Court Opinion

ID: 9843145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:28:32.257434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:37.991407
License: Public Domain

CONTIE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because Twitty’s offenses were committed after November 1, 1987, the district court’s authority to revoke her probation was governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3565, not the more restrictive 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651 and 3653 (repealed by Pub.L. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)).1 In United States v. Williams, 15 F.3d 1356 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 431, 130 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994), this court held that the district court properly revoked the defendant’s probation for pre-probation conduct notwithstanding section 3653’s “within the probation period” language. In fact, this court expressly noted: “Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Congress has replaced 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651 and 3653 with 18 U.S.C. § 3565. That section clearly grants courts authority to revoke probation for pre-probationary conduct.” Id. at 1359 n. 4. See also United States v. Myers, 993 F.2d 1548 (6th Cir.1993) (unpublished) (“If Congress had intended to authorize revocation of probation on the basis of conduct occurring at any time before the probation period ended, it would have been easy enough to say so — witness 18 U.S.C. § 3565, where Congress has now said precisely that.”).
In United States v. Ross, 503 F.2d 940 (5th Cir.1974), the Fifth Circuit held: “Sound policy requires that courts should be able to revoke probation for a defendant’s offense committed before the sentence commences; an immediate return to criminal activity is more reprehensible than one which occurs at a later date.” Id. at 943. See also United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir.1989) (“[T]he power to revoke probation permits the correction of a sentence based on an erroneous assumption that defendant would likely benefit from leniency.”).
In United States v. James, 848 F.2d 160 (11th Cir.1988), the Eleventh Circuit held:
It is true that Ross is factually distinguishable because James’ fraudulent sales of the worthless television sets took place prior to sentencing, but this is a distinction without a difference. A return to illegal activity prior to sentencing is just as contemptible as a return to illegal activity prior to the beginning of the probationary term.... We therefore hold that § 3653 authorizes a district court to revoke a sentence of probation for acts committed after conviction but prior to sentencing.
... [T]he district court was justified in believing that James should not receive the benefit of probation. Despite being warned by the district court to stay out of trouble pending the completion of the pre-sentence investigation, James engaged in illegal activity soon after pleading guilty to receiving and possessing stolen mail. The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his probation.
Id. at 162-63 (footnote and citations omitted).
Because Twitty “cannot seriously contend that she did not understand that illegally *415cashing checks using the name of her dead sister might have an effect on her sentence,” Appellee’s Brief at 9, Twitty’s “commission of new crimes while still under the jurisdiction of the district court demonstrates a contempt for judicial authority and indicates that she would not benefit from a further extension of trust.” Id. at 6. See generally United States v. Camarata, 828 F.2d 974, 980 (3d Cir.1987) (“Courts are granted ‘an exceptional degree of flexibility’ in determining when to grant probation, and are left an equal flexibility in determining when to revoke[J”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 108 S.Ct. 1036, 98 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1988).
Because the district court justifiably revoked Twitty’s probation when it learned that she had committed new crimes after pleading guilty in district court, I respectfully dissent.

. 18 U.S.C. § 3565 provides: "If the defendant violates a condition of probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of probation, the court may ... revoke the sentence of probation and impose any other sentence that was available under subchapter A at the time of the initial sentencing." Section 3653 provided: "At any time within the probation period, or within the maximum probation period permitted by section 3651 of this title, the court ... may issue a warrant for [the probationer's] arrest for violation of probation occurring during the probation period.”