Court Opinion

ID: 9898583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:41.308491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:19.346851
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                         Washington State
                                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Division Two

                                                                                            May 9, 2023

       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                             DIVISION II
    In the Matter of the Estate of:                                  No. 56662-1-II
                                                                      (Consol. with
    MICHAEL COHEN,                                                   No. 56759-8-II)

                                      Deceased.               UNPUBLISHED OPINION

          LEE, J. — Loren Cohen appeals the superior court’s orders removing Cohen as the personal

representative of his father’s (Michael Cohen’s) estate and appointing a third-party neutral as

successor personal representative to his father’s estate. Cohen argues that the superior court erred

by removing him as personal representative and appointing a third-party neutral instead of Cohen’s

brother, Lee Cohen,1 as successor personal representative.

          We hold that the superior court did not err by removing Cohen as personal representative

due to a conflict of interest or by appointing a third-party neutral instead of Lee, who also had a

conflict of interest, as successor personal representative. Therefore, we affirm the superior court’s

orders.

                                                  FACTS

          Michael Cohen died in December 2020. The decedent’s will, executed in October 2020,

states that all of the decedent’s business assets were “transferred and sold to my eldest son Loren

McBride Cohen prior to my death and I do not own any business assets at the time of my death.”

1
  Michael Cohen and his sons Loren Cohen and Lee Cohen all share the same last name. To avoid
confusion, this opinion refers to Michael Cohen as “the decedent,” to Loren Cohen as “Cohen,”
and to Lee Cohen as “Lee.” No disrespect is intended.
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 56. The decedent’s will nominated as personal representative of the estate

the decedent’s sons Cohen or Lee, in order of preference and succession. The decedent’s will

authorized the personal representative to have nonintervention powers.

         Cohen presented the decedent’s will and moved for the superior court to appoint him as

personal representative of the decedent’s estate. Despite the will allowing for nonintervention

powers, Cohen expressly stated that he was not making a request for nonintervention powers “and

expect[ed] he [would] serve with full intervention until further order of this Court.”2 CP at 66.

The superior court admitted the will to probate and appointed Cohen to serve as personal

representative of the estate. The superior court did not grant nonintervention powers to Cohen.

         William Newcomer filed a creditor’s claim with the estate. Newcomer’s creditor’s claim

alleged that the decedent owed Newcomer money on an unpaid promissory note. Newcomer had

initiated a lawsuit against the decedent on the promissory note claim in 2016, but the case had not

yet been fully litigated at the time Newcomer made his creditor’s claim against the estate.

         In the probate proceeding, Newcomer requested a copy of the estate inventory from Cohen

pursuant to RCW 11.44.015(2).3 Cohen did not provide Newcomer with the requested estate

inventory, requiring Newcomer to file a motion to compel production of the estate inventory.

Subsequently, Cohen produced a preliminary inventory and appraisement. The preliminary estate

2
    The record does not show Cohen requesting nonintervention powers at any point.
3
    RCW 11.44.015(2) provides in relevant part that

         upon receipt of a written request for a copy of the inventory and appraisement from
         any . . . unpaid creditor who has filed a claim, . . . the personal representative shall
         furnish to the person, within ten days of receipt of a request, a true and correct copy
         of the inventory and appraisement.

                                                    2
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

inventory and appraisement contained some unknown sums, but the sums provided showed the

estate’s liabilities outvaluing its assets.

         After receiving the preliminary estate inventory and appraisement, Newcomer sent a letter

to Cohen regarding the personal representative’s statutory duty under RCW 11.48.1404 to recover

fraudulent conveyances. Newcomer’s letter stated that the decedent had previously attested under

penalty of perjury that the decedent owned more than $20,000,000.00 in business assets, and these

business assets were not included on the estate inventory. Because the will expressly states that

the decedent transferred all his business assets to Cohen prior to the decedent’s death, Newcomer

alleged that these business assets had been fraudulently transferred to Cohen. Newcomer also

stated that Cohen had a conflict of interest as the recipient of the transfers and told Cohen to either

transfer all business assets back to the estate or resign as personal representative.

