Court Opinion

ID: 9613816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:20:13.309092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:32.158688
License: Public Domain

LEE, J.
dissenting.
I would affirm because, in my opinion, the officer had both a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop (ORS 131.615) and probable cause accompanied by exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. Such arose from the officer’s observation of the "bag of clothes in the car” and the "tag hanging out of the shirt” which was the kind "you would normally find while the clothes were on the sales rack.” These incriminating observations distinguish this case from State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d 1006 (1977), on which the defendant relies.
The officer testified, "I followed him because of what I had seen and stopped him because of what I had seen at the house.” In State v. Crockett, 34 Or App 1019, 1023, 580 P2d 214 (1978), we said:
"* * * Probable cause means 'a well-warranted suspicion.’ State v. Willis, 24 Or App 409, 412, 545 P2d 1392, rev den (1976). It requires 'substantially less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but something more than a mere possibility.’ State v. Feehely, 27 Or App 343, 357, 556 P2d 142 (1976), rev den (1977).”
See also State v. Gilbert, 24 Or App 907, 911, 547 P2d 632, rev den (1976).
The brief interval between the observations and the stop and search should not preclude the stop and *676seizure moments later. The trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress.
I would affirm, so I respectfully dissent.