Court Opinion

ID: 9407314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 15:12:57.428359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:36.866097
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                        2023 WY 68

                                                          APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                   July 6, 2023

 FRANK J. McHENRY,

 Appellant
 (Defendant),

 v.                                                   S-22-0199

 THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee
 (Plaintiff).

                    Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County
                      The Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A.
      Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney
      General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms.
      Jones.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final
publication in the permanent volume.
KAUTZ, Justice.

[¶1] After spending over three years in jail awaiting trial on multiple charges, including
first degree murder, Frank J. McHenry entered into a plea agreement with the State and
pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, two
counts of aggravated burglary, and four counts of interference with a peace officer. Prior
to sentencing, he moved to withdraw his pleas over concerns about violation of his right to
a speedy trial and defense counsel’s performance. The district court denied his motion and
sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement. Mr. McHenry asserts the district
court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his pleas. We affirm.

                                           ISSUE

[¶2] Mr. McHenry raises a single issue on appeal: Whether the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his no contest pleas.

                                           FACTS

[¶3] On May 11, 2018, Mr. McHenry broke into two homes in Laramie County and stole
firearms, which he used to shoot two people, killing one and injuring the other. Law
enforcement arrested Mr. McHenry near the crime scene. Although a witness described
him as clothed at the time of the shootings, he was naked when officers took him into
custody. While being processed at the Laramie County Sheriff’s Office, Mr. McHenry
became physically aggressive and attacked several officers. He was admitted to the
hospital in Cheyenne later that day for agitated delirium.

Proceedings Prior to No Contest Pleas

[¶4] The State charged Mr. McHenry with first-degree murder (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-
101(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2021)), attempted first-degree murder (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-
101(a)-(b) & 6-1-301(a) (LexisNexis 2021)), two counts of aggravated burglary (Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2021)), four counts of felony interference with a
peace officer (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2021)), and one count of
misdemeanor property destruction (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a), (b)(i) (LexisNexis
2021)). On May 25, 2018, criminal proceedings against Mr. McHenry were suspended for
examination of his fitness to proceed under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302 and § 7-11-303
(LexisNexis 2021). A designated examiner found Mr. McHenry fit to proceed, and he was
arraigned on September 24, 2018. Mr. McHenry entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty
by reason of mental illness or deficiency (NGMI). Because Mr. McHenry pleaded NGMI,
the district court ordered an evaluation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304 (LexisNexis
2021) to determine his mental capacity at the time of the crimes. Section 7-11-304(a) (“A
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of the criminal conduct, as a
result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the
                                              1
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”);
Section 7-11-304(d) (“In all cases where a plea of ‘not guilty by reason of mental illness
or deficiency’ is made, the court shall order an examination of the defendant by a
designated examiner.”).

[¶5] On October 9, 2018, Mr. McHenry filed his first demand for a speedy trial. Trial
was originally set to commence on January 8, 2019, but, over the next several months, Mr.
McHenry filed several successful motions to extend the NGMI evaluation deadline and
continue the trial. He expressly stated in his motions that speedy trial was not a concern
because the delays were due to the NGMI evaluation procedure and would, therefore, be
excluded from the speedy trial calculation under Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure
(W.R.Cr.P.) 48 and be “solely attributable to the defense” in a constitutional speedy trial
analysis. See W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3)(A) (“The following periods shall be excluded in
computing the time for trial: . . . All proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency
of the defendant.”); Potter v. State, 2007 WY 83, ¶ 37, 158 P.3d 656, 665 (Wyo. 2007)
(attributing delay resulting from NGMI plea to the defense).

[¶6] Mr. McHenry changed attorneys in September 2019. His newly retained counsel
filed a motion to continue the trial which, at that time, was set for October 2019. At a
hearing on September 27, 2019, issues arose regarding Mr. McHenry’s NGMI pleas, the
NGMI evaluation, and speedy trial. There was discussion indicating the defense may no
longer be pursuing the NGMI pleas, but defense counsel represented that “until [the] NGMI
plea is fully revoked or this [c]ourt makes a ruling on such, [the] speedy trial date is
effectively paused.” He stated, “My client’s certainly prepared to, if this [c]ourt requires
it, waive that speedy trial demand. I don’t think that would be necessary at this point. I
think it’s really six months from whatever date we determine this NGMI plea goes away.”
The district court reset the trial to begin in January 2020, but Mr. McHenry requested
additional continuances and the trial was postponed until April 2020. Although Mr.
McHenry signed waivers of speedy trial in another docketed case, no written waiver was
ever filed in this case.

