Court Opinion

ID: 9712823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:00:39.957992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.624516
License: Public Domain

*432HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
CONCURRENCE IN PART
Agreeing that Neville was inadequately advised (warned) that the blood alcohol test would be used against him at trial, I would affirm the trial court’s holding that the statement is inadmissible.
DISSENT IN PART
I depart from the balance of the majority opinion which holds that SDCL 32-23-10.1 is constitutional as I am convinced that it does violate this state’s constitutional protection against self-incrimination. Joining Justice Dunn, I would strike down this statute as being unconstitutional.
As the majority opinion has expressed, there is a pertinent difference between the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article VI, § 9 of the South Dakota Constitution. I perceive that the United States Supreme Court would have this Court examine the South Dakota Constitution, with singular emphasis, and render an independent decision on our state constitution.
There can be little question but that the drafters of the South Dakota Constitution gave a broader protection by utilizing the word “evidence” rather than utilizing the word “witness” embraced in the United States Constitution. This Court should interpret the word “evidence” so that it has a realistic meaning. South Dakota, by precedent, has established that its highest court will grant protection to its citizens under the South Dakota Constitution independent from federal interpretation. South Dakota chose to not follow a federally oriented interpretation of its constitution. Rather, it chose to follow a state-specific interpretation. See State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976), a landmark case in America; sée also, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324 (1982), for a treatise on this subject.
The constitution of this state was independently adopted and should be a document of independent force. As Justice Dunn has pointed out, in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975), the United States Supreme Court has recognized that each state has the right to independently determine its own constitutional questions and, indeed, to grant a greater protection than required under the federal constitution. Therefore, the distinction between “evidence” and “testimony” is highly relevant in our determination. This Nation is a union of states and each state cannot depend upon the United States Supreme Court for constitutional direction on its state constitution. This state must keep within the intention and spirit of its constitution adopted in 1889. The United States Constitution obtained final ratification in 1791. Where there is a difference, we should stand up and state the difference and rule in accordance with the difference.
Foursquare before this Court is this question: Is SDCL 32-23-10.1 unconstitutional under the constitution of the State of South Dakota? A determination has been made by the United States Supreme Court that this statute was not unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court does not have the power to disturb this Court’s holding that SDCL 32-23-10.1 is unconstitutional under the constitution of the State of South Dakota. With that in mind, I find this statute to be unconstitutional. A coerced blood test is physical evidence. However, a coerced refusal of a blood test is testimonial evidence. Article VI, § 9, South Dakota Constitution provides: “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself_” (Emphasis supplied.) Ne-ville’s oral statement, if submitted to a jury, is tantamount to giving evidence against himself and would preclude him from having a fair jury trial. An obvious reason for the State to get this testimonial evidence before the jury in any case is this: To influence the jury into believing that the accused obviously refused the test because he or she was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. With coercion, Mr. Prosecutor would seek to establish a “conscious*433ness of guilt” for any criminal defendant who refused the test, albeit for a variety of reasons. A “consciousness of guilt” under this statute would go before the jury even when the defendant elected to remain silent for, in South Dakota, it has been determined that saying nothing constitutes an absolute refusal to take the test. Inherently, as I view it, the question or demand to take the test, and the response thereto, is an incriminatory interrogatory. If an officer on direct examination answers “yes” to a question posed as to whether the defendant refused the test, implicit in that answer is “evidence” of a testimonial nature. The “refusal”, in the eyes of the officer, might very well be a nod, a shrug of the shoulders, or an expression of negative disdain. Most importantly, however, implicit in that answer will be the unfair tipping of the scale of jury deliberation in favor of the State. This should not be for it is the State which bears the burden of proof and incrimination should not be compelled, under South Dakota’s Constitution, whereby a citizen gives evidence against himself either by saying “no,” saying nothing, shrugging his shoulders, nodding his head, or portraying an expression of negative disdain.
Therefore, I cannot subscribe to a concept of statutory manipulation to achieve results favorable to the State but at the expense of constitutional guarantees of the accused.
Interesting note: United States Supreme Court opinion in this case was written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. Justice O’Connor, while a judge in the State of Arizona, recognized the desire for a rule of law requiring more independent state determinations without the necessity of intruding into the federal courts. 22 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 801 (1981).