Court Opinion

ID: 9410775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 15:06:11.229655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:59.536488
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211030-U
                                              No. 1-21-1030
                                        Order filed July 24, 2023
                                                                                         First Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                                 IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                            FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                             )   Appeal from the
                                                                  )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                    )   Cook County.
                                                                  )
     v.                                                           )   No. 91 CR 2778
                                                                  )
 BYRON PERKINS,                                                   )   Honorable
                                                                  )   Thomas J. Hennelly,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                   )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Lavin and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1        Held: The circuit court’s order denying defendant’s motion for forensic testing is affirmed
                where the requested testing would not produce evidence materially relevant to his
                claim of actual innocence.

¶2        Defendant Byron Perkins appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion for forensic testing

pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West
No. 1-21-1030

2014, 2018)). 1 On appeal, he argues his motion should have been granted because identity was the

issue at trial, there was a sufficient chain of custody, and the requested testing has the potential to

produce new, noncumulative evidence that would materially advance his claim of actual

innocence. We affirm.

¶3      Defendant and codefendant Antjuan Jackson were charged together by a 31-count

indictment with offenses arising from shootings in Chicago on December 15, 1990. 2 In 1994, a

jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Keith Adams, the attempted first degree

murders of Jeffrey Wright and Donald Jones, and the armed robbery of Wright, Jones, and Adams.

He was sentenced to natural life in prison for first degree murder and 30 years each for the

attempted first degree murder and armed robbery counts, to be served consecutively. We affirmed

on direct appeal. People v. Perkins, No. 1-95-0648 (1997) (unpublished order under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶4      At trial, Wright testified that “off and on” over the last 10 years, he and Jones used stolen

credit cards to purchase items, which they stored in their apartment in the 1500 block of West

Greenleaf Avenue. On December 15, 1990, their apartment contained multiple television sets,

VCRs, camcorders, stereo equipment, athletic wear, shoes, and clothing.

¶5      At about 4 p.m. that date, Wright, Jones, and Adams drove in Adams’s vehicle, which was

a Chevrolet Spectrum, to Wright’s apartment. When they arrived, Wright saw defendant, identified

in court, in the apartment building’s stairwell. Wright knew defendant as Jones’s friend and had

        1
           While the majority of the record spells defendant’s first name as “Byron,” defendant spells his
first name as “Bryon” in his pro se filings in the record. We adopt the spelling “Byron,” as used in
defendant’s indictment, mittimus, and notice of appeal.
         2
           The record reflects Jackson’s first name as Antjuan and Untjuan. We adopt the name of Antjuan
as reflected in his affidavit appearing in the record.

                                                  -2-
No. 1-21-1030

previously seen defendant at his apartment twice. Wright and Jones exited the vehicle, approached

the stairwell, and went up to the apartment. They greeted defendant, who introduced Wright to

defendant’s cousin, codefendant Jackson. Wright, Jones, defendant, and Jackson went inside the

apartment, and Adams later joined them. The group had a “basic conversation” for about 20

minutes, and then defendant and Jackson “exchanged *** whispers.” Wright, Jones, and Adams

decided to leave for the mall. Defendant and Jackson decided to go with them.

¶6     Wright walked toward the front door with Jones and Adams behind him, and defendant

and Jackson behind them. When Wright reached for the doorknob, he heard defendant say,

“[D]on’t touch that motherf***ing doorknob; this is a stick-up.” Wright turned around and “looked

down the barrel of a shotgun” that Jackson held from about three to four feet away. Defendant

pointed a silver pistol at Wright, Jones, and Adams and ordered them to the ground, facedown.

Defendant then instructed Jackson “to get the tape” and “bond these motherf***ers, gag these

motherf***ers.” Using packaging tape, Jackson taped Wright, Jones, and Adams across their

mouths, taped their arms behind their back, and bound their feet. Defendant then instructed Jackson

to “go through the house,” get items, and “load*** them up.” Jackson “ransack[ed]” Jones’s

bedroom and brought bags from the bedroom to the doorway, while defendant paced in front of

Wright, Jones, and Adams. Eventually, Jackson stood over them with the firearm while defendant

went to the bedroom and found more items. Jackson then went through their pockets under

defendant’s direction. Jackson took from Wright’s pockets a wallet containing Wright’s

identification, credit card, about $20 in cash, and a set of keys. He took from Adams’s pockets a

wallet and keys. Jackson made about seven trips taking items from the apartment to Adams’s

vehicle and then reported there was no more room in the vehicle.

