Court Opinion

ID: 9526307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:15:30.26846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:26.527282
License: Public Domain

Reilly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s reasoning and its conclusion that all the plaintiffs have standing, that the issues presented should be reviewed by this Court, that the Governor is not immune from an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief when the plaintiffs claim that the Governor is acting outside his constitutional authority, that the Michigan Environmental Protection Foundation is not entitled to relief, and that no costs or attorney fees should be allowed.
However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Governor violated the separation of powers doctrine and exceeded his authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 2 when he *397issued Executive Order 1991-31, by which he created a new Department of Natural Resources in place of the old one, transferred functions among the executive units, and abolished various boards and commissions in the process, and Executive Order 1991-33, by which he created an advisory science board.
My basic disagreement with the majority relates to its interpretation of Const 1963, art 5, § 2 and its view that the enabling legislation, the Executive Organization Act, MCL 16.101 et seq.; MSA 3.29(1) et seq., curtails the legislative power of reorganization granted to the Governor under the second paragraph of § 2.
i
The majority has determined that the Executive Organization Act not only gave effect to the first paragraph of §2, but also applies to the second paragraph of § 2 as well, and effectively supersedes the reorganization powers granted to the Governor under the second paragraph of § 2. To support this position, the majority relies on statements by our Supreme Court in Soap & Detergent Ass’n v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728, 745; 330 NW2d 346 (1982), and McDonald v Schnipke, 380 Mich 14, 26, 155 NW2d 169 (1968), which recognized that art 5, § 2 was not self-executing. While I agree that neither the first paragraph nor the second paragraph of § 2 is self-executing, an examination of the rulings in those cases shows there is no basis for the majority’s position that the enactment of the Executive Organization Act by the Legislature foreclosed any action by the Governor under the second paragraph of § 2.
In McDonald, as in Soap, the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the phrase "shall be *398allocated by law” in the first paragraph of § 2. The Court ruled in both cases that that language was not self-executing, but required implementation by the Legislature within two years of adoption of the constitution, or by the Governor within the third year following adoption if the Legislature did not act, pursuant to the directive of Const 1963, Schedule and Temporary Provisions, § 12. McDonald, supra at 23; Soap, supra at 742. McDonald never discussed the language in the second paragraph of § 2, which relates to reorganization by the Governor after the initial allocation.
On the other hand, Soap discussed the Governor’s authority under the second paragraph of § 2 in depth:
Subsequent to this initial reorganization, the Governor was empowered to make further changes through executive orders which could be disapproved by the Legislature. If not disapproved, the executive orders would have the effect of law. [Soap, supra at 742.]
In Soap, the Court considered whether the second paragraph of § 2 allowed the Governor to transfer rule-making power from one agency to another. The Court applied its two rules of constitutional construction. First, the "Court considered "the sense most obvious to the common understanding,” the one that "reasonable minds, the great mass of people themselves, would give it.” Id. at 745.
We have no doubt that the plain reading of the constitution would indicate to the common understanding that the term "function” inherently includes the accompanying “power” necessary to give life and substance to the "function.” [Id. at 747-748.]
Next, the Court considered the second rule of *399construction, "the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished.” Id. at 745. After examining the record of the Constitutional Convention, the Court determined:
[T]he convention’s purpose . . . was to grant the Governor full legislative power to promote the most efficient possible executive department. Recognition of the broad powers of reorganization granted is found in the provisions for legislative veto of the Governor’s reorganization executive order, not in a diminution of power granted to the Governor. [Emphasis added. Id. at 747.]
Finally, the Court considered the Legislature’s enabling act, the Executive Organization Act, for further support for the logic of the Court’s interpretation. "Clearly, the Legislature considered 'powers’ subsumed within the broader category of 'functions.’ ” Id. at 750. The Court noted:
No specific considerations are provided in the Executive Organization Act for the art 5, §2, activities—the subsequent reallocations by the Governor. Yet in McDonald this Court held that the act was the implementing legislation for the constitutional section. The fair implication of this interpretation is that the Governor, in exercising his powers, should use the transfer mechanism established in the Executive Organization Act, i.e., the provisions regarding Type i through Type m transfers and the relationship between the departments and the transferred agencies.
This is in fact the mechanism and terminology that has been used by the Governor in his executive orders. . . . Thus, rule-making power has repeatedly been transferred by the Governor, as a "function,” within the scope of art 5, § 2. [Emphasis added. Id. at 750-751.]
*400The majority apparently believes that through the quoted language the Supreme Court held that the Executive Organization Act limits the reorganization authority granted to the Governor under the second paragraph of § 2.1 disagree.
