Court Opinion

ID: 9767757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:25:45.647367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:30.972229
License: Public Domain

*375GRANT, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on proximate cause. Cause in fact was established by sufficient circumstantial evidence and sufficient expert testimony, and foreseeability was not in issue. The majority opinion failed to apply the proper standards in three respects: (1) the proper standard concerning inferences, (2) the proper standard concerning expert witnesses, and (3) the proper standard in considering all of the evidence.
THE PROPER STANDARD CONCERNING INFERENCES
When there are possible conflicting inferences and conclusions, it is the function of the jury to make a choice, and whether the reviewing court agrees with that choice is not the proper test. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Orr, 319 F.2d 612 (5th Cir.1963). When an inference of the nonexistence of a fact is just as reasonable as an inference of the existence of a fact and there is no direct evidence on the issue, the question may not be resolved by the jury in favor of the party having the burden of proof that the fact exists. Cambridge Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Shoemake, 403 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1966, no writ). In the present case, however, there was direct evidence on the issue from three experts who testified as to cause in fact, and the nonexistence of the facts was not just as reasonable as the inference from the circumstantial evidence of the existence of the facts.
Under the subject of circumstantial evidence in books of legal quotations, the quotation that often appears is this one from the early American writer Henry David Thoreau: “Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the milk.” The first reaction to this statement by people in our time would probably be, “What was Thoreau talking about?” But this is no’: a nonsensical proposition. If we had lived in Thoreau’s time when there were no health department regulations and consumer protection agencies to oversee the contents of milk and when it was a common practice by milk suppliers to increase the volume of the milk by adding water, we would have well understood that a trout in our milk would strongly suggest that our milk supplier had added water from a nearby stream. Inferences are not made in a vacuum but are formulated on the basis of human knowledge and experience.
In our time, when a dependable convenience store clerk is missing in the wee hours of the morning, when there is cash missing from the store, which has been left unattended, and when the clerk’s mutilated body is later found, this is strong circumstantial evidence. In our time, can we say it would be illogical for a jury to draw an inference from these circumstances that a robbery, abduction, and murder had occurred? Clear reasoning says we cannot; the majority opinion says that we can and must.
In the majority opinion, the court finds that there is insufficient evidence of cause in fact because “no one knew who or what caused the death” of Diana Havner, or whether or not she was abducted. It is tragically true that no one has been convicted of her murder, but the name, age, and identity of the perpetrator is not necessary to establish the proof in the case. The absence of this information does not mean there is a great mystery as to what occurred on the night in question. When presented with the circumstances, except for a few people who believe everything is caused by aliens from outer space and except for the two justices favoring the majority opinion, any citizen of the State of Texas could conclude that it was highly probable that robbery, abduction and rape were committed.
As this Court said in American Surety Co. of New York v. Rushing, 356 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.), an inference can be drawn only from facts and evidence and must be based on probabilities. The plaintiff is not required to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, nor does the plaintiff need to negate entirely the possibility that the de*376fendant’s conduct was not a cause. Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.1992). It is enough to introduce evidence from which reasonable persons may conclude that it is more probable that the defendant was a cause of the event than that it was not. The plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant’s acts or omissions were the sole proximate cause, but only that the defendant’s acts or omissions were a cause. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex.1977).
Proximate cause itself is a test of common experience applied to human conduct. Cook Consultants, Inc. v. Larson, 700 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The fact of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since no one can say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if the defendant had acted otherwise. It has long been held in Texas that proximate cause can be established by circumstantial evidence.15 Gilbert v. Haigler, 363 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Considering the vicissitudes of human affairs, it is always possible to imagine some possible occurrence that might have altered the probable consequences, but the test remains one of probability. The majority does not seek probability and does not mention probability, but instead wonders who the perpetrator was and what his motivations might have been. These unknowns do not thwart the ability of the jury to make a probable inference from the known facts.
The Havners were only required to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. See Bock v. Fellman Dry Goods Co., 212 S.W. 635, 637 (Tex.Comm’n App. 1919, holding approved). The majority opinion erroneously requires proof of an absolute certainty.
THE PROPER STANDARD CONCERNING EXPERT WITNESSES
In its opinion, the majority refused to consider the expert opinion of Robert Stid-ham based upon an erroneous standard or no standard, chose to ignore the testimony of Norman Bottom and Norman Gray, and chose to distort the testimony of Donnie Lewis.
The witnesses were not asked to testify as to proximate cause but to cause in fact.16 The majority opinion tells us that Robert Stidham was a lay witness because the statement of facts fails to show that he was treated as an expert by the trial court or by either side to the litigation. In footnote six, the majority concluded that Sergeant Stidham was not an expert witness based on the statement of facts. Stidham testified that he had basic and advanced certification with the law enforcement standards in education; that he had numerous in-service training courses, such as crime scene investigations, drug and narcotics investigations, auto theft investigations, and basic fingerprints; that crime scene investigation is his daily job; and that he had thirteen years’ experience with the Sulphur Springs Police Department.
For a person to qualify as an expert witness, it must be shown that he possesses a higher degree of knowledge of a matter in issue than the jurors themselves possess. International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Beauchamp, 464 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ). It is an insult to every experienced crime investigator in this State to say that Stidham’s experience and extensive training does not qualify him, beyond the average juror, to reach conclusions based upon his investigation. Furthermore, his opinion must be of assistance to the fact finder. The jury was *377seeking an answer to the question of causation, and this testimony was beneficial to them.
As to whether Stidham was presented as an expert witness at the trial, there are no magic words that the attorney is required to say to present an expert witness, nor is the trial judge required to anoint the witness as an expert in any way other than ruling on objections. Whether the witness is sufficiently qualified as an expert witness on questions propounded to him or her is a matter for the trial court to determine after the witness has stated his or her training and experience. Stidham testified as to his qualifications, and then he was asked numerous questions about his opinions from the attorneys on both sides. No objection was made to his expertise or to his opinion testimony.
