Court Opinion

ID: 9497416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:51:16.448122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:11.539177
License: Public Domain

GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In my view the decision of the district court is based upon factual findings where there is eoq|licting evidence, particularly with respect to the present intent of County officials. The court followed the teaching of this court’s .earlier decision in Freethought Society of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir.2003), but overlooks the differing procedural posture of that case. This court in Freethought reviewed a permanent injunction ordering the removal of the Ten Commandments Plaque based on testimony the district court found believable and the legal conclusions based upon these findings. Id. at 255. In contrast, the case before us is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment.
Consistently with the teaching of the Supreme Court, decisions of other circuits, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, we have. stated, “Summary judgment should be granted where no genuine issue of material fact exists for resolution at trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3d Cir.1992). We explained:
When deciding a motion for summary judgment ... a court’s role remains circumscribed in that it is inappropriate for a court to resolve factual disputes and to make credibility determinations.... Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evh dence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.
Id. at 1363 (citations omitted). Relying upon Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), we stated that the summary judgment standard has been likened to the “ ‘reasonable jury’ directed verdict standard,” and “at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not ... to weigh the evidence to determine the truth .of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1362-63. We concluded:
In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant’s version of events against the opponent’s, even if the quantity of the movant’s evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.
Id. at 1363.
The district court, in following Freeth-ought, engaged in weighing of the evidence and fact finding contrary to the teaching of Big Apple BMW_ and Anderson. The district court based its decision on the conclusion that officials were “sincere” when they articulated secular reasons for keeping the Plaque in place:
With regard to the current dispute over retention of the Plaque, the reasonable observer would know that the County Executive, Mr. Roddey,- with support from County Council, decided to not to [sic] remove the Plaque because he believed it represented “an important- part of the heritage and tradition of an historic building” and that the Plaque commemorated the rule of law, as opposed to war.
*416Based on the cumulative knowledge of the reasonable observer, I find that he or she could not conclude that continued display of the Ten Commandments Plaque reflects an intent by the current county officials to promote or favor one religion over another or indeed even to promote religion over non-religion.
The district court particularly concluded that the County Executive, James Roddey, expressed legitimate, secular reasons for refusing to remove the Plaque, “analogous to those given by the Chester County Commissioners whose explanation had satisfied the ‘relatively low threshold required by the purpose prong of Lemon [v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) ],’ ” citing Freeth-ought, 334 F.3d at 267. The district court continued by observing that Roddey had consulted with the County Solicitor and President of the County Council, and their joint conclusion was that “the plaque was an important part of the heritage and tradition of an historic building; ... [it] was really a part of the history of the courthouse and we thought it would be inappropriate to take it down.” The district court observed that Roddey had conceded at his deposition that he had distributed a press release stating his belief that the Ten Commandments represented a single statement of “values” vital to citizens “at the crest of the last century and so meaningful to many at the dawn of this new millennium.” At the same time, the court accepted Roddey’s explanation that by “values” he meant that the people that were responsible for putting up the Plaque felt that The Commandménts represented a celebration of the rule of law, and the foundation of the rule of law that was an alternative to war, and was “just general rules of civilized society.” The district court then stated: “Mr. Roddey’s explanations appear to be sincere and consistent with the facts pertaining to the building, its history, the age of the Plaque, and the County’s intention to respect the past and preserve the artifacts for future generations.”
But the record contains other statements by Roddey that cast a much different light on his motivations. In a press release Roddey stated, “Perhaps the citizens of Allegheny County place a value on the family, on the church an$ on religion that is vastly different than those who dwell in Washington, D.C. But my heart and my instinct tell me to keep ‘The Commandments’ and I intend to follow them.” Presumably, the reasonable observer reads local newspapers as well as local history books, so this statement has to be entered into the mix in deciding what that observer would think. Furthermore, in his deposition Roddey stated that “the plaque, itself, represents an ethic and a standard for society that I believe the people of this community would generally agree to.” This statement could be understood to amount to an adoption of official religious precepts by majority rule, thereby sending a “message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” Freethought, 334 F.3d at 260 (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995)).
And had the reasonable observer attended the Allegheny County Council meeting of January 16, 2001, he or she would have heard the debate when the Council passed a “sense of Council” motion stating, “ ‘The Commandments’ reflect values that are important to this community today as they were in the early part of the century.” *417The sponsor of the motion, Vince Gastgeb,6 stated, “There’s values and traditions here in this County that people have fought for, and as elected representatives,-we should fight to continue that moving forward.” Gastgeb concluded his speech by stating, “We have to have faith.” He later stated to the press, “I’d rather see ten religious expressions in the courthouse than none.” Another Council member, Richard Olasz, stated during Council debate, “Maybe some of these people that object to [the Plaque] ought to go back and remember that there are no atheists in foxholes, and to remember the old sign on the tombstone: All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go.”
There was also in evidence a statement by the president judge of the Allegheny County Common Pleas Court that in giving an ethics seminar for the County bar association, “I told them to go over to the courthouse and read the Ten Commandments and follow them.”
The district court made no reference to an expert’s affidavit stating that the text of the Commandments Plaque is a particular Christian Protestant one differing in many ways from that accepted under the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Lutheran traditions.
There is thus significant record evidence that the decision to keep the Plaque stemmed predominantly from religious impulses and would have been so perceived by a reasonable observer. Even though under the Lemon test, the purpose of the display does not have to be exclusively secular, in this case the evidence would support a finding that the secular purpose was a fig leaf. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (purpose prong of Lemon requires that assertion of secular purpose be “sincere and not a sham”). Moreover, the statements of religious purpose were made in public in circumstances that may well have given rise to an appearance of endorsement of religion by responsible county officials.
Perhaps the district court simply considered this case to be governed by Freeth-ought.7 Any such reliance makes even more significant the distinction in the procedural postures between Freethought and this case, for in Freethought we dealt with factual findings made after a hearing in support of an order granting preliminary injunction and here we deal with the far different standard for summary judgment. A finder of fact could well come to the same conclusion that the district court arrived at. However, the district court was not sitting as finder of fact, but was considering a summary judgment motion. These disputed fact issues should not have been decided as a question of law.8
*418In my view, we should remand for further consideration of the issues in this case.

. Gastgeb said that the sense of Council motion was desirable because the Council has "control over the courthouse," which suggests an unresolved issue as to whether the Council had some authority over the decision to retain the Plaque.

. King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003), was recognized by Freeth-ought, but distinguished. 334 F.3d at 263. The county seal of Richmond County depicted a tablet with Roman numerals I-X, but without the text of the Ten Commandments. Because the text was not reproduced, the reasonable observer was therefore not “induced to read or venerate sacred text.” Id.

.I am aware that this court in Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986), reversed a summary judgment in a school prayer case, but carefully noted there were no material disputes of fact that would preclude consideration of the merits of the case on summary judgment. Id. at 542 n. 3.