Court Opinion

ID: 9906380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 21:02:24.988722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:20.553644
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/1/23 P. v. Huber CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B317860

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. BA048904)
          v.

 EILEEN MARIE HUBER,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Bruce F. Marrs, Judge. Affirmed.
      Maxine Weksler, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Blythe J. Leszakay, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       In 1992, defendant Eileen Marie Huber (defendant) was
convicted of numerous crimes, including three murders, that took
place during her participation in a two-month crime spree with
several accomplices. The trial court sentenced her to life in
prison without the possibility of parole. Decades later, defendant
filed a Penal Code section 1172.6 (former Penal Code section
1170.95) petition for resentencing.1 The trial court appointed
counsel for defendant, held an evidentiary hearing, and denied
defendant’s petition. The court found, relying on transcripts of
defendant’s trial, that she was a direct aider and abettor in the
three murders for which she was convicted and accordingly still
could be found guilty of those crimes under current law. We
consider whether the court’s direct aiding and abetting finding is
supported by substantial evidence.

                       I. BACKGROUND
      In November 1991, in a 27-count indictment, defendant,
her boyfriend John Lewis (Lewis), his sister Robbin Machuca
(Machuca), and Machuca’s boyfriend Vincent Hubbard (Hubbard)
were charged with committing a host of crimes between July 5
and August 27, 1991: murder, robbery, kidnapping for robbery,
kidnapping, receiving stolen property, and conspiracy to commit
the aforementioned felonies. Defendant was specifically charged,
among other things, with the murder of Jose Avina (Avina),
Willie Newton Sams (Sams), and Shirley Denogean (Denogean).

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

                                2
      A.       Evidence at Trial Regarding Defendant’s Role in the
               Murders of Avina, Sams, and Denogean
               1.    Avina’s murder
       In the summer of 1991, defendant, Lewis, Machuca, and
Hubbard were living together in an apartment in West Covina,
California. On the night of July 5, 1991, defendant and Lewis set
out to “go make some money.”
       The plan was for defendant and Lewis to drive around in
her vehicle, along with two accomplices in another vehicle, and
look for a victim whose automobile was loaded with “a lot of
stuff . . . that could be sold.” After identifying a suitable victim,
the plotters would “bump” the victim’s car and force him or her to
pull over to the side of the road. As defendant later explained to
the police, if the victim cooperated, he or she “wouldn’t be
harmed”; if the victim did not cooperate, though, the conspirators
would “shoot him.”
       When they set out that night, Lewis, as was his custom,
was armed (with a sawed-off shotgun on this occasion). After a
time, the plotters spotted Avina’s red truck, which looked like it
was “worth some money” and had “some gadgets in it.” The two-
car convoy of conspirators followed Avina’s truck onto and then
off a freeway. When a “bump” to the rear of Avina’s vehicle by
the accomplices’ vehicle failed to bring the truck to a stop, the
collaborators hemmed Avina in—the accomplices’ vehicle
alongside the truck and defendant’s coupe behind it.
       Eventually, Avina pulled his truck over in a dark
residential area of Monrovia. With the truck idling near a stop
sign, Lewis exited defendant’s car and confronted Avina, telling
him to get out of the truck. When Avina refused and attempted
to drive away, Lewis fatally shot him in the head. The truck

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climbed the curb, rolled onto a lawn, and came to a stop short of a
house. Once the truck stopped, Lewis pulled Avina’s body from
the truck, “dumped” it on the grass, and climbed into truck’s cab.
      Defendant followed Lewis (driving Avina’s truck) to the
home of one of the accomplices. Once there, they stripped the
truck’s interior of a stereo, an amplifier, a set of “big” speakers,
and a collection of compact discs. Lewis then drove the truck to
Pomona, again followed by defendant in her vehicle, which is
where they abandoned it.

             2.    Sams’ Murder
       On the night of August 18, 1991, Sams was robbed at
gunpoint at an automatic teller machine (ATM) and then driven
in his automobile to another ATM and forced to withdraw more
money from his account. From the second ATM, Sams was
driven to a third location, a middle school, where he was forced
into a dumpster and then shot multiple times by two different
guns.2 Sams’ automobile was found a few days later at a
shopping mall with the doors open and its radio missing.

2
      After Avina’s murder, but before the murder of Sams,
Lewis committed additional crimes—sometimes with defendant’s
assistance. Among the crimes was the robbery and kidnapping of
Eugene Valdez. After her arrest, defendant admitted to police
she had observed Valdez sleeping in his car in the parking lot of a
restaurant, watched as he was forcibly abducted, followed the
kidnappers in her car, and drove away in the company of one or
both of the kidnappers in Valdez’s vehicle after Valdez escaped
when one of the kidnappers attempted to shoot him (but failed
because the gun misfired).
      In addition, before Sams’ murder, the home of defendant’s
father was burglarized. The burglars stole ammunition and a

                                 4
       On the night of Sams’ murder, defendant, Lewis, and
Hubbard were seen by a witness leaving “at the same time.”
Both Lewis and Hubbard later confessed to shooting Sams even
though he had complied with all of their demands. Defendant’s
fingerprint was found on one of the weapons used to kill Sams:
the Ruger stolen from her father’s home. Defendant, after
initially denying any role in Sams’ murder, confessed to being
“involved” and affirmed she “went out on that one.” She also
admitted that shortly after the murder she had used Sams’ ATM
card to withdraw $60 from his account.

