Court Opinion

ID: 9953972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 13:02:45.655063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:57.685200
License: Public Domain

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          PATRICIA A. MCDONNELL v. NORMAN
                 A. ROBERTS II ET AL.
                       (AC 45261)
                 Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Schuman, Js.

                                    Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia,
   their alleged legal malpractice in connection with their representation
   of the plaintiff during her prior marital dissolution proceedings. The
   plaintiff, who initially was self-represented, commenced the action in
   June, 2020. In September, 2020, the defendants served a set of interroga-
   tories and requests for production on the plaintiff and also filed a request
   to revise the complaint. In October, 2020, the defendants filed a motion
   for a judgment of nonsuit based on the plaintiff’s failure to respond to
   their request to revise. In November, 2020, the defendants filed another
   motion for a judgment of nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff had
   failed to respond to their interrogatories and requests for production.
   In December, 2020, an attorney, M, filed an appearance on behalf of
   the plaintiff and requested a thirty day continuance to respond to the
   defendants’ requests to revise and for discovery. The trial court granted
   the request. In February, 2021, the defendants again moved for a judg-
   ment of nonsuit in light of the plaintiff’s failure to file a revised complaint
   and to respond to their discovery requests. The plaintiff did not file an
   objection to that motion. In March, 2021, the trial court issued an order
   in connection with the February, 2021 motion for a judgment of nonsuit,
   indicating that the plaintiff had thirty days to file a revised complaint
   and responses to the defendants’ discovery requests or the defendants
   could file another motion for a judgment of nonsuit that would be
   granted by the trial court. In April, 2021, the plaintiff filed a revised
   complaint but did not file a notice of compliance with discovery. In
   May, 2021, the defendants filed another motion for a judgment of nonsuit,
   as the plaintiff had failed to respond to discovery pursuant to the trial
   court’s March, 2021 order. The plaintiff filed a notice of compliance
   with discovery in June, 2021, which the defendants asserted was defi-
   cient. The following month, the defendants again filed a motion for a
   judgment of nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to fully
   respond to discovery pursuant to the trial court’s March, 2021 order.
   The plaintiff did not file an objection to the motion, which the trial
   court granted, and the court rendered a judgment of nonsuit against
   the plaintiff. In September, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion to open
   and set aside the judgment of nonsuit, claiming that there was a bona
   fide reason for her failure to respond to the defendants’ discovery
   requests. After the defendants filed an objection, arguing that the plaintiff
   could not establish that a good cause of action existed at the time the
   nonsuit was rendered or that she was prevented from prosecuting the
   action due to mistake, accident or other reasonable cause as required
   by the applicable statute (§ 52-212), M filed an affidavit in support of
   the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment of nonsuit, in which he
   asserted that the plaintiff did have good cause under multiple counts
   and that he had had various medical and veterinary appointments. The
   trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to open, and the plaintiff appealed
   to this court. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
   denying the plaintiff’s motion to open and set aside the judgment of
   nonsuit: the trial court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff failed
   to establish reasonable cause for her noncompliance with discovery
   under the second prong of the test set forth in § 52-212 because, contrary
   to the plaintiff’s assertion, the trial court did not find that her reasons
   for failing to prosecute were insufficient to constitute reasonable cause
   but, rather, concluded that she had not adequately substantiated her
   proffered reasons, as the affidavit she submitted in connection with her
   motion offered only general references to M’s various medical and other
   issues, without any specific dates, circumstances or other substantiation
   as to what prevented him from fully complying with the trial court’s
   March, 2021 order; moreover, although the plaintiff claimed that the
  trial court improperly applied the law because the rule of practice (§ 17-
  43) requires an affidavit to set forth particularized circumstances only
  if a plaintiff is nonsuited for failure to appear, not for failure to comply
  with discovery, she did not provide any legal authority for that proposi-
  tion, and a specific explanation was required to sustain her burden of
  demonstrating reasonable cause for noncompliance.
    Argued December 5, 2023—officially released March 26, 2024

                           Procedural History

  Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-
dants’ alleged legal malpractice, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Windham, where the court, Lynch, J., granted the
defendants’ motion for a judgment of nonsuit and ren-
dered judgment thereon; thereafter, the court, J.
Fischer, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion to open and
set aside the judgment of nonsuit, and the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Brian S. Mead, with whom was Curran R. Mead, for
the appellant (plaintiff).
