Court Opinion

ID: 9661510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:40:35.906318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:29.065116
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice Abramson.
I respectfully and firmly dissent. J.G.R. is entitled under Kentucky law to pursue a paternity action, as both the trial court and Court of Appeals properly concluded when confronted with this difficult case. This Court errs grievously in holding otherwise.
The majority reasons that (1) Kentucky’s Uniform Act on Paternity, KRS Chapter 406, applies only to children born out of wedlock (KRS 406.180); (2) young J.A.R. was not born out of wedlock as defined in KRS 406.011; and, consequently, (3) J.G.R. cannot pursue a paternity action even though DNA testing allegedly establishes his biological connection and his conduct evinces a strong desire to truly be a father to the child. In my view, the majority errs in finding that J.A.R. was not born out of wedlock, misconstruing the phrase “where evidence shows that the marital relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of the child.” Properly construed, KRS 406.011 applies to situations such as the one now confronting us and expressly allows for J.G.R.’s paternity petition. Admittedly, some jurisdictions (including many of those cited to by Justice Scott in his concurring opinion) have laws that reflect the legislature’s apparent desire to preserve a currently intact family, however previously fractured, at all costs, including ignoring the biological truth in matters of paternity. Kentucky is not one *602of those states. Moreover, as explained below, laws which allow for establishment of the biological truth as to the paternity of a child do far more to advance society’s interest in preserving families than those which lock the courthouse doors to anyone but the mother and her husband.
KRS 406.021(1) allows paternity to be determined “upon the complaint of the mother, putative father, child, person, or agency substantially contributing to the support of the child.” The term “putative father” is not defined in KRS Chapter 406 but “putative” is defined as “generally considered or deemed such; reputed.” WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1997). Is the father of a child generally considered to be the man who provided half of the child’s genetic makeup or the man married to the mother who gave birth to the child? While I believe the former is more generally considered the “father”, reasonable minds could certainly differ on this issue. Regardless, it is apparent that KRS 406.021(1) does not clearly rule in or rule out a petition by a man in J.G.R.’s position.1
KRS 406.180 does describe the general applicability of KRS Chapter 406 as follows:
This chapter applies to all cases of birth out of wedlock:
(1) Where birth occurs within this state;
(2) When birth occurs out of this state at the time the mother is a resident of this state after June 18,1964; or
(3) When birth occurs out of this state and at some time following the birth the mother becomes a resident of this state after June 18,1964.
KRS 406.011 provides the only description of a birth “out of wedlock”:
The father of a child which is or may be born out of wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock, whether or not the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother’s pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses of the child. A child born during lawful wedlock, or within ten (10) months thereafter, is presumed to be the child of the husband and wife. However, a child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband where evidence shows that the marital relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of the child. (Emphasis supplied).
After citing these two provisions, the majority notes that Kentucky did not simply adopt section 1 of the Uniform Act on Paternity (1960) which states that: “a child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband.” In fact, Kentucky adopted that precise language and then added the phrase emphasized above. The majority believes that by doing so the Kentucky General Assembly chose a “distinctively” different definition for birth out of wedlock, ie., if the married couple had “marital relations” within ten months prior to the birth of a child, that child is not born out of wedlock but is a child of the marriage. Under this interpretation, a wife could have one sexual encounter with her husband in the ten months preceding her child’s birth and have multiple sexual encounters with another man (or men) but the child would still be born in wedlock to the mother and the man named on her *603marriage certificate. This is not what our legislature intended.
KRS 406.011 does not speak to “marital relations”, a polite reference to the sexual aspect of marriage, but rather to the “marital relationship”, that broader, more meaningful aspect of married life that clergy and judges speak of when joining two fives as one. A marital relationship has emotional, physical, social and, yes, moral dimensions and is characterized by a monogamous bond between the two parties to the relationship. The “marital relationship between the husband and wife” referenced in KRS 406.011 can certainly be said to “cease” when the wife is having sexual intercourse with another man. The “marriage” may still exist as a matter of law and “marital relations” (ie., sexual intercourse) may still occur between the husband and wife on occasion, or even with regularity, but the monogamous “marital relationship” on which our society is based “ceased” when that third party entered the picture. If we focus on the words actually used by the Kentucky General Assembly, “marital relationship”, as opposed to substituting “marital relations” (and therefore sexual intercourse) as the operative concern, then it is apparent that a child born under the circumstances of this case is indeed born out of wedlock. This interpretation has the added advantage of comporting with common sense because few people would question that a child born to a married woman and a lover who is not her husband is indeed born out of wedlock.
