Court Opinion

ID: 9367041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 19:02:21.736324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:55.395287
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/30/23 P. v. Lyle CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C095597

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 20FE016122)

           v.

 TREVON LYLE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, defendant Trevon
Lyle pled no contest to carrying a concealed handgun, and the trial court suspended
imposition of his sentence and placed him on probation. Defendant contends the trial
court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence for three reasons: (1) when
police officers placed him in handcuffs immediately after detaining him, they made a de
facto arrest without probable cause; (2) police lacked reasonable suspicion defendant was
involved in criminal activity to justify detaining him; and (3) police lacked reasonable

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suspicion defendant was armed and dangerous to justify a pat-down search. We disagree
and will affirm the judgment.
                                    I. BACKGROUND
        The prosecution charged defendant with the felony offense of carrying a
concealed, loaded, unregistered firearm (Pen. Code, § 25400, subds. (a)(2), (c)(6)).1 At
the preliminary examination, officers from the Sacramento Police Department testified
about the circumstances that led to defendant’s arrest.
        Around 7:45 p.m., Officers Christopher Jensen and Chase Cunningham drove
through a shopping center parking lot known for gang activity, illegal drug sales, and
shootings. The officers were wearing their uniforms and driving a black, unmarked
police SUV. Despite the lack of markings, Officer Cunningham believed the large metal
bumper enhancement, the emergency lights across the front, the spotlights on the side,
and the exempt license plates made obvious that the SUV belonged to the police. The
officers observed a group of 10-15 people standing on the sidewalk in front of a liquor
store who all appeared to notice and react to the officers driving past. Defendant, in
particular, saw the officers and immediately turned away and started walking away, but
in a way indicating he did not know where he was going.
        Because of the size of the suspicious group in front of the liquor store, Officers
Cunningham and Jensen requested additional officers to help monitor the group.
Sergeant Zach Eaton drove to the shopping center in plain clothes and in an unmarked
police car and parked where he would have a clear view of the group. Sergeant Eaton
knew at least three different gangs that frequented that parking lot, and his team had
arrested gang members for illegal drug sales and illegal weapon possession in the parking

1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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lot. His team had also dealt with two or three shootings in the parking lot within the past
year.
        Sergeant Eaton saw defendant in a group of at least five people loitering in front of
a pizza restaurant and liquor store in the shopping center. Cars drove into the parking lot
and made contact with this group of people, stayed for a few minutes, and then left
without visiting any of the stores in the shopping center. Sergeant Eaton recognized this
behavior as indicative of illegal marijuana and narcotics sales. He saw defendant
approach the front passenger window of one car, which stayed in the parking lot for five
minutes or less. Defendant leaned into the open window for 10 or 20 seconds. Based on
these observations, Sergeant Eaton concluded that defendant was either making an illegal
drug sale or the people in the car were supplying defendant with illegal drugs. Sergeant
Eaton relayed to Officer Cunningham and Officer Jensen that cars were stopping in the
parking lot for short periods of time with the drivers not visiting any businesses and,
specifically, that defendant had leaned in the passenger window of one such car.
        Based on what they knew about the parking lot and defendant’s interaction with
the car, Officer Cunningham concluded defendant was likely involved in illegal drug
sales. Officers Cunningham and Jensen then pulled their car up near defendant, and
Officer Cunningham approached defendant while Officer Jensen approached K.W., who
was standing with defendant. The officers had interacted with K.W. before in that
parking lot when investigating illegal drug sales and knew K.W. was on probation.
        Officer Cunningham had defendant put his hands behind his back and planned to
quickly get handcuffs on him. Officer Jensen told K.W. to sit on the curb and then
quickly went to help Officer Cunningham with defendant. The officers expected
defendant to have a gun in the satchel he was wearing across his chest because people
involved in illegal drug sales often carry firearms. Several shootings had recently
occurred in that parking lot; they had recently arrested more people than usual for
carrying illegal guns in that parking lot; and they had found guns inside satchels worn

