Court Opinion

ID: 9571964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:36:53.59306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:15.209828
License: Public Domain

LANDAU, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that plaintiffs’ claims involving the nonremonstrance agreements arise out of a land use decision and are, therefore, subject to LUBA’s exclusive jurisdiction. I further agree that plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims are not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of LUBA. And, although I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the dismissal of those inverse condemnation claims, I do not agree with the majority’s rationale for doing so. The majority wrongly rejects the city’s contention that plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims are not ripe and, instead, disposes of the case on its merits. In my view, the appropriate basis for affirmance is the lack of ripeness.
Ordinarily, one who seeks judicial relief must demonstrate that the challenged decision is final, and all avenues of administrative relief have been pursued to no avail. Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or 35, 44, 400 P2d 255 (1965). The principal reason for imposing that requirement is to prevent premature interruption of agency decision-making processes, “especially when agency expertise will play a large role in any decision on the merits.” Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 615, 581 P2d 50 (1978) (quoting Bay River v. Envir. Quality Comm., 26 Or App 717, 721-22, 554 P2d 620, rev den 276 Or 555 (1976)); see also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 US 136, 148, 87 S Ct 1507, 18 L Ed 2d 681 (1967). If the administrative process is allowed to play out completely, judicial intervention may become unnecessary. Accordingly, if that administrative process is short-circuited, judicial relief is not available. See generally 4 Anderson, American Law of Zoning 3d § 30.11 (1986).
That requirement — occasionally labelled “exhaustion,” but more correctly known in this context as “ripeness” — applies to claims that a local government decision amounts to a taking of property without compensation, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., 452 US 264, 101 S Ct 2352, 69 L Ed 2d 1 (1981), *425for example, the Supreme Court reversed a district court’s decision on the merits of a claim that a federal law controlling surface mining effected an unconstitutional taking. It said:
“There is no indication in the record that appellees have availed themselves of the opportunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative relief by requesting either a variance * * * or a waiver from the surface mining restrictions * * *. If [the property owners] were to seek administrative relief under these procedures, a mutually acceptable solution might well be reached with regard to individual properties, thereby obviating the need to address the constitutional questions. The potential for such administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that the taking issue decided by the District Court simply is not ripe for judicial resolution.” 452 US at 297. (Footnotes omitted.)
See also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 US 340, 348, 106 S Ct 2561, 91 L Ed 2d 285 (1986); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 US 255, 260, 100 S Ct 2138, 65 L Ed 2d 106 (1980).
The same ripeness requirement is imposed in takings claims brought under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution. In Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., supra, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a landowner’s challenge to the constitutionality of a comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, because the landowner had failed to request amendments to either the plan or the zoning ordinance. 282 Or at 615-22.
Whether the claim is for compensation or for a declaration of unconstitutionality, the ripeness requirement applies with equal force. As the Oregon Supreme Court said in Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or 254, 656 P2d 306 (1982), in either case,
“the landowner may not simply rest on the apparent preclusive effect of the [challenged] plan or other regulation when administrative procedures exist by which [the landowner] might obtain at least temporary or partial relief, including administrative procedures for amending the plan. If such procedures for seeking relief exist, they must be pursued.” 294 Or at 261.
In this case, plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a city manager’s decision to grant a development permit *426only on condition that plaintiffs convey to the city a 55-foot drainage easement. Under the city’s development ordinance, plaintiffs could have taken the city manager’s decision to the city council for relief from those conditions. However, plaintiffs chose not to do that. Instead, they proceeded directly to court, alleging that the city manager’s imposition of the condition constitutes an uncompensated taking of property, in violation of both federal and state constitutions.
Under the circumstances, plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe. On the basis of the record before us, we simply have no way of knowing what the city council would have done. It might have granted plaintiffs’ relief from the drainage easement condition. Or a compromise position might have been reached. In either event, had plaintiffs taken their case to the city council, as the development ordinance allows, they might not have had to bring their claims in the first place. Thus, as in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., supra, if plaintiffs were to seek relief from the conditions imposed by the city manager, “a mutually acceptable solution might well be reached * * *, thereby obviating the need to address” plaintiffs’ takings claims. 452 US at 297.
