Court Opinion

ID: 9363007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 16:05:43.623654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:27.690539
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                          No. 124,911

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                            In the Matter of the Parentage of M.F.,
                                    By and Through K.L.,
                                          Appellant,

                                               and

                                              T.F.,
                                            Appellee.

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Butler District Court; DAVID A. RICKE, judge. Opinion filed December 23, 2022.
Affirmed.

       Valerie L. Moore, of Vinton Moore, of Lenexa, for appellant.

       Christopher J. Vinduska, of Klenda Austerman LLC, of Wichita, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., HILL and SCHROEDER, JJ.

       PER CURIAM: This is an appeal of an order that denied any relief to the petitioner,
K.L., who seeks a court declaration of her parentage of a young girl, M.F. A close
examination of the issues she raises reveals that K.L. is asking us to reweigh the evidence
and reverse the trial court. This we will not do. We affirm.

       The history of this case provides context and perspective. K.L.'s initial petition
was denied by the district court. K.L. appealed to this court and the district court's
decision was affirmed. Upon review, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed both courts and

                                                 1
remanded the case to the district court with directions to use the correct legal test. Upon
remand, the district court at first granted relief to K.L. but later reversed its order upon a
motion for reconsideration filed by T.F., the birth mother of M.F. We are now
considering K.L.'s appeal of that order.

Once close, this couple slowly parted.

        The record from the trial of this matter is uncontested. K.L. and T.F. were in a
committed same-sex relationship from 2007 to 2014. They owned a home and lived
together. T.F. always wanted children and began considering artificial insemination in
2012.

        They both attended a preinsemination session with social worker Renee Cristiano
in November 2012. Cristiano's report said the couple planned to be coparents and that
their families supported T.F.'s decision to have K.L. appointed as guardian. T.F. later
disputed these statements at trial. T.F. said K.L. went with her to see Cristiano because it
was a requirement of insemination if you lived with someone else.

        T.F.'s first attempt at artificial insemination failed. T.F. selected the sperm donor
on her own, went to the appointments on her own, and did not tell K.L. she was being
inseminated. T.F. later testified that the decision to become pregnant was not mutual.

        T.F.'s second attempt at artificial insemination was successful. But the parties
disagree on how involved K.L. was in the process. K.L. says she helped select the donor
because he was Hispanic like her. K.L. was present for the successful procedure. T.F.
testified that she alone chose the sperm donor.

                                               2
       A daughter, M.F., was born in October 2013. K.L. was at the hospital with T.F.
when M.F. was born. K.L. was given a hospital bracelet that identified her as a parent and
the couple provided the hospital a birth plan that said K.L. was the baby's other parent.

       The couple had never entered into a written parenting agreement. When M.F. was
born, K.L.'s last name was used as a second middle name on the birth certificate. T.F.
later testified that she felt pressure from K.L. to use her name. T.L. later unilaterally
dropped K.L.'s last name from the baby's name.

       In November 2014, T.F.—along with 13-month-old M.F.—moved out of the
couple's home in Andover and relocated in Inman, Kansas. K.L. testified that it was hard
for her to see M.F. after the move because T.F. did not regularly respond to messages.

       T.F. told K.L. that she could come to Inman to see M.F. but did not allow
overnight stays. K.L. testified she did not go to Inman to see M.F. often because by the
time she got there after work, M.F. would be going to bed. Eventually, T.F. would not let
K.L. be around M.F. alone, requiring K.L.'s mother to accompany her.

       In 2015, T.F. married and moved with M.F. to Nebraska. Shortly after that, K.L.
petitioned the court to establish parentage, custody, visitation, and child support. K.L.
asserted that she and T.F. are both M.F.'s mothers and asked the court to establish her
maternity. In addition to what we have discussed above, K.L. testified that she and T.F.
shared M.F.'s expenses "for the most part" and that after the couple broke up, she always
offered to buy things for M.F. when she was at the store.