                                               -3-
No. 1-21-1030

¶7     Defendant told Jackson to turn up a radio’s volume and retrieve pillows for Wright, Jones,

and Adams, because “it was time to do these motherf***ers.” Jackson turned up the radio’s

volume. Defendant assisted Jackson in placing pillows over the heads of Wright, Jones, and Adams

while they were still face-down on the floor. From behind them, defendant said, “[W]ell, this is it,

guys, say good-bye.” He fired shots in Wright’s back and arm, then two shots at Adams, and then

one shot at Jones. As defendant and Jackson left, defendant said, “[T]his motherf***er ain’t dead.”

He returned to Wright and placed the firearm against the pillow on Wright’s head. Wright heard

defendant’s firearm made a clicking sound, but no bullets discharged. Defendant and Jackson

immediately left the apartment. Wright and Jones survived their shots, but Adams was not moving.

Wright saw the apartment was missing all of the clothing, shoes, jewelry, money, luggage, garment

bags, and televisions except for one.

¶8     Jones called the police, who arrived minutes later. Wright named defendant as one of the

offenders to the police. He later identified Jackson from a lineup at the police station.

¶9     On redirect examination, Wright testified that when the pillow was over his head and just

before he was shot, he saw defendant’s shoes. He also saw the shadow from the firearm. On

recross-examination, he confirmed that he saw the firearm’s shadow about 1½ feet from the floor,

and saw defendant with Adams. He also stated that he saw Jackson’s feet next to defendant’s feet.

¶ 10   Jones testified similarly to Wright regarding the events of December 15, 1990. He added

that he was friends with defendant and had known him for three years. Defendant called him that

morning to say he was coming over to bring some money that he owed. Later in the day, he saw

defendant at his apartment. When Jones was on the floor, someone took about $40 or $50 from his

pockets. From the corner of his eye, Jones saw defendant shoot Wright. He saw defendant walk

                                                -4-
No. 1-21-1030

by Adams’s head and shoot him. Defendant then shot Jones in his right upper back. Jones told the

responding police that defendant shot him and identified Jackson by his nickname, “Hooker,” as

defendant’s cousin. Jones later identified Jackson from a lineup.

¶ 11   John Hayes testified that on December 20, 1990, he allowed Jackson to stay with him for

several days. They drove to a house on Washington Boulevard and Central Avenue, and Jackson

entered the house while Hayes remained in the vehicle. Jackson and defendant, identified in court,

exited the house each carrying a bag. Jackson introduced defendant as his cousin. Defendant,

Jackson, and Hayes then went to Hayes’s apartment. Defendant and Jackson carried bags into the

apartment containing various items, including clothing, cologne, shoes, and hats.

¶ 12   On a later date, at the apartment, defendant told Hayes that he and Jackson “shot these three

guys up over on Greenleaf Street.” Defendant stated he had a .22-caliber firearm and Jackson had

a shotgun during the incident. Defendant recounted that he and Jackson told the three men to lay

down, tied up and gagged them, put pillows over their heads, turned the music up “real loud,” “got

all of their stuff together,” shot them, and left. Defendant also recounted that he told Jackson to

throw the guns in the river. On January 3, 1991, Hayes returned to his apartment to find detectives

waiting for him. Hayes relayed to the detectives what defendant had told him, and they gathered

Jackson’s and defendant’s bags.

¶ 13   On cross-examination, Hayes testified that both defendant and Jackson stayed at his

apartment for almost two weeks.

¶ 14   Chicago police officer Donald Rose testified that he and his partner Officer Chow

responded to the scene of the shooting on December 15, 1990, at about 5 p.m. 3 Rose observed a

       3
           The first name of Officer Chow does not appear in the transcript of the trial proceedings.

                                                    -5-
No. 1-21-1030

large puddle of blood in the middle of the living room floor and three pillows on the floor, at least

one with bloodstains on it and another with gunpowder burns. Wright identified and described

both defendant and Jackson as the offenders. He also told Rose that defendant and Jackson stole

several television sets, a VCR, and a Chevrolet Spectrum belonging to one of the victims.

¶ 15   On cross-examination, Rose testified that Wright only gave defendant’s race, sex, age, and

name, but no physical description of defendant. On redirect examination, after viewing the case

report he wrote, Rose testified that he received information that the shooter was “a male black,

approximately 22 years old, 5 foot 6, 120 pounds.”

