Court Opinion

ID: 9393251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 18:07:31.428291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.955586
License: Public Domain

J-S22030-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ASKIA MUHAMMAD                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1836 EDA 2021

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 13, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0002579-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                               FILED MAY 9, 2023

        Askia Muhammad (Appellant) appeals from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his first, timely Post

Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition, following an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole, imposed on October 10, 2017, following his

jury convictions of first-degree murder, firearms not to be carried without a

license, and carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia.2 On appeal,

Appellant raises several claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. For

the reasons below, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 6106(a)(1), and 6108, respectively.
J-S22030-22

     We glean the underlying facts of this case from the PCRA court opinion:

          [Appellant’s convictions] stem from the July 23, 2011
     murder of Christine O'Neill.       The murder occurred at
     approximately 9:45 a.m. inside a white Mercury Sable parked in
     the driveway behind 5001 Sheldon Street in Philadelphia,
     Pennsylvania.

            On July 23, 2011, the victim’s daughter, Malika O'Neill,
     testified that she and her mother were sleeping in the same room.
     Between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m., Malika was awakened by the sound
     of her mother’s cell phone ringing with the name “Ski” appearing
     on the caller-ID. After her mother took the call, she told Malika
     “she was going to go meet Ski” and left their home approximately
     25-30 minutes later. Malika spoke with her again between 8:00
     and 8:30 a.m. when her mother called asking her to babysit her
     brother “because she was still on her way to meet Ski.” This was
     the last time Malika spoke to her mother.

            Between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m., Willie Wilcher, a nearby
     resident of the location where the shooting occurred, was driving
     his cousin, James Simpson[,] to work through the alleyway
     connecting Rubicam and Sheldon Streets. Wilcher and Simpson
     saw a white car coming through the alley from the opposite
     direction, so Wilcher pulled off to the side to create room for the
     car to pass. As the car passed, both men looked inside the vehicle
     and observed [Appellant] in the passenger’s seat with a female
     driver, Ms. O’Neill.8 They observed [Appellant] and Ms. O’Neill for
     approximately 15-30 seconds in close proximity, “about the
     distance between [the witness] and the court reporter.” Wilcher
     testified that [Appellant] was “motioning” to the woman who
     looked “scared” and “frantic,” while Simpson testified that the two
     appeared to be arguing and that [Appellant] appeared “hyper.”
     They returned to the alleyway later that morning after hearing of
     the shooting, at which point they noticed the same white Mercury
     Sable they had seen earlier with the female-driver inside of it, who
     was now dead.
     _________________________

        8Both Wilcher and Simpson identified [Appellant] as being
       the man they saw in the car that morning, first in a photo
       array and then again at trial.
     _________________________

                                    -2-
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            Martin Bennett was O’Neill’s boyfriend at the time of the
     murder.      Mr. Bennett testified that he called O’Neill from
     Graterford State Prison at 9:10 a.m. and spoke with her until 9:25
     a.m. A recording of this phone call revealed that she was still with
     [Appellant] during this period. Less than 20 minutes later at 9:44
     a.m., Elmire Price, who lived at 5001 Sheldon Street, called 911
     reporting a black male who had shot a gun behind her home.9
     Officer O’Brien arrived at the scene at 9:56 a.m. and discovered
     a white Mercury Sable parked in the rear driveway containing the
     victim, later identified as Ms. O’Neill, in the driver’s seat with a
     gunshot wound to her head. Flash information was given to
     investigating officers describing a black male in his twenties or
     thirties fleeing from the scene wearing a striped shirt and black
     pants.
     _________________________

        9Elmire Price was unable to testify both at the time of trial
       and at the evidentiary hearing. Her daughter, Bronte
       Williams, identified Price’s voice in the 911 call to lay a
       foundation.
     _________________________

            Dr. Albert Chu testified at trial as an expert in forensic
     pathology. Based on his review of the autopsy conducted by Dr.
     Aaron Rosen, he concluded to a reasonable degree of medical
     certainty that the cause of Ms. O’Neill’s death was a gunshot
     wound to the head, and that the manner of death was homicide.
     Notably, based on the “stippling” he saw in the photographs, he
     also found that the gun was fired from a close-range between 6[
     ] inches — 2 feet of the deceased. The Crime Scene Unit
     recovered a 40-caliber fired cartridge casing and projectile from
     the vehicle, as well as two cell phones belonging to Ms. O’Neill and
     Martin Bennett. An examination of the contents on O’Neill’s
     cellular devices showed that she and [Appellant] had spoken
     several times that month (156 calls and texts) to arrange various
     drug transactions, including the morning of the murder.

