Court Opinion

ID: 9910977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 22:01:39.544418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:19.679193
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
WALKER, HAYES, and MORRIS
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
Vv.
Staff Sergeant DANIEL D. HERMAN
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20220248

Headquarters, III Corps and Fort Cavazos
Scott Z. Hughes, Military Judge
Colonel Runo C. Richardson, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Major Mitchell D. Herniak, JA (argued);! Jonathan F. Potter,
Esquire; Major Mitchell D. Herniak, JA (on brief and reply brief).

For Appellee: Captain Stewart A. Miller, JA (argued); Colonel Christopher B.
Burgess, JA; Major Chase C. Cleveland, JA; Captain Stewart A. Miller, JA (on
brief).

15 December 2023

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

HAYES, Judge:

Appellant asserts two errors before this Court, both of which merit discussion
and one of which merits relief.2, The government concedes the military judge applied
the incorrect maximum punishment and we take action to correct that error in our
decretal paragraph. However, as discussed below, we find the military judge did not

' The court heard oral argument on 7 November 2023 at Syracuse University College
of Law as part of the court’s outreach program.

* We have given full and fair consideration to the matters personally raised by
appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), and
find they merit neither discussion nor relief.
HERMAN — ARMY 20220248

abuse his discretion when he denied a defense motion to suppress appellant’s
statements and derivative evidence and that any errors made in arriving at his ruling
were harmless.

BACKGROUND

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant,
contrary to his pleas, of six specifications of wrongful broadcast of intimate visual
images and one specification of false official statement in violation of Articles 117a
and 107, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 917a and 907.
The same day, the military judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, a
total of thirteen months of confinement,’ and reduction to the grade of E-1.

This case involved the sending of intimate images through digital
communications. Ms. was a 19-year-old junior soldier, previously in a romantic
relationship with the then 31-year-old appellant, and when she ended the
relationship upon his assignment to Kuwait, appellant broadcast intimate images of
her over social media. Ms. Miireported the offense to her local United States Army
Criminal Investigation Command (CID) office.

On 29 May 2020, CID interviewed appellant in Kuwait. The interview and
appellant’s time in CID custody lasted just over fourteen hours. At the outset,
Special Agent (SA) advised appellant of his rights under Article 31(b), UCMJ,
and Appellant waived his Article 31(b) rights in writing. Appellant was cooperative
with CID for the vast majority of his time in custody. Appellant provided consent to
search three digital devices: (1) an iPhone 7 Plus; (2) a Samsung tablet; and (3) a
Dell Inspiron computer. However, appellant denied owning a second cell phone.

Over eight hours into the interview, appellant was being interviewed by a
second CID agent, sAm when a third CID agent, SA WBentered the room. For
approximately twenty-one minutes, sA interrogate pellant. About four
minutes into SA Ss interrogation, in response to SA fil challenging appellant’s
assertion that he had been truthful about his ownership of an iPad, appellant made
two statements, “Imma have to [invoke]/[evoke]* on this one” and “[w]hen this is
over Imma have to pay somebody because this right here, no, this is definitely not
fair.” Without any acknowledgment of either statement, SA {Mj moved on from the
iPad discussion to a general discussion about appellant’s apparent culpability. She

3 Appellant was sentenced to thirteen months for each specification, and all
sentences to confinement ran concurrently.

* While it is difficult to ascertain if appellant said “evoke” or “invoke,” we are
satisfied that what he meant was “invoke” and will treat the statement accordingly.
HERMAN — ARMY 20220248

continued to question appellant for another seventeen minutes. Appellant was
subsequently questioned off and on by multiple agents for almost six more hours.

After appellant’s alleged invocation, upon being informed CID had seized a
second phone from appellant’s quarters and would be searching the second phone,
appellant said, “you can search it.” When he was asked to provide the passcode for
the phone, he provided the passcode. After receiving appellant’s passcode, CID
searched appellant’s phone. The search produced several images that formed the
basis for additional charges and specifications.

At trial, the defense filed a timely motion to suppress appellant’s post-
invocation statements and evidence derived from those statements. In a written
ruling, the military judge denied the motion. Add ing appellant’s invocation, the
military judge found appellant’s statements to SA were equivocal and ambiguous.
In arriving at this conclusion, the military judge “considered the Accused’s actions
and statements to CID throughout the course of the entire interrogation.”

On the dates appellant committed the offenses under Article 117a, UCMJ,
between 21 March 2020 and 24 May 2020, there was no enumerated maximum
punishment for Article 117a. The Executive Order establishing the maximum
punishment for a violation of Article 117a, UCMJ as a dishonorable discharge,
confinement for two years, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances, did not come
into effect until 26 January 2022. Exec. Order No. 14,062, 87 Fed. Reg. 4763 (Jan.
26, 2022). Trial defense counsel argued the maximum confinement for each
specification should be that for a general disorder: four months confinement and
forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for four months.

