Court Opinion

ID: 9892458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 21:05:43.090184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:00.439826
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220082-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                       NOTICE
 Decision filed 10/23/23. The
                                                                            This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0082
                                                                            Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                               not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                       limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                  under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Champaign County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 15-CF-510
                                                )
DAVID BEVERLY,                                  )     Honorable
                                                )     Randall B. Rosenbaum,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Barberis and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1       Held: Where the defendant raised a colorable claim of actual innocence, we reverse the
               trial court’s denial of the defendant’s petition for leave to file a successive
               postconviction petition and remand for further proceedings. Where the defendant
               waived his right to be present in the courtroom at his sentencing hearing, we find
               that the defendant has not successfully raised plain error and we affirm the
               sentence. Where the record does not support the defendant’s arguments that the
               trial court improperly considered a factor in aggravation at sentencing and/or that
               the sentence imposed was an improper de facto life sentence, we find no error
               supporting plain error review and affirm the sentence.

¶2       In April 2015, the State charged the defendant, David Beverly, with one count of first

degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2014)). After a jury trial, the defendant was found

guilty and was sentenced to 75 years in prison. He appealed and his conviction was affirmed, but

the appellate court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing because the trial court had

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relied on a void prior conviction when imposing sentence. People v. Beverly, 2019 IL App (4th)

160168-U. The defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief prior to resentencing. The trial

court denied the petition, and the defendant appealed. While that appeal was pending, the

defendant was resentenced. At resentencing, the court sentenced the defendant to a prison term of

65 years plus 3 years of mandatory supervised release. On January 17, 2022, the defendant sought

leave of court to file a successive postconviction petition. The trial court denied this request. On

December 27, 2022, the appellate court entered its order affirming the trial court’s dismissal of

some of his postconviction claims at the second stage of the proceedings, finding that he did not

establish that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance at the third-stage

evidentiary hearing, and finding that his postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance

and adequately framed and/or supported his claims. People v. Beverly, 2022 IL App (4th) 210677-

U.

¶3     On appeal, the defendant raises three issues. He argues that his request to file a successive

postconviction petition should have been allowed because he raised a colorable claim of actual

innocence; that he was denied his right to be present in-person for his resentencing hearing because

he was the only person appearing via Zoom, and he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his

right to be present; and that the trial court erred at resentencing both by improperly considering a

factor in aggravation that was already the subject of an enhancement and by imposing a de facto

life sentence without supportive reasoning. We reverse the denial of the defendant’s petition for

leave to file a successive postconviction petition and remand for further proceedings. We affirm

the defendant’s sentence.

                                                 2
¶4     The facts contained herein have been largely extracted from the appellate court orders on

direct appeal (People v. Beverly, 2019 IL App (4th) 160168-U) and in affirming the denial of his

postconviction petition (People v. Beverly, 2022 IL App (4th) 210677-U).

¶5                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶6                     A. Pretrial, Trial, Sentencing, and Direct Appeal

¶7     The State charged the defendant with the murder of Arsenio Carter (Carter) who was shot

and killed with a firearm. His jury trial was held in January 2016. The State presented evidence

that at around 6 p.m. on April 10, 2015, police officers responded to a shooting at a barbecue at

Oakwood Trace Apartments in Champaign.

¶8     Dreshana Caston (Caston), the victim’s girlfriend, testified she witnessed the murder. On

April 10, 2015, Caston attended a barbecue at Oakwood Trace Apartments with her brother, Robert

Caston (Robert), and Carter, arriving at around 4 or 5 p.m. Caston drove to the barbecue in a Dodge

Durango.

¶9     When they arrived at the barbecue, they sat in Caston’s vehicle talking for about 10

minutes. Caston testified that she recognized several of the individuals in attendance. Her uncle,

Christopher Hugger, came up to her vehicle to say hello. Caston subsequently left the barbecue for

about 5 or 10 minutes with her brother and Carter, going to her grandmother’s house.

¶ 10   Caston testified that they returned to the barbecue. She was in the driver’s seat, Carter was

seated in the front passenger seat, and Robert was seated in the back. Caston parked in a lot located

near Third Street and Burr Oak Court in the vicinity of Oakwood Trace Apartments.

¶ 11   When they returned to the barbecue, Caston saw her ex-boyfriend, Joseph Carter, the

defendant, and Matt Carter. Caston stated “[t]he first time [she saw the defendant], he was in the

group talking” and then he “came around [a] truck.” Caston could see the defendant’s face and

                                                 3
recognized his tattoos as well as his dreadlocks. She further explained that when she initially saw

the defendant, he was wearing a black hoodie with the “hood on” but it “wasn’t [drawn] tight and

[the defendant’s] dreads [were] out.”

¶ 12   When asked how “sure [she was] of [her] identification” of the defendant at that time,

Caston stated she was “pretty sure.” Caston explained she knew the defendant and she had seen

him on about five prior occasions when he was “out” and “going into clubs and stuff like that.”

Caston stated that the defendant had also been to her house for a “get-together.”

¶ 13   Caston further testified that when she pulled into the parking lot she also saw Deveonta

Lindsey (Lindsey), an individual she knew from the “neighborhood” and school. During the

barbecue, Lindsey “pulled [Caston’s] brother to the side, talked to [her brother], and then after

[Lindsey] [was] done talking to him, [Lindsey] was standing in the back of [Caston’s] [vehicle].”

Caston testified that she “didn’t really hear what [Lindsey] was talking about.” Caston “got out of

[her] car to try to [hear], but [her] brother was getting back in [her] car by then.”

¶ 14   Caston testified she was “very worried” when she got back inside her car because, in her

side-view mirror, she saw Lindsey with a black hoodie that he pulled tight as he stared—“mean

mugging”—which meant that Lindsey was “looking at [Caston’s] car” with a “mean face” as

though he had “a problem or something.” Caston further testified that Lindsey “[j]ust stood there”

toward the “back of [Caston’s] car” on the “driver’s side.” According to Caston, Robert said,

“Man, I don’t know what’s going on.” Carter, who was sitting in the front passenger seat smoking

a cigarette with his window rolled down, replied, “Yeah, we need to get ready to go.”

¶ 15   Caston testified that the defendant then walked up to Caston’s car. When asked how certain

she was of the defendant’s identity as he approached, Caston responded, “It was David.” She

further stated, “Yes,” it was “[t]he [d]efendant, Mr. Beverly.” Caston explained that she could see

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the defendant’s tattoos, face, and hair. She further explained that it was light outside and she could

see “a blue glove on [the defendant’s] hand” as he approached her car. Caston stated, “[W]hy

would [the defendant] just be walking around with a blue glove on his hand unless he’s going to

do something to somebody[?]” When shown a picture of the blue glove depicted in the State’s

exhibit number 7, Caston identified the glove in the picture as the same glove she saw the defendant

wearing at the time of the shooting.

¶ 16   As Caston attempted to back her car out of the parking space, the defendant pulled out a

short black gun. As she was trying to drive away, the defendant “shot in [Caston’s] car at Arsenio

[Carter] and shot him in the chest.” The defendant was standing about three feet away from

Caston’s car at the time. When Caston heard the gunshot, she “sped off.”

¶ 17   Caston drove Carter to the hospital for medical treatment. Blood was coming out of his

chest as she was driving. By the time they arrived at the hospital, Carter was unable to speak as he

gasped for air. Carter subsequently died at the hospital that day.

¶ 18   At the hospital, police officers spoke to Caston about the shooter’s identity. Caston testified

that she “pulled up” the defendant’s Facebook photo on her cell phone. Caston testified she knew

the defendant by the nickname “Glocc” and his Facebook name was “Glocc Murdablock Krazi.”

¶ 19   On cross-examination, Caston stated she “didn’t see [the defendant]” when she first arrived

at the barbecue. However, after visiting her grandmother’s house and returning to the barbecue,

Caston saw the defendant in a white truck with her ex-boyfriend, Joseph Carter, and Matt Carter.

¶ 20   Caston testified that when police officers questioned her at the hospital, she told them the

shooter was wearing light jeans. Caston later spoke to Detective Patrick Funkhouser at the police

department about the shooting. Detective Funkhouser showed Caston a picture of the defendant,

                                                  5
and Caston responded, “that was him.” Caston testified that the picture she was shown was a “mug

shot.”

¶ 21     On redirect examination, Caston testified that at the time of the shooting, she saw a blue

glove “hanging out of [the defendant’s] pocket.” She explained that the defendant pulled the glove

from his pocket and then held the gun with the glove when he shot Carter.

¶ 22     Champaign police officer Justus Clinton testified he was on duty at 6 p.m. on April 10,

2015, when he received a report of shots fired near “Fourth and Beardsley [Avenue].” He stated

the parking lot where the shooting occurred was west of Oakwood Trace Apartments. Another

police officer, Arthur Miller, stated he located “a single spent shell casing” in the parking lot.

¶ 23     Dr. Shiping Bao testified that he performed an autopsy on Carter. Dr. Bao stated the cause

of death was a gunshot wound to the chest.

¶ 24     Champaign police officer Thomas Petrilli testified he went to the hospital after the

shooting. He secured Caston’s car and observed “blood on the passenger *** side step board” and

the “center console area of the vehicle.” Officer Petrilli also testified that while at the hospital, he

spoke to Caston, who was “flustered” and “pacing back and forth.” She seemed “pretty worked up

at the time.” Caston showed officers a picture of the defendant on her phone.

¶ 25     Detective Dustin Sumption testified he was asked to assist with investigating the

defendant’s Facebook information. Detective Sumption received a picture of the defendant’s

Facebook profile. He testified that State’s exhibit number 5 depicted “a snapshot” of a Facebook

profile picture, beneath which was the name “Glocc Murdablock Krazi.” Detective Sumption

testified that the Facebook profile picture depicted the defendant “wearing a black Adidas coat and

a black stocking cap.”

