Court Opinion

ID: 9776106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:19:02.711638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:34.419918
License: Public Domain

*441PRICE, Justice, concurring.
I concur only in the judgment of the majority.
The majority indicates that it is now interpreting Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution to provide less protection to the citizens of Texas than does the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Certainly, as a matter of interpretation, a state court is free to interpret its constitution as it sees fit. The practical result of this (and what our “Sister Court” obviously meant when it stated that the federal constitution sets the floor for individual rights, and state constitutions establish the ceiling, see ante at 437) is that if its interpretation gives greater protection to its citizens than does the federal constitution, then as a matter of federalism, its citizens get that greater protection;1 and to the extent that its interpretation gives less protection to its citizens than does the federal constitution, its citizens still get the greater protection of the federal constitution.2 Of course, if a state gives less protection to its citizens than does the federal constitution, then a defendant normally must ask for that greater federal protection in order to get it.
The majority finds that appellant in the instant case does not get the greater protection of the federal constitution because he has not asked for it; instead, he has only asked for protection under the state constitution. Ante, at 433-434, 437. What the majority fails to recognize, however, is why appellant has done this. For more than fifty years now, this Court has repeatedly stated that the “search and seizure” provision of the Texas Constitution gives the citizens of Texas the same protection as the Fourth Amendment,3 and that it may give them greater *442protection.4 Clearly, appellant asked for protection only under the Texas Constitution because, relying on our case law of more than fifty years, he reasonably believed that he would get at least the same amount of protection as that granted by the federal constitution, and perhaps even more. To now “pull the rug out” from under appellant and say that he gets less protection than that granted by the federal constitution may itself present some serious constitutional questions. See Ex parte Ramos, 977 S.W.2d 616, 616-617 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (Relying on Tex.Const. art. I, § 19 to hold that literal application of Tex.Code CRIM.Proc. art. 11.071 to applicant would deny him “due course of the law of the land”).
Nevertheless, I concur in the judgment of the majority, based on precedent, as well as on the ground for review actually granted by this Court. In affirming appellant’s conviction, the Court of Appeals held that a stop is permissible when the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the motorist posed a danger to himself or the public, or was otherwise in need of immediate assistance. Hulit v. State, 947 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1997, pet. granted). Noting that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment and, by implication, Art. I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution, is reasonableness, the court relied on several cases to find that the community caretaking duty of police officers is a reasonable exception to the warrant requirement of the Texas Constitution.5 Id. at 710-711. Applying that standard to Appellant’s ease, the court determined that the brief, warrantless intrusion by Officer Page was reasonable. Id. at 711. Based on the information Page had, along with his observations, Page could reasonably assume that Appellant had a medical problem and needed immediate assistance. Id. I agree.
Article I, § 9 states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
The Fourth Amendment similarly provides that people have a right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. However, some exceptions to the warrant requirement are recognized. The cornerstone to these exceptions is that the *443police actions must meet the reasonableness requirement of the Constitutions.
Appellant contends that without reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed, police may not validly stop or detain a motorist. This contention is untenable in light of community expectations of the role of police officers and the frequency with which police are involved in non-criminal interaction concerning traffic regulation and investigation of accidents. The United States Supreme Court discussed the frequent contact which occurs between police and motorists, noting that because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic and the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, police officers and motorists are often in contact for reasons unrelated to crime. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528. Thus, police often “engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Id, Indeed, citizens expect police officers who patrol the highways and streets to assist them, if necessary, as part of the duty to serve and protect the public.
In Brimage, this Court recognized and approved a community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement of the Texas and United States Constitutions in a slightly different, but analogous context, known as the emergency doctrine. Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 500-501. We determined that the war-rantless entry of the defendant’s house was lawful because information learned by police showed that a missing woman might be located inside the defendant’s house. Id. at 501-503. We held that based on information they had gathered, the police reasonably could conclude that an emergency existed because there was a reasonable possibility the missing woman was injured, in need of assistance, and possibly located somewhere inside the house. Id. at 502-503.
The emergency doctrine is most typically applied to buildings, such as houses or other private premises. The community caretak-ing exception applicable to this ease is generally applied to vehicles and situations involving motorists. Both exceptions are rooted in a foundation of reasonableness and an understanding of the duty and role of the police in protecting individuals and the general public in non-criminal situations. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Seaboh and Seizure §§ 6.6 & 7.4 (3rd ed.1996).
In this case, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the officer’s actions should be evaluated under an objectively reasonable standard of review. See Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (adopting objective test for evaluating legal basis for police stop of vehicle under Art. I, § 9). A detention or stop is constitutionally permissible when the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for believing there is an immediate need for police assistance. Thus, in this case, the appropriate standard of review as to whether Officer Page had an objectively reasonable basis for believing Appellant needed help and/or posed a danger to himself or the public is de novo. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
The undisputed facts show that Page acted reasonably in approaching Appellant’s vehicle and determining whether Appellant was in need of assistance. Page responded to a radio dispatch of a possible heart attack victim in a vehicle. He saw Appellant slumped over the steering wheel, and initially unresponsive in a vehicle on a public highway with the engine running. Page reasonably continued to inquire into the situation, concerned that a medical emergency might exist. Viewing these actions under an objectively reasonable standard, Page acted properly. After Appellant opened the door, Page smelled the strong odor of alcohol and then properly investigated further. These facts demonstrate that the warrantless intrusion by Page was an objectively reasonable exercise of his community caretaking function.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur only in the judgment of the majority.
MEYERS, J., joins.

