Court Opinion

ID: 9760522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:58:41.213591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:13.030703
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority is quite correct legally. Hejl v. Wirth, 161 *400Tex. 609, 343 S.W.2d 226 (1961), still governs trespass to try title suits. It holds both that a plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title and that the effect of a take-nothing judgment against a plaintiff is to vest title in the defendant. Our Supreme Court should address and change the latter rule.
It is archaic, in my humble opinion, to vest title in a party-defendant simply because the plaintiff has not shown title. If the defendant is to be vested with title, he should be required to plead and prove the manner in which he is asserting it.
Neither the pleadings nor evidence sustains the trial court’s finding that the defendants are the record owners. Similarly, there is insufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that the defendants adversely possessed the land. Nevertheless, the majority holds that the trial court properly found that the plaintiff failed to prove his title and, therefore, as a legal result, title vested in the defendant.
In Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 73 S.W. 490, 496 (1934), modified on other grounds, 107 S.W.2d 564 the court reasoned that this rule was “but an application of the provision of the statute to the effect that any final judgment in an action to recover real estate shall be conclusive as to the title or right of possession established in such action upon the party against whom it is recovered, and upon all persons claiming through or under him, by title arising after the commencement of the action. Article 7391, R.S. 1925 [now TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. sec. 22.003 (Vernon 1984) ] 1.’ The fallacy of this rationale for the rule is that by allowing a defendant to recover solely on a not guilty plea he has been relieved of the normal burden of establishing his title or right to possess the litigated property. The statute was intended to estop losing plaintiffs or cross-claimants from pursuing further litigation, not to aid a defendant or cross-defendant in establishing good title. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Bergman, 128 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston 1939, writ dism’d judgmt cor.).
The Supreme Court originally recognized that the title that vested in a defendant upon the plaintiff’s failure to prove his claim was nothing more than that held by the plaintiff. Wilson v. Swasey, 20 S.W. 48, 49 (Tex.1892). In most cases it would be fair to assume that a plaintiff’s failure results from a defect in his claim, thus rendering the defendant’s title by virtue of the case less than certain as to other claimants. But see, Turner v. Land, 472 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.). It, therefore, makes little sense to hinge the defendant’s claim to property upon another party’s failure to prove his right to it since the loser’s failed interest is all that passes under the rule. Unfortunately, judicial evolution of the Hejl rule has resulted in judgments that actually declare title to be in the defendant. Hancock v. Booker, 608 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1980, writ ref’d n.r. e.). This is a far cry from merely recognizing that the effect of a take nothing judgment is to make the defendant’s claim unassailable by the plaintiff and unnecessarily clouds title to the property. Moreover, I find nothing in our Rules of Civil Procedure that supports declaring title to be in a defendant on a not guilty plea unless proof accompanies that plea.
Those rules that deal most specifically with trespass to try title cases, TEX.R. CIV.P. 783-809, support this conclusion. A not guilty plea, without qualification, is an admission that the defendant is either in possession of the premises sued for or that he claims title to the disputed property. TEX.R.CIV.P. 790. Rule 789 requires that a limitations claim be specially pleaded. Thus, if the defendant claims either by adverse possession or title he has implicitly cross claimed for relief. Rule 795 incorporates the rules of pleading, practice, and evidence for civil cases generally in the trial of a trespass to try title case. Allow*401ing recovery on the strength of a pled, but unproved claim, is foreign to our civil practice and violates due process. For that reason I would hold that even the more limited application of the rule that passes title as between the losing plaintiff and defendant abrogates the rules of procedure. Hejl v. Wirth, supra, its ancestry and progeny, should be overruled concerning the effect of a take nothing judgment in a trespass to try title case so that this area of the law is consonant with modern practice.
In departing from current law, I would reverse and render a take nothing judgment against both parties. Staying within current law, I would reverse the judgment and order a remand for the trial court’s entry of a take nothing judgment against the plaintiff without affirmatively entering a judgment vesting title in the defendants based upon their strength of title.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent and implore the Supreme Court of Texas to overturn and abandon Hejl v. Wirth, supra.

. TEX.PROP.CODE ANN. sec. 22.003 provides:
"A final judgment that establishes title or right to possession in an action to recover real property is conclusive against the party from whom the property is recovered and against a person claiming the property through that party by a title that arises after the action is initiated."