Court Opinion

ID: 9908399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 17:08:59.321882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:10.327773
License: Public Domain

J-S37016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: E.C. a/k/a               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  B.B.C., A MINOR                              :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: C.C., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1039 EDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 23, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-DP-0001166-2020

  IN THE INTEREST OF: E.C. a/k/a               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  B.B.C., A MINOR                              :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: C.C., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1040 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered March 23, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000089-2023

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 8, 2023

       C.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree involuntarily terminating her

parental rights to her son, E.C. a/k/a B.B.C. (“Child”), born in October 2020.1

____________________________________________

1 On the same date, by separate decree, the court terminated the parental

rights of any unknown father with respect to Child. No purported father
participated in the lower court proceedings, filed an appeal, or participated in
the instant appeals.
J-S37016-23

Mother also appeals from the order changing Child’s permanency goal from

reunification to adoption. Upon review, we affirm the termination decree and

dismiss the appeal from the goal change order as moot.

      The factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. In October

2020, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) learned

through a general protective services report that Mother and Child tested

positive for fentanyl and cocaine at Child’s birth. See N.T., 3/23/23, at 45.

Due to withdrawal symptoms, Child remained in the neonatal intensive care

unit until October 30, 2020. See id. Upon discharge, DHS obtained an order

of protective custody. See id. Following a shelter care hearing on November

2, 2020, Child remained in the care and custody of DHS. Thereafter, the court

adjudicated Child dependent on December 15, 2020. See id. at 45-46.

      In furtherance of Child’s permanency goal of reunification, Mother was

required to complete the following goals: (1) attend weekly supervised

visitation with Child; (2) participate in a drug and alcohol program and a

mental health program; (3) submit to random drug screens at the Clinical

Evaluation Unit (“CEU”); (4) participate in Achieving Reunification Center

(“ARC”) services, including parenting classes; (5) locate suitable housing; and

(6) sign all releases. See id. at 46. Mother was informed of her objectives.

See id.   Mother’s objectives largely remained the same throughout the

duration of Child’s dependency in which the trial court conducted regular

permanency review hearings. See id. at 46-47.

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       Aside from completing a parenting course through ARC in April 2021,

Mother failed to accomplish these objectives. See id. at 63. Mother attended

most weekly visits with Child, but she consistently arrived forty-five to fifty-

five minutes late to the hour-long visits. See id. at 49. As a result, in July

2022, the court reduced Mother’s visitation schedule to once every two weeks.

See id. at 49-50. However, even after the change, Mother continued to arrive

forty-five to fifty-five minutes late. See id. at 50. Further, Mother failed to

engage in any alcohol, drug, or mental health treatment.         See id. at 47.

Mother also never submitted to an assessment or random drug screen at CEU.

See id. at 48-49. Finally, DHS referred Mother to ARC to aid in her search for

suitable housing.      See id. at 66.      However, ARC discharged her on three

separate occasions because Mother failed to engage with the service. See id.

       On March 6, 2023, DHS filed a petition seeking the involuntary

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),

(2), (5), (8), and (b), and a separate petition to change Child’s permanency

goal from reunification to adoption. The trial court conducted an evidentiary

hearing on March 23, 2023, when Child was approximately two-and-a-half

years old, wherein he was represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”).2

____________________________________________

2  Insofar as Child was two years old at the time of these proceedings and
incapable of articulating a well-settled preference with respect to termination,
we determine that Child’s right to legal counsel pursuant to section 2313(a)
is satisfied. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (holding that
if a child is “too young to be able to express a preference as to the outcome
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -3-
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Mother was represented by counsel and testified on her own behalf via

telephone.      DHS presented the testimony of CUA case manager Destiny

Vargas (“Ms. Vargas”).

       Ms. Vargas testified that Child was adjudicated dependent because

Mother and Child tested positive for fentanyl and cocaine at Child’s birth. See

N.T., 3/23/23, at 45. DHS provided Mother with objectives, but Ms. Vargas

testified that Mother only successfully completed one, a parenting class

through ARC. See id. at 63. On direct examination, Ms. Vargas testified to

Mother’s failures, as follows:

       Q: And is Mother engaged in any drug and alcohol treatment at
          this time?

