Court Opinion

ID: 9732723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:33:03.881355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:32.131921
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STAMOS, specially concurring: We concur with the result reached by Justice Bilandic. We, however, express our concerns with the problems inherent in the defense of allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. In our view, the present procedure is unfair to both defense attorneys and courts of review. We believe that either the supreme court rules or the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 — 101 et seq.), should be amended to provide a vehicle by which an attorney, who allegedly was ineffective, could respond to the allegations. The present procedure is unfair to defense attorneys because they are not afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations. Indeed, often they are unaware that they are being attacked on appeal by their former clients. Fairness, at the very least, dictates that the former trial or appellate attorney be given notice of any allegations so that he can respond if he so desires. This would have two salutary effects. First, the attorney could defend himself against a serious charge. Second, his account would enable a court of review to assess the allegations on a complete record. As it is now, we can only speculate as to why certain matters occurred as they did. We are left to judging actions without any context, which is like watching a play after missing the first act. We are cognizant of the fact that our views are contrary to those expressed in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, in which the Supreme Court was concerned that “intrusive post-trial inquiry” would lead to a second trial of the attorney’s performance and result in the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. (466 U.S. 668, 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065-66.) We are also aware, however, that the court in that case had the opportunity to assess accurately defense attorney’s conduct because he testified in the Federal district court during defendant’s habeas corpus hearing. (466 U.S. 668, 678, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2060.) We are not arguing that any hearing or supplementing of the record be mandatory. We are merely suggesting that a defense attorney, whose competency is challenged, be given an opportunity to respond. HARTMAN, J., concurs in the special concurrence.