Court Opinion

ID: 9567324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:52:17.310571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:32.710371
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge.
On the morning of June 11, 1992, Paul Worth was admitted for outpatient surgery at Satilla Regional Medical Center. He died about four hours later, but not before suffering gradual bodily deterioration during the post-operative recovery period. Review of medical records by a registered nurse and a physician from the State of New York indicate that Worth’s death was the result of substandard medical care by the hospital’s nursing staff and the treating physicians, Pierre Aupont, Robert Carbaaugh, James S. Snow and S. William Clark III. The registered nurse and the New York physician suggest that Worth’s suffering and death were due (in large part) to untimely response and improper treatment of the patient’s high-risk medical condition, i.e., diabetes mellitus and hypertension.
On June 10, 1994, the Friday before expiration of the two-year statute of limitation, Fannie Lee Grady, as next friend of Azzie Lee Works and temporary administrator of the estate of Paul Worth (plaintiffs), brought a medical malpractice action against Pierre Aupont, Robert Carbaaugh, James S. Snow, Satilla Health Services, Inc. d/b/a Satilla Regional Medical Center, Doctor S. William Clark III, and Clark Eye Clinic. A nurse’s affidavit was filed with the complaint as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), but an affidavit supporting the medical malpractice claims against the treating physicians was not. Plaintiffs instead invoked the automatic 45-day extension period prescribed by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), alleging that “the statute of limitations will expire within ten (10) days of the filing of this complaint and because of such time constraints an expert affidavit concerning the Defendant Doctors could not be prepared for filing with the complaint.” Five days later, on June 15, 1994, plaintiffs filed the New York physician’s affidavit. Plaintiffs’ attorney received this affidavit on Monday, June 13, 1994.
The treating physicians and Clark Eye Clinic sought dismissal of the complaint with prejudice or summary judgment, asserting that plaintiffs failed to contemporaneously file an expert’s affidavit with the complaint as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). The trial court agreed, rejecting plaintiffs’ allegation that “time constraints” prevented compliance with OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). This appeal followed entry of an order, certified pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-54 (b), dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint and purportedly granting summary judgment in favor of the treating physicians and Clark Eye Clinic based on plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the pleading requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. See Druckman v. Ethridge, 198 Ga. App. 321 (1) (401 SE2d 336). Held:
1. In Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156 (456 SE2d 718), a majority *578of this Court recently recognized that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 has done more to spawn wasteful litigation than to “achieve its purpose of reducing frivolous litigation.” Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156, 160, supra. The case sub judice is no exception. This time, however, the dissent is reading more into OCGA § 9-11-9.1 than is provided, rather than demanding strict compliance with the statute as was the case in Sisk, in order to justify cutting off a cause of action for medical malpractice which has been deemed by an expert to have factual merit. See Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156, 160, supra.
An examination of the hearing transcript as well as the trial court’s summary judgment order reveals that the trial judge disposed of plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims against the treating physicians and Clark Eye Clinic because he did not believe plaintiffs’ allegation that “time constraints” prevented compliance with the contemporaneous filing requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). We reverse because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) unambiguously provides for an automatic 45-day extension for filing the requisite affidavit “to any case in which the period of limitation will expire within ten days of the date of filing and, because of such time constraints, the plaintiff has alleged that an affidavit of an expert could not be prepared.” OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b). See Dixon v. Barnes, 214 Ga. App. 7, 8 (1) (446 SE2d 774). If these two conditions are met, it does not matter whether the trial court believes or disbelieves a plaintiff’s allegation that “time constraints” prevented compliance with the contemporaneous filing requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). The plaintiff is given 45 extra days to come up with the necessary affidavit. It is not until after expiration of this 45-day period that subsection (b) provides for a hearing to determine whether good, cause exists for any further delay. Piedmont Hosp. v. Draper, 205 Ga. App. 160, 161 (1) (421 SE2d 543).
In the case sub judice, plaintiffs’ complaint against the treating physicians and Clark Eye Clinic was filed within ten days before expiration of the two-year statute of limitation and, because of this time constraint, plaintiffs’ attorney alleged that an affidavit of an expert could not be prepared for filing with the complaint. Consequently, since the requisite affidavit was filed within 45 days after the filing of plaintiffs’ complaint, the trial court had no discretion in questioning plaintiffs’ excuse for noncompliance with OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). Thus, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the treating physicians and Clark Eye Clinic based on plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the contemporaneous filing requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a).
2. Plaintiffs’ remaining enumeration of error presents nothing for review since the theory of liability questioned therein was not precluded by the trial court upon summary adjudication. The only basis of the trial court’s order was dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint for *579failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1. See Druckman v. Ethridge, 198 Ga. App. 321 (1), supra.

Judgment reversed.

Pope, P. J., and Blackburn, J., concur. Beasley, C. J., concurs specially. Smith and Ruffin, JJ., concur in the judgment only. Birdsong, P. J., Andrews and Johnson, JJ., dissent.