Court Opinion

ID: 9370426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 17:00:24.432981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.346803
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-8025      Document: 010110811865          Date Filed: 02/13/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                     FILED
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           February 13, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  TIM OTTEN,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,
                                                                 No. 22-8025
  v.                                                    (D.C. No. 2:20-CV-00103-ABJ)
                                                                   (D. Wyo.)
  BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY; UNION
  PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        Thermo Fluids, Inc. dispatched Tim Otten to retrieve oil from a railyard in

 Wyoming. After finding the oil barrel empty, Mr. Otten, driving a tanker truck, sought to

 exit the railyard. As Mr. Otten approached a track crossing, so too did a Burlington

 Northern Santa Fe (“BNSF”) train. Mr. Otten attempted to cross the tracks without first

 stopping, looking, or listening for a train. A collision ensued.

        Mr. Otten filed suit, alleging negligence against BNSF and Union Pacific, an

 owner of the railyard. Mr. Otten contended poor design of the rail crossing prevented him

        *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
 Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-8025      Document: 010110811865          Date Filed: 02/13/2023      Page: 2

 from squaring his truck to the crossing to look for a train. BNSF and Union Pacific

 moved for summary judgment, arguing Mr. Otten violated 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a)’s

 requirement that a truck stop, look, and listen before crossing a rail track and that this

 violation was (1) negligence per se and (2) the proximate cause of the accident.

        The district court granted summary judgment in accord with BNSF’s and Union

 Pacific’s arguments. Mr. Otten appeals. Procedurally, Mr. Otten argues the district court

 abused its discretion by relying on arguments raised for the first time by BNSF and

 Union Pacific in their reply brief on summary judgment. As to the substance of the

 district court’s reasoning, Mr. Otten contends § 392.10(a) did not apply to him, it was

 impossible for him to comply with § 392.10(a) based on the configuration of the rail

 crossing, and a Wyoming court would not treat any violation of § 392.10(a) as negligence

 per se or the only proximate cause of the collision.

        For five reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. First,

 BNSF’s and Union Pacific’s reply brief on summary judgment permissibly expanded

 upon opening brief arguments and addressed arguments advanced by Mr. Otten in his

 response brief. Second, Mr. Otten waived his argument that 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) did not

 apply. Third, although the rail crossing was not ideally designed, the crossing

 configuration did not prevent Mr. Otten from complying with the regulation. Fourth, the

 district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded a violation of § 392.10(a)

 would amount to negligence per se under Wyoming law. Fifth, Mr. Otten’s failure to

 stop, look, and listen was an intervening and unforeseeable cause of the accident,

 relieving BNSF and Union Pacific of any liability.

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                                 I.     BACKGROUND

                                  A.     Factual History

       In 2017, Thermo Fluids, Inc. employed Mr. Otten as a truck driver. At that time,

 Thermo Fluids, Inc. held a contract with BNSF to remove oil from railyards in Wyoming.

 On the date of the accident, Thermo Fluids, Inc. dispatched Mr. Otten to remove oil from

 a BNSF railyard in Wright, Wyoming.

       To access the barrel where BNSF stored the oil, a vehicle needed to enter the

 railyard from Hilight Road, cross three main-line tracks, and make a left turn to the

 north onto a dirt road that ran parallel to main-line track 1 (“M1”). From the crossing,

 it was just under a quarter mile to the oil barrel. Of additional note, a pair of curved

 BNSF “Wye” tracks ran just to the east of the dirt road that provided access to the oil

 barrel. An expert report offered by Mr. Otten identified the distance between the M1

 track and the closest Wye track as twenty-six feet.

       Prior to the date of the accident, Mr. Otten visited the Wright, Wyoming,

 railyard on only one prior occasion. On that first occasion, BNSF provided Mr. Otten

 an escort to lead him through the railyard, to the oil barrel, and back out of the

 railyard. On the day of the accident, BNSF did not provide Mr. Otten an escort to

 guide him through the railyard. Without an escort, Mr. Otten followed the previous

 route to the oil barrel, entering the yard from the west off of Hilight Road, crossing

 the three main tracks, making a left onto the dirt road, and traveling northward to the

 oil barrel. Upon arriving at the oil barrel, Mr. Otten discovered it was empty. He

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 called BNSF and was informed BNSF had not yet loaded the barrel and that he would

 need to return another day to retrieve the oil.

        Mr. Otten turned his truck around, looking to the north to see if a train was coming

 before retracing his steps to exit the railyard. Mr. Otten drove south on the dirt road for

 twenty to thirty seconds before reaching the crossing point for the main-line tracks.

 During those twenty to thirty seconds, Mr. Otten did not look or listen for any oncoming

 trains.1 As Mr. Otten approached the crossing, a BNSF train traveling southbound on the

 M1 track also approached the crossing. The BNSF train was traveling well under the

 speed limit for the section of track and blew its horn several times as it approached the

 crossing.2 Mr. Otten did not come to a stop or markedly slow his truck as he reached the

 crossing point. Rather, Mr. Otten turned directly onto the crossing, driving into the path

 of the BNSF train. The front left corner of the train struck the front right side of

 Mr. Otten’s truck. In his operative complaint, Mr. Otten alleges that, as a result of the

 collision, he suffers from “debilitating, progressive and permanent bodily injuries to his

 head, body and limbs, including facial laceration, traumatic brain injury, spinal, shoulder,

 hip, leg, lung, [and] ribs” and that his injuries may necessitate a permanent caretaker.

 App. at 68.

