Court Opinion

ID: 9911891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 23:02:42.068998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:52.449340
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/20/23 In re M.L. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re M.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
    Court Law.

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                              F085263

             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Super. Ct. No. JW121703-04)

                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
    M.L.,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
            APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Kern County. Lorna H. Brumfield
(Retired Judge of the Kern County Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) and Wendy L. Avila, Judge.†
            Candice L. Christensen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
            Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and
R. Todd Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*           Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and Peña, J.
†      Judge Brumfield ruled at the jurisdictional hearing; Judge Avila ruled at the
dispositional hearing.
                                           -ooOoo-
         Minor M.L. contends on appeal that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
disposition order must be reversed and remanded because there is insufficient evidence
supporting her convictions for battery on a peace officer and violating the terms of her
probation. We affirm.
                               PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
         Minor’s Juvenile Dependency History
         Minor was made a dependent child of the juvenile court at the age of two, pursuant
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1 Parental rights were terminated in 2013,
and she was adopted by her grandparents. She has an intellectual disability and an
individual education plan for emotional disturbance. Following the death of her
grandfather in August 2021, she attempted suicide multiple times and was placed on
several psychiatric holds.
         Minor’s Juvenile Delinquency History
         An original petition filed against minor on November 15, 2021, resulted in
probation for misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (a)).
         A first subsequent petition filed against minor on January 18, 2022, was sustained
for misdemeanor battery on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b)).
         A second subsequent petition filed against minor on April 5, 2022, was sustained
for driving a stolen vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), misdemeanor resisting arrest
(Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)), and driving without a valid driver’s license (Veh. Code,
§ 12500, subd. (a)).

1        All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
noted.

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       Minor’s July 22, 2022 Petition
       On July 22, 2022, the Kern County District Attorney filed a third subsequent
petition, pursuant to sections 602 and 777, subdivision (a)(2), alleging minor committed
misdemeanor battery on a juvenile correctional officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b);
count 1) and violated the terms of her probation (§ 777, subd. (a)(2); count 2).
       On July 25, 2022, minor denied the allegations of the third subsequent petition.
       On August 26, 2022, a contested jurisdictional hearing was held. The juvenile
court denied minor’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 701.1. The court sustained
both counts of the petition.
       On September 12, 2022, the juvenile court committed minor to confinement time
at Pathways Academy for a term of two years four months, less 99 days of credit for time
served. Upon completion of Pathways Academy, the court ordered minor to be released
to the custody of her adoptive mother.2 Minor was also ordered to complete substance
abuse counseling. Pursuant to section 730.7, minor and her parent were held jointly and
severally liable for any restitution, fines, and penalty assessments ordered by the court. A
restitution fine of $50 was imposed on minor.
       On November 10, 2022, minor filed a notice of appeal.
                                FACTUAL SUMMARY
       On July 20, 2022, minor was transported from the youth detention center where
she was housed to “central school.”3 Three corrections officers, including officer Jocelyn
Andrade, were involved in the transport because minor attempted to “AWOL” the day
before.

2      Minor’s grandmother is also her adoptive mother.
3      Minor attended “central school” because she was not an “orange shirt.” Juveniles
who are “orange shirts” are at a higher security level than minor and attend an
educational program at the youth detention center where they are housed. Minor stated
that she wanted to be an “orange shirt” because she preferred the pace of schooling in that
program more than that of “central school.”

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       During the transport, minor made “a few comments here and there,” including
“ ‘You guys want to get a head start?’ ” Believing minor was referring to her attempt to
“AWOL” the previous day, Andrade told minor, “ ‘Don’t start.’ ”
       During the transport, minor refused to comply with the officers’ orders. She
stopped to tighten her shoe straps and, after the school gate was closed, got out of line
and started skipping around the middle of the yard. Andrade told her to get on the
ground. Minor ignored her directive, so Andrade grabbed ahold of her and placed her
hands behind her back. Minor did not resist, so Andrade did not place her in handcuffs,
but took her from the school and transported her back to her unit at the detention center.
       Andrade testified that as they entered the unit and headed towards minor’s room,
minor “aggressively” kicked a trash can while Andrade maintained control of minor’s
hands. Andrade testified that minor attempted to break free of her grip on minor’s hands
as she kicked the trash can, and that she then pinned minor up against the wall to
maintain compliance and control.
       Andrade stated that minor then turned her body and swung towards Andrade’s
facial area with a closed fist an unknown number of times. Andrade placed minor on the
ground and minor was pepper sprayed by another officer.
       Andrade suffered minor facial bruising. Andrade testified that “[d]ue to … having
… sunglasses on at the time,” she suffered “just some facial minor bruising.” Photos of
Andrade’s facial bruises were admitted as exhibits.
       Defense Case
       A video of the incident was admitted as an exhibit and played in court. Defense
counsel argued the video showed minor did not swing her fist at Andrade because
minor’s arms were never free of Andrade’s grip and minor was pinned against the wall
and placed on the ground as soon as she kicked the trash can.

