Court Opinion

ID: 9561406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:09:29.068201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:46.987832
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment.
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 400 (24 SC 436, 48 LE 679) (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). I think that those words clearly apply to the case at bar. I further submit that the majority opinion also demonstrates that, on occasion, empathy and a faulty prognosis of dire results can cause courts to abandon judicial restraint and perform major legal surgery instead of allowing the traditional jurisprudential course of treatment to cure any ill that may exist. At this stage, the State has yet to bring Rosalind Hall to trial on the accusations charging her with reckless conduct. The only issue presented for resolution in this interlocutory appeal is whether the statute which underlies the pending prosecution against Ms. Hall is unconstitutionally vague. Concluding that the reckless conduct statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ms. Hall, the majority reverses the trial court’s denial of the motion to quash the accusa*96tions charging her with that crime. Although I am as sympathetic as is the majority with regard to the plight of those parents who must leave their children in the care of others, I cannot agree that the statute which Ms. Hall is charged with violating is unconstitutional as applied to her. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
A finding of vagueness means that no criminal responsibility attaches because the defendant could not reasonably understand that his or her contemplated conduct was proscribed under the terms employed in the challenged statute. Douglas v. State, 263 Ga. 748, 749 (2) (438 SE2d 361) (1994). In determining the sufficiency of the notice, the challenged “statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged. [Cit.]” United States v. Nat. Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29, 33 (II) (83 SC 594, 9 LE2d 561) (1963). Ms. Hall is charged with violating OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), which provides generally that
[a] person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Under the specific allegations of the accusations, Ms. Hall is charged with violating this statute by leaving the children “without proper supervision.” It is not necessary that the words “without proper supervision” which appear in the accusations also appear in OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) in order for the statute to pass constitutional muster. For a law to withstand a vagueness challenge, the federal and state constitutions require only that the statutory provision convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and provide explicit standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Douglas v. State, supra at 749 (2). Accordingly, the sole issue in this appeal is whether the terms employed in OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) to proscribe “reckless conduct” are sufficiently definite to encompass the act of leaving a child “without proper supervision” and to prevent arbitrary enforcement of the statutory mandate in that regard.
“Conduct,” as commonly understood, is a broad concept which includes “[p]ersonal behavior; deportment; mode of action; any positive or negative act.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). It is this broad definition which is applicable here, because, in the context of OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), “conduct” means an “act or omission” without any limitation or qualification whatsoever. Thus, any “act or omis*97sion” undertaken in connection with the supervision of a child is within the ambit of “conduct” covered by OCGA § 16-5-60 (b). “For conduct to be reckless, it must be such as to evince disregard of, or indifference to, consequences, under circumstances involving danger to life or safety of others, although no harm was intended.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Consistent with this definition, OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) clearly provides that the proscribed reckless conduct is that which is undertaken with a conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm or endangerment to another and which constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would have exercised.
It follows that the terms contained in OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), as commonly understood, are sufficiently definite to criminalize, as “reckless conduct,” an act of leaving a child “without proper supervision” which was undertaken with a conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm or endangerment to the child amounting to a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would have exercised. See Wilson v. State, 245 Ga. 49, 51 (1) (262 SE2d 810) (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of the predecessor “reckless driving” statute); Horowitz v. State, 243 Ga. 441 (254 SE2d 828) (1979) (upholding the constitutionality of the predecessor “reckless conduct” statute). Any person of common intelligence can determine whether a contemplated supervisory act or omission is “reckless,” as constituting a substantial and unjustified risk of harm or endangerment to a child and a gross deviation from reasonable care. See Watson v. State, 192 Ga. 679 (2) (16 SE2d 426) (1941).
It is urged that OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) nevertheless is unconstitutional because it fosters arbitrary law enforcement. By its terms, however, the statute is limited to “conduct” which is “reckless,” and “reckless” is further defined so as to limit the scope of the conduct which is made criminal. The General Assembly is not required to define every word in a criminal statute and, so long as a criminal statute provides a fair warning to the public and to law enforcement officers as to what actions are proscribed, there is no constitutional infirmity. See Land v. State, 262 Ga. 898, 899 (1) (426 SE2d 370) (1993). OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) is not unconstitutional simply because it permits an officer to make an assessment of the surrounding circumstances before arresting a person for “reckless conduct.” See State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 673 (2) (398 SE2d 547) (1990). Compare Daniels v. State, 264 Ga. 460 (2) (448 SE2d 185) (1994). While “reckless conduct” may have any number of definitions, the statute narrows the construction of this concept by making it clear that the proscribed conduct must be such as causes harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another through the conscious disregard of a substantial *98and unjustifiable risk which constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise. Bell v. State, 252 Ga. 267, 271 (1) (313 SE2d 678) (1984). If, drawing upon his or her professional experience, an arresting officer concludes that a suspect has committed “reckless conduct” as thus defined, it is then a matter for the trier of fact to determine whether, under all of the circumstances revealed by the evidence, the. suspect’s conduct was indeed “reckless.” See Bell v. State, supra at 271 (1). The fact that Ms. Hall was arrested and is being prosecuted for “reckless conduct,” whereas others who have left children under the supervision of others with tragic consequences have not been arrested and prosecuted, is not proof that the statute is susceptible to arbitrary enforcement. Presumably, Ms. Hall was not charged with violating OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) only because one of the children died while under the supervision of the 12-year-old to whom she entrusted them. Ms. Hall apparently was arrested and is being prosecuted because one of the children died during the period of such entrustment and the arresting officer and solicitor had sufficient probable cause to believe that Ms. Hall’s act of entrusting the children was, under the circumstances, a violation of OCGA § 16-5-60 (b). Because leaving a child “without proper supervision” in such conscious disregard for the bodily safety of the child as to constitute a gross departure from the standard of care a reasonable person would exercise is conduct which clearly comes within the language of OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), that statute provides sufficiently explicit standards so that judges and juries may fairly administer the law. “The Constitution requires no more.” Douglas v. State, supra at 750 (3).
