Court Opinion

ID: 9943636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 22:04:13.703894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:38.884393
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 220577-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                           NOTICE
 Decision filed 02/23/24. The
                                                                            This   order    was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0577                   Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                            not precedent except in the
 the filing of   a Petition for
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                       limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                  under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Macon County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 98-CF-1768
                                                )
LARRY A. McGEEHON,                              )     Honorable
                                                )     Thomas E. Griffith Jr.,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Presiding Justice Vaughan and Justice McHaney concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1       Held: The trial court’s finding that the respondent remained a sexually dangerous person
               under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act was not against the manifest weight of
               the evidence.

¶2       In 1999, the respondent, Larry A. McGeehon, was adjudicated a sexually dangerous person

under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDP Act) (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)),

and the trial court committed him to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

until such time as he was no longer a sexually dangerous person. On June 8, 2021, the respondent

filed an application for discharge or conditional release pursuant to section 9 of the SDP Act,

alleging that he had recovered and was no longer a sexually dangerous person. Id. § 9. Following

a bench trial, in August 11, 2022, the trial court entered a written order denying the respondent’s

application. The respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his application

                                                  1
for conditional release because he has made dramatic improvement in his treatment such that he is

not substantially probable to reoffend, and that the trial court’s denial of his application was against

the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

¶3                                      I. FACTS

¶4       On December 2, 1998, the respondent was charged by information with one count of

attempted predatory criminal sexual assault against A.M.P., a minor under the age of 13 (720 ILCS

5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)), and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against A.M.P.,

a minor under the age of 13 (id. § 12-16(c)(1)(i)). On March 15, 1999, the State filed a petition to

proceed under the SDP Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)). On December 15, 1999, the

respondent confessed to the State’s petition and the allegations contained therein, stipulated to the

two psychiatric evaluation reports, and consented to a court-ordered commitment to the custody

of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), under the guardianship of the Director of

Corrections (Director).

¶5       On June 8, 2021, the respondent filed a petition for discharge or conditional release

pursuant to section 9 of the SDP Act. Id. § 9(a). On November 23, 2021, the trial court ordered the

IDOC to appoint an evaluator and file a statutorily mandated socio-psychiatric evaluation report

on the respondent. See id. § 9. On December 16, 2021, the IDOC filed a sexually dangerous

persons evaluation report prepared by Dr. Clounch. On February 24, 2022, the respondent filed a

motion for the appointment of an expert witness, which was denied by the trial court on March 28,

2022.

¶6       The trial court conducted a recovery hearing on the respondent’s June 8, 2021, petition for

discharge or conditional release application on August 11, 2022. The State’s only witness was Dr.

                                                   2
Clounch, a clinical psychologist, and defense counsel stipulated to Dr. Clounch’s qualifications

and as an expert in assessing individuals under the SDP Act. Dr. Clounch testified that he was an

employee of Wexford Health Services that contracts with the State of Illinois to perform

sexually dangerous persons evaluations and that he had performed an in-person evaluation of

the respondent on November 30, 2021. In conducting the evaluation, Dr. Clounch interviewed

the respondent about his past, his sexual offenses, his medical and psychiatric history, and his

sexually dangerous person’s treatment.

¶7     Dr. Clounch testified that, in evaluating the respondent, he completed and scored the Static-

99R, STABLE-2007, and the violence risk scale offender version, known as the VRS-SO. Dr.

Clounch stated that all these assessment tools were empirically verified to show their accuracy.

On the Static-99R, Dr. Clounch explained it has a range of scores from negative 3 to 13. Dr.

Clounch scored the respondent at either a 4 or a 5. Dr. Clounch stated that the reason for that

particular score was that there was an extra sexual offense case in the respondent’s history.

However, it was unclear to Dr. Clounch if that case was a domestic battery case from 1997, where

the respondent was adjudicated delinquent, or another offense that had occurred in May 1998.

According to Dr. Clounch, the respondent admitted that one of his domestic battery cases was

actually an attempted rape of his mother. According to Dr. Clounch, the respondent’s score would

be either a 4 or a 5 depending on whether the attempted rape was one of those cases.

¶8     Dr. Clounch stated that the Static-99R measured the fact that the respondent would be

placed in the above average category level 4A, with either a score of 4 or 5. With a score of 5, the

respondent would be in the 88.7th percentile, meaning that 85 of 100 sex offenders would score

below the respondent. Dr. Clounch explained that individuals with a similar score of 5 would be

2.7 times more likely to re-offend than someone with a score of 2. If the respondent had a score of

                                                 3
4, Dr. Clounch stated that the respondent would be in the 79.6th percentile, meaning that 74 of 100

sex offenders would score below the respondent, and that the respondent would be 1.94 times more

likely to re-offend than the typical sex offender. According to Dr. Clounch, the typical sex

offender’s rate to re-offend is 10 to 15%, over the course of five years.