  Karen L. Allison, with whom, on the brief, was Ryan
V. Nobile, for the appellees (defendants).
                          Opinion

   CRADLE, J. In this action, the plaintiff, Patricia A.
McDonnell, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her
motion to open and set aside the judgment of nonsuit
rendered in favor of the defendants, Norman A. Roberts
II, the Law Offices of Norman A. Roberts, LLC, and
GraberRoberts, LLC. The plaintiff claims that the court
abused its discretion in denying her motion to open
and set aside the judgment of nonsuit on the grounds
that the court erred in finding that she failed to show
that a good cause of action existed at the time of the
judgment of nonsuit and that she was prevented by
mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prose-
cuting the action. We affirm the judgment of the court.
   The following undisputed factual and procedural his-
tory is relevant to our review of the plaintiff’s claims
on appeal. On June 1, 2020, the plaintiff, who was then
self-represented, commenced this action against the
defendants, alleging legal malpractice, reckless misrep-
resentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation
of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General
Statutes § 42-110a et seq., stemming from the defen-
dants’ representation of her in her prior marital dissolu-
tion action. On September 8, 2020, the defendants
served on the plaintiff a set of interrogatories and
requests for production. On September 15, 2020, the
defendants filed a request to revise, to which the plain-
tiff did not respond. On October 19, 2020, the defendants
filed a motion for nonsuit based on the plaintiff’s failure
to respond to their request to revise. On November 12,
2020, the defendants filed another motion for nonsuit
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to respond to
the defendants’ September 8, 2020 interrogatories and
requests for production. The defendants’ motions were
scheduled for a hearing on December 23, 2020. On
December 21, 2020, Attorney Brian Mead filed an
appearance on behalf of the plaintiff, and, on December
22, 2020, the plaintiff, through Mead, requested a thirty
day continuance, until January 23, 2021, to respond
to the defendants’ request to revise and outstanding dis-
covery requests. The court, Auger, J., granted the plain-
tiff’s request.
   On February 23, 2021, the defendants again moved
for a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff for ‘‘her
failure to file a revised complaint within the time permit-
ted by Practice Book § 10-37 and for her failure to
respond to discovery within the requirements of Prac-
tice Book § 13-6 et seq.’’ The plaintiff did not file an
objection. On March 12, 2021, the defendants filed a
proposed scheduling order, noting that the defendants’
counsel could not reach the plaintiff’s counsel. On
March 25, 2021, the court, Lynch, J., issued an order
in response to the February 23, 2021 motion for nonsuit,
providing that, ‘‘[w]ithin thirty days after the issuance
of this order, the plaintiff shall file a revised complaint
and responses to the defendants’ interrogatories and
requests for production. If the defendants do not receive
compliance by that date, they may file a motion for a
judgment of nonsuit referring to this order. Absent the
filing of a revised complaint and proof of compliance
with outstanding discovery on file before the motion
appears on this short calendar, the motion may be
granted by the court and judgment may enter.’’
   On April 23, 2021, the plaintiff filed a revised com-
plaint but did not file a notice of compliance with dis-
covery. On May 24, 2021, the defendants filed another
motion for a judgment of nonsuit for failure to respond
to discovery pursuant to the court’s March 25, 2021
order. The defendants attached exhibits and an affidavit
in support of the motion. On June 1, 2021, the plaintiff
filed a notice of compliance with discovery, which the
defendants asserted was deficient.
   On July 9, 2021, the defendants filed a motion to
strike counts two, three, and four of the revised com-
plaint.1 The plaintiff did not respond.
   On July 22, 2021, the defendants filed yet another
motion for a judgment of nonsuit for failure to fully
respond to discovery pursuant to the court’s March 25,
2021 order. The motion alleged that the responses to
the outstanding discovery request, due on April 24, 2021,
and sent by the plaintiff on May 25, 2021, were substan-
tially deficient. The plaintiff did not file an objection
to the defendants’ motion. On August 23, 2021, the court,
Lynch, J., granted the defendants’ July 22, 2021 motion
and rendered a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff.
