Court Opinion

ID: 9642970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:13:56.172228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:55.399662
License: Public Domain

*793COOPER, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion only insofar as it reinstates the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) with respect to the $1,000,000.00 verdict for reputation damages. However, I conclude that Belo Kentucky, Inc., d/b/a WHAS-TV (“WHAS”) was also entitled to a JNOV with respect to the remainder of the damages because the statements deemed defamatory by the jury were absolutely privileged. Aternatively, WHAS is entitled to a new trial because the trial court’s jury instructions did not accurately state the law of the case. Furthermore, the punitive damage award was excessive under the guidelines established in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003).
I. FACTS.
Kentucky Kingdom Amusement Company operates an amusement park on the premises of the Kentucky state fairgrounds in Louisville, Kentucky. For several years, it operated a twenty-year-old Jet Star II model indoor roller coaster dubbed the “Starchaser.” On July 26, 1994, one of the Starchaser’s coaster cars rear-ended another coaster car, injuring several passengers, including seven-year-old Mary Noonan, who sustained a lacerated liver. The incident received widespread local news coverage, including three televised broadcasts by WHAS that are the subject of this defamation action. Noonan also filed a personal injury action against Kentucky Kingdom. The two lawsuits proceeded almost simultaneously with many of the same witnesses giving discovery depositions in both cases, either to prove or disprove the negligence of Kentucky Kingdom in Noonan’s personal injury action, or to prove the truth or falsity of the statements made by WHAS in this defamation action.
Kentucky Kingdom’s customers enter the Starchaser’s coaster cars at a “loading station.” A “dispatch brake” is raised from the center of the track so as to contact the brake pan on the underside of the car and hold the car in place. Until 1994, this brake was operated by an electric motor that was activated when the “loader operator” pressed down on a button labeled “brake.” After the car was loaded, the loader operator would push the “car ready” button to notify the “tower operator” that the car was ready for dispatch. The tower operator would then press the “dispatch” button to activate the “dispatch tire,” a wheel located in the middle of the track just around a bend from the loading station. However, the dispatch tire also had a brake that remained locked until the loader operator pressed the “brake” button, which both (1) released the dispatch brake so that the car could begin moving, and (2) released the dispatch tire’s brake, so that the tire could begin spinning in place. The loader operator would then push the car forward while continuing to hold down the brake button until the car passed over the dispatch brake, whereupon the operator would release the brake button, causing the dispatch brake to reactivate (rise) in order to stop and hold the next car in line.
Once past the dispatch brake, a loaded car rolls around the bend to the spinning dispatch tire which contacts the car’s brake pan and propels the car forward past the “proximity switch,” which turns off the dispatch tire, and onto a “second kick” or “booster” tire which guides the car onto the lift chain. The lift chain pulls the car to the top of a steep incline from where the tracks drop precipitously, caus-*794mg the car to be propelled around the track by gravitationally induced coasting. As the car nears the station at the end of the trip, it is slowed by “station brakes” and stopped by a “safety brake” and an “unloading brake.” An “unloader operator” activates these two motorized brakes by pushing buttons labeled “safety brake” and “unload brake.” Like the dispatch brake, the unloading brake is located in the center of the track and holds the car in place while the passengers disembark. Once all the passengers have exited the car, the operator presses and holds down the unload brake button to disengage the unloading brake while pushing the car forward until it passes over the brake. The car then rolls forward into the loading area where it is stopped by the dispatch brake. Additional “emergency brakes” located at various points along the track can be activated to stop a car mid-trip in case of an emergency. These brakes can be activated either by the tower operator or by an operator situated below the tracks “in the hole.”
Kentucky Kingdom had experienced problems with the dispatch brake during the summer of 1993, resulting in cars being prematurely released from the loading area and, on one occasion, causing a rear-end collision similar to the one that occurred on July 26, 1994. Another accident occurred on July 24, 1994, when a car failed to stop at the unloading station. There was evidence that one or both of these prior accidents occurred because the brake pans on the cars were so worn that they did not make proper contact with the dispatch or unloading brake. However, Thomas Pardue, Kentucky Kingdom’s technical services manager, attributed both accidents to “operator error.” Specifically, he concluded that the July 24, 1994, accident was caused by the failure of the unloader operator to activate the safety and unloading brakes.
