Court Opinion

ID: 4324200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2018-10-25 00:32:54.907986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:46:51.108824
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals
                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
                           _______________________

                              NO. 09-18-00362-CR
                           _______________________

                 JOSE DIEGO CRUZ-ESCOBAR, Appellant

                                        V.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
_______________________________________________________           ______________

                   On Appeal from the 221st District Court
                        Montgomery County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 14-03-03342-CR
________________________________________________________           _____________

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Jose Diego Cruz-Escobar was convicted in Trial Cause Number 14-03-03342-

CR of four counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and four counts of

indecency with a child by sexual contact. We affirmed the trial court’s judgments.

See Cruz-Escobar v. State, Nos. 09-14-00202-CR through 09-14-00209-CR (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Mar. 4, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Long after our mandate issued, Cruz-Escobar filed a motion asking the trial court

for leave to file a mandamus petition to address errors that he claimed occurred in

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the trial. On August 14, 2018, the trial court denied the motion for want of

jurisdiction. Cruz-Escobar filed a notice of appeal. On September 26, 2018, we

notified that parties that the order identified in the notice of appeal was neither a

final judgment nor an appealable order.

      “The standard for determining jurisdiction is not whether the appeal is

precluded by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by law.” Abbott v. State, 271

S.W.3d 694, 696-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A defendant’s general right to appeal

under article 44.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure has always been limited

to appeal from a final judgment. Id. at 697 n.8; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 44.02 (West 2018).

      Furthermore, the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive authority to release

from confinement persons who have been finally convicted of felonies in this State.

Ex parte Alexander, 685 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). When a conviction

is affirmed on appeal the trial court has limited jurisdiction to ensure that a higher

court’s mandate is carried out and to perform other functions specified by statute.

State v. Patrick, 86 S.W.3d 592, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Absent the grant of

habeas relief by the Court of Criminal Appeals, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to

rule on a motion for new trial more than 75 days after sentence is imposed in open

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court. See Fowler v. State, 803 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991,

no pet.).

      Because Cruz-Escobar is not appealing from a judgment of conviction or an

otherwise appealable order, we lack appellate jurisdiction. See Ragston v. State, 424

S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

      APPEAL DISMISSED.

                                                ________________________________
                                                       LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                             Justice

Submitted on October 23, 2018
Opinion Delivered October 24, 2018
Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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