Court Opinion

ID: 9863043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:57:04.032191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:41.109253
License: Public Domain

Justice ALBIN,
concurring.
The school children of this State possess the “fundamental right” to a thorough and efficient system of public education. *467Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 147, 351 A.2d 713 (1975) (Robinson IV). That right is guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution and, like other fundamental rights, cannot be denied based on “the vicissitudes of political controversy” or the outcome of a poll. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1185, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 1638 (1943). Whether the children before us receive the benefit of their right to a thorough and efficient education may determine their future, indeed whether they “may reasonably be expected to succeed in life” itself. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873, 880 (1954).
Because the judiciary’s obligation to protect individual rights is as old as the republic, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 2 L.Ed. 60, 71 (1803), the challenge to our Court is not a new one. It is a challenge not to sacrifice the rights of some affected group—here, the disadvantaged children of this State—-because of the felt necessities of the moment. If the children before us are denied their right to a constitutionally adequate education, it is not a right that can be reclaimed after they drop out of school or graduate without having received the learning and skills they need to succeed as citizens.
At the direction of this Court, a Special Master, the Honorable Peter E. Doyne, A.J.S.C., conducted a hearing to determine whether the State’s failure to meet the funding requirements of the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA), L. 2007, c. 260 (N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -63), is denying disadvantaged children throughout this State a thorough and efficient education as measured by the Core Curriculum Content Standards mandated by state law. At the hearing, the Education Law Center, counsel for the children in the former Abbott districts, served in effect as the equitable representative of all at-risk children in the State. Based on the testimony and evidence before him, Judge Doyne held that the State’s underfunding of SFRA, particularly in school districts operating below their “adequacy” budgets, is depriving disadvantaged children of their right to a constitutionally adequate edu*468cation. The record before us amply supports Judge Doyne’s conclusion.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, 72% of the State’s at-risk students lived in the 205 school districts that were funded below their adequacy budgets. The six school superintendents who testified before Judge Doyne were representative of those school districts, districts with high, medium, and low concentrations of disadvantaged children. Those school districts were constitutionally shortchanged in the amount of $972,930,819 for FY 2011 under SFRA. We cannot undo the past for the affected at-risk children; we can remediate their future. I would order funding at the levels required under SFRA for the coming school year for those 205 school districts.
I agree with Justice LaVeechia that this Court in Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140, 971 A.2d 989 (2009) (Abbott XX), would not have relieved the State of its obligations to the Abbott districts if it knew that the State would not honor its funding commitments to those districts under SFRA.1 Therefore, I concur that those districts are entitled to funding as promised under SFRA However, I believe that Justice LaVeechia’s remedy—fully funding just the 31 former Abbott districts—is not sufficient to meet the constitutional violations found by Judge Doyne. The at-risk children in the 187 underfunded non-Abbott districts suffer from the same disadvantages of poverty as the children in the former Abbott districts. Based on the charge given to him by this Court, Judge Doyne adjudicated the rights of all the disadvantaged children in the below-adequacy-funded districts.
My viewpoint, however, does not command a majority. I will not deny the remedy of a constitutionally adequate education to at-risk children in 31 districts because I believe the same remedy should be provided to at-risk children in 187 other districts. I *469therefore must join the remedy advanced in Justice LaVecchia’s opinion.
I.