Prior to the 1994 season, Kentucky Kingdom hired a local machine shop to rebuild the motors that operated the motorized brakes. Pardue subsequently “lost confidence” in the dispatch brake’s motor and disengaged it. Thereafter, the loader operator was required to manually engage and disengage the dispatch brake. The disengagement of the electric motor also disengaged the brake on the dispatch tire. However, the loader operator still needed to press the “car ready” button to notify the tower operator to activate the dispatch tire.
Brian Harkness was the operator “in the hole” on the afternoon of July 26, 1994. When he observed two cars descending from the top of the initial incline no more than thirty to forty feet apart, he attempted to stop the second car with one of the safety brakes in order to hold it until the first car was safely down the track. Unfortunately, he activated the brake too soon, stopping the first car and causing it to be rear-ended by the second car.
After the injured, customers were removed from the scene, Pardue and other technical services personnel attempted to determine the cause of the accident. They ultimately concluded, as they had with respect to the previous accidents, that this accident was caused by operator error. Their theory was as follows: After loading the first car, the loader operator manually disengaged the dispatch brake and pushed the car forward toward the dispatch tire. However, he forgot to push the “car ready” button, so the dispatch tire was never activated. Because the dispatch tire’s brake had been previously disengaged, the car rolled over the idle dispatch tire and stopped at a point somewhere between it and the proximity switch, out of the loader operator’s view. The loader operator then loaded the second car, disen*795gaged the dispatch brake, and pushed the “car ready” button, causing the tower operator to activate the dispatch tire. When the second car reached the spinning dispatch tire, it was propelled into the rear of the first car so that both cars reached the lift chain at approximately the same time and were pulled to the top of the incline, the second car close behind the first.
In a deposition given in the Noonan personal injury action on April 4, 1996, Pardue testified that had the dispatch brake’s motor been operational, the dispatch tire would have been locked and would have stopped the first car while it was still visible to the loader operator.
Q. In this case, Mr. Pardue, if the brake had been working and in place, as I understand it, even if the operator had made the mistake, if you will, or was able to release the car from the unloading area in to the — towards the first tire, the dispatch tire, had the brake been working and the tire been held in place, that first car would not — or, excuse me, the second car — the first car would not have gone over the tire, correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. So with the original dispatch system brake activated, the accident sequence involving Mary Noonan could not have occurred, correct?
A. If everything was operational -
Q. (Interrupting) Okay.
A. (Continuing) — that’s correct.
Inspection and regulation of amusement rides is the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture. As required by administrative regulation, Kentucky Kingdom notified the local inspector, Carl Dills, Jr., of the accident. Following his inspection at the scene, Dills issued a “stop operation order” that reads as follows:
STOP OPERATION ORDER
Kentucky Department of Agriculture 206 W. 2nd St.
Frankfort, Ky 40601
(602) 564-4870
Issued to: Kentucky Kingdom
Resp. Person: Ron Bemie
Address: Kentucky State Fairgrounds
Louisville, Kentucky
You are hereby notified that the following described ride or attraction, Star-chaser (Jet Star II), is operating in violation of KRS 247.232 — KRS 247.236 and/or the regulations of the Kentucky Department of Agriculture. The specific violation is: KRS 247.324 — Point of safety not corrected.
You are hereby advised and instructed that the foregoing violation cannot be corrected immediately. You must immediately take steps to correct this violation.
This stop operation order issued at Louisville, Kentucky on the 26th day of July 1994 by: /s/_
Inspector
Inspector
Action Taken: Factory to be notified for advice on dispatch safety. Safety to be incorporated to insure that no vehicle can be released from station till advance vehicle has past [sic] first brake past lift chain. Install mirror in dispatch area in order that operators can view lift chain area. Notify Dept, of Agriculture when Starchaser is ready for re-inspection.
