Court Opinion

ID: 9367671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 16:03:50.246308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.194188
License: Public Domain

NOTICE               2023 IL App (4th) 220368-U
 This Order was filed under
                                                                                      FILED
                                         NO. 4-22-0368                           January 31, 2023
 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
                                                                                   Carla Bender
 not precedent except in the
                                 IN THE APPELLATE COURT                        4th District Appellate
 limited circumstances allowed
                                                                                     Court, IL
 under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                          OF ILLINOIS

                                      FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                        )      Appeal from the
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                              )      Circuit Court of
           v.                                               )      Lee County
                                                                   No. 20CF202
ERIC McGHEE,                                                )
           Defendant-Appellant.                             )
                                                            )      Honorable
                                                            )      Jacquelyn D. Ackert,
                                                            )      Judge Presiding.

                JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justices Cavanagh and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER
¶1     Held: The appellate court affirmed in part and remanded with directions, concluding
             (1) the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of official misconduct and
             (2) defendant’s convictions for aggravated battery and official misconduct
             violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine.

¶2              Defendant, Eric McGhee, appeals from his convictions for aggravated battery

(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2020)) and official misconduct (720 ILCS 5/33-3(a)(2) (West

2020)) following a bench trial. On appeal, defendant argues (1) the State failed to prove him

guilty of official misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) alternatively, his convictions

violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine. The State argues the evidence was sufficient to convict

defendant of official misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt and his convictions do not violate

the one-act, one-crime doctrine. We conclude (1) the State’s evidence was sufficient to convict
defendant of official misconduct and (2) defendant’s convictions violate the one-act, one-crime

doctrine. We affirm in part and remand to the trial court with directions that it determine which

of defendant’s convictions to vacate as the less serious offense.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4                                   A. Defendant’s Charges

¶5             In August 2020, the State charged defendant by information with one count of

aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2020)) (count I), one count of

official misconduct, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/33-3(a)(2) (West 2020)) (count II), and one

count of abuse of a long-term health care facility resident, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS

12-4.4a(a)(2) (West 2020)) (count III). Count I alleged defendant committed aggravated battery

in that he, “in committing a battery ***, and while L.M. (07/22/1966) was at the Jack Mabley

Developmental Center [Jack Mabley], a public property, did knowingly cause physical contact of

an insulting or provoking nature, in that said defendant picked up L.M. from a wheelchair and

threw L.M. onto a toilet.” Count II alleged defendant committed official misconduct in that

“defendant, a public employee, a Mental Health Technician at [Jack Mabley] , an Illinois

Department of Human Services facility, while acting in his official capacity, knowingly

performed an act which he knew was forbidden by law to perform, in that he committed the

offense of Battery ***, by picking up L.M. (07/22/1966) from a wheelchair and throwing L.M.

onto a toilet, causing insulting or provoking contact.” In March 2021, the State filed a motion to

voluntarily dismiss count III, which the trial court allowed.

¶6                                        B. Bench Trial

¶7             After waiving his right to a jury trial, on March 21, 2022, defendant proceeded to

a bench trial on counts I and II. The relevant evidence adduced at trial follows.

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¶8                                   1. State’s Case-in-Chief

¶9                                  a. Jacquelynn Washington

¶ 10           Jacquelynn Washington testified she was employed as a certified nursing assistant

(CNA) with the staffing agency Maxim Healthcare (Maxim). On June 9, 2020, Maxim had

assigned Washington to work as a “home health aide,” which was “basically CNA work,” at a

facility in Dixon, Illinois (later identified as Jack Mabley). The facility was comprised of various

residential buildings, which housed developmentally disabled persons. On that evening,

Washington was to work from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. and was assigned to a residence which housed

women. Washington had worked at that residence on several other occasions and testified it

contained around 7 to 10 bedrooms and housed between seven or eight residents at the time.

¶ 11           Washington testified L.M. was a resident at this facility. Washington identified a

photograph of L.M. and agreed it adequately depicted the way L.M. looked on June 9, 2020, with

the exception that when Washington met her, she “was in a recliner, and she had on a boot.”

L.M.’s boot was a type commonly used for medical purposes. When asked to describe L.M.,

Washington stated, “She was confused. She did not say much. She slept a lot. She was a

two-person assist. She needed help eating and for evening snack.” Washington clarified that a

“[t]wo-person assist means you need two CNAs to assist the persons, as far as mobility-wise, to

the washroom, to the bed.” Washington testified defendant, whom she had not met before June 9,

2020, was also working at the facility that night. Defendant was a “regular staff member” of the

facility who was specifically assigned to L.M. as an “assistant or CNA.”

