Court Opinion

ID: 9372443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 17:02:55.232796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.514702
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                  )
                                   )
  v.                               )
                                   )         ID No. 1701009508
DENEISHA WRIGHT,                   )
                                   )
        Defendant.                 )

              MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

   Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief:
                               DENIED

                     Submitted: December 12, 2022
                       Decided: February 21, 2023

Sean Lugg, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, of the DELAWARE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.

Patrick Collins, Esquire, of COLLINS & PRICE, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Deneisha Wright.
    RENNIE, J.

                                  INTRODUCTION
         On May 1, 2017, a grand jury indicted Deneisha Wright on two counts of

    Murder in the First Degree (intentional murder and felony murder), one count

    of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, three counts of Possession of a

    Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), and one count of

    Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”).1 The police

    alleged that Ms. Wright, who was admittedly “really ripped on Xannies,”

    fatally shot Charles Mays during a robbery gone wrong.

         The case against Ms. Wright proceeded to a jury trial in June 2018.2 After

    a six-day trial, the jury convicted her of Murder in the First Degree (felony

    murder), Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, two counts of PFDCF, and

    one count of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon.3 Following the verdict,

    the Court independently assessed the evidence and found Ms. Wright guilty

    of the severed PFBPP charge.4 She was sentenced to life imprisonment plus

    nine years in November 2018.5

1
  D.I. 2.
2
  D.I. 30, 31, 34.
3
  Id.
4
  D.I. 3.
5
  D.I. 48.

                                           2
           Ms. Wright filed the motion for postconviction relief presently before the

      Court, after the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed her convictions on direct

      appeal.6       Through the motion, she asserts a single claim of ineffective

      assistance of counsel based on her trial attorney’s failure to request an alibi

      instruction.7 After careful review of the motion and the record, the Court has

      concluded that Ms. Wright is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, for the

      reasons discussed below, her motion is DENIED.

                                        FACTUAL OVERVIEW
           The Delaware Supreme Court summarized the underlying facts of this case

      in its decision on direct appeal:

                   The charges arose from the shooting death of Charles
                   Mays. The evidence presented at trial fairly reflects that
                   in the early afternoon of January 14, 2017, Mays’s pick-
                   up truck crashed in Wilmington, and Mays was found
                   unresponsive inside, with gunshot wounds to his legs.
                   Mays was transported to the hospital, where he was
                   pronounced dead. A trail of blood led police officers from
                   Mays’s truck to a nearby apartment building. Surveillance
                   video obtained from the apartment complex showed
                   Braheem Mitchell (Ms. Wright’s brother) and Kori
                   Thomas (a friend of the family), exiting Apartment 1-A.
                   Lisa Mitchell (Ms. Wright’s aunt) then exited the
                   apartment, where she lived with her daughter Sharnice
                   Mitchell, and approached Mays’s truck. While Lisa
                   Mitchell was standing at the truck, a fourth person exited
                   Apartment 1-A, stopped briefly behind a car, and then
                   approached the passenger side of Mays’s truck. As the

6
    Wright v. State, 2019 WL 2417520 (Del. June 6, 2019).
7
    D.I. 77.

                                                            3
truck pulled away, knocking Lisa Mitchell to the ground,
the fourth person extended an arm toward the passenger
door of the truck and shot Mays.

… Lisa Mitchell testified that she purchased pills from
Mays every morning, and that she arranged to meet Mays
that morning. As she leaned down to give Mays the money
for the pills, someone approached the truck, shooting a
gun. Lisa Mitchell got knocked down as the truck began
to drive away, and as she stood up, she saw that the shooter
was Wright.

… Ralph Mitchell, Wright’s cousin, testified that he was
at Apartment 1-A on the morning of January 14, 2017, and
that Wright, Sharnice Mitchell, Latasha Brown (also
known as “Brownie”), Kori Thomas, and Braheem
Mitchell were also there. He testified that he heard the
others plotting to have Lisa Mitchell call Mays to the
apartment so they could rob Mays of pills and money. He
testified that he and Brownie watched from the apartment
window and that he saw Wright fire four shots at Mays.
On the surveillance video, Ralph Mitchell identified
Braheem Mitchell and Kori Black as the first two people
to leave the apartment, followed by Lisa Mitchell and then
Wright.

