Court Opinion

ID: 9940574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 19:12:40.009703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:02.489374
License: Public Domain

J-S03006-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANDRE ALONZO WEEKS                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1231 MDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 12, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-28-CR-0001343-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 14, 2024

       Appellant, Andre Alonzo Weeks, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered July 12, 2022, after this Court remanded the matter for a hearing

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D).1 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history

of this case as follows.

        [Appellant] was charged, by criminal complaint, on June 20,
        2019 with count [one]: manufacture, delivery, or possession
        with intent to manufacture or deliver; count [two]: drug
        delivery resulting in death; and count [three]: involuntary
        manslaughter. [Appellant’s] case proceeded to [a] preliminary
        hearing on August 5, 2019 and mandatory arraignment on
____________________________________________

1 We note that Appellant purported to appeal from the August 21, 2023 order

denying his Rule 600 motion to dismiss. In a criminal action, however, an
“appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial
of post-sentence motions.” Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408,
410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (citation omitted). Accordingly the
docket has been corrected to reflect that Appellant’s appeal lies from the July
12, 2022 judgment of sentence.
J-S03006-24

        August 21, 2019. The case was continued numerous times,
        several of note, on occasion of the [COVID]-19 pandemic. In
        October of 2020, the case was listed for trial from February
        18[th through] 23[rd], 2021.

        On January 25, 2021, an Amended Emergency Judicial Order
        was issued by th[e trial] court extending the postponement of
        all criminal jury trials until March 8, 2021, which canceled
        [Appellant’s] trial. [Appellant] filed his first [motion pursuant
        to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600] on January 28, 2021. [He] then amended
        this motion on February 4, 2021. On February 10, 2021, the
        Commonwealth filed a request to hold a status conference [to
        discuss potential trial dates]. On February 15, 2021, a status
        conference was held where the Commonwealth asked for the
        next dates available to try [Appellant]. Given the [trial court’s
        COVID-19] measures and the construction of the new Franklin
        County Courthouse, the earliest dates available for trial were
        November 18[th through] 23[rd], 2021.

        A hearing was held on [Appellant’s] first Rule 600 motion on
        March 1, 2021. An order was issued denying [Appellant’s]
        motion on March 22, 2021. [Appellant] filed his second Rule
        600 motion on October 18, 2021. The Commonwealth filed an
        answer to [Appellant’s] motion on October 27, 2021. [The trial
        court, however, did not address Appellant’s motion via a
        hearing or otherwise. The matter proceeded to a jury trial] on
        November 18, 2021 through November 23, 2021[. Appellant
        was found guilty of all charges.2]

        The [trial court] sentenced [Appellant] on January 12, 2022 to
        serve an aggregate term of incarceration of 15 to 30 years.
        [Appellant] filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the [trial
        court] denied on July 16, 2022.              [See Pa.R.Crim.P.
        720(B)(3)(b) (allowing the trial court to grant one 30-day
        extension for decision on a defendant’s post-sentence motion
        upon motion by the defendant and good cause shown).
        Appellant] filed [a] timely notice of appeal on July 13, 2022. …
        [Ultimately, this Court] remanded the matter back to [the trial
        court] for the sole purpose of conducting a hearing pursuant to
        Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D) to determine whether [Appellant’s right to
____________________________________________

2 On Appellant’s previous appeal, this Court set forth the circumstances of his

convictions at length. See Commonwealth v. Weeks, 2023 WL 3884606,
*1 (Pa. Super. 2023).

                                           -2-
J-S03006-24

       a prompt trial was violated. See Weeks, 2023 WL 3884606 at
       *1. In particular, we instructed the trial court “to consider
       whether the Commonwealth established the necessary due
       diligence as intended under Rule 600(C)(1)” and to either grant
       or dismiss Appellant’s Rule 600 motion based upon this
       determination. Id. at *6. We otherwise affirmed Appellant’s
       judgment of sentence in all other respects. Id. at *1].

