Court Opinion

ID: 9639957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:53:13.477085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:23.738064
License: Public Domain

Conbon, J.,
dissenting. In my opinion sec. 7 (2) needs no construction. Therefore it should be applied as it is written. That is what the trial justice did, and I think correctly. The section expressly provides that an unemployed person shall prove his availability for work by registering for work and filing a claim for benefits at the employment office. The appellee complied with those requirements. He thereupon became eligible for benefits.
However, the section also provides that he shall not be eligible in any week “unless in such week he is physically able to work and available for work, whenever duly called for work through the employment office.” (italics supplied) In other words the section itself clearly specifies the time when his availability for work may be questioned. If he refuses the work offered, the administrator may then, and not until then, inquire into whether he is actually and truly available for work in accordance with his registration.
The appellee was never duly called for work. For that reason the trial justice held that his availability for work could not be questioned, and that he was eligible for benefits in accordance with his registration. I agree with such application of the section, and furthermore I think it is imperative.
The section as it is written is admittedly extremely lib*84eral, but for that matter so is the whole chapter providing for employment security. Apparently the legislature quite definitely and clearly intended such liberality because they expressly provided in sec. 19: “This act shall be construed liberally in aid of its declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls on the unemployed worker and his family.”
It may well be that under sec. 7 (2) as it is written it is possible for one who is not truly available for work to receive benefits until he is actually offered work and refuses it. However, that is the way the legislature drafted the section and this court is without authority to redraft it to effect what may appear to us a wiser or more prudent policy. We have heretofore in several cases stated that principle. Moretti v. Division of Intoxicating Beverages, 62 R. I. 281; Goldman v. Forcier, 68 R. I. 291; Carlson v. McLyman, 77 R. I. 177. We have also frankly acknowledged our lack of power to change the clear meaning of the legislative language, Allen v. Rhode Island State Board of Veterinarians, 72 R. I. 372, Korjian v. Boghigian, 60 R. I. 73, or to search for a meaning beyond the words of the statute, Hathaway v. Hathaway, 52 R. I. 39. Where a statute contains its own definition of words used therein this court long ago held that it had no right to look elsewhere for their meaning. State v. Foster, 22 R. I. 163. Here the statute prescribes how availability for work shall be proved, which is equivalent to a definition of that term. In short, we have always adhered to the view that in construing a statute we were not at liberty to substitute our own ideas of its justice, expediency or policy for those of the legislature. Blais v. Franklin, 31 R. I. 95; Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R. I. 452.
Of course, I recognize that the majority view sec. 7 (2) as ambiguous and therefore claim the right and power to construe it. I respectfully submit, however, that such view is not borne out by the section as it is written. It seems to me that my brethren have imported an ambiguity into the *85statute by refusing to give any effect to the clause italicized .above, namely, “whenever duly called for work through the ■employment office.” I prefer to read and apply the section ns it is written. Indeed I acknowledge that I am bound to •do so. “If a law is plain, and within the legislative power, it declares itself, and nothing is left for interpretation. It is binding upon the court as upon every citizen.” Smith v. Soucy, 46 R. I. 417, 424.
Oñst D. Chaharyn, Petitioner, pro se.
Marshall D. Marcus, for Department of Employment Security.
In construing the provision of a constitution or a statute nothing so becomes a court of last resort as a frank and generous recognition of the just limits of its authority in the performance of this necessary yet delicate duty. Having no superior to revise and correct its errors, it should be most scrupulous in refraining from trespassing upon the constituent rights of the people in the one case and from invading the province of the legislature in the other. Thus is promoted that harmony so greatly to be desired between the coordinate legislative and judicial departments of the government. To the accomplishment of that salutary objective all the canons of construction of constitutions and statutes are directed; and none more so than the canon which declares that where the language of a statute is clear there is no room for judicial construction.
Because I am convinced that sec. 7 (2) is clear and should be applied as it is written and because I think the trial justice has correctly applied it, I must dissent from the majority opinion. I may add that I have not examined any cases from other jurisdictions, as it appears to be admitted that the statute of no other state contains a provision like sec. 7 (2). Hence language of courts construing statutes lacking such a section would not be helpful here.