… Tyrell Simpson testified that he was in a romantic
relationship with Wright for approximately one year in
2016-2017. He stated that around 12:30 p.m. on January
14, 2017, he and Wright were at their residence when
Braheem Mitchell and Kori Black stopped by and Wright
abruptly left with them. Then, in the evening of January
14, Simpson spoke with Wright on the telephone and
“[she] said she had done something dumb … She had shot
someone.” Simpson also testified that about a week before
the incident, he had heard Wright talking to Braheem
Mitchell about robbing Mays because Mays had money
                             4
                   from selling pills. Simpson testified under a plea
                   agreement and cooperation agreement reached with the
                   State in connection with unrelated charges.

                   … When law enforcement located Wright approximately
                   ten days after the shooting, she was wearing a jacket that
                   the State suggested appeared similar to the jacket worn by
                   the shooter in the surveillance video. Expert testing
                   identified several particles that were consistent with
                   gunshot residue on the jacket. Ballistics evidence
                   indicated that a gun recovered by probation officers some
                   time after the incident was the gun that killed Mays, but
                   no link was established between Wright and the residence
                   where the gun was found or its occupants.

                   … The defense focused on questioning the credibility of
                   the State’s witnesses and suggesting that Brownie, who
                   died before trial, was the shooter. Wright testified that she
                   was not at Apartment 1-A on January 14, 2017, and that
                   she did not attempt to rob Mays and did not shoot Mays.
                   She testified that she was at the corner store at the time of
                   the shooting. She further testified that Lisa Mitchell,
                   Ralph Mitchell, and Tyrell Simpson each had conflicts
                   with her that could have motivated them to provide false
                   testimony against her. Aigner Neal, who had children with
                   Wright’s brother, and Marsha Mitchell, Wright’s mother,
                   testified that the shooter on the video looked like Brownie
                   and not Wright. Robin Henry, who was Wright’s cousin
                   and Ralph Mitchell’s sister, testified that a few days after
                   Mays was shot, she drove Brownie on some errands.
                   When Brownie went into a store, Henry discovered that a
                   wallet that Brownie left on the seat was Mays’s wallet.8

                                        PROCEDURAL HISTORY

8
    Wright, 2019 WL 2417520, at *1-2.

                                                5
         Ms. Wright initially filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief in July

     2020.9 Because her motion was filed “within the extended deadline set by the

     Delaware Supreme Court” due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court deemed

     the motion to be timely filed.10 The Court also directed the Office of Conflicts

     Counsel to appoint counsel for Ms. Wright’s postconviction proceedings,

     which it did.11 Thereafter, Ms. Wright’s counsel filed an amended motion,

     which the Court considers here.12 Under Superior Court Criminal Rule

     61(g)(2) and Horne v. State,13 the Court ordered Ms. Wright’s trial counsel to

     submit an affidavit to be considered as part of the record in this proceeding.14

     The Court then directed the State to respond, and gave Ms. Wright leave to

     reply to trial counsel’s and the State’s submissions.15 The motion is now ripe

     for consideration.

                                      STANDARD OF REVIEW
         Before addressing the merits of any motion for postconviction relief, the

     Court must first determine whether the claims pass through the procedural

     filters of Rule 61.16 Rule 61 imposes four procedural imperatives upon a

9
  D.I. 65.
10
   See State v. Wright, 2020 WL 6376647, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 30, 2020).
11
   D.I. 77.
12
   D.I. 83.
13
   887 A.2d 973, 975 (Del. 2005).
14
   D.I. 85.
15
   Id.
16
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61; Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) (“It is well-settled that the Superior Court
… must address the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before considering the merits of [the postconviction]
motion.”).

                                                          6
     defendant bringing a motion for postconviction relief: (1) the motion must be

     brought within one year after the judgment of conviction is final; (2) any basis

     for relief must not have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction

     proceedings unless warranted in the interest of justice; (3) any basis for relief

     not asserted in the proceedings below as required by the court rules is

     subsequently barred unless defendant can show cause and actual prejudice;

     and (4) any ground for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any

     proceeding unless warranted in the interest of justice.17

        To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant

     must meet the two-prong test set out in Strickland v. Washington.18

     Specifically, the defendant must show counsel’s representation fell below an

     objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s

     unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the

     proceeding would have been different.19                   Further, “review of counsel’s

     representation is subject to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was

     professionally reasonable.”20 An ineffective assistance claim is not a question

17
   Id.
18
   466 U.S. 668 (1984).
19
   Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
20
   Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190, cert. denied, Dawson v. Delaware, 519 U.S. 844 (“Counsel’s efforts …
enjoy a strong presumption of reasonableness.”).

