Court Opinion

ID: 9897424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:23.34281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:59.092143
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   Apr 17 2023, 8:34 am

                                                                                       CLERK
                                                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                        and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
      Michael D. Kvachkoff                                        Christian W. Bartholomew
      Crown Point, Indiana                                        Burke Costanza & Carberry LLP
                                                                  Merrillville, Indiana

                                                   IN THE
           COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Marion Assets 2020, LLC,                                    April 17, 2023
      Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Petitioner,                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                  22A-TP-1681
              v.                                                  Appeal from the Lake Superior
                                                                  Court
      Fiascone Family LP,                                         The Honorable Stephen E.
      Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Respondent                         Scheele, Judge
                                                                  Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                  45D05-2111-TP-2051

                                      Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                Judges Bradford and Kenworthy concur.

      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   Marion Assets 2020, LLC (“Marion Assets”) appeals and the Fiascone Family

      LP (“Fiascone Family”) cross-appeals the Lake Superior Court’s order setting

      aside a tax deed on equitable grounds after the deed had been issued to Marion

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023                                   Page 1 of 24
      Assets. Between them, the parties raise three issues for our review, which we

      consolidate and restate as the following two issues:

              1. Whether Marion Assets provided constitutionally adequate
              notice to Fiascone Family to support the issuance of the tax deed.

              2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it set aside
              the tax deed notwithstanding its finding that Marion Assets had
              provided Fiascone Family with constitutionally adequate notice.

[2]   We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Marion Assets provided Fiascone

      Family with constitutionally adequate notice in obtaining the tax deed. We

      reverse the trial court’s conclusion to set aside the tax deed on equitable

      grounds, and we remand with instructions for the court to deny Fiascone

      Family’s motion to set aside the tax deed.

                                   Facts and Procedural History
[3]   In March 2019, Fiascone Family acquired condominium 3B at 1640 White Oak

      Circle in Munster. Marty Fiascone and his father are the principals of Fiascone

      Family. Marty lives in Florida, and he and his father used the condominium for

      “personal purposes” when they were in the Chicago area. Appellant’s App. Vol.

      2, p. 3. During its ownership of the condominium, Fiascone Family’s mailing

      address on file with the Lake County Auditor was 7593 Gathering Drive #806,

      Reunion, Florida 34747 (“the Florida address”).

[4]   After Fiascone Family failed to pay its property taxes on the condominium, the

      Lake County Treasurer initiated tax-sale proceedings, and Marion Assets

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023        Page 2 of 24
      purchased the tax sale certificate for the condominium at an ensuing public

      auction. The tax sale certificate identified the condominium’s “[c]ommonly

      known” address only by its street address, without reference to the unit number,

      although the certificate’s immediately adjacent parcel description identified the

      property as “Unit 3B in Building 10” at that address. Id. at 18.

[5]   After obtaining the tax sale certificate, Marion Assets did a title search, which

      confirmed that Fiascone Family was the only party of record with an interest in

      the condominium and further confirmed Fiascone Family’s Florida address. Id.

      at 51. In February 2021, pursuant to Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-4.5(d)

      (2020), Marion Assets mailed notice of the Fiascone Family’s redemption rights

      via certified mail to both the Florida address and the condominium’s

      “commonly known” address, i.e., its street address without the unit number. At

      the same time, Marion Assets mailed the same notices to those addresses via

      first-class mail. The United States Postal Service returned the certified letter and

      first-class letter that had been sent to the Florida address as “[v]acant” and

      “unable to forward.” Id. at 28, 55-56. The certified letter sent to the

      condominium’s street address was returned as an “insufficient address,” but the

      first-class letter was not returned. Id. at 57.

[6]   After having those letters returned, in March, Marion Assets sent a process

      server to the condominium’s street address to post the redemption notice at the

      property. The process server went to the street address and observed several

      buildings. He located the only building that had the location number “1640” on

      it, and he further observed that that building had “multiple doors entering into

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023        Page 3 of 24
      [it].” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 93-94. Specifically, the process server observed three doors

      on the building. He posted the notice on “the center door,” which was “closest

      to the garages” and was being used by “more people . . . than any other” door.

