Court Opinion

ID: 9773306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:41:50.958094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:51.905241
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s grant of relief from judgment. I would reverse the trial court’s October 28, 2010 Order as contrary to Indiana law establishing paternity.
The majority makes it clear that their holding is premised upon “the power of the trial court to vacate an order that it later concludes was issued under a fraudulent pretext.” Op. p. 149. The trial court here concluded that the paternity affidavit was void as a matter of law because it “cannot be used as a fraudulent vehicle to terminate the parental rights of a biological father.” (Appellant’s App. p. 11). The trial court further concluded that Mother and her counsel’s actions in procuring the October 22, 2008 Order constituted fraud on the court. However, because the paternity affidavit at issue was not properly rescinded and because B.H. was not deprived from fully and fairly establishing his paternity of S.C. by virtue of either the paternity affidavit or the October 22, 2008 Order, I conclude that both of the trial court’s conclusions are clearly erroneous.
I. Paternity Affidavit
Paternity may only be established though a paternity action commenced under I.C. ch. 81-14 or by execution of a paternity affidavit under I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1. See I.C. § 81-14-2-1; In re Paternity of D.L., 938 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ind.Ct. App.2010), aff'd on reh’g, 943 N.E.2d 1284. An “executed paternity affidavit conclusively establishes the man as the legal father of a child without any further proceedings by a court.” I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(n); I.C. § 31-14-7-3.
Statutory and case law provide two ways that a paternity affidavit may be rescinded. First, I.C. § 16 — 37—2—2.1 (i) allows the man who executed a paternity affidavit to file an action requesting a genetic test within sixty days following execution of the paternity affidavit. If the genetic test reveals that the man who signed the paternity affidavit is not the biological father, then the court may set aside the paternity affidavit. I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(0- If more than sixty days have passed, the court may set aside the paternity affidavit only if there is (1) a showing of “fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact existed in the execution of the paternity affidavit” and (2) a court-ordered genetic test requested by the man who signed the paternity affidavit reveals him not to be the biological father. I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1®. Second, although the Indiana Code does not provide for a direct action to disestablish paternity, establishing paternity in another man in effect operates to disestablish paternity, even if paternity is established through a paternity affidavit. In re Paternity of M.M., 889 N.E.2d 846, 848 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008), reh’g denied.
Here, C.C. did not bring an action to contest his paternity of S.C., nor did the trial court order a genetic test. The trial court was therefore not permitted to rescind the paternity affidavit under I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1® or (j). See I.C. § 16-37-2-2.l(i). Further, paternity had not yet been established in B.H. through a genetic test under a separate action, and thus there was no action to disestablish C.C.’s paternity. Although a mother who falsely *155names a man as biological father in a paternity affidavit commits a Class A misdemeanor, the statute does not address rescission of a paternity affidavit under such circumstances. See I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(g). Consequently, I conclude that the trial court erroneously voided the paternity affidavit in light of the statute and relevant case law.
Furthermore, the trial court’s conclusion that B.H.’s rights as biological father are terminated by a fraudulent paternity affidavit is not supported by Indiana law governing the establishment of paternity. After paternity has been established in' one man through a paternity affidavit, another man alleging to be a child’s father may assert his paternity in three ways. The first is through a direct action, which in general must be commenced within two years following the birth of the child. I.C. § 31-14-5-3(b). A man alleging paternity may also bring an indirect action as the child’s next friend. I.C. § 31-14-5-2. Such action must generally be brought before the child’s eighteenth birthday. I.C. § 31 — 14—5—2(b); In re Paternity of K.L.O., 816 N.E.2d 906, 908 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Finally, if requested by an alleged father, a county prosecutor must bring a paternity action under I.C. § 31-14-4-2. Clark v. Kenley, 646 N.E.2d 76, 78 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. Such action is not time barred even if the two-year statute of limitations applicable to a direct action to establish paternity has expired. In re Paternity of N.D.J., 765 N.E.2d 682, 683-84 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).
C.C. and Mother executed the paternity affidavit on July 28, 2008. From that point forward, no further court proceedings were required to establish C.C.’s paternity. I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(n). Although the trial court found the paternity affidavit void based on Mother’s knowledge that there was a reasonable possibility that B.H. was S.C.’s biological father, the paternity affidavit did not preclude B.H. from asserting paternity in his own right. Consequently, the trial court’s conclusion that the paternity affidavit, even if fraudulent, amounted to a termination of a biological father’s rights is clearly erroneous, and the trial court abused its discretion in declaring the paternity affidavit void as a matter of law.
