Court Opinion

ID: 9627448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:43:42.088971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:45.739641
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s holding affirming defendant’s drug-related convictions. The majority has, however, misapplied its analysis in approving the search of the back seat of defendant’s car. That search resulted in the discovery of the gun, and I therefore dissent from the affirmance of the conviction for ex-convict in possession of a firearm.
The search of the front seat of defendant’s car was incidental to his arrest for possession of marijuana and, after the discovery of the white powder, for felony possession of a controlled substance. After that search defendant was clearly going to be placed in custody, and the car would be impounded. In State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259, 373 P2d 392 (1962), the Supreme Court pointed out that one of the factors in evaluating the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest is whether the officers had an opportunity to obtain a warrant. I understand State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337, 667 P2d 996 (1983), to mean that this Chinn criterion is entitled to great weight and that a search incident to an arrest should be more strictly limited in its time, scope and intensity when it is possible to get a warrant. As the majority notes, “when a search reaches a logical stopping point the police must seek a warrant before proceeding further.” 68 Or App at 634. After the search of the front seat the situation had come to rest, the search had reached a logical stopping point, and any further warrantless *641search was not “reasonable in light of all the facts.” State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 759, 653 P2d 942 (1982).1
Although the search was not properly incident to an arrest, it may have been based on practical necessity, which, as the majority notes, seems in this context to mean probable cause and exigent circumstances. I have no doubt that there was probable cause for searching the back seat and, probably, for searching the entire car. However, neither the trial court nor this court should have been asked to make that decision’after’the search. The purpose of Article 1, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution is to ensure that a judge, not an officer, will determine whether there is probable cause for a search, and that the determination will occur before the search and thus before any possible violation of a person’s constitutional rights. There was no practical necessity for an exception in this case. Defendant was going to jail. There was no one else to drive the car away. There is no evidence that it would have been difficult or impossible to obtain a warrant.2 The officers could and should have done so. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Joseph, C.J., joins in this opinion, as does Newman, J., who has authorized me to state that he expressly disassociates himself from the majority’s analysis of State v. Lowry, supra.

The other Chinn/Caraher criteria also militate against continuing the search, which was becoming a generalized search of the vehicle' rather than of the area immediately associated with defendant.

Even if there had been greater urgency than appears in this record, the officers could have obtained a telephonic warrant. ORS 133.545(4), ORS 133.555(3). There are 15 circuit and district judges in Lane County, each of whom has authority to issue a warrant by telephone. Cf. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash 2d 686, 701-03, 674 P2d 1240, 1249 (1983) (availability of telephonic warrant is relevant to existence of exigent circumstances).