Court Opinion

ID: 9715876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:18:29.64523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:39.161910
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I dissent. By a process of specious reasoning, the majority asserts that defenses to mechanic’s lien claims can only be made in specific ways, that since the exercise of the warrant of attorney satisfied the claim in this case it must be a defense, and that because this *493“defense” ivas not asserted according to the statutory method, it is without effect. This I can not accept.
The majority fails to distinguish between a defense to a mechanic’s lien claim and a contractually agreed upon method by which one party to a contract is able to protect himself from the violation of that contract by the other party.
We are not here concerned with a defense to a mechanic’s lien claim. What is involved in this case, purely and simply, is the exercise of an irrevocable power of attorney to mark satisfied any mechanic’s lien claim which might be filed contrary to the contract and the recorded waiver. This procedure was a matter of agreement between the parties. There is no authority given by the majority which justifies striking down this contractual provision, thereby relieving one party from the agreed upon consequences of his violation of the waiver provision of the contract.
As the court below noted, “the owners here had a choice of ways of meeting this claim. They could rely on their defense to the scire facias [by asserting the waiver agreement] or they could exercise the warrant, or as they did in this case, they could do both.”
The majority action today imposes an arbitrary, unprecedented, and unnecessary restriction upon the rights of parties to freely contract with regard to the method and procedure by which they shall conduct their affairs.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell and Mr. Justice Musmanno join in this dissenting opinion.