Court Opinion

ID: 9942845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 21:12:28.536458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:45.038230
License: Public Domain

02/21/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                         Assigned on Briefs February 21, 2024

            MICHAEL WHITE v. VINCENT VANTELL, WARDEN

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Trousdale County
                 No. 2023-CV-5040     Michael Wayne Collins, Judge
                       ___________________________________

                            No. M2023-00967-CCA-R3-HC
                        ___________________________________

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael White, of five counts of rape in
2005, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-five years.
Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because, among other things, the original
affidavit of complaint was invalid and that his charges were not supported by probable
cause. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the application, finding that the
Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief and that he failed to comply with the
statutory requirements for requesting the writ. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the
judgment of the habeas corpus court.

                         Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right;
                        Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT,
JR., and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Michael White, Hartsville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Brooke A. Huppenthal, Assistant
Attorney General; and Jason L. Lawson, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State
of Tennessee.
                                         OPINION

                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        In 2005, a Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner of five counts of rape, and
the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of fifty-five years. A
summary of the factual background of this case may be found in our opinion resolving the
Petitioner’s direct appeal. See State v. White, No. M2005-01659-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL
1931749 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2006).

       Since that time, the Petitioner has unsuccessfully pursued a post-conviction petition,
three applications for a writ of habeas corpus, and two motions to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. We have outlined this procedural
history in our opinion resolving the Petitioner’s most recent appeal. See White v. Frink,
No. M2022-00429-CCA-R3-HC, 2022 WL 17986538 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2022),
no perm. app. filed.

        On March 3, 2023, the Petitioner filed a fourth application for a writ of habeas
corpus. In this filing, the Petitioner alleged, among other things, that the affidavit of
complaint was invalid and that his charges were not supported by probable cause. The
Petitioner argued that because of these issues, “the indictments, convictions and
judgment[s] are void and [the resulting] restraint illegal.” Although the Petitioner attached
a copy of his third application for a writ of habeas corpus, he did not attach copies of his
first two applications. He explained that copies of these first two applications were “lost
and destroyed” due to being transported between institutions and being subject to
“numerous cell searches over the years.”

       The habeas corpus court summarily denied the application by a written order entered
on June 14, 2023. The court found that the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory
requirement that copies of all previous petitions for a writ of habeas corpus be attached to
the application. It also found that the alleged errors did not affect the trial court’s
jurisdiction. The Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on June 29, 2023.

                       STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

      With respect to every issue on appeal, our supreme court has recognized that a
reviewing court must ask, “[W]hat is the appropriate standard of review?’” State v. Enix,
653 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tenn. 2022). The principal issue in this case is whether habeas
corpus relief should be granted. This question is one of law, and our standard of review is

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“de novo with no presumption of correctness given to the conclusions of the court below.”
Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. 2010).

                                         ANALYSIS

        The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed by article
I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution, which states that “the privilege of the writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the
General Assembly shall declare the public safety requires it.” Despite the writ’s being
constitutionally guaranteed, the procedures used to issue the writ have been regulated by
statute “at least since the Code of 1858.” State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tenn. 2000)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Today, a petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus is subject to various statutory
procedural requirements. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-107(b). These requirements “are
mandatory and must be followed scrupulously.” See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251,
259 (Tenn. 2007). Indeed, an application for the writ may be summarily denied if it fails
to comply with these requirements. See id. at 260.

       One of the mandatory statutory requirements is that a habeas corpus petitioner who
seeks relief for the first time must confirm that the application is the “first application for
the writ.” Id. § 29-21-107(b)(4). However, if a petitioner has sought habeas corpus relief
previously, then the statute requires that “a copy of the [application] and proceedings
thereon shall be produced, or satisfactory reasons be given for the failure so to do.” Id.

        In this case, the Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus is his fourth one.
However, he failed to attach a copy of his first and second applications. As such, absent
“satisfactory reasons” for his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the
statute, the Petitioner’s latest application should be summarily denied. The Petitioner
should be familiar with this statutory requirement, as it was the reason his third application
for the writ was denied. See White, 2022 WL 17986538, at *2 (“[I]t is clear that Petitioner
has filed two prior habeas petitions challenging the judgments for his rape convictions.
Petitioner failed to attach copies of his prior petitions herein[,] and the habeas corpus court
summarily dismissed the petition on this ground. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.”).