            On July 27th, 2011, Homicide detectives transported Martin
     Bennett to the Homicide Unit from Graterford State Prison. There,
     Mr. Bennett told the detectives that Ms. O’Neill was selling
     marijuana for him using his cell phone while he was incarcerated.
     He told detectives that [Appellant] went by the nickname “Ski,”
     and that Ski was one of his regular customers. The Assistant
     District Attorney played the recording of the phone call Mr.

                                    -3-
J-S22030-22

        Bennett made to O’Neill the morning of her murder, and he
        identified the man’s voice in same as belonging to [Appellant].
        Mr. Bennett also identified [Appellant] in a photograph.
        Detectives generated a photo array containing eight photographs,
        including one of [Appellant]. They showed the array to five
        witnesses: Willie Wilcher, James Simpson, Elmire Price, Maya
        Kane, and Matthew Kane. Wilcher and Simpson each identified
        [Appellant]’s photograph as the man they saw in the car that
        morning.

               On August 30, 2011 at 11:00 a.m[,] Detectives Byard and
        Lucke brought [Appellant] into the Homicide Unit for
        questioning.10 Detective Lucke read Petitioner his Miranda[3]
        warnings two hours later at 1:00 p.m., and [Appellant] indicated
        that he was willing to speak to the police without an attorney
        present.11 During his interview which took place the following
        afternoon,12 [Appellant] denied any involvement in the murder but
        admitted that O’Neill had been his marijuana supplier for the
        previous five months, having taken over Bennett’s “business”
        while he was incarcerated.13 He also confirmed with the police
        that he went by the nickname “Ski.” [Appellant] gave detectives
        the phone number he used to communicate with the victim, which
        was (267) 242-7260. He was not arrested at that time, and he
        left the Homicide Unit after giving his statement.
        _________________________

          10 Sergeant Cooney testified that he received a phone call
          from a male identifying himself as [Appellant]’s father who
          was “inquiring as to his son in reference to this case.” Later
          that same day, [Appellant] called and told Cooney that he
          “was aware of the situation” and would be coming into the
          Homicide Unit around 2:00 p.m. that day to discuss same
          with detectives. [Appellant] never showed up. [Appellant]’s
          father called again hours later, and Cooney informed him
          that [Appellant] was a no-show.

          11The warnings were read from a “warning card” which the
          police routinely use.

____________________________________________

3   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

                                           -4-
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        12 Two new murders had occurred on 8/30/11 that required
        investigation, so [Appellant]’s interview did not begin until
        the following afternoon at 4:34 p.m.           However, he
        acknowledged at that time that he recalled being read his
        Miranda rights on 8/30/11 and that he understood them.
        He also indicated that he was provided bathroom breaks,
        food, cigarettes, and coffee while he waited.

        13During these five months, he purchased “about four to
       five pounds [of marijuana] a day” from the victim.
     _________________________

            Using [Appellant]’s phone number, detectives obtained call
     detail records from his cell phone provider (T-Mobile) and matched
     same to extraction records retrieved from O’Neill’s cell phone.
     Their analysis revealed that on July 23, 2011 between 6:38 a.m.
     and 9:00 a.m., a total of eight connections (one SMS and seven
     phone calls) were made between [Appellant] and O’Neill’s phones.
     It also showed that [Appellant] called O’Neill two times after the
     shooting using the “*67” feature which anonymized his caller-ID,
     despite having never used this feature in the 156 calls and texts
     he made to her the entire month of July leading up to the murder.
     [Appellant]’s call detail records also revealed that, immediately
     after the shooting,14 he made three outgoing calls to the
     Germantown Cab Company at 9:45 a.m., 9:46 a.m., and 9:54
     a.m.
     _________________________

        14Detectives ascertained the time of the shooting as 9:44
       [a.m.] based on the initial 911 call, after which the victim’s
       phone showed no signs of activity.
     _________________________

           Cell-Site-Historical-Information (“CSLI”) was obtained, the
     analysis of which matched [Appellant]’s cell location to the area
     of the shooting at the time of the murder, which was the only
     time in the 25 days analyzed that his phone was used in that area.
     FBI Special Agent Shute testified at trial as an expert in the field
     of historic cell-site analysis, having reviewed the findings in the
     report prepared by the FBI’s Cellular Analysis Survey Team
     (“CAST’).     Shute explained that the cell-site analysis put
     [Appellant]’s phone in the area of Susquehanna & Broad Street at
     approximately 9:20 a.m., with him moving further north by 9:27
     a.m., eventually crossing over Roosevelt Boulevard at 9:30 a.m.

                                    -5-
J-S22030-22

      Then, between 9:40 and 9:58 a.m. (the timeframe of the murder
      and subsequent call to Germantown Cab Company), the analysis
      placed [Appellant]’s phone in the area of Wisterwood Park and
      5001 Sheldon Street where the crime occurred.