LAW AND DISCUSSION
Motion to Suppress

Appellant has challenged the military judge’s ruling denying the motion to
suppress all statements made after the alleged invocation of his Fifth Amendment
rights and all derivative evidence therefrom. Appellant argues the alleged
invocation was unequivocal and all subsequent statements were secured in violation
of his Fifth Amendment rights and were therefore involuntary.

A military judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, and the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the party
that prevailed at trial. United States v. Mitchell, 76 M.J. 413, 417 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
However, “‘[t]he military judge’s determination that a confession is voluntary is a
question of law, requiring independent, i.e., de novo, review.’” United States v.
Burnside, 74 M.J. 783, 789 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (citing United States v.
Ford, 51 M.J. 445, 451 (C.A.A.F. 1999)).
HERMAN — ARMY 20220248

The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads, “No person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself... .” U.S.
CONST. amend. V, cl. 3. A communication is entitled to the privilege where it is
“testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court,
542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). An accused’s communication is testimonial when it
“explicitly or implicitly, relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] information.”
Doe vy. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).

When an individual is in custody and subject to interrogation, the individual
must be advised he has the right to remain silent and he has the right to have an
attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71
(1966). During questioning by law enforcement, “if the individual ‘indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease.’” United States v. Traum, 60 M.J. 226, 230 (C.A.A.F.
2004) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473); see also United States v. Pruett, ARMY
20180368, 2019 CCA LEXIS 468, at *3 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 25 Nov. 2019)
(summ. disp.). If an accused exercises his right to “cut off questioning,” that right
must be “scrupulously honored.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). To
invoke the right to remain silent, “no particular words or actions are required,”
however, “[the] invocation must be unequivocal before all questioning must stop.”
Traum, 60 M.J. at 230 (citing United States v. Sager, 36 M.J 137, 145 (C.M.A.
1992)). A partial invocation as to a particular question or subject area has been held
to be equivocal and does not foreclose questioning on other topics. Id.

An unequivocal or unambiguous invocation requires immediate cessation of
questioning under Military Rule of Evidence [Mil. R. Evid.] 305(c)(4). This court
has previously found “[t]he term ‘equivocal’ means ‘having different significations
equally appropriate or plausible; capable of double interpretation; ambiguous.’”
United States v. Rittenhouse, 62 M.J. 509, 511 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting
Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1425 (11th Cir. 1994)). Whether an accused
has invoked his or her right to remain silent is an “objective inquiry.” Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010). The appropriate analysis is whether an
invocation is “‘sufficiently clear[] that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney’ or to
remain silent.” United States v. Delarosa, 67 M.J. 318, 324 (C.A.A.F. 2009)
(quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).

In evaluating ambiguity, “[c]ourts may consider the circumstances ‘preceding,
as well as concurrent with, the invocation in the course of addressing the issue of
ambiguity.’” Pruett, 2019 CCA LEXIS 468, at *4 (quoting Delarosa, 67 M.J. at
324). However, in evaluating ambiguity, courts may not consider subsequent
responses. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1984) (in holding a court may not
consider subsequent statements to determine a valid waiver of the right to counsel,
the Court stated, “[u]sing an accused’s subsequent responses to cast doubt on the
HERMAN — ARMY 20220248

adequacy of the initial request itself is even more intolerable.”) (emphasis in
original).

Pursuant to Mil. R. Evid. 304(a), “[i]f the accused makes a timely motion or
objection under this rule, an involuntary statement from the accused, or any
evidence derived therefrom, is inadmissible at trial except as provided in subdivision
(e).” Military Rule of Evidence 304(a)(1)(A) defines “involuntary statement” as “a
statement obtained in violation of the self-incrimination privilege or Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 31, or
through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.” “‘[A]n
individual may claim the most favorable privilege provided the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, Article 31, or these rules.’” Mitchell, 76 M.J. at 419
(emphasis in original) (quoting Mil. R. Evid. 301(a)).

In the instant case, appellant was in a custodial interrogation. However, he
was provided his Article 31(b) rights and executed a valid waiver. Appellant
concedes his statement was voluntary up until the point he allegedly invoked his
right to remain silent. Appellant argues his invocation was unambiguous and
unequivocal, requiring law enforcement to scrupulously honor the invocation and
cease all questioning. Appellee argues appellant’s invocation attempt was
ambiguous and equivocal, and that CID was not required to clarify it.

Conducting our objective inquiry, we find it is not sufficiently clear that a
reasonable police officer in these circumstances would understand appellant’s
statement to be a request for an attorney or to remain silent. At best, appellant
appears to invoke his right to remain silent when challenged about whether he had
been truthful about his ownership of an iPad when he said “Imma have to ‘invoke’
on this one” (emphasis added) followed immediately by “When this is over Imma
have to pay somebody because this right here, no, this is definitely not fair.”
(emphasis added). The interviewer then proceeded to a different line of questioning.
To the extent appellant’s first statement was an invocation of his right to remain
silent, it was apparently a limited invocation as to that particular subject area, and
SA [honored that limited invocation by moving on from the iPad discussion. At
the very least, it was ambiguous. As appellant concedes his second statement was at
best an indication of a future intent to retain an attorney after the interview was
complete, it also did not require a cessation of questioning. Appellant’s subsequent
statements therefore continued to be voluntary.

