Court Opinion

ID: 9905504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:10:56.03582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.314331
License: Public Domain

J-A13017-23

                                  2023 PA Super 248

    NATIONAL BROKERS OF AMERICA,               :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    INC. AND ALAN CHRISTOPHER                  :         PENNSYLVANIA
    REDMOND                                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JASON SCOTT JORDAN                         :    No. 642 MDA 2022
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: ALAN CHRISTOPHER                :
    REDMOND                                    :

             Appeal from the Judgment Dated December 20, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s):
                                 14-17117

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.:                            FILED: NOVEMBER 29, 2023

       Alan Christopher Redmond appeals from the judgment, entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, entered on the verdict and sanctions

imposed against him in the amount of $13,105,197.20.1 Upon review, we

affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Judgment was entered against Redmond on December 20, 2021. On
December 30, 2021, Redmond filed a post-trial motion. However, on
December 3, 2021, prior to both the verdict and Redmond’s post-trial motion,
Redmond filed a notice of appeal to this Court, docketed at 1621 MDA 2021,
from a November 3, 2021 order granting sanctions against Redmond for
failure to pay his own counsel. Ultimately, on March 11, 2022, this Court
quashed Redmond’s appeal at 1621 MDA 2021, see Order, 3/11/22, at 1, and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A13017-23

       In February of 2013, Redmond was the sole owner and operator of

National Brokers of America, Inc. (NBOA). Redmond operated NBOA as an

insurance sales call center. During this period, NBOA was unprofitable and on

the brink of financial failure. Redmond induced Jason Scott Jordan (Jordan)

to relocate to Pennsylvania from Florida and work for NBOA. Jordan had 13

years of professional experience in sales and management of insurance call

centers.   Jordan relocated his family to Reading, Pennsylvania, in order to

work at NBOA.        On July 13, 2013, Jordan entered into an Employment

____________________________________________

on March 31, 2022, the trial court denied Redmond’s post-trial motion. On
April 19, 2022, Redmond filed the instant timely notice of appeal, in which he
purports to appeal from the March 31, 2022 order denying his post-trial
motion. However, in a civil case, an appeal “can only lie from judgments
entered subsequent to the trial court’s disposition of any post-verdict motions,
not from the order denying post-trial motions.” Johnston the Florist, Inc.
v. TEDCO Const. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc)
(citation omitted); see also Angelichio v. Myers, 110 A.3d 1046, 1048 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (“As a general rule, this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals
taken from final orders.”).

Additionally, we note that despite the then-pending appeal at 1621 MDA 2021,
the trial court possessed the authority to enter its verdict and judgment
against Redmond on December 20, 2021. See Christian v. Pennsylvania
Fin. Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan, 686 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1996)
(order granting discovery sanctions is interlocutory and not generally subject
to appeal until underlying case completed); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(6)
(after an appeal has been taken, trial court may “proceed further in any matter
in which a non-appealable interlocutory order has been entered,
notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal[.]”). Accordingly, we have
corrected the caption, and conclude that we have jurisdiction to entertain the
instant appeal.

                                           -2-
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Agreement with        NBOA.2        The   Employment Agreement required any

modifications to be made in writing.

       Between July 31, 2013 and October 31, 2013, NBOA paid Jordan

$23,778.00 less than the sum due under the Employment Agreement.

Consequently, Redmond offered to compensate Jordan with equity, by offering

50% of NBOA’s non-voting stock to Jordan. Jordan declined, because such an

agreement would leave Redmond as sole voting shareholder.         After some

negotiation, Redmond and Jordan, by way of a Shareholders’ Agreement,

dated November 1, 2013, became 50/50 shareholders of NBOA.               Both

Redmond and Jordan would have exactly one voting stock, with those two

shares comprising all of NBOA’s issued stock.        Redmond then confirmed

Jordan’s 50% ownership of NBOA by directing the accountant to list Redmond

and Jordan as 50/50 owners of NBOA stock in NBOA’s 2013 tax returns.3

       From approximately November 2013 until August 4, 2014, Redmond

and Jordan took equal pay, took equal distributions, and acted at all times as

having equal authority in the management of NBOA. Redmond and Jordan

were NBOA’s only shareholders and the only directors. Under the Amended

____________________________________________

2 NBOA and Jordan agreed to a bi-weekly commission payment, based upon

Jordan’s performance at NBOA. See Defendant’s Answer to Complaint and
New Matter, 12/11/14, Ex. A (Employment Agreement).

3 At no time did Jordan resign from his employment, management or
ownership of NBOA. See Decision and Verdict, 12/20/21, at 2-3.

                                           -3-
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and Restated Bylaws of NBOA (NBOA Bylaws),4 Redmond and Jordan had

equal power and authority, albeit different titles. Redmond and Jordan agreed

that Redmond would have primary responsibility for the corporate finances,

and Jordan would have primary responsibility for the operations of NBOA.

