Court Opinion

ID: 9755652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:45:35.475161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:09.418437
License: Public Domain

SMITH-RIBNER,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the order of the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court dismissed the appeal of the Board of Supervisors of East Rockhill Township from the notice of “deemed approval” of Robert Mager’s application for a conditional use to permit use of his property as a life care facility under Section 27-701 of the zoning ordinance. The court determined that the Township had no right to appeal from the deemed decision under Section 913.2 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by Section 93 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10913.2, and that to allow the appeal would permit the Township to benefit from its failure to hold a hearing within the required time. I reject the conclusion that the Township was not entitled to party status and that it had no right to appeal the deemed approval under the situation presented in this case.
Section 913.2(a) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10913.2(a), references the fact that the municipality was a party to the proceedings:
Where the governing body, in the zoning ordinances, has stated conditional uses to be granted or denied by the governing body pursuant to express standards and criteria, the governing body shall hold hearings on and decide requests for such conditional uses in ac*922cordance with such standards and criteria. The hearing shall be conducted by the board or the board may appoint any member or an independent attorney as a hearing officer. The decision or, where no decision is called for, the findings shall be made by the board. However, the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, in addition to the municipality may, prior to the decision of the hearing, waive decision or findings by the board and accept the decision or findings of the hearing officer as final. (Emphasis added.)
In accordance with the foregoing, a municipality may appear as a party before its own governing body, and in this context it may be a “party opposing the application.” Section 913.2(b)(3) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10913.2(b)(3).1
A review of the powers granted to governing bodies by the MPC and by The Second Class Township Code, Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 65101-68701, demonstrates that a board of supervisors is required to act on behalf of a municipality in executive, legislative and adjudicatory capacities. The MPC recognizes that a governing body may adjudicate a challenge to a zoning ordinance and in the same proceeding appoint an attorney to defend the ordinance on its behalf; a governing body may adjudicate a request for a conditional use and then intervene as a litigant in an appeal brought by a landowner; and this Court has recognized that a board of commissioners may in the same litigation act as an adjudicator and as the executive body representing the municipality. Section 916.1 of the MPC, added by Section 99 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10916.1; Section 913.2 and Section 1004-A, 53 P.S. § 11004-A; Collier Stone Co. v. Township of Collier Board of Commissioners, 735 A.2d 768 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (noting that board of commissioners may simultaneously adjudicate request for conditional use and in its capacity as representative of the township assert applicant’s lack of standing).
The Board initially acted in its quasi-judicial capacity by appointing a hearing officer to take evidence and to make findings in preparation for the Board’s decision on Mager’s application, but the hearing was not held by the August 11, 2002 extension date granted by Mager. Section 913.2(b)(2) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10913.2(b)(2), refers to the fact that the governing body must “commence, conduct or complete the required hearing as provided for in section 908(1.2)” in order to avoid a deemed decision in favor of the applicant, and Section 908(3), 53 P.S. § 10908(3), specifically acknowledges that the municipality is a party to any proceeding under that section. I believe that a fair reading of Section 908 and of Section 913.2, particularly in light of the unique party status granted to municipalities in land-use appeals, compels the conclusion that even when a deemed decision occurs because of a governing body’s failure to hold a hearing due to inadvertence or non-*923deliberate inaction, the municipality retains its status as a party and therefore may be a “party opposing the application” and is entitled to appeal from a deemed approval. Section 908(9), 58 P.S. § 10908(9), and Section 918.2(b)(3).
Because the Board did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that it is within the trial court’s discretion whether to conduct a de novo hearing or to remand the case to the Board for hearing. Section 1005-A of the MPC, added by Section 101 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 11005-A. This conclusion, however, does not contradict the holding in Gryshuk v. Kolb, 685 A.2d 629 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), for in that case the Board conducted evi-dentiary hearings but failed to file timely findings of fact. Nonetheless, Gryshuk does not support the conclusion that a municipality may not appeal from a deemed decision in favor of an applicant; rather it stands for the proposition that a deemed decision is final only in regard to the proceedings before a board and that such a decision does not extinguish a party’s right to appeal on the merits: “We emphasize that a deemed zoning board approval no more cuts off the right to an appeal on the merits than would a timely board decision approving the application.” Gryshuk, 685 A.2d at 631.
I do not believe that a decision allowing the Township’s appeal defeats the legislative purpose of the deemed decision provision. Because the Township enjoyed party status during the proceedings below, it was entitled to appeal from the deemed decision in favor of Mager. That right has been extinguished on what I see as a flawed interpretation of the relevant hearing provisions of the MPC, which results in the total foreclosure of any review of the merits of Mager’s application. Therefore, the trial court’s order should be reversed and the case should be remanded for a hearing on the Township’s appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

. The municipality is entitled to party status and to be represented before its governing body when a landowner seeks a curative amendment to a zoning ordinance, Section 609.1 of the MPC, added by Section 10 of the Act of June 1, 1972, P.L. 333, 53 P.S. § 10609.1; it is entitled to party status and to be represented before its governing body in hearings related to planned residential developments, Section 708, 53 P.S. § 10708; it is accorded automatic party status in proceedings before its zoning hearing board, Section 908, 53 P.S. § 10908; it may be represented before its governing body in hearings on conditional use applications, Section 913.2; and it “may intervene as of course” in a land use appeal before a court of common pleas, Section 1004-A, added by Section 101 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 11004-A.