Court Opinion

ID: 9944648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:09:30.310895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:20:07.467874
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Etherson-Tabb, 2024-Ohio-550.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      SCIOTO COUNTY

State of Ohio,                                     :       Case No. 22CA4009

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                        :
                                                           DECISION AND
        v.                                         :       JUDGMENT ENTRY

Ryan C. Etherson-Tabb,1                            :

        Defendant-Appellant.                       :       RELEASED 2/9/2024

______________________________________________________________________
                            APPEARANCES:

Valerie M. Webb, The Law Office of Valerie M. Webb, LLC, Portsmouth, Ohio, for
appellant.

Shane A. Tieman, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay Willis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.

        {¶1}     Ryan C. Etherson-Tabb appeals from a judgment of the Scioto County

Court of Common Pleas convicting him of aggravated trafficking in drugs and possessing

criminal tools. Etherson-Tabb presents one assignment of error asserting that the trial

court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons which follow, we overrule

the assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                            I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        {¶2}     On August 25, 2021, Etherson-Tabb was indicted on one count of

aggravated trafficking in drugs, one count of aggravated possession of drugs, and one

1 At the trial level, appellant indicated his last name is “Etcherson-Tabb.”   In this decision we have spelled
his last name as it appears in the judgment entry from which he appeals.
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                    2

count of possessing criminal tools. He pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress.

The trial court conducted the suppression hearing and part of the bench trial

simultaneously.

       {¶3}   Several witnesses testified for the state, but most pertinent to this appeal is

the testimony of Trooper Nick Lewis of the Ohio State Highway Patrol. He testified that

on Sunday, June 28, 2020, around 11:30 p.m., he saw a vehicle traveling southbound on

U.S. Route 23 (“US 23”). The vehicle caught his attention because it appeared to be a

rental vehicle, and the driver appeared to be wearing a brand-new yellow construction

vest. Trooper Lewis testified that a lot of drug traffickers use rental vehicles, that it is

unusual to see construction workers on US 23 on a Sunday at 11:30 p.m., and that people

sometimes try to look like construction workers to “blend in with traffic.” Trooper Lewis

caught up to the vehicle near the exit to State Route 823 (“SR 823”). The vehicle was in

the right lane, and Trooper Lewis saw its left tires drift completely over the white dash

center lane line before abruptly moving back into the right lane. The driver then took the

southbound exit ramp to SR 823. Trooper Lewis testified that there is a point where the

fog lines for the southbound and northbound exit ramps “basically come into a triangle,”

and the lanes join. Right before that point, he saw the vehicle’s “right side tire” drift over

the southbound exit ramp’s white fog line by about half a tire width. The driver then

activated his turn signal and moved into the other lane.

       {¶4}   Trooper Lewis had two cameras in his cruiser at the time of the traffic stop—

a front-facing one which captured events happening through the front windshield and a

rear-facing one which captured events happening in the backseat. Trooper Lewis testified

that the cameras were set up to continuously record but only began recording 60 seconds
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                3

before he activated his overhead lights. He indicated that the cameras did not capture the

traffic violations in this case because they occurred more than 60 seconds before he

activated his overhead lights.

       {¶5}   The video footage starts 90 seconds before Trooper Lewis activated his

overhead lights. The audio is sometimes difficult to hear, but after Trooper Lewis

approaches the vehicle, he can be heard asking the driver, Etherson-Tabb, for his license.

Trooper Lewis testified that Etherson-Tabb gave him a Michigan ID card. On the footage,

Etherson-Tabb tells Trooper Lewis that he is driving a rental car and heading to Ashland,

Kentucky for court. They discuss the reason for the traffic stop, and Trooper Lewis says,

“So you don’t have a driver’s license?” Etherson-Tabb says he does and gives Trooper

Lewis some paperwork. Trooper Lewis briefly looks at it while Etherson-Tabb talks.

Trooper Lewis puts the paperwork inside the vehicle and has Etherson-Tabb exit the

vehicle.   Trooper Lewis asks if Etherson-Tabb has any weapons.           Etherson-Tabb

indicates he does not and raises his arms up, and Trooper Lewis says he will pat

Etherson-Tabb down if he does not mind. On the footage, it sounds as if he says, “Ok,”

and Trooper Lewis testified that Etherson-Tabb said he did not care. Trooper Lewis then

does a pat-down search, places Etherson-Tabb in the back of the cruiser, and retrieves

the paperwork from his vehicle.

