Court Opinion

ID: 9918438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 22:06:30.943739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:14.523238
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McNair, 2024-Ohio-107.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                      STARK COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                     JUDGES:
                                                  Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                        Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                  Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-
                                                  Case No. 2023 CA 00042
TYLER McNAIR

        Defendant-Appellant                       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                       Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
                                               Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR 00986

JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        January 12, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

KYLE L. STONE                                  CATHERINE MEEHAN
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY                           PATITUCE & ASSOCIATES, LLC
VICKI L. DeSANTIS                              16855 Foltz Industrial Parkway
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR                           Strongsville, Ohio 44149
110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510
Canton, Ohio 44702-1413
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                        2

Wise, J.

       {¶1}   Appellant Tyler McNair appeals his conviction on one count of Felonious

Assault, entered in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas following a jury trial.

       {¶2}   Appellee is the state of Ohio.

                                    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

       {¶3}   For purposes of this Opinion, the relevant facts and procedural history are

as follows:

       {¶4}   On June 1, 2022, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Defendant-

Appellant Tyler McNair in a three-count indictment with one count of Felonious Assault,

in violation of R.C. §2903.11(A)(2)/(D)(1)(a), a felony of the second-degree, one count of

Attempted Murder, in violation of R.C. §2923.02, a felony of the first degree, and one

count of Aggravated Arson, in violation of R.C. §2909.02(A)(1)/(B)(2), a felony of the first

degree.

       {¶5}   On March 8, 2023, a jury trial commenced in this matter.

       {¶6}   The State called seven witnesses: the victim ("T.I."); the victim’s mother

("S.C."); the victim’s father ("C.C."); Heather Bizub, a forensic scientist at the Ohio Bureau

of Criminal Investigation ("BCI"); Clara Gandy, R.N., from MetroHealth burn unit; Richard

Bibighaus, an investigator for the City of Canton Fire Department ("CFD"); and Michael

Mullins, a cellmate of Appellant.

       {¶7}   T.I., the victim, testified that she had been staying at 614 Marion Ave., S.W.,

remodeling her brother's house, for approximately two weeks prior to the incident. (T. Vol.

I. at 140, 153, 195). The house was located about two blocks from her parents' house.

(T. Vol. I. at 125). She told the jury that she had set up a two-room tent on the first floor
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                         3

of the house and slept on a cot inside the tent. (T. Vol. I. at 155). She explained that she

heated the tent with candles because there was no gas or electric in the house. (T. Vol.

I. at 156, 157).

       {¶8}   T.I. testified that on April 26, 2022, her on-again/off-again boyfriend, Tyler

McNair, stayed at the house to help paint. (T. Vol. I. at 156). She recalled that she fell

asleep that night on one of the cots and woke up around 8:00 a.m. to find McNair sitting

with some books on his lap on another cot. (T. Vol. I. at 159). She said that McNair asked

her where his gold was and she replied, "I [don't] have it." (T. Vol. I. at 160). She testified

that as she started to put her shoes on she noticed a blank look on McNair's face. And

the next thing she recalled was McNair hitting her head, face, and arms several times

with a hammer. (T. Vol. I. at 161-162). She testified that "[she] was trying to defend

[her]self" and McNair told her, "We [a]re going to die together." (T. Vol. I. at 163). She

stated that when McNair hit her, she knocked over the candle sitting on the table in the

tent, which set a stuffed teddy bear on fire. (T. Vol. I. at 163). She said that she begged

McNair to allow her to try to put out the fire, but he refused, so she pushed him and ran

toward the front door and that as she ran, McNair hit her again in the back of the head.

(T. Vol. I. at 164-165, 184).

       {¶9}   T.I. recalled that her clothes had caught fire and that she tried to put the fire

out with her hands. (T. Vol. I. at 165). She then ran to her parents' house and knocked on

the door, where her dad answered. (T. Vol. I. at 166). The next thing she recalled was

waking up in Cleveland MetroHealth hospital. (T. Vol. I. at 167).

       {¶10} T.I. sustained multiple injuries on her head, hands, and arms, including skull

fractures, scars, and burns. (T. Vol. I. at 162, 168). T.I. explained she required skin grafts
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                          4

for the burns and that her hands no longer work like they did before. (T. Vol. I. at 169).

T.I. identified the claw hammer McNair used to hit her. (T. Vol. I. at 171). T.I. positively

identified McNair as the person who attacked her. (T. Vol. I. at 172).

