Court Opinion

ID: 9476455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:56:32.925653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:19.943881
License: Public Domain

RONEY, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent for three reasons: First, both Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), involved a life sentence given under a state recidivist statute. None of the sentences here has been enhanced because of prior conduct. Marre-ro does not challenge the validity of the sentence received on any individual count, but rather he claims that the cumulative effect of consecutive sentences, which would not be present if the sentences were concurrent, renders his total sentence invalid. Both Rummel and Helm involved the imposition of life sentences after conviction of a lower class felony. The maximum sentences for those felonies, ten years in Rummel and five years in Helm, are consistent with the individual sentences being challenged here. The recidivist statutes of Texas and South Dakota, however, incorporated prior behavior into the sentencing analysis and life sentences were imposed. Unlike either Rummel or Helm, Marrero was not sentenced under a recidivist statute, but under the normal sentencing statute. He received only the statutory sentence for each crime. It is not cruel and unusual for a person to be held accountable to the full extent of the law for each crime of which he is convicted.
I am unsure what principle of constitutional law the Court is applying in this case. It seems to put the federal courts in the business of conducting a proportionality review of every state case involving consecutive sentences for individual crimes. That is not even required in federal court. The law of our Circuit has consistently been that this Court has no authority to review sentences which are within the statutory limits. We have found no case where sentences for individual crimes were disturbed simply because they were consecutive.
Second, I would affirm the district court’s decision that this case is more like Rummel than Helm. The availability of parole is, of course, the evident distinction between Helm and this case, just as it was the distinction between Rummel and Helm. The Court’s observation that a violation of parole would cause a revocation and cause Marrero to be subjected to the prison sentence is equally applicable to Rummel and the life sentence. The 240-year sentence is in effect no more than a life sentence. As with Rummel, the possibility of parole is such that the prison sentence is subject to reduction to less than that so that the term of imprisonment would be a clearly appropriate one. Marre-*1474ro was actually released on parole on November 19, 1985.
Third, unlike Rummel and Helm, the goal defendant seeks here is to go unpunished for many of his crimes. Assuming the state could constitutionally convict Marrero of 24 separate crimes under these circumstances, a point that has not been challenged on this appeal, Marrero would constitutionally require the state to impose some concurrent sentences. That means, of course, that the Constitution would require him to go virtually unpunished for several of his crimes. A day in prison for one crime is apparently no different than a day in prison for several crimes. In neither Rummel nor Helm was there any suggestion that the state could not impose the statutory maximum sentence for the separate crimes for which the defendants were convicted. The Court here apparently would have the district court consider going further than that, and render potentially ineffective any accountability for crimes beyond some given number, which would dictate the maximum sentence he could get for all his crimes.
This decision goes much further than the Supreme Court did in Rummel and Helm, and applies a principle which encroaches measurably upon a state’s attempt to administer an effective and efficient criminal justice system.
To the extent the Court seeks sustenance from the effect of the Supreme Court’s remand of this case, it is misconceived. Common knowledge has it that when an important case like Helm is handed down by the Supreme Court, a number of pending cases that have similar issues are simply remanded “to reconsider in the light of,” with no careful determination by the Supreme Court as to whether the key decision will or will not affect the outcome of the particular case. To reason otherwise relies upon an exercise that the Supreme Court admittedly has not undertaken.1
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION BENITO MARRERO, Plaintiff, -vs-LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, Defendant.
No. 80-114 Civ-T-10
■ ORDER
This cause is before the Court on a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition following remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration of Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim in light of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).
In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner asserts that the issue of the volun-tariness of his confession should have been addressed by the Magistrate on remand. The Supreme Court, in Marrero v. Wainwright, 463 U.S. 1223, 103 S.Ct. 3567, 77 *1475L.Ed.2d 1407 (1983), remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Solem. Solem addressed only the Eighth Amendment. Reconsidering in light of Solem does not require revisiting the holding in respect to a Fifth Amendment claim of involuntary confession.
Petitioner also asserts the failure of the Magistrate to consider the proportionality analysis enunciated in Solem. Applying this analysis to the absolute number of years imposed in the sentence would be misleading when the possibility of parole is such that the sentence will potentially be reduced to a clearly appropriate one. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). In light of the Florida Supreme Court decision, Lowry v. Parole & Probation Commission, 10 FLW 314, 473 So.2d 1248 (S.Ct.Fla., 1985), parole for the Petitioner continues to be likely. It is not necessary that the Petitioner be able to enforce parole as a matter of right in order for the possibility of parole to be a deciding factor in assessing his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S.Ct. at 1142-43. Petitioner’s attempts to distinguish Rummel on the basis that the punishment imposed on Petitioner was a result of judicial discretion rather than legislative mandate are unpersuasive.
Petitioner, asserting that he is proceeding in forma pauperis, also complains of the language of the order of June 27, 1985 stating “each party shall bear its own costs”. Accordingly, the Court’s order is amended to read “the government shall bear its own cost” and upon due consideration Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE and ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 3rd day of September, 1985.
/s/ W. Terrell Hodges United States
District Judge
APPENDIX B
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS CAUSE came on for consideration of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a state prisoner, BENITO MARRERO, pro se, in forma pauperis. This case is presently before this court on remand from the Supreme Court, for reconsideration of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim in light of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).
Petitioner was convicted of twelve counts of breaking and entering motel rooms and twelve counts of burglary of television sets in the rooms, all offenses occuring in one motel in one criminal episode. Consecutive sentences were imposed upon said convictions for a total of 240 years imprisonment. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to full scale discovery in order to conduct extensive proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment. Petitioner’s counsel has advised this court that no statistical analysis presently exists from any known source which would be material to the extended analysis necessary to determine if petitioner’s sentences are not constitutionally disproportionate. As a first stage in obtaining the statistics which petitioner’s counsel maintains are necessary to the development of his case, petitioner seeks advance authority under the Criminal Justice Act to employ a statistical expert for a fee of $2,500.00, not including necessary court appearances.
To date, counsel for the parties and, indeed, the undersigned, have assumed that a full scale, extensive statistical analysis would be required in order to satisfy the mandate of the Supreme Court in this case. A review of the cases decided subsequent to Solem has now convinced me to the contrary. Solem, supra, does not require extensive analysis with respect to every excessiveness issue. The Court in Solem expressly did not require extensive analysis with regard to every petition for habeas corpus relief raising the Eighth Amendment proportionality issue.1
The Solem majority opinion noted that its decision was not inconsistent with Rum-*1476mel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), and that Rummel was controlling in similar fact situations.2
In Rummel the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for a series of rather minor offenses with eligibility for a reasonably early parole. In Helm the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for parole. The Supreme Court specifically distinguished Solem from Rummel on the basis of the availability of parole, although other distinguishing factors were noted.3 In the instant case, although the petitioner has been sentenced to a long sentence, he, like Rummel but unlike Helm, will be eligible for early release.4
Accordingly, I recommend that the petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim be denied as being without merit and that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed, this 10th day of January, 1985.5
/s/ Paul Game, Jr. PAUL GAME, JR.
United States Magistrate
NOTE: This matter was referred to the United States Magistrate pursuant to the Standing Order of this Court and Local Rule 6.01(c)(17). Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual findings on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Local Rule 6.02; Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.1982). Because this Report and Recommendation contains conclusions of law which may be novel in light of the recent cases cited and the conclusions reached, the time for filing objections is extended, and petitioner may file written objections to this report within 30 days from date of service of this report.

