Court Opinion

ID: 9533562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:32:38.440854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:05.282198
License: Public Domain

Petrich, J.*
(dissenting) — In its quest to evaluate what it characterizes as the reasonableness of Wilcox and Church’s activities in investigating the Board’s allegations, the majority improperly partakes in a fact-finding mission of its own. The law is well-settled that an appellate court reviewing a decision of an administrative body does not try the facts de novo but accepts the facts of the administrative body provided they are supported by substantial evidence. RCW 34.05; Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983); Renton Educ. Ass’n v. PERC, 101 Wn.2d 435, 680 P.2d 40 (1984); Clallam County v. PERC, 43 Wn. App. 589, 719 P.2d 140, review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1013 (1986).
Had the majority accepted the facts supported by the evidence as established by PERC, it would be compelled to reach the same conclusion as PERC. Instead, it appears to make its own factual determinations from evidence it found in the record that were not a part of PERC’s findings. By doing so, the majority affords weight to those facts, allowing it to reach a different conclusion. In apply*930ing weight to those facts, the court is usurping the role of the administrative body, whose duty it is to weigh the evidence.
Even assuming the majority considers "reasonableness” to be a question of law, it is still bound by the factual determinations of the administrative agency that are supported by the evidence. Franklin County, 97 Wn.2d 317. The majority, in simple passing, claims that it is not a rubber stamp, somehow implying that this court has the power to conduct a de novo review when it disagrees with the agency’s conclusions. The majority cites no authority for this statement. Nor could it.
The following explanation by PERC of its decision readily rejects the majorities "four observations” for denying the status of protected activity to the conduct of Church and Wilcox on May 10, 1990.
The record indicates that, prior to directly contacting students, Church had asked the employer for permission to interview students on the school bus. The employer denied that union request, and did not suggest any joint or cooperative interview process. Church had asked the substitute bus driver for the names and addresses of students who rode the bus, but he had not been provided that information. Finally, Church had given Bruener advance notice that the union would try to talk with the students. The record also indicates that Bruener made, and Church acknowledged, an admonition that the union should not interview students without parental permission.
The only contacts made with students on May 10, 1990 were either made with parental permission, or limited to asking the students for information designed to obtain parental permission before further conversation. There is no evidence that either Wilcox or Church harassed any of the students. Wilcox approached only a couple of students, and only asked those if their parents were home and where they lived. There is no evidence that he pursued the children in any way, or that he verbally threatened them when they did not respond to his inquiries.
Because of the nature of the March 28th incident, and the *931local community’s special sensitivity to potential threats against its children, it would no doubt have been preferable if Wilcox had not approached any students at all on May 10, 1990. We cannot agree, however, that the limited contacts he had with students on that date should deprive Wilcox of the protections of the collective bargaining statute.
Wilcox’s mere presence and approach could have had the unintended effect of frightening some students, but the actions of the substitute bus driver, first in refusing to let the students off the bus and then in telling them they did not have to talk to Church and Wilcox, had no doubt already heightened the anxiety of the students on the bus. So too at Smith’s house, where a call from the school principal triggered alarm before Church and Wilcox ever arrived or had any opportunity to explain the reason for their visit. Consequently, it is unfair to hold Church and Wilcox solely responsible for the fact that some children might have become frightened by their presence.
The record indicates that several parents cooperated in the union’s investigation, and that Linda Poe was the first parent to express any objection to Church and Wilcox being in the neighborhood. Once Poe voiced her objection, Church and Wilcox left the area, and did not try to contact any more students or their families.
The employer has acknowledged that it increased the disciplinary action from a suspension to a termination based on those May 10th actions. In light of the foregoing, we do not find the actions of Church and Wilcox on May 10, 1990 so egregious as to fall outside the scope of the statutorily protected activity of making a reasonable investigation concerning the Wilcox grievance.
Clerk’s Papers at 25-26 (footnote omitted).
I would reverse the superior court and direct reinstatement of the Commission’s decision.
After modification, further reconsideration denied January 19, 1996.
Review denied at 129 Wn.2d 1019 (1996).