Court Opinion

ID: 9705312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:02:04.891298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.781410
License: Public Domain

*19
Menchine, J.

dissenting:

In my view, the Appellant has shown no more than that a witness at trial had testified before the grand jury. This is not enough to lift the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
This precise issue has been considered by the Supreme Court of the United States. I would not depart from that Court’s holding in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 et seq., 3 L. Ed. 2d 1323, 1326, et seq., 79 S. Ct. 1237, 1241, wherein it was said:
"Petitioners argue, however, that the trial judge’s discretion under Rule 6 (e) must be exercised in accordance with the rationale of Jencks; namely, upon a showing on cross-examination that a trial witness testified before the grand jury — and nothing more — the defense has a 'right’ to the delivery to it of the witness’ grand jury testimony.
This conclusion, however, runs counter to 'a long-established policy’ of secrecy, United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. supra (356 US at 681), older than our Nation itself. The reasons therefor are manifold, id., at 682, and are compelling when viewed in the light of the history and modus operandi of the grand jury. Its establishment in the Constitution 'as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases’ indeed 'shows the high place it [holds] as an instrument of justice.’ Costello v. United States, 350 US 359, 362, 100 L ed 397, 401, 76 S Ct 406 (1956).
Ever since this action by the Fathers, the American grand jury, like that of England, 'has convened as a body of laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one because of *20prejudice and to free no one because of special favor.’ Ibid. Indeed, indictments may be returned on hearsay, or for that matter, even on the knowledge of the grand jurors themselves. Id 350 US at 362, 363. To make public any part of its proceedings would inevitably detract from its efficacy. Grand jurors would not act with that independence required of an accusatory and inquisitorial body. Moreover, not only would the participation of the jurors be curtailed, but testimony would be parsimonious if each witness knew that his testimony would soon be in the hands of the accused.
It does not follow, however, that grand jury minutes should never be made available to the defense. This Court has long held that there are occasions, see United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. supra (356 US at 683), when the trial judge may in the exercise of his discretion order the minutes of a grand jury witness produced for use on his cross-examination at trial. Certainly 'disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it.’ United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. supra (310 US at 234).
The burden, however, is on the defense to show that 'a particularized need’ exists for the minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy. We have no such showing here. As we read the record the petitioners failed to show any need whatever for the testimony of the witness Jonas. They contended only that they had a ’right’ to the transcript because it dealt with subject matter generally covered at the trial. ” (Emphasis supplied)
The lifting of grand jury secrecy to defense counsel is the equivalent of lifting it to the world, for counsel would have the right, indeed perhaps the duty, to disclose to his client what he finds in the transcript. Thus the safety of the wit*21ness may be put at risk because the transcript discloses names or events inimical to the accused or named but unindicted individuals may thereby be subjected to obloquy or physical danger.
Such risks and dangers must, of course, be accepted when the defense shows that "a particularized need exists for the minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy.” Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra. No such showing has been made here.
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Per Curiam:
The State has filed a motion for reconsideration of our holding that after a State’s witness has testified on direct examination, a defendant is entitled to inspect the grand jury testimony for cross-examination purposes without any requirement that he show any other need. The State has urged us to withdraw our holding in Jones and return "to the flexible interpretation of the 'particularized need’ standard enunciated by [Chief] Judge Murphy in Silbert v. State, [12 Md. App. 516, 523-24, 280 A.2d 55, 60 (1971), cert. denied, 263 Md. 720 (1971)].” Alternatively, the State has submitted various questions and requested that we answer them in order to clarify certain issues.
We decline to grant the State’s motion for reconsideration for the reasons set forth in the opinion. Nevertheless, in the interests of judicial economy, we shall grant the State’s request for clarification with respect to (1) whether all grand jury testimony must be recorded and transcribed, (2) the basis for the Court’s holding, i.e., constitutional or common law, and (3) whether our holding has retrospective or prospective application.
*22(1)
