Court Opinion

ID: 9379968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 19:00:45.069871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.476663
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                       FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MAR 16 2023
                                                                   MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALFREDO PABLO PEREZ,                           No. 22-528

              Petitioner,                      Agency No.      A209-812-576

  v.                                           MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted March 08, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND, NELSON, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,*** District
Judge.

       Petitioner Alfredo Pablo Perez seeks review of an order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have

       *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
       ***
            The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th

Cir. 2017), and we deny the petition.

      1.    The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of Pablo

Perez’s application for asylum based on the IJ’s adverse credibility finding

resulting from Pablo Perez’s inconsistent statements. When the BIA agrees with

the conclusions of the IJ, we review both decisions. See Garcia-Martinez v.

Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018).

      The IJ may base an adverse credibility determination on a variety of

factors, including but not limited to consistency between written and oral

statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath), internal consistency

of those statements, and the consistency of those statements with other record

evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). In reviewing an adverse credibility

finding, “we must look to the ‘totality of the circumstances[ ] and all relevant

factors.’” Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). Taking the totality of the circumstances

into account, we review the agency’s credibility determination for substantial

evidence. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). Under this

standard, an agency’s findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Ruiz-Colmenares

v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453

F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)).

      The BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility determination

                                        2                                  22-528
based on Pablo Perez’s omission of any reference to his political views when

asked during his credible fear interview about what motivated the harm he

suffered. Pablo Perez was asked three times during his credible fear interview

why he was harmed and each time he said he had no idea why the gang targeted

him. He also said during the interview that he had never been targeted for his

political opinions.1 Later, however, he wrote in his asylum application and in a

declaration, and testified before the IJ, that the gang targeted him because of his

involvement in a political campaign for a new mayor who opposed gangs. The

IJ did not err in finding these inconsistencies material because of their relevance

to showing the required nexus for Pablo Perez’s asylum and withholding of

removal claims.2 See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that

when inconsistencies go “to the heart of” an asylum claim, they are “of great

weight” in evaluating credibility).

      Pablo Perez counters that reliance on inconsistencies between a credible

fear interview and other testimony is impermissible. We have never so held. In

Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005), we did note that

“[c]ertain features of an asylum interview make it a potentially unreliable point

of comparison to a petitioner’s testimony for purposes of a credibility

1
  Pablo Perez does not argue that he claimed political persecution during his
credible fear interview and that this was not transcribed.
2
  Pablo Perez also asserted fear of persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group before the IJ, but he has not raised that argument on appeal.

                                         3                                     22-528
determination.” But Singh did not set forth a categorical prohibition. The INA

allows the IJ to consider “the consistency between the applicant’s . . . written and

oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath . . . .” 8 U.S.C. §

1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added); see also Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1084

(9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he IJ may base an adverse credibility determination on any

relevant factor that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, can

reasonably be said to have a bearing on a petitioner’s veracity.” (internal

quotations and citation omitted)).

      Further, these were not the only inconsistencies found. The IJ and BIA

also pointed to inconsistencies between Pablo Perez’s testimony stating that he

had never been harmed or had any problems with the gangs prior to his political

involvement, and his written declaration stating that he did have trouble with a

gang before his political involvement. Taken together, these inconsistencies

constitute substantial evidence.

      Pablo Perez also contends that the IJ failed to consider corroborative

evidence in support of his claim. But the IJ and BIA did consider this evidence

and concluded it did not resolve the specific concerns about the gang’s motive in

targeting him. Given the record inconsistencies identified, the IJ and BIA’s

determination that other evidence did not rehabilitate Pablo Perez’s testimony is

supported by substantial evidence. See Mairena v. Barr, 917 F.3d 1119, 1126

(9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[O]ur task is to determine whether there is

substantial evidence to support the BIA’s findings, not to substitute an analysis

                                         4                                    22-528
of which side in the factual dispute we find more persuasive.” (internal quotations

and citation omitted)).

      The IJ afforded Pablo Perez an opportunity to explain these inconsistencies

before making the adverse credibility finding. The IJ considered Pablo Perez’s

explanation and found it unreasonable. See Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1092–

93 (9th Cir. 2014) (requiring an IJ to consider and address plausible and

reasonable explanations for any inconsistencies). The IJ determined that the

record did not indicate that Pablo Perez was scared or nervous during his credible

fear interview, that he spoke Spanish despite stating that he had a hard time

understanding the interpreter, and that the record reflected no difficulty

comprehending or responding during his interview. The IJ also reiterated that

Pablo Perez was given multiple opportunities to explain why he believed the gang

targeted him.

      Considering the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors, the IJ

and BIA’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence

and the record does not compel an alternate conclusion. See Mukulumbutu v.

Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020).

      2.     Because Pablo Perez’s claims for asylum and withholding of

removal both depend on his testimony, the IJ and BIA’s adverse credibility

determination causes both claims to fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153,

1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

      3.     Pablo Perez’s CAT claim was also supported, in substantial part, by

                                        5                                     22-528
his own testimony. Even so, an adverse credibility determination does not excuse

the IJ and BIA from their obligation to consider “all evidence relevant to the

possibility of future torture.” Id. at 1156–57. But Petitioner “points to no other

evidence that he could claim the BIA should have considered in making its [CAT]

determination.” See id. at 1157. Indeed, Petitioner raises no arguments on appeal

other than his challenge to the IJ and BIA’s adverse credibility determination. In

the absence of credible testimony, substantial evidence also supports the denial

of Petitioner’s CAT claim. See Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927–28.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                        6                                   22-528