Court Opinion

ID: 9931309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 19:01:40.199518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:06.720346
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10614    Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024    Page: 1 of 31

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10614
                           ____________________

        KEVIN JULMIST, et al,
                                                     Plaintiffs-Appellants,
        versus

        PRIME INSURANCE CO., et al,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01416-SCJ
                           ____________________
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        22-10614                    Opinion of the Court                                    2

        Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        ED CARNES, Circuit Judge:
              On February 19, 2013, Dr. Nedra Dodds performed a
        surgical liposuction procedure on April Jenkins at CJL Healthcare,
        LLC (the Clinic) in Georgia. Jenkins died that same day. Four
        months after her death, on June 20, 2013 at the same clinic, Dr.
        Dodds performed a surgical liposuction procedure on Erica
        Beaubrun, who died that night.
                Initially, two lawsuits resulted from those two deaths. On
        August 5, 2013, Hal Jenkins, who is April’s father and the
        administrator of her estate, filed a lawsuit in Georgia state court
        against the Clinic and Dodds. We’ll call that the Jenkins estate
        lawsuit. Almost a year later, on June 16, 2014, Kevin Julmist, who
        is the father of Erica Beaubrun’s two minor children, filed a lawsuit
        in Georgia state court against Dodds, the Clinic, and Opulence
        Aesthetic Medicine (the Clinic’s doing-business-as name). To
        simplify things, we’ll call that the Beaubrun estate lawsuit even
        though technically it is not. 1

        1
          Julmist filed that lawsuit not as the personal representative of Beaubrun’s
        estate but instead as “next friend” and “natural parent” of her children. See
        City of Dalton v. Cochran, 55 S.E.2d 907, 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949) (“The purpose
        of a guardian ad litem or next friend is to furnish a person suit juris to carry on
        the litigation for the minor’s benefit.”); see also Till v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
        Co., 124 F.2d 405, 408 (10th Cir. 1941) (explaining that unlike a guardian ad
        litem, who is appointed by the court, “[a] next friend is one who, without
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        22-10614                  Opinion of the Court                               3

               The appeal before us involves the Beaubrun estate lawsuit
        indirectly, but it does not directly involve the claims that were
        brought in that lawsuit. Instead, it arises from the Clinic’s
        assignment to the Beaubrun estate of some of the Clinic’s claims
        against its insurance companies after a consent judgment in the
        amount of $60,000,000 was entered in favor of the Beaubrun estate
        and against the Clinic in the estate’s lawsuit.
               For purposes of the present lawsuit, which is a dispute about
        insurance coverage and its limits, the Beaubrun estate and the
        Clinic essentially became co-plaintiffs, advancing the same claims
        and asserting the same arguments against the insurers. When we
        refer to those two parties collectively, we’ll simply call them the
        plaintiffs.
                The lawsuit that arose from the death of Dodds’ other
        patient at the Clinic (the Jenkins estate lawsuit) is only tangentially
        related to this appeal. That lawsuit is relevant only because of the
        effect it had on the aggregate amount of coverage available under
        the insurance policy that covered the Clinic and Dr. Dodds. (She is
        not a party to this appeal.) That insurance policy contained a
        diminishing limits provision. 2 Under that provision, the cost of

        being regularly appointed guardian, represents” a plaintiff who is a minor).
        But referring to it as the Beaubrun estate’s lawsuit does not affect any of the
        issues before us and links the name of the lawsuit to the decedent instead of
        using the different name and capacity of Julmist.
        2
           Diminishing limits provisions create “an arrangement where defense
        expenses incurred by the insurer decrease[] the amount of liability coverage.”
        Nicholas A. Marsh, Note, “Bonded & Insured?”: The Future of Mandatory
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        22-10614                   Opinion of the Court                                4

        defending the Clinic and Dr. Dodds from the Jenkins estate lawsuit
        not only diminished the $50,000 amount available for the Jenkins
        estate’s claim to coverage, but it also diminished the total amount
        of coverage available under the policy, which was capped at
        $100,000. Likewise, under that same provision, the cost of
        defending the Clinic and Dr. Dodds from the Beaubrun estate
        lawsuit diminished the $50,000 amount available for the Beaubrun
        estate’s claim to coverage and also diminished the $100,000 total
        amount of coverage available under the policy.
               The bottom line for this appeal is that under the terms of
        the policy, the defense of the Jenkins and the Beaubrun estates’
        lawsuits exhausted the Clinic’s insurance coverage. The policy’s
        declarations page unambiguously specifies a $50,000 limit for any
        professional liability claims and a $100,000 policy aggregate limit
        for any and all of those claims combined. In other words,
        defending the Beaubrun estate lawsuit diminished the amount of
        coverage available for that claim, and defending both the Beaubrun
        and the Jenkins estates’ lawsuits diminished the aggregate limit
        until there was no coverage left.
                  I. Factual Background and Procedural History

        Insurance Coverage and Disclosure Rules for Kentucky Attorneys, 92 Ky. L.J. 793,
        814 (2004); cf. James E. Mercante, Article, Hurricanes and Act of God: When the
        Best Defense Is A Good Offense, 18 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 1, 13 (2006) (“There are some
        marine policies with ‘wasting’ or ‘diminishing’ limits meaning that the liability
        limits are diminished by legal fees. These are not uncommon and in such a
        policy, as the cost of defense rises, the available funds for settlement are
        reduced.”).
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        22-10614              Opinion of the Court                        5

