Court Opinion

ID: 9948492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 15:08:02.84672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:45.266191
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                       CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                              MARCH 7, 2024
                                                                        STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                   2024 ND 43

In the Interest of A.P., a Child

State of North Dakota,                                Petitioner and Appellee
      v.
A.P., child, S.A.M., mother                                      Respondents
      and
J.C.P., father,                                    Respondent and Appellant

                                   No. 20230404

Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District,
the Honorable Daniel E. Gast, Judicial Referee.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.

Diane K. Davies-Luger, Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, N.D., for petitioner
and appellee; submitted on brief.

Justin M. Balzer, Bismarck, N.D., for respondent and appellant; submitted on
brief.
                                Interest of A.P.
                                 No. 20230404

Tufte, Justice.

      J.C.P. appeals from a juvenile court order terminating his parental
rights. He argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by taking judicial
notice of the affidavit underlying the petition without receiving testimony or
other evidence in support of termination. Therefore, he argues, the juvenile
court’s findings are clearly erroneous because they are not supported by
evidence in the record. We reverse the juvenile court order terminating
parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

                                        I

     J.C.P. is the father of A.P. A.P. was placed in protective custody in
September 2021, and adjudicated in need of protection in January 2022.
During two review proceedings, both parents were in default, and the court
extended protective custody an additional nine months. A petition for
termination of parental rights was filed in June 2023.

      Status conferences were held on July 11, 2023, September 5, 2023,
October 3, 2023, and October 31, 2023. The mother did not appear at any of
these hearings. J.C.P. appeared at each hearing, except the status conference
on October 31, 2023.

      At the status conference on October 31, 2023, the State moved for default
against J.C.P. The case manager testified in support of the motion for default,
affirming the information in her affidavit in support of the petition for
termination as true and correct. The juvenile court found J.C.P. in default,
incorporated the affidavit of the case manager into his findings, and
terminated the parental rights of both parents. The court agreed to receive the
testimony of the qualified expert witness by affidavit after the hearing. After
receiving the affidavit of the qualified expert witness, the court filed its order
terminating parental rights. J.C.P. appeals.

                                        1
                                       II

      As a preliminary matter, we must address whether the appeal was
timely. “This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal filed more than 30
days following entry of an order terminating parental rights.” Interest of
C.A.S., 2023 ND 122, ¶ 3, 993 N.W.2d 347 (cleaned up).

       Under N.D.R.App.P. 2.2(a), an appeal from a decision terminating
parental rights must be taken by filing a notice of an expedited appeal with the
clerk of the supreme court within 30 days after entry of the order. Extensions
cannot be granted in a termination of parental rights appeal. N.D.R.App.P.
26(b); Interest of T.S.C., 2018 ND 76, ¶¶ 6-8, 908 N.W.2d 754. In this case, the
deadline to file a notice of appeal was December 20, 2023. The notice of appeal
was filed on December 21, 2023, and thus was not timely to commence this
appeal.

       However, J.C.P. filed his appellant’s brief on December 20, 2023. We
consider whether the brief, which was timely filed, satisfies the requirements
for a notice of an appeal under N.D.R.App.P. 2.2. “The notice of appeal must:
(1) specify the party or parties taking the appeal; (2) designate the order being
appealed; (3) name the court to which the appeal is taken; and (4) indicate that
an expedited appeal is requested.” N.D.R.App.P. 2.2(b).

      The appellant’s brief states J.C.P. is appealing a juvenile court order
terminating his parental rights entered on November 20, 2023. The first page
of the brief indicates it was prepared for filing “in the Supreme Court of the
State of North Dakota.” Because appeals from orders terminating parental
rights are necessarily expedited, we consider the indication that the appeal is
from such an order to satisfy Rule 2.2(b)(4), N.D.R.App.P. See N.D.R.App.P. 2
(permitting the Court on its own motion to suspend any provision of these rules
except the time to file a notice of appeal). The appellant’s brief satisfies the
requirements of a notice of appeal and thus timely commenced this appeal.

