Court Opinion

ID: 9737637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:31:07.19495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.399376
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 18.] As I have traveled along the path of sentencing review, I have encountered numerous sentences that have struck me as excessive. In reviewing the ten pages or more of the sentencing transcript in this case and other information in the record, this sentence, after an objective review, certainly, in my mind, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment no matter how you look at it. What is “cruel and usual punishment” has never been precisely defined. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 597-98, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642 (1958), Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court stated,
[t]he exact scope of the constitutional phrase “cruel and unusual” has not been detailed by this Court.... The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less -than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.... The Court [has] recognized ... that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
[¶ 19.] In concluding that this sentence is disproportionate to the crime committed, I can not erase from my mind other appeals that have come before this Court, such as the following cases.
[¶ 20.] In State v. Bonner, 1998 SD 30, 577 N.W.2d 575, Bonner was accused of breaking into a lock box at a party, stealing necklaces, a watch and several two dollar bills and engaging in sexual acts with several minor girls. Bonner, who was charged with third degree rape and second degree burglary, was sentenced to the maximum. punishment of two consecutive fifteen year prison terms. Bonner had no prior felony record and only a few lesser misdemeanors. On appeal, this Court held that the fifteen year sentence for burglary was grossly out of proportion to-the severity of the crime.
[¶ 21.] In State v. Lemley, 1996 SD 91, 552 N.W.2d 409, Lemley strangled a man after Lemley’s friend McClanahan beat him up. Both men left with the deceased’s wallet and car and fled to Sioux Falls. Lemley had a learning disability, a tenth grade education, a third grade reading level, math skills of a sixth grader and an inability to express himself in writing. Lemley was ultimately charged with first degree manslaughter after the murder and burglary charges were dismissed and was sentenced to 350 years in the South Dakota penitentiary. On appeal, we held that *812Lemley failed to establish that 350 years shocked the conscience of men generally because Lemley was eligible for parole on August 15, 2038 (age 64) and good time release on December 30, 2170. This Court further noted that “the sentencing court imposed a term of years rather than a life sentence to give Lemley an opportunity to rehabilitate himself. ‘[A] term of years allows for rehabilitation and allows [the defendant] hope.’ ” Id. at ¶ 15, 552 N.W.2d at at 413 (quoting State v. Ferguson, 519 N.W.2d 50, 54 (S.D.1994)).
[¶ 22.] In State v. Henjum, 1996 SD 7, 542 N.W.2d 760, Henjum was charged with first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter for shooting and killing his roommate. After pleading guilty to first degree manslaughter, Hen-jum was sentenced to forty-five years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary. On appeal, this Court opined that Henjum’s sentence did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
[¶ 23.] In State v. Chase in Winter, 534 N.W.2d 350 (S.D.1995), Chase in Winter took his 11 year old male cousin hostage at knife point and did many deplorable acts to him. Chase in Winter had been arrested eight prior times on juvenile delinquency charges, assault and battery, and tribal pickup orders. He ultimately pled guilty but mentally ill to kidnapping and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to 200 years for kidnapping and a concurrent fifteen years for aggravated assault. On appeal, this Court held that Chase in Winter’s sentence did not shock the conscience. We further held that while he was a “young first time felon”, he had had an extensive juvenile record whereby he had committed crimes which mirrored the crimes for which he was presently convicted. He pled guilty to avoid a possible life without parole sentence and received instead an opportunity for rehabilitation, therapy and parole eligibility at the age of forty-six.
[¶ 24.] In State v. Cragoe, 514 N.W.2d 396 (S.D.1994), Cragoe had committed numerous sexual contact offenses. While on probation for those offenses, he babysat for a five and eight year-old girl and sexually molested them. Cragoe was charged with six counts of first degree rape and four counts of sexual contact with a child under age sixteen. Cragoe was sentenced to concurrent 99 year penitentiary terms with thirty-four years conditionally suspended on each sentence. . He would be eligible for parole in ten years. This Court noted on appeal that Cragoe began molesting children at age fifteen and was twenty at the time of this sentencing. Further, based upon the gravity of offenses and his lack of remorse, the sentence did not shock the conscience or was so disproportionate to the crime to violate the Eighth Amendment.