               As mentioned, the Jenkins estate lawsuit was filed first. For
        that reason, we will first provide the highlights of its procedural
        history and then discuss the history of the Beaubrun estate lawsuit.
                          A. The Jenkins Estate Lawsuit
                The Jenkins estate lawsuit was filed in August 2013, and the
        Clinic’s insurer, Prime Insurance Co., defended the Clinic and
        Dodds under a reservation of rights. A couple of months after the
        lawsuit was filed, David McBride, who worked for Prime, tendered
        a settlement offer from Prime of $50,000 to the Jenkins estate, but
        the estate rejected that offer.
               In April 2014, the Jenkins estate demanded $100,000 from
        Prime, which counteroffered $39,000, an amount that was $11,000
        less than it had offered through McBride earlier. The reason
        Prime’s second offer was for only $39,000 of coverage apparently
        was that under the diminishing limits provision, defending the
        Jenkins estate lawsuit had diminished the total amount available by
        $11,000. The Jenkins estate rejected that offer.
               On May 6, 2014, Prime notified the Clinic that the policy’s
        Professional Liability Limit of $50,000 for a single claim had been
        depleted defending the Jenkins estate lawsuit. And in July 2014 a
        Georgia state court entered an order authorizing Prime to
        withdraw from representing the Clinic and Dodds in the Jenkins
        estate lawsuit.
              Dodds was dismissed as a party, and the Jenkins estate’s case
        proceeded to trial, during which the Clinic was not represented by
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                        6

        counsel. A default judgment was entered against the Clinic, and in
        December 2018 a jury awarded the Jenkins estate $60,000,000 in
        damages.
                         B. The Beaubrun Estate Lawsuit
              In a letter dated June 11, 2014, Prime’s counsel wrote this to
        counsel for the Beaubrun estate:
              As you know, I represent Prime Insurance Company
              which insured CLJ Healthcare with respect to the
              above-referenced claim [referring to a claim number].
              The policy is the same policy at issue in the Jenkins v.
              CLJ Healthcare claim. The policy has a $50,000
              professional liability limit, with a $100,000 aggregate.
              The aggregate has been depleted by defense of the
              Jenkins claim. Prime hereby tenders the $50,000
              professional liability limit to your client in exchange
              for a release of all claims against CLJ Healthcare and
              its employees and agents.
         (It’s not entirely clear why, if Prime had spent more than the
        $100,000 aggregate policy limit, it still offered the Beaubrun estate
        the $50,000 policy limit, but we have set out exactly what the June
        11, 2014 letter said.)
               The Beaubrun estate rejected Prime’s $50,000 offer for two
        reasons. First, the estate believed that the policy provided $100,000
        in coverage, which would mean that the offer was for less than the
        amount of coverage available. Second, the estate objected to the
        release of claims against a nurse anesthetist who allegedly failed to
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                        7

        properly monitor Beaubrun.        (That second objection is not
        involved in this lawsuit.)
                After the Beaubrun estate rejected Prime’s $50,000 offer, on
        June 16, 2014, the estate filed a Georgia state court lawsuit against
        Dodds, the Clinic, and Opulence Aesthetic Medicine (the Clinic’s
        doing-business-as name). The lawsuit claimed that Dodds was
        liable for professional negligence and that the Clinic and Opulence
        Aesthetic Medicine were liable under a theory of respondeat
        superior. In the “damages,” section of its complaint, the estate
        sought “to recover for the full value of the life of Erica Beaubrun,
        for her wrongful death, and all other elements of damages allowed
        under Georgia law.” Among other things, the estate specifically
        sought damages for pain and suffering and for funeral expenses. It
        also sought attorney’s fees and costs. Prime defended the named
        defendants in that lawsuit for a period of time.
                But on January 27, 2015, Prime sent Dodds and the Clinic a
        letter stating that “[t]he limit of insurance available through [the]
        policy issued by Prime is $50,000 per claim, with an aggregate limit
        of $100,000.” (The reference to “per claim,” in context, is not to a
        legal claim asserted in the underlying lawsuit against the insureds
        but is to their claim for coverage under the policy. There was a
        Jenkins “claim” and a Beaubrun “claim” for coverage.) Prime’s
        letter to Dodds and the Clinic stated that the $50,000 “per claim
        limit of liability” had already been “completely depleted” in
        providing a defense in the Beaubrun “matter.” It added that the
        $50,000 per claim limit had also been expended “in relation to the
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                        8

        claims of ” the Jenkins estate against the defendants. The result was
        that the combined expenditures in defending the insureds against
        the two lawsuits exhausted the aggregate $100,000 policy limit. For
        that reason, Prime stated it was withdrawing its defense in the
        Beaubrun “matter.”
                       1. The Utah Declaratory Judgments
               On January 27, 2015, the same day that Prime sent its letter
        to the Clinic and Dodds telling them that the policy limits were
        exhausted, Prime filed a declaratory judgment action against them
        in state court in Utah, where Prime’s principal place of business
        was. The action sought a judgment that:
              (a) Prime has no obligation to provide for Dr. Dodds’
              and/or [the Clinic’s] defense in the Jenkins or
              Bea[u]brun claims beyond the $50,000 Professional
              Liability limit applicable to each of those claims.
              (b) Prime is entitled to withdraw its defense of Dr.
              Dodds and [the Clinic] in the Jenkins lawsuit
              inasmuch as it ha[d] incurred in excess of $50,000 in
              defending that matter.
              (c) Prime is entitled to withdraw its defense of Dr.
              Dodds and [the Clinic] in the Bea[u]brun claim
              inasmuch as it ha[d] incurred in excess of $50,000 in
              defending that matter.
         The complaint did not seek any declaratory relief based on the
        aggregate policy limit provision. Instead, it relied solely on the
        $50,000 policy limit per claim provision and sought declaratory
        relief based only on that provision.
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        22-10614                  Opinion of the Court                               9

