Court Opinion

ID: 9690092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:53:25.785867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:53.512851
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with majority that Clatterbuck’s letter was qualifiedly privileged. However, I would find that Young has at least raised an issue of fact as to whether Clatterbuck acted with malice. I would therefore hold that summary judgment is inappropriate. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
A defendant to a libel action may establish that the allegedly libelous communication was qualifiedly privileged. The plaintiff can overcome this privilege by establishing that the communication was made with actual malice. Turner v. Welliver, 226 Neb. 275, 411 N.W.2d 298 (1987). In the context of a qualified privilege, actual malice means hate, spite, or ill will. Id.
The majority states that defamatory statements which have not been pled may be introduced as evidence of malice. True enough. But a statement need not be defamatory to be evidence of malice. “I wrote that letter with hate, spite, and ill will” is not a defamatory statement, but is clearly evidence of malice. *50Virtually any admissible statement may be introduced as evidence of malice. The real question, on a motion for summary judgment, is whether the statement which has been introduced raises an issue of fact as to malice.
In deposition, Clatterbuck testified that he questioned Young’s integrity. The testimony raises the possibility that Clatterbuck bore Young ill will, which in turn raises the possibility that Clatterbuck’s letter was written with actual malice. Young has presented a genuine issue of material fact as to malice, and he should be able to try this issue to a jury.