        1
         Mr. Otten had the windows up and the radio on in his truck, and there was a
 strong wind such that he could not hear an approaching train.
        2
         The speed limit for the section of the track in the railyard was fifty miles per
 hour. The BNSF train was traveling between thirty-seven and thirty-eight miles per
 hour.

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                                  B.    Procedural History

       Mr. Otten filed a complaint against BNSF in state court, raising a claim of

 negligence.3 BNSF removed the case to federal court. Mr. Otten filed an amended

 complaint, raising a claim of negligence against BNSF and a claim of negligence against

 Union Pacific. BNSF and Union Pacific filed answers to the amended complaint, and the

 case proceeded to discovery.

       BNSF and Union Pacific filed a joint motion for summary judgment. They argued

 that Mr. Otten violated 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) by not stopping, looking, and listening

 before crossing the track and that said violation was negligent per se.4 BNSF and Union

 Pacific further argued Mr. Otten’s negligence per se was the proximate cause of the

 accident. In support of these arguments, BNSF and Union Pacific cited a mix of

 Wyoming case law regarding negligence, proximate cause, and the impact of regulatory

 violations, as well as non-Wyoming cases involving vehicle/train collisions.

       3
          The state court complaint also identified Mr. Otten’s wife, Noella Otten, as a
 plaintiff and identified Western Railroad Properties, Incorporated as a defendant. The
 parties stipulated to the dismissal of Ms. Otten’s claims. As part of an amended
 complaint, Mr. Otten replaced Western Railroad Properties, Incorporated with Union
 Pacific.
       4
           In pertinent part, 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) states,

       the driver of a commercial motor vehicle . . . shall not cross a railroad
       track . . . unless he/she first: Stops the commercial motor vehicle within
       50 feet of, and not closer than 15 feet to, the tracks; thereafter listens
       and looks in each direction . . . for an approaching train; and ascertains
       that no train is approaching.

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          In opposing summary judgment, Mr. Otten scantly cited 49 C.F.R. § 392.10,

 identifying it only in response to a few statements of undisputed facts by BNSF and

 Union Pacific. Mr. Otten never suggested § 392.10(a) did not apply or that he had not

 violated the regulation. Rather, Mr. Otten raised several arguments for why any violation

 of § 392.10(a) did not compel granting summary judgment in BNSF’s and Union

 Pacific’s favor. First, Mr. Otten contended that, under Wyoming law, when a court finds

 that a plaintiff advancing a negligence claim violated a regulation, it has discretion to

 conclude the violation is evidence of negligence rather than negligence per se and that

 Wyoming courts favor submitting the issue of negligence to a jury. Second, Mr. Otten

 argued any regulatory violation he committed was one of two proximate causes of the

 accident—the design of the rail crossing being the other—such that the issue of

 comparative negligence should be submitted to a jury. Third, Mr. Otten contended that if

 he violated § 392.10(a), the violation should be excused because, given the spacing

 between and configuration of the M1 and Wye tracks, it was impossible for him to

 comply with the regulation and square up his truck to the track to look for an approaching

 train.

          In reply, BNSF and Union Pacific argued a Wyoming court would find this

 regulatory violation negligence per se because 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) provided a “positive

 and definite standard of care.” Id. at 212 (quoting Pinnacle Bank v. Villa, 100 P.3d 1287,

 1291 (Wyo. 2004)). Next, BNSF and Union Pacific argued the temporal proximity

 between Mr. Otten’s failure to stop, look, and listen, and the collision, made his violation

 of § 392.10(a) the proximate cause of the accident. Finally, BNSF and Union Pacific

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 countered Mr. Otten’s impossibility argument by noting Mr. Otten had the burden on the

 issue, his evidence of impossibility was speculative and indefinite, and there was

 evidence Mr. Otten could have complied with the regulation.

        The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The district court

 concluded Mr. Otten violated 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) by not stopping, looking, and

 listening before attempting to cross the M1 track. The district court further concluded

 § 392.10(a) set forth a “positive and definite standard of care” and a Wyoming court

 would apply negligence per se to Mr. Otten’s violation of the regulation rather than

 treating it as mere evidence of negligence. From this, the district court held that

 Mr. Otten’s violation of the regulation was an intervening proximate cause, was not

 foreseeable, and thus discharged any liability on the part of BNSF or Union Pacific.

 Finally, the district court rejected Mr. Otten’s impossibility argument on the basis that

 nothing prevented him from at least stopping and listening, which would have alerted him

 to the approaching train.

        On appeal, Mr. Otten raises five arguments, one procedural and four substantive,

 for reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment. On the procedural front,

 Mr. Otten contends the district court abused its discretion because its grant of summary

 judgment rests on several arguments and cases raised for the first time by BNSF and

 Union Pacific in their reply brief. On the substantive front, Mr. Otten argues (1) he never

 admitted 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a), applied and BNSF and Union Pacific failed to advance

 evidence proving such; (2) the district court should have excused any regulatory violation

 because it was impossible for Mr. Otten to fully comply with § 392.10(a) given the

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 geometry of the rail crossing; (3) the district court abused its discretion by concluding a

 Wyoming court would treat any violation of § 392.10(a) as negligence per se rather than

 evidence of negligence; and (4) even if the regulatory violation were treated as

 negligence per se, the rail crossing design contributed to the accident such that a jury

 should have been permitted to assess comparative negligence.

