Court Opinion

ID: 9715403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:04:40.411371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:34.762872
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority opinion’s ultimate conclusion is that the motor patrolman did not violate this appellant’s constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by denying her a reasonable opportunity to have a blood test. I adopt these authorities, all contrary to the majority stance, that the arrestee be given an independent test at his or her request and expense: Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 905 (1961); *526Brown v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, 86 Cal.App.3d 357, 150 Cal.Rptr. 216 (1978); In re Newbern, 175 Cal.App.2d 862, 1 Cal.Rptr. 80 (1959); State v. Munsey, 152 Me. 198, 127 A.2d 79 (1956); Commonwealth v. Alano, 388 Mass. 871, 448 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (1983); People v. Burton, 13 Mich.App. 203, 163 N.W.2d 823 (1969); Scarborough v. State, 261 So.2d 475 (Miss.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946, 93 S.Ct. 1353, 35 L.Ed.2d 613; State v. Snipes, 478 S.W.2d 299 (Mo.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 979, 93 S.Ct. 332, 34 L.Ed.2d 242; City of Kettering v. Baker, 42 Ohio St.2d 351, 354, 328 N.E.2d 805 (1975); State v. Lewis, 266 S.C. 45, 48-49, 221 S.E.2d 524 (1976); City of Blaine v. Suess, 93 Wash.2d 722, 728, 612 P.2d 789 (1980); City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash.2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966).
This is a case of first impression in this state and both parties so concede in their briefs. Thus, past precedent in this Court does not exist for the set of facts before us. Let us not, then, be married to cases such as Schlenker, cited in the majority opinion. This is uniquely a different case. This is not a civil hearing before an agency to revoke a driver’s license; it is a criminal case for which appellant may be imprisoned. We must raise our vision and minds past implied consent cases and upward to the Constitution. Then, our reasoning shall peak.
Unfortunately, the majority opinion fails to set forth the true facts of this case which are critical in our decision to the issue before us. And the issue before us is whether or not this appellant was denied a reasonable opportunity to have a blood test.
This was a court trial at Watertown. There was a “Stipulation of Facts” by the parties and without those stipulated facts, the reader cannot understand the true meaning and background of this case and its holding. Thus, I set forth in extenso those stipulated facts:
On April 24, 1983, State Trooper McManus arrested Barbara Jo Zoss for driving while under the influence of alcohol, violating SDCL 32-23-1. She was taken into custody and transported to the Codington County Detention Center in Watertown. While at the Detention Center, the trooper asked Ms. Zoss to take a breath test and read her the implied consent advisory. Ms. Zoss expressed concern about the accuracy of a breath test and requested a blood test. When the trooper asked if she wanted to submit to the breath test, she answered, “No.” The trooper asked if he should consider that a refusal, which began a discussion between them about the implications if she declined the breath test.
Trooper McManus said that if she refused the breath test, he would take her to the hospital for a blood test, and that the only difference would be that she could have her drivers license revoked if she refused the breath test. The trooper said, “I can’t see why you’d want to take your own blood test and refuse this one. If that’s the way you want to do it, fine. We can write up a refusal and submit it to the state, and take you over to the hospital for a blood test_” Ms. Zoss responded by again requesting a blood test. The trooper appeared ready to take her to the hospital for such a test when a Watertown police officer interrupted and left the room with the trooper. Upon the ■ trooper’s return, he refused to take Ms. Zoss for a blood test, and she was informed that she had no right to such a test. She was processed and placed in a jail cell, from where she renewed her request for a blood test a short time later. Again told she could not have such a test, Ms. Zoss remained in jail until she was discharged from custody several hours later.
During the course of this trial, the arresting trooper acknowledged that he had refused to allow Ms. Zoss to take a blood test. Per the transcript, a blood test would have been reasonably available. The transcript vividly reveals that Ms. Zoss repeatedly requested a blood test. There can be no doubt that this trooper told Ms. Zoss that he would take her to a nearby hospital *527for a blood test and initiated arrangements to accomplish the blood test. Later, he refused to do so apparently acting on the advice of a police officer at the jail.
The implied consent warning given at the time of Zoss’ arrest contained, inter alia, the following:
1. I have arrested you for driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, marijuana or any controlled drug or substance, a violation of SDCL 32-23-1.
