Court Opinion

ID: 9958046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-06 14:00:42.517321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:43.608120
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20209            Document: 93-1        Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/05/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                                    No. 23-20209
                                                                                     FILED
                                                                                   April 5, 2024
                                   ____________
                                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                          versus

Julia Ann Poff,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:17-CR-669-1
                   ______________________________

Before Davis, Smith, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       Defendant Julia Ann Poff appeals the district court’s orders denying
her restitution- and compassionate-release-based motions. For the reasons
that follow, we AFFIRM the order denying her restitution-based motions
and VACATE and REMAND the order denying her compassionate-
release-based motion for lack of jurisdiction.

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-20209          Document: 93-1         Page: 2       Date Filed: 04/05/2024

                                      No. 23-20209

                                 I.    Background
        Julia Ann Poff was indicted on several charges after mailing explosive
devices to President Barack Obama, Texas Governor Greg Abbott, and Social
Security Commissioner Carolyn Colvin. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she
pleaded guilty to one count of transporting explosives with the intent to kill,
injure, or intimidate, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(d). The district court
sentenced Poff to 120 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised
release. It also ordered her to pay a $100 fine and $9,700 in restitution for
fraud on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. 1
        Poff has unsuccessfully requested that the district court stay or modify
her restitution obligations on multiple occasions.                 The district court
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her most recent restitution challenge, citing
United States v. Diggs, 578 F.3d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 2009). Poff moved for
reconsideration on the basis that the district court misconstrued her motion
as a challenge to her payment schedule imposed by the Bureau of Prison’s
(“BOP”) Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”), as opposed to
a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). The district court denied the
motion for reconsideration, stating: “Defendant shows no meritorious
grounds for the requested stay.”
        Poff has also filed multiple unsuccessful motions for compassionate
release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582. The district court dismissed the most
recent attempt on the basis that Poff’s appeal of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
was pending before us and that therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction
over her conviction and sentence. Poff timely appealed that order (which
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        1
           In addition to several other charges, the second superseding indictment charged
Poff with Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program fraud. Although the government
agreed to dismiss that charge pursuant to the plea agreement, Poff in turn “agree[d] to pay
full restitution to the victim(s) regardless of the count(s) of conviction.”

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                                   No. 23-20209

also included the district court’s ruling on her motion for reconsideration of
her motion to stay restitution). In the interim, however, the district court
issued an amended order withdrawing its denial of Poff’s compassionate
release motion for lack of jurisdiction and issuing a denial on the merits.
                             II.    Discussion
   A. Restitution
       Poff argues that the district court erred by dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction her motion to stay restitution and further argues that the motion
should have been granted on the merits. The government responds that, to
the extent Poff’s motion challenged her payment obligations imposed by the
BOP’s IFRP, the district court lacked jurisdiction. But to the extent Poff
moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) to modify the restitution schedule imposed
by the district court, the government posits that the district court had
jurisdiction to consider her motion but properly denied it on the merits.
       We agree that the district court lacked jurisdiction to address a
challenge to Poff’s obligations under the BOP’s IFRP because such motions
“must be filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and in the district of incarceration”
after exhausting administrative remedies. Diggs, 578 F.3d at 319–20. Poff
does not dispute that she has failed to meet those requirements.
       Instead, she contends that her motion should be construed as a
§ 3664(k) motion. Under § 3664(k), we may, inter alia, adjust a district
court’s restitution schedule after being notified of a “material change in the
defendant’s economic circumstances that might affect the defendant’s
ability to pay restitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). But “[p]risoners cannot use
§ 3664(k) as a vehicle for a court not in the district of incarceration to modify
or suspend IFRP payments.” Diggs, 578 F.3d at 320.

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                                    No. 23-20209

       Even construing Poff’s motion liberally, we conclude that she is not
seeking an adjustment to the district court’s restitution schedule, which
requires her to pay $25 per quarter. In her motion to stay restitution, she
asserts that “[s]ince arriving at FMC Carswell, [she] has participated in the
FRP program. Whatever money is in her account when they take it is what
they take, depleting her account.” In her appellate brief, she states that she
“was ordered by the District Court to pay $25.00 a quarter” but that “[a]t
the time [she] filed the original motion the BOP was attempting to make her
pay $282 a month, which was completely unreasonable.” She further states
in her reply brief that “[a]t the time the original motion was filed the BOP
was trying to force [her] and her family to pay ‘$1000 a quarter,’” and that
“[i]f the Bureau of Prisons would acknowledge the criminal judgment of
‘$25.00 a quarter,’ then the remaining time she has left it would be ok, but
they refuse to.” Because Poff explicitly states that she could comply with the
district court’s restitution schedule and is clearly challenging the BOP’s
administration of the IFRP, she has not presented a basis for relief under
§ 3664(k). 2 See id. at 319–20. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of her restitution-based motions.
   B. Compassionate Release
       Poff contends that the district court retained jurisdiction to decide her
compassionate release motion because she had not yet obtained a certificate
of appealability (“COA”) for her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The government
agrees and asks us to remand so that the district court may rule on the merits
of Poff’s compassionate release motion. But after the parties filed their
principal briefs in this appeal, and before Poff filed her reply brief, the district

       _____________________
       2
           To the extent Poff otherwise challenges the validity of the district court’s
restitution order, § 3664(k) is not a proper vehicle for such challenges.

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                                  No. 23-20209

court withdrew its order denying compassionate release for want of
jurisdiction and entered an amended order denying the motion on the merits.
       We first address whether the district court correctly denied Poff’s
compassionate release motion for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, “[t]he filing
of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control
over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). But 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) provides that for certain habeas corpus proceedings and
proceedings under § 2255, “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of
appeals.”       The COA in those situations is therefore a “jurisdictional
prerequisite,” without which “federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to
rule on the merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
       We had not granted Poff a COA on her § 2255 motion when the
district court denied her compassionate release motion for want of
jurisdiction.     In fact, we ultimately denied Poff’s request for a COA.
Accordingly, the district court had jurisdiction to decide her compassionate
release motion, even though it initially concluded otherwise. The district
court seems to have recognized that, as evidenced by its conduct thereafter:
filing an amended order but then acknowledging that the case was before us,
so the district court lacked jurisdiction at that point. Thus, the court held
that ruling pending our decision. We therefore vacate the district court’s
compassionate-release-based original order about lacking jurisdiction and

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                                       No. 23-20209

remand so that the district court may exercise jurisdiction and enter an order
on the merits of Poff’s compassionate release motion. 3
                                III.     Conclusion
        For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
denying Poff’s restitution-based motions and VACATE and REMAND
the district court’s compassionate-release-based order as explained above.

        _____________________
        3
         We note that after the parties had filed their appellate briefs, Poff filed a letter
providing notice of an address change and indicating that she has been “released by the
Bureau of Prisons” and relocated to the “Liedel Sanction Center,” a residential reentry
center. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ website, however, lists Poff’s release date as “May
18, 2025.” Neither party contends that Poff’s alleged relocation affects her motion, and
we do not take a position on whether it does or not.

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