Court Opinion

ID: 9565237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:17:12.866424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:28.985753
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(dissenting):
The majority holds that a duly elected mayor of a city may be removed from office by a court decree because he shot and killed a dog that had been running loose in the city. Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 77-6-1, which the majority holds authorizes that result, was never intended, in my view, to permit a court to nullify an election on such flimsy grounds. Because the Court construes § 77-6-1 to permit a handful of citizens to override the voice of the majority on such frivolous grounds, I dissent.
Section 77-6-1, which is part of the criminal procedure code, provides for the removal of individuals who are unfit to serve in public office. It states: “All justices of the peace and all officers of any city, county or other political subdivision of this state not liable to impeachment shall be subject to removal as provided in this chapter for high crimes and misdemeanors or malfeasance in office.” (Emphasis added.) Formerly, actions for removal had to be initiated by grand juries, district attorneys, or county attorneys.1 The current statute allows taxpayers to initiate such actions.2
*1094Removal statutes are quasi-penal in character and should be strictly construed. State v. Probate Court, 22 Ohio St. 2d 120, 258 N.E.2d 594 (1970); C. Rhyne, The Law of Local Government Operations § 13.46 at 274 (1980). Removal is intended for those rare occasions when an official, because he has committed an act so morally reprehensible or offensive to accepted standards of honesty and integrity, shows himself to be an unfit steward of the public trust. State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 193-94, 407 P.2d 571, 573 (1965). The purpose of the removal statutes is not to authorize judicial removal of unpopular, disliked, or thoughtless public officials. The election process is a sufficient remedy in such cases. If the rule were otherwise, disgruntled citizens could use the courts to nullify the results of an election, interfere in the administration of governmental affairs to an intolerable extent, and otherwise interfere with the political process. Vigorous, effective municipal government can hardly thrive in such an environment. Furthermore, reputable, civic-minded persons will be deterred from agreeing to serve the public if their names can be so easily blackened.
The issue in this case is whether the mayor of Grantsville violated § 77-6-1 by committing “malfeasance in office,” since his action clearly does not qualify as a “high crime and misdemeanor.” Even assuming that Mayor Brown acted in his official capacity when he participated in disposing of the dogs, the question is whether that conduct shows that he is unfit to act as mayor. Malfeasance in office has nothing to do with an official’s acts affecting only his personal character as a private individual; “the character of the man must be separated from his character as an officer.” State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, 141 Minn. 308, 170 N.W. 201, 203 (1918). Rather, the issue is whether the official, acting in his official capacity, committed an illegal or wrongful act of such culpability as to constitute a substantial abuse of the office he holds. See Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 415, 98 P. 300, 308 (1908); State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Pla. 119, 155 So. 129, 132 (1934); 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 246 (1984); cf. cases noted at 26 Words and Phrases 183-84 (1953).
Not every illegal, wrongful, or unjust act that may be committed by a public official amounts to malfeasance in office. This Court has stated that malfeasance in office means “an intentional act or omission relating to the duties of a public office, which amounts to a crime, or which involves a substantial breach of the trust imposed upon the official by the nature of his office, and which conduct is of such a character as to offend against the commonly accepted standards of honesty and morality.” State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 348, 359 P.2d 12, 14 (1961). Malfeasance must also have “a direct relation to the performance of official duties and must amount to either maladministration or willful and intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties.” C. Rhyne, The Law of Local Government Operations § 13.46 at 273-74 (1980).
Malfeasance requires an evil or criminal intent, a conscious wrongdoing. McQuillin states:
[T]he courts have prevented the common-law crime of misconduct in office from becoming a means for oppressive prosecutions premised upon vague moral principles by making wilfullness an element of the crime. Wilfulness ... means, in the context of malfeasance arising out of *1095the breach of a duty of public concern, an evil purpose or mental culpability, ... guilty knowledge, mens rea, bad purpose, or corruption.
4 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 12.237 at 265 (footnotes omitted). The law presumes that a public official conducts himself in good faith, and the burden to show evil intent rests on the complainant. Id.
The nature of the misconduct which the term “malfeasance” was intended to reach is suggested by the words in the statute which precede the word malfeasance, i.e., “high crimes and misdemeanors.” State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d at 194, 407 P.2d at 573. “Malfeasance in office” does not require conduct so culpable as high crimes and misdemeanors, but it clearly does require conduct that seriously interferes with one’s proper discharge of official duties.
Malfeasance requires more than an error of judgment or a minor violation of duty or of the law. Acts which the courts have held do not constitute sufficient grounds for removal include failure by a mayor to report liquor law violations to the county attorney, State v. Corwine, 113 Kan. 192, 213 P. 658 (1923); a mayor’s failure to report a police chief’s violations of duty and his false denial of knowledge thereof, McDonald v. Brooks, 215 Tenn. 535, 387 S.W.2d 803 (1965); and gambling by a city marshall, Mayor and Council of Macon v. Shaw, 16 Ga. 172 (1854). See also cases noted at 4 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 12.237a at 271-72 n.22 (1979); C. Rhyne, The Law of Local Government Operations § 13.46 at 275 (1980). Conduct which has been held to constitute malfeasance in office must demonstrate unfitness or untrustworthiness in fulfilling the duties of office, such as acting with a conflict of interest when dealing with government contracts, committing perjury or falsifying records, filing false reports, and making personal use of municipal property. 4 E. McQuillin, supra, at § 12.237a; cf. C. Rhyne, supra, § 13.46 at 274-75.
Mayor Brown’s acts simply do not, in my judgment, constitute malfeasance in office, as a matter of law. For all that appears in the record, Mayor Brown’s error seems to have been that he became more involved in trying to solve a community problem than he needed to be, even though he may well have used poor judgment in disposing of the dogs. In truth, the owners of the dogs which were allowed to run loose were primarily at fault in the first instance, and given the finding that loose dogs were customarily disposed of in the manner that occurred in this case and that the City of Grantsville has no dog pound, one might wonder what alternative course of action there was.
Finally, the evidence shows no evil intent. The mayor simply acted to solve a community problem. He received no personal benefit from his actions. Perhaps his actions were both wrong and harsh, but, if so, that was not a sufficient ground for removing him from office and short-circuiting the electoral process.
DURHAM, concurs in the dissenting opinion of STEWART, J.
HALL, C.J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein; CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, District Judge, sat.

. Section 77-7-2 (repealed, 1980 Utah Laws, ch. 15, § 1) stated:
An accusation in writing against any district, county, precinct or municipal officer, or an *1094officer of any board of education, for any high crime, misdemeanor or malfeasance in office may be presented to the district court by the grand jury or by the district attorney, or by the county attorney of the county in which the officer accused was elected or appointed.

. Section 77-6-2 states:
An action for the removal of a justice of the peace or officer of a city, county, or other political subdivision of this state shall be commenced by presenting a sworn, written accusation to the district court. The accusation may be initiated by any taxpayer, grand jury, county attorney for the county in which the officer was elected or appointed, or by the attorney general.