Court Opinion

ID: 9942615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:01:43.041062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:20.629129
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11437   Document: 39-1    Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 1 of 13

                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 23-11437
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        CAROLYN MINCEY,
        QUENTINA SONNIER,
                                                  Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        RYAN VARDMAN,
        PIEDMONT HEALTHCARE, INC,
        HUGHSTON HOSPITAL, INC.,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                       23-11437

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Georgia
                       D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00110-CDL
                             ____________________

        Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Carolyn Mincey and Quentina Sonnier appeal the district
        court’s grant of summary judgment to Ryan Vardman, Piedmont
        Healthcare, Inc., and Hughston Hospital, Inc., in Mincey and Son-
        nier’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case. Mincey and Sonnier allege Vardman
        violated their Fourth Amendment rights when he falsely arrested
        them while they were visitors at a hospital. 1 Mincey and Sonnier
        also allege the district court erred in denying them leave to amend.
        After review,2 we aﬃrm the district court.

        1 Mincey and Sonnier also brought claims under Georgia state law against

        Vardman, Piedmont Healthcare, Inc., and Hughston Hospital. The district
        court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. As we
        affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Vardman, we need
        not address the state law claims.
        2 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable

        inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ireland v. Prum-
        mell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1286 (11th Cir. 2022). While we generally review a district
        court’s decision to deny leave to amend for an abuse of discretion, we review
        de novo an order denying leave to amend based on a conclusion of law. City of
        Miami v. Citigroup Inc., 801 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir. 2015).
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        23-11437                Opinion of the Court                          3

                                 I. BACKGROUND
               On July 7, 2019, Mincey and her daughter Sonnier were in
        the waiting room of the emergency room (ER) at Piedmont Co-
        lumbus Northside Hospital in Columbus, Georgia. Mincey and
        Sonnier were visiting a sick loved one, and they were each holding
        one of Sonnier’s 10-month-old twins. By chance, some extended
        family members were also present in the ER visiting a diﬀerent sick
        loved one. Mincey and Sonnier were sitting with several family
        members, including Patricia Banks, Jariyah Cotton, Alberta Cot-
        ton, Niﬀerteria Parham, Keonte Alexander, Marsha Alexander, and
        Linda Green.
               Vardman was a corporal in the Columbus Police Depart-
        ment, and was working oﬀ-duty providing security in the ER on
        July 7, 2019. Vardman was wearing his standard issue Columbus
        Police Department uniform. Vardman was seated at the front desk
        of the ER waiting room next to Katharina Spurlock, the ER patient
        access representative. Spurlock controlled access to the ER rooms
        from the waiting area. At one point, when Spurlock opened the
        secure doors to allow an authorized visitor into the ER, another
        unauthorized person also went through the secure doors. Spurlock
        expressed her frustration, and Keonte Alexander made a comment
        to those sitting next to him that “if she didn’t like her job, she needs
        to go ﬁnd another one.”
              This led Vardman to get up from behind the desk to address
        the group. Keonte Alexander acknowledged he made the com-
        ment about Spurlock. When Vardman told the group to “shut up,”
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                     23-11437

        he did so in an “aggressive and disrespectful” way, that was “rude
        and loud.” Vardman told the group if they were not quiet, they
        would have to leave.
               Mincey and Vardman argued about her behavior and Spur-
        lock’s enforcement of hospital policies. Another visitor in the ER
        waiting room, Keith Wright, videoed some of the encounter on his
        phone. On the video, the following exchange can be heard:
              Vardman:     Are we good?
              Mincey:      Sit down and stop talking to me.
              Vardman:     Okay. Stand up . . . give the kid to some-
                           one . . . stand up.
              Mincey:      No, I’m not.
              Vardman:     Do you want to go to jail?
              Mincey:      Do you?
              Vardman:     You want to go to jail? Stand up . . .
              Mincey:      [Inaudible] not bothering you . . .
              Vardman:     You’re not going to do that . . . you’re
                           not going to do this . . . no you’re not . .
                           . what you’re doing is you’re causing a
                           scene.
              Mincey:      No . . . I didn’t say anything . . .
              Vardman:     You are . . . She [Spurlock] is not being
                           rude . . . listen . . . listen . . . what she’s
                           [inaudible] is . . . she’s [inaudible] policy
                           and procedures . . . there’s a reason for
                           it.
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        23-11437              Opinion of the Court                            5

