Court Opinion

ID: 9483315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:17:07.665203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:33.332400
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Terry Gnazzo appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Peter C. Dorsey, Judge, granting defendant G.D. Searle & Co.’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 on the ground that plaintiffs action was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to her product liability action. See Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-577a (1990). We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Judge Sweet dissents in a separate opinion.
BACKGROUND
On November 11, 1974, Gnazzo had a Cu-7 intrauterine device (“IUD”) inserted in her uterus for contraceptive purposes. The IUD was developed, marketed and sold by G.D. Searle & Co. (“Searle”). When Gnazzo’s deposition was taken, she stated that her doctor had informed her that “the insertion would hurt[,] but not for long,” and that she “would have uncomfortable and probably painful periods for the first three to four months.” On October 11, 1975, Gnazzo found it necessary to return to her physician due to excessive pain and cramping. During this visit she was informed by her doctor that he .thought she had Pelvic Inflammatory Disease (“PID”). She recalled that he stated that the infection was possibly caused by venereal disease or the use of the IUD. The PID was treated with antibiotics and cleared up shortly thereafter. Less than one year later, Gnazzo was again treated for an IUD-associated infection. This infection was also treated with antibiotics. Gnazzo continued using the IUD until it was finally removed in December of 1977.
Following a laparoscopy in March of 1989, Gnazzo was informed by a fertility specialist that she was infertile because of PID-induced adhesions resulting from her prior IUD use. Subsequent to this determination, and at the request of her then-attorneys, Gnazzo completed a questionnaire dated May 11, 1989. In response to the following question, “[w]hen and why did you first suspect that your IUD had caused you any harm?”, Gnazzo responded “sometime in 1981” and explained:
I was married in Apr. 81 so I stopped using birth control so I could get pregnant — nothing ever happened (of course) then I started hearing [and] reading about how damaging IUD’s could be. I figured that was [the] problem however my marriage started to crumble so I never persued [sic] the issue....
On May 4, 1990, Gnazzo initiated the underlying action against Searle. In an amended complaint, she alleged that she had suffered injuries as a result of her use of the IUD developed by Searle. Searle moved for summary judgment on the ground that Gnazzo’s claim was time-barred by Connecticut’s three-year statute of limitations for product liability actions. Searle argued, inter alia, that Gnazzo knew in 1981 that she had suffered harm caused by her IUD. Gnazzo contended that her cause of action against Searle accrued only when she learned from the fertility specialist that the IUD had caused her PID and subsequent infertility.
In a ruling dated September 18, 1991, the district court granted Searle’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Gnazzo’s claim was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In reaching this result, the court determined that Connecticut law provided no support for Gnaz-zo’s contention that she should not have *138been expected to file her action until she was told of her infertility and the IUD’s causal connection. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Gnazzo contends that the district court improperly granted Searle’s motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when she discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, her injuries and their causal connection to the defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct.
Under our well-established standards, we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Gnazzo de novo. Trans-Orient Marine v. Star Trading & Marine, 925 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir.1991). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We consider the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Trans-Orient Marine, 925 F.2d at 572. However, the non-movant “ ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted).
Under Connecticut law, a product liability claim must be brought within “three years from the date when the injury ... is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered_” Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-577a. “In Connecticut, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers actionable harm.” Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 212 Conn. 509, 562 A.2d 1100, 1107 (1989) (citation omitted). “Actionable harm occurs when the plaintiff discovers or should discover, through the exercise of reasonable care, that he or she has been injured and that the defendant's conduct caused such injury.” Id.
Gnazzo contends that “[t]he mere occurrence of a pelvic infection or difficulty in becoming pregnant does not necessarily result in notice to the plaintiff of a cause of action.” Thus, she maintains that her cause of action did not accrue until 1989 when the fertility specialist informed her both that she was infertile and that this condition resulted from her previous use of the IUD.
Under Connecticut law, however, “the statute [of limitations] begins to run when the plaintiff discovers some form of actionable harm, not the fullest manifestation thereof.” Lambert v. Stovell, 205 Conn. 1, 529 A.2d 710, 713 (1987) (emphasis in original); see Barnes v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732, 473 A.2d 1221, 1224 n. 7 (1984) (“Although an expert opinion may lead to discovery of an ‘actionable harm[,]’ ... it does not follow that a plaintiff cannot reasonably discover an injury absent verification by a qualified expert.” (citation omitted)).
Therefore, as Gnazzo’s responses to the questionnaire indicate, she suspected “sometime in 1981” that the IUD had caused her harm because she had been experiencing trouble becoming pregnant and had “started hearing [and] reading about how damaging IUD’s could be ... [and had] figured that was [the] problem....” Thus, by her own admission, Gnazzo had recognized, or should have recognized, the critical link between her injury and the defendants causal connection to it. In other words she had “discover[ed] or should have discovered] through the exercise of reasonable care, that ... she ha[d] been injured and that [Searle’s] conduct caused such injury.” Champagne, 562 A.2d at 1107. However, as Gnazzo acknowledged in the questionnaire, she did not pursue the “issue” at the time because of her marital problems. Thus, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Gnaz-zo, the non-moving party, we are constrained to find that she knew by 1981 that she had “some form of actionable harm.” Lambert, 529 A.2d at 713. Consequently, by the time she commenced her action in 1990, Gnazzo was time-barred by the Connecticut statute of limitations.
*139Since we have determined that Gnazzo’s cause of action commenced in 1981, we need not address Searle’s additional contention that Gnazzo’s awareness in 1975 of her PID and her purported knowledge of its causal connection to the IUD commenced the running of the Connecticut statute of limitations at that time.
We are sympathetic to Gnazzo’s situation and mindful that the “unavoidable result we reach in this case is harsh.” Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 472 A.2d 1257, 1261 (1984). Nevertheless, we are equally aware that “it is within the [Connecticut] General Assembly’s constitutional authority to decide when claims for injury are to be brought.... Where a plaintiff has failed to comply with this requirement, a court may not entertain the suit.” Id.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.