Court Opinion

ID: 9458534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:54:34.941294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:48.026660
License: Public Domain

TAMM, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I join in the court’s opinion today solely because these cases fall squarely within our decisions in Ricks v. District of Columbia, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 201, 414 F. 2d 1097 (1968); Ricks v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 215, 414 F.2d 1111 (1968). Were it not for the constitutional issue involved I would have preferred to have this court stay its hand in these cases in deference to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. It is because of these constitutional issues alone that I join in the court’s decision.
The need for reorganization of the courts in the District of Columbia was a foregone conclusion by the time that the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (July 29, 1970), took effect on February 1, 1971. In March 1970 the House District Committee observed,
[t]he fact is that the diversity of Federal and local interest [in the District of Columbia] has led to the jurisdictional disarray which presently exists — the local court handles some federal misdemeanors, the Federal court has jurisdiction of local felonies and concurrent jurisdiction over local misdemeanors; the local court makes determinations as to certain administrative procedures appeals, the Federal court hears others without apparent distinction as to local-Federal interest ; the Federal court tries cases that would elsewhere be within the state system. And then there is the overall problem of concurrent jurisdiction, producing delays in the disposition of criminal matters, described as “ping-pong”, in derogation of the public and federal interest.
H.R.Rep.No.907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970). As a result of feelings of inefficiency, confusion, and lack of effectiveness of the local courts Congress enacted the Court Reform Act. Under the terms of one section of that Act, 11 D. C.Code § 102 (Supp. Y 1972), “The D. C. Court of Appeals is declared by Congress to be the ‘highest court of the District of Columbia’ whose final judgments and decrees are reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970)] in the same manner as such review is accorded the highest court of a State.” Kern, The District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970: A Dose of the Conventional Wisdom and a Dash of Innovation, 20 Am.U.L.Rev. 237, 241 (1970-71).
*800In M. A. P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 810 (D.C.App.1971) the court stated:
As this court on February 1, 1971 became the highest court of the District of Columbia, no longer subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals, we are not bound by the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals rendered after that date. With respect to decisions of the United States Court of Appeals rendered prior to February 1, 1971, we recognize that they, like the decisions of this court, constitute the case law of the District of Columbia. As a matter of internal policy, we have adopted the rule that no division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court or refuse to follow a decision of the United States Court of Appeals rendered prior to February 1, 1971, and that such result can only be accomplished by this court en banc.
Id., at 312. (Emphasis added.) As .Judge Wright succinctly stated in United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D. C. 1, 10, 452 F.2d 1333, 1342 (1971), “[t]he overriding purpose which emerges from the [Court Reform] Act is to put the District’s judicial system on a par with those of the states.”
It is equally obvious that the transitional period, in which shifts of jurisdiction occur, will be a difficult one. As one law review author expressed:
[T]he transitional period will require that the courts in the District, local and federal, adopt a self-imposed hierarchy for the resolution of competing notions of local law, a new doctrine of abstention in yet another exercise of judicial discretion and restraint.
Williams, District of Columbia Court Reorganization, 1970, 59 Geo.L.J. 477, 497 (1971). The realities of the situation require the judges of this court to abstain from acting in cases now within the ambit of review by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. It is only through such restraint and abstention that we can make the jurisdictional realignment of the local courts a reality and assure the realization of the goals set out by the Court Reform Act. We must be willing to realize and appreciate the role that the respective courts are now to play.
The Court Reform Act unequivocally distributed the “judicial power in the District of Columbia” between the federal courts and the District of Columbia courts, allotting to each its own sphere and making neither subservient to the other.
M. A. P. v. Ryan, supra, 285 A.2d at 313.
Our willingness to accept this change in the local court organization is, of course, important to the ultimate success of the Court Reform Act. Change is nothing new to the law — this is a profession based on the proposition of orderly change — and it is change which both gives strength to the law and allows it to remain a viable and living force in our modern and complex society. As Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated in his first State of the Judiciary address:
I have great confidence in our basic system and its foundations, in the dedicated judges and others in the judicial system, and in the lawyers of America. Continuity with change is the genius of the American system, and both are essential to fulfill the promise of equal justice under law.
Burger, The State of the Judiciary— 1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 934 (1970). Only by living up to the Chief Justice's confidence can we satisfy the ultimate goal of an efficient system of justice for the District of Columbia.