Court Opinion

ID: 9846191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:36:32.673605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:34.959027
License: Public Domain

Smith, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because the law requires reliance on the Department of Motor Vehicle Safety (DMVS) computer database in order to verify the insurance status of Georgia motorists, a questionable notation in that database provided sufficient basis for a brief investigative stop of Dixson’s car. I therefore would reverse the trial court’s grant of Dixson’s motion to suppress.
The Georgia Code provides that the burden is on the owner of a motor vehicle to provide “satisfactory proof that the motor vehicle is subject to a policy of insurance.” OCGA § 40-2-26; see also OCGA § 40-6-10. While former law relied upon a system of identification cards carried by the owner/driver in the vehicle or on his person, as is still required for a driver’s license and vehicle registration, the scheme in effect since January 1, 2004 relies upon the DMVS computer database. Compare OCGA § 40-6-10 (a) (1) with OCGA § 40-6-10 (a) (3).
The database is therefore the legal method by which insurance coverage is verified, and an “unknown” insurance status raises, at a minimum, a suspicion that the owner has failed to provide proof of coverage as required by law. It could well be that the “unknown” status is the result of a computer “glitch” or data entry error by DMVS personnel, but the officer is certainly justified in investigating further to find the reason for the owner’s apparent violation of the law in failing to provide adequate proof of insurance.
While cases such as Berry v. State, 248 Ga. App. 874 (547 SE2d 664) (2001), cited by the majority, prohibit a stop on the “mere hunch” that a vehicle with a perfectly legal drive-out tag “might be stolen,” id. at 880-881 (3), our other decisions in this area make plain that a drive-out tag may provide sufficient basis for a stop if it gives some indication that it is invalid, such as a faded or weathered appearance. Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) (563 SE2d 527) (2002). A questionable notation in a database therefore should provide a “particularized and objective basis” for a stop. Id. The majority’s observation that a law officer could not, before the advent of the database, stop a vehicle in order to check its insurance status in essence points up the utility of this information for law enforcement. Before the database, such a stop would have been based upon no facts and made completely at random.
*266Decided July 5, 2006
Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, District Attorney, Leonora Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Priya N. Lakhi, Therese M. Allen, for appellee.
In addition, unlike the officer in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (99 SC 1391, 59 LE2d 660) (1979), cited by the majority, the police officer here did not stop Dixson’s vehicle in order to check his driver’s license and registration. Before stopping the vehicle or making any contact with the driver, he simply observed the vehicle’s license plate, which was on public display, and checked his insurance status using that information. The driver of a vehicle has no privacy interest in the license plate; the entire purpose of the plate is to provide a positive and public identification of the vehicle. OCGA § 40-2-41. In Self v. State, 245 Ga. App. 270, 274 (3) (a) (537 SE2d 723) (2000), a police officer checked a vehicle’s license plate before stopping it and found that it was registered to another vehicle. We expressly held that “the potential violation of OCGA § 40-2-6 supported the stop of the vehicle.” Id. We then went on to lay out an alternative and independent basis for the stop in the description and location of the vehicle, but nowhere in the opinion did we qualify our original holding as dependent upon other factors, as suggested by the majority. Prouse therefore offers no guidance here.
While an officer may not issue a citation for an insurance violation based solely on the database, the statutory prohibition of a citation does not affect whether the database can provide an articulable suspicion upon which to base a Terry stop. Otherwise, the database would appear to be largely ineffective because the officer cannot use the information it provides. If he stops the car and the driver has no “proof or evidence” of insurance, the officer is to write a citation. OCGA§ 40-6-10 (a) (6). But he cannot confirm insurance, or the lack of it, unless and until he stops the car. Moreover, such a stop could be considered a “courtesy stop” in that it may alert the driver to a problem with his insurance status before he is involved in an accident or stopped for some other reason and then cited for failing to have insurance.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.