Court Opinion

ID: 9831373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:01:52.951957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:34.034041
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee contends that we erred in holding that appellant is entitled to an injunction “in terms set out in the opinion of the court.” It fails to specify, however, wherein the terms are believed to be unwarranted by pleadings or evidence. The terms were copied in the opinion, so that full opportunity would be presented, without procuring a copy of the judgment, to make such objections as might be deemed well founded. If any pro-, vision of the judgment is deemed too onerous, it should be pointed out, in order that we may correct the judgment, if it is in fact erroneous in that respect. In the absence of such a specification of error, we can hardly be expected to again go over the record for the purpose of verifying the correctness of the terms of the judgment rendered.
The contention is made that the “contracts declared upon and offered in evidence constitute an interstate transaction to which the Texas anti-trust laws do not apply.” If the contracts did not undertake to fasten restrictions upon the resale of the property by the buyers, the contention would doubtless be well founded. While the terminology of the contracts smacks of agency, and the contracts and evidence disclose that appellee seeks to restrict the distributors as if they were merely agents, the fact is undisputed that the automobiles are sold outright by appellee to them. The contracts and appellee’s policy, so successfully pursued, impose restrictions upon the resale of property in this state delivered to the distributors and paid for by them, and in which appellee has no further interest whatever; its only connection being that it had formerly owned such property, That the transactions between such distributors and their customers- are not interstate *615transactions is fully sustained by the case Watkins Med. Co. v. Johnson, cited in our original opinion and the cases therein discussed, and also by the opinion in the case of Banker Bros. Co. v. Penn., 222 U. S. 210, 32 Sup. Ct. 38, 56 L. Ed. 169. The restrictions objected to by the state- are those imposed by appellee upon such transactions. If appellee wishes to avoid being charged with a violation of our anti-trust laws it can accomplish it very easily. It need only do as other sellers do, permit its purchasers who pay for what they buy, to -resell to any one, anywhere and at any price. The record in this case discloses that a striking unanimity of sentiment is brought about among all persons handling appellees’ commodities, so that all sales are made at the price designated by appellee as the list price, and competition is' stifled. Above all of these persons and corporations sits appellee, the arbiter to whose decision all must bow when it passes on the issue whether one of them has committed a trespass upon the rights given the other by appellee. Of course appellee does not go to the trouble of making and enforcing regulations and restrictions concerning the sale of property for which it has been paid, without having a purpose in view. That purpose doubtless is to benefit its business, and to accomplish it the policy is inaugurated that each dealer shall operate in a certain territory. Thus competition is prevented, anjl, according to this record, as effectually'as if the selling price had been prescribed by ap-pellee. There can be no doubt that the penalty imposed by appellee for violations of territorial designations tends to prevent such violations. There can be no doubt that the contract as written and construed and enforced has actually created restrictions such as our statutes prohibit. of
The motion for rehearing is overruled.