       On June 12, 2023, the [trial court] issued an order scheduling
       a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D). A hearing was held
       on July 25, 2023. At the hearing, the Commonwealth was
       unprepared to present evidence in accordance with [this
       Court’s] ruling and asked for a continuance.             Against
       [Appellant’s] objection, the [trial court] granted the
       Commonwealth’s request and a new hearing was scheduled for
       August 3, 2023. On August 21, 2023, the [trial court] issued
       an opinion denying [Appellant’s] motion for Rule 600 relief.
       [Appellant] timely filed this present appeal on August 28, 2023.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/23, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted)

(footnote added).

      Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

       Did the Commonwealth []meet its burden to show due
       diligence[] by not making any effort whatsoever to assure that
       [Appellant] was tried on the charges related to this case[] until
       115 days after the previously set, court determined, adjusted
       run date (as to Rule 600) of July 26, 2021?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

      On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s disposition of his Rule

600 motion to dismiss.      Appellant contends that the trial court erred in

determining that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence over the life of

the case and, in turn, in concluding that Appellant’s right to a speedy trial was

not violated even though his trial did not commence until November 18, 2021.

We disagree.

                                      -3-
J-S03006-24

     Our review of this issue is governed by the following standard:

      In evaluating [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600 issues, our standard of review
      of a trial court's decision is whether the trial court abused its
      discretion. Furthermore:

            The proper scope of review [ ... ] is limited to the evidence
            of record of the [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600 evidentiary hearing,
            and the findings of the trial court. An appellate court must
            view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing
            party. Additionally, when considering the trial court's
            ruling, this Court is not permitted to ignore the dual
            purpose behind [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600. [Pennsylvania Rule of
            Criminal Procedure] 600 serves two equally important
            functions: (1) the protection of the accused's speedy trial
            rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining
            whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been
            violated, consideration must be given to society's right to
            effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain
            those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.
            However, the administrative mandate of [Pa.R.Crim.P.]
            600 was not designed to insulate the criminally accused
            from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the
            Commonwealth.

      So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
      Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy
      trial rights of an accused, [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600 must be construed
      in a manner consistent with society's right to punish and deter
      crime.

Commonwealth v. Martz, 926 A.2d 514, 517 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted).

     Rule 600 provides, in relevant part:

      (A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

            (1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to
            commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial,
            or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo
            contendere.

                                     -4-
J-S03006-24

           (2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

                    (a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint
                    is filed against the defendant shall commence within
                    365 days from the date on which the complaint is
                    filed.

                                      ***

      (C) Computation of Time

           (1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any
           stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth
           when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due
           diligence shall be included in the computation of the time
           within which trial must commence. Any other periods of
           delay shall be excluded from the computation.

                                      ***

      (D) Remedies

           (1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within
           the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time
           before trial, the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if
           unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that
           the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that
           this rule has been violated. A copy of the motion shall be
           served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently
           with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the
           motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.

     This Court has explained

      the courts of this Commonwealth employ three steps in
      determining whether Rule 600 requires dismissal of charges
      against a defendant. First, Rule 600(A) provides the mechanical
      run date. Second, we determine whether any excludable time
      exists pursuant to Rule 600(C).       We add the amount of
      excludable time, if any, to the mechanical run date to arrive at
      an adjusted run date.

                                       -5-
J-S03006-24

Commonwealth v. Bethea, 185 A.3d 364, 371 (Pa. Super. 2018) (cleaned

up) (citation and emphasis omitted).

      Herein, the mechanical run date was June 20, 2020. See Weeks, 2023

WL 3884606 at *4. We must, however, “account for any ‘excludable time’

and ‘excusable delay’” to derive an adjusted run date. Commonwealth v.

Colon, 87 A.3d 352, 358 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “Excludable

time is delay that is attributable to the defendant or his counsel.” Id. (citation

omitted). Excusable delay, on the other hand, “is delay that occurs as a result

of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth's control and despite its due

diligence.” Id. (citation omitted). “When the defendant or the defense [was]

instrumental in causing the delay, the period of delay will be excluded from

computation of time.” See Pa.R.Crim.P 600, Cmt.

      “[P]eriods of judicial delay [constitute excusable delay and, therefore,]

are excludable from calculations under [Rule 600].”         Commonwealth v.