       The record reveals several other points on K.L.'s behalf:

       • The couple's former neighbor Kenneth Von Feldt submitted an affidavit that
          said T.F. and K.L. talked to him about having a baby together both before T.L.
                                              3
          got pregnant and while she was pregnant. Once M.F. was born, both women
          acted as her mother and T.F. referred to K.L. as "mom," "mommy," or
          "mama." T.F. also referred to K.L.'s mother as M.F.'s grandmother.
      • K.L.'s friend Janet Brown testified that K.L. and T.F. talked about motherhood
          together before M.F. was born. Brown testified she heard M.F. call K.L.
          mommy over the phone a week before the trial.
      • Dr. Thalia Lopez, the OB/GYN who provided T.F. with prenatal care, testified
          that K.L. and T.F. presented themselves as a couple having a baby together.
          Dr. Lopez understood that K.L. was M.F.'s other parent.
      • Denise Strickland, a nurse manager at the Birth Care Center where M.F. was
          born, testified that K.L. was with T.F. the whole time T.F. was in labor. The
          couple also used K.L.'s last name as one of M.F.'s middle names.
      • Jolinda Kelley testified that before T.F. was pregnant, she talked to T.F. and
          K.L. about the artificial insemination process because she had been through it.
          Kelley testified that the couple talked about parenting together and after M.F.
          was born, T.F. told Kelley she wanted another child but K.L. was satisfied with
          one. She testified that T.F. and K.L. introduced M.F. as their daughter and she
          had no doubt they were a family.
      • K.L. admitted into evidence the following:
             o A Mother's Day card T.F. had given her while T.F. was pregnant. T.F.
                 wrote, "You will be a great mother."
             o A birthday card T.F. had given to her while T.F. was pregnant. T.F.
                 addressed the card from "Little Feather,"—their nickname for M.F.—to
                 "Mama K." The card read, "To My Mommy: I have two little arms and
                 know just what they're for . . . hugging the Mommy I love and adore!
                 Happy birthday from your little girl."

      T.F. testified that she was M.F.'s only parent and she never presented K.L. as a
coparent; K.L. was never M.F.'s mother. She said K.L. was her best friend and like an
                                             4
aunt to M.F. She testified K.L. never had financial responsibility for M.F. and she did not
know K.L. claimed to be a parent until she was served with K.L.'s petition. T.F. testified
that she never wanted K.L.'s last name on the birth certificate and K.L. never used M.F.'s
full name anyway so T.F. legally changed it.

       T.F. testified that the year she and M.F. lived in Inman there was an open
invitation for K.L. to visit M.F. and she visited only two times. T.F. presented evidence
that she paid for the insemination and related costs, her and M.F.'s medical bills, and
M.F.'s childcare.

       T.F. testified about the Mother's Day card she sent K.L. while T.F. was pregnant.
She said that she was trying to encourage K.L. to support the idea of T.F. having a baby,
not represent that K.L. was a parent. T.F. said she called her "Mama K" because when
she worked in an orphanage in Guatemala, all the women there were called "Mama" by
the children.

       T.F.'s witnesses testified as follows:

       • Emily McVay testified that she considered T.F. the sole parent of M.F. She
          said only T.F. took care of M.F. and that M.F. never called K.L. "mom" or
          "mommy."
       • Edward Eagan, T.F.'s former boss, testified that T.F. told him K.L. did not help
          pay for M.F.'s care and if anything happened to T.F. her parents would take
          care of M.F.
       • Staci Eddy, M.F.'s daycare provider when she and T.F. lived in Inman, testified
          that she never knew K.L. as a parent of M.F. and K.L. never brought her to
          daycare.
       • T.F.'s friend Elizabeth Avelar Hardyway testified that K.L. did not want to
          have a child because she was older than T.F. and felt that time in her life had
                                                5
          passed. Hardyway testified that there was a baby shower thrown only for T.F.
          when she was pregnant. She said that when T.F. was pregnant, T.F. told her
          she would make sure she was the only parent listed on M.F.'s birth certificate.
      • T.F.'s sister, K.V., testified that she and T.F. discussed in the past that K.L. did
          not want to have a child. She testified that M.F. never called K.L. "mama" or
          "mommy" and that T.F. was solely responsible for parenting and financially
          supporting M.F.