                                     II.    DISCUSSION

          We start by addressing Mr. Otten’s procedural challenge, concluding the district

 court did not abuse its discretion in considering arguments and case law discussed by

 BNSF and Union Pacific in their reply brief on summary judgment. Then we address

 Mr. Otten’s four substantive arguments and determine none of them warrants reversal of

 the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

           A.     Procedural Challenge: Arguments Relied Upon by District Court

          Mr. Otten contends BNSF and Union Pacific raised arguments for the first time in

 their reply brief to the district court about (1) his regulatory violation qualifying as

 negligence per se; and (2) his negligence being the proximate, intervening cause of the

 accident, relieving them of liability. Mr. Otten further asserts the district court relied upon

 these two arguments in granting summary judgment, as evident by its citations to

 Pinnacle Bank and Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co., 939 P.2d 233 (Wyo.

 1997). BNSF and Union Pacific counter that they raised the issues identified by

 Mr. Otten in their opening brief to the district court and that their citation to additional

 authority in their reply brief addressed arguments raised by Mr. Otten in his response

 brief.

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        We begin by stating the law governing reply brief argumentation on summary

 judgment. Then we consider whether BNSF and Union Pacific waited until their reply

 brief to raise either of the two arguments identified by Mr. Otten.

 1.     Law Governing Reply Brief Argumentation

        “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 implicitly requires the district court to allow

 the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond before summary judgment is entered

 against it.” Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1163 (10th Cir. 1998).5 “Thus,

 when a moving party advances in a reply new reasons and evidence in support of its

 motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party should be granted an opportunity to

 respond.” Id. at 1164; cf. D. Wyo. Local Civ. Rule 7.1(b)(2)(C) (“Reply briefs shall not

 be used to . . . address issues not previously raised in the motion or response.”). A

 moving party, however, does not introduce new arguments for summary judgment in its

 reply merely by responding to arguments in the nonmoving party’s brief and “point[ing]

 out the defects” in those arguments. Green v. New Mexico, 420 F.3d 1189, 1196 (10th

 Cir. 2005); see also In re Gold Res. Sec. Litig., 776 F.3d 1103, 1119 (10th Cir. 2015)

 (“While it is true that we generally do not review issues raised for the first time in a reply

 brief, we make an exception when the new issue argued in the reply brief is offered in

        5
          Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 has been modified since Beaird
 v. Seagate Technology, Inc., 145 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 1998), such that the precise
 language relied upon in Beaird is no longer in Rule 56, the Rule still includes
 language generally supporting the implication identified by Beaird. Cf. Fed. R. Civ.
 P. 56(b)(2) (permitting party to object to alleged fact); 56(f) (permitting district court
 to grant summary judgment on own motion but only “[a]fter giving notice and a
 reasonable time to respond”).

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  response to an argument raised in the plaintiff’s brief.” (internal quotation marks and

  brackets omitted)).

         We review whether a district court violated the implicit guarantee of Rule 56 by

  relying on an argument raised by the moving party for the first time in its reply brief for

  an abuse of discretion. Beaird, 145 F.3d at 1164. “Under the abuse of discretion standard,

  a trial court’s decision will not be disturbed unless we have a definite and firm conviction

  that the lower court has made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of

  permissible choice in the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets

  omitted). A district court relying on new evidentiary materials or new arguments

  presented in a reply brief without permitting the nonmoving party an opportunity to

  respond amounts to an abuse of discretion. Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d

  1117, 1139 n.13 (10th Cir. 2003).

  2.     Argument that Violation of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10 Qualified as Negligence Per Se

         First, Mr. Otten argues BNSF and Union Pacific failed to timely argue his

  violation of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) amounted to negligence per se. In addressing whether

  Mr. Otten was negligent per se, the district court specifically identified BNSF and Union

  Pacific as raising the issue on page thirteen of their opening brief. On that page of their

  brief, BNSF and Union Pacific (1) quoted § 392.10(a), (2) asserted Mr. Otten “failed to

  slow down or stop prior to going over the crossing as required by th[e] regulation,”

  (3) asserted Mr. Otten failed to “look and listen prior to going over the crossing,” and

  (4) contended Mr. Otten “exhibited negligence.” App. at 109. BNSF and Union Pacific

  then discussed Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981), a Wyoming case that adopted

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  a provision of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that advanced four elements for

  determining when a regulatory violation qualifies as negligence per se. BNSF and Union

  Pacific proceeded to discuss why § 392.10(a) and Mr. Otten’s conduct satisfied these four

  elements. Thus, it is apparent BNSF and Union Pacific argued, in their opening brief on

  summary judgment, that a Wyoming court would treat a violation of § 392.10(a) as

  negligence per se.

         Mr. Otten contends BNSF and Union Pacific presented an incomplete argument on

  the issue because they did not inform the district court that, even if all four elements from

  Distad and the Restatement (Second) of Torts were met, a Wyoming court would not

  exercise its discretion to apply negligence per se unless the regulation also imposed a

  “positive and definite standard of care.” Appellant’s Br. at 16 (quoting Pinnacle Bank,

  100 P.3d at 1291). It is true that, under Wyoming law, a trial court has such discretion

  even where the moving party presents evidence showing the regulatory violation satisfies

  all four elements. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo. 1987).

  But nothing required BNSF and Union Pacific, in their opening brief on summary

  judgment, to identify and then attempt to defeat arguments Mr. Otten might raise for why

  a violation of § 392.10(a) was not negligence per se. Rather, once Mr. Otten contended

  application of negligence per se was discretionary, BNSF and Union Pacific were free to

  amplify their argument in their reply by contending a Wyoming court would exercise

  such discretion where a regulation stated a “positive and definite standard of care.” App.

  at 212; see Green, 420 F.3d at 1196–97; see also In re Gold Res. Sec. Litig., 776 F.3d at

  1119. Furthermore, Mr. Otten raised the issue of a court’s discretion to find evidence of

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  negligence rather than negligence per se in his response brief. Therefore, we conclude the

  district court did not contravene the implied purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

  56 or abuse its discretion by considering the issue of whether Mr. Otten’s violation of

  § 392.10(a) qualified as negligence per se under Distad and the “positive and definite

  standard of care” threshold.

