Court Opinion

ID: 9362946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:13:12.843865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.777429
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania             :
                                         :
            v.                           :
                                         :
Raymel Addison,                          :   No. 174 M.D. 2021
                   Petitioner            :   Submitted: July 29, 2022

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM                                   FILED: January 13, 2023

            Before the Court are the “Preliminary Objections to the Petition for
Review” (Preliminary Objections) filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Department of Corrections (Department) on September 28, 2021, in response to pro
se petitioner Raymel Addison’s (Addison) “Motion to Be Exonerated From
Misconduct Number #D314112” (Petition), in which Addison seeks review in our
original jurisdiction of an inmate misconduct conviction that Addison alleges prison
authorities issued in retaliation for Addison having filed numerous complaints of
harassment against various staff members. For the reasons that follow, we sustain
the Preliminary Objections.
            Addison is an individual incarcerated at State Correctional Institution
at Benner (SCI-Benner). See Preliminary Objections at 1. On February 10, 2021,
Addison received Department Misconduct Report No. D314112 (Misconduct),
which alleged violations of Prison Rule 15, Threatening an Employee, and Prison
Rule 33, Using Abusive, Obscene or Inappropriate Language to or About an
Employee, for threats towards prison officials contained in a Form CD-135A
Request to Staff Member complaint form allegedly filled out and signed by Addison
(Retaliation Complaint). See Misconduct, attached to the Petition at Ex-5. Addison
claims the Misconduct was issued in retaliation for his multiple complaints against
prison personnel for alleged harassment. See Petition at 1 (pagination supplied); see
also Preliminary Objections at 2.
              In the Petition, Addison alleges that prison officials violated his rights
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by failing to provide
him with an opportunity to challenge evidence used against him at the proceeding
on the Misconduct and the appeals that followed. See Preliminary Objections at 2;
Petition at 1-4. Specifically, Addison contends that officials violated his rights by
not providing a handwriting expert to aid his defense in a hearing on the Misconduct
and that the Hearing Examiner “went way beyond her job and duty acting [a]s a
‘handwriting’ expert” by personally reviewing the Retaliation Complaint in an effort
to determine the merits of the Misconduct. Petition at 1. Addison argues that,
although he repeatedly asked for the appointment of a handwriting expert at each
stage of review of the Misconduct,1 or a continuance of the proceedings to allow
time for him to secure such an expert, his requests were refused. See Petition at 2.
Addison claims that, following the prosecution of his challenge to and appeals of the
Misconduct conviction, he secured through his own efforts and expense a report
from a handwriting expert that opines that Addison did not author the Retaliation
Complaint upon which the Misconduct was based. See Petition at 2-3; see also
Report of Curt Baggett dated March 19, 2021 (Expert Report), attached to Petition
at Ex. 1-2. Addison asks this Court to review the Misconduct conviction and

       1
        Addison claimed that evidence from a handwriting expert “was the only way to prove and
show that [Addison] was “[n]ot” the [a]uthor of the [h]andwriting” contained in the Retaliation
Complaint. Petition at 2.

                                              2
“exonerate” him of the Misconduct on the basis of the Expert Report. See Petition
at 3. Addison further requests that this Court: (1) transfer him to a medical facility
for treatment; and (2) investigate Grievance No. 914328, in which Addison claims
that a member of the prison psychology staff breached a duty of confidentiality in
relation to him. See Petition at 3; Preliminary Objections at 3.
              The Department responded to the Petition by filing the Preliminary
Objections. Therein, the Department claims that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
review inmate misconduct convictions, and that, in any event, Addison received all
process to which he was entitled in the misconduct process. See Preliminary
Objections at 7-10. The Department further demurs to the Petition’s retaliation
claim, arguing that the Petition lacks adequate detail to support his claim that the
Misconduct was issued in response to any harassment complaints he made. See id.
at 3-7. Likewise, the Department claims that, to the extent Addison raises due
process claims regarding the Hearing Examiner’s review of evidence or failure to
afford Addison a handwriting expert, Addison has failed to state a claim with regard
to either claim. See Preliminary Objections at 7-10. Further, the Department argues
that, to the extent Addison purports to raise a Sixth Amendment claim the Sixth
Amendment is inapplicable to prison misconduct hearings, which are not criminal
trials. See id.
              Initially, we note that:

              In ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true
              all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for
              review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced
              therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions
              of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
              allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain
              preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that

                                          3
              the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be
              resolved by a refusal to sustain them.

