Court Opinion

ID: 9520761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:49:16.972546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:50.793312
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
¶ 51. {concurring). I join the majority opinion, and write only to answer the dissenting opinions of Justice Geske and Justice Bradley.
¶ 52. Both dissents take the position that the response of juror Metzler of "probably" was good enough. It was not good enough when taken in context.
¶ 53. The issue to which the juror was asked to respond was whether he would afford the defendant the rights due him under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Thus, his answer was, in reality, "I probably will grant the defendant his rights under the Fifth Amendment." That is not the juror's choice. He *506must afford the defendant his rights under the Constitution. He either will or he won't, not "probably;" that term connotes the potential that he will not.
¶ 54. Further exacerbating the issue is that the juror's response did not appear in a vacuum. His response of "probably" came only after a number of colloquies between counsel for the defendant, the circuit court, and the juror. These colloquies are well documented in the majority opinion, but they include statements from juror Metzler such as " Well, if your client is innocent, why wouldn't he take the stand?"; "Well, if he's innocent, why wouldn't he go up there and tell us he's innocent?"; "I think I may." (in response to a question of whether he would hold the defendant's failure to take the stand against the defendant); "Well, I would have a hard time believing that he was innocent if he didn't take the stand and tell me he wasn't [sic] innocent."; "Well, I would certainly try to set it aside."; and then, "Probably."
¶ 55. The circuit court, at the conclusion of all this, stated: "I'm not removing Mr. Metzler. He said he could do this." The court, respectfully, was in error. Mr. Metzler did not say he could do this. He said, "Probably." Following what preceded this, it was not good enough.
¶ 56. We are not here dealing with whether a juror can accept the court's instructions on some mundane area of the law. We are dealing with fundamental rights. The majority's conclusion is absolutely correct.
¶ 57. I am authorized to state that Justice Donald W. Steinmetz and Justice N. Patrick Crooks join this concurrence.