If our General Assembly intended this interpretation, some might question why they bothered to add the phrase “where evidence shows that the marital relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of the child.” Why did they not simply adopt the UPA’s standard definition — “a child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband”? If the General Assembly had done so, any man claiming to be the father of a child could bring a petition and set in motion paternity testing and proceedings with little more than a bare allegation. The language added by our legislature requires a preliminary showing of evidence that the marital relationship “ceased” in the relevant timeframe. In other words, the putative father must have some evidence to proffer that shows he is not merely on a fishing expedition or out to create havoc in a marriage. The evidence which would show a cessation of the marital relationship must inevitably be assessed on a case-by-case basis but it would undoubtedly encompass a situation where the putative father has had access to the child through cooperation by the mother and has secured DNA testing that establishes his biological fatherhood. There is no more telling proof that “the marital relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of the child.”
For those who believe that KRS 406.011 is just as readily susceptible to the interpretation advanced in the majority opinion and who believe that particular interpretation does more to advance the Commonwealth’s interest in the integrity of the family, three points should be considered. First, how is the family strengthened when a mother can conceive a child outside of marriage and be assured that she alone knows the child’s biological origins and can control their discovery? She can harbor this secret until divorce, revealing the truth at that juncture if it serves her purposes. See, e.g. Boone v. Ballinger, 228 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.App.2007). With this interpretation, there are no societal disincentives to conceiving a child outside the bounds of her marriage. Construing “marital relationship” as the more encompassing monogamous relationship, on the other hand, leaves no doubt that if she *604engages in an extramarital affair, the man will have a legal right to claim a place in the child’s life. Second, for those who think it places the child in an untenable position vis-á-vis his or her in-home father and perhaps other siblings, there are tens of thousands of blended families all across Kentucky who deal with those types of issues daily. Many marriages include children who are “yours and mine” or “yours, mine and ours” and those families cope with weekend and summer visitation, shared holidays and other aspects of blended families. In situations such as the one in this case, the only variable is that the child or children who have a parent outside the home are the younger as opposed to the older children in the family residence. Third, knowing the truth about one’s genetic background has both medical and psychological consequences. Is it appropriate to leave a child without such genetic knowledge that could be crucial in the course of his or her life in medical situations? As for the psychological component, it is commonplace that adoptive parents are encouraged to share with their children the fact of their adoption at an appropriate time. Why should children like J.A.R. not have a similar right to know? In short, hiding the truth does not support the integrity of the family or advance the best interests of the child.
Justice Scott’s concurring opinion cites cases from several jurisdictions that similarly leave the biological father without recourse where the mother is married to another man. Each of these cases is decided as a matter of that individual state’s law and none is binding on this Court. The United States Supreme Court has held that states may properly adopt presumptions and limit paternity actions as a matter of state law. Specifically, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a biological father’s procedural and substantive due process rights were not violated by a California statute creating a conclusive presumption that a child born during a marriage was a child of the marriage. Only the husband or wife could challenge the presumption and, even then, only if the challenge was raised within two years of the child’s birth. In this context, the Supreme Court stated:
Where ... the child is born into an extant marital family, the natural father’s unique opportunity (to develop a relationship with his offspring) conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference to the latter.
Id. at 129,109 S.Ct. at 2333.
Thus, states can and do give clear “categorical preference” to the rights of the husband of the marriage. For example, in David V.R. v. Wanda J.D., 907 P.2d 1025 (Okl.1995), the Oklahoma statutory scheme provided that “all children born during wedlock are legitimate” and the presumption was irrebuttable except by the husband or wife or the descendant of one or both of them. In other states, there are several ways a man can be a “presumed father” and once a child has a presumed father under the statute, the issue of his or her paternity cannot be raised except by the mother, the presumed father, the child or an agency of the state if the child is receiving public assistance. See, e.g., Ex parte C.A.P., W.H.P and A.C.P., 683 So.2d 1010 (Ala.1996).
Kentucky has not expressed a “categorical preference” for the interest of the husband to the marriage. Unlike states with presumptions that expressly state that only the husband or wife can challenge the “born during the marriage and therefore child of the marriage” presumption, KRS 406.011 does not preclude a challenge by parties outside the marriage. Indeed, such challenges have been allowed as evidenced by Montgomery v. McCracken, 802 *605S.W.2d 943 (1990), discussed in the majority opinion and Bartlett v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d 470 (Ky.1986). In the latter case, a child born in May, 1975 was deemed not to be the child of his mother’s marriage even though she was married at the time of the birth. There was conflicting testimony about whether she and her husband were separated or in any type of marital relationship at the time the child was conceived but HLA testing established that another man was the father. The case was apparently brought by the Commonwealth to determine the child’s real father.
