Court Opinion

ID: 9853099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:42:38.646211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:40.884683
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 3 and in the holding of Division 4 of the majority opinion. Thus, I agree with the affirmance of Kennebrew’s conviction and life sentence for malice murder. In Division 2, however, the majority remands for the trial court to consider the issue of the effectiveness of Kennebrew’s trial counsel “under the representation of new counsel.” I dissent to the remand because, in my opinion, the trial court has already addressed the issue of the effectiveness of Kennebrew’s trial counsel, and Kennebrew has no right to have that issue presented in the trial court yet again by new appellate counsel.
As an indigent, Kennebrew was entitled to appointed counsel to *408represent him at his trial and on appeal. However, it is undisputed that Kennebrew was represented by appointed counsel at his trial and on his motion for new trial. The issue presented for resolution is whether Kennebrew was entitled to appointment of new appellate counsel to represent him on his motion for new trial. In his motion for new trial, Kennebrew sought to raise the issue of the effectiveness of his trial counsel, but the appellate counsel appointed to represent Kennebrew was a member of the same public defender’s office as trial counsel. Kennebrew urges and the majority holds that this, without more, is sufficient to require the appointment of new appellate counsel. I cannot agree.
If Kennebrew’s right to raise the effectiveness of his trial counsel were an issue, the fact that his trial and appellate attorneys have a common employer would be relevant. For purposes of determining waiver, “an attorney cannot reasonably be expected to assert or argue his or her own ineffectiveness. . . . [Cit.]” White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32 (401 SE2d 733) (1991). “Likewise, it would not be reasonable to expect one member of a law firm to assert the ineffectiveness of another member. . . .” Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662 (409 SE2d 507) (1991). Unlike White and Ryan, however, this case does not present a question of waiver. The only question is whether Kennebrew was entitled to the appointment of new appellate counsel to pursue the ineffectiveness issue on the motion for new trial. In this regard, it is clear that Kennebrew has no right to the appointment of counsel of his choosing. Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 303, 308 (6) (298 SE2d 1) (1982). Kennebrew’s request to discharge appointed counsel and to appoint new counsel was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 35 (1) (257 SE2d 543) (1979). Because Kennebrew did not make an initial showing that the allegations of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are potentially meritorious, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint new counsel. See Bailey v. State, 240 Ga. 112, 113 (1) (239 SE2d 521) (1977); Heard v. State, 173 Ga. App. 543, 544-545 (1) (327 SE2d 767) (1985). See also 28 USC § 1915 (d).
[N]ew counsel should not be appointed without a proper showing. A series of attorneys presenting groundless claims of incompetence at public expense, often causing delays to allow substitute counsel to become acquainted with the case, benefits no one. The court should deny a request for new counsel at any stage unless it is satisfied that the defendant has made the required showing. This lies within the exercise of the trial court’s discretion, which will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.
*409People v. Smith, 863 P2d 192, 200 (Cal. 1994). If a defendant provides neither a basis to support an ineffectiveness claim nor facts from which to infer a basis to support such a claim, a trial court should deny a motion to appoint new appellate counsel. People v. Munson, 662 NE2d 1265, 1284 (Ill. 1996). Simply put, it cannot be an abuse of discretion to fail to appoint new appellate counsel to pursue a potentially frivolous ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. See Phillips v. State, 238 Ga. 497-498 (233 SE2d 758) (1977); Hesterlee v. State, 210 Ga. App. 330, 333 (2) (436 SE2d 32) (1993). To hold otherwise allows a defendant to obtain the appointment of new appellate counsel simply by filing a motion for new trial attacking the effectiveness of trial counsel. Accordingly, the initial focus should be upon the potential merit of the defendant’s assertions of the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. If, but only if, Kennebrew showed that his assertions were not frivolous, would the trial court have abused its discretion in failing to appoint new appellate counsel to present those claims in the hearing on the motion for new trial.
[W]hen a defendant satisfies the trial court that adequate grounds exist, substitute counsel should be appointed. Substitute counsel could then investigate ... a motion for new trial based upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
People v. Smith, supra at 200.
The majority cites Harris v. State, 266 Ga. 775, 778 (9) (470 SE2d 637) (1996) as authority for its holding. However, we did not resolve a defendant’s entitlement to new appellate counsel in Harris, since the trial court had already appointed new appellate counsel in that case and Harris raised no issue as to that appointment. Moreover, to the extent that Harris may suggest there is an absolute right to appointment of new appellate counsel based merely upon a defendant’s post-conviction allegation of the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, I believe that it should be overruled. A defendant can and should be required to make a preliminary showing that his allegations of the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel are not frivolous, so as to justify the time and expense of obtaining new appellate counsel. Here, the trial court properly required Kennebrew to make an initial showing as to the allegations of the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. Had it found potential merit in any of those allegations, the trial court presumably would have appointed new appellate counsel to address those allegations on the merits. By failing to appoint new appellate counsel, however, the trial court presumably found no potential merit in any of Kennebrew’s allegations. On appeal, Kennebrew makes no contention that any of his allegations have potential merit. Instead, he urges only that the trial court erred in failing to appoint *410new appellate counsel to present those allegations. In my opinion, Kennebrew is entitled only to the opportunity to have new appellate counsel present potentially meritorious allegations of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Accordingly, I would affirm the denial of the motion for new trial and I dissent to the majority’s remand for the trial court’s consideration of the ineffectiveness issue “under the representation of new counsel.”
Decided November 12, 1996
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1996.
Paul J. McCord, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Thomas S. Clegg, Desiree S. Peagler, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Christopher S. Brasher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this dissent as to Division 2.