Court Opinion

ID: 9414838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 17:04:10.20015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:38.410139
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/2/23 P. v. Johnson CA6
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                   IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                           SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                 H049257
                                                                            (Monterey County
              Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      Super. Ct. No. 18CR010752)

              v.

 DONAVAN WAYNE JOHNSON,

              Defendant and Appellant.

          A jury convicted defendant Donavan Wayne Johnson of multiple offenses,
including one count of torture, after he repeatedly slashed and stabbed the mother of his
children with a box cutter. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison plus 11 years
and four months.
          On appeal, Johnson raises the following arguments related to his convictions:
(1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for torture; (2) the trial court
erred in admitting expert testimony on intimate partner violence; (3) the trial court
misinstructed the jury on the crime of torture; (4) the cumulative effect of the errors
warrants reversal; and (5) he cannot be convicted for violating both Penal Code
section 245,1 subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (a)(4).
          Johnson also raises multiple issues regarding his sentencing: (1) the trial court
misapplied section 654 with respect to several counts; (2) he is entitled to resentencing as
a recent amendment to section 654 gives the trial court discretion to stay a longer term as

          1
              Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
opposed to a lesser term; (3) he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court no
longer has the authority to impose an upper term sentence unless a jury has found true the
aggravating circumstances; (4) his one year term for misdemeanor child endangerment
was unauthorized; (5) the record must be corrected to reflect that the trial court did not
impose a fine under section 1202.5; and (6) at resentencing, the trial court must consider
dismissing enhancements under recent amendments to section 1385.
       For the reasons explained below, we will reverse the judgment for the limited
purpose of resentencing.
                   I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. Procedure
       On March 1, 2021, the Monterey County District Attorney filed an amended
information charging Johnson with attempted premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a); count 1); aggravated mayhem with an enhancement for personal use of a
deadly weapon (§§ 205, 12022, subd. (b)(1); count 2); torture (§ 206; count 3); attempted
kidnapping with an enhancement for great bodily injury involving domestic violence
(§§ 664, 207, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (e); count 4); domestic violence with
enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon and inflicting great bodily injury
(§§ 273.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (e); count 5); assault with force
likely to cause great bodily injury with an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury
(§§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 12022.7, subd. (e); count 6); first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460,
subd. (a), 462, subd. (a); count 7); misdemeanor child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (b);
count 8), and assault with a deadly weapon with an enhancement for inflicting great
bodily injury (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (e); count 9).
       At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Johnson not guilty of attempted
murder (count 1), aggravated mayhem (count 2), attempted kidnapping (count 4), and
first degree burglary (count 7). The jury convicted Johnson of torture (count 3), domestic
violence (count 5), assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 6), child

                                              2
endangerment (count 8), assault with a deadly weapon (count 9), the lesser included
offense of simple mayhem (count 2), and the lesser included offense of attempted false
imprisonment (count 4). The jury also found true the enhancements for personal use of a
deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury on all the associated counts on which
Johnson had been convicted, i.e., the lesser included offense of simple mayhem (count 2),
domestic violence (count 5), and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury
(count 6).
       On July 1, 2021, the trial court sentenced Johnson to a life term for torture
(count 3).2 The court also imposed a consecutive determinate term of 11 years and four
months, consisting of the upper term of four years for domestic violence (count 5) plus
five years for the great bodily injury enhancement, one year for the deadly weapon
enhancement, four months (one-third the middle term of one year) for attempted false
imprisonment (count 4) and 364 days for misdemeanor child endangerment (count 8).
       Pursuant to section 654, the court imposed and stayed the following terms: (1) an
upper term of eight years for simple mayhem plus one year for personal use of a weapon
(count 2); (2) an upper term of four years for assault with force likely to cause great
bodily injury, plus five years for the inflicting great bodily injury (count 6); and (3) an
upper term of four years for assault with a deadly weapon (count 9).
       The trial court imposed a $5,000 restitution fund fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a
parole violation restitution fund fine of $5,000 (§ 1202.45) (stayed pending successful
completion of parole), $3,583.53 in victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $280 court
operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $210 court facilities assessment
(Gov. Code, § 70373).
       Johnson timely appealed.

       2
        Pursuant to section 3046, Johnson will be eligible for parole after seven years, so
his term is “seven years to life.”

                                              3
        B. Facts
              1. Prosecution case
        At approximately 11:00 a.m. on November 12, 2018, Salinas Police Officer James
Knowlton responded to a report of a domestic disturbance in the City of Salinas. On the
way, Knowlton saw a vehicle described as belonging to the suspect driving away from
the scene. When Knowlton activated his lights and siren, Johnson began driving
erratically, running two red lights, before stopping in front of the emergency department
at Natividad Medical Center. Johnson got out of the car and stood next to it. Knowlton
pointed his firearm at Johnson and ordered him to get on the ground, but Johnson was
uncooperative. Knowlton repeated his command three or four times before Johnson
ultimately complied. Johnson was agitated and said something about his passenger
needing help. As Knowlton and another officer handcuffed Johnson, Knowlton saw K.R.
sitting in the passenger seat, bleeding from a cut on her forehead. After hospital
personnel took K.R. inside, Knowlton searched the vehicle and saw a black box cutter on
the center console.
        Salinas Police Officer Joseph Kinney also responded to the domestic disturbance
report and, on his arrival at Natividad Medical Center, he observed other officers taking
Johnson into custody. Kinney approached Johnson’s vehicle and saw K.R. in the
passenger seat. K.R. was bleeding “profusely” from a “pretty deep” cut on her forehead.
K.R. told Kinney she had cuts to her legs as well and Kinney did not think she could walk
on her own. Emergency room personnel came out and took her inside for treatment.
Kinney followed, and the video, including audio, from his body camera was played for
the jury. Photographs of K.R.’s wounds when she was in the hospital were admitted into
evidence and showed cuts on her forehead, near her left ear, on her right arm, and on both
legs.
        An investigator for the district attorney, Tim Willmore, went to see K.R. while she
was at the hospital. K.R. was in a wheelchair, with her left leg immobilized and extended

                                             4
in a brace. He observed that the cut on her forehead was, in his estimation, three to
three-and-a-half inches in length. He described the other cuts near her ear and arm as
being between two and three inches long. Willmore noted that K.R. had a defensive
wound on the webbing of her right hand, between her thumb and index finger. When
Willmore saw K.R. again in December 2018, she could walk slowly, with a limp, and had
difficulty moving her left leg which was still in a brace.
       Over two years later, in February 2021, Isabelle Diaz, also an investigator with the
district attorney’s office, visited K.R. at the clothing store where she was working. K.R.
was sitting behind a partition so Diaz could not tell if she continued to have trouble
walking or if she had a cane or other assistive device. However, K.R. had a visible scar
running from the top of her forehead down toward her right ear.
       K.R.’s 911 call was played for the jury, although she did not testify.3 In that call,
K.R. told the dispatcher she was at home along with her grandmother, her great
grandmother, and her children. She said Johnson, her “ex-boyfriend,” had messaged her
saying he would break in the house and now he had arrived. K.R. reported that he had
gotten out of his vehicle, jumped over a fence, and entered the house. Johnson could be
heard telling K.R. that she was “get[ting] on [his] fucking nerves!” He then yelled “Get
in (unintelligible) my fuckin’ car!” Johnson told K.R. “All you have to do is . . . talk to
me,” after which a child could be heard yelling “Let her go!” and “Stop!” several times.
K.R. and her grandmother could also be heard yelling at Johnson to stop and to let K.R.
go. Johnson asked K.R. if she “want[ed] to press charges” and “you think I’m fucking
with you, huh? . . . You thinking you can fuck with them?” Johnson said, “now I gotta
       3
         It is not clear why K.R. did not testify, but she failed to appear on the first day of
jury voir dire. At the prosecutor’s request, the court issued an order to show cause (OSC)
as to why it should not hold K.R. in contempt. On the second day of jury voir dire, the
prosecutor asked that the court vacate the OSC, noting that K.R. appeared that day. The
prosecutor stated that if K.R. voluntarily appeared to testify at trial, she would decide at
that time whether to call her as a witness. During the prosecutor’s opening statement, she
informed the jury that K.R. would not testify, but the jurors would hear the 911 call.

