Court Opinion

ID: 9858661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:34:33.953079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:25.813829
License: Public Domain

HAMITER, Justice (dissenting).
It is my opinion that the judgment about which plaintiff complains is of the unappealable kind and, hence, we are without right to entertain this appeal.
After plaintiff obtained the divorce decree, which also enjoined defendant from selling or encumbering community assets until a complete partition be effected, she caused to be issued a rule ordering the defendant to show cause why he should not render an accounting of all assets of the community allegedly concealed by him and, further, why the properties listed on the inventories taken on her behalf should not be adjudged' as belonging to the community.
Answering the rule, defendant denied that he had concealed any community property. Additionally, he specifically challenged the correctness of the inventories taken on plaintiff’s behalf and affirmatively averred “* * *• that there is attached hereto, marked ‘Schedule 1’, an exhibit showing all of the community property which existed at the date of the dissolution of the community and the status of said property as of within a few days of the filing of this answer; that said Schedule 1 is true and correct in all respects.” Then defendant prayed “* * * that this answer and return may be deemed good and sufficient, and that the court, after considering all of the law and the evidence, expressly hold that defendant has not in any wise concealed or attempted to conceal any of the community property; that the community property consists of those properties set forth- in Schedule 1 attached hereto; and that plaintiff’s petition be dismissed and the rule discharged.”
As scheduled, a hearing on plaintiff’s rule to show cause was had; and thereafter the *805court rendered and signed the following judgment:
“The rule to show cause filed herein and made returnable on September 8th, 1947, was taken up, tried, and submitted, and after considering the evidence adduced on the trial of said rule, the court has arrived at the conclusion that the relator has failed to establish by competent evidence any material found, and for reasons this day orally assigned;
“It is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the said rule be and the same is hereby recalled, amended [annulled] and set aside, together with costs.
“Judgment rendered, read, and signed in open court on this 24th day of May, 1948.” (Brackets ours.)
It is from this judgment that plaintiff is now appealing.
According to the Louisiana Code of Practice:
“One may appeal from all final judgments rendered m causes in which an appeal is given by law, whether such judgments have been rendered after hearing the parties, or by default.” Article 565.
“One may likewise appeal from all inter- ' locutory judgments, when such judgment may cause him an irreparable injury.” Article 566.
“Interlocutory judgments do not decide on the merits; they are pronounced on preliminary matters, in the course of the proceedings.” Article 538.
“Definitive or final judgments are such as decide all the points in controversy, between the parties.
“Definitive judgments are such as have the force of res judicata.” Article 539.
In our jurisprudence interpreting these articles there appeared a conflict among the earlier decisions. Thus, in 1883 it was held that a ruling which disposed definitely of any one phase of a controversy was final as. to that phase and, therefore, appealable. State ex rel. Ikerd v. Judge of Eighth Dist.. Court, 35 La.Ann. 212. Later, during the same year, in another case, a contrary view seems to have been taken, the court holding in effect that a suit should not be heard on appeal by fragments unless the interlocutory decree appealed from would cause irreparable injury. State ex rel. Pflug v. Judge of Civil Dist. Court, 35 La. Ann. 765.
Recognizing this conflict the court in Bossier’s Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson, 117 La. 221, 222, 41 So. 553, 555, resolved it by adopting the view taken in the Pflug case. Then it observed:
“We therefore usually understand by the term ‘final judgment’ that judgment which, disposing of all the issues not previously disposed of by interlocutory judgments, is the last judgment which the court renders. If this be not so, there may be, in any given case, as many appeals as there are issues presented, and as the law authorizes the cumulation of separate actions in the same demand (Code Prac. art. 148), a *807single suit may be infinitely divided, with divisions and subdivisions pending, at the same time, in different courts. The judgment now under consideration does not dispose of all the points in controversy between the parties, nor does it cause the parties against whom it was rendered irreparable injury, and, in neither of these respects, is its character affected by the fact that it bears the judge’s signature.
“It can be reviewed, on the appeal from the judgment which may ultimately be rendered in the case (provided the plaintiffs take such appeal or answer it, as the case may be) ; but we do not think that it would conduce to an orderly administration of justice to review it at this time, * *
The doctrine of the Bossier’s Heirs case was adhered to in Trclca v. Bragmans Bluff Lumber Company, 168 La. 805, 123 So. 332, and Feitel v. Feitel, 169 La. 384, 125 So. 280, 281, in the latter of which the court, with respect to the earlier jurisprudence, stated: “ * * * The case of State ex rel. Ikerd v. Judge [of Eighth Dist. Court], 35 La.Ann. 212, was, in effect, overruled in Bossier’s Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson, supra, * *
It is true that in Williams et al. v. De Soto Bank & Trust Company et al., 185 La. 888, 171 So. 66, an appeal was entertained principally on the strength of the Ikerd case, and without mentioning the Bossier’s Heirs, Trcka and Feitel cases. In citing the Ikerd case as authority, however, the court seemingly interpreted it as holding that to disallow the appeal would work an irreparable injury.
