Court Opinion

ID: 2964612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:28:16.796381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:31.217905
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1224

                                 DARLENE F. MORRISON,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                    CARLETON WOOLEN MILLS, INC. and MICHAEL RILEY,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                   [Hon. Eugene W. Beaulieu, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                             _____________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                         and Boyle,* Senior District Judge. 
                                     _____________________

                                 ____________________

            David  J.  Kerman  with  whom  Robert  Lewis  and Jackson,  Lewis,
            _________________              _____________      ________________
        Schnitzler & Krupman were on briefs for appellants.
        ____________________
            Peter B. Bickerman with  whom Robert J. Stolt, Walter F. McKee and
            __________________            _______________  _______________
        Lipman & Katz, P.A. were on brief for appellee.
        ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                    March 19, 1997
                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

        *Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.

                      CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.   These appeals and
                                ____________________

            cross-appeals relate  to actions heard in  the district court

            arising from  federal and state claims  of sexual harassment,

            sex  discrimination, and disability discrimination brought by

            Darlene  F.  Morrison  against her  employer  Carleton Woolen

            Mills,  Inc. (the  "Company"),  and two  of her  supervisors,

            Michael Riley and Lee Moody.  We affirm certain parts of  the

            district court's judgment and reverse others.

                                          I.

                      In  Count  I  of  her  amended  complaint, Morrison

            alleged  that she  was subjected  by  Carleton and  the other

            defendants to  sexual harassment,  in violation of  the Maine

            Human  Rights Act,  5 M.R.S.A.    4551, and Title  VII of the

            Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.   2000e et seq.  In Count
                                                        __ ___

            II,  she alleged  violation  of the  same  state and  federal

            statutes  by reason of sex discrimination.  In Counts III and

            IV,  Morrison alleged  that defendants  had subjected  her to

            discrimination on account of  disability, in violation of the

            Maine Human  Rights Act  and the Americans  with Disabilities

            Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C.   12101 et seq.  
                                                       __ ___

                      Trial before a jury began  in the district court on

            October  4, 1994.1  The Title VII claims of sexual harassment

                                
            ____________________

            1.   By consent  of the parties,  a United States  Magistrate
            Judge  presided   over  the   jury  trial   and  subsequently
            determined the various  non-jury issues.  28 U.S.C.    636(c)
            (West 1993).

                                         -2-

            (Count  I) and  sex (gender)  discrimination (Count  II) were

            presented to the jury  but only insofar as these  claims were

            based upon conduct  occurring on or after  November 21, 1991,

            the  effective  date  of the  1991  Civil  Rights  Act.   See
                                                                      ___

            Landgraf v. USI  Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).  The ADA
            ________    __________________

            disability  discrimination  claim  (Count  IV)  was  likewise

            presented to the  jury.   However, the Maine  law claims  for

            sexual   harassment,   sex   discrimination  and   disability

            discrimination, and the Title VII claims for pre-November 21,

            1991  conduct did not go to the jury but rather were reserved

            for later decision by the magistrate judge.

                      During the  jury trial, the court, upon defendants'

            motion, dismissed as a matter of law all the claims (jury and

            non-jury) against Moody and many of the claims against Riley,

            to  wit, the  claims  for sexual  harassment (Count  I) after

            November 21, 1991, for sex discrimination (Count II), and for

            disability  discrimination (Counts  III and  IV).   The court

            denied the  Company's motions  to dismiss the  claims against

            itself.

                      On October 14, 1994,  the jury returned verdicts in

            Morrison's  favor on  her  Title VII  post-November 21,  1991

            sexual  harassment claim  (Count  I) and  her ADA  disability

            claim  (Count IV).    The jury  awarded  Morrison $50,000  in

            compensatory damages  and $100,000 in punitive  damages.  The

                                         -3-

            jury  found against Morrison, and in favor of the Company, on

            her Title VII gender discrimination claim (Count II).

                      On April 10, 1995,  the court issued its Memorandum

            of Decision deciding the non-jury claims that it had reserved

            for  bench determination.  On  Count I, the  court found that

            Morrison had been subjected to sexual harassment sufficiently

            severe  and pervasive  to create  a hostile  work environment

            prior  to  November  21,  1991.   Consequently,  it  ruled in

            Morrison's favor, and against  the Company and Riley, on  her

            Maine  law sexual harassment claim, and also on her Title VII

            sexual  harassment claim  for conduct  prior to  November 21,

            1991.  The court  assessed a civil penalty for  $10,000 under

            state law.  5 M.R.S.A.   4613(2)(B)(7) (West Supp. 1996).

                      On Count II (gender discrimination) the court found

            no  incidents  of gender  discrimination before  November 21,

            1991.   It, therefore, ruled  in favor of  the defendants and

            against  Morrison under  Title  VII.   The court  determined,

            however     contrary to the jury's Title VII verdict    that,

            after  November  21, 1991,  Morrison  had  been subjected  to

            gender discrimination,  finding the Company liable  under the

            Maine Human  Rights Act.2   The  court declined,  however, to

                                
            ____________________

            2.    In making  this finding,  the court  specifically noted
            that,  in differing  with  the jury,  it  did not  intend  to
            suggest that  the jury lacked sufficient  evidence from which
            to conclude  contrary to the  court's findings.   "The  Court
            simply  disagrees  with  the  jury's  conclusion  in  certain
            respects."

                                         -4-

            award  her back pay, because  it would be  duplicative of the

            jury's damages award.

                      Finally, as to Count III, the court determined that

            plaintiff had  not been disabled within the  meaning of Maine

            law, and hence  found against Morrison and  for defendants on

            the Maine law disability claim.  In determining that Morrison

            was not disabled, the  court found that the Company  "did not

            perceive her to be  unable to perform a major  life activity,

            specifically  work."   The court  noted that the  Company had

            only perceived Morrison as incapable of performing the single

            position of floorperson.

                      Defendants'  post-trial motions  for judgment  as a

            matter of law, for  new trial, and other relief  were denied.

            Plaintiff's own motion for new trial was also denied.

                      The Company and  Riley appeal, and Morrison  cross-

            appeals, from  the judgment  and the  rulings on the  various

            motions  below.   Morrison  has  since  expressly waived  her

            cross-appeal from  the jury's adverse verdict  under Count II

            (gender discrimination).

                                         II.

                      The evidence at trial,  construed in the light most

            favorable to Morrison, showed essentially the following.

                      On  August  23, 1983,  Morrison  was  hired by  the

            Company to  work as a  "spinner" in the  spinning department.

            Later that year, Morrison bid on and was awarded the position

                                         -5-

            of "sewer."   Months later,  she bid on  and was  awarded the

            position  of  "coner"  in  the  yarn preparation  department.

            Morrison held  this position  from approximately May  of 1984

            until January of 1987.  All the positions held by Morrison up

            to this time were traditionally filled by female employees.

                      In December  1986, Morrison bid on  the position of

            "temporary  floorperson"  on  the  third shift  in  the  yarn

            preparation  department.  At  this time, Riley  was the shift

            supervisor  on  the  third  shift  in  the  yarn  preparation

            department.  Riley was angry with Morrison for bidding on the

            floorperson position.   Prior to December  1986, Morrison had

            once  had an angry encounter with Riley when they both worked

            on the second shift.   Riley had screamed at her  for leaving

            her machine to go to the restroom.

                      A month later,  Morrison was awarded the  temporary

            floorperson  position.  As  shift supervisor,  Riley approved

            her transfer  to the position and  certified her satisfactory

            completion of the  thirty-day probationary period.   However,

            he had no  discretion under the  Company's contract with  the

            Union to  refuse  a position  to  the most  senior  qualified

            person who bid on it, which, in this case, was Morrison.