       Prior to executing the November 1, 2013 Shareholders’ Agreement,

NBOA’s gross annual sales were approximately $365,000.00. In 2014, due to

Jordan’s contributions, NBOA’s gross annual sales increased to roughly

$4,000,000.00. From January 2014 until August 4, 2014, NBOA went from

making one insurance sale per day, to over 1,000 sales per month.

       On August 4, 2014, Redmond unilaterally changed the locks on NBOA’s

place of business. Redmond did not give Jordan a key, and Redmond posted

an armed guard at the entrance so that Jordan could not enter. Since then,

Redmond has continuously prevented Jordan from participating in the

operations and management of NBOA, refused to provide Jordan with any

financial or management information regarding NBOA,5 kept all earnings,

profits, and distributions solely for himself, publicly claimed to be a 100%

owner of NBOA, and treated Jordan as a total stranger to NBOA, rather than

a director or shareholder of NBOA. At no time did the parties amend, modify,
____________________________________________

4 The NBOA Bylaws have, at all times, been the controlling documentation in

the underlying lawsuit. The NBOA Bylaws have not been superseded or
amended. See id. at 3. The NBOA Bylaws require unanimous consent from
voting shareholders for any action. See id.

5 As we discuss infra, Redmond ultimately provided this information during
discovery. See id. at 4.

                                           -4-
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or change the Shareholders’ Agreement or the NBOA Bylaws. To this date,

Jordan officially remains a 50% voting shareholder and director of NBOA.

       On August 8, 2014, NBOA filed a writ of summons against Jordan in the

trial court, alleging trespass, and an emergency motion for an ex parte

preliminary injunction. Additionally, NBOA alleged, inter alia, that Jordan and

NBOA had no employment agreement, but that Redmond had fired Jordan

after an argument and physical altercation.           See Emergency Petition for

Preliminary Injunction, 8/8/14, at 1.            Jordan was not notified of these

proceedings.6 Ultimately, on August 13, 2014, the trial court granted NBOA’s

injunction against Jordan, without a hearing, and barred him from entering

the NBOA premises and imposing an order that Jordan stay at least 1,000

yards away from NBOA.

       Subsequent to these events, and during the pendency of this case,

Redmond began lavishly spending NBOA’s money. Redmond made numerous

purchases using NBOA company funds, including but not limited to visiting

strip clubs, buying items from Babies-R-Us, purchasing various pieces of

jewelry, and making a notable purchase for $118,907.27 at Neiman Marcus.

These purchases and others were made directly from the NBOA General

Ledger, were listed as “Redmond’s Personal Expenses,” and ultimately totaled

$604,126.45. In addition, Redmond made numerous cash withdrawals from

____________________________________________

6Redmond was not initially a party to this litigation. As we note infra, on
December 11, 2014, the parties stipulated to add Redmond, personally, as a
party.

                                           -5-
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NBOA accounts totaling $116,738.00, and wired another $56,000.00 to his

mother in Ireland.

       Redmond’s misuse of funds did not stop.           Redmond transferred

$361,782.72 from NBOA to a newly-formed company, Bene Market, LLC (Bene

Market), in which Redmond is a 96% equity owner.             Redmond further

transferred the NBOA book of business to Bene Market, which ultimately

resulted in the shutdown of NBOA in 2018.           In 2017, prior to NBOA’s

shutdown, Bene Market’s gross proceeds rose from $765,545.00 to

$17,295,549.00. In lieu of any Bene Market member distributions, Redmond

began paying himself guaranteed payments from Bene Market, totaling

$2,842,276.00 in 2017, $1,294,182.00 in 2018, and $3,125,623.00 in 2019.

Redmond also used NBOA accounts to finance his personal civil defense in this

litigation, totaling $270,945.05.

       The following is a summary of the tortured seven-year history of the

proceedings in this case.7        On October 28, 2014, NBOA filed a complaint

against Jordan for breach of contract and defamation. On December 1, 2014,

Jordan filed an answer and counterclaims for breaches of contract, violations

of the Wage Payment and Collection Law,8 breaches of fiduciary duty, and for

____________________________________________

7 We do not include every single filing from the parties, as they are numerous

and unnecessary for our review of Redmond’s claims on appeal.

8 43 P.S. § 260.1 et seq.

