Court Opinion

ID: 9381992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 15:01:42.810932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.311587
License: Public Domain

Rel: March 24, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

   SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                   _________________________

                                         SC-2023-0042
                                   _________________________

                            Levorn Davis and Levern Davis

                                                      v.

   Darryl Hamilton, as personal representative of the Estate of
                     Henry Brim, deceased

                          Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court
                                    (CV-17-900448)

WISE, Justice.

        The defendants below, Levorn Davis and Levern Davis, appeal from

the Etowah Circuit Court's judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff

below, Darryl Hamilton, as personal representative of the estate of Henry

Brim, deceased. We reverse and remand.
SC-2023-0042

                     Facts and Procedural History

     On November 3, 2006, Brim sold property located on West

Tomahawk Trail in Gadsden ("the property") to Levern Davis. On that

same date, Levern executed a promissory note and a mortgage in favor of

Brim. The promissory note and the mortgage provided that the principal

amount of the note was $56,000; that the interest rate was 7% per

annum; that principal and interest payments were "due and payable in

465 equal consecutive monthly installments of $350.00, on the first day

of each month, beginning December 1, 2006"; and that the final

installment would be due on August 1, 2045. On April 16, 2015, Levern

executed a quitclaim deed in which he transferred his interest in the

property to his brother, Levorn Davis.

     On June 1, 2017, Brim filed a complaint against the defendants in

the Etowah Circuit Court. Brim alleged that the defendants were in

default under the terms of the promissory note and the mortgage; that

the defendants disputed that they were in default; and that the parties

also disputed the balance owed on the note. Brim further alleged that he

was seeking to foreclose on the property under terms of the mortgage but

that, "until it is determined the defendants have defaulted under the

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payment of the note and mortgage securing the same, foreclosure is not

available."   Thus, Brim asked the trial court to enter a judgment

declaring that the defendants were in default; determining the amount

still owed on the promissory note; and authorizing Brim to foreclose the

mortgage.

     On October 24, 2018, the trial court conducted a bench trial. At the

conclusion of the trial, the trial court gave the parties time to file briefs

and to submit additional financial documents. However, the parties did

not do so.

     On May 8, 2019, Jack Floyd ("former counsel") filed a suggestion of

death, stating that Brim had died on May 1, 2019. On June 18, 2021,

John Floyd ("current counsel") filed a notice of appearance as counsel for

"the plaintiff." On December 3, 2021, current counsel filed a motion to

substitute Hamilton, as personal representative of Brim's estate, as the

plaintiff. The motion stated that Hamilton had been appointed as the

personal representative of Brim's estate on February 26, 2020. The trial

court entered an order substituting Hamilton as the plaintiff on that

same day.

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     On December 6, 2021, the defendants filed a "Motion to

Reconsider," in which they asked the trial court to reconsider its order

substituting Hamilton as the plaintiff and to dismiss the action pursuant

to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. After being directed to do so by the trial

court, Hamilton filed a response to the motion to reconsider on December

16, 2021. In his response, Hamilton asserted:

           "1. That the attorney for [Brim], Jack Floyd[,] filed a
     Suggestion of Death on May 8, 2019. That following the death
     of [Brim], the family member and caretaker of [Brim], Darryl
     Hamilton[,] came to the attorney for [Brim] to probate the
     Last Will and Testament of Henry Brim ….

           "2. That [Brim] had numerous children/heirs-at-law
     that resulted in extensive time spent attempting to locate and
     provide service on the said heirs-at-law. Due to said delays,
     the Letters of Testamentary were not issued until February
     26, 2020.

           "3. That prior to the letters being issued, Jack Floyd …
     filed a Motion to Continue on January 29, 2020[,] stating that
     the Estate of Henry Brim was presented to Probate and that
     a hearing to appoint a personal representative for the estate
     was scheduled for February 26, 2020, which provides evidence
     of intent by the attorney to file the Motion for Substitution
     once the Letters of Testamentary were issued. …

          "4. That the Letters of Testamentary were received from
     the Probate Court by the attorney in March of 2020[,] after
     being processed. Simultaneously, due to the outbreak of
     Covid-19, an Administrative Order was entered by the
     Presiding Circuit Judge for the 16th Judicial Circuit of the
     State of Alabama on March 13, 2020, and an amended Order
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     on March 16, 2020. An Order of April 3, 2020[,] was issued as
     a result of said Administrative Order suspending the Civil
     Non-Jury Docket of April 13, 2020[,] that the case was set on
     ….

           "5. That court conflicts by the attorney for [Brim]
     resulted in continuances and due to a major health crisis of a
     brain bleed experienced by Jack Floyd in May of 2021, an
     entry of appearance was filed by John Floyd on June 21, 2021.

