Court Opinion

ID: 9457891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:36:38.74662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:33.328837
License: Public Domain

McCREE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. It is clear to me that the easement was granted for the purpose of “constructing, maintaining, operating, altering, repairing, replacing and removing” a pipeline for the transportation of coal slurry. It is equally clear that the pipeline is still maintained for the transportation of coal slurry and that there has been no cessation of that use. The construction which the majority gives the instrument selects one of the seven stated purposes of the easement, operating, as the only purpose.
I am also unpersuaded that the parties have given a contrary construction to the instrument by their subsequent conduct. In the first place, the extension agreements provided
“ . . . if at any time said pipeline shall cease to be used for the purpose . . . after [a stated date subsequent to the extension agreement], then all rights of the Grantee . . . shall cease. ...” (Emphasis added.)
The use of this language indicates that the parties did not agree that the pipeline had ceased to be used for the purpose set forth in the granting instrument. Of more significance, however, is the fact that the extension agreements were executed, as the majority opinion recites, “to preserve the status quo during negotiations,” which concerned, in part, the transmission through the pipeline of products in addition to coal slurry. Further, evidence of settlement negotiations is inadmissible to prove facts material to the dispute which they concern.
Finally, I do not regard the amount of consideration paid for the easement in 1956 as relevant in ascertaining the parties’ intent at that time. It appears that the land was completely idle and perhaps unsuited for any purpose other than as a right-of-way for a pipeline. Also, if the grantor should desire at any time to use the land, the grantee would be required to relocate the pipeline and right-of-way at his own expense. The value of an easement subject to relocation at the will of the grantor might be no more than the amount paid here. *382But that fact is not material to the issue before us.
I would affirm the judgment of Judge Lambros.