Court Opinion

ID: 9462323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:38:13.846918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:32.319328
License: Public Domain

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting);
Section 11-502(3) of the District of Columbia Code extends the criminal jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to local offenses which are “joined in the same information or indictment with any Federal offense.” In recent years the United States Attorney’s use of this jurisdictional provision to combine charges under both local and federal statutory schemes in order to seek maximum penalties greater than would be available under either scheme alone has raised difficult questions of equal protection, see, e.g., United States v. Shepard, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 367-68, 515 F. 2d 1324, 1338-39 (1975) (Bazelon, C. J., concurring); United States v. Knight, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 27-28, 509 F.2d 354, 360-361 (1974) (per curiam), and of construction of both local, see, e. g., United States v. Greene, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 489 F.2d 1145 (1973), and federal laws, see, e. g., United States v. Canty, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 469 F.2d 114 (1972) *831(per curiam). The present appeal involves all of these issues.
Appellants were tried in the District Court on an indictment charging possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of federal law (Count 1). They were also charged with simple possession of heroin (Count 2), destruction of evidence (Count 3), and maintaining a common nuisance (Count 4), all in violation of District of Columbia law.1 The fourth count was dismissed, and appellants were acquitted by the jury on Count 1. They were found guilty on Counts 2 and 3, however, and tyere sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 months to five years for possession and one to three years for destroying evidence.
D.C. law does not differentiate between simple possession and sale of narcotics, providing a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.2 Federal law, on the other hand, punishes possession of heroin with intent to distribute by a maximum sentence of 30 years and a fine of not more than $25,000 and simple possession with a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.3 Thus, by combining statutory provisions, the prosecution in this ease was able to put the defendants at risk of the heavy federal punishment for possession with intent to distribute while preserving the possibility that if the greater offense could not be proved, the defendants would be subject to the D.C. rather than to the federal penalty for the lesser included offense of simple possession.
Had appellants been charged with simple possession of narcotics in any federal court outside the District of Columbia, they would have been subject to a maximum penalty for simple possession of heroin of two years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The disparity between this maximum and the possible 10 years in prison and $5,000 fine to which they might have been sentenced under the District’s possession provision forms the basis for appellants’ claim that the combination of federal and local charges violated their right to equal protection of the laws. I believe their claim raises a substantial question concerning the constitutionality of the Government’s action in this case. In addition, I agree with appellants that their conviction on the D.C. charge is prohibited by 33 D.C.Code § 424 (1973).4 Finally, I believe this court’s decision in United States v. Canty, supra, requires at least that we reduce appellants’ prison terms for possession of heroin to the maximum sentence provided by federal law.5

The Equal Protection Claim

Appellants’ equal protection claim is easy to understand: unlike defendants in any other federal District Court, they were faced with the possibility of being sentenced to 10 years in prison for possession of heroin. The sentences they received provide maximum prison terms two and a half times as severe as could be imposed under congressional enactment for possession of heroin in any other federal court. Thus the jurisdictional provision contained in 11 D.C.Code *832§ 502(3) (1973), as applied in this case, created an invidious discrimination based solely on the fact that the trial occurred within the District of Columbia.6
The majority opinion dismisses this argument “on the basis of our opinion in Shepard, see 169 U.S.App.E).C. at 363 n.25, 515 F.2d at 1335 n.25.” Majority op. at 820. The cited footnote states:
Our holding eliminates any argument that prosecution under both statutes is a denial of equal protection. A defendant is subject to only a single trial in this district and there are no possible adverse consequences due to being found guilty under both federal and D.C. law since he can ultimately be sentenced under only one statutory scheme.
It is obvious, however, that being put at risk of receiving a prison term five times as great, and actually receiving a sentence two and a half times as great, as a defendant in any other federal District Court might receive is an “adverse consequence.” Thus the footnote in Shepard and the majority’s reliance on it in this case make sense only on the assumption that outside the District of Columbia a defendant could be tried on a federal narcotics charge and then be tried by the state for a violation of its own narcotics laws arising from the same act. This assumption depends on the continuing vitality of the doctrine that the double jeopardy clause is not violated by successive prosecutions by different sovereigns (the state and the federal government) even though both trials involve the same criminal act. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959).
Whatever the current strength of the Bartkus rule might be,7 that doctrine cannot be applied to this case. Forty-eight of the 50 states8 have adopted either the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act or the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, both of which contain provisions9 similar to 33 D.C.Code § 424:
§ 33-424. Effect of acquittal or conviction under Federal narcotic laws.
No person shall be prosecuted for a violation of any provision of this chapter if such person has been acquitted or convicted under any United States statute governing the sale or distribution of narcotic drugs, of the same act or omission which, it is alleged, constitutes a violation of this chapter.
The bar to dual prosecutions is accepted by 42 states in addition to the District of Columbia.10 Only in the District of Columbia, among all of the jurisdictions whose local legislatures have chosen to adopt the double jeopardy provision of *833the uniform laws,11 is it possible for an individual to be brought to trial on both federal and state narcotics charges for the same act.12 Operation of 11 D.C. Code § 502(3) to create this anomaly clearly discriminates against individuals tried in the District of Columbia.13 Since I am convinced that the joint prosecution and the resulting increased sentence in this case were improper under both local and federal law, I find it unnecessary to determine whether the prosecution was also unconstitutional.

