Court Opinion

ID: 9379840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 16:07:13.32551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:06.436912
License: Public Domain

J-S04041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DONALD M. COOL                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1826 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 10, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-45-CR-0001617-2021

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                           FILED MARCH 16, 2023

        Donald M. Cool (Cool) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court) after he entered

an open guilty plea to four counts of possession of a firearm prohibited,1 that

after the trial court sentenced him, it then granted the Commonwealth’s

motion for reconsideration of sentence. He argues that the trial court was

presumptively vindictive when it resentenced him to a greater maximum term

of imprisonment because the new sentence was based on the same set of

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). The Commonwealth nolle prossed five additional
counts of possession of a firearm prohibited and one count of possessing
unlawful body armor (bullet proof vest), 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(c), in exchange for
the plea.
J-S04041-23

facts as the original sentence and that it relied on impermissible factors. We

affirm.

      We take the following factual background and procedural history from

the trial court’s August 25, 2022 opinion and our independent review of the

record.

                                       I.

      On March 3, 2021, police responded to a call at a residence in Mount

Pocono, Pennsylvania. The caller advised that his roommate had allowed an

individual to spend the night and the caller became concerned when he saw

guns and a bullet proof vest that the individual had brought to the home.

      On March 3, 2022, Cool pled guilty to four counts of possession of a

firearm prohibited, fugitive from justice. (See Written Guilty Plea Colloquy,

3/03/22, at ¶ 4). The trial court ordered the preparation of a presentence

investigation (PSI) report. On May 13, 2022, with the assistance of the PSI,

the trial court sentenced Cool to an aggregate term of imprisonment of not

less than twenty-four nor more than forty-eight months to be served

consecutively to a Luzerne County sentence imposed at docket number 1612

of 2019 for his guilty plea to statutory sexual assault.

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       The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence,2

arguing that the seriousness of the offenses and the disturbing circumstances

of the case required reconsideration. Specifically, the Commonwealth averred

that Cool had plead guilty to felony 2 statutory sexual assault in Luzerne

County for impregnating his fifteen-year-old cousin, was declared a sexually

violent predator (SVP), and failed to appear for sentencing, instead fleeing to

Mount Pocono Borough for another sexual encounter.            (Commonwealth’s

Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, 5/20/22, at ¶¶ 5-6, 9). According to

the Commonwealth, the PSI3 prepared in this case indicates Cool has a serious

____________________________________________

2 “Well-settled Pennsylvania law permits the Commonwealth to pursue a
correction, modification or increase in the originally imposed sentence because
no sentence is final until the right of appellate review has been exhausted or
waived.” Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Pa. Super.
1994) (citations omitted); see Pa.R.Crim.P. 721(A)(1), (B) (Commonwealth
may file motion to modify sentence within ten days after sentence’s
imposition).

3 Although Cool’s arguments involve the PSI and the claim that nothing new
was presented at the reconsideration hearing, the trial court record reflects
that he failed to ensure that the certified record provided to this Court contains
the PSI or to order a transcript of the original May 13, 2022 sentencing hearing
to enable us to compare it with the reconsideration hearing. It is well-settled
that “an appellate court is limited to considering only the materials in the
certified record when resolving an issue.” Commonwealth v. Preston, 904
A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 916 A.2d 632 (Pa. 2007) (citation
omitted). “Our law is unequivocal that the responsibility rests upon the
appellant to ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete in the sense
that it contains all of the materials necessary for the reviewing court to
perform its duty.” Id. (citation omitted); see id. at 7 (“any claims that cannot
be resolved in the absence of the necessary transcript or transcripts must be
deemed waived for the purpose of appellate review.”) (citation omitted);
Pa.R.A.P. 1911, 1931. Nor is it this Court’s responsibility to scour the trial
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -3-
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psychiatric issue that involves sexual abuse. (See id. at ¶ 10). When he was

