Court Opinion

ID: 9637412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:06:46.860862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:42.244532
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
                                Docket No. 49189

 XANTHA J. DARROW, fka XANTHA J. )
 WHITE,                                      )
                                             )
    Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-              )
    Appellant,                               )
                                             )
 v.                                          )            Twin Falls, August 2022 Term
                                             )
 TODD WHITE, individually, and as Trustee of )            Opinion Filed: June 27, 2023
 the John Embleton White & Carma G. White )
 Revocable Family Trust, and WHITE X )                    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 THREE, LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
 company,                                    )
                                             )
    Defendants-Counterclaimants-             )
    Respondents.                             )
                                             )

       Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls
       County. Benjamin J. Cluff, District Judge.

       The decision granting summary judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.

       Elam & Burke, P.A., Boise, for Appellant Xantha Darrow. Jaclyn T. Gans argued.

       Robertson & Slette, PLLC, Twin Falls, for Respondents Todd White and White X
       Three, LLC. Gary D. Slette argued.

                                   _____________________

STEGNER, Justice.
       This appeal concerns the 2008 sale of real property located in Twin Falls, Idaho (“the
Property”). The Property was owned by the partnership White, White & Lawley I (“WWLI”),
which sold the Property to White X Three, LLC, for $650,000. In 2009, after White X Three
acquired and then substantially renovated the Property, it began to lease the Property to Wilson-
Bates Appliance Stores, Inc., for an initial amount of $21,000 per month, which increased annually
by 1.5%.
       At the time of the sale, Xantha White, then a minor child, and Todd White, her uncle, each
held a one-half interest in the White Family Trust. The White Family Trust was a one-third partner

                                                1
in WWLI when it sold the Property. As Trustee of the White Family Trust, Todd White—along
with the other two partners of WWLI—agreed to the sale of the Property. Todd White was also a
member of White X Three, placing him on both sides of the sale and purchase of the Property.
Although he had a conflict of interest in the sale, Todd White did not obtain court approval for the
sale pursuant to Idaho Code section 68-108(b), nor did he inform Xantha White or her mother,
who was also Xantha’s conservator, of the sale. Exactly when Xantha White learned of the sale is
disputed by the parties.
         Xantha White (now known as Xantha Darrow) and the Trustee of the Xantha J. White
Trust, Larry Braga, brought suit against Todd White and White X Three, asserting that, because
Todd White did not obtain court approval for the sale of the Property, the sale was void and the
Property should be placed in a constructive trust. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Todd White and White X Three,
concluding that the sale of the Property was not void because Idaho Code section 68-108(b) did
not apply. The district court also declined to place the Property in a constructive trust but allowed
Xantha Darrow’s claim of breach of a fiduciary duty to continue.
         Xantha Darrow moved the district court for an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
certification to allow her to appeal the partial judgment rendered against her. The district court
granted her request, and this appeal followed. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate the
district court’s grant of summary judgment.
                              I.       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. Factual Background
         John and Carma White formed the White Family Trust in 1982. After John 1 and Carma
both passed away in 1997, their two sons—Kevin and Todd White—each received a one-half
interest in the White Family Trust. At all times relevant to this appeal, Todd was the sole Trustee
of the White Family Trust. 2 Kevin passed away in 1999, at which time his one-half interest in the
White Family Trust devolved to his daughter, Xantha. From 1999 to the present, both Todd and
Xantha have been the only beneficiaries of the White Family Trust.

1
  For clarity, the individuals in the White family will be referred to by their first names. No disrespect is intended by
doing so.
2
  It can be inferred from the parties’ briefing that Kevin acted as a co-Trustee with his brother, Todd, from the time of
their parents’ death until Kevin’s. However, Kevin’s designation as co-trustee cannot be confirmed by the record.

                                                           2
        The White Family Trust was a one-third partner in WWLI, a partnership established in
1985. The other two partners of WWLI were Wallace Richard White, Sr. (Todd’s uncle, who is
also known as Rick Sr.), and Marilyn Lawley (Todd’s aunt). In 1998, WWLI purchased the
Property for $420,000.
        In the spring of 2008, WWLI decided to sell the Property for $650,000. Todd, in his
capacity as Trustee of the White Family Trust, approved the sale of the Property for $650,000. In
2007, prior to WWLI agreeing to the sale, Twin Falls County assessed the value of the Property to
be $675,305; however, in 2008—after WWLI had agreed to the sale details but before the
transaction actually occurred—the Twin Falls County’s Assessor assessed the value of the
Property to be $807,261. At no point did Todd seek or obtain court approval of the sale of the
Property. Xantha’s share of the proceeds from the sale was $95,000, which was remitted to Garald
Price in his capacity as Trustee of Xantha’s personal trust, the Xantha J. White Trust (established
in 2002). Xantha was twelve years old at the time.
        WWLI sold the Property to White X Three, a limited liability corporation with three
members: Todd, Rick Sr., and Richard M. White (Rick Sr.’s son). White X Three financed the sale
by taking a loan from Wilson-Bates Appliance Stores, Inc., an entity in which the White Family
Trust has an interest. White X Three then obtained a loan from Wells Fargo in 2009 for
approximately $2 million, a portion of which was used to repay the Wilson-Bates loan. White X
Three used the rest of the Wells Fargo loan to finance construction costs for a remodel of the
warehouse on the Property. The renovated warehouse was then leased to Wilson-Bates for $21,000
per month, beginning in 2009 with the rent set to increase 1.5% each year.
        In 2016, Larry Braga replaced Price as the Trustee of the Xantha J. White Trust. Braga
began attending shareholder meetings of Wilson-Bates and discovered Xantha previously had, but
no longer retained, an interest in the Property. 3 This litigation followed.
    B. Procedural Background
        On March 27, 2020, Xantha, individually, and Braga, in his capacity as Trustee of the
Xantha J. White Trust, filed a complaint against Todd and White X Three contesting the propriety
of the sale of the Property. Xantha and Braga alleged three separate causes of action. First, Xantha
and Braga asserted the sale of the Property was void because a court had not authorized the

3
 Todd and White X Three dispute that Xantha learned of the sale in 2016. The district court concluded that when
Xantha knew or should have known about the sale remains a question of fact; therefore, this conclusion is not before
us on appeal.

