Court Opinion

ID: 9377221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 14:03:19.510647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.756077
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                  Decided: March 7, 2023

                          S23A0326. HOOD v. THE STATE.

       LAGRUA, Justice.

       Appellant Larry Hood challenges the superior court’s order

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to malice murder and

other crimes in connection with the death of Angela Ritter Davis.

Hood claims that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary         because          his      plea       counsel          made        an       affirmative

misrepresentation about the collateral consequences of his plea, i.e.,

his parole eligibility. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the

superior court’s denial of Hood’s motion. However, because the

superior court committed sentencing errors, we vacate two of Hood’s

convictions and remand for resentencing.

       The record shows that, on November 2, 2020, a Decatur County

grand jury indicted Hood for malice murder, felony murder,

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aggravated assault, kidnapping, false imprisonment, making a false

statement, possession of a controlled substance in Schedule I, and

false report of a crime. Among other things, the indictment charged

Hood with malice murder for “caus[ing] the death of . . . Davis . . . by

striking her in the head with a pipe,” and it charged Hood with

aggravated assault for “mak[ing] an assault upon . . . Davis with

intent to murder by striking [her] in the head with a pipe.”

      On February 1, 2022, the superior court held a plea hearing

during which Hood entered a negotiated guilty plea to Count 1

(malice murder), Count 3 (aggravated assault), Count 6 (making a

false statement), and Count 7 (possession of a controlled substance

in Schedule I). In exchange, the State agreed to nolle pros the

remaining charges and recommend a total sentence of life with the

possibility of parole, plus 20 years.

     At the plea hearing, the State represented that the factual

basis for the plea was that Hood beat Davis, his ex-girlfriend, to

death with a pipe because she was dating someone else. Davis’s body

was discovered in a wooded area with blunt impact injuries to the

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head, including facial and oral contusions, multiple lacerations of

the scalp, and a prominent circular skull fracture with radiating

linear fractures. The blood of Davis and Hood was discovered on a

pipe that was located near Davis’s body. Hood stipulated to the

factual basis provided by the State, but he provided some additional

details, e.g., that Davis hit Hood with the pipe and injured him, and

the State acknowledged this occurred.

     Before the plea hearing, Hood and his plea counsel completed

and signed a 2-page form containing 32 questions about Hood’s

constitutional and other legal rights. By signing this form, Hood

acknowledged that he understood that the minimum sentence for

malice murder was “life” and the maximum sentence was “life

w[ith]o[ut] parole.” Hood and his plea counsel also signed a two-page

form entitled “Plea and Sentence Recommendation,” which stated

the State was recommending the following sentence: (a) life with the

possibility of parole on malice murder (Count 1); (b) 20 years to serve

on aggravated assault (Count 3) to be served consecutive to Count

1; (c) 5 years to serve on making a false statement (Count 6) to be

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served consecutive to Count 1 and concurrent with Count 3; and (d)

3 years to serve on possession of a controlled substance in Schedule

I (Count 7) to be served consecutive to Count 1 and concurrent with

Count 3.

     During his colloquy with the superior court, Hood confirmed

that he had signed the “32-question plea transcript form” and that

he understood his constitutional rights and had no questions about

them. Hood also confirmed that his plea counsel had discussed

parole eligibility with him, and he had no questions about it. After

finding that there was a factual basis to believe the crime was

committed as alleged and that Hood made a knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights, the superior court

accepted Hood’s guilty plea. The superior court then orally

sentenced Hood consistent with the recommendation on the “Plea

and Sentence Recommendation” form.

     Two months later (and in the same term of court), Hood’s plea

counsel filed a timely motion to withdraw guilty plea. Hood was

appointed new counsel, and on September 6, 2022, the superior court

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held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. At the hearing, Hood

testified:

     [My plea counsel] told me that a life sentence was 14
     years. And if I went through about seven years, I’d parole
     out with good behavior. I signed a plea under the
     impression that a life sentence was 14 years. I got to
     Jackson State Prison and they tell me a life sentence was
     30 [years].[1]

Hood also stated that his plea counsel’s assistant and investigator

told him “that a life sentence was 14 years” and that “everything

was self-defense and that [Hood] wouldn’t do but seven [years] and

[he would] go home.”

     Hood’s plea counsel testified that she told Hood that he was not

eligible for parole until after he had served 30 years in prison. She

further testified:

     I remember having this discussion with Mr. Hood on
     numerous times because he kept saying he was 49 and he
     was going to be 79 when he got out and his parents would

     1OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (c) (1) provides:
     Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of Code Section 42-
     9-39, for a first conviction of a serious violent felony in which the
     accused has been sentenced to life imprisonment, that person shall
     not be eligible for any form of parole or early release administered
     by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles until that person has
     served a minimum of 30 years in prison.