                      When Morrison told Fred DeVaudreuil, the department

            supervisor and  Riley's superior,  that she had  been awarded

            the floorperson  position, he asked her  to reconsider taking

            it.   He indicated that  the Company  was not happy  with her

                                         -6-

            getting the job.   Morrison  believed that  he was  concerned

            thatshewould beinjured andassured himthatshe wouldbe careful.

                      In April 1987,  seven female employees  of Carleton

            filed a formal grievance against  Riley, charging that he was

            harassing employees  at the Company by  yelling, making false

            accusations  and   threatening  their  jobs.     The  Company

            responded by  stating  that it  did not  condone shouting  by

            anyone, but that employees  must recognize that they are  not

            at liberty "to ignore management directives or to be tardy in

            following them."   Ultimately,  this  grievance was  resolved

            informally, with Plant Manager  Everett Owens advising  Riley

            about the need to be more "low key." 

                      In  February 1988,  Morrison bid  on the  permanent

            opening  for the position of floorperson  on the third shift.

            Once again,  Riley became  very angry, telling  Morrison that

            the job  was not for her,  and that she was  taking jobs away

            from men.   Days after  Morrison was awarded  the floorperson

            bid, Riley told her that she was going to regret it, and that

            sooner or later he was going to get her out of the job.

                      The floorperson  is responsible for  bringing boxes

            of  yarn on bobbins to the machine operators, for taking full

            cones  of  yarn, weighing  them  and  storing them,  and  for

            changing the warp  beams.   Changing a warp  beam, which  can

            weigh  up to 1,100 pounds when full of yarn, involves several

                                         -7-

            steps.   First, the warp  is removed from  its cradle  with a

            crow-bar type of tool.  The warp then drops about two inches,

            after which it must be rolled to where it can be picked up by

            a hydraulic lift and moved into a storage area.

                      Morrison remained in the floorperson position until

            March  of 1989.  During that  time various incidents occurred

            that are relevant to the present action.

                      After changing  a warp beam, Morrison  went to wash

            her hands.  When  she left the restroom moments  later, Riley

            was waiting for her.  He accused her of being in the restroom

            for a long time and threatened to write her up.

                      Riley  took  Morrison   into  the  plant  manager's

            office.  He then told her that he was a big person within the

            Company and that "any woman would be proud to have a man in a

            position like this."

                      Several female employees  complained that the  room

            was too hot because of the machinery.  They asked Riley if he

            could open more of the ceiling vents.  Riley said he  thought

            that they were just having "hot flashes", and walked away.

                      Riley threatened  to fire  Morrison if she  did not

            drive  his  girlfriend  (and future  wife)  and  co-employee,

            Juanita Courtney, to her house from work during her shift.

                      Riley  told several  people in  Morrison's presence

            that the  other female floorperson,  Linda Paul, was  able to

                                         -8-

            stay in such  a position  because she and  Moody patted  each

            other on the rearend.

                      Morrison reported a  problem with a box  of yarn to

            Riley, who told her she was probably so dumb she  created the

            problem herself.

                      Riley told Morrison that Courtney was pregnant.  He

            said "you thought  I was too old, didn't  you", and "I showed

            you."

                      In March 1989, Morrison  accepted a position as the

            medical clerk for  the Company  nurse, Lucille  Turner.   Two

            months later, Morrison  decided that she wanted to  return to

            her former position.

                      In October 1989, Morrison bid on a temporary coner,

            fixer and tender ("fixer") position.  Riley flew into a rage,

            telling Morrison  that she was  "stepping out of  bounds" and

            that "her place was in the kitchen."

                      Thereafter,  Morrison  bid  on  a  permanent  fixer

            position.  Riley told her fellow workers that if she got  the

            job, she would have to travel to a training seminar and share

            a  motel room with Moody  and another male  worker.  Morrison

            voided her bid  in an  effort to stop  speculation about  the

            seminar, and returned to her floorperson position.

                      In  June 1990, a  first shift  floorperson, William

            Rogers,  asked Morrison to swap shifts with him.  Even though

            Riley  had moved to the  first shift, Morrison  agreed to the

                                         -9-

            switch.  Riley told Morrison that he "was not going to put up

            with any bullshit on the first shift" and that he "had enough

            bitches in  the first shift."   Riley also called a  male co-

            worker  over to where he and Morrison were standing and began

            patting him in  the rearend, and told her that she would have

            to get used to such behavior in the first shift.

                      Riley and  Moody moved their desk  near the women's

            restroom, explaining that they wanted  to watch the usage  of

            the restroom so that  they could write female workers  up for

            abusing  the  privilege of  using the  restroom.   Also, they

            regularly made comments about  Morrison bending over boxes to

            the point where she felt very uncomfortable having to do so.

                      Other incidents occurred between the spring of 1990

            and the fall of 1991.

                      Riley handed  Morrison a  piece of paper,  which he

            said was an  application for  a fixer position.   She  turned

            over  the paper and discovered, to her annoyance, that it was

            entitled "Application for a Piece of Ass."  

                      Riley gave  Morrison an ink-blot that, when folded,

            depicted various  sexual acts involving persons  and animals.

            He called her  a "dumb  broad" for being  unable to  properly

            fold it, after  which he folded it for her.   Morrison became

            very upset and called Riley a "filthy pig."

                      Riley told Morrison that  Moody wanted to do "funny

            things" to her  body, although Moody later denied ever making

                                         -10-

            such  a  comment.    On another  occasion,  Moody  approached

            Morrison and told her that he would like to see her naked.

                      Moody handed Morrison a document entitled "Canadian

            Condom  Marketing  Board", which  contained sexually-oriented

            attempts at humor.   Morrison  asked Moody why  he was  doing

            this,  and he replied something  to the effect  that he takes

            his orders from the office.

                      Riley  asked Morrison if she knew what a man with a

            ten-inch penis eats for breakfast.  When she did not respond,

            he proceeded to tell her what he had eaten for breakfast.

                      Riley  gave Morrison a  document entitled "Proposed

            Restroom Policy."   This  document, another crude  attempt at

            humor, informed employees that  if they occupied the bathroom

            stalls  for more  than  three minutes,  certain events  would

            occur,  including  the taking  of  their  photographs in  the

            stalls.

                      Riley regularly screamed and hollered at the  women

            employees in  the yarn preparation department, but not at the

            men.  If any  of the women indicated that they might complain

            about  his behavior, he would tell them "pay-back's a bitch."

                      During this  period of time, Morrison  went, on two

            occasions, to  the office  of Annette McGowan,  the Company's

            personnel  manager,  to   complain  about  Riley's  harassing

            behavior.  On  neither occasion was Morrison allowed to speak

                                         -11-

            with  McGowan.   McGowan's secretary  told Morrison  that she

            would  not be allowed to see McGowan without her supervisor's

            permission,  even  though  Morrison  informed  her  that  her

            complaint was about Riley, her supervisor.

                      In May 1991, Morrison injured her shoulder at work.

            She  kept   working,  but   was  eventually   diagnosed  with

            tendinitis,  and told  to take  ibuprofen and  learn  to pace

            herself.

                      In October 1991, Morrison  injured her back at home

            while  she was making her bed.  Morrison went to the Belgrade

            Regional  Health  Center  where  she  saw  Gretchen  Hill,  a

            registered  nurse-practitioner.    Hill found  that  Morrison

            appeared  to have  a lower lumbar  muscle strain  without any

            disc problems.   Hill  informed Turner, the  Company's nurse,

            that Morrison would be absent for one week.  

