Court Opinion

ID: 9558014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:01:42.347471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:05.813620
License: Public Domain

SCHWAB, C. Jo,
specially concurring.
Defendant contends that a criminal nonsupport prosecution for any period prior to May 30, 1975, the date of defendant’s first nonsupport trial, is barred on *629the grounds of former jeopardy. ORS 131.515(2) sets out a three-part test establishing a statutory former jeopardy rule:
"No person shall be separately prosecuted for two or more offenses [1] based upon the same criminal episode, [2] if the several offenses are reasonably known to the appropriate prosecutor at the time of commencement of the first prosecution and [3] establish proper venue in a single court.”
Accord, State v. Brown, 262 Or 442, 497 P2d 1191 (1972). Since there is no question here regarding the third element, only the first two must be considered.
In State v. Boyd, 271 Or 558, 565-66, 533 P2d 795 (1975), the Oregon Supreme Court held that "same criminal episode” is synonymous with "same transaction.” Boyd defined these terms as follows:
" 'We hold that the two charges arise out of the same act or transaction if they are so closely linked in time, place and circumstance that a complete account of one charge cannot be related without relating details of the other charge.’ ” (Quoting from State v. Fitzgerald, 267 Or 266, 273, 516 P2d 1280 (1973).)
The majority simply states that "* * * [o]ne [charge of criminal nonsupport] was not the same act or transaction as the other * * *.” I cannot agree. In Boyd the court observed that it was difficult to apply the "same transaction” definition to the facts there since the crimes charged constituted a single condition — possession—rather than relatable events. The court then continued:
"The criminal code treats the fact of possession as a criminal act of a continuing nature. In this statutory sense, the possession of the television set and the drugs, existing at the same place and time, constitute a single occurrence. Once unlawful possession of goods, without more, is recognized as criminal conduct, there is no reason for fragmenting the criminal conduct into as many parts as there are different items of property, however acquired. If a defendant is charged with the possession of drugs, some of which had been acquired at one time and the rest at another time, it would seem *630clear that he would be entitled to object to multiple prosecutions. There would be no reason other than harassment of the defendant for the state to divide the condition of possession into parts and prosecute separately on each * * * ” 271 Or at 570-71.
The same inherent difficulty arises here where we are dealing with the crime of nonsupport which is also an act of a continuing nature.1 There is no reason to allow the state to fragment the criminal conduct into separate days, or separate sixty-day periods, and prosecute each separately. This is not to say that the state cannot make multiple charges and then move to consolidate before trial as suggested in State v. Bishop, 16 Or App 310, 314, 518 P2d 177 (1974).
Because of my conclusion as to the remaining element of the former jeopardy rule — prosecutorial knowledge — I reach the same result as the majority. Even if several offenses are part of the same criminal episode, for the government to be barred from trying them separately the offenses must be "reasonably known to the appropriate prosecutor at the time of commencement of the first prosecution.” ORS 131.515(2). The issue then is whether or not the prosecutor in the first trial had knowledge of the offense that occurred before the first triah for which defendant was later charged, tried and convicted.2 This court addressed the same issue in State v. Hammang, 19 Or App 265, 527 P2d 137 (1974), aff’d 271 Or 749, 534 P2d 501 (1975):
"How is this 'knowledge’ question to be resolved? The *631other two aspects of the Brown formula [and ORS 131.515(2)] — same act or transaction and venue — are obviously questions of law. By contrast, the question of knowledge is one of fact. Being a question of fact initially passed upon by the trial court, it follows that the trial court must, if there is any factual dispute, hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the facts. And once the trial court has determined the factual question of prosecutorial knowledge, its finding should be subject to only limited review in this court under the doctrine of Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 443 P2d 621 (1968).
"In this case, however, during the argument of defendant’s motion to dismiss, both the prosecutor and defense counsel, without being sworn as witnesses, made factual representations to the trial court. This procedure obviously cannot always substitute for a full evidentiary hearing to determine the relevant facts. But since no party in the trial court or on appeal has objected to this procedure, and since there is no conflict in the representations of fact made to the trial court, we proceed to the merits on the record made.” 19 Or App at 268-69.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss in this case, there was no evidence offered by the defendant on the issue of prosecutorial knowledge of periods other than the one for which defendant was charged in the first trial. The only statement of relevance was one made by defense counsel during argument. He stated: "* * * [W]e must, I think, assume that the district attorney has access to that support — that computer print-out support ledger, so they do have — or they should have had knowledge of his support record * * *.” This was not a factual representation; it was counsel’s opinion. Furthermore, the district attorney did not make a similar statement. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because of former jeopardy.
If the trial court had determined that there was prosecutorial knowledge of the second offense before the first trial, then dismissal would have been required here. Therefore, I cannot agree with the statement by the majority that the defendant was in *632jeopardy only as to the time period charged in the first indictment.

 E.g., in In Re Perdiak’s Petition, 162 F Supp 76, 77-8 (SD Cal 1958), the court stated:
"* * * Wilful failure by a parent to provide for a minor child is a continuing offense and the immorality inherent in it continues until provision is commenced to be made * *

 The majority opinion notes the overlap in time between the second indictment and the first trial. Furthermore, at the second trial, the court instructed:
"In order to establish the crime of criminal nonsupport, it is necessary for the state to prove * * * that between the dates of April 17th and June 17th, 1975, the defendant did knowingly and unlawfully refuse and neglect to provide support for such children * *