Court Opinion

ID: 9603049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:02:51.201171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:45.791219
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Justice,
concurring specially.
There can be no doubt that Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. — (97 SC 2861, 53 LE2d —) (1977), eliminated the death penalty for rape of an adult where the victim is not killed. Apparently, Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U. S. — (97 SC —, 53 LE2d —) (1977), eliminated the death penalty for kidnapping of an adult where death to the victim does not result. The purpose of this special concurrence is to point out that neither of these cases appears to prevent the imposition of the death penalty for rape or kidnapping under any and all circumstances.
For instance, several states now have statutes providing for the death penalty for rape of a minor child. Those statutes were not involved in Coker and must be considered valid unless and until they are held unconstitutional by a proper tribunal. Likewise, the kidnapping with violence of an infant or minor for ransom was not considered under the factual situation in Eberheart, supra.
In my opinion it is still possible for the General Assembly to enact clearly defined and restricted death penalty statutes dealing with the crimes of rape and kidnapping of a minor child where the treatment of the victim is outrageously vile, horrible or inhuman, or where other aggravating circumstances exist, even though the victim be left short of death. As pointed out in the opinion, we only hold that the "death penalty may not be imposed for these crimes under present Georgia statutes.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course the crimes of treason and aircraft hijacking, along with murder, remain capital felonies, giving this court jurisdiction of appeals from the conviction for such offenses.
*405Note: Pursuant to direction from the Supreme Court opinions will not be published in the following three (3) habeas corpus cases. Rule 32 (k), Supreme Court Rules.