Court Opinion

ID: 9915068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 16:12:24.277317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:00.958466
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      JANUARY 4, 2024
                                                                 In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                                WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )
                                               )         No. 39293-7-III
                     Respondent,               )
                                               )
       v.                                      )
                                               )
BRYAN JOHN VOORHEES,                           )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                               )
                     Appellant.                )

       STAAB, J. — Bryan Voorhees pleaded guilty to three domestic violence felonies

under two superior court cause numbers on the same day. The trial court imposed an

exceptional sentence for a conviction of second degree assault domestic violence by

running the sentence consecutive to the sentences imposed in the first case. Voorhees

appeals his conviction and sentence for second degree assault raising two issues. First, he

argues that the record fails to establish that his plea was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary because the trial court failed to establish that Voorhees understood the nature

of the offense for which he was pleading guilty. Second, Voorhees contends that the trial

court abused its discretion by imposing a consecutive sentence.
No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

       We find that Voorhees’ plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary but reverse

the exceptional sentence for second degree assault. Voorhees’ single misdemeanor

conviction for assault domestic violence from 2007 does not represent a substantial and

compelling reason for departing from the guidelines and imposing an exceptional

sentence.

                                     BACKGROUND

       The State charged Voorhees with domestic violence crimes stemming from two

separate incidents, with two different alleged victims, occurring three years apart.

       On October 5, 2022, Voorhees pleaded guilty to three counts of domestic violence

under both cause numbers. In the older of the two cases, Voorhees pleaded guilty to one

count of second degree assault domestic violence from an incident that occurred in March

2019. In the statement of defendant on plea of guilty, Voorhees’ attorney indicated that

the elements of this charge were reflected in the information. In lieu of making a

statement in his own words, Voorhees stipulated that the court could consider the

probable cause affidavit to establish a factual basis for the plea. The stipulated probable

cause affidavit alleged that during an argument with his then-girlfriend, Voorhees

“produced a pistol and, with his finger on the trigger, pressed it into her chest causing

pain and visible injury,” and then fired a shot into her bedroom doorframe.

       In the more recent of the two cases, Voorhees pleaded guilty to first degree

burglary domestic violence and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm on

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State v. Voorhees

January 2022. The stipulated probable cause statement alleged that on or about January

16, 2022, Voorhees assaulted another woman by pressing a pistol into her chest.

       Sentencing for both cases occurred immediately after the pleas. Voorhees’

criminal history includes a prior fourth degree misdemeanor assault conviction for

domestic violence occurring back in 2007. This prior misdemeanor was not included in

calculating Voorhees’ offender score.

       The first degree burglary charge carried a standard range sentence of 31 to 41

months of incarceration. The parties recommended a mid-range sentence of 36 months.

The second degree assault charge carried a standard range sentence of 13 to 17 months.

The parties recommended a 17-month sentence on the assault charge to run concurrent

with the sentence on the other case.

       During the plea hearing, the judge went through each charge Voorhees intended to

plead guilty to. She started with the charges of burglary and unlawful possession of a

firearm from January 2022 and asked whether it was his intention to plead guilty to

burglary in the first degree domestic violence and unlawful possession of a firearm in the

second degree. Voorhees responded affirmatively. Next, the judge moved onto the

assault charge from March 2019. She asked whether it was his intention and

understanding to plead guilty to one count of second degree assault domestic violence.

Again, Voorhees responded affirmatively.

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State v. Voorhees

       Following this interaction, the judge informed Voorhees she had received his

statement of defendant on plea of guilty in both matters. She informed him that it

referenced the charges they just talked about and appeared to have both his and his

attorney’s signature on all the paperwork with his intent to plead guilty. She further

inquired whether Voorhees reviewed the paperwork with his attorney in which he

answered, “yes ma’am.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 6. In addition, she asked generally

whether he understood everything it contained and again he answered yes. She then

informed him of the standard sentencing range and that she was not required to follow

any recommendations provided. Before asking Voorhees how he wanted to plead to each

individual charge, she once again asked him whether he had enough time to speak with

his attorney about the consequences to plead guilty in which he stated yes.

       After Voorhees entered the guilty pleas, the judge allowed both victims to provide

a statement in court explaining the impact these crimes have had on their lives. After

hearing their statements, Voorhees told the court he never thought he would grow up “to

be a monster” and that he deserved what the judge decided to give him. RP at 22.

