Court Opinion

ID: 9963592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 19:28:41.405806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:53.366555
License: Public Domain

04/25/2024
                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                                AT KNOXVILLE
                                 Assigned on Briefs April 9, 2024

                              DAVID CARROLL v. TODD FOSTER

                       Appeal from the Chancery Court for Unicoi County
                              No. 8277   Suzanne S. Cook, Judge1

                                 No. E2024-00525-COA-T10B-CV

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed jointly
by David Carroll (“Plaintiff”) and Todd Foster (“Defendant”) (“Petitioners,” collectively),
seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal
appeal filed by Petitioners, and finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery
                        Court Affirmed; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.
CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Shelley S. Breeding, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, David Carroll.

Jason Shade, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Todd Foster.

                                            OPINION

                                           Background

      The underlying proceedings in the Chancery Court for Unicoi County (“the Trial
Court”) concern the sale of real property improved by a residential house. Plaintiff
purchased the property at issue from Defendant. Plaintiff later sued Defendant in the Trial
Court alleging significant structural deficiencies in the home that were not disclosed by
Defendant before the sale, an allegation Defendant denies. The original trial judge,
Chancellor John C. Rambo, did not have a trial setting available to accommodate a trial in

1
    Sitting by interchange.
this matter. Therefore, in January 2024, Chancellor Rambo entered an Order of
Designation providing that the matter would be heard by Washington County Circuit Court
Judge Suzanne S. Cook (“Judge Cook”), sitting by interchange.

        The parties engaged in discovery. Defendant disclosed an expert—structural
engineer Alan Rommes (“Rommes”). Rommes was slated to testify about the structural
integrity of the home. The parties agree that Rommes’ testimony is of central importance
to the case, and that the trial judge’s assessment of his credibility will be key. At one point,
Rommes asked counsel for Defendant who the trial judge was. When told Judge Cook,
Rommes shared that Judge Cook had represented him for approximately seven years in a
slip and fall case when she was a practicing attorney. The representation ended in
December 2021, shortly before Judge Cook took office. On March 26, 2024, counsel for
Defendant informed counsel for Plaintiff about the potential conflict. The parties agreed
that Judge Cook should recuse. On March 28, 2024, Petitioners filed a joint motion for
recusal. Petitioners do not allege actual bias on Judge Cook’s part, but rather that there is
an appearance of impropriety based on her prior representation of Rommes.

       On April 1, 2024, the Trial Court entered an order denying Petitioners’ joint motion
for recusal. Judge Cook held that, contrary to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, Petitioners had failed
to support their motion by affidavit or include a statement that the motion was not filed for
an improper purpose. Moving on to address the merits, Judge Cook found that a reasonable
person would not perceive an appearance of impropriety in her hearing the case
notwithstanding her prior representation of Rommes. The Trial Court stated, in part:

              Thereafter, the joint motion states that Mr. Rommes has been retained
       as an expert structural engineer for Defendant Todd Foster in the present
       matter. The alleged basis for the joint motion is overbroadly stated and/or
       inaccurately insinuated.
              The Court pulled the court files on the matter referred to in Paragraph
       5 to review the same. Suit was filed on November 5, 2014 in the Circuit
       Court for Washington County at Jonesborough, Tennessee. Case. No. 33794
       against Mr. Rommes. The undersigned was retained by a third party to
       defend Mr. Rommes, who as a landlord, was sued by a tenant / former tenant
       for an alleged fall on his property over a piece of pipe in a grassy area. The
       undersigned filed a motion to involuntarily dismiss the suit on January 23,
       2017 pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. Pro. 41.02 alleging plaintiff’s failure to
       prosecute the matter. Plaintiff in turn filed a notice of voluntary dismissal
       without prejudice pursuant to Tenn R. Civ. Pro. 41.01 which was granted by
       order on March 2, 2017.
              The plaintiff refiled suit just shy of one year later on February 8, 2018
       again in the Circuit Court for Washington County, Tennessee at
                                              -2-
      Jonesborough, Case No. 37434. The undersigned was again retained by a
      third party to defend Mr. Rommes on the same allegations. The undersigned
      deposed the plaintiff, after which a motion for summary judgment was filed
      on March l4, 2019. The motion was denied. Then, the plaintiff’s counsel
      unexpectedly passed away, and the ultimate dismissal with prejudice was
      delayed while the deceased attorney’s cases were taken over by other
      counsel. The matter was dismissed with prejudice by order entered on
      December 13, 2021.

