Court Opinion

ID: 9710313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:06:38.356274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:38.727494
License: Public Domain

*1088STEVENS, J„
Dissenting:
¶ 1 I agree with the Majority that Officer Monaghan requested Acosta’s consent during an investigative detention that was lawful. I disagree, however, with its determination that Acosta’s consent was coerced. A review of all competing factors pertinent to the voluntariness inquiry leads to the conclusion that Acosta’s consent was not the product of an overborne will but was, instead, a deliberative election. The Majority fails to consider all pertinent competing interests, and makes its voluntariness determination on factors proving only that Acosta was subject to a lawful seizure at the time he consented. A voluntary consent may occur during a lawful seizure, as was the case here. Accordingly, I dissent.
¶ 2 It is well-settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The applicable'procedure for determining the validity of consensual searches incident to traffic stops entails assessing the constitutional validity of the citizen-police encounter giving rise to the consent, and, ultimately, the volun-tariness of consent. Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. at 82, 757 A.2d at 903 (2000). Where the encounter is lawful, voluntariness becomes the sole focus. Id.
¶ 3 “The F.ourth Amendment9 test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and ‘voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.’” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996). A consent is “voluntary” when it is the “product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice — not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne — under the totality of the circumstances.” See, generally, Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40, 117 S.Ct. 417; Mack, 568 Pa. at 334, 796 A.2d at 970 (quoting Strickler, 563 Pa. at 79, 757 A.2d at 901). In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne, á court considers the factual circumstances surrounding consent, assesses the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluates the legal significance of how the accused reacted. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The inquiry is ultimately objective, and employs a reasonable person test presupposing an innocent person. See Strickler, supra (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)). Nevertheless, factors aiding the inquiry into the “psychological impact” on the citizen include subjective matters such as the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the citizen (including age, intelligence, and capacity to exercise free will). Id.
¶ 4 Assessing the “circumstances surrounding consent” requires us to review *1089aspects of the citizen-police interaction such as: the length and location of the detention; use of the detention itself as leverage in obtaining consent; the use of physical restraints; use of aggressive behavior or any use of language or tone by the officer that was not commensurate with the circumstances; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether the questioning was repetitive and prolonged; use of subtle or artful questioning; and the claim of lawful authority to conduct a search even if consent is withheld. Id.; Mack, supra; Strickler, supra.
¶ 5 No one factor in the voluntariness inquiry is controlling. Strickler, supra. “The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041. So it is that while a citizen’s subjective knowledge of the right to refuse to consent is a factor to be taken into account, such knowledge is not a prerequisite to establishing voluntary consent. Strickler, 563 Pa. at 79, 757 A.2d at 901 (citing Schneckloth, supra). In fact, there is not even a presumption of invalidity or the assignment of extra weight to when a citizen consents without explicit notification that he or she was free to refuse to cooperate. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2113, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002). Neither is a defendant’s consent involuntary simply because it is given at a time when the defendant knows the search will produce evidence of a crime. See United States v. Bennett, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13472, *26 (E.D.Pa.2000) (heightened sense of coercion that a guilty citizen feels at the notion of a consent search not relevant to the voluntariness inquiry).