During the same year in which the Williams decision was rendered the court in Mann v. Edenborn, 185 La. 154, 168 So. 759, 760, refused to pass upon an appeal from what was termed an interlocutory judgment, it not being decisive of all points in controversy. Therein the court quoted Code of Practice Articles 538 and 539, which define interlocutory and definitive judgments, and then commented:
“The judgment appealed from is not a final judgment, because it leaves undecided the main demand. Not being decisive of all points in controversy, it would not support a plea of res judicata. This is so because it is a judgment on a preliminary matter in the course of the proceeding. The fact that the judgment was signed cannot change it from an interlocutory to a final judgment. Feitel v. Feitel, 169 La. 384, 125 So. 280, and authorities cited.
“And it is clear that the judgment appealed from is not such a judgment as may work irreparable injury. When the final judgment to be rendered by the district court comes before this court for review, the court in its decree can restore the parties, without loss of any right under the pleadings, to the identical position which they respectively occupied before the interlocutory judgment complained of was rendered. Feitel v. Feitel, supra.”
Later in Reeves et al. v. Barbe, 200 La. 1073, 9 So.2d 426, the Bossier’s Heirs, *809Trcka and Feitel cases were cited with approval. The same was done in Carmody v. Land et al., 207 La. 625, 21 So.2d 764, in ■support of a holding that the complained •of ruling dismissing a reconventional demand was an interlocutory judgment causing no irreparable injury and from which no appeal could be taken.
Meanwhile there was presented for determination in Benham, Ziegler & Company, Inc., v. Mouledoux, 175 La. 711, 144 So. 428, 429, the question of whether or not a judgment ordering an accounting was of the kind from which an appeal would lie. In answering it in the negative the court ■said:
“A judgment, rendered by a trial judge, ■ordering an accounting, whether signed by him or not, is not a final or definitive judgment, but is an interlocutory one. * * *
It is not, however, an interlocutory judgment, which may work irreparable injury. The error, if any, in ordering the accounting, is such a one as may be corrected by appeal, after the case is finally disposed of in the trial court. * * *
“The reason why the law does not grant an appeal from such a judgment as the present is because it does not favor the bringing up of cases by fragments. * * * ”
The above language from the Benham case was quoted approvingly in State ex rel. Knighton et al. v. Derryberry et al., 188 La. 412, 177 So. 256; also it was the basis for the dismissal of an appeal in Cotton v. Wright, 214 La. 169, 36 So.2d 713, which had been taken from an interlocutory judgment ordering the defendant husband to account to the plaintiff wife (between whom a separation had been decreed) with respect to the community of acquets and gains.
With reference specifically to the kind of judgment from which an appeal in a partition proceeding will lie ther<“ is a paucity of decisions in our jurisprudence. Seemingly appropriate, however, is Marionneaux et al. v. Succession of Marionneaux, 28 La.Ann. 392, in which the court said:
“Two appeals have been taken in this case, one from an order homologating the report of experts and the other from an order directing a partition to be made in kind, and referring the parties to a notary to complete the partition. A motion has been made in this court to dismiss these appeals, on the ground, among others, that the orders appealed from are interlocutory only, and do not work an irreparable injury. Whatever may be done by the notary will only amount to a project for a partition, which will not bind any one until the same shall have been presented to the court for final homologation; and from that judgment of the court, homologating the partition, any one interested can appeal.
“This court said in the case of Gay v. Marionneaux et al., that, ‘according to said article all orders and rulings of courts rendered on all contestations pending the operation of the partition before the notary are interlocutory, and any party feeling ag*811grieved has his remedy, and may be relieved when the partition is presented for final homologation, and it is from the judgment thus rendered that an appeal would lie, subjecting the whole proceedings and all interlocutory orders to revision of this court.’ 20 [La.] An[n]. 358; * *
And in the partition proceeding of Green v. Fisk, 103 U.S. 518, 26 L.Ed. 485, a suit commenced in a state court of Louisiana and later removed to the federal judiciary, the United States Supreme Court refused to consider an appeal of the defendant taken from a judgment decreeing the plaintiff to be the owner of one-half of the property involved and referring the matter to a master with directions to proceed to a partition according to law under the direction of the court. In dismissing the appeal the court said in part:
“In partition causes, courts of equity first-ascertain the rights of the several persons interested and then make a division of the property. After the division has been made and confirmed by the court, the partition, if in kind, is completed by mutual conveyances of the allotments to the several parties. * * *
“A decree cannot be said to be final until the court has completed its adjudication of the cause. Here the several interests of the parties in the land have been ascertained and determined, but this is merely preparatory to the final relief which is sought; that is to say, a -setting off to the complainant in severalty her share of the property in money or in kind. This, can only be done by a further decree of the court. * * *
“ * * * There are, still, questions in. which the parties have each a direct interest, and they must be determined judicially before the relief has been granted which the suit calls for.
