Court Opinion

ID: 9966075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-04 06:11:14.978074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:08.485030
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed April 30, 2024

                                      In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                               No. 11-23-00021-CR
                                   __________

                  PAMELA MARIE YBARRA, Appellant
                                         V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                      On Appeal from the 161st District Court
                               Ector County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. B-19-0156-CR

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
       Appellant, Pamela Marie Ybarra, was indicted for the state jail felony offense
of theft. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(4)(D) (West 2019). Although the
value of the stolen property was less than $2,500, the charged offense is a felony
because Appellant had been previously convicted of theft on two or more occasions.
Id. After the jury found Appellant guilty as charged in the indictment, and upon
Appellant’s election, the trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at two years’
confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
and a $1,000 fine.
      Appellant raises a single issue on appeal. She argues that the trial court
erroneously admitted certain statements that she made to law enforcement after her
arrest was effectuated. Specifically, Appellant contends that the trial court erred
when it (1) admitted these statements and (2) failed to initially hold a hearing to
determine the admissibility of these statements in violation of the dictates of
Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.22 (West Supp. 2023). We affirm.
                                      I. Factual Background
      On November 24, 2018, Jeremy Reyes, an asset protection specialist for
Walmart, observed Appellant attempting to leave a Walmart store in Odessa with
merchandise that she had not purchased. Before she was able to leave Walmart,
Reyes apprehended Appellant and escorted her to the store’s loss prevention office.
The unpurchased merchandise was retrieved, and law enforcement was contacted.
      Corporal Tyler Silverthorn of the Odessa Police Department was dispatched
to the Walmart store and after a brief discussion with Appellant, during which
Appellant produced the unpurchased items, he arrested her for theft. Corporal
Silverthorn read the required Miranda1 and statutory warnings to Appellant, and he
thereafter transported her to the Ector County Law Enforcement Center (ECLEC).
During transport, Appellant was seated in the backseat of Corporal Silverthorn’s
patrol unit; a camera in the patrol unit that is equipped with a recording feature was
focused on the backseat where Appellant sat. As such, Appellant’s actions and the
statements that she made during transport were recorded by this device. It is certain
statements that she made, and which were captured by the recording, that are the
focus of her complaint on appeal.
      The State moved to admit the recording at trial. The recording shows that
during her transport to the ECLEC, Appellant initially mentions her prior theft