¶ 6 Both the lower court and the Majority largely overlook such factors, and instead give determinative weight to the fact that the detention had not reached an endpoint, that driving papers were not returned, and that several officers were present with their cruisers’ overhead lights flashing. In so doing, the Májority Opinion stands for the proposition that insurmountable coercion exists in conditions commonplace to a lawful, roadside investigative detention.10 Our jurisprudence has *1090never adopted such a standard. Compare Commonwealth v. Lopez, 415 Pa.Super. 252, 609 A.2d 177 (1992) (invalidating consent, even if given voluntarily, because officer’s withholding of driving papers and request to search car on grounds unrelated to the legitimate initial stop and unsupported by reasonable suspicion constituted an unlawful second detention mandating application of exclusionary rule).11 The conditions of a traffic stop are indisputably more burdensome to a citizen than are the conditions of a “mere or consensual encounter,” but the fact that an ongoing investigative detention has been effected neither precludes an officer from asking a citizen for consent nor invalidates the consent given. Rather, pursuant to the totality of circumstances test, we look to the quality and manner of the investigative detention and its objective effect on the citizen to determine if consent was given voluntarily.
¶ 7 The facts before us show that the manner in Which Officer Monaghan conducted the investigative detention favors a finding of voluntariness. Not only were the detention and the request for consent lawfully supported by reasonable suspicion,12 they were carried out in a manner commensurate with the cooperative role Acosta adopted once he was stopped. That is, no tactics were employed to draw consent from Acosta. Officer Monaghan never used or threatened to use physical force apart from making the stop; never bore down on Acosta with an aggressive or disapproving voice or body language, or with a claim that he believed Acosta was running drugs; never removed the detention from the open-air, easily-visible roadside location; never used or threatened to use protracted detention to fatigue or frustrate Acosta; never conditioned Acosta’s innocence or ability to leave on the granting of consent; and never attempted to leverage consent by claiming he could obtain authority to search the vehicle if consent was withheld. The questions asked of Acosta were tailored to the facts at hand, and were plain and direct. There is no suggestion that Officer Monaghan engaged *1091in subtleties or trickery. Indeed, Officer Monaghan asked but once for Acosta’s consent to a search, and Acosta agreed.
¶ 8 Acosta’s subjective attributes likewise weigh in favor of crediting his choice to consent as a voluntary one. Acosta is an adult man of ostensibly sound mind, normal intelligence, and the capacity for exercising free will. Though Spanish is Acosta’s first language, he demonstrated sufficient proficiency in English for this Court to conclude that the exchange between himself and Officer Monaghan was knowing and meaningful. Acosta answered all questions put to him, including those that required more than “yes” or “no” answers. When asked about discrepancies in his documentation, he did not sit in silent confusion or claim not to understand, he articulated explanations. Acosta’s claim of possessing a Minnesota Driver’s License and his presentation of a department store ID card also suggested enough adeptness at using and understanding the English language to obtain services. Even Acosta’s apparently extensive navigation of highways across multiple state lines suggests a comfort with English language directional signs.
