Court Opinion

ID: 9382053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 18:03:37.138776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.802028
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CRE NIAGARA HOLDINGS, LLC,
CLUB EXPLORIA, LLC, and CRE
NIAGARA PARTICIPATION
HOLDINGS, LLC,

                             Plaintiffs,

     v.                                    C.A. No. N20C-05-157 PRW CCLD

RESORTS GROUP, INC.,
                    Defendant.
CRE NIAGARA HOLDINGS, LLC,
CLUB EXPLORIA, LLC, and CRE
NIAGARA PARTICIPATION
HOLDINGS, LLC,

                             Plaintiffs,

     v.                                    C.A. No. 2021-0953-PW

RESORTS GROUP, INC.,
                            Defendant.

                           Submitted: March 1, 2023
                           Decided: March 24, 2023

                 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Upon Defendant Resorts Group, Inc.’s Superior Court Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Superior Court Motion for Partial Judgment on
                                  the Pleadings,
                                    DENIED.
 Upon Defendant Resorts Group, Inc.’s Court of Chancery Motion to Dismiss for
                    Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
                                GRANTED.

 Upon Plaintiffs CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC, et al.’s Court of Chancery Motion
              for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts III and IV,
                             DENIED AS MOOT.

Richard P. Rollo, Esquire, Travis S. Hunter, Esquire, Dorronda R. Bordley, Esquire,
RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; J. David Washburn,
Esquire, Charles L. Perry, Esquire, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, Dallas, Texas;
David A. Crichlow, Esquire, Brian L. Muldrew, Esquire, KATTEN MUCHIN
ROSENMAN LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiffs CRE Niagara
Holdings, LLC, Club Exploria, LLC, and CRE Niagara Participation Holdings,
LLC.
Garvan McDaniel, Esquire, HOGAN MCDANIEL, Wilmington, Delaware; David S.
Rosner, Esquire, Ronald R. Rossi, Esquire, Paul J. Burgo, Esquire, Stephen P.
Thomasch, Esquire, Jed I. Bergman, Esquire, KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP, New
York, New York, Attorneys for Defendant Resorts Group, Inc.

WALLACE, J.
      The Plaintiffs originally filed this action in the Superior Court on May 18,

2020. Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, asserting

claims against the Defendant for (1) fraudulent inducement, (2) breach of

contract/indemnification, and (3) declaratory relief. The dispute centers around one

primary agreement, two ancillary agreements, and a supplemental agreement.

      In April 2021, the Court issued a decision denying the Defendant’s motion to

dismiss the Amended Complaint. Thereafter, the Defendant filed an Answer,

Counterclaims, and a Third-Party Complaint (that also was later amended) asserting

claims against Third-Party Defendants on eleven grounds. In May 2022, the Court

issued a second decision denying in part and granting in part the motions to dismiss

the Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaint, as well as denying the Defendant’s

motion to stay.

      The Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings

relating to Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim. That Motion is now ripe for

decision.

      Relatedly, the same Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against the same Defendant

in the Court of Chancery (that also was later amended) and asserts claims for specific

performance and anticipatory repudiation, and seeks three declarations.           The

Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Chancery Amended Complaint. That

                                         -1-
Motion, too, is now ripe for decision. Additionally, the Plaintiffs have filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment relating to two of the declaratory judgment claims.

That Motion is also now ripe for decision.

                  I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       The facts here are taken from the Superior Court action’s Amended

Complaint1 and the Court of Chancery action’s Amended Complaint.2 The facts

overlap and will be discussed together. As there are two previously-issued decisions

from the Superior Court action,3 the Court will only provide a brief recitation of the

facts here.

    A. THE PARTIES

       Plaintiffs CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC (“CRE Niagara”); Club Exploria,

LLC, a successor by merger to CRE Bushkill Group, LLC; and CRE Participation

Holdings, LLC (collectively, “CRE” or “Plaintiffs”) are Delaware LLCs.4 CRE

1
    Plaintiffs’ Superior Court Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Sept. 15, 2020 (D.I. 40 Super.). The
Superior Court action is N20C-05-157 PRW CCLD. Any document identifier number from this
action will be distinguished by the designation “Super.”; for example, (D.I. 40 Super.).
2
    Plaintiffs’ Court of Chancery Amended Complaint (“CAC”), June 7, 2022 (D.I. 35 Ch.). The
Court of Chancery action is captioned 2021-0953 PW. Any document identifier number from this
action will be distinguished by the designation “Ch.”; for example, (D.I. 35 Ch.).
3
    CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC v. Resort Groups, Inc., LLC, 2021 WL 1292792 (Del. Super. Ct.
Apr. 7, 2021) (denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss); CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC v. Resort
Groups, Inc., 2022 WL 1749181 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2022) (denying, in part, and granting,
in part, Plaintiffs’/Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and denying Defendant’s Motion
to Stay).
4
    SAC ¶¶ 5-7.

                                             -2-
Niagara and Club Exploria, LLC are also citizens of Pennsylvania and have

members who are citizens there.5      Defendant Resorts Group, Inc. (“RGI” or

“Defendant”) is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in

East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania.6     Before the transaction at the center of this

controversy occurred RGI owned timeshare resorts in Pennsylvania.7

     B. THE UNDERLYING TRANSACTION

         On May 19, 2017, RGI and CRE Niagara entered into a Unit and Asset

Purchase Agreement (the “UAPA”), through which CRE Niagara acquired the assets

of the Pennsylvania timeshare resorts and ownership of specified entities, including

CRE Bushkill Group, LLC.8 CRE Niagara purchased the timeshare business and

existing timeshare contracts, and RGI retained the right to the payment stream under

those contracts.9 There are four agreements to the transaction: (1) the UAPA;10

(2) the Servicing Agreement, which addressed the servicing of receivables from

sales by RGI;11 (3) the Participation Agreement, which provided CRE an interest in

the receivables collected by RGI from the Servicing Agreement (the Servicing and

5
     See id. ¶ 10.
6
     Id. ¶ 7.
7
     Id. ¶ 13.
8
     Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
9
     See id. ¶¶ 23-25.
10
     See id. ¶ 16.
11
     See id. ¶ 25.

                                        -3-
Participation Agreements are the “Ancillary Agreements”);12 and (4) the

Supplemental Agreement, which supplemented the Servicing and Participation

Agreements.13 The Ancillary Agreements were executed on May 18, 2017.14 The

Supplemental Agreement was executed on December 28, 2018.15

     C. SUPERIOR COURT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Eventually, a dispute arose between the parties regarding RGI selling

timeshares, pre-transaction, to “less creditworthy” purchasers, which CRE believes

was contrary to the representations and warranties made by RGI in the UAPA.16 In

May 2018, RGI sent CRE a letter asserting that CRE’s collected funds didn’t meet

scheduled benchmarks, but CRE denied such shortfall and instead blamed RGI for

its alleged misrepresentations.17

         CRE filed the current Superior Court action on May 18, 2020.18 The same

day, RGI filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District

of New York asserting breach-of-contract claims under the agreements.19 On May

12
     See id. ¶¶ 17, 23.
13
     See id. ¶ 43 n.5.
14
     Id. ¶ 17.
15
     Id., Ex. J.
16
     See id. ¶¶ 28-30; CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC, 2021 WL 1292792, at *1-2.
17
     See SAC ¶¶ 29-31, Ex. D, Ex. E.
18
     See Complaint (“Compl.”), May 18, 2020 (D.I. 1 Super.).
19
   See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings (“Def.’s Super. MTD”) at 6, Aug. 15, 2022 (D.I. 156 Super.).

