Court Opinion

ID: 9301341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:07:42.664533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:41.750868
License: Public Domain

BRADLEY', Circuit Justice.
This action was brought to recover the amount of certain bonds and coupons thereto attached, issued by the corporate authorities of the city of Montgomery in the years 1850 and 1852, to aid in the construction of the Montgomery South Plankroad, and the Montgomery and Wetumpka Plankroad respectively, extending from points within said city to certain points several miles outside of its bounds.
The main question raised in the ease is, whether the city authorities had any legal authority or power to issue said bonds. If they had, it is admitted that the plaintiffs are bona fide holders thereof, and entitled to recover; if they had not, no recovery can be had. The original charter of the city was an act of the legislature of Alabama, passed December 23, 1837, which remained without material alteration, so far as the question involved in this case is concerned, until the bonds in question were issued. A careful examination of this charter does not disclose any authority to make or issue bonds or other commercial securities of a negotiable character. It confers upon the corporation the ordinary police powers which are given to municipal bodies — such as the power to pass by-laws and ordinances necessary and proper to prevent contagious and infectious diseases, to preserve the public health, to prevent and remove nuisances, to license and regulate shows and theatrical amusements, to restrain gaming, to establish night watches and patrol, to make, alter and regulate streets, to regulate the wharves, to erect and regulate markets, the conveyance of water, etc.
In 1S46, a special act was passed authorizing the city council to raise seventy-five thousand dollars by the issue of bonds to that amount; which was immediately done, and the money was applied to the erection of the state capitol in said city. The power was exhausted and became extinct This very act, however, shows the public sense as to the incapacity of the city to issue bonds without special authority. The mode pointed out in the charter for raising revenues to meet the public expenditures was by taxation. Indebtedness incurred by the authorities at any time, in carrying out any of the prescribed objects of the charter, is undoubtedly binding on the city; but such indebtedness, and the ordinary certificates or vouchers given as evidence thereof, stand on a very different ground from that of commercial securities issued by the city officials, the consideration of which cannot be inquired into in the hands of a bona fide holder, and which might be issued to an extent involving the financial ruin of the city. It is the latter species of securities for the issue of which no authority can be found in the charter; and the power to issue these is not implied from the ordinary police powers given to a municipal corporation. Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. [86 U. S.] 468. In the next place, the charter contains no authority to aid or subscribe for stock in private corporations created for constructing works of internal improvement. The bonds in question were issued for this purpose, as is shown by a printed memorandum in their margin.
A municipal corporation is but a subordinate branch of the government; it represents the state sovereignty in a limited district and for specified purposes. Those purposes are local government and police. The power of taxation is granted as a means of carrying out these purposes. The diversion of these revenues to other purposes is unlawful and ultra vires. If it is desirable that a municipal body should have the power of subscribing to railroads or plankroads, or of issuing commercial securities to be sold in the financial markets, it is time enough for it to do so when authorized thereto by legislation. It possesses no powers but such as are given to it expressly or by necessary implication. These views were recently expressed by the supreme court of the United States in the case of Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. [86 U. S.] 468, and substantially the same conclusion was’ reached by the supreme court of Alabama in the case of Montgomery v. Montgomery & W. Plankroad Co., 31 Ala. 84. The ruinous extravagance and demoralization which have resulted from the possession of unlimited powers of expenditure and issue of bonds by municipal bodies all over the country, evince the wisdom of these decisions. Mj- attention has been called to the charter of the plank-road companies in whose aid the bonds were issued; but I find nothing in them to supply the fundamental defect of want of power to grant the aid and issue the bonds in question. Reference has also been made to an act passed in 1S60. authorizing the citj' council to issue new bonds in the place and in extension of the issues of which the bonds in *640suit form a part, provided tlie owners of real estate resident in tlie city should vote consent thereto. But the vote was adverse to such reissue, and the law does not, if it could, cure the original defect of power in the issue of the bonds.
The plea that the city is estopped by the acts of its officers, by the resolutions of the city council, or by the negotiable form or other matter in the bonds themselves, from denying the authority of' such officers to pledge the faith of the city in aid .of saiti planltroads, and to issue the bonds in question, cannot be maintained. Public officers cannot acquire authority by declaring that they have it. They cannot thus shut the mouth of the public whom they represent. The officers and agents of private corporations, entrusted by them with the management of their own business and property, may estop their principals and subject them to the consequences of their unauthorized acts. But the body politic cannot be thus silenced by the acts or declarations of its agents. If it could be, unbounded scope would be given to the peculations and frauds of public officers. I hold it to be a sound proposition, that no municipal or political body can be estopped by the acts or declarations of its officers, from denying their authority to bind it. The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. [74 U. S.] 6G6.
Finally the plea that the plaintiffs are bona fide holders of the bonds cannot avail where the defense is want of power to issue them. Of this defect the plaintiffs were bound to take notice. Had the power to issue the bonds existed, and had the question been, whether certain preliminaiw conditions had been complied with, the plea might, under certain circumstances, have been a good one. No doubt the plaintiffs in these cases are meritorious holders of the bonds; and no doubt there are considerations of equity in their favor; and perhaps it is to be regretted that the citizens of Montgomery did not, in their own vindication, under the act of 1800, vote for a reissue and extension of the bonds. An eminent citizen,2 who was called upon, nearly twenty years ago, to investigate the rights of the parties holding these bonds, speaking for himself and a committee of which he was chairman, forcibly observed: “That the principles of common honesty, as well as a just regard for the credit of the city, demand that immediate provision should be made for the payment of the interest in arrear,” etc., and he further observed: “The committee is aware that the authority of the city council in the issue of these bonds is questionable; that it is doubtful if such issue constitutes any valid legal obligation on the city; but as it was done in accordance with the deliberately expressed wishes of a large majority of the real estate holders of the city, and as they would have derived the principal benefit in the increased value of their property, had the enterprise to promote which the bonds were issued proved successful, they do not doubt under such circumstances, that the same property holders who united in recommending the issue and loan will most cheerfully submit to the slight increase of taxation which is proposed.” Unfortunately, these anticipations have not, thus far, been realized; and the court, under the view of the law which I have been compelled to take, is powerless to afford relief. There must be a finding and judgment for the defendant.

 Hon. Geo. Goldthwaite.