       {¶11} T.I.’s father, C.C., testified that he heard T.I. screaming and pounding on

his door and that she fell into the house as he opened the door. (T. Vol. I. at 141). He

recalled that he helped her to the couch and called his wife. (T. Vol. I. at 142). T.I. told

him she was in really bad pain; and then he saw an ambulance pull up to the house so

he walked her out to the ambulance. (T. Vol. I. at 142).

       {¶12} T.I.’s mother, S.C., testified that when she saw her daughter for the first time

after the incident, T.I. was black from smoke, her hair was singed to her head, and blood

and tears were streaming down her face. (T. Vol. I. at 128). She recalled that EMS initially

took T.I. to Aultman hospital, but due to the trauma, she was transferred to Cleveland

MetroHealth. (T. Vol. I. at 129). There, S.C. saw her daughter sedated but in terrible pain.

Id. T.I. was in MetroHealth hospital almost two weeks and was then transferred to Mercy

Hospital for several days. (T. Vol. I. at 131, 133).

       {¶13} The jury also heard from Michael Mullins, McNair's cellmate, who testified

that McNair confessed to him. (T. Vol. I. at 275). Mullins stated that McNair told him that

he and T.I. were living in a tent inside an abandoned house. (T. Vol. I. at 269). McNair

claimed T.I. was going through his phone, he became irate, and hit T.I. with a hammer a

couple of times. Id. McNair told him that during the struggle a candle was knocked over

which then caught other things inside the tent on fire and McNair panicked. Id. McNair

told Mullins he then jumped out the window and ran, stating he cut himself a few times to

make it look like T.I. attacked him first. (T. Vol. I. at 270). McNair also told Mullins that he
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                              5

would need gold to get into heaven. (T. Vol. I. at 274). Mullins kited (used a machine to

write a note) to a guard in his pod after McNair confessed to him.

       {¶14} Mullins admitted, and the jury heard, he was a convicted felon and although

released, he still had a pending case for identity fraud in Cuyahoga County, was currently

on probation from Summit County for felony child support, was in veteran’s court, and

had misdemeanor theft and domestic violence charges. (T. Vol. I. at 277-279).

       {¶15} Clara Gandy, R.N., from MetroHealth's burn unit testified that she treated

T.I. at the hospital and had reviewed her records. (T. Vol. Vol. II. at 26, 58). She described

the burns on T.I. as severe second and third-degree burns, and further noted the

lacerations on T.I.'s head and arms required staples. (T. Vol. II. at 38). Ms. Gandy then

described the third-degree burns on T.I.'s chest which required skin grafting taken from

her thigh. (T. Vol. II. at 39). T.I. also had fractures to her skull and right hand. (T. II. at 44).

Nurse Gandy identified numerous photographs of T.I.'s injuries. (T. Vol. II. at 34).

       {¶16} Richard Bibighaus, Canton Fire Department Investigator, testified that he

was dispatched and was first on the scene. (T. Vol. II. at 195). Investigator Bibighaus

explained that T.I. was intubated and then placed on a ventilator in the hospital to protect

her airway. (T. Vol. II. at 209). He stated that he personally observed T.l.'s injuries and

also saw photographs of her at the hospital, and that injuries resembled lacerations from

a claw hammer. (T. Vol. II. at 200-202, 212, 239). After seeing those photographs, he

returned to the scene on Marion and located the hammer. (T. Vol. II. at 215). He stated

that an evidence technician had found the claw hammer in the backyard, just outside the

window, laying in a pile of rubble. (T. Vol. II. at 215-216). He explained that he found hair

on the head of the hammer. (T. Vol. II. at 244, 252). He further explained that the person
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                            6

who left through the back of the house exited through a window, not a door. (T. Vol. II. at

245). He told the jury that once he was able to speak to T.I., she told him that McNair was

the person who attacked her. (T. Vol. II. at 238).

         {¶17} Heather Bizub, a forensic scientist at BCI assigned to the DNA section,

testified that she tested the hammer and found female DNA profile on the head of the

hammer consistent with T.l.'s DNA profile. (T. Vol. II, at 11, 19).

         {¶18} The defense presented the testimony of Appellant’s mother who stated that

she saw her son on the evening of the fire. (T. Vol. II at 76). Mrs. McNair indicated that

Appellant had cuts on his hands and going up his fingers as if he were putting his arms

up to try to grab. (T. Vol. II at 79-80). The cuts were significant enough that she suggested

he go to the Emergency Room for stitches. (T. Vol. II. at 78-79). Mrs. McNair indicated

that she was aware these injuries occurred in an altercation with T.I. (T. Vol. II at 82). Mrs.

