Court Opinion

ID: 2963454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:10:06.213642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:41.425380
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2281

                            HECTOR GUZMAN-RIVERA, ET AL.,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                             HECTOR RIVERA-CRUZ, ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                [Hon. Gilberto Gierbolini, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                           __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Jose R.  Gaztambide, with  whom Luis  A. Plaza  and Elisa  Bobonis
            ___________________             ______________      ______________
        Lang were on brief for appellants.
        ____
            Victoria A. Ferrer, with whom Alvaro  R. Calderon, Jr. and  Alvaro
            __________________            ________________________      ______
        R. Calderon, Jr. Law Offices were on brief for appellees.
        ____________________________

                                 ____________________

                                     May 31, 1995
                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES, Senior  Circuit Judge.  This  is the second
                      BOWNES, Senior  Circuit Judge.
                              _____________________

            time that this civil rights action has been before us.  After

            being arrested,  convicted, and imprisoned for  a murder that

            he  did not  commit, plaintiff-appellee Hector  Guzman Rivera

            (joined  by several  family  members) sued  the Secretary  of

            Justice  of  Puerto Rico  and  two  other Justice  Department

            officials  under   42  U.S.C.     1983,   alleging  that  the

            defendants failed  to timely  reinvestigate the facts  of the

            murder after his conviction, and that they failed to move for

            his release  even after their  investigation had  established

            his innocence.

                      In  Guzman-Rivera v.  Rivera-Cruz, 29  F.3d  3 (1st
                          _____________     ___________

            Cir.  1994)  (Guzman I),  we  reversed  the district  court's
                          ________

            dismissal of Guzman's suit on statute of limitations grounds.

            The  defendants  did  not  assert  absolute  immunity  as  an

            alternative ground for affirmance, although that  defense had

            been raised below.  On remand, just six days before trial was

            scheduled to  begin, the  defendants filed an  "Urgent Motion

            for  Relief" seeking  summary judgment  on  absolute immunity

            grounds.  We  are left  to wonder why  absolute immunity  was

            originally  pled  as  a  defense, abandoned  in  the  initial

            appeal, and then resurrected as an emergency on remand.

                      The  district court nevertheless  denied the motion

            on  the merits, finding genuine issues of material fact as to

            the nature of the defendants' post-conviction activities.  We

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                                          2

            therefore  do  not  consider  the absolute  immunity  defense

            waived;  it is  the sole  issue on  appeal.   From  the facts

            presented in this appeal, we find that the defendants are not

            entitled to absolute immunity  for any delays or inadequacies

            in  their  conduct  of  the investigation.    We  also  find,

            however,  that they  are  absolutely immune  for their  post-
                                                                    ____

            investigation  failure  to go  into  court  to seek  Guzman's

            release.

                                          I.
                                          __

                      We  shall assume, as we did in Guzman I, 29 F.3d at
                                                     ________

            5, that the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the defendants'

            authority, duties, acts and omissions are true, and that they

            are  sufficient to allege a violation of federal rights.  See
                                                                      ___

            Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2609 (1993).
            _______    ___________

                      Guzman was convicted of  a 1987 murder in Carolina,

            Puerto Rico, and sentenced to 119 years' imprisonment on June

            27, 1989.  Beginning  on August 21, 1989, his  father, Guzman

            Fernandez, repeatedly  corresponded  with  or  met  with  the

            defendants:   Hector  Rivera Cruz,  the Secretary  of Justice

            (Puerto Rico's equivalent of  a state attorney general); Luis

            Feliciano  Carreras,  Director  of the  Justice  Department's

            Prosecutor's Office and a  high-ranking official of the Civil

            Rights  Division;  and  Carreras'  successor,  Pedro Geronimo

            Goyco. Based on his own investigation, which yielded powerful

            evidence  that  his   son  was  innocent,   Guzman  Fernandez

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            requested  that  defendant Luis  Feliciano  Carreras  order a

            reinvestigation of the murder.   Carerras referred the matter

            to an attorney with the Civil Rights Division, but refused to

            do anything more.

                      After several  months  of stonewalling,  the  Civil

            Rights   Division   finally   investigated   Guzman's   case.

            Investigators interviewed  three of  the true  murderer's co-

            conspirators,   who  unanimously   stated  that   Guzman  was

            innocent.  The head of the Civil Rights Division reviewed the

            findings of  the investigation and concluded  that Guzman was

            innocent.  Defendants Pedro  Geronimo Goyco and Hector Rivera

            Cruz refused, however, to move for Guzman's release until the

            murderer was captured.

                      On  June 11,  1990,  Guzman Fernandez  told of  his

            son's plight on Puerto Rico television.  Several  days later,

            he appealed to  the Governor  of Puerto Rico.   The  Governor

            allegedly ordered defendant Geronimo Goyco to release Guzman.

