Court Opinion

ID: 9410729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 07:07:52.121184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:00.010154
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued July 20, 2023

                                     In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                               NO. 01-23-00206-CR
                           ———————————
           EX PARTE JOSE ANGEL GONZALEZ-RODRIGUEZ

                   On Appeal from the 268th District Court
                          Fort Bend County, Texas
                    Trial Court Case No. 23-DCR-102451

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Jose Angel Gonzalez-Rodriguez appeals the trial court’s order

denying his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant contends that

he is unlawfully detained in the Fort Bend County Jail without probable cause and

because of an unlawful, federal immigration detainer. We affirm.
                                      Background

      In February 2023, appellant was arrested on three charges—possession of a

controlled substance (felony), possession of marijuana (misdemeanor), and

furnishing alcohol to a minor (misdemeanor)—and detained in the Fort Bend County

Jail. The United States Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs

Enforcement Office (ICE) lodged an immigration detainer against appellant. The

immigration detainer states that probable cause exists to believe appellant is a

“removable alien” and asks the jail to (1) notify ICE of appellant’s release date and

(2) hold appellant for up to 48 hours after his release, to give ICE time to assume

custody. The immigration detainer also instructs that appellant “must be served

with a copy of this form for the detainer to take effect.”1 (Emphasis in original.)

      Appellant applied for a pretrial habeas writ, seeking release because probable

cause did not exist to hold him for any offense or under the immigration detainer.

Before the habeas hearing, a grand jury indicted appellant for possession of a

controlled substance, and the State declined to prosecute the two misdemeanor

offenses. The State argued, among other things, that these developments mooted the

probable cause question, and that appellant is not confined by the immigration

1
      The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “a law enforcement agency
      that has custody of a person subject to an immigration detainer . . . shall: (1) comply
      with, honor, and fulfill any request made in the detainer request provided by the
      federal government; and (2) inform the person that the person is being held pursuant
      to an immigration detainer[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2.251(a).
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detainer because it does not take effect until he is released from the state’s custody.

Appellant replied that, even if the returned indictment established probable cause to

detain him for possession of a controlled substance, the trial court should grant

habeas corpus relief from the immigration detainer because it was ineffective absent

service and a warrant showing probable cause to believe he is subject to deportation.

He asserted: “the ICE Hold is invalid; and [the trial court] must cancel it.”

      After a hearing, the trial court denied appellant habeas corpus relief,2 finding:

      • probable cause existed to detain appellant based on his indictment for
        possession of a controlled substance;

      • no evidence showed appellant met the bail requirements for release on that
        offense;

      • appellant was not confined on the two misdemeanor charges the State
        declined to prosecute;

      • it had no authority over the immigration detainer;

      • the immigration detainer reflected ICE’s determination that there is
        probable cause to believe appellant is a removable alien; and

      • neither party provided any legal authority establishing “a mandatory time
        period within which a person in custody subject to an immigration detainer
        must be informed of [the] detainer.”

2
      During this appeal, letters from this Court addressed to appellant in jail were
      returned to the Court as undeliverable and marked “NO LONGER HERE.” By
      order, this Court inquired whether appellant had been released from custody and
      asked appellant’s counsel to file a supplemental clerk’s record containing any
      release order. No response or supplemental clerk’s record suggesting appellant’s
      release from custody was filed.
                                          3
                                         Analysis

       Appellant asked the trial court for pretrial habeas relief based on a lack of

probable cause for his continued detention and the alleged illegality of the

immigration detainer.

       1. Probable cause

       Before a petitioner is indicted, he may use a pretrial habeas writ to litigate

probable cause to restrain him. Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 & n.9 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005) (per curiam). But a returned indictment establishes probable cause

as a matter of law and moots any issue on its existence. Ex parte Plumb, 595 S.W.2d

544, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Golden v. State, 288 S.W.3d 516, 518

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d). Because here a grand jury has

indicted appellant for possession of a controlled substance, probable cause exists to

restrain him, and he is not entitled to a pretrial habeas writ on that basis. See Ex parte

Branch, 553 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Golden, 288 S.W.3d at 518.