arrested at the Mount Pocono home, he had nine firearms, some of them

loaded with a round in the chamber, ammunition, magazines for the guns and

a bullet proof vest. (See id. at ¶¶ 7-8). The grading of the offenses in this

case were only charged as misdemeanors because sentencing on the felony 2

sexual assault had not yet occurred due to Cool having absconded from

Luzerne County. (See id. at ¶ 11). The Commonwealth stated that, “given

the circumstances of this case, [Cool] poses a serious, grave danger to society

[because] he is psychologically unstable, on the run with an arsenal of

weapons and numerous magazine[s] of ammunition[,]” and the sentences he

received on each count below the middle of the standard range are not

appropriate in this case. (Id. at ¶ 12); (see id. at ¶¶ 13-14).

       On June 10, 2022, the court held argument on the Commonwealth’s

motion at which it did not receive any new evidence. Although the court had

____________________________________________

court to unearth materials presented to the trial court but never made part of
the certified record. See Preston, 904 A.2d at 7-8.

However, Cool does not argue that the court misstates what the PSI contains,
and the court does not maintain that it relied on new information that was not
previously available to it. Although the PSI and May 13, 2022 sentencing
transcript would enable a more thorough review, we decline to find waiver in
the interest of judicial economy and rely on the representations of Cool and
the court about what they contain.

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the PSI and appended Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB)4 report at

the time of the initial sentencing, in an effort to elucidate the court about

Cool’s character and need for increased supervision, the prosecutor argued

about their specific contents. The prosecutor noted that this case does not

involve any sexual offenses or sentences but stated that the SOAB report

contained information about Cool that raised concerns about his character and

circumstances for sentencing purposes in this matter. For example, the SOAB

report noted his deceptive character, his psychological diagnosis of anti-social

personality disorder, inconsistencies in his statement to probation officers in

this case and to officers in the Luzerne County case, and his history of

violence, including a previous conviction for terroristic threats and simple

assault for attacking his mother’s paramour and threatening to attack his

mother with a hatchet. Cool’s counsel objected to the prosecutor’s mention

of statements in the SOAB report made by Cool’s statutory sexual assault

victim about him threatening her with violence based on hearsay because he

denied the threats in the same report. The court overruled the objection,

stating that it regularly relies on such reports in sentencing.      (See N.T.

Reconsideration, 6/10/22, at 4-8).

____________________________________________

4 The SOAB report was produced in Luzerne County and attached to the PSI
in this matter (that was not provided to this Court). We rely on the testimony
from the reconsideration hearing for what it contains because Cool does not
argue that its contents were misrepresented.

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       According to the Commonwealth, the PSI reflected that Cool’s

statements to officers in this matter conflicted with those of his wife about

such things as how long they had been together, who owned the guns found

in his possession and why he was in the area, with her saying he was in Monroe

County to avoid serving his Luzerne County sentence and him saying it was

for a marital retreat. He lacked remorse for his past criminal actions with his

fifteen-year-old cousin.   Finally, in addition to the number of guns in his

possession, the prosecutor mentioned that there was a “bulletproof vest with

a loaded gun with one in the chamber attached to the vest[,]” to which Cool’s

counsel did not object or argue that it was an impermissible consideration

where the related charge had been nolle prossed. (Id. at 11); (see id. at 10-

14).

       Cool’s counsel argued that the court had the PSI and SOAB report at the

original sentencing, so there was no new information to justify modifying the

sentence. (See id. at 15-16).

       When resentencing, while the court kept the minimum sentence on each

count the same (twenty-four months), it increased the back end from forty-

eight to ninety-six months. It explained that although it had the PSI at the

initial sentencing hearing, upon reconsideration, the four years of supervision

was inadequate based on all the circumstances that had been brought to its

attention. Instead, it believed that a longer period of parole supervision was

appropriate. (See id. at 16-18); (Trial Ct. Op., at 2-3) (pagination provided).