      The district court ruled for T.F. The court held that there was insufficient evidence
to find a parent/child relationship between M.F. and K.L. and denied her relief. The
matter was then reviewed by a panel of this court. The panel rejected K.L.'s arguments
and affirmed the district court's decision. In re Parentage of M.F., No. 117,301, 2019 WL
2399482, at *8 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion).

      That decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in In re Parentage of M.F., 312
Kan. 322, 353, 475 P.3d 642 (2020). After giving a background on the Kansas Parentage
Act and the line of cases stemming from Frazier v. Goudschaal, 296 Kan. 730, 295 P.3d
542 (2013), the Supreme Court laid out the following formula for how the district court
should have handled the parentage case:

      "K.L. seeks judicial recognition of her legal parentage relationship with M.F. . . . She
      wants to employ the legal fiction permitted through the KPA by invoking the
      presumption in subsection (a)(4) of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 23-2208, because she
      'notoriously . . . recognize[d]' her maternity of M.F. If she can succeed in demonstrating
      that this presumption arose, then, under subsections (b) and (c), T.F. must rebut the
      presumption by clear and convincing evidence that no such legal relationship ever existed
      or by showing the district judge a court decree establishing paternity or maternity of
      another individual or by invoking a competing presumption under (c). If T.F. succeeds
      using one of these methods to rebut the initial presumption in K.L.'s favor, then K.L.
      bears the burden of going forward with evidence." In re M.F., 312 Kan. at 349.

                                                   6
The Supreme Court agreed with K.L. that the district court erred in applying the
Parentage Act:

       "It simply was not necessary that [K.L.] demonstrate she was an attentive, hands-on,
       involved mother. Rather, she had to show that she notoriously recognized her maternity,
       including the rights it would give her and the duties it would impose on her. The two
       courts' focus, under that statutory language that our Legislature has not seen fit to change,
       needed to be on whether K.L. had qualified as one of M.F.'s two parents, not on whether
       she had later turned out to be a model of parenting success." In re M.F., 312 Kan. at 350.

       The Supreme Court explained that, in line with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000), along with finding a presumption of
maternity, the court must also be persuaded that the birth mother, at the time of the child's
birth, consented to share her due process right to decision making about her child's care,
custody, and control with the woman claiming parentage under the KPA. In re M.F., 312
Kan. 322, Syl. ¶ 5. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district
court to look at the evidence by using the analysis pattern it had provided. 312 Kan. at
350.

After remand, the district court reviewed the evidence and at first ruled in K.L.'s favor.

       The district court obeyed the Supreme Court's mandate. Both parties agreed there
was no need to present any more evidence. This time the district court found that K.L.
had met her burden to show she notoriously recognized maternity of M.F. when she was
born and thus established a presumption of maternity under K.S.A. 23-2208(a)(4).

       The court then ruled that T.F. had to rebut the presumption by one of the methods
found in K.S.A. 23-2208(b) and (c). The court held that T.F. could not rebut the
presumption for these reasons:

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       •   "[T.F.] was not married to, or cohabitating with another man (or woman) during her
           pregnancy or at the time the child was born;
       •   "No other person openly and notoriously recognized or voluntarily acknowledged
           their parentage in writing or otherwise at the time that M.F. was born;
       •   "No court decree establishing conflicting parentage was produced at the trial; and
       •   "No duty of another person to support M.F. was established at [sic] by trial
           evidence."

