Court Opinion

ID: 9956876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 06:12:33.956685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:56.659269
License: Public Domain

Reversed, Rendered, and Opinion Filed March 26, 2024

                                    S   In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-01358-CV

 DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND HEALTH
             AND HOSPITAL SYSTEM, Appellant
                           V.
                MICHAEL BALLEW, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
                             Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. CC-20-04852-A

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
             Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Breedlove
                       Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
      Appellee Michael Ballew sued appellant Dallas County Hospital District d/b/a

Parkland Health and Hospital System (Parkland) for disability discrimination and

retaliation. Parkland filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. In

this interlocutory appeal, Parkland argues the trial court’s order is erroneous. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (allowing appeal from interlocutory

order denying plea to the jurisdiction by governmental unit). We reverse the trial

court’s November 30, 2022 Order Denying Defendant’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and
render judgment dismissing Ballew’s claims against Parkland for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction.

                                 BACKGROUND

      This proceeding arises from the 2019 termination of Ballew’s employment,

which he contends was the result of disability discrimination. Ballew began working

at Parkland in 2001 as the Accounts Receivable Audit Supervisor. By 2008, he had

been promoted to the position of Director of Patient Financial Services (PFS

Director). At that time, Ballew was one of three directors of patient financial

services, each with different functional responsibilities. The PFS Directors report

directly to the Senior Vice President (SVP) of Revenue Cycle, who in turn reports

to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Ballew was the PFS Director over “billing and

collections for third parties and patients, and customer relations related to” those

activities. According to Ballew, from June 2018 forward his responsibilities included

“collections, customer service, cash posting, refunds, cashiers, bank reconciliation,

reporting department, insurance update team, and scanning team.” Between 2015

and 2017, Ballew reported to Rhonda Miller, the SVP of Revenue Cycle.

I.    2016 Integrity Line Complaints

      In 2016, employees filed eleven complaints against Miller and Ballew (the

Integrity Line Complaints). Employees accused Miller and Ballew of: (1) displaying

favoritism and poor leadership; (2) retaliating against employees; and (3) engaging

in questionable billing and collection practices. Parkland’s human resources

                                        –2–
department, which is called the Officer of Talent Management (OTM), investigated

the Integrity Line Complaints. Art Ferrell, Parkland’s Director of Employee

Relations at the time, initially recommended Miller and Ballew be terminated. But

after discussions with senior leadership, the decision was made to administer a final

disciplinary action on Ballew rather than terminate him because “the general

consensus” was that Miller’s “domineering style” may have impacted Ballew. In

April 2017, Parkland terminated Miller. However, Ballew petitioned Parkland’s

President and Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Frederick Cerise, and he rescinded the

progressive discipline for Ballew.

II.   November 6, 2017 – Miller Replaced by Gerry Baker

      Between May 2017 and November 2017, Miller’s position remained vacant

as Parkland searched for a new CFO. In August 2017, Parkland hired Rick

Humphrey as CFO. On November 6, 2017, Humphrey hired Gerry Baker as SVP of

Revenue Cycle to replace Miller. According to Baker, he was hired to improve

Parkland’s revenue cycle management. Baker was also tasked with completing 2017

performance reviews for his direct reports, including Ballew. Those reviews covered

each employee’s performance between October 1, 2016, and September 30, 2017,

which was prior to Baker joining Parkland. Because he did not have firsthand

knowledge of the employees’ performance during that period, he largely adopted

Miller’s evaluation and ratings.

                                        –3–
         Ballew received his 2017 performance review on December 19, 2017. He

received an overall rating of “Solid Contribution,” which was consistent with his

2013 and 2015 reviews in which he also received an overall rating of “Solid

Contribution.” Baker included the following comment on the review:

         Overall, Michael has done a very good job managing the resources that
         he has had available to him. Focus areas for the upcoming year should
         be 1) developing staff[,] 2) updating policy and procedure documents
         so that they are relevant to how business is done today[,] 3) further
         improvement in key performance metrics (e.g., billed claims and
         DNB)[, and] 4) development of a formal Denials Management
         Program[.]

III.     Ballew’s June 2018 Hospitalization

         In June 2018, Ballew experienced symptoms of hypopnea, a severe arterial

obstruction. Ballew maintains he told Baker about his condition on June 30, 2018,

before beginning treatment at Parkland. Baker testified he did not know specifically

why Baker was hospitalized in June 2018. Ballew took paid time off (PTO) in June

and July 2018 to undergo treatment. According to Baker, Ballew did not seek

FMLA1 leave for that treatment and did not request an accommodation of any kind

or notify Parkland that he allegedly had a disability. Ballew also did not notify Baker

that his tasks were not complete due to taking leave.

IV.      Ballew’s 2018 Performance Review

         Ballew’s 2018 performance review covered the period between October 1,

2017, and September 30, 2018. Ballew received the review in December 2018. Baker

   1
       FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (1993).
                                                –4–
gave Ballew an overall rating of “Needs Improvement.” The performance review

addressed Ballew’s completion of performance goals assigned to him for the review

period and his leadership competencies. The three performance goals included in the

2018 review were:

           “Implement 2 process improvement initiative that originate from
            line staff through a new initiative to be developed to foster
            positive exchanging of ideas between leadership and staff.”

           “Implement quarterly huddle meetings to share organization
            updates and solicit new and innovative ideas to opportunities
            from all levels of the departments.”

           “Develop job descriptions and retain staff in areas of span of
            control--Denials Unit, Collections, Customer Service.”

Baker rated Ballew as “Needs Improvement” on each goal based on Ballew’s

implementation of one or fewer initiatives, implementation of three or less

documented huddle meetings, and developing 75% of job descriptions and

completing 75% of retraining. Baker made the following comments concerning his

review of the performance goals:

      Michael has several areas that need improvement as he lacks follow
      through and being responsive to internal and external requests for
      information or requests. One of his primary goals this year was to create
      a Denials Unit. It took many months to recruit and hire staff and
      deadlines were not met. He also has not followed through on engaging
      employees and being responsive to their development needs.