. In response to Judge Godbold's comments on my decision in this case, I have carefully reread my dissent to see wherein I may have suggested "that the Supreme Court really did not mean what it said when it remanded the case ‘for further consideration in light of Solem v. Helm.' ” I cannot find that suggestion. If it is there, I disclaim it. All I have said is that the Supreme Court in remanding the case made no decision that Helm would in fact change the outcome of this case. I stand by that view.
As to whether the district court reconsidered the case in light of Helm, I attach in full the district court opinion and the magistrate’s report and recommendation so that the reader can decide whether the magistrate and the district court have followed the Supreme Court mandate. (See Appendixes A and B).
The following of legal precedent should result in like facts receiving like results. The district court found that this case was more like Rum-mel than Helm. I agree. We may be wrong, but it is not because we have not tried to fairly apply both Helm and Rummel, two decisions that are difficult to reconcile.

. Solem, 103 S.Ct. at 3009, n. 16; Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 180 (5th Cir.1984); see also Whitmore v. Maggio, 742 F.2d 230, 234 (5th Cir.1984).

. Solem, supra, [103 S.Ct.] at 3013-3014, and 3015-3016. See also Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171 at 179-181.

. Moreno, 717 F.2d 171, 180 n. 11 (5th Cir.1984).

. Rummel became eligible for parole after serving approximately 12 years. Rummel, supra, 445 U.S. at 267, 100 S.Ct. at 1135. Petitioner's counsel advised the undersigned that, according to a Florida Department of Corrections official, petitioner may be released as early as November 25, 1985, after serving approximately 10 years. Petitioner’s eligibility for early release was not disclosed to the Supreme Court in briefs filed by the parties with that court and apparently was not a factor considered in its remand for consideration under Solem. See copies of briefs filed herein on April 24, 1984.

.The Report and Recommendation previously filed in this case is incorprated herein by reference in light of the finding that Rummel applies and was not over-ruled by Solem.