Court Opinion

ID: 9954114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:10:09.226314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.064438
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Vanek-Peterson, 2024-Ohio-1096.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 MAHONING COUNTY

                                         STATE OF OHIO,

                                          Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                     v.

                                 JUDITH VANEK-PETERSON,

                                       Defendant-Appellant.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                        Case No. 23 MA 0021

                                 Criminal Appeal from the
                     Youngstown Municipal Court, Mahoning County, Ohio
                                Case No. 2022 TRD 0281

                                            BEFORE:
                          Mark A. Hanni, Carol Ann Robb, Judges,
            William A. Klatt, Retired Judge of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
                                     Sitting by Assignment.

                                              JUDGMENT:
                                                Affirmed.

Atty. Kathleen Thompson, Youngstown City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. Donald K. Pond, for Defendant-Appellant.

                                        Dated: March 22, 2024
                                                                                         –2–

HANNI, J.

       {¶1}   Defendant-Appellant, Judith Vanek-Peterson, appeals from a Youngstown
Municipal Court judgment convicting her of failing to stop her school bus after an accident.
The court found her guilty in Case Number 22TRD0281 of violating R.C. 4511.36 with an
improper turn, a minor misdemeanor, and failure to stop after an accident in violation of
R.C. 4549.02, a first-degree misdemeanor. The court also found Appellant guilty in Case
Number 22TRD0314 for violating R.C. 4511.76, regarding school bus regulations. She
appeals only the conviction for failure to stop after an accident.
       {¶2}   The trial court sentenced Appellant on the failure to stop to a one-year
license suspension, with credit from August 24, 2022, one-year of reporting probation,
and 180 days in jail with 180 days suspended. The court stayed the sentence pending
appeal. She also incurred fines in both cases.
       {¶3}   On appeal, Appellant contends that insufficient evidence supports her
conviction and it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons,
Appellant’s assignments of error lack merit and we affirm her conviction.
       {¶4}   On February 24, 2022, Youngstown Police Officer Kevin Bokesch issued
Appellant a citation for an improper turn in violation of R.C. 4511.36 and leaving the scene
of an accident in violation of R.C. 4549.02. The citation indicated that Appellant was
driving a school bus at the intersection of South Osborn near Melwood and made an
improper turn and left the scene of an accident with a mail truck.
       {¶5}   At the bench trial on September 1, 2022, the parties stipulated that an
accident occurred on February 24, 2022. Officer Bokesch testified that a mail truck was
parked on the side of the road and Appellant struck the truck as she made a right-hand
turn with her school bus onto Melwood. (Tr. at 28-30). He stated that he took the report
of the accident, but did not speak to Appellant until she returned to the bus garage. (Tr.
at 30). He testified that when he asked about the accident, she told him that she did not
think that she hit anything, so she continued driving. (Tr. at 30).
       {¶6}   Kyle Bailey testified that he was sitting in his mail truck, which was parked
on the side of the street, when he saw a school bus turn right and hit the back left end of
his truck. (Tr. at 36). He stated that the crash lifted up his truck, tore half of the truck’s

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back bumper off, and destroyed the convex mirror on the back of the truck as it was
completely rammed into the back door of the truck. (Tr. at 36). He further testified that
there were dents in the back corner of the truck with yellow paint on them. (Tr. at 36).
       {¶7}   Mr. Bailey testified that he exited his truck to assess the damage and when
he looked forward to see how the bus driver would react, he saw that she continued to
drive to the stop sign on the next street. (Tr. at 36). He related that as he watched her
turn right onto that street, he observed that the right side of the bus had a broken window.
(Tr. at 36). He stated that he continued to stand in the road to see if she would return,
but she did not. (Tr. at 37). He testified that he observed a little hesitation by the bus
after the accident, but then it just proceeded ahead. (Tr. at 37).
       {¶8}   Jonathan Atherton testified that he was a technology coordinator for the
Youngstown City Schools’ transportation department. (Tr. at 42). He stated that he
maintained DVRs and GPS devices in the busses and he pulled video from the internal
camera of the bus that Appellant drove on the day of the accident. (Tr. at 43). Some of
the DVD was played during his testimony. (Tr. at 46).
       {¶9}   The DVD is not in the appellate file and staff at Youngstown Municipal Court
reported that they are unable to locate it. On January 18, 2024, this court’s Magistrate
issued an Order advising the parties of the missing video and mandating that they comply
with App.R. 9(E) by supplementing the record with the DVD or filing a stipulation as to the
missing DVD within 10 days of the Order. The parties filed a joint stipulation indicating
that the DVD was unable to be used due to damage.
       {¶10} In any event, Mr. Atherton testified that he decided which portion of the
internal camera on the bus to record and the video showed Appellant driving to the corner
with the mail truck visible, the sound of the window shattering, and the only student left
on the bus yelling that a window had broken. (Tr. at 47). He testified that the student
was still on board because her parents were absent at drop off and school policy is that
students are taken to the bus garage until parents are called to pick them up. (Tr. at 54).
He noted that this student was often taken to the garage to wait for her parents and she
was yelling during the video. (Tr. at 53-55).
       {¶11} Mr. Atherton testified on cross-examination that he did not view the entire
video and did not know what happened after the taped portion of the video ended. (Tr.

