Court Opinion

ID: 9727127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:20:45.012073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:33.863721
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the rule to show cause should be discharged, as the imposition of reciprocal discipline in this particular case would amount to a grave injustice as set forth in Pa.R.D.E. 216(c)(3). I write separately, however, to disassociate myself from that portion of the majority’s analysis that reevaluates the facts underlying Respondent’s misconduct in New Jersey. It is not the role of our Court to look behind a foreign jurisdiction’s finding of attorney misconduct and second-guess the method and manner of discipline imposed.1 Such an evaluation is precisely what our Court intended to prevent in disbarment cases by adopting Pennsylvania Rule of Bar Admission 203, which effectively precludes an attorney who is disbarred in another jurisdiction from seeking admission to practice law in this Commonwealth. As the majority properly notes, however, this rule is not applicable to the instant case as it had not yet been adopted at the time Respondent sought to gain admittance to the Pennsylvania bar.
The majority’s rehashing of the factual predicate of Respondent’s transgressions demonstrates the infirmity in such an approach. The majority not only looks behind the New Jersey Supreme Court’s disciplinary ruling, but also behind the criminal conviction which formed the basis of the disciplinary proceeding. In finding that Respondent’s misconduct “does not reveal a basic flaw in character, but rather a lack of maturity and fiscal responsibility,” Op. at 215, the majority overlooks the fact that an element of the offense for which Respondent was convicted is the unlawful disposition of prop*218erty.2 Implicit in such finding is something far more serious than immaturity. Although our Court is by no means bound by the New Jersey rulings when imposing a disciplinary sanction in Pennsylvania, I find it unwise to discount them. The grave injustice that would occur upon imposition of reciprocal discipline does not arise from Respondent being wrongly convicted or disbarred in New Jersey, but rather would lie in the fact that Respondent was given every assurance that he would be permitted to practice law in Pennsylvania upon passage of the bar exam.
Although I agree that there is no evidence that Respondent would pose a threat to the public by engaging in the practice of law at this time, the same may be said of future respondents who have been disbarred in foreign jurisdictions and will not be permitted to seek admittance in Pennsylvania under the newly adopted bar admission rule. Thus, this case should be seen for what it is — a limited exception to what our Court has done in the past and a practice that will not be repeated in the future.3
Justice SAYLOR joins this Concurring Opinion.

. Other than a finding of grave injustice, the only other instances where reciprocal discipline may not be imposed arise when it is clear from the record that the procedure was so deficient as to constitute a deprivation of due process, where there was an infirmity of proof and where the misconduct has been held to warrant substantially different discipline in this Commonwealth. Pa.R.D.E. 216(c).

. The New Jersey statute provides that "a person commits a crime if he applies or disposes of property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary ... in a manner which he knows is unlawful and involves substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner of the property or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted whether or not the actor has derived a pecuniary benefit.” N.J.S.A. 2C:21-15.

. I recognize that this case may apply to a limited number of similarly situated respondents who sought admittance prior to the adoption of Pa.R.B.A. 203.