Court Opinion

ID: 9649477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:55:26.6941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:24.204608
License: Public Domain

RAKER, Judge,
dissenting:
The trial court sentenced Bolden in Case No. 4557 for the sale of cocaine to 25 years’ incarceration. The court sentenced Bolden in Case No. 4558 on Count I, sale of cocaine, to 32 years’ incarceration, consecutive to the 25 years in No. 4557; on Count IV in No. 4558, sale of cocaine, the court sentenced Bolden to 40 years’ incarceration, consecutive to the sentence imposed in Count I. The total sentence imposed was 97 years’ imprisonment, at a single sentencing hearing.
*170The trial judge expressed the following rationale for the sentences:
COURT: ... Criminal # 4557 which was the earliest case tried on August 22nd, the minimum guideline would be twenty four (24) years so your sentences will be twenty-five (25) years to the division of corrections and that will be consecutive to any and all outstanding and unserved sentences.
% ij; ij:
That is count number one, the distribution of cocaine. That’s the flagship count there. Yes. In #4558 because these are subsequent to the other ones, your sentence has to be greater for each of these events than it was in the proceeding one and while there’s no magic in sentencing there is some symmetry to what I’m going to do. Thirty-two (32) years is halfway between twenty-five (25) and forty (40) roughly. So thirty-two (32) years to the division of correction. Under count number one is # 4558 is your sentence for that distribution. Yes, consecutive to any and all outstanding unserved sentences and consecutive to # 4557. Now if you haven’t earned the max by this time no one ever will. So the maximum I can give under # 4558 is forty (40) years under count number four which is your final distribution count that you’re subject to sentencing on. That forty (40) year sentence under count number four is consecutive also to the sentence in count number one in # 4558 and consecutive also to # 4557 as well as to all other outstanding and unserved sentences. That may well be the better part of your life. It’s ninety-seven (97) years or so. That’s what the public wants. If you end up serving most of it or dying in jail you’ve put yourself there. Better you should die in jail than other people die of cocaine on the street.
Before the Court of Special Appeals, Bolden argued that the sentence imposed in this case was cruel and unusual punishment under both the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the *171Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. That court agreed, and held in an unreported opinion that the total sentence imposed by the trial court was “ ‘cruel’ because it is ‘grossly disproportionate when measured against the offense and relevant surrounding circumstances....’” (Quoting Thomas v. State, 333 Md. 84, 92, 634 A.2d 1, 5 (1993).) Accordingly, the court vacated the entire 97-year sentence and remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing. In addition, the court vacated the conviction on Count IV in Case No. 4558 on the ground that the second distribution of drugs, some twenty minutes after the first and to the same undercover officer, was effectively a continuation of the initial offense, not warranting additional punishment. The State did not seek review in this Court on that holding; therefore this appeal addressed only the remaining 57 years. This Court reverses the Court of Special Appeals, holding that the sentences are not cruel and usual punishment.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for a new sentencing proceeding, but on different grounds. I would not reach the constitutional question, but would decide the case on non-constitutional grounds. This Court has generally followed the principle that “ ‘we will not reach a constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground.’ ” Secretary, Dep’t of Public Safety & Correctional Servs. v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 451, 718 A.2d 1150, 1156 (quoting Professional Nurses v. Dimensions, 346 Md. 132, 138, 695 A.2d 158, 161 (1997) (quoting State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 403-04 n. 13, 631 A.2d 453, 463 n. 13 (1993))). We should follow that principle in this case as well; as there is a valid non-constitutional ground upon which to affirm the Court of Special Appeals, there is no need for us to rale upon the constitutional issues.
I would reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new sentencing proceeding to permit the judge to reconsider the sentences in light of the fact that the Court of Special Appeals vacated the 40 year sentence, leaving only the 25-year and 32-year sentences. The sentencing judge made it *172crystal clear that “while there is no magic in sentencing, there is some symmetry to what I am going to do. Thirty-two (32) years is halfway between twenty-five (25) and forty (40) roughly. So thirty-two (32) years is to the division of correction.” As quoted above, the judge then explained his thinking in imposing the remaining sentence. Without the forty years, the trial court may conclude that the symmetry he sought to achieve was destroyed.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge ELDRIDGE have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed herein.