                                              5
go to jail.” K.R.’s grandmother said she had the kids, as K.R. could be heard screaming.
Johnson repeated “Let’s go!” followed by “I swear I’ll start cutting her ass too . . . Let’s
go!”
         Johnson told K.R. there was something “all over you [i.e., K.R.].” K.R. said
repeatedly she did not want to go, and Johnson replied, “No, fuck that I’m not messin’
with you no more. No ‘cause you ignore me every fuckin’ time. Fuck, no! Let’s go!”
When K.R. continued to refuse, Johnson said, “I’ll cut your ass some more then.”
Johnson said that he did not care about going to jail, “I don’t give a fuck. Your legs are
open. Like open—open—open look. Look at your fuckin’ leg. No, you gonna fuckin’
die like seriously you don’t listen.” Just before the call ended, K.R. told Johnson, “No,
go away run. Run.”
         After the incident, investigating officers went to the residence and photographed
blood trails and droplets both inside the house and on the driveway.
         The prosecution introduced a recorded jail call from Johnson to his mother. In
that call, Johnson said he knew that K.R. was “fine,” but he was worried about the
children. Johnson said he did not care if K.R. was seeing anyone else, but her staying out
late and being absent from the house was affecting the children. He criticized K.R. for
seeing another man, letting that man drive the car that Johnson left for K.R., and having
that man take care of the children while K.R. was at work. Johnson referred to this man
as “the dude . . . that caused all this” and said “if [K.R.] wasn’t fuckin’ with this dude that
night we woulda never had no argument. . . . It woulda never came to this.” Later in the
conversation, Johnson told his mother, “My life has to get taken away ‘cause of this
dude.”
         Dr. Mindy Mechanic testified as an expert on victim partner abuse. Dr. Mechanic
said that such abuse involves a pattern of behavior that can include physical violence, as
well as emotional/psychological abuse. The abuser will often quickly shift from being
violent toward the victim to being loving and kind, which is confusing to the victim. The

                                              6
abuser also often blames the victim, and victims often blame themselves for the violence,
going so far as to protect the abuser. A victim is at most risk of escalated, possibly lethal,
violence in the period just before, during, or in the months after separating from the
abuser. In Dr. Mechanic’s opinion, abusers offer many different excuses for their
conduct, such as financial stress or housing insecurity, but those stressors are not causal.
Dr. Mechanic confirmed that she was not aware of the facts involved in this particular
case, had not reviewed any of the evidence, and did not know either K.R. or Johnson.
                2. Defense case
                       a. Johnson’s testimony
         Johnson testified he and K.R. started dating during their senior year in high school
and had four children together. At the time of trial, their oldest child was 11 and the
youngest was three years old. Before the incident, the family became homeless and
stayed in various places, including K.R.’s mother’s home. Johnson and K.R. broke up in
August 2018.
         On Friday, November 10, 2018, Johnson traveled to Arizona with the children but
not K.R. Over the next three days,4 Johnson slept very little. During the drive back to
Salinas, Johnson communicated with K.R. on the phone and via text messages, discussing
whether they would get back together. Johnson began thinking about killing himself, and
during a restroom stop, he purchased a box cutter at the gas station in order to slash his
wrist.
         Johnson arrived in Salinas with the children around 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. He and K.R.
talked in the living room and in the garage area about their relationship and his thoughts
of suicide. Johnson went outside and slept in his car for an hour before heading to work
around 6:00 a.m. the next day.

         4
       Johnson was not asked what day he returned to Salinas, but the incident occurred
on November 12 which is only two days after he drove to Arizona.

                                               7
       Johnson later contacted K.R. and, on learning she planned to take a taxi to work,
Johnson offered to drive her there instead. When he arrived at her house, K.R. said she
did not want a ride which confused him. Johnson decided he would leave with the
children, so he placed them in his car. However, after around five minutes, Johnson took
the children back inside and drove back to work.
       After work, Johnson went back to K.R.’s house to talk to her, but the front door
was locked. Johnson heard K.R. tell their son not to open the door, so he jumped over the
fence to the backyard and came through a window. Johnson testified that he was
sleep-deprived, and was feeling depressed, angry, and suicidal. When he saw K.R.,
Johnson yelled at her, and she yelled back at him. Johnson said that K.R.’s godmother
and her grandmother were also yelling, so he grabbed K.R. by her sweater and tried to
take her outside, “away from all the confusion.”
       As Johnson was pulling K.R. toward the front door, she was able to stop her
momentum and punched him in the genitals, stomach, and face. K.R. grabbed and
twisted his testicles, at which point, Johnson “lost it.” He took the box cutter out of his
pocket and swung it at K.R., three or four times. Johnson did not intend to cut her and
was not aware that he had done so at first. Johnson stopped when he saw “blood coming
down her face.” Johnson was still agitated and yelling, but he tried to tell K.R. he needed
to get her to the hospital. K.R. kept telling him it was not serious and that Johnson
should run.
       Johnson told K.R. she needed to stop fighting him about going to the hospital, but
it was only after he told her “I’ll cut your ass some more” that she realized the
seriousness of her injuries. When Johnson said her leg was “[cut] open,” she started to
“freak.” He then picked her up and put her in his car. Johnson grabbed some towels to
wrap around her legs to stop the bleeding, then drove toward Natividad Medical Center.
On the way, Johnson noticed that the police were following him, with their lights and
sirens. Because K.R. needed help, he did not stop and even ran two stop signs and a red

                                              8
light to get K.R. to the hospital as quickly as possible. Johnson did not know the extent
of K.R.’s injuries until six months later when he saw the photos of her wounds.
       Johnson testified that he was not disputing that he assaulted K.R., committed an
act of domestic violence, and inflicted great bodily injury on her. However, Johnson
denied that he had any plan to kill, disable, or disfigure her or that he intended to cause
her great pain and suffering as an act of revenge. Johnson was more than a foot taller
than K.R.5 and much stronger physically. Johnson testified that he did not act out of
jealousy that night, as he and K.R. had been with other people in the past.
       Johnson admitted that, since he has been in custody, he was involved in two fights
and, in the latter incident, threatened a correctional officer. In the first fight, Johnson and
six other inmates attacked a second group of six inmates. Johnson punched one inmate in
the head, pushed another to the ground, and kicked a third inmate in the head. In the
second fight, Johnson punched another inmate in the face several times, and then
threatened a deputy sheriff who responded to the incident.
              b. Other defense evidence
       Lynda Gates, a defense investigator, testified that she met K.R. on November 30,
2020, at the restaurant where K.R. worked as a waitress. Gates observed that K.R. did
not have a limp while walking, nor did she use a cane.
       Merriam Young, a critical care registered nurse, testified as an expert in
interpreting medical records and “explanation[s] of traumatic injuries.” In preparing for
her testimony, Young reviewed K.R.’s medical records as well as the photographs of
K.R.’s injuries. Young noted that, when she arrived at the hospital, K.R.’s heart rate was
high and her blood pressure was low, both of which were triggered by blood loss. K.R.
was given a blood transfusion to prevent her from going into shock, which would have
impaired major organs and would potentially be fatal. According to the medical records,

       5
         Johnson testified that he is six foot four inches tall whereas K.R. is either five or
five foot one inches tall.

                                               9
K.R. had seven cuts that were sutured but did not require surgery: a three-centimeter
laceration near her left temple, a four-centimeter cut on the left side of her scalp, an
eight-centimeter cut on her forehead that was deeper and required more than one layer of
sutures, a four-centimeter cut on her arm, a cut on the webbing of her left hand between
her thumb and index finger, a 15-centimeter laceration on her left shoulder that required
multiple layers of sutures, and a 10-centimeter cut on her left knee which also required
more than one layer of sutures. One of the lacerations went into K.R.’s left knee and an
orthopedic surgeon repaired her lateral-collateral ligament, lateral meniscus, as well as a
perineal nerve. On K.R.’s right leg, the orthopedic surgeon repaired a quadriceps muscle
that attaches to the outside of the knee and K.R.’s hamstring tendon.
                3. Prosecution rebuttal
         Leslie Chiang, a trauma nurse, acted as a scribe during K.R.’s treatment in the
emergency room at Natividad Medical Center. K.R.’s injuries when she arrived were
potentially fatal because of the nature of the wounds and her vital signs. Chiang testified
that if someone’s perineal nerve is severed, they would be unable to lift their foot.
Chiang also said that a cut hamstring makes it impossible to walk and, even after the
hamstring is repaired, a person would require extensive rehabilitation to be able to walk
again.
                                     II.    DISCUSSION
         A. Sufficiency of the evidence supporting torture conviction
         Johnson advances two arguments to support his position that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his torture conviction. First, he argues that
voters6 intended section 206 to apply to only the most violent, heinous, and callous

         6
        Section 206 was adopted by the California electorate in June 1990 as part of
Proposition 115, also known as the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act.” (Raven v.
Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 340.) Proposition 115’s “stated general purpose [was]
to adopt ‘comprehensive reforms . . . needed in order to restore balance and fairness to
(continued)

                                              10
conduct, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that his conduct met those
criteria. Second, Johnson argues that, even under a broader construction of section 206,
the evidence was insufficient. We disagree with both arguments.
              1. Applicable legal principles
       In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we “review the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit a
defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the
appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054.) “Simply put, if the
circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed
simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding.” (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 143 (Farnam).)
       Section 206 provides, “ ‘Every person who, with the intent to cause cruel or
extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any
sadistic purpose, inflicts great bodily injury as defined in Section 12022.7 upon the
person of another, is guilty of torture. [¶] The crime of torture does not require any proof
that the victim suffered pain.’ ” The crime of torture has two elements: “(1) a person
inflicted great bodily injury upon the person of another, and (2) the person inflicting the
injury did so with specific intent to cause cruel and extreme pain and suffering for the

our criminal justice system.’ ” (Ibid.) To that end, “the measure adopt[ed] a variety of
changes and additions to our state Constitution and statutes” (id. at p. 342), including
section 206, which defined the crime of torture, and section 206.1, which prescribed its
punishment. (People v. Barrera (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1559.)