             The jury heard testimony from just one defense witness,
      Linwood Scott, who testified as an expert in the design of wireless
      cell-site towers. While he testified on direct that it is impossible
      to determine with 100 percent certainty whether a cell map
      representation is correct, he acknowledged during cross-
      examination that the ten pings between [Appellant]’s phone and
      the cell tower closest to the crime scene between 9:34 a.m. and
      9:47 a.m. “makes it a lot more probable that the handset would
      be in the coverage area for that tower.”

PCRA Ct. Op., 12/14/21, at 4-8 (record citations omitted; emphasis in

original).

      On June 8, 2012, Appellant was arrested and charged with the above-

mentioned crimes. His jury trial began on October 3, 2017, and seven days

later, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. That same day,

the court sentenced him to the following: (1) life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole on the first-degree murder conviction; (2) a consecutive

term of three and one-half to seven years’ incarceration for the firearms not

to be carried without a license offense; and (3) a consecutive term of two and

one-half to five years for the carrying a firearm on public streets conviction.

      Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion, but did file a timely direct

appeal, which was docketed in this Court as Docket No. 3757 EDA 2017.

However, on June 7, 2018, counsel for Appellant moved to dismiss the direct

appeal, with Appellant’s consent.      Subsequently, this Court granted the

                                      -6-
J-S22030-22

motion,    and    the   appeal    was    withdrawn.   See Commonwealth v.

Muhammad, 3757 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. June 25, 2018) (order).

        On February 28, 2019, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition.

Counsel then filed an amended PCRA petition on July 30, 2019.             In the

amended petition, Appellant alleged trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing

to call three witnesses (Maya Kane, Matthew Kane, and Elmire Price) and (2)

for failing to file a motion to suppress with respect to his statement to police.

See Appellant’s Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to the

Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. and Consolidated

Opening Memorandum of Law (Appellant’s PCRA Petition), 7/30/19, at 23-42.

The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, to which Appellant filed a

response.

        On February 14, 2020, the PCRA court scheduled an evidentiary hearing

on Appellant’s claim concerning that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

call three witnesses.4 The hearing took place over three days — November

12, 2020, March 8, 2021, and April 20, 2021.5 On June 24, 2021, the court

issued a notice of intent to dismiss the PCRA petition, stating that his claim

regarding counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to call the three witnesses was

____________________________________________

4   The court did not grant a hearing on the suppression argument.

5 As the PCRA court noted, “Due to COVID, there were logistical hurdles
resulting in the passage of time and three listings for the hearing.” PCRA Ct.
Op. at 2 n.7.

                                           -7-
J-S22030-22

“without merit.” PCRA Ct. Rule 907 Notice, 6/24/21, at 1 (unpaginated). The

court further stated: “In addition, after independent review of all relevant

filings, I have also made the decision that your second claim of ineffectiveness

is without merit because the police did not . . . lack probable cause for your

detention and your Miranda warnings were not stale.” Id. (italics in original;

footnote omitted). Appellant did not file a response. Thereafter, on August

13, 2021, the PCRA court entered an order, dismissing Appellant’s petition.

This timely appeal followed.6

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and call at
       trial two exculpatory witnesses?

       2. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to present meritorious
       arguments in a pre-trial suppression hearing that would have
       resulted in suppression of his custodial statement to police?

Appellant’s Brief at 1 (some capitalization omitted).

       Our standard regarding PCRA appeals is well-settled:

       When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, an appellate court
       must determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by
       the record and free of legal error. Generally, a reviewing court is
       bound by a PCRA court’s credibility determinations and its fact-
       finding, so long as those conclusions are supported by the record.
       However, with regard to a court’s legal conclusions, appellate
       courts apply a de novo standard.

____________________________________________

6 On September 14, 2021, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
to which Appellant timely complied. The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion on December 14, 2021.

                                           -8-
J-S22030-22

Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. 2022) (footnotes &

quotation marks omitted).

      Because both of Appellant’s claims concern ineffective assistance of

counsel, we also are guided by the following:

             To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
      PCRA petitioner must satisfy the performance and prejudice test
      set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
      Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This Court has recast
      the two-part Strickland standard into a three-part test by
      dividing the performance element into two distinct components.
      To prove that counsel was ineffective, the petitioner must
      demonstrate: (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit;
      (2) that no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure
      to act; and (3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of
      counsel’s error. To prove that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a
      reasonable basis, a petitioner must prove that an alternative not
      chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than
      the course actually pursued. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a
      petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
      that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
      but for counsel’s action or inaction. Counsel is presumed to be
      effective; accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness the
      petitioner must adduce sufficient evidence to overcome this
      presumption.

Drummond, 285 A.3d at 634 (footnotes & quotation marks omitted). We

also note: “Failure to satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection of the

appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”        Commonwealth v.

