Court Opinion

ID: 9956410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 12:01:47.366788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:31.467301
License: Public Domain

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Page 2                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                April 2, 2024

         2                              APRIL, 2024                 348 Conn. 726
                            Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

               GLEN A. CANNER, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF
                 CHARLES A. CANNER) v. GOVERNORS
                  RIDGE ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
                             (SC 20759)
                 LOUIS D. PUTERI v. GOVERNORS RIDGE
                       ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
                              (SC 20760)
                      Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                            Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         Pursuant to the Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA) (§ 47-249 (a)),
            condominium associations are ‘‘responsible for maintenance, repair and
            replacement of the common elements’’ of a common interest community,
            except to the extent provided by the community’s declaration or pro-
            vided by, among other statutory provisions, General Statutes § 47-255
            (h).

             The plaintiff G, the executor of the estate of his father, C, and, in the
             second case, the plaintiff L, brought separate actions against the defen-
             dant condominium association, alleging that the foundations supporting
             the units purchased by C and L were defective. L and C purchased the
             units, which were part of a common interest community, in 2001 and
             2002, respectively. Around that time, the defendant began affirming its
             responsibility for any foundation settlement issues. C’s and L’s units
             thereafter suffered from significant, uneven settling. From 2012 to 2016,
             the defendant hired several companies to investigate the possibility of
             repairing the foundations underlying the units, but no repairs were ulti-
             mately made. G and L commenced their actions in 2016 and 2017, respec-
             tively, pursuant to statute (§ 47-278 (a)). The initial complaints alleged
             that the defendant had negligently designed and constructed the founda-
             tions and, thereafter, had violated its duties under § 47-249 (a) by failing
             to conduct necessary repairs to common elements of the community.
             The defendant asserted as a special defense that the CIOA claims were
             time barred by the statutory (§ 52-577) three year limitation period gener-
             ally applicable to tort actions. Thereafter, in 2018, G and L filed amended
             complaints that included the allegation that the defendant had breached
             its declaration and bylaws by failing to maintain, repair, or replace the
             defective foundations. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the
             CIOA claims were time barred and rendered judgments for the defen-
             dants. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments, conclud-
             ing, inter alia, that the limitation period set forth in § 52-577 applied
             because the claims sounded in tort rather than contract, and that the
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          348 Conn. 726                    APRIL, 2024                                    3
                               Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.
                CIOA claims accrued when the units were purchased, as the original
                wrong underlying those claims related to methods of construction. The
                Appellate Court also agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the
                declaration and bylaws created no duty to repair because the relevant
                declaration required the defendant to repair only insured common ele-
                ments, and there was no requirement that the foundations themselves
                be insured. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that, because
                the actions were commenced more than three years after the units were
                purchased, the trial court correctly concluded that the CIOA claims were
                time barred. On the granting of certification, G, and L’s daughter, who
                had been substituted for L as the plaintiff following L’s death after the
                Appellate Court released its decision, filed separate appeals with this
                court. Held:

          1. The Appellate Court properly applied the statute of limitations set forth
              in § 52-577 to the portion of the CIOA claims seeking recovery for
              negligence during the course of construction of the foundations:

                Because the CIOA included no express statute of limitations governing
                claims brought pursuant § 47-278, this court looked to the nature of the
                cause of action in determining the applicable statute of limitations, and
                this court concluded that violations of duties imposed directly by the
                CIOA sound in tort and are governed by § 52-577, whereas violations of
                a community’s declaration or bylaws sound in contract and are governed
                by the statutory (§ 52-576) six year limitation period applicable to con-
                tract claims.

                In the present cases, the initial complaints alleged only that the defendant
                had negligently designed and constructed the foundations, they did not
                allege that the defendant had breached any provision of the community’s
                declaration or bylaws, and, although the amended complaints included
                allegations that the defendant violated the declaration and bylaws, those
                additional allegations related solely to the claims that the defendant
                improperly had failed to maintain, repair or replace the foundations and
                did not connect the allegations related to the construction process with
                the breach of the declaration or bylaws.

                Accordingly, the CIOA claims relating to the construction process alleged
                only statutory, as opposed to contractual, violations, and such claims,
                therefore, were subject to three year limitation period prescribed by
                § 52-577.

                Because the three year limitation period prescribed by § 52-577 began
                to run when L and C purchased their units in 2001 and 2002, respectively,
                and, because the present actions were not commenced until more than
                one decade later, there was no error with respect to the conclusion that
                the claims relating to the construction process were time barred.
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         4                              APRIL, 2024                 348 Conn. 726
                            Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.
         2. The Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court’s disposition, in
             favor of the defendant, of the claims, initially raised in the amended
             complaints, that the defendant had violated its contractual duties under
             the bylaws to maintain, repair or replace common elements when it
             failed to effectuate repairs to the foundations:

             The amended complaints alleged that the defendant had violated the
             specific provision of the bylaws requiring the defendant to carry out
             maintenance of and repairs to the common elements, and, contrary to
             the defendant’s argument and the conclusions of both the trial court and
             the Appellate Court, the existence of a provision in the declaration
             affirmatively requiring that it maintain and repair insured common ele-
             ments did not preclude the existence of a duty on part of the defendant
             to maintain and repair uninsured common elements.

             The fact that the defendant possessed discretion with respect to the
             maintenance of uninsured common elements did not insulate the exercise
             of that discretion from judicial review, and the broad, remedial purpose of
             CIOA supported a conclusion that statutory and contractual obligations
             relating to the maintenance and repair of uninsured common elements,
             although vested in the discretion of the defendant, should continue to
             be characterized as a legal duty, as the defendant would otherwise be
             permitted to forgo even reasonable repairs without recourse to the unit
             owners, leaving them without the ability to seek judicial relief in the
             event the defendant exceeded its discretion.

             The claims that the defendant breached its contractual duties imposed
             under the bylaws by failing to repair the foundations were governed by
             the six year limitation period applicable to contract claims in § 52-576.