                                                         3
transaction pursuant to Idaho Code section 68-108(b). Second, Xantha and Braga requested that
the Property be placed into a constructive trust due to the void sale. Finally, Xantha and Braga
asserted Todd had breached his fiduciary duty owed to Xantha in agreeing to the sale of the
Property.
       Todd and White X Three filed their answer on April 30, 2020, which asserted three
counterclaims. First, Todd and White X Three sought a declaration that Section W of the Trust
Indenture provided the Trustee of the White Family Trust with the power “to determine the wisest
and best course of action to pursue” without obtaining court approval, and that Todd’s actions in
consenting to the sale of the Property complied with Section W. Second, Todd and White X Three
sought a declaration that Xantha’s and Braga’s complaint violated the incontestability provision
of the Trust Indenture, and that they “must thereby forfeit and disgorge any and all beneficial
interests thereunder.” Finally, Todd and White X Three sought a declaration quieting title against
Xantha and Braga to the Property.
       Xantha and Braga moved for summary judgment on their first cause of action as well as all
three of Todd’s and White X Three’s counterclaims. Todd and White X Three also moved for
summary judgment on all three of their counterclaims, and further asserted that Xantha’s and
Braga’s complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations pursuant to either Idaho Code
section 5-217 or Idaho Code section 5-224.
       The district court first found that Todd had a clear conflict of interest in consenting to the
sale of the Property such that, “absent any other facts,” he would have been subject to the
requirement to obtain court approval for the sale pursuant to Idaho Code section 68-108(b). The
district court further found that “the terms of the [Trust Indenture] unquestionably supersede the
provisions of” Idaho Code section 68-108(b) as allowed by Idaho Code section 68-111. Therefore,
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Indenture, the district court determined that Todd was not
required to obtain court approval for the sale of the Property “so long as he used his best judgment
based upon all the circumstances.” (Italics in original.)
       The district court then reviewed the evidence to determine whether Xantha and Braga had
carried their burden to demonstrate that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Todd
complied with the terms of the Trust Indenture in consenting to the sale of the Property. The district
court concluded Xantha and Braga had not carried their burden, and declined to grant summary
judgment in their favor on their first cause of action. Noting that Xantha and Braga had “brought

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forth evidence that the value of the [P]roperty exceeded the sale price” and had “also presented
evidence regarding the subsequent rental value of the [P]roperty, which provided years of
uninterrupted cash flow[,]” the district court further declined to grant summary judgment to either
party as to Todd’s and White X Three’s first counterclaim.
          Next, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Xantha and Braga as to
Todd’s and White X Three’s second counterclaim, concluding that Xantha and Braga had probable
cause to contest the Trust Indenture; as a result, the district court dismissed the second
counterclaim. Last, the district court declined to grant summary judgment in favor of either party
on Todd’s and White X Three’s third counterclaim, reasoning that whether the sale of the Property
was void was still an open question and thus it was inappropriate to quiet title to the Property.
          On December 23, 2020, Todd and White X Three moved for summary judgment a second
time, this time with respect to all three of Xantha’s and Braga’s causes of action. Todd and White
X Three also requested the district court dismiss Braga as a plaintiff because he lacked standing,
and further asserted Xantha should be dismissed “on the basis of estoppel, consent, and the statute
of limitations[.]” After a dispute over discovery, Xantha and Braga opposed Todd’s and White X
Three’s motion for summary judgment but did not move for summary judgment on their own
behalf.
          The district court then rendered its second decision regarding summary judgment. Finding
that Braga did not have standing, the district court dismissed him as a plaintiff. 4 Next, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Todd and White X Three as to Xantha’s first and
second causes of action. The district court stated that “it [wa]s clear to the [c]ourt that Todd formed
his judgment based upon all the circumstances of the situation as to the wisest and best course
regarding the sale of the [P]roperty, and Xantha’s interest in that sale.” Because the sale was not
void, the district court further concluded there was no need to place the Property in a constructive
trust. The district court then determined there was an issue of material fact as to whether Todd
violated his fiduciary duty as Trustee and declined to award summary judgment with respect to
Xantha’s third cause of action. The district court further determined that whether the statute of
limitations barred the third cause of action was a question of fact for the jury to decide, and

4
  The dismissal of Braga as a plaintiff is not challenged on appeal. As a result, we have amended the title of the appeal
to remove Braga as an appellant. I.A.R. 6 (“The Supreme Court may amend a title of an appeal or proceeding before
it at any time.”).

                                                           5
additionally declined to award summary judgment in Todd’s and White X Three’s favor regarding
their affirmative defenses of estoppel and consent.
       Xantha requested the district court enter a partial final judgment with respect to its
dismissal of her first and second causes of action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
The district court determined there was no just reason for delay and granted the request on August
25, 2021. Xantha timely appealed.
                                     II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
       “This Court exercises de novo review of a grant of summary judgment and the ‘standard
of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.’ ” AED, Inc. v. KDC Invs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 163, 307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013) (quoting
Stonebrook Constr., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 929, 277 P.3d 374, 376
(2012)).
       “On review, summary judgment is appropriate if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to
       any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ”
       Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Lautenschlager, 168 Idaho 841, 844, 488 P.3d 509, 512
       (2021) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(a)). The moving party carries the burden to
       demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.
       of Idaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415, 419, 234 P.3d 739, 742 (2010) (citation omitted).
Taylor v. Taylor, 169 Idaho 806, 812, 504 P.3d 342, 348 (2022).
       Ordinarily, “[a]ll disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-
       moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are
       to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 645,
       650, 214 P.3d 631, 636 (2009). However, “[w]hen an action will be tried before the
       court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most
       probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and
       grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences.”
       Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360–61, 93 P.3d 685, 691–
       92 (2004). “The test for reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial court is whether
       the record reasonably supports the inferences.” Id.
Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235, 238, 254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011) (alterations in original).
                                           III.    ANALYSIS
   A. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Todd and White X Three
      as to Xantha’s first cause of action.
       The district court concluded there was no issue of material fact as to whether the sale of
the Property was void and granted summary judgment in favor of Todd and White X Three. On
appeal, Xantha presents three main arguments as to why the district court erred in granting