¶9     Dr. Clounch then testified that the STABLE-2007 utilizes 13 dynamic risk factors to

determine an individual’s risk to re-offend. Using this assessment, the respondent scored 15 out of

a possible 26 points. According to Dr. Clounch, scores of 12 and above indicate a high level of

STABLE dynamic risk. The respondent’s score of 15 placed him in the 92nd percentile, indicating

that 91 of 100 sex offenders would score below the respondent.

¶ 10   Dr. Clounch testified that, for purposes of determining recidivism, the Static-99R and

STABLE-2007 are used in conjunction with one another to determine a relative risk ratio and

provide an overall risk category for the respondent. When combining the respondent’s score of 15

on the STABLE-2007, with a Static-99R score of 4 or 5, it placed the respondent in the “well-

above average category” of level 4B. According to Dr. Clounch, the level 4B category is the

“highest category that we have for the sex offender risk levels, and it indicates that individual[s]

from the group re-offend at a rate of 3 to 4 times the rate of the average offender convicted of the

sex offenses.”

¶ 11   Dr. Clounch then stated that a third assessment, the VRS-SO, was utilized in his evaluation.

The VRS-SO is a combination of an individual’s historical and risk factors, and has two separate

sections, a static and a dynamic factor. Dr. Clounch scored the respondent at a total of 50 out of a

possible 72 in this assessment. This also placed the respondent in the “well-above average”

category. This assessment provides both a 5 and a 10 year risk assessment. Using the VRS-SO

calculator, the respondent’s risk to re-offend for five years would be 27% and for 10 years it would

                                                 4
be 39.6%. Dr. Clounch stated that in his professional opinion, the combination of the Static-99R

and the STABLE-2007 was the best indicator of the respondent’s risk to re-offend.

¶ 12   Dr. Clounch testified that he had a lengthy interview with the respondent to prepare his

evaluation. During the interview, the respondent was able answer questions with respect to some

of his early treatment terms. The respondent understood the questions regarding his treatment and

provided a simplistic understanding of his deviant cycle, at least indicating the level that he had

groomed A.M.P. Therefore, the respondent recognized some of the things he did to foster a

relationship with that child victim, such as bribing A.M.P. to come to the respondent’s home and

communicating with the child’s mother to allow the child to come to the house. Dr. Clounch stated

that this showed that the respondent recognized some of the factors that had led to his past sex

offenses. However, Dr. Clounch stated that a significant portion, including his interview and the

respondent’s treatment, indicated that the respondent primarily attributed his sexual offenses to

him being angry or wanting revenge against the victim or others. Further, the respondent indicated

that he was getting revenge and hurting others because his brother had hurt the respondent when

he was 11 or 12 years old.

¶ 13   Dr. Clounch opined that a significant portion of the respondent’s offenses were “due

primarily to his sexual deviance and the level at which he has arousal to sexualize violence against

women and sexual arousal and attraction to young males.” Accordingly, Dr. Clounch believed that

it was important for the respondent to “process the sexual deviance specific to sexualized violence

and pedophilic interest that will assist [the respondent] in making further progress in treatment,

and hopefully reducing his risk sufficiently that he could be released in the community.”

¶ 14   When asked his opinion about whether or not the respondent remained a sexually

dangerous person, Dr. Clounch opined, based on a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that

                                                 5
the respondent remained a sexually dangerous person. Dr. Clounch was then questioned whether

the respondent had any protective factors that would go against this conclusion. In response, Dr.

Clounch acknowledged that there were three protective factors he considered regarding the

respondent. These three protective risk factors included an individual’s advanced age and/or

significant health decline, an individual’s being in the community for an extended period of time

without re-offending, and whether the individual made either significant progress and/or

completed a sex offender treatment program.

¶ 15   In addressing these protective factors, Dr. Clounch stated that the respondent was 40 years

old, which results in a one-point reduction in his Static-99R score. The respondent had no

significant medical issues that would reduce his risk. Further, although the respondent attended

and participated in his group sessions, and had made some progress in his treatment, he had not

made sufficient progress at that time to reduce his risk. Dr. Clounch acknowledged his awareness

of the protective factors, but indicated that they did not change his opinion that the respondent

remained a sexually dangerous person.

