Court Opinion

ID: 9845475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:22:45.169921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:08.882320
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
Although I.C. § 72-719(3) gives the Commission the power to correct “manifest injustice,” the Commission in this case ruled:
“Since Claimant knew at the time he signed the Compensation Agreement he had multiple sclerosis, the record does not support a modification of the Compensation Agreement to correct a manifest injustice. Idaho Code, Section 72-719(3) covers situations where a worker suffers a latent injury or disease not discoverable within the limitations period. In this case, Claimant knew he suffered from multiple sclerosis at the time he entered into the Compensation Agreement.”
Given the Commission’s interpretation of I.C. § 72-719(3), it is obvious that the Commission believed that it could not under these circumstances modify the settlement agreement. As the Court correctly concludes, however, the Commission erred in interpreting the statute so narrowly.
Idaho is one of several states which have statutes allowing workmen’s compensation awards and settlement agreements to be reopened by the Commission. Some of these statutes set forth specific circumstances in which awards may be modified, while others “give the Commission blanket power to make such changes in awards as are in its judgment justified” or “say that awards may [be] modified for any good cause.” 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 81-52 at 15-546 (1976). In view of the fact that the purpose of these statutes is to ensure that victims of industrial accidents receive adequate protection and compensation, the sounder approach is to broadly construe the power of the Commission to reopen awards. Id. at 15-536 to 15-546. Cf. Goodson v. L. W. Hult Produce Co., 97 Idaho 264, 266, 543 P.2d 167, 169 (1975).
I.C. § 72 — 719(3) gives the Commission broad power to “correct manifest injustice,” rather than listing any specific grounds for modification. In that regard it is similar to Minn.Stat. § 176.461 (1980), which provides in part: “[T]he workers compensation court of appeals, for cause, at any time after an award, upon application of either party . . . may set the award aside .... ” In Wollschlager v. Standard Const. Co., 300 Minn. 550, 220 N.W.2d 346 (1974), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that cause for setting aside an award exists in cases involving fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, and a substantial change in the employee’s condition. This interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 176.461 was applied in the recent case of Landon v. Donovan Const. Co., 270 *16N.W.2d 15 (Minn.1978), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: “In all cases the basic concern in determining whether sufficient cause exists to set aside an award is to assure a compensation proportionate to the degree and duration of the disability.” Id. at 16.
An approach similar to that employed by the Minnesota Supreme Court has been adopted by the California Supreme Court in interpreting its reopening statute, which allows awards to be reopened for “good cause.” Cal.Labor Code §' 5803 (West 1971). Grounds commonly held to constitute good cause are:
“(1) mistake of fact, occasioned by failure or inability to produce certain evidence at a prior hearing;
(2) mistake of law disclosed by subsequent appellate court ruling on the same point in another case;
(3) inadvertence, as when the Appeals Board issues a decision under the mistaken impression that its Medical Bureau had made an adverse report in the case;
(4) newly discovered evidence which is more than merely cumulative; and
(5) fraud, such as may be perpetuated through perjury and false statements.” Nicky Blair’s Restaurant v. Worker’s Compensation Appeals Board, 109 Cal. App.3d 941, 167 Cal.Rptr. 516, 525 (1980) (quoting 1 Hanna, Law of Employee Injuries and Workmen’s Compensation § 9.02[2][a], at 9-14 (2d rev. ed. (1980)).
Given the purpose of workmen’s compensation acts, it is clear that the approach employed by the Minnesota and California Supreme Courts is the proper approach. The Commission has the power to reopen an award or a settlement agreement at any time within the five year period set forth in I.C. § 72-719(3), whenever circumstances exist which render the original award inequitable.1 Cf. Pullman Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 28 Cal.2d 379, 170 P.2d 10, 15 (Cal.1946).
The Court states the settlement agreement “may very well have [been] a manifest injustice.” To my mind, however, it is clear that the failure to join the I.S.I.F. in the original proceedings constitutes “manifest injustice” as a matter of law.2 In this case, Mr. Sines was given a 15% disability rating by Dr. Lynch and a 20% disability rating by Dr. Thurston for the injury to his back resulting from the industrial accident. The Compensation Agreement approved by the Commission was prepared on the basis of 17V2% of a total disability, an obvious compromise. However, I agree with the *17Court that the claimant’s impairment due to the back injury was properly determined, and it is therefore res judicata that the permanent physical impairment resulting from claimant’s back injury is 17V2%. However, that certainly was not the only issue which should have been considered in this case. The law in Idaho is clear that in evaluating permanent disability, all the claimant’s physical impairments, not just that which ensues from the recent industrial injury, must be considered. I.C. § 72-332; Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemn. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 406, 565 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1977). The Commission did not do so in this case.
