Court Opinion

ID: 9473593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:33:49.964824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:37.051855
License: Public Domain

POOLE, Circuit Judge, with whom SNEED, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting.
The majority correctly holds that a defendant who distributes a sample of narcotics from a bulk amount which he retains intending to make a further distribution to the same recipients commits and may be convicted of two crimes. I part company, however, with the majority’s further conclusion that such a defendant may be sentenced on only one crime.
This was a clear and relatively uncomplicated case to which the majority has applied convoluted and contradictory reasoning and from which it has distilled a rule that when Congress has created two distinct and separate criminal offenses — possession with intent to distribute and distribution — a defendant may be convicted of both but may be sentenced on only one.
Palafox was charged and convicted under an indictment alleging that he violated the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (the Drug Act), in that he (1) possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute it and (2) he did distribute a controlled substance. The section in question provides:
*565(a) Except as authorized by this subchap-ter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally—
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance;
In February, 1982, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency of the Department of Justice, Special Agent Edward Cazares, received an unexpected telephone call at his Sacramento office from an inmate at Terminal Island Federal Correctional Institute in San Pedro, California who introduced the agent to appellant Palafox as a prospective heroin buyer. The agent gave Palafox the number of an undercover telephone at the Sacramento Regional Office of the Agency. From February through April Palafox initiated several collect telephone calls to Ca-zares. In late April 1982 Palafox and his wife (Gonzalez, who became a co-defendant with Palafox) continued communications with Cazares discussing the possible delivery of a quantity of heroin. In late July Palafox told Cazares that he was then out on parole and would soon arrange a delivery. On September 9 Palafox advised Ca-zares, again by telephone, that he would deliver a quantity of heroin and cocaine and that he was coming to Sacramento. On September 10 Palafox telephoned that he was in Los Angeles and that he and Gonzalez would arrive in Sacramento that night with 5 ounces of heroin. Three days later, on September 13, Palafox telephoned Ca-zares that he and Gonzalez were at Fresno, had 5 ounces of heroin, and would arrive in Sacramento in the early afternoon. That afternoon Palafox called Cazares and said he was in Sacramento at a shopping center parking lot and had the contraband. He gave Cazares a description of himself and of his vehicle.
Cazares drove to the lot and recognized Palafox standing by a Ford Ranchero vehicle. Seated inside was Gonzalez. Ca-zares parked his government car a short distance away and Palafox came over to the agent and introduced himself. The agent then walked over to the Ranchero and negotiated with Palafox and Gonzalez for the purchase and delivery of the contraband. Palafox wanted the agent to go with him to a motel where the agent could get a small sample of the heroin. After further negotiations Palafox agreed to produce the heroin. Palafox removed from under the dashboard of his vehicle a baseball sized ball of masking tape from which he unsuccessfully attempted to remove a sample quantity. Gonzalez gave him a fork to open the tape and they went over to the government vehicle. There Palafox handed Cazares the ball, from which Cazares removed a sample of brown heroin. Pala-fox then returned to his Ford Ranchero and replaced the ball under the dashboard. On the pretense that he would have to call someone to test the sample and would return, Cazares walked away and shortly thereafter gave a prearranged arrest signal. Other officers appeared and Palafox and Gonzalez were taken into custody.
Palafox was charged in a two-count indictment with two violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Count I charged distribution of the sample. Count II charged possession of the bulk (124.58 grams) of heroin with intent to distribute.
The majority concedes that § 841(a)(1) creates two offenses and that possession with intent to distribute is a crime distinct and separate from distribution. The majority agrees that the government could properly charge, try and seek conviction of the defendant for the discrete offenses of distribution and possession, but the majority holds that the court, upon conviction, could sentence the defendant for only one offense.
Normally when Congress has created two offenses and a defendant is convicted of both, he would be subject to sentence on each, the sentence to run concurrently or cumulatively. The majority holds that only one may be imposed here. The question arises: Why? Because it is dictated by controlling precedent? Not so.
The controlling precedent in this circuit is United States v. Mehrmanesh, 682 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir.1982), a decision by a panel of *566which the author of today’s opinion was a member. It holds that each offense is properly subject to separate sentencing.
