Court Opinion

ID: 9562450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:29:18.298957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:21.501647
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
All members of the en banc panel appear to agree that the firing of an employee’s co-worker-spouse (or co-workerfiancée) in retaliation for the employee’s opposition to an unlawful employment practice is unlawful under § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The majority does not agree, however, that the fired spouse has a right to sue under Title VII. Like the other dissenting judges, I disagree. I write separately to make clear that I do not rely on Title VII’s broad remedial purpose to reach this conclusion. Although recognizing Thompson’s right to maintain an action is consistent with Title VII’s remedial purpose, I would not find such a right were it contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. In short, while I join in Judge Moore’s and Judge Martin’s dissenting opinions, I come to that point after rejecting the majority’s conclusion that § 704(a), which makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee because he has opposed an unlawful employment practice, unambiguously provides that only the person who opposed the violation can maintain the action.1
I
The majority states that in its view, the text of § 704(a) is plain in its protection of a limited class of persons who are afforded the right to sue for retaliation. To be included in this class, plaintiff must show that his employer discriminated against him “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
By application of the plain language of the statute, Thompson is not included in the class of persons for whom Congress created a retaliation cause of action because he personally did not oppose an *827unlawful employment practice, make a charge, testify, assist, or participate in an investigation.
Majority Op. at 808 (emphasis in original). The majority correctly observes that “Burlington Northern [ & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006),] addressed the scope of actionable retaliation committed by the employer under § 704(a), an issue that is separate and distinct from whether § 704(a) permits an employee who did not himself engage in protected activity to bring a retaliation claim....” Majority Op. at 815. The majority then contrasts § 704(a)’s lack of limiting language regarding retaliatory discrimination (at issue in Burlington Northern) with the language of § 704(a) it finds pertinent to this case:
The statutory language of § 704(a) pertinent to the present case is not silent regarding who falls under the umbrella of its protection. It explicitly identifies those individuals who are protected — employees who “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” or who “made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. Section 704(a) thus clearly limits the class of claimants to those who actually engaged in the protected activity.

Id.

