Court Opinion

ID: 9947257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 15:06:46.186436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:17.864121
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-384

                               EDWARD G. WRIGHT

                                       vs.

                   DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION & another. 1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        An inmate at a Massachusetts correctional facility appeals

 from the judgment dismissing his contempt complaint against the

 Department of Correction (department).           We affirm.

        Background.    In 2018, the plaintiff, Edward G. Wright,

 filed an action seeking to challenge the department's adoption

 of a new standard operating procedure (SOP) that changed the

 department's policies for the handling of inmate mail.               Under

 the regulations in existence at the time the SOP was issued,

 "[i]f there is reason to believe contraband is being introduced

 through the mail based on the paper color, texture, etc., a

 photocopy of the original correspondence rather than the

 original correspondence may be forwarded to the inmate."                103

 1   Superintendent of the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center.
Code Mass. Reg. § 481.12 (2) (2017).   In other words, the

regulation allowed the department to provide inmates with copies

of their mail in lieu of the originals only where the originals

raised suspicions.   The SOP altered this by requiring the

department to provide inmates copies of correspondence in lieu

of the originals in all instances.

     On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court

judge agreed with Wright's position that the SOP was not valid

unless it was promulgated as a regulation pursuant to G. L.

c. 30A.   Accordingly, a declaratory judgment entered as follows:

     "The Court hereby DECLARES that the implementation of the
     Standard Operating Procedure related to 103 Code Mass.
     Regs., § 481 requiring the photocopying of all non-
     privileged inmate mail prior to distribution to the inmate
     at facilities as directed by the Commissioner violates 103
     Code Mass. Regs., § 481.

     "The Court further DECLARES that the Department of
     Correction was required to meet the requirements of G. L.
     c. 30A, the Administrative Procedures Act, when it adopted
     the Standard Operating Procedure related to 103 Code Mass.
     Regs., § 481 requiring the photocopying of all non-
     privileged inmate mail prior to distribution to the inmate
     at facilities directed by the Commissioner."

The judge stated that she was staying the judgment for 180 days

in order to give the department time to go through the process

of reissuing the SOP as a new regulation. 2

2 Specifically, the judge's "memorandum of decision and order" --
docketed on September 22, 2020 -- allowed Wright's motion for
summary judgment, approved entry of a declaratory judgment, and
further stated that "[t]he [j]udgment thereafter shall be stayed
for 180 days to permit the DOC to take such action as it may

                                 2
     Before turning to what happened next, some observations

about the intended stay and judgment are warranted.    First, the

relief that the judgment provided was declaratory only; the

judgment did not include any express injunctive relief.    Second,

unlike in Carey v. Commissioner of Correction, 479 Mass. 367,

374-375 (2018), the case cited by the judge in support of her

decision to issue a stay, the entry of judgment was not stayed;

the declaratory judgment in fact entered the following day.    In

light of this, the precise import of the judge's order that

"[j]udgment thereafter shall be stayed" is not entirely clear.

It appears that the judge intended to preclude Wright from

enforcing the judgment while the stay was in effect.   This is

consistent with the Supreme Judicial Court's characterizing what

the judge did as "stay[ing] execution of her judgment."    Wright

v. Department of Correction, 487 Mass. 1025, 1025-1026 (2021)

(denying petition seeking relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3).

     In any event, the department purported to amend its

regulations on April 2, 2021.   Meanwhile, the stay was extended

until that date.   Asserting that the regulatory amendment was

ineffective because the department had failed to comply with

deem appropriate, including amending 103 Code Mass. Regs, § 481
in conformance with the APA. See [Carey v. Commissioner of
Correction, 479 Mass. 367, 373-374 (2018)] (staying entry of
judgment to permit DOC action)." The declaratory judgment then
entered the following day.

                                 3
required statutory procedures, Wright sought approval to pursue

a contempt action against the department.   Accepting the

department's representations that it had complied with

applicable procedures, the judge dismissed Wright's contempt

complaint.   The judge also denied a separate motion that Wright

had filed seeking the return of original mail that had

accumulated in the interim.

     After Wright appealed, a panel of this court concluded that

the department in fact had not complied with required statutory

procedures, because it had published notice of the required

hearing only nine days prior to the hearing.    See G. L. c. 30A,

§ 2 (requiring publication twenty-one days in advance).     By way

of relief, the panel reversed the dismissal of Wright's contempt

complaint, 3 and it remanded the case for the judge to craft an

appropriate order in light of current circumstances.   With

respect to the denial of Wright's separate motion seeking to

obtain the original mail that the department continued to hold

pursuant to the SOP, the panel expounded on the form of relief

that the department "should" provide inmates.

3 The panel spoke in terms of the department's being in
"violation of the injunction put in place by the motion judge,"
despite the fact that, at least on its face, the final judgment
appears to have included only declaratory relief. We need not
address that issue further.

                                 4
       The remand proceedings were quite complicated, and we need

not recite their details.    Three overall points warrant mention.

First, on November 25, 2022, the department again purported to

amend its regulations to adopt the substance of the SOP.

