Court Opinion

ID: 9534941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:43:56.920514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:08.615694
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting)’.
*207I dissent from the majority opinion which nulifies the jury verdict and reverses the trial court’s judgment. I do so because it is my view: first, that the verdicts rendered with respect to the contributory negligence of Stone and Sheffy are not necessarily inconsistent; and second, that even if they were inconsistent, that would not be ground for reversal in this case.
The fact that the jury found proximate cause as to Stone, and not as to Sheffy, would render the verdicts inconsistent only if the negligences of the two parties were the same. I think' a fair and realistic look at the evidence; and at the questions and answers set out in the majority opinion, will show plainly that they were not.
The fact which may appear to give some substance to the argument that Sheffy was guilty of the same negligence as Stone is that they were positioned near together and were injured from the same source; and such plausibility as the attack on Sheffy’s verdict has is occasioned by the way the questions as to him were worded as set forth in the main opinion. But if they are examined in the light of correct principles applicable to review on appeal, the plausibility vanishes.
It is universally recognized that whenever there is doubt or uncertainty, it must be resolved in favor of the validity of the verdict and the judgment. The specific application of that principle here requires that the questions put to the jury and the answers given be reconciled as consistent with each other if that reasonably can be done, and that they not be interpreted as inconsistent or contradictory unless that is the only reasonable conclusion to be. drawn therefrom.1
Looked at from that point of view, it seems unmistakable that the negligence of Stone: in permitting his truck to run out of gas before switching to his auxiliary tank; so it stalled in a position of danger in a traveled portion of the highway; and in failing to keep its lights on and/or in not placing flares, were all prior in time and different in character from the negligence found against Sheffy.
As to Sheffy’s negligence: if we look at the facts shown by the evidence and the manner in which the questions presented the issues to the jury from the point of view most favorable to .reconciling it as consistent in reasoning and with the objective of sustaining the verdict, it appears most reasonable to believe that the. jury would have regarded the questions as to him as inquiring simply whether he exposed himself to danger under the conditions created by Stone; and not as requiring an answer as to whether he was negli*208gent in connection with the placement of the truck, or the failure to have lights on it, or to place flares; and further that the negligence actually found against Sheffy was that under those conditions he exposed himself to danger and failed to keep a proper lookout. I emphasize the fact, as noted above, that these of necessity had to be later in time and different in character from the negligence found against Stone.
I submit that the above is not only what the jury reasonably could believe (which is all that is necessary to support Sheffy’s verdict on a separate and independent basis), but that it is the most rational interpretation both of the evidence and of what the jury found. I go beyond that: it is the only finding of' negligence which would have been sustainable against Sheffy.
A fact of controlling importance in that respect is that the duties as to the operation of the truck, the keeping its lights on and the placement of flares fell upon Stone, and therefore any blame for misdeeds therein was his, not Sheffy’s. The unsoundness of attempting to hold Sheffy responsible for either of those aspects of the negligence as apparent when one reflects that he could not have had anything whatsoever to do with the placement of the truck, nor with the failure to have its lights burning; and this is more particularly true of the failure to place flares. Even if the latter duty had been Sheffy’s, the evidence is that he would have had only about one minute to do so. Thus he would have had to .rush about and place flares before even asking the other driver (Stone) what was wrong and why he didn’t pull the truck off the highway. So it would have to be ruled as a matter of law that Sheffy was not negligent in that regard.
The next phase of the problem is whether, because the jury found Stone’s negligence was the proximate cause of his injury, consistency would require them also to so find as to Sheffy’s negligence. The accepted test of proximate cause: whether the injury of the party resulted from his negligence in a manner reasonably to be expected in the natural sequence of events,2 must be applied to each separately.
As to Stone, the jury could have reasoned that from his negligence in running out of gas so that he could not get his truck out of the position of danger on the highway; and his failure to have sufficient lights burning on the truck, and/or to place flares, it might be foreseen that someone would run into the rear of his truck and injure him, as actually happened; and thus that his negligence proximately caused his injury. But as seen above, the situa*209tion as to Sheffy was significantly different from that of Stone. The jury could have reasoned that the danger to be apprehended from Sheffy’s negligence in standing on the driver’s (north) side of the truck without keeping a proper lookout was from passing traffic; and that the particular injury he suffered (by the striking of the truck from the rear) was not in any way caused by his own acts of negligence. The fact of controlling importance here is that Sheffy was not hurt by passing traffic, the source from which it could reasonably be foreseen that he might be injured from the negligence he was found guilty of. Therefore the jury could have thought that he would have been injured in the manner he was whether he had committed that particular negligence or not. More specifically, they could have believed: that he was just as likely to have suffered his injury had he been on the opposite (south) side of the truck and thus not exposed to the danger of passing traffic; and where his failure to keep a lookout would have made no difference; that consequently the particular manner in which he was injured was not reasonably to be expected to follow as a result of his negligence; and thus that his injury was not proximately caused thereby.
If we accept the position which the majority thinks justified: that the jury found Sheffy guilty of the same negligence as Stone in part, that still would not impel the result they reach. Looking at the questions and answers under the required favorable view to Sheffy, the conclusion cannot be escaped that the only negligence that could possibly be common to both would be as to the non-placement of the-flares. It is significant to note that in the questions as to Stone, the two questions as. to the failure of lights and as to the flares-were combined in question 1C, therefore-the jury’s answer that this negligence (1C) was a proximate cause could mean that the jury believed that either the lack of lights,, or the lack of flares, or both, was the negligence which proximately caused the collision. The view of this situation most favorable to sustaining Sheffy’s verdict is that the jury thought it was Stone’s negligence in failing to have the lights on the truck, rather than negligence with respect to the flares, which proximately caused the collision. This is quite reasonable because even Stone would have had very little time to place flares; and certainly Sheffy would not have had sufficient time. This view would be entirely in accord with the jury’s-refusal to find that, even if Sheffy were negligent with respect to non-placement of flares, it was not a proximate cause of his-injuries.
The problem of proximate cause here-presented can be seen clearly if we look at the different components of the negli-gences of each of the parties separately and designate them by letters as seen in the-*210diagram below. Stone: A, runs out of gas so his truck stalls on the highway; B fails to have lights and/or C flares, Sheífy: X fails to place flares; Y, exposes self to danger; Z, fails to keep proper lookout.