                After this ﬁrst exchange, Vardman returned to the front
        desk. He again reminded the group he would have to ask them to
        leave if they did not sit quietly. In response, Mincey gave Vardman
        a dismissive hand gesture, which Mincey calls the “whatever hand.”
        Vardman then left the desk, and walked back toward Mincey and
        the group. Mincey testiﬁed Vardman stated she needed to leave or
        she would be arrested. The ER Security Video shows Vardman
        standing in front of Mincey, who is still holding one of the twins,
        talking and motioning with his hands. Vardman is then seen walk-
        ing away and speaking into his radio. This call was recorded. Vard-
        man states “Code 3” and asks for a transport. A “Code 3” is a re-
        quest for a backup oﬃcer. After the radio call, Vardman returned
        to speak with Mincey. At this point, Wright began ﬁlming again.
              Mincey:       I did not say anything to you . . .
              Vardman:      You’ve been asked to leave . . . if you
                            don’t leave, you’re going to jail.
              Mincey:       Let’s go . . . racist ass motherfuckers . . .
                            I get tired of this shit . . .
              Vardman:      Not . . . now you’re under arrest
              Mincey:       I’m not . . . I’m not [inaudible]
              Vardman:      Ma’am stop . . .
              Mincey:       Do not touch me!
              Vardman:      Get the child . . .
              Mincey:       Don’t touch me!
              Vardman:      Give the child . . . give the child . . . oh
                            no, no, no that was too late . . . too late
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                23-11437

                            . . . you’re jerking the child around
                            ma’am . . . stop . . . you know what
                            you’re doing . . .
        While holding the child, Mincey physically resisted Vardman’s ef-
        forts to arrest her, pushing him as she was leaving. Sonnier, who
        was also holding a child, placed herself between Vardman and
        Mincey, and did not comply with Vardman’s order to “get out of
        the way,” making it more diﬃcult for Vardman to arrest Mincey.
        Sonnier also pushed Vardman as he attempted to separate her from
        Mincey. Throughout the struggle, Vardman directed Mincey and
        Sonnier to stop using the children to interfere with their arrests.
        Her resistance resulted in a cut to Vardman’s head when Mincey
        knocked oﬀ his sunglasses. Once Mincey and Sonnier ﬁnally re-
        leased the children, Vardman arrested Mincey and Sonnier.
               Mincey was charged with misdemeanor disorderly conduct
        in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39, misdemeanor criminal trespass
        in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21, misdemeanor reckless conduct
        in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60, and felony obstruction of an of-
        ﬁcer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-1024(b). Sonnier was charged
        with misdemeanor reckless conduct and felony obstruction of an
        oﬃcer. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Mincey and Sonnier were
        acquitted on all charges.
                                II. DISCUSSION
              To receive qualiﬁed immunity, an oﬃcer “bears the initial
        burden to prove that he acted within his discretionary authority.”
        Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1041 (11th Cir. 2017). The plaintiﬀ
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        23-11437                Opinion of the Court                          7

        then bears the burden of proving “the defendant violated a consti-
        tutional right” and “the right was clearly established at the time of
        the violation.” Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012).
        Because Mincey and Sonnier do not dispute Vardman was engaged
        in a discretionary function, they bear the burden of proving Vard-
        man was not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity.
                 Mincey and Sonnier claim Vardman is liable under the
        Fourth Amendment for false arrest. In the context of an arrest,
        probable cause exists “when the facts, considering the totality of
        the circumstances and viewed from the perspective of a reasonable
        oﬃcer, establish ‘a probability or substantial chance of criminal ac-
        tivity.’” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)). In
        assessing whether there was probable cause for an arrest, we “ask
        whether a reasonable oﬃcer could conclude that there was a sub-
        stantial chance of criminal activity.” Id. at 902 (quotation marks
        and alteration omitted). “Probable cause does not require conclu-
        sive evidence and is not a high bar.” Id. at 899 (quotation marks
        omitted).
               An oﬃcer need not have actual probable cause, but only ar-
        guable probable cause, to receive qualiﬁed immunity. Brown v. City
        of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). “Arguable probable
        cause exists where reasonable oﬃcers in the same circumstances
        and possessing the same knowledge as the [oﬃcer] could have be-
        lieved that probable cause existed to arrest.” Id. (quotation marks
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11437

