Court Opinion

ID: 9901094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 01:00:35.37846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:25.824604
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40637     Document: 00516974553         Page: 1     Date Filed: 11/20/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                          FILED
                                ____________
                                                                     November 20, 2023
                                 No. 22-40637                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                Clerk

   Women’s Elevated Sober Living L.L.C.; Constance
   Swanston,

                                         Plaintiffs—Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

   Shannon Jones,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   City of Plano, Texas,

                                 Defendant—Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:19-CV-412
                  ______________________________

   Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
          Defendant-Appellant, the City of Plano (the “City”) appeals the
   district court’s judgment holding that it violated the Fair Housing Act
   (“FHA”) due to its failure to accommodate Plaintiffs as to the capacity limits
   in the applicable zoning ordinance. Because we hold that the district court
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                                          No. 22-40637

   erred in determining that the evidence satisfied the applicable legal standard,
   we VACATE the district court’s injunction and REMAND for further
   proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1
                                                I.
           Plaintiffs are Constance Swanston (“Swanston”), Shannon Jones
   (“Jones”), and Women’s Elevated Sober Living, LLC (“WESL”)
   (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Swanston is an individual in recovery from
   substance use disorders (“SUDs”) and the owner and operator of WESL. In
   November 2018, WESL opened a sober living home (the “Home”) on
   Stoney Point Drive in Plano, Texas. Jones is a caretaker and resident of the
   Home.
           WESL offers numerous services to the Home’s residents, including
   weekly Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous meetings, daily drug and
   alcohol testing, employment training, and access to drug- and alcohol-
   education groups. The Home is 5980 square feet and has seven bedrooms,
   one for Jones and six for WESL residents. WESL requires each resident to
   have at least one roommate. At one point, the Home had fifteen residents.
           In early 2019, the City opened an investigation into the Home after
   receiving complaints from neighborhood residents. The City’s zoning
   ordinance allows only two types of residences in SF-7 (single family) zones,

           _____________________
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             Because the district court’s injunction is vacated based on its determination of an
   FHA violation, the district court’s judgment ordering damages and attorneys’ fees to
   Plaintiffs is also vacated. For this reason, we do not address the parties’ arguments on
   appeal regarding damages and attorneys’ fees.

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   either a “Household” or a “Household Care Facility.” The zoning
   ordinance limits the occupancy of a Household Care Facility to eight
   unrelated disabled individuals and two caretakers. After the City completed
   its investigation, it informed WESL that the Home violated the SF-7 zoning
   ordinance because the occupancy exceeded eight unrelated disabled
   individuals.
          On April 16, 2019, WESL filed a request for accommodation with the
   City’s Board of Adjustment (the “Board”) to allow seventeen to twenty
   residents in the Home. WESL’s request included Swanston’s declaration
   that living in “a sober home with 12 residents creates the necessary family
   and community atmosphere for the personal accountability and support that
   makes sober living effective.” The Board took up WESL’s accommodation
   request at a public meeting on May 28, 2019. At the meeting, a city official
   testified that the Home could safely house up to thirty-four people. The
   Board also heard public comments that predominantly urged the Board to
   deny the requested accommodation. It then heard from Swanston’s attorney
   before briefly deliberating on the request. After deliberation, the Board voted
   eight-to-zero against WESL’s request for accommodation.
          On June 5, 2019, Swanston and WESL filed suit in federal court
   claiming disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure-to-accommodate
   based on theories of financial and therapeutic necessity. One week later,
   Swanston and WESL filed an Amended Complaint adding Jones as a plaintiff.
   On February 8–9, 2021, the district court held a bench trial. Plaintiffs’ expert,
   Dr. John Majer, testified that in terms of occupancy levels of a sober-living

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   home, having more residents would “increase the richness of the social
   support available that is going to help individuals connect to recovery.” He
   further averred that “when you increase the [capacity], you’re going to
   increase the therapeutic benefit.”
          The district court issued its memorandum opinion on the issue of
   liability on August 27, 2021. The district court determined that Plaintiffs
   failed to prove their claims of disparate treatment, disparate impact, and
   failure-to-accommodate under a theory of financial necessity. On Plaintiffs’
   failure-to-accommodate claim under a theory of therapeutic necessity, the
   district court determined that the issue “require[d] individualized
   considerations” and “must be meticulously considered on a case-by-case
   basis and in light of the evidence presented.” The district court then held
   that the City violated the FHA for its failure to accommodate after
   concluding that Plaintiffs’ proposed accommodation was therapeutically
   necessary as compared to the offered alternative, considering the disabilities
   of the Home’s residents.
          The district court then enjoined the City from (1) restricting the
   Home’s occupancy to fewer than fifteen residents; (2) enforcing any other
   property restriction violative of the FHA or ADA; and (3) retaliating against
   Plaintiffs for pursuing housing discrimination complaints under the FHA and
   ADA. The district court also ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of
   damages and, following a hearing, awarded Plaintiffs nominal damages of one
   dollar. The district court rejected Swanston’s and WESL’s demands for
   punitive, mental anguish, and lost profits damages because it reasoned that

