Court Opinion

ID: 9854080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:00:26.273216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:54.478635
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent in both cases.
In Case No. A09A0394, contrary to the majority’s view, I find that dismissal in this case on the basis of Georgia’s dismissal statutes, OCGA §§ 9-2-60 and 9-11-41 (e), elevates form over substance in contravention of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (the “Act”),2 50 USC Appx. § 501 et seq., here controlling federal law.
Critically important to the disposition of this case is an appreciation of the significant rights the Act seeks to preserve and protect on behalf of our men and women in the service of their country. Section 510 thereof declares these as follows:
[i]n order to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense under the emergent conditions which are threatening the peace and security of the United States and to enable the United States the more successfully to fulfill the requirements of the national defenses, provision is hereby made to suspend enforcement of civil liabilities, in certain cases, of persons in the military service of the United States in order to enable such persons to devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation, and to this end the following provisions are made for the temporary suspension of legal proceedings and transactions which may prejudice the civil rights of persons in such service during the period herein specified over which this Act remains in force.
50 USC Appx. § 510 (2002); see also Lankford v. Milhollin, 197 Ga. 227, 233 (2) (28 SE2d 752) (1944). As the United States Supreme Court has held, the Act is to be “liberally construed to protect those who have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation.” Boone v. Lightner, 319 U. S. 561, 575 (4) (63 SC 1223, 87 LE2d 1587) (1943).
The majority points to 50 USC Appx. § 522 (“Section 522”) as the stay provision at issue, arguing that it authorizes a stay only *88upon “a consideration of an application, the requirements of which are laid out in subsection (b) of that statute.” (Emphasis supplied.) But this is to engage in no more than supposition because Section 522, by its own terms, merely sets forth the conditions upon which entitlement to a stay rests.3
The same is true with respect to the stay provision of the Act in effect when Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for stay, 50 USC Appx. § 521 (2002) (“former Section 522”), which required the service-member to demonstrate only that the exigencies of military service “materially affected” his or her or ability to prosecute or defend a civil action in order to authorize a stay. Id.
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ motion to stay was made in compliance with former Section 522, i.e., evidence was presented showing that the requirements of Cornelius’ military service materially affected Plaintiffs’ ability to prosecute the instant lawsuit. There also is no dispute that Plaintiffs’ consent motion to stay was duly filed and that a courtesy copy of the motion was sent to the trial judge. Moreover, the trial judge conceded that Plaintiffs were entitled to a stay of the proceedings, declaring that had she known of the motion, she “would have granted [the motion] in a heartbeat.” While no order was entered, in fact, granting Plaintiffs a stay in this case, it is apparent that this was but the result of administrative *89error alone, and given our duty to construe the Act liberally, I cannot conclude that Plaintiffs should be denied the effect of a stay to which they were clearly and indisputably entitled. Moreover, under the totality of the attendant circumstances, I am unpersuaded that the failure of Plaintiffs’ counsel to secure a written order for stay should be regarded as in violation of OCGA §§ 9-2-60 and 9-11-41 (c). See Atlanta Public Schools v. Diamond, 261 Ga. App. 641, 644 (2) (583 SE2d 500) (2003) (The proceedings of courts of competent jurisdiction are presumed to have been regularly undertaken.). Thus, in my opinion, Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a stay of the proceedings is established as a matter of law but for the intervention of administrative error, for which the Plaintiffs should not be penalized. Former Section 522; Boothe v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, 168 Ga. App. 352, 353 (308 SE2d 844) (1983) (trial court required, as a matter of law, to grant stay upon applicant’s request supported by a bare statement that he was active in the military service and no evidence indicated that his ability to prosecute the action would not be impaired).
While the majority disagrees, I am also satisfied that the operation of the five-year rule of OCGA § 9-2-60 (b) is preempted in this case. Specifically, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution nullifies state law which (1) prevents or frustrates the accomplishment of a federal objective, or (2) makes it impossible for private parties to comply with both state and federal law. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 873 (120 SC 1913, 146 LE2d 914) (2000) (discussing implied preemption when there is an “actual conflict” between state and federal law). The intention of Congress to ensure that the requirements of military service not compromise a servicemember’s rights in civil litigation is made crystal clear by the Act. 50 USCS App. § 510 (2002); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Nat. Treasury Employees Union, 265 Ga. 557, 558 (2) (458 SE2d 95) (1995) (“The issue of federal preemption of state law is fundamentally a question of Congressional intent. . . .”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Even without an express provision for preemption, we will find preemption where “under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” (Emphasis supplied.) Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (61 SC 399, 85 LE 581) (1941). To hold that the five-year rule under OCGA § 9-2-60 (b) runs, notwithstanding preemption by former Section 522 in the unique circumstances of this case, is manifestly to frustrate the plain intent of Congress to ensure that no servicemember be denied his or her day in court due to the requirements of military service. See Municipal Elec. Auth. of Ga. v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm., 241 Ga. App. 237, 241 (3) (525 SE2d *90399) (1999) (“[C]ourts should not interpret federal law to preempt state sovereignty unless the language of the federal law clearly compels the intrusion.”). Sound public policy and the clear terms of former Section 522 require this interpretation of the statute. Given the foregoing, I do not reach the holding in Roberts v. Eayrs, 297 Ga. App. 821 (678 SE2d 535) (2009), and Clark v. Clark, 293 Ga. App. 309 (667 SE2d 103) (2008), supra, to which the majority alludes.
In Case No. A09A0395, citing Fagan v. Atnalta, Inc., 189 Ga. App. 460, 461 (2) (376 SE2d 204) (1988), the majority concludes, as a matter of law, that Cornelius IV assumed the risk involved in the fight at issue, foreclosing any application of the rescue doctrine as a defense. Finding jury questions remaining, I cannot agree.
The rescue doctrine may operate to excuse a rescuer’s assumption of the risk if the “ ‘apparent necessity for rescue and assistance [is] made necessary by the . . . negligence of the defendant.’ [Cit.]” Montega Corp. v. Grooms, 128 Ga. App. 333, 339-340 (8) (c) (196 SE2d 459) (1973). Assumption of the risk will not bar recovery so long as the rescuer’s conduct does not evidence a reckless or wanton disregard of dangers inherent in the situation. Lorie v. Standard Oil Co., 186 Ga. App. 753, 755 (368 SE2d 765) (1988). This is such a case.
Here, material issues of fact exist regarding the application of the rescue doctrine. Specifically, there is evidence that Cornelius IV and his friends came to the aid of a fellow student upon seeing him attacked by seven or eight others. The majority’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding,
[t]here is no issue involved as to assumption of risk, since the doctrine of rescue necessarily contemplates an assumption of the risk inherent in the peril created by the defendants’ negligence and allows recovery for injuries thereby incurred, for the reason that the defendants were charged with the duty of anticipating that their negligence might attract rescuers who would necessarily have to assume the dangers inherent in the situation.
Lorie, supra, 186 Ga. App. at 755 (1). Consequently, a jury should be allowed to decide whether Cornelius IV was in the exercise of ordinary care in attempting to rescue his fellow student or whether “his actions [were] so imprudent and beyond what a person in the same circumstances might be expected to do that they must be classified as reckless and wanton. [Cit.]” Id.
Plaintiffs, in sum, are entitled to their day in court, and in fairness, this Court should allow it.
I am authorized to state that Judge Mikell joins in this dissent.
*91Decided July 14, 2009
Charles A. Mathis, Jr., for appellants.
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Bradley S. Wolff, for appellees.