The mother’s testimony, if believed, was sufficient to establish “that the marital relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of the child.” KRS .106.011, supra. We need not decide whether the HLA testing standing alone would be sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy and establish the appellant’s paternity. Certainly, the HLA testing when corroborated by the evidence of access, the contribution toward support, and a similar genetic characteristic, is so overwhelming as to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
By this opinion we acknowledge the importance of HLA blood testing in supplying evidence as necessary to overcome the presumption of legitimacy and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Truth and justice are irrevocably bound. They are Siamese twins sharing a single heart beat. Neither can survive very long without the other. When the advances of science serve to assist in the discovery of the truth, the law must accommodate them. The law cannot pick and choose when truth will prevail.
Id. at 472-73.
In Montgomery it appears the Commonwealth was again the moving party but it is also clear that the Court of Appeals concluded that a child could be deemed born out of wedlock even where the parties to the marriage had maintained “marital relations” if there was clear evidence the husband was not the child’s father.
Contrary to appellant’s assertions, we are not persuaded that this provision indicates that a child born to a married woman can be found to have been born out of wedlock only if the spouses’ marital relationship ended at least ten months prior to the child’s birth. Here, although the spouses’ marital relationship did not fall into the category of having ceased ten months prior to the child’s birth, it is uncontroverted that the husband was found in an earlier circuit court proceeding to not be the child’s father. That finding is not before us on appeal. That being so, the trial court certainly did not err by concluding that the presumption of legitimacy had been overcome by evidence “so clear, distinct and convincing as to remove the question from the realm of reasonable doubt.” See Simmons v. Simmons, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 585, 587 (1972).
802 S.W.2d at 944 (emphasis in original). The majority, in my view, errs in overruling cases such as Montgomery which allow rebuttal of the presumption.
Finally and notably, many states have dealt with parentage in cases such as this one by adopting the Uniform Parentage Act. The 2000 version of the Uniform Parentage Act would allow standing to a man in J.G.R.’s position provided he sought adjudication of parentage not later than two years after the child’s birth. See, § 607 Uniform Parentage Act (2000). The commentary to § 607 reflects the variance among states in dealing with the issue as of 2000 and the middle ground adopted in the Uniform Parentage Act:
*606As of the year 2000, the right of an “outsider” to claim paternity of a child born to a married woman varies considerably among the States. Thirty-three States allow a man alleging himself to be the father of a child with a presumed father to rebut the marital presumption. Some States have granted this right through legislation, while in other States case law has recognized the alleged father’s right to rebut the presumption and establish his paternity. In some States, there is both statutory and common law support for the standing of a man alleging himself to be the father to assert his paternity of a child born to a married woman. Finally, some States, such as California, absolutely bar a man from commencing a proceeding to establish his paternity if state law provides a statutory presumption of the paternity of another man, see West’s Ann. Cal. Evid.Code § 621, upheld in Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91(1989).
UPA (2000) attempts to establish a middle ground on these exceedingly complex issues. Subsection (a) establishes a two-year limitation for rebutting the presumption of paternity established under Section 204 if the mother and presumed father were cohabiting at the time of conception. The presumption of paternity may be attacked by the mother, the presumed father, or a third-party male during this limited period; thereafter, the presumption is immune from attack by any of those individuals.
9B Uniform Laws Annotated, § 607 Uniform Parentage Act (2000) at p. 342. Certainly Kentucky’s stance on this issue would be clearer and the issue of paternity would be fairly and finally adjudicated in a timely manner if the General Assembly simply adopted the 2000 version of the Uniform Parentage Act. Nonetheless, even without this model legislation, Kentucky law allows a paternity action to be filed by J.G.R. under the circumstances of this case.
In short, our world is full of inconvenient truths. We accomplish nothing for families, the broader community and our justice system when we deny those truths, especially when Kentucky law does not require that result. J.G.R. should be allowed to pursue a paternity action because J.A.R. was born out of wedlock, in both the common understanding of that term and as provided in KRS 406.011. The family court had jurisdiction and the Kentucky Court of Appeals was correct in denying the writ of prohibition.
SCHRODER, J., joins.

. As the majority notes, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines "putative father” as “[t]he alleged biological father of a child born out of wedlock.” Under this definition, J.G.R. is a putative father.