Court Opinion

ID: 9945598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 22:05:46.497007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:34.111351
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24 P. v. Ramos CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B324174

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BA442346
        v.

 LUIS RAMOS,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
      John Lanahan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         INTRODUCTION

       In 2019, a jury found defendant and appellant Luis Ramos
guilty of first degree murder and four counts of attempted
murder. In 2022, Ramos filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied the petition on
the grounds that Ramos’s trial took place after changes in the law
concerning murder and that any arguments Ramos had with
respect to resentencing could be addressed in his direct appeal.
Ramos contends that the court erred in its reasoning and in
denying his petition without appointing counsel. The Attorney
General agrees that the court erred in denying the petition
without appointing counsel but contends that any error was
harmless because Ramos was not entitled to relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law.
       We agree that the court erred, both in failing to comply
with the procedures set forth in section 1172.6 and in its
conclusion that Ramos’s arguments regarding resentencing would
be, or could have been, addressed on a direct appeal from his
convictions. Because there is no basis in the record to conclude
that the court considered the record of conviction or made any
determination as whether Ramos’s petition made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, we reverse and remand.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Ramos

filed his petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95, which
the Legislature later renumbered to section 1172.6 without
substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We hereafter cite to
section 1172.6 for ease of reference.

                                   2
                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

       Ramos and his codefendant, Josue Garcia, were members of
the MS-13 street gang and acted in retaliation against Edwin
Jurado, whom they believed to be a member of the rival 18th
Street gang, after an altercation between Jurado and a member
of MS-13 at a nightclub, El Cafetal. Pablo Delgado, Jr. was
driving Jose Delgado, Pablo Delgado, Sr., and Christian Diaz
home after a Dodgers game when they observed Jurado, whom
they did not know, being attacked by a group of men. They
stopped to render assistance to Jurado and Garcia shot at their
car, striking Diaz. During the altercation with the MS-13
members, Jurado sustained three gunshot wounds, two of which
were fatal.
       Ramos’s former girlfriend, Dina Padilla, testified at trial
that she, Ramos, and another MS-13 member, Carlos Gonzalez,
were turned away from El Cafetal and returned to an apartment
where other gang members were angry about an incident that
had taken place at the nightclub. They wanted to go back to El
Cafetal and teach someone who had disrespected them a lesson.
Ramos eventually agreed to go with them and took a revolver
with him. He told Padilla to stay behind at the apartment with
Maria Escobar, but Escobar convinced Padilla to drive her to the
nightclub. When they arrived near the nightclub, Escobar saw
Jurado, exited the car, and punched Jurado in the face, knocking

2 In his petition below, Ramos did not describe the facts underlying his

convictions. On appeal, Ramos includes a detailed factual background
based on the record in his direct appeal, which we briefly summarize
here for the limited purpose of providing context. We do not use it to
determine if Ramos made a prima facie showing.

                                   3
him to the ground. Padilla observed Ramos, Garcia, and other
MS-13 members approach and join Escobar in attacking Jurado.
They began hitting and kicking Jurado while he was on the
ground. A strange car pulled up and Padilla heard gunshots. She
saw Ramos holding a revolver at the time the shots were fired.
Escobar re-entered the car as Padilla was turning it around to
return to the apartment. She appeared nervous and stated that
they had killed someone.
       Carlos Gonzalez also testified. On the night of the
shootings, Gonzalez planned to go to El Cafetal with Ramos and
Padilla. However, while they were making their way there,
Ramos received a phone call and they went back to the
apartment to get guns. Gonzalez testified that Ramos was the
one running the clique at the time and that he was the one who
would decide who would commit the crime. Ramos, Garcia, and
Gonzalez drove back to El Cafetal and, after they saw Escobar
begin to fight with Jurado, Ramos approached with Garcia. As
Jurado was beginning to stand, Ramos grabbed him by the head
and shot him. He fired additional shots at Jurado, although
Garcia did not know how many. While all this was taking place, a
car pulled up, and Gonzalez observed Garcia fire approximately
three shots at the car.
       Transcripts of two wiretap conversations between Ramos
and another MS-13 member were also introduced at trial. The
first conversation appeared to concern police fliers with three
men pictured in buses that passed through the Rampart area,
where the shootings took place. Ramos stated that the fliers had
been in the buses for about a year and that he “ ‘was pulling [his]
hair out . . . because [he] did not know anything about that.’ ”
Ramos also expressed concern about fingerprints. In the second