Mills, 162 A.3d 323, 325 (Pa. 2017). Indeed, “where a trial-ready prosecutor

must wait several months due to a court calendar, the time should be treated

as ‘delay’ for which the Commonwealth is not accountable.” Id. Importantly,

however, “‘before a trial court excludes time from its Rule 600 [] computation

on the basis of ‘judicial delay,’ the Commonwealth must ‘demonstrate that it

acted with due diligence.’” Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 719 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (citation omitted).    Thus,

       in ruling on a defendant's Rule 600 motion to dismiss, a trial
       court must first determine whether the Commonwealth has met
       its obligation to act with due diligence throughout the life of the

                                      -6-
J-S03006-24

         case; if the Commonwealth meets its burden of proving due
         diligence, only then may the trial court rely upon its own
         congested calendar or other scheduling problems as
         justification for denying the defendant's motion.

Id. (citation omitted).

         “Due diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does

not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the

Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.”             Commonwealth v.

Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010). “[T]he Commonwealth must do

everything reasonable within its power to guarantee that a trial begins on

time,” Colon, 87 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted), and it bears the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exercised due diligence.

Commonwealth v. Plowden, 157 A.3d 933, 941 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en

banc) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d

1097, 1102 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding due diligence “includes, among other

things, listing a case for trial prior to the run date, preparedness of trial within

the run date, and keeping adequate records to ensure compliance with Rule

600”).

      A review of the certified record in this case reveals that, in contrast to

Appellant’s current claims on appeal, Appellant made multiple continuance

requests and, as such, the periods from July 2, 2019 through August 5, 2019

and October 21, 2019 through March 9, 2020, a total of 174 days, are

attributable to Appellant and constitute excludable time.         In addition, our

Supreme Court, as well as the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,

                                       -7-
J-S03006-24

executed multiple judicial emergency orders starting on March 16, 2020 and

continuing through March 8, 2021, delaying all trials due to COVID-19. We

note, however, that the trial court in its previous Rule 1925(a) opinion stated

that, during this time, jury trials were, in fact, conducted for a total of 111

days. Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/22, at 20. Hence, a total of 246 days are

excludable based on the aforementioned judicial emergency orders. Adding

the 174 excludable days attributable to Appellant and the 246 excludable days

attributable to the judicial emergency orders, results in 420 total excludable

days and an adjusted run date of August 14, 2021.3

       Appellant’s trial, however, did not commence until November 18, 2021,

a total of 96 days after the August 14, 2021 adjusted run date. On Appellant’s

previous appeal, the trial court found “167 additional days of delay attributable

to [Appellant]” but failed to hold a hearing to determine whether the

“Commonwealth exercised due diligence” during that time. Weeks, 2023 WL

3884606 at *5-*6.        This Court therefore remanded the matter to the trial

____________________________________________

3 We acknowledge that these allocations for excludable days due to Appellant

or emergency judicial orders differ from those previously determined by the
trial court and later affirmed by this Court. See Weeks, 2023 WL 3884606
at *4. In particular, this Court in Weeks affirmed the trial court’s finding that
“171 days were excludable due to [Appellant’s] continuance requests, and 231
days were excludable based on judicial emergency orders for a total of 402
excludable days.” Id. The Weeks Court then affirmed the trial court’s
determination that July 26, 2021 constituted the adjusted run date. Id. Upon
further review, we note that the trial court’s periods of excludable time were
correct, but a small mathematical error occurred effecting its final
determination. Thus, this limited error did not truly affect its ultimate Rule
600 determination.

                                           -8-
J-S03006-24

court with instructions to conduct a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)

to make such a determination.

      On August 3, 2023, the trial court held a Rule 600(D) hearing as

instructed.   At the hearing, Chief Deputy District Attorney Jonathan Faust

testified. Initially, Attorney Faust explained that the criminal complaint in this

matter was filed on June 20, 2019.     Appellant’s preliminary hearing was held

on August 5, 2019, following Appellant’s request for a continuance, and his

mandatory arraignment occurred on August 21, 2019. Thereafter, Appellant

was placed on the “October [2019] Call-of-the-List,” all discovery was

provided to the defense, and the Commonwealth was ready to proceed to trial.

