Court Opinion

ID: 9765271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:57:40.465313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:07.207589
License: Public Domain

BATTAGLIA, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority interprets Sections 1, 9 and 15, Article II of the Maryland Constitution in conjunction with the language of Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and holds that an appeal from a denial of a temporary restraining order is appropriate,1 that members of the Public Service Commission *615(“PSC”) are “civil officers” within the meaning of Section 15, and erroneously abrogates the centuries old doctrine of “checks and balances” which this Court, from the time of Article IPs inception, has recognized to be a part of our organic law which has defined the prerogatives and parity of the Legislative and Executive branches in Maryland. More specifically, the majority ignores the settled Maryland constitutional principle, set forth in several opinions by the Court, that the appointment and removal of statutory officers is not intrinsically or inherently an executive function, and is entirely subject to the authority of the General Assembly.
The majority assumes that the PSC Commissioners are “civil officers” within the meaning of Section 15, Article II of the Maryland Constitution. In fact, under our jurisprudence, it is highly doubtful that the PSC Commissioners are civil officers for purposes of Section 15.2
*616The leading case with regard to whether an individual is a “civil officer” or “public officer” under Section 15, Article II of the Maryland Constitution is Board of County School Commissioners of Worcester County v. Goldsborough, 90 Md. 193, 44 A. 1055 (1899). In Goldsborough, this Court was asked to determine whether a county school commissioner was subject to removal by the Governor for incompetence or misconduct under Section 15, Article II of the Maryland Constitution. The dispositive question the Court addressed was whether the commissioners were “civil officers” within the provisions of Section 15, Article II of the Maryland Constitution, the same constitutional provision with which we grapple in this case. Initially, we evaluated the term “civil officer” in the context of Section 13, Article II of the Maryland Constitution, which at the time provided that “all civil officers appointed by the governor and senate ... except in cases otherwise provided for in this constitution, shall ... continue for two years.” Id. at 202, 44 A. at 1056. Because the school commissioners were appointed to six-year terms, adopting a two-year criteria would mean that the Governor could remove the commissioners at any time, because they were not constitutionally protected. Goldsborough, 90 Md. at 202, 44 A. at 1056. To avoid this conundrum, we chose to define civil officers for the purposes of Section 15 of Article II as “government agents” who had to be vested individually with a portion of the state’s sovereignty. Id. at 207, 44 A. at 1058-59 (“It was manifestly not the purpose of the Legislature to confer upon the school *617commissioners, as individuals, the powers, or to impose upon them, personally, the duties, which in explicit terms, and by the use of exact language, the General Assembly committed to boards that were called into corporate existence expressly to conduct the school system.... [W]e hold that a school commissioner is not a civil officer.... ”).
Although our Constitution has been amended, effectively eliminating the two-year requirement, see Maryland Constitution Sections 5 and 13, Article 17, as the majority recognizes, Goldsborough’s definition of civil officer under Section 15 of Article II as an individual who must personally exercise the state’s sovereign power has been acknowledged and reaffirmed by this Court even after the constitutional changes. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. Fallon, 203 Md. 534, 544, 102 A.2d 284, 288 (1954) (stating that exercising sovereign power is “the most important characteristic of a public office”), quoting Buchholtz v. Hill, 178 Md. 280, 283, 13 A.2d 348, 350 (1940) (“The most important characteristic of a public office, as distinguished from any other employment, is the fact that the incumbent is entrusted with a part of the sovereign power to exercise some of the functions of government for the benefit of the people.” (citing Goldsborough, supra)). In 1963, this Court clearly reaffirmed Goldsborough in Howard County Metropolitan Commission v. Westphal, 232 Md. 334, 193 A.2d 56 (1963), by stating:
The essential question in Goldsborough was whether or not a member of a board of county school commissioners was a civil officer subject to removal by the Governor under § 15 of Article II of the Constitution. The holding was that a school commissioner was not such an officer. Insofar as the reasoning in that case rested on the premise that a member of a school board is not a civil officer because he could exercise the power of the board only as a member thereof and not as an individual, we think the reasoning should not be extended so as to apply to the meaning of the term ‘office of profit, created by the Constitution or Laws of this State,’ as used in Article 35 of the Declaration of Rights, which is *618the constitutional provision with which we are here concerned.