(Emphasis added.)
Between July 27 and July 29,1994, Kentucky Kingdom’s technical services personnel spent twenty-six man hours performing repairs on the Starchaser. At the conclusion of the repairs, a handwritten report entitled “Kentucky Kingdom Technical Services Project Report” was prepared. That report reads as follows:
Project: Modify Safety System, Weld, Repair brake on #2 kickmater [sic] [apparently the dispatch tire], Install mir*796ror, Mov.e override button. Replace seat belts. Repair metal on rear of car. Test Cars on all brakes. Test Operations.
(Work performed) Wired loading [dispatch] brake in with # 2 dispatch tire. Repaired # 2 tires [sic] brake. Installed mirror so operator could see Chain & Tires. Removed station override button From control box. Welded spredder [sic] bar. Welded' ear on jackstand. Welded Fence in Front of track in hole. Replaced Seat belts on all cars. Repaired Pop Rivits [sic] on rear metal on Cars. Tested All Cars on brakes on track (State Inspector was there). Test Operation.
Parts Used: 8 sets of seat belts./ 1 brake disc. /I section of Fencing./ 1 mirror.
(Emphasis added.)
II. ALLEGED DEFAMATION.
The importance of the constitutionally protected freedom of the press cannot be understated:
The. newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the country, it is- safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrument of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints ' upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgment of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern .... A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936). Judicial decisions touching on freedom of the press “emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 435 U.S. 765, 781, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1418, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). Because .of the importance of this role, the function of the press is “precisely that form of speech which the Framers of the Bill of Rights were most anxious to protect — speech that is ‘indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.’” Fed. Communications Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3119, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandéis, J.‘, concurring)). Thus, the constitutional guarantee'of freedom of the press must be safeguarded not simply for the benefit of the press, but for the benefit of the citizenry at large. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1806-07, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389, 87 S.Ct. 534, 543, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967).
“Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that -the law of libel carve out an area of ‘breathing space’ so that protected speech is not discouraged.” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2695, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)). Therefore, to ensure that the freedom of-the press is protected when implicated by a defamation claim regarding a public matter, a plaintiff may only recover damages upon a showing that the allegedly defamatory statement was made with “actual malice.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 *797(1964). This standard is predicated upon a recognition that’ “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,” id. at 271,- 84 S.Ct. at 721, and that punishment for good faith error would create strong incentives for self-censorship, thereby inhibiting legitimate exercises of the freedom of speech and of the press. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 840, 94 S.Ct. at 8007. The fact that erroneous publications are sometimes protected under the “actual malice” standard is a testament to the commitment of our nation’s courts to the preservation of a vibrant press. E.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1326, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968).
Kentucky Kingdom admits that it is a public figure and does not deny that the collision of two roller coaster cars, which caused personal injuries to its paying customers, was a matter of public interest and concern. Viewing isolated statements out of context, the majority opinion concludes, in cursory fashion, that the broadcasts cited by Kentucky Kingdom were made with actual malice. Ante, at 791. However, upon examination of the broadcasts in full context, it is impossible to conclude that the broadcasts were made with actual malice, because they were substantially true.
Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, the. sting, of the libelous charge be justified. Put another way, the statement is not considered false unless it would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced. Our definition of actual malice relies upon this historical understanding.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517, 111 S.Ct-2419, 2433, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The first statement found to be defamatory by the majority opinion occurred during WHAS’s 6:00 pun. newscast on July 27, 1994. The reporter summarized the Star-chaser accident, updated the ■ status of those injured, stated that state officials had ordered changes made to the Star-chaser, and reported that Kentucky Kingdom believed the cause of the accident was operator error. The reporter then interviewed one of the passengers on the Star-chaser at the time the collision occurred. This person stated: “I mean everybody should know about how dangerous this ride is.” The reporter then continued:
State inspectors also think the ride is too dangerous. They ordered the park to make brake improvements and to install mirrors to help the ride operators avoid releasing cars too soon, the reason yesterday’s accident happened.