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across the chest more than 50 times over the past year and a half and several times per
week for the past several months, indicating a trend. When Officer Jensen approached
defendant, the satchel appeared to be holding a heavy L-shaped object. Officer Jensen
immediately patted the satchel and felt a gun.
       Officer Jensen told Officer Cunningham to handcuff defendant because he had a
gun, and Officer Cunningham handcuffed defendant. When Officer Jensen opened the
satchel, he found a loaded gun that appeared operable.
       The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the gun. The court noted the
context: a high crime area where people carried illegal guns and where criminal activity
had recently increased. The officers had seen activity consistent with illegal drug sales
and had specifically seen defendant engage in what he believed was drug sales. Based on
the officer’s experience, they reasonably expected defendant to be carrying a gun in his
satchel. The trial court also found that the officers did not arrest defendant until the pat -
down search revealed the gun in defendant’s satchel. Accordingly, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion, held defendant to answer for the charged offense, and deemed the
complaint to be an information.
       Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the information pursuant to section 995,
which the trial court denied. Following the denial, defendant agreed to plead no contest
to the misdemeanor offense of carrying a concealed firearm (§ 25400, subd. (a)(2)), and
the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on informal
probation for one year. Defendant timely appealed to the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court, which concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and directed the
clerk to send the notice of appeal to this court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.304(a)(2).)
                                     II. DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the
gun found in his satchel because the officers placing him in handcuffs, detaining him, and

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patting down his satchel violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. We disagree.
       The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
(U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1.) “[T]hat Amendment’s
proscriptions are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,”
applying the same standards of reasonableness. (See also Ker v. California (1963)
374 U.S. 23, 33.) “The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment as requiring state and federal courts to exclude evidence that government
officials obtained in violation of the amendment’s protections.” (People v.
Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125.) “One of those protections is that a government
official must obtain a warrant from a judicial officer before conducting a search or
seizure.” (Ibid.) “The prosecution has the burden of proving a justification for a
warrantless search or seizure.” (Id. at pp. 136-137.)
       “In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view
the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, deferring to those express
or implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] We
independently review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.” (People v.
Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969.)
A.     Arrest
       Defendant argues that the officers immediately handcuffed him, which amounted
to a “de facto arrest requiring probable cause,” but lacked probable cause to justify the
warrantless arrest. The parties do not dispute the officers seized defendant, but do
dispute whether the seizure amounted to a brief investigative detention or an arrest.
       This dispute matters because, “[w]hen the seizure of a person amounts to an arrest,
it must be supported by an arrest warrant or by probable cause.” (People v. Celis (2004)
33 Cal.4th 667, 673.) “Probable cause is shown ‘when the facts known to the arresting
officer would persuade someone of “reasonable caution” that the person to be arrested

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has committed a crime.’ ” (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 57.) “ ‘[T]here is no
hard and fast line to distinguish permissible investigative detentions from impermissible
de facto arrests. Instead, the issue is decided on the facts of each case, with focus on
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to
dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly, using the least intrusive means reasonably
available under the circumstances.’ ” (Celis, supra, at pp. 674-675.) For example,
stopping a suspect at gunpoint, handcuffing him, and making him sit on the ground for a
few minutes while officers investigate potential nearby threats do not necessarily convert
a detention into an arrest. (Id. at pp. 675-676; see id. at p. 675 [citing additional cases].)
       Here, not only did the officers have probable cause to arrest defendant by the time
they handcuffed him, but the detention prior to the use of handcuffs was brief and
immediately directed at confirming their suspicion that defendant had a gun in his satchel
to constitute an arrest. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Officer
Jensen determined defendant had concealed a gun in his satchel before Officer
Cunningham handcuffed defendant. After he felt the satchel, Officer Jensen then told
Officer Cunningham, “ ‘Cuff him. There’s a gun,’ ” and held defendant’s arm while
Officer Cunningham handcuffed defendant. This means that at the time they handcuffed
him the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for carrying a concealed firearm.
To the extent defendant objects to Officer Cunningham putting defendant’s hands behind
his back in preparation for placing him in handcuffs, we conclude these actions did not
transform a detention into a de facto arrest. The entire detention prior to Officer Jensen
locating the gun lasted less than 30 seconds. The detention occurred at night in an area
known for drug crime and a recent surge in gang-related gun violence, amidst a crowd of
defendant’s companions. Defendant reacted suspiciously when he saw the officers
driving through the parking lot. Sergeant Eaton had witnessed defendant engage in what
appeared to be a drug transaction and told the other two officers about his observations.
And defendant wore a satchel on his chest, a recent trend the officers had observed that

