Court Opinion

ID: 9778163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:34:19.009787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:04.215394
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
On original submission appellant’s conviction for burglary was reversed because of the improper admission of two blank pistols, keys, and ink pens over objection.
On rehearing the State contends the court overlooked or ignored uncontroverted evidence which would have been sufficient to sustain the conviction. The State argues that one of the blank pistols stolen in the robbery was taken from appellant with his consent by assistant innkeeper Beaujon before Beaujon would let the appellant enter the club room of the Holiday Inn and that therefore this pistol was not the result of the illegal arrest condemned by this Court’s opinion. The State argues that the pistol was admissible into evidence and would support appellant’s conviction.
While that particular blank pistol might have been admissible under the circumstances, there is no evidence that this particular pistol was one of the two pistols admitted into evidence. As a matter of fact, the arresting officer testified that when he arrived at the Holiday Inn appellant had been “arrested” by the motel security officer and that he took one of the blank pistols from appellant’s pocket and the other pistol was given to him by the security officer who stated that he had taken it from appellant’s hand. There is no evidence that the security officer obtained the “freely given” pistol from Beaujon. Here again we observe that the security officer was not called as a witness and what evidence was developed does not support the State’s argument.
Next, the State contends that it was the appellant who first proved that he was in *925possession of stolen property when arrested and that (1) this proof was sufficient to support a finding of guilty or (2) this proof along with the circumstantial evidence charge to the jury would render harmless any error in proof by the State as to the details of such possession.
The “proof” by the defense relied on by the State came during the cross and recross examination of James Brooks, the parts manager of the burglarized automobile agency. He testified that he came to the office during the evening when it was closed and saw a burglar in the office. He did not get a good look at the burglar, could only give a general description of him, and was able to identify appellant at the examining trial only because of “what he had in his possession.”
“Q. (By defense counsel): The last question I asked you on my cross examination was that the reason that you’ve identified Larry Irvin is because he was found later on with something that was taken in the burglary. Is that correct?
“A. He had it in his possession when the police arrested him. Yes, sir.
“Q. And that’s what you base your eye witness identification on. Is that correct?
I believe that was your answer the last time I asked the question.
“A. That’s all I could go on.” (S.F. 87).
The record is clear that Brooks was not present when appellant was arrested and searched and that his knowledge as to what appellant had in his possession when arrested was gained by his attending the examining trial and from what he was told by the police.
His testimony was therefore hearsay, without any probative value, and did not prove that appellant was in possession of stolen property when arrested. Thus the State’s argument is without merit.
The State’s motion for rehearing is overruled.