                                                     7
     of hindsight about what trial counsel could have done better; rather, the

     question is whether trial counsel’s actions were adequate.21

                                                   ANALYSIS
        With the above in mind, the Court is satisfied that Ms. Wright has

     presented a timely and procedurally proper claim of ineffective assistance of

     counsel.22 Now that she has passed that threshold, the Court assesses trial

     counsel’s performance under Strickland’s two-prong test below.

        A. Trial Counsel’s Representation Fell Below an Objective Standard
           of Reasonableness.
        At the time of Ms. Wright’s trial, it was (and remains) clear that under

     Delaware law, a defendant is entitled, upon request, to a specific jury

     instruction regarding an alibi defense if “there is some credible evidence

     showing that the defendant was elsewhere when the crime occurred.”23 The

     Delaware Supreme Court has defined “some credible evidence” as evidence

     “capable of being believed,” including sworn testimony.24 And, not long ago,

     our Supreme Court observed in Brown v. State that “[a]n alibi instruction is

     required so that a jury does not make a determination of guilt based on the

     ‘failure of the defense rather than because the evidence introduced by the

21
   See Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174, 1178 (Del. 1997) (emphasis added).
22
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
23
   Gardner v. State, 397 A.2d 1372, 1374 (Del. 1979).
24
   Brown v. State, 958 A.2d 833, 838 (Del. 2008).

                                                         8
     [State] ha[s] satisfied the jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

     doubt.’”25

         Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that Ms. Wright

     presented conceivable, albeit far from airtight, evidence by sworn testimony

     that she was somewhere other than at the location of the shooting. As

     mentioned, Ms. Wright testified that she remembered “clear as a bell” being

     at the “corner store” at the time of the homicide. Although this testimony

     stood in contrast to her initial account of the events, where she told police she

     was high on drugs and could not recall the day of the shooting,26 Ms. Wright

     explained away her previous statement by claiming that she did not want to

     talk to police without a lawyer present.27 Indeed, the alibi evidence was of

     such a quality that the jury passed a note that read, “was there any verification

     of defendant’s alibi, corner store?”28

         The State does not dispute that Ms. Wright offered alibi evidence for the

     day of the shooting, but, nevertheless, argues that trial counsel reasonably

25
   Id. at 839 (quoting Rogers v. Redman, 457 F.Supp. 929, 934 (D. Del. 1978)).
26
   D.I. 84 (App. to Def.’s Mot.) at A705-06.
27
   Id.
28
   Wright, 2019 WL 2417520, at *4. On the same note, the jury also asked: 1) “How far away was [sic] security
camera from the truck?”; 2) “Was there ever a height and weight determined for [Latasha Brown]?”; and 3) “Was Mr.
Mays’ wallet ever recovered?” D.I. 84 at A790-91. After conferral with the parties outside the presence of the jury,
this Court responded: “The record evidence is closed and no further evidence will be presented for your consideration.
You should … collectively consider all of the evidence that was presented during the trial. Alright?” Id. at A791.

                                                          9
     chose not to request an alibi instruction.29 The Court disagrees. At the outset,

     the Court notes that Ms. Wright’s trial counsel filed a four-sentence affidavit

     in which he states, in conclusory fashion, that arguing an alibi defense to the

     jury “may have weakened the primary defense strategy.”30 This strategy,

     according to counsel, was to cast “reasonable doubt based on lack of reliable

     identification of [Ms. Wright] as the suspect.”31 But the Court cannot see, and

     trial counsel makes no effort to explain, why an alibi instruction would have

     weakened the identification defense.32

         Time and time again, the Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized the

     fundamental concepts that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty and the

     State bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.33 When

     alibi evidence is presented, it is imperative that the jury knows the burden of

     proof does not shift to the defendant and that the defendant need not prove her

     alibi to any extent. To ensure proper jury deliberation, the jury must be told

29
   D.I. 86.
30
   D.I. 87.
31
   Id.
32
   In State v. Kellum, this Court considered an issue similar to the present matter. See State v. Kellum, 2010 WL
2029059 (Del. Super. May 19, 2010). Although the Court did not view Kellum through the Strickland lens for
ineffective assistance and largely confined its analysis to whether Kellum was prejudiced when the trial judge did not
sua sponte give an alibi instruction, the Kellum Court ultimately concluded that trial counsel’s failure to request the
instruction was reasonable “because as a matter of trial tactics, the defendant’s attorney may not wish to request an
alibi instruction in particular instances … such as when it would tend to concentrate attention upon this defense and
divert consideration from unrelated weaknesses in the State’s case.” See Kellum, 2010 WL 2029059, at *9. Here,
however, trial counsel has failed to explain why an alibi instruction would “divert consideration from unrelated
weaknesses in the State’s case.” Id.
33
   See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 374 A.2d 1 (Del. 1977); Gardner, 397 A.2d 1372; Brown, 958 A.2d 833.

