Court Opinion

ID: 9918693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 15:06:09.349265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:31.499517
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                                 APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this
               opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                          SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                          APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                          DOCKET NO. A-0480-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

         Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KINTAYE Z. CRAWFORD,

         Defendant-Appellant.

                   Submitted December 11, 2023 – Decided January 16, 2024

                   Before Judges Marczyk and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No.
                   21-02-0075.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public
                   Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

                   Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Randolph E. Mershon III,
                   Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Kintaye Crawford appeals the trial court's September 10, 2021

order denying his motion to suppress physical evidence police seized during a

warrantless pat-down of his person following a motor vehicle stop. Defendant

also appeals the trial court's May 18, 2022 order denying his motion for

reconsideration. Lastly, defendant challenges the prison sentence imposed.

Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we affirm.

                                       I.

      In February 2021, a Middlesex County grand jury returned an indictment

charging defendant with the following:        fourth-degree obstruction of the

administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (count one); third-degree resisting

arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1) and 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a) (count two); and second-

degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count three).

Defendant subsequently moved to suppress physical evidence.

      We derive the following facts from the record developed at the September

2021 suppression hearing. At approximately 9:45 p.m. on November 12, 2020,

Piscataway Police Department Detective Jerry Nichols and his supervisor,

Detective Sergeant Michael Coffey, were on patrol in an unmarked police car in

the area of Hazelwood Place and West Fourth Street. Both Detectives Nichols

and Coffey were assigned to the Narcotics Bureau. Their vehicle was equipped

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with a mobile video recorder system which had one microphone that was placed

in Detective Nichols' shirt pocket.

      The detectives parked their vehicle on Hazelwood Place near the

intersection with West Fourth Street. While parked, both detectives observed a

black Kia sedan without a rear license plate traveling in the southbound lane of

Hazelwood Place. The Kia approached the intersection and made a right turn.

In making this turn, the Kia failed to make a complete stop at the stop sign before

continuing westbound on West Fourth Street. The detectives began to follow

the Kia and again observed the vehicle failed to make a complete stop at West

Fourth Street and Walnut Street. The detectives subsequently activated their

emergency lights and initiated a motor vehicle stop. The detectives exited their

unmarked patrol vehicle and approached the Kia. Detective Coffey approached

the driver's side of the vehicle and identified the driver as Janiyyah M. Jones,

while Nichols approached the passenger side and identified the front seat

passenger as defendant.

      While speaking to the occupants, Detective Nichols smelled a "pretty

pungent" odor of raw marijuana emanating from the interior of the vehicle.

Detective Coffey also detected the "strong" smell of raw marijuana coming from

the interior of the car through the open driver's side window and signaled to

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Detective Nichols by pointing to his nose. While the detectives were speaking

with the occupants of the vehicle, additional officers, Michael Sexton and Rob

Mercer, arrived on scene.     Detective Coffey ran Jones and defendant for

warrants; neither had any. Using his flashlight to illuminate the inside of the

Kia, Detective Nichols observed a blue-green vial containing suspected

marijuana in the center console area. Officer Sexton, who had arrived as backup,

told Detective Coffey he had observed a vial of suspected marijuana in the center

console area. Detective Coffey confirmed that observation himself by looking

into the car. Detective Coffey testified the vial was in an area behind where an

elbow would rest on the center console.

        Coffey went to the passenger side of the Kia to commence a probable

cause search of the car based on the observation of marijuana. Detective Coffey

approached the passenger side of the vehicle, and defendant was asked to step

out. Initially, defendant cooperated with the officers' requests. When defendant

exited the car, he reached for his waistband, which concerned Detective Coffey.

Detective Coffey grabbed defendant's wrists, and defendant was resistive.

Detective Coffey stated defendant was tensing up, moving his hands, and pulling

away.     At that point, the officers secured defendant's wrists, "for safety

precautions," and placed him in handcuffs. Detective Coffey began to conduct

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a pat-down search of defendant. While Detective Coffey was near defendant's

inner thigh, he felt a "hard bulge," and he immediately identified the object as a

gun. Detective Coffey alerted the officers about the gun. Defendant then lunged

into the passenger's seat of the car, and Detective Coffey dove on top of him in

an attempt to secure the gun.