       2. Immigration detainer

       Appellant argued in the trial court that even if probable cause exists to keep

him in jail until the trial on the possession charge, he is still entitled to pretrial habeas

relief from the immigration detainer. According to appellant, it is “immaterial”

whether he is lawfully restrained on the possession charge because “[o]ne lawful

detainer does not make another detainer lawful.” And he asserts the immigration

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detainer “confines” him within the meaning of the habeas statute and is unlawful

because (1) it lacks a warrant and (2) he was not served with a copy. In appellant’s

view, he can use a pretrial writ in state court to secure relief on the legality of a

federal immigration detainer, even before he is released from the state’s criminal

custody and subject to any 48-hour holding period. We disagree.

      The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner’s

current detention. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.01. A pretrial habeas writ,

followed by an interlocutory appeal, is an extraordinary remedy. Ex parte Ingram,

533 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Thus, it is reserved for when

resolution of a legal issue in the applicant’s favor will result in his immediate release.

Ex parte Ingram, 533 S.W.3d at 892; cf. Ex parte Alba, 256 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008) (“‘The function of a writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the

legality of the particular restraint being then imposed upon the petitioner. It is not to

inquire into the validity of some future restraint that may or may not be imposed.’”).

      In support of his contention that he is in custody because of the immigration

detainer, appellant cites Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345 (1973). There, the United

States Supreme Court considered whether a person released on his own recognizance

is “in custody” within the meaning of the federal habeas statute. Id. at 345. The

petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor, sentenced to one year in jail, and then

released on his own recognizance under an order staying execution of his sentence.

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Id. at 347. Under the state law, he had to appear when ordered or else be apprehended

and returned to custody. Id. at 348. The Court determined that the applicant, though

not imprisoned in a jail, was in custody for habeas purposes:

      First, he is subject to restraints ‘not shared by the public generally,’ that
      is, the obligation to appear ‘at all times and places as ordered’ by ‘(a)ny
      court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction.’ He cannot come and go
      as he pleases. His freedom of movement rests in the hands of state
      judicial officers, who may demand his presence at any time and without
      a moment’s notice. . . .

      Second, petitioner remains at large only by the grace of a stay entered
      first by the state trial court and then extended by two Justices of this
      Court. The State has emphatically indicated its determination to put him
      behind bars, and the State has taken every possible step to secure that
      result. His incarceration is not, in other words, a speculative possibility
      that depends on a number of contingencies over which he has no
      control. This is not a case where the unfolding of events may render the
      entire controversy academic. The petitioner has been forced to fend off
      the state authorities by means of a stay, and those authorities retain the
      determination and the power to seize him as soon as the obstacle of the
      stay is removed. The need to keep the stay in force is itself an unusual
      and substantial impairment of his liberty.
Id. at 351–52.

      Appellant correctly points out that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has

agreed with Hensley that a person may be “in custody” for habeas purposes even if

he is not detained within a jail’s four walls. See, e.g., Ex parte Clear, 573 S.W.2d

224, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (stating that “one may be ‘in custody’ for habeas

corpus purposes even though he is out of jail on bond or his own personal bond,”

and that in such cases, “the issue is whether the relator has been subjected to

                                           6
restraints on his liberty not shared by the public generally”); Ex parte Trillo, 540

S.W.2d 728, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (same), overruled on other grounds by

Aguilar v. State, 621 S.W.2d 781, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see also Ex parte

Snodgrass, 65 S.W. 1061, 1062 (Tex. Crim. App. 1901) (“The words ‘confined,’

‘imprisoned,’ ‘in custody,’ ‘confinement,’ ‘imprisonment,’ refer not only to the

actual, corporeal and forcible detention of person, but likewise to any and all

coercive measures by threats, menaces or the fear of injury whereby one person

exercises control over the person of another and detains him within certain limits.”).

      In each of these cases, the courts considered habeas applications filed by

persons out on bail or bond and subject to conditions for reporting and appearance.