       After hearing from Voorhees, the judge made the following comments on the

record:

       Mr. Voorhees, I appreciate that you had something to say. I think that it
       can be helpful for victims of domestic violence to hear some remorse. But
       you’re right, you can’t give them back what you took away from them. You
       can’t give them back their peace of mind, their security. And the trauma

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State v. Voorhees

      that you have left not only the two women with but also their families–
      because domestic violence does affect more than just the victim, it affects
      their whole family. And domestic violence is one of those crimes that can
      silently smolder for years.
              You don’t have any prior felonies in your history. The domestic
      violence from 2007 was a fourth-degree assault–domestic violence. It’s
      significantly long ago, but it tells me that this is behavior that has been
      brewing within you. And you do need to look within yourself and decide
      how you can be different in the future because that’s the only way you can
      truly atone for this. Even my sentencing you to prison isn’t going to give
      these folks back what you took from them.

RP at 23.

      The judge then continued by stating that although there were recommendations

contemplated, these were just recommendations. The judge moved through the

sentencing on the burglary and firearm case, following recommendations provided, then

proceeded to the second degree assault domestic violence case, which is at issue on this

appeal. Based on the offender score of three, the standard range was 13 to 17 months.

However, the judge declined to run the sentences concurrently, noting:

              I understand the recommendation is to run these cases concurrently.
      However, I am finding that these are two very different incidents. They
      occurred nearly three years apart in time. They involve two different
      victims. And the nature of the fact that they’re coming to me today on one
      day with a plea isn’t making a difference with regard to the severity of each
      separate and individual act.
              I don’t find that running these matters concurrently is in the interests
      of justice. And I know that over objection of your counsel, it’s not been
      asked or recommended, but I am going to exercise my discretion and find
      that there are facts sufficient to establish what I’m going to call an

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State v. Voorhees

       exceptional sentence. And I’m going to order that the 17 months I’m
       ordering for this charge, the second-degree assault-domestic violence, is
       going to run consecutive to your sentence on the other matter. That is just
       and fair. And I think that that is in the interests of justice and does give a
       little peace of mind back to these victims who have been very affected by
       this matter.

RP at 26-27.

       Following this ruling, counsel consulted with Voorhees to see if he wished to

withdraw his plea. Defense counsel informed the court after hearing the victims speak

“and because of how much remorse he feels, he feels he owes this sentence to them” and

he was not going to move to withdraw his plea. RP at 28-29.

       The court directed the prosecutor to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of

law for the exceptional sentence. The findings stated that the two cases involved separate

domestic violence victims. In its findings, the court noted “defendant’s prior conviction

for 4th Degree Assault (Domestic Violence) in 2007, which was omitted from the

offender calculations pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525 results in a presumptive sentence that

is clearly too lenient.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 39.

       Voorhees appeals the conviction and sentence for second degree assault domestic

violence.

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

                                        ANALYSIS

1.     WHETHER VOORHEES UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE TO WHICH HE
       WAS PLEADING GUILTY

       Voorhees argues that his plea to second degree assault was not knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary because there is nothing in the record to show that he

understood the nature of the charge.1 In support of his argument, he points out that his

statement on plea of guilty did not include the elements of the crime, the judge never

informed him of the elements or even the nature of the charge, never read the factual

basis for the plea into the record, and never determined that Voorhees understood the

charge of second degree assault. Nor did Voorhees’ allocution indicate an understanding

of the elements or factual basis for the plea.

       While the requirements of the constitution and the court rules are not identical,

both require that a defendant understand the nature of the charges for which they are

pleading guilty. CrR 4.2(d); Matter of Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. 723, 727, 695 P.2d 596

(1985). Due process requires that a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

State v. Codiga, 162 Wn.2d 912, 922, 175 P.3d 1082 (2008). The constitutional

requirements for a voluntary plea include a showing that the defendant understands the

essential elements of the offense. Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. at 727.

       1
        The only case before us is Voorhees’ conviction for second degree assault.
Voorhees did not appeal his convictions for first degree burglary—domestic violence and
second degree unlawful possession of a firearm.

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

       The procedures set forth in CrR 4.2 were intended to aid the court in protecting the

constitutional right to a voluntary plea. See Matter of Keene, 95 Wn.2d 203, 206, 622

P.2d 360 (1980); Hilyard, 39 Wn. App. at 726. The court rule provides that “[t]he court

shall not accept a plea of guilty, without first determining that it is made voluntarily,

competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences

of the plea.” CrR 4.2(d). While the rule does not require the defendant to know every

element of the crime to which they are pleading guilty, the defendant must be “‘aware of

the acts and the requisite state of mind in which they must be performed to constitute a

crime.’” Keene, 95 Wn.2d at 207 (quoting State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148, 153 n.3,