  3.     Argument that Mr. Otten’s Negligence was the Proximate, Intervening Cause

         The district court also concluded Mr. Otten’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a)

  was a proximate and intervening cause of the accident, was not foreseeable, and therefore

  discharged BNSF and Union Pacific of any liability for the accident. In addressing the

  issue, the district court specifically identified BNSF and Union Pacific as raising the

  argument on pages fourteen and fifteen of their opening brief. There, BNSF and Union

  Pacific contended that Mr. Otten’s violation of § 392.10(a) was “the proximate cause of

  any injury” given the “temporality between the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10[(a)] and

  the accident itself” and that the violation was “the sole cause of the collision, representing

  a superseding or intervening cause, and cutting off any claims of negligence against the

  Defendants.” App. at 110–11. Thus, we conclude BNSF and Union Pacific did raise this

  issue in their opening brief on summary judgment, and the district court did not abuse its

  discretion by reaching the issue.6

         6
           In so concluding, we acknowledge BNSF’s and Union Pacific’s briefing of
  this issue was on the cursory side and it was not until their reply brief that they
  identified a Wyoming case for the proposition that an “intervening cause which was
  not reasonably foreseeable,” could relieve them of liability and permit for summary
  judgment. App. at 213 (quoting Est. of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co., 939 P.2d
  233, 237 (Wyo. 1997)). However, imperfect briefing does not equate to inadequate
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                                B.     Substantive Challenges

         Mr. Otten raises four substantive challenges to the district court’s grant of

  summary judgment, one of which involves the interpretation of federal law while the

  other three advance issues governed by state law. We start by stating the standard of

  review applicable to appeals from grants of summary judgment. Then we address

  Mr. Otten’s argument involving federal law. Finally, we address Mr. Otten’s three

  arguments governed by state law.

  1.    Standard of Review

         We review the district court’s rulings on summary judgment de novo, applying the

  same standard as the district court. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Winton, 818

  F.3d 1103, 1105 (10th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no

  genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

  of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986);

  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). On appeal, we “examine the

  record and all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from it in the light most

  favorable to the non-moving party.” Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 654 F.3d 1073,

  briefing. And Mr. Otten, based on his response to summary judgment, certainly
  understood the nature of BNSF’s and Union Pacific’s argument. See id. at 163–65
  (arguing that any violation of § 392.10(a) was a proximate cause rather than the only
  proximate cause of the collision such that the case should be submitted to a jury for a
  comparative negligence analysis). Thus, the concern implicitly protected against by
  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56—that a non-moving party is deprived the
  opportunity to address an issue central to the district court’s ruling—is not in play in
  this case.

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  1077 (10th Cir. 2011). “In so doing, we ‘need not defer to factual findings rendered by

  the district court.’” Amparan v. Lake Powell Car Rental Cos., 882 F.3d 943, 947 (10th

  Cir. 2018) (quoting CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir.

  2006)). Finally, this court “can affirm on any ground supported by the record, so long as

  the appellant has had a fair opportunity to address that ground.” Alpine Bank v. Hubbell,

  555 F.3d 1097, 1108 (10th Cir. 2009).

  2.     Federal Law Argument: Applicability of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) and Waiver

         Mr. Otten contends the district court erred in concluding 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a)

  applied. Specifically, Mr. Otten argues BNSF and Union Pacific did not demonstrate the

  oil BNSF tasked him with removing from the railyard was a “hazardous material” for

  purposes of § 392.10(a)(4) or that any other provision in § 392.10(a)(1)-(a)(6) triggered

  applicability of the regulation. In advancing this argument, Mr. Otten contends he “was

  not called upon to admit or deny” that the regulation applied and did not so admit, as

  evident by his repeated use of “‘alleged violations’ of the regulations” in his response to

  summary judgment. Appellant’s Br. at 19 (quoting App. at 147, 158, 163–64, 166). In

  response, BNSF and Union Pacific argue that Mr. Otten waived this issue by not raising

  it in the district court and not presenting it through the lens of plain error in his opening

  brief on appeal. We agree with BNSF’s and Union Pacific’s waiver argument and,

  therefore, do not reach the issue of whether § 392.10(a) applied to Mr. Otten.

         “If a claimant fails to present an issue to the district court, the issue is forfeited

  unless compelling reasons dictate that the forfeiture be excused.” Kilcrease v. Domenico

  Transp. Co., 828 F.3d 1214, 1224 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).

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  Further, where a litigant fails to raise an issue in district court, the issue is subject to plain

  error review and the litigant’s “failure to argue for plain error and its application on

  appeal . . . surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first

  presented to the district court.” Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th

  Cir. 2011). Finally, a litigant seeking this court’s review of a forfeited issue must present

  his plain error argument in his opening brief, not his reply brief; otherwise the issue is

  waived. See Platt v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 960 F.3d 1264, 1273 (10th Cir. 2020)

  (“Where counsel fails to raise a theory in the district court out of neglect . . . we consider

  it forfeited and we review forfeited theories for plain error. In order to avoid a waiver on

  appeal, a party is required to identify plain error as the standard of review in their

  opening brief and to provide a defense of that standard’s application.” (emphasis added)

  (citations omitted)).

