Court Opinion

ID: 9642226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:52:34.886578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:44.773891
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority, in its holding that “Any possible misunderstanding of the phrase [in the course of committing theft] would have been more restrictive than the statutory definition, and could only have been to appellant’s benefit,” has not properly considered the facts of this cause.
The undisputed facts in this cause reflect that the appellant, while in an S.H. Kress Company store in San Antonio, was seen by Delores Rossel, an employee of the store, shoplifting merchandise. Realizing that he had been seen, appellant fled the premises, but was pursued by Andre Dominquez, a fellow employee of Rossel, into an alley near the store. Appellant made no threats while inside the store. However, Domin-quez testified that in the alley appellant “flashed” a knife toward him, causing Dom-inquez to return to the inside of the store. Appellant in his testimony denied “flashing” a knife toward Dominquez in the alley. Appellant was subsequently arrested at a location away from the store. The arresting officers returned him to the store for identification purposes. After appellant was returned to the store, he made threatening remarks to both Rossel and Domin-quez.
Appellant was charged with the offense of robbery, with one element alleging that he intentionally and knowingly threatened and placed Dominquez in fear of bodily injury and death while in the course of *411committing theft of property from Rossel. The statutory phrase, “in the course of committing theft,” was not defined in the jury charge. Thus, although the jury was instructed that they had to find that the threat to Dominquez occurred in the course of committing theft, it was not informed what the phrase, “in the course of committing theft,” legally means.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals correctly ruled that such omission was so prejudicial to the appellant that it was error calculated to injure the rights of the appellant, and ordered the conviction reversed. That Court stated the following: “It is not a matter of common understanding that the meaning of ‘in the course of committing theft’ may encompass conduct that occurs, as it did here, after the theft already had been completed. As a result, the jurors were instructed to decide' whether appellant’s threats occurred ‘in the course of committing theft,’ but were not apprised that this element could be satisfied by evidence that appellant was in flight from completed theft. Without an awareness of the fact that such circumstances could constitute robbery, there is a substantial likelihood that the jury could have been misled into convicting appellant for robbery by finding him guilty of the elements of the offense of theft.” The San Antonio Court, in reaching its holding, used this Court’s panel decision of Rohlfing v. State, 612 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), as its linchpin.
Rohlfing, Id., held that such omission was not fundamental error because, of the three statutory meanings of the phrase, “in the course of committing theft,” only the second meaning, “during the commission of theft,” could have been applied to the facts of that cause. However, the facts here reflect that the jury could have found that the appellant committed the offense of theft from Rossel during which time appellant made no threats, but could have believed appellant’s testimony that no threats were made in the alley, and also believed that appellant made threats after he was returned to the store by the arresting police officers.
I will now return to the parable mentioned in Rohlfing, Id.* Here, the jury was told they had to find it [in the course of committing theft] in order to convict appellant, but were not told what it [in the course of committing theft] looked like. I believe that it is reasonable that the twelve jurors in this cause, being without sufficient guidance in the form of an instruction defining the phrase, “in the course of committing theft,” may very well have done in their deliberations what the six blind men of Nepal eventually did. However, they also may have arrived at their own definition of the phrase. Regardless, it would be *412presumptious for members of this Court to say what definition, if any, they used.
The majority by its opinion appears to imply that a reasonable interpretation or definition of the phrase, “in the course of committing theft,” would be limited to “the commonly understood meaning” of the phrase. The majority, however, does not explain what the “commonly understood meaning” of the phrase might be as distinguished from the statutory definition; merely concluding that the “commonly understood meaning” does not clash with the statutory definition. It also concludes, without any explanation, that “Any possible misunderstanding of the phrase would have been more restrictive than the statutory definition, and could only have been to appellant’s benefit.”
Without benefit of any discussion by the majority in its opinion, I must conclude that it is holding that a reasonable definition of the phrase comports with the statutory phrase and the jury, being composed of reasonable persons, used the reasonable definition of the phrase. This, of course, clashes with the fact that as I interpret the opinion of the Court of Appeals, that Court also applied a reasonable or “common understanding” meaning to the phrase, and concluded that “It is not a matter of common understanding that the meaning of ‘in the course of committing theft’ may encompass conduct that occurs, as it did here, after the theft already had been completed.”
What all of this means to me is that like the twelve justices involved in the California decisions of People v. Carroll, 1 Cal.3d 581, 83 Cal.Rptr. 176, 463 P.2d 400 (Sup.Ct.Cal.1970), also see People v. Carroll, 80 Cal.Reptr. 807 (Cal.Ct.App., Second Dis., Division 4, 1969), where they were concerned with the meaning of the phrase “during the commission of a robbery,” but could not unanimously agree upon a definition or meaning for that phrase, I believe it is unfair to the lay persons who served as the jury in this cause to attribute to them a particular definition of the phrase, “in the course of committing robbery.” On the other hand, the collective majority, composed of wise and astute individuals, may only be holding that the three justices of the San Antonio Court of Appeals, who composed the panel that wrote its opinion, were not, as they are, more reasonable thinking men.
In any event, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion and its holding, whatever that may be.

 The parable found in Rohlfing comes to us from Edmund C. Berkeley’s “The Six Blind Men of Nepal,” which is contained in his work Ride the East Wind. The parable concerned six blind men, each of whom had heard conflicting stories about a great beast, which trumpeted and was called the elephant. The elephant roamed the jungles of the lowlands of Nepal. The six blind men decided to make an investigation of just what the elephant looked like and the six thereafter ventured forth into the jungle. They subsequently found an elephant, which was asleep but soon awakened. Before the elephant awakened, each managed to touch the elephant. However, when the elephant awakened, the six blind men fled to safety. After they had returned to safety, they continued to argue over what they had come into contact with, with each making a conclusion, to-wit: one believed the elephant was like a tree trunk because he had felt the elephant’s leg; one believed the elephant was like a string because he had felt the tail; one believed the elephant was like paper because he had felt the ear; one believed the elephant was like bone because he had felt the tusk; one believed the elephant was like a pig because he had felt the body; and one believed the elephant was like a snake because he had felt the trunk. The six blind men finally agreed upon six propositions: 1) By straining their imagination, they could imagine an animal that had two, or perhaps three, of these properties; 2) But they could not possibly conceive of an animal that had all six of these properties; 3) Therefore, as a beast, the elephant was impossible; 4) Certainly, it was as legendary as the unicorn or the griffin; 5) The trumpeting they had heard was undoubtedly a jungle illusion, that happened from time to time in the jungles of the lowlands of Nepal; and 6) Henceforth, they would forbid all discussion of the elephant — to avoid arguments, friction, and the waste of time.