Court Opinion

ID: 9716725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:49:26.560011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:48.435928
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
ALLEN, J.:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. The Majority holds that the Commonwealth does not have the burden of proving that Appellee’s blood draw was taken for an independent medical purpose, and presumes that Ap-pellee’s blood draw was conducted for a legitimate medical reason. Op. at 509-10, 515. Relying on this judicially-created presumption, the Majority concludes that the blood draw constituted a lawful seizure. In my view, application of the Majority’s presumption effectively nullifies the Commonwealth’s time-honored burden of proving the admissibility of the evidence. Unlike the Majority, I conclude that because the Commonwealth did not offer any evidence to establish that the hospital drew Appellee’s blood for an independent medical purpose, the Commonwealth did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the blood draw was obtained legally. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress.
¶ 2 Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H), the Commonwealth “shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence and of establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.” Id. In cases involving blood tests, two types of searches typically occur: the search of the blood and the search of the medical records containing the results of the first search. Commonwealth v. Riedel, 539 Pa. 172, 651 A.2d 135, 138-139 (1994). This case concerns the legality of the former (the blood draw) and not the latter (the seizure of medical records).
¶ 3 It is well-established that the administration of a blood test for the purpose of obtaining evidence of guilt constitutes a “search” and a “seizure” which triggers the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). “Before a law enforcement officer may lawfully take a blood sample without consent or a warrant, he or she must have probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed an offense of which the current state of one’s blood will constitute evidence.” United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir.1995); see United States v. Eagle, 498 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir.2007); United States v. Berry, 866 F.2d 887, 891 (6th Cir.1989).
¶ 4 Under Pennsylvania statutes and relevant constitutional law, a blood draw is valid in three circumstances: (1) pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a), an officer has probable cause to believe that the driver was DUI and requests the hospital to draw blood; (2) under 75 Pa.C.SA. § 3755(a), the hospital itself determines that it has probable cause to believe that the driver was DUI and draws blood;1 or (3) the *517hospital draws the blood of the driver for an independent medical purpose, that is, to aid in treating the driver’s medical condition. Shaw, 770 A.2d at 298-99; Riedel, 651 A.2d at 138-139; Commonwealth v. West, 834 A.2d 625, 631-38 (Pa.Super.2003).
¶ 5 In this case, the record indicates that Officer Unterkoefler did not request the hospital to draw Appellee’s blood, and thus, the hospital conducted the draw on its own initiative. The question remains, however, whether Appellee’s blood was drawn by the hospital: (1) solely for medical reasons, or (2) because hospital personnel had probable cause to believe that Appellee violated the DUI statute under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a).2
¶ 6 In West, this Court held that the trial court erred in admitting the blood test results of the defendant’s second blood draw performed at Indiana Hospital. In that case, the Commonwealth speculated that the hospital conducted the blood draw for either an independent medical purpose or pursuant to its own finding of probable cause under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a). Id. at 637. At the suppression hearing, however, the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that the hospital performed the test for an independent medical purpose or pursuant to its “perceived duty” under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a). Id. at 635-36. Notably, there was no testimony from hospital personnel explaining why — or for what purpose — the doctor ordered the blood test. Id. at 636. A panel of this Court found this deficiency in the evidence fatal, stating that “absent some explicit reason for the medical necessity of drawing blood from [the defendant] ... or any evidence suggesting the test was taken in conjunction with Section 3755(a), we cannot see how the Commonwealth met its burden of proof and persuasion.” Id. at 637-38.
¶ 7 The case at bar is materially indistinguishable from the second blood test at issue in West. Although Officer Unterkoe-fler’s testimony revealed that he did not request the hospital to draw Appellee’s blood under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a), the Commonwealth, as in West, offered absolutely no evidence to demonstrate whether the hospital drew the blood for an independent medical purpose or pursuant to its own probable cause determination under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a). I find that the Commonwealth’s failure to demonstrate one or the other is problematic because each ground for admissibility has different consequences and accompanying standards of proof. For instance, if the hospital did, in fact, draw Appellee’s blood for an independent medical purpose, then the blood draw would have been legal. In this context, the hospital would be a private actor, and Appellee’s Fourth Amendment rights would not be implicated since there was no *518state action in drawing the blood. Riedel, 651 A.2d at 138-39.
¶ 8 On the other hand, if the hospital did, in fact, draw Appellee’s blood pursuant to its perceived statutory duty under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755, then the hospital would be acting as an agent of the Commonwealth. See id.; United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir.1990) (stating that “where a private party acts as an ‘instrument or agent’ of the state in effecting a search or seizure, fourth amendment interests are implicated”) (citation omitted). Thus, the blood draw would have constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Attson, 900 F.2d at 1433. Consequently, to establish the admissibility of a blood draw taken pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755, an employee of the hospital would have had to testify that he/she had probable cause to believe that Appellee was DUI. See Shaw, 770 A.2d at 298. These differences are legally significant, as proof of an independent medical purpose does not require a supplemental showing of probable cause, while proof a blood draw taken pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a) requires an additional showing of probable cause. To reiterate, the record does not demonstrate whether hospital personnel drew Appellee’s blood for medical purposes or pursuant to the directives in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755.
