Court Opinion

ID: 9411616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 14:04:58.021393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:31.704087
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               DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                  No. 21-CV-0031

                                TAX ANALYSTS
                                     and
                            AARON DAVIS, APPELLANTS,

                                         V.

                         DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLEE.

                           Appeal from the Superior Court
                            of the District of Columbia
                               (2020-CA-001999-B)

                        (Hon. Robert R. Rigsby, Trial Judge)

(Argued March 8, 2022                                       Decided July 27, 2023)

      Cornish F. Hitchcock for appellants.

       Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl Racine,
Attorney General at the time of argument, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General at the
time of submission of the briefs, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor
General at the time of submission of the briefs, and Ashwin P. Phatak, Deputy
Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.

     Before DEAHL, Associate Judge, and STEADMAN and GLICKMAN, * Senior
Judges.

      *
          Judge Glickman was an Associate Judge at the time of argument.
                                           2

      GLICKMAN, Senior Judge:           Tax Analysts, a nonprofit publisher of tax

periodicals, and its reporter Aaron Davis (hereinafter referred to jointly as “Tax

Analysts”), seek disclosure pursuant to the District of Columbia Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA) 1 of 24 private letter rulings (PLRs) issued by the District of

Columbia Government’s Office of Tax and Revenue (OTR). Such rulings are

provided by OTR in response to taxpayers’ requests for guidance on specific tax

matters. The requestors are entitled to rely upon the PLRs’ guidance in filing their

returns because the responses are binding on OTR with respect to the specific tax

matters and taxpayers involved.

          The District claims that the rulings constitute or contain “tax information”

that is specifically exempted from disclosure by D.C. Code § 47-4406, and that the

exempt material either cannot be segregated and redacted or, even if that could be

done, it would leave the requested rulings with no informational value. Tax Analysts

disputes this latter claim, arguing that the statute merely requires deletion of data in

the PLRs that would directly or indirectly identify the taxpayers who requested them.

We do not entirely agree with either party’s position on appeal. We hold that the

Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment to the District without first

      1
          D.C. Code §§ 2-531 to -540.
                                          3

examining the PLRs in camera to determine whether any non-exempt portions of the

documents were reasonably segregable from the exempt tax information (a category

that is not as limited as Tax Analysts contends), such that the PLRs should be

disclosed in redacted form.

                                          I

      In October 2019, Tax Analysts filed its FOIA request with the Office of the

Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), which oversees OTR. The request sought, among

other things not at issue here, all PLRs issued by OTR between January 1, 2016, and

October 8, 2019. OTR identified 24 PLRs that were responsive to this request.

However, OTR and OCFO denied the request on November 14, 2019, on the stated

ground that the information requested was statutorily exempt from disclosure under

FOIA exemptions for confidential business records and for records specifically

protected from disclosure by other statutes. 2 OCFO subsequently added that it also

relied on the FOIA exemption applicable where disclosure would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 3

      2
          D.C. Code §§ 2-534(a)(1) and (6), respectively.
      3
          Id. § 2-534(a)(2).
                                          4

      Pursuant to D.C. Code § 2-537(a), Tax Analysts appealed the denial to the

Mayor’s Office of Legal Counsel. The Mayor’s Office requested OTR to select and

produce for its inspection one sample “PLR with the information identifying the

taxpayer, the tax or financial information provided by the taxpayer, and any analysis

which includes the tax information provided by the taxpayer redacted.” Based on

its review of that one expurgated PLR, the Mayor’s Office upheld the denial of Tax

Analysts’ FOIA request; without having seen what was redacted, it agreed with OTR

that the cited FOIA exemptions applied and that the necessary “redactions of

taxpayer identification information, financial data and analysis drawing on the

financial data left the document with little to no informational value.”