[¶7] The April 2020 trial date was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defense
counsel represented there were no speedy trial problems and Mr. McHenry would not be
prejudiced by the delay. The district court held several status conferences in the spring,
summer, and fall of 2020 to discuss setting the case for a jury trial under pandemic
restrictions. At a September 2020 hearing, the district court and State expressed concerns
about Mr. McHenry’s right to a speedy trial, but defense counsel stated Mr. McHenry had
waived his right. The district court noted no waiver had been filed in the case and ordered
defense counsel to do so. It also ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing Mr.
McHenry’s right to a speedy trial. Defense counsel did not file the waiver, and there is
nothing in the record indicating either party complied with the court’s briefing order.

                                              2
[¶8] The case continued to be delayed in 2021 due to the pandemic. On April 2, 2021,
Mr. McHenry filed a second demand for a speedy trial. At a scheduling conference on
May 6, 2021, defense counsel said that, although Mr. McHenry “knowingly and
voluntarily” waived his right to a speedy trial, he was refusing to sign a written waiver and
had, instead, directed defense counsel to file the second demand for a speedy trial. The
district court set the jury trial to commence on September 7, 2021, and, again, ordered the
parties to brief the speedy trial issue. The State complied by filing a brief on May 28, 2021,
which included a comprehensive review of the course of proceedings and analysis of Mr.
McHenry’s right to a speedy trial under W.R.Cr.P. 48 and the federal and state constitutions
and concluded there was no violation. Mr. McHenry never filed a brief specifically
addressing the speedy trial issue.

[¶9] The district court held a hearing on May 26, 2021 (three years after Mr. McHenry’s
arrest and two years and eight months after his arraignment), to address the status of Mr.
McHenry’s NGMI pleas. No evaluation under § 7-11-304 had ever been filed, and defense
counsel asserted the pleas had been verbally withdrawn at the September 27, 2019, hearing.
The district court ordered him to file, by the close of business the next day, a written notice
that Mr. McHenry intended to withdraw the NGMI pleas and proceed only with the not
guilty pleas. Defense counsel did not comply with the court’s order, and, after a show
cause hearing on July 22, 2021, the court found him in contempt of court. To purge himself
of the contempt, he filed a “Notice of Position Regarding NGMI Plea.” He asserted no
written withdrawal of the NGMI pleas was required, the pleas became “a nullity” upon the
“cessation of proceedings related to NGMI” in September 2019, and Mr. McHenry
“persisted in” his not guilty pleas entered at his September 24, 2018, arraignment. He
seemed to indicate the speedy trial clock resumed once the NGMI plea became a “nullity”
in September 2019.

       No Contest Pleas

[¶10] Mr. McHenry and the State entered into a plea agreement, whereunder the first-
degree murder and attempted first-degree murder charges were reduced to voluntary
manslaughter (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2021)) and attempted
voluntary manslaughter (§§ 6-2-105(a)(i), 6-2-301(a)(i)) and the misdemeanor property
destruction charge was dismissed. He also agreed to plead guilty to the originally charged
two counts of aggravated burglary and four counts of felony interference with a peace
officer. The recommended sentences in the plea agreement included a maximum of twenty
years in prison for all counts, which was a significant downward departure from the
potential sentences of death or life in prison without the possibility of parole for the original
first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder charges. See § 6-2-101(b) (penalty
for first-degree murder) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-304 (LexisNexis 2021) (penalty for
attempted first-degree murder).

                                               3
[¶11] Because the presiding district court judge was out of town, a different judge
conducted the change of plea hearing on August 18, 2021. Defense counsel confirmed at
the hearing the NGMI pleas had been withdrawn and stated the defense was “not pursuing
. . . a motion to dismiss . . . nor any appeal issues related” to speedy trial. The court
reviewed Mr. McHenry’s rights in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 11, including his rights to
persist with his not guilty pleas and to be tried by a jury, and informed him that, by changing
his pleas, he “would be waiving or giving up” his rights. See W.R.Cr.P. 11(b), (d)-(h)
(setting out requirements which must be met for a court to accept a guilty or no contest
plea). Mr. McHenry said he did not have any questions about his rights or the effects of
changing his pleas and was satisfied with his counsel. However, later in the hearing, he
questioned the court, “So being incarcerated for three-and-a-half years, and being arraigned
in September of 2018 has nothing to do with the speedy trial?” The court informed him he
would receive credit against his sentences for his presentence incarceration and then said,
“As to speedy trial, it’s a separate legal issue. Your attorney asserts that while everyone
was obviously interested in those sorts of things, that he has not moved to dismiss, and you
have agreed not to appeal on speedy trial grounds. You agree with that?” Mr. McHenry
said he did. Although the plea agreement stated Mr. McHenry would plead guilty, the State
and the court agreed at the change of plea hearing to allow him to enter no contest pleas,
with the court accepting the probable cause affidavit filed with the criminal information as
the factual basis for the crimes. The court accepted the pleas after finding Mr. McHenry
entered them knowingly and voluntarily, with full understanding of his rights and the
consequences of the pleas.

