Court Opinion

ID: 9826945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:00:43.441042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:41.270578
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES DALE HUFFMAN, Esquire,                    No. 22-35471

                Plaintiff-Appellant,          D.C. No. 3:21-cv-
                                                 00343-AC
    v.

AMY LINDGREN; SAMUEL                              OPINION
ERSKINE; CITY OF ST. HELENS,

                Defendants-Appellees.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the District of Oregon
         Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

                 Submitted August 25, 2023 *
                  San Francisco, California

                   Filed September 1, 2023

    Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Sidney R. Thomas, and
            M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

                 Opinion by Judge McKeown

*
 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2                      HUFFMAN V. LINDGREN

                          SUMMARY **

                  Pro Se Litigant Attorneys

    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of a complaint and held, in accordance with other
circuits, that pro se litigants who are also attorneys should
not be afforded special consideration or be treated as
proceeding without counsel under the Circuit Rules.
    James Huffman, a practicing attorney, sued a municipal
court judge, a prosecutor, and the City of St. Helens, Oregon,
in state court. After defendants removed the case to federal
court, Huffman moved to remand to state court, claiming
that, although his complaint referenced federal law, it was
poorly drafted, and he did not intend to bring federal
claims. The district court severed and remanded the state-
only claims, and dismissed the retained claims with
prejudice. On appeal, Huffman filed an informal pro se brief
and argued that he should have been granted leave to amend
his complaint to exclude any mention of a federal claim and
to seek a remand to state court.
    The panel held that, although there is a good reason for
awarding leeway to pro se parties who presumably are
unskilled in the law and more prone to make pleading errors,
that logic does not apply to practicing attorneys.
    Noting that Huffman neither moved to amend in the
district court nor voluntarily moved to dismiss his case, the
panel determined that his attempt to backtrack seemed aimed

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                     HUFFMAN V. LINDGREN                     3

at robbing the government of its removal option and
ensuring another bite at the apple in state court. The panel
held that a sophisticated attorney like Huffman should not be
allowed to jettison his own complaint when it is beneficial
yet avoid the consequences of that renunciation.
    Addressing the merits, the panel held that because
Hoffman facially alleged a violation of his federal rights, the
district court had federal question jurisdiction. In view of
the immunity of the government defendants, the complaint
could not be saved by amendment and therefore the district
court’s dismissal without leave to amend was proper.

                         COUNSEL

James D. Huffman, Scappoose, Oregon, pro se Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Aaron P. Hisel and Elizabeth A. Jones, Law Offices of
Montoya Hisel and Associates, Salem, Oregon, for
Defendants-Appellees.
4                    HUFFMAN V. LINDGREN

                          OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

    This appeal asks us to consider whether pro se litigants
who are also attorneys should be afforded liberal pleading
construction and treated as proceeding without counsel
under Circuit Rules 28-1(c) and 30-1.3. James Huffman, a
practicing attorney, sued a municipal court judge, a
prosecutor, and the City of St. Helens, Oregon in Columbia
County Circuit Court. Huffman contends that, via an oral
motion, he disqualified Judge Lindgren from hearing his
client’s case; he alleges that she ignored this disqualification,
held him in contempt, and imprisoned him for six hours. The
defendants, collectively “the government,” removed to
federal court. Huffman moved to remand to state court,
claiming that, although his complaint referenced federal law,
he did not intend to bring federal claims. The district court
dismissed his case with prejudice, and adopted the
magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, which
noted that Huffman was afforded a liberal pleading standard.
On appeal, resting on his perceived pro se status, Huffman
argues that he should have been granted leave to amend his
complaint to exclude any mention of a federal claim and seek
a remand to state court. Joining our sister circuits, we take
the opportunity to clarify that attorneys representing
themselves should not be afforded special consideration and
do not fall into the category of those “proceeding without
assistance of counsel.” Circuit Rule 28-1(c). We affirm the
district court’s dismissal with prejudice.
                      BACKGROUND
   The strangeness of the facts in this case is matched only
by the oddity of the jurisdictional posture. Huffman, an
                        HUFFMAN V. LINDGREN                           5