            3.    Denogean’s murder
      On August 27, 1991, Lewis and defendant drove to the
Puente Hills Mall in defendant’s vehicle to look for a robbery
victim.3 Lewis was armed with the stolen Ruger and had brought
with him plastic ties to restrain the victim.
      As they drove through the mall’s parking lot, they saw
Denogean driving alone in her Mercedes. Defendant parked next

number of firearms from the father’s gun collection, including a
Ruger .357 Magnum pistol (the Ruger). Prior to the burglary,
defendant had been heard to talk repeatedly about stealing
firearms from her father’s collection—saying at one point in
Lewis’s presence that they should “take the guns from my Dad’s
house.”
3
      Three days earlier, Lewis had driven to the same shopping
mall and kidnapped Elizabeth Nisbet; after withdrawing funds
from her bank account at two different ATMs, Lewis murdered
her by the side of a freeway. One day later, Lewis gave Nisbet’s
wedding ring to defendant as an engagement ring.

                                5
to Denogean’s vehicle and she and Lewis watched Denogean walk
into the mall and waited for her return.
       When Denogean returned a short time later, Lewis forced
himself inside her Mercedes and bound her hands. Defendant
obtained Denogean’s bank card and personal identification
number (PIN) and drove Lewis and Denogean in her Mercedes to
several ATMs, where defendant withdrew a total of $500 from
Denogean’s bank account. They then returned to the mall where
defendant, driving her vehicle, followed Lewis and Denogean in
the Mercedes onto a freeway. On the shoulder of the freeway
near an off-ramp, the two cars parked; Lewis then led Denogean
down an embankment where he shot her multiple times with the
Ruger.
       After the shooting, defendant followed Lewis in the
Mercedes to a location where they wiped the Mercedes of their
fingerprints before driving to a second location where they
abandoned the vehicle. Later that same day, defendant took a
portion of the funds stolen from Denogean’s bank account and
went shopping. Early the next morning, she went to an ATM and
withdrew an additional $200 from Denogean’s bank account.
       Following the arrest of defendant, Lewis, and Machuca on
August 30, 1991, a police officer overheard and recorded some of
the statements defendants made to each other while locked in
holding cells. When Lewis observed that defendant had
participated in the killing of three victims, defendant did not
deny or otherwise contradict him. After Machuca remarked that
“at least” they had “fun” committing their crimes, defendant said
she “would do it all over again.”

                                6
              4.     The jury verdicts and sentencing
        A trial jury convicted defendant of the first degree murders
of Avina, Sams and Denogean, along with conspiracy to commit
murder and other crimes. For each of the murder counts, the
jury found true robbery-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and
lying-in-wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) special circumstance
allegations. For the Sams and Denogean murders, the jury also
found true kidnapping-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B)) special
circumstance allegations. With regard to Denogean’s murder, the
jury found true a multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) special
circumstance allegation. The trial court sentenced defendant to
three concurrent terms of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. On direct appeal, a different panel of this court, with
minor modifications, affirmed the judgment. (People v. Hubbard,
et al. (Oct. 3, 1994, B074596) [nonpub. opn.].)

       B.    Defendant’s Petition for Resentencing
       In 2019, nearly three decades after her murder convictions,
defendant petitioned for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.
Without appointing counsel for defendant or holding a hearing,
and relying solely on the opinion resolving defendant’s direct
appeal, the trial court summarily denied the petition. We
reversed, holding the opinion on direct appeal alone was
insufficient to find defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. (People v. Huber (Dec. 30, 2020, B301360) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On remand, the trial court appointed defendant’s former
trial attorney as defense counsel for proceedings on the petition.
After both parties submitted briefing, the court issued an order to
show cause and set the matter for a hearing.

                                 7
      The trial court held the hearing on the petition in
November 2021. The court admitted into evidence “all of the
paperwork in the court file,” which it had reviewed in advance of
the hearing and included the transcript of defendants’ trial. No
witnesses testified at the hearing, and neither party offered any
additional documentary evidence.
      After hearing argument from both parties, the court denied
the petition. The court made two alternative findings beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) that “defendant, with intent to kill, aided
and abetted” the murders of Avina, Sams, and Denogean and
“could be found guilty of murder under current law”; and (2) that
“defendant was a major participant” in the murders who acted
“with reckless disregard for human life.”

