Court Opinion

ID: 9753149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:01:05.497246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:31.073950
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Mr. Justice Arnold,
The defendant was indicted, tried before a jury, and found guilty of murder in tbe first degree, the penalty being fixed at life imprisonment. At trial he was represented by able counsel who had wide experience in homicide cases, but who did not argue this appeal.
Defendant had gone to his wife’s home, some distance from his own residence, and when she called her mother on the telephone, lie called into the telephone that by the time the mother got there the daughter would be dead, — which statement he made come true. He quite clearly shot his wife, Dorothy, with a 22 calibre target pistol, causing wounds from which she died. He then turned the same weapon upon himself, inflicting a wound from which he fully recovered. Át the hospital to which he was taken he admitted the'shooting of his wife.
The pistol was obtained by the defendant two days before the shooting, although he testified he had obtained it on the same day. He wrote two notes to his father and mother, stating hé was going to commit suicide because of the unrequited love he had for his wife. He did not testify that he did hot shoot her, but testified that he did not intend to kill her or to do *450anything more than scare her. This the jury did not believe.
The defendant testified that he was drunk, and that his wife had said he was half Mexican and half Puerto Rican and refused to have children by him out of fear that they would be black. The jury obviously rejected the contentions of the defendant, who brings this appeal.
We have here the acquiring of the murder weapon two days before the homicide, thus evidencing premeditation; and the statement to the mother of the deceased that the wife would be dead before the mother reached her. The fact that the defendant twice shot his wife is evidence of malice: Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 17; Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 167, 168, 58 A. 2d 433.
The appellant further contends that the assistant erred in its comment on the guilt of the defendant. The court had a right to so comment so long as the jury was told that the court’s opinion was not binding upon it, and the court left that determination to the jury. This the court did. See Commonwealth v. Bibalo, 375 Pa. 257, 100 A. 2d 45; Commonwealth v. Lance, 381 Pa. 293, 113 A. 2d 290.
The appellant’s first contention is that the court district attorney in his closing address to the jury said: “He [the defendant] lied about where he got the gun,” and contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion .for the withdrawal of a .juror. The defendant’s objection was. not timely as it. was made at the conclusion of..the.assistant district attorney’s address; but even if it. was timely- the action of. the trial judge was the subject of his .sound discretion. See Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 240, 316 Pa. 129, 173 A. 653, and Commonwealth v. Kerr, 171 Pa. Supe*451rior Ct. 131, 89 A. 2d 889. In Commonwealth v. Meyers, 290 Pa. 573, 581, 139 A. 374, this Court stated: “Where, under all the circumstances of the case, the verdict rendered is a just one, the language of the prosecuting officer which will justify a reversal must be such that its unavoidable effect . would be to prejudice the jury ...” In the following eases the district attorney used such phrases as “a typical gunman’s defense”: Commonwealth v. DelVaccio, 299 Pa. 547, 554, 149 A. 696; “defense was cooked, up”: Commonwealth v. Massarelli, 304 Pa. 335, 338, 156 A. 101; “the prisoner didn’t have the heart of a man or the soul of a man”: Commonwealth v. Smith, 270 Pa. 583, 588, 113 A. 844; “I will ask you to say that they [the eyewitnesses who had fled the jurisdiction] are staying away from this jurisdiction for the purpose of helping this criminal”: Commonwealth v. Touri, 295 Pa. 50, 57, 144 A. 761; “the defendant might be called a skunk”: Commonwealth v. Davison, 99 Pa. Superior Ct. 412, 414. None of these was held to be prejudicial error. We find no merit in this contention.
The next contention is that the court took away from the jury the right to render a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Since there was no evidence to reduce the crime to voluntary manslaughter, that point is settled by Commonwealth v. Yeager, 329 Pa. 81, 85, 196 A. 827; Commonwealth v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113, 112 A. 2d 362. The ..evidence of the defendant was that his wife made.remarks .about him that enflamed him, and had emphasised ..them-by'.sticking .her. finger .at his shoulder. .-..The- law. of. -.Pennsylvania;is clear- .that no •words, of- provocation-,creproachy. abuse: or . slight assault are.'sufficient to .free .the ’.party- from. guilt;,of • murder. ■The’.legal “battery”; committed-.in this, case- was of a most trivial nature which,- .combined with the words used, is of no moment in reducing the crime to man*452slaughter: Commonwealth v. Newson, 277 Pa. 48, 120 A. 707.
The charge by the court on reasonable doubt was unimpeachable in the light of the fact that no further elaboration of instructions was asked for by the trial counsel. While the court did not specifically charge that character evidence alone might work an acquittal of the defendant, no exception was taken to this charge nor was the matter raised in a motion for new trial. However, in the absence of a request for such instruction, it was not error to fail to charge it. This Court said in Commonwealth v. Barnak, 357 Pa. 391, 419, 54 A. 2d 865: “Taking an appeal in criminal cases is not a game in which the appellant wins if he can show that the trial judge fell a few degrees short of perfection in the conduct of his trial. This court has consistently refused to reverse convictions of murder in the first degree, even with the death penalty imposed, for errors in the conduct of the trial or in the admission of evidence or in the judge’s charge, when these errors did not deprive the defendant of the fundamentals of a fair trial.” In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 764, the United States Supreme Court said: “If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight' effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . .” (Italics supplied). The court charged practically that character-evidence alone would justify an acquittal. We are not impressed by the fact that the court stated that it was its “conviction” that “under the evidence ... a verdict of not guilty would be a miscarriagé of justice. However, my opinion is not binding upon you.” This was not harmful tó the defendant and the jury could not have drawn the distinction between the use of the word “conviction” and the use of the word “opinion” which the appellant claims. It *453would be unwarrantable to hold that the jurors in this case, who were undoubtedly laymen, — not philologists or lexicographers, — would understand the word “conviction” to be something different than “opinion.”1 The court is not obliged to use any particular phrase in the absence of request for such charge: Commonwealth v. Beingo, 217 Pa. 60, 62, 66 A. 153.
The appellant asks that the conviction be reversed because the court did not charge that admissions of the defendant should have been received with great caution. It was for the jury to say that the confession was voluntarily made. This the jury found and this was not denied by the defendant.
This is of the highest grade of evidence. Again this point was not raised by any exception to the charge nor on the motion for new trial.
Next the defendant challenges the court’s comment on the evidence. The court had a complete right to comment thereon, providing the jury was told that the court’s opinion was not binding upon it. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 367 Pa. 159, 164, 79 A. 2d 201; Commonwealth v. Bibalo, 375 Pa. 257, 100 A. 2d 45.
The court charged that the jurors must not be guided by any prejudice against the defendant nor, on the other hand, be swayed by any sympathy toward him, and again charged: “You . . . must discharge . . . [your] duty . . . without sympathy for the defendant or prejudice against him.” This was a correct statement. See Commonwealth v. Silcox, 161 Pa. 484, 29 A. 105.
We are requested to alter the rule in Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, which we are unwilling to do.
We have reviewed the law and the evidence under the Act of 1870, P. L. 15, 19 PS §1187, and find that *454•the verdict of the jury is amply supported by the evidence. The defendant was fortunate that he did not receive a recommendation of the death penalty at the hands of the jury.
The judgment of sentence is affirmed.

 Cf. Territory v. Buick, 27 Haw. 28, 37.