McNair was afraid for her son and wanted him to go to the hospital. (T. Vol. II. at 82). She

also testified about an injury Appellant had on his right eye after the fire. (T. Vol. II. at 80).

She took photographs of Appellant's injuries about one week after the incident. (T. Vol. II.

at 80). On cross-examination, Mrs. McNair agreed that the cuts appeared linear and

agreed that they could have come from glass. (T. Vol. II. at 83-84).

         {¶19} After two days of testimony, Appellant was convicted of Felonious Assault.

The Attempted Murder count was dismissed, and Appellant was acquitted of Aggravated

Arson.

         {¶20} On April 4, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an indefinite

minimum prison term of eight (8) years up to a maximum prison term of twelve (12) years.

         {¶21} Appellant now appeals, raising the following errors for review:
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                        7

                                   ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶22} “I. APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT

OF THE EVIDENCE.

       {¶23} “II. APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL AS GUARENTEED [SIC] BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUION [SIC] AND ARTICLE 1 SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO

CONSTITUION [SIC].

       {¶24} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED THE MAXIMUM

PRISON TERM FOR ONE OFFENSE.”

                                                 I.

       {¶25} In his first assignment of error, Appellant claims his felonious assault

conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

       {¶26} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be

overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678

N.E.2d 541. Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and

ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id.

       {¶27} Appellant herein was convicted of Felonious Assault, in violation of R.C.

§2903.11(A)(2)/(D)(1)(a). which states:

              (A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                        8

              (1) ***

              (2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to

       another's unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.

              ***

              (D)(1)(a) Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault.

       Except as otherwise provided in this division or division (D)(1)(b) of this

       section, felonious assault is a felony of the second degree. If the victim of a

       violation of division (A) of this section is a peace officer or an investigator of

       the bureau of criminal identification and investigation, felonious assault is a

       felony of the first degree.

       {¶28} Appellant herein argues that the “record is filled with conflicting testimony

which would make it difficult to surmount the claim that Appellant knowingly caused

serious physical harm to T.I.” and “replete with testimony regarding T.I.’s mental health

status and her substance abuse issues.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4).

       {¶29} While Appellant argues that the jury should not have believed the victim’s

testimony as what happened that day and how she was injured based on her mental

health issues and her admission to using drugs in the days leading up to the incident,

Appellant fails to point to any actual inconsistent testimony in the record.

       {¶30} Even if inconsistent testimony had been presented, the jury may take note

of inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly, and such inconsistencies

alone do not render a conviction against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the

evidence. State v. Craig, 10th Dist. Franklin App. No. 99AP-739, 2000 WL 297252, (Mar.
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                         9

23, 2000), quoting State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. Franklin App. No. 95APA09-1236, 1996 WL

284714, (May 28, 1996).

       {¶31} Here, the jury had before it the testimony of T.I., the victim, as to what took

place on that morning. She testified that Appellant hit her in the head with a claw hammer

more than once. Both the victim and Nurse Gandy testified as to the injuries T.I. sustained

on her head, hands, and arms, including skull fractures, scars, and burns which required

skin grafts. The jury also heard testimony from Michael Mullins which corroborated that

of T.I. He testified that Appellant told him he hit T.I. with a hammer a couple of times, that

during the struggle a candle was knocked over which then caught other things inside the

tent on fire, and that he jumped out the window and ran. Mullins testified that Appellant

told him that he cut himself a few times to make it look like T.I. attacked him first. The jury

also heard from a forensic scientist who testified that she tested the hammer and found

female DNA profile on the head of the hammer consistent with T.l.'s DNA profile.

       {¶32} It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the testimony, and in this

case, it is not patently apparent that the jury lost its way. Therefore, based on the evidence

before this Court as set forth above, we do not find this to be an exceptional case in which

the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.

       {¶33} Appellant’s first assignment of error is denied.

                                                  II.

       {¶34} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.

       {¶35} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel's performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) that counsel's errors
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                     10

prejudiced the defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the

result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–

688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136,

538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. "Reasonable

probability" is "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland

at 694.

       {¶36} Because there are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any

given case, judicial scrutiny of a lawyer's performance must be highly deferential.