In making the quoted statement in Soap, the Court was considering only the transfer of rule-making powers from one agency to another. As noted by the majority, the only issue before the Court was whether the word "functions” in the second paragraph of § 2 would include the word "powers” in the first paragraph of § 2. The Court was not considering an extensive reorganization plan such as the one sought by the Governor under Executive Order 1991-31.
The language of the Court giving deference to the Executive Organization Act simply recognized that when transferring rule-making powers, as the Governor was authorized to do, the Governor should follow the procedure for transferring functions as prescribed in the Executive Organization Act. The Court did not hold, as the majority has, that the Governor’s constitutional legislative powers to reorganize the executive branch may be limited or denied by an act of the Legislature.
To the contrary, the Court in Soap fully considered the doctrine of separation of powers and concluded that where, as in art 5, § 2, the constitution explicitly grants powers of one branch to another, there can be no separation of powers problem.
Article 5, § 2, does not by any means vest "all” or any considerable legislative power in the executive. While it is true that broad legislative power has been delegated to the Governor to effectuate executive reorganization, this power is clearly limited. Three limitations must be emphasized. First, *401the area of executive exercise of legislative power is very limited and specific. Second, the executive branch is not the sole possessor of this power; the Legislature has concurrent power to transfer functions and powers of the executive agencies. Third, the Legislature is specifically granted the power to veto executive reorganization orders before they become law. [Emphasis added. Soap, supra at 752.]
Because the Governor has concurrent legislative power with the Legislature under the second paragraph of § 2 to "make changes in the organization of the executive branch or the assignment of functions among its units,” the Governor may accomplish by executive order in that limited area whatever the Legislature might accomplish by the enactment of a statute. Each has veto power over the other.
Legislative power is the authority to make, alter, amend, and repeal laws. Harsha v Detroit, 261 Mich 586, 590; 246 NW 849 (1933). State agencies created by legislative acts derive all their powers from those legislative acts, and those powers are at all times subject to the control of the Legislature. Such powers, also, in the absence of any constitutional regulation forbidding it, may be enlarged or diminished, extended or curtailed, or withdrawn altogether, as the Legislature may determine. Id. at 591.
The power to amend and repeal legislation, as well as to enact it, is vested in the Legislature, and the Legislature cannot restrict or limit its right to exercise the power of legislation by prescribing modes of procedure for the repeal or amendment of statutes; nor may one Legislature restrict or limit the power of its successors. Atlas v Wayne Co Bd of Auditors, 281 Mich 596, 599; 275 NW 507 (1937); see also Frederick v Presque Isle Co Circuit Judge, 439 Mich 1, 14; 476 NW2d 142 (1991). One. *402Legislature cannot enact irrepealable legislation or limit or restrict its own power, or the power of its successors, with respect to the repeal of statutes; and an act of one Legislature is not binding on, and does not tie the hands of, future Legislatures. Atlas, supra at 599.
Further, the Legislature’s power is subject to the limitations and restrictions imposed by the state constitution. A statute that violates provisions of the state constitution will be declared unconstitutional. Oakland Co Taxpayers’ League v Oakland Co Supervisors, 355 Mich 305, 323; 94 NW2d 875 (1959).
It follows, then, that the Legislature may not limit the broad concurrent legislative power of the Governor in this limited area. Therefore, although the Executive Organization Act was authorized under the first paragraph of § 2, it cannot limit the Governor’s legislative powers to reorganize the executive branch "subsequent to the initial allocation” under the second paragraph of § 2. Having been granted concurrent legislative power to make changes in the organization of the executive branch under the second paragraph of § 2, the Governor may, by means of an executive order, make, alter, amend, and repeal laws that determine the organization or structure of the executive branch or of any of its units. The Governor is given the concurrent legislative power to determine which person or unit within his executive branch shall perform designated functions and to shift responsibility for performing the functions to that person or unit. The Legislature’s remedy, if it disapproves of the proposals in the executive order, is to exercise its veto powers. If the Legislature fails to disapprove, the executive order becomes the law.
Accordingly, the Governor has the power to *403amend or repeal any part of the Executive Organization Act that determines the organization or structure of the executive branch, or any of its units, including the Department of Natural Resources. Further, pursuant to his concurrent legislative power in this limited area, the Governor may effectively amend or repeal by executive order any laws that created the various boards and commissions in the Department of Natural Resources. Because the Department of Natural Resources and the boards and commissions were entities created by statute and were part of the executive organization, they were subject to organizational or structural change by executive order under the second paragraph of § 2. They could be abolished and their functions, including the appointment of the chair of the Department of Natural Resources and the holding of public hearings, could be transferred by executive order.
There is no indication from the language of the executive order, or from the record before us, that the statutorily created authority and functions of these boards and commissions are abolished or eliminated. The plain language of the general provisions of the executive order provides, in pertinent part:
All the statutory authority, powers, duties, functions and responsibilities of the Commission of Natural Resources and of the Department of Natural Resources . . . and of the director of the Department of Natural Resources and of the agencies, boards and commissions contained therein, including the function of budget, procurement and management-related function, and the functions set out more particularly in Part n below relating to natural resources management and the functions set out more particularly in Part in below relating to environmental protection are hereby *404transferred to the director of a new Michigan Department of Natural Resources ....
The transfer of the "statutory authority powers, duties, functions and responsibilities” of these boards and commissions to the director of the new Michigan Department of Natural Resources is a change in departmental organization or structure authorized by the second paragraph of § 2. Although certain boards and commissions have been abolished, their functions remain intact.1
The fact that no Governor has ever attempted such an extensive reorganization by executive order in the past is not a basis for declaring that the power does not exist. Constitutional and statutory authority does not wither by disuse. See Washtenaw Co Road Comm’rs v Public Service Comm, 349 Mich 663; 85 NW2d 134 (1957).
ii
Applying the two rules of construction used in Soap to the present case, it is apparent that the *405Governor was given broad legislative power in the limited area of executive branch reorganization. Although the majority has cited these two rules, it has not applied them.
A
COMMON UNDERSTANDING RULE
A principal rule of constitutional construction is that the people who ratified the Constitution have accepted the words employed in the sense most obvious to the common understanding. Council No 11, AFSCME v Civil Service Comm, 408 Mich 385, 405; 292 NW2d 442 (1980).
The meaning of the words of the second paragraph of Const 1963, art 5, §2, when read in context with the first paragraph of that section, is plain and obvious.
Subsequent to the initial allocation, the governor may make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units which he considers necessary for efficient administration. Where these changes require the force of law, they shall be set forth in executive orders and submitted to the legislature. Thereafter the legislature shall have 60 calendar days of a regular session, or a full regular session if of shorter duration, to disapprove each executive order. Unless disapproved in both houses by a resolution concurred in by a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house, each order shall become effective on a date thereafter to be designated by the governor.
The phrase "subsequent to the initial allocation” means at any time after or following the legislative or gubernatorial allocation of the functions, powers, and duties of the then existing 123 execu*406tive and administrative offices, agencies, and instrumentalities to "not more than 20 principal departments” as mandated by the first paragraph of §2, and directed by Const 1963, Schedule and Temporary Provisions, § 12.
The meaning of the following language,
"the governor may make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units which he considers necessary for efficient administration. Where these changes require the force of law, they shall be set forth in executive orders and submitted to the legislature”
is clear and unambiguous. The Governor is given authority to make any change in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions, if the Governor believes the change is necessary for efficient administration. No restriction is imposed. The change may be minor, or it may be sweeping; it may be made even if it requires a change in the law. The "change” may be to add, alter, or delete, as long as it does not involve the creation of more than twenty departments, the limitation imposed by the first paragraph of § 2, or the abolition of a statutorily created function.2 In this limited area of structuring the executive branch, the Governor stands in the same shoes as the Legislature.
Further, the constitutional grant of authority to the Legislature to promote natural resources under Const 1963, art 4, § 52 is also clear and unam*407biguous.3 The provision imposes a responsibility on the Legislature to preserve our natural resources. The language does not state that the organization and administration of an executive agency, having the responsibility for effectuating legislation protecting our natural resources, is placed under the sole control of the Legislature. Therefore, it is not a limitation on the Governor’s concurrent legislative authority to reorganize the executive branch, including the Department of Natural Resources.
B
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ADOPTION
This "common sense” interpretation is borne out by the application of the "circumstances surrounding the adoption and the purpose to be accomplished” rule of interpretation.
The Constitutional Convention record is replete with discussions of the extent of executive reorganization power given to the Governor after the first three years following the adoption of the constitution has passed, and the initial allocation has been made.4
The legislative delegates on the committee, as *413well as others, argued that the language now contained in the second paragraph of § 2 gave the Governor powers that were too broad, that the Governor was being placed in the same position as the Legislature and could change the laws relating to executive reorganization for political purposes, that the Governor already had sufficient power to submit reorganization plans to the Legislature under the now-repealed 1958 PA 125, MCL 16.1 et seq.; MSA 3.28(1) et seq., and that each incoming Governor could entirely revamp the executive branch. In spite of all these concerns, which were well known and understood by the delegates, the constitutional language in the second paragraph of § 2 giving the Governor concurrent legislative power was adopted.