      Tax Analysts then filed its complaint in Superior Court to compel production

of the 24 responsive PLRs. The District moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing

only that the PLRs were exempt under FOIA Exemption (6) because D.C. Code

§ 47-4406 barred disclosure of the tax information in the requested PLRs and the

documents could not reasonably be redacted to eliminate that obstacle. Tax Analysts

opposed the motion and moved for in camera review of the withheld PLRs. It

submitted an affidavit and exhibits showing that OTR previously had published

redacted versions of at least one PLR and other “functionally” equivalent rulings;

that OTR’s own web page stated that even though private letter rulings apply only
                                           5

to the taxpayers that request them, the “rulings provide guidance to other District

taxpayers as to the interpretation and development of the DC Tax Code”; and that

OTR also had stated it will “sometimes convert PLRs” to notices that are published

on its website to provide public legal guidance. 4

      The court denied both motions. In addition to expressing skepticism about

the applicability of D.C. Code § 47-4406, it reasoned that “any determination of

whether a document contains exempt information that is reasonably segregable from

non-exempt information requires review of the specific document at issue, which is

a question of fact that is not currently before the Court.”

      OTR then filed its Vaughn index. 5 The index listed each of the 24 responsive

PLRs by date and stated that the “entire record” of each one was withheld pursuant

      4
         Tax Analysts also pointed out that many other (state) jurisdictions do publish
their private letter rulings in redacted form. The pertinence of this observation is at
best uncertain, since Tax Analysts did not address whether those other jurisdictions
have applicable disclosure-restricting statutes comparable to ours.
      5
       A proper Vaughn index, first described in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820
(D.C. Cir. 1973), is composed of “detailed indexes itemizing each item withheld, the
exemptions claimed for that item, and the reasons why the exemption applies to that
item.” Lykins v. Dep’t of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
                                          6

to “statutes protecting the confidentiality of tax information.” 6 The index was not

accompanied by an affidavit from an OTR official or other person with knowledge

of the contents of the responsive documents, and its descriptions of the documents

stated only that there were 13 PLRs “on Sales and Use Tax,” 3 PLRs “on QHTC

Tax,” 3 PLRs “on Franchise Tax,” 3 PLRs “on Sales Tax,” 1 PLR “on Individual

Income Tax,” and 1 PLR “on Estate Tax.”

      The District then moved for summary judgment, relying primarily on D.C.

Code § 47-4406. 7 Appellants opposed that motion and renewed their request for the

court to conduct an in camera review to evaluate whether there were “reasonably

      6
        In addition to D.C. Code § 47-4406, the Vaughn index cited FOIA
Exemptions (1), (2), and (6), and a few other provisions of the D.C. Code that
provide for the confidentiality of tax-related information. See D.C. Code
§§ 47-2018, -1805.04, -3719. (Except for Exemption (2), the District has not
otherwise relied on these latter statutes in this litigation, and has not claimed they
extend protection from disclosure beyond that provided by § 47-4406.)
      7
         The District also relied on FOIA Exemption (2), the exemption for
“[i]nformation of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” However, the trial
court did not address the applicability of this exemption in its summary judgment
ruling, and we therefore do not consider that question to be properly before us in this
appeal. That said, it would appear that the redaction necessary to satisfy § 47-4406
would also avoid disclosure of any information covered by FOIA Exemption (2), so
the applicability of Exemption (2) would seem to be a moot point.
                                         7

segregable” non-exempt portions of the PLRs. The District did not oppose in camera

review for that purpose.

      On January 13, 2021, the court denied Tax Analysts’ motion for in camera

review and granted summary judgment in the District’s favor. Accepting the

agency’s description of the PLRs, the court concluded that they were entirely exempt

from disclosure under D.C. Code § 47-4406 because PLRs “are in their entirety an

evaluation of the tax consequences of a taxpayer’s financial circumstances” based

on “tax information submitted by the taxpayer.” Although the court did not inspect

the PLRs, it ruled that even if they do contain some non-exempt information,

redacting it would leave them with “little informational value.” Tax Analysts timely

appealed.

                                         II

      Tax Analysts disputes the trial court’s ruling that the PLRs responsive to its

FOIA request are wholly exempted from disclosure by D.C. Code § 47-4406. While

that statute prohibits disclosure of “federal, state, or local tax information either

submitted by the taxpayer or otherwise obtained,” Tax Analysts contends that PLRs

may contain additional useful and segregable information that is not “tax

information” within the meaning of the statute, such as OTR’s legal interpretations
                                          8

and analyses of generally applicable District tax laws and regulations; and that

§ 47-4406 should be construed to require disclosure of PLRs with only personal

identifying information redacted to protect taxpayer privacy. Tax Analysts argues

that the court therefore erred in granting summary judgment for the District without

conducting an in camera review to determine whether there are non-exempt and

reasonably segregable portions of the PLRs that could be disclosed. By contrast, the

District maintains that § 47-4406 exempts PLRs from disclosure in their entirety

because they are responses to taxpayers’ requests for tax guidance based on the

taxpayers’ particular circumstances, and that any non-exempt portions of the PLRs

are inextricably intertwined with exempt information such that the necessary

redactions would produce a document with little or no informational value.