N.T. Hearing, 8/3/23, at 12.      Appellant’s counsel, however, requested a

continuance during the October 2019 trial term and then again during the

January 2020 trial term. As such, Appellant’s case was “listed for the March

trial term in 2020” but, due to a series of administrative orders, all trials,

including Appellant’s, were placed on hold from March 2020 through October

2020. Id. at 13-14. The parties ultimately proceeded to a pre-trial conference

on October 12, 2020, during which “both parties certified to the [c]ourt that

[they] were ready for trial” and that “all discovery was given over,” resulting

in Appellant’s trial being set to take place from February 18, 2021 through

February 23, 2021. Id. at 16.

      On November 28, 2020, and then again on January 25, 2021, however,

the President Judge of Franklin County Court of Common Pleas entered

administrative orders further suspending all criminal trials until the spring of

                                      -9-
J-S03006-24

2021, causing Appellant’s trial to be continued again and Appellant’s pretrial

conference to be set for May 2021. Attorney Faust, being ready to proceed to

trial, “did [not] want to wait until May [2021] to get [Appellant] relisted for

trial.” Id. at 18. As such, Attorney Faust “filed for a status conference to get

th[e] case moved up so [the parties] could get a sooner trial date than waiting

until May.” Id. A status conference was conducted on February 15, 2021,

during which the parties, “once again, certified that [they] were ready for trial

to take place.” Id. at 19. The trial court, however, “reviewed its calendar

and determined that the earliest it could schedule a consecutive one[-]week

homicide trial with the information known to it at that time was[] November

1[8]-23, 2021.”    Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/23, at 3.       This was because

“Franklin County Court of Common Pleas [was] dealing with the challenges of

conducting trials under [COVID] protocols” as well as “the entire court facility

[] undergoing new construction and renovation that resulted in the loss of

available courtrooms.” Id. Appellant’s trial commenced according to schedule

on November 18, 2021.

      Herein, the trial court determined that the aforementioned testimony

confirmed that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence during the life of

the case. Id. at 8. In addition, the trial court concluded that the delay from

the February 15, 2021 status conference until Appellant’s trial constituted

judicial delay because the court “simply had no ability” to conduct Appellant’s

trial prior to November 18, 2021 in light of the COVID protocols in place, as

well as the “limited resources for trial spaces being used by the entire board

                                     - 10 -
J-S03006-24

of judges and the lack of availability of the new judicial center until early

October[] 2021.”     Id. at 7-8.    Based upon the foregoing, the trial court

dismissed Appellant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss.

      Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial

court. The testimony elicited during the August 3, 2023 hearing demonstrated

that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in this matter. Attorney Faust

testified that, at all relevant times, the Commonwealth was prepared to

proceed to trial. In addition, Attorney Faust stated that the Commonwealth

consistently listed Appellant’s case for trial. Finally, Attorney Faust specifically

stated the additional judicial emergency orders issued by the President Judge

of Franklin County Common Pleas in November 2020 and January 2021 further

delayed Appellant’s trial scheduled for February 2021. To avoid this further

delay, Attorney Faust “ask[ed] the trial court to review its calendar [and] the

available jury trial courts spaces and set new trial dates.” Id. at 7. Hence, in

contrast to Appellant’s claims, the Commonwealth did “everything reasonable

within its power to guarantee that [Appellant’s] trial [began] on time.” Colon,

87 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted). The trial court, however, was unable to

accommodate Appellant’s trial prior to November 18, 2021, despite the

Commonwealth’s attempt to schedule Appellant’s trial at an earlier date. Trial

Court Opinion, 8/21/23, at 7.      Thus, we conclude that the period from, at

least, March 8, 2021, until Appellant’s trial, November 18, 2021, a total of 255

days, constitutes excludable time under Rule 600. This calculation extends

the final run date to (at the earliest) April 26, 2022 – nearly five months after

                                      - 11 -
J-S03006-24

Appellant’s trial commenced.    Hence, the trial court properly denied

Appellant’s Rule 600 motion.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2024

                                 - 12 -