c
PRESERVATION OF VALIDITY OF ALL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A third rule of constitutional construction has been recognized by our Supreme Court. It provides "that wherever possible an interpretation that does not create constitutional invalidity is preferred to one that does.” Council No 11, supra at 405. If we hold that the Governor may not reorganize the executive branch after a reorganization has been implemented by the Legislature pursuant to the first paragraph of § 2, we will invalidate the second paragraph of § 2. The preferred interpretation, then, would be to recognize that the Governor’s reorganization powers exist after the initial allocation.
Having applied the rules of construction, it is apparent that the second paragraph of § 2 grants *414the Governor concurrent power with the Legislature to completely reorganize the executive branch, not merely to transfer functions from one agency to another. The Governor’s power with respect to reorganization of the executive branch, subject to veto by the Legislature, is akin to that of a chief executive officer of a corporation whose actions are subject to the veto of a board of directors. See Soap, supra at 744. Because the Governor’s legislative powers to reorganize and to transfer functions are concurrent with the legislative powers given to the Legislature in this area, the Governor has the same authority to make changes in the law as does the Legislature, even to amend the Executive Organization Act.
iii
Appellees also argue that the power "to make changes in the organization of the executive branch” does not permit the Governor to abolish the Department of Natural Resources because that phrase in the second paragraph of § 2 was derived from the now-repealed 1958 PA 125, MCL 16.5; MSA 3.28(5), which limited the areas in the organization of the executive branch in which the Governor might propose reorganization. I disagree.
First, although Executive Order 1991-31 states that the existing Department of Natural Resources is abolished, it also, at the same time, establishes a new Department of Natural Resources with a new and different organizational structure to take the place of the one abolished. To argue that the Department of Natural Resources has been abolished by Executive Order 1991-31 when, by that same order, a Department of Natural Resources clearly exists, although with a different structure, places form over substance.
*415Secondly, the constitutional authority granted the Governor under the second paragraph of § 2 is broader than that granted pursuant to 1958 PA 125. Section 5 of that act provided in pertinent part:
Reorganization plans shall relate only to abolishing or combining agencies in the executive branch of the state government or to changing the organization thereof or the assignment of functions thereto, and each such plan shall contain, where appropriate the provisions necessary to effect:
Appellees contend that because the phrase "[Reorganization plans shall relate only to abolishing or combining agencies in the executive branch” was not included in the second paragraph of § 2, the Governor does not have the authority to abolish a department, but may only "change the organization thereof.” This argument must fail because the phrase "change the organization thereof’ refers to the previous language, "agencies in the executive branch.” The language in the second paragraph of §2 is not so limited. It permits the Governor to "change the organization of the executive branch,” not just an agency within the executive branch. See the discussion by constitutional delegates relating to extensive grants of power set forth in footnote 4, supra.
IV
Finally, the Michigan Environmental Protection Foundation argues that Executive Order 1991-33 is invalid because it is an unconstitutional delegation of rule-making power to a board created by the Governor. However, it is clear from the language of the order that the science board is designed to *416act in an advisory capacity only. Executive Order 1991-33 provides that the science board may, at the request of the Governor, review proposed or existing environmental standards, procedures for establishing certain permit or operating license conditions, and staff recommendations for denial or approval of permit and license applications. The board is only authorized to make findings and recommendations to the director of the new Department of Natural Resources, who is responsible for making the final determination. Thus, the role of the board is one that is advisory in nature. See, e.g., Lucas v Wayne Co Bd of Road Comm’rs, 131 Mich App 642, 662; 348 NW2d 660 (1984). The Governor has not delegated decision-making powers to the science board, because the ultimate decisions rest with the department director.
v
I conclude, then, that the Governor’s proposal in Executive Order 1991-31 to restructure the Department of Natural Resources by abolishing the old department and creating a new one, to reassign the functions of the Natural Resources Commission, to appoint and assign responsibilities to the director, to abolish various boards and commissions, and to transfer their functions is a constitutionally valid exercise of the Governor’s legislative authority and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The Legislature’s remedy, if it does not approve, is to exercise its veto power.
I would reverse the rulings of the trial court that the Governor exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority, that Executive Order 1991-31 was in violation of the separation of powers clause of the Michigan Constitution, that the Governor lacked authority to appoint the new head of the *417Natural Resources Commission, and that the Governor was not empowered to abolish commissions and boards whose functions include the holding of public hearings. Further, contrary to the majority, I would uphold the validity of Executive Order 1991-33, creating an investigatory and advisory board.