Section 33-424 of the D.C.Code

Appellants also contend that 33 D.C. Code § 424 prohibits their joint trial on federal and local narcotics charges. The majority opinion dismisses appellants’ argument by concluding that Section 424 “precludes prosecution under D.C. statutes only where a defendant has been acquitted or convicted of the same narcotics offense at a prior federal trial.” Majority op. at 829 (emphasis in original). I can find no support for this conclusion.
The majority’s approach is directly contrary to the decision of the only other federal appellate court which has been called upon to interpret the meaning of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act’s double prosecution bar in the context of a single trial under both federal and local drug laws. See Lewis v. United States, 235 F.2d 580 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 897, 77 S.Ct. 136, 1 L.Ed.2d 89 (1956). In Lewis both the court and the Govern*834ment itself considered untenable the interpretation adopted by the majority here:
The Alaska statute prohibits prosecution thereunder if the accused has been “acquitted or convicted under the Federal Narcotic laws for the same act or omission, which, it is alleged, constitutes a violation of this Act.” Appellee [the Government] suggests that the prohibition might not apply where the same offense is charged under Federal and Alaska law concurrently. However, characterizing this argument as one of “doubtful worth” appellee cites a decision from the Supreme Court of Arizona, State v. Wortham, 63 Ariz. 148, 160 P.2d 352, and concedes that the conviction * * * is within the prohibition of the Alaska statute and that the conviction under Count I should be vacated.
235 F.2d at 581 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the Alaska conviction. It is true that in Lewis the court vacated a local law conviction which duplicated a federal conviction whereas here we are asked to reverse a local conviction because of a federal acquittal, but the statutory language does not allow us to attach any significance to this factual distinction.
State v. Wortham, cited in Lewis v. United States, supra, provides the rationale for Lewis in the Arizona Supreme Court’s explanation that the “State Uniform Narcotic Act is complimentary [sic] to the laws of our federal government in the control and abolition of the traffic in narcotics.” 63 Ariz. at 155, 160 P.2d at 355. This understanding of the purpose of the Uniform Acts is supported by the Prefatory Notes of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 146, 524 (1973). The double jeopardy provisions of the Uniform Acts further this purpose by insuring that the state laws do not become mere adjuncts of the federal laws.
The majority attempts to dissipate the force of these precedents by arguing that Lewis and Wortham involved prosecutions for the same offense, whereas the federal charge of possession with intent to distribute and the local charge of possession involved in the present case do not concern “the same act or omission” within the meaning of 33 D.C. Code § 424. Majority op. at 829 & note 14. Neither case permits the majority’s attempted distinction. In Wort-ham the court held that a federal indictment charging (1) importation of marihuana without registering or paying the appropriate tax and (2) acquiring as a transferee and possessing bulk marihuana without paying the tax charged the same offense as a state information alleging illegal possession under the Arizona Uniform Narcotic Act. The basis for the court’s conclusion was that “[b]oth charges are based upon the same act — possession of the same marihuana.” 63 Ariz. at 155, 160 P.2d at 355. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Lewis found that the federal charge and the local charge for violation of the Alaska Territory’s Uniform Narcotic Drug Act involved the same offense because “[t]he date of the offense is the same, the same individuals are defendants and the possession of the same type of narcotic is alleged.” 235 F.2d at 581. Here, too, the federal and local charges involve the same narcotics in the possession of the same defendants on the same day. There is no basis for concluding that the federal and local charges do not involve “the same act or omission” within the meaning of the Uniform Narcotics Act in force in the District of Columbia.14