      Id. at 94. The center door also had “1640” written across the top of the door. Id.

      at 93. The process server posted the notice in a fashion to keep it from being

      blown away by the wind. The notice included the parcel description in bold font

      on the first page, which identified the condominium at issue as “Unit 3B in

      Building 10.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 59.

[7]   In July, Marion Assets again sent redemption notices via first-class mail to the

      Florida address and the condominium’s street address. Both of those mailings

      were returned for the same reasons as the February mailings. Following the

      expiration of the redemption period, in October Marion Assets sent notices

      pursuant to Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-4.6 of the filing of its petition to issue

      a tax deed. Marion Assets sent those notices simultaneously via certified mail

      and first-class mail to both the Florida address and the condominium’s street

      address. This time, the certified mail sent to the Florida address was returned as

      “unclaimed.” Id. at 65. The certified mail sent to the condominium’s street

      address was returned for an insufficient address. Neither of the first-class

      mailings was returned.

[8]   Marion Assets petitioned for the issuance of a tax deed, which the trial court

      granted in February 2022. A few weeks later, Marion Assets attempted to

      change the locks at the condominium, and the condominium’s management

      company contacted Marty. Marty then sought counsel, and, in April, Fiascone

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023         Page 4 of 24
       Family filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the tax deed. In support of

       that motion, Fiascone Family argued that Marion Assets had not served

       Fiascone Family with constitutionally adequate notice and, thus, the tax deed

       had been issued in violation of Fiascone Family’s due process rights.

[9]    The trial court held a hearing on Fiascone Family’s Rule 60(B) motion. At that

       hearing, the parties stipulated to Marion Assets’ numerous attempts to serve the

       notices on Fiascone Family, and the process server testified about his posting of

       the redemption notice at the property. Marty also testified at that hearing and

       stated that the Florida address “is his commonly used address” and that “he

       had no knowledge of any problems receiving mail at that address,” yet “none of

       [Marion Assets’ attempted] notices were actually received” by Fiascone Family.

       Id. at 4-5. Marty also testified that the door on which the process server had

       posted the redemption notice “was not commonly used by residents.” Id. at 4.

[10]   Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that Marion Assets

       had “complied with the provisions of [the Indiana Code] by sending notice via

       certified mail at the ‘last address of the owner for the property, as indicated in

       the records of the county auditor.’” Id. at 6 (quoting I.C. § 6-1.1-25-4.5(d)). The

       court further concluded that Marion Assets

               has satisfied standards of due process in providing notices to
               [Fiascone Family] concerning the tax sale. In addition to the
               statutorily required certified mailings to [Fiascone Family’s]
               address on file with the Lake County Auditor, [Marion Assets]
               took the additional steps of sending notice via first class mail and
               posting notice at the Property address. [Marion Assets] also sent

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023         Page 5 of 24
               a second round of 4.5 Notices subsequent to sending the first set
               of returned notices. Such steps are indicative of a desire to
               actually inform the owner of the pendency of the tax sale and
               satisfy due process requirements, which do not require actual
               notice.

       Id. at 7. However, the court then concluded that Fiascone Family’s failure to

       actually receive any of Marion Assets’ notices presented the court with an

       “exceptional” case that justified equitable relief. Id. Thus, the court set aside the

       tax deed, reopened the redemption period through August 1, and directed

       Fiascone Family to pay the redemption amount it would have paid had the

       original redemption period not expired. This appeal ensued.

                                        Discussion and Decision
[11]   Marion Assets appeals and Fiascone Family cross-appeals the trial court’s

       decision to set aside the tax deed on equitable grounds. We first address

       Fiascone Family’s argument on cross-appeal that the trial court erred when it

       found that Marion Assets’ attempts at notice were constitutionally adequate.

       We then turn to Marion Assets’ argument on appeal that the trial court abused

       its discretion in setting aside the tax deed notwithstanding Marion Assets’

       compliance with due process.

         1. The trial court did not err when it found that Marion Assets had provided
                    Fiascone Family with constitutionally adequate notice.

