Court Opinion

ID: 9376906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-05 22:00:41.575572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.204218
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

                              )
VALENCIA-MARIE COX, Family of )
Cox,                          )
                              )
        Petitioner,           )
                              )
     v.                       )                  Miscellaneous Action 22-mc-113 (TSC)
                              )
ROBERT DEWEES, III, et al.,   )
                              )
                              )
        Respondents.          )
                              )
                              )

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Pro se petitioner Valencia-Marie Cox filed this miscellaneous action purportedly

on behalf of the “Cox family” against fourteen individual Respondents. For the reasons

set forth below, the court will dismiss this action without prejudic e.

                                 I.     BACKGROUND

       The nature of Petitioner’s claims is unclear. She appears to allege that

Respondents are “agents of a foreign principal” that are associated with a homeowner’s

association in Kentucky, a mortgage research center, and a bank. See Pet’r’s Compl.,

ECF No. 1 at 1–2. She asserts that this lawsuit involves, inter alia, “a Constitutional

matter involving a woman on the land complaining about theft and kidna p,” as well as

an attempted “foreclosure” of property Petitioner claims to own “free and clear.” Id. at

2–4. She contends that Respondents “appear to be a debt collector putting them under ”

15 U.S.C. § 1692, the Federal Debt Collections Practices Act, and she asks for “an

order saying that they violated the [Act] by sending [Petitioners] letters that was

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ambiguous.” Id. at 2. Petitioner also cites to criminal statutes involving admiralty law.

Id. at 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 661). She provided the court with a Kentucky address and

lists Kentucky, South Carolina, Missouri, Ohio, or Pennsylvania addresses for

Respondents. Id. at 8.

       On December 27, 2022, the court ordered Petitioner to show cause why this

action should not be dismissed because: 1) venue appeared improper as all the events

underlying her allegations appeared to have occurred in Kentucky, and Respondents did

not appear to be residents of the District of Columbia; 2) Petitioner did not cite legal

authority for this court to assert personal jurisdiction over the Respondents; and 3)

Petitioner provided no justification for attempting to litigate her dispute as a

miscellaneous action (involving a $49 filing fee), rather than a civil action (involving a

$402 filing fee). See Show Cause Order, ECF No. 5. The court ordered Petitioner to

respond by January 30, 2023, or face dismissal of her action. Id.

       Petitioner responded with a two-paragraph motion to amend her complaint, Mot.

for Leave to File Am. Compl., ECF No. 7, but did not attach a copy of a proposed

amended complaint, as required by the court’s local rules, and the court denied the

motion. See 1/27/23 Min. Order (citing LCvR 7(i)). Cox did not ask the court to

extend her show cause response deadline, although she did file a response after the

deadline had passed.

                                    II.     ANALYSIS

       Petitioner did not describe or propose amendments in her motion to amend her

complaint, and so it is unclear whether the amendments would save her claims .

Petitioner subsequently filed an untimely response to the Show Cause Order in which

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she argued that venue is proper in this district because “[t]he unlawful conduct, illegal

practices, and act that will be explained in the Amended Complaint were all committed

within the Federal Reserve circular and involved real property. ” Pl.’s Resp. to Show

Cause Order, ECF No. 8 at 2. She also mentioned the HUD-1 real estate form and

contended that venue is proper in this district because the governmental agencies that

created these documents are located in the District of Columbia and they are “directly

associated as a party to the suit,” purportedly because they exercise authority over the

conduct of banks involved in foreclosures. Id. at 2.

        These arguments are unavailing. Cox did not name a U.S. government agency in

her petition or in her response, nor is there any indication that Respondents are legally

associated with the U.S. government. Moreover, federal governmental oversight of a

private entity does not establish venue in the District of Columbia for events that

occurred elsewhere and involved defendants located elsewhere. See 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b). 1

        In addition, Petitioner provided no legal authority for this court to assert

personal jurisdiction over Respondents. None of the Respondents appear to reside in

the District of Columbia and Petitioner did not demonstrate that (1) Respondents

transacted business in the District of Columbia, (2) the claim arose from the business

1
    Section 1391(b) provides that

        [a] civil action may be brought in . . . (1) a judicial district in which any defendant
        resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
        (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
        rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
        action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
        brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is
        subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction ....

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transacted in the District, (3) Respondents had minimum contacts with the District, and

(4) the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.” Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65, 71

(D.D.C.1992), abrogated on other grounds by FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529

F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

       Moreover, Petitioner’s allegations do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 8(a),

which states that a complaint must contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for

the court’s jurisdiction . . . [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(2); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

677–78 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

       Finally, with respect to filing this matter as a miscellaneous case, Cox cites

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27, arguing that miscellaneous cases “require

resolution through the judicial system.” ECF No. 8 at 3. But Rule 27 relates to the

taking of depositions and therefore does not justify allowing a matter that appears to

challenge a foreclosure to proceed as a miscellaneous action.

                                     III.    CONCLUSION

       For the reasons set forth above, this court finds that this case was improperly

filed as a miscellaneous case and will dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of

venue. This court declines to exercise its discretion to transfer this case because the

“interests of justice” would not be served by doing so. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)

(providing that cases filed in the wrong district may be dismissed or, “if it be in the

interest of justice” transferred).

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Date: March 5, 2023
                               Tanya S. Chutkan
                               TANYA S. CHUTKAN
                               United States District Judge

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