Court Opinion

ID: 9388879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 21:03:58.448649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.504739
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211079-U

                                           No. 1-21-1079

                                     Order filed April 21, 2023

                                                                                   FIFTH DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                           IN THE
                                APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                  FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                   )      Appeal from the
                                                         )      Circuit Court of
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                             )      Cook County.
                                                         )
  v.                                                     )      No. 17 CR 11818
                                                         )
  RINNELL MALLORY,                                       )      Honorable
                                                         )      Michele M. Pitman,
         Defendant-Appellant.                            )      Judge presiding.

       JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Lyle and Navarro concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1     Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction of being an armed habitual criminal where the
       trial court did not err in giving a jury instruction regarding the use of defendant’s prior
       convictions.

¶2     Defendant Rinnell Mallory appeals his conviction as an armed habitual criminal. Mallory

raises a single issue: did the trial court err in providing a jury instruction on the limited use of a

defendant’s prior convictions because the instruction improperly highlighted his prior convictions?

For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3     In July 2017, Detective E. Muhammad pulled over a black Maserati for obstructing traffic

near a night club in Harvey, Illinois. He approached the driver, Rinnell Mallory, and asked for his
No. 1-21-1079

license and proof of insurance. Mallory handed the detective his driver’s license but could not find

proof of insurance. While Mallory searched for his insurance card, Officer Kant arrived to assist.

When Mallory could not produce proof of insurance, Detective Muhammad asked him to turn off

the vehicle and step out, informing Mallory that, under a village ordinance, the vehicle had to be

towed for lack of proof of insurance. Mallory turned off the ignition but did not step out.

¶4     When he did not comply with the order several more times, the detective opened the

driver’s side door and immediately observed a gun on Mallory’s left side, near his leg. Detective

Muhammad verbally notified Officer Kant of the gun and drew his own gun. Detective Muhammad

and Mallory fought over the gun as Mallory restarted the vehicle, which accelerated forward about

10 to 20 feet before colliding into two parked cars. Mallory eventually let go of the gun, and

Detective Muhammad arrested him. Detective Muhammad transported Mallory to the Harvey

police station and interviewed him. In a videotaped statement, Mallory admitted that the gun found

in the vehicle was his. The State charged Mallory with being an armed habitual criminal. 720 ILCS

5/24-1.7(a) (West 2016).

¶5     At trial, Mallory testified to a wholly different version of the event: On the night of the

arrest, Mallory borrowed a Maserati from a family friend and drove to the night club. The club had

set up traffic cones for cars to drive into the parking lot, and Mallory joined the line of cars and

waited to park. While Mallory sat in the vehicle, Detective Muhammad, in his police car, pulled

up next to him and told him to get out of the line. Mallory drove out of the line, and the detective

walked up to Mallory and insisted that he step out of the vehicle. When Mallory asked what he

had done wrong, Detective Muhammad said, “I’m the cop, you listen to what I say, get the F out

of the car.” After explaining to the detective that the vehicle belonged to a family friend, Mallory

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No. 1-21-1079

asked if he could reach for his insurance card in the glove compartment. As Mallory did so,

Detective Muhammad grabbed him through the window, and Mallory’s foot released the brake.

As a result, the vehicle “went two feet and hit a little car.” Detective Muhammad took Mallory out

of the vehicle and handcuffed him. The officers then searched the vehicle for five to ten minutes

and came over to Mallory with a gun, asking if the gun belonged to him. Mallory denied it.

According to Mallory, at the police station, he again denied that the gun belonged to him.

¶6      The parties entered a stipulation that Mallory had two qualifying felony convictions for

the purpose of proving an element of the armed habitual criminal charge. Both convictions were

from 2005.

¶7     At the jury instruction conference, the State offered a modified version of Illinois Pattern

Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.13X (approved Oct. 17, 2014), instructing the jury on the use of

prior convictions. The defense counsel objected to the instruction because it highlighted that

Mallory has prior convictions. The trial court gave the instruction over the defense objection.

¶8     The jury found Mallory guilty of being an armed habitual criminal. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)

(West 2016). The trial court denied Mallory’s subsequent posttrial motions for a new trial and

sentenced Mallory to 10 years’ imprisonment. This timely appeal followed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606 (eff.

Mar. 12, 2021).

¶9     Mallory argues that the trial court erred in giving IPI Criminal No. 3.13X jury instruction

because the instruction unduly emphasized Mallory’s prior convictions and had a high probability

of confusing the jury. “The sole function of jury instructions is to convey to the jury the correct

principles of law applicable to the evidence submitted to it in order that, having determined the

final state of facts from the evidence, the jury may, by the application of proper legal principles,

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No. 1-21-1079

arrive at a correction conclusion according to the law and the evidence.” People v. Pinkney, 322

Ill. App. 3d 707, 717 (2000). Generally, we will reverse a trial court’s determination about what

instruction to give only if the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Rodriguez, 387 Ill. App.

3d 812, 821 (2008).