        Proceedings After Change of Pleas

[¶12] The district court judge who had presided over most of the proceedings but was not
available for the change of plea hearing sua sponte held an “in camera” hearing on
November 12, 2021, with only Mr. McHenry and his defense counsel present. Although
the judge copied the State with the order setting the hearing, she “precluded” the State
“from participating” and sealed the hearing transcript.1 The judge began by telling Mr.

1
  The State filed a motion asking for reconsideration to “cure” ex parte communications, the closure of the
courtroom to the public, the prohibition on the State’s attendance at the hearing, and the sealing of the
record. The State asserted the judge had violated Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.9(A), which
states:

        (A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider
        other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their
        lawyers, concerning a pending* or impending matter,* except as follows:

             (1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling,
        administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters
        or issues on the merits, is permitted, provided:

                (a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a
                                                    4
McHenry she “had many concerns about [defense counsel’s] conduct,” which she did not
have the opportunity to express before Mr. McHenry changed his pleas. The judge
informed Mr. McHenry she had reported defense counsel to the Wyoming State Bar for
concerns about his “inattentiveness” to this case and another case involving Mr. McHenry,
misfiling of documents, “oversights,” and “inaccuracies.” She offered to appoint the public
defender’s office to advise Mr. McHenry on “whether the circumstances [she had]
described . . . would cause [him] to move to withdraw” his no contest pleas.

[¶13] Mr. McHenry acknowledged he had been concerned about “signing [away his] right
to appeal in respect to speedy trial violations”; however, he recognized he “did waive those
rights” by pleading no contest. He stated he was “still comfortable with the plea
agreement,” his sentence, and defense counsel’s performance and he would not be
withdrawing his pleas. The judge advised him to take some time to think about the situation
and to write her a letter if he wanted her to appoint alternate counsel. She told him, “If you
go back to the jail and sleep on it over the weekend and decide on Monday that things are
looking a little bit differently to you than they are right now, I will not hold it against you
if you tell me something different in the future.”

[¶14] A few days later, Mr. McHenry sent a letter to the judge. Contrary to what the judge
said at the hearing, her judicial assistant told Mr. McHenry the judge was not “authorized
to receive ex parte communications of this nature” and forwarded the letter to defense
counsel without the judge reading it. Later, Mr. McHenry requested his scheduled
sentencing be continued to give him time to consult with the public defender’s office and
make “a full and cohesive decision regarding his rights and potential courses of action.” 2
On January 19, 2022, he sent another letter to the court. He stated he was having trouble

            procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte
            communication; and

                 (b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties
            of the substance of the ex parte communication, and gives the parties
            an opportunity to respond.

A “‘[p]ending matter’ is a matter that has commenced. A matter continues to be pending through any
appellate process until final disposition.” Wyo. Code of Jud. Conduct, Terminology. The district court
denied the State’s motion.
2
  During this time, the district attorney filed a “Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus” with this Court,
naming the district judge as the respondent. The district attorney sought a writ of mandamus ordering the
district judge to “perform her statutory obligations and immediately produce to the [State] a copy of the
November 12, 2021, hearing transcript; to comply with the requirements of Wyoming Code of Judicial
Conduct, Rule 2.9 Ex Parte Communications; to cease and desist closure of the public’s courtroom; and
cease the prohibition of the State’s knowledge of, presence at, and participation in any and all future
proceedings” in the case against Mr. McHenry. We dismissed the petition after the district attorney failed
to respond to our order to “show cause, in writing, why her petition for writ of mandamus should not be
dismissed for the reason the district attorney does not have the authority to pursue this matter in this Court.”
However, the district court eventually unsealed the transcript of the November 12, 2021, hearing.
                                                       5
contacting his attorney and had sent him a letter on January 10, 2022, stating his “wish[es]
of removing [his] plea, fighting for [his] rights and freedom.”

[¶15] On February 9, 2022, Mr. McHenry moved to withdraw his no contest pleas. He
stated in his motion that, after consulting with defense counsel and the public defender’s
office, he believed he had a fair and just reason to withdraw his pleas. He cited concerns
about speedy trial and defense counsel’s performance, as voiced by the judge at the
November 12, 2021, hearing. See W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) (“If a motion for withdrawal of a plea
of guilty or [no contest] is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit
withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.”).

[¶16] The district court reassigned the case to the judge who had conducted the change of
plea hearing. The court held a hearing on Mr. McHenry’s motion to withdraw his no
contest pleas on April 12, 2022. The district court asked Mr. McHenry if he wanted to
continue to be represented by defense counsel, and he said he did. After analyzing the case
using the factors set out in Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, 29 P.3d 86 (Wyo. 2001), the
district court denied Mr. McHenry’s motion to withdraw his no contest pleas.

