Court Opinion

ID: 9445933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:41:24.823451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:27.403179
License: Public Domain

*119RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I agree with the learned district judge.1 In issuing and paying its checks, the United States is exercising a constitutional function or power,2 which cannot be expanded by the so-called “impostor rule” adopted by some, but not all, of the states. Many of the underlying reasons for that rule, such as estoppel against or negligence of the drawer, cannot be applied against the Government.3 In the absence of approval of the “impostor rule” by the Supreme Court, I adhere to the view that it should not serve to weaken or confuse the unconditional warranty of the title of him who presents the check for payment.4
Assuming arguendo, however, that the “impostor rule” may be applied against the Government, the stipulated facts in this case do not bring the checks within that exception. Howard never did pose as or pretend that he himself was any one of the fictitious payees of the 109 checks. His fraudulent pretense was that such payees actually existed and were entitled to the refunds. In one sense or another every forger is an impostor, but, as Mr. Justice Cardozo indicated in Strang v. Westchester County National Bank, 235 N.Y. 68, 138 N.E. 739, 741, “ * * * the line is hard to draw between the impostor who appropriates what is intended for another, and the impostor who deceives by misxepresenting his responsibility or character.” See also 8 Am.Jur., Bills and Notes, § 602; 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 494(b). It seems clear to me that Howard simply appropriated checks intended for 109 other, albeit fictitious, persons, and that he did not become a human chameleon by impersonating each of those many people. It seems preposterous to say that Howard was the real payee, the person for whom each of the 109 checks was really intended.
I agree with some of the statements in the majority opinion, e. g.:
“Each [the Collector and the Disbursing Officer] relied solely upon the names appearing upon the fictitious income tax returns in paying the refunds, but with the belief and intention that the person named as payee in the check would receive the benefits therefrom.”
* * * * *
“The Government considered that the fictitious taxpayers existed. After such administrative checking as the Government thought sufficient, it concluded that each such person was entitled to a refund. To effectuate the intended refund, the Government made out a check to that person and required that before the check was paid, that that person should endorse it.”
I disagree, however, with the easy assumption which follows: “That person was, of course, not the fictitious nonexistent name, but Howard who had alone submitted the papers constituting the claim.” Instead, I would say, “While that person was nonexistent, it certainly was not Howard, who had misrepresented the existence of such person, but not that he himself was that person.”
Further as to 106 of the checks, the banks derived title through still another *120fictitious endorsement, the creature of Howard’s own evil imagination, whose existence or identity was never in any way vouched for by the Government. Moreover, as to those checks, the banks could not have been led to believe that the first endorsement was made by the intended payee.
Certainty and definiteness are perhaps the most desirable characteristics of the law of negotiable instruments. The “impostor rule” introduces confusion, requiring the ascertainment of nonexistent intent and almost metaphysical speculation degenerating into mere logomachy. Better, I submit, to adhere to the simple and definite rule that each endorser guarantees the genuineness of all prior endorsements. Being of the firm opinion that neither Howard, his fictitious en-dorsees, nor the banks to which the Government made payment ever acquired title to the checks, I respectfully dissent.

. “The defendant banks are liable to the plaintiff upon the guaranty of all prior indorsements. United States v. National Exchange Bank, 214 U.S. 302, [29 S.Ct. 665, 53 L.Ed. 1006] ; National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, [65 S.Ct. 354, 89 L.Ed. 383.]
“The statement of facts herein is not applicable to the exceptions noted in the cases of Continental-American Bank and Trust Co v. United States, [5 Cir.,] 161 F.2d 935 and United States v. Continental-American Bank and Trust Co., [5 Cir.,] 175 F.2d 271.”

. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 1943, 318 U.S. 363, 366, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838.

. United States v. National Exchange Bank, 1909, 214 U.S. 302, 29 S.Ct. 665; National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 1945, 323 U.S. 454, 65 S.Ct. 354.

. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 1943, 318 U.S. 363, 368, 63 S.Ct. 573.