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¶ 26   Detective Sumption testified that during his investigation, he obtained photographs of the

defendant from the Illinois Secretary of State that included the defendant’s “driver’s license

photograph as well as an Illinois Department of Corrections photograph.” Detective Sumption

explained he was able to compare those photographs to the defendant’s Facebook profile picture

that Caston had shown officers at the hospital. Detective Sumption testified he was able to identify

the defendant as the individual in the Facebook profile picture Caston had showed to officers the

day of the shooting.

¶ 27   Cynthia Lubamba (Lubamba) testified next. She began dating the defendant after they met

in February 2015. She identified the defendant in court. Lubamba testified that the defendant was

“close friends” with Kytiece “Boosie” Frazier who had been shot in April 2015, and the defendant

was “upset” about Frazier having been shot.

¶ 28   Lubamba stated she told the defendant she could not attend the April 10 barbecue. Around

6 p.m. on the night of the barbecue, the defendant “kept calling” her. When she finally answered

the phone, the defendant asked her for “a ride.” The defendant initially asked to come over to

Lubamba’s home, but she told him she was busy. The defendant then asked Lubamba for a ride to

a “friend’s house” instead. Lubamba testified she picked the defendant up at the Panera Bread

restaurant (Panera) in Champaign “around 7:00 or 8:00” p.m. that day.

¶ 29   Lubamba testified that when she arrived, the defendant was inside Panera. Lubamba texted

the defendant that she was outside. After driving the defendant from Panera to Brookstone Court,

Lubamba went to her aunt’s house.

¶ 30   Lubamba next heard from the defendant later that night when the defendant asked about a

hat he left in her car. Lubamba dropped off the defendant’s hat and went home. When she arrived

at her home, police officers pulled in behind her vehicle. They asked her to contact them the next

                                                 7
time she saw the defendant. Later that night, around 11 p.m., the defendant called and asked

Lubamba to pick him up.

¶ 31   In the early morning hours on April 11, 2015, Lubamba picked the defendant up from

Brookstone Court. Lubamba testified the defendant sat in the backseat of Lubamba’s vehicle even

though nothing was in her front passenger seat preventing him from sitting there. She explained

that the windows in the back of her vehicle were tinted. As they drove, a black truck followed

behind them. Lubamba asked the defendant what was going on, but he “didn’t say much.” The

defendant “just wanted cigarettes.” When they arrived at a gas station, Lubamba exited the vehicle

and police officers subsequently arrested the defendant.

¶ 32   Champaign police officer Benjamin Newell testified that he was present for the defendant’s

arrest on April 11, 2015, and stated no weapons were found on the defendant at that time.

¶ 33   Brandy Coakley, Carter’s sister, testified she frequently saw Carter and his best friend,

Tarrell “Rat” Boatman, together. They were “like brothers.”

¶ 34   Champaign police officer Jim Bednarz testified he executed a search warrant on April 13,

2015, at “1302 Brookstone, [a]partment 102.” He testified to photographs depicting two hooded

sweatshirts found in an upstairs bedroom of the apartment. Another photograph showed a small

purse hanging in a closet in the same upstairs bedroom. In the purse, he found a plastic bag

containing 9-millimeter bullets and casings in addition to a .40-caliber bullet. Officer Bednarz

testified he did not find “anything that put [the defendant] in that apartment.”

¶ 35   Detective Patrick Simons testified that he was an expert in cellular forensics. He explained

he performed an analysis of the defendant’s cell phone. Detective Simons testified the defendant’s

cell phone number was linked to his Facebook account. Detective Simons located a Facebook post

                                                 8
originating from the defendant’s cell phone on the day of the murder at approximately 11:10 a.m.,

which stated: “I put it on my soul *** u ain’t goin b da only one wit a headstone my nigga.”

¶ 36   Detective Funkhouser testified next and explained he was primarily responsible for the

investigation of Carter’s murder. He had also investigated a case in which Tarrell Boatman pled

guilty to shooting Kytiece Frazier on April 8, 2015. Detective Funkhouser testified he obtained

and reviewed video surveillance footage from Carle Hospital where Frazier was recovering from

his gunshot wounds.

¶ 37   Detective Funkhouser testified he made screenshots of still images from the video

surveillance footage at Carle Hospital that depicted the defendant inside the hospital at around 11

a.m. on April 10, 2015. He stated that two still images of the defendant at Carle Hospital depicted

the defendant with a cell phone in his hand at 11:19 a.m. Detective Funkhouser testified that in the

Carle Hospital surveillance video, the defendant was wearing a “flat-billed ball cap” with a “black

zippered hoodie” and “frosted” camouflage pants. He testified the defendant’s clothing in the

surveillance video “appears to be the same exact clothing that [the defendant] was wearing when

he was taken into custody with the exception of the fact that when he was taken into custody, [the

defendant] was not wearing a black hoodie.”

¶ 38   Detective Funkhouser testified that in Frazier’s hospital room, there were dispensers

mounted on the wall containing blue latex gloves. He explained that when the defendant was

searched following his arrest, two blue gloves were found in his right front pants pocket that

“appeared to be identical” to the blue gloves in Frazier’s hospital room. Detective Funkhouser

acknowledged that the gloves found in the defendant’s pocket were tested and no gunshot residue

was found.

                                                 9
¶ 39   Detective Funkhouser obtained video surveillance footage from the day of the murder from

the Walmart Supercenter (Walmart) located at 2610 North Prospect Avenue in Champaign. He

testified that the footage showed the defendant was at Walmart with his girlfriend, Wendy Driver.

Detective Funkhouser testified the surveillance footage showed the defendant entering the

Walmart at around 4:38 p.m. and exiting at 4:44 p.m. He stated that the shooting occurred around

6 p.m. and was reported at around 6:03 p.m. on April 10, 2015.

¶ 40   Detective Funkhouser testified he found a text message on the defendant’s cell phone

“between [the defendant] and Cynthia Lubamba that described [Lubamba] picking [the defendant]

up at Panera” on the day of the shooting. He testified the “time listed” on the “Panera text” was

6:23 p.m. He also stated that the “driving time” between Panera and where the shooting occurred

at Oakwood Trace Apartments was approximately 10 to 11 minutes.

¶ 41   Detective Funkhouser, along with Sergeant Dennis Baltzell, interviewed the victim’s

girlfriend, Caston, after the shooting on April 10, 2015. During the first recorded interview with

Caston, she stated that before the shooting at the barbecue, “she saw her brother get out of [her]

vehicle and speak with Deveonta Lindsey right outside [Caston’s] vehicle.” When asked whether

Caston told Detective Funkhouser if she had overheard her brother and Lindsey discussing another

murder that occurred in 2014 involving Rakim Vineyard, Detective Funkhouser responded that he

believed Caston “mentioned the Rakim Vineyard murder in relation to the conversation” between

her brother and Lindsey. Detective Funkhouser testified that Caston told him two groups of

individuals at the barbecue had an “ongoing dispute with Arsenio [Carter] and [Carter’s] friends

over the murder of Rakim Vineyard.” Detective Funkhouser acknowledged that Caston was “very

upset” and crying during the initial interview, which took place shortly after the murder.

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¶ 42      With respect to the bullet recovered from Carter’s body, Detective Funkhouser testified it

was a 9-millimeter bullet. Detective Funkhouser further testified that Landriana Walker, one of

Lindsey’s girlfriends, lived in apartment 102 located at 1302 Brookstone Court, which was located

“right in [the] area where the [d]efendant was picked up by Cynthia Lubamba” on the day of his

arrest.

¶ 43      The parties entered several evidentiary stipulations. Specifically, they stipulated that

(1) deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) collected from the defendant was compared to DNA from the

black hooded sweatshirts found in the Brookstone Court apartment, and the comparison was

deemed inconclusive; (2) the 9-millimeter cartridge casing recovered from the scene was tested

for latent fingerprints, but none were found; (3) no gunshot residue was detected on the latex

gloves found in defendant’s pocket after his arrest or on the black hooded sweatshirts found in the

Brookstone Court apartment; and (4) gunshot residue might not be detectible for several reasons

and the absence of gunshot residue on a person did not mean that the person had not discharged a

firearm.

¶ 44      The State rested, and the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.

¶ 45      The defendant presented the testimony of Champaign police officer Edward Sebestik, who

testified that he went to the hospital after Carter was shot. Upon arrival at the emergency room,

there was “a little bit of chaos” and Caston was “covered in a large amount of blood.” Caston was

“pacing back and forth” and both Caston and her brother “appeared to be in hysterics after having

just experienced a pretty traumatic incident firsthand.”

¶ 46      Officer Sebestik acknowledged that he wrote in his report that Caston was “initially

uncooperative.” However, Officer Sebestik testified he believed Caston was “as cooperative as she

could be given the circumstances.”

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¶ 47   When Officer Sebestik asked Caston if she had any information about the shooter, “[s]he

did not verbally respond” and she “pulled out her cell phone and went to her Facebook page” to

show Officer Sebestik “a photo of an individual.” Officer Sebestik asked Caston if “that was who

had *** shot her boyfriend Arsenio [Carter], [and] she said [‘]yes.[’]” Officer Sebestik testified

that Caston “again bec[a]me uncooperative [after] further question[ing],” she “lock[ed] her

phone,” and Officer Petrilli persuaded Caston to unlock her phone again. He subsequently took

Caston to his squad car to have a “one-on-one” conversation.

¶ 48   According to Officer Sebestik, during Caston’s recorded interview, Caston described the

shooter as wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and black jeans and had medium length dreadlocks.

Caston also told Officer Sebestik that the shooter was “wearing a rubber hospital glove” and had

“a tattoo.” Caston was “not sure what the tattoo was of but *** she was sure that it was on [the

shooter’s] face.”

¶ 49   Wendy Driver (Driver) testified next. She stated that in April 2015, she lived at 1301 North

Brookstone Court, apartment 104. She testified she was the defendant’s friend.

¶ 50   Driver testified to the timeline of events on April 10, 2015. Driver explained she dropped

the defendant off at Carle Hospital that morning. Later that day, Driver called the defendant and

asked if he would go to Walmart with her “to buy a shirt.”

¶ 51   At around 4 p.m. on April 10, 2015, Driver picked the defendant up from the barbecue at

Oakwood Trace Apartments. They went “directly” to a Walmart located in Champaign. After

purchasing a shirt at Walmart, Driver and the defendant went back to her house where they “hung

out” for “a little while” before the defendant left.