[¶17] On April 25, 2022, Mr. McHenry sent a pro se letter to the court asking for
“removal” of his attorney and appointment of a new attorney. At the sentencing hearing
two days later, Mr. McHenry decided to waive his right to counsel and represent himself,
which the district court allowed. The court sentenced Mr. McHenry in accordance with
the plea agreement, which gave him a maximum of 20 years in prison for all counts
(voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, two counts of aggravated
burglary, and four counts of felony interference with a peace officer). He was credited
with the 1,448 days he served prior to sentencing. Mr. McHenry filed a timely notice of
appeal.

                                      DISCUSSION

[¶18] Under W.R.Cr.P. 32(d), “[i]f a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or [no
contest] is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea
upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.” “‘The defendant has the
burden of establishing a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea under W.R.Cr.P. 32(d).’”
Delgado v. State, 2022 WY 61, ¶ 25, 509 P.3d 913, 922 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Wanberg v.
State, 2020 WY 75, ¶ 15, 466 P.3d 269, 273 (Wyo. 2020), and Steffey v. State, 2019 WY
101, ¶ 30, 449 P.3d 1100, 1107-08 (Wyo. 2019)).

[¶19] In reviewing a district court’s denial of a Rule 32(d) motion to withdraw, we treat
no contest pleas like guilty pleas. Winsted v. State, 2010 WY 139, ¶ 7, 241 P.3d 497, 499
(Wyo. 2010) (citing Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d 468, 472 (Wyo. 2004)). “‘A
defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed,
and where the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and the defendant intelligently,

                                             6
knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty, the district court’s decision to
deny such a motion is within its sound discretion.’” Steffey, ¶ 38 n.11, 449 P.3d at 1110
n.11 (quoting Frame, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d at 89) (emphasis and other citations omitted)). Thus, a
district court’s denial of a defendant’s Rule 32(d) motion to withdraw his plea is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Delgado, ¶ 26, 509 P.3d at 923 (citing Wanberg, ¶ 14, 466 P.3d at
273). The heart of our inquiry is the reasonableness of the district court’s decision.
Delgado, ¶ 26, 509 P.3d at 923 (citing Russell v. State, 2013 WY 137, ¶ 9, 312 P.3d 76, 78
(Wyo. 2013), and Jackson v. State, 2012 WY 56, ¶ 6, 273 P.3d 1105, 1107 (Wyo. 2012)).
“‘A court abuses its discretion only when it could not reasonably decide as it did.’”
Wanberg, ¶ 14, 466 P.3d at 273 (quoting Steffey, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d at 1105). “[W]e accept
the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” Delgado, ¶ 26, 509
P.3d at 923 (citing Russell, ¶ 9, 312 P.3d at 78, and Dobbins v. State, 2012 WY 110, ¶ 30,
298 P.3d 807, 815 (Wyo. 2012)).

[¶20] In general, “‘[a] fair and just reason [to withdraw a guilty plea] includes inadequate
plea colloquies, newly discovered evidence, intervening circumstances, or other reasons
that did not exist when the defendant entered his plea.’” Pettus v. State, 2022 WY 126, ¶
19, 518 P.3d 267, 274 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Winsted, ¶ 16, 241 P.3d at 501) (other citation
omitted). However, a “‘change of mind or belated misgivings about entering a plea do not
constitute a fair and just reason for allowing a plea withdrawal.’” Id. (quoting Russell, ¶
24, 312 P.3d at 83) (other citation omitted).

[¶21] Courts use seven nonexclusive factors from Frame to analyze whether a defendant
has established a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea:

              “(1) [w]hether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2)
              whether the government would suffer prejudice; (3) whether
              the defendant has delayed in filing his motion; (4) whether
              withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court; (5)
              whether close assistance of counsel was present; (6) whether
              the original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether
              the withdrawal would waste judicial resources.”

Delgado, ¶ 27, 509 P.3d at 923 (quoting Wanberg, ¶ 16, 466 P.3d at 273, and Frame, ¶ 7,
29 P.3d at 89) (other citations omitted). “‘No single factor is dispositive, and the ultimate
determination on the motion is based upon whether the defendant has carried his burden of
establishing a fair and just reason for withdrawal.’” Russell, ¶ 20, 312 P.3d at 82 (quoting
Dobbins, ¶ 53, 298 P.3d at 822, and Major, ¶ 14, 83 P.3d at 473) (emphasis omitted).