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often indicated a person was concealing a gun. In these circumstances, Officer
Cunningham beginning to handcuff defendant while Officer Jensen felt defendant’s
satchel demonstrated a diligent investigation reasonably designed to dispel or confirm
their suspicions quickly, using the least intrusive means reasonably available. We
conclude the officers’ conduct prior to arresting defendant was not a de facto arrest.
B.     Detention
       Defendant also contends that, even if the officers merely detained him initially,
they lacked reasonable suspicion defendant was involved in criminal activity to justify
that detention. We disagree.
       “A ‘brief, investigatory stop’ is justified where an officer has ‘reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,’ implicating the suspect.” (Cornell v.
City and County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 779-780.) “While the
more demanding standard of probable cause requires a basis to suspect someone of
having committed a particular crime, reasonable suspicion to detain only requires facts
connecting the suspect to ‘criminal activity’ more generally.” (Id. at p. 780.) “Because it
is a ‘less demanding’ standard, ‘reasonable suspicion can be established with information
that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause.’ ”
(Kansas v. Glover (2020) ___U.S.___ [206 L.Ed.2d 412, 419].)
       The relevant contextual circumstances officers can consider when forming
reasonable suspicion a person is involved in criminal activity include “the fact that the
stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ ” (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124),
their knowledge of gang activity in the area (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 600),
the time of day (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 241), and the detainee’s nervous,
evasive behavior upon seeing officers (Florida v. Rodriguez (1984) 469 U.S. 1, 6).
       Here, substantial evidence establishes that Sergeant Eaton had witnessed
defendant engage in an apparent drug transaction; the detention occurred at night in an
area known for drug crime and a recent surge in gang-related gun violence; defendant

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reacted suspiciously when he saw the officers driving through the parking lot; and
defendant wore a satchel on his chest in conformance with a recent trend for concealing
guns. In these circumstances, we conclude the officers had a reasonable articulable
suspicion defendant was involved in criminal activity, justifying their brief investigatory
stop.
C.      Pat-Down Search
        Finally, defendant contends the pat-down search during his detention violated the
Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked a reasonable belief defendant was armed
and dangerous. Once again, we disagree.
        “ ‘[I]t is a cardinal principle that “searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” ’ ” (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041.) One such exception is
“a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” (Terry v. Ohio,
supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27.) To justify a Terry search, “[t]he officer need not be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger.” (Ibid.) Such a search must “be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of
the police officer.” (Id. at p. 29.)
        Here, substantial evidence establishes that the officers had sufficient reason to
believe defendant had a gun in the satchel he was wearing across his chest. First, people
involved in illegal drug sales often carry firearms. Second, several shootings had
recently occurred in that parking lot. Third, the officers had recently arrested more
people than usual for carrying illegal guns in that parking lot. Fourth, the officers had

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found guns inside satchels worn across the chest more than 50 times over the past year
and a half and several times per week for the past several months. Officer Cunningham
had searched approximately 75 similar satchels worn across the chest when investigating
criminal activity in that area in the past year and a half, and about 50 of them contained
guns. Officer Jensen had found guns inside such satchels multiple times per week for the
past six months. Because of these suspicions, Officer Jensen felt defendant’s satchel
immediately upon approaching him, less than 30 seconds after Officer Cunningham
approached and began detaining defendant.
       In these circumstances, we conclude the officers had a reasonable apprehension of
danger and the resulting pat-down search was reasonably designed to discover weapons
that could harm the officers. We conclude this search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
                                   III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                         /S/

                                                  RENNER, Acting P. J.

       We concur:

       /S/

       EARL, J.

       /S/

       HOCH, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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