 The majority has taken the position that public hearings have been effectively abolished by Executive Order 1991-31 because of the inability of the new Department of Natural Resources director and his staff to handle the work load. The issue whether any statutorily created right to a public hearing has been abolished because of lack of resources was not considered or decided by the lower court and should not be resolved by this Court on the record presented.
However, as was previously noted, pursuant to the express language of Executive Order 1991-31, all the statutory authority, powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities of the various boards and commissions have been transferred to the director of the new Department of Natural Resources. Any statutory duty or responsibility to hold a public hearing would be transferred under the language of Executive Order 1991-31.
Furthermore, there can be no "right” to a public hearing where the requirement of the hearing is established by rules or regulations of an individual agency because the agency has the discretion to amend, restrict, modify, or suspend its own rules. International Union of Civil Bights & Social Service Employees v Michigan Civil Service Comm, 57 Mich App 526, 530; 226 NW2d 550 (1975).

 The Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, defines change as:
1. to make different the form, nature, content, future course, etc., of (something). 2. to transform or convert. ... 3. to substitute another or others for; exchange for something else, usually of the same kind.

 Art 4, § 52 provides:
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction.

 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 1842-1843, 1846-1851 sets forth the discussion regarding Mr. Bentley’s proposed amendment of the second paragraph of § 2 that would have allowed legislative veto of an executive order by a majority of either house, rather than both houses:
Mr. Bentley: . . . [W]e now come to the provision of the proposal of the executive branch committee dealing with the question of reorganization after the third year following the adoption of the constitution. As it was explained in the previous 2 paragraphs, we have provided for the initial period of 2 *408years for the legislature to reorganize. We have provided for the governor to act by executive order for the third year. The paragraph which is now under discussion contemplates reorganization actions after the third year.
... In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that we do have, as Chairman Martin outlined, of course, I believe, a 4 year old statute [1958 PA 125] which does provide for the reorganization as carried out by the statute at the present time. . . .
Writing a reorganization plan into the constitution, Mr. Chairman, is admittedly somewhat of a novelty. I believe there is only one other state at the present time that does have a provision in its state constitution for executive reorganization and legislative approval or disapproval. Nevertheless, the members of the committee on executive branch, I believe unanimously, agreed on the concept of writing it into the constitution as a forward looking step permitting more effective and more efficient reorganization over future years of our state government. . . . We did differ as to whether it should be difficult or easy, relatively speaking, for the legislature to approve or disapprove those executive reorganization plans as submitted by the governor.