                                              -4-
19, 2020, RGI filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of

Delaware.20 In August 2020, both federal actions were dismissed for lack of

diversity.21

         In July 2020, RGI filed a motion to dismiss CRE’s Complaint in the Superior

Court action.22 In August 2020, RGI filed an amended motion to dismiss, or, in the

alternative, to stay the Superior Court action.23 In September 2020, CRE filed the

current Amended Complaint, asserting claims for fraudulent inducement (Count I),

breach of contract/indemnification (Count II), and a declaratory judgment (Count

III).24 Count III is at issue now. Count III seeks a declaration that “there is no

subsisting claim by RGI for any default of [sic] breach by any Plaintiff of the UAPA,

the Servicing Agreement and/or the Participation Agreement,” and that Club

Exploria “is entitled to terminate the Servicing Agreement and/or is not restricted or

obligated by” a schedule attached to the agreements.25 In October 2020, RGI filed

a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, or, in the alternative, to stay the action

thereunder.26 In that motion, RGI sought to dismiss Amended Complaint Counts I

20
     Id. at 6-7; SAC ¶ 10.
21
     Def.’s Super. MTD at 7; SAC ¶¶ 10-11.
22
     See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, July 8, 2020 (D.I. 11 Super.).
23
     See Defendant’s Am. First Motion to Dismiss or Stay, Aug. 7, 2020 (D.I. 28 Super.).
24
     See SAC ¶¶ 62-87.
25
     Id. ¶ 87.
26
     See Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss or Stay, Oct. 15, 2020 (D.I. 46 Super.).

                                                -5-
and II under Rule 12(b)(6), dismiss the portions of Counts I and III relating to the

Servicing Agreement and Participation Agreement for improper venue, and dismiss

or stay the entire action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.27

         In April 2021, the Court issued a decision denying RGI’s motion in full.28 The

following is a brief summary of that decision. The Court found the UAPA’s forum

selection clause applies and the parties waived any objection to an inconvenient

forum.29 This was in response to RGI’s argument that the Ancillary Agreements’

forum selection clause chose New York, so any non-UAPA claims must be litigated

there.30 But, the Court found the UAPA was later-executed and its Delaware forum

selection clause governed.31 The Court also found that Counts I and II survived

RGI’s timeliness challenges.32 Shortly thereafter, the Court denied RGI’s motion

for reargument.33

         In June 2021, RGI filed its Answer with Affirmative Defenses and

27
     See id. at 11-35.
28
     See CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC, 2021 WL 1292792.
29
     See id. at *11.
30
     See id. at *4.
31
     Id. at *5-7.
32
     See id. at *10.
33
  CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC v. Resort Groups, Inc., LLC, 2021 WL 2110769 (Del. Super. Ct.
May 25, 2021).

                                           -6-
Counterclaims, and a Third-Party Complaint.34 In September 2021, RGI amended

this filing as it relates to the Counterclaims.35 Also in September 2021, CRE and the

Third-Party Defendants filed two motions to dismiss RGI’s Third-Party

Complaint.36 In February 2022, RGI filed a renewed motion to stay the non-UAPA

claims in the Superior Court action in light of related litigation in New York state

court.37 In May 2022, the Court issued a Letter Order resolving the above-mentioned

motions.38 The Court held in pertinent part that RGI’s breach-of-contract claim

under the UAPA survived dismissal,39 but its claims under the Servicing Agreement

and Participation Agreement were dismissed with prejudice based on RGI’s

representations to the Court.40 Namely, RGI maintained its non-UAPA claims

should be litigated in New York in compliance with those agreements’ forum

selection clauses, and that RGI proffered them in the Superior Court action only to

preserve the claims in the event they were thrown out in New York. 41 The Court

34
    See Defendant’s Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims and Third-Party
Complaint, June 9, 2021 (D.I. 81 Super.). The Third-Party Complaint is not highly relevant for
the purposes of the current motions, so it will not be discussed in detail.
35
    See Defendant’s Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Amended Counterclaims and Third-
Party Complaint, Sept. 1, 2021 (D.I. 92 Super.).
36
     See D.I. 95 Super.; D.I. 96 Super.
37
     See Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Stay, Feb. 4, 2022 (D.I. 126 Super.).
38
     See CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC, 2022 WL 1749181.
39
     See id. at *5.
40
     See id.
41
     See id. at *9.

                                              -7-
noted that the New York Supreme Court held the non-UAPA claims belong in New

York, and the Court dismissed RGI’s non-UAPA claims with prejudice.42

Additionally, the Court denied RGI’s motion to stay its non-UAPA claims.43 In July

2022, CRE filed its Answer to RGI’s Amended Counterclaim.44

     D. NEW YORK COURT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        On August 12, 2020, a day after the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York dismissed RGI’s non-UAPA claims, RGI filed its

complaint in the Supreme Court of New York (the “New York Action”). 45 That

complaint asserts claims against CRE for, inter alia, breach of the Servicing

Agreement and Participation Agreement.46 In February 2021, RGI amended its

complaint in the New York Action47 and asserted claims against CRE (and others)

for, inter alia, breach of the Servicing Agreement, the Participation Agreement, the

UAPA, and the Supplemental Agreement.48 In December 2021, the New York

Supreme Court issued a decision on CRE’s (and other defendants’) motion to

42
     See id. at *9-10.
43
     See id. at *10.
44
   See Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendants’ Answer to Amended Counterclaim, July 12, 2022 (D.I.
146 Super.).
45
     See Def.’s Super. MTD at 7.
46
     See id.
47
     See id. at 7, Ex. 7 (displaying a copy of RGI’s amended complaint in the New York Action).
48
     See id., Ex. 7 ¶¶ 283-332.