.See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967)); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 81 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 969, 974 n. 9, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983) (plurality opinion) (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) & Cooper v. California); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120, 96 S.Ct. 321, 334, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.) (citing Oregon v. Hass, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) & Cooper v. California); United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1279 n. 9 (9th Cir.1977) (citing Cooper v. California); United States v. Valenzuela, 546 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir.1975) (citing Cooper v. California & People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (Cal.1975)); United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1246 n. 17 (9th Cir.1976) (Duniway, J., concurring) (citing Cooper v. California), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1075, 97 S.Ct. 814, 50 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977); United States v. Getter, 560 F.Supp. 1309, 1314 (E.D.Pa.1983) (citing Cooper v. California, PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, Oregon v. Hass & Davis v. Bd. Of Medical Examiners), aff'd sub nom. United States v. DeMaise, 745 F.2d 49 (3rd Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109, 105 S.Ct. 786, 83 L.Ed.2d 780 (1985); Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 903 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (citing Cooper v. California); Milton v. State, 549 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (citing Oregon v. Hass, Cooper v. California, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) & People v. Hoinville, 191 Colo. 357, 553 P.2d 777 (Colo.1976)); Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 676 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Baird, J., dissenting) (citing Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins & Cooper v. California); Gillett v. State, 588 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (Roberts, J., dissenting, joined by Phillips and Clinton, JJ.) (citing Cooper v. California, Milton v. State, 549 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) & Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Crim.App.1972)); Reeves v. State, 969 S.W.2d 471, 484 (Tex.App.Waco 1998, no pet. h.) (citing Oregon v. Hass, Cooper v. California & Sibron v. New York); Jones v. State, 867 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref'd) (citing Cooper v. California & Heitman v. State); State v. Engelking, 771 S.W.2d 213, 218 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989) (Dunn, J., dissenting) (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982), Oregon v. Hass & Cooper v. California), rev’d, 817 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

. See, e.g., Davis v. Bd. Of Medical Examiners, 497 F.Supp. 525, 528 (D.N.J.1980) (citing Prune-Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins & Cooper v. California); Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Tex. Crim.App.1994) (plurality opinion) (citing Prune-Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, Oregon v. Hass, Cooper v. California & Heitman v. State); Kami v. State, 694 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, pet. ref'd) (citing Cooper v. California).

. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 288 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (citing Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), for proposition that Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution are "in all material aspects the same”), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2914, 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991); Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (plurality opinion) (citing Eisenhauer v. State & Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), and *442stating that "... where the federal and state constitutional provisions are in all material aspects the same, this Court is free to 'follow the lead’ of the Supreme Court where the position has a logical and equitable basis and it appears our own state interests will also be served ...” and therefore adopting for purposes of Article I, § 9, a standard enunciated in federal case law); Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 903 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989) (plurality opinion) (following Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), and holding that Art. I, § 9 is to be interpreted with the Supreme Court’s opinions interpreting the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 3266, 106 L.Ed.2d 611 (1989); Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 164-165 (Tex. Crim.App.1988) (plurality opinion) (relying on federal precedent in holding that a “totality of the circumstances” test was applicable in determining probable cause for a warrantless search, and stating that "... today’s opinion is made to stay in step with the federal constitutional model for probable cause determinations”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848, 109 S.Ct. 127, 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988); Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (citing Brown v. State and relying on federal precedent in holding that a search was justified); Ward v. State, 659 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (relying on federal precedent and holding that an inventory search was in violation of neither the United States or Texas Constitutions); Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (plurality opinion) (“[For] almost forty years ... this Court has opted to interpret our Constitution in harmony with the Supreme Court’s opinions interpreting the Fourth Amendment. We shall continue on this path until such time as we are statutorily or constitutionally mandated to do otherwise”); Crowell v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 299, 180 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex.Crim.App.1944) ("Art. I, Sec. 9, of the Constitution of this State, and the 4th Amendment to the Federal Constitution are, in all material aspects, the same”).

. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim. App.1991); Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (plurality opinion).

. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); McDonald v. State, 759 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.App. Fort Worth 1988, no pet.).