Court Opinion

ID: 9723236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:08:11.409039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:10.785475
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: Although I agree with the majority decision, I write specially to emphasize that the trial court erred three different ways in its handling of defendant’s prior conviction. First, the court erred by stating that Williams permits impeachment by prior conviction only when the prior conviction involves dishonesty or false statement, the so-called "second prong” of Montgomery. Since the supreme court’s decision in Williams, this court has held repeatedly that "first prong” convictions under Montgomery — those involving crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year — are still admissible to impeach a testifying defendant within the trial court’s discretion after it engages in the required Montgomery balancing test. This court’s most recent decision so holding was Bramlett (276 Ill. App. 3d at 207, 658 N.E.2d at 515). Thus, this court has rejected the trial court’s interpretation of Williams as barring such "first prong” convictions. Second, as the majority decision properly points out, the trial court erred by not performing the Montgomery balancing test before permitting the use of defendant’s prior conviction to impeach him. Even with "second prong” convictions, admissibility for impeachment purposes is not automatic, and especially in light of Williams, the record should affirmatively show that the trial court determined that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Third, as in Bramlett, the trial court again could have — and should have — avoided the issue defendant raises concerning the improper inclusion of damaging and irrelevant information regarding his prior conviction of armed robbery. The court could have avoided this issue if it had utilized the “mere fact” method of impeachment by prior conviction. (See Bramlett, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 208-09, 658 N.E.2d at 515-16 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring).) After decades of successful use of the "mere fact” method of impeachment by prior conviction — especially throughout Central Illinois — it is difficult to justify continued use of an alternative method that, as here, tends to maximize the prejudicial effect and potential error of admitting the prior conviction to impeach the defendant. As an example, in the very case before us, had defendant properly objected at trial to the inclusion of the irrelevant portions of his prior armed robbery conviction, this court might well have reversed his conviction on that basis alone out of a concern that he was denied a fair trial. Such a reversal would have been wholly unnecessary. As a last point, I emphasize that the trial court can — and should — utilize the "mere fact” method of impeachment sua sponte and not wait for either the prosecution or the defense to suggest it. All aspects of the subject of impeachment by prior conviction are left to the trial court’s discretion, and the court is in no way limited to handling such impeachment in a fashion suggested by the parties.