Court Opinion

ID: 9965789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 15:01:22.096278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:39.564260
License: Public Domain

22-6197
    Hossen v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Gordon, IJ
                                                                           A215 660 840

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                              SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of May, two thousand twenty-
    four.

    PRESENT:
                    RICHARD C. WESLEY,
                    JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                    ALISON J. NATHAN,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    MD FORHAD HOSSEN,
            Petitioner,

                    v.                                           22-6197
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER:                    Xiaotao Wang, Esq., Law Office of Xiaotao
                                   Wang, P.C., New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                   Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright,
                                   Senior Litigation Counsel; Margot P. Kniffin,
                                   Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
                                   Litigation, United States Department of
                                   Justice, Washington, DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioner Md Forhad Hossen, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks

review of a March 24, 2022 decision of the BIA, affirming a December 30, 2019

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). In re Md Forhad Hossen, No. A215 660 840 (B.I.A. Mar. 24, 2022 ), aff’g

No. A215 660 840 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 30, 2019). We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

      Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the BIA’s and the IJ’s

decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448

F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).   We review an adverse credibility determination

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“under the substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76

(2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

      “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or

responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the

applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or

witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under

oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made),

the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements

with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such

statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” Id.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

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       Hossen alleges that he was attacked on multiple occasions by members of

the Awami League on account of his work for Bangladesh’s Liberal Democratic

Party (“LDP”). The agency determined that Hossen was not credible because,

inter alia, he was unable to recall details of his work for the LDP and did not

rehabilitate his inconsistent or implausible testimony with reliable evidence of his

political activities.

       Hossen argues that the agency erroneously relied on his lack of knowledge

about the LDP.          However, the IJ reasonably based its adverse credibility

determination on Hossen’s inability to provide details about his own alleged

political activities given his testimony that he was an active party member. See 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   Hossen joined the LDP in January 2014, and left

Bangladesh in 2018.       He stated that he “hung posters, campaigned for party

leaders, attended meetings and rallies and was available at all times to do

whatever task [he] was assigned by [his] party leaders.” CAR at 346. However,

on cross-examination, he could not recall how many posters he put up, where he

got the posters, how many people he recruited to the party, the names of

individuals he recruited, or the last LDP meeting he attended before leaving the

country. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that

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an adverse credibility determination may be based on inherent implausibility if

the finding “is tethered to the evidentiary record” or “record facts . . . viewed in

the light of common sense and ordinary experience”).

      Hossen also testified that he last voted in 2008, and when asked why he had

not voted in the most recent election, he stated that he understood “the elections

things less” and was busy farming. CAR at 89-90. Given his professed level of

engagement in the party from 2014 until his departure from Bangladesh, the IJ did

not err in finding his explanations that he was too busy to vote or otherwise

uninterested implausible. See Siewe, 480 F.3d at 169. Hossen’s later explanation

to the to the BIA—that he did not vote because the LDP boycotted the 2014 national

elections—was not compelling because it is inconsistent with the explanation he

offered to the IJ. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner

must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to

secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). Hossen’s basic inability to

articulate the details of his political activity that are central to his claim to asylum,

or to adequately explain the reason for these omissions, provided substantial

support for the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Hong Fei Gao, 891

                                           5
F.3d at 79.

      Finally, Hossen has abandoned any claim that the agency erred in finding

that he failed to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence.

The agency may rely on the lack of reliable corroboration where an applicant’s

credibility is already in question. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d

Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on

credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant

unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”).

Although Hossen states that he sufficiently corroborated his claim, he does not cite

specific documents, explain why the IJ should have given the documents weight,

or explain how the documents rehabilitated his inability to describe his activities

for the LDP. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir.

2005) (finding claim abandoned where petitioner “devote[d] only a single

conclusory sentence to the argument”).       In any event, the agency reasonably

determined that Hossen’s documentary evidence warranted minimal weight and

failed to rehabilitate his claim.

      In sum, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination

given Hossen’s inability to recall details of his work for the LDP, his implausible

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and inconsistent statements about why he did not vote, and the lack of reliable

corroboration of his political activities. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia

Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273; Siewe, 480 F.3d at 168–69. The

adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief were based on the same

factual predicate. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                       Clerk of Court

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