             Moreover, it was undisputed that, from the time C and L purchased their
             units until 2016, the defendant repeatedly affirmed its responsibility to
             maintain the foundations, made minor repairs as problems arose, and
             explored more substantial repairs, and that all such efforts had ceased,
             the claims that the defendant breached the bylaws by failing to repair
             the foundations therefore accrued at the time the defendant ceased its
             efforts to repair, and, because the contractual claims were initially raised
             in 2018, they were timely under § 52-576.
                Argued November 13, 2023—officially released April 2, 2024

                                      Procedural History

           Action, in each case, seeking damages for, inter alia,
         the defendants’ alleged negligence, and for other relief,
         brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
         of Fairfield, and transferred to the judicial district of
         Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, where the cases
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                             Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          were tried to the court, Lager, J.; judgment in each case
          for the defendants, from which the plaintiff in each case
          appealed to the Appellate Court, Prescott, Suarez and
          DiPentima, Js., which affirmed the judgments of the
          trial court; thereafter, Lorraine Sando, executrix of the
          estate of Louis D. Puteri, was substituted as the plaintiff
          in the second case; subsequently, the plaintiff in the
          first case and the substitute plaintiff in the second case,
          on the granting of certification, filed separate appeals
          with this court, which consolidated the appeals. Affirmed
          in part; reversed in part; further proceedings.
            Glen A. Canner, the appellant in Docket No. SC
          20759, and for the appellant in Docket No. SC 20760
          (plaintiff in the first case and substitute plaintiff in the
          second case).
            Timothy M. Gondek, for the appellee in Docket Nos.
          SC 20759 and SC 20760 (named defendant in each case).
                                             Opinion

            DANNEHY, J. The plaintiffs, Glen A. Canner, the
          executor of the estate of Charles A. Canner, and Louis
          D. Puteri,1 brought separate actions against a condomin-
          ium association, the named defendant in each case,
          Governors Ridge Association, Inc.,2 alleging that the
            1
              Glen A. Canner commenced the first action in his representative capacity
          as the executor of the estate of his father, Charles A. Canner. The original
          plaintiff in the second action, Louis D. Puteri, died during the pendency of
          the proceedings before the Appellate Court. We hereinafter refer collectively
          to Glen A. Canner and to Louis D. Puteri as the original plaintiffs. Louis D.
          Puteri’s daughter, Lorraine Sando, was subsequently appointed to serve as
          the executrix of Puteri’s estate and, thereafter, was substituted as a plaintiff
          in the second action. For the sake of simplicity, we refer collectively to
          Glen A. Canner and Lorraine Sando, in their representative capacities, as
          the plaintiffs and individually by name when necessary. We further refer
          collectively to Charles A. Canner and Louis D. Puteri as the decedents and
          individually by name when necessary.
            2
              The following parties were also named as defendants in one or both of
          the underlying actions: The town of Trumbull, Donald G. Murray, South
          Meadow Development, LLC, Glenn Tatangelo, Anthony O. Lucera, Adeeb
          Consulting, LLC, Kareem Adeeb, Jarrett M. Crooks Architects, LLC, and
          Jarrett M. Crooks. Because the interests of these parties are not at issue in
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         6                             APRIL, 2024                 348 Conn. 726
                            Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

         foundations supporting their respective units were sink-
         ing as a result of improper design. In this consolidated
         appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the Appellate Court
         improperly affirmed the trial court’s judgments in favor
         of the defendant on the ground that the three year tort
         statute of limitations; see General Statutes § 52-577;
         barred pursuit of an alleged cause of action under the
         Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA), General Stat-
         utes § 47-200 et seq. We conclude that some, but not
         all, of the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant are
         time barred and, accordingly, we affirm in part and
         reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.
             The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
         tory are relevant to our consideration of the present
         appeal. In 2001, the defendant received a special permit
         from the Trumbull Planning and Zoning Commission
         approving an expansion of an existing common interest
         community through the construction of thirty-six addi-
         tional, detached single-family condominium units located
         in Trumbull. Motivated by concerns related to soil con-
         ditions on the proposed site, the defendant’s developer,
         South Meadow Development, LLC, hired Adeeb Con-
         sulting, LLC, to design a series of foundations for each
         of these new units.3 Although previous plans had called
         for the use of pilings, Kareem Adeeb, a geotechnical and
         structural engineer and owner of Adeeb Consulting, LLC,
         proposed an alternative system relying on geofabric, foot-
         ings, and grade beams. Such a design, Adeeb stated, would
         ‘‘tie all foundation elements together and increase the
         rigidity of the foundation system’’ and ‘‘decrease, if not
         eliminate, the chance that differential settlement will
         take place.’’ Notwithstanding warnings from other engi-
         this appeal, we refer to Governors Ridge Association, Inc., as the defendant
         for the sake of simplicity.
            3
              Testimony and documents presented during the course of the trial court’s
         evidentiary hearing indicate that the site, once a peat moss bog, had been
         filled in with blasted rock following the construction of Route 25 in Trumbull.
April 2, 2024                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      Page 7

          348 Conn. 726                 APRIL, 2024                                     7
                             Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          neers, the Trumbull Building Department approved
                  4