    On September 13, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion
to open and set aside the judgment of nonsuit, which
is the subject of this appeal, asserting that there was
a bona fide reason for her failure to respond to the
defendants’ discovery requests.2 On September 22, 2021,
the defendants filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion
to open the judgment of nonsuit, arguing that the plain-
tiff could not establish that a good cause of action
existed at the time the nonsuit was rendered or that
she was prevented from prosecuting the action due to
mistake, accident or other reasonable cause as required
by General Statutes § 52-212. The defendants argued,
inter alia, that the plaintiff could not establish a good
cause of action because her claims against the defen-
dants were filed beyond the applicable three year stat-
ute of limitations. The defendants also noted that the
plaintiff continues to be in noncompliance with the
court’s March 25, 2021 discovery order. The following
day, the plaintiff’s counsel filed an affidavit in support
of the motion to open the judgment of nonsuit. The
affidavit substantially mirrored the plaintiff’s motion to
open the judgment of nonsuit and concluded by stating,
‘‘[i]t is counsel’s contention that the plaintiff has good
cause under multiple counts.’’
   On January 10, 2022, the court, J. Fischer, J., held a
hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment
of nonsuit. At the hearing, Mead reiterated the reasons
stated in the plaintiff’s motion to open for her noncom-
pliance with the court’s March 25, 2021 order and
asserted that the plaintiff ‘‘has a viable case and viable
claims . . . .’’ In response to the defendants’ con-
tention that the plaintiff’s claims were filed beyond the
statute of limitations, Mead disagreed, asserting for the
first time that Governor Ned Lamont’s Executive Order
No. 7G, which was issued on March 19, 2020, extended
all statutes of limitations.3 The court, ruling from the
bench, denied the plaintiff’s motion to open. The court
first noted that the motion to open filed by the plaintiff
did not contain an assertion that there was a good cause
of action. The court concluded that, ‘‘under the totality
of the circumstances, there’s no good cause here for
this. . . . I haven’t had one affidavit, one bill, one thing
that supports what you’ve said, Counsel. So, based on
the totality of the circumstances, the fact that there’s,
you know, no argument about—no argument presented
to the court until this moment about the good cause of
action—and there have been four earlier motions for
nonsuit—the court finds that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the motion should be denied.’’ This appeal
followed.
   On March 24, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for
articulation asking the trial court to articulate the legal
and factual basis ‘‘of there was no good cause found’’
and ‘‘of the totality of the circumstances which supports
the court’s decision.’’ The motion was sent in error to
Judge Lynch, who issued an articulation on April 14,
2022, that related to her August 23, 2021 order rendering
the judgment of nonsuit. The plaintiff subsequently filed
a motion for review with this court, asking that the
‘‘articulation rendered by Judge Lynch be vacated and
removed from both the Appellate and Superior Court
records.’’ This court granted review and ordered Judge
Fischer to articulate the basis of his decision denying
the plaintiff’s motion to open4 but denied the plaintiff’s
request to vacate the April 14, 2022 articulation issued
by Judge Lynch.
   On June 16, 2022, the court, J. Fischer, J., issued a
written articulation of its decision denying the motion
to open. The articulation explained that the court found
that ‘‘the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment did
not set forth any showing that [she] had a good cause of
action, which was mentioned only later in the plaintiff’s
affidavit5—which came after the defendant[s] raised
that issue in [their] objection. It consists only of a bald
statement that the plaintiff ‘has good cause under multi-
ple counts.’ This, considering the pending and unop-
posed motion to strike, leaves doubt about the exis-
tence of said cause of action.’’ (Emphasis in original;
footnote added.) The articulation further explained that
the ‘‘court found no reasonable cause for the plaintiff’s
noncompliance with discovery because the affidavit
sets forth no particularized circumstance as to why
there had not been compliance with the court’s order.
Aside from the period immediately before the court’s
ruling, the affidavit offers only general references to
various medical and other issues of the plaintiff’s coun-
sel without any specific dates, circumstances, or any
other substantiation as to what kept him from fully
complying with the order since March 25, 2021. As such,
it lacks any ‘particularities’ as required by Practice Book
§ 17-43 and this court found it to be entirely unpersua-
sive, especially in the context of the history of noncom-
pliance with the court’s explicit order.’’
   The plaintiff appeals from the denial of the motion
to open the judgment of nonsuit. ‘‘In ruling on a motion
to open a judgment of nonsuit, the trial court must
exercise sound judicial discretion, which will not be
disturbed on appeal unless there was an abuse of discre-
tion. . . . In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of its
discretion, we make every presumption in favor of its
action. . . . [When a] plaintiff [does] not appeal from
the [underlying] judgment of nonsuit . . . [he or] she
is . . . limited to challenging the court’s exercise of
discretion in denying the motion to open.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v.