[¶22] After considering the Frame factors, the district court decided Mr. McHenry had
not established a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his no contest pleas and denied his
motion to withdraw his pleas. The district court found generally in Mr. McHenry’s favor
on the second, fourth, and seventh factors, i.e., it concluded allowing withdrawal of the

                                             7
pleas would not prejudice the State, inconvenience the court, or waste judicial resources.
Although the State asserts some of those conclusions were in error, we need not address
them because we agree with the district court that, even with the favorable rulings on those
factors, Mr. McHenry did not establish a fair and just reason to withdraw his no contest
pleas. We turn, then, to Mr. McHenry’s challenges to the district court’s conclusions on
the other Frame factors.

       Factor 1 – Assertion of Innocence

[¶23] The district court found the first Frame factor weighed against allowing Mr.
McHenry to withdraw his no contest pleas because he did not properly assert his innocence.
Mr. McHenry concedes he did not claim in his motion to withdraw his pleas that he was
factually innocent of committing the crimes but maintains he “adamantly” asserted his right
to a speedy trial had been violated, which could show his legal innocence. We recognized
in Delgado, ¶ 30, 509 P.3d at 923-24, that a defendant may satisfy the first Frame factor
by asserting his legal innocence. See also, United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d 1209, 1214
(10th Cir. 2007) (to establish a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty plea under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure (Fed.R.Crim.P.) 32(d), “a defendant may satisfy the assertion-
of-innocence factor by asserting [his] legal innocence” (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 advisory
committee’s note to 1983 amendments, and United States v. Maxwell, 498 F.3d 799, 801
(8th Cir. 2007))).

[¶24] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article 1, § 10 of the
Wyoming Constitution, and W.R.Cr.P. 48 guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a
speedy trial. See Vance v. State, 2012 WY 83, ¶ 8, 278 P.3d 254, 256 (Wyo. 2012) (Sixth
Amendment); Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 17, 93 P.3d 222, 227 (Wyo. 2004) (“We
review speedy trial claims to ensure that the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48 and constitutional
guarantees have been met.”). When a defendant’s speedy trial right has been violated, the
charges against him must be dismissed. Vance, ¶ 8, 278 P.3d at 256 (citing Warner v. State,
2001 WY 67, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001), and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522,
92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). Thus, proof of a violation of speedy trial
could establish the defendant’s legal innocence.

[¶25] However, a “speedy trial claim is non-jurisdictional and [is] waived by [an]
unconditional no contest plea.” Baker v. State, 2022 WY 69, ¶ 3, 510 P.3d 1080, 1080
(Wyo. 2022) (citing Kitzke v. State, 2002 WY 147, ¶¶ 8-9, 55 P.3d 696, 699 (Wyo.
2002) (“Analysis of these claims must begin with the observation that an
unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defenses, including claims based on
the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights. The only claims not waived by an
unconditional guilty plea are those that address the jurisdiction of the court or the
voluntariness of the plea. . . . Non-jurisdictional defects include . . . a claim of violation
of the right to speedy trial.” (citations omitted))). See also, Cohee v. State, 2005 WY 50,
¶ 13, 110 P.3d 267, 272 (Wyo. 2005) (a guilty plea waives non-jurisdictional constitutional

                                              8
challenges to pretrial proceedings, including speedy trial violations). Consequently, a
defendant who pleads guilty or no contest cannot seek dismissal of the charges against him
for a speedy trial violation unless he successfully withdraws his plea.

[¶26] When considering a motion to withdraw a plea, the “‘mere assertion of a legal
defense is insufficient’” to satisfy the first Frame factor. Russell, ¶ 22, 312 P.3d at 82
(quoting United States v. Byrum, 567 F.3d 1255, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2009)). “‘[T]he
defendant must present a credible claim of legal innocence.’” Id. (other citation omitted).
In Sunseri v. State, 495 P.3d 127, 132 (Nev. 2021), the Nevada Supreme Court decided the
defendant presented a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing.
He offered a credible legal defense by making “a strong argument that his right to a speedy
trial had been violated and the charges against him should be dismissed.” He also presented
evidence showing “his counsel never discussed with him whether his speedy-trial right had
been violated before he agreed” to plead guilty. Id. at 133. C.f., Hamilton, 510 F.3d at
1214-15 (in seeking to withdraw his guilty plea for possession with intent to distribute
crack cocaine, the defendant did not properly assert a credible claim he was legally
innocent because he failed to present facts demonstrating that law enforcement’s “seizure
of the drugs violated the Fourth Amendment”).

