Court Opinion

ID: 9778384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:02:46.08325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:08.287580
License: Public Domain

LUKOWSKY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds that the search of Cox’s purse did not violate “Rawl-ings’ legitimate or reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion” under the Fourth Amendment even though the items seized belonged to Rawlings and had been placed in Cox’s purse with her consent for safekeeping.1 I am compelled to dissent for two reasons.
I
The searches and seizures which occurred were the fruits of unlawful arrests and should be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 481, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). After lawfully entering the premises to arrest Marquess the police officers decided that they had probable cause to obtain a warrant to search the premises for marijuana. While some of the police officers went to obtain the search warrant, the remaining police officers would not allow those present to leave the room or the premises unless they would submit to a search. This constituted an arrest because it significantly deprived those individuals of their freedom of action. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). It was not an investigatory stop but an arrest because the detention here went well beyond the bounds of permissible investigatory stops. See, e. g., United States v. McCaleb, 6th C.A., 552 F.2d 717, 720 (1977); Manning v. Jarnigan, 6th C.A., 501 F.2d 408, 410-411 (1974). See also Dunaway v. New York, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
The arrest of Rawlings and the other people present at 1264 Adams Street was unlawful because no misdemeanor had been committed in the presence of the police *351officers.2 KRS 431.005. The facts that the police officers smelled the odor of burnt marijuana and inadvertently discovered a few marijuana seeds in “plain view” in Marquess’ room created probable cause for the police officers to obtain a search warrant for the premises, but did not establish that a misdemeanor was being committed in their presence by any of the individuals on the premises.3 See, e. g., Marsh v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 484, 74 S.W.2d 943 (1934). The odor of burnt marijuana is merely evidence that marijuana has been smoked on the premises at sometime in the past.4 It does not establish that marijuana is present on the premises at the time the odor is detected. Only the odor of either unburned marijuana or burning marijuana would indicate the actual presence of marijuana on the premises. The presence of the seeds in Marquess’ room did not create probable cause to believe that any of the individuals in the living room possessed marijuana even with the presence of the odor of burnt marijuana. See, e. g., People v. Hilber, 403 Mich. 312, 269 N.W.2d 159 (1978); State v. Schoendaller, Mont., 578 P.2d 730 (1978). The possession of the odor of burnt marijuana is not an offense in this Commonwealth hence no misdemeanor was committed in the presence of the police officers.
But for the unlawful detention of Rawl-ings and the others present in the house, the police would not have discovered any evidence against Rawlings. All evidence discovered was a result of this unlawful detention and should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, supra ; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, supra.
II
Even if Rawlings and the others present had not been arrested by the police when they detained them for forty-five minutes, the search of Cox’s purse was unlawful because the search was beyond the perimeter of the search warrant and consequently unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.5 The real issue here is whether Rawlings should be permitted to raise the clear violation of Cox’s Fourth Amendment rights as a violation of his own on the basis that he owned the property seized and the offense charged is the possession of that property.6
The majority opinion concludes “that Rawlings probably does not have standing to raise the issue . . . ’’’tof the illegality of the search of Cox’s purse. (Emphasis added). This conclusion is apparently based on Rakas v. Illinois, - U.S.-, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).
Rakas is substantially different from the instant case. It involved a non-possessory offense and the articles seized were not owned by or in the possession of the defendants. Id.-U.S. at-n.l, 99 S.Ct. at 423 n.l, 58 L.Ed.2d at 393 n.l. Rakas reformulated the test for standing to contest the legality of a search. It held that standing and the substantive Fourth Amendment question of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists are the same. That is *352to say, if there is standing there is a legitimate expectation of privacy and vice versa. However, it left undisturbed the automatic standing rule articulated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), for possessory offenses. I do not read Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), as undermining this rule but as a reaffirmation of it.7 Rakas v. Illinois,-U.S.-, -n.6, 99 S.Ct. 421, 439 n.6, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 412 n.6 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973).
Rawlings is charged with a possessory offense and the Commonwealth should not be heard to say that his possession of these drugs is sufficient to support his conviction but insufficient to support a reasonable expectation of privacy when they are concealed in the purse of a companion. He was entitled to expect that governmental officials would/intrude into the purse only with consent or by complying with the Fourth Amendment. Rakas v. Illinois, - U.S. -, -, 99 S.Ct. 421, 441, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 414 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). Jones v. United States, supra, recognizes his standing to raise the illegality of the search and seizure of the evidence from Cox’s purse. Rakas v. Illinois, - U.S. -, - n.4, 99 S.Ct. 421, 426 n.4, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 396 n.4 (1978). Because the search of Cox’s purse was an unreasonable search and seizure its results should be suppressed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
Further, the search of Rawlings’ person was unlawful because it was not incident to a valid arrest. The “second” arrest upon which the search was based was itself unlawful because it was based upon the fruits of the illegal search for and seizure of the drugs in Cox’s purse.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case to the circuit court for a new trial with directions to suppress the evidence discovered by the unlawful searches.

. Although not articulated in the majority opinion it must be assumed from its tenor that if Cox had been challenging the validity of the search instead of Rawlings the court would have held the search to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and ordered the evidence suppressed. United States v. Micheli, C.A. 1st, 487 F.2d 429 (1973); United States v. Hooper, E.D.Tenn., 320 F.Supp. 507 (1969); Parker v. State, 177 Tenn. 380, 150 S.W.2d 725 (1941).

. The first offense of possession of marijuana for sale is a misdemeanor. KRS 218A.990(4). There is nothing in the record to indicate that any of the individuals present had been previously convicted of this offense so as to provide the police officers with reasonable grounds to believe a felony had been committed by anyone.

. The possession of marijuana for personal use is a misdemeanor. KRS 218A.990(7).

. The Commonwealth’s evidence established that it had been at least twenty-four hours since marijuana had been smoked on the premises.

. Supra note 1.

. Because of the limitations imposed on federal review of Fourth Amendment issues by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), I am disturbed that my colleagues are willing to affirm a conviction which rests upon allegedly illegally obtained evidence when they confess in the majority opinion that they find the concepts of law involved to be “totally incomprehensible.” Collins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 574 S.W.2d 296, 298 n.1 (1978) (Lukowsky, J., dissenting).

. Simmons v. United States holds that when possession of the seized evidence is in itself an essential element of the offense with which the defendant is charged the prosecution is pre-eluded from denying that the defendant has the requisite possessory interest to challenge the admission of the evidence.