Court Opinion

ID: 9364411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 16:04:02.89812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:37.758212
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Florida
                          ____________

                          No. SC21-917
                          ____________

                 NICOLE “NIKKI” FRIED, etc.,
                         Petitioners,

                               vs.

                  STATE OF FLORIDA, et al.,
                        Respondents.

                          ____________

                          No. SC21-918
                          ____________

              CITY OF WESTON, FLORIDA, et al.,
                        Petitioners,

                               vs.

                  STATE OF FLORIDA, et al.,
                        Respondents.
                        ____________

                        January 19, 2023

POLSTON, J.

     This case involves whether the common law doctrines of

legislative immunity and governmental function immunity prohibit
the statutory civil actions and penalties imposed against local

governments and officials for certain violations of section 790.33,

Florida Statutes (2021), the firearms preemption statute. We agree

with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in State v. City

of Weston, 316 So. 3d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021), that neither

doctrine prohibits the statutory civil actions and penalties in

sections 790.33(3)(c), (d), and (f).1

                           I. BACKGROUND

     In 1987, the Florida Legislature acted to preempt the field of

firearms and ammunition regulation. See ch. 87-23, § 2, Laws of

Fla. Section 790.33 (the “Preemption Statute”), currently provides

as follows:

     PREEMPTION.—Except as expressly provided by the
     State Constitution or general law, the Legislature hereby
     declares that it is occupying the whole field of regulation
     of firearms and ammunition, including the purchase,
     sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership,
     possession, storage, and transportation thereof, to the
     exclusion of all existing and future county, city, town, or
     municipal ordinances or any administrative regulations
     or rules adopted by local or state government relating
     thereto. Any such existing ordinances, rules, or
     regulations are hereby declared null and void.

     1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

                                   -2-
§ 790.33(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). The Legislature’s express intent in

enacting the Preemption Statute was to maintain uniform firearms

laws throughout Florida; to nullify and void all ordinances and

regulations not enacted at the state or federal level; “to prohibit the

enactment of any future ordinances or regulations relating to

firearms, ammunition, or components thereof unless specifically

authorized by this section or general law”; and “to require local

jurisdictions to enforce state firearms laws.” § 790.33(2)(a).

Petitioners in this case do not challenge the Legislature’s authority

to preempt the field of regulation of firearms and ammunition.

     The Preemption Statute also contains the following exceptions:

           (a) Zoning ordinances that encompass firearms
     businesses along with other businesses, except that
     zoning ordinances that are designed for the purpose of
     restricting or prohibiting the sale, purchase, transfer, or
     manufacture of firearms or ammunition as a method of
     regulating firearms or ammunition are in conflict with
     this subsection and are prohibited;

          (b) A duly organized law enforcement agency from
     enacting and enforcing regulations pertaining to firearms,
     ammunition, or firearm accessories issued to or used by
     peace officers in the course of their official duties;

          (c) Except as provided in s. 790.251, any entity
     subject to the prohibitions of this section from regulating
     or prohibiting the carrying of firearms and ammunition

                                 -3-
     by an employee of the entity during and in the course of
     the employee’s official duties;

           (d) A court or administrative law judge from hearing
     and resolving any case or controversy or issuing any
     opinion or order on a matter within the jurisdiction of
     that court or judge; or

          (e) The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
     Commission from regulating the use of firearms or
     ammunition as a method of taking wildlife and regulating
     the shooting ranges managed by the commission.

§ 790.33(4)(a)-(e).

     In 2011, the Legislature amended the Preemption Statute, see

chapter 2011-109, Laws of Florida, to include a series of civil

penalties and actions, which apply to:

     Any person, county, agency, municipality, district, or
     other entity that violates the Legislature’s occupation of
     the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition,
     as declared in subsection (1), by enacting or causing to
     be enforced any local ordinance or administrative rule or
     regulation impinging upon such exclusive occupation of
     the field shall be liable as set forth herein.

§ 790.33(3)(a). Relevant to this case, sections 790.33(3)(c)-(d) are

applicable to local officials and provide as follows:

          (c) If the court determines that a violation was
     knowing and willful, the court shall assess a civil fine of
     up to $5,000 against the elected or appointed local
     government official or officials or administrative agency
     head under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred.

