Court Opinion

ID: 9654839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:52:38.419809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.059519
License: Public Domain

KAPLAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the totality of the circumstances negates any possibility of a voluntary confession by the appellant. The surprise assault on appellant’s apartment by the tactical squad created an inherently coercive environment which resulted in an illegal confession and the ultimate discovery of the evidence. I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the appellant freely and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights under the circumstances presented in this case.
The record graphically illustrates the physical destruction caused by deployment of the stun grenade. The grenade landed in an empty baby stroller just three feet from appellant. A baby had been removed from the stroller only minutes earlier. The stroller was burned and shattered. The explosion broke all of the plates in the china cabinet, pulled the sheetrock one-and-one-half inches out of the ceiling, and burned a hole in the sofa and carpet. The apartment was filled with smoke and the occupants had to be evacuated before the police conducted their search.
Officer Shinn indicated that appellant was upset about the baby at the time he was read his Miranda rights and questioned about the cocaine. Specifically, the record reflects the following testimony given by Shinn:
Q: [BY PROSECUTOR]
How did you lead into the fact of asking the defendant about where some cocaine was after you read him his rights?
A: [BY OFFICER SHINN]
Okay. Well, number one, it was all smoky and everything like that. I told Mr. Garcia, I asked him, I said — I said, “Is there any cocaine?” He said, “What cocaine?” I said, “Well”, I said, “we can go in here after the smoke clears out, we can look through your personal items and try to find cocaine, or you can just show us where it is or tell us — you can tell us where it is.”
That’s when Mr. Garcia started, you know — he was upset over the baby, because from the stun grenade and everything like that, still, we could have killed the baby and all that, he was worried about that.
He eventually said, “I’ll show you where it is.” I said, “No, just tell me where it is.” And that’s when he told me that there was some cocaine on the dining room table and there was some cocaine in the bathroom. That’s when I couldn’t find it.”
(Emphasis added). This testimony by Officer Shinn shows appellant’s state of mind during questioning leading to the discovery of the cocaine. Clearly, appellant was upset and worried about the baby because of the destruction wreaked by the stun grenade.
Officer Fortner testified that the stun grenade is designed to stun and disable people long enough for the police to gain control of the premises. Officer Fortner also stated that a stun grenade contains no shrapnel, but he did not dispute the shrapnel-like effect that could result when a grenade blasts a baby stroller to pieces.
No one disputes that appellant was stunned or disabled immediately upon detonation of the stun grenade. Appellant testified that he did not regain his faculties for forty-five to fifty minutes following the explosion of the grenade. Shinn and Fort-ner testified that they had experienced the detonation of the stun grenade and that the explosion affected them only for fifteen or twenty seconds. Officer Fortner’s testimony was not altogether clear whether he had experienced the impact of an exploding stun grenade as a result of training or from accidental misfires in actual tactical assaults. Officer Shinn was clear that his limited experience with a stun grenade occurred when one accidentally went off behind him as he was running away from the site of impact. In whatever way the officers experienced close-up detonations of stun grenades, at least they were fore*835warned. They knew that the devices were in the vicinity and potentially capable of being detonated. The officers also knew that their chances of being seriously harmed were remote.
In stark contrast, appellant was within the privacy of his apartment when suddenly a stun grenade was hurtled through a window. The only other occupants of the apartment were his pregnant wife and two young children. He had no warning that anything out of the ordinary was about to happen. Appellant testified that, when he heard the noise and saw the blinding light, his first impression was that something had malfunctioned with the TV or VCR. It necessarily took him some time just to realize what actually occurred. Nevertheless, the majority ignores the totality of the circumstances and defers to the subjective observations and conclusions of the police officers that the explosion did not prevent appellant from effectuating a knowing or voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.
Officer Fortner testified that he was unaware at the time of the tactical squad’s forcible entry that any woman, let alone a pregnant one, or any children were in the apartment. He said that the tactical unit would not have used a stun grenade if they had realized that there were young children in the house. Officer Shinn knew that appellant and his wife were in the apartment, but did not know that she was pregnant. Officer Shinn admitted that appellant expressed concern for his pregnant wife.
It is true that appellant, his wife, and the two young children they were babysitting were not injured. But the effect of seeing the shattered stroller from which appellant had just removed a baby would scarcely be mitigated by the later realization that the four of them were, after all, unharmed. When the majority states that no threats were made to appellant, it can mean only that there were no articulate, verbal threats made subsequent to the forcible entry by the tactical squad. It may be that the officers would not have used a stun grenade if they had been aware that a pregnant woman and. two young children were inside the apartment with appellant. That consideration, however, is irrelevant to the impact that the detonation of the grenade and forcible entry into the apartment had on appellant under the circumstances of this case.
Officer Shinn stated that he began to question appellant five to ten minutes after the grenade exploded. As a result of this interrogation, appellant led the police to the cocaine in the bathroom. Within this five to ten minute period: (1) appellant endured a totally unexpected stun grenade hurtled through the window; (2) appellant saw that the sheetrock from the ceiling was pulled out, holes were burned in the sofa and carpet, all the dishes in the china cabinet were shattered, and a stroller from which appellant had just removed a baby was demolished; (3) appellant knew that his wife was seven months pregnant; (4) everyone had to be evacuated from the apartment because of the smoke; and (5) appellant was not immediately reunited with the others while the police questioned him. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that this short time interval was sufficient for appellant to regain his senses and make a voluntary confession, without regard to the awesome display of police power that he had just witnessed.
I do not believe that the confession given by appellant passes muster under the totality of the circumstances. A confession is not admissible if it is obtained by any sort of threat or violence, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. Tovar v. State, 709 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, no pet.); see also Roberts v. State, 545 S.W.2d 157, 160-61 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). The devastating effects of the stun grenade under the circumstances presented in this case constituted an inherently coercive environment which prevented appellant from effectuating a free and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights. Cf. Russell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 923, 931 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, pet. granted) (Whitham, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the evidence obtained as a result of this illegal confession should be suppressed.
*836I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.