Court Opinion

ID: 9586038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:06:34.79936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:19.116697
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES:
I concur in the majority opinion’s holding that the circuit court’s Batson ruling constituted harmless error under State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 470 S.E.2d 366 (1996). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s holding that the circuit court committed no error in charging the jury. In my opinion, the circuit court committed reversible error, and Petitioner is entitled to a new trial.
Petitioner was charged with three counts of first-degree CSC with a minor, in violation of South Carolina Code section 16-3-655.2 Another statute, section 16-3-657,3 provides that *119“[t]he testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under §§ 16-3-652 through 16-3-658.” The circuit court charged the jury the above quoted language of section 16-3-657. This was reversible error.
“In general, the trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina. ... A jury charge is correct if it contains the correct definition of the law when read as a whole.” Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 665, 594 S.E.2d 462, 472 (2004) (citations omitted). Some principles of law, however, are not to be charged to a jury. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 275 S.C. 404, 408, 272 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1980) (holding that although evidence of a defendant’s flight is admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt, it is improper for the trial judge to instruct the jury on the law of flight, because such an instruction “oftentimes has the potential for creating more problems than solutions,” as it “places undue emphasis upon that part of circumstantial evidence”).
Contrary to the majority opinion, we did not hold in Schumpert that this no-corroboration charge was proper. Rather, “[tjaking the charge as a whole, we [found] no reversible error.” 312 S.C. at 509, 435 S.E.2d at 863.4 We observed that the trial judge, in addition to charging the jury under section 16-3-657, had charged “the jury it could believe any single witness over several, it was the sole judge of the facts, [the trial judge] had no opinion about those facts, and the State had the burden of proving the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
I would hold that it is error for a trial court to charge the jury that an alleged victim’s testimony needs no corroboration. Although section 16-3-657 contains current and correct law, it is not a proper subject of a jury charge. Section 16-3-657 prevents courts, either on a dispositive motion at the trial level or on appellate review, from finding a lack of sufficient evidence to support a conviction because the alleged victim’s testimony is uncorroborated. See James Cranston Gray, Jr., Criminal Law—Rape Reform in South Carolina, 30 S.C. L.Rev. 45, 55-60 (1979) (discussing the no-corroboration rule *120as governing judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence); cf. Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 468 (Ind.2003) (holding that the no-corroboration rule is a legal standard for a court reviewing a conviction). Charging this rule does not assist the jury in fulfilling its function of deciding the facts and determing whether the state has proved the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, it “has the potential for creating more problems than solutions,”5 for it might cause confusion when read with the general charge on witness credibility.6
More important, charging this rule carries a strong possibility of biasing the jury against the defendant. No witness’s testimony need be corroborated. By specifically charging that the alleged victim’s testimony need not be corroborated, the trial court singles out the alleged victim and “appears to express an opinion on her credibility.” State v. Schumpert, 312 S.C. 502, 510, 435 S.E.2d 859, 864 (1993) (Finney, J., dissenting); see also S.C. Const. art. V, § 17 (providing that “[jjudges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall declare the law”). I would therefore hold that charging a jury on the contents of section 16-3-657 constitutes error.
Further, I would overrule the holding in Schumpert that the charge as a whole can render this no-corroboration charge harmless. Separately instructing the jury that it may believe one witness against many or many against one does not ameliorate or remove the favorable emphasis on the alleged victim’s testimony.
Furthermore, this case is different from Ludy, supra, in which the Supreme Court of Indiana held that although the trial court had erred in giving the no-corroboration charge, the error was harmless because: “[T]he testimony of the victim was not uncorroborated.... [AJside from the victim’s testimony there was substantial probative evidence establishing the elements of the charged offenses.” 784 N.E.2d at 463. Here, *121the only evidence of Petitioner’s committing CSC was the testimony of the alleged victims. The jury had to determine whether it believed the purported victims or Petitioner.
For these reasons, I would hold that the circuit court committed reversible error in charging the jury. I would therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for a new trial.
Acting Justice STEPHEN S. BARTLETT, concurs.

. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-655 (2003).

. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-657(2003).

. We cited Lottie v. State, 273 Ind. 529, 406 N.E.2d 632 (1980), to support this holding. Lottie was recently overruled in Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 462 & n. 2 (Ind.2003).

. Grant, 275 S.C. at 408, 272 S.E.2d at 171.

. According to the majority opinion, the General Assembly “has decided it is reasonable and appropriate” to instruct the jury that an alleged CSC victim's testimony need not be corroborated. I can find no indication in section 16-3-657 or elsewhere that the legislature intended this no-corroboration rule to be charged to the jury.