Court Opinion

ID: 9555799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 13:08:35.140005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:03.327096
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                         San Antonio, Texas
                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                             No. 04-22-00848-CV

                           IN THE INTEREST OF S.P. AND H.P., Children

                      From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2013-CI-00618
                            Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting:          Beth Watkins, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
                  Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) 1

Delivered and Filed: August 9, 2023

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

           The issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in

denying appellant’s motion to compel arbitration. Concluding arbitration is warranted here, we

reverse and remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to render an order compelling

arbitration.

                                                 BACKGROUND

           S.P. (born 2010) and H.P. (born 2012) are the minor children of appellant-father M.P. and

appellee-mother J.J. 2 On April 10, 2013, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce terminating

1
  The Honorable Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Retired) of the Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment
of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
2
  To protect the privacy of the minor children, we use initials to refer to the children and their parents. TEX. FAM.
CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
                                                                                         04-22-00848-CV

M.P. and J.J.’s marriage. The final decree contained alternative dispute resolution language,

including in relevant part:

               It is agreed that before setting any hearing or initiating discovery in
               a suit for modification of the terms and conditions of
               conservatorship, possession, or support of the children, except in an
               emergency, the parties shall mediate the controversy in good faith.
               This requirement does not apply to actions brought to enforce this
               Final Decree of Divorce or to enforce any subsequent modifications
               of this decree. It is agreed that the party wishing to modify the terms
               and conditions of conservatorship, possession, or support of the
               children shall give written notice to the other party of a desire to
               mediate the controversy. If, within ten days after receipt of the
               written notice, the parties cannot agree on a mediator or the other
               party does not agree to attend mediation or fails to attend a
               scheduled mediation of the controversy, the party desiring
               modification shall be released from the obligation to mediate and
               shall be free to file suit for modification.

               The parties agree that any claim or controversy arising out of this
               Final Decree of Divorce that cannot be settled by direct negotiations
               or mediation will be submitted to binding arbitration with WAYNE
               URBANOWSKI as provided in chapter 171 of the Texas Civil
               Practice and Remedies Code. The arbitrator, WAYNE
               URBANOWSKI, is hereby selected by mutual agreement. The cost
               of arbitration will be paid 50 percent by husband and 50 percent by
               wife.

       Over the course of many months starting in the fall of 2021, M.P. sought to negotiate,

mediate, and, if unsuccessful, arbitrate certain custody issues. On July 21, 2022, counsel for J.J.

sent an email to counsel for M.P. stating their position that modifications need not be arbitrated.

After further attempts to negotiate or mediate failed, on August 1, 2022, M.P. emailed a demand

for arbitration to Wayne Urbanowski.

       On October 13, 2022, J.J. filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship. The

petition sought to: (1) deny M.P. access to the children or, alternatively, render a possession order

providing M.P.’s periods of visitation be continuously supervised and deny M.P. periods of

overnight possession; (2) grant J.J. exclusive right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical

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treatment involving invasive procedures; and (3) grant J.J. the exclusive right to consent to

psychiatric and psychological treatment of the children.

       On November 8, 2022, appellant filed a motion to compel arbitration. On December 5,

2022, the trial court entered an order denying appellant’s motion to compel arbitration. This appeal

follows.

                         ARBITRATION OF MODIFICATION PROCEEDING

       In his sole issue on appeal, M.P. argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel

arbitration because J.J. expressly agreed to arbitrate “any claim or controversy arising out of” the

final decree.

       A party seeking to compel arbitration must establish two elements: (1) the existence of a

valid arbitration agreement and (2) that the disputed claims fall within the scope of that agreement.

Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277, 284 (Tex. 2021); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 171.021. The parties do not dispute the existence of a valid arbitration agreement in the

final decree. However, J.J. asserts the arbitration provision specifically carves out (1) emergencies

and (2) modification suits.

       A dispute over whether parties agreed to resolve their controversies through arbitration—

typically referred to as “arbitrability”—typically encompasses three distinct disagreements: (1) the

merits of the underlying controversy; (2) whether the merits must be resolved through arbitration

instead of in the courts; and (3) who (a court or the arbitrator) decides the second question.

TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694, 701 (Tex. 2023). “The

second question must be answered before the first, but the third must be answered before the

second.” Id. Therefore, we begin with the third question.

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                                                                                       04-22-00848-CV

Should a court or arbitrator decide arbitrability of J.J.’s modification proceeding?

       Where, as here, “the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to

arbitration, then the court should decide that question. . . .” Id. at 702 (quoting First Options of

Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)) (emphasis in original). Because the final decree

does not delegate the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator, we hold the proper forum for resolving

arbitrability under the subject arbitration provision is the courts. And because the merits are not at

issue in this interlocutory appeal, the only question remaining before us is the second: the

appropriate forum for resolving the merits.

Does J.J.’s modification proceeding fall within the scope of the arbitration provision?

                                         Standard of Review

       Because M.P. established the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, “a ‘strong

presumption favoring arbitration arises’ and we resolve doubts as to the agreement’s scope in favor

of arbitration.” Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 850 (Tex.