(Emphasis added.)
The second statement the majority opinion finds defamatory occurred during WHAS’s 11:00 p.m. newscast on July 30, 1994. While reporting on the expected reopening of the Starchaser, the reporter referred to it as “the roller coaster ride that malfunctioned earlier this week.”
The majority opinion next recites that ‘WHAS-TV libelously reported, ‘Kentucky Kingdom removed a key component of the ride.’ ” Ante, at 788. Actually, the majority opinion is referring to a series of broadcasts aired in 1996 about the upcoming trial of Noonan’s personal injury action. What the reporter actually said was that “public court documents” in the Noonan case revealed important information about a “key component” of the ride; that Kentucky Kingdom’s technical services manager “says they disabled a brake that he even points out in the deposition may have prevented the scenario leading up to Noo-nan’s crash.” In another segment, the reporter stated that “new information filed in court documents shows that a component of .the ride was removed by the park *798and the park’s own technical services manager now says that component, had it been there, may have prevented the scenario that led to Mary Noonan’s crash.”
At common law, even without taking First Amendment considerations into account, truth was an absolute defense to a civil defamation suit. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 581A (1977) (“One who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true.”). A fortiori, where, as here, the defendant is a news media organization and it is undisputed that the plaintiff is a public figure and that the defendant’s broadcasts concerned a public matter, the truth of the broadcasts bars any recovery. In fact, in such circumstances, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing falsehood. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 1920, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (“[A] statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations, like the present, where a media defendant is involved.”); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1564, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986) (“To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred, we hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern.”).
Even an inaccurate statement in a news report is not defamatory if it is “substantially true” or a “rational interpretation” of known facts. The “rational interpretation” test allows the author an interpretive license that is necessary when relying upon ambiguous sources, so long as the report does not purport to be a verbatim recitation of a speaker’s statement. Masson, 501 U.S. at 519, 111 S.Ct. at 2434 (“The protection for rational interpretation serves First Amendment principles by allowing an author the interpretive license that is necessary when relying upon ambiguous sources.”). The “rational interpretation” test originated in Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 291, 91 S.Ct. 633, 640, 28 L.Ed.2d 45 (1971) (recognizing a “constitutional zone of protection” for errors of interpretation, for otherwise, “once a jury was satisfied that the interpretation was ‘wrong,’ the error itself would be sufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff’). In Pape, the plaintiff claimed a magazine article was libelous because of its failure to use the word “alleged” in repeating a government report’s descriptions of police brutality.
Time’s omission of the word ‘alleged’ amounted to the adoption of one of a number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled with ambiguities. The deliberate choice of such an interpretation, though arguably reflecting a misconception, was not enough to create a jury issue of “malice” under New York Times. To permit the malice issue to go to the jury because of the omission of a word like “alleged,” despite the context of that word in the Commission Report and the external evidence of the Report’s overall meaning,. would be to impose a much stricter standard of liability on errors of interpretation or judgment than on errors of historic fact.
Id. at 290, 91 S.Ct. at 639. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1966, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (holding, in a product disparagement case, that where “adoption of the language chosen was ‘one of a number of possible rational interpretations’ of an event ‘that bristled with ambiguities’ and descriptive challenges for the writer,” plaintiff could not establish actual malice); S. Air Transp., *799Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 678 F.Supp. 8, 11-12 (D.D.C.1988) (holding that if the truth of the statement can be reasonably inferred from proven facts, it is not defamatory).
