Court Opinion

ID: 9527653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:32:19.658233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:02.420708
License: Public Domain

Schultheis, C.J.
(dissenting) — The majority perceives no error in compelling defense counsel to proceed, immediately following his client’s arraignment, with a hearing on the admissibility of critical evidence. This is a denial of due process and the right to effective assistance of counsel. I would reverse the conviction with respect to the charges involving D.G.
The prosecutor’s untimely amendment of the information gave Ralph G. two choices. He could waive his right to a speedy trial on the charges relating to T.W.G. and seek a continuance to enable his attorney to prepare to meet the new charges involving T.VG. and D.G., or he could invoke his right to a speedy trial and go forward with an attorney who admitted he was wholly unprepared to meet the new charges. Mr. G. declined to waive his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Consequently, only minutes after he had been arraigned on charges involving D.G., his attorney was required to represent him in a hearing to determine the admissibility of hearsay evidence of statements D.G. had made when interviewed by a caseworker.
There is nothing in the record suggesting Mr. G.’s attorney was aware of any allegations involving D.G. until a week earlier when, after some delay, he was permitted to interview all three children for the first time. He first learned that the State intended to file such charges a few *28days after that interview was concluded. There is no indication Mr. G.’s counsel had any opportunity, after learning of the proposed new charges, to interview either the child or the caseworker whose testimony the State sought to introduce. To the contrary, counsel advised the court that he was wholly unprepared to respond to the State’s motion to admit the child’s hearsay statements.
The court nevertheless permitted the State to proceed with an examination of the child, the caseworker, and the police officer who was present during the interview, and required the defense to conduct any cross-examination without any opportunity for preparation whatsoever. After the State had presented its witnesses, and following an unreported discussion in chambers, Mr. G. agreed to waive his right to a speedy trial. The court then granted a continuance, allowing Mr. G. to prepare and present evidence in opposition to the admission of the child’s hearsay statements.
The constitutional right to counsel includes a reasonable time for consultation and preparation. State v. Hartzog, 96 Wn.2d 383, 402, 635 P.2d 694 (1981). A reasonable time is “sufficient time for effective legal representation.” State v. Anderson, 23 Wn. App. 445, 449, 597 P.2d 417 (1979). Compelling counsel to represent a defendant in an evidentiary hearing with no more than 45 minutes in which to prepare deprives the defendant of his right to due process and effective assistance of counsel. State v. Hartwig, 36 Wn.2d 598, 601, 219 P.2d 564 (1950).
The child hearsay statute allows the admission of statements made by children related to sexual acts performed against them even if they would not otherwise be admissible under the evidence rules. RCW 9A.44.120. In order to admit the child’s hearsay statements, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there are sufficient indicia of reliability and the child must either testify or be unavailable as a witness. RCW 9A.44.120(1), (2). State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 175-76, 691 P.2d 197 (1984) sets out nine factors that a court should consider before finding child hearsay statements sufficiently reliable.
*29It is impossible to imagine that any attorney could provide effective assistance to his client in a hearing, upon which the outcome of the case may well depend, involving multiple witnesses and a complex nine-part test, a few minutes after his client was arraigned on the information.
The majority finds that any error in adding the new charges was cured by the continuance. I disagree. The right to counsel arises at any critical stage in a criminal prosecution. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wn.2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966). We cannot know what objections defense counsel might have interposed during the prosecutor’s examination of the key witnesses if he had been given time to prepare for the hearing. We cannot know what questions he might have asked during cross-examination if he had ever had an opportunity to talk with those witnesses after learning of the new charges. There can be no doubt that the testimony of the State’s witnesses in the hearing on the admissibility of the victims’ hearsay statements was a critical stage in the prosecution during which Mr. G. was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
The court erred in allowing the State to bring new charges and join them with charges for which the time for trial was imminent. I agree with the majority’s recognition of the effect of that error in depriving Mr. G. of his right to a speedy trial on the charges relating to T.W.G. I cannot agree that there was no prejudice with respect to the charges involving D.G.
Accordingly, I would reverse the conviction on the charges involving D.G. and remand for a trial in which Mr. G. is represented by counsel to the full extent required by the constitution.