Court Opinion

ID: 9479039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:06:19.592856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:47.149215
License: Public Domain

*1415CLARK, Circuit Judge,
specially-concurring:
There is no doubt that to convict a defendant of continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) under 21 U.S.C. § 848, the government must prove that the defendant has committed three or more violations of the drug laws. These violations need not have resulted in convictions if the government proves them beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir.), modified in part, 801 F.2d 378 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919, 107 S.Ct. 1377, 94 L.Ed.2d 692 (1987). The difficult issue in this case concerns the extent to which the government may use acts not specifically charged in the indictment to prove the continuing series element of CCE. Despite the majority’s assertion to the contrary, this is an open question in this circuit. I write separately to explain how I believe it should be answered in this case.
The redacted indictment charging Alvarez-Moreno with CCE did not set out the three violations necessary to support a CCE conviction. The appellant argues that the government introduced evidence concerning the Opa Locka airport incident, the Northern Trust Bank incident and Alvarez-Moreno’s arrest in Colombia as the three underlying violations. The appellant misconstrues the government’s position. The government supported the underlying series element through proof of over twenty-one drug and financial transactions. The airport and bank incident were admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove intent. The facts surrounding the Colombian arrest were introduced as evidence of the charged conspiracy. Proper limiting instructions were given so the jury would not have considered these acts to support the continuing series element.
The real issue in this case is whether the indictment gave Alvarez-Moreno sufficient notice of the acts which the government would use to prove the CCE count. Due process requires that an indictment give notice to a defendant of the elements of the charge so that he can prepare an adequate defense. United States v. Becton, 751 F.2d 250, 256 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 3480, 87 L.Ed.2d 615 (1985). The CCE count in the redacted indictment asserts that Alvarez-Moreno imported cocaine and laundered money. Neither that count nor the other two counts give any further notice of the specific acts of cocaine importation or money laundering the government would prove to support a CCE conviction. For this reason, I do not believe United States v. Rosenthal controls this case. In Rosenthal, the defendant challenged his conviction for CCE because the CCE count in the indictment did not separately charge the underlying violations. However, the violations were charged as overt acts under the RICO count. 793 F.2d at 1226; see Becton, 751 F.2d at 256 (since violations charged in other counts, defendant had notice). This case differs from Rosenthal and other cases cited by the majority because the redacted indictment gave no notice of the specific acts the government would prove to support the continuing series element. Compare United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 919 (10th Cir.) (no counts of indictment gave defendant notice that government would use acts to support continuing series element), reh’g en banc granted 847 F.2d 660 (1988) with United States v. Sterling, 742 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir.1984) (indictment had eleven counts), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099, 105 S.Ct. 2322, 85 L.Ed.2d 840 (1985); United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1000 n. 15 (5th Cir) (defendant convicted of six counts of narcotics violations incorporated in the CCE count), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 47, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1344 (2d Cir.1974) (although indictment gave no notice of violations, government gave defendant a bill of particulars), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439 (1975).
The facts of this case, however, reflect that Alvarez-Moreno had actual knowledge of the acts the government intended to use to prove the continuing series element. In this case, the original indictment listed specific money laundering transactions as overt acts in the Travel Act count (Count I). That count was omitted from the “re*1416dacted indictment” pursuant to restrictions in the Extradition Order. It appears from the record, however, that, with the parties’ consent, the “redacted indictment” was not prepared until the final day of trial (May 8, 1986). 1st Supp.Rec., Vol. 3, at 199-200. Thus the preparation of the “redacted indictment” was a mere formality to conform with the Extradition Order and the proof at trial. The fact that the defendant proceeded through the entire trial without the “redacted indictment” belies any suggestion that the defendant was lead to believe that the government would not use the facts alleged in Count I of the original indictment at trial. Alvarez-Moreno has never claimed surprise or prejudice because of the introduction of that evidence and in oral argument, defense counsel conceded that he had notice that the government intended to prove the continuing series through evidence of the drug and financial transactions. “If a defendant has actual notice, due process may be satisfied despite an inadequate indictment.” Becton, 751 F.2d at 256. Therefore Rosenthal and the other cases cited by the majority at page 1408 are relevant only to the extent that the defendants had actual notice through other counts of the indictment of the acts the government intended to prove to support the CCE count.1
In the absence of such actual notice, however, an indictment which merely tracks the statutory language and does not specify the violations which will support CCE is inadequate. Since that is not the issue here, I only briefly mention several reasons such an indictment is insufficient.2 First, as pointed out above, due process entitles the defendant to notice of the charges against him so that he can prepare his defense. Merely citing the statutory language of CCE is insufficient because it does not provide the “ ‘facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offence, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.” ’ Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (citation omitted). In addition, the prosecutor gains an unfair advantage in being “free to roam at large — to shift its theory of criminality so as to take advantage of each passing vicissitude of the trial and appeal.” Id. at 768, 82 S.Ct. at 1049. Furthermore, the lack of specific notice may hamper the ability of all parties to ensure that the defendant is not placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Id. at 765, 82 S.Ct. at 1047. Finally, the failure to allege specific acts in the indictment runs the risk that the jury will convict based on evidence that was not presented to the grand jury. See id. at 770, 82 S.Ct. at 1050-51. Whether such a situation constitutes a constructive amendment, which is prejudicial per se, or a variance, which requires a showing of prejudice, will depend on the specifics of the case. In either event, the potential for prejudice to the defendant is clear. I therefore agree with the Becton court that the government should allege the specific violations it will prove in the CCE count itself.
In this case, I am persuaded by the record that the defendant’s actual notice of the events the government intended to prove ensured that he suffered no prejudice. In addition, it is clear that the evidence of the money laundering transactions was presented to the grand jury. Alvarez-Moreno’s conviction must be affirmed.

. In each of these cases, the defendant was on notice of the violations the government proved to support the CCE conviction. The language of the majority opinion at page 1408, when read in isolation, however, suggests that a defendant need not be notified of the acts which will constitute the "continuing series" element. Later, the majority does acknowledge that Alvarez-Moreno had notice of these acts. Majority opinion at 1411. This special concurrence is written out of concern that a later panel might view the language at page 1408 to be the holding in this case.

. These concerns are cogently explained in United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d at 917-20.