       {¶6}   Trooper Lewis testified that he returned to his cruiser to verify whether

Etherson-Tabb had a driver’s license. On the footage, once in the cruiser, Trooper Lewis

asks Etherson-Tabb what he has court for, and Etherson-Tabb says it is for a “ticket.”

Trooper Lewis asks if there is anything illegal in Etherson-Tabb’s vehicle. Etherson-Tabb

says there is not and something like “everything you need to do.” Trooper Lewis testified
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                   4

that he took this comment to mean Etherson-Tabb would probably consent to a vehicle

search if asked, so Trooper Lewis had Trooper Matt Lloyd head to the scene. At some

point before Trooper Lloyd arrived, Trooper Lewis ran the number on the Michigan ID

card, and the Michigan BMV indicated Etherson-Tabb’s license was expired and

suspended. On the footage, Trooper Lewis and Etherson-Tabb discuss his paperwork.

Trooper Lewis testified that he had “a difficult time” going through it because it was from

two different courts. It appeared to him that Etherson-Tabb had been granted driving

privileges in Michigan for 60 days, which had expired. Trooper Lewis testified that he tried

to figure out if the privileges had been extended.

       {¶7}   On the footage, Trooper Lewis and Etherson-Tabb discuss the fact that

another person rented the vehicle Etherson-Tabb is driving because he could not do so

with a suspended license. Trooper Lewis also asks where Etherson-Tabb works. He

initially says he is not working right now but then says he does a little construction in

Detroit and is traveling from work. They discuss his driver’s license again and a document

Trooper Lewis says that he is “trying to figure out.” About 10 minutes into the traffic stop,

Trooper Lewis asks dispatch for a “78,” which he testified is a criminal history check. He

testified that he gave dispatch Etherson-Tabb’s driver’s license number, and at that point,

dispatch will “typically run that,” check the status of the person’s license, check for

warrants, and run a criminal history check. However, he acknowledged that he did not

think dispatch could give him any information about the license status that he did not

already have access to from his cruiser.

       {¶8}   On the footage, Trooper Lewis asks Etherson-Tabb additional questions

about his upcoming traffic case. About 14 minutes into the stop, Trooper Lloyd arrives.
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                    5

Trooper Lewis testified that at that point, he thought he was trying to verify whether

Etherson-Tabb had court the next day. On the footage, Trooper Lewis says that if

Etherson-Tabb does not care, “while they’re checking some information on you,” he will

“check the car real quick” if Etherson-Tabb does not mind, and Etherson-Tabb says, “Ok.”

Trooper Lewis and Trooper Lloyd converse, and dispatch provides information on

Etherson-Tabb’s criminal history. The troopers finish their conversation, and Trooper

Lloyd discusses the driver’s license issue with Etherson-Tabb, while Trooper Lewis

searches the front passenger side of the vehicle. About 16 minutes into the stop, Trooper

Lewis announces that he found a “piece of weed.” Trooper Lewis testified that based on

his training and experience, he can identify marijuana by sight, and he found a “small

piece of marijuana” or “little bit of marijuana residue on the floor.” Trooper Lewis continued

to search the vehicle, and Trooper Lloyd joined him after additional discussion with

Etherson-Tabb about the driver’s license issue. Trooper Lewis testified that aside from

marijuana “debris” or “residue” which was “throughout the vehicle,” the troopers found no

other contraband.

       {¶9}   On the footage, about 52 minutes into the stop, the troopers stop the vehicle

search.   Etherson-Tabb returns to his vehicle. Trooper Lewis testified that he then

reviewed the footage from his rear-facing camera to see if there was anything the troopers

missed, like Etherson-Tabb reacting to a “hotspot on the car where something was * * *

concealed.” Trooper Lewis thought his story did not make sense because he made

inconsistent statements about being employed, claimed to be coming from a construction

job while wearing what appeared to be brand new clothing, and was traveling with six

pairs of shoes for an overnight trip. The footage shows that while Etherson-Tabb is alone
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                    6

in the cruiser waiting for Trooper Lewis to retrieve his paperwork, he puts his hands inside

his pants and seems to adjust something in his crotch area. Trooper Lewis testified that

when he watches footage from inside his cruiser, he can “kill” certain microphones. When

he did this with a microphone that was creating a “buzzing” sound, he could hear a

“crunching sound” when Etherson-Tabb moved his hands around. The footage also

shows Etherson-Tabb moving his hands around his crotch area, from over top and inside

of his pants, at other times he is in the cruiser.