The majority declines to follow the course I have described. If I understand its opinion correctly, the majority concludes that ripeness is not required in this case because that prerequisite to judicial review only applies to “pure regulatory takings claims,” and plaintiffs’ claims are not of the “pure regulatory takings” variety. The majority appears to limit the category of “pure” takings claims to those in which
“the owner asserts that regulatory restrictions on land use effect a complete deprivation of beneficial or economically viable use of property that is and remains privately owned.” 126 Or App at 420.
The majority contrasts that class of takings cases with “conditions” cases, in which the legal test is whether the condition imposed by a local government “bears a relationship to the impacts of the use” to which the government has attached the condition.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the majority’s categorization of takings cases is correct,1 there is no *427rule that ripeness does not apply to “conditions” cases. Directly on point is Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 105 S Ct 3108, 87 L Ed 2d 126 (1985). In that case, the plaintiff applied for a permit to develop its property. The local planning commission disapproved the application, because it failed to satisfy eight conditions required by the local zoning ordinance. That zoning ordinance allowed the plaintiff to apply to the planning commission for relief from those conditions. The plaintiff did not do that and, instead, brought a regulatory takings action, claiming that the conditions imposed by the planning commission effected a taking of the plaintiffs property. The Court refused to hear the merits of the constitutional challenge, because the plaintiff had failed to take advantage of the opportunity to obtain a variance from the conditions imposed by the planning commission. The Court observed that, after receiving the decision of the planning commission on the plaintiffs application,
“[the plaintiff] did not seek variances that would have allowed it to develop the property according to its proposed plat, notwithstanding the Commission’s finding that the plat did not comply with the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations. It appears that variances could have been granted to resolve at least five of the Commission’s eight objections to the plat.” 473 US at 188.
Thus, the Court held, in the face of the plaintiffs refusal to follow the procedures for requesting a variance, it could *428hardly complain that the disapproval was the equivalent of a final decision on its application. The case, it concluded, was not ripe. See also Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F2d 596, 609 (8th Cir 1986) (challenge to city decision to grant development permit only on condition that applicant convey public right-of-way held not ripe, because of the plaintiffs failure to request variance).
The majority acknowledges the Williamson decision, but reads it very differently than I do. The majority contends that, in Williamson, the Court held that an applicant need only pursue administrative remedies through the first decision-maker and that “exhaustion of available appeals from the first decision-maker to other administrative bodies” is not required. I have searched the Williamson decision in vain for any such holding. The portion of the decision that the majority cites in support for its statement of Williamson’s holding refers to an entirely different issue.
The plaintiff in Williamson had argued that imposing a requirement that it seek variances from the planning commission would be inconsistent with the general rule that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not normally required in cases brought under 42 USC § 1983. See generally Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 US 496, 102 S Ct 2557, 73 L Ed 2d 172 (1982). The Court held that there was no inconsistency. The key, said the Court, lies in the distinction between ripeness and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Ripeness concerns “whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury.” Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, supra, 473 US at 193. Exhaustion concerns procedures by which a person obtains review of the lawfulness of an adverse decision. 473 US at 193. The distinction, the Court said, is best illustrated by comparing the difference in that case between applying to the commission for relief from the conditions and appealing to the County Board of Zoning Appeal for review of the lawfulness of those conditions. Thus, the distinction lies in the nature of the relief that may be obtained from different agencies, not in the level of review in terms of organizational hierarchy. See generally Smith, “Ripeness for the Taking Clause: Finality and *429Exhaustion in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,” 13 Ecology LQ 625, 634-36 (1986).
In this case, the initial decision-maker, the city, never was given the opportunity to arrive at a definitive position on the imposition of the drainage easement condition; the city council could have simply disagreed with the city manager and removed the condition.2 Thus, under Williamson, plaintiffs’ takings claims are not ripe. Plaintiffs do not have to seek administrative review by LUBA of the lawfulness of the imposition of the condition imposed by the city. That is the sort of “exhaustion” that is not required under Williamson.