607 P.2d 845 (1980).

       The mandated form of the statement of defendant on plea of guilty, provided as

part of CrR 4.2(g), provides additional aides to ensure that a defendant is aware of the

nature of the charge. The form provides space to identify the crime, provide its elements,

and allow the defendant to state in their own words what they did that makes them guilty

of the crime for which they are pleading guilty. CrR 4.2(g). Below this space is a box

that can be checked, indicating that in lieu of making a statement in their own words, the

court may review police reports and the probable cause statement to determine a factual

basis for the plea. See Id. When a defendant “fills out a written statement on plea of

guilty in compliance with CrR 4.2(g) and acknowledges that he or she has read it and

understands it and that its contents are true, the written statement provides prima facie

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

verification of the plea’s voluntariness.” State v. Perez, 33 Wn. App. 258, 261, 654 P.2d

708 (1982).

       Voorhees contends that his plea was involuntary because he never admitted his

role in the crime and the record was silent as to his understanding of the elements of the

crimes charged. In support of his position, he relies heavily on United States v. Fountain,

777 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1985). Fountain is distinguishable because it concerned

compliance with Federal Rule 11(f), which is not the same as Washington’s rule. “While

Washington’s rule requires the trial judge to determine that the defendant understands the

nature of the charges, it does not contain comparable language [to Federal Criminal Rule

11(f)] requiring an inquiry in open court.” State v. Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 201, 137 P.3d

835 (2006); see also CrR 4.2(d).

       Nevertheless, as Voorhees points out, the trial court did not question Voorhees

about whether he understood the nature of the charges. Nor did the court describe the

offense or read the factual basis for the plea into the record, which would have provided a

record of how the allegations met the elements of the charge. Finally, the statement on

plea of guilty failed to include the elements of the charge or a statement in the

defendant’s own words showing that he understood the nature of the offense.

       Despite these deficiencies, the record supports the fact that Voorhees understood

the nature of the crime to which he was pleading guilty. The statement of defendant on

plea of guilty indicated that the elements of “Assault 2-DV” were “reflected in the

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

information.” CP at 2. The statement also indicated that Voorhees was pleading guilty to

“count 1 Assault 2-DV in the information,” and that Voorhees had “received a copy of

that information.” CP at 12. At the plea hearing, Voorhees’ attorney attested that she

discussed the statement with Voorhees and that he is competent and fully understood the

statement.

       On appeal Voorhees does not otherwise contend that he did not actually

understand the nature of the charges. Instead, his argument is essentially that the court

failed to comply with CrR 4.2. While we would like to see a more thorough record, in

this case the statement of defendant on plea of guilty is sufficient to show that the court

complied with CrR 4.2, and Voorhees understood the nature of the charge and the

requirement of CrR 4.2.

2.     WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING AN
       EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE

       Voorhees argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed an

exceptional sentence for his conviction of second degree assault domestic violence. He

contends that the aggravating factors found by the court did not support the consecutive

sentence.

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

       The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence when it ordered Voorhees’

sentence on the conviction for second degree assault domestic violence to run consecutive

to his sentences for burglary and unlawful possession of a firearm.2 In its oral decision,

the trial court suggested the primary reason for imposing a consecutive sentence was the

court’s belief that the two incidents resulting in three felony offenses, while considered

current offenses, had significant differences:

              I understand the recommendation is to run these cases con currently.
       However, I am finding that these are two very different incidents. They
       occurred nearly three years apart in time. They involve two different
       victims. And the nature of the fact that they’re coming to me today on one
       day with a plea isn’t making a difference with regard to the severity of each
       separate and individual act.

RP at 26.

       However, in the written findings and conclusions, presented by the State, there is

no mention of the differences between the incidents. Instead, the written findings rely

solely on Voorhees’ 2007 misdemeanor conviction for assault domestic violence, finding

       2
         When a defendant is sentenced to two or more current offenses, the sentences
should be served concurrently. RCW 9.94A.589(1). A “current offense” is one that is
either entered or sentenced on the same date. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Under this rule,
Voorhees’ convictions in two cases, although occurring three years apart, were
considered current offenses and the standard range assumes the sentences would run
concurrently.

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

that the omission of this crime from Voorhees’ offender score resulted in a presumptive

sentence that was clearly too lenient.

       Consecutive sentences may be imposed under the “exceptional sentence”

provisions of RCW 9.94A.535. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). In turn, RCW 9.94A.535

provides that a court may impose a sentence outside the standard range if it finds that

there are “substantial and compelling” reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. RCW

9.94A.535.

       Whenever a sentence outside the standard range is imposed, “the court shall set

forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id.

