Court Opinion

ID: 9381423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 20:04:25.271061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:32.513398
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                  2023 IL App (4th) 220437-U                        FILED
This Order was filed under                                                          March 21, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is               NO. 4-22-0437                             Carla Bender
not precedent except in the
                                                                                 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).               IN THE APPELLATE COURT                              Court, IL

                                            OF ILLINOIS

                                        FOURTH DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )      Appeal from the
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )      Circuit Court of
            v.                                                 )      Tazewell County
 CORY D. PARKER,                                               )      No. 17CF563
            Defendant-Appellant.                               )
                                                               )      Honorable
                                                               )      Paul P. Gilfillan,
                                                               )      Judge Presiding.

                 JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
                 Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1       Held: The appellate court granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to
               withdraw as counsel and affirmed the trial court’s judgment as no issue of
               arguable merit could be raised on appeal.

¶2               Defendant, Cory D. Parker, appeals the trial court’s first-stage dismissal of his

pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

(West 2020)). This court appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to

represent defendant. Thereafter, OSAD moved to withdraw as counsel, arguing defendant’s

appeal presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. We grant the motion and affirm the

court’s dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition.

¶3                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶4               In December 2017, the State charged defendant with home invasion (720 ILCS

5/19-6(a)(3) (West 2016)) and armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)), both Class X felonies. On
February 5, 2018, defendant pleaded guilty to both charges under a fully negotiated plea

agreement in exchange for concurrent sentences of 6 years’ incarceration with 15-year gun

enhancements on each charge, to be served at 50%, for a total sentence of 21 years.

¶5             At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court fully admonished defendant of the nature

of the charges, the minimum and maximum sentences, and his right to plead not guilty, and it

ascertained he understood the rights he was waiving. Defendant confirmed no one had threatened

him or promised him anything other than what he had signed as part of the plea agreement.

Defendant also confirmed he discussed the matter with his attorney, understood the plea

agreement, and it was his desire to plead guilty and have the court approve the agreement.

¶6             The State gave the following factual basis for the plea. At approximately 3:04

a.m. on November 19, 2017, Tazewell County Sheriff’s Deputy Hibbert was dispatched to 136

Fauber Lane, East Peoria, Illinois, on a report of a home invasion. A victim, Aaron Schroeder,

stated he had been sitting in the living room of his residence with Richard Hill when he heard a

knock at the front door and someone say, “[i]t’s your boy.” Schroeder opened the front door, and

two black males, later identified as defendant and Marquis German, and a white male, later

identified as Corie VanOppen, pushed their way into the residence. All three suspects were

holding guns, and defendant and German were wearing bandannas on their faces. VanOppen was

holding his arm up over his face, but Schroeder recognized him as his coworker.

¶7             Defendant and German held guns to the victims’ heads and demanded their

property. One of the black males removed the magazine from his handgun, showing that it was

loaded with ammunition, and stated to the other two suspects he believed they should kill

Schroeder and Hill. The men took Schroeder’s cell phone, computer, headphones, Xbox console,

$100 in cash, and Hill’s cell phone. Hill gave the same statement to police as Schroeder.

                                               -2-
¶8             While Hibbert was still at the scene, the East Peoria Police Department reported

another home invasion at 116 North Hawthorne Avenue in East Peoria. VanOppen and his

vehicle were located at the scene, and defendant and German were located at a nearby gas

station. A loaded .45-caliber magazine was found in the front yard of 116 North Hawthorne

Avenue and a .45-caliber handgun missing the magazine was found in a yard between 116 North

Hawthorne Avenue and the gas station where defendant and German were located. The State

provided additional facts concerning charges related to the home invasion at 116 North

Hawthorne Avenue. Those charges are not at issue in this appeal.

¶9             Defendant, VanOppen, and German were interviewed by law enforcement.

VanOppen stated he, German, and defendant went to Schroeder’s house to buy cannabis.

VanOppen knocked on the door and, when Schroeder opened the door, German and defendant

pushed their way into the residence. VanOppen admitted they took electronics, cannabis, and

cash from Schroeder’s residence and said defendant had a handgun and threatened to kill

Schroeder and Hill.

¶ 10           During the interview, German stated he, VanOppen, and defendant went to

Schroeder’s residence to purchase cannabis and that an argument broke out. Defendant produced

a .45-caliber handgun, which belonged to VanOppen, and threatened to kill Schroeder and Hill.

However, defendant told police he stayed in the car while VanOppen and German went into the

residence and that German and VanOppen returned to the vehicle with electronics.

¶ 11           After the State concluded the factual basis, the trial court asked defendant if he

believed the State could provide the witnesses to testify as set forth in the factual basis, and

defendant replied “[y]es.” The court again asked defendant if he was pleading guilty of his own

free will, and defendant replied, “Yes.” The court accepted the plea.