A trial court’s conclusion as to an expert witness’s qualification will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Standard Motor Co. v. Blood, 380 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1964, writ dism’d by agr.). The only indications that we have as to the trial court’s opinion and the jury’s opinion are the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment. The majority does not state what standard they used to determine that Stidham’s opinions should not be considered, but it is obvious that the wrong standard or no standard was used. It is impossible to read this record and conclude that the attorneys and the judge did not recognize that Stidham was testifying as an expert. Furthermore, this ruling violates the law of the case because the Supreme Court has already determined that Stidham was testifying as an expert:
Each was qualified as an expert without objection. Both Detective Sergeant Stid-ham and Chief Lewis were law enforcement veterans who had personally inspected the crime scene and participated actively in the murder investigation. Both possessed extensive personal knowledge and perception of the facts underlying their opinions. An investigating officer may properly testify as to causation. Louder v. DeLeon, 754 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.1988) (per curiam). Given their knowledge of the underlying facts and their expertise, the witnesses’ testimony met the requirement of assisting the fact-finder and should not be disregarded as insisted by the dissent.
Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, 825 S.W.2d at 460.
On the next expert witness, Donnie Lewis, the majority concludes that in the context of his conclusion he may have meant that Diana Havner would have been raped and killed in the back of the store and left there instead of being taken from the premises and raped and killed. This interpretation is in diametric contrast with all of Lewis’s other testimony. (See footnote nine of the majority opinion). The testimony in question was the following:
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Diana Havner would have been taken from that store, raped and murdered, had they had a security system there?
A. My honest true opinion of that is Diana would not have been taken out of that store. We would have been there and we would not be in here today.
(Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion ignores the last sentence in Lewis’s testimony. The context does not indicate that Diana Havner would have been raped and murdered even if E-Z Mart had had an adequate security system. Such a reading is strained and distorted. Lewis testified that the store had no security system and that the employees had no training. He described the E-Z Mart employee manual as only informing the employees how to be calm in case of a robbery, how to protect E-Z Mart’s money, and how to fill out various forms about the occurrence. He was especially critical of the manual instruction that the employee was to comply with the robber’s instructions completely. He testified that Havner should not have cooperated in being taken from the scene, but should have fallen to the floor, passed out, or done anything but get in the vehicle with the robber.
*378An examination of the context17 reveals that Lewis testified on that same question a little later in the proceeding that
In this case, I feel like (if) there had been an alarm system we would have been there when the alarm was set off by a panic button or whatever system they put in and we would have been and you would not — we don’t feel like we would have had the abduction and rape and murder and on from there, plus possibly still having this person running our streets today.
(Emphasis added.)
Lewis clearly was testifying that the court proceeding would not be held because Diana Havner would not have been killed if there had been an adequate security system.
The majority opinion dismisses Dr. Norman Bottom’s testimony because he did not reach a conclusion about causation, but Bottom’s testimony points up many deficiencies in E-Z Mart’s failure to furnish Havner with a safe place to work. From these deficiencies, strong inferences could be drawn by the jury regarding E-Z Mart’s failure to provide adequate security. The majority erred in not considering the inferences that can be drawn from these admitted acts of negligence and the subsequent harm.
The majority recognizes Norman Gray’s expertise and direct testimony on causation but finds that it is not compelling because “[n]o one knows how Diana Havner was killed, or why.” There was evidence from the state of the body that Diana Havner was killed with blows from a blunt instrument and that she was raped. The evidence also strongly suggests that the store was robbed. There was no security system in the store. We need not delve into the sociological reasons for the heinous conduct of the perpetrator in order to assess the absence of a store security system. The majority has not properly considered the expert testimony offered in that regard.
The majority opinion is faced with a catch-22 situation: The record contains sufficient expert testimony to support the jury’s finding, so the majority says that an expert opinion is not needed. If an expert opinion is not needed to make inferences from the known facts, then these witnesses could reach such conclusions as laymen, in Lewis’s words, “just using common sense,” and the jury could likewise infer such a conclusion from the evidence without the need for expert opinions.
THE PROPER STANDARD IN CONSIDERING ALL THE EVIDENCE
The majority properly cites but fails to follow the standard requiring that when considering an insufficient evidence point of error, we must consider all of the evidence. The majority, however, details and states as facts the evidence offered by E-Z Mart but gives short shrift to all of the evidence to the contrary. An example is that the opinion states as a fact that, “When the police were in close proximity to the store, it took them three to four minutes to arrive. When the police were farther away, the response time was ten to fifteen minutes.” 18 In addition to Gray’s testimony that if an alarm system had been in place he did not believe that a robber could have left the scene with the clerk *379before the police arrived, Chief of Police Donnie Lewis testified about an approximate arrival time for the police: In the daytime, it would have probably taken two and a half minutes for the police to reach the store after the alarm was set off and at four o’clock in the morning (the approximate time that the robbery occurred), the police could probably arrive in “a minute to a minute and a half or possibly quicker.” 19 The majority ignored this testimony.
Another example of the majority’s failure to consider all of the evidence concerns the deterrent of having two employees instead of one employee on the late night shift. The majority twice mentions in its opinion that studies show that having two clerks did not prevent or reduce criminal acts against clerks. The majority chose to ignore the testimony of Bottom that in Gainesville, Florida, the city passed an ordinance that required two clerks to be on duty in convenience stores from dark to dawn and that this ordinance significantly reduced the number of robberies, and that Kent, Ohio, had the same experience. The majority has not considered all of the relevant evidence.
After considering all the evidence, including inferences that may be properly drawn, expert opinions, and all the evidence offered by the appellee, it is clear that the jury had sufficient evidence upon which to determine the answer to the question of proximate cause.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Circumstantial evidence, expert testimony, or common knowledge may provide a basis from which the causal sequence may be inferred. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 41, at 269-70 (5th ed. 1984).