Constitutional Guarantee of a Thorough and Efficient Education

The rights guaranteed in the New Jersey Constitution do not rise and fall with popular opinion; they do not flourish in the best of times and perish in the worst of times. The framers of our constitutional charters made the courts the guarantors of those rights, even when it may not be fashionable to do so. We cannot escape our constitutional responsibilities. Judicial review requires the courts, from time to time, to sit in judgment of the acts of another branch of government. A core judicial function is to construe the meaning of the Constitution and to make meaningful the rights given our citizens by the Constitution. That is a key piece in the structural framework of a constitutional democracy.
The drafters of the New Jersey Constitution made the provision of a public education a “fundamental right.” See Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. at 147, 351 A.2d 713. The Constitution’s Education Clause requires that “[t]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.” N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1. For more than thirty years, this Court has ruled that the poorest and most vulnerable children of this State, those mostly living in financially strapped urban areas, have a right to a constitutionally adequate education. See Abbott XX, supra, 199 N.J. at 144, 971 A.2d 989; Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 481, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (Robinson I). The litigation that bears the name Abbott v. Burke first came before this Court in the mid-1980s when children attending schools in Jersey City, Camden, East Orange, and Irvington filed suit, successfully challenging the constitutionality of the Public School Education Act of 1975. See Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 277-78 & n.1, 495 A.2d *470376 (1985) (Abbott I). Over time, the Abbott litigation expanded to include children in 31 school districts who demanded a thorough and efficient education. See Abbott v. Burke, 196 N.J. 544, 555 n.5, 960 A.2d 360 (2008) (Abbott XIX). Decades of school-funding litigation led this Court to issue “numerous remedial orders to enforce the constitutional rights of the pupils in the Abbott districts.” Abbott XX, supra, 199 N.J. at 148, 971 A.2d 989.
But the rights of children outside the 31 Abbott school districts—also poor and disadvantaged—were not addressed in the Abbott litigation because they were not involved in the case. That seemed unfair to many. In 2009, on motion by the State, this Court upheld the constitutionality of SFRA—an Act “designed[ ] as a state-wide unitary system of education funding” to address the needs of at-risk children everywhere in the State, not just those in the Abbott districts. Id. at 147, 971 A.2d 989. In doing so, we relieved the State of having to adhere to the remedial orders that provided special funding to the Abbott children. Id. at 175, 971 A.2d 989. Indeed, the new Act abolished the designation of Abbott districts. See id. at 168-69, 971 A.2d 989.
This Court found SFRA constitutional “premised on the expectation that the State [would] continue to provide school funding aid during this and the next two years at the levels required by SFRA’s formula each year.” Id. at 146, 971 A.2d 989. The State committed that SFRA would enable schools to deliver the Core Curriculum Content Standards (sometimes referred to as CCCS) to their students and thus provide a thorough and efficient education. See id. at 170-71, 971 A.2d 989.
All three branches of government acknowledge that the benchmark for providing a thorough and efficient education is the teaching of the Core Curriculum Content Standards. See N.J.S. A. 18A:7F-44(q) (stating that students’ “access to a constitutional education [is] defined by the core curriculum standards”); N.J.A.C. 6A:8-1.3 (stating that CCCS, as adopted by State Board of Education, are standards “established for the provision of a thorough and efficient education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-4”); *471Abbott XIX, supra, 196 N.J. at 562, 960 A.2d 360 (stating that CCCS “provide[] a constitutionally acceptable definition of a thorough and efficient education”).
The Core Curriculum Content Standards “describe the knowledge and skills all New Jersey students are expected to acquire by benchmark grades.” N.J.A.C. 6A:8-1.3. These standards—identified by the State Board of Education, ibid.—comprise nine academic areas: “the visual and performing arts, comprehensive health and physical education, language arts literacy, mathematics, science, social studies, world languages, technological literacy, and 21st century life and careers.” N.J AC. 6A:8-1.1(a)(1). The constitutionality of SFRA hinged on the State “ensuring that the formula provide[d] those resources necessary for the delivery of State education standards across the State.” Abbott XX, supra, 199 N.J. at 170, 971 A.2d 989.
Having found SFRA’s funding formula constitutional, it appeared that this Court’s long intercession in the school-funding controversies brought before us had come to an end. The following year, however, in balancing the budget, the Legislature enacted an appropriations bill that cut 1.601 billion dollars from the school-funding formula set forth in SFRA. The Education Law Center (ELC) then filed an action in aid of litigant’s rights, seeking an order requiring the State to fund SFRA, as promised. The ELC argued that the short-funding of SFRA constituted a deprivation of the constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education to all at-risk children throughout the State—not just Abbott children. The State countered that dire fiscal circumstances—one of the reasons it advanced for our holding SFRA constitutional—was now a compelling reason not to fully fund the Act.
After initially hearing oral argument on the ELC’s motion, the Court decided that the record before it was inadequate to rule on so important an issue. Based on argument alone, without the presentation of facts, we could not assess whether the underfunding of SFRA violated the constitutional guarantee of a thorough *472and efficient education. We therefore remanded the matter to a Special Master, the Honorable Peter E. Doyne, A.J.S.C., to determine “whether school funding through SFRA, at current levels, can provide for the constitutionally mandated thorough and efficient education for New Jersey school children.” Our remand Order to Judge Doyne specifically noted: “[T]he Court’s determination that SFRA’s funding formula was constitutional, on its face, [was] predicated on the express assumption that SFRA would be fully funded and adjusted as its terms prescribed, Abbott XX, supra, 199 N.J. at 170, 971 A.2d 989.” .
The remand Order further stated that,
because our previous holding expressly was based on the assumption of full funding, see Abbott XX, supra, 199 N.J. at 175 [971 A.2d 989], the State must bear the burden of demonstrating that the present level of school funding distributed through the SFRA formula can provide for a thorough and efficient education as measured by the comprehensive core curriculum standards in districts with high, medium, and low concentrations of disadvantaged pupils.
No school district was permitted to intervene in this action, although we did grant amicus-curiae status to a number of districts, including Piscataway and Montgomery Townships.2
II.

