Court Opinion

ID: 9471006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:23:13.68455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:14.071112
License: Public Domain

POOLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This case is a conspicuous illustration of the capacity of a determined individual literally to thumb his nose at a district court and later escape being called to account because judges are unable to avoid tripping over themselves with legal technicalities. Try as I have, I simply cannot agree that this defendant, whose history of utter defiance of legal process and court orders, is spread across a clear record, is again to be bailed out on the grounds that he did not act knowingly and intelligently when he rejected two court appointed lawyers, tried to insist that a personally-known lawyer be appointed at public expense and, denied that luxury, elected to represent himself. In an earlier phase of this same case the defendant became the beneficiary of judicial technicality when this circuit reversed the trial court’s adjudication of civil contempt. United States v. Rylander, 656 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir.1981) (Rylander I). The Supreme Court overruled and reversed us and reinstated the judgment. United States v. Rylander, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983) (Rylander II). We are about to reward him again.
I can agree that Rylander was not shown sufficiently to have actually had possession of the disputed corporate records during the critical period although he was the president of the corporation. The presumption that because he directed the corporation he personally had possession of the records, is inadequate.
But on March 24, he deliberately failed to appear in response to the court’s order to show cause. He was tried on that charge and the majority concludes that he had notice of both the duty to appear, the nature of the proceeding scheduled, and the ability to have appeared. When he was finally brought in involuntarily, the court proceeded to hear an ordinary contempt case. The judge appointed a lawyer to represent the defendant. Rylander dis*1007charged him. The judge appointed a second lawyer to defend him. Rylander discharged that lawyer. Clearly, Rylander could keep up that act indefinitely and as clearly, might be able indefinitely to fend off any trial. The judge then gave him his option: take either of the first two lawyers or go it alone.
Rylander went it alone and was convicted. For two reasons, both of which I believe are wrong, the majority has set aside this conviction. First the majority says that the court did not explain to Rylander the pitfalls of being his own counsel. It cites cases such as United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322 (9th Cir.1982) as its authority. The facts in Harris are vastly different. Harris was tried under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 for failing to file income tax returns for three years. It was a jury trial and he represented himself. He knew of his right to counsel but twice stated that he wished to represent himself. He did not know anything about a jury trial, nothing about challenges, nothing about cross-examination and making objections. The Harris opinion states that his “opening” statement was largely a rather meaningless objection to the law and proceedings. A § 7203 charge has many elements calling for learning and skill in presentation. An untutored layman is not generally equipped to handle the intricacies of a jury trial, and especially not in a criminal tax case.
But the only similarity to this case is thát Rylander had refused to appear when ordered by the court in a proceeding which was merely ancillary to a tax trial. Since he was notified to appear and there is no reason shown why he did not appear, his case would seem well described by the language in Harris that
“this court has, however, held that a failure [of the district court to describe all the elements of waiver] will not, in every case, necessitate reversal.”
Whatever defense Rylander chose to offer, he had to have a valid reason for not appearing when he knew he should. Rylander presented no excuse and took no part in the proceedings except his effort to disqualify the trial judge. His adamant refusal to comply with any order of the court was part of a pattern. I find it difficult to comprehend how we expect obedience to valid court orders if we tolerate willful and sustained contumacy. Rylander is shown as a crafty and deliberate person. The rejection of counsel by this corporation president cannot be called the decision of a novice. That principle is intended to protect the unwary, not to ratify deliberate disobedience to a simple and uncomplicated order to come to court at a certain time.
JURY TRIAL
The majority holds that Rylander was entitled to a jury trial because that the contempt charge arose from his refusal to comply with a summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602. The majority reasons that disobedience to § 7602 is punished under § 7604(b) and § 7210, authorizing a misdemeanor penalty of as much as $1,000 or a year’s imprisonment, or both. Therefore, says the majority, “any criminal contempt charged as a result of disobedience to a § 7602 summons is a serious offense and carries with it the right to a jury trial.” (Op. p. 16). The majority is confused. He was not in contempt for disobeying a summons but for disobeying a court order.
The Internal Revenue code sections make it a crime to disobey a summons. Congress has established procedures to compel compliance with IRS’ summons to appear before that agency and produce records and/or give testimony. There are defenses to that requirement. See United States v. Rylander, - U.S. -, 103 U.S. 1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983) (passim), which can be asserted in the agency proceedings or in any court proceedings convened for the purpose of enforcing the obligation. But when a court issues an order or other process to a person for the purpose of bringing him into court where his defenses or mitigation may be heard, the court is invoking its judicial power, and even if the entire world knows that the defendant has a perfect and complete defense to the summons itself, he still *1008must come. If he refuses, it is not merely a disappointment to the agency’s mission, it is disobedience to valid court process. This, as I thought no one disputed, is a plain act of contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401, and is initiated by the court on motion, or sua sponte, under Rule 42, Fed.R.Crim.P., or on application of the United States Attorney or an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose. In such a proceeding, the agency has no standing except as the court may direct, for the purpose is not remedial for the agency’s benefit, but punitive to vindicate the court’s own dignity.
The district court here denied Rylander a jury trial on such authorities as Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975). In its view, however outrageous Rylander might be in refusing to respond to the court’s process, he still was liable to punishment only under the tax statutes. This is at odds with both logic and policy. The district court advised Ry-lander that he would be subject only to a fine of $500 or six months confinement, or both. That is the limit of a petty offense. Petty offenses do not carry the right to jury trial. Rylander’s sentence was within those bounds. I dissent from the majority’s reversal and its awarding him a jury trial.
Finally, although it may be only advisory dictum and district judges may wish to accept the advice with caution and reservations, I do not associate with the majority’s teaching that it is bad practice to combine civil and criminal contempt hearings. Combined hearings are common in district court contempt cases, of which many arise in the course of labor case injunctions. Because they involve almost the identical evidence, and, especially in labor cases, because of the need to bring a speedy end to labor disputes, it would be burdensome on the parties and expensive charges against judicial resources to require two trials with the same evidence and witnesses. The majority supplies no empirical basis for its announced preference and therefore I would belabor it no further.
Rylander has once again, as the Supreme Court said in reinstating his civil contempt adjudication, played “a game of hare and hounds.” Rylander I, 103 S.Ct. at 1555 (quoting from United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884). It is now time for an end.