Court Opinion

ID: 9463708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:13:51.102813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:14.635980
License: Public Domain

BARRETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
*917The majority opinion recognizes that at the time the hearing was held before the five member school board, Oklahoma law had no provision for a dismissal proceeding before any other body or tribunal. In Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936) we recognized and adopted the so-called “rule of necessity.” We there said:
some of the board [members] had expressed such prejudice, and doubtless all were in fact prejudiced. . From the very necessity of the case has grown the rule that disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises. . Findings of administrative tribunals cannot be overturned as long as it [the result] is reached from a consideration of substantial evidence produced at the hearing. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
83 F.2d, at pp. 356-358.
I would apply the rule laid down in Brinkley in the case before us. We noted in Brinkley that such administrative tribunals as the FTC, the ICC and state Public Service Commissions investigate, file complaints, conduct the hearings on charges preferred and decide the ultimate issues in controversy. We did not find prejudice per se which, in my judgment, is the effect of the majority opinion in this case. Such prejudice and bias has been determined notwithstanding that the three challenged board members, Mayes, Moore and Wade, testified before the district court that their public statements and campaign material critical of Superintendent Staton aimed at his removal from the school system did not prejudice them in the decisional process at or following the hearing. Furthermore, the district court found a lack of prejudice following an evidentiary hearing.
The “rule of necessity” has been invoked in many cases similar to that presented here. These cases stand for the proposition the the type of bias or prejudice attributed to the three board members in this ease is not such as to disqualify them from hearing the matter. See: Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 40 S.Ct. 550, 64 L.Ed. 887 (1920) where the validity of taxing income of judges was heard in that there was no other appellate tribunal available; Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010 (1948); Loughran v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1944); State ex rel. Burns v. City of Livingston, 144 Mont. 248, 395 P.2d 971 (1964).
The majority opinion cites to the recent Hortonville decision rendered by the Supreme Court. Significantly, the Court, in reversing, while not directly discussing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision to “fashion” a remedy involving alleged bias and prejudice on the part of school board members in a hearing involving dismissal of teachers, nevertheless did not lend any comfort or support to the Court’s order that any teacher dissatisfied with the board’s decision could obtain a de novo hearing before a county court on all issues. The Supreme Court impliedly rebuked the Wisconsin court for “fashioning” the remedy referred to by stating (a) that a decision-maker is not disqualified because he has taken a position on a policy issue related to the dispute (and, I submit, the manner of performance by a school superintendent does involve a policy issue insofar as board members are concerned) and (b) that state law vests the government or policy-making function exclusively in the school board; the federal courts must guard against altering the statutory powers of a state created board as a matter of federal due process.
I readily agree that 70 O.S.A. § 6-103, prior to the 1975 amendments, under which the board proceeded in the instant case, lacked both procedural and substantive due process. Even so, in each case we must look to the record in order to ascertain whether, in fact, the complaining party has been provided a fair and adequate notice of charges, a proper opportunity to be heard, to confront witnesses, appear with counsel and — most significantly — whether the board rendered adequate findings of fact (or adequately stated reasons) for its ultimate decision from which state courts could, upon appeal and review, determine *918whether the board’s decision is based on substantial evidence and is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. This, to me, should be the sole concern of the courts. If the respective state legislative bodies determine, as Oklahoma has, to provide substantially more right of review, de novo or otherwise, that is a determination reserved to the states.
My cursory review of applicable statutes in the states of our Circuit indicates that those of Colorado (C.R.S.1973, Art. 63, § 22-63-117), Kansas (K.S.A., 1974 Supp., §§ 72-5436 through 72-5445, L.1974 Ch. 301) and Utah (Utah Code Anno.1953, 1975 Supp., Vol. 5B, §§ 53-51-1 through 53-51-9) likely “pass muster” when measured against the due process commands of the majority opinion in the instant case. However, the same does not appear true for the States of New Mexico and Wyoming. Both statutory arrangements (N.M.S.1953, Anno., 1975 Supp., §§ 77-8-12 through 77-8-17; Wyoming Statutes, 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., Vol. 6, §§ 21.1-151 through 21.1-164) provide for hearings before the school board, with procedural and substantive due process requirements equal to those prescribed under the model Administrative Procedure Act, with full review accorded. The Supreme Courts of both states have held that there is no deprivation of due process, per se, resulting from dismissal proceedings conducted by the very board which through one or more of its members or an agent has (a) given notice of the determination to dismiss before the hearing and (b) submitted a statement of “cause” if a hearing should be requested by the teacher, and thereafter heard and decided the issues presented. Upon a required complete record of the proceedings, the appellate courts examine to determine whether there is substantial evidence in support of the board’s findings and conclusions. If the courts determine that the board acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, the decision is set aside. See: Monahan v. Board of Trustees, etc., County of Fremont, 486 P.2d 235 (Wyo.1971); Wickersham v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 188, 464 P.2d 918 (1970).
In my view the procedure above related provides adequate due process guarantees. Regardless of any pre-hearing bias or prejudice such as that attributed to Mayes, Wade and Moore, the reviewing courts must examine the complete record of the administrative proceedings and determine (a) whether procedural due process was accorded and (b) whether the dismissal was justified on the merits based on substantial evidence. Given the above related due process protections which I believe any person occupying a position such as that of Superintendent Staton is entitled, I would not hesitate to follow and apply the rule we laid down in Brinkley, supra.