Court Opinion

ID: 9829330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:13:20.97979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:00.056314
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing, appellants contend that we erred in approving the allowance to Mrs. Devenport of $750, being her half interest in the community fund used in improving the Waters street or homestead property; their contention being that as P. F. Devenport only owned a seven-twelfths interest in this property, his estate would not be responsible, to the community, in excess of the value of the improvements to his interest, and, as $1,500 was the value of the improvements to the entire property, seven-twelfths of the sum, or $875, would represent the improvement value to the interest of deceased, one-half of which, $437.50, would be the community interest of appellee, which amount should have been allowed instead of the sum of $750. The claim in favor of appellee for $750 was allowed as a debt against the estate of her husband and, in our opinion, it is none the less a debt in its entirety because the money was used to improve the homestead in which he only owned seven-twelfths of the fee. Our reasons for holdings on other questions are, in our opinion, sufficiently stated in the original opinion.
In paragraph 7 of the original opinion, we said, “At the death of P. F. Devenport, a constituent of his family (appellee) remained, therefore his interest in the homestead descended and vested in appellants, free from debt, except for purchase money, taxes, or improvements contracted in writing in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, and as it is not contended that, the claim for $750 belongs to either of these categories, it was *909neither a charge upon the land nor its proceeds.” Appellee challenges the correctness of this conclusion, and insists that the record does disclose the existence of a legal contract that fixed a lien, for paving improvements, upon the undivided interest of P. F. Deven-port in the homestead property, hence we are' asked to correct the conclusion accordingly. In view of the criticism, we have very carefully re-examined the statement of facts, and the only evidence in regard to a written contract for paving is the testimony of Mrs. Devenport, who said, “We (meaning herself and husband) signed a paving contract and the Bitulithie Paving Company did the paving in front of the lot, etc.” This evidence, in our opinion, falls far short of' showing the execution of a contract, such as the Constitution (section 50, art.-16) requires, in order to fix a lien on homestead property, hence we find no reason to correct the conclusion as stated.
Motions of the parties for rehearing are both overruled.
Overruled.