          "6. That John Floyd assisted in taking care of his father
     and law partner, Jack Floyd[,] after he had to undergo two
     surgeries to repair a brain bleed and remove a blood clot in
     June of 2021.

          "7. That Jack Floyd, [John Floyd's] father and law
     partner[,] contracted Covid-19 in August of 2021 and passed
     away on August 24, 2021.

           "8. That due to the disruption resulting from the
     outbreak of Covid-19 and [Jack Floyd's] subsequently
     experiencing a major brain bleed that resulted in
     deteriorating health before his death from Covid-19, the
     failure to file the Motion for Substitution was made in error.

           "WHEREFORE, premises considered [Hamilton] prays
     that your Honor will find that the failure to file a Motion for
     Substitution was made in error and that premises stated show
     that said error was made in excusable neglect."

On that same day, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to

reconsider.

     On June 28, 2022, the trial court entered a final judgment in the

case. The trial court held that the defendants had failed to timely make

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all payments pursuant to the promissory note and the mortgage; that the

defendants were in default; that the amount owed on the note was

$26,125.50; and that Hamilton could proceed with foreclosure

proceedings. This appeal followed.

                                Discussion

     The defendants argue that the trial court erroneously denied their

motion to reconsider the order substituting Hamilton as the plaintiff and

to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., because

the motion for substitution was not filed until nearly 31 months after the

filing of the suggestion of death.

     Rule 25(a)(1) provides:

     "If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
     court may order substitution of the proper parties. The
     motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the
     successors or representatives of the deceased party and,
     together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the
     parties as provided in Rule 5[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] and upon
     persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4[, Ala. R.
     Civ. P.,] for the service of a summons, and may be served in
     any county. Unless the motion for substitution is made not
     later than six months after the death is suggested upon the
     record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as
     provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall
     in the absence of a showing of excusable neglect be dismissed
     as to the deceased party."

(Emphasis added.) Rule 6(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part:
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     "When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
     order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or
     within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any
     time in its discretion … (2) upon motion made after the
     expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done
     where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect;
     but it may not extend the time for taking any action under
     Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b), [Ala. R. Civ.
     P.,] except to the extent and under the conditions stated in
     them."

     In Hayes v. Brookwood Hospital, 572 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (Ala. 1990),

this Court held that "the six-month provision of Rule 25(a)(1)[, Ala. R.

Civ. P.,] is subject to the general language of Rule 6(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]

allowing the extension of a specified time period upon a determination of

excusable neglect." This Court went on to state:

           "This holding requires the trial court to exercise
     discretion in determining, pursuant to Rule 6(b), whether
     there was excusable neglect warranting an extension of the
     time period in Rule 25(a)(1). The determination of excusable
     neglect will rest on the facts of each case. For example, in
     Wagner v. Frazier, 712 S.W.2d 109 (Tenn. App. 1986), the
     plaintiff died while awaiting a decision from the trial court on
     a question of damages. One of the defendants filed a
     suggestion of death, but no other action was taken within the
     90-day substitution period. The defendants moved for
     dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 25.01, a
     rule similar to Alabama's except for the time period. The
     deceased plaintiff's administratrix filed a motion seeking
     substitution 8 days after the 90-day period had expired; she
     asserted that letters testamentary had been issued, and she
     sought an extension of time beyond the 90-day period set in
     Rule 25.01. The defendants argued that the rule was
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     mandatory and that there was no showing or reason for the
     extension.

           "The trial court in Wagner, however, allowed the late
     substitution, finding '(1) [that] the time lapse was not an
     unreasonable one, and (2) [that] the case had been heard in
     its entirety, and (3) [holding] [that] as a matter within the
     court's discretion only "dire" circumstances would compel
     dismissal.' 712 S.W.2d at 113. The appellate court stated:

          " 'As is generally true, the kind of excuse that will
          satisfy this [excusable neglect] requirement is a
          function of the length of time that has passed and
          the possible harm to the opposite party. In this
          case where the suit had been fully tried and the
          parties were awaiting a decision from the court
          and the motion was made eight days after the
          ninety day period had run, we think the mere
          oversight of the plaintiff is excusable.'

     "Id. See also Garcia v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 712 P.2d 1114
     (Colo. App. 1985) (waiting for estate to be opened is not to be
     considered excusable neglect where the issue of excusable
     neglect was raised only by a passing reference in the plaintiff's
     brief opposing the defendant's motion to dismiss); Doherty v.
     Straughn, 407 A.2d 207 (Del. 1979) (ignorance of the rule does
     not constitute excusable neglect); Markan v. Sawchyn, 36
     Ohio App. 3d 136, 521 N.E.2d 824 (1987) (excusable neglect
     existed where administrator of estate, appointed 99 days after
     suggestion of death, filed a motion for substitution 2 days
     after appointment); Miller v. Ladd, 140 Vt. 293, 437 A.2d 1105
     (1981) (excusable neglect requires some reasonable basis for
     noncompliance within the stated period)."