      After defendant was secured, Detective Coffey retrieved a loaded semi-

automatic handgun from defendant's pants. Defendant was placed under arrest

and secured in the rear of a patrol vehicle. The rest of the vehicle was searched.

Marijuana was then seized from a container in the center console.

      In an oral ruling, the trial court denied the suppression motion. The trial

court found the officers' testimony to be "very credible" and "consistent" with

the video of the stop. The court found the stop was lawfully based on the

detectives' observations of the motor vehicle violations and held that the

detectives had probable cause to search the Kia for contraband based on the odor

of marijuana and the plain view observation of the suspected vial of marijuana.

Finally, the trial court held the search of defendant's person was a reasonable

and lawful pat-down for weapons and that the gun was immediately identified

during that frisk. The court noted the specific and particularized reasons for the

pat-down included defendant's non-compliance with directions, refusing to

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place his hands on the car, fidgeting with his waistband, and furtive movements.

The trial court concluded that Detective Coffey was justified in seizing the gun

from defendant's pants.

      In December 2021, defendant's private counsel was relieved, and

defendant was assigned counsel from the Office of the Public Defender. In April

2022, the newly assigned counsel moved for reconsideration of the trial court's

suppression decision. Defendant argued the search of defendant was not limited

to a pat-down for weapons. Defendant asserted the search was a full search, and

the video footage depicted Detective Coffey reaching into defendant's pockets,

removing items, and placing those items on the vehicle. Defendant further

argued that, even if the search was a limited frisk for weapons, there were no

articulable facts to support the suspicion that defendant was armed at the time

of the search.

      The court initially observed the motion for reconsideration was untimely

under Rule 1:7-4.     Nevertheless, the court considered the merits of the

arguments. It noted defendant failed to present any new case law that would

demonstrate the court's prior decision was palpably incorrect or irrational. The

court further noted the motion "merely reargue[d] the original motion."

Accordingly, the court denied the motion for reconsideration.

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      Defendant subsequently pled guilty to count three, second-degree

unlawful possession of a handgun. The State agreed to recommend a custodial

sentence of seven years with forty-two months of parole ineligibility, subject to

the "Graves Act," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). The State also agreed to dismiss the

remaining charges. Pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f), defendant preserved the right to

appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On September 30, 2022, the trial

court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement to a custodial

term of seven years with forty-two months of parole ineligibility.

                                       II.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:

            POINT I

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
            DETERMINED THAT THE GUN WAS SEIZED
            DURING A LAWFUL PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF
            DEFENDANT'S PERSON.

            POINT II

            THE SENTENCING COURT ERRED WHEN IT
            RELIED ON DEFENDANT'S JUVENILE RECORD
            AND HIS HALLMARK FEATURES OF YOUTH IN
            AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING

                                       A.

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      In assessing defendant's arguments related to the pat-down search, we

apply well-settled principles. We recognize that under the United States and

New Jersey Constitutions, a warrantless search by police officers is invalid

unless it is justified by an established exception to the warrant requirement.

State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 319 (2023). If the State fails to prove such an

exception applies, the evidence seized must be suppressed. Ibid.

      "When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a suppression

motion, appellate courts 'must defer to the factual findings of the trial court so

long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.'" State

v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249,

262 (2015)). Trial courts are owed deference because of their "opportunity to

hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing

court cannot enjoy." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting State

v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)).         However, "[a] trial court's legal

conclusions . . . are reviewed de novo," and factual findings that are "clearly

mistaken" must be reversed in the interest of justice. Cohen, 254 N.J. at 319

(first quoting Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 609; then quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J.

412, 425 (2014)).      If the reviewing court finds that the officers acted

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unconstitutionally, the fruits of the search must be suppressed. State v. Patino,

83 N.J. 1, 14-15 (1980).

      Defendant does not challenge the initial stop of the vehicle, nor does he

challenge the search of the vehicle. After smelling marijuana, the detectives

asked defendant to get out of the vehicle so that the interior of vehicle could be

searched. Under then-applicable law,1 the odor provided the police with grounds

to remove the passengers and search the passenger compartment of the car.

Cohen, 254 N.J. at 308.

