Court Opinion

ID: 9600910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:33:11.624903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:54.501269
License: Public Domain

STANFORD, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority opinion and in support of my dissent, I quote from the case of Ex parte Black, 140 Cal.App. 361, 35 P.2d 355, 356: "The petition for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain a reduction of bail is denied. There are numerous considerations entering into the determination of the amount of bail to be required by the trial court in any case. In re Tsuji Horiuchi, 105 Cal.App. 714, 288 P. 708; Ex parte Ruef, 7 Cal.App. 750, 96 P. 24; In re Williams, 82 Cal. 183, 23 P. 118. Under the authorities cited, this court must assume in this proceeding that * * * the trial court determined from the facts before it that the bail fixed was reasonably necessary. Furthermore, it is well settled that this court should not reduce the bail unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its discretion. There has been no showing made of an abuse of discretion herein.”
And from 8 C.J.S., Bail, § 51(b)(2), I quote: “The exercise of discretion by a court or officer in fixing the amount of bail is subject to review, but his decision will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless an abuse of power is clearly shown, for the action of the trial court is presumed *313to be well founded until such presumption is overcome by some character of proof." (Emphasis supplied.)
At the hearing had before this court there was no offer of proof whatsoever that, the action of the lower tribunal, in imposing the additional $3,500 bond, was not reasonable or that it was an abuse of power. The only matter presented to this court, material to the issue here was an affidavit signed by the petitioner, alleging that petitioner was without funds and unable to meet the obligations of the additional bond imposed upon him by the lower tribunal.
Petitioner also contends in the above mentioned affidavit, that the additional charges filed by the county attorney were filed merely for the purpose of harassing petitioner. If true, this of course might offer grounds for a holding that the additional bail was unwarranted and excessive, but again there has been no offer of proof of these allegations. From the case of In re Mariano, 34 R.I. 534, 84 A. 1086, 1087, I quote: “* * * We are aware that a few courts have doubted their authority, in the absence of statute for that purpose, to require new or additional bail for the appearance of a respondent, while a recognizance already given by him for that purpose remained in full force, with its conditions unbroken, and the respondent liad not been surrendered by the sureties. We find no such difficulty. In entering into such prior recognizance the petitioner acquired no vested rights superior to the right of the state to have him in court without fail when required. In such recognizance there is no express, and we find no implied, provision that he shall not be required, Upon a change of circumstances, to furnish further bail. * * *”
See also People v. Eiseman, 69 Cal.App. 143, 230 P. 669 and Ex parte Wasson, 50 Tex.Cr.R. 361, 97 S.W. 103.
In the case of People ex rel. Rothensies v. Searles, 229 App.Div. 603, 243 N.Y.S. 15, 17, the court said: “* * * The nature of the offense, the penalty which may be imposed, the probability of the willing appearance of the defendant or his flight to avoid punishment, the pecuniary and social condition of defendant, and his general reputation and character, and the apparent nature and strength of the proof as bearing on the probability of his conviction—all these are elements which may properly be taken into consideration by the court in determining the amount of bail.”
From 6 Am.Jur., Bail and Recognizance, section 33, I quote: “In the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, subject to certain established principles and precedents. Such power to' grant bail is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. * * * ”
In this respect I feel duty bound to mention that petitioner was at the date of the *314hearing before this court charged with 41 separate offenses, embodying 6 separate and distinct crimes as set out in the Arizona Code Annotated, 1939, among which are sodomy, fellatio, illegal possession of narcotics and contributing to the delinquency of minors. A.C.A. 1939, §§ 43-406, 43-407, 68-803, 43-1008. It is of course well settled law that where the bail required does not appear to be excessive as measured by the character of the offense, the mere inability of the accused to procure bail in the amount required does not make it excessive. Ex parte Spoon, 18 Okl.Cr. 703, 192 P. 698; Ex parte Paul, 36 Okl.Cr. 86, 252 P. 853; People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 Ill. 464, 173 N.E. 8, 72 A.L.R. 801 and cases cited therein.
Concerning the excessiveness of the aggregate amounts imposed on petitioner, the majority opinion concedes that if the offenses were charged each individually and separately and bond .imposed accordingly, that each one would not be excessive. In the case of People v. Eiseman, supra, where the defendant was convicted of eight separate charges - of felony and sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment and bail was imposed as to each, the court held that the aggregate bail was not excessive, where none of the charges were duplicates and the amounts were hot separately excessive.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion.-