         In their brief in support of summary judgment, BNSF and Union Pacific cited 49

  C.F.R. § 392.10 nineteen times and quoted the provision. See App. at 101–18. In so

  doing, BNSF and Union Pacific stated, in multiple places, that Mr. Otten “violated”

  § 392.10(a). Id. at 101, 106, 110. And BNSF and Union Pacific cited case law involving

  violations of § 392.10(a) for the proposition that a violation of the regulation amounted to

  negligence per se and thus compelled a grant of summary judgment. Id. at 113–14 (citing

  Dietz v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 823 P.2d 810, 816 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991);

  Gasich v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 453 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)).

  Thus, although Mr. Otten attempts to fault BNSF and Union Pacific for not specifically

  alleging in a statement of fact that § 392.10(a) applied to him and that he had violated the

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  provision, it is entirely clear from the summary judgment brief of BNSF and Union

  Pacific that they contended § 392.10(a) applied to Mr. Otten and that a violation of it was

  essential to their motion.

         In his response to the summary judgment motion, although Mr. Otten never

  conceded 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) applied or that he violated the provision, he also never

  argued the provision did not apply. Rather, he remained silent on the matter, hardly citing

  § 392.10, and presenting several arguments for why any violation of the regulation did

  not require the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of BNSF and Union

  Pacific. Accordingly, we conclude Mr. Otten failed to contest the applicability of

  § 392.10(a) before the district court.

         As a result of his failure to present the argument to the district court, Mr. Otten

  needed to present his appellate argument about the inapplicability of 49 C.F.R.

  § 392.10(a) through the lens of plain error. However, Mr. Otten’s opening brief makes no

  mention of plain error. Instead, Mr. Otten did not raise plain error review until his reply

  brief. But, by then, it was too late, as Mr. Otten had already waived appellate review of

  whether § 392.10(a) was applicable. See Platt, 960 F.3d at 1273. Accordingly, we

  proceed under the assumption that § 392.10(a) applied and that Mr. Otten violated the

  regulation.

  3.     State Law Arguments

         Mr. Otten raises three arguments under Wyoming law for why his violation of 49

  C.F.R. § 392.10(a) did not warrant summary judgment against him: (1) it was impossible

  for him to comply with § 392.10(a); (2) a Wyoming court would have treated the

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  violation as evidence of negligence rather than negligence per se; and (3) it was not the

  only proximate cause of the accident, such that a jury should have performed a

  comparative negligence analysis. Before addressing each of these issues in turn, we

  briefly discuss how federal courts apply state law in actions based in diversity

  jurisdiction.

         a.       Federal court application of state law

         Under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), “federal courts sitting in

  diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Ctr.

  for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.

  § 1652, prohibits federal courts from “generating substantive law in diversity

  actions.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,

  438 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Instead, when faced with an issue of state

  substantive law, a federal court “has a duty to apply state law as announced by the

  state’s highest court” that otherwise would have jurisdiction over the claim at issue.

  Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000). If the state’s highest

  court has not directly addressed the issue, a federal court “must endeavor to predict

  how that high court would rule.” Stickley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d

  1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007). This process of determining how the highest court of a

  state would rule is sometimes referred to as making an “Erie-guess.” Pehle v. Farm

  Bureau Life Ins. Co., 397 F.3d 897, 901 (10th Cir. 2005).

         In this case, neither Mr. Otten nor BNSF and Union Pacific identifies a

  Wyoming Supreme Court case applying 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a). Thus, although the

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  parties identify Wyoming Supreme Court cases involving the impossibility of

  compliance with a regulation, negligence per se, and proximate and intervening

  causes, we must ultimately make an Erie-guess as to how a Wyoming court would

  address those concepts in the context of a violation of § 392.10(a). A federal court

  tasked with making an Erie-guess should start its analysis by considering relevant

  rulings by courts of the state. Stickley, 505 F.3d at 1077. A federal court may also

  look to “appellate decisions in other states with similar legal principles, district court

  decisions interpreting the law of the state in question, and the general weight and

  trend of authority in the relevant area of law.” Wade v. EMCASCO Ins. Co., 483 F.3d

  657, 666 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In

  conducting an Erie-guess analysis, federal courts should be “generally reticent to

  expand state law without clear guidance from [the state’s] highest court.” Belnap v.

  Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272, 1295 (10th Cir. 2017); see also id. (stating that it is

  not a federal court’s place to “expand . . . state law beyond the bounds set by the

  [highest court of the state]”).

         b.     Impossibility of compliance with 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a)

         The pertinent provision of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10 reads:

         Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the driver of a
         commercial motor vehicle specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of
         this section shall not cross a railroad track or tracks at grade unless
         he/she first: Stops the commercial motor vehicle within 50 feet of, and
         not closer than 15 feet to, the tracks; thereafter listens and looks in each
         direction along the tracks for an approaching train; and ascertains that
         no train is approaching. When it is safe to do so, the driver may drive
         the commercial motor vehicle across the tracks in a gear that permits the

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         commercial motor vehicle to complete the crossing without a change of
         gears. The driver must not shift gears while crossing the tracks.

  49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Mr. Otten did not stop his

  truck, listen for a train, or look in both directions before attempting to cross the M1 track.

