Court Opinion

ID: 9509173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 21:43:43.829464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:45.613524
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GRAY,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the opinion of the majority as to issues 1 and 2.1 must respectfully dissent from that opinion on issue 3, relating to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. I do so because the result of that holding is to broaden the applicability of the immunity I agree is extended to Evergreen under § 7-33-2208, MCA, past the point included within that statute.
Furthermore, in order to reach its conclusion, the majority has reached beyond the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. That order, while couched in part in summary judgment terms, was in effect an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim premised entirely on the availability of the statutory immunity, rather than an order determining that no genuine issues of material fact existed. To that extent, this Court has engaged in unstated fact-finding of its own that the damages suffered by the Hydes were caused by Evergreen’s activities at the Hydes’ residence during the fire, as opposed to being caused by negligent acts or omissions by Evergreen in advance of that fire.
I would remand for such further motions or proceedings as may be appropriate.