                                                 -3-
¶ 12           Defendant’s counsel waived a presentence investigation (PSI) and hearing. The

State pointed out there was a “Pretrial Services Criminal History” the State would rely on, and

the trial court indicated it had reviewed the “criminal history in the file” and accepted the terms

of the negotiated plea. In the order stating the terms of the plea agreement, the court specifically

found defendant waived his right to a PSI, with both parties having agreed to the imposition of a

specific sentence and the court having made a finding as to defendant’s history of delinquency or

criminality.

¶ 13           The trial court entered the agreed-upon sentence and fully admonished defendant

of his appeal rights, including admonishing him of the need to file a motion to withdraw his

guilty plea in order to appeal. Defendant did not file any posttrial motions. In March 2021,

defendant moved to file a late notice of appeal, which the appellate court denied.

¶ 14           Defendant moved to file a late postconviction petition. The trial court dismissed

the motion without prejudice, stating defendant did not need permission to file a postconviction

petition. On April 14, 2022, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition he labeled as a

second successive petition, although it was his first postconviction petition.

¶ 15           Defendant’s petition and supporting memorandum included multiple factual

assertions and citations to legal boilerplate language with no explanation of its applicability. We

agree with counsel’s general interpretation of the petition as alleging the following:

(1) defendant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the evidence and sentencing

statutes related to whether the crime caused great bodily harm and in coercing him to accept the

plea; (2) his sentence violated the one-act, one-crime rule; (3) the State failed to prove

applicability of the gun enhancement; (4) the trial court erred in failing to consider defendant’s

status as an emerging adult, when he was only 19 at the time of the offense; (5) the trial court

                                                -4-
erred in failing to order a PSI; and (6) the appellate court erred when it denied defendant’s late

notice of appeal. Defendant attached multiple documents to the petition, including a police report

in which German confessed to the police that he had the real firearm and defendant had a BB

gun. Ultimately, defendant asked the court to vacate and amend his extended-term sentence.

¶ 16           On April 27, 2022, the trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently

without merit. The court found the claims were rebutted by the record, which reflected there was

a fully negotiated plea agreement that defendant entered knowingly and voluntarily. The court

noted defendant appeared to have second thoughts about his sentence and wanted it reduced, but

the sentence was within the statutory range and he never filed a motion to withdraw his plea.

¶ 17           This appeal followed.

¶ 18                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19           OSAD moves to withdraw as counsel. Counsel for OSAD states she (1) read the

record on appeal, (2) reviewed the facts and applicable law, and (3) discussed the case with

another attorney. OSAD concludes an appeal in this case would be without arguable merit. We

granted defendant leave until November 22, 2022 to file additional points and authorities.

Defendant did not respond. For the following reasons, we agree with OSAD this appeal presents

no nonfrivolous issues.

¶ 20           First, OSAD submits it would be frivolous to argue the trial court failed to comply

with the procedural requirements of the Act when it dismissed the petition. OSAD then submits

the underlying claims in the petition are frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 21           The Act provides a remedy to criminal defendants who demonstrate a violation of

their constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020). At the first stage of a

postconviction proceeding, the trial court must determine whether the petition is frivolous or

                                                -5-
patently without merit. Id. § 122-2.1(a)(2). “[A] pro se petition seeking postconviction relief

under the Act for a denial of constitutional rights may be summarily dismissed as frivolous or

patently without merit only if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” People

v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2009). A petition lacks an arguable factual basis when it is based

on a fanciful factual allegation, such as one that is clearly baseless, fantastic, or delusional. Id. at

16-17. A petition lacks an arguable legal basis when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal

theory, such as one that is completely contradicted by the record. Id. at 16.

¶ 22            At the first stage, the allegations in the petition, when taken as true and liberally

construed, must present the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Hatter, 2021 IL 125981,

¶ 24. “Thus, to survive summary dismissal, a petitioner is only required to include a limited

amount of detail and need not present formal legal arguments or citations to legal authority.” Id.

“An allegation in a postconviction petition must be based on factual allegations and not mere

conclusory statements.” People v. Ivy, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1019 (2000). The petition must be

both (1) verified by affidavit (725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2020)) and (2) supported by

“affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations,” or, if not available, the petition

must explain why (725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020)). People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 65 (2002).

If a postconviction petition is found to be frivolous or patently without merit, a trial court may

summarily dismiss it within 90 days of its filing. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001).

Our review of the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo. People v. Dunlap,

2011 IL App (4th) 100595, ¶ 20.

¶ 23            Here, OSAD notes the trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently

without merit within the 90-day period. OSAD next submits all underlying claims in the pro se

postconviction petition are frivolous and patently without merit. We agree.