Mehrmanesh involved separate punishments for separate distributions of a sample and then of the remaining bulk of contraband. Mehrmanesh made a deal through an informant, Melchi, to sell 50 grams of heroin to Melchi’s buyers. At a meeting between Melchi, Mehrmanesh and Mehrmanesh’s associates, Napier and Reedy, Melchi asked for a sample to show to his principals. Mehrmanesh said that the heroin was elsewhere but he would have it delivered to the home of one of his associates the next morning. Reedy, who later gave evidence for the government, testified that Mehrmanesh arranged for Reedy to pickup the heroin and that he did so. Later, Mehrmanesh’s associate, Napier, gave Melchi a 4 gram sample which apparently Melchi never delivered to his principal. Melchi later told Reedy and Napier that his principal wanted another sample. Reedy gave him 2.8 grams and this transfer became the basis of a count in the indictment which charged Mehrmanesh with aiding and abetting that distribution. When the balance of the heroin was delivered to the agent, approximately 594 grams, Reedy and Napier were arrested and that delivery was the basis of the second count against Mehrmanesh.
Mehrmanesh argued that there had only been one sale although there had been two distributions. The Mehrmanesh majority rejected this contention, noting that the 1970 Drug Act
[o]n its face * * * proscribes each act of delivery, rather than each purchase or sale. [The Act is] extremely broad in scope, no longer restricted to the narrower concepts of buy and sell, but all inclusive in covering the entire field of narcotics and dangerous drugs * * * All distribution is controlled or prohibited, legitimate or illegitimate.
Mehrmanesh, 682 F.2d at 1306, citing United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir.1973). The court held that both distributions were separate offenses and subject to separate sentences. Today’s author of Palafox, who dissented in Mehrmanesh, did not then take issue with that holding, but dissented only on the grounds that she believed the evidence did not show Mehrmanesh’s actual knowledge of and participation in the first delivery. Until today, Mehrmanesh has controlled this circuit’s view.
As the majority recognizes, Congress intended to criminalize “all aspects of drug trafficking, and it compels us to reject an approach which focuses on sales or commercial transactions.” Maj. op. at 560. When Congress fixed a 15 year maximum for possession with intent to distribute and a like penalty for distribution, “Congress indicated thereby that the offenses were equally serious and should be treated with equal severity. The Drug Act attacks illegal drug traffic by making the price for drug participation in any aspect prohibitive.” Id. The majority agrees that Palafox may be charged and convicted of each offense and that the government need not declare an election between the crimes, citing cases from other circuits including United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948 (1979).
The majority says, however, that only one sentence may be imposed. The Gomez court, to whose analysis the majority looks, based this conclusion on divination that Congress did not intend to “pyramid” sentences when “two violations of the statute are proved by but one distribution.” Gomez, 593 F.2d at 213. This is inconsistent with our circuit’s decision in Mehrmanesh and is contrary to the majority’s analysis in the instant case. The majority here does not agree that the two violations amount only to “one” crime.
Lacking any supporting precedent in rulings of the Supreme Court under the Drug Act, the majority has reached out to an entirely different statute and a single decision thereunder upon which to base today’s holding. The majority argues that its single-sentence theory finds authority in Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 *567(1957), a decision interpreting the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 et seq. In the Bank Robbery Act, the majority says, “Congress created separate offenses, i.e., entry with intent to rob, and robbery, out of what could have been described as one criminal undertaking.” Maj. op. at 561. The Supreme Court held that as amended in 1937, § 2113(a) of that Act makes separately punishable bank robbery and larceny, but also the Act of entering a bank with intent to commit robbery and larceny; however, one may not be separately punished for both entry and successful ultimate robbery or larceny, because the history of the amendment convinced the Supreme Court that Congress intended no such discrete punishment. The majority tracks no such Congressional intent in the Drug Act.
As set forth hereafter, the Bank Robbery Act supplies no real analogue to treatment of the offenses of possession with intent to distribute and distribution. Although the Court in Prince held that a defendant could be convicted of both bank robbery and of entry with the intent to rob but could be sentenced to only the robbery itself, that conclusion does not illuminate the Drug Act which is an entirely different statutory provision and has an entirely different legislative history.