      We thus direct our attention to the next phase of this encounter—the pat-

down of defendant's pants. Defendant argues the detectives did not have a

reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific facts, that he was armed and

dangerous, and, thus, the detectives could not lawfully conduct a frisk.

1
   The search at issue predates the 2021 passage of the Cannabis Regulatory,
Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA),
N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, which added a new section in the Criminal Code stating
that neither "the odor of cannabis or burnt cannabis," nor the "possession of
marijuana or hashish without evidence of quantity in excess of any amount that
would exceed the amount . . . which may be lawfully possessed," "shall,
individually or collectively, constitute reasonable articulable suspicion of a
crime[,]" except on school property or at a correctional facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
10(a), (c). "[G]oing forward [after CREAMMA], we anticipate that cases
involving the automobile exception and probable cause to search a vehicle based
solely on the smell of marijuana will likely be few and far between." Cohen,
254 N.J. at 328.

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Defendant further asserts that Detective Coffey was acting on a hunch based on

his statement after the discovery of the gun and defendant's arrest where he

stated, "I just got that idea that he had a gun, man . . . . As soon as I saw him, I

thought this kid probably has a gun."        Further, even if the totality of the

circumstances provided the detectives with the requisite suspicion to conduct a

pat-down search, Detective Coffey exceeded the limited scope of a pat-down

search when he began removing items from defendant's pockets. Because the

search of defendant's person exceeded the limits of a permissible frisk for

weapons, it was illegal, and the gun should have been suppressed.

      The State counters the trial court properly found the detectives ' initial

encounter with defendant was an investigative detention amply supported by

reasonable suspicion that defendant was concealing contraband or armed with a

weapon. The State submits the trial court properly found that the detectives'

actions were reasonable and justified, given defendant's action as he was exiting

the vehicle, and the motion to suppress should be affirmed.

      In denying the motion suppress, the trial court noted:

            Defendant, in this court's opinion, was non-compliant.
            He wasn't so much resistant as . . . discussed during the
            hearing but rather would be best described as non-
            compliant.

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                  . . . Defendant repeatedly was fidgeting with his
            waistband and was not complying with the officer's
            instructions to place his hands on the car. The officers
            had, as a result, . . . specific and particularized reasons
            to believe that [d]efendant might . . . be concealing
            contraband or a weapon, especially because they
            believed that there was contraband in the vehicle.

                  The officers then reasonably conducted a pat
            down of . . . [d]efendant at the scene to ensure that . . .
            [d]efendant was not armed before the police could
            continue their investigation regarding the search of the
            automobile, as well as the occupants. . . . Defendant's
            furtive movements created risk for the officers and
            caused the officer to exercise heightened caution.

      We affirm substantially for the reasons noted by the trial court. We note

when defendant exited the vehicle, he grabbed his waistband, was pulling away

from the detectives, and was not cooperative in placing his hands on the car. At

that juncture, the detectives were justified in handcuffing defendant for reasons

of officer safety. Defendant's conduct provided the detectives reason to believe

he could have been reaching for a weapon concealed in his pants. In this

circumstance, defendant's conduct was more indicative of danger and potentially

being armed than the nervous conduct of the defendants noted in State v. Nyema,

249 N.J. 509, 530-31 (2022) (citing e.g., State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 277

(2017); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47 (1990)).

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                                       11
      Turning to the subsequent pat-down, it is well-established under the

federal and New Jersey constitutions that the police may stop and frisk a person

if they have reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal activity or a weapon

may be found on that person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968); State v.

Smith, 155 N.J. 91-92 (1998). This standard of reasonable suspicion is less

rigorous than probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-27. In the course of a

permissible Terry stop and frisk, the police are authorized to "conduct a

carefully limited search of the outer clothing" of the person. Id. at 30; see also

State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988).

      We agree with the trial court the detectives had reasonable suspicion to

perform a pat-down frisk of defendant under the Terry doctrine.           Despite

Detective Coffey's statements following the arrest about his thought defendant

might have a gun, the totality of circumstances independently supported a

reasonable suspicion for the pat-down, including defendant reaching for his

waistband, flailing his hands, and pulling away from the detectives. Moreover,

we do not focus on the officer's subjective intent. See State v. Diaz, 470 N.J.

