Court Opinion

ID: 9770214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:54:34.449634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:15.813519
License: Public Domain

PEEPLES, Justice,
concurring.
The respondent trial court has ruled that the physician-patient privilege “does not permit the physician to qualify or be designated as an expert witness against the patient.” The court therefore ordered that Humana cannot present the testimony of Dr. Spebar, who had treated the plaintiff in the past. Thus the court has created a brand-new privilege for a patient to prevent her former physicians from testifying against her in a personal injury suit. The plaintiff’s motion to strike the expert witness characterized the privilege as a “fiduciary duty” to the patient not to be employed as an expert witness against the patient’s interests.1 Unlike the party seeking discovery in Mutter v. Wood, 744 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.1988), Humana did not ask for a broad authorization requiring the plaintiff to waive the physician-patient privilege completely, even concerning irrelevant matters.
*547This court has not held that the trial court’s ruling was correct but that Humana has not met the procedural requirements for mandamus. I do not agree with the court’s reasoning, but I concur in the result because the appellate courts simply cannot entertain requests for mandamus relief every time a trial judge incorrectly rules that a witness can or cannot testify. To hold otherwise would swell the flood of mandamus filings in the appellate courts, which already threaten to swamp us. Regular appellate review of witness-exclusion rulings before trial would also disrupt trial court docket management to an unacceptable degree.
It is tempting to grant mandamus review of all clear abuses of discretion, such as the creation of a new privilege unsupported by the rules. But mandamus is not available — even where the trial court has abused its discretion — if there is an adequate remedy by appeal. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.1987); State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.1984); State ex rel Pettit v. Thurmond, 516 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1974). If we were to grant relief in this case, could we articulate a principled basis for preventing a rash of filings involving less clear rulings in other cases? Would we entertain a petition for mandamus when the trial court ruled on a motion in limine (and committed a clear abuse of discretion) on Friday before a trial on Monday?
The law allows significant mandamus review of discovery rulings, but that is not true of witness-exclusion decisions. It is true that some courts have reviewed pretrial witness-exclusion decisions more devastating than the one before us. See, e.g., Mother Frances Hosp. v. Coats, 796 S.W.2d 566, 571-72 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding) (exclusion of eight experts and limitation of testimony of eight other experts “emasculated” defense of lawsuit and was reviewable); Williams v. Crier, 734 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, orig. proceeding) (reviewing by mandamus the pre-trial exclusion of three experts). Another court has refused to do so. Forscan Corp. v. Touchy, 743 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, orig. proceeding) (exclusion of two experts not reviewable by mandamus because the right to offer the evidence by bill of exceptions is an adequate remedy at law); see also Williams v. Crier, 734 S.W.2d at 193-94 (Enoch, C.J., dissenting) (right to make record and appeal is an adequate remedy at law).
Here, as the court emphasizes, Humana has not sought to depose the doctor. I recognize that a deposition is not a prerequisite to presenting the witness at trial. But if Humana had tried to depose the doctor and the trial court had denied its request, this would be an entirely different case.2 When a court denies a party discovery of the only evidence that could show error in the appellate court, an appeal after trial is not an adequate remedy at law and mandamus will lie if it is otherwise proper. See Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 576 (Tex.1984). Without Dr. Spebar’s deposition, Humana has only a hearsay letter, which would not be admissible as a bill of exceptions if the court or the plaintiff insists on a question-and-answer offer, as the rules permit them to do. See TEX.R.CIV. EVID. 103(b). And even a letter stipulated to be admissible would not be nearly as persuasive as real testimony.
The law is wise to limit mandamus review of witness-exclusion rulings because often there is a possibility that the matter will work itself out in the trial court, as there is here. Humana seeks only to have Dr. Spebar review the records of others and give his opinions. In light of Jampole, it is possible that the trial court will permit the deposition, which Humana has not yet sought to take, and Humana might then be able to show that his testimony can be offered without offering his own records or any communications between him and the plaintiff, which is all that the physician-patient privilege protects. See TEX.R.CIV. EVID. 509(b) (privilege covers communications and records only). In addition, the court might reconsider its decision about *548Dr. Spebar’s records and his communications with the plaintiff in view of TEX.R. CIV.EVID. 509(d)(4) (privilege does not apply to communications or records that are relevant to the patient’s claim concerning her condition or the defendant’s defense of that claim). For all we know the court might reconsider its decision about the consent form that has been signed and apparently never withdrawn. See TEX.R.CIV. EVID. 509(d)(2) and 509(e)(2). There is of course no right to prevent anyone from being a witness unless such a right is specified in the constitution, a statute, or a rule. TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 501(4).
It is true that as the record now stands, Humana’s designation of the witness has been stricken, but even that ruling might be changed at the time of trial. This is a real possibility under Bexar County’s central docket. For example, the deposition might be taken and the testimony could be so powerful, and its exclusion therefore so probably harmful, that the judge who ultimately tries this case and whose name will be on the judgment might not stand by the earlier ruling of a different judge that Dr. Spebar cannot testify, instead continuing the case until the doctor could be timely designated.
We do not know whether any of this will happen, and for purposes of mandamus jurisdiction, it does not matter. The law does not permit pre-trial mandamus review of witness-exclusion rulings, except in extreme cases of complete emasculation, such as Mother Frances Hosp. v. Coats, 796 S.W.2d at 571-572 (exclusion of eight experts and limitation of eight others). Trial courts make many decisions before trial, some correct and some incorrect. If we too freely grant mandamus review of the incorrect ones involving witness designation, that will enable, and perhaps encourage, litigants to seek review of other rulings that may be correct. That much pre-trial intervention is too great a price to pay for occasional correction of pre-trial error.
For these reasons, I concur in the result.

. The motion says that plaintiff has "in no way released the doctors [Dr. Spebar and another doctor not involved in this mandamus proceeding] from their fiduciary duties to their patients [not] to be employed as expert witnesses against the patient’s interest.”

. In view of its creation of a new privilege, in all likelihood the trial court would deny Huma-na the right to depose Dr. Spebar, but the request has not been made.