          Adeeb’s designs, and construction was subsequently
          completed.
             The decedents owned, respectively, two detached
          single-family condominium units created during the course
          of this expansion that have, undisputedly, suffered from
          significant, uneven settling. One of the units, located
          at 105 Governor Trumbull Way, was purchased by Lor-
          raine Sando’s father, the decedent Louis D. Puteri, on
          December 26, 2001. The other unit, located at 220 Fitch’s
          Pass, was purchased by Glen A. Canner’s father, the
          decedent Charles A. Canner, a few months later, on April
          30, 2002.5 Around that same time, the defendant began
          to make statements affirming its responsibility for any
          future foundation settlement issues.6
             Over the following years, the decedents experienced
          a series of escalating problems inside of their units as
          a result of settling: cracks appeared in the walls, doors
          stopped closing correctly, and windows began to stick.
             4
               As the trial court recounted: ‘‘Exhibit 33 is a letter dated July 22, 2001,
          written by Herbert L. Lobdell, a professional engineer, questioning Adeeb’s
          foundation design and opining that it created a ‘risk of some long-term
          settlement and structural distress.’ Lobdell believed the foundations needed
          to be pile supported. A copy of this letter was sent to the Trumbull Building
          Department. Exhibit 40 is a report dated October 12, 2001, sent directly to the
          Trumbull Building Department, by John P. Dugan, a professional engineer.
          At page 6, the report opines that ‘[b]uildings along Fitch’s Pass will be
          underlain by organic soils and should be supported by piles . . . .’ Dugan
          restates this opinion in exhibit 41, dated October 30, 2001.’’
             5
               Although Louis D. Puteri’s wife, Loretta G. Puteri, and Charles A. Canner’s
          wife, Doris L. Canner, were both listed as purchasers respectively in these
          two sales, both predeceased their husbands.
             6
               For example, the parties stipulated that minutes of the defendant’s Janu-
          ary 2, 2002 board meeting state that, ‘‘[o]nce the building is complete the
          [defendant] is responsible for any settling that may occur.’’ (Internal quota-
          tion marks omitted.) In a January 17, 2002 letter to Trumbull town officials
          raising concerns about the construction approval process, the defendant’s
          board wrote: ‘‘We have some very real concerns that everything be done
          correctly, for if there are problems in the future, the [defendant] will be the
          first to bear the responsibility for remediation.’’
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         8                              APRIL, 2024                 348 Conn. 726
                            Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

