Court Opinion

ID: 9744711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:13:44.71818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:51.097080
License: Public Domain

O’Connor, J.
(dissenting, with whom Liacos, C.J., joins). The Commonwealth argues that, even if the grand jury were presented with insufficient evidence to support the trafficking indictment, the conviction “rendered any error in the grand jury proceedings harmless,” and therefore the conviction should be affirmed. I disagree. I shall refrain from setting forth my reasoning on that issue because the court’s opinion implies that the court disagrees as well.
The court’s position is that the evidence before the grand jury warranted the trafficking indictment. Despite its discussion of Massachusetts case law concerning the sufficiency of evidence at trial to warrant a conviction of possession with intent to distribute, ante at 645-647, the court’s reasoning in support of its conclusion that, in this case, the evidence before the grand jury was sufficient for indictment is virtually non-existent. The court merely states, in conclusory fashion that “[a] reasonable belief that the defendant, who pos*650sessed 25.6 grams of cocaine in a motor vehicle on a State highway, did so with the intent to distribute the cocaine is warranted in this case. . . . Evidence supporting inference of an intent to distribute need not support a finding of such an intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an inference must, however, rise above the level of mere suspicion. Possession of 25.6 grams of cocaine warranted a reasonable inference in the circumstances of this case that a person would not carry such a volume of cocaine in a motor vehicle if it was intended solely for his use alone.” Ante at 647-648. The only “circumstances in this case,” identified by the court in addition to the weight of the cocaine and the fact of possession in a motor vehicle, are that the defendant was a nonresident1 operating a vehicle in Massachusetts. The court does not discuss how or why the evidence that the nonresident defendant (if indeed he was a nonresident) possessed 25.6 grams of cocaine in his automobile on a Massachusetts highway, without more, rises above the level of mere suspicion to reach the level of a permissible inference that the defendant possessed the cocaine, not for his personal use, but for the purpose of distribution.
The question on appeal is whether the information before the grand jury was adequate to establish probable cause to arrest the defendant for trafficking in cocaine. See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 790 (1990); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982). “Probable cause requires facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed.” Commonwealth v. Catalina, supra. Commonwealth v. Brzezinski, 405 Mass. 401, 402 (1989). “In dealing with probable cause ... we deal with probabilities.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). The question, then, is whether the evidence before the grand jury of the defendant’s possession of a single bag containing less than one *651ounce of cocaine, while he was in his automobile, by itself was enough to warrant a rational conclusion that probably — more likely than not — not just “possibly” — the defendant intended to distribute the cocaine to others and not to consume it himself.
I agree with the court that “[t]he judge was correct in ruling that the evidence would not support an inference that the defendant had brought the cocaine into the Commonwealth.” Ante at 644. Therefore, I fail to see the significance of the defendant’s nonresidency in Massachusetts. For all that appears from the evidence presented to the grand jury, the defendant obtained the cocaine in Massachusetts. Does the court really mean that if two individuals, one a Massachusetts resident and the other a Connecticut resident, were to purchase 25.6 grams of cocaine in Massachusetts and then drive with it on a Massachusetts highway, a reasonable person, without other evidence, could justifiably conclude that one of those individuals, but not the other, probably intended to distribute the cocaine?
The defendant’s place of residence is irrelevant as is the fact that the defendant happened to be apprehended while driving his automobile, and not while at home. Furthermore, unlike other cases in which sufficiency of evidence has been in issue, here there was not a shred of evidence of the defendant’s habits or life-style, particularly with respect to cocaine use, nor was there evidence of how long it might take an habitual user to consume 25.6 grams, or of the cocaine’s street value. There was no evidence that possession of 25.6 grams was less consistent with personal use than with distribution, which is not a matter that can be left to the sophistication of the jurors, and there was no evidence that the defendant possessed equipment or packaging materials or other items suggestive of a plan to distribute. The court states, ante at 648, “A reasonable person is expected to use common sense and rely on what he or she has learned from experience.” Hopefully, the court is not implying that a grand juror may take into account, in addition to the evidence that has been presented, his or her special knowledge concerning *652illicit drug use and distribution acquired as a result of the juror’s unique personal experience. I assume, rather, that the court’s intended suggestion is that common sense and common experience instruct those who are reasonable that a Connecticut resident’s possession of 25.6 grams of cocaine in an automobile on a Massachusetts highway, without other evidence, demonstrates the likelihood that the possessor intends to distribute, rather than personally use, the cocaine. I disagree. In my view, most readers of the opinions in this case will not have a clue as to the probabilities based on the evidence. In short, while the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to establish a possibility2 that the defendant intended to distribute the cocaine rather than consume, it himself, it was not enough to establish a probability. Therefore, there was no showing at the grand jury proceeding of probable cause to arrest the defendant for trafficking, and the judge rightly dismissed the indictment. The order of dismissal should be affirmed.

There was evidence before the grand jury that, when asked by a police oEcer for his operator’s license, the defendant produced a suspended Connecticut license. There was no other evidence of the defendant’s residency.

The court observes that “[t]he Legislature has recognized that a person who has only fourteen grams of a mixture containing cocaine could be a trafficker.” Ante at 648. It is also true, of course, that a person who has 25.6 grams could be a trafficker. The question before the court, however, is whether the evidence before the grand jury in this case was “sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing” that the defendant probably was a trafficker.