                                               -8-
dismiss the New York Action.49 The New York court dismissed RGI’s claims

against CRE under the UAPA because of “the broad Delaware forum selection

clause contained in that agreement.”50 The New York court did not dismiss the

Servicing Agreement and Participation Agreement claims because those agreements

“contain broad mandatory New York forum selection clauses applicable to all claims

related to these agreements.”51

     E. Court of Chancery Procedural History

         On November 5, 2021, CRE filed its complaint in the Court of Chancery,

asserting claims against RGI for specific performance under the Servicing

Agreement         and   Participation     Agreement,       and      anticipatory   repudiation.52

Simultaneously, CRE submitted a motion for entry of a status quo order for the

purpose of “prohibiting [RGI] from unilaterally dispersing disputed funds to itself

in the very near future.”53 RGI opposed the motion.54 The Court granted CRE’s

49
    See Letter for Judicial Review, Ex. A (“New York Action Dec. 27 Decision”), Dec. 30, 2021
(D.I. 109 Super.).
50
     Id., Ex. A at 2.
51
    Id., Ex. A at 3. The New York Court also made other findings with respect to RGI’s other
claims, but those are not particularly relevant for the present motions here. See generally id., Ex.
A. On February 28, 2023, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division affirmed the New
York Action Dec. 27 Decision in full. See Letter for Judicial Review, Ex., Mar. 1, 2023 (D.I. 177
Super.).
52
     See Verified Complaint, ¶¶ 32-51, Nov. 5, 2021 (D.I. 1 Ch.).
53
     See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of a Status Quo Order at 1, Nov. 5, 2021 (D.I. 1 Ch.).
54
   See Defendant’s Opposition to the Motion for Entry of a Status Quo Order, Mar. 8, 2022 (D.I.
19 Ch.).

                                                -9-
motion for entry of a status quo order.55 Later, CRE filed its current Amended

Complaint in the Court of Chancery action, asserting five claims: specific

performance (Count I), anticipatory repudiation (Count II), declaratory judgment

regarding UAPA § 8.5(a) (Count III), declaratory judgment regarding UAPA § 8.7

(Count IV), and breach of the UAPA (Count V).56

     F. Current Superior Court and Chancery Motions

           RGI filed its current Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

and for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (the “Superior Court Motion to Dismiss”),

relating to CRE’s declaratory judgment claim (Count III).57

           Between the Opposition and Reply filings, CRE sent a letter to the Court

regarding “material development[s]” in the New York Action.58 The letter stated

that RGI filed an “emergency motion” in the New York Action, seeking to enjoin

CRE from further pursuing: “(1) parts of the [Superior Court] Action . . . ; (2) [the

Court of Chancery] Action Counts I-II . . . , and Counts III-IV . . . ; and (3) CRE’s

motion for summary judgment on [the Court of Chancery] Action Counts III-IV.”59

55
    See Order Governing Accounting & Resolving Status Quo Motion, Apr. 28, 2022 (D.I. 32 Ch.)
(granting CRE’s Motion).
56
     See CAC ¶¶ 45-85.
57
     See Def.’s Super. MTD.
58
    See Letter for Judicial Review (“New York Action Development Letter”) at 1, Sept. 30, 2022
(D.I. 166 Super.).
59
     Id.

                                             -10-
In September 2022, the New York Supreme Court submitted an order for CRE to

show cause why the New York Supreme Court should not enjoin CRE from pursuing

claims in Delaware for the claims that are related to the agreements with New York

forum selection clauses.60

         In November 2022, CRE sent a follow-up letter to the Court.61 The letter

stated the New York Supreme Court denied RGI’s motion to enjoin CRE.62 The

New York Supreme Court’s Order stated that court would not issue the anti-suit

injunction RGI requested.63           The New York Supreme Court’s reasoning was

primarily premised on the fact that this (Delaware) Court has “extensive knowledge”

of the complex issues of this litigation and has been mindful of the impact of the

overlapping claims.64 The New York Supreme Court also criticized the parties for

the “poor [contract] drafting decisions that resulted in multi-forum litigation.”65 In

essence, the New York Supreme Court deferred to this Court to decide the merits of

the issues in the first instance.66

60
     See id., Ex. B (displaying a copy of the New York Supreme Court’s Order).
61
   See Letter for Judicial Review (“New York Action Development Letter Update”), Nov. 17,
2022 (D.I. 170 Super.).
62
     Id., Ex. at 1.
63
     Id., Ex. at 1.
64
     Id., Ex. at 1.
65
     Id., Ex. at 2.
66
     Id., Ex. at 2.

                                              -11-
        Concerning the Court of Chancery action, RGI filed its Motion to Dismiss the

Amended Complaint (the “Chancery Motion to Dismiss”),67 seeking to dismiss the

Amended Complaint in full.68 CRE filed its Opposition to the Chancery Motion to

Dismiss.69 Contemporaneously, CRE filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on

Counts III and IV (the “Chancery Motion for Summary Judgment”).70

                                     II. LEGAL STANDARD

     A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER SUPERIOR COURT RULE 12(b)(1)

        “A party may move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.”71 “Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that

the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the Court shall dismiss the

action.”72 When the Court considers a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the Court need not

accept [a plaintiff’s] factual allegations as true and is free to consider facts not

alleged in the complaint.”73 “The movant ‘need only show that the Court lacks

67
     See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Ch. MTD”), Aug. 15, 2022 (D.I. 39 Ch.).
68
     See id. at 15-38.
69
     See Plaintiffs’ Answering Brief (“Pls.’ Ch. Answering Br.”), Sept. 22, 2022 (D.I. 43 Ch.).
70
    See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J.”), Sept. 22, 2022 (D.I.
43 Ch.). Plaintiffs filed one, omnibus brief for their Opposition to Defendant’s Chancery Motion
to Dismiss and their Opening Brief in support of their Chancery Motion for Summary Judgment.
71
   Blue Cube Spinco LLC v. Dow Chem. Co., 2021 WL 4453460, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 29,
2021) (citing Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(1)).
72
     Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(h)(3); see also Blue Cube Spinco LLC, 2021 WL 4453460, at *5.
73
   Appriva S’holder Litig. Co., LLC v. EV3, Inc., 937 A.2d 1275, 1284 n.14 (Del. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Nelson v. Russo, 844 A.2d 301, 302 (Del. 2004) (“In
                                               -12-
jurisdiction,’”74 but “the non-movant bears the ‘far more demanding’ burden ‘to

prove jurisdiction exists.’”75 “A motion to dismiss challenging jurisdiction of the

subject matter based on lack of ripeness is properly considered under Rule

12(b)(1).”76

     B. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS UNDER SUPERIOR COURT RULE 12(c)

        When a party moves under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings, “the

Court accepts the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable factual

inferences in favor of the non-movant.”77 The Court will grant a 12(c) motion only

when, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, “no

material factual dispute exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.”78

        “The standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is almost identical

deciding whether the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction . . . [the Court] must look
beyond the language in the complaint.”).
74
   Blue Cube Spinco LLC, 2021 WL 4453460, at *5 (quoting Airbase Carpet Mart, Inc. v. AYA
Assocs., Inc., 2015 WL 9302894, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2015), aff’d, 2016 WL 4938890
(Del. Sept. 16, 2016)).
75
     Id. (quoting Appriva, 937 A.2d at 1284 n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76
    Benefytt Techs., Inc. v. Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp., 2022 WL 16504, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct.
Jan. 3, 2022) (citing Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2020 WL 5758027,
at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2020)); B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. J.A. Reinhardt Hldgs., LLC, 2020
WL 4195762, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 21, 2020)).
77
     Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP, 2021 WL 3620435, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2021)
(citing Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199,
1205 (Del. 1993)).
78
     Id. (citing Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c)).