¶ 12           That evening, defendant asked Washington to assist him in taking L.M. to the

bathroom and putting her to bed. L.M. was in a wheelchair, and defendant and Washington

brought her into the bathroom. Washington testified, “I remember him taking—[defendant]

                                                -3-
taking [L.M.]’s shirt off. I remember him taking her boot off, [and] throwing it towards the

wall.” After removing the rest of her clothing, defendant then “pick[ed] [L.M.] up by the arms

and kind of thr[ew] her on the toilet.” Washington explained, “[I]t wasn’t like a stand, pivot,

which as a CNA we learn. It was like, a stand, pivot, throw because there’s a bar right there, and

she kind of hit the bar, and he kind of fixed her to sit on the toilet.”

¶ 13            After L.M. was seated on the toilet, defendant then began to “spray her with the

shower hose,” which Washington had never seen before. Washington testified, “As he was

showering her he began to say derogatory things towards her. Basically said, [‘]No man will ever

want you with your stuff smelling like that,[’] and he’s spraying her and kind of laughing.”

When defendant allegedly said this, he was showering her vaginal area. While defendant

continued to shower L.M., Washington briefly left to get towels. Washington and defendant

dressed L.M. and returned her to her wheelchair.

¶ 14            Afterwards, Washington went to the facility’s main office to report what she

observed to the supervisor. Washington worked at the facility one other time, after which the

facility ceased working with Maxim.

¶ 15                                   b. Sergeant Kyle Bocka

¶ 16            Sergeant Kyle Bocka of the Illinois State Police also testified for the State.

Sergeant Bocka testified his job was to investigate state employees in the executive branch who

are accused of committing crimes on state time. According to Sergeant Bocka, Jack Mabley is

an assisted living facility in Dixon, Illinois, and houses people with physical and mental

disabilities. The facility is owned by the State of Illinois under the purview of the Illinois

Department of Human Services (DHS) and staffed by both state employees and contractors.

                                                  -4-
¶ 17           In Sergeant Bocka’s role, he investigated defendant in connection with the events

in this case. Sergeant Bocka interviewed defendant at the Dixon police station and informed him

he was accused of abuse. Defendant did not recall having any negative interactions with

Washington and could not provide a reason why she might make allegations against defendant if

they were untrue. Defendant’s version of events was mostly consistent with Washington’s, with

the exception of his “throwing or hip tossing [L.M.] onto the toilet or onto the bed,” which

defendant denied.

¶ 18           The State rested, and defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court

denied the motion, and defendant proceeded with his evidence.

¶ 19                                       2. Defendant

¶ 20           Defendant testified on his own behalf. On June 9, 2020, defendant was employed

at Jack Mabley as a mental health technician I. He had worked there since approximately

October 2019. In his role, he “provide[d] direct care for individuals such as toileting, showers

and feeding and bathing and things of *** that sort.” He had provided care to L.M. once before

June 9 and knew she was a “two-person assist.”

¶ 21           That night, defendant requested Washington’s assistance with taking L.M. to the

bathroom to shower. According to defendant, it took Washington “about five minutes to

respond,” and “it appeared that she had an attitude because she didn’t want to assist *** with

putting [L.M.] in the [wheel]chair.” Washington was “sitting there playing on her phone.” L.M.

needed to use a wheelchair because “she had a boot on” and was not able to walk on her own.

After entering the bathroom, defendant recalled removing L.M.’s clothes and boot but did not

recall throwing the boot. Defendant and Washington performed a two-person assist, which

involved lifting her from her underarms and pivoting to place her on the toilet. Defendant then

                                               -5-
lathered and showered L.M. but denied making any comments to her about smelling or regarding

her vaginal area. Defendant also denied “throwing” L.M. from the wheelchair onto the toilet seat.

According to defendant, he had been trained to bathe “large” residents on the toilet rather than in

the shower.

¶ 22           On cross-examination, defendant agreed he was a state employee and Jack

Mabley was under the purview of DHS. When asked why Washington might have reason to

“make up” allegations against defendant, defendant responded that Washington “didn’t want to

help” him because she had been chatting with her colleagues and playing on her phone.

¶ 23                              3. Verdict and Posttrial Motion

¶ 24           Following arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of both aggravated

battery and official misconduct as alleged in counts I and II of the information. Specifically, the

trial court found Washington’s testimony to be credible and that defendant’s “[t]hrowing” L.M.

onto the toilet was “insulting or provoking in this instance.”