¶ 52   According to Driver, approximately 10 or 20 minutes after leaving her apartment, the

defendant called and asked Driver to drive him to the Panera. Driver dressed her children and met

                                                  12
the defendant at her apartment complex. The defendant was already there waiting for her outside.

They proceeded to Panera, and when they arrived, Driver and the defendant “sat there for a while”

in Driver’s vehicle. The defendant told Driver “he was waiting on a ride.” They talked for “a little

bit” and then the defendant got out of Driver’s car. Driver returned to her apartment because she

had to work later that evening. Driver admitted she “[didn’t] really remember any of the times.”

¶ 53   On cross-examination, Driver testified that the defendant called her after he was arrested

and in custody. Driver stated, “When I first spoke to [the defendant], I asked him *** [‘]how are

you accused of the killing when you was with me? We went to Walmart. Wasn’t that the time we

went to Walmart?[’]” Driver acknowledged she did not know what time the shooting occurred.

When asked about what she told Detective Funkhouser, Driver testified she “didn’t know what

time [she] was there” at Walmart and she did not think that she “gave [him] a time.” Driver also

admitted that, when she spoke to Detective Funkhouser, she did not know at what time she drove

the defendant to Panera.

¶ 54   Driver testified that “the sun was setting and it was shining in [her] eyes as [she] [was]

driving” the defendant to Panera. Driver explained she “specifically remember[ed] that because

[her] glasses [were] broke and [she] could barely see.”

¶ 55   Sergeant Baltzell testified that he investigated the shooting on April 10, 2015. That

evening, he and Detective Funkhouser interviewed Caston. Sergeant Baltzell wrote a report

summarizing the interview. When asked about the first time Caston saw the defendant on the day

of the shooting, Sergeant Baltzell testified that the way “[s]he phrased it[,] [Caston] didn’t see [the

defendant] prior to [the defendant] walking up to the car with a latex glove on.” Sergeant Baltzell

explained that “from the very beginning” Caston was “very clear about who did it.”

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¶ 56      The defendant testified on his own behalf. He met Caston in March 2015 at a small party.

The defendant next saw Caston at a barbecue on his birthday several days later. The defendant

testified that Carter was not at either of these events in March 2015. The defendant denied ever

meeting Carter. He denied shooting Carter or “even [being] in the vicinity of where this took

place.”

¶ 57      The defendant testified that on the morning of April 10, 2015, Driver took the defendant to

visit Kytiece Frazier at Carle Hospital. Afterwards, the defendant went to an apartment complex

and saw Tiwanda Winkins, who was pregnant with the defendant’s child. Winkins and Driver lived

in the same apartment complex. The defendant visited Winkins for about an hour and then left for

the barbecue at Oakwood Trace Apartments.

¶ 58      At the barbecue, the defendant had a disagreement with David Dalton, “the guy *** who

the barbecue was for.” The defendant testified that he “really had words” with Dalton “so [the

defendant] left.” The defendant testified that he did not return to the barbecue.

¶ 59      Driver picked the defendant up from the barbecue at about 4 p.m. and asked him to go to

Walmart. When they left Walmart, they drove back to Driver’s apartment and the defendant stayed

there for “[p]robably like 30, 45 minutes.”

¶ 60      The defendant testified that he left Driver’s apartment and went to the home of “Iresha,”

Kytiece Frazier’s “auntie,” who lived on Beslin Street. The defendant explained that he went to

Iresha’s home because he wanted her to “drop [the defendant] off on Kirby [Street].” The

defendant testified that Iresha “had her *** kids so she wouldn’t” drive him there. The defendant

explained “that’s why [he] had to call Wendy [Driver]” and asked for a ride to “Kirby [Street].”

¶ 61      The defendant testified he walked from Beslin Street to Driver’s apartment complex. He

asked Driver to take him to Kirby Street because the defendant was “going to meet another girl.”

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The defendant explained Driver took him to “Panera Bread right along Kirby and Mattis in the

plaza.”

¶ 62      According to the defendant, he arrived at Panera with Driver at “6 something.” The

defendant testified that the “sun [was] setting” at “the time [he] [was] on [his] way there [to Panera

Bread].” As they drove to Panera, it was “still light” outside. The defendant explained the sun “was

setting” but it “wasn’t set” yet. Upon arrival, the defendant and Driver stayed at Panera for

“probably like ten or [fifteen] minutes” and talked.

¶ 63      The defendant testified that Lubamba subsequently picked him up from Panera Bread at

“probably like 6:40, 6:50.” The defendant stated that it was “getting dark” but it still “wasn’t dark.”

He later testified that Lubamba picked him up from Panera “around 7:00.”

¶ 64      The defendant stated Lubamba contacted him later about his hat he had left in Lubamba’s

vehicle. Lubamba brought the defendant his hat and “left again.”

¶ 65      The next time the defendant saw Lubamba was the day of the defendant’s arrest. The

defendant testified that Lubamba met him at “Hamilton [apartments] [at Brookstone Court] and

she drove *** to the gas station *** [where] [the defendant] [was] apprehended by the police.”

The defendant testified that he sat in the backseat of Lubamba’s vehicle because he was

“intoxicated.” The defendant further explained that Lubamba was “acting real funny” so the

defendant sat in the backseat “in case something happened” and the defendant was “going to jump

out.”

¶ 66      The defendant testified that after he was arrested, blue latex gloves were found in his

pocket. He took two gloves from “the hospital when [he] was there earlier.” The defendant

explained that he took the latex gloves because he has eczema on his hands. He “usually” wears

gloves such as “baseball gloves” “especially if [he is] going somewhere.” He testified that he wears

                                                  15
gloves “a lot.” The defendant explained that “people who know [him]” “don’t see [him] actually

with hospital gloves, but they [have] seen [the defendant] with baseball gloves a lot.” He chose to

take hospital gloves from Frazier’s hospital room because he “didn’t have any gloves” that day so

he “just grabbed some.” The defendant testified that it was a “normal practice” for him to do this.

The defendant further stated, “Like every time I’m at the hospital, like my baby mama or any one

of my friends, they’ll tell you every time I go like I grab some gloves. Like the girl I used to go

with, she was pregnant. I grabbed some gloves.”

¶ 67   The defendant testified that he took the blue gloves from Frazier’s hospital room “close in

time” to when he posted the following on Facebook: “I put it on my soul *** u ain’t goin b da only

one wit a headstone my nigga.” He explained that he posted it “from [his] phone” when he was

visiting Kytiece Frazier at the hospital at around 11:20 a.m. on April 10, 2015. The defendant

further explained the name beneath his Facebook picture, “Glocc Murdablock Krazi,” referred to

him.

¶ 68   The defendant denied the Facebook post was intended to be a threat or an “expression of

being upset about Kytiece Frazier.” The defendant explained it was “actually [Frazier’s] favorite

song.” The defendant further explained that, “since [Frazier] was hurt, [the defendant] just wanted

to post something for him.” He stated the song in the Facebook post was about “shooting people

based on other people having been shot.” The defendant testified that the song was “[n]ot really

[about] revenge.” But he acknowledged “[i]t’s a violent song.” The defendant also acknowledged

that when he posted it to Facebook, he knew Frazier had been shot two days earlier. But the

defendant “didn’t know [Tarrell Boatman] was in custody yet” for shooting Frazier.

                                                16
¶ 69   Prior to the defense resting, the court read the following stipulation to the jury: “the Court

has taken judicial not[ic]e of the fact that on April 10 of 2015 in Champaign, Illinois, Central

Daylight Time, sunset was at 7:26 p.m.”

¶ 70   The State then presented Caston as a rebuttal witness. On rebuttal, Caston testified that on

the occasions she saw the defendant in March 2015, “[h]e never had on any gloves.” Caston stated

she only saw him wearing gloves on April 10, 2015.

¶ 71   Caston further testified that her uncle, Christopher Hugger, sent her a text after the

shooting. He texted “words to the effect of [‘]sorry, that wasn’t supposed to happen.[’]” Caston

testified, “I don’t know what [Hugger] meant by that.” When asked whether it could have been

Hugger who shot Carter, Caston responded, “The face I seen plays in my head every day, and it is

[the defendant’s] face.” She further explained that Hugger had no tattoos on his face but he did

have a “RIP Rakim” tattoo on his neck. She testified that there was no “possibility that [she] could

mistake [her] uncle for the [d]efendant.”

¶ 72   The State also presented Lubamba as a rebuttal witness. Lubamba testified she did not

recall the defendant “ever wearing gloves” when they dated from February 2015 until the

beginning of April 2015. She also could not remember the defendant wearing baseball gloves.

When asked how many times she saw the defendant wearing “blue plastic gloves,” Lubamba

responded, “Not at all.” Lubamba clarified that on April 10, 2015, the day of the shooting, she

picked the defendant up from Panera “around 7:30” that evening.

¶ 73   Detective Funkhouser testified next as a rebuttal witness. Detective Funkhouser testified

he spoke with Driver on April 13, 2015, to discuss the defendant’s whereabouts on the day of the

shooting. Detective Funkhouser testified Driver told him she was at Walmart with the defendant

“[b]etween 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.” on April 10, 2015. Detective Funkhouser explained this was

                                                17
important to his investigation because it encompassed the time that included the murder. Detective

Funkhouser testified that by the time he spoke with Driver on April 13, 2015, she had already

spoken with the defendant following his arrest. When Detective Funkhouser first spoke with

Driver, she did not mention going to Panera with the defendant. She only said that after going to

Walmart “[Driver] drove [the defendant] back to her residence, and within a very short amount of

time [the defendant] received a text message and he left.” Driver told Detective Funkhouser that

she “never saw [the defendant] again.”

¶ 74   The second time Detective Funkhouser spoke with Driver, she said that on the day the

shooting occurred, “she gave [the defendant] a ride to West Kirby Avenue in Champaign” where

the Panera was located.