Super. 495, 522-23 (App. Div. 2022).         Rather, under Fourth Amendment

analysis, reviewing courts apply an objective test of reasonableness to evaluate

police conduct. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016). Absent evidence of

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impermissible racial profiling or some other constitutionally impermissible

motive, the officer's intent or motive is irrelevant because the Fourth

Amendment "proscribes unreasonable actions, not improper thoughts." State v.

Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983). We further note the pat-down was directed

appropriately at defendant's outer clothing. 2

        We are also unpersuaded by defendant's argument the detectives exceeded

the limited scope of a pat-down search when he began removing items from

defendant's pockets. The presence or absence of probable cause to search

defendant's pockets is a distinct issue from whether police had reasonable

suspicion to frisk his pants. First, there were no charges filed against defendant

2
    The trial judge explained:

                     Here, following the lawful traffic stop and the
              officer discovering the contraband in the vehicle, the
              officer's discovery of the handgun on . . . [d]efendant
              during a lawful pat down of [d]efendant's outer clothes,
              the officer felt an object in [d]efendant's pants. He
              identified the object immediately as a handgun due to
              its shape and feel. It was readily apparent to the officer
              that the object in [d]efendant's pants was a handgun,
              and in fact it turned out to be a handgun. Therefore, the
              officer was justified in reaching into [d]efendant's pants
              to retrieve the handgun, because the handgun was
              immediately apparent in the pat down of . . .
              [d]efendant[].

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stemming from the search of his pockets. Moreover, the pat-down was unrelated

to the search of defendant's pockets, and detectives did not rely on the discovery

of any evidence from defendant's pockets to justify the pat-down that revealed

the gun. We therefore affirm the court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress

the seized handgun. Given our analysis the pat-down was justified based on

defendant's actions when he was removed from the vehicle, we need not address

whether the search was also valid as a search incident to an arrest.

                                       B.

      Defendant next argues the sentencing court weighed defendant's hallmark

features of youth against him at sentencing, and the sentence should be reversed

and remanded for resentencing to a lesser term. Defendant notes the trial court

determined N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), and (9) (risk of re-offense, defendant's

prior criminal record, and the need for deterrence) substantially outweighed

mitigating factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) (defendant was under

twenty-six years old at the time of the offense) in imposing the sentence.

Defendant notes that although mitigating factor fourteen was applied because

defendant was nineteen years old during the offense, the court overly relied on

defendant's "defiant" and "anti-social" behavior during the motor vehicle stop

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                                       14
and his failure to attend the pre-sentencing report interview to find the

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.

      Sentencing decisions are discretionary in nature. State v. Cuff, 239 N.J.

321, 347 (2019). Therefore, we review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones,

232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). We defer to the sentencing court's factual findings

and should not "second-guess" them. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).

      A sentence should be affirmed "unless: (1) the sentencing guidelines were

violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were not 'based

upon competent credible evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the application of the

guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial conscience.'" State v.

Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth,

95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).

      The trial judge comprehensively considered the applicable aggravating

and mitigating factors. The court observed aggravating factor six (extent of

prior record) applied, given defendant had a "significant" juvenile record

coupled with the seriousness of the offenses including adjudications involving

weapons. The court noted defendant's pattern of defiance toward the rule of

law in view of his juvenile record, along with committing a serious offense at

age nineteen, support aggravating factor three (risk of re-offense).

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Furthermore, the court determined aggravating factor nine (need for deterrence)

was implicated as there was a clear need to deter defendant from committing

other offenses along with a more general need to deter this type of behavior in

society at large. The court further recognized mitigating factor fourteen was

applicable, given defendant was under twenty-six years of age when the crime

was committed and the prospect that he could seek help to resolve whatever

issues were causing him to disregard the law. In balancing the factors, the court

determined, based on the totality of the circumstances, the aggravating factors

"substantially outweighed the mitigating factor" and that the plea agreement

was fair and reasonable.

      Appling the above principles, we discern no error in the trial judge's

consideration of the aggravating factors and mitigating factors. The trial judge

appropriately considered defendant's age as a mitigating factor. There is no

indication the court considered defendant's youth as an aggravating factor. The

court applied the facts of this case to the applicable law. There was ample

evidence in the record to support the court's conclusions.

      To the extent we have not addressed any remaining contentions, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2).

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Affirmed.

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