Robbery is an unlawful taking of personal property from the person or immediate presence of another accomplished variously by force, fear or intimidation. In the sense relevant here, bank robbery is “literally robbery committed in a bank.” R. Perkins, Criminal Law 285 (1969). It is much like the common law crime of burglary. It cannot be committed without an entry of the premises. The federal act was passed in 1934, in the wake of gang robberies of banking institutions. At that time, the Act did not contain present section 2113(a), which punishes entry with the intent to commit robbery, other felony, or larceny. Section 2113(a) was added in 1937 at the urging of the Attorney General who cited to Congress “incongruous results” in which a thief walked out of a bank with $11,000 he had slipped into his pocket during the brief absence of a teller. Under the 1934 statute he had committed no federally prosecutable offense. Prince, 352 U.S. at 325-27, 77 S.Ct. at 405-406. Responding to this anomaly, Congress enacted the 1937 amendments which made punishable the entry with intent to “commit any felony or larceny,” as well as the actual commission of those offenses. Later, the larceny provisions were segregated in § 2113(b), leaving (“simple”) robbery and entry in § 2113(a). Id. at 326, n. 5, 77 S.Ct. at 406 n. 5.
Under today’s Bank Robbery Act, entry is chargeable as a separate offense but punishable as such only if the intended crime does not succeed. The “gravamen of the offense” which Congress had in mind in 1937
is not in the act of entering, which satisfies the terms of the statute even if it is simply walking through an open, public door during normal business hours. Rather the heart of the crime is in the intent to steal. This mental element merges into the completed crime if the robbery is consummated. To go beyond this reasoning would compel us to find that Congress intended, by the 1937 Amendment, to make drastic changes in authorized punishments. This we cannot do. If Congress had so intended, the result could have been accomplished easily with certainty rather than by indirection.
Prince, 352 U.S. at 328, 77 S.Ct. at 406 (footnotes omitted).
Despite some gross similarities, Prince furnishes no real clue to the problem in this case which is whether both possession and distribution are punishable under the Drug Act. Both are related acts denounced as criminal although arising out of the progressions of the transaction. The real inquiry must be whether Congress can be said to have intended each accomplished crime to be punished. Entry is an inseparable element of all bank robberies. One literally cannot commit the crime without entering because Congress was legislating bank robbery, not common law robbery. *568Congress intended that one who went so far as to enter, but who then abandoned his project or was frustrated from its commission, should not go unpunished, but the “heart” of the amended statute lay in its proscription of mere stealing, in addition to proscription of the traditional robbery. Congress’ purpose was not to double the already severe punishment for robbery. Rather, the purpose was to add theft, and entry to commit theft, as sequential, individually punishable acts. Viewing the “gravamen of the [newly added] offense” as the harm arising from the intent to steal, the Chief Justice in Prince held that where the intended crime is in fact consummated, the traditional elements of robbery are already satisfied without reference to the amendments. In such an actual case, the intent which accompanied the entry would carry over into the robbery, supplying the necessary union of act and intent (the Court said, “merges into the completed crime”). 352 U.S. at 328, 77 S.Ct. at 406. Congress’ purpose in adding larceny within a bank to robbery within a bank logically would be satisfied by making it a crime to commit either act, as the Attorney General suggested. And when Congress went further and made entry punishable, it was not to enhance every substantive offense unless the objective fell short.
The Supreme Court in Prince found that Congress had no double penalties in mind and simply did not intend for bank robbery to be parsed into its separate elements where the robbery actually occurred. The Court specifically said that “the unlawful entry provision was inserted to cover the situation where a person enters a bank for the purpose of committing a crime, but is frustrated for some reason before completing the crime.” Id. The Court contrasted the entry provision of the Bank Robbery Act with “a very similar provision relating to post office offenses,” citing 18 U.S.C. § 2115: “Whoever forcibly breaks into or attempts to break into any post office, * * with intent to commit in such post office, or building or part thereof, so used, any larceny or other depredation, shall be fined [not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both].” Id., n. 9. The Court noted that § 2115 has been held to create an offense separate from a completed post office theft. See Morgan v. De-vine, 237 U.S. 632, 35 S.Ct. 712, 59 L.Ed. 1153 (1915).
The majority has tried to bring this ease within precedents holding that where a single act of distribution forms the basis of a charge of distribution and a charge of possession, only one sentence may be imposed. Maj. op. at 562. But it simply is untrue to say of the Palafox facts that “the possession and the distribution occurred at the same time, in the same place, and with the involvement of the same participants.” Id. at 563. The possession existed before the distribution and some possession still existed when the distributor was arrested.