McGarry, 172 A.3d 60, 70 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

                                       -9-
J-S22030-22

       In Appellant’s first argument, he claims trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to call two minor siblings, Maya Kane and Mathew Kane, as witnesses.7

See Appellant’s Brief at 30.         He states his claim has arguable merit and

counsel failed to provide a reasonable trial strategy based on the following:

       [T]rial counsel acknowledged that he was aware that neither
       witness selected [Appellant] from the photo array; he was aware
       that Maya Kane saw a neck tattoo on the man; and that his client
       did not have such a tattoo. There is thus no possible reasonable
       explanation for not conducting a pre-trial interview of Matthew
       and Maya Kane to see if they would be good witnesses.

Id. at 32. Appellant alleges that he and counsel wanted to call these witnesses

at trial and “[t]he only reason offered by counsel for not calling them . . . was

that he believed that the Commonwealth had subpoenaed them, but the[y]

were not present in court.” Id. at 33. Appellant also notes that counsel did

not have a reason “for not issuing his own subpoena at the time that he

realized that the two witnesses were not in court[.]” Id.

       Appellant further alleges that he suffered prejudice as a result of

counsel’s error because Wilcher and Simpson, the two Commonwealth

witnesses who identified and placed Appellant with the victim, O’Neil, near the

____________________________________________

7 At the time of the murder, Maya Kane was eight years old, and Matthew
Kane was 12 years old. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 9. At the PCRA hearing, Maya
Kane testified that “she heard shots outside of her window, looked out, and
saw a man leaving the scene. She believed the man had a neck tattoo but
could not describe the tattoo in any more detail beyond it looking like ‘a little
scribble.’” Id. Matthew Kane testified “he only saw a tattoo on the man’s
right forearm, which is actually consistent with [Appellant].” Id.

                                          - 10 -
J-S22030-22

time of the shooting, were incredible.      See Appellant’s Brief at 35-37.     In

support of this contention, he points to the following: (1) Wilcher and Simpson

did not see Appellant with O’Neil close in time to the shooting but rather 40

minutes earlier; (2) their out-of-court identifications were made at least two

weeks after the shooting and neither witness knew Appellant so they “had no

reason to pay particular attention to him” and they “only had a fleeting view

when their car passed the victim’s car[;]” (3) Wilcher had a prior record and

even though he was not seeking special consideration from the police and

prosecution, “it is difficult to believe that he was not seeking to curry favor[;]”

and (4) Simpson testified that he observed Appellant while he was waiting for

a store to open at 9:00 a.m. so that he could purchase “beer for breakfast,”

and he “also said that the car he saw was ‘brightly’ colored [while] the victim’s

car was white.” Id. at 35-36 (emphasis omitted).

              When raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call
      a potential witness, a petitioner satisfies the performance and
      prejudice requirements of the Strickland test by establishing
      that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to
      testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known
      of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to
      testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of
      the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a
      fair trial. To demonstrate Strickland prejudice, a petitioner must
      show how the uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been
      beneficial under the circumstances of the case. Thus, counsel will
      not be found ineffective for failing to call a witness unless the
      petitioner can show that the witness’s testimony would have been
      helpful to the defense. A failure to call a witness is not per se
      ineffective assistance of counsel for such decision usually involves
      matters of trial strategy.

                                      - 11 -
J-S22030-22

Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108-09 (Pa. 2012) (citations &

quotation marks omitted).

      Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has previously held that

“a defendant who makes a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision

concerning trial strategy will not later be heard to complain that trial counsel

was ineffective on the basis of that decision.” Commonwealth v. Paddy,

800 A.2d 294, 316 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted). “To hold otherwise, would

allow a defendant to build into his case a ready-made ineffectiveness claim to

be raised in the event of an adverse verdict.” Id. In Paddy, the defendant

raised a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to call alibi witnesses.

The Supreme Court held that “this ineffectiveness claim fails for the

fundamental reason that [the defendant] agreed at trial to counsel’s decision

not to call the witnesses in question.” Id. at 315. As such, “[a] defendant

who voluntarily waives the right to call witnesses during a colloquy cannot

later claim ineffective assistance and purport that he was coerced by counsel.”

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 762 A.2d 753, 756 (Pa. Super. 2000).

      A review of the trial testimony reveals that after the Commonwealth

rested and the defense presented its only witness, the following exchange

occurred between the trial court and Appellant concerning his satisfaction with

counsel’s representation and whether he wished to present any additional

witnesses and evidence:

      THE COURT: [Appellant], how old are you, sir?

                                       - 12 -
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     [Appellant]: [32 years old].

     THE COURT: And how far did you go in school?

     [Appellant]: I graduated high school.

     THE COURT: So you read, write, and understand English?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And are you currently under the influence of any
     drugs or alcohol or even medication as you sit here today?

     [Appellant]: No.

     THE COURT: And have you ever be[en] diagnosed with a mental
     illness?

