Court Opinion

ID: 9954206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:03:21.060892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:53.240249
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 Marriage of Van Der Veer and Regalbuto CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 In re Marriage of LOTTE VAN                                     B326982
 DER VEER and MICHAEL
 REGALBUTO.                                                      (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. SD031662)

 LOTTE VAN DER VEER,

           Respondent,

           v.

 MICHAEL REGALBUTO,

           Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark A. Juhas, Judge. Affirmed.
     The Law Office of Aaron Leetch and Aaron J. Leetch for
Appellant.
     Susan E. Wiesner, A Law Corporation, Susan Wiesner;
DLA Piper, Justin R. Sarno and Noorvik Minasian for
Respondent.
                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

      Appellant Michael Regalbuto challenges a trial court order
requiring him to pay $25,000 in attorney fees and costs as
sanctions to Lotte Van Der Veer under Family Code section 271.1
Regalbuto and Van Der Veer are former spouses who share a
minor daughter, J.R. After the family law court granted Van Der
Veer sole custody of J.R., she obtained the court’s permission to
move from California to Texas with J.R. Regalbuto asserts that
he also moved to Texas.
      Although no party sought modification of any of the family
court’s orders, and no party initiated proceedings in a Texas
court, Regalbuto filed a request in the trial court for an order
declaring California no longer has exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (§ 3400 et seq.) to make non-
emergency custody or visitation orders regarding J.R. Regalbuto
also sought sanctions against Van Der Veer for refusing to
stipulate that California no longer has UCCJEA jurisdiction.
Van Der Veer opposed the request and requested sanctions
against Regalbuto for filing a frivolous request.

1     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Family Code.
      The parties were previously before us in a different matter,
In re Marriage of Van Der Veer and Regalbuto (Sept. 16, 2022,
B310897 [nonpub. opn.]), which also involved sanctions assessed
against Regalbuto under section 271.

                                2
       The trial court denied Regalbuto’s request and awarded
sanctions to Van Der Veer, concluding Regalbuto sought an
impermissible advisory opinion regarding the court’s jurisdiction.
On appeal, Regalbuto argues the trial court misinterpreted the
UCCJEA and, even if it did not, his request was based on a
reasonable interpretation of the statute and his conduct did not
warrant sanctions.
       We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding sanctions. Regalbuto’s request for a finding on
jurisdiction was not justiciable. Courts may not issue purely
advisory opinions. While the UCCJEA sets forth criteria for the
court to determine whether it has exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody determination, it does
not create an exception to the fundamental principle that, to be
justiciable, an action must be ripe and founded on an actual
controversy. The order is affirmed.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Van Der Veer has had sole legal and physical custody of
J.R. since 2015. In August 2020, the trial court issued a domestic
violence restraining order against Regalbuto. As relevant here,
the restraining order prohibits Regalbuto from having any
contact with J.R. or Van Der Veer. The order expires in August
2025.
       In 2022, Regalbuto, through legal counsel, twice asked Van
Der Veer to stipulate that California no longer has jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA to make non-emergency custody and
visitation orders concerning J.R. Van Der Veer refused both
requests.
       In September 2022, Regalbuto filed a request for order
asking the trial court to “[f]ind that this Court no longer has

                                3
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the [m]inor [c]hild per the
UCCJEA” to make custody and visitation orders, since all parties
had moved to Texas. Regalbuto asked the court “to relinquish
jurisdiction so that a much more convenient forum, for both
parties, can make further custody and visitation orders . . . .” He
also asked the court to issue sanctions against Van Der Veer
under section 271 for refusing to stipulate that California no
longer has UCCJEA jurisdiction in the case.
       Van Der Veer opposed Regalbuto’s request. She argued
that because there was no custody dispute pending in either
California or Texas, the UCCJEA was not triggered, thus
Regalbuto was merely seeking an advisory opinion. She also
asserted that Regalbuto has not, in fact, permanently relocated to
Texas. She attached evidence to support this claim. Finally, Van
Der Veer requested sanctions against Regalbuto under
section 271 for filing a frivolous request. Regalbuto filed a reply
brief, to which he attached his own declaration and evidence to
support his claim that he has indeed relocated to Texas.
       In January 2023, the trial court denied Regalbuto’s request
for a determination of the court’s continuing jurisdiction. The
court reasoned that Regalbuto had neither requested any
substantive relief, such as modification of a prior custody order,
nor filed any action in Texas regarding J.R.’s custody. The court
stated it was not clear what Regalbuto sought to accomplish with
his request, except to obtain an advisory opinion as to jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA. Further, the court expressed concern that if
it terminated jurisdiction over J.R.’s custody without first
relinquishing it to another court, J.R. would be “in limbo.”
       The trial court subsequently denied Regalbuto’s request for
sanctions and granted Van Der Veer’s. The court concluded