Mr. Pollock:

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the problem is one of administrative organization and here, it seems to me, the governor is in a much better position to know what is needed within his own administrative structure than anybody else. I think certainly the legislature should have the power to veto any proposal that is not in the public interest, but I do not think that this should be made easy, and I think it is not too difficult by requiring the majority of both houses. Therefore, I am opposed to the Bentley amendment.
Mr. Hutchinson: . . . Instead of giving to the legislature the lawmaking function in these reorganization plans, and to the governor a veto, you are giving to the governor, in effect, the power to make the law and you are according to the legislature a veto.
I call your attention to this again: this is a tremendous political power, this power to reorganize. And I am not willing to agree, offhand, that just because the governor thinks that a particular reorganization is in the best interests of the government, that that necessarily makes it so. I think that the governor also can make some mistakes or be misled, or be influenced by groups or be influenced by considerations, which in the minds of other people, might not be in the best interests *409of the state. Consequently, when you subject the governor’s reorganization to the test of veto by either house, you are simply applying in a reverse sort of arrangement, the same principle which we have always had.
... I think that it would be extremely bad public policy to, in effect, permit the governor to reorganize the executive branch in any way that he saw fit without any real effective legislative veto, and then, at the same time, expect the legislature to come forth and produce the money with which to carry on, perhaps, increased programs and different emphasis upon programs brought about because, as I said yesterday, I can well imagine that a governor may be dissatisfied with the emphasis or the way that a particular program is being carried on in one department and think that he can get a better treatment of it somewhere else, it can be expanded somewhere else; perhaps the head of another department is more friendly with the governor and they can expand the program to the political benefit of the governor, and the legislature will be expected to provide the money, and at the same time you have effectively denied the legislature any positive or effective role in asserting what it thinks to be the best interests of the state of Michigan. After all, the legislature, too, is elected by the people, is answerable to the people, not statewide but by constituency, and for those reasons, I think that the Bentley amendment is a good one, that at least it won’t be as bad a system as it would be if you, in effect, denied to the legislature the power of veto.

Mr. Pollock:

I think the history of administrative reorganizations and the failure to have administrative reorganization clearly points to the excellence of this device, and the only point at issue is whether you want it to be very easy for the legislature to knock down a proposal which, as Mr. Hutchinson—I think, with a great deal of exaggeration—indicates that it is a fearful exercise of power by the governor, it is the kind of administrative authority which any general manager of a business would insist upon having, if he couldn’t rearrange his own administrative structure to promote the efficiency of the organization, he wouldn’t want to be general manager. It is, of course, a matter of power; but the question of power, and calling it a traditional way of doing things doesn’t make a bad institution good. And the fact simply is, as I see it, either you want to promote flexibility in administrative structure, and thus to permit the abolition of useless agencies, the combining of others, or you want to make it so difficult that, in fact, it is not going to be accomplished.
It is true that we have a statute in Michigan, one of the few states that have such a statute, permitting this power by the governor. But again, the experience of our legislature in the exercise of their veto over the governor’s power gives nobody any encouragement that it will ever get anywhere if it remains *410as easy as that, and that is why the committee, in its wisdom, I think, provided that it would take a veto by both houses ....

Mr. Binkowski:

But I am not criticizing the legislature for not acting in executive reorganization. However, I think basically the reason for having this form is to place the responsibility with the executive, who should know all about these administrative agencies, and to allow him to initiate the programs, and therefore present them to the legislature. I think the reason for executive reorganization is simply economy and efficiency in government.
Now, I think all of you who have been in government know that we have a certain number of bureaucrats. We have people who build empires. They don’t want these empires consolidated or eliminated. If you are going to go ahead, as we have done, and give the executive the responsibility of lowering appropriations, then I think you have to give him the responsibility in this area of his executive departments, so that he can eliminate or consolidate in the best interest of the state. . . .
A third point I would like to call to your attention is that the legislature does appropriate funds, so that if they are unhappy with any extension of power, so called power by the governor, if the governor should create a new agency which they are dissatisfied with, they can effectively reduce the effectiveness of that organization. For these reasons, I oppose the amendment.

