Court Opinion

ID: 9764120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:11:09.416955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:47.969489
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
The Court concludes in this case that the State cannot impose cumulative or dual penalties for weight and registration violations when these respective violations are based on the same facts. While I do not disagree with the result reached by the Court, I reject the invocation of constitutional principles in deciding this issue. Statutory interpretation — either imputing to the legislature the intent not to impose dual penalties, or strict construction of these penal statutes — should suffice. The constitutionalization of this case is both unnecessary and unwise.
I.
The only issue, as I see it, is one of statutory interpretation. The Court takes evident pains to interpret and understand a rather complicated statutory scheme; its effort to determine the legislative intent concerning cumulative penalties is sedulous to a point. However, it breaks off its pursuit of legislative *113intent, concluding that the Legislature’s intent is “unclear” and then determining that under the principle of strict construction of penal statutes, multiple punishment for simultaneous weight and registration violations is inappropriate. The Court acknowledges the sufficiency of this principle as a basis for decision, but instead of clearly developing and relying on the applicability of this principle, the Court seems to incorporate into its analysis federal double-jeopardy principles intended to demonstrate independently that dual penalties cannot be imposed in this case. In my view, confronted with “unclear” legislative intent, the Court could not sanction the imposition of dual penalties regardless of double-jeopardy considerations. Rather than plunging into the abyss of double-jeopardy jurisprudence, the Court could have rested its conclusion solely on strict construction, or even could have concluded that there is a sufficient basis to determine by reasonable imputation that the Legislature itself did not intend multiple punishments for registration and weight violations based on identical facts.
What is at issue here is whether under this statutory scheme the Legislature intended the imposition of multiple or cumulative punishment for the commission of separate regulatory crimes that are based on the same facts. If we were to conclude that dual penalties were intended by the Legislature, then we might have some concern with the validity of such dual punishment. In that posture, the case might have double-jeopardy implications. See discussion, infra at 117-124. Such double-jeopardy overtones, however, do not excuse the need to engage in statutory construction. Indeed, they demand it.
Our Court has long recognized the extent to which constitutional principles can overlap common-law doctrine, particularly in situations that appear to implicate double-jeopardy concerns. E.g., State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 144 (1951) (“constitutional guaranties against double jeopardy are merely declaratory of the common law.”) Nevertheless, the Court need not confront the question whether statutory meaning can be answered *114through constitutional analysis; indeed, the Court in this case explicitly states that the decision need not be predicated on double-jeopardy analysis since statutory construction indicates that defendants may not be punished under both Section 20e and Section 84(b)(4). See ante at 101. This acknowledgement of the superfluity of constitutional -analysis calls into question the necessity or wisdom of engaging in unwarranted discussion of double-jeopardy principles.
The Court correctly identifies strict construction of penal statutes as a basis for decision in this case, but does so in a cursory manner that belies the soundness and sufficiency of this principle as an adequate basis for decision. See ante at 102. Our decisional law clearly importunes us to construe such statutes strictly and narrowly. See, e.g., State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14 (1987). If there is genuine doubt about the statute’s meaning, that doubt should be resolved against an expansive application of its penal sanctions. See, e.g., State v. Valentin, supra, 105 N.J. at 18; State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318 (1961). This applies to penal statutes that address regulatory concerns. See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 114 N.J. 111 (1989); State v. Fair Lawn Serv. Center, Inc., 20 N.J. 468, 472 (1956). The rule of strict construction serves to confine both the scope of offensive conduct covered and “the penalty applicable to such conduct.” State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 514 n. 6 (1980). Whether a penal statute imposes by clear terms multiple or cumulative punishments for offenses based on identical facts poses an interpretive issue that calls for circumspect and strict analysis. Only in unusual circumstances, such as where an obvious legislative intent is unmistakably confirmed by a strong public policy, can an expansive application of a criminal statute's penal sanctions be tolerated. See, e.g., State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504 (1987); State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62 (1983). Conversely, if there is a sufficient doubt about the constitutional validity of a particular statutory application, a legislative intent should be imputed that will remove the doubt. See, e.g., Matter of Kimber Petroleum Corp., 110 N.J. 69, 83 (1988).
*115Here, it should suffice to point out that regulation through penal statutes of the operation of commercial motor vehicles with respect to their size and weight does not invoke a compelling public policy sufficient to impel us to infer a need for multiple or enhanced punishments when these are not otherwise plainly and clearly provided.