                                  -4-
          (d) Except as required by applicable law, public
     funds may not be used to defend or reimburse the
     unlawful conduct of any person found to have knowingly
     and willfully violated this section.

§ 790.33(3)(c)-(d).

     Section 790.33(3)(f) is applicable to local governments and

provides as follows:

          1. A person or an organization whose membership
     is adversely affected by any ordinance, regulation,
     measure, directive, rule, enactment, order, or policy,
     whether written or unwritten, promulgated or caused to
     be enforced in violation of this section may file suit
     against any county, agency, municipality, district, or
     other entity in any court of this state having jurisdiction
     over any defendant to the suit for declaratory and
     injunctive relief and for actual damages, as limited
     herein, caused by the violation. A court shall award the
     prevailing plaintiff in any such suit:

          a. Reasonable attorney fees and costs in accordance
     with the laws of this state, including a contingency fee
     multiplier, as authorized by law; and

          b. The actual damages incurred, but not more than
     $100,000.

§ 790.33(3)(f)1.

     Petitioners in these consolidated cases consist of thirty

municipalities, three counties, more than seventy elected officials,2

      2. Adam Putnam, the then Commissioner of Agriculture, was
a defendant named in the original complaints. His successor,

                                 -5-
and one private citizen. Without enacting any of the desired

ordinances and regulations, Petitioners brought suit seeking a

declaration from the circuit court that the challenged provisions are

invalid. Petitioners brought numerous claims alleging various

constitutional violations 3 and violations of legislative immunity and

governmental function immunity. On summary judgment, as

relevant here, Petitioners argued that enforcement of section

790.33(3) against local officials would violate legislative immunity

and enforcement of section 790.33(3)(f) and section 790.335(4)(c),

Florida Statutes (2021), against local governments would violate

Petitioner Nicole “Nikki” Fried, declined to join the State’s appeal
and supported the trial court’s ruling before the First District.

      3. Petitioners challenged both section 790.33, Florida
Statutes (2021), and section 790.335(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2021),
which penalizes governmental entities for maintaining any “list,
record, or registry of privately owned firearms” or the owners of
those firearms. § 790.335(2). Not relevant to this appeal,
Petitioners also alleged the challenged provisions violate
gubernatorial removal authority; are overbroad and
unconstitutionally vague; are irrational, arbitrary, and capricious;
violate the right to free speech, association, petition and
instruction; violate the contract clause; and violate due process.
Petitioners also sought declaratory judgment that certain proposed
regulations were permissible. The circuit court denied all
constitutional claims, except two pertaining to the governor removal
provision in section 790.33(3)(e), which the State did not appeal.

                                 -6-
governmental function immunity. The circuit court invalidated the

challenged provisions 4 on the grounds that (1) the penalties against

local officials violate legislative immunity, and (2) the actions

against local governments violate immunity for discretionary

government functions. First, while the circuit court found that “the

legislature abrogated the common law legislative immunity,” the

circuit court also found that “legislative immunity arising from the

separation of powers clause in the Florida Constitution does apply

to judicial review of local legislators and cannot be waived by

statute.” The circuit court explained that “[b]ecause local

governments must have what amount to small legislatures, and

because courts cannot interfere in legislative processes, neither this

      4. The circuit court’s order refers to section 790.33(3) and
section 790.335(4)(c) collectively as the “penalty provisions.” For
purposes of this appeal, the parties present no argument pertaining
to section 790.335(4)(c). The circuit court’s order also contained
several “Declarations.” One such declaration pertained to section
790.335(4)(c) and article VIII, section 5(b) of the Florida
Constitution, which provides that “[e]ach county shall have the
authority to require a criminal history records check and a 3 to 5-
day waiting period, excluding weekends and legal holidays, in
connection with the sale of any firearm occurring within such
county.” The circuit court “declare[d] that counties may lawfully
enact enabling regulations to enforce the Local Option powers of
Article VIII, Section 5(b).” The parties did not appeal these rulings
to this Court.

