Court Opinion

ID: 9829524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:24:12.436434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:02.626373
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant requests us to specifically pass on its fifth assignment of error, which is that the court erred in refusing to allow it to prove by appellee on his cross-examination that an unprecedented drought prevailed in Matagorda county and along the Colorado river throughout the season of 1910. We overrule this assignment for the reason that the act of God is no defense to appellee’s cause of action.
To the general rule that the act of God is no defense to the failure to perform a contract, there is an exception, viz., where the performance of the contract depends upon the continued existence of a particular person or thing. Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514, 9 Am. Rep. 65; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, 7 Am. Rep. 416; Nicol v. Fitch, 115 Mich. 15, 72 N. W. 988, 69 Am. St. Rep. 548. We have found, however, but two characters of cases in which this exception has been applied: One is where personal service is to be performed, as where one person agrees to marry another, or an artist agrees to paint a picture; the other is where the continued existence of a particular thing, which is the basis of the agreement, is necessary to the performance of the contract. In such cases the courts have said that there is an implied agreement that the performance of the contract is to be contingent on the continued existence of the person or thing. Appellant insists that this principle is applicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the evidence shows that both parties to the contract expected that the water would be obtained from the Colorado river. But it was not so specified in the contract. A tender of water in appellant’s irrigation ditch, suitable for irrigation purposes, obtained from wells, or from any other source, would have been a compliance with appellant’s contract. It does not appear that it was a physical impossibility for appellant to comply with its contract on account of the failure of the water in the Colorado river, which it would be necessary to show in any event, in order to excuse appellant on account of drought. It is no answer to say that to have obtained the necessary water from any other source would have been very expensive. Appellant had the option under its contract to either incur such additional expense or to pay the damages, not exceeding $4 per acre.
In Dexter v. Norton, supra, the court said: “The plaintiff would not have been obliged to accept any other cotton than the bales specified in the bought note.” In the instant case no particular water was specified in the contract, and it is probable that the water contemplated to be furnished was not in the Colorado river at the time the contract was made. Nor is any particular source from which the water was to be obtained mentioned. It is true that appellant expected to obtain the water from the Colorado river, and appellee expected that it would do so, but this is not sufficient to bring this contract within the exception mentioned.
In Summers v. Hibbard, 153 Ill. 102, 38 N. E. 899, 46 Am. St.- Rep. 874, doubtless both parties contemplated that the iron contracted for should be manufactured at defendant’s mill; and so in McGee v. Hill, 4 Port. (Ala.) 170, 29 Am. Dec. 277, it is evident from the defense interposed that it was expected that the corn contracted to be delivered should be raised on defendant’s farm; but it was not so specified in the contracts, and the courts refused to read these provisions into the contracts by implication.
In the case of Middlesex Water Co. v. Knappmann Whiting Co., 64 N. J. Law, 240, 45 Atl. 692, 49 L. R. A. 572, 81 Am. St. Rep. 467, where an inevitable accident, not provided for in the contract, was interposed as a .defense, the court quotes with approval from Mr. Chief Justice Shaw in Dam Co. v. Hovey, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 417, as follows: “The good sense of the rule seems to be this: That in case where, if an event happened, it must inevitably cause loss to one or the other contracting parties, the party who has contracted that such an event shall not happen, although he cannot specifically perform that contract, because the event may happen through the act of God or inevitable necessity, yet he shall take that risk and make good *950all the loss which shall occur in consequence of the happening of the event contemplated. The party thus contracting takes the consequences.” In the Water Company Case above cited there was no question as to the source from which the water was to be obtained, nor as to the machinery by which it was contemplated it would be supplied, but neither of these things were mentioned in the contract. In the instant case the event which appellant contracted should not happen was that appellee’s crop should not suffer for want of water. No particular water then in existence was agreed to be furnished, and no exception was made in case there should be a drought.
The maxim that as a man binds himself so shall he be bound is a sound one, and courts should hesitate to change express contracts by implication. The appellee may or may not have been willing to contract to cultivate appellant’s land without payment of damages, if appellant’s failure to furnish water should be occasioned by drought. All that we can say in this case is that he did not do so, and we are not at liberty to make a contract for him which he did not make for himself.
The motion for a rehearing is overruled.