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at 50). He related that he was also in the office when Appellant called the garage from
the bus to report the broken window. (Tr. at 51). He explained that when the window
broke, Appellant should have immediately reported to the garage that a student was still
on board and she should have stopped the bus so that the police department could be
called to the scene and write an accident report. (Tr. at 55). Mr. Atherton testified that
Appellant returned to the garage with the bus and she and the student boarded another
bus until she was called back to the garage after the accident was discovered. (Tr. at
56).
       {¶12} Ohio State Highway Patrol Officer Joel Hughes testified that he cited
Appellant under R.C. 4511.76(C) for violating Ohio regulations concerning transportation
of pupils on school buses. (Tr. at 63). He learned that Appellant was involved in a traffic
crash and the regulation required the bus to be taken out of commission immediately until
the bus was re-inspected and put back in service. (Tr. at 64).
       {¶13} Officer Hughes testified that he observed the broken window and the
scratches and scrapes on the side of the bus. (Tr. at 64). He spoke to Appellant, who
told him that she did not realize that she struck the mail truck or that a bus window had
broken. (Tr. at 64). He indicated that he reviewed the video and saw the bus strike the
mail truck and heard the child say something about the window breaking. (Tr. at 65-66).
       {¶14} On cross-examination, Officer Hughes stated that he did not view the entire
video, but saw enough to cite Appellant under the Ohio school bus regulation as the video
showed the bus strike the mail truck, which in itself required Appellant to stop, even if no
damage occurred to the bus. (Tr. at 68).
       {¶15} The defense called Timothy Hahn, the fleet foreman for Youngstown City
Schools in charge of the buses. (Tr. at 75). He testified that Appellant called into the
garage and reported that a bus window broke after she hit a pothole. (Tr. at 77). He told
her to bring the bus back and he gave her another bus. (Tr. at 78). He testified that after
the police came in later on to report the accident, he called her and told her to stop
unloading students from her second route and return to base. (Tr. at 79).
       {¶16} Appellant testified that she had been a bus driver for two months before the
accident occurred. (Tr. at 88). She stated that she dropped off one of two remaining
students at the corner of Osborn and Melwood and the other student remained on the

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bus because her parents were absent when she attempted to drop the student off at
home. (Tr. at 90). Appellant radioed in for instructions on what to do with the student
and was told to bring her back to the base. (Tr. at 90).
       {¶17} Appellant related that from the moment she left the student’s home, the girl
was screaming and crying and moved up behind Appellant on the bus. (Tr. at 90).
Appellant explained that she is deaf in her left ear and while she was driving, she heard
the girl screaming, the bus cooling fans whirling, and the CB radio with all of the bus
drivers chattering on it. (Tr. at 91-92). She recalled dropping off the second to the last
student, putting her bus back in drive, closing her doors, checking her mirrors, and
releasing the parking brake to approach the right turn. (Tr. at 93).
       {¶18} Appellant testified that she saw the mail truck as she made the turn,
although she did not know at the time that it was a mail truck. (Tr. at 93-94). When asked
what was going through her mind as she made the turn, Appellant stated that it had just
rained or snowed the day before and she did not want to go through people’s yards and
get stuck in the grass. (Tr. at 94). She continued making the turn and thought that she
had hit the curb, so she looked in her mirrors and saw that no contact was made with the
curb or the mail truck. (Tr. at 94). She then kept going to the next stop sign. (Tr. at 94).
Appellant stated that the design of the bus impeded her ability to see certain things in the
back of the bus. (Tr. at 95). She indicated that she checked the mirrors after hitting what
she believed to be the curb, and she checked on the remaining student and saw nothing
unusual. (Tr. at 96). A window on the bus had cracked after the accident, but Appellant
stated that she could not see it. (Tr. at 95).
       {¶19} Appellant explained that as she was heading back to base with the
remaining student, she hit a pothole and she and the girl jumped as they both heard the
window of the bus shatter. (Tr. at 97). She related that she called her base and told them
about the broken window and then returned to base as instructed. (Tr. at 97).
       {¶20} Appellant testified that after she picked up another bus and began picking
up students for her second route, she was called on the radio and was told to return to
base and not to drop any of the children in the bus off at home. (Tr. at 99). She did not
know why she was summoned back and thought something happened to her husband or
daughter. (Tr. at 100). A police officer was waiting with the fleet staff and told her that