Westphal, 232 Md. at 340-41, 193 A.2d at 60. We continue to recognize Goldsborough’s efficacy. Despite any constitutional amendments that may have vitiated the concerns raised in Goldsborough, the primary characterization of a civil officer in its holding is abiding; a civil officer must individually exercise the sovereign power of the state.
In the case sub judice, the PSC Commissioners do not have individual power to exercise the state’s sovereignty; the PSC is the entity given the power to act under the Public Utility Companies Article. Maryland Code (1998), Section 2-101 of the Public Utility Companies Article. Comparable to the Goldsborough “corporate” board of school commissioners, the individual PSC Commissioners cannot act unless the PSC is convened. Therefore, under our jurisprudence, the PSC Commissioners are not civil officers under Section 15, Article II of the Maryland Constitution.
The majority’s greatest foible, however, is in its treatment of the primary issue before this Court, whether the enactment of Senate Bill 1, by which the Legislature removed the PSC Commissioners, constituted an encroachment by the Legislature on the gubernatorial powers enumerated in Sections 1, 9 and 15, Article II of the Maryland Constitution, and a violation of Section 8 of the Declaration of Rights’ separation of powers.3
*619Aristotle’s principles, explored by John Locke, and later pragmatically structured by Baron de Montesquieu, are generally credited as the mainstay of the separation of powers doctrine. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L.Rev.2073, 2093 n. 59 (2005) (recognizing that the American government’s three distinct branches originate from a fusion of concepts found in Aristotle’s The Politics, John Locke’s The Second Treatise of Government, and Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws)-, Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 1343, 1371 n. 96 (2005) (observing that the traditional theory of separation of powers originated from the writings of John Locke and Montesquieu). See M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 134 (2d ed., Liberty Fund 1967) (“Locke and Montesquieu provided the intellectual ammunition by which the separation of powers could be advanced as a principle more fundamental than that of mixed government.”); Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional Development In The South Atlantic States, 1776-1860: A Study in the Evolution of Democracy, 81 (DaCapo Press 1971) (1930) (“Montesquieu had formulated the doctrine [of separation of powers] .... The people accepted these views and believed that, unless the legislative, executive, and judicial powers were separated ... there could be no political liberty.”); Dan Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual and Conceptual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era State Declarations of Rights of Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, 33 Rutgers L. J. *620929, 988 (2002) (“Historians generally credit Montesquieu for developing and promoting the concept of the separation of powers.”). See also Dep’t of Transport, v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 77-78, 532 A.2d 1056, 1062 (1987) (“Steeped in the political theories of Montesquieu and Locke, those who framed the constitutions of our states and of the federal government believed that separating the functions of government and assigning the execution of those functions to different branches was fundamental to good government and the preservation of civil liberties.”); Mayor of Baltimore, supra, at 472 (Le-Grand, C.J., concurring) (“[I]n the true sense of Montesquieu, in this [State], as in each of the other States of the confederacy, the powers of government have been parceled out to be exerted by separated and distinct departments.”); Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 476 (1829) (noting that Article Vi’s mandate that the powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches be separate and distinct was adopted from Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws).
In Montesquieu’s treatise, The Spirit of Laws, first published in English just twenty-eight years prior to the adoption of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights,4 he depicted a government consisting of three distinct branches of government: the legislature, which was to enact, amend, or abrogate the law; the executive, which was to execute the law; and the judiciary, which was to punish criminals and determine disputes between individuals. 1 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 181.
To preserve the integrity of the these distinct branches, Montesquieu favored a government in which each respective branch’s powers remained separate from the powers of the other two:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body or magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehension may arise, lest the *621same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.

Id.

A facet of Montesquieu’s vision of the separation of powers was his recognition that the legislative branch is the closest to and most representative of the people:
As in a free state, every man who is supposed a free agent, ought to be his own governor; so the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people. But since this is impossible in large states, and in small ones is subject to many inconveniences; it is fit the people should act by their representatives, what they cannot act by themselves. The inhabitants of a particular town are much better acquainted with its wants and interests, than with those of other places; and are better judges of the capacity of their neighbors, than of that of the rest of their countrymen. The members therefore of the legislature should not be chosen from the general body of the nation; but it is proper, that, in every considerable place, a representative should be elected by the inhabitants.