(Footnotes omitted). After a discussion of caselaw on recusal, Judge Cook concluded as
follows:

             In the present matter, Mr. Rommes is not a party to this matter. He is
      a witness. But, these cases illustrate that recusal was not required in
      circumstances far more involved than the present situation. The parties have
      not set forth any support for their premise that recusal is warranted in the
      present matter.
             Turning to the present case and motion, the Court has no knowledge
      of the parties in this matter, nor the issues in the litigation other than what
      are contained within the pleadings to date, and thus no opinions nor bias for
      or against either party or any witness(es) in the case. The Court has not heard
      any motions nor made any rulings in this matter. The undersigned has no
      relationship with Mr. Rommes, nor the parties or any other witness in this
      matter. Mr. Rommes is not a party in the present matter, and the suit(s) years
      ago to which he was a party involved different and distinct legal questions,
      including that his expert opinion(s) were not required nor offered in that suit.
             Accordingly, the Joint Motion For Recusal is DENIED on this basis
      too.

(Footnote omitted).

        Thereafter, Petitioners filed a joint motion to alter or amend and renewed motion
for recusal, this time complying with the requirements of Rule 10B. Petitioners also filed
a joint motion to stay proceedings. The Trial Court denied both motions. The Trial Court
stated, in part:

      [T]he alleged factual and legal grounds are identical as to the first motion to
      recuse. What is notable, however, about the Affidavit of Alan Rommes is
      that his affidavit wholly lacks any testimony that the slip and fall case in
      which the undersigned represented him included any expert opinions or
      testimony by him at any point.
                                            -3-
                                             ***

               Despite the Court’s overview of the litigation and docket numbers
       through which the parties could verify the scarcity of activity due to
       plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the matter, including no discovery by plaintiff,
       and the passage of time due to various events in which little activity of
       substance occurred, both parties and their counsel now continue to restate the
       same legal and factual theories as contained within the first motion. As
       previously stated in the Order, the undersigned defended Mr. Rommes
       against an ordinary slip and fall claim, during which spans of time passed in
       each case with little activity or contact due to the plaintiff’s
       uncooperativeness and failure to prosecute her case, as well as a year between
       the first nonsuit and the refiled suit.
               Yet, the parties appear to continue to deliberately overstate the same.
       The parties’ joint motions are prone to hyperbole including statements
       alleging representing Mr. Rommes’ for “almost a decade”. The parties’ and
       /or their counsels’ tenor and approach, including in the first motion, shaded
       representation as continuous and personal in nature, and insinuated the scope
       and type of testimony involved, rather than a straightforward
       acknowledgement of the proceedings. These subsequent motions persist in
       that course of conduct.

(Internal citations omitted). Pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, Petitioners timely filed an
interlocutory appeal as of right from the Trial Court’s order denying recusal. Petitioners
also filed a joint motion to stay proceedings, which this Court granted.

                                         Discussion

       We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for recusal under a de novo standard of
review with no presumption of correctness. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.01. “The party
seeking recusal bears the burden of proof, and ‘any alleged bias must arise from
extrajudicial sources and not from events or observations during litigation of a case.’”
Neamtu v. Neamtu, No. M2019-00409-COA-T10B-CV, 2019 WL 2849432, at *2 (Tenn.
Ct. App. July 2, 2019), no appl. perm. appeal filed (quoting Williams by & through Rezba
v. HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. N., No. W2015-00639-COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 2258172,
at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2015), no appl. perm. appeal filed). As this Court explained
in Neamtu:

       The party seeking recusal bears the burden of proof. Williams, 2015 WL
       2258172, at *5; Cotham v. Cotham, No. W2015-00521-COA-T10B-CV,
                                              -4-
       2015 WL 1517785, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015) (no perm. app.
       filed). “[A] party challenging the impartiality of a judge ‘must come forward
       with some evidence that would prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to
       believe that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Duke
       [v. Duke], 398 S.W.3d [665,] 671 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)] (quoting Eldridge
       v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). When reviewing
       requests for recusal alleging bias, “it is important to keep in mind the
       fundamental protections that the rules of recusal are intended to provide.” In
       re A.J., No. M2014-02287-COA-R3-JV, 2015 WL 6438671, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
       App. Oct. 22, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016). “The law on
       judicial bias is intended ‘to guard against the prejudgment of the rights
       of litigants and to avoid situations in which the litigants might have cause
       to conclude that the court had reached a prejudged conclusion because
       of interest, partiality, or favor.’” Id. (quoting Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d
       798, 803 (Tenn. 2009)).

Neamtu, 2019 WL 2849432, at *3 (quoting In re Samuel P., No. W2016-01592-COA-
T10B-CV, 2016 WL 4547543, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016), no appl. perm. appeal
filed.) (emphasis in original).

