Court Opinion

ID: 9745311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:48:12.430241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:58.945909
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, also dissenting: I dissent. The majority seems to make no distinction between an agreement made but not kept by the State which led, or might have led, to the conviction of a defendant, and an agreement made but not kept by the State which resulted in no disadvantage to the defendant. Had the State here, as in Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495, reneged either accidentally or purposely on an agreement which led to the conviction of the defendant through a plea of guilty, I would agree that the agreement should be enforced. Had the State here, as in Butler v. State (Fla. App. 1969), 228 So. 2d 421, and State v. Davis (Fla. App. 1966), 188 So. 2d 24, reneged on an agreement which might have led to the conviction of the defendant, I might also enforce the agreement. Here, though, the defendant gave up nothing in exchange for the State’s promise. The results of a polygraph test may not be used at trial in a criminal case in Illinois (People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225), in the sentencing phases of a capital case (People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327), or in the hearing on a post-trial motion (People v. Yarbrough (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 421). Thus, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that in submitting to the test the defendant took the risk that a negative result could adversely affect his trial or sentence. While I certainly do not condone the failure of the State to keep an agreement made with a defendant no matter how ill-advised that agreement might be, I would not set aside the verdict of the jury and enforce the agreement under the circumstances here. Had the defendant made an incriminating statement during the taking of the test, or had the defendant been disadvantaged by the test in any way, I would then apply sanctions appropriate to the circumstances. A defendant cannot compel, as a matter of Federal constitutional law, specific performance of an executory plea agreement; a guilty plea made with the knowledge that a prior plea agreement has been withdrawn is not invalid. (Mabry v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. _, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 104 S. Ct. 2543.) I see no reason for recognizing a greater entitlement here. Under the circumstances in this case, I do not believe that the defendant should be allowed to now compel the performance of a promise which did him no harm and for which he gave nothing in return. Accordingly, I dissent. WARD and MORAN, JJ., join in this dissent.