Remand Hearing

Our remand Order charged the Special Master with the task of determining whether the FY 2011 funding of SFRA at 1.601 billion dollars below the statutory formula met the constitutional mandate of a thorough and efficient education for New Jersey school districts with high, medium, and low concentrations of disadvantaged children. Judge Doyne took testimony from six school superintendents, whose school budgets were all below the “ade*473quacy” level set forth in SFRA.3 He also heard the opinion of three experts and reviewed thousands of documents. Judge Doyne concluded that the underfunding of SFRA denied disadvantaged children, in at least 205 school districts, a constitutionally adequate education. This is the testimony that led him to that conclusion.
Richard Tardalo, the superintendent of the City of Clifton school district, testified that the 38% reduction in state aid from the SFRA formula (approximately 13 million dollars) in a district where 42% of the students are at risk made it impossible to deliver the CCCS to all its students. The district was forced to eliminate: basic-skills instructors who assisted students not achieving proficiency in math or literacy; administrative aids who ensured student safety; supervisors for science, physical education, and social studies; and all guidance counselors in the elementary schools, and two in the high school. These reductions led to increased class sizes in the elementary and secondary schools and adversely affected the ability to provide the CCCS to students, according to the superintendent.
Tardalo explained that in more than one half of the schools in Clifton, a large percentage of students were not meeting proficiency in the CCCS. For example, in one elementary school less than 50% of the students reached proficiency level, and at the middle-school level approximately 50% did not achieve that level. Roughly 30% of students failed the High School Proficiency Assessment examination. Tardalo concluded that the district was not providing a “21st century education for all of our students.”
*474Harry Victor Gilson, the superintendent of the City of Bridge-ton school district, testified that a total of forty-five teacher positions were eliminated in this former Abbott district where 89.3% of the children are classified as at risk. Bridgeton received 18% less in state aid (over 13 million dollars) than under the SFRA formula. The loss of teachers resulted in increased class sizes, decreased course offerings, and interfered with the district’s ability to provide the CCCS. Because Bridgeton has a high concentration of students mired in poverty, Gilson maintained that students were hobbled with disadvantages that required additional staffing. Gilson reported that Bridgeton cannot deliver the CCCS to its students, and has been unable to do so for several years. The budget cuts, he reasoned, are widening the achievement gap.
Walter Whitaker, the superintendent of Buena Regional school district, testified that the 21% reduction in state aid (almost 5 million dollars) required the elimination of five high-school, four middle-school, and four elementary-school teachers. The at-risk population of students in the district is 48%. The budget cuts have led to a “horrific” increase in class sizes, according to Whitaker. He explained that Buena was failing to deliver the CCCS for its disadvantaged children for the current year and that although the district had failed to do so in past years, the achievement gap was worsening. In short, Buena was falling further behind in enabling its students to acquire proficiency in the CCCS.
Robert L. Copeland, the superintendent of the Piscataway Township school district, testified that twenty-one teacher positions were eliminated in a district where 27% of the students are at risk. Piscataway received 40% less in state aid (approximately 8 million dollars) than under the SFRA formula. Given the cuts, Copeland indicated that it would be “incredibly difficult” for many of his students to achieve proficiency in one of the subject areas of the CCCS. In a graphic illustration, Copeland alluded to the budget cuts falling most heavily on the disadvantaged children: “[Tjhere are some kids who are ... bom on third base. They *475walk in and they’re able to do everything they’re supposed to do. I have a bunch of kids having a hard time getting out of the dugout. I’m worried about the kids who it doesn’t come easy for and what we’re not able to do for them.”
John A. Crowe, the superintendent for the Woodbridge Township school district—30% of whose children are at risk—testified that as a result of the 44% reduction in state aid from the SFRA formula (14 million dollars), five elementary-school guidance counselors, all elementary-school computer teachers, and three district-wide substance-abuse counselors were terminated. Moreover, there are no longer librarians and security guards in the middle schools. Business technology and social-studies course offerings were reduced, and students from grades six to eight only received instruction in world languages for just part of the year—an approach inconsistent with proficiency requirements of the CCCS. Crowe concluded that due to lack of resources, Woodbridge could not deliver the CCCS to many of its students, despite the district’s best efforts.
Earl Kim, the superintendent for Montgomery Township school district, testified that the district received 71% less in state aid (approximately 4.5 million dollars) than under the SFRA formula. Montgomery has an at-risk student population of 2.5%, smaller than the other districts. Nevertheless, the budget cuts still directly affected disadvantaged students. The program that helped failing students make progress toward proficiency in the CCCS was reduced. Although the number of students in need of academic support almost tripled in one year to 120, those students are no longer receiving the support they received in past years due to the cuts in state aid. Kim concluded that the loss of state aid affected the district’s ability to deliver the CCCS and provide a thorough and efficient education, and that the district would feel the deleterious effects in the years to come.
The ELC presented as an expert witness Melvyn Wyns, who served for thirteen years as Director of the Office of School Finance in the New Jersey Department of Education. He testi*476fied that the 205 districts funded below their adequacy budgets were not financially capable of providing their students with proficiency in the CCCS.
Based on the testimony and documents presented at trial,4 Judge Doyne observed that “despite the best effort of the superintendents, the [Core Curriculum Content Standards] are not being met at existing funding levels. The loss of teachers, support staff and programs is causing less advanced students to fall farther behind and they are becoming demonstrably less proficient.” He did not find that the districts were misallocating the limited monies available to them. Indeed, to the contrary, the district superintendents “attempted to resolve the difficulties of instituting reductions as fairly as possible while still complying with their mandate to provide a thorough and efficient education consistent with the CCCS.”
Judge Doyne found that the 1.601 billion-dollar reduction in state aid contained in the FY 2011 Appropriations Act—a 19% reduction from the previous year—fell most “significantly” on the most vulnerable districts. Judge Doyne held that the extensive cuts in state aid—the underfunding of SFRA—denied disadvantaged children their constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education as measured by the Core Curriculum Content Standards.
III.

