Court Opinion

ID: 9844612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:28.664047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.968269
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
McFADDEN, Chief Justice.
Herein, the trial court found that the initial agreement between the parties was substantially executed and the properties transferred to the respective parties by regular warranty deeds and bill of sale. Furthermore the trial court denied their claim of misrepresentation.
Prior to the time appellants executed and delivered their deed to the Lemhi County property to the respondent and accepted and recorded the deed to the Saratoga Hotel executed by respondent, they were in a position to first have demanded compliance with the provisions of the contract for a new bulk sales affidavit, abstract of title showing good marketable title, and to have proceeded with the processing of the increase of the loan secured by the mortgage on the Lemhi County property. After consultation with the attorney representing them during the transaction, (an attorney other than those representing them on this appeal, who were not in anyway connected with the preliminary negotiations, execution of the agreement, or delivery and recording of the deeds), they determined to record the deed to the Sara-toga Hotel. This they did for the stated purpose of avoiding other liens being filed, which is indicative of an intent to accept the title. By this action of accepting and recording the deed to the Hotel and delivering the deed to the Lemhi County property, they eliminated their ability to comply with the provisions of the contract for the increase of the loan, and they cannot now be heard to complain in that regard.
The trial court by its findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree, in addition to denying appellants’ claim for rescission of the contract on the asserted grounds of misrepresentation, also found and concluded that the agreement was executed by acceptance and recording of the deed. Under such circumstances where the deed had been delivered and the vendee is in possession, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, the purchaser is relegated to this action for damages for defects in the ven*393dor’s title. Johnson v. Green, 54 So.2d 44 (Fla.1951) ; James v. Jacobsen, 93 Ga.App. 233, 91 S.E.2d 527 (1956) ; Nixon v. Franklin, 289 S.W.2d 82 (Mo.1956); 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 161b, p. 1122; Annot: 50 A.L.R. 180. Herein, the court awarded appellant damages, and properly-denied equitable relief by way of rescission.
Appellants orally amended their complaint to allege the corporation was not authorized to do business in Idaho, by reason of its failure to file its articles of incorporation in Canyon County. As previously pointed out, appellants were estopped to deny its corporate authority to transact business. Appellants also cited and relied upon the provisions of § 30-108. Subsection (4) thereof bars a noncomplying corporation from maintaining or defending an action in relation to real property. The amendment to the complaint denying the corporate authority to transact business did not present the issue of its right to defend the action, or pursue its counter-claim, which issue should have been presented by pleading or motion under I.R.C.P. § 12(b).
The petition for rehearing is denied on June 7, 1966.
TAYLOR and SMITH, JJ., concur.
KNUDSON, J., sat at the argument but retired from office prior to the decision.