Court Opinion

ID: 6235182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-02-17 20:30:53.719736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:58:01.555794
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Sharswood
delivered the opinion of the court,
The very able and exhaustive opinions, as well of the auditor as of the learned court below, have relieved us from an examination of the English decisions upon the Mortmain Act of that country. They undoubtedly throw a clear and strong light upon the question presented upon this record. They establish two positions: 1. That if an absolute estate is devised, but upon a secret trust assented to by the devisee, either expressly or impliedly, by knowledge and silence before the death of the testator, a court of equity will fasten a trust on him on the ground of fraud, and consequently the Statute of Mortmain will avoid the devise if the trust is in favor of a charity. But 2. If the devisee have no part in the devise, and no .knowledge of it until after the death of the testator, there is no ground upon which equity can fasten such a trust on him, even though, after it comes to his knowledge, he should express an intention of conforming to the wishes of the testator. .The latter proposition applies directly to the case now before us. Reuben Yeakle, the legatee named in the will, was not present when the instrument was executed. He had no communication with the testator, directly or indirectly, upon the subject. The testator had long intended to leave his estate for charitable purposes. On his death-bed he sent for a scrivener, and expressed to him his wish to have his property so disposed of after his death. He was informed that if he should die within thirty days, such a disposition would be ineffectual, but that he might make an absolute bequest to some individual, upon the confidence and belief that when he should be informed of his wishes, he would, of his own accord, carry them out. This plan was.adopted, and upon the suggéstion of one of the bystanders, Reuben Yeakle, the bishop of the church to which the decedent belonged, was chosen by him. It is clear, not only from the evidence, but from the verdipt of the jury in the issue of devisavit vel non, that no undue influence was exercised to procure the will. It was the testator’s own free and voluntary act, and he was told “that he could dispose of his property to a particular person unconditionally, and if that man would do it, then he could put it to those places where he wanted it; but that would be *406entirely at his option; he could do it or not.” Eeuben Yeakle was not informed of the will until some time after the death of the testator. When informed of it he declared his intention to appropriate the money as the testator wished it to be. He said, when examined as a witness before the auditor: “I have not seen the will, but if it gives me the absolute right to the property without condition, I should consider that I had the legal right to do with thle property as I pleased. I draw a distinction in this case between the legal and moral right.”
We are unshackled by authority upon this question. The English precedents upon the construction of their Statute of Mortmain are not binding upon this court, and with us the question is an entirely new one. By the 11th section of the Act of Assembly of April 26th 1855, Pamph. L. 832, it is provided, “ that no estate, real or personal, shall hereafter be bequeathed, devised or conveyed to any body politic, or to any person, in trust for religious or charitable uses, except the same be done by deed or will, attested by two credible and at the time disinterested witnesses, at least one calendar month before the death of the testator or alienor, and all dispositions of property contrary hereto shall be void, and go to the residuary legatee or devisee next of kin or heirs according to law.”
It seems very clear that the bequest in the will of Frederick Schultz to Eeuben Yeakle is not within the words of the statute. There is nothing in the circumstances to fasten a trust upon him. The statute out of the way, the charities intended to be benefited would have had no claim, legal or equitable, to enforce payment by him to them. He would, in the eye of the law, be guilty of no fraud, legal or equitable, either against them or the testator, if he should, even at this day, change his intentions and apply the money to some other use. Being the absolute owner, under the will, the declaration of his intention would not be binding upon him. It is not, therefore, in the words of the statute, a bequest “ to a body politic or to any person in trust for religious or charitable uses.” Had Eeuben Yeakle been present when the will was executed, or the objects of the bequest been communicated to him before the testator’s death, and he had held his peace, there would have been some ground for fastening a trust upon him ex maleficio, as in Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts 163. But nothing of that kind can be pretended here.
It has been contended, however, very strenuously, that as Edward Schultz proposed Eeuben'Yeakle to the testator as the man, the acceptance of Eeuben Yeakle of the bequest recognised Edward Schultz as his attorney, and ratified whatever he had said and done. They urge the maxim, omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitwr et mandato csquiparatur. It is a very ingenious contention, but unfortunately for the appellants, there is nothing in the evidence *407upon whicb it can be built. Edward Schultz did not undertake for Reuben Yeakle; he gave the testator no assurance that he would accept and carry out his intentions when made known to him. He says : “ I proposed Reuben Yeakle, so far as I remember, for the man. Frederick then agreed to Reuben Yeakle. Reuben Yeakle was considered to be an honest man, and it was for this reason he was taken, and because he was acquainted with these societies mentioned.” “ As far as I can recollect, I said, that through Yeakle his desire could be carried out in the distribution of his property.” “ The object was to carry out the wish of Frederick in that way. There was a chance to carry it out in that way if the legatee was willing, and Reuben Yeakle was selected because it was thought he would agree to it.” There is nothing in all this which indicates any promise or assurance by Edward Schultz to the testator that Reuben Yeakle would accept the bequest in trust for the charities. There was the mere expression of an opinion, concurred in by the testator, that when the legatee came to understand the object and purpose of the bequest to him, as an honest man he would carry out the intention of the testator.
It is urged, however, that this whole plan is nothing but a contrivance to evade the statute. No doubt such was the intention of the testator. It is said that it is a fraud upon the law, and that the bequest ought therefore to be declared void. But that overlooks the fact that the absolute property in the subject of this bequest has vested in the legatee, and that he is entirely innocent of any complicity in the fraud of the testator. If the statute is practically repealed by this construction it is evident that it must be for the legislature to devise and apply a remedy, not the judiciary, whose province is not jus dare but yiis dieere.
Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the cost of the appellants.