Court Opinion

ID: 9611065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:51:38.882599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:09.611991
License: Public Domain

Lewis, Chief Justice
(dissenting) :
The sole issue in this case is whether an automobile insurer can be joined as a defendant in an action against an *775insured when automobile liability insurance has been statutorily mandated. The majority hold that such a joinder may not be accomplished. I disagree.
The well established common law of this State was most recently articulated in Dobson v. American Indemnity Company, 227 S .C. 307, 87 S. E. (2d) 869 (1955).
(1) The long-established rule of our decisions is that the fact that a defendant is protected from liability in an action for damages by insurance shall not be made known to the jury. The reason of the rule is to avoid prejudice in the verdict, which might result from the jury’s knowledge that the defendant will not have to pay it. Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S. C. 236, 75 S. E. 533. Cox v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp., 191 S. C. 233, 196 S. E. 549. Haynes v. Graham, 192 S. C. 382, 6 S. E. (2d) 903.
(2) Exception to the rule obtains when the insurance is required by statute or ordinance. Sec. 10-702, Code of 1952. It was said in Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., 203 S. C. 119, 26 S. E. (2d) 406, 407; “The right of joinder of insurer and insured under policies of compulsory liability insurance in actions by third persons based upon negligence of the insured, is settled in this State.”
While it is true that the aforementioned rule has generally been applied to common carriers, the majority has cited no precedent rejecting a joinder of an automobile insurer as here proposed. Our precedent only involves common carriers due to the previous statutory requirements of mandatory insurance which was unique to common carriers. I note no implication in those cases that there is some special significance to the involvement of a common carrier. Application of our long tradition requires inquiry of whether liability insurance is required by statute or ordinance, and not an inquiry of whether a common carrier is involved, as suggested by the majority.
*776Since the' South Carolina Automobile Reparation Reform Act of 1974, Section 56-11-10, et seq., Code of Laws of-South Carolina requires the procurement of insurance or security as a condition precedent to acquisition of a vehicle registration, compulsory liability insurance has clearly been statutorily mandated in this State. As a result, the exception to the general rule applies because of the mandatory nature of liability insurance.
In addition, careful analysis indicates that no reason exists for application of the general rule that the existence of liability insurance shall not be made known to the jury. At-temps by the judiciary to keep such knowledge from the jury would be futile. “This is a public act and every citizen is presumed to have public knowledge of it. In a case of this nature, it would be practicably impossible to keep knowledge of it from the jury.” Benn v. Campbell City Coach Co. et al., 162 S. C. 44, 160 S. E. 135 (1931).
Finally, the majority implies a further distinction between insurance required for common carriers and private motor vehicles because other forms “. . . of security in lieu of such a liability insurance policy . . . are permitted for automobiles.” This Court previously held in Bryant v. Blue Bird Cab Co. et al., 202 S. C. 456, 25 S. E. (2d) 489 (1943), that such a distinction is without merit due to the public knowledge of the statute. Also, see Benn, supra. I would adhere to this precedent.
Accordingly, the decision of the lower court to allow joinder should be affirmed.