                      Morrison  returned to see Hill  one week later.  By

            that time, the pain was  gone, although she was  experiencing

            some stiffness.   Hill  was considering allowing  Morrison to

            return to work, so she called Turner again.  Turner suggested

            that Morrison should be kept out of work  for two more weeks,

            a suggestion that Hill accepted.

                      On November 8, 1991,  Hill issued Morrison a return

            to  work slip  for full  activity.   Hill testified  that she

            would  have preferred Morrison to work  in a limited capacity

            for a short period of time,  but she felt that Morrison could

                                         -12-

            successfully return to  work without restriction.   Following

            another  conversation with Turner,  Hill wrote a  new note on

            November 13, 1991, which suggested that Morrison be placed on

            light  duty work  from November 11  through November  22, and

            then return to regular duty.

                      Turner and  McGowan met with Morrison  and informed

            her that the Company had no light duty work available at  the

            time.   McGowan then  offered Morrison the  option of bidding

            into a  different position, or accepting a layoff slip, which

            would entitle her to unemployment benefits.  Morrison did not

            want  to lose  her floorperson  seniority  by bidding  into a

            different position, so she accepted the layoff.

                      Morrison believed that she had medical clearance to

            return  to regular duty after  November 22, 1991,  and so, on

            November  25,   1991,  she  went  to   the  yarn  preparation

            department and sought to  punch in.  Morrison could  not find

            her  own timecard, and asked  Moody where she  could find it.

            Moody responded by saying, "Girlie, I don't know.  You're not

            coming back to my department.  Go see nursie."  Morrison felt

            "stupid."  

                      Turner told  Morrison that she remained  on layoff,

            and  that she had no authority to  allow her to work.  Turner

            advised  Morrison to  speak with  McGowan.   McGowan informed

            Morrison that she did not have the authority to return her to

            work absent medical clearance, and suggested that she see Dr.

                                         -13-

            Barron, the Company's physician.   On November 26,  1991, the

            next day, Morrison went to see Dr. Barron.

                      The examination of Morrison consisted of the  nurse

            taking her  blood pressure,  temperature and weight,  and the

            doctor  asking her how she felt.  Dr. Barron advised Morrison

            that  he would be going to view the floorperson position, but

            he reported to her  (and wrote in  his office notes) that  he

            saw no physical reason why she could not return to work.  

                      After  he  viewed  the  floorperson  position,  Dr.

            Barron wrote the following notation:

                      "I  feel that  [Morrison] can do  most of
                      the  work without any problems.  However,
                      when  it   came  to  watching   the  warp
                      removed, I  felt  that this  was far  too
                      much for  a woman  with tendinitis  and a
                      back  problem.   I understand  that these
                      warps  weigh in  the neighborhood  of 500
                      pounds  and  the  manipulation of  moving
                      them onto  a hydraulic lift  is certainly
                      more than she  can do.  Over a  period of
                      time,  I feel that  she would be crippled
                      doing this job.  With tendinitis and back
                      problems within a year she will be out of
                      work    and    on    disability.       My
                      recommendation  is that she not be put on
                      this type of job."

            Dr. Barron did not speak to Morrison's treating  physician or

            her  nurse-practitioner.     Dr.  Barron  disregarded   their

            opinions   which  indicated  that  Morrison  was  capable  of

            fulfilling  her  duties,  because   they  had  not  seen  the

            floorperson position.   At the  time of  trial, Morrison  was

            still  not permitted to  work in the  floorperson position on

            the basis of Dr. Barron's evaluation.

                                         -14-

                      On  November  23, 1992,  Morrison returned  to work

            after she decided to bid  on a fixer position.   She received

            the position,  although after a  month she was  "bumped", was

            laid  off for a few  weeks, accepted a  creeler position, and

            eventually returned as a  fixer.  After a dispute  over being

            paid  as   a  temporary  fixer,  Morrison   finally  attained

            permanent  fixer status.   Since  she returned,  Morrison has

            worked  primarily  on   the  third  shift,  under   different

            supervisors from  Riley and  Moody.  Morrison  testified that

            she had no problems  with Riley and Moody after  she returned

            as  they  stayed away  from  her.    The Company's  personnel

            manager  told Morrison  that  she had  spoken  to the  people

            Morrison would be working with and that they would not harass

            her about her former complaints.  Morrison was to report back

            any complaints she might have. 

                      Morrison  further  testified, however,  that, after

            her return, most of  her co-workers would no longer  speak to

            her.  She  felt that this  was due to  the fact that most  of

            those  who   spoke  to   her  were  harassed   afterwards  by

            supervisors  for doing so.  Also, the third shift supervisor,

            Ernest  Clark,   often  criticized   Morrison  for   her  job

            performance.  The Company,  moreover, never asked Morrison to

            substitute  when  the  floorperson  was  absent, even  though

            employees  with   less  experience  were  asked   to  do  the

            floorperson's job.   And finally, Morrison  became very upset

                                         -15-

            and angry when  she saw  a petition,  expressing support  for

            Riley and Moody, being circulated among Carleton employees.

                                         III.

                      Defendants appeal from  the adverse jury  verdicts,

            from  the adverse findings of the district court and from the

            denial of various motions including their motion for judgment

            as a matter of law.

                      A federal district court may  not set aside a  jury

            verdict and direct the entry of a contrary verdict, unless no

            reasonable jury could have returned a  verdict adverse to the

            moving  party.  Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506,
                            _______    ____________________

            509 (1st Cir. 1996).  In making this determination, the court

            examines the  evidence adduced  at  trial in  the light  most

            favorable  to the  nonmoving  party,  drawing all  reasonable

            inferences in  its favor.    Id.   On appeal,  we review  the
                                         ___

            district court's  determination  de novo,  applying the  same
                                             __ ____

            standards.  Id.
                        ___

                      Our review  of a  district court's own  findings of

            fact is for clear  error only; we review its legal rulings de
                                                                       __

            novo.  Damon v. Sun  Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 1467, 1483  (1st Cir.
            ____   _____    ______________

            1996).

                                         IV.

            A. Sexual Harassment (Count I)
            ______________________________

                      Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of  1964 provides

            that  it is an "unlawful  employment practice for an employer

                                         -16-

            . . . to discriminate against any individual  with respect to

            his   compensation,  terms,   conditions  or   privileges  of

            employment  because  of  such  individual's  . . . sex."   42

            U.S.C.    2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).  The  Maine Human Rights

            Act,  likewise,  provides  that  it  is  unlawful  employment

            discrimination  for an  employer to  discriminate against  an

            employee on the basis  of sex "with respect to  hire, tenure,

            promotion,  transfer,  compensation,  terms,   conditions  or

            privileges of  employment . . . ."   5 M.R.S.A.    4572(1)(A)

            (West Supp. 1996).3

                      In   1980,   the   Equal   Employment   Opportunity

            Commission  ("EEOC")  promulgated guidelines  specifying that

            sexual  harassment is  a  form  of employment  discrimination

            based on  sex in violation  of Title  VII.  See  29 C.F.R.   
                                                        ___

            1604.11 (1996).  Under Title VII, "unwelcome sexual advances,

            requests  for sexual  favors,  and other  verbal or  physical

            conduct  of a  sexual  nature constitutes  sexual  harassment

            when:  (1)   submission  to  such  conduct   is  made  either

            explicitly  or   implicitly  a   term  or  condition   of  an

            individual's employment; (2) submission  or rejection of such

                                
            ____________________

            3.   The Maine  courts have  relied on the  federal case  law
            surrounding  Title  VII for  the  purpose  of construing  and
            applying the provisions of  the Maine Human Rights Act.   See
                                                                      ___
            Bowen v. Department of Human Servs., 606 A.2d 1051, 1053 (Me.
            _____    __________________________
            1992).    We, therefore,  apply the  same legal  standards in
            considering  whether or  not the  evidence was  sufficient to
            support  determinations  under  both  the  state  and federal
            statutes.