¶ 75   The third time Detective Funkhouser spoke to Driver, she told him, “I can’t even say that

[the defendant] and I were together a whole hour that day.” Detective Funkhouser testified that,

during this interview, Driver never mentioned going to Panera with the defendant. He also stated

that the approximate “driving time” between Panera and Oakwood Trace Apartments where the

shooting occurred was “ten to eleven minutes.”

¶ 76   The defendant, in surrebuttal, testified Lubamba would not have seen him wearing gloves

when they dated because he only wore gloves when he was outdoors “around, like, grass or dirt”

and he generally spent time with Lubamba “late at night[,] [when] [the defendant] needed a ride[,]

or [when they would] get a hotel room.” The defendant testified that he “normally” wears “baseball

gloves.” He further explained that the “only reason” he had the hospital gloves on April 10, 2015,

“was because [he] was at a hospital.”

¶ 77   In closing argument, the State asserted that the defendant shot and killed Carter on April

10, 2015. The State argued that Carter’s friend, Tarrell Boatman, shot the defendant’s friend,

                                                 18
Kytiece Frazier, on April 8, 2015, and that Carter’s murder was “retribution for the shooting of

Kytiece Frazier.”

¶ 78   With respect to the sequence of events, the State stressed that on the morning of the

shooting, the defendant was at the hospital visiting Kytiece Frazier when the defendant “ma[de]

this post, ‘Put it on my soul, you ain’t goin’ be the only one with a headstone.’ ” The State argued

that this was a “window” into “what’s going on inside the [d]efendant’s head, he wrote down what

he was thinking.” The State noted the defendant took blue gloves from the hospital room when he

was writing the Facebook post. “[C]learly he’s intending that there be more than one headstone,

and that’s why he takes the gloves.”

¶ 79   The State asserted that after leaving the hospital, the defendant “h[ung] out with friends”

before going to the barbecue at Oakwood Trace Apartments where he “sees [Carter,] the guy who

is best friends *** with the fellow who shot [the defendant’s] own friend.” The State argued that

the defendant “puts on that glove, takes that gun out, points it through the window at Arsenio

Carter[,] and [the defendant] shoots him [around 6 p.m.].” The State noted Detective Funkhouser’s

testimony, stating it is a 10-minute drive from the area of Oakwood Trace Apartments to Panera.

At the time of the defendant’s arrest, “[t]he biggest coincidence” occurs where he “just happens to

have those gloves in his pocket.”

¶ 80   Defense counsel argued the lyrics in the defendant’s Facebook post referencing a

“headstone” lacked relevance because Kytiece Frazier was “alive” and “didn’t have a headstone.”

Further, no one else at the barbecue identified the defendant as the shooter, the physical evidence

could not be connected to the defendant’s DNA, the State’s case “rest[ed] solely” on Caston’s

testimony that “significantly” differed from what she initially told officers, and Caston was only

“pretty sure” the defendant was the shooter.

                                                19
¶ 81   As for the sequence of events on April 10, 2015, defense counsel asserted that the defendant

was not present when the shooting occurred, noting the defendant and Driver arrived at Walmart

at 4:38 p.m. and left at about 4:44 p.m. before returning to Driver’s residence around 5 p.m. and

staying there for about 30 minutes. The defendant left Driver’s apartment “briefly” and thereafter

met Driver and her children in the parking lot of Driver’s apartment complex, at which time they

drove to Panera. After they arrived at Panera, the defendant and Driver “stay[ed] there for a few

minutes talking.” Defense counsel then noted Lubamba sent the defendant a text message at

“6:2[3] p.m.” describing Lubamba picking the defendant up at Panera, and thus establishing the

defendant “wasn’t at the barbecue” when the shooting occurred.

¶ 82   Following deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder.

¶ 83   On March 3, 2016, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court

denied. The court conducted the defendant’s sentencing hearing that same day. The court stated

the defendant’s criminal history was “extensive” and noted the recency of his “last conviction out

of Cook County *** for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon” in May 2013. The court then

sentenced the defendant to 75 years in prison.

¶ 84   The defendant’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, but his sentence was vacated.

People v. Beverly, 2019 IL App (4th) 160168-U.

¶ 85                             B. Postconviction Petition and Appeal

¶ 86   In April 2021, the defendant filed a postconviction petition with the assistance of privately

retained counsel. He raised numerous allegations that his trial attorney provided ineffective

assistance. His petition included allegations that, prior to trial, his attorney improperly failed to

(1) communicate with the defendant, show the defendant discovery in the case, or discuss with the

defendant the State’s evidence; (2) review available discovery and locate geolocational data from

                                                 20
the defendant’s cell phone that would have established the defendant was not present at the scene

of the shooting when it occurred; (3) locate and interview occurrence witnesses Joseph Carter

(Joseph), Jason Eatman (Eatman), Darnell Hayes, and Tolanda Boykins (Boykins); (4) speak with

and prepare Driver, the defendant’s alibi witness, to testify; (5) interview Caston or properly

prepare for Caston’s testimony; (6) interview Lubamba; (7) prepare the defendant to testify;

(8) discuss stipulations in the case with the defendant; and (9) file motions in limine to exclude

evidence.

¶ 87    The defendant also alleged several ways in which his trial attorney allegedly provided

ineffective assistance during his jury trial. Specifically, in his petition, he asserted his trial attorney

failed to effectively develop the defendant’s alibi defense by not (1) eliciting testimony from

Driver regarding the route she took when driving the defendant to Panera, (2) objecting to

testimony about the approximate drive time from the scene of the shooting to Panera, and

(3) seeking to admit a written copy of the text message Lubamba sent to the defendant that “proved

the time at which Lubamba arrived to pick up *** defendant at Panera.” The defendant also alleged

that his attorney failed to call occurrence witnesses on his behalf, including Joseph, Eatman, and

Boykins. He asserted that his attorney improperly failed to object to certain testimony; entered

stipulations that were detrimental to his defense; failed to admit “key pieces of evidence,”

including clothing he wore on the day of the offense; “failed to develop the relationships between

the individuals allegedly involved or the lack thereof”; and failed to elicit testimony from Caston

that would have damaged her credibility.

¶ 88    Finally, in his postconviction petition, the defendant alleged that his trial attorney was

ineffective after his trial for failing to file a “complete” posttrial motion. He also alleged his

appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise any of the claims set forth in

                                                   21
his petition. The defendant attached various documents to his petition, including his own affidavit;

the affidavits of Joseph, Eatman, and Boykins; police reports; cell phone records, including a

transcript of text messages purportedly exchanged between himself and Lubamba; transcripts from

the underlying trial proceedings; and the motion for a new trial filed by his attorney.

¶ 89   In his affidavit, Joseph asserted that he was present at Oakwood Trace Apartments on the

day of the shooting. He was familiar with the defendant, but “would not say that [the two] were

friends.” Joseph maintained he “was in the area when the shooting occurred” but “did not see [the

defendant] there at the time.” When the shooting happened, Joseph looked in the direction of where

the shots were fired and could see “a male running away from” Caston’s vehicle. He thought that

person was the shooter and stated the man he saw “was definitely not” the defendant. Joseph

further maintained that he spoke with the police about the incident, but the defendant’s trial

attorney never tried to contact or interview him. He would have been willing to testify on the

defendant’s behalf if he had been asked.

¶ 90   In her affidavit, Boykins asserted she was also present at Oakwood Trace Apartments

around the time of the shooting. She was familiar with the defendant and observed him at the

barbecue around 3 p.m. When she saw the defendant, he was wearing blue latex gloves. Boykins

averred that she had seen the defendant wearing gloves in the past and it was her understanding

that he did so “due to excema [sic].” Boykins asserted that the defendant left the barbecue about

an hour after she arrived, and she did not see him return to the area. Further, Boykins stated she

“was in the area when the shooting occurred later and [she] did not see [the defendant] there.”

According to Boykins, the defendant “was not present” when Carter was shot. Additionally, she

maintained that she spoke with the police after the shooting. Although she was willing to testify

on the defendant’s behalf, the defendant’s trial attorney never interviewed her about the case.

                                                22
¶ 91   Finally, Eatman averred that between 6 or 7 p.m. on the day of the shooting, he went to

Oakwood Trace Apartments to meet a friend who lived at that location. While there, he observed

“a light[-]skinned male with short dread locks, with a face full of tattoos, run pas[t] [him].” The

man had a gun that “he was tryin[g] to put back in his hoody,” and he was running with another

individual, who was “light[-]skinned” and had gold teeth. According to Eatman, neither individual

was the defendant, who Eatman knew “from around Champaign.” Although Eatman later learned

someone was killed in the area and that the defendant was arrested for the crime, he did not report

what he had seen to the police because he did not want the police bothering him. It was not until

Eatman and the defendant ended up “in the same prison” that Eatman reached out to the defendant.

¶ 92   The trial court advanced the defendant’s postconviction petition to the second stage of

postconviction proceedings. In June 2021, the State filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s

petition, and in July 2021, the defendant filed a reply to the State’s motion.

¶ 93   In August 2021, the circuit court entered a lengthy written order in which it granted in part

and denied in part the State’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the vast majority of the

defendant’s claims, finding his petition and accompanying documentation failed to make a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation. The court found those claims were either rebutted

by the record or “vague, conclusory[,] or speculative.” Additionally, it stated that many of the

defendant’s claims lacked “specificity to show that counsel’s actions were inappropriate or that

the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”

¶ 94   The circuit court advanced two of the defendant’s claims for a third-stage evidentiary

hearing. Specifically, it determined the defendant made a substantial showing of a constitutional

violation with respect to his claims that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to locate,

interview, and present testimony from Joseph and Boykins.

                                                 23
¶ 95   In November 2021, the circuit court conducted a hearing in the matter. At the outset of the

hearing, the defendant’s postconviction counsel informed the court that Boykins was not present

for the hearing, although she had been served with a subpoena. She asked that the court hear

testimony from Joseph, who was present from the Illinois Department of Corrections, and then

grant the defendant a continuance “to try to secure *** Boykins’[s] appearance” in court. The State

objected, arguing the case had “been set for a great deal of time” and that it also had witnesses

who were present. The court elected to proceed with the hearing and revisit the issue of a

continuance after hearing testimony from other witnesses. Ultimately, the record shows that

postconviction counsel decided not to seek a continuance based on Boykins’s absence.