               Prime served Dodds and the Clinic with the complaint in the
        declaratory judgment action, but neither of them filed an answer
        or otherwise responded. After default was entered, Prime sought
        a default judgment against Dodds and the Clinic on the Jenkins
        claim and on the Beaubrun claim. It asked the court to declare that
        it had no obligation to defend or indemnify Dodds and the Clinic
        against any claims brought by the Jenkins or the Beaubrun estates.
               The Utah state court first entered an order granting default
        judgment against Dodds and the Clinic in regard to the Jenkins
        claim for coverage. That order stated that Prime had no obligation
        to defend or indemnify Dodds or the Clinic on the Jenkins claim
        beyond $50,000, and because Prime had already incurred expenses
        of more than $100,000 defending both the Jenkins and Beaubrun
        claims, it had no obligation to indemnify Dodds or the Clinic for
        the $60,000,000 judgment entered in the Jenkins lawsuit. 3
              In April 2019, after the Utah district court had entered the
        Jenkins declaratory judgment but before it entered judgment on
        the Beaubrun claim, the Beaubrun estate submitted to Prime a
        demand for $100,000 to settle the Beaubrun claim and release

        3
         It is unclear why the Utah state court granted Prime declaratory relief on the
        $100,000 aggregate limits provision as well as on the $50,000 policy limit per
        claim provision when Prime requested relief only on the $50,000 policy limit
        per claim provision. In any event, it does not matter because, as we will
        explain later, the declaratory judgment granted by the Utah state court does
        not affect our analysis.
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                       10

        Dodds and the Clinic. The next month Prime responded that based
        on the policy limits, there was no remaining coverage.
               A few of months after that, in July 2019, the Utah state court
        entered an order granting Prime’s motion for default judgment
        against Dodds and the Clinic on the Beaubrun claim. The order
        stated that Prime had no obligation to defend Dodds or the Clinic
        “in the Bea[u]brun claim beyond the $50,000 Professional Liability
        limit applicable to that claim.” It also stated: “[i]nasmuch as Prime
        incurred in excess of $50,000 in defending the Bea[u]brun claim,
        and also incurred in excess of $100,000 total in defending the
        Jenkins and Bea[u]brun claims, it has no further obligation to
        defend [the Clinic] or Dr. Dodds in the Bea[u]brun lawsuit.”
               About two weeks after that, on July 31, 2019, Prime filed in
        Georgia state court a notice and a petition seeking to domesticate
        the Utah judgment against Dodds and the Clinic. On September
        16, 2019, the Georgia state court entered an order domesticating
        that judgment. The order declared that (1) beyond the $50,000
        professional liability limit, Prime had no obligation to defend or
        indemnify Dodds or the Clinic against the Beaubrun claim; (2) it
        had no obligations under the policy once the $100,000 aggregate
        limit had been exhausted; and (3) it had no obligation for the
        Beaubrun “judgment” because it had spent more than $50,000
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        22-10614                 Opinion of the Court                           11

        defending the Jenkins claim and more than $100,000 total
        defending the Jenkins and Beaubrun claims.4
                    2. Judgment in the Beaubrun Estate Lawsuit
               On January 22, 2020, with the parties’ consent, the Georgia
        state court ordered Dodds’ dismissal in the Beaubrun estate’s
        lawsuit that was pending there. And on February 13, 2020, a
        consent judgment in the amount of $60,000,000 was entered in
        favor of the Beaubrun estate and against the Clinic in that lawsuit.
                        C. The Parties in the Present Lawsuit
                To recap, the plaintiffs in the present lawsuit are the
        Beaubrun estate and the Clinic. And the defendants are Prime
        Insurance Co., Prime Holdings Insurance Services, Inc. (d/b/a
        Claims Direct Access), and Evolution Insurance Brokers, LC
        (collectively, the insurers). Prime issued the insurance policy to the
        Clinic; Prime Holdings (Claims Direct) is a related entity; Evolution
        is the broker that sold that policy to the Clinic.
              Claims Direct’s employee David McBride allegedly advised
        the Clinic during the defense of the Beaubrun lawsuit. The
        complaint describes McBride as “an adjuster acting on behalf of
        Claims Direct.” In their brief to this Court, the insurers describe
        him as Claims Direct’s Senior Vice President and Corporate
        Attorney. But McBride was not named as a defendant.

        4
          The order referred to the Beaubrun “judgment,” even though the consent
        judgment in the Beaubrun estate lawsuit wasn’t entered until after the Utah
        declaratory judgment and the Georgia state court order domesticating it.
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        22-10614              Opinion of the Court                       12

