Court Opinion

ID: 9595462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:40:45.644322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:25.031843
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting):
The critical question in this case is whether the trust created by Dr. Jones prior to his marriage to Thressa Jones completely divested him of all legal or equitable estates in the real property which formed the corpus of the trust so that our widow’s estate statute1 does not apply. It provides:
One-third in value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by the husband at any time during the marriage, to which the wife has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be set apart as her property in fee simple, if she survives him; .
The purpose of this statute is to insure that a surviving widow shall not be deprived of inheritance in her husband’s property. We should interpret and apply this statute consistent with that purpose; that is, in this instance, to prevent a person from using this illusory trust as a device to retain all of the advantages of ownership, while at the same time, putting the property beyond inheritance by his wife.2
The New York Court of Appeals was faced with a similar problem in Newman v. Dore.3 There, the settlor had created a trust which retained in him the enjoyment of the entire income so long as he lived, but reserved a right to revoke at any time. Further, the powers given the trustee could be exercised “in such manner only as the settlor shall from time to time direct in writing.” Upon the reasoning and public policy I advocate herein, the New York court held that such a trust was illusory, *1268and that it could not defeat the wife’s right to participate in the estate.
In this case, Dr. Jones initially asked Thressa Jones to marry him in June, 1960, but put off the wedding until November, 1961, saying he had certain business to take care of first. When the trust was executed in June of 1961, it was identical in effect to the trust declared invalid in the Newman case just referred to. Dr. Jones reserved the right to amend or revoke at any time, to withdraw any or all of the principal, and to authorize all sales or other dispositions of the property, or investments of money earned by the trust. These very provisions are diametric refutation of the assertion that “the trustee completely divested himself of title in the lands in question; and there was nothing left to set apart to the surviving widow.” If he had in fact completely divested himself of any and all interest in the property, then he would have had no more right in it than any passing stranger. This is so patently not true that the mere statement of the proposition shows its fallacy.
What the circumstances of this case and this trust instrument amount to is a subterfuge to circumvent the statute quoted above. The true meaning of what it says is: I will not divest myself of my property, except that I place the bare legal title elsewhere, so that my wife in my prospective marriage cannot have the interest therein which the law gives her.
In my judgment these conclusions are inescapable: (1) that this trust was planned and executed for the sole purpose of permitting Dr. Jones to retain full and absolute control of his property; (2) that it must necessarily follow that he retained some “legal or equitable” interest therein; and (3) that the widow (and her successors) are entitled to “one-third in value” of whatever that value may be determined to be. Inasmuch as it thus appears the trust was executed for the sole purpose of evading the statute, it should be held invalid.

. Section 74-4-3, U.C.A.1953.

. Compare Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975), wherein a spend-thrift trust was invalidated under Section 25-1-11, U.C.A.1953, because the purpose of that statute is to prevent people from using trusts as a means of avoiding creditors’ claims. a means of avoiding creditors’ claims.

. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966, 112 A.L.R. 643 (1937).