                                           -6-
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a stockholders’ appraisal.9         On December 11, 2014, NBOA and Jordan

stipulated to add Redmond as a party to the suit. After additional filings, the

trial court, on February 2, 2015, granted Jordan’s request to compel Redmond

to respond to Jordan’s interrogatories and request for production of

documents within 15 days. See Order, 2/2/15, at 1. On February 20, 2015,

Jordan filed a petition for sanctions, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 4019, for

Redmond’s willful failure to comply with the court’s February 2, 2015 discovery

order. On February 24, 2015, the trial court issued a rule to show cause,

directing Redmond to explain why he had failed to comply with the trial court’s

discovery order. See Order, 2/24/15, at 1. Subsequently, on February 26,

2015, the trial court granted Redmond an additional 20 days to comply with

the discovery order. See Order, 2/26/15, at 1.10

       On March 26, 2015, Jordan filed a motion for partial summary judgment,

which the trial court denied on April 8, 2015. The parties subsequently filed

a stipulation in which they jointly requested a scheduling order. On April 13,

2015, the trial court directed: all written discovery to be completed by July

____________________________________________

9In his complaint, Redmond did not attach the Employment Agreement or
NBOA Bylaws. However, Jordan, in his answer and counterclaim, attached
both, as well as the Shareholders’ Agreement. See Answer and Counterclaim,
12/1/14, Exs. A, B, C.

10 In particular, the trial court denied Jordan’s petition for sanctions.
                                                                      See id.
However, our review of the certified record reveals that Redmond did not file
a response to the trial court’s February 24, 2015 rule to show cause.
Consequently, the trial court’s reasons for granting an additional 20 days on
February 26, 2015, are unclear.

                                           -7-
J-A13017-23

10, 2015; all depositions to be completed by August 25, 2015; all expert

witnesses and their respective curricula vitae to be disclosed by August 25,

2015; and expert witness reports to be served by the parties by September

25, 2015. See Order, 4/13/15, at 1. On April 27, 2015, Redmond filed a

petition to quash discovery into his personal finances, which the trial court

granted on April 30, 2015.

       In October 2015, the parties filed a second stipulation requesting an

amended scheduling order. The trial court ordered all the above discovery

requirements be completed no later than February 2016. However, this order

was short-lived, as the trial court, on January 14, 2016, issued an order

suspending all discovery deadlines.

       On May 2, 2016, Redmond sought and was granted a stay in the

proceeding pending an investigation by the Pennsylvania Department of

Insurance.11     Before the trial court, Redmond blamed this investigation on

Jordan, claiming that Jordan was responsible for all sales from NBOA. On May

27, 2016, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration of the stay, and the trial

court entered an order capping the stay’s duration at 90 days without any

further extensions.      See Order, 6/17/16, at 1 (granting Jordan’s motion,

____________________________________________

11 In January of 2016, the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance      began an
investigation into Redmond and NBOA to determine whether Redmond had
knowingly permitted unlicensed producers in his agency to sell under the
license of other individuals. It is unclear from the record before us whether
this investigation was ever closed.

                                           -8-
J-A13017-23

permitting ongoing discovery during stay, and specifying no further extensions

would be granted).

      During this stay, Jordan sought answers to numerous interrogatories,

some of which the trial court had previously directed Redmond answer.

Redmond filed an equal number of responses in which he objected and/or

declined to answer.    On September 16, 2016, the trial court conducted a

hearing on Redmond’s failures to answer interrogatories and comply with its

discovery orders.

      After the hearing, the trial court, on September 27, 2016, ordered

Redmond to provide full and complete responses to interrogatories and

requests for production of documents.       See Order, 9/27/16, at 1-3.       On

December 1, 2016, the trial court ordered Redmond to “fully comply” with the

September 27, 2016 order within 20 days. The trial court also stated that it

would not consider any requests for further delay of trial. On February 28,

2017, Jordan filed a petition for sanctions, in which he informed the trial court

that Redmond was still refusing to comply with the trial court’s order for

discovery of financial books and records of NBOA, including NBOA’s General

Ledgers for 2015, 2016, and 2017. In response, Redmond claimed that his

accountant, Malcolm C. Smith, would not release the data because Smith had

not been paid. The trial court conducted a hearing on Jordan’s petition for

sanctions and, on April 5, 2017, the trial court granted Jordan’s petition and

ordered that Redmond provide the requested material within two weeks. See

Order, 4/7/17, at 1.    Additionally, the trial court sanctioned Redmond and

                                      -9-
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ordered that any evidence “not provided within two weeks from the date of

this order will be barred from use in the trial in this matter.” See id.

(emphasis added).

      Redmond filed a petition for sanctions against Jordan, which the trial

court denied on May 31, 2017. At the same time, the trial court permitted

Redmond to secure an expert witness and to propound interrogatories to

Jordan. In July of 2017, as a result of the trial court’s scheduling conflicts,

this case was again delayed. Jordan petitioned for re-scheduling trial, which

the trial court granted, but a date was not set. On November 6, 2017, Jordan

petitioned to dissolve the August 2014 preliminary injunction that had been

granted ex parte without a hearing. On March 8, 2018, Jordan petitioned for

the trial court to set a trial date, which it had not done since the scheduling

conflict in July of 2017.   On April 2, 2018, the trial court denied Jordan’s

November 6, 2017 petition under the doctrine of laches.        Jordan filed an

interlocutory appeal to this Court.