¶ 9 Additionally, to the degree that the case involves a stress-inducing show of authority not uncustomary to a traffic stop, application of the reasonable person standard should dispel the notion that such a show of authority controls the outcome of the voluntariness inquiry. For example, a reasonable person would not expect an officer to return his driving papers and send him on his way when questions regarding the validity of such papers and authorization to operate the vehicle remain unresolved. So too would a reasonable person understand the safety initiative of activating overhead lights to alert other drivers to the presence of a roadside stop. As for the presence of two other officers at the scene, they did not actively participate in the pre-consent investigation of Acosta but, instead, took the neutral position of standing nearby. See Strickler, supra (presence of back-up officer not significant where he was not an active participant).13
¶ 10 Finally, Acosta was not expressly apprised of his right to withhold consent, but such explicit notification need not be given to validate a consent, See Strickler, supra. Fair application of the reasonable person standard, moreover, requires us to find that a sincere request for consent made during a seizure at least tends to imply the right to refuse consent. The very fact that a sincere request for consent was made in this case must be factored in the voluntariness inquiry. As the United States Supreme Court stated:
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police Officers act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion.
Drayton, 122 S.Ct. at 2114. Here, the inference that Acosta retained the right to refuse consent is supported by the officer’s transition from making directives to making a request.
*1092¶ 11 Indeed, Officer Monaghan directed Acosta to pull over, directed him to produce papers, directed him to explain discrepancies in the information, and directed him out of the vehicle. Officer Monaghan never asked for Acosta’s permission to conduct this phase of the interaction, and so it should have been clear to Acosta that his cooperation to that point was mandatory, not discretionary. But then, the exchange undergoes a marked difference in form. Officer Monaghan does not direct Acosta to yield to a vehicle search, he asks for Acosta’s permission to conduct a search. Such a transition in the dialogue between officer and citizen, free of any coercion extraneous to a lawful investigative detention, alerts the citizen that the investigation is no longer compulsory but may continue only on his consent. The act of a sincere request thus infuses due process rights into the police/citizen encounter, and itself militates in favor of finding any consent given in response to be voluntary.
¶ 12 Therefore, the manner of the lawful investigation and Acosta’s reaction thereto belies the Majority’s opinion that Acosta’s consent was coerced. Aided by neither overt nor subtle tactic identified as pertinent under established voluntariness inquiry, the officer issued a genuine request to conduct a consent search, and Acosta readily agreed. Indeed, as it ultimately took a drug-sniffing dog to discover what three officers could not, Acosta’s consent would appear to reflect a confidence that the drugs were securely hidden rather than a purportedly overborne will from brief police questioning. Regardless of Acosta’s subjective state of mind, however, the objective realities of the case do not evoke an involuntary consent.
¶ 13 To find otherwise simply because consent was given during a traffic stop performed before two other officers and activated police lights is a failure to accommodate society’s legitimate need14 for consent searches amid reasonable suspicion. To be sure, our courts have accommodated competing interests with the totality-of-circumstances balancing test to find consents voluntary under circumstances far more coercive than were present here. See Mack, supra (holding that Miranda warnings and time to consider explicit advisement of right to withhold consent offset extremely coercive conditions, which included: arrest of woman in airport terminal by one officer; confiscation of luggage; private office, closed-door interrogation conducted by sergeant and two law enforcement officers, with two airline employees also present; statement to woman that officers believed she had drugs in luggage; and an attempt to leverage consent with claim of authority to obtain warrant and override a refusal to consent).15
*1093¶ 14 Accordingly, I would find Acosta’s consent voluntary, and would reverse the order of the suppression court.16

