Court Opinion

ID: 9949197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-09 01:00:33.870537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:42.631476
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20180           Document: 58-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/08/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                         FILED
                                  ____________
                                                                                  March 8, 2024
                                   No. 23-20180                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                                         Clerk

DISH Network, L.L.C.,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Bassam Elahmad, also known as Bassem El Ahmad, doing business
as Elahmad.com,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:21-CV-581
                  ______________________________

Before Willett, Wilson, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
      DISH Network, L.L.C., appeals the district court’s dismissal of its
case for lack of personal jurisdiction. We REVERSE and REMAND.
                                            I
      DISH Network, a Colorado company, is the fourth-largest pay-
television provider in the United States. It provides copyrighted
      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                 No. 23-20180

programming to millions of subscribers nationwide. DISH is also one of the
largest providers of international television channels, offering more than 400
channels in 27 languages. This dispute concerns its Arabic language channels.
       In 2020, DISH sued Bassam Elahmad, a resident of Germany doing
business as Elahmad.com, for contributory copyright infringement, alleging
that Elahmad violated DISH’s rights under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 501, by providing access to the Arabic language channels for which DISH
holds the “exclusive rights to distribute and publicly perform in the United
States.” DISH alleged that Elahmad “searches the Internet for
unauthorized sources” of DISH’s Arabic channels, uploads and embeds
links to that content on his website, and organizes them into categories based
on their country to make it easy for users to locate and watch the channels.
When users click on the links to the channels, “they instantaneously receive
unauthorized streams” of the content on Elahmad’s website.
       DISH alleged that Elahmad profits from his website by using U.S.
marketing companies that advertise for U.S. businesses on his website. To
attract more users, Elahmad allegedly promotes his website as providing free
access to “Arab channels in America” on social media sites such as
Facebook, Instagram, and Pinterest. DISH claims that the website is worth
approximately $1.8 million and averages more than 2 million views per
month, with almost 30% of those views coming from the United States.
       Elahmad’s website has a Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
page that says, “[W]e don’t [h]ost any of these videos embedded here,”
“[o]ur mission here, is to organize those videos and to make your
search . . . easier,” and “[w]e simply link to the video.”
       After learning of Elahmad’s conduct, DISH contacted Elahmad
through the email address provided on his website and asked him to stop
providing United States users with access to DISH’s copyrighted content.

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Elahmad refused. Since February 2014, DISH alleges that it has sent
Elahmad at least 62 notices of copyright infringement.
       In the district court proceedings, DISH properly served Elahmad,
but he did not file an answer or otherwise participate in the suit. DISH
moved for default judgment. The district court denied the motion without
prejudice, concluding that the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction
over Elahmad because DISH did not allege or offer any evidence that
Elahmad had any connections with Texas. DISH filed an amended motion.
Addressing the court’s concern about personal jurisdiction, DISH argued
that the district court had specific personal jurisdiction over Elahmad under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) based on Elahmad’s contacts with
the United States as a whole. But the district court again concluded that it
lacked personal jurisdiction over Elahmad because DISH did not show that
Elahmad specifically targeted Texas. The district court faulted DISH for
failing to “mention ‘Texas’ at all.” Accordingly, the district court denied
DISH’s amended motion for a default judgment and dismissed its complaint
without prejudice.
       DISH timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582,
590 (2020) (“Orders denying a plaintiff the opportunity to seek relief in its
preferred forum often qualify as final and immediately appealable, though
they leave the plaintiff free to sue elsewhere. Notably, dismissal for want of
personal jurisdiction ranks as a final decision.”); 16 Front St., L.L.C. v. Miss.
Silicon, L.L.C., 886 F.3d 549, 561 (5th Cir. 2018).
                                       II
       We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 46 F.4th 226, 231

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(5th Cir. 2022) (en banc); Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 F.3d
646, 650 (5th Cir. 2004).
       Because the district court ruled on personal jurisdiction without an
evidentiary hearing, DISH needed to “make only a prima facie showing” of
personal jurisdiction. Adams, 364 F.3d at 650; Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Grp.
PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). To determine whether DISH has
met its burden, we “must accept as true [DISH’s] uncontroverted
allegations, and resolve in [its] favor all conflicts between the [jurisdictional]
facts contained in the parties’ affidavits and other documentation.” Pervasive
Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 219–20 (5th Cir.
2012) (second and third alteration in original) (citations omitted).
                                       III
       We first address the district court’s application of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). The district court concluded that DISH could only
satisfy personal jurisdiction by showing that Elahmad had sufficient
connections with Texas. This was wrong. “Rule 4(k)(2) provides for service
of process and personal jurisdiction in any district court for cases arising
under federal law where the defendant has contacts with the United States as
a whole sufficient to satisfy due process concerns and the defendant is not
subject to jurisdiction in any particular state.” Adams, 364 F.3d at 650
(emphasis added); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). As our en banc court recently
explained, “[f]or federal claims filed in federal courts . . . the relevant
minimum contacts are those with the entire United States, not a forum state.”
Douglass, 46 F.4th at 242 (emphases added).
       Thus, the district court erred by failing to consider whether Elahmad
had sufficient contacts with the United States to establish personal
jurisdiction.

