Court Opinion

ID: 9953502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 13:02:43.336551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:00.358537
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                        Case No. 5D22-2197
                  LT Case No. 2020-CA-001490-A
                  _____________________________

ISMAEL PEREIRA,

    Appellant,

    v.

EMILY JONES, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Gregory Wilkes, and GEICO
INDEMNITY COMPANY,

    Appellees.
                  _____________________________

Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County.
Dan R. Mosley, Judge.

E. Aaron Sprague and Stefano D. Portigliatti, of Coker Law, P.A.,
Jacksonville, and Luke T. Moreau, of Law Offices of Luke T.
Moreau, Esq., Hollywood, for Appellant.

Steven E. Brust, Jennifer P. Lawson, Jonathon D. Pressley, Jill
F. Bechtold, Dion K. Bass, and Cassandra R. Daum, of Smith,
Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Jacksonville, for Appellee, GEICO
Indemnity Company.

No Appearance for Remaining Appellee.

                         March 22, 2024
PER CURIAM.

     At issue is the grant of a motion by GEICO Indemnity
Company (“GEICO”) to sever and transfer a portion of the
complaint of Ismael Pereira (“Pereira”), who was involved in two
successive motor vehicle accidents, one in Lake County and one in
Orange County. In the trial court, GEICO argued that Pereira
failed to allege in his complaint that it was difficult or impossible
to apportion his injuries arising from the two different accidents.
Pereira counters that Florida law allows for a plaintiff to try
together, in a single case, two personal injury claims that result in
injuries that are difficult or impossible to apportion and that he
should be given leave to amend his complaint to include language
alleging such injuries where, as here, he has not abused the
privilege to amend.

     In granting GEICO’s motion as to the count involving the
Lake County accident, the trial court reasoned that the two
accidents were not sufficiently intertwined and could be severed
because they involved different counties, different injured parties,
and different patient treatments; they also occurred over three
years apart.

      This approach—which focuses on the accidents themselves
rather than whether the plaintiff’s injuries can be apportioned—is
inconsistent with this court’s decision in Froats v. Baron, 883 So.
2d 885, 887 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), which held that a “plaintiff who
is injured in two successive accidents may bring one suit where the
accidents cause the same or similar injuries and it is difficult or
impossible to apportion the injuries between the two tortfeasors.”
In addition, “where the accidents or injuries occur in different
counties, all of the defendants may be sued together in one of the
counties in which one of the causes of action arose.” Id. A plaintiff
bringing such an action must clearly allege in his complaint that
his injuries “in the two accidents were difficult or impossible to
apportion between defendants.” Id. Under Froats, the focus is on
the plaintiff’s injuries, and whether they are difficult or impossible
to apportion, rather than whether the circumstances of the
accident are alike.

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     The question becomes whether Pereira, whose complaint
lacked an allegation that his injuries were unapportionable,
should be allowed to amend under the circumstances. The trial
court did not allow Pereira to amend his complaint, despite Pereira
requesting that he be given leave to do so. Based on this court’s
decision in Froats, which is nearly identical factually and legally,
this was error. Froats highlighted that the “problem is essentially
one of pleading” and that the plaintiff “should have the opportunity
to make the necessary allegations.” Id. As in Froats, Pereira’s
request to amend was timely and he had not abused the privilege
of amendment. See id.

      As to possible prejudice, it is notable that GEICO’s motion to
sever and transfer acknowledged that a trial court abuses its
discretion in severing “a case when two successive accidents cause
the same or similar injuries” provided that “those injuries are
indivisible, impossible, and or very difficult for the jury to
apportion fault.” It noted further that for “[Pereira] to join GEICO
and add a successive accident, [Pereira] must allege in [his]
Complaint the injuries are the same or similar, or that they were
difficult or impossible to apportion between the two tortfeasors.”
GEICO thereby recognized that the basis for its motion was a
pleading deficiency; as such, no prejudice is evident in allowing
Pereira to make the necessary allegation. See Hemingway v.
Bresney, 733 So. 2d 1135, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

    We, therefore, reverse the order of severance and transfer and
remand with instructions that Pereira be allowed to amend his
complaint.

    REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.

MAKAR, KILBANE, and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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