Court Opinion

ID: 9958660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 19:11:02.458895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:33.700498
License: Public Domain

04/09/2024

        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                          Assigned on Briefs February 6, 2024

                ANTONIO BENSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
                        No. 13-04060 Lee V. Coffee, Judge

                             No. W2023-00668-CCA-R3-PC

The Petitioner, Antonio Benson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for first degree premeditated
murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying
relief on his claim alleging that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to meaningfully
present the Petitioner’s self-defense claim. After review, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER and JOHN
W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.

Robert L. Sirianni, Jr., (on appeal), Winter Park, Florida, and C. Ann Tipton (at post-
conviction hearing), Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Antonio Benson.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Steven J. Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Leslie Byrd, Assistant
District Attorney General for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                     I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                              A.     Trial and Direct Appeal

      On May 31, 2013, the Petitioner shot and killed the victim, Amy Hallmon, at the
home of Kevin Williams. State v. Benson, 600 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S.Ct. 427 (Oct. 5, 2020). A Shelby County grand jury indicted the Petitioner for the
offense of first degree murder in August of 2013. The Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial
represented by two attorneys (“lead counsel” and “co-counsel” or collectively as “trial
counsel”).

        The following pertinent facts and procedural history are derived from our supreme
court’s opinion in this case on direct appeal. See id. at 898-902. At trial, Mr. Williams
testified that he, the Petitioner, and the victim were at his residence socializing. During the
evening, the Petitioner asked the victim to perform oral sex on him. When the victim
refused, the Petitioner grabbed the back of the victim’s head. The victim told the Petitioner,
“I’m not playing with you,” and the Petitioner backed away. Twice more, the Petitioner
demanded oral sex from the victim. After the third demand, the victim swung at the
Petitioner twice, striking him once and causing his nose to bleed. The victim —a “petite
woman”—then began to verbally taunt the Petitioner. The Petitioner pulled a handgun out
of his back pocket and asked Mr. Williams, “Hey, Cous, man, you think I should shoot that
b----?” Mr. Williams replied, “Hell, no, fool, she told you to quit messing with her.”
Instead of heeding Mr. Williams’s advice, the Petitioner told the victim, “B----, I feel sorry
for your kids,” before shooting her five times, including twice in the back. Mr. Williams
stated that the Petitioner dragged the victim outside and then returned to the house without
the victim. The victim’s body was found early the next morning with multiple gunshot
wounds, as well as abrasions and contusions indicating she had been dragged.

       In Petitioner’s statement to police, introduced as evidence at trial, the Petitioner
claimed he and the victim were arguing because the victim demanded drugs, and the
Petitioner would not give her any. The Petitioner admitted that after being hit by the victim
in the nose, he shot the victim at least twice. The Petitioner stated that he and the victim,
despite her being shot, continued to argue and that they eventually moved “behind” Mr.
Williams’s home, where the Petitioner shot the victim again as they were on the ground
fighting. The Petitioner also admitted that after the shooting he went home and later
wrapped the gun in a bag and disposed of it in a garbage can.

        The medical examiner testified that the victim’s toxicology report showed numerous
drugs in the victim’s blood. The medical examiner stated that these drugs could cause
agitation, aggressiveness, anxiety, paranoia, and hallucinations. However, he could not
say how these drugs affected the victim personally.

        After the State’s proof, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal, which the trial
court denied. At that time, the defense requested that a self-defense instruction be given to
the jury, stating that the State’s proof showed that the victim was the first aggressor. The
trial court found that although the victim threw the first punch, this did not necessarily

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justify the Petitioner’s shooting her. The trial court reasoned that the victim was unarmed,
had not threatened or attempted to use unlawful deadly force against the Petitioner, and
had not caused or threatened to cause serious bodily injury to the Petitioner. Therefore,
the trial court denied the Petitioner’s motion to submit a self-defense instruction to the jury,
finding that self-defense had not been “fairly raised” by the proof.

       The defense called only one witness, Lady Jordan, who testified that she saw the
Petitioner trip and fall on the day of the shooting. Ms. Jordan stated that the Petitioner’s
nose looked different and “messed up”; however, she did not know what caused the
difference.

        The defense then rested and notified the court that they had now filed a formal
written request for a self-defense instruction. The defense argued that their witness’s
testimony fairly raised the issue of self-defense, in that Ms. Jordan’s testimony established
that the Petitioner’s nose had been disfigured as a result of his being punched by the victim.
The trial court again denied the motion, stating that Ms. Jordan testified she did not know
when or how the Petitioner had hurt his nose. The trial court again found that the Petitioner
did not sustain a serious bodily injury and that even if the problem with his nose had been
caused by the victim’s punch, it still did not amount to “serious bodily injury” that would
allow the deadly force to be used as a defense.