                                                          10
     that “[i]f the evidence … [of alibi] raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as

     to the defendant’s guilt, you must give [the defendant] the benefit of the doubt

     and return a verdict of not guilty.”34

         The entitlement to the alibi instruction, of course, does not ineluctably

     imply that trial counsel was derelict for not wanting it. Here, however, trial

     counsel’s failure to request the instruction meant the jury was left free to

     assume that Ms. Wright bore the burden of proving alibi for the shooting, in

     direct contravention of Delaware law and in violation of her substantial

     rights.35

         Hence, based on trial counsel’s self-assessment, the evidence presented at

     trial, and prevailing Delaware law, the Court finds that Ms. Wright has met

     the first prong of Strickland with regard to trial counsel’s failure to request a

     jury instruction on alibi. Ultimately, Ms. Wright’s sworn testimony was that

     she was somewhere else when the homicide occurred. It follows, then, that in

     light of the importance placed on an alibi instruction in Delaware law, the

     Court cannot “envision an advantage which could have been gained by

     withholding a request for the instruction[]” in this case.36

34
   Brown, 958 A.2d at 839 (Del. 2008).
35
   Smith, 991 A.2d at 1178.
36
   See Smith v. State, 991 A.2d 1169, 1176 (Del. 2010) (finding trial counsel’s failure to request specific instruction
on accomplice testimony amounted to “deficient performance” under the first prong of Strickland).

                                                          11
        B. Ms. Wright Was Not Prejudiced By Trial Counsel’s Failure to
           Request the Alibi Instruction.
                    i. The Evidence Against Ms. Wright
        Because trial counsel was deficient in failing to request an alibi instruction,

     the Court now turns to the separate issue of ultimate trial prejudice. As noted

     above, the Court will only grant postconviction relief if it finds that, but for

     counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability the result of

     the proceeding would have been different.37 When evaluating whether Ms.

     Wright was prejudiced by the omission of the alibi instruction, the Court must

     consider the totality of the evidence before the jury.38 And, in this case, the

     evidence overwhelmingly established Ms. Wright as Mr. Mays’s murderer.39

        By way of review, on January 17, 2017, Lisa Mitchell arranged to buy

     drugs from Mr. Mays outside of her apartment.40 But, as Ralph Mitchell

     testified, Ms. Mitchell and Ms. Wright set up the drug deal to rob Mr. Mays

     of pills and money.41 When Mr. Mays arrived in a pick-up truck, Ms. Mitchell

     approached his vehicle and paid for the drugs on the driver’s side of the car.42

37
   Albury, 551 A.2d at 58.
38
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
39
   See Wright, 2019 WL 2417520, at *4 (“The jury heard from several witnesses who said they saw Wright shoot
Mays, or provided corroborating, circumstantial evidence, including witnesses who knew Wright and identified her
as the person on the surveillance video….”). It bears mention that the Delaware Supreme Court also evaluated this
Court’s not giving an alibi instruction sua sponte, as contemplated by Jackson, on behalf of Ms. Wright. After
analyzing the record evidence and given jury instructions, the Supreme Court concluded that “[b]ased on a careful
review of the record, … the Superior Court did not commit plain error by failing, sua sponte, to issue an alibi
instruction.” Id.
40
   D.I. 84 at A511-12.
41
   Id. at A543.
42
   Id. at A516; A546.

                                                       12
     As she did so, Ms. Mitchell testified that Ms. Wright approached the vehicle

     from the passenger’s side and shot and killed Mr. Mays.43 Ms. Wright’s

     former boyfriend, Tyrell Simpson, testified that after the homicide, Ms.