¶ 96   At the hearing, Joseph testified that on April 10, 2015, he was present for the barbecue at

Oakwood Trace Apartments. At that time, he had seen the defendant around, but he did not know

exactly who the defendant was. Joseph recalled the shooting and testified that when he “heard the

shots” he “ducked” but then “got up to look around and see what was going on.” He did not know

how far away he was from the location of the shooting, stating, “I really wouldn’t know the

distance, but I was fairly, like, I guess you would say in the middle kind of far. I wasn’t far away,

but I was there.” Joseph looked in the direction of where the shots had been fired and saw “a truck

pulling off” and “a male running the opposite way of everybody else.” Joseph believed the person

he saw running was the shooter because the person was running in a different direction than others

at the scene. The person he saw running was not the defendant.

¶ 97   Joseph acknowledged that he spoke with the police about the shooting shortly after it

occurred. He agreed that he reported that he saw the defendant on the scene, but he did not

remember telling the police that “there was a lot of stuff going on” at the time of the shooting. He

denied stating that he was wearing earbuds when the shooting occurred. Further, he asserted that

                                                 24
he was scared when speaking to the police, in part, because they accused him of being involved in

the shooting. Joseph testified that he did not know the identity of the shooter. Additionally, he

stated he never received any phone calls about the case from the defendant’s trial attorney. If he

had, he would have spoken with the attorney and been willing to testify at the defendant’s trial.

¶ 98   On cross-examination, Joseph acknowledged that he only saw the back of the person that

he observed running away from the shooting, not the person’s face, and that he did not see the

person holding a gun. He agreed that when he previously spoke with the police, he told them he

“heard nothing” and “seen nothing.” Joseph acknowledged that he might have reported that he was

talking on the phone with his girlfriend when the shooting happened and that he was not sure that

he heard the gunshots because there was a train going by and a lot of noise. He did not remember

the police asking him if he saw anyone run away from Caston’s vehicle. Additionally, he asserted

his memory of the event was “probably better” at the time of the evidentiary hearing than it was at

the time of the incident. Finally, Joseph acknowledged having a criminal history that included two

prior felony convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and a felony conviction for “theft

with a prior.”

¶ 99   The State presented testimony from Detective Baltzell, who investigated the shooting.

Baltzell testified he interviewed Joseph, and he identified a video recording of that interview. The

State moved for the admission of the video, and the defendant’s postconviction counsel objected

based on “a discovery issue,” arguing she had not seen the video. According to postconviction

counsel, the trial attorney, who was then deceased, “had completely destroyed [his] file” and she

had difficulty obtaining discovery from the State. Postconviction counsel acknowledged, however,

that “[t]he State provided the discovery in the eleventh hour,” enabling her to file the defendant’s

postconviction petition, and that she had not asked the trial court for assistance in obtaining any

                                                25
discovery. In response, the State maintained that it had “disclosed the entire file” to postconviction

counsel. The State asserted that once it was established that the trial attorney’s file was not

available, it sent postconviction counsel “everything along with directions that all of the materials

should be here.” The State maintained that postconviction counsel voiced no complaints thereafter.

¶ 100 The circuit court overruled defendant’s objection and allowed the video of Joseph’s

interview to be admitted. It stated that defendant would be entitled to a continuance if needed “to

be able to find evidence or come up with argument to contradict this video.” Ultimately,

postconviction counsel did not request a continuance.

¶ 101 The video of Joseph’s interview was published at the hearing. During the interview,

conducted by Detective Baltzell and Detective Funkhouser, Joseph reported that he did not see the

shooting and did not see anyone running away from Caston’s vehicle. He indicated he was not

sure whether he heard gunshots and that his attention was not drawn to the area of the shooting

until he heard Caston’s vehicle pulling away. He further reported that there had been music

playing, people talking, children playing, and the sounds of a train. Joseph maintained that he had

been on his phone with his earbuds in and he did not see or hear anything.

¶ 102 Detective Baltzell denied that before the interview, either he or Detective Funkhouser

suggested to Joseph that he was a suspect in the case. According to Detective Baltzell, the police

already had the name of the person who was alleged to have committed the crime. On cross-

examination, he acknowledged that other individuals he spoke with indicated that Joseph had been

involved in the incident. When he interviewed Joseph, it was his intention to determine if Joseph

drove the defendant to the scene of the shooting.

¶ 103 In rebuttal, Joseph testified that the reason he agreed to be interviewed was because the

police “were saying that *** [he] did it.” He stated he had concerns because he was on parole, and

                                                 26
he was scared the detectives would inform his parole officer about the incident. Joseph maintained

that at the time of the interview, he was trying to distance himself from the shooting.

¶ 104 The defendant also testified at the hearing on his own behalf. He asserted he retained his

trial attorney to represent him at his trial. During that representation, he had discussions with his

attorney about calling certain witnesses, including Joseph and Boykins. According to the

defendant, his attorney stated that they “didn’t need” Joseph and he never responded to the

defendant’s request to call Boykins. It was the defendant’s opinion that his attorney was “rushing”

him to trial because the defendant was not paying him enough money.

¶ 105 On November 10, 2021, the trial court entered a written order, finding that the defendant

failed to prove a violation of his constitutional rights and denied his postconviction petition. The

court found that the defendant’s claims with respect to Boykins were waived because she was not

called to testify at the evidentiary hearing. With respect to the defendant’s claim that his trial

attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate or call Joseph as a witness, the court determined

that the defendant had not established either that his attorney’s performance was deficient or that

the defendant suffered prejudice. Initially, the court stated that given Joseph’s prior statements to

the police—indicating he was not paying close attention to the area of the shooting and did not see

anyone running away—the defendant’s attorney had no valid reason to contact Joseph or call him

as a witness at trial. It also concluded that there were strategic reasons not to call Joseph, including

that Joseph was a convicted felon on parole and because his credibility could have been attacked.

¶ 106 Regarding prejudice, the circuit court stated it had “serious doubts about [Joseph’s]

credibility” and that it did not believe Joseph’s testimony would have changed the outcome of the

defendant’s trial. In particular, the court stated as follows:

                                                  27
        “[Joseph] has felony convictions which the Court can consider as to his credibility. He also

        admitted on the stand that he lied to police officers because he was on parole at the time

        and was near a shooting, he did not want [to be] implicated. He claims that the police

        questioning him were threatening and pressuring him[.] However, the video of the

        questioning does not show threats at all[.] In fact, [Joseph] received a phone call [during

        the interview] and officers said he would not be there long[.] Incredibly, [Joseph] stated

        that his memory of the event was better in 2021 than it was in 2015[.] On the stand[,] he

        was defensive about prior statements, not recalling many he made to the police[.] While it

        is true that he does not appear to have anything to gain now, since he does not know the

        Defendant, on balance, the Court has concerns about his credibility[.]”

¶ 107 The court further stated that even if a jury had found Joseph was credible, his testimony

was “of limited assistance to the issue of who the shooter was.” In particular, the court noted the

person Joseph described as the shooter was running away from him. Joseph did not see the person’s

face or see the person with a gun.

¶ 108 On December 27, 2022, the appellate court entered its order affirming the trial court’s order

dismissing some of his postconviction claims at the second stage of the proceedings, finding that

the defendant did not establish that his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance

at the third-stage evidentiary hearing, and finding that his postconviction counsel provided

reasonable assistance and adequately framed and/or supported his claims. People v. Beverly, 2022

IL App (4th) 210677-U.

¶ 109                         C. Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 110 On January 7, 2022, the defendant sought leave of court to file a successive postconviction

petition. The defendant raised an actual innocence claim with newly discovered evidence in the

                                                28
form of an eyewitness, Kamari Ray-Davis (Ray-Davis). Ray-Davis was present at the barbeque

and witnessed the shooting. He was 15 years old at the time of the events. Champaign Officer

Robert Delong was involved in the search for the shooter. Officer Delong stopped Ray-Davis and

three other males to ask if they had been present when the shooting occurred. Officer Delong stated

that Ray-Davis acknowledged being present and that he heard the gunshot. An attorney allegedly

attempted to interview Ray-Davis, but the request was declined by his parents who did not want

their son to be involved in this case. The record contains no detail about the identity of the attorney

and/or whether the attorney was representing the State or the defendant.

¶ 111 In November 2021, the defendant met Ray-Davis, who shared what he witnessed. The

defendant’s petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition contained a notarized

affidavit signed by Ray-Davis. What follows is the entirety of this handwritten affidavit:

               “Kamari Ray-Davis was attending a going away party for David Dalton A.K.A.

       Pookie in the late afternoon of 4-10-15. I got there a little after 3:00 pm. I really wasn’t for

       the barbeque. I was walking from the Arab store which is around the corner[,] and I walked

       through Oak Wood Trace Apts which I did often and the BBQ was already going. I seen a

       dice game and that made me stay. I remember seeing Glock A.K.A. David Beverly stand

       by the dice game wearing a black hoodie and blue gloves which looked goofy (And I

       remember laughing at him. We were all kicking it for a minute[)]. Then I remember seeing

       him leave with a dark[-]skinned girl with glasses about a hour or so after I arrived. I would

       say around (4:00-4:30 pm)[.] I remember seeing this S.U.V. leave and come back multiple

       times to the BBQ with a female driver and male passenger. There was multiple people

       standing around the S.U.V. when it was parked in Oak Wood Trace Apts. Right before the

       shooting occur[r]ed[,] the same crowd that was hanging around the S.U.V. was back

                                                  29
       gatherer[e]d around [the] S.U.V. As I was just about to leave [the] dice game[,] I seen the

       female driver get into an argument with two guys about something. Then one of the guys

       went toward [the] entrance by the park and the other one hopped in the backseat. As I

       walked into the parking lot towards the middle of the parking lot, I seen the S.U.V. leaving

       out the parking space and the passenger was getting into it with the same guy that walked

       of[f] as he walked back up. He was wearing an all black jogging suit and was light skinned

       but of darker tone and he had an afro that was nappy. He was musc[u]lar in size. He had

       no tattoos from what I remember. This guy walked up and shot one time into the passenger

       side of the car. The shooter then ran off toward Bradle[y] Ave. and I ran with [the] rest of

       [the] crowd towards the park. When I got home[,] I told my mom what happen[e]d and she

       told me not to get involved. I remember a lawyer calling my house[,] but my family told

       him I wasn’t getting involved. I was 15 years old at the time. Since 2015 I’ve changed

       address and phone number multiple times so if anybody tried to contact me[,] it would be

       hard. I ran into David Beverly A.K.A. Glock in the county[,] and he asked me to write an

       affidavit stating what I saw. Nobody is making me write this statement or am I rec[ei]ving

       anything for writing this statement.”