     [Appellant]: No.

     THE COURT: Have you and your attorney discussed the fact that
     you have the right to testify in this matter?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: I want to be clear you have an absolute right to
     testify and an absolute right not to testify. Do you understand
     that?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And the decision whether or not to testify is really
     yours and yours alone. Do you understand that?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: Although I say it is your decision, I would hope that
     you would have -- you know, have spoken to the experts, your
     attorneys, about this decision. Have you done that?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: . . . You heard me tell the jury during my preliminary
     instructions -- and I will again tell them later -- that a defendant

                                    - 13 -
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     has no obligation to testify and that they’re not permitted to make
     an adverse or negative inference against you if you choose not to
     testify, correct?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: . . . Have you made a decision as to whether or not
     to testify?

     [Appellant]: I'm not testifying.

     THE COURT: So you have made a decision. Your decision is that
     you do not wish to testify, correct?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: Okay. And you've spoken to [counsel] about this
     decision, correct?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And are you satisfied with the representation
     that you received so far?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And are there any other witnesses or any other
     evidence that you wish to have presented on your behalf
     that has not been done?

     [Appellant]: No.

     THE COURT: Okay. And I already asked if you're satisfied with
     the representation. You said yes, correct?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

N.T. 10/6/17, at 61-64 (emphases added).

     In denying relief, the PCRA court found the following:

           This colloquy makes clear that [Appellant] was advised of
     his right to take the stand, to be represented by competent
     counsel, and to present additional witnesses and/or evidence.

                                    - 14 -
J-S22030-22

     Counsel had spoken with [Appellant] about the Kane witnesses
     while preparing for trial, their statements were passed during
     discovery, and counsel even mentioned the possibility of their
     testimony during his opening statement. It is therefore clear that
     [Appellant], having been made well-aware of these witnesses and
     the substance of their potential testimony, nonetheless indicated
     to the court at the conclusion of trial that he was satisfied with his
     counsel’s strategy, including the decision not to call the Kane
     witnesses. Simply put, [Appellant] made a choice not to have the
     Kane siblings testify, and he cannot now come forward and fault
     counsel for failing to call them at trial.19 See Commonwealth v.
     Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 642 (Pa. Super. 2014) (ineffectiveness
     claim for failure to call witnesses fails where “the colloquy
     conclusively establishes that Appellant agreed with trial counsel’s
     decision not to present additional witnesses”); Commonwealth
     v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108-09 (Pa. 2012) (a claim of
     ineffective assistance of counsel cannot succeed “through
     comparing, in hindsight, the trial strategy employed with
     alternatives not pursued”).
     _________________________

         Although [Appellant] argues in his Response in Opposition
        19

       to the Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss that his waiver of
       the right to call witnesses was invalid because his decision
       was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
       [distinguishing Pander in doing so], no questioning of trial
       counsel was done on this issue as it was not raised in earlier
       Petitions. Further, the court did a complete colloquy of
       [Appellant] regarding his right to testify as well and it was
       indeed knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
     _________________________

            Counsel also had a reasonable basis for not calling the Kane
     witnesses.       While [Appellant] argues that his counsel’s
     “concessions” (that they both wanted the Kanes to testify)
     negates any argument that he had a reasonable, strategic basis
     for not calling them once he learned that they were not
     subpoenaed by the Commonwealth, this argument fails to account
     for the totality of the evidence. Trial counsel’s strategy was to call
     into question the veracity and reliability of Wilcher and Simpson’s
     identifications, Agent Shute’s historical cell site analysis putting
     [Appellant] in the area of the murder at the time it occurred, and
     to, overall, cast doubt on the Commonwealth’s theory despite the
     overwhelming evidence of [Appellant]’s guilt.

                                    - 15 -
J-S22030-22

            Again, [counsel]’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was
     that he did not believe the Kanes would be particularly helpful to
     his client’s case, especially considering their age and the fact that
     their identifications themselves were inconsistent: “I did not think
     that at a homicide trial [Maya Kane] would at that time, because
     of her age, aided us.” He acknowledged that he had spoken with
     [Appellant] before trial about the Kane siblings and clarified that
     their testimony would not completely support one another. Upon
     reviewing the trial testimony, he confirmed that [Appellant] was
     comfortable calling just the one witness at trial and that they were
     on the same page in terms of strategy. It is therefore clear that
     trial counsel had at least “some” reasonable, articulable basis
     designed to effectuate [Appellant]’s interests.