[12]   Fiascone Family argues that Marion Assets’ attempts at notice were

       constitutionally inadequate. “A tax deed is void if the former owner was not

       given constitutionally adequate notice of the tax sale proceedings,” including
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023          Page 6 of 24
       notice of the right of redemption under Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-4.5 and

       notice of the petition for the issuance of a tax deed under Indiana Code section

       6-1.1-25-4.6. Schaefer v. Kumar, 804 N.E.2d 184, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.

       denied. Although Fiascone Family’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion did not identify the

       specific subsection of the Rule on which its motion was premised, the substance

       of the motion and Fiascone Family’s arguments to the trial court was that the

       issuance of the tax deed was void under Rule 60(B)(6). See Anderson v. Wayne

       Post 64, Am. Legion Corp., 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting

       Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied.

[13]   As we have explained:

               The standard of review for the granting or denying of a T.R.
               60(B) motion is limited to whether the trial court abused its
               discretion. Freels v. Winston (1991), Ind. App., 579 N.E.2d 132,
               135, reh. denied, trans. denied. However, a motion under [Trial]
               Rule 60(B)(6) alleging the judgment is void requires no discretion
               on the part of the trial court because either the judgment is void
               or it is valid. Schoffstall v. Failey (1979), 180 Ind. App. 528, 389
               N.E.2d 361, 363. Void judgments can be attacked, directly or
               collaterally, at any time. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
               Employees v. Sunshine Promotions, Inc. (1990), Ind. App., 555
               N.E.2d 1309, 1315.

       Id. at 1205 (quoting Santiago v. Kilmer, 605 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1992), trans. denied). Thus, where, as here, the trial court found facts after an

       evidentiary hearing on a Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside a tax deed, we

       review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. Ind. Land Trust Co. v. XL

       Invest. Props., LLC, 155 N.E.3d 1177, 1182 (Ind. 2020). As for whether the trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023          Page 7 of 24
       court’s findings are sufficient to demonstrate constitutionally adequate notice,

       our review is de novo. Id.

[14]   To comply with due process, the tax-sale purchaser must give notice that is

       “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties

       of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their

       objections.” Marion Cnty. Auditor v. Sawmill Creek, LLC, 964 N.E.2d 213, 218

       (Ind. 2012). “‘But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the

       case these [notice] conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional

       requirements are satisfied.’” Id. at 219 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &

       Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950)). Ultimately, the issue is not the former

       property owner’s actual knowledge, but whether the purchaser “gave notice

       under the circumstances of this case in a manner reasonably calculated to

       inform” the former owner of the pending loss of its interest in the real estate. See

       Iemma v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 992 N.E.2d 732, 741-42 (Ind. Ct. App

       2013).

[15]   In Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234 (2006), the Supreme Court of the United

       States held that, when a state attempts to give notice of a tax sale via certified

       mail that is returned “unclaimed,” the state is required to take “additional

       reasonable steps to notify [the property owner of the sale], if practicable to do

       so.” The Court stated that, “[w]hat steps are reasonable in response to new

       information depends upon what the new information reveals.” Id. For example,

       the return of a certified letter as “unclaimed” might simply mean that the

       property owner “was not home when the postman called and did not retrieve

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023         Page 8 of 24
       the letter at the post office, or that [the property owner] no longer resided at that

       address.” Id. The Court added that, in response to such a situation, “[o]ne

       reasonable step . . . would be for the [s]tate to resend the notice by regular mail,

       so that a signature was not required.” Id. Another “reasonable followup

       measure[]” might include “post[ing] notice on the front door” of the property.

       Id. at 235.

[16]   The Indiana Supreme Court has applied Jones to Indiana tax sales in two

       opinions of particular relevance here. First, in Sawmill Creek, our Supreme

       Court considered the constitutionality of the Marion County Auditor’s attempts

       to provide notice of tax-sale proceedings to the property owner of record where

       the property owner’s name on file was misidentified as “Saw Creek” rather than

       “Sawmill Creek.” 964 N.E.2d at 214-15. The auditor’s attempts to send

       certified mail to the owner were returned as “NOT DELIVERABLE AS

       ADDRESSED, UNABLE TO FORWARD.” Id. at 215. The auditor then

       published notice in a local newspaper, on the auditor’s website, and outside of

       the county clerk’s office.

