Court Opinion

ID: 7817202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:40:44.06818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:37.931019
License: Public Domain

Conley Byrd, Justice, dissenting. Involved here is a collective bargaining contract requiring the employer, upon discharging an employee, to give both the employee and the president of the union, within twenty-four hours, a written statement of the reason for the discharge. We held, the third time this matter was before the court, Andrews v. Victor Metal Products Corp., 239 Ark. 763, 394 S. W. 2d 123 (1965), that the employee, as a member of the union, was entitled to the benefits of the contract provision on discharge, and was also entitled to seek redress by way of damages because of the employer’s failure to give the required written notice. The majority opinion is this day holding that the employer, who has breached his contract by failing to state his reasons for the discharge of appellant in writing as required by the contract, can now come into court and show any justifiable reason for the discharge of appellant. If the majority opinion is followed to its logical conclusion, it would follow that the employer can disregard the breach of his contract by showing any reason which he thinks justifiable to sustain the discharge, even in a suit by the union to require the employer to re-instate the employee. The right of discharge of a servant by a master generally, as distinguished from a contract requiring that an employer must specify the reason for discharge in writing, was pointed out by the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Kiker v. Bank Sav. Life Ins. Co., 37 N. M. 346, 349, 23 P. 2d 366, 368 (1933) It was there said: ‘ ‘ Generally, in an action for wrongful discharge, the employer may plead in defense any sufficient cause, though it may have been unknown to him at the time, though his real reason or motive may have been something else, and though another cause may have been expressly assigned. Williston on Contracts, §§ 744, 839; Labatt on Master and Servant, § 189; Page on Contracts (2d Ed.) § 3058; 18 E. C. L. 516; 39 C. J. 89. But the parties of course have the right to stipulate the manner in which the employer may terminate the contract. If they stipulate that it shall be by written notice specifying the cause, a discharge specifying no cause, or an insufficient cause, would be wrongful. It follows that, under such a contract, a cause not specified would not be available in defense. Hughes v. Gross et al., 166 Mass. 61, 43 N. E. 1031, 32 L. R. A. 620, 55 Am. St. Rep. 375, cited; 18 R. C. L. 516; Mortimer v. Bristol, 190 App. Div. 452, 180 N. Y. S. 55.” In addition to obliterating the provision of the collective bargaining agreement which required a written statement of the reasons for discharge, the majority opinion suggests that — since the president of the union received written notice and appellant was told explicitly the reason for her termination — there was a substantial compliance with the contract provision requiring a writing. Thus, concludes the majority, the failure to give written notice to Mrs. Andrews did not preclude her right to go before the grievance committee within three working days after the occurrence, nor her right to prosecute an appeal therefrom. There are two answers to this suggestion: ONE: The same suggestion was made in Andrews v. Victor Metal Products Corp., 239 Ark. 763, 394 S. W. 2d 123 (1965), and we said: “Finally, it is insisted by the employer that Mrs. Andrews should have exhausted her remedies under the collective bargaining agreement by first appealing to the grievance committee created by the contract. It appears, however, that it was the employer who first breached the contract; so it cannot complain of a later breach by the employee. ...” TWO: The employee had the right to rely upon the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement requiring the employer to state in writing the reason for the discharge which would limit the issues before the grievance committee. Furthermore, the record does not show that, within the three-day time limit for going before the grievance committee, Mrs. Andrews knew or had any knowledge that the president of the union had received a written notice in compliance with the contract. If it were the intent of a lawyer to draft a collective bargaining agreement to require that an employee discharged for cause should receive written notice stating the reasons for the discharge, how could he have made it plainer than the provision in this instance? For the reasons set forth, I would reverse and remand for a new trial. George Rose Smith and Jones, JJ., join in this dissent.