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       After the court denied Cool’s motion for reconsideration, Cool timely

appealed and filed a court-ordered statement of errors complained of. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

       Cool raises four issues in which he alleges the trial court committed an

abuse of discretion5, 6 by: (1) reconsidering and increasing his sentence based

on the same facts and information available at the time of the original

sentence; (2) increasing his sentence based on current events; (3)

considering    unreliable     hearsay    testimony;   and   (4)   considering   facts

____________________________________________

5 “Generally, a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all defects and defenses
excepting the voluntariness of the plea, the jurisdiction of the court and the
legality of the sentence.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 223 A.3d 715, 717 n.3
(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). However, Cool can challenge the
discretionary aspects of his sentence because he entered an open plea
“without an agreement to the terms of the sentence.” Id. (citation omitted).

6Our standard of review of a discretionary aspects of sentence challenge is
well-settled:

       Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
       sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
       absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
       of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
       the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
       sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
       judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
       arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

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underlying charges that had been nolle prossed in exchange for the plea

agreement. (See Cool’s Brief, at 13).7

                                               II.

        A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not appealable

as of right and is more properly considered a request for permission to appeal.

        Before [this Court may] reach the merits of [a challenge to the
        discretionary aspects of a sentence], we must engage in a four
        part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2)
        whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s
        brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
        allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
        sentence [see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)]; and (4) whether the concise
        statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is
        appropriate under the sentencing code.... [I]f the appeal satisfies
        each of these four requirements we will then proceed to decide
        the substantive merits of the case.

Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 759 (citation omitted) (brackets in original).

        Cool has satisfied all the requirements for us to reach the substantive

merits of his claims where the appeal is timely; he filed a motion for

reconsideration of sentence, his brief includes a Rule 2119(f) statement with

the reasons relied upon for appeal and he raises a substantial question. See

Commonwealth v. Ali, 197 A.3d 742, 760 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal denied,

207 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2019) (claim of vindictiveness in resentencing raises

substantial question); Commonwealth v. Bromley, 862 A.2d 598, 605 (Pa.

Super. 2004), appeal denied, 881 A.2d 818 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.

____________________________________________

7   The Commonwealth failed to file a brief in this matter.

                                           -8-
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1095 (2006) (claim that court relied on impermissible factors in sentencing

raises a substantial question). Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of Cool’s

claims.

                                      A.

      Cool argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on

the same information available at the original sentencing hearing to

resentence him to an increased term of incarceration. (See Cool’s Brief, at

20-23). He maintains that this raises a presumption of vindictiveness that

cannot be overcome because the increase was not based on new information.

(See id.).

      “The trial court, as a matter of law, has discretion to modify its own

sentence in response to a Commonwealth Motion for Reconsideration of

Sentence. However, any increase in sentence cannot be the result of judicial

vindictiveness.”   Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1125 (Pa.

Super. 2017), appeal denied, 184 A.3d 944 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).

“Generally, a presumption of vindictiveness arises if the court imposes a

harsher sentence upon resentencing.”       Commonwealth v. Watson, 228

A.3d 928, 937 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).              However, the

presumption of vindictiveness only arises “if a defendant establishes facts that

demonstrate a probability that an adverse action by the … court has been

motivated by vindictiveness in retaliation for successful exercise of a

defendant’s legal rights rather than for some other legitimate cause.”

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Commonwealth v. Kane, 188 A.3d 1217, 1229 (Pa. 2018), appeal denied,

197 A.3d 1180 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted); see Commonwealth v.

Speight, 854 A.2d 450, 455 (Pa. 2004) (A trial court “may not punish an

appellant for exercising appellate rights.”).      “The key to whether a

presumption of vindictiveness arises in a given case would be the factual

circumstance in which the challenged action occurred.” Kane, 188 A.3d at

1229 (citation omitted). A court can rebut any presumption if it places non-

vindictive reasons on the record such as identifiable conduct that occurred

after the original sentence or other “objective information or legitimate

sentencing concerns that were not … considered by the trial court at the

original sentencing hearing.” Id. (citation omitted).

