Court Opinion

ID: 9444529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:04:12.241921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:54.634371
License: Public Domain

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
I concur in the reversal but dissent as to the remandment.
Believing that plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to his injuries, I would reverse the judgment below.
Viewed most favorably to plaintiff, the evidence reveals the following facts.
At the time of the accident on April 26, 1950, plaintiff was 40 years old and in the possession of normal eyesight and hearing. At about 6 a. m., when the sun was shining and the weather was clear and dry, plaintiff, employed regularly as a truck driver, was operating a tractor-trailer combination through Anderson, Indiana. He made about three trips a *842week over a route passing in a westerly direction along West 25th Street across the single railroad track of defendant. West 25th Street was the southern city limits of Anderson. There were no bends or curves in the street. This was also true of the railroad track. Both the railroad’track and the street where plaintiff was driving were level, that is, without any grade.
At this crossing there were located several sets of automatic flasher-light signals, which, however, were not working at the time of the accident. On top of each signal was mounted the usual crossbuck sign with the words “Railroad Crossing.”
At the time in question, defendant was operating at a speed of 43 miles per hour in a southwesterly direction toward and over said crossing a passenger train consisting of two Diesel-electric locomotive units and 13 passenger, mail and bag'gage cars. Each of the locomotive units was 71 feet in length, 10y2 feet in width, and 13 feet 11 inches in height, gray in color, with a white stripe.
Several blocks east of the crossing, plaintiff entered West 25th Street. From there to the crossing there were to his right no buildings, except a small concrete building, about 9 feet' by 13 feet in size which was located about 88 feet east of the crossing .and 32% feet north of the center line of. West 25th Street. There were two trees whose trunks were 33 feet north of the center line of West 25th Street and 132 feet and 165 feet respectively east of the crossing. There was a parking lot along the north side of West 25th Street, the easterly boundary of which was about 200 feet east of the crossing. From there it extended west to the small concrete building. Its westerly boundary paralleled the railroad track at a distance of 32 feet therefrom. Its northern boundary was parallel to West 25th Street and approximately 155 feet from the center line thereof. There were no buildings north of the parking lot and east of the railroad track. The building south of West 25th Street and -east of the railroad track and nearest-to both of them was' a 'gas building about 12 foot square which was about 39 feet east of the track and 12 feet southerly of a line drawn at right angles to the east rail of the railroad track where it intersected the south line of West 25th Street. A few feet east of this gas building was the northwest corner of a manufacturing building known as Guide Lamp Manufacturing plant.
As plaintiff proceeded west on West 25th Street at 20 miles an hour, knowing that he was about to cross a railroad track, he looked to his right (northeast) to see if there was anything on the track, when he -was about 250 feet east of the crossing. He saw nothing. As he approached the crossing and when he was about 165 feet from it, he looked a second time to his right toward the railroad track. He did not see a train coming. He next looked to the right toward the railroad track as he was passing the concrete building, from a point indicated by plaintiff on a map in evidence as being about 110 feet east of the crossing. He testified that at this point he thought that he would have seen a train coming if it had been in that area. Looking north from this point, a view of the railroad track was afforded extending over 418 feet from the crossing toward which plaintiff was driving. Such a view would have revealed that the track at that distance from the crossing was elevated above the intervening ground between the track and the point in West 25th Street 110 feet east of the crossing, so that the tops of fence posts bordering the railroad right of way on the east, were several feet lower than the rails. As plaintiff looked north from this point, he reduced his speed to 15 miles per hour, at which speed he could have stopped in about 25 feet. Thereafter he did not look to his right until just before the crash, his attention being focused to his left toward the Guide Lamp Manufacturing plant south of 25th Street. He was primarily interested in that side of the 'road. As soon as he saw there was nothing coming from the south he looked to his right, he being then 15 feet from the *843rail, at which time he noticed the train approaching. The front of his tractor then ran into the left side of the first Diesel locomotive unit about 12 feet from the front thereof. There is no evidence that he was relying on the flasher-light signals on the occasion in question.
There was no vehicular traffic, except plaintiff’s tractor-trailer at or near the crossing at the time or just before the time of the collision.
Defendant made timely motions for a directed verdict in its favor on the ground that the evidence affirmatively showed that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. On the same ground it made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. These motions were overruled by the trial court. They should have been sustained.
In Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Fraze, 150 Ind. 576, 50 N.E. 576, 65 Am.St.Rep. 377, the Indiana Supreme Court said that if a traveler, by looking, could have seen an approaching train in time to escape, it will be presumed, in case he is injured by a collision, either that he did not look, or, if he did look, he did not heed what he saw.
In Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 149 Ind. 490, 49 N.E. 445, at page 450, the court held that, while a traveler has a right to presume that the railroad company will discharge its statutory duty and give the signals as required by the law, still this does not relieve him from using his own senses, and exercising due care to avoid injury in crossing its track.
In Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 114 Ind.App. 160, 51 N.E.2d 384, at page 386, the court said:
“The courts of this state are thoroughly committed to the doctrine that a railroad crossing is a known place of danger, and its presence alone is a warning of the possible approach of trains. When about to cross a railroad a traveler on the highway must use reasonable care for his own safety, and it is requisite to such care ‘that he look and listen attentively both ways, and if by looking he could have seen, and if by listening he could have heard, an approaching train in time to have avoided collision, it is presumed, if such collision occurs, that he either did not look and listen or did not heed what he saw and heard, in either of which events he is guilty of contributory negligence.’ Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Rosborough, 1907, 40 Ind.App. 14, 18, 80 N.E. 869, 870; Cleveland, C., C..& St. L. R. Co. v. Griffin, 1901, 26 Ind.App. 368, 58 N.E. 503; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Fraze, 1898, 150 Ind. 576, 50 N.E. 576, 65 Am.St.Rep. 377; Morford v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 1902, 158 Ind. 494, 63 N.E. 857; New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Miller, Adm’r, 1935, 101 Ind.App. 498, 200 N.E. 78; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Briggs, 1942, [112 Ind.App. 360] 42 N.E.2d 367.
“As was said in Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Van Laningham, 1913, 52 Ind.App. 156, 164, 97 N.E. 573, 576: ‘When a person before attempting to cross a railroad track does not heed the danger of his situation and fails to look and listen for an approaching train, he is guilty of negligence as a matter of law/
“In the instant case, we have the appellee’s own testimony that he did not look for an approaching train until a few seconds before he was struck, and there is no evidence, from any source or of any character, to the contrary. It is undisputed that the train that struck him was in plain view, and that he could have seen it at any point for a distance of 145 feet west of the crossing had he looked, and that at any time while traveling such distance he could have stopped his automobile within two or three feet and so avoided the accident. It seems clear to us that reasonable men can come to no other conclusion than that the appellee’s own negligence contributed to his injuries, and thus his right to a recov*844ery on the first paragraph of his complaint is defeated.”
These cases indicate that the law of Indiana is the same as the prevailing rule in the other states, such as Illinois, where in Greenwald v. Baltimore & O. R. R. Co., 332 Ill. 627 at page 631, 164 N.E. 142, at page 144, the court said:
“The rule has long been settled in this state that it is the duty of persons about to cross a railroad track to look about them and see if there is danger, and not to go recklessly upon the track, but to take proper precaution to avoid accident. It is generally recognized that railroad crossings are dangerous places, and one crossing the same must approach the track with the amount of care commensurate with the known danger, and when a traveler on a public highway fails to use ordinary precaution while driving over a railroad crossing, the general knowledge and experience of mankind condemns such conduct as negligence. * * * One who has an unobstructed view of an approaching train is not justified in closing his eyes or failing to look or in crossing a railroad track in reliance upon the assumption that a bell will be rung or a whistle sounded. No one can assume that there will not be a violation of the law or negligence of others and then offer such assumption as an excuse for failure to exercise care. The law will not tolerate the absurdity of allowing a person to testify that he looked but did not see the train when the view was not obstructed, and where, if he had properly exercised his sight, he must have seen it.”
While on three occasions, when plaintiff was 100 or more feet east of the crossing, he looked toward the railroad track upon which a train from the north would come, for some reason he then dismissed from his mind the possibility of a train coming from that direction and thereafter focused his attention upon the possibility of a train coming from the south. It was not until he was a few feet from the track that he again evinced any interest in a south-bound train. This strange division of the care which he was required to exercise for his own safety cannot be reconciled with the caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. While he could have stopped his truck in about 25 feet, he traveled about 100 feet without looking to the north. If during this interval he had looked north he could have seen the train approaching on a straight track with its large gray diesel locomotive units with a white stripe about them, against which the bright morning sun was directly shining. If under such circumstances a driver, after driving his vehicle into the side of a passing train, is permitted to recover for the personal injuries which he thereby sustains, the law is putting a premium upon careless driving. I cannot accede to such a doctrine.