As a Finding of Fact, the Commission stated: “[Sines] was not hired on one occasion because he disclosed to the potential employer that he had multiple sclerosis.” Thus, although prior to the industrial accident Mr. Sines was able to carry out all the duties of a lumberjack, as a matter of law, his multiple sclerosis constituted a permanent physical impairment. See Gugelman v. Pressure Treated Timber Co., 102 Idaho 356, 630 P.2d 148 (1981). The Commission, however, did not take into account Mr. Sines’ pre-existing physical impairment in approving the compensation agreement. If it had, the Commission certainly would have concluded that Mr. Sines was totally and permanently disabled as a result of the industrial accident.
Although the Court states that “[i]n the instant case, the files before the Commission reflect some evidence that the claimant was totally and permanently disabled,” (emphasis added), the evidence clearly established that Mr. Sines was in fact totally and permanently disabled. It was undisputed that following his industrial accident Mr. Sines was never able to return to work. Furthermore, my review of the record indicates that there was essentially no dispute in the proceedings before the Commission that at the time the settlement agreement was entered into, Mr. Sines was totally and permanently disabled. As the Court notes, neither the employer or its surety disputed this fact. Their only contention was that their only responsibility under I.C. § 72-332 was for the 17V2% physical impairment that the doctors testified was attributable to the accident. The Court also notes that Dr. Thurston, the physician who had treated Mr. Sines for several years, was of the opinion that as of December 13, 1977 (before the settlement agreement was entered into), Mr. Sines was totally disabled. The testimony of Dr. Lynch supports this conclusion:
“Q. Doctor, when you’re speaking of the 15 percent impairment, are you speaking of an impairment as a result of the accident? Is that what you’re speaking of?
A. That’s all I’m relating that to, yes.
Q. Now, Mr. Sines has much more bodily impairment, I take it, than bodily impairment resulting from the accident; does he not?
A. 'Correct.
Q. What would you consider his bodily impairment taking into consideration the 15 percent which you rate as a direct result of the accident and the multiple sclerosis combined?
A. Ninety percent altogether.
Q. Do you believe that he is able to do any work at this time?
A. I don’t believe he could, no.
Q. For how long a time do you think that has existed?
A. He appears to be unchanged from my examination of 1976, on January 12, so it’s existed for three years now. And I would expect this to go on indefinitely.” (Emphasis added.)3
The only real question in this case is whether Mr. Sines’ total disability was caused by the industrial accident. The fact that the industrial accident resulted in only *18a 17%% impairment in no way precludes a finding that the total disability resulted from the accident. The substantial evidence in the record is that the combined effects of the multiple sclerosis and the industrial accident did in fact cause claimant’s total and permanent disability. Up until the time of the accident, the claimant was able to work. However, following the accident, Mr. Sines was never able to return to work. The fact that Mr. Sines’ multiple sclerosis would have eventually resulted in total disability regardless of the accident is naught but a mere happenstance and cannot be said to negate his right to receive compensation for his total permanent disability under the actual facts and circumstances as they did occur.
Since the I.S.I.F. is liable for that portion of the claimant’s total permanent disability not attributable to the industrial accident, i.e., that portion attributable to his pre-existing physical impairment, the failure to join the I.S.I.F. resulted in a settlement agreement which was manifestly unjust. Thus, like the agreement in the Landon case, supra, the agreement in this case appearing on its face to be unfair, I would prefer that the Court speed up the process by directing the entry of a modified award which includes the liability of the I.S.I.F. However, I feel certain that the claimant will look with favor upon the Court’s opinipn, which in my view is another in a series of enlightened opinions in what is a somewhat unexplored area of Idaho’s Workmen’s Compensation law. A very worrisome aspect of I.C. § 72-719 is that provision which seems to say that a proceeding “to correct a manifest injustice” will be made by the Commission on its own motion. I understand by our holding today that we are making it known that claimants, and in some instances, employers and their sureties, are not precluded from making the same motion, and thereby triggering what I perceive to be a very broad equitable power conferred by the legislature upon the Commission. This is as it should be. It must be remembered that at one stage in the field of Workmen’s Compensation law, appeals did not proceed directly from the Commission into the Supreme Court; claimants were first entitled to take an appeal “to the district court of the county in which the injury occurred” and the case was thereafter tried by the court in a review limited to questions of law. Idaho Code Annotated §§ 43-1408-1409 (1932). The district court was specifically authorized to have regard for “any irregularity or error” which was to the damage of a party. I would assume that the district court could also have used its inherent equitable powers to avoid or correct a manifest injustice had the occasion arisen necessitating that it do so.
Similarly, I assume today, with equal confidence, that the 1971 legislature had in mind that the Commission, which is now the only tribunal to which a claimant has access other than this Court, should have the same broad equitable powers of a district court in order to fulfill its function of providing sure and certain relief for the injured working man or woman. Hence, it is important that the Commission realize the extent of its power, a power which, by its makeup, it can most competently and effectively administer.4 I surmise that until the handing down of today’s opinion, the Commission may have had some doubts.

