Court Opinion

ID: 9483500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:22:12.161789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:39.464861
License: Public Domain

*1223WILLIAM A. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In reviewing this dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we are required to accept the allegations in Madsen’s complaint as true. Klarfeld v. United States, 944 F.2d 583, 585 (9 th Cir.1991). Moreover, because Madsen is pro se, his complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1971) (per curiam). Madsen’s complaint alleges a violation of his civil rights and incorporates a letter from the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”). The OCR letter contains findings of fact, which we must treat as supplementing Madsen’s factual allegations.
Thus, Madsen alleges that he is physically disabled, which affects his ability to walk more than 50 to 100 feet; that, for professional reasons, he obtained an instructor’s permission to audit a calculus course; that he needed to park in the disabled parking areas on campus in order to attend the course and to use the library; that some free parking was available to those without disabilities but that the university required a $15 fee for all disabled parking spots; that he telephoned the Parking Services Office, Student Special Services, and the Vice President’s office stating that he could not afford the $15 fee, and was told he would have to pay the fee with his initial application if he wished to appeal; that he did not formally apply for a disabled parking permit; that the University’s policy is that the fee for a parking permit may not be waived because of an individual’s inability to pay; and that, as a result of his inability to attend the calculus course, he lost 9 months in working on a project.
The OCR specifically found that the University was in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “based on the University’s failure to provide the option of free parking to handicapped persons comparable to the free parking available to nonhandicapped persons.” Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Regional Civil Rights Director, Region X, to John Madsen (July 2, 1990) (“OCR Findings”) at 4, reprinted in Appellee’s Reply Brief Appendix A.
I
The majority’s holding that Madsen lacks standing is based solely on the fact that he did not formally apply for a disabled parking permit. The majority leaps from this single omission to the bizarre conclusion that “[Madsen’s] lawsuit is based on the University’s policy in the abstract” rather than on the concrete personal injury he alleges. Maj. op. at 1220. Neither the facts of this case nor the case law on standing justify that conclusion.
The majority correctly discerns that the requirement of standing “presents a bright line separating those who have suffered from the challenged policy and those who have not.” Id. at 1222. On the basis of the pleadings, we must conclude that Mad-sen is among “those who have suffered” from the University’s parking policy. Mad-sen obtained the instructor’s permission to audit a class, yet the University’s parking policy combined with his physical disability and poverty to prevent him from attending. Faced with this obstacle, Madsen appealed to three University offices, including the one responsible for handling complaints about parking. The majority ignores both the injury Madsen actually sustained and the steps he took to avert it because of the one step he did not take — filing a formal application, with or without the $15 fee that the University officials insisted must accompany it. Willfully blind to the facts of this case, the majority redraws standing’s “bright line” so that it excludes, not only those who suffered no injury, but others who made no formal application because published policy and informal inquiry indicated to do so would be futile.
When the majority announces that Mad-sen’s allegations “say nothing about the futility of applying for a waiver of the fee based on ... handicap,” maj. op. at 1222, its narrow reading of the pleadings does violence to the standard for reviewing 12(b)(6) motions. It is settled law in this circuit that “[a] complaint should not be *1224dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 855 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (quoted in Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1276 (9th Cir.1986)). Civil rights complaints in particular are to be liberally construed. Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir.1989)). Madsen alleges that the University had no specific procedure for appealing its fee for handicapped parking, and that when he appealed in three telephone calls, he was told he would have to pay the fee if he wanted to apply for a permit. OCR Findings 13. Certainly these allegations suggest a set of facts that would entitle Madsen to relief! To hold otherwise is to ignore that “[l]aw reaches past formalism.” Lee v. Weisman, — U.S. -, at-, 112 S.Ct. 2649, at 2659, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992).
None of the cases cited by the majority conditions standing on a formal application for the denied benefit. In the first of the list of cases, the Supreme Court held that a black plaintiff who “never sought to become a member” of a fraternal organization lacked standing to challenge its discriminatory membership policies. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 167, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1968-69, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972). But as Judge Posner has astutely observed: “At least so far as one can tell from the opinions in the case, there was no evidence that Mr. Irvis wanted to be a Moose; not everyone does.” Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Chicago v. Kempiners, 700 F.2d 1115, 1136 (7th Cir.1983) (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). In this case, there can be no similar doubt that Madsen wanted, and made clear to the University that he wanted, free disabled parking.
