Court Opinion

ID: 9697495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:18:17.669582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.044440
License: Public Domain

*119
Lowe, J.

concurring:

I agree with the second alternative suggested by the majority that it is most likely that the Legislature never thought of the problem of notice when it exposed manufacturers to direct suits by ultimate consumers. For that reason I must concur in the result reached because the term "seller” used in the preexisting notice section (Md. Com. Law Code Ann., § 2-607 (3) (a) (1975)) was not consciously expanded to include manufacturers, etc., when enacted expressly to apply to the warranty sections (Md. Com. Law Code Ann., §§ 2-314 — 2-318 (1975)) for purposes of abolishing the privity requisites.
The bill enacting the change of definition of "seller” emanated from a constituent’s letter to the then President of the Senate of Maryland, The Honorable William S. James. Noting the need for "careful scrutiny” of this issue, President James referred it to the Judicial Committee of the Legislative Council which adopted a draft as it now appears in § 2-314. Item No. 256 Legislative Council Reports explains that:
"This bill recommended by the Judiciary Committee of the Legislative Council enlarges the definition of 'seller’ as it aplies [sic] to Sections 2-314 through 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, abolishes the requirement of privity in actions brought under these sections, extends a seller’s expressed or implied warranty to third party beneficiaries, and generally relates to expressed and implied warranties in the Uniform Commercial Code. In testimony before the Judiciary Committee, it was discovered that Maryland is far behind other states in extending implied and expressed warranties to third party beneficiaries. This bill will cover a present gap in the Commercial Code in Maryland in situations where someone who actually did not buy a defective product might suffer injury in using it.
Although the reporter’s explanation referring to the defi*120nition of "seller” used the limiting language "as it aplies [applies] to Sections 2-314 through 2-318”, not everyone understood it as so clear a limitation on the application of the expanded definition. A Maryland Commissioner on Uniform State Laws, M. King Hill, wrote the Secretary and Director of Research for the Legislative Council that the bill amending the definition of seller was fraught with danger.
"The intent of the amendments appears to be to dispense with the necessity of privity of contract in a breach of warranty action. If this is the intent, then I think the proposed amendment is poorly drafted. 'Seller’ is already adequately defined in the UCC and I think it is very poor practice to amend Section 2-314 as proposed, which enlarges the definition of 'seller’ not only for tort claims but also generally, and thus destroys the uniformity which is so highly desirable in the Uniform Commercial Code. Furthermore, as I see it, the amendment of Section 2-314 is unnecessary since 'seller’ already includes those persons specifically referred to in the amendment as far as breach of warranty claims in tort are concerned.” (Emphasis added).
Although Mr. Hill’s alternative observation did not accord with the Court of Appeals, Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 309 (1976), his former appears to have been the view of the Legislatures of Maine and South Carolina. These two states amended their comparable sections of the notice section, § 2-607, expressly to indicate that their expanded definitions of "seller” did not apply in certain instances. Such action bears out Mr. Hill’s concern that the expanded definition may indeed apply "generally” at least interpretatively.
But I must concede with the majority that if our Legislature had consciously intended the broader application it should have said so, or at the very least should not have restricted its application as it expressly did.
I do not agree with the moral rationale that either justice or "fair play” supports that result, nor can I imagine with the *121majority that the Legislature could have been aware of the problem and desired to make no change. In a society surviving on mass production, the removal of the privity shield exposed the financial stability of manufacturers by creating an entire new vista of suits by plaintiffs and a fruitful field for specialization in the legal professions. To think that the Legislature would consciously effect such a revolutionary change and intentionally deprive fair warning, even to the exposed giants that a crippling blow may be struck, is insulting to the General Assembly. It is one thing to accuse it of lack of knowledge, forgivable in an era when it was beginning to emerge from an antiquated system. It is quite another to charge it with consciously invoking procedural unfairness.
This case particularly points out the immorality of permitting a plaintiff to sandbag-by-silence a manufacturer’s investigatory opportunity to determine if it was at fault or, if not, where the fault lay. To rationalize as fair warning for a lack of notice requirement by suggesting that an installer will notify a retailer, who will notify a wholesaler, who will notify a distributor, who will notify a subsidiary, who will notify a manufacturer, is hardly convincing. That such a relay-team relationship would ever exist is not too likely, since here as in most cases, the initial seller and the ultimate manufacturer are not attacked upon related theories.
In this case the retailer, Elliott, apparently retained Swann, the installer, which Firestone suggests caused the blowout by pinching the tube upon an improper installation. Neither Elliott nor Swann had any great incentive to notify Firestone propitiously to investigate that possibility. Rather, the year and a half that elapsed during which the crucial evidence to make such determination disappeared, enured to their benefit when the deep-pocketed manufacturer was ultimately sued.
Firestone’s experts are then left at trial years after the incident, to express an opinion of a "possibility” of the cause, the likelihood of which may be apparent even to a layman. But because of the lack of notice, any possible foundation to *122support such opinion is lost; and of course, expert opinions are only as good as the foundation upon which they stand. "Deep-pockets” are thus inverted by plaintiffs’ experts without any fear of contradiction by a factually supported explanation. Both less financially endowed, local defendants are dismissed in the meantime so that a local jury may not become confused by conflicting theories or local emotional prejudices. In most consumer oriented locales, the title of a case such as "John Doe v. Firestone” is a persuasive closing argument, while "John Doe v. local dealer” is fraught with obvious pitfalls.
The expansion of a notice requirement in accordance with § 2-607 (3) (a) clearly cannot limit a diligent consumer damaged by a warranty breach by a manufacturer. The "within a reasonable time” clause provides the same protection from an arbitrary bar to suit that the judicially created discovery rule provides in determining when a cause of action accrues for purposes of limitations. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 (1981).
I separately concur for two reasons. First to point out to the Legislature its obvious oversight in 1969 and secondly to remind the Court of Appeals (which needs no reminder) that not only may it inherently create new causes of action, e.g., Teays v. Supreme Concrete Block, 51 Md. App. 166, 167-169 (1982), and even abolish old ones, e.g., Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 340-343 (1979), but it is constitutionally endowed with the authority to regulate the procedure of the judicial process to ensure fair play. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 1-201 (1980 Repl. Vol.). Surely if time determinations for speedy trials are of a procedural nature (Md. Rule 746), the Court can establish notice requirements.
Procedural fair play, like procedural due process, must be equally provided not only to the poor or individual consumers but to the rich, and to corporate goliaths as well. As our preoccupation with the rights of indigent criminals ofttimes obscures an equal concern with the rights of victims, we must dispense justice with an equal hand even to those who appear strong enough to fend for themselves. We have made manufacturers "equally” vulnerable by abol*123ishing privity. They should be equally equipped to defend themselves fairly by reasonable forewarning.