Court Opinion

ID: 9578715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:47:45.408456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:26.073953
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the introduction of irrelevant evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding does not, in and of itself, warrant reversal of Appellant’s death sentence.
Although we cautioned in State v. Bowman that evidence relating to the conditions of incarceration should not be admitted during a capital sentencing proceeding, nothing in that case indicated a departure from the general rules governing appeals involving the admission of evidence or constitutional issues. See 366 S.C. 485, 498-99, 623 S.E.2d 378, 385 (2005). With this principle in mind, I believe our jurisprudence requires clarification.
That evidentiary appeals in criminal trials and questions of fundamental fairness sometimes overlap must be an easy conclusion. Even the most cursory review of this Court’s *491jurisprudence and federal precedent in the capital arena reveals as much. Arguments in capital cases involving the introduction of evidence will invariably be buttressed by considerations of fundamental fairness secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In these cases, both the evidentiary questions of state law and the federal constitutional questions are of paramount importance. Accordingly, a genuine resolution requires that these issues be given a complete discussion.
A trial court has a great deal of latitude concerning rulings on the admissibility of evidence, and a trial court’s ruling on such an issue will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion and a demonstration of prejudice. State v. Plath, 281 S.C. 1, 9-10, 313 S.E.2d 619, 624 (1984); State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 103, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1941).
In this case, although the trial court admitted irrelevant evidence during Appellant’s sentencing proceeding, I can find no evidence indicating that the introduction of this evidence prejudiced Appellant. Although the State improperly introduced evidence regarding the general conditions that Appellant would experience while in prison, Appellant cross-examined the State’s witness at length and demonstrated that the conditions of Appellant’s imprisonment would be quite severe. Specifically, Appellant was able to inform the jury that, if he was spared the death penalty, he would be subject to the second highest degree of restriction in South Carolina’s prison system for the remainder of his life.4 In short, though this evidence was irrelevant and improper, Appellant used the evidence quite effectively to argue against imposing the death penalty. Absent a showing of prejudice which resulted from the introduction of this evidence, our standards of review require us to affirm the trial court’s decision.5
*492Turning to the questions of federal law, the Eighth Amendment is violated when the decision to impose the death penalty is made in an arbitrary manner, or “out of a whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329-30, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 587, 300 S.E.2d 63, 72 (1982). Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment occur when something “so infects the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). Furthermore, an appellate court’s inquiry does not end upon finding that a constitutional violation occurred. Very recently, the United States Supreme Court reminded us that harmless error analysis is a constitutionally sufficient rubric by which an appellate court may judge whether most constitutional violations require reversal in a criminal case. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 2551, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006).
In this case, I would not reach the question of whether the trial court’s error in admitting the above described evidence was harmless because I would find no constitutional violations occurred. As a first matter, Appellant did not raise any constitutional objections in the trial court, and it is not clear that he raises these issues here.6 Assuming, however, that Appellant makes such arguments, in my view, the introduction of this improper evidence did not create an impermissible risk that the jury would make the decision to impose the death penalty in an arbitrary manner, nor did it so infect Appellant’s sentencing proceeding with prejudice as to render it fundamentally unfair.7 Again, because I would find that no constitutional violations resulted from the introduction of this evidence, I do not believe this Court need decide whether any evidentiary error was harmless.
*493In my view, the majority’s resolution of this issue is controlled by a theme found largely in dicta beginning in State v. Woomer. In that case, this Court stated “[w]hen a solicitor’s personal opinion is explicitly injected into the jury’s deliberations as though it were in itself evidence justifying a sentence of death, the resulting death sentence may not be free from the influence of any arbitrary factor as required by S.C.Code § 16-3-25(0(1), and by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 277 S.C. at 175, 284 S.E.2d at 359.
I believe this Court has mistakenly seized upon the latter part of that statement and proceeded to treat § 16-3-25(0 as providing a separate standard by which this Court should judge the conduct of capital sentencing proceedings.8 In my view, State v. Torrence all but openly rejects the argument that the statute’s prohibition of imposing a death sentence obtained under the influence of “passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor,” constitutes anything other than a recital of the Eighth Amendment’s requirements. See 305 S.C. at 68, 406 S.E.2d at 328. Furthermore, in my view, the Eighth Amendment’s requirements are primarily concerned with the ultimate result in capital cases, which is “preventing the imposition of excessive and disproportionate punishment upon the individual prisoner.” State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 590, 300 S.E.2d 63, 73-74 (1982). Thus, even if Torrence did not reject this proposition, I would decline to view 16-3-25(C) as proscribing a standard of review that is independent from the Eighth Amendment. Instead, I would interpret the statute to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty only in those situations where it would offend the Constitution. In my view, a separate standard is not necessary.9
*494Our pronouncement disfavoring this evidence in Bowman was nothing new. See Plath, 281 S.C. at 15, 313 S.E.2d at 627 (“It should not be necessary in the near future ... to remind the bench and bar of the strict focus to be maintained in the course of a capital sentencing trial.”); and Smart, 278 S.C. at 526, 299 S.E.2d at 692-93 (“While this Court approves zealous representation ... it is important in capital cases to maintain strict focus upon the particular characteristics of the specific crime and the unique attributes of the defendant.”). In reversing this case, I believe we treat the disapproval of this type of evidence as though it were a novel development, and that we unnecessarily depart from an established course of analysis that is easily tied to defined doctrines. In my view, reversing Appellant’s sentence uses Bowman to propagate a rule that inappropriately presumes prejudice in many cases and is unjustified given the existing constitutional framework.10
The majority and concurrence presume what they purport to establish, which is that § 16-3-25(0(1) requires reversal when improper evidence is introduced in a capital sentencing proceeding. Were that the General Assembly’s intention, I believe it surely would have spoken in terms of an arbitrary factor’s “presence” instead of its “influence.” Appellate courts are ill-equipped to speculate about the influence improperly admitted evidence might have exerted on a jury’s determination. Therefore, in my view, the most prudent course in these cases is to tie the statutory review requirement to the established guideposts provided by the relevant constitutional jurisprudence. Today, the majority and concurrence endorse a rule that is markedly stricter than the constitution requires, is contrary to at least two of this Court’s prior decisions, and plays far too loosely with the language of the statute.
*495For these reasons, I would hold that the trial court erred in admitting evidence relating to the conditions of incarceration during Appellant’s capital sentencing proceeding, but I would affirm Appellant’s death sentence.
BURNETT, J., concurs.