                                               11
purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.” (People v. Baker
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1223.) Evidence of intent to cause cruel or extreme pain
and suffering, like other forms of intent, is usually circumstantial. (People v. Pre (2004)
117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419-420 (Pre).)
       “The torture offense contained in section 206 was adopted by the voters to ‘fill[] a
gap in existing law dealing with extremely violent and callous criminal conduct.’
[Citation.] ‘[T]orture as defined in section 206 focuses on the mental state of the
perpetrator and not the actual pain inflicted.’ ” (Pre, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 419-420.) Accordingly, a defendant need not inflict “permanent, disabling, or
disfiguring injuries” on the victim in order to violate the statute, as “ ‘[s]ection 206 only
requires “great bodily injury as defined in Section 12022.7.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 420.) Nor does
the statute “ ‘require any proof that the victim suffered pain.’ (§ 206.) The statutory
requirement of an intent to inflict ‘cruel’ pain and suffering has been interpreted to
require that the defendant had an intent to inflict extreme or severe pain.” (Ibid.)
       Furthermore, unlike the intent required to convict a defendant of murder by
torture, “section 206 does not require that the defendant act with premeditation or
deliberation or that the defendant have an intent to inflict prolonged pain.” (Pre, supra,
117 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) As a result, “the brevity of the attack does not, in and of
itself, compel a conclusion the defendant must be acquitted of torture.” (Ibid.) Likewise,
“ ‘[s]everity of a victim’s wounds is not necessarily determinative of intent to torture’
since ‘[s]evere wounds may be inflicted as a result of an explosion of violence [citations]
or an “act of animal fury” ’ rather than an intent to inflict pain for revenge, extortion,
persuasion, or other sadistic purpose.” (Id. at pp. 420-421.)
              2. Voters intended section 206 to proscribe this type of conduct
       We first address Johnson’s claim that the voters, in adopting section 206, did not
intend that the type of conduct at issue in this case would qualify as torture under the
statute. In support of this argument, Johnson notes that section 206 was enacted in

                                              12
response to the fact that the defendant in People v. Singleton (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 418,
who had committed horrific crimes,7 was released on parole after serving only seven
years of his total sentence of 14 years and four months. (Pre, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at
p. 425.) In his view, the voters intended section 206 to apply only to such heinous and
appalling conduct, not to convert all acts of aggravated assault into torture. Johnson cites
Justice McIntyre’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Pre, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at
page 426, specifically his critique that “application of [section 206] has expanded, by
judicial accretion, to any assault in which the victim suffers ‘great bodily injury’ where
the jury infers an intent to inflict cruel and extreme pain, regardless of whether the
assailant’s conduct was extremely violent and callous[,] [citations]” thus subjecting a
defendant “to a life sentence rather than a two- to four-year sentence applicable to an
aggravated assault conviction [citation], even if the crime was not particularly heinous
and the injuries were not particularly substantial.” (Ibid.)
       “In interpreting a voter initiative . . . , we apply the same principles that govern
statutory construction. [Citation.] Thus, ‘we turn first to the language of the [initiative],
giving the words their ordinary meaning.’ [Citation.] The [initiative’s] language must
also be construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the [initiative’s] overall . . .
scheme.” (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685.) “Absent ambiguity, we presume
that the voters intend the meaning apparent on the face of an initiative measure [citation]
and the court may not add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent that
is not apparent in its language.” (Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 543.)
       We agree with the majority opinion in Pre that Johnson’s argument is meritless:
“[The] characterization [in the dissent] disregards the fact that for a torture conviction the

       7
        Singleton kidnapped and brutally sexually assaulted a 15-year-old girl before
using a hatchet to cut off both her hands and push her into a culvert. (People v.
Singleton, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at pp. 421-422.)

                                              13
jury must not only find the defendant inflicted great bodily injury but also that the
defendant intended to do so for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or some
other sadistic purpose. This additional intent requirement distinguishes the offense of
torture from an aggravated assault and is clearly a matter for a jury to determine.” (Pre,
supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 423, italics added.) Had the voters intended to require that
section 206 only apply to “particularly heinous” crimes and “particularly substantial”
injuries, they could have so provided when enacting section 206. They did not. The
plain language of the statute does not require that the prosecutor prove the defendant
inflicted any specific injury or even that the victim suffered pain as a result.
Consequently, Johnson’s actions in this case fall within the parameters of section 206.
              3. Sufficient evidence Johnson tortured K.R.
       In his second insufficiency of the evidence argument, Johnson contends there was
insufficient evidence to show that he acted with the requisite “intent to cause cruel or
extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any
sadistic purpose.” (§ 206.) Johnson claims that his actions could not “lead to a
reasonable inference that he specifically intended to inflict cruel or extreme pain and
suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose”
because he “never subdued K.R. or changed the purpose of the attack to a robbery or
other purpose[;]” and the attack “was an indiscriminate explosion of anger that lasted
about three or four minutes.” We disagree.
       As noted above, evidence of the intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering
is usually circumstantial. (Pre, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 419-420.) “Intent is a state
of mind. A defendant’s state of mind must, in the absence of the defendant’s own
statements, be established by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 433.)
       Johnson seeks to distinguish the facts of his case from those in People v. Hale
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 106-107 (defendant hit victim in the head with a hammer as

                                              14
part of six-month campaign of terror), People v. Quintero (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1152,
1163 (defendant held victim’s head while deliberately carving her face), and even Pre,
supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pages 422 through 423 (defendant, during robbery, strangled
victim into unconsciousness, then bit and strangled her again though she had stopped
resisting). The facts of those cases are different from the evidence presented to the jury
in this case, but that does not mean that this jury could not reasonably infer from that
evidence Johnson’s intent to “cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of
revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.” (§ 206.) Having argued
repeatedly with K.R. over the past few days regarding, among other things, her
relationship with another man, Johnson went to her home armed with a boxcutter. In the
911 call, the jury heard K.R. and others screaming and calling out for Johnson to stop as
he repeatedly slashed her on the face, arms, legs, and back. The jury observed
photographs of the injuries, several of which were deep enough to require multiple layers
of stitches, as well as surgeries to repair damage to K.R.’s left knee, right quadriceps,
right hamstring, and her perineal nerve. The jury also heard that K.R. had lost so much
blood due to her wounds that she required an infusion of blood to prevent her from going
into shock and possibly dying. Finally, the jury heard Johnson’s testimony about the
attack and obviously did not believe he lacked the intent to torture K.R.
       Johnson repeatedly notes his attack was brief, perhaps three or four minutes in
length, but it is clear that “the brevity of the attack does not, in and of itself, compel a
conclusion the defendant must be acquitted of torture.” (Pre, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at
p. 420.)
       We are also not persuaded that Johnson’s acquittal by the jury of attempted
murder and aggravated mayhem necessarily demonstrated that he lacked the intent to
torture K.R. As Johnson admits, those crimes require entirely different intents, i.e., an
intent to kill or maim K.R., whereas torture requires an intent to “cause cruel or extreme

                                               15
pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic
purpose.” (§ 206.)
       Finally, the fact that Johnson drove K.R. to the hospital for treatment is not
dispositive of his intent to torture her at the time he was slashing her repeatedly with the
boxcutter. The jury obviously discounted Johnson’s conduct following his assault on
K.R. in reaching its verdict, and we defer to the jury’s conclusions in assessing the import
of those actions. (Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 143.)
       Accordingly, we conclude sufficient evidence supports Johnson’s conviction for
the crime of torture.