                          D. The Claims in the Present Lawsuit
                In their complaint, the Beaubrun estate and the Clinic
        asserted the following claims against the defendants: Count 1
        breach of duty against Claims Direct; Count 2 breach of contract
        against Prime; Count 3 negligence against Prime and Claims
        Direct; (the complaint has no Count 4); and Count 5 unauthorized
        sale of surplus lines insurance against Prime and Evolution.
        Counts 6 and 7 sought punitive damages and attorney’s fees against
        all the defendants.
               Count 1, the breach of duty claim against Claims Direct,
        alleged that McBride had held himself out as protecting the Clinic’s
        interests when he was actually protecting Prime’s interests. The
        specific allegations were that McBride breached a duty by failing to
        pass along to Prime the Beaubrun estate’s $100,000 settlement
        demand, and that he also assisted Prime during the Utah
        declaratory judgment proceedings by signing an affidavit for it
        stating that the policy limits were exhausted.
               Count two, the breach of contract claim against Prime,
        alleged that it had breached the policy by asserting that the limit
        for defending the Beaubrun claim was $50,000 instead of $100,000
        and by asserting that the limit had been exhausted. Count three
        alleged that Prime was negligent in refusing the Beaubrun estate’s
        demand for $100,000 and that Prime and Claims Direct were
        negligent by not informing the Clinic of that demand. Count five,
        the unauthorized sale of surplus lines insurance claim against
        Prime and Evolution, alleged that the sale of the policy was
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                        13

        unauthorized in Georgia because, among other things, it did not
        include the “standard” surplus lines disclosure.
              The insurers removed the case to federal district court where
        they moved to dismiss the complaint. The court granted that
        motion.
                The district court decided that counts one, two, and three
        (the breach of duty, breach of contract, and negligence claims) all
        failed because they relied on an incorrect interpretation of the
        policy’s limits, and the Utah default judgment collaterally estopped
        litigation of whether the policy had a $100,000 limit for the
        Beaubrun claim. The court also decided that the count one breach
        of duty claim was barred by a four-year statute of limitations. It
        dismissed count five after determining that the Georgia Surplus
        Lines Insurance Act does not provide a private cause of action.
        Finally, the court decided that the derivative claims for punitive
        damages and attorney’s fees failed because the substantive claims
        on which they were based failed.
              The Beaubrun estate and the Clinic appeal the judgment
        dismissing their complaint.
                              II.    Standard of Review
                We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss,
        accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
        construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movants.
        Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC, 674 F.3d 1238, 1240 (11th Cir. 2012). The
        district court considered the insurance policy that the insurers
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        22-10614                 Opinion of the Court                           14

        attached to their motion to dismiss without converting their
        motion into one for summary judgment. That was appropriate
        because the policy is “(1) central to [the Beaubrun estate’s and the
        Clinic’s] claim[s] and (2) undisputed,” meaning that “the
        authenticity of the document is not challenged.” Day v. Taylor, 400
        F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). “Because insurance policies are
        considered contracts, interpretation of insurance policy language
        is also a matter of law, subject to de novo review.” Hegel v. First
        Liberty Ins. Corp., 778 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
                                     III.   Discussion
               As we’ve noted, Prime’s principal place of business is in
        Utah. Prime sold the policy to the Clinic through Evolution
        Insurance Brokers. Evolution is organized under the laws of Utah.
        The Clinic is located in Georgia. The fact that Prime and Evolution
        are out-of-state insurers matters here because the Clinic purchased
        a surplus lines policy from them.
                                       A. The Policy
                The insurance policy that covered the Clinic and Dr. Dodds
        is a surplus lines policy. Surplus line insurers are authorized to sell
        insurance in Georgia so long as they comply with certain
        requirements, including selling the insurance through a licensed
        surplus lines broker.5 See Kay-Lex Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., 649 S.E.2d
        602, 609 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).

        5
          The Georgia Code defines surplus line insurance as “any property and
        casualty insurance permitted in a state to be placed through a surplus line
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        22-10614                  Opinion of the Court                               15

                   According to the plaintiffs, Evolution was not licensed as a
        surplus lines insurance broker in Georgia, and the policy did not
        include the standard disclosure that Georgia law requires for
        surplus lines policies. See Ga. Code § 33-5-20.1(8) (defining a
        surplus lines broker as “an individual who is licensed in this state to
        sell, solicit, or negotiate insurance on properties, risks, or exposures
        located or to be performed in this state with nonadmitted
        insurers”); see also id. § 33-5-26 (requiring disclosures for surplus
        lines policies).
               The coverage period of the policy that Prime issued to the
        Clinic and Dodds was December 22, 2012 to December 22, 2013,
        and the premium was $3,991.52. The declarations page lists
        “$100,000 Policy Aggregate” and “$50,000 Professional Liability.”
        It is a healthcare services professional liability policy providing
        coverage for “Wrongful Acts relating to the providing of Your
        Services.”
               The Limits of Liability section in the policy states that
        “[e]ach Wrongful Act Limit of Liability listed on the Declarations
        is the most we will pay for any combination of Damages and/or
        Claim Expenses because of all Damages arising or allegedly arising

        broker with a nonadmitted insurer eligible to accept such insurance.” Ga.
        Code § 33-5-20.1(7). The governing regulations describe it as “a policy placed
        with an insurer that is not licensed (or ‘admitted’) in [Georgia], but is
        nonetheless eligible to provide insurance on property or liability insurance
        protection to citizens of [Georgia] through specially licensed agents or brokers
        known as surplus lines brokers.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-89 app. A.
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        22-10614              Opinion of the Court                         16

