Court Opinion

ID: 9956562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 15:20:24.021093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:36.033614
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Ortiz, Friedman and White
              Argued by videoconference

              VAYLENE MICHELLE ARNETT
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 1035-23-3                                     JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ
                                                                                   APRIL 2, 2024
              HENRY-MARTINSVILLE DEPARTMENT
               OF SOCIAL SERVICES

                                     FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY
                                                Marcus A. Brinks, Judge

                               Kimble Reynolds, Jr. (Kimble Reynolds & Associates, on brief), for
                               appellant.

                               Jeremy E. Carroll; Jason S. Eisner, Guardian ad litem for the minor
                               child (Brian H. Richardson; George A.H. Lyle, County Attorney;
                               Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, on brief), for appellee.

                      Vaylene Michelle Arnett (“mother”) appeals the circuit court’s order terminating her

              parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Mother argues that the circuit court erred by finding

              that (1) the termination was in the best interests of the child and (2) the Henry-Martinsville

              Department of Social Services made reasonable and appropriate efforts to help her remedy the

              conditions that led to or required the continuation of the child’s placement in foster care. We find

              no error and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                              BACKGROUND1

        “On appeal, ‘we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case the Department.’” Joyce v. Botetourt Cnty.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 75 Va. App. 690, 695 (2022) (quoting Farrell v. Warren Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 386 (2012)). Though mother is the biological parent of the child who is

the subject of this appeal, in October 2020 the child, then ten years old, lived with her legal

guardian, not mother.2 On October 15, 2020, the child’s guardian petitioned to be relieved of the

child’s custody. In November 2020, the Henry County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District

Court (“JDR court”) awarded temporary custody of the child to mother and ordered the Department

to provide close supervision once a week. The JDR court also ordered mother to cooperate with the

Department’s services and entered a preliminary child protective order.

        The Department offered mother parenting classes and referred her to a parenting coach;

however, mother used the parenting coach “to help her clean her home, drive her to and from

places, and pick her up from work.” As a result of mother using the parenting coach for

transportation and housekeeping, she did not complete her parenting modules. The Department

referred mother for intensive care coordination (“ICC”), but mother met with the worker only once.

The Department also noted concerns about mother’s housing situation, as she struggled to maintain

a “clean” home. Mother allowed a man with a prior felony conviction for distribution of cocaine

near a school to live in her home and called him her “nanny.” The Department also referred mother

to domestic violence services because of reported incidents with her then-boyfriend. Due to

        1
         The record in this case was sealed. “[T]his appeal requires unsealing certain portions to
resolve the issues raised by the parties.” Mintbrook Devs., LLC v. Groundscapes, LLC, 76
Va. App. 279, 283 n.1 (2022). We unseal only the facts mentioned in this opinion; the rest of the
record remains sealed. Id.
        2
            The child’s father is deceased.
                                                  -2-
mother’s “[p]oor choices and lack of progress in services,” the JDR court entered a preliminary

removal order on August 9, 2021, and ordered mother to cooperate with all recommended services

and evaluations.3

        When the child entered foster care, she had not been attending school regularly. Though she

needed to be evaluated for an individual education plan, evaluators were unable to obtain a baseline

because of her regular absences. The child had no physical health concerns but had been diagnosed

with anxiety, borderline intellectual functioning, and attention deficit disorder, requiring medication.

        After the child entered foster care, the Department established requirements that mother

needed to complete before she could be reunited with the child. The Department referred mother

for a psychological evaluation. Mother completed only the first of three necessary appointments

for the psychological evaluation before the JDR court’s permanency planning hearings.

        The Department continued the parent coaching services and ICC and offered mother

supervised weekly visitation, usually at public places to which mother could easily secure

transportation. By December 2022, the Department reduced the frequency of the supervised visits

to bi-weekly at its offices, following an “incident” during visitation at a local restaurant during

which mother “shout[ed] obscenities” at the CASA worker and the child’s foster mother. The

restaurant indicated that mother was “no longer welcomed to have visitation there.”

        In addition, the Department required mother to obtain and maintain stable employment

and housing that was “clean, hazard free, and suitable for children.” The Department found

mother’s home “cluttered, in a state of construction and disrepair, . . . unsafe and unsanitary and

. . . an imminent risk to the [child’s] health and safety.” To assist mother with keeping a clean

house, the Department referred her for a life skills assessment. Between July and December

        3
         The child’s younger sibling initially entered foster care also, but later the Department
placed him with his paternal grandparents; his placement is not before the Court in this appeal.
                                                -3-
2022, mother moved at least three times and was unable to secure suitable housing for the child.

The Department visited mother’s home in Martinsville in May 2022 and discovered that it was

undergoing renovations and had “safety hazards” as a result. Mother subsequently moved to

Danville, but then returned to Martinsville. Mother held various jobs throughout 2022, but never

provided proof of employment to the Department.