                                         -17-

            conduct  is  used  as  the  basis  for  employment  decisions

            affecting such  an individual;  or (3) such  conduct has  the
                                                   ______________________

            purpose  or  effect  of  unreasonably  interfering  with   an
            _____________________________________________________________

            individual's  work performance  or creating  an intimidating,
            _____________________________________________________________

            hostile  or  offensive working  environment."    29 C.F.R.   
            ___________________________________________

            1604.11(a) (1996) (emphasis added).

                      In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
                         _________________________    ______

            (1986), the Supreme Court confirmed that a violation of Title

            VII  can  be  established  through evidence  of  an  abusive,

            hostile or offensive work environment.  Quoting from the EEOC

            guidelines, the  Supreme Court  stated that the  existence of

            sexual harassment must be assessed "in light of the record as

            a whole and the totality  of the circumstances."  Id.  at 69;
                                                              ___

            see  also  Harris v.  Forklift Sys.,  Inc.,  510 U.S.  17, 23
            _________  ______     ____________________

            (1993) (relevant  factors, though no single  one is required,

            include the  frequency  of the  discriminatory  conduct;  its

            severity; whether it is threatening or humiliating, or a mere

            offensive utterance;  and whether it  unreasonably interferes

            with an employee's work performance).

                      In Lipsett  v. University of Puerto  Rico, 864 F.2d
                         _______     __________________________

            881, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB,
                                                 _______________________

            477 U.S. at 67)4, this court held that, for sexual harassment

                                
            ____________________

            4.   We note that the  plaintiff's claims in Lipsett actually
                                                         _______
            proceeded  under Title IX  of the Civil Rights  Act of 1964. 
            This  court,   however,  viewed  the  standards   for  sexual
            harassment  claims under Title  IX to be  equivalent to those
            used under Title VII.  See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 899.  
                                   ___ _______

                                         -18-

            to  be  actionable,  "it  must  be  'sufficiently  severe  or

            pervasive  to . . . create an  abusive working environment.'"

            See  also  Harris, 510 U.S. at  21.  We said that an employer
            _________  ______

            "is  liable  upon a  finding  of  hostile environment  sexual

            harassment perpetrated by its  supervisors upon employees  if

            an   official   representing   that  institution   knew,   or

            . . . should  have known,  of  the  harassment's  occurrence,

            unless that official can show that he or she took appropriate

            steps to halt it."  Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901.
                                _______

                      Claimants  under  Title VII  were,  until recently,

            limited to  the equitable  remedies of injunctive  relief and

            back  pay.  The 1991 Civil Rights Act, which became effective

            on November 21, 1991,  amended Title VII, and, for  the first

            time,  authorized  individuals alleging  intentional unlawful

            discrimination  to  seek  compensatory and  punitive  damages

            against their employers.   The 1991  Act also conferred  upon

            Title VII  plaintiffs the right to  a trial by jury.   See 42
                                                                   ___

            U.S.C.    1981a(b)-(c) (West 1994).  In Landgraf, the Supreme
                                                    ________

            Court held that the right to such damages and to a jury trial

            did not apply to conduct that occurred prior to the effective

            date  of the Act, i.e. prior to November 21, 1991.  Landgraf,
                                                                ________

            511 U.S. at 244-45.

                      Pursuant  to Landgraf, Morrison's  Title VII sexual
                                   ________

            harassment  claim was tried to the jury only insofar as based

            upon conduct on and after November  21, 1991.  Insofar as the

                                         -19-

            Title  VII  harassment claim  was for  conduct prior  to that

            date,  it  was  tried  to  the  magistrate  judge,  who  also

            determined in its entirety  Morrison's claim that the alleged

            sexual  harassment  violated  the  Maine  Human  Rights  Act.

            Because  Title VII  damages were  only recoverable  for post-

            November 21, 1991 sexual  harassment, that date assumes great

            importance here.

                 1. Before November 21, 1991
                    ________________________

                      During the  pre-November  21, 1991  period,  as  to

            which the magistrate judge rather than the jury was the trier

            of fact,  the court  determined under Count  I that  Morrison

            "was subjected to sexual  harassment sufficiently 'severe  or

            pervasive enough to create  an objectively hostile or abusive

            work  environment'", quoting  Harris, 510  U.S. at  21.   The
                                          ______

            court also found that Morrison "'subjectively perceive[d] the

            environment  to be abusive.'   Id."  This hostile environment
                                           ___

            was found to have existed prior to November 21, 1991, and the

            Company  was found  to have  known about  it, or  should have

            known about it, because  it was so pervasive.   The Company's

            plant manager and plant supervisor5 were found to have worked

            in the same general  area as plaintiff and Riley,  "and could

                                
            ____________________

            5.   Carleton and  Riley point  out in their  appellate brief
            that there is no  such position as "plant supervisor"  at the
            Company,  nor  was there  any  testimony at  trial  about any
            comparable  position.    Notwithstanding any  error  in  this
            particular,  we  uphold  the  court's  finding  of knowledge.
            Infra.
            _____

                                         -20-

            not have missed the discriminatory  atmosphere that permeated

            the department."  Based on these conclusions, the court found

            against the Company and Riley on Morrison's claims of hostile

            environment sexual harassment under Maine law and under Title

            VII  for conduct occurring before November 21, 1991.  We find

            ample record evidence to sustain these findings.

                      As  an  initial  matter,  we  turn  to  defendants'

            contention that the federal and state statutes of limitations

            do not allow us to look at any  conduct antedating the middle

            of  1991  in  support  of  the  hostile  environment  claims.

            Section  2000e-5(e)(1) of  Title VII provides  that claimants

            must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300

            days of the alleged  discriminatory act.  42 U.S.C.    2000e-

            5(e)(1) (West 1994).   Section 4613(2)(C) of  the Maine Human

            Rights  Act states that "[t]he action  shall be commenced not

            more than two  years after the act of unlawful discrimination

            complained of."  5 M.R.S.A.   4613(2)(C) (West 1989).

                      Since Morrison  filed her  charge with the  EEOC on

            April  23, 1992, and her complaint with the district court on

            September 3,  1993, the  appellants argue that  only acts  of

            sexual  harassment occurring  after  June 27,  1991, for  her

            federal  claim, and  after September 3,  1991, for  her state

            claim, should  be considered in reviewing  the sufficiency of

            the  evidence.  We disagree.   The district  court found that

            the hostile environment  at Carleton had existed for a number

                                         -21-

            of  years  prior to  November 21,  1991 and  continued beyond

            September 3, 1991.  We have held that there is no prohibition

            on recovery  for earlier conduct if  the "systemic violation"

            extends into the limitation period. See Jensen v. Frank,  912
                                                ___ ______    _____

            F.2d  517, 523 (1st Cir. 1990).  Here, the systemic violation

            continued without  interruption from  the late  1980's onward

            through September  3, 1991.   It was,  therefore, appropriate

            for the district court to look at  defendants' conduct dating

            back to the  1980's, and  we may do  likewise, in  evaluating

            Morrison's federal and state sexual harassment claims.

