Court Opinion

ID: 9588243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:31:47.293585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:39.841408
License: Public Domain

Justice WALLER:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the evidence clearly establishes that the biological mother, Laura McCann, voluntarily signed a relinquishment form which complied with the statutory requirements set out by the Legislature. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 20-7-1700 & -1705 (Supp.2007). Because the relinquishment form complied with the statute, and McCann failed to prove duress or coercion, I would hold that the family court erred by revoking McCann’s consent to the adoption.
“Relinquishment” is defined as:
[T]he informed and voluntary release in writing of all parental rights with respect to a child by a parent to a child placing agency or to a person who facilitates the placement of a child for the purpose of adoption and to whom the parent has given the right to consent to the adoption of the child.
S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1650(h) (Supp.2007).9 Withdrawal of any consent or relinquishment is permitted only when the court finds10 the withdrawal is in the best interests of the child and the consent or relinquishment was given involuntarily or was obtained under duress or through coercion. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1720 (Supp.2007).
*392The majority concludes that the evidence showed McCann’s “emotional stressors and suffering caused impaired functioning,” which in turn rendered her relinquishment involuntary. However, an action is involuntary when it is performed under duress, force, or coercion,11 and the crux of this case really is whether McCann acted while under duress. As noted by the majority opinion, duress is “ ‘a condition of mind produced by improper external pressure or influence that practically destroys the free agency of a party and causes [her] to do an act or form a contract not of [her] own volition.’ ” Phillips v. Baker, 284 S.C. 134, 137, 325 S.E.2d 533, 535 (1985) (emphasis added, citation omitted).
In my opinion, there is no compelling evidence that McCann’s “emotional stressors” were anything but internal in nature.12 Therefore, although I would agree with the family court’s conclusion that McCann was in an emotional state, the family court erred in finding her consent was given involuntarily. Circumstances such as temporary depression or emotional distress simply are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to invalidate a consent to adoption. See, e.g., In re J.N., 123 Wash.App. 564, 95 P.3d 414, 419 (2004) (“emotional stress alone does not vitiate an otherwise voluntary decision to relinquish parental rights”), review denied, 154 Wash.2d 1003, 114 P.3d 1198 (2005); Boatwright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d 237, 242-43 (Ky.Ct.App.1986) (consent to adoption will not be revoked based upon emotional distress or temporary depression; a showing of fraud or duress is required); Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 42 Ill.App.3d 39, 355 N.E.2d 361, 363-65 (1976) (where the 19-year-old biological mother was experiencing “a great deal of stress,” the court nonetheless reversed the lower court’s finding of duress because there was no evidence that her consent to adoption was the product of “third party persuasion, inducement, deception, or domination”), aff'd 68 Ill.2d 419, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858 (1977).
*393Moreover, to suggest that because others offered support to McCann regarding her adoption decision, this encouragement somehow acted to coerce McCann into signing the relinquishment is a sad commentary, indeed. Support for a parent’s choice to place a baby for adoption is something that should be promoted, although clearly the decision should never be forced upon a parent.13
Furthermore, there is significant evidence which clearly refutes the idea that McCann was in any way coerced to give up her baby for adoption. For example, McCann herself: (1) initially raised the issue of adoption to her nurses and postpartum obstetrician; (2) requested information about adoption agencies from the social worker; (3) called the private adoption agency and arranged a meeting with Helen Duschinski for the next day at the hospital; and (4) called Duschinski when she was late arriving and gave her directions to the hospital.
Duschinski eventually arrived with the Does’ attorney, Rick Corley, and another attorney, Hector Esquivel. However, only Esquivel and the social worker remained in the hospital room with McCann while Esquivel went over all the forms in detail. McCann thereafter signed various documents.
Of most importance to the instant case is the relinquishment form, which was entitled “CONSENT TO ADOPTION.” As previously mentioned, and as conceded by the majority, this form complied with the statutory requirements.14 See §§ 20-7-1700 & -1705. The purpose of these statutes is “to ensure that birth parents freely and voluntarily consent to relinquish *394their particular child, and do not do so under conditions of duress.” Doe v. Clark, 318 S.C. 274, 277, 457 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1995) (Waller, J., dissenting).
The main reason this particular form is so crucial is because, under South Carolina law, there simply is no waiting period before a relinquishment of parental rights becomes effective. It is the Legislature, not this Court, that has made this pronouncement. “ ‘The legal rules on the timing of consents are ultimately a compromise between the interest in protecting biological mothers from making hasty or ill-informed decisions at a time of great physical and emotional stress, and the interest in expediting the adoption process for newborns.’ ” Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time To Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents To The Adoption Of Their Newborn Infants, 72 Tenn. L.Rev. 509, 541 (2005) (citation omitted).
The Legislature has chosen to safeguard this difficult decision-making process with certain requirements regarding both the “form and content” of a consent or relinquishment form and the process employed at the actual signing of the form. See §§ 20-7-1700 & -1705. There are numerous other states that, unlike South Carolina, provide for various waiting and/or revocation periods.15 Nonetheless, this Court simply is not empowered “to effect a change in the statutes enacted by the Legislature.” State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 120, 529 S.E.2d 20, 27 (2000).
In other words, although it might seem unwise that under South Carolina law a biological parent does not have even a few days to retract such an important decision as relinquishing one’s rights to her own child, this Court may not “second guess the wisdom or folly of decisions of the Legislature.” Id. *395at 121, 529 S.E.2d 20, 27 (citing Keyserling v. Beasley, 322 S.C. 83, 86, 470 S.E.2d 100, 101 (1996)).
The Legislature has set the parameters for adoption. Thus, in order to have her consent to adoption withdrawn, McCann was required to prove her “relinquishment was given involuntarily or was obtained under duress or through coercion.” § 20-7-1720. Because it is my opinion McCann did not make such a showing, I would reverse the family court’s order revoking McCann’s consent to the adoption.

