Court Opinion

ID: 9572777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:44:33.238867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:16.691411
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (specially concurring). I concur only in the result that summary judgment be reversed. Plaintiff sued defendants for damages as a result of her wrongful discharge from employment. Defendants were granted summary judgment because plaintiff did not avail herself of the grievance or appeal procedures under HELP’s Personnel and Policies Manual. Plaintiff appealed. We reversed. Hernandez v. Home Ed. Livelihood Program, 95 N.M. 281, 620 P.2d 1306 (Ct.App.1980). After remand, defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment. It was based upon the fact that the injuries alleged by plaintiff arose out of an in the course of. employment as contemplated in § 52-1-19, N.M.S.A.1978 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; that pursuant to § 52-1 — 9 and 52-1-6, the exclusive remedy available to plaintiff was the right to compensation. This summary judgment became the cart before the horse. On reversal of Hernandez # 1, the primary issue before the court was whether plaintiff’s discharge complied with HELP’s manual. By reversal of this second appeal, the case is remanded for a hearing to determine whether the procedures of the personnel manual were complied with. This result was reached by exploring the doctrine of employment “at will,” an issue not raised or argued in this appeal. The only issue is whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claim. The trial court granted summary judgment. The order preceding the judgment contained findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court failed to find or conclude that plaintiff suffered an accidental injury. Section 52-l-28(A)(l) reads: Claims for workmen’s compensation shall be allowed only: (1) when the workman has sustained an accidental injury arising out of. and in the course of, his employment. [Emphasis added.] “Accidental injury” or “accident” is an unlooked for mishap, or untoward event which is not expected or designed. Lyon v. Catron County Comm’rs, 81 N.M. 120, 464 P.2d 410 (Ct.App.1969). Plaintiff did not suffer an “accidental injury.” As the court found, “all injuries complained of were the result of the manner in which defendants terminated her employment.” Defendants caused plaintiff’s injuries by a telephone message of discharge. Plaintiff did not herself undertake any activity or conduct that accidentally caused her injuries. Plaintiff did not suffer an accidental injury. Plaintiff was not entitled to workmen’s compensation. Sections 52-1-19 and 52-1-9 relied on by defendants relate to accidental injuries. My disagreement with the majority opinion arises out of the application of § 52-1-9, an exclusive remedy provision set forth in the majority opinion. It relates to: The right to compensation * * * in lieu of any other liability whatsoever * * * for any personal injury accidentally sustained * * * and the injury * * * is proximately caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment * *. This section means that if a workman suffers an accidental injury and other essential factors, he is compelled to seek workmen’s compensation benefits “in place of any liability whatsoever.” His claim is governed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. He can seek no other relief. Plaintiff did not suffer an accidental injury. Nevertheless, the majority opinion focuses on whether plaintiff’s injuries arose out of and within the scope of plaintiff’s employment. This was the issue raised by defendants. It was irrelevant. It is unnecessary to answer irrelevant issues raised in an appeal. Plaintiff’s claim was outside the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claim. Upon reversal, defendants may file a third motion for summary judgment based upon the exclusive provisions of the last paragraph of § 52-1-8. It reads in pertinent part: Any employer who has complied with the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act * * * shall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the * * personal injury to any employee, except as provided in the * * * Act, and all causes of action * * * and all * * * common-law rights and remedies for and on account of such * * * personal injury to, any such employee and accruing to any and all persons whomsoever, are hereby abolished except as provided in the * * * Act. [Emphasis added.] The employer is not liable for “personal injury to any employee” unless the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides a remedy for “personal injury.” No remedy is available if the Act does not provide for one. All common law rights and remedies are abolished. The question is: Does the Workmen’s Compensation Act provide a remedy for “personal injury”? The majority opinion refused to answer this question because it was not an issue in this case. Neither was the issue of employment “at will” which became the basis of reversal. In Count II, plaintiff requested punitive damages. The trial court found “there being absolutely no evidence whatsoever that the resulting injury was intentional * * * Count II of Plaintiff’s complaint should also be dismissed * * [Emphasis by court.] The majority opinion refused to decide the issue of summary judgment as to punitive damages. It reversed the summary judgment “and remanded for reinstatement on the trial court docket.” There being no restrictions, the delay in this case is indeterminable. This delay should be avoided.