The performance review also rated Ballew on three leadership competencies: (1)

driving continuous improvement, (2) developing talent, and (3) driving performance

excellence. Baker rated Ballew as “Solid Contribution” for driving continuous

                                        –5–
improvement and “Needs Improvement” for the other competencies. He commented

that Ballew “has failed to drive performance excellence and motivate his staff to

achieve all that they can. He has not been able to resolve most conflicts when

presented to him.”

V.    The 2019 FMLA Leave

      In March 2019, Ballew needed surgery. Baker encouraged Ballew to seek

FMLA leave. Ballew applied for FMLA leave and was granted FMLA leave from

March 20, 2019, through May 5, 2019 (the 2019 FMLA Leave). According to Baker,

Ballew did not request any accommodation or notify Baker that he would be unable

to complete certain tasks due to the 2019 FMLA Leave. Baker recalls that, before

Ballew took the 2019 FMLA Leave, he “repeatedly” told Baker in their “weekly

one-on-one meetings that his projects were on track,” and Ballew did not notify

Baker “of any issues or complications that would prevent the completion of his

projects.”

VI.   Baker’s Discoveries During the 2019 FMLA Leave

      Baker covered Ballew’s responsibilities during the 2019 FMLA Leave. Baker

testified he was “appalled” by what he discovered “and the state of affairs on projects

[he] assigned to Ballew.” Between November 2017 and April 2018, Baker had

assigned Ballew the following projects:

      1.     Cancel a vendor contract with NThrive because Parkland had
             contracted with a replacement vendor;

                                          –6–
        2.      Develop a Denials Management Group dedicated to appealing
                insurance claim denials and hire six full-time employees to staff
                the group (the DMG Project);

        3.      Establish a procedure that would allow Parkland to send out
                invoices to self-pay patients (the Self-Pay Accounts Project);

        4.      Improve the abandonment rate for calls to the PFS call center;
                and

        5.      Improve his responsiveness to his team, customers, and other
                departments.

According to Baker, Ballew did not successfully complete any of the assigned tasks.

Baker testified those failures detrimentally impacted his efforts to improve

Parkland’s revenue cycle management and cost Parkland millions of dollars in lost

or delayed revenue.

        A.      Self-Pay Accounts Project

        Ballew’s handling of the Self-Pay Accounts Project was central to Parkland’s

decision to terminate Ballew. When Baker started at Parkland, the billing of and

collection from self-pay patients was outsourced to BCA, a third-party vendor. BCA

was a “soft collection”2 agency, as opposed to a “bad–debt” agency or collector.

BCA earned its fee by delivering a first round of statements to Parkland patients and

then collecting payments from those patients. Baker created the Self-Pay Accounts

    2
      Soft collections “refer to the process of collecting payment from patients before their medical bills
become delinquent. This collection strategy involves sending reminders and statements to patients who
have not paid their bills on time. Soft collections are less aggressive than hard collections, and they are
often used to prevent the need for legal action or other aggressive collection strategies.”
https://myrcmgroup.com/articles/what-is-the-difference-between-hard-and-soft-collections (last visited
March 26, 2024).
                                                   –7–
Project to reduce the amount of fees paid to third-party vendors like BCA to collect

from self-pay patients.

         According to Baker, most self-pay patients paid their bills within the first two

months of billing. He concluded the outsourcing fees could be reduced if Parkland,

rather than BCA, generated and sent out the first statement to patients when medical

services were complete and sent the second statement thirty days later if payment

was not received. Parkland would save money under this plan because paying BCA

for collections assistance would be limited to invoices that went unpaid beyond fifty-

five days, when BCA would take over collection efforts. Accounts would be sent to

a “bad-debt agency” if they remained unpaid more than 180 days.

         Baker delegated the Self-Pay Accounts Project to Ballew in April 2018

because Parkland’s contract with BCA was set to expire in June 2018. When the

contract with BCA expired, MiraMed3 became the new third-party vendor for self-

pay collections. Under the new process, Parkland would refer past-due accounts to

MiraMed at the fifty-five-day mark. MiraMed would then send statements to and try

to collect payment from those self-pay patients whose account remained unpaid from

day 56 until day 180. If the account remained unpaid for 180 days, MiraMed would

send the account back to Parkland, and then Parkland would send the account to a

“bad-debt agency.”

   3
       MiraMed, like BCA, is a “soft-collection” agency.
                                                  –8–
      Baker expected Ballew to have the Self-Pay Account Project completed and

the process in place by July 2018, so there would be no disruption in operations.

Because Parkland did not have the in-house ability to print and mail statements,

Parkland planned to utilize a third-party vendor, Exalt, to print and mail the first two

statements. During the Fall of 2018, Ballew coordinated with Parkland’s IT

department and Exalt to test the new process. During the testing period, Exalt was

allowed to print and mail no more than 500 statements per day. The cap was in place

to test Exalt’s capacity and to make sure the data was flowing correctly from

Parkland to Exalt. But the cap was supposed to be lifted once testing was complete

and Exalt’s capacity confirmed. The plan was for Exalt to print and mail 5,000

statements per day.