*835The majority’s interpretation of Section 424 also fails to follow the well known canon of statutory construction that requires a statute to “be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” 2A D. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973). See, e. g., Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961); Morton v. Delta Mining, Inc., 495 F.2d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 906, 95 S.Ct. 824, 42 L.Ed.2d 835 (1975). It is well settled, and has been since long before Congress enacted Section 424, that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment protects an individual from being tried for the same act before two tribunals which derive their authority from the United States. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-355, 27 S.Ct. 749, 51 L.Ed. 1084 (1907). This constitutional restriction prohibits successive trials under local and federal law for the same act in the District of Columbia. E. g., United States v. Shepard, supra, 169 U.S.App.D.C. at 360, 515 F.2d at 1331; United States v. Knight, supra, 166 U.S. App.D.C. at 27-28, 509 F.2d at 360-361. According to the majority’s interpretation of Section 424, that provision adds nothing to this well established constitutional rule. Since the majority’s reading transforms Section 424 into a mere redundancy, it should be rejected.
In the present case the prosecutor has charged violation of the D.C. narcotics law as a lesser included offense to a charge of violation of the federal narcotics law.15 This action, which treats the D.C. law as subsidiary rather than complementary to the federal law, is forbidden by Section 424 interpreted in accordance with the only relevant precedent, the purpose of the section, and the canons of statutory construction. Since the joinder of charges was improper, the conviction for possession should be reversed.
By interpreting Section 424 as I think we must, we would require the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to choose whether to prosecute alleged narcotics violators under local or federal law. In United States v. Shepard, supra, we stated that forcing such a choice as a general rule would be contrary to the intent of Congress that the local and federal statutory schemes “mesh together.” We recognized, however, that we must examine the particular statutes in question to determine whether, in a specific case, the prosecutor should be required to choose. See 169 U.S.App.D.C. 361-63, 515 F.2d at 1332-1334. In this case Congress has embodied in Section 424 a requirement that the narcotics prosecutions be brought under either federal or D.C. law, but not both.16. Since this congressional*836ly imposed limitation on the United States Attorney in the District of Columbia is no different from the limitation imposed on prosecutors by most states,17 I see no reason to shy away from enforcing it.
The Doctrine of United States v. Canty
In United States v. Canty, supra, this court held improper the United States Attorney’s decision to charge the defendants with bank robbery with force and violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of 22 D.C.Code § 502. The prosecutor had drafted the indictment to charge both local and federal violations rather than the federal crime of committing an assault with a dangerous weapon while robbing a bank (18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)) in order to increase the possible maximum penalty. We vacated the conviction on the local assault charge. Finding that “[t]he federal bank robbery statute establishes a comprehensive scheme for prosecuting and punishing persons who rob federally-insured banks,” we held that the prosecutor could not, “[b]y venturing outside the federal scheme, * * * circumvent the scheme’s carefully crafted hierarchy of penalties.” 152 U.S.App.D.C. at 116-117, 469 F.2d at 127-128. Since the prosecutor has done here exactly what we said he could not do in Canty, the sentences must be vacated.
The majority rejects application of Canty primarily because the federal narcotics law specifically preserves state narcotics laws. Majority op. at 825-828 & note 12. The statutory disavowal of any congressional intent to preempt state laws dealing with narcotics does not, however, deal with the problem on which Canty focuses. All that the statute does is state that the federal narcotics law is not intended to prevent prosecution under applicable state laws. I do not challenge this proposition, and in Canty itself we also recognized that the existence of a comprehensive statute did not prevent enforcement of applicable state criminal law. 152 U.S.App.D.C. at 117-118 n.20, 469 F..2d at 128-129 n.20. The entirely separate question decided by Canty and raised here is whether allowing a federal prosecutor to bring simultaneous charges under both federal and local statutes contravenes Congress’ purpose in establishing a “carefully crafted hierarchy of penalties.”
The majority recognizes that the House Report on the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Control Act of 1970, under which appellants were prosecuted, identified “providing for an overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs” as one of the Act’s three methods for dealing with the problem of drug abuse. H.R.Rep.No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1970), quoted in majority op. at 825. However, the majority attaches no weight to this statement since “there is no evidence that Congress intended this language to mean anything other than that the Act itself was internally consistent.” Id. I disagree.
