Court Opinion

ID: 9819016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:17:59.685828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:35:07.306037
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: My colleagues today content themselves with a purely literal interpretation of section 2 — 14 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2 — 14 (West 1994)). In doing so, they ignore one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction: the proper interpretation of any legislative enactment cannot be based solely upon the language of the statute in question, but "must be grounded on the 'nature, objects and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other.’ ” Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District, 123 Ill. 2d 303, 313 (1988), quoting Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 233 (1960). By failing to consider the consequences of its literal interpretation of section 2 — 14, the majority inadvertently contributes to the very hardship that the legislature intended to prevent, i.e., inordinate delay in resolving allegations of child abuse and neglect. Under the majority’s approach, the State — on behalf of the minors — must now refile its petition for wardship, thereby starting the entire adjudicatory process over again. Equally troubling, however, is the fact that the majority fails to consider the circuit court’s finding that a dismissal would not be in the best interests of the four children who are at the heart of this case. The General Assembly enacted the Juvenile Court Act to safeguard the best interests of the children, and further charged the court system with construing the Act liberally to carry out that purpose. See 705 ILCS 405/1 — 2 (West 1994). The court today fails to carry out that mandate. Because I believe that section 2 — 14 can be construed so as to fulfill the legislature’s intent of securing the best interests of the children without the automatic dismissal of the petition, I respectfully dissent. I The dispositive issue in this case is whether section 2 — 14 of the Juvenile Court Act requires an automatic dismissal where the adjudicatory hearing is commenced, but not completed, within 90 days from the date of service of process. According to the majority, the General Assembly’s use of the phrase "shall be held” rather than "shall begin” or "shall commence” indicates that the legislature must have intended that the hearing be fully completed within the statutory time period. See 175 Ill. 2d at 482. Had the legislature wanted the hearing to "commence” within 90 days, the majority reasons, it would have said so directly in the statute. The majority further suggests that its literal interpretation of section 2 — 14 is "consistent with the stated purpose of the statute to 'insure’ the speedy resolution of abuse and neglect cases.” 175 Ill. 2d at 483. I disagree with this interpretation for the following reasons. . From a linguistic point of view, the majority errs in reasoning that the absence of the words "begin” or "commence” signifies an express legislative intent that the hearings must be "completed” or "concluded” within 90 days. The error in that reasoning stems from the fact that an argument based on the opposite inference could just as easily be supported. Had the legislature intended for all adjudicatory hearings to be finished within the time allotted, it would have expressly stated that the hearings shall be "completed” or "concluded” within 90 days. But the legislature did not do so. Because I do not believe that the absence of the words "begin” or "commence” is any more indicative of the legislature’s intent than the absence of the words "completed” or "concluded,” I am not persuaded by the majority’s argument concerning what the legislature might have said. Throughout its analysis, the majority focuses exclusively on the legislature’s goal of preventing serious delay in the adjudication of abuse and neglect cases. Noticeably absent from that analysis, however, is any mention of the overriding legislative intent to safeguard the best interests of the minors. See In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1991); see also 705 ILCS 405/1 — 2 (West 1994) (requiring Juvenile Court Act to be "liberally” construed to carry out its purpose of securing that which is best for the minors). That paramount interest permeates the entire Juvenile Court Act, including section 2 — 14. As our appellate court has recognized, "[wjhile one of the express purposes of [section 2 — 14] is to prevent grave harm to minors and families by less than diligent court proceedings [citation], the overall purpose of the Act is to safeguard the children [citations].” In re H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d 907, 912 (1996). Indeed, it was in accordance with that purpose, as well as the legislative mandate to construe the Act liberally, that Judge Smierciak, who presided over this case from its inception, denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 — 14. The transcript here reveals that Judge Smierciak specifically found that granting the motion to dismiss would not be in the best interests of the children. He stated: "Each of the continuances that was had in this case was done with the best interest of these children in mind. Each was done out of necessity. And we certainly believe that the spirit of the statute has been followed. I would also state unequivocally that it would not be in the best interest of these children to dismiss these petitions at this time.” Ignoring Judge Smierciak’s finding, the majority today assumes, without explanation, that the speedy resolution of adjudicatory hearings, as contemplated by section 2 — 14, will always be consistent with the legislature’s overall intent to safeguard the children. In my opinion, however, the swift prosecution of these hearings may not always be in a child’s best interest. The case at bar amply reinforces and highlights my position. Although I am not unmindful that the legislature stated that serious delay "can cause grave harm to the minor and the family” (705 ILCS 405/2 — 14(a) (West 1994)), I also cannot ignore the fact that the legislature expressly provided that the best interests of the children must prevail under the Act. Given this statutory scheme, the desire for a prompt adjudication, no matter how laudable in the abstract, should and must yield when necessary or desirable to the best interests of the children in a particular case. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very essence of our Juvenile Court Act. I take issue with the majority’s statement that its interpretation of section 2 — 14 comports with "the stated purpose of the statute to 'insure’ the speedy resolution of abuse and neglect cases.” 