Court Opinion

ID: 9760214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:43:22.844145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.366444
License: Public Domain

Frank Holt, Justice, dissenting. I cannot agree with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the six year old children could be trespassers upon appellant’s property and, therefore, the trial court erred in holding otherwise. The majority correctly notes that the trial court, in granting a motion for a directed verdict on this issue, relied upon Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Kilpatrick, 185 Ark. 678, 49 S.W. 2d 353 (1932); and Cooper v. Diesel Service, Inc., 254 Ark. 743, 496 S.W. 2d 383 (1973). In Kilpatrick we said: “Children the age of the injured boy [7], going on other’s property, are not trespassers.” It is true that case involved an attractive nuisance (an electric substation). In Cooper, however, we made it clear that our holding in Kilpatrick is not limited to attractive nuisance cases and reaffirmed Kilpatrick that a seven year old boy, who goes upon the property of another, is not a trespasser because of his incapacity as an infant of tender age. As I read Kilpatrick and Cooper, this court is committed to the rule of law that infants of the tender age of six are incapable of committing trespass. Other jurisdictions support this reasoning. See Queen Insurance Company v. Hammond, 132 N.W. 2d 792 (Mich. 1965); Seaburg v. Williams, 161 N.E. 2d 576 (Ill. 1959); DeLuca v. Bowden, 329 N.E. 2d 109 (Ohio 1975); and Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934). The majority cites Moore v. Wilson, 180 Ark. 41, 20 S.W. 2d 310 (1929), as authority that an infant, as a general rule, is liable for his tort like that of an adult. That case is inapposite. The minor there was involved in a traffic mishap when driving a car. His age is not specified. The court characterized him as a minor and a “young man.” I would affirm. Dudley, J., joins in this dissent.