Court Opinion

ID: 9670786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:26:17.10537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.529366
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Justice
(concurring specially).
I am disturbed by today’s court holding that a criminal defendant’s judicial admission or offer to stipulate to a prior DWI *398conviction may deprive the state of offering evidence of the existence of that conviction and the jury from considering it in determining whether the accused has committed a gross misdemeanor in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(a) (1982) (subsequently amended at Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(a) (Supp.1983)). As the majority today holds, the prior conviction is an element of the offense. I disagree with its holding that an accused, by stipulation or admission of an element of this crime, can remove the element of prior conviction from consideration by the jury.
In most criminal jury trials, the complaint or indictment alleging the elements of the crime charged is read to the jury. See CRIMJIG 1.01 (1977). In a criminal trial, the state bears a heavy burden. The jury is admonished by court and counsel, usually several times, that the state has the burden of proving each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Unless the jury is informed either by the court or by the state introducing the judicial record of prior conviction, a risk exists that it will return a not guilty verdict simply because it believes one element of the crime charged has not been proved.
The general rule is that a criminal defendant’s judicial admission or offer to stipulate does not necessarily deprive the state’s right to offer evidence on an element of the crime. State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 205 N.W.2d 667 (1973). The reason for the rule, of course, is that an accused should not unilaterally control the issue of the need for relevant evidence. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 126 (1978).
The majority opinion relies upon our recent decision in State v. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8 (Minn.1984). In my view this reliance is not justified. Davidson was prosecuted under Minn.Stat. § 624.713 (1982), which makes it a felony for a person who has been convicted “of a crime of violence” to possess a pistol. While the conviction of a “crime of violence” is an element of the crime created by that statute, the potential for unfair prejudice to an accused is much greater in a prosecution under that statute than in a prosecution under section 169.121, subd. 3(a). “Crime of violence” involves a number of causes of criminal conduct. By necessity, the precise prior crime would have to be identified and the jury instructed that the prior crime was one “of violence.” On the other hand, the prior criminal conduct relevant in a section 169.121, subd. 3(a) prosecution is a misdemeanor conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages. All the state has to prove is that, in fact, the accused had a prior drunk driving conviction within the statutory time limits. The details and facts surrounding that pri- or conviction are normally irrelevant to a section 169.121, subd. 3 prosecution. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling in prohibiting the use of the stipulation procedure.
Nevertheless, in this case I concur in the result reached by the majority. Even if one accepts the court’s conclusion that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to remove the issue of prior conviction from the case, the trial court’s ruling here clearly was not prejudicial.