II. Fraud upon the Court
As the majority points out, “[fjraud upon the court is narrowly applied and is limited to the most egregious of circumstances involving the courts.” Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 357. Fraud upon the court may be pursued through three ways under T.R. 60(B): (1) a T.R. 60(B)(3) motion for extrinsic or intrinsic fraud, brought within one year of the judgment; (2) an independent action for extrinsic fraud under T.R. 60(B)(8); and (3) an independent action to invoke the court’s inherent power to grant relief for fraud on the court. Id. at 355-57. No matter which of the three avenues is invoked, fraud upon the court requires a showing that (1) the adverse party engaged in an “unconscionable plan or scheme” that improperly influenced the trial court’s decision and (2) that the moving party was deprived from “fully and fairly presenting his case.” Id. at 357.
The trial court concluded that the October 22, 2008 Order was obtained through a deliberately planned, carefully executed scheme to defraud the court. However, as noted above, fraud upon the court requires not only a showing of a deliberate scheme, but also that the moving party be precluded from fairly and fully presenting his case. Id. Since the October 22, 2008 Order did not establish C.C.’s paternity, nor prevent B.H. from asserting paternity in his own right, the trial court’s conclusion that Mother committed fraud upon the court is clearly erroneous.
*156As discussed above, the trial court’s October 22, 2008 Order did not establish CiC.’s paternity of S.C. by way of a paternity action under I.C. ch. 31-14; rather, C.C.’s paternity was established through the paternity affidavit. I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(n); I.C. § 31-14-7-3. Although the October 22, 2008 Order adopted C.C. and Mother’s joint stipulation of C.C.’s paternity derived from the paternity affidavit, more importantly, the Order was prefaced upon the parties’ arrangements as to S.C.’s custody, support, and parenting time. A trial court may find without a hearing that a man is a child’s biological father based upon a joint stipulation and where such determination has already been made, the court must conduct a hearing to determine “support, custody, and parenting time” issues. I.C. § 31-14-8-1; -10-1. If the parties file a verified written stipulation resolving the foregoing issues or a joint petition to establish paternity, the court is not required to hold a hearing, and incorporates the provisions of the stipulation into its orders thereon. I.C. § 31-14-10-3.
Here, C.C. filed a Verified Petition to Establish Paternity with the Hancock County Court on October 21, 2008. Although its caption purported to establish paternity, C.C.’s Verified Petition to Establish Paternity merely sought acknowl-edgement of his paternity derived from the paternity affidavit. In addition, the trial court was requested to grant Mother sole physical and legal custody and make arrangements for parenting and support. Thus, C.C.’s paternity was established by the paternity affidavit, not by the trial court’s October 22, 2008 Order, which is properly viewed as merely a modification of those custodial and other arrangements specified in the paternity affidavit. See I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(f).
Also as discussed above, at the time of the October 22, 2008 Order, B.H. could still assert his paternity through a direct action, indirect action as S.C.’s next friend, or upon request to the prosecutor. Consequently, no matter if Mother and her counsel engaged in a deliberate scheme to defraud the trial court, B.H. was not precluded from “fully and fairly” presenting a defense, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in granting B.H.’s motion for relief from judgment.
III. Prior Precedent
The majority relies on In re Paternity of Tompkins, 518 N.E.2d 500 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), to support its premise that the “prevention of a full and fair presentation of his case” component of fraud upon the court “cannot be interpreted such that it applies only to those judgments that lie completely beyond the bounds of direct or collateral attack via appeal or other means.” Op. p. 151-52. Although involving both a paternity matter and determination of fraud upon the court, Tompkins is distinguishable on a number of grounds so as to render it incapable of guidance here.
First, contrary to the majority’s summary of Tompkin’s facts, no hospital paternity affidavit was apparently involved in that case. Tompkins instead involved a joint petition to establish paternity and mention of a “paternity affidavit” appears nowhere in the opinion.3 Legislation providing for the hospital paternity affidavit at issue in this case was not enacted until 1989, while Tompkins was decided in 1988.4 Thus, the Tompkins court set aside *157a petition establishing paternity rather than a hospital paternity affidavit doing so. Here, the majority implicitly analogizes C.C.’s Verified Petition to Establish Paternity to the Tompkins joint petition by asserting that C.C.’s petition, filed pro se, “was initiated at least in part to obtain an order legally establishing C.C. as S.C.’s biological father.” Op. p. 151. Despite acknowledging that C.C.’s recitation of paternity derived through the paternity affidavit was only one of the five requests for relief contained in C.C.’s petition, the majority points to this recitation to justify its determination that Mother and her attorney used the trial court to fraudulently procure an order establishing C.C.’s paternity. The majority has elevated form over substance since, as noted above, all that Indiana law requires in such case is that the trial court, without a hearing, approve the parties’ arrangements as to support, custody, and parenting time. See I.C. § 31-14-10-3.