[¶ 25.] In Ferguson, 519 N.W.2d 50, a karate instructor and volunteer in big brother/big sister developed relationships with eight young boys, ranging from ages eight to thirteen, who he later molested. Ferguson was charged with one count of rape and seven counts of contact with a minor. Ferguson was sentenced to 180 years in the penitentiary for rape. Ninety years of his sentence was conditionally suspended and an additional fifteen years was imposed for sexual contact with minors. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. We held on appeal that Ferguson’s sentence did not shock the conscience because he had pled guilty to avoid a life sentence without parole. Further, he had placed himself in a position of trust with the victims and then repeatedly sexually abused them.
[¶ 26.] Finally, in State v. Holloway, 482 N.W.2d 306 (S.D.1992), Holloway had drunken confrontation with a man in an alley which led to the stabbing death of the man. Holloway then took the man’s wallet and other property. Holloway was charged with first degree manslaughter and robbery and was sentenced to 121 years for manslaughter and twenty-five years for robbery, to be served consecutively for a total sentence of 146 years. *813This Court held on appeal that Holloway’s sentence did not shock the conscience because the sentence was well within the statutory limits and he could have received a life sentence without parole. Further, because he received a sentence for a term of years, he would be eligible for parole.
[¶ 27.] When imposing sentences after a plea or conviction, the court is required to draw a line to determine what the proper term would be and not whether or not imprisonment should be ordered. Under our pre-Bonner jurisprudence in Henjum, we have-held that when deciding a case under the old “shock the conscious” test, our Legislature determines the range of sentences, but where it has provided broad sentencing authority that “suggests that a term less than a life sentence[,][it] would be unlikely so shock the conscience of humankind.” See Henjum, 1996 SD 7, ¶ 8, 542 N.W.2d at 762. Even under our new “grossly disproportionate” rule, a sentence of less than mandatory life is not likely to shock any jurist.
[¶ 28.] In the case of Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1014-15, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2712, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 878 (1991), the United States Supreme Court, when ruling on an Eighth Amendment issue, stated:
“[T]his Court has ‘not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to “barbarous” methods that were generally outlawed in the 18th century,’ but instead has interpreted the Amendment ‘in a flexible and dynamic manner.’ ” In so doing, the Court has borne in mind Justice McKenna’s admonition in Weems v. United States, [217 U.S. 349, 373, 30 S.Ct. 544, 551, 54 L.Ed. 793, 801], that “[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.” [citations omitted.]
[¶ 29.] In this case, the finality of this life sentence, the other decisions involving lesser sentences for less severe or as severe offenses and the constitutional restriction against cruel and unusual punishment lead this writer to only one conclusion. “[A] life sentence was just that, a life sentence!.]” See Brim v. South Dakota Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 1997 SD 48, ¶ 19, 563 N.W.2d 812, 817. This life sentence without parole clearly constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The only medicine to help in changing or rehabilitating any individual seems to be the “hope” that he or she can again obtain their freedom by amending their attitude and ways. There should generally be a light at the end of the tunnel for any human no matter how bad he appears or how bad his past conduct reflects he is. Mr. Ganrude, when reviewing this record, has done very little to convince a court. that he is remorseful, sorry, or accepts the consequences of his deplorable conduct in this case. While he was not the only individual involved in commission of the deplorable acts for which he was charged, he certainly will be the only when spending the rest of his life incarcerated. It seems as though the result of this sentence is to cast this individual into the human waste dump and let him languish there until he finally totally decomposes and has gasped his last breath. I cannot agree that this should be the severity of the sentence and would hold that a light should remain on at the end of the tunnel for this individual.
[¶ 30.] I would reverse and remand for resentencing proceedings.