Court Opinion

ID: 9666657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:24:07.342035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:31.692830
License: Public Domain

D. Franklin Arey, III, Judge, concurring. I agree that the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission’s finding that appellee sustained a compensable neck injury. I also agree that the temporary total disability claim should be remanded. Because the majority pulls an estoppel argument out of thin air, and does so in a fashion that favors one party over the other, I must concur. Nothing before us justifies an implication of estoppel. Nothing in the Commission’s opinion suggests that the appellant failed to assert a claim or right, and that the appellee relied on that failure to his detriment. Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Spencer, 222 Ark. 710, 262 S.W.2d 290 (1953) (noting that where one stands by and fails to assert a claim, he cannot later assert it against another who relied on his silence). Nothing in the Commission’s opinion suggests that appellant told appellee to seek medical care, and then refused to pay. Compare Southern Hospitalities v. Britain, 54 Ark. App. 318, 925 S.W.2d 810 (1996) (finding employer liable to pay for medical treatment that it directed the employee to obtain, on a theory of estoppel). The majority puts the cart before the horse: it implies estoppel, without any factual findings by the Commission to support the implication, and remands to the Commission for it to supply the missing findings. Further, the majority’s implication favors the appellee over the appellant. Without any basis for believing the Commission relied on estoppel, it implies a theory which prevents further argument by the appellant concerning appellee’s healing period.1 The Commission’s opinion could just as easily have been read to suggest that the appellant consistently exercised its right not to pay for medical expenses until the appellee was determined to have suffered a compensable injury. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11—9—102(5)(F)(i) (Repl. 1996); Southern Hospitalities, 54 Ark. App. at 322, 925 S.W.2d at 812. Hopefully, on remand the Commission will realize that it is not required to utilize estoppel without giving both sides a chance to argue its applicability. I would, nonetheless, remand this matter. In my opinion, substantial evidence does not support the Commission’s finding that the appellee’s healing period ended on the same day appellee returned to work. On these facts, I believe fair-minded persons would conclude that this was a happy coincidence, and nothing more; I do not believe fair-minded persons would reach the same conclusion as the Commission. However, we are allowed to remand even if we do not find substantial evidence of record. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-711 (b)(4). Therefore, I concur.   We should not assume that the appellant’s refusal to pay for further medical care somehow stymied the presentation of appellee’s claim. For example, the Commission, in its discretion, could have ordered a medical examination of appellee. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ ll-9-511(b), -811.