2. I request that you submit to a chemical test of your breath to determine the amount of alcohol, marijuana or any controlled drug or substance in your blood.
3. You have a right to a chemical test by a person of your own choosing, at your own expense, in addition to the test I have just requested. (Emphasis supplied mine.)
The State apparently takes the position that if Ms. Zoss refused the test, she forfeited her right to have an independent test. There is no way that the State can wiggle out of its stipulation of facts. The motor patrolman advised Ms. Zoss that if she refused the breath test, he would take her to the hospital for a blood test and that the only difference would be that she could have her driver’s license revoked if she refused the breath test. One of the shocking developments of fact in this case was the motor patrolman’s admission on the stand that he recognized the importance of the scientific means of blood tests in gathering evidence; to that end, he testified that in every one of the over 200 D.W.I. arrests he had made, he had attempted to obtain a test for blood alcohol content. Stripped down to its naked rationale, the State is here contending the supremacy of statutory law in South Dakota over constitutional law. And, as we all know, such an argument does not hold water. The State is contending that Ms. Zoss’ statutory choice not to take a breath test (with its accompanying license-losing sanction) vitiated her constitutional right to her reasonable opportunity for a timely blood test. To say the least, it is illogical to propound that a citizen’s constitutional right will be respected only if the citizen first waives a statutory right. Having no authorities to submit its unsound contention, the State asks this Court to buttress its holding on old implied consent law cases such as Schlenker and State v. Birney, 85 S.D. 1, 176 N.W.2d 475 (1970). This I refuse to do for it would be tantamount to putting on a set of constitutional blinders.
I hereby vote to reverse this conviction as I believe that this lady was denied her constitutional rights to produce evidence on her own behalf. Ms. Zoss was held in custody beyond the time when she could have made arrangements to have a timely blood sample taken. She was discharged from custody several hours after her arrest. A timely blood test would have been effective evidence irrespective of the percentage of alcohol in the blood. Ultimately, the law enforcement officer (after first telling her that she could have a blood test) told Ms. Zoss that she absolutely had no right to exercise a reasonable opportunity for a blood test. This is blatantly contrary to the holdings contained in the authorities whichl have set forth above. What makes this case so constitutionally offensive is that the arresting officer promised Ms. Zoss that if she refused the breath test, he would take her to the hospital for a blood test. Ms. Zoss, having received that assurance, declined the breath test and the law enforcement officer forgot the promise of the blood test. Some 25 years ago, the United States Supreme Court observed that 23 states had enacted state laws sanctioning the use of blood tests to determine intoxication. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957). Critical language in that opinion brought out that a blood test could not only prove guilt but it could also prove innocence. Historically, the South Dakota State Legislature has given a great amount of consideration and attention to blood alcohol tests. See SDCL ch. 32-23. These statutes seem to cry out for procedures and sanctions pertaining to the gathering of evidence via *528blood alcohol testing procedures. How, then, can our courts of law in this state be so callous as to disregard the legislative intent and past United States Supreme Court decisions? A constitutional right of dimension has been violated here. Very little effort would have been required of the trooper to take this lady to the hospital to have a blood sample taken from her body. The opportunity to procure evidence was readily available. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194,10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the highest Court of this land held that the prosecution’s suppression of material evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process. In United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C.Cir.1971), it was held that Brady also applies to situations where it cannot be determined whether the evidence would have been favorable. Thus, the blood alcohol percentage of Ms. Zoss, whether favorable or unfavorable, is immaterial to her constitutional right. Cf. State v. Helmer, 278 N.W.2d 808 (S.D.1979). The constitutional right is one of a reasonable opportunity to have a blood test taken and this was refused based upon unconstitutional stratagem. South Dakota had this lady in custody in a jail cell and her whole being, including the blood coursing in her veins, was in the possession and control of law enforcement. Abraham Lincoln once penned and immortalized the phrase that this was a nation of the people, by the people, and for the people. Should then, a government of the people, withhold from one of its people, evidence which might prove her innocent of a crime she allegedly perpetrated — against all the people? Indeed, this is what has transpired when she is denied an opportunity to have her blood examined for its alcoholic content. There was no way she could gather evidence which might prove favorable to her. To take away her license to drive because of her refusal is a sanction provided by statute, but to refuse her the reasonable opportunity to take and pay for her own blood test is a constitutional transgression of due process and vitiates her criminal conviction.