attorney who has argued before our court on three occasions
and appeared on multiple other occasions, 1 was representing
a client in City of St. Helen’s Municipal Court when he
concluded that the judge hearing his case would not give him
a fair shake. He informed Judge Lindgren that he was orally
disqualifying her. Huffman alleges that Judge Lindgren
violated his state and federal constitutional rights by
ignoring his oral dictum and holding him in contempt.
Huffman also ropes in the prosecutor opposing him in that
case, Sam Erskine, and the City of St. Helens, alleging
Erskine made a “malicious statement” against him in the
hearing and the City is responsible for the acts of the
allegedly rogue judge.
    Pointing to Huffman’s references to federal
constitutional rights and violations of equal protection and
due process, the government removed the case to federal
court. The district court severed and remanded the state-only
claims, keeping jurisdiction over the apparent 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim and the related state-law claims for the
courtroom incident. Huffman v. Lindgren, No. 3:21-cv-
00343-AC, 2022 WL 1479514, at *10 (D. Or. Apr. 18,
2022), findings and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
1473732 (D. Or. May 9, 2022). The district court dismissed

1
  See Holloway v. Clackamas River Water, 739 F. App’x 868 (9th Cir.
2018); Mitchell v. Clackamas River Water, 727 F. App’x 418 (9th Cir.
2018); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2005).
Apart from this case, Huffman has appeared or been a party in this court
on six total occasions—including facing a reciprocal discipline
suspension, in which he was suspended from practice in the circuit
concurrent with his suspension from the Oregon bar. See In re James
Dale Huffman, No. 22-80025 (9th Cir. 2022) (disciplinary proceedings);
see also In re Brandenfels, 692 F. App’x 461 (9th Cir. 2017); In re
Holloway, No. 20-35888 (9th Cir. 2022) (withdrew as counsel before
briefing).
6                     HUFFMAN V. LINDGREN

the retained claims with prejudice. Huffman urges that the
complaint was just poorly drafted; he never meant to include
federal claims, so he asked for leave to amend so he can seek
remand to state court. On appeal, Huffman took advantage
of circuit rules that afford leeway to pro se litigants, filing an
informal brief without excerpts of records and leaving the
tasks of formal briefing and record excerpts to the
government. See Circuit Rules 28-1(c); 30-1.3.
                          ANALYSIS
    We begin by assuring ourselves of jurisdiction, as
Huffman argues that he never intended to include a federal
claim. Despite Huffman’s second thoughts about his own
allegations, the complaint is unambiguous, stating that the
imprisonment in county jail for six hours “was a violation of
[his] state a [sic] federal constitutional rights” and the
judge’s acts against him were “violation[s] of the plaintiffs
[sic] right to due process and equal protection.” The district
court correctly determined that the complaint raises a federal
question and the “state claims arising from the January 2019
Hearings share a common nucleus of operative fact with his
federal claims[,]” affording supplemental jurisdiction.
Huffman, 2022 WL 1479514, at *5; see United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
    Huffman’s argument that his complaint was poorly
written is creative but unavailing. Huffman neither moved
to amend in the district court nor voluntarily dismissed the
case, and his attempt at backtracking now seems aimed at
robbing the government of its removal option and ensuring
another bite at the apple in state court. A sophisticated
attorney like Huffman should not be allowed to jettison his
own complaint when it is beneficial yet avoid the
consequences of that renunciation. Because Huffman
                     HUFFMAN V. LINDGREN                      7

facially alleged a violation of his federal rights, the district
court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
     We next address the proper pleading standard for a pro
se litigant who is also a licensed attorney, a question that has
split several district courts in this circuit. The Central
District of California has declined to afford pro se attorneys
leniency. See Spadaro v. County of San Bernadino,
No. 5:19-cv-01054-CJC (SHK), 2019 WL 8064075, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019) (“With respect to the liberality
with which the Court assesses a complaint for compliance
with the technical requirements under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not
afforded the ‘special consideration which the courts
customarily grant to pro se parties.’” (quoting Holtz v.
Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001))),
report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 917281
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020). In contrast, courts in the District
of Hawaii and the Southern District of California have
chosen to liberally construe the filings of attorneys who
appear pro se. See Rossmann v. Pompeo, No. 17-00539
DKW-KJM, 2017 WL 5163232, at *1 (D. Haw. Nov. 7,
2017); Osgood v. Main Streat Mktg., LLC, No. 16cv2415-
GPC(BGS), 2017 WL 131829, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13,
2017) (“Since the law is not settled in this circuit on whether
a pro se plaintiff who attended law school and has past
litigation experience is entitled to liberal construction of his
or her pleadings, the Court will liberally construe Plaintiff
Ewing’s pleadings.”). The findings and recommendations
adopted by the district court acknowledged this divide and
“continue[d] to construe Huffman’s complaint liberally and
allow[ed] him leave to amend when possible.” Huffman,
2022 WL 1479514, at *4.
8                    HUFFMAN V. LINDGREN