       {¶10} Based on his training and experience, Trooper Lewis believed Etherson-

Tabb was concealing contraband, such as pills or crack cocaine. Trooper Lewis testified

that he had Etherson-Tabb exit his vehicle again, searched him, and felt an object

concealed between his legs. Trooper Lewis testified that he offered to let Etherson-Tabb

leave the scene and do a direct indictment if he voluntarily surrendered the object.

Etherson-Tabb reached down the front of his pants, pulled out a baggie containing 180

oxymorphone pills and 5 oxycodone pills, and gave it to Trooper Lewis, who let him leave

the scene about an hour and a half after initiating the stop. Trooper Lewis could not recall

whether he ever completed a written warning “for the lane violation.” He did not cite

Etherson-Tabb for driving under suspension because he was unable to confirm whether

Etherson-Tabb had valid driving privileges. Trooper Lewis “aired [sic] on the side of

caution” because the stop was during the COVID-19 pandemic, and he knew “Ohio was

extending driver’s license renewals,” so he “went ahead with the assumption that

Michigan had probably renewed” Etherson-Tabb’s driving privileges.

       {¶11} After the state rested its case-in-chief, the trial court overruled the motion to

suppress. The defense then presented its case-in-chief during which Etherson-Tabb
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                                 7

testified. The trial court found him guilty on all counts.2 The court found that the

aggravated trafficking in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs counts merged. The

state elected to proceed to sentencing on the aggravated trafficking in drugs count, and

the court imposed an aggregate sentence of five to seven and a half years on that count

and the possessing criminal tools count.

                                  II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        {¶12} Etherson-Tabb presents one assignment of error: “The trial court erred in

denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.”

                                     III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

        {¶13} In his sole assignment of error, Etherson-Tabb contends that the trial court

erred in denying his motion to suppress. He maintains the traffic stop was unconstitutional

because “a reasonable prudent person would not believe a crime had been committed.”

He asserts that Trooper Lewis was only suspicious of him because he was wearing a

yellow construction vest and driving a vehicle with Virginia license plates, followed his

vehicle “for several miles without probable cause to stop it,” and only stopped his vehicle

when its “tires finally contacted the white line.” Quoting State v. Grigoryan, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 93030, 2010-Ohio-2883, ¶ 25, he asserts that “[a]t least one Ohio court

has held that a vehicle’s ‘inconsequential movement within a lane’ does not create

reasonable, articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop and is insufficient for probable

cause.” [Id.] Etherson-Tabb also claims the duration of the stop was excessive, asserting

2 The indictment indicated that the aggravated trafficking in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs

counts involved oxycodone. The state filed a motion to amend the indictment to state those counts involved
both oxycodone and oxymorphone. Before the suppression hearing/bench trial began, defense counsel
told the court the defense had no objection to the motion. The court orally granted the motion and found
Etherson-Tabb guilty of the drug counts as amended and the possessing criminal tools count. The court’s
post-trial judgment entry does not mention the amendment to the drug counts. However, we observe that
pursuant to Crim.R. 36, “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments * * * may be corrected by the court at any time.”
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                 8

that “although Trooper Lewis reported that he observed marijuana residue on the floor of

the vehicle, the time he took to review his in-car camera, coupled with the delay in

obtaining assistance from another trooper went beyond temporary detention, was

unreasonable, and amounted to an illegal seizure.”

      {¶14} “Normally, appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed

question of law and fact.” State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10

N.E.3d 691, ¶ 7, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797

N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained:

      When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of
      trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions
      and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court
      must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by
      competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate
      court must then independently determine, without deference to the
      conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal
      standard.

(Citations omitted.) Burnside at ¶ 8.