[17]   After the property was sold, the auditor employed a title company to conduct

       additional research on the property, but the title company could not locate a

       “Saw Creek” business entity. Id. at 216. Two post-sale notices were again sent

       via both certified and first-class mail to the address on file, but both mailings

       were returned as undeliverable. Only when the new property owner’s “for sale”

       signs appeared on the property did the original owner become aware of the sale

       and sued to set aside the tax deed. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023         Page 9 of 24
[18]   Applying Jones, our Supreme Court held that the auditor had satisfied the

       owner’s due process rights because “the [a]uditor’s actions were reasonably

       calculated to provide notice to [the owner].” Id. at 221. Significantly, the court

       noted that it would have been unreasonable for the auditor to re-send the same

       notice via first-class mail after the auditor had received the prior certified mail

       as not deliverable at that address. Id. at 220. The court also noted that posting

       notice on the bare, unimproved property would not have been a reasonable

       means to inform the property owner. Id. at 221. However, the court was

       satisfied that the auditor had taken the required “additional reasonable steps”

       after receiving the returned certified mail when the auditor published those

       notices, “mailed the post-sale and issuance-of-a-tax-deed notices” via certified

       mail to the address of record (although those were also returned), and engaged

       a title search company to search government records and the phonebook for

       additional addresses for the owner of record. Id. at 220-21.

[19]   Similarly, in Indiana Land Trust, a county auditor simultaneously sent notice of

       an impending tax sale via certified letter and via first-class mail to the owner’s

       address of record. The owner, however, had moved from its original address

       several times and had not updated its tax address with the county auditor. The

       auditor’s certified letter was returned as undeliverable, but the first-class mail

       was never returned. The auditor did a record search for any other addresses for

       the owner but eventually published the notice in a local newspaper. Thereafter,

       the original owner learned of the tax sale after the purchaser had filed a quiet

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023         Page 10 of 24
       title action. The original owner then moved to set aside the tax deed due to

       insufficient notice.

[20]   Our Supreme Court, following Jones, held that the auditor’s simultaneous

       mailing of the notice via certified and first-class mail satisfied the original

       owner’s due process rights. Ind. Land Trust, 155 N.E.3d at 1189. As our

       Supreme Court explained:

               While the certified mail was returned . . . , there is no evidence
               the first-class mail was ever returned . . . . This meant either the
               mail was received by its intended recipient or simply lost to time.
               Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Jones observed that sending
               notice via regular mail likely increases the chances of actual
               notice. [547 U.S.] at 236, 126 S. Ct. at 1719. Given actual notice
               is not required, we do not think the Auditor should be left to
               speculate whether the first-class mail was truly delivered,
               especially when it was not returned to its sender.

               Regardless, [the original owner] argues the distinction between
               “Unclaimed” mail and mail returned as “Not Deliverable as
               Addressed—Unable to Forward” made notice by first-class mail
               unreasonable. See Sawmill Creek, 964 N.E.2d at 219 n.6. The first-
               class mail in this case, however, was sent contemporaneously
               with the certified letter. This is unlike the facts in Sawmill Creek
               where we made particular note that following up with first-class
               mail after a certified letter was returned as undeliverable would
               be unreasonable based on the auditor’s new knowledge that the
               certified letter was not deliverable at the listed address. See id. at
               219-20. One could reasonably assume the unreturned first-class
               mail in this case indicated to the Auditor that the mail was
               received by the intended recipient. We do not think that under
               these circumstances, the Auditor was required to speculate any
               further.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023          Page 11 of 24
               Perhaps the circumstances would be different if both the certified
               letter and first-class mail were returned . . . . This knowledge—
               that the tax notice address was more than likely incorrect—
               would certainly require additional reasonable steps to notify [the
               original owner] if practical to do so. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234,
               126 S. Ct. at 1718. And perhaps under those facts, an auditor
               would satisfy due process by searching its internal records. But
               those circumstances are simply not present here. In addition to
               the first-class mail, the Auditor . . . performed a skip trace search
               for a better address and published notice in the newspaper. These
               combined actions, at least under the circumstances present in this
               case, satisfy the minimal due process requirements discussed in
               Jones and subsequent caselaw in Indiana.