  Mr. Otten, however, argues any violation of the regulation should be excused because it

  was impossible for him to comply with the regulation. More specifically, Mr. Otten

  contends that given the configuration of the tracks and that only twenty-six feet separated

  the M1 track from the Wye track, it was not possible for him to comply with the

  regulation because he could not “square[] up” his truck and stop it at least fifteen feet

  from the M1 track without crossing into, or fouling, the Wye track. Appellant’s Br. at 48.

         While Wyoming law recognizes that a violation of a regulation may be

  excused, it does so in limited circumstances. Distad, 633 P.2d at 175–76.

  Specifically, Distad adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A, which excuses a

  regulatory violation in five specific circumstances:

         (a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor’s incapacity;
         (b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance;
         (c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
         (d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
         (e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others.

  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A(2)) (emphasis added). Mr. Otten’s

  argument falls under the third circumstance. However, for two reasons, Mr. Otten is

  unable to satisfy this circumstance.

         First, Mr. Otten misreads the regulation. While Mr. Otten contends the track

  geometry prevented him from squaring up his truck to the track, nothing in 49 C.F.R.

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  § 392.10(a) required Mr. Otten to place his truck at an angle perpendicular to the track.

  Rather, it required him to stop his truck “not closer than 15 feet to[] the tracks” and

  “listen[] and look[] in each direction along the tracks for an approaching train” to

  determine that “no train [was] approaching” before crossing the tracks. 49 C.F.R.

  § 392.10(a). Thus, Mr. Otten could have complied with the regulation if he had brought

  his truck to a stop at an angle of less than ninety degrees to the M1 track, looked to his

  right and left, and listened for a train before attempting to cross the track. And

  Mr. Otten’s supervisor testified that, without performing a three-point turn or

  encroaching on the opposing Wye track, one could bring a truck to a stop at a sixty-

  degree angle to the track—a position from which a driver could look up and down the M1

  track. App. at 182–83. Thus, even if Mr. Otten could not square up with the track, this

  does not show he was “unable” to comply with the regulation.

         Second, even if Mr. Otten had advanced evidence demonstrating he was “unable”

  to comply with the regulation, Wyoming law requires more for excusal of a regulatory

  violation. Specifically, inability to comply with a regulation is excusable under Wyoming

  law only after the violator exercises “reasonable diligence or care to comply.” Distad,

  633 P.2d at 76 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A(2)(c)). Here, as

  demonstrated by the video of the crash, Mr. Otten made no meaningful attempt to

  exercise care when crossing the track. He did not stop at an angle to the track and look up

  and down the track, as sight lines might have permitted. He did not lower a window and

  listen for a train. He did not even slow down and make a meaningful effort to look in his

  side view mirror before turning onto the track. And, given the very close proximity of the

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  train to the crossing when Mr. Otten attempted to cross and that the train was blowing its

  horn, any one of these exercises in reasonable diligence and care would have alerted

  Mr. Otten to the train’s presence. As a result, even if it had been impossible for Mr. Otten

  to comply with 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a), his violation is not excusable under Wyoming law.

         c.     Negligence per se versus evidence of negligence

         Next, Mr. Otten argues the district court “abused its discretion” by concluding his

  violation of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) was negligence per se rather than evidence of

  negligence.7 Appellant’s Br. at 1, 13, 22. Although we acknowledge that Wyoming

  disfavors negligence per se, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion given

  the basic and definite standard announced by § 392.10(a).

         Under Wyoming law, “[t]he thrust of the negligence per se rule is that a legislative

  or administrative rule fixes a standard for all members of the community which does not

  require a specific interpretation by the jury, and thus certainty is promoted.” Short, 731

  P.2d at 1198. Therefore, a court may rely upon a legislative enactment or an

         7
           Mr. Otten argues that Wyoming’s abuse of discretion standard, rather than
  the de novo standard federal appellate courts apply to a grant of summary judgment,
  controls this issue. Without passing on this potential issue, we apply the abuse of
  discretion standard under which Mr. Otten has argued his case. See BLB Aviation
  S.C., LLC v. Jet Linx Aviation, LLC, 748 F.3d 829, 835 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Because
  both parties cite state law for the standard of review, we look to state law for the
  standard of review.”); see also Access Telecomms. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605,
  608 (8th Cir. 1998) (“In their briefs, both parties argue based on the assumption that
  we review de novo the issue of whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was
  properly applied by the District Court. Without deciding the standard-of-review
  question, which is best left to be resolved in a case in which it is contested, we accept
  the parties’ invitation to review the . . . issue de novo (footnote omitted)).

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  administrative regulation to establish a standard of care. Distad, 633 P.2d at 172.

  However, in considering whether a regulation may serve as the basis for negligence per

  se, a court must be cognizant that “it is seldom that [a regulation] provides specifically a

  standard of conduct which, if violated shall entail civil liability in tort.” Id.

         To help a trial court determine whether a regulatory violation is negligence per

  se rather than evidence of negligence, the Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the

  approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and directs a trial court to engage in a

  three-step process:

         (1) the standard defined by legislation or administrative rule should only
         be adopted when the four criteria of § 286, Restatement 2d, are met;
         (2) the excused violation of the legislative enactment or administrative
         rule is not negligence (a non-exclusive list of excused violations is
         encompassed in § 288A, Restatement 2d); and (3) even if the court finds
         that the criteria of § 286 are met, it is not required to adopt the
         legislative enactment as the standard of conduct because of the
         permissive language of the Restatement 2d.

  Short, 731 P.2d at 1198–99. We have already concluded Mr. Otten’s regulatory

  violation is not excusable for purposes of the second step of the process, so we focus

  our analysis in this section on the first and third steps.