      We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, conducting an

independent review of the record, and applying the same substantive standard as the

trial court. 8 Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue

of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 9

      8
          Murphy v. Schwankhaus, 924 A.2d 988, 991 (D.C. 2007).
      9
          See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(a).
                                           9

      Because FOIA “is designed to promote the disclosure of information, not to

inhibit it,” 10 the burden is on the government agency to justify its withholding, and

courts review such actions de novo.11 To meet its burden when claiming a FOIA

exemption, an agency must provide “sufficient information in the form of affidavits,

so-called Vaughn indexes, oral testimony, or an in camera review of responsive

documents to enable the court — not the agency — to be the final arbiter of the

propriety of the agency’s decision to withhold information.” 12 Summary judgment

is appropriate where the agency “describes the documents and the justifications for

nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrates that the information

withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not controverted by

either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” 13 An

agency may justify withholding entire documents rather than only exempt portions

      10
        Wash. Post Co. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm’n, 560 A.2d 517, 521
(D.C. 1989).
      11
         Padou v. District of Columbia, 29 A.3d 973, 980 (D.C. 2011) (“D.C. Code
§ 2-537(b) not only places the burden on the administrative agency to sustain its
action, but also authorizes this court to review the agency’s withholding of requested
FOIA information de novo.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
      12
           Riley v. Fenty, 7 A.3d 1014, 1018 (D.C. 2010) (footnote omitted).
      13
        Fraternal Ord. of Police v. District of Columbia, 79 A.3d 347, 355-56 (D.C.
2013) (alterations omitted).
                                         10

by showing that “the exempt and non-exempt information are inextricably

intertwined, such that the excision of exempt information would impose significant

costs on the agency and produce an edited document with little informational

value.” 14

                                         III

       We have said that “the provisions of [FOIA] giving citizens the right of access

are to be generously construed, while the statutory exemptions from disclosure are

to be narrowly construed, with ambiguities resolved in favor of disclosure.” 15 The

exemptions from disclosure are listed in D.C. Code § 2-534(a). Exemption (6)

authorizes withholding of “[i]nformation specifically exempted from disclosure by

[another] statute . . . , provided that such statute: (A) Requires that the matters be

       14
        District of Columbia v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Metro. Police Lab. Comm.,
33 A.3d 332, 346 (D.C. 2011) (Ruiz, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Antonelli v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 623 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60
(D.D.C. 2009)).
       15
         Riley, 7 A.3d at 1018 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also D.C. Code § 2-531 (“The public policy of the District of Columbia is that all
persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of
government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and
employees. To that end, provisions of this subchapter shall be construed with the
view toward expansion of public access and the minimization of costs and time
delays to persons requesting information.”).
                                          11

withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or

(B) Establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of

matters to be withheld.” 16 Subsection (b) of § 2-534 provides that “[a]ny reasonably

segregable portion of a public record shall be provided to any person requesting the

record after deletion of those portions which may be withheld from disclosure

pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.”

      The statutory exemption invoked by OTR pursuant to FOIA Exemption (6) is

in D.C. Code § 47-4406, a tax code provision entitled “Secrecy of returns.” There

is no question that this statute satisfies the proviso in Exemption (6); the question is

what specific information § 47-4406 protects. As pertinent here, and subject to some

inapplicable exceptions, § 47-4406(a) prohibits agents of the District of Columbia

from divulging not only “federal, state, or local tax returns” (which do not appear to

be involved here), but also “federal, state, or local tax information either submitted

by the taxpayer or otherwise obtained.” 17 The statute does not define what is meant

      16
           D.C. Code § 2-534(a)(6) (emphasis added).
      17
          Section 47-4406(a) also restricts the disclosure of “the amount of reported
value, or any information relating to value or the computation of value, disclosed in
a return required to be filed under this title.” Such information does not appear to
be at issue here.
                                           12

by “state, or local tax information,” but it specifically defines “federal tax

information” to mean “a return or return information received directly from the

Internal Revenue Service or obtained through an authorized secondary source.” 18

To be consistent, we construe “state, or local tax information” to have a similar

meaning, i.e., we conclude that it, too, refers to “a return or return information.”

