Court Opinion

ID: 4735327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-08-12 02:59:13.560966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:08:13.732372
License: Public Domain

Chadwick, J.
(concurring) — Without taking issue with the argument made by the majority, it seems to me that there are other and more controlling reasons for denying the petition of relator. The relator did not receive a majority of the votes cast, or if he did receive such maj ority, he is not, under the law, entitled to have his name placed upon the general election ballot. There has been much, and it seems to me unnecessary, confusion in considering the question of the majority of votes cast with reference to judicial offices. The confusion comes from a disposition to treat the words “ma*262jority of the votes cast” as synonymous with a majority of all the ballots, that is to say, the paper ballots cast by the electors.
The word ballot, in the sense in which it has thus been employed, is not in the statute, and cannot be read into it by any right rule of construction. It might be so held if there were but two candidates running and one to elect, but from the nature of things, the words “majority of the votes” cannot be held to be a majority of the paper ballots cast, when there are several candidates and several places to be filled and there is no compulsion or duty upon the voter 'to vote for the full number to be elected. If we were to accept the terms as synonymous, we would be compelled to say that a ballot, if the voter voted for two names, would be two-thirds of a vote, and if he voted for one name, one-third of a vote. Such a construction would lead not only to the ridiculous, but to the impossible as well.
Taking, therefore, the plain words of the statute, “a majority of the votes cast,” every individual expression of the elector’s will is a vote. Each vote cast for a candidate is a vote. It is admitted that there were individual expressions of the electors as follows:
Judge Parker .......................124,218
Judge Fullerton......................124,108
Judge Morris........................119,897
Edgar G. Mills.......................109,699
C. E. Claypool....................... 87,186
Loosely considered, it may be said that a candidate, where three are to be elected, is running against the field, but it cannot be so, for that would be running one candidate for one of the three positions, against, not one other place or candidate for the same place, but against two other places and all candidates. He would be against three fields.
For the purpose of the argument, we may assume that the supreme court is a body divisible into nine parts. Three parts are to be filled. A certain number of the electors regis*263ter their choice for Judge Parker for one of these places. It does not follow that, because they vote for two other men for two other places, they have cast either one or two votes against Judge Parker. The candidate has no interest in the other places. Nor has the elector who votes for Judge Parker any intention of reducing his vote, or which is the same thing, creating by his vote a standard that will record his vote for others, or any part of it, against the affirmative expression of his will. It follows, by this reasoning, that if there are two candidates and one received more votes than his opponent, he alone is entitled to go upon the general election ballot; and, by the same reasoning, if there are four candidates and two places to be filled, or six candidates and three places to be filled, that is to say, double the number of candidates, or a less number than double the number, the three receiving the highest vote receive a majority of all the votes cast.
To illustrate: There are three places to fill. Judge Parker has 124,218 votes. He is entitled, under the law, to the first place on the ballot unopposed, unless some one of the several candidates can show that he, as an individual, has a greater number of votes for the same place. Each candidate, in turn, must fail, for none can say, “I have more votes for any of the places to be filled than Judge Parker has.”
The relator having received less than candidates Parker, Fullerton and Morris, is in no position to challenge their right to go upon the ballot as majority candidates.
Upon this theory, it will always be possible to determine a majority, whereas counsel for relator frankly admits that, upon his theory, either no one 'may receive a maj ority, or a greater number than one-half of the candidates (double the number being on the primary ballot) can receive a majority. To hold, where there are three nominations to be made, and there are six or a lesser number of candidates, all of the candidates, or any greater number than three, can receive a majority of the votes cast would be to violate every canon *264of reason and common sense. It would be to say that the legislature provided for a selection by majorities, and then deliberately provided a scheme whereby majorities (although there were candidates equal to double the number or less of the places to be filled) could not be obtained.
We are bound to give life to all the words of a statute if it can be done. To hold to the contrary of my conclusion would write the word “majority” out of the statute, and invite the abuse of “plunking” for one candidate, whereas every elector should perform his full duty as a citizen and vote for three. The only way other than this to save one candidate for one place from measuring the votes for one place against the votes for all the other places would be to force the presumption that every elector had performed his whole duty and had voted for three men. There is no showing that they did not do so, and the presumption might be sustained in principle. Upon this theory, there were 565,103 votes cast. This, divided by three, the number of places to be filled, the votes — ballot votes — would be 188,367. A majority would be 94,184. Clearly, then, the three having the higher number of votes would be the nominees, for there cannot be more than three majority nominees upon the ballot, as I shall hereafter attempt to show. To rule otherwise would be to rule that two and two do not make four, or that a fraction may be more than the whole.
But if it be held by some strange process of reasoning that the relator did receive a majority of all the votes cast, he is still not entitled to have his name upon the ballot. The statute, Rem. 1915 Code, § 4842, reads as follows:
“When there are to be elected at any general election one or more judges of the supreme court, or of the superior court of any county, the candidates for each respective office whose names are to be placed on the general election ticket shall be determined as follows: The number of candidates equaling the number of judicial positions to be filled who receive the highest number of votes at the primary election, and an equal number of candidates for such positions, providing *265there are such candidates, who receive the next highest number of votes, shall be the candidates for such respective offices and their names shall appear on the general election ballot under the designation of such respective offices: Provided, however, that where any candidate for any such office shall receive a majority of all votes cast at such primary election for such office, the name or names of such candidates receiving such majority shall be printed separately on the general election ballot, under the designation ‘Vote for.......,’ and the name or names of no opposing candidate or candidates shall be printed on such ballot in opposition to such candidate or candidates, but spaces equaling the number of such majority candidates shall be left following such name or names, in which the voter may insert the name of any person for whom he wishes to cast his ballot.”
If there be any doubt or uncertainty in the statute requiring construction, we are not compelled to go beyond the statute for a rule of construction. The primary election law, as we said in a former opinion, is intended to be a comprehensive scheme for the selection of candidates to go upon the general election ballot, and it is a familiar rule of construction that where one part of an act is ambiguous or uncertain, if the legislature has put a construction upon some analogous part of the act, the court will follow the legislative interpretation, to the end that, if confusion is to be prevented' in the one case, it ought to be prevented in the other by the same method that has been suggested by the legislature.
In Hem. 1915 Code, § 4827, it is provided:
“In the event that there are more than one position of the same kind to be filled and more candidates of any political party receive majorities of the votes of such party cast at such election than there are positions to be filled, then in that event the number of candidates equal to the number of positions to be filled receiving the highest number of votes shall be the nominees of such political party for such positions.”
True it is that this section refers to candidates of political parties, but, under the rules of construction that I have suggested, we may adopt it as a guide reflecting the will of the *266legislature. And now, in this case, granting, for the sake of argument only, that the relator did receive a majority of all the votes cast (which does not appear upon the face of the returns), it leaves a greater number of candidates than, there are positions to be filled, and the words “the one having a majority” of all the votes cast must be construed as the one having the greater number of votes cast, for it is obvious that, as between majority candidates, pluralities must prevail. Otherwise, the intent of the statute would be entirely overcome.
Another reason for saying that this provision has application to judges of the supreme and superior courts is that it could have no application to any other condition. Legislative positions are the only positions outside of the office of judges of the supreme and superior courts where there is more than-one position of the same kind to be filled, and as to the legislative positions, it is elsewhere provided that the persons receiving a plurality of the votes are the candidates for the positions, and the only candidates for the positions, regardless of whether they received a majority of the votes or not. Hence this provision, in reality, can apply only to the nonpartisan offices of judges of the supreme and superior courts.
The relator is not entitled to have his name upon the ballot, and the writ is properly denied.