Court Opinion

ID: 9929418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 16:19:14.644285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:13.899367
License: Public Domain

THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2024 WY 17

                                                                   OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                           February 2, 2024

 CHARLES A. SANTISTEVAN,

 Appellant
 (Defendant),
                                                                   S-22-0229, S-23-0116
 v.

 THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee
 (Plaintiff).

                       Appeal from the District Court of Albany County
                          The Honorable Tori R.A. Kricken, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk
      A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; H. Michael Bennett, Senior Assistant
      Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General;
      Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John J. Woykovsky, Senior
      Assistant Attorney General.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FENN, Justice.

[¶1] A jury convicted Charles Anthony “Tony” Santistevan of six counts of sexual
assault in the first degree, one count of sexual assault in the third degree, and one count of
voyeurism. On appeal, he claims the district court abused its discretion when it allowed
the State to introduce evidence pursuant to Wyoming Rules of Evidence (W.R.E.) 404(b)
that Mr. Santistevan’s sexual relationship with the victim, R.S., began when she was a
minor. We affirm.

                                           ISSUE

[¶2] Mr. Santistevan presents a single issue, which we rephase as follows: Did the district
court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Mr. Santistevan’s relationship with
R.S. when she was a minor pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b)?

                                          FACTS

[¶3] In 2020, a task force with the Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigation began
investigating Mr. Santistevan on unrelated criminal allegations. During the execution of a
search warrant at Mr. Santistevan’s residence, law enforcement seized electronics
including two laptop computers. When Special Agent Luke Rippy reviewed the contents
of the laptops, he found thumbnails and videos of a nude female who appeared to be
unconscious while an individual performed sexual acts on her. Special Agent Rippy
identified the female in the videos as Mr. Santistevan’s wife, R.S., and contacted her to ask
about the videos. R.S. told law enforcement she was unaware of the videos, she did not
know they existed, and she never consented to the sexual encounters.

[¶4] Special Agent Rippy obtained an additional search warrant to allow him to review
the videos and photos on the laptops more thoroughly. He found approximately seven
videos of R.S. unconscious while Mr. Santistevan performed sexual acts on her, including
penetration using a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation unit which sends electric
shocks into the body for nerve stimulation. In addition to the seven videos of sexual
intrusion while R.S. was unconscious, Special Agent Rippy located four videos of R.S.
taking a shower where she appeared to be unaware she was being video recorded. Special
Agent Rippy interviewed Mr. Santistevan and R.S. about the videos.

[¶5] When Special Agent Rippy asked Mr. Santistevan about the videos, “[h]e stated
[R.S.] would take Klonopin to the point where she would pass out [or] go . . . unconscious.”
Mr. Santistevan said “[h]e would perform sexual acts on [R.S.] and record it[]” and then
the next day they would watch the recordings together. Mr. Santistevan said they were
married at the time the videos were recorded. He stated he met R.S. when she was
approximately 16 to 17 years old, and he was helping her parents redo their roof. He stated
they began dating when R.S. was 18 and going to college.

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[¶6] When Special Agent Rippy interviewed R.S., he had her review still photographs
from the videos to identify herself, the location of the videos, and determine if it was Mr.
Santistevan performing the sexual acts and recording the videos. During the interview,
R.S. became angry and upset. R.S. informed Special Agent Rippy she had no knowledge
of the videos and that she never consented to the sexual acts being performed on her by
Mr. Santistevan or to the recordings of the sexual acts. R.S. further informed Special Agent
Rippy she met Mr. Santistevan when she was approximately 14 or 15 years old while
waitressing at a café. R.S. said Mr. Santistevan would come into the café and talk to her
about his art. He gave her his phone number and told her, “If you ever want to come hang
out or come look at my art, give me a call.” R.S. stated she went over to Mr. Santistevan’s
house when she was 15 and they began a sexual relationship. Mr. Santistevan was
approximately 37 years old at the time. During his investigation, Special Agent Rippy
found nude photographs of R.S. on Mr. Santistevan’s electronic devices that Mr.
Santistevan took when she was 15 years old.

[¶7] Mr. Santistevan was charged with six counts of sexual assault in the first degree in
violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-302(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2016), one count of sexual
assault in the third degree in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-304(a)(iii) (LexisNexis
2016) for the sexual intrusion and video recordings of R.S. while she was unconscious, and
one count of voyeurism in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-4-304(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2016)
for the shower videos of R.S. These charges did not include allegations stemming from
sexual relations between Mr. Santistevan and R.S. when she was under the age of 18.