       B. No error in admitting expert testimony on intimate partner violence
       Johnson claims the court erred in allowing expert testimony regarding intimate
partner violence. Specifically, Johnson contends that the expert’s testimony was both
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1107 and unduly prejudicial because it
described the behavior of abusers not victims. He also argues the expert’s testimony
constituted improper profile evidence, thereby also violating his due process rights.
       Alternatively, Johnson argues that, in the event the court concludes trial counsel
failed to raise an appropriate objection to this testimony, his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. We disagree that the trial court erred in admitting the expert
testimony at issue and further conclude there was no ineffective assistance of counsel.
              1. Additional background
       The prosecutor moved in limine to present expert testimony from Dr. Mechanic on
victim partner abuse, specifically to explain how victims of domestic violence can act in
ways that are contrary to how one would expect a crime victim to behave. The
prosecutor stated she intended to elicit testimony from Dr. Mechanic that: (1) abusers’
behavior will sometimes change suddenly from peaceful to violent but will sometimes
come about through a gradual buildup of anger; (2) abusers often blame their victims for

                                             16
the violence or abuse; and (3) victims are at most risk of escalated, potentially fatal,
violence just before, during, or in the months after separating from the abuser. Defense
counsel objected to the first two areas of testimony on foundational grounds,8 but not the
third.9 The trial court ruled that Dr. Mechanic could offer testimony on victims’
counterintuitive behavior, such as trying to protect the abuser, or an abuser suddenly
switching from violent to loving behavior, as well as how abusers often blame the victim
for the domestic violence and that victims are at greatest risk of elevated levels of
violence around the time of a separation from their abuser.
       At trial, Dr. Mechanic testified that domestic violence offenders tend to switch
quickly from being peaceful to violent, but there can also be a slow burn “where . . .
anger slowly build[s].” She further testified that it is common for offenders to be violent
one moment and peaceful, loving, and caring the next, which is “really confusing” to the
victim.
       Dr. Mechanic testified it is “very, very common for the victim to be blamed [by
the abuser],” and the most lethal time in a relationship is around the period of separation.
Abusers’ tactics vary, and do not follow a pattern of behavior; instead, the only pattern is
the continuity of abuse over time.
       Dr. Mechanic also testified she did not know anything about the facts of the case,
the relationship of the parties, or the charges against Johnson. The prosecutor did not ask
her to try to correlate her generalized testimony about victim partner abuse to any of the
specific facts involved in this case.

       8
        In defense counsel’s view, the testimony lacked foundation because there was no
evidence Johnson committed domestic violence before this incident.
       9
          Defense counsel indicated that Johnson would testify that he and K.R. “had . . .
broken up in August [2018]” but “were reuniting” and living together “within two weeks
of this incident.” Later, however, defense counsel clarified that it was objecting to “any
of [the testimony] coming in on the basis of foundation, and that there’s not even one
prior incident [of domestic violence] that’s going to be coming into evidence.”

                                             17
       Immediately following Dr. Mechanic’s testimony, and again at the close of
evidence, the court instructed the jury that Dr. Mechanic’s testimony was not evidence
that Johnson committed any of the charged crimes, and that the jury could consider her
testimony only to determine if K.R.’s conduct was inconsistent with the conduct of
someone who has been abused.
              2. Applicable legal principles
       Evidence Code section 1107 specifically addresses expert testimony on intimate
partner battering: “In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the
prosecution or the defense regarding intimate partner battering and its effects, including
the nature and effect of physical, emotional, or mental abuse on the beliefs, perceptions,
or behavior of victims of domestic violence, except when offered against a criminal
defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse which form the basis of the
criminal charge.” (Id., at subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) of that section further provides, in
part: “The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert testimony if the
proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and the proper qualifications of the
expert witness.”
       A trial court’s admission of expert testimony should not be reversed “absent a
clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 778,
790.) Similarly, “[t]he qualification of expert witnesses, including foundational
requirements, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] That discretion
is necessarily broad: ‘The competency of an expert “is in every case a relative one, i.e.,
relative to the topic about which the person is asked to make his statement.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] Absent a manifest abuse, the court’s determination will not be disturbed on
appeal.” (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1175 (Ramos).)
       Testimony from an expert or witness which could otherwise be considered a
criminal “profile” requires additional consideration by the trial court. “A profile
ordinarily constitutes a set of circumstances—some innocuous—characteristic of certain

                                               18
crimes or criminals, said to comprise a typical pattern of behavior. In profile testimony,
the expert compares the behavior of the defendant to the pattern or profile and concludes
the defendant fits the profile.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1226.)
“[P]rofile evidence does not describe a category of always-excluded evidence; rather, the
evidence ordinarily is inadmissible ‘only if it is either irrelevant, lacks a foundation, or is
more prejudicial than probative.’ [Citation.] In sum, ‘[p]rofile evidence is objectionable
when it is insufficiently probative because the conduct or matter that fits the profile is as
consistent with innocence as guilt.’ ” (Ibid.) “By contrast, background testimony is not
‘profile’ evidence and does not specifically address the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. Instead, it enables the jury to understand other evidence that does address
guilt or innocence.” (People v. Lopez (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1556.) For example,
evidence that there is no commonality among offenders is not profile evidence and is
therefore admissible. (People v. Robbie (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1089 (Robbie).)
         “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) A trial court has broad discretion
in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence under this section (Ramos, supra,
15 Cal.4th at p. 1170), and a court’s rulings under Evidence Code section 352 will not be
overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055,
1070.)
         Any error in admitting expert testimony is evaluated for prejudice under Watson10
and will be reversed only where it is “ ‘reasonably probable that a result more favorable
to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (People v.
Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247 (Prieto).)

         10
              People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

                                              19
              3. The expert testimony was admissible
       Johnson claims that Dr. Mechanic’s testimony was inadmissible profile evidence.
In his view, the evidence was offered to show how an abuser acted, rather than to explain
a victim’s counterintuitive behavior. We disagree.
       In sum, there are three areas of intimate partner violence that Dr. Mechanic
discussed in her testimony: (1) abusers often blame the victim for the violence and
abuse; (2) abusers can quickly shift from physical violence and emotional abuse to
demonstrating love and affection, which confuses the victim; and (3) the most dangerous
time for a victim is the period surrounding a victim’s attempt to separate from the
relationship. Dr. Mechanic’s testimony about these concepts did not constitute profile
evidence. Instead, this testimony helped the jury understand why a victim might stay
with or even try to protect an abuser, rather than leave them or ensure their prosecution.
       Johnson relies principally on Robbie, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 1075, but that case is
distinguishable. In Robbie, the expert witness was offered to testify “ ‘in the area of the
behaviors and conduct of persons who commit sexual assaults.’ ” (Id. at p. 1082.)
According to the expert, the defendant’s behavior, as described by the prosecutor’s
hypotheticals which closely matched the facts of the case, was the “ ‘most prevalent type
of behavior that I’ve seen with sex offenders.’ ” (Id. at p. 1084.)
       The Robbie court concluded that this testimony was improper “inherently
prejudicial” profile evidence “because it requires the jury to accept an erroneous starting
point in its consideration of the evidence.” (Robbie, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085.)
The expert “was asked hypothetical questions assuming certain behavior that had been
attributed to the defendant and was allowed to opine that it was the most prevalent kind
of sex offender conduct. The jury was invited to conclude that if defendant engaged in
the conduct described, he was indeed a sex offender.” (Ibid.)
       Here, in contrast, the prosecutor did not ask Dr. Mechanic any hypothetical
questions which would demonstrate that Johnson matched the profile of someone who

                                             20
engages in intimate partner violence. The testimony was not impermissible profile
evidence as it “was not offered to establish a stereotype, then condemn the defendant for
fitting it.” (Robbie, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.)
       People v. Yang (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1, is also distinguishable. In that case, the
court found that the trial court erred in two ways: (1) permitting expert testimony
regarding postpartum depression and psychosis as evidence of defendant’s guilt when
defendant had not been diagnosed with a postpartum mental condition; and (2) allowing
the prosecution to use defendant’s privileged psychotherapy records. (Id. at p. 51.) The
court reversed the judgment due to the cumulative nature of these errors. (Ibid.)
       Here, Dr. Mechanic’s testimony about intimate partner violence was supported by
the underlying facts and at no time did the prosecution ask Dr. Mechanic to connect the
specifics of the case with her testimony. Unlike in Yang, Dr. Mechanic’s testimony
provided appropriate contextual information to assist the jurors in understanding the
evidentiary record. The expert’s testimony would have assisted the jury in understanding
how Johnson could repeatedly ignore K.R.’s screams to stop, but then drive her to the
hospital for treatment, as well as explain why K.R. would tell Johnson to run instead of
surrendering to police. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the expert testimony on intimate partner violence.
       Even assuming the trial court erred in admitting this evidence, however, the error
was not prejudicial. The evidence of torture was overwhelming, as the jury heard the
testimony describing the multiple injuries Johnson inflicted on K.R., saw the photos of
those injuries taken at the hospital, and heard the 911 call, as well as Johnson’s recorded
jail call to his mother describing his motivation for the attack. Johnson admitted that he
inflicted great bodily injury on K.R. in an act of domestic violence. Under these
circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that Johnson would have achieved a more
favorable result in the absence of Dr. Mechanic’s testimony. (Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
p. 247.)