The “substantially true” test has been recognized in Kentucky for many years. Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Ky.1966); State Journal Co. v. Redding, 175 Ky. 388, 194 S.W. 301, 303 (1917); Pearce v. Courier-Journal, 683 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Ky.App.1985). Remarkably, the majority opinion summarily dismisses Bell as a “common law” case that has no application to the First Amendment, ante, at 791, a distinction that is mystifying in light of the fact that our common law of defamation cannot detract from the protections afforded to the news media by the First Amendment.1 These First Amendment protections are implicated whenever a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern. Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 776, 106 S.Ct. at 1563 (recognizing “a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault”). Moreover, Bell was a defamation action against a newspaper, and is thus indistinguishable from the case sub judice. Our predecessor court specifically held that the “substantially true” test applied to newspapers. Bell, 402 S.W.2d at 87 (“Where the defendant is a newspaper, the rule is that it is not to be held to the exact facts or to the most minute details of the transactions that it reports. What the law requires is that the publication be substantially true.”). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A cmt. f (1977) (“It is not necessary to establish the literal truth of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance.”). Accordingly, application of the “substantially true” test is not only required by our common law, but is also mandated by the United States Constitution.
With respect to the statement that “State inspectors also think the ride is too dangerous,” Kentucky Kingdom claims the statement is false because no state inspector actually said that the ride was “too dangerous.” Of course, WHAS did not say that a state inspector said the ride was “too dangerous.” WHAS reported only that state inspectors think the ride was too dangerous, a rational interpretation that could be drawn from the fact that Dills issued the “Stop Operation Order” because of the violation of a safety statute and ordered that it remain in effect until designated safety improvements were made. Even if Dills did not actually “think” the ride was “too dangerous, “[ejrrors of fact, particularly in regard to a man’s mental states and processes, are inevitable.” New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272, 84 S.Ct. at 722 (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C.Cir.1942)). WHAS’s interpretation of Dills’s action was both rational and substantially true, thus privileged as a matter of law.
With respect to the reference to “the ride that malfunctioned,” Kentucky Kingdom asserts the statement was false because the accident was caused by operator error, not equipment malfunction. However, Pardue admitted that the operator error would not have occurred except for the malfunction and subsequent disengage*800ment of the dispatch brake, which also caused the dispatch tire’s brake to malfunction. Furthermore, “malfunction” was an accurate description of an incident in which two roller coaster cars collided on the same track. Whether that malfunction was caused by operator error or equipment breakdown, the reporter’s description of the accident as a “malfunction” was, as in Bose, “ ‘one of a number of possible rational interpretations’ of an event ‘that bristled with ambiguities’ and descriptive challenges for the writer.” 466 U.S. at 512, 104 S.Ct. at 1966 (quoting Pape, 401 U.S. at 290, 91 S.Ct. at 639). At worst, the characterization was mere hyperbole, which is not actionable as defamation. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285-86, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 2782, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974) (language in union publications labeling nonunion letter carriers as “scabs” was “merely rhetorical hyperbole,” not actionable as libel); Greenbelt Co-op. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 1541-42, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970) (newspaper’s report of public debate characterizing real estate developer’s negotiating tactics as “blackmail” held, as a matter of law, not libelous). The statement that the ride “malfunctioned” was substantially true and privileged as a matter of law. I would further note that WHAS had reported in its first broadcast that Kentucky Kingdom attributed the accident to operator error and that state inspectors ordered safety improvements “to help the ride operators avoid releasing cars too soon, the reason yesterday’s accident happened.”
As for the third statement, WHAS simply reported Pardue’s testimony given in his deposition in the Noonan personal injury action, i.e., that he disabled the dispatch brake motor because he had lost confidence in it, and that the accident would not have happened if the brake had been operational. An accurate report of a civil trial is protected speech. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1044-45, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975) (“With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.... The special protected nature of accurate reports of judicial proceedings has repeatedly been recognized.”). See also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1298-1300 (D.C.Cir.1988). Kentucky Kingdom objects to WHAS’s characterization of the dispatch brake’s motor as a “key component.” However, if a properly functioning dispatch brake motor would have prevented this accident, as Pardue admitted under oath, characterizing it as a “key component” was substantially true and, thus, privileged as a matter of law.
