Court Opinion

ID: 9744666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:11:55.636286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.877530
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: I conclude that defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel and was denied the due process of law. (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV.) Accordingly, I dissent. Jury Instruction Conference At the close of the evidence, the trial judge held a jury instruction conference. Present were not only defense counsel and the prosecutor, but also defendant. When the conference reached the instruction that defines murder, the trial judge addressed defendant individually. The trial judge attempted to explain the difference between first degree murder and the lesser included offense of second degree murder, and the possible consequences of instructing the jury on each offense. During this lecture, the trial judge explicitly stated on four occasions that only defendant could decide whether to have the jury instructed on second degree murder. On two of those four occasions, the trial judge further told defendant that his attorney could not decide for him. At the close of this lecture, defendant decided not to have the jury instructed on second degree murder. He stated: "I have been weighing it and thinking about it all day. I have come up with the conclusion that it’s either one or the other, acquittal or a first degree.” At that point, the trial judge asked defense counsel whether he was satisfied that defendant "understands what’s going on?” Defense counsel replied: "I believe that he does.” Defendant contends, inter alia, that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because: (1) the trial judge prevented defense counsel from assisting defendant, and (2) defense counsel failed to provide effective assistance. I agree for both reasons. Trial Judge The trial judge’s "advice” to defendant — that only defendant individually and not his defense counsel could decide whether to have the jury instructed on second degree murder — was incorrect. Courts have recognized only four decisions that a criminal defendant has the ultimate authority to make, after full consultation with defense counsel: what plea to enter, whether to waive a jury, whether to testify on his or her own behalf, and whether to take an appeal. Jones v. Barnes (1983), 463 U.S. 745, 751, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987, 993, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312; People v. Ramey (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 41, 54. "Beyond these four decisions, however, trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client.” (Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54.) Such decisions are binding on the client. People v. Bowman (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 131, 141. Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. (People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill. App. 3d 8, 23-24; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 414, 428.) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. (Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54; Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d at 141; accord 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 208, at 355 (1980); but see, contra, 1 Standards for Criminal Justice 4 — 68 (2d ed. 1980).) Consequently, the trial judge’s "advice” to defendant in the present case was erroneous. I now address whether the trial judge’s error deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. (People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 329, 337.) "[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.” Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 684, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063; accord People v. Lee (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 420, 424-26. Ordinarily, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s substandard representation so prejudiced defendant as to deny him a fair trial. To prove actual prejudice, a defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. A " 'reasonable probability’ ” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. People v. Horton (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 11, 23, quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068. However, there are some circumstances where Strickland’s two-part test does not apply. The most obvious circumstance is the complete denial of counsel. A criminal trial is presumed unfair if the defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of the trial. (United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648, 659, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 668, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047.) Specifically, no showing of prejudice is required where defense counsel was prevented from assisting defendant during a critical stage of the proceedings. (Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 668 n.25, 104 S. Ct. at 2047 n.25; see Perry v. Leeke (1989), 488 U.S. 272, 280, 102 L. Ed. 2d 624, 633, 109 S. Ct. 594, 600.) Whether a defendant has reached a "critical stage” of criminal proceedings depends on "a pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular proceeding, and the dangers to the accused of proceeding without counsel.” Patterson v. Illinois (1988), 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 276, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2398; accord People v. Taylor (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 165, 169. Applying these principles to the present case, I conclude that the trial judge denied defendant counsel at a critical stage of the trial. Initially, it is clear that a jury instruction conference is a "critical stage” of criminal proceedings. Arguably, the charge to the jury "is that part of the whole trial which probably exercises the weightiest influence upon jurors.” (Andres v. United States (1948), 333 U.S. 740, 765, 92 L. Ed. 1055, 1070, 68 S. Ct. 880, 892 (Frankfurter, J., concurring, joined by Burton, J.).) The function of jury instructions is to guide the jury in its deliberations and to help it reach a proper verdict through the application of correct legal principles according to the law and the evidence. (People v. Hester (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 91, 98, citing People v. Gambony (1948), 402 Ill. 74, 81-82.) Especially in criminal cases with conflicting evidence, "it is highly essential” that a jury be correctly instructed so that it may. properly consider the facts. (People v. Edwards (1945), 389 Ill. 63, 566.) "Appropriate and proper instructions to a jury are essential for a fair trial.” 