Second, the Tompkins court found that by fraudulently filing a petition for paternity, the child “was prevented from having an actual day in court, and the court was defrauded by use of the fabricated petition.” Id. at 507. As explained previously, however, no one has been denied their day in court. Although the time for him to file a direct action may have expired, B.H. may yet establish paternity as S.C.’s next friend or upon request to the county prosecutor, which, in the latter case, may also be requested by the child, the mother, and any other party designated under I.C. § 31-14-4-2. See In re the Paternity of B.N.C., 822 N.E.2d 616, 620 n. 7 (Ind.Ct. App.2005) (distinguishing Tompkins).
' Third, the equities involved in Tompkins actually favor upholding C.C. as the legal father of S.C. Tompkins involved a mother who gave birth to a son while separated from her second husband. Id. at 502. The mother moved in with her first husband, divorced her second husband, then met and married her third husband. Id. Following her marriage to the third husband, Mother and her first husband “filed a joint petition to establish paternity” and “a judgment was entered declaring” the mother’s first husband as the child’s father. Id. Both the mother and the first husband knew that the first husband was not the child’s biological father. Id. at 506. Mother remained married to her third husband until her death when the child was five years old. Id. at 502. The third husband initiated guardianship proceedings for the child and the child’s guardian sought “to set aside the paternity judgment on the basis of fraud” after determining that mother’s first husband was not the child’s biological father. Id. The court noted that the child’s interests and his “need for stability and psychological support would be served best if he were allowed to remain with his half-sister and [the mother’s third husband], rather than his father as presumed under the paternity judgment.” Id. at 503.
The equities here favor the opposite result. Mother and C.C. both knew B.H. and purchased drugs from him. In 2007, Mother was at B.H.’s house when she learned she was pregnant. By this time, Mother was addicted to methadone, which B.H. had provided to her. Mother ceased contact with B.H. and began taking Subox-one to control her addiction to opiates. Since S.C.’s birth, C.C. has been the only *158father she has known. It is thus arguable that both Mother and S.C.’s interests would be better served without B.H.’s involvement.
Finally, the result in Tompkins is not consistent with this court’s subsequent resolutions of those paternity affidavits obtained expressly or impliedly by fraud. A paternity affidavit knowingly executed falsely by both the mother and father has been upheld against the mother’s subsequent attack. In re H.H., 879 N.E.2d 1175, 1176, 1178 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). A paternity affidavit was set aside only upon establishing the identity of the biological father pursuant to I.C. § 31-14-4-1. Paternity of Davis v. Trensey, 862 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Ind.Ct.App.2007); see also Paternity of H.J.B. ex rel. Sutton v. Boes, 829 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (“We likewise think that it would be appropriate for the trial court to withhold the disestablishment of a deceased father’s paternity until paternity has been established in another man.”). Paternity affidavits have also been upheld in the face of medical evidence to the contrary. See In re K.M., 651 N.E.2d 271, 274-276 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).
IV. Public Policy
The soundness of the majority’s conclusion is further belied by examination of the effect of its decision. S.C. has now been rendered a filius nullius, a “child of no one” — a situation carrying with it “countless detrimental emotional and financial effects.” In re Paternity of E.M.L.G., 863 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citation omitted). No matter if S.C.’s biological father is in fact B.H., C.C. undertook the obligation to support S.C. and B.H. has not. All that has occurred here is the judicially imposed removal of that obligation since B.H. has not been legally recognized as S.C.’s father. This leads to an unjust result whereby B.H. is free to abandon his claim to S.C.’s paternity leaving S.C. with no one obliged to support her. Given B.H.’s dilatory attempts to establish his paternity of S.C. following his initial attempt to secure a DNA test, it is plausible that he may refrain from further proceedings. Although S.C., Mother, or the State may file an action to compel B.H. to submit to DNA testing in accordance with Indiana paternity law, it is improper to deny S.C. support in the interim. That Mother would be reluctant to pursue such course seems obvious given her attempts to flee from B.H. in the past. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court.

. This is not to say that affidavits acknowledging paternity did not exist. See Johnson v. Ross, 405 N.E.2d 569, 572 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (paternity deemed admitted by father’s execution of an "Affidavit of Legitimation” filed with a county board of health).

. See I.C. §§ 16-1-16-15 and 31-6-6.1-9 (1989), both amended by P.L. 185-1989, §§ 6 *157& 9, effective July 1, 1989, to provide for paternity affidavits. Both sections were repealed and either recodified or reconstituted as I.C. §§ 16-37-2-2.1 and 31-14-7-1, respectively, by P.L. 46-1995, § 63 and P.L. 1-1997, § 157, effective July 1, 1997. Further, I.C. § 31-14-7-3, conclusively establishing the man signing the paternity affidavit as the legal father, was enacted by P.L. § 138-2001, § 8, effective July 1, 2001.