Court Opinion

ID: 9529039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:46:42.588556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:36.391141
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COLEMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334 (2007), our supreme court overruled an interpretation of Rule 216 that imposed a signature requirement not created by the rule’s plain language and held that denials certified in accordance with section 1 — 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure are sufficient to satisfy the rule’s requirement of service of a sworn statement. I do not believe that the majority’s opinion sufficiently adheres to the course set by the Vision Point court. As the majority notes, Rule 216 provides that facts that are the subject of admission requests are deemed admitted unless “the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission *** a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 216. The rule’s language requires only “a” sworn statement, not “the party’s statement,” not “his statement,” and not “her statement.” The rule addresses the actions of an answering party only in requiring her to serve the responses upon her opponent. Like the signature requirement imposed by this court in Moy and disapproved by the supreme court in Vision Point, the majority’s mandate that the sworn statement be made by the party “has no support in the language of Rule 216.” Vision Point, 226 Ill. 2d at 355. In addition to its rejection of verification requirements not established by the language of Rule 216, Vision Point establishes the form of sworn statement sufficient to satisfy the rule’s terms: “[S]ection 1 — 109 verification constitute^] the very ‘sworn statement’ that Rule 216 requires.” 226 Ill. 2d at 355. The language of section 1 — 109 does not require verification by a party; instead, the statute calls for certification by “[t]he person or persons having knowledge of the matters stated in a pleading, affidavit or other document.” 735 ILCS 5/1— 109 (West 2006). A reading of Vision Point in concert with the language of section 1 — 109 compels the conclusion that Rule 216 responses may be certified by any individual with knowledge of the facts at issue, whether that individual is a party or her attorney. This conclusion cannot be reconciled with the majority’s disposition. The Rule 216 requests served by the plaintiff in the instant case sought admission of the necessity of her medical treatment and the reasonable nature of the charges for that treatment. The majority’s opinion produces the result that these facts will be deemed admitted solely because the defendant cannot be found to personally certify their denial. This result is particularly inappropriate in view of the fact that the defendant is not likely to have the expertise to testify competently on such issues (see Gill v. Foster, 232 Ill. App. 3d 768, 792 (1992); aff’d, 157 Ill. 2d 304 (1993); Rose v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., LLC, 378 Ill. App. 3d 615, 621-22 (2007)) and would have been required to consult with her attorneys and other agents to incorporate their knowledge into her answers (Szczeblewski v, Gossett, 342 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349 (2003) (quoting Singer v. Treat, 145 Ill. App. 3d 585, 592 (1986), and citing Brandon v. DeBusk, 85 Ill. App. 3d 645, 647 (1980)). The majority’s blanket prohibition of attorney-certified responses extends not only to denials of admitted facts, but also to explanations of the inability to admit or deny. Whether his client is willfully absent, unlocated for unknown reasons, incompetent or disabled, and whether the proper answer is an admission, denial, or explanation of the client’s disability, the majority bars the attorney who cannot secure his client’s verification from providing the Rule 216 answers that are within his own knowledge. The section 1 — 109 certification held sufficient in Vision Point does not require this result. Since it permits answers from individuals having knowledge of the matters asserted, it would allow attorneys to provide sworn answers to requests directed to their expertise rather than the party’s knowledge. The knowledge-based certification would require a party’s swearing to matters directed to the party’s personal recollections. It would also permit an attorney with knowledge of a party’s absence or incapacity to certify a response explaining the reasons why the party could not truthfully admit or deny the requests. The question presented for our review in the case at bar asks only whether the trial court has the authority to permit attorney certification under the present circumstances; it does not ask us to find that such certifications be accepted in all cases. The section 1 — 109 certification permits the trial court to determine whether the responses to Rule 216 requests have been verified by an individual with knowledge of the facts and to accept or reject the responses on that basis. I believe that the trial court had the authority to accept the attorney-certified responses in the instant case, and I would answer the trial court’s question in the affirmative.