¶ 10    Mallory concedes that he forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in his posttrial motion and

seeks review under the plain-error doctrine. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007) (“[A]

defendant forfeits review of any supposed jury instruction error if he does not object to the

instruction or offer an alternative at trial and does not raise the issue in a posttrial motion.”). Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013) provides that “substantial defects [in jury

instructions in criminal cases] are not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto if the

interests of justice require.” Rule 451(c)’s exception to the forfeiture rule applies “when there is a

grave error or when the case is so factually close that fundamental fairness requires that the jury

be properly instructed.” People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2004). This rule is coextensive with the

plain-error doctrine of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a). Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564; see also

People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 175 (2005) (Rule 451(c) and Rule 615(a) are construed

identically).

¶ 11    Under the plain-error doctrine, a reviewing court will review a “clear or obvious error” that

is otherwise forfeited in two circumstances: “(1) where the evidence in the case is so closely

balanced that the jury’s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence; or

(2) where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair

trial.” People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 489 (2009). Mallory limits his request for plain-error

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No. 1-21-1079

review to the closely balanced prong. The first step of this analysis is to determine whether an

error occurred at all. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010).

¶ 12   Mallory contends that it was error to give IPI Criminal No. 3.13X as modified by the State.

This pattern instruction relates to the admissibility of a defendant’s prior conviction when this

prior conviction is an essential element of the charged crime, as is the case here. IPI Criminal No.

3.13X, Committee Note (approved Oct. 17, 2014). When the defendant testifies at his trial, the

instruction could be modified to inform the jury that the evidence of his prior conviction is

admissible as substantive evidence as well as for impeachment purposes. Id.

¶ 13   Here, Mallory testified at the trial, but he could not be impeached by his prior convictions

because the convictions were older than 10 years. See People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516

(1971) (“Evidence of a conviction *** is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has

elapsed since the date of conviction ***.”). The State removed reference to admissibility of prior

convictions for impeachment purposes from the instruction and offered a modified version:

       “Ordinarily, evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction of an offense may not be considered

       by you as evidence of his guilt of the offense with which he is charged. However, in this

       case, because the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the proposition that the

       defendant has previously been convicted of a qualifying offense, you may consider

       evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction of the qualifying offense only for the purpose

       of determining whether the State has proved that proposition.”

¶ 14   This instruction, as given, clearly and accurately conveyed the applicable law to the jury.

In light of an additional jury instruction regarding the elements of the crime and the stipulated

evidence of Mallory’s two qualifying felonies, IPI Criminal No. 3.13X informed the jury how to

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No. 1-21-1079

view Mallory’s prior convictions in light of the crime charged. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(a) (eff. Apr.

8, 2013) (“Whenever [IPI Criminal] contains an instruction applicable in a criminal case ***, and

the court determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, the IPI Criminal instruction

shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law.”); Hopp, 209

Ill. 2d at 7. Given that Mallory could not be impeached due to the age of his prior convictions, the

instruction limited the use of his prior convictions to determining whether the State had proved the

element beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 15   Mallory’s reliance on cases involving a different pattern instruction, IPI Criminal No. 3.13,

is misplaced. IPI Criminal No. 3.13 concerns evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction for

impeachment, and it requires that the instruction be given “only at the request of the defendant”

when there has been impeachment by prior conviction. IPI Criminal No. 3.13, Committee Note

(approved Oct. 17, 2014). Thus, IPI Criminal No 3.13 is an instruction only available at the

defendant’s request—whereas No. 3.13X contemplates giving the instruction without the

defendant’s request, when the defendant does testify at trial. See People v. Lewis, 2014 IL App

(1st) 122126, ¶ 16 (IPI Criminal No. 3.13X instruction given as suggested by the trial court).

Accordingly, there was no error, let alone plain error, in giving IPI Criminal No. 3.13X to the jury.

¶ 16   Alternatively, even if there was error, the evidence in this case is not so closely balanced.

Evidence may be closely balanced when a case turns on a credibility determination between

conflicting testimony. People v. Scott, 2020 IL App (1st) 180200, ¶ 51 (citing People v. Sebby,

2017 IL 119445, ¶ 63). However, there is no “credibility contest” where, as here, one party’s

version of events is unrefuted, implausible, or corroborated by other evidence. Id. Officer Kant’s

testimony that he heard Detective Muhammad yelling “gun” and saw him and Mallory fighting

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No. 1-21-1079

over the gun inside the vehicle corroborated Detective Muhammad’s account. Photographs of the

vehicles into which Mallory’s vehicle collided during the struggle as well as Mallory’s videotaped

statement, which the jury heard, also confirmed the State’s case. Under a commonsense approach

based on the context of the case (Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 53), the evidence was not closely

balanced.

¶ 17   Accordingly, the trial court did not commit plain error, or any error, in giving the modified

pattern instruction, IPI Criminal No. 3.13X.

¶ 18   The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 19   Affirmed.

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