Court Opinion

ID: 9908610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 14:07:47.131273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:19.054741
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00097-CR
     ___________________________

        ERICK GARCIA, Appellant

                      V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 5
          Denton County, Texas
      Trial Court No. F21-1866-16

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Erick Garcia appeals his sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for

his fifth driving-while-intoxicated offense (DWI). In a single issue, Garcia asserts that

the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to confinement as opposed to

probation in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 1.02(1)(B). We will affirm.

                                     I. BACKGROUND

      Garcia was charged with felony DWI following a May 2020 incident. See Tex.

Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2). Although Garcia’s offense was a third-

degree felony, the indictment contained an enhancement paragraph that increased the

punishment range to that of a second-degree felony. See id. §§ 12.42(a); 49.09(b)(2).

Garcia pleaded guilty to the alleged offense and true to the enhancement paragraph.

Garcia also waived his right to a jury trial regarding sentencing and elected to have the

trial court decide his punishment.

      At the punishment hearing, the State called two on-scene police officers as

witnesses. Officer Jeffrey McAdams testified that Garcia had been found with his car

in a ditch. According to Officer McAdams, Garcia had been unconscious behind the

wheel of the vehicle when he arrived on the scene, reeked of alcohol, had slurred

speech, was unable to perform multiple standardized field sobriety tests, was unable to

stay awake during the entirety of the investigation, and was one of the most

intoxicated people that he had ever investigated for DWI. Officer Ryan Karnes

testified that his observations of Garcia matched Officer McAdams’s.

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      The State also introduced a number of exhibits into evidence. One of these

exhibits was a lab report showing that Garcia had a blood–alcohol concentration level

of 0.376 at the time that he was tested, which was several hours after he drove into

the ditch. In addition, the State offered a number of exhibits detailing Garcia’s prior

criminal history, which included four prior DWI convictions.

      After the State rested, Garcia called his ex-girlfriend, his ex-wife, and his

counselor as witnesses. Garcia’s ex-girlfriend and ex-wife both praised his current

sobriety but also acknowledged his long-term issues with alcohol abuse and the fact

that he had continued to drink after his May 2020 DWI arrest despite having been

ordered not to consume alcohol upon his release from jail. The counselor testified

that Garcia was a good candidate for community supervision, posed little risk to

reoffend, and would benefit from the DWI Court program.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Garcia to seven years

in prison. Garcia objected to the sentence as being contradictory to the Texas Penal

Code’s rehabilitative goals. See id. § 1.02(1)(B). The trial court overruled Garcia’s

objection, and this appeal followed.

                                     II. DISCUSSION

      On appeal, Garcia contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing

to consider the Texas Penal Code’s rehabilitative objectives when sentencing him. See

id. Garcia’s argument lacks merit.

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      We review a trial court’s punishment decision for an abuse of discretion.

Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The general rule is that a

trial court does not abuse its discretion if the sentence is within the statutory

punishment range. Id. Indeed, a trial court has “essentially ‘unfettered’” discretion to

impose any sentence within the prescribed statutory range, Ex parte Chavez, 213

S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892,

895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)), and any sentence within the statutory limits is virtually

“unassailable” on appeal provided that it is based upon the sentencer’s informed

normative judgment. Id. at 324.

      The range of punishment for a second-degree felony1 is imprisonment for any

term of not more than twenty years or less than two years in the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice.   Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33(a).          Thus, Garcia’s seven-year

sentence is well within the applicable statutory range. See id.

      Garcia argues that because he presented evidence showing that he had a

genuine desire for change and sobriety, posed little risk to reoffend, and would benefit

greatly from a rehabilitative program and because the State presented no evidence

showing that Garcia was a danger to public safety or that sentencing him to prison

would deter him or others from committing additional crimes, the trial court abused

      1
       As noted above, Garcia pleaded true to the indictment’s enhancement
paragraph. Thus, even though his DWI offense was a third-degree felony, the
applicable punishment range was that for a second-degree felony. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.42(a), 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2).

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its discretion by sentencing him to confinement as opposed to probation. But as the

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized, a trial court’s decision regarding

what sentence to impose is a “normative process, not intrinsically factbound.”

Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d at 323. Even assuming that specific evidence were

needed to support the imposed sentence, we cannot conclude that the trial court

abused its discretion. The State presented evidence showing that Garcia has been

convicted of five DWIs, two of which he committed while on probation for previous

DWI offenses.      Given the egregious nature of Garcia’s DWI offense—which

involved driving his car into a ditch while having a blood–alcohol level of over four

times the legal limit, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. 49.01(1)(B), (2)(B)—and his history of

recidivism, we cannot say that his sentence violates the Texas Penal Code’s objectives

to ensure public safety by deterring and preventing the reoccurrence of criminal

behavior. See id. § 1.02(1)(A), (C); Marquez-Ortiz v. State, No. 11-21-00196-CR, 2023

WL 3513188, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 18, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).

      Moreover, as Garcia’s counselor acknowledged, Garcia will have access to

continued treatment after he serves his prison sentence. Thus, by sentencing Garcia

to incarceration, the trial court did not necessarily deny him the opportunity for

rehabilitation. See Marquez-Ortiz, 2023 WL 3513188, at *3.

      In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Garcia’s sentence falls

within the prescribed statutory range and does not violate the Texas Penal Code’s

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objectives. See Tex. Penal Code § 1.02(1). Accordingly, we overrule Garcia’s sole

issue.

                                    III. CONCLUSION

         Having overruled Garcia’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                        /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                        Dabney Bassel
                                                        Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: December 7, 2023

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