         The decedents reported these problems to the defen-
         dant’s management company, Consolidated Manage-
         ment Group, which responded by effectuating repairs
         in connection with these individual issues.
            Problems eventually came to a head in 2011 and 2012,
         when both decedents attempted, and failed, to sell their
         units. On May 9, 2011, the listing agent for 220 Fitch’s
         Pass, Kenneth Martin, received feedback from potential
         buyers about the ‘‘very dramatic slope in the floors . . . .’’
         Likewise, in an email to an employee of Consolidated
         Management Group dated June 20, 2012, Louis D. Puteri
         catalogued various ‘‘noticeable defects’’ in his unit located
         at 105 Governor Trumbull Way, including a shifted struc-
         tural beam, a crack running the full length of the second
         floor landing, inoperable doors and windows through-
         out the house, damage to the rear concrete patio, and
         a ‘‘one to two inch deviation in the floor height in the
         transition from the hallway to the spare bedroom on
         the second floor . . . .’’
            The defendant investigated the possibility of making
         structural repairs to the foundations underlying the
         decedents’ units from 2012 to 2016.7 In 2012, the defen-
         dant hired Fuller Engineering & Land Surveying, LLC,
         to measure the settling. In 2014, the defendant began
         seeking proposals from several contracting, engineering,
         and consulting firms to conduct repairs. On December
         8, 2014, one of those firms, Maser Consulting P.A., held
         a teleconference with representatives of the defendant
         in order to discuss a plan to lift the two units and place
             7
               During this period, the defendant continued to reaffirm repeatedly its
         responsibility for repairs. For example, the parties stipulated that minutes
         of the defendant’s February 26, 2014 board meeting state that ‘‘[i]t is con-
         firmed that any settling issues are the responsibility of [the defendant].’’
         (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The parties also stipulated that the
         minutes of the defendant’s June 15, 2015 board meeting reiterated that,
         ‘‘[l]egally, the [defendant] is solely responsible for repairing the two units.’’
         (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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          348 Conn. 726               APRIL, 2024                                 9
                           Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          them on piles. Although excavation was tentatively
          scheduled to start on December 29, 2014, that project was
          subsequently cancelled. From January, 2015, through
          March, 2016, the defendant continued to seek proposals
          from five additional firms. None of these companies, how-
          ever, ultimately undertook repairs.
             The civil actions underlying this consolidated appeal
          were commenced; first, on February 11, 2016, Canner
          v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc., Superior Court, judicial
          district of Waterbury, Docket No. UWY-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
          S, and, then, on September 5, 2017, Puteri v. Governors
          Ridge Assn., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of
          Waterbury, Docket No. UWY-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S. The com-
          plaints in each case asserted a statutory cause of action
          alleging that the defendant had violated CIOA. Read
          broadly, these claims appeared to allege that the defen-
          dant had constructed the foundations under the units
          negligently and, thereafter, had violated their statutory
          duties by failing to conduct necessary repairs to com-
          mon elements of the community.8 See General Statutes
          § 47-249 (a) (‘‘[e]xcept to the extent provided by the
          declaration . . . or subsection (h) of section 47-255,
          the association is responsible for maintenance, repair
          and replacement of the common elements, and each unit
          owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and
          replacement of his unit’’). The initial pleadings did not,
          however, allege that the defendant had breached its
          second amended and restated declaration (declaration)
          or its operative bylaws (bylaws) with respect to the
          construction or maintenance of common elements.
             The defendant filed its respective answers to the
          operative complaints in the underlying cases on June
          1, 2018, both of which alleged by way of special defense
          that the CIOA claims ‘‘sound[ed] in tort, and therefore
            8
              The parties agree that the foundations underlying the decedents’ units
          are properly considered to be common elements.
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          10                            APRIL, 2024                348 Conn. 726
                            Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          [are] time barred pursuant to . . . § 52-577.’’ A few
          months later, on August 14, 2018, the original plaintiffs
          amended their CIOA claims to specifically allege, for
          the first time, that the defendant had violated, inter alia,
          § 23.1 of the declaration9 and § 5.2 (b) of the bylaws10
          by failing to make timely repairs to the foundations
          underlying their units. A few days later, the trial court
          issued an order indicating that it had scheduled, with
          the consent of all parties, an evidentiary hearing limited
          to the statute of limitations defense and other matters
          raised in avoidance of the statute of limitations.
             After conducting a two day evidentiary hearing and
          receiving additional briefing from the parties, the trial
          court issued memoranda of decision, concluding that
          the CIOA claims against the defendant were time barred.
          After observing that CIOA itself lacked an express limi-
          tation period, the trial court began its substantive analy-
          sis by looking to the pleadings to determine ‘‘the most
          suitable statute of limitations on the basis of the nature
          of the cause of action or of the right sued [on].’’ Bellemare
          v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 284 Conn. 193, 199, 931
          A.2d 916 (2007). Although the trial court recognized
          that the amended complaints alleged violations of both
          the declaration and bylaws, it found that those provi-
          sions were inapposite, noting that § 23.1 of the declara-
          tion mandates repair of only insured common elements
          and that, because foundations were not required to be
          insured; see General Statutes § 47-255 (a); the defendant
             9
               Section 23.1 of the declaration provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny
          portion of the [c]ommon [i]nterest [c]ommunity for which insurance is
          required under [a]rticle XXII which is damaged or destroyed shall be repaired
          or replaced promptly by the [defendant] . . . .’’
             10
                Section 5.2 (b) of the bylaws provides: ‘‘All maintenance and repairs
          of and replacements to the [c]ommon [e]lements and [l]imited [c]ommon
          [e]lements, unless otherwise provided in [a]rticle XIX of the declaration,
          shall be made by the [e]xecutive [b]oard and be charged to all [u]nit [o]wners
          as a [c]ommon [e]xpense, unless necessitated by the negligence, misuse or
          neglect of a [u]nit [o]wner.’’
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                        Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          had no contractual duty to repair the foundations. As
          a result of that conclusion, the trial court focused its
          analysis on the question of whether the statutory claims
          alleging violations of § 47-249 (a) were timely under the
          tort statute of limitations, § 52-577. See, e.g., Bellemare
          v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., supra, 200 (‘‘when a plain-
          tiff seeks to recover damages for the breach of a statu-
          tory duty, such an action sounds in tort’’).
             The trial court concluded that the essence of the
          statutory claims was that the foundations had been
          improperly constructed on soft ground and that, because
          § 52-577 runs ‘‘from the date of the act or omission com-
          plained of’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Prokol-
          kin v. General Motors Corp., 170 Conn. 289, 294, 365
          A.2d 1180 (1976); the clock started to run on those
          particular claims when the decedents acquired their
          homes in 2001 and 2002, rather than the time that they
          first discovered harm. Finally, the trial court declined
          to apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to
          toll the running of § 52-577, concluding that (1) the
          original plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the
          defendant owed an absolute duty to act, and (2) there
          was no evidence that the defendant had breached any
          discretionary duties imposed on it by acting ‘‘unreason-
          ably or in bad faith . . . .’’
             The original plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court
          from the trial court’s judgments in favor of the defen-
          dant, claiming, among other things, that (1) the six