      {¶15} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio

Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.” State

v. Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-Ohio-5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15. The Supreme

Court of Ohio has held that these provisions provide the same protection in felony cases.

State v. Hawkins, 158 Ohio St.3d 94, 2019-Ohio-4210, 140 N.E.3d 577, ¶ 18. “This

constitutional guarantee is protected by the exclusionary rule, which mandates the

exclusion at trial of evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure.” State

v. Petty, 2019-Ohio-4241, 134 N.E.3d 222, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.).

      {¶16} “ ‘[S]earches [and seizures] conducted outside the judicial process, without

prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                9

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated

exceptions.’ ” (Footnotes omitted and alterations sic.) State v. Conley, 4th Dist. Adams

No. 19CA1091, 2019-Ohio-4172, ¶ 17, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357,

88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). “Once a defendant demonstrates that he or she

was subjected to a warrantless search or seizure, the burden shifts to the state to

establish that the warrantless search or seizure was constitutionally permissible.” State

v. Dorsey, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 19CA3874, 2019-Ohio-3478, ¶ 13. In this case, law

enforcement did not act pursuant to a warrant.

                      A. Constitutionality of the Initial Traffic Stop

      {¶17} A traffic stop initiated by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,

809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Thus, a traffic stop must comply with

the Fourth Amendment’s general reasonableness requirement. Id. at 810. “An officer’s

decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable when the officer has probable cause or

reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver has committed, or is committing a crime,

including a minor traffic violation.” State v. Farrow, 2023-Ohio-682, 209 N.E.3d 830, ¶ 13

(4th Dist.), citing Whren at 809-810, and State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-561, 185 N.E.3d 131,

¶ 15-17 (4th Dist.). “ ‘[A] traffic stop with the proper standard of evidence is valid

regardless of the officer’s underlying ulterior motives as the test is merely whether the

officer “could” have performed the act complained of; pretext is irrelevant if the action

complained of was permissible.’ ” Petty at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Koczwara, 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 13 MA 149, 2014-Ohio-1946, ¶ 22.
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                     10

          {¶18} Trooper Lewis’s testimony implicates R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), which states:

“Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for

traffic, * * * [a] vehicle * * * shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a

single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved from such lane or line until the driver

has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” Contrary to what

Etherson-Tabb suggests, Trooper Lewis did not initiate the traffic stop based on

inconsequential movement within a lane of traffic. Trooper Lewis testified that when

Etherson-Tabb was driving in the right lane on US 23, Trooper Lewis saw his vehicle’s

left tires drift completely over the white dash center lane line before abruptly moving back

into the right lane. See generally State v. Hoffman, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-08-02, 2008-

Ohio-2253, ¶ 2, 16, 20 (drifting over dashed white line between two lanes on two

occasions by one to two tire widths violated R.C. 4511.33 and provided probable cause

for traffic stop). Trooper Lewis also testified that when Etherson-Tabb was driving on the

southbound ramp to SR 823, Trooper Lewis saw one of his vehicle’s right tires drift over

the white fog line by about half a tire width right before the southbound and northbound

ramps join. See generally State v. Allen, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 21CA3969, 2023-Ohio-192,

¶ 41-42 (trial court reasonably applied caselaw to find violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1)

where vehicle crossed fog line two times by half a tire width, making initial traffic stop

valid).

          {¶19} “[T]he observation of a traffic violation provides law enforcement with both

reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop a vehicle.” State v. Cremeans, 2022-

Ohio-3932, 199 N.E.3d 594, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.). The trial court indicated it believed Trooper

Lewis’s testimony, and “[a] traffic stop is constitutionally valid when a law-enforcement
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                   11

officer witnesses a motorist drift over the lane markings in violation of R.C. 4511.33, even

without further evidence of erratic or unsafe driving.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406,

2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, syllabus. Thus, we conclude Trooper Lewis had

reasonable suspicion and probable cause to initiate the traffic stop, and the initial traffic

stop was constitutional.

                              B. Duration of the Traffic Stop

       {¶20} Initially, we consider whether Etherson-Tabb properly preserved a

challenge to the duration of the traffic stop for purposes of appellate review. “ ‘It is well

settled that issues not raised in an original motion to suppress cannot be raised for the

first time on appeal.’ ” State v. Meadows, 2022-Ohio-287, 184 N.E.3d 168, ¶ 21 (4th

Dist.), quoting State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Highland No. 04CA9, 2005-Ohio-768, ¶ 18.

