Court Opinion

ID: 9372934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:38.840838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.972078
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SARAH P. EMANUELE,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         PH-0752-15-0539-B-3

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF                                   DATE: February 2, 2023
       TRANSPORTATION,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sarah P. Emanuele, Cornwall, New York, pro se.

           Maria Surdokas, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision,
     which sustained her removal from the Federal service. On petition for review,
     the appellant argues, among other things, that the administrative judge incorrectly
     rejected evidence from being accepted into the record, and she reiterates her

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonpreceden tial orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                               2

     claims of equal employment opportunity (EEO) reprisal and due process
     violations. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. Generally, we grant petitions
     such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains
     erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review.    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review.              Except as expressly
     MODIFIED to provide the appropriate standard for EEO reprisal claims,
     we AFFIRM the initial decision.
¶2         The administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved the charge
     of inappropriate conduct by preponderant evidence. Emanuele v. Department of
     Transportation, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-15-0539-B-3, Appeal File (B-3 AF),
     Tab 102, Initial Decision (ID) at 6-14. She also correctly found that the appellant
     failed to establish that the agency violated her due process rights, 2 that a nexus

     2
       The appellant argued below that the agency violated the Privacy Act and that such a
     violation constitutes a violation of her due process rights. B-3 AF, Tab 86 at 40-41.
     The administrative judge did not address this argument in the initial decision; thus, we
     address it here. Specifically, the appellant states that 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) requires an
     agency to “collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the
     subject individual when the information may result in adverse determinations about an
     individual’s rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs.” B-3 AF, Tab 86
     at 40-41 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 522a(e)). Based on this provision, the appellant argues that
     the agency was required to interview and question her prior to taking the removal action
     against her and that its failure to do so constituted a violation of her due process rights.
     Id. at 41. We are not persuaded by the appellant’s argument. The section of the statute
                                                                                             3

     exists between the appellant’s removal for misconduct and the efficiency of the
     service, and that the penalty of removal was reasonable. 3 ID at 17-21.
¶3         As it relates to the charge, the appellant argues on review that the
     administrative judge erred in rejecting some of her evi dence from admission into
     the record. 4 PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-11. The administrative judge accepted into the
     record evidence submitted by the appellant that was untimely filed and issued

     relied upon concerns record creation and keeping and imposes the above-stated
     requirements for those purposes. The statute does not indicate that these requirements
     are a matter of due process for an adverse action taken against an employee. The
     appellant does not cite any authority to support her contention. Accordingly, the
     appellant’s argument is unconvincing.
     3
       We acknowledge that the administrative judge’s analysis regarding the reasonableness
     of the penalty is terse. ID at 19-21. Nonetheless, we agree with her conclusion that the
     penalty of removal is reasonable. See Gaines v. Department of the Air Force,
     94 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶ 11 (2003) (explaining that the Board has upheld a penalty of
     removal for disrespectful conduct); Holland v. Department of Defense, 83 M.S.P.R.
     317, ¶¶ 10-12 (1999) (concluding that a penalty of removal was reasonable for rude and
     discourteous behavior toward customers, despite a lengthy Federal tenure and princ iples
     of progressive discipline, and when the appellant repeatedly engaged in such behavior
     and never acknowledged that such behavior was improper or expressed remorse);
     Lewis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 80 M.S.P.R. 472, ¶ 7 (1998) (considering
     whether removal was within the tolerable bounds of reasonableness for a charge of
     disrespectful behavior and concluding that it was, particularly when such conduct was
     directed at a superior in the presence of coworkers); Roberson v. Veterans
     Administration, 27 M.S.P.R. 489, 494 (1985) (stating that abusive language and
     disrespectful behavior are not acceptable conduct and are not conducive to a stable
     work environment).
     4
       Related to the administrative judge’s rejection of evidence, the appellant argues on
     review that the initial decision is incomplete because it does not include a discussion of
     all the evidence, PFR File, Tab 1 at 11 (citing Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
     Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980)). In Spithaler, the Board explained that an
     initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize the
     evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the administrative judge’s
     conclusions of law and his legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that
     reasoning rests. Spithaler, 1 M.S.P.R. at 589. Because, as later explained, we discern
     no abuse of discretion in the administrative judge’s rulings on evidence and the
     appellant otherwise has failed to clearly state what, if any, evidence that was accepted
     into the record that the administrative judge did not consider or discuss in the initial
     decision, the appellant has not demonstrated that the initial decision is not in
     accordance with the requirements set forth in Spithaler.
                                                                                           4