Id. at 183-84.
This delineation of these three branches of government is but one aspect of the separation of powers doctrine. Integral to this doctrine is a powerful system of “checks and balances,” whereby the legislative and executive branches are vested with power sufficient to “check” the other branch’s powers in order to maintain their separation. Montesquieu envisioned that:
[t]he legislative body being composed of two parts, one checks the other, by the mutual privilege of [annulling a resolution taken by another]. They are both checked by the executive power, as the executive is [checked] by the legislative.
Id. at 189. The executive “checks” the legislature through such means as controlling the timing and duration of its *622assemblage and the power to veto legislative acts, while the legislature would have the ability to check the executive by “examining in what manner its laws have been executed.” He contended that, only by a series of “checks” on the respective branches’ powers could their separation be maintained. Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of the American Constitution, 18 Pepp. L.Rev. 1, 19-20 (1990).5
*623The system of checks and balances which fits tongue and groove with the notion of separation of powers of the legislative and executive bodies complimented the colonial experience, as recognized by Professor Carpenter in his treatise, The Development of American Political Thought, when he stated:
Across the black morass of English political corruption the principles of Montesquieu loomed to American statesmen all the more vividly. The doctrine of the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances appeared not only correct as theories but also fitted in with colonial experience.
William Seal Carpenter, The Development of American Political Thought 51 (1930), and also by William Penn, the founding father of Pennsylvania, who observed that:
It ha[d] always been the favorite maxim of princes, to divide the people, in order to govern them; it is now time that the people should avail themselves of the same maxim, and divide power among their rulers, in order to prevent their abusing it.
William Penn, No. 2 (Jan. 3, 1788), reprinted in 1 The Founder’s Constitution 324 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lefner eds., 1987).
Thus, many of the colonists campaigned for the incorporation of the doctrine of separation of powers and its auxiliary system of checks and balances into the new Maryland government, as reflected in the “militia resolves” of the Freemen of Anne Arundel County published in the Maryland Gazette in July of 1776, just four months before the adoption of the Maryland Declaration of Rights:
It is essential to liberty, that the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive powers of Government be separate from each other; for where they are united in the same person, or number of persons, there would be wanting that mutual, check which is in the principal security against their making of arbitrary laws, and a wanton exercise of power in the execution of them.
*624Bruce Worthing, Letter to Charles Carroll, Barrister, Samuel Chase, Thomas Johnson, William Paca, and Charles Carroll, Esquire, Delegates in Convention for Anne Arundel County, The Maryland Gazette, July 18, 1776 (emphasis added). The separation of powers and checks and balances are now the foundation of Maryland’s government. See Bergman, supra, at 25 (“[T]he separation of powers principle had been central to the establishment of the governments of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina. Combined with a doctrine of checks and balances, it had become a staple of the American political creed.”) (emphasis added).
It is within this historical context that we must address the gravamen of this case; whether Maryland’s system of separation of powers and checks and balances provides the Executive branch with the inherent power to select and remove civil officers serving in legislatively-created offices. It does not. Chief Judge Robert Murphy, writing for this Court in Commission on Medical Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 435 A.2d 747 (1981), clearly and definitively differentiated the gubernatorial power to execute the law, which is an inherent executive function, from the power of appointment, which is not an intrinsic executive function:
In answer to the contention that the power of appointment was ‘an intrinsic executive function,’ beyond the legislature’s authority, the Court observed: ‘The Legislature makes the laws, the Judiciary expounds them, and the Governor sees that they are faithfully executed.... It does not follow, as a necessary conclusion, that, in order to perform this duty, the Governor must have agents of his own nomination. Our form of government, in its various changes, has never recognized this power as an executive prerogative.
Id. at 409-10, 435 A.2d at 757 (emphasis added). In recognizing this differentiation, Chief Judge Murphy, writing for a unanimous court, relied on over two-hundred years of precedent.
