Court Opinion

ID: 7812953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:14:55.012947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:28:30.782142
License: Public Domain

McCulloch, C. J., (dissenting). I am unable to agree with the conclusions of law announced by the majority, that the testimony of certain witnesses introduced by appellants tending to prove the statements of the donor, Jones, after the consummation of the alleged gift, was admissible. It is elemental in the law of evidence that the declarations of a party to a sale or gift or other transfer of property, made after its consummation, tending to impair vested rights under such transfer, are, with certain exceptions which I do not think apply to the present case, inadmissible. It is unnecessary to cite authorities in support of that proposition, for the principle is clearly announced in the very decision on which the majority rely. Cox v. Vise, 50 Ark. 283. The exception to the rule found in that case does not apply to the present one, for that was a contest between the assignee and the creditors of an alleged frandnlent grantor concerning the validity of the assignment. Creditors of a fraudulent grantor do not, after the grant, stand in privity with the grantor, but their relation is a hostile one, and they have the right to prove, as long as there exists a conspiracy between the fraudulent grantor and his grantee, declarations of the former tending to impeach the good faith of the transaction. In the present case, however, appellants are heirs of the donor, Jones, and do not stand in- any such relation, for they can assert only such rights as Jones himself could have asserted if alive. If Jones were alive and was suing for the recovery of the personal property involved in this controversy on the ground that it wias a bailment and not a gift, it would scarcely be contended that proof of his own declaration after the consummation of the gift would be competent evidence against his alleged donee. Since it is seen that appellant stands in no better attitude that Jones himself would have stood* it necessarily follows that this testimony was not competent. This testimony is conceded to be important, and is considered by the court as turning the scales in favor of appellants. Without this testimony in the case, I am clearly of the . opinion that the weight of the evidence is not against the finding of the chancellor on the issues of fact, but that the preponderance is clearly in favor of the chancellor’s finding. The letter of Jones to appellee, dated June 16, is not without some force as tending to show that the money was turned over to appellee pursuant to a plan to defraud Jones ’ creditors, but whatever appears froin the recitals of that letter tending in that direction is entirely overcome by the other testimony as to subsequent declarations of Jones, clearly manifesting his intention to make a gift to appellee, rather than a mere bailment for the purpose of hiding the property from creditors. Whatever may have occurred theretofore, the written declarations of Jones in his sworn statement, dated August 26, 1922, evidences in the most solemn manner his intention to make an absolute gift to appellee of the property in controversy. My conclusion therefore is that the decree should be affirmed, and I am authorized by Mr. Justice Hart to say that he shares the views here expressed.