                                 4
Regalbuto’s request for a prospective jurisdictional determination
was unreasonable and Van Der Veer was required to investigate
whether Regalbuto is residing in Texas to defend against the
request. The court ordered Regalbuto to pay $25,000 in attorney
fees and costs as sanctions under section 271.
      Regalbuto timely appealed.
                          DISCUSSION
      Regalbuto argues the sanctions order should be reversed
because the court misinterpreted section 3422, subdivision (a)(2).
He alternatively contends that even if the trial court’s
interpretation of the law was correct, his UCCJEA arguments
were reasonable and sanctions thus improper. We disagree.
I.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
      Awarding Sanctions Under Section 271
      A.     Section 271
      Under section 271, a trial court has the discretion to award
attorney fees and costs as sanctions.2 (In re Marriage of Rangell
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1218 (Marriage of Rangell); § 271,
subd. (a).) “Section 271 provides the court with a powerful
weapon to curb obstreperous conduct in family law proceedings

2       At the time of the trial court’s decision, the statute
provided: “[T]he court may base an award of attorney’s fees and
costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney
furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement
of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by
encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An
award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in
the nature of a sanction.” Section 271 was amended effective
January 1, 2024. The amendments do not relate to the issues in
this case and do not affect our analysis. (§ 271, as amended by
Stats. 2023, ch. 67, § 1.)

                                  5
by assessing attorney fees and costs as a sanction for frustrating
the policy of the law to promote settlement and reduce litigation
costs.” (Marriage of Rangell, at p. 1219.)
       We review an award under section 271 for an abuse of
discretion. (Marriage of Rangell, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 218.) “Under this standard of review, the trial court’s order
will be upheld on appeal unless, considering all the evidence
viewed most favorably in support of the order and indulging all
reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably
make the order.” (Ibid.) However, “ ‘[t]he scope of discretion
always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the
“legal principles governing the subject of [the] action . . . .” Action
that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law
is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an
“abuse” of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees
of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393.)
       B.    Regalbuto’s request for order was not
             justiciable
       Regalbuto first contends the sanctions award was an abuse
of discretion because it was based on the trial court’s
misapplication of the UCCJEA. We independently review the
proper interpretation of the UCCJEA and the trial court’s
determination that Regalbuto’s request was not justiciable. (In re
Kayla W. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 99, 186; A.M. v. Superior Court
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 343, 351 (A.M.); Redondo Beach
Waterfront, LLC v. City of Redondo Beach (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
982, 1000.)
             i.     Justiciability
       “California courts will decide only justiciable
controversies.” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City

                                  6
(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573 (Wilson & Wilson).) “The
concept of justiciability is a tenet of common law jurisprudence
and embodies ‘[t]he principle that courts will not entertain an
action which is not founded on an actual controversy . . . .’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
       The doctrine of justiciability concerns both ripeness and
mootness.3 (Wilson & Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.)
“ ‘A controversy is “ripe” when it has reached, but has not passed,
the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an
intelligent and useful decision to be made.’ [Citation.]” (Pacific
Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d
158, 171 (Pacific Legal Foundation).) The ripeness requirement
is intended to prevent courts from issuing purely advisory
opinions. (Id. at p. 170; In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261,
273.) “It is rooted in the fundamental concept that the proper
role of the judiciary does not extend to the resolution of abstract
differences of legal opinion.” (Pacific Legal Foundation, at
p. 170.) Thus, to be justiciable, a case must “concern a present,
concrete, and genuine dispute as to which the court can grant
effective relief . . . .” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484,
1489.) “ ‘The controversy must be definite and concrete . . .
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical set of facts.’ ” (Pacific Legal
Foundation, at p. 171.)

3     Only ripeness is relevant here. Moot cases are those “ ‘in
which an actual controversy did exist but, by the passage of time
or a change in circumstances, ceased to exist.’ [Citation.]”
(Catlin Ins. Co., Inc. v. Danko Meredith Law Firm, Inc. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 764, 774 (Catlin Ins.).)

