Court Opinion

ID: 9380991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 18:07:04.628757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.865682
License: Public Domain

J-S40041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    JAMES P. BEAL                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1855 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered June 8, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0007286-2007

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                 FILED MARCH 21, 2023

       Appellant, James P. Beal, appeals pro se from the order entered in the

Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his pro se motion for

return of property as untimely.1 We affirm.

       A prior panel of this Court set forth the relevant facts and procedural

history of this appeal as follows:

          [O]n February 29, 2008, Appellant pleaded guilty to a
          plethora of drug offenses, and was originally sentenced by
          the trial court to an aggregate period of incarceration of not
          less than 20 nor more than 41 years’ incarceration and a
          fine in excess of $2.8 million. Appellant filed a direct appeal,
          challenging the validity of his guilty pleas and the imposition
          of his sentence “without reference” to the sentencing
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1 “Preliminarily, we note that ‘[b]oth this Court and the Commonwealth Court
have jurisdiction to decide an appeal involving a motion for the return of
property filed pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 588.’” Commonwealth v. Caviness,
243 A.3d 735, 738 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Durham,
9 A.3d 641, 642 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 583, 19 A.3d 1050
(2011)).
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       guidelines. On January 19, 2011, we determined that
       Appellant had waived all issues pertaining to his guilty pleas,
       but vacated the sentence and remanded the case “so that
       the trial court can consider the applicable sentencing
       guidelines and impose a punishment that is consistent with
       the Sentencing Code.”

       On December 22, 2011, the trial court convened a hearing,
       after which it re-sentenced Appellant to not less than 18 nor
       more than 40 years’ incarceration plus costs. It re-imposed
       the fine exceeding $2.8 million. Appellant filed a motion for
       reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Appellant
       appealed to this Court. A panel of this Court affirmed
       Appellant’s judgment of sentence. On December 11, 2014,
       our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance
       of appeal.

       … Appellant pro se filed [a] PCRA petition on September 28,
       2015. In his petition, Appellant raised, among other things,
       mandatory minimum sentencing claims under Alleyne [v.
       United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d
       314 (2013),] as well as claims for ineffective assistance of
       counsel. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed
       amended petitions. On May 8, 2017, Appellant pro se filed
       a motion requesting the appointment of new counsel. On
       January 24, 2018, the PCRA court granted the motion and
       appointed a new counsel, who subsequently filed a no-merit
       letter … on April 24, 2018. On May 17, 2018, the PCRA court
       issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss
       Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. On May 25,
       2018, Appellant filed his response to the no-merit letter. On
       June 7, 2018, the PCRA court issued an order, granting in
       part and denying in part Appellant’s post-conviction relief
       petition. Specifically, the PCRA court granted the petition to
       the extent it challenged Appellant’s sentence under
       Alleyne. In this regard, the PCRA court granted him a new
       sentencing hearing without the application of the mandatory
       minimum sentencing provisions of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508,
       relating to drug trafficking sentencing and penalties. The
       PCRA court, however, denied Appellant relief on his
       ineffectiveness claim with respect to the voluntariness of his
       guilty pleas.

Commonwealth v. Beal, No. 2474 EDA 2018, unpublished memorandum at

                                    -2-
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1-4 (Pa.Super. filed September 19, 2019) (internal citations and footnotes

omitted).    Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the portion of the order

denying relief on his ineffectiveness claim, and this Court affirmed the order

on September 19, 2019.

       Thereafter, the trial court proceeded with Appellant’s resentencing. On

February 18, 2020, the court appointed new counsel to represent Appellant at

the resentencing hearing. The court conducted the resentencing hearing on

December 14, 2020.          At that time, the court imposed another aggregate

sentence of eighteen (18) to forty (40) years’ imprisonment. 2 Appellant did

not file post-sentence motions or a notice of appeal.

       On February 25, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se motion for return of

property seeking the return of various items that were seized in conjunction

with his arrest.3 The Commonwealth filed an answer on April 14, 2022. In it,

the Commonwealth argued that the court should dismiss the motion as

untimely filed. The court conducted a hearing on June 8, 2022. After receiving

____________________________________________

2 In a separate order entered July 14, 2021, the court also vacated all fines
previously imposed in the prior sentencing orders.

3 Appellant was incarcerated when he filed the pro se motion. Although the
trial court did not docket the pro se motion until March 8, 2021, the motion
included a certificate of service indicating that Appellant submitted it for
mailing on February 25, 2021. Giving Appellant the benefit of the “prisoner
mailbox rule,” we deem the motion as filed on February 25, 2021. See
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied,
616 Pa. 625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (explaining prisoner mailbox rule provides
that pro se prisoner’s document is deemed filed on date he delivers it to prison
authorities for mailing).

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argument from the parties, the court dismissed Appellant’s pro se motion as

untimely filed.4 (See N.T. Hearing, 6/8/22, at 24).

       Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on June 30, 2022. On

July 7, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed a pro se

Rule 1925(b) statement on July 22, 2022.

       Appellant now raises one issue for our review:

          The trial court committed an error of law and abused [its]
          discretion when [it] dismissed [A]ppellant’s motion for
          return of property that was filed within thirty days of the
          final disposition of his case as untimely.

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

       Appellant acknowledges that the court conducted his resentencing

hearing on December 14, 2020. Appellant emphasizes, however, that he was

also litigating a federal habeas corpus petition at the time of the resentencing

hearing. Appellant alleges that his resentencing “was contingent on the fact

that [he] would withdraw his federal [habeas corpus filing] and not pursue

any future appeals in regards to this criminal matter.” (Id. at 8). After the

resentencing hearing, Appellant maintains that he “contacted the federal court

____________________________________________

4 Despite the court’s on-the-record denial of Appellant’s pro se motion, the
court also determined that “Appellant actually only sought the return of …
family and other personal photographs.” (Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/4/22, at
8). Consequently, the court “informally directed the Commonwealth to go
back and look at the file and evidence seized in the case, and if the
Commonwealth was able to locate these sentimental photographs, [it] should
return those to Appellant.” (Id.) (citing N.T. Hearing at 24-25).

