Court Opinion

ID: 9848287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:15:51.508902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:11.154647
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice
(concurring).
I concur with the majority opinion, but write separately to make two points. First, joint ownership of a motor vehicle is a serious matter involving certain responsibilities and potential liability. For instance, the Safety Responsibility Act, Minn.Stat. § 169.09, subd. 5a (2008), imposes liability on an owner of a motor vehicle if someone other than the owner operates a vehicle with the owner’s express or implied consent and causes an accident. Given, however, that the legislature did not provide for an innocent owner defense to joint owners in the Safety Responsibility Act, it is difficult to argue that it is inherently repugnant that the legislature refrained from extending the innocent owner defense under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d) (2008), to joint owners.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been understood, at least in part, as punishment.” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993). In addition, “[f]or-feitures are not favored; they should be enforced only when within both letter and spirit of the law.” United States v. One 1986 Model Ford V-8 Be Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226, 59 S.Ct. 861, 83 L.Ed. 1249 (1939). Based on these statements from the U.S. Supreme Court, we have said that “to the extent that the forfeiture law at issue here is, in part, ‘punishment’ and, therefore, disfavored generally, we strictly construe its language and resolve any doubt in favor of the party challenging it.” Riley v. 1987 Station Wagon, 650 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn.2002). The approach we adopt here satisfies the obligation to strictly construe the language of the forfeiture statute.
That said, there is reason to question the balance struck by the legislature between various competing interests. For example, given the general disfavor of forfeiture statutes, the wisdom of vesting the right to possession of a forfeited vehicle in the law enforcement agency responsible for the arrest of a defendant and the forfeiture of a defendant’s vehicle is not immediately evident. See Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.63, subds. 1(b), 2, and 3 (2008). But such issues are for the legislature to address, not this court.