      But in April 2019, while Ballew was on FMLA leave, Baker discovered the

Self-Pay Accounts Project was never completed. Baker was informed that patients

who had never received a statement from Parkland were complaining about being

turned in to bad-debt collectors. When he began investigating those specific

complaints, he discovered the 500-statement cap had not been removed “for many,

many, many months” and no statements had gone out to thousands of patients. By

May 3, 2019, more than 11,000 self-pay patients had never been sent an initial

statement. Baker determined the cause was Ballew’s unilateral decision to keep the

500-statement cap in place even though Exalt had the capacity to send out 5,000

statements per day. Ballew’s actions and inactions affected between $150 million

                                          –9–
and $180 million of accounts receivable by May 2019, and Baker estimated Parkland

would incur additional, unbudgeted expenses to outsource accounts receivable “to

prevent further delays in efforts to collect some of the cash.” Baker also explained

how Ballew’s actions negatively impacted patient cash collections:

      Those patients who would normally pay their balance or a portion after
      receiving two statements, have not paid Parkland. On average we
      collect approximately 1% of self-pay from patients, which equates to
      $1.5-$1.8 million per month in cash Parkland could have received.

Baker estimated Ballew’s actions resulted in the loss of or delay in receiving between

$6 million and $7.2 million during the first four months of 2019.

      Baker also discovered Ballew tried to conceal his failure to complete the

project by sending thousands of self-pay account customers to a bad-debt collector

without ever sending the patients a first or second statement. Had he not done so, the

reported amount of Parkland’s receivable on self-pay accounts would have

ballooned and alerted Baker the project had not been completed. Ballew evaded

detection because sending thousands of customers straight to bad-debt collection

made the amount of outstanding accounts receivable appear to not be increasing. But

the number of calls to the PFS call center increased because of calls from “angry

patients who were being hounded by debt collectors.” Ballew’s actions violated

Parkland’s policies and placed added stress on the PFS call center.

      B.     Denial Management Group Project (DMG Project)

      Ballew’s failure to complete the DMG Project also caused Parkland to lose a

valuable revenue stream. Parkland, like many hospital systems, relies on
                                        –10–
reimbursement from insurers to fund patient care. But the insurance claims process

is complicated and often results in insurers denying claims for correctable reasons,

such as typographical errors and incorrect billing codes. Baker charged Ballew with

developing and establishing a group (the Denials Management Group) to amass

denied claims, understand and address the reasons for denial, and then appeal those

claims with insurers as necessary with the goal of obtaining payment. To complete

the DMG Project, Ballew needed to hire the necessary staff to form the group, create

training material and templates for the group to use when challenging the insurance

denials, and create staff workflows and staff training documents. Although Ballew

told Baker the Denials Management Group had been formed, Baker discovered

during the 2019 FMLA Leave that Ballew had not hired or trained the appropriate

staff to form the group.

      By the end of March 2019, the amount of denials had grown to $93 million.

At that time, only one full-time employee was handling the denials and could not

keep up with the growing number of denials. Ballew allowed that employee to write-

off old balances instead of trying to resolve the denials and collect the revenue owed

to Parkland. By the end of April 2019, Ballew’s failure to form the Denials

Management Group forced Parkland to write off at least $23 million dollars because

the time to appeal those denials had expired. Baker estimated Parkland could lose an

additional $10 to $15 million dollars as more denials aged out of the appeal window.

                                        –11–
      C.    The remaining assignments

      According to Baker, Ballew also failed to fulfill the remaining assignments.

Ballew’s failure to timely cancel the NThrive contract cost Parkland $120,000. As

for addressing the abandonment rate for calls, Ballew took no steps to improve the

abandonment rate. Call abandonment occurs when a caller hangs up after being

placed on hold. Baker testified Ballew should have addressed this issue by (1)

coaching and training his team to be more efficient, (2) engaging in progressive

discipline, where necessary, and (3) requesting additional full-time employees.

Ballew took none of those steps and, instead, blamed his employees and stated he

could not get them to do a better job. Ballew also continued to be nonresponsive to

his team, customers, and others. He would not return calls, respond to emails, or

answer his team’s questions. This resulted in patient questions remaining

unanswered and required Baker to intervene on multiple occasions.

VII. Parkland’s Investigation

      On May 3, 2019, Baker wrote a memorandum outlining Ballew’s performance

issues (the May 3, 2019 Memo). In it, Baker described the discoveries he made

regarding the Self-Pay Accounts Project, the DMG Project, and the NThrive

cancellation. Baker stated Ballew’s “behavior has likely cost Parkland

approximately $40-50 million in recoverable revenue” and demonstrated Ballew’s

integrity and transparency were “lacking and extremely troubling.” Baker

                                       –12–
recommended an immediate investigation and indicated the results of that

investigation would determine if he would recommend Ballew be terminated.

      Ballew’s 2019 FMLA Leave ended on May 5, 2019. On May 9, 2019,

Parkland placed Ballew on administrative suspension with pay while it investigated

the state of PFS and Baker’s allegations. Baker testified the investigation complied

with Parkland’s standard operating procedures.

      In his interrogatory responses, Ballew stated he first told Parkland he was

“being treated unfairly because of his health condition” on May 9, 2019, when they

suspended him:

      The complaint was made to Gary Baker and the human resource
      representative who was present. He also complained of discrimination
      and retaliation on his appeal to the persons involved in the appeal.
      Parkland retaliated against him by making false statements about him,
      by not conducting a fair investigation or appeal, and by terminating his
      employment.

Ballew presented three written statements to explain his actions between May 9,

2019, and June 10, 2019. In them, Ballew denied wrongdoing and challenged the

accuracy of the May 3, 2019 memo.

