Court Opinion

ID: 9770316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:58:22.067545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:38.835044
License: Public Domain

*597OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted of burglary and his punishment was assessed by the court at five (5) years, probated. On original submission his conviction was affirmed in a panel opinion.
The one-man dissenting opinion contended that there was a material variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof. It notes that the indictment alleged the owner to be “Cecil Chatman” and the proof showed the owner to be “Cecil Chapman.”
The dissent noted that if the names are not idem sonans as a matter of law, then the question of the sufficiency of the evidence may be raised on appeal, even where a jury has been given an instruction to resolve the issue and has found against the defendant and cited Cox v. State, 608 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Escobar v. State, 578 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); and Grant v. State, 568 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
The dissent called attention to Westbrook v. State, 23 Tex.App. 401, 5 S.W. 248 (1887), and stated that it held “Chapman” and “Chatman” are not the same names and are not idem sonans as a matter of law. The dissent would reverse because of a fatal variance.
The majority of the panel noted the dissent’s position and stated that the issue had not been raised in the trial court or on appeal and had been urged only by the dissent. Martin v. State, 541 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), was quoted:
“.. . Questions involving the rule of idem sonans must be raised in the first instance at trial. If the issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it will be treated as having been waived and will present nothing for review ... . ”
The en banc court granted the motion for rehearing limited to the above described contention.
An examination of the record shows the indictment alleges the owner to be “Cecil Chatman.” The transcription of the court reporter’s notes shows that the witness who testified he was the owner was Charles Chapman, at least that is the way the court reporter spelled his name. No one asked the witness to spell his name for the record, and no issue was raised at trial and no issue was raised on appeal. Appellant thus never presented any evidence that the names “Chatman” and “Chapman” are patently incapable of being sounded the same and are not idem sonans.
Our concern, however, was the description of the holding in Westbrook v. State, supra, given by the dissenting opinion. It stated that the Westbrook opinion held that “Chatman” and “Chapman” are not the same names and are not idem sonans as a matter of law.
Westbrook held that it is not essential for a forgery indictment to set out the forged instrument both by its purport and its tenor clauses. If, however, the indictment sets out the alleged forged instrument by both its purport and its tenor clauses, any repug-nancy between the two allegations is fatal to the indictment. The purport clause of the Westbrook indictment alleged the names of the injured party to be “C. J. Chapman,” whereas the tenor clause alleges the name to be “C. J. Chatman.” The court stated:
“Because the variance and repugnancy between the purport and tenor clauses are irreconcilable to the extent that they invalidate the indictment, the judgment is reversed, and the prosecution is dismissed.”
An examination of the opinion shows the court observed Chatman and Chapman are not the same name, but we fail to find any discussion or holding relating to the rule of idem sonans. Certainly the Westbrook court did not, as stated by the dissenting opinion, hold that Chatman and Chapman are not idem sonans as a matter of law.
We conclude in light of Martin v. State, supra, that the panel majority was correct in holding that it is too late to raise a question of idem sonans for the first time on appeal.
*598Further, if the contention can now be raised, we observe that the rule of idem sonans applies and calls for the overruling of appellant’s motion for rehearing. If the names may be sounded alike without doing violence to the power of the letters found in the variant orthography, or if the name as stated be idem sonans with the true name, the variance and misspelling is immaterial. 1 Branch’s Ann.P.C., 2nd ed., § 39, p. 31.
“Names will be considered identical or similar so as to bring them within the scope of the presumption of identity of person if they can be regarded as idem sonans, or ‘of the same sound.’ Names are idem sonans if it is difficult to distinguish them when pronounced, or if common and long continued usage has made them identical in pronunciation.” 40 Tex. Jur.2d Rev., Part 2, § 21, p. 27.
The following names have been held idem sonans. Foster v. State, 1 Tex.App. 531 (1877) (“Foster” and “Faster”); Henry v. State, 7 Tex.App. 388 (1879) (“Whiteman” and “Whitman”); Bronson v. State, 59 Tex.Cr.R. 17, 127 S.W. 175 (1910) (“Darnell” and “Donnell”); Gatlin v. State, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 516, 163 S.W. 428 (1914) (“Janes” and “James”); Jones v. State, 115 Tex.Cr.R. 418, 27 S.W.2d 653 (1930) (“Holland” and “Hollins”); Raseley v. State, 470 S.W.2d 899 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) (“Raseley” and “Roseley”); Sikes v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 257, 312 S.W.2d 524 (1958) (“Vogelsang” and “Voglesang”); Martin v. State, 541 S.W .2d 605 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (“Dianna” and “Dina”).
Where the name of the injured party was correctly spelled “Mahaffey” throughout the record, the fact that it was spelled “Mahaffrey” in the indictment did not create a fatal variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof since the names were of like sound and therefore idem sonans. Jenke v. State, 487 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
Further, in a theft prosecution where the information charged that the property was stolen from “Carl Wallman,” but the prosecuting witness was named by the court reporter as “Carl Waldman,” the names were held to be idem sonans. Smith v. State, 468 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
In the instant case, we hold that the name of “Cecil Chatman” in the indictment and the name “Cecil Chapman” given to the prosecuting witness by the court reporter are idem sonans. To the extent that West-brook v. State, supra, is in conflict with this decision, it is overruled.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.