Court Opinion

ID: 9711717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:37:41.295838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.030529
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court dismissed the case upon defendant Drolet’s motion because the plaintiff failed to appear. Therefore, Pa.R.C.P. 218, 42 Pa.C.S., is the rule applicable to the procedure followed in this case. A dismissal under Rule 218 does not require a showing of prejudice. Further, we are limited to the contents of the certified record on appeal.
At the time that the trial court entered the nonsuit under review on this appeal, there was nothing in or on the record *427to excuse the plaintiffs non-appearance when the case was called. The discretionary dismissal of the case was, therefore, free from abuse.
Had the plaintiff made a proper record, alleging or establishing a satisfactory excuse for the non-appearance, we would then be faced with deciding whether a subsequent decision to remove or not to remove the nonsuit should be upheld. The mere filing of a Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs Claim and Re-Schedule Non-Jury Trial is insufficient to compel removal of a nonsuit, even where accompanied by the unsworn argument of counsel at a subsequent hearing at which no testimony is offered or taken. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
On October 12, 1988, the Honorable Robert A. Doyle dismissed Elcomp, Inc. (Elcomp)’s cause of action against Peter J. Drolet (Drolet). The case was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The order was issued in open court and entered upon the record. Trial Transcript, October 12, 1988, page 2. The case had been advertised in the Pittsburgh Legal Journal on August 9, 1988. In that advertisement, the case had been listed for trial before Judge Doyle on October 12, 1988, in Courtroom 617, City-County Building, at 9:00 o’clock. Id. At that time and place, Judge Doyle placed these facts on the record. He then inquired whether there was anybody in the hallway and whether the plaintiff was present. The court received answers in the negative to both questions. Id.
Rule 218 of our Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, as applicable at the time of the order in question, provided, in its entirety:
Rule 218. Party Not Ready When Case is Called for Trial
When a case is called for trial, if without satisfactory excuse a plaintiff is not ready the court may enter a non-suit on motion of the defendant or a non pros on the court’s own motion. If without satisfactory excuse a defendant is not ready, the plaintiff may proceed to trial.
*428The transcript of October 12, 1988 makes it clear that we are reviewing a nonsuit entered pursuant to Rule 218, where neither Elcomp nor its counsel appeared in Courtroom 617 on the day of trial. Therefore, the record before us on review consists only of the proceedings of October 12, 1988. If an appeal is permitted directly from the entry of the nonsuit in this case, there is absolutely nothing on the record to support the majority’s conclusion that Judge Doyle abused his discretion.
The majority, relying on Carroll v. Kimmel, 362 Pa.Super. 432, 437, 524 A.2d 954, 956 (1987), asserts that Judge Doyle could not properly exercise his discretion in this matter without considering the possibility of prejudice to Drolet. Majority opinion, pages 205, 205. However, prejudice is not an element to be considered in the direct review of a Rule 218 dismissal. The only element which the trial court need consider prior to entry of a nonsuit on motion of the defendant, where the party is not ready when the case is called for trial, is whether the plaintiff is “without satisfactory excuse.” Rule 218, supra. A review of the record supports the action of Judge Doyle, in that the plaintiff did not answer the call, the case had been properly advertised, and the defendant moved for a nonsuit. Transcript, October 12, 1988,' page 2.
I cannot join in my colleague’s conclusion that a trial judge abuses his discretion by entering a nonsuit upon failure of the plaintiff to appear. This is precisely what is contemplated by Rule 218. And since the order may be entered in any situation where a satisfactory excuse is not tendered, a direct appeal from such an order leaves little to be reviewed. The only question on direct appeal would be: at the time the order was entered, was there any satisfactory excuse before the trial court?
Carroll v. Kimmel, supra, upon which the majority relies, is inapposite to the present appeal. In that case, we were called upon to review a judgment of non pros entered pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1037(c), which governs judgments upon default or admission. The plaintiff in that case had *429filed a notice complaint with the arbitration panels for health care against a physician. The notice was filed one day less than two years following the death of Rita Carroll, by a trustee ad litem for her estate. A full complaint was not filed for another five years. We followed Gallagher v. Jewish Hospital Assoc., 425 Pa. 112, 228 A.2d 732 (1967) and considered whether there had been (1) a want of due diligence, (2) no compelling reason for the delay, and (3) prejudice to the adverse party. Those criteria are proper where the court is called upon to review the entire record to determine whether judgment by default may be entered. James Brothers Lumber Co. v. Union Banking & Trust Co. of DuBois, 432 Pa. 129, 132, 247 A.2d 587, 589 (1968).
Nonsuits entered pursuant to Rule 218 need not, and should not, be treated as if they involved considerations identical to those found in Rule 1037(c) judgment-by-default matters. The petition practice established through Pa.R. C.P. 206-209 provides a sound basis by which the trial court can assess whether a “satisfactory excuse” may have existed at the time the Rule 218 nonsuit on defendant’s motion was entered. If a party, rather than filing an appeal directly from the entry of nonsuit, submits a petition to the trial court to remove a Rule 218 nonsuit without a satisfactory excuse for being unprepared, the court can properly refuse to take off the nonsuit. Farabaugh Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Covenant Management, Inc., 361 Pa.Super. 234, 522 A.2d 100 (1987); Snyder v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 259 Pa.Super. 448, 393 A.2d 911 (1978).
Where this petition practice is followed, both the trial court and any reviewing court has record evidence on the issue of whether the nonsuit should be removed. Upon such a record, it is the decision to remove, or the failure to remove, after consideration of all the evidence, which is subject to judicial review. Then, the issue on appeal is not whether the trial court should have entered the nonsuit, but whether reasons exist for opening the judgment, i.e., for removing the nonsuit.