                                                  -6-
¶ 24                           A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 25           Defendant alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to examine physical

evidence, failing to visit the crime scene, and coercing him into pleading guilty because counsel

should have been investigating viable defenses instead of using each jail visit to remind him of

the plea offer. Defendant further alleged counsel failed to investigate whether the victims

sustained great bodily harm and he contends this failure led to an improper determination of his

sentence under his plea agreement.

¶ 26           Claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel are governed by the

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17.

Under the Strickland standard, “a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance ‘fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). “At the first stage of postconviction

proceedings under the Act, a petition alleging ineffective assistance may not be summarily

dismissed if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.” Id.

¶ 27           “[T]he two-part Strickland test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). In the context of a

guilty plea, counsel’s conduct is deficient under the Strickland test if the attorney failed to ensure

that the defendant entered the plea voluntarily and intelligently. People v. Brown, 2016 IL App

(4th) 140760, ¶ 23.

¶ 28           Here, defendant alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to examine

physical evidence and visit the crime scene. However, nothing in the record establishes counsel

                                                -7-
never made a visit to the crime scene, nor does defendant explain how a visit to the crime scene

would have affected his plea. See People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 164 (1994).

¶ 29           Defendant also suggested his plea was coerced. However, our review of the

record shows the allegations of ineffective assistance made in defendant’s pro se petition are

refuted by defendant’s responses to the trial court’s questions at the guilty plea hearing. See

People v. Ramirez, 162 Ill. 2d 235, 240 (1994).

¶ 30           At the hearing, the trial court specifically asked defendant if he understood the

terms of the agreement. The court confirmed defendant understood the plea, agreed with the

factual basis, and wished to plead guilty. The record also reflects defendant specifically agreed

trial counsel explained everything to him and acknowledged he freely and voluntarily entered

into the plea agreement.

¶ 31           Accordingly, we agree it would be frivolous for OSAD to argue trial counsel

coerced defendant’s plea or otherwise provided him ineffective assistance.

¶ 32                 B. Lack of a Finding of Great Bodily Harm at Sentencing

¶ 33           Regarding sentencing, defendant’s arguments focus primarily on his claim trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to the investigate the facts and sentencing statutes concerning

great bodily harm, and the corresponding lack of a finding that defendant’s conduct “resulted in

great bodily harm to a victim” within the meaning of section 5-4-1(c-1) of the Unified Code of

Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1) (West 2016)) so as to require him to serve 85% of the

sentence imposed (see id. § 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii)). Defendant also noted VanOppen and German were

not required to serve their sentences at 85%. We agree with OSAD that defendant’s sentencing

claim lacks merit.

                                                -8-
¶ 34           Defendant was sentenced within the statutory range. See 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(3),

(c) (West 2016); id. § 18-2(a)(2), (b); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2016). Further, defendant

was not charged with causing great bodily harm, nor was he sentenced to serve his prison term at

85%. Instead, his plea agreement specifically included day-for-day sentencing credit. Thus, as

OSAD notes in the motion to withdraw, defendant’s arguments concerning sentencing at 85% for

offenses causing great bodily harm are irrelevant, as there was no reason for the trial court to

make any such finding on the record during the guilty plea hearing.

¶ 35                               C. One-Act, One-Crime Rule

¶ 36           We agree with OSAD that the one-act, one-crime rule is inapplicable here.

¶ 37           In his petition, defendant appeared to allege his sentences for home invasion and

armed robbery violated the one-act, one-crime rule. Under that principle, a criminal defendant

may not be convicted of multiple offenses when those offenses are all based on precisely the

same physical act. People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 11. As charged here, home invasion

involves entering the dwelling place of another when one or more persons are present and, while

armed with a firearm, using force or threatening the imminent use of force upon any person or

persons within the dwelling. 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(3) (West 2016). Armed robbery involves taking

property by use or threat of force while carrying a firearm. Id. § 18-1(a); id. § 18-2(a)(2). In this

case, defendant’s convictions are not carved from the same act. Entering a home while armed

with a firearm is a separate and distinct act from taking property while armed with the firearm.

See People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977) (stating an “act” is “any overt or outward

manifestation which will support a different offense”). Thus, while there is overlap between the

offenses, they are considered two separate crimes and acts. See People v. Gagliani, 251 Ill. App.

3d 1019, 1026 (1993) (holding convictions of home invasion and armed robbery did not violate

                                                 -9-
the one-act, one-crime rule); see generally People v. Govednik, 150 Ill. App. 3d 717, 724 (1986)

(holding multiple convictions for residential burglary and home invasion did not violate one-act,

one-crime principles). Thus, it would be frivolous to argue defendant’s sentences for home

invasion and armed robbery violated the one-act, one-crime rule.