175 Ill. 2d at 483. On the contrary, requiring a dismissal under the circumstances of this case will only serve to defeat the will of the legislature by generating further delay. I note that Judge Smierciak had already ruled on numerous pretrial motions, entertained opening arguments, and began hearing witness testimony. As such, he was familiar with the participants in the case as well as the allegations of abuse and neglect. Notwithstanding the depth of his involvement, the majority now insists that Judge Smierciak erred by not dismissing the petition in the middle of the trial. In my opinion, a dismissal of the petition at this juncture will not only undo all that has been accomplished so far, but will also set off a chain of events which will prolong the final adjudication of the charges of abuse and possibly put the victims at risk. Indeed, under today’s ruling, the State must once again file its petition for wardship, obtain service of process, seek a new order of temporary custody, and attempt to reset the matter for trial.1 There is no guarantee that this case will even be reassigned to Judge Smierciak. Assignment to a new or different judge to reconsider previously litigated issues represents a waste of judicial time and effort.2  The majority’s literal interpretation of section 2 — 14 has the potential of encouraging an endless cycle of litigation. I point out that it was not judicial foot dragging which prevented the trial judge from trying this complex case within the statutory deadline. Rather, it was an over-crowded court docket. In this respect, we have for review the detailed record made by the trial judge in this case so as to fully inform the reviewing courts of the extent of the problem and the reason for the delay. As Judge Smierciak explained in denying the motion to dismiss: "This case is unusual because of the substitution of attorneys, because of the great number of pretrial motions that were filed on behalf of the children and other parties as well as by the fact that the lawyers have suggested that there would be as many as 10 to 12 witnesses testifying in this case. In fact, I’ve blocked out this day and two subsequent days on this court’s calendar to hear this case because of its complexity and because of the adversarial stances that have been taken by the parties. With 4000 cases on the Court call, it’s just impossible to hear 10-, 12-witness cases and take 20 hours of court time to try them without scheduling in this manner.” The majority pays little heed to Judge Smierciak’s explanation as to why this case could not be resolved within 90 days of service of process. Had it done so, the majority would have been cognizant of the impractical consequences of its decision to require the dismissal of the present action. Assuming, as we should, that the State still has an interest in prosecuting this case, it must now return to the same congested court system from which the case is being dismissed. The State must refile without any guarantee that the system will be any less congested, or that the second action will produce a result any different from the first. Indeed, the majority offers little, if any, assurance that a refiled petition will not suffer the same fate as the original petition. Instead, the majority callously suggests that "the legislature has provided for a reasonable and adequate period of time, at least 90 days, for the exercise of judicial duties,” and further that "[t]rial judges are aware of the statutory deadline and are charged with controlling their docket accordingly.” 175 Ill. 2d at 492. In my view, it is naive to think that even the most conscientious trial judge will be able to fully try all adjudicatory hearings within 90 days of service of process, especially when one considers what is involved in trying these cases. Presumably, the 90-day period includes the filing of motions disputing personal jurisdiction, contesting service of process, or challenging the sufficiency of the complaint. After those motions are disposed, defendants will then be afforded an opportunity to answer the complaint so as to place the parties at issue. At this point, the parties may commence discovery: propounding written interrogatories, responding to requests to produce documents and/or admit facts, and taking of the parties’ depositions. Discovery may be further complicated if the parties wish to present expert testimony, as is often the case where allegations of sexual abuse are involved. If the parties do not comply with discovery orders, additional court time will be needed to rectify the noncompliance. Finally, the court must actually hear the witnesses and render its decision. All of this in a case which is given what the majority deems is a "reasonable” statutory life of 90 days. In view of the foregoing, I do not share my colleagues’ confidence "that the trial judge can exercise sufficient control over the proceedings to prevent a party from obtaining a dismissal through purposeful delay.” 175 Ill. 2d at 483. Even if a trial judge suspected that a party was engaging in such tactics, it is not likely that the additional burden of disciplining the laggard party would have a positive impact upon the judge’s ability to try the matter in 90 days. If anything, taking the time to issue rules to show cause, hold contempt hearings and order sanctions would actually hamper the progress of the case. Therefore, unlike the majority, I have serious doubts about whether trial judges can realistically comply with the deadline set forth in section 2 — 14, as interpreted by the majority, simply by exercising judicial oversight of recalcitrant litigants. Moreover, I think it unwise to underestimate the ingenuity of respondents who have now been given an incentive to extend the litigation beyond the statutory deadline. I am concerned that today’s opinion opens the door for such respondents to thwart the legislature’s desire to protect the best interests of the minors. It is well settled .that "a court construing the language of a statute will assume that the legislature did not intend to produce an absurd or unjust result.” State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992), citing People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 316 (1985). In addition, " '[w]hen the literal enforcement of a statute would result in great injustice and lead to consequences which the legislature could not have contemplated, the courts are bound to presume that such consequences were not intended and will adopt a construction which it may be reasonable to presume was contemplated by the legislature. City of Chicago v. Mayer, 290 Ill. 142.’ ” People ex rel. Cason v. Ring, 41 ILLl. 2d 305, 312-13 (1968), quoting Village of Glencoe v. Hurford, 317 Ill. 203, 220 (1925). The majority’s literal interpretation of section 2 — 14 leads to absurd results while at the same time prejudices society’s interest in protecting its children. Because the legislature could not have intended such consequences, I believe this court should adopt a more reasonable construction than that suggested by my colleagues. Such a construction may be found in a recent decision of the Fourth District of the Appellate Court, decided after we granted leave to appeal in the instant case. In re H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d 907 (1996). In In re H.R., the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship on November 9, 1995. The circuit court of Champaign County commenced the adjudicatory hearing 85 days later. After hearing extensive testimony, the court continued the matter for an additional 45 days. Shortly thereafter, the respondent mother filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 — 14. The court granted the motion to dismiss, and the State appealed. In reversing the order of the circuit court, the Fourth District expressly rejected the analysis utilized by the appellate court, and which is being used by this court, in the instant case. H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 910. Instead, the H.R. court held that section 2 — 14 does not require a dismissal of a petition where the hearing is begun, but not yet completed, within the 90-day period. H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 912. In support of this holding, the H.R. court stated at length: "We disagree with the S.G. court’s interpretation of the word 'heard.’ Although the matter must be 'heard,’ that is not synonymous with 'concluded.’ Witnesses and parties may be 'heard’ at a hearing on a matter which is not concluded. See Black’s Law Dictionary 721 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of 'hearing’ [hold means "[t]o administer; to conduct or preside at; to convoke, open and direct the operations of’]). A hearing need not be concluded and the decision of the tribunal need not be made for the matter to be in the process of being 'heard.’ It must be recognized that the number and availability of witnesses affects when the hearing will be concluded. The legislature could not have reasonably meant that a hearing, though commenced, must be halted and the cause dismissed because of the illness of one of the witnesses, or that the parties to the proceeding would simply be denied the opportunity to present witnesses who would not be available on time.” H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 912. In addition, the court in H.R. further emphasized that the overall purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to safeguard the best interest of the children. H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 912, citing 705 ILCS 405/1 — 2(1) (West 1994). The court then pointed out that "[g]iving the persons alleged to be endangering the children the opportunity to retain custody of the children simply because an adjudicatory hearing, though started, has not been concluded within the 90-day period is not consistent with the overall purpose of the Act.” H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 912. Accordingly, the court concluded that the "beginning of the adjudicatory hearing within 90 days in the case at bar satisfied the statute, and the dismissal of this case was an abuse of discretion.” H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 912. I find the foregoing reasoning reflects the will of the General Assembly more accurately than the literal approach endorsed by my colleagues. The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly warned against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction which confines itself to the bare words of a statute [citations], 'for literalness may strangle meaning.’ ” Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710, 8 L. Ed. 2d 211, 215, 82 S. Ct. 1063, 1067 (1962). I would heed that warning in this case and hold, like the Fourth District appellate panel, that the only way to fully effectuate the mission of the legislature is to liberally construe the word "heard” so as to include the commencement of a hearing. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 59 Ill. 2d 402, 405 (1974) (holding speedy-trial provision ("[e]very person *** shall be tried *** within 120 days” (emphasis added)) satisfied by commencement of proceeding). Any other interpretation would lead to absurd consequences that could not possibly have been contemplated by our General Assembly. Finally, I realize that my voice is only that of a dissenter, and that the majority opinion speaks with the force of law. Accordingly, I call upon the legislature to act promptly in amending the Juvenile Court Act so as to provide trial courts with some degree of discretion in granting or denying motions to dismiss pursuant to sectian 2 — 14. In this respect, I urge our legislature to take note of those factors which can cause — unavoidably at times — a violation of the 90-day statutory deadline, such as congested court calendars and the exigencies of litigation.3 Indeed, if safeguarding the rights of children is to have any real significance in Illinois, courts must be given a legitimate opportunity to pass upon the allegations of abuse and neglect. Sadly, when that opportunity is needlessly hampered, it is the abused and neglected children — in whose interest the General Assembly acted in the first place — who suffer the tragic consequences. Because I would affirm the order of the circuit court denying respondents’ motion to dismiss, I respectfully dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE and JUSTICE MILLER join in this dissent.  Presumably, any orders of temporary wardship removing the children from their home on the basis of abuse and/or neglect would have to be automatically vacated until such time as the State refiles its petition. The majority fails to explain what will happen to the children during this interim period.   Other possible scenarios highlight the absurdity of the majority’s approach even more so than the instant case. Consider, for example, the judge who decides to take a case under advisement after presiding over the trial. The judge does so despite the imminent approach of the 90-day deadline simply because the judge realizes that the decision will affect the lives of many people, including the children. According to the majority, that judge would have to either rule on the case forthwith or risk running afoul of section 2 — 14. Similarly, under the determination of the majority, a petition would have to be dismissed if, after trial had been commenced, witnesses were ill or otherwise unavailable until after the 91st day or thereafter.   In response to a question during oral argument, the assistant Cook County State’s Attorney represented the following to the court: "The mandatory application of the statute as proposed by the appellate court, I am told, would result in the dismissal of 'thousands of petitions for adjudications of wardship in the circuit court.”