                          II. DISCUSSION
      The evidence at trial amply established defendant could be
convicted under current law as a direct aider and abettor for the
three murders in question.4 She and her codefendants initially
agreed to hunt for robbery victims and to kill any of the victims
who resisted; over time, however, they began killing (or
attempting to kill) all robbery victims regardless of their
cooperation. Defendant assisted in the conspiracy’s first murder
by driving Lewis, her armed boyfriend and apartment mate, in a
search of a robbery victim. After finding Avina and watching
Lewis kill him following Avina’s resistance, she helped Lewis loot
and abandon Avina’s truck. Following Avina’s murder, defendant

4
      Because we so hold, we need not discuss the evidence in
context of support for the trial court’s alternative major
participation and reckless indifference findings.

                                8
repeated her role as at least a driver and thief in the robbery-
murders of Sams and Denogean (as well as in the kidnapping,
robbery, and attempted murder of Valdez). Defendant also
helped bolster the conspiracy’s capacity for violence by
facilitating the burglary of her father’s home to obtain arms and
ammunition. From these assistive acts, it can reasonably be
inferred that defendant had knowledge of the actual killer’s
unlawful intent and intended to assist in achieving that unlawful
end. (See generally People v. Curiel (Nov. 27, 2023, S272238) ___
Cal.5th ___ [2023 WL 8178140], *19.)

      A.      Section 1172.6 and Appellate Review
      “Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).)” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) “Senate
Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability
for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must
possess malice aforethought.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 848.) A defendant is liable for murder perpetrated by an
accomplice if he “‘aided or encouraged the commission of the
murder with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating its commission.’” (In re Lopez (2023)
14 Cal.5th 562, 585.)

                                9
       On appeal from the denial of a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, we review the trial court’s factual findings
for substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
988.) “Under this standard, we review the whole record ‘“in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

       B.    Defendant Is Ineligible for Resentencing
       Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or
implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “It is express when there is a
manifest intent to kill (§ 188, subd. (a)(1)); it is implied if
someone kills with ‘no considerable provocation . . . or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart.’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(2)).” (Gentile, supra, 10
Cal.5th at 844.)
       Because there is rarely direct evidence of intent, “it is well
settled that intent to kill or express malice, . . . , may in many
cases be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances
of the crime.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741; accord,
People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 355 [“Mental state and
intent are rarely susceptible of direct proof and must therefore be
proven circumstantially”]; Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 1165, 1171 [“a person’s intent ‘is a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances of the case’”].) Factors
to consider when determining whether a person aided and
abetted the commission of a crime “‘include presence at the scene

                                 10
of the crime, failure to take steps to attempt or prevent the
commission of the crime, companionship, flight, and conduct
before and after the crime.’” (People v. Garcia (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 261, 273; accord, People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 576, 599.) Substantial evidence here supports the
trial court’s finding that defendant harbored express malice and
directly aided and abetted the killings of Avina, Sams, and
Denogean.
       Defendant’s own admissions established she intended
Avina to be shot if he resisted the planned robbery, which he did
by first refusing to pull over and then attempting to flee when
Lewis threatened him with the sawed-off shotgun. Defendant
was present for the murder and made it possible by driving an
armed Lewis to the scene. Further, after Lewis shot Avina in the
head, defendant assisted with the completion of the robbery-
murder by following Lewis, who was driving Avina’s truck, to one
location where the truck was plundered, and then to another
where it was abandoned.
       After the Avina murder, defendant and her partners in
crime began killing (or attempting to kill) their identified robbery
victims regardless of whether the victims resisted.
       Sams was killed with defendant’s assistance even though
he had not resisted and had cooperated with his kidnappers by
surrendering his PIN to them. Defendant was seen in the
company of Lewis and Hubbard prior to the shooting, the
shooting was accomplished with at least one weapon obtained
from the burglary of defendant’s father’s home and with
defendant’s fingerprint on it, defendant admitted she was
“involved” with the murder and “went out on that one,” and
defendant used Sams’ bank card to withdraw money after the

                                 11
murder. In view of this evidence and defendant’s role in the
preceding and subsequent crimes (including the robbery and
attempted killing of Valdez), the trial court could reasonably infer
defendant intended to kill Sams, knew of Lewis’s plan to do the
same, and intended to facilitate that plan.
       As for victim Denogean, defendant played a critical role in
the kidnapping-robbery-murder. She acted as a victim-spotter,
ATM-thief, and get-away driver for Lewis. Denogean, like Sams,
was executed despite her cooperation with her kidnappers—and
she was killed with a weapon defendant helped acquire. After
defendant’s arrest a few days after the murder, defendant
expressed no remorse over any of the killings; instead, she stated
that if she had the chance she would do it all over again. The
evidence concerning the Denogean crimes was accordingly
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that defendant knew
of Lewis’s murderous intent and intended to assist in achieving
that unlawful end..

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                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           BAKER, J.
We concur:

      RUBIN, P. J.

      KIM, J.

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