       The district court then analyzed whether T.F. consented to share parenting with
K.L. at the time of M.F.'s birth. The district court found that T.F. consented to K.L.'s
maternity and some degree of shared parenting when M.F. was born. It was not of
consequence that T.F. took many steps after M.F.'s birth to revoke or otherwise limit that
consent because the Kansas Supreme Court required the district court to focus on the
status quo at the time of M.F.'s birth. The district court relied on these facts when
reaching its decision:

       • The couple was in a long-term committed relationship and discussed having
           children together.
       • K.L. attended a preinsemination meeting with social worker Renee Cristiano.
           Cristiano's report stated the couple planned to be coparents.
       • K.L. attended the second, successful insemination procedure. The couple
           selected a sperm donor together and chose a Hispanic man, ostensibly because
           K.L. is Hispanic.
       • The couple's neighbor Kenneth Von Feldt testified that they planned to parent
           together and T.F. called K.L. "mom" and "mommy."
       • K.L.'s last name was included on M.F.'s birth certificate as a second middle
           name.
       • K.L. attended childbirth classes with T.F.
       • T.F.'s written birth plan identified K.L. as M.F.'s other parent.

                                                   8
       • T.F. sent K.L. Mother's Day and birthday cards from M.F. before and after her
          birth, with the cards referring to K.L. as "Mama K" and "Mother."

       Noting that over five years had passed since the case was first filed, and that K.L.
and M.F. were separated during that time, the district court ordered their slow
reintegration and granted T.F. temporary sole legal custody.

The court then modified its prior ruling on T.F.'s motion to reconsider.

       T.F. moved to reconsider the district court's September 2021 ruling and argued
that the court erred by finding she could only rebut the presumption under K.S.A. 23-
2208(c), or by providing a court decree establishing paternity of someone other than K.L.
T.F. argued there was a third avenue by which she could rebut the presumption of
maternity: by presenting clear and convincing evidence that no such relationship existed,
which is not limited to any particular kind of evidence.

       T.F. argued that by failing to recognize the third avenue available, the district
court misapplied the law and ignored her clear and convincing evidence that rebutted
K.L.'s presumption of maternity. T.F. argued that the district court also ignored material
evidence that she did not consent to share parentage with K.L. at the time M.F. was born.
T.F. then addressed the court's factual findings on the presumption of maternity and laid
out all the evidence she presented to rebut those factual findings.

       The court heard the motion to reconsider in November 2021. It found for T.F.,
agreeing that it had failed to analyze whether she rebutted the presumption of maternity
by clear and convincing evidence. It found that T.F. had rebutted the presumption by
clear and convincing evidence, adopting as facts the points made by T.F. in her
memorandum in support of the motion to reconsider. The district court said that the great
weight of the witness testimony supported T.F.'s claims that she made the decision to
                                              9
have a child, provided all care for the child, and presented to others that she was the sole
parent. The court found that she was more credible in her assertions than K.L.

       Recognizing that the burden-shifting analysis was not over, the court explained
that K.L. now had an obligation to prove "whether she notoriously recognized her
maternity, including the rights it would give her and the duties it would impose upon her,
and also, whether [T.F.] had implicitly or explicitly consented to share parenting with
[K.L.] at the time of M.F.'s birth."

       The district court found that K.L. did not meet her burden to show that she
notoriously recognized maternity, including the rights it would give her and the duties it
would place upon her. As the court said in its original journal entry of judgment, K.L. did
not recognize the right to share parental responsibilities and did not share the
responsibilities in practice. It held that "[T.F.] was responsible for the day-to-day
parenting of the child and had the financial responsibility for the child." The court
reiterated that the decision to have a child was T.F.'s alone and K.L. merely acquiesced. It
reviewed the evidence and said, "The truth of the facts that [K.L.] asserted at trial is not
found to be more probable than not."