The first discussion of the legislative authority to appoint officers as embraced in Article II of the Constitution, within *625the context of the Declaration of Rights, occurred in Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854). In that case, our predecessors considered the constitutionality of a law abrogating the power of the Governor to appoint an inspector of bark6 and rejected the Petitioner’s argument that the act was an encroachment by the Legislature on the Executive’s power to appoint. We explained that Section 11, Article II7 does not reserve the power to appoint civil officers exclusively for the Governor, but instead
means, simply, that the Governor shall have the power to fill all offices in the State, whether created by the Constitution or by Act of Assembly, unless otherwise provided by the one or the other.
Id. at 161 (emphasis added). Thus, when the Legislature has delegated the power of appointment to the Governor, the Legislature can remove that power to appoint. Hence, because the office of the inspector of the bark was a legislatively-created office:
\I]t can be modified, controlled or abolished, and within these general powers is embraced the right to change the mode of the appointment to the office. We have only to add, that as the legislature has the power to withdraw the authority to appoint from the Governor, the mode pointed out by the Act of 1854, by which inspectors under that Act are to be designated and qualified, was a constitutional exercise of the legislative power.
Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
In Baltimore v. State, supra, one of the most cited cases in our jurisprudence,8 this Court squarely addressed an alleged *626conflict between the power of the Executive branch to appoint civil officers and the power of the Legislature to control the offices which it had created. In Baltimore, the General Assembly had repealed all laws regarding the Baltimore City police force and enacted new legislation vesting the power to recreate and maintain the police force in a newly created commission, reserving to itself the power to appoint the commissioners. The Mayor and City Council objected and alleged that the Act was an encroachment by the Legislature on the Executive’s power to appoint the commissioners and therefore a violation of the Declaration of Rights’ mandatory separation of powers.
In addressing this argument, we clearly opined that the power of appointment is not inherently an executive function:
We are not prepared to admit that the power of appointment to office is a function intrinsically executive, in the sense in which we understand the position to have been taken; namely, that it is inherent in, and necessarily belongs to, the executive department.
Baltimore, 15 Md. at 455 (emphasis added). To the contrary, we stated that:
[I]t is no where intimated that another department, than the executive, cannot exercise the power.... And, indeed, here it is admitted, that the executive cannot act where other modes of appointment are prescribed by the Constitution. It is true that certain powers are peculiar to each department, as their designations import the Legislature makes the laws, the Judiciary expounds them, and the Governor sees that they are faithfully executed; but even in this duty *627he is restrained in some degree, because they must be enforced according to the Constitution and laws, and not at his will and discretion. It does not follow, as a necessary conclusion, that, in order to perform this duty, he must have agents of his own nomination. Our form of government, in its various changes, has never recognized this power as an executive prerogative.
Id. at 456 (citations omitted). Thus, we explicated that the Legislature, in creating a new commission to administer the Baltimore City police force, retained the ability to pass legislation affecting the appointment of the commissioners:
[t]he Constitution surely designed to repose some discretion in the Legislature, both over the mode of appointment, and the propriety and necessity of passing any law on the subject to which the exercise of the power might relate.
Id. at 460. Clearly, we recognized this legislative prerogative as a “check[] upon the improper exercise of the appointing power if left in the hands of the Governor alone,” id. at 459 (emphasis added), because the power to appoint commissioners “belongs where the people choose to place it,” id. at 457, and because “such power had been exercised by the Legislature, from the earliest period of the government.”9 Id. at 461.
*628Since Baltimore, this Court consistently has iterated that the Executive does not have the inherent power of appointment and, most importantly, that the Legislature has the power to abolish, modify and control any office that it has created. In Stillman, supra, a case which the majority addresses peripherally, we answered the question of whether the Legislature’s delegation of the power to appoint commissioners serving on the Commission on Medical Discipline to a private organization, violated the gubernatorial power provisions of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine in the Declaration of Rights. Chief Judge Murphy, writing for this Court, summarized this Court’s jurisprudence and succinctly and clearly articulated that the power of appointment is not an intrinsic executive function, but rather, that the Legislature can modify, control, and abolish any office it has created:
[This question] was considered by the Court in Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854), and Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376 (1860). In Davis, the question was whether, under this constitutional provision, the legislature could provide for appointment to an office created by statute. [We] [c]onclud[ed] that it could....