CIT Bank, N.A., 219 Conn. App. 139, 146–47, 293 A.3d
984 (2023).
   ‘‘The power of a court to set aside a judgment of
nonsuit is conferred by . . . § 52-212, which provides
in relevant part: ‘(a) Any judgment rendered or decree
passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court
may be set aside, within four months following the date
on which the notice of judgment or decree was sent,
and the case reinstated on the docket, on such terms
in respect to costs as the court deems reasonable, upon
the complaint or written motion of any party or person
prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that
a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part
existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment
or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or
defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other
reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making
the defense. . . .’ ’’ Id., 146. Practice Book § 17-43 sub-
stantially mirrors the language of § 52-212 (a).6 In
essence, ‘‘ ‘[t]here is a two-pronged test for setting aside
a judgment rendered after a nonsuit. . . . There must
be a showing (1) that a good cause of action, the nature
of which must be set forth, existed at the time judgment
was rendered, and (2) that the plaintiff was prevented
from prosecuting the action because of mistake, acci-
dent or other reasonable cause.’ . . . ‘Since the con-
junctive ‘‘and’’ meaning ‘‘in addition to’’ is employed
between the parts of the two prong test, both [prongs]
must be met.’ ’’ (Citations omitted.) Estela v. Bristol
Hospital, Inc., 165 Conn. App. 100, 108, 138 A.3d 1042,
cert. denied, 323 Conn. 904, 150 A.3d 681 (2016). With
these principles in mind, we turn to the plaintiff’s argu-
ments in support of her claim that Judge Fischer abused
his discretion in denying her motion to open the judg-
ment of nonsuit.7
   On appeal, the plaintiff makes several arguments
challenging the court’s finding, under the second prong
of the test of § 52-212 and Practice Book § 17-43, that
there was no reasonable cause for her noncompliance
with discovery. First, the plaintiff argues that the exis-
tence of ‘‘circumstances beyond her control’’ consti-
tutes reasonable cause for her failure to comply with
discovery. This argument is unavailing. The court never
made a finding that the plaintiff’s reasons for failing to
prosecute were insufficient to constitute reasonable
cause. Instead, it concluded that the plaintiff had not
adequately substantiated her proffered reasons, finding
that ‘‘the affidavit offers only general references to vari-
ous medical and other issues . . . without any specific
dates, circumstances, or any other substantiation . . . .
As such, it lacks any ‘particularities’ as required by
Practice Book § 17-43 . . . .’’ The court’s conclusion
is consistent with prior decisions of this court. See, e.g.,
Farren v. Farren, 162 Conn. App. 51, 63, 131 A.3d 253
(2015) (‘‘[w]e will not require the court to accept an
unauthenticated document that . . . may be based
entirely on self-reported statements by the party moving
to open the default judgment’’), cert. denied, 320 Conn.
933, 134 A.3d 622, and cert. denied, 320 Conn. 933, 134
A.3d 623, cert. denied, 580 U.S. 917, 137 S. Ct. 296, 196
L. Ed. 2d 215 (2016); Searles v. Schulman, 58 Conn.
App. 373, 377, 753 A.2d 420 (‘‘[a]lthough the plaintiff in
her motion to open . . . stated that she was unable to
attend the scheduled . . . conference because of out
of state medical ‘appointments,’ there is nothing in the
record verifying the appointments or indicating why
these appointments could not be rescheduled’’), cert.
denied, 254 Conn. 930, 761 A.2d 755 (2000). Because
the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient substantiation
that her proffered reasons were connected to her repeated
failures to meet the court set deadlines, her argument
is unavailing.
   The plaintiff also challenges the court’s finding that
she did not adequately substantiate her reasons for
noncompliance with discovery as an improper applica-
tion of the law. In Judge Fischer’s articulation, he
explained that the ‘‘court found no reasonable cause
for the plaintiff’s noncompliance with discovery because
the affidavit sets forth no particularized circumstance
as to why there had not been compliance with the
court’s order.’’ The plaintiff contends that the court’s
use of the phrase ‘‘particularized circumstance’’ reflects
a misapplication of the law because Practice Book § 17-
43 requires an affidavit to set forth particularized cir-
cumstances only if the plaintiff failed to appear.8 The
plaintiff contends that, because she was nonsuited for
her failure to comply with discovery—not for failure
to appear—she was not required to set forth with partic-
ularity her reasons for failing to comply with discovery.