         Newcomer then filed a joint motion with another creditor of the estate5 to remove Cohen

as personal representative and appoint a third-party neutral. Newcomer’s motion alleged that the

4
    RCW 11.48.140 provides that

         [w]hen there shall be a deficiency of assets in the hands of a personal representative,
         and when the deceased shall in his or her lifetime have conveyed any real estate, or
         any rights, or interest therein, with intent to defraud his or her creditors or to avoid
         any right, duty, or debt of any person, or shall have so conveyed such estate, which
         deeds or conveyances by law are void as against creditors, the personal
         representative may, and it shall be his or her duty to, commence and prosecute to
         final judgment any proper action for the recovery of the same, and may recover for
         the benefit of the creditors all such real estate so fraudulently conveyed, and may
         also, for the benefit of the creditors, sue and recover all goods, chattels, rights, and
         credits which may have been so fraudulently conveyed by the deceased in his or
         her lifetime, whatever may have been the manner of such fraudulent conveyance.
5
    The other creditor was Peoples Bank, which is not a party to this appeal.

                                                    3
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

decedent, shortly before his death, fraudulently transferred tens of millions of dollars in assets to

Cohen for the purpose of avoiding creditors. Newcomer’s motion relied on a statement the

decedent made under oath in 2018 that the decedent owned more than $20,000,000.00 in business

assets, the fact that these assets did not appear on the estate inventory, and the fact that the

decedent’s will stated that the decedent’s business assets were transferred to Cohen prior to death.

       Newcomer argued that Cohen was conflicted out of serving as personal representative

because Cohen could not fulfill the statutory duty for personal representatives to investigate and

pursue recovery of fraudulent transfers. Newcomer cited RCW 11.68.0706 as the procedure for

removing a personal representative and appointing a successor.

       Cohen opposed the motion, arguing, in relevant part, that Newcomer lacked standing to

bring the motion and did not follow the procedures outlined in RCW 11.68.070, which Cohen

contended required initiation of a Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA) action under

chapter 11.96A RCW. Cohen also argued “out of an abundance of caution” that RCW 11.28.2507

did not authorize his removal as personal representative because the elements “are not met nor

could they ever be met.” CP at 134.

6
  Chapter 11.68 RCW pertains to settlement of estates without administration (i.e., without
intervention by the court). RCW 11.68.070 provides procedures and a list of causes for removing
a personal representative.
7
  Chapter 11.28 RCW pertains to letters testamentary and letters of administration. RCW
11.28.250 provides procedures and a list of causes for revoking letters testamentary and removing
a personal representative.

                                                 4
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

       In his reply brief, Newcomer argued that RCW 11.68.070 did not apply because chapter

11.68 RCW applies only to nonintervention estates, and Cohen did not have nonintervention

powers. Instead, Newcomer argued that RCW 11.28.250 provided for Cohen’s removal.

       At the hearing on Newcomer’s motion to remove Cohen as personal representative,

Newcomer again argued that RCW 11.68.070 did not apply because chapter 11.68 RCW applies

exclusively to nonintervention estates. Newcomer also argued that he followed all the procedures

required for removal under chapter 11.28 RCW and that the removal procedures in chapter 11.28

RCW were the correct procedures for this case. Newcomer further argued that both Cohen and

Lee were conflicted out of serving as personal representative.

       The superior court ruled that Newcomer had standing to bring the motion and that RCW

11.28.250 gave the court “authority to remove a personal representative when there’s misconduct

or for any other reason which makes it necessary.” 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Dec. 17,

2021) at 28. The superior court also ruled that Newcomer’s motion had complied with all

procedures required by RCW 11.28.250.

       The superior court stated that it was not making any finding of misconduct by Cohen, but

there was a question of whether the decedent had fraudulently conveyed business assets to Cohen

before the decedent’s death. The superior court found that there was an “inherent conflict of

interest” because the decedent, just prior to his death, had transferred all his business assets to

Cohen, and Cohen, as the personal representative, was statutorily required to investigate and

recover fraudulent conveyances. 1 VRP (Dec. 17, 2021) at 30. Based on this conflict of interest,

the superior court ordered that Cohen be removed as personal representative.

                                                5
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

         The superior court also considered who should be named as successor personal

representative. Although the decedent’s will lists Lee, the superior court found that any family

member of Cohen would also have a conflict because they would have to “choose between a good

faith investigation as required by the personal representative that might be at the cost of Loren

Cohen, as opposed to the creditors.” 1 VRP (Dec. 17, 2021) at 30. The superior court found that

the family members were “in a less immediate conflict of interest than Loren Cohen, but still have

an inherent conflict there.” 1 VRP (Dec. 17, 2021) at 31. To support this finding, the superior

court stated that it “would be very hesitant to pull money from my siblings for a creditor knowing

that there might be a chance that something would go to me personally.” 1 VRP (Dec. 17, 2021)

at 31.

