Court Opinion

ID: 9831169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:52:20.47974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:32.026266
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees complain somewhat vehemently of slight inaccuracies in the original opinion of this court relating to certain immaterial matters of fact, as follows:
*9021. It was said in the original opinion that Mary J. Luhy, in her suit in the district court of Duval county, described the lands there involved “in detail as they were described in her deed of trust, but alleging in general terms that some of them were embraced in” Jim Hogg county; whereas, she in fact described the lands as all having been originally situated in Starr county, but now situated in Jim Hogg county, and asked to be allowed to make proof of the fact.
2. It was said in the original opinion that in the Duval county district court Francisco Daborde alleged that “some of the lands were ‘perhaps’ embraced in Jim Hogg county.” Appellees challenge the accuracy of this statement. The precise allegation of Daborde on this point was that the lands were situated “perhaps partly in the since created county of Jim Hogg, in the state of Texas, as the facts may be.”
3. It was said in the original opinion that the sheriff of Starr county sold all the lands for the “exact amount of the judgment, $62,-934.85, plus $85 costs.” Appellees insist that the record does not show foe payment by appellants of $85 in costs. It is true, we find upon careful inspection that the record does not show the payment of the sum of $85 costs; it merely shows the payment of $62,934.85 “and all costs.” It was alleged by appellants that the costs amounted to $85, but whether or not this allegation was accurate was not shown; it being neither disputed nor proven.
4. It was said in the opinion that it was conceded that appellants had paid $2,600 taxes on all the 25,000 acres of land involved. This amount was alleged by appellant to have been paid, but no showinar was made as to the accuracy of this allegation. It was conceded that appellants had paid $259.34 taxes on the 9,000 acres recovered by appel-lees. The fact of the payment of $2,600 on the whole of the 25,000 acres was neither admitted nor challenged.
5. It was said in the opinion that the deeds of trust described the lands as all lying in Starr county. A part of one tract, which was not in controversy here, was described as lying partly in Starr and partly in Zapata county. The fact was purposely omitted throughout the opinion, because it could not possibly have any bearing upon the case, and references ¿o and discussion of it would merely incumber and confuse the decision.
6. It was said in the original opinion that the agreed statement of facts showed that the “Das Cuevitas grant lies also in a solid body, of which 7,000 acres are situated in Jim Hogg county, and the balance in Starr county.” Appellees say this statement “is an entire misapprehension of the record.” The agreed statement, on this point, recites that “the Las Cuevitas grant lies in a solid body, the great bulk thereof being- situated in Jim Hogg county, but a part being situated in Starr county, the dividing Tine between said counties crossing said * * * tract, so that a part of said tract is situated in Jim Hogg county, and a part in Starr county.” The statement that 7,000 acres of this grant lay in Jim Hogg county was contained in appellees’ trial petition and brief, and was not challenged; but no affirmative agreement seems to have been made thereon.
7.Appellees urge that it was said in the original opinion that appellants set up the facts very fully, and claimed title to all the.lands, and in the alternative for the return of the purchase money. Appellees claim this statement is “not correct” and is “misleading.” The pleadings and contentions of the parties were fully and correctly stated in the original opinion, however, and we will not disturb that statement. We should state here, however, that while we are quite clear that by pleading the facts appellants placed upon appellees the burden of offering to do equity, it is well, in view of another trial, for both parties to re-plead their respective cases, so that the trial court may there adjust all the equities between the parties.
With these corrections and ’explanations, appellees’ motion for rehearing is overruled.