Court Opinion

ID: 9719036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:41:15.248954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.334071
License: Public Domain

*243BENHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I disagree with Division 2 of the opinion which reverses the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee. In Division 2, the majority creates a rule neither contemplated by the homestead statute nor called for by the issues raised on appeal.1 Instead of simply determining the issues raised, the majority has decided to reverse the trial court based on what Glynn County “should have” done with regard to its administration of homestead exemptions. Specifically, the majority concludes that DeKalb County’s act of rescinding the homestead exemption on the DeKalb County property in which appellant resides was erroneous because Glynn County should not have “honored” husband’s homestead application based on the fact appellant’s residence had the exemption during the four years prior to husband’s application. In effect, the majority has created an equitable rule awarding the right of the homestead exemption to the property of the estranged spouse who first obtained such an exemption.
One problem with this result is the fact that neither Glynn County nor Mr. Masters are parties to this lawsuit. Indeed, the trial court did not make any determinations regarding their actions, but only determined that the homestead statute was constitutional and that the Masters were a “family group” such that they were only entitled to one homestead exemption. The majority’s reversal does nothing to rectify the underlying problem at hand because, when appellee reinstates the homestead exemption on appellant’s residence, as the majority opinion seemingly obliges it to do, the Masters will again have two homestead exemptions which the majority agrees in its Division 1 is not permitted by the homestead statute.
The majority is overreaching in its effort to resolve the matter as a response to Mr. Masters’ implied bad behavior of causing the “nullification”2 of the exemption on appellant’s DeKalb County residence. The majority overlooks the fact that, because the Masters are married, the homestead exemption on the Glynn County property, which presumably is marital property, is as much appellant’s homestead exemption as it is her husband’s. The alleged estrangement3 that causes the Masters to be unable or unwilling to decide for themselves which of their properties they will apply their one *244homestead exemption does not justify denying DeKalb County the ability to administer the homestead exemption in compliance with the homestead statute.4 Nor do the vagaries of the couple’s purported estrangement justify this Court making equitable rulings beyond the scope of the issues raised on appeal. Since DeKalb County became aware that the Masters had two homestead exemptions and the law does not allow such, it was entitled to rescind the homestead exemption on the DeKalb County property. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellee.
Decided November 22, 2010.
Richard J. Dreger, Kenneth P. Robin, for appellant.
Duane D. Pritchett, Stephen E. Whitted, for appellee.

 Appellant has only challenged the constitutionality of the homestead statute and the definition of the term “family group” therein.

 Although Mr. Masters is not a party to this case, the majority takes issue with his being able to “nullify the pre-existing exemption” without authority.

 Given the fact that the appellant is employed by her husband in his private tax business and that her husband is a certified public accountant, I find it difficult to believe that the couple is so completely estranged that they cannot make basic tax-related decisions.

 The majority does not explain how or why DeKalb County would have authority over Glynn County’s administration of the homestead exemption, or vice versa.