Court Opinion

ID: 9857528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 15:00:28.401036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:44.466278
License: Public Domain

PATTON, Bankruptcy Judge
(concurring).
Section 362 provides broad relief for a debtor from collection attempts by creditors. We are not convinced, however, that the Section 362 stay was intended to block the collection of alimony, maintenance and child support payments in a case filed under Chapter 13 of the Code after judgment has been entered in state divorce proceedings. The Code reflects a strong policy against its being used by a debtor to avoid such obligations.
In Wetmore v. Markoe, supra, the Court enunciated a principle of statutory construction which can give guidance in this situation. In deciding that an alimony judgment could not be discharged, it noted:
“The bankruptcy law should receive such an interpretation as will effectuate its beneficent purposes, and not make it an instrument to deprive dependent wife (sic) and children of support and maintenance due them from the husband and father, which it has ever been the purpose of the law to enforce. Systems of bankruptcy are designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive, and to permit him to have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the obligations and responsibilities which may have resulted from business misfortunes. Unless positively required by direct enactment the courts should not presume a design upon the part of Congress, in relieving the unfortunate debtor, to make the law a means of avoiding enforcement of the obligation, moral or legal, devolved upon the husband to support his wife and to maintain and educate his children.” 196 U.S. at 77, 25 S.Ct. at 176.
This principle remains viable in the context of modern bankruptcy law. Its application in this situation is consistent with recent decisions construing federal statutory enactments so as not to interfere with state enforcement of support obligations. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2nd Cir. 1979). Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F.Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Cody v. Rieker, 454 F.Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
A. T. & T. v. Merry, supra, is particularly persuasive. In that case, the court found that a state court ordered garnishment to satisfy family support payments was not blocked by provisions of ERISA preempting state law and proscribing alienation of assignment of pension benefits accumulated under that federal statutory scheme. The court rejected a literal statutory interpretation of the ERISA provisions and found that the enforcement actions taken were “impliedly excepted” from the restrictions. 592 F.2d at 121.
In reasoning similar to that contained in Wetmore, the court in the A. T. & T. case, quoting Cartledge v. Miller, supra, relied on the “fundamental principle of statutory interpretation (whereby) courts have presumed that the basic police powers of the states, particularly the regulation of domestic relations, are not superseded by federal legislation unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” 592 F.2d at 122.
These principles of statutory construction seem particularly applicable to one of the questions in the case at bar. We are faced with a statutory proscription which, if read strictly and literally, could well pose a sub*262stantial impediment to the already difficult task faced by the states in enforcing family support obligations. We do not think Congress intended this result. Failing to find such Congressional intent, a construction of such obligations in the control of the states is mandated. Absent clear and explicit Congressional direction, we believe it unwise to alter the balance between state and federal functions which exists in this area.
BRODY, Bankruptcy Judge, participated in the hearing but took no part in the decision of this case.