Court Opinion

ID: 9958771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 20:11:27.46408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:50.747235
License: Public Domain

Ryan v Board of Mgrs. of the Sequoia Condominium
               2024 NY Slip Op 31038(U)
                     March 28, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 152897/2013
                  Judge: Paul A. Goetz
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
 Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
 State and local government sources, including the New
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 This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
                       publication.
                                                                                                                       INDEX NO. 152897/2013
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 152                                                                                              RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/28/2024

                                 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                           NEW YORK COUNTY
          PRESENT:             HON. PAUL A. GOETZ                                                  PART   47
                                                                                     Justice
          ----------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------X      INDEX NO.          152897/2013
           WAYNE-PAUL RYAN and ROBERT PETER BUNCKE,
                                                                                                   MOTION DATE         09/14/2020
                                                       Plaintiffs,
                                                                                                   MOTION SEQ. NO.         003
                                           - against -
           BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE SEQUOIA
           CONDOMINIUM, THE SEQUOIA CONDOMINIUM
                                                                                                     DECISION + ORDER ON
           ASSOCIATION, PRECISION ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.,
           and VINCENT OCCHIPINTI,                                                                         MOTION

                                                       Defendants.
          ------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------X

          The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 93, 94, 95, 96, 97,
          98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118,
          119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138,139,
          140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151
          were read on this motion to/for                                                       JUDGMENT-SUMMARY

                    In this real and personal property damage action, plaintiffs own condominium unit 2B

          (the unit) at the Sequoia Condominium, located at 222 West 14th Street in Manhattan (the

          Sequoia). Defendants include the Board of Managers of the Sequoia Condominium (the Board);

          the Sequoia Condominium Association (the Association); the Sequoia's management company,

          Precision Asset Management Inc. (Precision); and the Sequoia's managing agent, Vincent

          Occhipinti (Occhipinti) (NYSCEF Doc No 96).

                                                                  BACKGROUND

                    Plaintiffs allege that their unit has been plagued by recurring water leaks over several

          years that resulted in damage to their real and personal property, and loss of use and enjoyment

          of their unit. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that water infiltrated their bedroom from 2001 through

          2012, with the frequency of the leaking escalating between 2010 to 2012 (id. at ,i 8). Plaintiffs
           152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                                         Page 1 of 14
           Motion No. 003

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          further allege that defendants were made aware of the leaks and were responsible for curing,

          repairing, and correcting the conditions causing same, and because defendants failed to do so

          efficiently, plaintiffs' property was damaged (id. at ,i,i 9-15).

                  Plaintiffs further allege that defendants incorrectly blamed the leaking on plaintiffs'

          allegedly improperly pitched air conditioner sleeve, for which defendants denied responsibility.

          Thereafter, plaintiffs incurred the costs of hiring a contractor, engineering consultant and

          architectural consultant to investigate the air conditioner sleeve, address the ongoing leaking, and

          repair the water-damaged areas of their unit (NYSCEF Doc No 94 ,i,i 54-58; NYSCEF Doc No

          105, pp. 4-7, 11, 16-17). When the leaking persisted following these measures, and other units in

          the Sequoia experienced leaking as well, defendants hired engineer William Lau (Lau) to further

          investigate the issue (NYSCEF Doc No 94 ,J 31; NYSCEF Doc No 105, p. 18; NYSCEF Doc No

          128, ,i,i 51-52). Lau determined that the source of the leak was an exterior wall, for which

          defendants took responsibility by taking corrective measures which stopped the leaking

          (NYSCEF Doc No 94, ,J 59).

                  Thereafter, the parties corresponded about reimbursing plaintiffs' expenses for, inter alia,

          interior repairs, hotel rooms, contractors, and attorneys' fees. Emails reveal that defendants

          offered plaintiffs $16,000 for the reimbursement of interior repairs, but that other expenses were

          still subject to negotiation (NYSCEF Doc No 105, pp. 53-56, 59-66). Plaintiffs sought to collect

          the $16,000, but defendants responded that plaintiffs would first have to sign a general release of

          all claims relating to the leaks. Upon plaintiffs' refusal to release all claims, defendants withdrew

          their offer (NYSCEF Doc No 96, ,J,J 16-30).

