Court Opinion

ID: 9743511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:35:21.271963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.715440
License: Public Domain

Supplement to Opinion on Denial of Petition for Rehearing In the Petition for Rehearing, the defendant is critical of the language of our opinion which states: “Section 14 of the Statute of Limitations and its two year bar does not apply to every action involving personal injuries, but rather to those where the plaintiff is suing for direct physical or mental injuries.” And, the defendant also urges that the cases cited in support of this statement do not so hold. The defendant contends that when any cause of action is related to, or arises as a consequence of personal injuries — even though to a person other than the plaintiff — the two-year limitation of section 14 must apply. This is not so, and the defendant has misconstrued the following cases: In Bassett v. Bassett, 20 Ill App 543 (1886) — an action by a wife against her father-in-law, who wrongfully caused her husband to desert her — at page 548, the court stated: “The cause of action for an injury to the person which is barred in two years is limited to a direct physical injury to the person. If it were intended to include all injuries to personal and relative rights, the legislature would not have considered it necessary in the same act to provide specially for a period of time in which an action should be brought for many of the injuries to such rights. Thus actions to recover damages for slander and libel, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abduction, seduction and criminal conversation, are expressly provided for, showing the clear intent of the legislature to limit ‘injuries to the person’ to those of a physical nature. This case is one of those not specially provided for, and would therefore seem to be governed by the fifteenth section of the act making five years the limitation.” In Roth v. Lundin, 237 Ill App 456 (1925), plaintiff’s wife was injured in a collision between plaintiff’s car— driven by his minor son while plaintiff and his wife and daughter were in the car — and the jointly owned car of the defendants. Plaintiff sued for the cost of repairing his car and for the services of a physician in the treatment of his wife for the personal injuries sustained. Defendants set up the two-year statute of limitations as a defense to the physician’s services. Plaintiff contended “(1) that, inasmuch as plaintiff is not suing for an injury to his own person but for damages occasioned to him by reason of his marital relationship to the injured party, the time limited for the commencement of his action is governed by section 15 of said Act rather than by section 14; and (2) that, even though the two year limitation be applicable, the action was commenced in time.” At page 459 in Roth, the court held: “We, however, hold that the time for the commencement of plaintiff’s action for the recovery of all damages as enumerated in his statement of claim should be governed by section 15 of said Limitations Act and not by section 14; and that, even if it be considered that section 14 is applicable to the portion of his claim for the payment of said physician’s bill, his action for the recovery of the amount of said bill as damages was commenced in time.” In Menolascino v. Superior Felt & Bedding Co., 313 Ill App 557, 40 NE2d 813 (1942), at page 569, the court held that the determination of which statute of limitations applies in a given case depends on whether plaintiff’s claim is for personal injuries or for property damage suffered by him; and that the cause of the injury — negligence or nuisance — bears no relation to this determination. In Seymour v. Union News Co., 349 Ill App 197, 110 NE2d 475 (1953), the plaintiff sued for damages resulting from direct personal injury to himself. Suit was not brought within two years and the complaint was dismissed on motion. Plaintiff insisted that he was suing only for injury to his property and not for injury to his person in that his amended complaint was not based on damages for pain and suffering, but rather for loss of earnings and moneys expended for medical treatment. The court affirmed the judgment against the plaintiff and held that the two year limitation applied to damages which arose directly or indirectly as a result of injury to the person of the plaintiff. At page 201, the court distinguished Roth and Bassett stating: “In Roth v. Lundin, 237 Ill App 456, the court applied the five year limitation where a husband sued for medical expenses incurred by reason of his wife’s injuries. The court concluded that the action of the husband was not based on a direct injury to his person. In Bassett v. Bassett, 20 Ill App 543, a suit by a wife against her husband’s father for maliciously enticing her husband to separate from her, the court held that the action was not for damages for injury to the person of the plaintiff and that it came within the five year limitation. The suit involved no injury to the person of the plaintiff.” The rationale of the foregoing cases sustain our original opinion and our determination that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to render the five year limitation of section 15 applicable. Consequently, we adhere to the opinion as originally adopted and the petition for rehearing is denied. Reversed and remanded.