* * *
In Baltimore, the Court reconciled the interpretation in Davis with the separation of powers provision contained in *629the Declaration of Rights. In answer to the contention that the power of appointment was ‘an intrinsic executive function,’ beyond the legislature’s authority, the Court observed: ‘(T)he Legislature makes the laws, the Judiciary expounds them, and the Governor sees that they are faithfully executed.... It does not follow, as a necessary conclusion, that, in order to perform this duty, the Governor must have agents of his own nomination. Our form of government, in its various changes, has never recognized this power as an executive prerogative.’ 15 Md. at 456. The Court in Baltimore said that the Constitution ‘so far from treating ... the appointment power as an inherent executive power, indicates that it belongs where the people choose to place it.’ Id. at 457. Addressing the separation of powers question, the Court concluded: ‘In considering the question as to separation of the departments, we are to bear in mind that the Declaration of Rights is not to be construed by itself, according to its literal meaning; it and the Constitution compose our form of government, and they must be interpreted as one instrument.... The former announces principles on which the government, about to be established, will be based. If they differ, the Constitution must be taken as a limitation or qualification of the general principle previously declared, according to the subject and the language employed.’ Id. at 459 (citation omitted in original).
In Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865), the Court considered a provision of the Maryland Constitution of 1864 which was also identical to Art. II, § 10 of our present Constitution. In holding that the legislature could constitutionally provide for appointment to an office created by it, notwithstanding the separation of powers provision of the Declaration of Rights, the Court said: ‘The Act in question, creating the office, does prescribe a different mode of appointment. Where the office is of legislative creation, the Legislature can modify, control or abolish it, and within these powers is embraced the right to change the mode of appointment.’ Davis v. State, 7 Md. at 161.’
*630Hi * *
In Scholle v. State, 90 Md. 729, 46 A. 326 (1900), the Court interpreted Art. II, § 10 of the present Maryland Constitution in accordance with the holding in the Davis, Baltimore, and Baker cases. It is thus clear that when the legislature creates an office by statute, as it did in § 130(a), the separation of powers provision of Article 8 does not of itself prevent the legislature from placing the power of appointment in the hands of someone other than the Governor. As stated in Scholle, when the legislature has created an office by statute, it ‘can designate by whom, and in what manner the person who is to fill the office shall be appointed.’ 90 Md. at 743, 46 A. 326.
Stillman, 291 Md. at 409-411, 435 A.2d at 757-58. See also Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 116, 371 A.2d 1094, 1102 (1977) (stating “that if the General Assembly may abolish an office of its creation, then there is no vested right in an office of other than constitutional stature which would prevent changing the qualifications of office during the term”); Buchholtz, 178 Md. at 287, 13 A.2d at 352 (“ ‘The Governor has no power of appointment except as expressly provided by the Constitution or statute; and if he attempt to make an appointment without such express authority, that appointment would simply be without effect.’ ”) quoting in turn Smoot v. Somerville, 59 Md. 84, 93 (1882); Riggin v. Lankford, 134 Md. 146, 153-55, 105 A. 172, 173-74 (1918) (holding that the Governor did not have to obtain the consent of the Senate for the appointment of a candidate when the first candidate had been rejected by the Senate, the Senate was not in session at the time that the second candidate was appointed, and because the Legislature, which created and therefore controlled the office, did not require by statute that the Governor seek the Senate’s approval in those circumstances); McCurdy v. Jessup, 126 Md. 318, 320-27, 95 A. 37, 38-40 (1915) (holding that the requirement that the county seek recommendations for appointments to a civil office from a private corporation was not constitutionally repugnant because, where the office was created by the Legislature, the Legislature retains the control over that *631office’s method of appointment); Purnell v. State Board of Education, 125 Md. 266, 270, 93 A. 518, 520 (1915) (holding that the Legislature, which created the State Board of Education, has the power to abolish, modify, and control it, and therefore had the power to do away with the prerequisite that the Senate affirm the Governor’s appointments of all commissioners serving on the Board); Ash v. McVey, 85 Md. 119, 129-31, 36 A. 440, 441-42 (1897) (holding that the Governor had no power to make the appointment of officer of the school commissioner for Cecil County without the consent of the Senate when the office was not vacant because the Legislature, which had created and therefore controlled the office, had not delegated that power to the Governor); Warfield v. Com’rs of Baltimore County, 28 Md. 76, 84 (1868) (holding that a law creating a public office and providing for the officer’s compensation, mode of payment thereof, and mode of appointment, could be modified or abolished by the Legislature at any time). Cf. County Comm’rs of Calvert County v. Monnett, 164 Md. 101, 105-07, 164 A. 155, 156-57 (1933) (holding that the prohibition of Section 35, Article III against the increase or diminution of compensation for public officers applied to the treasurer of Calvert County, and therefore, even though the Legislature retained the power to alter or abolish the office, it could not change the treasurer’s salary while in office).
