Court Opinion

ID: 9681283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:47:20.570253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:33.049555
License: Public Domain

GRAY, Justice.
Appellant sued appellee for damages to a one story concrete building owned by appellant and located in the City of Winters, Texas. It was alleged that the damage was caused by an explosion of dynamite set off by appellee’s agents near the building which explosion “threw large rocks and debris onto and against Plaintiff’s building, thereby breaking several panes of glass in the windows of Plaintiff’s building, chipping out a corner portion of Plaintiff’s building and causing a long crack in the upper part of the South wall.” In the alternative appellant alleged that appellee’s agents were negligent in setting off one blast in which an excessive amount of dynamite was used and which blast caused “earth tremors and vibration” causing a long crack in the upper part of the south wall of the building.
The blasting was being done by appellee’s agents in an effort to level some concrete blocks which were formerly the foundation for a gin located on a block near appellant’s building. More dynamite was used in one blast than was used in the others and it appears that appellant asserts that this blast caused his alleged damages.
The trial was to a jury. The jury made findings favorable to appellee, one of which was that an excessive amount of dynamite was not used in “such explosion.” Upon the jury’s findings, a judgment was rendered that appellant take nothing.
Appel1 ant here complains that the trial court erred in excluding from the jury, upon appellee’s objection, the testimony of witnesses showing the damage done by the explosion to a building other than that of appellant, such damage being caused by rocks thrown against the building. This building was constructed of sheet iron on a wooden frame. It fronted north, had wooden doors at its front and was located across the street and south about sixty feet from the explosion. It housed a welding or blacksmith shop and will be later referred to as the shop.
Appellant’s building was located north or northwest about 100 feet from the explosion.
The excluded evidence was to the effect that the explosion threw rocks and concrete against the shop, that its doors were demolished and large holes were torn in its walls.
The deposition of appellee’s agent who set off the blast was offered in evidence by appellant. Upon objection of appellee that part of his deposition wherein he identified the explosion that damaged the shop was excluded from the jury. This witness testified that he set off more than one blast and that in one of them he used more dynamite than he used in the others. It appears that this later blast is the one that damaged the shop and is alleged to have caused appellant’s damage.
The excluded evidence was offered to show “the force of the blast and its destructive power.”
In Linforth v. San Francisco Gas & Electric Co., 156 Cal. 58, 103 P. 320, the Supreme Court of California considered the question of damages resulting from an explosion of gas. The Court held that evidence showing that the force of the explosion was such as to injure adjoining houses other than the house of the plaintiff was admissible and competent evidence for the plaintiff. Similar holdings were made by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lynne, 199 Ala. 631, 75 So. 14, and in Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Scott, 185 Ala. 641, 64 So. 547. Also, see: 25 C.J. p. 208, Sec. 43; 35 C.J.S., Explosives, § 11.
In Linforth v. San Francisco Gas & Electric Co., supra [156 Cal. 58, 103 P. 323], the Court took notice of the rule announced in decisions, one of which is Fitzsimons & Connell Co. v. Braun, 199 Ill. 390, 65 N.E. 249, 59 L.R.A. 421, which are to the effect that it is not error to exclude evidence that property other than that of the plaintiff, and located at various distances from the damaged property, was not damaged by the explosion on the theory that the admission of such evidence would tend to introduce *772collateral issues likely to mislead or confuse the jury. The 'Court said:
“The damage that was actually done by an explosion is one thing; the damage that was not done is quite another.”
and that proof of the later would tend to add nothing. In Hickey v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 95 S.W. 763, 764, it was held proper to admit, over objection, evidence that
“ * * * certain persons who were near by when the explosion of dynamite occurred, of which the plaintiff complains, and which he claims caused the injuries for which he seeks in this suit to recover damages, some of said persons being nearer and some farther from said explosion than plaintiff, were not hurt by said explosion, and that a certain small engine with delicate glass tubes and other frail appliances, which was within 15 feet of said explosion, was in no manner injured by said explosion; * *
to show that
“ * * * the concussion produced was not as great in extent as appellant’s evidence would indicate and that it was not sufficient to cause the injury.”
 It is our opinion that the admissibility of the excluded evidence depends on whether or not it is relevant to the issues as made by the pleadings. If it tends to either prove or disprove those issues, or if it throws light thereon it is relevant and admissible. 17 Tex.Jur. pp. 338-339, Secs. 106 and 107. The pleadings put in issue damages cause by a trespass, or, in the alternative, damages caused by the force of the explosion. The excluded evidence would have tended to throw light on either of these issues and should have been admitted.
Because of the error complained of the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.