Etherson-Tabb’s written motion to suppress and defense counsel’s oral argument in

support of the motion do not explicitly address the duration of the traffic stop in this case.

However, in overruling the motion, the trial court addressed the issue, stating that “one of

the things that becomes impairing is the amount of time that we are out there on the

scene.” The court indicated the duration of the stop was not excessive because the

troopers had to sort out the issue with Etherson-Tabb’s license, and Trooper Lewis had

the right to review the cruiser footage. Although we question whether Etherson-Tabb

sufficiently raised a challenge to the duration of the stop we will address the issue.

       {¶21} “[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is

determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the

stop, and attend to related safety concerns.” (Citations omitted.) Rodriguez v. United

States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). “Because addressing
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                  12

the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to

effectuate th[at] purpose.’ ” (Alteration sic.) Id., quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,

500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.E.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion). “Authority for the seizure

thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

completed.” Id., citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84

L.E.2d 605 (1985) (in determining the reasonable duration of a stop, “it [is] appropriate to

examine whether the police diligently pursued [the] investigation”). “Beyond determining

whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries

incident to [the traffic] stop.’ ” (Alteration sic.) Id. at 355, quoting Illinois v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.E.2d 842 (2005). “Typically such

inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are

outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration

and proof of insurance.” Id. “These checks serve the same objective as enforcement

of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.”

Id.

       {¶22} “After the reasonable time for the original traffic stop has elapsed, the

officer must have ‘ “a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue the

detention.” ’ ” Farrow, 2023-Ohio-682, 209 N.E.3d 830, at ¶ 15, quoting Jones, 2022-

Ohio-561, 185 N.E.3d 131, at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Ramos, 155 Ohio App.3d 396,

2003-Ohio-6535, 801 N.E.2d 523, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). “Any further detention may last as

long as the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity continues[.]” Id. We have explained:

       The length of the time for the continued detention is governed by the totality
       of the circumstances:
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                               13

             “The officer may detain the vehicle for a period of time
             reasonably necessary to confirm or dispel [the officer’s]
             suspicions of criminal activity.” “Once the officer is satisfied
             that no criminal activity has occurred, then the vehicle’s
             occupants must be released.”

             “In determining whether a detention is reasonable, the court
             must look at the totality of the circumstances.” The totality
             of the circumstances approach “allows officers to draw on
             their own experience and specialized training to make
             inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
             information available to them that ‘might well elude an
             untrained person.’ ”

(Citations omitted and alteration sic.) Id. at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Williams, 12th Dist.

Clinton No. CA2009-08-014, 2010-Ohio-1523, ¶ 18-19.

      {¶23} Under the totality of the circumstances here, the stop’s duration was

reasonable. “[I]t has been noted that a timeframe of approximately 15 minutes should be

sufficient, on average, to complete the necessary checks and be ready to issue a traffic

citation.” State v. Harper, 2022-Ohio-4357, 202 N.E.3d 126, ¶ 34 (4th Dist.). The traffic

stop in this case exceeded that time; however, within the first 15 minutes of the stop,

Trooper Lewis discovered facts which gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of

additional criminal activity—that Etherson-Tabb was driving under suspension as

indicated by the information from the Michigan BMV. Etherson-Tabb asserts that Trooper

Lewis improperly delayed the stop “in obtaining assistance from another trooper,” but

contrary to what Etherson-Tabb suggests, Trooper Lewis was not idle while he waited for

Trooper Lloyd to arrive. Trooper Lewis tried to confirm or dispel his suspicion that

Etherson-Tabb was driving under suspension. He tried to ascertain whether Etherson-

Tabb had valid driving privileges by reviewing paperwork from two different courts and

discussing the matter with Etherson-Tabb multiple times.
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                   14

       {¶24} On the footage, the last conversation about the license issue before Trooper

Lloyd arrives ends about nine and a half minutes into the stop. Trooper Lewis then gives

dispatch Etherson-Tabb’s license number, and there is a period of about four minutes

before Trooper Lloyd arrives in which there is mostly silence interspersed with brief

conversation about the reason for Etherson-Tabb’s travel. It is not clear whether Trooper

Lewis investigated the license issue during those minutes. However, it appears Trooper

Lewis was still waiting for information from dispatch about outstanding warrants during

this time. And even if it could be said that Trooper Lewis was not acting diligently during

those minutes, the license issue still impeded his ability to complete the traffic stop within

15 minutes, and he found marijuana in the passenger compartment of Etherson-Tabb’s

vehicle about 16 minutes into the stop. Etherson-Tabb does not challenge the trial court’s

finding that he consented to the search which led to that discovery.

