Court Opinion

ID: 9488590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:49:32.573938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:58.506082
License: Public Domain

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The court properly does not decide whether an interim presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1) can be rebutted under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(4), “reserv[ing] [that issue] for another day and a case with less of procedural awkwardness to becloud its resolution.” Ante at 523. The court does attempt, though, to dictate the resolution of this issue through dicta which, in my view, misstates the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 108 S.Ct. 427, 98 L.Ed.2d 450 (1987). Specifically, the majority asserts that “[t]he Supreme Court has flatly stated that it cannot be: that ‘after a Subsection (a)(1) invocation, the question of pneumoconi-osis is effectively closed.’” Ante at 522-23 (quoting Mullins, 484 U.S. at 150 n. 26, 108 S.Ct. at 435-36 n. 26). It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court did not foreclose in Mullins the possibility of a subsection (b)(4) rebuttal of an interim presumption of pneu-moconiosis under subsection (a)(1). The Court did not even have before it this issue. The issue in Mullins concerned the burden of proof that a claimant must meet to invoke an interim presumption of eligibility for benefits under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a). The Court held only that a claimant must establish one of the five qualifying facts by a preponderance of the evidence in order to invoke an interim presumption of eligibility under subsection 203(a). See Mullins, 484 U.S. at 138, 159-61, 108 S.Ct. at 429, 440-41. *525Compare Grigg v. Director, OWCP, 28 F.3d 416, 419 (4th Cir.1994).
The passage from Mullins into which the majority reads a “flat statement” by the Court that subsection (b)(4) rebuttals are “effectively closed” whenever the claimant successfully invokes a subsection (a)(1) presumption was not even a statement by the Court of its view of the regulation, but was rather the Court quoting the position of the Secretary of Labor. In the passage, the Court first describes the Secretary’s position and then quotes the government’s brief as follows: ‘“after a Subsection (a)(1) invocation, the question of pneumoconiosis is effectively closed: the rebutting party cannot, as a practical matter, attempt to show that the miner does not suffer from some form of clinical pneumoconiosis.’ ” Mullins, 484 U.S. at 150 n. 26, 108 S.Ct. at 435-36 n. 26 (quoting Br. for Fed.Resp. at 24, n. 22). The Court expressly stated three times in the single footnote that it was only stating the Secretary’s position in the litigation, presumably so as not to be misunderstood as having placed its imprimatur on the Secretary’s view.
Of course, the mere quotation of the Secretary’s view is not tantamount to the embrace of that view. Even if it were, the Court at most could be understood as having said that it is not “practical” to rebut a subsection (a)(1) presumption under subsection (b)(4), not that such a rebuttal is unavailable as a matter of law.
Thus, when the occasion does arise to address the applicability of a (b)(4) rebuttal following the establishment of an (a)(1) interim presumption, our court will write on a clean slate, bound by neither Mullins nor by today’s dicta that such rebuttal is not available.
On the merits of the issue that the court does properly have before it, I would affirm the ALJ’s finding that Beatrice Pocahontas rebutted the interim presumption by showing that Curry’s disability “did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3). Both the ALJ and all four members of the en banc Benefits Review Board agreed that the (a)(1) presumption had been rebutted under subsection (b)(3). This determination is, without any reasonable question, clearly supported by substantial evidence.
First, Dr. Endres-Bereher, who examined Curry and performed numerous tests on him, concluded that “[objective testing ... does not demonstrate any significant pulmonary impairment” and that Curry “does not have any pulmonary disability.” J.A. at 407. Dr. Endres-Bereher further explained that any impairment he did detect was attributable to Curry’s history of chronic bronchitis and multiple episodes of pneumonia. Thus, Dr. Endres-Bereher conclusively determined that there was no pulmonary impairment and that to the extent that there was any pulmonary impairment, it was unrelated to Curry’s coal mine employment. See id.
The majority dismisses Dr. Endres-Bercher’s testimony as not creditable under Grigg, which holds that medical opinions of no impairment premised on a finding that the claimant does not suffer from pneumoconio-sis “are not worthy of much, if any, weight” when used to rebut an (a)(1) interim presumption of pneumoconiosis. Grigg, 28 F.3d at 419. The disregard of this testimony is error in two respects. First, Grigg does not prohibit consideration of opinions premised on the belief that a claimant does not suffer from pneumoconiosis; it merely directs that such testimony must be discounted. Second, Dr. Endres-Bereher never stated “that Curry did not have pneumoconiosis.” Ante at 521. Rather, Dr. Endres-Bereher concluded that “[i]f a disease process such as pneumo-coniosis were present to any significant degree there would be diminution of the total lung capacity as well as the lung subdivisions.” J.A. at 406 (emphasis added). An opinion that pneumoconiosis is not present “to any significant degree” is not an opinion “premised ... on an erroneous finding that the claimant does not suffer from pneumoco-niosis.” Grigg, 28 F.3d at 419. Thus, the ALJ could, consistent with Grigg, fully credit Dr. Endres-Bercher’s testimony.