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   Plaintiffs presented “no factual evidence” to support those demands. In a
   separate memorandum opinion on attorneys’ fees, the district court awarded
   Jones, Swanston, and WESL the full lodestar without any reduction or
   increase. This appeal followed. WESL and Swanston cross-appealed on the
   issue of the district court’s denial of their demand for lost profits damages.
                                          II.
          “The standard of review for a bench trial is well established: findings
   of fact are reviewed for clear error and legal issues are reviewed de novo.”
   Luwisch v. Am. Marine Corp., 956 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
   (citations omitted). The district court’s findings of fact will stand unless we
   are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
   committed.” Jauch v. Nautical Servs., Inc., 470 F.3d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 2006)
   (citation omitted). Where “the district court appl[ies] the wrong legal
   standard in making its factual findings, this court then reviews the district
   court’s factual findings de novo.” City of Alexandria v. Brown, 740 F.3d 339,
   350 (5th Cir. 2014).

                                          III.
          Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental,
   or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter
   because of a handicap of . . . a person residing in or intending to reside in that

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   dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B). 2 Discrimination includes “a refusal to
   make reasonable accommodations in rules [or] policies . . . when such
   accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity
   to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). In a failure-to-
   accommodate claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the residents of the
   affected dwelling or home suffer from a disability, (2) they requested an
   accommodation from the defendant, (3) the requested accommodation was
   reasonable, and (4) the requested accommodation was necessary to afford the
   residents equal opportunity to use and enjoy the home. See Providence Behav.
   Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util. Dist., 902 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2018).
   Importantly, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a violation of the FHA.
   See Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996).

           To prove that an accommodation request is necessary, courts require
   that a plaintiff prove that the requested accommodation makes the home
   either “financially viable” or “therapeutically meaningful.” See Bryant
   Woods Inn v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1997). Some courts
   have determined that necessity must be considered (1) in light of the
   statutory provision’s language; (2) in accord with the purpose of the FHA
   and ADA, to ameliorate the plaintiff’s particular disability; and (3) in the light
   of “proposed alternatives.” See Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n,

           _____________________
           2
             Both parties agree that the accommodations requirements under both the FHA
   and the ADA are functionally identical. As such, “this opinion will address the claims
   relating to these statutes collectively.” Providence Behav. Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util.
   Dist., 902 F.3d 448, 455 n.2 (5th Cir. 2018).

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   903 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2018). However, a requested accommodation that
   is preferable to an alternative is not sufficient; it must be essential. See
   Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr. v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917, 923 (10th
   Cir. 2012). While we have spoken to the issue of therapeutic necessity before,
   we have no precedential opinions addressing this inquiry.

           We must evaluate necessity considering its definition, that is,
   something “[i]ndispensable, requisite, essential, needful; that cannot be
   done without, or absolutely required.” Vorchheimer, 903 F.3d at 105
   (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 10
   Oxford English Dictionary 275–76 (2d ed. 1989)). A requested
   accommodation from capacity restrictions must directly ameliorate the effect
   of the plaintiffs’ disabilities, such that the requested number must reside
   together in a dwelling to achieve effective amelioration of their afflictions. 3
   See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Put another way, without the requested
   accommodation, the ameliorative benefit provided must be so insignificant
   that it deprives persons with disabilities from the opportunity to use and
   enjoy the dwelling of their choice as compared to those without disabilities.
   See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008);

           _____________________
           3
             As an illustration, see Oxford House, Inc. v. Browning, 266 F. Supp. 3d 896, 916
   (M.D. La. 2017) (holding that “at least six otherwise unrelated individuals who are
   recovering from alcoholism or drug addiction must reside together in a dwelling in order to
   achieve the[] [desired] ameliorative effects”).

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   Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996).
   This closely tracks with the standards devised by our sister circuits.

          For example, the Fourth Circuit held in Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v.
   Howard County that the necessity element “requires the demonstration of a
   direct linkage between the proposed accommodation and the ‘equal
   opportunity’ to be provided to the handicapped person.” 124 F.3d at 605.
   Considering prior jurisprudence, we hold that the district court improperly
   applied a standard accepting that proof of greater therapeutic benefit from
   residents’ disabilities was sufficient to establish that the requested
   accommodation was indispensable to their recovery from SUDs, rather than
   requiring the plaintiffs to prove that the accommodation was indispensable
   or essential.