         The superior court set a hearing for deciding on a successor personal representative. The

superior court stated that if the parties did not come to an agreement on who the successor personal

representative should be, the superior court would look at RCW 11.28.1208 and also consider third-

party neutrals.

         The parties submitted briefing regarding the successor personal representative. Newcomer

suggested third-party neutral Carol Vaughn. Cohen requested that the court reinstate Cohen as

personal representative and not appoint any successor.

         At the hearing for determining the successor personal representative, the superior court

stated that Vaughn fit “what I was directing in my previous oral rulings for a suitable person who

is not a family member.” 2 VRP (Jan. 21, 2022) at 3. The superior court noted that the other

8
  RCW 11.28.120 provides a list of categories of successor personal representatives to be
appointed if the personal representatives named in the will declined or were unable to serve.

                                                 6
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

categories of successor personal representatives in RCW 11.28.120 did not apply to this case

except for section seven, which allowed the superior court “to appoint any suitable person.” 2

VRP (Jan. 21, 2022) at 4.

        The superior court entered an order appointing Vaughn as successor personal

representative. The order specified that Vaughn was excused from any duties or responsibilities

relating to the 2016 litigation between the estate and Newcomer, and Cohen retained the authority

to direct the defense of the estate in that litigation.9

        Cohen filed a motion for discretionary review at this court, which was converted to a notice

of appeal.

                                              ANALYSIS

A.      REMOVAL OF COHEN AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

        Cohen argues that the superior court erred by removing Cohen as personal representative.

Specifically, Cohen argues that the superior court erred by allowing Newcomer to argue for

Cohen’s removal, proceeding under RCW 11.28.250 instead of RCW 11.68.070, ruling that the

9
  Newcomer proposed this “specific carve-out” for the appearance of fairness, so that it would not
appear that Newcomer was choosing the estate’s attorney for his own lawsuit against the estate. 2
VRP (Jan. 21, 2022) at 6. The superior court asked Cohen if he would rather be removed entirely.
Cohen’s attorney responded that he did not know what to comment, but he suspected that Cohen
was the only person with the ability to defend the Newcomer lawsuit and that Vaughn could not
defend the case. Cohen’s attorney also stated that “if that’s the request . . . we did not submit an
opposition to that request, so I think that’s what . . . the Court should order if that’s the case.” 2
VRP (Jan. 21, 2022) at 11.

                                                    7
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

elements for removal under RCW 11.28.250 were met, and failing to enter findings and

conclusions justifying Cohen’s removal.10 We disagree.

        The issues in this appeal require statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.

Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 761, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014).                  Our primary goal when

interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. at 762. We first

look to the statute’s plain language to determine legislative intent. Id.

        We do not read statutory provisions in isolation when determining a statute’s plain

meaning. Citizens All. for Prop. Rts. Legal Fund v. San Juan County, 184 Wn.2d 428, 437, 359

P.3d 753 (2015). Rather, the plain meaning of a statutory provision is derived from the context of

the statute in which it appears, the entire act, and any related statutes that disclose legislative intent

about the provision in question. Id.; Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762. We will not construe any

statutory provisions as superfluous, void, or insignificant as long as some other reasonable

interpretation exists. Freedom Found. v. Teamsters Loc. 117 Segregated Fund, 197 Wn.2d 116,

134, 480 P.3d 1119 (2021).

        If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, we give the words their common and

ordinary meanings. Tesoro Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 173 Wn.2d 551, 556, 269

P.3d 1013 (2012). “If the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, we give effect to that plain meaning

as the expression of what was intended.” TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 170 Wn.2d

273, 281, 242 P.3d 810 (2010).

10
    Two of these arguments (proceeding under RCW 11.28.250 instead of RCW 11.68.070 and
not meeting the elements of RCW 11.28.250) are not fully explained in Cohen’s assignments of
error but are argued in the analysis section of Cohen’s opening brief and are arguably attached to
Cohen’s assignments of error. Therefore, this opinion addresses each argument on the merits.

