Court Opinion

ID: 9540069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:12:33.295005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:34.193235
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
POPOVICH, J.;
¶ 1 I dissent to the Majority’s vacation of the judgment of sentence and remanding of this case for the trial court to impose the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1 upon Appellee, Sue Zortman.
¶ 2 Appellee does not dispute the fact that the apartment she occupied with a co-defendant (Robert Prisk) contained marijuana in the kitchen and in a briefcase, and that there was a firearm in a bedroom, all of which were seized by police while executing a consensual search of Appellee’s residence. Appellee pleaded guilty to pos*245session of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (PWID), possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy, which exposed her to a maximum term of imprisonment of twelve years. At sentencing, the Commonwealth invoked the mandatory minimum punishment required by § 9712.1 because Appellee violated Section 13(a)(30) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter “Drug Act”) and a gun was discovered in close proximity to the drugs.
¶ 3 At the court below, Appellee did not dispute the facts associated with the presence of a gun in the apartment she shared with Prisk. Rather, Appellee acknowledged its presence but argued the inapplicability of the mandatory nature of § 9712.1 because of the inoperability of the gun found in the apartment. In a motion for re-consideration, the trial court agreed with Appellee for the following reasons; to-wit:
The firearm for which [Appellant] was deemed in physical control of had a missing firing pin, which is a vital component of the weapon. Without the firing pin the bullet could not be projected. Without the firing pin the firearm is incapable of discharging a bullet. Without the firing pin the gun was completely defective. The defectiveness of the gun was so absolute that it was no longer functional within the nature of its original design. The firearm was so [... ] “defective or damaged that it had lost its initial characteristics as a firearm.” [Appellant’s] firearm was not readily repairable as the missing firing pin was not located on [Appellant’s] person or within the residence. [Appellant’s] weapon could no longer be characterized as a “firearm” as defined by § 9712(e). Hence, th[e trial e]ourt was correct in dismissing the application of § 9712.1 to [Appellant’s] sentence.
Trial court opinion, 7/16/08, at 3 (citation omitted). Additionally, the trial court analogized 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(a) (where Legislature expressed intent to permit punishment of defendant in possession of firearm, even if not functional, because weapon still capable of placing victim in fear of harm or death) with Section 9712.1, which contains no such express language relating to punishment regardless of the operability of a handgun. The trial court viewed the facts against the backdrop of the preceding statutes and case law in deciding not to impose a mandatory minimum sentence upon Appellee because the gun found in her apartment was missing the firing pin. The Majority concludes otherwise because Section 9712.1 “specifically excludes any requirement of operability. [...] Under § 9712(e), a firearm includes any weapon ‘designed’ to expel a projectile by explosive means. The language is clear and free from doubt, and the weapon in question, which was a handgun that was designed to fire bullets, falls within its parameters.” Majority Opinion, at 242 (citation omitted). I disagree with the rationale espoused by the Majority, which resorts to an expansive reading of a criminal statute to enhance the severity of Appellee’s sentence because of her proximity to an “inoperable” firearm found in the bedroom of an apartment she shared with a co-defendant. Thus, the question posed for our review requires us to interpret the term “firearm” within § 9712.1.
In interpreting a statute, we must ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When statutory language is clear and free from all ambiguity, it generally furnishes the best indication of legislative intent; we must not disregard the statutory language under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); Bowser v. Blom, 569 Pa. 609, *246807 A.2d 830, 835 (2002). Accordingly, a reviewing court should resort to other considerations to determine legislative intent only when the words of the statute are not explicit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); O’Rourke v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Corrs., 566 Pa. 161, 778 A.2d 1194, 1201 (2001). Finally, while minding our other principles of statutory construction, we must construe all penal provisions strictly in favor of defendants’ liberty interests. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1); cf. Commonwealth v. Wooten, 519 Pa. 45, 545 A.2d 876, 879 (1988) (“[W]here an ambiguity exists in the language employed by the legislature in a penal statute, it should be interpreted in a light most favorable to the criminally accused.”). But see id. at 880 (“While strict construction of penal statute is required, however, courts are not required to give words of a criminal statute their narrowest meaning or disregard evident legislative intent.”).