¶ 16   Chicago police mobile crime lab technician John Naujokas testified that he processed the

scene, which included examining and photographing evidence. A photograph, marked as exhibit

8, depicted a multicolored pillowcase with burn marks on the top portion of the pillow, which is

generally indicative of gunfire. A photograph, marked exhibit 10, depicted a white pillow that had

a blood spatter. The pillow and pillowcases were not suitable for lifting fingerprints. The State

presented Naujokas with three exhibits, marked as group 6. Those three exhibits were a

multicolored pillow with a burn mark and blood stains on it, a multicolored pillow that was

“stained and soiled” and submitted to trace serology for further analysis, and a white pillowcase

with a blood spatter on it that was also submitted to serology. A clear adhesive tape was also

recovered from the scene and tested for fingerprints. Naujokas testified that no cartridge cases or

fired bullets were found at the scene, which was expected because a revolver does not eject

cartridge cases “in an automatic fashion.”

¶ 17   Naujokas lifted prints from a Sony Watchman television and Sony clock radio in the living

room, and a cup and wine glass from the kitchen. Two bags and some clothing at the scene were

                                                -6-
No. 1-21-1030

not suitable for fingerprint lifts because they were likely to absorb body moisture. Naujokas was

unable to recover any other lifts from the scene.

¶ 18   Chicago police detective Tony Villardita also testified that he responded to the scene. He

observed a pool of blood in the center of the living room, and blood drops leading to the bedroom

and kitchen. In the bedroom, “everything was upside down,” and articles of clothing with price

tags still on them were on the floor “like somebody had ransacked it.”

¶ 19   At the police station, Villardita spoke with Jones and learned that the offenders’ names

were “Byron Perkins” and “Untjuan,” also known as “Hooker.” Jones had known defendant for at

least two years. Villardita also learned that the offenders took Adams’s vehicle, and he then radioed

a message to hold the vehicle if it was seen.

¶ 20   Chicago police officer Kevin Navarro testified that on January 3, 1991, at about 11 a.m.,

he was driving around the 4700 block of West Huron Street when he saw a 1988 Chevrolet

Spectrum with no front plate. Navarro attempted to curb the Spectrum but the vehicle drove away,

so he chased it for about six or seven blocks. A check of the vehicle’s rear license plate “c[ame]

up as taken in a homicide.” The driver of the Spectrum attempted to flee on foot, while two other

occupants in the Spectrum did not flee. Navarro caught up to the driver on foot, arrested him, and

learned he was Jackson.

¶ 21   Chicago police detective John Fitzsimmons testified that he spoke with Jackson at the

police station after Jackson’s arrest. Jackson agreed to accompany him in looking for defendant,

eventually leading to Hayes’s apartment, but defendant was not present. Hayes provided his

consent to the officer to conduct a search of the apartment. Fitzsimmons recovered gym bags from

the apartment.

                                                -7-
No. 1-21-1030

¶ 22   A Cook County assistant chief medical examiner testified that she performed an autopsy

on Adams, who had two gunshot wounds in his back, and a bullet lodged in both his spine and

anterior chest wall. The examiner opined that Adams died from multiple gunshot wounds.

¶ 23   The State rested. Defense counsel then informed the court that defendant wanted to call

Jackson, who had signed an affidavit saying he was responsible for “this entire thing.” After the

court spoke with Jackson’s counsel, defendant called Jackson, who invoked his Fifth Amendment

privilege and did not testify.

¶ 24   During closing arguments, defendant argued, in relevant part, that the only information the

officers had to “go on” was from Wright and Jones, who were the only individuals stating

defendant robbed the apartment, and no fingerprints were recovered that could be used to

incriminate him. In rebuttal, the State argued that defendant knew the victims, had been in the

apartment previously, and knew the stolen items were inside the apartment.

¶ 25   The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Adams, the attempted first

degree murders of Wright and Jones, and the armed robbery of Wright, Jones, and Adams. The

trial court sentenced defendant to natural life in prison for first degree murder and 30 years each

for the attempted first degree murder and armed robbery counts, to be served consecutively.

