Court Opinion

ID: 9605533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:38:32.062574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:28.672178
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a conviction of a felony, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, in which the principal contentions of the appellant are:
1. That a motion to suppress evidence should have been granted because the search warrant was obtained on the basis of sworn testimony recorded electronically rather than by means of a written affidavit, and
2. That the evidence is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.
On February 25, 1972 in Elmore County an informant appeared before a magistrate and testified that certain controlled substances were located in a certain house trailer occupied by the appellant-defendant, Lee Charles Badger, and his roommate. The informant’s testimony was given under oath and was recorded electronically. No written affidavit was obtained from the informant or any other witness. The magistrate issued a search warrant and pursuant thereto officers searched the trailer and seized quantities of marijuana and hashish found therein. Badger and his roommate were charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a) (1) (B). The defendants moved to suppress the items seized on the grounds, among others, that the search warrant was invalid because it was not supported by an affidavit. That motion was denied. Defendants were tried by a jury and Badger was convicted of the offense charged. His roommate was convicted of the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance. Only Badger has appealed.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence since the search warrant *170was issued on the basis of electronically recorded testimony rather than a written affidavit. There is no question but that Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure 41(c) which was adopted to be effective January 1, 1972, was in effect at all times relevant to this case and govern its disposition. Said rule provides:
“Rule 41. Search and Seizure —
“(c) Issuance And Content. A warrant shall issue only on an affidavit or affi-' davits sworn to before a district judge or magistrate or by testimony under oath and recorded and establishing the grounds for issuing a warrant . . . ”
Badger argues that the rule contravenes article 1, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution and I.C. § 19-4403. Article 1, section 17 of the Constitution provides:
“Unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited. — The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the place to' be searched and the person or thing to be seized.” I.C. § 19-4403 provides:
“Affidavit of probable cause. — A search warrant can not be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person, and particularly describing the property and the place to be searched.”
This Court has the inherent power to formulate rules of practice and procedure in the courts of Idaho. R.E.W. Construction Co. v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 88 Idaho 426, 400 P.2d 390 (1965). It is also clear than any such rules adopted by this Court cannot properly contradict constitutional provisions but we find no such contradiction in the subject portion of the rule under consideration herein. We hold that the word “affidavit” is broad enough to include the recording of sworn testimony. We find no express requirement of a “written” affidavit and our holding does no violence to the purpose or spirit of our constitution but merely recognizes modern advances in technology. Electronic recording of sworn testimony is no less reliable and no more perishable than a sworn writing. The search warrant was properly issued by the magistrate and the trial court did not err in denying suppression of the evidence.
Appellant secondly contends that there was insufficient evidence upon which the jury could have found “intent to deliver” on the part of Badger. This court has stated its standard for review of questions involving the sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases:
“This jurisdiction has long followed the rule that a verdict of conviction will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial and competent evidence to support that verdict.” State v. Shannon, 95 Idaho 299, 507 P.2d 808 (1973).
Appellant asserts that there is no substantial or competent evidence on which the jury could have concluded that Badger had the “intent to deliver” and that such conclusion is necessary to support the judgment of conviction and the verdict of the jury. We disagree. The record discloses that the quantity of contraband seized herein consisted of 394.4 grams of marijuana plant material and 3.828 grams of hashish. The material was contained in numbers of plastic baggies or foil packets. The evidence revealed that the hashish was the equivalent of 57 marijuana cigarettes and that 1,180 cigarettes could have been made from the marijuana.
The record reveals that an experienced narcotic agent for the Idaho Bureau of Drug Enforcement testified that based on his experience in the narcotic field and from the quantity of the materials and the method of their packaging that he concluded the contraband was being held for sale. The defendant himself took the stand in his own behalf and testified that while he was not a heavy user he smoked two or *171three cigarettes a day and perhaps more on week-ends.
It is our opinion that the evidence contained in the record herein is sufficient to distinguish this case from State v. O’Mealey, 95 Idaho 202, 506 P.2d 99 (1973).
In O’Mealey a district court had held that a defendant was unlawfully held to answer “since no evidence was presented upon which the magistrate could have found probable cause * * * ” We said in O’Mealey “The sole issue for determination herein is whether the intent to deliver a controlled substance can be inferred or presumed solely from the quantity and variety of substances found upon the defendant’s person.” * * * “Hence, it is crucial in a matter of this type that the State in its evidence furnish the lower court and this court with some purported evidence sufficient to reach a conclusion as to what amount of drugs may create a presumption of intent to deliver.”
In the case at bar the testimony outlined herein satisfies the admonition to law enforcement and prosecuting attorneys which this Court set forth in O’Mealey. The testimony outlined above concerning the quantity of the controlled substances, the defendant’s own stated personal habits of marijuana use, the defendant’s own testimony to the effect that he might give portions of the material to his roommate, the method of packaging of the material and the opinion of the law enforcement officer taken in total constituted sufficient and competent evidence, albeit circumstantial, from which the jury may have found an “intent to deliver.” We note also that only the appellant Badger was found guilty of “intent to deliver.” Badger’s roommate was convicted only of the lesser included offense of “possession.”
Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.