Constitutional Violation

The 581 school districts in New Jersey teach 1,366,271 students. In all, 205 school districts—36.6% of all the State’s school districts—were funded below adequacy in FY 2011. Those districts teach 54% of the students in the State. Of all the at-risk students in the State, 72% reside in those 205 districts. Judge Doyne *477credited the testimony of the six superintendents, all of whom served in districts that were funded below their adequacy budgets. All six described how cuts in state aid in violation of the SFRA formula impaired—and, in most cases, rendered impossible—their school districts’ ability to meet the CCCS. These six school-district superintendents represented a fair cross-section of districts with high, medium, and low concentrations of at-risk children funded below their adequacy budgets. Judge Doyne also credited the testimony of Melvyn Wyns, the State’s long-time Director of School Finance, who stated that the 205 districts funded below their adequacy budgets cannot provide a thorough and efficient education to their students.
In his findings of fact, Judge Doyne concluded that school districts that were funded under their adequacy budgets were not able to provide proficiency in the CCCS to at-risk children. The educational deprivations detailed by Judge Doyne were not trivial or inconsequential; they were systemic. This Court is required to defer to the factual determinations of the Special Master so long as they are “supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.” Abbott XX, supra, 199 N.J. at 146 n.2, 971 A.2d 989 (quotation and citation omitted); accord State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 98, 943 A.2d 114 (2008).5 Judge Doyne’s factfindings are supported by credible evidence in the record.
Based on those factfindings, the State is in violation of its constitutional obligation to provide a thorough and efficient education to the at-risk children in 205 school districts statewide. Cf. Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 513, 303 A.2d 273 (“A system of instruction in any district of the State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional command.”). Neither the State nor the ELC provided any testimony from school superintendents representing districts funded above their adequacy budgets. The record, therefore, cannot support a finding that state-*478aid cuts in violation of the SFRA formula for districts above adequacy (excepting the former Abbott districts) amounted to a constitutional violation.
The fiscal problems facing the State were not addressed by Judge Doyne. Those problems are real and daunting. But they do not transform a constitutionally inadequate education into a constitutionally adequate one. More than three decades ago, it was suggested that the State could not remedy the unequal funding of education in poor urban districts because of “depressed economic conditions.” See Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. at 173, 351 A.2d 713 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Two years ago, the State successfully urged the Court to find the unitary funding formula of SFRA constitutional and not to order supplemental funding to the Abbott districts, in part, because of the dire fiscal troubles confronting the State. See Abbott XX, supra, 199 N.J. at 172-73, 971 A.2d 989. Now, also based on economic circumstances, we are asked to approve a breach of the SFRA formula that will deny at-risk children a constitutionally adequate education.
The State counsels that we stay our hand in deference to the other branches of government. That would be a proper approach had Judge Doyne found that the reduction in school funding did not significantly diminish the ability of the State to provide a constitutionally adequate education. But Judge Doyne found otherwise, based on credible testimony and documentary evidence. The record reveals that the constitutional rights of tens of thousands of children are being violated. In these circumstances, the Constitution does not permit this Court to stay its hand.
Children go to school for a finite number of years. They have but one chance to receive a constitutionally adequate education. That right, once lost, cannot be reclaimed. The loss of that right will have irreparable consequences, particularly for the disadvantaged children to whom SFRA was intended to give a fair chance at a thorough and efficient education.