                                 7
             ii.     The UCCJEA
       “The UCCJEA is the exclusive method for determining
subject matter jurisdiction for child custody proceedings in
California . . . .” (In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 859.) The
UCCJEA “ ‘arose out of a conference of states in an attempt to
deal with the problems of competing jurisdictions entering
conflicting interstate child custody orders, forum shopping, and
the drawn out and complex child custody legal proceedings often
encountered by parties where multiple states are involved.’
[Citations.]” (In re J.W. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 354–355
(J.W.).)
       “One of the ‘primary purposes’ of the UCCJEA is ‘ “to
encourage states to respect and enforce the prior custody
determinations of other states, as well as to avoid competing
jurisdiction and conflicting decisions.” ’ [Citation.]” (Segal v.
Fishbein (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 692, 702 (Segal).) Accordingly,
under the UCCJEA, only one state has jurisdiction to make child
custody decisions at a time.4 (Segal, at p. 702.) California has
adopted the UCCJEA.5 In California, the law is codified at

4     A “child custody determination” is “a judgment, decree, or
other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical
custody, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a
permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order.” (§ 3402,
subd. (c).)

5     We grant Regalbuto’s request that we take judicial notice of
Texas Family Code section 152.313, incorporating the UCCJEA.
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (a).) All citations to sections of the
UCCJEA are to the model code, Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act of 1997, section 101 et seq.,
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform

                                 8
Family Code section 3400 et seq. (Segal, at p. 702; J.W., supra,
53 Cal.App.5th at p. 355 [every state except Massachusetts has
enacted the UCCJEA].)
       A California court has jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination if, among other bases, California is the
child’s home state when the proceeding is commenced. (§ 3421,
subd. (a)(1)–(4).) The home state is “the state in which a child
lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a
child custody proceeding.” (§ 3402, subd. (g).)
       Once a California court obtains initial jurisdiction and
makes a custody determination, it retains “exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction” over the determination as the issuing state until
either “(1) [a California court] determines that neither the child,
nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as
a parent have a significant connection with this state and that
substantial evidence is no longer available in this state
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal
relationships,” or (2) a California court “or a court of another
state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any
person acting as a parent do not presently reside in [California].”
(§ 3422, subd. (a)(1), (2).)6
       Other provisions of the UCCJEA facilitate the recognition
and enforcement of a court’s custody orders in other states.

State Laws. (9IA West’s U. Laws Ann. (2019) UCCJEA, p. 459, et
seq.)

6     See 9IA West’s Uniform Laws Annotated (2019) Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, section 202,
pages 510–511.

                                 9
Under section 3443, subdivision (a), a court is required to
“recognize and enforce a child custody determination of a court of
another state” if the issuing court exercised jurisdiction in
“substantial conformity” with the UCCJEA, “or the
determination was made under factual circumstances meeting
the jurisdictional standards” of the UCCJEA and “the
determination has not been modified in accordance” with the
UCCJEA.7 Section 3445 also sets forth a procedure by which a
child custody determination issued by a court in one state may be
registered in a court in another state, “with or without a
simultaneous request for enforcement . . . .”8 (§ 3445, subd. (a).)
             iii. Discussion
       Justiciability is a threshold issue. (Consumer Advocacy
Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 46, 57.) There are two questions we must consider to
determine whether an issue is ripe: “First, a controversy is ripe
for adjudication ‘ “when it has reached, but has not passed, the
point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an
intelligent and useful decision to be made.” ’ [Citation.] Second,
a controversy is ripe if withholding a decision would result in
hardship to the parties.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 152, 162, quoting Pacific Legal Foundation, supra,
33 Cal.3d at pp. 171, 172–173.)

7     See 9IA West’s Uniform Laws Annotated (2019) Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, section 303,
page 546.

8     See 9IA West’s Uniform Laws Annotated (2019) Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, section 305,
page 549.

