Court Opinion

ID: 9734750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:44:58.935418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:50.997670
License: Public Domain

J. L. Banks, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent. A jury verdict of more than twice what the plaintiff asked is excessive; in addition, the *560proofs offered at trial appear to provide no basis upon which this jury verdict can be sustained. Moreover, as the trial judge did not reduce the jury verdict to its present value, as he is required to do even absent a request, the case must be remanded for that purpose. Freeman v Lanning Corp, 61 Mich App 527, 531; 233 NW2d 68 (1975), Currie v Fiting, 375 Mich 440, 454; 134 NW2d 611 (1965), Nagi v Detroit United Railway, 231 Mich 452, 461; 204 NW 126 (1925).
I find, as does the majority, that an attractive, bright, articulate young woman was terribly injured in an industrial accident. I have no doubt that the physical and emotional scars that she sustained will follow her for the remainder of her life and that she has suffered a serious loss to both her capacity to earn and to her self-esteem. However, the jury’s verdict must have some reasonable basis in the facts.
Plaintiff argued past and future pain and suffering, lost earning capacity, lost earnings sustained while she was hospitalized and while she was recovering from her injury, as well as medical expenses.
As to pain and suffering, counsel suggested that a fair award might be $2 per day for the 51 years life expectancy of the plaintiff after age 19. (365 X 51 = 18,615 days X $2 - $37,230)1 Even if the amount might properly be $10 per day, the total for pain, suffering and mental anguish would only come to $186,150.
The proofs show that plaintiff suffered a loss in future earning capacity approximating $10,000 per year. The jury was entirely free to find that loss, and if it did so, to award damages to age 65 *561($410,000) or age 70 ($460,000). I disagree with the assumption made by the majority that this jury could have determined "that plaintiff would never be gainfully employed”. There is no testimony that would support this inference. In fact, this is precisely the opposite of the plaintiff’s theory at trial. The proofs showed a courageous, plucky, self-confident young woman, determined to make the very best of her serious handicap, resolute in her determination to succeed.
I agree that the trial proofs showed lost earnings during plaintiff’s hospitalization and recovery from her injuries of at least $3,100. Moreover, the parties stipulated to medical expenses of $1,807.70.
It appears, then, that plaintiff’s future losses to pain and suffering and her lost ability to earn comprise 99% of the damage award. If the proved future earning loss is a maximum of $460,000, then plaintiff receives an award for pain and suffering of $975,000 from these defendants.2 This amounts to $52.11 per day for pain and suffering over the plaintiff’s 51-year life expectancy from the time of this accident; 26 times what plaintiff’s attorney asked the jury to award!
The economics of large jury awards aside, and remembering that this able and courageous plaintiff was very seriously injured, I conclude that bias and passion must have influenced this jury. I also conclude that the able trial judge abused his discretion in refusing defendants’ motion for remittitur or a new trial.
1 concur with the dissenters in Precopio v Detroit, 94 Mich App 506, 511-515; 289 NW2d 34 (1979), lv gtd 409 Mich 898 (1980), and Pippen v *562Denison Division of Abex Corp, 66 Mich App 664, 678-684; 239 NW2d 704 (1976), that the amount of this award outstrips the evidence before the jury and shocks the judicial conscience.
I would reverse for an order for remittitur to $750,000, the amount of plaintiffs ad damnum clause, or for a new trial.

 Plaintiffs counsel incorrectly totaled this amount as $153,000 while outlining his damages to the jury during closing argument.

 Defendant Mackworth G. Rees, Inc., settled with plaintiff at trial for $65,000. That amount was deducted from plaintiffs 1.5 million dollar jury award before judgment was entered against the remaining defendants.