Court Opinion

ID: 9955744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 14:14:46.600818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:21.553476
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 22, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1373-MR

TIMOTHY WATKINS                                                      APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE A. C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 19-CR-000355

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND CALDWELL, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Timothy Watkins, pro se, appeals from an order of

the Jefferson Circuit Court which denied his Kentucky Rules of Criminal

Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion in which he alleged ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. Finding no error, we affirm.
                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             In 2019, Appellant was indicted for multiple crimes relating to child

pornography. On October 23, 2019, Appellant pleaded guilty to some of these

charges and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On October 5, 2022,

Appellant filed the underlying RCr 11.42 motion in which he raised numerous

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion

without holding a hearing and this appeal followed.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

             To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant

must show two things:

             First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
             performance was deficient. This requires showing that
             counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
             functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
             the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
             that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
             This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
             serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
             whose result is reliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984). “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably

effective assistance.” Id.

                    An error by counsel, even if professionally
             unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
             judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
             effect on the judgment. The purpose of the Sixth

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               Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a
               defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance
               on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any
               deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial
               to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance
               under the Constitution.

Id. at 691-92, 104 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (citations omitted). “It is not enough for the

defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of

the proceeding.” Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. “The defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.

Ct. at 2068.

                       Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
               highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant
               to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or
               adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court,
               examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
               unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission
               of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of
               attorney performance requires that every effort be made
               to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
               reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged
               conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
               perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties
               inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
               strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
               the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
               is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
               under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be
               considered sound trial strategy.” There are countless
               ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.

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             Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not
             defend a particular client in the same way.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (citations omitted).

                     Where the trial court does not hold an evidentiary
             hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion, appellate review is
             limited to “whether the motion on its face states grounds
             that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which,
             if true, would invalidate the conviction.” An evidentiary
             hearing is only required “if there is a material issue of
             fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e.,
             conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of
             the record.”

Haley v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Ky. App. 2019) (citations

omitted).

             We must also consider that this case involves a guilty plea.

                          A showing that counsel’s assistance
                   was ineffective in enabling a defendant to
                   intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in
                   deciding to plead guilty has two
                   components: (1) that counsel made errors so
                   serious that counsel’s performance fell
                   outside the wide range of professionally
                   competent assistance; and (2) that the
                   deficient performance so seriously affected
                   the outcome of the plea process that, but for
                   the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable
                   probability that the defendant would not
                   have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted
                   on going to trial.

                   Evaluating the totality of the circumstances
             surrounding the guilty plea is an inherently factual
             inquiry which requires consideration of “the accused’s
             demeanor, background and experience, and whether the

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              record reveals that the plea was voluntarily made.”
              While “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong
              presumption of verity,” “the validity of a guilty plea is
              not determined by reference to some magic incantation
              recited at the time it is taken[.]” The trial court’s inquiry
              into allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
              requires the court to determine whether counsel’s
              performance was below professional standards and
              “caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would
              probably have won” and “whether counsel was so
              thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the
              hands of probable victory.” Because “[a] multitude of
              events occur in the course of a criminal proceeding which
              might influence a defendant to plead guilty or stand
              trial,” the trial court must evaluate whether errors by trial
              counsel significantly influenced the defendant’s decision
              to plead guilty in a manner which gives the trial court
              reason to doubt the voluntariness and validity of the plea.

Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted).

                                      ANALYSIS

              Appellant’s first argument on appeal is that he was denied effective

assistance when his trial counsel was unprepared for trial. Appellant’s trial was

scheduled for October 21, 2019. When Appellant and his counsel appeared on that

day, trial counsel indicated that he was not prepared because he believed this was

the final pretrial date and not the day of trial.

              Appellant suffered no prejudice here. Defense counsel informed the

trial court that there was a tentative plea agreement and that Appellant wanted to

discuss the agreement with his wife. Defense counsel also stated that he could be

ready for trial by the next week if the plea agreement was not accepted. The trial

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court continued the case for two days so the plea could be either accepted or

declined. The court then went on to say that if no agreement was reached a new

trial date could be scheduled. Appellant went on to accept the plea agreement. As

the case was continued and a new trial date was available, there was no prejudice

to Appellant.

             Appellant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective because he

failed to investigate the case. He raises multiple issue regarding the failure to

investigate and we will address each one in turn. First, he claims that counsel

failed to investigate false statements a detective made to the grand jury. Appellant

claims some of the pictures and videos described by the detective to the grand jury

did not exist.

             “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any

ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly

assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of

deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

“A reasonable investigation is not an investigation that the best criminal defense

lawyer in the world, blessed not only with unlimited time and resources, but also

with the benefit of hindsight, would conduct. The investigation must be reasonable

under all the circumstances.” Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 446 (Ky.

                                          -6-
2001), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151

(Ky. 2009) (citations omitted).

             Appellant believes trial counsel did not investigate this issue because

the case file provided to Appellant by his counsel did not contain any notes

regarding it. We do not believe this allegation is sufficient to support this

argument. “In seeking post-conviction relief, the movant must aver facts with

sufficient specificity to generate a basis for relief.” Lucas v. Commonwealth, 465

S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ky. 1971).

