Court Opinion

ID: 9362943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:10:45.777478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.814059
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
01/13/2023 09:10 AM CST

                                                        - 251 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        313 Nebraska Reports
                      MOLLRING V. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
                                        Cite as 313 Neb. 251

                                     Scott Mollring, appellant, v.
                                  Nebraska Department of Health and
                                    Human Services et al., appellees.
                                                   ___ N.W.2d ___

                                        Filed January 13, 2023.   No. S-22-133.

                 1. Administrative Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A judgment or
                    final order rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to
                    the Administrative Procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified
                    by an appellate court for errors appearing on the record.
                 2. ____: ____: ____. When reviewing an order of a district court under
                    the Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record,
                    the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is sup-
                    ported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor
                    unreasonable.
                 3. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Whether a decision conforms
                    to law and the interpretation of statutes present questions of law, in con-
                    nection with which an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent
                    of that reached by the lower court.
                 4. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of
                    statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and
                    should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the
                    intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent,
                    harmonious, and sensible.
                 5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain
                    and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to inter-
                    pretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
                    direct, and unambiguous.
                 6. Teacher Contracts: Words and Phrases. “[T]he first two years of . . .
                    employment” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-845 (Reissue 2014) means the
                    first 2 calendar years of employment.
                            - 252 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
    MOLLRING V. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
                      Cite as 313 Neb. 251

   Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Susan
I. Strong, Judge. Affirmed.

  Nicholas J. Welding, of Norby & Welding, L.L.P., for
appellant.

  Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and James A.
Campbell, Solicitor General, for appellees.

  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

   Miller-Lerman, J.
                      NATURE OF CASE
   Scott Mollring’s employment as a teacher for the Nebraska
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) was
terminated, and the Nebraska State Personnel Board (Board)
upheld the termination. The district court for Lancaster County
affirmed the decision of the Board, and Mollring appeals.
Mollring claims that the district court erred when it deter-
mined that because he had not completed 2 calendar years
of employment at the time of his dismissal, he was a pro-
bationary employee who could be terminated without cause.
Mollring asserts that “two years” as referenced in Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 79-845 (Reissue 2014) means 2 school years and that
because he had completed 2 school years of employment, he
was not a probationary employee at the time of his termina-
tion and cause was required. We agree with the district court’s
conclusion that “two years” under § 79-845 means 2 calendar
years, and cause was not required. We affirm the order of the
district court that affirmed the decision of the Board, which
upheld the termination.

                 STATEMENT OF FACTS
   Mollring was hired by DHHS in August 2018 to serve as
a teacher at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center
in Kearney, Nebraska. Mollring signed and worked under
                            - 253 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
    MOLLRING V. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
                      Cite as 313 Neb. 251

separate individual teacher contracts for each school term
that he taught. His first contract covered the school year from
August 13, 2018, through May 24, 2019, and his second cov-
ered the school year from August 9, 2019, through May 22,
2020. After completing those two contracts, Mollring signed
a contract to teach the summer session from June 1 through
July 31, 2020. Around that time, he also signed a contract to
teach during the 2020-21 school year, which was to begin on
August 10, 2020.
   Mollring was a member of the bargaining unit represented
by the State Code Agencies Teachers Association (SCATA).
During the times relevant to this case, Mollring’s employment
was subject to the SCATA labor contracts/collective bargain-
ing agreements that covered the periods from July 1, 2017,
through June 30, 2019, and from July 1, 2019, through June
30, 2021. Article 6.2 of the relevant SCATA labor contracts
provided that “teachers . . . shall be on a probationary period
during the first two years of employment and may be termi-
nated during the probationary period without cause per Neb.
Rev. Stat. Sec. 79-845.” The contract language was either
recited verbatim or incorporated by reference in each of the
individual teaching contracts signed by Mollring.
   On July 2, 2020, Mollring received a letter from his
facility administrator informing him that his employment
was being terminated effective immediately. The letter stated
that Mollring’s employment was being terminated during his
“original probationary period” and that the action was being
taken in accordance with article 6.2 of the SCATA labor con-
tract. No cause was stated in the letter. On July 15, Mollring
initiated the grievance procedure set forth under the SCATA
labor contract. Mollring maintained in part that he had com-
pleted the probationary period when he completed teaching
contracts for 2 school years and that therefore, his employ-
ment could not be terminated without just cause. DHHS
denied Mollring’s grievance at each level in the process
and reasoned in part that the probationary period was for a
                              - 254 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
    MOLLRING V. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
                      Cite as 313 Neb. 251

