Court Opinion

ID: 9585862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:04:32.499891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:15.765718
License: Public Domain

GILDEA, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority affirms the district court’s decision to allow a bench trial in this matter. The district court granted Lessley’s request for a bench trial because it concluded that (1) the State did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial, and (2) it would be an abuse of discretion to deny Lessley’s request. The majority affirms the district court because it holds that Article I, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution does not apply to criminal cases, and therefore the State has no right to object to the defendant’s request for a bench trial. In my view, we should resolve this case without reaching the constitutional question the majority decides.1
*841We generally avoid reaching constitutional questions “if there is another basis on which a case can be decided.” State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn.2006) (internal quotation omitted). Following our general practice, I would resolve this case based on the language of the applicable criminal rule, Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01 (2009) (amended Feb. 11, 2010),2 and our precedent, rather than reaching the constitutional question. Under the rule and our precedent, the district court abused its discretion in granting Lessley’s request, and I would therefore reverse.
I do not lightly come to the conclusion that a district court judge has abused his discretion. But the facts of this case compel me to this result.
The State charged Lessley with intentional murder in the second degree for the shooting death of Darby Claar. Pursuant to Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.07, Lessley moved that the district court allow him to plead guilty to the lesser offense of second-degree manslaughter. The court denied that motion by order dated October 14, 2008. In the order, the court said that “the State’s evidence of intent is limited,” and that “[Lessley’s] remorse is ... compelling.” A few days later, Lessley, by submitting a request to waive a jury trial, asked this judge to be the finder of fact in his case. Lessley’s desired fact-finder had earlier questioned the credibility of the State’s witnesses and characterized the case — on the record' — -as one involving “idiocy” and “a bunch of drunkards.”
The State objected to Lessley’s request for a bench trial, and urged the court to deny it.3 In ruling on Lessley’s request, the court noted that it had “some discretion.” But the court viewed its discretion as
limited to those cases where the court thinks that for some reason the defendant’s decision to waive the jury is not smart, often pro se people. It does not appear that the State has a right to a jury trial and I suspect it would be an *842abuse of discretion for me to deny the right to the waiver, although frankly my job would be much easier. That’s not one of the choices I get. So I’m going to deny the State’s motion with regard to the jury trial and accept the waiver of the jury trial.
The court offered no other rationale for its decision; the court simply signed the jury-waiver form Lessley had provided.
The court’s ruling constitutes nothing more than a reflexive grant of Lessley’s request. But we have repeatedly recognized that the defendant does not have an unconditional right to a bench trial. E.g., State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 217-18 (Minn.1995) (recognizing that “a defendant does not have an absolute right to waive jury”). Rather, we have said that the court must, in the exercise of its sound discretion, decide whether to approve the request. Id.; State v. Linder, 304 N.W.2d 902, 904-05 (Minn.1981); State v. Kilburn, 304 Minn. 217, 224-25, 231 N.W.2d 61, 65 (1975); State v. Hoskins, 292 Minn. 111, 118, 193 N.W.2d 802, 808 (1972); Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354, 359, 184 N.W.2d 599, 602 (1971). The district court’s “ ‘duty ” in considering a jury-waiver request is not “ ‘discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from’ ” the jury-trial process. State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn.1991) (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312-13, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930)). In my view, the district court’s automatic and unreasoned approval of Lessley’s request runs afoul of this precedent.
Moreover, the district court gave no consideration to the State’s objection because, according to the court, the State did not have “a right to a jury trial.” But, as Lessley argued to the district court, “[t]he current rule provides the State with an opportunity to have its concerns heard and considered by the judge before the defendant is allowed to have a bench trial.” I agree.
Exercise of the discretion that Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01 vests in the district court requires that the court consider all factors relevant to the defendant’s request for a bench trial. For example, in Linder, we affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the defendant’s request for a bench trial. 304 N.W.2d at 905. We said that the court had “expressed a legitimate concern for defendant’s right to a fair trial” if the case were tried to the court because all of the judges “in the district had been involved in defendant’s case in some way....” 304 N.W.2d at 905. Thus, in Linder, we recognized that the perceived fairness of the process properly informed the decision on a jury-waiver request. See Shorter v. State, 511 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn.1994) (recognizing that “ ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice’ ” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954))).
Because it also relates to the perceived fairness of the process, I would hold that the sound exercise of the district court’s discretion warranted consideration of the State’s position on Lessley’s request. As we recognized in Gaulke, “ ‘the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result’ ” — the jury. 289 Minn. at 357, 184 N.W.2d at 601 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965)). There might be a case where the objection offered by the State to a defendant’s request for a bench trial is done purely for an “ ‘ignoble purpose.’ ” Gaulke, 289 Minn. at 357, 184 N.W.2d at 601 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. at 36, 85 S.Ct. 783). In such a sitúa*843tion, the district court would be well within its discretion under Rule 26.01 in refusing to give the State’s objection any weight. But that is not this case. In this case, the district court had repeatedly questioned the prosecutor’s charging decisions, challenged the credibility of the State’s witnesses, characterized the State’s evidence as “limited” and “thin,” and insulted the alleged victim.4
In summary, a defendant does not have an unconditional right to demand a bench trial. Our criminal rule and precedent vest the decision of whether to approve such a request with the district court. The court’s discretion is not constricted as the judge in this case suggested. Rather, the court should consider all factors relevant to the question, including whether the available judge (or judges) is able to provide both parties a fair trial if he acts as the finder of fact, whether a bench trial will undermine the public’s confidence in the judicial process, and whether pretrial publicity or any other relevant facts have somehow rendered ineffective “ ‘the tribunal which the constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.’ ” Gaulke, 289 Minn. at 357, 184 N.W.2d at 601 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965)). Applying these factors to the facts here, I would hold that it was an abuse of discretion to grant Lessley’s request for a bench trial.
I reach this result because, in my view, to grant Lessley’s request risks undermining the public’s trust and confidence in our judicial system. We have said that in order “to maintain public trust and confidence in the judiciary, judges ... should act to assure that parties have no reason to think their case is not being fairly judged.” Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163-65 (Minn.2002) (reversing order denying petition for postconviction relief “[o]ut of concern that the process employed here gives the appearance of impropriety” where the district court “adopt[ed] verbatim the state’s proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order” exonerating the prosecutor of misconduct without affording the petitioner an opportunity to respond to the state’s proposed findings). Because the judge “‘is vested with the responsibility to ensure the integrity of all stages of the proceedings[,]’” the judge must act so that he is viewed as “ ‘the neutral factor in the interplay of our adversary system....’” Id. at 164 (quoting State v. Mims, 306 Minn. 159, 168, 235 N.W.2d 381, 387 (1975)).
In this case, given the judge’s comments that I referenced above and the judge’s refusal to remove himself from the case, there was a basis for concern as to the appearance of the fairness of the proceeding if that judge acted as the fact-finder in this case. See Linder, 304 N.W.2d at 905. The record does not provide any countervailing factor that would support granting Lessley’s request for a bench trial. For example, the record does not reflect any concerns over pretrial publicity. The record likewise does not provide any other basis for me to conclude that “ ‘the tribunal which the constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result’ ” has been undermined so as to outweigh the appearance concerns the judge’s comments created. Gaulke, 289 Minn. at 357, 184 N.W.2d at 601 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965)). I would therefore reverse and remand the matter for a jury trial.

