Court Opinion

ID: 9698422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:49:59.61892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:40.873011
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority’s general statement of the discovery rule and its origins, I disagree with its application of the rule to this case. I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim is time barred.
Appellant Stauffer brought this medical malpractice action for personal injuries which allegedly resulted when appellee Dr. Ebersole negligently exposed her to excessive radiation during radiation treatments following a masectomy in 1977. Beginning in 1978, appellant experienced numbness in her left hand caused by the radiation. The condition gradually worsened over time, becoming much worse by 1982. In May 1982, appellant was definitively diagnosed as suffering from the results of excessive radiation, causing paralysis and pain in the left arm and hand. She instituted this lawsuit in April 1984.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Ebersole, holding that Ms. Stauffer knew or should have known that she was injured and that Dr. Ebersole’s actions were the cause of her injury more than two years prior to when she instituted suit. The trial court reached *314this conclusion based on its review of the following evidence.1
Although Ms. Stauffer’s testimony is somewhat confused, she clearly stated that as early as 1978, she knew that Dr. Ebersole might have done something wrong that had resulted in her symptoms. In her appellate brief, Ms. Stauffer again admits that she had a suspicion of wrongdoing by Dr. Ebersole at this early date. She undeniably knew that she had the symptoms, albeit minor, in 1978.
Moreover, the evidence reveals that Ms. Stauffer was concerned about these minor symptoms from the time they began through mid-1982. She repeatedly informed her various doctors of them. One of these doctors, Dr. Patterson, produced a note he had made of a conversation with Ms. Stauffer in 1979. The note indicates that Ms. Stauffer told him of her numbness and she attributed it to her radiation therapy with Dr. Ebersole. Similarly, another doctor with whom she consulted, Dr. Smith, told Ms. Stauffer that her symptoms resulted from scar tissue, although it appears that he did not tell her that the scar tissue resulted from excessive radiation. In any event, by 1980 Ms. Stauffer consulted with Dr. Medinger, who finally diagnosed her in 1982. Dr. Medinger’s records indicate that he attributed her hand problems to the radiation as early as June 1980, but he did not recall telling Ms. Stauffer that fact until the final diagnosis.
The foregoing demonstrates that well before mid-1982, and perhaps as early as 1978 or 1979, Ms. Stauffer knew both of her injury and its possible cause. Although her symptoms were minor, she had them and had reason to suspect that her radiation treatment was the cause.
Ms. Stauffer argues that since her symptoms were initially so insignificant that her doctors did not order the tests *315necessary to make a final diagnosis, she should not be held to have known of her injury and its cause until her symptoms became much more severe and were actually diagnosed in 1982. In support of this argument, Ms. Stauffer relies on Trieschock v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Co., 354 Pa.Super. 263, 511 A.2d 863 (1987), allo. den., 514 Pa. 617 and 619, 521 A.2d 932-3 (1988), which concerns the application of the discovery rule to a “creeping disease”, namely, asbestosis. In Trieschock, plaintiff was unaware of his asbestosis symptoms. After a routine medical screening at work, the company doctor telephoned Trieschock and told him that asbestosis was suspected. Within one month, plaintiff saw a specialist and was diagnosed as having asbestosis. Plaintiff brought suit within two years of the diagnosis, but more than two years from the initial screening. Since the plaintiff was suffering from a creeping disease without any symptoms apparent to a layperson, and since the company doctor had merely expressed a suspicion of asbestosis, this court held that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations until the actual diagnosis and that the action was timely. Since Trieschock had no independent means of learning of his injury, this court reasoned that he should not be required to have greater knowledge of his medical condition that his physicians had.
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from Tries-chock. Whereas Trieschock was unaware of any symptoms related to his injury and, therefore, dependent on his doctors to learn about the very existence of the injury, Stauffer experienced initial symptoms soon after the exposure to radiation. Moreover, as noted above, she admitted to knowing in 1978 that Dr. Ebersole may well have done something wrong in connection with her radiation treatment.
I, therefore, conclude that the evidence demonstrates as a matter of law that Stauffer knew or reasonably should have known that the numbness in her left hand was caused by radiation therapy more than two years before she instituted suit. Even if she only harbored suspicions of malpractice before the definitive diagnosis was made, it is clear that she *316experienced symptoms of the injury and that the cause was knowable through the exercise of due diligence long before mid-1982. The law requires that a plaintiff make prudent legal inquiry as to the cause of her injury. Bickford v. Joson, 368 Pa.Super. 211, 533 A.2d 1029 (1987), allo, den., 518 Pa. 647, 544 A.2d 959 (1988). See also Levenson v. Souser, 384 Pa.Super. 132, 557 A.2d 1081 (1989) (en banc). This Ms. Stauffer failed to do.
Any other conclusion would significantly alter the established discovery rule test by shifting the focus from what the victim knew or should have known to what the doctors reasonably should have told the victim. The discovery rule properly focusses on the victim and arises “from the inability of the injured, despite the exercise of diligence, to know of the injury or its cause.” Pocono International Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 503 Pa. 80, 85, 468 A.2d 468, 471 (1983). Unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that her doctor, through fraud or concealment, caused her not to inquire further into her condition or its cause, the plaintiff is under a duty to exercise diligence in ascertaining the pertinent facts. See Levenson v. Souser, supra (citing Molineux v. Reed, 516 Pa. 398, 532 A.2d 792 (1987)). Since Ms. Stauffer does not allege any fraud or concealment by her treating physicians, she had no reason to relax her vigilance as to her condition or its cause. A plaintiffs duty of prudent inquiry cannot automatically be held in abeyance until a physician determines that it is appropriate to make a full medical inquiry and final diagnosis.
Equally dangerous would be the adoption of Ms. Stauffer’s contention that we should not hold that she knew or should have known of her injury before 1982 because her initial symptoms were so minor. To permit such fine line drawing based upon the severity of the injury would create a potential for significant abuse of the discovery rule. It would require medical testimony to ascertain at what point an injury was sufficiently serious to trigger the running of the limitations period, thus opening the door to close medical distinctions not always pertinent to what the plaintiff *317legally knew or should have known concerning her own condition.
Since I conclude that there remains no genuine issue of material fact as to when Ms. Stauffer discovered or should have discovered her injury or its cause, and that date was clearly more than two years before she instituted suit, I would affirm the entry of summary judgment for defendant.

. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court must view the evidence favorable to the non-moving party, the appellant. Washington Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Stein, 357 Pa.Super. 286, 515 A.2d 980 (1986). Analyzing the record facts favorable to the appellant, I find the trial court’s rendition of facts to be substantially in accord with the record.