. Eight pages of the record contain the State’s expert’s direct testimony. Appellant's cross-examination of this expert fills twenty pages of the record.

. Plath further underscores my point. In that case, this Court unanimously affirmed a death sentence because these precise errors were not accompanied by any demonstration of prejudice. See 281 S.C. at 9-10, 313 S.E.2d at 624.

. At trial, Appellant objected that this testimony was improper under this Court's ruling in Plath. That case contains no material discussion of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Plath’s discussion of this type of evidence is best interpreted as resolving a traditional appeal of a question of the admission of evidence. See 281 S.C. at 14-16, 313 S.E.2d at 627.

. In making this determination, I judge the effect of these evidentiary errors in the context of the entire record. See State v. Woomer, 277 S.C. 170, 174-75, 284 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1981).

. This principle has consistently re-appeared in our precedent. See Thompson v. Aiken, 281 S.C. 239, 240, 315 S.E.2d 110, 110 (1984); State v. Sloan, 278 S.C. 435, 438, 298 S.E.2d 92, 93 (1982); State v. Smart, 278 S.C. 515, 517, 299 S.E.2d 686, 687 (1982) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 70, 406 S.E.2d 315, 329 (1991)); and State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 544, 290 S.E.2d 420, 420 (1982) (overruled on other grounds by Torrence, 305 S.C. at 70, 406 S.E.2d at 329).

. I do not necessarily question the holdings in the cases I have cited, only the reasoning. Any number of errors can infect a trial with unfairness to such a degree as to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. These include (1) the introduction of overly inflammato*494ly evidence and (2) arguments which impermissibly appeal to the passions or prejudices of a jury.

. Coincidentally, the view taken by the concurrence is contrary to our opinion in Bowman and seems to embrace a rekindled form of in favorem vitae review. This view, if applied in Bowman, would surely have commanded the Court to at least deal with the merits of Bowman's claim regarding this "prison conditions” testimony rather than disposing of his claim on error preservation grounds. See 366 S.C. at 498, 623 S.E.2d at 385.