      We have jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

                                       2
                                      III

      J.C.P. argues the juvenile court’s findings on termination of his parental
rights are clearly erroneous because they are not supported by evidence in the
record.

     Section 27-20.3-20, N.D.C.C., authorizes a juvenile court to terminate
parental rights:

      1. The court by order may terminate the parental rights of a
         parent with respect to the parent’s child if:
         a. The parent has abandoned the child;
         b. The child is subjected to aggravated circumstances;
         c. The child is in need of protection and the court finds:
            (1) The conditions and causes of the need for protection are
                likely to continue or will not be remedied and for that
                reason the child is suffering or will probably suffer
                serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm; or
            (2) The child has been in foster care, in the care, custody,
                and control of the department or human service zone for
                at least four hundred fifty out of the previous six
                hundred sixty nights;
         ....

N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1).

      The party seeking termination of parental rights “must prove all
elements by clear and convincing evidence.” Interest of I.B.A., 2008 ND 89,
¶ 15, 748 N.W.2d 688. “Clear and convincing evidence is ‘evidence that leads to
a firm belief or conviction the allegations are true.’” Interest of M.R., 2015 ND
233, ¶ 6, 870 N.W.2d 175 (quoting Interest of T.A., 2006 ND 210, ¶ 10, 722
N.W.2d 548). “A court’s decision to terminate an individual’s parental rights is
a question of fact, and that decision will not be overturned unless it is clearly
erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous
view of the law, no evidence exists to support it, or if it is clear a mistake has
been made.” Id. (citations omitted).

                                        3
                                       IV

      J.C.P. argues the district court abused its discretion by taking judicial
notice of, and relying on, the affidavit of the case manager. The court also took
judicial notice of, and relied on, the affidavit of the qualified expert witness.

       At a status conference, after hearing testimony on the issue of default,
the juvenile court immediately entertained and ruled on the petition to
terminate parental rights solely on the basis of the case manager’s testimony
that merely affirmed the content of her affidavit as true and accurate.
Thereafter, the juvenile court’s findings adopted much of the case manager’s
assertions from her affidavit as its findings of facts. The findings specifically
cite: “Further facts as set forth in the Affidavit of Megan Dahl, dated June 19,
2023, which is on file herein” and “The Affidavit of Megan Dahl, L.B.S.W.,
dated June 19, 2023, is on file herein, and is incorporated into this Order by
reference.” The findings also state the qualified expert witness “provided
testimony via Affidavit on file herein and therefore, the Court having
considered the testimony provided, makes this Order final.”

       “[D]ue process and notice requirements prohibit a juvenile court from
taking judicial notice of testimony in proceedings where termination is not an
issue, but where termination is a culmination of prior proceedings the court . . .
may take judicial notice of orders in prior proceedings.” Interest of J.C., 2007
ND 111, ¶ 9, 736 N.W.2d 451. However, “[t]he court may only take judicial
notice of the evidence as presented, and not for the truth of the matters
asserted by the evidence.” Wessman v. Wessman, 2008 ND 62, ¶ 19, 747 N.W.2d
85 (quoting State v. Bergstrom, 2006 ND 45, ¶ 18, 710 N.W.2d 407). In Interest
of J.C., 2024 ND 9, ¶ 11, we explained, “Although the court was allowed to
consider the orders in the permanency proceedings, it could not consider
testimony, including statements in affidavits, from the permanency
proceedings.” (Emphasis added.)

      The juvenile court relied on the case manager’s affidavit in its findings,
incorporated it by reference, and specifically quoted the assertions in the
affidavit as its findings of fact. At the hearing, the case manager testified, but

                                        4
only to affirm her affidavit as true and accurate. She did not testify to the facts
underlying her affidavit. Nor did the State offer the affidavit into evidence.

