Court Opinion

ID: 9392299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 16:10:51.896672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.240219
License: Public Domain

J-S13043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    WILLIAM MOISES TORRES                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2536 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 22, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-39-CR-0003055-2008

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED MAY 04, 2023

        Appellant, William Moises Torres, appeals from the September 22, 2022,

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County dismissing his

self-styled petition for habeas corpus relief as an untimely serial petition filed

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9545. After a careful review, we affirm.

        The relevant facts and procedural history have been set forth previously,

in part, by this Court as follows:

              On February 18, 2009, [Appellant] entered a negotiated
        guilty plea to two counts of murder in the third degree. After
        receipt of a pre-sentence investigation report, on March 26, 2009,
        in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court
        sentenced him to an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years’
        imprisonment. [Appellant] did not file a direct appeal.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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              On January 29, 2010, [Appellant], acting pro se, filed a
       petition pursuant to the [PCRA]. On March 30, 2010, following
       appointment of counsel and counsel’s filing of an amended PCRA
       petition, [Appellant] withdrew his petition.
            On July 20, 2016, [Appellant], acting pro se, filed a second
       PCRA petition. The PCRA court denied the petition on August 22,
       2016. [Appellant] did not file an appeal.
              On July 10, 2018, [Appellant] filed a motion for modification
       or relief. The trial court denied that motion on July 13, 2018.
       [Appellant] did not file an appeal.
             On March 13, 2019, [Appellant] filed a motion [to modify
       sentence nunc pro tunc]. The trial court denied the motion on
       March 14, 2019. [Appellant filed an appeal, and this Court
       affirmed.]

Commonwealth v. Torres, 223 A.3d 715, 716 (Pa.Super. 2019).

       On December 16, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se petition for writ of

habeas corpus, and on January 7, 2020, the lower court denied the petition.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this Court affirmed.           See

Commonwealth v. Torres, No. 541 EDA 2020 (Pa.Super. filed 11/24/20)

(unpublished memorandum).

       On July 26, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se petition, which he entitled a

“Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief.”1 Therein, Appellant averred the plea court

did not have the authority to sentence him to any term of prison following his

guilty pleas to third-degree murder. Specifically, he reasoned he was illegally

sentenced because 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a), which is the statute setting forth

____________________________________________

1 Although the petition was time-stamped and docketed on August 8, 2022,
we shall deem it to have been filed on July 26, 2022, when Appellant handed
it to prison authorities. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423 (Pa.
1997) (discussing the prisoner mailbox rule).

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a trial court’s sentencing options, authorizes the trial court to sentence a

defendant to a term of “confinement,” but in his view, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(d),

refers only to a term of “imprisonment,” and therefore violates Subsection

9721(a).   Thus, he contended any term of prison for third-degree murder

imposed under Section 1102(d) is illegal. He also suggested Section 1102(d)

is unconstitutional since it is too vague.

      On August 30, 2022, the PCRA court provided notice of its intention to

treat the habeas corpus petition under the auspices of the PCRA, as well as its

intention to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing. On September

12, 2022, Appellant filed an answer to the PCRA court’s notice wherein he

averred he was entitled to habeas corpus relief outside of the PCRA.

      By order entered on September 22, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed

Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief under the auspices of the PCRA.

Specifically, the PCRA court concluded Appellant’s petition was untimely, and

Appellant did not plead or prove any of the timeliness exceptions. This timely

pro se appeal followed, and all Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been met.

      In his pro se appellate brief, Appellant reiterates his argument that the

plea court did not have the authority to sentence him to any term of prison

following his guilty pleas to third-degree murder. Specifically, he reasons he

was illegally sentenced to an aggregate of 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment

because 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a), which is the statute setting forth a trial

court’s sentencing options, authorizes the trial court to sentence a defendant

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to a term of “confinement,” but in his view, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(d), refers

only to a term of “imprisonment,” and therefore violates Subsection 9721(a).

He reasons confinement does not include imprisonment. Thus, he contends

there is no statutory authority for the imposition of any term of imprisonment

for third-degree murder, and accordingly, his sentence is illegal. He also

suggests Section 1102(d) is unconstitutional and void for vagueness.

