Court Opinion

ID: 2964356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:31.585645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:54.175882
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1245

                                 STEPHEN R. MARQUES,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                 KEVIN J. FITZGERALD,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                     [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                             and Tauro,* District Judge.
                                         ______________

                                 ____________________

               Thomas S. Brown with whom Stephen A. Rodio  was on brief for
               _______________           ________________
          appellant.
               Kathleen M. Powers with  whom Marc DeSisto was on  brief for
               __________________            ____________
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                   October 28, 1996
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

               *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

               COFFIN, Senior  Circuit Judge.   This case  concerns several
                       _____________________

          claims  brought  by  plaintiff-appellant,  Stephen   R.  Marques,

          against the city of  East Providence, Rhode Island, based  on his

          discharge while a  probationary employee of  the city.   Marques,

          who had refused to continue a work assignment on a boat at a city

          pond  due  to  his   fear  of  capsizing  and  was   subsequently

          terminated, sued the city  under both state and federal  law; the

          city  removed  the case  to federal  court.   The  district court

          granted directed verdicts for the city on all claims.   We affirm

          on two claims,  and vacate as to  Marques' claim under  the Rhode

          Island Whistleblowers' Act.  

                                      BACKGROUND

               Marques was hired as a laborer by the city of East

          Providence in June 1993.1  On December 22, 1993, several days

          before the expiration of his six-month probationary period,

          Marques was assigned to work at Jones Pond, cutting weeds in the

          pond from an aluminum row boat.  Marques, who is unable to swim,

          expressed some concerns about the assignment to Gregory Gammell

          ("Gammell"), the Superintendent of the Parks Department, but was

          told by Gammell not to worry about it.  On his arrival at Jones

          Pond, Marques noticed that there were no life preservers in the

          boat, and asked Gammell for one.  Gammell initially questioned

          Marques' need for the life preserver, but told him he would get

                              
          ____________________

               1    We  take the  facts  from the  pleadings  and from  the
          testimony at trial.   See PHC, Inc. v. Pioneer  Healthcare, Inc.,
                                ___ _________    _________________________
          75 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1996).

                                         -2-

          one; however, this life preserver was not forthcoming.2  Marques

          nevertheless performed the assignment.

               On the following day, December 23, 1993, Marques, who had

          again been assigned to duty in the boat cutting reeds, told lead

          worker Robert Barlow ("Barlow") that he was nervous about working

          in the boat, that he would like a life preserver, and that he had

          asked for one on the prior day but not received it.  Barlow

          questioned the need for a life preserver, given the depth of the

          water, but said he would call Gammell.  Gammell arrived, but sans

          life preserver, and subsequently left the site.  Marques

          testified that he began to feel nauseous during the morning while

          working on the boat, which he attributed to motion sickness.  At

          the morning break, he therefore told Barlow that he wasn't going

          back in the boat because he was feeling sick.  Barlow indicated

          that if Marques didn't return to the boat, Barlow would call

          Gammell.  During subsequent general conversation between workers

          at the pond site about the safety of the project, Marques and

          others expressed concerns about the lack of life preservers and

          other safety devices.  Gammell returned to the pond, and
                              
          ____________________

               2    Testimony  was  presented by  city  witnesses  at trial
          indicating  that the depth of  Jones Pond varied  between two and
          five  feet.  The Pond  was created artificially  by dredging, and
          measures  approximately  300 feet  by  250  feet, with  retaining
          cement walls.  We also note that Paul Lemont, the City Manager of
          East Providence, who gave the original order for the work project
          at Jones Pond, testified that the weed cutting project could have
          been  performed by laborers in  a boat, as  actually occurred, or
          alternatively by laborers wearing boots.  
                    On the other hand, Marques testified  that at one point
          during the December  23rd session, he  lost hold of  a five  foot
          rake he  was using; when he grabbed it, the rake was almost fully
          submerged in the water, and had not yet touched bottom.  

                                         -3-

          instructed Marques and Barlow to get in his car.  On their

          arrival at Gammell's office, Gammell instructed Marques to "punch

          out" and then terminated him.3  Marques did not discuss his

          safety concerns with Gammell during the car trip or at his

          termination.  Gammell informed Marques that he was being

          terminated because he wouldn't get back in the boat and because

          of his attitude.  

               Marques subsequently met with City Manager Lemont to discuss

          his firing.   At this meeting, Marques explained his concerns

          about safety and his physical ills to Lemont; however, Lemont

          later wrote Marques a letter informing him that the decision to

          terminate Marques would stand.

