Court Opinion

ID: 9452948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:57:48.120774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:26.045311
License: Public Domain

VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority opinion to the extent that it affirms the judgment for plaintiff on the $10,000 Count II recruiting fee.
I respectfully dissent from the majority holding affirming the $4,125 Count I judgment. I agree with the majority’s Count I determination that no valid modification of the . employment contract has been pleaded or proved and likewise concur in the holding that the employment contract sued upon is complete and integrated.
My point of departure is upon the issue of whether the written contract providing for compensation is ambiguous. Unlike my brethren, I cannot accept the view that such contract, which is set out in the footnote 1 of the majority opinion, is ambiguous. Paragraph 2 of the employment contract provides that Balch shall assist his employer in the areas of management and personnel and that (1) such duties shall be performed at times requested by the corporation and that Balch will hold himself available for consultation; and (2) Balch shall devote a minimum of twenty-four days per year to such duties.
I can find nothing whatsoever in such language which fairly limits Balch’s performance • to twenty-four days a year. Plaintiffs are in effect seeking to have the word “minimum” interpreted as maximum. I can find no reasonable basis for such a construction.
Paragraph 3 of the contract gives either party a right to terminate on thirty days notice. Thus, if plaintiff is called upon to do more work than he thinks he should do, he is in a position to promptly terminate the contract.
The provision for compensation covered in paragraph 4 appears to be entirely clear-cut and unambiguous. Provision is made for payment of $300 per month on the last day of each month for any services called for by the contract. Parenthetically, I note that the trial court made a finding that in addition to the contract compensation Balch by a separate agreement obtained certain stock option rights. It is hard to conceive how the compensation provision of the contract could be stated in any clearer or more precise manner. It is apparent that the compensation paragraph by its terms covers the full and complete compensation for services Balch was required to perform under the contract.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in applying the integration rule in Lehman v. Stout, 261 Minn. 384, 112 N.W.2d 640, 644, states in part:
“ ‘The rule has become mere horn-book law that, where parties have reduced their contract to writing, the contract may not be proved by prior or contemporaneous utterances or writings and that these are entirely immaterial for the purpose of determining what the terms of the contract are. * * * Antecedent and contemporaneous utterances are excluded, not because they are lacking in evidentiary value, but because the law for *221substantive reasons declares that such matters shall not be shown. If the rule were otherwise, there would be an absurd futility in written contracts which it is the purpose of the parol evidence rule to prevent. * * * ’ ”
The issue of whether an ambiguity exists is one of law to be determined by the court. Eastmount Constr. Co. v. Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co., 8 Cir., 301 F.2d 34, 41. It is well-settled law that if the language used in the contract is plain, complete and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be gathered from that language alone, no matter what the actual secret intentions of the parties may have been. 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts §§ 241 and 245. Kuhlmann v. Educational Publishers, Inc., 245 Minn. 171, 71 N.W.2d 889, 893; Jimmerson v. Troy Seed Co., 236 Minn. 395, 53 N.W.2d 273, 277; Matthews v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 215 Minn. 369, 10 N.W.2d 230, 232, 147 A.L.R. 147; Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 308 F.2d 709, 711; Minneapolis-Moline Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 8 Cir., 199 F.2d 725, 730.
The general rule, supported by overwhelming authority cited in footnotes, is thus stated in 17 Am.Jur.2d § 273:
“The rule that the surrounding circumstances should be considered in determining the meaning of a contract and the intention of the parties thereto, as of the time of entering into the contract, is limited to cases where resort to such circumstances is made necessary by reason of the ambiguity and uncertainty of the contract language, and the rule does not apply where the language of a written agreement is plain and not susceptible of more than one meaning.”
Of course, where material words have different established meanings, or where technical meanings are given to words in a trade or locality, resort may be had to parol evidence to show the meaning intended. I find nothing in our present case to indicate that any of the material words have any unusual or special meaning.
Plaintiff was an attorney and well-informed and experienced person. He participated in the drafting of the agreement. The rule for construing agreements most strongly against the draftsman does not arise unless an ambiguity exists which permits more than one reasonable construction and such rule is not to be favored over more primary rules of construction. See Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 8 Cir., 359 F.2d 297, 301.
I would hold that the employment contract involved in Count I is complete, integrated and unambiguous and that plaintiff is limited to the compensation provided in such contract. Hence, I would reverse the judgment entered for plaintiff on Count I.