Court Opinion

ID: 9854602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:09:49.834865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:10.336793
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
1. I respectfully dissent. No cocaine was found on any person in the duplex when it was searched, and the State, recognizing this fact, proceeded on the theory that the four co-defendants were in joint constructive possession of the cocaine. This court has held that OCGA § 16-13-31 (a) (1) requires actual possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine, or of any mixture containing cocaine, in order to be guilty of the offense of trafficking in cocaine. Ramsay v. State, 175 Ga. App. 97, 100 (7) (332 SE2d 390) (1985). This rule was reaffirmed in the recent case of Lockwood v. State, 257 Ga. 796, 798 (364 SE2d 574) (1988), in which the court held that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the defendant could be convicted if he was in constructive possession of cocaine, because “[t]he statute clearly requires a finding of actual possession and not constructive possession.” Since the State proceeded on the theory of constructive possession, as stated in its brief, this court cannot become a factfinder and decide that there must have been actual possession in someone, and therefore, Martha Heath is guilty. To reach this conclusion the majority is assuming facts which are not in evidence, and which the State recognizes are not in evidence.
The only evidence connecting Martha Heath with the cocaine found in the duplex was the fact that she occupied the premises where the cocaine was found. However, the cocaine was found in bedrooms occupied by visitors, and in a medicine bottle stuffed into a couch in the living room which was accessible to everyone present. There is no evidence that Martha Heath was on the couch, or even near the couch.
It is general law in this State that merely finding contraband on premises occupied by the defendant is not sufficient to support a conviction if it affirmatively appears from the evidence that persons other than the defendant had equal opportunity to commit the crime. Blankenship v. State, 135 Ga. App. 482, 483 (218 SE2d 157) (1975); Nations v. State, 177 Ga. App. 801, 802 (1) (341 SE2d 482) (1986); Ramsay, supra at 99 (7). The evidence here establishes clearly that five of the six persons present were visitors, and all of them had access to the entire premises. Thus, the general rule of law just cited is applicable here.
I would also point out that Martha Heath’s conviction cannot be supported on the basis that cocaine was found on appellant Tommy Heath some ten hours later when he was frisked at the jail, as the evidence established that all persons in the duplex were searched at the duplex and no cocaine was found on Tommy Heath at that time. He had also been searched earlier at the jail and no cocaine was found *660on him. Thus, the evidence shows in regard to appellant Martha Heath that she was, at most, in joint constructive possession of the cocaine, which is not sufficient to support a conviction of trafficking in cocaine. Accordingly, I would reverse appellant Martha Heath’s conviction.
Decided March 18, 1988
Rehearing denied March 31, 1988.
Jerry M. Daniel, John Fleming, for appellants.
Sam B. Sibley, Jr., District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
2. I would also reverse appellant Tommy Heath’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine for the same reasons set forth in Division 1. However, Tommy Heath was found in possession of cocaine at the jail, and such evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of the offense of possession of cocaine because the possession of any controlled substance, regardless of amount, constitutes an offense. Dixon v. State, 180 Ga. App. 222, 224 (2) (348 SE2d 742) (1986).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Banke join in this dissent.