Court Opinion

ID: 9780816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:57:19.093795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:14.375039
License: Public Domain

CURETON, A.J.,
dissenting.
Because I am firmly convinced Beverly properly preserved the issue of the failure of the trial court to charge loss of use, I am compelled to dissent.
At trial, counsel for Beverly inquired whether the trial court would “charge the loss of use provisions.” The court responded that it would charge Beverly could recover loss of use only if the jury found her car was economically repairable.1 The court’s actual charge follows:
*403If repairing the vehicle would put it in as good a condition as before the accident, then the measure of damages would be the cost of the repair plus any amount by which the value of the vehicle was decreased due to its involvement in the collision. This is also called depreciation.
If the vehicle cannot be repaired, the measure of damages would be the value of the vehicle immediately before it was struck minus any salvage value.
A plaintiff may also be entitled to recover for the loss of use of a vehicle during the time the plaintiff was unable to use it.
Actual damage for this purpose would be measured by determining what if any it would cost the plaintiff to rent a similar vehicle while the plaintiffs own vehicle was being repaired.
After the court charged the jury, Beverly renewed her objection to the charge, stating “[t]he plaintiff still maintains their objection to not being able to charge the jury that total loss is recoverable. Loss of use is recoverable in the event the car is a total loss — thank you.”
Quite candidly, in her brief, Kayla does not take the position that the issue is not preserved for our review. Instead, Kayla concludes: “Although loss of use may be recoverable when a vehicle is destroyed or not economically repairable, [Beverly] offered no evidence that she was entitled to an exception to the general rule. The trial court properly denied [Beverly]’s request to submit loss of use as an element of damages in this case.”
I believe the issue of whether or not a plaintiff may recover loss of use of a totally destroyed or non-repairable vehicle is a novel issue in this state and should be decided on the merits. Furthermore, Beverly argues she suffered prejudice from the deficient charge, in that she might have received a substantially higher damages award if the jury had considered loss of use. See Hughes v. W. Carolina Reg’l Sewer Auth., 386 S.C. 641, 646, 689 S.E.2d 638, 641 (Ct.App.2009) (permitting reversal of a trial court’s decision declining to give a particular jury charge when the decision is both erroneous and prejudicial). *404Inasmuch as I believe Beverly was entitled to the requested charge, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. While Beverly’s written request to charge and the court's entire charge are not included in the record on appeal, the record contains four pages of the colloquy between the court and counsel concerning *403whether to charge loss of use. Moreover, the relevant portion of the court’s charge is included in the record.