                      From  the late 1980s  into the fall  of 1991, there

            was ample  evidence of crude, demeaning and sexually-oriented

            behavior  by  Riley  and  others  directed  at  Morrison.   A

            rational factfinder could conclude that the harassment was so

            severe  or  pervasive  that  it created  a  work  environment

            abusive  to Morrison because of her gender.  Harris, 510 U.S.
                                                         ______

            at 22.  There  is, indeed, evidence that the  harassment went

            so far as to adversely affect Morrison's ability to function,

            by  making  her  fearful  to  apply  for  certain  employment

            opportunities and undermining her  mental and emotional well-

            being.

                      Even so, the appellants  argue that the Company, as

            an entity,  cannot be  held liable  because Morrison  has not

            shown  that it knew, or should have known, of the harassment.

            Morrison did not complain of harassment to the Company during

                                         -22-

            the period,  even though  there were procedures  available to

            file such complaints.  This is a closer question, but we find

            sufficient evidence to support  the finding of the magistrate

            judge that the  Company knew  or should have  known that  the

            hostile  environment existed  despite plaintiff's  failure to

            use official procedures to complain.  In April  1987, several

            female employees  of Carleton  had filed a  grievance against

            Riley,  alleging that he was  harassing them.   At that time,

            Plant  Manager Everett Owens told Riley to be more "low key",

            but  never  took any  action  to discipline  or  more closely

            supervise him.   In the years before the trial  of this case,

            Union President Gwendolyn  Gatcomb brought several complaints

            concerning  Riley's  behavior  to the  attention  of  Company

            personnel.   In spite  of these  complaints, Riley  and other

            Carleton  supervisors  were allowed  to  continue  with their

            responsibilities  and  their  harassing  conduct.    Morrison

            testified  that  she had  tried to  bring  the matter  to the

            attention of Personnel Manager  Annette McGowan, but had been

            unable  to  see her.   The  magistrate  judge found  that the

            layout of the mill was such that higher management "could not

            have missed the discriminatory  atmosphere that permeated the

            department."  We are satisfied that the evidence sufficiently

            supports  the   court's  above   finding,  and  can   see  no

            justification to disturb it on appeal.

                 2. After November 21, 1991
                    _______________________

                                         -23-

                      For us to  affirm the  jury's award  of damages  to

            Morrison  on her Count  I Title VII  sexual harassment claim,

            the  record  must reveal  evidence  of  conduct on  or  after

            November 21, 1991      the  effective date of the  1991 Civil

            Rights  Act        sufficient   to  have  created  a  hostile

            environment  as that term is used under Title VII.  Landgraf,
                                                                ________

            511 U.S. at 244-45.  Hostile environment sexual harassment is

            a  particular  species of  sex  discrimination.   The  EEOC's

            regulations, as  noted,  describe it  as "[u]nwelcome  sexual

            advances,  requests for  sexual favors,  and other  verbal or

            physical conduct of a sexual nature . . . when . . . (3) such

            conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering

            with  an   individual's  work  performance  or   creating  an

            intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."  29

            C.F.R.    1604.11(a) (1996).   The Supreme Court  speaks of a

            "workplace . . . permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation,

            ridicule and  insult' . . . that is  'sufficiently severe  or

            pervasive to  alter the  conditions of a  person's employment

            and  create an  abusive working  environment.'"   Harris, 510
                                                              ______

            U.S. at 21 (citations omitted).

                      In  the  present  case, the  jury  heard  extensive

            evidence of the vulgar pre-November 21, 1991 incidents which,

            as we have held, amply support the magistrate judge's finding

            of hostile environment sexual harassment during that  earlier

            time.   However, the jury's  task was to  determine Title VII

                                         -24-

            liabilities and damages  for the  period from   November  21,

            1991  onward.  The jury  could take the  earlier conduct into

            account  only to the extent  it was legally  relevant to what

            later  happened     for  example,  to help  prove  the intent

            behind an act committed after November 21, 1991, or the act's

            likely effect on someone  like Morrison.  See, e.g.,  Fed. R.
                                                      ___  ____

            Evid. 402, 403, 404(b),  406, 412.   The earlier abuse is  no

            substitute for proof of actual sexual harassment occurring in

            the post-November  21, 1991 period.   Because we  cannot find

            evidence  of sexually  abusive conduct  in this  later period

            sufficient  to support the jury's Title VII award under Count

            I, we are obliged to reverse that part of the verdict.  

                      From  October 19,  1991  until  November 23,  1992,

            Morrison  was  either on  medical  leave  or on  layoff  from

            Carleton, hence she could not, during that period,  have been

            subjected to workplace abuse,  nor could her work performance

            at  Carleton have  been  interfered with  by abusive  conduct

            while there.  The only incident during that period that might

            be  construed as  workplace  sexual  harassment  occurred  on

            November  25, 1991, when Morrison went to Carleton seeking to

            return to work.   Moody refused to let her  punch in, telling

            her she had  first to get medical clearance.   In turning her

            away, Moody called Morrison  "Girlie" and told her to  go see

            "nursie",  raising the  question whether  use of  these terms

            made Moody's remark so  offensive as to support a  finding of

                                         -25-

            hostile environment  sexual harassment.   In order  to assess

            Moody's probable intent when  he spoke as he did  on November

            25,  1991 and  the reasonable  effect of  the phraseology  on

            Morrison,  see Harris,  510 U.S. at  22 (citing  Meritor Sav.
                       ___ ______                            ____________

            Bank,  FSB,  477 U.S.  at 67),  the  jury could  consider the
            __________

            evidence of  Moody's and others' prior  offensive conduct and

            remarks in the period before November 21, 1991.  In light  of

            that history, the jury  could reasonably construe Moody's use

            of the  terms "Girlie" and "nursie" as demeaning, rather than

            as merely light-hearted banter, and could also determine that

            Morrison  had reason to be offended.  Morrison testified that

            Moody's remark, made at  a time when "everybody was  lined up

            getting ready to punch in", made her feel "stupid."

                      We are  unable to  conclude, however,  that Moody's

            "Girlie-nursie" remark was, by  itself, a sufficient basis to

            hold  the  Company liable  to  Morrison under  her  Title VII

            sexual  harassment claim.   Morrison was  not working  at the

            time.  Her contact  on this one  day with the Company's  work

            environment was fleeting.   There is no evidence  the Company

            knew  of or  sanctioned Moody's  particular phraseology.   We

            know  of  no case  where a  single,  brief encounter  of this

            mildly offensive sort, at  a time when the plaintiff  was not

            actually working, and hence could not be affected in her work

            performance and  conditions of  employment, has been  held to

            create a sexually hostile  workplace environment.  See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

                                         -26-

            Harris, 510 U.S. at  21 (conduct must be severe  or pervasive
            ______

            enough  to  create an  objectively  hostile  or abusive  work

            environment affecting employee's  conditions of  employment);

            Chamberlin v. 101 Realty,  Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783  (1st Cir.
            __________    _________________

            1990) (single or isolated remarks  do not establish a hostile

            environment).  Even assuming this incident, when coupled with

            the more serious pre-November  21, 1991 incidents, might lead

            a  rational  jury  to   conclude  that  the  earlier  abusive

            environment would have remained the same through November 25,

            1991, the fact that Morrison was not working at Carleton from

            November 21, 1991 until November 23,  1992    a year later   

            makes  this conclusion  largely irrelevant  to her  claim for

            damages  during this  period.  Morrison  could not  have been

            injured by hostility at a workplace she did not attend.6

                      We realize that Morrison contends that she accepted

            layoff status  only because  of the Company's  refusal during

            this  period to let  her return to  her floorperson position.

