Court Opinion

ID: 9628708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:30:02.15986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:10.180580
License: Public Domain

McINTYRE, Justice
(concurring specialty)-
Without deciding whether the confession of defendant ought to be clothed with the mantle of voluntariness, I feel justified in concurring in the result reached by Chief Justice Parker on this point because I think the appellant has failed to show any damage or prejudice to her position from the admission of her confession.
As I see it, there is no substantial difference in the narrative of facts as defendant related them in the confession instrument and in the facts as she related them at the trial. Also, appellant’s attorney still relates in substance the same set of facts on behalf of his client in stating her position on appeal. Thus, it would appear defendant is not claiming she was induced or tricked into an erroneous or misleading statement.
Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977; and Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, have laid down important new safeguards. The purpose of such safeguards, however, is to make sure a confession is reliable before it is used against a defendant. But in this instance the question of reliability is removed, as far as our consideration is concerned, because appellant does not claim any facts were incorrectly stated in the written confession. There is therefore no need to apply Escobedo or Miranda.
In appellate procedure, the appellant has the burden of showing harmful or prejudicial error before he is entitled to a reversal. Tompkins v. Byrtus, 72 Wyo. 537, 267 P.2d 753, 756; In re Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 57 Wyo. 425, 120 P.2d 601, 608. See also Honda v. People, 111 Colo. 279, 141 P.2d 178, 186.
Appellant in this case has not pointed out wherein she was hurt or prejudiced by the statement she afterwards corroborated in her own testimony. If there was irregularity in submitting her written statement to the jury, the burden (as in any other case) is still on the appellant to show how and why it resulted in harm or prejudice to her. No effort has been made to show actual harm from the statement, and we cannot say prejudice follows as a matter of course.
Another way of arriving at the same result would be to say that defendant’s subsequent corroboration of her written statement sufficiently contradicts her claim of involuntariness to confirm the finding of voluntariness made by the trial judge.
In any event, to make my position clear, I am not saying I would be upholding the finding of voluntariness with respect to defendant’s confession, if the evidence had shown a substantial conflict in the confession and the defense offered by defendant at her trial. I am saying only that it does not appear, from the record in this case, that defendant was prejudiced by a written statement she afterwards, at the trial and now on appeal, corroborates.
I concur in the opinion of Chief Justice Parker insofar as it relates to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury, and insofar as it relates to an absence of prejudicial error in statements of the trial judge, which are complained of by appellant.