Court Opinion

ID: 9474887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:11:54.058333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:23.800615
License: Public Domain

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority gives little weight to Taylor’s Eotk -type argument, disposing of it in one paragraph. The majority states that “although undoubtedly for the best interest of the children affected, none of the sections cited creates specific rights or benefits in particular children. When statutes provide only that certain procedural guidelines be followed in arriving at a decision, they do not create a substantive interest protected by the Constitution. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 981 (11th Cir.1984) (en banc).”
I disagree for several reasons. First, the Georgia statutes in question provide more than just “procedural guidelines to be followed in arriving at a decision.” The Georgia foster care and placement scheme is a comprehensive one. The Children and Youth Act provides that “legal custody embodies: ‘(B) the right and the duty to protect [children] ... and (C) the responsibility to provide food, clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care.’ ” O.C. G.A. § 49-5-3(12). The regulations governing foster care services are found in O.C.R.R.G. § 290-2-12-08. Subsection 3 of that section provides that the selection of a foster home should be based upon an assessment of the child’s total needs and how well a particular program meets the child’s needs. Section 16 provides that supervision of children in foster homes is to be maintained “through visits made at regular intervals and as frequently as necessary for the best interest of the child.”
Thus, the Georgia scheme mandates that officials follow guidelines and take affirmative actions to ensure the well being and promote the welfare of children in foster *885care. To say that these children cannot state a claim based upon deprivation of liberty interest when the officials fail to follow the mandates is, in my estimation, wrong. “In a constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty’ must be broad indeed.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 558 (1972).
A determination that Taylor can state a claim based upon a denial of a liberty interest is buttressed by a case which the district court cites: Dollar v. Haralson County, Ga., 704 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.1983). In Dollar, this court stated: “In determining whether a constitutional deprivation has occurred, courts must examine whether the defendant was under any obligation to the particular plaintiff. The question of the existence of such a duty is an issue of law.” Dollar, at 1543. This court went on to note that the existence of duties resulting from relationships is usually clear in section 1983 cases (citing the relationship between prisoners and wardens and hospitals and patients).
Dollar is important because it suggests that the more important the relationship and its attendant duties, the more likely it is that an act or omission on the part of one party has the potential to deprive the other of a constitutionally protected right. The relationship between state officials charged with carrying out a foster child care program and the children in the program is an important one involving substantial duties and, therefore, substantial rights.
The majority also rejects Taylor’s assertion that her complaint stated a cause of action under the principles announced in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), and Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1981). In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference by state prison personnel to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury would constitute cruel and unusual punishment contravening the fourteenth amendment and giving rise to a section 1983 action. In Doe, the Second Circuit held that a child in state custody had a section 1983 cause of action based on an Estelle-type analysis under the fourteenth amendment. The majority states that
although we might be inclined to follow the Second Circuit’s standard of care in connection with children in the custody of the state, it is not necessary for us to decide whether this circuit should extend the rationale of Estelle outside of the eighth amendment context into the foster care arena, because plaintiff’s allegations fail to show the ‘deliberate indifference’ which Doe requires.
Taylor v. Ledbetter, 791 F.2d 881, at 883 (11th Cir. June 16, 1986).
In Doe, however, the Second Circuit stated that deliberate indifference is closely associated to gross negligence:
One is a type of conduct, and the other a state of mind. Nevertheless, the two are closely associated, such that gross negligent conduct creates a strong presumption of deliberate indifference. [Citation omitted.] While this presumption is at least theoretically rebuttable, the fact that there can be instances where glaring negligence may not constitute deliberate indifference does not mean that a factfinder is barred from equating negligence of a certain dimension with deliberate indifference.
Doe, 649 F.2d at 143.
Whether appellees’ conduct amounted to gross negligence is, of course, an issue for a jury. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the district court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.