¶ 112 The trial court denied the defendant’s petition for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition on January 19, 2022, without a written order. The court stated that it did not find that Ray-

Davis’s affidavit presented newly discovered evidence because Ray-Davis’s identity was available

at the time of trial and could have been discovered with due diligence. The court also noted that in

the defendant’s amended postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel,

his postconviction attorney listed numerous witnesses that trial counsel could have interviewed.

The court stated that Ray-Davis could potentially have been discovered during the postconviction

                                                 30
proceedings. The court also found that the “new evidence” did not raise a colorable claim of actual

innocence. The court noted: “Mr. Davis gives a description in his affidavit that’s different from

Ms. Caston. That might ordinarily make me think that this is of such character that it could change

the outcome of the trial.” However, the court discounted Ray-Davis’s affidavit, and concluded that

Ray-Davis’s testimony could not change the outcome of trial because at the time of the shooting,

he told police that he merely heard the shooting, and thus, “[h]e’s changed his story.”

¶ 113                                  D. Resentencing

¶ 114 The resentencing hearing was held on January 19, 2022. The defendant was not present in

the courtroom and was appearing via Zoom. The attorney representing the State and his attorney

were in person in the courtroom. At the outset of the hearing, the following occurred:

               “THE COURT: Sir, before we get started here[,] I want to make sure you

        understand what your rights are. You do have the right to be personally present in the

        courtroom but because of COVID concerns the jail’s not transporting people, so if you

        wanted to be here in person[,] we’d have to continue this several weeks. Otherwise, you

        have the right to give up being here personally and we can do this by Zoom. What that

        would mean is that the lawyers and I would be here in the courtroom[,] and you would be

        at the jail appearing by Zoom. You would not be physically next to your lawyer, but there’s

        no legal difference whether you’re here in court or whether you do it remotely. It’s

        identically the same.

               Do you understand all of that, sir?

               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

               THE COURT: Have you had a chance to talk to Ms. Propps [the defendant’s

        attorney] about this?

                                                31
       THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

       THE COURT: And do you want to proceed by Zoom like this? Is that what you

would like to do sir?

       THE DEFENDANT: Is there—is there any way I can talk to my lawyer first[,] or

no?

       THE COURT: Well, the—

       THE DEFENDANT: (unintelligible.)

       THE COURT: Yes. We’ll figure this out. We’ll be in recess briefly; okay? Stay

where you are.

                                          ***

       THE COURT: We are back on the record in 15-CF-510.

       The Defendant appears by Zoom. Ms. Propps appears in court, as does Mr. Lozar

[the attorney representing the State].

       Mr. Beverly, where I left off with you was telling you that you have the right to be

here in person[,] but we can also proceed with his hearing today by Zoom, and I just wanted

to make sure you understood everything.

       Would you like to proceed by Zoom today or are you asking that we set this over a

couple weeks and appear in person? Which would you like to do sir?

       THE DEFENDANT: We can proceed.

       THE COURT: All right.

       THE DEFENDANT: We can proceed.

       THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

                                         32
               We’ll show that he has discussed this with counsel, and I find that his decision is

       knowing and voluntary.”

¶ 115 The trial court commented upon the original presentence investigation report dated

February 22, 2016, and the updated report dated January 13, 2022. The court specifically noted

that although he was going to be considering the defendant’s prior record, he would not be

considering the weapons charge “which is the one that I’m not allowed to consider.”

¶ 116 In aggravation, the State asked the trial court to consider the prior sentencing hearing, as

well as the events and facts of this case. Additionally, the State called Brandy Coakley (Coakley)

and Darlene Dobynes (Dobynes) to testify.

¶ 117 Before Coakley began her testimony, the trial court adjusted the video toward her so that

the defendant could see her while she was testifying. Coakley’s brother was the victim in this case.

Numerous other family members were present, but she was “elected” to represent the family during

the hearing. Coakley testified that the persons most impacted by the loss of her brother were his

two children—a daughter who was then 10, and a son who was then 6. Coakley testified that her

nephew did not really know who his father was, but that her niece was affected by the loss, stating

that she did not want to visit the victim’s mother, because of the resemblance to her deceased

father. Coakley testified that all family members were impacted by the victim’s loss stating that

he was everyone’s favorite. Coakley testified to the difficulties her mother has experienced since

her son was killed.

¶ 118 Dobynes testified that she was the victim’s mother. She stated that while the defendant’s

family can still see him, even if seeing him is via Zoom, she can no longer hug her child and can

only see him in spirit. Dobynes testified that before his death, her son had stopped “all this mess,”

                                                 33
and was trying to get his life together. She testified that her son was a good person, and she believed

that his death has caused her to suffer from medical issues.

¶ 119 The defendant presented no evidence in mitigation.

¶ 120 After arguments of counsel, the defendant read a statement he prepared. The defendant

noted that he had been incarcerated since 2015, but that he had become a better person. He spoke

of his ability to obtain education while in prison, but that if he is given a lengthy sentence, he

would have no ability to use that education. Noting his imperfections, the defendant stated that his

situation was one placed upon him. He concluded by expressing his empathy for the family of the

victim.

¶ 121 The judge presiding over the defendant’s resentencing hearing indicated that although he

had not been the trial judge, he had read the trial and appellate court records and transcripts. The

judge also indicated the two presentence investigation reports were considered, and specifically

noted that he was not considering “that one criminal conviction which the Appellate Court said

should not be considered.” The court stated that it had considered all relevant statutory aggravating

and mitigating factors. In mitigation, the trial court considered the fact that the defendant had a

six-year-old child but stated that it may not rise to a level constituting statutory mitigation. In

aggravation, the trial court noted the defendant’s previous criminal history beginning with his

juvenile record of violent offenses including robbery and armed robbery. Adult offenses ranged

from misdemeanors to Class 2 felonies involving theft, stolen vehicles, and similar crimes. The

court also noted that the defendant also had misdemeanor batteries. The court considered the

deterrence factor, and the specific facts of this case: that the shooting was in a crowded area, the

victim was unarmed, and the shooting was during daylight. The court stated:

                                                  34
        “It was a barbecue during daylight hours, perhaps a hundred people nearby. A bullet could

        have gone through the victim and hit somebody else. There could have been other bullets

        flown from that gun that Mr. Beverly had. Other people potentially could have drawn

        weapons. It could have turned into quite a dangerous situation because of what Mr. Beverly

        did to start it off and so others potentially were threatened with physical harm. Again,

        unarmed victim in the daylight.”

The court noted that the defendant was relatively young, had a difficult upbringing with behavioral

and school issues, and had used alcohol and drugs in the past. Since being incarcerated, the

defendant had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and depression. The court

referenced the impact that the victim’s murder had on his family. The trial court sentenced the

defendant to 65 years, 40 years for first degree murder plus the mandatory 25-year firearm

enhancement.

¶ 122                                  II. ANALYSIS

¶ 123 The defendant filed this appeal contesting the denial of his request for leave to file a

successive postconviction petition, the legality of his presence via Zoom at his resentencing

hearing, and his sentence.

¶ 124                        A. Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 125 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) provides

a procedural process by which a defendant may assert that the conviction resulted from a

substantial denial of constitutional rights. Id. § 122-1(a); People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 253

(2008). “The Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition and provides in

section 122-3 (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2014)) that ‘[a]ny claim of substantial denial of

                                                35
constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.’ ” People v. Bailey,

2017 IL 121450, ¶ 15.

¶ 126 The wrongful conviction of an innocent person violates due process under the Illinois

Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2), and thus, a defendant can raise a freestanding

claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence in a postconviction petition. People

v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 43. However, a petitioner must obtain leave of court to file a

successive postconviction petition even when raising a claim of actual innocence. 725 ILCS 5/122-

1(f) (West 2020). Typically, when a defendant seeks leave to file a successive postconviction

petition, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of both cause for the failure to bring the

claim in the initial postconviction proceedings and prejudice resulting from that failure. Id.; People

v. White, 2020 IL App (5th) 170345, ¶ 18 (citing Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24). However, where

the defendant raises a freestanding claim of actual innocence, the defendant is not required to meet

the cause-and-prejudice test. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 332 (2009). Instead, the defendant

must show a colorable claim of actual innocence. Id. at 330. To raise a colorable claim of actual

innocence, “the supporting evidence must be (1) newly discovered, (2) material and not

cumulative, and (3) of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on

retrial.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 (citing People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 32); People

v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004).

¶ 127 The trial court should only deny a petition for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition “where it is clear from a review of the petition and supporting documentation that, as a

matter of law, the petition cannot set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence.” Robinson, 2020

IL 123849, ¶ 44. In the pleading stage of all postconviction cases, “all well-pleaded allegations in

the petition and supporting affidavits that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be

                                                  36
taken as true.” Id. ¶ 45. When a trial court decides the legal sufficiency of a postconviction petition,

the court is not permitted to make factual and credibility determinations. Id. On appeal from the

denial of a successive postconviction petition alleging actual innocence, our review is de novo. Id.

¶ 40.

¶ 128 Evidence is deemed to be “newly discovered” when it was unavailable at trial and

it could not have been discovered sooner through due diligence. Id. ¶ 47; Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 334.

