Court Opinion

ID: 9819071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:14.927754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.096324
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW specially concurring: At a bench trial, the State introduced evidence establishing that defendant, during a traffic stop, was unable to produce documentation to show that the borrowed vehicle he was driving was insured. For this reason, defendant was charged with violating section 3 — 707 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3 — 707 (West 2000)) for operating an uninsured motor vehicle. Defendant presented no evidence in his defense. Instead, he sought a directed verdict, arguing that the State had not proved a culpable mental state and, therefore, had not proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court found defendant guilty, but the appellate court reversed and held that, “To show a violation of section 3 — 707 of the Code, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew that the vehicle he was driving was uninsured.” 316 Ill. App. 3d at 224. In reversing the appellate court decision, this court today holds that section 3 — 707 of the Code is an absolute liability offense. While I agree with this result, I write separately because my conclusion is drawn from considerations other than those relied on by the majority. There is no dispute that section 3 — 707 contains no mens rea and thus the statute, on its face, imposes absolute liability. It is also agreed, however, that pursuant to section 4 — 9 of the Criminal Code of 1961, even when express language regarding mental state is lacking, absolute liability may not be presumed unless: (1) the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or a fine exceeding $500, or (2) the legislative intent to impose absolute liability is clear. See 720 ILCS 5/4 — 9 (West 2000). Because a violation of section 3 — 707 is punishable by a fine greater than $500, the majority concedes that the existence of a culpable mental state should be inferred unless there is a clear indication that the legislature intended to impose absolute liability. See People v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15 (1992); People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d 113, 120 (1989). The majority attempts to discern legislative intent by focusing on the word “shall” in the provision, “No person shall operate a motor vehicle ***.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/3 — 707 (West 1998). The majority finds the word “shall” to be “a clear expression of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation.” 197 Ill. 2d at 93. But this observation is not particularly relevant. There is no question that the legislature intended to impose a mandatory obligation to insure motor vehicles. We know that insurance is mandatory pursuant to section 7 — 601 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/7 — 601 (West 1998)). The question to be resolved in this appeal, however, is whether a violation of this mandatory obligation, to be proved, must be accompanied by evidence of a culpable mental state. In other words, the question in this appeal is whether the legislature intended that the State, in order to convict someone for operating an uninsured vehicle, must prove that the driver had knowledge that the vehicle was uninsured. Focusing on the word “shall” in the provision fails to resolve the issue. I believe that a legislative intent to impose absolute liability is discernable from the legislative scheme created in section 3 — 707. When viewing the statute in its entirety, as we must (State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247 (1990) (in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, courts should consider the statute in its entirety, noting the subject being addressed and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting the statute)), a statutory scheme is revealed, which makes clear that the legislature’s omission of a mens rea requirement was not an oversight. Section 3 — 707, in addition to barring all persons from operating uninsured motor vehicles, states: ' “Any person who fails to comply with a request by a law enforcement officer for display of evidence of insurance, as required by Section 7 — 602 of this Code, shall be deemed to be operating an uninsured motor vehicle. *** However, no person charged with violating this Section shall be convicted if such person produces in court satisfactory evidence that at the time of the arrest the motor vehicle was covered by a liability insurance policy in accordance with Section 7 — 601 of this Code.” 625 ILCS 5/3— 707 (West 2000). This places all operators of motor vehicles on notice that they must have proof of insurance readily available. By including this requirement, and by creating the rebuttable presumption that the vehicle is uninsured if the driver is unable to produce evidence of insurance, the legislature has equated the failure to possess an insurance card with knowledge that the motor vehicle is uninsured. Clearly, the onus is placed on the person operating the motor vehicle to ascertain the insured status of the vehicle, as evidenced by the insurance card, prior to operating a vehicle on the roads of this state. I also find it significant that the presumption of a violation, created by the inability to produce evidence of insurance on demand, can be rebutted only by satisfactory proof in a court of law, that the motor vehicle was actually covered by a liability insurance policy at the time the violation was charged. By providing one means of avoiding liability, it may be inferred that the legislature intended to exclude all others. See State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242 (1990). Unknowing or unintentional violations are not recognized or acceptable excuses. Thus, the scheme created by the legislature in section 3 — 707 reinforces the notion that the omission of a mens rea requirement was not inadvertent and that the operation of an uninsured motor vehicle was intended to be an absolute liability offense. In addition to the statutory scheme, I find public policy support for the conclusion that section 3 — 707 was intended to be an absolute liability offense, something the majority fails to address. As we have noted in the past, when a statute does not expressly state whether absolute liability will or will not apply, it is appropriate to look to sources beyond the statutory language to ascertain the intent of the legislature and decide whether the statute indicates a clear legislative purpose to impose absolute liability. See Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d at 118-19. Factors to be considered are “the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved.” Stewart v. Industrial Comm’n, 115 Ill. 2d 337, 341 (1987). Section 3 — 707 is the penalty provision for violation of the mandatory insurance provisions of the Code. See 625 ILCS 5/7 — 601, 7 — 602 (West 2000). The purpose to be achieved, then, is enforcement of the mandatory insurance requirement, which was instituted for the protection of the public (see State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 285 Ill. App. 3d 115, 120-21 (1996)), and to promote public safety and financial responsibility (see 625 ILCS 5/7 — 100 through 7 — 708 (West 2000) (“Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law”)). In the legislature’s words, “the State has a compelling interest in ensuring that drivers *** demonstrate financial responsibility, including family financial responsibility, *** in order to safely own and operate a motor vehicle.” See 625 ILCS 5/7 — 701 (West 2000). Thus, the legislature, in its wisdom, has determined that important public interests are served by eliminating uninsured vehicles from the roads of this state. It makes sense, then, that they should place an absolute obligation on the operators, who are directly responsible for placing a motor vehicle on the road, to ascertain the insured status of the motor vehicle or suffer the consequences. Thus, section 3 — 707, which defines the penalty for a violation of the mandatory insurance requirements set forth in sections 7 — 601 of the Code, is appropriately read as imposing absolute liability and expressing the public policy of Illinois. It is for these reasons that I would reverse the appellate court decision and find that the defendant was properly convicted of a violation of section 3 — 707 of the Code. JUSTICES FREEMAN and KILBRIDE join in this special concurrence.