      1
          Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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convictions and how her past conduct might affect the prosecution of this
offense. After a period of silence, Appellant asks Corporal Silverthorn if she would
be fined. Corporal Siverthorn responded: “I don’t know.” Appellant later states,
spontaneously, “I hate stealing, I really do . . . I wish I was rich so I wouldn’t have
to [steal]” and that she regretted the “bad choices [she] made.” In the midst of
Appellant’s unsolicited banter, Corporal Silverthorn never questioned, provoked, or
engaged Appellant in any manner; he simply drove his patrol unit to the ECLEC.
      Appellant’s trial counsel objected to the admission of the recording and
argued that Rules 401 and 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence precluded its
admission. Before ruling on Appellant’s asserted relevance and undue prejudice
objections, the trial court asked Appellant’s trial counsel if she intended to object to
the admission of the recording pursuant to Article 38.22, to which she responded
“No.” After considering trial counsel’s arguments on this matter, the trial court
overruled Appellant’s relevance and prejudice objections and admitted the
recording. The jury convicted Appellant of the charged offense and this appeal
followed.
                            II. Preservation of Complaint
      A. Standard of Review
      To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present a specific,
timely objection to the trial court that articulates the specific grounds for the ruling
that the complaining party sought from the trial court. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A);
Burg v. State, 592 S.W.3d 444, 448–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Ford v. State, 305
S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 821
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (Campbell, J., concurring)). The rules of preservation
require that the complaint raised on appeal must first have been presented to and
addressed by the trial court. In that regard, the purpose of requiring a specific
objection “provide[s] the trial judge and opposing counsel an opportunity to address
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and, if necessary, correct the purported error.”          Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 533
(citing Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
         For purposes of preservation, an objection asserted at trial on one ground
cannot support a different contention on appeal. Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333,
339–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990); Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). As
such, the complaint and argument raised by Appellant on appeal must comport with
and correspond to the objections that she made to the trial court, or they are waived.
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995); Arevalo v. State, 675 S.W.3d 833, 845 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no
pet.); Dominguez v. State, 474 S.W.3d 688, 699 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no
pet.); Edmondson v. State, 399 S.W.3d 607, 611 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no
pet.).
         Importantly, when the procedures outlined in Article 38.22 are at issue, as in
the case before us, trial counsel must assert specific objections to the particular
statutory provisions that counsel alleges have been violated to preserve such a
complaint for appellate review; a general reference to Article 38.22, without more,
will not suffice. See Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009); Patterson v. State, 496 S.W.3d 919, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, pet. ref’d). “If an issue has not been preserved for appeal, neither the court of
appeals nor [the Court of Criminal Appeals] should address the merits of that issue.”
Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 532.
         B. Analysis
         The issue that we must consider at the outset is whether Appellant preserved
for appellate review the complaint that she now asserts. Appellant argues on appeal
that certain statements that she made in Corporal Silverthorn’s patrol unit during her
transport to the ECLEC, which were recorded, were erroneously admitted by the
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trial court because the necessary statutory requirements for admission were not met.
Appellant further argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it “failed” to
initially hold an Article 38.22 hearing to determine the admissibility of these
statements. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, §§ 3(a)(2), 6 (West Supp. 2023). The State
asserts that Appellant did not preserve these complaints for our review. We agree
with the State.
      As we have said, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must
assert a specific, contemporaneous objection to the challenged evidence at the time
the evidence is offered for admission. Burg, 592 S.W.3d at 448–49; Lane v. State,
151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Compliance with this preservation
requirement is particularly necessary when it is claimed on appeal, as it is here, that
evidence was improperly admitted in violation of Article 38.22. See Resendez, 306
S.W.3d at 313; Roberts v. State, No. 11-20-00013-CR, 2022 WL 120714, at *5–6
(Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the alleged violation of a
specific provision of Article 38.22 must be brought to the trial court’s attention);
Rodriguez v. State, No. 11-14-00340-CR, 2016 WL 7649858, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Dec. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In this
context, and to be considered on appeal, if an alleged violation of Article 38.22 is
raised, Appellant or his trial counsel must have articulated to the trial court the
specific Article 38.22 violation that Appellant now claims occurred.
      Here, and despite the trial court’s rhetorical inquiry and tacit suggestion,
Appellant’s trial counsel declined the trial court’s invitation to assert an
Article 38.22 objection to the admission of the evidence (Appellant’s statements)
that Appellant now challenges on appeal. Moreover, Appellant’s trial counsel did
not request that the trial court conduct a hearing pursuant to Article 38.22 so it could
determine whether the statutory requirements for admissibility had been met. The
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record shows that no Article 38.22 argument was raised or presented to the trial court
at any phase of Appellant’s trial—let alone “with sufficient specificity to make the
trial court aware of [Appellant’s] complaint.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
Rather, the only objections asserted by Appellant to the admission of the
complained-of evidence were based on relevance and undue prejudice under
Rules 401 and 403.
      The complaints that Appellant urges on appeal were not presented to the trial
court for determination. Therefore, because Appellant’s objections at trial do not
comport with or correspond to the complaints that she now advances on appeal, and
because she never invoked the provisions of Article 38.22, Appellant presents
nothing for our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at
312–13; Ordway v. State, No. 11-18-00336-CR, 2020 WL 5552736, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Sept. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Roberts, 2020 WL 120714, at *5–6.
                            III. Admission of Evidence
      Nevertheless, even if we assume that Appellant’s complaints had been
preserved for our review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted the recording or by “failing” to hold an Article 38.22 hearing.
      A. Standard of Review
      We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); Ruiz v.
State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 855 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). This standard
also applies to a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude extraneous-offense
