Court Opinion

ID: 9411668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 16:02:04.823566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:08.771896
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FORTUNATO DE JESUS AMADOR                           No. 18-71987
DUENAS,
            Petitioner,                             Agency No.
                                                   A205-318-278
    v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney                          OPINION
General,
             Respondent.

          On Petition for Review of an Order of the
              Board of Immigration Appeals

                    Submitted July 20, 2023*
                    San Francisco, California

                        Filed July 27, 2023

    Before: John B. Owens, Kenneth K. Lee, and Patrick J.
                  Bumatay, Circuit Judges.

                      Opinion by Judge Lee

*
 The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2                       DUENAS V. GARLAND

                          SUMMARY **

                           Immigration

    Denying Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas’s petition
for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals, the panel held that the appointment and removal
process for Immigration Judges and members of the BIA
comports with Article II of the Constitution.
    The panel rejected Amador Duenas’s suggestion that
Immigration Judges and BIA members are principal officers
who, under the Appointments Clause of Article II, must be
nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. Rather, the panel concluded that they are inferior
officers (whose appointment may be vested in the head of a
department) because the Attorney General ultimately directs
and supervises their work. Thus, the panel held that the
Appointments Clause allows Congress to vest their
appointment in the Attorney General.
   The panel next held that the removal process for
Immigration Judges and BIA members satisfies Article II,
which requires that officers remain accountable to the
President by limiting restrictions on the removal of the
President’s subordinates. The panel explained that the
Attorney General has the power to remove Immigration
Judges and BIA members, and that nothing restricts the
Attorney General’s ability to remove them at will. Thus,

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                      DUENAS V. GARLAND                        3

these officers remain dependent on the Attorney General for
their positions—and by extension, on the President.
    In an accompanying memorandum disposition, the panel
rejected Amador Duenas’s other challenges.

                         COUNSEL

Fortunado De Jesus Amador Duenas, San Bernardino,
California, pro se Petitioner.
Aric A. Anderson, Trial Attorney; Kohsei Ugumori, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division; United States Department of
Justice; Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

                          OPINION

LEE, Circuit Judge:

    Our Constitution vests all executive power in one person,
the President of the United States. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.
1. The President, however, remains answerable to the
people, and the officials who work for the President, in turn,
remain answerable to him or her. This structure ensures that
the Executive Branch—and its vast power provided by the
Constitution—remains accountable to the people.
   Article II protects this chain of accountability. Its
Appointments Clause limits who can appoint executive
branch officers, making clear to the people who is
4                    DUENAS V. GARLAND

responsible for good—and bad—appointees wielding
considerable power. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044,
2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). And Article II bars a
restriction on the President’s power to remove officers if it
insulates them from presidential oversight. See Seila Law
LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191–92 (2020). These rules
are a crucial feature of the separation of powers that lies at
the heart of our constitutional system. The President’s
accountability to the people legitimizes the concentration of
executive power in the President. Id. at 2203. In turn, the
President’s “ongoing supervision and control” of executive
officials legitimizes the power that they exert in his or her
name. Id.
    In this case, Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas
challenges the constitutionality of the appointment and
removal process for Immigration Judges and members of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). These officials
exercise significant authority within our immigration
system, making them officers under the Appointments
Clause. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But they remain
accountable for their conduct. They are inferior officers
appointed by the Attorney General, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1), who is in turn appointed by the
President, 28 U.S.C. § 503. And nothing restricts the
Attorney General’s ability to remove these officials. This
process follows our Constitution and the separation-of-
powers principles that underlie it. Accordingly, we deny
Amador Duenas’s petition for review. 1

1
  We reject Amador Duenas’s other challenges in a memorandum
disposition issued concurrently with this opinion.
                      DUENAS V. GARLAND                       5

                STANDARD OF REVIEW
   We review de novo the constitutionality of the
appointment and removal process for Immigration Judges
and members of the BIA. See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions,
857 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
                         ANALYSIS
     Article II of the Constitution vests all “executive Power”
in the President of the United States. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1,
cl. 1. With this power comes the responsibility to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Id. § 3. To that end,
the Appointments Clause mandates that the President
appoint the principal “Officers of the United States,” subject
to “the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Id. § 2, cl. 2.
Principal officers include cabinet heads and other high-level
appointees. See id. § 2. Relevant here, the Appointments
Clause also allows Congress to vest the appointment of
“inferior” officers, who still exercise significant authority
but do not need Senate confirmation, in “Heads of
Departments.” Id.
    Amador Duenas challenges the appointment and
removal of Immigration Judges and BIA members, arguing
that these processes do not follow the constraints imposed
by Article II. He suggests that Immigration Judges and BIA
members are principal officers, so they must be nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. He also
maintains that the lack of a specific statutory provision
governing their removal violates Article II. We reject these
arguments.
6                    DUENAS V. GARLAND