              A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits
              every well-pleaded fact in the complaint and all inferences
              reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the legal
              sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be
              sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed
              to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When
              ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to
              the complaint.

Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
              First, regarding his request that this Court “exonerate” him of the
Misconduct, Addison essentially asks this Court to review the evidence submitted at
the Misconduct hearing together with the handwriting expert report he attached as
an exhibit to the Petition for the purpose of overturning the Misconduct conviction.
See Petition at 1-4. This we may not do.
              This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition to the extent that
it seeks review of the Misconduct. This Court has held that the Department’s internal
grievance procedure provides constitutionally adequate and meaningful legal
remedies to inmates. See Silo v. Ridge, 728 A.2d 394, 399 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999); see
also Fennell v. Goss (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1198 C.D. 2015, filed Feb. 5, 2016),2 slip
op. at 9. In Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1998),
our Supreme Court agreed with this Court that “internal prison operations are more
properly left to the legislative and executive branches, and that prison officials must
be allowed to exercise their judgment in the execution of policies necessary to

       2
          Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure 414(a), 210 Pa. Code
§ 69.414(a), unreported panel decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited
for their persuasive value.

                                               4
preserve order and maintain security free from judicial interference.” Id. at 358
(citing Robson v. Biester, 420 A.2d 9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980)). In Bronson, the Supreme
Court held that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review inmate appeals of decisions by
intra-prison disciplinary tribunals by explaining:

             Unlike the criminal trial and appeals process where a
             defendant is accorded the full spectrum of rights and
             protections guaranteed by the state and federal
             constitutions, and which is necessarily within the ambit of
             the judiciary, the procedures for pursuing inmate
             grievances and misconduct appeals are a matter of internal
             prison administration and the full panoply of rights due a
             defendant in a criminal prosecution is not necessary in a
             prison disciplinary proceeding.            Therefore, the
             [C]ommonwealth [C]ourt does not have appellate
             jurisdiction, under 42 Pa.C.S § 763, over inmate appeals
             of decisions by intra-prison disciplinary tribunals.

Id. at 358-59 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Though Addison brings
this Petition before this Court in our original jurisdiction, our Supreme Court further
held in Bronson that this Court cannot entertain such matters in our original
jurisdiction, except in very limited circumstances. As the Supreme Court explained:

             Prison inmates do not enjoy the same level of
             constitutional protections afforded to non-incarcerated
             citizens . . . [. I]ncarceration brings about the necessary
             withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a
             retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
             penal system. Unless an inmate can identify a personal or
             property interest . . . not limited by Department of
             Corrections regulations and which has been affected by a
             final decision of the [D]epartment the decision is not an
             adjudication subject to the court’s review.

                                          5
Id. at 359 (internal citation, quotations, and brackets omitted). Thus, to the extent
Addison challenges the Misconduct conviction, we do not have either appellate or
original jurisdiction to consider this finding because review of such intra-prison
discipline is solely a matter of internal prison administration. See id. at 358-59.
             Further, to the extent Addison argues that his rights were violated by
the failure of the Department to provide him with a handwriting expert, we do not
agree. See Petition at 2-3. As this Court has explained:

             In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, three
             components, at minimum, must be present to satisfy an
             inmate’s right to procedural due process:

                 Advance written notice of the claimed violation; a
                 written statement of the factfinders as to the
                 evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
                 disciplinary action taken; . . . and the ability to call
                 witnesses and present documentary evidence in his
                 defense when permitting him to do so will not be
                 unduly hazardous to institutional safety or
                 correctional goals.

