Court Opinion

ID: 9735305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:08:35.00628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:57.092466
License: Public Domain

GARIBALDI, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the Court’s holding today that N.J.S.A 2A:42-10.6 of the Tenant Hardship Act, which grants courts the power to stay an eviction up to a maximum of six months, does not preclude a court from vacating a judgment of possession on equitable grounds pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. Likewise, I agree with the Court, and emphasize here, that vacating a judgment of possession on equitable grounds pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly and only under truly exceptional situations. Ante at 289, 639 A.2d at 293.
My narrow disagreement with the majority stems from its wholly unnecessary discussion of the Prevention of Homelessness Act, N.J.S.A 52:27D-280 to -287, and that Act’s effect on the Housing Authority’s public-policy responsibilities. According to the majority, the trial court’s exercise of discretion to vacate the judgment evicting Little was valid in part because it “reflected a pragmatic recognition that the State’s homelessness prevention policies would be disserved by the eviction of a tenant in public housing who had demonstrated satisfactorily her ability to fulfill *295her rental obligations.” Ante at 293, 639 A.2d at 295. More specifically, the majority argues that the discretionary ruling by the trial court to vacate the judgment of possession is bolstered by the fact that failure to do so would result in an unseemly and incongruous situation in which one public authority (the Housing Authority) would be seeking to evict Little, while another (the Emergency Assistance Program) would be seeking to provide her with housing. In effect, the majority holds that tenants in public housing have a better argument against eviction than do tenants in private housing.
In the two relevant statutes addressing the eviction and dispossession of tenants, the Legislature has not distinguished between tenants in public housing and tenants in private housing. The Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, protects all tenants—both public-housing tenants and private-housing tenants—from eviction without good cause. One of the enumerated statutory grounds for eviction is failure to pay rent. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a. The Legislature did not exempt public-housing tenants from potential eviction for failure to pay rent, nor did it say that the landlords of public-housing tenants should have a greater burden than private landlords in seeking eviction on those grounds. Similarly, nothing in N.J.S.A 2A:42-10.16 of the Tenant Hardship Act indicates a legislative intent to distinguish between public-housing and private-housing tenants for the purposes of summary dispossession.
Although the possibility that a dispossessed tenant may become homeless is an equitable consideration that a trial court should take into account in deciding whether to vacate a judgment of possession pursuant to Rule 4:50-1, that possibility should be given exactly the same weight regardless of whether a tenant is dispossessed by a private landlord or a public-housing authority. I am as sympathetic to the plight of the homeless as the majority. I am also as committed as the majority to allowing trial courts to consider the possibility of homelessness in deciding whether to vacate a judgment of possession pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. Howev*296er, the Legislature should strike the proper balance between providing public housing, providing assistance to dispossessed tenants, and ensuring that tenants who fail to pay rent are subject to eviction. The relevant statutes do not distinguish between public-housing tenants and' private-housing tenants; neither should this Court.
Justice HANDLER joins in this concurrence.
HANDLER and GARIBALDI, JJ., concurring in result.
For reversal—Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN—7.