Court Opinion

ID: 9532810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:25:00.962153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:50.712994
License: Public Domain

Finley, C. J.
(dissenting) — I cannot agree with what seems to be the position of the majority — that the plaintiff favored driver as a matter of law could not have been guilty of contributory negligence. In Owens v. Kuro (1960) (56 Wn. (2d) 564, 573, note 5, 354 P. (2d) 696) 2 Blash-field, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice (Perm, ed.) 298, 303, § 1028, was quoted as follows:
“ ‘The assumption [that other cars will observe traffic laws] is not unlimited, but is subject to the same restrictions as are other permissible assumptions as to the observance of the common-law and statutory duties of another driver, so that, in crossing in front of a vehicle coming from an intersecting street, the driver having the right of *214way cannot close his eyes to threatening danger, relying on the presumption that the other driver will use reasonable care and prudence and obey the traffic laws. The rule that a motorist has a right to assume that other users of the highway will not drive negligently and will obey stop signs applies only in favor of those whose conduct measures up to the standard of due care. If a driver does not notice a motorist approaching an intersection from the left, he cannot assert that he thought the motorist from the left would give him the right of way.’ ”
The reasoning of the foregoing quotation convinces me that in the instant case plaintiff’s failure to observe the defendant’s automobile until immediately before the collision raised a question of contributory negligence which should have been submitted to the jury. Consequently, I dissent.