                                                   -13-
to the standard for a motion to dismiss.”79 The Court thus accords a plaintiff

opposing a Rule 12(c) motion the same benefits as a plaintiff opposing a Rule

12(b)(6) motion.80 Given the similarity between a 12(c) motion and a 12(b)(6)

motion, “the Court engages certain 12(b)(6) procedures during 12(c) review,”81 such

as considering “documents outside the pleadings”82 that are “integral to and

incorporated referentially into them.”83

                             III. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

     A. SUPERIOR COURT ACTION CONTENTIONS

           RGI contends that CRE’s declaratory judgment claim (Count III) should be

dismissed to the extent Count III concerns the Ancillary Agreements and the

Supplemental Agreement.84 RGI offers two primary reasons for its contention.

First, RGI claims that litigating Count III in this Court is “unnecessary” and would

result in “duplicative litigation and risk inconsistent judgments.”85 Specifically, RGI

79
    Silver Lake Off. Plaza, LLC v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 2014 WL 595378, at *6 (Del. Super.
Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
80
    Intermec IP Corp., 2021 WL 3620435, at * 8 (citing Alcoa World Alumina LLC v. Glencore
Ltd., 2016 WL 521193, at * 6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2016), aff’d sub nom., Glencore Ltd. v. St.
Croix Alumina, LLC, 2016 WL 6575167 (Del. Nov. 4, 2016)).
81
     Id.
82
   Id. (citing Jiménez v. Palacios, 250 A.3d 814, 827 (Del. Ch. 2019), aff’d, 2020 WL 4207625
(Del. July 22, 2020)).
83
     Id. (citing McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 500 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
84
     See Def.’s Super. MTD at 11.
85
     See id.

                                               -14-
argues that CRE’s Count III, as it relates to the Ancillary Agreements and the

Supplemental Agreement, mirrors RGI’s affirmative claims in New York and, thus,

litigating Count III here would risk inconsistent judgments and present

overwhelming hardship.86 Second, RGI claims that Count III should be dismissed

as overripe because there is a “simultaneous non-declaratory judgment action”

pending in New York.87 RGI invokes the Superior Court’s seven-factors from Burris

v. Cross,88 and also relies on the Court of Chancery’s decision in Markusic v. Blum.89

RGI claims that in light of these cases, Count III should be dismissed as overripe.

         On the other side, CRE argues its declaratory judgment claim is proper in this

Court.90 CRE’s attack on RGI’s assertions is twofold. First, CRE argues that

litigating Count III here is proper under the “law of the case” doctrine.91

Specifically, CRE claims the Court previously held Count III was properly filed in

Delaware due to the language in UAPA Section 9.6. 92 Second, CRE argues RGI’s

“overripeness” argument fails because Count III “is the only claim related to the

86
     See id. at 13.
87
     Id. at 14.
88
     583 A.2d 1364 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).
89
     2021 WL 2456637 (Del. Ch. June 16, 2021); see Def.’s Super. MTD at 14-21.
90
   See Plaintiffs’ Answering Brief (“Pls.’ Super. Answering Br.”) at 8, Sept. 22, 2022 (D.I. 164
Super.).
91
     See id.
92
     See id. at 8-9 (citation omitted)

                                             -15-
[Ancillary Agreements] that is filed in the correct forum based on the plain language

of the UAPA.”93 Additionally, CRE argues Burris does not apply, and even if it did,

the seven factors weigh in CRE’s favor.94

     B. COURT OF CHANCERY ACTION CONTENTIONS

         In the Chancery Amended Complaint, CRE’s Count I seeks “specific

performance directing RGI to abide by its contractual commitments under the

Servicing Agreement and Participation Agreement” and to pay CRE funds from the

Lockbox.95 In Count II, CRE claims that RGI anticipatorily repudiated the Servicing

Agreement and Participation Agreement and asks for an injunction “prohibiting RGI

from disbursing funds from the Lockbox account to itself until Plaintiffs’ offset

rights are established.”96 In Count III, CRE seeks a declaration that UAPA Section

8.5(a) limits liability via an indemnification cap.97 In Count IV, CRE seeks a

declaration that UAPA Section 8.7 limits the types of claims that can be brought by

RGI.98 And in Count V, CRE alleges RGI breached the UAPA by filing the New

93
     See id. at 14.
94
     See id. at 14-20.
95
    CAC ¶¶ 45-55; see also id. ¶ 3 (noting that the Servicing Agreement defines the parameter of
the Lockbox Account).
96
     Id. ¶¶ 56-64.
97
     Id. ¶¶ 65-70.
98
     Id. ¶¶ 71-76.

                                             -16-
York Action.99

          RGI moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Court of Chancery

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).100 Broadly, RGI argues “[t]he legal and factual issues

in Counts I-IV are before the New York court, which ruled it had exclusive

jurisdiction over such claims.”101 RGI makes a series of global arguments as applied

to all counts. First, RGI claims that McWane compels the Court to dismiss or stay

this action.102 Second, RGI argues CRE is collaterally estopped from “attacking the

New York court’s ruling by arguing that the UAPA, or at minimum, Delaware law,

applies to RGI’s indemnification claims” because the New York court found the

UAPA does not govern the Servicing Agreement or Participation Agreement.103

Third, RGI argues the claims do not sound in equity and therefore the Court of

Chancery lacks subject matter jurisdiction.104

                                  IV. DISCUSSION

      A. RGI’S SUPERIOR COURT RULE 12(b)(1) ARGUMENT FAILS.

          RGI believes Count III, as it relates to the Ancillary Agreements and the

99
      Id. ¶¶ 77-85.
100
      Def.’s Ch. MTD at 1.
101
      Id. at 17.
102
      Id. at 19-20.
103
      Id. at 21-22.
104
      Id. at 23.

                                         -17-
Supplemental Agreement, should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). RGI asserts

dismissal is warranted because the Ancillary Agreements’ forum selection clause

states New York is the proper forum for claims under those agreements. RGI

contends allowing CRE to litigate non-UAPA claims in Delaware runs the risk of

duplicative litigation and inconsistent judgments. CRE relies on the “law of the

case” doctrine in light of this Court’s previous determination that the broad language

of UAPA Section 9.6 permits the non-UAPA claims to be heard in this Court.

