Court Opinion

ID: 9889345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-09 19:04:20.690583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:46.757831
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/9/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                       DIVISION SEVEN

In re JOSE C., a Person Coming          B317838
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                        (Los Angeles County
                                        Super. Ct. No.
                                        21CCJP04738A-C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

       Plaintiff and Respondent,

       v.

JOSE C.,

       Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Linda Sun, Judge. Dismissed as moot.
       Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
       Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       On December 2, 2021 the juvenile court sustained the
petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (a) and former (b)(1), 1 alleging that
Maira H. and Jose C., the parents of now-nine-year-old Gael C.,
five-year-old Matias C. and three-year-old Jocelyn C., had a
history of engaging in violent physical and verbal altercations in
the presence of the children and describing a September 9, 2021
incident in which Maira repeatedly struck Jose and Jose
forcefully pushed Maira onto a couch and struck her in the face
with his fist. 2 At disposition the court declared the children
dependents of the court, removed them from Jose’s care and
released them to Maira, allowing Jose to have unmonitored
visitation in a public setting. Jose appealed the December 2,
2021 findings and orders. Maira did not.
       On September 22, 2022, prior to Jose’s filing of his opening
brief on appeal arguing the evidence did not support the juvenile
court’s findings, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and
issued custody orders, based on the parents’ mediated agreement,
providing for joint legal and physical custody of the children with

1      The Legislature amended Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, effective January 1, 2023, in part by rewriting
subdivision (b)(1) to now specify in separate subparagraphs
various ways in which a child may come within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court as a result of the failure or inability of the
child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or care for the
child.
2     The violent incident on September 9, 2021 was apparently
precipitated by Maira’s discovery that Jose was communicating
with multiple women in Mexico and had a three-year-old son in
that country.

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their primary residence to be with Maira. The custody orders
include a parenting plan that specifies a visitation schedule for
Jose and allows for additional visitation as agreed by both
parents. Jose did not appeal the order terminating jurisdiction or
the custody orders.
       The Department contends termination of dependency
jurisdiction moots Jose’s appeal. Jose argues, because he had
unlimited access to the children prior to the initiation of
dependency proceedings (when he was living with Maira, which
he no longer does) and now has limited visitation, the appeal is
not moot.
       We agree with the Department. (See In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276 [case becomes moot when events “‘“render[ ]
it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief”’”].) Although Jose is
no doubt correct that the jurisdiction findings impacted the
custody orders entered by the juvenile court, to provide Jose with
effective relief, we would have to reverse not only the jurisdiction
findings and disposition orders but also the orders terminating
jurisdiction and determining visitation. (See In re Rashad D.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164.) Because he did not appeal the
September 22, 2022 custody and visitation orders, however, those
orders are not now before us or otherwise subject to appellate
review. (Ibid.) We have no jurisdiction to review and change
Jose’s visitation rights, and “the juvenile court has no jurisdiction
to conduct further hearings in the now-closed case.” (Ibid.;
see In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 [“where
jurisdiction has been terminated and is final . . . , jurisdiction
cannot be conferred upon the appellate court”]; see also Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 304 [juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear

                                  3
proceedings regarding custody “until the time that the petition is
dismissed or dependency is terminated”]; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.620(a) [same].) Accordingly, we dismiss Jose’s appeal as
moot.
                          DISCUSSION
        The Supreme Court earlier this year in In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th 266 explained the mootness doctrine and confirmed it
applied to dependency appeals: “A court is tasked with the duty
to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried
into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. A
case becomes moot when events render it impossible for a court,
if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effective relief. For relief to be effective, two requirements must
be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (Id. at p. 276
[cleaned up].)
        Despite its reaffirmation of the applicability of the
mootness doctrine to dependency appeals, the Supreme Court
emphasized that, even when a case is moot, courts may exercise
their inherent discretion to reach the merits of the dispute.
(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) That discretion, the
Court explained, is generally exercised only when the case
presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,
when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the
parties or when a material question remains for the court’s
determination. (Ibid.) However, because features of dependency
proceedings tend to make appeals prone to mootness problems,

                                 4
the Court identified several additional factors for the courts of
appeal to evaluate when deciding whether discretionary review of
a moot case may be warranted outside of those instances. (Id. at
pp. 284-286.)
       Specifically, and without intending to be exhaustive, the
Supreme Court suggested the following considerations. First,
whether the challenged jurisdiction finding could potentially
impact the current or future dependency proceedings, for
example, by influencing the child protective agency’s decision to
file a new dependency petition or the juvenile court’s
determination about further reunification services. (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.) Second, the nature of the allegations
against the parent: “The more egregious the findings against the
parent, the greater the parent’s interest in challenging such
findings.” (Id. at p. 286.) Third, whether the case became moot
due to prompt compliance by parents with their case plan: “It
would perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine
resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional findings
only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the court has
issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)
       Here, Jose may satisfy the first half of the mootness
inquiry: He complains of ongoing harm in the form of restricted
visitation rights with the children suffered from a change in his
legal status. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) But, in
the absence of an appeal from the order that created the
restriction he wants revised, he fails to demonstrate that this
court can provide any relief that will have “‘a practical, tangible
impact’” on that legal status. (Ibid.) That is, in the language of
In re D.P., the harm that Jose identifies—his reduced visitation—

                                 5
cannot be rectified by the outcome he seeks—reversing the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding. (See id. at p. 276.)
       This court explained in In re Rashad D., supra,
63 Cal.App.5th 156 that “termination of dependency jurisdiction
does not necessarily moot an appeal from a jurisdiction finding
that directly results in an adverse juvenile custody order. But in
most cases . . . for this court to be able to provide effective relief,
the parent must appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and
disposition order but also from the orders terminating
jurisdiction and modifying the parent’s prior custody status.
Without the second appeal, we cannot correct the continuing
adverse consequences of the allegedly erroneous jurisdiction
finding.” (Id. at p. 159.) By not appealing the September 22,
2022 custody orders, Jose “forfeited any challenge to those
rulings, including the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to issue them.”
(Id. at p. 167.)
       Jose did not cite In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th
156 in his opening brief, let alone disagree with its mootness
analysis or attempt to distinguish it. And after the Department
argued the appeal was moot based on In re Rashad D. following
Jose’s failure to appeal the custody and visitation orders, Jose
elected not to file a reply brief. Under these circumstances we
see no reason not to apply the holding of In re Rashad D. 3

3     In In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266, while the parents’
appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings was
pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction without
issuing custody and visitation orders, leaving in place the status
quo ante. (See id. at p. 275.) The Supreme Court did not address
the procedural posture at issue in In re Rashad, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th 156 and this case.

                                   6
       As discussed, the Supreme Court in In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th 266 held, even when a case is moot, the reviewing
court has discretion to reach the merits. (Id. at p. 282.)
However, Jose declined to ask us to exercise that discretion in
this case, omitting from his brief any argument that one or more
of the factors identified by the Court in In re D.P. was applicable
to his appeal. Indeed, as the Department argues, this is hardly
an appropriate case for a merits review of an otherwise moot
appeal. The parenting plan that was incorporated in the juvenile
court’s custody and visitation orders was the product of a
mediation at which Maira and Jose and their respective counsel
participated, and Jose reviewed and agreed to the final form of
the plan.
                         DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed as moot.

                                     PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.

            MARTINEZ, J.

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