Court Opinion

ID: 9653700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:52:13.741535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:52.785688
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
WOODLEY, Presiding Judge.
Upon re-examination of appellant’s fourth ground of error, in light of state’s motion for rehearing and brief, we have concluded that under the record Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed. 2d 255, does not support our holding that the trial court erred in allowing the district attorney to read from the transcription of the court reporter’s notes, over appellant’s objection that the state failed to lay a proper predicate, the testimony of the witness Cecil Porter.
The state points out that the trial at which the testimony was reproduced was on January 30 to February 1, 1967. Barber v. Page, supra, was decided more than a year later (April 23, 1968).
Appellant’s brief assigning error was filed in the trial court on April 1, 1968 (3 weeks prior to Barber v. Page).
Art. 39.01 V.A.C.C.P. provides in part that testimony of a witness “taken at any prior trial of the defendant for the same offense, may be used by either the State *76or the defendant in the trial of such defendant’s criminal case * * *. When oath is made by the party using the same that the witness resides outside the State; or that since his testimony was taken, the witness has died, or that he has removed beyond the limits of the State, * * When the testimony is sought to be used by the state, the oath may be made by any credible person.”
The Witness Harris testified that Cecil Porter was “in Nevada,” “works there,” lives in Mina, Nevada — “That’s where he resides.”
After the Witness Harris left the stand and a recess had been taken, the District Attorney offered into evidence “the testimony that was given by Mr. Cecil Porter at a prior trial of this matter held on April 25, of 1966, it having been shown that he is a resident of Nevada and works in Nevada.”
The objection which the court overruled before the testimony of the absent witness was read was:
“Your Honor, please, the defendant is going to object to reading the testimony for the reason the proper predicate has not been laid for its admission. No attempt, as far as the record is, has been made to have Mr. Porter here. We had no notice that this was going to attempt to read the deposition. There’s been no application as far as we know to the Judge for certificate to have him appear here as a witness, assuming the State of Nevada is past the Uniform Out of the State Witness Act, and just the proper predicate has not been laid for the simple — one State witness testifies another one is off somewhere else does not authorize them to read testimony of a prior trial. We’re going to object to it until the State has complied with the law and until a proper predicate has been laid for its admission.”
The record reflects that counsel for appellant waived any complaint as to whether the testimony given at the prior trial was correctly transcribed and correctly read to the jury when he agreed that the court reporter correctly transcribed the testimony, and the testimony admitted was that read from the statement of facts at the former trial which transcript he had purchased and had used in cross-examining witnesses at the second trial.
The Witness Porter was examined and cross-examined at the former trial by the same counsel that represented the state and the appellant at his second trial for the same offense at which his prior testimony was reproduced.
There remains the question of whether the holding of the Supreme Court in Barber v. Page, supra, should be applied retroactively, and if so, whether such decision is to be applied where, as here, the testimony of the absent witness which was reproduced was given at a former trial, “a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner (the defendant), had been represented by counsel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine * * (quote from Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923)
The Supreme Court pointed out in Pointer v. State of Texas, supra, that “(i)t cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right to cross-examine is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him,” and also stated “(t)he case before us would be quite a different one had Phillips’ statement been taken at a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine.” Barber v. Page, supra, is also a case where the testimony taken was at a preliminary hearing.
The following language from the Barber opinion makes it clear that the decision closely parallels the earlier decision of Pointer:
“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the oppor*77tunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial.” (emphasis added)
The predicate was sufficient and the trial court did not err in permitting the reproduction of Porter’s testimony.
The state’s motion for rehearing is granted; the reversal is set aside, and the judgment is affirmed.
ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING