Court Opinion

ID: 9882506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:51.902683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:36.209871
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Brown, 2023-Ohio-2917.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                         CASE NO. 1-22-55
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

MATTHEW L. BROWN,                                        OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
                           Trial Court No. CR2022 0030

                     Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part

                            Date of Decision: August 21, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        William T. Cramer for Appellant

        John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-22-55

POWELL, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Matthew L. Brown (“Brown”) brings this appeal

from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County convicting him

of multiple felonies and sentencing him to an aggregate prison term 150 years to

life. On appeal Brown challenges 1) the admission of improper testimony; 2) the

imposition of mandatory prison terms; and 3) that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed in

part and reversed in part.

                                   Background

       {¶2} Brown was married to a woman (“B.B”) who had a child (“the Victim”)

from a prior relationship. The Victim was born in 2007, and Brown began his

relationship with B.B. in 2012. After the marriage ended, Brown would visit his

biological children with B.B., but the Victim would not interact with him anymore.

       {¶3} In 2022, Brown’s niece contacted B.B. through Facebook and

expressed her concerns that the Victim was displaying signs that he had been

sexually abused. Following this, B.B. and the Victim’s grandmother spoke with the

Victim and asked him if anyone had touched him inappropriately. The Victim

denied it, but later messaged B.B. and admitted to being abused. B.B. and the

Victim’s grandmother spoke with the Victim again, and the Victim’s grandfather

contacted the police. B.B. then contacted Brown and asked him about what had

happened. Brown apologized and stated that he was sick.

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Case No. 1-22-55

      {¶4} On March 17, 2022, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Brown on

five Counts: 1) Sexual Battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), 2907.03(B), a

felony of the second degree; 2) Sexual Battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5),

2907.03(B), a felony of the second degree; 3) Gross Sexual Imposition in violation

of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), 2907(C)(2), a felony of the third degree; 4) Gross Sexual

Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), 2907(C)(2), a felony of the third

degree; and 5) Importuning in violation of R.C. 2907.07(A), 2907.07(F)(2), a felony

of the third degree. Brown entered a written plea of not guilty to all counts. On

June 16, 2022, the Allen County Grand Jury issued a superseding indictment

consisting of 19 Counts: nine counts of Rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b),

felonies of the first degree; seven counts of Sexual Battery in violation of R.C.

2907.03(A)(5), felonies of the second degree; two counts of Gross Sexual

Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), felonies of the third degree; and one

count of attempted rape in violation of 2923.02/2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the

second degree. Brown entered pleas of not guilty to all counts.

      {¶5} A jury trial was held from July 19-21, 2022. The jury returned verdicts

of guilty as to all nineteen counts in the superseding indictment. The trial court

accepted the verdicts and continued the matter for sentencing. A sentencing hearing

was held on August 29, 2022.

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Case No. 1-22-55

Count    Offense                   Sentence

1        Rape                      10 years to life – mandatory

2        Sexual battery            Merged with count 1

3        Gross sexual imposition   60 months – mandatory

4        Rape with force           25 years to life - mandatory

5        Sexual battery            Merged with count 4

6        Gross sexual imposition   60 months – mandatory

7        Rape with force           25 years to life - mandatory

8        Rape                      Merged with count 7

9        Sexual battery            Merged with count 7

10       Rape with force           25 years to life – mandatory

11       Sexual battery            Merged with count 10

12       Rape with force           25 years to life – mandatory

13       Rape                      Merged with count 12

14       Sexual battery            Merged with count 12

15       Rape                      11 years to 16.5 years – mandatory

16       Sexual battery            Merged with count 15

17       Rape                      11 years to 16.5 years – mandatory

18       Sexual battery            Merged with count 17

19       Attempted rape            8 years to 12 years

                                    -4-
Case No. 1-22-55

The trial court also ordered that the sentences be served consecutive to each other

for an aggregate prison term of 150 years. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal

from this judgment. On appeal, Brown raises the following assignments of error.

                             First Assignment of Error

       [Brown’s] due process rights were violated by the improper
       admission of testimony from police officers and a forensic
       interviewer to the effect that the alleged victim and his family
       were being truthful.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court improperly imposed mandatory prison terms on
       counts three and six for gross sexual imposition.

                            Third Assignment of Error

       [Brown] was deprived of his rights to the effective assistance of
       counsel under the state and federal constitutions because defense
       counsel failed to object to improper testimony and unlawful
       mandatory prison terms.

                               Bolstering of Testimony

       {¶6} In his first assignment of error, Brown alleges that the trial court erred

by allowing police officers and a forensic interviewer to testify to the effect that the

Victim and his family were being truthful. The determination of the weight to be

given to evidence and the assessment of a witness’ credibility is left to the trier of

fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). “In our system

of justice it is the fact finder, not the so-called expert or lay witnesses, who bears

the burden of assessing the credibility and veracity of witnesses.” State v. Eastham,

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Case No. 1-22-55

39 Ohio St.3d 307, 312, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988). As a result, the opinion of one

witness as to the veracity of another witness is inadmissible. State v. Smith, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-21, 2017-Ohio-9283, ¶46, 102 N.E.3d 9283. “When such

testimony is admitted, it is subject to a harmless error analysis on review.” Id.

       {¶7} Initially, we note that Brown does not specifically identify which

statements he finds to be bolstering the testimony of the Victim and the family

members who testified. A review of the record shows that the State asked Sergeant

Lawrence Wallace (“Wallace”) if there was anything in the demeanor of the Victim,

B.B., or the Victim’s grandmother that he “found to be disingenuous”. Tr. 317.

Wallace answered “No.” Tr. 317.

       {¶8} Deputy Clayton Eichman (“Eichman”) testified to the demeanor of the

Victim, B.B. and the Victim’s grandmother. Like Wallace, Eichman was also asked

if he found anything in the demeanor of the Victim, B.B., and the Victim’s

grandmother to be disingenuous. Eichman answered no to each question.

       {¶9} Shelby Lutterbein (“Lutterbein”) testified that she is an investigator for

Allen County Children’s Services.     Lutterbein testified that during the interview

she conducted with the Victim, the Victim’s reactions were not atypical. The State

asked Lutterbein how she knew if a child was lying to her and she testified to some

indications of deception she sees in children. Lutterbein then testified that she did

not observe those indications when interviewing the Victim.

                                         -6-
Case No. 1-22-55

       {¶10} In all of the above testimony, the State did not specifically ask the

witnesses if they believed the testimony of the Victim and the family members.

Instead, the State asked the witnesses if they observed anything in their interactions

with the Victim and the family members that would indicate they were lying. This

Court has previously addressed this issue in State v. Daley. 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-

13-26, 2014-Ohio-2128. In Daley, the detective was specifically asked as follows.

       Q: You’ve been trained in identifying deception in people that you
       deal with, haven’t you?

       A: Correct.

       Q: Did Ms. Tenney display or demonstrate, during the course of that
       portion of the interview where she revealed the sexual incident, did
       she demonstrate behaviors indicating that she was being deceptive?

       A: No. No, she did not.

Id. at ¶ 47. The detective did not testify whether a witness “was truthful or not

deceptive but rather, that she did not ‘display or demonstrate * * * behaviors

indicating that she was being deceptive’”. Id. at ¶ 50.

       Testimony based on the perception of a witness is within the scope of
       permissible lay opinion testimony under Evid.R. 701. * * * Here,
       Detective Reinbolt testified about Tenney’s behavior as he perceived
       it when she was describing “the sexual incident.” * * * This testimony
       did not rise to the level of expressing an opinion as to the veracity of
       Tenney and as such, was not improper. See [State v. Davis, 116 Ohio
       St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 116-120, 880 N.E.St.3d 404] (holding that a
       lay witness’s testimony that another witness was “very non-
       committal, very wishy washy,” was not an improper description of the
       witness’s demeanor that was relevant in showing evasiveness).

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Case No. 1-22-55

Id.   This Court then found the testimony to be admissible, as it did not

“impermissibly infringe on the role of the fact finder”. Id. at ¶ 53.

         {¶11} Brown argues that allowing the above referenced testimony was

allowing the witnesses to testify as to the veracity of the Victim and the family

members. However, the testimony of the witnesses went to what they observed or

did not observe, not to the truthfulness of the witness. Evidence Rule 701 allows a

witness to testify to an opinion if it is 1) rationally based on the perception of the

witness and 2) would be helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony

or a determination of a fact in issue. The testimony of the witnesses complies with

the requirements of Evidence Rule 701. Pursuant to this Court’s holding in Daley,

the testimony of the witnesses was admissible. The first assignment of error is

overruled.

                  Mandatory Sentences for Gross Sexual Imposition

         {¶12} Brown claims in the second assignment of error that the trial court

erred by ordering that his sentences for the gross sexual imposition convictions were

mandatory pursuant to R.C. 2905.05(C)(2). In support of this argument, Brown

cites to the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Bevly, 142 Ohio St.3d 41,

2015-Ohio-475, 27 N.E.3d 516. The State concedes that the trial court held contrary

to the holding in Bevly and requests a remand for a new sentencing hearing. We

agree.