[¶27] Although Mr. McHenry was aware of the speedy trial issue in his case, he did
nothing more than make the bare assertion his right to a speedy trial had been violated. In
his motion to withdraw his pleas, he stated that he had “re-analyzed certain issues related
to his right to [a] speedy trial and believe[d] his concerns warrant[ed] further analysis and
potentially [m]otions regarding the same.” At the hearing on his motion to withdraw,
defense counsel simply stated Mr. McHenry had “grave concern” about his “speedy trial
rights.” Neither his written motion to withdraw his pleas nor his argument at the hearing
included any discussion of the facts and course of proceedings of his case under W.R.Cr.P.
48 or the speedy trial provisions of the federal and state constitutions. See, e.g., Cotney v.
State, 2022 WY 17, ¶¶ 18-19, 503 P.3d 58, 65-66 (Wyo. 2022) (demonstrating proper
speedy trial analyses). To this day, he has not presented a credible speedy trial claim, and
his brief on appeal is devoid of any such analysis. The record contains no credible claim
Mr. McHenry was legally innocent of the charges because his speedy trial rights had been
violated. Consequently, the district court correctly found the first Frame factor weighed
against allowing Mr. McHenry to withdraw his no contest pleas.

       Factor 3 – Delay in Filing Motion to Withdraw Pleas

[¶28] The district court ruled the third Frame factor weighed against allowing Mr.
McHenry to withdraw his pleas because he waited until February 9, 2022, to file his motion
to withdraw, which was nearly six months after he entered his pleas on August 18, 2021.
Mr. McHenry asserts the district court ignored the effect of the November 12, 2021, ex
parte hearing where the judge expressed concerns about Mr. McHenry’s pleas and defense
counsel’s performance in the case. He claims to have followed her advice to take some

                                              9
time to think about having another attorney advise him and consider options regarding how
to proceed in the case. Mr. McHenry directs us to the January 19, 2022, letter he sent to
the court stating he had been having trouble contacting his attorney and had sent him a
letter on January 10, 2022, stating his “wish[es] of removing [his] plea, fighting for [his]
rights and freedom.”

[¶29] Mr. McHenry’s vague arguments about his right to a speedy trial and dissatisfaction
with his attorney do not explain his delay in filing the motion to withdraw. He provides
no justification for the delay from the August 18, 2021, change of plea hearing to the
November 12, 2021, hearing or how the information he obtained from the judge at that
hearing substantively changed his position on the speedy trial issue. He also does not
explain why it took another three months after that hearing to file the motion to withdraw.
Even if we accept that he expressed his desire to withdraw his plea in his January 2022
letter to the judge, there is no explanation for his failure to take any action to withdraw his
pleas in the preceding two months when he was aware of the judge’s concerns and had the
opportunity to confer with alternate counsel.

[¶30] Delgado is an example of a case where the defendant provided a valid explanation
for his delay in filing a motion to withdraw his plea. Delgado, ¶ 39, 509 P.3d at 925-26.
After Mr. Delgado entered a no contest plea to felony possession of a deadly weapon with
unlawful intent, he entered inpatient substance abuse and mental health treatment, where
he was diagnosed with bipolar I and severe alcohol use disorders. Id., ¶¶ 1, 9, 509 P.3d at
917-18. He filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea a short time after being released
from treatment, claiming the information he obtained there supported allowing him to
withdraw his plea and proceed with a NGMI plea. Id., ¶ 39, 509 P.3d at 925-26.

[¶31] Mr. McHenry’s situation is nothing like Mr. Delgado’s. Mr. Delgado discovered
he was suffering from mental health disorders after he pleaded no contest; Mr. McHenry
did not learn any new facts regarding the underlying case at the November 12, 2021,
hearing. The district judge’s concerns about his attorney’s performance and consequential
report to the Wyoming State Bar were based on matters Mr. McHenry was intimately aware
of when he entered his no contest pleas, having attended the same hearings as the judge
and counsel. The State and the district court raised the speedy trial issue numerous times
prior to the change of plea hearing. In fact, Mr. McHenry had the benefit of the State’s full
briefing of the speedy trial issue in May 2021, but it did not spur him to take any action to
protect his right to a speedy trial. To the contrary, he expressly waived that right when he
pleaded no contest in August 2021, and he confirmed his understanding of the waiver at
the November 12, 2021, hearing. Mr. McHenry did not communicate any concern about
his counsel to the court until January 2022, and he did not request a change of counsel until
right before sentencing, when he chose to represent himself. There was simply no “newly
discovered evidence, intervening circumstances, or other reasons that did not exist when
[Mr. McHenry] entered his plea” to justify his six-month delay in filing the motion to
withdraw his no contest pleas. Pettus, ¶ 19, 518 P.3d at 274 (quotation marks and citation

                                              10
omitted). The district court correctly determined the third Frame factor weighed against
allowing him to withdraw his pleas.