        out of any one Wrongful Act.” The policy also caps payouts on
        multiple claims against the insured in this way:
              Multiple Claims by one or more parties arising out of
              a single Wrongful Act or series of related Wrongful
              Acts resulting in, or allegedly resulting in, Damages
              suffered by a single resident at an Insured’s facility or
              under the Insured’s care, shall be considered a single
              Claim for purposes of this Policy, and as a single
              Claim shall be subject to the Limit of Liability listed
              on the Declarations for a single Claim.
        The policy provides: “A single Wrongful Act, or the accumulation
        of more than one Wrongful Act during the Policy Period, may
        cause the per event limit and/or the annual aggregate maximum
        limit to be exhausted at which time the Insured will have no further
        benefits under the Policy.” And “[n]otwithstanding anything
        contained in this Policy to the contrary, the Insurer’s financial
        obligation imposed by the coverage with respect to all Claims
        hereunder shall not exceed the amount specified on the
        Declarations as the aggregate Limit of Liability.” That’s a $100,000
        cap on coverage for “all Claims.”
               The policy gives Prime “both the right and the duty to
        provide for [the Insured’s] defense with respect to a Claim covered
        by the Policy.” But Prime’s duty to defend its Insured ends “[w]hen
        the applicable Limits of Liability of the Policy are exhausted by
        payment of Damages and/or Claim Expenses.”
              Then there’s the diminishing limits feature of the policy. See
        supra n.2. According to the policy’s plain terms, claim expenses
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                         17

        come out of the policy’s limits. The policy defines “Claim
        Expenses” to include “[a]ll fees, costs, and expenses charged by any
        lawyer or other service provider designated by the Insurer to
        represent the Insured” and “[a]ll other fees, costs, and expenses . . .
        resulting from the investigation, adjustment, defense, and appeal
        of a Claim.” It sets the “Limit(s) of Liability” as the “maximum
        amount the Insurer will be obligated to pay for an otherwise
        covered Claim, including payment for Claim Expenses, Damages,
        or any other sums due under this Policy, the amount of which is
        set forth on the Declarations.” And “[a]ll Claim Expenses reduce
        the available Policy Limits.”
                       B. Count One: Statute of Limitations on
                              the Breach of Duty Claim
               Count one alleges that Claims Direct breached a duty to the
        Clinic. The district concluded that the claim was barred by the
        statute of limitations.
                                1. The Alleged Duty
                The complaint itself doesn’t name the duty to the Clinic that
        Claims Direct allegedly breached. In their brief to us the plaintiffs
        say it was the breach of a fiduciary duty. And the factual allegations
        of the complaint focus on the advice that was given (or allegedly
        should have been but was not given) to the Clinic by Claims
        Direct’s employee McBride (who is not named as a defendant).
               The complaint alleges that McBride failed to communicate
        to the Clinic an April 26, 2019 settlement offer from the Beaubrun
        estate. He was allegedly protecting the insurers’ interests while
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        22-10614                    Opinion of the Court                                 18

        giving advice that made the Clinic believe he was protecting its
        interests. And McBride allegedly did not explain to the Clinic that
        defending the Beaubrun lawsuit would cost more than $50,000,
        which was the policy limit for the claim. Finally, in the Utah
        declaratory judgment action, he assisted Prime’s lawyers. He
        allegedly did so “through signing an affidavit for use in support of
        Prime’s contention that the available policy limits were exhausted.”
        According to the complaint, “McBride, as an agent for Claims
        Direct Access, filed an affidavit regarding the amount of
        attorney[’]s fees and expenses incurred in its ‘defense’ of the
        Beaubrun matter.”
               The district court determined that the Georgia four-year
        statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty or legal
        malpractice applied, not Georgia’s six-year statute of limitations for
        breach of contract. 6 It then concluded that McBride’s alleged
        actions and inaction that were the basis for this claim occurred
        outside of that four-year period.
               The plaintiffs contend that Georgia’s six-year statute of
        limitations for breach of contract should apply to this claim. They
        now specify that while the claim is one for breach of fiduciary duty
        “the underlying conduct” for the claim is a breach of contract, so

        6
         In their briefs to this Court, the parties accept the district court’s position that
        Georgia law applies, and each cites decisions of that state’s courts on the
        statute of limitations issue relating to the breach of duty claim. We will accept
        their implicit agreement that Georgia law applies to the issue without deciding
        whether they are both right (or both wrong) about choice of law.
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                       19

        the six-year statute of limitations should apply. And they argue that
        there was a continuing series of breaches based on McBride’s
        conduct.
                The Georgia statute of limitations for breach of “simple
        contracts in writing” is six years. Ga. Code § 9-3-24. That six-year
        limit also applies when “an implied promise to perform
        professionally pursuant to a written agreement for professional
        services” is written into a contract by law and that promise is
        broken. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. v. Jordan Jones & Goulding,
        Inc., 703 S.E.2d 323, 325 (2010).
                A four-year limitations period “applies where no sufficiently
        written contract exists and a cause of action can therefore be based
        solely on the breach of an express oral or implied promise.” Id.
        (citing the four-year limitations period in Ga. Code § 9–3–25, which
        applies to the breach of “any implied promise or undertaking”).
        Then there’s the hybrid situation where a written contract exists,
        and a party to it alleges that implied duties were breached. See
        Newell Recycling, 703 S.E.2d at 325. To determine whether the six-
        year period applies in a hybrid situation, courts must look to
        whether “any implied duties” that were allegedly breached “would
        have grown directly out of the existence of the written contract
        itself.” Id. (emphasis added).
               The district court determined that the insurance policy was
        not a “complete written agreement for professional services.” It
        observed that the policy did not assign any specific responsibilities
        to Claims Direct or its employee McBride for defending the insured
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        22-10614              Opinion of the Court                       20