               While the Auditor certainly could have done more, the
               Constitution does not require more than the actions taken in this
               case. . . .

       Id.

[21]   Following that authority, we conclude that Marion Assets’ attempts to provide

       notice to Fiascone Family were constitutionally adequate. First, after

       purchasing the tax-sale certificate, Marion Assets performed a title search of the

       property. That title search confirmed that Fiascone Family was the only

       interested party of record and further confirmed that no other address of record

       for Fiascone Family existed besides the Florida address.

[22]   Second, Marion Assets sent the notice of the Fiascone Family’s redemption

       rights simultaneously via certified mail and first-class mail both to the Florida

       address of record and the condominium’s “commonly known” address of

       record. Both of the letters sent to the Florida address were returned as

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023         Page 12 of 24
       undeliverable because the location at that address was “vacant” and the post

       office was “unable to forward” the letters. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 28, 55-

       56. However, while the certified letter to the condominium’s street address was

       returned for an “insufficient address,” the first-class letter sent at the same time

       to the same address was not returned.

[23]   Following the return of three of the four initial redemption notices, Marion

       Assets sent a process server to post the notice at the condominium’s location,

       the one location where any of the four letters may have been received. The

       process server posted the notice on the central, most-used door to the unit

       building. And the posted notice conspicuously identified the unit at issue as unit

       3B in that building.

[24]   Although Marion Assets again resent the redemption notices via first-class mail

       to both the Florida address and the condominium’s street address after the

       process server had posted the notice at the property, we need not take those

       additional mailings into account. Following Jones and Indiana Land Trust, we

       hold that Marion Assets provided constitutionally adequate notice when,

       following a title search, it simultaneously sent four letters, two via certified mail

       and two via first-class mail, to both the Florida address and the condominium’s

       street address, one of which was not returned to Marion Assets. And, upon

       learning that the first-class letter sent to the condominium’s street address was

       not returned, Marion Assets had a process server post the redemption notice at

       that same location.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023         Page 13 of 24
[25]   As for Marion Assets’ ensuing attempts to provide Fiascone Family with notice

       of the petition for the issuance of the tax deed several months later, after the

       expiration of the redemption period, Marion Assets simultaneously mailed

       certified and first-class letters to both the Florida address and the

       condominium’s street address. Although both of the certified letters were

       returned, neither of the first-class letters were. Again, following Jones and

       Indiana Land Trust, we conclude that Marion Assets provided Fiascone Family

       with constitutionally adequate notice of its petition for the issuance on the tax

       deed.

[26]   Further, unlike in Sawmill Creek, these additional notices were not the “same”

       as the redemption notices. See 964 N.E.2d at 220. Rather—necessarily, as these

       notices could not be sent until the redemption period had expired—these

       subsequent, statutorily required notices were sent in October 2021, eight

       months after the initial redemption notices were sent. It was not unreasonable

       for Marion Assets to start the notice process over at this point, and, upon not

       having either of these first-class mailings returned, Marion Assets was not

       obliged to speculate that the delivery of those letters had failed. Ind. Land Trust,

       155 N.E.3d at 1189.

[27]   Still, Fiascone Family argues that, when Marion Assets received the certified

       letters sent to the condominium’s address back as an “insufficient address,”

       Marion Assets should have specifically amended the “commonly known”

       address to include the unit number based either on a visit to the property or on

       a reading of the parcel description. Appellee’s Br. at 12-13. But neither Marion

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023        Page 14 of 24
       Assets’ February 2021 first-class letter nor its October 2021 first-class letter, sent

       to the same address at the same time as the certified letters, was returned. Based

       on those letters not being returned, we cannot say that Marion Assets’ reliance

       on the “commonly known” address was unreasonable. See Ind. Land Trust, 155

       N.E.3d at 1189; see also Tax Cert. Invests., Inc. v. Smethers, 714 N.E.2d 131, 134

       (Ind. 1999) (“the burden of notifying the county taxing authority of the

       taxpayer’s correct address [is] upon the taxpayer. If . . . notice reaches this

       address, then notice is sufficient[.]”) (quoting Holland v. King, 500 N.E.2d 1229,

       1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)). We therefore affirm the trial court’s conclusion that

       Marion Assets provided Fiascone Family with constitutionally adequate notice.