                  Plaintiffs assert that defendants' offer to pay $16,000 to reimburse plaintiffs for their

          interior repair expenses was an unequivocal and unconditional offer which plaintiffs accepted,

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           Motion No. 003

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          and that defendants subsequently changed its material terms by requiring an exchange of mutual

          releases among the parties before defendants would make payment. Plaintiffs' complaint

          includes six causes of action: ( 1) breach of contract of an unconditional offer to pay $16,000 in

          damages; (2) breach of contract of the condominium documents; (3) violation of Real Property

          Law (RPL) § 339-cc; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) negligence; and (6) interference with the

          use and enjoyment ofreal property. Plaintiffs seek compensation for personal and real property

          damage and loss of use to their property; retroactive adjustment of common charges;

          reimbursement for expenses, including but not limited to monies spent on contractors, engineers

          and attorneys; use of plaintiffs' real property to make repairs to other units at the premises; and

          related relief (NYSCEF Doc No 96, i11).

                   Defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint in its

          entirety. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' first cause of action should be dismissed based on

          documentary evidence, as there were negotiations but no binding agreement; the second cause of

          action should be dismissed based upon evidence that defendants acted diligently to locate and

          repair the leak; the third cause of action should be dismissed because there is no private cause of

          action under RPL § 339-cc, except for partition in certain circumstances; the fourth cause of

          action should be dismissed because condominiums do not owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners;

          the fifth cause of action should be dismissed because the negligence claim is duplicative of the

          breach of contract claim; and the sixth cause of action should be dismissed because a common

          charge refund is not a proper cause of action, and the obligation to pay same is an independent

          covenant unrelated to the habitability of a condominium unit. Further, defendants argue that all

          claims against defendants Precision and Occhipinti must be dismissed, as managing agents are

           152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                    Page 3 of 14
           Motion No. 003

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          only responsible for affirmative acts of negligence or wrongdoing, and not for non-feasance

          (NYSCEF Doc No 94, ,J 8).

                   Plaintiffs oppose defendants' motion and cross-move pursuant to CPLR §§ 3212(a) and

          (e) for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for each of their six causes of action,

          and for an order pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 imposing sanctions on defendants and

          awarding plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorneys' fees (NYSCEF Doc No 127). Defendants

          oppose plaintiffs' cross-motion and argue that it should be denied as an untimely and improper

          motion for summary judgment (NYSCEF Doc No 149).

                                                    DISCUSSION

          Timeliness of Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

                   As a threshold matter, defendants argue that plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary

         judgment is untimely and should not be considered. Pursuant to the status conference order dated

          March 3, 2020, all dispositive motions were to be made no later than 60 days after the filing of

          the note of issue (NYSCEF Doc No 83). The note of issue was filed on May 15, 2020 (NYSCEF

          Doc No 85), making the deadline to file dispositive motions July 14, 2020. The cross-motion was

          filed on November 6, 2020 (NYSCEF Doc No 122). However, a "cross motion for summary

         judgment made after the expiration of the [deadline for making dispositive motions] may be

          considered by the court, even in the absence of good cause, where a timely motion for summary

         judgment was made seeking relief nearly identical to that sought by the cross motion" (Alonzo v

          Safe Harbors of the Hudson Haus. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 104 AD3d 446, 448-49 [1st Dept 2013]).

          Moreover, even if the court chose not to consider plaintiffs' submission as a cross-motion, it still

          has the discretion to consider it as opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment.

          Additionally, "upon a summary judgment motion, [the court] may search the record and grant

           152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                    Page 4 of 14
           Motion No. 003

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         judgment to the non-moving party without necessity of notice or cross-motion" (Abramovitz v

          Paragon Sporting Goods Co., 202 AD2d 206 [1st Dept 1994]). Accordingly, plaintiffs' cross-

          motion will not be denied on untimeliness grounds and will be considered on the merits.

          Summary Judgment

                  "It is well settled that 'the proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima

          facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw, tendering sufficient evidence to

          demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact."' (Pullman v Silverman, 28 NY3d 1060,

          1062 [2016], quoting Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). "Once such a prima

          facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce

          evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to raise material issues of fact which require a

          trial of the action." (Cabrera v Rodriguez, 72 AD3d 553, 553-554 [1st Dept 2010], citing

         Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 342). The evidence presented in a summary judgment motion must be

          examined "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" (Schmidt v One New York Plaza

          Co., 153 AD3d 427,428 [2017], quoting Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 339

          [2011]) and bare allegations or conclusory assertions are insufficient to create genuine issues of

          fact (Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223,231 [1978]). If there is any doubt as to the

          existence of a triable fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied (id.).