               Shortly after his termination, Marques began experiencing

          physical symptoms such as tightness in his chest and difficulty

          breathing, which his physician attributed to situational anxiety

          brought on by his firing.  His doctor prescribed medications and

          counseling.  Marques also began experiencing marital

          difficulties.  

               Marques sued the city in state court, alleging violations of

          a number of state statutes, including the Rhode Island

          Whistleblowers' Act, as well as federal claims including the

          Americans with Disabilities Act.  He also claimed that the city's

          actions constituted negligent or intentional infliction of

          emotional distress, and that the city had violated the Rhode
                              
          ____________________

               3    During the probationary period, city employees could be
          fired for any reason,  with or without cause, and  also could not
          file a grievance with the city regarding a discharge.

                                         -4-

          Island Regulation of Boats law.4  The city removed the case to

          federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.  At

          the close of the evidence, the district court granted a directed

          verdict for the city on all counts.5   This appeal on three of

          the claims followed. 

                                      DISCUSSION

               Our review of the directed verdicts on the appealed claims

          is plenary; as such we must apply the same criteria used by the

          district court, with all proof and inferences reasonably drawn

          therefrom viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. 

          Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1994).  To
          ______    ________________

          affirm, we must find that the evidence on each count would permit

          thoughtful factfinders to reach but one conclusion.  Fashion
                                                               _______

          House v. K Mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1088 (1st Cir. 1989). 
          _____    ____________

          After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the district

          court on the intentional infliction of emotional distress and

                              
          ____________________

               4    The specific statutes under which Marques'  claims were
          brought  are as  follows:  the Rhode  Island Whistleblowers'  Act
          (R.I.  Gen. Laws    28-50-1 - 9); the Americans With Disabilities
          Act (on the grounds that the city saw him as disabled) (42 U.S.C.
             12100 et seq.); the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act
          (R.I. Gen. Laws     28-50-1  - 28-50-9); the  Rhode Island  Civil
          Rights  Act  (R.I.  Gen. Laws     42-112-1  et  seq.); and  Rhode
          Island's Regulation of Boats law (R.I. Gen. Laws   46-22-1 - 19).

               5    Marques voluntarily  dismissed a claim  that the city's
          actions  violated Rhode  Island's safe  boating practices  public
          policy.  After the  trial court had granted directed  verdicts on
          all the  other claims,  Marques moved  to  reinstate this  count;
          however,  the district  court denied  this motion.   We  need not
          address  this  issue because  appellant did  not  brief it.   See
                                                                        ___
          Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Public Service Com'n of Puerto Rico,
          _________________________    ___________________________________
          906 F.2d 25, 40 (1990) (appellant waives any issue not adequately
          raised in initial brief).

                                         -5-

          Rhode Island Regulation of Boats claims, but vacate on the

          appellant's claim under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act.  We

          deal first with the most significant claim.

          A.   Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act Claim
               ______________________________________

               The Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act provides in relevant

          part that:

                    An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or
               otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding
               the employee's compensation, terms, location, or
               privileges of employment
                    (1)  because the employee [...] reports or is
               about to report to a public body, verbally or in
               writing, a violation which the employee knows or
               reasonably believes has occurred or is about to occur,
               of a law or regulation, or rule promulgated under the
               law of this state, a political subdivision of this
               state, or the United States, unless the employee knows
               or has reason to know that the report is false....6

          Accordingly, an employee must demonstrate that there was a causal

          connection between the report and the termination.

               The statute does not explicitly define what constitutes a

          "report" or "reporting" a suspected or known violation.  However,

          it does define "public body" as follows:

                    (4)  "Public body" means all of the
               following:[...]
                    (iii) A county, city, town, or regional governing
               body, a council, school district, or a board,
               department, commission, agency, or any member or
               employee thereof.7

                              
          ____________________

               6    R.I. Gen. Laws   28-50-3(1) (1995).  The current  Rhode
          Island Whistleblowers' Act was  enacted in 1995, and replaced  an
          earlier  version  of  the  Whistleblowers'  Act  that  carried  a
          different  statutory  number, (R.I.  Gen. Laws    36-15-1  - 10);
          however, the terms of this section were unchanged.  

               7    R.I. Gen. Laws   28-50-2(4)(iii) (1995).

                                         -6-

               The district court concluded that this statute is

          inapplicable in the circumstances of this case because Marques'

          statements could not be construed as "reports" to a "public

          body."  The district court reasoned that the statute contemplates

          a situation in which an employee reports or threatens to report a

          violation of a law to a third party with jurisdiction over the

          violation.  For the district court, Marques' statements were

          merely explanations for his refusal to return to the boat, rather

          than reports to an appropriate individual or body of known or

          suspected violations.  

