Court Opinion

ID: 9534097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:36:46.987337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:29.085818
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
Unless the helicopter flight in this case was a search, defendant’s privacy interests cannot have been violated. Clearly, no search occured under the United States Constitution. Florida v. Riley, 488 US _, 109 S Ct 693, 102 L Ed 2d 835 (1989). Moreover, until now, it would have been equally obvious that no search occurred under Oregon’s constitution. See State v. Farkes, 71 Or App 155, 161, 691 P2d 489 (1984), rev den 298 Or 704 (1985). In apparent eagerness to chart new constitutional territory, however, the majority has decided that, within the boundaries of this state, it is unconstitutional to use aerial surveillance to find marijuana farms. Because I do not share in the majority’s flights of fancy about the meaning of Oregon’s constitution, I dissent.
Under Oregon’s constitution, the test for whether a protected privacy interest has been violated is “whether the practice, if engaged in wholly at the discretion of the government, will significantly impair ‘the people’s’ freedom from scrutiny.” State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157, 171, 759 P2d 1040 (1988). Presumably, this test is not a “formula for expressing a conclusion,” but rather “a starting point for analysis.” State v. Campbell, supra, 306 Or at 164. Thus, in determining whether a search has occurred, the court must consider all relevant factors, including whether the police activity was purposeful, *248whether a property interest is involved, whether the police have used technological devices to enhance their sensory perceptions and whether the police have offended social or legal norms of behavior. Considered properly, these factors make it clear that no search occurred in this case.
The majority appears to contend that, whenever officers engage in a purposeful investigation, they conduct a search. Although certainly purposefulness is an element to be considered, it does not by itself create a search in the constitutional sense. If it did, a game warden could not travel remote county roads looking for illegal game activity; state police could not use radar equipment to ticket speeding motorists; and officers could not look for marijuana plants growing on unposted private land. See State v. Dixon/Digby, 307 Or 195, 766 P2d 1015 (1988). Yet, none of those investigative activities is a search under Article I, section 9.
The point is this:
“A privacy interest * * * is an interest in freedom from particular forms of scrutiny. The interest is not one of freedom from scrutiny in general, because, if that were the case, any form of scrutiny would infringe a privacy interest and thereby be considered a search.” State v. Campbell, supra, 306 Or at 170. (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, “individual freedom from scrutiny is determined by social and legal norms of behavior, such as trespass laws * * *.” 306 Or at 170. Thus, it is not enough for defendant to complain that he was scrutinized. He must show that the particular form of scrutiny to which he was subjected is a significant impairment of “the people’s” freedom, as evidenced by current law and custom.
The police officers in this case did not offend any legal or social norms when they passed through the public airspaces over defendant’s property. On the contrary, they did no more than what any member of the public could do. It is an accepted fact of modern life that our outdoor activities may be observed from a passing aircraft. The majority’s characterization of aerial surveillance as a “significant impairment” of our usual freedoms simply ignores current social norms.
Arguing that ancient property rights extended vertically from the bowels of the earth to the billowy heavens *249above, the majority does its best to find that the helicopter observation violated some property interest of defendant. It suggests that, although modernly we have had to adjust ancient property rights ideas to the requirements of air commerce, defendant here retains property rights to and in the sky, and aerial surveillance is analogous to trespass or nuisance.
Property owners have no right to exclude either public or private aircraft from flying over their land. Moreover, if followed to its logical conclusion, the majority’s trespass analogy would allow police to observe defendant’s property from above, so long as they remained outside defendant’s invisible property lines as they extend upward into the sky. This argument ignores the fact that we have entered the space age. As interesting as the majority’s historical insights may be, they have little to do with the validity of aerial surveillance under Article I, section 9. Defendant’s property interests are not implicated here.
Of course, under different circumstances, aerial surveillance could be so intrusive as to constitute a search. For example, a helicopter could be used to harass an individual or to create an actual nuisance. There was no hint of that here, however. The investigation was brief. There is no evidence that it interfered with defendant’s use and enjoyment of his property through noise, dust, or threat of injury. See Florida v. Riley, supra. The police did not use sophisticated observational equipment, but simply saw the marijuana plants with the naked eye. Given the limited intrusion involved here, no search occurred.
The majority attempts to bolster its conclusion that an aerial surveillance is a search by labeling a helicopter a “technological enhancement.” It apparently reasons that, unless officers can reach the place from which they make their observations under their own power, their perceptions are “technologically enhanced” and therefore are intrusive. This approach is an unwarranted extension of Campbell and will lead to ridiculous results.
State v. Campbell, supra, dealt with the use of a radio transmitter that was attached to the defendant’s automobile for surveillance purposes. The court compared the transmitter with the hidden listening device placed on a public telephone *250in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 88 S Ct 507, 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967). The court noted that, because such devices are difficult to detect, permitting their use would mean that “no movement, no location and no conversation in a ‘public place’ would in any measure be secure from the prying of the government.” 306 Or at 172. Campbell and Katz are about devices that enhance sensory perceptions over what nature has provided. Modern forms of transportation are hardly difficult to detect and do not raise the same concerns as do bugging devices. Campbell’s concern with technological enhancements does not apply to them.
Moreover, the majority’s approach defies common sense. As surely as Icarus could not fly without the aid of feathers and wax, he also could not survive long in the sea below him without a boat. Using the majority’s reasoning, police traveling by motorboat on public waterways could not legitimately “scrutinize” illegal activity that occurred in plain view because their presence so far from shore would be “technologically enhanced.” Similarly, because police cars arguably “enhance” an officer’s ability to observe conduct by allowing them to cover more territory than they could otherwise, under the majority’s analysis, we must view with suspicion any reports of conduct unobservable without the aid of a fast automobile. Aircraft, boats and automobiles improve mobility, not sensory perception. A helicopter is no more a “technological enhancement” than are other forms of modern transportation.
In short, the aerial surveillance in this case was purposeful, but that does not end the inquiry. It violated no property right of defendant, and it did not depend on the use of sensory enhancing devices. Most importantly, it did not intrude on any privacy right which society is prepared to recognize. When all the circumstances are considered, no search occurred.
Finally, I am well aware that the Oregon Supreme Court has rejected the federal test for determining whether a search has occurred. Try as it may, however, the court seems unable to escape the fact that a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is relevant to the existence of an Article I, section 9, privacy right. For example, in State v. Dixon/Digby, supra, the court based its rejection of the defendants’ privacy claims on *251the fact that their private property was not fenced and posted so as to manifest an intention to exclude all visitors. Further, the court’s recognition in State v. Campbell, supra, that legal and social norms define the freedom from scrutiny guaranteed by Article I, section 9, also bears a great resemblance to federal analysis, which measures Fourth Amendment freedoms partly by what society is willing to accept as reasonable. See Florida v. Riley, supra.
Both Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment protect only against unreasonable searches and seizures and, despite the different nomenclatures used by the courts, the same factors are relevant under both analyses. Considering all of the facts and circumstances, the United States Supreme Court found that helicopter surveillance like that which occurred here does not offend the Fourth Amendment, because it is unreasonable to expect complete privacy from passing aircraft. The same factors make it clear that it also does not violate Article I, section 9.
The only flight that merits concern in this case is the seemingly endless joyride on which some individuals are taking the Oregon Constitution. The direction they take may be intellectually exhilarating; it ignores, however, the proper focus of our inquiry — the reasonableness of police activity. The type of aerial surveillance that occurred in this case is not a search within the meaning of the constitution. It is a reasonable investigatory tool in the fight against illegal drugs. The trial court should be affirmed.
Riggs, J., joins in this dissent.