       On whether T.F. consented to share parenting rights and responsibilities, the court
noted that while some evidence showed that she accepted K.L.'s involvement as a
parental figure, K.L. did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that T.F. consented
to shared parenting. The court noted that the evidence on T.F.'s consent is highly
conflicting and that it gave too much weight to K.L.'s evidence and not enough to T.F.'s
on remand. The court set aside its contrary finding in the previous ruling and order.

       It offered the following summary of its ruling:

                                             10
       "1. [K.L.] met her initial burden of notoriously recognizing parentage of the minor child
       M.F.
       "2. [T.F.] rebutted [K.L.]'s presumption of maternity by clear and convincing evidence
       presented at trial.
       "3. [K.L.] was unable to overcome that rebuttal by presenting evidence to show that she
       openly and notoriously recognized parentage and the rights and duties attendant to it at
       the time of the child's birth.
       "4. This court ultimately has not been persuaded that the birth mother [T.F.], at the time
       of the child's birth, consented to share her due process right to decision-making about her
       child's care, custody, and control with [K.L.], the woman claiming parentage under the
       Kansas Parentage Act.
       "5. The court's previous Ruling and Order Making a Determination of Maternity
       Regarding [K.L.] did not appropriately analyze or consider whether [T.F.]'s trial evidence
       rebutted [K.L.]'s presumption of maternity by clear and convincing evidence or properly
       apply the burden-shifting analysis required by the Kansas Supreme Court's opinion in this
       case. Therefore, that previous Ruling and Order is altered, amended, and set aside to the
       extent that it establishes a mother-child relationship between [K.L.] and the minor child
       M.F. In addition, paragraphs I, II, and III setting forth orders regarding child custody,
       support, alternative dispute resolution, and parenting rights are set aside in their entirety.
       "6. The court's previous findings and rulings on the issue of [T.F.]'s consent to [K.L.]'s
       parentage are set aside, this court finding that such rulings did not appropriately
       contemplate the weight of considerable conflicting evidence presented by [T.F.] and that
       the court's decision was based on overly-weighted consideration of the evidence
       favorable to [K.L.] on this issue and therefore was improvidently granted."

       K.L. now appeals the district court's ruling on the motion to reconsider, arguing
that
       (1) the court erred by finding T.F. presented evidence sufficient to rebut her
           presumption of maternity; and
       (2) the court erred by finding that K.L. did not sufficiently rebut T.F.'s rebuttal of
           her presumption of maternity.

                                                     11
Burdens of proof shift back and forth between the parties in parentage cases.

       The Kansas Parentage Act deals with presumptions that are created by the
evidence presented in court by those seeking to acknowledge parentage of a child. The
first step for a party seeking legal recognition of her parentage under the Act is to satisfy
one of the presumptions in K.S.A. 23-2208(a). The only presumption that may apply in
this case—and the one K.L. used—is that the party "notoriously or in writing recognizes
[maternity] of the child." K.S.A. 23-2208(a)(4). The Kansas Supreme Court has clarified
that the woman must notoriously recognize maternity and the rights and duties attendant
to it at the time of the child's birth. In re M.F., 312 Kan. 322, Syl. ¶ 5. But evidence of a
party's state of mind before, during, and after the birth may be relevant to the
determination. 312 Kan. at 352.

       Neither party here argues that K.L., on remand, failed to meet her initial burden to
prove a presumption of maternity by showing that she notoriously and openly recognized
parentage of M.F. Instead, it is the second and third burden-shifting steps at issue.

       If the party seeking a parent-child relationship succeeds, the burden shifts to the
other party to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, by court decree
establishing paternity of someone else, or by applying K.S.A. 23-2208(c), when there are
competing presumptions. If the presumption is rebutted, the burden shifts back to the
party seeking establishment of a parent-child relationship, who then has the burden of
going forward with the evidence and proving a parent-child relationship by a
preponderance of the evidence. K.S.A. 23-2208(b); In re M.F., 312 Kan. at 341-42.