See, e.g., Hensley, 411 U.S. at 347 (applicant released on his own recognizance); Ex

parte Clear, 573 S.W.2d at 229 (applicant out on bail); Ex parte Trillo, 540 S.W.2d

at 731 (applicant released on personal bond); Ex parte Snodgrass, 65 S.W. at 1061

(applicant out on bail). Appellant asserts the immigration detainer satisfies the

definition of “custody” or “confinement” applied in these cases because it is a

restraint not shared by the public. But he has cited no case in which an applicant for

habeas relief under Texas’s statute, lawfully restrained on a pending state charge,

challenged a federal immigration detainer before being released from state custody.

                                          7
      Even putting aside questions about whether a Texas court can invalidate a

federal immigration detainer,3 none of appellant’s arguments in the trial court

convince us that appellant is entitled to immediate release if he is correct about the

detainer’s legality. Appellant is detained because the returned indictment establishes

probable cause to hold him in state custody pending his trial on the possession

charge. See Ex parte Branch, 553 S.W.2d at 381; Golden, 288 S.W.3d at 518. Thus,

even assuming without deciding that the immigration detainer is defective absent a

warrant and proper service, appellant would not be entitled to immediate release.

And as stated, “pretrial habeas is not available when the question presented, even if

resolved in the defendant’s favor, would not result in immediate release.” Ex parte

Ingram, 533 S.W.3d at 891.

      Appellant argued in the trial court that a different conclusion is compelled by

the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335

3
      See In re Wiles, No. 08-18-0177-CR, 2019 WL 1810756, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—El
      Paso Apr. 24, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for
      publication) (granting mandamus relief from bond order requiring sheriff to ignore
      ICE detainer because Texas statute required sheriff to honor detainer and trial court
      had no “express, implied, or inherent authority” to order defendant’s release); cf.
      DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976), superseded by statute on other grounds
      as recognized in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 404 (2012) (“Power to regulate
      immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”); Ricketts v. Palm
      Beach Cnty. Sheriff, 985 So.2d 591, 592–93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding
      appellant could not secure habeas relief from state court on legality of his federal
      detainer because “area of immigration and naturalization is within the exclusive
      jurisdiction of federal courts” and thus constitutionality of detainer was “a question
      of law for the federal courts”).

                                            8
(1968) (per curiam). In Walker, the habeas petitioner was convicted of murder and

sentenced to life in prison. Id. at 335. Five years later, he was convicted of

aggravated assault and sentenced to five years, to begin when he completed his

murder sentence. Id. The petitioner sought in a writ on the murder conviction in

federal court, which the federal courts refused because a favorable decision on the

murder conviction would not result in his immediate release. Id. at 336. The Supreme

Court disagreed, holding:

      Whatever its other functions, the great and central office of the writ of
      habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner’s current detention.
      The petitioner is now serving a life sentence imposed pursuant to a
      conviction for murder. If, as he contends, that conviction was obtained
      in violation of the Constitution, then his confinement is unlawful. It is
      immaterial that another prison term might still await him even if he
      should successfully establish the unconstitutionality of his present
      imprisonment.

Id. at 336–37.

      Federal courts following Walker have concluded that a failure to allege and

establish the right to immediate release is no longer a basis for denial of relief under

the federal habeas statute. See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968);

Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th Cir. 2009). But here, appellant seeks

relief under the Texas habeas statute, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

continues to use the immediate release rule in determining the availability of habeas

                                           9
relief under that statute.4 See, e.g., Ex parte Hammons, 631 S.W.3d 715, 716 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2021) (per curiam); Ex parte Ingram, 533 S.W.3d at 892; see also Ex

parte Estrada, 573 S.W.3d 884, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no

pet.) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals has limited the use of pretrial habeas

applications to issues that would result in immediate release . . . .”). Given that the

immediate release rule applies, we do not reach the merits of appellant’s arguments

on lack of service or a separate probable cause warrant.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s application for a pretrial writ

of habeas corpus.

                                                Sarah Beth Landau
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Rivas-Molloy.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

4
      The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has cited Walker only once, quoting its
      general statement of a habeas writ’s purpose as support for Texas courts’ refusal to
      grant habeas relief on abstract propositions. Ex parte Alba, 256 S.W.3d 682, 686
      (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

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