Court Opinion

ID: 9723699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:28:00.075597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:51.180884
License: Public Domain

BENKE, J.
Concurring in result. I agree an affirmance is compelled in this case. However, I believe my colleagues have unnecessarily, and I re*396spectfully submit incorrectly, restricted the use of expert testimony offered on the “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome” (CSAAS).
I
The majority opinion concludes Kelly-Frye1 and People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236 [203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291], when read together serve to exclude general evidence concerning CSAAS. It concludes that only where introduction of a specific element of the syndrome is necessary in order to disabuse a myth or misconception concerning sexual abuse does the syndrome become admissible and then only the specific element may be presented to the jury.
Underlying the majority’s holding is its conclusion expert testimony is not admissible unless it is “necessary” and, where “necessity” does not appear, such testimony is irrelevant and thus inadmissible.
While academic debate may exist on the issue (see 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) The Opinion Rule, § 475, p. 447), the test employed to determine admissibility of expert testimony is not, as the majority suggests in this case, whether the evidence is somehow “necessary” but whether the proffered evidence will be of any assistance or appreciable help to the fact finder.
Evidence Code section 801, subdivison (a), is quite clear. Expert opinion is admissible when it is “Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.” (Italics added.)
In criticizing case law which had engrafted a rule of necessity on Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (a), our Supreme Court has stated: “[Section 801, subdivision (a)] does not flatly limit expert opinion testimony to subjects ‘beyond common experience’; rather, it limits such testimony to such subjects ‘sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact’ (italics added). The emphasized words . . . make it clear that the admissibility of expert opinion is a question of degree. The jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter of the opinion in order to justify its admission; if that were the test, little expert opinion testimony would ever be heard. Instead, the statute declares that even if the jury has some knowledge of the matter, expert opinion may be admitted whenever it would ‘assist’ the jury. It will be excluded only when it would add nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of information, i.e., when ‘the subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that men of *397ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness’ (People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99 [301 P.2d 854, 56 A.L.R.2d 1435] . . .).” (People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 367 [208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 46 A.L.R.4th 1011], italics added.)
Consistent with the majority’s reliance on a test of necessity is its conclusion that where it cannot be demonstrated the particular jury is in need of education regarding a specific myth regarding child sexual abuse, such evidence is not relevant and is therefore inadmissible. I find this a novel approach to the concept of relevance, and one which I respectfully submit is inconsistent with existing rules of evidence. Evidence Code section 210 defines relevant evidence as evidence “having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” This broad definition of relevance is not limited or expanded by the jury’s need for particular information. Nor is it limited by a determination of what potential misconceptions of the evidence a given jury might have. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Circumstantial Evidence, § 287, pp. 256-257.)
The definitional premises offered by the majority opinion lead, in my view, to an overly restrictive use of expert testimony. I believe existing California law permits a court to decide in any given case whether expert medical testimony concerning the existence of a syndrome would be of general assistance to the jury, free of the impediments now placed upon it by this court.
Moreover, I do not share my colleagues’ concern that syndrome evidence will be misused as a “predictor” of a condition which will necessarily misguide the fact finder. A “syndrome” is nothing more than a set of symptoms which tend to occur together. (Sloan-Dorland Annot. Medical-Legal Diet. (1987) p. 686.) The existence of such symptoms in the annals of medical literature does not necessarily “predict” anything. Where syndrome evidence is admitted, the parties are free to test the existence of the syndrome and whether the facts of the case are consistent with the syndrome. The majority’s concern that the jury will be improperly swayed by such evidence is one which portrays an overly pessimistic view of the jury system. Indeed, such factual determinations are best left to the fact-finding processes at trial, processes by which I believe the judge and jury can adequately examine the validity of specific medical testimony.
Unlike the majority, I am unconcerned that some elements of a syndrome may or may not be applicable in a given case. The applicability of a syndrome can be adequately determined by a fact finder with the assistance of able counsel.
*398II
In addition to my disagreement with the premises of the majority’s opinion, I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ application of the Kelly-Frye rule and interpretation of the Bledsoe decision.
A
Despite a plethora of case authority and textual materials on the subject, Kelly-Frye remains an elusive and inconsistently applied component in evidentiary law. It has variously been defined as a test applicable to “scientific evidence” rather than “expert medical opinion” (People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d 351, 373), “new scientific process operating on purely psychological evidence” (People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 53 [181 Cal.Rptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775]), expert medical opinion used to enhance the truth-finding process rather than to rehabilitate a victim (People v. Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d 236, 249) and any new scientific method of proof to which “factfinders would ‘tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty’” (In re Amber B. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 682, 690-691 [236 Cal.Rptr. 623]). It is amazing any trial court can determine what the test is and on what evidentiary basis it rests, let alone apply it.
