Court Opinion

ID: 9842980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:23:19.255714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:23.067196
License: Public Domain

NIES, Circuit Judge, concurring.
In my view, the decision of the MSPB should be set aside because of an error of law with respect to its interpretation of the requirements of a defense of reprisal. However, I do not join in reversal based on ex parte contacts. I also find it necessary to present a somewhat different view of the facts.
I

The Merits

Sullivan was required to work at the Naval facility in order to be entitled to overtime pay or compensatory time. There is no question in this case but that Sullivan submitted inaccurate time sheets. He admits that the specific times he reported on his time sheets for his work at the facility on weekends were not correct. His defense is that he worked the number of hours for which he received either pay or compensatory time and was merely careless about the specific times he put down on his reports.
*1277The majority opinion would indicate that the surveillance was a farce. It was not. A review of Sullivan’s time sheets submitted by Sullivan before the surveillance showed he had never reported any overtime prior to 0800. Therefore, the surveillance began shortly before 0800. There was am-pié parking space next to the only entrance open for weekend entry. That area and door, as well as his home, were monitored. The fact that the agents never checked his office or telephoned him in his office was for the reason that the surveillance was covert.
The Presiding Official found that Sullivan’s explanation of his activities was incredible. As an example of one of the days for which he claimed pay, Saturday, March 15, 1980, his time sheet represents that he arrived at work at 0845 departed at 1245 returned at 1415 and departed at 1615. The surveillance disclosed that he arrived at 1008 and departed at 1358. His explanation is that he reported at 0700 by bicycle, departed at approximately 0930, returned at approximately 1010 in green car, departed 1245, returned 1415 in white car, and departed 1615 for the day. For over seven hours of work, he says he charged for only six. Similarly, on Sunday, March 9, 1980, he reported officially that he worked from 0810 to 1240, and 1330 to 1530. The surveillance disclosed that he arrived at 0910, departed 1220, and made no other entries into the building. His explanation is that he reported at 0700 by bicycle, departed 0830, reported approximately 0900 in green car, departed 1240, reported 1330 on a red motorbike, and departed 1530, thus working 7 hours and 10 minutes, for which he charged the Government 6 hours and 30 minutes. Similar comings and goings in various ways characterize each of the six days.
The Presiding Official carefully considered all of the evidence, including the fact that at times the surveillance officers checked his home, and he reached the following conclusion:
I have also carefully, weighed the defendant’s manner and demeanor while testifying at the hearing and considered his admissions that he knowingly made entries on the time and attendance report which falsely depicted him to be at work when, in fact, he was not there, and that he knew that inaccurately reporting the times at work was in direct violation of the agency’s regulation. I have also observed the manner and demeanor of the NIS agents during grueling cross-examination. I find their testimony much more credible than the defendant’s statements and testimony.
The Presiding Officer also found it inconceivable that appellant’s “arrivals and departures would so neatly coincide with the agent’s absences from the surveillance site or otherwise go unnoticed.” Since these findings have not been set aside, the removal action must be sustained against Sullivan unless he has an affirmative defense.
II

