Court Opinion

ID: 9514873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:52:17.716511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:22.079695
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
[¶ 13.] The subject we are faced with was first addressed by the South Dakota Legislature in chapter 376, section 5 of the 1917 Session laws. It provided:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee subject to this act on account of personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, on account of such injury or death.
Thus, at that time, an employee who was injured or killed on the job was precluded from suing anybody and everybody. The ban was all-inclusive in exchange for workers’ compensation benefits.
[¶ 14.] Through chapter 422 of the 1977 Session Laws and chapter 370, section 2 of the 1978 Session Laws, the Legislature limited the scope of this ban. SDCL 62-3-2 now states:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee subject to this title, on account of personal injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin on account of such injury or death against his employer or any employee, partner, officer or director of such employer, except rights and remedies arising from intentional tort, (emphasis added).
Thus, the amendments limited the scope of the prohibition against suit by the employee to claims against “his employer or any employee, partner, officer of director of such employer-” Clearly this prohibition does not apply to suits initiated by party defendants such as Lawrence County, and I disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion to the contrary.
[¶ 15.] Disposition of this issue instead rests upon an examination of the individual claims. County claims a right contribution under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, arguing Simms is a “joint tortfeasor” under the Act. As the majority opinion points out, Simms cannot be a joint tortfeasor because he is not liable in tort for the injury to Hagemann. This conclusion is in line with the vast majority of jurisdictions, and is based on a plain reading of the clear language of SDCL 15-8-11. In addition, a claim for contribution is intimately tied to, and “on account of personal injury or death.” SDCL 62-3-2. For those reasons, County’s claim for contribu*847tion falls within the exclusivity provision of SDCL 62-3-2, and cannot stand.
[¶ 16.] A claim for indemnity, however, is not “on account of personal injury or death.” Id. Indemnity is a separate cause of action that arises “independent of the underlying liability.” Weiszhaar Farms, Inc. v. Tobin, 522 N.W.2d 484, 492 (S.D.1994). Indemnity is an equitable remedy by which the burden of loss is entirely shifted from one party onto another. Mark, Inc. v. Maguire Insurance Agency, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 227, 230 (S.D.1994). South Dakota law allows a claim for indemnity to proceed in the following circumstances: (1) derivative or vicarious liability; (2) action at direction of, and for, another; (3) breach of duty to indemnify; (4) failure to discover negligence of another; and (5) express contract. Id. Indemnity can arise through contractual agreement or based on a legal relationship, such as that between bailee and bailor or between a principal and her agent. Professor Larson notes in his treatise that as a general rule, “[t]he third party may recover-over against the employer [or employee] whenever it can be said that the employer [or employee] breached an independent duty toward the third party and thus acquired an obligation to indemnify the third party.” Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 121.04 at 121-47. Because a claim for indemnity is an independent cause of action, which does not arise “on account of personal injury or death,” it should not be dismissed out of hand based on the exclusivity provision of SDCL 62-3-2. See id. Rather, it should be allowed to proceed, but only if the employer or employee owes an independent duty to the third party.
[¶ 17.] The question for this Court then becomes whether Simms owed an independent duty to County. Simms owes no contractual duty to indemnify County. Nor does the relationship between Simms and County create such a legal duty. Therefore, because Simms owes no duty to indemnify County, the circuit court was correct in dismissing County’s third party complaint against Simms.
[¶ 18.] For the above reasons, I concur in result.