Strickland, supra at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. “Decisions on strategy and trial

tactics are granted wide latitude of professional judgment, and it is not the duty of a

reviewing court to analyze trial counsel's legal tactics and maneuvers. State v. Quinones,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100928, 2014-Ohio-5544, ¶18.” State v. Timm, 5th Dist. Delaware

No. 21-CAA-11-0060, 2023-Ohio-3768, ¶29.

       {¶37} A defendant's failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a

court's need to consider the other. Strickland at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at

699; State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 2000-Ohio-448, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000).

       {¶38} In this case, Appellant argues counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to

challenge the composition of the jury pool, (2) failing to provide notice of intent to claim

self-defense, and (3) failing to ask the defense witness additional questions on redirect.

                                            Jury Pool

       {¶39} Appellant, who is African-American, argues that only one African-American

juror was on the venire, and that juror was ultimately excused for cause by both parties

due to the juror’s health and financial burden. Appellant argues that the jury panel failed
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                     11

to reflect a cross-section of the community, and counsel should have objected to the

composition.

       {¶40} The Sixth Amendment guarantee to a jury trial contemplates a jury drawn

from a fair cross section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527-529,

95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). To establish a violation of this requirement, the

“defendant must prove: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in

the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are

selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the

community; and (3) that the representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in

the jury-selection process.” State v. Fulton, 57 Ohio St.3d 120, 566 N.E.2d 1195 (1991),

paragraph two of the syllabus, citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664,

668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 586–587 (1979).

       {¶41} In this case, other than defense counsel's personal observation that the

venire appeared imbalanced, Appellant failed to produce any evidence demonstrating

that African–Americans were underrepresented on the venire in relation to their

percentage in the community. There is no evidence in the record whatsoever as to the

race of the persons in the venire or on the master list of potential jurors, cognizable for

purposes of the fair cross-section requirement. State v. Seymour, 5th Dist. Richland No.

03-CA-37, 2004-Ohio-3835, 2004 WL 1614891, ¶54, citing United States v. Maxwell, 160

F.3d 1071, 1075-76 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d 781, 782 (9th Cir.

1992); Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 681-82 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928,

109 S.Ct. 315, 102 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988).
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                       12

       {¶42} More importantly, Appellant has not produced any evidence of the

systematic exclusion of African–Americans from the process used to draw jurors in Stark

County.

       {¶43} Finally, we note that Appellant's claim is based solely on alleged under-

representation on his venire; however, underrepresentation on a single venire is not

systematic exclusion. State v. McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 444, 700 N.E.2d 596 (1998).

       {¶44} Additionally, both Appellant and the victim in this case are African-

American, and race was never raised or implied as an issue.

       {¶45} Appellant has also failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of

trial would have been different.

       {¶46} For these reasons, Appellant's claims regarding the makeup of the venire

on the basis of race lacks merit.

                                           Self-defense

       {¶47} Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective by failing to provide written

notice of intent to present evidence of self-defense, pursuant to Crim.R. 12.2.

       {¶48} Upon review, we find that while the trial court did cite the Crim.R. 12.2

requirement, it also found that Appellant had not presented sufficient evidence to support

a self-defense instruction, namely that he failed to show that he had any reason to believe

that he was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm or death or how his injuries were

caused.

       {¶49} We also find that Appellant herein was not entitled to a self-defense

instruction. Appellant did not take the stand to assert self-defense or provide any evidence

of self-defense at trial. While a defendant does not need to testify to be entitled to a self-
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                     13

defense instruction, there must be evidence, however, to support the instruction. State v.

McDade, 113 Ohio App. 397, 404, 178 N.E.2d 824 (1959) (“The evidence of self-defense

may come wholly from the state....”).

       {¶50} Based on the testimony produced at trial, Appellant was not entitled to an

instruction on self-defense because all of these elements were not presented. As the

evidence does not support the instruction, defense counsel's failure to request such

instruction does not fall below the standard of reasonableness. As such, Appellant is

unable to satisfy the first prong of Strickland.

                                                Witness

       {¶51} Appellant argues that trial counsel should have asked questions of

Appellant’s mother on redirect with regard to the injuries she observed on Appellant’s

hands.

       {¶52} Upon review, we find that since Mrs. McNair was not present at the scene,

it is unlikely that she would have been able to explain how Appellant received his injuries

or aid further in his claims of self-defense.

       {¶53} Further, defense attorney's decision at trial regarding whether to conduct

redirect examination of a witness, and the extent of the questioning, is a tactical choice.