                                  -7-
court, nor any other court in Florida, can enforce the civil penalty

provisions of Section 790.33 against local legislators.” The circuit

court also ruled that “the U.S. Constitution affords local legislators

legislative immunity.” Further, the circuit court found that

“governmental function immunity applies and the local

governmental entities and their officials are immune from suit.”

The circuit court explained that “were the penalty provisions to be

enforced, they would necessarily subject local legislative planning

decisions to judicial scrutiny because the penalty provisions create

liability for enacting legislation—an inherently discretionary

governmental function.”

     On appeal, as relevant here, Respondents argued that the

circuit court erred by concluding that sections 790.33(3)(c) and (d)

violate legislative immunity and that section 790.33(3)(f) violates

governmental function immunity. The First District reversed the

circuit court’s ruling, holding “that the statutory penalty provisions

disputed on appeal are valid and enforceable.” City of Weston, 316

So. 3d at 404. The First District concluded that “[g]overnment

function immunity does not shield entities that act contrary to or

more restrictively than state law in the completely preempted field

                                 -8-
of firearm and ammunition regulation. Likewise, legislative

immunity does not shield individuals who knowingly and willfully

act contrary to or beyond the limits of state law.” Id. As to

legislative immunity, the First District explained that “the particular

attempt to invoke [legislative] immunity here occurs in direct

violation of state preemption,” and “[o]fficials are not immune from

having to prove lack of knowing and willful intent to violate state

preemption.” Id. at 407. The First District concluded that “[t]he

Florida Legislature has the authority to abrogate legislative

immunity,” and “[i]t has done so here.” Id. As to governmental

function immunity, the First District explained that “[t]he trial court

erred in elevating the separation of powers doctrine over the state’s

superior legislative authority validly exercised in this case.” Id. at

405. The First District reasoned that “[t]he separation of powers

doctrine protects only lawful and authorized planning-level activity,”

not “violation of state preemption statutes.” Id. at 405-06.

                            II. ANALYSIS

     Petitioners argue that sections 790.33(3)(c) and (d) are invalid

because they violate legislative immunity, and that section

790.33(3)(f) is invalid because it violates governmental function

                                  -9-
immunity. Respondents counter that the First District properly

concluded that neither legislative immunity nor governmental

function immunity “shields local governments and officials from the

challenged statutes.” City of Weston, 316 So. 3d at 408. We agree

with Respondents and approve the First District’s decision in City of

Weston.5

                      A. Legislative Immunity

     Petitioners first argue that the First District in City of Weston

erred in concluding that legislative immunity does not prohibit the

statutory penalties in sections 790.33(3)(c) and (d) because local

officials are entitled to legislative immunity for purely legislative

acts. However, because legislative immunity as applied to local

officials is a common law doctrine that the Legislature abrogated in

the context covered by the Preemption Statute, we conclude that

legislative immunity does not prohibit the statutory penalties in

sections 790.33(3)(c) and (d).

     5. This Court’s standard of review is de novo. See Volusia
Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla.
2000).

                                  - 10 -
     The challenged statutory provisions, sections 790.33(3)(c)-(d),

applicable to local officials, provide as follows:

          (c) If the court determines that a violation was
     knowing and willful, the court shall assess a civil fine of
     up to $5,000 against the elected or appointed local
     government official or officials or administrative agency
     head under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred.

          (d) Except as required by applicable law, public
     funds may not be used to defend or reimburse the
     unlawful conduct of any person found to have knowingly
     and willfully violated this section.

§ 790.33(3)(c)-(d).

     Legislative immunity is commonly understood as a doctrine

that protects legislators from being sued for all actions taken in

their lawmaking capacity and is a doctrine broadly recognized by

federal and state courts alike. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S.

44, 48 (1998) (“The principle that legislators are absolutely immune

from liability for their legislative activities has long been recognized

in Anglo-American law.”). Petitioners argue that legislative

immunity for local officials arises from three sources: (1) Florida

common law, (2) separation of powers in the Florida Constitution,

and (3) federal law.