             In addition, an email contained in the record from defense counsel

indicates that it would be the jury’s job to determine what pictures and videos

constituted child pornography. We believe this indicates that defense counsel

knew that challenging the evidence would be the best trial strategy. Furthermore,

as the Commonwealth points out in its brief, the appropriate place to challenge the

detective’s prior testimony would be at trial. Trial counsel was not ineffective

here.

             Appellant next claims that trial counsel did not investigate the fact

that Appellant lived a nudist lifestyle, which would have indicated the pictures

found in Appellant’s possession were not sexual in nature. This argument is

without merit. The email from defense counsel mentioned above also described

how counsel had contacted the American Association for Nude Recreation and

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sought information from that group. This shows that defense counsel did

investigate Appellant’s nudist lifestyle.

                Next, Appellant argues that trial counsel did not investigate the fact

that the other party with whom Appellant was exchanging pictures, was the one

who initiated contact with Appellant. Appellant was allegedly contacted by

another person, referred to as Sandra, over the internet. Appellant claims that if

counsel had reviewed their conversations, he would have discovered that Sandra

initiated contact and that Appellant turned down Sandra’s requests to photograph

his children.

                We also believe this argument is without merit. Appellant does not

indicate why he believes defense counsel did not consider investigating Sandra.

Appellant states in his brief that, after he entered the plea agreement, he was

supplied with the messages between Sandra and himself. He does not indicate if

these messages came from the Commonwealth, defense counsel, or some other

source. In addition, regardless of Sandra’s involvement, the fact remains that

Appellant received and kept images that authorities believed to be child

pornography. Sandra’s involvement here is mostly irrelevant to Appellant’s case.

There are no specific facts to suggest defense counsel was ineffective here.

                Appellant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not

investigating Sandra to determine if this was a case of entrapment. Again, this

                                            -8-
argument is without merit. There are no facts or even inuendo which suggest

Sandra was an agent of law enforcement.

             Appellant also claims that counsel was ineffective because he did not

investigate whether the images that were alleged to be child pornography actually

depicted images of a minor in a sexual performance. Kentucky’s child

pornography laws revolve around sexual performance of minors. See Kentucky

Revised Statutes (KRS) 531.300 et seq. Appellant argues that the pictures in

question did show nude minors, but the pictures were not sexual in nature. This

argument is also without merit. As previously stated, the record indicates that

defense counsel knew that challenging the pictures was going to be the main

defense in this case. There is no evidence that counsel did not review the pictures.

             Appellant’s final claim revolving around a lack of investigation is that

counsel generally failed to investigate the case and understand that Appellant lived

a nudist lifestyle and was sent pictures he did not request. This issue lacks any

specificity or supporting facts; therefore, we decline to address it. Lucas, supra.

             Appellant next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

an argument of double jeopardy. Appellant was charged with promoting a sexual

performance of a minor, KRS 531.320, and the distribution of matter portraying a

sexual performance by a minor, KRS 531.340. He claims that because these

                                         -9-
charges arose out of the same course of conduct, he was subject to double

jeopardy.

            We conclude there was no double jeopardy violation here.

            [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a
            violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to
            be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or
            only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a
            fact which the other does not. Pursuant to this test, [a]
            defendant is put in double jeopardy when he is convicted
            of two crimes with identical elements, or where one is
            simply a lesser-included offense of the other.

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 213, 218 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

            KRS 531.320(1) states: “A person is guilty of promoting a sexual

performance by a minor when, knowing the character and content thereof, he

produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a

minor.” KRS 531.340 states in relevant part:

            (1) A person is guilty of distribution of matter portraying
            a sexual performance by a minor when, having
            knowledge of its content and character, he or she:

               (a) Sends or causes to be sent into this state for sale or
               distribution; or

               (b) Brings or causes to be brought into this state for
               sale or distribution; or

               (c) In this state, he or she:

                   1. Exhibits for profit or gain; or

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                   2. Distributes; or

                   3. Offers to distribute; or

                   4. Has in his or her possession with intent to
                   distribute, exhibit for profit or gain or offer to
                   distribute, any matter portraying a sexual
                   performance by a minor.

             (2) Any person who has in his or her possession more
             than one (1) unit of material coming within the provision
             of KRS 531.300(2) shall be rebuttably presumed to have
             such material in his or her possession with the intent to
             distribute it.

Here, both statutes have different elements and neither is a lesser-included offense

of the other; therefore, there was no double jeopardy violation.

             Appellant next argues that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel when counsel did not accurately present a plea offer to him. Appellant

alleges that he was offered an eleven-year sentence and would have to serve 85%

before being eligible for parole; however, he then claims that 4 days later that plea

offer was withdrawn and he was offered a new plea agreement with a twenty-year

sentence that would require him serve 20% before he was eligible for parole.

Again, this argument lacks facts to support it. Lucas, supra. There is no evidence

in the record showing an earlier plea offer and Appellant provides no information

surrounding the earlier plea offer or its withdrawal. Ultimately, Appellant agreed

to the twenty-year plea agreement and changed his plea to guilty in open court.

There is no evidence that trial counsel was ineffective here.

                                         -11-
            Appellant’s final argument on appeal is that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel due to the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s errors. As

we have previously found no error on behalf of defense counsel, there can be no

cumulative error. McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 701 (Ky. 1986).

                                 CONCLUSION

            Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant received effective

assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Timothy Watkins, pro se                   Daniel Cameron
La Grange, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Jenny L. Sanders
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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