Court Opinion

ID: 9577283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:33:37.395957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:17.790021
License: Public Domain

GIVENS, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion states :
“ * * *; that the only positive and affirmative proof required is of facts and circumstances from which undue influence may be reasonably inferred, for instance, that the beneficiary was active in the preparation and execution of the will.”
Not a single word of testimony and nothing in the opinion shows John Sylvester Lunders did anything or had anything to do with or said, anything to anybody about the preparation and execution of the will. He merely took his father to the lawyer’s office.
The majority opinion further states:
“We further held that the mere existence of a confidential relation between a testator and a beneficiary in his will does not establish undue influence unless it appears that the beneficiary was active in the preparation and execution of the will.”
There being no active, or any, participation in the preparation of the will, under the majority’s own statement, the confidential relationship of father and son is insufficient. Knowing his father was going to make a will shows no influence by the son.
John Sylvester Lunders accepted a deed to certain property on the day the will was made. Not one word, nor did any question enlighteningly and conclusively pursue, how or why his father happened to make this deed to him — certainly there was no showing nor any inquiry as to any affirmative action by the son in connection therewith. It was not necessary that the deed be in evidence for appellant to cross-examine in regard to it and she did cross-examine about it.
The only grounds of dissatisfaction with this will are, that appellant was in straightened circumstances, and was virtually disinherited. The majority say, in effect, the will is unjust. Who is to determine that? Who, but the testator?
This Court quoted with approval from Perkins v. Perkins, 116 Iowa 253, 90 N.W. 55, thus:
“ ‘While, as every lawyer knows, a man may be capable of making a good will after he is so far gone into imbecility and mental darkness as to be no longer capable of making a valid deed or of transacting business generally, the very opposite conclusion seems to pervade the lay mind, and the making of a will is, to its apprehension, the one item of business which requires the presence of all one’s faculties in their normal strength.’ ” Schwarz v. Taeger, 44 Idaho 625, at page 631, 258 P. 1082, at *457page 1084, cited in the majority opinion; Marker v. McCue, 50 Idaho 462, at page 465, 297 P. 401; Hedin v. Westdala Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241, at page 251, 81 P.2d 741.
All presumptions are in favor of a will properly executed as herein. 68 C.J. 444, §43.
Nothing shows John Sylvester Lunders or the other two daughters had anything to do with not requiring a bond from the executors.
The record fully justified the learned trial court in his analysis of the evidence before him and upon which he based his nonsuit:
“The motion will be granted by the Court for the reasons mentioned by Mr. Madden; that the proof has not been such as to overturn a written will witnessed by persons or a person who stated that the decedent was competent at the time and duly executed the will. There are hints, and it could be presumed from the evidence, by indulging in presumption, that there was some feeling that this old gentlemen wasn’t completely at himself as far as a difficult negotiation is concerned, but the Court understands the rule to be that a decedent does not have to have the youth and health of a young person to be competent to make a will, so far as testamentary capacity is concerned. There is no actual proof of undue influence. The evidence shows only the opportunity for those two things to exist without actual proof thereof, and the Court feels that a will must be sustained if it is possible to do so and it cannot be overturned without actual definite proof that it is not the will of the deceased.”
The majority cites In re Arnold’s Estate, 16 Cal .2d 573, 107 P.2d 25 and In re Heazle’s Estate, Idaho, 257 P.2d 556, 558, as supporting the proposition if a will appear unnatural, unjust or irrational, the unnatural, unjust or irrational character of the will may be taken into consideration in determining its legality. Of course, if a person were so irrational he did not possess testamentary capacity, the will would be illegal'. The Court said in the Heazle case, supra:
“ * * *, where a will is unnatural, unjust, or irrational, such fact, though not controlling, may be taken into consideration in determining the competency of the author.”
There is no showing in the evidence the will herein is irrational.
It is contended it is so unnatural and unjust it must, perforce, fail. The provisions of the will in the Heazle case and the one herein are quite different and the cases cited under the general text would not support holding this will is so unnatural as to show the result of lack of testamentary capacity. 68 C.J. 452, § 51.
As to the applicability of In re Arnold’s Estate, supra, the will' therein being h.eld *458valid, quoting some of the specific announcements in that case shows it fully sustains the judgment of nonsuit herein [16 Cal.2d 573, 107 P.2d 27]:
“In an action to set aside a will of a deceased person on the ground of undue influence, it is necessary to show that the influence was such as, in effect, to destroy the testator’s free agency and substitute for his own another person’s will. Estate of Motz, 136 Cal. 558, 583, 69 P. 294. Evidence must be produced that pressure was brought to bear directly upon the testamentary act. In re McDevitt’s Estate, 95 Cal. 17, 33, 30 P. 101. Mere general influence, however strong and controlling, not to bear upon the testamentary act, is not enough; it must be influence used directly to procure the will, and must amount to coercion destroying free agency on the part of the testator. Estate of Keegan, 139 Cal. 123, 127, 72 P. 828. It is further held that mere opportunity to influence the mind of the testator, even coupled with an interest or a motive to do so, is not sufficient. Estate of Easton, 140 Cal.App. 367, 371, 35 P.2d 614.
“ ‘The unbroken rule in this state is that the courts must refuse to set aside the solemnly executed will of a deceased person upon the ground of undue influence unless there be proof of “a pressure which overpowered the mind and bore down the volition of the testator at the very time the will was made.” ’ Estate of Gleason, 164 Cal. 756, 765, 130 P. 872, 876.
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“Conceding, simply for the purpose of argument, that a confidential relation was proved to have existed between Mrs. Logan and Arnold, proof of that fact alone did not cast the burden of proof upon her that the will was not obtained by her through undue influence. Estate of Purcell, 164 Cal. 300, 303, 128 P. 932. In that case it was held that proof of a confidential relationship did not bring into play a presumption of undue influence in the absence of evidence that the beneficiary suggested the terms of the will. In the Estate of Baird, 176 Cal. 381, 384, 168 P. 561, 563, we find the applicable rule stated in the following concise language: ‘As suggested in Estate of Higgins, 156 Cal. (257) 261, 104 P. (6) 8, a “presumption of undue influence” arises from proof of the exercise of a confidential relation between, the testator and such a beneficiary, “coupled with activity on the part of the latter in the preparation of the will.” The confidential relation alone is not sufficient. There must be activity on the part of the beneficiary in the matter of the preparation of the will.’
“In an unbroken line of decisions of this court, the above statement of law has been approved. (Cases cited.)”
The judgment of nonsuit should be affirmed.