Court Opinion

ID: 9480000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:35:02.969374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:25.279604
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I am fully in agreement with the scholarly opinion of Judge Vance. I write separately because I believe the trial court erred in failing to address the defendants' assertion of qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiff's claim that he was deprived of a liberty interest in his reputation without due process. Had the trial court addressed this defense or had the defendants asserted on appeal that its failure to do so was error, I believe we would have had jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
In Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court established the standard by which courts must analyze assertions of qualified immunity. 472 U.S. 511, 527-28, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816-17, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The Court held that in evaluating claims of immunity a reviewing court
need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions....
Id. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816. The Court emphasized "that the appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged (by the plaintiff, or in some cases, the defendant) support a claim of violation of clearly established law." Id. at 528 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. at 2816 n. 9.
This standard for review is no different from that which a district court must follow in evaluating claims of qualified immunity. When a defendant has interposed a qualified immunity defense the district court must determine whether, accepting the plaintiff's allegations of fact as true, the defendant has violated clearly established law. See id.; Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1561 & n. 1 (11th Cir.1988); Goddard v. Urrea, 847 F.2d 765, 769 (11th Cir.1988) (Johnson, J., dissenting). But see Peppers v. Coates, 887 F.2d 1493, 1496-97 & n. 7 (11th Cir.1989) (following approach of majority in Goddard ).1 If a plaintiff's *1395factual allegations fail to establish a violation of clearly established law, then the court must grant the defense of qualified immunity. Conversely, if the facts alleged by the plaintiff establish such a violation, then the court must deny the defendant’s claim of immunity. In either case, the court’s disposition of the qualified immunity claim is ripe for appeal to this court (assuming the other prerequisites for appeal are satisfied) as either a final judgment or as an appealable collateral order under Mitchell as interpreted by the panel opinion in this case.2
Here, the district court erred by not addressing the defendants’ qualified immunity claim. The court noted that plaintiff had alleged facts supporting his claim that he was deprived of a liberty interest in his reputation. Green v. Brantley, 719 F.Supp. 1570, 1576 (N.D.Ga.1989). The judge also determined that the protectable liberty interest was “well settled.” Id. at 1583. Nevertheless, the court declined to pass on the qualified immunity issue because “an issue of fact exists for the jury as to whether the defendants released information that damaged the plaintiff’s reputation prior to his termination.” Id. at 1576.
The defendants’ dispute of the facts alleged by the plaintiff is irrelevant to the disposition of a qualified immunity assertion. The appropriate disposition of this claim would have been to deny summary judgment and deny the assertion of immunity because the court believed that plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to show the violation of clearly established law.
The defendants did not appeal the district court’s treatment of this issue. See Brief for Appellant at 4 n. 3 & 12 n. 10. In fact, they conceded in their brief, as they later did during oral argument, that “the reputational injury aspect of the case is not before the Court in this appeal, and will necessitate further trial proceedings regardless of the outcome of the immunity claims presented here.” Id. at 12 n. 10. Given the failure of the defendants to appeal the district court’s disposition of the reputation claim, I concur in Judge Vance’s opinion for the court.

. Recently, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit adopted the dissenting view expressed by Judge Johnson in Goddard, stating: "factual disputes do not affect qualified immunity analysis since `that analysis assumes the validity of the plaintiff's version of the facts and then examines whether those facts support a claim of violation of clearly established law.'" Horlock v. Georgia Dept. of Human Resources, 890 F.2d 388, 392-93 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Goddard, 847 F.2d at 769 (Johnson, J., dissenting)). Because Horlock conflicts with the panel decisions in Goddard and Peppers, Horlock has been vacated and will be heard by the full court en banc to resolve the divergence of authority in this circuit. Horlock v. Georgia Dept. of Human Resources, 890 F.2d *1395388, at 396 (11th Cir.1990) (order vacating prior panel opinion and determining to hear case en banc).

. This court also lacks jurisdiction of qualified immunity dispositions when the district court denies the immunity claim because it needs substantial additional factual development in order to even assess the claim. Goddard, 847 F.2d at 769, 770; Rich, 841 F.2d at 1561 n. 1; see, e.g., Riley v. Wainwright, 810 F.2d 1006, 1007 (11th Cir.1986).