Court Opinion

ID: 9847737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:06:44.59826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:29.871377
License: Public Domain

Swanson, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the court's decision, and I wish to emphasize my reasons for doing so.1
*709The initial search for weapons of defendant Thompson was permissible under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979), which held that Terry did not justify a cursory search for weapons of a tavern patron when a search warrant for the tavern was being executed, is factually distinguishable. In Ybarra, the petitioner was one of 9 to 13 persons in a public establishment. The officers did not recognize Ybarra and had no reason to believe he might assault them. Further, he made no gestures, and he generally acted in a nonthreatening manner. The Supreme Court summarized, "In short, the State is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous." (Italics mine.) Ybarra, at 93.
This case stands in sharp contrast to Ybarra. Here, the search warrant was for a private residence. The officers had information that "within the last 24 hours the informant was present at the above address and saw what the informant recognized to be Heroin and Dilaudid that was being offered for sale by a negro male known as Clifford and who resides at the above address."
In executing the warrant, Detective Buckland was directed to stand guard at the rear door. Sergeant Scheuf-fele and Detectives Baylor and Roesler entered the house through the front door. The officers discovered a teenage girl, a baby, and two adult males in the living room. The males were the defendant Thompson and one Clifton Broadnax, evidently the "Clifford" referred to in the affidavit for the search warrant.2 Scheuffele, who was in charge of the unit, instructed Broadnax and Thompson to raise their arms over their heads, and he and Detective Baylor *710remained with the suspects while Roesler continued through the house.
Buckland meanwhile had been at his position at the rear door for about 30 seconds when he saw that the other officers had entered the house. He then went around to the front and entered, observing Broadnax and Thompson, arms overhead. At this point, no one apparently had been searched. Scheuffele testified that as long as the suspects had their arms raised, he wasn't too concerned about weapons.3 However, he said he did notice a bulge in Broad-nax' pocket "that piqued my interest and I was concerned about my own safety and the safety of my detectives ..." He further stated that "like I say, there was a bulge in the pocket that I didn't want any hand near except my own or someone else's, some detective's." By this time Roesler had returned from a bedroom where he had discovered contraband in plain view and a woman. Scheuffele ordered Roesler to search Broadnax. At about the same time Buck-land, who assumed Thompson and Broadnax were under arrest, asked Scheuffele if Thompson had been searched: "I asked Sergeant Scheuffele if the defendant Mr. Thompson had been searched. He stated No. I believe I said, 'Would you like him to be searched?' He said Yes or words to that effect."4
*711To summarize, this case presents a situation where three officers entered through the front door and one, Roesler, continued through the house. The two adults were detained with their hands over their heads. Seconds later, Buckland entered. Scheuffele, who was in command, believed Broad-nax was armed and feared for his officers' safety. Scheuffele ordered Broadnax searched and answered yes when Buck-land asked if Thompson should be searched. Either shortly before or shortly after Thompson was searched, Roesler returned and announced the discovery of the contraband, and the suspects were arrested. Total elapsed time was a matter of seconds. Even the most tortured version of these facts fails to fall within the ambit of Ybarra.
I have no quarrel with the language from Ybarra, quoted in the dissenting opinion, that nothing in Terry permits "a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." Ybarra, at 94. Terry, however, makes clear that the appropriateness of an officer's actions is judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search, warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Terry, at 21-22.
In this case, Sergeant Scheuffele, who commanded the unit, expressly testified he feared for his safety and the safety of his detectives.5 Scheuffele thus ordered Broadnax *712to be searched, and by answering yes to Buckland's question, in effect, ordered Thompson to be searched. This case therefore satisfies the subjective element required by Terry. Further, judged against Terry's objective test, I have no trouble finding the search of Thompson appropriate. I am reluctant to engage in judicial second-guessing. As has been said in a slightly different context,
The officers' on-the-spot decision is of necessity a hasty judgment based upon the facts — or reasonably founded suspicion — of the moment. Severe judicial second-guessing is therefore inappropriate. The officer must be given a degree of latitude for good faith judgment as to his own possible peril,. . .
State v. Mitchell, 6 Ore. App. 378, 386, 487 P.2d 1156 (1971).
The suggestion is made, however, that even granting the validity of the patdown, seizure of the heroin was improper because the search went beyond the scope of a limited search for weapons.6 However, as I read the record, Buck-land identified the item in Thompson's shirt pocket as a balloon of heroin before he reached his hand into the pocket and confirmed his discovery. His testimony was " [w]hen I first pat searched him for weapons I could feel a small bulge in his pocket, a small bulge in his shirt pocket. After this I did go into the pocket." (Italics mine.) Thus, Buckland discovered the contraband within the limited scope of a search for weapons, and the search was not a "general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find." Terry, at 30.7
*713The court's attention has been drawn to our Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Allen, 93 Wn.2d 170, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980), a case which appears similar, but close examination discloses critical factual differences. In that case, during a search for weapons, the officer took the defendant's wallet, opened it, discovered a folded-up dollar bill and discovered contraband within the bill. The court said, "[ojnce it is ascertained that no weapon is involved, the government's limited authority to invade the individual's right to be free of police intrusion is spent." Allen, at 173. I think Allen paints with too broad a brush. The expansive language is appropriate in the factual context of the case; however, no claim was there made, or could have been made, that discovery of the wallet established probable cause for arrest or further search. In fact, the State attempted to justify the search of the contents of the wallet on the ground the officer was looking for the defendant's identification. I don't think the court in Allen intended to say that when an officer discovers contraband within the scope of a permissible patdown for weapons, he must close his eyes to the discovery.
I concur in the majority opinion's discussion of the question of whether Buckland's discovery of the balloon through the material of the shirt pocket was sufficient to give rise to probable cause. I would only emphasize that there is authority, in this and other jurisdictions, that evidence discovered during the course of a search for weapons can provide the basis for probable cause. See State v. Dunn, 22 Wn. App. 362, 591 P.2d 782 (1979); Guzman v. Estelle, 493 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. United States, 367 A.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Lyles v. Florida, 312 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).

