Court Opinion

ID: 9671338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:34:41.813146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.352981
License: Public Domain

*686WOODLEY, Presiding Judge
(dissenting)-
It is regrettable that the views of the Judges of this Court as to the controlling principles of law and their application are so divergent that the numerous and lengthy opinions herein will be of little value as legal precedent or as authority in any case other than that before the Court.
The majority opinion on original submission reversed this conviction upon the holding that the evidence showed appellant’s guilt as an accomplice, but not as a principal.
Judge McDONALD’s opinion on rehearing states his present view that such holding was wrong and that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant as a principal. Thus, the conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction as a principal becomes the majority holding.
The writer concurs in the conclusion of Judge McDONALD that the court in Harris County did not err in refusing to hear testimony regarding what evidence the grand jury considered in returning the indictment against the appellant.
This holding of the majority leaves only the supposed errors on the trial in Bell County which were not relied upon in Judge DICE’S opinion as ground for reversal, but were the basis of the admonition to the trial court not to admit certain evidence and to limit certain evidence “upon another trial.”
On original submission there was no occasion for the Court to consider these claims of error because another trial upon the indictment had been precluded by the holding that the appellant was not a principal, as the indictment charged.
The evidence which Judge McDONALD holds inadmissible as showing extraneous offenses relates to property belonging to the Currie Estate and the actions of the appellant as County Judge, and of the administrator Putney in regard thereto. This evidence was admissible. If it showed or tended to show any offense it was not an extraneous offense but the offense charged in the indictment, namely the conversion of property belonging to the Currie Estate by the administrator, the appellant acting with him as a principal.
It is not controlling that the state elected to stand upon the conversion of $50 or more of the proceeds of the $10,000 check. The allegations of the indictment, not the case submitted to the jury, determines what evidence is admissible and what is extraneous.
It is incorrect to assume that the state was limited by the indictment to the proceeds of the $10,000 check drawn on the account of the Currie Estate. The court properly charged the jury that proof of conversion of $50 or more belonging to the estate would be sufficient. In the jury’s absence the trial judge stated, in ruling upon an objection: “Gentlemen, the indictment alleges the theft of $10,000 from the estate. It does not say what $10,000 was taken from the estate.”
The first reference to the Southwest Equities Corporation transaction was when Putney testified on cross-examination that he had been indicted “on the $15,000 Southwest Equities check.” Thereafter the state offered the prospectus and proof regarding the appellant’s connection with Southwest Equities Corporation, but the careful trial judge ruling in the absence of the jury admitted only the notation ascribed to the appellant, the check and the testimony of Putney that the appellant told him to issue it but no court order was obtained.
The first reference to a loan made from the Currie Estate was also on Putney’s cross-examination regarding a transfer of funds belonging to the estate from a Savings and Loan Association to a checking *687account when Putney testified: “That was at the time that we were making the loan for the estate.”
Also the final account of Putney was introduced as State’s Exhibit S-26 wherein the loans and Southwest Equities Corporation $15,000 investment are listed. Also Putney testified on cross-examination about the loans and interest thereon.
The complained of testimony went no further than to show that loans were authorized and made for the Currie Estate.
In view of the above, appellant has no ground to complain.
Much has been written about Putney’s testimony elicited by the defense as to withdrawals he made and converted to his own use which the appellant did not authorize and about which he was not advised.
To make this part of the evidence complete attention is directed to Putney’s explanation made and repeated that he drew the money in violation of the law, knowingly, in anticipation of fees and made false statements on the checks “simply to assure myself that I would not have to split any more fees * * * I did not intend to divide any more fees.”
Also, the record shows that evidence was elicited by the defense showing that Put-ney, with the knowledge of the appellant, sold $40,278.24 worth of Texaco Inc. stock belonging to the Currie Estate a month before he obtained a court order to do so. And on his cross-examination Putney testified that he sold U.S. Treasury Bonds belonging to the Currie Estate with the knowledge of the appellant but without obtaining a court order.
I see no error in the failure of the court to limit the evidence mentioned in his charge.
I respectfully dissent from the overruling of the State’s motion for rehearing.