                                  - 11 -
     In Florida, the doctrine of legislative immunity is based in

common law. See Fla. House of Representatives v. Expedia, Inc., 85

So. 3d 517, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“[T]he privileges and

immunities afforded to all government officials, including those who

serve in the legislative branch, arise from the common law.”); cf. id.

(“[J]udicial immunity, like legislative immunity, is based on

principles developed in the common law.”).6 An immunity conferred

by common law may be abrogated by statute. See McNayr v. Kelly,

184 So. 2d 428, 430 n.6 (Fla. 1966) (“The Legislature, for example,

could extend absolute immunity to certain high state, county or

municipal officials or do away with the immunity altogether.”).

     Here, the Legislature has exercised its power—since 1987—to

preempt “the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition.”

§ 790.33(1). Section 790.33(3)(a) states in pertinent part that “[a]ny

person . . . that violates the Legislature’s occupation of the whole

      6. The parties do not argue that the statutory protection for
legislators found in section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes, applies in
this case. See § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021) (“An officer,
employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions may not
be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in
any action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act,
event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment
or function.”).

                                - 12 -
field of regulation of firearms and ammunition . . . by enacting or

causing to be enforced any local ordinance . . . impinging upon such

exclusive occupation of the field shall be liable as set forth herein.”

(Emphasis added.) The challenged provisions, sections 790.33(3)(c)

and (d), set forth the civil fines for local officials who knowingly and

willfully enact a preempted firearms regulation and prohibit the use

of public funds to defend or reimburse such officials. The

Preemption Statute abrogates legislative immunity in this context

for local officials by establishing that civil penalties may be imposed

upon local officials. Specifically, local officials enact local

ordinances, and by enacting the challenged statutory provisions,

the Legislature has deprived local officials of any authority to

legislate in this field beyond the enumerated exceptions.

Accordingly, as the trial court and the First District in City of

Weston concluded, the Legislature abrogated common law

legislative immunity for local officials to the extent provided in the

Preemption Statute.

     Petitioners next argue that legislative immunity arises from

the separation of powers in the Florida Constitution, citing this

Court’s decision in League of Women Voters of Florida v. Florida

                                  - 13 -
House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d 135, 143 (Fla. 2013), which

held “that a legislative privilege exists in Florida, based on the

principle of separation of powers codified in article II, section 3, of

the Florida Constitution.” However, Petitioners’ cited decision in

League of Women Voters has no application to the issue in the

present case. See League of Women Voters, 132 So. 3d at 147 n.11

(“This case does not involve legislative immunity, nor does it involve

the liability of any individual legislator. We note that the legislative

privilege (that is, an evidentiary privilege against compelled judicial

process) is different than legislative immunity from suit, even

though federal courts have held that the legislative privilege is

derived from the principles underlying legislative immunity.”).

     Further, we find no merit in Petitioners’ argument that section

790.33(3) violates separation of powers principles because it

authorizes the judiciary’s interference with legislative acts of local

officials. Petitioners have provided no basis in the Florida

Constitution or precedent indicating that it would exceed the scope

of judicial power for courts to interpret statutes and hear cases

where parties seek to enforce statutory violations and penalties duly

enacted by the Legislature. To the contrary, it is within the

                                 - 14 -
judiciary’s constitutional authority and responsibility to do so. See

art. V, Fla. Const.

     We likewise reject Petitioners’ argument that legislative

immunity flows from article VIII of the Florida Constitution. To the

contrary, article VIII expressly grants the Legislature plenary

authority over the state’s local governments, which have only those

“powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law.”

Art. VIII, § 1(g), Fla. Const. (charter counties); see also id. § 2(b)

(“Municipalities . . . may exercise any power for municipal purposes

except as otherwise provided by law.”); City of Palm Bay v. Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A., 114 So. 3d 924, 928 (Fla. 2013) (“The critical

phrase of article VIII, section 2(b)—‘except as otherwise provided by

law’—establishes the constitutional superiority of the Legislature’s

power over municipal power.”). Local governments, including

counties and municipalities, are creatures of the State without any

independent sovereignty. See art. VIII, §§ 1-2, Fla. Const.; see also

Weaver v. Heidtman, 245 So. 2d 295, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)

(“[C]ounties . . . do not possess any indicia of sovereignty; they are

creatures of the legislature, created under Art. VIII, Sec. 1, of the

                                  - 15 -
State Constitution . . . and accordingly are subject to the legislative

prerogatives in the conduct of their affairs.”).