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1302, at 207 (1989). Also, it is clear from the record that the trial judge prevented defense counsel from assisting defendant at this critical stage of the trial. The trial judge did not ask defendant if he would like to have the jury instructed on second degree murder. Rather, the judge repeatedly told defendant that only he and not his defense counsel could decide. The trial judge explicitly stated that defense counsel could not participate in the decision, thereby forcing defendant to appear pro se on this issue. The majority simply ignores the law as explained by the United States Supreme Court. The majority states that the trial judge fully informed defendant (albeit initially incorrectly) about the separate instructions for first and second degree murder. The majority concludes that defendant, with his attorney present, made the choice voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. 158 Ill. 2d at 493-94. However, when a court interferes with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense, the court denies the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. (Perry, 488 U.S. at 280, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 633, 109 S. Ct. at 599, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2063.) "The constitutional right to be represented by counsel includes defendant’s right to conference with an attorney. Such right to confer is at no time more important than during the progress of a trial.” (State v. Larmond (Iowa 1976), 244 N.W.2d 233, 236.) I conclude that the trial judge prevented defense counsel from assisting defendant during a critical stage of the proceeding. Defense Counsel Defendant contends that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel during the jury instruction conference also because defense counsel did not provide it. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not limited to counsel’s performance as a whole, but, rather, may focus on specific errors and omissions. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657 n.20, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 666 n.20, 104 S. Ct. at 2046 n.20. Applying Strickland’s two-part test to the present case, I conclude that defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Referring to the first part of the Strickland test, the record shows that defense counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Horton, 143 Ill. 2d at 23. The majority quotes at length from the trial judge’s lecture on second degree murder. The majority acknowledges that defense counsel did not object to or indicate any disagreement with the trial judge’s erroneous directive that defendant and not defense counsel make the decision. The majority also acknowledges that defense counsel did not indicate any disagreement between himself and defendant. 158 Ill. 2d at 493-94. This is exactly the point. During the trial judge’s lecture, defense counsel did not say or do anything. "That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the [sixth amendment].” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2063; accord Lee, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 425. Defense counsel stood mute while the trial judge forced defendant to make a decision that was defense counsel’s to make. The record also shows confusion on the part of defense counsel due to a lack of communication between him and defendant. When defendant stated that he did not want the jury instructed on second degree murder, he stood alone. Referring to the second part of the Strickland test, I further conclude that, had the jury been instructed on second degree murder in addition to first degree murder, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. See Horton, 143 Ill. 2d at 23. Initially, defendant was clearly entitled to a jury instruction on second degree murder. The majority previously recounted the evidence adduced at trial. I need not repeat it here. Suffice it to say that the record contained evidence of whether defendant committed second degree murder, i.e., whether unlawful force was threatened against defendant and that he was not the aggressor, and that he unreasonably believed that he acted in self-defense (People v. Jerome (1990), 206 Ill. App. 3d 428, 432; see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 7 — 1, 9 — 2(a)(2)). See People v. Everette (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 147, 156. Also, the defense theory was that defendant acted in self-defense. The jury was instructed on self-defense. A defense of self-defense does not preclude a second degree murder instruction. Rather, if the evidence supports a self-defense instruction, it will also support a second degree murder instruction. (People v. Lockett (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 546, 550-51.) I also note that the trial judge stated that the evidence justified an instruction on second degree murder in addition to one on first degree murder. All of these reasons entitled defendant to have the jury instructed on second degree murder. Such an instruction would have provided an important third option to the jury. If the jury believed that defendant was guilty of something, but uncertain whether first degree murder had been proved, it might have convicted defendant of the lesser offense rather than convict or acquit him of the greater offense. See Keeble v. United States (1973), 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844. 850. 93 S. Ct. 1993. 1997-98. I am also of the opinion that had the jury been instructed on second degree murder in addition to first degree murder, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. The evidence pertaining to second degree murder was closely balanced and conflicting, sufficiently so to undermine confidence in the outcome. I conclude that defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Since defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel, he did not receive a fair trial. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 691-92, 104 S. Ct. at 2063.) As the United States Supreme Court stated: "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. *** If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.” Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170-71, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64. This is what happened in the present case. I dissent.