Strict construction does not provide the only tool of statutory interpretation available for decision of this case; the Court could easily conclude that there is a sufficient basis to determine by reasonable imputation that the Legislature did not intend multiple punishments for registration and weight violations based on identical facts.
The basis for this conclusion can be found in the Court’s own opinion. The Court correctly rejects the State’s argument that the 1983 amendment of N.J.S.A. 39:3-20 and 3-84 bespeaks clear legislative intent to establish separate and independent penalties for simultaneous weight and registration violations. As the Court ably demonstrates, there is no clear indication of legislative intent that this should be so. Since the Court concludes that the legislative intent with respect to dual penalties is “unclear,” and simply refuses to impute any intent one way or the other, it is arguable that with respect to a second penalty the statute is incomplete, and therefore unenforceable. See, e.g., State v. Fair Lawn Serv. Center, supra, 20 N.J. at 473 (“Where a statute fails to provide a penalty it has been uniformly held that it is beyond the power of the court to prescribe a penalty.”). However, in light of the statute’s facial ambiguity and historical antecedents, as well as the penal nature of the regulatory scheme, I would determine that it is reasonable to impute to the Legislature the intent not to impose multiple or cumulative punishments in these circumstances.
We should consider the historical antecedents of the statute for indications of what legislative intent can reasonably be imputed. State v. Madden, 61 N.J. 377 (1972). N.J.S.A. 39:3-84.3k (previously N.J.S.A. 39:3-84) now provides only for single *116fines in the context of simultaneous weight violations. There is, however, no indication by the Legislature demonstrating intent to levy registration penalties consecutive to weight penalties based on the same set of facts. Indeed, as recognized by the Court, from 1966 to 1983, section 84, most particularly N.J.S.A. 39:3-84.3, “explicitly prohibited cumulative punishment” for simultaneous weight and registration violations. Ante at 101. Further, when the Legislature amended section 20, it retained the provision that “this section shall not be construed to supersede or repeal the provisions of section [84].” N.J.S.A. 39:3-20e. This historical prohibition implies a legislative intent contrary to that argued by the State. Because, in determining legislative intent, this Court “must consider any history which may be of aid,” State v. Madden, supra, 61 N.J. at 389 this prohibition of multiple punishment should not be undervalued.
I find no barrier to the imputation of a legislative intent to require an election of regulatory remedies, rather than to mandate or permit the imposition of dual penalties. No regulatory objective of the statutory scheme will be disserved or undermined by such an interpretation. The prosecutor will be free to pursue and the court will be empowered to impose that sanction, be it the most or least severe, prescribed by the Legislature for the commission of either offense when proof of identical facts indicate that both offenses have occurred.
It is thus clear as a matter of sound statutory construction that the imposition of multiple penalties for simultaneous registration and weight violations is entirely inappropriate. We are provided with neither a clear statutory mandate nor an unambiguous manifestation of legislative intent nor a compelling public policy that severally or collectively justify the imposition of multiple punishment. Further, we are cautioned by our traditional understanding of regulatory penal statutes to construe their terms narrowly and strictly. We see, moreover, a statutory history, not countermanded by current enactment, forcibly indicating a continuing legislative intent that multiple *117punishments not be imposed. These factors demonstrate that principles of statutory construction — either imputation of legislative intent or strict construction of penal statutes — provide a sufficient basis for decision of this case.
II.
The Court, nevertheless, reaches out to convert a rather straight-forward issue of statutory construction into one of constitutional dimensions. In doing so, the Court seemingly acknowledges an understanding that the double-jeopardy protections afforded by our State Constitution may not be co-extensive with those provided by the federal clause, and professes to defer consideration of our own Constitution for another day. Ante at 106-108. By opting, however, to marshal double-jeopardy analysis to determine or confirm a statutory meaning, the Court may be treading further down the path of constitutional doctrine than it believes.
