Court Opinion

ID: 9498312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:14:24.237129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:45.709672
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Like the majority, I am troubled that in this case the jury did not hear eye-witness testimony that may well have strengthened Davis’s case. Yet, under the limited review permitted by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2005), I am simply unable to conclude that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law. While I concur in Part II of the majority opinion, holding that no unconstitutional intimidation by the prosecution occurred, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the state courts acted contrary to established Supreme Court law, either by permitting a witness to give a blanket assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or by finding no ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to offer the same witness’ prior out-of-court statements as declarations against interest.
The witness Jourdan invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, after consulting with independent counsel, and without (as the majority agrees) unconstitutional intimidation by the prosecution. The trial court did not require Jourdan to take the stand and invoke his right in response to each question. The only way to hold that this procedure was “contrary to” established Supreme Court law is to determine that Supreme Court case law requires defense witnesses invoking the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to take the stand and invoke the right on a question-by-question basis.
Such a rule doubtless has merit, see In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 167 (6th Cir.1983), although it could be argued that the trial court should have discretion to permit blanket invocation of the right in appropriate circumstances.1 But neither the petitioner nor the majority has cited a Supreme Court case holding that such a procedure is required for the benefit of criminal defendants.
The majority relies upon Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951), but that case states no rule proscribing a blanket assertion of the privilege. In fact, Hoffman upheld the invocation of the privilege as to very preliminary questions. The opinion in Hoffman does state at one point, “To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.” 341 U.S. at 486-87, 71 S.Ct. 814. In context, the Court may have been simply admonishing trial courts to use their good judgment when determining whether a responsive answer would tend to incriminate the witness. Id. at 486, 71 S.Ct. 814. The sentence by its terms, and certainly in context, does not necessarily imply — and clearly does not hold- — that defense witnesses must always take the stand in order to invoke the privilege. Indeed, the Court immediately followed by saying: “The trial *376judge in appraising the claim ‘must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.”’ Id. at 487, 71 S.Ct. 814 (citing Ex parte Irvine, 74 F. 954, 960 (C.C.S.D.Ohio 1896) (Taft, J.)).
It is true that our circuit in Morganroth, supra, stated as follows:
A blanket assertion of the privilege by a witness is not sufficient to meet the reasonable cause requirement and the privilege cannot be claimed in advance of the questions. The privilege must be asserted by a witness with respect to particular questions, and in each instance, the court must determine the propriety of the refusal to testify. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-88, 71 S.Ct. 814.
718 F.2d at 167. The issue resolved in Morganroth, however, was not whether the invocation of the privilege required that the witness to take the stand. The witness in that case had in fact taken the stand. Instead, the issue was whether the witness “must supply personal statements ... or ... evidence with respect to each question propounded to him to indicate the nature of the criminal charge which provides the basis for his fear of prosecution” in the particular context of possible incrimination for perjury. Id. at 169. Such a requirement was warranted where the witness feared incriminating himself of perjury by giving testimony inconsistent with prior sworn testimony, because “the incriminating nature of the answer is not evident from the implications of the question in the setting in which it is asked[.]” Id. Not only is this a different issue, but also the issue was raised in the context of an appeal by a witness from an order directing him to testify, not in the context of a criminal defendant’s right to present testimony. The statement in Morganroth about blanket assertions and particular questions is thus at best dictum with respect to the issue presented in this case: whether a criminal defendant has a due process right to invoke the Fifth Amendment without taking the stand and responding to individual questions, regardless of the circumstances. In any event, AEDPA calls for us to interpret clearly established federal law, “as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” not the United States Courts of Appeals. Indeed, the Supreme Court has considered that a state court may disagree with the law of its federal circuit: “A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), also fails to warrant a grant of habeas corpus under AED-PA. It is true that, entirely outside the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination context, Washington v. Texas clearly established that, under the Sixth Amendment, a state may not arbitrarily deny a defendant the right to call a witness whose testimony is relevant and material to the defense. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision, however, was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Washington v. Texas.
Washington v. Texas does not hold that a defendant has the right to present any and all witnesses. The Court addressed the limits of a defendant’s right to call witnesses and held that a state cannot create “arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.” *377Id. at 22, 87 S.Ct. 1920. The Court proceeded to hold that Texas’ rule against allowing purported accomplice testimony was an “absurdity.” Id. Because the Court did not consider the question of a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination anywhere in its opinion, it cannot be said that the Court created clearly established law against a blanket assertion of the privilege in that case. See id. at 23 n. 21, 87 S.Ct. 1920 (“Nothing in this opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination ..., which [is] based on entirely different considerations from those underlying the common-law disqualifications for interest.”).
This leaves only one remaining basis for granting the writ — that Davis received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to try to introduce Jourdan’s prior unsworn statements into evidence. Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel requires both that defense counsel’s services fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney and that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish prejudice, it would be necessary to show that Jourdan’s prior unsworn statements were admissible. But the contrary was held by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which determined as a matter of state evidence law that Jourdan’s prior statements would not have been admissible in any event. See People v. Davis, No. 207725, 2000 WL 33385391, at *3 (Mich.Ct.App. Dec.26, 2000) (per curiam) (“[The statements] do not qualify as statements against penal interest for purposes of MRE 804(b)(3).”). We are bound by the state court’s determination of its own law. Hutchison v. Marshall, 744 F.2d 44, 46 (6th Cir.1984); see also Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir.2003); Israfil v. Russell, 276 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir.2001); Duffel v. Dutton, 785 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir.1986). Because we cannot logically grant the writ based on ineffective assistance of counsel without determining that the state court erred in its interpretation of its own law, we are constrained to uphold the district court’s denial of the writ.
Finally, a different result is not required by the asserted tension between a constitutional holding that a witness may not be required to testify for fear of providing an incriminating statement and a state-law evidentiary holding that prior statements by the same witness were not admissible as statements against penal interest. The majority cites no authority for the proposition that these determinations are legal mirror-images of each other, and certainly the Supreme Court has not so held as a matter of constitutional law.
I therefore reach the conclusion that under AEDPA the writ was properly denied.

. Defendant suggests that the first question for Jourdan would have been: "Were you present?" A strong case can be made that such an initial question could properly warrant invocation of the privilege. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). If so, it is arguably a pointless formality, within a trial court's discretion to forgo, to insist that the witness take the stand.