Court Opinion

ID: 9636400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:26:51.453199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:45.071752
License: Public Domain

CHARLES F. BAIRD, Justice (Assigned),
dissenting.
In my mind, this case boils down to whether appellant’s continued detention was reasonable after trooper Chavez learned appellant had a more extensive arrest record than initially stated.1 If the *331continued detention was reasonable, the consent to search the vehicle was valid. However, if the continued detention was unreasonable, the consent was tainted and the trial court erred in failing to suppress the fruits of that search. For the following reasons, I believe the detention was unreasonable.
To determine whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment a dual inquiry is made: was the detention justified at its inception; and, if so, was the detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the detention. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In addressing the first prong, the majority states:
[W]e believe Chavez had reasonable suspicion to do so based on appellant’s: (1) immediate exit of his car upon being stopped and putting his keys in his pocket; (2) abrupt and unsure answers to Chavez’s questions; (3) nervousness; and (4) misstatement of his criminal history. The totality of these factors, combined with commonsense inferences about human behavior, suggest that appellant was nervously attempting to direct Chavez’s attention away from appellant’s car as well as his criminal history. This, in turn, supported a reasonable suspicion that appellant could have illegal items in his car and justified a continued detention.
See swpra at 329.
As noted by the majority, on the video tape, Chavez stated if the license check came back clear, appellant would be issued a warning ticket and would be free to leave. See supra at 328.2 When this statement was made, factors one, two and three had already occurred: appellant had exited his vehicle and placed the keys in his pocket; appellant had already blurted his answers and was unsure in some responses;3 and appellant had already appeared nervous.4 Chavez determined these factors were not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to detain appellant beyond the traffic investigation because they had been considered by Chavez when he announced that a warning ticket would be issued and the detention would end if the dispatcher did not give Chavez an additional reason to hold appellant. See supra at 328. Therefore, the determinative factor for the continued detention was Chavez learning of appellant’s arrests for aggravated battery and aggravated burglary.5
*332For the continued detention to have been reasonable, these arrests must have provided a man of reasonable caution with an articulable reason to believe appellant was or soon would be engaged in criminal activity. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). An ar-ticulable reason is required because a detention based upon nothing more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or good faith hunch is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243 nn. 3 and 4. However, when Chavez was asked why he chose to continue the detention, he was not able to articulate any reason. On direct examination, Chavez simply stated learning of the undisclosed arrests “brought my awareness up a little bit that he’s not telling the truth for some reason.” This is the closest Chavez came to stating a reason for the continued detention. Clearly, this explanation does not provide an articulable reason to believe appellant was or soon would be engaged in criminal activity, and the “for some reason” portion of the testimony is nothing more than an unparticularized suspicion.
On cross-examination, Chavez was asked why he made inquiry into appellant’s criminal history:
Q. And you want to know whether or not there’s any warrants?
A. Or criminal history, yes, sir.
Q. Right. Well, why criminal history?
A. To see if this gentleman has been involved in any sort of criminal activity before.
Q. And what you found out was — is that at least he had no criminal history related to drugs, did he?
A. But he had a criminal history.
Q. Well, how would a criminal history give you some reason to believe that there may be contraband in a vehicle?
A. Not necessarily contraband, but something that he’s hiding.
Q. The fact of the matter is, you believe that if somebody has a criminal history that you need to investigate further on that reason alone; isn’t that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, to you is that a sufficient basis to initiate an additional investigation other than just a traffic violation?
A. Yes, sir.
Again, Chavez was unable to articulate any reason to believe appellant was or soon would be engaged in criminal activity.
The fact that an individual has a prior arrest or arrests does not automatically provide reasonable suspicion for detention. Otherwise, every person previously arrested would be subject to detention at the whim of a peace officer. Moreover, our law provides that the fact that someone has been arrested, without more, does not give rise to any suspicion whatsoever. Even those who have been arrested and later formally charged with a criminal offense are presumed innocent. See Tex. Code CRImPROcAnn. art. 38.03; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1076-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).6 Furthermore, the record does not reveal when appellant was arrested for these alleged offenses, if he was subsequently charged or ever tried for these alleged offenses. For all Chavez knew, the arrests occurred many years ago and appellant simply forgot about them, the charges might have been dismissed following the arrests, or appellant might have been acquitted. However, Chavez did know there were no warrants for appellant’s arrest for any of*333fense at the time of this continued detention. Because there was no articulable reason to believe appellant was or soon would be engaged in criminal activity the continued detention was unreasonable and, thus, violative of the Fourth Amendment.
This leads me to the second prong of Terry; the scope of the detention must be limited otherwise it becomes a “fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity.” See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41, 117 S.Ct. 417, 422 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (Ginsberg, J., concurring). A detention that is not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the detention is unreasonable and, thus, violative of the Fourth Amendment. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. If the undisclosed arrests were the basis of the continued detention, as Chavez testified, then the scope of the continued detention was limited to an investigation of those arrests and nothing more unless and until something fruitful came from that investigation. However, Chavez never investigated the arrests or the reason for their omission in appellant’s account of his arrest history. Instead, upon learning of the additional arrests, Chavez immediately began an investigation of the contents of appellant’s vehicle. This began with questioning appellant about whether he had ’ anything illegal in the vehicle. Because the continued detention was not limited in its scope to appellant’s undisclosed arrests, it was unreasonable and, thus, violative of the Fourth Amendment.
On a final point, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Robinette for two reasons. See supra at 329. First, Ro-binette merely stands for the narrow proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not require a peace officer to notify a driver that he is free to leave before seeking consent to search a vehicle. However, the Robinette Court noted that knowledge of the right to refuse the consent was a factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the consent. See also, Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 332-33 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (Citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). In the instant case, Chavez’s failure to inform appellant of the right to refuse the search militates against a finding that the consent was voluntary. Second, in Robi-nette, the peace officer issued a verbal warning and returned the defendant’s driver’s license before seeking consent to search the vehicle. Simply stated, the defendant was free to leave when the consent was requested. However, a much different scenario is presented in the instant case. Here Chavez did not issue a warning ticket as promised and Chavez refused to relinquish control over appellant’s driver’s license and insurance papers before seeking appellant’s consent. Finally, appellant walked away when Chavez requested consent to search the vehicle, but Chavez ordered appellant to return. See supra at 329. For these reasons, I do not believe Robinette can be read to hold appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.
The continued detention of appellant was unreasonable and, thus, violative of the Fourth Amendment. And because the detention was illegal, appellant’s subsequent consent to search his vehicle was tainted. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the fruits of that search. Accordingly, I would sustain the first and second points of error. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.