To this milieu we add People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d 351. There, the defendant had offered the testimony of a medical expert on the psychological factors which may affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification. While he did not propose to offer an opinion as to the validity of any identification offered by particular witnesses at trial, he did wish to set forth in some detail the medical-psychological processes he believed were involved. He thus attempted to outline for the jury a “three-stage identification process.” The trial court, however, held the testimony inadmissible as failing to pass the Kelly-Frye analysis.
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court stated: “Here, ... no [unproven and ultimately unsound scientific] methods are in issue. We have never applied the Kelly-Frye rule to expert medical testimony, even when the witness is a psychiatrist and the subject matter is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a past state of mind or the prediction of future dangerousness, or even the diagnosis of an unusual form of mental illness not listed in the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association (People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 86-87 [175 Cal.Rptr. 703] . . . (‘Munchausen’s syndrome by proxy’)). We see no reason to require a greater foundation when the witness is a qualified psychologist who will simply explain to the jury how certain aspects of everyday experience shown by the record can affect human perception and memory, and through them, the accuracy of *399eyewitness identification testimony.” (People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p.373, italics added.)
Applying the principles set forth in McDonald, it is clear that CSAAS, much like theories of identification process, is a medical theory formulated by medical experience and opinion. CSAAS is not an experiment and no results of experiments need be relayed to the jury. Nor is a “medical procedure,” as that term is used in McDonald, employed.
If expert medical opinion regarding CSAAS is to be subjected to the Kelly-Frye test, that test would logically extend into all areas of expert opinion, including those involving psychological evaluation of individuals.
Aside from running afoul of the clear language of McDonald, the dangers inherent in such an extension are obvious. The application of the Kelly-Frye test would become overly burdensome, overly hypertechnical and even more inconsistently applied, precisely the grounds upon which the test has been challenged.21 believe the majority opinion, in applying Kelly-Frye to expert medical opinion, opens the door to such abuses and contributes to the kind of criticism which can only function to hasten the demise of an otherwise useful tool by which we can assimilate evergrowing and increasingly complex bodies of scientific evidence into our legal structure.
B
Nor do I believe the Bledsoe decision alone or in combination with Kelly-Frye necessarily compels the result reached by the majority.
With due respect to my colleagues and those critics and decisions debating perceived internal inconsistency created by an application of the Kelly-Frye test in Bledsoe, I am not confident the Bledsoe opinion rests upon a *400strict Kelly-Frye analysis. Indeed a close reading of the Bledsoe decision reflects that while the issues were framed by the parties as Kelly-Frye issues and while the court in Bledsoe gestures toward a Kelly-Frye analysis, Bledsoe never comes to grips with whether Kelly-Frey applies and does not rest its decision on a conclusion that general syndrome evidence is to be admitted or not admitted depending upon its general acceptance in the scientific community. Indeed to have rested Bledsoe on Kelly-Frye would have been to create inconsistency with McDonald and expand Kelly-Frye into the realm of expert testimony. Thus, while Bledsoe contains ambiguity it is ambiguity which I believe may serve a purpose.
I would adopt a far more simple view of the Bledsoe decision, one by which it remains both internally consistent and consistent with existing law.
Closely examined, Bledsoe holds that the rape trauma syndrome has only been used by the scientific community as a therapeutic device. The court concludes the syndrome was never intended as a device which could be used to determine whether the individual involved had actually been raped. It had no truth-finding function. In an analysis similar to that used in Kelly-Frye, the court reasoned that since the medical profession itself employed a limited use for the rape trauma syndrome, the prosecution could not exceed that use and introduce the syndrome to demonstrate that in fact, a particular complainant had been raped. Such would be a misuse of the syndrome.
Instead, using what appears to me to be a simple test of balancing prejudice against probative value (Evid. Code, § 352), the Supreme Court found the prejudice caused by the introduction of such evidence far outweighed the probative value due to the great likelihood the jury would actually misapply the evidence and use it to determine an issue for which the syndrome was never intended to apply.
However, the court held that if the defendant challenges a complainant’s credibility by urging a victim of rape would not act in the manner the complainant did, the prosecutor might then introduce evidence of the syndrome to demonstrate the medical profession has identified a syndrome which assumes assault in order to overcome popular myths surrounding the conduct of rape victims.
Viewed in this light Bledsoe does not create a “rule” and an “exception.” It is but a traditional application of section 352 as it relates to expert testimony. Moreover, such an interpretation of Bledsoe clearly permits introduction of general syndrome evidence. Indeed, nothing in Bledsoe suggests general syndrome evidence is inadmissible. Rather, consistent with the holding in McDonald, expert testimony concerning a medical syndrome remains admissible if it meets the general test of assistance to the jury on an issue which is before the fact finder. In Bledsoe, of course, the syndrome *401would have been of no assistance to the jury on the issue of guilt, the only purpose for which it had been offered.
C
In any event, whatever inconsistency one may find in Bledsoe, here Dr. Murphy did no more than offer medical testimony concerning a school of medical thought. He made no reference to the children alleged to have been molested, and, as was the situation in People v. Gray (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 213 [231 Cal.Rptr. 658], the testimony was introduced to rehabilitate the victim’s testimony and was thus pertinent to the question of credibility.3 (Id. at pp. 217-225; People v. Roscoe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1100 [215 Cal.Rptr. 45].) As in Gray, while the rehabilitation occurred during the People’s case-in-chief, it was, nonetheless, rehabilitative testimony which need not await the rebuttal stage of trial. (See, e.g., People v. Blakesley (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 723, 728 [102 Cal.Rptr. 885].)
It is for the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 18, 1988, and the opinion was modified on August 29, 1988, to read as printed above. The petitions of both parties for review by the Supreme Court were denied November 10, 1988.