Neither invocation nor expansion of constitutional double-jeopardy analysis is required in this case. Indeed, it is ironic that in resorting to double-jeopardy analysis, the Court cites case law demonstrating that double-jeopardy principles do not control the decision of the main issue contested in this case— what the statute means. See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425, reh’g denied, 468 U.S. 1224, 105 S.Ct. 20, 82 L.Ed.2d 915 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). These cases clearly indicate that legislatures determine whether multiple punishments apply to single specific instances of conduct.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the traditional judicial role of effectuating legislative intent is a function different from the application of double-jeopardy strictures in determining a statutory result. In Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), the Court stated that “the question whether punishments imposed by a court after a defendant’s conviction on criminal charges *118are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized.” Id. at 445 U.S. at 688, 100 S.Ct. at 1436, 63 L.Ed.2d at 721. In three separate opinions variously concurring or dissenting from the Whalen majority, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rhenquist expressed their belief that resolution of this question centered on statutory construction rather than application of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e.g., id. at 696, 100 S.Ct. at 1440, 63 L.Ed.2d at 726 (White, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated that
[d]icta in recent opinions of this Court at least have suggested, and now I think wrongly, that the Double Jeopardy Clause may prevent the imposition of cumulative punishments in situations in which the Legislative Branch clearly intended that multiple penalties be imposed for a single criminal transaction. I believe that the Court should take the opportunity presented by this case to repudiate those dicta squarely, and to hold clearly that the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. I must concede that the dicta that seemingly support a contrary view have caused confusion among state courts that have attempted to decipher our pronouncements concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause’s role in the area of multiple punishments. [Id. at 697-98, 100 S.Ct. at 1440-41, 63 L.EdM at 727-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted).]
Justice Blackmun’s invitation to clarify the relationship between statutory interpretation and the double jeopardy clause was accepted the following term, when the Court stated that “the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1145, 67 L.Ed.2d 275, 285 (1981). This observation, understood in the context of the judicial dialogue presented in Whalen, clearly demonstrates the superfluity of double-jeopardy principles in pursuing what is, in essence, an exercise in statutory construction. Indeed, other jurisdictions have recognized the limited role of the Double Jeopardy Clause in analogous situations. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 460, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986) (Double Jeopardy Clause plays limited role; legislative intent is determinative); People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458, *119355 N.W.2d 592 (1984) (only interest of defendant is not having more punishment imposed than intended by legislature; legislative intent is determinative).
Concededly, it is difficult to stay clear conceptually from double-jeopardy principles. As the Court notes, citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969), the Supreme Court has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution to provide three forms of constitutional protection: protection against second prosecution for the same offense after either acquittal or conviction, and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Ante at 103. Since this case presents a multiple-punishment problem, the attraction of double-jeopardy anaylsis is present. However, it cannot be overemphasized that multiple-punishment cases and successive-prosecution cases involve different interests, and that multiple-punishment issues may not actually invoke the same double-jeopardy protections that are applied in multiple-prosecution cases:
Successive-prosecution cases involve the core values of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the common-law concepts of autrefois acquit and convict. Where successive prosecutions are involved, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the individual’s interest in not having to twice “run the gauntlet”, in not being subject to “embarrassment, expense and ordeal”, and in not being compelled “to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity”, with enhancement of the "possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty”.
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Different interests are involved when the issue is purely one of multiple punishments, without the complications of a successive prosecution. The right to be free from vexatious proceedings simply is not present. The only interest of the defendant is in not having more punishment imposed than that intended by the Legislature. [People v. Robideau, supra, 419 Mich, at 484-85, 355 N.W.2d at 602-03 (citations omitted).]
This difference in interests is amply reflected by the numerous pronouncements by federal and state courts that legislative intent, rather than double-jeopardy principles, controls the decision of multiple-punishment issues. Professor Thomas explains this in “Multiple Punishments For the Same Offense: The Analysis After Missouri v. Hunter or Don Quixote, The Sar*120gasso Sea, and The Gordian Knot,” 62 Wash.U.L.Q. 79 (1984) (hereafter “Multiple Punishments”). He points out that under Missouri v. Hunter, supra, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, multiple-punishment doctrine is distinctive. It is derivative in nature and is not a protection that is directly provided or defined by the Double Jeopardy Clause, which in other contexts serves to constrain legislative as well as other state actions; rather, the multiple-punishment doctrine may be more properly regarded as a stricture against the judiciary from invading the legislative province. Id. at 124.
Because the Court accepts the teachings of Hunter, its opinion is not exceptional in acknowledging that double-jeopardy principles should not control the determination of legislative intent. But there is another problem: whether double-jeopardy principles should be available as a source of substantive protection against multiple-punishment for the same offense.