Preliminarily, we point out that by section 2-503, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.), the legislature has provided that "[t]he jury judge of the circuit court for a[ny] county may appoint a stenographer to take and transcribe the testimony given before the grand jury for the exclusive use and benefit of the grand jury and the State’s attorney of the county unless otherwise ordered by the court.” Thus it is patent that the jury judge has discretionary power to so appoint a stenographer but is not mandated to do so. Our decision in Jones was not intended to mandate the recording and transcription of all grand jury testimony as such a holding would be in contravention of section 2-503. Furthermore, we believe that whether to require transcription of recorded grand jury testimony in a particular case is a matter for the discretion of the grand jury or the State’s Attorney and ultimately for the jury judge, whose judgment ought not to be disturbed absent an abuse of said discretion. In Jones, the witnesses’ testimony before the grand jury had been recorded and transcribed (presumably at the request and expense of the State) and thus was available. Under such circumstances, the defendant should be given access to the transcript for purposes of cross-examination. As the Supreme Court observed in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 1851, 16 L.Ed.2d 973, 985 (1966), "[i]n our adversary system for determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact.” (Footnote omitted). Moreover, in our view, under section 2-503, the jury judge has the discretionary power to order grand jury testimony to be recorded and transcribed at the request of the defendant as well as the State. Where such testimony is transcribed at the request of the defendant, it should be at the expense of the defendant.
*23(2)
The rule of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings is a product of the common law and "is designed to protect the jury from outside interference or pressure [.]” See Piracci v. State, 207 Md. 499, 515, 115 A.2d 262, 269 (1955) and Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 566-67, 166 A. 45, 49 (1933). See also In Re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 137 A. 370 (1927). Nevertheless, there are instances when the reason for the rule may disappear, particularly where the jury has returned an indictment and the accused is apprehended. See 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury, § 41 (1968). See also Dennis v. United States, supra, 384 U.S. at 870, 86 S.Ct. at 1849, 16 L.Ed.2d at 983-84; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400, 79 S.Ct. 1237, 1241, 3 L.Ed.2d 1323, 1327 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683, 78 S.Ct. 983, 987, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077, 1082 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-34, 60 S.Ct. 811, 849, 84 L.Ed. 1129, 1174 (1940). As stated in American Jurisprudence:
"The rule of secrecy concerning matters transpiring in the grand jury room, it has been said, is not designed for the protection of witnesses before the grand jury, but for that of the grand jurors, and in furtherance of the public justice. The witness has no privilege of having his testimony treated as a confidential communication, but must be considered as testifying under all the obligations of an oath in a judicial proceeding; hence his testimony may be disclosed wherever it becomes material to the administration of justice.” 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury, § 41 (1968).
Likewise, the right of cross-examination is a matter of common law evidence. Professor Wigmore in his treatise on Evidence points out that:
"For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination *24as a vital feature of the law.” 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (1974).
While it is true that the right of cross-examination may be said to be embodied in the right of confrontation contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, nevertheless, it is of common law origin; our holding is based on common law principles of procedure and evidence.
(3)
With respect to the State’s inquiry whether our holding in Jones will be given retrospective or prospective application, it is essential that it be understood just what the holding was. In essence, we held that after a State’s witness had testified in chief, the accused was entitled to see that witness’s transcribed grand jury testimony for use in cross-examination which was a "particularized need,” without any other showing of need. What the holding did was to explain what "particularized need” was. Previously, by dictum in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Strathen, 287 Md. 111, 117, 411 A.2d 102, 105-06 (1980), Chief Judge Murphy had stated, in pertinent part:
"It is true, of course, that in a proper case an accused may, at trial, be afforded access to grand jury minutes for purposes of cross-examination or impeachment if he demonstrates a 'particularized need’ for disclosure.” (Citations omitted).
Consequently, the Jones holding was not a change of the law; it merely explained the "particularized need” referred to in Strathen. There was no overruling of a prior decision or overruling of an interpretation by this Court, and there was no change in the common law. Therefore, the issue of *25retroactivity is not presented.1 Cf. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 336, 403 A.2d 356, 370 (1979) (On Motion for Reconsideration) (per curiam), where we stated:
"We recognize that our initial opinion in this case did not overrule any prior interpretation of Rule 746. Nevertheless, the critical language of Rule 746, upon which our decision in this case was based, was essentially unchanged from the language in Art. 27, § 591, which was incorporated by reference in former Rule 740 and was construed as being only directory in Young v. State [15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, summarily aff'd, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972)], supra. Consequently, our holdings in the instant case did overrule a prior interpretation of the same language and did set forth a new interpretation of that language. Thus, the case is an appropriate one for considering whether such new interpretation should be given only prospective effect.”
Opinion clarified and, as clarified, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

. Because this case does not involve any change in the Maryland law, a defendant’s failure to demand an available grand jury transcript, and to preserve an objection to the trial court’s failure to require its production, clearly implicates the waiver provisions of Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 145-150, 395 A.2d 464 (1978).