     Section 790.33(3)(c) imposes a civil fine of up to $5,000

against “the elected or appointed local government official or

officials or administrative agency head under whose jurisdiction the

violation occurred,” if a court determines the violation was “knowing

and willful.” Section 790.33(3)(d) prohibits the use of public funds

to defend or reimburse such individuals for civil fines or costs of

defense, unless another law provides to the contrary.

     By expressly preempting the field of firearms and ammunition

regulation, the Legislature has deprived local governments and

officials of any authority or discretion to contravene, exceed, or

evade the Legislature’s regulation of this field (subject to the limited

exceptions set forth in section 790.33(4)). See Fla. Power Corp. v.

Seminole Cnty., 579 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1991) (“While the

authority given to cities and counties in Florida is broad, both the

constitution and statutes recognize that cities and counties have no

authority to act in areas that the legislature has preempted.”);

Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d 494, 504

(Fla. 1999) (“If political subdivisions were able to continue actions to

                                 - 16 -
enforce ordinances that conflict with general law, the political

subdivisions would have the power to frustrate the ability of the

Legislature to set policies for the state.”). While “state legislators

are immune from civil suits for their acts done within the sphere of

legislative activity,” Walker v. President of the Senate, 658 So. 2d

1200, 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), as the First District held below,

“legislative immunity does not shield individuals who knowingly

and willfully act contrary to or beyond the limits of state law” that

provides for statutory penalties against government officials. City of

Weston, 316 So. 3d at 404.

     To the extent Petitioners argue that the challenged statutory

provisions penalize “mistaken” violations of the Preemption Statute,

all that is required to avoid the penalties in section 790.33(3)(c) is to

refrain from knowingly and willfully violating the Preemption

Statute. The narrow exceptions to the Preemption Statute are

expressly identified in sections 790.33(4)(a)-(e). As argued by

Respondents, before the challenged statutory provisions were

added, the onus was on citizens to challenge ordinances defensively

or by way of actions for declaratory and injunctive relief. By

enacting these statutory provisions, the Legislature shifted the

                                  - 17 -
burden to those in the position to violate the Preemption Statute.

To the extent the parties and amici disagree with this legislative

decision or argue that the challenged provisions are unnecessary or

unwise, it is for the Legislature to evaluate and resolve those policy

concerns. See Hamilton v. State, 366 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1978) (“The

Legislature has a great deal of discretion in determining what

measures are necessary for the public’s protection, and this Court

will not, and may not, substitute its judgment for that of the

Legislature insofar as the wisdom or policy of the act is

concerned.”).

     Petitioners also rely heavily on federal law recognizing

legislative immunity for state, regional, and local legislators. See

Bogan, 523 U.S. at 52 (extending legislative immunity to local

government legislators); Lake Country Ests., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l

Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405-06 (1979) (extending legislative

immunity to regional legislators); Woods v. Gamel, 132 F.3d 1417,

1419 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ounty commissioners can be entitled to

legislative immunity when acting in their legislative capacities.”).

For members of Congress, legislative immunity was established in

the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution,

                                 - 18 -
which protects not only the speech and debate of legislators but

also voting on legislative acts. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see

also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1951). To the

extent Petitioners rely on federal case law that has stated that

article I, section 6 of the United States Constitution (the Speech or

Debate Clause) creates a form of legislative immunity, Florida’s

Constitution does not contain a Speech or Debate Clause providing

legislative immunity to members of the Legislature. See Tenney,

341 U.S. at 375 n.5 (“Only the Florida Constitution has no

provision concerning legislative privilege.”). Further, the United

States Supreme Court has “made clear that the holding [in Tenney]

was grounded on its interpretation of federal common law, not on

the Speech or Debate Clause.” United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S.