This finding of voluntariness is readily ascertained from the circumstances
preceding, and concurrent with, the alleged invocation. As such, the military judge
did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to suppress the statements made
after the alleged invocation. To the extent the military judge relied on any
information subsequent to the alleged invocation in making his ruling, our de novo
review of the voluntariness of the statement renders the error harmless.
HERMAN — ARMY 20220248

As the continued questioning was authorized, we need not reach the
lawfulness of the consent to search the second phone, the request for the passcode,
or the inevitable discovery of the contents of the phone absent the request for the
passcode. The consent, the passcode, and the contents of the phone were all
lawfully obtained as a result of appellant’s voluntary statements.

Maximum Punishment

The consideration of the maximum punishment authorized for an offense is a
question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Beaty, 70 M.J. 39, 41
(C.A.A.F. 2011). Although courts review a “military judge’s sentencing
determination under an abuse of discretion standard ... where a military judge’s
decision was influenced by an erroneous view of the law, that decision constitutes
an abuse of discretion.” Id.

““The Constitution forbids the passage of ex post facto laws, a category that
includes [e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.’” United States v.
Busch, 75 M.J. 87, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (quoting Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S.
530, 532 (2013)) (emphasis added).

Rule for Courts-Martial 1003(c)(1)(B) addresses the maximum punishment for
offenses not listed in Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial. The first part of that
rule calls for determining whether the offense not listed is “included in or closely
related to” a listed offense. R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(B)(i). The second part of the rule
states, “[a]n offense not listed in Part IV and not included in or closely related to
any offense listed therein is punishable as authorized by the United States Code, or
as authorized by custom of the service.” R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(B)(ii).

In looking at the definition of “custom of the service,” our superior court has
stated, “we find that the ‘custom of the service,’ as used in R.C.M.
1003(c)(1)(B)Gi), simply means the penalty authorized for those offenses which
have traditionally been used in the military justice system to charge service members
under the same or similar factual circumstances.” Busch, 75 M.J. at 93.

In addressing Article 134, UCMJ, offenses that do not fall into any category
of R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(B), our superior court has set the maximum punishment at four
months confinement and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for four months.
Beaty, 70 M.J. at 45; See also United States v. Holdman, ARMY 20190040, 2020
CCA LEXIS 102, *8-9 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 31 Mar. 2020) (mem. op.) (reducing
appellant’s calculated maximum confinement by four months after finding a novel
Article 134 offense that used almost identical elements to Article 117a was factually
insufficient).
HERMAN —- ARMY 20220248

The offense of wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images
was enacted in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. Pub.
L. No. 115-91, §533, 131 Stat. 1389-90 (2017). The President did not promulgate a
maximum punishment until 26 January 2022. Exec. Order No. 14,062, 87 Fed. Reg.
4763 (Jan. 26, 2022)

Here, appellant’s sentence for the Article 117a offenses violates the ex post
facto clause because application of Exec. Order 14,062 inflicted a greater
punishment on appellant than the law annexed to the crime when committed.
Busch, 75 M.J. at 88. At the time of the alleged offenses, a period spanning 21
March 2020 to 24 May 2020, an enumerated maximum punishment for Article
117a did not exist. The offense under Article 117a is neither included nor closely
related to any other UCMJ offense under R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(B)(i). Furthermore,
under R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(B)(ii), there is no analogous federal offense, nor an offense
that has traditionally been used to charge servicemembers under the same or
factually similar circumstances. Consequently, the appropriate maximum
punishment was a sentence of four months confinement and forfeiture of two-thirds
pay per month for four months. Beaty, 70 M.J. at 40.

CONCLUSION

On consideration of the entire record the findings of guilty are AFFIRMED.
The thirteen-month sentence to confinement for the Article 107 violation is
AFFIRMED. Upon reassessment of the remainder of the sentence due to the
erroneous calculation of the maximum punishment for the Article 117a offenses, we
are confident the military judge would have sentenced appellant to four months
confinement for each Article 117a specification, to run concurrently.> We are also
confident the military judge would still have imposed a reduction to the grade of E-1
and bad-conduct discharge.°®

> We assess the impacted specifications in accordance with the principles articulated
by our superior court in United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 307-08 (C.M.A. 1986)
and United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013). Based on our
experience as judges on this court, we are familiar with the relatively new but
frequently charged Article 117a offense such that we may reliably determine what
sentence appellant would have received in light of the four-month maximum period
of confinement for a general disorder.

® As the military judge ordered the sentences to confinement for each Article 117a
violation to run concurrently to the thirteen-month sentence to confinement for the
Article 107 violation, and because we have reassessed the remainder of the sentence
and found the reduction and discharge appropriate, the error in calculating the
maximum punishment did not prejudice the appellant — his sentence to confinement
remains thirteen months.
HERMAN — ARMY 20220248

Senior Judge WALKER and Judge MORRIS concur.

FOR THE COURT:

Clerk of Court