                                             21
              4. No due process violation
       Johnson’s due process argument, i.e., that admitting Dr. Mechanic’s testimony
permitted the jury to draw an unreasonable inference as to his guilt, is similarly flawed.
In Johnson’s view, the jury was led to believe that because he shared characteristics of
abusers, as described by Dr. Mechanic, he was more likely to be guilty of the charged
offenses, again citing Robbie and Yang. Because, as he claims, the error violated his
constitutional rights, we must therefore apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman). We
disagree.
       “The introduction of improper evidence against a defendant does not amount to a
violation of due process unless the evidence ‘is so extremely unfair that its admission
violates “fundamental conceptions of justice.” ’ ” (Dowling v. United States (1990) 493
U.S. 342, 352.) For the erroneous admission of evidence to amount to a denial of due
process, the evidence must have been “ ‘ “sufficiently material to provide the basis for
conviction or to remove a reasonable doubt that would have existed on the record without
it.” ’ ” (People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1025-1026.) Dr. Mechanic’s
testimony does not meet that standard and Johnson’s due process rights were not violated
by its admission.
       As discussed above, Robbie and Yang are distinguishable. Dr. Mechanic testified,
in general terms, about intimate partner violence, but she did not know any of the
particulars of this case. More importantly, Dr. Mechanic was not presented with
hypothetical questions mirroring the facts of Johnson’s assault on K.R. and asked to
opine on whether those facts meant that Johnson had the intent to torture, kill, or maim

                                             22
K.R. During his testimony, Johnson admitted inflicting great bodily injury on K.R. while
committing domestic violence and offered his own version of what took place that day.11
       In addition, the jury was twice instructed that it could only consider Dr.
Mechanic’s testimony to determine if K.R.’s behavior was inconsistent with that of a
victim of abuse, not as evidence Johnson committed any of the charged offenses.
Because we are not presented with indications otherwise, we presume the jury heeded the
trial court’s instructions. (People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 487.) That
presumption is bolstered by the fact that the jury found Johnson not guilty on four12 out
of the nine charged offenses. As discussed above, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Dr. Mechanic’s testimony, but even if it had, the error was
harmless under the applicable Watson standard.
              5. No ineffective assistance of counsel
       We have addressed Johnson’s arguments that the trial court erred in admitting Dr.
Mechanic’s testimony, without regard to whether trial counsel did or did not interpose an
appropriate objection to that testimony. As a result, we need not reach his alternative
argument that trial counsel was ineffective. However, even if we were to consider that
argument, we conclude it has no merit.
       To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Johnson must first show trial
counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)

       11
          Johnson contends there was evidence supporting his testimony that he did not
realize he had cut K.R. until blood was finally visible, stating that K.R. “did not think she
needed medical care,” and he had to “convince her to go to the hospital.” The jury,
which heard the 911 call and observed Johnson’s testimony, obviously found his
testimony to be lacking in credibility and rejected his version of what took place.
       12
         As a reminder, the jury found Johnson not guilty of attempted murder (count 1),
aggravated mayhem (count 2), attempted kidnapping (count 4), and first degree burglary
(count 7), though it found him guilty of lesser-included offenses of simple mayhem
(count 2) and attempted false imprisonment (count 4).

                                             23
466 U.S. 668, 687-688.) Second, he must show prejudice flowing from counsel’s
performance or lack thereof. (Id. at pp. 691-692.) “Prejudice exists where there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 92-93, citing
Strickland, supra, at pp. 687-688, 693-694.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be
reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked
for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) It is the defendant’s burden
on appeal to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel and is entitled to relief. (People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1388.)
         As discussed above, the trial court did not err in admitting Dr. Mechanic’s
testimony on intimate partner violence. “ ‘Counsel may not be deemed incompetent for
failure to make meritless objections.’ ” (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732.)
         C. No instructional error
         Johnson next argues the court erred in instructing the jury on torture with
CALCRIM No. 810 as it failed to also instruct the jury with specific definitions for
“extortion” and “sadistic purpose” and thus the jury could have returned a guilty verdict
on this count based on an incorrect legal theory. We disagree.
                1. Additional background
         In discussing jury instructions, the parties agreed that they did not want to include
bracketed portions of CALCRIM No. 810 discussing extortion or sadistic purpose. The
court omitted the bracketed language,13 but read the standard version of the instruction

         Specifically, the court omitted the following language: “[Someone acts for
         13

purpose of extortion if he or she intends to (1) obtain a person’s property with the
(continued)

                                               24
which informed the jury that, in order to find Johnson guilty of torture, “the People must
prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant inflicted great bodily injury on someone else; [¶] AND
[¶] 2. When inflicting the injury, the defendant intended to cause cruel or extreme pain
and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic
purpose.” (CALCRIM No. 810.) The court did not provide separate definitions for the
terms “revenge,” “extortion,” “persuasion,” or “sadistic purpose.”
       During opening argument, the prosecutor argued that Johnson attacked K.R. in
revenge for her relationship with another man, as well as to persuade her to come with
him. The prosecutor described K.R.’s injuries before turning to Johnson’s motivation,
saying “he’s vengeful that she’s moved on . . . that she’s dating another man. He’s pretty
clearly angry at that. . . . He’s inflicting great bodily injury on her because of that
revenge. [¶] [Or] persuasion. It could be revenge or persuasion. She says no multiple
times. ‘No. I don’t want to go with you. I don’t want to go with you.’ What does he
do? He cuts her legs one by one, left and right, right and left. . . . The nerves,
everything. . . . And all you need is revenge or persuasion for element number two for
the crime of torture.”
       Defense counsel’s final argument on torture was that there was no evidence that
Johnson acted out of revenge or to persuade K.R.
       In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor again described the severity of K.R.’s injuries
before arguing that Johnson attacked her with the “intent to permanently disfigure her,
deprive her of her ability to walk, use her legs. [¶] And it’s also his intent to torture her.
Because the whole reason he did this is because he wanted to inflict revenge on her. He

person’s consent and (2) obtain the person’s consent through the use of force or fear.]
[Someone acts for the purpose of extortion if he or she (1) intends to get a public official
to do an official act and (2) uses force or fear to make the official do the act. An official
act is an act that an officer does in his or her official capacity using the authority of his or
her public office.] [Someone acts with a sadistic purpose if he or she intends to inflict
pain on someone else in order to experience pleasure himself or herself.]” (CALCRIM
No. 810.)

                                              25
came into the house being mad at her, angry at her because she’s hooked up with another
guy. And after multiple attempts to take her with him, when she kept saying no, no.
Persuasion. Cuts up her legs. Not just one leg, both the legs.”
       Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor argued to the jury that Johnson tortured
K.R. either to extort her or for a sadistic purpose.
               2. Applicable legal principles
       The trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues
raised by the evidence. (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 87.) Insofar as a
challenged instruction engendered any ambiguity, “we inquire whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.”
(People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 963.) We view the challenged instruction “in
the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” (Estelle v. McGuire
(1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72.) We also “consider the arguments of counsel in assessing the
probable impact of the instruction on the jury.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1202.)
               3. No sua sponte duty to define “extortion” or “sadistic purpose”
       We first address Johnson’s argument that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to
define “sadistic purpose” when instructing the jury on torture. The California Supreme
Court noted that “sadistic purpose” “is a term in common usage, having a relatively
precise meaning” and that “ ‘there is no need to instruct a jury on the meaning of terms in
common usage, which are presumed to be within the understanding of persons of
ordinary intelligence.’ (People v. Ordonez (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1229-1230.)”
(People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 901 (Raley).) As a result, the court’s failure to
provide the jury with a definition14 of “sadistic purpose” was not error.

       14
          As the California Supreme Court noted, even if the jury had requested a legal
definition of “sadistic purpose,” the trial court has no duty to provide one because “there
is no legal definition of the term.” (Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 901.)

