Court Opinion

ID: 9742960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:23:25.606156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:23.490177
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE BARRY, specially concurring: Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I can not agree with their reasoning concerning the issue of whether the defendant’s cross-examination of Boardman was properly limited. I believe it was. The majority seeks to extend the holding in People v. Norwood (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 253, 296 N.E.2d 852. In Norwood the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that “a defendant is entitled to have the trier of the fact informed as to any promises of leniency that may have been made to the witness, whether those promises related to the present offense or other pending charges.” People v. Norwood (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 253, 257, 296 N.E.2d 852, 854. When, in attempting to prove the State’s promises of leniency to the witness, the cross-examination discloses to the jury the potential penalty facing the defendant if he is found guilty, a unique problem arises. “As a general rule the latitude to be allowed in cross-examination of witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court. Such cross-examination should be kept within fair and reasonable limits, and it is only in a case of clear abuse of such discretion, resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant, that a reviewing court will interfere.” People v. Halteman (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 74, 86, 139 N.E.2d 286, 294. Accord, People v. Gallo (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 343, 297 N.E.2d 269. Nevertheless, the trial court should afford a defendant the widest latitude to demonstrate the bias of the witness against him (People v. Barr (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 50, 280 N.E.2d 708) and to demonstrate that a witness has “a personal stake in the outcome of the trial” (People v. Hughes (3d Dist. 1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 985, 987, 367 N.E.2d 485, 486). In People v. Dimond (3d Dist. 1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 146, 369 N.E.2d 383, even though we found no prejudice to the defendant warranting a reversal, this court indicated that a defendant may cross-examine the State’s witness concerning the failure of the State to institute a probation revocation proceeding against the witness, who had been placed on probation pursuant to section 410 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 56½, par. 1410). Yet to allow the witness in the case at bar to testify as to the limits of the statutory penalty he faced for the offense with which he was charged would have incidentally informed the jury of the possible penalty to be imposed upon the defendant if he is found guilty. Although it may be harmless error to do so, it is a well recognized principal of law that the potential penalty facing the defendant ought not to be disclosed to the jury. (People v. Cimino (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 556, 257 N.E.2d 97; People v. Klapperich (1939), 370 Ill. 588, 19 N.E.2d 579.) The underlying rationale is not merely the lack of relevance to the issue of guilt, but also because of the possible prejudice to the defendant. Of course, just as the State’s Attorney, in order to get a finding of guilt, may emphasize the lesser limit of the sentence for the offense with which the defendant is charged, the defense can emphasize the higher limit to shock the jury into a finding of not guilty or a conviction of a lesser included offense. Even if both arguments are fully presented to the jury, it would be difficult to predict to which party’s benefit such an influence would accrue. Therefore, I believe the better rule to be for the trial court not to allow before the jury any evidence concerning the possible sentence the defendant may receive for the offense charged. In the instant case, the trial court had to consider these somewhat conflicting rules of law. As a result, I could find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s limiting the defendant’s cross-examination of the State’s witness.