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                                      IV
       We now turn to whether DISH made a prima facie showing of
specific personal jurisdiction. DISH relies only on Rule 4(k)(2), which is a
procedural rule that does not “expand[] the scope of a court’s personal
jurisdiction.” Id. at 234. But DISH’s properly served summons establishes
personal jurisdiction under the rule if three conditions are satisfied:
(1) DISH’s claims arise under federal law; (2) Elahmad is not subject to the
general jurisdiction of any other state; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
       DISH easily satisfies the first two prongs. Its claim for contributory
copyright infringement arises under federal law. And although DISH must
prove that Elahmad had the requisite contacts with the United States, it need
not “negate jurisdiction in every state.” Nagravision SA v. Gotech Int’l Tech.
Ltd., 882 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2018). As we have explained, “the burden
to establish that there was a state meeting the criteria necessarily must fall on
the defendant.” Id. Elahmad did not appear before the district court and has
not filed a brief in this court. He therefore has not shown that he is subject to
another state’s jurisdiction.
       Whether DISH meets the last prong is a closer question. “In applying
Rule 4(k)(2) [we] must determine whether the defendant has sufficient ties
to the United States as a whole to satisfy constitutional due process
concerns.” Adams, 364 F.3d at 651. DISH relies only on specific personal
jurisdiction. To establish this kind of jurisdiction, DISH first must show
that Elahmad “purposefully avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege of conducting
activities” in the United States. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021). Elahmad’s contacts with the United States “must
be [his] own choice and not random, isolated, or fortuitous. They must show

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that [he] deliberately reached out beyond [his] home—by, for example,
exploi[ting] a market in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship
centered there.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Importantly, DISH’s claim against Elahmad must “arise out of or relate to”
those contacts. Id. (citation omitted). And finally, DISH must show
that “exercising our jurisdiction [would] be ‘fair and reasonable’ to
[Elahmad].” Johnson v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 21 F.4th 314, 317–18
(5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).
                                       A
       We first consider whether Elahmad purposefully availed himself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the United States, “look[ing] only to
the contact[s] out of which the cause of action arises”—here, the operation
of Elahmad’s website. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 2002).
       DISH contends it has satisfied this prong because Elahmad profited
from United States users through third-party advertising; made his website
appeal to a United States audience by contracting with a California-based
company to optimize the website’s performance; referenced the DMCA on
his website; targeted the United States through his social media advertising;
and failed to limit United States users from accessing his website.
       “[T]he analysis applicable to a case involving jurisdiction based on the
Internet . . . should not be different at its most basic level from any other
personal jurisdiction case.” Pervasive Software, 688 F.3d at 226–27 (second
alteration in original). That said, where, as here, a defendant’s website is the
basis for specific jurisdiction, our circuit applies the framework set out in
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997). See Admar Int’l, Inc. v. Eastrock, L.L.C., 18 F.4th 783, 786 (5th Cir.
2021). Under Zippo, a defendant does not purposefully avail itself of the
benefits and protections of the forum state if the website is passive, simply

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“post[ing] information that people can see.” Johnson, 21 F.4th at 318. Nor
does “a defendant . . . have sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state
just because its website is accessible there.” Admar Int’l, 18 F.4th at 787. But
if the defendant “‘enters into contracts with residents of [the] foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer
files over the Internet,’” id. at 786, or “the site interacts with its visitors,
sending and receiving information from them, we must then apply our usual
tests to determine whether the virtual contacts that give rise to the plaintiff’s
suit arise from the defendant’s purposeful targeting of the forum state.”
Johnson, 21 F.4th at 318.
       “At bottom, Zippo seeks to answer the question: Has the defendant
targeted the forum state?” Admar Int’l, 18 F.4th at 786. Indeed, we have
warned that “[a]lthough interactivity along the Zippo sliding scale can be an
important factor . . . because it can provide evidence of purposeful conduct,”
we must still “focus[] on the nature and quality of online and offline contacts
to demonstrate the requisite purposeful conduct that establishes personal
jurisdiction.” Pervasive Software, 688 F.3d at 227 n.7 (citation omitted).
       DISH does not argue on appeal that the website is interactive. It
argued to the district court that the website was interactive because
Elahmad’s website transmits computer files of television content to users
who select from the website’s electronic channel guide. But it has abandoned
its interactivity argument on appeal. See Moreno v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 35 F.4th
965, 974 n.8 (5th Cir. 2022).
       Unlike our circuit’s other website-based cases, however, DISH
alleges other facts to show that Elahmad purposefully targeted the United
States. DISH alleges that Elahmad contracted with various social media
companies to promote his website in the United States. For example, on his
Pinterest page, Elahmad advertises his website as a place to “watch Arab