        or counseling the insured about mounting a defense. The court
        reasoned that McBride’s actions “cannot reasonably be understood
        as services that were directly contemplated in and arose out of the
        Policy.” Instead, his alleged actions were incidental to the policy
        and ref lect asserted failures to provide what amounted to “legal or
        business advice.” In the court’s view, that means whatever advice
        McBride provided or failed to provide, his professional services did
        not “grow immediately out of the Policy” and the insurer’s
        obligations under the terms of that contract.
                We agree that if there was a duty that McBride’s actions or
        omissions breached, it did not “grow out of ” the written contract.
        See Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-24; Newell Recycling of Atlanta, 703 S.E.2d
        at 325. The contract was an insurance policy, not a contract for
        professional services. And the six-year statute of limitations for
        breach of contract found in Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-24 refers only to
        “liabilities resting in or growing out of written contracts, not
        remotely or ultimately, but immediately.” Newell Recycling of
        Atlanta, 703 S.E.2d at 325 (quotation marks omitted).
                At most, McBride’s alleged breaches are of a fiduciary duty
        that is incidental to the policy. Any obligations he had to provide
        advice or guidance or to provide those services in a certain manner
        did not “grow[] . . . immediately” out of the policy. Id. (quotation
        marks omitted). The district court correctly concluded that a four-
        year statute of limitations applies to the breach of fiduciary duty
        claim.
                           2. When the Claim Accrued
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                        21

               The next step is determining whether the claim accrued
        outside of the four-year statute of limitations period. Under
        Georgia law, “[t]he statute of limitation for a cause of action for
        breach of fiduciary duty is triggered by a wrongful act
        accompanied by any appreciable damage.” Hendry v. Wells, 286 Ga.
        App. 774, 779, 650 S.E.2d 338, 343 (2007). And Georgia courts have
        rejected the “continuing tort theory” for breach of fiduciary duty
        claims. See Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 368 S.E.2d 732,
        733 (Ga. 1988) (stating that “[t]he continuing tort theory . . . is
        limited to cases in which personal injury is involved”); Allen v.
        Columbus Bank & Tr. Co., 534 S.E.2d 917, 921 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
        (rejecting an argument that the mismanagement of a trust is a
        continuing tort “inasmuch as the [Georgia] Supreme Court has
        ruled that the continuing tort theory is applicable only to cases
        involving personal injury”).
               The district court determined that the earliest alleged breach
        of duty arose from “McBride’s advice or counsel—or lack thereof,”
        which occurred before the Beaubrun estate’s state court lawsuit was
        filed on June 16, 2014. McBride’s actions, or inaction, and Claims
        Direct’s and McBride’s alleged breaches related to their assistance
        with the Utah declaratory judgment action in 2015, all occurred
        more than four years before the present lawsuit was filed on March
        12, 2021. So the statute of limitations barred the breach of duty
        claim.
              The plaintiffs point to McBride’s alleged conduct in 2019.
        They assert that he failed to pass along to the Clinic an April 2019
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                       22

        settlement demand for $100,000 from the Beaubrun estate, and
        that the same year he signed an affidavit that Prime could use in
        the Utah declaratory judgment action to establish that the policy
        limits had been exhausted.
               It is true that “each act of alleged breach of fiduciary duty
        that causes damage creates a new cause of action for that specific
        act.” Godwin v. Mizpah Farms, LLLP, 766 S.E.2d 497, 505 (Ga. Ct.
        App. 2014). But McBride’s alleged failure to convey to Prime the
        Beaubrun estate’s $100,000 settlement demand in 2019 was directly
        related to the settlement negotiations in 2014 and the filing of the
        declaratory judgment action in 2015, which were outside the four-
        year statute of limitations. The Beaubrun estate’s 2019 demand for
        $100,000 and Prime’s rejection of it were a continuation of the
        estate’s June 2014 rejection of the $50,000 tender and its insistence
        that the policy provided $100,000 in coverage for the Beaubrun
        claim. Any refusal to provide $100,000 or pass along information
        relating to that demand is the same allegedly wrongful act and not
        a new, separate basis for a claim in 2019.
               As we mentioned, the Georgia Supreme Court has limited
        any “continuing tort theory” to personal injury claims, see Corp. of
        Mercer Univ., 368 S.E.2d at 733, and a breach of fiduciary duty claim
        that occurs outside the statute of limitations cannot be revived by
        asserting that it based on “continuing” conduct. If there is a new
        and distinct breach of duty, that may start the limitations clock
        running anew, see Godwin, 766 S.E.2d at 505, but that isn’t what the
        plaintiffs have alleged.
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                        23

               Instead, they’ve alleged a breach of duty that had two
        components. The first involved the June 2014 refusal to settle with
        the Beaubrun estate for the aggregate limit of the Clinic’s policy
        ($100,000). The second component was McBride’s supplying an
        affidavit in the Utah declaratory judgment action in 2019 stating
        that the policy limits had been exhausted.
                The alleged breach that is the second component is a
        continuation of the alleged breach that is first component.
        Providing an affidavit supporting a paid-out defense that has
        already been asserted is not materially different for these purposes
        from seeking a declaratory judgment that policy proceeds have
        been fully paid out. The time for filing the breach of fiduciary duty
        claim began to run when the 2015 declaratory judgment action was
        filed, which was more than four years before the plaintiffs filed the
        present lawsuit in 2021.
               It follows that the district court correctly dismissed the
        count one breach of fiduciary duty claim as barred by the four-year
        statute limitations. See Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d
        1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of
        limitations grounds is appropriate if it is apparent from the face of
        the complaint that the claim is time-barred.”) (quotation marks
        omitted).
             C. Counts Two and Three: the Utah Declaratory Judgment
                   and the Claims Dependent on the Policy Limit
              Count two alleges that Prime breached the policy by failing
        to provide $100,000 in coverage. Count three alleges that Claims
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        22-10614                  Opinion of the Court                             24

