Court Opinion

ID: 9905509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:10:58.777091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.015481
License: Public Domain

J-A19016-23

                                   2023 PA Super 247

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ADAM W. MOFFITT                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3011 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 27, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-46-CR-0006277-2019

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:                             FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2023

       Appellant, Adam Moffitt, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed on June 27, 2022 in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery

County following his convictions of fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, 1

resisting arrest,2 and numerous summary offenses3 arising out of events that

occurred on April 29, 2019. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by

permitting amendment of the information charging him with fleeing and

eluding; that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for resisting

arrest; and that the trial court erred by denying a motion to quash the

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104(a)(2)(iii).

3 Appellant was convicted of 17 summary offenses under the Vehicle Code, 75

Pa.C.S.A. § 101 et seq.
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summary offenses based on the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated

herein, we affirm.

      The trial court summarized evidence adduced at trial as follows:

      On April 29, 2019, at approximately 4:50 p.m., Pennsylvania State
      Trooper Keith Gamber was traveling westbound on Ridge Pike
      approaching Belvoir Road in Plymouth Township, Montgomery
      County when he observed a white GMC Yukon stopped at the
      intersection with windows possessing dark tinting which prevented
      the trooper from seeing inside. Trooper Gamber proceeded to run
      a registration query which indicated that the registration on the
      GMC Yukon was a suspended “dead plate.”              The trooper
      subsequently attempted to initiate a traffic stop on the vehicle
      using his emergency lights and siren, but the GMC Yukon refused
      to stop.

      The vehicle turned right onto Fairfield Road and began to
      accelerate.     The GMC Yukon passed the Riverview Road
      intersection and, in an attempt to pass a vehicle, crossed the
      double yellow lines into the oncoming traffic lane which nearly
      caused a head on collision with another automobile. When the
      GMC Yukon approached the Sandy Hill Road intersection, where
      traffic was stopped at a red signal, the vehicle again crossed into
      the oncoming traffic lane in order to pass the stopped traffic. The
      GMC Yukon also ignored the red light and proceeded through the
      intersection despite the presence of cross traffic driving through
      the intersection on Sandy Hill Road. The vehicle continued on
      Fairfield Road and ignored another red signal at the intersection
      with New Hope Street despite the presence of cross traffic. Upon
      entering the intersection, the GMC Yukon nearly collided with
      another vehicle which was driving on New Hope Street. The GMC
      Yukon subsequently drove over a sidewalk and onto a property
      before it exited onto New Hope Street. The vehicle continued on
      New Hope Street and reached speeds of eighty-two (82) miles per
      hour. The GMC Yukon again crossed into an oncoming traffic lane
      and eventually drove to the back of the Norriswood Apartments
      on Arch Street where the driver parked it on a single lane road
      behind the complex.

      The driver of the GMC Yukon, later identified as [Appellant],
      proceeded to flee from the vehicle but stumbled and dropped an
      item at the foot of the driver’s side door which was later revealed

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       to be a wallet. [Appellant] eventually regained his footing and
       looked back at Trooper Gamber, which allowed the trooper to catch
       a clear glimpse of [Appellant’s] face before [Appellant] fled from
       the scene. Authorities recovered a Pennsylvania identification
       card from the wallet which contained a photograph matching the
       appearance of the individual who Trooper Gamber observed
       fleeing from the GMC Yukon.         The identification card also
       contained [Appellant’s] name and date of birth. Authorities later
       arrested [Appellant] in July of 2019.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/23, at 1-2.

       Following a trial on March 8, 2022, a jury convicted Appellant of fleeing

or attempting to elude an officer as well as resisting arrest. The trial court

found Appellant guilty of the vehicle code summary offenses. On June 27,

2022, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 12 to 24 months in

prison, plus fines for the summary offenses.4 Appellant filed post-sentence

motions, which the trial court denied on October 24, 2022. This timely appeal

followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant asks us to consider three issues:

       I.     Did the trial court err in allowing the Commonwealth to
              amend the bill of information charging fleeing and eluding
              to add language which resulted in an additional element that
              turned a misdemeanor of the second degree to a felony of
              the third degree?

