Court Opinion

ID: 9537780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:23:56.024733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:00.972697
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
*185Frank E. Nash, Portland, and Mark C. McClanahan, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With them on the briefs were Seitz, Easley & Whipple, Norman L. Easley, and King, Miller, Anderson, Nash & Yerke, Portland.
John C. Caldwell, Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were William Charack, Milwaukie, Uney and Jacobs, and Dale Jacobs, Oregon City.
PERRY, J.
The plaintiff commenced this suit to quiet her title in and to the following described real estate:
“Part of the J. D. Garrett and wife D. L. C. in Sections 31 and 32, and a part of Section 32, T. 1 S., R. 2 E., and a part of Section 5, T. 2 S., R. 2 E., of the W. M., described as:
“Beginning at an iron pipe in the Longcoy Road at the southwest corner of a tract of land conveyed to Parry P. Tiseh and Lynn G. Tisch, his wife, containing 20 acres, in book 178 of deeds at page 248 and 249, records of Clackamas County, Oregon; *186thence from said beginning point run north 500.00 feet, more or less, to an iron pipe at the southeast corner of land described in book 193 of deeds, page 362, thence westerly along the southerly line of said tract 359.88 feet to the southwest corner thereof; thence west 30.00 feet, more or less, to the easterly line of a tract of land in book 197 of deeds at page 10; thence southerly along the easterly side of said tract to the southeast corner thereof; thence westerly along the southerly line of said tract 328.56 feet, to the easterly line of tract of land in book 153 of deeds, page 159; thence south along the east line of said tract 132.27 feet to the southeast corner thereof which is also the northeast corner of a tract of land in book 235 of deeds, page 44, all records of Clackamas County, Oregon; thence southerly along the easterly line of said tract 200.00 feet to the southeast corner thereof; thence westerly along the southerly line of said tract 328.56 feet to the southwest corner thereof; thence continue west 15.00 feet, more or less, to the center of the County road; thence south in the center of said road 1161.40 feet to a point 20.00 feet north of the southerly line of Kiel and Beckman County Road #313; thence parallel with the southerly line of said road South 65° 16' 30" Bast 1386.4 feet more or less, to the center line of County Road #1648; thence Northerly, along the center line of said road #1648, 1300 feet, more or less, to the initial point of said road #1648; thence North 00° 48' Bast, along the center line of Longcoy Road 442.53 feet to the place of beginning.”
No dispute exists between the parties except as to a triangular portion of land situated in the Southeast corner of said tract, consisting of approximately 5 acres.
The plaintiff’s claim of title rests upon two propositions, (1) adverse possession, and (2) interpretation of the deed of conveyance from the defendants to the plaintiff.
The trial court entered a decree for the plaintiff *187and the defendants appealed. On April 29, 1959, by opinion we affirmed the trial conrt. The defendants petitioned for a rehearing which was granted and the matter is again before us.
The trial court found the evidence offered by the plaintiff was insufficient to establish a title in her by adverse possession and our examination of the record convinces us that the judgment of the trial court upon that issue was correct.
The sole issue then is a matter of interpreting the deed of conveyance executed by the defendants and delivered to the plaintiff on November 30, 1944. The description in this deed is as follows:
“Part of the J. D. G-arrett and wife D. L. C. in Sections 31 and 32, in T. 1 S. B. 2 E. of W. M., described as:
“Beginning at an iron pipe in the Longcoy Boad at the southwest corner of a tract of land conveyed to Parry P. Tisch and Lynn G. Tisch, his wife, containing 20 acres, in Book 178 of Deeds at page 248 and 249, records of Clackamas County, Oregon; thence from said beginning point run North 500.00 feet, more or less, to an iron pipe at the southeast corner of land described in book 193 of deeds, page 362, thence westerly along the southerly line of said tract 359.88 feet to the southwest corner thereof; thence west 30.00 feet, more or less, to the easterly line of a tract of land in book 197 of deeds at page 10; thence southerly along the easterly side of said tract to the southeast corner thereof; thence westerly along the southerly line of said tract 328.56 feet, to the easterly line of tract of land in book 153 of deeds page 159; thence south along the east line of said tract 132.27 feet to the southeast corner thereof which is also the northeast corner of a tract of land in book 235 of deeds page 44, all records of Clackamas County, Oregon; thence southerly along the easterly line of said tract 200.00 feet to the southeast corner thereof; thence westerly along the *188southerly line of said tract 328.56 feet to the southwest corner thereof; thence continue west 15.00 feet, more or less, to the center of the County road; thence south in the center of said road 1161.40 feet to a point 20.00 feet north of the southerly line of Kiel & Beckman County Boad #313; thence parallel with the southerly line of said road South 65° 16' 30" E. 956.4 feet more or less, to the center of the H. Longcoy County Boad #256, thence northerly in said road to the place of beginning.”