                  As an initial matter, defendants have established that Precision and Occhipinti are entitled

          to summary judgment on each of plaintiffs' causes of action. Plaintiffs' first and second causes

          of action are for breach of contract, and yet, plaintiffs did not allege that an agreement existed

          between them and Precision and Occhipinti; plaintiffs only allege the existence of a contract

          between them and the Sequoia. Plaintiffs' third cause of action pursuant to RPL § 339-cc fails

          because they have not alleged any action taken by Precision and Occhipinti, in particular, which

           152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                    Page 5 of 14
           Motion No. 003

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          would constitute a violation under that statute. Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action for breach of

          fiduciary duty fails because "the managing agent is a fiduciary as to the condominium, but not as

          to the individual unit owners" (Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d 176, 191, 825 N.Y.S.2d 55 [2d

          Dept 2006]), and plaintiffs did not allege that Precision and Occhipinti aided and abetted the

          Board's alleged breach (Brasseur v Speranza, 21 AD3d 297 [1st Dept 2005]). Regarding

          plaintiffs' negligence cause of action, as the management company and property manager for the

          Sequoia, Precision and Occhipinti could only be liable to plaintiffs as unit owners for affirmative

          acts of negligence (see Pelton v 77 Park Ave. Condominium, 38 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2006]

          [internal quotations and citations omitted] overruled on other grounds Fletcher v Dakota, Inc.,

          99 AD3d 43 [1st Dept 2012]). Despite plaintiffs' attempts to characterize Precision and

          Occhipinti's actions as affirmative, they have merely alleged non-feasance (NYSCEF Doc No

          144 [stating that "defendants affirmatively did not take the appropriate actions to repair the

          leaks"]), and therefore their negligence claim fails as well. Finally, the sixth cause of action fails

          because plaintiffs have not alleged any specific actions taken by Precision and Occhipinti which

          interfered with their use and enjoyment of their real property. Accordingly, that part of

          defendants' motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint as against

          Precision and Occhipinti will be granted. 1

                i.      Breach of Contract- Unconditional Offer to Pay $16,000 in Damages

                     Defendants argue that plaintiffs' first cause of action for breach of contract based on

          defendants' withdrawal of their offer to pay damages should be dismissed based on documentary

          evidence indicating that there were ongoing negotiations, but no binding offer. Additionally,

          defendants assert that they believed the discussed amount of $16,000 represented the complete

          1
           For the remainder of the "Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" section of the Discussion, reference to
          "defendants" shall mean the Board and the Association.
              152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                          Page 6 of 14
              Motion No. 003

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          and final settlement of all claims, and that plaintiff rejected this deal. Plaintiffs, on the other

          hand, contend that the documentary evidence indicates that defendants' offer, when initially

          extended, was not contingent on plaintiffs signing a general release, and that they accepted the

          offer of $16,000-for repair reimbursement only-before defendants attempted to withdraw it.

                  There can be no contract absent a mutual intent to be bound (Joseph Martin, Jr.,

          Delicatessen, Inc. v Schumacher, 52 NY2d 105, 109 [1981]). "Whether such intent exists is a

          mixed question of law and fact. This means that the question is to be decided by the court if

          determinable from the language employed in the written instrument, and if not so determinable[,]

          ... then by the finder of the facts" (Four Seasons Hotels v Vinnik, 127 AD2d 310, 316 [1st Dept

          1987]; In re Commissioners to Determine, 285 NY 326, 331 [1941] ["While the construction of

          writings is, to be sure, [a] matter of law ... , still the particulars of the process of ascertaining the

          disclosed intention of a writer are for the most part items of fact."]). To make this determination,

          an objective test is applied, meaning that "the manifestation of a party's intention rather than the

          actual or real intention is ordinarily controlling" (21 NY Jur 2d, Contracts§ 29). "As a general

          rule, in order for an acceptance to be effective, it must ... be clear, unambiguous and

          unequivocal" (King v King, 208 AD2d 1143, 1143-44 [3d Dept 1994]). With regard to any

          material term, "[d]efiniteness is essential" (Four Seasons Hotels, 127 AD2d at 317 [internal

          citation omitted]).