            2. The trial court abused its discretion when it set aside the tax deed on
                                       equitable grounds.

[28]   We next consider Marion Assets’ argument on appeal that the trial court

       abused its discretion when it set aside the tax deed on equitable grounds. The

       trial court’s decision to grant equitable relief is reviewable only for an abuse of

       discretion. State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016). An abuse of

       discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts

       and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual

       deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. (quotation marks omitted). We will not

       reweigh the evidence on appeal. Id.

[29]   However, the equitable power of our trial courts is not unlimited. As our

       Supreme Court has long made clear:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023          Page 15 of 24
               Equity has the power, where necessary, to pierce rigid statutory
               rules to prevent injustice. Wabash Valley Coach Co. v. Turner
               (1943), 221 Ind. 52, 46 N.E.2d 212, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 754, 63
               S. Ct. 1167, 87 L. Ed. 1707. But where substantial justice can be
               accomplished by following the law, and where the parties’ actions are
               clearly governed by the rules of law, equity follows the law. In this case
               the rights of the parties are clearly governed by the statute; and
               no injustice will result from following such statute. Therefore,
               equity in this case, must follow the law, there being no equitable
               reason for not doing so. See 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence,
               §§ 425-27 (1941 Edition).

       State ex rel. Root v. Cir. Ct. of Allen Cnty., 259 Ind. 500, 289 N.E.2d 503, 506-07

       (1972) (emphasis added; original emphasis removed) (quoting Metro. Sch. Dist.

       of Sw. Parke v. Vaught, 249 Ind. 412, 417 233 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1968)).

[30]   Further:

               When interpreting a statute, we begin by reading its words in
               their plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account “the
               structure of the statute as a whole.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre
               Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). Mindful of
               what the statute says and what it doesn’t say, we aim to “avoid
               interpretations that depend on selective reading of individual
               words that lead to irrational and disharmonizing results.” Id.
               (quotation and citation omitted). Rather, we presume the
               “legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a
               logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and
               goals.” Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind. 2019)
               (quotation and citation omitted). Ultimately, “our goal is to
               determine and give effect to” the legislature’s intent. State v. Int’l
               Bus. Machines Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2012) (citation
               omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023               Page 16 of 24
       Town of Linden v. Birge, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2023 WL 2383795, at *5 (Ind. Mar. 7,

       2023).

[31]   Here, three statutes are of particular relevance in determining the scope of a

       trial court’s equitable power to set aside a tax deed. First, Indiana Code section

       6-1.1-25-4 (“section 4”) provides various redemption periods in the event of a

       tax sale. As relevant here, section 4 provided that Fiascone Family’s “period of

       redemption” was “one (1) year after the date of sale” of the condominium to

       Marion Assets. I.C. § 6-1.1-25-4(a)(1).

[32]   Relatedly, Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-4.6(f) (“section 6(f)”) states:

                Not later than sixty-one (61) days after the petition [for the
                issuance of a tax deed] is filed under subsection (a), the court shall
                enter an order directing the county auditor . . . to issue to the petitioner a
                tax deed if the court finds that the following conditions exist:

                        (1) The time of redemption has expired.

                        (2) The tract or item of real property has not been
                        redeemed from the sale before the expiration of the period
                        of redemption specified in section 4 of this chapter.

                        (3) Except with respect to a petition for the issuance of a
                        tax deed under a sale of the certificate of sale on the
                        property under IC 6-1.1-24-6.1 or IC 6-1.1-24-6.8, or with
                        respect to penalties described in section 4(j) of this chapter,
                        all taxes and special assessments, penalties, and costs have
                        been paid.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023                   Page 17 of 24
                        (4) The notices required by this section and section 4.5 of
                        this chapter have been given.