                                                    6
summary judgment to Todd and White X Three on her first cause of action. First, Xantha argues
that the district court misinterpreted Idaho Code sections 68-108(b) and 68-111. Second, Xantha
argues that the district court erred in interpreting the terms of the Trust Indenture. Finally, Xantha
asserts that, even if the district court’s legal analyses were correct, the district court still erred in
granting summary judgment to Todd because there were genuine issues of material fact. Each
argument will be addressed in turn.
        1. The district court did not err in determining that the terms of a trust may supersede the
           statutory requirement to obtain court approval.
        Xantha’s first assignment of error raises a question of statutory interpretation. The district
court found that Todd had a clear conflict of interest in the sale of the Property. In general, trustees
with conflicts of interest must obtain court approval prior to consenting to a sale of property.
I.C. § 68-108(b). Idaho Code section 68-108(b) provides that “[i]f the duty of the trustee and his
individual interest . . . conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power may be exercised only
by court authorization, except as provided in sections 68-106(c)(1), (4), (6), (18), and (24) upon
petition of the trustee.” However, the district court determined that the statutory requirement to
obtain court approval could be superseded by the trust pursuant to Idaho Code section 68-111.
Idaho Code section 68-111 provides that, “[e]xcept as specifically provided in the trust, the
provisions of this act apply to any trust established after the effective date of this act.” (The
legislature enacted the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act (“the Act”) in 1965. I.C. §§ 68-101–13.)
The district court concluded that section 68-111 was “unambiguous and leaves no room for
statutory construction” and “a trustor may draft trust terms that nullify the court approval
requirements of § 68-108(b).”
        On appeal, Xantha asserts that the district court erred when it read Idaho Code section
68-111 to allow settlors to draft around Idaho Code section 68-108(b)’s requirement for court
approval. She argues that, by the plain language of the statute, the “court-approval requirement is
not qualified in any manner: if a conflict of interest exists, the trustee’s power may be exercised
only by court authorization.” (Italics in original.) Xantha reads Idaho Code section 68-111 to
permit settlors to draft around the Act as a whole, but “it does not permit a trustor to draft around
individual statutory provisions within the Act.” Xantha further contends that the district court’s
interpretation impermissibly allows private parties to draft around a mandatory statute and is
against public policy.

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       Todd and White X Three respond by urging the Court to adopt the district court’s decision
that Idaho Code section 68-111 allows settlors to draft trust terms “that nullify the court approval
requirements of Idaho Code § 68-108(b).”
       We hold the district court correctly interpreted Idaho Code section 68-111 to allow settlors
to draft around section 68-108(b)’s requirement for court approval.
       The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative
       body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language
       of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in
       the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole,
       and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be
       noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute
       so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language
       is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
       effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction.
Estate of Stahl v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 162 Idaho 558, 562, 401 P.3d 136, 140 (2017) (quoting
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011)). “It is incumbent upon this Court
to interpret a statute in a manner that will not nullify it, and it is not to be presumed that the
legislature performed an idle act of enacting a superfluous statute.” Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho
568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990). “The Supreme Court will not construe a statute in a way which
makes mere surplusage of provisions included therein.” Id. “It is the duty of the courts in
construing statutes to harmonize and reconcile laws wherever possible and to adopt that
construction of statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory
provisions.” Id. (quoting Sampson v. Layton, 86 Idaho 453, 457, 387 P.2d 883, 885 (1963)).
       Pursuant to Idaho Code section 68-111, the provisions of the Act apply to a trust “[e]xcept
as specifically provided in the trust[.]” I.C. § 68-111. The dictionary definitions of two words in
the quoted clause lend guidance here. First, Merriam-Webster defines “as” to mean “in the way or
manner that” and “in accordance with what or the way in which[.]” As, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, INC.,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/as        (last   visited   Nov.   16,   2022).   Second,
“specifically” is defined to mean “in a specific manner: in a definite and exact way: with
precision[.]”   Specifically,   MERRIAM-WEBSTER,         INC.,   https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/specifically (last visited Nov. 16, 2022). Based on these definitions, section 68-111
should be read to mean that the provisions of the Act apply to a trust except in the specific manner
provided in the trust. The reference to specificity suggests that the legislature intended settlors
should be able to draft around specific provisions within the Act as they so choose, rather than the

                                                 8
all-or-nothing approach as Xantha suggests. Therefore, we conclude that by its plain language,
Idaho Code section 68-111 unambiguously allows settlors to draft around the requirement to obtain
court approval under section 68-108(b).
       Xantha attempts to avoid this conclusion by pointing to Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705,
201 P.3d 1282 (2009), asserting that this Court has already determined Idaho Code section
68-108(b) to be unambiguous. In Taylor, this Court stated:
       [T]he plain, unambiguous language of the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act provides
       that even if a trustee’s actions are reasonable and prudent, if a conflict of interest
       exists, the court must authorize the action before the trustee can exercise that power.
       This includes the power to close a real estate sale under I.C. § 68-106(c)(7).
Id. at 711, 201 P.3d at 1288. However, Taylor is factually distinguishable from the case at bar:
Notably absent from the Taylor opinion is any discussion of whether the trust instrument contained
a clause that attempted to render the court approval requirement a nullity. See generally id.
Therefore, either the trust instrument did not contain such a clause or neither party presented the
issue to the Court. Whichever occurred, this Court did not address the interplay between sections
68-108(b) and 68-111, and thus Taylor is inapposite here.
       Xantha further argues that allowing settlors to draft trusts around the statutory requirement
for court approval violates public policy. Citing City of Meridian v. Petra Incorporated, 154 Idaho
425, 446, 299 P.3d 232, 253 (2013) and Drakos v. Sandow, 167 Idaho 159, 164, 468 P.3d 289, 294
(2020), Xantha points out that this Court has refused to allow private parties to contract around
statutory requirements, such as statutes of limitation. Notably, although each party’s interpretation
of the Act would allow private parties to contract around statutory requirements, Xantha provides
no explanation as to how her interpretation of section 68-111 (that it allows settlors to only draft
around the entire Act) supports public policy while on the other hand allowing settlors to draft
around individual provisions in the Act violates public policy. Furthermore, the legislature
expressly approved of drafting around section 68-108(b) by its enactment of section 68-111.
       In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Idaho Code
section 68-111 provides that the terms of a trust may supersede the statutory requirement to obtain
court approval set out in Idaho Code section 68-108(b).
       2. The district court did not err in determining that the terms of the Trust Indenture
          superseded the requirement to obtain court approval pursuant to Idaho Code
          section 68-108(b) provided that the trustee complied with Section W.

                                                 9
         The district court concluded that the terms of the Trust Indenture nullified the requirement
to obtain court approval. Relying on Idaho Code section 68-111, the district court concluded that
Idaho Code section 68-108(b) was inapplicable to the sale of the Property because “the terms of
the trust unquestionably supersede the provisions of the statute.” The district court found that the
Trust Indenture was unambiguous. Pointing to Article VII, Section W of the Trust Indenture, the
district court concluded that “the Trustee of the White Family Trust may sell (or otherwise consent
to the sale of) Trust Property ‘without the necessity of obtaining the consent of approval of any
court,’ so long as the Trustee uses his best judgment under all the circumstances.”
         On appeal, Xantha argues that, because the Trust Indenture “does not authorize Todd to
engage in self-dealing to the detriment of a co-beneficiary[,]” the district court erred in determining
the terms of the Trust Indenture superseded Idaho Code 68-108(b). Essentially, Xantha contends
that Section W of the Trust Indenture lacks specific language regarding a trustee as a
co-beneficiary; thus, she argues, Section W cannot supersede Idaho Code section 68-108(b)
because Todd is both a co-beneficiary and the trustee. Xantha further asserts that Section W does
not apply to a trustee’s consent of a sale of real property not owned in full by the White Family
Trust.
         Next, Xantha argues that the Trust Indenture is ambiguous because “Section (W) as applied
to these facts is inherently contradictory.” Xantha posits that “Todd cannot consent to the sale of
real property for his personal benefit and to the detriment of Xantha while also acting in a fiduciary
capacity towards her.”
         Todd and White X Three respond that Section W is unambiguous and reflects the settlors’
intent to grant the trustee(s) of the White Family Trust “absolute and unfettered discretion to make
decisions regarding the management and disposition of the trust assets without the need to seek or
obtain court approval.” They argue that, because the Trust Indenture created the conflict of interest
between Todd as a trustee and Todd as a co-beneficiary, the settlors implicitly approved of that
conflict of interest.
                 When interpreting a trust instrument, such instrument must be construed as
         a whole, considering all parts and reading each part in light of the whole instrument.
         Matter of Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 827, 907 P.2d 794, 804 (1995). The Court’s
         primary objective in construing a document is to discover the intent of the parties
         by viewing the document in its entirety. Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996, 829
         P.2d 1342, 1345 (1992). “The determination of a contract’s meaning and legal
         effect are questions of law to be decided by the court where the contract is clear

                                                  10
          and unambiguous.” Id. When the document is ambiguous, the primary
          consideration is determining the intent of the parties. Id. “[I]n determining whether
          a contract is ambiguous, [the Court’s] task is to ascertain whether the contract is
          reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation.” Id. at 997, 829 P.2d at 1346.
Frizzell v. DeYoung, 163 Idaho 473, 477–78, 415 P.3d 341, 345–46 (2018) (alterations in original).
                   Once a court determines that a document is ambiguous, “interpretation of
          the document presents a question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the
          parties.” Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho at 997, 829 P.2d at 1346. See also Allen v.
          Dennie, 116 Idaho at 916, 782 P.2d at 39. This issue of the settlors’ intent, as a
          question of fact, [may] not be resolved on summary judgment. See I.R.C.P. 56(c);
          Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho at 997, 829 P.2d at 1346.
Carl H. Christensen Family Tr. v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 873–74, 993 P.2d 1197, 1204–05
(1999).
          We conclude that the Trust Indenture supersedes the statutory requirement to obtain court
approval pursuant to Idaho Code section 68-108(b). Article VII of the Trust Indenture governs the
“Powers of the Trustee(s)[.]” It provides in relevant part:
                 The Trustee shall have, with respect to any and all property, whether real or
          personal, which may at any time be held hereunder, whether constituting principal
          or accumulated income, the following rights and powers, which may be exercised
          in the Trustee’s discretion at any time, and from time to time, during the
          continuance of any Trust hereunder and until actual distribution of all property:
                 ...
                  (W) The Trustee may freely act under all or any of the powers herein granted
          to him in all matters concerning the trust estate, after forming his judgment based
          upon all the circumstances of any particular situation as to the wisest and best
          course to pursue in the interest of the Trust and the beneficiaries hereunder, without
          the necessity of obtaining the consent or approval of any court, and notwithstanding
          that he may be acting in his individual capacity, or as Trustee of other Trusts, or as
          an agent for other persons or interested in connection with the same matters as an
          agent, shareholder, director, or otherwise, provided, however, that he shall exercise
          such powers at all times in a fiduciary capacity primarily in the interests of the
          beneficiaries hereunder[.]
          We recognize that Section W is not a model of clarity. However, upon examination it
unambiguously reveals that the trustee may exercise a trust power without obtaining court approval
if two conditions are met: first, that the trustee “form[s] his judgment based upon all the
circumstances of any particular situation as to the wisest and best course to pursue in the interest
of the Trust and the beneficiaries hereunder[;]” and second, that the trustee “exercise[s] such
powers at all times in a fiduciary capacity primarily in the interests of the beneficiaries

                                                   11
hereunder[.]” So long as both conditions are met, the trustee is permitted to act without obtaining
court approval. Therefore, we conclude that Section W supersedes Idaho Code section 68-108(b).
       Xantha correctly points out that Section W does not expressly contemplate the conflict of
interest arising when a person is both a trustee and a co-beneficiary. However, Section W broadly
approves of conflicts of interest, allowing the trustee to exercise trust powers even when he is
“acting in his individual capacity, or as Trustee of other Trusts, or as an agent for other persons or
interested in connection with the same matters as an agent, shareholder, director, or otherwise[.]”
(Italics added.) Furthermore, as noted by Todd and White X Three, the settlors, by the terms of the
Trust Indenture, appointed Todd as a trustee knowing he was also a beneficiary of the trust. The
settlors intended Section W to apply to Todd’s exercise of trust powers.
       Xantha next argues that trustees do not have the power to consent to the sale of real property
not owned in full by the White Family Trust: “If the specific power exercised by Todd as trustee
was not granted to him by the Trust Indenture Agreement, then Section (W) has no applicability.”
Xantha would have the Court read the Trust Indenture narrowly. However, like Section W, as
discussed above, the trust powers laid out in the Trust Indenture are broad. First, contrary to
Xantha’s assertion, it is clear that the trust powers encompass real property. The opening statement
of Article VII states that “[t]he Trustee shall have, with respect to any and all property, whether
real or personal . . . the following rights and powers[.]” (Italics added.)
       Next, as Todd and White X Three point out, sections F and Q of Article VII of the Trust
Indenture allow a trustee to agree to a sale of real property owned only in part by the White Family
Trust. Section F conveys the trustee the power “[t]o manage, control, sell at public or private sale”
“any and all property[.]” Section Q conveys to the trustee the power
       [t]o do all such acts, take all such proceedings and exercise all such rights and
       privileges, although neither specifically hereinabove mentioned nor conferred upon
       it by law, with relation to such property as if the absolute owner thereof and in
       connection therewith to enter into any covenants or agreements binding the trust
       estate[.]
(Italics added.) Read together, sections F and Q grant Todd the power to agree to the sale of the
Property.
       Finally, Xantha’s argument that the Trust Indenture is “inherently contradictory” and
therefore ambiguous is without merit. The crux of Xantha’s argument is that a trustee cannot act
in a fiduciary capacity while “avoid[ing] his statutory obligation” under Idaho Code section
68-108(b) to obtain court approval. However, as discussed above, Idaho Code section 68-108(b)