Although the Act as it was finally enacted into law was a House bill, its enforcement and penalty provisions originated in S. 3246 sponsored by Senator Dodd. As he was explaining his proposal, Senator Dodd emphasized the importance of the bill’s scheme of penalties:
In summation, Mr. President, I believe that the one part of S. 3246 which takes the biggest and best step forward with respect to drug control is the new penalty structure we have proposed.
116 Cong.Rec. 1654 (1970). Senator Hruska emphasized the care with which the bill’s penalties had been structured:
*837These changes in the penalty structure were not decided upon arbitrarily, but were the result of careful examination of the relevant facts. The Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency has for several years followed the drug abuse problem very closely, receiving testimony from persons knowledgeable in all aspects of the problem. * * *
The evidence which we have received shows that the severe penalties imposed under existing laws have failed to deter drug abuse. In fact, the opposite is true. * * *
Mr. President, I hasten to add that while the penalty provisions contained in this bill are tough, they are also rational and credible. The penalties are tailored to fit the crime and the person who committed that crime.
Id. at 1664. Several other senators emphasized the significance of the bill’s systematic approach to penalties and their hope that by rationalizing the penalty structure the bill would improve law enforcement.18
When the House • considered H.R. 18583, which became the Act, the central importance of the rationalization of criminal penalties, and reduction of penalties for simple possession, received even greater stress than in the Senate. Representative Springer emphasized the importance of rationalization:
It is not as though there has been no drug law up to this point. The biggest problem may be caused by the fact that there have been many drug laws which have come about under different circumstances and with entirely separate and diverse histories.
Everyone is interested in the revised penalties included in the bill. Upon inspection some say enforcement has been weakened. Others say just the opposite. The idea of the changes was to create more flexibility in the handling of the first offenders and those who might actually be salvaged, while bearing down with great intensity upon the pusher and the peddler.
116 Cong.Rec. 33299, 33300 (1970). Similarly, Representative Bush noted that “[t]he penalties in this bill are not only consistent with each other, but with the rest of the Federal criminal law — something which cannot be said for present drug laws.” Id. at 33314. Congressman Boland pointed to the reduction in penalties for possession:19
One of the. most striking features of the new penalty structure is that illegal possession of a controlled drug for one’s own use is a misdemeanor. * * This section on simple possession violations reflects the judgment of most authorities that harsh penalties have little deterrent value and often ruin the life of an individual involved. It is unfortunate that the Federal Government rarely has cases of simple possession within its jurisdiction so that this kind of sensible statute could apply. It is hoped that it may serve as an example to the States as they reform their own drug abuse laws.
Id. at 33316 (emphasis added).20 Representative Weicker explained the law en*838forcement benefit which rationalization of penalties would secure:
To me, however, the areas of this bill which deserve primary emphasis are the penalty and enforcement provisions, since these are the areas which have been most in need of reform. The penalty structure has been designed to accommodate all types of drug offenders, from the casual drug user and experimenter to the organized criminal syndicates engaged in unlawful importation and distribution of illicit drugs. But what is most important- about this penalty structure is that it is credible in that the penalties fit the crimes and the persons who commit the crimes. By being credible, this law will be enforceable, which is not the case today with existing law.
Id. at 33631. Virtually every congressman who spoke on the bill sounded one or more of these themes.21
Thus it is clear that Congress attached great importance to the “carefully crafted hierarchy of penalties” established by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, and especially to the reduction in penalties for simple possession of narcotics.22 Canty teaches that it is our duty to preserve the congressionally established structure by rejecting the prosecutor’s attempt to circumvent the Act’s sentencing provisions. Since appellants in this case were sentenced to maximum prison terms two and a half times as great as the Act provides, we cannot, consistently with Canty, allow their sentences under the possession count to stand.
I respectfully dissent.