Reprisal Defense

The only basis for dismissal of Sullivan’s affirmative defense of reprisal was stated to be:
The Board finds that though the appellant had filed a grievance against the official who started the investigation into appellant’s claims of time worked, and that reprisal for this grievance substantially motivated the beginning of the lengthy and detailed investigation, ordering such an investigation is not taking a personnel action. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2). Furthermore, this official did not take the personnel action, removal against appellant. Appellant proved no causal connection between the taking of the personnel action and the tainted motivation which precipitated the investigation. Appellant failed to prove that retaliation was a significant factor in the agency’s decision to remove him.
As I understand what the board is holding, reprisal cannot be established if the case against an employee is a good one and the person instigating removal proceedings does not actually take the removal action himself.
*1278I find this is error, as a matter of law, on both points. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(B) provides that an adverse action may not be sustained if the employee shows that the decision was based on any prohibited personnel practice described in § 2302(b). In an adverse action proceeding, the affirmative defense of reprisal is significant only in those cases which have been determined to have merit. Thus, the merits cannot be the determinative factor that there was no reprisal. A meritorious adverse action must be set aside where there is reprisal.
The second factor, that is, that Westbrock did not take a personnel action, is invalid, in my view, under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) as a matter of statutory construction. The section reads, in pertinent part:
(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority-—
* 4s * * *
(8) take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to any employee ....
Westbrock is within the category of persons defined in § 2302(b) and he not only started the investigation leading to the personnel action against Sullivan (which establishes “nexus”) but also “recommended” a personnel action against Sullivan. No more is necessary. I read the phrase “take or fail to take” in subparagraph (b)(8) to encompass any of the authority specified in the lead-in paragraph. In other words, a recommendation to take an action is on a par with taking the action. Moreover, I agree with Sullivan’s position that
WESTBROCK’s continuous, behind-the-scenes, manipulations and orchestration of the removal decision established that his agreed-upon recusal was a meaningless sham and illustrative of the Agency’s bad faith reprisal action and motives in this case.
III

Ex parte Communication

With respect to this issue, I do not join the majority. I believe it is greatly to be preferred to rely solely on the statute. I find the judge-made protection against ex parte contacts prior to the hearing stage * to be the type of doctrine which leads to confusion and essentially to ad hoc decisions.
Sullivan’s argument to the MSPB on ex parte contacts was solely directed to violation of the statutory provisions and regulations which require that an employee must be given notice of the reasons and access to materials which are relied on to support the action against him. 5 CFR § 752.404(b); 5 CFR § 752.203(b); and 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) and (e). He argued that he did not receive all materials relied upon by the agency. He further argued that no ex parte communications are allowable in the decision-making process, after he made his oral reply, since he was not given an opportunity to refute information received ex parte. He treated the ex parte contacts with the FBI and all NAVTRAEQUIPCEN employees on a par. Contacts with Westbrock were not singled out except in connection with the assertion of reprisal. The MSPB ruled:
In this case, the presiding official found that the agency had furnished appellant with all material in support of its stated charges and that he had even been afforded an additional opportunity to respond before the agency deciding official issued the decision. Appellant’s bare assertion of error is insufficient to trigger a complete review of the presiding official’s findings. Lopez v. Veterans Administration, MSPB Docket No. DA07528110066 (June 16, 1962); Weaver v. Department of the Navy, 2 MSPB 297 (1980). Further, based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the presiding official did not err in his interpretation of 5 C.F.R. § 752.404, and that the agency fully satisfied its obligation to notify appellant of *1279and provide him a reasonable opportunity to review the material in support of the advance notice of charges.
The position of the MSPB is entirely in accord with the decision of this court in Depte v. United States, 715 F.2d 1481 (Fed. Cir.1983). As stated by Judge Davis therein:
Of course, petitioner was not constitutionally entitled, at the agency stage, to confront the witnesses against her, but merely to those procedures mandated by statute or regulation. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 [94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15] (1974); Giles v. United States, 553 F.2d 647, 649 (Ct.C1.1977). Here, no statute (including the Civil Service Reform Act) and no regulation required an evidentiary hearing at the agency level or prohibited (at that stage) ex parte communications with witnesses to an incident of this type. It is settled that the right to make a written and oral reply (which petitioner received) did not call for such a hearing nor did it preclude the ex parte discussion undertaken by the agency. Grover v. United States, 200 Ct.Cl. 337, 349-51 (1973), expressly so held. Mrs. Depte later had a full evidentiary hearing (at which Sterner and the agency’s deciding official both testified and were subject to cross-examination) before the presiding official of the MSPB.6 That was adequate under the Constitution, the statute, and the regulations applicable to this case. The prior proceedings at the agency stage were not unlawful. [Footnote omitted.]
The board made no ruling on the issue of proper versus improper ex parte contacts. Moreover, in this appeal, Sullivan continued to make the argument that ex parte contacts per se are improper. To quote from his brief:
WESTBROCK’s ex-parte communications with his fellow officer (CNET) was not merely an evaluation of record evidence as such ex-parte communications were of the type ... that went to the essence of the validity of the Agency’s decision in this case and, therefore, Petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity to review, comment upon, and counter such ex-parte communications. In Doe v. Hampton [566 F.2d 265] that Court, on Page 278 stated:
.... We, of course, do not intend to hamper the Commission with the fear that the validity of its decisions will be jeopardized whenever it attempts better to inform its deliberative process and to assure a correct result. When, however, for whatever reason, it seeks to obtain further evidence against which to adjudge the validity of the agency’s adverse personnel decision, both the Commission’s own regulations and fairness to the individual employee require that evidence be placed in the record for all the parties to see and, should they choose, make their views known.
The majority decision that improper ex parte contacts tainted the proceeding is not merely a new argument developed by the majority to overrule a holding by the MSPB on an issue below. Rather, it is an entirely new issue interjected into the case. It is well settled that this court does not act de novo in MSPB appeals but can only review the decision of the board. There is no reviewable decision on this issue. Regardless of merit, new non-jurisdictional issues cannot be raised and decided for the first time on appeal. Finally, since reprisal was found by the majority, this basis for its decision is wholly unnecessary.
IV