. There is no support for the Majority’s suggestion that Article I, § 8 requires a more stringent test for the voluntariness of a consent than does the Fourth Amendment. Though under certain circumstances Article I, § 8 of our constitution confers greater protections than its federal counterpart, “[the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's] recent decision in [Commonwealth v.] Cleckley, [558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427 (1999),] lays the groundwork for alignment of Pennsylvania law with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence [with respect to the issue of voluntariness of consent]. See Cleckley, 558 Pa. at 528, 738 A.2d at 433 (endorsing the Schneckloth test for voluntariness in the context of a request for consent to search made during the course of a mere encounter).” Strickler, 563 Pa. at 80, 757 A.2d at 902. See also Commonwealth v. Mack, 568 Pa. 329, 334, 796 A.2d 967, 970 (2002) ("The test for the validity of a consent to search is the same for both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, i.e., that the consent is given voluntarily.”).

. Most troubling about the lower court and Majority opinions is that their application of the voluntariness test is limited to the four factors that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used in Strickler, 563 Pa. at 76-77, 757 A.2d at 900-901, to determine whether Strickler was subject to a seizure at the time of his consent. See Majority Opinion at 13 n. 4. Only after applying said factors to find "that the request to search did not rise to a second or subsequent seizure under the Fourth Amendment” did the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "proceed to a voluntariness assessment.” Strickler, 563 Pa. at 78, 757 A.2d at 901.
Both seizure and voluntariness inquiries rely on totality-of-circumstances tests, but the danger of equating the first-step inquiry meant to determine whether a seizure occurred with the second-step inquiry meant to determine whether consent was voluntary is clear — the voluntariness of a consent would be recognized only where a “mere encounter” between citizen and police is first established. Some cases do present significant overlap in the factors used to determine seizure and voluntariness, especially “mere encounter” cases like Strickler, which logically holds that having reason to believe you can simply walk away from a police officer also means having reason to believe you can refuse a consent search. However, our jurisprudence has never limited the possibility of voluntary consent to the first type of interaction between police and citizenry. See, e.g., Mack, supra, (recognizing voluntary consent to a search during lawful custodial interrogation). The concurrence of lawful seizure and voluntary consent is clearly quite possible.
Because the present case involves a legitimate investigative detention, the application of Strickler’s "mere encounter” analysis to *1090our facts has limited value. In investigative detention cases, the voluntariness inquiry cannot turn simply on whether a citizen has lost reason to believe he is free to go. It must, instead, turn on whether the circumstances of the seizure give reason to believe he cannot refuse an officer’s request for consent to search. In other words, the inquiry asks if the citizen has reason to feel he retains the power to restrict the investigation from areas that apparently are to remain private without consent even though he has no reason to believe he can terminate the investigation altogether. In conducting this inquiry, courts are to make an accommodation of all competing societal and individual interests, as is done infra. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224-225, 93 S.Ct. 2041.

. In the dicta of Commonwealth v. Hoak, 700 A.2d 1263 (Pa.Super.1997) (en banc), we expanded Lopez beyond its actual holding with the passage "[t]his court has held [citizens] cannot consent [during a traffic stop] while the officer holds their identification.” Hoak, 700 A.2d at 1267 (citation to Lopez omitted). In fact, the holding in Lopez was limited to where an officer unlawfully retains a driver's identification despite having accomplished the purpose of the traffic stop. Lopez relies on the principle that unconstitutional seizures taint subsequent consents. Therefore, we held in Lopez that where an officer commits an unconstitutional seizure by withholding valid identification and detaining a driver for further questioning unrelated to the initial stop and unsupported by independent reasonable suspicion, any subsequent consent is fruit of the poisonous tree that must be suppressed. Clearly, we never advocated a per se preclusion of voluntary consent whenever an officer holds driving papers.

. See footnote 8, infra, and its reliance on United States v. Bennett, supra, for the conclusion that Acosta fit a drug courier profile warranting its own investigative detention and justifying the request to conduct a consent search for drugs.

. Furthermore, to find that the presence of back-up patrol necessarily undermines volun-tariness runs afoul of the goal to accommodate competing societal and individual interests, as society’s interest in ensuring the safety of investigating officers is of great import. Indeed, the Majority Opinion will force police officers who possess reasonable suspicion to make the Hobson's choice of either placing themselves at risk to preserve the vital option of requesting consent or ensuring their own safety to the detriment of that option.

. Consent searches may prevent false accusation of, and further embarrassment to, the innocent, and enable the apprehension of the guilty where no other investigative tool is available. "In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041.

. Mack is instructive because it shows how offsetting factors may correspond to heightened coercive factors to avoid an overborne will. Where, as here, coercive factors identified as critical in Mack — an arrest, backroom interrogation, assertion of belief that detainee is guilty, and, especially, the attempt to leverage consent through a claim of authority to override refusal — are absent, it only follows that the balancing test requires less in the way of offsetting measures. A well-settled example of this point is the requirement that Miranda warnings be read before the commencement of a custodial interrogation, but need not be read before commencement of questioning in an investigative detention. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. 2041 *1093("Miranda, of course, did not reach investigative questioning of a person not in custody, which is most directly analogous to the situation of a consent search, and it assuredly did not indicate that such questioning ought to be deemed inherently coercive.”) (citation omitted).