                                         -8-
Case No. 1-22-55

       {¶13} In Bevly, the Court held as follows.

       [B]ecause there is no rational basis for the provision in R.C.
       2907.05(C)(2)(a) that requires a mandatory prison term for a
       defendant convicted of gross sexual imposition when the state has
       produced evidence corroborating the crime, the statute violates the
       due-process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
       the United States Constitution. Furthermore, because a finding of the
       existence of corroborating evidence pursuant to R.C.
       2907.05(C)(2)(a) is an element that must be found by a jury, we hold
       that the application of R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) in this case violated
       Bevly’s right to trial by jury found in the Sixth and Fourteenth
       Amendments of the United States Constitution.

Bevly, supra at ¶ 29. The Court then reversed the judgment and remanded the case

to the trial court for resentencing. Id.

       {¶14} This Court recently addressed a similar case. In State v. Smith, the

defendant was convicted of 17 counts of rape and four counts of gross sexual

imposition. State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-22-40, 2023-Ohio-1613. Smith

argued on appeal that the trial court erred by imposing mandatory prison terms for

gross sexual imposition based upon a finding that there was evidence to corroborate

the victim’s claims. This Court held that the trial court erred by finding that the

sentences were mandatory and that the sentence was contrary to law. Id. at ¶ 46.

This Court went on to say in the Smith case, that the error was “obvious, and any

sentence imposed by the trial court for gross sexual imposition upon remand would

be different, as it would not be a mandatory sentence. Id. at ¶ 47. The assignment

of error was sustained and the matter was remanded for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 48.

                                           -9-
Case No. 1-22-55

       {¶15} Here, Brown was found guilty of the charges by a jury. Pursuant to

the holdings in Bevly and Smith, we hold that the sentence imposed by the trial court

was contrary to law. Although there will not be a practical effect on the length of

Brown’s imprisonment given the extent of the sentence imposed, it is appropriate to

remand this matter for resentencing as to Counts 3 and 6. The second assignment

of error is sustained.

                              Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       {¶16} In the third assignment of error, Brown claims that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel because counsel 1) failed to object to the bolstering

testimony and 2) failed to object to the mandatory prison terms for the gross sexual

imposition.

       In evaluating whether a petitioner has been denied effective assistance
       of counsel, this court has held that the test is “whether the accused,
       under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and substantial justice
       was done.” State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 74 O.O.2d 156,
       341 N.E.2d 304, paragraph four of the syllabus. When making that
       determination, a two-step process is usually employed. “First, there
       must be a determination as to whether there has been a substantial
       violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to his client.
       Next, and analytically separate from the question of whether the
       defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated, there must be a
       determination as to whether the defense was prejudiced by counsel's
       ineffectiveness.” State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396–397,
       2 O.O.3d 495, 498, 358 N.E.2d 623, 627, vacated on other grounds
       (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3135, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154.

       On the issue of counsel's ineffectiveness, the petitioner has the burden
       of proof, since in Ohio a properly licensed attorney is presumably
       competent. See Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 299, 31

                                          -10-
Case No. 1-22-55

       O.O.2d 567, 209 N.E.2d 164; State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d [107] at
       110–111, 18 O.O.3d [348] at 351, 413 N.E.2d [819] at 822.

State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 1999-Ohio-102, 714 N.E.2d 905. “The

failure to prove either 1) a substantial violation or 2) prejudice caused by the

violation makes it unnecessary for a court to consider the other prong of the test.”

State v. Walker, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-42, 2016-Ohio-3499, 66 N.E.3d 349, ¶

20. “To show prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State

v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 95. “The

prejudice inquiry, thus, focuses not only on outcome determination, but also on

‘whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.’”

State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180 quoting

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).

       {¶17} Here, Brown alleges that counsel made two substantial errors. The

first is that counsel failed to object to the statements by witnesses that bolstered the

testimony of the Victim and the Victim’s family members. This issue was addressed

in the first assignment of error and found to be without merit. Since no violation

was found, counsel could not have been ineffective for this alleged failure.

       {¶18} Brown also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

the imposition of mandatory sentences on the gross sexual imposition convictions.

This issue was addressed in the second assignment of error. Having found that the

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Case No. 1-22-55

trial court erred in imposing the mandatory sentences, the matter was remanded for

resentencing. As a result, this claim is rendered moot and need not be addressed at

this time. For these reasons, the third assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶19} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County

is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The matter is remanded to the trial court for

the purpose of resentencing as to Counts 3 and 6 in accord with this opinion.

                                                         Judgment Affirmed in Part
                                                                  Reversed in Part

MILLER, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.

/hls

** Judge Stephen W. Powell of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, sitting
by Assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.

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