                                                26
       As for “extortion,” we do not agree that the trial court was obligated to define this
term either. Like “sadistic purposes,” the term “extortion” is in common usage. (See
People v. Barrera, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564 [noting that “ ‘sadistic purpose’ and
‘extortion’ have consistently been used in this state in the area of torture murder without
further definition being required”].)
       Johnson relies on People v. Hill (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 661 in which the court
found error in failing to define extortion in connection with a kidnapping offense, but that
case is distinguishable. In Hill, the trial court instructed the jury on kidnapping for the
purpose of robbery and kidnapping for the purpose of ransom or extortion without
separately defining ransom or extortion. (Id. at p. 667.) On review, the court concluded
that the overlapping instructions could have misled the jury into thinking that kidnap for
robbery was the equivalent as kidnap for extortion. (Id. at p. 668.) In addition, the court
also noted that, while the term “extortion” “may be understood in a general sense,
extortion as used in [kidnapping] has a technical meaning peculiar to the law[,] [and]
[t]he court should have instructed on the legal definition of extortion.” (Ibid.)
       In People v. Ordonez, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d 1207 (Ordonez), the court did not
provide the jury with a definition of extortion, even though the defendant was charged
with felony murder with the underlying offense being kidnapping for ransom or
extortion. On appeal, the court distinguished Hill on two grounds: (1) the prosecutor’s
argument at trial was based only on kidnapping for ransom thus the jury would not have
been misled into convicting on the theory of kidnapping for extortion; and (2) the term
extortion as used in the kidnapping statute (§ 209) has a particular meaning different from
its common understanding. (Ordonez, supra, at pp. 1229-1230.)
       In this case, like Ordonez, the prosecutor did not rely on “extortion” (or “sadistic
purpose” for that matter) in asking the jury to conclude that Johnson tortured K.R. The
only purposes argued to the jury were revenge and persuasion. There is no reasonable

                                              27
possibility that the jury could have found Johnson’s intent to injure K.R. was for
extortion or sadistic purpose.
       The record shows that the trial court afforded defense counsel ample opportunity
to make suggestions or request modifications to the proposed instructions. The jury was
properly instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 810 pursuant to the consent of both
parties; by failing to request an instruction further defining or clarifying the meaning of
“extortion” or “sadistic purpose,” Johnson has waived this issue for the purposes of
appeal. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 153; People v. Barillas (1996) 49
Cal.App.4th 1012, 1023.)
       The trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to define the terms “extortion” or
“sadistic purpose” for the jury, any more than it had a duty to define “revenge” or
“persuasion” because “there is no need to instruct a jury on the meaning of terms in
common usage, which are presumed to be within the understanding of persons of
ordinary intelligence.” (Ordonez, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1229-1230.)
              4. No reasonable possibility the jury was confused
       Johnson also contends that the torture conviction must be reversed because the
torture instruction permitted the jury to find him guilty based on an invalid theory.
Where the court provides a legally correct instruction, but one with no application to the
facts of the case, the error is one of state law subject to review under People v. Watson,
supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836. (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129-1130.)
While “extortion” and “sadistic purpose” were listed in CALCRIM No. 810, there were
no facts presented that would have supported either of those purposes, and the prosecutor
only argued that Johnson tortured K.R. for the purpose of revenge, persuasion, or both.
As we have discussed above, there is no reasonable possibility the jury was confused by
the lack of definitions for “extortion” or “sadistic purpose.”

                                             28
              5. No ineffective assistance of counsel
       Johnson argues, in the alternative, that if the court lacked a sua sponte duty to
provide definitions of “extortion” and “sadistic purpose,” then his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to request those definitions or to ensure that those
terms were excised from CALCRIM No. 810. As discussed above, those definitions
were not necessary, and there was no reasonable possibility that Johnson was convicted
on either theory. Accordingly, counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in this
regard.
       D. No cumulative error
       Johnson next contends that the cumulative effect of the purported errors discussed
above warrants reversal of the judgment. As we have found no individual error, we reject
his cumulative error argument.
       E. Section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and (4), describe the same offense
       Johnson argues that he cannot be convicted of assault with force likely to cause
great bodily injury in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(4) (count 6) and assault
with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 9) because the
two subdivisions describe the same offense. The Attorney General agrees, noting that the
California Supreme Court decided this question in Johnson’s favor in People v. Aguayo
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 974 (Aguayo).15
       In Aguayo, the California Supreme Court concluded that subdivision (a)(1) and
subdivision (a)(4) of section 245 are different statements of the same offense, and that
one cannot be convicted of both offenses based on the same act or course of conduct.
(Aguayo, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 993.)
       Accordingly, we will remand the matter for the limited purpose of resentencing.
We express no opinion as to whether the trial court, on remand, should strike the

       15
         In his opening brief, Johnson noted that Aguayo was pending before the
California Supreme Court.

                                              29
conviction for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (count 6), the
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon (count 9), or consolidate the two convictions.
(Aguayo, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 996.)
       F. Aggravating factors were established beyond a reasonable doubt
       After Johnson was sentenced, the Legislature amended section 1170 to allow an
aggravated prison term to be imposed only if the aggravating factors supporting it are
admitted by the defendant or found true by a jury. (Sen. Bill No. 567 (2020-2021 Reg.
Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) As an ameliorative change, that legislation applies
retroactively to this case that is not yet final on appeal. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d
740, 747.) Johnson argues that, under the new standards, the court could not impose an
upper term sentence on any of the substantive offenses or enhancements because he did
not admit any of the aggravating facts relied on by the court nor did a jury find them true.
       While the parties agree that the amendments to section 1170 have retroactive
application, they disagree on the question of prejudice. We conclude that, under the
circumstances of this case, a jury would have found at least two of the aggravating factors
to be true and it is not reasonably likely the trial court would not have imposed upper
term sentences.
       The published opinions are in conflict on the standard to be applied when the court
relies on multiple factors, some of which were not found by the jury or stipulated to by
the defendant.16 (Compare People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500 [remand not
required if appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have
found at least one aggravating factor true] with People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
459, 466 (Lopez) [all aggravating factors must have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt; if only some factors would have been found true, it must be reasonably probable
the same sentence would have been imposed based on those] and People v. Dunn (2022)

       16
        The issue is currently pending before our Supreme Court. (See People v. Lynch
(May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 10, 2022, S274942.)

                                             30
81 Cal.App.5th 394 (Dunn), review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655 [if at least one
aggravating factor would have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt and it is
reasonably probable any remaining aggravating factors relied on in imposing sentence
would have been found true, assess likelihood of same sentence being imposed absent
factors not meeting that standard].) (Dunn, supra, at p. 410.)
       Johnson contends that we should apply the two-pronged test set forth in Lopez. At
the first step of the Lopez analysis, the court, applying the standard set forth in Chapman,
supra, 386 U.S. 18, decides whether “to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury
would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt every factor on which the court relied,
because the amended statute requires that every factor on which a court intends to rely in
imposing an upper term, with the exception of factors related to a defendant’s prior
conviction(s), have been admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury.” (Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.) If so, then the error is not prejudicial. (Ibid.) If not, then the
analysis proceeds to the second step, where “a reviewing court can be certain, to the
degree required by People v. Watson[, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836], that the trial court
would nevertheless have exercised its discretion to select the upper term if it had
recognized that it could permissibly rely on only” those aggravating factors that it could
consider, “rather than all of the factors on which it previously relied.” (Id. at p. 467,
fn. 11.) If not, “then it is clear that remand to the trial court for resentencing is
necessary.” (Ibid.)
       The Attorney General contends that we should apply the test from Dunn, which
described the standard for assessing prejudice as follows: “The reviewing court
determines (1)(a) beyond a reasonable doubt whether the jury would have found one
aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt and (1)(b) whether there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have found any remaining aggravating
circumstance(s) true beyond a reasonable doubt. If all aggravating circumstances relied
upon by the trial court would have been proved to the respective standards, any error was

                                               31
harmless. If not, the reviewing court moves to the second step of Lopez, (2) whether
there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a sentence other
than the upper term in light of the aggravating circumstances provable from the record as
determined in the prior steps. If the answer is no, the error was harmless. If the answer is
yes, the reviewing court vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing.” (Dunn,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409-410, fn. omitted.)
       Lopez requires the reviewing court to evaluate every factor on which the court
relied, and we read Dunn to require at least one aggravating factor that the trial court
actually relied upon to withstand Chapman scrutiny. (See Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th
at p. 466; Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409-410.) We need not decide which of
these approaches to employ because it is clear that, even under the more stringent
standard set forth in Lopez, Johnson cannot show prejudice.
       At sentencing, the trial court found no mitigating circumstances and four
aggravating circumstances, specifically: “[](1) The crime involved great violence, great
bodily harm and other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and
callousness. [¶] [](2) The defendant used a weapon at the time of the offense. [¶]
[] (3) The victim was particularly vulnerable. [¶] . . . [¶] [(4)] The defendant has engaged
in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society.”
       There can be no question a jury would have found true at least two of these four
factors. First, Johnson admitted he used a weapon, i.e., a boxcutter, in committing the
offense. Second, Johnson admitted he inflicted great bodily injury on K.R., and because
the jury found him guilty of torture, there can be no question that it would have found
true the first aggravating factor as well, i.e., that the crime involved great bodily harm
“disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness.”
       Assuming that the trial court had been limited to considering only those two
aggravating factors in sentencing, it is not reasonably probable that it would have selected
anything other than the upper term. The trial court made clear that it believed Johnson’s

