Court Opinion

ID: 9601368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:42:41.605108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:57.058277
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in part in the judgment:
I agree with the majority that Singh’s claim against Lawyer 1 is barred because he did not exhaust administrative remedies, but I would remand the res judicata issue to the district court. Under the compulsion of precedent, I am required to agree with the majority’s jurisdictional determination with respect to Singh’s claim against Lawyer 2.
I write separately because I doubt there is a constitutional ineffective assistance doctrine that applies in immigration proceedings and recommend that our court reconsider the issue en banc. If there were no such constitutional right in this case, Singh could not show that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution ... of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), and the district court’s dismissal of the claim against Lawyer 2 would not be error.
Because “deportation and removal proceedings are civil, they are not subject to the full panoply of procedural safeguards accompanying criminal trials, including the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (quotations and citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (giving persons in removal proceedings “the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by ... counsel[ ] authorized to practice in such proceedings”). Where “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney ...., a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Singh bears the risk of Lawyer 2’s error resulting in a procedural default. See id. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546.
This makes sense because the effective assistance of counsel is not necessary to render immigration proceedings “full and fair,” Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir.1999) (quotations and citation omitted), which is all that is required by the Fifth Amendment’s due pro*981cess guarantee. For Singh, “[t]he civil remedy is damages for malpractice, not a re-run of the original litigation.” Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir.2005); see also Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir.2006) (“We may assume, without having to decide because the issue is not raised, that the Board’s decision to allow aliens to claim ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for reopening deportation proceedings is within the scope of the Board’s discretionary authority even though it is probably not compelled by statute or the Constitution.” (quotations and citation omitted)).
Our court has mistakenly incorporated a criminal case constitutional right into civil cases. This has unnecessarily complicated an already overburdened immigration enforcement process. I suggest our court reconsider this questionable rule.