        The trial court then gave final instructions to the jury and did not include any charge
related to whether the Petitioner acted in self-defense. The jury found the Petitioner guilty
of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. The Petitioner
filed a motion for new trial, arguing, amongst other things, that the trial court erred in its
denial to give a self-defense instruction. The trial court denied the Petitioner’s motion.

        On appeal, this court reversed the Petitioner’s conviction based on the trial court’s
refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense, holding the issue was fairly raised by the proof.
State v. Benson, No. W2017-01119-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 5810004, at *8-9 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Nov. 5, 2018), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2019). The State appealed to the
supreme court, who reversed this court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s judgment,
concluding that the trial court properly refused to instruct on self-defense consistent with
its role as “gatekeeper.” Benson, 600 S.W.3d at 908. The supreme court concluded that
self-defense was not fairly raised by the proof even “when viewed in the light most
favorable to the [Petitioner].” Id. at 907. The supreme court reasoned,

       At most, the defense proof fairly raised the issue of whether the [Petitioner]
       was justified in using non-lethal force to protect himself from the victim.

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        The [Petitioner] here, however, is not attempting to justify a simple assault
        against the victim. Instead, he chose to respond to a punch in the nose by
        pulling out a gun and shooting a small, unarmed woman five times, including
        twice in the back.

Id. Even if self-defense had been fairly raised by the proof, the supreme court added, the
trial court’s failure to provide the instruction to the jury “would have been ‘harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because no reasonable jury would have accepted the
[Petitioner’s] self-defense theory.’” Id. (quoting State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 404-05
(Tenn. 2017)).

                                B.      Post-Conviction Proceedings

        On April 23, 2021, the Petitioner, through counsel, filed a “Petition for Relief from
Conviction or Sentence” along with a supporting memorandum, 1 arguing that he was
denied constitutionally effective counsel by the attorneys who represented him at trial and
on appeal. Specifically, the Petitioner argued that his trial counsel were ineffective for
failing to meaningfully present his self-defense claim. According to the Petitioner, trial
counsel rendered deficient performance when they failed to present any evidence of a self-
defense claim outside the opening remarks to the jury. The Petitioner claimed that “the
only other time [t]rial [c]ounsel attempted to introduce a self-defense claim at trial was
[the] failed attempt to request a jury instruction from” the trial court. The Petitioner
asserted that trial counsel should have presented the Petitioner’s self-defense claim “as a
motion-in-limine, a motion for directed verdict, or any other suitable method[.]” Relative
to prejudice, the Petitioner states that this court’s opinion on direct appeal confirmed that
his “self-defense claim had substantial merit,” which is indicative of the prejudicial nature
of trial counsels’ deficiency. A post-conviction hearing was held on February 10, 2023, at
which lead counsel and the Petitioner testified.

        Lead counsel testified that he started practicing law in 2011 and had handled several
first degree murder cases prior to Petitioner’s trial. He was appointed to represent the
Petitioner six months before the case went to trial and was assisted by co-counsel, whom
        1
          The supporting memorandum was styled by counsel as a “Memorandum of Law in Support of
Petitioner’s Request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.” The parties and the post-conviction court treated the
petition as a petition for post-conviction relief, and we will do the same. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-30-105(c). We note that the original pleadings in this case were filed on the Petitioner’s behalf
by attorney Robert L. Sirianni, Jr., (“appellate post-conviction counsel”), who later filed the Petitioner’s
appellate briefs. Mr. Sirianni did not personally appear in the post-conviction court to represent the
Petitioner at the hearing. Instead, attorney C. Ann Tipton represented the Petitioner at the post-conviction
hearing.

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he described as “one of the best” attorneys he knew in the area. He also worked with a
private investigator on the case and represented the Petitioner on appeal.

       Lead counsel said that he reviewed discovery, researched the law, prepared pretrial
motions and that he met with the Petitioner, the private investigator, and the Petitioner’s
family on multiple occasions. Lead counsel stated he fashioned a theory of self-defense
for the case, as well as an alternative theory that the Petitioner’s act was not premeditated
and, therefore, was not first degree murder. Lead counsel stated he discussed these theories
with the Petitioner.