                                           -4-
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and filed the appropriate paperwork to have his … federal habeas corpus

withdrawn so that he could receive final disposition of his criminal matters.”

(Id.)    Appellant notes that the federal court dismissed the habeas corpus

petition on January 29, 2021. Under these circumstances, Appellant insists

that the “final disposition” of his criminal case did not occur until the federal

court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, and he timely filed the pro se

motion for return of property within thirty days of the federal court’s order.

(Id. at 10). Appellant concludes that this Court must vacate the order that

dismissed the motion as untimely. We disagree.

        The following principles govern our review of an order disposing of a

motion for return of property:

          The standard of review applied in cases involving motions
          for the return of property is an abuse of discretion. In
          conducting our review, we bear in mind that it is the
          province of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
          witnesses and weigh the testimony offered. It is not the
          duty of an appellate court to act as fact-finder, but to
          determine whether there is sufficient evidence in the record
          to support the facts as found by the trial court.

Caviness, supra at 738 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 172 A.3d

1162, 1165 (Pa.Super. 2017)).

        Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 588 governs the filing of a

motion for return of property as follows:

          Rule 588. Motion for Return of Property

             (A) A person aggrieved by a search and seizure,
          whether or not executed pursuant to a warrant, may move
          for the return of the property on the ground that he or she

                                      -5-
J-S40041-22

         is entitled to lawful possession thereof. Such motion shall
         be filed in the court of common pleas for the judicial district
         in which the property was seized.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 588(A).

      “Courts in this Commonwealth have long recognized that a motion for

the return of property is timely if it is filed ‘during the pendency of the criminal

proceedings, or while the trial court retains jurisdiction for thirty days following

its disposition of the criminal case.””      Caviness, supra at 739 (quoting

Rodriguez, supra at 1164 n.10).

         Although Rule 588 does not directly address the question of
         timing, it is sufficiently precise with regard to who may file
         a return motion and where the motion must be filed to
         permit us to discern that a criminal defendant has an
         opportunity to file a motion seeking the return of property
         while the charges against him are pending. Specifically,
         return motions are filed by “a person aggrieved by a search
         and seizure” and must “be filed in the court of common pleas
         for the judicial district in which the property was seized.”
         Pa.R.Crim.P. 588(A). Additionally, a return motion may be
         filed pre-trial and joined with a motion to suppress. Id. at
         588(C). Pursuant to Rule 588, therefore, a return motion is
         timely when it is filed by an accused in the trial court while
         that court retains jurisdiction, which is up to thirty days after
         disposition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (providing that a trial
         court retains jurisdiction to modify or rescind any order
         within thirty days of its entry, if no appeal has been taken).

Commonwealth v. Allen, 630 Pa. 577, 589, 107 A.3d 709, 716-17 (2014)

(internal footnotes omitted).

      Additionally, “federal habeas corpus proceedings are civil in nature

because they exist for the enforcement of a right to personal liberty, rather

than as a stage of the state criminal proceedings or as an appeal therefrom[.]”

                                       -6-
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Commonwealth v. Speight, ___ Pa. ___, 249 A.3d 1075, 1084 (2021)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).         “Thus, a proper grant of

federal habeas relief to a state prisoner does not purport to revise or interfere

with the state court’s criminal judgment.” Id.

       Instantly, the trial court analyzed Rule 588 and the relevant case law,

and it determined that Appellant’s federal habeas corpus petition had “no

effect on the time frame in which Appellant can file a Rule 588 motion for

return of property.”      (Trial Court Opinion at 12).   Consequently, the court

provided the following timeliness analysis:

          Appellant was resentenced, for the final time, on December
          14, 2020…. Therefore, at the latest, Appellant had until
          January 13, 2021, to file a motion for return of property
          pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 588(A), while [the trial c]ourt still
          retained jurisdiction. See Allen[, supra at 589, 107 A.3d]
          at 717. Appellant did not file his motion for return of
          property until February 25, 2021. As such, Appellant’s
          motion is patently untimely….

(Id. at 13). We agree with this analysis and emphasize that the disposition

of Appellant’s federal habeas corpus petition did not impact the finality of the

criminal proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas. See Speight, supra.

On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Appellant’s

pro se motion for return of property.5 See Caviness, supra. Accordingly,

we affirm.

____________________________________________

5 On the last page of his brief, Appellant provides an alternative argument
asking this Court “to take into consideration that during this time period, it
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023

____________________________________________

was one of the worst ongoing outbreaks of Covid-19 … at SCI Huntingdon
where [Appellant] was residing at such time.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11).
Appellant did not include this argument in his Rule 1925(b) statement, and it
is waived on this basis. See Commonwealth v. Landis, 277 A.3d 1172,
1181 (Pa.Super. 2022) (reiterating that issues not raised in Rule 1925(b)
statement will be deemed waived). Moreover, the Commonwealth correctly
analyzes the relevant judicial emergency orders for Bucks County, which “did
not affect the timeliness of filings in January of 2021.” (Commonwealth’s Brief
at 11). See also Commonwealth v. Woolstrum, 271 A.3d 512 (Pa.Super.
2022) (rejecting appellant’s argument that PCRA petition was timely in light
of judicial emergency orders entered in response to Covid-19 pandemic;
appellant’s late filing was due to flawed and unsupported reasoning regarding
when his judgment of sentence became final).

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