Court Opinion

ID: 9726640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:01:26.602643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:29.412772
License: Public Domain

Scott, Justice
(concurring specially).
I agree with the court that the writ should issue, and would agree with the entire opinion if the logical conclusion that Rule 18, Rules of Criminal Procedure, has changed the law in Minnesota were more clearly spelled out.
The opinion states that Rule 18.06, subd. 3, abolishes presentments. In State ex rel. Strong v. District Court, 216 Minn. 345, 12 N. W. 2d 776 (1944), decided at a time when presentments were part of the statutory law, we allowed certain parts of a grand jury report to stand, but suppressed and expunged from *155the files of the court that which did not conform to the statutory definition of “presentment.” Now that the rules have abolished presentments completely, for the obvious reasons stated in this court’s opinion, we are not changing the law of the Strong case one iota for we are still allowing a written report by the grand jury. This seems completely contrary to the purpose of the rule in abolishing presentments and also contrary to all the cases cited in the court’s opinion. For example, we quote, as follows, People v. McCabe, 148 Misc. 330, 333, 266 N. Y. S. 363, 367 (1933):
“A presentment is a foul blow. It wins the importance of a judicial document, yet it lacks its principal attributes — the right to answer and to appeal. It accuses but furnishes no forum for a denial. No one knows upon what evidence the findings are based. An indictment may be challenged — even defeated. The presentment is immune. It is like the ‘hit and run’ motorist. Before application can be made to suppress it, it is the subject of public gossip. The damage is done. The injury it may unjustly inflict may never be healed.”
The purpose of the abolition of the presentment was to avoid these effects. To allow any report at this time defeats the purpose. When criticism is made of an office or a function, it must be remembered that some individual holds the office or performs the function and that published reports will not limit the story to merely what is said by the grand jury in its report but will name the public official or person responsible for the function. We cannot be certain that a grand jury or those advising that body will always be sensible.
Again, in footnote 2 of the majority opinion, Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326, 345 (N. D. Ohio), affirmed, 450 F. 2d 480 (6 Cir. 1971), was correctly and appropriately quoted: .
“* * * [W]e think the proper function of the grand, jury under Rule 18 is to serve as a part of the criminal judicial *156process, not a civil investigative arm of the executive. As the court stated in Hammond v. Brown [supra] : ‘* * * The grand jury in its inquest of crimes and offenses is part of the judicial branch of government. Like other branches of government the judicial branch is subject to the doctrine of separation of powers. State ex rel. Finley, Judge v. Pfeiffer, Bd. of County Commissioners, 163 Ohio St. 149, 126 N. E. 2d 57 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1955). The grand jury is part of the judicial branch of government and is separate and distinct from the legislative and executive branches of government; and the grand jury, therefore, may not "impinge upon the authority or rights of the others,” Finley, supra, at 149, 126 N. E. 2d at 58.’ ”
The court in Hammond goes on to say:
“Hence, a grand jury is without authority to issue a report that advises, condemns or commends, or makes recommendations concerning the policies and operation of public boards, public officers, or public authorities. Protection of the ‘doctrine of the separation of powers’ is carefully developed and relied on in a widely quoted and authoritative decision, Application of United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858 (S. D. N. Y. 1953), in which Judge Edward Weinfeld ordered expunged a ‘presentment’ of a grand jury that was actually a report.” 323 F. Supp. 345.
I believe we should hold clearly that presentments have been abolished by Rule 18, Rules of Criminal Procedure. In doing so we would be in no way limiting the grand jury’s investigatory powers and hearings in the implementation of its duties enumerated in Minn. St. 628.61. A necessary investigation can be effective without the potential disclosure of its findings by other than the return of an indictment or a no bill. Proper questions and suggestions for corrective measures contemplated by Minn. St. 628.61 can be effectively put forth in the confidence of the grand jury room by members of the grand jury when specific witnesses are called in fulfilling this statutory duty. The suggestions to *157that official called as a witness can be monitored during the grand jury’s tenure. To extend this power to allow a reporting instrument without express authority is inconsistent with the intent of Rule 18.1
Todd, Justice (concurring specially).
I join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Scott.
Yetka, Justice (concurring specially).
I join in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Scott.

 Both amici curiae Minnesota Public Defenders Association and the Ramsey County Attorney agree with this conclusion.