¶ 25           On December 2, 2021, defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal

notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, among other things, the State failed to prove defendant

guilty of aggravated battery and official misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Following a

March 21, 2022, hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. Defendant was sentenced to

30 months’ probation on both counts and 90 days in the county jail, which was stayed subject to

diminution. Defendant was further ordered not to have contact with L.M. or work in any capacity

with vulnerable persons with developmental disabilities.

¶ 26           On May 3, 2022, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal,

which this court granted. On May 6, 2022, defendant filed a late notice of appeal in sufficient

                                                -6-
compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Thus, we have

jurisdiction of defendant’s appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 3, 2013).

¶ 27           This appeal followed.

¶ 28                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 29           On appeal, defendant argues the State failed to prove him guilty of official

misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt and his conviction should be vacated. Alternatively,

defendant argues his convictions for both official misconduct and aggravated battery violate the

one-act, one-crime doctrine. In the event this court agrees with his alternative argument,

defendant contends this court should remand the case for the trial court to vacate whichever of

defendant’s convictions it determines is the less serious offense. The State argues the evidence

was sufficient to convict defendant of official misconduct and his convictions do not violate the

one-act, one-crime doctrine. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of

official misconduct but find his convictions violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine.

¶ 30                              A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 31           We first address defendant’s argument the evidence was insufficient to convict

him of official misconduct because the State failed to prove he acted within his “official

capacity” beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues it proved defendant acted within his

official capacity and therefore his conviction should be affirmed. We agree with the State.

¶ 32           Our supreme court has set forth the following standard of review for insufficiency

of the evidence claims:

               “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing

               court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

               the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the required elements beyond

                                               -7-
                a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] [I]t is not the function of this court to retry the

                defendant. [Citation.] All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn

                in favor of the prosecution. [I]n weighing evidence, the trier of fact is not required

                to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence before it, nor need

                it search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to

                a level of reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We will not reverse the trial court’s

                judgment unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as

                to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. [Citation.]” (Internal

                quotation marks omitted.) People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 24, 120 N.E.3d

                948.

¶ 33            Under section 33-3(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720

ILCS 5/33-3(a)(2) (West 2020)), “[a] public officer or employee or special government agent

commits misconduct when, in his official capacity or capacity as a special government agent, he

or she *** [k]nowingly performs an act which he knows he is forbidden by law to perform.”

¶ 34            In this case, defendant concedes he committed aggravated battery but argues the

State failed to prove the element that he used his position, i.e., acted in his “official capacity,” to

further the commission of that crime. “[A]n act is performed in one’s official capacity if it is

accomplished by exploitation of his position as a public officer or employee.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) People v. Selby, 298 Ill. App. 3d 605, 615, 698 N.E.2d 1102, 1109 (1998). The

First District has explained this element as follows:

                “[T]he key to proving a conviction for official misconduct is that the alleged

                perpetrator actively used his or her position or official status to ‘[k]nowingly

                perform an act which he knows he is forbidden by law to perform.’ [Citation.] In

                                                  -8-
               other words, it’s not enough that a defendant commits a crime when acting in an

               official capacity; he must also use the very fact of his authority or position to

               further the commission of that crime.” People v. Brogan, 352 Ill. App. 3d 477,

               491-92, 816 N.E.2d 643, 655-66 (2004).

¶ 35           Here, the evidence supports a finding defendant used his position as a mental

health technician to further the commission of the aggravated battery against L.M. Defendant

contends he did not use his position to gain special access to L.M., but rather merely “committed

a battery while on duty as a state employee.” On the contrary, defendant only had access to L.M.

by virtue of his employment as a mental health technician at a facility operated by DHS.

Washington specifically testified that contract workers such as herself were not permitted

one-on-one access with the “more developmentally challenged persons” such as L.M. But for

defendant’s state employment, he would not have had occasion to commit the aggravated

battery. Defendant himself testified his duties as a mental health technician included bathing and

toileting residents. As alleged in the information, the act which constituted the aggravated battery

in this case was that defendant “picked up L.M. from a wheelchair and threw L.M. onto a toilet.”

Defendant directly used his job responsibility of toileting L.M. as a means to commit the act of

throwing her from the wheelchair onto the toilet. We conclude defendant’s status as a public

employee was integral to the offense of aggravated battery in this case, and the State therefore

proved he acted in his official capacity beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 36                            B. One-Act, One-Crime Doctrine

¶ 37           Alternatively, defendant argues his convictions for both aggravated battery and

official misconduct violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine. Defendant further argues this court

should remand to the trial court with directions to vacate whichever of his two convictions it

                                                -9-
deems is the lesser offense. Defendant acknowledges he forfeited this issue by failing to raise it

at trial or in a posttrial motion. Defendant nonetheless argues we should review the issue for

plain error. The State argues no plain error occurred because defendant’s convictions do not

violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine. We agree with defendant.