¶ 16   Per the trial court’s prior ruling, Dr. Clounch’s December 16, 2021, report was admitted

into evidence over the respondent’s objection. When asked to summarize why he believed the

respondent remained a sexually dangerous person, Dr. Clounch stated that:

       “I—first, I diagnosed [the respondent] with two sexual disorders, sexual sadism—disorder

       in a controlled environment, pedophilic disorder sexually attracted to males non-exclusive.

       I’ve completed three measures looking at his risk level for future sexual offenses. I believe

       that he is substantially probable to re-offend if released into the community. And I do not

       believe at this time he has made sufficient progress in treatment to reduce his risk.”

                                                6
¶ 17   On cross-examination, Dr. Clounch acknowledged that the respondent was found sexually

dangerous when he was 17 years old and that all of his prior offenses occurred within a quick

period of time, in 1997 and 1998. Further, although the respondent had some program violations

in the past, he had no disciplinary reports since 2005. Dr. Clounch agreed that the respondent hit

“phase 2” treatment in 2019 and that the COVID-19 pandemic caused treatment at the facility to

stop until it resumed in May 2021. Dr. Clounch testified that since treatment resumed in May 2021,

the respondent had been participating and making progress in his treatment. The respondent was

discussing his issues in treatment, with respect to the offense against his mother, and working

through his cognitive distortions.

¶ 18   When questioned on the frequency of the respondent’s treatment, Dr. Clounch stated that

he believed it to be one group session per week, for an hour and a half. Dr. Clounch acknowledged

that treatment is available outside of the IDOC facility and that individuals who are placed on

conditional release are ordered to obtain treatment as part of their release plan.

¶ 19   During redirect examination, Dr. Clounch restated that in 2019, the respondent was in

“phase 2” but that the IDOC no longer used the phases with the treatment program. Dr. Clounch

explained that there were four phases when they were utilized. When questioned regarding

treatment on conditional release and why he did not believe the respondent was ready for

conditional release, Dr. Clounch opined as follows:

       “Well, the concerns are that he hasn’t really addressed all of the factors that are related to

       his offending. Tends to place it based primarily on his anger, I believe anger for [the

       respondent] is a kind of dis-inhibitor so it was a moderating variable in his offending. But

       it’s not—does not appear to primary mechanism and basis for this offending.

                                                  7
               So I would be looking for him to make improvements upon his understanding of

       his whole offending process to implement appropriate interventions to—so that he can

       intervene on his cycle, as well as what he is—the process of different things that are going

       on in his life. And so hopefully he would be able to do that at that time.

               I recognize that yes, he could have treatment in the community, but I don’t believe

       he’s at a point now in which he would be able to respond appropriately if faced with a

       situation where he could offend.”

In closing, Dr. Clounch agreed that the respondent was engaging in treatment and making some

progress, but that the respondent was just not there yet.

¶ 20   At the conclusion of the testimony and arguments of counsel, the trial court ruled as

follows:

               “[Defense counsel], regarding the [respondent’s] age at the time of the offenses and

       so on, in regarding the length of his incarceration, I do have concerns—great concerns. The

       [respondent] apparently does have a limited mental capacity. There are obviously very

       serious allegations. The attempted rape of his mother and then sexual assaults directed

       against very young children. Doctor Clounch’s report was very thorough. He just resourced

       a lot of sources of information.

               The diagnosis is the [respondent] remains a sexually dangerous person. The

       [respondent] has engaged in treatment, but again his progress is still lacking at this point. I

       think COVID really has put a real wrench in terms of individuals being able to make

       progress in treatment. The [respondent] remains a very high risk, so I believe at this time

       the State has met its burden of proof.

                                                 8
              So ***, show again that the Court has considered Doctor Clounch’s report dated

       December 16 of 2021. The sworn testimony and the statements of counsel. Show finding

       by the Court, the State has met its burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that

       the [respondent] remains a sexually dangerous person.

              Having said that, [respondent], I’m now talking to you, I think you made progress.

       My thinking here is within the next couple of years if you can continue to make progress—

       if we have another hearing at that time on a petition for discharge or conditional release—

       again, if there has been substantial progress in statement, I would think at least my thinking

       is at this time you would be at least conditionally released into the community at that time.”

This appeal followed.

¶ 21                                  II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22   Under section 9(a) of the SDP Act, a respondent who has been found to be a sexually

dangerous person may submit an application to the trial court setting forth facts showing that he

has recovered. 725 ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2020). Section 9(a) of the SDP Act states:

       “An application in writing setting forth facts showing that the sexually dangerous

       person or criminal sexual psychopathic person has recovered may be filed before

       the committing court. Upon receipt thereof, the clerk of the court shall cause a copy

       of the application to be sent to the Director of the Department of Corrections. The

       Director shall then cause to be prepared and sent to the court a socio-psychiatric

       report concerning the applicant. The report shall be prepared by an evaluator

       licensed under the Sex Offender Evaluation and Treatment Provider Act. The court

       shall set a date for the hearing upon the application and shall consider the report so

                                                 9
       prepared under the direction of the Director of the Department of Corrections and

       any other relevant information submitted by or on behalf of the applicant.” Id.