      While Jordan’s interlocutory appeal was pending, Jordan, on May 22,

2018, again petitioned for the trial court to set a trial date. On August 3,

2018, the trial court denied the May 22, 2018 petition due to the pending

appeal.   Consequently, Jordan withdrew his interlocutory appeal and, on

September 28, 2018, submitted another petition for the trial court to set a

trial date. On October 4, 2018, the trial court granted the petition and set

trial for February 25, 2019. On January 28, 2019, the trial court conducted a

pre-trial conference, at which Redmond voluntarily withdrew his claim of

                                      - 10 -
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defamation against Jordan. See Order, 1/28/19, at 1. Additionally, the trial

court ordered Redmond to prepare a list of all exhibits and witnesses he

intended to present at trial. Id.

      On February 20, 2019, mere days prior to the start of trial, NBOA filed

for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District

of Pennsylvania. See Notice of Bankruptcy Case Filing, 2/21/19, at 1 (notice

to trial court that NBOA filed bankruptcy, with case number 19-11045-ref).

As a result, on February 21, 2019, the trial court stayed the instant case with

regard to any claims involving NBOA, but directed the trial between Jordan

and Redmond to proceed as scheduled on February 25, 2019. See Order,

2/21/19, at 1-2. Redmond filed a motion to reconsider on February 21, 2019,

which the trial court granted on February 22, 2019. See Order, 2/22/19, at

1. In particular, the trial court vacated its February 21, 2019 order, cancelled

the February 25, 2019 trial date, and noted that trial would be rescheduled.

See id.

      On April 17, 2019, Jordan filed a petition to reschedule the trial date in

the instant case.   Jordan’s petition included the United States Bankruptcy

Court’s order dismissing NBOA’s bankruptcy filing for “fail[ure] to timely file

the documents required by the orders dated February 21, 2019[,] and March

7, 2019.” See Defendant’s Pre-Trial Petition, 4/17/19, Ex. A (United States

Bankruptcy Court Order, 4/4/19, at 1).        On May 17, 2019, the trial court

ordered that trial would commence on September 9, 2019.             See Order,

5/17/19, at 1.

                                     - 11 -
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      On May 31, 2019, Jordan petitioned the court for leave to take

Redmond’s deposition on the question of his personal assets for purposes of

punitive damages. On July 12, 2019, the trial court granted Jordan’s petition

and ordered that Redmond be deposed within 45 days of the order and

“[b]ecause punitive damages can be sought in this case against [] Redmond,

counsel for [Jordan] may conduct discovery involving [] Redmond’s personal

finances.” See Order, 7/12/19, at 1. The trial court entered a subsequent

order directing Redmond to provide his tax returns to Jordan no later than

August 27, 2019.       On August 27, 2019, the trial court conducted a

teleconference with both parties, during which the trial court became aware

that Redmond had not provided his state and federal income tax filings as

directed.   Consequently, on August 27, 2019, the trial court ordered that

“Redmond[] shall provide his tax returns requested by [Jordan] in discovery

to [Jordan]’s counsel no later than the close of business today.”         Order,

8/27/19, at 1. On August 28, 2019, Redmond appeared for his deposition,

without his tax returns.    Throughout his deposition, Redmond refused to

answer questions regarding his personal finances. When Redmond did not

provide his tax returns, the trial court, on August 28, 2019, issued another

order giving Redmond 24 hours to produce “state and federal income tax

returns for the years 2012 to the present . . . before the continued deposition

of [] Redmond which [] is scheduled to occur on Friday, September 5, 2019.

Failure to comply with this Order will result in significant sanctions[.]” Order,

8/28/19, at 1.

                                     - 12 -
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       By September 1, 2019, Redmond had refused to respond to the court-

ordered discovery regarding his personal finances. On September 3, 2019, a

mere six days before trial, NBOA filed a second bankruptcy petition; at that

time Redmond still had not complied with the trial court’s discovery orders.

On September 6, 2019, Jordan moved to sever trial for the parties and proceed

immediately with his claims against Redmond. The trial court ordered trial to

begin on January 27, 2020. However, the case was ultimately removed to

Bankruptcy Court, and the trial court again cancelled the trial date.12 See

Order, 1/21/20, at 1.

       This case languished until January 6, 2021, when the Bankruptcy Court

remanded the case to the Common Pleas Court, so that Jordan “may

immediately prosecute his claims against [] Redmond only.” Consent Order,

1/6/21, at 1-3.

       On February 16, 2021, the trial court scheduled a status conference for

April 9, 2021. See Order, 2/16/21, at 1. At this time, Redmond had still not

provided discovery as ordered more than one year prior. On April 19, 2021,

Jordan moved for sanctions due to Redmond’s continuing refusal to cooperate

in discovery regarding Redmond’s personal finances. On May 24, 2021, the

trial court scheduled trial for September 20, 2021. See Order, 5/24/21, at 1.

