Court Opinion

ID: 9394052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 05:04:40.266285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.211985
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     May 11, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 362908
                                                                     Ingham Circuit Court
LAMONT TORBERT,                                                      LC No. 20-000938-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and GADOLA and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

         Defendant faces charges based upon an alleged sexual assault perpetrated by several men
in 2001. Authorities collected deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in 2001, but no DNA contributor was
identified until 2018, when defendant’s DNA was entered into the DNA index system and matched
the DNA collected in 2001. At some point between 2018 and 2020, part of the file associated with
the DNA sample went missing. In this interlocutory appeal on leave granted,1 defendant contests
the trial court’s denial of his motion to exclude the DNA evidence, arguing that without the missing
portion of the file, the reliability of the DNA analysis cannot be established. We reject defendant’s
argument and affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to exclude the DNA evidence.

                                 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

         On November 29, 2001, when the victim was a student at Michigan State University, she
went with some friends to a social gathering at an apartment building. While at the apartment, the
victim had several drinks and felt ill, so she went to lie down in the bed of her male friend and she
fell asleep. When she woke up, she was naked from the waist down and a man was on top of her
engaging in vaginal intercourse. She said “stop,” “no,” and “get off,” and tried to push him away.
Another unidentified man who was naked from the waist down was standing in the bedroom. The
victim passed out after somebody put a pillow over her head. When she woke up, she was on her

1
 People v Torbert, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 3, 2023 (Docket
No. 362908).

                                                -1-
stomach and an unidentified man was behind her having vaginal intercourse with her. The victim
saw another unidentified man, naked from the waist down, standing near the bed. Eventually, one
of the victim’s friends came into the bedroom, pulled the victim off the bed, and took her from the
apartment.

        The victim went to the hospital and underwent a sexual assault nurse examination, which
resulted in the collection of swabs of the victim’s genital area and clothing. The Michigan State
University Police Department (MSUPD) collected the swabs and submitted them to the Michigan
State Police (MSP) laboratory for DNA analysis. An initial chemical and microscopic examination
of the swabs revealed the presence of seminal fluid and sperm cells on the victim’s underwear and
on her vagina, rectum, and perianal area. The MSP laboratory extracted DNA from the swabs in
April 2002. Because the contributors of the DNA were unknown, the MSP laboratory entered the
DNA profile into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).

        In 2018, CODIS alerted to a match that indicated that the DNA profile extracted from the
victim’s perianal area matched defendant’s DNA profile.2 To confirm the CODIS results, MSUPD
executed a search warrant on defendant. The MSP laboratory typically uses a defendant’s known
DNA sample and compares it with the original DNA profile. After receiving defendant’s known
sample, the MSP laboratory realized that the paper records concerning the original DNA analysis
of the victim’s swabs—the case jacket—were missing.3 Despite the missing case jacket, the MSP
laboratory was able to analyze the original DNA extracts in January 2020. The tubes that contained
the extracts still had the original labels with the MSP laboratory number, record number, and item
identifier. A 2002 report on these DNA tubes identified what DNA extract material corresponded
with which evidence number. The 2002 laboratory report referred to samples 5112.01A-M (DNA
vaginal swabs-male fraction), 511201C-M (rectal swabs-male fraction), 5112.01D-M (perianal
swabs-male fraction), and 5112.01E-M (panty-male fraction), and stated that the samples “reveal
the presence of multiple male donors.” After reanalysis of the DNA extracts, the MSP laboratory
confirmed in a 2020 report that defendant’s known DNA sample matched the DNA extracted from
the swabs of the victim’s vaginal, rectal, and perianal areas and from her underwear. Defendant
was charged with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(d),
and, “in the alternative,” with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), MCL
750.520d.

        Defendant filed a motion to exclude the DNA test results under MRE 702 and Daubert4 on
the ground that the missing case jacket rendered it impossible to assess the reliability of the DNA
extraction process in 2002 and, in turn, the reliability of the results obtained in the 2020 reanalysis
of the DNA extracts. He further argued that the loss of the case jacket created confusion as to the
contents of the tubes that contained the DNA extracts when the DNA reanalysis took place in 2020.