         Regarding the first step, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a regulation

  establishes a “standard of conduct of a reasonable man” if a court concludes the

  regulation is designed:

         (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is
             invaded, and
         (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
         (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted,
             and

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         (d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the
             harm results.

  Distad, 633 P.2d at 175 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286). Mr. Otten does

  not seriously contend that these four elements are not satisfied, nor could he. The stop,

  look, and listen regulation advanced by 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) is designed to protect truck

  operators and railroads from train/truck collisions by requiring truck operators to take

  precautions before crossing a train track. Here, Mr. Otten did not stop, look, and listen,

  and the harm sought to be avoided by § 392.10(a)—a collision—ensued. Accordingly, we

  turn to the third step in the process for determining when a regulatory violation may give

  rise to negligence per se.

         On the third step, although the Wyoming Supreme Court has expressed reluctance

  to rely on regulatory violations to apply negligence per se, it has allowed the trial court

  the discretion to apply the doctrine when appropriate. To be sure, the Wyoming Supreme

  Court has recognized systemic “benefits” to treating a regulatory violation as mere

  evidence of negligence and submitting the matter to a jury, rather than concluding the

  violation is negligence per se. Frost v. Allred, 148 P.3d 17, 21 (Wyo. 2006). And BNSF

  and Union Pacific have not identified, and we have not found, a single case where a

  Wyoming court has applied negligence per se, much less a case where the Wyoming

  Supreme Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by applying negligence

  per se. While this lack of authority causes us to carefully consider whether to uphold the

  application of negligence per se, we are also cognizant that the Wyoming Supreme Court

  has not foreclosed application of the doctrine. See Belnap, 844 F.3d at 1295 (stating

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  federal courts should be “generally reticent to expand state law without clear guidance

  from [Wyoming’s] highest court”).

         The Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement, which permits for

  negligence per se. In Distad, the Wyoming Supreme Court quoted the following language

  from the Restatement:

         (1) The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an
         administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the
         standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.
         (2) The unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation which is not
         so adopted may be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent
         conduct.

  633 P.2d at 176 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B). The commentary to

  § 288B of the Restatement expresses a similar sentiment, permitting negligence per se but

  cautioning against its use:

         More frequently than in the case of statutes or ordinances, the
         requirements of administrative regulations are not adopted by the court
         as defining a definite standard of conduct in negligence actions, but are
         accepted as affording relevant evidence. The courts have tended to look,
         more often than in the case of a statute, to the nature of the regulation,
         the circumstances of the case, and particularly to the character and
         importance of the administrative body which has issued the regulation.
         Thus a rule of the Interstate Commerce Commission may be adopted as
         defining a definite standard, a departure from which is negligence in
         itself, where an order of a city fire department commission would at
         most be accepted as relevant evidence.

  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B cmt. d).

         From its reading of the Restatement, the Wyoming Supreme Court has

  concluded that a trial court “may adopt” a standard of conduct from a regulation and

  apply negligence per se but that “application of negligence per se is not always

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  appropriate.” Id. at 176–77 (citing McLinn v. Kodiak Elec. Assoc., Inc., 546 P.2d

  1305 (Alaska 1976), and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B cmt. d). Wyoming

  cases have identified at least five situations where negligence per se should not be

  applied to the violation of a regulation: (1) the regulation, while still legally valid, is

  inconsistent with modern practices, id. at 178; (2) the regulation is “overbroad and

  inflexible,” id.; (3) the regulation is “obscure, oblique, or irrational,” such that

  members of the public would not be aware of the regulation, Short, 731 P.2d at 1199;

  (4) the violation of the regulation was “insubstantial” and not “unreasonably

  dangerous,” Pullman v. Outzen, 924 P.2d 416, 418 (Wyo. 1996); and (5) the facts of

  the specific case “represent a conglomeration of circumstances” such that a jury

  would have to make multiple findings to assess the applicability of the regulation,

  Short, 731 P.2d at 1199; Distad, 633 P.2d at 179; see also Pinnacle Bank, 100 P.3d at

  1291 (“[W]hen a conglomeration of circumstances are relied on in order to find the

  statutory or regulatory violation, use of the negligence per se doctrine is not

  desirable.”). Mr. Otten focuses his arguments on the fifth of these situations, arguing

  the configuration and geometry of the rail crossing and Wye track make this an

  inappropriate case for negligence per se.8

         8
           For the sake of completeness, we concluded the first four situations where
  negligence per se is improper do not apply because (1) it is common and current
  practice for commercial vehicles to stop, look, and listen before crossing railroad
  tracks; (2) the regulation is specific rather than overbroad; (3) the regulation is well-
  known to the public and to members of the trucking community, as evident by the
  training Mr. Otten received regarding the regulation; and (4) Mr. Otten completely
  disregarded the regulation, creating a significant danger to materialize.

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         Regarding the fifth situation, the Wyoming Supreme Court has concluded that

  a regulation must announce a “positive and definite standard of care” for a court to

  exercise its discretion and apply negligence per se:

         if a positive and definite standard of care has been established by
         legislative enactment (administrative regulation) whereby a jury may
         determine whether there has been a violation thereof by finding a single
         issue of fact, a violation is negligence per se; but where the jury must
         determine the negligence or lack of negligence of a party charged with
         the violation of a rule of conduct fixed by legislative enactment from a
         consideration and evaluation of multiple facts and circumstances by the
         process of applying, as the standard of care, the conduct of a reasonably
         prudent person, negligence per se is not involved.

  Distad, 633 P.2d at 179 (quoting Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 119 N.E.2d 440, 444 (Ohio

  1954)). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding 49 C.F.R.