Regrettably, today’s majority opinion has imposed defamation liability for statements that are unmistakably substantially true when viewed in their full context.2 The real tragedy of today’s decision, however, is that it significantly diminishes the *801“breathing space,” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. at 3008, that is imperative for a vigorous and competent press. The majority’s conclusions that these three broadcasts were “fundamentally inaccurate,” ante, at 792, and were made with actual malice, ante, at 791, make no provision for substantially true speech, much less for the “constitutional zone of protection” required for rational interpretations of ambiguous source material, Pape, 401 U.S. at 291, 91 S.Ct. at 640, or for the fact that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,” New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271, 84 S.Ct. at 721. When defamation liability is imposed in a manner that reduces the news media’s margin of error in covering public figures and matters of public concern, self-censorship by the media in its conduct of its most essential role is the inevitable result.
The Constitution specifically selected the press ... to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs.... Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change ... muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.
Mills v. State of Ala., 384 U.S. 214, 218-19, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966). The majority’s departure from the protections provided by the First Amendment and our common law will have a deleterious effect on the openness of societal debate on public matters.
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS.

A Failure to Instruct on Substantial Truth.

At trial, WHAS tendered jury instructions that would have required the jury to determine whether each of the alleged defamatory statements was “substantially true.” Instead, the trial court instructed the jury to return a verdict for Kentucky Kingdom if it found that the statements were false. As previously noted, the First Amendment precludes a defamation judgment against a media defendant premised upon statements that were “substantially true.” Haynes v. Alfred, A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir.1993) (“The rule making substantial truth a complete defense and the constitutional limitations on defamation suits coincide.”). “Truth,” in the context of a defamation action, has a particular meaning, i.e., “substantially true,” not “literally true.”
“[W]e have found error in the failure to define terms when the law ascribes a particular meaning or when a common term is used as a term of art.” McKinney v. Heisel, 947 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky.1997). See also Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky.1970); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Shemwell, 273 Ky. 264, 116 S.W.2d 328, 331 (1938); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Ovesen, 257 Ky. 622, 78 S.W.2d 745, 746 (1935). The majority disregards this requirement on the basis of our well-known preference for “bare bones” instructions. Ante, at 792. However, even “bare bones” instructions must contain an accurate and complete statement of the law; otherwise, the jury cannot properly apply the law to the facts of the case. Risen v. Pierce, 807 S.W.2d 945, 947-48 (Ky.1991).
In Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 301-02 (2nd Cir.1986), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved the district court’s first instruction to the jury, viz: “If the statement is true or substantially true, it- cannot be libelous. It’s not necessary of course that a statement be literally true.” Id. at 301. However, the Court found a subsequent instruction to be erroneous because it “improperly permitted the jury to *802disregard the substantial truth defense.” Id. at 302. See also Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1112 (6th Cir.1978) (“First, as the District Court instructed the jury, the article is not libelous if substantially true. ‘To be true,’ the Court correctly stated, ‘it is not essential that the literal truth be established in every detail as long as the article contains the gist of the truth as ordinarily understood.’ ”).
In the case sub judice, the Court of Appeals correctly held that it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury that “truth” means “substantial truth.” Cf. Harte-Hanks Communications, 491 U.S. at 667 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. at 2685 n. 7 (trial court should instruct jury in such a manner to ensure that New York Times “actual malice” standard is correctly applied). Under the instructions as given, “once a jury was satisfied that the interpretation was “wrong,’ the error itself would be sufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff.” Pape, 401 U.S. at 291, 91 S.Ct. at 640.

B. “Implied Libel” Instruction.

Neither the Court of Appeals nor the majority opinion of this Court has discussed the propriety of the instruction that permitted the jury to find for Kentucky Kingdom if it believed that “[t]he WHAS Reports in July 1994, taken as a whole, conveyed and created false inferences or implications concerning Kentucky Kingdom and the management, maintenance and safety of the amusement park.” However, “an allegedly false implication arising out of true statements is generally not actionable in defamation by a public official .... ” Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Minn.1990). See also Strada v. Conn. Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 477 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1984) (“A publisher cannot be responsible for every strained interpretation that a plaintiff might attribute to its words.”); Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So.2d 185, 188 (La.1981); Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass.App.Ct. 602, 417 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (1981) (insinuating overtone insufficient to constitute libel of public figure); DeFalco v. Anderson, 209 N.J.Super. 99, 506 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Ct.App.Div.1986); C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 Iowa L.Rev. 237, 305 (1993) (“There are an increasing number of cases that at least purport to reject a cause of action based upon an implied libel when the plaintiff is a public figure and the expression at issue involves a matter of public concern.”).