                                                    8
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

       1.      Newcomer’s Standing

       Cohen argues that the superior court erred by allowing Newcomer to argue for Cohen’s

removal as personal representative because Newcomer did not have standing. We disagree.

       Generally, a person has standing if the person’s interests are “‘arguably within the zone of

interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question’” and

the challenged action caused “‘injury in fact, economic or otherwise,’” to that person. Wash. State

Hous. Fin. Comm’n v. Nat’l Homebuyers Fund, Inc., 193 Wn.2d 704, 711-12, 445 P.3d 533 (2019)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses

Lake, 150 Wn.2d 791, 802, 83 P.3d 419 (2004)). In TEDRA cases, “[a] person has standing if

they have a direct, immediate, and legally ascertainable interest in an estate.” In re Estate of

Becker, 177 Wn.2d 242, 244, 298 P.3d 720 (2013).

       RCW 11.28.250 provides that “[w]henever the court has reason to believe that” certain

causes for removal exist, “it shall have power and authority, after notice and hearing to revoke

such letters.” RCW 11.28.250 does not include any language requiring a certain party or person

to bring a formal motion nor does it include any language limiting the circumstances under which

the court must come by its belief that cause exists to remove a personal representative and revoke

letters testamentary.

       Other statutes do describe formal motions or procedures from a certain party or person.

For example, RCW 11.68.070(1)(a) states that “[a] party, as defined in RCW 11.96A.030” may

“petition the court under chapter 11.96A RCW” if they are seeking the removal of a personal

representative with nonintervention powers. No such procedure is mandated by RCW 11.28.250.

                                                9
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

Had the legislature intended to mandate a formal motion or procedure from an interested party or

person, it could have done so as it did in RCW 11.68.070. Instead, RCW 11.28.250 authorizes

courts to remove a personal representative when certain reasons for removal exist, regardless of

how that reason comes to the court’s attention.

       Here, Newcomer, who had filed a creditor’s claim against the estate, is “‘arguably within

the zone of interests’” protected by RCW 11.28.250 and appears to have a “direct, immediate, and

legally ascertainable interest” in how the estate is administered. Wash. State Hous. Fin. Comm’n,

193 Wn.2d at 711 (quoting Grant County, 150 Wn.2d at 802); Becker, 177 Wn.2d at 244.

Specifically, as a creditor, if assets were fraudulently transferred prior to the decedent’s death,

Newcomer has suffered an injury that could be remedied if the estate pursues those assets. Thus,

Newcomer has sufficiently established standing.

       Cohen has provided us with no legal authority showing that RCW 11.28.250 requires a

specific procedure be followed or limits who can bring to a court’s attention the need for the

removal of personal representatives. “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition,

we are not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search,

has found none.” Helmbreck v. McPhee, 15 Wn. App. 2d 41, 57, 476 P.3d 589 (2020), review

denied, 196 Wn.2d 1047 (2021). Therefore, we hold that the superior court did not err by allowing

Newcomer to argue for Cohen’s removal as personal representative.

       2.      RCW 11.28.250 versus RCW 11.68.070

       Cohen argues that the superior court erred by proceeding under RCW 11.28.250 instead of

RCW 11.68.070. We disagree.

                                                  10
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

       RCW 11.28.250 and RCW 11.68.070 provide different procedures and causes for removing

a personal representative. RCW 11.28.250 provides that

       [w]henever the court has reason to believe that any personal representative has
       wasted, embezzled, or mismanaged, or is about to waste, or embezzle the property
       of the estate committed to his or her charge, or has committed, or is about to commit
       a fraud upon the estate, or is incompetent to act, or is permanently removed from
       the state, or has wrongfully neglected the estate, or has neglected to perform any
       acts as such personal representative, or for any other cause or reason which to the
       court appears necessary, it shall have power and authority, after notice and hearing
       to revoke such letters. The manner of the notice and of the service of the same and
       of the time of hearing shall be wholly in the discretion of the court, and if the court
       for any such reasons revokes such letters the powers of such personal representative
       shall at once cease, and it shall be the duty of the court to immediately appoint some
       other personal representative, as in this title provided.