360, 372 n.10 (1980). As the First District in City of Weston

concluded, these cases do not apply here. See NRP Holdings LLC v.

City of Buffalo, 916 F.3d 177, 190 n.10 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining

that the federal common law legislative immunity recognized by the

Supreme Court protects only against federal claims, may be

abrogated by federal statute, and affords no protection from state

law actions for damages); League of Women Voters, 132 So. 3d at

                                  - 19 -
152 (“[F]ederal courts have long recognized the existence of a federal

legislative privilege based on the explicit text of the Speech or

Debate Clause of the United States Constitution and through

federal common law—neither of which applies to an action in state

court based on a specific prohibition in the state constitution.”).

     Accordingly, because legislative immunity as applied to local

officials is a Florida common law doctrine that the Legislature

abrogated in the context addressed in the Preemption Statute, we

conclude that the First District properly concluded that legislative

immunity does not prohibit the statutory penalties in section

790.33(3)(c) and (d).

              B. Governmental Function Immunity

     Petitioners next argue that the First District erred in

concluding that governmental function immunity does not prohibit

the statutory actions in section 790.33(3)(f).7 We disagree.

     Section 790.33(3)(f) is applicable to local governments and
provides as follows:

     7. The First District’s decision in City of Weston also
addressed section 790.335(4)(c). However, in this review
proceeding, Petitioners make no argument with regard to this
statute; therefore, any argument would be deemed waived, and we
do not address this statute.

                                 - 20 -
           (f)1. A person or an organization whose membership
     is adversely affected by any ordinance, regulation,
     measure, directive, rule, enactment, order, or policy,
     whether written or unwritten, promulgated or caused to
     be enforced in violation of this section may file suit
     against any county, agency, municipality, district, or
     other entity in any court of this state having jurisdiction
     over any defendant to the suit for declaratory and
     injunctive relief and for actual damages, as limited
     herein, caused by the violation. A court shall award the
     prevailing plaintiff in any such suit:

          a. Reasonable attorney fees and costs in accordance
     with the laws of this state, including a contingency fee
     multiplier, as authorized by law; and

          b. The actual damages incurred, but not more than
     $100,000.

§ 790.33(3)(f)1.

     Florida has a broad statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in

tort suits for the State. See § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (2021) (“[T]he

state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives

sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent

specified in this act.”). However, governmental function immunity,

also called discretionary function immunity, is a doctrine under

which “certain ‘discretionary’ governmental functions remain

immune from tort liability . . . because certain functions of

coordinate branches of government may not be subjected to

                                 - 21 -
scrutiny by judge or jury as to the wisdom of their performance.”

Com. Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty., 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022

(Fla. 1979). We have explained that “[i]t is ‘the nature of the

conduct, rather than the status of the actor,’ that determines

whether the function is the type of discretionary function which is,

by its nature, immune from tort liability.” Trianon Park Condo.

Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 918 (Fla. 1985)

(quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio

Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984)).

     Petitioners argue that the enforcement of penalties against

local governments would violate governmental function immunity

because the process of determining what is preempted under the

Preemption Statute remains inherently discretionary. However, to

engage in conduct that is prohibited by statute is not a

discretionary function. As the First District concluded below,

“[g]overnment function immunity does not shield entities that act

contrary to or more restrictively than state law in the completely

preempted field of firearm and ammunition regulation.” City of

Weston, 316 So. 3d at 404.

                                - 22 -
     The Florida Constitution expressly grants the Legislature

plenary authority over the state’s local governments, which have

only those “powers of local self-government not inconsistent with

general law.” Art. VIII, § 1(g), Fla. Const. (charter counties); see

also id. § 2(b) (“Municipalities . . . may exercise any power for

municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.”). We

have explained that if the rule were otherwise, the state’s “political

subdivisions would have the power to frustrate the ability of the

Legislature to set policies for the state.” Metro. Dade Cnty., 737

So. 2d at 504. The constitution also confers exclusively upon the

Legislature the power to abrogate common law and restrict local

government power. See art. VIII, §§ 1-2, Fla. Const.; McNayr, 184

So. 2d at 430 n.6 (acknowledging that the Florida Legislature has

the authority to “do away with the immunity altogether” as it

applied to local officials). For example, the Legislature can abolish

counties by general law, see art. VIII, § 1, Fla. Const. (“The state

shall be divided by law into political subdivisions called counties.