The Supreme Court itself was sharply divided on the issue of the extent to which legislative intent to impose multiple punishment might be the sole determinant of the appropriateness of such punishment. Professor Thomas noted, for example, that Justice Stewart, who authored the majority opinion in Whalen, forcefully challenged the Court’s subsequent treatment of Whalen. In his concurring opinion in Albemaz, in which he was joined by Justice Marshall and Stevens, Justice Stewart said: “[N]o matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact that the other did not, under the criterion of Blockburger v. United States.” Thomas, “Multiple Punishments,” supra, 62 Wash.U.L.Q. at 104 (quoting Albernaz v. United States, supra, 450 U.S. at 345, 101 S.Ct. at 1145-46, 67 L.Ed.2d at 286 (Stewart, J., concurring)). This leads to an aspect of statutory interpretation that has engendered serious difficulties in the realm of double-jeopardy analysis: determination of what substantive standards define whether offenses are the “same” and what relevance *121these standards have to multiple punishments as well as to multiple prosecutions.
Professor Thomas has pointed out that embedded in the Hunter decision is its assumption that the “sameness” of underlying offenses is not of critical importance when it comes to multiple punishments. There are, however, two schools of thought, viz:
The conflict between the dissent and the majority opinion in Hunter mirrors the conflict between the Missouri Supreme Court and a majority of the United States Supreme Court. One view is that punishments imposed in a single proceeding can never be multiple if the legislature has authorized them, and thus clearly authorized multiple penalties cannot be multiple punishment for the same offense. The other view is that the double jeopardy clause will not permit the legislature to authorize more than a single conviction for the same offense.
Under the view of the dissent in Hunter, only one type of same offense analysis is necessary because the analysis is the same whether it arises in the context of a single proceeding or of successive prosecutions. Under the view of the Hunter majority, a different type of analysis must be applied in multiple punishment cases. [Thomas, “Multiple Punishments,” supra, 62 Wash.U.L.Q. at 112.]
The question of the “sameness” of offenses has proven problematic. Our own decisional law demonstrates the numerous and difficult problems involved in determining the “same offense” in this as well as in other contexts implicating federal double-jeopardy concerns. Compare State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98 (1987) (same-elements and same-evidence tests of double jeopardy are alternatives) with State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573 (1983) (same-elements and same-evidence tests of double jeopardy are cumulative). The difficulty of this technical question is compounded by the realization that “sameness” may have differing ramifications in multiple-conviction and multiple-punishment contexts, thus engendering different measures of similarity in each context. This complexity suggests that even aside from the difficulties inherent in any consideration of the relationship of double-jeopardy principles under the Federal and State Constitutions, any effort to further our understanding of relevant federal principles should be undertaken only when *122circumstances demand such analysis; otherwise, already murky waters are much too easily roiled.
The effects of such casual constitutionalization are apparent in this case. In analyzing and accepting the Hunter doctrine, the Court, in effect, homogenizes the multiple-prosecution and multiple-punishment contexts; it applies the standard for “sameness” governing multiple prosecutions to multiple punishments. Ante at 106. While this result may not be incorrect, it should not be unnecessarily embraced without the fullest possible consideration of the consequent implications for our understanding of federal double-jeopardy doctrine. This cautionary note is even more appropriate in a case, like this one, where the sufficiency of statutory interpretation as a basis for decision obviates any need to engage in constitutional analysis in the first place.
By restricting its discussion of double-jeopardy considerations to analysis and interpretation of federal double-jeopardy principles, the Court seeks to avoid deciding whether multiple punishments that may be imposed without violating the federal Double Jeopardy Clause might nonetheless violate the Double Jeopardy Clause or substantive due process principles of the State Constitution. There is, however, a potential or inchoate conflict between the doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court in Hunter and our own decisional law.
The Court is well aware of the extent to which Hunter and our own case law conflict with regard to whether legislative intent is the determinative factor in ascertaining the permissible limits of multiple punishments. The Court, as already noted, recognizes that “the [federal] constitutional protection [as construed in Hunter\ against double jeopardy does not prohibit multiple punishment of two statutory offenses involving essentially the same conduct tried in a single trial when there is a clear expression of legislative intent to impose punishment for those offenses.” Ante at 105. However, such deference to legislative intent has not been a feature of our *123own double-jeopardy doctrine. In State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69 (1975), we stated that “[w]ere the legislature, in attempting to create separate crimes, to do no more than simply apply different labels to what is in fact the same charge, it would plainly exceed its authority.” Id. at 80. This proposition, expressive of a more restrictive view of legislative power to impose multiple punishments than that permitted under the more expansive Hunter double-jeopardy principles deployed by the Supreme Court, cannot comfortably co-exist with the Hunter doctrine.