          year contractual limitation period set forth in General
          Statutes § 52-576 should have been applied, and (2)
          their claims did not accrue at the time of purchase.
          Canner v. Governor’s Ridge Assn., Inc., 210 Conn. App.
          632, 640–41, 647, 270 A.3d 694 (2022). The Appellate
          Court rejected both contentions, concluding that the
          application of § 52-577 was appropriate because the
          claims sounded in tort rather than in contract, and those
          particular claims accrued on the date that the decedents
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          12                            APRIL, 2024                 348 Conn. 726
                             Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          closed on the units because the ‘‘original wrong’’ under-
          lying the claims related to methods of construction. Id.,
          646–47, 649. The Appellate Court further agreed with
          the trial court that the declaration and bylaws, with a
          focus on § 23.1 of the declaration, created no duty to
          repair because the foundations did not need to be
          insured.11 Id., 646–47. Because the allegations sounded
          in tort, and because these civil actions were commenced
          more than three years after the decedents’ respective
          purchases of their units, the Appellate Court upheld
          the trial court’s conclusion that the CIOA claims were
          time barred. Id., 659, 661–62. This consolidated appeal
          followed.
            Before this court, the plaintiffs renew the claim that
          the six year limitation period applicable to contract
          claims set forth in § 52-576, and not the three year
          statute contained in § 52-577, should have been applied
          to the CIOA claims. The plaintiffs contend that the
          defendant’s duty to maintain, repair, or replace common
          elements under the bylaws is contractual and that a
          claim for breach of that obligation did not arise until
          the defendant repudiated it. The plaintiffs further con-
          tend that both the Appellate Court and the trial court
          erred in applying § 52-577 to the portion of the CIOA
          claims seeking recovery for the defendant’s alleged mis-
          conduct during the course of construction. For the rea-
          sons that follow, we agree with both the trial court and
             11
                The Appellate Court declined to reach two of the original plaintiffs’
          subordinate claims as inadequately briefed, namely, that (1) the trial court
          erred in failing to rule that reaffirmations by the defendant of its obligation
          to fix the settling problems restarted the statute of limitations, and (2) the
          trial court erred by not concluding that the continuing course of conduct
          doctrine applied to toll any statute of limitations. Canner v. Governor’s
          Ridge Assn., Inc., supra, 210 Conn. App. 651–52 n.15. The Appellate Court
          likewise declined to address the original plaintiffs’ claims that the trial
          court had erred in finding the defendant reasonably exercised its discretion,
          stating, without further discussion, that no such finding had been made. Id.
          But see footnote 20 of this opinion.
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                             Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          the Appellate Court that the claims that the defendant
          violated its statutory duties by negligently constructing
          the foundations sound in tort and are time barred under
          § 52-577. We further conclude, however, that the respec-
          tive complaints also distinctly alleged that the defendant
          had violated its contractual duty under the declaration
          and bylaws to maintain, repair, or replace foundations
          and that these claims accrued at the time the defendant
          ceased its efforts to repair.
                                                 I
            Before addressing the substance of the claims pre-
          sented in this consolidated appeal, we begin with a brief
          review of the statutes and relevant principles of law
          governing (1) duties to maintain common elements under
          both CIOA and the applicable declaration and bylaws,
          and (2) the statutes of limitations potentially applicable
          to actions alleging the breach of those duties.12
                                                 A
             As this court has previously noted, CIOA was adopted
          by our legislature to address ‘‘the creation, organization
          and management of common interest communities
          . . . . It entails the drafting and filing of a declaration
          . . . the enactment of bylaws . . . the establishment
          of a unit owners’ association . . . and an executive
          board to act on . . . behalf [of the association]. . . .
          It anticipates group decision-making relating to the
             12
                We note that the scope of our review on these subjects is plenary. See,
          e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601, 612, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023)
          (statutory interpretation presents question of law); Nationwide Mutual Ins.
          Co. v. Pasiak, 346 Conn. 216, 228, 288 A.3d 615 (2023) (interpretation of
          contract presents question of law); Carpenter v. Daar, 346 Conn. 80, 128,
          287 A.3d 1027 (2023) (‘‘[t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question
          of law for the court’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Certain Under-
          writers at Lloyd’s, London v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383, 407–408, 957 A.2d
          836 (2008) (‘‘[t]he question of whether a party’s claim is barred by the statute
          of limitations is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo’’ (internal
          quotation marks omitted)).
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          14                           APRIL, 2024               348 Conn. 726
                            Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          development of a budget, the maintenance and repair
          of the common elements, the placement of insurance,
          and the provision for common expenses and common
          liabilities.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
          omitted.) Weldy v. Northbrook Condominium Assn.,
          Inc., 279 Conn. 728, 735, 904 A.2d 188 (2006).
             With certain delineated exceptions, the tasks enumer-
          ated in the preceding paragraph, which include the
          maintenance and repair of common elements, are gen-
          erally committed to the discretion of the association.13
          See, e.g., id., 734 (‘‘[w]hen a court is called [on] to assess
          the validity of [an action taken] by a board of directors,
          it first determines whether the board acted within its
          scope of authority and, second, whether the [action]
          reflects reasoned or arbitrary and capricious decision
          making’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
          Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeown-
          ers Assn., 21 Cal. 4th 249, 265, 980 P.2d 940, 87 Cal. Rptr.
          2d 237 (1999) (‘‘[when] a duly constituted community
          association board, upon reasonable investigation, in
          good faith and with regard for the best interests of the
          community association and its members, exercises dis-
          cretion within the scope of its authority under relevant
          statutes, covenants and restrictions to select among means
          for discharging an obligation to maintain and repair a
          development’s common areas, courts should defer to
          the board’s authority and presumed expertise’’).
            The various rights and obligations imposed by CIOA
          are, however, judicially enforceable; see General Stat-
          utes § 47-212 (b); and unit owners are authorized to
          bring individual causes of action. See General Statutes
          § 47-278 (a) (‘‘[a] declarant, association, unit owner or
            13
               By logical extension, this will sometimes encompass the discretion not
          to act. See, e.g., Vaccaro v. Shell Beach Condominium, Inc., 169 Conn. App.
          21, 50 n.33, 148 A.3d 1123 (2016) (citing 2 Restatement (Third), Property,
          Servitudes § 6.13, p. 233 (2000)), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 917, 154 A.3d
          1008 (2007).
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                        Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          any other person subject to this chapter may bring an
          action to enforce a right granted or obligation imposed
          by this chapter, the declaration or the bylaws’’). The
          remedies provided by CIOA are to be broadly construed.
          See General Statutes § 47-212 (a); Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del
          Grosso, 232 Conn. 666, 678, 657 A.2d 1087 (1995).
             CIOA, the declaration, and the bylaws each distin-
          guish between maintenance and repair of common ele-
          ments versus individual units. Under CIOA, associations
          are responsible for the former, and individual owners
          for the latter. Specifically, General Statutes § 47-244 (a)
          provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[e]xcept as provided
          in subsection (b) of this section, and subject to the
          provisions of the declaration, the association, even if
          unincorporated . . . (6) [m]ay regulate the use, main-
          tenance, repair, replacement and modification of com-
