Court Opinion

ID: 9549246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:15:21.88996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:01.947804
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The transcript of the 1974 hearing reveals ■ that the defendant was charged with escape *840and two counts of habitual criminal. On the morning of March 18, 1974, the day before his trial was to begin, the defendant, along with his counsel, a deputy public defender, appeared in court. Defendant’s counsel advised the trial judge that a plea bargain had been agreed to and that the defendant would enter a plea of guilty to a charge of conspiracy to escape. Defense counsel advised the court that in return for the defendant’s plea of guilty the district attorney had agreed to dismiss the three charges pending against the defendant.
The matter was continued until later in the afternoon. The defendant, at the request of his counsel, was given the opportunity to contact certain people who had planned to be at his trial the next day.
At the afternoon session, the district attorney tendered a fourth count to the information, conspiracy to commit escape by a felon, and this fourth count was read to the defendant. Defendant’s counsel again advised the court that a plea bargain had been entered into, that “the charge itself probably does not have a factual basis to sustain a conviction to this fourth count but due to the fact that there are other charges to be dismissed which carry severe penalties, Mr. Watkins is desirous of tendering a plea to the fourth count.”
Defense counsel further stated that he had advised his client as to the possible penalty and stated, “I think Bill is intelligent and understands what is going on and is prepared to tender a plea of guilty to the fourth count.”1
The trial court then said, “Mr. Watkins, in this fourth count it is alleged that you conspired with others to commit the crime of escape or to attempt to commit the crime of escape. Do you understand the nature of the charge that is involved in this fourth count?” The defendant responded by answering, “Yes, your Honor, I do.” The defendant also acknowledged that the plea was voluntary, that he understood his right to a trial by jury, and he wished to waive that right, that he was aware that he could be sentenced from five to forty years in the penitentiary and the likelihood of probation was nil.
Defense counsel then advised the court that there was no factual basis to sustain the charge of conspiracy, because the charge was based on a plea bargain, but there were facts to substantiate the charge of escape. He told the court that the defendant while at Camp George West Honor Unit had walked out the front gate and was gone about a month before he was arrested. Based on the foregoing information, the trial court accepted the defendant’s plea of guilty.
The defendant, again represented by the State Public Defender, now argues that the 1974 plea should be set aside because the nature and elements of the charged offense were insufficiently explained. Nowhere in their brief do they allege that the defendant did not understand the elements and nature of the conspiracy charge.2 Their argument rests solely on their claim that the trial judge never explained or asked the defendant if he understood the elements of the crime.
In my view, the majority opinion elevates form over substance. Satisfaction of Crim.P. 11 does not require a prescribed ritual. What is required is that the substance of the circumstances surrounding the plea should prevail over form.
Under the circumstances that existed at the time of the 1974 plea, I find it difficult to accept the defendant’s argument that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. Here, the day before his trial, the defendant was able to negotiate a plea bargain that allowed him to avoid a trial on the offense of escape and habitual criminal. Paren*841thetically, it should be noted that his escape was admitted at the time of his advisement. Further, he was represented by able counsel, and, as previously noted, at no time has it been alleged or argued that the defendant did not understand the charge which was filed as a result of the plea bargain which he knowingly and voluntarily entered into.
The substance of the circumstances surrounding the plea indicates that it was voluntarily made with a clear understanding of the elements and nature of the charge. People v. Edwards, 186 Colo. 129, 526 P.2d 144 (1974).
In People v. Pauldino, 187 Colo. 61, 64, 528 P.2d 384, 386, decided in 1974, we noted that the trial court:
“did not specifically explain in detail the elements of the crime of burglary on which defendant admitted the conspiracy count. Nevertheless, the information was read to him in which the count charges he and other defendants did ‘wil-fully break and enter, and without force enter, the building * * * with intent then and there to commit the crime of theft.’ No more full explanation of the substantive crime could be given than the charge itself and defendant answered ‘yes’ to the court’s question whether he understood the charge to which he was pleading.”
In my opinion, the rationale of Pauldino should be followed here and the defendant’s claim for relief denied. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
HODGES, C.J., joins in this dissent.

. The defendant was not an inexperienced youthful offender. He had been convicted in 1969 of second-degree burglary and in 1971, pursuant to a plea bargain arrived at during the course of a trial, had entered a plea of guilty to robbery with a dangerous weapon.

. The defendant did not testify concerning the 1974 advisement. He relies solely on the Reporter’s Transcript of that hearing to support his argument that the advisement was inadequate because the nature and elements of the charged offense were insufficiently explained.