        omitted). “Showing arguable probable cause does not . . . require
        proving every element of a crime.” Id.
               We begin with discussing Mincey’s arrest for disorderly con-
        duct, which is the arrest that preceded the oﬀenses of reckless con-
        duct and obstruction of an oﬃcer in Mincey’s and Sonnier’s arrests.
        See Glenn v. State, 849 S.E.2d 409, 418 (Ga. 2020) (“When an arrest
        is lawful, of course, the right to resist an unlawful arrest is not per-
        tinent.”).
        A. Disorderly conduct
               To determine whether there was probable cause or arguable
        probable cause for Mincey’s disorderly conduct arrest, we ask
        whether a reasonable oﬃcer could have concluded there was a sub-
        stantial chance she had committed the crime of disorderly conduct.
               (a) A person commits the oﬀense of disorderly con-
               duct when such person commits any of the following:
               ....
               (3) Without provocation, uses to or of another person
               in such other person’s presence, opprobrious or abu-
               sive words which by their very utterance tend to in-
               cite to an immediate breach of the peace, that is to
               say, words which as a matter of common knowledge
               and under ordinary circumstance will, when used to
               or of another person in such other person’s presence,
               naturally tend to provoke violent resentment, that is,
               words commonly called “ﬁghting words”; or
               (4) Without provocation, uses obscene and vulgar or
               profane language in the presence of or by telephone
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        23-11437               Opinion of the Court                         9

              to a person under the age of 14 years which threatens
              an immediate breach of the peace.
        O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(a)(3)-(4).
               Vardman had arguable probable cause to arrest Mincey for
        disorderly conduct. The “totality of the circumstances” is im-
        portant in this analysis. See Washington, 25 F.4th at 898. Mincey
        frames the probable cause issue solely in response to her profane
        comment calling Vardman a “racist ass motherfucker” as she at-
        tempted to leave the hospital. We agree that Mincey’s vulgar lan-
        guage, without more, would not constitute a violation of the stat-
        ute. See In re L.E.N., 682 S.E.2d 156, 158 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (“State
        law no longer criminalizes the use of unprovoked language threat-
        ening an immediate breach of peace, which is obscene, vulgar, or
        profane, that is directed to a person older than 14 years of age, un-
        less such language also constitutes ‘ﬁghting words.’” (quotation
        marks omitted)). Further,
              the ﬁghting-words exception to constitutionally pro-
              tected speech requires a narrower application in cases
              involving words addressed to a police oﬃcer. This is
              because a properly trained oﬃcer may reasonably be
              expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than
              the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond
              belligerently to ﬁghting words.
        Trammell v. State, 851 S.E.2d 834, 851 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting
        Knowles v. State, 797 S.E.2d 197, 201 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)). Merely
        insulting an oﬃcer is not enough for a disorderly conduct arrest.
        See id.
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                23-11437

               However, Mincey’s words and actions must be put into con-
        text. See Knowles, 797 S.E.2d at 278-79 (“[W]hen determining
        whether words constitute ﬁghting words, the circumstances sur-
        rounding the words can be crucial, for only against the background
        of surrounding events can a judgment be made whether these
        words had a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by others.”
        (quotation marks omitted)). First, Mincey engaged in an argument
        with Vardman in an ER waiting room where people were waiting
        for medical care and tensions are often high. In addition to
        Mincey’s family, there were people waiting in the same room to see
        a medical professional. For example, Lindsey Kyte was waiting to
        see a medical professional while suﬀering a serious ear infection
        and was in severe pain. Second, Mincey continued holding her 10-
        month-old grandson even after being asked by Vardman to hand
        the child to someone else. Mincey had several family members
        around who could have held the child after Vardman asked Mincey
        to hand the child to someone else. Mincey’s actions in the video
        support that she failed to hand over the child and kept the child to
        use as a shield. Third, Mincey’s obscene and vulgar or profane lan-
        guage was used in the presence of two children under the age of
        14 years. Fourth, Mincey used the obscene language in front of the
        rest of her family, which could threaten a breach of the peace.
               A reasonable oﬃcer, knowing what Vardman knew at the
        time, objectively could have believed probable cause existed to ar-
        rest Mincey for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(a)(3)-(4). See
        Brown, 608 F.3d at 734. We conclude Mincey’s actions of (1) argu-
        ing with Vardman in front of a group of her family, (2) while
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        23-11437               Opinion of the Court                        11