       The law of the case doctrine is a “judicially-created doctrine that prevents

parties from relitigating issues[s] that previously have been decided.”105 Under this

doctrine, “a court’s legal ruling at an earlier stage of proceedings controls later stages

of those proceedings, provided the facts underlying the ruling do not change.”106

“Once a matter has been addressed in a procedurally appropriate way by a court, it

is generally held to be the law of that case and will not be disturbed by that court

unless [a] compelling reason to do so appears.”107 The law of the case doctrine “is

not inflexible in that, unlike res judicata, it is not an absolute bar to reconsideration

of a prior decision that is clearly wrong, produces an injustice[,] or should be

105
    Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Protection LLC, 2022 WL 4091260, at *3 (Del. Super.
Ct. Aug. 24, 2022).
106
   Nationwide Emerging Managers, LLC v. Northpointe Hldgs., LLC, 112 A.3d 878, 894-95 (Del.
2015) (citation omitted).
107
   Zirn v. VLI Corp., 1994 WL 548938, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 23, 1994); see also Bragdon v.
Bayshore Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 251 A.3d 661, 677 (Del. Ch. 2021) (citing Zirn, 1994 WL
548938, at *2).

                                           -18-
revisited because of changed circumstances.”108 “This Court has held: ‘A party

seeking to have the Court reconsider the earlier ruling must demonstrate newly

discovered evidence, a change of law, or manifest injustice.’”109

          In April 2021, the Court issued its first of two decisions in this matter. In the

April 2021 decision, the Court analyzed the competing forum selection clauses of

the UAPA—with a Delaware forum selection clause—and the Ancillary

Agreements—with their New York forum selection clauses.110 The Court held that

the UAPA’s Delaware forum selection clause governed disputes arising from the

UAPA and the Ancillary Agreements for two reasons. First, RGI conceded “CRE’s

affirmative claims are based on an alleged breach of representations and warranties

set forth in the UAPA.”111 Second, the UAPA is the later-executed document, and

UAPA Section 9.6’s “plain language itself includes the Ancillary Agreements within

its forum selection clause.”112 The Court, therefore, held Delaware was the proper

forum for CRE’s claims.113

          In May 2022, the Court issued its second decision and dismissed RGI’s non-

108
   Hamilton v. State, 831 A.2d 881, 887 (Del. 2003) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
109
   Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2022 WL 4091260, at *3 (quoting E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Admiral Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 45, 55 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995)).
110
      See CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC, 2021 WL 1292792, at *5-7.
111
      See id. at *6.
112
      See id. at *7.
113
      See id.

                                             -19-
UAPA claims with prejudice.114 The Court never reached CRE’s Rule 12(b)(6)

arguments on RGI’s non-UAPA claims because “RGI’s own representations to this

Court [were] sufficient to bar each claim.”115 Namely, RGI represented that it filed

non-UAPA claims in this Court, even though it believed those claims belonged in

New York, just in case the New York court dismissed them.116 The Court noted the

New York court agreed RGI’s non-UAPA claims must be litigated in New York,117

and then the Court held RGI to its representations and dismissed RGI’s non-UAPA

claims based on those representations.118

          Here, RGI argues “if anything, CRE’s argument is barred by the law of the

case” in light of the Court’s May 2022 decision.119 RGI’s reasoning is that the

necessary inference to be drawn from that decision is RGI’s claims were dismissed

to avoid duplicative litigation and inconsistent judgments.120 Not so. Rather, the

Court dismissed RGI’s non-UAPA claims based on RGI’s representations that it

filed those claims in Delaware only as a safety net if the New York court dismissed

114
      See CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC, 2022 WL 1749181, at *9-10.
115
      See id. at *9.
116
      See id.
117
      See id.
118
      See id. at *10.
119
      Defendant’s Reply Brief (“Def.’s Super. Reply”) at 8-9, Oct. 13, 2022 (D.I. 167 Super.).
120
      Id. at 9.

                                                -20-
RGI’s non-UAPA claims in New York.121 It does not follow that CRE’s non-UAPA

claims must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) based on the law of the case. Indeed,

the opposite is true—the Court previously held Delaware is the proper forum for

certain non-UAPA claims because (1) RGI conceded CRE’s affirmative claims are

based on breaches set forth in the UAPA, and (2) UAPA Section 9.6 encompassed

certain claims under the Ancillary Agreements.122

         Additionally, there has been no “newly discovered evidence, a change of law,

or manifest injustice” since the Court issued its two previous decisions. Any

perceived injustice derives solely from the parties’ own tactical decisions and

representations, not from any of the multiple courts that have dealt with this morass.

Any risk of “duplicative litigation” or “inconsistent judgments” is a result of the

parties’ tactical decisions, which have already unnecessarily burdened multiple

courts. The New York Supreme Court said it best in denying RGI’s request for an

anti-suit injunction: “While it would have made more sense for the parties to

expressly bargain to only litigate in one court (and equal sense to pick one now),

they have only themselves to blame for their poor drafting decisions that resulted in

121
    See CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC, 2022 WL 1749181, at *9 (“The Court need not reach CRE’s
arguments that [RGI’s non-UAPA] claims fail on their merits, as advanced in its 12(b)(6) Motion.
Instead, RGI’s own representations to this Court are sufficient to bar each claim.”); see also id. at
*10 (“RGI represented that it filed its Amended Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaint just in
case the New York court determined those claims belong in Delaware. The New York court
didn’t.”).
122
      See CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC, 2021 WL 1292792, at *6-7.

                                                -21-
multi-forum litigation.”123

         Simply put, if anything, the law of the case dictates that CRE’s Count III is

properly in Delaware.           RGI’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction is DENIED.

      B. RGI’S SUPERIOR COURT RULE 12(c) ARGUMENT FAILS.

         RGI’s next basis to dismiss Count III is that it’s “overripe.”124 RGI argues

Count III is overripe because RGI pleaded an affirmative, non-declaratory claim in

New York, which makes CRE’s Count III overripe under Burris and Markusic.125

RGI argues that the seven-factors set out in Burris control, and when the Court

analyzes these factors, judgment in RGI’s favor is proper.126 CRE counters that the

overripeness argument fails because Count III still serves a practical and useful

purpose especially when it’s the only claim related to the Ancillary Agreements in

this Court.127 CRE believes Burris is inapposite for several reasons,128 and that even

if Burris applies, the factors weigh in favor of denying RGI’s Motion.129

         As an initial matter, the term “overripe” as used in this context appears in only

123
      New York Action Development Letter Update, Ex. at 2.
124
      See Def.’s Super. MTD at 14.
125
      See id. at 14-15; Def.’s Super. Reply at 12-13.
126
      See Def.’s Super. MTD at 15-21.
127
      See Pls.’ Super. Answering Br. at 13-14.
128
      See id. at 14-17.
129
      See id. at 17-20.

                                                 -22-
six Delaware cases: Burris, both previously-published decisions in this case,

Markusic, and two other Superior Court cases. Put differently, there aren’t many

decisions discussing this doctrine.