       II.    Was the evidence insufficient to find the Appellant guilty of
              the charge of resisting arrest, since the Appellant was never
              arrested nor was any force used on the Appellant or by the
____________________________________________

4 The court imposed statutory fines for Counts 3 and 4 and for Counts 6
through 19. For Count 5 (driving while operating privilege is suspended or
revoked), the court imposed a sentence of 60 days’ imprisonment, concurrent
with the sentence of imprisonment imposed for Count 1 (fleeing or attempting
to elude an officer).

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              Appellant because the police officer never got within twenty
              feet of the Appellant?

       III.   Did the trial court err in denying the Appellant’s motion to
              quash bill of information counts three through nineteen
              because these charges were summmary (sic) offenses and
              the complaint was not filed for almost three months after
              the incident, well beyond the statute of limitations for
              summary offenses?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

       In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by

permitting an amendment to the bill of information because the amendment

added an element to the bill of information, converting the charge from a

second-degree misdemeanor a third-degree felony. “We review a trial court’s

decision to grant or deny a motion to amend an information for an abuse of

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Sandoval, 266 A.3d 1098, 1101 (Pa. Super.

2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666, 681 (Pa. 1999)).5

       The information as originally filed charged Appellant as follows:

       COUNT 1: FLEEING OR ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE OFFICER
                [75 Pa.C.S.A. 3733A] – Felony 3rd DEGREE

       Did willfully fail or refuse to bring his/her vehicle to a stop, or
       otherwise flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle, when
       given visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.

Information, 12/11/19, at Count 1.

       The statute at issue, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733, provides, in relevant part:
____________________________________________

5 We remind counsel for Appellant that an appellant’s brief is to include a
“[s]tatement of both the scope and the standard of review.” Pa.R.A.P.
2111(a)(3).

                                           -4-
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         § 3733. Fleeing or attempting to elude police officer

     (a) Offense defined.--Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully
     fails or refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise
     flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer, when given a
     visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, commits
     an offense as graded in subsection (a.2).
                  ...

     (a.2) Grading.--

        (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an offense under
        subsection (a) constitutes a misdemeanor of the second
        degree. . . .

        (2) An offense under subsection (a) constitutes a felony of
        the third degree if the driver while fleeing or attempting to
        elude a police officer does any of the following:

             (i) commits a violation of section 3802 (relating to
             driving under influence of alcohol or controlled
             substance);

             (ii) crosses a State line; or

             (iii) endangers a law enforcement officer or
             member of the general public due to the driver
             engaging in a high-speed chase.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733 (emphasis added).

     The original information, consistent with the statute, defined the offense

and designated the grading as a third-degree felony, without specifically

referring to subsection (a.2).      Nevertheless, Appellant contends he was

prejudiced when the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to amend to

information in open court on November 15, 2021. At the time, the prosecutor

explained:

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      In the abundance of caution, we did want to put the additional
      language of subsection (a)[2)(iii)]. So the language will remain
      the same for the statute, but it endangers the law enforcement or
      general public to the driver engaging in [a] high-speed chase.

      We believe defense counsel and defendant have been on notice,
      as it was appropriately charged as a felony of the third degree,
      and the facts lay out the high-speed chase and there is no other
      subsection in play in regards to the fleeing and eluding. I believe
      under Rule 564 we are able to make that amendment.

Notes of Testimony, Hearing, 11/15/21, at 19.

      Appellant’s counsel argued that the facts alleged in the bill of information

“indicated a misdemeanor of the second degree,” and that the proposed

amendment would “actually increase[e] the penalty. It’s a different charge.

It has different elements” beyond the statute of limitations. Id. at 22.

      As the trial court observed, Rule 564 of the Pennsylvania Rules of

Criminal Procedure governs the amendment of a criminal information and

provides that

      [t]he court may allow an information to be amended, provided
      that the information as amended does not charge offenses arising
      from a different set of events and that the amended charges are
      not so materially different from the original charge that the
      defendant would be unfairly prejudiced. Upon amendment, the
      court may grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is
      necessary in the interests of justice.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/23 (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 564.). “[T]he purpose of

Rule 564 is to ensure that a defendant is fully apprised of the charges, and to

avoid prejudice by prohibiting the last minute addition of alleged criminal acts

of which the defendant is uninformed.”       Id. (quoting Commonwealth v.

Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citation omitted)).

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     As this Court has recognized:

     In evaluating challenges to the amendment of criminal
     informations, this Court has set forth the following standard of
     review:

       In Commonwealth v. Mentzer, 18 A.3d 1200 (Pa. Super.
       2011), we set forth our considerations in determining
       whether the trial court erred in permitting the amendment
       of the information.