        Direct and Prime negligently failed to accept a demand for
        $100,000, offering only $50,000.
                Those two counts hinge on whether the policy provided a
        $100,000 or a $50,000 limit for the Beaubrun claim. The district
        court dismissed them after determining that the plaintiffs were
        collaterally estopped from contending that the policy has a
        $100,000 limit for the Beaubrun claim, after that issue was fully
        litigated and decided in favor of the defendants in the Utah
        declaratory judgment action.7 That judgment, and the Georgia
        one domesticating it, declare that the professional liability limit for
        the Beaubrun claim was $50,000 and that because that limit had
        been exceeded, Prime had no further obligation to defend or
        indemnify the Clinic or Dodds against the Beaubrun claim.
                                    1. The Policy Limits
               It doesn’t matter whether collateral estoppel applies to the
        policy limits issue underlying the claims in counts two and three
        because those claims are foreclosed by the plain language of the
        policy anyway. For that reason, we need not and do not address
        collateral estoppel.
               The policy provides: “This Agreement is entered into in the
        State of Utah and the Agreement, and any rights, remedies, or
        obligations provided for in this Agreement, shall be construed and

        7
         The court also determined that the count one claim for breach of fiduciary
        duty was subject to collateral estoppel for the same reason. Because we’ve
        concluded that count one is barred by the four-year statute of limitations, we
        do not address the collateral estoppel as to it either.
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        22-10614                   Opinion of the Court                                25

        enforced in accordance with the laws of Utah.” 8 Utah courts
        interpret insurance policies as they do other contracts: “if the
        language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous,
        the parties’ intentions are determined from the plain meaning of
        the contractual language.” Benjamin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d
        1210, 1213 (Utah 2006) (quotation marks omitted). Under Utah
        law, policy terms are given their “usually accepted meanings” and
        are construed “in light of the insurance policy as a whole.” Utah
        Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 980 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1999). “Policy
        terms are harmonized with the policy as a whole, and all provisions
        should be given effect if possible.” Id.
               The Prime policy language is unambiguous. In its
        Declarations section under a heading titled “Professional Liability”
        the policy states: “$100,000 Policy Aggregate” and “$50,000
        Professional Liability.” And in the Limits of Liability section the
        policy states that:
                Each Wrongful Act Limit of Liability listed on the
                Declarations is the most we will pay for any
                combination of Damages and/or Claim Expenses
                because of all Damages arising or allegedly arising out
                of any one Wrongful Act. Multiple Claims by one or
                more parties arising out of a single Wrongful Act or
        8
         Although the parties agreed that Georgia law applied to determine the statute
        of limitations for the breach of duty claim, see supra n.6, they don’t say whether
        they think Utah law or Georgia law should apply to construction of the terms
        of the policy. Because the policy clearly states that Utah law governs
        construction of its terms, and neither party suggests it should not, we will
        apply it in interpreting the terms of the policy.
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                         26

               series of related Wrongful Acts resulting in, or
               allegedly resulting in, Damages suffered by a single
               resident at an Insured’s facility or under the Insured’s
               care, shall be considered a single Claim for purposes
               of this Policy, and as a single Claim shall be subject to
               the Limit of Liability listed on the Declarations for a
               single Claim.
        The Beaubrun estate’s claim, which stems from Erica Beaubrun’s
        death following a liposuction procedure at the Clinic, is a single
        claim under the Policy. That means it is subject to the $50,000 limit
        of liability.
                              2. The Expert’s Affidavit
               We are unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ attempt to redirect our
        attention to an affidavit they obtained from a lawyer who is an
        author of insurance treatises, in which he purports to enlighten us
        on why the policy’s limit provisions should be construed in the
        plaintiffs’ favor. In Utah the interpretation of an insurance policy
        is a question of law. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 201 P.3d
        1004, 1007 (Utah 2009). The same is true in Georgia. See, e.g.,
        Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc. v. Imaging Sys. Int’l, 543 S.E.2d 32, 34
        (Ga. 2001) (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 13–2–1). And probably in
        every other state too.
                We have repeatedly said, in a number of contexts, that we
        do not need, want, or accept expert testimony on questions of law.
        See, e.g., Commodores Ent. Corp. v. McClary, 879 F.3d 1114, 1128–29
        (11th Cir. 2018) (“[Q]uestions of law are not subject to expert
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        22-10614                   Opinion of the Court                                27

        testimony.”); Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013)
        (explaining that questions of law, like whether a use of force is
        excessive, are not subject to expert testimony); Newland v. Hall, 527
        F.3d 1162, 1208 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that when determining
        the reasonableness of an attorney’s conduct, “statements from
        other attorneys are not dispositive; indeed, they have little weight
        in our analysis.”); Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th
        Cir. 1998) (“[I]t would not matter if a petitioner could assemble
        affidavits from a dozen attorneys swearing that the strategy used
        at his trial was unreasonable. The question is not one to be decided
        by plebiscite, by affidavits, by deposition, or by live testimony. It is
        a question of law to be decided by the state courts, by the district
        court, and by this Court, each in its own turn.”); see also Montgomery
        v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990). 9