      For example, he insisted the cap on self-pay statements was necessary because

the system was not ready for increased output. He also insisted it was Baker’s “call”

when to lift the cap. He also asserted that patient complaints about being sent to

collections without receiving statements had been “known and ongoing since around

August 2018.” Ballew maintained Baker “reviewed and approved” the cap on

statements and “was keenly aware” the cap would cause Parkland to “encounter
                                    –13–
months of little to no placements.” He blamed Baker’s decision to change the self-

pay methodology for “the lapse in bad debt placements.” He also stated the Self-Pay

Accounts Project could not be completed without hiring new full-time employees,

and he blamed Baker and Miller for understaffing the PFS. According to Ballew,

Parkland approved new hires in November 2018, but did not hire anyone until March

2019. He contended he was unable to participate in hiring and training because he

was on FMLA leave when those events occurred. Ballew also denied being tasked

with creating a denials work group and stated Baker told him not to create such a

group. In his May 21, 2019 statement, Ballew described the suspension as “another

step in a pattern of retaliation directly linked to [Ballew’s] health issues.”

      Pamela Brooks, a member of Parkland’s employee relations team, conducted

the investigation. In June 2019, Baker sent a follow-up email to Brooks and Arthur

Ferrell, the head of Parkland’s employee relations team. In that email, Baker

provided additional information concerning the situation and a recap of a meeting

he had with Ballew at which he posed a series of questions for Ballew to answer.

Baker noted he had “no confidence in Mr. Ballew’s integrity” because Ballew “was

not honest in his answers to questions today nor in his written statements from May

9th and May 21st.” Baker also suggested Ballew lacked compassion and did not have

the ability to uphold Parkland’s values because he turned patient accounts over to

debt collectors as bad debts without first sending them a statement or following

Parkland policy guidelines. Baker recommended Parkland terminate Ballew.

                                         –14–
      After completing the investigation, Brooks provided an investigation report to

Farrell in which she recommended Ballew be terminated. Farrell reviewed the

investigation report and approved Brooks’ recommendation to terminate Ballew.

Farrell testified the issues with Ballew were “of gross misconduct,” so the lack of

prior progressive discipline was not a factor. Because the misconduct was considered

so egregious, “the first time it occurred could indeed lead to termination of

employment, which was the case here.”

      Parkland terminated Ballew’s employment. In a June 21, 2019 termination

letter, Brooks informed Ballew of the outcome of the investigation:

      The investigation findings indicate that you have exhibited behavior
      that does not align with Parkland values and failed to meet the
      performance standards expected of a leader. As such, your employment
      is terminated effective June 20, 2019 for not adhering to the Standards
      of Service Excellence (OTM Procedure 6000-210) required of Parkland
      employees, and also failing to demonstrate the values of Compassion,
      Integrity, Respect, and Stewardship. The Progressive Discipline Report
      documenting the reasons for your termination is attached.

The reasons for progressive discipline described in the report mirrored Baker’s

allegations. Parkland’s internal termination statement listed the following reasons

for the termination:

      Lack of integrity and not carrying out job responsibilities: Mr.
      Ballew was responsible for establishing a process to hold self-pay AR
      in-house for 55 days and to send (2) statements to patients and then
      outsource the AR to an Early Out vendor.

      Honesty, Personal Accountability: Mr. Ballew was tasked with
      for[m]ing a denials unit within the department in early 2018.
      Throughout the entire performance year Mr. Ballew and Mr. Baker
      repeatedly discussed his progress. By the time annual reviews were
                                       –15–
      conducted, Mr. Ballew still had not accomplished this task and this was
      highlighted as a deficiency in this FY 2018 annual review. Mr. Ballew
      repeatedly told his leader that he had established the work.

Farrell and Brooks testified the reasons for Ballew’s termination were the poor

performance issues and concerns with Ballew’s integrity and honesty as set out in

Baker’s May 3, 2019 memo and follow-up email and as summarized in Brooks’

investigative findings.

      Ballew appealed the termination internally, and Parkland upheld the

termination. On December 9, 2019, Ballew filed a charge of discrimination with the

EEOC alleging disability discrimination and retaliation. In the charge, Ballew

asserted Parkland discriminated against him because he had a serious blood vessel

circulation condition. He also claimed Parkland’s reason for terminating him—

performance—was not true because his “performance was not an issue.” After

exhausting his administrative remedies and obtaining a right to sue letter from the

EEOC, Ballew filed the underlying lawsuit.

VIII. Parkland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction

      Parkland filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the trial court. In support, Parkland

submitted nearly 600 pages of evidence, including Baker’s affidavit, documents

related to Baker’s concerns and the investigation, Ballew’s 2013, 2015, 2017, and

2018 performance reviews, Ballew’s request for FMLA leave and the approval of

that request, Ballew’s investigation responses, the termination notice and

accompanying documentation, Ballew’s EEOC charge, and the deposition

                                        –16–
transcripts of Baker, Brooks, Ferrell, Humphrey, Ballew, and three other witnesses

employed at Parkland at the time of the investigation. Ballew filed a written response

to Parkland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. In support of his response, Ballew submitted

excerpts from his deposition, two personal declarations, his medical record excerpts

and 2017 performance review, the deposition of Humphrey, and a declaration from

former Parkland employee Sheri Kowalski. The trial court held a hearing on the plea

to the jurisdiction on November 21, 2022, and denied the plea on November 30,

2022. This interlocutory appeal followed.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Governmental entities, including hospital districts, are immune from suit

unless the state consents. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

217, 224 (Tex. 2004); Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d

838, 842 (Tex. 2009) (hospital districts have governmental immunity). “The

TCHRA4 waives immunity, but only when the plaintiff states a claim for conduct

that actually violates the statute.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544

S.W.3d 755, 770–71 (Tex. 2018) (citing Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia,

372 S.W.3d 629, 636 (Tex. 2012)).

         Immunity from suit may be asserted through a plea to the jurisdiction and may

challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo Heights

I.S.D., 544 S.W.3d at 770–71. When a jurisdictional plea challenges the pleadings,

   4
       Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA).
                                            –17–
we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject-

matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26). If, however, the plea

challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must move beyond the pleadings

and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues, even if

the evidence implicates both subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits of a claim.

Id.