. Footnote thirteen of the majority opinion suggests that no witness was shown to be qualified as to causation, nor was any witness knowledgeable of the legal definition of proximate cause. An expert witness can testify as to causation of the death or injury. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ.App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The witnesses were not asked about proximate cause, which includes legal ramifications that cause in fact does not.

. Lewis’s reference to a "high school boy” is also ripped from context by the majority. Lewis was testifying about the lack of proper training of the E-Z Mart employees and how this lack of training and lack of a security system hampered their ability to find the perpetrator of the criminal acts.

. I agree with the majority that the response time was an i nportant factor in determining causation. This case has some similarities to McCane-Sondock Protection Systems, Inc. v. Emmittee, 540 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.Civ.App.-East-land 1976, no writ). In the Emmittee case, the question was whether the failure of the defendant to install a burglar alarm system properly was a cause of the loss from a robbery. The principal difference in that case and the present case is that there was no testimony in the present case about the actual amount of time that the robber spent at the scene of the holdup. Although there is no direct testimony on it in the present case, there was expert opinion that the police could have arrived at the scene before the robber escaped if there had been an alarm.

. Lewis also testified:
You’re goin^ to have to be awful fast to take a clerk out of the store with an alarm system going off. In this town I’ve never seen it happen except in this case and there wasn't an alarm. You would have to be awful fast. It might work in Dallas but I don’t think it would work here.
He also testified that the alarm that the store had before E-Z Mart took over was an automatic dispatch and received top priority.