                                10
       Regalbuto’s request did not meet the first test of ripeness.
Section 3422 concerns the court’s modification jurisdiction. It is
one of several provisions that, together, “provide a
comprehensive, integrated system designed to provide that one—
and only one—court may exercise jurisdiction over custody
determinations at any given time.” (In re Marriage of Nurie
(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 498 (Marriage of Nurie).) Yet, in
filing his request, Regalbuto did not seek to modify the existing
custody or visitation order, thereby giving the trial court a reason
to determine whether it retained jurisdiction to do so. (Segal,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 702 [“when a California court is asked
to make . . . a modified custody determination, UCCJEA
jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied”].) Nor was there a
pending motion that invoked any court’s jurisdiction to make
further custody or visitation orders. (Cf. A.M., supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at p. 355 [where mother and minor had moved out of
state, considering whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to
consider pending motion for grandparent visitation].)
       Likewise, there was no custody proceeding in Texas, such
that the California court needed to determine whether it retained
exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA or was required to cede
it to the Texas court. (Marriage of Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th
at p. 498 [considering whether a California trial court retained
jurisdiction to modify its prior custody order after mother moved
out of state and obtained a conflicting custody order from
Pakistan].)
       Nothing in the language of section 3422, subdivision (a)(2),
or any other provision in the UCCJEA, requires a court to make
findings regarding its continuing jurisdiction in advance of the
initiation of a proceeding for which such findings would be

                                11
relevant.9 In Marriage of Nurie, the court explained the critical
question in determining where the parties “ ‘presently reside’ ”
under section 3422, subdivision (a)(2) is not whether the parties
are residing out of state, but whether they have stopped residing
in California. (Marriage of Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at
p. 499.) As the facts of this case illustrate, parties’ geographic
residencies are not set in stone. Until there is an actual
controversy and a court is asked to exercise its jurisdiction to
modify a custody determination, the facts relevant to
modification jurisdiction are subject to change. A jurisdictional
determination that is temporally disconnected from a party’s
request that a court exercise that jurisdiction would risk a
premature and potentially unwarranted divestment of exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction. (Cf. Marriage of Nurie, at p. 505
[rejecting idea of “wandering jurisdiction” under UCCJEA].)
       In this case, no request for modification was pending, there
was no representation that such a request was imminent, and
there was a dispute as to whether all parties had in fact stopped
residing in California. The facts had not “ ‘sufficiently congealed
to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made’ ” with
respect to prospective modification jurisdiction, which was the
only conceivable purpose of the request for the determination.
(Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 171.)

9      Section 3422, subdivision (a) offers two alternative bases
for a court to determine it does not have exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction to modify its prior custody determination.
Throughout this litigation, Regalbuto has limited his arguments
to section 3422, subdivision (a)(2). We therefore do not consider
section 3422, subdivision (a)(1) in detail.

                                12
       Regalbuto further has not demonstrated he would suffer
hardship absent an immediate decision. On appeal, Regalbuto
contends that requiring that the modification jurisdiction
determination be made in connection with a request for
modification would be “absurd” and “wasteful,” in that he might
commence a modification proceeding in one state only to have the
court conclude it does not have jurisdiction to modify the custody
orders. This concern does not constitute the hardship required to
render a controversy ripe. The need to resolve threshold
questions regarding the proper forum or jurisdiction is a
commonplace feature of litigation. It does not justify a separate,
anticipatory proceeding that divorces the threshold issue from
the actual controversy.
       Moreover, the UCCJEA itself provides mechanisms for
threshold jurisdictional issues to be resolved in connection with
the underlying custody proceeding while conserving judicial and
party resources. Section 3422, subdivision (a)(2) specifically
provides that either California or a court of another state may
make the determination that the child, child’s parents, and any
person acting as a parent do not presently reside in California.
The official comment to the corresponding text in the uniform law
notes: “If the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents
have all left the State which made the custody determination
prior to the commencement of the modification proceeding,
considerations of waste of resources dictate that a court in State
B, as well as a court in State A, can decide that State A has lost
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.” (9IA West’s U. Laws Ann.
(2019) UCCJEA, com. 2 to § 202, p. 512; see A.M., supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at p. 355, fn. 9 [“ ‘The official commentary from the
drafters of the UCCJEA is entitled to substantial weight’ ”].)