                        (5) The petitioner has complied with all the provisions of
                        law entitling the petitioner to a deed. . . .

       (Emphasis added.) Or, as our Supreme Court has summarized it, “a purchaser

       who has complied with the statutory requirements is entitled to a tax deed.”

       Smethers, 714 N.E.2d at 133.

[33]   We have held that the identically worded predecessor statute to section 6(f)

       “clearly mandates the trial court to enter an order issuing a tax deed within

       sixty-one days of the filing of the Petition if the petitioner has met all necessary

       conditions.” Strezovski v. Frazee, 818 N.E.2d 505, 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In

       Strezovski, although the tax sale purchaser had complied with the statutory

       requirements entitling it to the issuance of a tax deed, the trial court granted the

       original property owner an additional ninety-eight days beyond the one-year

       statutory redemption period to redeem the property.

[34]   On appeal, we held that the trial court abused its discretion in extending the

       redemption period:

               [Section 6(f) is] silent in allowing the trial court to exercise its
               discretion in granting additional time before ordering the
               issuance of a tax deed. In the instant case, the trial court did just
               that: after granting the Appellants’ Petition, the trial court
               nevertheless allowed the [original owners] extra time to redeem
               the property by awarding them an additional 98 days beyond the
               one-year limitation for redemption of property.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023             Page 18 of 24
               Consequently, based on the clear and unambiguous language [of
               section 4 and section 6(f),] we conclude that the trial court does not
               have the discretion to extend the period of redemption beyond the one-
               year limitation.

       Id. (emphasis added).

[35]   However, a purchaser’s entitlement to a tax deed upon its satisfaction of the

       statutory requirements notwithstanding, Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-16

       (“section 16”) provides as follows:

               A person may . . . defeat the title conveyed by a tax deed
               executed under this chapter only if:

                        (1) the tract or real property described in the deed was not
                        subject to the taxes for which it was sold;

                        (2) the delinquent taxes or special assessments for which
                        the tract or real property was sold were paid before the
                        sale;

                        (3) the tract or real property was not assessed for the taxes
                        and special assessments for which it was sold;

                        (4) the tract or real property was redeemed before the
                        expiration of the period of redemption (as specified in
                        section 4 of this chapter);

                        (5) the proper county officers issued a certificate, within
                        the time limited by law for paying taxes or for redeeming
                        the tract or real property, which states either that no taxes
                        were due at the time the sale was made or that the tract or
                        real property was not subject to taxation;
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023           Page 19 of 24
                        (6) the description of the tract or real property was so
                        imperfect as to fail to describe it with reasonable certainty;
                        or

                        (7) the notices required by IC 6-1.1-24-2, IC 6-1.1-24-4,
                        and sections 4.5 and 4.6 of this chapter were not in
                        substantial compliance with the manner prescribed in
                        those sections.

       (Emphasis added.) Thus, in addition to establishing the requirements to obtain

       a tax deed, the Indiana Code also provides an explicit, and limited, opportunity

       for the original property owner to defeat title conveyed by a tax deed.

[36]   For example, in Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. M Jewell, LLC, we held that a tax

       deed was void under section 16(7) due to a county auditor’s “lack of substantial

       compliance with statutory notice procedures,” which procedures where

       themselves the codification of constitutional requirements. 992 N.E.2d 751, 759

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Still, the purchaser argued that, because the

       trial court’s judgment was ultimately an equitable one, we were required to

       defer to “the equitable discretion of the trial court” and affirm the trial court’s

       refusal to set aside the tax deed. Id. We rejected the purchaser’s argument,

       stating that, where a deed is void under section 16, “the trial court exercises no

       discretion and is required to set aside the tax deed.” Id.

