Court Opinion

ID: 9958951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 14:11:58.841616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:08.131271
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jose Gonzalez,                             :
                           Petitioner      :
                                           :
             v.                            :   No. 924 C.D. 2022
                                           :   Submitted: April 28, 2023
Pennsylvania Parole Board,                 :
                        Respondent         :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                              FILED: April 10, 2024

             Jose Gonzalez (Petitioner) has petitioned this Court to review a decision
of the Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board), mailed August 2, 2022, which denied his
request for administrative relief. Additionally, Kent D. Watkins, Esq. (Counsel),
Petitioner’s court-appointed counsel, has filed an application to withdraw,1 asserting
this appeal lacks merit. After careful review, we dismiss as moot the petition and
grant Counsel’s application to withdraw.
                                 I. BACKGROUND
             In March 2017, Petitioner entered guilty pleas to drug-related charges
and received a sentence of 1 year, 10 months, and 15 days to 5 years of incarceration,
with a maximum sentence date of March 23, 2022. See Sentence Status Summ.,
6/30/17. The sentencing court subsequently modified his sentence to reflect credit
for time served and revised his maximum sentence date to February 11, 2021. See

      1
        See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550
A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).
Sentence Status Summ., 8/3/17. Petitioner was paroled on December 26, 2017. See
Parole Order, 10/17/17.
            On May 5, 2018, Petitioner was arrested on new drug charges, and the
Board issued a detainer. See Warrant, 5/5/18; see also Phila. Police Dep’t Arrest
Report, 5/6/18. Petitioner waived his right to counsel and a revocation hearing. See
Waiver, 5/22/18. On June 6, 2018, the Board recommended Petitioner be detained
pending the disposition of his new criminal charges. See Prelim. Detention Hr’g
Report, 6/6/18. Subsequently, Petitioner was released from detention. See Order to
Release From Temporary Detention, 1/14/19.
            On September 2, 2020, Petitioner was arrested on firearms-related
charges, and the Board issued a detainer. See Warrant, 9/1/20; Not. of Charges and
Hr’g, 9/8/20. Petitioner again waived his right to counsel and a detention hearing.
See Waiver, 9/8/20. The Board recommended that Petitioner be detained pending
disposition of his criminal charges. See Detention Hr’g Report, 9/24/20; Not. of Bd.
Dec., 9/30/20. Subsequently, Petitioner was released from detention. See Order to
Release From Temporary Detention, 2/4/21.
            The Board issued a warrant and detainer on July 6, 2021. See Warrant,
7/6/21. On July 10, 2021, Petitioner was convicted of the firearms offenses and
sentenced to 11½ months to 23 months of incarceration. See Not. of Charges &
Hr’g, 10/27/21. Petitioner waived his right to counsel at his parole revocation
hearing. See Waiver, 10/27/21.
            The    Board    recommended      revoking    Petitioner’s   parole   and
recommitting him as a convicted parole violator (CPV). See Revocation Hr’g
Report, 11/11/21. On December 28, 2021, the Board recommitted Petitioner as a
CPV. See Order, 12/28/21. The Board recalculated his maximum sentence date to

                                         2
January 31, 2024. See id. The Board mailed notice of Petitioner’s recommitment
on December 30, 2021. The recommitment advised Petitioner that he had thirty days
to file an appeal and that if he desired an attorney, he would need to contact the
public defender’s office directly. See Not. of Bd. Dec., 12/30/21.
               On January 10, 2022, Petitioner pro se filed a request for administrative
relief with the Board. See Correspondence, 1/10/22. On February 28, 2022,
Petitioner pro se filed an application for parole. See Parole Appl., 2/28/22. On
March 23, 2022, Counsel entered his appearance on Petitioner’s behalf.                           See
Correspondence, 3/23/22. On March 29, 2022, and June 22, 2022,2 Petitioner sent
additional pro se administrative remedies forms to the Board, attempting to
challenge the recommitment order.
               On August 2, 2022, the Board responded to the administrative remedies
form. See Resp. to Correspondence & Admin. Remedies Form, 8/2/22. The Board
noted that Petitioner’s correspondences postmarked February 28, 2022, March 29,
2022, and June 22, 2022, would not be considered as they were filed beyond the 30-
day period provided by regulation. See id. (citing 37 Pa. Code § 73.1). The Board
affirmed its earlier decision. See id. at 1-2.
               Specifically, the Board noted that the recalculation of Petitioner’s
maximum date of incarceration did not violate any constitutional provisions,
including double jeopardy; the Prisons and Parole Code, 61 P.S. §§ 101-3701,
authorizes the Board to recalculate maximum dates of CPVs to reflect that they
received no credit for time spent at liberty on parole. See id. Further, Petitioner had
constructive notice of this potential penalty via the statute, as well as the ability to