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she had been involved in an accident. (Tr. at 102). She testified that she started laughing
and told him that she was not involved in an accident. (Tr. at 102). She stated that she
told him that she just hit a pothole. (Tr. at 102). She testified that she was 53 years old,
had been driving since she was 16, and she knew that whenever a person was involved
in an accident, she was to stop and wait for officers. (Tr. at 103). She stated that had
she been in an accident with the bus, she would have stopped. (Tr. at 103-104).
        {¶21} On cross-examination, the DVD of the bus camera video was played for
Appellant. She testified that the DVD showed the mail truck as she approached to make
the right turn and a noise was heard as the bus hit the mail truck. (Tr. at 107-108).
Appellant related that on the DVD, she stated, “Oh” or “Oh shoot,” when the noise
occurred. (Tr. at 108). Appellant testified that she had reacted to hitting the curb. (Tr. at
108).   When asked if she reacted to the bump she felt, Appellant said yes.                The
prosecution then asks, “Okay. So you knew that you hit something?” (Tr. at 108).
Appellant responded, “yes.” (Tr. at 108). When asked if she heard what the girl on the
bus said, Appellant indicated that she did not. (Tr. at 109). The following discussion then
occurred on the record, although we do not have the benefit of the DVD playing as it was
during this discussion:

        A: I - - she said I hit - - I thought she said curb. I did not hear her say bus.
        Or. . .

        Q: She repeated it three times. You asked her to repeat it, and she
        repeated it. And you reacted, did you not?

        A: I reacted to hitting the curb. When I looked up - - and you can see me
        looking up - - I did not see any contact with any vehicle.

        Q: But you acknowledged [sic] child telling you that you broke a window,
        correct?

        A: I acknowledged her talking. But I don’t remember what she said in that
        moment, no. Because she had been screaming the entire trip.

Tr. at 109.

Case No. 23 MA 0021
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       {¶22} Appellant reiterated on redirect examination that she did not know that she
hit a vehicle. (Tr. at 112-113). She stated that she did not purposely leave the scene
because it was the law not to do so and she did not know that she hit the mail truck. (Tr.
at 113).
       {¶23} On September 23, 2022, the court issued a judgment entry finding Appellant
guilty on all counts. The court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.
       {¶24} On October 31, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and
sentenced Appellant to a $50 fine in Case Number 22TRD0314 with court costs
suspended. In Case Number 22TRD0281, the court issued Appellant a $50 fine on the
improper right turn violation and suspended its court costs. The court issued Appellant a
$150 fine with court costs suspended on the leaving the scene of an accident conviction,
along with a 1-year license suspension with credit from August 24, 2022, 1 year of
reporting probation with $100 in probation fees, and 180 days in jail, with 180 days
suspended.
       {¶25} Appellant filed this appeal asserting two assignments of error as to her
conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. She was granted a stay of her sentence
pending appeal.
       {¶26} In her first assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENTERING A GUILTY VERDICT
       AGAINST JUDITH VANEK-PETERSON FOR THE CHARGE OF
       FAILURE TO STOP AFTER AN ACCIDENT, IN THE ABSENCE OF
       SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO DUE PROCESS AND THE
       FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
       CONSTITUTION AND ARITCLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO
       CONSTITUTION. (DOCKET, JANUARY 30, 2023).

       {¶27} Appellant focuses on the knowledge element for the offense of failing to
stop after an accident under R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)(b). She explains that the statute requires
that the operator of a motor vehicle on a public road “must have knowledge” of the
accident before stopping and remaining at the scene until the operator gives her name
and address, or the vehicle owner’s name and the registration number of the vehicle. She

Case No. 23 MA 0021
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cites caselaw and Ohio Jury Instructions providing that “knowledge” is determined by the
facts and circumstances in evidence.
       {¶28} Appellant cites R.C. 2901.22(B), which defines the culpable mental state of
knowingly as:

       [a] person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware
       that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably
       be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the
       person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge
       of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
       knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a
       high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
       conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.