Counties may be created, abolished or changed by law . . . .”), and

municipalities exist only by virtue of general law, see ch. 165, Fla.

Stat. (2021). The Legislature is likewise authorized to enact general

                                 - 23 -
laws preempting all regulation in an area of the law. See Metro.

Dade Cnty., 737 So. 2d at 504 (“[W]henever ‘any doubt exists as to

the extent of a power attempted to be exercised which may affect

the operation of a state statute, the doubt is to be resolved against

the ordinance and in favor of the statute.’ ”) (quoting Rinzler v.

Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 668 (Fla. 1972)).

     By enacting the Preemption Statute, the Legislature exercised

its power to preempt the field of firearms and ammunition (subject

to limited exceptions). See §§ 790.33(1), (4). As it did in the present

case, the Legislature has the authority to change substantive law.

Section 790.33(3)(f) authorizes lawsuits against local governments

and authorizes awards of damages, attorney’s fees, and costs to

prevailing plaintiffs. The imposition of these civil statutory actions

for violations of the Preemption Statute does not violate

governmental function immunity. It is not a core municipal

function to occupy an area that the Legislature has preempted, and

local governments have no lawful discretion or authority to enact

ordinances that violate state preemption. See Fla. Power Corp., 579

So. 2d at 107 (“While the authority given to cities and counties in

Florida is broad, both the constitution and statutes recognize that

                                 - 24 -
cities and counties have no authority to act in areas that the

legislature has preempted.”).

     Accordingly, we conclude that the First District did not err in

concluding that governmental function immunity does not prohibit

the statutory actions in section 790.33(3)(f).

                          III. CONCLUSION

     For the reasons explained above, we conclude that neither

legislative immunity nor governmental function immunity prohibit

the statutory actions and penalties in section 790.33(3)(c), (d), and

(f). Accordingly, we approve the First District’s decision in City of

Weston.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ.,
concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
FRANCIS, J., did not participate.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., dissenting.

     In its order granting summary judgment in favor of dozens of

cities, counties, and elected local government officials, the trial

court correctly observed that the Legislature has the authority to

                                 - 25 -
abolish counties and cities if it chooses to do so.8 Additionally, the

Legislature has the power and authority to preempt local

government control by general law. However, this broad legislative

power and authority is not without limits. The trial court explained:

     But once those governments are established, the
     Constitution mandates certain requirements for how they
     must be set up. The establishment of a legislative county
     commission is one. Art. VIII, Section 1(e), Fla. Const.
     Establishing municipal legislative bodies is another. Art.
     VIII, Section 2, Fla. Const. The legislature cannot change
     these fundamental aspects of counties and cities without
     amending the Constitution. In following this reasoning,
     the court sees no relevance to the legislative supremacy
     argument when considering the separation of powers
     question because the legislature cannot change the
     fundamental aspects of separation of powers.

     Here, the majority approved a penalty provision included by

the Legislature in section 790.33(3)(c)-(d) applicable to local

officials. The provision imposes a fine of up to $5,000 against

elected or appointed local government officials or administrative

agency heads for “knowing and willful” violations of the statute.

      8. Article VIII, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution provides
that “[c]ounties may be created, abolished or changed by law.”
Section 2(a) provides that “[m]unicipalities may be established or
abolished and their charters amended pursuant to general or
special law.”

                                 - 26 -
Section (3)(d) also prohibits the use of public funds to defend or

reimburse the public official “found to have knowingly and willfully

violated this section.” To make matters worse, section 790.33(3)(c)

requires the judicial branch to determine whether the violation by

the public official was “knowing and willful.”

     As noted by the trial court, “[j]udicial power is vested in courts

alone and judges cannot wield executive or legislative power. As a

part of this separation, Florida courts cannot question any

legislator about her or his legislative process because it would be

impermissible judicial meddling in a purely political matter.”

