Court Opinion

ID: 9588758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:38:14.92109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:48:33.836137
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I concur fully in the majority’s opinion in Divisions 1 through 4.1 also concur in the reversal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Terry.
However, I dissent in part because I believe the opinion’s analysis requires us to reverse the denial of summary judgment to State Farm. The trial court denied summary judgment to State Farm because it found the language in the dismissal was contrary to the statutory provisions of OCGA § 33-7-11. On appeal, State Farm *26claimed the trial court erred in finding the dismissal was in conflict with the Uninsured Motorist Act and in finding that Terry was not bound by the agreement in the dismissal. The majority agrees with State Farm on both points. However, in spite of this holding, the opinion then affirms the denial of summary judgment to State Farm.
Decided December 4, 1997
Reconsideration denied December 18, 1997
Harper, Waldon & Craig, Russell D. Waldon, Jonathan M. Adelman, for appellant.
Robert S. Windholz, for appellee.
In Division 5, the opinion holds that Terry did not have to reserve State Farm and then concludes that because of this, State Farm should be denied summary judgment. This is immaterial. I agree Terry properly served State Farm pursuant to OCGA § 33-7-11 (d) in the first lawsuit and also properly served State Farm in the instant case. However, State Farm’s contentions, as discussed above, were that the trial court erred in finding the dismissal contrary to the intent of the Uninsured Motorist Act and in not enforcing State Farm’s right, under the dismissal, to be allowed to defend on the issues of liability and damages. As the opinion agrees with both these contentions, State Farm is entitled to summary judgment.
How Terry chooses to further pursue his rights under the dismissal agreement is not a matter upon which this Court should speculate. Moreover, Rabun v. Williams, 168 Ga. App. 467 (309 SE2d 624) (1983), is simply not before this Court. Accordingly, I do not concur in Divisions 6 and 7 as they are wholly advisory.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong joins in this dissent.