       {¶25} “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, officers may

search a vehicle without obtaining a warrant when they have probable cause to believe

the vehicle contains evidence of illegal activity.” State v. Jackson, 171 Ohio St.3d 412,

2022-Ohio-4365, 218 N.E.3d 790, ¶ 28. “ ‘[W]hen a police officer has probable cause to

believe a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, the officer may conduct a warrantless

search of every part of the vehicle and its contents, including all movable containers and

packages, that could logically conceal the objects of the search.’ ” Farrow, 2023-Ohio-

682, 209 N.E.3d 830, at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Maddox, 2021-Ohio-586, 168 N.E.3d 613,

¶ 20 (10th Dist.). Once Trooper Lewis found the small piece of marijuana on the vehicle

floor, he had probable cause to search the entire vehicle. See generally Jackson at ¶ 1,

28 (observation of marijuana cigarette on vehicle floor gave probable cause to search
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                               15

vehicle); State v. Greenwood, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19820, 2004-Ohio-2737, ¶ 10-11

(observation of marijuana seeds and leaves on passenger seat and floorboard gave

probable cause to search entire vehicle); State v. Burke, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29256,

2022-Ohio-2166, ¶ 37 (explaining that while R.C. 3796.06(A)(3) allows possession of

prescribed marijuana plant material, the Ohio Administrative Code requires that it be kept

in an approved container in a secure location, so officer could reasonably conclude the

defendant was illegally possessing marijuana when there was marijuana “shake” all over

the defendant’s clothing, “even it if it was legitimate medical marijuana”). Adding to the

totality of the circumstances at that point were facts suggesting Etherson-Tabb was lying

about being a construction worker.

      {¶26} Contrary to what Etherson-Tabb suggests, Trooper Lewis was entitled to

review the cruiser footage to see if the troopers missed any contraband in the vehicle.

See generally Harper, 2022-Ohio-4357, 202 N.E.3d 126, at ¶ 4, 38-39 (rejecting

contention that by starting and stopping vehicle search three times over about three hours

to review cruiser footage, troopers conducted three separate searches which each

required separate reasonable suspicion or probable cause because troopers had

probable cause to search the entire vehicle, and there was no time limit in conducting the

search); Farrow, 2023-Ohio-682, 209 N.E.3d 830, at ¶ 19, 27 (trooper’s suspicion that

vehicle contained contraband was not dispelled after he failed to locate contraband in

passenger compartment because trooper was entitled to search entire vehicle, trooper

was entitled to review recording of driver and defendant in patrol car “for any assistance

it might provide in locating hidden contraband,” and trooper did not unconstitutionally

extend duration of stop to review the recording, which helped trooper focus search on the
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                              16

engine compartment where he found drugs hidden near the headlight).           The video

footage, coupled with the marijuana debris in the vehicle and facts suggesting Etherson-

Tabb was lying about his employment and travel plans, gave Trooper Lewis reasonable,

articulable suspicion that Etherson-Tabb was concealing contraband around his crotch

area. Trooper Lewis did not unconstitutionally further extend the duration of the stop to

investigate that suspicion, which resulted in Etherson-Tabb turning over the baggie of

pills.

         {¶27} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the duration of the stop was

constitutional.

                                     C. Conclusion

         {¶28} The trial court did not err when it denied Etherson-Tabb’s motion to

suppress. We overrule the sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                               JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Scioto App. No. 22CA4009                                                                 17

                                   JUDGMENT ENTRY

         It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.

         The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

       IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                          For the Court

                                          BY: ________________________
                                              Michael D. Hess, Judge

                                 NOTICE TO COUNSEL

       Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.