        holding her 10-month-old grandson, (3) in an ER waiting room,
        and (4) using profane language in the presence of children under
        14 years old, could have indicated to an objectively reasonable of-
        ﬁcer at the scene that Vardman’s conduct was disorderly, even if
        those circumstances were ultimately insuﬃcient to prove a viola-
        tion of § 16-11-39(a)(3)-(4). See id. Consequently, the district court
        did not err in determining Vardman was entitled to qualiﬁed im-
        munity on Mincey’s claim for false arrest.
        B. Reckless Conduct and Obstruction of an Oﬃcer
                Georgia’s reckless conduct statute provides, “[a] person who
        . . . endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously
        disregarding a substantial and unjustiﬁable risk that [her actions]
        will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the
        disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
        which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty
        of a misdemeanor.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b). Georgia’s obstruction
        statute provides, “[w]hoever knowingly and willfully resists, ob-
        structs, or opposes any law enforcement oﬃcer . . . in the lawful
        discharge of his . . . duties by oﬀering or doing violence to the per-
        son of such oﬃcer . . . shall be guilty of a felony.” O.C.G.A. § 16-
        10-24(b).
              Vardman possessed probable cause to arrest Mincey and
        Sonnier for reckless conduct and obstruction of an oﬃcer. First,
        Vardman was acting within the lawful discharge of his duties as he
        had arguable probable cause to arrest Mincey for disorderly con-
        duct. In the course of making that lawful arrest, Mincey, while
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                    23-11437

        holding a 10-month-old child, physically interfered with Mincey’s
        arrest, and Sonnier, while also holding a 10-month-old child, phys-
        ically interfered with Mincey’s arrest. As the district court stated,
        “[b]y holding the children during their arrest, [Mincey and Sonnier]
        put the children in harm’s way. Under these circumstances, Vard-
        man possessed probable cause to arrest them for both reckless con-
        duct and felony obstruction.” Vardman was entitled to qualiﬁed
        immunity as he had probable cause to arrest Mincey and Sonnier
        for these oﬀenses. 3
        C. Leave to Amend
               Mincey and Sonnier moved to amend their complaint to add
        a negligence count 88 days after the amended pleadings deadline,
        and only two days before the extended discovery deadline expired.
        The district court denied the motion, concluding they failed to
        show good cause for ﬁling an amended complaint beyond the dead-
        line established by the scheduling order. Mincey and Sonnier con-
        tend the district court used the wrong standard in denying the mo-
        tion, asserting the court should have used the Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 15(a)(2) standard of freely giving leave when justice so
        requires, rather than the Rule 16 “good cause” standard. Mincey
        and Sonnier assert the scheduling order’s language that any amend-
        ments after 90 days prior to the close of discovery “shall require

        3 Because we conclude Vardman had arguable probable cause or actual prob-

        able cause for at least one charged offense, it is not necessary to address
        whether the trespass charge against Mincey was supported by probable cause.
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        23-11437                  Opinion of the Court                              13

        leave of Court,” required the district court to use the Rule 15 stand-
        ard.
               That the scheduling order referenced “leave of Court” does
        not implicitly adopt the Rule 15 standard for amendments.
        “[W]hen a motion to amend is ﬁled after a scheduling order dead-
        line, Rule 16 is the proper guide for determining whether a party’s
        delay may be excused.” Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418
        n.2 (11th Cir. 1998). Mincey and Sonnier ﬁled their motion to
        amend after the scheduling order deadline—thus, Rule 16’s “good
        cause” standard was the proper legal framework. The district court
        did not err. 4
                                   III. CONCLUSION
               We aﬃrm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
               AFFIRMED.

        4 Mincey and Sonnier do not contend the district court abused its discretion in

        its good cause finding.