Court Opinion

ID: 9375736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 18:06:48.187422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.197851
License: Public Domain

J-S03013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 BRIAN D. GORDON                          :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 2049 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 4, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0002526-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                         FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2023

      Brian D. Gordon appeals from the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”) petition. We affirm.

      The trial court offered the following summary of the facts for Appellant’s

direct appeal:

             [D]uring the early morning hours of April 3, 2018,
      Mr. [Stephen] and Mrs. [Tiffani] Howard, their three children and
      Mrs. Howard’s mother were inside their home located at 310
      Crimson Court, Warrington Township, Bucks County.                At
      approximately 3:00 a.m., Mr. Howard entered the garage through
      the door connecting the kitchen to the garage. At the time, he
      observed [Appellant] in Mrs. Howard’s car. Upon being confronted
      by Mr. Howard, [Appellant] fled the garage, pursued by
      Mr. Howard. After a brief foot chase, during which Mr. Howard
      never lost sight of [Appellant], Mr. Howard tackled [Appellant] and
      a struggle ensued. When police arrived on scene, Mr. Howard was
      on top of [Appellant]. In the immediate vicinity, police found
      approximately $30 in loose change[ ] scattered on the street, a
      plastic bag, and dark-colored work gloves. After the police
      arrived, Mr. Howard returned to his home to find the center
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      console of his wife’s car open and approximately $4.00 in change
      missing from the door pocket of the vehicle.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/20, at 4 (citations omitted). Appellant was arrested

and charged with burglary, criminal trespass, receiving stolen property

(“RSP”), theft from a motor vehicle, disorderly conduct, and loitering and

prowling at nighttime.

      The police were summoned to the scene by the Howards’ neighbor,

Ernest Rehr. Mr. Rehr had awoken to his dog barking at the sound of Appellant

and Mr. Howard scuffling near his home. N.T., 1/4/19, at 175-76. Mr. Rehr

looked out the window, saw his vehicle’s interior dome light was on, realized

someone had been in his vehicle, and called the police. Id. at 176-77. After

arresting Appellant, police learned that approximately $5 worth of coins had

been taken from Mr. Rehr’s vehicle. For this incident, Appellant was charged

with theft from a motor vehicle, RSP, and loitering and prowling at nighttime.

      On January 4, 2019, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial at which

Mr. Howard and Mr. Rehr testified. Appellant testified in his own defense that

he was in the area dropping off a co-worker, and heading to check on a

disabled ex-coworker, when he stopped his car in the neighborhood to urinate.

See N.T. 1/7/19, at 29-35. Appellant relieved himself in someone’s yard and

attempted to go back to his vehicle, when he heard someone yelling in his

direction and was tackled to the ground. Id. at 31, 36. Appellant denied

entering Mr. Howard’s garage, Mr. Rehr’s vehicle, and any connection to the

$30 found on the ground nearby. Id. On January 7, 2019, the jury convicted

Appellant of burglary, loitering and prowling at nighttime, criminal trespass,

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theft from a motor vehicle, and RSP relative to his conduct towards

Mr. fromHoward. The jury found Appellant not guilty of disorderly conduct

with respect to Mr. Howard, and all charges related to Mr. Rehr’s vehicle.

        The trial court sentenced Appellant to four to ten years of imprisonment

for the burglary followed by one year of probation for loitering and prowling

at nighttime. No further penalty was imposed for the remaining convictions.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence

and requesting reconsideration of his sentence, which the trial court denied.

A timely direct appeal followed.     On August 17, 2020, this Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence.      See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 240

A.3d 168 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision).           Appellant sought

allocator   review   in   our   Supreme   Court,   which   was    denied.    See

Commonwealth v. Gordon, 249 A.3d 497 (Pa. 2021).

        On December 16, 2021, Appellant filed the timely counseled PCRA

petition that is the subject of this appeal. In the petition, Appellant alleged

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witness Stanley Waclawski,

a co-worker of Appellant’s who would have corroborated Appellant’s testimony

that he was in the area that night because he had just dropped him off from

work.     Appellant included an affidavit from Mr. Waclawski stating that

Appellant would routinely drive him home from work and did so on the night

of Appellant’s arrest.    After the Commonwealth submitted its answer, the

PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, indicating that Appellant had failed to establish

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he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to call Mr. Waclawski as a witness.

