Court Opinion

ID: 9850439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:57:16.190823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:37.175692
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially. I concur solely because of the apparent broad discretion given to the trial court *3by the General Assembly by the 1968 amendment quoted in the opinion. What amounts to “unreasonable delay” may vary from 5 to 10 days in the opinion of one judge to 60 or 90 days or longer in the opinion of another. I think more definite guidelines should have been established by the General Assembly, or in such absence by the courts, so that a uniform application of the law will result.
Under the 1968 amendment three things must appear, (1) failure to pay costs or make pauper’s affidavit, resulting in (2) inexcusable delay and (3) unreasonable delay in transmitting the record to the appellate court. In this ease the record was completed on May 28, 1968, at which time the costs were due. They were paid by check dated July 3, 1968, some 35 days later, at which time the record could have been forwarded to this court. Even with this delay, part of which was due to press of business in the trial court clerk’s office, the case would have been docketed in this court within less than 3 months from the filing of the notice of appeal. Is such a delay “unreasonable?”
The word unreasonable is defined as “beyond the bounds of reason or moderation.” The word “stale,” used in the George v. American Credit Control case, 222 Ga. 512, cited in the opinion, where there was a 70-day delay in payment of costs, is defined as “tasteless, unpalatable from age.” The business world recognizes the payment of practically all debts within 30 days as timely. In my opinion where the costs are paid in a case to the clerk within this period and the resulting delay is no longer than this, a trial court would abuse its discretion in ruling such to be an “unreasonable” delay under this statute.
In the absence of a suitable guideline, and since the delay here due to nonpayment of costs exceeded 30 days, we cannot say as a matter of law that there was a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court in this case.