Court Opinion

ID: 9790803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:59:42.361549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.732224
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
specially concurring in the judgment only:
We granted certiorari in this case to determine “whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over the [husband] prior to 1989 and that In re Marriage of Wolford, 789 P.2d 459 (Colo.App.1989) [holding that In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47 (Colo.1988), could not be applied retroactively], was not applicable to this case.” I agree with the majority’s conclusions that the “trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over the husband in 1983 under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of dividing all marital property,” op. at 738, and that our decision in In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47 (Colo.1988) (holding that military pensions constitute marital property), “may not be applied retroactively.” Op. at 740.
In my opinion, however, the majority unnecessarily goes beyond the scope of our grant of certiorari by analyzing whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4) (1988) (the Act). Instead of analyzing whether personal jurisdiction existed under the Act, we should simply hold that the *741Act’s jurisdictional provisions were inapplicable to the present case and that the court of appeals erred when it relied on the Act's provisions in its decision.
10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1982) provides:
Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.
(Emphasis added.)
10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4) (1982) provides:
A court may not treat the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member in the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court.
(Emphasis added.)
A plain reading of the statute indicates that a prerequisite to applying the jurisdictional provisions in the Act is that a state must first recognize that a military pension is property. In 1988, 1984, and 1985— during which time the wife filed the dissolution of marriage petition, the trial court issued its permanent orders, and the husband filed a motion and personally appeared in court — Colorado did not recognize military pensions as “property.” Ellis v. Ellis, 191 Colo. 317, 319, 552 P.2d 506, 507 (1976) (holding that “military retirement pay is not ‘property’ under the dissolution of marriage act”).
The jurisdictional provisions in the Act did not apply to the dissolution proceeding in this case because Colorado did not recognize military pensions as marital property until this court’s decision in In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47 (Colo.1988). Thus, the court of appeals erred when it relied on the Act to determine whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the husband for purposes of dividing the military pension in 1983.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice ROVIRA and Justice ERICKSON join in this special concurrence in the judgment only.