         “The basic purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to enable the court to

adjudicate a controversy prior to the time when a remedy is traditionally available

and, thus, to advance to [a] stage at which a matter is traditionally justiciable.”130 A

declaratory judgment is intended to “promote preventive justice,”131 but it’s not “a

means of eliciting advisory opinions from courts.”132 The Court has discretion to

grant or deny a declaratory judgment,133 but the Court cannot exercise this discretion

unless there is an “actual controversy.”134 An actual controversy exists if all of the

following elements are met:

         (1) It must be a controversy involving the rights or other legal relations
         of the party seeking declaratory relief; (2) it must be a controversy in
         which the claim of right or other legal interest is asserted against one
         who has an interest in contesting the claim; (3) the controversy must be
         between the parties whose interests are real and adverse; [and] (4) the
         issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial

130
    Diebold Comput. Leasing, Inc. v. Com. Credit Corp., 267 A.2d 586, 591-92 (Del. 1970)
(citation omitted); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6501 (2023).
131
   Stabler v. Ramsay, 88 A.2d 546, 551 (Del. 1952), adhered to on reh’g, 89 A.2d 544 (Del.
1952).
132
      Ackerman v. Stemerman, 201 A.2d 173, 175 (Del. 1964) (citing Stabler).
133
    See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6506 (2023); Sec. Nat’l Mortg. Co. v. Lehman Brothers Hldgs.
Inc., 2016 WL 6396343, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2016).
134
   See Gannett Co., Inc. v. Bd. of Managers of the Delaware Criminal Justice Info. Sys., 840 A.2d
1232, 1237 (Del. 2003); XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. WMI Liquidating Tr., 93 A.3d 1208, 1216-17
(Del. 2014).

                                              -23-
         determination.135

         Here, the parties don’t really contest the first three elements. Instead, the

fourth element—ripeness, or to be more exact, overripeness—is at issue.

         RGI asks the Court to dismiss Count III as overripe citing Markusic and

Burris. RGI tells the Court that it need not engage in the longer Burris analysis

because Markusic states: “The court need not engage in the [Burris] analysis . . . .

Where non-declaratory claims are pending in another court, the declaratory version

of those same claims are overripe and risk the unnecessary burdening on the court’s

resources and possibility of inconsistent factual and legal findings between the

courts.”136      While Markusic was recently affirmed by the Delaware Supreme

Court,137 the Court here would be remiss if it rested its decision on Markusic without

engaging in the Burris analysis.

         The Superior Court in Burris set out seven factors to consider whether a claim

should be dismissed as overripe:

         1.    Whether the defendant is truly an unwilling litigant, thus
               necessitating declaratory action.

         2.    What form of relief is truly being sought by the plaintiff and
               whether that relief, if not solely a declaration of rights, would
               require resort to another court for supplemental relief. If so,

135
      Rollins Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Hydronics Corp., 303 A.2d 660, 662-63 (Del. 1973).
136
      See Markusic, 2021 WL 2456637, at *5; Def.’s Super. MTD at 14-15.
137
   Markusic v. Blum, 2022 WL 4451486 (Del. Sept. 23, 2022) (affirming the Court of Chancery’s
decision without a separate opinion).

                                                 -24-
                whether both the rights and relief could be attained in a single non-
                declaratory action already available.

          3.    Whether another remedy exists and whether it would be more
                effective or efficient and, thus, whether declaratory judgment
                would serve a useful purpose.

          4.    Whether another action is pending, instituted either before or after
                the instant action, at the time of consideration of the Motion to
                Dismiss, and whether plaintiff would be able to raise all claims and
                defenses available in the instant action, as part of the pending
                action.

          5.    Whether the instant action has truly been instituted to seek a
                declaration of rights or merely for tactical or other procedural
                advantage.

          6.    Whether the instant action was filed in apparent anticipation of
                other pending proceedings.

          7.    Whether plaintiff will suffer any prejudice if the instant action is
                dismissed.138

          Application of the Burris factors is appropriate here. In E.I. Dupont De

Nemours & Co. v. Huttig Building Products,139 the Superior Court declined to

engage in the Burris analysis because it determined the defendant effectively “cast

a cloud” upon the contract at issue by filing a second action in California a month

after the Delaware action was instituted.140 On the other hand, in Security National

138
      Burris, 583 A.2d at 1372-73.
139
      2002 WL 32072447 (Del. Super. Ct. May 28, 2002).
140
      See id. at *4-5.

                                             -25-
Mortgage Company v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,141 the Court engaged in the

Burris analysis.142 There, this Court determined “the parties ha[d] moved far

forward to litigate the claim” because they were actively pursuing litigation in the

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.143 The

present case is more like Lehman Brothers than Huttig Building Products because

RGI is actively pursuing similar claims in New York, which were originally filed

less than one day after CRE initiated this action.144 As such, it’s proper to engage in

the Burris analysis.145

          Factor One: RGI is a willing litigant.

          RGI is a willing litigant. RGI initially brought an action in the Southern

District of New York within a day of the filing of this action. Though later dismissed

for lack of diversity, RGI proceeded with the New York Action shortly thereafter in

state court. Further, on March 30, 2020, less than two months before the lawsuits

started, RGI sent a default notice to CRE, suggesting that CRE “preserve documents

141
      2016 WL 6396343 (Del. Super Ct. Aug. 24, 2016).
142
      See id. at *8-11.
143
      Id. at *8.
144
    See Declaration of Paul Burgo ¶ 2, Aug. 15, 2022 (D.I. 156 Super.) (“On May 18, 2020, RGI
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
asserting claims for breach of contract under the Servicing, Participation, and Supplemental
Agreements.”); see also Compl. (having a filing date of May 18, 2020).
145
      See Sec. Nat’l Mortg. Co., 2016 WL 6396343, at *8.

                                              -26-
in view of potential litigation.”146 CRE argues RGI is “active” but “unwilling”

because RGI does not want to litigate in Delaware.147 That misses the point. This

factor asks whether the party is a willing litigant as it relates to the causes of action

generally, not in a specific court.148

         Factor Two: CRE is seeking declaratory relief under Count III.

         Count III seeks a declaration that:

         [T]here is no subsisting claim by RGI for any default of [sic] breach by
         any Plaintiff of the UAPA, the Servicing and/or Participation
         Agreement. This includes a declaratory judgment that there is no
         default or breach as asserted by RGI . . . and that Club Exploria (as
         successor by merger to CRE Bushkill) is entitled to terminate the
         Servicing Agreement and/or is not restricted or obligated by Schedule
         2.149

         The relief sought by CRE here could also be sought in the New York Action

because RGI has advanced affirmative claims that CRE (and others) breached the

UAPA, Ancillary Agreements, and Supplemental Agreement.150                          The Court

previously held, however, that Delaware is the proper forum for this lawsuit because

146
      SAC, Ex. I at 4.
147
      See Pls.’ Super. Answering Br. at 17.
148
    See Burris, 583 A.2d at 1373 (explaining the defendant was a willing litigant because it was
actively pursuing a lawsuit in the Court of Chancery); Sec. Nat’l Mortg. Co., 2016 WL 6396343,
at *8 (explaining the defendant was a willing litigant because it was actively pursuing claims in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York).
149
      SAC ¶ 87.
150
    See Def.’s Super. MTD, Ex. 7 ¶¶ 283-332 (asserting claims by RGI against CRE for breach of
these agreements).

