Court Opinion

ID: 9894234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 21:06:10.696042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:10.957282
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
            precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 220454-U

                                 Order filed October 31, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST                   ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
      COMPANY, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Ixis )    of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
      Real Estate Capital Trust 2006-2 Mortgage Pass ) Du Page County, Illinois.
      Through Certificates, Series 2006-2            )
                                                     )
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                     )
                                                     )
             v.                                      ) Appeal No. 3-22-0454
                                                     ) Circuit No. 22-EV-331
      BENEDICT LAZ and UNKNOWN                       )
      OCCUPANTS,                                     )
                                                     )
             Defendants                              ) The Honorable
                                                     ) Joseph T. Bugos,
      (Benedict Laz, Defendant-Appellant).           ) Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: Trial court properly entered eviction order in favor of property owner and against
                  occupant, who was son of previous owner, despite property owner’s failure to
                  issue occupant written demand because written demand was not required.

¶2           In 2020, plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank) became the

     owner of real property following a foreclosure action against David A. Laz and a judicial sale. In
     2022, Deutsche Bank filed an eviction complaint against David’s son, Benedict Laz, seeking

     possession of the property. Benedict filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment,

     arguing that Deutsche Bank did not provide him with a written demand before filing suit against

     him. The circuit court denied Benedict’s motions and entered an eviction order against Benedict.

     Benedict appeals the eviction order. We affirm.

¶3                                          BACKGROUND

¶4          On May 28, 2015, Deutsche Bank instituted a foreclosure action against David Laz for real

     property located at 2110 Babst Court in Lisle. On March 9, 2018, the circuit court entered a

     judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche Bank and against David Laz. On February 4, 2020,

     the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale to Deutsche Bank. On March 9, 2020, the circuit court

     entered an order confirming the sale and an order of possession was entered against David. On the

     same day, a sheriff’s deed was issued to Deutsche Bank. David appealed the judgment of

     foreclosure, and the appellate court affirmed. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Laz, 2021

     IL App (2d) 200341-U.

¶5          According to affidavits submitted by David and Benedict Laz, Benedict is David’s son and

     began living with him at 2110 Babst Court in 2016. Benedict was not a lessee of the property and

     was not named as a defendant in the foreclosure suit filed by Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank

     became aware that Benedict was occupying the foreclosed property. Therefore, on February 3,

     2022, Deutsche Bank filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Benedict, seeking

     possession of the property. The complaint alleged that Benedict was occupying the premises when

     Deutsche Bank became owner of the property and was “unlawfully withhold[ing] possession

     thereof.”

                                                       2
¶6            On March 15, 2022, Deutsche Bank filed a proof of service and affidavit from a process

     server. The affidavit stated that the process server attempted to serve the occupants of 2110 Babst

     Court with the eviction summons and complaint seven times between February 10, 2022, and

     March 7, 2022, but was unsuccessful because no one would answer the door. Deutsche Bank filed

     a second proof of service and affidavit from a process server on April 14, 2022. According to those

     documents, the process server attempted to serve the occupants of 2110 Babst Court on seven

     occasions from March 25, 2022, to April 11, 2022, but was unsuccessful.

¶7            On May 6, 2022, the trial court entered an order allowing service by posting. On the same

     day, Deutsche Bank filed an affidavit for service by posting. On May 27, 2022, a Du Page County

     Deputy Sheriff filed an affidavit asserting that he (1) posted a notice in three public places located

     near the court where the case was to be tried, and (2) mailed one copy to Benedict at 2110 Babst

     Court.

¶8            On June 24, 2022, Benedict filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the court lacked

     jurisdiction over him because he was never personally served with a demand for possession of the

     property. Attached thereto was an affidavit from Benedict, stating that he has been an occupant of

     2110 Babst Court since 2016, and was not personally delivered a demand for possession, as

     required by sections 9-102(a)(6) and 9-104 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/9-

     102(a)(6), 9-104 (West 2020)), before Deutsche Bank filed its complaint against him. Deutsche

     Bank filed a response to the motion, asserting that sections 9-102(a)(6) and 9-104 of the Code (id.)

     do not apply because Benedict was not a party to the foreclosure proceeding. Deutsche Bank

     argued that section 9-102(a)(2) of the Code (id. § 9-102(a)(2)) applies and does not require pre-

     suit demand.

                                                       3
¶9            On July 28, 2022, the circuit court entered an order denying Benedict’s motion to dismiss.