            Morrison insists that the  refusal, while supposedly based on

            health  concerns, was  actually based  on the  Company's bias

            against women  working as  floorpersons.  The  jury, however,

            specifically  rejected Morrison's  Count  II,  Title VII  sex

                                
            ____________________

            6.    Obviously, an  award  of $150,000  in compensatory  and
            punitive damages  would be patently excessive  for one mildly
            offensive  remark.    Even  supposing  the  workplace  itself
            remained potentially abusive  during Morrison's absence, this
            would  be irrelevant while she  was on layoff  status and not
            present.

                                         -27-

            discrimination claim  premised on such a  theory, finding for

            the Company on Count  II.  The magistrate judge,  contrary to

            the jury,  later upheld Morrison's  sex discrimination  claim

            under Maine law, holding that the Company's refusal to  allow
            _______________

            Morrison to go  back to her floorperson  position was gender-

            based  and  discriminatory.     But  the  jury's  verdict  is

            conclusive  on the part of the Count II claim seeking damages

            under Title  VII.  The jury found for Morrison on her Count I

            claim of  hostile environment  sexual harassment, but,  as we

            discuss here, there was insufficient evidence of abuse during

            the  post-November 21, 1991 period for us to affirm the award

            of damages under that theory.7 

                      Following the  period of  over a year  during which

            she did not work at the  Company (from October 19, 1991 until

            November  23, 1992), Morrison finally returned  to work.  But

            the  record covering  the period  after Morrison's  return to

            work on  November  23, 1992  provides scant  support for  her

            hostile environment claim.  When she returned, she accepted a

            different,  somewhat higher-paying position8, and reported to

                                
            ____________________

            7.    The  jury's finding  against  Morrison  under Count  II
            refutes any argument that  the jury based its Count  I sexual
            harassment   verdict  on   a   finding  that   Morrison   was
            discriminated against  when denied the opportunity  to return
            to  the floorperson  position.  Cf.  Chamberlin, 915  F.2d at
                                            __   __________
            782-83.

            8.   The  Company's personnel manager testified  that, at the
            time of  trial, a  fixer  was paid  $9.64 per  hour, while  a
            floorperson  was  paid  $8.54  per hour.    Morrison  herself
            testified that a  similar pay difference existed in 1989 when

                                         -28-

            new  supervisors.   There is  no evidence  that, in  this new

            position,  her  supervisors, or  any  other  person for  that

            matter,  subjected  her   to  "discriminatory   intimidation,

            ridicule  and insult", Harris, 510  U.S. at 21,  much less to
                                   ______

            sexually   offensive,  embarrassing  or   vulgar  conduct  or

            remarks,  or other sex-based conduct or  remarks, such as had

            occurred prior to November 21, 1991 when she was working as a

            floorperson  under  Riley.   The Company's  personnel manager

            advised  her that  employees  had been  warned  to treat  her

            fairly and equitably,  and that  she was  to report  anything

            offensive  immediately  so   that  it  could   be  corrected.

            Morrison did not thereafter  complain of sexual harassment to

            Company personnel.   Morrison conceded that  her old nemeses,

            Riley and Moody, stayed away from her, and never harassed her

            after she returned to work.  Morrison, nonetheless, points to

            certain incidents  that  occurred during  this later  period,

            which,  according  to  her,  gave  rise  to  a  hostile  work

            environment at Carleton.

                      Morrison  testified that  most of  the  people with

            whom  she had worked  for years would no  longer speak to her

            when she  returned to work  in November 23,  1992, ostensibly

                                
            ____________________

            she  had  briefly worked  as a  fixer.   There  was  a period
            shortly after  her return  when she  was "bumped",  laid off,
            returned  as  a creeler,  and  ultimately  restored to  fixer
            status.  Morrison and  the Company thereafter skirmished over
            her fixer pay  scale, whether it was temporary  or permanent;
            eventually she got the permanent rating.

                                         -29-

            because discouraged by  management from  doing so.   The  few

            that  did were reprimanded  by their  supervisors afterwards.

            Morrison felt  that some  of her  co-workers would  no longer

            cooperate  with  her,  thereby   making  her  job  much  more

            difficult, and that one of her new supervisors, Ernest Clark,

            would occasionally assign her  excessive work.  Ernest Clark,

            according to Morrison,  would also follow her around and look

            for flaws in her work, and would often blame her for mistakes

            that  were not of her own doing.  Morrison further complained

            that,  for  some  time after  she  had  completed a  training

            period, she  received temporary pay, instead  of regular pay,

            for her work as a fixer, and that, despite her seniority, she

            never was asked to  fill in for those employees  with higher-

            ranking jobs  within the  Company.  Lastly,  Morrison claimed

            that  she saw  a  petition expressing  support for  Riley and

            Moody circulating throughout the  Company, an event that, she

            says, led her to seek professional counselling.  

                      Morrison argues that she does not need to show that

            management's conduct  during this later period was "expressly

            sexual"  in  order  to  establish  a  sexually  hostile  work

            environment based  on gender discrimination.   We accept that

            many different  forms of  offensive behavior may  be included

            within  the   definition   of  hostile   environment   sexual

            harassment.  See Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 447 (3d Cir.
                         ___ _____    ________

            1994) (employee  can show  that there  is a sexually  hostile

                                         -30-

            work    environment    "without   proving    blatant   sexual

            misconduct.").  However, the  overtones of such behavior must

            be, at the very least, sex-based,  so as to be a recognizable

            form of sex discrimination.  McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129,
                                         ________    ____

            1138  (D.C.  Cir. 1985).    Merely  because a  supervisor  is

            overbearing or  fellow employees  unsociable and hard  to get

            along  with, does not suffice  unless underlying motives of a

            sexual  or  gender  discriminatory  nature   are  implicated.

            Spain, 26 F.3d at 449.
            _____

                      The  post-November  23,  1992  conduct  alleged  by

            Morrison  occurred over  a year  after the  earlier sexually-

            explicit misconduct  by the  other supervisors in  her former

            position.    The later  conduct, as  said,  was not  the kind

            associated  with  a  claim  for  hostile  environment  sexual

            harassment.   See, e.g., Gross  v. Burggraf  Constr. Co.,  53
                          ___  ____  _____     _____________________

            F.3d 1531, 1546  (10th Cir. 1995) (employee did not establish

            a gender-based  hostile environment by  showing that employer

            reprimanded  her in  front  of other  employees, grilled  her

            about some plans to bring discrimination charges against him,

            and  told her "she  was skating on  thin ice.").   It was not

            shown  that   Supervisor  Clark's  harshness  was   based  on

            annoyance with her  as a  woman, or because  he regarded  the

            fixer position as off limits for women.  A connection between

            Morrison's gender and the incidents she complains of  was not

            established.   The record contains no  evidence that Morrison

                                         -31-

            complained to the  Company that  she was  being subjected  at

            this  time to further  sexual harassment or  that the Company

            knew  or  should  have   believed  that  Morrison  was  being

            subjected  to  sexual  harassment   then.    If  the  Company

            deliberately  sought to  isolate or  punish Morrison  for her

            earlier complaints of harassment,  by telling other employees

            not  to speak  to her,  such conduct  might have  supported a

            claim   for   unlawful  retaliation,   but  not   for  sexual

            harassment.9   The evidence  presented by Morrison  is simply

            insufficient to  establish a post-November  21, 1991 sexually

            hostile work environment created  by severe or pervasive sex-

            based harassment.