By this dissent, I do not intend to suggest that Ms. Hall is guilty of violating OCGA § 16-5-60 (b). No evidence has yet been presented to support’ the allegations that Ms. Hall’s “conduct” in leaving the children “without proper supervision” was “reckless.” This is because the constitutional challenge to OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) arises in the context of Ms. Hall’s pre-trial motion to quash the accusations. Compare United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 (95 SC 710, 42 LE2d 706) (1975); Hubbard v. State, 256 Ga. 637 (352 SE2d 383) (1987); Horowitz v. State, supra. Despite the fact that Ms. Hall brings a pretrial constitutional challenge, the majority bases its holding upon such purported evidence as it contends the State plans to use to prove the case against Ms. Hall upon the trial of the case. In my opinion, the majority’s consideration of any “conduct” other than that attributed to Ms. Hall in the accusations constitutes the fundamental error in its analysis.
In the first instance, I find nothing in the record to support the majority’s assertion that the State has made a representation to this Court regarding the evidence of Ms. Hall’s “conduct” that it expects to *99offer in support of the allegations of the accusations. In any event, the State has made no admission in judicio that the “few facts” recited by the majority constitutes the entirety of the evidence of Ms. Hall’s conduct which will be produced at the trial of the case. More importantly, however, the majority’s reliance upon evidence of Ms. Hall’s “conduct” other than that attributed to her in the accusations ignores the mandate of United States v. Nat. Dairy Products Corp., supra at 33 (II), fn. 2 and 37 (IV), wherein the Supreme Court of the United States held that, in addressing a pre-trial constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, an appellate court is “required to accept well-pleaded allegations of the indictment as the hypothesis for decision” and is, therefore, “bound by the well-pleaded allegations of the indictment. . . .” In accordance with this authority, I believe that, for purposes of reviewing Ms. Hall’s pre-trial challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) as applied to her, we must assume that the allegations of the indictment are true and we cannot consider any additional facts which may be shown at trial. United States v. Bohonus, 628 F2d 1167, 1169, fn. 2 (9th Cir. 1980). See also United States v. Mussry, 726 F2d 1448, 1454-1455 (9th Cir. 1984).
Contrary to the majority, following the mandate of United States v. Nat. Dairy Products Corp. will not allow the State to “avoid all vagueness challenges simply by withholding allegations of fact from its indictments.” The mandate of that case is simply that an appellate court must determine a pre-trial constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness on the basis of the allegations of the indictment or accusation and not on the basis of the evidence which will be produced at trial in support of those allegations. Ms. Hall otherwise was free to challenge the sufficiency of the factual allegations of the accusations by filing demurrers. See State v. Shepherd Constr. Co., 248 Ga. 1, 3 (I) (b) (281 SE2d 151) (1981). However, she did not do so and filed only a pre-trial challenge to the constitutionality of the “reckless conduct” statute as applied to her. Where, as here, the defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the factual allegations of the underlying accusations, but contests only the pre-trial constitutional vagueness of the predicate statute, I believe that the issue can and should be resolved only on the basis of the unchallenged allegations of the criminal “conduct” contained in the accusations.
Certainly, if the State cannot present evidence at trial to prove the allegation that Ms. Hall’s “conduct” in leaving the children “without proper supervision” was “reckless,” she should not be convicted of violating OCGA § 16-5-60 (b). However, nothing in the record before us forecloses the possibility that the State can introduce evidence at trial proving that Ms. Hall’s “conduct” in this regard was “reckless.” Contrary to the import of the majority opinion, I know of no authority which compels the State to disclose all of its evidence when defending *100against a pre-trial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute with which the defendant is charged with violating. See United States v. Nat. Dairy Products Corp., supra at 37 (IV); United States v. Mussry, supra; United States v. Bohonus, supra. Here, unlike in United States v. Mazurie, supra at 550 (II), the “facts of the case at hand” necessarily are limited to the terms of OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) and the accusations alleging that Ms. Hall violated that statute. Compare Hubbard v. State, supra; Horowitz v. State, supra. Should the State obtain convictions of Ms. Hall for violating OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) based solely upon proof that she left the children with a 12-year-old, then those convictions cannot stand. If, however, the State can prove that, by leaving the children with this particular 12-year-old, Ms. Hall disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to the children and that this constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised, her convictions for violating OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) would be authorized. The only issue currently before us is whether OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) is so vague that due process prohibits the State from even attempting to prove that Ms. Hall’s alleged act of leaving the children “without proper supervision” was “reckless conduct.” In my opinion, OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) is not unconstitutionally vague and the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the allegations of the accusations against Ms. Hall must await a trial on the merits. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Decided May 12, 1997 —
Reconsideration denied June 6, 1997.
Shulman & McBride, Warren S. Shulman, for appellant.
Roxann G. Daniel,. Solicitor, Russell B. Poole, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.