Court Opinion

ID: 9597561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:00:19.00118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:38.618695
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
*244Heard before Blume, Chief Justice, Harnsberger, Justice, and McAvoy, District Judge.
In support of the petition for rehearing, there was a brief for the plaintiff and respondent by Lathrop & Lathrop, and James A. Tilker, all of Cheyenne, Wyoming.
In opposition to the petition for rehearing, there was a brief for the defendants and appellants by Bard Fer-rall of Cheyenne, Wyoming.
OPINION
Mr. Justice Harnsberger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent has asked for a rehearing following our reversal of the lower court’s judgment in her favor. She asserts she would be inclined to forego this request if our decision had been based upon legal questions fully presented by the appellant’s original brief and answer in respondent’s original brief or if it had been orally argued. It is represented that as the effect of § 6-2306, W.C.S. 1945, upon appellant’s plea of the statutes of limitation had not been discussed either in brief or argumment, all petitioner sought was an opportunity to present her views with respect to the *245interpretation of that provision of our law, but the hope is evident that this would persuade us to reconsider our decision.
We could not accept petitioner’s erroneous assumption that, by noticing this section of our statutes, we were giving consideration to an issue not presented and developed by the parties because it was our opinion that we had merely applied a relevant law of this state which we were bound to notice and which seemed to be conclusive of the case. Nevertheless, we permitted both parties to submit by brief an elaboration of their views on the subject. However, and notwithstanding repeated disclaimers of any purpose to re-argue matters previously presented and decided adversely to the respondent, a major portion of the rehearing brief was devoted to that theme and of course has not been considered.
Counsel either misconceives or misunderstands what was intended to be conveyed in Wilson v. Martinez, Wyo., 301 P.2d 785, 801, when we said:
“When our statute gave a right of action upon the making of a decree of distribution, it as definitely made the decree the turning point in the administration of the estate where the trust relationship theretofore existing between the personal representative and those entitled to receive legacy or distributive share terminated, and the time when the personal obligation of a representative to the entitled person began.
We believe this statement fairly well served to make plain that we felt the position of the representative became adversary to those entitled to receive distribution as of the time the decree was made, because a right of action was given for the recovery of that which was decreed. We left unsaid whether that constituted the respresentative a simple debtor or whether it destroyed all aspects of fiduciary relationship — an as*246sumption which the petitioner seems to make and upon which she predicates much of her argument. Those determinations were unnecessary to a disposition of the case, although we did go so far as to point out that the probate court’s jurisdiction and the liabilities upon the representative’s bonds continued.
After giving the matter our most careful thought, study and consideration we are convinced a further hearing would not alter our views.
The petition for rehearing is denied.