      The presumption of vindictiveness does not apply to the circumstances

of this matter. Although the court imposed a higher maximum sentence after

resentencing, it did not do so in response to Cool successfully appealing or

even after Cool successfully challenged the original judgment of sentence in a

post-sentence motion.     Instead, it entered the new sentence after the

Commonwealth exercised its legal right to file a motion for reconsideration

of sentence, not in retaliation for Cool doing so. Therefore, the presumption

of vindictiveness is not applicable. See Kane, 188 A.3d at 1229.

      Moreover, even assuming that it was, Cool would be due no relief on

this issue. As stated previously, the Commonwealth had the legal right to file

a motion for reconsideration of the sentence, and the court had the discretion

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to modify its sentence based on information it failed to consider at the original

sentencing hearing. See Kane, 188 A.3d at 1229; Bullock, 170 A.3d at 1125.

The court explained its reasons for increasing the maximum term of the

sentence at the June 10, 2022 reconsideration hearing and in its August 25,

2022 opinion.

      At the hearing, the court explained that although it had the opportunity

to view the PSI before imposing the original sentence, upon reconsideration

of the PSI, this “is a disturbing case.” (N.T. Reconsideration, at 16). The

court noted the photographs attached to the PSI showing the number and

type of firearms, with many of them loaded with bullets in the chamber. It

drew attention to the fact that at the time he was arrested in this matter,

there was a bench warrant for his failure to appear for sentencing in a sexual

assault case in Luzerne County. (See N.T. Reconsideration, at 16-17). In its

opinion it again explains:

      Instantly, we received the Commonwealth’s Motion and at hearing
      determined that there were details in the [PSI] which we
      reconsidered. We considered that [Cool] absconded from Luzerne
      County where he was scheduled to be sentenced on serious sexual
      offenses to which he plead guilty and failed to appear for
      sentencing. After he fled from Luzerne County, he was located in
      Monroe County with nine firearms, some of which were loaded and
      he was in possession of a bullet proof vest. We considered [Cool]’s
      plea in this case and upon reconsideration, we believe that the
      sentence should be increased to an aggregate sentence of not less
      than 24 months nor more than 96 months in a state correctional
      institution. The sentences imposed were all within the standard
      guideline range and ordered to be served consecutively. In
      modifying the sentence, the [c]ourt felt a longer period of parole
      supervision was warranted under the circumstances.

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(Trial Ct. Op., at 2-3) (pagination provided).

      First, there is no evidence that the trial court was motivated by any

vindictiveness in resentencing Cool, only by a fuller understanding of the facts.

Moreover, even if the presumption of vindictiveness applied, the trial court

rebutted any presumption by putting non-vindictive reasons on the record to

support its modification of sentence. See Kane, 188 A.3d at 1229.

                                       B.

      Cool argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on

current events of mass shootings to support vacating his original sentence and

imposing an increased one. (See Cool’s Brief, at 24-25). Because he was not

charged with any offenses related to the mass shootings, Cool maintains that

consideration of their prevalence was impermissible. (See id. at 24-25).

      Cool relies on Commonwealth v. Sypin, 491 A.2d 1371, 1372 (Pa.

Super. 1985), in support of his argument. In Sypin, the defendant pled guilty

to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child and corruption of minors

for his sexual abuse of a nine-year-old boy. See Sypin, 491 A.2d at 1372.

In imposing sentence, the court stated: “As you know there are thousands of

kids, and I mean thousands of kids that disappear every year. … Youngsters

no one ever sees or hears from again.         Sometimes they’re found dead;

sometimes they’re never found. … And their problems result from men like

you.” Id. A panel of this court vacated the judgment of sentence, concluding

the trial court relied on factors unrelated to the defendant’s case. See id.