Feliciano v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 588 M.D. 2019, filed Apr. 13,
2021) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563, 566 (1974)) (internal
brackets omitted); see also Robson v. Biester, 420 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980).
             The facts alleged by Addison regarding his requested handwriting
expert facially suggest that the Department did not comply with the ability to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence component. However, Addison cites
no authority that establishes that prisoners have a right that requires prison officials
to find, retain, and present an expert witness on a prisoner’s behalf in a disciplinary
proceeding. While we have found no Pennsylvania case directly on point, we note

                                            6
that multiple federal courts have determined that a prisoner’s rights are not denied
when prison officials do not comply with a prisoner’s request to have an expert
witness secured and provided for the prisoner’s defense in disciplinary hearings. See
Garrett v. Smith, 180 F. App’x 379, 381 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding due process not
denied where prison officials refused prisoner request for voice analysis expert
witness to analyze recorded phone conversation in aid of prisoner’s defense); see
also Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755-56 (8th Cir.1986) (finding no prisoner
right to present expert testimony where such testimony would interfere with
institutional goals and prompt resolution of disciplinary actions). We agree that
requiring prison officials to locate, secure, and ultimately furnish Addison with a
handwriting expert would interfere with both the Department’s institutional goals of
preventing prisoner threats to Department employees and preventing prisoners from
using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to or about Department employees
and would impede the prompt resolution of disciplinary actions. Thus, we hold that
the Department did not violate Addison’s rights by denying his request for a
handwriting expert in this matter.3 See Garrett; Spence.
               Further, to the extent Addison argues that he was denied the process
required by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in criminal
prosecutions,4 he is incorrect.             The Sixth Amendment applies to criminal

       3
         The existence of the Expert Report attached to the Petition, which Addison argues
exonerates him from the Misconduct, does not change our analysis. See Petition, Ex. 1-2. Even
assuming the truth of the content of the purported expert report, the fact that such after-produced
report may contain evidence upon which Addison’s innocence of the Misconduct could have been
argued before the Hearing Examiner does not change whether the Department was duty-bound to
provide Addison with an expert report in the first instance in consideration of the institutional goals
and time considerations discussed supra.
       4
         The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides criminal
defendants with the following guarantees:

                                                  7
proceedings but is not applicable to prison disciplinary hearings. See Wolff, 418 U.S.
at 556 (“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and
the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”); see
also Horan v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1425 C.D. 2013, filed May 28, 2014), slip
op. at 9. Thus, this aspect of Addison’s Sixth Amendment claim also fails.
              Moreover, we agree that Addison’s retaliation claim should be
dismissed because the Misconduct was issued pursuant to a prison rule prohibiting
threats and inappropriate language to or about an employee. See Department’s Br.
at 4-7; see also Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections
Misconduct Report No. D314112, attached to the Petition at Ex-5; Department of
Corrections Form DC-135A Inmate’s Request to Staff Member dated February 9,
2021, attached to Petition at Ex.-4. In prisoner retaliation claims, “courts require
proof the inmate engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, prison officials took
adverse action, and the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for
the action.” Yount v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 966 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2009). In
addition to these basic elements, to prevail on a retaliation claim, a prisoner also
maintains the burden of proof to disprove a legitimate penological goal for the
alleged retaliatory action. Id. The reason for this requirement stems from the

              In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
              speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
              wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
              have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
              nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
              witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
              witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
              defence.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

                                                8
“potential for abuse” inherent in retaliation claims and also a policy of judicial
deference to the prison officials’ “legitimate interest in the effective management of
a detention facility.” Id. at 1120-21. “[C]laims of retaliation fail if the alleged
retaliatory conduct violations were issued for the actual violation of a prison rule.”
Horan v. Newingham (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2622 C.D. 2015, filed Oct. 24, 2016), slip
op. at 5 (quoting Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2008)). “Thus, a
defendant may successfully defend a retaliatory discipline claim by showing some
evidence the inmate actually committed a rule violation.” Id. (quoting Hartsfield,
511 F.3d at 829) (emphasis added). Further, “a report from a correctional officer,
even if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other evidence, legally suffices
as ‘some evidence’ upon which to base a prison disciplinary violation[.]” Id.
             In the instant matter, the Misconduct alleged violations of prison Rule
15, Threatening an Employee, and Rule 33, Using Abusive, Obscene or
Inappropriate Language to or About an Employee.             See Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections Misconduct Report No. D314112
(Misconduct Report), attached to the Petition at Ex-5. The Misconduct Report
referred to the Retaliation Complaint allegedly signed by Addison that stated:

             I had a hearing yesterday and Ms. Murray up [sic] my level
             from a 2 to a 3. You are trying to retaliate against me. I
             will show you and this staff member[] [h]ow to retaliate if
             you fuck up my freedom. I am not the person who need to
             be fuck [sic] with. [I]t is best that I be removed from this
             unit [b]efore it be [sic] a problem. I am tired of you, Ms.
             Murray, [a]nd this C.O. fucking with me and my freedom.
             You are looking for problem [sic] everyday [a]nd trying to
             retaliate. I will [r]etaliate against [a]nyone for my
             freedom. I don’t care no more [sic].”

