Court Opinion

ID: 9744178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:55:54.227904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.288765
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE WEBBER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the remandment for a new trial on the subject of ordinary damages, although I do so on far different grounds from those of my colleagues in the majority. I most vehemently dissent from the proposition that a charge of ordinary fraud will support a claim for punitive damages. The majority apparently holds that the ordinary damages were excessive, but no reasons are assigned other than generalizations as to the purported inadequacy of plaintiff’s evidence. There is no indication that the evidence will be of any better quality on retrial. However, since defendant has admitted a breach of the contract, plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages. I concur in the reversal of the ordinary damage award only because I believe that the trial judge, who sat in this case without a jury, showed prejudice and passion in the award of punitive damages and in the posture of this case such passion and prejudice cannot be disentangled from the award of ordinary damages. In Bumblauskas v. South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. (1969), 110 Ill. App. 2d 52, 60, 249 N.E.2d 143, 147, the court said: “The question of damages is one for the trial judge in a nonjury trial and his decision will not be upset unless it is so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice on his part.” In Queen v. Behm (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 253, 255, 373 N.E.2d 1382, 1383, the court said: “The allowance of punitive damages is a matter within the trial court’s discretion to determine, and such a determination will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.” Courts in Illinois have struggled with the question of punitive damages for many years. In an early case the supreme court said: “° ° ° [T]o authorize the giving of exemplary or vindictive damages, either malice, violence, oppression or wanton recklessness must mingle in the controversy. The act complained of must partake of a criminal or wanton nature, else the amount sought to be recovered must be confined to compensation.” City of Chicago v. Martin (1868), 49 Ill. 241, 245. The Martin decision dealt with personal injuries, and it is in this context that the greater number of punitive damage claims are made. However, as recently as 1973 there is found a firm echo of the language in Martin in a breach of contract case: “This rule [denial of punitive damages in a breach of contract case] does not obtain, however, in those exceptional cases where the breach amounts to an independent, willful tort, in which event exemplary damages may be recovered under proper allegations of malice, wantonness, or oppression.” Wallace v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 623, 629-30, 299 N.E.2d 344, 349. Two recent cases have stated flatly that punitive damages are not recoverable in a breach of contract action in Illinois. (Ash v. Barrett (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 414, 274 N.E.2d 149; Alsip Homebuilders, Inc. v. Shusta (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 65, 284 N.E.2d 509.) In the latter case the court said: “The theory behind this rule rests upon a distinction drawn between compensation and punishment. If the general purpose underlying the law of damages is to promote security and prevent disorder, as Corbin points out, and breaches of contract do not cause as much resentment of other physical or mental discomfort as do wrongs called torts or crimes, then the remedies needed to prevent breaches of contract and satisfy the injured party are not as severe as those needed to punish the tort feasor or criminal.” 6 Ill. App. 3d 65, 69, 284 N.E.2d 509, 512. It has long been the rule in Illinois that in a breach of contract suit the effort should be to restore the plaintiff to at least as good a position as he would have been, had the contract been performed, via the vehicle of money damages. In the contract action this is much easier to do than in tort where such intangibles as pain and suffering must be assessed. The result is that punitive damages in contract actions are sometimes permissible but are generally viewed with suspicion, if not downright hostility. The core element of pleading and proof in such a case is malice, violence, oppression or wanton wickedness. Martin; Wallace. Some cases, including the case at bar, have attempted to evade the strictures of the rule by pleading fraud. However, simple fraud of the type cited in the majority opinion (Zeilenga) is insufficient. In Laughlin v. Hopkinson (1920), 292 Ill. 80, 126 N.E. 591, the court allowed punitive damages for what it called “willful, wanton, and grossly fraudulent misrepresentations.” Wilful and wanton fraud is obviously something more than ordinary fraud and perhaps should even have a different name since different elements compose it. In Russow v. Bobola (1972), 2 Ill. App. 3d 837, 277 N.E.2d 769, concerning the sale of a house, the court allowed allegations of ordinary fraud to stand but dismissed on motion a wilful and wanton count upon a finding that the facts did not support. In Sears v. Weissman (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 827, 286 N.E.2d 777, the facts were similar but much more aggravated than those in the case at bar. Defendants had formed a corporation to build air-raid shelters. After looting the corporate treasury down to about $50 they entered into a contract with an elderly woman to build a shelter for her. They took her money, divided it and then did not perform. The court allowed only compensatory damages. Another recent case, Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hospital Care of Hospital Service Corp. (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540, rev’d on other grounds (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75, suggests that a disparity in bargaining power between the parties could support a punitive claim, although such was not allowed in that case. Turning, then, to the case at bar, I find no pleading nor proof of malice, wantonness or oppression. If anything, there appears only simple fraud, and unlike the foregoing cases it does not go to the total performance of the contract, only to the time for performance. It is noteworthy that this contract consisted only of a verbal agreement followed by an ordinary invoice. There was no provision stating in haec verba, nor in substance, that time was of the essence, and there was some evidence tending to excuse late performance. The central fact is that there was performance, the scales were completed, albeit late, and the plaintiff got what he bargained for. There has been no claim of poor workmanship nor defect in materials. Any damage suffered by plaintiff was consequential and not direct. The majority opinion lays violent hands on a century of Illinois law. If the majority opinion be correct, then any shoerepairman who promises to have the half-soles ready by “next Thursday” could be subject to punitive damage claim unless he delivers right on the dot. I am therefore persuaded that the result in this case was reached because of the passion and prejudice of the trial court which infected the entire proceeding. I would therefore reverse the award of ordinary damages and remand for a new trial on those only. I would reverse without remand the award of punitive damages.