¶ 9 By failing to establish the basis upon which hospital personnel drew Appellee’s blood, the Commonwealth did not demonstrate that the blood sample was obtained in compliance with Appellee’s constitutional or statutory rights. Quite simply, “[t]he Commonwealth should have produced evidence showing what the ‘independent medical purpose’ was, or evidence to prove that the blood was drawn pursuant to [the hospital’s] ‘perceived duty’ arising out of Section 3755.” West, 834 A.2d at 637. As a result, the legal basis for the admissibility of the blood draw is nothing more than speculation. Because the Commonwealth did not establish the legality of the initial blood draw by a preponderance of the evidence, the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the results of the blood draw were admissible into evidence.
¶ 10 To ease the Commonwealth’s burden of proof in this matter, the Majority invokes a presumption against Appellee, assuming that all blood draws are taken for independent medical purposes, unless exceptional circumstances suggest otherwise. I particularly question the validity of such a presumption in light of 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3755, which deputizes hospital personnel with the traditional and exclusive authority of the state to seize evidence upon their own finding of probable cause. See supra, at n. 1. The problem with the Majority’s presumption is that doctors and medical personnel would, in essence, have an unencumbered license to draw blood, not for medical purposes, but for the sole reason of gathering evidence for the state.3 The Majority’s presumption would allow medical personnel, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755, to draw blood (forcefully if necessary and over a defendant’s express refusal), without any showing of probable cause or consent, either express or implied. I conclude, accordingly, that application of the Majority’s presumption would have the practical effect of abrogating the probable cause requirement of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755 by dispensing with the Commonwealth’s burden of establishing whether a blood test is admissible under that statute. *519Stated differently, the Majority presupposes that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a) is inapplicable, by presuming that a blood test was done for independent medical purposes, thus relieving the Commonwealth of any obligation that it may have had to prove probable cause under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a). I find this especially troubling because when an agent of the state withdraws blood for law enforcement reasons, a finding of probable cause is a constitutional necessity. See generally Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (concluding that state hospital’s policy to conduct involuntary drug testing of pregnant woman was unconstitutional because the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes and there was no showing of articulable and individualized suspicion).
¶ 11 Moreover, in distinguishing the three blood tests in West, the Majority chooses when the Commonwealth must carry the burden to demonstrate that the blood draw was taken for an independent medical purpose. According to the Majority, in this case, “[tjhere was no evidence to suggest Appellee’s blood draw had been taken for any reason other than independent medical purposes,” and thus, “the Commonwealth had no obligation to prove the sample was taken for independent medical purposes.” Op. at 515. The Majority, however, concedes that the Commonwealth has a burden to prove a specific medical purpose under questionable circumstances, namely when a defendant’s blood is drawn shortly after being discharged from a hospital. Op. at 514-15. Ultimately, the Majority submits that the Commonwealth only bears the burden of proving that a blood draw was taken for independent medical reasons when the record displays facts that “cast a shadow” on the “presumption” that the draw was for a legitimate medical purpose. Op. at 516.
¶ 12 I find the Majority’s assessment of the Commonwealth’s burden of proof untenable. The Commonwealth unconditionally bears the burden of establishing the admissibility of the evidence, including the legality of a blood draw. The Commonwealth, in all cases, carries the initial burden of proving that a blood draw was legal and admissible. Whether the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the admissibility of a blood draw does not depend, as the Majority suggests, on the potential merits of the defendant’s suppression motion. Contrary to the Majority, I find that the Commonwealth’s burden of proving the legality of a blood draw should be uniformly applied irrespective of the factual predicates of a particular case.
¶ 13 For the above-stated reasons, I conclude that the Majority’s not only abrogates the Commonwealth’s burden of proof under Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H), but also jeopardizes our citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Where a police officer does not direct or request medical personnel to take a blood draw, I would require the Commonwealth to affirmatively establish whether the medical personnel took the blood draw for independent medical purposes or as part of its statutory duty under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755. As explained above, if the blood draw was taken for medical reasons, then the search and seizure would be legal. If, on the other hand, the blood was drawn pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755, then the search and seizure would be legal only if a hospital employee testified to facts establishing probable cause to believe that the driver was DUI. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. "Section 3755(a), by its plain language, requires hospital personnel, in cases where probable cause exists to believe that an emergency room patient has violated Pennsylvania's DUI statute, to take blood samples for BAC testing. There is no requirement in the *517statute that the BAC testing be conducted at the request of a police officer. The only requirement is the abstract requirement that ‘probable cause exists to believe a violation of [of the DUI statute.]' If such ‘probable cause exists,' then hospital personnel must take blood samples for BAC testing.”
Commonwealth v. Shaw, 564 Pa. 617, 770 A.2d 295, 298 (2001) (emphasis in original).
“Section 3755(a) is, to say the least, inart-fully drafted. For some vague and curious reasons, the legislature has required a probable cause determination without specifying who is to make such a determination, or how such an abstract requirement is met.” Id. at n. 3. “[A] determination by hospital personnel familiar with Section 3755(a) that probable cause existed to believe that that a person requiring treatment had violated [the DUI statute] would [ ] seem to mandate that hospital personnel conduct BAC testing.” Id. (emphasis supplied).

. I note that the hospital drew Appellee’s blood to conduct a chemical toxicity screen; this test determines whether alcohol or drugs are present in the bloodstream.

. Indeed, under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(b), hospital personnel are required, without exception, to take the blood test and are granted civil add criminal immunity for any claims arising out of the withdrawal of blood.