                                             32
conduct to be especially reprehensible, commenting that, in the course of her career as
both a judge and a criminal attorney, she had never seen worse non-fatal injuries inflicted
on a victim. Where the record “ ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have
reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion[,]’
[citation] [¶] . . . remand would be an idle act.” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371,
432.)
        As a result, there is no basis for resentencing Johnson pursuant to section 1170, as
amended by Senate Bill No. 567.
        G. Section 654
        Johnson next contends that the court erred in failing to apply section 654 to stay
the terms on his convictions for attempted false imprisonment (count 4), domestic
violence (count 5), the great bodily injury enhancement attached to count 5, and
misdemeanor child endangerment (count 8). He further argues that the matter must be
remanded for resentencing pursuant to the recent amendment to section 654 made by
Assembly Bill No. 518. (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.)
               1. Additional background
        At the sentencing hearing, the court addressed the incident, stating that Johnson
had different objectives during the attack and had “multiple times to reflect and stop, but
he didn’t.” In the trial court’s view “there were some clear cut separations in the assaults
and cutting that was happening.” Towards the end of the assault, where it “appears the
injuries to the legs occurred, based on the 911 call[,] . . . the objective and intent did
change.” Specifically, where Johnson tried to have K.R. leave with him, “that objective
changes to really inflicting the extreme suffering and pain that is part of the torture act.”
The trial court concluded that “the evidence here showed that it was divisible. There
were multiple times where [] Johnson could have stopped and walked away, and he chose
to, again, resume the assaultive conduct, and at one point then becoming the intent,
specific intent necessary for the torture count. [¶] I don’t find here that all the discreet

                                              33
acts were part of a course of conduct in which the torture was based.” The court also
expressly stated that it found “different objectives and intent” with respect to the child
endangerment charge.
       The court concluded that Johnson’s intent changed to inflicting the “extreme
suffering and pain that is part of the torture act.” In discussing the aggravating factors,
the court also noted that K.R.’s injuries were “the worst [she had] ever seen” on a victim
who lived and that included her time as both a judge and practicing criminal law attorney.
The court stated that Johnson did not appear to be genuinely remorseful, and “the crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, and callousness.”
              2. Applicable legal principles
       At the time of Johnson’s sentencing, section 654 provided as follows: “[a]n act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be
punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of
imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” (Former § 654, subd. (a).) The statute “precludes multiple punishments for a
single act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290,
294.) “Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more
than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the
actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be
punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” (Neal v. State of
California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19, disapproved on other ground in People v. Correa
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334.)
       “Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial
court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination. [Citations.] Its
findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support
them.” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) “The court’s findings may

                                               34
be either express or implied from the court’s ruling. [Citation.] In the absence of any
reference to . . . section 654 during sentencing, the fact that the court did not stay the
sentence on any count is generally deemed to reflect an implicit determination that each
crime had a separate objective.” (People v. Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612, 626.)
The implied finding “must be sustained on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.”
(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730 (Osband).) In applying this standard, we
“review the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable to the respondent and
presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.” (Jones, supra, at p. 1143.)

              3. The trial court would not impose a lower term even had it the
                 discretion to do so
       Johnson argues that we must remand his case for resentencing based on recent
change to section 654 made by Assembly Bill No. 518. Effective January 1, 2022,
section 654 was amended by Assembly Bill No. 518. (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.) As
amended, section 654, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part, “An act or omission that
is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under
either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more
than one provision.” (Italics added.) Previously, where section 654 applied, the
sentencing court was required to impose the term that “provides for the longest potential
term of imprisonment” and stay execution of the other term. (§ 654, former subd. (a).)
       The Attorney General concedes that the legislative changes to section 654 apply to
Johnson because his judgment is not yet final. We agree. (See People v. Mani (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 343, 379; People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673.) However, the
Attorney General does not agree that this case should be remanded for resentencing under
the amended version of section 654 because the court’s comments at the sentencing
hearing made clear that it would impose the higher term for torture even if it had the
discretion to impose the lower terms.

                                              35
       We agree with the Attorney General that the record “ ‘clearly indicate[s]’ ” that
the trial court necessarily would have sentenced Johnson the way it did even had it
possessed the discretion afforded by amended section 654. (People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391; see also People v. Jones (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 267, 273.) Again,
the court expressly noted the horrific nature of K.R.’s injuries were “the worst [she had]
ever seen” on a victim who lived and that included her time as both a judge and
practicing criminal law attorney. The photographs of those injuries, which are part of the
record, substantiate the trial court’s assessment. Accordingly, we will turn to Johnson’s
claims that the trial court erred in failing to stay the terms on counts 4, 5 (including the
enhancement), and 8.
              4. No error in declining to stay domestic violence term
       Johnson asserts that the trial court should have stayed the term on his domestic
violence conviction because it was continuous to the torture offense and both offenses
were committed with the same intent and close in time. In support of his argument,
Johnson relies principally on People v. Mitchell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 349 (Mitchell) and
People v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036 (Mejia). We disagree.
       In assessing whether section 654 applies, the court may consider a number of
factors, including whether the defendant had multiple sequential intents, as well as
whether he had the opportunity to pause and reflect before continuing his course of
action. (People v. Surdi (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 685, 689; People v. Trotter (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 363, 368.) At the sentencing hearing, the court determined that Johnson’s
intent changed during the attack, morphing from an intent to simply injure his partner to
an intent to torture her for her having a relationship with another man or for failing to
leave with him or both. Drawing all inferences in favor of the court’s finding on this
matter, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support its decision. (People v.
Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143.) The recording of the 911 call indicates that
Johnson had multiple opportunities to reflect on what he was doing, but he continued to

                                              36
slash K.R. in spite of her screams and in spite of the entreaties from others in the home,
including his child, to stop. We are not persuaded that Mitchell or Mejia, supra, 9
Cal.App.5th 1036 dictate a different result. The defendant in Mitchell, armed with a pair
of scissors, entered a store and assaulted the clerk before grabbing two boxes of chips as
he left. (Mitchell, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 352.) The court concluded that the
defendant’s “armed assault with scissors was incidental to and facilitated the armed
robbery with scissors” and thus section 654 precluded separate punishment for the assault
and the robbery. (Mitchell, supra, at p. 353.) The basis for the court’s decision was that
it determined the defendant did not harbor or form separate intents, and it expressly
distinguished cases in which section 654 would not apply, such as where a “defendant
commits two crimes . . . in pursuit of two independent objectives, even if they are
simultaneous.” (Mitchell, supra, at p. 354.)
       In Mejia, after the defendant was convicted of torture, spousal rape, and infliction
of corporal injury on a spouse, the court held that section 654 barred separate punishment
for the rape and infliction of corporal injury offenses. (Mejia, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1045.) Because the “prosecution relied upon each act of spousal rape and each act of
infliction of corporal injury on a spouse as the intentional acts underlying the torture
conviction,” it made no difference whether the defendant had a single objective or
multiple objectives. (Ibid.) However, the Mejia court acknowledged that a determination
“[w]hether a particular offense is part of a course of conduct for purposes of section 654
is a question of fact.” (Ibid.)
       Here, in contrast, the court expressly discussed application of section 654 and
found that Johnson had separate intents during his assault on K.R., and his initial conduct
was not essential to the torture count nor did the prosecution rely on that to establish the
elements of torture.
       The California Supreme Court has upheld separate punishments where a
defendant’s consecutive intents result in distinct crimes of violence. (People v. Jackson

                                               37
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 269.) In Jackson, the defendant entered a home in order to steal some of
its contents, but when he discovered someone inside, he formed a separate intent to
murder the occupant. “[Defendant]’s own statement suggests that he entered the house
believing it was empty (suggesting an intent to steal), and developed the intent to harm
[the victim] only when she appeared, startling him, and he panicked, finding that he was
unable to leave. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s determination.”
(Id. at p. 354.)
       In this case, there was substantial evidence that Johnson’s intent changed from the
time he initially entered the house to when he finally ended his attack. As a result, the
trial court did not err by not staying the domestic violence term under section 654.
               5. No error in not staying attempted false imprisonment
       Johnson next argues that section 654 applies to his sentence for attempted false
imprisonment because it shared the same objective as the torture offense, i.e., to persuade
K.R. to go with him. We disagree.
       The court imposed a four-month determinate term for the attempted false
imprisonment, which appears to have been based on Johnson’s grabbing K.R.’s clothing
in an effort to force her to leave with him. The court declined to stay that four-month
term because it concluded that Johnson’s intent changed during the incident.
       As discussed above, a trial court has “broad latitude” in determining “[w]hether
section 654 applies in a given case,” and “[i]ts findings [on that question] will not be
reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them.” (People v.
Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143.) In this case, there is substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s conclusion that Johnson’s intent changed during the attack, from
wanting to force K.R. to go with him, to hurt her for refusing to listen to him, and to
torture her for seeing someone else and for continuing to disobey him. The court did not
err in declining to stay Johnson’s sentence for attempted false imprisonment. (Ibid.)