     an order denying the agency’s request to strike that evidence but inf orming the
     parties that no new submissions would be accepted into the record and that “[a]ll
     other submissions will be rejected.”      B-3 AF, Tab 94 at 1.       Nonetheless, the
     appellant attempted to file more evidentiary pleadings.        B-3 AF Tabs 97-100.
     The administrative judge rejected several of those submissions but explained that,
     because some of the appellant’s “late-filed submissions may be relevant” to her
     findings, she admitted them into the record. B-3 AF, Tab 101 at 1-2. Regarding
     the submissions she did not accept into the record, the administrative judge
     explained that those documents were already in the record and/or “significantly
     predate the close of the record deadline and were in the appellant’s possession
     long before the close of record date.” Id. at 1. As she did in her previous order,
     she explained that any pleadings not accepted would be deleted from the online
     repository. 5 Id. at 2.
¶4         On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s rejection of
     evidence and argues that she should have been afforded greater leniency given her
     status as a pro se appellant. 6 PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-11, 31. These arguments are

     5
       The appellant also argues on review that the administrative judge was required by the
     Administrative Judges Handbook to include in the record a description of the rejected
     evidence and that she did not do so. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10 -11, 31. However, the
     appellant does not cite to any provision of the Administrative Judges Handbook
     supporting such a requirement. Id. Indeed, the only relevant provision in that
     document that requires a “Rejected Exhibit” section in the record, inclusive of a
     description of such evidence, relates to evidence that is rejected due to its volume and
     size. Administrative Judges Handbook, Chapter 10, The Hearing and Its Record at 62.
     The evidence here was rejected due to untimeliness and relevance. In any event, in
     both orders rejecting the appellant’s submissions, the administrative judge listed what
     was being excluded and, in some instances, included a brief description. B-3 AF,
     Tabs 95, 101. As such, the appellant’s argument is without merit .
     6
       With the appellant’s petition for review, she files additional documents and a
     supplement, which appear to include the pleadings and evidence rejected below.
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 33-44, Tab 2. As explained above, we discern no error in the
     administrative judge’s rejection of certain evidence. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b). To the
     extent some of the documents are being submitted for the first time on review, the
     Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with a petition
     for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record closed before the
                                                                                            5

     unpersuasive. The Board’s regulations provide an administrative judge with wide
     discretion to rule on submissions of evidence and to ensure a fair and just
     adjudication of the case. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b). Here, the administrative judge
     appropriately set forth fair deadlines for the submission of argumen ts and
     evidence and gave the parties at least 3 weeks’ notice of those deadlines. B -3 AF,
     Tab 80.    Despite these deadlines, she accepted into evidence the appellant’s
     untimely September 10 and 11, 2021 evidentiary submissions, ordered that no
     other pleadings would be accepted into the record, and later still explained that,
     despite this order, she would accept into the record certain untimely-filed
     submissions from the appellant that she deemed relevant to her decision. B -3 AF,
     Tabs 94, 101. Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge did not abuse
     her discretion under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b) when she rejected certain evidentiary
     submissions from the appellant. 7
¶5         Regarding the appellant’s claim that her removal was taken in reprisal for
     prior EEO activity, the administrative judge applied the standard set forth in
     Warren v. Department of the Army, 804 F.2d 654 (Fed. Cir. 1986), and found that