On June 7, 2021, the trial court granted Jordan’s motion for sanctions,
____________________________________________

12 The case was removed at the behest of Redmond and his counsel, who filed

a petition for removal in the United States Bankruptcy Court. See Notice of
Filing of Notice of Removal, 1/30/20, Ex. A (containing Redmond’s counsels’
petition for removal filed in United States Bankruptcy Court).

                                          - 13 -
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directing Redmond to, within 10 days, provide full and complete answers to

Jordan’s August 1, 2019 discovery request and to appear for a second

deposition within 30 days. See Order, 6/7/21, at 1. The trial court warned

that if Redmond failed to comply, the trial court would impose monetary

sanctions for attorneys’ fees and court reporter costs.

       On August 11, 2021, the trial court held a teleconference due to

Redmond’s refusal to appear in person.13           On August 12, 2021, Jordan

petitioned for sanctions due to Redmond’s refusal to appear, which the trial

court granted on August 31, 2021. See Order, 8/31/21, at 1-3. In particular,

the trial court prohibited Redmond from presenting any evidence regarding

interrogatories he failed to answer, and from testifying to any evidence that

he failed to otherwise disclose in discovery. See id. at 2-3. Additionally, the

trial court found Redmond to be willfully non-compliant with court-ordered

discovery, and willfully non-compliant in failing to appear for depositions. See

id. at 3. The trial court ordered that Redmond pay $10,484.50 in reasonable

attorneys’ fees incurred by Jordan within five business days.14 See id. The

____________________________________________

13 We note that this teleconference is not transcribed. However, it is clear
from the parties’ filings and the subsequent trial court orders that Redmond
was refusing to appear for depositions for reasons that are unclear from the
record. Redmond would later claim his refusals to appear were because of
the COVID-19 pandemic. See Brief for Appellant, at 28-29.

14 On October 28, 2021, Jordan filed a petition for entry of judgment, in which

he alleged that Redmond had not paid the court-ordered $10,484.50 in
attorneys’ fees. See Petition for Entry of Judgment, 10/28/21, at 1-2. On
November 3, 2021, the trial court directed the prothonotary to immediately
enter judgment against Redmond. See Order, 11/3/21, at 1.

                                          - 14 -
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trial court again ordered that trial was to commence on September 20, 2021.

Id.

       Ultimately, Redmond and Jordan proceeded to a non-jury trial on

September 20-21, 2021. At the conclusion, the trial court ordered that the

parties file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.       Both parties

complied.     On December 20, 2021, the trial court adopted almost all of

Jordan’s proposed findings of fact and issued its verdict. See Decision and

Verdict, 12/20/21, at 1-14. The trial court determined that Redmond had

directly misappropriated $3,698,627.00 from NBOA and misappropriated

$11,797,865.00 in assets transferred from NBOA to Bene Market. See id.

The trial court found that Redmond had obtained a total amount of

$15,496,492.00 that was not equally divided with Jordan, as directed under

the NBOA Bylaws and the Shareholders’ Agreement. See id. Ultimately, the

trial court returned a verdict in favor of Jordan, sanctioned Redmond, and

awarded     Jordan     $8,105,197.20       in   compensatory   damages,   including

prejudgment interest, and also awarded $5,000,000.00 in punitive damages,

resulting in a total damages award of $13,105,197.20. See id. at 15.

       Redmond filed timely post-trial motions, which the Honorable Jeffrey K.

Sprecher15 denied. Redmond, as noted above, filed a timely notice of appeal

____________________________________________

15 Prior to the resolution of Redmond’s post-trial motion, the Honorable
Timothy J. Rowley retired. On January 6, 2022, the case was reassigned to
the Honorable Jeffrey K. Sprecher. See Order, 1/6/22.

                                          - 15 -
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and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal. Redmond raises the following claims for our review:

       1. Did the trial court err in allowing [] Jordan to amend his
       counterclaim to add a conversion claim after the statutory
       limitation period for that claim had expired?

       2. Did the trial court err in entering a sanctions order, dated
       August 31, 2021[,] . . . which: (a) precluded [] Redmond [] from
       testifying at trial; (b) precluded Redmond from “calling any
       witnesses at trial to testify to any matter that is within the
       reasonably expected personal knowledge of Redmond with the
       trial court to make the determination of what issues would
       reasonably be in his personal knowledge;” and (c) allowed Jordan
       to introduce into evidence at trial Redmond’s deposition testimony
       without calling Redmond to testify[,] regardless of hearsay
       prohibitions, all as a sanction for not appearing in person for a
       third deposition by [Jordan] amidst the COVID-19 pandemic?