People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 [130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240]; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013.

 The Kelly-Frye test has been harshly criticized for its ambiguity, inconsistent application, inflexible nature and needless rejection of relevant evidence. (Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later (1980) 80 Columbia L.Rev. 1197, 1204-1223; McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility (1982) 67 Iowa L.Rev. 879, 882-885; Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence—A Critique From the Prospective of Juror Psychology (1983) 100 Mil. L.Rev. 99, 102-107.) Its continued vitality has been questioned in United States v. Downing (1985) 753 F.2d 1224, 1234; see Giannelli, Novel Scientific Evidence, supra, at pp. 1228-1229; Weinstein & Berger, 3 Weinstein’s Evidence, ]| 702[03] pp. 702-15 to 705-21. The rule has recently been rejected in Oregon, which elected a more flexible criteria for admitting novel scientific evidence. (See, e.g., State v. Brown, (1984) 297 Ore. 404 [687 P.2d 751, 754].)
We clearly add inconsistency here, for while we now hold CSAAS is subject to a Kelly-Frye analysis, clear existing authority holds the battered child syndrome and Munchausen’s syndrome are not subject to th& Kelly-Frye test. (People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 87 [175 Cal.Rptr. 703]; People v. Jackson (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 504; Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 409 [131 Cal.Rptr. 69, 551 P.2d 389, 97 A.L.R.3d 324] [95 Cal.Rptr. 872]; People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 549, fn. 4 [128 Cal.Rptr. 161, 546 P.2d 665, 83 A.L.R.3d 1206].)

 Tonya denied that appellant had touched her anywhere other than the outside of her vagina. On direct examination she stated that she had been touched only once. However, on cross-examination she said that the touching occurred four times. She continued to assert that she had been touched very quickly. On redirect, she stated that she had also been touched on the right side of her bottom, but denied that she had been touched inside or outside her anus. This was contrary to the testimony she gave at the preliminary hearing.