2
    Defendant’s DNA appears to have been obtained through an unrelated interaction with the police.
3
  In April 2018, an MSP forensic scientist had retrieved the case jacket after the CODIS alert, made
a photocopy of the necessary report, and refiled the case jacket. In July 2019, the forensic scientist
tried to pull the case jacket to prepare for a meeting about this case and discovered that the case
jacket was missing. In addition, the original swabs apparently had been destroyed by MSUPD.
4
    Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993).

                                                 -2-
Also, defendant contended that there were issues with the chain of custody and called into question
the ethics of the analyst who performed the reanalysis in 2020. Finally, he asserted that his due-
process rights would be violated if the data on which the MSP laboratory relied was not available
to him for review and address on cross-examination.

        The prosecution responded that it would not present the 2002 DNA analysis as substantive
evidence at trial. It asserted that defendant had received all of the reports and underlying data used
in the 2020 reanalysis of the DNA extracts, which formed the evidence the prosecution planned to
introduce at trial. The prosecution also asserted that the MSP laboratory reanalyzed the original
DNA extracts by applying reliable principles and methods and compared the reanalyzed results to
defendant’s known DNA. Finally, the prosecution insisted that any issues regarding the chain of
custody of the DNA extracts and the credibility of the forensic scientist would bear upon the weight
of the evidence, not its admissibility.

        The trial court granted defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing as to the reliability
of the 2002 extraction process, but stated that “other matters such as chain of custody and personnel
matters . . . go to the weight of the DNA evidence and the ultimate opinion of the analyst.” During
the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution’s expert, Jeffrey Nye,5 the director of the Forensic Science
Division of the MSP, gave a detailed description of the DNA extraction process used to obtain, or
“extract,” DNA. He testified that the extraction process remained largely unchanged since 2001.
According to Nye, that process separated the epithelial cells, which are readily breakable cells such
as skin cells and cells from inside the mouth or the vaginal tract, from the more rigid sperm cells.
The epithelial cells are known as the “female fraction” and are placed into a tube. The sperm cells
are called the “male fraction” and are placed into a separate tube.

        After the DNA is extracted, the next step is quantification—that is, a determination of how
much DNA exists. There is a target range for DNA analysis because of limitations on how much
DNA extract the instrumentation and system can accept. If the amount of DNA extracted is outside
the target range, a separate tube is used to dilute the DNA, and the diluted extract is then analyzed.
According to Nye, the concentrated extract and the diluted extract are essentially the same extracts
with different concentrations of DNA. The extraction tubes are labeled with a laboratory number,
a record number, and an item identifier unique to the specific case by the person who performs the
DNA analysis. Nye testified that DNA does not change over time and DNA will not degrade if it
is properly stored. If DNA does degrade, the degradation does not change the result. Rather, the
degradation prevents a result from being obtained. The DNA extracts in this case were preserved
by dehydrating the DNA in the labeled tubes.

        Nye did not believe that the missing case jacket from the 2002 analysis had any impact on
the integrity of the original analysis. He observed that the original extracts were labeled and were
identifiable to the case. Nye did acknowledge that the laboratory report from the 2020 reanalysis
indicated that there was a clear tube and a pink tube for each item tested and that it was unclear
from the records whether the pink tube contained the concentrated DNA extract and the clear tube

5
 Nye was the forensic scientist who performed the original DNA analysis of the evidence in this
case, but he acknowledged that he did not have an independent recollection of this particular case.

                                                 -3-
contained the diluted DNA extract, or vice versa.6 Nye explained that a substantial difference in
concentration of DNA in each tube would indicate whether the tube contained the concentrated
DNA extract or the diluted DNA extract. Nye testified that, nevertheless, the tubes for each item
would contain the same DNA. Nye noted that if standard operating procedures were not followed
in extracting and testing the DNA, “the important part is that it’s not that you’re getting the wrong
result. It would just keep you from getting a result.”

