Court Opinion

ID: 9745719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:28:47.700124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:40.880611
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
I fully coneur in the majority's conclusion that this judgment is a chattel, albeit an intangible. However, the fact that a chattel exists does not end the inquiry with regard to preferred venue. In addition to its status as an intangible chattel, the chattel must also have a present situs within the county claimed to be a county of preferred venue. In the case before us, the only factor upon which preferred venue is based is the fact that ten years previously, in 1992, the judgment was entered in Hamilton County. I do not subscribe to the clear implication of the majority opinion that a judgment is always "regularly located or kept" in the county where it was originally entered merely because it was originally rendered there.
*514The argument is made by intimation that because a judgment when rendered becomes entered as a matter of record in that county, so long as not vacated or extinguished, that judgment "remains kept" in that county. The judgment itself in its original form is required to be placed within the Record of Judgments and Orders. Ind. Trial Rules 77(A))@), TT(C). To that extent and to the extent that the Record of Judgments and Orders remains of record in that county, the judgment may be said to be "kept" in that county.
The more persuasive argument, in my estimation, recognizes that the terms "located" and "kept" connote that some person or entity within that county has ownership or control over the chattel. This would appear especially true in the case of intangibles which do not have a physical presence in and of themselves.3 Only the person in whose favor the judgment was rendered or his assignee may realize the benefits of that judgment by enforcing it. Accordingly, it would seem that the mere recordation of an intangible within the county does not satisfy the requirements of preferred venue unless there is some entity domiciled within that county having a proprietary interest in the judgment.
The majority opinion itself acknowledges a degree of import which must be given to the ownership of the judgment. The opinion states, "Further, [tlhe plaintiff in the action in which a judgment is recovered against the defendant is the presumed owner of the judgment.'" Op. at 512. In addition, the majority places significance upon L.C. § 34-54-7-1 which provides that a judgment may be assigned and that " 'title to the judgment or decree' then vests in the assignee." Id. It is clear to me therefore, that the existence and location of a person or entity having ownership or control over the judgment so as to enforce it is more than a mere cireumstance or coincidence.
To be sure, the two principal cases relied upon by the majority in conjunction with the "location" of the chattel would seem in support of the position which I take. In Phillips v. Scalf, 778 N.E.2d 480 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), the suit involved a claim of violation of a right of publicity. The court held that preferred venue lay in Morgan County because the owner of the right was domiciled in Morgan County and that therefore the chattel, ie., the right of publicity, assumed the situs of the owner. Id. at 483-84.
In In Re Trust of Johnson, 469 N.E.2d 768 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), the determination of the court that preferred venue with respect to the trust lay in Hamilton County rested not only upon the fact that the trust records were maintained in Hamilton County, but perhaps more importantly that the Trustee resided in Hamilton County.
Be that as it may, Bostic's Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Venue was premised solely upon the proposition that the defendants resided in Howard County. The Motion in no way challenged the applicability of TR. 75(A)(2) to the judgment here involved. Accordingly, there is no issue in the case as presented to us as to whether House of James, Inc. is or is not a corporation domiciled in Hamilton County. Therefore, it would be wholly inappropriate to conclude that preferred venue lies in Hamilton County only because the judgment was originally entered there.
Bostic has not demonstrated that the trial court's determination under TR. 7T5(A)(2) was erroneous as a matter of law. *515For this reason, I concur in the result reached by the majority.

. An intangible is defined as "property that is a right ... or one which is lacking physical existence." Black's Law Dictionary 809 (6th Ed.1990).