Court Opinion

ID: 9460324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:47:19.490292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:34.476609
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
The majority opinion holds that an unsolicited, bizarre letter from a juror, who claims to be able to “see things before it happen” and to know what other people “are thinking,” does not justify further inquiry into the juror’s competence, even though seven psychiatrists preliminarily diagnose her as mentally ill. From this holding, I emphatically dissent.
There is no need to rehearse in great detail the basic principles of law that govern the issue before us. As the majority points out, after a trial is over, there is a great judicial “[r]eluctance to *84inquire into the state of mind of any juror[s] . . . during their deliberations,” and that reluctance rests upon “sound reasons.” But reluctance to inquire is not the same as obdurate refusal to face facts, especially such “objective” facts as a rambling, unsolicited letter, sent 13 days after verdict, that strongly suggests severe mental illness. A close look at that letter and the comments upon it of the seven doctors, whose six letters and one affidavit were submitted to the district judge is instructive.
The letter from juror Rush was written on stationery which bears the Zodiac sign “Libra” at the top over a picture of a woman holding scales. It stated as follows:
February 8th — 1973
Dear Mr. Dioguardi,
Under the situation and such circumstance I hope that I have made the right decision. I talk to may friends Bertha and her husband Olive about this, Olive agree that I write to you. Bertha, however, was against it. Nevertheless, I felt I had to write you. I cannot omit what I have seen. When I saw the good within you and how hard your wife was trying; I prayed about it. One word appear before me repent. If you repent and run a clean business it is the good within you that will save you, and you will gain what you have lost. Before I continue I must explain something to you. I have eyes and ears that I can see things before it happen. I can tell you about other and what they are thinking and doing. If I am wrong about this it is the first time.
I would like to visit you. I would like to do so when my eyes fully open. I would like to talk to you about what appear before me. They are only partly open. I don’t know at the present when they will open. Unfortunate, a curse was put upon them some years ago. I have some people working on them. Everything is being done that can be done. So we will have to wait. As I stated I cannot omit what appear before me, when I was on the jury bench. You feel that this is the end for you. However, it is not. Something appear before me that I must do. It is the good within you that I must use and within that good, you will gain what you have lost. If, however, I am wrong it is the first time.
Why, you let such a relationship exist between you and a man like Heller-man? When I think of the good that I saw within you it does not add up. Where did Hellerman get those fur coats? Does he have any for sail? Omit the question. I really can’t afford one, and if I could I probably be afraid to wear it.
Why persecute your wife? Your mistake your guilty then take it out on her. The ordeal you put her through I wonder how she survive through it. One word appear before me brave. She is a brave girl. She love you. She never stop loving you not a single moment. Tell her to please be careful. From what I can see she is still in business. I suggest it is not wise at this time. I believe she is being watch.
That was a good lawyer you had. I entain to send him some custom as soon as my eyes open.
Tell Ostrer I am praying for him.
Mr. Dioguardi, I want to ask a favor of you please.
I want you to look upon me as a woman and I look upon you as a man and not white man and black woman. Olive agree with me.
Let’s leave color out, OK.
I was told you will only have to serve one third of the time given. So relax this is not the end. Soon you will be free.
When I call the Federal information center and the record room yesterday they all know you. They all seem to *85have it in for you. Its seated deep within them like a personal matter.
Sincerely,
Genena
Thus, the juror claims that she has “eyes and ears that . . . can see things before it happen.” She can “tell” what other people “are thinking and doing.” Her eyes are now “only partly open” because “a curse was put upon them some years ago.” She is writing this letter because “[sjomething appear before me that I must do.” Although Dioguardi’s wife was never in the courtroom, the juror somehow knows that Mrs. Dioguardi “is a brave girl” and “is still in business,” but is being watched. As soon as the juror’s “eyes open” she intends to send Dioguardi’s lawyer some customers. And when she “saw the good within” Dioguardi and how hard his wife “was trying,” the word “repent” appeared before her.
The letter is staggering in its implications. No special training is needed to appreciate that this juror seems to believe she is clairvoyant and can see things that may not, or could not, be apparent to others, such as what people think or an event before it happens. And if juror Rush actually did believe she was clairvoyant in this way, is it really necessary to spell out why she could not fairly try the guilt or innocence of any man? It seems obvious to me that a “clairvoyant” juror might honestly “see” a defendant’s guilt despite the lack of evidence because she can see into the defendant’s mind. Or conversely, she might for the same reason divine a defendant’s innocence, in the face of overwhelming proof of guilt. A person who was known to regard herself as clairvoyant would certainly not be allowed on a jury in the first place. United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918, 92 S.Ct. 943, 30 L.Ed.2d 788 (1972); United States v. Benson, 31 F. 896, 900 (D.Cal.1887). Such a woman would clearly be “incapable, by reason of mental . . . infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service ...” under 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(4). Cf. Jorgensen v. York Ice & Machinery Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764, 68 S.Ct. 69, 92 L.Ed. 349 (1947). Moreover, the incapacity on such a ground of even one juror would poison the verdict regardless of the competence of the remaining 11. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966) (per curiam); United States v. Rattenni, 480 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1973).