       Thereafter, Benedict filed an answer and affirmative defense, asserting that Deutsche Bank was

       required to issue him a written demand, pursuant to section 9-104 of the Code (id. § 9-104), before

       filing its eviction action against him. Benedict also filed a motion for summary judgment based on

       Deutsche Bank’s alleged noncompliance with section 9-104 of the Code (id.). Benedict also filed

       a motion for substitution of judge.

¶ 10          Following a hearing, the circuit court denied Benedict’s motion for substitution of judge.

       Thereafter, the circuit court denied Benedict’s motion for summary judgment. On October 13,

       2022, the circuit court entered an eviction order against Benedict and “unknown occupants” of

       2110 Babst Court.

¶ 11                                              ANALYSIS

¶ 12          Benedict argues that the trial court should not have entered an eviction order against him

       because Deutsche Bank did not serve him with a written demand to vacate the premises before

       filing its action. Deutsche Bank responds that no written demand was necessary.

¶ 13          Article IX of the Code governs forcible entry and detainer actions. See 735 ILCS 5/9-101,

       et seq. (West 2020). Section 9-102 of the Code sets forth when such an action may be maintained

       and provides as follows:

          “(a) The person entitled to the possession of lands or tenements may be restored thereto under

          any of the following circumstances:

              (1) When a forcibly entry is made thereon.

              (2) When a peaceable entry is made and the possession unlawfully withheld.

              (3) When entry is made into vacant or unoccupied lands or tenements without right or title.

                                                       4
(4) When any lessee of the lands or tenements, or any person holding under such lessee,

   holds possession without right after the termination of the lease or tenancy by its own

   limitation, condition or terms, or by notice to quit or otherwise.

(5) When a vendee having obtained possession under a written or verbal agreement to

   purchase lands or tenements, and having failed to comply with the agreement,

   withholds possession thereof, after demand in writing by the person entitled to

   possession ***.

(6) When lands or tenements have been conveyed by any grantor in possession, or sold

   under the order or judgment of any court in this State, or by virtue of any sale in any

   mortgage or deed of trust contained and the grantor in possession or party to such order

   or judgment or to such mortgage or deed of trust, after the expiration of the time of

   redemption, when redemption is allowed by law, refuses or neglects to surrender

   possession thereof, after demand in writing by the person entitled thereto, or his or her

   agent.

(7) When any property is subject to the provisions of the Condominium Property Act, the

   owner of a unit fails or refuses to pay when due his or her proportionate share of the

   common expenses of such property, or of any other expenses lawfully agreed upon or

   any unpaid fine, the Board of Managers or its agents have served the demand set forth

   in Section 9-104.1 of this Article in the manner provided for in that Section and the

   unit owner has failed to pay the amount claimed within the time prescribed in the

   demand; ***.

(8) When any property is subject to the provisions of a declaration establishing a common

   interest community and requiring the unit owner to pay regular or special assessments

                                         5
                   *** or of any other expenses of the association lawfully agreed upon, and the unit

                   owner fails or refuses to pay when due his or her proportionate share of such

                   assessments or expenses and the board or its agents have served the demand set forth

                   in Section 9-104.1 of this Article in the manner provided for in that Section and the

                   unit owner has failed to pay the amount claimed within the time prescribed in the

                   demand.” 735 ILCS 5/9-102(a) (West 2020).

¶ 14           Section 9-102(a) of the Code sets out when a demand in writing is necessary to maintain

       an eviction action. Vogel v. Dawdy, 107 Ill. 2d 68, 76 (1985). A demand in writing is required only

       if the plaintiff brings the action under a subsection that specifically requires it. See Loekelt v. Stoltz,

       323 Ill. App. 164, 166-67 (1944). Only four of the eight subsections require that demand be given.

       See North American Old Roman Catholic Church v. Bernadette, 253 Ill. App. 3d 278, 291 (1992);

       735 ILCS 5/9-102(a)(5) (“after demand in writing”); id. § 9-102(a)(6) (“after demand in writing”);

       id. § 9-102(a)(7) (“have served the demand set forth in Section 9-104.1”); id. § 9-102(a)(8) (“have

       served the demand set forth in Section 9-104.1”). No demand is necessary to maintain an action

       for possession of property under section 9-102(a)(2) of the Code (id. § 9-102(a)(2)). Vogel, 107

       Ill. 2d at 76; Bernadette, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 291.