       {¶29} Appellant asserts that she was unaware of the accident and failed to act or
make inquiry about the accident because there was a low probability that an accident
existed. She states that she is deaf in one ear and excessive noise filled the bus from
the screaming girl, the chattering over the bus CB, and the loud cooling fan.
       {¶30} Appellant further asserts that it was reasonable for her to infer that she hit
the curb and not the mail truck. She reasons she saw the mail truck, saw that the turn
was not that tight on the road even with the location of the mail truck, and she believed
that she hit the curb and noted nothing out of the ordinary when she looked in her mirrors.
Appellant also contends that while the bus window cracked, it did not shatter upon impact
with the mail truck. Rather, she asserts that the window shattered two blocks later when
she hit a pothole with the bus. She thus thought that the pothole caused the window to
shatter.
       {¶31} Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine
whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as a
matter of law to support the verdict. State v. Dickson, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 12 CO
50, 2013-Ohio-5293, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541
(1997). Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Id. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient
to sustain a verdict is a question of law. Id.

Case No. 23 MA 0021
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       {¶32} In reviewing the record for sufficiency, the relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.,
citing State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 138, 694 N.E.2d 916 (1998). When evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the elements, it must be remembered that
circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence. Id., citing State
v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272-273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) (superseded by state
constitutional amendment on other grounds).
       {¶33} A sufficiency of the evidence challenge tests the burden of production while
a manifest weight challenge tests the burden of persuasion. Thompkins, supra, at 390,
678 N.E.2d 541 (Cook, J., concurring).           Therefore, when reviewing a sufficiency
challenge, the court does not evaluate witness credibility. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio
St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 79. Instead, the court looks at whether
the evidence is sufficient if believed. Id. at ¶ 82.
       {¶34} In City of Cleveland v. Norman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106742, 2019-Ohio-
697, ¶ 14, the appellate court faced a similar situation. There, an Ohio State Highway
Patrol Trooper was the only witness to testify at Norman’s trial on a number of criminal
charges stemming from a traffic stop. After a portion of the trooper’s testimony, the State
played a video of the trooper’s dashcam showing the encounter with Norman. The trooper
then responded to questions based on the video and the video was admitted into
evidence.
       {¶35} On appeal, Norman asserted that insufficient evidence existed to support
his conviction for resisting arrest.    Before addressing the assignment of error, the
appellate court noted that the dashcam video was absent from its record and the trial
court certified that it could not be located. The appellate court held:

       [i]t is the appellant's responsibility to provide the court with a record of the
       facts, testimony, and evidentiary matters that are necessary to support the
       appellant's assignments of error. State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
       94063, 2010-Ohio-3512, ¶ 11. Thus, in the absence of a complete record,
       an appellate court must presume regularity in the trial court's proceedings.

Case No. 23 MA 0021
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       Id. We cannot presume regularity, however, where the record is incomplete
       due to the trial court's failure to secure the exhibits.

Norman, supra, at ¶ 14. The court distinguished its case from State v. Harper, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-130134, 2013-Ohio-5217. There, the court reversed Harper’s conviction
for resisting arrest because a dashcam video played at trial and admitted into evidence
was absent from the appellate record. Id. The appellate court found that the city did not
supplement the record with the video, even though it possessed the video, because it
believed that it was the appellant’s duty to supplement. Id. The Harper court found
insufficient evidence for the conviction since the video was not in the record, the state
trooper deferred to his dashcam video in his testimony, and the trial court relied on the
video in finding Harper guilty of resisting arrest. Id. The court held that without the video,
it could not determine whether Harper acted in the manner that the trooper testified was
shown in the video. Id.
       {¶36} In differentiating Harper, the Norman court held that the missing exhibits
were not the only basis relied upon for the conviction. Norman, supra, at ¶ 17. The court
indicated that the trooper in its case testified to and described the encounter with Norman
prior to playing the video at trial. Id. The court concluded:

       [b]ecause the trial court could have considered [Trooper] Martens's
       testimony in reaching its verdict, and not relied only on the dashcam video
       and the LEADS report, we cannot conclude based solely upon the absence
       of the exhibits from the record that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
       Norman's conviction.

