Court Opinion

ID: 9560242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:45:54.177032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:29.596026
License: Public Domain

WALTERS, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In light of the evidence and the instructions given to the jury in this case, I believe the alleged new evidence will not “probably produce an acquittal” — contrary to the verdict already found by the jury — by raising a reasonable doubt as to Caldwell’s guilt. See State v. Ames, 112 Idaho 144, 730 P.2d 1064 (Ct.App.1986).
Caldwell was charged with grand theft under I.C. § 18-2403(1) and (3). Those sections provide:
(1) A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.
(3) A person commits theft when he knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over, or makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, the property of another person, with the intent of depriving the owner thereof.
The jury was instructed in the language of these statutes. Additionally, Instruction *754No. 5 explained to the jury that not every taking of property amounts to a theft. The instruction informed the jury that “[a] person may wrongfully taken [sic] another’s property through mistake or under the onest [sic] belief that he has a legal right to take possession of it, in which case the taking would not be a crime____” The evidence at trial was conflicting as to whether Tolman had authorized Caldwell to sell any of her property. Accordingly, the jury could have found the existence of such authority. However, the evidence was undisputed that Caldwell was not authorized to keep the proceeds, even if he had authority to sell any of Tolman’s property. Tolman testified that Caldwell never gave her the money derived from the sale of her property. Caldwell did not present any evidence to contradict that statement. In fact, testimony from Tolman’s husband, called as a witness by Caldwell, corroborated Tolman’s statement that she indeed had not received any money from Caldwell. Furthermore, Caldwell’s girl friend and the bartender, called also as defense witnesses, both testified that Caldwell was supposed to give Tolman the money.
I disagree with my colleagues’ view that the instructions limited the jury’s consideration of Caldwell’s guilt or innocence solely to a theory of larceny. Any sale by Caldwell, without remitting the proceeds to Tolman, would constitute an unauthorized transfer of Tolman’s interest in her property. Appropriately, as instructed under I.C. § 18-2403(3) and based upon uncontradicted evidence, the jury could, and did, find Caldwell guilty of theft. Therefore, I am not persuaded that the anticipated new evidence from Tolman’s nephew — to the effect that Tolman’s memory may have been impaired by intoxication or that Tolman had authorized Caldwell to sell her property— would “probably produce an acquittal” on retrial. The order granting a new trial should be reversed and a judgment of conviction entered.