For a clearer understanding of the problem we set forth a survey which clearly shows the land in dispute.

From a comparison of the description of the real property as set out in plaintiff’s complaint and the description in the deed, it is disclosed that the dispute resolves itself in a question as to the proper terminus of that portion of the description described as “thence parallel with the southerly line of said road [Kiel and *189Beckman Road] South. 65° 16' 30" E. 956.4 feet more or less to the center of the H. Longcoy County Boad #256.”
It must be kept in mind that this is not a suit to reform the deed to comply with an agreement of the parties, for there are no allegations in the complaint to support such a suit. DeTweede v. Barnett Estate, 160 Or 406, 85 P2d 361; Meier v. Kelly, 20 Or 86, 25 P 73. Likewise, the evidence offered would not sustain sufficient allegations.
In construing a deed, it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intentions of the parties. United States Nat. Bank v. Miller et al., 122 Or 285, 258 P 205, 58 ALR 339; Dutton v. Buckley, 116 Or 661, 242 P 626. And this intention is to be gathered from the language of the instrument and the consideration of the circumstances at the time of the execution, ORS 42.220, for prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, even though received without objection, may not be considered except when the language used is equally susceptible of different meanings. ORS 41.740; ORS 42.220; Heimbigner et al. v. U.S. Natl. Bank, 190 Or 592, 227 P2d 827; Weniger v. Ripley, 134 Or 265, 293 P 425; Holcomb v. Mooney, 13 Or 503, 11 P 274.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the use of the words “H. Longcoy County Boad #256” by the grantor as the terminus of the southerly line of the description, when in fact there is no visible road, makes the conveyance so ambiguous that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that a road visible in that general vicinity, sometimes called H. Longcoy Boad, was the road intended to mark the terminus of the southerly line. Then to avoid the effect of the stated distance to an H. Longcoy County Boad #256, they rely upon , a rule of construction set out in OBS 93.310(2) as follows:
“When pérmanent and visible or ascertained *190boundaries or monuments are inconsistent with the measurement, either of lines, angles or surfaces, the boundaries or monuments are paramount.”
If we are to accept this contention, then we must first find from the language of the conveyance that it was the expressed intention of the grantor that an open, used and visible road should constitute the terminus, or the language used to describe the terminus is so obscure that extrinsic evidence is necessary to disclose the intention of the parties. In Meier v. Kelly, 20 Or 86, 25 P 73, at page 93, we said:
“* * * "Where the terms used in the description contained in a deed or mortgage are clear and intelligible, the court will put a construction on the terms, * * *; but when the description is uncertain and ambiguous, parol evidence will be admissible to fit the description to the thing described, but not to add to or change the words of the description.” (Italics ours)
Again, in Hyland v. Oregon Agricultural Co., 111 Or 212, 216, 225 P 728, we approved this statement:
“ * * The test of the admissibility of evidence dehors the deed is involved in the question whether it tends to so explain some descriptive word or expression contained in it, as to show that such phraseology, otherwise of doubtful import, contains in itself, with such explanation, an identification of the land conveyed.’ The authors then say: ‘The rule is founded on the maxim “Id cerium est, quod cerium reddi potest.” ’ * * *”
There is nothing in the particular language used to describe the southern boundary of this tract which would indicate that the road described as the terminus was either open, used and visible, or abandoned, unused and not visible. Any uncertainty of mind arises only when going near the premises there is found only one *191visible and nsed roadway near the southeast corner of the tract of land.
Therefore, this evidence offered by the plaintiff becomes admissible and may be considered only if there is found uncertainty as to what is intended by the language used in the deed, for the deed appears in all particulars regular upon its face. ORS 41.740; ORS 42.220; Weniger v. Ripley, supra.
That the description does not create a latent ambiguity is clearly demonstrated.