  § 392.10(a) sets just such a standard. The regulation required Mr. Otten to take the

  affirmative actions of stopping, looking, and listening before crossing the M1 track.

  It established the rule in clear and definite terms. And a jury would have an easy task

  if asked to determine whether Mr. Otten stopped, looked, and listened before crossing

  the M1 track. Simply put, as he admits and can be seen from watching the video of

  the collision, he did not. Finally, although the design of the track crossing may not

  have been ideal, Mr. Otten had every ability to stop at an angle to the track and look

  up and down the M1 line before crossing. Accordingly, while we recognize that

  Wyoming courts are cautious about applying negligence per se, we conclude the

  district court did not abuse its discretion by applying it in this case. This leads us to

  the final question, whether Mr. Otten’s negligence per se in violating § 392.10(a)

  relieves BNSF and Union Pacific of any liability.

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         d.     Proximate and intervening cause and comparative negligence

         Mr. Otten argues that, even if his violation of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a) was

  negligence per se, it was one of two proximate causes of the accident, the design of the

  rail crossing being the other. From this, Mr. Otten contends the district court, rather than

  granting summary judgment, should have permitted a jury to assess his negligence

  compared to the negligence of BNSF and Union Pacific in designing the crossing. In

  response, BNSF and Union Pacific contend Mr. Otten’s violation of § 392.10(a) was an

  intervening and unforeseeable cause that relieves them of any liability for the collision.

         Wyoming has adopted the traditional definition of proximate cause, in that

  “[p]roximate cause means that the accident or injury must be the natural and probable

  consequence of the act of negligence.” McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414

  (Wyo. 1983). “In determining what constitutes proximate cause, the same principles

  apply whether the negligence is a violation of a statutory duty or a nonstatutory

  duty.” Id. Wyoming also recognizes the concept that the “acts of negligence of two or

  more people . . . , although not working in concert, [can] combine to produce a single

  injury.” Nat. Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 1994). As a

  result, “[m]ore than one proximate cause can exist for an accident or injury” because

  “[e]ach concurrent cause that contributes directly to the accident or injury is a

  ‘proximate cause.’” Id. Thus, “[w]here injury results from two separate and distinct

  acts of negligence by different persons operating and concurring simultaneously and

  concurrently, both are the proximate cause.” Id. (quoting Hester v. Coliseum Motor

  Co., 285 P. 781, 783 (Wyo. 1930)).

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        Applying this to a situation where both the plaintiff and the defendant are

  negligent, the basics of comparative negligence are governed by statute. Wyo. Stat.

  Ann. § 1-1-109(b). Under the statute, a plaintiff who bears some fault for his injury

  may recover proportional damages so long as his fault “is not more than fifty percent

  (50%) of the total fault of all actors.” Id. Furthermore, under Wyoming law,

  comparative negligence is not the only limitation on a plaintiff’s ability to recover

  where his negligence contributes to his injury. Specifically, where the plaintiff’s

  negligence is an “intervening cause” it may “discharge[] the defendant’s liability for

  [its] negligence . . . and entitle[s] such a defendant to summary judgment on the

  issue.” Est. of Coleman, 939 P.2d at 237. An intervening cause that discharges

  liability “is one which occurs subsequent to the defendant’s negligent act or

  omission” and is “unforeseeable.” Stephenson v. Pac. Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d

  1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989). Conversely, an intervening cause is “reasonably

  foreseeable” where “it is a probable consequence of the defendant’s wrongful act or

  is a normal response to the stimulus of the situation created thereby,” and such an

  intervening cause will not automatically relieve the defendant of liability because a

  comparative negligence assessment is necessary in such situations. Id. at 1179

  (quoting Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1985)).

        For two reasons, application of this body of law supports the district court’s

  grant of summary judgment. First, Mr. Otten’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a)

  qualifies as an intervening and unforeseeable cause. The violation was intervening

  because it occurred seconds before the collision, long after BNSF and/or Union

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  Pacific designed and oversaw construction of the rail crossing. And Mr. Otten’s

  complete disregard of § 392.10(a) was not foreseeable, for motorists, particularly

  truck drivers at a rail crossing without a signal, are expected to make some effort to

  stop, look, and listen for a train. Thus, Mr. Otten’s violation of § 392.10(a) relieved

  BNSF and Union Pacific of any liability for the accident. Second, even if we were to

  conclude Mr. Otten’s violation of § 392.10(a) was foreseeable and there were

  multiple proximate causes for the collision, we alternatively conclude that no

  reasonable jury could determine the design of the crossing was an equal or greater

  contributor to the accident than Mr. Otten’s failure to stop, look, and listen.

  Accordingly, summary judgement was also appropriate under Wyoming’s

  comparative negligence statute. Cf. Foote v. Simek, 139 P.3d 455, 464 (Wyo. 2006)

  (permitting summary judgment on issues of proximate cause where “the evidence is

  such that reasonable minds could not disagree” (quoting Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d

  47, 52 (Wyo. 1997))).

                                     III.   CONCLUSION

         Concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering

  BNSF’s and Union Pacific’s reply-brief arguments, that Mr. Otten waived his challenge

  to the applicability of 49 C.F.R. § 392.10(a), that the district court did not abuse its

  discretion in concluding his violation of § 392.10(a) was negligence per se, and that the

  violation of § 392.10(a) was an intervening and unforeseeable cause of the collision, we

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  AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment.

                                           Entered for the Court

                                           Carolyn B. McHugh
                                           Circuit Judge

                                          30