Court Opinion

ID: 9810207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:43:29.228722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:28.884481
License: Public Domain

Hall, J.,
dissents, and votes to reverse the judgment, grant that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence, and order a new trial, with the following memorandum: In my view, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence because the testimony of the People’s sole witness at the suppression hearing was incredible. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
At the suppression hearing, the People’s sole witness, a po*487lice officer assigned to the 100th Precinct, testified that on August 2, 2008, at approximately 1:45 a.m., she was in her unmarked car at the location of Beach 65th Street and Thursby Avenue in Queens. The officer, who was with her partner, was observing two groups of people. One group consisted of four individuals, one of whom was the defendant. On the other side of the street was another group, consisting of approximately 30 to 40 people.
According to the police officer, the group of four individuals were standing “right next to” a van. She testified that the four individuals were huddled around each other. Two of the individuals had their backs towards the officer, and were blocking her view of the individuals’ hands. The other two individuals were facing the officer, while in the huddle. The police officer testified that she was drawn to the four individuals because she thought they were trying to break into the van. The other group was throwing glass bottles, screaming, and yelling. At one point, the police officer observed people in the larger group throwing glass bottles towards the opposite side of the street where the four individuals were standing. The bottles were breaking on the street and the sidewalk, where people were present. However, despite these observations, the police officer paid more attention to the four individuals than the larger group. The officer did not make any radio communication indicating that a group of individuals were throwing glass bottles that were breaking near others.
The officer initially testified that when she observed the four individuals, she was “a couple of feet” away from them. However, it was later clarified that she was approximately 20 feet away from the four individuals when she observed them.
As the police officer was watching the four individuals, she heard one gunshot, which, the officer stated, came from where the four individuals were standing. The officer also saw sparks coming from where the four individuals were standing, which were about neck high, in relation to the four individuals. The officer testified that the sparks came “from right within the group of the four [individuals].” The police officer described the spark as “like fire, like a firecracker going off. Like a light.” The police officer also saw smoke at the time she heard the shot, which was coming from where the four individuals were standing. However, the police officer could not see the source of the smoke. In addition, the police officer could not see the hands of the four individuals. The officer did not see any of the four individuals raise their arms, produce a weapon, or point a weapon in any direction. The officer did not actually see any of *488the four individuals with a gun in hand. The officer testified that, when she heard the gun shot, the four individuals were huddled in a circle.
Approximately one second after hearing the initial gunshot, the police officer heard five to six more gunshots. The police officer did not observe any smoke in connection with the additional gunshots. She did not know where the additional gunshots were coming from. The officer testified that she could not determine if the gunshots were coming from the area where the four individuals were standing. However, she later testified that when she heard the five to six additional shots, she did not see any sparks or smoke in the vicinity of the four individuals.
The police officer explained that, after the first gunshot, the four individuals proceeded to jump into the van that they were next to, and they sped off. The police officer followed the van. The police officer and her lieutenant, who was traveling in a separate car, eventually cut off the van, and the police officer and her lieutenant approached the van with their guns drawn. The police officer opened the driver’s door and stated, “don’t move.” The four individuals were removed from the van. The police officer “went inside the van on the driver’s side” while the lieutenant went to the passenger’s side and flashed a flashlight into the van. While sitting in the driver’s seat, the officer observed a gun, wedged into the bottom of the console on the floor, with its handle sticking out. The gun was removed and the four individuals were arrested.
The police officer testified that she filled out a complaint report in connection with the arrests. In the report, the officer made a note as to whether the weapon found in the van had been discharged. On cross-examination, the police officer was asked if she indicated, in the paperwork relating to the arrests, that the recovered gun had not been fired. The prosecutor’s objection to this question was sustained. The Supreme Court did not allow any questioning into whether the officer indicated in her report that the gun had not been discharged.
The police officer testified that, at some point after the first shot, but perhaps not after all the shots, a woman, who was originally in the group of 30 to 40 people, ran into the street and yelled towards the four individuals, “Get out of here. The cops are coming.” According to the police officer, at the point when the woman ran into the street, the four individuals were not yet in the van; rather, they were “running towards the van.”
The Supreme Court, giving full credence to the police offi*489cer’s testimony, denied the defendant’s suppression motion. It is my opinion that this determination was in error.
