Court Opinion

ID: 9745040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:30:00.101367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:31.328176
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD delivered the opinion of the court: In the opinion we hold that where there is complete identity between the holders of the beneficial interest in land trust property described in a condemnation petition and other property not taken but alleged to be damaged by the taking, the common ownership of the beneficial interest is sufficient to permit the filing of a cross-petition for severance damages to the remaining property provided other requirements necessary to the filing of cross-petition are met. In the petition for rehearing the appellee notes that the beneficial interest in a land trust is an interest in personal property and submits that the case of City of Chicago v. Albert J. Schorsch Realty Co., 127 Ill. App. 2d 51 (1970), is controlling on the question of whether a person who has an interest in property which is not an estate in land is entitled to file a cross-petition for severance damages. In Schorsch, the cross-petitioner had an unexercised option to purchase one of the parcels taken. It also was the legal title holder of adjoining property not described in the condemnation petition. The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling striking a portion of a witness’s answer in which he described the option interest in response to the question, “Did you own any other real estate in the immediate vicinity of this property?” (City of Chicago v. Albert J. Schorsch Realty Co., 127 Ill. App. 2d 51, 69 (1970).) The court also held that leave to file the cross-petition was properly denied because the defendant merely had an option to purchase one of the parcels taken, did not “own” it, and a mere intention on the part of the owner to put properties to a common use is not sufficient to allow a cross-petition in a condemnation action. (Schorsch, 127 Ill. App. 2d 51, 70.) We agree with the court in Schorsch that the mere fact that a property owner has an unexercised option to purchase neighboring property at the time of a filing of a petition to condemn that property does not establish a sufficient interrelationship between the two parcels as to warrant their consideration as a single unit within the principle permitting damages to be awarded for injury to land not taken. However, we do not agree with the appellee’s contention that Schorsch is determinative of the question of whether one who has an interest in property which will be taken or damaged which is not an estate in land can maintain a cross-petition for severance damages.  The basic question before the court was whether in the light of the relevant statutory and constitutional provisions, the ends of justice would be served by permitting the question of damages to Parcel 7 to be considered in the same proceeding in which the question of just compensation for the taking of Parcel 12 and part of Parcel 11 and damages to the part of Parcel 11 not taken are determined. In this regard, we agree with the statement of the court in the analogous of Guptill Holding Corp. v. State, 23 App. Div. 2d 434, 261 N.Y.S.2d 435, 437 (1965): “It would appear to us that the paramount constitutional requirement of just compensation must be allowed to prevail over the niceties of legal title advanced by the State.” (See also Erly Realty Development, Inc. v. State, 43 App. Div. 2d 301, 351 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1974); cf. M.T.M. Realty Corp. v. State, 47 Misc. 2d 44, 261 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Ct. Cl. 1965).) Further, we note that our holding may serve the public interest by obviating the possibility that the appellee will be obliged to defend a separate action at law brought by the trustee of Parcel 7 to determine damages to that parcel. It is true that the decision in Chicago & Evanston R.R. Co. v. Dresel, 110 Ill. 89 (1884), does not mention a cross-petition. However, where the property described in the petition includes both that taken and that not taken, no cross-petition is necessary. Commissioners of Lincoln Park v. Schmidt, 375 Ill. 474, 476 (1941); Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Rider, 12 Ill. 2d 326, 333 (1957). Rehearing denied. GUILD, P. J., concurs.