Court Opinion

ID: 9398220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 16:10:28.870232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.655343
License: Public Domain

J-S16006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    VICTOR SIMMONS                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1797 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 21, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-23-CR-0007266-2016

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                  FILED MAY 30, 2023

       Appellant, Victor Simmons, appeals pro se from the June 21, 2022 order

entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas denying his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.

§§ 9541-46. After careful review, we affirm.1

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On November

10, 2016, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count each of

Robbery—Threatening Immediate Serious Injury, Possession of an Instrument

of Crime, Terroristic Threats, Theft by Unlawful Taking, Harassment,

____________________________________________

1 In light of our disposition, we deny Appellant’s February 24, 2023 “Motion
for Relief to Preserve Discovered Facts,” March 13, 2023 “Motion for Relief to
Add Newly Discovered Facts to this Appeal,” April 27, 2023 “Motion for Relief,”
May 2, 2023 “Motion of Relief to Add Ineffective Assistance from Newly
Discovered Fact from Sentencing 9714 D Violation,” and May 17, 2023 “Motion
of Relief to Disqualify Prior Record Based on Gideon v. Wainwright Violation.”
J-S16006-23

Disorderly Conduct, and Receiving Stolen Property in connection with his

robbery of a Wells Fargo Bank in Lansdowne, Delaware County.

        Appellant waived his preliminary hearing and his jury trial commenced

on January 8, 2019.

        Immediately prior to the commencement of jury selection, Appellant

informed the court that he wished to represent himself and completed a

colloquy and waiver of counsel to that effect.2 The court ordered Appellant’s

appointed counsel, Robert A. Turco, Esquire, to act as stand-by counsel.

Appellant proceeded to conduct jury selection, after which he withdrew his

request to represent himself and the court ordered Attorney Turco to

represent Appellant for the remainder of trial.3 Following the three-day trial,

the jury convicted Appellant of one count of Robbery—Threatening Serious

Bodily Injury with respect to one victim, James Carr.

        On March 4, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory

minimum sentence of 10 to 20 years of incarceration.4 On July 31, 2020, this

Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence,5 and on May 10, 2021, the
____________________________________________

2   N.T. Trial, 1/8/19, at 12-30.

3   N.T. Trial, 1/9/19, at 8.

4The court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9714 because Appellant had a prior conviction of a crime of violence.

5  Relevant to the instant appeal, we affirmed Appellant’s judgment after
finding meritless his claims that: (1) he was prejudiced when the trial court
permitted the Commonwealth to amend the criminal information to add the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, No. 800 EDA 2019, 2020 WL

4383666 (Pa Super. filed July 31, 2020) (non-precedential decision), appeal

denied, 253 A.3d 216 (Pa. 2021). Appellant did not seek further review of his

judgment of sentence.

       On June 8, 2021, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA petition raising

claims pertaining to his preliminary hearing waiver, alleged defects in, and the

Commonwealth’s amendment of, the criminal information, and his counsel’s

alleged ineffectiveness, including, inter alia, counsel’s failure to file a motion

to restore Appellant’s right to a preliminary hearing.6         On June 23, 2021,

August    12,    2021,    and    August    13,   2021,   Appellant   filed   a   “PCRA

Supplementary Amendment,” an “Amended Motion for Relief under the

____________________________________________

victim’s name or to conform to the evidence; (2) the trial court abused its
discretion permitting the amendments; (3) he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his preliminary hearing; and (4) his sentence of 10 to 20
years of incarceration, based on his status as a second strike offender, is
illegal. Commonwealth v. Simmons, No. 800 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 4383666
at *1 (Pa. Super. filed July 31, 2020) (non-precedential decision).

6 Because this was Appellant’s first PCRA petition, the PCRA court appointed
counsel. However, shortly thereafter, Appellant pro se filed a motion to
proceed pro se and for a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier,
713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). On August 3, 2021, the PCRA court held a hearing
after which it granted Appellant’s motion to proceed pro se. See N.T., 8/3/21,
at 6.

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[PCRA],” and a “Supplemental Amend[ed] Motion for Relief Under [the

PCRA,]” respectively.7

       On October 5, 2021, the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss

Appellant’s PCRA petition as meritless without a hearing pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On October 22, 2021, Appellant filed a response to the

court’s Rule 907 notice.

       On June 21, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as

meritless. This timely pro se appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       In his pro se brief, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Did the Commonwealth violate [] Appellant[’]s right to due
          process by breaching the negotiated waiver of [] Appellant[’]s
          preliminary hearing and changing the description of the
          robbery charge from a threatens immediate bodily injury to one
          that threatens serious bodily injury[?]

       2. Did the Commonwealth breach the terms of the negotiated
          waiver and violate [] Appellant[’]s right to due process by
          adding James Carr to the robbery count after the negotiated
          waiver of the preliminary hearing[?]