Even jurisdictions that do not adhere to this general rule define “implied libel” as a publication that “convey[s] a substantially false and defamatory impression by omitting material facts or suggestively juxtaposing true facts.” Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex.2000). See also Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable and Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir.1996) (“[T]he touchstone of implied defamation claims is an artificial juxtaposition of two true statements or the material omission of facts that would render the challenged statement(s) non-defamatory.”). Kentucky Kingdom does not identify any material omissions or juxtapositions in the WHAS broadcasts that could give rise to a claim of “implied libel.” It simply asserts that the three statements claimed to be libelous are not true. The “taken as a whole” instruction should have been deleted from the jury instructions.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
The award of $2,500,000.00 in punitive damages exceeds the amount authorized by the compensatory damages award of $475,000.00. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, *803134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), the United States Supreme Court identified three guideposts for determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive: the degree of reprehensibility, the disparity between the harm suffered and the amount of the punitive damages award, and the difference between the punitive damages and the civil penalty authorized in comparable cases, with the degree of reprehensibility being the most important indicia of reasonableness. Id. at 575, 116 S.Ct. at 1598-99.
In State Farm, Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), the Court held that one factor to be considered in determining the degree of reprehensibility was “whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic,” id. at 419, 123 S.Ct. at 1521, and that “[i]t should be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages .... ” Id. Campbell pointed out that “[i]n Haslip, ... we concluded that an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety,” id. at 425, 123 S.Ct. at 1524 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1046, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991)), and noted that “[w]e cited that 4 to 1 ratio again in Gore,” and “further referenced a long legislative history, dating back over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.” Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 581, 116 S.Ct. at 1589).
While these ratios are not binding, they are instructive. They demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution ....
Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. at 1589).
Both Gore and Haslip, like the case sub judice, involved claims only for economic damage. In Campbell, which did not involve a personal injury per se, but did involve damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court held that the appropriate award of punitive damages would be “at or near the amount of compensatory damages.” Id. at 429, 123 S.Ct. at 1526. Here, even if the statements WHAS made about the Starchaser accident had not been substantially true, it was highly speculative that they caused any more economic damage to Kentucky Kingdom than would have resulted if WHAS had merely reported that two roller coaster cars collided, causing a life-threatening injury to a seven-year-old child, and that the ride had been shut down by state inspectors for safety violations. From those “literally true” facts, WHAS’s viewers probably would have concluded for themselves that a key component of the roller coaster malfunctioned and that the inspectors shut it down because they thought it was unsafe. Cf. Masson, 501 U.S. at 517, 111 S.Ct. at 2433 (“[T]he statement is not considered false unless it would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Under these circumstances, the award of compensatory damages was more than generous and the punitive damages award should have been “at or near” the same amount. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429, 123 S.Ct. at 1526.
Accordingly, I dissent.
GRAVES, J., joins this opinion.

. Ironically, while the majority now holds that the statements "too dangerous,” "ride that malfunctioned,” and "removed a key component,” were each malicious and fundamentally untrue, this Court has recently held that statements such as, "The City is Broke Because of His Management,” "Frog Has Squandered Over 1½ Million Dollars of Surplus Money,” "Think before you vote and wonder why Frog and his cronies are working so hard to get rid of people who have stood in his way and called his hand on illegal activities. FROG WAS SUCCESSFUL IN RUNNING OFF 62 SEPARATE COUNCIL MEMBERS IN DISGUST,” to be lacking of malice and too indefinite, imprecise, and figurative to be considered false. Welch v. Am. Publ’g Co. of Ky., 3 S.W.3d 724, 726, 730 (Ky.1999).