                                 4
conversation, Ramos mentioned turning himself in. He and the
other MS-13 member discussed how the police had come around
the area posting pictures and seeking information. The two
discussed an unnamed “ ‘girl’ ” they believed was talking to the
police and Ramos suggested that someone should “pick her up” so
that if they were eventually named as “the shooters, there won’t
be any witnesses.” He later stated that he did not believe that
“those assholes” had anything on him and that they just had to
lay low for a while.

                PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In an information filed December 19, 2016, Ramos and
Garcia were charged with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)),
four counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder (§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and one count of shooting at an
occupied motor vehicle (§ 246).3 In connection with each of these
counts, it was further alleged that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, which proximately caused the
death of Edwin Jurado, within the meaning of sections 12022.53,
subdivisions (d) and (e)(1); that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1); and that a principal
personally used a firearm within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e). Finally, it was alleged
pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) that the offenses
were committed for the benefit of, at the direction or, or in
association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to

3 Garcia was also charged with one count of criminal threats in

connection with an unrelated incident (§ 422, subd. (a)).

                                   5
promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members,
and that the offense of shooting at an occupied vehicle was
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members pursuant
to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4).
       An amended information dated August 19, 2019, charged
the defendants with the same offenses, but clarified the names of
the attempted murder victims. With respect to the murder
charge, it additionally alleged that Ramos personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm which resulted in the victim’s
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (id., subd. (c)), and personally used a
firearm (id., subd. (b)).
       In September 2019, a jury found Ramos guilty of first
degree murder and the four counts of attempted murder. With
respect to the murder charge, the jury found true the allegations
that Ramos personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
which caused death to the victim; personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm; and personally used a firearm. With
respect to all counts against Ramos, the jury also found that a
principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
which caused death to the victim; that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm; and that a principal
personally used a firearm. The jury also found the gang
allegations to be true.
       The court sentenced Ramos to 50 years to life for the
murder and 160 years to life for the attempted murders. The
court also imposed and stayed a sentence of 32 years to life for
shooting at an occupied motor vehicle.

                                 6
       Ramos appealed and a panel of this Division affirmed the
judgment in an unpublished opinion, People v. Ramos (May 14,
2021, B304855).
       In April 2022, Ramos filed a handwritten petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. Ramos alleged that
an information was filed against him: (1) that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
his participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) he was convicted
of murder and attempted murder following a trial; and (3) he
could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes made to sections 188 and 189. Ramos asserted
that CALCRIM Nos. 1402 and 3149 allowed the jury to convict
him of murder under the theory of liability of the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. With respect to attempted
murder, Ramos asserted that CALCRIM Nos. 600, 601, and 1402
demonstrated the prosecution’s reliance on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. He subsequently filed a form
petition as well.
       In June 2022, a judge other than the sentencing judge
issued an order denying the petition without appointing counsel
for Ramos, accepting further briefing, or holding a hearing. The
trial court stated that section 1172.6 became effective January
19, 2019, that Ramos was therefore “convicted under the new law
regarding murder,” and that “[a]ny issue regarding his conviction
would be addressed on his direct appeal.”

                               7
                         DISCUSSION

       Ramos contends that the court erred in denying his petition
without appointing him counsel because the petition was facially
sufficient. He further contends that the court erred in its
conclusion that he could raise any issue regarding his conviction
on direct appeal, both because the law regarding attempted
murder did not change until after his direct appeal was decided
and because claims made under section 1172.6 must be raised in
a post-conviction petition filed in the superior court. Ramos
argues, “had the trial [court] not summarily denied [his] petition
and appointed counsel, the obvious error of the trial court
dismissing the petition on the basis that the claim of
resentencing could be raised on direct appeal could have raised
before the trial court.” He also asserts that “the issues at trial
were different from those at Mr. Ramos’s trial from those raised
in the petittion [sic] to recall his sentence.”
       The Attorney General does not dispute that the petition
was facially sufficient or that the court erred in summarily
denying the petition without appointing counsel for Ramos and
does not dispute Ramos’s further contention that the court’s basis
for denying the petition was incorrect. Rather, the Attorney
General argues that we should affirm because Ramos “cannot
show a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome had he
had the benefit of counsel.”
       We reverse and remand for the court to appoint counsel for
Ramos, accept further briefing, and hold a prima facie hearing.
1.    Legal Standards
       As amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 2), effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6, subdivision (a)