“In advancing an actual innocence claim, it is the evidence in support of the claim that must be

‘newly discovered,’ not necessarily the source.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Class, 2023 IL

App (1st) 200903, ¶ 76 (citing People v. Fields, 2020 IL App (1st) 151735, ¶ 48). Accordingly,

“an affidavit from a witness may be newly discovered, even when the defense knew of the witness

prior to trial.” Fields, 2020 IL App (1st) 151735, ¶ 48 (citing People v. White, 2014 IL App (1st)

130007, ¶ 20). Evidence is “material” if the evidence is relevant and probative of the defendant’s

innocence. People v. Parker, 2012 IL App (1st) 101809, ¶¶ 83-84. The most important element of

an actual innocence claim is the conclusive character of the new evidence. Robinson, 2020 IL

123849, ¶ 47; People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996).

¶ 129 The court must also consider whether the new evidence places the trial evidence in a

different light and undermines confidence in the verdict. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 48; People

v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97. The new evidence does not need to be dispositive to modify

the original guilty verdict. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 48. “Probability, rather than certainty, is

the key in considering whether the fact finder would reach a different result after considering the

prior evidence along with the new evidence.” Id. (citing People v. Davis, 2012 IL App (4th)

110305, ¶¶ 62-64).

                                                  37
¶ 130 Here, the defendant claims that the proffered eyewitness testimony of Ray-Davis would be

in direct contradiction to Caston’s trial testimony. Ray-Davis was present at the barbeque that day

and saw the defendant at the party. The defendant was engaged in a dice game and was then

wearing blue latex gloves. Ray-Davis would also testify that later that day he saw the shooting,

and that the defendant was not the shooter. He would testify to what the shooter looked like and

was wearing, which was not consistent with the defendant’s look and attire on the day of the

shooting. The defendant argues that if a jury heard Ray-Davis’s testimony, he could be found

innocent of the murder.1

¶ 131 While we are aware that Ray-Davis was “interviewed” by a law enforcement officer in the

investigation of the shooting, and thus his name was included in the discovery documents, all that

was known about Ray-Davis was that he heard the shooting—not that he directly witnessed the

shooting. An attorney apparently attempted to speak with Ray-Davis before the underlying trial in

this case. However, Ray-Davis did not speak with this attorney because his parents would not

allow their juvenile son to be interviewed or otherwise “get involved” in this criminal case.

Additionally, Ray-Davis stated that in the intervening years from the date of the shooting until he

submitted his affidavit, he had moved multiple times and changed telephone numbers. Thus, he

would not have been easy to locate.

¶ 132 The trial court concluded that the evidence was not “newly discovered,” because Ray-

Davis’s name was in the Champaign police officer’s report, and thus was theoretically

        1
          Although the State alleged that there was physical evidence connecting the defendant to the crime
in the form of a black hooded sweatshirt and 9-millimeter bullets found in his girlfriend’s apartment, the
State is mistaken about where those evidentiary items were recovered. The record establishes that those
items were recovered from the apartment of Deveonta Lindsey’s girlfriend. Lindsey is the individual who
was speaking with Dreshana Caston’s brother at her vehicle, and who also gave Caston a “mean look” just
prior to the shooting. At the time of the shooting, witnesses reported that Lindsey was wearing a black
hoodie.
                                                   38
discoverable by the defendant before his trial, or at the time of his postconviction proceedings. We

find that the trial court’s basis for its decision is inconsistent with Illinois law because the court

focused on the possibility that Ray-Davis’s identity was discoverable before trial or during

postconviction proceedings, instead of focusing on the “newness” of the evidence involved. Class,

2023 IL App (1st) 200903, ¶ 76 (citing Fields, 2020 IL App (1st) 151735, ¶ 48). Moreover, by

discounting Ray-Davis’s statements in his affidavit that he witnessed the shooting when compared

to his original claim to law enforcement that he merely heard the shooting, the trial court

improperly focused on Ray-Davis’s credibility as a witness. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 45. We

are reminded that in the pleading stage of a successive postconviction petition, “all well-pleaded

allegations in the petition and supporting affidavits that are not positively rebutted by the trial

record are to be taken as true.” Id.

¶ 133 We find that this proffered testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence. Moreover,

even though Ray-Davis’s name was in the investigative reports, we cannot conclude that the

defendant could have discovered this new evidence in the exercise of due diligence. Regardless of

whether Ray-Davis was discoverable to the defendant at the time of trial or during his

postconviction proceeding, the evidence that Ray-Davis provided in his affidavit asserting that the

defendant was not the shooter constitutes new and material evidence. Class, 2023 IL App (1st)

200903, ¶ 76 (citing Fields, 2020 IL App (1st) 151735, ¶ 48).

¶ 134 Having satisfied the first two requirements of an actual innocence claim, the defendant

must establish that this new evidence places the trial evidence in a different light and undermines

confidence in the verdict. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 48; Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97. After

reviewing the evidence and considering the reasonable doubt standard, we conclude that

confidence in the guilty verdict has been undermined. The opposing testimony eyewitnesses

                                                 39
Caston and Ray-Davis, coupled with the lack of physical evidence connecting the defendant to this

murder, supports our decision. Having found that the defendant satisfied all three requirements of

an actual innocence claim, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s petition for leave

to file a successive postconviction petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

order.

¶ 135                      B. Zoom Presence at Resentencing Hearing

¶ 136 The defendant also asks this court to remand the case for a new resentencing hearing on

the basis he was not present in person, while everyone else was physically present in the courtroom.

He alleges that this process did not adequately fulfill his constitutional right to be present, and that

he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to an in-person hearing. We review the issue

of a defendant’s waiver to be present at sentencing on a de novo basis. People v. Liss, 2012 IL App

(2d) 101191, ¶ 10 (citing People v. Breedlove, 213 Ill. 2d 509, 512 (2004)). When a defendant

appears remotely at a court proceeding and fails to object, the lack of objection is construed as

consent, and the defendant waives the issue for review unless he can show plain error. People v.

Lindsey, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1034 (2000).

¶ 137 “[T]he federal constitution and our state constitution afford criminal defendants the general

right to be present, not only at trial, but at all critical stages of the proceedings, from arraignment

to sentencing.” People v. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d 45, 55 (2002). This right to be present is largely

based upon the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. People v. Stroud, 208 Ill. 2d 398, 408

(2004) (quoting United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985)). “ ‘[A] defendant is

guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its

outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’ ” Id. (quoting Kentucky

v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)).

                                                  40
¶ 138 However, “ ‘a defendant is not denied a constitutional right every time he is not present

during his trial, but only when his absence results in a denial of an underlying substantial right, in

other words, a constitutional right; and it is only in such a case that plain error is committed.’ ”

Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57 (quoting People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 81 (1990)). Thus, a defendant’s

absence from a critical proceeding violates his constitutional rights “only if the record

demonstrates that defendant’s absence caused the proceeding to be unfair or if his absence resulted

in a denial of an underlying substantial right.” Id.

¶ 139 The Illinois legislature and the Illinois Supreme Court have both addressed the issues of

remote participation in criminal proceedings. Pursuant to section 106D-1 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963, the chief judge of an Illinois circuit court may permit a criminal defendant to

appear by two-way audio-visual communication, including computerized video conference for

specified procedural hearings. 725 ILCS 5/106D-1(a) (West Supp. 2021). However, sentencing is

not included on that list of specified hearings. Subsection (c) of the statute—in effect as of the date

of the defendant’s resentencing—stated: “Nothing in this Section shall be construed to prohibit

other court appearances through the use of two-way audio-visual communication, upon waiver of

any right the person in custody or confinement may have to be present physically.” Id. § 106D-

1(c). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 45, in effect on the date of the defendant’s sentencing, also

allows a criminal defendant to participate remotely in a hearing, including by telephone or video

conference, so long as the procedures employed during the hearing are “consistent with

constitutional guarantees.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 45 (eff. May 22, 2020). In its committee comments, the

supreme court stated:

               “The use of telephone or video conferences was formally contained in Article II—

       Rules on Civil Proceedings in the Trial Court as Supreme Court Rule 185 (Telephone or

                                                  41
        Video Conferences). New Rule 45 recognizes that telephone and video conferences can be

        used effectively and appropriately in other types of proceedings beyond civil cases. As

        indicated in the rule, special attention must be given to the use of telephone or video

        conferencing in criminal or juvenile delinquency proceedings. Continued study as this

        technology evolves will be necessary to ensure the constitutional guarantees applicable to

        such proceedings are consistently provided.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 45, Committee Comments

        (adopted May 22, 2020).

¶ 140 Here, there is no question that the defendant verbally agreed to participate in his sentencing

hearing remotely via Zoom. Therefore, the question we must decide is whether the defendant’s

constitutional right to an in-person sentencing was violated, and thus, if plain error review of his

claim would be appropriate. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57.

¶ 141 A reviewing court is allowed to excuse a defendant’s forfeiture using the plain error

doctrine in two limited circumstances. People v. Bailey, 2020 IL App (5th) 160458, ¶ 73. We may

review a forfeited claim “if the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to

tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,” or if the

error is “so fundamental that it undermined the fairness of the defendant’s [sentencing] and

threatened the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. (citing People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551,

565 (2007)). The defendant argues that plain error review is appropriate under the second prong

of the plain error rule.

¶ 142 For the reasons that follow in this order, we disagree and conclude that the trial court did

not commit error, and thus, the fairness of the defendant’s resentencing was not undermined.

¶ 143 The Illinois Supreme Court has found that a defendant’s right to be present at critical

criminal hearings was violated when a guilty plea was entered via a closed-circuit television feed

                                                  42
and the defendant was not advised of his right to be present, nor did he waive that right. Stroud,

208 Ill. 2d at 409. This case is factually quite different than the facts in People v. Stroud. Here,

due to transportation limitations resulting from COVID-19, the defendant was not able to be

transported from the county jail to the courthouse for resentencing. He appeared via Zoom. The

trial court judge adequately explained to the defendant that the judge and the attorneys would be

present in the courtroom, and he would be appearing remotely by Zoom. The judge reiterated that

the defendant would not be physically next to his attorney, but regardless, the process would be

the same. The judge explained that if the defendant wanted to be in the courtroom during his

resentencing, the hearing would be continued. The defendant was then provided an opportunity to

consult with his attorney through Zoom. Following that discussion, the defendant stated that he

agreed to the remote sentencing versus having the sentencing rescheduled for a later date when he

could physically be in the courtroom. The judge stated that he found the defendant’s waiver of the

in-person hearing was knowing and voluntary.