This Court has recognized that “there is a significant connection between the sums expended and the quality of the educational *479opportunity ... notwithstanding that the impact upon students may be unequal because of other factors, natural or environmental.” Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 481, 303 A.2d 273. SFRA itself was premised on the correlation between spending per student—in particular the spending necessary to educate at-risk students—and the delivery of a thorough and efficient education. See Abbott XX, supra, 199 N.J. at 152-53, 971 A.2d 989. We are long past saying that money does not matter.
Moreover, this Court has rejected the argument that the State Constitution’s Appropriation Clause trumps a fundamental right in general, and the Education Clause in particular. Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. at 154, 351 A.2d 713; cf. City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 148-49, 411 A.2d 462 (1980) (stating that judiciary cannot compel funding of statutorily created rights). The securing of fundamental rights may, in certain circumstances, require the appropriation of funding. The State conceded at oral argument that the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel requires the State to appropriate monies for the representation of indigent criminal defendants. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 (1963); Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 285-86, 277 A.2d 216 (1971) (citations omitted). The implementation of Brown v. Board of Education, which brought tumbling down the walls of state-sponsored segregation in public education, came at a price—the expenditure of public funds. See 347 U.S. at 493-95, 74 S.Ct. at 691-92, 98 L.Ed. at 880-81.
Likewise, the Appropriation Clause cannot render a nullity “the mandate of the Education Clause”—the fundamental right to a constitutionally adequate education. See Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. at 154, 351 A.2d 713. The Constitution’s Education Clause begins with the language, “The Legislature shall provide....” N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Legislature cannot decide to withhold that which the Constitution mandates it must provide. Because a constitutionally adequate education is a fundamental right, “it follows that the court must *480afford an appropriate remedy to redress a violation” of the Education Clause. See Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. at 147, 351 A.2d 713 (quotation and citation omitted). “To find otherwise would be to say that our Constitution embodies rights in a vacuum, existing only on paper.” Ibid. (quotation and citation omitted).
The New Jersey Constitution is the supreme law of this State. Every branch of government, including the judiciary, is subordinate to its command. It is the judiciary’s unique responsibility, however, to be the final expositor of the Constitution’s meaning and the ultimate protector of the rights conveyed by the Constitution to the people. This is not a new concept. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers recognized that it is the duty of courts “to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void” and that the failure to do so would mean that “particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” See The Federalist Papers No. 78, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1976); accord Marbury, supra, 5 U.S. at 177-78, 2 L.Ed. at 73-74. At the time of the drafting of New Jersey’s modem Constitution, Governor Alfred E. Driscoll echoed Hamilton’s vision of the role of the judiciary, noting that “independent courts” were necessary “to curb any tendency on the part of the other two branches of government to exceed their constitutional authority.” 4 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1917, at 428-29.
In ordering that the State comply with our Constitution’s mandate under the Education Clause, our Court—although at odds with coordinate branches of government to which we ordinarily accord great deference—is fulfilling its historical role as the guarantor of fundamental rights.
IV.