“A latent ambiguity occurs when the deed or instrument is sufficiently certain and free from ambiguity; but the ambiguity is produced by something extrinsic, or some collateral matter out of the instrument. It is that, said Lord Bacon, ‘which seemeth certain and without ambiguity for anything that appeareth upon the deed or instrument, but there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth ambiguity.’ And the illustration given by him is this: ‘If I grant my manor of S. to J. F. and his heirs, here appeareth no ambiguity at all. But if the truth be that I have the manor both of South S. and North S., this ambiguity is matter of fact, and therefore it shall be holden by averment whether of them it was that the party intended should pass.’ (See Cheyney’s Case, 5 Coke, 69.) ‘A latent ambiguity is where you show that words apply equally to two different things or subject-matters.’ (Smith v. Jeffreys, 15 Mee. & W. 501.) The things must be different, and the parties, on account of such difference, have intended one, and not the other. (Webster v. Paul, 10 Ohio St. 534.) As where the call was for ‘Swift Creek Swamp,’ and it appeared that two points were called by the same name, so that it was held competent to show which point was intended by the call for ‘Swift Creek Swamp.’ (Brooks v. Brett, 4 Dev. 481.) Woodbury, J., in Claremont v. Carlton, 2 N.H. 369, puts a case of latent ambiguity thus: ‘The identical monument or boundary referred to in a deed is always a subject *192of parol evidence, and when disputed is always left to the jury to say what was the actual monument intended. Thus there may be two trees of a similar species, and with similar marks; two similar stakes not far distant from each other, or two rivers of the same name; and which was intended by the deed would be settled by parol evidence, on the ground that it is a latent ambiguity.’ So that, although a deed is apparently complete and clear, yet it appears in the course of applying or executing it, that its words are applicable to different things or persons, and there is nothing in it to show which is meant, then the ambiguity is latent, and extrinsic evidence is admissible to show which is meant.” Holcomb v. Mooney, 13 Or 503, 507, 11 P 274.
In 6 Thompson on Eeal Property 460, § 3283, it is stated:
“A latent ambiguity occurs when the deed or other instrument appears sufficiently certain, free from ambiguity, but the ambiguity is produced by something extrinsic, or some collateral matter out of the instrument. Where a description is apparently clear and complete, yet when it is applied to the land it appears that the words are applicable to different things, and there is nothing in the deed to show which is meant, * *
It is clear, as is later pointed out, that the language of the deed points out the object described as the terminus so that it cannot be said that the language used may describe equally well both objects.
In construing a deed, the courts must construe the instrument as a whole and effect be given, if possible, to each of the grantor’s expressions therein to determine the intention of the parties. Palmateer et al. v. Reid, 121 Or 179, 254 P 359; 26 CJS 814-822, Deeds §§83 and 84.
The description of the granted land discloses that it is a portion of the J. D. G-arrett and wife Donation Land Claim No. 38.
*193The evidence discloses, and ah examination of the map hereinbefore set ont will show, that the eastern boundary of the J. D. Garrett and wife Donation Land Claim lies but a short distance east of the vacated H. Longcoy County Road #1256. To extend the southern boundary of the tract, as sought by the plaintiff, to the visible, and also known as, H. Longcoy Road would be to ignore the grantors’ use of the words “Part of the J. D. Garrett and wife D.L.C. in sections 31 and 32, in T. 1 S. R. 2 E. of W.M.,” for the road also known as H. Longcoy Road lies east of the eastern boundary of the Land Donation Claim.
There is also used in the deed of conveyance the call distance of “956.4 feet more or less.” This call must be materially ignored if the parties intended the eastern terminus of the south line to be the road also called H. Longcoy Road, for to reach that point the distance would not be 956.4 feet, but 1386.4 feet.
It is also to be noted that the parties not only describe the terminus of the southerly line alone as H. Longcoy Road, but they also use the designation “County Road #256.” The road also called H. Longcoy Road is designated as “County Road #1648.”
The evidence discloses that there is in this vicinity no “County Road #256,” but there is a “County Road #1256,” which is an open, used and visible road lying north of the 956.4 feet measurement described as the point of terminus. The evidence also discloses that this County Road #1256 was officially surveyed and platted down to and beyond the point of terminus described in the conveyance, although it was never opened or improved and was vacated about 5 years prior to the execution of the deed. It seems quite clear that through a typographical error alone the “1” was omitted when describing the county road, for the three following numbers are identical with that of County *194Road #1256. That this was a mere typographical error .is also indicated from the fact that there is no contention bnt that the easterly boundary of the granted land is Longcoy County Road #1256, at least to the point where it connects from the north with County Road #1648.
It thus appears, if we are to accept the plaintiff’s contentions that the eastern terminus of the southerly line was to be an open, used and visible roadway, we are required to reject the language of the conveyance in these four particulars: (1) That the land described is a part of the J. D. Garrett and wife Donation Land Claim; (2) that the distance along the southern boundary is 956.4 feet; (3) that the road was H. Longcoy County Road as platted; and (4) that this road is County Road #1256.
We must also ignore this language in the conveyance if we are to say that the language used would “apply equally to two different things or subject matters,” for none of this language could possibly be construed to describe a roadway that lies outside the J. D. Garrett and wife Donation Land Claim, is far more than 956.4 feet east of the southwest corner, and is known officially as County Road #1648.
We are of the opinion that the language of the conveyance clearly expresses the intention of the parties,- — that the easterly terminus of the southerly boundary of the land described is the abandoned roadway officially known as H. Longcoy County Road #1256; for if there is any language of doubtful import, the language of the deed removes that doubt and the evidence dehors the deed confirms this conclusion.
Our former opinion is withdrawn, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Neither party shall recover costs in this Court.