¶ 15           A possessor of property may maintain an action under section 9-102(a)(2) of the Code (735

       ILCS 5/9-102(a)(2) (West 2020)) “[w]hen a peaceable entry is made and the possession unlawfully

       withheld.” Id. “This language has been construed to mean that a peaceable entry must have been

       made upon the premises in the actual possession of either the plaintiff, or of those to whose rights

       he has succeeded.” Layzod v. Martin, 305 Ill. App. 1, 4 (1940) (citing West Side Trust & Savings

       Bank v. Lopoten, 358 Ill. 631 (1934); Fitzgerald v. Quinn, 165 Ill. 354 (1896); Kaufman v. Miller,

       214 Ill. App. 236 (1918)). A peaceable entry is one without force or violence. See City of

                                                           6
       Bloomington v. Brophy, 32 Ill. App. 400, 402 (1889); see also People v. Wimbley, 314 Ill. App. 3d

       18, 29 (2000) (“Kicking down a door to enter a residence is a forced, not peaceable, entry.”).

¶ 16          An action under section 9-102(a)(2) of the Act may be maintained by a plaintiff who

       succeeded to the rights of a prior owner in whose possession the property was when the defendant

       entered. See Winitt v. Winitt, 339 Ill. App. 75, 77 (1949). An action under this section is proper

       “when the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist.” Id. at 78.

¶ 17          Here, Deutsche Bank brought its eviction action against Benedict after obtaining ownership

       of the property from David, who was the property owner when Benedict entered the property.

       Additionally, Benedict stated in his affidavit that he was not a lessee of the property. Therefore,

       the requirements of section 9-102(a)(2) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-102(a)(2) (West 2020) were

       met. See Winnit, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 77-78. Consequently, written demand was not a prerequisite

       to Deutsche Bank’s action. See Vogel, 107 Ill. 2d at 76; Bernadette, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 291.

¶ 18          Nevertheless, Benedict argues that he was entitled to demand because Deutsche Bank

       should have brought its action under section 9-102(a)(6) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-102(a)(6)

       (West 2020)), as the owner of the property following a judicial foreclosure sale. We disagree.

¶ 19          Section 9-102(a)(6) of the Code requires a purchaser of property at a judicial sale to make

       a “demand in writing” to the “party to such order or judgment” who “refuses or neglects to

       surrender possession thereof.” Id. Here, Deutsche Bank was the purchaser of the subject property

       at a foreclosure sale; however, Benedict was not a party to the foreclosure judgment. The

       foreclosure judgment was issued against Benedict’s father, David, not Benedict. Thus, section 9-

       102(a)(6) of the Code (id.) does not apply. Instead, Deutsche Bank properly instituted its eviction

       action under section 9-102(a)(2) of the Code (id. § 9-102(a)(2)), which does not require pre-suit

       demand. See Vogel, 107 Ill. 2d at 76; Bernadette, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 291.

                                                        7
¶ 20          Finally, Benedict argues that even if written demand was not required by section 9-102 of

       the Code (id. § 9-102), it was required by section 9-104 (id. § 9-104). Section 9-104 of the Code

       provides in pertinent part:

                  “The demand required by Section 9-102 of this Act may be made by delivering a copy

              thereof to the tenant, or by leaving such a copy with some person of the age of 13 years or

              upwards, residing on, or being in charge of, the premises; or in case no one is in the actual

              possession of the premises, then by posting the same on the premises; or if those in

              possession are unknown occupants who are not parties to any written lease, rental

              agreement, or right to possession agreement for the premises, then by delivering a copy of

              the notice, directed to ‘unknown occupants’, to the occupant or by leaving a copy of the

              notice with some person of the age of 13 years or upwards occupying the premises, or by

              posting a copy of the notice on the premises directed to ‘unknown occupants’. ***.” Id.

¶ 21          We reject Benedict’s contention that section 9-104 of the Code (id.) creates a demand

       requirement. Section 9-104 merely describes how “[t]he demand required by Section 9-102” is to

       be made. See id. “Section 9-104 does not impose a demand or notice requirement that is not

       otherwise specifically provided for by the particular subpart or subsection of 9-102.” Bernadette,

       253 Ill. App. 3d at 291. Thus, Benedict was not entitled to written demand pursuant to section 9-

       104 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-104 (West 2020)).

¶ 22          Lack of written demand was the only argument Benedict raised to contest the circuit court’s

       order in this case. Because no demand was required, the circuit court properly entered the eviction

       order against Benedict.

¶ 23                                            CONCLUSION

¶ 24          The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

                                                       8
¶ 25   Affirmed.

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