      Here, Parkland’s jurisdictional plea challenged the existence of jurisdictional

facts with supporting evidence. The standard of review, therefore, mirrors that of a

traditional summary judgment:

      [I]f the plaintiffs’ factual allegations are challenged with supporting
      evidence necessary to consideration of the plea to the jurisdiction, to
      avoid dismissal plaintiffs must raise at least a genuine issue of material
      fact to overcome the challenge to the trial court’s subject matter
      jurisdiction.

Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 221). In determining whether a material fact issue

exists, we must take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff, indulging every

reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. (citing City

of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 811–12, 822–23, 827 (Tex. 2005)). We cannot,

however, disregard evidence necessary to show context, and we cannot disregard

evidence and inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff if reasonable jurors could not.

Id. at 771 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)).

                                         –18–
                                    APPLICABLE LAW

       The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) prohibits an

employer from committing an “unlawful employment practice” against an employee

“because of” the employee’s “race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or

age.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051. Under the TCHRA, an employer commits an

unlawful employment practice if the employer discharges an individual “because of”

a disability. Id. § 21.051(1). Generally, an employer commits an unlawful practice

“because of” an employee’s disability if the employee’s disability “was a motivating

factor for an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated the

practice, . . .” Id. § 21.125(a).

       To establish unlawful discrimination, a plaintiff may rely on either direct or

circumstantial evidence. Id. at 782. When, as here, there is no direct evidence of

discrimination or retaliation, we follow the burden-shifting framework the United

States Supreme Court established in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973). Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 764, 782. Under this framework, (1)

the plaintiff must first create a presumption of illegal discrimination by establishing

a prima facie case, (2) the defendant must then rebut that presumption by

establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, and

(3) the plaintiff must then overcome the rebuttal evidence by establishing the

defendant’s stated reason is a mere pretext. Id. at 782. The burden of persuasion

showing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction always lies with the employee.

                                         –19–
Id.; Flores v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 634 S.W.3d 440, 451 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2021, no pet.) (Flores II).

                                    ANALYSIS

      In two issues, Parkland contends the plea to the jurisdiction should have been

granted because (1) Parkland’s reasons for terminating Ballew were undisputed and

legitimate and nondiscriminatory, and (2) Ballew failed to make a prima facie case

of discrimination, retaliation, or hostile work environment. Parkland maintains it is

unnecessary to determine if Ballew presented a prima facie case for each alleged

TCHRA violation because Ballew presented no evidence Parkland’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Ballew’s employment were false and

pretextual.

      We agree Parkland’s arguments regarding Ballew’s disability discrimination

and retaliation claims may be decided without determining if Ballew established a

prima facie case on each of those claims. However, it is unclear whether the

McDonnell Douglas framework applies to a hostile work environment claim in this

context. We will, therefore, analyze that claim outside of the McDonnell Douglas

framework.

I.    Disability Discrimination and Retaliation Claims

      There is no direct evidence of disability discrimination or retaliatory conduct

in this case. The burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas,

therefore, applies to Ballew’s claims for discrimination and retaliation. See Alamo

                                       –20–
Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782 (noting the McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting steps

applied in discrimination claims also apply to retaliation claims). We assume without

deciding that Ballew established a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation

and, as a result, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and retaliation arose.

Under McDonnell Douglas, the burden then shifts to Parkland to rebut the

presumption by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

the termination of Ballew’s employment. Id.

      A.     Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating
             Ballew

      Parkland contends it “proffered ample legitimate and nondiscriminatory

reasons for firing Ballew.” Specifically, Parkland maintains its evidence showed

Ballew engaged in conduct requiring him to be terminated. That conduct included

failing to execute Parkland’s objectives, acting callously toward Parkland’s patients,

and lacking integrity, honesty, and personal accountability in his job performance.

We agree.

      Parkland presented declarations, deposition transcripts, and supporting

evidence showing the conduct for which it decided to terminate Ballew. That

evidence is discussed at length above and will not be repeated here. However,

included in that evidence was testimony from Farrell and Brooks confirming that the

reasons for Ballew’s termination were the poor performance issues and concerns

with Ballew’s integrity and honesty as set out in Baker’s May 3, 2019 memo and

follow-up email and summarized in Brooks’ investigative findings. Brooks also
                                  –21–
testified the performance issues that lead to Ballew’s termination occurred prior to

the 2019 FMLA leave. Those issues were not discovered until he was on leave,

however, because Ballew did not communicate any problems with implementing the

projects to Baker or escalate any issues to Baker for resolution.

      Under this record, we conclude Parkland’s evidence established that its stated

reasons for terminating Ballew’s employment were legitimate and non-

discriminatory. By doing so, Parkland rebutted any presumptions of discrimination

and retaliation. See Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., La., 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th

Cir. 2000) (finding “unsatisfactory performance as a manager” sufficient to meet

burden of production); See also Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318,

326 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Poor work performance is a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for discharge”); Gold v. Exxon Corp., 960 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (loss of confidence caused by an employee’s job

performance is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason). The burden then shifted back

to Ballew to show Parkland’s stated reasons were false and a pretext for

discrimination.

      B.     No evidence of pretext

      To raise a fact issue on the pretext element of a discrimination claim, the

employee must present evidence proving the reasons stated by the employer were

not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination, or the reasons were not

credible. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000);

                                        –22–
Chandler v. CSC Applied Techs., LLC, 376 S.W.3d 802, 814 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (quoting Elgaghil v. Tarrant Cnty. Junior Coll., 45

S.W.3d 133, 139 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied)); Jespersen v.

Sweetwater Ranch Apartments, 390 S.W.3d 644, 655 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no

pet.). However, “an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the

record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the

employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether

the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted

independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.