If a court finds an exceptional sentence outside the standard range should be imposed,

“the sentence is subject to review only as provided for in RCW 9.94A.585(4).” Id. RCW

9.94A.585(4) provides that to reverse a sentence outside the standard range, the

reviewing court must find:

               (a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not
       supported by the record which was before the judge or that those reasons do
       not justify a sentence outside the standard sentence range for that offense;
       or (b) that the sentence imposed was clearly excessive or clearly too
       lenient.

RCW 9.94A.585(4).

       Under this statute, an appellate court is to engage in a three-part analysis. State v.

Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 405, 38 P.3d 335 (2002). First, the court must determine if the

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

record supports the reasons given by the sentencing court for imposing an exceptional

sentence, which is a factual inquiry. Fowler, 135 Wn.2d at 405. Second, the court must

determine as a matter of law whether the reasons provided justify imposing an

exceptional sentence. Id. Finally, the court is to examine whether the sentence is clearly

excessive or clearly lenient. Id. We review the record under a clearly erroneous standard

to determine if it supports the trial court’s reasons for imposing an exceptional sentence.

State v. Fletcher, 20 Wn. App. 2d 476, 488, 500 P.3d 222 (2021).

       The trial court’s oral and written findings suggest two justifications for the

exceptional sentence. First, in its oral ruling, the court suggested that despite the

statutory requirement to treat the three felonies as current offenses, they were

significantly different incidents. On appeal, the State concedes that this reason is legally

inadequate because, despite being current offenses, Voorhees’ offender score was

enhanced by each of the felonies and Voorhees did not avoid the increased penalties.

       The second reason provided in the court’s written findings was the unscored

misdemeanor conviction from 2007. Voorhees acknowledges the prior conviction, but

contends that legally it is insufficient to support an exceptional sentence. We apply a de

novo standard when reviewing whether the reasons given by the court justify imposing an

exceptional sentence. Fletcher, 20 Wn. App. 2d. at 489.

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

       A trial court may impose an exceptional sentence upon finding that “the

defendant’s prior unscored misdemeanor or prior unscored foreign criminal history

results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purposes of this

chapter.” RCW 9.94A.535(2)(b).3 When reviewing the legal adequacy of an aggravating

factor, we employ a two-part test: “(1) The trial court may not base an exceptional

sentence on factors the Legislature necessarily considered in establishing the sentencing

range; and (2) the aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to

distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” Fletcher, 20 Wn.

App. 2d at 489-90 (quoting State v. Jennings, 106 Wn. App. 532, 555, 24 P.3d 430

(2001)).

       Voorhees contends that the trial court’s reasons for imposing the exceptional

sentence were not compelling and substantial. We agree. While a defendant’s prior

unscored misdemeanor convictions can support an exceptional sentence, they must be

sufficiently substantial and compelling. Voorhees’ single conviction twelve years before

the oldest felony incident is not substantial or compelling. See State v. Atkinson, 113 Wn.

App. 661, 669, 54 P.3d 702 (2002) (five unscored misdemeanor or foreign convictions

       3
         Since the parties do not raise the issue, we do not consider whether a finding of
“clearly too lenient,” used to impose an exceptional sentence by way of consecutive
sentences, must be found by a jury. See State v. Johnson, __ Wn. App. __, 536 P.3d 1162
(2023).

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

supported exceptional sentence); State v. Ratliff, 46 Wn. App. 325, 730 P.2d 716 (1986)

(history of 34 misdemeanors supported exceptional sentence); State v. Clarke, 156 Wn.2d

880, 895, 134 P.3d 188 (2006) (six unscored misdemeanor convictions provided legal

justification for exceptional sentence); State v. Teuber, 109 Wn. App. 640, 36 P.3d 1089

(2001) (history of 10 traffic misdemeanor convictions and 29 traffic infractions justified

exceptional sentence for felony hit and run).

       The State points to the legislature’s recognition that domestic violence is a

“serious crime against society” and seeks to assure “the victim of domestic violence the

maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can

provide.” RCW 10.99.010. The State also notes that since 2011, certain misdemeanor

domestic violence convictions, including assault, are included in an offender score. See

RCW 9.94A.525(21)(c),.030(42). Finally, the State asserts that the trial court referred to

the unscored misdemeanor as part of a pattern of behavior that had been “long brewing”

within Voorhees. RP at 23.

       We acknowledge these important policies and procedures on domestic violence.

But even in light of these considerations, we do not find that a single misdemeanor

conviction twelve years before a subsequent felony incident is substantial or compelling

enough to support an exceptional sentence.

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No. 39293-7-III
State v. Voorhees

      We reverse Voorhees’ sentence on his conviction for second degree assault and

remand for resentencing.

      A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                            _________________________________
                                                    Staab, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________
      Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.

_________________________________
      Pennell, J.

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