Court Opinion

ID: 9758317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:21:00.017987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:49.324677
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. This opinion today, which forces the appellants, in effect, to return to the trial court for resolution of claims against John Doe defendants, when the plaintiffs complaint has already been dismissed by the trial court, defies the test of reasonableness. I would treat a dismissed complaint as exactly that — a dismissed complaint — and not require the trial court to engage in a redundant act. To remand to the trial court under these facts is meaningless and further delays resolution of this appeal and justice for the parties. Clearly, where claims against John Doe defendants have not been resolved, this court has invoked Rule 54(b) and dismissed the appeal. See, e.g., Shackelford v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 334 Ark. 634, 976 S.W.2d 950 (1998). But those cases involved situations where judgments were rendered for all individual parties except the John Doe defendants. That is not the situation for the present appeal. Here, the appellants’ complaint has been dismissed by the trial court which necessarily resolves all claims against all defendants. The trial court’s dismissal of the complaint was not limited to certain defendants. Rather, the trial court said, “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted and Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed with prejudice.” Adding weight to this conclusion is the fact that the motion to dismiss referred to all defendants in its style of the case. Not only is today’s decision unreasonable, but it casts doubt on a recent opinion by this court. See Nelson v. Weiss, 366 Ark. 361, 235 S.W.3d 891 (2006). In Nelson, the plaintiffs medical malpractice complaint was brought against the defendant doctor and five John Does. The trial court granted the doctor’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the patient’s complaint with prejudice. This court accepted the patient’s appeal and did not invoke Rule 54(b) on our own motion regarding the John Doe defendants. That is precisely the situation we have in the instant case. Now, however, this court in six short months is willing to jettison that opinion in favor of the opposite result. It is true that the dismissal order in Nelson referenced the John Doe defendants, but the motion to dismiss was filed solely by the doctor. In the case before us, John Does were named as defendants. The two named defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, referring to all defendants in the style of the case, and the trial court did so. To now contend that dismissal of the complaint is limited only to certain defendants stretches credulity and undermines the trial court’s order. If the trial court had wished to limit its dismissal to certain defendants, the court would have said so. It did not. Furthermore, had the appellants believed their complaint was still extant regarding the John Does, they would have raised that issue to the trial court before appealing. They did not do so. None of the cases cited by the majority are apposite to this case. In Shackleford v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., supra, the dismissal by the trial court specifically related to AP&L, thus leaving the complaint against the John Doe defendants still pending. In the instant case, the trial court dismissed the complaint without limitation to any defendant. In Jones v. Huckabee, 363 Ark. 239, 213 S.W.3d 11 (2005), the trial court’s dismissal order expressly excepted the John Doe defendants. That is not the situation in the case before us. In Black v. Crawley, 304 Ark. 716, 804 S.W.2d 366 (1991), only the mother’s claim was dismissed, leaving the daughter’s claim still viable. We said that was a clear Rule 54(b) violation. That is obviously distinguished from the instant case. In Vermeer Manufacturing Co. v. Vandiver, 279 Ark. 218, 650 S.W.2d 244 (1983), only one claim was resolved against one party in a multiple-party case. We dismissed that appeal as an obvious Rule 54(b) violation. Those cases are far afield from the case at hand where the entire complaint was dismissed. Our Nelson v. Weiss decision was reasonable and just. I would not expand our John Doe jurisprudence in such an illogical way. Rather, I would resolve this case on the merits. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. Hannah, C.J., and Gunter, J., join this dissent.