From the above diagram, which accurately represents the facts under the required favorable view to Sheffy, it will be seen, as stated above, that the only possible negligent act common to both is the non-placement of' flares, represented by the crosshatched area, CX. In reasoning from this premise to the question of proximate cause, it should be kept clearly in mind that as to each of the separate aspects of negligence, reasonable minds could differ as to whether it was a proximate cause of the collision. That being so, I can conceive of no reason why the questions and answers are not reasonably susceptible of interpretation that the jury found the separate acts of negligence of Stone of A, running out of gas; and B, failing to have lights on, were proximate causes of the collision; and refuse to so find as to the negligence the parties had in common (the non-placement of the flares) represented by the cross-hatched area, CX. It is conceded that they could refuse to find proximate cause as to the other acts of negligence of Sheffy represented by YZ.
Based upon the foregoing considerations, it seems to me that consistency in reasoning would not compel the jury to find proximate cause as to Sheffy’s negligence merely because they found it as to Stone’s different negligence.
A far more important point, which I believe should be controlling in this case, is that even if it were necessary to regard the verdicts as to Stone and Sheffy as inconsistent, is that it is both wrong in principle and an injustice to Sheffy to dispossess him of his judgment because a different finding was made in a companion case. That is *211something for which he had no responsibility; and so far as he was concerned, was merely an irrelevant co-incidence which occurred because his case was tried along with that of another.
Under proper circumstances consistency undoubtedly has value. It has been referred to as a jewel. But the idea certainly has some limitations. Things can be consistently wrong as well as consistently right; consistently bad as well as consistently good. One must look to the substance behind the consistency before ascribing virtue to it. If we assume that the negli-gences of Stone and Sheffy were the same, or sufficiently similar to place them in the same position; and that the jury therefore should have found the issue of proximate cause the same as to both of them, then what justification would there be to assume they were right as to Stone, but wrong as to Sheffy? Isn’t it just as likely that on the issue of proximate cause they were right as to Sheffy and wrong as to Stone ?
Further questions arise which, insofar as I can see, find no answers in the majority opinion. Under such circumstances, why should Sheffy suffer a disadvantage? Must he lose his judgment because Stone lost his case and failed to take an appeal? No sound reason is given for nullifying his verdict. No authority has been cited, and as so far as the writer knows, none can be found to support doing so under these circumstances.
The only case referred to purporting to do so is that of Detrixhe v. McQuigg.3 It involves a fact situation so completely different that it has only a remote resemblance to our case and stands for no legal precedent applicable here. There, three actions were combined for trial, all of which arose out of one collision. In each of the three actions the negligence of the plaintiffs’ car driver, Dick C. Detrixhe, was of importance. The yarious verdicts involved a finding that he was negligent on one of the verdicts rendered, but that he was not negligent on the other two. Thus, the findings were that the same person under the same circumstances was both negligent and non-negligent. It may well be that the ruling that those particular inconsistent verdicts is correct. We are not presently concerned with whether that case was right or wrong in its conclusion. However that may be, it obviously is not analogous to our case and should not be regarded as persuasive.
On the other hand there are soundly reasoned authorities which hold that where cases are joined for trial inconsistency in the jury verdicts is no ground for reversal. The reasoning and the rule are well stated by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Brown v. Parker:4