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     be deceased. And this was a very big deal to him
     considering the 30-year mark and that’s why I know that
     I went over the 30 years with him.

Hood argued that his guilty plea should be withdrawn because he

did not understand that a life sentence meant he was not eligible for

parole until after he had served 30 years and there was “no written

form . . . that specifically says that he was told that life will be 30

years.”

     At the conclusion of the hearing, the superior court orally

denied Hood’s motion to withdraw. On October 6, the superior court

issued its order denying the motion, determining that plea counsel’s

testimony was more credible than Hood’s testimony and that Hood

failed to show that his plea counsel’s performance was deficient.

     1. Hood contends the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This claim has no

merit.

     After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea

only to correct a manifest injustice. See McClain v. State, 311 Ga.

514, 515 (858 SE2d 501) (2021); Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.12

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(B) (“In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to

correct a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw a plea of

guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right once sentence has been

pronounced by the judge.”).

     The test for manifest injustice will by necessity vary from
     case to case, but it has been said that withdrawal is
     necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a
     defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the
     guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an
     understanding of the nature of the charges.

Powell v. State, 309 Ga. 523, 524 (1) (847 SE2d 338) (2020).

     There is no constitutional requirement that a defendant
     be informed of his parole eligibility prior to entering a
     guilty plea for a guilty plea to be voluntary. Should,
     however, counsel make an affirmative misrepresentation
     about the collateral consequences of a plea, such as parole
     eligibility, the misrepresentation may form the basis of an
     ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Crowder v. State, 288 Ga. 739, 739 (707 SE2d 78) (2011) (citations

omitted). To prevail on his claim, Hood “must show both that his

plea counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that

the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Wright v. State,

314 Ga. 355, 357 (877 SE2d 178) (2022) (citing to Strickland v.

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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984)). To meet the first prong of the Strickland test, Hood “must

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell

within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that

counsel’s decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.” Wright, 314 Ga. at 357 (citation and

punctuation omitted). To meet the second prong of the Strickland

test in the guilty plea context, Hood “must demonstrate that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”

Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). “If an appellant fails to meet

his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the

reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.” Collins

v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 744 (8) (864 SE2d 85) (2021) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “This Court accepts a superior court’s factual

findings and credibility determinations on an ineffectiveness claim

unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply legal principles to

the facts de novo.” Powell, 309 Ga. at 526-527 (2).

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     In this case, the superior court found that plea counsel’s

testimony that she provided Hood with “informed legal advice

regarding the consequences of his decision to plead guilty” was

“credible” and that plea counsel’s testimony “countered” the

testimony of Hood. The superior court’s credibility findings, which it

was entitled to make, were not clearly erroneous. See Powell, 309

Ga. at 525 (1) (“Where the evidence at issue is in conflict, the

credibility of witnesses is for the [superior] court to determine.”).

The superior court then concluded that Hood failed to show that his

plea counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Because

the record supports the superior court’s findings, the court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Hood’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea. See Wright, 314 Ga. at 359.

     2. At sentencing, the superior court sentenced Hood on both the

malice murder count and the aggravated assault count. That was

error. See Miller v. State, 309 Ga. 549, 552 (3) (847 SE2d 344) (2020)

(“When there is no evidence to suggest the occurrence of an

aggravated assault independent of the act which caused the victim’s

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death . . . a jury’s guilty verdict on the aggravated assault merges as

a matter of fact with the malice murder verdict for sentencing

purposes.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Hood does not raise

this error. But “an exercise of our discretion on direct appeal to

correct a merger error that harms a defendant (but of which he has

not complained) may avoid unnecessary habeas proceedings and

thereby promotes judicial economy.” Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697

(4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017). Accordingly, we vacate Hood’s conviction

for aggravated assault (Count 3).

     3. Also at sentencing, during the superior court’s oral

pronouncement of Hood’s sentence, the court sentenced Hood to

serve three years in prison on the possession of a controlled

substance in Schedule I count (Count 7). However, Hood’s written

sentence reflects that he was sentenced to serve seven years in

prison on Count 7. But the maximum sentence for possession of a

controlled substance in Schedule I, under the circumstances of this

case, is three years. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (c) (1). Although this error

has not been raised by Hood, we vacate Hood’s void sentence on

                                  10
Count 7 and remand the case for resentencing within the statutory

parameters. See Barber v. State, 314 Ga. 759, 766 (3) (879 SE2d 428)

(2022) (“[A] sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that

the law does not allow.” (citation and punctuation omitted));

Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762, 770 (2) (c) (873 SE2d 150) (2022)

(“[W]e often do exercise our discretion sua sponte to vacate a

sentence for the benefit of defendants if we notice that it is void.”).

    Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case
remanded. All the Justices concur.

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