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       Here, Cool points to the trial court’s statement that:

       I mean the way things are going in society today it’s not unusual
       to hear stories about people involved in shooting in public places.
       You know it’s happening all over the place and here Mr. Cool is
       with an arsenal on a bench warrant for failure to appear for
       sentencing.

(N.T. Reconsideration, at 17).

       Although the trial court made the general comment about guns and

shootings, the court increased the back end of Cool’s sentence based on

considerations specific to him, including his absconding from justice, his

psychiatric diagnosis and violent history. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926

A.2d 957, 966 (Pa. 2007) (affirming judgment of sentence where, despite

court’s general comments about people who victimize young children,

sentence was individualized to defendant). While the trial court mentioned

recent mass shootings, which would not be an appropriate basis for modifying

Cool’s sentence, it was harmless error since it was made in passing and Cool

was not prejudiced by it. See Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 540

(Pa. 2022).8

____________________________________________

8 The harmless error doctrine applies where the error “did not prejudice the
defendant or the prejudice was de minimis[.]” Holt, 273 A.3d at 540. “We
may sua sponte invoke the harmless error doctrine as it does nothing more
than affirm a valid judgment of sentence on an alternative basis.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).

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                                      C.

      Cool asserts that the trial court erred by admitting unreliable hearsay at

sentencing to prove his violent nature.       Specifically, he notes that the

prosecutor mentioned an incident reported in his SOAB report in which the

victim alleged that he threatened her with a firearm. (See Cool’s Brief, at 27)

(citing N.T. Reconsideration, at 5). He maintains that since he denied pointing

a gun at the victim in the same assessment, the victim’s hearsay statement

should not have been considered since he had no opportunity to cross-

examine her. (See id. at 27-28).

      [A] proceeding held to determine sentence is not a trial, and the
      court is not bound by the restrictive rules of evidence properly
      applicable to trials. Commonwealth v. Orsino, 197 Pa. Super.
      306, 178 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 1962) (sentencing court has
      wide latitude in considering facts, regardless of whether such facts
      are produced by witnesses who the court sees and hears). Rather,
      the court may receive any relevant information for the purposes
      of determining the proper penalty. … Although sentencing
      proceedings must comport with due process, the convicted
      defendant need not be accorded the entire panoply of criminal trial
      procedural rights.

Commonwealth v. Medley, 725 A.2d 1225, 1229 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal

denied, 749 A.2d 468 (Pa. 2000) (quotation marks and most citations

omitted).

      At the reconsideration hearing, to demonstrate Cool’s past violent acts

and threats, the prosecutor mentioned the fifteen-year-old Luzerne County

victim’s statements about Cool’s alleged threats involving weapons, which

were contained in the SOAB report. (See N.T. Reconsideration, at 5-6). The

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court overruled defense counsel’s hearsay objection because it regularly

considers such reports in sentencing. (See id. at 6).

       First, given that he had been determined to be an SVP based on that

report, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the

Commonwealth to argue about the victim’s statements. See Medley, 725

A.2d at 1229. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the court erred or

abused its discretion, Cool has not proved that he was prejudiced. There is

no evidence that the court considered the victim’s statements in imposing

Cool’s sentence.      As stated previously, the court expressly explained the

reasons why it was increasing Cool’s period of supervision, and they involved

facts related to this case, not the Luzerne County victim’s statements in the

SOAB report.9

                                               D.

       Finally, relying on Commonwealth v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 593 (Pa.

Super. 2005), Cool argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it

____________________________________________

9 Cool’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 990 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super.
2009) is wholly unpersuasive because it is distinguishable from the case at
bar. Rhodes involved, in pertinent part, a trial court’s express reliance on
police reports it received ex parte that were almost entirely comprised of
hearsay statements. The court “then drew factual inferences directly from
those reports on the basis of which [it] imposed a sentence almost five times
that recommended by the Commonwealth and only one to two years shy of
the statutory maximum[.]” Rhodes, 990 A.2d at 745. This is inapposite to
the facts herein where there is no evidence that the court considered the
victim’s statements at all to impose the standard range sentence and only
modified the back end of the sentence for supervision purposes.