See State v. Likosar, 9th Dist. Medina No. 03CA0063-M, 2004-Ohio-114, 2004 WL

57467, ¶26; State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 767 N.E.2d 678, ¶123.

Hence, whether further questioning of a witness would have unearthed any useful

information is a matter for speculation only. State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-

Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶125. Speculation is insufficient to establish the requisite

prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Peterson, 9th Dist. Summit
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                     14

No. 23434, 2007-Ohio-2091, 2007 WL 1264202, ¶8. Further, vague speculation by an

appellant as to what he would have said if called to testify, and how that would have

affected the jury's verdict, is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

State v. Wiley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-340, 2004-Ohio-1008, 2004 WL 396767, ¶30,

citing State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 146, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989).

       {¶54} Upon review of Appellant's arguments and the applicable law, we find he

has not met the burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was ineffective or that he

was prejudiced by the alleged errors.

       {¶55} Appellant’s second assignment of error is denied.

                                                III.

       {¶56} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

imposing the maximum sentence. We disagree.

       {¶57} A court reviewing a criminal sentence is required by R.C. §2953.08(F) to

review the entire trial court record, including any oral or written statements and

presentence investigation reports. R.C. §2953.08(G)(2) provides this Court may either

increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing where we

clearly and convincingly find that either the record does not support the sentencing court's

findings under R.C. §2929.13(B) or (D), §2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the

sentence is otherwise contrary to law. See, also, State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209,

2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶28.

       {¶58} "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is

more than a mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty

as is required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will produce in
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                   15

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three

of the syllabus.

       {¶59} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial

court “considers the principles and purposes of R.C. §2929.11, as well as the factors

listed in R.C. §2929.12, properly imposes post release control, and sentences the

defendant within the permissible statutory range.” State v. Morris, 5th Dist. Ashland No.

20-COA-015, ¶90 quoting State v. Dinka, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2019-03-022 and

CA2019-03-026, 2019-Ohio-4209, ¶36.

       {¶60} The trial court must consider the purposes and factors contained in R.C.

§2929.11 and §2929.12, but this Court has held that when the transcript of “the

sentencing hearing is silent as to whether the trial court considered the factors in R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12”, a presumption arises “that a trial court considered the factors

contained in R.C. 2929.12.” State v. Hannah, 5th Dist. Richland No. 15-CA-1, 2015-Ohio-

4438, ¶13. Accord State v. Tenney, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2009-A-0015, 2010-Ohio-

6248, 2010 WL 5289110, ¶14 and State v. Crawford, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2021-

0059, 2022-Ohio-3125, ¶18.

                                       ANALYSIS

       {¶61} This Court may modify Appellant’s sentence only if it “clearly and

convincingly finds that either the record does not support the sentencing court's findings

under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence

is otherwise contrary to law.”
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                    16

       {¶62} Appellant herein does not argue that R.C. §2929.13(B) or (D),

§2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or §2929.20(I) apply, so we are restricted to consideration of

whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly otherwise contrary to law.

       {¶63} Initially, we note that the sentence imposed by the trial court is within the

statutory guidelines, and Appellant does not assert a position to the contrary. Instead,

Appellant contends that the trial court imposed a maximum sentence that fails to comply

with the guidelines of R.C. §2929.11 or §2929.12 and that we should reverse the sentence

on that basis.

       {¶64} Appellant is requesting that we act in a manner that has been prohibited by

the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169

N.E.3d 649 where the Court clearly stated that R.C. §2953.08(G)(2) does not permit “an

appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not

supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”

       {¶65} Appellant acknowledges that Jones is controlling and asks that we

disregard it. However, we “are bound to follow the law and decisions of the Ohio Supreme

Court, unless or until they are reversed or overruled. State v. Lenior, 5th Dist. Delaware

No. 10CAA010011, 2010-Ohio-4910, 2010 WL 3921188; Phillips v. Phillips, 5th Dist.,

2014-Ohio-5439, 25 N.E.3d 371.” Wendt v. Dickerson, 5th Dist. No. 2017 AP 08 0024,

2018-Ohio-1034, 108 N.E.3d 1174, ¶30. We are therefore obligated to adhere to the

decision in Jones and to reject Appellant’s request.
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00042                                                   17

       {¶66} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶67} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the decision of the Court of

Common Pleas, Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed.

By: Wise, J.

Hoffman, P. J., and

King, J., concur.

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