“In foreclosure suits it has been held that a decree, which settles all the rights, of the parties and leaves nothing to be done but to make a sale and pay over the proceeds, is final for the purposes of an appeal.. The reason is that in such a case the saléis the execution of the decree of the court, and simply enforces the rights of the parties as finally adjudicated. Here, however,, such is not the case, because still the court, must act judicially in making the partition it has ordered. What remains to be done is not ministerial but judicial. The law has prescribed no fixed rules by which the officers of the court are to be governed in the- performance of the duty assigned to-them. The court is still to exercise its. judicial discretion in directing the movements and approving the acts of its assistants, until it has finally settled and determined on the details of the partition, if made in kind, or directed a sale by the-ministerial officers and prescribed the rules-for a division of the proceeds.”
From all of the foregoing it appears that under our present jurisprudence an appeal will lie only from: -1. A definitive or final: judgment, being that which ultimately de*813cides all the points in controversy between the parties and effects a complete adjudication of the cause, or 2. an interlocutory judgment, determining a preliminary matter in the course of the proceeding, when it may cause irreparable injury.
The judgment from which the instant ■appeal was taken clearly is not definitive in •character. By merely decreeing that the rule to show cause be recalled, annulled .and set aside, its only effect obviously was a determination that, as to her primary demand, plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish the alleged concealment by defendant of community assets; and that, as to the other demand, the inventories taken on plaintiff’s behalf were not binding on defendant inasmuch as he was not present or represented when they were prepared. Certainly the judgment would not have been res judicata as to plaintiff, had she taken no appeal, when attempting to show by way of opposition to the homologation of the completed partition that all community property had not been listed, including that described in her inventories.
And, contrary to the holding of the majority opinion, certainly the judgment appealed from does not approve the accounting furnished by the defendant. In his answer to the rule he prayed that the court expressly hold “that the community property consists of those properties set forth in Schedule 1 attached hereto”; but the judgment contains no language whatever expressly or impliedly maintaining this affirmative demand. That the district court did not pass upon such demand is also shown by the majority opinion itself, for therein it is said: “ * * * However, as the judge of the district court, by merely dismissing plaintiff’s rule, did not formally approve the account rendered by defendant, as prayed for by him, a remand of this portion of the case will be required as we cannot say, from the record before us, that all of the debts listed by defendant as community liabilities are proper.”
Unquestionably, the judgment presently submitted for review did not decide all the points in dispute between the parties in this partition proceeding and settle off to the litigants their respective shares of the property in money or in kind, these being essentials for rendering the judgment definitive in character under the above discussed jurisprudence. Yet to be determined are such controverted matters (among others) as the exact properties belonging to the community, their values, the manner of dividing them (in kind or by licitation), and the community obligations.
The proper procedure for determining all disputes in partition proceedings, as I appreciate the law, is that the district judge enlists the services of a notary public to make a partition, under his supervision and direction and with all interested parties having the right to be heard before the notary, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 1027 and 1028 of the Code of Practice. *815When the partition is completed by the notary it is presented to the court for homologation, at which time all oppositions thereto are considered and passed upon. Code of Practice Articles 1029 to 1032, inclusive. Following the determination of the oppositions there is rendered a judgment homologating the partition. From this judgment, evidencing the final adjudication of the cause, an appeal may be taken. And on the appeal a review can be had of all rulings made on the various disputes arising during the course of the partition proceedings.
The ruling from which the instant appeal was taken pronounced only on a preliminary matter. It is, therefore, interlocutory, not definitive. And it cannot cause plaintiff any irreparable injury. As was said in Mann v. Edenborn, supra, in applying the test laid down in the Pflug and Feitel cases, both supra, “when the final judgment to be rendered by the district court comes before this court for review, the court in its decree can restore the parties, without loss of any rights under the pleadings, to the identical position which they respectively occupied before the interlocutory judgment complained of was rendered.” In this connection it is to be remembered that the plaintiff herein is protected by an injunction against defendant, preventing his selling or encumbering the property; and all of defendant’s books and records are in the possession of the court under the writ of subpoena duces tecum. Moreover, even if defendant should violate the injunction, it appears certain that plaintiff can be adequately compensated for any monetary loss that she may sustain.
The holding of the majority herein that the district court’s judgment is definitive is predicated on Cary v. Richardson, 35 La. Ann. 505, and Garland v. Dimitry, 164 La. 875, 114 So. 718. With reference to these decisions this court, through the author of the Garland opinion, observed in Feitel v. Feitel, supra: “ * * * The cases of Cary v. Richardson, 35 La.Ann. 505, and Garland v. Dimitry, 164 La. 875, 114 So. 718, which latter follows the Cary Case, may be differentiated from the present case on the ground that the judgments, appealed from in those cases, disposed of the entire merits of the cases, with the exception of an accounting to be done, which was to be done in furtherance, or in execution, of the judgments, forming the bases of the appeals.”
As pointed out above the instant judgment clearly does not dispose of the entire merits of the partition proceeding, leaving only an accounting to be done in furtherance or in execution of such judgment. From which it follows that such decisions are inapplicable here.
Since the appeal under consideration is not from a definitive judgment, nor from an interlocutory decree which may cause plaintiff irreparable injury, my conclusion is that we are without right to entertain it. Plaintiff’s remedy for obtaining a review *817of the ruling complained of herein is to appeal from the final judgment to be rendered, being that which ultimately homologates the partition.
For the above reasons I respectfully dissent.