        According to lead counsel, he believed the self-defense theory would be raised by
the Petitioner’s statement, the victim’s toxicology report, and Ms. Jordan’s testimony
regarding the Petitioner’s nose injury. Lead counsel indicated that through this evidence,
he attempted to establish the Petitioner’s state of mind. Lead counsel stated he tried to
paint a picture that the Petitioner had been attacked by someone under the influence of
drugs and that the shooting was the Petitioner’s reaction to the attack. Lead counsel said
that he attempted to impeach Mr. Williams on cross-examination after Mr. Williams’s
testimony at trial differed from his police statement. To further bolster the theory of
self-defense, lead counsel attempted to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior violent
conduct to show that she was the first aggressor, but this evidence was excluded. Lead
counsel testified that he attempted to emphasize the perspective of being attacked by
someone under the influence of drugs to the jury while diminishing the relative sizes and
gender roles of the Petitioner and the victim. Lead counsel also stated that he had discussed
these issues with the Petitioner and would have advised him about the pros and cons of
testifying.

        Additionally, lead counsel said that he requested a jury instruction on self-defense
during the trial and “persistently and repeatedly” argued for this instruction throughout the
trial. Lead counsel noted that he filed a formal written motion requesting the instruction
after “the facts were developing on the record” and after the trial court gave an early
indication that it might not give the self-defense instruction. Lead counsel testified that in
his experience, trial courts will not typically rule on the issue of a self-defense instruction
pretrial before the facts develop.

        Testifying at the hearing, the Petitioner agreed that he discussed legal defense
theories with trial counsel before trial. However, he stated that they did not go into the
details of a self-defense claim. The Petitioner stated that trial counsel never asked about
his state of mind when he shot the victim—specifically, whether he was in fear for his
safety. The Petitioner also said that trial counsel did not discuss with him his testifying

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until they “got ready to go to trial.” He testified that lead counsel told him “it might be
best” if he did not take the stand because it might harm his defense given his police
statement. But, trial counsel told him it was his choice, the Petitioner said.

       When the Petitioner was asked at the hearing if he felt fear he would suffer serious
bodily injury or death at the time of the incident if he did not act, the Petitioner responded,
“Any time you’re in an altercation, it’s a possibility that you’re going to feel fear that you’re
going to get hurt or something like that.” When asked the same question again, the
Petitioner said, “yes.” The Petitioner stated that if he were to have testified at trial, he
would have testified that he was in fear and given the reasons why. The Petitioner also
said he received ice for his nose but did not get any other medical treatment.

        After the hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner
had failed to establish that his trial counsel were ineffective. Specifically, the Petitioner
failed to produce any additional evidence, namely witnesses, that trial counsel could have
presented at trial to support a self-defense claim. Further, the Petitioner failed to specify
what other defenses trial counsel could have pursued. The post-conviction court noted that
lead counsel testified he defended the Petitioner by challenging the credibility of the State’s
witnesses and their motives for testifying, presented the testimony of Ms. Jordan regarding
the Petitioner’s nose injury, frequently requested of the trial court a self-defense
instruction, and argued to the jury that this killing was justified or a lesser crime than
premeditated murder. In addition, the post-conviction court mentioned lead counsel’s
belief that the Petitioner’s statement to police, the victim’s toxicology report, and Ms.
Jordan’s testimony were sufficient to present a self-defense claim.

        The post-conviction court further noted that lead counsel argued the “case all the
way to the Tennessee Supreme Court,” which held, unfavorably to the Petitioner, that
self-defense was not fairly raised by the proof. Citing all of trial counsels’ efforts in the
case, the post-conviction court stated, “There is absolutely nothing else that [trial counsel]
could have done on this case.” Accordingly, the post-conviction court determined that the
Petitioner had failed to show either of the two requirements for ineffective assistance of
counsel: deficient performance or prejudice.

       Addressing separately the adequacy of trial counsels’ pretrial preparation relative to
the Petitioner’s “specious argument” regarding the failure to develop any viable defense,
the post-conviction court stated that the Petitioner had failed to present any proof in support
of his allegation. The post-conviction court observed that “the gist” of the Petitioner’s
argument was that trial counsel “did not mount a defense, interview witnesses, or
cross-examine the State’s witnesses . . . well.” Ultimately, the post-conviction court

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determined that the record showed trial counsel zealously represented the Petitioner and
that the Petitioner had failed to prove he was prejudiced by the tactical decisions of trial
counsel.

        In a related issue, the post-conviction court held that lead counsel “made a strategic,
trial, tactical decision to challenge credibility of the victim and other witnesses.”
According to the post-conviction court, the record clearly indicated that “trial counsel
vigorously challenged and cross-examined prosecution witnesses.” The post-conviction
court found that the Petitioner’s allegation that trial counsel did not effectively
cross-examine the State’s witnesses was meritless.