I note the impressive array of early authority assembled by the dissent under the heading "Basic Principles." I am in full agreement with and support enthusiastically the interesting discussion of the basic principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but fail to see the relevance to this case of the bulk of the tomes cited.

The dissent states that the majority "expeditiously ignore[s] the presence of others on the premises than Broadnax and Thompson" to shore up its justification for frisk of Thompson. However, if the police feel a teenage girl and an infant present no threat, I see no reason to read any significance into their failure to frisk them.

I cannot subscribe to the dissent's view of the record. Scheuffele stated that, "As long as we could see their hands at that point it wasn't imperative that they be patted down." The dissent apparently reads this as "express testimony" that the officers had no reasonable belief or suspicion that Thompson was armed. I take Scheuffele's testimony to mean what it says: that as long as, and only as long as, the suspects had their arms raised, Scheuffele was not concerned about weapons. He clearly did not expect the suspects to keep their hands over their heads indefinitely.

The record is unclear regarding the time of Buckland's search of Thompson relative to other events. Buckland testified that Roesler did not return from the bedroom and announce discovery of the contraband until after Thompson had been searched. Scheuffele stated that the search of Broadnax, which was conducted by Roesler, was contemporaneous to the search of Thompson and that he, Scheuffele, did not see Thompson being searched because he was watching *711Roesler search Broadnax. Roesler testified that Buckland was present with the others when he returned from the bedroom.

Buckland testified that he did not believe the balloon of heroin in Thompson's pocket was a weapon. In fact, the trial court found that "Detective Buckland did not personally believe the defendant possessed a weapon at the time of the search." Finding of fact No. 7. This is an inartfiilly drawn formal finding. The court stated in its oral decision that " [t]he circumstances involved here are sufficient to warrant the officer in conducting a frisk type of search, that is for the security of the officer and to make certain there are no weapons." I think the trial court's formal finding is an expression of the court's conclusion, based on Buck-land's testimony that he didn't think the balloon felt like a weapon, that Buck-land drew his conclusion after feeling the balloon. I do not take finding of fact No. *7127 to mean that prior to beginning the patdown Buckland did not believe Thompson was armed.

The dissent appears to attach significance to the fact that Buckland described his actions as a "search" and not a "frisk." I do not think Buckland's characterization is significant, but if it is, his testimony demonstrates that he initiated a search for weapons.

Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968) where the initial intrusion took the form of the officer thrusting his hand into *713Sibron's pocket, and the State attempted to justify the search solely on the basis of probable cause to believe Sibron possessed heroin.