. The majority states that I have concluded that article 1, section 4 applies to criminal cases. I have reached no such conclusion. It is my view that we need not resolve that question in this case. Our court has discussed this question in dicta in several cases, but we do not appear to have actually decided *841this important question. I would likewise not do so in this case because, in my view, the proper exercise of judicial restraint counsels that constitutional issues not be resolved if the case can be decided on alternative grounds.
I must note, however, at least one of my reservations with the majority’s analysis of the constitutional question. In a footnote in Gaulke v. State, we said that ”[i]t has long been considered that Minn. Const, art. I, § 4, applies to both criminal and civil cases.” 289 Minn. 354, 359, 184 N.W.2d 599, 601 n. 6 (1971). The majority attempts to dismiss this conclusion because the majority concludes we did not offer sufficient support for it. I disagree.
We supported our conclusion in Gaulke with citation to State v. Sackett, 39 Minn. 69, 70, 38 N.W. 773, 774 (1888). In Sackett, the defendant and the State agreed to proceed with a jury trial before 11 jurors. The defendant was found guilty and appealed contending his right to jury trial was violated. Id. We said that ”[t]he bill of rights (article 1 of our constitution) contains three sections, the fourth, sixth, and seventh, which are designed for the protection of the citizen accused of crime.... Each is an independent but absolute guaranty to those needing protection. ...” 39 Minn. at 70, 38 N.W. at 774. It seems to me that Sackett provides compelling support for our conclusion in Gaulke that article I, section 4, applies to criminal cases.

. Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. l(2)(a) provides:
The defendant, with the approval of the court, may waive jury trial on the issue of guilt provided the defendant does so personally in writing or orally upon the record in open court, after being advised by the court of the right to trial by jury and after having had an opportunity to consult with counsel.

. As the majority notes, the State requested that the judge remove himself from the case, and also attempted to remove the judge for cause; these efforts were unsuccessful. The court deferred ruling on Lessley’s request for waiver of the jury until the chief judge in the district resolved the removal issue.

. In highlighting the district court’s concerns with the State’s case, I do not mean to suggest that the court demonstrated sufficient bias to require his removal for cause.