    I. Immigration Judges and BIA members are
       inferior officers properly appointed by the
       Attorney General.
    The Appointments Clause applies only to “Officers of
the United States”—not simple employees. Lucia, 138 S.
Ct. at 2049 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). Unlike
employees, officers, whether principal or inferior, exercise
“significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States,” id. at 2051 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
126 (1976) (per curiam)), and their duties are “continuing
and permanent,” rather than “occasional or temporary,” id.
(quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12
(1878)). For example, SEC Administrative Law Judges
qualify as officers because they “hold a continuing office
established by law” and exercise “all the authority needed to
ensure fair and orderly adversarial hearings” before issuing
“decisions containing factual findings, legal conclusions,
and appropriate remedies.” Id. at 2053.
    For the same reasons, Immigration Judges and BIA
members also qualify as officers. Their responsibilities are
legally defined and continuous. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a
(Immigration Judges); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (members of the
BIA). And they wield substantial authority: Immigration
Judges conduct adversarial hearings in removal proceedings,
see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)–(c), and BIA members perform
substantive appellate review of Immigration Judges’
removal determinations, leading to decisions that combine
factual and legal analysis and that order suitable remedies,
see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d).
    The key question here is whether Immigration Judges
and BIA members are principal or inferior officers. When
distinguishing between these types of officers, we mainly
                       DUENAS V. GARLAND                          7

look at whether the officer’s work is “‘directed and
supervised at some level’ by other officers appointed by the
President with the Senate’s consent.” Free Enter. Fund v.
PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010) (quoting Edmond v.
United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)); see also Seila Law,
140 S. Ct. at 2199 n.3.
    Under this framework, Immigration Judges and BIA
members are inferior officers. The Attorney General—who
is appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate,
28 U.S.C. § 503—ultimately directs and supervises the work
of both officials.        See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (“An
immigration judge shall be subject to such supervision and
shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall
prescribe . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (“[Members of the
BIA] shall . . . act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the
cases that come before them.”).
     And because they are inferior officers of the United
States, the Appointments Clause allows Congress to vest
their appointment in the head of a department. U.S. Const.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Attorney General qualifies as the head
of a department, as he or she leads the Department of Justice.
28 U.S.C. § 503; see Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 510
(establishing that the executive departments enumerated in 5
U.S.C. § 101—including the Department of Justice—
constitute departments under the Appointments Clause).
And Congress has charged the Attorney General with the
responsibility of appointing Immigration Judges and
members of the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (Immigration
Judges); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (members of the BIA). 2

2
 No statute specifically governs the appointment of BIA members. But
Congress authorized the Attorney General to enact the regulations
establishing the BIA (which is housed in the Executive Office for
8                       DUENAS V. GARLAND

The Attorney General’s involvement in this process
maintains “clear lines of accountability—encouraging good
appointments and giving the public someone to blame for
bad ones.” Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).     In short, the appointment process for
Immigration Judges and BIA members satisfies Article II
and the principles that it protects.
    II. The removal process for Immigration Judges and
        BIA members also satisfies Article II.
    Article II requires that officers remain accountable to the
President—and ultimately to the people—by limiting
restrictions on the removal of the President’s subordinates.
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191–92. If Congress has vested the
appointment of inferior officers in the head of a department,
“it is ordinarily the department head, rather than the
President, who enjoys the power of removal.” Free Enter.
Fund, 561 U.S. at 493. (The President, of course, can direct
the department head to remove an inferior officer and can
also dismiss the department head, holding him or her “to
account for . . . supervision” of the officer. See id. at 495–
96.)
    Relying on Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S.
477 (2010), Amador Duenas questions the constitutionality
of the removal process for Immigration Judges and BIA
members.      He maintains that no statutory provision
expressly provides for their removal. But there can be no
doubt that the Attorney General enjoys the power to remove
Immigration Judges and members of the BIA, just as he or

Immigration Review, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1)), and thus, by extension,
vested the power to appoint the BIA’s members in the Attorney General
as well. See 6 U.S.C. § 521.
                      DUENAS V. GARLAND                      9

she enjoys the power to appoint them. Cf. Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926) (noting “the well-approved
principle of constitutional and statutory construction that the
power of removal of executive officers was incident to the
power of appointment”).
     And Free Enterprise Fund does not support Amador
Duenas’s argument. In that case, the Court determined that
a double layer of for-cause protection violated Article II
because it insulated an official from presidential oversight
and removal. 561 U.S. at 495–96. Amador Duenas has
identified no such limit on the Attorney General’s ability to
dismiss Immigration Judges or BIA members at will. Thus,
the removal process for these officials complies with Article
II, as they “remain dependent” on the Attorney General for
their positions—and by extension, on the President. See
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2211.
                      CONCLUSION
    We hold that the appointment and removal process for
Immigration Judges and members of the BIA comports with
Article II of our Constitution. For these reasons and those
set forth in our accompanying memorandum disposition, we
DENY Amador Duenas’s petition for review.