Court Opinion

ID: 9585299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:58:49.313905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:06.669246
License: Public Domain

Judge WELLS
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I believe that the cross-examination of defendant as to his refusal to give the police a statement following his arrest violated defendant’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination and denied him due process of law. The United States Supreme Court has held that “. . . it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at *523trial.” Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Doyle was decided on facts which clearly indicate that a Miranda warning had been given. The record in the case sub judice is silent as to whether, defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, but this distinction is of no import to this question. Chief Justice Branch, writing for our Supreme Court on this matter, stated:
[W]e attach little significance to the fact that Miranda warnings were not given. With or without such warnings defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent was guaranteed by Article 1, Section 23, of the North Carolina Constitution and the fifth as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. . . . Thus, any comment upon the exercise of this right, nothing else appearing, was impermissible.
(Citation omitted), State v. Lane, 301 N.C. 382, 271 S.E. 2d 273 (1980).
The state contends that Doyle v. Ohio, supra and State v. Lane, supra are not applicable to this case because the prosecutor did not ask why defendant failed to tell the police of his alibi, but only why he did not mention Griggs’ ill will toward him when he was arrested. A close examination of the record reveals that this is not the case. While some of the prosecutor’s questions relate to defendant’s failure to tell the police of Griggs’ motive to frame him, others are specifically directed to defendant’s failure to give a statement about the break-in. Even if all the objectionable cross-examination had related to defendant’s failure to tell the police of Griggs’ possible motive for framing him, I fail to find any distinction which would render Doyle and Lane inapplicable. Interpreting the cross-examination in the light urged by the state, defendant is still being impeached by his post-arrest silence. Clearly defendant had no duty to inform the police of Griggs’ motive, and the state’s attempts to impeach defendant for his post-arrest silence are obviously a violation of his rights against self-incrimination as articulated in Doyle and Lane.
Next the state argues that defendant has waived his right to assert this error because his counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s questions at trial. It has long been the rule in North Carolina that an objection to, or a motion to strike, an offer of evidence must be made contemporaneously with the contested ac*524tion; and unless such objection was made, the party was held to have waived his right to object. See State v. Banks, 295 N.C. 399, 245 S.E. 2d 743 (1978). Recently, however, in State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E. 2d 375 (1983) our Supreme Court adopted the “plain error” rule with respect to a defendant’s failure to object to jury instructions under Rule 10(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. This rule was extended to failure to object to rulings, such as evidentiary rulings, governed by Rule 10(b)(1), in State v. Black, 308 N.C. 736, 303 S.E. 2d 804 (1983). In both cases the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following interpretation of the rule:
[T]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a “fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,” or “where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,” or the error has “ ‘resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial’ ” or where the error is such as to “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” or where it can be fairly said “the . . . [error] had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.” (Emphasis in original.)
United States v. McCaskill, 676 F. 2d 995 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 381, 74 L.Ed. 2d 513 (1982). An examination of the record in this case indicates that there was a denial of defendant’s fundamental rights of due process and against self-incrimination and that this error had a probable impact on the jury’s verdict. My decision is based upon the following factors. This is a close case where the only evidence of defendant’s guilt is the testimony of Griggs, who had served a prison sentence for breaking or entering and larceny and who was implicated in this crime by fingerprints found on the stolen file cabinet. Defendant, who also had a previous criminal record, relied upon an alibi defense which was supported by two witnesses. In this situation the crucial question for the jury was the credibility of defendant and Griggs. Defendant offered an explanation as to why Griggs would lie and implicate him. I believe that the prosecutor’s effective, albeit improper, questions regarding defendant’s failure to *525inform the police of Griggs’ motive probably substantially contributed to the jury’s verdict. Therefore, for the trial court to allow such cross-examination was “plain error” which necessitates the granting of a new trial.
For the reasons given, I must respectfully dissent as to the majority disposition of defendant’s first assignment of error. I concur as to the disposition of defendant’s second assignment of error.