Remedy

In Abbott XX, the legal landscape was forever altered when this Court upheld SFRA’s constitutionality. SFRA did not speak *481about Abbott districts, but about at-risk children, wherever they might reside in this State. See Abbott XX, supra, 199 N.J. at 168-69, 971 A.2d 989. SFRA’s constitutionality was “premised on the expectation that the State [would] continue to provide school funding aid during this and the next two years at the levels required by SFRA’s formula each year.” Id. at 146, 971 A.2d 989. There are no longer Abbott districts; there are only at-risk children, and they reside in every district.
The remedy in this case should flow naturally from the charge given to Judge Doyne by this Court. We have a finding that 205 school districts funded below their adequacy budgets under the SFRA formula are not able to provide a thorough and efficient education. Those school districts, therefore, should receive funding as required under the SFRA formula. That would accord with the mandate of our State Constitution’s Education Clause.6 I would go further than Justice LaVecchia and give relief beyond the 31 former Abbott districts.
At every stage in the present proceedings, the issue has been the constitutionality of the underfunding of SFRA with respect to at-risk children in school districts everywhere in the State. When the ELC filed its motion in aid of litigant’s rights, it sought an order “enjoining the State Defendants from ... providing State school funding aid to New Jersey school districts for [FY 2011] *482that is less than the aid levels required by” SFRA. At oral argument before this Court, the ELC indicated that, although it represented “Abbott plaintiffs,” under SFRA those plaintiffs were now “at-risk students,” and that the short-funding of SFRA violated the constitutional rights of all at-risk students in the State.
Clearly, with the Abbott designation stripped from our law, the ELC had the standing to assert the rights of these at-risk students. The at-risk children in the former Abbott districts share the same exact characteristics of at-risk children in other districts, particularly those with high concentrations of disadvantaged children. With the Abbott designation gone, and based on the remand Order of this Court, the ELC in my view became the equitable representative of all at-risk children in the State.
Our remand Order asked Judge Doyne to determine “whether school funding through SFRA, at current levels, can provide for the constitutionally mandated thorough and efficient education ... in districts with high, medium, and low concentrations of disadvantaged pupils.” In light of our remand Order, no school official could reasonably have understood that the present action involved only the 31 former Abbott districts. Of the six superintendents called to testify at the remand hearing by both the State and the ELC, only one represented a former Abbott district. If the interests of only former Abbott districts were at issue, it was a terrible waste of time for Judge Doyne to hear from superintendents representing the school districts of Clifton, Piscataway, Woodbridge, Montgomery, and Buena and to render a ruling addressing all school children, not just children in the former Abbott districts.7
*483Finding a constitutional violation of the rights of at-risk children in the former Abbott districts, while acquiescing to the violation of the constitutional rights of tens of thousands of similarly situated students in districts funded below their adequacy budgets, to my mind, is not a just solution. The redress of the rights of those students now must await a day when it may be too late for them to enjoy their right to a constitutionally adequate education.
V.