¶ 26   We affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Perkins, No. 1-95-0648 (1997) (unpublished order

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 27   On August 22, 2014, defendant filed a pro se section 116-3 motion for forensic testing,

alleging the police took his fingerprints but “no other biological evidence” despite “the fact that

multiple items of (DNA Bearing Evidence) had been collected from the crime scene.” He claimed

the fingerprint expert could not determine that the fingerprints found at the scene belonged to

                                               -8-
No. 1-21-1030

defendant. He also claimed that untested blood and saliva samples, an untested firearm, and the

vehicle with three occupants, none of whom were defendant, were all “proof” that identity was an

issue at trial. Defendant requested that the court order the State to “produce (all Items of DNA-

Bearing Evidence), and any items that could bear DNA evidence for the defense to inspect.” He

asserted that the actual testing of the items had the potential to produce new, noncumulative

evidence materially relevant to his assertion of actual innocence.

¶ 28   Defendant attached to the motion the police report of Jackson’s arrest.

¶ 29   He also attached Jackson’s affidavit dated August 22, 1996. Jackson averred that he took

“full blame [for] the crime [defendant] has been arrested for” and defendant did not “have anything

to do with the case.” Jackson “was a user of drugs, smoking cocaine that led [him] to do things

[he] regret[s].” On December 15, 1990, he was “high” and went to the 1500 block of West Green

Leaf without defendant to rob Jones. Jackson averred that he shot all three victims. He told the

victims “I’m glad [defendant] set [this] up,” as his “whole plot” was to have the victims identify

defendant. After the robbery, Jackson asked to stay at Hayes’s home and brought travel bags with

the property he took from Jones’s apartment. On January 3, 1991, he was caught driving Adams’s

vehicle. He lied to the police that defendant left bags at Hayes’s house and was hiding there.

However, Jackson had taken the two travel bags of items from Jones’s apartment and left them at

Hayes’s house.

¶ 30   Jackson further averred that he “manipulated” defendant to not notice that Jackson framed

him. Jackson’s public defender later informed him of an offer by the State, in which Jackson would

receive a “lesser sentence” if he said defendant “did the crime.” Jackson rejected the offer, but his

public defender told him if he stated what he presented on his affidavit, Jackson would receive the

                                                -9-
No. 1-21-1030

death penalty. Jackson averred he had attempted to present an affidavit twice to “clear” defendant’s

name, but his public defender and the assistant state’s attorney “destroyed” both affidavits. He

averred that his public defender and the State “did all they could do to block the truth not to be

told by using the death penalty to direct [Jackson] to not voice what happened in this case.”

¶ 31    Defendant was appointed counsel, and his initial motion was continued from 2014 through

2019.

¶ 32    On January 23, 2019, defendant filed a second pro se section 116-3 motion for forensic

testing. He asserted that during his trial, a lab technician testified that he collected fingerprints

from different items from the crime scene but did not know whether the fingerprints matched those

of defendant. Defendant claimed that it was hidden from the jury that his fingerprints and blood

were not found at the scene and in Adams’s vehicle. He requested the court “have them go to the

[Chicago] police forensic unit to get the evidence [they hid] from my jury in trial.” He claimed

that there was a “conspiracy to prove [his] wrongful conviction,” and lab reports showed the

“fingerprints and blood” were not his.

¶ 33    On February 14, 2019, defendant also filed a pro se “motion for exigent circumstances,”

requesting “documents” of “(fluids)” that were “withheld from [his] jury trial,” as well as

fingerprints from a “latent print card,” which were not a match with his. He asserted the lab testing

of the blood and fingerprints, along with Jackson’s affidavit, would prove his innocence.

¶ 34    On July 20, 2020, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s section 116-3 motions.

The State argued that it presented significant evidence of defendant’s guilt at trial, which included

the identification of defendant by the two surviving victims. The State also asserted that the results

from the testing would have little probative value because there was no evidence that defendant

                                                - 10 -
No. 1-21-1030

touched the items or bled in the apartment, and it was unknown how many other individuals may

have used the vehicle before it was recovered. Additionally, the State asserted that no firearm was

recovered for testing. The State argued that the evidence used as exhibits at trial would not be

reliable because they may have been touched by attorneys, witnesses, the courtroom deputy, and

jurors. Moreover, the State argued that defendant had failed to show the pillows and pillowcases

were subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish they had not been contaminated.

¶ 35   That same date, defendant’s counsel told the court he would not be supplementing

defendant’s most recent pro se motion for forensic testing but adopted defendant’s prior motion

containing the affidavit and police report.

¶ 36   On December 11, 2020, the court heard arguments on the motions.