                                                  12
is not a mandatory statutory obligation; rather, the terms of the Trust Indenture could (and did)
negate the requirement to obtain court approval, so long as Todd complied with the mandates of
Section W. Additionally, Xantha’s argument rests on the fact that Todd’s agreement to the sale of
the Property was a detriment to Xantha—a fact which is heavily disputed by the parties. Thus,
Section W does not create an “inherent inconsistency;” rather, Section W places limits on Todd’s
discretion as Trustee by requiring him to abide by the conditions set forth in Section W in order to
bypass the requirement for court approval.
         In sum, we hold that the district court did not err in determining Section W unambiguously
supersedes Idaho Code section 68-108(b)’s requirement to obtain court approval for the sale of the
Property.
         3. The district court erred in determining that there was no issue of material fact that
            Todd had fulfilled his obligations under the terms of the Trust Indenture as to the sale
            of the Property.
         After determining that the Trust Indenture superseded the automatic court-approval
requirement, the district court concluded that it must evaluate Todd’s decision to consent to the
sale of the Property under the standard set forth in Article VII, Section W of the Trust Indenture:
“[T]he standard which might invoke the necessity of court approval for Todd’s consent to the sale
of the [P]roperty is whether Todd formed ‘his judgment based upon all the circumstances . . . as to
the wisest and best course to pursue in the interest of the Trust and the beneficiaries.’ ” 5 (Ellipsis
in original.) The district court stated, “arriving at the most probable inferences from the undisputed
material facts, it is clear to the [c]ourt that Todd formed his judgment based upon all the
circumstances of the situation as to the wisest and best course regarding the sale of the [P]roperty,
and Xantha’s interest in that sale.”
         The district court noted that, while Todd did not have the Property appraised prior to the
sale, the Property was sold for a $230,000 profit at a sale price that was approved by Marilyn

5
  Xantha based her claim that the sale of the Property was void on her argument that Todd had violated Idaho Code
section 68-108(b), rather than arguing that Todd had violated Section W. In their answer, Todd and White X Three
asserted a “counterclaim,” alleging that Todd had complied with Section W and, for that reason, the sale of the Property
was valid. However, while they categorized their Section W argument as a counterclaim, a more accurate
characterization is that their Section W argument was simply a defense to Xantha’s claim: They requested a declaration
from the district court that Todd’s actions “were consistent with the Grantors’ stated provision in the Trust Indenture
[Section W] that he was not required to obtain consent or approval of any court in order to consent to the sale of the
[] Property by White, White & Lawley I.” Essentially, they sought a declaration that, contrary to Xantha’s claim, Todd
did not need to obtain court approval prior to the sale of the Property. Because this is a legal argument against Xantha’s
claim, rather than a stand-alone counterclaim, and because the district court addressed the Section W argument without
objection by the parties, we will address the parties’ Section W arguments on appeal.

                                                           13
Lawley, “an astute businesswoman,” who was only on the sellers’ side of the sale. The district
court next noted that “the agreement to sell the [P]roperty preceded the newer assessed [over
$800,000] value at the time the transfer occurred.” The district court concluded that, “[a]lthough
Todd’s action in evaluating the sales price of the property could have been better, it was not
unreasonable.”
       Next, the district court considered “the dilapidated nature of the building on the [P]roperty
required a significant remodel.” The district court also noted that Todd had based his decision on
Xantha’s age, then twelve years old, when he concluded she “would be better off having liquid
assets for her future living expenses, support and education; rather than having money tied up in a
project that relied heavily on debt which would not be making any distributions in the near future.”
Further, the district court noted that in considering Xantha’s risk in “becoming mired in a
$2,000,000.00 renovation project[,]” Todd’s “decision to take a more conservative route for her[]
was entirely appropriate.”
       The district court placed great emphasis on evaluating Todd’s decision in terms of the facts
and circumstances known to Todd at the time he made the decision, stating, “[r]eliance on
hindsight is inappropriate.” The district court reasoned:
       Viewing the transaction as it existed in 2008, Plaintiffs’ argument that it would
       have been better for a 12-year-old girl to be part of a remodel project requiring
       nearly $2,000,000.00 of debt, that was to be rented by an entity that had
       “precipitously” decreasing sales, instead of investing the proceeds of the sale of the
       [P]roperty into a much safer market (or other) investment, is wholly unpersuasive.
Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Todd and White X Three and
dismissed Xantha’s first cause of action.
       On appeal, Xantha first asserts that the district court misapplied Section W of the Trust
Indenture when determining the standard it used to evaluate Todd’s decision-making process.
Specifically, she argues the district court failed to apply the second prong of the standard set forth
in Section W: whether Todd “exercise[d] [trust] powers at all times in a fiduciary capacity
primarily in the interests of the beneficiaries hereunder.” She contends that, had the district court
analyzed this second prong, it necessarily would have concluded there was an issue of material
fact because it had found an issue of material fact existed as to her third cause of action: whether
Todd had violated his fiduciary duty.
       Next, Xantha argues that, even under the “incomplete standard,” the district court still erred
in determining there was no issue of material fact. Xantha points out that the district court

                                                 14
originally declined to award summary judgment on the first cause of action when she was the party
that moved for it. Although Todd and White X Three put forth additional affidavits before they
moved for summary judgment, Xantha asserts that the “additional testimony did not resolve the
genuine issues of material fact the district court determined existed in the first place.”
        Todd and White X Three respond that the district court correctly interpreted Section W of
the Trust Indenture and applied the correct standard. They further contend Xantha is asking the
Court to “analyze Todd’s decision in hindsight” in contravention of the prudent investor rule.
        We agree with Xantha’s interpretation of Section W of the Trust Indenture. Section W
states that
        [t]he Trustee may freely act under all or any of the powers herein granted to him in
        all matters concerning the trust estate, after forming his judgment based upon all
        the circumstances of any particular situation as to the wisest and best course to
        pursue in the interest of the Trust and the beneficiaries hereunder, without the
        necessity of obtaining the consent or approval of any court, and notwithstanding
        that he may be acting in his individual capacity, or as Trustee of other Trusts, or as
        an agent for other persons or interested in connection with the same matters as an
        agent, shareholder, director, or otherwise, provided, however, that he shall exercise
        such powers at all times in a fiduciary capacity primarily in the interests of the
        beneficiaries hereunder[.]
(Italics added.) Xantha reads Section W to allow a Trustee to exercise his given powers without
court approval only if two conditions are met: first, the Trustee “form[s] his judgment based upon
all the circumstances of any particular situation as to the wisest and best course to pursue in the
interest of the Trust and the beneficiaries” of the White Family Trust; and, second, the Trustee
“exercise[s] such powers at all times in a fiduciary capacity[.]” As discussed above, we agree.
Section W aligns with Xantha’s interpretation: The Trustee may exercise a trust power “after
forming his judgment” “as to the wisest and best course” but must exercise that trust power “in a
fiduciary capacity primarily in the interest of the beneficiaries[.]” The district court analyzed
Todd’s actions only under the first prong but did not address the second prong. This was error.
Only if Todd satisfied both prongs does Section W operate to supersede Idaho Code section
68-108(b)’s requirement that he obtain court approval.
        We need not, however, remand to the district court to determine in the first instance
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Todd satisfied the second prong of
Section W. While the district court did not analyze whether Todd had violated his fiduciary duty
under Section W, it did analyze whether Todd had violated his fiduciary duty under Xantha’s third

