Court Opinion

ID: 9855833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:31:52.250416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:12.441482
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I dissent from the lead opinion’s reasoning and conclusion in Brown v Dep’t of Transportation. I find that the reasoning of the lead opinion departs from the language of the statute, and I am unable to conclude that there is any support in the statute or prior case law for the two-part test articulated in footnote 10 of the lead opinion. MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) states in relevant part:
A person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the gov*656emmental agency. . . . The duty of the state and county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and does not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. [Emphasis added.]
I find this portion of the statute, as it relates to Brown, to be clear. Under the language of the statute, “a person” may recover damages “from the governmental agency” where that agency breached its “duty ... to repair and maintain highways” and the “liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel . . . .” The liability for that duty does not extend to “repairing] and maintain [ing]” sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Because plaintiff in Brown did not allege that the state had a duty to repair or maintain a crosswalk, but instead alleged that the state had a duty to repair and maintain the intersection preceding the crosswalk, which was part of the improved portion of the highway, plaintiffs claim should go forward.
The lead opinion has taken the statute and has twisted its meaning into an awkward holding that states that even though the improved portion of the road may be defective, a person may not recover if injured while traversing a crosswalk. Plaintiff in this case did not allege that the state failed to maintain the crosswalk in a safe condition; rather, she alleged that the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel was not safe. The mere mention of a crosswalk should not defeat a plaintiffs claim, *657especially where the plaintiff has alleged a defect in the improved portion of the road.
Plaintiff alleged that the design of the intersection preceding the crosswalk was defective because it violated industry standards relative to design and site distance requirements for intersections. Furthermore, in the six years preceding Abby DeRusha’s injuries, there were at least six vehicle-to-vehicle accidents resulting from the same design and sight distance defects that contributed to Abby’s injuries. Contrary to the intent of the Legislature, the lead opinion’s holding would allow recovery for injuries sustained by passengers of the vehicles alleging the same defect alleged by Abby DeRusha, but would deny recovery to Abby DeRusha only because she was crossing the street at a crosswalk.
The Legislature intended that the focus of the highway exception should be on the nature or location of the claimed defect, not on the status of the person injured or the place where the injury occurred. I cannot accept the lead opinion’s strained interpretation of the statute. Indeed, the decision in Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 341; 408 NW2d 783 (1987), supports this proposition. “The criterion used by the Legislature was not based on the class of travelers, but on the road on which they travel.”
While the lead opinion relies on Mason v Wayne Co Bd of Comm’rs, 447 Mich 130; 523 NW2d 791 (1994) to support its position, that case really bolsters plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute by stating, “[t]he highway exception specifically excepts the state and counties from liability for defects in crosswalks, the defect alleged by the plaintiff . . . .” Id. at 135 (emphasis added). However, in our case, plaintiff *658Brown did not allege a defect in the crosswalk, rather she alleged a defect in the improved portion of the highway.
I cannot agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion because it erroneously focuses on where the alleged injury occurred and the class of persons who are injured, rather than focusing on where the defect occurred. Under the lead opinion’s reasoning, “First, a court must determine whether the plaintiff’s accident occurred on the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. The next question ... is whether the plaintiff’s injury occurred on a . . . crosswalk.” Ante at 651, n 10 (emphasis added). I challenge the lead opinion to find support for this two-part test in the language of the statute. It simply is not there. Flirthermore, support for the test is not found in our prior case law. Finally, support for the test is not founded on public policy grounds, as noted infra, in the discussion about jaywalkers.
A brief review of our prior case law will illustrate my point. In Roy, supra, we held that a bicycle path adjacent to, but separate and detached from, a highway was not part of the improved portion of the road designed for vehicular travel. The primary focus was on the location of the alleged defect. We stated, “[t]he criterion used by the Legislature was not based on the class of travelers, but the road on which they travel. ” Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
In Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), we focused on where the alleged defect occurred. We stated that the failure to install lighting along a state trunk line did not subject the government to potential liability because “the physical structure of the lights falls outside the trav*659eled or paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.” Id. at 633.
In Gregg v State Hwy Dep’t, 435 Mich 307; 458 NW2d 619 (1990), we again focused on where the alleged defect occurred. In that case, the plaintiff was injured when his bicycle struck a pothole located within two white lines demarking a bicycle path within the paved portion of the road and preceding its paved shoulder. We held that the plaintiff, even though a bicyclist and not a motorist, was a member of the class of travelers to be protected, and the bicycle path was part of the improved portion of the road designed for vehicular travel. Id. at 312.
In Chaney v Transportation Dep’t, 447 Mich 145; 523 NW2d 762 (1994), again we focused on the location of the defect. We held that because a bridge railing was not physically located within the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, and because it did not integrally and directly affect safe travel on the improved portion of the highway, the highway exception was not applicable.
In Mason, supra, we focused on the location of the alleged defect. In that case, a school boy ran into the street while traversing a crosswalk and was struck by a car whose driver ran a red light. Plaintiff sued, alleging that the county road commission failed to install appropriate safety devices, including school warning signs. This Court, in an opinion written by Justice Boyle, recognized that the statute excludes “ ‘sidewalks, crosswalks, and other installations from the duty of maintenance and repair . . . .’” Mason, 447 Mich 137, quoting Roy, supra at 336 (emphasis added). We reaffirmed this by stating that “[t]he highway exception specifically excepts the state and *660counties from liability for defects in crosswalks . . . Id. at 135 (emphasis added). This Court’s focus was clearly on the location of the defect, rather than the location of the injury. The government was immune from liability not because plaintiff was in a crosswalk when she was injured, but because the defect was outside the improved portion of the road or in a crosswalk.
It is clear from the statutory language and our case law that the statute defines the government’s duty by telling it what portions of the road it must maintain and repair, not to whom it owes a duty or where the injury occurs.1
Finally, I question the prudence of the lead opinion’s holding as it relates to jaywalkers. While it is true that this state recognizes comparative negligence, a jaywalker would be permitted to recover under the same facts as this case, whereas someone lawfully crossing at a crosswalk would be completely barred from recovery. From a public policy standpoint, it seems obvious to me that the focus should not be on where the alleged injury occurred. Rather, the focus is properly on where the alleged defect was, *661at least, according to prior case law and the express terms of the statute.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the lead opinion in Brown.2
As to the Suttles case, I concur in the result reached by the lead opinion.
Brickley and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 The lead opinion asserts that “the dissent does not cite a single case to support its contention.” Ante at 654, n 14. The claim, apparently, is that, because I have not cited a case in which a pedestrian was allowed to recover because of a design defect in the improved portion of the road, there is no support for my holding. However, both the lead opinion and this opinion cite cases in which pedestrians were allowed to recover. See Gregg, supra. The lead opinion has also generously cited cases dating back to 1886 in which this Court held that a design defect is actionable. Ante at 654, n 14. This Court has already held both that a pedestrian may recover and that a design defect is actionable. The only difference in this case is that a pedestrian is allowed to recover because of a design defect in the improved portion of the road designed for vehicular travel.

 Despite the fact that a majority of justices agree with my analysis that the location of the claimed defect controls over the location of the injury, it is unfortunate that plaintiff in Brown is precluded from litigating her case for the mere fact that a single justice fails to acknowledge this Court’s long line of cases allowing recovery for a design defect, as noted even by the lead opinion. Ante at 654, n 14, citing cases allowing recovery for a design defect dating as far back as 1886.