 The Act was formerly known as the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act. 50 USC Appx. § 501 et seq. (2002).

 In relevant part, Section 522 is as follows:
(a) Applicability of section. This section applies to any civil action or proceeding, including any child custody proceeding, in which the plaintiff or defendant at the time of filing an application under this section - (1) is in military service or is within 90 days after termination of or release from military service; and (2) has received notice of the action or proceeding.
(b) Stay of proceedings.
(1) Authority for stay. At any stage before final judgment in a civil action or proceeding in which a servicemember described in subsection (a) is a party, the court may on its own motion and shall, upon application by the servicemember, stay the action for a period of not less than 90 days, if the conditions in paragraph (2) are met.
(2) Conditions for stay. An application for a stay under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A letter or other communication setting forth facts stating the manner in which current military duty requirements materially affect the servicemember’s ability to appear and stating a date when the servicemember will be available to appear.
(B) A letter or other communication from the servicemember’s commanding officer stating that the servicemember’s current military duty prevents appearance and that military leave is not authorized for the servicemember at the time of the letter.
(d) Additional stay. (1) Application. A servicemember who is granted a stay of a civil action or proceeding under subsection (b) may apply for an additional stay based on continuing material affect of military duty on the servicemember’s ability to appear. Such an application may be made by the servicemember at the time of the initial application under subsection (b) or when it appears that the servicemember is unavailable to prosecute or defend the action. ...
(Emphasis supplied.) 50 USC Appx: § 522.