Court Opinion

ID: 9639682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:44:27.756031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:05.231600
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I believe that we should reach the merits of this case and reverse the decree of the court below, and accordingly I dissent.
In my opinion, Merchants Mutual Ins. Co. v. DiUmberto, 433 Pa. 250, 248 A. 2d 842 (1969), Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co. v. Medycki, 431 Pa. 67, 244 A. 2d 655 (1968), and Nat. Grange M. Ins. Co. v. Kuhn, 428 *26Pa. 179, 236 A. 2d 758 (1968) are completely inapplicable to the case now before us. DiUmberto, Medycki, and Kuhn all involved situations in which the claimant requested arbitration and the insurance carrier argued that the controversy was not one which fell within the arbitration clause of the insurance contract. Thus in all. three cases, there was a dispute between the parties as to the meaning of the insurance contract, and this Court, in sending all three suits to arbitration, was interpreting the contracts.
, This is not the case here. At no time in the course of the present litigation has either party resisted having the issue of whether appellant was a member of his parents’ household (and thus covered by the policy in question) determined by the courts. Certainly under our decisions in DiUmberto, Medycki and Kuhn, either party could have required this issue to be decided by an arbitrator, but neither has ever done so. Our prior decisions only hold that a given interpretation be applied to the arbitration clause of the insurance contract when there is a, dispute as to the clause’s coverage. But the parties to a contract can always mutually change, disregard or disaffirm its terms, and if they do so, it is certainly not for the courts to hold them to their original contract, a contract to which neither party still is interested in adhering.
It is true, as the majority opinion indicates, that the petition for declaratory judgment and the stipulation to stay arbitration came before our decision in Kuhn. I must assume, however, that if either party felt in any way prejudiced by this turn of events, they could have so claimed, either in their briefs or at oral argument. Of course, neither did so; most likely, having come this far through the judicial system, and having had the issue (whether appellant is a member of his parents’ household) almost decided once and for all, the parties see the folly of starting afresh with ar*27bitration. I do not see how this Court can force that result and its attendant waste of time and money on these litigants.
I appreciate the fact that if we allow cases in which neither party desires arbitration to be decided by the courts, we may increase the judicial workload.1 That, however, is an option which the parties must have, within the jurisdictional limits set by the Legislature. The Court can hardly claim that it is a third-party beneficiary of the parties’ insurance contract, and thus demand the enforcement of a provision which neither party wishes to utilize.
Although I believe that this case is properly before the courts, in my view the decision of the court below was in error on the merits, and I would reverse its determination. At the time of the accident in question, appellant was a student, working toward his Ph.D. at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. His parents lived in California. Appellant continued to maintain his voting address at his parents’ California home and voted there by absentee ballot; he kept clothing, books and hobbies there; and appellant continued to receive his personal mail in California, having only his professional mail (and junk mail) delivered to his college address. Appellant received a stipend during his studies at Lehigh, which made him “marginally self-supporting;” his parents continued to occasionally send him clothing and spending money, however, and gave him spending money during the times he returned home on breaks from his studies.
While at college, appellant lived in private rooms, or shared college apartments with other graduate students. Appellant stated that at the time of the aeci*28dent, he- intended to continue work toward Ms Pli.D. by taking a teaching fellowship at Bueknell University.
On these facts, I believe that it was improper for the court below to hold that appellant was not a member of his parents’ household within the meaning of the insurance policy. It of course is hornbook law that aii insurance policy where ambiguous or unclear, will be construed against the insurer, and will be interpreted in order,to give the result sustaining coverage. See, e.g., Lovering v. Erie Indemnity Co., 412 Pa. 551, 195 A. 2d 365 (1963). In the case before us, it is clear to me that appellant continued to háve his roots in his parents’ home in California. He continued to have his legal residence there, and did not establish one elsewhere. The fact, that' he was physically in Pennsylvania is not particularly significant. “If mere, physi-. cal presence is sufficient to establish a residence, without more, one could change his residence by taking a vacation.” Appleton v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 228 N.Y.S. 2d 442, 444 (1962). Certainly had the insurance company intended physical presence to be the key factor in ascertaining coverage, it could have used explicit language so stating, see Id. at 446, but the use of language such as “resident of the same household” must, when construed against the insurer, indicate a differént intention.
Appellant did not consider his permanent home as anywhere but the one in which his parents lived. His residence at school — rooms in private houses, and apartments shared with other students — can be characterized as nothing more than transient. Appellant never established any household other than that of his parents, and in my opinion this is strong indication that he remained a member of his parents’ household.2
*29Courts in other jurisdictions have shown a willingness to interpret the word “household” at least as broadly as appellant requests here. See Appleton v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., supra (child in army is part of parents’ household) ; Mazzilli v. Accident Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, Switzerland, 35 N.J. 1, 170 A. 2d 800 (1961) (parents, although separated, and child still part of same household); Barker v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E. 2d 305 (1955) (child, although married and living with wife at college, was part of parents’ household). Fruchtman v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Minn. 54, 142 N.W. 2d 299 (1S68) (child at college and mother not in same household ), the only case relied on by appellee, is inapposite. In Fruchtman, the court read “household” narrowly in order to hold against the insurer,3 Since each given insurance policy is to be interpreted against the insurer, to give the broadest possible coverage that may be produced by ambiguous language, there is nothing inconsistent with the decision in Fruchtman and the one which I believe we should reach in this case.
In summary, in my view we should reach the merits of this case and should reverse the decision of the court below. The parties, if they so desire, can then go to arbitration, limited solely to the question of damages.
Mr. Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Pomeroy join in this opinion.

 I should point out, however, that I see no reason to expeet there to be any great number of eases in which both parties will choose to not go to arbitration.

 This is especially true since appellant was not married, and thus had not established a “family” residence of his own, although *29eyen had appellant been married, it would still be possible for him to remain in Ms parents’ household within the policy. See Barker v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E. 2d 305 (1955).

 The policy in Fruchtman excluded coverage of persons in the same household as the policyholder, apparently in an attempt to prevent collusion. 274 Minn, at 55, n.1, 142 N.W. 2d at 300, n.1.