The plaintiff has cited no legal authority, nor are we
aware of any, that stands for the proposition that a
court may not, in ruling on a motion to set aside a
judgment of nonsuit for failure to comply with discov-
ery, require a specific explanation as to the reason for
the delinquent party’s noncompliance. Such an explana-
tion is essential to sustaining one’s burden of demon-
strating reasonable cause for noncompliance. Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff’s argument fails. See Baris v.
Southbend, Inc., 68 Conn. App. 546, 554, 791 A.2d 713
(2002) (affirming trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion
to open judgment of nonsuit rendered due to plaintiff’s
failure to answer discovery request because he had
‘‘ignored his obligation to present his reason for the
delay with any degree of particularity’’).
   In light of the court’s finding that the plaintiff did not
meet her burden of showing reasonable cause and the
plaintiff’s unconvincing arguments to the contrary, the
court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff failed
to establish reasonable cause for her noncompliance
with discovery under the second prong of the test of
§ 52-212 (a) and Practice Book § 17-43. Because the
failure of the plaintiff to meet either prong is fatal to
her motion to open; Karanda v. Bradford, 210 Conn.
App. 703, 714, 270 A.3d 743 (2022); we need not address
the plaintiff’s arguments as to the first prong. For the
foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to
open and set aside the judgment of nonsuit.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
    Counts two, three, and four of the revised complaint alleged reckless
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, respectively.
  2
    The motion states in relevant part: ‘‘[T]here exists a bona fide reason the
plaintiff’s counsel was unable to respond to the defendants’ requests. . . .
  ‘‘In support of the plaintiff’s request [to set aside the judgment of nonsuit],
counsel offers the following information. Over the past two months, the
undersigned counsel [has] had numerous medical and dental appointments
which have prohibited counsel from responding to the defendants’ motion
for nonsuit. The appointments have resulted in oral surgery, colonoscopy,
and removal of several precancerous lesions and [counsel] is scheduled for
an orthopedic appointment on . . . [September] 17, 2021, to address a torn
tendon in counsel’s left (dominant) hand. In addition to the medical prob-
lems, two weeks prior to the motion, counsel discovered that his family’s
nine and one-half year old German Shepherd had developed degenerative
myelopathy and anaplasmosis. The [animal] required several trips to the
veterinary and continues to require treatment. Due to [the dog’s] size, coun-
sel’s wife needs counsel’s assistance to transport the animal to the veterinary
hospital. In addition . . . the hurricane took out the power . . . for three
days immediately prior to the motion being heard . . . .
  ‘‘The defendant[s] would not be prejudiced by reopening the dismissal
due to the fact the [defendants have] recently filed a motion to strike and
a second set of interrogatories.
  ‘‘Wherefore the undersigned counsel respectfully requests that the court
set aside the nonsuit and provide counsel with forty-five days to answer or
object to said interrogatories and request for production and respond to
the defendants’ motion to strike.’’
  3
    Although, at the hearing, Mead referenced ‘‘Executive Order No. 8,’’
the plaintiff’s appellate brief clarifies that the correct executive order is
Executive Order No. 7G.
   4
     Specifically, this court ordered Judge Fischer ‘‘to articulate the factual
and legal basis of [his] January 20, 2022 decision denying the plaintiff’s
motion to open and set aside the judgment of nonsuit, with particular refer-
ence to: (1) whether the court considered the affidavit filed by the plaintiff’s
counsel on September 23, 2021, in reaching its decision; and (2) whether
the court reached the second prong of the test to open nonsuit judgments,
i.e., that the plaintiff’s noncompliance with discovery was due to a reason-
able cause.’’
   5
     The court clarified in its articulation that it ‘‘review[ed] the plaintiff[’s]
counsel’s affidavit and it was considered in this court’s decision.’’