*430Elcomp would argue that a satisfactory excuse did, in fact, exist for its non-appearance when the case was called for trial on October 12, 1988. In seeking to establish this, the relevant time period would appear to be the period from October 5, 1988 to October 12, 1988. During this period, there may have been at least several attempts at communication between counsel for Elcomp and counsel for Drolet. However, the record does not provide us with petition, answer, and depositions on disputed issues of fact. Pa.R. C.P. 206-209 or with any testimony.
The majority does not cite to any pleadings contained in the certified record. It appears to rely upon the Brief for Appellant and the Brief for Appellee to establish those “facts” which have “never been disputed.” In doing so, the majority accepts as “fact” matters on which the trial court has not passed.
Our supreme court has instructed us that, in resolving those issues properly before us, we may only look to the record prepared in the trial court. Alleging facts in a brief on which a trial court has not passed has been specifically condemned. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 507 Pa. 204, 214-15, 489 A.2d 1291, 1296 (1985); see Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 114-16, 317 A.2d 258, 264 (1974) (collecting civil cases); Commonwealth v. Lowry, 385 Pa.Super. 236, 246, 560 A.2d 781, 785-86 (1989). For our court to attempt, now, to resolve issues based upon such allegations is precisely the type of review and analysis that was so roundly condemned by our Supreme Court in Reilly, supra.
Upon the certified record before us, we are limited to one, unverified motion prepared by counsel for Elcomp. The motion seeks to reinstate Elcomp’s claim and have the de novo appeal from arbitrators rescheduled. The Motion to Reinstate is time-stamped as having been filed in the Court of Common Pleas on October 18, 1988, although attached under the same document binder as the order of the trial court denying the motion, which order is dated October 18, *4311988 and bears a prothonotary’s time stamp of October 20, 1988.
We also have the unsworn argument of opposing counsel recorded at a hearing held October 18, 1988 before Judge Doyle. I do not find these items an adequate substitute for a certified evidentiary transcript from which the trial court would have been compelled to reach findings of fact and conclusions of law. Cox v. Felice Perri & Sons, 412 Pa. 415, 195 A.2d 79 (1963). The absence of a complete evidentiary record in this case illustrates why a direct appeal should not be permitted from the entry of a nonsuit on motion of the defendant pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 218. While the majority seemingly finds no dispute over what transpired between counsel, I find the transcript of the October 18, 1988 hearing to be filled with clear disagreements between counsel, the trial court and among the parties regarding what occurred.
Judge Doyle, in his Opinion Supporting Orders of Court of October 12 and 18, 1988, which Opinion was prepared and filed on November 22, 1988 pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, stated:
Plaintiff appeals from Orders entered October 14 and 20, 1988. We find that Orders were not entered on these dates. If Plaintiff is alleging that the Orders were docketed on those dates, we still have nothing of record upon which to base an Opinion. We entered our Orders because the absence of Plaintiff s counsel was not satisfactorily explained and the explanation offered was refuted by counsel for Defendant.
Opinion, Doyle, J., filed November 22, 1988, pages 1-2. (emphasis added).
Elcomp has included a copy of a Motion for Reconsideration of Dismissal of Plaintiffs Claim in the Reproduced Record filed with this court on April 10, 1989. However, the original of that Motion has not been included in the original record, nor has it been referred to in the entries in the certified docket. In determining this appeal, we should disregard that document and its contents entirely. It re*432mains well settled that an appellate court can consider only the certified record on appeal when reviewing the case. Barner v. Barner, 364 Pa.Super. 1, 527 A.2d 122 (1987). Of equal importance, we have before us in this case the statement by the trial judge that “the explanation offered [for non-appearance] was refuted by counsel for Defendant,” quoted above.
The majority seemingly would place upon our trial judges ¡he burden of determining, at the time a case is called for trial, all of those factors which more properly are presented as part of the petition and rule practice. Suggestions of “a brief discussion with counsel present” and receiving “argument____concerning any prejudice resulting to [defendant] from [plaintiffs] failure to appear” is exactly the type of extended procedure which Rule 218 is designed to avoid. The majority’s suggestions appear to rule out the filing of any petition to vacate or open the nonsuit. But relying on brief discussions and unverified motions is the kind of procedure upon which our Supreme Court looked askance in Cox v. Felice Perri & Sons, supra.
In Cox, our Supreme Court reviewed, and reversed, an order which struck off a judgment of non pros because the reasons advanced to strike the judgment were all outside the certified record. On facts which closely parallel the situation on this appeal, the court said:
[T]he instant motion does not, nor does it purport to, attack the entry of this judgment for any defects apparent on the face of this record; on the contrary, the reasons assigned in the motion for the removal of the judgment are dehors the record of the judgment. The appropriate proceeding would have been a petition and rule to open the judgment, a proceeding which would necessarily have involved the taking of testimony to establish the verity of the facts alleged for the removal of the judgment ... By the procedure adopted, clearly and patently erroneous, [defendant’s] counsel was precluded from contradicting by testimony the facts averred in the motion____ In the third place, unlike a *433review of an order granting the opening of a judgment wherein the test is whether there was an abuse of discretion on the part of the court below, on our review of this order we look only to the record to ascertain the presence of any defects and such an examination of the record clearly reveals no such defects.
412 Pa. at 417-18, 195 A.2d at 80-81.
The majority does not explain why this court should accept, as facts, allegations contained in an unverified motion where the trial court has expressly rejected those allegations and denied relief. In my view, upon the record before us, Elcomp has not sustained its burden of showing that its absence from trial on October 12, 1988 was accompanied by a satisfactory excuse. I therefore cannot find any reasonable basis for removing the nonsuit.
Thus, I dissent.
Joined by FORD ELLIOTT, J.