                                  *     *      *

           [Appellant] also cannot establish that he was prejudiced,
     which alone is sufficient for the PCRA court to dismiss his
     ineffectiveness claim. When evaluating prejudice, “the question
     is not whether the [d]efendant would more likely than not have
     received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its
     absence he received a fair trial . . . a trial resulting in a verdict
     worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
     (1995). The absence of the Kanes’ testimony certainly did not
     deprive [Appellant] of a fair trial.        The Kanes were not
     eyewitnesses to the shooting, and they were just eight and twelve
     years old at the time of trial. The nature of their testimony would
     be that they heard gunshots from their bedrooms, and saw a man
     get out of a white car from an obscured distance 20 feet away
     behind a window. Again, their testimonies themselves were
     inconsistent, with Matthew’s identification carrying the risk of
     putting [Appellant] at the scene of the crime. Their testimony
     could not possibly tilt the verdict in [Appellant]’s favor in light of
     the overwhelming evidence presented by the Commonwealth,
     including:

        • Ms. O’Neill’s daughter’s testimony that Ski called
        ([Appellant]’s acknowledged nickname) the morning of the
        murder and Ms. O’Neill’s statement to her daughter that she
        was going to meet Ski that morning and needed her
        daughter to watch the her younger child.

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          • Wilcher and Simpson’s positive identifications of
          [Appellant] as the man they saw in the car with the victim
          just before her murder.

          • Bennett’s testimony and the recorded prison phone call
          placing [Appellant] in the car with the victim the morning of
          the murder, minutes before it happened.

          • The cell phone data establishing [Appellant]’s presence at
          the crime scene during the time of the murder, and
          displaying patterns in [Appellant]’s behavior that
          spontaneously changed that morning.

          • The testimony showing that [Appellant] called a cab within
          one minute of the 911 call reporting shots being fired, with
          the call pinging from a cell phone tower in the area of the
          shooting.

          • [Appellant]’s use of “*67” to call Ms. O’Neill’s phone two
          times immediately after the murder, when he had not done
          so in the 156 previous times he called her.

          • The testimony arising from [Appellant]’s custodial
          statement that was used to show a consciousness of guilt
          arising from [his] alleged lie: “[Appellant]’s statement is
          interesting because it’s a lie with a little truth wrapping
          around it. And when they take him down to homicide, he
          says, oh, no, I don’t know anything. I don’t even know her.”

PCRA Ct. Op. at 14-17 (some citations & record citations omitted; emphasis

in original).

      After a careful review, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant is

not entitled to relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

call the two young children, Maya Kane and Mathew Kane, to testify as

witnesses. First, Appellant’s argument — that he and counsel wanted to call

the two minor witnesses but believed the Commonwealth would subpoena

them first, and therefore, counsel was ineffective for not doing so after

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learning the children would not be called — does not persuade us otherwise.

The aforementioned colloquy plainly demonstrates that Appellant was advised

of his right to present additional witnesses and whether he was satisfied with

counsel’s representation. See N.T., 10/6/17, at 64. Based on Appellant’s

responses, to which he is bound, he voluntarily and knowingly indicated that

he did not wish to present any more witnesses and was content with counsel.

See id.    He may not now assert that counsel was ineffective for failing to

present the testimony of these two witnesses. See Paddy, 800 A.2d at 316;

Pander, 100 A.3d at 642.8 Therefore, his ineffectiveness claim lacks arguable

merit.

       Moreover, our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion

that counsel possessed a reasonable basis not to call Maya Kane and Mathew

Kane to testify.       The court’s analysis comprehensively and adequately

addresses the claim, and the evidence supports its determination. We discern

____________________________________________

8We note that for the first time on appeal, Appellant suggests that the colloquy
was deficient because specific witnesses were not named during the
questioning and therefore, his “one word ‘no’ response to the leading question
of whether there are witnesses or evidence he wishes to offer hardly fits the
bill.” Appellant’s Brief at 38-39. It is well-settled that “[i]ssues not raised in
the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). “This requirement bars an
appellant from raising a new and different theory of relief for the first time on
appeal.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 141 A.3d 512, 522 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citation & quotation marks omitted).         Accordingly, to the extent that
Appellant raises a sufficiency claim regarding the colloquy, we find it waived
pursuant to Rule 302.

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no legal error on the part of the PCRA court, and therefore, Appellant is not

entitled to any relief. Accordingly, Appellant’s first claim fails.

       In his second argument, Appellant contends that counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise suppression claims that his custodial statement was the

product of an illegal detention, and that his Miranda warnings were stale

when he provided a statement to police.9           See Appellant’s Brief at 44.

Appellant first alleges that his statement to police was the fruit of an illegal

detention because “there was no showing of probable cause and . . . no arrest

warrant.”     Id.   This purported illegal detention argument lends itself to

Appellant’s next complaint — that while being detained, he was originally

provided with Miranda warnings when he arrived at the police station on

August 30, 2011, but police did not re-administer the warnings until 27 hours

later when Appellant gave a formal statement.           He argues the warnings

became “remote” and “detectives were required to readvise [him] of his

Miranda warnings [but] failed to do so.” Id. at 47-48. He maintains that as

a result of police inaction, his statement was not admissible. Appellant further

asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these issues at the

____________________________________________

9 It merits mention that counsel did file a motion to suppress, and a hearing
was held on the matter. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 20. Counsel raised the issue of
whether or not Miranda warnings were given, and whether Appellant
voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights. See id. The trial court “held that
Detective Lucke had given [Appellant] the Miranda warnings and that [his]
statement was voluntary.” Id.; see also N.T., 1/24/17, at 59.