    The circuits that have reached the issue speak with one
voice: they have uniformly declined to extend the liberal
pleading standard to pro se attorneys. See Tracy v.
Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that
“the degree of solicitude may be lessened where the
particular pro se litigant is experienced in litigation” and “a
lawyer representing himself ordinarily receives no such
solicitude at all”); Andrews v. Columbia Gas Transmission
Corp., 544 F.3d 618, 633 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that it
was not an abuse of discretion to deny pro se practicing
attorneys special consideration); Comm. on the Conduct of
Att’ys v. Oliver, 510 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2007)
(declining to extend liberal construction to a licensed
attorney); Godlove v. Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald, &
Hahn, 903 F.2d 1145, 1148 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Ordinarily, we
treat the efforts of pro se applicants gently, but a pro se
lawyer is entitled to no special consideration.”).
    We join this chorus. There is a good reason that we
afford leeway to pro se parties, who appear without counsel
and without the benefit of sophisticated representation:
“Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far
more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who
benefits from the representation of counsel.” Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation
omitted). That logic does not apply to practicing attorneys,
nor should the grace extend to them.
    Turning to the merits, we construe Huffman’s pleadings
without deference and conclude that his claims are deficient,
and amendment would be futile. Huffman’s claims against
the prosecutor and the City are cursory at best, and his appeal
seems aimed entirely at Judge Lindgren. Huffman’s only
mention of his claims against Erskine and the City of St.
Helens is his note that “[t]here are a variety of bases to bring
                     HUFFMAN V. LINDGREN                       9

actions against the other defendants that were admittedly not
clear enough in the complaint to withstand a motion to
separately state the claims and make more definite and
certain. Any pleading defects are clearly curable by
amendment.” Huffman does not explain how he would
amend to cure the defects against these defendants.
     As is, Huffman alleges that the prosecutor, Erskine, did
not take appropriate steps to ensure that a pro tem judge was
assigned, and he “made a false a [sic] malicious statement
that the City of St. Helens had no provision for pro tem
judges.” Huffman fails to state a claim against Erskine; even
if there was a cause of action for interference or “malicious
statement,” Erskine would be shielded by prosecutorial
immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420–28
(1976). Huffman fares no better against the City of St.
Helens. Huffman seems to allege that the City is liable for
the judge’s alleged acts, but “a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
The state-law claims also fail because Huffman does not
include sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. In addition,
judicial and prosecutorial immunity are imputed to the City.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(5). Because Huffman’s claims
against Erskine and the City of St. Helens are deficient
without any sign that he could amend to state a claim, we
affirm dismissal of these claims without leave to amend.
    The bulk of Huffman’s appeal is targeted at Judge
Lindgren, who held him in contempt, a function shielded by
judicial immunity. See Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699,
700 (9th Cir. 1990). Huffman claims that he orally
disqualified Lindgren at the January 3 hearing. The
government responds that Oregon law requires a subsequent
written motion and affidavit to be filed by the next judicial
10                     HUFFMAN V. LINDGREN

day after oral notice. See OR. REV. STAT. § 14.270. This
spat between the parties over whether Huffman complied
with Oregon law does not implicate Judge Lindgren’s
judicial immunity. 2 The district court correctly concluded
that Judge Lindgren is immune. See Crooks, 913 F.2d at
700.
   In view of the immunity of the government defendants,
where, as here, “it is clear that the complaint could not be
saved by amendment,” then “dismissal without leave to
amend is proper.” Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d
1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (cleaned up).
We affirm the dismissal with prejudice of Huffman’s
complaint.
     AFFIRMED.

2
 The government has moved for judicial notice of Huffman’s motion for
disqualification on January 11, arguing that this record shows that
Huffman failed to properly disqualify Lindgren as of the January 3 or
January 10 hearing. We deny the motion as unnecessary given our
conclusion that amendment is futile.