            The defendants instructed Guzman's attorneys to file a motion

            for a new trial under Rule 192.1 of the Puerto  Rico Rules of

            Criminal Procedure.  The  motion was filed on June  15, 1990,

            and Guzman was released the same day.

                                         II.
                                         ___

                      Qualified  immunity  is   the  defense   ordinarily

            available  to public officials who are sued under 42 U.S.C.  

            1983.  Absolute  immunity, by contrast,  is reserved for  the

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                                          4

            "'special  functions'" of  certain  officials  that  resemble

            functions  that would have been  immune at common  law when  

            1983 was enacted.  Buckley, 113  S. Ct. at 2613 (quoting Butz
                               _______                               ____

            v.  Economou,  438 U.S.  478,  508 (1978)).    In determining
                ________

            whether a particular act fits within the common-law tradition

            of absolute  immunity, the Supreme Court  takes a "functional

            approach," Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991), examining
                       _____    ____

            "'the nature of the function  performed, not the identity  of

            the  actor who performed  it.'"  Buckley, 113  S. Ct. at 2613
                                             _______

            (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)).
                     _________    _____

                      Under the  functional  approach, it  is  immaterial

            that the  defendants were  prosecutors ex officio.   Absolute
                                                   __ _______

            immunity protects the prosecutor's "'role as advocate for the

            State,'" and not  his or  her role as  an "'administrator  or

            investigative  officer.'"   Burns, 500  U.S. at  491 (quoting
                                        _____

            Imbler  v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.  409, 430-31, 431 n.33 (1976)).
            ______     ________

            Prosecutorial  conduct is  absolutely  immune only  if it  is
                                                          ____

            "intimately   associated  with  the  judicial  phase  of  the

            criminal  process  .  . .  ."    Imbler, 424  U.S.  at 430-31
                                             ______

            (holding that state prosecutor  had absolute immunity for the

            initiation and  pursuit of a criminal  prosecution, including

            presentation  of  the  state's  case  at  trial).    See also
                                                                 ___ ____

            Buckley,  113 S.  Ct. at  2614; Celia  v. O'Malley,  918 F.2d
            _______                         _____     ________

            1017,  1019 (1st  Cir. 1990)  ("a prosecutor  enjoys absolute

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                                          5

            immunity from suit  based on  actions taken  pursuant to  his

            quasi-judicial function").

                      We  begin by  dividing  the defendants'  challenged

            conduct into two  phases:   (1) the delay  in performing  the

            post-trial  investigation, including any  inadequacies in the

            investigation itself; and (2)  the failure to go to  court to

            obtain   Guzman's   release  after   the   investigation  had

            established his innocence.  As the defendants  moved from (1)

            to (2),  and as the  evidence of Guzman's  innocence mounted,

            their acts  became increasingly associated  with the judicial

            phase of the criminal process.  To illustrate:  once Guzman's

            innocence was  established, the  defendants could obtain  his

            release  only  by filing  a  motion to  dismiss  the criminal

            action,  or by acquiescing in  Guzman's own motion  for a new

            trial.    Looking  backwards  from this  endpoint,  we  might

            characterize   (1),  the   post-trial  investigation,   as  a

            preparatory  step  for  (2),  the in-court  exercise  of  the

            prosecutorial function.

                      The defendants seem to think that absolute immunity

            extends  to all  conduct that  facilitates the  prosecutorial

            function.   The functional analysis, however,  requires us to

            draw  a  line  between  preparatory conduct  that  is  merely

            administrative or  investigative,  and that  which is  itself

            prosecutorial.   For  example,  some,  but not  all,  of  the

            prosecutor's preparatory acts in initiating a prosecution and

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                                          6

            presenting  the  State's case  are  absolutely  immune.   See
                                                                      ___

            Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431  n.33; Burns, 500 U.S. at  492-96 (no
            ______                         _____

            absolute  immunity for  prosecutor's  legal advice  to police

            that there was probable cause for an arrest); Buckley, 113 S.
                                                          _______

            Ct.  at   2615-17  (no  absolute  immunity  for  prosecutors'

            conspiracy  to  manufacture  false evidence  that  was  later

            introduced at grand jury  proceedings and at trial, or  for a

            prosecutor's  out-of-court  statements to  the  press).   Cf.
                                                                      ___

            Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th
            ________    ______________________

            Cir. 1991) ("[A]bsolute  immunity may  attach even to  . .  .

            administrative   or   investigative  activities   when  these

            functions are necessary so that  a prosecutor may fulfill his
                          _________

            function  as  an officer  of  the  court.") (emphasis  added;

            citations  and  internal  quotation   marks  omitted).    The

            prosecutorial nature of an act does not spread backwards like

            an inkblot, immunizing everything it touches.  See Burns, 500
                                                           ___ _____

            U.S.  at 495 ("Almost  any action by  a prosecutor, including

            his or  her  direct  participation  in  purely  investigative

            activity, could  be said  to be  in some  way related to  the

            ultimate  decision whether  to prosecute,  but we  have never

            indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive.").

