Court Opinion

ID: 9543909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:50:22.023686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:26.690992
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WOODWARD, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. The issue before this court is whether the decision of the trial judge to suppress the evidence derived from stopping the defendant was against the manifest weight of the evidence. As stated, the testimony of Officer Davis and the defendant was stipulated to by the parties. Davis admitted that he had not observed any traffic violations, and the defendant testified that he did not violate any traffic law. Davis stated that he observed the passenger in the defendant’s car yelling and motioning to the two juvenile females. Davis interpreted the gestures of the young women to mean that they wanted to be left alone; however, this was merely his conclusion. Davis had no idea what the passenger was saying to the young women, and therefore, he could not be certain that verbal harassment was taking place. The passenger did not get out of the defendant’s car, and there was no testimony that the defendant or his passenger was making threatening gestures but only that they were making gestures. There was no evidence indicating that the defendant and his passenger would continue to follow the two girls as they walked along. The evidence was that defendant’s passenger was merely trying to get the attention of the two girls because he thought he knew one of them. The two girls were, in fact, neighbors of the defendant’s passenger. On the basis of the above and foregoing evidence, the trial judge concluded that the police stop of the defendant was not warranted. There is no evidence to indicate that the young women were in any danger except the conclusion of Officer Davis. The trial judge by sustaining the motion to suppress determined that the conclusion of Officer Davis that the young women were in danger was not supported by the facts and circumstances prior to and at the time of the stop. The trial judge was in the best position to observe the conduct of the witnesses, to determine their credibility, and to weigh their testimony; yet the majority finds that the decision of the trial judge is against the manifest weight of the evidence based on the conclusion of Davis that the defendant’s passenger was “harassing the juveniles.” The trial judge had the right to disbelieve or disregard this conclusion as this was part of his duty in fairness to the State and the defendant. I cannot agree with the majority that comparing the facts of the instant case to those of People v. Garman (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 682, is an academic exercise. Clearly, the facts of the present case are far more favorable to this defendant than Garman facts were to that defendant. In Garman, two girls, whose ages were approximately 9 and 10, flagged down a patrol car at 10 p.m. in October (it was clearly dark, and there was no evidence that the street was well traveled). The two girls excitedly told the police officer that a man driving a car had yelled something to them and asked them to come over to his car. They were not sure what he had said, but they were frightened by him. Unlike the facts in the Garman case, the incident in this case occurred in broad daylight (6:45 p.m. daylight savings time) on May 18. The young women were older than thé complainants in the Garman case. Officer Davis did not stop or speak to the girls who continued to walk along Route 34. Defendant testified that he and his companion were not “harassing” the girls walking along the street but that his passenger was merely trying to get their attention because he thought he knew one of them. The majority states the girls were, in fact, neighbors of the defendant’s companion. In response to the words uttered by defendant’s passenger, the girls showed no fear but merely motioned indicating that they didn’t want anything to do with defendant’s passenger. The girls did not seek police protection, and the police officer did not know the identity of the girls or what had been said to them. Since two members of the Garman court determined that the facts did not give rise to a reasonable police stop, it is only logical that the facts of this case do not possibly support a legitimate stop by a police officer. From the foregoing facts, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the stop of defendant’s car was without probable cause and that the evidence arising therefrom should be suppressed. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s decision.