Court Opinion

ID: 9607977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:04:11.937793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:42.223580
License: Public Domain

ACOBA, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the remand of this case on the grounds that in determining the division of property, the family court employed a system of “uniform starting points,” which was disapproved in Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw. 470, 836 P.2d 484 (1992).
I would reverse the October 9, 1991 order granting in part Wife’s Motion for Reconsideration Filed July 23, 1991 because on the record there is no valid basis for requiring that Wife continue as the beneficiary on the policy insuring Husband’s life.
I would not remand for a determination of the applicability of the 1987 amendment to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 572-22, because neither party claimed any contract existed under HRS § 572-22 much less requested the trial court or this court for enforcement of contractual remedies.1 As with *96any other contract, the purported existence and enforcement of any HRS § 572-22 contract are matters to be raised by the party claiming relief thereunder. Nothing in the language of HRS § 572-22 or its legislative history contemplates that pursuant to HRS § 572-22, a court may sua sponte impose contractual obligations on a party absent a claim for such relief by the opposing party. With all due respect to the majority, the approach adopted by it conflicts with the legislature’s apparent intent to validate agreements which the parties themselves make and choose to enforce, not agreements which we may perceive as possibly falling under HRS § 572-22. Many promises or agreements made in the marital context are never meant to be infused with the considerations that characterize ordinary contacts and I see no justification here for casting divorce issues in the mold of HRS § 572-22 where the parties themselves do not. The controversy here is one which arises under HRS § 580-47, not HRS § 572-22.

. It is evident from the briefs that neither party in this dispute argued there was any premarital or marital or post-marital contract under HRS § 572-22 with regard to Husband’s survivor’s benefit plan (SBP).
The issue was whether Wife’s claim for such benefits was appropriately raised.
In his Second Amended Opening Brief, Husband alleged that Wife sought an order that Husband maintain her as the exclusive beneficiary under the SBP only after the divorce trial was completed. On July 30, 1991, the court had initially decided not to divide retirement benefits.
MR. UKISHIMA: I take it—do I assume that you just—the Court is not dividing any of the retirement or IRA pension plans? Each will keep their own.
THE COURT: Each keeps their own.
Wife, on the other hand, asserted that she properly raised a claim to the SBP in paragraph 9 of her February 6, 1991 Position Statement which declared generally that ”[e]ach of the parties should be awarded as his or her sole and separate property, the retirement, pension, IRA, profit-sharing and/or other deferred compensation benefits to which he or she is entitled to or to which he or she may become entitled; provided the properties are distributed pursuant to this Position Statement."
Wife’s brief also contended that Husband’s counsel raised the SBP issue in direct examination of Husband, and cross-examination and redirect examination of Wife. Whether Wife's claim was timely raised or not, it was raised solely in terms of the division of SBP benefits in conjunction with the division of other assets of the parties, not in terms of a contract which had been breached:
MR. TOMAR [Husband’s counsel]: Well, the problem—the reason we submitted an affidavit is because if a new request is coming in which was not made at trial, if it had been made at trial then we would have come in and offered *96evidence to rebut the request to keep her as a beneficiary.
It is not in their position statement. It was not in the question. They didn't even ask her in direct whether she wanted it. There were no questions on—on cross-examination. It was not in closing argument. It just wasn’t brought up.
If it was—
THE COURT: I think it was brought up in terms of deviating from the Uniform Starting—
MR. TOMAR: It was brought up only with respect to an analysis of when they bought the property.
THE COURT: In her basis also the argument being for deviation.

Her position was the deviation on the Uniform Starting Point regarding the marital residence as well as her separately owned property.

MR. TOMAR: She didn’t argue for continued life time benefits, however, as a survivor's annuity in that connection.
THE COURT: No, because her position was I was going to do something other than what I did. (Emphasis added.)