Court Opinion

ID: 9546291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:26:55.923746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:14.394421
License: Public Domain

Petrich, J.
(concurring) — I agree with the majority opinion that the petitioner has not shown an error of constitutional magnitude warranting relief and that the petition should be denied. I disagree, however, with the majority's reasoning.
The majority seems to overlook a fundamental requirement of a constitutionally valid guilty plea, namely, that a guilty plea cannot be truly voluntary "unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969); State v. Chervenell, 99 Wn.2d 309, 662 P.2d 836 (1983); In re Keene, 95 Wn.2d 203, 622 P.2d 360 (1980). To me this means the defendant must understand that the facts the defendant admits fit the proscription of the criminal act. One can be aware of the essential elements of the charged offense without understanding that the acts he admits may not amount to a crime.
The majority is mistaken when it states that the court's opinion in In re Keene, supra, discussing the factual basis issue "is couched entirely in terms of reference to CrR 4.2(d) and its antecedent, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and does not refer to constitutional principles." Majority, at 726. In re Keene clearly recognizes the rule prohibiting collateral *729attack of a guilty plea on nonconstitutional grounds which could have been raised on appeal. It is true that the court discussed at length the requirement of CrR 4.2(d) and its federal counterpart requiring the court to develop on the record a factual basis for the plea and at first blush seems to give the impression that it's equating the rule with a constitutionally mandated procedure. A more careful reading discloses that the court recognized the difference between the rule and the constitutional requirements of a guilty plea. The court was satisfied that the defendant was aware of the essential elements of the offense by his plea of guilty to the crime of forgery as charged in the information. The court then addresses the next step in its analysis of a constitutionally valid plea: whether through being aware of the nature of the charge, the defendant realized that his conduct actually fell within the charge. The court in addressing this issue did not confine itself to the record at the time of the plea as was required by the rule but examined any and all available evidence touching on this question.
Neither the petitioner's admission, contained in his statement, nor the facts subsequently revealed in the presentence report would support a conviction for forgery. The instrument was neither falsely made nor falsely completed.
The petitioner completed the check. However, he was authorized to do so by Mr. Lindh, his employer, who had signed it. He was also authorized to cash it. What he was not authorized to do was to use the money for nonbusiness purposes. Thus, Mr. Keene's unauthorized personal use of the $100 constituted third degree theft under RCW 9A.56.050, not forgery as defined in RCW 9A.60-.020.
In re Keene, 95 Wn.2d at 211. Finding no factual basis the court permitted a collateral attack on constitutional grounds and set aside the guilty plea to the charge of forgery.
Here, although the record at the time of the plea does not provide a factual basis for the plea as required by the *730court rule, I am satisfied that a factual basis does exist to satisfy the requirements of a constitutionally valid plea. The "pen report" which is a part of the record here and which is not disputed by the petitioner, adequately establishes a factual basis for the plea.
In conclusion, I believe there must be a showing that a factual basis exists demonstrating that the accused realized that the conduct he admits fits within the proscription of the law before a plea can meet the requirements of a free and voluntary plea under the constitution. However, the constitution does not require, as does the rule, that such a factual basis must appear on the record at the time the plea was entered. Believing that such a factual basis exists here, I join in the denial of the petition.