Court Opinion

ID: 9811506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:22:56.322056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:40.185678
License: Public Domain

ClakK, C. J.,
dissenting: The assignments of error that there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury, and that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, do not require any consideration. It was very full and complete, and if believed, justified the verdict rendered.
It appears in the record that the indictment was for the larceny of an automobile, the property of Frank Eosenberg. The evidence of Mrs. Elsie Eosenberg is that she was the owner of the car. As to the steps taken to notify the authorities and the finding of the stolen machine there was no exception at the trial, nor in the assignments of error, nor in plaintiff’s brief, nor in the argument here, that there was a fatal variance in the proof of ownership. It may be that the evidence, if set out in full, would'have shown that Frank Eosenberg was her husband-, and that he was bailee and in possession of the car. If so, the property was sufficiently laid in him. (S. v. Allen, 103 N. C., 433), and cases there cited and citations to that case in Anno. Ed.
It is true that when ownership is alleged it should be proven as charged, and failure to do so is a fatal variance. But, as said, 25 Oyc., 88, “ownership in a particular person is not an essential element in crime. The allegation is merely part of the description and identification of the goods.” A motion for nonsuit or for arrest of judgment because the verdict is against the weight of evidence therefore does not bring up the question of variance between proof and allegation as to the ownership.
This has been expressly decided in this State. In S. v. Baxter, 82 N. C., 606, Chief Justice Smith passed upon this point, saying that “several answers may be made to the allegation of variance when made for the first time in this Court, i. e., the case shows (1) that no question was made in regard to the allegation of property; (2) the variance should have been taken advantage of on the trial and by verdict of acquittal; (3) the objection cannot be made for the first time on appeal, and is not founded on error in law.” This ruling is cited among other cases, by Allen, J., in S. v. Hawkins, 155 N. C., 472, where there was a motion in arrest of judgment upon the ground that the State failed to prove the ownership in the town of Morganton as alleged, and this Court said, “If there had been a failure proved, the defendant should have *764taken advantage of it by a prayer for instructions and not by motion in arrest of judgment. S. v. Baxter, 82. N. C., 606; S. v. Harris, 120 N. C., 578; S. v. Huggins, 126 N. C., 1056.”
If it appeared, witli tbe whole evidence before us, that there was a variance in the proof of ownership, exception on that_ground should have been made before verdict, when the court could have allowed this to be remedied by proof that Frank Rosenberg was in possession of the car as bailee for his wife, which would have been sufficient to cure the alleged variance. Even if there was a variance, it was not a defect “in the proof of the crime” itself, which would be embraced by the motion to nonsuit, but it was merely a variance which was waived by failure to make the exception at the trial. S. v. Baxter, and other cases, supra.
S. v. Gibson, 169 N. C., 318, does not conflict with the holding of Chief Justice Smith in S. v. Baxter, supra, and Judge Allen in S. v. Hawkins, above quoted. In S. v. Gibson, supra, the charge was of obtaining money under false pretenses and the evidence shows that it was a note. This was a “failure of proof” as to an essential element in 'the defense — a defect in the evidence for which a nonsuit should have been granted, but the allegation of the ownership of articles stolen is not an element in the offense, but, as said in 25 Cyc., 88, supra, “the allegation of ownership in a particular person is not an essential element in the crime.” “Such allegation is merely part of the description and identification of the goods, as Judge Smith says, and when there is no question made in regard to the allegation of ownership the variance must be taken advantage of in the trial, and cannot be made for the first time on appeal.”
In S. v. Gibson, supra, the offense charged was false pretense in obtaining money, and the proof was of obtaining a note, which would be equivalent in a trial for larceny to charging the theft of a horse and proving the theft of an ox — a defect of proof for which a motion for nonsuit should have been made. The allegation of ownership, when not an essential element in the crime, has been dispensed with entirely in many classes of cases, especially, for instance, in selling whiskey or the name of persons whom it is intended to cheat or defraud. S. v. Hedgecock, ante, 714. Not being an essential element in the offense, but only for identification on a plea of former jeopardy, oral evidence is competent to show that it was or was not the same occurrence. This distinction clearly appears in S. v. Gibson, supra, on the second appeal, 170 N. C., 698.
In the present case, -there was no constituent element in the charge which was not fully proven, and if there was a variance in the name of the owner of the article it should, as Chief Justice Smith and Judge Allen both state, have been called to the attention of the Court and “the *765objection cannot be made for the first time on appeal.” As bas been well said, the object of a trial is to decide the matter in issue upon its merits and “not to set a trap for the judge.” the defendant’s counsel in this case did not set a trap for the judge, and be did not make the objection in this Court. Doubtless be knew the facts. If there bad been any doubt as to the'ownership of the property, be should (and doubtless would), have made the objection below as was held in S. v. Baxter, supra, and other cases above cited.
ClaeKsoN, J., concurs in dissent.