                                          9
Retaliation Complaint, attached to Petition at Ex.-4. The Retaliation Complaint
represents some evidence that Addison actually committed a rule violation upon
which a prison disciplinary violation could be based.                  Accordingly, as this
Misconduct was issued for alleged violations of prison rules, Addison’s retaliation
claim fails. See Newingham.
               Addison’s remaining requests – that this Court transfer him to a medical
facility and investigate a prisoner grievance in which he claims that a member of the
prison psychology staff breached a duty of confidentiality in relation to him – raise
claims not before the Court and upon which relief cannot be granted.
               First, Addison’s requested review of Grievance No. 914328, which
seeks review of a grievance in which Addison alleges harassment by a member of
the Department’s psychology staff, appears unrelated to the Misconduct underlying
the instant matter and is therefore not properly before or reviewable by the Court.
See Petition at 3. Further, Addison must prosecute this unrelated grievance through
the Department’s internal grievance and appeal procedure, which, as discussed
supra, provides constitutionally adequate and meaningful legal remedies to inmates
not subject to review by this Court. See Bronson, 721 A.2d at 358-59; Silo, 728 A.2d
at 399.
               To the extent Addison seeks transfer to a medical facility, he effectively
makes a specific mandamus request5 that also appears completely unrelated to the

      5
          As this Court has explained:

               Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that compels the official
               performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty. [This Court]
               may issue a writ of mandamus only where[] (1) the petitioner has a
               clear legal right to enforce the performance of an act, (2) the
               [respondent] has a corresponding duty to perform the act[,] and (3)
               the petitioner has no other adequate or appropriate remedy.

                                               10
request that the Department furnish an expert witness for Addison in the Misconduct
that underlies this matter. See Petition at 3. While we acknowledge that deliberate
indifference to serious prisoner medical needs by prison officials can present a valid
claim for the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that such indifference may be
manifested by the intentional denial or delay of access to prescribed medical care by
prison officials,6 the Petition fails to plead facts adequate to state such a claim. The
Petition notes Addison’s medical condition and necessary treatment but makes no
allegation that he has been denied such treatment through the deliberate indifference
of Department officials or has been caused unnecessary pain as a result. See Petition
at 3. Accordingly, this claim, if reviewable, would be properly dismissed.7
                For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Preliminary Objections and
dismiss the Petition with prejudice.

Kretchmar v. Dep’t of Corr., 831 A.2d 793, 798 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Further, the Court has noted that mandamus “will not lie to control the
exercise of discretion unless the [respondent’s] action is so arbitrary as to be no exercise of
discretion at all.” Id.
       6
           See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
       7
        We further note that, under Department regulations, “[a]n inmate does not have a right to
be housed in a particular facility[.]” 37 Pa. Code § 93.11(a). As this Court has explained:

                “It is entirely a matter of [the Department’s] discretion where to
                house an inmate.” Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa. Cmwlth.
                2007). “It is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is
                at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.” McKune v. Lile, 536
                U.S. 24, 39 [] (2002). Under [the Department’s] regulations, “an
                inmate does not have a right to be housed in a particular facility or
                in a particular area within a facility.” 37 Pa. Code § 37.11.

Lopez v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 119 A.3d 1081, 1085 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Lopez v.
Wetzel, 144 A.3d 92 (Pa. 2016).
                                                 11
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania           :
                                       :
            v.                         :
                                       :
Raymel Addison,                        :   No. 174 M.D. 2021
                  Petitioner           :

PER CURIAM
                                   ORDER

            AND NOW, this 13th day of January, 2023, the “Preliminary
Objections to the Petition for Review” filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Department of Corrections are SUSTAINED and pro se petitioner Raymel
Addison’s “Motion to Be Exonerated From Misconduct Number #D314112” is
DISMISSED with prejudice.