                                 8
provides: “A person convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter
may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to
have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts[.]”
       An offender must file a petition in the sentencing court
averring that: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was
filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The
petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a
trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder
or attempted murder[;] [¶] [and] (3) The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3); see also id., subd. (b)(1)(A).)
Additionally, the petition shall state “[w]hether the petitioner
requests the appointment of counsel.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)(C).)
       “Upon receiving a petition in which the information
required by this subdivision is set forth or a petition where any
missing information can readily be ascertained by the court, if
the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint

                                 9
counsel to represent the petitioner.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) The
prosecutor shall file a response within 60 days of the service of
the petition, and the petitioner may file a reply within 30 days of
the response. (Id., subd. (c).) When briefing has been completed,
“the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.) “If the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.”
(Ibid.)
       In determining whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief, the trial court’s inquiry will
necessarily be informed by the record of conviction, which will
facilitate the court in distinguishing “petitions with potential
merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) This includes the jury
instructions, which are part of the record of conviction, because
the instructions “given at a petitioner’s trial may provide ‘readily
ascertainable facts from the record’ that refute the petitioner’s
showing, and reliance on them to make the eligibility or
entitlement determinations may not amount to ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion,’ ”
which must wait to occur until after an order to show cause
issues. (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055,
disapproved on another ground in Lewis.) The court is prohibited
from engaging in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of the
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972.) Rather,
the court must “ ‘ “take[ ] [the] petitioner’s factual allegations as
true” ’ ” and make a “ ‘ “preliminary assessment regarding
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her
factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.) Summary

                                 10
denial of the petition is appropriate where the record of
conviction establishes the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing
as a matter of law. (People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941,
945.)
       “The mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not
afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial
error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s findings. To the contrary, ‘[n]othing in the language of
section [1172.6] suggests it was intended to provide redress for
allegedly erroneous prior factfinding . . . . The purpose of section
[1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188
and 189 with respect to issues not previously determined, not to
provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been
resolved.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
942, 947.)
2.    The court erred in denying the petition without
      appointing counsel.
       In Lewis, our Supreme Court held that once a petitioner
files a facially sufficient petition under section 1172.6 and
requests appointment of counsel, the superior court must appoint
counsel before conducting any prima facie review. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 963 [“petitioners who file a complying petition
requesting counsel are to receive counsel upon the filing of a
compliant petition”]; accord, § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) There is no
dispute that Ramos’s handwritten petition and his form petition
were facially sufficient. We agree with the parties that the court
erred in denying Ramos’s petition without appointing counsel,
permitting further briefing, and holding a prima facie hearing.
       We conclude that the court further erred in rejecting
Ramos’s petition on the ground that his contentions could be

                                11
addressed on direct appeal. At the time Ramos filed his petition,
his direct appeal had already been resolved. Moreover, the
Supreme Court had previously rejected the contention that an
appellant could seek relief under section 1172.6 on a direct
appeal. (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 851–852
[“[C]onvictions may be challenged on Senate Bill 1437[4] grounds
only through a petition filed in the sentencing court under
[former] section 1170.95.”].) Although the Legislature abrogated
this holding the following year by expressly authorizing
challenges on direct appeal (§ 1172.6, subd. (g)), that change in
the law did not take effect until January 2022, approximately
eight months after Ramos’s appeal was decided.5

4 “Senate Bill 1437 amended the natural and probable consequences

doctrine for murder and the felony-murder rule ‘to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not
act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life[]’
[citation] . . . [and] provided for retroactive application of these
amendments by creating a process in [former] section 1170.95 through
which qualifying defendants can have their murder convictions vacated
and be resentenced.” (People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740, 746.)
5 Ramos notes that the judge who denied his petition was not the same

judge who sentenced him but does not assert this as an independent
ground for error. In People v. Santos (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 467, 474,
Division Five of this District held section 1172.6, subdivision (b),
requires “the individual public official” who sentenced the petitioner to
rule on the petition unless the record shows the presiding justice of the
superior court determined that person was “not available” to do so.
There is no evidence in the record that the sentencing judge was not
available to rule on Ramos’s petition, and thus this is another basis to
conclude the court erred. However, Ramos has forfeited this argument.