                      We  do  not  think  that absolute  immunity  should

            extend  to  the  preparatory  conduct  in  this  case.    The

            investigators  of the  Civil  Rights Division,  whose actions

            have been  imputed to  the defendants, actively  gathered and

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                                          7

            corroborated  evidence  of  Guzman's  innocence.   These  are

            functions   typically  performed   by  police   officers  and

            detectives.      By   contrast,  the   prosecutor-as-advocate

            "evaluat[es]   evidence  and  interview[s]  witnesses  as  he
             ___________                                           ______

            prepares  for trial  . . .  ."   Buckley, 113 S.  Ct. at 2616
            ___________________              _______

            (emphasis added).  It is not the prosecutor's usual office to

            uncover evidence in the first instance, before s/he has cause

            to  initiate a post-trial  judicial proceeding.   And  to the

            extent  that prosecutors do so act, they are not performing a

            function "intimately  associated with the  judicial phase  of
                                                       ________

            the  criminal  process .  . .  ."   Imbler,  424 U.S.  at 430
                                                ______

            (emphasis added).

                      Our functional analysis draws  upon Buckley, a pre-
                                                          _______

            trial  immunity  case,  in  which the  Supreme  Court  denied

            absolute  immunity  to  prosecutors  who   had  conspired  to

            manufacture false evidence before there was probable cause to

            arrest  the  suspect.     "When  a  prosecutor  performs  the

            investigative  functions normally performed by a detective or

            police  officer, it  is neither  appropriate  nor justifiable

            that, for the same  act, immunity should protect the  one and

            not the other."  Id. at 2616 (citation and internal quotation
                             ___

            marks  omitted).    The   prosecutors  in  Buckley  were  not
                                                       _______

            functioning as advocates  for the state, but  in an "entirely

            investigative"  capacity, inasmuch  as  they lacked  probable

            cause to arrest the  suspect or initiate judicial proceedings

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                                          8

            during  that  period.   Id.   "A  prosecutor neither  is, nor
                                    ___

            should  consider himself  to be,  an  advocate before  he has

            probable cause to have anyone arrested."  Id.
                                                      ___

                      This  case  mirrors   Buckley  in  the   post-trial
                                            _______

            context.  It is undisputed  on appeal that no post-conviction

            proceeding was  pending  at  the  time of  the  civil  rights

            investigation.   Although  the investigation  ultimately gave

            the  defendants   cause  to  move  to   reopen  the  criminal

            proceedings -- i.e., to resume their role as "advocate[s] for
                           ____

            the [Commonwealth]," Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 -- this was
                                 ______

            only  one of  several possible  outcomes.   The investigation

            might  have found nothing at all.   Or, it might have exposed

            evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, such as the withholding

            of  potentially  exculpatory  material,  but   no  conclusive

            evidence of Guzman's innocence.  Neither result would require

            the  defendants  to  perform  a  quasi-judicial  function  in

            Guzman's  case.  Only with  the benefit of  hindsight can the

            defendants  marry  the investigation  to  the  exercise of  a

            quasi-judicial function.   See Buckley,  113 S.  Ct. at  2616
                                       ___ _______

            (noting  that prosecutors  lacked "probable  cause  . .  . to

            initiate  judicial   proceedings"  during  period   of  their

            challenged   conduct).     Accordingly,   the   civil  rights

            investigation  had  only  an  attenuated  and contingent,  as

            opposed to "intimate[]," association with the judicial  phase

            of the criminal process.  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
                                      ______

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                                          9

                      We  note  several other  reasons for  not extending

            absolute  immunity to any delays or inadequacies in the civil

            rights investigation.  First, "the official seeking  absolute

            immunity bears the  burden of showing  that such immunity  is

            justified  for the function in question."  Burns, 500 U.S. at
                                                       _____

            486.  The defendants here have not identified  any historical

            or common-law support for  extending absolute immunity to the

            conduct  of  a  civil   rights  investigation  that  is  only

            contingently  associated  with  the  judicial  phase  of  the

            criminal process.  "Absent a tradition of immunity comparable

            to the common-law  immunity from malicious  prosecution," the

            Supreme  Court  has "not  been  inclined  to extend  absolute

            immunity  from liability under    1983."  Id.  at 493 (citing
                                                      ___

            Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)).
            ______    ______

                      Second,  to  the extent  that  the  defendants were

            functioning as  officials of the Civil  Rights Division, they

            were not acting purely as advocates for the Commonwealth, but

            partly to vindicate Guzman's civil rights.  The mixed purpose

            of the  civil rights  investigation reflects the  defendants'

            own  mixed functions.   This  factor  also tends  to separate

            their  conduct  from  the  judicial  phase  of  the  criminal

            process.

