Court Opinion

ID: 9896167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 17:10:12.569252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:13.138779
License: Public Domain

J-S31021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 CHRISTOPHER H. WRIGHT                   :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 1089 EDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 13, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
            Criminal Division at No: CP-64-CR-0000210-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED NOVEMBER 09, 2023

     Appellant, Christopher H. Wright, appeals from the judgment of

sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County entered on April 13,

2023. Counsel has filed a brief and petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we grant counsel’s petition for leave to

withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

     The trial court summarized the relevant background as follows.

     On March 13, 2023, [Appellant], represented by [counsel], signed
     a written guilty plea colloquy pleading guilty to Counts 3 and 5 of
     the Second Amended Information, Stalking (18 Pa.C.S.A.
     § 2702(a)(1)) (felony of the third degree) and Simple Assault (18
     Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1) (misdemeanor of the second degree),
     respectively. On the same date, [the trial court] conducted an
     oral colloquy and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. On April
     13, 2023, upon consideration of the pre-sentence investigation
     report and following a sentencing hearing, [the trial court] ordered
     a total sentence of forty-five (45) months to one hundred eight
     (108) months in a State Correctional Institution. . . . .
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      On April 17, 2023, [Appellant] filed a Motion for Post Sentence
      Relief pursuant to Rule 720 of Pa.R.Crim.P. requesting [the trial
      court] to reconsider and reduce [Appellant]’s sentence,
      specifically with respect to Count 3, for which [the trial court]
      imposed a sentence in the aggravated range. [The trial court]
      denied the Motion for Post Sentence Relief by Order dated April
      18, 2023.

Trial Court Opinion, June 9, 2023, at 1-2. The sentencing transcript reflects

that Appellant has seventeen adult convictions “ranging from assault to

strangulation to DUI to fraud to theft to disorderly conduct to possession with

intent to deliver.” N.T., 4/13/23, at 11. In the present case, after Appellant’s

wife obtained a Protection From Abuse order against Appellant, Appellant

attempted to strangle her to death while their children were in the other room.

Id. at 5-7. At the time of this assault, Appellant had undergone state drug

treatment in prison but had relapsed after his release. Id. at 7. He was drunk

and high on drugs when he assaulted his wife, and as she underwent

treatment at the hospital for the assault, he broke into their house again,

graffitied the wall, destroyed his wife’s bed and urinated on it. Id. at 5-6.

      Appellant filed a timely appeal from the order denying post-sentence

motions. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On July 5, 2023, counsel filed an Anders brief, in which he argued that

Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and requested permission from this Court to

withdraw as counsel. Appellant did not file a response to counsel’s Anders

brief or raise any additional claims.

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     Before we address the merits of the challenge, we must consider the

adequacy    of   counsel’s   compliance    with   Anders     and    Santiago.

Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 797, 800 (Pa. Super. 2013); see

also Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(“[w]hen faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to

withdraw”) (citation omitted).

     Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders,
     counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established
     by our Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:

            (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
     with citations to the record;
            (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
     arguably supports the appeal;
            (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
     frivolous; and
            (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
     frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
     controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
     conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

     Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his client.
     Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the client of his
     right to: (1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed
     pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems
     worthy of the court[’]s attention in addition to the points raised
     by counsel in the Anders brief.

Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 879-80 (Pa. Super. 2014).

     Counsel’s brief substantially complies with these requirements by

(1) providing a summary of the procedural history and facts; (2) referring to

matters of record relevant to this appeal; and (3) explaining why the appeal

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is frivolous. Counsel also sent his brief to Appellant with a letter advising him

of the rights listed in Orellana. Accordingly, all Anders’ requirements are

satisfied.

       We now examine the issues counsel identified in the Anders brief and

conduct “a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case

is wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1195 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (en banc) (quotation omitted).

       Appellant objects to the length of his sentence based on the consecutive

nature of his sentences for stalking and simple assault and the fact that his

sentence for stalking is in the aggravated range.1

       This issue raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s

sentence.     We note that “[a]n appellant is not entitled to the review of

challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an

appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke

this Court’s jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1006-

07 (Pa. Super. 2014). To determine whether this Court’s jurisdiction has been

properly invoked, we consider whether: (1) Appellant has filed a timely notice

of appeal; (2) the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion

to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) the brief includes a statement

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s written guilty plea colloquy was an “open” guilty plea that
permitted him to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2005).