                                   12
      Thus, the court erred both in denying Ramos’s petition
without complying with the procedures set forth in section 1172.6
and in its reasoning for doing so.
3.    Because the court did not reach the issue of whether
      Ramos’s petition made a prima facie showing of
      entitlement to relief, we remand for further
      proceedings.
       The Lewis court determined that the right to counsel under
section 1172.6 was created under state law and when an error of
state law occurs, the Watson6 harmless error test applies. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973; see also People v. Watson, supra, 46
Cal.2d at p. 836.) Accordingly, where trial courts have denied a
petition without appointing counsel, courts of appeal have
concluded that any error is harmless where the trial court
properly concluded that the record of conviction negates any
possibility that the petitioner could obtain relief under section
1172.6. (See People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 947,
957 [summary denial of second petition for resentencing without
appointing counsel, while erroneous, was harmless where trial
court correctly concluded that jury’s true finding on felony-
murder special circumstance allegation precluded relief as a
matter of law]; People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887,
891–893 [trial court’s failure to appoint counsel, set a briefing
schedule, or hold a hearing was harmless error where the court
correctly concluded that the record of conviction demonstrated
that the petitioner was “the attempted murderer”].)

6 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

                                  13
       However, the court’s error here was not merely its failure
to comply with the procedures set forth in the statute. The court
did not conclude, whether on correct or incorrect grounds, that
the record of conviction negated the possibility that Ramos could
obtain relief under section 1172.6. It expressed no view on
whether the petition stated a prima facie showing under section
1172.6. The court stated that it reviewed Ramos’s petition, but it
is unclear whether the court even considered the record of
conviction. The grounds for its denial did not require it to do so: it
believed that Ramos’s contentions would be, or could have been,
addressed on direct appeal, even though this Division had
already ruled on the direct appeal, it could not have considered
his section 1172.6 arguments on a direct appeal under the law in
effect at the time, and the change to the law with respect to
attempted murder took effect months after that decision.
       Under the circumstances, “[i]t is uncertain whether the
trial court would have reached the same result using correct legal
standards.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 158
[concluding that the matter should be returned to the trial court
to reconsider its new trial order where trial court employed
incorrect legal standards]; see also People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981, 992 [where court committed an error of law in
sustaining murder conviction, reversing the judgment with
directions to remand the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings]; People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944
[“where the record affirmatively discloses that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of its discretion, remand to the trial
court is required to permit that court to impose sentence with full
awareness of its discretion”].) Accordingly, we conclude that the
best course is to remand the matter for the trial court to comply

                                 14
with the procedures set forth in section 1172.6, which are
summarized above, and to decide whether Ramos can make a
prime facie showing of entitlement to relief.7

7 For the benefit of the parties and the court below, however, we note

that the definition of implied malice in CALCRIM No. 520, with which
the jury was instructed, is not the same as the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or imputed malice. “Although the instructions
related to implied malice and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine of aiding and abetting include similar language regarding a
‘natural consequence,’ they are distinctly different concepts.” (People v.
Soto, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 1056; see also People v. Mancilla
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 867, superseded by statute on another
ground.) With implied malice murder the perpetrator knows his
conduct endangers another life and acts with conscious disregard of
that life. (Soto, at p. 1058.) In contrast, under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor who intends to commit a
less serious crime can be convicted of a greater crime that is the
natural and probable consequence of the lesser crime. (Ibid.) Thus,
courts have rejected arguments based on the similarity of language in
two materially different theories of murder liability. (See, e.g., People
v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677–678 & fn. 4; People v. Lee
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254, 263–264.)

                                   15
                        DISPOSITION

      The trial court’s order is reversed and the matter is
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with
the views expressed in this opinion.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                    LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

     EDMON, P. J.

     EGERTON, J.

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