   6
     Practice Book § 17-43 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any judgment ren-
dered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside within
four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent, and the case
reinstated on the docket on such terms in respect to costs as the judicial
authority deems reasonable, upon the written motion of any party or person
prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action
or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of such
judgment or the passage of such decree, and that the plaintiff or the defen-
dant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from
prosecuting or appearing to make the same. Such written motion shall be
verified by the oath of the complainant or the complainant’s attorney, shall
state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly
set forth the reason why the plaintiff or the defendant failed to appear. The
judicial authority shall order reasonable notice of the pendency of such
written motion to be given to the adverse party, and may enjoin that party
against enforcing such judgment or decree until the decision upon such
written motion. . . .’’
   7
     The plaintiff, in her appellate brief, also claims (1) that her failure to
file timely objections and responses to the defendants’ first two motions
for nonsuit is moot because Governor Lamont’s Executive Order No. 7G
suspended statutes of limitations with regard to malpractice actions and
court filing deadlines at that time; (2) that this court erred in sending the
plaintiff’s motion for articulation to Judge Lynch instead of Judge Fischer;
and (3) that the court, Lynch, J., abused its discretion in granting the
defendants’ motion for nonsuit. These claims merit little discussion.
   First, as to the effect of Executive Order No. 7G in the present case, the
plaintiff argues that her reasons for failing to timely respond to the defen-
dants’ first two motions for nonsuit are moot because the governor’s Execu-
tive Order No. 7G excused her from responding during that period. Even if
the plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first two motions for nonsuit was
excused under Executive Order No. 7G, which expired on March 1, 2021;
see Executive Order No. 10A, § 5 (February 8, 2021); the plaintiff still needed
to establish reasonable cause for failing to comply with the court’s later
March 25, 2021 order directing her to file responses to the defendants’
interrogatories and requests for production. In other words, whether Execu-
tive Order No. 7G excused the plaintiff’s failure to respond to the defendants’
first two motions for nonsuit has no bearing on the court’s denial of her
motion to open because the plaintiff does not argue that Executive Order
No. 7G excused her failure to comply with the court’s March 25, 2021 order.
   As to the plaintiff’s second claim, that this court erred in sending the
plaintiff’s motion for articulation to Judge Lynch instead of Judge Fischer,
she specifically argues that this court’s ‘‘decision not to strike Judge Lynch’s
articulation from the trial court record is in essence [improperly] adding to
the record’’ and ‘‘effectively changes [Judge Fischer’s] reasoning in the
decision.’’ The plaintiff’s argument is belied by a review of Judge Lynch’s
articulation, which simply sets forth the plaintiff’s history of noncompliance
with the defendants’ discovery requests, a history that is readily gleaned
from a review of the trial court file. The plaintiff’s argument is further belied
by Judge Fischer’s articulation, which expressly addresses the articulation
request filed by the plaintiff as to Judge Fischer’s order denying the motion
to open, and the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy her burden under § 52-212.
Because it is clear from the record that Judge Lynch’s articulation had no
impact on Judge Fischer’s articulation, the plaintiff’s contention that this
court’s failure to strike it from the record constituted an improper addition
of information is unavailing.
   Finally, we note that the plaintiff’s attorney expressly abandoned the
plaintiff’s third claim, that Judge Lynch abused her discretion in granting
the defendants’ motion for nonsuit, at oral argument before this court.
Specifically, the plaintiff’s counsel stated that the plaintiff did not raise a
claim on appeal challenging Judge Lynch’s ruling. He clarified that the
plaintiff ‘‘raised . . . strictly the motion to open before Judge Fischer.’’ We
therefore decline to consider the plaintiff’s briefed arguments in support of
this abandoned claim, including her argument that the May 24, 2021 motion
for nonsuit was never heard and was thus effectively denied. We also decline
to review the plaintiff’s contention that this matter should have been resolved
by ‘‘a discovery dispute hearing’’ instead of by a judgment of nonsuit.
Although she raises this argument in support of her claim that Judge Fischer
abused his discretion in denying her motion to open, it instead supports a
challenge to the judgment of nonsuit. See Francis v. CIT Bank, N.A., supra,
219 Conn. App. 146–47 (‘‘[i]n the present case, the plaintiff did not appeal
from the judgment of nonsuit, and, thus, she is presently limited to challeng-
ing the court’s exercise of discretion in denying the motion to open’’).
   8
     General Statutes § 52-212 (c) provides that ‘‘[t]he complaint or written
motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or his attorney, shall
state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly
set forth the reason why the plaintiff or defendant failed to appear.’’ Practice
Book § 17-43 (a) mirrors this language.