Court Opinion

ID: 9568558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:05:06.42058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:48:20.227243
License: Public Domain

Hunt, Justice,
dissenting.
The ambiguity which is present in the alimony provision in this case would certainly cause that alimony to terminate upon the wife’s remarriage if the rule in Daopoulos v. Daopoulos, 257 Ga. 71 (354 *240SE2d 828) (1987), is applied. My disagreement with the majority opinion is that while it recognizes that Daopoulos must be applied prospectively, it has, nevertheless, effectively applied it to this case.
Decided June 7, 1990.
Word & Flinn, Gerald P. Word, for appellant.
Brenda S. Weathington, for appellee.
The decree in this case was entered on August 8, 1986. Therefore, it is controlled by the rationale of Wiley v. Wiley, 243 Ga. 271 (253 SE2d 750) (1979). That rationale is that the trial court must construe the alimony obligation to determine whether the parties have “provided otherwise” under OCGA § 19-6-5 (b) to avoid termination of alimony on remarriage. If, indeed, the alimony obligation is ambiguous, it is the function of the trial court to resolve that ambiguity and determine the intent of the parties following the ordinary rules of construction. See OCGA § 13-2-1 et seq. Therefore, I would remand this case to the trial court for such determination.1
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Smith joins in this dissent.

 As we see the record, the trial court did not resolve the ambiguity but simply held that ‘permanently” in its context in the contract, precluded abatement of alimony by remarriage.