Court Opinion

ID: 9658796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:14:28.296342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:59.600768
License: Public Domain

Carter, Wenke, and Boslatjgh, JJ.,
dissenting:
*765This is a prosecution on a charge of rape. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve 3 years in the penitentiary. We are in agreement with what is said in the opinion affirming the judgment except as it relates to the sufficiency of the cautionary instruction given and the overruling of Reynolds v. State, 27 Neb. 90, 42 N. W. 903, 20 Am. S. R. 659.
The defendant requested a cautionary instruction which in part stated: “The charge made against the defendant is in its nature a most heinous one and well calculated to create strong prejudice against the accused, and the attention of the jury is directed to the difficulty, growing out of the nature of the unusual circumstances connected with the commission of such a crime, in defending against the accusation of rape.” The trial court refused to give this portion of the tendered instruction and purported to cover the subject by an instruction reading as follows: “Consider the importance of your function as jurors. You are the sole judges of the facts. Your decision on these facts is final. Thus, your position is of grave importance in the proper functioning of the court in the administration of justice. Your primary desire must be to reach a fair and just conclusion only from facts and circumstances in evidence. A consideration of facts and circumstances in evidence excludes sympathy or prejudice in reaching a conclusion. It includes, however, a careful application by you of all the law contained in these instructions. Thus, it will be your duty to read these instructions after you retire and to use them as a guide in all your deliberations. Let your verdict reflect a deliberate judgment free from any influence other than the law and all facts and circumstances in evidence.” We find no fault with this instruction as far as it goes. In our opinion, however, it does not cover the purpose of the requested instruction to which the defendant is entitled under the law of this state where a proper request is made therefor.
We submit that the instruction given by the trial court *766does not contain the substance of the rejected instruction. It fails to cautibn the jury that prejudice was liable-to be aroused against the accused because of the heinous nature of the crime charged in the information, or to call attention to the difficulty growing out of the nature- and unusual incidents of the crime of defending against an accusation of rape, however innocent the defendant may be. In Reynolds v. State, supra, the court said: “The fact that the charge itself will frequently raise a clamor among ignorant and easily biased persons has been recognized by fair-minded judges and law writers from’ the time of Chief Justice Hale, at least, until the present time. * * * He (Chief Justice Hale) says: T only mention these instances that we may be more cautious upon trials of offenses of this nature, wherein the court and jury may with so much ease be imposed upon without great care and vigilance.’ ” The refusal to give such an instruction upon request has constituted prejudicial error in this state since Reynolds v. State, supra, adopted in 1889. The lack of cases dealing with the rule-in this state evidences its general application and acceptance over the years.
We point out that although the testimony of a prosecutrix must be corroborated to some extent, yet essential elements of the crime are necessarily supported only by her uncorroborated testimony. Many reasons exist, why such uncorroborated evidence should be most carefully scrutinized and the jury cautioned about permitting prejudice to creep into their deliberations. It is a fact, well known to fair-minded judges and lawyers,, and others as well, that the evidence of a prosecutrix in this type of case is often influenced by a stricken conscience, a fear of inquiry and discovery, or possible pregnancy. Arguments of counsel are not ordinarily effective in securing for the defendant the careful and impartial consideration of such evidence to which he is-entitled. An instruction by the court is much more likely to do so. The rule is one for the protection of the inno*767cent and can afford no comfort to the guilty. The overruling of Reynolds v. State, supra, insofar as it conflicts with the present case, eliminates the necessity for giving any such cautionary instruction in the future, with or without request. It, in fact, has the effect of eliminating any necessity for a cautionary instruction in any type of case under any and all circumstances, whether réquested or not. It destroys the beneficent purposes of a rulé bordering on a substantial right in this type of case, which has stood as a protection to the innocent for almost 70 years. No reason is given in the opinion for this departure from the time-honored rule. For aught the opinion shows, there has been no consolidation of thought or reason by the majority as to why this landmark of the criminal law of this state should be so inconsiderately stricken down. No change of condition is pointed out, no failure of its purpose noted.
We submit that such changes in our criminal law for the asserted reason that the refusal of the tendered instruction does no prejudicial harm to the defendant is a mere speculation as to what effect the jury might have given to it. In determining that the refusal could have no prejudicial effect upon the jury, the court usurps the duty of the jury to apply it to the evidence. It amounts to a declaration that trial courts may hereafter with impunity disregard the substantial rights of a defendant in this type of case. This long-established rule had for its objective the protection of the innocent against prejudice and resulting injustice. It conforms to the purposes of the law to see that justice is done in all cases and to alleviate the danger that innocent persons may suffer because the jury may be swayed by matters inducing other than a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence' before it. The abrogation of the rule, in our opinon, is a backward step in the development of the judicial process and can only result in less assurance of a fair and impartial trial in this type of case.
*768We have searched the record in vain for evidence that the requested instruction was otherwise covered by the trial court in his instructions to the jury. We find nothing that even remotely refers thereto. The refusal to give the requested instruction is not cured by other instructions, either singly or as a whole. We unqualifiedly reject any contention made that the instructions as a whole were sufficient or that their sufficiency in other respects can by any process of reasoning justify an affirmance of the present case.
We submit that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to give the requested cautionary instruction, and that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.