Court Opinion

ID: 9746893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:43:00.59015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:26.257456
License: Public Domain

BEDSWORTH, J.
I dissent.
Like my colleagues, I sympathize with Sue Garnet’s misfortune. And I regret the intemperate choice of words of the trial judge. Unlike my colleagues, I cannot find “there was an abuse of discretion because of a combination of events,” and I cannot find authority for reversal because of “the appearance of substantial unfairness.” And while reliance by the majority upon the rules of kickball will ordinarily make opinions more intelligible to me, I fear that it will not provide much guidance to trial judges trying to discern from this opinion just how they must handle an in propria persona litigant.
My colleagues recognize in one sentence the hoary but still vigorous rule that “pro per litigants are not entitled to any special treatment from the courts,” but devote several paragraphs to setting out the kinds of special treatment trial judges will be obliged to accord them under this opinion.
In propria persona litigants have become more common in recent years and seem destined to become a much larger portion of the trial court docket than they have been in the past. It may be time to reassess our case law regarding them. And while I agree with much that is said in the majority opinion, and might be prepared to give a second look to our rules regarding in propria persona litigants, I think an ad hoc reversal which tells trial judges to treat in propria persona litigants the same as they treat represented litigants—only different—accomplishes little in the way of addressing the problem and does a disservice to the people who must deal with in propria persona litigants every day.
As near as I can determine, the majority orders a “do-over” (their term) in this case because appellant received confusing or misleading information *1288from the trial court. But appellant makes no such claim. And probably with good reason. After all, there is no doubt that she knew of the trial readiness conference, appeared (through counsel) at the show cause hearing, and knew unmistakably that the complaint had been dismissed within days after the fact. Indeed, she wrote to the trial judge to ask for reconsideration even before notice of entry of judgment was served.1
As to the trial judge’s failure to explain his reasons for dismissal of the action, this is another instance in which I wish my trial colleague had proceeded differently, but the oversight is not grounds for reversal. A judgment of a lower court is presumed to be correct, and error must be affirmatively shown. (Jacques Interiors v. Petrak (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1363, 1369 [234 Cal.Rptr. 44].) In this case, nothing has been shown except ill-chosen remarks, which the majority purports to recognize as possibly no more than venting by “a busy trial judge trying to keep control of his calendar, with no rancor intended.” (Maj. opn., ante, fn. 4.) I cannot find in that a basis for reversal.
I
As to Gamet, the only issue before us is whether the trial judge erred in denying the motion to vacate. I cannot agree there was an abuse of discretion.
Gamet never appealed from the order dismissing the complaint, so we have no power to review it. A notice of appeal filed after denial of a motion to vacate a judgment confers no jurisdiction to review the merits of the judgment. It presents only the propriety of the order refusing to set aside the judgment. (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 109, 117 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 113].)
Even if members of this court would have reached a different result, the trial judge’s decision was within the bounds of reason. Despite Garnet’s problems, it was reasonable to infer none prevented her from appearing for the trial readiness conference, or at least asking that it be continued to a later date. Gamet never said she was unable to travel, she had agreed to travel to California for her deposition, and she made the trip to argue the motion to vacate. The majority’s claim that she was unaware of the trial readiness *1289conference date is unconvincing, since the trial judge specifically told her it was set for April 5, 1996, when he wrote to her after granting counsel’s motion to withdraw. And Garnet’s willingness to communicate directly with the judge quite reasonably raises the question why she did not notify the judge of her problems prior to the hearing, or ask for a postponement. The upshot is that I cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion when he declined to vacate the judgment.
II
Turning to ASI, my colleagues grant it relief in the guise of dismissing its appeal. They invite ASI to move the trial court to set aside the May 1996 judgment, on the ground that a void judgment may be vacated at any time. And, if I take their meaning correctly, they imply that should the trial judge deny the motion, they will reverse him on appeal.
I think these suggestions unwise. Beyond that, neither the record nor the law support the conclusion the judgment is void.
ASI certainly knew of the order allowing counsel to withdraw because Gamet knew. After all, suit on behalf of ASI was brought by Gamet, the corporation’s majority shareholder, one of its two directors, and apparently its president as well. In fact and in substance, ASI had notice of the order of withdrawal. There is no denying that the withdrawal order did not become operative by its terms, never having been served as required. The question I think this presents is whether we should focus on formal defects even when the substance is there. And I think the answer should be “no.”
The authorities cited by the majority would not support finding this judgment void. Morgan v. Clapp (1929) 207 Cal. 221 [277 P. 490] found the judgment before it valid. In Lovato v. Santa Fe Internal Corp. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 549 [198 Cal.Rptr. 838], the court set aside a default judgment where a corporation had neither actual nor constructive notice of the hearing at which the judgment was entered. Notably, there the corporation filed a timely motion to set aside the default and a timely notice of appeal. Here, ASI had actual notice of the dismissal order, it did not move to set it aside, and it did not file a timely notice of appeal. I would dismiss the appeal of ASI as untimely and go no further.
I can find no basis for a reversal in this case other than my own chagrin that the trial judge inappropriately expressed his desire to force a reluctant *1290litigant into court. And since the Legislature has inexplicably failed to recognize my disapproval as a grounds for reversal, I would affirm the judgment.
Respondents’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 14, 2001.

 In that letter she asserts, “I would have been at this conference myself but my family needed me back in South Dakota since my mom needed to be out of town on a matter that couldn’t be rescheduled and my father is really having problems with the loss of his only son.” This is not the complaint of someone who didn’t know about the conference, but rather the explanation of someone who decided her mother’s family business was more important.