          As stated above, this circuit has no published precedent on point.
   However, a previous panel of this court issued an unpublished opinion in
   Harmony Haus Westlake, L.L.C. v. Parkstone Property Owners Ass’n, 851 F.
   App’x 461 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The Harmony Haus panel stated that
   where the request for accommodation addresses a restriction limiting a
   home’s capacity, a plaintiff must show that a certain number of residents is
   necessary for the home to be “therapeutically meaningful.” See id. at 465.
   The panel then determined that the sober home failed to meet its burden to
   prove that an accommodation allowing twelve residents was necessary to
   ameliorate the residents’ disabilities via the specific programs the sober home
   ran. Id. We stated that “[s]howing that an accommodation is necessary for a
   sober-living home operator’s chosen model is not sufficient.” Id. at 466. The

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   panel concluded that the sober home’s expert and resident testimony
   demonstrated at most that an accommodation to allow twelve residents
   provided better recovery prospects for the residents but was insufficient to
   prove necessity. Id. at 465–66.

          This case is strikingly analogous to Harmony Haus. We hold that the
   district court erred by applying a standard accepting that therapeutically
   beneficial treatment constitutes necessity under the FHA and ADA. The
   testimony elicited at the bench trial—like the evidence in Harmony Haus—
   was insufficient to demonstrate that the requested capacity accommodation
   was indispensable or essential to the continued facilitation of the residents’
   recovery from SUDs. See id. A requested accommodation is necessary only if
   the plaintiff shows that without the requested accommodation, they will
   receive no ameliorative effect from their disability, thereby depriving them of
   the equal opportunity to enjoy the dwelling. 4 To accept evidence that an
   accommodation would be better or provide a greater benefit to its residents
   with disabilities constitutes legal error. Cf. Vorchheimer, 903 F.3d at 112.

          Thus, the legal error flows from the district court’s determination that
   Plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proof. At trial, Dr. Majer testified that
   having fifteen residents in a sober home provides an increased therapeutic
   benefit over eight residents and “improv[ed] the odds of [residents] staying
   sober.” Throughout his testimony, however, he does not explicitly state
   whether a specific number of residents is required for the Home to provide

          _____________________
          4
              See, e.g., Vorchheimer, 903 F.3d at 110; Cinnamon Hills, 685 F.3d at 923–24.

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   the requisite therapeutic milieu for recovery. 5 For instance, he stated that a
   minimum number of fifteen residents was required to have “an effective
   therapeutic result.” But he also stated that “adding more residents increases
   therapeutic benefit in recovery homes” and makes it “more likely [] to
   produce more therapeutic effect.” He also opined that having fifteen
   residents in a sober home improved the odds of its residents staying sober.
   Thus, the district court erred by concluding that Plaintiffs satisfied their
   failure-to-accommodate claim here based on the evidence showing an
   ameliorative benefit derived from a larger occupancy.

           Looking to our sister circuits, we find confirmation that our holding
   here is appropriate. In Vorchheimer, the Third Circuit determined that a
   resident failed to allege a cognizable failure-to-accommodate claim because
   the requested accommodation was merely more preferential than the
   proposed alternatives. See 903 F.3d at 108–09. There, the resident had an

           _____________________
           5 We measure necessity in light of its definition as “something that ‘cannot be done

   without.’” See Cinnamon Hills, 685 F.3d at 923 (rejecting the argument that “an
   accommodation should be held ‘necessary’ anytime it would provide [] direct amelioration
   of a disability’s effect”); Vorchheimer, 908 F.3d at 105 (“[T]he [FHA]’s necessity element
   requires that an accommodation be essential, not just preferable.”); Bryant Woods Inn, 124
   F.3d at 605 (“Thus, nothing in the record that we can find suggests that a group home of
   15 residents, as opposed to one of 8, is necessary to accommodate individuals with
   handicaps.”); Davis v. Echo Valley Condo. Ass’n, 945 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding
   that the plaintiff’s proposed “total smoking ban likely was not necessary (that is,
   ‘indispensable,’ ‘essential,’ something that ‘cannot be done without’) to give her the same
   opportunity to use and enjoy her condo as compared to a non-disabled person who dislikes
   the smell of smoke”); Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 2021)
   (“In other words, absent an accommodation, the plaintiff’s disability must cause the
   plaintiffs to lose an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”).

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   ambulatory disability which required the use of a walker to get from her condo
   to her building’s lobby. Id. at 103–04. The condominium owners’ association
   rejected her request to leave the walker in the lobby but offered several
   methods to store it for her, all of which she refused. Id. at 104. In affirming
   the district court’s dismissal of her claim, the Vorchheimer court noted that
   the necessity inquiry “adopts a strict sense of ‘necessary’” and may
   “function[] as a but-for causation requirement, tying the needed
   accommodation to equal housing opportunity.” Id. at 110. The Third Circuit
   concluded that, based on its strict reading of § 3604(f)(3)(B) and the prior
   jurisprudence in its court and its sister circuits, the resident failed to prove
   that her requested accommodation was necessary considering the definition
   of the term, the purpose of the FHA, and the proffered alternatives. Id. at
   112–13. For the same reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs have failed to establish
   that their requested accommodation was therapeutically necessary. See id.

                                         IV.
          For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s injunction is
   VACATED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings
   consistent with this opinion.

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