Court Opinion

ID: 9721556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:02:18.013666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:27.181797
License: Public Domain

CROSBY, J.
I concur, but lament the necessary inflexibility of the result. For I can suggest numerous examples of indecent exposure cases where it might be appropriate to require registration during the period of probation, which generally varies from one to three years. Multiple and repeat offenders, and particularly those who make a practice of selecting audiences of small children, should at least be subject to registration in the exercise of the court’s sound discretion for that relatively brief period.
If the Supreme Court was unable to carve out such reasonable exceptions in Reed, however, we can hardly do so here. Just as in Reed, we must take the seemingly illogical step of declaring a condition of probation invalid because to impose it for a lifetime is cruel or unusual under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, even though conditions of probation do *559not last a lifetime and expire, of course, with the termination of probation. Reed explains why: “Although the obligation to register may be terminated pursuant to section 1203.4, there is no provision for expunging the initial registration. Thus, for example, a person who lives in Los Angeles but is convicted under section 647(a) in San Diego must register under section 290 in Los Angeles. After the probationary period has expired, he may petition in San Diego for release from the registration penalty under section 1203.4. If successful, he will not be required to reregister if he moves; however, he will always remain registered as a sex offender in Los Angeles. His name, photograph, fingerprints, and other relevant information will be permanently available to the Los Angeles police. Thus section 290 effectively imposes a lifelong burden on all those subjected to its terms.” (In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914, 920-921 [191 Cal.Rptr. 658, 663 P.2d 216], fn. omitted.) I read this language to mean the Legislature can remedy the constitutional defect by simply providing a postprobation expungement procedure.1 It may well wish to do so.

The Legislature may have thought it had already created a means of expungement. Section 1203.4, subdivision (a) provides in part, “[a successful probationer] shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense . . . .” Having found section 290 to be a “penalty” (In re Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914), tfhe Supreme Court might have utilized section 1203.4 to uphold Reed’s 290 registration condition of probation by finding the quoted language sufficient basis for relief from future registration and for orders to purge past registrations, as well. It did not, however; and we are consequently foreclosed from pursuing this approach. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455-456 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].)