       “An affidavit filed in a case is part of the court’s file or record. However,
generally an affidavit only becomes part of the evidentiary record when a party
offers it and the court receives it into evidence.” Interest of J.C., 2024 ND 9,
¶ 13. “[T]here is a distinction between the court file or record and the
evidentiary record. Generally, a document in the court file is not part of the
evidentiary record unless a party offers the document and the court receives
it.” Id. at ¶ 15. Therefore, the court abused its discretion by relying on an
affidavit the State never offered and the court never received into evidence. See
id.; see also Interest of Skorick, 2020 ND 162, ¶ 10, 946 N.W.2d 513 (the court
abused its discretion when it considered an expert report the State did not offer
into evidence at the commitment hearing); Wetzel v. Schlenvogt, 2005 ND 190,
¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d 836 (petitions for protective orders and affidavits are
inadmissible hearsay under N.D.R.Ev. 801(c)).

      The juvenile court also treated the qualified expert witness’s affidavit as
testimony. “One of the fundamental precepts of our judicial system is that the
finder of fact must rely only on the evidence presented in court.” Green v.
Green, 1999 ND 86, ¶ 10, 593 N.W.2d 398 (holding the court committed
reversible error when it relied on evidentiary facts in a guardian ad litem’s
report not introduced into evidence); see also Interest of J.C., 2024 ND 9, ¶ 16.
The State never offered and the court never received the qualified expert
witness’s affidavit into evidence. The State provides no authority for
substituting an affidavit for testimony.

      The juvenile court found the Indian Child Welfare Act applies to this
case. See N.D.C.C. ch. 27-19.1. The court explained:

      The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (et seq.) does apply
      to this child because the child is an “Indian Child” as defined by
      the Act, as there is Native American heritage through the Turtle
      Mountain Band of Chippewa and the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe.
      Leech Lake has indicated the child is enrollable with that Tribe
      through her mother.

                                         5
      The Indian Child Welfare Act requires specific findings:

      The court may order the termination of parental rights over the
      Indian child only if the court determines, by evidence beyond a
      reasonable doubt that continued custody of the Indian child by the
      parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional
      or physical damage to the Indian child.

N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(4). The juvenile court did not comply with N.D.C.C. § 27-
19.1-01(4) by making these findings. Under N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(5), the
juvenile court is required to consult a qualified witness for these findings:

      In considering whether to involuntarily place an Indian child in
      foster care or to terminate the parental rights of the parent of an
      Indian child, the court shall require that a qualified expert witness
      must be qualified to testify regarding whether the Indian child’s
      continued custody by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to
      result in serious emotional or physical damage to the Indian child
      and should be qualified to testify as to the prevailing social and
      cultural standards of the Indian child’s tribe. An individual may
      be designated by the Indian child’s tribe as being qualified to
      testify to the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian
      child’s tribe. If the parties stipulate in writing and the court is
      satisfied the stipulation is made knowingly, intelligently, and
      voluntarily, the court may accept a declaration or affidavit from a
      qualified expert witness in lieu of testimony.

      The parties did not stipulate to “accept a declaration or affidavit from a
qualified expert witness in lieu of testimony.” Id. The juvenile court did not
comply with N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(5). Without the necessary testimony from a
qualified expert witness, the juvenile court order remains open to collateral
attack, and the stability and certainty for the child is undermined. Interest of
K.S.D., 2017 ND 289, ¶ 28, 904 N.W.2d 479. The court abused its discretion by
relying on an affidavit the State never offered and the court never received into
evidence, and by accepting the qualified expert witness’s affidavit in lieu of
testimony.

      The juvenile court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of the
affidavits in the record and considering them as part of the evidentiary record.

                                       6
No evidentiary basis for termination of parental rights was presented to the
juvenile court. The court’s findings on termination are clearly erroneous
because the findings are not supported by evidence in the record.

                                     V

      To the extent J.C.P. argues the district court also erred by entering
default judgment under these circumstances, the issue is inadequately briefed
and unnecessary to our decision. We reverse the juvenile court order
terminating parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

     Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
     Daniel J. Crothers
     Lisa Fair McEvers
     Jerod E. Tufte
     Douglas A. Bahr

                                     7