       When presented with a question concerning the propriety of
       an amendment, we consider:

       whether the crimes specified in the original indictment or
       information involve the same basic elements and evolved
       out of the same factual situation as the crimes specified in
       the amended indictment or information. If so, then the
       defendant is deemed to have been placed on notice
       regarding his alleged criminal conduct. If, however, the
       amended provision alleges a different set of events, or the
       elements or defenses to the amended crime are materially
       different from the elements or defenses to the crime
       originally charged, such that the defendant would be
       prejudiced by the change, then the amendment is not
       permitted. Additionally, in reviewing a grant to amend an
       information, the Court will look to whether the appellant was
       fully apprised of the factual scenario which supports the
       charges against him. Where the crimes specified in the
       original information involved the same basic elements and
       arose out of the same factual situation as the crime added
       by the amendment, the appellant is deemed to have been
       placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal conduct and
       no prejudice to defendant results.

       Further, the factors which the trial court must consider in
       determining whether an amendment is prejudicial are:

       (1) whether the amendment changes the factual scenario
       supporting the charges; (2) whether the amendment adds
       new facts previously unknown to the defendant; (3) whether
       the entire factual scenario was developed during a
       preliminary hearing; (4) whether the description of the
       charges changed with the amendment; (5) whether a

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         change in defense strategy was necessitated by the
         amendment; and (6) whether the timing of the
         Commonwealth’s request for amendment allowed for ample
         notice and preparation.

In re D.G., 114 A.3d 1091, 1094-95 (Pa. Super. 2015) (brackets removed)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Beck, 78 A.3d 656, 660 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citations omitted)).

      The central inquiry, therefore, is whether Appellant was prejudiced by

the trial court’s amendment of the charge brought against him. The trial court

concluded he was not. The original information indicated Appellant was being

charged with a third-degree felony.      As set forth above, under Section

3733(a)(2), there are three scenarios under which fleeing or attempting to

elude constitutes a third-degree felony. There is no suggestion that Appellant

committed a violation under Section 3802 (driving under the influence) or that

he crossed a State line. Therefore, it is clear Appellant’s third-degree felony

charge was based on endangering a law enforcement officer due to engaging

in a high-speed chase under Section 3722(a)(2)(iii). This “element” was not

added when the information was amended. It was included in the original

information.

      The trial court recognized that Appellant “was fully apprised of [the]

charge involving a high speed chase” from the outset of this matter. Trial

Court Opinion, 1/25/23, at 5. The criminal complaint indicated that Appellant

ignored the trooper’s attempt to initiate a traffic stop and that he fled at

speeds approaching 82 miles per hour. Id. The amendment did not change

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that factual scenario. Importantly, “considering the defense in this matter

involved the claim that [Appellant] was not the individual who was driving the

GMC Yukon, the defense strategy was unaffected by the amendment.” Id.

(citing Mentzer, 18 A.3d at 1202-03).

      We find no error in the trial court’s conclusions. Appellant’s first issue

affords him no relief.

      Appellant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction of resisting arrest. By statute,

      [a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with
      the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful
      arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a
      substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone
      else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to
      overcome the resistance.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104 (Resisting arrest of other law enforcement).

      Our standard of review for a sufficiency of evidence claim is as follows:

         Whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
         to the Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable
         inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, there
         is sufficient evidence to find every element of the crime
         beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may
         sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
         beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
         circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above
         test, the entire trial record must be evaluated and all
         evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
         trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
         and the weight to be afforded the evidence produced, is free
         to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

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Commonwealth v. Jackson, 907 A.2d 540, 542 n. 6 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Petaccio, 764 A.2d 582, 585 (Pa. Super.

2000)).

      As Appellant acknowledges:

      It is well settled in this Commonwealth that where the
      circumstances of a suspect’s flight exposes a pursuing officer or
      anyone else to a substantial risk of injury, a conviction for resisting
      arrest is proper. Section 5104 does not require evidence of
      serious bodily injury, nor does it require actual injury. Merely
      exposing another to the risk of such injury is sufficient to sustain
      a conviction under Section 5104.

Appellant’s Brief at 13 (quoting In the Interest of Woodford, 616 A.2d 641,

643-44 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation omitted)).

      Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction

for resisting arrest because “no physical contact took place between the

Appellant and Trooper Gamber.         Moreover, their respective vehicles never

collided or came close to colliding.” Id. at 14. The Commonwealth counters

that “[A]ppellant’s actions, engaging in a high speed vehicle chase to avoid

the efforts of the police in discharging their duties [] placed members of the

public and the police at risk of serious injury while the officers were attempting

to   stop   [A]ppellant   regarding     numerous    Vehicle    Code    violations.”

Commonwealth Brief at 21.

      The trial court determined:

      Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth plainly supports a finding beyond a reasonable
      doubt the [Appellant] committed the offense of resisting arrest.
      Trooper Gamber was discharging his lawful duty when he

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      attempted to initiate a traffic stop on the GMC Yukon due to
      several vehicle code violations.     [Appellant] disregarded the
      trooper’s attempt to stop the GMC Yukon and engaged in a high
      speed chase in his attempt to elude the trooper. During this
      chase, [Appellant] exceeded the posted speed limit by
      approximately sixty (60) miles per hour, crossed into oncoming
      traffic lanes on several occasions and ignored red lights. These
      actions clearly created a substantial risk of bodily injury not only
      to Trooper Gamber, but to every other driver present on these
      roads in addition to any pedestrians.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/23, at 8 (citation omitted).

      We agree with the trial court’s reasoning and conclusion. The evidence

was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction of resisting arrest. Appellant’s

second issue fails.

      In his third and final issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred

when it denied Appellant’s motion to quash Counts 3 through 19 of the bill of

information based on the statute of limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5553(a). Section 5553 of the Judicial Code (Summary offenses involving

vehicle) directs that, except under circumstances not applicable here,

“proceedings for summary offenses under Title 75 (relating to vehicles) must

be commenced within 30 days after the commission of the alleged offense or

within 30 days after the discovery of the commission of the offense or the

identity of the offender, whichever is later, and not thereafter.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5553(a).

      As this Court has recognized, “The decision to grant a motion to quash

a criminal information or indictment is within the sound discretion of the trial

judge and will be reversed on appeal only where there has been a clear abuse

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of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Wyland, 987 A.2d 802, 804 (Pa. Super.

2010) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

      Counts 3 through 19 were strictly summary offenses charged in the

criminal complaint filed on July 18, 2019, 80 days after the April 29, 2019

event giving rise to those charges. As such, the charges were filed well beyond

30-day period prescribed by Section 5553(a) for initiating “proceedings for

summary offenses.” (Emphasis added.) However, because Appellant was

also charged with attempting to flee or elude—a felony—in Count 1, and

resisting arrest—a misdemeanor—in Count 2, we must determine whether the

complaint initiated a “proceeding for summary offenses” subject to Section

5553(a). The trial court concluded it was not. We agree.

      Important to our analysis is a comparison of Chapter 4 (Pa.R.Crim.P.

400 et seq.) and Chapter 5 (Pa.R.Crim.P. 500 et seq.) of our Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Chapter 4 sets forth “Procedures in Summary Cases” while and

Chapter 5 sets forth “Procedures in Court Cases.”

      Prefacing Chapter 4 of the rules is an “Explanatory Comment to Chapter

4,” which indicates, inter alia, that “[u]nless otherwise provided in Chapter 4

or elsewhere in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court case rules [in

Chapter 5] are not intended to apply to summary cases.”           Explanatory

Comment to Chapter 4.

      Rule 400 itself sets forth the means of instituting proceedings in

summary cases. The comment to Rule 400 directs that

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      [i]f one or more of the offenses charged is a misdemeanor, felony,
      or murder, the case is a court case (see Rule 103) and proceeds
      under Chapter 5 of the rules. Ordinarily, any summary offenses
      in such a case, if known at the time, must be charged in the same
      complaint as the higher offenses and must be disposed of as part
      of the court case.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 400 (Means of Instituting Proceedings in Summary Cases),

Comment.

      Further, “[w]henever a misdemeanor, felony, or murder is charged,

even if the summary offense is also charged in the same complaint, the case

should proceed as a court case under Chapter 5.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 502, Comment

(citations omitted).   Again, Chapter 5 prescribes the procedures for court

cases.