¶ 23   Once the respondent files an application, the court must hold a hearing, and the State has

the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent remains a sexually

dangerous person. Id. § 9(b); People v. Hancock, 2014 IL App (4th) 131069, ¶ 139. The respondent

is a sexually dangerous person if he has (1) a mental disorder existing for at least one year before

the petition was filed, (2) criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and

(3) demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or sexual molestation of children. 725

ILCS 205/1.01 (West 2020); People v. Holmes, 2016 IL App (1st) 132357, ¶ 103. “ ‘[C]riminal

propensities to the commission of sex offenses’ means that it is substantially probable that the

person subject to the commitment proceedings will engage in the commission of sex offenses in

the future if not confined.” 725 ILCS 205/4.05 (West 2020).

¶ 24   The respondent argues that the evidence presented at the recovery hearing did not support

the trial court’s finding that he remained a sexually dangerous person and the denial of his petition

for discharge or conditional release. The trial court’s finding that the respondent is still sexually

dangerous may not be disturbed on review unless that decision is against the manifest weight of

the evidence. People v. Houde, 2019 IL App (3d) 180309, ¶ 26. A decision is against the manifest

weight of the evidence only if an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id. On appeal from a

recovery hearing, we must consider all of the evidence introduced at trial in the light most

favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 725 ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2020);

People v. Bailey, 405 Ill. App. 3d 154, 171 (2010). We also note that the trier of fact is in the best

                                                 10
position to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the testimony and evidence presented.

Houde, 2019 IL App (3d) 180309, ¶ 26.

¶ 25   Section 1.01 of the SDP Act defines “sexually dangerous persons” as:

               “All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed

       for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing of the petition

       hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex

       offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of

       sexual molestation of children ***.” 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 2020).

¶ 26   The crux of the respondent’s argument is that he has been committed as a sexually

dangerous person since he was 18 years old and is now over 40. During that entire time, the

respondent received treatment, had been attending his treatment sessions, and was making progress

in his treatment. The respondent contends that evidence was presented that he could be

electronically monitored if he was released and that the evidence showed that he had not been

getting into trouble as much since 2019. Further, the respondent’s probation and suspensions

dramatically decreased since July 2019, and it was reported in November 2021 that he participated

in treatment, always did his homework, was vocal, and “kind of a leader in that group.” The

respondent argues that these facts indicate major positive steps and a dramatic improvement in his

treatment. Accordingly, the respondent argues that the trial court’s decision to deny conditional

release was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

¶ 27   The sexually dangerous persons evaluation report prepared by Dr. Clounch was admitted

into evidence and fully considered by the trial court. In his report, Dr. Clounch extensively set

forth the respondent’s various mental disorders that have existed for over a year or more, and are

accompanied by criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses. Dr. Clounch testified

                                               11
regarding the statistical testing conducted on the respondent, and that he demonstrated propensities

toward acts of sexual assault or molestation of children under the age of 18 years. Although Dr.

Clounch acknowledged the young age at which the respondent committed the offenses, Dr.

Clounch testified at length that his expert opinion was that the respondent is substantially probable

to re-offend if not confined and explained that the respondent had not lessened his propensity to

commit sex offenses through treatment.

¶ 28   Dr. Clounch further explained that he used actuarial measures, the Static-99R, STABLE-

2007, and VRS-SO, all generally accepted by experts in the field for measuring risk of future

offending. All of the actuarial measures indicated that the respondent maintained a high probability

of re-offending. Dr. Clounch testified that he considered the potential protective factors that

reduced the respondent’s risk to re-offend, but opined that the respondent remained a sexually

dangerous person.

¶ 29   Therefore, we find that the evidence presented by State, through Dr. Clounch’s testimony

and report, demonstrated that the respondent remained a sexually dangerous person as defined by

the SDP Act and was sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to find by clear and convincing

evidence that the respondent remained a sexually dangerous person. After a thorough review, we

find nothing in the record that would require us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

The trial court was in the best position to evaluate the expert testimony, make credibility

determinations, and determine the weight to be given to the evidence and any inferences therefrom.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that the respondent remained a

sexually dangerous person was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 30                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31   For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court of Macon County is affirmed.

                                                  12
¶ 32   Affirmed.

                   13