Court Opinion

ID: 9545473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:13:08.89237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:52.479753
License: Public Domain

Munson, J.
(dissenting)—I disagree because I attribute no fault to the prosecuting attorney when he is prohibited by the trial court from justifying his recommendation. It is clear from the quotations in the majority opinion that the prosecutor was not given an opportunity to justify his recommendation. However, the determination of a defendant's sentence is solely within the discretion of the trial court; no error is assigned to the court's failure to obtain as much information about Mr. Peterson as possible. To require, at this point, an opportunity for the trial court to obtain the *662benefit of the prosecutor's reasoning appears to be of little avail. I doubt the prosecutor will be able to persuade the trial court to reach a different result.
In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971), the United States Supreme Court gave its approval to plea bargaining. It reversed that case because an assistant United States attorney, other than the one who had entered into the plea bargain agreement, represented the government at the time of sentencing. That attorney was unaware of the agreement and did not concur in the recommendation; nevertheless, the court held the prosecution was bound by the plea bargain. Likewise, United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974), found that the prosecutor backed away from the agreement.
I have no difficulty with the prosecutor who does not stand by his recommendation. In re Palodichuk, 22 Wn. App. 107, 110, 589 P.2d 269 (1978). While I would agree the trial court should have listened to the prosecuting attorney if he had any comments in addition to his recommendation, I know of nothing that compels the court to do so.
Mr. Peterson attacks the prosecutor's alleged failure to advocate, not the court's failure to listen or to require the prosecutor to speak. I would agree that upon inquiry from the court, the prosecutor must justify his position or his recommendation by such reasons as: a crowded trial docket, a weak link in the chain of evidence, the availability or recalcitrance of witnesses, or the elimination of some possible, questionable application or interpretation of law based upon recent appellate decisions. But once the agreement has been struck, the recommendation made and acknowledged as a product of negotiation, I would not impose upon the prosecutor the obligation to "strongly advocate" for that position. Presumably the defendant has able counsel to do that on his behalf; it is unnecessary for the State to supply additional advocacy by its own representative.
State v. Happy, 94 Wn.2d 791, 793, 620 P.2d 97 (1980), was based on a procedural rule adopted to afford the *663defendant "a personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing", quoting from Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 305, 5 L. Ed. 2d 670, 81 S. Ct. 643 (1971). Brooks v. Rhay, 92 Wn.2d 876, 878, 602 P.2d 356 (1979), speaks to the necessity of resentencing if an erroneous sentence has been imposed. State v. Bird, 95 Wn.2d 83, 622 P.2d 1262 (1980), speaks to suspending the execution of a disposition order in a juvenile case. None of the cases cited in the majority compel the trial court to seek the reason or reasons behind the prosecuting attorney's plea bargain, or require the prosecuting attorney do more than keep his bargain.
Lastly, while Mr. Peterson would hold the prosecutor responsible, the majority on page 660 holds the court erred "in preventing the prosecutor from explaining the reasons underlying the plea bargain." The majority finds no error by the prosecutor; thus, the reversal is on a point not raised by Mr. Peterson on appeal. The point is not of constitutional magnitude. While the trial court may be affirmed by this court on any theory, it should not be reversed on a theory not raised.
Reconsideration denied October 2, 1981.
Review granted by Supreme Court December 3,1981.