                  Defendants have failed to establish the absence of issues of fact regarding whether their

          offer to pay plaintiffs $16,000 was conditional on plaintiffs signing a general release of all

          related claims and whether plaintiffs rejected that offer. Notably, a letter dated July 12, 2012

          indicates that the $16,000 was contemplated as "full reimbursement ... for the interior repairs"

          and that "the remaining reimbursements to include attorney fees, engineering frees and hotel

           152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                       Page 7 of 14
           Motion No. 003

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          bills" would be determined after the insurance companies completed their investigations of the

          incident (NYSCEF Doc No 142). In an email dated July 25, 2012, plaintiffs counsel made "a

          final attempt at settlement," apparently referring to the remaining expenses in dispute (NYSCEF

          Doc No 105, pp. 53-54). The next day, Precision replied by letter, confirming that "the Sequoia's

          board has agreed to reimburse Mr. Ryan for $16,000 + for the interior repairs" and that the other

          reimbursements remained outstanding and open for negotiation (NYSCEF Doc No 130). The

          letter also recommended "that Mr. Ryan pick up his check for $16,000 without signing any kind

          of release while negotiations continue" (id.). Thus, far from eliminating any questions of fact, the

          correspondence actually tends to show that the $16,000 offer was not conditioned on a general

          release, and defendants have not submitted any evidence of plaintiffs' alleged rejection of that

          offer. Similarly, plaintiffs have not established that they unambiguously and unequivocally

          accepted the offer. Accordingly, that part of defendants' motion seeking summary judgment on

          plaintiffs' first cause of action and that part of plaintiffs' cross-motion seeking summary

         judgment on the same claim will be denied.

             ii.      Breach of Contract - Condominium Documents

                   Defendants argue that plaintiffs' second cause of action for breach of contract should be

          dismissed because no agreement was entered into whereby defendants agreed to perform repairs

          or compensate plaintiffs for any repairs they might make on their own. To the extent that the

          cause of action is based on alleged violations of the condominium's by-laws, defendants assert

          that they acted efficiently to correct problems identified by plaintiffs. Defendants further argue

          that awarding punitive damages would be inappropriate because there is no evidence of gross

          negligence or recklessness on defendants' part. Plaintiffs argue that the condo's by-laws

          constitute a contract between the Board and all unit owners which imposed an obligation on the

           152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                   Page 8 of 14
           Motion No. 003

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          Board to perform "prompt repair[s]." Plaintiffs assert that while the by-laws suggest that "prompt

          repair" means repair within 60 days, defendants took years to finally cure the leak problem.

                    A condominium's by-laws constitute a binding contract with the unit owners (Avenue A

         Assoc. LP v Board ofMgrs. of the Hearth House Condominium, 190 AD3d 473, 473-74 [1st

          Dept 2021]). As such, defendants were obligated to "promptly ... repair[] any leaks that are not

          caused by the acts or omissions of the Unit Owner" (NYSCEF Doc No 109, Article VI§ 10). The

          parties have provided conflicting accounts regarding defendants' promptness in addressing the

          leaks (compare NYSCEF Doc No 116, 14: 19-15:5 [plaintiff Ryan testifying that the leaks began

          in "2000, probably earlier" and that this was an "ongoing" problem from that time until

          defendants fixed the exterior wall late in 2011] with NYSCEF Doc No 119, 58: 13-24 [Occhipinti

          stating that, to his recollection, plaintiff first complained in 2010 and that "there was no ongoing

          thing for ten years"). Thus, there are remaining issues of fact as to when defendants were first

          notified of the leaks and how soon thereafter defendants remedied them. Accordingly, the part of

          defendants' motion seeking summary judgment on plaintiffs' second cause of action will be

          denied and the part of plaintiffs' cross-motion seeking summary judgment on same will also be

          denied.

