Court Opinion

ID: 9768920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:56:15.451945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:49.576381
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice, on rehearing. Appellant strenuously contends that if the original opinion is allowed to stand it will seriously interfere with its Primary Road Program. This fact if true has, of course, no binding legal significance, but the assertion does impel us to carefully re-examine the opinion in the light of other suggestions of error. The essence of appellant’s objections appears to be: (1) There is no evidence in the record to sustain the finding that the new highway construction in 1932 or 1933 was along an already existing road or street; (2) If there was such a street there is no evidence to sustain the finding that it was 40 feet wide, and (3) The evidence does not sustain the finding that appellees had no notice of the taking by the Highway Department when the entry was made in 1932 or 1933. A careful re-examination of the record reveals no support for appellant’s contentions. (1) On this point, a re-examination of the record sustains our finding that the 1932 or 1933 road was constructed where a street already existed in the Town of Coal Hill. The opening statement in appellees’ brief on appeal contains this statement: ‘ ‘ The appellees own property adjacent to and fronting upon a street in the incorporated town of Coal Hill, Arkansas. This street was dedicated to public use and was in actual use as a public highway long prior to 1929; its width was 20 feet on each side of the center line, or a total width of 40 feet.” This statement was not contradicted by appellant although the ease was orally argued. (2) Appellant, on rehearing, says: “There is no evidence in the record that there was a forty-foot street.” In the opinion there is this statement: “At this place the Order affected property forty feet on each side of the Centerline, whereas the existing street was approximately only twenty feet wide.” (3) This objection begs the answer to the one fundamental issue of sufficient notice. It is obvious from the entire record that appellees knew appellant was engaged in improving (concreting a strip 18 feet wide) along the existing street, and also that the shoulders were being maintained for a few feet on each side. The essence of the opinion is that this kind of notice, under the facts in this case, was insufficient as to the full extent of the land described in the County Court Order. In the last paragraph of the opinion we stated that it was “based on the facts and circumstances of this ease.” To further emphasize the limited scope of the opinion we here reaffirm that statement, now that the facts and circumstances have been re-examined. Rehearing denied.