       3. Is the sentence illegal, the trial court did not have before it the
          allege[d] prior conviction or provide the record with the
          allege[d] prior conviction as required by [42 Pa.C.S. §]
          9714[(d)?]

____________________________________________

7 Appellant also filed on August 13, 2021, a “Motion to Except Amendments
and Supplemental Amendment that were Filed.” Although the court did not
expressly grant Appellant’s request for leave to file any amended petitions, in
its Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, the PCRA court indicated that it considered the
three above-listed amendments prior to determining that Appellant’s claims
lacked merit.

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       4. Was counsel ineffective for not objecting to the incorrect
          instruction by the trial court reg[]arding the victims on the
          single count of robbery and for counsel providing erroneous
          information in his closing argument to the jury reg[]arding the
          victims on the single count of robbery[?]

       5. Was counsel ineffective for not enforcing the negotiated
          agreement from the preliminary hearing or filing a petition to
          have [] Appellant[’]s preliminary rights restored[?]

       6. Was trial counsel ineffective for not having the jur[]or number
          8 removed or requesting a mistrial, the jur[]or was seen at the
          bank moments before the robbery on the security video the
          Commonwealth presented for trial[?]

       7. Did the PCRA court err[] in law and abuse his discretion when
          he denied [] Appellant[’]s PCRA [petition] because he thought
          that [] Appellant had represented himself at trial and []
          Appellant has shown that he rescinded his desire to proceed
          pro se before the trial started[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 13-14 (unpaginated).8

                                               A.

       We review the denial of a PCRA Petition to determine whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is otherwise free of

legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). This

Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if they are
____________________________________________

8 Although Appellant has included 7 issues in his statement of questions, our
review of his pro se Brief indicates that it does not include any argument
corresponding with his sixth and seventh issues in violation of Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (requiring that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts
as there are questions to be argued.”). Accordingly, we will not consider
Appellant’s sixth and seventh issues. Furthermore, Appellant’s Brief includes
a section of argument concerning the constitutionality of 18 Pa.C.S. §
3701(a)(ii); however, Appellant did not include this issue in his statement of
questions involved in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (explaining that “[n]o
question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions
involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”). We, likewise, will not consider this
argument.

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supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.

Super. 2007).      “We give no such deference, however, to the court’s legal

conclusions.”   Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super.

2017).

      To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish that

his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors

or defects found in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2): a constitutional violation;

ineffective assistance of counsel; an unlawfully induced plea; improper

obstruction by governmental officials; a case where exculpatory evidence has

been discovered; an illegal sentence has been imposed; or the tribunal

conducting   the    proceeding lacked jurisdiction.     See    42   Pa.C.S. §§

9543(a)(2)(i)-(viii). In addition, a petitioner must establish that the issues

raised in the PCRA petition have not been previously litigated or waived, and

that “the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial, during unitary

review or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational,

strategic or tactical decision by counsel.” Id. at § 9543(a)(3), (a)(4). See

also id. at § 9544 (relating to previous litigation and waiver).

                                      B.

      In his first two issues, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth

violated the terms of his negotiated waiver of his preliminary hearing and his

due process rights by amending the criminal information to include the

appropriate subsection of robbery and the victim’s name. Appellant’s Brief at

16-18, 57 (unpaginated).

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       In its opinion, the PCRA court explained that Appellant previously

litigated both of these issues. See PCRA Ct. Op, 11/15/22, at 4 (noting that

Appellant raised issues on direct appeal challenging the Commonwealth’s

amendment of the criminal information and the Commonwealth’s alleged

“breach of terms of agreement”). Following our review of the certified record,

we agree. As noted above, a prior panel of this court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence after concluding, inter alia, that the Commonwealth’s

amendment of the criminal information to add the victim’s name and change

the robbery subsection to conform to the evidence did not prejudice Appellant.

Simmons, 2020 WL 4383666 at *1. Because Appellant previously litigated

these issues, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant is

not entitled to relief on these claims.

       In his third issue, Appellant claims that his mandatory minimum

sentence is illegal because the trial court did not have proof at sentencing that

Appellant had committed a prior crime of violence. Appellant’s Brief at 80

(unpaginated). Appellant also raised this issue on direct appeal, and this Court

found that it lacked merit. See id. at *2 (“Appellant’s sentence of 120 to 240

months’ imprisonment, based on his status as a second-strike offender, is not

illegal.”).9 He is, likewise, ineligible for relief on this claim.

____________________________________________

9 Moreover, even if Appellant had not previously litigated this issue, it would
fail. The Notes of Testimony from Appellant’s sentencing hearing reflect that
the Commonwealth provided a copy of the certified conviction which
constituted Appellant’s first crime of violence to the court, stating “this is a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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                                               C.

