Court Opinion

ID: 9854333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:05:53.837934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:02.052676
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, V.C.J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion misconstrues the facts in this case and does not properly apply the law to the facts as they actually existed. The evidence clearly shows that the set-off at Boggy Curve was a makeshift affair and was not the regular and normal set-off used by railroads. The location of the set-off was on a slant, which made it easy for the section hands to fall when taking a motor car from the tracks. In addition, the evidence showed that the track and ground around the set-off were covered with snow and ice at the time the plaintiff was injured; and the further *502fact was brought out that the foreman caused the men to hurry to get the car off the main line, when there was in fact no urgency about the matter at the time, and he knew it.
The photograph filed in the case-made as the defendants’ exhibit shows that the set-off was not safe under normal conditions, and especially would it be a precarious place for the section hands to work when snow and ice were on the ground.
I think the law is settled that in an action for injuries to servants of a railroad the question of whether the injuries proximately resulted from negligence of the railroad company regarding its tracks and roadbeds is for the jury where there is sufficient evidence. McClain v. Charleston & W. O. Ry. Co., 191 S.C. 332, 4 S.E. 2d 280; 57 C.J.S. §533 ,(e) (2). I say that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine whether the working conditions provided by the defendant were safe under the circumstances in the case at bar. It was clearly a case about which reasonable men could differ. There is no question but that the foreman was hurrying the men at the time the plaintiff was injured, and the evidence shows that the approach of the train was not so imminent as to necessitate any hurry. In my opinion, it was a question of fact for the jury to pass on as to whether or not the foreman was guilty of negligence in giving the hurry-up orders he did under the conditions which then existed. See 56 C.J.C., Master and Servant, §280; Williams v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n of St. Louis (Mo. App.) 20 S.W. 2d 584; Mitchell v. Wabash Railway Co., 334 Mo. 926, 69 S.W. 2d 286.
The majority opinion states that the trial court committed error in failing to advise the jury the applicable provision for the diminution of damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act. The trial court did not give such an instruction, but did give an instruction that was more favorable to the defendant railroad than the rule provided for under the Federal Employers Liability Act. The instruction given told the jury that if the plaintiff’s negligence contributed in any way to his injuries he could not recover, while the instruction that the defendant sought would have permitted the jury to allow recovery for the plaintiff if it found that his negligence contributed to his injuries. Under the instruction given, the jury had to find that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in order for him to recover anything, and by the verdict of the jury there was contributory negligence. The record was devoid of any evidence of contributory negligence. The defendant cannot complain about the failure of the court to give a requested instruction if the instruction given was more favorable to the defendant than the one requested. Teeters v. Frost, 145 Okla. 273, 276, 292 P. 356; Anderson v. Rucker Bros., 107 Wash. 595, 183 P. 70, 8 A.L.R. 544.
There was testimony by a duly licensed physician that the injury the plaintiff received caused traumatic epilepsy, and there was medical testimony to the contrary. It was clearly the jury’s function to determine which doctor it believed.
I respectfully dissent.