Our understanding of state constitutional protections also conflicts with federal double-jeopardy principles in other ways. For example, we have formulated a flexible approach toward determination of when separate offenses have been established, acknowledging the applicability of “considerations of ‘fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations in the light of constitutional and common law goals.’ ” State v. Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 81 (quoting State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 539 (1964)). These considerations are particularly relevant in the context of multiple punishments. We have not depended exclusively on “principles of double jeopardy, substantive due process or some other legal tenet” in addressing multiple punishment issues. State v. Best, 70 N.J. 56, 61 (1976).
Although the Court maintains that the conflicts embodied by these competing principles are not implicated through invocation of federal doctrine alone, the Court should nonetheless appreciate the extent to which its interpretation and tolerance of the Hunter doctrine might suggest an affinity toward the federal view of double jeopardy. The attraction to Hunter can imply the adoption of its assumptions about what substantive standards define whether offenses are the “same” and what relevance those standards have to multiple punishments as well as multiple prosecutions. The Court can ill-afford to accept implicitly the view that for state constitutional purposes the double jeopardy clause segregates multiple punishments from multiple prosecutions, or the view that whether offenses are *124the “same” may be constitutionally more significant for purposes of multiple convictions than for multiple punishment.
The Court claims to have preserved its state constitutional options. Nevertheless, one must consider whether unnecessary constitutionalization of this case has cast a shadow on future state constitutional understanding of some very perplexing problems. The protections of double jeopardy are extremely chimerical in the context of dual punishment because they can be, under Hunter, satisfied simply by viewing double jeopardy merely as a mirror image of the legislature’s intent. Were the Court later to conclude in a case that there is something fundamentally wrong about multiple punishments, the Court would have either to repudiate Hunter or, alternatively, to look beyond double jeopardy and invoke fundamental fairness, “substantive due process or some other legal tenet.” State v. Best, supra, 70 N.J. at 61. By reaching out to buttress its decision in this case with double-jeopardy principles, the Court may be signalling a predisposition to increase the weight of double jeopardy relative to other underlying tenets. The substantive effect of such a valuation in analyzing state constitutional doctrine could be considerable if accompanied by an embrace of the Hunter doctrine, with its relatively high deference to statutory intent and concomitant notion that double jeopardy does not restrain legislative action.
III.
In determining whether separate convictions for possession and distribution of narcotics involved the “same” offense, Davis now seems prescient in its observation that expansion of the double jeopardy clauses “beyond their traditional scope ... need not be pursued ... inasmuch as the members of the Court who vote with [the majority] ... are not of one mind on the question of whether it is double jeopardy or substantive due process that is to be applied.” Id. '68 N.J. at 76. In its rush to interpret and apply Hunter in this case, the Court, whether it *125thinks so or not, goes far toward committing itself to the proposition that the definition of “same” offense for multiple-punishment purposes can be different from its definition for other double-jeopardy purposes.
It is possible that we may be compelled to repudiate the assumptions rather gratuitously reached in this case. Therefore, why become involved in this doctrinal imbroglio? I return to an initial point: this case involves only a question of statutory interpretation, and not a very exceptional one at that. We should in such a case adhere to the sage advice of Chief Justice Weintraub:
[t]he Constitution must not be busied with issues that are minutiae in a grand scheme of things; it serves best as a majestic presence, unperturbed by claims of absolute verity in matters economic, social, moral, spiritual, medical or penological. It is very human, and very wrong, to see one’s image in every nook of the Constitution. There must be tolerance of disagreement, for without it there can be no experimentation or ready accommodation to a changing scheme. Of greater importance, the judiciary must not lose popular acceptance as the final arbiter of the Constitution in historic disputes. This unique mystic value could be lost if the Constitution, construed to be weighted down with matters of legislative calibre, could command no higher regard. [State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247, 261 (1967).]
We are not involved in an historic dispute. Where the question of legislative intent is no different from the question of constitutionality, the “legislative calibre” of the matter commends the wisdom of resort only to canons of statutory construction. We should hold the constitution in reserve and follow decisional principles other than double jeopardy analysis in determining the statutory issue presented.
The Court, in a case in which it is wholly unwarranted, may be stepping into doctrinal quicksand. I can therefore concur only in its judgment.
HANDLER, J., concurs in the result.
For affirmance and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
Opposed — None.