Court Opinion

ID: 9714476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:38:29.669247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:26.349900
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, also dissenting: I dissent and would reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial. I am unable to agree that there was a knowing, voluntary waiver of defendant’s right to silence in the face of the undisputed testimony that the police and assistant State’s Attorney falsely informed the defendant that Burnett had given a statement naming defendant as the “trigger man” in the case. In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 476, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1602,1629, the Supreme Court said: “[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver [of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination] will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.” Frazier v. Cupp (1969), 394 U.S. 731, 22 L. Ed. 2d 684, 89 S. Ct. 1420, does not support the majority’s conclusion. Frazier was tried before the decision in Miranda, and the Supreme Court expressly held that it was not applicable to the case. This court, long prior to Miranda, held that confessions “acquired by trick, promises, or threats” are inadmissible. People v. Stevens (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 21, 27. There is no difference in principle between the withholding of evidence favorable to a defendant and the wilful, knowing falsehood which tricked defendant into making the statement. To sweep this type of official misconduct under the rug on the basis that it is merely a part of the “totality of the circumstances” serves to denigrate and demean the judicial process. The majority offers no explanation how, in the face of the falsehood, the waiver here could have been knowingly and voluntarily made. The reason, I submit, is obvious — because there is none. I would remand for a new trial. WARD and SIMON, JJ., join in this dissent.