Court Opinion

ID: 9688822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:07:28.825074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:42.457099
License: Public Domain

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
I join Justice Simonett’s dissent as to the first certified question, whether, in a partial taking condemnation action, evidence of construction related interferences are admissible, not as a separate item of damages, but as a factor to be considered by the finder of fact in determining the diminution in market value of the remaining property.
However, I would also answer no to the second certified question, whether, in a partial taking condemnation action, the evidence of loss of visibility to the public traveling on a redesigned highway is admissible, not as a separate item of damages, but as a factor to be considered by the finder of fact in determining the diminution in market value of the remaining property. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
In determining condemnation awards, any fact may properly be considered, as long as it legitimately bears on the market value of the property. State v. Gannons Inc., 275 Minn. 14, 18, 145 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1966) (emphasis added). However, not all factors that affect market value are appropriate to consider. See, Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285, 60 S.Ct. 231, 237, 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939). Admission of evidence for non-compensable damages can give rise to an inference that those claims are compensable. See, Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 453, 277 N.W. 394, 400 (1937) (overturned by Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm’n, 317 N.W.2d 352, 358 (Minn.1982) (Alevizos II), to the extent that sale prices of comparable properties are now admissible).
Not every decrease in the value of property caused by public improvements is com-pensable; the damage must be to the property itself. McCarthy v. City of Minneapolis, 203 Minn. 427, 431, 281 N.W. 759, 761 (1938). The property must be damaged in substance rather than aesthetically. Id. Here, the road grade change has altered the ability of the motorists to see the Woodbridge building and landscaped grounds, which is an aesthetic, not substantive change in value.
The State may relocate a roadway, as it did here, “without being liable for consequential economic losses” sustained by adjacent property owners. Recke v. State, 298 Minn. 500, 503, 215 N.W.2d 786, 788 (Minn.1974). The property owner has no vested right in the traffic flow. Id. at 504 n. 1, 215 N.W.2d at 788 n. 1, citing Mattson v. Colon, 292 Minn. 189, 198, 194 N.W.2d 574, 579 (1972). Since there is no right to a continued flow of traffic past the owner’s business property, it follows that there is also no right to be viewed by the traveling public. See, Recke, 298 Minn, at 504, 215 N.W.2d at 788.
Minnesota has never held that a property owner has a right to be seen, as distinguished from the “easement of view” permitting an owner to view outward from the property. McCarthy v. City of Minneapolis, 203 Minn, at 430-31, 281 N.W. at 761. An owner “cannot object * * * that a view of his shop windows or signs by the public is so cut off.” Id. (Citation omitted).
*566Even if the right to be seen were synonymous with the implied right to a view, it is not an absolute right but an entitlement to a “view that [is] not obstructed by a proper street use.” Haeussler v. Braun, 314 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn.1981) (emphasis added). Although the ability of the traveling public to see Woodbridge has been altered by the grade level change and construction, there is no dispute that the use of trunk highway 12 as converted to limited access 394 is a proper street use. Therefore, even if an adjacent property did have an entitlement to be seen, it must yield to the general public’s right to travel on an improved street. Id. at 7-8. If this were not so, every property owner behind a sound barrier would have a cause of action to recover for the possible change in market value of their property since they could no longer see or be seen from the roadway. Perhaps even the junkyard operator who is required to provide screening would have a cause of action. Haeussler specifically rejects this notion.
Woodbridge has a right to be compensated for the partial taking. However, there is no inherent property right to be seen that is compensable, and therefore evidence of that loss should not be admissible. Woodbridge should not be in a better complaining position over the inconvenience and sight lines than other property owners surrounding the highway who have not had property taken. See, Kentucky v. Ray, 392 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Ky.Ct.App.1965).
The majority decision is a revolutionary and dramatic change in condemnation law. It results in a burden on the taxpayers that is unfair and unwise.
I dissent.