This however is, however, but one example of the diverse ways in which the majority has bent the facts to give credence to its conclusion. Palafox was convicted of “two criminalized steps of one transaction,” id. at 562, “two such component offenses,” id. at 561, “two offenses,” id. at 563, and “one criminal undertaking.” Id. at 563. The majority repeatedly sounds the theme that there really was practically only a single act in Palafox’s case, and that if indeed there was but one act, there ought, as a sort of natural law, only be one punishment. The majority therefore is persuaded that only one sentence could be allowed
where the defendant distributes a sample and retains the remainder for the purpose of making an immediate distribution to the same recipients at the same place and the same time * * *
Maj. op. at 560.
Questions immediately surface: Is such a rule to be applied literally or with flexibility? Does the liability to multiple punishment depend upon whether the person retaining possession intends an immediate distribution as distinguished from a generalized intent to distribute at some future time to some person? Does it matter *569whether it is the seller or the buyer who is the dominant actor? Must both parties actually contemplate a lightning-fast wrap-up? Would it have been different had Pa-lafox sensed danger and escaped? If so, would he face a single punishment if caught immediately, or double punishment if hours or days elapsed?
We took this case en banc to consider whether Mehrmanesh should be overruled. The majority concludes that it should be disapproved. But the majority opinion has in reality changed the facts of Mehrman-esh in arriving at that disapproval. According to today’s opinion, the delivery of a sample by Mehrmanesh’s accomplice, Reedy, to the informant, Melchi, was “unbeknownst” to Mehrmanesh. Maj. op. at 559. That is also what today’s author, a member of that panel, said then in her partial dissent. The Mehrmanesh majority held that the defendant fully understood that a sample would be delivered. See Mehrmanesh, 682 F.2d at 1307-08. The trial jury and two judges necessarily found the facts contrary to the version urged by the dissent — the version which appears in today’s majority opinion. A decent regard for the principle of the law of the case and that decisions are made by a majority of judges, must mean that decided facts are not subject to reconstruction when convenient to do so for the purpose of another case. If indeed the Mehrmanesh facts were as today’s majority now assembles them, that case should be overruled, not for the reasons ascribed, but because it would be wrong to let stand a conviction for distribution of which a defendant had no knowledge and of which he was therefore innocent. Endorsing such a miscarriage of justice would reflect no credit upon our appellate process; but that is not the issue upon which we convened ourselves en banc.1
In fact, the majority appears to be striving, uncertainly, for a rule to the effect that where “a single act of distribution forms the basis for both the charge of distribution and the charge of possession with intent to distribute, the government may prosecute and the defendant may be found guilty of both charges, but the court may impose only one sentence.” Maj. op. at 562. But this is not such a case, for there is more than a single act here.
The majority suggests two rationales for its rule. One is by analogy to the decision in Prince and the other is that some other circuit courts have leap-frogged to the same conclusion. But the real inquiry, and an inquiry almost ignored by the majority, ought to have been: What did Congress intend in this statute? The majority does not argue that Congress could not constitutionally have made Palafox subject to punishment for both crimes. That would implicate the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) which has stood for many years as a rule for determining when multiple punishments for two offenses arising out of the same transaction may constitute double jeopardy. Impliedly, the majority concedes that in the Drug Act Congress could have imposed double punishments for double crimes. Did Congress so intend? That question is no where answered.
All the arguments advanced by the majority fail because they do not address the only issue which is dispositive of this case. The majority opinion presents no history, no language, and no facts showing that Congress did not intend for both punish*570ments to apply in the Drug Act. Invoking the decision in Prince accomplishes little because the entire thrust,of that case is that Congress intended only to fill the void pointed out to it, and did not intend in the 1937 amendments to change the 20 year punishment for bank robbery. That is not persuasive that a similar lack of Congressional intention applies to the Drug Act.
Neither do the several circuit court decisions cited by the majority give much help in reaching the Congressional purpose. On the contrary, those cases show how firmly Congress had gone about making each separate illegal drug act “equally serious,” Maj. op. at 560; “making the price for drug participation in every aspect prohibitive,” and “an all-out attempt to combat illicit drugs by subjecting [knowing offenders] * * * to substantial, and in some cases severe, penalties,” id. at 560; “covering the entire field of narcotics and dangerous drugs in all phases of their manufacturing, processing, distribution and use,” id. at 561; and that “Congress intended to proscribe all drug activity in enacting the Drug Act.” Id. at 561.
No contemporaneous statements or writings, nor any subsequent research, has come to light to indicate that Congress did not intend to exercise its full power to impose against drug peddlers all the weight consistent with the statute which it was enacting and which we now must construe. Nothing in the “get tough” talk which preceded passage of the Act, and the ringing statements about “get[ting] at the pushers, the people who peddle * * *,” 116 Cong.Rec. 33605 (1970), discloses to Congressional intent to stop short of both prosecution and punishment for conduct such as that before us.