¶ 144 We note that the defendant asks us to consider the amended Rule 45, which addresses a

defendant’s waiver of his right to certain in-person court appearances, including sentencing, and

its direction to trial judges presiding over remote sentencing. Ill. S. Ct. R. 45(d)(3)(iii) (eff. Jan. 1,

2023). This rule provides specific guidance to judges to confirm that the defendant’s in-person

waiver is knowing and voluntary and that the defendant understands the following five applicable

matters: (1) that he has a right to be physically present in the courtroom; (2) that a remote

appearance means that the defendant will participate via telephone, video conference, or other

electronic means; (3) that a remote proceeding may result in the defendant and his attorney not

being physically present together; (4) that the legal effect of the remote proceeding is identical to

                                                   43
an in-person proceeding; and (5) that the defendant has discussed the waiver with counsel. 2 While

we appreciate the clarity that this new rule provides to trial judges, this amendment to Rule 45 was

not in effect on the date of the defendant’s resentencing. However, after reviewing the transcript

of the hearing, we find that the judge substantially complied with these requirements in concluding

that the defendant’s waiver of his in-person sentencing was knowing and voluntary.

¶ 145 The record and the law do not support a conclusion that the defendant’s in-person absence

from the sentencing hearing caused the proceeding to be unfair. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57. The

defendant was represented by counsel and had the opportunity to confer with his attorney before

the sentencing began. The trial court provided the defendant with the option to continue the hearing

to a later date so that he could be present in the courtroom. The defendant declined the continuance

opportunity the court offered. The trial court moved the camera during the hearing to allow the

defendant to see and hear the witnesses testify and present their victim impact statements. The

defendant addressed the court and the members of the victim’s family with his prepared statement.

While a remote criminal proceeding is not always ideal, the record in this case fails to support a

conclusion that the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated. We find that the defendant was

not denied an underlying substantial right by his remote presence at his resentencing. Id.

Accordingly, we conclude that plain error review is not applicable in this case, and that the

defendant waived the issue because he failed to object to his remote appearance.

        2
          There is a sixth matter that is not applicable in this case, and so we chose not to include it in the
list: “That in matters open to the public, any remote appearance may be viewable by the public over the
Internet or other method of streaming or broadcasting (if applicable).” Ill. S. Ct. R. 45(d)(3)(iii)(C) (eff.
Jan. 1, 2023).
                                                     44
¶ 146                                         C. Sentence

¶ 147 The defendant asks this court to grant him a new sentencing hearing because the trial court

improperly considered a factor in aggravation that was already the subject of the 25-year firearms

enhancement. Secondly, the defendant alleges that 65-year sentence imposed by the court amounts

to a de facto life sentence and argues that this sentence is inconsistent with the trial court’s implicit

rejection of a sentence of natural life.

¶ 148 Here, the defendant failed to raise these issues by objection or in a postsentencing motion,

and thus the issues were forfeited. People v. Newlin, 2014 IL App (5th) 120518, ¶ 21 (explaining

that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a defendant must both object contemporaneously

and include the issue in a written postsentencing motion). He asks this court to consider these two

issues pursuant to the second prong of plain error review. Under the second prong of this doctrine,

we may consider claims of error that have been forfeited if the error alleged is of such a magnitude

that it undermined the fairness of the defendant’s trial and the integrity of the judicial process.

Bailey, 2020 IL App (5th) 160458, ¶ 73 (citing Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565). The first step in

plain error review is to determine whether any error occurred at all. People v. Abdelhadi, 2012 IL

App (2d) 111053, ¶ 7.

¶ 149                   1. Improper Consideration of Factor in Aggravation

¶ 150 The appropriate sentencing range for first degree murder is 20 to 60 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-

4.5-20(a) (West 2020). When there is a finding that a firearm was discharged in the commission

of the murder, and that the firearm discharge proximately caused the death, the sentenced imposed

for murder shall be enhanced by an additional 25 years, or up to a term of natural life. Id. § 5-8-

1(a)(1)(d)(iii). The Illinois legislature explained the intent behind the enactment of the firearm

                                                   45
enhancement, noting “the serious threat to the public health, safety, and welfare caused by the use

of firearms in felony offenses.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 531 (2005).

¶ 151 “A reasoned judgment as to the proper penalty to be imposed must be based on the

particular circumstances of each individual case.” People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718,

¶ 12 (citing People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268 (1986)). That judgment differs from case to

case and “ ‘depends upon many relevant factors, including the defendant’s demeanor, habits, age,

mentality, credibility, general moral character, and social environment [citations], as well as the

nature and circumstances of the offense, including the nature and extent of each element of the

offense as committed by the defendant [citations].’ ” Id. (quoting Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d at 268-69).

Other factors that can be considered include the defendant’s criminal history, his potential for

reform, the recognized interest in protecting the public, and the interest in deterrence. Id. (citing

People v. Wilson, 257 Ill. App. 3d 670, 704-05 (1993). “ ‘The trial court is in the best position to

balance the appropriate factors and tailor a sentence to the needs of the case.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilson,

257 Ill. App. 3d at 704).

¶ 152 A sentence within the statutorily prescribed range is presumed to be proper. People v.

Hampton, 2021 IL App (5th) 170341, ¶ 136. In addition, there is a strong presumption that the trial

court made its sentencing decision based on correct legal reasoning. Abdelhadi, 2012 IL App (2d)

111053, ¶ 7. A defendant can only overcome this presumption “by an affirmative showing that the

sentence imposed varies greatly from the purpose and spirit of the law or manifestly violates

constitutional guidelines.” Id. ¶ 8; see also People v. Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL App (4th)

110720, ¶ 22.

¶ 153 However, the trial court may not use “a factor implicit in the offense” as an aggravating

factor in sentencing the defendant for that offense. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718, ¶ 13 (citing

                                                  46
People v. Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d 86, 07 (1989). “This prohibition against double enhancements is

based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for an offense,

the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.” Id. (citing People v.

Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995)).

¶ 154 Although a reviewing court typically reviews a sentence on a discretionary basis, if the trial

court relied upon an improper factor at sentencing, the question presents a matter of law, and thus

our review is de novo. People v. Arbuckle, 2016 IL App (3d) 121014-B, ¶ 39; Abdelhadi, 2012 IL

App (2d) 111053, ¶ 8.

¶ 155 The reviewing court will not vacate a sentence unless it is evident that the trial court relied

upon an improper factor. People v. Bowen, 2015 IL App (1st) 132046, ¶ 49. The burden to

affirmatively establish that the trial court’s sentence was based on an improper factor lies with the

defendant. People v. Williams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759, ¶ 18.

¶ 156 In determining whether the trial court erroneously considered a factor inherent in the

offense in aggravation, we must view the record in its entirety rather than focusing on isolated

statements made by the court. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718, ¶ 14. The defendant is required

to establish “more than the mere mentioning of an improper fact” to obtain a remand for

resentencing. People v. Reed, 376 Ill. App. 3d 121, 128 (2007). “Rather, defendant must show that

the trial court relied on the improper fact when imposing sentence.” Id. However, the appellate

court is not required to remand if we determine that the weight placed on that factor was

insignificant. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL App (3d) 130511, ¶ 13.

¶ 157 At sentencing, the trial court considered the defendant’s conduct on the day of the murder

in stating that the defendant’s actions could have caused additional harm. “The commission of any

offense, regardless of whether the offense itself deals with harm, can have varying degrees of harm

                                                 47
or threatened harm.” Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d at 269. We find that the trial court’s statement that the

offense could have caused additional harm to other people was proper consideration of the degree

of harm suffered by the victim and the community. Obviously, firing a weapon in a suburban area

is inherently dangerous. Although the trial court referenced that danger, the record fails to establish

that the court relied upon this factor in sentencing the defendant. Accordingly, we find that the

trial court did not commit error in sentencing, and that a plain error analysis is inapplicable.

¶ 158                                 2. De Facto Life Sentence

¶ 159 The Illinois Constitution mandates that a sentence must be determined “according to the

seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”

People v. Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶ 26 (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). As stated

earlier, if the sentence imposed by the trial court is within the statutory range, the sentence is

presumptively appropriate. Hampton, 2021 IL App (5th) 170341, ¶ 136.

¶ 160 We note that the original sentence imposed by the court was 75 years, whereas on

resentencing, the court imposed a 65-year sentence—40 years for first degree murder plus 25 years

for the firearm enhancement. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2020). The defendant argues that since

the trial court had the ability to sentence him to natural life (id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii)), the trial court

implicitly did not feel that the defendant deserved a sentence of natural life. Therefore, given the

defendant’s current age, he argues that his sentence is a de facto life sentence because he will not

be eligible for release until he is 93 years of age. As the current life expectancy of an Illinois

prisoner held in a general prison population is 64 years (see People v. Sanders, 2016 IL App (1st)

121732-B, ¶ 26), the defendant contends that the trial court imposed a de facto life sentence, which

failed to consider the goal of rehabilitation.

                                                    48
¶ 161 We have carefully reviewed the transcript of the defendant’s sentencing hearing and find

that the court was well aware of the defendant’s age and his desire to be part of his minor child’s

life. The court also noted the defendant’s difficult upbringing. Yet, there was little else in the way

of mitigation. However, the court found that the defendant’s past criminal and juvenile offenses,

the need for deterrence, the seriousness of the crime, and the impact on the victim’s family all

warranted the sentence imposed. We find that the defendant has not been able to establish that his

65-year sentence was based upon improper facts or law. Williams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759,

¶ 18. As we find no clear error in the trial court’s sentence, we do not reach plain error review.

¶ 162                                 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 163 For the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Champaign County circuit court

denying the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, and we

remand for further proceedings. We affirm the defendant’s sentence.

¶ 164 Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

                                                 49