Remedy

The authority granted to this court under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) is to “set aside” agency action. I do not find any authority to order reinstatement or payment of back pay. That may flow from setting aside the action of the agency and, if not, Sullivan may have a claim against the Government, offset, inter alia, by payments on his false claims for overtime.
The statute relating to appeals to this court from MSPB decisions is significantly different from the former statute authoriz*1280ing appeals to the United States Court of Claims. Under the former statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) specifically directed that petitions were filed as provided in Chapter 91 of Title 28, i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Under that statute the Court of Claims was empowered to “render judgment upon any claim against the United States” and to “issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records, and such orders may be issued to any appropriate official of the United States.” That authority now resides in the United States Claims Court, not this court. Unlike the United States Court of Claims, which had both trial and appellate functions and powers, this court is strictly an appellate court. It may no longer look to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 as a basis for its authority and may not treat an MSPB appeal the same as a back pay case, which the United States Court of Claims was free to do. Cf. Meyer v. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 666 F.2d 540, 541 (Ct.Cl.1981), (“This civilian pay case is before the court on petitioner’s appeal for review of an order of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB),” (emphasis added)).
The majority relies on Brewer v. United States Postal Service, 647 F.2d 1093 (Ct.Cl. 1981), which, in fact, supports my view. As stated therein at 1098:
Since this is the first review by this court of a decision of the Merit Systems Board under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, we call attention to the fact that the petitioner seeks relief which is not within our power to grant under the Act. He sues for back pay, requests reinstatement, and claims the right to related benefits. The standard of review set forth in the Act is limited. We are authorized only to “hold unlawful and set aside” an improper agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Therefore, we are without jurisdiction to render a money judgment — a Tucker Act remedy which the court is empowered to grant in other cases.
Apparently the court had the same doubt as I, with respect to what action it could take had the result been the other way, and opined:
If judgment had been rendered for petitioner, we would have been required to remand the case to the Merit Systems Protection Board with instructions to determine the amount of back pay and related benefits due and to reinstate him.5
5 In response to a question at oral argument, respondent’s counsel expressed the view that when the court decides that the agency action should be set aside as unlawful, it has the power to remand with instructions to award the discharged employee back pay and to reinstate him to his former position.
(647 F.2d at 1099.)
No controlling precedent can arise from dictum on a question not before the court. Nor can the jurisdiction of the court be established, in any event, simply by the answer of Government counsel.

 While the majority uses the term “hearing” to identify the oral response made to the agency, it is not used in a “due process” sense. As indicated by the majority, the “hearing” was “not adversary in nature.”