Court Opinion

ID: 9583604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:40:26.873659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:17.403477
License: Public Domain

Judge Braswell
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which disallows the use of a prior conviction as an aggravating factor in the sentencing hearing on the ground that the record is silent as to whether the defendant was indigent, represented by counsel or waived counsel at the time of his prior conviction.
It has been 20 years since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R. 2d 733 (1963), and its enunciation of the constitutional principle of the right to counsel. The doctrine of waiver of right to counsel, and waiver of other constitutional rights, is ageless.
The concept of requiring that an objection or motion to suppress be made whenever counsel or a party desires to challenge the admissibility of evidence is a cornerstone of our trial procedure. To erase the necessity of making an objection or motion to suppress to the admission of evidence of a prior conviction in the sentencing stage of a criminal trial creates an undesirable procedural rule which is not required by statute or constitution. The majority opinion follows a higher standard for the admission *9of evidence of prior convictions than for the reception into evidence of proof of any other statutory aggravating factor.
The rule of law on reception of evidence in the sentencing stage of a trial is more relaxed and less stringent than in the case in chief. The sentencing hearing statute, G.S. 15A-1334(b), provides in part: “Formal rules of evidence do not apply at the hearing.”
I would also compare the underlying alleged constitutional issue with the subject of confessions. In a criminal trial, the State can offer a confession as substantive evidence of guilt, and the defense counsel may fail (for whatever reason) to object or move to suppress. Counsel will know that the record is silent on whether the officer gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and silent on whether the defendant did or did not want a lawyer before confessing, or whether the defendant was indigent. However, our law is that because the defendant did not object or move to suppress the introduction of the confession in the trial division, he may not assign as error on appeal the admission of the confession at trial. The silent record becomes a legally binding waiver of the right to inquire later whether defendant had actually said he wanted an attorney or was indigent. The failure on counsel’s part to object to the confession does not require either the District Attorney or Judge to object for the defendant, nor does the failure to object require a suppression hearing.
The “silent record” point, upon which remand is granted, rewards the lazy lawyer who did not object or who did not investigate his client’s record. It may be that on remand a defendant will not be found to have been indigent at his prior conviction case, or if indigent, that he waived counsel, and in such situations the remand serves only to delay, is time consuming, and is costly to the State. Our record on appeal does not show any allegation that in fact the appellant was indigent or that on remand he will be successful in eliminating this “prior conviction” from being considered against him as an aggravating factor. Nor should such allegations properly be placed in a record on appeal. This is a subject matter that should have been specifically addressed by the trial judge after an appropriate objection.
Also, the “silent record” point will in the future make the trial judge have the affirmative duty (in order to insure against *10needless remands) to ask the defendant, his counsel, and the District Attorney if they are unconditionally positive that the defendant had counsel, or was not indigent, or did not waive his right to counsel concerning the prior conviction. Such a duty should not be placed upon a trial judge. Any duty must be placed on defendant and his counsel by requiring a proper objection or motion to suppress at the sentencing stage.
The record is “silent” only because the defendant voluntarily chose for it to be “silent.” Otherwise, he would have objected or moved to suppress. Even when the record is “silent,” the power of choice not to assign the point as error on appeal remains with the defendant. It is not such a severe constitutional error so as to automatically require a remand for a resentencing hearing when it is raised on appeal for a first time. If the defendant did object at the sentencing stage about no counsel at his prior conviction, then the trial judge would have had the opportunity to ask questions or conduct a voir dire as to admissibility. Otherwise, the trial judge is saddled with having violated a defendant’s constitutional rights in the admission of evidence when he is innocent of any knowledge that the defendant wishes to raise the issue of “no counsel.” As far as the judge knows, the defendant and his counsel were “silent” because none of the defendant’s rights were being violated.
The doctrine of waiver ought to apply as a matter of law on these facts. A criminal defendant can lawfully waive a substantive right as well as a procedural right. A constitutional right may also be waived. In 1970 our Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell, 276 N.C. 404, 409-10, 172 S.E. 2d 527, 530 (1970), fused these principles into our jurisprudence with these words:
“It is elementary that, ‘nothing else appearing, the admission of incompetent evidence is not ground for a new trial where there was no objection at the time the evidence was offered.’ [Citations omitted.] An assertion in this Court by the appellant that evidence, to the introduction of which he interposed no objection, was obtained in violation of his rights under the Constitution of the United States, or under the Constitution of this State, does not prevent the operation of this rule.”
*11To grant appellate relief by remanding for a hearing, giving due consideration to the record in this case, is to pass upon a constitutional question in the appellate division that was not affirmatively raised and passed upon in the trial division. See Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 97 L.Ed. 387, 73 S.Ct. 293 (1953); State v. Parks, 290 N.C. 748, 228 S.E. 2d 248 (1976).
The use of a prior conviction for a criminal offense, punishable by more than 60 days’ confinement, as an aggravating factor in sentencing is authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(l)o. A method by which prior convictions may be proved is set forth in G.S. 15A-1340.4(e). Subsection (e) provides in part:
“No prior conviction which occurred while the defendant was indigent may be considered in sentencing unless the defendant was represented by counsel or waived counsel with respect to that prior conviction. A defendant may make a motion to suppress evidence of a prior conviction pursuant to Article 53 of this Chapter. If the motion is made for the first time during the sentencing stage of the criminal action, either the State or the defendant is entitled to a continuance of the sentencing hearing.”
I would hold that the above-quoted statute means that the judge can consider the prior conviction if the defendant fails to move to suppress or object or ask for a voir dire. The wording of the statute is that “a defendant may make a motion to suppress . . . .” (Emphasis added.) For tactical reasons counsel may not wish to suppress and may wish to explain away or simplify that which otherwise could be serious. If there is a motion to suppress, then the State would have the burden of proving the acceptable prior conviction. Absent the motion to suppress or an objection, there is no burden on the State to show on the record, affirmatively and automatically, that the defendant had counsel, waived counsel or was not indigent at his prior conviction.
Although the defendant presents by his third question whether the trial judge committed reversible error “in finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors,” in his brief he states, after his discussion of the judge’s use of the .38 caliber pistol as an aggravating factor, “The only other factor in aggravation meets the statutory definition but seems to be inconsequential in light of the defendant’s explanation of such con*12viction.” (Emphasis added.) From a reading of the judgment, “the only other factor” left in the case was the evidence of a prior conviction punishable by more than 60 days’ confinement. Thus, in his brief the defendant has conceded that in this case this aggravating factor “meets the statutory definition” of the existence of usable evidence of a prior conviction, and should be treated as “inconsequential in light of the defendant’s explanation.” The explanation of the prior conviction mentioned in defendant’s brief shows that in the guilt phase (not sentencing stage) of the trial, and by redirect examination, defendant explained that he was convicted for carrying a concealed weapon in 1972 and that the weapon was a knife, something like a motorcycle knife.
The defendant himself makes no point that he ought to have a new sentencing hearing because the judge did not determine the counsel issue for the prior conviction. Neither should this Court make the point for him on this record.