Id. While the court ultimately found insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, its
determination was based on the testimony at trial. Id.
       {¶37} Similarly here, the trial court could have considered and relied on the
testimony of Appellant and Mr. Bailey in finding that Appellant met the knowledge element
of R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)(b), as defined in R.C. 2901.22(B). Appellant testified that she saw
a vehicle on the side of the street as she made the right turn in the bus and she thought
that she hit the curb, looked out of the mirrors, saw no contact, and kept going. (Tr. at
94). She stated that she had been driving a bus for two months and was deaf in her left

Case No. 23 MA 0021
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ear, and she did not hear her bus hit the mail truck due to noises from the bus engine,
the bus CB, the bus fan, and the yelling of the remaining student on the bus. (Tr. at 105).
However, Appellant testified that she felt the impact of the bus hitting something and she
knew that she hit something. (Tr. at 108). Yet she did not stop.
       {¶38} Further, Mr. Bailey testified that he saw Appellant make a right-hand turn
and hit the back left end of his truck while he was seated in the truck. (Tr. at 36). He
testified to extensive damage to his mail truck, including a halfway torn off back bumper
and a large convex mirror on the back of the truck that was destroyed and jammed into
the back of the truck. (Tr. at 39.) He further testified that the collision actually lifted him
up in his mail truck. (Tr. at 36). He also indicated that he noticed a broken window on
the right side of the bus as he watched the bus drive away and take another right turn.
(Tr. at 36-37).
       {¶39} From this testimony, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, we find that sufficient evidence was presented to find that Appellant knew
that a high probability of an accident existed and she failed to make inquiry with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact. She felt an impact but did not stop and the
extensive damage to the mail truck supports the trial court’s decision.
       {¶40} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error lacks merit and is
overruled. In her second assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENTERING A GUILTY VERDICT
       AGAINST JUDITH VANEK-PETERSON FOR THE CHARGE OF
       FAILURE TO STOP AFTER AN ACCIDENT.                      THE VERDICT WAS
       AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, CONTRARY
       TO    DUE     PROCESS        AND     THE     FIFTH     AND      FOURTEENTH
       AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
       ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. (JANUARY 30,
       2023).

       {¶41} Appellant contends that the court lost its way by finding that she knowingly
failed to stop after an accident. She asserts that the State did not meet its burden of

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persuasion as to the knowledge element and we do not view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution when considering manifest weight assertions.
       {¶42} Appellant relies on the same reasons asserted for her sufficiency of the
evidence assignment of error. She contends that she was unaware that she was involved
in an accident with the mail truck and there was a low probability of the existence of an
accident.
       {¶43} Appellant’s second assignment of error also lacks merit. In determining
whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new
trial ordered. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541. “Weight of the evidence
concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to
support one side of the issue rather than the other.’ ” Id. (Emphasis sic). In making its
determination, a reviewing court is not required to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution but may consider and weigh all of the evidence produced at
trial. Id. at 390.
       {¶44} Only when “it is patently apparent that the factfinder lost its way,” should an
appellate court overturn the jury verdict. Id. citing State v. Woullard, 158 Ohio App.3d 31,
2004-Ohio-3395, 813 N.E.2d 964 (2d Dist.). If a conviction is against the manifest weight
of the evidence, a new trial is to be ordered. Thompkins, supra, at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541.
       {¶45} An appellate court may independently weigh the credibility of the witnesses
when determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
State v. Jackson, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 09 JE 13, 2009-Ohio-6407, at ¶ 18. But we must
give deference to the fact finder's determination of witnesses’ credibility. Id. The policy
underlying this presumption is that the trier of fact is in the best position to view the
witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these
observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony. Seasons Coal Co. Inc.,
v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).
       {¶46} As explained in conjunction with the sufficiency of the evidence, Mr. Bailey
testified that he saw Appellant’s school bus hit his mail truck and continue to drive away.

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(Tr. at 36). He testified that the collision lifted his truck up, tore the mail truck’s back
bumper halfway off, and smashed the back convex mirror into the back door of the mail
truck. (Tr. at 36-37, 39). While Appellant testified that left ear deafness and bus noises
prevented her from hearing any noise associated with hitting the mail truck, she testified
that she felt impact from what she thought was hitting the curb, but she continued to drive.
       {¶47} The court did not believe Appellant’s testimony and found it evasive and
nonsensical at times. The court chose to believe Mr. Bailey’s testimony. The court could
reasonably believe that the amount of damage sustained to the mail truck would cause a
considerable enough impact for Appellant to believe that she hit the mail truck and should
have stopped to investigate.      The determinations of witness credibility, conflicting
testimony, and evidence weight are primarily for the trier of the facts. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.
       {¶48} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error lacks merit and is
overruled.
       {¶49} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Robb, P.J., concurs.

Klatt, J., concurs.

Case No. 23 MA 0021
[Cite as State v. Vanek-Peterson, 2024-Ohio-1096.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Youngstown Municipal Court, Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.