Court Opinion

ID: 9929907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 18:05:36.733614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:51.371092
License: Public Domain

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 1       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

 2 Opinion Number: _____________

 3 Filing Date: January 29, 2024

 4 No. A-1-CA-40083

 5 JARROD LOWREY,

 6         Plaintiff-Appellant,

 7 v.

 8 SINFY CASTILLO and JAVIER
 9 ARGUETA,

10         Defendants-Appellees.

11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
12 Nancy J. Franchini, District Court Judge

13 Jarrod Lowrey
14 Rio Rancho, NM

15 Pro Se Appellant

16 Jackson Loman Stanford Downey & Stevens-Block, P.C.
17 Eric Loman
18 Albuquerque, NM

19 for Appellees
 1                                      OPINION

 2 WRAY, Judge.

 3 {1}    Plaintiff Jarrod Lowrey appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of the

 4 complaint brought against Defendants Sinfy Castillo, a probation officer, and Javier

 5 Argueta, Defendant Castillo’s supervisor (collectively, Defendants), both employed

 6 by the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court (the Metro court). The complaint

 7 asserted unspecified causes of action relating to Defendants’ alleged misconduct in

 8 the supervision of a participant in a domestic violence early intervention program

 9 (EIP Participant), which is a Metro court treatment program. Defendants moved to

10 dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint based on Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA. The district court

11 granted the motion and determined in part that Defendants were protected by quasi-

12 judicial immunity. We conclude that the alleged misconduct arose from Defendants’

13 activities that were performed as an arm of the Metro court and their services

14 supervising the Metro court treatment program participants were integral to the

15 judicial process; quasi-judicial immunity permits Defendants to perform that judicial

16 function without fear of civil liability and sufficient procedural safeguards protect

17 against potential misconduct; and Defendants acted within the scope of their quasi-

18 judicial function. We therefore affirm.
 1 BACKGROUND

 2 {2}    Plaintiff’s complaint asserts the following. EIP Participant had been arrested

 3 for twice violating a domestic violence restraining order and agreed to participate in

 4 a preprosecution diversionary domestic violence early intervention program (the

 5 EIP) run by the Metro court. As part of the EIP, EIP Participant entered into two EIP

 6 agreements (EIP Agreements), which contemplated supervision by a probation

 7 officer and imposed a series of conditions. The conditions required EIP Participant

 8 to (1) report to the probation officer weekly or “as often as the probation officer may

 9 require”; (2) notify the probation officer of any change in address, employment, or

10 school status; (3) inform the probation officer of any missed counseling sessions or

11 treatment and explain any absences; (4) submit to drug and alcohol testing upon the

12 probation officer’s request; and (5) be truthful with the probation officer, the EIP

13 judge, and any counselor. Defendant Castillo was the probation officer who

14 supervised EIP Participant’s compliance with the EIP Agreements and the Metro

15 court’s conditions of release, and Defendant Argueta was Defendant Castillo’s

16 supervisor.

17 {3}    Plaintiff’s primary allegation is that Defendants’ failure to supervise EIP

18 Participant put Plaintiff, his minor son, other children, and the community at risk.

19 EIP Participant was living with Plaintiff’s ex-wife and her children, including

20 Plaintiff’s son. Concerned that EIP Participant was using drugs in the home while

                                              2
 1 living with the children, Plaintiff investigated EIP Participant and discovered that he

 2 was subject to the EIP Agreements and Defendants’ supervision. Plaintiff initially

 3 contacted Defendants to report violations of the EIP Agreements, which included

 4 the failure to notify the probation officer of a change of address, drug use, and

 5 contact with an assault victim. Specifically, Plaintiff reached out to Defendant

 6 Castillo “to see if she could assist . . . in removing [EIP Participant] from [Plaintiff’s]

 7 son’s house.” Defendant Castillo stated that “there was nothing she could do to get

 8 [EIP Participant] away from [Plaintiff’s] son” but did instruct EIP Participant to

 9 submit to a drug test, filed an EIP probation violation report, and participated in the

10 EIP probation violation hearing.

11 {4}    Plaintiff subsequently reported to Defendants additional violations by EIP

12 Participant, which included arrests, failure to appear in court, failure to obtain or

13 continue employment, perjury, and failure to submit to drug tests. Defendants

14 requested that Plaintiff prepare an affidavit detailing the information, and Plaintiff

15 complied. Thereafter, Defendants filed additional EIP probation violation reports

16 and affidavits, participated in the hearings, recommended that the Metro court

17 impose community service as sanctions, and required EIP Participant to submit to

