Court Opinion

ID: 9628025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:05:11.398082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:35.862621
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
specially concurring, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins.
Except for that said in the section captioned “Error in Failing to Allow Questions Concerning Workmen’s Compensation,” I concur with the majority opinion. With reference to the section captioned “Error in Failing to Allow Questions Concerning Workmen’s Compensation,” I concur in the result but would base the result on lack of abuse of discretion by the trial judge in sustaining the objection to the questions and on the fact that there could be no prejudice from the ruling inasmuch as the case was resolved on the determination of no liability and the issue of damages (to which the questions were directed) was never reached.
Although a few courts have held that an objection was necessary to apply the doctrine of invited error in situations such as presented in this case, I do not believe that we should set such a strict requirement as is done by the majority opinion.
“ * * * The party who first introduces improper evidence cannot object to the admission of evidence from the adverse party relating to the same matter.
“However, the admission of such evidence is not a matter of absolute right, but rests in the sound discretion of the court, which will not permit a party to introduce evidence, which should not be admitted, merely because the adverse party has brought out some evidence on the same subject, where the circumstances are such that no prejudice can result from a refusal to go into the matter further.” 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 190a.
“Except that there are some cases to the contrary, and that the rule has been held to be limited in scope,[1] the rules stated in subdivision a of this section apply not only to the subject matter of evidence, but also to its nature. Thus, the rule that one party should be allowed to introduce evidence not in its nature such as should be received where similar evidence has been received from the other party without objection, subject to the exceptions, has been applied in the ease of secondary evidence, hearsay evidence, declarations of a deceased person, self-serving declarations, declarations against interest, parol evidence affecting writings, opinion evidence, or conclusions of a witness.” (Emphasis added.) 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 190b.
The quotation in the majority opinion from McCormick on Evidence 2nd Ed., § 57, when left in context, does not support the strict holding of that opinion. The text presents an acceptable analysis of the issue. Section 57 provides in pertinent part:
“One party offers evidence which is inadmissible. Because the adversary fails to object, or because he has no opportunity to do so, or because the judge erroneously overrules an objection, the incompetent evidence comes in. Is the adversary entitled to answer this evidence, by testimony in denial or explanation of the facts so proved? It has been stated that in some jurisdictions the adversary is not entitled to so meet the evidence, in others he may do so, and finally in some he may do so if *916he would be prejudiced by rejection of efforts to meet the evidence; but that in reaching these results many of the decisions seem merely to affirm the action of the trial court. However, most of the courts seem to say generally that ‘one who induces a trial court to let down the bars to a field of inquiry that is not competent or relevant to the issues cannot complain if his adversary is also allowed to avail himself of the opening.’ “Many of these pronouncements do not settle the questions as to how the trial judge should deal with the problem, or as to whether the adversary is entitled as of right to introduce the answering evidence. Because of the many variable factors affecting the solution in particular cases the decisions do not lend themselves easily to generalizations, but the following conclusions, having some support in the decisions, are submitted as reasonable:
“(1) If the incompetent evidence sought to be answered is immaterial and not prejudice-arousing, the judge, to save time and to avoid distraction of attention from the issues, should refuse to hear answering evidence; but if he does hear it, under the prevailing view, the party opening the door has no standing to complain.
“(2) If the evidence, though inadmissible, is relevant to the issues and hence probably damaging to the adversary’s case, or though irrelevant is prejudice-arousing to a material degree, and if the adversary has seasonably objected or moved to strike, then the adversary should be entitled to give answering evidence as of right. By objecting he has done his best to save the court from mistake, but his remedy by assigning error to the ruling is not an adequate one. He needs a fair opportunity to win his case at the trial by refuting the damaging evidence. * * *
“(3) If again the first incompetent evidence is relevant, or though irrelevant is prejudice-arousing, but the adversary has failed to object or to move to strike out, where such an objection might apparently have avoided the harm, then the allowance of answering evidence should rest in the judge’s discretion. He should weigh the probable influence of the first evidence, the time and distraction incident to answering it, and the possibility and effectiveness of an instruction to the jury to disregard it. However, here various courts have indicated that introduction of the answering evidence is a matter of right.
“(4) In any event, if the incompetent evidence, or even the inquiry eliciting it, is so prejudice-arousing that an objection or motion to strike can not have erased the harm, then it seems that the adversary should be entitled to answer it as of right.” (Emphasis added.) McCormick on Evidence, supra, § 57, pp. 131-133.
In this instance, the trial court could have deemed the evidence sought to be answered to be immaterial, incompetent or irrelevant and not prejudice-arousing, and thus properly exclude introduction of answering evidence. Since the issue to which it was directed was that of damages — -an issue not reached in this case, such conclusion by the trial court would have been correct. But even if the evidence sought to be answered was material, competent and relevant or prejudice-arousing, and even if it were not objected to when presented, I would consider it within the discretion of the trial judge whether or not the answering evidence should be received. Grist v. Upjohn Company, 16 Mich.App. 452, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969); Crosby v. Keen, 200 Miss. 590, 28 So.2d 322 (1946); Biener v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 160 S.W.2d 780 (1942). The discretion could not be said to have been here abused inasmuch as prejudice did not result, i. e. the issue of damages to which the evidence was directed was never reached.

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