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                                     DISCUSSION
       Minor contends there is not substantial evidence to support her conviction for
battery on a peace officer. The People disagree. We agree with the People.
      A.     Background
      At the jurisdictional hearing, Andrade testified about the events leading to her
pinning minor against the wall. She stated that after minor was placed on the ground for
disobeying orders en route to “central school,” she placed minor’s hands behind her back
and, as “she wasn’t being resistive at the time … [Andrade] didn’t deem it necessary to
place her in handcuffs” while she transported minor back to her unit. Andrade and the
prosecution then had the following exchange:

              “[ANDRADE:] … We walked towards the direction of her room
      [after entering the unit].

             “[PROSECUTION:] And then what happened next?

            “[ANDRADE:] [Minor] aggressively kicked the trash can as I still
      maintained control of her hands.

             “[PROSECUTION:] And what happened next?

             “[ANDRADE:] While she was kicking the trash can, she
      simultaneously attempted to let go of my grip.

             “[PROSECUTION:] And what happened after that?

            “[ANDRADE:] For me to gain compliance and control, I went
      ahead and pinned her up against the wall.”
      The juvenile court admitted a surveillance video from the detention center
showing the incident. The video shows minor walking down the hall with Andrade
behind her. Andrade is using both hands to hold onto minor’s right hand, which is behind
minor’s back. Minor suddenly kicks a large trash can over and the pair move in the
direction of the wall. The view of minor’s right hand is somewhat obscured by Andrade
but, when they turn towards the hall, minor’s right hand is twisted higher up her back

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with Andrade holding onto it. As they reach the wall, minor twists away, raises her left
hand and strikes at Andrade’s head and face, and they fall to the floor and continue
struggling with each other.
          The prosecution argued the video of the incident showed a struggle where minor
attempted to grab Andrade and fight with her after minor kicked the trash can.
          Defense counsel argued the video did not show any evidence of minor attacking
Andrade after Andrade pinned her against the wall. Defense counsel brought a motion to
dismiss count 1, battery on a peace officer, pursuant to section 701.1.
          The juvenile court denied the motion. The court stated the video showed minor
resisted Andrade upon being pinned to the wall after kicking the trash can. The court
stated,

                  “[W]e can watch the video again, but that’s why I got up close to
          [the video]. I don’t know if [minor] punched [Andrade] with a fist in the
          face, but she was clearly moving her arms towards the officer. She was
          pushed up against the wall after she kicked the trash can, but she was
          resisting and moving her arms towards the officer, and then she was taken
          to the ground. I agree to the extent that I’m—I don’t believe she actually
          got a fist in her face, but she definitely was trying to strike the officer. I
          saw her shoulder and her arm move, which is why I came down into the
          well to get close to the video because I wanted to see that particular part of
          the video before [minor] was taken to the ground. I believe that I saw her
          strike the officer. Not necessarily punch her in the face, but I saw her—I
          saw her shoulder movement and her arm movement towards the officer
          when she was being pushed up against the wall right before she was taken
          to the ground and then subsequently [pepper] sprayed. So I’m going to
          deny the motion.”
          B.     Law
          We review the minor’s contentions using the same standard of review that applies
in adult criminal cases. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) “Specifically, we
determine whether substantial evidence—‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value’—supports the juvenile court’s findings. [Citation.] We view the evidence
‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the [findings]
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the existence of every fact the [court] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’
[Citation.] We ‘accept [all] logical inferences that the [court] might have drawn from the
… evidence’ [citation], but reject inferences ‘ “based on suspicion alone, or on
imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work [citations].” ’
We will reverse only if ‘ “it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” the [court’s findings].’ ” (In re I.A. (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778.)
       Although we review the whole record, “[t]he uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible
or inherently improbable.” (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296; see People v.
Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 489.)
       Pursuant to Penal Code section 243, subdivision (b), battery on a peace officer is
any willful and unlawful use of force or violence against the person of a peace officer
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, where the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, the victim was a peace officer. (People v. Lindsay (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 849, 857.)
       “ ‘A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of
another.’ [Citation.] ‘Any harmful or offensive touching constitutes an unlawful use of
force or violence’ under this statute. [Citations.] ‘It has long been established that “the
least touching” may constitute battery. In other words, force against the person is
enough; it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and
it need not leave a mark.’ ” (People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404–405.)
       Battery is a general intent crime. (People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107
(Lara).) “ ‘Reckless conduct alone does not constitute a sufficient basis for … battery
….’ [Citation.] However, if an act ‘ “inherently dangerous to others” … [is] done “with
conscious disregard of human life and safety,” the perpetrator must be aware of the