¶ 38                                       1. Plain Error

¶ 39           The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error

under the following two scenarios:

               “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that

               the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,

               regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred

               and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and

               challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the

               evidence.” People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189, 940 N.E.2d 1045, 1058 (2010).

¶ 40           The first step in conducting a plain-error analysis is to determine whether any

error occurred at all. People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 25. If error occurred,

the court then considers whether the defendant has satisfied his persuasive burden under either of

the two prongs. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 25. “If the defendant fails to meet

his or her burden of persuasion, the reviewing court applies the procedural default.”

Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 25.

               “An alleged one-act, one-crime violation is reviewable under the second prong of

               the plain-error doctrine because it affects the integrity of the judicial process.

               [Citation.] Although the one-act, one-crime rule is not of constitutional

               dimension, its purpose is to prevent the prejudicial effect that could result in those

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               instances where more than one offense is carved from the same physical act.”

               (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Wiley, 2022 IL App (4th) 210283,

               ¶ 52.

¶ 41                               2. Whether Error Occurred

¶ 42           As stated above, we must first determine whether error occurred—i.e., whether

defendant’s convictions violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine.

¶ 43           “The one-act, one-crime rule prohibits convictions for multiple offenses that are

based on precisely the same physical act.” People v. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 13, 155 N.E.3d

396. “The first step in this analysis requires us to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was

a single physical act or multiple acts.” People v. Kotero, 2012 IL App (1st) 100951, ¶ 20, 978

N.E.2d 315. For the purpose of the one-act, one-crime rule, our supreme court has defined an

“act” as “any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.” People v.

King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45 (1977). “[I]f a defendant commits multiple

acts, then multiple convictions may stand, provided that none of the offenses are lesser-included

offenses.” Kotero, 2012 IL App (1st) 100951, ¶ 19. We review an alleged violation of the

one-act, one-crime rule de novo. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 15.

¶ 44           In determining whether defendant’s conduct was a single physical act or multiple

acts, we find the First District’s decisions in Kotero, 2012 IL App (1st) 100951, and People v.

Moshier, 312 Ill. App. 3d 879, 728 N.E.2d 822 (2000), to be instructive.

¶ 45           In Moshier, the defendant, who was a township supervisor, was charged with theft

and official misconduct after stealing $100,000 from his municipal employer. Moshier, 312 Ill.

App. 3d at 881. Upon his conviction for both offenses, the defendant sought vacatur of his

official misconduct conviction based upon the one-act, one-crime doctrine. Moshier, 312 Ill.

                                              - 11 -
App. 3d at 880. The First District agreed, concluding that because both counts of the indictment

were based on the same act (i.e., “converting ‘certain checks and money *** having a total value

in excess of $100,000’ ”), defendant was entitled to vacatur of his official misconduct

conviction. Moshier, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 882.

¶ 46           Similarly, in Kotero, 2012 IL App (1st) 100951, ¶ 3, the defendant, a village

parking enforcement officer, was charged with five counts of theft and official misconduct after

he “allegedly told several people whose vehicles had been booted that if they paid him a certain

amount of money in cash, then he would arrange to have the boot removed from their cars.” The

defendant was found guilty of all counts and appealed, arguing his convictions for both theft and

official misconduct violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine. Kotero, 2012 IL App (1st)

100951, ¶ 1. The First District again agreed with the defendant. Kotero, 2012 IL App (1st)

100951, ¶ 26. In concluding the defendant’s convictions violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine,

the First District specifically looked to the charging instruments, noting, “[t]he official

misconduct and aggregated theft charges were based on the same physical act, which was

stealing money over a two-month period that belonged to the Village.” Kotero, 2012 IL App

(1st) 100951, ¶¶ 22-26.

¶ 47           Like the Moshier and Kotero courts, we look to the charging instruments to

determine whether defendant’s aggravated battery and official misconduct convictions were

based on the same “act.”

¶ 48           As charged in this case, aggravated battery under section 12-3.05(c) of the

Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2020)) occurs when a person, “in committing a

battery, other than by the discharge of a firearm, he or she is or the person battered is on or about

a *** public property.” In the information, the State alleged defendant committed this offense in

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that he, “in committing a battery in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2), and while L.M.

