Court Opinion

ID: 9663456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:39:39.701729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:50.380317
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring.
I concur but still unenthusiastically. See Regstad v. Steffes 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1988) (Meschke, concurring). I write separately to bring notice to the dramatic procedural step this understated opinion represents, to register my reservations, and to acknowledge its lone meritorious quality.
Heedless of the concerns that I recorded in my concurrence to Regstad v. Steffes, this decision applies Rule 54(b) to a classic temporary injunction, an order requiring a debtor to make pretrial turnover of mortgaged goods to a foreclosing creditor. The doctrine of finality is applied to “an adjudicated claim for prejudgment possession of collateral” because “an unadjudicated claim for foreclosure” remains. Thus, it is concluded that “Rule 54(b) is applicable.”
So it is quietly decided that there can be no appeal from an order granting an interlocutory injunction without the trial court’s further action under Rule 54(b). Without any mention, this abandons the assumption made in Regstad v. Steffes, supra, “that an order granting an injunction may be appealed without regard to Rule 54(b).” As I set out in Regstad, this departs from more than a century of experience in this state, ignores the longstanding and widespread experience of other states, and carries our Rule 54(b) well beyond its prototype and the experience of its federal procreators. Today’s decision leaves behind a century of procedural tradition with scarcely a farewell wave of the pen. This is a radical innovation and the need for it goes undisclosed.
I joined in Gillan v. Saffell, 395 N.W.2d 148 (N.D.1986) and Gast Construction Co. v. Brighton Partnership, 422 N.W.2d 389 (N.D.1988), with their unnecessarily sweeping statements of how Rule 54(b) should be employed. Neither involved an interlocutory injunction. Later I paused, concurring in Matter of Estate of Stuckle, 427 N.W.2d 96 (N.D.1988), to evaluate for myself the functions of finality and Rule 54(b) for appeals. While I agreed that it was very desirable to generally require a final decision for a civil appeal, I also suggested that we should honor customary exceptions based on experience and akin to the federal model from which we got 54(b). Obviously, my reach for principled exceptions to finality for appeals is unacceptable to a majority of this court, even if those traditional alternatives are not examined or their rejection explained.
To be sure, the majority opinion seeks to set up a framework for review of a trial *566court’s abuse of discretion in refusing Rule 54(b) consent. It appropriates and adapts the approach used in an earlier review of an improvident grant of Rule 54(b) consent in Union State Bank v. Woell, 357 N.W.2d 234 (N.D.1984). The majority does not explain that this is also a new and innovative application of that form of review. I am unaware of any prior decisions in our state which have applied an abuse of discretion standard to review of a refusal of 54(b) action. In the parallel federal context, it is “certainly ... a general proposition” that “the district court’s refusal to execute a certificate involves an exercise of its discretion that will not be interfered with by an appellate court,” although “there may be exceptional cases where an appellate court is justified in mandamusing the district court to execute the certificate or in forthwith reviewing the interlocutory order by the medium of a prerogative writ.” 6 Moore’s Federal Practice II 54.41[3], at pp. 54-277 and 278 (1988).
. Since I see no abuse of discretion in this trial court’s pretrial turnover order based on the virtually unsupported arguments submitted on this appeal, I cannot say that the majority’s conclusion, “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 54(b) certification,” is wrong. On the other hand, I find no support in Rule 54(b) for the proposition that the consent of the trial court to a final and appealable interim judgment should be given only when there are “unusual or compelling circumstances,” (see p. 565). While that extreme expression was used in the opinion in Union State Bank v. Woell supra, the Rule 54(b) criteria is “that there is no just reason for delay.”
Another stage of review of trial court conduct has been introduced. Denial of the 54(b) action must be considered before reviewing the merits of granting or denying the temporary injunction. Each is reviewed on a separate abuse of discretion standard. See Fargo Women’s Health Organization v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176 (N.D.1986). Mere acknowledgement of this dual standard of abuse of discretion for review illustrates the clumsiness that will now be involved in appealing a temporary injunction without a trial court’s consent.
Of course, since our court can control its own agenda, we can always look ahead to the second stage of review. If it looks bad enough, we can always declare an abuse of discretion in the first stage in order to get to the second stage. But that makes review of an interlocutory injunction unpredictable and capricious.
It is small answer to suggest, as the majority opinion seems to, that an interlocutory injunction can be reviewed on “a proper appeal from a final judgment.” Of course that is true. But in this and in many cases, property will be gone, destroyed or sold, or status will be changed drastically. As I pointed out in Regstad, supra, (and as the majority opinion recognizes), “[i]f not reviewed before a final determination, an injunctional order often becomes moot” even when mistaken. 433 N.W.2d at 207.
“An injunction, issued or denied under a mistaken view of the law, can do a lot of harm while due process takes its serene course.” Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d at 207 (Meschke, concurring). According a money claim to someone whose property or status is gone from a mistaken but unre-viewable temporary injunction subverts the very purpose of an injunction — an equitable remedy as an alternative to the proverbial “inadequate remedy at law.” See 42 Am. Jur.2d Injunctions § 2 (1969). It is no procedural improvement to insist that another level of mistake be demonstrated to avoid that serious consequence.
Thus, I think that it remains to be seen whether the Union State Bank v. Woell formula is workable as a first stage of review for an interlocutory injunctional order. It is unfortunate that we have not had the aid of full briefing and argument on that course before embarking on it or that we have not utilized our usual forum for procedural change, the Joint Procedure Committee of the Supreme Court and the State Bar Association. While I agree with the majority opinion that this court has the power to “promulgate rules of procedure, including appellate procedure,” we should *567not exercise it in an unexpected and unexplained manner.
Still, there is a single, though simplistic, meritorious quality in today’s decision. It should be easy for all to understand. Without a final judgment or 54(b) action, no practitioner can stand before this court and say that he didn’t understand that his appeal was premature. As I pointed out in Regstad, “[f]or procedure generally, certainty [can be] more important than correctness.” It is a bright line to apply the doctrine of finality for appeal to all judgments and orders without exception.
As I said in Regstad, “since certainty is more important than the choice we make, I acquiesce in the holding,” 433 N.W.2d at 207, even though I expect it to bring more problems than we think we are solving.