                      Morrison seeks to overcome  the deficiencies in the

            evidence  by  contending  that the  more  recent,  non-sexual

            incidents could be linked to the pattern of vulgar, sexually-

            related  misconduct that  occurred at  Carleton prior  to the

            effective  date of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.  Morrison urges

            that  the later incidents could be evaluated by the jury, not

            in  isolation, but rather as  a continuation of  what she and

                                
            ____________________

            9.   Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has a separate
            statutory provision, not at issue here, making it an unlawful
            employment practice for  an employer to discriminate  against
            an individual  because of his  or her having  opposed another
            unlawful  practice or made a charge under the subchapter.  42
            U.S.C.    2000e-3(a) (West 1994);  see also Fennell  v. First
                                               ___ ____ _______     _____
            Step  Designs,  Ltd.,  83  F.3d  526,  535  (1st  Cir.  1996)
            ____________________
            (outlining the elements of a retaliation claim).

                                         -32-

            other employees encountered  at the  Company before  November

            21, 1991.

                      This point  might have arguable  merit relative  to

            Moody's "Girlie-nursie" remark on  November 25, 1991, were it

            not for the isolated nature of this incident, occurring as it

            did when Morrison was  on continuous leave, hence not  at the

            workplace so as  to be exposed to a  hostile environment.  As

            to the events after  her return to work on November 23, 1992,

            the pre-November 21, 1991  harassment was too remote in  time

            and  character  to  transform  the  later  conduct  into  the

            different  kind of behavior needed to support a damages claim

            for  hostile  environment  sexual harassment.    Morrison, by

            then, was  working in a new position  with other supervisors.

            To  establish that  she  was entitled  to  damages for  being

            subjected to  hostile environment discrimination  during this

            later period, she had  to show some conduct within  that time

            frame fitting  into a  cognizable definition of  abusive work

            environment  harassment.   If this  were not so,  the Company

            would  be held  liable for  conduct which  it would  not have

            known  was either improper or a source of potential liability

            under the "hostile environment" theory at issue.

                      In light  of the foregoing, we hold  that there was

            insufficient evidence from which a rational  factfinder could

            conclude that  Morrison was  subjected to a  sexually hostile

            work environment at Carleton after November 21, 1991. 

                                         -33-

            B. Gender Discrimination (Count II)
               ________________________________

                      In  Count  II,  the  district court  ruled  in  the

            Company's  favor on  Morrison's  federal claim,  finding that

            there   were  no  incidents  of  sex  discrimination  against

            Morrison prior to  November 21, 1991.10   The district court,
                     _____

            however,   held    that   Morrison   had    established   sex

            discrimination after November 21,  1991, and entered judgment

            in her  favor  under  Maine  law.   We  find  that  there  is

            sufficient  evidence  in  the  record below  to  support  the

            court's  state law  ruling  and, accordingly,  we affirm  its

            judgment in this respect.

                      The district  court first  found that Morrison  was

            not  permitted  to  return  to her  floorperson  position  on

            November  25,  1991  "because of  Lucille  Turner's,  Annette

            McGowan's, and Dr. Barron's  perception that women would more

            likely be  severely injured in the  floorperson position than

            would men."  The record permits the inference that Morrison's

            injury  was  temporary  and  not  especially  serious.    The

            evidence  shows   that  Turner   convinced  Hill  to   extend

            Morrison's layoff,  and later suggested that  Morrison should

                                
            ____________________

            10.  As  with   Count  I,  the  issue   of  whether  Carleton
            discriminated  because  of  gender  against   Morrison  after
            November  21, 1991 in violation of Title VII was presented to
            the jury.  The  jury found against Morrison on that claim, as
            noted.  The magistrate  judge subsequently found otherwise on
            the  same  facts for  purposes  of Morrison's  Maine  law sex
            discrimination  claim,  finding  gender discrimination  after
            November 21,  1991  based on  the  Company's refusal  to  let
            Morrison continue in the floorperson position.

                                         -34-

            not be allowed to  return to the floorperson position.   When

            Morrison was given the choice of either accepting a layoff or

            leaving the floorperson position,  McGowan told her that "she

            should have seen this  coming because . . . [the Company] did

            not want [her]  on the job."  Finally, even though Dr. Barron

            talked  extensively  with  Turner about  Morrison's  physical

            condition, he refused to  consult with her treating physician

            or her nurse-practitioner, both  of whom felt she was  fit to

            perform her  floorperson duties, in recommending  that she be

            kept out of the job.

                      The district  court stated  that  it was  satisfied

            that "a man presenting the same medical history and clearance

            to return to work would have been immediately permitted to do

            so."  The record  below gives credence to this  statement, as

            two long-time Carleton  employees, William Rogers and  Norman

            Williams, testified  that the  Company has permitted  them to

            remain in  their physically-demanding jobs,  despite the fact

            that they  have, respectively, a  chronic back problem  and a

            ruptured cervical disc.   Moreover, Leland Rice, who,  at one

            time,  worked as a floorperson  at Carleton, and  who is only

            five  foot  three inches  tall and  weighs  no more  than 140

            pounds, testified that he did not find any aspect of the job,

            including  the removal of the warp beam, to be very difficult

            to perform.    It  could  be found,  therefore,  that,  while

            Carleton  seized upon  Morrison's  relatively  minor  medical

                                         -35-

            problems  to exclude  her from  the floorperson  position, it

            allowed other male employees,  with more serious ailments and

            less physical abilities, to continue working for the Company.

                      It  is  true,  to  be  sure,  that  there  was also

            evidence    suggesting     that    legitimate    health-based

            considerations  had motivated  the Company's  decision.   But

            this  is the  kind of  matter  best sorted  out by  the trial

            court.  There was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable

            trier's  finding that  Morrison was  rejected because  of her

            gender.  The court  was entitled to conclude  that Morrison's

            sex  "was  a substantial  motivating  factor  in the  adverse

            employment  decision."   Cumpiano v.  Banco  Santander Puerto
                                     ________     _______________________

            Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 155  (1st Cir. 1990).  Finding  no error,
            ____

            we affirm.   We also hold  that, on remand, the  court should

            reopen  the issue  of  back pay  given  our vacation  of  the

            damages awards under Counts I and IV.

            C. Disability Discrimination (Count IV)
               ____________________________________

                      In  Count  IV,  the  jury  returned  a  verdict  in

            Morrison's favor on her  federal ADA claim.  When  this claim

            was  submitted to the jury, the court correctly told the jury

            that Morrison  could recover only  for violations of  the Act

            occurring  on or after July  26, 1992, the  effective date of

            the Act.  Because the record reveals no evidence of any post-

            July  26, 1992  violations,  we are  obliged to  overturn the

            verdict.  

                                         -36-

                      Ever  since the  ADA became  effective on  July 26,

            1992, the courts have  consistently held that the Act  is not

            retroactive.  Miller  v. CBC  Cos., 908 F.  Supp. 1054,  1062
                          ______     _________

            (D.N.H. 1995) ("there is little doubt the First Circuit would

            decline to  extend the continuing violation  theory to permit

            [plaintiff]   to   recover   for  the   defendants'   pre-ADA

            conduct.").  As a  result, to uphold  a claim under the  ADA,

            there must  be evidence  that the claimant  was discriminated

            against because of a disability on or after July 26, 1992.

                      Morrison's discrimination claim, however,  is based

            on Carleton's rejection of  her request, made in the  fall of

            1991, to be  allowed to continue in  the floorperson position

            that  she had previously held.  The Company's decision to bar

            her from the position  was effectively made, and communicated

            to  her, in November 1991, eight  months before the statute's

            effective date.  While  Morrison grieved the decision through

            her   union,  in  proceedings   strenuously  pursued  through

            February  of 1992,  and  while the  grievance process  itself

            appears  to  have continued  into 1993,  when the  matter was

            stated  to  be  arbitrated,  its subject  was  the  Company's

            alleged  unfair practice in the  fall of 1991.   Morrison has

            not  pointed to  additional incidents that  took place  on or

            after July 26, 1992, which constituted separate violations of

            the ADA during the later period.    