               Marques argues on appeal that the district court gave an

          overly narrow interpretation to the statute's provisions.  He

          claims that his statements to Barlow could fall within the

          statute and that both caselaw (albeit from other jurisdictions)

          and public policy support his view.  The city, on the other hand,

          contends that the district court properly construed the

          provision; it maintains that Marques made no statements to Barlow

          or other supervisors that reasonably could be construed as

          reports of violations to a public body.  

               Our task is complicated by the lack of guideposts.  There is

          no relevant legislative history indicating the intent of Rhode

          Island lawmakers concerning the interpretation of these terms. 

          Furthermore, Rhode Island courts have not directly interpreted

          "report" or "public body" under the statute.  We do, however,

          have the statutory language, which must be construed consistently

          with its purpose.  Our review of the language of the statute,

                                         -7-

          together with an examination of similar statutes from other

          jurisdictions, with an eye to the public policy underlying such

          whistleblowers' statutes, counsels a broader view of the statute

          than that adopted by the district court.  

               We begin with principles of statutory construction.  Where

          the terms of a statute are clear, a court must give the words

          their plain and obvious meaning.  See Ellis v. Rhode Island
                                            ___ _____    ____________

          Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 57 (R.I. 1991);
          ________________________

          O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1996) (courts
          _________    _______

          are bound to give statutes a practical, commonsense reading).  

          Furthermore, a statute may not be construed in a manner that

          results in absurdities or defeats its underlying purpose.  In re
                                                                     _____

          Falstaff Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I. 1994).  As
          ______________________

          noted, the statute explicitly includes municipal employees in the

          definition of "public body"; however, the boundaries of the

          definition of "report" are still unclear.  Therefore, we turn to

          Rhode Island's sister states in search of further clarification.8

               Similar whistleblowers' statutes are found in Massachusetts,

          Maine, New Hampshire, and Connecticut.  Of these, the Connecticut

          statute bears the closest resemblance to the Rhode Island statute

          at hand, although it, too, has not been the focus of relevant

          caselaw.9  Generally, these whistleblowers' statutes appear to
                              
          ____________________

               8    We look  first to those states within  our own circuit,
          and  then to the state  (Connecticut) with the  statute that most
          resembles the one at issue here.    

               9    Conn.  Gen.  Stat.  Ann.      31-51m  (West   1987)("No
          employer shall  discharge, discipline, or otherwise  penalize any

                                         -8-

          fall into two broad categories:  statutes like Rhode Island's and

          Connecticut's, which are broadly drafted, and do not explicitly

          include statements to an employee's supervisor within the rubric

          of reports to a public body, and more detailed statutes like

          those of Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire.  The statutes in

          this second category are considerably more complex than those of

          the first type; these explicitly include statements to a

          supervisor within protected behavior, and indeed, require it as a

          preliminary reporting step.10  Clearly, under this type of

          statute, Marques' statements to Barlow would come under the

          umbrella of protected actions.  Such is not as clearly the case

          here, where we must deal with a more broadly drafted statute.  

               Marques, confronted with a paucity of Rhode Island

          authorities on this issue, points to two cases from other

          jurisdictions dealing with whistleblowers to support his

          assertion that public policy supports a broad reading of the

          Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act.  Appeal of Bio Energy Corp.,
                                             __________________________

          607 A.2d 606 (N.H. 1992), concerned an employee who was

          terminated after bringing to her supervisor's attention a
                              
          ____________________

          employee  because  the  employee  ...  reports,  verbally  or  in
          writing, a violation  or a  suspected violation of  any state  or
          federal  law   or  regulation  or  any   municipal  ordinance  or
          regulation to a public body ....").  

               10   See, e.g., N.H. Rev.  Stat. Ann.   275-E (1987  & Supp.
                    ___  ____
          1995)  ("[the protections of this section] shall not apply to any
          employee unless the employee  first brought the alleged violation
          to the  attention of a  person having supervisory  authority with
          the  employer,  and  then   allowed  the  employer  a  reasonable
          opportunity to  correct that  violation...."); Mass. Gen.  L. ch.
          149,   185(b)(1) et seq. (West 1996); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26
            831(1) -  833(2) (West 1988).

