Court Opinion

ID: 9546202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:26:07.259858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:07.897144
License: Public Domain

Petrich, J.
(dissenting) — Although the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing in the present case arguably would support different and stronger findings of fact with regards to probable cause, we must accept the facts as reflected in the findings prepared by the State and entered by the suppression judge. State v. Poirier, 34 Wn. App. 839, 841, 664 P.2d 7 (1983). Accordingly, the following facts are pertinent to the issue of probable cause: (1) a theft of property from a vehicle in a felonious amount; (2) a witness having observed a blue and white Chevrolet Blazer occupied by two young men in the vicinity of the victim's vehicle at the approximate time of the theft; (3) fresh tire tracks at the approximate location where the Blazer vehicle had been which indicated a wide tire with a mud or snow pattern; (4) parked at a nearby restaurant was a blue and white Blazer vehicle containing a large quantity of items, none of which were positively identified as being stolen;7 *785and (5) when approached by police at 4:24 a.m., four to six blocks from the crime scene, two young male occupants of a blue and white Chevrolet Blazer, with Idaho plates and mud or snow tires, watched the officer "somewhat intently."
There is no doubt that the time, the geographic proximity and the other circumstances here created a suspicion of a relationship with the earlier vehicle theft, but a hunch is not enough for probable cause. State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 842, 613 P.2d 525 (1980). Nor is mere presence at the scene of criminal activity, without more, sufficient probable cause to arrest. State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 302, 654 P.2d 96 (1982).
In the present case, the findings of fact adopted by the trial judge are silent as to: (1) whether the Blazer vehicle was stopped or parked at the crime scene; (2) whether the occupants exited their vehicle at the crime scene; (3) whether the street and vicinity of the crime scene were isolated or received heavy vehicular use; (4) whether police identified contents from outside the Blazer vehicle as stolen property.
From the findings of fact, there is no nexus between the crime and the two suspects except for their presence at a time uncertain on a street where a vehicle theft occurred within an uncertain time frame.
The present case is different than the factual pattern where the suspects are actually observed in the criminal act and/or fleeing therefrom in an identified automobile. See State v. Scott, 93 Wn.2d 7, 604 P.2d 943, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920 (1980); State v. Todd, 78 Wn.2d 362, 474 P.2d 542 (1970); State v. Kohler, 70 Wn.2d 599, 424 P.2d 656 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968); State v. Berkins, 2 Wn. App. 910, 471 P.2d 131 (1970). Also missing here is the police officer's knowledge of the suspects' criminal proclivities, State v. Hoffman, 64 Wn.2d 445, 392 P.2d 237 (1964), and the observation by police of an occupied vehicle suspi*786ciously parked near an isolated crime scene. State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974). And, although the occupants' nervous behavior may bolster the facts supporting probable cause, State v. Kohler, supra, nervousness has been held not enough to establish probable cause. State v. Rodriguez, 32 Wn. App. 758, 762, 650 P.2d 225, review denied, 98 Wn.2d 1005 (1982).
The facts as found by the trial court below support an intrusion to detain and question, but do not give rise to probable cause to arrest. The facts here are less persuasive than those existent in State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984), which the Supreme Court held not sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest. There, a police officer responded to a silent burglar alarm at a residence. The officer spotted a car parked in front of the residence which appeared empty, but as the officer drove closer, the headlights went on and the car moved away from the curb. The driver was detained and a search conducted. Result, no probable cause to arrest.
In light of the absence of a finding that a lawful arrest occurred prior to the search on minor in possession charges, and absent probable cause to arrest for theft until after the intrusion, I would not allow the State "to put the cart before the horse." The State in my view has failed to carry its burden of proving the search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
The automobile exception, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), does not alter the right to search in this case. It is clear that when officers have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband, they may stop and search that vehicle without complying with the constitution's general warrant requirement. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925); State v. Southard, 32 Wn. App. 599, 602, 648 P.2d 504 (1982). Here, Officers Johnson and McNicholas did not possess sufficient objective facts to believe the Blazer vehicle contained stolen property.
*787Conclusion of law 3 states that the objective facts gave the officers "a well-founded suspicion." This is not sufficient to justify an arrest or an intrusion into the vehicle. The trial court was not satisfied that probable cause existed until after the discovery of the stolen property. The later discovery of stolen articles does give rise to probable cause, but the unlawful intrusion had already occurred. As stated in State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 299, "one cannot search first to gather evidence to establish the probable cause needed to justify the initial intrusion. Otherwise, the requirement of probable cause to arrest would be turned upside down."
I would reverse.
Review denied by Supreme Court April 19, 1985.

The majority states that when first observed by the police, the Chevrolet Blazer contained some items similar to those stolen. The trial court did not make such a finding. It is true that a fishing pole had been seen in the Blazer and a fishing pole was one of the stolen items. However, the officer who eventually *785searched the vehicle acknowledged that the prior view did not disclose "anything definitely connecting them with the specific crime."