Court Opinion

ID: 9792567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:30:51.5536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:43.636767
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority affirms the trial court’s award of attorney fees concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The entire majority opinion is premised on an assumption that the trial court understood that it could exercise discretion under I.C. § 12-121.
The trial court, as disclosed by its memorandum decision, apparently felt it had no discretion and was mandated by statute to award fees to the “prevailing party,” the trial court’s decision reading in part,
“When the parties were considering whether to bring, defend or settle this case, the state of the law was that the prevailing party was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. They should be held to have known the law and to have made case conduct decisions with relation to it.” (Emphasis added.)
The actual state of the law at that time was that attorney fees rested in the sound discretion of the trial court pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. Minich v. Gem State Developers, 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078 (1979), concerned attorney fees on appeal; however, the court recognized that the statutory power (I.C. § 12-121) is discretionary and attorney fees will not be awarded as a matter of right. Since this court’s opinion in Minich, we have addressed the issue of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 numerous times. It is within the discretion of the trial court and such award will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Palmer v. Idaho Bank & Trust of Kooskia, 100 Idaho 642, 603 P.2d 597 (1979); Odziem*68ek v. Wesely, 102 Idaho 582, 634 P.2d 623 (1981); White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1, 644 P.2d 323 (1982); Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982).
To argue, as the majority does, that the paragraph involved is only one part of a meticulous memorandum decision ignores the fact that it is the only portion of the decision dealing with the trial judge’s understanding of the state of the law on the issue.
It appears from the memorandum decision in this case that the trial court determined that it had no discretion, but rather felt compelled to award attorney fees as a matter of right to the prevailing parties. Therefore, the judgment of the district court should be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for a re-determination of attorney fees, pursuant to its right to exercise its discretion on the issue of whether any attorney fees need be awarded the prevailing party.