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channels in America.” This type of direct advertising in the forum is relevant
to whether the defendant solicited business in the form. Cf. Admar, 18 F.4th
at 787; Pervasive Software, 688 F.3d at 228. DISH also alleges that Elahmad
contracted with California-based Cloudflare, Inc., to conceal his IP address
and to optimize the website’s performance for United States users.
According to DISH, “Cloudflare’s service “cache[s] static assets across
[the Cloudflare] network,” which includes data centers in 39 U.S. cities,
“and always directs end users to the closest data center, minimizing
latency.” In GreatFence.com, Inc. v. Bailey, we explained that the location of a
“web server’s location alone” does not “suffice[] to establish personal
jurisdiction” “where there is no allegation, argument, or evidence that the
defendants played any role in selecting the server’s location—or that its
location was selected with the purpose or intent of facilitating the
defendants’ business in the forum.” 726 F. App’x 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2018)
(emphasis added). But that’s just what DISH alleges here. It argues that
Elahmad purposefully chose Cloudflare to enhance the experience for United
States users.
       Although DISH relies heavily on the website’s traffic and the fact
that Elahmad profited from this traffic through third-party advertising, the
advertising isn’t what gives rise to DISH’s claim—the streaming of
DISH’s channels on his website does. And based on our precedent, the fact
that Elahmad used visitors’ location data to tailor advertising to them is
irrelevant. See Johnson, 21 F.4th at 318. As in Johnson, the advertisements do
not relate to the claim, and “[t]he place from which a person visits
[Elahmad’s] site is entirely beyond [Elahmad’s] control.” Id. Indeed, these
types of advertisements do not attract users to his site; they are only relevant
to “those already visiting [his] site.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Thus, they
cannot be used to show that Elahmad purposefully targeted the United
States. Nor can Elahmad’s failure to restrict United States users from

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accessing his website show that he was targeting the United States. Although
one of our sister circuits has found such a failure relevant to a defendant’s
intent to serve the United States, Plixer Int’l, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2018), on these facts, we do not think it shows that Elahmad
“deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ [his] home.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S.at
362.
       Nonetheless, we conclude that DISH has met its burden of proving a
prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over Elahmad because he
purposefully reached out beyond his home by advertising to United States
users that his site was a place to “watch live Arabic tv” and that it had “Arab
channels in America.” And to ensure that his website performed optimally
for United States users, he contracted with U.S.-based Cloudflare. These
contacts are the means by which Elahmad has made DISH’s copyrighted
works accessible in the United States. Thus, DISH’s copyright claim against
Elahmad arises out of or relates to those contacts. In isolation, these contacts
would be insufficient to prove personal jurisdiction. But taken together, and
given that they relate to DISH’s claim, we conclude they are sufficient, at
least at this stage of the proceedings, to confer specific personal jurisdiction
over Elahmad.
                                        B
       Finally, it is fair and reasonable for Elahmad to be subject to
jurisdiction in the United States. We’ve concluded that DISH has met its
prima facie burden, so the burden shifts to Elahmad to show that our exercise
of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. To determine fairness, we look to:
“(1) the burden on the nonresident defendant, (2) the forum state’s
interests, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in securing relief, (4) the interest of the
interstate judicial system in the efficient administration of justice, and (5) the
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social

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policies.” Luv N’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir.
2006).
         Given that he did not respond to this suit or file an appellate brief,
Elahmad is unlikely to meet his burden to show that the exercise of
jurisdiction would be unreasonable. DISH relies mostly on the second and
third factors. It argues that jurisdiction over Elahmad is fair and reasonable
because DISH is a United States company whose copyrights are limited to
the United States, the infringement and harm occurred in the United States,
and DISH’s rights are protected by United States law. Thus, DISH argues,
the United States has an interest in enforcing its laws, and it is unclear that
any other forum would hear DISH’s claim. We agree. What’s more, the
DMCA page on Elahmad’s website suggests that he was expecting United
States users and felt the need to explain the legality of his website under
United States law—tellingly, it is the only country’s law referenced on his
website.
                                       V
         We conclude that DISH has established a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction over Elahmad and that the exercise of jurisdiction over him
would be fair and reasonable. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND
to the district court for further proceedings on DISH’s motion for default
judgment.

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