        The post-conviction court also addressed as separate issue trial counsels’ advice to
the Petitioner not to testify at trial. The post-conviction court noted that the trial court had
conducted a Momon2 hearing in this case and found the Petitioner’s testimony at the
post-conviction hearing concerning his election to testify was not credible. The
post-conviction court determined that the Petitioner was untruthful at the post-conviction
hearing when he insisted trial counsel forced, influenced, or coerced him not to testify at
trial. Additionally, the post-conviction court found the Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing
to be insufficient to fairly raise the issue of self-defense.

       The Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                         II.     ANALYSIS

       On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his
claim that he received ineffective assistance due to trial counsels’ failure to meaningfully
present the theory of self-defense. The State argues that the post-conviction court did not
err by denying the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because the
Petitioner failed to show either deficient performance or prejudice. We agree with the
State.

       Post-conviction relief is available when a “conviction or sentence is void or
voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of
Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. The
burden in a post-conviction proceeding is on the petitioner to prove allegations of fact by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f); see Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282,
293-94 (Tenn. 2009). “Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight
and value to be given their testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to
       2
           See Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999).

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be resolved” by the post-conviction court. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn.
2001). On appeal, we are bound by the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless we
conclude that the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings. Id. Because
they relate to mixed questions of law and fact, we review the post-conviction court’s
conclusions as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient and whether that deficiency
was prejudicial under a de novo standard with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457.

       Criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed the right to effective assistance
of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 344 (1980); Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 293. When a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is made under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the burden is on the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was
deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1993). “Because a
petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or
prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance
claim.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). The Strickland standard has
been applied to the right to counsel under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee
Constitution. State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).

        Deficient performance requires a showing that “counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness,” and reviewing courts “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. When a court reviews a lawyer’s
performance, it “must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from the
perspective of counsel at that time.” Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tenn. 2006)
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). We will not deem counsel to have been ineffective
merely because a different strategy or procedure might have produced a more favorable
result. Rhoden v. State, 816 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). We recognize,
however, that “deference to tactical choices only applies if the choices are informed ones
based upon adequate preparation.” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1992) (citing Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)).

        As to the prejudice prong, the petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 116 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “That is, the petitioner must establish that his

                                           -8-
counsel’s deficient performance was of such a degree that it deprived him of a fair trial and
called into question the reliability of the outcome.” Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 869
(Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 463 (Tenn. 1999)).

       The Petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to present any defense and specifically
failed to meaningfully present a theory of self-defense. The Petitioner states that trial
counsel made no effort toward a self-defense claim, save a failed attempt to request a jury
instruction on the issue, and that there were multiple methods trial counsel could have
employed to present self-defense effectively. The State responds that the Petitioner failed
to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.

       Nothing in the record preponderates against the post-conviction court’s findings,
which demonstrate that trial counsel raised the issue of self-defense throughout the trial
and raised, in the alternative, that the Petitioner’s act was not premeditated. At the
post-conviction hearing, lead counsel testified that he attempted to impeach Mr. Williams
on cross-examination after Mr. Williams’s testimony at trial differed from his police
statement. Lead counsel stated that he filed a motion requesting a self-defense jury
instruction during trial, and the record reflects that trial counsel also made oral requests for
a self-defense instruction. According to lead counsel, he believed that the Petitioner’s
statement to police and the victim’s toxicology report, which indicated the victim had
numerous drugs in her system at the time of the incident, and Ms. Jordan’s testimony would
support the issue of self-defense. Through this evidence, lead counsel intended to establish
the Petitioner’s state of mind. Further, lead counsel testified that he attempted to emphasize
the perspective of being attacked by someone under the influence of drugs to the jury while
diminishing the relative sizes and gender roles of the Petitioner and the victim. As an
alternative theory to self-defense, lead counsel stated that he argued to the jury that this
killing was a lesser crime than first degree murder because there was no premeditation
involved.

        At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner testified that he never discussed his
state of mind during the incident with trial counsel. The Petitioner stated, however, that if
he were to have testified at trial, he would have stated that he was in fear during the
incident. Later in the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner admitted that his fear was
based on the possibility of getting hurt during a fight or argument and not anything the
victim was doing directly. The Petitioner claimed that he was advised by trial counsel not
to testify, and this influenced him to not take the stand. The post-conviction court
accredited the Petitioner’s testimony at the Momon hearing, in which the Petitioner stated
that his election not to testify was a personal decision made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily, over his testimony at the post-conviction hearing. Importantly, the

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post-conviction court found the Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing to be insufficient to
fairly raise the issue of self-defense.