“The issue at the pretext stage is not whether the employer made an erroneous

decision; it is whether the decision, even if incorrect, was the real reason for the

termination.” Jespersen, 390 S.W.3d at 655 (first citing Sandstad v. CB Richard

Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir. 2002), and then citing Mayberry v. Vought

Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1995)). The employer “is entitled to be

unreasonable so long as it does not act with discriminatory animus.” Sandstad, 309

F.3d at 899.

      “If the employee intends to show the explanation is so unreasonable it must

be pretextual, it is the employee’s burden to proffer evidence creating a fact issue

regarding reasonableness.” Jespersen, 390 S.W.3d at 655 (citing Sandstad, 309 F.3d

at 899). “An employee’s subjective belief of discrimination or retaliation, no matter

how genuine, cannot serve as the basis for judicial relief.” McCoy v. Tex.

                                         –23–
Instruments, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 548, 555 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.);

Jespersen, 390 S.W.3d at 655–56 (“An employee’s subjective belief that he suffered

an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination, without more, is

insufficient to survive a summary judgment motion.”).

      In the trial court, Ballew argued his performance was “not an issue,” and he

was a “good worker” with “high” performance. He argued Parkland’s performance-

based reasons for terminating his employment “were false and a pretext to cover up

discrimination and retaliation.” Ballew denied all the allegations against him, and

maintained any problems were due to lack of personnel or were caused by other

managers or other departments. For example, Ballew stated the NThrive cancellation

issue was caused by the legal department’s failure to timely cancel the contract.

Similarly, he insisted Baker’s allegations that Ballew did not form the Denial

Management Group and did not complete the Self-Pay Accounts Project were false.

Ballew maintained Baker was the problem, not him.

      The evidence submitted by Ballew to support his arguments, however,

consisted only of his own, conclusory statements in two personal declarations and

similar deposition testimony. Ballew presented no documentary support for those

allegations. Moreover, Ballew does not dispute Parkland’s findings that the Self-Pay

Accounts Project was not completed, the Denials Management Group was not

formed, or the NThrive contract was not timely cancelled. Similarly, he does not

dispute that he left the 500-statement cap in place past the testing period or that he

                                        –24–
sent thousands of patient accounts to bad-debt collection without first sending

statements to those patients and seeking payment. Instead, he blames other Parkland

employees, including Baker, for those actions and their consequences, and insists he

acted in accordance with Baker’s directives.

      Ballew’s evidence, at most, shows his subjective disagreement with

Parkland’s investigative findings and his subjective beliefs that he was a high

performing employee who acted appropriately and per the direction of management.

His beliefs, standing alone, are insufficient to show pretext. See Tex. Dep’t of Aging

& Disability Servs. v. Lagunas, 618 S.W.3d 845, 853 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no

pet.) (a plaintiff must do more than make a “bare assertion” or merely express his

“subjective belief” that the defendant’s reasons for its employment decision were

both false and pretextual) (internal citation omitted). Other than stating Parkland’s

accusations are false, Ballew did not attempt to refute Parkland’s evidence that he

performed poorly and violated Parkland protocols. He provided no evidence to show

he performed the assignments in a timely and appropriate matter, to prove his actions

were all at the direction of Baker or other employees, or to disprove Baker’s findings

and the timing of those findings. He, therefore, failed to rebut Parkland’s reasons for

terminating him and failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether the

poor-performance reason given by Parkland was mere pretext for discrimination.

See, e.g., Ajao v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 265 Fed. Appx. 258, 263 (5th Cir. 2008)

(in failing to provide evidence of his own good job performance, plaintiff failed to

                                        –25–
create genuine issue of material fact on whether poor performance reason given by

employer was mere pretext for discrimination).

      Moreover, an employee does not raise a fact issue on the question of pretext

merely because he disagrees with the employer’s assessment of his performance;

rather, the issue is whether the employer’s perception of his performance, accurate

or not, was the real reason for his termination. See Donaldson v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging

& Disability Servs., 495 S.W.3d 421, 438–39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016,

pet. denied) (employee’s affidavit testimony denying employer’s allegation of poor

job performance and offering an explanation for the cited performance issues and

work rule violations did not raise a fact issue as to pretext); see also McCoy, 183

S.W.3d at 555–56 (noting that absent discriminatory motive, disagreement about job

performance is not actionable and that even incorrect belief that employee’s

performance is inadequate constitutes legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

termination). Similarly, an employee’s denials of bad performance and his subjective

belief that his employer has given a false reason for its employment decision does

not raise a fact issue as to pretext. Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987 F.2d 1160,

1166 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[plaintiff] must, instead, produce evidence demonstrating that

[the City’s decisionmakers] did not in good faith believe the allegations, but relied

on them in a bad faith pretext to discriminate against him on the basis of his age.”

(emphasis in original)); Little v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 177 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has made it

                                        –26–
clear that it is not sufficient merely to show that the employer’s reasons are false or

not credible; the plaintiff must prove that the employer discriminated intentionally.”)

(citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146–47).

      Parkland cited many job-related reasons for losing confidence in Ballew and

for terminating him. Those reasons were based on conduct that occurred before

Ballew took the 2019 FMLA Leave and before Baker was aware Ballew had a

disability due to his medical condition. Further, although Parkland did not suspend

or terminate Ballew until he returned from the 2019 FMLA Leave, temporal

proximity alone cannot rebut an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

the employment action. Stingley v. Den–Mar Inc., 347 F. App’x 14, 20 (5th Cir.

2009) (per curiam); Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 2004)

(affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of employer where plaintiff

attempted to rebut the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a

termination with only timing allegations) Reed v. Cook Children’s Med. Ctr., Inc.,

No. 02-13-00405-CV, 2014 WL 2462778, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 29,

2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (temporal proximity argument alone is insufficient to

create a genuine issue as to pretext where employer provided a nondiscriminatory

reason for employment action). Here, the evidence shows the timing was the result

of Baker discovering the performance issues while covering Ballew’s job when he

was on leave.

