court. The reversal of this case by the majority seems principally to be predicated upon the question by the Prosecuting Attorney as to whether the revolver found in the apartment had been loaded or unloaded. The objection to this question was sustained, but the motion for mistrial was denied, the court telling the jury to disregard any reference to the pistol. The jurors were then polled individually, and each answered that, in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, he could completely disregard any reference to the revolver. The court was careful and specific, asking such questions as, “You are sure about it?” “Is there any doubt in your mind?” “You can completely disregard it in your deliberations in this case?” As stated, all jurors answered in the affirmative. We have repeatedly held that an admonition to the jury to disregard improper questions or answers occurring during the trial cures any possible error, and the only exception to this rule is where the testimony is so prejudicial that an admonition cannot cure it. In Crawford v. State, 204 Ark. 748, 164 S. W. 2d 898, the trial court first admitted certain evidence that it subsequently decided was inadmissible. From the opinion: “Later on and before the case was sent to the jury the court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony objected to entirely as he doubted whether or not it would shed any light on the state of mind of the parties or on the question as to who was the probable aggressor. “Relative to the erroneous admission of evidence during the progress of a trial and the subsequent withdrawal thereof before the case was submitted to the jury this court, in the case of Goynes v. State, 184 Ark. 303, 42 S. W. 2d 406, quoted from 38 Cye. 1440 as follows: The general rule is that if inadmissible evidence has been received during the trial, the error of the admission is cured by its subsequent withdrawal before the trial closes, and by an instruction to the jury to disregard it.” In Kasinger v. State, 234 Ark. 788, 354 S. W. 2d 718, we said: “Appellants contend that error was committed when the Sheriff of Baxter County was asked by the State’s attorney why he moved the appellants to a jail in Yellville, Marion County, and he replied, ‘They’d broke jail here before;’ also, error is asserted because of a question asked appellant Ray Kasinger by the State’s attorney, ‘How many times has Jack Gregory arrested you?’ In each instance, the Court instructed the jury not to consider this question and answer. In Davis v. State, 155 Ark. 245, 244 S. W. 750, the prosecuting attorney made certain remarks which the appellant contended to be prejudicial, but this Court said: “ ‘It will be noted that the court instructed the jury to disregard the remarks made by the prosecuting attorney and this, we think had the effect to cure any prejudice that might have resulted to the defendants from the remarks.’ ” Likewise, in Washington v. State, 227 Ark. 255, 297 S. W. 2d 930, a similar situation arose. We said: “The next assignment of error relates to the following answer given by Officer Jack Morgan when counsel for appellant asked him whether he knew appellant was a minor about sixteen years of age: ‘Yes, we had him one other time.’ Appellant’s objection to the answer was promptly sustained by the trial court and the jury admonished not to consider it. If it be assumed that the answer was unresponsive to the question and erroneously given, any possible prejudice arising therefrom was cured by the court’s action.” Also, in Knight and Johnson v. State, 228 Ark. 502, 308 S. W. 2d 821, we said: “Harper was asked by the State if he received any money from any of the accused by way of restitution, and in replying in the affirmative he mentioned appellant’s name. The witness was immediately interrupted by an objection on behalf of the appellant. Thereupon the court cautioned the jury to disregard the testimony. The court also asked the jurors if they could do that and all of them held up their hands to indicate they could. From this it is hard to see how any prejudice could have resulted to appellant.” Literally dozens of similar eases could be cited, but no point would be served in adding to the aforementioned citations, which clearly show that an admonition to the jury to disregard particular evidence is entirely sufficient, unless “it is manifest that the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the jury remains, despite its ex-elusion and influences their verdict.”1 I certainly cannot agree that the Prosecuting Attorney’s reference to the pistol makes manifest that the jury was prejudiced. The majority cite Rush v. State, 238 Ark. 149, 379 S. W. 2d 29, where we held that the introduction in evidence of a pistol, having no connection with the crime, was reversible error. Let it be quickly, pointed out that in Rush, the defendant was being tried for murder — not burglary, the state charging that Rush had entered into a conspiracy to kill his stepfather, the elder Rush having been shot to death. Admittedly, the pistol there offered was not in the alleged crime, though it was of the same caliber as the murder weapon (a .22 pistol, the murder weapon being a .22 rifle), and there was evidence that some of the conspirators had been firing the pistol which was introduced. We said: “ * * * qqLe pigtol in question is very heavy for a .22 caliber; it has a 9-inch barrel, and is rather wicked looking. The very fact that the pistol was admitted in evidence could have had a tendency to confuse the jury, notwithstanding there is no contention on the part of the State that the pistol was used in the killing. ’ ’ It is easy to see that, in a murder case, particularly where some of the alleged conspirators had been using the pistol, the jury could, in their minds, tie this in with the murder, but no such situation exists in the instant ' case. In the first place, there was no allegation, nor evidence anywhere in the record, that a pistol had been used; the pistol was not even shown to the jury, nor was an answer given to the question by the Prosecuting Attorney, the court sustaining the objection. I do not see how prejudice arises against a defendant simply because he had a pistol in his home. I daresay that thousands of good citizens individually keep a pistol in their respective homes for the purpose of protection. No one considers these citizens “dangerous” or “bad” because of this fact. To summarize, counsel for appellant agreed that the items could be offered for identification; this in my view, means that he had abandoned his motion to suppress. The court sustained every objection made to offering these items in evidence, and when the pistol was referred to by the Prosecuting Attorney, the court quickly admonished the jury to disregard the question, and then took the additional precaution of polling each member individually for the purpose of ascertaining whether any prejudice resulted. Finally, I reiterate that keeping a pistol in one’s home does not establish, or even indicate, that one is of bad character, or likely to commit unlawful acts. I respectfully dissent to the reversal.  This quote is from Goynes v. State, 184 Ark. 303, 42 S. W. 2d 406.