period of 24 months from the date Mollring began his employ-
ment in August 2018. That is, DHHS maintained that under
the contracts and § 79-845, the probationary period during
which a teacher could be terminated without just cause was 2
calendar years, not 2 school years.
   Mollring appealed DHHS’ denial of his grievance to the
Board. Mollring and DHHS agreed that Mollring’s employ-
ment was governed by the SCATA labor agreements and
by governing statutes, including § 79-845, which provides
as follows:
         Any contract of employment entered into after July
      1, 1984, between the teaching staff and [DHHS] which
      applies to the first two years of the employment of such
      teaching staff shall provide that the first two years of the
      employment of such teacher are a probationary period.
      Any such contract may be terminated during the proba-
      tionary period without cause.
   The parties disagreed regarding the meaning of the statu-
tory provision in § 79-845 stating: “two years . . . are a pro-
bationary period” during which a contract “may be terminated
. . . without cause.” DHHS asserted that the probationary
period under § 79-845 was 2 calendar years and specifically
that Mollring’s probationary period began in August 2018
and would not be completed until August 2020. In contrast,
Mollring argued that the statutory “two years of the employ-
ment [which] are a probationary period” are 2 school years and
that having completed his probationary period when he had
completed his second school year on May 22, 2020, cause for
termination was required. The Board agreed with DHHS and
affirmed the denial of Mollring’s grievance.
   Mollring appealed the Board’s decision to the district
court for Lancaster County pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act; specifically, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1319 (Reissue
2014) states an “[a]ppeal from the decision of the . . . Board
shall be in accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act.” Mollring repeated his argument that the “two years”
                              - 255 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
    MOLLRING V. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
                      Cite as 313 Neb. 251

probationary period under § 79-845 is 2 school years and that
because he had completed teaching contracts for 2 school
years, his employment could not be terminated without just
cause. The court interpreted the term “the first two years of the
employment” under § 79-845 to mean the first 2 calendar years
of employment. The court therefore rejected Mollring’s argu-
ments and affirmed the Board’s decision.
   Mollring appeals the order of the district court.

                 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Mollring claims, restated and summarized, that the district
court erred when it interpreted § 79-845 to establish a proba-
tionary period of 2 calendar years and when it therefore deter-
mined that he was still in the probationary period during which
his employment could be terminated without cause.

                  STANDARDS OF REVIEW
   [1,2] A judgment or final order rendered by a district court in
a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for
errors appearing on the record. Gelco Fleet Trust v. Nebraska
Dept. of Rev., 312 Neb. 49, 978 N.W.2d 12 (2022). When
reviewing an order of a district court under the Administrative
Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry
is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by
competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor
unreasonable. Id.
   [3] Whether a decision conforms to law and the interpreta-
tion of statutes present questions of law, in connection with
which an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of
that reached by the lower court. Id.