. The federal charge was brought under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970). The local charges were brought under 33 D.C.Code § 402 (1973) (possession), 23 D.C.Code § 591(a) (1973) (destruction of evidence), and 33 D.C.Code § 416 (1973) (maintaining a common nuisance).

. 33 D.C.Code § 423(b) (1973) provides this penalty for violators of 33 D.C.Code § 402, see note 1 supra, who have previously been convicted of a narcotics offense, see note 3 infra.

. Simple possession is prohibited by 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1970). Since both appellants had previously been convicted of narcotics offenses, the maximum penalty under § 844(a) would have been double the one year in prison and $5,000 fine provided for first offenders. Possession with intent to distribute is proscribed in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), which also provides increased penalties for second offenders.

. See p. 832 infra.

. The only challenge to the destruction of evidence conviction is brought by Jones, who contends that he was prejudiced by continuation of the trial during the absence of codefendant Bryant. I agree with the majority that this contention, raised for the first time on appeal, is without merit.

. The discrimination is not shielded from judicial examination simply because it arises from the operation of a jurisdictional statute.
The government should not be permitted to accomplish through discriminatory jurisdiction what it cannot do through discriminatory statutory coverage. * * * To hold otherwise would allow the government to run roughshod over the Fifth Amendment in the name of jurisdictional sacrosanctity, employing jurisdiction as an inviolate tool.
United States v. Antelope, 523 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S. L.Week 3281 (Nov. 3, 1975) (No. 75-661).

. “This court is of the view that even this long settled doctrine is of dubious vitality * *.” United States v. Knight, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 27 & nn.13-14, 509 F.2d 354, 360 & nn.13-14 (1974). But cf. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973) (referring to but not repudiating dual sovereignty doctrine); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970) (same).

. See 9 Uniform Laws Annotated (ULA) 24, 146 (Supp.1975). The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act is in force in the District of Columbia and seven states, while the more recent Uniform Controlled Substances Act is the law in 41 states as well as the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Only New Hampshire and Vermont have adopted neither Uniform Act.

. Uniform Controlled Substances Act § 405; Uniform Narcotic Drug Act § 21.

. Of the seven states which still utilize the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, only Maine has not adopted the dual prosecution bar. Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Montana have adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act without barring prosecutions under both state and federal laws. See 9 ULA 307-308; id. 76-77 (Supp.1975).

. The majority misconstrues this discussion as suggesting that District residents are denied equal protection because District laws differ from the laws of other states. Majority op. at 823. My point is the converse of the argument refuted by the majority: District law is the same as the law in the 42 other jurisdictions which have adopted the prosecution bar of the Uniform Acts. Yet only in the District, of all the states with this uniform provision, can a defendant be brought to trial on charges of violating both local and federal narcotics laws. This possibility exists not because the District narcotics laws differ from other states’ but because of the United States Attorney’s use, approved today, of a jurisdictional provision whose history contains no indication that it was intended to alter the accepted uniform pattern of prosecuting drug offenders under a federal or a local drug law, but not under both.

. These state laws do not, of course, prevent the federal government from trying an individual on a narcotics charge arising from the same act for which he had previously been tried by the state. However,
it is Department policy that after a State prosecution there should be no Federal trial for the same act or acts unless there are compelling Federal interests involved, in which case prior authorization should be obtained from the appropriate Assistant Attorney General having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Department of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual, tit. 2 at 5 (1970). See 1 Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 346-347 (1970). Despite the majority’s suggestion that the Justice Department’s policy cannot form the basis of an equal protection claim, majority op. at 822-823, this court has recognized that “the realistic consideration * * * that except in unusual or emergency cases there is no sound warrant for multiple federal and state convictions even assuming constitutional authority” can raise an issue of constitutional dimension. United States v. Knight, supra note 7, 166 U.S.App.D.C. at 28, 509 F.2d at 361.

. The harm to the defendants, I repeat, lies in their exposure to the mixture of federal and local penal schemes, and the, added risk of a lengthy sentence which that exposure creates. The majority’s emphasis on the fact that only one trial is possible in the District because of double jeopardy considerations, majority op. at 820, 825, neither justifies nor explains away the inequality created by subjecting District of Columbia defendants to this increased risk.
The majority seems to have difficulty understanding the meaning of the word “risk.” See majority op. n.6. The concept is not difficult: at the beginning of their trial these defendants, unlike individuals charged with possession of narcotics with intent to distribute in federal courts outside the District of Columbia, faced the possibility that if the jury acquitted them of that charge, they might still be sentenced to up to 10 years for simple possession. Appellants were thus in a worse position than similarly situated individuals outside the District. In short, they faced a greater risk because they had more to lose from a jury verdict acquitting them of the greater charge but finding them guilty of the lesser.
Nothing in this concept of risk or in my opinion suggests that I have adopted the “sporting theory of justice,” id., so thoroughly discussed and refuted by the majority.