                                         -9-

          violation of State Department of Labor rules regarding payment of

          wages.  Id. at 607.  The court there found that the New Hampshire
                  ___

          statute, which mandates an initial report to a supervisor,

          applies to employees from the point of this initial report.  Id.
                                                                       ___

          at 608-09.  The court noted the dual purposes of the New

          Hampshire Act:  "to encourage employees to come forward and

          report violations without fear of losing their jobs and to ensure

          that as many alleged violations as possible are resolved

          informally within the workplace."  Id. at 609.  Similar purposes,
                                             ___

          Marques argues, undergird the Rhode Island statute.  The city,

          however, distinguishes Bio Energy from our case on the grounds
                                 __________

          that the Rhode Island statute, unlike the New Hampshire one, does

          not contain specific language including supervisors within the

          group to whom reports may be made, and that no intent to do so

          should be inferred.  

               Bechtel Construction Co. v. Labor Sec'y, 50 F.3d 926, 931-32
               ________________________    ___________

          (11th Cir. 1995), concerned an internal complaint made pursuant

          to the whistleblowers' provisions of the Energy Reorganization

          Act, rather than to a state whistleblowers' Act.  There, the

          court broadly construed the Act's terms (which prohibited

          discharging or discriminating against employees who assisted with

          or participated in "proceedings") to encompass the actions of an

          employee who called violations of procedures for handling

          radiation-contaminated tools at a nuclear power plant to the

                                         -10-

          attention of his supervisor.  Id. at 931-32.11  Marques argues
                                        ___

          that public policy counsels a similarly broad reading of the

          Rhode Island statute.  The city, however, maintains that the

          Energy Reorganization Act's inclusion of the "catchall" phrase

          "or any other action" at the end of the whistleblowers' section

          in question indicated an intent not present in the Rhode Island

          statute to extend the protections afforded employees beyond

          "proceedings" to include internal complaints.  

               As the whistleblowers' provisions at issue in Bechtel do not
                                                             _______

          mirror those at issue in this case, the comparison of the Rhode

          Island Whistleblowers' Act to the Energy Reorganization Act,

          while informative, is not dispositive.  But, we take from both

          this case and Bio Energy an important and applicable public
                        __________

          policy consideration -- that employees should not be discouraged

          from reporting suspected violations initially to supervisors.  We

          see no significant policy served by extending whistleblower

          protection only to those who carry a complaint beyond the

          institutional wall, denying it to the employee who seeks to

          improve operations from within the organization.  The latter

          course appears to us as more likely to lead to prompt resolution

          of issues related to suspected violations of laws or regulations.

                              
          ____________________

               11   The court partially based this finding on the fact that
          whistleblowers' provisions in other regulations such as the Clean
          Air Act and  the Federal  Water Pollution Control  Act have  been
          deemed  to include internal complaints.  Bechtel, 50 F.3d at 932.
                                                   _______
          The court  also noted that  deference is given  to administrative
          interpretation of regulations under Chevron v. Natural  Resources
                                              _______    __________________
          Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
          _____________________

                                         -11-

               We therefore conclude that a jury permissibly could find the

          Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act applicable to statements made by

          an employee to a supervisor concerning known or suspected

          violations of the law.  The terms of the statute specifically

          define a "public body" as including "[a]...city...governing

          body...or any...employee thereof."  We do not read this language

          as covering all municipal employees, such as a co-worker, but as

          including a superior charged with carrying out the policies and

          decisions of the city.  While the Act does not explicitly address

          statements to supervisors, as do other states' whistleblowers'

          statutes, the public policy behind these statutes is surely

          similar: to encourage the prompt reporting and early, amicable

          resolution of potentially dangerous workplace situations, and to

          protect those employees who do report such violations from

          retaliatory action by employers.  

               We do not, of course, hold that a verdict for Marques is

          therefore mandated; the jury must decide whether the statements

          he made fall under a more expansive reading of the statute than

          that allowed by the district court, and then whether Marques was

          actually fired as a result of his statements to Barlow.  However,

          we think that the question of whether Marques' statements bring

          him within the protection of the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act

          was one for the jury, and not a proper subject for a directed

          verdict.  

               Marques raised concerns about the project twice with Gammell

          on December 22nd:  first, when he initially received the

                                         -12-

          assignment to work in the boat on Jones Pond, and then again, at

          the Pond, where he fruitlessly asked Gammell for a life

          preserver.  Furthermore, Marques testified on direct examination

          that on December 23rd, after the morning break, he told Barlow he

          did not want to go back in the boat because he felt sick, that he

          did not feel conditions in the pond were safe, and that he still

          had not gotten a life preserver.  On cross examination, Marques

          again testified that he had told Barlow he was not feeling well,

          that he was not going back in the boat, and that during general

          conversation on the shore, he and others discussed the safety of

          the project.  Moreover, as we have observed in note 2, supra, the
                                                                 _____

          evidence of the depth of the pond was not so clear that Marques'

          fear was completely unfounded.  We do not feel that a reasoned

          factfinder could have reached but one conclusion on the issue

          whether these statements constituted a report of a violation

          covered by the Rhode Island Act and whether Marques' termination

          was the result of his statements.