       Factor 5 – Close Assistance of Counsel

[¶32] With respect to the fifth factor, the district court found “[t]here is no doubt [Mr.
McHenry] has had the close assistance of counsel.” It noted that “[e]ven the issues raised
at the confidential [ex parte] hearing” on November 12, 2021, and his consultation with the
public defender’s office did not “dissuade” his allegiance to his attorney. Mr. McHenry
“reaffirmed his confidence in and desire to be represented by [defense] counsel” many
times, including at the April 12, 2022, hearing on his motion to withdraw his pleas. The
district court continued, “The trial preparation, and the seemingly beneficial [plea]
agreement reached for greatly reduced charges also weigh in favor of the conclusion that
he has had more than sufficient opportunity to benefit from representation.”

[¶33] Mr. McHenry argues that whether he personally liked or was satisfied with his
attorney is irrelevant. He claims the question, instead, is whether his attorney properly
assisted and attended to the case and points out the judge at the November 12, 2021, hearing
had “severe reservations” in that regard. He identifies numerous times where his attorney
failed to comply with the court’s orders to file documents or brief legal issues pertaining
to speedy trial and the NGMI pleas as evidence he did not receive the close assistance of
counsel.

[¶34] “‘[T]he close assistance of counsel factor under Frame requires counsel’s assistance
to be adequate and available.’” Delgado, ¶ 40, 509 P.3d at 926 (quoting Steffey, ¶ 35, 449
P.3d at 1109, and citing Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 22, 55 P.3d 29, 33 (Wyo. 2002)).
The focus of the inquiry is whether counsel provided adequate assistance to ensure the
defendant made an “informed decision when he entered his plea.” Steffey, ¶ 37, 449 P.3d
at 1109.

[¶35] The record shows Mr. McHenry’s right to a speedy trial was at the forefront of
everyone’s mind throughout the proceedings. Various defense filings described
discussions between defense counsel and Mr. McHenry about his right to a speedy trial,
and the attorneys and the district court conferred about the issue in Mr. McHenry’s
presence. Approximately three months before the change of plea hearing, the State filed a
comprehensive brief setting forth its position that Mr. McHenry’s speedy trial right had not
been violated. Defense counsel represented at the July 2021 contempt hearing that, after
reviewing the state’s speedy trial brief, he had “work[ed] with” Mr. McHenry “regarding
his understanding of speedy trial” and “consult[ed] with a law professor at UCLA regarding
the speedy trial issues. . . .” Mr. McHenry entered into the plea agreement within a few
weeks of that hearing. At the change of plea hearing, the district court, defense counsel,
and Mr. McHenry discussed waiver of his speedy trial claim as one of the consequences of
his decision to plead no contest.

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[¶36] While we acknowledge, as did the district court, that defense counsel did not comply
with the court’s orders to file various documents addressing the speedy trial and NGMI
issues, the record contains no information whatsoever on how those failures affected
counsel’s advice to Mr. McHenry regarding entry of his no contest pleas. Mr. McHenry
did not testify at the hearing on the motion to withdraw or provide other evidence regarding
defense counsel’s assistance in helping him decide whether to enter into the plea agreement
which resulted in his no contest pleas. He presented no evidence showing deficiencies in
defense counsel’s explanation of the speedy trial issue or how defense counsel’s advice
improperly influenced his decision to accept the terms of the plea agreement and waive his
speedy trial claim. The lack of such evidence distinguishes this case from Steffey, ¶¶ 11-
13, 449 P.3d at 1104, where the defendant testified about the difficulty he had
communicating with counsel concerning matters integral to his decision to change his plea
for driving while under the influence of alcohol from not guilty to no contest. During the
plea colloquy, Mr. Steffey repeatedly indicated he did not understand the plea agreement
or his plea, and the evidence showed defense counsel did not adequately assist him in
gaining that understanding. Id., ¶¶ 23-29, 449 P.3d at 1106-07.

[¶37] Mr. McHenry’s motion to withdraw his no contest pleas was based upon the
concerns expressed by the judge at the November 12, 2021, ex parte hearing, which led
him to reconsider his pleas in light of the speedy trial issue. However, Mr. McHenry
provided no explanation about how a lack of adequate or available assistance from defense
counsel affected his decision to enter into the plea agreement and plead no contest to the
reduced charges. Mr. McHenry failed to establish he lacked the close assistance of counsel
in deciding to plead no contest. The district court correctly concluded the fifth Frame
factor weighed against allowing him to withdraw his pleas.