                                              7
nature of the conduct and choose to ignore its potential for injury, i.e., act willfully….’ ”
(Id. at pp. 107–108.)
       A conviction for battery on a peace officer pursuant to Penal Code section 243,
subdivision (b) requires the officer be engaged in lawful duties and not using excessive
force when the defendant commits battery against the officer. (In re Joseph F. (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 975, 982 [Joseph F.]; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166.)
       “The reasonableness of a particular use of force is judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, not by the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The inquiry is an
objective one: Was the officer’s action objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation?
[Citation.] It is a pure question of fact whether a police officer used reasonable force in
detaining a defendant, so reviewing courts determine if there is sufficient evidence in the
record for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the force used in effectuating a
detention was reasonable.” (Joseph F., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 989–990.)
       C.     Analysis
       Here, there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that minor
committed battery on a peace officer pursuant to Penal Code section 243, subdivision (b).
The record does not support minor’s contention that Andrade used excessive force. The
record also shows minor touched Andrade in a manner that constituted battery pursuant
to Penal Code section 243, subdivision (b).
       Minor first contends there is insufficient evidence of battery on a peace officer
because Andrade used excessive force and was thus not engaged in the lawful
performance of her duties. She argues Andrade used excessive force when she pinned
her against the wall “without provocation” because Andrade “lost patience” after minor
kicked a trash can while being transported to her cell. She argues that “kicking the trash
can was the specific act that resulted in [minor] being thrown up against the wall by …
Andrade,” and that “minor was being compliant.”
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       However, viewing Andrade’s actions from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene to determine whether her actions were objectively reasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting her, we conclude there is sufficient evidence on the
record for the juvenile court to find the force she used to pin minor against the wall to
maintain her grip on minor’s wrists was reasonable because Andrade testified that she
pinned minor against the wall in an effort to maintain her grip on minor’s hands when
minor attempted to break free of her grip at the same time minor kicked the trash can.
(See Joseph F., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 989–990.)
       Here, Andrade testified that she was gripping minor’s hands but not using
handcuffs because minor seemed to be compliant on the transport back to her cell, but
minor suddenly became noncompliant again and attempted to remove her hands from
Andrade’s grip as she kicked the trash can. The juvenile court was entitled to find
Andrade’s testimony credible, as it was neither physically impossible nor inherently
improbable, and was not inconsistent with the video recording of the incident showing
minor simultaneously kicking the trash can and moving her arms and shoulders. (See
People v. Scott, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 296; see also People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
p. 489.) The video shows minor being escorted down the hallway by Andrade, with
Andrade’s hands on minor’s right hand, held behind minor’s back. Minor kicks the trash
can, but it is difficult to view in the video what minor then does with her right hand that is
held by Andrade’s hands, as it is obscured by Andrade. However, Andrade then turns
minor towards the wall of the hallway, and minor’s right hand and arm, still held by
Andrade’s hands, are much further up her back than before, consistent with twisting her
arm to release it from Andrade’s grip. As minor nears the wall, she twists away from
Andrade and strikes Andrade’s head and face area with her left hand as Andrade
struggles to maintain her grip on minor’s right hand and both fall to the floor. From the
perspective of a reasonable officer transporting a juvenile who had minutes earlier been
noncompliant, and then suddenly attempted to escape her grip, the record shows the force
                                              9
used by Andrade to restrain minor by pinning her against the wall to prevent her from
breaking free was reasonable.
       Moreover, the force Andrade used did not involve a weapon or infliction of bodily
harm, as there was no testimony or evidence of physical injury to minor from being
pinned against the wall. (See In re Ramon T. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 201, 206 [no
excessive force when officer put arm around the defendant’s chest but caused no distress