       3. Did the trial court err in granting Jordan’s [p]etition for
       [j]udgment, which sought to convert to a judgment in favor of
       nonparty Cornerstone Law Firm (Jordan’s counsel) the $10,484.50
       sanction entered against Redmond by the trial court in its August
       31, 2021 [o]rder?

       4. Did the trial court err in allowing Jordan to testify on expert
       financial matters pertaining to the business, on which he lacked
       personal knowledge and was not qualified as an expert to address?

       5. Did the trial court err in rejecting the expert testimony of
       Redmond’s expert accountant regarding the valuation of the
       business and the nature of distributions to Redmond despite
       Jordan’s failure to present a countering expert?

       6. Did the trial court err in adopting Jordan’s complex financial
       findings and conclusions regarding conversion and damages
       without requisite expert testimony or record support? [16]
____________________________________________

16 We note that Redmond has waived his sixth claim for failure to include it in

the argument section of his appellate brief. See McEwing v. Lititz Mut. Ins.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 16 -
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       7. Did the trial court err in awarding excessive compensatory
       damages that were not rooted in evidence, were not within the
       limits of fair and reasonable compensation, and were inconsistent
       with the actual evidence?

       8. Did the trial court err in entering a grossly excessive punitive
       damages award of $5[,000,000.00] based on a conversion claim
       that was itself time-barred, while including not a single reference
       to conversion in the findings and conclusions, in violation of [d]ue
       [p]rocess rights?

Brief for Appellant, at 6-8.

       Because Redmond appealed from the judgment entered following a non-

jury trial, the following general principles apply to our review:

       Our review in a non-jury case is limited to whether the findings of
       the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether
       the trial court committed error in the application of law. We must
       grant the court’s findings of fact the same weight and effect as
       the verdict of a jury and, accordingly, may disturb the non-jury
       verdict only if the court’s findings are unsupported by competent
       evidence or the court committed legal error that affected the
       outcome of the trial. It is not the role of an appellate court to pass
       on the credibility of witnesses; hence[,] we will not substitute our
       judgment for that of the fact[-]finder. Thus, the test we apply is
       not whether we would have reached the same result on the
       evidence presented, but rather, after due consideration of the
       evidence which the trial court found credible, whether the trial
       court could have reasonably reached its conclusion.

____________________________________________

Co., 77 A.3d 639, 646-47 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails
to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails
to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that
claim is waived.”) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing
“argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions
to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part-in distinctive type or
in type distinctively displayed-the particular point treated therein, followed by
such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”)
(emphasis added). Consequently, we do not address it below.

                                          - 17 -
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Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Szymanski, 936 A.2d 87, 92-93 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(quotation and citations omitted).

       Preliminarily, we observe that Redmond has waived numerous claims,

which we address first for ease of disposition.       For the sake of brevity,

Redmond has waived, in their entirety, his first,17 third,18 fourth,19 seventh,20
____________________________________________

17 Redmond’s first claim, pertaining to Jordan’s conversion claim filed in his

amended counterclaim, is waived because Redmond did not object to the filing
of Jordan’s amended counterclaim, and he did not raise this claim in his post-
trial motion. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b)(2) (“Grounds not
specific [in the post-trial motion] are deemed waived[.]”).

18 Redmond’s third claim, pertaining to the attorneys’ fees awarded to Jordan’s

counsel, Cornerstone Law Firm, based upon Redmond’s failure to appear for
multiple depositions, is waived for a litany of reasons. Redmond’s brief on
this issue falls woefully short of our briefing requirements, as it is merely a
page in length, does not provide even a boilerplate standard of review, and is
replete with bald assertions purporting to characterize the substance of our
rules without citation to those rules. See McEwing, supra. Moreover,
Redmond did not file any objections to this sanction prior to trial, nor was this
issue contained within his post-trial motion.          See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a);
Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b)(2).

19 Redmond’s fourth claim, arguing that Jordan improperly testified to “expert

financial matters” over Redmond’s “repeated objections” is likewise waived.
In his brief, Redmond cites to a series of exchanges in the trial transcript,
purportedly containing his objections. See Brief for Appellant at 31-33.
However, upon review of the record, it appears that these citations contain
either no objection or objections that Redmond himself withdrew.
Consequently, the record reflects that Redmond did not object to Jordan’s
testimony and, therefore, this claim is waived as well. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

20 Redmond’s seventh claim, purportedly pertaining to the trial court’s
calculation of compensatory damages, is waived for several reasons. See
Brief for Appellant, at 34-36. First, this claim is labeled in the argument
section as “V” in violation of Rule 2119(a).        See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
Additionally, Redmond’s argument here does not pertain to compensatory
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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and eighth21 claims for either failing to preserve them before the trial court,

failing to properly raise them in his either his pre-trial motions or post-trial

motions, or for failing to adhere to our briefing requirements. See Pa.R.A.P.

302(a) (“[I]ssues not raised in the [trial] court are waived and cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal.”); Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b)(2); Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a); see also McEwing, supra.

