Court Opinion

ID: 9567700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:56:57.152936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:15.078181
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Shaep
dissenting.
To the majority’s decision that G.S. 20-150 (c) requires a holding that plaintiff was guilty of negligence per se when he attempted to pass defendant’s tractor-trailer under the facts of this case (set out below), I dissent.
Rose Hill is an incorporated town with a population under 5,000. The main approach to the town is U. S. Highway No. 117. On 1 August 1973 plaintiff was driving his pickup truck on rural paved road No. 1146 toward Rose Hill when he overtook defendant’s diesel log-truck. Preparatory to passing, plaintiff “gave his signal, pulled out and blew the horn and came around.” When he came alongside the truck its driver (defendant Pridgen) drove to his left of the center of the road without having given any signal of his intention to turn into “a little dirt road,” which intersected No. 1146 at that point. There was, of course, a collision. The “little dirt road,” which was about the width of the log truck, happened to be Pine Street and within the corporate limits of Rose Hill.
There were, however, no signs or markings of any kind on No. 1146 to warn a motorist that he was approaching an intersection; nor had any corporate-limits sign been posted on No. 1146 to advise the traveler he was within a city or town. Further, the area through which plaintiff had approached the intersection of Pine Street and No. 1146 was devoid of urban characteristics and gave the traveler no clue that “according to law” he was in a “city or town.” “It was about a half a mile further down the road before the sign said ‘Rose Hill.’ ”
The Chief of Police of Rose Hill described the vicinity of the accident as follows: “It’s not a built-up area. . . . It’s no houses in there. A corn field lies in there. Or tobacco. This is out in farm country.” (Emphasis added.) In attempting to *17turn into Pine Street defendant was “headed back to the woods, back to . . . haul more lumber.” The rear, left-turn signal on defendant’s log truck was not working, and the Chief of Police, who investigated the accident, gave defendant. Pridgen a “citation for improper equipment; directional signals not working.”
The result of the majority’s decision in this case is this: Any motorist who attempts to pass another vehicle at any intersection within any area which has been incorporated into a city or town violates G.S. 20-150 (c) and is guilty of negligence per se even though (1) the area appears to be rural and no posted sign informs the traveler that in contemplation of law he has left the country and entered a town; and (2) the motorist has no knowledge, no reason to suspect, and no opportunity to ascertain that the intersection lies within corporate limits. In my view this construction of G.S. 20-150 (c) put an unreasonable burden on the motorist and the General Assembly never intended to impose strict liability upon a motorist under such circumstance. The court should never adopt a construction which results in palpable injustice or undesirable consequences when the language of the statute is reasonably susceptible to another construction. Puckett v. Sellars, 235 N.C. 264, 69 S.E. 2d 497 (1952); 7 Strong’s N. C. Index 2d Statutes § 5 (1968).
G.S. 20-150 (c), as the majority opinion makes clear, is a safety statute which fixes the standard for safe conduct at certain intersections; it does not prohibit passing at all intersections. Passing at intersections outside of cities and towns is prohibited only if the Board of Transportation “by appropriate signs” has marked the intersection. The foregoing limitation denotes (1) the legislative expectation that the Board would mark all intersections at which passing would create an unreasonable risk of harm to the traveling public and (2) the legislative awareness that a motorist on an unfamiliar highway outside of developed urban areas could not reasonably be expected to obey the statutory mandate not to pass at an intersection unless he had been given notice that the intersection was ahead.
At the time of the enactment of G.S. 20-150 (c) the General Assembly undoubtedly took notice of the prevailing custom of cities and towns to post their limits on all public highways, roads, and streets entering the municipality, and it legislated on the assumption that the motorist would have notice when he *18crossed the line between town and country. Typical street intersections in cities and towns are only “a city block” apart and are highly visible. Intersections are the rule and, in urban areas, the motorist needs no notice that they are there.
Thus, it appears the legislature equated marked rural intersections with the city street intersections. It relied upon the marking of intersections to give the requisite notice in rural areas and upon the character of the street and its surroundings to give the notice in towns and cities. Where no sign warns of an intersection in a rural area, there is no notice of its existence and passing does not violate the statute. Similarly, where the street intersection is within unmarked corporate limits and in an area which lacks all the essential characteristics of a city there is also no notice of its existence, and passing therein does not violate the statute.
Under the majority decision, albeit the intersection and the area surrounding it have undergone no physical change, passing which was reasonable and lawful one way would become unlawful and negligence per se the next merely because the town extended its limits — and this irrespective of whether the new limits had been posted. Such a result does not comport with the purpose of G.S. 20-150 (c) to set the standard of reasonable driver conduct at an intersection, for the reasonableness of conduct is not changed by the mere act of incorporation.
The spirit and intent of the legislature control the construction of a statute. 7 N. C. Strong’s Index 2d, Statutes § 5 (1968). Thus, as applied to the situation we consider here, I believe the proper construction of G.S. 20-150(c) is this: When the limits of a town are unmarked a motorist who passes or attempts to pass another vehicle at an unmarked intersection within the corporate limits does not violate G.S. 20-150 (c) unless he knows that he is within the town limits or the character of the intersection and surrounding area is such that any reasonable person would know he was in town. This construction in no way weakens the doctrine of negligence per se, for if the statute is violated the violation is negligence per se.
It is needless to say tjiat a statute “should not be interpreted in such a manner as to render it unconstitutional, if a reasonable constitutional interpretation can be given.” Highway Commission v. Industrial Center, 263 N.C. 230, 231, 139 S.E. 2d 253, 254 (1964).
*19The violation of G.S. 20-150 (c) is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment, G.S. 20-176. However, the Chief of Police, when he cited defendant for “improper equipment, directional signals not working,” did not cite plaintiff for illegally passing at an intersection. I apprehend that any attempt to hold plaintiff criminally liable would raise the serious question whether the application of G.S. 20-150 (c) to the facts of this case could satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process. Surely its application to a motorist who had no knowledge he was inside corporate limits, no reason whatever to suppose he was, and every reason to think he was not, is not only an unreasonable and arbitrary application of the statute but one which bears no reasonable relation to the legislative purpose.
The majority notes, quite correctly, that a motorist who does not know the rear lamp on his vehicle has burned out may be held liable for a violation of G.S. 20-129 (d). It is argued, by analogy, that one who — for no matter what reason— does not know he is in a town should be equally liable for a violation of 20-150 (c) when he attempts to pass at an unmarked intersection. This argument is not apropos. The law requires every motorist to keep his rear lamp “in good working order.” He is responsible for his automobile and has control of it. No motorist, however, is responsible for posting- corporate limits and for ascertaining the location of the limits of any city, town, “Middlesex village or farm” through which his journey may take him.
For errors in the charge, my vote is for a new trial.
Justice Copeland joins in this dissent.