     Wright called him and told him she shot someone.44 He also testified that he

     overheard Ms. Wright planning the robbery and that she admitted to opening

     the door of Mr. Mays’s truck and shooting him.45

         When police arrested Ms. Wright, she was wearing a sweatshirt that

     appeared to be the same sweatshirt worn by Mr. Mays’s shooter in

     surveillance footage.46 The cuff of the sweatshirt ultimately tested positive

     for gunshot residue.47 Then, Ms. Wright’s cellmate in prison, Doneisha

     Martin, testified that: (1) she overheard Ms. Wright admit to shooting Mr.

     Mays for Percocet pills; and (2) while in prison, Ms. Wright boasted that she

     was going to beat her charges.48

         Before offering the corner store alibi, Ms. Wright presented no explanation

     of her whereabouts at the time of Mr. Mays’s murder.49 The first time she

43
   Id.
44
   Id. at A491.
45
   Id. at A492-95.
46
   Id. at A441-43.
47
   Id.
48
   Id. at A465-66.
49
   Id. at A702.

                                           13
       mentioned her alibi was at trial on cross examination, and, as the jury heard,

       it directly contradicted her initial statement given to police:

                    I take Xannies and Percocets. I cannot tell you nothing
                    about [the day of the shooting], the day before. Once I get
                    high, I don’t know nothing. . . . Like I’m telling you that
                    [on the day of the shooting], I don’t remember anything.
                    And the day before, I [got] high. Like, I take Xannies.
                    Like, I really got ripped on Xannies. Like, I don’t
                    remember anything.50

       Ms. Wright failed to provide additional details about the corner store she

       visited at the time of the shooting. And, most importantly, there was no

       corroboration of her alibi at trial.51

           Thus, to the extent Ms. Wright’s seemingly on-the-spot alibi was

       considered, the Court is confident it did not weaken the State’s case. And to

       the extent Ms. Wright claims the giving of an alibi instruction would have

       moved the needle in her favor at trial, that argument is rejected. Viewed

       cumulatively with the other evidence, the Court is satisfied that trial counsel’s

       failure to request the instruction did not constitute prejudice to Ms. Wright

       sufficient to merit postconviction relief.

                          ii. The Identification Instruction

50
     Id. at A783.
51
     See id. at A702.

                                                14
           Moreover, from a procedural standpoint, the Court finds that the jury

       instruction on identification, coupled with the entirety of the instructions,

       remedied any potential issue with the jury’s consideration of Ms. Wright’s

       alibi. As the Court instructed:

                     An issue in this case is the identification of the defendant.
                     To find the defendant guilty, you must be satisfied, beyond
                     a reasonable doubt, that the defendant has been accurately
                     identified, that the wrongful conduct charged in this case
                     actually took place, and that the defendant was in fact the
                     person who committed the act. If there is any reasonable
                     doubt about the identification of the defendant, you must
                     give the benefit of such doubt and find the defendant not
                     guilty.52

       An alibi instruction, if given, likely would have stated as follows:

                     The defendant has raised the defense of alibi to the charge
                     of Murder in the First Degree. The defendant contends
                     that, when the crime was allegedly committed, [she] was
                     somewhere other than the place where the crime was
                     allegedly committed. If the evidence on this defense raises
                     a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, you must
                     give [her] the benefit of that doubt and find the defendant
                     not guilty.53

           Both instructions inform the jury that it must be satisfied that Ms. Wright

       was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court is satisfied that this

52
     Id. at A827 (emphasis added).
53
     Super. Ct. Crim. Pattern Jury Instr. 5.61 (2022).

                                                         15
       similarity demonstrates Ms. Wright suffered no prejudice from the Court’s

       giving of an identification instruction rather than an alibi instruction.

           Undoubtably, one purpose of giving an alibi instruction can be to advise

       the jury that it is not a defendant’s burden to prove alibi. In this case, however,

       the identification instruction given militates in favor of a determination that

       there is no reasonable probability the omission of an alibi instruction,

       containing essentially the same information, affected the outcome of the

       trial.54 The difference in wording between these instructions, insofar as the

       facts of this particular case are concerned, is negligible.

54
     See Kellum, 2010 WL 2029059, at *8.

                                               16
                                CONCLUSION
   The Court, in closing, understands that trial counsel’s performance was far

from perfect. But Strickland necessarily implicates Ms. Wright’s burden to

prove there exists a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted her

if trial counsel had requested an alibi instruction. Based on the foregoing, she

has failed to satisfy that burden. Her convictions will stand. Her motion is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                  Sheldon K. Rennie, Judge

Original to Prothonotary (Criminal Division)
Cc: Patrick Collins, Esquire
   Sean Lugg, DAG

                                      17