Court Opinion

ID: 9619005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:20:35.040064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:34.789391
License: Public Domain

Benham, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion because I believe the evidence in the record was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the state met its burden in establishing venue. Even if we assume that the State is required to establish venue beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the State has met that burden is a question for the jury. Johns v. State, 239 Ga. 681 (1) (238 SE2d 372) (1977); Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592 (2) (266 SE2d 201) (1980). As such, it is our duty to uphold the jury’s determination on this issue when there is sufficient evidence in the record authorizing a rational trier of fact to make such a finding. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
In the instant case, two witnesses testified as to venue. A Fulton County police investigator testified that the crime scene was on Evans Drive, and a neighbor to the victim testified he lived on Evans Drive; that Evans Drive is in Fulton County; and that the crime took place in a house directly across the street from the witness’s house. This evidence is more than sufficient to authorize a reasonable jury to find the prosecution proved venue beyond a reasonable doubt. While it is possible that houses that are directly across from one another, or even next door to each other, are in different counties since county lines may be drawn anywhere, there was no evidence in this case to suggest this possibility. Even if one were to speculate, reasonable people may differ as to whether this possibility creates a sufficient doubt under the law with respect to the venue question at hand because it is axiomatic that the majority of houses located opposite each other on a particular street will be located in the same county.
Neither is this conclusion affected by the holding in Bradley v. State, 238 Ga. App. 490 (519 SE2d 261) (1999). The majority cites Bradley for the proposition that “a street name, standing alone, is never sufficient to establish venue, because streets frequently run through more than one county.” Bradley is distinguishable from the instant case. In Bradley, the Court of Appeals, using the “slight evidence exception,” held that venue for the defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence and failure to maintain lane had not been established by a trooper’s testimony that he observed the defendant’s vehicle weaving on the northbound lane of Georgia Highway 5 and on Baptist Camp Road. The court ruled that since the trooper did not specify in which county Georgia Highway 5 or Baptist Camp Road were located, the jury had no evidence to determine in which county those streets were located. However, in the instant case, the witness specified that Evans Drive was located in Fulton *907County and that the crime occurred in a house that was directly opposite his house on Evans Drive. Because this evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find that venue was established beyond a reasonable doubt, I respectfully dissent.
Decided October 2, 2000
Reconsideration denied October 20, 2000.
Brian Steel, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Anna E. Green, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, H. Maddox Kilgore, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins this dissent.