        Defendant’s expert, Janine Arvizu, a chemist and laboratory auditor, testified as an expert
in internal auditing and quality assurance for laboratories. She opined that any conclusions drawn
from the DNA evidence in this case were based on “secondary records.” Her classification of the
records as being “secondary” arose from the loss of the case jacket from the 2002 DNA analysis
and the use of DNA extracts, rather than the original swabs. Arvizu was concerned about the loss
of the case jacket because an “unambiguous record trail identifying the identity, unique identity,
and the origin of each and every tested item” was necessary. She cited the possibility of human
error in transcribing records as one of her primary concerns. Arvizu criticized the MSP laboratory
because it was not apparent which tubes contained the diluted extract and which tubes contained
the concentrated extract. She conceded, however, that the tubes containing the DNA extracts were
labeled with what appeared to be unique identifying numbers. She also admitted that the tubes for
each sample contained the same DNA; the only difference was in the concentration of the DNA.
Arvizu opined that, in this case, the MSP laboratory did not meet international standards regarding
laboratory recordkeeping and its failure to maintain records undermined the reliability of the DNA
analysis.

        The trial court issued a written opinion and order denying defendant’s request to exclude
the results of the DNA analysis. The trial court concluded that the original DNA extraction process
was reliable and that there was no basis to exclude the evidence. The trial court reasoned that the
fact that analysis yielded a result constituted evidence that the extraction process was performed
properly and the extracts were properly stored. The trial court noted that Arvizu’s criticisms that
the laboratory could not unambiguously identify the origin of the tested items was merely a chain-
of-custody issue that did not call into question the reliability of the extraction, and therefore that
concern bore upon the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The trial court determined that
there was sufficient evidence to establish that the DNA extracts were what they were purported to
be because the extract tubes were labeled. Thus, the trial court concluded that the DNA reanalysis
performed in 2020 was based upon a sufficiently reliable extraction process in 2002. This appeal
followed.

6
  During the 2020 reanalysis, the analyst added a “P” for pink tube or a “C” for clear tube to the
end of the item number for each sample. The item description for each sample was obtained from
the 2002 lab report. The pink and the clear tubes for the male fractions for samples 5112.01A,
5112.01C, 5112.01D, and 5112.01E were reanalyzed.

                                                 -4-
                                      II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

         On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined
that the results of the 2020 DNA reanalysis were admissible at trial. Defendant argues that because
the laboratory failed to comply with the guidelines for record keeping, and therefore lost the case
jacket and no longer had the original DNA swabs, the reliability of the 2002 extraction process is
suspect. Thus, defendant concludes that the reliability of the 2020 reanalysis cannot be established
because that reanalysis was based upon the 2002 DNA extracts. Defendant insists that, despite the
fact that the tubes containing the extracts were labeled, there is no way to be certain that the labels
are correct, and therefore no way to be certain what the tubes contain. Defendant also argues that
the only way to establish the admissibility of DNA test results is to furnish proof that the laboratory
followed generally accepted standards, which requires production of the case jacket. Beyond that,
defendant contends that his due-process rights will be violated if the data on which the laboratory
relied in performing the DNA analysis is not available for him to review. Finally, defendant argues
that the trial court impermissibly narrowed the scope of the evidentiary hearing. We conclude that
defendant’s arguments lack merit.

        We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v
Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 216; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the
court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id.
at 217. We review the trial court’s factual findings underlying the decision to admit or exclude
evidence for clear error. People v Murphy (On Remand), 282 Mich App 571, 584; 766 NW2d 303
(2009). “Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake was made.” People v Brooks, 304 Mich App 318, 319-320; 848 NW2d 161 (2014)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether a defendant’s right to due process was violated
is a constitutional question that we must review de novo. People v Smith, 498 Mich 466, 475; 870
NW2d 299 (2015).