                                13
Similarly, under section 3423, a court of this state may not
modify a child custody determination made by a court of another
state unless the issuing court determines it no longer has
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 3422, or either a
court of this state or the issuing state determines the child, the
child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not
presently reside in the issuing state. The UCCJEA further
provides for communication between courts, which facilitates the
expeditious resolution of jurisdictional questions. (§ 3410.)10
       On appeal, Regalbuto does not directly address issues of
justiciability and ripeness. Instead, he asserts that section 3422,
subdivision (a)(2) allowed him to file his request. He points to the
text of the statute, which, as noted above, provides that a court of
this state that issued a custody determination has exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction until “[a] court of this state . . . determines
that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a
parent do not presently reside in this state.” He contends he
merely asked for this determination.
       For the reasons expressed above, we disagree that
section 3422, subdivision (a)(2) creates an exception to general
justiciability principles. Section 3422 concerns the court’s
jurisdiction to modify an existing child custody determination.
While section 3422, subdivision (a) indicates the issuing state will

10    The trial court referenced these procedures, stating: “Here’s
how the UCCJEA works. When there is a case in Texas, or if
there is ever a case in Texas, the Texas judge will then contact
me as the decree[ ] state, and we will have a hearing or not,
depending on what the Texas judge and I talk about it.” (See
Segal, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 700, 706–707 [jurisdictional
conference between California and Virginia courts]; 9IA West’s U.
Laws Ann. (2019) UCCJEA, § 110, p. 497.)

                                  14
have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction until one of two
determinations is made, it does not set forth or suggest any
procedure that would require a court to make that determination
in the absence of an actual or impending invocation of a court’s
modification jurisdiction.
       Regalbuto’s reliance on A.M., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th 343, is
unavailing. In A.M., the appellate court considered the trial
court’s exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 3422,
subdivision (a)(2) in the context of a pending motion for
grandparent visitation. The appellate court considered whether
the trial court had ongoing jurisdiction to adjudicate the
grandparents’ pending request for court-ordered visitation after
the mother and child moved out of state. (Id. at pp. 347–348.)
Here, however, there was no pending motion before the trial
court that required the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over the
custody determination. A.M. did not consider or hold that when
there is no pending, actual controversy, section 3422,
subdivision (a)(2) entitles a party to a judicial determination of
jurisdiction.11

11    To the extent the A.M. decision could be read as holding a
court must make a jurisdictional determination under
section 3422, subdivision (a)(2) even in the absence of a pending
proceeding in another state, that holding would not suggest an
outcome in this case as there was no pending proceeding in the
California family court requiring the exercise of the court’s
modification jurisdiction. It is the absence of an actual
controversy that creates the justiciability problem in this case,
rather than the mere absence of an active proceeding in another
state. The trial court acknowledged this when it explained that
Regalbuto was not seeking any substantive relief, in any court.

                                 15
       Indeed, Regalbuto has not identified a single case, treatise,
or other authority to support his contention that despite the
absence of a request for modification in any state, he was entitled
to have the court make an abstract, free-floating determination of
whether it had continuing, exclusive UCCJEA jurisdiction to
modify the prior custody determination. Or, as his counsel
suggested at the trial court hearing, that Regalbuto was entitled
to have the California court “relinquish” jurisdiction over the
custody determination, even though no party had asked for any
relief or order that would necessitate the exercise of jurisdiction
in any court. Our independent research of section 3422 reveals
only cases in which the jurisdictional determination was made, or
should have been made, in connection with requests for
additional custody determinations or modification of custody
determinations. (See, e.g., Segal, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 692
[continuing jurisdiction issue decided in context of father’s
request that California court modify Virginia custody order];
Marriage of Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 478 [continuing
jurisdiction decided in context of wife’s attempt to register and
enforce competing foreign custody determination]; cf. In re
Marriage of Kent (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 487, 495 (Marriage of
Kent) [trial court erred in modifying out-of-state custody order
without first obtaining or determining modification jurisdiction
under § 3423].)
       Cases in other jurisdictions addressing similar issues are
also persuasive. For example, in Nordike v. Nordike (Ky. 2007)
231 S.W.3d 733 (Nordike), the Supreme Court of Kentucky
considered whether a Kentucky court had jurisdiction to modify a
Kansas court’s child support order under the Uniform Interstate