      As reflected above, the comments to both Rules 400 and 502 instruct

that if a summary offense is charged in addition to a misdemeanor or felony,

the crimes are to be charged in the same complaint and must be disposed of

as part of the court case. That, in fact, is what occurred here. Therefore, the

trial court concluded that because this case did not involve “proceedings in [a]

summary case[],” Section 5553(a)’s statute of limitations did not apply. The

court explained that the “summary offenses were part and parcel of the

misdemeanor offense which constituted [a ‘court case’ under Pa.R.Crim.P.

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1036] and had to be charged within the same complaint so that the entire

matter could proceed as a court case.”             Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/23, at 9

(citing Commonwealth v. Kline, 592 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. 1991) and

Commonwealth v. Moran, 675 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Super. 1996)).

       Appellant     relies   on    the    1992     decision   from   this   Court   in

Commonwealth v. Vergotz, 616 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Super. 1992), in support of

his assertion that his summary offenses were barred by the Section 5553(a)’s

provision relating to the statute of limitations in summary cases.

       In Vergotz, a state trooper received information that Vergotz was

selling illegal inspection stickers. Armed with a search warrant, on December

15, 1989, the trooper searched Vergotz’s place of business and removed 33

inspection stickers from vehicles that were listed for sale.             The trooper

continued his investigation before preparing a criminal complaint, which was

filed on February 2, 1990, charging Vergotz with the 33 summary counts under

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4730(a)(2), relating to the certificates of inspection, along with

____________________________________________

6 Rule 103 defines a “court case” as one in which “one or more of the offenses

charged is a misdemeanor, felony, or murder[.]” Rule 103 further defines a
“summary case” as one in which “the only offense or offenses charged are
summary offenses.” (Emphasis added.) Again, the comment to Pa.R.Crim.P.
400 provides that “[o]dinarily, any summary offenses [in a court case], if
known at the time, must be charged in the same complaint as the higher
offenses and must be disposed of as part of the court case.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
400, Comment.

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one misdemeanor count of deceptive business practices under 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 4107(a)(4).

      Vergotz filed a motion to quash the complaint. The trial court denied

the motion but this Court reversed, stating:

      In the instant case, the offense was committed prior to [the
      trooper’s] discovery of the offense and the identity of Appellant.
      Therefore, the time period for commencing charges against
      Appellant would have begun to run when it was discovered that
      an offense had been committed or that Appellant was the person
      who committed the offense. . . . [O]nce the stickers which were
      in Appellant’s possession had been confiscated, sufficient evidence
      existed to support, with reasonable certainty, that Appellant had
      committed the summary offense of Violations of Use of Certificate
      of Inspection[]. Because this violation is a summary offense, the
      thirty day time period set forth in [Section] 5533(a) is applicable.
      See Commonwealth v. Matthews, [429 A.2d 37 (Pa. Super.
      1981)]. The charges in the instant case were not filed until [more
      than 30 days] after the discovery that Appellant had committed
      the offense; therefore, we must reverse the trial court’s finding of
      guilt in regard to the summary offenses with which Appellant was
      charged.

Vergotz, 616 A.2d at 1383-84 (citations omitted).

      We find the narrow holding in Vergotz inapplicable to the instant case.

Initially we note that the Matthews case cited in Vergotz involved summary

offenses only. Therefore, the Court in Matthews did not consider whether

the summary offense statute of limitations applied to a case in which the

defendant was charged with a misdemeanor or felony in addition to the

summary offenses. Nor did the Court in Vergotz address that distinction.

Also importantly, the Court in Vergotz did not consider the fact that charging

the defendant with a misdemeanor resulted in the matter being a court case,

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not a summary case, and that Rules 400 and 502 require that if a summary

offense is charged in addition to a misdemeanor or felony, the crimes are to

be charged in the same complaint and must be disposed of as part of the court

case.

        Requiring that summary charges be filed within 30 days when the events

also give rise to misdemeanor or felony charges would mean that authorities

would have to initiate a separate summary case within 30 days even if the

investigation into a misdemeanor or felony arising from the same events was

not yet complete. Under that scenario, the defendant could simply plead guilty

to the summary offenses and then rely on double jeopardy principles to avoid

prosecution for the more serious offenses. In fact, that is the lesson from this

Court’s ruling in Kline, supra.