*212“ * * * The law imposes no requirement of consistency upon jurors hearing separate cases which are consolidated for purposes of trial. If such separate cases were being tried separately, by different juries, there would be no assurance of consistency in the verdicts, and no greater assurance of consistency is insisted upon when one jury tries both cases together.” (Citing cases.)
The Idaho court follows the same doctrine and makes a very similar statement in the case of Baldwin v. Ewing.5
It cannot be questioned that if these cases had been tried separately and two different juries had brought in the verdicts, both would have been sustained. The result should not be different because the two separate actions were tried together and separate verdicts rendered by the same jury. In that regard it is important to realize that the verdict against Stone is not before this court because no appeal was taken from it, and it thus should be of no concern to us. Upon what basis then can we assume that it was either right or wrong? I cannot see how the conclusion can be escaped that we should confine our view solely to the case appealed, that of Sheffy. It is not properly within the province of this court to look behind the verdict and speculate as to the process by which the jury arrived at it; nor is it proper to permit the appellant to divert us aside into the companion case and seize upon a claimed inconsistency for the purpose of nullifying Sheffy’s verdict. If we confine .our review solely to Sheffy’s case, as we should do, and view the evidence, the questions and the answers given in the light most favorable to him, it is unmistakably clear that the verdict would have to be sustained.
Furthermore, it seems to me unquestionable that the action taken by the majority decision is at variance with the spirit and purpose of our new rules of civil procedure which are liberal in allowing the joinder of cases for trial.6 The purpose is to make the most efficient, economical and convenient use of courts, juries and witnesses in disputes which had common issues of fact and/or law. If the rights of parties are to be in such hazard that whenever an inconsistency exists as to any of the verdicts rendered all results will be nullified, litigants will justifiably make the most determined efforts to avoid such joinder.’ And the courts, with equal justification, will be reluctant to force, parties to accept consolidation because of the likelihood that the joinder will actually defeat the purpose of expediting litigation rather than serving it.
For these reasons I urge that it is both unwise and unjust to set aside Sheffy’s ver-*213■diet. He has gone to court to seek justice : has invested the time, trouble and expense involved in the filing, preparation and trial of his lawsuit; he prevailed at the trial; and has defended this appeal. To now deprive him of his verdict will force him to the further trouble and expense, as well as the hazards involved in a new trial. In order to do so it is necessary: to go outside the issues of his own case; to indulge in what impresses me as an unjustified interpretation and comparison of the verdict in a companion case to find an inconsistency; and to penalize Sheffy merely because the other plaintiff, for whom he had no responsibility, lost his case. The expropriation of his verdict, as this court’s decision does, which, in the final analysis, has resulted because his case was tried along with another, strikes me as an unfair and unwarranted intrusion into his right of trial by jury and the sanctity which should be accorded the verdict he obtained ;7 and more important in the overall purview of the administration of justice, it establishes a dangerous and unsound precedent which will .result in similar injustices to others whose rights will be governed by this decision.
For the foregoing reasons I would sustain the jury verdict and the trial court’s judgment thereon.

. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Line, Ltd., 82 S.Ct. 780 (1962).

. See Valasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. et al., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989.

. See footnote 3 in Main Opinion.

. See footnote 1 Main Opinion.

. See footnote 2 Main Opinion.

. Rule 42(a), U.R.C.P.

. See statement in Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822.