Court Opinion

ID: 9662743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:16:44.827358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:41.976259
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Joining the judgment of the Court, I write to supplement the chronology of and to expand on various actions by the parties, in order further to justify our conditional grant of the writ.
On February 8, 199U, after receiving the report from the hearing officer, the Board of Pardons and Paroles decided to proceed with the final revocation hearing.1
Promptly thereafter counsel for Victor Michael Delgado, Real Party in Interest, presented his application for writ of habeas corpus to Judge Marquez. Op., at 482. As well as claiming certain irregularities in preliminary revocation proceedings, Delgado requested as relief “that he be in all things discharged,” and prayed that the sheriff show cause “why Petitioner should not be in all things discharged or other appropriate relief granted.”2
The ensuing proceedings, including Delgado’s notice of appeal from an order granting partial relief, op., at 482, all occurred before March 17, 1994, when the Board of Pardons and Paroles entered its order of revocation and issued its “white warrant” for arrest of Delgado.
On March 27, 1994, notwithstanding that his prior notice of appeal had effectively suspended and arrested all further proceedings in the habeas court, Tex.R.App.Pro. 40(b)(2), Magistrate Carter entertained further pleadings and entered additional orders in the cause, including an order that purported to set aside the revocation order of the Board and its “white warrant.”
In my view, at all times after his arrest on the “blue warrant” Delgado was in the custody of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, at least constructively, pending its final determination of revocation proceedings. Delgado still retained the status of a convicted felon, subject to serving the remainder of his sentence for the offense of murder under terms and conditions imposed by the Board. His claim for post-conviction habeas relief in the *485premises must be made under Article 11.07 § 3, V.A.C.C.P., which mandates that the procedure prescribed therein “shall be exclusive and any other proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner.”

. All emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise indicated.

. Directing the writ to the Sheriff was purely pro forma; he was merely holding Delgado for the Board of Pardons and Paroles on its “blue warrant,” pending further revocation proceedings before the Board.