                                16
Family Support Act (UIFSA).12 The mother and child had moved
to Kentucky from Kansas. The mother filed a motion that the
Kentucky Supreme Court characterized as requesting that the
Kentucky court “declare that it had jurisdiction over child
support, so [the mother] could at some time in the future ask that
support be modified.” (Id. at p. 738.)
      The Nordike court determined the issue of its jurisdiction
was not “ripe” for adjudication, reasoning that until mother made
a demand for child support, there was no “ ‘ “justiciable issue
before the Court” ’ ” because “the question of the court’s authority
to modify child support does not arise until it is actually put in
dispute by the motion.” (Nordike, supra, 231 S.W.3d at p. 739.)
It explained it could not “render advisory opinions,” and “[t]he
question of a court’s jurisdiction by itself, much like any dispute
over a pure question of law not grounded in an actual claim,
simply is not ‘a present actual controversy.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Similarly, in King v. King (N.Y.App.Div. 1998) 251 A.D.2d
1028 (King), a New York appellate court refused to consider the
question of a California court’s future jurisdiction over a New
York child custody order, recognizing “the issue of jurisdiction in
future proceedings must await an actual controversy.” (Id. at
p. 1029; see King v. King (N.Y.App.Div. 2005) 15 A.D.3d 999,
1000.) As in Nordike and King, Regalbuto’s request that the trial

12     Similar to the UCCJEA, the UIFSA creates “continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction” to ensure that only one state at a time has
jurisdiction to make and modify a child or spousal support order.
(§§ 5700.205, 5700.211; see In re Marriage of Haugh (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 963, 969 [court lacked jurisdiction to modify child
support under UIFSA where mother, father, and child no longer
lived in California at time of request].)

                                17
court determine the status of its jurisdiction was not justiciable
and must await an actual controversy.
       In sum, the principle that California courts “will decide
only justiciable controversies” is a tenet of common law
jurisprudence that courts will “ ‘not entertain an action which is
not founded on an actual controversy . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Wilson
& Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.) The UCCJEA does
not create an exception to this fundamental precept. Regalbuto
did not seek modification of the court’s custody orders or
otherwise request actual relief with respect to a child custody
determination in California or in Texas. The issue of
modification jurisdiction was not ripe. The trial court therefore
properly declined to issue what would effectively have been an
advisory opinion. (Young v. Young (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 85, 86
[affirming dismissal of suit because there was no “ ‘genuine and
existing controversy, calling for present adjudication’ ” where
plaintiff sought to establish the existence of a divorce decree from
another state but did not argue defendant failed to comply with
its terms]; Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39
Cal.4th 235, 243 [“we will not attempt to render an advisory
opinion on a motion plaintiffs have not yet filed”]; Catlin Ins.,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 774 [finding trial court justified in not
ruling on a moot anti-SLAPP motion only “for the purposes of
establishing entitlement to a request for fees, as no such request
had yet been made. To conclude otherwise would require the
court to have issued an advisory opinion”], italics added.)
       The trial court did not misinterpret section 3422. It
therefore could properly consider Regalbuto’s disregard of
fundamental justiciability requirements in determining whether
to assess sanctions.

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      C.      The trial court’s sanctions award was not an
              abuse of discretion
       The trial court based the sanctions award on its finding
that in the absence of the commencement of an action in Texas,
or a request for modification of the existing custody orders, “[i]t is
not at all clear to the Court what [Regalbuto] is trying to
accomplish, except an advisory opinion as to jurisdiction under
the UCCJEA.” The court found sanctions were warranted
because Van Der Veer had to conduct “some investigation” to
defend against Regalbuto’s request, yet “there is no real request
before the Court regarding the minor child.” The court also cited
the parties’ “lengthy litigation history,” which, the court
concluded, caused Van der Veer to “move[ ] to Texas with her
family.”
       A court may award sanctions against a party who has
“ ‘unreasonably increased the cost of litigation.’ [Citation.]” (In
re Marriage of Blake & Langer (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 300, 310
(Marriage of Blake & Langer); In re Marriage of Corona (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1227.) This includes the filing of
unwarranted or meritless claims. (Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212
Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175 (Parker) [awarding sanctions where no
“objective party” could view the evidence as warranting the
contempt allegations filed by sanctioned party]; Marriage of
Blake & Langer, at p. 310 [affirming sanctions order for “frivolous
motion”].) “[C]onduct falling short of bad faith may be considered
by a court in awarding attorney fees” in the form of sanctions.
(In re Marriage of Norton (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 53, 59 (Marriage
of Norton).) This includes the sanctioned party’s history of filing
claims to harass the other party and of filing meritless claims.
(In re Marriage of Burgard (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 74, 82