                                        –27–
      Ballew presented no competent evidence to dispute Parkland’s evidence or its

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination. Rather, he relied solely on

his own, conclusory testimony to insist Baker knew the Self-Pay Accounts Project

was not completed, chose to keep the 500-statement cap in place despite the

consequences, and did not task Ballew with implementing a Denial Management

Group. That testimony is insufficient to raise a fact question as to pretext. See

Coastal Transp. Co., Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 231–

32 (Tex. 2004) (“Opinion testimony that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant

evidence, because it does not tend to make the existence of a material fact ‘more

probable or less probable.’”) (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 401); see also Cas.

Underwriters v. Rhone, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. 1939) (holding that a witness’s

statements were “but bare conclusions and therefore incompetent”).

      Ballew states in his brief that he is using evidence of “pattern and practice, or

systemic discrimination, . . . as part of showing pretext. . . .” In support, he cites only

conclusory statements from his declarations. Those statements include his allegation

that he has personal knowledge of “Parkland’s pattern and practice of discriminating

against persons with disabilities,” his assertion that disability discrimination “is

widespread and well known at Parkland,” and his claim that he witnessed disability

discrimination against other Parkland employees. To the extent Ballew relies on this

purported evidence of pattern or practice to show pretext, we conclude it does not

raise a fact issue as to pretext. Ballew submitted no evidence to support his

                                          –28–
allegations. Rather, they are simply his unsubstantiated opinions. Such testimony is

insufficient to raise a fact question as to pretext. See TEX. R. EVID. 401; see also

Coastal Transp. Co., 136 S.W.3d at 231–32; Rhone, 132 S.W.2d at 99. Further, the

pattern-or-practice evidence cited by Ballew refers to alleged conduct related to

other Parkland employees and far in time from Ballew’s termination. Those

allegations do not raise a fact issue on the question of pretext.

          Under this record, we conclude Ballew produced no competent evidence that

Parkland’s reasons for terminating him were false or a pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying Parkland’s plea to the jurisdiction as to

Ballew’s disability discrimination and retaliation claims. We sustain Parkland’s

issues as to those claims.

II.       Hostile Work Environment Claim5

          Ballew’s pleadings below reference his contention that Parkland’s actions

against Ballew created a hostile work environment. It is unclear whether the

McDonnell Douglas framework applies to a hostile work environment claim in a

case alleging disability discrimination. Compare Carpenter v. Haaland, No. 19-CV-

13208, 2021 WL 1198261, at *10 n.122 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2021) (concluding the

      5
      Ballew’s pleadings also reference his contention that Parkland engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination. On appeal, Ballew confirmed he is not asserting a separate claim or alternative theory of
pattern and practice discrimination. Rather, he contends evidence of pattern and practice is “part of showing
pretext or the totality of circumstances to show discrimination.” Ballew cannot rely on evidence of “pattern
or practice,” however, because that theory of recovery is available only to plaintiffs in a class action. E.g.,
Rogers v. Pearland ISD, 827 F.3d 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2016) (confirming pattern-or-practice method of
proving discrimination is unavailable in a private, non-class action).
                                                    –29–
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis does not apply to hostile work

environment claims because an employer “may not offer a legitimate reason for

creating such an environment.”), EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 35

F.Supp.3d 836 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2014) (hostile work environment claims are not

proven using McDonnell Douglas scheme), and Razavi v. Franklin Apartment

Mgmt., Ltd., No. SA-21-CV-01093-JKP, 2022 WL 4545755, at *9–11 (W.D. Tex.

Sept. 28, 2022) (applying traditional summary judgment burdens to hostile work

environment claim), with Hayatdavoudi v. Univ. of La. Sys. Bd. of Trs., 240 F.3d

1073 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to each alleged

adverse employment action within plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim).

      Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Parkland’s plea to the jurisdiction

should have been granted as to a hostile work environment claim for the same

reasons Ballew’s discrimination and retaliation claims should be dismissed; Ballew

failed to raise a fact issue as to pretext. The result is the same if we apply general

summary judgment standards because Ballew failed to present evidence of a prima

facie case of a hostile work environment claim.

      A hostile work environment claim entails ongoing harassment, based on the

plaintiff’s protected characteristic, so severe or pervasive it alters the conditions of

employment and creates an abusive working environment. Filardo v. Baylor Scott

& White Health, No. 05-21-01066-CV, 2023 WL 5317870, at *11 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Aug. 18, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (first citing In re Parkland Health & Hosp.

                                         –30–
Sys. Litig., No. 05-17-00670-CV, 2018 WL 2473852, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas June

4, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.), and then citing Anderson v. Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys.,

458 S.W.3d 633, 646 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.)). The elements

of a prima facie case of hostile work environment are (1) the employee belongs to a

protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the

harassment complained of was based on the protected characteristic; (4) the

harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment;

and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to

take prompt remedial action. Parkland, 2018 WL 2473852, at *8; Anderson, 458

S.W.3d at 646. An employee complaining of harassment by a supervisor need only

show the first four elements. Parkland, 2018 WL 2473852, at *8; Anderson, 458

S.W.3d at 646. We consider the totality of the circumstances when reviewing a

hostile work environment claim, including: “the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating,

or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with the

employee’s work performance.” Donaldson, 495 S.W.3d at 445.