18 additional drug tests. The Metro court ordered EIP Participant to perform community

19 service. Nevertheless, Plaintiff had an additional meeting with Defendants to

                                                3
 1 articulate his continued frustration with their supervision and his view that

 2 Defendants had misrepresented and minimized his reports to the Metro court judge.

 3 {5}    In Plaintiff’s words, Defendants “dismissed” Plaintiff’s concerns. Thereafter,

 4 Plaintiff filed a civil complaint against Defendants in district court and alleged that

 5 Defendant Castillo failed to (1) check more frequently on EIP Participant’s “living

 6 situation” and criminal records; (2) require more frequent drug testing; and (3) report

 7 accurately to the Metro court the information that Plaintiff had provided about EIP

 8 Participant’s potential probation violations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants created

 9 a dangerous situation for the community, himself, his son, and other children by

10 enabling EIP Participant’s “drug problems to persist” and “completely fail[ing] to

11 rehabilitate” him. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and argued, in

12 relevant part, that Defendants were an arm of the court and entitled to absolute

13 immunity from civil suit. The district court granted Defendants’ motion and

14 dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals.

15 DISCUSSION

16 {6}    Plaintiff first argues that the district court did not properly apply the

17 “functional approach” to determine whether Defendants were entitled to quasi-

18 judicial immunity and as a result, improperly dismissed the complaint, which leaves

19 no redress for the constitutional harm that Defendants’ alleged misconduct has

20 caused to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s son, other children, and the community. Plaintiff’s

                                              4
 1 second argument—that immunity results in the lack of redress of harm—challenges

 2 the long-standing policy-based decision by our courts to afford immunity to some

 3 actors under some circumstances. See Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 1991-NMSC-

 4 013, ¶¶ 18-19, 26, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (collecting immunity cases and

 5 applying immunity principles to guardians ad litem), abrogated on other grounds by

 6 State v. Mares, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 32, ___ P.3d ___ (S-1-SC-38948, Dec. 22, 2023).

 7 Specifically, our Supreme Court has afforded absolute immunity to individuals

 8 acting “within the scope of the appointment” as “an arm of the court.” Kimbrell v.

 9 Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, ¶ 8, 331 P.3d 915 (internal quotation marks and citation

10 omitted); see id. ¶ 11 (stating the rule set forth in Collins). As a result, we do not

11 reevaluate the legitimacy of the immunity doctrines but instead review the district

12 court’s application of immunity law to the present case. See Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-

13 027, ¶¶ 11-17 (adopting a framework for the applicability of immunity under the

14 circumstances). We “review questions of immunity de novo.” Hunnicutt v. Sewell,

15 2009-NMCA-121, ¶ 8, 147 N.M. 272, 219 P.3d 529. Where, as here, the question is

16 whether the district court erred by granting a Rule 1-012(B)(6) motion to dismiss,

17 we take “the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true and test the legal

18 sufficiency of the claims.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

19 {7}    Quasi-judicial immunity refers to the extension to quasi-judicial officers of

20 the well-settled law that a judge acting within their jurisdiction is entitled to absolute

                                               5
 1 immunity. Collins, 1991-NMSC-013, ¶¶ 17, 24. Absolute judicial immunity is

 2 afforded in order to protect judges “from harassment, intimidation, or other

 3 interference with their ability to engage in impartial decision-making.” Id. ¶ 18. It

 4 preserves the “autonomy and integrity of the judiciary” and is extended to quasi-

 5 judicial offers “so that persons who are integral to the judicial process are able to

 6 perform their functions without the intimidating effect of potential lawsuits.” Id. ¶ 24

 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Hunnicutt, 2009-NMCA-121, ¶ 9.

 8 Because we conclude that quasi-judicial immunity applies to a probation officer

 9 supervising participation in the Metro court EIP and Defendants did not act “clearly

10 and completely outside the scope” of their appointment as an arm of the court, we

11 agree with the district court that Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

12 Cf. Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 2, 22 (concluding that quasi-judicial immunity

13 applies to certain guardians ad litem and considering whether the alleged misconduct

14 was “clearly and completely outside the scope” of their appointment).

15 I.     Quasi-Judicial Immunity Applies to a Probation Officer Supervising
16        Participation in the Metro Court EIP

17 {8}    Quasi-judicial immunity is applicable if (1) the individual is acting as an arm

18 of the court and the acts are integral to the judicial process; (2) the threat of civil

19 liability could impair the independence of the individual and thereby the ability of

20 the court to perform its judicial duties; and (3) procedural safeguards exist to “protect

21 against misconduct.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13. We first evaluate whether Defendants acted as an

                                               6
 1 arm of the court in their capacity as probation officers monitoring Metro court EIP

 2 participants and whether those acts were integral to the judicial process. We then

 3 turn to consider together the threat of civil liability and the existence of other

 4 procedural safeguards.