While the credibility determinations of the Supreme Court following a suppression hearing are entitled to great deference on appeal (see People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]), a reviewing court is not required to “discard common sense and common knowledge” in assessing an officer’s hearing testimony (People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86, 88 [1974]; see People v Lebron, 184 AD2d 784, 785 [1992]). “Where a testifying officer claims to have seen that which common sense dictates could not have been seen, courts have repeatedly deemed this testimony patently tailored to meet constitutional objections” (People v Lebron, 184 AD2d at 787).
In my view, common sense dictates that the events could not have unfolded as the police officer testified. First, it is curious that the police officer focused her attention on four individuals huddled next to the van, when a group of 30 to 40 individuals across the street were screaming, yelling, and throwing glass bottles into the street that were breaking near others. The police officer did not report this dangerous activity, and took no steps to calm down the larger group. Instead, the police officer apparently was focused on the four individuals because she thought they were trying to steal the van, but she provided no justifiable basis for that conclusion. The officer testified that the four individuals were “messing” with the van, and that they had their hands “around the latch, the lock” in the back of the van. This testimony contradicts the officer’s earlier testimony that she could not view the individuals’ hands. Moreover, after the shots were fired, the four individuals simply entered the van; they did not break into the van or open any latch in the back of the van. Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that the officer’s testimony that the four individuals were “messing” with a latch in the back of the van is not credible.
The police officer’s testimony with regard to the initial gunshot is also problematic. While the officer testified that she heard a gunshot and saw a flash or spark from within the group of four individuals, she did not see any individual with their arms raised, did not see any individual holding a gun, did not see anyone point a weapon in any direction, and did not observe a flash of a muzzle in front of any particular individual. Furthermore, in an affidavit signed in connection with the criminal court complaint, the officer stated that she heard gun shots and saw the four individuals “scurry[ ] away.” She did not indicate in that prior statement that the flash came from *490the vicinity of the four individuals. The Supreme Court ultimately sustained an objection to questioning in this regard, ostensibly on the ground that it was not clear whether the officer was asked if the flash came from the vicinity of the four individuals when making her prior statement.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that one of the four individuals shot a gun while in a circular huddle formation. Indeed, if a gun would have been shot in such a fashion, the shooter would have gravely risked injuring the three other individuals. The police officer, who could apparently see that the four individuals were huddled in a group, did not testify that any of the individuals turned to face away from the huddle or circle. It is contrary to human experience that a member of the four individuals would have fired a gun while standing in a circular huddle with three other people, in the same manner testified to by the police officer.
It is also curious that, after approximately five to six gunshots were fired, the police officer left this dangerous scene, without reporting anything with respect to the larger group, and then followed the four individuals.
In addition, the officer testified that after the woman from the group of 30 to 40 people ran into the street and warned the four individuals, the four individuals were “running towards the van.” However, the officer testified earlier that the four individuals were “right next to” the van. These two statements cannot both be accurate.
Further, the Supreme Court should have allowed into evidence testimony from the police officer that she indicated in a report that the gun recovered from the van had not been discharged. This evidence was relevant, as it tended to disprove the officer’s testimony that the initial gun shot came from one of the four individuals (see People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]). Such evidence was highly relevant to the police officer’s credibility, and there is no discernible unfair prejudice in allowing questioning on this matter. To the extent this issue, or any other issue raised herein, may be unpreserved for appellate review, I would nonetheless reach it in the exercise of this Court’s interest of justice jurisdiction (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]; [6] [a]).
While the defendant has the ultimate burden of proving illegality on this suppression motion, the People have the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance (see People v Malinsky, 15 NY2d 86, 91 n 2 [1965]). Where the testimony of the People’s witnesses is unworthy of belief, “the People have not met their burden of *491coming forward with sufficient evidence and [the court should] grant the motion to suppress” (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 369 [1971]). Under all the circumstances, I find that the police officer’s testimony was incredible and patently tailored to meet constitutional objections (see People v Lebron, 184 AD2d at 787). Consequently, I find that the People have failed to meet their burden of going forward, and that the gun should have been suppressed (see Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 488 [1963]; People v Marcial, 109 AD3d 937, 939 [2013]). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse the judgment, grant that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence, and order a new trial.