                                                 15
cause of action and ultimately determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact which
precluded summary judgment on that claim. We note that, unlike Xantha’s first cause of action,
her third cause of action will be tried by a jury rather than the district court. As the district court
correctly noted, it was required to liberally construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences
in Xantha’s favor at the summary judgment stage. While the fiduciary duty inquiry here would
allow the district court sitting as factfinder to draw the most probable inferences from the
undisputed facts, we are nonetheless convinced that, had the district court addressed Section W’s
second prong, it would have concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Todd had violated his fiduciary duty under Section W.
       For example, in concluding there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Xantha’s third
cause of action, the district court expressly noted the disparity between the sale price of the
Property and the much higher value the Property was assessed to be shortly after the agreement to
sell was reached. Additionally, the district court noted that, while Todd personally guaranteed
$2 million in debt in order to purchase and renovate the Property, he effectively “converted his 1/6
interest in the [P]roperty to a 1/3 interest in the [P]roperty.” The district court further reasoned
that, although “Todd had a duty to Xantha to keep her reasonably informed of the trust and its
administration[,]” “[t]here is substantial evidence in the record that Todd did not do so.” Although
the district court did not specifically apply this analysis to the second prong of Section W, this
analysis is nonetheless applicable as to whether Todd violated his fiduciary duty as set forth in
Section W.
       Todd and White X Three contend that Todd only “had two choices he could make on behalf
of the Trust in 2008[:]” He could either consent to the sale of the Property or not. However, Xantha
makes clear that she is challenging two separate decisions Todd made: first, his decision to consent
to the sale of the Property at all, and second, his decision to consent to the sale of the Property at
the sale price of $650,000.
       As to Todd’s decision to consent to the sale of the Property, Xantha points out that the
district court placed great weight on Todd’s purported consideration of the liquidity of Xantha’s
assets, despite the fact that Xantha already had over $300,000 of liquid assets in the White Family
Trust at the time the Property was sold. The district court discounted that liquidity, seemingly
because it was a small percentage of Xantha’s total assets: “At first blush, Plaintiffs’ argument
might seem to be a valid objection to Todd’s reasoning; however, it ignores the fact that Xantha’s

                                                  16
total interest in White Family Trust at the time slightly exceeded $1 million.” (Italics in original.)
However, at no point in Todd’s affidavits, nor during his deposition, did he explain his liquidity
determination in terms of a percentage of Xantha’s total assets. Rather, although he acknowledged
Xantha already had more than $300,000 in liquid assets in the White Family Trust, Todd appeared
to have reasoned only that Xantha needed more liquidity due to her young age. He did not appear
to have taken into account her actual liquidity under the White Family Trust, nor did he appear to
have considered whether Xantha needed more liquidity compared to her actual liquidity; instead,
Todd appeared to have valued liquidity above all else, regardless of the actual facts and
circumstances of Xantha’s financial position. While a factfinder could ultimately agree with
Todd’s liquidity-above-all-else approach, the factfinder should only do so with the benefit of
evidence elicited at trial—not at the summary judgment stage. Furthermore, Xantha has pointed to
evidence that White X Three is leasing the renovated property for $21,000 per month. Although
the one-time payment of $95,000 gave Xantha a greater degree of liquidity, it effectively
eliminated the possibility of greater long-term growth of her assets. The cash received by Xantha
from the sale of the Property pales in comparison to the cash flow generated by the leasing of the
Property. We conclude Xantha has shown the existence of an issue of material fact as to whether
Todd acted “after forming his judgment based upon all the circumstances of any particular
situation as to the wisest and best course to pursue” and whether he acted “in a fiduciary capacity”
in consenting to sell the Property.
       Next, as to Todd’s decision to consent to the sale of the Property for $650,000, Xantha
acknowledges that the $807,261 assessment of the Property occurred after Todd had agreed to the
sale of the Property for $650,000. However, she argues that “[t]he timing of the assessor’s
valuation does not change the fact that Todd did no due diligence to determine the fair market
value of the Property at the time of the sale.” It is undisputed that Todd never had the Property
appraised, nor did he hire a real estate agent to analyze the sale in any way. Rather, in his
deposition, Todd explained that the $650,000 sale price originated from Rick White, Sr., who was
both the managing member of White X Three and a partner of WWLI. Todd further testified in his
deposition that he, Rick White, Sr., and Marilyn Lawley “felt that [$650,000] was a very fair price”
based on their own experiences in the real estate market in Twin Falls but admitted that he did not
review any documentation to determine the fair market value of the Property. As the district court
noted, “Todd’s action in evaluating the sales price of the [P]roperty could have been better[.]”

                                                 17
       Although Todd did not have knowledge of the $807,261 assessment before he agreed to
the sale of the Property, the fact that the assessment is over $150,000 more than the sale price
illustrates the problem in Todd’s decision not to obtain an appraisal. More concerning, however,
is Todd’s faith in Rick Sr.’s arriving at the sale price. Like Todd, Rick Sr. was a partner in WWLI
and a member of White X Three and thus was on both the selling and the purchasing sides of the
transaction. As Xantha points out in her reply brief:
       Rick White confirmed that no appraisal was completed, nor did he consult with any
       real estate agents or commercial property brokers, or look at any other comparable
       sales for commercial properties in determining the ultimate sales price of
       $650,000.00. Other than looking to the 2007 tax assessment, Rick White did not
       review any other documentation in coming up with the $650,000.00 figure.
(Internal citations omitted.)
       Todd and White X Three maintain that Lawley, the only seller on only one side of the
transaction, approved of the sale price of the Property. However, at no point in her declaration
does Lawley discuss the fair market value of the Property; rather, she states that she was in her late
seventies at the time of the sale and refused to personally guarantee the loan that would be required
to renovate the Property. She further stated she agreed to the sale price “because a substantial
amount of profit would accrue to [her] given the difference between the original purchase price
and the sale price of the [P]roperty[.]” At most, Lawley can be said to have approved of the sale
price because it was significantly higher than the 1998 purchase price and she would personally
benefit from selling the property. Between Rick Sr.’s conflict of interest in the sale, Todd’s lack
of independent analysis, and the lack of information in Lawley’s declaration, Xantha has shown
the existence of an issue of material fact as to whether Todd acted “after forming his judgment
based upon all the circumstances of any particular situation as to the wisest and best course to
pursue” and whether he acted “in a fiduciary capacity” in consenting to the sale price of the
Property.
       In sum, we conclude the district court erred in determining there was no issue of material
fact that Todd complied with the terms of the Trust Indenture in consenting to the sale of the
Property, both in general and in terms of the sale price. Therefore, we hold that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Todd and White X Three as to Xantha’s first cause
of action.