Consequently, the requirement of judicial involvement in

determining whether the action of the public official was “knowing

and willful” amounts to nothing less than an impermissible judicial

intrusion into the official’s legislative thought process, and it

undermines the official’s ability to effectuate the constituents’ will.

     As aptly observed by the trial court, “[b]ecause local

governments must have what amounts to small legislatures, and

because courts cannot interfere in legislative processes, neither this

court, nor any other court in Florida, can enforce the civil penalty

provisions of [s]ection 790.33 against local legislators.”

                                 - 27 -
     I respectfully dissent.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
     Direct Conflict of Decisions and
     Statutory Validity/Direct Conflict of Decisions

     First District – Case No. 1D19-2819

     (Leon County)

Genevieve Hall and Steven Hall, General Counsel, Florida
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Tallahassee,
Florida,

     for Petitioner, Nicole “Nikki” Fried, as Commissioner of Florida
     Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

Edward G. Guedes and Jamie A. Cole of Weiss Serota Helfman Cole
& Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida,

     for Petitoners, Weston, Miramar, Pompano Beach, Pinecrest,
     South Miami, Miami Gardens, Cutler Bay, Lauderhill, Boca
     Raton, Surfside, Tallahassee, North Miami, Orlando, Fort
     Lauderdale, Gainesville, St. Petersburg, Maitland, Key
     Biscayne, Turkel, West Palm Beach, North Miami Beach,
     Safety Harbor, Village of Palmetto Bay, Dunedin, and Riviera
     Beach

LaShawn D. Riggans, County Attorney, Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Petitioner, Leon County

Michael Cardozo and Chantel L. Febus of Proskauer Rose LLP, New
York, New York, Matthew Triggs of Proskauer Rose LLP, Boca
Raton, Florida, and Joseph S. Hartunian of Proskauer Rose LLP,
Washington, District of Columbia; and Eric A. Tirschwell of
Everytown Law, New York, New York,

                                - 28 -
     for Petitioners, Dan Daley, Frank C. Ortis, Rebecca A. Tooley,
     Justin Flippen, City of Coral Springs, City of Pembroke Pines,
     City of Coconut Creek, and City of Wilton Manors

Abigail G. Corbett and Veronica L. De Zayas of Stearns Weaver
Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Miami, Florida,

     for Petitioner, Coral Gables

Andrew J. Meyers, René D. Harrod, Nathaniel A. Klitsberg, and
Joseph K. Jarone, County Attorneys, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

     for Petitioner, Broward County

Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Altanese Phenelus, Shanika A. Graves,
and Angela F. Benjamin, County Attorneys, Miami, Florida,

     for Petitioner, Miami-Dade County

Robert F. Rosenwald, Jr., Rafael Paz, Aleksandr Boksner, and Raul
J. Aguila, City Attorneys, Miami Beach, Florida,

     for Petitioner, City of Miami Beach

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor
General, and Daniel William Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General,
Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Respondents

Eric J. Friday of Kingry & Friday, PLLC, Jacksonville, Florida,

     for Amicus Curiae Florida Carry, Inc.

John Parker Sweeney, James W. Porter, III, Marc A. Nardone, and
Connor M. Blair of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP,
Washington, District of Columbia, and R. Craig Mayfield of Bradley
Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Tampa, Florida,

                                - 29 -
     for Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc.

Philip R. Stein, Kenneth Duvall, and Ilana Drescher of Bilzin
Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP, Miami, Florida; and Brook
Dooley, David J. Rosen, Anna Porto, and Andrew S. Bruns of Keker,
Van Nest & Peters LLP, San Francisco, California,

     for Amici Curiae Local Government Law Professors and League
     of Women Voters of Florida, Giffords Law Center to Prevent
     Gun Violence, Brady, and Equality Florida Institute, Inc.

Michael Spellman of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida;
Kraig Conn and Rebecca O’Hara of Florida League of Cities, Inc.,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Edward G. Labrador of Florida Association
of Counties, Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Amici Curiae Florida League of Cities and the Florida
     Association of Counties

                               - 30 -