Court Opinion

ID: 9737783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:34:32.098642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:01.308773
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the enlightened opinion authored for the Court by the Chief Justice. I write separately to note that the trial court apparently agreed with much of the philosophy contained in that opinion for it cited with approval the following statements from Stanford Law Review:
“But once the tribes adopt appeals procedures and a Court of Indian appeals is established to tie the tribal courts to the federal [state] system, no good reason remains to deny tribal courts full faith and credit. When these safeguards are in place, Congress [the legislature] should extend full faith and credit to tribal courts to further advance the Indian policy of self-determination.” [Bracketed language is the trial court’s.] Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 Stan.L.Rev. 1397, 1424 (1985).
It appears that the issue in this case focuses on which branch of the government is to extend full faith and credit to the tribal courts that have in place appropriate procedures and appeals mechanisms to rectify any errors committed by the trial courts of the tribe.1 Although the Legislature may not have granted full faith and credit to all judgments of the courts of the Three Affiliated Tribes, I agree with the majority opinion that the judicial branch is not prohibited from doing so. The matter of comity is as much a matter for the courts to decide as it is for the Legislature to decide, if not more. See e.g., Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737 (S.D.1985), and cases cited therein. Because the Three Affiliated Tribes have procedures and mechanisms in place which could have been used to rectify these errors, we are holding that, in this instance, the trial court was in error in not exercising its discretion to grant full faith and credit to the judgment of the tribal court.
The legislative history of section 27-01-09, NDCC, to which the majority opinion refers, clearly reveals that statute is not intended as a limitation on the power of the judiciary to recognize tribal judgments. Rather, as that history indicates, the legislation originally enacted in 1987 with a two-year “sunset” provision was introduced at the behest of the Three Affiliated Tribes. It was introduced because of a particular problem which arose in the area of domestic violence, child custody and juvenile delinquency. Thus, the enactment of the statute does not indicate an intent to *172limit the authority of the judiciary to recognize tribal-court judgments under the concept of comity. It is, as the majority opinion notes, a limitation on the discretion of the courts of this State to deny comity to certain judgments. Therefore, the rule that the expression of one thing in a statute excludes all others is not applicable. Juhl v. Well, 116 N.W.2d 625 (N.D.1962). [Rule should be applied only where it appears to point to legislative intent and it does not apply if there is some special reason for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning a second.]
Finally, the legislative history discloses that the other tribes in North Dakota were contacted to determine if they desired to be included in the legislation and that they did not respond. One of the witnesses before the House Judiciary Committee which considered the legislation, in response to a question from a member of the committee, indicated that the other tribes do not have law-trained judges and an appellate procedure which would meet the requirements necessary to grant recognition to the judgments of those tribal courts. If that situation still exists, our opinion today should not be considered a carte blanche invitation to recognition of judgments of those tribal courts by the North Dakota courts.

. Perhaps the greatest test of the principle of comity is to affirm a judgment which we believe to be in error. In this instance it appears clear to me that the tribal statute did not apply to repossessions which took place off the Reservation and that the tribal court’s authority to require the return of the pickup and impose the other relief contained in the judgment is questionable.