Court Opinion

ID: 9777690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:19:52.50315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:59.498199
License: Public Domain

CHEW, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion completely and write separately only to except to the statement that:
It is well established that a comment [on the failure to testify] which was prior to the time testimony in the case has closed cannot be held to refer to a failure to testify which has not yet occurred. (Emphasis in original).
Opinion at 224.
It is a true statement and, even though it has evolved from meager roots, I must readily concede that it is clearly established precedent. See Hogan v. State, 943 S.W.2d 80 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.); Reynolds v. State, 744 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987, pet. ref'd); McCarron v. State, 605 S.W.2d 589, (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Garcia v. State, 513 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); Jackson v.State, 501 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Terry v. State, 489 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.Crim.App.1973). On its face, it also seems quite logical, *228except that, in my opinion, it flies in the teeth of the Texas Constitution and statute.
The true issue is not the inference that a jury might draw from a defendant’s invocation of constitution rights. What is involved is the direct attack on constitutional rights. Article I, § 10 of the Texas Constitution states in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused _ shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself,....
Article 1.05, Tex.Code CRiM.PROc. Ann. says the same.
The prosecutor’s question in this ease invited a response from the victim’s mother that imposed an inescapable compulsion on the defendant to testify. It was a violation of the defendant’s constitutional and statutory right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.