. Although the approach used in Minnesota and California is sound, cases from those jurisdictions which list certain circumstances in which awards can be reopened should not be taken as limiting in any way the power of the Commission to reopen awards when, in its judgment, an award is manifestly unjust.

. As in the Landon case, there is a serious question as to ineffective assistance of counsel. The úncontradicted testimony of Mr. Sines was as follows:
“Q. Mr. Sines, when you signed the agreement which is Page 1 of Exhibit 1, were you represented by a lawyer?
A. Carl Buell. He was in the hospital then, had cancer of the liver. He died right after that. Well, I knew he was dying then.
Q. Did you refer to the agreement, did you read it before you signed it?
A. I couldn’t read it.
Q. Did someone explain it to you?
A. I asked him about it, what I was signing, and he was just about as blind as I am. He had cataracts bad on his eyes.
Q. Did he explain it to you, though?
A. He just told me not to worry about it, that it wasn’t — I wasn’t signing anything away when I signed it.”
A competent attorney with reasonable experience in handling workmen’s compensation cases would have pursued the issue of liability on the part of the I.S.I.F. from the outset. The issue of claimant’s total disability and I.S.I.F. involvement, however, was not presented to the Commission until the hearing on Mr. Sines’ application for modification of 'the Compensation Agreement. At that point, the Commission’s consideration of the issue was foreclosed by its own improperly limited interpretation of I.C. § 72-719(3). However, the Commission itself is bound to take judicial notice of its own files pertaining to a case. Anderson v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 77 Idaho 263, 268, 291 P.2d 859, 862 (1955). Given the facts of this case and the record before the Commission, at the time it approved the Compensation Agreement the Commission had the responsibility to raise the issue of claimant’s total disability, regardless of whether that issue was raised by his attorney.

. The Court acknowledges the testimony of Dr. Lynch, stating that Dr. Lynch testified that “Claimant was 90% disabled.” The Court, however, appears to confuse disability with impairment. Dr. Lynch testified that Mr. Sines had a total bodily impairment rating of 90% when the 15% impairment resulting from the industrial accident was combined with Mr. Sines’ multiple sclerosis.

. As I recently mentioned in Heese v. A. & T. Trucking, 102 Idaho 598, 635 P.2d 962 (1981), one member of the Commission is learned in the law, possessing all of the qualifications required of judges and justices, and the other two members are possessed of a vast accumulation of knowledge and experience in Workmen’s Compensation law, amounting to a sense of intuitive fairness — which is but another way of declaring their ability to award equitable relief where a manifest injustice has occurred.