                                                 18
   B. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Todd and White X Three
      as to Xantha’s second cause of action.
       The district court also granted summary judgment for Todd and White X Three as to
Xantha’s second cause of action. Xantha requested that the district court create a constructive trust
for the Property. The district court declined to do so because “[t]his remedy [wa]s contingent upon
the [c]ourt finding the sale of the [P]roperty in 2008 to be void” and the district court had
determined “there [wa]s no basis to void the sale[.]”
       On appeal, Xantha argues that, because the district court erroneously determined that there
was no issue of material fact whether the sale of the Property was void, the district court also
erroneously dismissed her request to place the Property into a constructive trust. She requests that
this Court reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Todd and White X Three as
to her second cause of action. Todd and White X Three do not respond to Xantha’s arguments
regarding the creation of a constructive trust.
       Because we agree with Xantha’s assertion that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment as to her first cause of action, we also hold that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment as to her second cause of action. As discussed above, the requirement in Idaho
Code section 68-108(b) that Todd obtain court approval prior to consenting to the sale of the
Property is only superseded by Section W if Todd complied with the two conditions set forth in
Section W. If Todd did not comply with Section W, Idaho Code section 68-108(b) applied to the
sale of the Property and, because he did not obtain court approval, the sale of the Property would
be void. Therefore, we hold that Xantha has established there is an issue of material fact as to
whether the Property should be placed in a constructive trust. We reverse the district court’s grant
of summary judgment as to the second cause of action and remand the matter to the district court
for reconsideration after Xantha’s first cause of action is resolved on the merits.
   C. Todd and White X Three are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
       Todd and White X Three request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section
12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. They assert that Xantha’s Complaint “was ill-conceived and
that this appeal by Xantha has been brought frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation.”
Xantha counters that she has brought her arguments in good faith and, importantly, “[t]his appeal
presents legal issues of first impression[.]”
       Todd and White X Three are not the prevailing parties on appeal and are thus not entitled
to attorney fees. Additionally, Todd and White X Three are not entitled to attorney fees because

                                                  19
this appeal raises a novel question of law. Idaho Code section 12-121 provides that, “[i]n any civil
action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party or parties when the
judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation.” I.C. § 12-121. “Fees under section 12-121 are not appropriate when the appeal raises
a novel legal question.” Glatte v. Hernandez, 170 Idaho 481, 486, 512 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2022).
This case turns on the interpretation of two statutes enacted as part of the Uniform Trustees’
Powers Act. Despite both statutes being enacted over half a century ago in 1965, this Court has
never analyzed the interplay of Idaho Code sections 68-108(b) and 68-111. In fact, this Court has
never analyzed section 68-111—the only “citing references” available for the statute on Westlaw
are the three briefs submitted by the parties to this appeal. Therefore, we deny Todd’s and White
X Three’s request for attorney fees.
                                         IV.     CONCLUSION
       For the foregoing reasons, this Court vacates the district court’s grant of summary
judgment as to both Xantha’s first and second causes of action and remands for further
proceedings.
       Chief Justice BEVAN, Justice MOELLER, and TRIBE, J. Pro Tem, CONCUR.

ZAHN, Justice, dissenting.
       I agree with the majority that: (1) Idaho Code section 68-111 provides that the terms of a
trust may supersede the statutory requirement for court approval contained in section 68-108(b),
and (2) that Section W of the Trust Indenture in this case supersedes section 68-108(b). However,
I do not agree with its conclusion that Xantha can nullify Section W and revive the applicability
of section 68-108(b) if she establishes that Todd violated Section W. I therefore respectfully
dissent.
       This case comes to us on an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certificate of final
judgment. The only two claims before us on appeal are Xantha’s first and second causes of action.
The first cause of action sought a declaratory judgment that the sale of the real property was void.
It was based entirely on the assertion that Todd violated section 68-108(b) when he failed to obtain
court approval prior to selling the real property. The second cause of action requested that, because
the sale of the property was void, the court place the real property in a constructive trust.

                                                 20
       I agree that Idaho Code section 68-111 allows settlors to draft around section 68-108(b)’s
requirement for court approval and that Section W supersedes section 68-108(b)’s requirement to
obtain court approval for the sale of the Property. These conclusions resolve Xantha’s first claim.
Section W did not require Todd to obtain court approval before consenting to the sale of the
Property. As a result, Xantha is not entitled to a judgment that the property sale was void. That
conclusion, in turn, resolves her second claim. The property sale is not void under section 68-
108(b) and Xantha therefore is not entitled to the imposition of a constructive trust.
       If the majority opinion ended there, I would join it with no reservations. However, the
majority goes further. Despite holding that the settlors in this case drafted around section 68-
108(b), the majority goes on to conclude that if Todd failed to comply with Section W of the Trust
Indenture, Todd was required to obtain court approval pursuant to section 68-108(b):
       As discussed above, the requirement in Idaho Code 68-108(b) that Todd obtain
       court approval prior to consenting to the sale of the Property is only superseded by
       Section W if Todd complied with the two conditions set forth in Section W. If Todd
       did not comply with Section W, Idaho Code section 68-108(b) applied to the sale
       of the Property and, because he did not obtain court approval, the sale of the
       Property would be void.
(Emphasis added.) I cannot join this part of the majority’s opinion because it is based on two
erroneous conclusions. First, the majority misconstrues Respondents’ first counterclaim as
exclusively stating an affirmative defense to Xantha’s first claim for relief. Second, the majority
erroneously concludes that, while a settlor can draft around the requirements of section 68-108(b),
the requirements of that section are revived if the trustee breaches the trust indenture.
       The first error relates to Respondents’ first counterclaim. The majority construes the
language of Respondents’ first claim as seeking only “a declaration that, contrary to Xantha’s
claim, Todd did not need to obtain court approval prior to the sale of the Property.” One paragraph
of the counterclaim does seek such a declaration. The paragraph thus states both a counterclaim
and an affirmative defense to Xantha’s first claim. This claim is resolved in Todd’s favor by the
conclusion that section 68-111 allows settlors to draft around section 68-108(b) and that the settlors
in this case did as much in Section W of the Trust Indenture.
       The majority’s mistake is in concluding that Respondents’ first claim only seeks this one
declaration. A close reading of the claim reveals that it actually seeks two declarations. A second
paragraph of the first claim seeks a declaration that Todd in fact complied with Section W when
he consented to the sale of the property:

