Court Opinion

ID: 9530182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:58:01.289233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:01.079892
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL, concurring in part, dissenting in part: I concur with the majority insofar as it holds that defendant waived alleged errors which were not set out in his motion for a new trial. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s view that the jury’s verdict must be reversed and remanded due to improper prosecutorial argument. To begin with, the facts of this case fall squarely within the doctrine of invited response, a doctrine which Illinois has recognized for at least a quarter of a century. (See, e.g., People v. Weisberg (1947), 396 Ill. 412, 71 N.E.2d 671, cert, denied (1947), 331 U.S. 826, 91 L. Ed. 1842, 67 S. Ct. 1318.) The case of People v. Fleming (1st Dist. 1964), 54 Ill. App. 2d 457, 203 N.E.2d 716, illustrates this doctrine. There, during closing argument, defendant’s counsel posed questions to the jury as to why, inter alia, the prosecution had not produced a certain witness (a codefendant not on trial because of a severance). In reply the State’s Attorney argued that the defense had had an equal opportunity to put the witness on the stand and pointed out that the missing party was in jail and had signed a confession. On appeal, it was held that under the circumstances these statements in reply were not error. Furthermore, other remarks by the prosecutor during final argument concerning two State’s witnesses’ prior consistent statements to police, while improper and erroneous, did not constitute reversible error under the doctrine of invited response. In light of this well-settled doctrine, I cannot agree that the error in this case, if any, was prejudicial. The record demonstrates that prior to final argument both sides were aware a mix-up had occurred concerning whose clothing was sent to the F.E.I. and the State’s request to show that Sneyd’s clothing really belonged to Edwards and had been tested positively for plaster particles was denied upon defense counsel’s objection. Since defense counsel knew that both the clothing and the positive test results would not be admitted into evidence, it was improper for him to state rhetorically that “I want it and the State has yet to produce it — the clothing of the defendant [Edwards].” In my opinion, this statement raised an inference in the minds of the jurors that the State could not produce evidence which was essential to its case, and permitted the prosecutor to make references to the clothing during his final argument. Although an exception to the invited response doctrine exists when a prosecutor’s argument is so prejudicial as to deny a defendant a fair trial, it will not be invoked where the improper remarks do not constitute a material factor in the conviction or there is otherwise overwhelming evidence of guilt. (People v. Berry (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 453, 165 N.E.2d 257, cert, denied (1960), 364 U.S. 846, 5 L. Ed. 2d 69, 81 S. Ct. 87; People v. Mostert (3d Dist. 1976), 34 Ill. App. 3d 767, 340 N.E.2d 300.) In this connection, it is significant that the State was only permitted to prove that the clothes already in evidence did not belong to Edwards, and that it restricted its comments during final argument to the fact that other clothing existed without mentioning the positive test results. It seems apparent that absent some reference to these test results the fact that other clothes existed has no real importance and certainly could not have been a material factor in the defendant’s conviction. This is especially true where, as here, there was otherwise overwhelming evidence of guilt. The record indicates (1) that defendant Larson plead guilty; (2) that Sneyd implicated Edwards in the crime, received no consideration for his testimony and was corroborated in part by the testimony of a security guard; (3) that Sneyd and Edwards were apprehended together by police in the immediate vicinity of the burglary; (4) that Edwards’ explanation of his presence in the area was, at best, implausible, and was directly refuted by Sneyd; and (5) that the jury was cautioned that opening and closing statements were not evidence and were to be disregarded if not based on evidence adduced at trial. Aside from the majority’s refusal to apply the invited response doctrine, I also dissent from what I perceive to be the majority’s intrusion into the province of the jury. While the majority opinion correctly points out that the conflicting testimony of defendant and Sneyd was a factual issue of credibility for the trier of fact, it goes on to conclude that “the evidence of guilt was not so overwhelming that defendant’s conviction would surely have resulted absent the prosecutor’s prejudicial comments ° * I would remind the majority that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, although suspect, is a sufficient ground on which the trier of fact may base a conviction. (People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346.) Here, as I have already pointed out, Sneyd not only testified without consideration but was corroborated to some extent by the testimony of the security guard. These circumstances, coupled with the other evidence of record I have outlined above, indicate the overwhelming nature of the evidence against defendant. Considering this evidence in light of the fact that the test results were not revealed to the jury, it is evident to me that the majority has merely substituted its own judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the trier of fact. Therefore, the prosecutor’s remarks, even if erroneous, can hardly be said to have substantially prejudiced defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. Accordingly, the error is insufficient to require reversal of the jury’s verdict against defendant. People v. Hammond (1st Dist. 1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 956, 359 N.E.2d 1.