The majority’s haste to formulate an opinion which is result-orientated has caused it to overlook the fact that the denial of a temporary restraining order is not appealable, that the PSC members are not “civil officers” for the purposes of Section 15, Article II of the Constitution if they are not vested with a portion of the state’s sovereignty to individually act for the public good, and, most importantly, that the gubernatorial powers enumerated in Sections 1, 9 and 15, Article II do not divest the Legislature of its power to create, control, modify, and abolish any office which it has created. To the contrary, this Court has consistently said that the power to appoint and remove civil officers is not inherently executive, not even with respect to the Governor’s own appointees, but also may be *632exercised by the Legislature if the office itself is a legislative creation. The PSC is an example of such an office, and therefore, the Legislature has the power to regulate fully its Commissioners, a power which includes the ability to fire them. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

. The majority posits that a denial of a temporary restraining order is appealable under Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.VoL), Section 12-303(3)(iii) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article by superimposing the definition of temporary restraining order in Rule 15-501(c) to the statute. That juxtaposition is erroneous; we cannot confer the right to appeal upon ourselves, because as we have held, "the right of appeal is entirely dependent upon statutes.” State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 76, 785 A.2d 1275, 1284 (2001); Id., 785 A.2d at 1284 ("[Q]uestions of appealability have today become entirely governed by statutes.”), overruling Cardinell v. State, 335 Md. 381, 644 A.2d 11 (1994). See also State v. Manck, 385 Md. 581, 597, 870 A.2d 196, 205 (2005); Mateen v. Saar, 376 Md. 385, 399, 829 A.2d 1007, 1015 (2003); Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 247-49, 808 A.2d 795, 797 (2002).
The Supreme Court has interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1292, which is the counterpart of Section 12-303(3)(iii) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, see Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 244 Md. 141, 149-50, 223 A.2d 168, 173 (1966) (stating that Maryland Code (1957), Section 7 of Article 5 making certain interlocutory orders appealable-which would later become Maryland Code, Section 12-303 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article — "has a counterpart” in 28 U.S.C. § 1292), and acknowledged that a denial of a temporary restraining order is not appealable. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Am. Fed'n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 1301, 1303-04, 105 S.Ct. 3467, 3468, 87 L.Ed.2d 603, 605 (1985). Other federal courts have recognized only one exception to the nonappealability, that being if the denial of the temporary restraining order effectively disposes of the litigation. See Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir.2002) (acknowledging that denial of motion for temporary restraining order is not appealable unless "it is tantamount to a ruling on a preliminary *615injunction”); First Eagle Sogen Funds, Inc. v. Bank for Int’l Settlements, 252 F.3d 604, 607 (2d. Cir.2001) (noting that denial of motion for temporary restraining order is not appealable unless the order "effectively disposes of the litigation”); Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 1058, 1062 (10th Cir.1998) (observing that denial of motion for temporary restraining order is not appealable unless appellant will suffer irreparable harm absent immediate review “and 'might have a serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence' ”); Hunt v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that denial of motion for temporary restraining order is not appealable unless it effectively decides the merits of the case); Robinson v. Lehman, 771 F.2d 772, 782 (3d Cir.1985) (stating that denial of motion for temporary restraining order is not appealable unless it "decides the merits of the case or is equivalent to a dismissal of the claim”).