evidence. Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 216–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022);
Arevalo, 675 S.W.3d at 843; Barron v. State, 630 S.W.3d 392, 410 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). The trial court’s decision will be upheld, and there is no
abuse of discretion, as long as it was within the “zone of reasonable disagreement.”
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Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); De La Paz v. State,
279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Further, we will not reverse a
trial court’s evidentiary ruling, even if the trial court’s reasoning is flawed, if it is
correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record and is applicable to the
case. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Dering v. State,
465 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.).
      B. Analysis – Article 38.22
      Article 38.22 governs the admissibility of statements that a defendant makes
during a custodial interrogation. CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22 § 3(a). It is significant that
Article 38.22, Section 3 applies only to oral statements made by a defendant who is
subject to a custodial interrogation. Id. A custodial interrogation setting requires
that (1) the defendant must have been “in custody” at the time the statements are
made, and (2) law enforcement must have “interrogated” the defendant either by
express questioning or its functional equivalent. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 300–02 (1980); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). However, the
provisions of Article 38.22 do not apply if either the “custodial” or “interrogation”
predicates are not met. Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 174–76 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990); Shiflet v. State, 732 S.W.2d 622, 623–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). It is the
defendant’s burden to show that a statement made by her was the product of a
“custodial interrogation” before Article 38.22 may be invoked. Gardner v. State,
306 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520,
526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
      A person is considered to be in “custody” only if a reasonable person would
believe that she has been deprived of her freedom to the degree associated with a
formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). In this case,
Appellant was arrested, handcuffed, and transported to the ECLEC. Therefore, for
purposes of Article 38.22, Section 3, Appellant was in “custody” at the time she
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made the statements of which she complains on appeal. As such, it is the application
of the “interrogation” element that will determine whether Appellant could avail
herself of the protections afforded by Article 38.22, Section 3.
      “Interrogation” for purposes of Article 38.22 refers to express questioning and
any words, actions, or conduct on behalf of law enforcement that they should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant. Innis,
446 U.S. at 300–02; Jones, 795 S.W.2d at 174. However, not all post-arrest
discussions between a defendant and law enforcement can be characterized as an
“interrogation.” Jones, 795 S.W.2d at 174. For example, interviewing a defendant
under certain circumstances may not equate to an “interrogation.” Howes v. Fields,
565 U.S. 499, 512–14 (2012); Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526–28.
      Appellant’s actions and the statements that she made as she was transported
to the ECLEC in Corporal Siverthorn’s patrol unit were recorded. The recording
from Corporal Silverthorn’s patrol unit clearly shows that Appellant’s statements
and admissions were spontaneous and unsolicited. Further, at no time during
Appellant’s transport to the ECLEC did Corporal Silverthorn question, provoke,
intimidate, or coerce Appellant. In fact, Corporal Silverthorn simply drove his patrol
unit to the ECLEC while Appellant randomly volunteered the very statements of
which she now complains on appeal.
      In this instance, Appellant was not interviewed, questioned, or subjected to a
setting whereby the actions and conduct of law enforcement was reasonably likely
to elicit incriminating responses from her. Corporal Silverthorn remained mostly
silent; Appellant did not. Thus, the “one-sided” discussion that occurred during
Appellant’s transport to the ECLEC does not constitute an “interrogation” within the
meaning of Article 38.22, Section 3; therefore, its provisions would not apply.
See Barnes v. State, 665 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.)
(Article 38.22 only applies to a custodial interrogation setting.); Fernandez v. State,
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No. 11-16-00135-CR, 2018 WL 811954, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 31,
2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Article 38.22 does not
apply if there is no “interrogation” by law enforcement.).
      Despite Appellant’s preservation dilemma, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it admitted the recording that included Appellant’s
complained-of statements.
      Finally, and assuming it is necessary to do so, we address Appellant’s
contention that the trial court abused its discretion when it “failed” to hold an
Article 38.22 hearing before it admitted the recording. Pursuant to Section 6 of
Article 38.22, if the issue of voluntariness is raised, the trial court must conduct a
hearing outside the presence of the jury and make an independent finding regarding
the voluntariness of the challenged statement. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 6 (where
a question is raised regarding the voluntariness of an accused’s statement, the trial
court must make an independent finding in a hearing outside the jury’s presence);
see also Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“Because
raising a ‘question’ is what triggers the trial court’s duty under Section 6 to conduct
a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the only reasonable reading of this
language is that a ‘question is raised’ when the trial judge is notified by a party or
raises on his own an issue about the voluntariness of the confession.”).
      Here, a question of voluntariness was not raised; therefore, Appellant was not
entitled to a hearing under Article 38.22. See Copeland v. State, No. 12-16-00333-
CR, 2017 WL 4161547, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (“Because Appellant did not object to the voluntary
nature of the statements at trial, the trial court’s duty to conduct an Article 38.22
hearing and make independent findings was not triggered, and Appellant has not
preserved the issue of voluntariness for appeal.”); Rodriguez v. State, No. 05-11-
01734-CR, 2013 WL 438686, *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 5, 2013, no pet.) (not
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designated for publication) (“[T]o be entitled to a hearing under [A]rticle 38.22, a
defendant must first raise a fact issue as to the voluntariness of the statement. A trial
court is not required to engage in fact finding concerning the voluntariness of oral
statements unless there is some evidence raised to indicate that the statement is not
voluntary.”) (internal citations omitted); cf. Lindley v. State, 635 S.W.2d 541, 544–
45 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (the trial court does not err by failing to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of voluntariness under Section 6
when the issue is never raised). We conclude, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in “failing” to conduct an Article 38.22
hearing on any alleged voluntariness issue that Appellant only now raises on appeal.
      Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
                                   IV. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                W. STACY TROTTER
                                                JUSTICE

April 30, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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