        “[T]he admission of real evidence does not require a perfect chain of custody.” People v
White, 208 Mich App 126, 130; 527 NW2d 34 (1994). A “deficiency in the chain of custody goes
to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility once the proffered evidence is shown to
a reasonable degree of certainty to be what its proponent claims.” Id. at 130-131. “[T]he
admission of relatively indistinguishable evidence requires a chain of custody only sufficiently
complete to ‘render it reasonably probable that the original item has neither been exchanged with
another nor been contaminated or tampered with.’ ” Id. at 131. The threshold question is “whether
an adequate foundation for admission of the evidence has been laid under all the facts and
circumstances of each individual case.” Id. at 133. “Once a proper foundation has been
established, any deficiencies in the chain of custody go to the weight afforded to the evidence,
rather than its admissibility.” Id. In rejecting an argument that DNA evidence must be excluded
because the DNA evidence lacked a proper foundation as a result of a missing link in the chain of
custody, we noted that the defendant had not alleged that the technician had “actually lost,
misidentified, or tampered with” the blood sample, but “only that it is possible that she did so[.]”
People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 405; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).

                                                 -5-
        Here, defendant concedes that he is not challenging the science that supports DNA analysis.
Rather, defendant frames this as a challenge under MRE 7027 to the reliability of the DNA analysis
performed in this case. But defendant has not demonstrated any errors or irregularities in the DNA
extraction performed in 2002 that could affect the reliability of the reanalysis in 2020. Defendant
merely points to what is undisputed—the MSP laboratory lost the case jacket. Despite the loss of
the case jacket, the methods employed in this case were still applied in a reliable manner. Nye’s
testimony establishes that: (1) seminal fluid was located on the original DNA swabs; (2) DNA was
extracted from those swabs; (3) the extracted materials were separated into “female” and “male”
fractions in separate tubes; (4) the tubes were labeled with unique identifying numbers that linked
each tube to the original swabs; and (5) the extracted materials were properly preserved. Further,
Nye’s testimony established that, even though it was not known whether the pink tubes or the clear
tubes contained the diluted extract, the DNA in both the pink and the clear tubes was the same.

         Nye testified that the extraction process would only yield testable DNA if it was performed
correctly. Nye’s uncontroverted testimony established that if there were issues with the extraction
process, the result would be that no DNA would be identified from the extraction. Nye testified
unequivocally that it was not possible for a defective extraction process to yield an incorrect DNA
result. Additionally, Nye testified that the failure to properly preserve DNA extracts would cause
degradation of the sample, which would result in the failure to produce a result. Thus, the fact that
a result was obtained constitutes evidence that the extraction process and the storage of the DNA
extracts in this case were properly conducted. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit an abuse
of its discretion in determining that the 2002 extraction process was sufficiently reliable.

          The trial court ruled that the issues defendant raised—record-keeping deficiencies and the
possibility of transcription errors—were more properly characterized as challenges to the chain of
custody. Those issues pertain to whether the mixture in the tubes was what it was purported to be.
Defendant contends that it was not definitively established that the tubes were properly labeled, so
the contents of the tubes cannot be definitely determined. As a result of that uncertainty, defendant
insists that we do not know whether the source of the DNA extract in a particular tube was a skin
cell or a sperm cell. Despite defendant’s attempt on appeal to frame this as an issue of admissibility
under MRE 702, we agree with the trial court that the issues relate to the chain of custody of the
DNA extracts, not to the reliability of the extraction process. Additionally, we agree with the trial
court that the evidence presented demonstrated to a reasonable degree of certainty that the mixtures
contained in the tubes were what the prosecution claimed. See White, 208 Mich App at 130-131.

7
    MRE 702 states:
         If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
         assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
         witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
         education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (1) the
         testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
         reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
         methods reliably to the facts of the case.

                                                  -6-
        The evidence established that the tubes containing the extracts were labeled with identifiers
corresponding to the 2002 laboratory report. That laboratory report stated the origin of the extract
contained in each tube—either a sperm cell or an epithelial cell—and where on the victim’s body
or clothing that cell was found. Defendant maintains that the prosecution’s claim that the DNA
derived from a sperm cell, rather than an epithelial cell, was unreliable because “it is not rationally
derived from a sound foundation.” But this is inconsistent with the evidence presented to the trial
court. During the evidentiary hearing, Nye offered testimony about how epithelial cells and sperm
cells are separated in the DNA extraction process. Nye testified that initial analysis of the evidence
from the original swabs confirmed the presence of sperm cells and seminal fluid. Then the DNA
extraction process separated the epithelial cells from the sperm cells, and the sperm cells were
washed to remove residue left behind from epithelial cells. The sperm cells from each sample
were put into a tube labeled as the “male fraction.” The samples reanalyzed in 2020 in this case
were identified as “male fractions” obtained from the victim’s vaginal, rectal, and perianal areas,
as well as from her underwear. Defendant’s argument that it is not known with certainty what is
in each tube relies upon a deficiency in the chain of custody. Additionally, while there was some
uncertainty about which tubes contained the diluted DNA extract, that would have no impact on
the results of the analysis.