Section 9712.1, “Sentences for certain drug offenses committed with firearms[,]” provides, as herein relevant:
(a) MANDATORY SENTENCE.— Any person who is convicted of a violation of section 13(a)(30) of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, when at the time of the offense the person [... ] is in physical possession or control of a firearm, whether visible, concealed about the person or the person’s accomplice or within the actor’s [...] reach or in close proximity to the controlled substance, shall likewise be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement.
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(d) AUTHORITY OF COURT IN SENTENCING. — There shah be no authority in any court to impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any lesser sentence than provided for in subsection (a) or to place such offender on probation or to suspend sentence. Nothing in this section shall prevent the sentencing court from imposing a sentence greater than that provided in this section. Sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing shall not supersede the mandatory sentences provided in this section.
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(f) DEFINITION. — As used in this section, the term “firearm” shall have the same meaning as that given to it in section 9712 (relating to sentences for offenses committed with firearms).
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1. Section 9712, from which § 9712.1 draws its definition of “firearm,” defines a firearm as: “[a]ny weapon, including a starter gun, which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by-the action of an explosive or the expansion of gas therein.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(e). As noted earlier, the Majority concludes that the language contained in § 9712(e) is “clear and free from doubt.” I disagree.
¶ 4 It is beyond cavil that “our principles of statutory construction require us to look no farther than the provision in question when its language is unambiguous, 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1922(b), but here the provision in question cross-references another section for definitional purposes, which complicates the inquiry.” Commonwealth v. Dickson, 591 Pa. 364, 375, 918 A.2d 95, 102 (2007).
¶ 5 We begin by reviewing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision from which Appellant, the Commonwealth, and the trial court cite in support of their respective positions concerning the “operability” of the firearm and its impact upon application of the mandatory minimum sentence called *247for under § 9712.1. In Commonwealth v. Layton, 452 Pa. 495, 307 A.2d 843 (1973), the defendant was convicted under the following section of the Uniform Firearms Act:
No person who has been convicted in this Commonwealth or elsewhere of a crime of violence shall own a firearm, or have one in his possession or under his control.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.1 The high Court held that a person could not be convicted under the statute, if the object owned, possessed, or controlled by the accused was not capable of firing a shot, and if he did not have under his control the means to convert the object into one capable of firing a shot. In Layton, it was stipulated that the pistol possessed by the accused could not have been fired at the time of the arrest. There was no evidence offered as to how the pistol could have been made operable in that case. Further, the Supreme Court explained that even though the object was not operable, a conviction might be sustained if the possessor had under his control the means to convert the object into one capable of firing a shot. The Supreme Court went on to state that an operable firearm may be said to be under the control of the alleged actor even though it is “a malfunctioning assembled firearm or a disassembled firearm” so long as the accused has under his control the means to convert the inoperable firearm into an operable firearm. Layton, at 499, 307 A.2d at 845. The same Court also stated that an “operable” status could be found if the weapon had a damaged part that was “readily repairable.” Id.; accord Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 894 A.2d 759 (Pa.Super.2006) (Appellant’s handgun was operable for purposes of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 6106; evidence showed that reinsertion of firing pin by hand was all that was needed to test-fire weapon successfully; and handgun was also held operable because means to make it so were readily available to Appellant pursuant to Layton and this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Siiams, 260 Pa.Super. 409, 394 A.2d 992, 994 (1978) (construing § 6106)). We see no reason why the reasoning in Layton and its progeny should not apply here. Indeed, the state of inoperability was confirmed through the Commonwealth’s witness (Agent Adams) during Appellant’s co-defendant Prisk’s trial, wherein Agent Adams described the condition of the firearm when found under the mattress as missing the firing pin. Further, Agent Adams testified that lab tests confirmed the weapon was not functional, and he (a weapon-carrying police officer) was without knowledge of where to purchase the missing part to allow it to be “readily [... ] converted to expel a projectile;” to-wit:
[Assistant District Attorney:]
Q: And did you — was there a determination in terms of the operation, or ability of the gun?