       A: No. ...

       Q: Is Mother engaged in any mental health treatment at this time?

       A: No.

                                         ****

       Q: And at each permanency review hearing, was Mother referred
          to the CEU for a forthwith, randoms [sic], and an assessment?

       A: That’s correct.

       Q: Has Mother attended any of the -- has Mother attended a CEU
          assessment?

____________________________________________

of the proceedings,” there is no conflict between a child’s legal and best
interests, and a child’s section 2313(a) right to counsel is satisfied by an
attorney serving as GAL who represents the attorney-GAL’s view of the child’s
best interests); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a).

                                           -4-
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       A: The last -- she attend[ed] -- she went to the CEU on
          10/13[/22]; however, she refused to give a screen and left.

       Q: And other than the 10/13/[]22, has she had any other screens
          through the CEU?

       A: No.

Id. at 47-49.3

       Ms. Vargas additionally testified that Child never resided with Mother,

and, during Child’s dependency Mother did not spend enough time with Child

to establish a parent-child bond due to her tardiness.      See id. at 51-52.

Moreover, Ms. Vargas testified that Child has a parent-child bond with the

foster parent, as follows:

       Q: And have you observed [Child’s] relationship with the resource
          parent?

       A: Yes.

       Q: And what does their interaction look like?

       A: He looks to her as his mother.

       Q: And does the resource parent meet all of his needs?

       A: Yes.

       Q: And who does [Child] look to for love, protection, and support?

       A: The foster parent.

____________________________________________

3 Mother testified that she no longer used illegal substances. See N.T.,
3/23/23, at 79-80. Ms. Vargas and Mother also testified that Mother had
reported to Ms. Vargas that she (Mother) had attended therapy, but there is
no evidence of record to substantiate that Mother had actually received
treatment. See id. at 47, 56, 82-84.

                                           -5-
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       Q: And is this a preadoptive home?

       A: Yes.

       Q: And do you believe that [Child] would suffer irreparable harm
          if Mother’s rights were terminated today?

       A: No.

Id. at 53.

       By decree dated and entered on March 23, 2023, the trial court

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to          section

2511(a)(1), (5), (8), and (b). See, e.g., N.T., 3/23/23, at 113.4 In addition,

by order entered the same date, the court changed Child’s permanency goal

to adoption. Both Mother and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.5

       On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for review:

       1. Whether the trial court committed error by involuntarily
          terminating [Mother’s] parental rights to [Child], where such
          determination was not supported by clear and convincing
          evidence establishing grounds for termination under the
          Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5)[,] and
          (a)(8)?

       2. Whether the trial court committed error by involuntarily
          terminating [Mother’s] parental rights where such ruling did
          not give primary consideration to the developmental, physical,
          and emotional needs and welfare of [Child] as required by the
          Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
____________________________________________

4 We note that at the hearing, the trial court terminated pursuant to only
section 2511(a)(5) and (8), but in the subsequent decree, the trial court added
section 2511(a)(1) as a grounds for termination. Compare N.T., 3/23/23, at
113 with Decree, 3/23/23. This discrepancy does not affect our analysis.

5 This Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals from the termination

decree and goal change order. See Order, 6/14/23.

                                           -6-
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      3. Whether the trial court committed error by changing [Child’s]
         permanency goal from reunification with the parent(s) to
         adoption?

Mother’s Brief at 5.

      Our standard of review is as follows:

      [I]n cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights[,
      our review] is limited to determining whether the trial court’s
      determination is supported by competent evidence.               When
      applying this standard of review, an appellate court must accept
      the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
      if they are supported by evidence of record. Where the trial
      court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
      appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
      has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of
      discretion is found where there is a demonstration of manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. It matters
      not that an appellate court might have reached a different
      conclusion, as it is well-established that absent an abuse of
      discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for
      the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (internal citations

omitted).

      Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs involuntary termination

of parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. Subsection

2511(a) provides grounds for the involuntary termination of parental rights.

If the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence

of one of the grounds for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court

must then consider whether termination would best serve the child under

subsection (b). See id. § 2511(b). This Court need only agree with one of

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the grounds set forth in subsection (a) to affirm, provided subsection (b) is

also satisfied. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).

      Here, the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to

Child pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (5), (8), and (b). As we need only agree

with the trial court’s determination as to any one section of 2511(a), we limit

our discussion to sections 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

                                    ****

         (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
         agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
         removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
         removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
         termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
         and welfare of the child.

                                    ****

      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

                                     -8-
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      In her first issue, Mother argues the trial court erred in finding grounds

for termination of her parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8). In order

to satisfy section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that: (1) the child has

been removed from the parent’s care for at least twelve months; (2) the

conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Furthermore, termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) does not require an

evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led

to the removal or placement of the child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434,

446 (Pa. Super. 2017). Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-

issue “conditions” have been “remedied” such that “reunification of parent and

child is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.

Super. 2009).

      Finally, this Court has explained that,

      while both [s]ection 2511(a)(8) and [s]ection 2511(b) direct us
      to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required
      to resolve the analysis relative to [s]ection 2511(a)(8)[] prior to
      addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as pr[e]scribed
      by [s]ection 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must
      address [s]ection 2511(a) before reaching [s]ection 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

      Regarding section 2511(a)(8), Mother, without citing to any legal

precedent, asserts that Child was not removed from her care because he was

placed directly into foster care upon his discharge from the hospital.      See

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Mother’s Brief at 26. As such, she contends that there was no evidence of

neglect, abuse, inability, or abandonment of Child. See id. at 27. Mother

also generally asserts that the trial court erred in terminating her parental

rights because DHS failed to offer reasonable services and assistance for her

to achieve reunification. See id. at 21-23.

      Instantly, in determining that DHS satisfied section 2511(a)(8), the

court stated the following:

             This [c]ourt found that Ms. Vargas’[s] testimony was
      credible regarding Mother and her single case plan objectives.
      This [c]ourt found that Mother did not remedy any of the
      conditions which led to the removal of [Child]. The testimony
      offered by Mother proved to the trial court that the conditions
      which brought [Child] into care had not been remedied. Mother
      was notified of her single case plan objectives in January of 2021.
      Mother did not comply with any of her single case plan objectives.
      The primary objective was drug and alcohol treatment given that
      [Child] and Mother tested positive for fentanyl and cocaine at
      [Child’s] birth. There has not been any proof of drug or alcohol
      treatment for Mother throughout the life of the case. Mother has
      not attended any randoms [sic] or drug screens whatsoever in the
      entire life of this case. Another single case plan objective was
      mental health treatment and there was no proof offered of mental
      health treatment for Mother. There was some testimony from Ms.
      Vargas that Mother told her she was attending therapy . . ., but
      Ms. Vargas did not have any record of that treatment. Mother
      testified this was because [the provider] had her under the wrong
      name[,] but Mother did not provide proof to support this assertion.
      Mother has also not obtained suitable housing for herself and
      [Child]. Mother’s visitation with [Child, initially,] was . . . weekly
      one hours visits but the testimony from Ms. Vargas was that
      throughout the life of the case, Mother was consistently 45-55
      minutes late for the visits, giving her very little time with [Child].
      As a result of this lateness, the visits were switched to bi[-]weekly
      hour visits and still Mother would show up very late to the visits.
      Mother gave both Ms. Vargas and the [c]ourt reasons for why she
      was always late but the [c]ourt did not find them credible. In fact,
      the [c]ourt found that Mother arriving over an hour and a half late

                                     - 10 -
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      for the termination hearing was further supportive evidence of
      Mother attending the visits late without valid reasons. Based on
      all these reasons, the [c]ourt found that DHS met its burden by
      clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental
      rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)[(8)] . . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/23, at 15-16 (internal citation omitted).

      Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law

by the trial court. It is undisputed that Child, at the time of the termination

hearing, was in DHS’s care for more than two years, far in excess of the

statutory minimum.       Concerning the second factor, Mother’s lack of

compliance with her objectives, especially the objectives tailored towards

achieving sobriety, supports the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions

which led to Child’s removal still exist.    Lastly, regarding the third section

2511(a)(8) factor, the trial court heard sufficient testimony that termination

of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child

for the following reasons:   Child has never resided with Mother as he was

placed in the care of DHS following his discharge from the hospital. See N.T.,

3/23/23, at 45. Further, although Mother attended visitation, she consistently

arrived forty-five to fifty-five minutes late, and her tardiness caused her

visitation time to be reduced by half. See id. at 49-50. Ms. Vargas testified

that Mother’s habitual tardiness prevented her from achieving a parent-child

bond with Child. See id. at 51-52. In contrast, the record demonstrates a

parent-child bond between foster parent and Child. See id. at 53-54. Foster

parent is a pre-adoptive resource that meets all of Child’s needs. See id.

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Based on the foregoing testimony, the trial court was well within its discretion

to terminate Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(8) because Child

had been removed from Mother’s care in excess of the twelve-month statutory

minimum; the conditions which led to Child’s removal continue to exist; and

termination would best serve the needs and welfare of Child.        See In re

Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 943.

      With respect to Mother’s argument that Child was not removed from her

care because he was removed upon his discharge from the hospital, she does

not cite to any controlling law, and we are not aware of any that states this

proposition.   Indeed, Mother’s assertion is contrary to precedent from our

Supreme Court. See In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 889-90 (Pa.

1986) (affirming termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(5), which includes

the same language as section 2511(a)(8) regarding removal of a child, where

the child had been under the care of the agency since his birth and where the

father had “never had custody of, nor provided support for, [the] child”).

      To the extent Mother argues that DHS’s burden during the termination

hearing included proving reasonable efforts by DHS, we find her argument to

be waived for failure to provide a discussion with citation to the relevant law

and develop the issues in a manner allowing for meaningful review. See In

re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (noting that “[w]here an

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion

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capable of review, that claim is waived”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing,

inter alia, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)).6

       Mother next argues the trial court erred in finding that termination was

in the best interests of Child pursuant to section 2511(b). Section 2511(b)

affords primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional

needs and welfare of the child. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “Notably, courts

should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing [their]

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for

the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). This

determination “should not be applied mechanically,” but “must be made on a

case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must determine each child’s specific

needs.” Id. at 1106. Accordingly, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that

must be considered in this context. Id. at 1113 n.28.

       Regarding the section 2511(b) best interest analysis, this Court has

explained:

             While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a
       major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it
       is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
       court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
       The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
____________________________________________

6 Even if this claim were not waived, we would deem it to be meritless.    In In
the Interest of D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme Court held
that, with respect to section 2511 of the Adoption Act, “Neither subsection (a)
nor (b) requires a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided to a parent
prior to termination of parental rights.” Id. at 672. Therefore, Mother’s
assertion that the court erred in terminating her parental rights because DHS
failed to provide reasonable efforts is misplaced.

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      termination of parental rights. Rather, the [trial] court must
      examine the status of the bond to determine whether its
      termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
      relationship. . . ..

             In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
      emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
      the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
      the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the
      trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
      relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
      severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations,

quotations, brackets, and indentation omitted). Furthermore, our Supreme

Court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering

termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive

home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M.,

71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013). In weighing the bond considerations pursuant

to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in

mind.” Id. at 269. Children “are young for a scant number of years, and we

have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts

fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

      Our High Court recently explained:

      Severance of a “necessary and beneficial” bond would predictably
      cause more than the “adverse” impact that, unfortunately, may
      occur whenever a bond is present. By contrast, severance of a
      necessary and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that would
      predictably cause “extreme emotional consequences” or
      significant, irreparable harm.

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K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10 (internal citations omitted).       As such, the K.T.

Court distinguished “extreme emotional consequences” from an “adverse

impact” to the child when parental rights are terminated.          Id. at 1111.