       RCW 11.68.070 provides:

       (1)(a) A party, as defined in RCW 11.96A.030, may petition the court under chapter
       11.96A RCW for a determination that a personal representative:
                (i) Has breached a fiduciary duty;
                (ii) Has exceeded the personal representative’s authority;
                (iii) Has abused the personal representative’s discretion in exercising a
       power;
                (iv) Has otherwise failed to execute the trust faithfully;
                (v) Has violated a statute or common law affecting the estate; or
                (vi) Is subject to removal for a reason specified in RCW 11.28.250.
                (b) The petition submitted under (a) of this subsection must allege facts in
       support of the claim and must be verified or be supported by an affidavit showing
       facts in support of the claim.
                (2) If the court finds that the personal representative has committed one or
       more of the acts listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section, the court may order such
       remedy in law or in equity as it deems appropriate. The remedy may include, but
       not be limited to, awarding money damages, surcharging the personal
       representative, directing the personal representative to take a specific action,
       restricting the powers of the personal representative, removing the personal
       representative and appointing a successor, and awarding fees and costs under RCW
       11.96A.150. If the court restricts the powers of the personal representative, it shall
       endorse the words “powers restricted” upon the original order granting the personal
       representative nonintervention powers and upon the letters testamentary or of
       administration together with the date of the endorsement.

                                                 11
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

       Chapter 11.68 RCW, which contains RCW 11.68.070, pertains to “settlement of estates

without administration.” It is clear from the statutes within chapter 11.68 RCW that “estates

without administration” means estates in which the personal representative has nonintervention

powers. See RCW 11.68.011 (“Settlement without court intervention”); .021 (“Hearing on petition

for nonintervention powers”); .041 (“Petition for nonintervention powers”); .050 (“Objections to

granting nonintervention powers”); see generally chapter 11.68 RCW. Therefore, the plain

language of chapter 11.68 RCW supports limiting RCW 11.68.070’s application to estates in

which the personal representative has nonintervention powers.

       This limitation is also supported by the existence of another statute outside of the chapter,

namely RCW 11.28.250, providing for different procedures and causes for removing a personal

representative.    The    legislature   expressly    incorporated   RCW     11.28.250    in   RCW

11.68.070(1)(a)(vi), evidencing the legislature’s intent for the causes for removal listed in RCW

11.28.250 to also apply to removals of personal representatives under RCW 11.68.070. But the

legislature made no mention of RCW 11.68.070 in RCW 11.28.250, showing that the legislature

did not intend for the incorporation to work the other way around and did not intend for RCW

11.68.070 to apply to removals of personal representatives under RCW 11.28.250. Thus, the plain

language and meaning of RCW 11.68.070 and RCW 11.28.250 evidence the legislature’s intent to

limit RCW 11.68.070’s applicability to circumstances where the personal representative has

nonintervention powers.

       Here, Cohen did not have nonintervention powers. Therefore, RCW 11.28.250, not RCW

11.68.070, provided the proper procedure and causes for removing Cohen as personal

representative.

                                                12
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

       Cohen argues that because RCW 11.68.070 incorporates RCW 11.28.250, the superior

court should have followed the procedures outlined in RCW 11.68.070 even if it was proceeding

under RCW 11.28.250. But RCW 11.68.070 only incorporates the causes for removal specified

in RCW 11.28.250, in effect expanding the list of reasons for which a personal representative with

nonintervention powers could be removed. RCW 11.68.070(1)(a)(vi). RCW 11.68.070 does not

incorporate RCW 11.28.250 more broadly and does not provide that RCW 11.68.070’s processes

must be applied to removals under RCW 11.28.250.

       Cohen also mentions without argument that Newcomer sought removal of the personal

representative under “RCW 11.68.070 as the procedural basis for removal and then switched gears

to RCW 11.28.250 in the middle of the proceedings.” Br. of Appellant at 1-2. Cohen then notes

in his reply brief that Newcomer switched his argument for the removal motion from RCW

11.68.070 to RCW 11.28.250 and contends that Newcomer “should not be allowed to gain an

advantage by such an action.” Reply Br. of Appellant at 22.

