Court Opinion

ID: 9720702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:39:42.765906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:20.722642
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,
concurring in part.
Plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of section 44-501, R. R. S. 1943. The section incorporates by reference the 1-year period of limitation of the New York standard fire insurance policy. Rhodes v. Continental Ins. Co., 180 Neb. 10, 141 N. W. 2d 415 (1966), motion for rehearing overruled, 180 Neb. 794, 146 N. W. 2d 66 (1966). The majority opinion reaches for the 5-year period prescribed by section 25-205, R. R. S. 1943. According to it, (1) the Rhodes case is distinguishable by two paragraphs of defendant’s policy and (2) the statutory con*296stnuction justifiably allows the court to avoid the constitutional issues.
The two paragraphs of defendant’s policy are immaterial in that they do not attempt to decrease the 1-year period. They or their equivalents are present is most policies written in Nebraska. They become a device for the majority opinion to inter the Rhodes case without an autopsy or certificate of cause of death.
I am puzzled by a rule of construction announced in the majority opinion. The rule comes to this: To avoid a decision on the constitutionality of section 44-501, R. R. S. 1943, to the extent that it prescribes the 1-year period, the court simply eliminates the language from the statute.
Construction and application of the 1-year period among the states have not been uniform. See, A. B. A., Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law, Annotation of the Fire Insurance Policy, 217 (1970); 3 Richards on Insurance, 1876 to 1879 (5th Ed., 1952). We ought not to compound problems by appearing to falter between the 1 and 5 year periods.
I concur that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the commencement of the 1-year period.