       In his fourth issue, Appellant asserts that his counsel was ineffective for

not objecting when the trial court provided the jury with an allegedly

erroneous instruction. Appellant’s Brief at 49 (unpaginated). Appellant claims

that the court’s instruction was erroneous because “there were 2 victims on

this single count of robbery and the [t]rial [c]ourt should have explained to

the jury that in[]order to be guilty of this crime [Appellant] would have had

to have threatened both victims [in] the same manner.” Id. Appellant avers

that counsel was also ineffective for repeating this error in his closing

argument when he stated that the jury “need[s] to make sure that you believe

he put these people or one of these people in fear of [s]erious [b]odily

[i]njury.” Id. Appellant baldly claims that these alleged errors have arguable

merit, that counsel had no reasonable basis for his conduct, and that had

these errors not occurred the jury would not have convicted him. Id. He

asserts that he was prejudiced by the “wrong instruction” and the “wrong

closing argument” because it confused the jury and led to his conviction

“based on this misinformation.” Id. at 49-50

____________________________________________

certified criminal history from Allentown, from Lehigh County and this is just
confirming that [Appellant] was previously convicted of a qualifying crime of
violence. The original signatures and seals are on this document. Defense
does have a copy.” N.T., 3/4/19, at 4-5. Furthermore, the sentencing court
also noted that Appellant’s pre-sentence investigation report reflected a prior
conviction of a crime of violence. It is, thus, evident from the record that the
trial court had a copy of Appellant’s prior conviction at the time of sentencing.

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      Preliminarily, we observe that counsel is presumed to be effective and

the petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 236 A.3d 63, 68 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc). To do so, he must

establish the following three elements:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the
      petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with
      prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability
      that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Id. Failure to prove any of the three elements will result in dismissal of the

ineffectiveness claim. Id. In addition, “counsel cannot be deemed ineffective

for failing to raise a meritless issue.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 861 A.2d

919, 932 (Pa. 2004).

      Here the trial court instructed the jury on the offense of Robbery—

Threatens Serious Bodily Injury, in relevant part, as follows:

      To find [Appellant] guilty of this [offense], you must find that the
      following two elements have been proven beyond a reasonable
      doubt. First that [Appellant] threatened the victim with serious
      bodily injury of intentionally put the victim in fear of immediate
      serious bodily injury. Second that [Appellant] did this during the
      course of committing a theft.

N.T., 1/9/19, at 212.

      This instruction comports with the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard

Criminal Jury Instruction for this offense. See Pa.S.S.J.I.(Crim). 15.3701A

(2019). Because the trial court provided an accurate charge, any objection to

it by Appellant’s counsel would have been meritless. Accordingly, the record

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supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that counsel was not ineffective for not

objecting to the court’s accurate instruction to the jury.

      We further agree with the PCRA court that trial counsel was not

ineffective when he stated in his closing argument that the jury needed to find

that Appellant put at least one of the victims in fear of serious bodily injury in

order to convict Appellant of that offense. This was an accurate statement of

law and Appellant has, thus, failed to prove that this ineffective assistance of

counsel claim has merit.

      In his final issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in finding

that his counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to enforce the

“negotiated agreement from [] Appellant’s preliminary hearing” or to restore

Appellant’s preliminary hearing rights. Appellant’s Brief at 32-34.

      The certified record indicates that, at the preliminary hearing the

Commonwealth explained to the court that it had agreed to withdraw the

Receiving Stolen Property charge and Appellant had agreed to waive his right

to the preliminary hearing “in a non-trial disposition.” N.T., 11/17/16, at 3.

At that time, Appellant admitted that he “did the crime.”              Id. at 6.

Subsequently, however, Appellant elected to proceed to trial on the charges,

which, notably, did not include the Receiving Stolen Property charge the

Commonwealth had withdrawn. Accordingly, there is no basis for Appellant’s

assertion that the Commonwealth violated the terms of the “negotiated

agreement.” Thus, any motion that counsel would have filed to enforce the

“negotiated agreement” would have lacked merit. We, therefore, agree with

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the PCRA court that counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to

enforce the “negotiated agreement.”

      With respect to Appellant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion to restore his right to a preliminary hearing, we observe

that, on direct appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed the trial court’s finding

that Appellant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to the

preliminary hearing. Simmons, 2020 WL 4383666 at *2. Moreover, beyond

baldly claiming that counsel’s conduct prejudiced him, Appellant has not

demonstrated that had a preliminary hearing occurred, this case would have

likely had a different outcome. This claim, therefore, also lacks merit.

                                       D.

      In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that Appellant had either previously litigated the claims raised in his

PCRA petition or that they lacked merit.      Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA

court’s order dismissing Appellant PCRA petition as meritless.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/30/2023

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