Court Opinion

ID: 9572530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:42:30.321038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:25.001370
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
The trial court properly applied SDCL 15-6-49(b) by conforming the mistaken verdict to the correct and consistent answers to special interrogatories. In doing so, the trial court stated:
The verdict will be conformed to the interrogatories. I think it is clear what the jury meant in this case, and I think it will be unfair and unjust to let Verdict No. 8 1 stand.
*767Contrary to the majority, this is exactly what is contemplated by SDCL 15 — 6—49(b), which provides in part:
... When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to § 15-6-58 in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict ... (Emphasis added.)
Here, the answers were consistent with each other and inconsistent only with Verdict No. 8, so this part of the statute controls. The consistency of the answers makes it clear that Richard was 75% at fault and Schmieg was 25% at fault. The answers were not only consistent with themselves but consistent with all of the verdicts except Verdict No. 8, where the percentage of fault was obviously and incorrectly transposed. Therefore, the trial court properly corrected the errant verdict as permitted by the statute.
The majority opinion wholly fails to pinpoint where the trial court abused its discretion. In fact, the majority opinion refrains from using the “abuse of discretion” standard or language, even though it concedes at page 766 that “[ojrdinarily, it is discretionary with the court as to which of these alternatives is pursued.” The majority then fails to point out why this situation is EXTRAordinary. If this opinion prevails, it will have created a new standard of review — the “more appropriate” standard.
In my view, it is a waste of time and effort to remand for a new trial when the trial court properly complied with the statute. Therefore, we should affirm in all respects.2

. Referred to in the text and in footnote 1 of the majority opinion as Verdict # 4.

. In doing so, we need not inquire into the question of whether Richard is collaterally es-topped to deny his 75% fault by virtue of the fact that he paid the $75.00 of the $100.00 total damages sustained by Schmieg.