        During the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner was asked repeatedly what his
trial counsel could have done differently or what more they could have done in his case.
The Petitioner gave either no or vague responses to these inquiries. Additionally, as the
post-conviction court noted, the Petitioner produced no other witnesses or evidence to
establish his claim that his trial counsel were ineffective.

        The Petitioner argues that trial counsel could have raised self-defense in a pretrial
motion or a motion for directed verdict. During the post-conviction hearing, lead counsel
was asked if he had filed any pretrial motions requesting a self-defense jury instruction.
Lead counsel stated that a motion was filed mid-trial. While it appears that lead counsel
may have also orally requested a self-defense instruction pretrial, see Benson, 2018 WL
5810004, at *7, pretrial motions are not required for general defenses such as self-defense.
See State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 129 n.9 (Tenn. 2013) (noting that self-defense is a
general defense which does not require pretrial notice). Additionally, lead counsel testified
in the post-conviction hearing that, in his experience, trial courts will not typically rule on
the issue of a self-defense instruction pretrial before the facts develop. “Deference will be
given to sound trial strategy. . . . if the choices are informed ones based on adequate
preparation.” Cooper, 847 S.W.2d at 528. Nothing in the record suggests that lead
counsel’s choice was uninformed or based on inadequate preparation. Rather, lead counsel
based his decision upon his experience and knowledge regarding requests for self-defense
jury instructions, a strategic decision that we will not second-guess on post-conviction
review. See Hellard, 629 S.W.2d at 9. Relative to a motion for directed verdict, lead
counsel was not asked during the post-conviction hearing about raising the self-defense
issue in such a motion, and therefore, the Petitioner has failed to prove this allegation of
fact by clear and convincing evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f); see Dellinger,
279 S.W.3d at 293-94. In sum, the post-conviction court correctly ruled that the Petitioner
had not established deficient performance of trial counsel.

        Additionally, we agree with the post-conviction court that the Petitioner has failed
to show his trial counsels’ performance prejudiced him. The Petitioner claims that “[t]here
is a substantial probability—had Trial Counsel rendered effective performance—that [the
Petitioner’s] trial would have gone differently.” Specifically, the Petitioner repeatedly
states that this court on intermediate direct appeal confirmed he had a viable self-defense
claim, and therefore, we should now find that the self-defense claim was necessary for the
proper presentation of his defense.

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       Before addressing this argument, we will address an issue with post-conviction
appellate counsel’s briefs. On seven separate occasions in his principal and reply briefs,
post-conviction appellate counsel either cites to or quotes from this court’s decision in
Benson, 2018 WL 5810004. While we generally applaud citation to and reliance on our
prior decisions, we do not encourage this practice when the cited decision has been reversed
by our state’s highest court.3 This is especially true when the cited case also happens to be
the case at bar. Not once in his briefing does appellate counsel cite to our supreme court’s
decision in Benson, nor does he give the slightest indication that the decision from our
court—on which he so stridently relies—has been reversed. Based on the record, appellate
counsel was aware of the supreme court’s decision in Benson. In the memorandum of law
in support of the petition for post-conviction relief, for instance, appellate counsel
acknowledges and references the supreme court’s decision. Additionally, appellate
counsel attached the supreme court’s decision to the memorandum. For reasons unknown,
appellate counsel neglected to cite to controlling law before our court or, more importantly,
to argue how this controlling law affects the appellate claims that he is advancing.

         As evident throughout the record but not acknowledged by the Petitioner in his
briefs, his relief before our court on direct appeal was short-lived. The supreme court
reinstated the judgment of the trial court in 2020, reversing the decision of this court, and
held unequivocally that the Petitioner did not have a viable self-defense claim. Benson,
600 S.W.3d at 907-08. Further, the supreme court noted that even if the trial court erred in
not instructing the jury on self-defense, “such an error would have been ‘harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt because no reasonable jury would have accepted the [Petitioner’s]
self-defense theory[,]’” id. (citing Perrier, 536 S.W.3d at 404-05), a conclusion that
forecloses the Petitioner’s claims of Strickland prejudice before this court. As the trial
court below recognized during the trial proceedings, “There’s absolutely nothing . . . that
would allow a jury to conclude that this [Petitioner] had . . . reasonable grounds to
fear . . . serious bodily injury or death.” Id. The post-conviction court correctly ruled that
the Petitioner had not established prejudice. He is not entitled relief.

        3
          This is the case unless, of course, counsel acknowledges the reversal and cites to the intermediate
opinion for support of a proposition outside the holding of the controlling decision or is making a good
faith argument for a modification or reversal of controlling law.

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                                  III.   CONCLUSION

       In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment
of the post-conviction court.

                                                   ______________________________
                                                   KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

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