                                              -27-
the UAPA’s Delaware forum selection clause governs the UAPA and the Ancillary

Agreements.151 So, while it is plausible CRE could seek the same relief in the New

York Action, the law of the case holds “[t]his Court is the proper forum for CRE’s

suit.”152 There is an affirmative claim in New York that mirrors the declaratory

judgment action here, but the Court has already held that this Court is the proper

forum for CRE’s lawsuit, which includes the declaratory judgment action. Therefore

this factor is neutral.

          Factors Three and Four: CRE’s Count III claim may serve a useful
          purpose, but CRE could likely raise its claims and/or defenses in the New
          York Action.

          Considering the Court’s prior decision, Count III serves a useful purpose

inasmuch as it permits CRE to pursue its claims under the UAPA and Ancillary

Agreements in accordance with the Court’s holding that Delaware is the proper

forum for CRE’s suit. On this ground, factor three favors CRE.

          CRE argues the New York court determined the UAPA is governed by a

Delaware forum selection clause, and thus CRE would not be able to raise all claims

and defenses available in the New York Action.153 But this assertion appears

conclusory, as RGI points out—“CRE [] fails to explain what defenses from the

151
      See CRE Niagara Hldgs., LLC, 2021 WL 1292792, at *6-8.
152
      See id. at *7.
153
      See Pls.’ Super. Answering Br. at 19.

                                              -28-
UAPA it could possibly rely on in litigating its claims that it did not breach the

[Ancillary] Agreements, nor does it explain why it would be unable to assert them

defensively in New York.”154              Because CRE has yet to provide an adequate

explanation as to why it wouldn’t be able to raise the appropriate claims or defenses

in the New York Action, factor four favors RGI.

         Factors Five and Six: This action may have been initiated to seek a
         declaration of rights, but it may also have been filed in anticipation of the
         New York Action.

         CRE claims, and the Court must accept at this stage, it filed this action in

accordance with the UAPA’s forum selection clause.155 RGI paints a different

picture. RGI says CRE filed this action for tactical advantage shortly after RGI sent

CRE notices of default on the Ancillary Agreements. RGI points to CRE’s Motion

for Summary Judgment in the Chancery action and says CRE believes Delaware law

on indemnification and willful misconduct is more advantageous.156                 But, if

anything, that argument goes to the Chancery action and RGI fails to directly connect

it to the Superior Court action. The argument, therefore, is not persuasive and factor

five favors CRE.

         RGI claims it is the “natural plaintiff” and CRE filed this action in anticipation

154
      Def.’s Super. Reply at 15.
155
      See Pls.’ Super. Answering Br. at 19.
156
      See Def.’s Super. Reply at 16 (citing Pls.’ Ch. Answering Br. at 20-21).

                                                -29-
of the New York Action. RGI points to certain caselaw for the proposition that

“[s]eeking a declaratory judgment prior to the natural plaintiff bringing an action can

be viewed as ‘filing in anticipation’ of litigation.”157 RGI says it’s the natural

plaintiff because CRE’s damages, at most, make up a “small offset of RGI’s much

larger damages.”158 CRE argues this action was not anticipatorily filed because, in

its view, it had to file or it would have faced a “timeliness” challenge under the

agreements if it did not file.159 It does appear CRE filed this action in anticipation

of litigation based on the “natural plaintiff” argument by RGI, as well as the fact that

RGI’s damages, if proven, are significantly greater than CRE’s damages.160 For

these reasons, factor six favors RGI.

         Factor Seven: CRE would be prejudiced if this action is dismissed.

         RGI argues CRE will suffer no prejudice if the non-UAPA portions of Count

III are dismissed because CRE can pursue those in the New York Action.161 In

briefing and at argument, CRE countered that it would suffer prejudice if Count III

was dismissed because the New York Action’s decision was on appeal to the New

157
   See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Turner Constr. Co., 2014 WL 703808, at *4
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2014).
158
      See Def.’s Super. Reply at 16-17.
  See Pls.’ Super. Answering Br. at 19-20; see also Def.’s Super. Reply at 16 n.13 (noting the
159

UAPA timeliness limitations period expired a year before CRE filed in Delaware).
160
      See Def.’s Super. Reply at 17 n.16 (explaining the possible damages disparity).
161
      See Def.’s Super. MTD at 20-21.

                                                -30-
York Appellate Division, which could have found all claims must be brought in

Delaware.162 The New York Appellate Division issued no such decision.163 But

also, says CRE, dismissal would deprive it of the bargain it struck through the

UAPA.164 CRE is correct—it likely will be deprived of its bargain struck through

the UAPA if Count III is dismissed because the Court previously held the UAPA,

with its Delaware forum selection clause, covers the Ancillary Agreements. This

factor favors CRE.

         Factors one, four, and six favor RGI. Factors three, five, and seven favor

CRE. Factor two is neutral. Weighing the factors (some of which are more

substantial than others) and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to CRE, the

Court DENIES RGI’s Motion to Dismiss Count III for overripeness.

      C. CHANCERY COUNTS I AND II LACK AN EQUITABLE BASIS AND THE COURT
         WILL NOT RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION.

         The Court of Chancery, one is oft-reminded, “is proudly a court of limited

jurisdiction”165 that enjoys subject matter jurisdiction “only when (1) the complaint

162
      See Pls.’ Super. Answering Br. at 20.
163
   See Letter for Judicial Review, Ex., Mar. 1, 2023 (D.I. 177 Super.) (unanimously affirming the
New York Action Dec. 27 Decision in full, which held UAPA claims properly belong in
Delaware).
164
      See Pls.’ Super. Answering Br. at 20.
165
   Citizens Against Solar Pollution v. Kent Cnty., 2023 WL 2199646, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2023); Nask4Innovation Sp. Z.o.o. v. Sellers, 2022 WL 4127621, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 12, 2022);
Parseghian v. Frequency Therapeutics, Inc., 2022 WL 2208899, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2022);
Perlman v Vox Media, Inc., 2019 WL 267520, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2019).