       Before we may address the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must

determine whether the PCRA court properly treated Appellant’s claim as one

falling under the auspices of the PCRA.2 We have noted that a defendant may

not circumvent PCRA time limits applicable to issues cognizable under the

PCRA simply by couching such issues in a self-styled petition for habeas corpus

relief. This Court has held:

              We recognize that, [i]t is well-settled that the PCRA is
       intended to be the sole means of achieving post-conviction relief.
       Unless the PCRA court not provide for a potential remedy, the
       PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus. Issues that
       are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA
       petition and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition. Phrased

____________________________________________

2
 We note:
     On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review
     calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is
     supported by the record and free of legal error. The PCRA court’s
     findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
     findings in the certified record. The PCRA court’s factual
     determinations are entitled to deference, but its legal
     determinations are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quotation
marks and quotations omitted).

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       differently, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by
       titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations

omitted).

       Appellant arguably raises two alternate theories of relief. Under his first

theory, Appellant challenges the legality of his sentence on the basis the trial

court did not have the statutory authority to impose a term of imprisonment.

See Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865 (Pa.Super. 2015). See also

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 270 A.3d 1121, 2021 WL 5822148 (Pa.Super.

filed 12/7/21) (unpublished memorandum)3 (holding the appellant raised a

legality of sentencing claim when he averred the trial court did not have

authority to impose imprisonment since, in his view, the term “confinement”

in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 does not include prison as provided for in 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1102(d)). Under the second theory, Appellant claims the sentencing statutes

pertaining to third-degree murder are void for vagueness. Such a claim also

implicates the legality of one’s sentence. See Commonwealth v. Prinkey,

277 A.3d 554, 997 (Pa. 2022); Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990 (Pa.

2021) (explaining that because a sentencing court does not have the authority

____________________________________________

3 We note Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), amended effective, May 1, 2019, provides that
non-precedential decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited
for their persuasive value.

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to sentence a defendant under a sentencing statute that is unconstitutionally

vague, a void-for-vagueness challenge implicates the legality of a sentence).

      Under either theory, therefore, Appellant’s self-styled habeas corpus

petition raises a legality of sentence claim, which is cognizable under the PCRA

and subject to the PCRA timeliness provisions. See Moore, supra.

Accordingly, as did the PCRA court below, we deem Appellant’s habeas corpus

petition as a serial PCRA petition. Thus, we proceed to determine whether

Appellant’s petition was timely filed.

            Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to
      hear an untimely PCRA petition. The most recent amendments to
      the PCRA, effective January 16, 1996, provide a PCRA petition,
      including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one
      year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final “at the
      conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
      Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
      Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”
      42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super. 2010)

(citations omitted).

             [There are] three statutory exceptions to the timeliness
      provisions in the PCRA [that] allow for the very limited
      circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be
      excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a
      petitioner must allege and prove:
             (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
            (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
      unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by
      the exercise of due diligence; or

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             (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
      recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
      Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
      this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

Id. at 1079-80 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii)).

      Under this framework, an appellant must either file a petition within one

year of his judgment of sentence becoming final under Section 9545(b)(3), or

“plead” and “prove” that one of the enumerated exceptions apply. “[T]here

is no generalized equitable exception to the jurisdictional one-year time bar

pertaining to post-conviction petitions.”     Commonwealth v. Brown, 943

A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 2008).

      In the case sub judice, Appellant does not dispute that his instant

petition, filed on July 26, 2022, was not filed within one year from the date

his conviction became final, i.e., in April of 2009, thirty days after he failed to

file a direct appeal to this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P.

903(a).   Further, although under limited circumstances a petitioner may

invoke a timeliness exception under which the late filing of a petition will be

excused, Appellant does not present or develop any argument related to the

timeliness exceptions. Instead, he contends the PCRA court erred in treating

his pro se document as a PCRA petition subject to the timeliness requirements.

As indicated supra, the PCRA court did not err in this regard.

      For all of the aforementioned reasons, we conclude the PCRA court

properly found Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief presented claims

cognizable under the PCRA, and therefore, the petition was subject to the

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PCRA’s timeliness restrictions. Appellant’s petition is facially untimely, and he

has not pled and proven an exception. “[Thus,] neither this Court nor the

[PCRA] court has jurisdiction over this petition.      Without jurisdiction, we

simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.”

Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa.Super. 2007)

(citation omitted).   Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of

Appellant’s instant PCRA petition.

      Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/4/2023

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