        9
          In the land of the law, it seems, there is always an exception or two to nearly
        every rule, no matter how emphatically the rule is stated or how close to
        universally it applies. So it is here. The exception is that expert testimony on
        foreign law is permitted. See Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U.S. 546, 551 (1883) (“The
        general rule as to the proof of foreign laws is that . . . unwritten law must be
        proved by the testimony of experts, that is, by those acquainted with the
        law.”); Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011)
        (relying on expert testimony to interpret Columbian law); Ramsay v. Boeing
        Co., 432 F.2d 592, 599–602 (5th Cir. 1970) (relying on expert testimony to
        interpret Belgian law); Shapleigh v. Mier, 83 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1936) (“The
        law of Mexico . . . remains foreign law to be proven as a fact when written by
        production of copies of the Constitution and statutes, and in other respects by
        the testimony of experts.”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 299 U.S. 468 (1937). But
        neither Georgia nor Utah law is the law of a foreign state.
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        22-10614                 Opinion of the Court                           28

               Every federal judge takes an oath of office swearing to
        “administer justice . . . and . . . faithfully and impartially discharge
        and perform all the duties” of a judge “under the Constitution and
        laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 453. And under the
        Constitution, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
        judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5
        U.S. 137, 177 (1803). We will not cede that province or delegate our
        duty to say what the law is to non-judges with opinions that can be
        called forth for hire.
               Because we interpret the plain language of the insurance
        policy to mean that the policy limit is $50,000 for a claim of
        professional liability, the Beaubrun estate’s argument to the
        contrary fails. And counts two and three of the complaint fail with
        it.
                D. Count Five: Georgia Surplus Lines Insurance Claim
               The district court also dismissed count five, which is a claim
        against Prime and Evolution for the unauthorized sale of surplus
        lines insurance. The court concluded the Georgia Surplus Lines
        Insurance Act (GSLIA) provides no private cause of action. It also
        determined that the claim had been abandoned because the
        plaintiffs did not respond to the insurers’ argument that the GSLIA
        does not provide a private cause of action.
               Section 33-5-26(b) of the GSLIA states that “[n]o surplus
        lines policy or certificate . . . shall be delivered in this state unless a
        standard disclosure form or brochure explaining surplus lines
        insurance is attached to or made a part of the policy or certificate.”
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        22-10614               Opinion of the Court                        29

        Ga. Code Ann. § 33-5-26(b). Georgia Rules and Regulations 120-2-
        89 provides that “[a]ny insurer or surplus lines broker failing to
        comply with the requirements of this Regulation Chapter shall be
        subject to such penalties as may be appropriate under the insurance
        laws of this State.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-89-.04.
               The plaintiffs allege that the policy did not have the required
        disclosure and assert that the lack of this disclosure enabled
        Evolution and Prime to “exploit internal ambiguities within the
        Policy to their advantage,” and that the Clinic has “sustained
        damages” (in the form of the $60,000,000 consent judgment)
        “resulting from the substandard policy of insurance.” They also
        assert that Evolution was not authorized to sell insurance in
        Georgia.
                The insurers contend that the GSLIA does not provide a
        private cause of action. The plaintiffs failed to address that
        contention in the district court, and they don’t address it in their
        briefs to this Court. Instead, they contend only that the “regulating
        of insurers and the requirement that insurers and/or insurance
        brokers be licensed in Georgia to transact insurance business is a
        long-standing policy decision of our state.” They argue that
        because the State of Georgia has not “taken any corrective or
        disciplinary action” against the defendants, we should engraft a
        private cause of action onto the GSLIA in order to serve “public
        policy.” But they point to no authority supporting a private cause
        of action for failing to comply with the GSLIA’s disclosure
        requirements.
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        22-10614                   Opinion of the Court                                 30

               The insurers respond that Georgia law does not provide a
        private cause of action and that, even if it did, it would not result
        in unlimited liability coverage. Instead, they note that even if the
        policy did not contain a disclosure,10 the sole remedy for that failure
        would be a penalty imposed by the Georgia Insurance
        Commissioner. See Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-89-.04; cf. Tyson v.
        Scottsdale Indem. Co., 805 S.E.2d 138, 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)
        (finding no support for the assertion that “an insurer’s failure to
        comply with [the surplus lines insurance statutes] renders a policy
        unenforceable”). The insurers also argue that the Clinic’s liability
        for a $60,000,000 consent judgment “has nothing to do with”
        whether the policy had the proper surplus lines disclosure.
              The district court was correct to dismiss count five. Georgia
        law provides no private cause of action for the unauthorized sale
        of surplus lines insurance. And we are not in the business of
        engrafting additional remedy provisions onto state (or federal for

        10
          The policy contains a disclosure page about its status as a surplus lines policy.
        At oral argument, counsel for the insurers pointed out that the policy did
        contain a surplus lines disclosure, but conceded that the disclosure in the
        Policy did not exactly track the language in Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-89
        app. A, as required by that section. See Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-89-.03(a).
        But, as counsel correctly stated, the proper remedy for failing to comply with
        that section comes in the form of penalties from the Georgia Insurance
        Commissioner, not a judicially imposed private cause of action. See Ga.
        Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-89-.04.
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        22-10614                   Opinion of the Court                                 31

        that matter) statutes. As written, the GSLIA provides the plaintiffs
        no relief.11
                AFFIRMED.

        11
          In counts six and seven of the complaint, the plaintiffs seek punitive damages
        and attorney’s fees, but because all their substantive claims fail, they have no
        basis for that relief, and the district court correctly dismissed those counts. (As
        mentioned before, the complaint contained no count four.)