       2
         Pursuant to the “prisoner mailbox rule,” pro se legal filings of prisoners are deemed filed
on the date they are “given to prison officials or put in the prison mailbox.” See Kittrell v. Watson,
88 A.3d 1091, 1096 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

                                                  3
challenge the recalculation decision. See id. Additionally, the Board noted that the
decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for time spent at liberty on parole is purely
discretionary so long as the Board articulates the reason for its decision. See id.
Instantly, Petitioner was denied credit for this time because his new conviction
involved firearms offenses. See id.
               Petitioner, through Counsel, timely petitioned this Court for review of
the Board’s decision. See Pet. for Rev., 8/30/22. On December 2, 2022, Counsel
filed a Turner/Finley letter and accompanying application to withdraw as counsel,
asserting that the appeal was without merit. See Turner/Finley Letter, 12/2/22. On
December 7, 2022, this Court issued an order advising Petitioner of his right to
obtain substitute counsel at his own expense or file a brief on his own behalf. See
Order, 12/7/22. On December 22, 2022, Petitioner filed a pro se response to
Counsel’s Turner/Finley letter, attempting to argue the merits of his appeal and
averring that he no longer wished to be represented by counsel. See generally Pet’r’s
Br., 12/22/22.
               On January 18, 2023, the Board filed an application for relief,
requesting that this Court stay the briefing schedule pending the resolution of
Counsel’s petition to withdraw. See Appl. for Relief, 1/18/23, at 1. According to
the Board, Petitioner’s pro se response constituted prohibited hybrid representation.
See id. On January 23, 2023, this Court granted the Board’s application and stayed
the Board’s obligation to brief, pending the resolution of Counsel’s petition to
withdraw. Thereafter, on May 1, 2023, this Court then directed the submission of
the matter to a panel for a merits review on the briefs. As of that date, the Board had
not filed a brief.3

       3
        Prior to addressing the merits of the Turner/Finley letter, we note the following regarding
the Board’s application for a stay. The premise of the Board’s application was that Petitioner’s

                                                4
                       II. TURNER/FINLEY REQUIREMENTS
               We first consider whether Counsel’s application to withdraw complies
with the Turner/Finley requirements. A Turner/Finley letter must detail “the nature
and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing the issues [that] the
petitioner wants . . . reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and
requesting permission to withdraw.” Zerby, 964 A.2d at 960 (citation omitted).
               Further, counsel must “also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the ‘no-
merit’ letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw; and (3) a statement
advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new counsel.” Id. (citation

pro se response to the Turner/Finley letter constitutes hybrid representation, which is prohibited.
See Appl. for Relief, 1/18/23, at 1. This is plainly incorrect. It has long been recognized that the
prohibition against hybrid representation is inapplicable in the Turner/Finley context. See
Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607, 615 n.12 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also Lerch v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (while Superior Court
decisions are not binding on this Court, they offer persuasive precedent where they address
analogous issues). Indeed, required procedure after filing a Turner/Finley letter involves advising
the petitioner of his right to proceed pro se. See Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 960 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2009) (counsel must advise petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new counsel). For this
reason, we believe that the Order staying the Board’s briefing obligation was incorrectly issued.
        Upon filing an application to withdraw, the relationship between a petitioner and appointed
counsel is broken, and a petitioner must be permitted to proceed pro se. In our view, a respondent
should not be relieved of its briefing obligations yet may exercise discretion and professional
judgment. The Board may voice its agreement with Counsel’s analysis and/or refute the pro se
arguments of the petitioner. Alternatively, the Board may simply inform the Court that it will
forego submitting a brief.
        During the stay of the Board’s briefing obligations, the Court also issued an order
suggesting that we would address the merits of the petition for review without the benefit of
briefing from the Board. See Order, 5/1/23. The Order states, “appointed counsel’s application
for leave to withdraw as counsel shall be submitted on briefs, along with the merits of the Petition
for Review, without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered.” Id. To be clear, if the Court
discerns potential merit in issues raised by a petitioner, we will deny the application to withdraw
and direct appointed counsel to file a merits brief. Zerby, 964 A.2d at 960; see, e.g., Hughes v. Pa.
Bd. of Prob & Parole, 977 A.2d 19, 27 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (concluding that the Board’s iterative
rulings may have deprived a petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to challenge those rulings and,
therefore, denying an application to withdraw). Of course, the Court would then issue a briefing
schedule, and the Board would have an opportunity to respond.