        The Trial Court denied Petitioners’ recusal motions on procedural grounds and on
the merits. We first address the Trial Court’s denial of the recusal motions on the merits—
namely, whether Judge Cook’s prior representation of Rommes creates an appearance of
impropriety. In their brief, Petitioners state that Rommes is Defendant’s only engineering
expert. They contend that Judge Cook’s “work with Rommes caused her to form opinions
as to his tendencies to veracity or mendacity. And because the credibility of Rommes will
be a key trial issue, her knowledge of that is problematic.” (Footnote omitted). Petitioners
emphasize that they do not allege actual bias on Judge Cook’s part, but rather that a
reasonable observer might question Judge Cook’s impartiality.

       “[P]reservation of the public’s confidence in judicial neutrality requires not only
that the judge be impartial in fact, but also that the judge be perceived to be impartial.”
Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see also Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (holding that “justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice”). As such, Rule 2.11(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct as set forth in Tenn. Sup.
Ct. R. 10 requires a judge to recuse herself “in any proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” See also Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322,
341 (Tenn. 2011) (noting that recusal is required, even if a judge subjectively believes he
or she can be fair and impartial, whenever “‘the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably
questioned because the appearance of bias is as injurious to the integrity of the judicial
system as actual bias’” (quoting Bean, 280 S.W.3d at 805)).
                                            -5-
       However, “a judge should not decide to recuse unless a recusal is truly called for
under the circumstances.” Rose v. Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. M2007-02368-COA-
R3-CV, 2008 WL 2078056, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2008), no appl. perm. appeal
filed. This is true because “‘[a] judge has as much of a duty not to recuse [herself] absent
a factual basis for doing so as [she] does to step aside when recusal is warranted.’” Id.
(quoting Mass v. McClenahan, No. 93 Civ. 3290 (JSM), 1995 WL 106106, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 9, 1995)). Recusal based upon an asserted appearance of bias or prejudice “is
appropriate only if the facts provide what an objective, knowledgeable member of the
public would find to be a reasonable basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality.” Rose,
2008 WL 2078056, at *2 (quoting In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981)).

        While finding no Tennessee case directly on point, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
has stated that “‘[a] judge’s prior representation of a litigant generally does not require the
judge’s recusal.’” Gilbert v. State, 509 P.3d 928, 933 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting United States
v. Davis, 801 F.App’x 75, 78 (4th Cir. 2020)). The Wyoming court upheld the trial judge’s
decision not to recuse, stating in part: “Mr. Gilbert provided no evidence that Judge
Johnson had any personal knowledge of the current proceedings against him based on her
prior representation of him. Nor did he present any evidence that her prior representation
of him caused her to harbor any personal bias or prejudice against him.” Gilbert, 509 P.3d
at 933. While the present case concerns the trial judge’s prior representation of an expert
witness rather than a party, Gilbert is instructive. In a scenario more akin to the one at bar,
a federal district judge in Alabama declined to recuse despite having previously represented
a witness in the case before him, stating in part:

              The case law surrounding [28 U.S.C.] § 455(a) is generally in
       agreement that a judge’s impartiality would not be reasonably questioned
       simply because the judge’s former client now appears as a witness in an
       unrelated matter over which the judge is presiding. See David v. City and
       County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1996) (recusal not
       required based on trial judge’s representation of police chief more than 20
       years before he appeared before judge as witness in unrelated lawsuit);
       Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 773 F.2d 850, 856-57 (7th Cir. 1985)
       (judge represented witness 25 years ago); M.K. Metals, Inc. v. National Steel
       Corp., 593 F.Supp. 991, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (Shadur, J.) (principal of
       company judge represented over four years ago called as witness); see also
       Chitimacha Tribe [of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc.], 690 F.2d [1157,]
       1166 [(5th Cir. 1982)] (judge represented party in unrelated matter at least
       six years ago). Based on these cases, plus the fact that approximately 30
       years have elapsed since I represented Covin, I am confident that my prior

                                              -6-
          association with Covin would not lead an objective, disinterested, lay
          observer to entertain a significant doubt about my impartiality.

                 In addition to the federal disqualification statutes, I have also
          consulted ethics rules on recusal. According to the Judicial Conference
          Committee on Codes of Conduct:

                  “If a former client of the judge is a party, but the litigation is
                  totally unrelated to the earlier representation, whether recusal
                  is required depends upon such factors as the length of time
                  since the earlier representation ended; the nature, duration, and
                  intensity of the earlier representation; the presence or absence
                  of ongoing personal relationships; etc.”

          Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct, Compendium of
          Selected Opinions § 3.6-5(b) (2005) (emphasis added).

