Court Opinion

ID: 9646840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:13:07.019929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:42.607775
License: Public Domain

BASKIN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority opinion on rehearing discusses at length the law as it relates to products liability and the law as it relates to negligence. There is no real dispute between the parties hereto regarding the substantive law relating to those two theories of action nor is there any real complaint by appellant that the trial court, in entering judgment, misapplied the law to the facts found by the jury.
The sole issue here is whether the trial court committed reversible error in declining to give appellant’s requested instruction. A majority has heretofore held, and I would continue to hold, that the court did not commit reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury specifically not to consider any evidence of negligence on the part of appellant when answering the special issue inquiring whether the ladder was defectively designed.
The appellant, as plaintiff below, was, under the provisions of Tex.R.Civ.P. 277 and 279, entitled to have the controlling issues of her case submitted to the jury on special issues. The trial court did so submit the controlling issues to the jury, and appellant does not complain that the court should have submitted the case on a general charge nor does appellant complain of the special issues themselves.
Rule 277 also provides that the trial court shall submit such explanatory instructions and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict. The sufficiency of the explanations and definitions is largely within the discretion of the trial court. Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.1974). DeLeon v. Otis Elevator Co., 610 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1980, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Rendon v. Texas Employers Insurance Assn., 599 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1980, writ ref’d n. r. e.). It is also held that the trial court has considerably more discretion in submitting explanatory instructions than it has in submitting spe*789cial issues. Houston Nat’l Bank v. Biber, 613 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n. r. e.); First State Bank & Trust Co. of Edinburg v. George, 519 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.). Special instructions are authorized only when it is necessary “to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict on such issues.” DeLeon v. Otis Elevator Co., supra. Perhaps the court in Brandon v. Cooper, 591 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1979, writ ref’d n. r. e.) has most fully and aptly stated the law in this regard, at page 555:
Rule 277, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes a special instruction only when it is necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict on the issues submitted. Pittsburg Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex.1969); Boaz v. White’s Auto Stores, 141 Tex. 366, 172 S.W.2d 481, 484 (1943). Assuming a proper request or objection, the primary criterion to be observed is that the trial court must give definitions of legal and other technical terms used in the charge. Union Oil Co. of California v. Richard, 536 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1975, writ ref’d n. r. e.). “Anything else, however interesting, or, indeed, however relevant to the case in general— which does not aid the jury in answering the issues must be excluded.” (quoting G. Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas 25 (1959)).
The special instruction requested by appellant is not a definition of a legal or a technical term used in the charge. It was not necessary in order to enable the jury properly to pass upon and render a verdict on the special issues that were submitted to it. As pointed out in the majority opinion heretofore rendered in this case, special issue number one followed the recommended form for the broad submission of a strict liability issue based upon defective design. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1979). The opinion went on to point out that special issue number one covered the pertinent facts of the case and focused the attention of the jurors on one particular question, the existence of a defective design. The requested instruction would not have aided the jury in answering that one question. It therefore was not a proper instruction under Rule 277, and certainly not a necessary one, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request.
Moreover, the trial court would have erred if it had granted appellant’s request so to instruct the jury. Rule 277 instructs the trial court not to advise the jury on the effect of their answers; and this court has held that it is improper under our special issue submission to advise the jury of the effect of their answers. Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The appellant asked the court below to instruct the jury as to the effect of their decision upon the negligence, if any, of the appellant upon the jury’s findings on special issue number one. The trial court correctly instructed the jury, in Paragraph V of the Charge of the Court:
You must not decide who you think should win, and then try to answer the question accordingly. Simply answer the questions, and do not discuss nor concern yourselves with the effect of your answers.
Finally, Rule 434 provides that no judgment shall be reversed on the ground that the trial court has committed an error of law unless the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of the appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Appellant wholly fails to meet the burden of showing that the refusal by the trial court to give the requested special instruction was calculated to and probably did cause the entry of an improper judgment. Nowhere in this appeal does appellant claim that there was insufficient evidence to support findings of the jury to the special issues submitted on defective design of the ladder or upon the answer of the jury inquiring about negligence, if any, of the various parties. Since *790there is no complaint that the evidence does not sustain the jury’s answers, we must assume that the answer to special issue number one, as well as the answer to special issue number three, was fully supported by the evidence in the case. Since the ladder was not defectively designed, the appellant does not show and cannot show that the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the effect of appellant’s negligence, if any, probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict.
For each of the reasons given above, I dissent from the opinion of the majority on rehearing; and I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.