       To the extent Cohen is attempting to argue that the superior court erred by allowing

Newcomer to cite RCW 11.68.070 in the original motion then argue for removal under RCW

11.28.250, the record shows that Cohen, in his response to Newcomer’s motion to remove the

personal representative, argued that RCW 11.28.250 did not authorize his removal as personal

representative because Newcomer cannot meet the elements of that statute. The superior court had

discretion to allow Newcomer to make alternative arguments so long as Cohen had the opportunity

to respond to those arguments. Cohen was provided the opportunity to address RCW 11.28.250

in his response brief to the superior court, and he had the opportunity to make further arguments

                                               13
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

regarding RCW 11.28.250 at the hearing before the superior court.11 Therefore, because Cohen

was provided the opportunity to respond, the superior court did not err by allowing Newcomer to

proceed under RCW 11.28.250.

       Further, Cohen provides no legal authority to support the proposition that a party is not

allowed to respond to arguments raised in opposition to a party’s motion. We are not required to

search out authorities when no authority is cited in support of a proposition and “may assume that

counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” Helmbreck, 15 Wn. App. 2d at 57.

       Cohen’s argument that the superior court erred by not proceeding under RCW 11.68.070

fails. We hold that the superior court did not err by proceeding under RCW 11.28.250 instead of

RCW 11.68.070.

       3.      RCW 11.28.250’s Elements

       Cohen argues that the superior court erred by ruling that the elements for removal under

RCW 11.28.250 were met. We disagree.

       RCW 11.28.250 gives trial courts broad discretion in removing a personal representative,

“but its grounds must be valid and supported by the record.” In re Estate of Ardell, 96 Wn. App.

708, 718, 980 P.2d 771, review denied, 139 Wn.2d 1011 (1999). “If any one of the court’s reasons

for removal is valid, the court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal.” Id.

       Cohen argues in his opening brief that the elements of RCW 11.28.250 “were not met, nor

could they ever be met,” but does not elaborate on which elements he references. Br. of Appellant

11
   We note that although Cohen had the opportunity to argue at the hearing that RCW 11.28.250
did not justify his removal as personal representative, the record shows that Cohen did not make
this argument at the hearing.

                                                14
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

at 13. Cohen alleges that Newcomer did not comply with the “citation process required by” RCW

11.28.250, but does not explain what is the citation process or requirement he references. Br. of

Appellant at 12. In his reply brief, Cohen cites to In re Estate of Beard, 60 Wn.2d 127, 372 P.2d

530 (1962), in support of his argument that “citation” is required for RCW 11.28.250. Beard cited

the 1917 version of RCW 11.28.250, which did require “citation.” 60 Wn.2d at 132. However,

RCW 11.28.250 was amended in 1965 to no longer require “citation.” LAWS OF 1965, ch. 145, §

11.28.250.

        Regardless, Cohen’s removal was justified under RCW 11.28.250. One of the enumerated

reasons in RCW 11.28.250 that allows for the removal of a personal representative is “for any

other cause or reason which to the court appears necessary.” Here, the superior court found that

there was a question of whether the decedent had fraudulently conveyed business assets to Cohen

before the decedent’s death. This question of fraudulent conveyances was supported in the record

by the 2015 declaration from the decedent stating that he had more than $20,000,000.00 in business

assets, the fact that these assets were not listed in the estate inventory, and the decedent’s will that

stated he transferred all business assets to Cohen and the decedent did not own any business assets

at the time of his death.

        The superior court acknowledged that personal representatives have a statutory duty to

investigate and recover assets that were fraudulently conveyed out of the estate. The superior court

found that Cohen’s status as recipient of the assets giving rise to the fraudulent transfers allegation

created a conflict of interest with this statutory duty. It was well within the superior court’s

discretion to determine that this conflict of interest was a necessary cause or reason for removing

Cohen as personal representative of the estate. See Ardell, 96 Wn. App. at 718. Therefore, we

                                                  15
No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

hold that the superior court did not err by ruling that RCW 11.28.250’s elements for removal were

met.12,13

        4.     Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

        Cohen argues that the superior court erred by failing to enter findings of fact and

conclusions of law justifying Cohen’s removal. We disagree.

        There is no language in RCW 11.28.250 that requires a court to enter findings of fact or

conclusions of law. Cohen does not cite to any legal authority in his opening brief to support his

argument that findings of fact and conclusions of law are required for removal of a personal

representative under RCW 11.28.250. In his reply brief, Cohen cites to Beard, 60 Wn.2d 127, for

the proposition that findings of fact are required. Although the trial court in Beard entered findings

of fact, nothing in Beard suggests that findings of fact or conclusions of law were required. 60

Wn.2d at 135. Further, findings of fact and conclusions of law are not necessary when deciding

motions. CR 52(a)(5)(B). Therefore, we hold that the superior court did not err by not entering

findings of fact or conclusions of law justifying Cohen’s removal.