. Inclusion of the portion of oral argument regarding the abolition of the Court of Special Appeals and the removal of its judges on pages 530-32, 907 A.2d 181-82 of the majority opinion is provocative. The dialogue is misleading because it incorrectly suggests that the Legislature may not only have the power to abolish the Court of Special Appeals but also to remove the judges sitting thereon. While the Legislature could abolish the Court of Special Appeals, Maiyland Constitution Section 14A, Article IV ("The General Assembly may by law create such intermediate courts of appeal, as may be necessary.”), it could not remove the judges from office because the judges, through the Constitution, are protected from legislative removal, with the exception of impeachment. Maryland Constitution Article IV, Section 4 ("Any Judge shall be removed from office by the Governor, on conviction in a *616Court of Law, of incompetency, of wilful neglect of duty, misbehavior in office, or any other crime, or on impeachment, according to this Constitution----”); Maryland Constitution Article IV, Section 5A(d) ("The continuance in office of a judge of the Court of Special Appeals is subject to approval or rejection by the registered voters of the geographical area prescribed by law at the next general election following the expiration of one year from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy which he was appointed to fill, and at the general election next occurring every ten years thereafter.”); Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.) Section 1-701 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article ("A judge’s salary may not be diminished during his continuance in office.”). Therefore, the graphic suggestion that the Legislature could terminate the employment of the judges on the Court of Special Appeals is without foundation.

. Furthermore, the motives for the Legislature’s action in enacting Senate Bill 1 are questioned by the majority opinion. See, e.g., ("Senate Bill 1 and the proceedings during which it was enacted, make clear that the primary focus of the Bill was to remove members of the Public Service Commission.”); (The General Assembly’s decision to terminate the current Commissioners was purely for the purposes of controlling or supervising the Commission it created as an Executive Branch agency.”); ("[Tjhe primary, if not sole, reason for the passage of the Section 12 of the Act was to fire, i.e., 'remove,' the Commissioners because of the Legislature's disapproval of their actions while in office.”). This Court has previously determined that it is improper to consider what we perceive to be the Legislature’s motivations when assessing constitutionality. See Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376, 461 (1860) ("[Wjhile the motives of the Legislature can have no *619effect upon the efficiency of the laws, neither can they be regarded by the judiciaiy when testing their power to pass them."). See also Pack Shack, Inc., 377 Md. at 71, 832 A.2d at 179-80 (2003) ("generally courts adhere to the familiar principal of constitutional law that [a] Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”) (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 106 S.Ct. 925, 929, 89 L.Ed.2d 29, 38 (1986), quoting in turn United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1682, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 683 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

. The Spirit of Laws was first published in 1748, see Vile, supra, at 131. Maryland adopted its Declaration of Rights on November 3, 1776. Proceedings of the Conventions of the Province of Maryland, Held at the City of Annapolis in 1774, 1775, & 1776, at 310.