                                 19
[considering prior meritless claim]; Marriage of Norton, at p. 59
[considering several prior claims to “harass” former spouse].)
       Regalbuto contends he reasonably believed he was
permitted to file the request for relinquishment of jurisdiction
under section 3422, subdivision (a)(2). He asserts his request
was not so devoid of merit that sanctions were warranted and,
prior to filing the request, he asked Van Der Veer to stipulate
that California no longer has jurisdiction.
       We find no abuse of discretion. As explained above, the
trial court did not misinterpret the law. Regalbuto requested an
advisory opinion as to jurisdiction with no apparent immediate
purpose. It has long been established that California courts will
not issue advisory opinions. (People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior
Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 910, 912.) The trial court did not exceed
the bounds of reason in finding that Regalbuto’s request for a
jurisdictional determination, untethered to any request for a
modification of the court’s prior orders in any court, was
unreasonable.
       Further, Regalbuto’s effort to obtain Van Der Veer’s
stipulation that California no longer has UCCJEA jurisdiction
did not make his request more reasonable, as courts have held
“ ‘[t]here is no provision in the UCCJEA for jurisdiction . . . by
stipulation, consent, waiver, or estoppel.’ [Citation.]” (In re
Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1015, 1040; Marriage of Kent, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 495
[trial court erred in accepting parties’ agreement that California
had UCCJEA jurisdiction rather than independently determining
whether it had modification jurisdiction].)
       Regalbuto’s request unreasonably increased the costs of
litigation for Van Der Veer—who had to defend against the

                               20
request by gathering and submitting evidence that Regalbuto had
not moved to Texas—even though there was no corresponding
request to modify the custody order. (Marriage of Blake &
Langer, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 310.) Even if, as Regalbuto
argues, his request was not wholly frivolous, “the court was
authorized to impose sanctions even in the absence of a finding of
frivolity” because his conduct was meritless and “wasted” the
court’s and Van Der Veer’s time. (Parker, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1177, 1178.)
II.    Van Der Veer’s Motion for Appellate Sanctions Is
       Denied
       Van Der Veer seeks appellate sanctions against Regalbuto
based on his failure to provide this court with an adequate
appendix. The appellant’s appendix included a declaration Van
Der Veer submitted in opposition to Regalbuto’s request for
order, but the appendix omitted all of the exhibits attached to the
declaration. Van Der Veer subsequently moved to augment the
record with the omitted exhibits.13 Regalbuto opposed the
motion, arguing certain exhibits were properly excluded under
applicable rules and case law. Van Der Veer asserts Regalbuto
“affirmatively omitted” the exhibits, in violation of California
Rules of Court, rule 8.124(g), which requires that an appendix
contain “accurate” copies of documents in the superior court file.
       Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276, this court has
the discretion to impose sanctions against any party or attorney
for committing any unreasonable violation of the court rules.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.124(g) further authorizes this

13    We denied Van Der Veer’s motion to augment the record
but allowed her to include the omitted documents in a
respondent’s appendix.

                                21
court to impose sanctions for the filing of an appendix that
contains inaccurate copies of documents.
       Regalbuto’s failure to include a complete copy of Van Der
Veer’s declaration appears to have violated California Rules of
Court, rule 8.124(g). His opposition to Van Der Veer’s
subsequent request to provide the court with a corrected copy of
the declaration further calls into question whether the omission
was deliberate and, indeed, Regalbuto has not claimed the
omission was inadvertent.
       However, we also acknowledge the Advisory Committee
comment to California Rules of Court, rule 8.124(g), which notes
that sanctions under the rule “do not depend on the degree of
culpability of the filing party—i.e., on whether the party’s
conduct was willful or negligent—but on the nature of the
inaccuracies and the importance of the documents they affect.”
Courts applying a former version of the rule have come to similar
conclusions. (Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21
Cal.App.4th 1611, 1620 [defects in preparation of an appendix,
including omission of many documents, did not justify imposition
of sanctions]; Clean Air Transport Systems v. San Mateo County
Transit Dist. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 576, 580 [declining to impose
sanctions where omission was not of such grave nature that
justice could not be done without the documents].)
       We have resolved the issues presented in this appeal
without reference to the omitted exhibits. Van Der Veer initially
requested that the record be augmented to include only three of
the omitted exhibits and, ultimately, none of the omitted exhibits
was more than minimally relevant to the resolution of the issues
raised on appeal. (Huschke v. Slater (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th
1153, 1162 [“To be sure, not every violation of a procedural rule is

                                22
properly sanctionable, as some may be . . . relatively
inconsequential”].) We therefore decline to impose sanctions in
this case.
                          DISPOSITION
       The order is affirmed. Van Der Veer is awarded her costs
on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                         ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 EDMON, P. J.

                 LAVIN, J.

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