Specifically, the Court cautioned that a trial court “must not truncate its

analysis and preclude severance based solely on evidence of an ‘adverse’ or

‘detrimental’ impact to the child.” Id. at 1114. The Court concluded, “to grant

termination when a parental bond exists, there must be clear and convincing

evidence that the bond is not necessary and beneficial.” Id.

      Moreover, in reiterating that the parental bond is only one part of the

analysis, the K.T. Court held that the “[s]ection 2511(b) inquiry must also

include consideration . . . [of] certain evidence if it is present in the record.”

Id. at 1113, n.28 (emphasis omitted). The Court recognized that “case law

indicates that bond, plus permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors may

contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of ‘primary’

importance in the section 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109. For instance, if

relevant in a case, a trial court “can equally emphasize the safety needs of the

child” in its analysis under section 2511(b). See In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114,

118 (Pa. Super. 2014).

      Mother posits that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights

under section 2511(b) because DHS did not present any expert evidence to

establish that Child would not experience significant detrimental harm if her

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parental rights were terminated. See Mother’s Brief at 28. Mother argues

that the trial court inappropriately relied on the testimony of Ms. Vargas who

was unqualified to establish whether Mother lacked a parental bond with Child.

See id.

      The trial court explained that the section 2511(b) best interests

militated in favor of termination:

             The [c]ourt found credible all of the testimony from Ms.
      Vargas that there is a lack of a parent child bond between Mother
      and [Child]. Ms. Vargas provided the reasons for this as there
      was never any consistency in their visits and a bond could not
      have been formed given the [five to fifteen] minute visits that
      Mother had with [Child] throughout the life of the case. These
      short visits were due to Mother’s chronic lateness. The [c]ourt
      also found credible all of the testimony from Ms. Vargas as to the
      bond between Child with the resource parent and that all of Child’s
      needs are being met on a daily basis with the resource parent.
      [Child] has been in this foster care home since April of 2021 and
      it is preadoptive. The [c]ourt also heard testimony that [Child]
      would not suffer any irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights
      were terminated.       This was based on the resource parent
      providing for [Child’s] needs and the lack of involvement and bond
      with Mother.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/23, at 17.

      Following our review, we conclude the trial court did not commit an error

of law or abuse its discretion in finding that termination of Mother’s parental

rights was in Child’s best interests. Initially, we hold that the trial court did

not err in relying on the testimony of Ms. Vargas. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d

1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that “[w]hen conducting a bonding

analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony[; rather, s]ocial

workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well”) (internal citations

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omitted). Additionally, Ms. Vargas’s testimony, which the trial court could rely

on, established that Mother had not formed a parent-child bond and that Child,

instead, looks to his “resource parent,” i.e., his foster parent, who is a

preadoptive resource, as a mother, and he looks to her for his needs,

including, love, protection, and support. See N.T., 3/23/23, at 49-54. Ms.

Vargas additionally opined that E.C. would not suffer irreparable harm if

Mother’s parental rights were terminated. See id. at 53. Thus, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination best serves the

Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to

section 2511(b), and that termination of Mother’s parental rights would not

sever a “necessary and beneficial” relationship or cause “extreme emotional

consequences.” See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10.

      Given our disposition affirming the decree terminating Mother’s parental

rights, her third issue regarding the trial court’s decision to change Child’s

permanency goal from reunification to adoption is moot. See Int. of A.M.,

256 A.3d 1263, 1272-73 (Pa. Super. 2021) (finding issues regarding goal

change moot in light of termination of parental rights); see also In re

Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding that “the

effect of our decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s termination decree

necessarily renders moot the dependency court’s decision to change Child’s

goal to adoption”); In re D.K.W., 415 A.2d 69, 73 (Pa. 1980) (stating that

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once parental rights are terminated, issues of custody and dependency are

moot). Therefore, we do not review this issue.

     Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s

parental rights to Child and dismiss as moot the order changing Child’s

permanency goal to adoption.

     Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed.

Date: 12/8/2023

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