¶ 38                                   D. Gun Enhancement

¶ 39           We agree with OSAD there is no merit to defendant’s argument the State failed to

prove defendant was subject to a gun enhancement.

¶ 40           A factual basis for a guilty plea can be established by several means, including the

State’s summary of testimony and evidence which it would have presented at trial or a

defendant’s own admissions. People v. Calva, 256 Ill. App. 3d 865, 872 (1993). The trial court

can accept the guilty plea where a factual basis exists, even where the defendant maintains he or

she is innocent. Id. The quantum of evidence sufficient to establish a factual basis for guilty pleas

is much less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which would be required at trial, and need

not even reach a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

¶ 41           Here, the State gave a factual basis alleging both German and VanOppen stated

defendant had a gun. Although defendant attached to his postconviction petition a police report

in which German stated he had the real firearm and defendant had a BB gun, we agree with

OSAD that this fact does not entitle defendant to relief.

¶ 42           First, as previously discussed, defendant heard, and agreed to, the factual basis

given by the State supporting the fact he had a gun. Second, even if he carried a BB gun,

defendant could have been found guilty under the theory of accountability, and thus he would

still be subject to the mandatory gun enhancement. Once the prosecution demonstrates the

defendant intentionally aided and facilitated the commission of the offense, then the defendant is

                                               - 10 -
legally responsible under a theory of accountability for the crime. See People v. Houston, 258 Ill.

App. 3d 364, 367-68 (1994). Indeed, a defendant may be held accountable for armed robbery

even where he asserts that he was unaware his codefendant possessed a weapon. People v.

Bartlett, 91 Ill. App. 3d 138, 141 (1980). Here, even if defendant held a BB gun, the record

shows a gun was brandished at the crime scene by either German or VanOppen. Thus, defendant

would have been guilty of the offenses under a theory of accountability. Accordingly, there is no

merit to defendant’s argument the State failed to prove he was subject to a gun enhancement.

¶ 43                                E. Emerging-Adult Claim

¶ 44           We agree with OSAD there is no substantive merit to defendant’s “emerging-

adult claim” whereby he asserts that the trial court was required to consider his age at sentencing

under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

¶ 45           In his postconviction petition, defendant stated he was only age 19 at the time of

the offense. However, our supreme court has held a juvenile who enters a fully negotiated guilty

plea is precluded from raising a Miller claim challenging his sentence. People v. Jones, 2021 IL

126432, ¶ 28. Emerging-adult claims are an extension of claims under Miller to defendants

between 18 and 21. See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45. Thus, because a juvenile is

precluded from raising a Miller claim after entering into a fully negotiated guilty plea, an

emerging adult is likewise precluded from doing so.

¶ 46                                     F. Waiver of PSI

¶ 47           We agree with OSAD it would be frivolous to argue error based on the lack of a

PSI.

¶ 48           While normally a defendant may not be sentenced for a felony before a PSI is

considered by the trial court, the court need not order a PSI where both parties agree to the

                                               - 11 -
imposition of a specific sentence, provided there is a finding made for the record as to the

defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality, including any previous sentence to a term of

probation, periodic imprisonment, conditional discharge, or imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-3-1

(West 2016).

¶ 49           Here, defendant specifically waived his right to a PSI. At that time, the State

noted there was a “Pretrial Services Criminal History” it would rely on, and the court indicated it

had reviewed the “criminal history in the file” and accepted the terms of the negotiated plea. In

the order stating the terms of his plea agreement, the court specifically found defendant waived

his right to a PSI, with both parties having agreed to the imposition of a specific sentence and the

court having made a finding as to defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality. Thus,

defendant failed to show any error based on the lack of a PSI.

¶ 50                                 G. Late Notice of Appeal

¶ 51           Finally, there is no error in the denial of the motion to file a late notice of appeal.

The appellate court can allow a defendant to file a late notice of appeal within 30 days of the

expiration of the appeal period if the defendant shows a reasonable excuse, or within 6 months of

the expiration of the appeal period if the defendant shows a meritorious issue and a lack of

culpable negligence. People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 263-64 (2008); Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(c) (eff.

Mar. 12, 2021).

¶ 52           Here, the trial court entered its final judgment on February 5, 2018. No motions

were filed in the 30 days following the judgment. The appeal period ended on March 7, 2018,

with six months following that date being September 7, 2018. Defendant filed his late notice of

appeal on March 24, 2021, well past that deadline. Thus, it would be frivolous for OSAD to

argue the appellate court erred in denying his motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal.

                                                - 12 -
¶ 53                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 54           For the reasons stated, we agree with OSAD there are no nonfrivolous matters to

be raised on appeal. Accordingly, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 55           Affirmed.

                                             - 13 -