Court Opinion

ID: 9488992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:01:45.863313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:14.051867
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON REHEARING
May 3, 1996
PER CURIAM.
Steven Joyner petitions for rehearing of his appeal. See Joyner v. Forney, 78 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir.1996). We have considered his arguments with respect to the discovery rule, see id. at 1341-42, and reject them.
With respect to the continuing treatment rule, see id. at 1342-43, Mr. Joyner asserts that we have misconstrued the Nebraska cases and that the continuing treatment rule includes no requirement that the course of -treatment itself be negligent. Mr. Joyner offers this argument despite the language of Frezell v. Iwersen, 231 Neb. 365, 436 N.W.2d 194, 198 (1989), that the “continuous treatment doctrine applies when there has been either a misdiagnosis upon which incorrect treatment is given or when there has been a continuing course of negligent treatment” (emphasis supplied), and the subsequent observation that the plaintiff in that ease did “not allege [that] the treatment after the surgery was negligent” (emphasis supplied).
It is true, as Mr. Joyner contends, that the cases he cites do not appear to require that the treatment that is part of the “continuing course,” id., be negligent. See Healy v. Langdon, 245 Neb. 1, 511 N.W.2d 498, 501 (1994); Tiwald v. Dewey, 221 Neb. 547, 378 N.W.2d 671, 673-74 (1985); Smith v. Dewey, 214 Neb. 605, 335 N.W.2d 530, 534 (1983); and Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1941). We find it hard to reconcile this apparent disparity among the Nebraska cases, but we note that the emphasis in the cases cited by Mr. Joyner is on the issue of whether the “treatment” was a “continuing course,” rather than isolated acts that should, as a matter of law, be considered separately. In other words, the discussion was not about whether the treatment in question was itself negligent but, instead, about whether all of the defendant’s acts should be considered as an indivisible whole. See Tiwald, 378 N.W.2d at 673-74; Smith, 335 N.W.2d at 533-34; and Williams, 1 N.W.2d at 124.
Even assuming, however, that Mr. Joyner’s characterization of the Nebraska continuing treatment rule is correct, that characterization does him no good. That is because he denies that the one-year waiting period considered reasonable by his own expert was “treatment.” Because of that denial, the limitations period for his lawsuit had to begin running as of his second surgery, which occurred more than two years, see Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-2828, before he filed his lawsuit.
In his petition for rehearing, Mr. Joyner contends that the defendants’ negligence was in their failure to “treat” him after his second surgery, ie., their failure to require him to return to their office at some point so that they could re-examine him. Mr. Joyner did not make that argument in his appeal brief, however, so we decline to consider it at this point.
For the reasons given, therefore, we deny Mr. Joyner’s petition for rehearing.