Mr. Durst:

. . . What I am really saying here is, we should at least consider the desirability of allowing the governor as free a hand as possible to keep this thing in order. . . .
Mr. Wanger: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is quite clear that efficiency and not politics should be the guide and the motivation behind these executive reorganizations. It is also clear that we need to have some kind of a check upon them, as the committee in its proposal recommends when it allows the legislature to have any voice in this regard.
Now, it seems to me that the merit of the proposed amendment is this: you see, under the proposal as set forth in the committee report, if the governor or his party have strong control of either house, or perhaps just some of the committees thereof, he could ram through a politically motivated reorganization.
It is true that there are reasons on the other side, but let us remember this very simple fact, that reorganization can be *411used for political purposes and the temptation may always be there, to some extent, to make such use of reorganization. I, therefore, suggest that, as a practical matter of political management and efficient management, considered side by side together, as they must, it would be best to adopt this amendment to get around that difficulty.
Mr. DeVries: ... I think a more important reason for not getting administrative reorganization in the legislature is in the tendency to trade among legislative supporters for various agencies, and to prevent their favorite agencies from being consolidated or reorganized with others. And this always effectively blocks reorganization, particularly when it is easy to get a majority vote. Therefore, I would urge the defeat of the Bentley amendment. It seems to me if you try to depend on the legislature to accomplish rational administrative reorganization you are never going to get it done.

Mr. Hutchinson:

... I have been told by the members of the governor’s committee working on these reorganization plans that, as time goes on, and they attempt to get into more major fields, their task becomes infinitely greater and more difficult, and the likelihood of achievement is much harder. That isn’t because people are objecting to economy or anything of the sort. At the base of this thing is what I said before, a fear—and a genuine fear—of the concentration of political power. If you are going to concentrate—and it is a tremendous political powér, even though Dr. Pollock thinks I exaggerate; I do not believe I do, I feel very strongly about this, and I want to, as best I can, convey to the delegates here the seriousness of vesting in a single man, who is the head of a political party, this tremendous political power to completely reorganize his executive branch of government to suit his political purposes. I am not here to say that that would customarily happen, but I can envision that it might. It was such kinds of concentration of political power in the hands of people overseas in Europe which completely destroyed liberty. I don’t think that the people of Michigan would let it go that far, knowingly, but I would hate to see you write into our state constitution a system where constitutionally such strange things could be brought about under the guise of governmental reorganization.
Mr. Brake: ... It isn’t a matter of theory with me. I can remember, in the senate, when the governor proposed and the legislature followed him in the complete abolition of a department and its reorganization for the one and only purpose of getting members of one party off the board and putting on the *412members of the other. I wouldn’t go along, and for a time I was regarded as an outlaw in my party, and I think Mr. Chase will remember that I was the only member of the party that wouldn’t stand for it. Oh, it is used, it has been used and it will be used again.
Mr. Martin: Judge Leibrand, this involves 2 processes. The preceding 2 paragraphs, as has been commented on by some of the delegates, deal with this problem of initial reorganization. After that 3 year period is completed, in which first the legislature, and then if the legislature does not do it, the governor has a chance to work out a general reorganization plan, then you have, into the future and for the future, a continuing reorganization proposal which is different from that as to this initial reorganization, and this continuing reorganization authority, which rests both in the governor and the legislature. After this initial reorganization is completed, then the governor may propose plans and the legislature is given the veto power on those plans as is provided here. And it is that later process of reorganization proposals coming from time to time, from year to year or 10 years to 10 years, that we are dealing with here. . . .
Mr. Leibrand: What I am trying to get at, Mr. Martin is this: could each successive or subsequent governor reorganize these departments according to his personal interests or the interests of his party, and would these successive reorganizations stand unless vetoed by a majority of the members elect of both houses of the legislature? Would that go on into the future every time we have a new governor?
Mr. Martin: Certainly, any governor can propose a plan of reorganization subject to legislative veto.
Mr. Leibrand: By a majority of the members of both houses?
Mr. Martin: That is correct.

Mr. Madar:

Frankly, I say this: that I can’t see why you would want to take out of the hands of the executive branch the setting up of the administration of your government. Businessmen operate or try to operate a good businesslike administration. Politicians, on the other hand, want these things in the hands of the legislators where they can manipulate and maneuver. I say this: for the sake of the people of the state of Michigan, give the administrative end the right to do this and if it isn’t done properly by the governors, believe me, those people who elected them will also throw them out. Let’s get good business administration in the state of Michigan. [Emphasis added.]
*413The Bentley amendment was subsequently defeated, and the language of the second paragraph of § 2 was adopted.