       In his second claim, Redmond raises three sub-issues. First, Redmond

argues that the trial court erred by precluding him from testifying in his own
____________________________________________

damages at all. Rather, Redmond argues that the trial court erred in awarding
compensatory damages because Jordan’s counterclaim was time-barred. See
Brief for Appellant, at 34-36; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). As we discussed
supra, Redmond’s argument regarding Jordan’s counterclaim has been
waived for failing to raise it before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Importantly, other than making bald and vague statements regarding
fiduciary duties, Redmond does not cite to anything in the record or any
relevant case law to support his purported challenge to the trial court’s
compensatory damage calculations.        See McEwing, supra; see also
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Consequently, we will not review Redmond’s attempts to
re-hash the waived argument in his first claim.
21  Redmond’s eighth claim, pertaining to the trial court’s award of punitive
damages, is waived on several grounds. First, in violation of Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a), Redmond labels this claim in his argument section as “VI” and it is
titled as a challenge to the trial court’s calculation of compensatory damages.
See Brief for Appellant, at 36; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Second, despite
Redmond’s boilerplate citations to our standard of review and assertions
regarding which claims could and could not support punitive damages awards,
Redmond provides no citations to the record or any relevant case law
supporting his claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Johnson, supra.

Moreover, we observe that Redmond asserts that this claim should prevail
because Jordan’s conversion claim was time-barred. See id. at 39. However,
as we noted supra, Redmond has previously waived that challenge and we
will not address this underlying claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a).

                                          - 19 -
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defense. See Brief for Appellant, at 26-30. Second, Redmond asserts that

the trial court abused its discretion in its August 31, 2021 sanctions order

where Redmond purports he had made the reasonable request of conducting

his depositions by video. Id. Redmond contends that, at the time, the COVID-

19 pandemic was at its height and that his own counsel had already contracted

the virus. Id. In support of this claim, Redmond relies on affidavits, attached

to his post-trial motions, that his trial counsel was sick. Id. Third, Redmond

contends that the trial court erred in allowing Redmond’s previous depositions

to be entered into evidence. Id. at 29.

       Redmond’s third sub-claim, that the trial court erred in allowing previous

depositions to be entered into evidence, is waived, as he did not object to the

admission of these transcripts at trial. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Additionally,

regarding Redmond’s second sub-claim that his counsel had COVID-19, we

find this argument waived as well. Redmond relies on affidavits attached to

his December 30, 2021 post-trial motion. We find these affidavits to be an

attempt to improperly raise a new ground in a post-trial motion that should

have been raised in a timely objection pre-trial, in violation of Rule

227.1(b)(1).22 See Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b)(1) (errors not preserved by timely

pre-trial objections may not be grounds for post-trial relief).

____________________________________________

22 Moreover, as we noted supra, the transcripts of this teleconference are not

contained within the certified record and, therefore, there is nothing for us to
review. The record and Redmond’s brief are entirely silent as to where
Redmond purportedly requested remote deposition as a result of the COVID-
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J-A13017-23

       Turning to Redmond’s first sub-issue, that the trial court abused its

discretion in precluding his testimony, Redmond argues that the trial court’s

sanction had the same effect as dismissing the entire action. See Brief for

Appellant, at 26-27.

       We are mindful that, in reviewing a trial court’s imposition of sanctions

due to a party’s failure to comply with a discovery order, the imposition and

degree of the sanction is within the discretion of the trial court. Jacobs v.

Jacobs, 994 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. Super. 2005). Accordingly, this Court will

not disturb such a sanction absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

       Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4019 generally authorizes trial

courts to impose sanctions for a party’s failure to comply with a discovery

order. Rule 4019 provides, in relevant part:

       (a)(1) The court may, on motion, make an appropriate order if

          (i) a party fails to serve answers, sufficient answers[,] or
          objections to written interrogatories under Rule 4005;

                                          ***

          (iii) a person, including a person designated under Rule
          4004(a)(2) to be examined, fails to answer, answer
          sufficiently[,] or object to written interrogatories under Rule
          4004;

____________________________________________

19 pandemic. Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude that this claim was
not properly preserved.     See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Trial Court
Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 6/1/22, at 1 (concluding lack of teleconference
transcript makes review of this claim impossible where alleged facts are not
of record).

                                          - 21 -
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           (iv) a party or an officer, or managing agent of a party or a
           person designated under Rule 4007.1(e) to be examined,
           after notice under Rule 4007.1, fails to appear before the
           person who is to take the deposition;

                                      ***

           (viii) a party or person otherwise fails to make discovery or
           to obey an order of court respecting discovery.

      (c) The court, when acting under subdivision (a) of this rule, may
      make

                                      ***

           (2) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
           support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
           prohibiting such party from introducing in evidence
           designated documents, things[,] or testimony, or
           from introducing evidence of physical or mental
           condition

Pa.R.Civ.P. 4019(a)(i), (iii)-(iv), (viii), (c)(2) (emphasis added).