. I focus on the term “relinquishment” because this is "commonly used to refer to a mother's surrender of parental rights to an adoption agency that will place the child with adoptive parents.” Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time To Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers' Consents To The Adoption Of Their Newborn Infants, 72 Tenn. L.Rev. 509, 511 n. 5 (2005).

. On appeal from the family court, this Court may find facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Phillips v. Baker, 284 S.C. 134, 325 S.E.2d 533 (1985).

. Black's Law Dictionary 574 (6th ed.1991).

. I certainly do not contend that any emotions McCann felt were not real, were in any way insignificant, or were her fault. I focus instead on the fact that these emotional pressures clearly were not generated or caused by the people around her, and therefore do not meet the pressures required by the legal definition of duress.

. See In re Comm'r of Soc. Servs., Suffolk County, 141 A.D.2d 821, 529 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.App.Div.1988). In this New York case, the appellate court appropriately rejected the birth mother's claim that her consent to adoption had been coerced even though the pregnancy was the result of a rape. Notably, the court found that her husband's encouragement “did not render the circumstances coercive nor did his entreaties impair her ability to exercise her free will." Icl. at 884; see also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 23 Ariz.App. 50, 530 P.2d 896, 898-99 (1975) (although birth mother's church official advised her in the hospital to "release the baby for adoption,” this did not constitute duress).

. In addition, although not specifically required by statute, the form expressly stated the following: "I understand that there is no revocation period during which I may withdraw this consent, and that the consent is effective immediately upon my signing the consent.”

. An interesting example is Vermont where a biological parent may not even execute a relinquishment until at least 36 hours after the baby is born and then may revoke the relinquishment within 21 days after the relinquishment was executed. See 15A Vt. Stat. Ann. § 2-404(a) (2002); see generally, Cynthia Ellen Szejner, Note, Intercountry Adoptions: Are The Biological Parents' Rights Protected?, 5 Wash. U. Global Stud. L.Rev. 211, 214 & n. 24 (2006) (where the author notes the "length of time that adoption statutes allow for a birth parent to revoke consent to the adoption varies among the States” and also cites 39 different state statutes, most of which have a time period during which consent may be revoked without a showing of fraud or duress).