          mon elements . . . .’’ Section 47-249 (a) follows and
          more specifically provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except to
          the extent provided by the declaration . . . or subsec-
          tion (h) of section 47-255, the association is responsible
          for maintenance, repair and replacement of the com-
          mon elements, and each unit owner is responsible for
          maintenance, repair and replacement of his unit. . . .’’
          Likewise, § 26.1 (g) of the declaration delineates the
          responsibilities of the defendant and provides in rele-
          vant part that the executive board, on behalf of the
          defendant, ‘‘[r]egulate[s] the use, maintenance, repair,
          replacement and modification of the [c]ommon [e]le-
          ments, including [l]imited [c]ommon [e]lements . . . .’’
          Section 5.2 (a) and (b) of the bylaws further provides
          in relevant part: ‘‘All maintenance of and repairs to any
          [u]nit . . . shall be made by and at the expense of the
          [o]wner of such [u]nit . . . . All maintenance and
          repairs of and replacements to the [c]ommon [e]lements
          . . . shall be made by the [e]xecutive [b]oard and be
          charged to all [u]nit [o]wners as a [c]ommon [e]xpense
          . . . .’’ These statutory and contractual provisions
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          16                      APRIL, 2024              348 Conn. 726
                        Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          impose related, but separate, general duties of upkeep
          for individual units and common elements.
             When repairs to an insured common element are
          required, the discretion to effect repairs otherwise
          afforded to an association is removed. Section 47-255
          provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any portion of the common
          interest community for which insurance is required
          under this section which is damaged or destroyed shall
          be repaired or replaced promptly by the association
          unless (A) the common interest community is termi-
          nated . . . (B) repair or replacement would be illegal
          under any state or local statute or ordinance governing
          health or safety, or (C) eighty per cent of the unit own-
          ers, including every owner of a unit or assigned limited
          common element that will not be rebuilt, vote not to
          rebuild. The cost of repair or replacement in excess of
          insurance proceeds and reserves, regardless of whether
          such excess is the result of the application of a deduct-
          ible under insurance coverage, is a common expense.’’
          (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 47-255 (h) (1);
          see Governors Ridge Assn., Inc., Second Amended and
          Restated Declaration § 23.1 (April 28, 2004) (same).
             Section 47-255 (h) speaks in absolute terms; it directs
          an association to promptly repair insurable common
          elements, except in limited circumstances, and provides
          that any costs in excess of the insurance proceeds shall
          be a common expense. Section 47-255 (h), however,
          neither expressly limits the association’s responsibili-
          ties to insured common elements nor renders indepen-
          dent obligations or duties imposed by CIOA, the
          declaration, or the bylaws meaningless. Sections 47-244
          (a) (6) and 47-249 (a) clearly place responsibility on the
          association for the maintenance and repair of common
          elements. But, unlike § 47-255 (h), §§ 47-244 (a) (6) and
          47-249 (a) do not speak in directives and do not mandate
          how that responsibility is to be carried out. See Public
          Acts 2009, No. 09-225, § 20 (distinguishing between
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          348 Conn. 726                APRIL, 2024                               17
                            Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          mandatory and discretionary duties under § 47-244 (a)).
          This suggests that, although an association is responsi-
          ble for the maintenance and repair of all common ele-
          ments, the scope of responsibility differs for uninsured
          versus insured common elements. As a result, a plain
          reading of the statutes and common sense support the
          conclusion that an association’s responsibility to main-
          tain and repair uninsured common elements, also echoed
          through both the declaration and bylaws, is not absolute.
          This conclusion makes sense for a few distinct reasons.
             First, if General Statutes § 47-249 (a) and § 5.2 of the
          bylaws already impose an absolute duty to maintain
          all common elements, the portions of General Statutes
          § 47-255 (h) and § 23.1 of the declaration specifically
          compelling the repair of insured common elements would
          be rendered mere surplusage, contrary to basic tenets of
          construction. See, e.g., Lopa v. Brinker International,
          Inc., 296 Conn. 426, 433, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010); 24 Leggett
          Street Ltd. Partnership v. Beacon Industries, Inc., 239
          Conn. 284, 297–98, 685 A.2d 305 (1996).
             Second, a blanket rule requiring uninsured common
          elements to be maintained—irrespective of the costs
          and benefits of the work required—would mandate the
          prompt completion of even unwarranted or unreason-
          ably expensive repairs. Such a result would be, as the
          defendant’s counsel suggested at oral argument before
          this court, untenable.14 See Weldy v. Northbrook Condo-
          minium Assn., Inc., supra, 279 Conn. 737 (‘‘a broad view
          of the powers delegated to the association is justified
          by the important role these communities play in main-
          taining property values’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
            14
               For example, an association may, and indeed in this case apparently
          did, adopt rules by which repairs that benefit only individual owners can
          be charged to those owners. Section 19.2 (a) of the declaration provides
          that ‘‘[a]ny [c]ommon [e]xpense for services provided by the [defendant] to
          an individual [u]nit at the request of the [u]nit [o]wner shall be assessed
          against that [u]nit.’’
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          18                            APRIL, 2024                348 Conn. 726
                            Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          ted)), quoting 2 Restatement (Third), Property, Servitudes
          § 6.4, comment (a), p. 90 (2000). The delegation of such
          decision-making authority to associations is, indeed,
          ‘‘inherent in the condominium concept . . . .’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Weldy v. Northbrook Condo-
          minium Assn., Inc., supra, 738.
            Likewise, a conclusion that an association has no
          obligation whatsoever to repair uninsured common ele-
          ments would not only ignore the language of CIOA, the
          declaration, and the bylaws, but also lead to its own
          unworkable results. For example, owners of freestand-
          ing condominiums, like those involved in the present
          appeal, would have no recourse because they are not
          permitted by statute or contract to repair common ele-
          ments, and, furthermore, the association would have no
          responsibility for common elements unless they were
          insured.
                                               B
             CIOA does not expressly create a statute of limita-
          tions governing claims brought pursuant to § 47-278.15
          This does not mean, however, that no limitation period
          applies. ‘‘Public policy generally supports the limitation
          of a cause of action in order to grant some degree of
          certainty to litigants. . . . The purpose of [a] statute
          of limitation[s] . . . is . . . (1) [to] prevent the unex-
          pected enforcement of stale and fraudulent claims by
          allowing persons after the lapse of a reasonable time,
          to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of cer-
          tainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted
          and unknown potential liability, and (2) to aid in the
          search for truth that may be impaired by the loss of
             15
                Counts alleging breach of either express or implied warranties brought
          pursuant to General Statutes §§ 47-274 or 47-275, by contrast, are expressly
          subject to a three year statute of limitations. See General Statutes § 47-277
          (a). No such limitation period is attached to the right of action set forth in
          § 47-278.
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          348 Conn. 726           APRIL, 2024                       19
                        Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          evidence, whether by death or disappearance of wit-
          nesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents
          or otherwise. . . . Therefore, when a statute includes
          no express statute of limitations, we should not simply
          assume that there is no limitation period. Instead, we
          borrow the most suitable statute of limitations on the
          basis of the nature of the cause of action or of the right
          sued [on].’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
          omitted.) Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., supra,
          284 Conn. 199.