¶ 37   Defendant’s counsel argued there were “possible biological materials” in the form of DNA

from a television, clock radio, glass, vehicle, “another unidentified item,” and blood samples from

the scene. He asserted there was also tape found at the scene potentially containing DNA material,

and possible saliva samples from a glass “along with other items of latent prints” and “unidentified

latent prints.” Counsel noted Jackson’s affidavit and argued that testing the items “may go

towards” defendant’s actual innocence claim.

¶ 38   The State responded that Jackson’s affidavit stating that he alone committed the crimes

would not render any additional forensic testing material, and the evidence did not reflect that

defendant touched the items sought to be tested. The State further argued that it was concerned

about contamination of the tape used to bound the victims as it had already been tested for

fingerprints.

                                               - 11 -
No. 1-21-1030

¶ 39    On August 11, 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s motions. The court stated there was

nothing in the pro se pleadings indicating the items in question, “the cups, the sink, the TV, the

clock, the radio, any of those things” were not tested, or that any of them “would have established

some sort of actual innocence or benefit to the defendant.” The court also noted there was an “issue

of contamination” as the State noted in its argument. The court gave “very little weight” to

Jackson’s affidavit, as “an eleventh hour sole admission to responsibility by a co-defendant should

be viewed with great suspicion.”

¶ 40    On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions for forensic

testing because identity was the issue at trial, a sufficient chain of custody existed, and the

requested testing had the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to

his claim of actual innocence.

¶ 41    Postconviction access to forensic testing is not a constitutional right but a statutory right

governed by state legislatures. People v. Grant, 2022 IL 126824, ¶ 26 (citing District Attorney’s

Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72-74 (2009)). In Illinois, the

legislature enacted section 116-3 to “provide an avenue for convicted defendants who maintained

their innocence to test available genetic material capable of providing new and dramatic evidence

materially relevant to the question of the defendant’s actual innocence.” People v. Henderson, 343

Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1114 (2003). Under section 116-3, a defendant may move “for the performance

of fingerprint, Integrated Ballistic Identification System, or forensic DNA testing *** on evidence

that was secured in relation to the trial *** which resulted in the defendant’s conviction,” and

either (1) “was not subject to the testing which is now requested at the time of trial” or (2) “although

previously subjected to testing, can be subjected to additional testing utilizing a method that was

                                                 - 12 -
No. 1-21-1030

not scientifically available at the time of trial that provides a reasonable likelihood of more

probative results.” 725 ILCS 5/116-3(a) (West 2014, 2018).

¶ 42   The defendant must present a prima facie case that: “(1) identity was the issue in the trial

or guilty plea which resulted in his or her conviction”; and “(2) the evidence to be tested has been

subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with,

replaced, or altered in any material aspect.” 725 ILCS 5/116-3(b) (West 2014, 2018). If the

defendant establishes a prima facie case, then the trial court must allow testing under reasonable

conditions upon a determination that:

                “(1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new,

       noncumulative evidence (i) materially relevant to the defendant’s assertion of actual

       innocence when the defendant’s conviction was the result of a trial, even though the results

       may not completely exonerate the defendant, *** and

                (2) the testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within the

       relevant scientific community.” 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c) (West 2014, 2018).

¶ 43   The State agrees defendant established his prima facie case but disputes his contention that

the testing would have the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant

to defendant’s assertion of actual innocence.

¶ 44   “A materially relevant determination requires an examination of the trial evidence, as well

as the evidence the defendant wants to test.” People v. Navarro, 2015 IL App (1st) 131550, ¶ 13.

The phrase “materially relevant” has been interpreted to include evidence that will “significantly

advance defendant’s claim,” and the evidence “need not exonerate defendant by itself.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Shum, 207 Ill. 2d 47, 66 (2003). “DNA evidence that plays a

                                                - 13 -
No. 1-21-1030

minor role and is a collateral issue is not materially relevant because it does not significantly

advance a claim of actual innocence.” People v. Gecht, 386 Ill. App. 3d 578, 582 (2008).

¶ 45   Because a section 116-3 motion is a pleading in the nature of a civil complaint or petition

for relief, “we must accept as true and construe liberally the well-pleaded facts in the petition

unless contradicted by the record.” People v. Cocroft, 2020 IL App (1st) 180056, ¶ 21. A ruling

on a motion for postconviction testing under section 116-3 is reviewed de novo. People v. Stoecker,

2014 IL 115756, ¶ 21.

¶ 46   We find that the trial court properly denied defendant’s requested forensic testing as the

results of that testing would not be materially relevant to the defendant’s assertion of actual

innocence. At trial, the State presented two surviving witnesses, Wright and Jones, who testified

that, on December 15, 1990, they spoke with Adams, defendant, and Jackson in Jones’s apartment

for about 20 minutes before defendant pulled a firearm on them, ordered Jackson to bind Wright,

Jones, and Adams, ordered Jackson to remove property from the apartment, and then shot each of

the victims while they were bound on the floor with pillows over their heads.