            Accordingly, we vacate the directed verdict on the Rhode Island

          Whistleblowers' Act claim and remand it for retrial.

          B.   Negligent/Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
               ____________________________________________________________

               Marques also appeals the district court's grant of a

          directed verdict for the city on his claim that the city's

          actions either negligently or intentionally caused him emotional

          distress.  Under Rhode Island law, a plaintiff, to succeed, must

          show that 1) the defendant's conduct was intentional or in

          reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional

                                         -13-

          distress, 2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, 3) there was

          a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the

          emotional distress, and 4) the emotional distress in question was

          severe.  See Champlin v. Washington Trust Co., 478 A.2d 985, 989
                   ___ ________    ____________________

          (R.I. 1984) (adopting standard of Restatement (Second) of Torts  
                                            _____________________________

          46).  Additionally, Rhode Island requires a physical

          manifestation of the emotional distress.  Id. at 990.  The
                                                    ___

          district court rejected this claim on the ground that the

          evidence presented was insufficient to warrant a finding that the

          city's actions in terminating Marques were extreme and

          outrageous.12  We agree.  While being terminated several days shy

          of the end of his probation period may not have been pleasant for

          Marques, we do not believe that a jury would properly have found

          on the evidence presented that the conduct of Barlow, Gammell,

          and Lemont was sufficient to make an "average member of the

          community ... exclaim 'Outrageous'."  Borden v. Paul Revere Life
                                                ______    ________________

          Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 380 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Restatement
          ________                                             ___________

          (Second) of Torts   46, comment (d)).13 
          _________________
                              
          ____________________

               12   In assessing whether conduct is extreme and outrageous,
          Rhode  Island courts  have used  three factors:   1)  the conduct
          itself; 2) the particular relationship of the parties; and 3) the
          known  or  knowable  susceptibility   of  the  plaintiff  to  the
          emotional  injury.  Russell v. Salve Regina College, 649 F. Supp.
                              _______    ____________________
          391, 401 (D.R.I. 1986), aff'd, 890 F.2d 484 (R.I. 1989).
                                  _____

               13   Both  parties note that  in Moniodis v.  Cook, 494 A.2d
                                                ________     ____
          212  (Md. 1985), the court  found an employee  who was discharged
          after  her refusal  to  submit  to  a  polygraph  test  stated  a
          colorable claim  for intentional infliction of emotional distress
          on  the  grounds that  the  employer's actions  were  extreme and
          outrageous because  the employer knew the  employee was dedicated
          to her work, that  she had a pre-existing nervous  condition, and
          she  was emotionally debilitated as  a result of the termination.

                                         -14-

          C.   Rhode Island Boating Law
               ________________________

               Finally, Marques appeals the directed verdict on the Rhode

          Island Boating Laws claim.  

               R.I. Gen. Laws   46-22-15 provides that 

               the owner of a vessel shall be liable for any injury or
               damage occasioned by the negligent operation of the
               vessel, whether the negligence consists of a violation
               of the provisions of the statutes of this state, or
               neglecting to observe such ordinary care and such
               operation as the rules of the common law require.

               This statute therefore requires "negligent operation" of a

          vessel and that a plaintiff's injuries be proximately caused by

          this negligent operation.  Even were negligent operation of the

          boat in question to be found, as to which we express some doubt,

          this claim would nevertheless founder on the proximate cause

          requirement: the connection between Marques' injuries, including

          his discharge and resulting alleged damages, and the city's

          operation of the boat on Jones Pond is too attenuated.  We

          therefore affirm the district court's ruling on this claim too.  

                                      CONCLUSION

               The Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act properly may be

          construed to encompass statements made by an employee to a

          supervisor concerning known or suspected violations of the law. 

          This accords with the terms of the statute itself, and with the

          public policies underlying this type of statute.  As a jury could

          have inferred that Marques' statements to Barlow constituted such

                              
          ____________________

          We find the facts of that  case as they related to the employer's
          actions clearly  distinguishable in nature and  degree from those
          alleged here.  

                                         -15-

          "reports" to a "public body" under this broader construction of

          the statute, and that he was fired as a result of these

          statements, we vacate the district court's directed verdict on

          this claim.  However, we affirm the district court's judgments on

          the negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress claim

          and on the violation of the Rhode Island Boating Safety Act

          claim.  

          Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part.  One half
          _________________________________________________   ________

          costs to appellant.
          ___________________

                                         -16-