                                              -31-
states a claim for relief that is equitable in character, (2) the complaint requests an

equitable remedy when there is no adequate remedy at law[,] or (3) Chancery is

vested with jurisdiction by statute.”166 “An adequate remedy at law is one that will

‘afford the plaintiff full, fair, and complete relief.’”167 “Plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”168

            “Although specific performance is an equitable remedy upon which equity

jurisdiction might be predicated, that is true only if the complaint, objectively

viewed, discloses a genuine need for such equitable relief.”169 “The fact that a

complaint contains a prayer for an equitable remedy, without more, does not

conclude the jurisdictional analysis.”170 “[T]he appropriate analysis requires a

realistic assessment of the nature of the wrong alleged and the remedy available in

order to determine whether a legal remedy is available and fully adequate.”171

            CRE asserts the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction because the claims seek

166
   S’holder Rep. Servs. LLC v. DC Cap. P’rs Fund II, L.P., 2022 WL 439011, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 14, 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
167
   Alliance Compressors LLC v. Lennox Indus. Inc., 2020 WL 57897, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6,
2020) (quoting El Paso Nat’l Gas Co. v. TransAmerican Nat’l Gas Corp., 669 A.2d 36, 39 (Del.
1995)).
168
    DC Cap. P’rs Fund II, L.P., 2022 WL 439011, at *2 (citations omitted); Alliance Compressors
LLC, 2020 WL 57897, at *3 (“The party seeking an equitable remedy has the burden to show that
a legal remedy would be inadequate.” (quoting Amaysing Techs. Corp. v. Cyberair Commc’ns,
Inc., 2004 WL 1192602, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2004)).
169
      Candlewood Timber Grp., LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997 (Del. 2004).
170
      Id.
171
      Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                                 -32-
equitable remedies.172 Specifically:

               Counts I and II seek specific performance (an equitable remedy) of
               RGI’s contractual obligations under the Servicing and Participation
               Agreements to distribute funds held in the Lockbox account to CRE
               Participation, and injunctive relief prohibiting distribution of funds
               held in the Lockbox account to RGI until Plaintiffs’ offset rights
               are established.173
          Additionally, CRE argues an adequate remedy at law is lacking because it’s

unclear whether money damages would make it whole.174 Specifically, CRE asserts

that “RGI has no business operations or other assets that it could use to satisfy a

judgment—so if RGI steals funds that should otherwise go to Plaintiffs, it is unlikely,

if not impossible, that Plaintiffs could ever recover those funds.”175

          In April 2022, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation and order governing

accounts and resolving the Status Quo Motion.176 That Order provided, in part:

          1. On the first business day of each calendar month, RGI shall pay
             CRE Niagara Participation Holdings LLC an amount equal to
             33.06% of RGI’s Swept Timeshare Contract Payments during the
             prior month.
          2. On the first business day of each calendar month, RGI shall pay an
             amount equal to 16.94% of RGI’s Swept Timeshare Contract
             Payments during the prior month into the trust account of Kasowitz
             Benson Torres LLP. The amounts held in such escrowed trust
             account shall only be distributed as ordered by this Court, by
             another court of competent jurisdiction following entry of final
172
      Pls.’ Ch. Answering Br. at 35-36.
173
      Id. (citation omitted).
174
      Id. at 36.
175
      Id. (citation omitted).
176
      Order Governing Accounting & Resolving Status Quo Motion, Apr. 28, 2022 (D.I. 32 Ch.).

                                              -33-
               judgment (including any appeal), or by mutual written agreement
               of RGI and CRE Niagara Participation Holdings LLC.177
          CRE’s fear that RGI could unilaterally distribute funds from the Lockbox is

addressed by the Court’s Order.178 And the disputed 16.94% sits in escrow until

final resolution of both the Chancery and Superior Court actions. So the entry of the

Status Quo Order effectively moots CRE’s argument that an adequate remedy at law

did not exist.179 While CRE continues to argue that the “Status Quo Order simply

ensures the funds are available for taking, not who is entitled to take” and “[a]lthough

the Lockbox Funds are currently stored in escrow, there remains a very real and

immediate controversy as to who owns the rights to the disputed 16.94%,”180 both

statements cut against the need for equitable relief. Accordingly, the specific

performance claims lack an equitable basis.

          The Court of Chancery has the ability to retain jurisdiction even after finding

177
      Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
178
    CRE asserts that equitable relief is necessary because it’s likely that RGI cannot satisfy an
eventual judgment. Pls.’ Ch. Answering Br. at 36-37. But such a circumstance arises only in the
narrow instances where there are “serious questions about defendants’ ability to pay a damage
award.” Brinati v. TeleSTAR, Inc., 1985 WL 44688, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 1985) (citations
omitted). For example, such a circumstance may arise in the dissolution or liquidation context.
Id. at *1, *4; In re Cencom Cable Income P’rs, L.P. Litig., 2000 WL 130629, at *1, *7-9 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 27, 2000). That is not the case here.
179
    See, e.g., Bauer v. Gilpin, 1994 WL 469220, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 1994) (“With respect to
plaintiffs’ complaint for specific performance, I conclude that the record demonstrates
unequivocally that the complaint has been effectively mooted by the parties entering into a
stipulation.”).
180
      Pls.’ Ch. Answering Br. at 38.

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the seemingly equitable claims lack an equitable basis.181 But such retention is

wholly discretionary.182 Factors for the Court to consider when determining whether

to retain jurisdiction include, for example, whether retaining jurisdiction would

avoid a multiplicity of suits, to promote judicial efficiency, and to avoid extra

expense.183 The Court finds those efficiencies weigh against retaining jurisdiction.

         Accordingly, RGI’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

is GRANTED. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the action, CRE’s

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED as MOOT.

                                       V. CONCLUSION

         For the foregoing reasons, RGI’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is

DENIED in full.

         Because the Court of Chancery lacks jurisdiction over the Chancery Amended

181
    Zeborski v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2156984, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2014).
The exercise of that discretion, via the clean-up doctrine, “can be appropriate for ‘any of several
reasons, including to resolve a factual issue which must be determined in the proceedings; to avoid
multiplicity of suits; to promote judicial efficiency; to do full justice; to avoid great expense; to
afford complete relief in one action; and to overcome insufficient modes of procedure at law.’” Id.
(quoting Darby Emerging Mkts. Fund, L.P. v. Ryan, 2013 WL 6401131, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27,
2013)). Here, judicial efficiency and avoiding multiplicity of suits counsel against retaining
jurisdiction.
182
    Id.; Biegler v. Underwriting Serv. Mgmt. Co., LLC, 2022 WL 17820533, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec.
20, 2022) (“While this Court retains the power to decide those claims under the cleanup doctrine,
it may decline to exercise that jurisdiction where, as here, this Court has not made any factual
determinations.” (citation omitted)).
183
      Zeborski, 2014 WL 2156984, at *9.

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Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss the Chancery Amended Complaint is GRANTED

subject to CRE’s right to transfer the action to the Superior Court under 10 Del. C.

§ 1902 (which might be done via appropriate amendment of its operative pleadings

there). As the Court lacks jurisdiction, it cannot hear the merits of CRE’s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgement on Counts III and IV. Accordingly, CRE’s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED as MOOT.

       CRE has sixty days to elect to transfer the Chancery action to the Superior

Court (or amend the necessary pleadings that are already-extant therein to effect a

de facto transfer).184 If CRE does not move this Court to transfer the action (or file

the amendments that it deems necessary) within that time, that action will be

dismissed but with final judgment thereon withheld until such time as the stipulated

status quo order is no longer necessary.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                              _________________________
                                                              Paul R. Wallace, Judge

184
    DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1902 (2023) (noting that a party adversely affected may transfer to
the appropriate court “within 60 days after the order denying the jurisdiction of the first court has
become final,” and that Section 1902 “shall be liberally construed to permit and facilitate transfers
of proceedings between the courts of this State in the interests of justice”).

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