(07/22/1966) was at [Jack Mabley], a public property, did knowingly cause physical contact of

an insulting or provoking nature, in that said defendant picked up L.M. from a wheelchair and

threw L.M. onto a toilet.”

¶ 49           As stated supra, official misconduct under section 33-3(a)(2) of the Criminal

Code occurs when a public employee, “in his official capacity ***, [k]nowingly performs an act

which he knows he is forbidden by law to perform.” 720 ILCS 5/33-3(a)(2) (West 2020). When

charging official misconduct under this section, the State is required to specify in the charging

instrument the law allegedly violated by the public employee. See Kotero, 2012 IL App (1st)

100951 (stating the same under a prior version of the official misconduct statute); see also

People v. Williams, 239 Ill. 2d 119, 127-28, 940 N.E.2d 50, 56 (2010) (“We have since repeated

that conclusion, holding an indictment charging official misconduct must, at a minimum, allege

facts that would show defendant violated an identifiable statute, rule, regulation, or tenet of a

professional code.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

¶ 50           As charged in this case, the State alleged defendant committed official

misconduct in that he, “a public employee, a Mental Health Technician at [Jack Mabley], an

Illinois Department of Human Services facility, while acting in his official capacity, knowingly

performed an act which he knew was forbidden by law to perform, in that he committed the

offense of Battery in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2), by picking up L.M. (07/22/1966) from

a wheelchair and throwing L.M. onto a toilet, causing insulting or provoking contact.”

¶ 51           Here, we conclude defendant’s convictions for both aggravated battery and

official misconduct cannot stand because they are both based solely on the same act of picking

up L.M. from a wheelchair and throwing her onto a toilet, causing insulting or provoking

                                                - 13 -
contact. Although the State argues defendant’s conduct “consisted of multiple acts” because he

threw L.M. twice, removed her clothes roughly, and “sprayed L.M.’s genitals with the

showerhead while laughing and making derogatory comments about her,” these additional acts

were not charged in the information.

¶ 52           The State further argues that even if we focus solely on the charging instruments,

“defendant’s conduct still consisted of multiple acts,” because he (1) picked L.M. up and

(2) threw her onto the toilet. We agree with defendant this argument fails under our supreme

court’s decision in People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 343, 788 N.E.2d 1117, 1122 (2001). There,

the supreme court held that a single attack in which three stab wounds were inflicted could not

support convictions for both armed violence and aggravated battery where the State did not argue

at trial that each stab wound supported a separate offense, but rather portrayed the defendant’s

conduct as a single attack. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 344-45. Here, similarly, the State treated

defendant’s conduct of (1) picking L.M. up from her wheelchair and (2) throwing her onto the

toilet as “a single attack” and made no attempt to apportion each action as a different crime in

charging defendant. Because the State chose to charge both counts based on the same “single

attack,” we conclude multiple convictions are improper.

¶ 53           In concluding defendant’s convictions violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine, we

find second-prong plain error occurred. See Wiley, 2022 IL App (4th) 210283, ¶ 52.

¶ 54           To remedy a violation of the one-act, one-crime doctrine, “sentence should be

imposed on the more serious offense and the less serious offense should be vacated.” People v.

Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 170, 902 N.E.2d 677, 686 (2009). “In determining which offense is the

more serious, a reviewing court compares the relative punishments prescribed by the legislature

for each offense.” Artis, 232 Ill. 2d at 170. “However, in situations where the degree of the

                                               - 14 -
offenses and their sentencing classifications are identical, [the supreme] court has also

considered which of the convictions has the more culpable mental state.” Artis, 232 Ill. 2d at

170-71. “[W]hen it cannot be determined which of two or more convictions based on a single

physical act is the more serious offense, the cause will be remanded to the trial court for that

determination.” Artis, 232 Ill. 2d at 177.

¶ 55           In this case, it cannot be determined which of defendant’s two challenged

convictions is the more serious offense. Both offenses are Class 3 felonies subjecting defendant

to the same range of penalties. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(h) (West 2020) (classifying aggravated

battery as a Class 3 felony); see also 720 ILCS 33-3(c) (West 2020) (classifying official

misconduct as a Class 3 felony). Additionally, both offenses required defendant to act

“knowingly,” and thus required the same mental state. Under these circumstances, we remand

the matter to the trial court for a determination of which offense should be vacated under the

one-act, one-crime rule. See Artis, 232 Ill. 2d at 177.

¶ 56                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 57           For the reasons stated, we remand to the trial court with directions that it

determine which of defendant’s two convictions to vacate as the less serious offense pursuant to

the one-act, one-crime rule. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 58           Affirmed in part; cause remanded with directions.

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