¶ 47   Wright and Jones knew defendant prior to that day and both identified defendant as the

shooter to police officers. Hayes testified that defendant and Jackson stayed at his home soon after

the crime, and defendant admitted to the crime, which defendant described to Hayes in detail.

Thus, the evidence at trial, including his admission to Hayes, overwhelmingly established

defendant committed the offenses. See People v. Navarro, 2015 IL App (1st) 131550, ¶ 16 (testing

of ballistic evidence would be immaterial where the State called multiple eyewitnesses who

identified the defendant as the shooter).

                                               - 14 -
No. 1-21-1030

¶ 48    Defendant claims that the forensic testing requested in his section 116-3 motion would

show he was not present at the scene of the crime, and only his codefendant, Jackson, committed

the crimes. As support, he provided Jackson’s affidavit, which averred that Jackson essentially

framed defendant for the crime, even though defendant was not present at the scene and had

nothing to do with the crime.

¶ 49    However, at no point did the State’s witnesses testify that defendant touched the items he

requested to be tested, including the glasses, television, clock radio, and tape inside the apartment.

There was also no testimony that defendant bled at the scene. Thus, any test results showing that

defendant did not contribute any DNA or fingerprints to the items in Jones’s apartment or the

blood sample recovered from the scene would not undermine the State’s trial evidence. 4 See

People v. English, 2013 IL App (4th) 120044, ¶¶ 23-24 (forensic testing would not significantly

advance a claim of actual innocence where, even if testing the firearm at issue revealed fingerprints

of another party and not the defendant, it would not undermine any of the evidence and would

have “little to no impact on [the] defendant’s case,” as the evidence showed defendant’s

accomplice possessed the firearm). Therefore, any evidence acquired from testing the requested

items would not be materially relevant to the issue of whether defendant was present at the scene

and would not lend support to Jackson’s affidavit that he acted alone in committing the offenses.

        4
           We note that, while the parties on appeal discuss whether forensic testing of the pillows and
pillowcases at the scene would have produced materially relevant evidence, defendant never specifically
raised this evidence in its section 116-3 motions or at the hearing on the motion, much less identified the
testing they should receive or what the testing of the items would uncover, as required by section 116-3.
See People v. Gibson, 357 Ill. App. 3d 480, 488 (2005) (limiting the reviewing court’s analysis to the testing
of evidence specifically requested in the defendant’s section 116-3 motion, corresponding memorandum,
and testimony at the motion hearing).

                                                   - 15 -
No. 1-21-1030

Any results gained from the requested forensic testing of that evidence in question would not be

materially relevant to his claim of innocence.

¶ 50   In a similar vein, any potential DNA or fingerprint evidence recovered from Adams’s

vehicle also would not materially advance defendant’s actual innocence claim. Adams’s vehicle

was not recovered until weeks after the incident. Jackson was found driving the vehicle with two

passengers, none of whom were defendant. Given that multiple other people had used the vehicle

and weeks had passed by the time the vehicle was recovered, evidence that defendant’s DNA or

fingerprints were not in the vehicle would not call into question whether defendant was present at

the scene of the robberies and shootings. Thus, any further forensic testing of the vehicle would

not produce evidence that would materially advance defendant’s claim that he was innocent. See

English, 2013 IL App (4th) 120044, ¶ 24 (fingerprint lift on firearm not materially relevant to

question of whether the defendant used the firearm, where the firearm was recovered more than

two weeks after the robbery, and evidence showed the firearm was used in three other robberies

during that period of time); Gecht, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 582 (finding DNA testing of knives and

carpeting implicated in a sexual assault would not have significantly advanced an actual innocence

claim, where the knives and carpeting were implicated in several other attacks). Also, while

defendant requested testing of a firearm, no firearm was recovered to permit testing of any kind.

¶ 51   We conclude that the requested testing was not materially relevant to defendant’s actual

innocence claim, and the circuit court was justified in denying defendant’s section 116-3 motion.

¶ 52   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 53   Affirmed.

                                                 - 16 -