[Agent Adams:]
A. Yes.
Q. What was the determination?
A. It was determined that the firing pin mechanism was missing off the hammer of the gun.
Q. And I’m not a gun person, Agent Adams. Could you explain what you mean by firing pin? Maybe some of the jurors know, but I don’t. What do you mean by firing pin, what exactly, when you reference that?
*248A. A firing pin is a little metal, pointy thing that hits the back of a bullet. And there’s a primer there, and it ignites the powder and makes the bullet come out of the gun.
Q. And where is it located on that weapon?
A. On this weapon, it’s a fixed firing pin. It would be located on the hammer on the top.
Q. And was it missing or was it broken?
A. It’s not there, so it’s missing.
Q. How difficult is it to go out and buy a firing pin?
A. I’ve never bought one.
Q. Okay.
A. I couldn’t tell you that.
Q. But you own guns, I take it—
A. Yes.
Q. —obviously, as a police officer.
A. Yes.
Reproduced Record at 98a-99a.
¶ 6 The Majority looks to the definition of “firearm” and notes that it includes any weapon which is “designed” to expel a projectile. Majority Opinion, at 242-43. With this conclusion I do not take issue. However, with the weapon here missing a firing pin, it seems rather incongruous that the manufacturer who “designed” the firearm did so absent a firing pin. Such a state of disassembly, under the particular facts recounted by Agent Adams, I believe renders such an instrument incapable of being “readily” repaired by Appellee so that it would shoot a bullet. I read § 9712.1(e) to require such an expulsion of a projectile for an item to be categorized a “firearm.” In other words, absent the capacity to expel a projectile or be readily capable of doing so converts the instrument here into something less than a “firearm” proscribed by § 9712.1 via § 9712. See Layton, supra; cf. Siiams, supra (trial court granted Appellee’s arrest of judgment for violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106; Commonwealth appealed; we vacated arrest of judgment and reinstated verdict on the basis that, while expert stated that pistol taken from Appellee was “inoperable,” expert also explained how he easily made a “repair” so that pistol would shoot a bullet rendering it a “firearm” forbidden to be carried by Appellee under § 6106).
¶ 7 Lastly, to adopt the Majority’s position would be the equivalent of incorporating the statutory language set forth in § 9712(a) into § 9712.1. To elaborate, § 9712(a) directs the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for any person who possesses a firearm (regardless of whether it is functional) during the commission of a crime of violence, provided possession of the firearm placed the victim in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. Likewise, § 9712.1 contains an identical mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment where a person convicted of violating the Drug Act was in possession of or in close proximity to a firearm. As recited earlier, § 9712.1 also authorizes the incorporation of the meaning of “firearm” outlined in § 9712. However, nowhere is there any mention that the lack of a functional firearm set forth in § 9712(a) should somehow make its way obliquely into § 9712.1 by way of the definitional provision of § 9712(e). See Trial court opinion, 7/16/08, at 3-4 (“The Commonwealth is incorrectly encompassing the entire language and legislative intent contained in § 9712, relating to violent crimes, upon § 9712.1, drug-related offenses. The main purpose of § 9712, relating to violent crimes, is the visual possession of a firearm, which places the victim in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. The primary focus of § 9712 is the level of fear the victim experiences during the commis*249sion of a violent crime involving a firearm, hence, § 9712 provision specifically address[es] functionality and the use of firearm replicas. Section 9712.1, drug-related offenses, does not address functionality or even the use of replicas.”). In my view, the Majority’s ruling achieves such a result by discounting the functionality of a firearm in applying the mandatory minimum sentence under § 9712.1(a). I cannot subscribe to such a decision. See Dickson, supra (statute [§ 9712(a) ] imposing mandatory minimum sentence for person possessing firearm during robbery strictly construed to apply only to person carrying gun, not unarmed accomplices or co-conspirator); see also Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 484 Pa. 476, 399 A.2d 392, 395 (1979) (“Where one section of a statute contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar (section) is significant [especially where one cross-references the other for definitional purposes] to show a different intention existed.”). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. Layton involved the Uniform Firearms Act, the Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 628, as amended 18 P.S. § 4628 (now 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105). The pertinent language of the Act, including what is now § 6105, is unchanged, which makes Layton instructional in resolving the meaning of "fireann” in the case at bar.