       Factor 6 – Knowing and Voluntary Plea

[¶38] A no contest “plea must be entered knowingly and voluntarily.” Pettus, ¶ 30, 518
P.3d at 276 (citing Delgado, ¶ 42, 509 P.3d at 926, Steffey, ¶ 19, 449 P.3d at 1105, and
Dobbins, ¶ 62, 298 P.3d at 824). “Whether or not a plea was knowing and voluntary is
determined by an analysis within the context of W.R.Cr.P. 11.” Dobbins, ¶ 62, 298 P.3d
at 824. To ensure a defendant knowingly enters a plea, the court must properly advise him
and confirm “he understands the ‘nature of the plea, the penalties, including the potential
maximum sentence associated with the charge he would be pleading to, the rights he would
be relinquishing, and the consequences if the court accepts the plea.’” Delgado, ¶ 42, 509
P.3d at 926 (quoting Major, ¶ 23, 83 P.3d at 479, and citing W.R.Cr.P. 11). A plea is
voluntary when it is

              “‘entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences,
              including the actual value of any commitments made to him by
              the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, [and is not] induced

                                            12
             by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
             misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
             promises), or . . . by promises that are by their nature improper
             as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business
             (e.g. bribes).’”

Dobbins, ¶ 62, 298 P.3d at 824 (quoting Major, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d at 472, and Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)) (other citations
omitted). “‘We look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a plea was
knowing and voluntary.’” Pettus, ¶ 30, 518 P.3d at 276 (quoting Steffey, ¶ 19, 449 P.3d at
1105) (other citation omitted).

[¶39] In deciding whether Mr. McHenry should be allowed to withdraw his pleas, the
district court reviewed the change of plea proceedings to confirm it had complied with
W.R.Cr.P. 11 and to “substantiate the knowing and voluntary nature of the pleas in this
case.” It described the change of plea hearing as follows:

             After discussion, including with [Mr. McHenry] directly about
             several matters including operation of the no contest plea[s],
             his speedy trial concerns, and other matters[,] it is clear [Mr.
             McHenry] understood his rights, the consequences he faced, .
             . . the effect of his pleas[,] and the operation of the plea
             agreement. Further, less usual matters were raised evidencing
             [Mr. McHenry’s] understanding, including the postponement
             of entry of an order for a pre-sentence investigation, a minor
             issue about the State[’]s amendment of the Information and his
             agreement (at the parties[’] request) to enter his pleas before a
             judge not currently assigned to the case.”

[¶40] Mr. McHenry argues that, while the district court followed Rule 11 at the change of
plea hearing, his pleas were not knowing and voluntary because he was not aware of “all
of the relevant information,” specifically, he did not know the judge had reported defense
counsel to the Wyoming State Bar. He maintains the November 2021 hearing shows that
particular district judge believed he “did not know all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding his case at the moment he entered his [no contest] plea[s],” and she wanted to
make him aware he had “options regarding withdrawal” of his pleas. Again, his vague
suggestion that the judge believed his right to a speedy trial had been violated or he had
not received proper assistance from defense counsel is not supported by any analysis of the
underlying speedy trial issue. He also fails to explain how that analysis changed between
the time he entered his pleas and when he filed the motion to withdraw. Mr. McHenry
does not argue that he did not understand the nature of his pleas or the consequences of
entering them. Nor does he claim he was improperly induced to enter into the plea
agreement by threats, promises, or misrepresentations. He has entirely failed to establish

                                            13
the district court erred when it decided he entered his pleas knowingly and voluntarily
under the sixth Frame factor.

[¶41] Mr. McHenry did not show the district court’s plea colloquy was inadequate,
identify any relevant newly discovered evidence or intervening circumstances, or provide
other reasons for withdrawal of his pleas that did not exist when he entered them. Pettus,
¶ 19, 518 P.3d at 274. The district court accurately found Mr. McHenry’s “only suggestion
. . . of specific additional work to be done was a vague reference to speedy trial . . . ., [but]
speedy trial was addressed at the plea proceeding where [Mr. McHenry] . . . acknowledged
his concern about the issue and understood he was giving that up with his plea[s], including
any right to appeal on that ground.” Even accepting that allowing Mr. McHenry to
withdraw his no contest pleas would not prejudice the State, inconvenience the court, or
waste judicial resources, the Frame factors overall weigh against granting his motion. He
did not adequately assert his innocence, delayed in filing the motion to withdraw, received
the close assistance of counsel when he pleaded no contest under a favorable plea
agreement, and entered his no contest pleas knowingly and voluntarily. The district court
did not abuse its discretion when it balanced the Frame factors and concluded Mr.
McHenry failed to establish a fair and just reason under W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) to withdraw his
no contest pleas.

                                       CONCLUSION

[¶42] The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mr. McHenry’s motion to
withdraw his no contest pleas because he failed to establish a fair and just reason for
withdrawal. His “belated misgivings” about his pleas did not justify allowing him to
withdraw them. Pettus, ¶ 19, 518 P.3d at 274 (other citations and quotation marks omitted).

[¶43] The district court’s decision is affirmed.

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