Court Opinion

ID: 9389450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 17:01:58.161257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:27.081877
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 25 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDREW VALENZUELA,                              No.    20-55867

                 Petitioner-Appellant,          D.C. No.
                                                2:17-cv-08410-CAS-SP
 v.

W. L. MONTGOMERY, Acting Warden,                MEMORANDUM*

                 Respondent-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                   Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 10, 2023
                              Pasadena, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, BERZON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

      Andrew Valenzuela appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253,

and we affirm.

      We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas petition. Sanders v.

Cullen, 873 F.3d 778, 793 (9th Cir. 2017). We “may affirm the district court’s

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
holding on any ground raised below and fairly supported by the record.” Columbia

Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Proctor

v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009)).

       Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a federal habeas

petitioner must show that the state court’s adjudication of the merits of the claim

“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). Because

the California Supreme Court summarily denied Valenzuela’s petition, we look “to

the last . . . state-court decision that . . . provide[s] a relevant rationale” and

“presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v.

Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018); see also Montiel v. Chappell, 43 F.4th 942,

958 (9th Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed, No. 22-6570 (Jan. 11, 2023). The last

state-court decision to provide a rationale for rejecting Valenzuela’s claim was the

decision of the California Court of Appeal.

       1. The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court adequately

instructed the jury that duress is a defense to kidnapping, and thus to felony murder

predicated on kidnapping. “Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, . . . criminal defendants [must] be afforded a meaningful opportunity

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to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).

A criminal defendant is thus entitled to “an instruction as to any recognized

defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in

his favor.” Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).

      First, there is no evidence that Valenzuela was under duress when he

committed the crime of kidnapping, so any error regarding the application of the

duress instruction to the kidnapping charge could not possibly have been

prejudicial. Second, the trial court made clear to the jury that duress is a defense to

kidnapping. Specifically, the court instructed that “[a] person is not guilty of a

crime other than malice murder when he engages in conduct, otherwise criminal,

when acting under threats and menaces” to his life. As the Court of Appeal

explained, “[b]ecause kidnapping is a ‘crime other than malice murder,’ this

general instruction regarding the duress defense by its plain terms applied to the

crime of kidnapping.” Valenzuela thus received an instruction that covered his

duress defense to kidnapping and, by extension, to felony murder predicated on

kidnapping. No clearly established federal law states that he was entitled to an

even more specific instruction or that the trial court was obligated to arrange the

instructions to give greater prominence to the availability of the duress defense.

      2. Valenzuela requested a special instruction that “[a]lthough duress is not

an affirmative defense to murder, the circumstances of duress are relevant to

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whether the evidence establishes the elements of premeditation or implied malice.”

We need not consider Valenzuela’s claim that the trial court’s refusal to give that

instruction was constitutional error. Even assuming error, Valenzuela cannot

establish prejudice.

      Where, as here, a habeas petitioner alleges a trial error, the petitioner must

show that the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). “A ‘substantial and

injurious effect’ means a ‘reasonable probability’ that the jury would have arrived

at a different verdict had the instruction been given.” Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855,

860 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 916 (9th Cir. 2006)).

      The jury specifically found that Valenzuela killed David Padilla while

engaged in the crime of kidnapping, and the jury was instructed that “[t]he

unlawful killing of a human being . . . which occurs during the commission or

attempted commission of the crime of kidnapping is . . . murder of the first degree

when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit [kidnapping].” Thus, even if

the trial court had given Valenzuela’s special duress instruction, and even if that

instruction had led the jury to conclude that Valenzuela lacked the mens rea for

first-degree malice murder, Valenzuela would still have been convicted of first-

degree murder under a felony-murder theory. There is, therefore, no “‘reasonable

                                          4
probability’ that the jury would have arrived at a different verdict had the

instruction been given.” Byrd, 566 F.3d at 860 (quoting Clark, 450 F.3d at 916).

      AFFIRMED.

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