      D.C. Code § 47-4406 does not define “return information,” and the scope of

that term is not self-evident. We have said that where there is doubt as to the

meaning of a specific District tax statute, we will “endeavor to conform its

interpretation to comparable provisions of the federal Internal Revenue Code.” 19

The federal analogue to D.C. Code § 47-4406, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (“Confidentiality

and disclosure of returns and return information”), defines “return information.” In

pertinent part, § 6103(b)(2) states that the term means

               (A) a taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of
               his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions,
               credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax
               withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments,
               whether the taxpayer’s return was, is being, or will be

      18
           § 47-4406(h)(3).
      19
         District of Columbia v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., 431 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1981)
(citing District of Columbia v. ACF Indus., Inc., 350 F.2d 795, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965));
see also ACF Indus. Inc., 350 F.2d at 798 (“Where no policies appear to require
otherwise, we have generally, if implicitly, assumed that Congress intended similar
construction of both the local and the federal tax statutes.”).
                                          13

             examined or subject to other investigation or processing,
             or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by,
             furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to
             a return or with respect to the determination of the
             existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount
             thereof) of any person under this title for any tax, penalty,
             interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense,
             [and]

             (B) any part of any written determination or any
             background file document relating to such written
             determination (as such terms are defined in [26 U.S.C. §
             6110(b)]) which is not open to public inspection under
             section 6110.

Subsection (b)(2) goes on to state that “such term [i.e., ‘return information’] does

not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify,

directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.” This subsection lends some support to

Tax Analysts’ position; however, it does not mean that all non-identifying data is

outside of the definition of “return information,” or that the removal of such

identifying data would necessarily suffice to make otherwise protected “return

information” subject to disclosure. 20

      20
         See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (concluding
that the deletion of identifiable data from “return information” as defined under 26
U.S.C. § 6103 “would not make otherwise protected return information
discloseable” because such deletion does not automatically deprive “return
information” of the protection from other statutory provisions that forbid disclosure).
                                         14

      The terms “written determination” and “background file document” in

subparagraph (B) of § 6103(b)(2) encompass private letter rulings and requests for

such rulings. 21 Such documents may well contain information within subparagraph

(A), such as “data,” furnished by taxpayers in requesting PLRs, “with respect to the

determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount

thereof).” Thus, conforming our interpretation of D.C. Code § 47-4406 to 26 U.S.C.

§ 6103(b), we conclude that a PLR may contain “return information” (and, therefore,

“tax information”) within the meaning of § 47-4406.

      That does not necessarily mean, however, that everything in a PLR falls within

the category of “return information,” or that (as the District asserts) “[t]he ruling

itself is tax information that D.C. Code § 47-4406(a) prohibits the District from

disclosing.” The D.C. Circuit has held that non-taxpayer-specific legal analyses in

      21
          Section 6110 provides that the term “written determination” means “a
ruling, determination letter, technical advice memorandum, or Chief Counsel
advice,” and that the term “background file document” includes “the request for that
written determination” and “any written material submitted in support of the
request.” 26 U.S.C. § 6110(b)(1)(A), (b)(2). Sections 6110(a) and (c) specifically
state that written determinations and related background file documents shall be
available for public inspection, provided they are redacted to delete sensitive
information, including identifying details of the person to whom the determinations
pertain, privileged and confidential financial and other information, and information
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. The District of Columbia Code does not have a specific statutory provision
comparable to § 6110(a) and (c), however.
                                           15

IRS written determinations — interpretations and conclusions respecting statutes,

rules, regulations, and judicial opinions, which are not unique to a particular

taxpayer — are not “return information” within the meaning of § 6103. 22 Such legal

discussions are not, for example, financial or tax-related data submitted by a

taxpayer seeking a private letter ruling, and in themselves they do not (or may not)

disclose such particular data or the identity of the taxpayer merely because they are