[¶8] Mr. Santistevan filed a demand for the State’s intent to use any evidence pursuant
to W.R.E. 404(b) at trial. The State filed its notice of intent and its supplemental notice of
intent indicating it intended to introduce several instances of uncharged misconduct or
other acts under W.R.E. 404(b). The State specifically sought to introduce evidence Mr.
Santistevan established a relationship with R.S. when she was 14 years old and he was
approximately 37 years old, and he engaged in sexual conduct with her on a regular basis
while she was under the age of 18. The State further sought to introduce evidence Mr.
Santistevan told R.S. she was not to discuss their relationship when she was a minor
because he could go to jail. The State sought to introduce this evidence under W.R.E.
404(b) for the purposes of plan, course of conduct, and because it went directly to the
consent element of the crimes charged. The district court held a pre-trial Gleason1 hearing
on December 28, 2021, and found the evidence was relevant and admissible under W.R.E.
404(b) to show an ongoing scheme or plan and to demonstrate Mr. Santistevan’s course of
conduct. The district court further held the evidence developed the facts regarding the

1
 A Gleason hearing is the required pre-trial hearing to determine the potential admissibility of proposed
W.R.E. 404(b) evidence. See, e.g., Volpi v. State, 2018 WY 66, ¶ 12, 419 P.3d 884, 889 (Wyo. 2018);
Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 25–30, 57 P.3d 332, 342–43 (Wyo. 2002).

                                                   2
relationship between R.S. and Mr. Santistevan and established the facts leading up to the
alleged nonconsensual sexual conduct.

[¶9] During the trial, the State introduced statements Mr. Santistevan made to Special
Agent Rippy about when he began his relationship with R.S. The State further introduced
R.S.’s testimony regarding when she met Mr. Santistevan, and the café manager’s
testimony about when R.S. worked at the café and how Mr. Santistevan would come into
the café. R.S. testified to the following regarding the W.R.E. 404(b) evidence:

             Q. And [R.S.], when did you meet Tony?

             A. I met Tony in summer of 2011.

             Q. And how old were you in the summer of 2011?

             A. I was 14, turning 15.

             Q. How old were you when you met Tony?

             A. I was 14.

             Q. And how did you meet Tony?

             A. I was a waitress at a truck stop and he was a patron there.

             Q. And where was this truck stop?

             A. It’s in Lusk, Wyoming; called the Outpost Café.

             Q. And so you were a waitress there when you were 14?

             A. Yes.

             Q. And how, I guess, how did you meet him?

             A. He would come into the restaurant and he would draw or
                play chess, but usually he’d come in there to draw.

             Q. Were you interested in art as well?

             A. Yes.

             Q. Would you talk about art with him?

                                            3
A. Yes.

Q. And how old was Mr. Santistevan when you were 14?

A. He was either 36 or 37.

Q. And did your relationship progress with Tony past one of
   waitress and patron?

A. Yes.

Q. What - - how did that happen?

A. We started to - - well, he would invite me over to his house
   because I was interested in his artwork. But then shortly
   after that, it progressed into a sexual relationship.

Q. Did you consider yourself dating Tony?

A. Yes.

Q. When, about, did you consider yourself dating Tony?

A. Not the first year but, like, 2012, that fall was when I would
   consider us to be starting, like, a monogamous dating
   relationship.

Q. And how old were you at that time?

A. I was 16.

Q. And when you were in a dating relationship, at that time
with Tony, or even before you considered yourself dating him,
did you ever tell anyone that you were seeing Tony?

A. No, I did not.

Q. And why not?

A. Because he told me not to. Because he knew he was going
   to get in trouble.

                               4
              Q. And how long did you date Tony?

              A. Until we got married.

              Q. And when was that?

              A. I was 19. . . .

[¶10] After a four-day trial, the jury found Mr. Santistevan guilty on all eight counts. The
district court sentenced Mr. Santistevan to 40 to 50 years for count one of sexual assault in
the first degree; 20 to 30 years for count two of sexual assault in the first degree to run
consecutively to count one; 10 to 20 years for counts three, four, five, and six of sexual
assault in the first degree, all to run concurrent to count one; 12 to 15 years for count seven
of sexual assault in the third degree to run concurrent to count one; and 12 months to 24
months for count eight of voyeurism to run concurrent to count one. Mr. Santistevan was
given 338 days of credit for time served on all eight counts.