     administrative judge despite the party’s due diligence. See Avansino v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 213-14 (1980).             Here, the record closed in early
     September 2021, B-3 AF, Tab 80, and all of the documents were available to the
     appellant before that time. Further, the appellant has not explained why she was unable
     to file any of the newly submitted documents below, nor has she explained how they are
     otherwise of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different than that of the initial
     decision. As such, none of the documents provides a basis to grant the petition for
     review. See Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (stating that
     the Board generally will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a
     showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the
     initial decision).
     7
       The appellant also argues on review that the administrative judge ordered sanctions
     against the agency precluding it from filing additional evidence to support one of the
     specifications and that the agency nonetheless filed additional evidence, which the
     administrative judge ultimately considered in the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5,
     31. After a review of the record, however, we are unable to find any evidence that the
     administrative judge ordered sanctions against the agency, and the appellant has cited to
     no such order. Accordingly, the appellant’s argument is without merit.
                                                                                           6

     the appellant failed to prove that the agency official responsible for her removal
     was aware of her EEO complaints and, as such, that she failed to meet her burden
     of proof on this claim. ID at 16-17. We clarify, however, that when analyzing an
     affirmative defense of discrimination or retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16,
     such as the appellant’s claims here, the Board applies Title VII standards.
     Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51 (2015), overruled in
     part by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25.
¶6         Even taking as true the appellant’s claim below and on review that everyone
     at the agency was aware of her prior EEO activity, we find that, absent more, the
     appellant has still failed to prove this claim by preponderant evidence.
     Cf. Brasch v. Department of Transportation, 101 M.S.P.R. 145, ¶ 13 (2006)
     (concluding that an appellant’s proof of responsible agency officials’ knowledge
     of   protected   activity   under   the   Uniformed     Services    Employment      and
     Reemployment Rights Act, without more, is insufficient to show that such
     activity was a motivating factor in the agency’s actions). Indeed, the appellant
     has not shown that the deciding official, who was also the proposing official, was
     the subject of the prior EEO activity, 8 that the EEO activity negatively affected
     him, or that he suffered any negative consequences from the appell ant’s decision
     to engage in that activity. Accordingly, we modify the initial decision to find that
     the appellant failed to prove that her EEO activity was a motivating factor in her
     removal. 9

     8
       We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that there is no evidence that the
     former Director of Operations, who was a subject in the appellant’s EEO complaints,
     was the actual proposing and deciding official in this matter. ID at 15 -16.
     9
      Because we find that the appellant failed to prove that her prior EEO activity was a
     motivating factor in her removal, we do not reach the question of whether that activity
     was a “but-for” cause of the removal. See Pridgen v. Office of Management and
     Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33.
                                                                                           7

¶7         Based on the forgoing, we affirm the initial decision as modif ied. 10

                              NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 11
           The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
     Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
     review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
     your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
     forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
     summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
     provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
     the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
     regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
     this final decision, you should immediately review the law appli cable to your
     claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
     within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
     chosen forum.

     10
        The appellant argues on review that the discovery process below was “incomplete”
     and “protracted” because the agency refused to turn over information and claimed that
     documentation was lost. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18-20. Based on our review of the record,
     we discern no error in the administrative judge’s handling of the discovery process.
     Notably, the parties have engaged in discovery in this matter for over four years.
     B-3 AF, Tab 79. When the appellant was unsatisfied with the agency’s discovery
     responses, she filed motions to compel the agency’s responses, pursuant to Board
     regulations. B-3 AF, Tabs 8-9, 12, 73. Addressing the appellant’s discovery
     challenges, the administrative judge regularly held discovery-based status conferences,
     remained engaged and informed regarding the discovery disputes between the parties,
     and, on several occasions, ordered the agency to respond to the appellant’s challenged
     discovery requests. B-3 AF, Tabs 14, 24, 30, 38, 54. Ultimately, she either deemed the
     appellant’s discovery requests not relevant, or she determined that the agency’s
     responses to her discovery orders were sufficient. B-3 AF, Tab 54, 67. On review, the
     appellant has not identified any specific error in these rulings, and we discern none.
     11
       Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
     the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
     Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                          8

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choice s of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                  9

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                      10

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review    pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 12   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

12
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisd iction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                11

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.