      22
          Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court of
appeals rejected IRS’s contention that “data” within the meaning of § 6103(b)(2)(A)
“might signify even legal discussions” or other non-taxpayer-specific information,
stating that “[w]hy § 6103 should protect such non-taxpayer-specific information is
a mystery the IRS has not offered to solve.” Id. at 615. Among the reasons the D.C.
Circuit gave for its conclusion, the court noted that

              Each of the specific items mentioned in the beginning of
              § 6103(b)(2)(A) is not only factual but unique to the
              particular taxpayer. And each of the more general items
              in § 6103(b)(2)(A) — “any other data, received by,
              recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the
              Secretary with respect to a return” or the liability “of any
              person” — is of the same character, that is, unique to a
              particular taxpayer. The IRS has itself drawn this very
              distinction in propounding its view of what constitutes
              return information. . . . Yet legal analyses and conclusions
              . . . cannot be viewed as unique to a particular taxpayer, or
              as the IRS puts it, “taxpayer-specific.” If the Office of
              Chief Counsel renders an interpretation of a certain section
              in the tax code, . . . that interpretation should apply to all
              other taxpayers who are, in material respects, similarly
              situated.

Id. at 614.
                                          16

relevant in responding to the taxpayer’s request for guidance.         Based on our

examination of the statutory language, we agree with the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion,

and we note that, in our view, the District has not offered a reasoned explanation for

holding otherwise. 23 We therefore do not view such legal analyses as within the

meaning of “return information” in § 47-4406.

      The issue before us, then, comes down to whether the District demonstrated

its entitlement to summary judgment by establishing that the 24 PLRs responsive to

the FOIA request do not contain segregable, non-taxpayer-specific legal analysis.

The District clearly did not do so.      Its bare-bones Vaughn index was purely

conclusory and did not address the legal analysis in the PLRs, redaction, or

reasonable segregability at all, and the District furnished the court with no affidavit

discussing those matters from anyone familiar with the contents of the PLRs. The

mere fact that the PLRs provided tax guidance based on the requesting taxpayers’

particular circumstances does not answer the questions of whether the PLRs contain

      23
         For that reason, and because we review legal issues de novo, we do not
believe we owe deference to OTR’s and the District’s conclusory assertion that
“[e]very aspect of a private letter ruling — whether the facts, the legal analysis, or
the conclusion” — is tax information covered by D.C. Code § 47-4406(a). See, e.g.,
D.C. Off. of Hum. Rts. v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 40 A.3d 917, 925 (D.C. 2012)
(“[W]hen it appears that the agency did not conduct any analysis of the language,
structure, or purpose of the statutory provision, it would be incongruous to accord
substantial weight to the agency’s interpretation.” (cleaned up)).
                                           17

non-exempt legal analyses, and if so, whether those analyses are so inextricably

intertwined with exempt material as to defeat any attempt at redaction.

      On the record as it stands, therefore, we cannot conclude that the PLRs contain

no segregable, non-taxpayer-specific legal analysis. Arguably, moreover, there is

evidence in the record that they may contain such material. Tax Analysts presented

unrebutted evidence that OTR has published redacted PLRs or similar documents in

the past and has considered them to provide useful legal guidance to other taxpayers;

and the fact that the Internal Revenue Service (and many states) do make PLRs

publicly available (with taxpayer-specific information redacted) may be a further

indication that it would be possible for OTR to do so too. An in camera review

presumably could have resolved this question, but the court did not conduct one even

though Tax Analysts requested it and the District was amenable to it. 24

      We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether OTR

can invoke D.C. Code § 47-4406 to withhold the 24 responsive PLRs in their entirety

      24
         It does not appear that in camera review would be unduly burdensome
(assuming it remains necessary after this opinion). It is estimated that the total length
of the 24 responsive rulings is only approximately 100 pages, and the question of
whether the rulings contain segregable legal analysis is a narrow and manageable
one.
                                        18

from disclosure under FOIA. Accordingly, we must reverse the grant of summary

judgment in favor of the District and remand this case to the Superior Court for

further consideration, which may well call for the court to conduct an in camera

review of the PLRs. 25

                                                                        So ordered.

      25
         We decline Tax Analysts’ invitation to perform the in camera review
ourselves. “[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005).