[37]   Our holdings in Strezovski and Farmers Mutual recognize that section 4, section

       6(f), and section 16 are unambiguous; that the parties to those appeals were

       clearly governed by those rules of law; and that, accordingly, equity would

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023           Page 20 of 24
       follow the law. However, our case law has supported the use of equitable relief

       when the basis alleged for setting aside a tax deed is premised not on a ground

       enumerated in section 16 but instead on a material misrepresentation during the

       statutory tax sale process. See Town of Edinburgh v. Black, 48 N.E.3d 340, 347

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the original property owner was entitled to

       equitable relief when he paid the amount the county auditor had represented to

       him to be the redemption amount, which turned out to be an incorrect amount);

       Tajuddin v. Sandhu Petro. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 891, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

       (holding that the original property owner was entitled to equitable relief where

       the tax assessment on the sold property had been misattributed to a different

       property owned by the owner, and which assessment the owner had paid);

       Atkins v. Niermeier, 671 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the

       trial court had the power in equity to order the county auditor to reissue a tax

       sale certificate to a purchaser when a party that had no substantial interest in

       the property, but who had represented otherwise to the purchaser, attempted to

       redeem the property); see also Swami, Inc. v. Lee, 841 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2006) (original owner argued for equitable relief “because it relied on a

       misrepresentation made by an employee in the county treasurer’s office,

       namely, that no taxes were due,” and we affirmed the denial of that request in

       part due to the owner’s unclean hands in not keeping its address with the

       county up to date).

[38]   Here, in its motion to set aside the tax deed, Fiascone Family argued only that

       the required notices were not in compliance with the law, in apparent

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023       Page 21 of 24
       accordance with section 16(7). Again, the trial court rejected Fiascone Family’s

       argument, and properly so for the reasons explained in Issue One above.

       However, despite finding no grounds under section 16 to set aside the tax deed,

       the trial court nonetheless used its equitable authority to extend Fiascone

       Family’s redemption period beyond the statutory timeframe provided for in

       section 4. In doing so, the court found that Fiascone Family’s failure to receive

       “actual notice” presented the court with an “exceptional” case that justified

       equitable relief.1 Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 7.

[39]   We conclude that there is nothing in this record to support the trial court’s

       assessment that this is an exceptional case. Following Strezovski, Farmers Mutual,

       and the unambiguous language of the Indiana Code, we hold that the trial court

       abused its discretion when it extended Fiascone Family’s redemption period

       beyond the statutory timeframe even though Marion Assets had provided

       Fiascone Family with constitutionally adequate notice. Section 4 gave Fiascone

       Family one year to redeem the condominium, which Fiascone Family did not

       do. Section 16 gave Fiascone Family means to set aside the tax deed, a showing

       under which Fiascone Family has been unable to make. Further, Fiascone

       Family has not alleged a material misrepresentation in the course of the tax sale

       proceedings, and, thus, the trial court’s invocation of equitable relief here is

       1
        There is some suggestion in the record that setting aside a tax deed for equitable reasons happens not
       uncommonly in Lake County. See Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 124-25.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023                              Page 22 of 24
       inconsistent with our precedent. Equity here should follow the law, and section

       6(f) entitled Marion Assets to the tax deed.

[40]   The trial court’s sua sponte invocation of its equitable authority is problematic

       for another reason. Because Fiascone Family moved to set aside the tax deed

       only on the ground that it had not received constitutionally adequate notice,

       Marion Assets limited its response only to that argument. But, as Marion Assets

       notes in its appellate brief, had it been given notice and an opportunity to argue

       against a proposed equitable theory of relief, Marion Assets may have had a

       legitimate basis to argue that Fiascone Family had unclean hands. See, e.g.,

       Swami, Inc., 841 N.E.2d at 1177 (affirming the denial of a motion to set aside a

       tax deed in part due to the original owner’s unclean hands in not keeping its

       address with the county up to date). We therefore conclude that the trial court

       abused its discretion when it awarded Fiascone Family equitable relief and set

       aside Marion Assets’ tax deed.

                                                   Conclusion
[41]   For all of the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that

       Marion Assets provided Fiascone Family with constitutionally adequate notice;

       we reverse the trial court’s decision to set aside Marion Assets’ tax deed

       notwithstanding that constitutionally adequate notice; and we remand with

       instructions for the trial court to deny Fiascone Family’s motion to set aside the

       tax deed.

[42]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023        Page 23 of 24
Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-TP-1681 | April 17, 2023   Page 24 of 24