        Given these facts, it is reasonably probable that the extracts contained in the labeled tubes
are what they are purported to be. See White, 208 Mich App at 131. Accordingly, any deficiencies
in the chain of custody of the DNA extract goes to the weight afforded to that evidence, rather than
its admissibility. See id. at 133. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted this
evidence and left it to the trier of fact to determine how much weight it deserves. The trial court’s
decision to admit the DNA evidence was not outside the range of principled outcomes, so it is not
an abuse of discretion. See Unger, 278 Mich App at 216-217.

         Defendant also argues that the prosecution must establish that generally accepted standards
were followed in handling defendant’s DNA. He relies on this Court’s opinion in People v Adams,
195 Mich App 267; 489 NW2d 192 (1992), modified on other grounds 441 Mich 916 (1993), to
support this position. Defendant maintains that the only way to establish this fact is to produce the
missing case jacket. Adams involved the admissibility of DNA analysis and this Court held that,
in general, DNA identification is reliable. Id. at 277. This Court cautioned, however, that “before
a trial court admits the test results into evidence, the prosecutor must establish in each particular
case that the generally accepted laboratory procedures were followed.” Id. This Court expressed
satisfaction that generally accepted practices were followed there because the laboratory’s failure
to comply with certain quality control standards did “not have any relevance to the reliability of
the testing[.]” Id. at 277 n 2. Here, any shortcomings by the MSP laboratory concerning the loss
of the case jacket did not relate to the reliability of the testing. The standards that defendant claims
were unmet involve the control, protection, and maintenance of records as well as the existence of
an evidence log. No evidence suggests that the materials in this case were not what they purported
to be, which is bolstered by the labels on the DNA extract tubes and the item descriptions for the
relevant samples in the 2002 laboratory report. Additionally, no evidence exists that the extraction
process was faulty. Therefore, any recordkeeping errors that occurred do not justify exclusion of
the DNA reanalysis that occurred in 2020.

       Defendant additionally argues that his rights to a fair trial and due process will be violated
because some data on which the analysts relied is not available for review and cross-examination.

                                                  -7-
But defendant overlooks the fact that the DNA extracts were reanalyzed in 2020 and the data from
that 2020 reanalysis is available to him. Defendant will not be prevented from pursuing his theory
of the case or attacking the weight of the evidence based on the missing case jacket and the original
swabs. Any deficiency in the chain of custody, like any uncertainty about what the DNA mixture
contained, goes to the weight of the evidence. Consequently, any assertion that defendant will be
denied a fair trial or that he cannot pursue a defense is meritless.

        Finally, defendant argues that the trial court ignored other pertinent issues when it focused
too narrowly on the issue of whether the DNA extraction process was reliable in 2002. At a hearing
on defendant’s motion on June 14, 2021, defendant asserted that the 2020 reanalysis of the extracts
was dependent upon an accurate and reliable analysis of the DNA in 2002. The trial court granted
defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing in response to that assertion and made clear that the
evidentiary hearing would simply address “the reliability of the extracts produced in 2002.” The
evidentiary hearing started with a detailed discussion of the scope of the issue to be addressed, and
defendant did not challenge the trial court’s characterization of the scope of the issue. Defendant
contends that the trial court should have more fully explored the admissibility of the DNA analysis
under every part of MRE 702. But as we have explained, the trial court correctly decided that the
issues defendant raised related to the chain of custody, rather than the admissibility of the evidence
under MRE 702. Consequently, the record does not support defendant’s suggestion that the trial
court’s focus at the evidentiary hearing was too narrow.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                              /s/ Christopher P. Yates

                                                 -8-