Court Opinion

ID: 9676139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:15:50.81903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:44.499981
License: Public Domain

SEERDEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe the original panel opinion properly disposed of this case, I cannot agree with the majority opinion on rehearing. The evidence in this case and the analyses of the Havners’ experts have been thoroughly discussed in both the original opinion and the one on rehearing. They have also been discussed in the numerous other cases involving the drug, Bendectin.1 It is not necessary to rehash it here. Simply put, with due regard to the rights of the Havners, the impassioned pleas of their lawyers, the personal opinions of their witnesses, and the verdict of the jury, I am convinced that there is no legally competent evidence to support the judgment that the ingestion of the drug, Bendectin, was a producing cause of Kelly Havner’s birth defect.
The expert witnesses for the Havners all have impressive credentials. All acknowledge the basic fact that it is mainly unknown how birth defects come about. Only Dr. Palmer testified specifically that, in his opinion, Kelly Havner’s condition was caused by Bendectin. For all of the reasons set out in our original panel opinion, and based on the standards for admissibility of expert testimony set forth and the reasoning in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 38 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 852, - S.W.2d - (June 17, 1995), I believe Dr. Palmer’s testimony constitutes only his personal opinion, which is no scientific evidence of the cause of Kelly’s problem. Assuming this is correct, the Hav-ners failed to meet their burden of proof.
My conviction is enhanced after reviewing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.1995) (upon re*565mand). The Ninth Circuit Court in this case reviewed affidavits of the same experts who testified in our ease. The review shows that the evidence is not only strikingly similar, but is essentially identical to the evidence in our case. In affirming summary judgment for Merrell Dow, the Ninth Circuit Court stated:
As noted above, plaintiffs rely entirely on the experts’ unadorned assertions that the methodology they employed comports with standard scientific procedures. In support of these assertions, plaintiffs offer only the trial and deposition testimony of these experts in other cases. While these materials indicate that plaintiffs’ experts have relied on animal studies, chemical structure analyses and epidemiological data, they neither explain the methodology the experts followed to reach their conclusions nor point to any external source to validate that methodology. We’ve been presented with only the experts’ qualifications, their conclusions and their assurances of reliability. Under Daubert, that’s not enough. This is especially true of Dr. Palmer — the only expert willing to testify “that Bendec-tin did cause the limb defects in each of the children.” Palmer Aff. at 8. In support of this conclusion, Dr. Palmer asserts only that Bendectin is a teratogen and that he has examined the plaintiffs’ medical records, which apparently reveal the timing of their mothers’ ingestion of the drug. Dr. Palmer offers no tested or testable theory to explain how, from this limited information, he was able to eliminate all other potential causes of birth defects, nor does he explain how he alone can state as a fact that Bendectin caused plaintiffs’ injuries. We therefore agree with the Sixth Circuit’s observation that “Dr. Palmer does not testify on the basis of the collective view of this scientific discipline, nor does he take issue with his peers and explain the grounds for his differences. Indeed, no understandable scientific basis is stated. Personal opinion, not science, is testifying here.” Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1360. For this reason, Dr. Palmer’s testimony is inadmissible as a matter of law under Rule 702.
Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1319.
Our Supreme Court’s announcement in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson causes me to believe that, in this type of case, Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 702 should be interpreted the same way.
For these reasons, I believe the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment rendered for appellant.

. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), on remand, 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.1995): Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 84, 121 L.Ed.2d 47 (1992); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046, 110 S.Ct. 1511, 108 L.Ed.2d 646 (1990); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C.Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882, 110 S.Ct. 218, 107 L.Ed.2d 171 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir.1987).