The ALJ’s finding is also supported by the testimony of Dr. Fino, who opined that “[f]rom a functional standpoint, [Curry] is not disabled.” J.A. at 381. While Dr. Fino *526acknowledged that Curry had symptoms of coughing and mucus production, he explained that “disability can only be determined by valid lung function studies. In this case, his lung function is normal.” Id. Again, the majority dismisses this testimony assertedly because it “was premised on [Dr. Fino’s] belief that Curry did not have pneumoconio-sis.” Ante at 521. Again, however, Dr. Fino never made such a statement. Rather, Dr. Fino reported his belief that Curry’s medical history is not consistent with “[s]imple coal workers’ pneumoconiosis,” expressly concluding that “[s]imple coal workers’ pneumoconi-osis has not caused any disability and has not contributed at all to a disability should one be found.” J.A. at 380, 381 (emphasis added).
In Dehue Coal Co. v. Ballard, 65 F.3d 1189, 1193 (4th Cir.1995), we explained that a “physician’s finding that the miner does not have coal workers’ pneumoconiosis is not necessarily inconsistent with an ALJ’s decision that the miner suffers from pneumoconi-osis as it is defined in 20 C.F.R. § 718.201. Both conclusions may be accurate because ‘the legal definition of pneumoconiosis contained in § 718.201 is significantly broader than the medical definition of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis.’ ” Id. at 1193 (quoting Hobbs v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 45 F.3d 819, 821 (4th Cir.1995)).* In other words, a determination that a claimant does not have “coal worker’s pneumoconiosis” does not contradict or in any way undermine the interim presumption that the miner is “presumed to be totally disable due to pneumoconiosis.” 20 C.F.R § 727.203(a). Thus, the majority’s assertion that the Hobbs “twist” on Grigg is inapplicable where the existence of pneumo-coniosis is established by x-rays used to invoke the interim presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1) is simply incorrect. See ante at 521 n. 7. The ALJ could, consistent with Grigg, fully credit Dr. Fino’s testimony, finding it, as he did, to be “well reasoned.” J.A. at 33, 34.
Finally, the majority rejects the testimony of Dr. Abernathy, and in part the testimony of Drs. Endres-Bereher and Fino, on the grounds that none of the doctors opined “that [Curry] suffered] no respiratory or pulmonary impairment of any kind.” See ante at 521. The majority’s rejection of this testimony is likewise in error. Neither Grigg nor any other interpretation of subsection (b)(3) requires a medical opinion to find “no respiratory or pulmonary impairment” in order successfully to rebut the subsection (a)(1) presumption under subsection (b)(3). Grigg merely addresses one method of (b)(3) rebuttal — where the claimant has no respiratory or pulmonary impairment. As we noted in Toler v. Eastern Associated Coal Co., 43 F.3d 109, 115 (4th Cir.1995), Grigg holds that “a medical opinion that a claimant does not have a respiratory or pulmonary impairment cannot rebut the interim presumption, raised by a chest x-ray showing pneumoconiosis, ... where the physician premised his opinion on a determination that the claimant does not have pneumoconiosis.” It is quite obvious that an employer can “establish[] that the total disability ... did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment,” 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3), while at the same time acknowledging that the claimant has some sort of respiratory or pulmonary impairment urn-elated to a claimant’s coal mine employment. Dr. Abernathy offered just such an opinion, concluding that the “degree of retention of coal dust, however, is not extensive and apparently does not account for [Curry’s] shortness of breath or his wheezing.” J.A. at 433.
Because the ALJ’s determination that Curry’s “total disability .... did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employ*527ment” is supported by substantial evidence, I would affirm the denial of benefits.

 The definition of "pneumoconiosis” applicable in Dehue Coal Co., 20 C.F.R. § 718.201, is the same as the one at issue in this case, 20 C.F.R. § 727.202. Both subsections provide:
For the purposes of the Act, pneumoconiosis means a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment. This definition includes, but is not limited to, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, anthrosilicosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis, progressive massive fibrosis, silicosis, or silicotuberculosis, arising out of coal mine employment.
20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201, 727.202 (second emphasis added).