                    However, plaintiffs have "no viable claim for punitive damages, which are not

          recoverable for ordinary breach of contract" (Soviero v Carroll Group Intl., Inc., 27 AD3d 276,

          277 [1st Dept 2006], citing Rocanova v Equitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 83 NY2d 603, 613

          [1994]) and, as discussed infra, "defendant's alleged conduct is not actionable as a tort

          independent of its alleged failure to perform its contractual obligations" (AXA Mediterranean

          Holding, S.P. v ING Ins. Intl., B. V, 106 AD3d 457,457 [1st Dept 2013]). Accordingly, that part

           152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                   Page 9 of 14
           Motion No. 003

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          of defendants' motion seeking to bar plaintiffs from seeking punitive damages on their second

          cause of action will be granted.

             iii.       Violation ofReal Property Law (RPL) § 339-cc

                    Defendants argue that plaintiffs' third cause of action pursuant to RPL § 339-cc should be

          dismissed because that statute only provides for a private cause of action for certain matters

          concerning partition which do not apply here. However, RPL § 339-cc only refers to partition as

          a potential remedy for instances where "[75%] or more of the building is destroyed or

          substantially damaged and [75%] or more of the unit owners do not duly and promptly resolve to

          proceed with repair or restoration," which is not claimed here. Plaintiffs instead seek relief under

          the general part of the statute providing that "damage to or destruction of [a] building shall be

          promptly repaired and reconstructed by the board of managers, using the proceeds of insurance,

          if any, on the building of that purpose" (RPL § 339-cc). Contrary to defendants' argument, "it is

          established that Real Property Law § 339-dd does not preclude an individual unit owner from

          suing the sponsor or the board of managers for wrongs to the unit owner's interest in his or her

          individual unit, because such actions seek to enforce a right unique to the individual owner"

          (Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d 176, 185 [2d Dept 2006]). Since this private cause of action may

          be maintained, and since there are issues of fact regarding defendants' promptness in repairing

          the leaks, neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Accordingly, that part of

          defendants' motion seeking summary judgment on plaintiffs' third cause of action and that part

          of plaintiffs' cross-motion seeking summary judgment on the same claim will be denied.

             iv.       Breach ofFiduciary Duty

                    Defendants next argue that plaintiffs' fourth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty

          must be dismissed since the condominium, as a corporation, does not owe a fiduciary duty to its

           152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                    Page 10 of 14
           Motion No. 003

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          shareholders, i.e., the individual unit owners. This is incorrect; the board of managers of a

          condominium does, in fact, owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners (Odell v 704 Broadway Condo.,

          284 AD2d 52, 59 [1st Dept 2001] [condominium's board owes fiduciary duties to owner upon

          unit's purchase]; Desernio v Ardelean, 188 AD3d 992, 993 [2d Dept 2020] ["As a general

          matter, [the condo] owes a fiduciary duty to condominium unit owners when it is engaged in the

          business of management of the condominium"]; Board ofManagers v Fairway at N. Hills, 193

          AD2d 322, 325 [2d Dept 1993 ["The Board is by definition in a 'fiduciary' relationship with the

          unit owners"]). Defendants have thus failed to demonstrate that plaintiffs' claim must be

          dismissed as a matter oflaw. Plaintiffs have also failed to establish that no issue of fact exists as

          to whether defendants breached their fiduciary duty. Accordingly, that part of defendants'

          motion seeking summary judgment on plaintiffs' fourth cause of action and that part of

          plaintiffs' cross-motion seeking summary judgment on the same claim will be denied.

             v.       Negligence

                   Defendants assert that plaintiffs' fifth cause of action for negligence must be dismissed

          because it is duplicative of their breach of contract claim. In opposition, plaintiffs argue that

          defendants cannot seek dismissal of their breach of contract claim on the basis that there is no

          contract and seek dismissal of their negligence claim on the basis that plaintiffs included a

          breach of contract claim in their pleadings.

                   "It is a well-established principle that a simple breach of contract is not to be considered a

          tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been violated. Put another way,

          where the damages alleged were clearly within the contemplation of the written agreement ...

          [merely] employing language familiar to tort law, does not, without more, transform a simple

          breach of contract into a tort claim" (Dormitory Auth. of the State ofNY v Samson Cons tr. Co.,

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           Motion No. 003

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          30 NY3d 704, 711 [2018] [internal quotations and citations omitted]). Here, plaintiffs'

          negligence allegations are "merely a restatement, albeit in slightly different language, of the []

          contractual obligations asserted in the cause of action for breach of contract" ( Clark-Fitzpatrick,

          Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 NY2d 382 390 [1987]). Plaintiffs do not identify any duty defendants

          breached that is separate and distinct from the alleged contractual duties. Since both causes of

          action essentially seek enforcement of the contract, they are duplicative. Accordingly, that part of

          defendants' motion seeking summary judgment on plaintiffs' fifth cause of action will be granted

          and that part of plaintiffs' cross-motion seeking summary judgment on the same claim will be

          denied.