       To that end, the Petitioner asserts that he cannot attach copies of his first and second
applications for the writ because they have been “lost and destroyed” over time. However,
this Court has rejected the argument that a petitioner’s failure to attach previous
applications may be excused upon a bare assertion that the applications were lost,
misplaced, or destroyed. See, e.g., Bailey v. State, No. W2022-01405-CCA-R3-HC, 2023
WL 4106264, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2023) (declining to excuse noncompliance

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on a claim that prior applications were “misplaced”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 12,
2023); Lowe v. State, No. E2022-00285-CCA-R3-HC, 2022 WL 13899444, at *4 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2022) (declining to excuse noncompliance on a claim that prior
applications were “lost”), no perm. app. filed; Goines v. State, No. E2004-03018-CCA-R3-
HC, 2005 WL 1798635, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2005) (declining to excuse
noncompliance on a claim that prior applications were “lost”), no perm. app. filed.

        Even if the Petitioner’s personal copies of those documents have been lost, his
application does not identify whether and to what extent he attempted to obtain copies of
these documents from other sources. This omission is curious, if only because he
represented in his last application that these missing documents do exist and are in the
possession of the “[c]ourts,” presumably meaning court clerks. To be clear, it is not the
duty of this Court or the habeas corpus court to search the realm for the Petitioner’s prior
applications for the writ of habeas corpus. Instead, the statute places this burden squarely
on the Petitioner alone. Because the Petitioner has failed to identify “satisfactory reasons”
for his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the statute, we conclude that
the habeas court properly dismissed the Petitioner’s fourth application for the writ.

        Moreover, the Petitioner has also failed to show that he is entitled to habeas corpus
relief otherwise. Our supreme court has recognized that, “[u]nlike the federal writ of
habeas corpus which reaches as far as allowed by the Constitution, the scope of the writ
within Tennessee does not permit relief from convictions that are merely voidable for want
of due process of law.” Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d at 630. As such, successful prosecution of the
writ “has long been limited to showing that the original judgment of conviction was void
due to a lack of jurisdiction by the convicting court or to showing that the sentence has
expired.” Id. (emphasis added). Stated another way, “the purpose of a habeas corpus
petition is to contest void and not merely voidable judgments.” Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d
60, 62 (Tenn. 1992) (emphasis added).

       Here, the Petitioner asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because (1) the
court clerk did not attest the original affidavit of complaint; (2) multiple charges were not
supported by probable cause; (3) the grand jury considered charges not bound over for its
review; and (4) his trial counsel rendered effective assistance. Any merit to these claims
would, at best, render the challenged judgments merely voidable rather than void. As such,
these claims are not recognized grounds upon which the writ of habeas corpus may issue.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Fitz, No. W2020-01294-CCA-R3-HC, 2021 WL 4077031, at *2 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2021) (“The Petitioner’s contention that he was arrested on a defective
affidavit of complaint and warrant, therefore, would render his judgment voidable, rather
than void.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2021); Ghormley v. State, No. M2019-
01233-CCA-R3-HC, 2020 WL 2779855, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 28, 2020) (“[E]ven
assuming the Petitioner’s claim was true, the sufficiency of the affidavit of complaint and
resultant arrest warrant are foreclosed by the finding of an indictment. Accordingly, the

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Petitioner is not entitled to [habeas corpus] relief.” (citation, footnote, and internal
quotation marks omitted)), no perm. app. filed; Carpenter v. Ford, No. W2017-01383-
CCA-R3-HC, 2018 WL 2727951, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2018) (“[T]he
Petitioner’s claim that the grand jury lacked the authority to charge him fails to establish
that his judgments are void or his sentences expired.”), no perm. app. filed; Moore v. State,
No. W2023-00798-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 8535039, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 11,
2023) (“[I]neffective assistance of counsel [claims] do not render a judgment void and,
thus, are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings.”). The Petitioner is not entitled to
relief.

                                     CONCLUSION

        In summary, we hold that the Petitioner failed to comply with mandatory statutory
requirements for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Despite this being the fourth
application for the writ, he did not attach his prior applications or provide “satisfactory
reasons” for his failure to comply with this requirement. Moreover, the Petitioner also
failed to show that his convictions are void due to a lack of jurisdiction by the convicting
court. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

                                          ___________________________________
                                                TOM GREENHOLTZ, JUDGE

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