       The court must also be persuaded that the birth mother, at the time of the child's
birth, consented to share her due process right to decision making about her child's care,
custody, and control with the woman claiming parentage. In re M.F., 312 Kan. 322, Syl.

                                              12
¶ 5. A birth mother's consent to share parenting may be implicit or explicit, proved by
direct or circumstantial evidence. In re M.F., 312 Kan. at 352.

T.F. presented sufficient evidence to rebut K.L.'s presumption of parentage.

       K.L. argues that the district court erred when it found that T.F. rebutted her
presumption of maternity. She points out that the court's findings of fact on remand
conflict with many findings of fact in its ruling on the motion to reconsider. She
complains that the district court only reviewed its findings of fact as they pertained to
T.F.'s memorandum in support of the motion to reconsider.

       K.L. argues this is wrong for three reasons:
       (1) The memorandum ignores much of the evidence and findings made at trial;
       (2) the standard the district court used to review the evidence disregards the
          Supreme Court's remand and admonishment to look at the time of the child's
          birth when deciding whether a birth parent rebutted the presumption; and
       (3) the memorandum fails to acknowledge the court's findings adverse to T.L.'s
          position that she acknowledged K.L. as a parent.

       These arguments direct our attention to the evidence T.F. offered in rebuttal. As an
appellate court reviewing a determination that must be based on clear and convincing
evidence, we consider whether, after review of all the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, the district court's factual findings are considered highly
probable. In reviewing those findings, we will not weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the
credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact. In re Adoption of C.L., 308 Kan.
1268, 1278-79, 427 P.3d 951 (2018).

       Below is a summary of the rebuttal evidence offered by T.F.:

                                             13
• T.F. selected her first sperm donor alone, attended her first insemination alone,
   and testified that she did not invite K.L. to the second insemination. T.F.
   testified it was not a mutual decision to have a child and she did not want K.L.
   there.
• K.L.'s last name was not included on the original birth certificate. T.F. added it
   as a concession to K.L.
• K.L. organized the baby shower but was not celebrated as a parent. Only T.F.'s
   name was on the invitation, which read: "Baby Shower. In Honor of [T.F.] and
   Lil Feather."
• K.L. opened a bank account for M.F. after she was born and unbeknownst to
   T.F., K.L. unilaterally opened the account and listed herself as a parent. T.F.
   never viewed, signed, or otherwise authorized the account. K.L. only deposited
   $100 over two years that neither party used for M.F.'s benefit.
• K.L. only identified M.F. as her child on her employer's dependent beneficiary
   coverage summary form two years after M.F. was born, and weeks before she
   filed the petition to establish parentage. K.L. did not name M.F. as a
   beneficiary or dependent on any other official documents, including her
   medical and dental insurance.
• While K.L. sent a letter to T.F. referring to herself as "Mama K," K.L. sent the
   letter only to T.F. and thus it was not a "notorious" recognition of maternity.
• T.F. testified it was not a mutual decision to have a child. K.L. was 15 years
   older than T.F. and at a different stage in her life and scoffed at the idea of
   having a child. T.F.'s friend Elizabeth Avelar Hardyway testified accordingly.
• K.L. did not support T.F.'s decision to have a child, so T.F. sent K.L. cards
   where she referred to her as "Mamma K" and "mother" to encourage her to
   accept the decision. With respect to the Mother's Day card T.F. sent to K.L.,
   T.F. sends those cards to many women in her life after she worked in a

                                      14
           Guatemalan orphanage where it was customary to refer to the women living
           there as "Mamma."

       The district court said that the great weight of the witness testimony supported
T.F.'s claims that she made the decision to have a child and found T.F. more credible in
her assertions than K.L.

       When viewed in the light most favorable to T.F., that finding is highly probable.
K.L. is essentially asking this court to reweigh the evidence in her favor and find her
more credible. But this court does not weigh conflicting evidence or pass on the
credibility of witnesses. In re Adoption of C.L., 308 Kan. at 1279. We hold that the
district court did not err by finding that T.F. rebutted K.L.'s presumption of parentage by
clear and convincing evidence.