Second, in the interim, the stay was extended until that date.

Third, the judge compelled the department to adopt procedures to

provide Wright access to the original mail that was being

withheld from him pursuant to the SOP and to decide what he

wanted to retain. 4

       Arguing that the department still failed to comply with the

procedures required by G. L. c. 30A, § 2, Wright sought to

pursue another contempt action.    Rejecting Wright's arguments,

the judge issued an order that dismissed Wright's original

contempt complaint and denied his motion to amend it. 5    Judgment

4 The department could not simply turn all retained original mail
over to Wright, because that mail first had to be screened to
see if it should be withheld pursuant to the 2017 regulation.
In addition, pursuant to separate regulations, inmates are
limited as to the amount of mail they can have in their cells.
The department thus created a procedure through which Wright
could review any originals held pursuant only to the SOP and
decide whether he wanted to retain that mail and, if not,
whether he wanted to have it sent to a designated recipient
outside of the facility in lieu of its being destroyed.
According to the department, Wright has not been fully
cooperative in that process. Any dispute about this is not
properly before us.

5   The judge later amended the order to correct a date.

                                  5
entered on February 22, 2023, and Wright's appeal from that

judgment is now before us.

     Discussion.   Wright's lead argument is that pursuant to

G. L. c. 30A, § 2, the department had an obligation to publish

notice of its regulatory hearing in at least two newspapers and,

as is undisputed, it published notice only in one.        Wright bases

his argument on the ground that the statute speaks in terms of

requiring publication in "such newspapers . . . as the agency

may select."   G. L. c. 30A, § 2.       By referring to "such

newspapers" in the plural, Wright maintains, the Legislature

must have intended to require publication in at least two.

Although this argument is not without some force, we are

unpersuaded by it.   Use of the plural of "newspaper" in

conjunction with "such" and "as the agency may select" is

natural regardless of whether the number of newspapers

ultimately selected by the agency is one or more.        Had the

statute instead referred to "such newspaper," this would connote

that agencies should limit publication to only one newspaper, as

opposed to leaving that choice up to the agency.        In addition,

we note that the Legislature expressly has cautioned against

reading too much into its use of singular and plural nouns.        See

G. L. c. 4, § 6 (directing that "[i]n construing statutes the

following rules shall be observed, unless their observance would

involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of

                                    6
the law-making body or repugnant to the context of the same

statute:   . . . Words importing the singular number may extend

and be applied to several persons or things, words importing the

plural number may include the singular, and words of one gender

may be construed to include the other gender and the neuter").

Finally, the department's interpretation of G. L. c. 30A, § 2,

is supported by that given to the statute by the Secretary of

the Commonwealth, the official charged with administering it.

Secretary of the Commonwealth, The Regulations Manual, at 3 (May

2016) (advising agencies that "notice must be . . . advertised

in a daily newspaper of general distribution," although they

"can choose to advertise the notice in several newspapers

throughout the state").   See Commonwealth v. Wimer, 480 Mass. 1,

5 (2018) ("We defer to an agency's statutory interpretation

where the statute is ambiguous and the interpretation is

reasonable").

     Wright separately claims that the department failed to

comply with c. 30A with respect to how it notified "interested

persons" of the regulatory hearing.   He points to the fact that

the notice that the department sent to the list of people who

had requested such notice stated that the hearing would be

"virtual" and it provided details of how to access that hearing

                                 7
by Zoom, while the notice sent to inmates themselves did not. 6

Without claiming that he or other inmates had any right to

participate in the Zoom hearing, Wright argues that the failure

to include Zoom access information in the notice sent to inmates

deprived them of being able to readily pass that information

along to others (such as friends and family).   Wright argues

that the department did this deliberately to limit potentially

interested persons from participating at the Zoom hearing.

     Without ascribing any bad faith on the part of department

officials, we note that it might have been better practice to

include Zoom access information in the notice sent to inmates

(even though they themselves would not be permitted to

participate in that hearing).   The narrow question we face,

however, is whether the department failed to comply with a

procedure mandated by statute that is a condition precedent to

the effectiveness of the regulation.   We are unpersuaded that

anything in G. L. c. 30A, § 2, required the department to send

notice of Zoom access information to inmates.

     To maintain a civil contempt action, a litigant must put

forward "clear and convincing evidence of disobedience of a

clear and unequivocal command."   Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass.

6 The notice sent to inmates identified the time and date the
hearing would be held without identifying that it would be
virtual. It focused on how written testimony and comments could
be provided.

                                  8
837, 853 (2009).    Because Wright has not demonstrated that he

could meet that standard, the judge did not abuse her discretion

in dismissing his contempt complaint and denying his motion to

amend that complaint. 7

                                      Judgment docketed February
                                        22, 2023, dismissing
                                        contempt complaint
                                        affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Milkey,
                                        Massing & Neyman, JJ. 8),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    March 4, 2024.

7 In its brief, the department requests that we rule that it may
now destroy any of Wright's original mail that remains in its
possession. Given that this is outside the scope of the current
appeal, we decline to do so.

8   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  9