Court Opinion

ID: 9730969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:29:33.686324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:11.762414
License: Public Domain

MALONEY, Justice,
dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that limitations does not bar Hugh F. Vanasek’s legal malpractice cause of action, I cannot agree that his Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) claims, like his malpractice claim, were tolled until final judgment in or other resolution of the underlying proceeding. Consequently, I dissent to that portion of the majority’s opinion and would overrule appellant’s fourth point of error as it relates to his DTPA claims.
The Texas Legislature has specified when a plaintiff must commence his DTPA action. See Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 17.565 (Vernon 1987). Under section 17.565, a DTPA action “must be commenced within two years after the date on which the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after the consumer discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the false, misleading, or deceptive act or prae-*16tice.” Id. The legislature included the discovery rule within section 17.565. See id.; Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex.1988); Hall v. Stephenson, 919 S.W.2d 454, 468 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
If an attorney commits malpractice while providing legal services in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on a malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claims are exhausted. See Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex.1991). Neither the legislature nor the supreme court, however, has applied the rationale of Hughes to toll the statute of limitations for DTPA claims arising from an attorney’s acts or omissions relating to litigation. In light of the specific statutory authority governing limitations in DTPA claims and the lack of existing authority to support an exception to section 17.565’s application, I decline to follow the majority’s application of Hughes to DTPA claims.
To prevail on statute of limitations grounds, appellees Paul B. Underkofler and Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & Langdon had to show (1) the date that the cause of action accrued and (2) that Vana-sek filed his suit after the passage of the applicable limitations period. See Zale Corp. v. Rosenbaum, 520 S.W.2d 889, 890-91 (Tex.1975). Movants’ summary judgment evidence shows that, in June 1991, Vanasek expressed that Underkofler mishandled various aspects of the proceedings in the underlying litigation. In November 1991, Vanasek met with Underkofler and expressed his dissatisfaction with the representation he was receiving and the fees he had paid. Vanasek continued to complain about Underkofler’s representation throughout early 1992. On April 7, 1992, Vanasek wrote to Jack Langdon, a Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & Langdon partner, listing specific complaints previously expressed to Underkofler regarding his representation. Vanasek had already determined that he could no longer work with Underkofler because he had lost confidence in Underkofler following a June 1991 hearing and realized he “was in dire straits.”
Vanasek’s summary judgment response does not contest that, as early as June 1991, appellant was aware of the allegedly deceptive, misleading, and false acts or practices forming the grounds for his DTPA claims. Instead, he asserts that the summary judgment evidence either fails to contain evidence, or reveals issues of material fact on whether, appellant either discovered or should have discovered the acts giving rise to the claims. Vanasek, however, had to plead discovery to invoke the discovery rule. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 647; Hall, 919 S.W.2d at 468; see also Archambault v. Archambault, 846 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (holding defendant must prove when cause of action accrued and negate discovery rule if pleaded). Vanasek did not plead discovery. Therefore, movants had to show only that Vanasek failed to commence his DTPA action within two years after the date on which the allegedly false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices occurred. Vanasek did not commence this action until April 6, 1994.
I conclude the summary judgment evidence shows that Vanasek knew of the acts or practices about which he complains in this lawsuit more than two years before filing his lawsuit. Consequently, I would overrule Vanasek’s fourth point of error to the extent he complains summary judgment was improper because limitations did not bar his DTPA claims.