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pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) Appellant has presented a “substantial

question” that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the

Sentencing Code. Id.

      Appellant timely appealed and preserved his claim that his sentence for

stalking was excessive in a motion for reconsideration of sentence.        See

Motion for Post-Sentence Relief, 4/17/23. Within his Anders brief, counsel

included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) Statement.       We will proceed, therefore, to

consider whether Appellant’s claim presents a substantial question.

      “An appellant making an excessiveness claim raises a substantial

question when he sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence

violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the

Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing

process.” Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). This is not the case here. Counsel

noted, and we agree, that “the sentences in question do not violate a particular

provision of the sentencing code, nor can Appellant demonstrate the

sentences . . . imposed [were] contrary to the fundamental norms underlying

the sentencing schemes.” Anders Brief at 19-20.

      The “imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may

raise a substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as

where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the

crimes and the length of imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992

                                     -5-
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A.2d 162, 171-72 (Pa. Super. 2010); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d

1263, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013) (defendant may raise substantial question

where he receives consecutive sentences within the guideline ranges “if the

case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be

clearly unreasonable, resulting in an excessive sentence; however, a bald

claim of excessiveness due to the consecutive nature of a sentence will not

raise a substantial question”); Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212,

1214 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating that an appellant is not entitled to a “volume

discount” for his crimes by having all sentences run concurrently);

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a).

      There is no indication that the instant sentence is “unduly harsh,

considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment,” Moury,

supra,   or   that   the   sentence   is   “clearly   unreasonable”   under   the

circumstances, given the serious nature of Appellant’s criminal conduct and

his extensive criminal record. Dodge, supra.

      Finally, nothing in the record indicates that Appellant raises a

substantial question by complaining that his sentence for stalking is in the

aggravated range.      There is no complaint, for example, that the court

considered improper factors in applying the aggravated range or failed to state

adequate reasons on the record for applying the aggravated range. Even if

we were to address the merits of this contention, the record demonstrates

that the court limited its consideration to proper factors and gave adequate

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reasons for applying the aggravated range during Appellant’s sentencing

hearing. N.T. Sentencing, 4/13/23, at 10-11; see also Commonwealth v.

Borger, 2020 WL 1304276, *3 (Pa. Super., Mar. 18, 2020) (unpublished

memorandum)2 (Appellant’s claim of excessiveness failed because, inter alia,

he did not contend that court failed to give sufficient reasons for imposing

sentence in aggravated range).

       Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant failed to raise a substantial

question and that his claims relating to the discretionary aspect of sentencing

are devoid of substance. We, therefore, agree with counsel that Appellant’s

sentencing challenge is frivolous.

       Even if we were to address the merits of the contention, we would find

that the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. 3 To this end, the

trial court noted:

       At the sentencing hearing on April 13, 2023, [the sentencing
       court] heard from the victim, [], who expressed that [Appellant]
       has threatened to end her life and that she suffers from post-
       traumatic stress disorder due to the trauma she endured from
       [Appellant]. [The trial court] also considered numerous letters
       submitted by family members of the victim. It is the position of
       [the trial court] that it ordered an appropriate sentence upon
____________________________________________

2Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), we may cite unpublished non-precedential
memoranda filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value.

3 “Sentencing is a matter vested within the discretion of the trial court and will

not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v.
Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2009). “An abuse of discretion
requires the trial court to have acted with manifest unreasonableness, or
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
erroneous.” Id.

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      consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offenses, the
      criminal history and characteristics of [Appellant], the gravity of
      the offenses in relation to the impact on the victim and the
      community, the pre-sentence investigation report and the
      sentencing guidelines.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/23, at 2-3 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781); see also N.T.

Sentencing, 4/13/23, at 10-11.

      After conducting our independent review as required pursuant to

Yorgey, supra, we discern no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal.

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel and

affirm the Judgment of Sentence.

      Judgment of Sentence affirmed. Petition to Withdraw granted.

Date: 11/9/2023

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