Hayes, 572 So. 2d at 1254.

          "Rule 6(b) gives the court a very broad discretion to
     enlarge time periods, but such enlargement is to be only for
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     cause shown. ... If … the application for extra time comes
     after the period has run, notice of the motion must be given to
     the other parties, and the only cause for which extra time can
     be allowed is 'excusable neglect.' As to the meaning of
     'excusable neglect,' see 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
     and Procedure, Civil, § 1165 (1969)."

Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 6, Ala. R. Civ. P.

According to the most recent edition of Federal Practice and Procedure,

"[e]xcusable neglect seems to require a demonstration of good faith on the

part of the party seeking an extension of time and some reasonable basis

for noncompliance within the time specified in the rules." 4B Charles

Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1165, at 644 (4th

ed. 2015).

     In this case, former counsel filed the suggestion of death on May 8,

2019. The motion for substitution includes an assertion that Hamilton

was appointed as the personal representative of Brim's estate on

February 26, 2020. However, the motion for substitution was not filed

until December 3, 2021. Hamilton did not file a motion for enlargement

of time pursuant to Rule 6(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., or assert that the delay in

filing the motion for substitution was the result of excusable neglect.

Rather, he first addressed the issue of excusable neglect in his response

to the motion to reconsider.
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     In that response, Hamilton asserted that, after Brim's death, he

had contacted former counsel about probating Brim's will; that Brim "had

numerous children/heirs-at-law that resulted in extensive time spent

attempting to locate and provide service on the said heirs-at-law"; that,

as a result of the delays, letters testamentary were not issued until

February 26, 2020; and that "the Letters of Testamentary were received

from the Probate Court by the attorney in March of 2020 after being

processed." Hamilton also attached to the response a copy of a motion to

continue that former counsel had filed in the trial court on January 29,

2020, in which it was asserted that the probate court had set a date of

February 26, 2020, to appoint a personal representative of the estate.

Additionally, Hamilton asserted that former counsel had experienced a

brain bleed in May 2021; that, in June 2021, former counsel underwent

two surgeries to repair the brain bleed and to remove a blood clot; that,

in August 2021, former counsel contracted COVID-19; and that former

counsel died on August 24, 2021. Hamilton also asserted that current

counsel was former counsel's son and law partner; that current counsel

filed a notice of appearance on June 21, 2021; and that current counsel

had assisted in taking care of his father after his June 2021 surgeries.

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Assuming, without deciding, that Hamilton set forth facts from which the

trial court could have concluded that any delay between the filing of the

suggestion of death and the appointment of the personal representative

of Brim's estate and any delay that occurred after former counsel

experienced the brain bleed were the result of excusable neglect,

Hamilton has not set forth sufficient facts to support the conclusion that

the approximately 15-month delay between the time Hamilton was

appointed personal representative of Brim's estate and when former

counsel experienced the brain bleed was the result of excusable neglect.

     The only reasons Hamilton provided for the delay during that 15-

month period were "the disruption resulting from the outbreak of Covid-

19"; the trial court's April 3, 2020, order suspending the civil nonjury

docket that was scheduled for April 13, 2020; and the fact that "court

conflicts by the attorney for the Plaintiff resulted in continuances."

Although the trial court suspended the April 13, 2020, civil nonjury

docket, the case-action-summary sheet includes notations that the trial

court entered orders setting the matter for a bench trial and continuing

the matter on several different occasions between April 2020 and May

2021 and that the notices of those settings and continuances were sent to

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former counsel.    Additionally, Hamilton has not explained why any of

former counsel's "court conflicts" that resulted in continuances would

justify or excuse his failure to file the motion for substitution during the

15-month period.     Finally, Hamilton's response did not include any

factual assertions or explanation as to why the disruptions caused by

COVID-19 would justify the lengthy delay at issue here. Without more,

the general allegations included in Hamilton's response did not explain

why the failure to file a motion for substitution during the 15-month

period was actually the result of excusable neglect. Compare Cobb v.

Fisher, 20 So. 3d 1253 (Ala. 2009)(holding that the circumstances did not

warrant a finding of excusable neglect). Accordingly, the trial court

exceeded its discretion when it denied the defendants' motion to

reconsider and to dismiss the action.

                                Conclusion

     Based on the foregoing, the trial court exceeded its discretion when

it denied the defendants' motion to reconsider and to dismiss the action

pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. Accordingly, we reverse the

trial court's judgment and remand this case for the trial court to set aside

its December 3, 2021, order substituting Hamilton as the plaintiff, to set

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aside the judgment it entered on June 28, 2022, and to enter a judgment

dismissing the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.1

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, Mitchell, and Cook, JJ., concur.

      Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Mendheim and Stewart,

JJ., join.

      1Based on our disposition of the issue addressed in this opinion, we
pretermit discussion of the remaining issue raised by the defendants.
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).

     I respectfully dissent from the decision to reverse the trial court's

judgment in favor of Darryl Hamilton, as personal representative of the

estate of Henry Brim, deceased. In my view, the trial court did not exceed

its substantial discretion in allowing the substitution of Hamilton as the

plaintiff in this matter after Brim, the original plaintiff, died.

     In June 2017, Brim commenced an action seeking a judgment

declaring that a loan secured by a mortgage on land Brim had sold to

Levern Davis in November 2006 was in default, declaring the

outstanding amount due on the loan, and declaring that Brim could

foreclose on the mortgage. A nonjury trial was held in October 2018, but,

in May 2019, before a final judgment was entered, Brim died.           His

counsel, whom the main opinion refers to as "former counsel," filed a

suggestion of death approximately one week later. In December 2021,

Darryl Hamilton, as the personal representative of Brim's estate, filed a

motion requesting that he be substituted as the plaintiff in this action.

     After Brim died, Hamilton retained former counsel to assist in

having Hamilton designated as personal representative of Brim's estate

and in probating Brim's will. Although Brim died in May 2019, because

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of delays associated with locating Brim's heirs, Hamilton was not

appointed personal representative of Brim's estate until February 2020.

Former counsel received notice of the appointment of Hamilton as

personal representative in March 2020.

     By that point, the COVID-19 pandemic had started to cause delays

in court systems across the country. And, because of scheduling conflicts

and health problems, former counsel received multiple continuances in

this action. Eventually, former counsel experienced a brain bleed in May

2021, which required two surgeries in June 2021. That same month,

former counsel's son and law partner, whom the main opinion refers to

as "current counsel," entered an appearance on behalf of "the plaintiff."

Former counsel died unexpectedly in August 2021. On December 3, 2021,

current counsel moved to substitute Hamilton as the plaintiff in this

action.2

     Although Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., generally requires a motion

for substitution after the death of a party to be filed not later than six

     2It  does not appear that the defendants below, either in the trial
court or in this Court, have disputed the above-stated facts that Hamilton
has alleged in attempting to excuse his delay in seeking to have himself
substituted as the plaintiff in this action.
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months after the death is suggested on the record, an action should not

be dismissed for failure to meet that deadline if there is a showing of

excusable neglect for the delay. And, as the main opinion notes, Rule

6(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., gives trial courts broad discretion in determining

whether there has been excusable neglect. See Gilland v. Schuman, 582

So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Ala. 1991) (noting that trial courts have discretion in

determining whether there has been excusable neglect and that

resolution of that issue depends on the specific facts of each case);

Committee Comments to 1973 Adoption of Rule 6, Ala. R. Civ P. ("Rule

6(b) gives the court a very broad discretion to enlarge time periods ….").

     As the main opinion notes, a leading treatise discussing the

analogous Federal Rule of Civil Procedure states that "[e]xcusable

neglect seems to require a demonstration of good faith on the part of the

party seeking an extension of time and some reasonable basis for

noncompliance within the time specified in the rules." 4B Charles Alan

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1165, at 644 (4th ed.

2015). In the present case, the parties had already tried this action when

Hamilton sought to be substituted as the plaintiff. The only remaining

step was the entry of a final judgment.       The delay in substituting

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Hamilton resulted from difficulties in locating the heirs of Brim's estate,

the COVID-19 pandemic, and the health problems and unexpected death

of former counsel, who was current counsel's father.

     In Edwards v. Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp., 962 So. 2d 194,

213 (Ala. 2007), this Court described when a trial court exceeds its

discretion as follows:

     "A court exceeds its discretion when its ruling is based on an
     erroneous conclusion of law or when it has acted arbitrarily
     without employing conscientious judgment, has exceeded the
     bounds of reason in view of all circumstances, or has so far
     ignored recognized principles of law or practice as to cause
     substantial injustice."

Viewed together, the facts in this particular case are sufficient to justify

the conclusion that excusable neglect existed and to justify the trial

court's exercising its discretion to allow the substitution of Hamilton as

the plaintiff, albeit more than two and one-half years after Brim's death.

I simply cannot conclude that the trial court "acted arbitrarily without

employing conscientious judgment," "exceeded the bounds of reason in

view of all circumstances," or "so far ignored recognized principles of law

or practice as to cause substantial injustice."        Id.   Accordingly, I

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respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to reverse the trial court's

judgment.3

     Mendheim and Stewart, JJ., concur.

     3Ialso am not persuaded by the alternative argument for reversal,
namely, that the evidence does not support the trial court's ruling
regarding the unpaid balance on the loan secured by the mortgage.
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