Court Opinion

ID: 9393140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 16:00:49.630698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.279836
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12902       Document: 22-1       Date Filed: 05/09/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                       [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                        In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                             ____________________

                                    No. 22-12902
                              Non-Argument Calendar
                             ____________________

       KEBIN VALENTIN,
       a.k.a. Kevin Valentin,
       MATTHEW DAVID VALENTIN,
       ANABELY ACEVEDO,
                                                        Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
       versus
       1245, LLC,
       RMRP REALTY, LLC,
       RONALD T. FATATO,
       RONALD J. FATATO,
       INTER STATE SALES CORP.,
       d.b.a. Interstate Sales Corp., et al.,
USCA11 Case: 22-12902      Document: 22-1      Date Filed: 05/09/2023     Page: 2 of 5

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12902

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-62263-AHS
                           ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Kebin Valentin, Matthew Valentin, and Anabely Acevedo ap-
       peal the district court’s grant of Appellees’ motion for summary
       judgment in their claim for overtime pay under the Fair Labor
       Standards Act (“FLSA”). On appeal, Appellants argue that the dis-
       trict court erred when it held that they failed to establish individual
       coverage. They also argue that they qualify under the FLSA as do-
       mestic service employees.
                                         I.
              An employee must demonstrate that he is covered by the
       FLSA in order to be eligible for overtime pay. Josendis v. Wall to Wall
       Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011). There
       are two types of FLSA coverage: First, an employee may claim “in-
       dividual coverage” if he regularly and directly participates in the
       actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce; sec-
       ond, an employee is subject to enterprise coverage if he is
USCA11 Case: 22-12902       Document: 22-1       Date Filed: 05/09/2023      Page: 3 of 5

       22-12902                Opinion of the Court                            3

       employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the produc-
       tion of goods for commerce. 1
               On appeal, Appellants claim coverage only pursuant to “in-
       dividual coverage.” We held in St. Elien v. All County Environment
       Services, Inc., 991 F.3d 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 2021), that “one who . .
       . regularly uses the instrumentalities of interstate commerce in his
       work, e.g., regular and recurrent use of interstate telephone, tele-
       graph, mails, or travel is one who directly participates in the actual
       movement of persons or things in interstate commerce.” Id. at 1200
       (internal quotation and punctuation omitted). See also id. at 1201
       (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 779.103: “[e]mployees are ‘engaged in com-
       merce’ within the meaning of the Act when they are performing
       work involving or related to the movement of persons or things
       (whether tangibles or intangibles, and including information and
       intelligence) among the several States or between any State and any
       place outside thereof ”); id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 776.23(d)(2):
       “[E]mployees who regularly use instrumentalities of commerce,
       such as the telephone, telegraph and mails for interstate communi-
       cation are within the scope of the Act.”). In St. Elien, we held that
       evidence of an employee’s three to ﬁve interstate telephone calls
       per week provided a legally suﬃcient basis for a reasonable jury to
       ﬁnd that the employee falls within the coverage of the Act. Id. at
       1198.

       1      Appellants have abandoned their claim to qualification for overtime
       under enterprise coverage by failing to brief it on appeal.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12902

              In his declaration, Kebin Valentin attested that he spoke to
       Appellees’ New York-based employees several times each week as
       part of his job; Appellants Matthew Valentin and Anabely Acevedo
       claim coverage indirectly through Kebin Valentin’s communica-
       tions. The Appellees asserted that Kebin only communicated with
       Appellee Ronald T. Fatato who lives in Florida and Kebin only had
       communications with the oﬃce in New York on isolated occasions.
               The district court acknowledged this dispute in its order but
       credited Appellees’ statement of the facts. This was error. “When
       considering a motion for summary judgment, . . . ‘courts must con-
       strue the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to
       the nonmoving party and when conﬂicts arise between the facts
       evidenced by the parties, [they must] credit the nonmoving party’s
       version.’” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th
       Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d
       759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006)). We have stated that the nonmoving party
       may rely on self-serving aﬃdavits to withstand a motion for sum-
       mary judgment. United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 858 (11th Cir.
       2018)(en banc). Further, we explained that Federal Rule of Civil
       Procedure 56 does not “require an otherwise admissible aﬃdavit be
       corroborated by independent evidence.” Id. Thus, “even in the
       absence of collaborative evidence, a plaintiﬀ’s own testimony may
       be suﬃcient to withstand summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Strick-
       land v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1160 (11th Cir. 2012)). Any
       requirement for corroboration must come from a source other
       than Rule 56. Id. at 858. Thus Kebin’s aﬃdavit is suﬃcient to create
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       22-12902                    Opinion of the Court                                  5

       a genuine issue of material fact on whether he was a covered em-
       ployee.
              The same is not true for Matthew and Anabely. We have
       stated that the employees seeking to establish that they are “en-
       gaged in commerce” under the FLSA must be “directly participating
       in the actual movement of person or things interstate commerce.”
       Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir.
       2006) (emphasis added). Thus, Matthew and Anabely’s admission
       that they were not involved in the phone calls Kebin says he partic-
       ipated in to the New York oﬃce is fatal to their claim.
              For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order is va-
       cated in part and aﬃrmed in part. We remand to the district court
       for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.2
       VACATED and REMANDED in part, AFFIRMED in part.

       2        We reject Appellants’ incomplete and belated argument that they
       qualify under the FLSA as domestic service employees. Appellants raised this
       issue for the first time in their answer to the Appellees’ motion for summary
       judgment and never amended their complaint. “At the summary judgment
       stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the
       complaint in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). A plaintiff may not amend
       her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”
       Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004). In
       recognition of that rule, the district court did not address the issue in its order.
       We likewise will not acknowledge this improperly raised argument.