[¶11] Mr. Santistevan filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Wyoming Rules of
Appellate Procedure 21 claiming his trial counsel was ineffective. He claimed his trial
counsel did not include him during discovery and witness identification and failed to
adequately investigate all of the facts and circumstances surrounding R.S.’s testimony.
Following a hearing, the district court denied Mr. Santistevan’s motion for a new trial. Mr.
Santistevan timely appealed the district court’s order allowing admission of evidence
regarding his relationship with R.S. when she was a minor and its order denying his motion
for a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶12] In his appellate brief, Mr. Santistevan raises only the admissibility of the W.R.E.
404(b) evidence and does not challenge the denial of his motion for a new trial for
ineffective assistance of counsel. He filed a pretrial demand for notice of the State’s intent
to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), so we review the admission of the evidence
for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. State, 2022 WY 119, ¶ 11, 517 P.3d 583, 588 (Wyo.
2022) (citing Barrett v. State, 2022 WY 64, ¶ 41, 509 P.3d 940, 948 (Wyo. 2022)). “We
will not disturb the trial court’s determination of the admissibility of evidence unless the
court clearly abused its discretion.” Freer v. State, 2023 WY 80, ¶ 11, 533 P.3d 897, 901
(Wyo. 2023) (quoting Anderson, ¶ 11, 517 P.3d at 588). On review, “[w]e need only
determine whether the court could have reasonably concluded as it did.” Id.

                                       DISCUSSION

[¶13] Mr. Santistevan contends the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of uncharged misconduct under W.R.E. 404(b). He challenges the district court’s

                                              5
decision to admit testimony stating he engaged in sexual intercourse with R.S. when she
was under the age of 18 and he was in his mid to late 30s. W.R.E. 404(b) governs the
admissibility of other acts evidence or uncharged misconduct, stating:

              Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
              prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted
              in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
              other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
              preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
              or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
              prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice
              in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
              notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such
              evidence it intends to introduce at trial.

W.R.E. 404(b).

[¶14] The admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts carries the risk of inherent prejudice.
Volpi, 2018 WY 66, ¶ 12, 419 P.3d at 889 (quoting Wease v. State, 2007 WY 176, ¶ 59,
170 P.3d 94, 116 (Wyo. 2007)). Generally, such evidence is not admissible because “the
defendant in a criminal case should not be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor
because of past misdeeds, but only because of his guilt of the particular crime charged.”
Freer, 2023 WY 80, ¶ 13, 533 P.3d at 902 (quoting Olson v. State, 2023 WY 11, ¶ 13, 523
P.3d 910, 913–14 (Wyo. 2023)); Volpi, ¶ 12, 419 P.3d at 889. If the State wishes to use
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts at trial, a well-established procedure must be
followed. Freer, ¶ 13, 533 P.3d at 902 (quoting Olson, ¶ 13, 523 P.3d at 914).

              When a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice of the
              State’s intent to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence, the
              State must identify the evidence. The district court then must
              hold a hearing in which the State offers a relevant and proper
              purpose for admissibility under Rule 404(b) and explains why
              the evidence is more probative than unfairly prejudicial. In that
              hearing, the district court must then conduct an exacting
              analysis of the Gleason factors:

                     (1) the evidence must be offered for a proper
                     purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3)
                     the probative value of the evidence must not be
                     substantially outweighed by its potential for
                     unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial
                     court must instruct the jury that the similar acts

                                              6
                         evidence is to be considered only for the proper
                         purpose for which it was admitted.

Id. (quoting Olson, ¶ 13, 523 P.3d at 914); see also Gleason, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 27, 57 P.3d
at 342 (discussing the procedures to admit evidence under W.R.E. 404(b)).

[¶15] We do not apply the Gleason analysis anew on appeal. Mayhew v. State, 2019 WY
38, ¶ 27, 438 P.3d 617, 624 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Garrison v. State, 2018 WY 9, ¶ 20, 409
P.3d 1209, 1215 (Wyo. 2018); Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 16, ¶¶ 128–129, 367 P.3d 1108,
1143 (Wyo. 2016)). Instead, we determine whether there is a legitimate basis for the
district court’s decision. Freer, 2023 WY 80, ¶ 14, 533 P.3d at 902; Barrett, 2022 WY 64,
¶ 48, 509 P.3d at 950. On appeal, Mr. Santistevan must show the district court abused its
discretion and did not admit the evidence for a proper purpose under W.R.E. 404(b).
Anderson, 2022 WY 119, ¶ 15, 517 P.3d at 589 (citing Barrett, ¶ 48, 509 P.3d at 950).