             ‘‘[T]he fundamental difference between tort and con-
          tract lies in the nature of the interests protected. . . .
          The duties of conduct [that] give rise to [a tort action]
          are imposed by the law, and are based primarily [on]
          social policy, and not necessarily [on] the will or inten-
          tion of the parties. . . . Furthermore, other courts
          have held that, when a plaintiff seeks to recover dam-
          ages for the breach of a statutory duty, such an action
          sounds in tort. . . .

             ‘‘On the other hand, [c]ontract actions are created
          to protect the interest in having promises performed.
          Contract obligations are imposed because of [the] con-
          duct of the parties manifesting consent, and are owed
          only to the specific individuals named in the contract.
          . . . In short, [a]n action in contract is for the breach
          of a duty arising out of a contract; an action in tort is for
          a breach of duty imposed by law.’’ (Citations omitted;
          internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 200.

             The application of this dichotomy to the various cate-
          gories of claims brought pursuant to § 47-278 provides,
          at least in principle, for a commonsense rule: violations
          of duties imposed directly by CIOA sound in tort and
          are circumscribed by § 52-577, whereas violations of
          the declaration or bylaws, by contrast, sound in contract
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          20                            APRIL, 2024                  348 Conn. 726
                             Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          and are governed by § 52-576.16 See, e.g., Pasco Common
          Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Benson, 192 Conn. App.
          479, 503, 218 A.3d 83 (2019). When a claim may be
          pursued separately under both statutory and contrac-
          tual theories, the longer of the two limitation periods
          should be employed. See id., 503 (‘‘although the issue
          of whether a claim sounds in tort or contract sometimes
          is a binary determination, that is not always the case’’);
          see also id., 503–504 (‘‘when two statutes of limitation[s]
          conflict, or when a claim may be pursued on two theo-
          ries having different limitation periods, the longer limi-
          tation period applies’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
          quoting 51 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Limitation of Actions § 76
          (2016).17
                                                II
             With these principles in mind, we begin by briefly
          addressing the plaintiffs’ implicit assertion that both
          the Appellate Court and the trial court erred in applying
          § 52-577 to the portion of the CIOA claims seeking
          recovery for the defendant’s alleged misconduct during
          the course of construction. The plaintiffs’ claims lack
          merit because the amended pleadings do not allege that
          either the declaration or bylaws were violated during
          the construction process.
            As previously noted in this opinion, the initial com-
          plaints in these actions alleged that the defendant had
          negligently designed and constructed the foundations
          supporting the units, together with broadly worded asser-
            16
                As this court has repeatedly stated: ‘‘[T]he declaration operates in the
          nature of a contract, in that it establishes the parties’ rights and obligations
          . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Southwick at Milford Condomin-
          ium Assn., Inc. v. 523 Wheelers Farm Road, Milford, LLC, 294 Conn. 311,
          313 n.3, 984 A.2d 676 (2009); see also Cantonbury Heights Condominium
          Assn., Inc. v. Local Land Development, LLC, 273 Conn. 724, 726 n.1, 873
          A.2d 898 (2005).
             17
                As a result, we focus in part III of this opinion on only the contractual
          claims alleged in the August, 2018 amended complaints.
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          348 Conn. 726                   APRIL, 2024                                    21
                              Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          tions that the defendant had violated its duties under
          CIOA. Those pleadings did not, however, allege that
          the defendant had breached any provisions of the decla-
          ration or bylaws.18 Although the original plaintiffs did
          eventually allege violations of the declaration and bylaws
          by way of amendments to their complaints on August
          14, 2018, those additions related solely to their claims
          that the defendant had improperly failed to maintain,
          repair, or replace the defective foundations. See part III
          of this opinion. Although the amendments incorporated
          the facts pleaded previously, they did not attempt to
          connect the factual allegations related to the process of
          construction with the breach of any specific provision
          of the declaration or bylaws.
            The progression of these pleadings leads us to agree
          with both the trial court and the Appellate Court that the
          CIOA claims, insofar as they relate to the construction
          process, alleged only statutory, as opposed to contrac-
          tual, violations. As both courts aptly observed, such
          claims sound in tort and are, therefore, subject to § 52-
          577. See, e.g., Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp.,
          supra, 284 Conn. 200 (‘‘when a plaintiff seeks to recover
          damages for the breach of a statutory duty, such an
          action sounds in tort’’). In light of the undisputed facts,
          that three year time period prescribed by that statute
          would have commenced at the time the decedents pur-
          chased their respective units in 2001 and 2002. See, e.g.,
          State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc., 307
          Conn. 412, 416 n.2, 54 A.3d 1005 (2012) (‘‘statute[s] of
          repose [terminate] any right of action after a specific
          time has elapsed, regardless of whether there has as
            18
              Both the sixth amended complaint filed in Canner on September 20,
          2017, and the amended complaint filed in Puteri on January 15, 2018, contin-
          ued to allege statutory, rather than contractual, violations. Indeed, both
          alleged that ‘‘§ 47-278 . . . states in ‘pertinent’ part: ‘(a) A declarant, associ-
          ation, unit owner or any person subject to this chapter may bring an action
          to enforce a right granted or obligation imposed by this chapter or the
          bylaws. . . .’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.)
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          22                      APRIL, 2024              348 Conn. 726
                        Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          yet been an injury’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));
          see also Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 212,
          541 A.2d 472 (1988). Because these civil actions did not
          commence until well over one decade later, there was
          no error in concluding that the claims related to the
          construction process were time barred.
                                         III
             We turn next to the plaintiffs’ principal claim, namely,
          that the Appellate Court erred in declining to conclude
          that the contractual CIOA claims were timely under
          our state’s six year statute of limitations for contract
          actions. See General Statutes § 52-576. The plaintiffs
          argue that § 5.2 of the bylaws imposed a continuing,
          contractual duty on the defendant to maintain, repair,
          or replace common elements and that the defendant
          breached that duty in 2016 by repudiating its obligation
          to repair the foundations. The defendant responds by
          arguing that, although it has an absolute duty to main-
          tain or repair insured common elements under § 23.1
          of the declaration, it has no duty to repair foundations,
          which are uninsured common elements. From that starting
          point, the defendant then argues that (1) no contractual
          duty could have existed, (2) the claims necessarily
          sounded in tort, and (3) the claims were untimely under
          § 52-577. We conclude that § 5.2 of the bylaws imposes
          a contractual duty to maintain common elements and
          that the claims that the defendant breached that duty
          in 2016 were timely under § 52-576.
             As previously noted in this opinion, the original plain-
          tiffs amended their respective complaints on August
          14, 2018, to allege, among other things, that the defen-
          dant had violated § 5.2 of the bylaws by failing to repair
          the foundations supporting their units. To repeat, § 5.2
          (b) of the bylaws provides in relevant part: ‘‘All mainte-
          nance and repairs of and replacements to [c]ommon
          [e]lements and [l]imited [c]ommon [e]lements . . .
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          348 Conn. 726                APRIL, 2024                               23
                            Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          shall be made by the [e]xecutive [b]oard and be charged
          to all [u]nit [o]wners as a [c]ommon [e]xpense . . . .’’19
          Both the trial court and the Appellate Court declined
          to read § 5.2 of the bylaws as imposing any duty on
          the defendant. Canner v. Governor’s Ridge Assn., Inc.,
          supra, 210 Conn. App. 646 and n.14. That reasoning, how-
          ever, was based primarily on the conclusion, reached
          by way of a negative implication, that § 23.1 of the
          declaration, which affirmatively requires the repair of
          insured common elements, precluded the existence of
          any duty to repair uninsured common elements.20 Id.
          We reject that premise.

