Court Opinion

ID: 9811150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:11:09.153241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:20.401715
License: Public Domain

Barnhill, J.,
dissenting in part: I am concerned only about tbe first question presented by this appeal and tbe disposition thereof by tbe majority. If I interpret tbe opinion correctly it, in effect, directs judgment tbat tbe 70 shares of preferred stock in tbe Carolina Power & Light Company are tbe property of tbe estate, free of any claim of Rossie Mae Barnes, except as to tbe one-balf interest conceded by appel-lees. I am unable to concur in this disposition of tbat phase of tbe case.
While judgment for tbe executor will inure to tbe benefit of tbe other defendants, tbe only persons having a legal interest in this stock are tbe executor and Rossie Mae Barnes. Judgment as to tbe stock was entered in favor of Miss Barnes. Tbe executor did not appeal. This would seem to settle tbe question.
If, however, tbe other defendants have such interest as entitles them to contest tbe ownership, tben it is to be noted tbat they concede tbat Miss Barnes is entitled to one-balf of tbe stock. This concedes donative intent and delivery and leaves for decision only one question: Is a joint tenancy created by contract enfoi’ceable in this State? This question is answered in Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C., 531. Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N. C., 178, 7 S. E. (2d), 366.
Tbe stock as transferred on tbe books of tbe company creates an estate for tbe common enjoyment of tbe joint tenants with tbe right of survivor-ship upon tbe death of either. When the testator directed tbat it be purchased and so transferred be put it beyond bis power to recall tbe gift or to sell, pledge, or give it away without tbe consent of tbe other joint owner.
“There is a complete gift of corporate stock where, by tbe direction of its owner, it has been transferred to tbe donee on tbe books of tbe corporation, and a new certificate issued in tbe name of tbe donee, or a certificate is issued in the first instance in tbe name of tbe donee,' although tbe certificate so issued is retained by tbe donor or tbe corporation and not delivered to the donee.” Oases cited, Anno. 99 A. L. R., 1080. Wherever it has been held to tbe contrary, decision was made to turn upon some *324additional, unusual circumstance which, definitely disclosed that the donor at the time had no present intent to make a gift.
If, however, .the inference of constructive delivery with donative intent does not follow as a matter of law, it is strongly indicated as an ultimate fact. Certainly the facts and circumstances are such as to permit that conclusion.
In this connection, in my opinion, the fact the testator had the right to petition for partition has no bearing on the question of delivery and does not vary the general rule that transfer on the books of the company constitutes constructive delivery. The right to partition is purely statutory and not contractual. It resided in the testator so long as he lived whether he held the certificate or not and without regard to the portion of the purchase price paid by him. The estate created and not the retention of the certificate gave him the right.
Nor is the receipt of a dividend significant. It was payable to the joint owners, was endorsed by the donee, and by her delivered to the testator.
Putting all else aside and coming to the disposition made of this part of the case we have this situation. The executor of an estate comes into court seeking advice and counsel respecting conflicting claims which have arisen in the administration of the estate. He and the devisees who are the only interested parties agree on and stipulate certain facts. In so doing they fail to stipulate as to the crucial, decisive, ultimate fact to be inferred from the facts agreed.
Did the testator with donative intent make actual or constructive delivery of the Carolina Power & Light stock? This is the decisive question. The answer is an inference of fact, pro or con, to be drawn from the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. As to this there is no stipulation.
The majority conclude that “it would not seem to follow as a necessary conclusion of law that a present gift was intended.” It is then said, “We have neither the verdict of a jury nor other definite determination of permissible inferences of fact which would compel a conclusion in accord with the appellee’s contention.”
Having thus conceded that there are permissible inferences favorable to appellee yet undetermined, the Court strikes down the judgment in her favor and closes the door against her, not because the facts are against her but because sufficient facts to support a definite decision on the question presented were not stipulated.
This is not in accord with the procedure in such cases heretofore established by this Court. The cause should be remanded for further proceedings to the end the true facts may be fully ascertained and the executor correctly advised as to the ownership of the stock involved.
*325In principle, Trustees v. Banking Co., 182 N. C., 298, 109 S. E., 6, is on all fours witb tbis ease. There tbe action was brought to recover the value of bonds delivered to defendant as bailee. Plaintiff alleged that defendant negligently failed to account therefor. The parties stipulated the facts and circumstances surrounding the bailment and the failure to account therefor, but failed to stipulate as to the crucial ultimate fact of negligence. The cause was remanded for further stipulation or trial by jury.
In Briggs v. Developers, 191 N. C., 184, 133 S. E., 3, heard on facts agreed, Stacy, O. J., says: “We think the facts agreed are insufficient to warrant the court in declaring, as a matter of law, that the title offered is good and indefeasible.” Judgment was not rendered or directed for defendants. The cause was remanded for further proceedings. See also Weinstein v. Raleigh, 218 N. C., 549, 11 S. E. (2d), 560.
If we are not to affirm, then we should follow the procedure established by these and other decisions of this Court and remand. I so vote.
Seawell, J., concurs in dissent.