 5 A.     A Probation Officer Supervising a Participant in the Metro Court EIP
 6        Serves as an Arm of the Court and Performs a Function That Is Integral
 7        to the Judicial Process

 8 {9}    Quasi-judicial immunity protects individuals who act “as an actual

 9 functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but in reality”

10 and are an “integral part[] of the judicial process.” Collins, 1991-NMSC-013, ¶¶ 16,

11 19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When the extent to which an

12 individual acts as an arm of the court is not clear, we apply the “functional

13 approach,” or analysis, to decide whether the acts, as alleged in the complaint, were

14 judicial functions. See id. ¶ 42 (stating that “a limited factual inquiry is necessary to

15 determine the nature of [the individual]’s appointment”); Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-

16 027, ¶ 17 (noting the necessity of the functional approach in Collins but declining to

17 apply that analysis because under the governing rule in Kimbrell, it was “very clear

18 that the guardian ad litem [wa]s an arm of the court”). Plaintiff argues, Defendants

19 do not dispute, and we agree that the functional approach applies to determine

20 whether Defendants are immune. We therefore apply the functional analysis to

                                               7
 1 determine whether Defendants acted as an arm of the court and then consider

 2 whether those functions are integral to the judicial process.

 3 {10}   To apply the functional analysis, we examine the Defendants’ role in the

 4 process that gave rise to Plaintiff’s allegations. See Hunnicutt, 2009-NMCA-121,

 5 ¶¶ 9-13. Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ conduct in relation to the Metro court

 6 treatment program. The Metro court accepted EIP Participant into the program

 7 subject to conditions that were set forth in the EIP Agreements and reiterated in part

 8 in the acceptance letter signed by the Metro court EIP judge. The EIP Agreements,

 9 on the Metro court letterhead, required EIP Participant’s performance of the required

10 conditions to be supervised by a probation officer, including reporting to the

11 probation officer; notifying the probation officer of changes in EIP Participant’s

12 address, employment, school status, or missed counseling sessions; submitting to

13 drug and alcohol tests at the probation officer’s request; and being truthful with the

14 probation officer and the Metro court EIP judge. The EIP Agreements incorporated

15 EIP Participant’s court-imposed conditions of release into the EIP Agreements’

16 conditions, and Defendant Castillo, as a probation officer, was trusted with

17 monitoring EIP Participant’s compliance with those conditions. EIP Participant

18 agreed that violation of the EIP Agreements could “result in sanctions, including a

19 warrant being issued . . ., jail time being imposed, and/or termination from the

20 program.” As Plaintiff concedes, Defendants’ actions were “clearly defined” by the

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 1 conditions in the EIP Agreements. As a result, Defendants’ role was to perform

 2 judicial functions—to implement the Metro court treatment program. See id. ¶ 10

 3 (concluding where a court has a responsibility to perform the function, that function

 4 is “judicial and not administrative”).

 5 {11}   We further conclude that Defendants’ judicial functions were integral to the

 6 judicial process. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ function of supervising EIP

 7 Participant was purely administrative because Defendants performed “general

 8 routine investigative acts” that are not integral to the judicial process. Because

 9 Plaintiff characterizes these functions as “operational in nature” and “subservient to

10 departmental directives,” Plaintiff argues that immunity should not be extended to

11 Defendants. After accepting EIP Participant, however, the Metro court was reliant

12 on Defendants’ supervisory actions to evaluate EIP Participant’s compliance with

13 the conditions and continued participation in the Metro court EIP. To that end,

14 Defendants presented reports to the Metro court based on EIP Participant’s alleged

15 violations of the conditions and recommended that the Metro court impose sixteen

16 hours of community service. Defendants supervised EIP Participant’s compliance

17 with the conditions of the EIP Agreements, and thereby played an integral role in

18 the Metro court’s performance of its function to evaluate whether EIP Participant

19 should continue to participate in the Metro court EIP.