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suppression hearing because they were “of arguable merit and counsel had

no reasonable strategic basis for failing to make” these arguments. Id. at 48.

Appellant states that “[t]here [was] a reasonable probability that but for

counsel’s failure, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”

Id. at 50. He points to the following:

      [Appellant]’s admissions contained in the statement were highly
      prejudicial. [Detective] Crone testified that [Appellant] said that
      he did not know [O’Neil]. In his later statement, he admit[ed] to
      knowing [O’Neil] and having a drug dealer/buyer relationship with
      her. Because the jury heard that [Appellant] lied initially, it was
      unlikely to believe the content of his statement – that he left [the
      victim] before she was shot – and was even more likely to infer
      guilt.

             Likewise, [Appellant]’s statement that [O’Neil] dropped him
      off at Gratz and York streets conflicted with the Commonwealth’s
      historical cell site analysis expert, Shute. Likely finding that
      [Appellant]’s statement was not truthful, the jury was much more
      likely to find [him] guilty. Had the statement been suppressed,
      the jury would have been left with two incredible eyewitnesses
      and an expert whose testimony was challenged by a defense
      expert. Combined with the three eyewitnesses who failed to
      identify [Appellant], including Maya[ Kane]’s specific description
      that directly excluded [Appellant], there is a reasonable likelihood
      that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

Id.

      Regarding Appellant’s illegal detention argument, the PCRA court

properly addressed this claim as follows:

      [Appellant] was brought in for questioning on August 30th, 2011
      after Detectives learned that he was with [O’Neil] just before she
      was murdered. This information alone provided the Detectives
      with sufficient probable cause, and therefore entitled them to
      bring [Appellant] in for questioning. See Commonwealth v.
      Mitchell, 383 A.2d 930, 932 (Pa. 1978) (finding probable cause
      for warrantless arrest where police knew through their

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      investigation that the victim was last seen alive with Mitchell and
      another person on the way to the scene of the murder, and
      rejecting derivative ineffectiveness claim); Commonwealth v.
      Ryles, 418 A.2d 542, 546 (Pa. Super. 1980) (that defendant was
      “the last person known to have been with the victim prior to the
      slaying” was among relevant circumstances giving rise to probable
      cause to arrest him).

             Since the Detectives did indeed have probable cause
      pursuant to both Mitchell and Ryles, even if [Appellant]’s trial
      counsel had raised this issue at the suppression hearing, he would
      not have succeeded. “Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for
      failing to raise a meritless claim.” Com[monwealth] v. Spotz,
      896 A.2d 1191, 1210 ([Pa.] 2006) (citing Commonwealth v.
      Tilley, 780 A.2d 649 ([Pa.] 2001)).

PCRA Ct. Op. at 18-19 (record citation omitted). We agree with the PCRA

court that Appellant’s illegal detention claim has no merit based on Mitchell

and Ryles.

      Next, we turn to his “staleness” argument.       We are guided by the

following:

      There is no prophylactic rule that a suspect must be rewarned of
      his constitutional rights each time custodial interrogation is
      renewed. Instead, we must view the totality of circumstances in
      each case to determine whether such repeated warnings are
      necessary.

            Pertinent to such an inquiry are the length of time between
      the warnings and the challenged interrogation, whether the
      interrogation was conducted at the same place where the
      warnings were given, whether the officer who gave the warnings
      also conducted the questioning, and whether statements obtained
      are materially different from other statements that may have been
      made at the time of the warnings.

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 282 A.2d 276, 279-80 (Pa. 1971) (citations

omitted).

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        Here, a review of the record reveals that Appellant was transported to

the police station at 11:00 a.m. on August 30, 2011, and he spoke with

Detectives Lucke and Byard at 1:00 p.m.            See N.T., 10/4/17, at 176-77.

Detective Lucke indicated that Appellant’s handcuffs had been removed and

he “did tell [Appellant] why he was there and what the investigation was

about.” Id. at 176. The detective read Appellant his Miranda warnings, to

which Appellant agreed to speak with police. Id. at 179-80. Detective Lucke

also asked him seven additional questions “to ascertain that [he] . . .

understood those warnings.” Id. at 179. Appellant told Detective Lucke that

he did not know the victim and he knew nothing about her death. Id. at 181.