The inapplicability of Prince is obvious. Given the direct relationship between the Attorney General’s complaint to Congress of the deficiency in the 1934 Bank Robbery Act and how that problem frustrated law enforcement, all to be learned from Prince is that Congress merely responded with a cure for the perceived need. The Prince court found no need to extend its holding further and therefore rejected arguments based purportedly on analogous cases dealing with fragmentation of crimes for purposes of punishment. The Court said
None of these [cases] is particularly helpful to us because we are dealing with a unique statute of limited purpose and an inconclusive legislative history. It can and should be differentiated from similar problems in this general field raised under other statutes. The question of interpretation is a narrow one, and our decision should be correspondingly narrow.
Prince, 352 U.S. at 325, 77 S.Ct. at 405. (Emphasis supplied.)
We have two initial questions: (1) could Congress constitutionally create two offenses — possession and distribution — and (2) did it do so?
The majority answers both questions affirmatively. But in its prudential hypothesis that Congress did not intend, on today’s facts, to punish cumulatively both acts, the majority can only point to a totally different statute and to the Supreme Court’s Prince decision thereunder.
From the manifest purpose and intent of Congress, and the “narrow” decision in Prince, it does not follow that a similar Congressional intent, or a similar “narrow” construction should be applied to the Drug Act with its entirely dissimilar history and purpose. Normally, each proscription of specific conduct would be punishable. That is why criminal laws are enacted. Presumably Congress was as aware as we that every act of distribution is preceded by possession and some intention on part of the person having dominion and control. Congress saw itself in a struggle against drug trafficking. Nothing shows that it was motivated by compassion for traffickers which the majority would bestow.
If the cumulative sentences are somehow seen as unfair, and if the majority’s result is based on “lenity,” it should affirmatively demonstrate that Congress intended to grant such lenity unless it can challenge Congress’ power to enact the separate punishments. A challenge would not succeed *571because 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) passes the Blockburger test. It simply does not constitute double jeopardy when multiple punishments are imposed for two offenses arising out of the same transaction where each offense “requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 833, 337-338, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1141-1142, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (quoting and applying the Blockburger test; conspiracies to import and to distribute marijuana separately punishable.)
The Albernaz Court first disposed of the contention that cumulative sentences, if authorized by Congress, would still be barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. It found that the two statutory sections involved in that case specified different ends as the proscribed object of the conspiracy — distribution in one, importation in the other — and therefore each section proscribed a different offense for which the imposition of separate sentences was proper.
The Albernaz Court also rejected the argument that because the statutes were “ambiguous” as to multiple punishment the rule of “lenity” should be applied to prevent consecutive sentences. The Court said that lenity is only “an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. The rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” Id. at 342, 101 S.Ct. at 1144. (Citation omitted.) Congress’ “silence” on the question of consecutive sentences does not make the Drug Act “ambiguous.”
Congress cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory construction which may arise. But, as we have previously noted, Congress is “predominantly a lawyer’s body,” * * * and it is appropriate for us “to assume that our elected representatives * * * know the law.” As a result, if anything is to be assumed from the congressional silence on this point, it is that Congress was aware of the Blockburger rule and legislated with it in mind. It is not a function of this Court to presume that “Congress was unaware of what it accomplished
Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 341-342, 101 S.Ct. at 1143-1144 (citations and footnote omitted).
The conclusion we reach today regarding the intent of Congress is reinforced by the fact that the two conspiracy statutes are directed to separate evils presented by drug trafficking. “Importation” and “distribution” of marihuana impose diverse societal harms, and, * * * Congress has in effect determined that a conspiracy to import drugs and to distribute them is twice as serious as a conspiracy to do either object singly. * * * This result is not surprising for, as we observed many years ago, the history of the narcotics legislation in this country “reveals the determination of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal machinery — detection, prosecution and punishment — tighter and tighter.” Gore v. United States, 357 U.S., at 390, 78 S.Ct. at 1283 (1958).
Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343, 101 S.Ct. at 1144.