                         ANALYSIS
   [4] Regarding the interpretation of § 79-845, Mollring
refers to our often-stated proposition of statutory construc-
tion that components of a series or collection of statutes
                             - 256 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
    MOLLRING V. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
                      Cite as 313 Neb. 251

pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and
should be conjunctively considered and construed to deter-
mine the intent of the Legislature, so that different provi-
sions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. See In re
Estate of Koetter, 312 Neb. 549, 980 N.W.2d 376 (2022).
Mollring generally argues that when applying that proposi-
tion, § 79-845 must be read in pari materia with other statutes
governing teaching contracts and related matters. He argues
that such other statutes focus on school years and specifi-
cally refer to “school years” and that therefore, “the first two
years” in § 79-845 should be read as 2 school years rather
than 2 calendar years. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-101(7)
(Cum. Supp. 2022) and §§ 79-201 and 79-824 (Reissue 2014)
(each referring to “school year”).
   [5] In response, DHHS refers to another often-stated propo-
sition of statutory construction that statutory language is to be
given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court
will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of
statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
See Echo Group v. Tradesmen Internat., 312 Neb. 729, 980
N.W.2d 869 (2022). DHHS contends that the district court cor-
rectly concluded that the plain meaning of “two years” as used
in § 79-845 is 2 calendar years rather than 2 school years.
DHHS argues that the other statutes cited by Mollring only
bolster the reading of § 79-845 as referring to calendar years
because those statutes specifically refer to a “school year”
and that therefore, the Legislature distinguished a school year
from a calendar year and intentionally used the words “school
year” when that was intended and referred to a “year” when it
intended a calendar year.
   Before reaching these familiar rules of statutory con-
struction cited by the parties, we note that Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 49-801(25) (Reissue 2021) specifically sets forth a defini-
tion for the word “year” when it is used in Nebraska stat-
utes. Section 49-801 provides in relevant part as follows:
“Unless the context is shown to intend otherwise, words and
                             - 257 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
    MOLLRING V. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
                      Cite as 313 Neb. 251

phrases in the statutes of Nebraska hereafter enacted are used
in the following sense: . . . (25) Year shall mean calendar
year.” We note that the definition of “year” as a “calendar
year” has been part of § 49-801 since its original enactment
in 1947, see 1947 Neb. Laws, ch. 182, § 1, p. 601, and the
definition was therefore in the statute when the original ver-
sion of § 79-845 was enacted as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-1254.09
(Reissue 1981) in 1980, see 1980 Neb. Laws, L.B. 442, § 2.
Accordingly, applying § 49-801, the usual meaning of “year”
in a Nebraska statute is a “calendar year” and it should be
given that meaning when used in a statute “[u]nless the con-
text is shown to intend otherwise.”
   [6] We read Mollring’s argument that § 79-845 should
be read in pari materia with related statutes to be an argu-
ment that when read in the context of related statutes, “year”
under § 79-845 may have been intended to mean a school
year rather than a calendar year. However, we do not read
references to “school year” in other statutes related to teacher
employment to show that when the Legislature used only the
word “year” in § 79-845, it intended to refer to a school year
rather than a calendar year. We believe the more reasonable
reading of the statutes is that the Legislature knew how to
refer to a “school year” when it intended to do so and that
therefore, when it referred only to “years” in § 79-845, it
intended to refer to the usual meaning of a year as a calendar
year. The context of the language found in § 79-845 is not to
the contrary. We therefore conclude that “the first two years
of . . . employment” under § 79-845 means the first 2 calendar
years of employment.
   The district court correctly read § 79-845 to establish a pro-
bationary period of 2 calendar years. Consequently, the district
court did not err when it determined that because he had not
completed 2 calendar years of employment, Mollring was still
in the probationary period when his employment was termi-
nated and by application of § 79-845, his employment could
be terminated without cause.
                            - 258 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
    MOLLRING V. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
                      Cite as 313 Neb. 251

                        CONCLUSION
   We conclude that the district court did not err when it
determined that § 79-845 establishes a probationary period of
2 calendar years, that Mollring was still in the probationary
period, and that his employment could be terminated with-
out cause. The district court did not err when it affirmed the
Board’s decision that upheld Mollring’s termination. We there-
fore affirm the order of the district court.
                                                  Affirmed.