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reconsidered and then increased his sentence based on the nolle prossed

unlawful body armor charge.

      In Stewart, this Court considered the issue of whether a defendant

could be sentenced to an aggravated range sentence based on charges that

had been nolle prossed. Stewart, 867 A.2d at 591. In deciding the issue,

the Court considered the competing maxims that, “when a court imposes its

sentence, the court may consider a defendant’s previous arrests and

concurrent charges” and “a sentence cannot be enhanced for any offense

other than the one to which the defendant pled guilty.”          Id. at 593.    In

Stewart’s case, in imposing sentence, the court explained, in pertinent part,

that “[t]his sentence is in the aggravated range because two counts of IDSI,

which each [carries] a mandatory minimum of five years, have been nolle

prossed as well as another count of statutory sexual assault.” Id. (record

citation omitted). Based on the specific circumstances, this Court observed

that “a manifest abuse of discretion exists when a sentence is enhanced due

to charges that have been nolle prossed as part of a plea agreement, because

notions of fundamental fairness are violated.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Cases since Stewart have restricted this observation to the specific

facts of that case. For example, in Commonwealth v. Tobin, 89 A.3d 663,

667 (Pa. Super. 2014), we concluded that a trial court’s reference to facts

underlying the nolle prossed charges did not indicate that it was expressly

considering   the   charges   to   formulate   its   sentence.      Similarly   in

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Commonwealth v. Turner, 58 A.3d 845, 847 (Pa. Super. 2012), the crime

of possession of a firearm was nolle prossed. At sentencing, the court made

a factual finding that Turner possessed a firearm at the time he committed

possession with intent to deliver, resulting in a mandatory term of

imprisonment. We held that the court did not err because it did not penalize

the defendant on the nolle prossed possession charge. See Turner, 58 A.3d

at 847.

       At the reconsideration hearing in this case, in an effort to elucidate the

court about Cool’s character and need for increased supervision, the

prosecutor argued extensively about inconsistencies in Cool’s statement in this

case and in the Luzerne County litigation, his failure to appear at the Luzerne

County sentencing hearing, psychological and sexual offender diagnoses in

the SOAB report, his lack of remorse for the sexual relationship with his

fifteen-year-old cousin, his previous convictions for assault and terroristic

threats, the number of guns in his possession and mentioned that there was

a “bulletproof vest with a loaded gun with one in the chamber attached to the

vest.”10 (N.T. Reconsideration, at 11); (see id. at 3-14).

       In imposing the new sentence, the court mentioned a laundry list of

what was discovered in Cool’s possession at the time of his arrest, including

____________________________________________

10 We again note that defense counsel did not object to the Commonwealth
mentioning the bullet proof vest or argue that it was an improper consideration
for the court. (See N.T. Reconsideration, at 15-16).

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the fact that “[t]here was a bulletproof vest.” (Id. at 16). However, there is

no indication that the court considered the charge of unlawful possession of

the bullet proof vest in fashioning its sentence. Contrary to Cool’s argument

that the court improperly considered this fact, there is absolutely no evidence

that the court considered the charge and enhanced his sentence on this basis.

See Commonwealth v. Miller, 965 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(concluding court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant where

it carefully reviewed the PSI and other evidence and mere reference to facts

underlying nolle prossed charge did not indicate that it specifically considered

the charge and enhanced his sentence based thereon); cf. Commonwealth

v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 593 (Pa. Super. 2005) (trial court specifically

indicated that it was sentencing appellant in aggravated range because of

three counts that were nolle prossed).

      In fact, as noted previously, the court only increased the back end of

Cool’s sentence to allow for increased supervision, which was not imposed for

the charge of possessing the bullet proof vest.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/16/2023

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