        At the first permanency planning hearing, the JDR court found that mother had not

completed the required services and ordered that the foster care goal change from relative

placement/adoption to adoption. The Department subsequently petitioned to terminate mother’s

parental rights. At the second permanency planning hearing on January 4, 2023, the JDR court

found that mother had made “very little progress,” approved the foster care goal of adoption, and

terminated mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed the JDR court’s rulings to the circuit court.

        At the circuit court hearing, the Department presented evidence that “mother was repeatedly

given notice of the need for housing and to complete services.” Mother had completed the

psychological evaluation by the time of the circuit court hearing but objected to its entry into

evidence at the circuit court hearing, so the circuit court did not consider it when ruling.

Acknowledging that mother did not have a car, the Department also noted that mother “routinely

secured rides to visitation and work,” but never requested assistance with transportation for services.

The circuit court heard evidence that mother was living with her purported half-brother, whom she

just met a few months before the hearing “when he saw her walking down the road and offered her

a ride.” The house that they lived in needed repairs. The child was reportedly “thriving” in her

foster care home. After hearing the evidence and arguments, the circuit court terminated mother’s

parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Mother appeals.

                                                  -4-
                                             ANALYSIS

        “On review of a trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights, we

presume the trial court ‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory

requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Joyce, 75

Va. App. at 699 (quoting Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Hardy, 42 Va. App. 546, 552 (2004)).

“Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and

will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Simms v.

Alexandria Dep’t of Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 74 Va. App. 447, 470 (2022) (quoting Fauquier Cnty.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011)).

        Mother challenges the circuit court’s termination of her parental rights. The circuit court

terminated her parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), which authorizes a court to terminate

parental rights if:

                 The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or
                 unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months
                 from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy
                 substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation
                 of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the
                 reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health
                 or other rehabilitative agencies to such end.

“[S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that

created the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated failure of the parent to make

reasonable changes.” Yafi v. Stafford Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 539, 552 (2018)

(alteration in original) (quoting Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 271

(2005)).

        Mother argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the Department had made

reasonable and appropriate efforts to help her remedy the conditions that led to or required the

continuation of the child’s foster care placement. Mother contends that the Department identified

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numerous services that she had to complete, but it “made no effort” to help her in meeting its

requirements. For example, the Department did not help her with transportation to the required

services.

       “A parent’s residual parental rights cannot be terminated ‘[i]n the absence of evidence

indicating that “reasonable and appropriate efforts” were taken by social agencies to remedy the

conditions leading to foster care . . . .’” Joyce, 75 Va. App. at 701 (alterations in original)

(quoting Weaver v. Roanoke Dep’t of Hum. Res., 220 Va. 921, 928-29 (1980)). “‘[R]easonable

and appropriate’ efforts of the Department can only be judged with reference to the

circumstances of a particular case.” Id. (quoting Harrison v. Tazewell Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

42 Va. App. 149, 163 (2004)). The Department “is not required to force its services upon an

unwilling or disinterested parent.” Tackett v. Arlington Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 62 Va. App.

296, 323 (2013).

       The record reflects that the Department offered mother numerous services, including

supervised visits and referrals for a psychological evaluation, parent coaching, and ICC.

Although mother attended the supervised visits, she did not comply with the other requirements

for reunification. Mother did not complete the psychological evaluation until after the JDR court

had terminated her parental rights, which limited the Department’s ability to provide her with

additional services. Mother used the parent coaching services for transportation and

housekeeping, instead of completing the parenting skills modules. Despite asking the parenting

coach to drive her “to and from places,” mother never asked for transportation assistance to

attend the psychological evaluation appointments, though she now asserts that the transportation

barrier prevented her from timely completing the final two appointments for the evaluation.

Based on the record before us, the circuit court did not err in finding that the Department offered

reasonable and appropriate services to mother.

                                                 -6-
       Mother also argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the termination of her

parental rights was in the best interests of the child, especially considering the “efforts and

accomplishments” that mother made to meet the Department’s requirements. Mother

emphasizes that she regularly visited the child and sought housing in Martinsville and Danville.

       The record reflects that mother moved several times while the child was in foster care.

At no point did she obtain and maintain safe and stable housing. By the time of the circuit court

hearing, mother was living with her purported half-brother in a home that “needed ceiling repairs

in the room where the child would stay to be safe.” Though mother testified that the home

needed only “minor repairs,” on appeal we must view the record in the light most favorable to

the Department—crediting the testimony that the Department and the CASA worker deemed the

living situation unsafe. See Joyce, 75 Va. App. at 695.

       In addition to her lack of suitable housing, mother did not complete the Department’s

required services. At the time of the circuit court hearing, the child had been in foster care for

almost two years, but mother was still not in a position to have custody of the child. “It is clearly

not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or

even if, a parent will be capable of resuming h[er] responsibilities.” Simms, 74 Va. App. at 463

(quoting Harrison, 42 Va. App. at 162). Considering the record before this Court, the circuit

court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

                                                 -7-