Appellant filed a response, asserting that there was sufficient prejudice

because Mr. Waclawski offered “key” corroboration testimony that would have

bolstered Appellant’s credibility. See Answer to Notice of Intent to Dismiss,

6/20/22, at ¶¶ 9-14.

        On August 4, 2022, the PCRA court denied the petition. A timely notice

of appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925. Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court

err in denying Appellant’s PCRA [p]etition without a hearing.” Appellant’s brief

at 4.

        We begin with a discussion of the pertinent legal principles. Our “review

is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,” and

we do not “disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record

and is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 220 A.3d 1112, 1116

(Pa.Super. 2019).      Similarly, “[w]e grant great deference to the factual

findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have

no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal

conclusions.”    Id.   “[W]here the petitioner raises questions of law, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Id. “It is

an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court erred and that relief

is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(cleaned up). A PCRA petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014). It is within

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the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a hearing if there are no genuine

issues of material fact in controversy.     Id.    We review the PCRA court’s

decision dismissing a petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. Id.

      Appellant’s   argument     raises   an      allegation   of   trial    counsel

ineffectiveness. Counsel is presumed to be effective, and a PCRA petitioner

bears the burden of proving otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Becker, 192

A.3d 106, 112 (Pa.Super. 2018). To do so, a petitioner must plead and prove

that: (1) the legal claim underlying his ineffectiveness claim has arguable

merit; (2) counsel’s act or omission lacked a reasonable basis designed to

effectuate the petitioner’s interests; and (3) prejudice resulted.          Id.   The

failure to establish any of the three prongs is fatal to the claim. Id. at 113.

      Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call

Mr. Waclawski as a witness. See Appellant’s brief at 12-15. When a PCRA

petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness at trial,

the petitioner must prove:

      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
      the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
      for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
      witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
      trial.

Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 16 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation

omitted and formatting altered).

      Appellant contends he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged

ineffectiveness because “Mr. Waclawski’s proffered testimony was critical as

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it would have corroborated Appellant’s testimony relating to his reason for

being in the area that night.” See Appellant’s brief at 14. However, the PCRA

court disagreed, concluding that Appellant was not entitled to a hearing or

PCRA relief and explaining:

            [Appellant’s] defense at trial was that, while he was in the
     Howards’ Warrington neighborhood at the time the crime was
     committed, he was not the person who committed the crime but
     rather had merely stopped to urinate on the side of the road while
     on his way to check on a disabled ex-coworker. The proposed
     testimony that [Appellant] had driven the witness to Warminster
     prior to the incident is not material to the issue before the jury.
     The material issue is what he did or did not do while he was in the
     Howards’ neighborhood. Given the weight of the evidence against
     [Appellant] regarding his commission of the crimes and the
     collateral nature of the proposed witness’s testimony, [Appellant]
     cannot establish the necessary prejudice resulting from trial
     counsel’s alleged omission. As a result, his claim of ineffective
     assistance of counsel cannot support his request for PCRA relief.
     Petitioner’s PCRA petition was therefore denied and dismissed
     without a hearing.

See PCRA Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 7 (emphasis in original). We agree with

the PCRA court that Appellant has failed to establish that prejudice ensued

from the absence of Mr. Waclawski’s testimony at trial.

     As stated above, Mr. Waclawski’s testimony related to the undisputed

fact that Appellant was in the area of Mr. Howard’s home at the relevant time.

However, Mr. Waclawski offered nothing to counter Mr. Howard’s testimony

identifying Appellant as the perpetrator based on his immediate pursuit and

apprehension of Appellant. See N.T., 1/4/19, at 133, 135, 147. Thus, even

if believed, Mr. Waclawski would not have assisted Appellant’s defense that

another person committed the crimes. Instead, it would have corroborated

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the testimony of the Commonwealth witnesses and made it more likely that

Appellant committed the underlying crimes.

      Since Appellant has failed to persuade us that Mr. Waclawski’s

testimony, even if believed, would have changed the outcome, no relief is due.

Accordingly, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s

petition without an evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Maddrey,

205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa.Super. 2019) (reiterating the well-established principle

that a defendant seeking reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a

petition without a hearing must show that “he raised a genuine issue of fact

which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the

court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”).

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/28/2023

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