. On cross-examination, Chavez testified that after learning of the two additional arrests, he exited his vehicle, placed appellant’s driver’s license and proof of insurance on the hood of *331the patrol vehicle and initiated an investigation which was secondary and unrelated to appellant’s license plate light.

. Additionally, Chavez testified: "I advised [appellant] that I was waiting for the returns on his driver’s license and if in fact everything came back clear and having a valid driver's license that he was going to receive a written warning for a defective license plate lamp.”

. Chavez admitted that these questions were not relevant to the traffic offense investigation.

. As the majority notes, appellant’s nervousness is not obvious from the video. Nevertheless, the majority cites Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), for the proposition that nervousness can be a factor in determining reasonable suspicion. See supra at 329 n. 2. The Wardlow Court held unprovoked flight upon noticing a peace officer could give rise to reasonable suspicion. In so holding, the Court stated: "Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” From the use of the phrase "a pertinent factor” the Court treats both nervousness and evasive behavior as a single factor in determining reasonable suspicion. And this court has recognized that "nervousness is not a reasonable grounds for suspicion” See Munera v. State, 965 S.W.2d 523, 531 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd), and cases cited therein. Indeed, even Chavez testified that it was common for a motorist to act nervous after being stopped by a peace officer.

.On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
Q. The fact of the matter is, you believe that if somebody has a criminal history that you need to investigate further on that reason alone; isn’t that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
*332Q. So, to you is that a sufficient basis to initiate an additional investigation other than just a traffic violation?
A. Yes, sir.

. In Davis, a background check revealed appellant's passenger had an arrest and conviction for a drug offense. However, that played no part in the court’s determination of whether there was reasonable suspicion for the continued detention or the automobile in which the passenger was traveling. See, 947 S.W.2d at 241.