. At the conclusion of its opinion, the Majority doubts the constitutional validity of the investigation into drug possession. If the Majority believes that the detention of Acosta exceeded its legitimate scope and duration prior to the request for consent, then the Majority should have confined its review to the predicate seizure analysis, deemed the seizure of Acosta unconstitutional, and applied the exclusionary rule to suppress the fruits of a tainted consent search. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (request for consent unrelated in its scope to the purpose of ongoing detention, and not independently supported by reasonable suspicion, is its own unlawful detention to which exclusionary rule applies to suppress any consent derived therefrom); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 563 Pa. 82, 757 A.2d 903 (2000) (mandating exclusion of consent even if voluntarily given); Lopez, supra.
In any event, the record belies the Majority's opinion in this regard, as it shows that the consent search was based on reasonable suspicion, which had evolved during the course of a completely lawful investigative detention, that Acosta was a drug courier.
The established facts of this case are that Acosta was seen to exhibit unusually nervous behavior upon spotting the police cruiser in that he "changed the manner in which he was driving by straightening up, putting both hands on the steering wheel and refusing to look at the officer.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/01, at 1 (emphasis added). Moreover, Acosta was driving a van with a suspended tag, he was unable to produce proper personal identification, and he gave the officer registration and insurance cards bearing another person’s name.
Officer Monaghan’s suspicions about Acosta’s authority over the van were thus properly aroused, and his questions concerning from where the van came and to where Acosta was taking it were quite justified. When Acosta's response described a route known to Officer Monaghan as one commonly used by drug runners, Officer Monaghan had before him a sum of evidence that allowed for the reasonable suspicion that Acosta was a drug courier. See Bennett, supra, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13472, *26 (E.D.Pa.2000) (person’s unusually nervous behavior, carrying luggage he appeared unlikely to own, arriving from a known drug source city, and having no identification, satisfied drug courier profile which justified a Terry stop and subsequent request for a consent search) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (holding that government need not make greater showing under reasonable suspicion standard where case involves drug courier profiling)). See also Freeman, supra, (acknowledging that evidence of nervous behavior accompanied by other indication of criminal activity, such as taking route heavily traveled by drug dealers, is pertinent factor in determining whether investigative detention was justified); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 741 A.2d 813 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal granted, 563 Pa. 675, 759 A.2d 922 (2000) (nervous driver, who produces papers under name different from name on driver’s license, along with presence of open laundry detergent box in back seat consistent with common method of masking drug odors, establish reasonable suspicion of drugs in vehicle).
Even if Officer Monaghan's initial purpose in executing the traffic stop was to issue a citation for expired tags, he was unable to accomplish such purpose when Acosta could not produce proof of valid interest in the van. This fact distinguishes the present case from holdings cited by the Majority, such as Lopez, supra, which turn on officers having extended lawful detentions beyond their legitimate endpoints. Moreover, even if the purpose of the detention increased in scope, it did so only after objective and lawfully-discovered circumstances first created reason to suspect *1094illegitimate operation of the vehicle and then, ultimately, operation of the van as drug runner. See Strickler, 563 Pa. at 69 n. 18, 757 A.2d at 896 n. 18 (quoting United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir.1995) (“subsequent or concurrent detentions for questioning are justified only when the officer has ‘reasonable suspicion' of illegal transactions in drugs or any other serious crime”) (citations omitted)) (emphasis added). See also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38, 117 S.Ct. 417 (an officer’s subjective intentions notwithstanding, a continued detention is not invalid where objective reasons justify the action).
Officer Monaghan’s investigation into the possibility of drug running was, therefore, consistent with the principle underlying Terry, traffic, and other investigative stops, namely, that an officer need not feel constrained to inaction amidst reason to suspect criminalily is afoot, even where suspicion may not amount to probable cause. Sound police work in service of the public good demands that an officer under circumstances as they developed in the present case maintain the status quo with a continued detention permitting investigation into the driver’s connection with the vehicle and into the vehicle’s cargo. A request to conduct a consent search is an accepted manner of furthering such an investigation.
Accordingly, I find Officer Monaghan’s request to conduct a consent search permissible under both state and federal constitutions. The request was directly related to a lawful investigative detention and supported by an evolving reasonable suspicion that Acosta was transporting illegal drugs.