                                             38
               6. No error in not staying great bodily injury enhancement
       Johnson also claims that the five-year enhancement for great bodily injury,
attached to his domestic violence conviction, must be stayed because great bodily injury
is an element of torture and the great bodily injury arose out of the same conduct and
objective as the torture offense. We disagree.
       At sentencing, the trial court imposed a five-year term for the great bodily injury
enhancement as prescribed by section 12022.7, subdivision (e).
       “The same type of enhancement may be imposed for each substantive offense
committed with differing intent or for a different purpose. So long as the conduct giving
rise to the convictions of separate substantive offenses is divisible or arises from separate
criminal acts, neither section 654 nor [People v. Ahmed (2011)] 53 Cal.4th 156 requires
the staying of the attached enhancements.” (People v. Wooten (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
121, 131.)
       Johnson’s argument is based on his assertion that his conduct and objective in
committing domestic violence against K.R. was the same conduct and objective in
torturing her in violation of section 206. The trial court concluded that Johnson’s intent
changed during the attack and there is substantial evidence to support that conclusion. As
the trial court stated, his initial acts of attacking K.R. with a boxcutter was first an act of
domestic violence but, as he became more enraged, his intent shifted to one in which he
sought to not just hurt her badly, but to “cause cruel and extreme pain and suffering for
the purpose of revenge [or] persuasion.” Both his conduct and objectives were therefore
divisible and the court did not err in declining to stay the great bodily injury
enhancement.
               7. No error in not staying child endangerment sentence
       Johnson’s final section 654 argument is that the trial court erred in not staying the
term for misdemeanor child endangerment on the ground that it was subject to the
multiple victim exception. In his view, whether a particular crime is a crime of violence

                                               39
for the purposes of the multiple victim exception to section 654 is determined by the
statutory definition of the crime in question, and because the statute defining
misdemeanor child endangerment does not indicate that it is a crime of violence, the
multiple victim exception does not apply. We disagree.
       The California Supreme Court has “long held that ‘the limitations of section 654
do not apply to crimes of violence against multiple victims.’ ” (People v. Oates (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1048, 1063.) “Under this exception, ‘even though a defendant entertains but a
single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct, he may be convicted
and punished for each crime of violence committed against a different victim.’
[Citations.] The reason for the multiple victim exception is that ‘when a defendant
“ ‘commits an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by means
likely to cause harm to several persons,’ his greater culpability precludes application of
section 654.” ’ ” (People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1781.) The multiple
victim exception “permits one unstayed sentence per victim of all the violent crimes the
defendant commits incidental to a single criminal intent.” (Id. at p. 1784.)
       Whether a defendant harbored a single intent—and thus a single objective—is a
factual question; the applicability of section 654 to settled facts is a question of law.
(People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) When interpreting the scope and
meaning of the multiple victim exception, we apply a de novo standard of review.
(See People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 552, fn. 5.) Regarding whether the facts
establish there were multiple victims of the crimes of violence, we review such finding
for substantial evidence. (See People v. Centers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 101.) An
appellate court will sustain a trial court’s implied factual determination in the application
of section 654 if supported by substantial evidence. (Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
pp. 730-731.)
       In this case, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that
the multiple victim exception applied to the misdemeanor child endangerment offense.

                                              40
While Johnson’s acts of violence were not directed at the child, that makes no difference.
As explained by People v. Pantoja (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1, “ ‘A defendant who
commits an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by a means
likely to cause harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms
only one person. For example, a defendant who chooses a means of murder that places a
planeload of passengers in danger, or results in injury to many persons, is properly
subject to greater punishment than a defendant who chooses a means that harms only a
single person. This distinction between an act of violence against the person that violates
more than one statute and such an act that harms more than one person is well settled.’
[Citation.] There is no requirement that the prosecution show that the defendant intended
harm to each victim by his wrongdoing, and no doubt that defendant’s acts harmed [the
child]. Therefore he may be punished separately for that separate crime.” (Id. at p. 16.)
       Johnson entered K.R.’s home with a boxcutter and, soon thereafter, began to
attack her with that weapon. It is reasonable to assume that he knew one or more of their
children were present at the time; in fact, a child can be heard on the 911 call, screaming
at Johnson to stop. While there is no evidence Johnson intended to physically harm the
child, his conduct certainly risked such harm, either from the child deliberately trying to
intervene or Johnson accidentally cutting the child while swinging the boxcutter at K.R.
Even aside from the risk of physical injury, however, it goes without saying that this
child likely suffered severe emotional trauma from witnessing his father brutally attack
his mother.
       Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly applied the multiple victim
exception to section 654 to Johnson’s sentence for misdemeanor child endangerment.
       H. The sentence for misdemeanor child endangerment must be reduced
       Johnson argues, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court erred in
imposing a term of 364 days on his conviction for child endangerment (§ 273a; count 8).
We agree.

                                             41
       Section 19 provides as follows: “Except in cases where a different punishment is
prescribed by any law of this state, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both.” Section 273a, subdivision (b)
provides: “Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to
produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or
inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or
custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be
injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or
her person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
       Because section 273a, subdivision (b) does not specify the punishment for a
misdemeanor violation,17 section 19 applies. We will reverse the judgment and remand
the matter for the limited purpose of resentencing at which time the trial court will reduce
Johnson’s sentence on count 8 to six months.

       I. The sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment must be corrected
       Johnson next argues that the minute order from his sentencing hearing and the
abstract of judgment are incorrect in that they both indicate the court imposed a $10 fine
under section 1202.5,18 plus penalty assessments, for a total of $41. The trial court did
not orally pronounce such a fine nor was Johnson convicted of an offense which supports
imposing a fine pursuant to section 1202.5. The Attorney General agrees that Johnson

       17
          Felony child endangerment is described in section 273a, subdivision (a) and
“shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the
state prison for two, four, or six years.”
       18
         Section 1202.5 provides in pertinent part: “In any case in which a defendant is
convicted of any of the offenses enumerated in Section 211, 215, 459, 470, 484, 487,
subdivision (a) of Section 487a, or Section 488, or 594, the court shall order the
defendant to pay a fine of ten dollars ($10) in addition to any other penalty or fine
imposed.” (Id., at subd. (a).)

                                             42
was not convicted of any of the offenses listed in section 1202.5 and that the fine and
penalty assessments must be stricken. We agree with the parties.
       At sentencing, the trial court imposed certain other fines and fees, but did not
order Johnson to pay a local crime prevention fee of $10, plus penalty assessments,
pursuant to section 1202.5. The most likely reason for this was because Johnson was not
“convicted of any of the offenses enumerated” in that statute. (§ 1202.5, subd. (a).)
However, the minute order and abstract of judgment both indicate that Johnson is subject
to a “local crime prevention fine of $10, plus penalty assessments; for a total of $41.”
“Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the
minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v.
Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) On remand, the trial court shall ensure that
the minute order from Johnson’s resentencing and the abstract of judgment accurately
reflect the fines and fees imposed.
       J. Discretion to dismiss enhancements under section 1385
       Johnson also argues that, on remand, the trial court shall apply “current law” at his
resentencing hearing, specifically to exercise its discretion to dismiss enhancements
under section 1385. We express no opinion on how the trial court should exercise its
discretion on remand but presume the trial court will resentence Johnson in accordance
with current law.
                                      III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for the limited purpose of
resentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court shall either consolidate the
convictions on count 6 and count 9 or strike one of those convictions, reduce the sentence
imposed on count 8 to six months, and resentence Johnson on all other counts consistent
with this opinion and in accordance with current law. The trial court shall also ensure
that the minute order and abstract of judgment accurately reflect the fines, fees, and
assessments imposed.

                                              43
                              ___________________________________
                                         Wilson, J.

WE CONCUR:

__________________________________________
                 Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.

______________________________________
                 Danner, J.

People v. Johnson
H049257