Court Opinion

ID: 9662133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:00:13.515782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.128354
License: Public Domain

*1398Hays, J.
(dissenting) — I cannot agree with the majority opinion and respectfully dissent.
The sole question involved here is the meaning to be given to the words “used for gambling” as they appear in section 1(1), chapter 64, Acts 54th General Assembly.
This chapter, enacted in February 19151, is before this court for the first time. Apparently no other jurisdiction has. a like statute, at least I have not so found, nor is any cited in the briefs or the majority opinion. No one questions the authority of the legislature to enact such legislation under its broad police powers. However, the statute is one providing for a forfeiture, is drastic in its provisions, and under all rules of construction must be strictly construed. In fact, such statutes should be enforced only when within the letter and spirit of the law. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U. S. 219, 59 S. Ct. 861, 83 L. Ed. 1249; State ex rel. Woodbury County Anti-Saloon League v. McGraw, 191 Iowa 1090, 183 N.W. 593; 37 C. J. S., Forfeitures, section 5(a); 23 Am. Jur., Forfeitures and Penalties, section 5.
Courts when called upon to construe a statute must give to it the meaning placed thereon by the enacting authority, even to the extent of reaching an absurd result, when the terms and provisions set forth in the statute are clear and unambiguous. Courts also in construing a statute will, when the terms thereof are indefinite and ambiguous, examine the entire statute, ascertain the object and purpose thereof and give to it a meaning in accord therewith, avoiding ridiculous and absurd results where possible. Schuler v. Holmes, 242 Iowa 1303, 49 N.W.2d 818.
In my opinion this statute is patently ambiguous. As said in Hubbard v. Marsh, 241 Iowa 163, 40 N.W.2d 488, an ambiguity exists when, after the application of pertinent rules of construction to the face of the instrument, a genuine uncertainty results as to which of one or two meanings is the proper one. This is certainly true here in the words “used for gambling.” The word “use” is one of the most comprehensive words in our language and may be used in many senses. Buell v. Indian Refining Co., 62 Ohio App. 108, 23 N.E.2d 329. In State v. Gastonguay, 118 Maine 31, 33, 105 A. 402, 403, it is said: “The verb ‘use’ or ‘used’ has two meanings recognized by all lexicographers *1399and unconsciously differentiated in common speech. (1) To employ or be employed or occupied. In this sense the word would include a single isolated instance of use. (2) To practice customarily or (in the case of a place or thing) to be the subject-of customary practice, employment or occupation.” As said in McJimsey v. City of Des Moines, 231 Iowa 693, 700, 2 N.W.2d 65, the word “use” should be interpreted with some reasonable regard for the connection in which it is employed.
All will concede that the pool table in question was, at the specific time in question, used for gambling purposes, but it does not follow that such use brings the table within the terms of said chapter. The majority opinion views the statute as a prohibition against the act of gambling, as such; accepts the literal meaning of the word “use” to be “to employ or be employed” ; and based upon decisions of this court in cases arising under the penal statutes, holds the isolated use of the table to bring it within the terms thereof. In support thereof it cites many eases arising under section 726.1, Code, 1950. Nowhere in this statute is the word “use” or “used” found. In each case there is ample evidence of continued violation of the statute, and, in many, statements to the effect that a single act would sustain a conviction appear to have no connection with the issues presented by the appeal.
The opinion also cites section 726.5, Code, 1950 (a penal statute), which contains words very similar to the ones in question, and states that we have never given these words the meaning the minority apparently would give the same language in chapter 64, citing four cases. I agree that we have never so construed that statute but perhaps it may be because the question has never been before the court. At least the four cases cited are not in point as they all deal with devices having an element of chance involved in their operation.
Getting back to the real question — what is the intended meaning of the words “used for gambling” ?
The legislature, in enacting this chapter, adopted four distinct classifications or instrumentalities in defining “gambling devices”: (1) Those specifically named, i. e., roulette wheels, etc.; (2) those having an element of chance attending their operation; (3) those adapted, devised and designed for gam*1400bling; (4) those used for gambling. While it is true that- the ■'ultimate end to be attained is the stamping out of' gambling, the statute does not contain any prohibition against- it, as such. Section 2 states that the use need not be established in order to revoke the license. Section 1(1) states “nothing in this definition shall be construed to include ordinary playing cards”, thus it would seem that one may 'gamble with such with impunity, so far as this chapter is concerned. Section 4 requires inspection of premises to see if gambling devices are kept, nothing said about use. Section 6 says that if the licensee intentionally possessed or kept any gambling device, the license shall be revoked. It does not even require that the use of the device for gambling-purposes be known to the licensee. It merely says a device used for gambling makes it a gambling device subject to the forfeitures in the statute if intentionally kept or possessed. Under a literal construction, a surreptitious use of the pool table by third parties would cause the forfeiture of the license of the party owning the table or who intentionally kept it. This- is of course a ridiculous view to take of the statute but that is what it says. Also in the instant ease the owner participated in the ‘gambling and I call attention to the above merely to show that the statute is not as clear and distinct in its meaning as the majority opinion might indicate. ■ ■
In State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 1371, 264 N.W. 608, 609, 103 A. L. R. 861, it is said that the evil the state recognizes in a gambling enterprise is that it “arouses the gambling spirit and leads people to hazard their substance on a mere chance.” The legislature under classifications (1), (2) and (3), above, has recognized the fact that such devices have but one primary purpose — gambling—and that the purpose in keeping and possessing the same can be for no other purpose than to arouse the gambling spirit of those frequenting his premises, to 'his own personal gain. To combat this situation chapter 64 was enacted and under it the state is relieved of the strict proof and procedure required under Titles XXXV and XXXVI, Code, 1950. Group (4), above, those used for gambling, is a part of the same Statute and must have been included therein for the same reasons and 'purpose. However, it deals with a device that is legal per se, *1401tbe mere possession of'which does not arouse the gambling instinct. The legislature wisely required that before such a device becomes illegal and subjects the ownér thereof to the forfeiture provisions of the statute by the mere possession thereof, something more than mere possession must appear. Thére must appear such a use thereof as to bring it within the meaning and purpose of the Act, i. -e., some degree of custom or continuity of use for gambling purposes- in connection with the premises where it is kept. One isolated use of this pool table, under the circumstances shown here, certainly cannot be such use. To so hold is, in my opinion, ridiculous and absurd. I think the trial court correctly held that the table was not a gambling device within the provisions of said chapter.
Under- this view of' the chapter and the decision reached, it ■ is not necessary to consider the propositions considered in-the other divisions of the majority opinión. T do however agree that the motion to dismiss or affirm the appeal should be'denied.
I would affirm the trial court.
Bliss, Smith and Mulroney, JJ., join in this dissent.