      In his pleadings below, Ballew included the following paragraph addressing

the hostile work environment claim:

      Parkland discharged Mr. Ballew and discriminated in its treatment of
      him in connection with the terms, conditions, or privileges of
      employment because of a disability. Parkland’s treatment of Mr.
      Ballew was severe and pervasive harassment that altered the terms and
      conditions of his employment by making his employment multiple

                                       –31–
        times harder than before he was diagnosed with his medical condition.
        The harassment included preventing Mr. Ballew’s ability to make
        decisions within his job responsibility, ostracizing him, displaying a
        hostile attitude demeaning him in leadership meetings, creating
        unnecessary obstacles for Mr. Ballew’s job, subverting his work by
        diverting needed information to other departments, and creating
        unnecessary problems with inconsistent direction and leadership, all in
        an intentional effort to place undue pressure and anxiety upon Mr.
        Ballew.

In response to Parkland’s plea to the jurisdiction, Ballew stated the following

regarding his hostile work environment claim:

        Mr. Baker’s [sic] boss, who had the power to make hiring, firing, and
        promotional decisions, made continuous false statements and
        instructions, making impossible demands that were contrary to
        Parkland’s instructions and then holding him accountable for the false
        narrative rather than the true instructions. (Ex. 1, P1. Appx. 1-18). It is
        hard to conceive of a more severe and pervasive environment short of
        physical assault. (Ex. 1, Pl. Appx. 1-18).

As evidence to establish a prima facie case, Ballew cited to the entirety of his

eighteen-page declaration.

        On appeal, Ballew asserts he belonged to a protected group because of his

disability and again references Baker’s allegedly “impossible demands” and

“outrageous accusations” as the alleged harassing conduct:

        He was subjected to unwelcome harassment that included outrageous
        accusations of costing Parkland “tens of millions of dollars in lost
        revenue” and exposing a “lack of integrity, candor, and compassion.”
        Appellant Brief p. 2, 8, 23. 4CR1069.6 In addition to the outrageous
        accusations, Ballew suffered a false and unmerited reprimand, poor

    6
     These citations are to allegations made in Parkland’s brief at pages 2, 8, and 23, and statements by
Baker in his declaration in support of the plea to the jurisdiction.
                                                 –32–
         performance review, and write up, as well as an underserved
         suspension.

         Baker’s [sic] boss, who had the power to make hiring, firing, and
         promotional decisions, made continuous false statements and
         instructions, making impossible demands that were contrary to
         Parkland’s instructions and then holding him accountable for the false
         narrative rather than the true instructions. CRSUPPL717. It is hard to
         conceive of a more severe and pervasive environment short of physical
         assault. The harassment was all tied to the disability for which no
         remedy was given to stop or prevent the harassment. Ballew has
         established sufficient facts for a hostile work environment for damages
         suffered before the termination of his employment.

Ballew cites no authority to support his contention these allegations establish a prima

facie case of hostile work environment claim. Parkland contends these arguments

and evidence fail to establish a prima facie case because they do not mention

harassment based on a disability and do not show an objectively or subjectively

hostile environment. We agree.

         The third and fourth elements of a hostile work environment claim require

Ballew to show the harassment complained of was based on the protected

characteristic and affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Anderson,

458 S.W.3d at 646. Ballew’s pleadings of hostile work environment and his

allegations and cited evidence in response to Parkland’s plea and appeal do not

reference his disability. Nor does Ballew assert or imply that Baker’s alleged actions

were because of Ballew’s disability. Ballew, therefore, failed to present a prima facie

case of the third element of a hostile work environment claim.

   7
       This citation is to paragraph 148 of Ballew’s declaration.
                                                    –33–
      His proof also falls short on the fourth element. To satisfy the fourth element

of a hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must show the workplace was permeated

with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently severe or pervasive

to create a hostile or abusive working environment. See Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of

Crim. Just., 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); Waffle House, Inc.

v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 806 (Tex. 2010) (noting abusive environment is

created “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation,

ridicule, and insult.’”) (citation omitted). The work environment must be both

objectively and subjectively offensive—one that a reasonable person would find

hostile or abusive and one that the victim perceived to be so. City of Hous. v.

Fletcher, 166 S.W.3d 479, 489 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied);

Donaldson, 495 S.W.3d at 445.

      The conduct alleged by Ballew, even if true, does not rise to a level to support

a hostile work environment claim because it either occurred when Ballew was on

suspension and not present in the work environment (i.e, Baker’s allegations against

him during the investigation), or describes work assignments as “impossible

demands” without discussion or proof as to how those assignments were offensive.

Moreover, none of the alleged conduct involved comments or actions targeted at

Ballew’s disability, and the conduct alleged to have occurred before his suspension

was not physically threatening or humiliating.

                                        –34–
      Under this record, we conclude Ballew failed to raise a genuine issue of

material fact on the third and fourth elements of a hostile work environment claim.

Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying Parkland’s plea to the jurisdiction as to

the hostile work environment claim.

                                  CONCLUSION

      Ballew presented no competent evidence to show or even suggest Parkland’s

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were

pretextual. Further, he presented no evidence supporting his hostile work

environment claim. Ballew, thus, failed to meet his burden of proof to waive

Parkland’s immunity from suit. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order

denying Parkland’s plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing Ballew’s

claims against Parkland for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

                                            /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
                                            ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
221358F.P05                                 JUSTICE

                                        –35–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL                       On Appeal from the County Court at
DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND                      Law No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL                          Trial Court Cause No. CC-20-04852-
SYSTEM, Appellant                            A.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
No. 05-22-01358-CV          V.               Kipness. Justices Reichek and
                                             Breedlove participating.
MICHAEL BALLEW, Appellee

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we REVERSE the trial
court’s order denying Appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction and RENDER judgment
dismissing Appellee Michael Ballew’s claims against Appellant for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

       It is ORDERED that appellant DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL
DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND HEALTH AND HOSPITAL SYSTEM recover
its costs of this appeal from appellee MICHAEL BALLEW.

Judgment entered this 26th day of March 2024.

                                      –36–