12
   Cohen emphasizes in his briefing that the superior court did not make any finding that Cohen
committed misconduct. But RCW 11.28.250 does not require a court to find that the personal
representative committed misconduct before removing them. And Cohen fails to cite any authority
for the proposition that a superior court must make a finding of misconduct before removing a
personal representative. Cohen also does not argue that we should adopt that rule. Even if Cohen
intended to make this argument, the plain language of RCW 11.28.250 does not allow us to adopt
a rule requiring a finding of misconduct—RCW 11.28.250 allows a court to remove a personal
representative “for any other cause or reason which to the court appears necessary.”
13
   Cohen uses the words “due process” four times throughout his briefing but does not appear to
be making any constitutional argument. Br. of Appellant at 22, 23; Reply Br. of Appellant at 12,
32. Therefore, this opinion does not treat Cohen’s use of the words “due process” as a due process
argument.

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No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

B.     APPOINTMENT OF VAUGHN AS SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

       Cohen argues that the superior court erred by appointing Vaughn as personal representative

instead of Lee. Specifically, Cohen argues that the superior court should have appointed Lee

because Lee was higher on the list of successor personal representatives in RCW 11.28.120. We

disagree.

       RCW 11.28.120 provides that if a personal representative declines or is unable to serve,

administration of the estate shall be granted to another individual from one of seven categories.

These seven categories are listed in RCW 11.28.120 in order of entitlement. The only categories

relevant here are the second and seventh categories. The second category is “next of kin” including

“[c]hild or children.” RCW 11.28.120(2). The seventh category provides:

       If the persons so entitled shall fail for more than forty days after the death of the
       decedent to present a petition for letters of administration, or if it appears to the
       satisfaction of the court that there is no next of kin, as above specified eligible to
       appointment, or they waive their right, and there are no principal creditor or
       creditors, or such creditor or creditors waive their right, then the court may appoint
       a contract service provider with the office of public guardianship and
       conservatorship under chapter 2.72 RCW or any suitable person to administer such
       estate.

RCW 11.28.120(7).

       Cohen appears to argue that the superior court did not properly consider RCW 11.28.120.

The record belies that contention. The superior court stated that the process of selecting a

successor is laid out in RCW 11.28.120 and discussed the categories of individuals in the statute.

       The superior court found both personal representatives named in the will, Cohen and Lee,

unable to serve due to the conflict of interest relating to the decedent’s alleged fraudulent transfer

of business assets to Cohen prior to death. The superior court was then required to proceed down

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No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

the list of categories of persons eligible to serve as a personal representative articulated in RCW

11.28.120. While Lee, the decedent’s son, fell within the second category of RCW 11.28.120, the

superior court already disqualified Lee as a “personal representative . . . named in the will” that

was “unable to serve” due to the conflict of interest. RCW 11.28.120.

       The next applicable category is number 7, which Vaughn fulfills as a “suitable person to

administer such estate.” RCW 11.28.120(7). Vaughn’s qualifications are not challenged on

appeal. Therefore, we hold that the superior court did not err by appointing Vaughn instead of Lee

as successor personal representative.14

                                          CONCLUSION

       The superior court did not err by removing Cohen as personal representative due to a

conflict of interest or by appointing a third-party neutral instead of Cohen’s brother, who also had

a conflict of interest, as successor personal representative. Therefore, we affirm the superior

court’s orders removing Cohen as personal representative of his father’s estate and appointing a

third-party neutral as successor personal representative.

14
   Cohen states in his reply brief, under a heading that contends Newcomer lacked standing, that
there appears to be no authority for a “‘hybrid personal representative’” or partial removal. Reply
Br. of Appellant at 26. It is unclear if Cohen is arguing that the superior court erred by only
partially removing Cohen as personal representative. To the extent Cohen makes this argument in
his reply brief, we decline to consider it. See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d
801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (“An issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is too
late to warrant consideration.”).

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No. 56662-1-II/No. 56759-8-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                    Lee, J.
 We concur:

 Glasgow, C.J.

 Cruser, J.

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