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's holding that K.L. failed to meet her
burden of proof.

       K.L. argues that the district court erred by finding that she did not establish a
parent-child relationship. After finding that T.F. rebutted the presumption of maternity,
the district court explained that K.L. was then required to overcome that rebuttal by
showing something more than what was necessary to meet the initial presumption of
parentage. "She must now show that she notoriously recognized her maternity, including
the rights it would give her and the duties it would place upon her."

       We review such question for an abuse of discretion. A judicial action is an abuse
of discretion if

       (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable;
       (2) it is based on an error of law; or

                                                15
       (3) it is based on an error of fact.
Biglow v. Eidenberg, 308 Kan. 873, 893, 424 P.3d 515 (2018).

       Essentially K.L. argues on appeal that the district court's findings were not
supported by the evidence. When a district court's decision is challenged for insufficiency
of evidence or as being contrary to the evidence, an appellate court does not reweigh the
evidence or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. If the evidence, when considered in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, supports the verdict, the verdict will not
be disturbed on appeal. Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth, 293 Kan. 375, 407, 266 P.3d
516 (2011).

       K.L. argues that she presented substantial evidence that she recognized the rights
and responsibilities of being a parent:

       • Testimony from her friend Jolinda Kelley that she and the couple discussed
          their plans for becoming parents before and after T.F. got pregnant.
       • K.L. sent her friend Janet Brown a sonogram saying, "We're going to be
          mothers" and discussed motherhood with Janet many times. And Janet testified
          that she heard M.F. call K.L. "mommy."
       • Testimony from the couple's neighbor Kenneth Von Feldt that
          o the couple talked to him about having a family before and after T.F. got
              pregnant;
          o he heard T.F. call K.L. "mom" and "mommy";
          o both of the women were motherly and took care of M.F.; and
          o both women were treated as mothers at M.F.'s first birthday party.
       • Evidence that both T.F. and K.L. were sent Mother's Day and holiday cards
          from their families that alluded to both of them as parents.

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       K.L. argues that these facts, paired with the district court's findings that she met
her initial burden of showing a presumption of maternity, show that she recognized the
rights and responsibilities of being a parent. K.L. argues that the district court abused its
discretion when finding otherwise and held her to an impossible standard. She asks this
court to reverse the ruling of the district court and find that T.F. did not present sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of parentage, but even if she did, that K.L. rebutted
that rebuttal.

       In response, T.F. argues that the district court properly found that K.L. did not
establish parentage. She says K.L. essentially asks this panel to reweigh the evidence and
find her more credible, which we cannot do because appellate courts may not weigh
conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of
fact. See Wolfe Electric, Inc., 293 Kan. at 407.

       T.F. also notes that the district court's finding that K.L. failed to overcome T.F.'s
rebuttal is a negative finding. She cites:

                 "The effect of a negative finding by a trial court is that the party upon whom the
       burden of proof is cast did not sustain the requisite burden. Absent arbitrary disregard of
       undisputed evidence of some extrinsic consideration such as bias, passion, or prejudice,
       the finding of the trial judge cannot be disturbed." Cresto v. Cresto, 302 Kan. 820, Syl.
        ¶ 7, 358 P.3d 831 (2015).

There is merit to this argument. And we see no obvious disregard of undisputed evidence
by the district court in this record.

        We decline K.L.'s invitation to reweigh this evidence. Both parties presented
significant conflicting evidence on K.L.'s role in M.F.'s life. The district court heard all
the evidence in a long trial and found T.F. and her witnesses more credible. The evidence
supports the district court's finding that K.L. did not meet her final burden to show a
                                                     17
presumption of maternity. Thus, we affirm the district court granting T.F.'s motion to
reconsider and finding that K.L. is not a parent of M.F.

       Affirmed.

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