             vi.       Interference with the Use and Enjoyment of Real Property

                    Defendants argue that plaintiffs' sixth cause of action should be dismissed because it

          seeks a common charge refund, which "is not a proper cause of action and the obligation to pay

          the same is an independent covenant not linked to the habitability of a condominium unit"

          (NYSCEF Doc No 94). Plaintiffs respond that this is a misstatement of the nature of the claim;

          the sixth cause of action is for interference with the use and enjoyment of real property, and the

          common charge refund is merely the relief they seek for this claim (NYSCEF Doc No 96, ,i,i 58-

          64). Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants demanded access to plaintiffs' unit, including

          their outdoor terrace, to effectuate repairs to common elements and other units in the Sequoia. It

          is only in reply that defendants raise the argument that plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages

          for defendants' use of their terrace because the by-laws require plaintiffs to permit access to

          facilitate repairs on other units. However, a movant may not use reply papers to remedy basic

          deficiencies in their prima facie showing (Tribbs v 326-338 E 100th LLC, 215 AD3d 480,481

          [1st Dept 2023] [internal quotations and citations omitted]; Dannasch v Bifulco, 184 AD2d 415,

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           Motion No. 003

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          417 [1st Dept 1992] ["The function of reply papers is to address arguments made in opposition to

          the position taken by the movant and not to permit the movant to introduce new arguments in

          support of, or new grounds for the motion"]). Therefore, whether the by-laws require plaintiffs to

          permit access to their terrace to facilitate repairs to other units remains an issue that will not be

          considered on this motion. However, questions of fact remain as to whether defendants' use of

          plaintiffs' unit constitutes interference with the use and enjoyment of their property.

          Accordingly, that part of defendants' motion seeking summary judgment on plaintiffs' sixth

          cause of action and that part of plaintiffs' cross-motion seeking summary judgment on the same

          claim will be denied.

          Plaintiffs' Requested Relief

                    In light of the denial of plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on each cause of

          their causes of action, plaintiffs' request for an award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees will

          be denied. 2 Additionally, the part of their motion seeking the imposition of sanctions will also be

          denied, as plaintiffs failed to show that defendants' motion was "so egregious as to constitute

          frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1" (Nugent v City ofNY, 189 AD3d

          631, 632 [1st Dept 2020] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]).

                                                            CONCLUSION

                    Accordingly, it is hereby

                    ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of

          plaintiffs' complaint is granted to the extent that the complaint is dismissed in its entirety as

          against defendants Precision and Occhipinti and the fifth cause of action for negligence is

          dismissed as against all defendants, and is otherwise denied; and it is further

          2
           Plaintiffs also argue that they are entitled to pre-judgment interest, but they failed to request this relief in their
          notice of cross-motion (NYSCEF Doc No 127) and, as no sums have yet been awarded, this request is premature.
              152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                                  Page 13 of 14
              Motion No. 003

          [* 13]
                                                                 13 of 14
                                                                                                 INDEX NO. 152897/2013
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 152                                                                       RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/28/2024

                  ORDERED that plaintiffs are barred from seeking punitive damages on their second

          cause of action; and it is further

                  ORDERED that plaintiffs' cross-motion is denied in its entirety; and it is further

                  ORDERED that the caption shall be amended in accordance with the foregoing to

          remove Precision and Occhipinti from the caption; and it is further

                  ORDERED that counsel for movants shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry

          upon the County Clerk (60 Centre Street, Room 141B) and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office

          (60 Centre Street, Room 119), who are directed to mark the court's records to reflect the parties

          being removed pursuant hereto; and it is further

                  ORDERED that such service upon the County Clerk and the Clerk of the General Clerk's

          Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse

          and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the "E-Filing" page

          on the court's website at the address (ww.nycourts.gov/supctmanh)].

                  3/28/2024
                      DATE                                                      PAUL A. GOETZ, J.S.C.

                                   ~
           CHECK ONE:                   CASE DISPOSED                 NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                        GRANTED         □ DENIED      GRANTED IN PART          □ OTHER
           APPLICATION:                 SETTLE ORDER                  SUBMIT ORDER

           CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:        INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN    FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT    □ REFERENCE

           152897/2013 RYAN, WAYNE-PAUL vs. BOARD OF MANAGERS                                   Page 14 of 14
           Motion No. 003
             [* 14]
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