Court Opinion

ID: 9531187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:08:29.801379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:21.657452
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 79. {concurring). I join the majority opinion. I write separately not to solve the riddle of harmless error that again confounds the court, but to help decipher a particular aspect of the riddle.1 As I have written previously, the doctrine of harmless error is a work in progress.2
*619¶ 80. I agree with the majority opinion that the applicable test for harmless error in the present case is the one set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), namely, that an error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.3
¶ 81. Footnote 9 of the majority opinion recognizes that some members of the court view the articulation of harmless error in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1999), as replacing the Chapman test, or at least restating it in a substantively different way. This court has interpreted the Neder test as stating that if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted absent the error, then the error did not contribute to the verdict.4
*620¶ 82. In several criminal cases before this court the State has avoided taking a position on whether the Neder and Chapman tests are the same or different. The State frequently asserts that whichever test is used, the error in that particular case was harmless. In a recent oral argument the State took the position that the Neder articulation of the harmless error test was somewhat different from the Chapman harmless error test, and that the Neder test was somewhat easier for the State to meet in that case.
¶ 83. I agree that the Neder test applies in cases involving a fact situation like that in Neder. Our court has so held (over my dissent).51 have written previously that I view Neder as limited to Neder-type cases. Different errors may call for different harmless error tests.
¶ 84. Whether the Neder test is the test of general application for non-IVeder-type cases continues to be debated by members of the court. Thus footnote 9. This case is not the first case, nor will it be the last case, in which the issue of the correct articulation of the harmless error test, let alone the correct application of the test, is posed.
¶ 85. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.

 Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (1970).

 State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 68, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).

 See majority op., ¶ 60.

 See, e.g., State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶ 29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485 (if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted absent the error then the error did not contribute to the verdict); State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶ 46, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 (error is harmless if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error); State v. Gary M.B., 2004 WI 33, ¶¶ 39, 42, 270 Wis. 2d 62, 676 N.W.2d 475 (Crooks, J., concurring) (same); State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶ 50-52, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (Crooks, J., concurring) (same).
For a discussion of Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), and harmless error, see 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 27.6(e), at 224-26 (2d ed. Supp. 2004).
According to Professor LaFave, "The Chapman standard clearly rejected a 'correct result' test, especially if the correct result was to be measured simply by sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. The standard looked not to whether the jury could have convicted without regard to the error ... but to *620whether the error had influenced the jury in reaching its verdict. ... The Chapman opinion did not clearly indicate, however, precisely what weight was to be given to the presence of overwhelming untainted evidence in making that judgment. ... In subsequent opinions, the Court has appeared to move back and forth between relying heavily upon the presence of proof of guilt in its harmless error analysis, and considering that proof as less central to the inquiry." 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 27.6(e), at 958-59 (2d ed. 1999).

 Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶ 35-47.