Court Opinion

ID: 9522835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:43.572872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:04.049621
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 36. dissenting. While there is much in the majority decision I agree with, I cannot agree with its conclusion, which is based on appellate fact-finding contrary to that of the Board. At best, the Court’s opinion justifies a remand for additional fact-finding by the Board. I would, however, find that the Board’s fact-finding was adequate and affirm.
¶ 37. In summary, the Board imposed on the State the obligation to prove that it would have disciplined grievant but for the admission that occurred in response to a question that the supervisor asked in violation of Article 14, § 7 of the collective bargaining agreement. That obligation is stated in Commonwealth v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 768 A.2d 1201, 1206 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001), a case cited favorably by the majority, as follows:
*361[Ojnce a Weingarten violation has been established, the burden shifts to the employer to establish that it did not impose the discipline based upon information that it obtained at the unlawful interview. If the employer fails to carry that burden, then a conventional make-whole order will be issued.
The Pennsylvania case is based, in turn, on Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 598 (1980) (once employee shows the violation, “the [employer] must demonstrate that its decision to discipline the employee in question was not based on information obtained at the unlawful interview”).2 Although it reached its standard by a different route,3 the Board in substance adopted the standard of Kraft Foods.
¶ 38. Here, the State showed that the supervisor reasonably suspected that misconduct occurred, but did not demonstrate that he would have pursued that suspicion to the point of a disciplinary investigation against grievant. In fact, the supervisor told grievant, even after grievant had admitted the misconduct, that he would deny the overtime compensation request but would not report grievant for discipline. While he changed course in light of grievant’s clear admission of misconduct, there is no evidence of what he would have done if there had been no admission. The Board appropriately found that the State failed to meet its burden. I would affirm that decision.
¶ 39. The majority has two responses to my position, neither of which is supportable. The first is that the Board made a finding, directly contrary to its conclusion, that a disciplinary investigation would have been commenced in any event and grievant would have been required to make a statement, with or without union representation present. See ante, ¶ 26 n.l. The “finding” on which the majority relies is a double-negative sentence in the Board’s opinion section, and not in the separate findings of fact section, of *362its June decision. It says: “since Lutz had reasonable suspicions, it does not follow that the Employer would not have further investigated Grievant but for Lutz’s improper questioning of him.” The majority turns the double negative into a Board finding that employer would have further investigated grievant.
¶ 40. It is clear from the Board’s discussion that the sentence is not a misplaced finding at all; it is instead a discussion of the weakness of a legal argument. In the two paragraphs that include that sentence, the Board is discussing an argument made by grievant that the Board should “exclude all evidence obtained by the Employer after the improper questioning of grievant by Lutz.” Grievant made this argument because there was no suspicion of wrongdoing before Lutz questioned grievant, and management initiated its investigation solely because of Lutz’s report. The Board labeled this argument as “too simplistic” because the Board had earlier concluded that Lutz reasonably suspected that there might be misconduct from the interview prior to the damning admission, and it therefore did not follow that the employer would not have investigated grievant. In this context, the Board made no finding that such an investigation would have occurred; it simply expressed that grievant’s argument was wrong because of the possibility of such a finding. Apart from the obvious observation that a double negative is not equivalent to a positive finding, the majority is erroneous because the sentence does not contain any finding of fact.
¶ 41. The majority’s second rationale — that the Board did not “explain its conclusion that grievant’s admissions with VSEA representation were the fruit of, and thus not independent of, the employer’s wrongful questioning at the first meeting” — is more persuasive as far as it goes. Ante, ¶ 23. If that is the error in the Board’s decision, however, the remedy is to remand for the Board to make the missing findings. The majority refuses to adopt this appropriate remedy, and instead engages in appellate fact-finding: finding that employer “surely would have investigated the matter further and required grievant to respond to questions concerning the suspicious March 27 call-out claim.” Ante, ¶ 24.
¶ 42. The use of the word “surely” is a give-away here, a red flag for appellate fact-finding. The least sure thing about this case is what the supervisor would have done if the conversation had stopped before grievant made the admission. Since no one testified specifically on that question, the fact can be determined only by *363inference. If the majority believes the Board was not specific enough on what inference it drew, it can remand for that purpose. But only the fact-finder can draw the inference in either direction. By drawing it adversely to grievant, the majority has impermissibly made itself the fact-finder. I respectfully dissent.

 The make-whole remedy of Kraft was overruled in Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222 (1984), because the Board found that § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibited that remedy. Taracorp did not affect the burden-shifting analysis of Kraft. Vermont has no statute similar to that relied upon by the Board in Taracorp.

 The Board’s decision used the “fruit of the poisonous tree” rule and its “inevitable discovery doctrine” exception, which permits the admission of evidence if the proponent can show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would ultimately or inevitably have been discovered.