Court Opinion

ID: 9680258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:27:37.921605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:27.280738
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the holding that “that the trial court erred in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict; but since the parties are in agreement that some new subterranean damage occurred, we believe that the cause should be remanded in the interest of justice.”
After concluding that there is no evidence to support a vital fact, such as the amount of damages, this court cannot properly reverse the judgment and remand for further development of the same or similar evidence. There is no showing on appeal that the evidence had not been fully developed before the jury, or that the parties proceeded under a misapprehension of what the present law is and, consequently, that the parties may have been denied a fair trial by their own good faith actions, in relying on the wrong theory of law. See Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.1966). The parties were not prevented from presenting evidence of damages. The “admission” by defendant that it owed the duty to make certain repairs which it valued at the sum of $1,600 was in evidence before the jury. The fact of “some new subterranean damage” was squarely before the jury throughout the trial, which they must have considered in answering the special issues submitted.
The appellants, plaintiffs below, do not ask for the relief which the majority now would grant. Instead they filed their motion for judgment on the verdict in the trial court. “A motion for judgment on the verdict is an affirmation by the movant that the findings of the jury are supported by competent evidence.” Skeen v. State, 550 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Neither the appellants nor the appellee bring forward by points the matters now advanced by the majority decision. In Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. Rowland, 525 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.Civ. App.—Amarillo 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the *56defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was overruled. Defendant there brought the point forward that there was lack of legal and factual sufficiency to support the jury findings and the judgment as to actual damages. This was an action for fraud, and the appellate court agreed that the correct measure of damages had not been applied. “.... because of the lack of sufficient data to apply the recognized rule of damages, under the present status of the evidence, we hold that a rendition is not justified and a retrial would best serve the interests of justice.” at 250.
Although the amended rules of civil procedure do receive liberal construction by the courts, the complaining party still has the duty of raising points of error and assignments of error where appropriate. Tex.R. Civ.Pro. 320, 321, 324. The rules do not contemplate that the appellate courts postulate as to “what might have been.” Since the point on which the majority would reverse and remand for a new trial has not been brought forward by either party on appeal, I believe it to be inappropriate for our consideration. Moreover, the two evidence subjects, that is, the lower sum of money, $1,600, as damages and new subterranean termite damage, were part of the jury’s consideration.
One of the few correct procedural steps to arrive at a “no evidence” determination is a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, Yol. 38, Texas L.Rev. 361 (1960). That there was no evidence to support the jury’s findings is evident from the record. The proper action for this court is to affirm the trial court’s finding of “no evidence” and granting of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See Tex.R.Civ.Pro. 434 and 301.
It is for these reasons that I dissent.