                  Although Covin is a witness in this case, and not a party, I must
          assume that similar factors should be considered. Here, the litigation is of
          course totally unrelated to my representation of Covin before I assumed the
          bench; it has been approximately 30 years since I represented him; my
          representation of Covin was relatively brief and routine; and I do not have,
          nor have I ever had, any personal association with Covin outside of our
          lawyer-client relationship which ended decades ago. Therefore, I conclude
          that I am not prohibited by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
          from hearing a case in which Covin is an expert witness.

                 Accordingly, despite my having once represented a witness, my
          recusal is not warranted in this case.

U.S. v. Lawson, No. 2:06cr173-MHT, 2007 WL 62854, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2007)
(footnotes omitted).2

       While Petitioners are correct in that the appearance of impropriety is sufficient to
require the recusal of a judge and that it is unnecessary to prove actual bias, Petitioners still
must be able to articulate, even if only conceptually, what that alleged appearance of
impropriety is. Implicit in Petitioners’ jointly-made argument for recusal is that Judge
Cook must necessarily appear biased because of her prior representation of Rommes.
Petitioners do not state against whom Judge Cook has the appearance of bias, only that the

2
    We note that the parties in Lawson agreed that recusal was not warranted. 2007 WL 62854, at *1.
                                                    -7-
appearance exists. Thus, Petitioners’ theory is a binary proposition. In one of Petitioners’
hypothetical scenarios, Judge Cook would appear to be predisposed to find Rommes
credible based on her prior representation of him because, during her prior representation
of him, she found him credible. In the other hypothetical scenario, Judge Cook would
appear to be predisposed to discount Rommes’ testimony because she assessed that he
lacked credibility.

        These two hypothetical scenarios leave out an equally viable possibility—that Judge
Cook has no opinion of Rommes one way or another. Indeed, Judge Cook said as much in
her orders declining to recuse. While Judge Cook’s representation of Rommes lasted seven
years and ended only a short time before she took the bench, Judge Cook explained that
there was very little activity in the case. So little activity, according to Judge Cook, that
the plaintiff in that case took no discovery, which must mean that the plaintiff never took
Rommes’ deposition. Petitioners’ position is based on an assumption, which they treat as
fact, that Judge Cook’s “work with Rommes caused her to form opinions as to his
tendencies to veracity or mendacity.” That is not necessarily so. It is entirely plausible
that Judge Cook’s representation of Rommes was unremarkable in nature; that she never
formed any indelible opinions of his credibility; and that she is perfectly able to impartially
assess his credibility as an expert witness in a wholly unrelated case. The prior case was a
slip and fall case in which Rommes was a defendant landlord. The present case concerns
the sale of real property and Rommes would be an expert witness testifying to the structural
integrity of a home. These are quite distinct matters.

       To prevail on their motion to recuse, Petitioners have to show that a person of
ordinary prudence in Judge Cook’s position, with knowledge of all facts known to Judge
Cook, would find a reasonable basis to question her impartiality. See Adams v. Dunavant,
674 S.W.3d 871, 878 (Tenn. 2023). That Judge Cook previously represented Rommes in
an unrelated matter is not an ipso facto basis for her recusal. Petitioners point to no
evidence contradicting Judge Cook’s detailed explanation of her representation of
Rommes, a case which consisted mainly of delays. To be sure, one can visualize a scenario
in which a trial judge’s prior representation of a witness could give rise to the appearance
of impropriety. Here, however, Petitioners have only the duration of the prior
representation and its proximity to when Judge Cook took the bench to go on, both of which
are heavily mitigated by the different subject matter and sporadic activity in the prior case.

       Petitioners say nevertheless that “[t]he trial judge inevitably formed opinions of
Rommes during her seven year representation of him . . . .” We respectfully disagree. That
is supposition on Petitioners’ part. As Judge Cook explained, Petitioners have not even
established that Rommes’ testimony was a factor in the prior case, so his credibility may

                                              -8-
not even have been implicated.3 We find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s denial of
Petitioners’ motions for recusal. Based on our holding regarding the merits of the recusal
motions, the Trial Court’s denial based on various procedural defects is pretermitted as
moot.

                                             Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the motions for
judicial recusal. David Carroll and Todd Foster are taxed equally with the costs of this
appeal, for which execution may issue. The stay on proceedings in the Trial Court is lifted,
and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

                                                ____________________________________
                                                D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

3
  To the extent Petitioners are arguing that the mere fact Judge Cook agreed to defend Rommes in the prior
matter means she must have concluded that the representation met the basic requirements of ethics, that is
a de minimus if not completely irrelevant point as to whether Judge Cook has an opinion of Rommes’
credibility as a witness.
                                                   -9-