. Many of the checks proposed by Montesquieu are embodied today in Maryland’s Declaration of Rights and Constitution. See, e.g., Md. Deck of Rights Art. 7 (providing that the people’s right to participate in the Legislature is the foundation of free government, and is secured by free and frequent elections); Md. Const. Art. 2, § 16 (granting the Governor the power to convene the Legislature, or just the Senate, in times of emergency, and when the Legislature’s safety is in question, to move the Legislature to a safer location); Md. Const. Art. 2, § 17 (granting the Governor the power to veto legislative acts, and the Legislature the power to over-ride the Governor’s veto). See also Md. Deck of Rights Art. 1 ("Government ... originates from the People ... and they have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their Form of Government”); Md. Deck of Rights Art. 29 ("[Sjtanding Armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised, or kept up, without the consent of the Legislature.”); Md. Deck of Rights Art. 34 ("[A] long continuance in the Executive Departments of power or trust is dangerous to liberty; a rotation, therefore, in those departments is one of the best securities of permanent freedom.”); Md. Deck of Rights Art. 35 (”[N]o person shall hold, at the same time, more than one office of profit, created by the Constitution or Laws of this State.”); Md. Const. Art. 2, § 6 (granting the Legislature the power to declare Governor or Lieutenant Governor unable to perform duties of his office by reason of physical or mental disability); Md. Const. Art. 2, § 7 (giving the Legislature the ability to impeach the Governor and Lieutenant Governor); Md. Const. Art. 2, § 24 (mandating that, if the Governor establishes new executive programs, the programs be submitted to the Legislature for approval); Md. Const. Art. 3, § 30 (requiring presentment of all legislative bills to the Governor); Md. Const. Art. 4, § 3 (granting the Legislature the power, with the approval of Governor, to retire a judge who is unable to perform his duties with efficiency due to continued sickness or physical or mental infirmity); Md. Const. Art. 4, § 4 (granting the Legislature the power to remove a judge by impeachment, and the Governor the power to remove a judge for incompetence, wilful neglect of duty, misbehavior in office, or other crime); Md. Const. Art. 4, § 5A (delegating the authority to appoint a person to fill vacancy on an appellate court until election to the Governor, upon the advice and consent of the Senate,); Md. Const. Art. 4, § 41D (delegating the authority to the Governor to, upon advice and consent of the Senate, appoint District Court judges).

. The inspector of bark was authorized to inspect ground black-oak bark, which was intended for exportation at the Port of Baltimore. 1821 Md. Laws. Chap. 77.

. This provision of the Constitution was moved in 1867 to Article 2, Section 10 of the Maryland Constitution. Md. Const. Art. 2, § 10 (1867).

. See, e.g., Benson v. State, 389 Md. 615, 642, 887 A.2d 525, 540 (2005); Prince George’s County v. Aluisi, 354 Md. 422, 432, 439, 731 A.2d 888, *626894, 898 (1999); McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272, 284, 701 A.2d 99, 104 (1997); Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Driver, 336 Md. 105, 118, 647 A.2d 96, 103 (1994); Harford County v. Univ. of Maryland Medical System Corp., 318 Md. 525, 528, 569 A.2d 649, 651 (1990); State v. Smith, 305 Md. 489, 511-12, 505 A.2d 511, 522 (1986); Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 491, 348 A.2d 837, 846 (1975); Johnson v. Luers, 129 Md. 521, 530, 99 A. 710, 713 (1916); Beasley v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641, 647, 648, 650, 654, 656, 657, 658, 660, 52 A. 61, 62, 64, 65 (1902); Jackson v. State, 87 Md. 191, 194, 39 A. 504, 505 (1898).

. In ihe concurring opinion, Chief Judge Le Grande, acknowledged that the legislative prerogative to appoint had its origins in Montesquieu:
The Constitution and laws fix the boundaries within which their ministers must act. All action outside is forbidden as usurpation, and, therefore, tyranny. In all governments, having any just pretensions to be considered free, limits are established to authority, of whatever character it may be. ‘There can be no liberty,' says Montesquieu, ‘where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body of magistrates,’ or ‘of the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ The meaning of this, says Mr. Madison, is not that 'these departments ought to have no partial agency, or no control over the acts of each other,’ but amounts to this: 'That where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free Constitution are subverted.' But of this more hereafter. Suffice it for the present, that in the true sense of Montesquieu, in this, as in each of the other States of the confederacy, the powers of government have been parceled out to be exerted by separate and distinct departments.... *628Neither of the departments is absolutely sovereign in all things, but is only so within its proper limits. According to the theory on which our State government is founded, the people are recognized as the source of all governmental power. They are, in this sense, the true and only sovereigns. For their own good, they have authorized a body, chosen by themselves, to exercise, under certain prescribed limitations, the supreme power. This body is known, in common parlance, as the Legislature, and, except in cases prohibited, either by the Constitution of the United States or that of the State, is as free and competent to act in the passage of binding and effective laws as would be the people themselves, if they were acting in their primary and sovereign capacity as a pure democracy, restrained only by their sense of justice and expediency.
Id. at 471-72 (emphasis added).