                                                 21
        Todd is entitled to a declaration from this court that his actions as set forth herein
        were consistent with the Grantors’ stated provision in the Trust Indenture that he
        was not required to obtain consent or approval of any court in order to consent to
        the sale of the Kimberly Road Property by White, White & Lawley I.
(Emphasis added.) It makes sense that Respondents would seek both declarations. To establish
that Todd properly consented to the sale of the property, they must show both that: (1) Section W
relieved Todd of the obligation to seek court approval prior to consenting to the sale, and (2) Todd
in fact complied with Section W.
        This second paragraph states a claim for relief, not an affirmative defense. “An affirmative
defense is a ‘defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s or
prosecution’s claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.’” Van Orden v. Van Orden,
170 Idaho 597, 607, 515 P.3d 233, 243 (2022) (quoting Kenworth Sales Co. v. Skinner Trucking,
Inc., 165 Idaho 938, 943, 454 P.3d 580, 585 (2019)). Xantha’s first claim sought a declaration that
Todd was required to obtain consent pursuant to section 68-108(b) prior to consenting to the sale.
Whether he, in fact, complied with Section W is irrelevant to this determination. As a result, the
second requested declaratory judgment is not an affirmative defense because it cannot defeat
Xantha’s claim that section 68-108(b) applied to the transaction. Instead, the second requested
declaratory judgment is its own claim for relief.
        This distinction is important because the only issues before us on appeal are whether the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on Xantha’s first two claims for relief. The
district court did not enter judgment on Respondents’ first counterclaim and, as a result, the request
for a declaration that Todd complied with Section W is not before us on appeal. Because judgment
has not been entered on that portion of the first counterclaim, and because it does not constitute an
affirmative defense to Xantha’s first claim for relief, there is no basis for the majority to address
whether Todd complied with Section W.
        Even if there was a basis to address Todd’s compliance with Section W, there is no legal
basis for the majority’s conclusion that Xantha can resuscitate the applicability of section 68-
108(b) if she establishes Todd failed to comply with Section W. Idaho Code section 68-111 is
short and to the point:
        Except as specifically provided in the trust, the provisions of this act apply to any
        trust established after the effective date [May 17, 1965] of this act.
(Alteration in original.) It unambiguously states that if the trust provides otherwise, then the
provisions of the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act (“Act”) do not apply. The statute does not impose

                                                  22
an additional requirement that the trustee must also comply with the provisions of the trust.
According to section 68-111, the Act applies unless the trust’s provisions indicate otherwise. The
trust in this case indicated otherwise and therefore section 68-108(b) did not apply. Once settlors
draft around the Act’s provisions, that is it. The beneficiaries’ rights are governed by the trust
indenture. The majority has cited no legal support for its conclusion to the contrary.
        This does not mean that Xantha is left without a remedy if Todd failed to comply with
Section W. But that remedy is not found in the Act. Instead, it is found in tort or trust law and is
an action for breach of trust:
        A trustee’s breach of trust provides a basis for the liability of the trustee regardless
        of whether the breach is wrongful and fraudulent or done through negligence or
        arises through mere oversight and forgetfulness, rendering the trustee liable for any
        damages proximately resulting from the breach, measured by the amount actually
        lost by the breach or the amount which the trustee has gained thereby. Redress may
        be had against the trustee for exceeding the trustee’s powers, acting negligently, or
        abusing the trustee’s discretion.
        The liability of the trustee may rest in tort, but, independent of tort law, trust law is
        a source of the trustee’s duties and liability for breach of trust. The required
        showing is (1) the presence of a formative instrument, (2) a duty owed by the
        defendant to the plaintiff, and (3) a breach of that duty, and (4) damages. The
        standard of proof for a breach of fiduciary duty claim against a trustee is clear and
        convincing evidence, rather than preponderance of the evidence.
90A C.J.S. Trusts § 347 (2023); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 95 cmt. a (2012)
(suggesting beneficiary’s remedies against trustee for breach of trust are, with limited exceptions,
equitable in nature). Although Xantha has not pleaded a breach of trust claim at this point, this
case will be remanded for further proceedings on her third claim for relief and on Respondents’
remaining counterclaims. Depending on the status of the proceedings on that point, it may be
possible for Xantha to successfully amend her pleadings to add a claim addressing Todd’s failure
to comply with Section W.
        Whether Xantha amends her complaint or not, on remand, the district court will need to
resolve the remainder of Respondents’ first counterclaim, which seeks a declaration that Todd
complied with Section W when he consented to the sale. The district court previously addressed
this issue in relation to Xantha’s first claim for relief. It is unclear why the district court believed
resolution of that question was relevant to Xantha’s first claim. To the extent it based its decision
to grant summary judgment on the conclusion that Todd failed to comply with Section W, I would
hold that it erred. For the reasons stated previously, whether Todd complied with Section W is

                                                   23
irrelevant to the request prayed for in Xantha’s first claim—a determination that Todd was required
to obtain court approval prior to consenting to the sale of the property. Nevertheless, I would affirm
its grant of summary judgment because it correctly held in its first memorandum decision and
order that section 68-111 permits a trust to supersede statutory provisions and that the settlors in
this case created a trust that drafted around the requirements of 68-108(b). These conclusions
resolved Xantha’s first and second claims for relief and I would affirm its decision dismissing
those claims on that basis.
       However, in the interest of providing guidance on remand, I agree with the majority’s
conclusion that the district court erred in its interpretation of Section W and the obligations that it
imposed on Todd. Section W indicated that Todd had to satisfy two conditions prior to consenting
to the sale of the Property. First, he had to form “his judgment based upon all the circumstances
of any particular situation as to the wisest and best course to pursue in the interests of the Trust
and the beneficiaries.” Second, he had to “exercise such powers at all times in a fiduciary capacity
primarily in the interests of the beneficiaries hereunder.” I also agree with the majority that Xantha
established a genuine issue of material fact on whether Todd complied with both of these
conditions when he consented to the sale of the Property.
       In summary, the district court’s determination that section 68-111 permits settlors to draft
around the Act, and that the settlors in this case drafted a trust that superseded the requirements of
section 68-108, resolved Xantha’s first and second claims for relief. I would affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on both claims. The majority opinion reversing the grants of
summary judgment goes beyond the claims presented to us on appeal and is based on an erroneous
conclusion of law. I therefore respectfully dissent.

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