Court Opinion

ID: 9524057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:49:39.132044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:48.657790
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for receiving stolen property and therefore respectfully dissent from the reversal of those convictions.
As a starting point, it seems likely to me that receiving stolen goods is an offense that is particularly likely in many cases to be sustainable only by cireumstantial evidence. It is normally not difficult to prove that the items in question were stolen. Typically, the most difficult part of the State's task is proving that the defendant was aware the items were stolen. Rare indeed is the case in which the original thief testifies that he or she conveyed the stolen items to the defendant, while at the same time advising the defendant that they are stolen. Rarer still is the scenario *978in which the defendant admits knowing the items were "hot." So, we are foreed to infer the defendant's guilty knowledge by the surrounding cireumstances. In the instant case, the majority concludes that the State failed to prove either element, ie., that the items were stolen, and that Vliets-tra knew it.
I believe the evidence was sufficient to prove that the equipment was stolen. Brian Olehy was the detective in charge of the investigation for the Indiana State Police. It appears that Detective Olechy was actively involved in the case from beginning to end. His investigation led to the discovery of the equipment in the Newenhouses' possession, and he was the law enforcement officer who contacted the Newen-houses and ultimately confiscated the stolen equipment. The prosecutor questioned Detective Olehy at trial about the fate of the confiscated equipment: "Eventually what did happen with those tractors?" Transcript at 137. Detective Olehy responded, "The tractors were returned to their rightful owners, or the benefit of the sale or use of those items [sic]." - Id. It is clear from the record that the stolen equipment bore serial numbers that were used to identify them and trace them to the original owners. Regardless of whether the NCIS information was admissible in evidence, Detective Olehy's response permits a reasonable inference that the original owner of the equipment in question accepted the return of that property. It may be inferred that said acceptance was premised upon the owner's recognition and identification of those items as the owner's property, which in turn permits a reasonable inference that it was stolen from that person in the first place. Therefore, quite apart from all of the questions either directly or tangentially concerning the NCIS or information derived therefrom, the foregoing portion of Detective Olehy's testimony alone was sufficient to prove that the equipment was stolen.
I turn now to the sufficiency of the evidence concerning Vlietstra's knowledge that the equipment was stolen. The majority concludes that the information from NCIS indicating that the equipment sold by Vlietstra to Newenbhouse was stolen was inadmissible hearsay. Even accepting that conclusion as true, I believe the remaining evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The difference of opinion between my colleagues and me is attributable in large part to the way we review this evidence. As I read the majority's analysis, its approach is to consider each item of cireumstantial evidence in isolation, determine its probative value in tending to prove the requisite element (Me., that the item was stolen, or Vlietstra's knowledge thereof), accept or reject that item of circumstantial evidence as sufficient proof, and then move to the next item. I believe that approach is flawed.
I might agree that the mere fact that Vlietstra sold the equipment to Newen-house for less than market value despite the fact that the items appeared to be relatively new does not necessarily, by itself, prove that the equipment was stolen or that Vlietstra knew it was. The same can be said of the mere facts that Vlietstra sold the equipment for cash and that no paperwork was completed on the transaction-they do not necessarily by themselves prove that the equipment was stolen or that Vlietstra knew it was. Similarly, the mere facts that Vlietstra, a private individual who claimed to be selling his own personal property, did not deliver all of the attachments that went with one of the tractors at the same time he delivered the tractor, and then later delivered different attachments than he originally promised, do not necessarily by themselves *979prove that the equipment was stolen or that Vlietstra knew it was.
Viewed in isolation from one another, it is perhaps fair to say that none of the aforementioned facts constitute compelling evidence of Vlietstra's knowledge that the items were stolen. Viewed in their totality, however, they present a mosaic of guilty knowledge sufficient to sustain the State's burden on that element. Finally, it is not insignificant to me that the entire course of dealing with Vlietstra was of such a character as to arouse Richard Newenhouse's suspicions about the validity of Vlietstra's claim of ownership of the equipment. The transaction was so suggestive of stolen property, in fact, that Newenhouse attempted to alter the serial number on one of the tractors because he "figured there was something wrong[.]" Transcript at 22.
Cireumstantial evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence in order to be deemed sufficient to support a conviction. Hawkins v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1158 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). Rather, it is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the conviction. Franklin v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind.1999). As I view the totality of the foregoing evidence, I can draw the same reasonable inference that motivated Richard Newenhouse to alter the serial number of one of the tractors after purchasing it, viz., Vlietstra knew that items he was selling to Newenhouse were stolen. I would affirm the convictions.