                      Third,   had  the  defendants   been  civil  rights

            officials only, it seems unlikely that they would be entitled

            to  absolute  immunity for  the  investigation  itself.   The

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                                          10

            defendants should  not enjoy  absolute immunity for  the same

            conduct  merely  because  they  happen  also  to  direct  the

            Prosecutor's  Office.  Cf. Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 (finding it
                                   ___ _____

            "incongruous to  allow prosecutors  to  be absolutely  immune

            from  liability for giving advice to the police, but to allow

            police  officers only  qualified immunity  for following  the

            advice");  Buckley, 113 S. Ct.  at 2617 n.6  ("If the police,
                       _______

            under  the guidance  of  the prosecutors,  had solicited  the

            allegedly 'fabricated'  testimony .  . .  they  would not  be

            entitled to anything more than qualified immunity."); Houston
                                                                  _______

            v. Partee,  978 F.2d  362, 367 (7th  Cir. 1992)  (prosecutors
               ______

            who, acting  solely as  investigators, acquired and  withheld

            exculpatory evidence after their  role in the prosecution had

            ended,  are  "not entitled  to  any  more immunity  than  the

            defendant police  officers"), cert.  denied, 113 S.  Ct. 1647
                                          _____  ______

            (1993).

                      Finally, although every denial of absolute immunity

            potentially exposes prosecutors to additional litigation, our

            analysis  cannot be  driven  by "a  generalized concern  with

            interference with an official's duties  . . . ."  Burns,  500
                                                              _____

            U.S.  at 494.   "Absolute  immunity is  designed to  free the

            judicial  process  from   the  harassment  and   intimidation
            _________________

            associated  with  litigation."    Id.   It  is  reserved  for
                                              ___

            "actions  that are  connected with  the prosecutor's  role in

            judicial  proceedings,  not  for   every  litigation-inducing

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                                          11

            conduct."   Id.    We think  that  the defense  of  qualified
                        ___

            immunity is  sufficient to protect prosecutors  who, like the

            defendants,   conduct   a   post-conviction,   civil   rights

            investigation.

                                         III.
                                         ____

                      These   considerations   do   not  apply   to   the

            defendants'  failure to  move for  the dismissal  of Guzman's

            case  at the  close of  the investigation.   Guzman  does not
                                                                      ___

            allege that the defendants withheld exculpatory evidence from

            him,  thereby delaying his own  motion for a  new trial.  See
                                                                      ___

            Houston,  978 F.2d  at 365  (denying absolute  immunity where
            _______

            claim was  based squarely on failure  to disclose exculpatory

            evidence to the  defense).  In  effect, the plaintiffs'  sole

            post-investigation claim is that  the defendants failed to go

            to court as prosecutors to undo Guzman's conviction.

                      Even if it were  shown that the defendants reviewed

            the evidence,  found Guzman innocent, and  did nothing, their

            decision  withal not to dismiss his criminal case lies at the

            heart of the prosecutorial function.  See Imbler, 424 U.S. at
                                                  ___ ______

            431  n.33 (noting  that  the duties  of  a prosecutor  as  an

            advocate  for  the  State  include the  decision  whether  to

            dismiss an indictment  against particular  defendants).   Cf.
                                                                      ___

            Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 42 n.3 (1st  Cir. 1992) (the
            __________    ____

            decision  to prosecute or not falls  within "the precise zone

            of decision-making the Supreme Court has placed at the center

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                                          12

            of the immunity doctrine").   After all, the decision  not to

            dismiss  complements the initial  decision to  prosecute, and

            the  prosecutor's absolute  immunity for  the latter  is well

            settled.   For the reasons cited in  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-
                                                 ______

            27,  dismissal decisions  fit  within the  same tradition  of

            common law immunity as  charging decisions; both are entitled

            to  absolute  immunity under    1983.    Otherwise, a    1983

            plaintiff   would   simply  recast   a  suit   for  malicious

            prosecution as one for failure to dismiss.

                      Although  the alleged omission is reprehensible, we

            hold  that the  defendants are  absolutely immune  from civil

            damages  liability for  their  post-investigation failure  to

            move for Guzman's release.

                                         IV.
                                         ___

                      Because   the  undisputed   facts  show   that  the

            defendants are  not entitled  to absolute immunity  for their

            conduct  of  the  civil  rights  investigation,  the district

            court's  order  denying the  defendants'  motion for  summary

            judgment is affirmed.   The case is remanded  for proceedings
                        ________                ________

            consistent with this opinion.

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