Court Opinion

ID: 9895493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 16:01:36.655366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:52.913883
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-3472
                        ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                                   Joshua Sweat

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
                                  ____________

                         Submitted: September 18, 2023
                           Filed: November 7, 2023
                                 [Unpublished]
                                ____________

Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Joshua Sweat photographed the genitalia of a young child that he occasionally
babysat. Sweat then sent the photographs to a man he met on the internet. Sweat was
charged with, and pleaded guilty to, one count of production of child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). The district court1 sentenced him to
three hundred months’ (twenty-five years) imprisonment and a lifetime term of
supervised release. On appeal, Sweat argues that the district court did not give
adequate weight to his disabilities, resulting in a substantively unreasonable
sentence.

        We review the substantive reasonableness of Sweat’s sentence for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (stating standard of review). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1)
‘fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight’; (2)
‘gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor’; or (3) ‘considers only
the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of
judgment.’” Id. at 461 (quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir.
2009)).

       Sweat faced an advisory Guidelines sentence of life imprisonment, but a
statutory range of fifteen to thirty years. In imposing Sweat’s sentence, the district
court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and explained why a twenty-five-
year sentence was appropriate. As aggravating factors, the court discussed the nature
and circumstances of the offense, as well as the need for Sweat’s sentence to afford
adequate deterrence and to protect the public. The court also addressed the
mitigating factors—Sweat’s “personal nature and characteristics.” The district court
observed that Sweat’s “mental and emotional deficits mitigate just how responsible”
he is and explained why these deficits gave the court “a reason to vary, not in a large
way, but . . . a reason to vary down from what otherwise would be a 30-year
sentence.”

      These were proper and relevant factors to consider. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The district court was within its discretion to weigh them as it did. See United States

      1
        The Honorable Lee F. Rudofsky, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
                                      -2-
v. Frenchone One Horn, 62 F.4th 461, 463–64 (8th Cir. 2023) (observing that a
district court has wide latitude, while weighing relevant factors, to give more weight
to the nature and circumstances of the offense, and less to the defendant’s mitigating
characteristics). And the district court properly explained why, even considering
Sweat’s impairments, it rejected his bid for an even greater downward variance. See
id. at 463 (“[W]here the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for
imposing a different sentence, . . . the judge will normally go further and explain
why he has rejected those arguments.” (quoting United States v. Kay, 717 F.3d 659,
663 (8th Cir. 2013))).

       Sweat also challenges the Sentencing Guidelines, and their application here,
on policy grounds. He argues that the Guidelines “reflexively” place defendants like
him at or near the statutory maximum, which eliminates any meaningful distinction
among offenders with varying degrees of culpability. “[A] district court ‘may
disregard the child pornography sentencing guideline on policy grounds, [but it] is
not required to do so.’” United States v. Burns, 834 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir. 2016)
(quoting United States v. Black, 670 F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2012)). Here, the district
court considered, but largely disagreed with, Sweat’s policy argument. That decision
was within its institutional discretion, and we owe it substantial deference. See Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51–52 (2007); Burns, 834 F.3d at 889 (“[O]ur
appellate role is limited to determining the substantive reasonableness of a specific
sentence where the advisory guidelines range was determined in accordance with
[the applicable Guideline].” (first quoting United States v. Shuler, 598 F.3d 444, 448
(8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 975 (2010); and then citing United States v.
Muhlenbruch, 682 F.3d 1096, 1102 (8th Cir. 2012))).

      Because the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable
sentence, see Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461–62, we affirm.
                      ______________________________

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