The majority also reasons that, because plaintiffs voluntarily acceded to the city manager’s condition of conveying a drainage easement, the city’s decision is, in fact, final and ripe for our review. The majority cites no authority for this proposition, and I am aware of none. To the contrary, it seems to me quite inconsistent with the admonition in Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, supra, that “the landowner may not simply rest on the apparent preclusive effect of the [challenged] plan or other regulation,” when there exist administrative avenues of relief. 294 Or at 261.
The majority acknowledges Suess Builders, but again reads the decision very differently than I do. The majority points out that one claim involving the local government’s acquisition of easements was held not subject to the doctrine of ripeness. However, the majority reads into a single phrase in the opinion more than its context will bear.
In Suess Builders, the plaintiffs alleged that, apart from enactment of a comprehensive plan, the defendant local governments had engaged in an effort to repress the value of *430the plaintiffs’ property by making it look as if it were going to be condemned for a public park, so that they ultimately could purchase the land at less than market value. According to the plaintiffs, they were induced “to forego further attempts to develop their property” by repeated assurances that their property would be acquired, by warnings that “it would be useless to pursue any proposals for private development” and by the defendants’ conduct in actually acquiring easements. 294 Or at 263. Under the circumstances, the court held, a ripeness requirement would serve no purpose, the defendants having already assured the plaintiffs that no development was possible.
The majority seizes on the mention of the defendants having acquired easements in Suess Builders and declares on the basis of that language that ripeness does not apply here either. In so doing, the majority misses the point of the court’s holding. The point was that it would have been futile for the plaintiffs to have been required to attempt to demonstrate the ripeness of their claim in the light of the defendants’ conduct and statements that no development would have been allowed. The acquisition of easements was not the basis of the plaintiffs’ claim. It was instead listed as a reason — along with the allegations of the defendants’ repeated assurances that they intended to purchase the property for a park — for concluding that the plaintiffs were, indeed, induced to believe that no development would have been allowed. Suess Builders, therefore, stands squarely for the proposition that ripeness is required in all takings cases unless a plaintiff can establish the futility of complying with that requirement. See Note, “Inverse Condemnation Damages in Oregon — Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton,” 20 Will L Rev 169, 177 (1984). There is no allegation of futility here, and so the ripeness requirement applies.
Because plaintiffs failed to take their case to the city council, their inverse condemnation claims are not ripe, and I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of those claims on that basis.
Edmonds and Leeson, JJ., join in this concurrence.

 I have some doubts. Since at least Agins v. Tiburon, supra, virtually all regulatory takings claims have been subject to the same test:
*427“The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” 447 US at 260. (Citations omitted.)
Whether a claim is based on a challenged use restriction or on the imposition of a permit condition, it is routinely denominated by the courts as a “regulatory takings claim” and is subject to the same test. In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 US 825, 107 S Ct 3141, 97 L Ed 2d 677 (1987), which the majority cites as the paradigm of the “conditions” class of cases, the United States Supreme Court referred to the plaintiffs’ claim simply as a “takings” claim and applied the Agins test. Similarly, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 317 Or 110, 854 P2d 437, cert granted _ US _, 114 S Ct 544, 126 L Ed 2d 446 (1993), another “conditions” case, the Oregon Supreme Court characterized the plaintiffs’ claim in the same fashion and applied the same test.
To be sure, depending on the nature of the claim, one part of the Agins test may be more or less relevant than another. But the fact remains that a claim that regulatory action effects a taking of property, whether by use restriction or exaction of a permit condition, is commonly referred to as a “regulatory takings claim” and is subject to the two-part Agins test.

 The city’s development ordinance provides that, on appeal from the city manager’s decision, the record is opened for the receipt of “oral and written testimony and materials provided by appellant, the city or other interested persons. ” It further provides that the city manager’s decision may be upheld, modified, remanded or reversed on the basis of that evidence. That appeal process provides de novo consideration of plaintiffs’ application, which at least potentially, could be based on an entirely new record. It does not involve a review of the lawfulness of the city manager’s decision. Under Williamson, that procedure is precisely the sort that must be pursued before a decision is considered ripe for judicial review.