Due to other murder investigations that required police assistance, the

detectives stopped the interview, and Appellant remained in the locked

interview room. Id. at 32, 181. During this time, he was provided with food,

beverages, cigarettes, and bathroom facilities. See N.T., 1/24/17, at 23.10

        The following day at approximately 4:30 p.m., the formal interview

began and lasted for approximately five to six hours. See N.T., 10/4/17, at

33, 187.      Detective Crone conducted the interview with Detective Lucke

present in the room. Id. at 33. Appellant then agreed to give a formal written

statement, to which Detective Crone typed his responses and Appellant signed

at the bottom of each page, indicating that was “a true and accurate account

____________________________________________

10   Interviewees are permitted to sleep in the room. See N.T., 1/24/17, at 23.

                                          - 22 -
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of the incident[.]”   Id. at 36-37.    In the written statement, Appellant

acknowledged the following: (1) he was being questioned in reference to

O’Neil’s death; (2) he was not under arrest at the time; (3) at the conclusion

of the interview, he would not be charged with a crime and was free to leave;

(4) any mention of drugs was not the focus of the investigation and any

narcotics information he provided would not be used to charge him at that

time or in the future; (5) he remembered speaking with Detective Lucke the

day before, and he requested that Miranda warnings be read to him and he

understood those warnings; (6) he knew O’Neil because she was his marijuana

supplier; (7) on the day prior to O’Neil’s death, he met with her to purchase

three pounds of drugs and once the transaction was completed, he walked

away; (8) on the morning of O’Neil’s death, he met with her to purchase four

more pounds of drugs and he again walked away after the sale was completed;

and (9) he learned about O’Neil’s death from her nephew and neighborhood

friends. Id. at 43-50.

     In applying the Bennett factors to the present matter, we note that

while the interrogation was conducted at the same place where the warnings

were given, it was 27 hours between the time the warnings were given and

when the challenged interrogation took place, Detective Lucke gave the

warnings whereas Detective Crone conducted the questioning, and the

statements obtained were materially different from Appellant’s earlier

statements. See Bennett, 282 A.2d at 279-80. We find there is plausible

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merit to Appellant’s assertion that repeated Miranda warnings were

necessary.    See Commonwealth v. Wideman, 334 A.2d 594, 599 (Pa.

1975) (concluding Miranda warnings were stale when a materially different

statement was given 12 hours after the warnings issued by different officers

in another interrogation room); Commonwealth v. Riggins, 304 A.2d 473,

478 (Pa. 1973) (holding defendant should have been re-warned where

statement was provided 17 hours after initial warnings were given in car, and

confession was given in a custodial room to different officers than those that

gave the warning).

      Nevertheless, even if there is arguable merit to Appellant’s claim, we

conclude that he has failed to establish the prejudice prong of the

ineffectiveness test — that counsel’s error prejudiced him to the extent that

the outcome of the underlying proceeding would have been different but for

counsel’s error.   See Drummond, 285 A.3d at 634.          As the PCRA court

properly found:

      Even if the court were to find that [counsel] was ineffective for
      failing to raise the issues of probable cause and staleness at the
      suppression hearing, reading [Appellant]’s statement to the jury
      at trial did not result in any unfair prejudice. [Appellant] argues
      that he was prejudiced because the Commonwealth used his
      statement during its closing to “insinuate that he was a liar.”
      Counsel’s strategic decision to forgo arguing staleness of a non-
      inculpatory statement did not prejudice him. Counsel’s omission
      did not adversely affect the outcome of the proceedings and
      therefore given that the jury heard evidence that [Appellant]
      called the victim shortly before the murder, that the victim told
      her daughter she was meeting [Appellant], and [he] was with the
      victim and her boyfriend on a recording telephone call minutes

                                    - 24 -
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       before the murder all related to drug distribution, [Appellant] was
       not prejudiced by the . . . admission of his statement.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 23 (citation omitted).

       We agree with the PCRA court’s well-reasoned analysis.11 The record

defeats Appellant’s assertion that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s

inaction — in the statement at issue, Appellant averred that he purchased

drugs from O’Neil on the morning of the incident, and there was considerable

circumstantial evidence that placed Appellant with O’Neil a few minutes before

her murder. Appellant’s argument fails to demonstrate that the outcome of

the underlying proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s error.

We reiterate that the failure to prove any prong of the ineffectiveness test is

fatal to the PCRA petition.         See McGarry, 172 A.3d at 70.       Therefore,

Appellant is not entitled to relief with respect to his second claim. Accordingly,

we shall not disturb the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

11We note that the PCRA court found that Appellant’s Miranda warnings did
not go stale based on the totality of the circumstances. See PCRA Ct. Op. at
21-23. Nevertheless, it is well-settled that we may affirm on any basis. See
Commonwealth v. Clouser, 998 A.2d 656, 661 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2010).

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/9/2023

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