Court Opinion

ID: 9902219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:04:37.153637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.872365
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1308-MR

JAMES RAMSEY                                                        APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 22-CR-00077

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: James David Ramsey appeals from the judgment of conviction

and sentence of the Fulton Circuit Court entered on September 14, 2022. After our

review, we affirm.

            On July 14, 2022, Ramsey was indicted on one count of first-degree

trafficking in a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug

paraphernalia. He was charged as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO I).

He entered into a plea agreement. In exchange for his unconditional guilty plea to
first-degree trafficking and possession of drug paraphernalia, the Commonwealth

offered to dismiss the PFO I count. The Commonwealth agreed to recommend a

seven-year sentence for trafficking and a twelve-month sentence for possession of

drug paraphernalia. Ramsey accepted the plea offer and pleaded guilty. He

appeared in court by Zoom. Ultimately, the PFO I charge was dismissed, and the

court sentenced Ramsey in accordance with the Commonwealth’s recommendation

on September 14, 2022. This appeal followed.

             On appeal, Ramsey argues that the conviction and sentence must be

vacated because his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

Additionally, he contends that his physical absence from the courtroom invalidated

the proceedings.

             In the plea agreement, Ramsey expressly waived many constitutional

rights -- including his right to appeal. Nevertheless, he appeals, arguing that his

plea failed to meet constitutional standards. He claims that it was not entered

knowingly because the trial court neglected to ensure that he understood that by

pleading guilty, he would give up his right not to incriminate himself and his right

to appeal his conviction. Additionally, he complains that the trial court never

inquired of defense counsel regarding Ramsey’s understanding of the terms and

consequences of the agreement.

                                         -2-
             A waiver of the right to appeal a guilty plea does not extinguish all

issues. See Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 52 (Ky. 2010). Some

questions survive the waiver; i.e., whether the plea was made knowingly and

voluntarily and in accordance with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395

U.S. 238, 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). We address this issue first.

             We are persuaded that Ramsey’s plea was made knowingly and

voluntarily. In his motion to enter the guilty plea, Ramsey acknowledged that he

had reviewed the indictment and discussed with his attorney the facts relevant to

the charges and any possible defenses. He indicated that he understood that he

could plead either guilty or not guilty to the charges. Additionally, the motion

provided as follows:

             I further understand the Constitution guarantees to me the
             following rights:

                   (a) The right not to testify against myself;

                   (b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at
                       which I would be represented by counsel and
                       the Commonwealth would have to prove my
                       guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;

                   (c) The right to confront and cross-examine all
                       witnesses called to testify against me;

                   (d) The right to produce any evidence, including
                       attendance of witnesses, in my favor;

                   (e) The right to appeal my case to a higher court.

                                         -3-
             I understand that if I plead “GUILTY,” I waive these
             rights.

In the motion, Ramsey indicated that he understood the nature of the proceedings

and the matters contained in the motion. He declared that his attorney had fully

explained his constitutional rights to him and that his guilty plea was made “freely,

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.”

           The plea agreement that Ramsey executed also shows that he was

informed of and that he understood his constitutional rights. He and his counsel

signed the agreement, which provided, in part, as follows:

             4. I understand that I may plead “NOT GUILTY” to any
             charge against me, in which event the Constitution would
             guarantee me the following rights:

                   (a) The right not to testify against myself;

                   (b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at
                   which I would be represented by counsel and the
                   Commonwealth would have to prove my guilt
                   beyond a reasonable doubt;

                   (c) The right to confront and cross-examine all
                   witnesses called to testify against me;

                   (d) The right to produce any evidence, including
                   attendance of witnesses, in my favor;

                   (e) The right to appeal my case to a higher court.

            I understand that if I plead “GUILTY,” I waive these rights.

                                         -4-
            Again, Ramsey indicated that he understood the charges against him,

the possible defenses to them, the penalties he faced, and the fact that the

Commonwealth was recommending a sentence in exchange for his plea.

Additionally, Ramsey acknowledged in the agreement that “no one, including my

attorney, has promised me any other benefit in return for my guilty plea. . . .”

             Furthermore, Ramsey’s counsel executed a certificate confirming that

Ramsey “understands the allegations contained in the indictment.” Counsel

indicated that he had fully discussed with Ramsey the charges against him and any

possible defenses. He said that he believed Ramsey fully understood.

Additionally, counsel indicated that he had reviewed the Commonwealth’s plea

offer with Ramsey -- as well as the motion to enter his guilty plea. Counsel

certified that he believed Ramsey understood the documents. Counsel represented

to the court that he had “fully explained” Ramsey’s constitutional rights to him and

that he believed that Ramsey understood them. Finally, Counsel declared that to

the best of his knowledge and belief, Ramsey’s guilty plea was made freely,

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

             The trial court confirmed that Ramsey understood that he was waiving

many of his constitutional rights by pleading guilty. Ramsey notes in his brief that

the court did not specifically reiterate the waiver of the right to appeal or the

privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Ramsey claims that his plea was invalid

                                         -5-
because the trial court failed to advise him that he was waiving his right against

self-incrimination and his right to appeal. However, Boykin “does not require

separate enumeration of each right waived.” Fontaine v. United States, 526 F.2d

514, 516 (6th Cir. 1975). Where the defendant has a full understanding of what the

plea means and its consequences, it is valid. Grigsby, supra.

             Ramsey offers no authority for the proposition that the trial court is

required to inform him specifically that he was waiving his right to appeal and his

right against self-incrimination. In fact, guilty pleas are routinely upheld even

where specific rights are not enumerated by the trial court during the plea hearing.

Id.

             We have reviewed the following factors: the representations that

Ramsey made in the plea agreement and the motion to plead guilty; the

certification of counsel concerning Ramsey’s understanding and decision to plead

guilty; and the trial court’s inquiry during the plea hearing and its express finding

regarding Ramsey’s understanding of the proceedings. After our consideration of

these elements of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is no doubt that

Ramsey’s plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. Ramsey was clearly aware

that he was waiving his constitutional rights by entering the plea of guilty and that

he would be sentenced to seven-years’ imprisonment. In exchange, he knew that

the Commonwealth would recommend that sentence and dismiss the PFO I charge.

                                          -6-
This knowledge satisfies the requirements of Boykin. Consequently, his conviction

and sentence cannot be vacated on this basis.

                Next, Ramsey argues that his conviction must be vacated because his

physical absence from the courtroom at the time of entry of his guilty plea and

sentencing rendered the proceedings illegal. He suggests that the trial court’s

decision to conduct the proceedings remotely rendered them invalid.

                Ramsey concedes that this argument was not preserved for our

review. Nevertheless, he requests that we consider whether his physical absence

from the courtroom constitutes palpable error pursuant to the standard established

by our RCr1 10.26.

                       A palpable error which affects the substantial
                rights of a party may be considered by . . . an appellate
                court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
                preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be
                granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has
                resulted from the error.
Id.

                We cannot conclude that manifest injustice has been shown.

“Manifest injustice is found if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of the proceeding.” McGuire v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d

100, 112 (Ky. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ramsey cannot show and

the record does not reflect how his physical presence during the proceedings rather

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                            -7-
than his remote appearance would have resulted in a different outcome. See Miller

v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 857 (Ky. 2013); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 60

S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001). Consequently, Ramsey is not entitled to relief under

our palpable-error standard.

            We affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the

Fulton Circuit Court.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Sarah D. Dailey                          Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                         Christopher Henry
                                         Assistant Attorney General
                                         Frankfort, Kentucky

                                       -8-