2013)). “The presumption in favor of arbitration is so compelling that a court should not deny

arbitration unless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible

of an interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue.” Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d

111, 115 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995))

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). Whether J.J.’s modification claims fall within

the scope of a valid arbitration agreement is a question of law we review de novo. Id.

                                               Analysis

       J.J.’s modification petition sought to: (1) deny M.P. access to the children or, alternatively,

render a possession order providing M.P.’s periods of visitation be continuously supervised and

deny M.P. periods of overnight possession; (2) grant J.J. exclusive right to consent to medical,

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                                                                                      04-22-00848-CV

dental, and surgical treatment involving invasive procedures; and (3) grant J.J. the exclusive right

to consent to psychiatric and psychological treatment of the children.

       M.P. asserts J.J.’s petition to modify the terms and conditions of conservatorship,

possession and support of the children—as set forth in the final decree—constitutes a claim or

controversy that is significantly related to and factually intertwined with the final decree. See

Kilroy v. Kilroy, 137 S.W.3d 780, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (determining

arbitration of SAPCR issue does not require trial court pre-approval). Therefore, M.P. argues, the

modification petition falls within the scope of the arbitration provision.

       J.J. responds the language of the arbitration provision carves out emergencies and

modification proceedings, and therefore the trial court properly denied M.P.’s motion to compel

arbitration. We reject J.J.’s interpretation because it confuses language applicable to the mediation

procedure with the arbitration provision proper:

                  ADR LANGUAGE                                       INTERPRETATION

 It is agreed that before setting any hearing or Except in an emergency, parties must
 initiating discovery in a suit for modification of the mediate before seeking modification.
 terms and conditions of conservatorship, possession,
 or support of the children, except in an emergency,
 the parties shall mediate the controversy in good
 faith.

 This requirement does not apply to actions brought Mediation requirement carve-out for
 to enforce this Final Decree of Divorce or to enforce enforcement actions.
 any subsequent modifications of this decree.

 It is agreed that the party wishing to modify the Written       notice         required     before
 terms and conditions of conservatorship, possession, mediation.
 or support of the children shall give written notice to
 the other party of a desire to mediate the
 controversy.

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                                                                                     04-22-00848-CV

                    ADR LANGUAGE                                    INTERPRETATION

 If, within ten days after receipt of the written notice, Releases movant from mediation
 the parties cannot agree on a mediator or the other requirement upon stated conditions.
 party does not agree to attend mediation or fails to
 attend a scheduled mediation of the controversy, the
 party desiring modification shall be released from
 the obligation to mediate and shall be free to file suit
 for modification.

 The parties agree that any claim or controversy Arbitration provision requires “any
 arising out of this Final Decree of Divorce that claim or controversy arising out of” final
 cannot be settled by direct negotiations or mediation decree to be submitted to arbitration.
 will be submitted to binding arbitration with
 WAYNE URBANOWSKI as provided in chapter
 171 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

 The arbitrator, WAYNE URBANOWSKI, is hereby Selection of agreed arbitrator.
 selected by mutual agreement.

 The cost of arbitration will be paid 50 percent by Agreement on costs of arbitration.
 husband and 50 percent by wife.

       We read the “emergency” exception to exempt the parties from mediation; however, no

such exemption applies to the requirement to arbitrate “any claim or controversy arising out of”

the final decree.

       J.J. further argues that the use of the words “hearing,” “discovery,” and “suit” necessarily

refers to a trial court proceeding rather than an arbitration proceeding. We disagree the mere use

of these three words inexorably refers to litigation in court and decline to read their use as

implicitly overruling the arbitration provision. Moreover, the express carve-out of the mediation

requirement for enforcement actions undercuts J.J.’s assertion that the parties intended to imply an

exception through the mere use of these words throughout the alternative dispute resolution

provisions; in other words, the four corners of the final decree confirm the parties knew how to

expressly draft exceptions to alternative dispute resolution requirements, yet they did not do so

with respect to arbitration of modification actions. See In re D. Wilson Const. Co., 196 S.W.3d

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                                                                                                     04-22-00848-CV

774, 782 & n.6 (Tex. 2006) (“If the parties intended for clause 4.5.1.1 to supplant subparagraph

4.5.1, they could have easily drafted language to accomplish exactly that. . . . Clearly, the parties

were free to delete and replace language in the General Conditions with language in the

Supplementary Conditions, and they had done so elsewhere.”).

         We cannot say with positive assurance that the broad language requiring arbitration of “any

claim or controversy arising out of” the final decree is not susceptible to an interpretation which

would cover modification of the terms of final decree. See Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115. Applying

the strong presumption favoring arbitration and resolving doubts as to the agreement’s scope in

favor of arbitration, we hold the modification proceeding falls within the scope of the arbitration

provision and sustain M.P.’s sole issue on appeal. 3

                                                   CONCLUSION

         We reverse the trial court’s order denying M.P.’s motion to compel arbitration, and we

remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to render an order compelling the parties to

arbitrate the merits of the modification petition.

                                                           Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

3
 In the trial court, J.J. asserted a perfunctory waiver of arbitration by litigation conduct argument. Assuming without
deciding the issue was preserved for our review, J.J. abandoned the argument in her brief. Therefore, we need not
address waiver.

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