Court Opinion

ID: 9693382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:39:03.097128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:45.721532
License: Public Domain

McGIVERIN, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part)
I respectfully concur in the result of division I of the majority opinion and dissent as to division II. I would affirm the rulings of the trial court.
I. The Iowa Code section 611.20 question. In McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1971), this court in a unanimous opinion held that the word “person” as used in Iowa Code section 611.20 “means only those born alive.” In Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 270-73 (Iowa 1981), we again adhered to that statutory construction. Since 1971, there has been no legislative change in the wording of section 611.20. Therefore, this court’s interpretation of the legislative intent as to the term “person” in section 611.20 has evidently met with the approval of each legislature and under such circumstances the interpretation should not be changed. Cover v. Craemer, 258 Iowa 29, 34, 137 N.W.2d 595, 599 (1965). The doctrine of stare decisis should be followed on this issue.
The trial court correctly dismissed the wrongful death claims of the unborn child under section 611.20. Therefore, I concur in the result of division I of the majority opinion.
II. The rule 8 claim. Iowa R.Civ.P. 8 states:
A parent, or the parents, may sue for the expense and actual loss of services, companionship and society resulting from injury to or death of a minor child.
(Emphasis added.)
The majority in division II holds that a surviving parent has a claim under rule 8 for damages resulting from deprivation of an unborn child’s companionship, society and services. The majority says that the claim under rule 8 is for wrong done to the parent in consequence of injury to his child. I dissent from such a construction of rule 8. It ignores the plain meaning of the words used in rule 8.
Of great importance are the words which the legislature chose to use in rule 8. The majority focuses on the word “child” which is defined as an “[ujnborn or recently born human being.” Black’s Law Dictionary 217 (rev. 5th ed. 1968). The legislature, however, modified the word “child” with the adjective “minor.” Thus a parent’s right of recovery under rule 8 is restricted by the limitations which the adjective “minor” places on the word “child.”
A “minor” has been defined as a “person.” Black’s Law Dictionary 899 (rev. 5th ed. 1968). The ordinary meaning of the word “person” is a human being who has “attained a recognized individual identity” by being born alive. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 271. I conclude, therefore, that the modifier “minor” was placed in rule 8 to limit a parent’s recovery to the death or injury of a child who was born alive.
Consequently, the initial requirement of the parent’s claim under rule 8 that injury or death occur to a “minor child” is not met. The fetus here had not yet been born and there was no “minor child.” The injury and death were suffered by a fetus, not a minor child. Thus, the parent could not have a claim under rule 8. Cf. State v. Beatty, 61 Iowa 307, 308, 16 N.W. 149, 149 (1883) (defendant charged with bastardy: “Now, as the child was not born alive, there never was any person for whose maintenance defendant could be charged.”); Kansz v. Ryan, 51 Iowa 232, 234, 1 N.W. 485, 487 (1879) (father could not recover for loss of *835services of an unborn child allegedly caused by a third-party’s inducing the mother to terminate her pregnancy); see also Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal.App.2d 95, 100, 268 P.2d 178, 179 (1954) (unborn child is not a “minor person” within the meaning of the wrongful death statute); Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303, 307 (Fla.1977) (no cause of action for wrongful death of stillborn fetus; decision based on construction of prior statute holding that a fetus was not a “person” or “minor child” for purposes of the wrongful death statute).
I conclude that the use of the modifier “minor” was intended by the legislature as a requirement that a “child” be born alive before it becomes a “minor child” under rule 8.
The trial court’s rulings also were correct in dismissing the counts of the petition seeking recovery by plaintiff as the surviving parent of the unborn fetus under rule 8.
UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK and SCHULTZ, JJ., join in this dissent.