Thus, the majority looks to the plain language of § 704(a) and finds in it the answer to the question whether § 704(a) permits an employee who did not himself engage in protected activity to bring a retaliation claim. But, the plain language of § 704(a) is addressed to declaring that particular conduct by an employer constitutes an unlawful employment practice. Contrary to the majority’s characterization, the statutory language does not tell us “toho falls under the umbrella of its protection,” Majority Op. at 815, but rather, what conduct is prohibited. The plain language of § 704(a) simply declares that it is unlawful to discriminate against an employee because that employee opposed an unlawful employment practice. The focus is on the prohibited retaliatory conduct. This, I believe, is the point made by the concurrence. It is true that by prohibiting the retaliatory conduct, Congress protected the employee, but the fact remains that § 704(a) speaks in terms of unlawful conduct, albeit as a means of protecting employees.
Because the language of § 704(a) addresses what is forbidden, rather than who is protected, the majority must make an inference to reach its conclusion that § 704(a) tells us who is and is not protected against the actions it prohibits, and then, more importantly, deduce from that inference who may and may not maintain a cause of action. Conceding, arguendo, that the majority’s inference is reasonable, it is not the only reasonable inference to be made. This, in my view, undermines the majority’s reliance on the plain language of § 704(a) as a barrier to recognizing Thompson’s right to maintain an action.
Section 704(a) tells us that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an opposing employee by firing that employee’s co-employee-fíancée in retaliation for the opposing employee’s opposition to an unlawful practice. To be sure, the unlawful employment practice prohibited by § 704(a) is discrimination against an employee who has opposed an unlawful practice, or supported another’s opposition. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 56, 126 S.Ct. 2405. It does not follow, however, that an employer cannot commit an unlawful employment practice under § 704(a) by discriminating against the opposing employee *828through the vehicle of firing that employee’s co-employee spouse. As the separate opinions have noted, it appears that all of us recognize that this would be unlawful conduct under Burlington Northern.
The majority goes beyond the language of § 704(a), concluding that even if Thompson can prove such a case, he cannot maintain the action because he is not the person who opposed the unlawful practice. The majority bases this conclusion on the plain meaning it ascribes to § 704(a), notwithstanding that § 704(a) does not purport to address the question who can bring a charge or maintain an action based on a violation. Essentially, the majority concludes that Thompson does not have a right not to be harmed in his employment by this particular unlawful employment practice because although the unlawful practice harmed him, and although the harm was the intended consequence of the unlawful practice (albeit an intermediate harm in path to the ultimate goal of harming Regalado), only the opposing employee is protected by § 704(a).
In contrast, the statutory provisions can reasonably be understood to mean that certain retaliatory conduct by an employer (such as that allegedly involved here) is unlawful; that when an employer engages in such conduct, it violates § 704(a); and once the employer’s conduct is found to violate § 704(a), there is no reason to look back to that section to determine who may maintain an action based on the violation. As noted by the concurrence, the provisions addressing the filing of charges and civil actions are found in a different section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which refers to persons “aggrieved.” Thus, to answer the question whether Thompson can sue based on the § 704(a) violation, we need ask whether Thompson is aggrieved by the unlawful employment practice.
Accepting the allegations as pled, Thompson, ■ himself, is unquestionably a person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice — the retaliation against Regalado. As Judge Moore ably discusses, there is no support for the conclusion that Thompson is not sufficiently aggrieved.
The concurrence rejects the plain meaning of “aggrieved” — to be “injured or wronged in one’s rights”2 — which would clearly include Thompson, in favor of a policy-based meaning that restricts the word’s scope to “those persons who are the intended beneficiaries of the protection enacted in the substantive provision,” Concurring Op. at 817, thus linking the definition of “aggrieved” to the substantive violation. Through this linkage, the concurrence reaches the same ultimate conclusion as the majority — that the person aggrieved must be the person who opposed the unlawful practice. The concurrence fears that persons who are not the intended beneficiaries of Title VII might sue. But this broader concern need not be satisfied by artificially restricting the plain meaning of “aggrieved” and declaring that only the person who opposed the unlawful practice can be aggrieved within the meaning of the statute. Title VII deals with discrimination in employment. The concurrence’s hypothetical creditor-plaintiff and shareholder-plaintiff can clearly be eliminated as not being within the scope of Title VII’s protections. Moreover, Title VII is already limited in scope — a co-employee plaintiff such as Thompson must prove that he was discriminated against in his employment either because he opposed his employer’s *829unlawful employment practice with respect to his co-employee/fiancée or because his employer sought to retaliate against his co-employee/fiancée by firing him. If the co-employee plaintiff proceeds according to the latter theory — the one at issue here — he must establish that the employer’s motivation for the employment action by which he was aggrieved was to retaliate against the person who opposed the unlawful practice. Where the relationship between the two employees is more attenuated, it will be more difficult to prove this unlawful motivation.
To be sure, lines must be drawn. And despite our differences, all members of the panel agree that Congress should draw those lines, not the courts. The majority concludes that Congress drew the line at issue here in § 704(a) by describing the unlawful practice in terms that refer to the opposing employee. I conclude that Congress described the unlawful practice in terms that refer to the opposing employee because it is discrimination against the opposing employee that is unlawful, and that Congress intended to protect employees who are aggrieved by unlawful employment practices. To be sure, every employee is not aggrieved when one employee is retaliated against. But sometimes the employer may retaliate in such a way that other employees will be directly and intentionally harmed. It is more consistent with the statutory language and purpose to draw the fine by determining if there has been an unlawful employment practice and then asking if the plaintiff is aggrieved within Congress’s use of the term, than it is to draw the line by, in effect, turning an otherwise unlawful practice into an acceptable one by declaring that the person aggrieved by the practice is not within the protection of the provision that makes the undeniably unlawful conduct unlawful. The former approach, which views conduct as either unlawful under § 704(a) or not, and proceeds from that point forward asking if a claimant is aggrieved, thus respecting the plain language of both statutory provisions at issue here, is preferable to the approach that restricts the plain language of these provisions in anticipation of cases yet to come. At the very least, the statutory provisions can be reasonably construed in this fashion. It does no violence to the plain meaning of § 704(a), and is consistent with it, to hold that Thompson can establish an unlawful employment practice under § 704(a) if he proves that he was fired as an act of retaliation against Regalado. Having reached this point, I concur in Judge Moore’s opinion.
II
The preceding discussion has been addressed to the issue whether Thompson can maintain an action based on his being fired as an act of retaliation against Regalado, as this is the posture in which the case has been litigated thus far. I agree with the majority that this claim is not directly affected by the Crawford decision because it does not rest on Thompson’s opposition. Nevertheless, I agree with Judge Moore and Judge Martin that we should not ignore Crawford’s effect on Thompson’s rights under § 704(a); that post-Crawford, the record is sufficient to create a genuine issue whether Thompson himself “opposed” an unlawful employment practice; that he should be permitted to amend his complaint to allege such opposition should he choose to do so; and that if the case raises no issues concerning his opposition under Crawford, the majority has no reason to reach the issue.
III
In sum, the question before us is whether Thompson’s action, which is consistent with the intent of the statute, is in fact authorized. The majority concludes that it is precluded by the language of § 704(a), but § 704(a) does not present the plain-*830meaning problem identified by the majority. The relevant questions are whether defendant violated § 704(a) and whether Thompson is a person aggrieved by that violation. Thompson has made a sufficient showing to survive summary judgment as to both. While an overly broad construction of “aggrieved” might be problematic if taken to the extreme, one need not go down that path here because Thompson lost his job and it is difficult to conceive of a potential plaintiff being more aggrieved. Because we are reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment and the intervening case of Crawford has significantly changed how Thompson might be able to proceed, he should be permitted to amend should he choose to do so.

. Two issues of statutory interpretation are implicated here. The first is whether Thompson can maintain an action on the basis that Defendant North American Stainless fired him as a means of retaliating against Regalado for her opposition; the second is whether, under the recently decided case of Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 846, 172 L.Ed.2d 650 (2009), Thompson can maintain an action on the basis that he was fired because he supported Regalado’s opposition. I first address the former issue.

. Oxford English Dictionary Online, http:// www.dictionary.oed.com (defining “aggrieved”).