[¶16] The district court held the required hearing, conducted the Gleason analysis, and
found the evidence of Mr. Santistevan’s relationship with R.S. when she was a minor was
admissible under W.R.E. 404(b). It held:

                 32. While the Court is cognizant of the potential prejudice
                 caused by information that Mr. Santistevan began a sexual
                 relationship with R.S. while she was a minor, the Court
                 concludes that this information is necessary to provide the jury
                 with a complete story as to Mr. Santistevan’s access to the
                 alleged victim, his control over her, and his development of a
                 “relationship” that would allow for sexual access (sometimes
                 referred to as “grooming” [2]).

                 33. The Court further agrees with the State that introduction
                 of this evidence is appropriate pursuant to the well-recognized
                 “course of conduct” purpose. See Leyva v. State, 2007 WY 136,
                 ¶ 28, 165 P.3d 446, 454 (Wyo. 2007) (explaining that the
                 “course of conduct” purpose refers to misconduct that “forms
                 part of the history of the event or serve to enhance natural
                 development of the facts”). This evidence is relevant to
                 establish the crimes charged because it assists in providing a
                 complete story to the jury, particularly Mr. Santistevan’s
                 conduct in developing a controlling relationship with a young

2
  “Grooming refers to deliberate actions taken by a defendant to expose a child to sexual material; the
ultimate goal of grooming is the formation of an emotional connection with the child and a reduction of the
child’s inhibitions in order to prepare the child for sexual activity.” United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816,
833 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Chambers, 642 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2011)).

                                                       7
              and vulnerable female. It develops the facts giving rise to the
              State’s current allegations against Mr. Santistevan, particularly
              the dynamics of his relationship with R.S., culminating in
              allegedly      forcible      and      nonconsensual        sexual
              intercourse/intrusion.     The Court concludes that Mr.
              Santistevan’s grooming behaviors and history of his
              relationship with R.S. are relevant to show an ongoing scheme
              or plan as well as to demonstrate a course of conduct.

[¶17] We have previously recognized evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible as
an exception under W.R.E. 404(b) if it “forms part of the history of the event or serves to
enhance the natural development of the facts.” Leyva, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 28, 165 P.3d at 454
(citing Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Wyo. 2007); Blakeman
v. State, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 32, 100 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Wyo. 2004); Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d
42, 49 (Wyo.1986)). “[E]vents do not occur in a vacuum and the jury has the right to have
the offense placed in its proper setting.” Garrison, 2018 WY 9, ¶ 27, 409 P.3d at 1217
(quoting Bromley, ¶ 21, 150 P.3d at 1209). When evidence is used to explain the parties’
relationship, it invokes the proper purpose of the course of conduct between the parties
under W.R.E. 404(b). Id. The evidence introduced by the State established: 1) Mr.
Santistevan met R.S. when she was 14; 2) how their relationship progressed, including his
grooming of R.S. when she was a minor; and 3) their sexual relationship. The district court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) for the proper
purpose of course of conduct to illustrate the relationship between Mr. Santistevan and R.S.
and to enhance the natural development of the facts. See generally Garrison, 2018 WY 9,
¶ 29, 409 P.3d at 1217 (finding the other acts evidence demonstrating the relationship
between the defendant and the victim prior to the alleged crime illustrated the strained
relationship between the parties and allowed the jury to place the charge within the context
of the parties’ relationship); Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 24, 114 P.3d 1252, 1263 (Wyo.
2005) (citing Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 28, 31 (Wyo. 1999)) (finding prior acts of domestic
violence between the defendant and the victim though dissimilar to the alleged crime
“help[ed] the jury understand the relationship between the parties”).

[¶18] While we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that the
evidence is admissible to show course of conduct, we have cautioned against relying solely
on course of conduct as a basis to admit evidence under W.R.E. 404(b). Moser v. State,
2018 WY 12, ¶ 36, 409 P.3d 1236, 1247 (Wyo. 2018). “[W]e recognize the danger that a
course of conduct exception, standing alone, could swallow the general rule against
admission of ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts,’ and we emphasize that it must be linked to
another legitimate purpose.” Anderson, 2022 WY 119, ¶ 25, 517 P.3d at 591 (Wyo. 2022)
(quoting Moser, ¶ 36, 409 P.3d at 1247). In this matter, we do not have that concern.