      However, we are mindful that “when a discovery sanction is imposed,

the sanction must be appropriate when compared to the violation of the

discovery rules.” Steinfurth v. LaManna, 590 A.2d 1286, 1288 (Pa. Super.

1991). Our Supreme Court has stated that, before determining the general

severity and vitality of a discovery sanction, we must examine the following

factors:

      (1) the prejudice, if any, endured by the non-offending party and
      the ability of the opposing party to cure any prejudice; (2) the
      non[-]complying party’s willfulness or bad faith in failing to
      provide the requested discovery materials; (3) the importance of
      the excluded evidence in light of the failure to provide the
      discovery; and (4) the number of discovery violations by the
      offending party.

                                      - 22 -
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City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 (Breary),

985 A.2d 1259, 1270 (Pa. 2009).

      In the order denying Redmond’s post-trial motion, Judge Sprecher noted

that the trial court was authorized to issue this sanction under Pa.R.Civ.P.

4019(c)(2) in light of Redmond’s dilatory and contemptuous behavior. See

Order, 3/31/22, at 1-2. We agree.

      Based upon our review of the record, summarized above, it is clear that

the trial court acted within its discretion in sanctioning Redmond. Redmond,

as we highlighted supra, routinely failed to comply with discovery orders

spanning approximately seven years of litigation. When he could no longer

delay discovery, NBOA conveniently filed bankruptcy, twice, resulting in an

automatic stay due to pending litigation in the United States Bankruptcy

Court.   See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (precluding any non-bankruptcy court,

including state and federal courts, from continuing judicial proceedings

pending against debtor). Further still, Redmond continued to fail to appear

for depositions or respond to interrogatories, even in the face of multiple trial

court orders compelling him to do the same. Redmond flagrantly disregarded

multiple discovery orders, in which he was warned that failure to comply would

prohibit him from entering testimony and evidentiary exhibits relevant to the

requested discovery. The importance of this evidence was noted by the trial

court in its numerous orders, summarized above. Accordingly, we discern no

abuse of discretion and grant Redmond no relief on this claim. See Jacobs,

supra; Pa.R.Civ.P. 4019(c)(2).

                                     - 23 -
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       In his fifth claim,23 Redmond asserts that the trial court improperly

disregarded his financial expert’s testimony. Brief for Appellant, at 33-34.

       We adhere to the following standard of review:

       Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the [trial court’s]
       exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether
       the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial
       judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
       presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
       to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
       reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is [or is
       not] against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
       assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower
       court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the
       weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in
       the interest of justice.

In re Estate of Smaling, 80 A.3d 485, 490 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc).

“The fact[-]finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence to

determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors

Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 39 (Pa. 2011). The trial court may award a new trial

“only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s

sense of justice.” Haan v. Wells, 103 A.3d 60, 69 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).    “In determining whether this standard has been met, appellate

review is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion was properly exercised,

and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose

____________________________________________

23 We note that this claim is stated as Redmond’s fifth claim in his statement

of questions involved, see Brief for Appellant, at 6-8, but is raised in
conjunction with his fourth claim in the argument section of his brief. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Despite this error, we address this claim separately as it
was adequately preserved for our review.

                                          - 24 -
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a palpable abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). When a fact-finder’s

verdict is “so opposed to the demonstrative facts that[,] looking at the verdict,

the mind stands baffled, the intellect searches in vain for cause and effect,

and reason rebels against the bizarre and erratic conclusion, it can be said

that the verdict is shocking.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, the trial court did not “disregard” the testimony of Malcolm Smith.

Rather, it expressly found Malcolm Smith’s testimony to be incredible.

Specifically, the trial court found that Redmond “used [] Smith to file tax

returns that Redmond and Smith knew were incorrect.” See Decision

and Verdict, 12/20/21, at 5 (emphasis added). Additionally, the trial court

expressly found “Smith was not a credible witness. He provided no credible

testimony in support of Redmond.         In [] many cases, his own written

correspondence contradicted his testimony.”      See id.    Upon review of the

record, we agree. “It is beyond argument that the fact-finder is free to accept

or reject the credibility of both expert and lay witnesses, and to believe all,

part[,] or none of the evidence.” Casselli v. Powlen, 937 A.2d 1137, 1139

(Pa. Super. 2007) (quotation omitted).           The trial court’s credibility

determination was supported by the record and, consequently, we may not

disturb that determination on appeal. See Estate of Smaling, supra;

Fletcher-Harlee Corp., supra. Therefore, Redmond is not entitled to relief

on this claim.

      Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not

commit an error of law or otherwise abuse its discretion.

                                     - 25 -
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     Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/29/2023

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