Court Opinion

ID: 9611456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:56:53.044963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:15.977481
License: Public Domain

WHITAKER, Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot agree that a litigant in this court is entitled to the full statutory period of six years in addition to the time during which he was denied access to the courts on account of war. I think the same limita-' tion should apply to a person unable to sue because of war as applies to those persons specifically excepted from the six-year limitation by section 262 of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 262 was the predecessor of section 2501 of Title 28 U.S.C., 62 Stat. 976, quoted in the majority opinion. Title 28 was amended to read as quoted in the majority opinion after this cause of action arose and, therefore, I think section 262 of the old Title 28 is applicable, although both sections perhaps mean the same thing.
It is true that prior cases, holding that the statute of limitations is tolled so long as the courts of a country are closed to- a litigant on account of war, have allowed the full statutory period, plus the time during which the courts were closed to the litigant. The leading case is Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 18 L.Ed. 939. The rule established by this case was subsequently approved in Braun v. Sauerwein, 10 Wall. 218, 222, 19 L.Ed. 895. These are the only decisions of the Supreme Court on this question. Neither of them, however, relate to suits in the Court of Claims.
However, in Sierra v. United States, 9 Ct.Cl. 224, 230-231, this court held that the statute was suspended during war, and that after the war was over the litigant had the full statutory period within which to bring suit. This case was cited with approval by this court in a subsequent case, Green v. United States, 17 Ct.Cl. 174. In neither of these cases, however, was consideration given to the fact that the statute of limitations applicable to the Court of Claims made an exception of claims of persons under certain disabilities and allowed only three years after the disability had ceased, instead of the full six, for the assertion of the claim. No consideration was given to- this by either of these two cases. The court merely followed the rule laid down in Hanger v. Abbott, supra, without any discussion as to whether or not this rule applied in the Court *552of Claims, in view of the peculiar wording of the statute applicable to this court.
Section 262 of Title 28 U.S.C. provides that every claim against the United States cognizable by this court .“shall be forever barred” unless the petition is filed within six years, but it makes these exceptions to this rule, to wit, married women, minors, idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas. As to these, it provides that they may file' a petition within three years after the disability has ceased.
Then it says, “but no other disability than those enumerated shall prevent any claim from being barred”.
Now, we say that there is another disability that will prevent a claim from being barred after six years, to wit, the fact that the litigant did not have access to the Court of Claims because of war. In so holding we are in fact doing what the Act prohibits; we are adding another disability that prevents a claim from being barred. I think we are justified in doing so, but if we do so-hold, then it seems to- me we must place the same limitation on a suit by a person under this disability that the statute places on a suit by those under the disabilities it mentions.