        In Kline, the appellant was arrested after an officer observed that the

vehicle she was driving was weaving across both lanes of the roadway. Upon

stopping the vehicle, he detected the odor of alcohol on Kline’s breath. She

refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. Prior to releasing Kline, the trooper

issued a citation charging her with a summary offense for failing to drive on

the right side of the highway.

        Five days later, a criminal complaint was filed, charging Kline with

driving under the influence (“DUI”).     Prior to receiving notice of the DUI

charge, Kline pled guilty to the summary offense by signing and mailing the

citation. Because no blood alcohol test had been conducted, the only evidence

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to support Kline’s conviction for DUI, and in particular, her inability to safely

operate a vehicle, was her failure to drive on the right side of the highway.

She argued that permitting the Commonwealth to prove that conduct, for

which she already pled guilty, would violate her constitutional guarantee

against double jeopardy. The trial court agreed, and this Court affirmed, citing

double jeopardy principles. However, we noted:

      [O]ur rules of procedure provide the Commonwealth with an
      expeditious avenue by which to avoid the double jeopardy bar
      encountered in the instant case. The rules contemplate that
      all charges, summary and greater criminal charges alike,
      will be brought together in a single proceeding. In light of
      today’s result it would appear unwise for citations to issue
      separately from criminal complaints arising from the same
      incident.

Kline, 592 A.2d at 734-35 (emphasis added).         Again, Rules 400 and 502

instruct that those “summary and greater criminal charges . . . be brought

together in a single proceeding,” i.e., a court case, which is not subject to

Section 5553(a)’s time constraints.

      This Court in Vergotz did not consider Kline, nor did it consider whether

the summary charges were part of a court case. Importantly, another case

relevant to our inquiry, i.e., Moran, supra, was decided after Vergotz.

      In Moran, the appellant was involved in a two-car collision. Both Moran

and an occupant of the other vehicle were hospitalized for an extended period

of time and blood tests as well as results of tests of the marijuana confiscated

from Moran were not received before expiration of the 30-day period for filing

summary charges.     Therefore, “[i]t was impossible for the Commonwealth to

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have filed the court charges in its complaint prior to its receipt of the test

results or within the thirty day period” and Moran’s attempt to have his

summary charges dismissed was unsuccessful.         Moran, 675 A.2d at 1272

(quoting Moran Trial Court Opinion, 9/1/93, at 2).

      On appeal, we agreed with the trial court, explaining that “[t]he

summary offenses sought to be dismissed were part and parcel of the criminal

misdemeanor complaint charging [Moran] with DUI, and as such, shall be

charged in the same complaint as the higher offense[] and shall be disposed

of as part of the court case. If such did not occur, we would be confronted

with a double jeopardy issue.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

      In a footnote to its opinion in the instant case, the trial court addressed

Vergotz. Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/23, at 10 n.4. The court observed:

      Despite being decided following the Superior Court’s holding in
      Kline, supra, the Court in Vergotz did not cite to Kline nor
      attempt to conduct any analysis involving the interplay between
      summary and court cases. Although this case does not appear to
      have been overturned to date, this court could not find any
      instance of Vergotz being relied upon by the Superior Court in
      reaching a determination that the statute of limitations set forth
      under Section 5553 still applies where summary charges are
      included within a court case. To the contrary, all of the case law
      found by this court indicated that summary offenses which are
      part and parcel of any criminal misdemeanor for felony counts
      must be charged in the same complaint as the higher offense
      thereby nullifying the application of the Section 5553 statute of
      limitations.

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Id. (citing, inter alia, Moran, supra).7

         As reflected above, the decision to grant a motion to quash a criminal

information or indictment is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and

will be reversed on appeal only where there has been a clear abuse of

discretion.”    Commonwealth v. Wyland, 987 A.2d 802, 804 (Pa. Super.

2010) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

         We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for denying

Appellant’s motion to quash the summary charges filed as part of the court

case that included a misdemeanor and a felony charge. Appellant’s third issue

fails.

         Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/29/2023

____________________________________________

7 Citing Moran, the trial court also noted that Appellant had failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay in initiating prosecution
beyond Section 5553(a)’s 30-day time limit. Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/23, at
8-9. However, we decide this case based on the fact the summary offenses
were part of a court case rather than a summary case, rendering Section
5553(a) inapplicable. Therefore, the determination of prejudice required
when dismissing a summary case for failure to comply with summary case
rules, see Explanatory Comment to Chapter 4, does not come into play.

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