Conclusion

To remedy the constitutional violation to the children in the 205 schools districts that were funded under their adequacy budgets, I would require the State to abide by the SFRA formula. However, my viewpoint does not command a majority of the Court. I will not sacrifice relief for at-risk children in 31 school districts because I cannot bring relief—a constitutionally adequate education—to at-risk children in 187 other districts. I therefore join Justice LaVecchia’s remedy.

With full knowledge of the "dire fiscal circumstances” facing the State in 2009, the Attorney General suggested that this Court order full funding to the Abbott districts to ensure the constitutionality of SFRA.

 School boards from Bridgeton, Burlington, East Orange, Jersey City, Perth Amboy, Phillipsburg, and Trenton (all former Abbott districts) were denied permission to intervene, although they were permitted to argue as amici curiae. Based on a separate motion, the Court granted amicus status to school boards from Newark (a former Abbott District) as well as Montgomery Township and Piscataway Township, neither of which are former Abbott districts.

 Statutory law and administrative regulations make a direct connection between a school district's adequacy budget and the ability to deliver a thorough and efficient education to students. Cf. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-6(a), —44(i); N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-9.4, -9.5. An adequacy budget is calculated by determining the cost per pupil based on grade level and other significant characteristics. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-50 to -51. For example, SFRA accounts for the greater cost of educating at-risk students (those eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(j), -45) and children with limited English proficiency. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(i), -51.

 Judge Doyne rejected the testimony of the State's two experts, who suggested a lack of correlation between funding toward an adequacy budget and the attainment of a thorough and efficient education.

 The dissent does not faithfully adhere to this deferential standard of review. We are not permitted to cherry pick bits and pieces of testimony that, when viewed in isolation, might suggest a different or preferred outcome.

 Full compliance with SFRA in the current year would not have brought every school district to the objective of an adequacy budget, but would have moved underfunded districts closer to that goal. When we upheld the constitutionality of SFRA, we understood that it was a work in progress. See Abbott XIX, supra, 196 N.J. at 558, 960 A.2d 360. That SFRA in its first year would not have achieved an adequacy budget for every district did not render it unconstitutional. But here, the withholding of state aid has driven some districts below adequacy and other districts further from adequacy. Accordingly, I would only require the State to abide by the SFRA formula with respect to the 205 districts under adequacy. Having found SFRA constitutional, this Court does not have the power to remodel SFRA to require that every district, all at once, be funded to adequacy. Had the State complied with its own SFRA formula, those 205 districts would have received $972,930,819 in state aid during FY 2011. To bring all those districts to adequacy would have required $1,071,287,484.

 The dissenters joined the Order remanding for factfindings by Judge Doyne. Implicit in the Order's language was the understanding that this Court had the authority to decide whether the State was fulfilling its constitutional obligations under Abbott XX and to correct any constitutional deficiencies. Now the dissenters take the position that this Court, in the present action, is powerless to enforce both the Constitution and one of our opinions.
*483Moreover, the dissenters hold fast to the view that majority rules—except when they are in the minority. Two weeks ago, when the dissenters were part of a three-person majority, they spoke for the five-person Court. See He v. Miller, — N.J. —, — A.3d — (2011). Now that the dissenters are in the minority, suddenly a super majority must speak for a five-person Court. I concur with Justice LaVecchia's refutation of the dissenters' account today of what constitutes a majority to decide a motion.