                                                 5
omitted). If counsel satisfies these technical requirements, we must then conduct
our own review of the merits of the case. Id. If we agree that the claims are without
merit, we will permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief. Id.
              Upon review, we conclude that Counsel has satisfied the technical
requirements of Turner/Finley.          Counsel discussed the nature of his review,
identified the issues raised in Petitioner’s administrative appeal—namely, the
calculation of his maximum date following his recommitment to Pennsylvania state
custody—and explained why those issues lack merit. See id.
              Counsel sent a copy of the brief and application to withdraw to
Petitioner and advised him of his right to proceed pro se or with new counsel. See
Turner/Finley Letter at 1-9; Certificate of Service, 12/2/22. Petitioner has filed a
pro se response.
                                    III. DISCUSSION4
              Petitioner asserts that the Board erred in calculating his maximum
sentence date. However, on January 31, 2024, Petitioner’s maximum sentence date
expired.
              “[I]t is well settled that the expiration of a parolee’s maximum term
renders an appeal from the Board’s revocation order moot.” Johnson v. Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole, 300 A.3d 525, 528 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023); see also Rhines v. Pa. Bd.
of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 361 C.D. 2020, filed June 9, 2021), 2021 WL

       4
         Our standard of review is limited to determining whether the Board committed an error
of law, whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence, and whether its decision
violated constitutional rights. Fisher v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 62 A.3d 1073, 1075 n.1 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2013); see also Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.

                                               6
2350902; Jackson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 170 C.D. 2020,
filed Nov. 19, 2020), 2020 WL 6799149.5
               A case will be dismissed as moot if there exists no actual case or
controversy. Mistich v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 863 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2004). This requires “(1) a legal controversy that is real and not hypothetical, (2) a
legal controversy that affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the
factual predicate for a reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal controversy with
sufficiently adverse parties so as to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution.”
Johnson, 300 A.3d at 527 (citations omitted). The controversy must continue
through “all stages of judicial proceedings, trial and appellate, and the parties must
continue to have a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the lawsuit.” See id. Courts
will not enter judgments or decrees to which no effect can be given. 6 Mistich, 863
A.2d at 119.
               Instantly, Petitioner’s original maximum sentence date was February
11, 2021. He was paroled on December 26, 2017, with 1143 days remaining on his
original sentence. At the time of his recommitment as a CPV, he was credited with
254 days spent in confinement, as well as one day of backtime, which resulted in a
total of 888 days remaining on his original sentence. Therefore, his new maximum
sentence date was January 31, 2024.

       5
         This Court’s memorandum opinions may only be cited “for [their] persuasive value, but
not as binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). This Court cites to the unreported cases herein for their
persuasive value.
       6
         Exceptions, inapplicable here, may be found where “(1) the conduct complained of is
capable of repetition yet likely to evade judicial review; (2) the case involves issues of great public
importance; or (3) one party will suffer a detriment in the absence of a court determination.”
Johnson, 300 A.3d at 527 (citations omitted).

                                                  7
                  There is no evidence in the certified record to show that Petitioner has
committed any additional crimes or that new criminal charges were brought against
him that could further extend his maximum sentence date. Indeed, it appears that
Petitioner is no longer in the custody and control of the Commonwealth.7
                  On this record, we conclude that Petitioner cannot establish an ongoing
case or controversy. See Johnson, 300 A.3d at 527. Any judgment entered would
be without effect. See Mistich, 863 A.2d at 119.
                                       IV. CONCLUSION
                  For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss as moot the petition for review
and grant Counsel’s application to withdraw.

                                                   LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

       7
            See Inmate Locator, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov (last visited Apr.
9, 2024).

                                                   8
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jose Gonzalez,                         :
                        Petitioner     :
                                       :
           v.                          :   No. 924 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Pennsylvania Parole Board,             :
                        Respondent     :

                                     ORDER

     AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 2024, the petition for review filed by Jose
Gonzalez is DISMISSED AS MOOT, and the application by Kent D. Watkins, Esq.,
to withdraw as counsel is GRANTED.

                                       LORI A. DUMAS, Judge