In two of the other cases the majority cites, plaintiffs challenging government hiring policies were found to lack standing because they had not “applied for or otherwise sought to fill ” the positions at issue. Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C.Cir.1991) (emphasis added); accord Jackson v. Dukakis, 526 F.2d 64, 65-66 (1st Cir.1975). The plaintiffs in Albuquerque Indian Rights challenged the absence of an affirmative action preference for Native Americans. Because they took no steps to pursue the jobs in question, the court could not determine whether the plaintiffs had been injured by this omission, as the government might have hired them on the strength of their other qualifications. 930 F.2d at 55. These facts are in marked contrast to those the Supreme Court hypothesized in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), where standing would be appropriate: “If an employer should announce his policy of discriminating by a sign reading ‘Whites Only’ on the hiring-office door, his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored the sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs.” Id. at 365, 97 S.Ct. at 1869-70. In Madsen’s case, the University’s parking policy was equally categorical: No handicapped parking was available without a permit, and no application for a permit was accepted without the $15 fee. OCR Findings 3, 13. Madsen did not have to ignore that policy and personally subject himself to rebuff in order to have standing to bring this suit.
Of the five other cases the majority cites for its proposition that standing requires a plaintiff to formally apply for a benefit, three do not address standing, and the other two involve plaintiffs who never attempted in any way to avail themselves of the benefits allegedly withheld. See Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53, 55, 37 S.Ct. 70, 71, 61 L.Ed. 145 (1916) (as-applied challenge to an ordinance is decided “upon the merits”); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Gillette Co., 905 F.2d 1176, 1177 (8th Cir.1990) (case lacks ripeness where plaintiff has not been denied retirement benefits); Doe v. Blum, 729 F.2d 186, 189-90 (2d Cir.1984) (no standing where plaintiffs never even requested family planning services); Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 769 (5th Cir.1981) (no standing because “no allegation that named plain*1225tiffs had any connection with [the challenged] program”); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Appleyard, 513 F.2d 575, 577 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840, 96 S.Ct. 72, 46 L.Ed.2d 60 (1975) (as-applied statutory challenge fails on the merits where trucker does not apply for the regulated benefit). In this case, where Madsen challenges a categorical policy he personally sought relief from, these cases do not serve as precedent. The district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of standing.
II
Because the majority upholds the dismissal of Madsen’s case on the basis of standing, it does not address the two alternative grounds relied upon by the district court in dismissing the action: (1) that the University is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, and (2) that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act establishes a comprehensive remedial scheme that forecloses § 1983 suits.
A
The University relies on Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), to argue that it is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. In Will, the Court held that “States or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the state’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not persons within the meaning of § 1983. Id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. at 2311; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.1989). Whether the University is an arm of the state turns on the balancing of five factors: (1) whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds, (2) whether the entity performs central governmental functions, (3) whether the entity may sue or be sued, (4) whether the entity has the power to take property in its own name or only in the name of the state, and (5) the corporate status of the entity. Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1081, 109 S.Ct. 2102, 104 L.Ed.2d 663 (1989). Given the factual nature of this inquiry, the district court should not have concluded that the University was not a “person” just by looking at the complaint, and it was error to dismiss the complaint on this basis.
B
The University also contends that § 504’s remedial scheme forecloses enforcement of the statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is a question of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. See Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2825, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991) (noting but not deciding the question). “We do not lightly conclude the Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for the deprivation of a federally secured right. The burden is on the State to show by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement.” Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498, 520-521, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 2523, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court in Wilder pointed out that it had only twice held statutory remedial schemes to be comprehensive enough to displace § 1983. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984) (Education of the Handicapped Act).
In this case, the University does not rely on any statutory language that suggests that Congress intended to preclude § 1983 actions. Rather, it relies upon an administrative regulation, which authorizes the Assistant Secretary of Education to require recipients of federal funds to take remedial action. 34 CFR § 104.6. However, this administrative regulation is not an expression of Congress’ intent. Nor is the administrative scheme a comprehensive one like those at issue in Middlesex and Smith. In fact, it most nearly resembles the Medicaid Act, which authorizes the Secretary to curtail federal funds to states whose plans are *1226not in compliance with the Act and which the Court has held not to bar § 1983 suits. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520, 110 S.Ct. at 2523. I would hold, therefore, that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not preclude § 1983 actions.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment dismissing the action under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.