[¶19] The district court did not rely solely on the course of conduct exception to admit the
evidence of Mr. Santistevan’s relationship with R.S. while she was a minor. The district

                                             8
court admitted Mr. Santistevan’s relationship history with R.S. to further show an ongoing
scheme or plan by Mr. Santistevan. It found the evidence relevant to illustrate the dynamics
of the relationship between Mr. Santistevan and R.S. and to show the jury the complete
story about how Mr. Santistevan developed his sexual relationship with R.S. and groomed
her for his sexual access from a young age. It further found the evidence showed Mr.
Santistevan developed a controlling relationship with R.S., which culminated in the
nonconsensual sexual activity that formed the basis for the underlying charges against Mr.
Santistevan.

[¶20] There is a legitimate basis for the district court’s decision to admit the evidence of
Mr. Santistevan’s relationship with R.S. when she was a minor. An essential element of
all seven counts of sexual assault Mr. Santistevan was charged with is whether Mr.
Santistevan “knows or reasonably should know . . . that [R.S.] has not consented.” Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iii); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(iii). Mr. Santistevan’s defense
to all seven sexual assault charges was that R.S. consented to the sexual encounters and
recordings of these sexual acts. As Mr. Santistevan’s counsel told the jury in his opening
statement “[t]he evidence in this case [came] down to one issue: Consent.”

[¶21] In Watters, we held the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found an
alleged victim’s testimony regarding prior incidents of sexual intercourse occurring
between her and the defendant along with sexually explicit photographs the defendant took
of the victim and himself were admissible under W.R.E. 404(b). Watters v. State, 2004 WY
155, ¶¶ 19–28, 101 P.3d 908, 916–19 (Wyo. 2004). The defendant was the foster parent,
guardian, and conservator of the victim who was over the age of 21 and in a group home.
Id. at ¶ 3, 101 P.3d at 911–12. One day the defendant visited the victim in the group home
and engaged in sexual intercourse with her. Id. at ¶¶ 3–5, 101 P.3d at 911–12. The State
charged the defendant with one count first-degree sexual assault, or, in the alternative one
count of second-degree sexual assault. Id. at ¶ 6, 101 P.3d at 912. At trial, the defendant
claimed the sexual relationship with the victim was consensual. Id. at ¶ 27, 101 P.3d at
918–19. On appeal, we upheld the district court’s decision to admit evidence of prior
incidents of sexual intercourse under W.R.E. 404(b) for the proper purposes of course of
conduct and bolstering the victim’s credibility. Id. at ¶¶ 19–28, 101 P.3d 908, 916–19. We
found the evidence went directly to an essential element of the charged offense regarding
whether the defendant used his authority over the victim to cause submission. Id. at ¶¶ 25–
27, 101 P.3d at 918–19. We agreed with the district court that the evidence went directly
to the State’s theory that the motivation for the defendant’s relationship with the victim
was for sexual gratification, and also established the charged incident evolved from the
relationship and prior incidents the defendant had with the victim. Id. at ¶¶ 24–27, 101 P.3d
at 918–19.

[¶22] Here, similar to the defense’s theory in Watters, the issue for the jury to decide was
whether R.S. consented to the sexual encounters and video recordings made by Mr.
Santistevan. The evidence of Mr. Santistevan’s relationship with R.S. when she was a

                                             9
minor, including their sexual relationship, illustrated: 1) the relationship between R.S. and
Mr. Santistevan; 2) placed the allegations into the context of the parties’ relationship; 3)
went directly to the parties’ theories of the case, including R.S.’s credibility; and 4) was
relevant to an essential element of the charged crimes. The evidence of R.S.’s and Mr.
Santistevan’s relationship from the time R.S. was a minor provided significant probative
value under the circumstances of this case. The district court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting the evidence under W.R.E. 404(b). See generally Garrison, 2018 WY 9, ¶¶
29–32, 409 P.3d at 1217–18 (finding evidence the victim obtained a protection order and
had separated from the defendant admissible for the course of conduct of the defendant and
establishing motive and identity); Watters, 2004 WY 155, ¶¶ 19–28, 101 P.3d at 916–19.

                                     CONCLUSION

[¶23] The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Mr.
Santistevan’s relationship with R.S. when she was a minor pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b) at
trial. We affirm.

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