In United States v. Woodward, —U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 611, 83 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), the Supreme Court has considered in still another context whether conduct separately proscribed by Congress can be separately punished. Woodward was indicted on charges of making a false statement to an agency of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and of willfully failing to report that he was bringing currency in excess of $5,000 into the country, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1101 (1976 ed.). In passing through Customs, he had been handed a form which asked if he or any family member was carrying over $5,000. He checked the “no” box. Officials searched Woodward and his wife and found over $20,000 in cash. The same conduct, answering “no,” formed the basis of a count under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statement) and a count under 31 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (willfully failing to report the transporting of more than $5,000). A jury convicted Woodward on both charges; *572he was sentenced separately on each conviction.
This court held that the defendant could not be punished under both statutes, because under Blockburger, the false statement felony was a “lesser and included offense” of the currency reporting misdemeanor count. We concluded that Congress’ silence showed an intention in such a case to punish only the reporting misdemeanor. 726 F.2d 1320 at 1326-27 (9th Cir.1983).
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, per curiam. The Court said that the two statutes had different elements. Section 1001 punishes the nondisclosure of a material fact only if the fact is concealed by “trick, scheme, or device,” whereas the willful failure to report that the traveler is carrying over $5,000 is punishable under § 1101(a) without any false statement. That difference in constituent elements sufficed to meet the Blockburger test.
The Supreme Court also said, citing Al-bernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. at 1142, and Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678-679, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983), that “there is no evidence in [the two statutes] that Congress did not intend to allow separate punishment for the two different offenses.” Woodward, 105 S.Ct. at 612 (emphasis supplied). And it said further that “[w]e cannot assume, therefore, that Congress was unaware that it had created two different offenses permitting multiple punishment for the same conduct. Id., at 613. (Emphasis added.)
The Court’s opinion concludes
Finally, Congress’ intent to allow punishment under both [statutes] is shown by the fact that the statutes “are directed to separate evils.” See Albernaz, supra, 450 U.S. at 343, 101 S.Ct. at 1144.
All guides to legislative intent reveal that Congress intended respondent’s conduct to be punishable under both 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1101 (1976 ed.).
I conclude that in today’s ruling, with inadequate analysis, upon infirm precedent, and without guidelines, the majority has merely converted into circuit law its own creative preference as to what should be the proper punishment under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Hundreds of pages of legislative history are reflected in the passage of that legislation. See, e.g., 116 Cong.Rec. (1970), supra; H.R.Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), accompanying H.R. 18583; S.Rep. No. 613 (Judiciary Committee) 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4566 et seq. Yet, the majority has produced not a line to show that Congress did not know in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) that it had enacted two crimes, each carrying a severe sentence; or to show that the unique history of amendment to the Bank Robbery Act is probative of Congress’ intent that upon conviction for possession with intent to distribute drugs, and actual distribution thereof, some ad hoc rule of lenity would operate to forbid two sentences.
One final aspect of the majority opinion is worthy of note. After deciding that Palafox may receive only one sentence, the court turns to a California statute and to a California rule of court and decides that they should be applied to sentencing in federal district courts. It appropriates not only the legislature’s prerogative to legislate, but misconceives the function of this court.
More significant, however, is the fact that California Rule of Court 449, relied upon by the majority, is itself based upon a specific legislative authorization, Cal.Penal Code § 654. Rule 449 was adopted by the Judicial Council of the State of California pursuant to specific authorization in California Constitution, Article VI, section 6, which provides that the Council “shall adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute * * (West 1973 & Supp.1985). The analogy to California law is seriously flawed and no such authority to make rules for trial courts has been conferred upon *573this court. The majority has simply decided to legislate on its own, which it has no business doing. If “problems may arise in connection with the imposition of single punishments where a defendant has been found guilty of multiple offenses,” Maj. op. at 13, the remedy is to turn to Congress, or at least, to the Judicial Conference of the United States.
The majority’s concern for fairness is not at fault. Its reasoning is. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. Similarly, the facts surrounding Palafox’s own embarassing mischance have been inaccurately portrayed in the statement that upon the passing of the sample of the heroin, "[a]lmost immediately thereafter agents arrested Palafox." Maj. op. at 559. That is not the record either. There was an interval of time between delivery of the sample and the arrest of Palafox; how much is not clear. We know that the agent walked away, ostensibly to go to a telephone. Defense counsel described the interval as coming "within minutes,” see Excerpts of Record at 11, but he did not say how many minutes. The money, the object of making the deal, had not passed, and Palafox certainly would not have given up possession before payment was made. Consequently, the crimes of possession before and afterwards, and of distribution, were distinctly separate. Whatever the time interval, the majority admits that two separate crimes were committed.