Court Opinion

ID: 3309105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 17:22:55.509436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:01.340650
License: Public Domain

I agree with all that is said by Justice Henshaw in his opinion, except the part relating to the so-called "secondary boycott" and the attempt to draw a distinction between the compulsion of third persons caused by picketing, and the compulsion of third persons produced by a boycott. My views concerning the "secondary boycott" are *Page 81 
expressed in my dissenting opinion in Parkinson v. BuildingTrades Council, 154 Cal. 581, [98 P. 1027, 98 P. 1040]. The means employed for the coercion or intimidation of a third person in a "secondary boycott" are unlawful whenever they are such as are calculated to, and actually do, destroy his free will and cause him to act contrary to his own volition in his own business, to the detriment of the person toward whom the main boycott or strike is directed; in other words, whenever the means used constitute duress, menace, or undue influence. Whether this coercion or compulsion comes from fear of physical violence, as in the case of picketing, or from fear of financial loss, as in the "secondary boycott," or from fear of any other infliction, is, in my opinion, immaterial, so long as the fear is sufficiently potent to control the action of those upon whom it is cast. I can see no logical or just reason for the distinction thus sought to be made. There is no such distinction in cases where contracts or wills are declared void, because procured by duress, menace, or undue influence. There should be none where actual injury is produced or threatened through such means acting upon third persons. Nor do I believe any well-considered case authorizes any such distinction. The opinions in the case ofNational Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, [88 Am. St. Rep. 671, 63 N.E. 369], are devoted to a discussion of the right to strike and the limitations of that right and not to a discussion of the "secondary boycott." A close analysis of the cases on the subject will, as I believe, show that this court stands alone on this point.
For these reasons I do not agree to that part of the judgment directing a modification of the injunction. I believe that it should stand in the form as given by the court below. *Page 82