                                             9
 1 B.     The Threat of Litigation Could Impair the Performance of the Judicial
 2        Function and Existing Procedures Safeguard Against Probation Officer
 3        Misconduct While Supervising Participation in the Metro Court EIP

 4 {12}   We turn next to the impact of the threat of civil liability and the existing

 5 procedural safeguards to protect against misconduct. Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027,

 6 ¶¶ 12-13. In Kimbrell, our Supreme Court recognized that the threat of “liability

 7 could impair [a] guardian ad litem’s ability to independently investigate and report

 8 the facts to the court, thereby obstructing the pathway to ascertaining the truth and

 9 impairing the judge’s ability to perform [their] judicial duties.” Id. As we have

10 described, the EIP Agreements similarly designated a probation officer to investigate

11 and report to the Metro court the facts related to EIP Participant’s compliance with

12 the EIP conditions. Independent objective discharge of this function by probation

13 officers is essential to provide the court with the information necessary to implement

14 the Metro court EIP. If a probation officer is concerned about civil liability—from

15 either a program participant or a member of the community—the probation officer’s

16 ability to act independently and the court’s ability to perform its duties could be

17 impaired. Cf. Collins, 1991-NMSC-013, ¶ 26 (explaining that “[t]he objectivity of a

18 guardian’s investigation and recommendation might be compromised by the threat

19 of liability; and . . . this could impair the judge’s own ability to perform [their]

20 judicial duties in approving the settlement”). We therefore conclude that the threat

                                             10
 1 of civil liability would impair the Metro court’s ability to perform its judicial duties

 2 in relation to the EIP. Cf. Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 12-13.

 3 {13}   Procedural safeguards further exist to protect against the misconduct alleged,

 4 which makes “the threat of civil litigation unnecessary.” Id. To evaluate the

 5 availability of procedural safeguards to prevent misconduct by a probation officer

 6 performing their duties in this context, we first observe that misconduct can involve

 7 either inaccurately reporting information to the detriment of the participant or failing

 8 to investigate and report accurate information to the detriment of third parties.

 9 Plaintiff alleges only the latter type of misconduct and argues that Defendants’ failed

10 to report or investigate violations, which in turn placed Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s son,

11 other children, and the community in danger. In the context of inaction that allegedly

12 places third parties at risk, adequate procedural safeguards exist because other law

13 enforcement agencies, including the police and child protective services, are charged

14 with keeping the community safe. See NMSA 1978, § 29-1-1 (1979) (describing the

15 duty of peace officers to investigate all criminal violations brought to their attention

16 or of which they are aware, and to initiate a criminal prosecution “if the

17 circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonably prudent person that such action

18 should be taken”); NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-3 (2021) (stating the duty of “[e]very

19 person,” including law enforcement officers, to report child abuse and child neglect,

20 as well as the responsibility of local law enforcement agencies to investigate such

                                              11
 1 abuse or neglect); NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-4(A) (2019, amended 2023) (requiring

 2 child protective services to investigate reports alleging neglect or abuse).

 3 {14}   For these reasons, when claims of civil liability are premised on allegations

 4 that probation officers failed to report or investigate violations by a participant in the

 5 Metro court’s EIP program, we conclude that the threat of civil liability could impair

 6 the judge’s ability to perform judicial duties and that procedural safeguards exist to

 7 otherwise protect against the type of misconduct alleged in the present case. Taking

 8 this conclusion together with our holding that probation officers who supervise

 9 participants in the Metro court EIP program function as an arm of the court and that

10 function is integral to the judicial process, we hold that quasi-judicial immunity

11 generally applies in this context.

12 II.    Defendants Did Not Act Outside the Scope of the Probation Officer’s
13        Function in Supervising EIP Participant

14 {15}   Even when quasi-judicial immunity applies, however, an individual may not

15 be entitled to its protection if the alleged misconduct was “clearly and completely

16 outside the scope” of the individual’s function as an arm of the court. Kimbrell,

17 2014-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff maintains that Defendants could not be immune

18 for actions taken in bad faith—for example, misrepresenting Plaintiff’s reports about

19 EIP Participant’s behavior—because such acts are not within the judicial function.

20 Importantly, however, Plaintiff concedes that Defendants’ actions were within the

21 scope of the duties assigned to them by the Metro court, complaining only about how

                                               12
 1 Defendants performed those duties. But allegations about the improper performance

 2 of duties have no bearing on the scope of duties inquiry. See Hunnicutt, 2009-

 3 NMCA-121, ¶ 13 (declining to “examine the allegations of improper or illegal

 4 conduct”). As a result, Plaintiff has not persuaded us that Defendants’ actions were

 5 “clearly and completely outside the scope of” a probation officer’s judicial function

 6 of supervising EIP Participant.

 7 CONCLUSION

 8 {16}   For these reasons, we hold that Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial

 9 immunity, and we affirm the district court.

10 {17}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

11                                               ______________________________
12                                               KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge

13 WE CONCUR:

14 __________________________
15 ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

16 __________________________
17 JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge

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