Court Opinion

ID: 9723172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:05:02.410242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.279838
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting in part). The plaintiff was suspended from her teaching position for failing to report for work. She claimed her absence was due to medical problems. Her request to have a doctor subpoenaed to appear at the hearing before the defendant school board was denied. The *95board’s decision to discharge her was reversed by the teacher’s tenure commission on the basis that she was denied due process of the law because "the law was violated by the board in failing to hear the appellant’s [plaintiffs] request to subpoena an important witness”. The tenure commission also awarded the plaintiff all salary lost.
The circuit court and the Court of Appeals agreed that the board’s refusal to subpoena the doctor was error requiring a hqw hearing. However, the circuit court vacated the tenure commission’s ruling and remanded for further proceeding before the board without requiring the payment of back salary. The Court of Appeals found "that the tenure commission’s decision was proper and should have been upheld in its entirety. By express statutory language, a suspended teacher is entitled to be paid until such time as an entirely legal and proper hearing is held”. 72 Mich App 717, 726-727; 250 NW2d 504 (1976).
The plaintiffs status, after reversal by the tenure commission, was that of a suspended teacher. The school board’s decision to discharge had been reversed, but she had not been reinstated. She was entitled to salary during this period of suspension under MCLA 38.103; MSA 15.2003:
"On the filing of charges in accordance with this section, the controlling board may suspend the accused teacher from active performance of duty until a decision is rendered by the controlling board, but the teacher’s salary shall continue during such suspension: Provided, That if the decision of the controlling board is appealed and the tenure commission reverses the decision of the controlling board, the teacher shall be entitled to all salary lost as a result of such suspension.”
The statute states that the board may suspend a *96teacher until it renders a decision and that the teacher’s salary shall continue during "such suspension”. The proviso in the statute states that if the tenure commission reverses the board, the teacher is entitled to all salary lost "as a result of such suspension”. The statute refers to both the period (1) before a board decision and (2) that preceding and following a reversal of a board decision as suspensions. The plain meaning of the language used in the statute requires the teacher to be paid until there is a proper hearing. There was not a proper hearing.
The fact that the board decision was reversed on procedural grounds does not affect the teacher’s status. Until a board decision following a proper hearing is made, the teacher is entitled to salary. The statute does not distinguish between reversals based on procedural errors and those predicated on substantive errors. We decline to read such a distinction into the statute. Such an interpretation would conflict with the policy of strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the teachers’ tenure act and commit a substantial injustice to the integrity of the act.
A teacher’s attempt to prevail on the substantive issues may be stymied by improper procedures in the hearing before the board. Procedural errors delay the final resolution of cases and impose financial hardships on teachers left in limbo for substantial periods of time. The hardship to teachers without salaries during these periods of suspension is only partially remedied by later awards of back pay. Compliance with the requirements of the teachers’ tenure act is, therefore, essential.
We decide only that until there is a proper hearing the status of the plaintiff was that of a suspended teacher and by the plain meaning of *97the statute, MCLA 38.103; MSA 15.2003, she was entitled to her salary.
We concur in the affirmance of the order remanding the case for a new hearing, but dissent from the decision to deny payment of salary until the plaintiff prevails on the merits.
Blair Moody, Jr., J., concurred with Williams, J.