The ultimate question, of course, is whether juror Rush was in fact “incapable” of rendering satisfactory jury service, but the precise legal issue before us is whether enough was presented to the district judge to require holding a hearing to determine her capacity to serve. The district court had before it the juror’s letter and the views of seven reputable psychiatrists, all of whom rendered expert opinions that the writer of the letter suffered from severe mental illness.1 According to some of these doctors, the precise diagnosis of her problem would require clinical evaluation through interviews and tests, but all of the phychiatrists agreed on the existence of a seriously disabling thought disorder which in their opinion would have impaired her mental functioning during the trial and her ability to judge the case intelligently. These expert views stand uncontradieted on the record before us. True, the majority opinion refers to them as “essentially horseback uninformed.” However, in view of the district judge’s oral order, that no one was to contact the juror,2 these adjectives are simply not justified. Several of the psychiatrists made clear that they would like to know more about *86the juror. Obviously, the directive prevented defense counsel from attempting any interview, and both defense and government counsel apparently interpreted the order as inhibiting any investigation of the juror, even apart from talking to her.
The combined effect of the uncontradicted record and the apparently intended scope of the judge’s order requires a remand for a further hearing. The unsolicited letter is bizarre, and seven psychiatrists have given their opinion on the basis of it that the juror was seriously mentally ill during the trial. I do not see how the district court, or we, can disregard these facts. Certainly a defendant is entitled to 12 sane jurors, Parker v. Gladden, supra, 385 U.S. at 366, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420; United States v. Rattenni, supra, 480 F.2d at 198, and if one is incompetent, we should exercise our supervisory power to order a hearing or a new trial just as we would if one turned out to be blind or deaf although no one had noticed it. Possibly this juror is not incompetent; she may just be peculiar. But the record as it now stands cannot justify such a conclusion. It may be that after the record is amplified — at least by cross-examination of appellants’ witnesses and by testimony of government experts — the district court might be warranted in finding juror Rush to have been capable of jury service. I express no view as to that. However, at the very least, defendants are entitled to a full hearing on the issue of the juror’s competence.
The majority cites a good deal of authority for the proposition that unless there is “substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence” of a juror’s incompetence during trial, a post-trial inquiry will not be ordered “merely on the allegations and opinions of a losing party.” See, e. g., Peterman v. Indian Motorcycle Co., 216 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1954). I do not quarrel with this statement of the law. Indeed, I heartily endorse it since the evidence on this record of the mental incompetence of juror Rush is, as I have indicated, quite “substantial.” Moreover, the inquiry here was not triggered solely by “the allegations and opinions of a losing party,” but by the unsolicited letter of the juror herself, which was sent only 13 days after the verdict and is itself persuasive evidence of incapacity.3 None of the decisions cited by the majority involved such an unusual objective fact. In Peterman, supra, for example, there was no communication by the juror, which was itself an overt symptom of mental disorder. On the contrary, there was “no suggestion that the juror was insane,” 216 F.2d at 293, whereas here the uncontradicted record supports the opposite conclusion. Furthermore, in many cases of alleged juror taint, hearings were actually held or ordered upon remand. See, e. g., Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); United States v. Hand, 472 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Silverman, supra; United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1373, 28 L.Ed.2d 646 (1971). Cf. Smith v. Cox, 435 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1970), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53, 92 S.Ct. 174, 30 L.Ed.2d 209 (1971).
I would only add the observation that, far from loosing a Pandora’s box of challenges to jury verdicts (as the district court feared), a remand for a hearing here would have almost no preceden-tial value because of the uniqueness of the facts. Nor would a hearing under these circumstances raise the twin spectres of juror harassment or incursion on jurors’ privacy during their deliberations. Cf. Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1968). The letter which forms the basis of the present attack on the verdict below was, as I have stressed, unasked for, and not the product of a fishing expedition. More*87over, an inquiry into competence need not entail a probe of jury discussions. I have already mentioned such alternative possibilities of enlarging the record as cross-examination of appellants’ witnesses and testimony by government experts. Counsel may also develop evidence by investigating the juror’s background or by persuading her to undergo a voluntary mental examination. I see no need to explore every conceivable avenue of investigation, but merely wish to make the point that I am not counseling any general break with the wise policy of protecting the sanctity of the jury room and the privacy of individual jurors.
For these reasons, I strongly believe that the district court erred in refusing to make further inquiry into the competence of juror Rush. Therefore, I dissent from the affirmance of the order denying a new trial without a hearing.4

. The credentials of the seven psychiatrists were set forth in varying detail, but, on this record, all appear to be qualified to give an expert opinion.

. The judge stated in open court that juror Rush is not to be contacted by anybody or communicated with by anybody in any possible way, directly or indirectly. Is that clear, gentlemen?

. There is no hint in the record that the letter was actually solicited or not genuine. Upon remand, those questions could, of course, be explored.

. I agree with the majority’s disposition of the other points raised by appellants.