or facial discoloration].) Further, minor neither moved nor argued at the hearing that
Andrade applied excessive force in effectuating the detention. Accordingly, there is
sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s implied finding that Andrade did not
use excessive force.
       Minor further argues she did not commit battery because she did not assault
Andrade “ ‘with conscious disregard for human life and safety,’ ” and was instead “in the
throes of an emotional collapse.” Minor contends that her offense of battery on a peace
officer “appears directly related to the minor’s educational status as a child with an
intellectual disability” because minor “wanted to become an orange shirt … due to her
educational deficits” and was “being transported to a school setting that did not meet her
needs” when she was being transported to “central school” by Andrade earlier on the day
of the incident.
       However, there is sufficient evidence on the record that minor’s touching of
Andrade constituted battery. For battery, “[t]he slightest degree of touching is
sufficient.” (In re B.L. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1495.) Here, the record shows
minor touched Andrade in an effort to strike her. As the juvenile court stated, the video
of the incident shows minor resisted Andrade while she was against the wall and moved
towards Andrade with her arm and shoulder, striking her. The court stated, “[Minor]
definitely was trying to strike the officer. I saw her shoulder and her arm move …. I
believe that I saw her strike the officer. Not necessarily punch her in the face, but … I
saw her shoulder movement and her arm movement towards the officer when she was
                                             10
being pushed up against the wall right before she was taken to the ground and then
subsequently [pepper] sprayed.” The video shows minor strike at Andrade’s head and
face area with her free left hand as she twisted away from the wall, and they fell to the
floor.
         Further, the juvenile court was entitled to find that minor acted willfully, as
required for battery. (See Lara, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 108.) In addition to the
video showing that minor moved her shoulder and arm towards Andrade, striking her,
Andrade testified that after she pinned minor against the wall to maintain her grip on
minor’s hands, minor “turned her body and swung towards [Andrade’s] facial area … as
[Andrade] attempted to block [her] face as [minor] swung towards [her] facial area.” As
discussed above, the court was entitled to find Andrade’s testimony credible, as it was
neither physically impossible, nor inherently improbable. (See People v. Scott, supra,
21 Cal.3d at p. 296; see also People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 489.) The video
and Andrade’s testimony are sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that
minor’s movements towards Andrade with her arm and shoulder, resulting in minor
striking Andrade in the face, were willful and that minor was aware of the nature of the
conduct and chose to ignore its potential for injury. (See Lara, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at
p. 108.)
         Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence presented to the trial court to sustain a
finding that minor committed battery on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b)).4

4      Minor also states in the last line of her opening brief that there is also insufficient
evidence to support the court’s finding on count 2 that she violated the terms of
probation. She implies it is because she was not told that kicking a trash can was a
violation of juvenile court rules and regulations. However, this argument lacks a separate
heading.
       We may disregard arguments not properly presented under appropriate headings.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204 (a)(1) [“Each brief must: [¶] … [¶] (B) State each
point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each
point by argument”]; Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 248,
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                                      DISPOSITION
       We affirm.

fn. 6 [“Arguments not raised by a separate heading in an opening brief will be deemed
waived”]; Alameida v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 46, 59 [“We may
disregard arguments not properly presented under appropriate headings”]; Opdyk v.
California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830, fn. 4 [“The failure to
head an argument … constitutes a waiver”].)
        However, regardless of minor’s failure to properly present the argument, there is
sufficient evidence minor violated the terms of her probation, as the court stated it found
she violated probation not only by failing to follow the rules of juvenile hall, but also by
having a new law violation, for battery on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 234, subd. (a)),
which violated the terms of her probation.

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