             The fact that the defendant possesses discretion with
          respect to the maintenance of uninsured common ele-
          ments, for the reasons previously stated, does not insu-
          late the exercise of that discretion from judicial review.
          See Weldy v. Northbrook Condominium Assn., Inc.,
          supra, 279 Conn. 734; see also Lamden v. La Jolla Shores
          Clubdominium Homeowners Assn., supra, 21 Cal. 4th
          265, 270; 17 C.J.S. 439, Contracts § 43 (2011) (‘‘[t]he
          mere existence of a discretionary duty does not render
          a contract unenforceable’’). The broad, remedial pur-
          pose of CIOA supports a conclusion that both statutory
            19
               The language of § 5.2 of the bylaws is congruent with the statutory
          duties relating to the repair of common elements imposed by CIOA itself.
          See General Statutes § 47-249 (a) (‘‘[e]xcept to the extent provided by the
          declaration . . . or subsection (h) of section 47-255, the association is
          responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common ele-
          ments, and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and
          replacement of his unit’’) Although § 5.2 of the bylaws does not employ the
          word ‘‘responsible,’’ the language of both provisions clearly assigns the
          task of overseeing the repair of the community’s common elements to the
          defendant alone. See Governors Ridge Assn., Inc., Second Amended and
          Restated Declaration, supra, § 26.1 (g).
            20
               The previous emphasis placed on the distinction between insured and
          uninsured common elements was understandable, as the original plaintiffs
          had previously argued that the defendant had an absolute duty to repair
          the foundations under § 23.1 of the declaration. The plaintiffs have now,
          however, expressly conceded that point in their briefing before this court.
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          24                      APRIL, 2024              348 Conn. 726
                        Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          and contractual obligations relating to the maintenance
          of uninsured common elements, although vested in the
          discretion of the association, should continue to be
          characterized as a legal duty. See General Statutes § 47-
          212; Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, supra, 232 Conn. 678;
          see also General Statutes § 47-211 (‘‘[e]very contract or
          duty governed by this chapter imposes an obligation
          of good faith in its performance or enforcement’’); cf.
          Dalton v. Educational Testing Service, 87 N.Y.2d 384,
          389, 663 N.E.2d 289, 639 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1995) (‘‘[when]
          the contract contemplates the exercise of discretion,
          [an obligation to exercise good faith] includes a promise
          not to act arbitrarily or irrationally in exercising that
          discretion’’). To conclude otherwise would, as noted
          previously, permit the defendant to forgo even reason-
          able repairs without recourse to the unit owners, leav-
          ing them without the ability to seek judicial relief in
          the event the decision of the defendant exceeds its dis-
          cretion.

             The claims that the defendant breached its contrac-
          tual duties under § 5.2 of the bylaws by failing to repair
          the foundations supporting the decedents’ units are,
          therefore, governed by § 52-576 (a), which provides in
          relevant part: ‘‘No action for an account, or on any
          simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing,
          shall be brought but within six years after the right of
          action accrues . . . .’’ The law concerning when a
          breach of contract action accrues is well settled. ‘‘[I]n an
          action for breach of contract . . . the cause of action
          is complete at the time the breach of contract occurs,
          that is, when the injury has been inflicted.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Tolbert v. Connecticut Gen-
          eral Life Ins. Co., 257 Conn. 118, 124, 778 A.2d 1 (2001).
          ‘‘The true test is to establish the time when the plaintiff
          first could have successfully maintained an action.’’
          (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Engelman v. Con-
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          348 Conn. 726                 APRIL, 2024                                   25
                             Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          necticut General Life Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 287, 294 n.7,
          690 A.2d 882 (1997).
             In the present appeal, the parties do not dispute the
          fact that, from the time the decedents purchased their
          units until 2016, the defendant repeatedly affirmed its
          responsibility to maintain the foundations, made minor
          repairs as various symptoms began to manifest, and
          eventually undertook steps to commence more substan-
          tial repairs. There is also no dispute that all such efforts
          have now ceased. In light of these facts, we conclude
          that the claims that the defendant breached § 5.2 of the
          bylaws by failing to repair the foundations underneath
          the decedents’ units accrued at the time the defendant
          ceased its efforts to repair. See, e.g., Pascarella v. Silver,
          218 Conn. App. 326, 351, 292 A.3d 45 (‘‘[a] contract that
          creates continuing obligations is capable of a series of
          partial breaches or a single total breach by repudiation’’
          (internal quotation marks omitted)) (quoting Minidoka
          Irrigation District v. Dept. of Interior, 154 F.3d 924,
          926 (9th Cir. 1998)), cert. denied, 347 Conn. 901, 296
          A.3d 171 (2023). Because the contractual claims were
          initially raised in 2018, we conclude that they were
          timely.21
             The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed inso-
          far as that court upheld the trial court’s disposition of
          the claims that the defendant had breached the declara-
          tion and bylaws by failing to effectuate repairs and the
          case is remanded to the Appellate Court with direction
             21
                In reaching this conclusion, we express no opinion as to the merits of
          the underlying contractual claims. Although the trial court’s memoranda of
          decision did contain a brief discussion related to whether the defendant
          had acted ‘‘unreasonably or in bad faith,’’ that discussion followed only a
          limited evidentiary hearing relating to the statute of limitations. As a result,
          further proceedings are required. Likewise, because we conclude that the
          contractual claims did not accrue until the defendant ceased its efforts to
          repair, we need not address whether it would be appropriate to apply the
          continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll the applicable statute of limi-
          tations.
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          26                        APRIL, 2024              348 Conn. 726
                          Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.

          to reverse the trial court’s judgments with respect to the
          disposition of those claims and for further proceedings
          consistent with this opinion; the judgment of the Appel-
          late Court is affirmed in all other respects.
               In this opinion the other justices concurred.