. See also State v. Krell, 125 N.J.Super. 457, 311 A.2d 399 (1973) (finding, inter alia, state charge of simple possession barred by federal charges of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute and of possession with intent to distribute).
Appellants also argue that the prosecutor’s decision to charge simple possession under local law in Count 2 deprived them of their right, recognized by the majority, majority op. n.7, to a jury instruction on the lesser included federal offense of simple possession under Count 1. The majority responds to this claim by stating that appellants would have been entitled to such an instruction if they had requested it. Id. Thus the majority concedes *835that alert trial counsel could nullify today’s ruling by requesting an instruction on the federal lesser included offense, thereby precluding a second conviction for the same offense under local law.

. The majority views it as “simply incorrect” to say that the local possession offense was charged as a lesser included offense to the allegation of possession with intent to distribute. Majority op. n.15. It is clear, however, that the participants in the trial considered the local count to be a lesser included offense of the federal count. Thus the District Judge instructed the jury that the charge of simple possession could be considered only if the defendants were found not guilty of the greater charge of possession with intent to distribute. Tr. at 439. Similarly, the jury was told that it could convict the defendants on the possession count if it found two of the three elements necessary for conviction on the charge of possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 429-433. That simple possession is separately specified in an indictment does not change its character as a lesser included offense to the crime of possession with intent to distribute. The majority’s general discussion of the relationship of the local possession statute to the federal statute completely ignores the way the local charge was used in this case.

. The choice between statutory schemes is strictly a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Hutcherson v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 345 F.2d 964 (1965); id. at 279-280, 345 F.2d at 969-970 (Burger, J. concurring) (“there is no substantial difference between allowing the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to proceed either under the muriici*836pal or the federal legislation in his discretion and allowing his counterpart in a state to bring a federal action or to defer to state authorities” (footnote omitted; emphasis added)).

. See note 12 supra.

. See, e. g., 116 Cong.Rec. 1011 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Young); id. at 1183 (remarks of Sen. Dole); id. at 1323 (remarks of Sen. Montoya); id. at 1666 (remarks of Sen. Cook).

. Prior to enactment of the 1970 law, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) provided that unexplained possession of a narcotic drug would be sufficient evidence to allow a conviction for illegally importing that drug into the United States. Section 174 provided a sentence for first offenders of not less than five or more than 20 years imprisonment and a possible fine of up to $20,000. Second offenders were to be sentenced to not less than ten or more than 40 years, and could also be fined up to $20,000.

. The majority appears to believe that congressional expressions of hope that the states would follow the federal lead support its conclusion that the joinder of charges in this case does not violate the intent of Congress. See majority op. at 825-828. 1 cannot understand the logic of this transmogrification of *838congressional desire for the states to rationalize their drug laws along the lines established by the new federal statute into support for the United States Attorney’s disruption of the orderly scheme of the federal law.

. See, e. g., 116 Cong.Rec. 33296 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Madden); id. at 33297 (remarks of Rep. Smith); id. at 33299 (remarks of Rep. Jarman); id. at 33304 (remarks of Rep. Rogers); id. at 33307 (remarks of Rep. Robison); id. at 33311 (remarks of Rep. Clancy); id. at 33313-33314 (remarks of Rep. Beall); id. at 33315 (remarks of Rep. MacGregor); id. at 33318 (remarks of Rep. Skubitz); id. at 33647 (remarks of Rep. Sisk); id. at 33650 (remarks of Rep. Keith); id. at 33651 (remarks of Rep. Brotzman); id. at 33652 (remarks of Rep. Broomfield); id. at 33653 (remarks of Rep. Anderson); id. at 33654 (remarks of Rep. Donohue); id. at 33656 (remarks of Rep. Hogan); id. at 33658 (remarks of Rep. Cohelan); id. at 33659 (remarks of Rep. Pickle).

. As the majority notes, Congress did not alter the D.C. statute when it enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, and the same session of Congress also revised the penalties provided under the D.C. law. However, these facts suggest only that Congress wished the prosecutor to have a choice; they in no way indicate that Congress wished a single individual to be subject to the conflicting penalty provisions of both statutes. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the same Congress which revised the D.C. law’s penalties also left untouched 33 D.C.Code § 424 (1973).