Court Opinion

ID: 9400014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 06:09:30.755159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:41.611782
License: Public Domain

Modified and Affirmed and Opinion Filed May 31, 2023

                                       In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00321-CR

                    KAMRON MICHAEL BELL, Appellant
                                  V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F20-76596-M

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Nowell, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Goldstein
      Kamron Michael Bell appeals his murder conviction. Following appellant’s

guilty plea before the jury, the jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment

at forty years’ confinement and a $1000 fine. In two issues, appellant argues the

jury charge at the guilt/innocence stage of trial was contradictory as to what evidence

the jury could consider and incomprehensible because words were omitted from the

section entitled “Evidentiary Instructions.” In a single cross-point, the State asks

that the judgment be reformed to show the jury made a deadly weapon finding. As

modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
      In November 2020, appellant was charged by indictment with murder.

Specifically, the indictment alleged that, on September 13, 2020, appellant

intentionally and knowingly caused the death of David Eugene Young by shooting

him with a firearm. At trial on April 4, 2022, after the jury was sworn, the prosecutor

read the indictment to the jury, and appellant entered a guilty plea. The State offered

into evidence appellant’s judicial confession, and the trial court admitted it, over no

objection. The State then rested “in the guilt/innocence portion of the trial,” and

defense counsel also rested. The trial court then read the court’s charge to the jury.

      Among other things, the jury charge instructed the jury to find appellant

“guilty as charged in the indictment.” Inexplicably, the charge then set out the law

of murder; applied the law of murder to the facts of the case; provided certain

evidentiary instructions, including the following incomplete instruction: “As to any

question to which an objection was”; and twice in one sentence instructed the jury

to only consider evidence it received from the witness stand. The charge concluded

with the sentence, “The Defendant has pleaded guilty, and you are hereby instructed

to find the defendant guilty of the charge of murder.” Appellant did not object to

the jury charge. The jury found appellant guilty of murder and explicitly found that

he used a deadly weapon, a firearm, during the commission of the offense.

Following a punishment hearing, the jury assessed punishment at forty years’

confinement and a $1000 fine. This appeal followed.

                                         –2–
       In two issues, appellant argues the jury charge at the guilt/innocence stage of

trial was contradictory as to what evidence the jury could consider and

incomprehensible because words were omitted from the section entitled

“Evidentiary Instructions.”    Specifically, appellant complains of the charge’s

instruction to only consider evidence it received from the witness stand and inclusion

of the incomplete sentence, “As to any question to which an objection was.”

Appellant complains these errors confused the jury, resulted in a charge that “failed

to distinctly set forth the law applicable to the case,” and violated appellant’s right

to a fair trial.

       In felony cases, a plea of guilty before the jury admits the existence of all

elements necessary to establish guilt and, in such cases, the introduction of evidence

by the State is only to enable the jury to intelligently determine punishment. See

Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Ex parte Williams,

703 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Williams v. State, 674 S.W.2d 315,

318 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (noting that no evidence need be entered when

appellant pleads guilty before jury). In such cases, the plea of guilty is conclusive

as to the defendant’s guilt and there is no question of the sufficiency of the evidence

on appeal. See Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (op.

on reh’g); Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d at 678; Brinson v. State, 570 S.W.2d 937,

938–39 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Specifically,

                                         –3–
      the plea of guilty before a jury essentially becomes a trial on
      punishment since entry of a plea of guilty before a jury establishes a
      defendant’s guilt except where evidence demonstrates his innocence.
      (Citations omitted). The introduction of evidence is not to determine
      guilt but is to enable the jury to intelligently exercise discretion in
      determining the appropriate punishment.

Luna v State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Williams, 674

S.W.2d at 318.)

      When the defendant fails to object to the charge, we will not reverse for charge

error unless the record shows egregious harm to the defendant. Ngo v. State, 175

S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Errors that result in egregious harm

are “those that affect the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable

right, vitally affect the defensive theory, or make a case for conviction clearly and

significantly more persuasive.” Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011). “Egregious harm is a high and difficult standard to meet, and such a

determination must be borne out by the trial record.” Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d

429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Neither party bears

the burden to show harm or lack thereof. Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The appellate court must examine the relevant portions of

the entire record to determine whether appellant suffered actual harm, as opposed to

theoretical harm, as a result of the error. Id. When the evidence is overwhelming,

it is “less likely the jury was influenced by an erroneous jury instruction than by the

                                         –4–
weight of the probative evidence itself.” Johnson v. State, 981 S.W.2d 759, 763

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998).

      Here, the jury charge at guilt/innocence contained errors: excess language,

inapplicable instructions, and a sentence fragment. However, because appellant

failed to object to these errors at trial, he must show that he was egregiously harmed

by these errors. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743–44. The record is clear that appellant

entered a guilty plea before the jury and raised no defensive theory at the

guilt/innocence stage. Appellant’s guilty plea was conclusive as to his guilt. See Ex

parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d at 792. Moreover, the charge twice instructed the jury to

find appellant guilty. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we

conclude appellant has failed to show that he was egregiously harmed. See Taylor,

332 S.W.3d at 490. We overrule appellant’s first and second issues.

      In a single cross-point, the State asks that the judgment be reformed to show

the jury made a deadly weapon finding. This Court has the power to correct and

reform the judgment of the court below to make the record speak the truth when it

has the necessary data and information to do so, or make any appropriate order as

the law and the nature of the case may require. Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526,

529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). The jury’s verdict in this case shows the

jury explicitly found that appellant used a deadly weapon, a firearm, during the

commission of the offense. Accordingly, we sustain the State’s cross-issue and

modify the judgment in this case to include a deadly weapon finding. See id.

                                         –5–
      As reformed, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                          /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
220321f.u05                               BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
Do Not Publish                            JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

                                       –6–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

KAMRON MICHAEL BELL,                          On Appeal from the 194th Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. F20-76596-M.
No. 05-22-00321-CR          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Goldstein. Justices Nowell and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Breedlove participating.

     Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:
     Under the heading “Findings on Deadly Weapon,” “N/A” is deleted,
     and “YES, A FIREARM” is substituted.
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 31st day of May, 2023.

                                        –7–