                                         -37-

                      The regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA add

            nothing to  Morrison's  claim.   These  regulations  prohibit

            disability  discrimination with  respect  to "  . . . layoff,

            termination, right to return from layoff, and rehiring."   29
                         ___________________________

            C.F.R.    1630.4(b)  (1996) (emphasis  added).   However, the

            denial  of any right Morrison  had to return  from layoff was

            complete  well before July 26, 1992.  Morrison was denied the

            floorperson  position in the fall of 1991 after she sought to

            return from  medical leave.   By  then  Morrison had  already

            accepted a layoff slip in lieu of bidding on another job, and

            remained on layoff until November 23, 1992, when she accepted

            the "fixer" position  with the Company.   Morrison would have

            us  find a continuing violation,  based on a  theory that not

            restoring her to her old  floorperson position formed part of

            a continuous  chain of  misconduct extending beyond  the July

            26, 1992 deadline.  But the Company's inaction is not enough.

            As  we  said  in  a somewhat  analogous  situation,  "'it was

            incumbent upon  [her] to allege facts  giving some indication

            that    the   later   refusals   were   themselves   separate

            . . . violations.'"  Velazquez v.  Chardon, 736 F.2d 831, 833
                                 _________     _______

            (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607
                                     _______    ____________________

            F.2d 1014, 1018 (1st Cir. 1979)).

                      As    Morrison    does    not   demonstrate    that

            discriminatory  conduct  forming a  basis  of  her ADA  claim

            occurred  after  July  26,  1992,  we  need  not  decide  the

                                         -38-

            Company's  further  contention that  Morrison's  claim failed

            because  her   purported   disability  did   not   meet   the

            definitional  requirements of the Act.  There may be merit to

            this and related substantive contentions, but we do not reach

            them  because   Morrison's  asserted  violation  of  the  ADA

            occurred prior to July 26, 1992.

            D. Riley's Individual Liability
               ____________________________

                      In footnotes in  their briefs, the parties  contest

            whether  Riley  can  be held  liable  under  Count  I in  his

            individual capacity for violations of Title VII and the Maine

            Human  Rights Act.  We  deal separately with  the federal and

            the state aspects of this issue.

                 1. Individual Liability under Title VII
                    ____________________________________

                      Title VII defines "employer",  in relevant part, as

            "a  person engaged in an industry  affecting commerce who has

            fifteen  or  more employees  . . . and  any agent  of  such a

            person."    42  U.S.C.    2000e(b)  (West  1994).   There  is

            controversy over  whether this  language  allows a  corporate

            supervisor, such as Riley, to be sued as the "agent of such a

            person."   Several circuits have held "No."  See, e.g., Tomka
                                                         ___  ____  _____

            v.  Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d  1295, 1313-17 (2d  Cir. 1995); but
                ____________                                          ___

            see id. at 1318-24 (Judge Parker's dissenting opinion).   The
            ___ ___

            question has no very obvious answer.

                      We decline to answer it here.  The district court's

            ruling that Riley was liable under Title VII for pre-November

                                         -39-

            21,  1991 sexual harassment (Count I) has little or no actual

            impact on Riley that we can discern.  Neither the Company nor

            Riley were or can be held  answerable in damages for the pre-

            November  21, 1991 conduct, and  it is not  apparent that any

            other available type of federal relief can be applied against

            Riley notwithstanding  the court's  determination that  he is

            liable under Title VII.  In such circumstances, and given the

            absence  of  developed  argument  by  the  parties and  of  a

            reasoned disposition  of this question by the court below, we

            are not inclined to seize this  opportunity to create circuit

            precedent on this relatively complex issue.

                 2. Individual Liability under the Maine Human Rights Act
                    _____________________________________________________

                      In   finding  Riley   liable,  together   with  his

            employer, under  Maine state law for  sexual harassment under

            Count  I,   the  court  imposed  a   $10,000  civil  penalty.

            Authority  for the penalty is found in the Maine Human Rights

            Act.   5 M.R.S.A.   4613(2)(B)(7) (West Supp. 1996).  Riley's

            liability for  that penalty  is apparently joint  and several

            with the Company's.   The state  law judgment against  Riley,

            therefore, is not  merely academic, as was the  adverse Title

            VII finding, supra.
                         _____

                      Still, we  are disinclined to rule at  this time on

            whether or not Maine law  allows individual liability.  While

            arguably the different language of the Maine law more clearly

            allows individual liability  than does Title VII, there is no

                                         -40-

            relevant state court precedent.  A  federal district court in

            Maine  has  construed  the  law  as   disallowing  individual
                                                  ___________

            liability, relying on the  federal precedent that trends that

            way.  Quiron v. L.N. Violette Co. Inc., 897 F.  Supp. 18, 20-
                  ______    ______________________

            21  (D.  Me.  1995).     Appellants'  objection  to  allowing

            individual  recovery here was not set out in the statement of

            issues  in their  brief, and  consists of  one sentence  in a

            footnote, together with a citation to Quiron and a subsequent
                                                  ______

            case.  We have said  that a party owes this court  "developed

            argumentation."   United  States  v. Caraballo-Cruz,  52 F.3d
                              ______________     ______________

            390, 393 (1st  Cir. 1995);  cf. Kost v.  Kozakiewicz, 1  F.3d
                                        __  ____     ___________

            176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993)  (casual mention in footnote, without

            citation,  not  enough).    See Wright,  Miller,  Cooper  and
                                        ___

            Gressman, Federal  Practice and  Procedure, Vol. 16,    3974,
                      ________________________________

            n.1 (West 1977 & Supp. 1996).  The district court  itself did

            not  have occasion  to discuss  the issue,  although appellee

            concedes that  defendants  raised it  in one  of their  trial

            motions.  Riley is  represented by the same attorneys  as the

            Company and, for all  that appears, may never be  required by

            his  employer  to share  personally  in  the  payment of  the

            $10,000 penalty.

                      Under   these  circumstances,  we  think  the  most

            satisfactory  way  to  handle  the issue  is  to  vacate  the

            individual judgment  against Riley  under Count I  and remand

            with  instructions that,  if either  party wishes,  the court

                                         -41-

            shall reopen, and expressly  rule upon, the issue  of whether

            the Maine Human Rights Act provides for individual liability.

            In  so doing, the court  may, in its  discretion, certify the

            question to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.  This course

            will  ensure  either a  reasoned  decision  or a  dispositive

            ruling by Maine's  highest court.   It will  also enable  the

            parties and the court to drop the matter if, as the  parties'

            casual treatment suggests, it is of no  practical interest to

            them.

                      The legal questions  of individual liability  under

            both  Title VII and  the Maine statute  are significant ones.

            Precisely  because this is so, we  do not wish to decide them

            in the fragmented, undeveloped setting in which they appear.

                                          V.

                      We affirm the district  court's rulings on Counts I

            and  II, except  we vacate  the finding  against  Riley under

            Count I.   We reverse the jury's verdicts on Counts I and IV.

            We vacate the court's amended judgment and remand for further

            proceedings,  and  for  the  entry  of a  new  judgment,  not

            inconsistent  with this  opinion.   Upon remand  the district

            court shall reopen  the question  of back pay  and any  other

            available form of  relief that may  now be appropriate  under

            the affirmed claims given our reversal of the jury's verdicts

            under Counts  I and  IV.   The parties shall  bear their  own

            costs of appeal.  

                                         -42-

                      It is so ordered. 

                                         -43-