Court Opinion

ID: 9671853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:44:02.031203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:12.648768
License: Public Domain

WALKER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree and dissent from the majority opinion. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 21.08 (Vernon 1994) provides:
A person commits an offense if he exposes his anus or any part of his genitals with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, and he is reckless about whether another is present who will be offended or alarmed by his act.
*273Factually, shortly before 7:30 p.m. on Friday, September 10, 1993, Complainant, a female, stopped off to have some film developed at an “Eckerd’s” drug store in the 300 block of Sawdust Road. When Complainant got out of her car, she noticed Appellant William Jeffrey Beasley sitting in a cream-colored sedan in the parking lot. Complainant went inside the store.
When Complainant came out of the store, the cream-colored sedan appeared to have left. However, as Complainant approached her car, the cream-colored sedan returned. The appellant was driving the cream-colored sedan and he smiled at Complainant as he drove by. The appellant pulled in front of Complainant’s car at an angle — effectively “pinning” her in.
The appellant swung his sedan door open and asked, “Baby, do you want to get in the ear?” Complainant noticed that the appellant “didn’t have any clothing on from the upper leg to the waist.” The appellant’s pants were fully unzipped, undone and pulled down. The appellant’s undergarments were also pulled down to just above the knees.
Complainant could see “skin,” although the appellant used his left hand to shield the view of his penis. The appellant appeared “nude” from the waist to just above the knees.
Even though the appellant shielded his penis from Complainant’s view, Complainant testified that the appellant’s penis was nevertheless “exposed ” to the “elements,” the “air,” and the “world.”
Before getting in her car and locking her doors, Complainant concentrated hard on the appellant’s face. Complainant saw that the appellant was still smiling and had a “sick grin” on his face. After getting in her car, Complainant noted the cream-colored sedan’s license plate number as the appellant slowly pulled away. Complainant then drove across the street to another store and called 911.
The police arrived shortly thereafter and apprehended the appellant, who was still in the Eekerd’s drug store parking lot, still smiling. Complainant positively identified the appellant as the man who had exposed himself.
Egregious, though these facts be, does the technical wording of § 21.08 prohibit a conviction of William Jeffrey Beasley simply because he was sufficiently astute to cover his penis by shielding same with his hand?
At first glance, it appears that a strict, technical, and literal view of § 21.08 prohibits a conviction where the anus or genitals are not actually seen by another person. In other words, the intent of § 21.08 is defeated should any person, seeking sexual gratification, totally naked, walk the public streets of any city in Texas, into any Court proceeding, into the gallery of our State Legislature while in session, or anywhere else, so long as certain body parts are covered with one’s hands. I am aware of no other statute in the penal code which would prohibit such conduct should § 21.08 be interpreted as the majority has done.
The evidence in this case clearly indicates that appellant was in the act of gratifying his own sexual desires and was doing so in the presence of Complainant.
I interpret “any person” under § 21.08 to include appellant. Appellant “exposed” himself to himself and in so doing was “reckless” about whether another person [Complainant] would be offended by his act.
The evidence in this case conforms perfectly with and to the INFORMATION. The information by which appellant was charged reads as follows:
COMES NOW the undersigned Assistant County Attorney of Montgomery County, Texas, in behalf of the State of Texas, and presents in and to the County Court at Law of Montgomery County, Texas, that in Montgomery County, Texas, WILLIAM J. BEASLEY, hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about SEPTEMBER 10, 1993, did then and there unlawfully and willfully expose HIS PENIS and was reckless about whether another person, namely, [COMPLAINANT], who was present would be offended or alarmed by HIS act, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of HIMSELF.
The majority cites McGee v. State, 804 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] *2741991, no pet.) as requiring appellant “to lay open to view,” his penis, to Complainant. Such is not the requisite under § 21.08, nor required proof under the INFORMATION. As to Complainant, § 21.08 only requires that appellant be “reckless” as to whether she was present and would be offended or alarmed by his conduct.
TexPenal Code Ann. § 6.03(c) (Vernon 1994), provides:
A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.
I cannot agree that the word “expose” as used in § 21.08 requires visible sighting. Miller v. State, 156 Tex.Crim. 389, 243 S.W.2d 175, 176 (1951), was a case wherein appellant was charged with “unlawfully and with lascivious intent, knowingly and intentionally exposed his private parts to a boy under the age of sixteen years ...,” A felony under former Vernon Ann. P.C. (1925) art. 535c. In Miller, the Court of Criminal Appeals was confronted with like contention that the evidence was insufficient to meet that charged in the indictment. In considering the word “exposed,” the Miller Court stated, “It will be very difficult to find any single word in the English language that is used in a wider sense and is more flexible than this particular word.” Id. at 175.
In affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction, Justice Beauchamp wrote:
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that words should be considered to have the meaning specifically defined for them, though it be contrary to the usual use. It is further provided that words used in a statute which does not specifically define the meaning shall be construed according to the general custom and use of such words. The article under which appellant is prosecuted does not give a specific meaning for the word “expose”, as it is there used. It becomes our duty, then, to give it the meaning generally in use.
Webster’s New International Dictionary, in discussing the many uses and meanings of the word, gives, among other things: “To render accessible to something that may prove detrimental.” “To submit or subject to any action or influence.” As an illustration he quotes: “They did not want their students exposed to new impressions.”
Another and common definition is embraced in the following language: “To deprive of concealment; to disclose or unmask something criminal, shameful, or the like.”
Volume 15-A, Words and Phrases, page 490, treats the use of the word in many different situations and illustrates clearly, by the decisions of the courts, that it need not be limited to the meaning “exposed to sight”, as contended for by appellant. Unless it is so intended, appellant’s argument must fall.
Id. at 176.
Certainly our State Legislature did not intend that an overt, frightening and criminal act such as that committed against Complainant should simply vanish because the offender shielded his penis with his hand. The past criminal history of appellant confirms that he is a sexually dangerous person. The appellant’s penitentiary packet reflects a St. Petersburg, Florida conviction for the Florida crime of “Involuntary Sexual Battery.” This conviction served as an enhancement for the appellant’s subsequent Texas conviction for Aggravated Sexual Assault. I would overrule appellant’s point of error two.