Court Opinion

ID: 9641094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:23:02.123857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:35.010013
License: Public Domain

POFF, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority that the judgment should be reversed. I dissent from *658that part of the majority opinion overruling Jim’s third point of error. For the reasons to be stated, I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering an increase in the amount of child support paid by Jim on the grounds that such an increase was “in the best interest of the child.” It may seem paradoxical that an increase in child support might not be in the best interest of the child, but as will be shown, literal application of that standard can lead to results detrimental to the child’s best interest.
The “best interest of the child” standard is inappropriate for determining whether to modify an existing child support order on grounds of material and substantial change in circumstances under section 14.056(a) of the Family Code. A literal reading of the statute would mandate that all motions to increase child support be granted, and all motions to decrease be denied, simply because an increase would always be in the best interest of the child, and a decrease would not. Examined in this light, the best interest of the child standard is meaningless.
Nancy advances a similar argument in her brief: “[I]f the Court was justified in increasing the child support being paid by [Jim], then it must clearly be implied from that justification that the increase was in the child’s best interest.” She argues that if Jim has the ability to pay more than the $400.00 per month required by their agreement, it is in the best interest of the child for him to do so. This is a dangerous rationale. If the child’s best interest follows the financial fortunes of the obligor, then a change in circumstances reducing the obligor’s ability to furnish support would necessarily result in an order reducing support, regardless of the best interests of the child. The "best interest of the child” standard would then belie its own name.
The standard that should be employed when determining the “best interest of the child” under section 14.056 is that of “adequate support sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of the child.” 1 Under this standard, a two-step process should be employed when ruling on a motion to modify child support. First, the court should determine that a material and substantial change in circumstances had taken place. Second, the court should determine how and whether the requested modification of support would affect the legitimate needs of the child.
In this case, Jim argues there is no evidence an increase in support would positively affect the legitimate needs of his son. Jim also contends that even if his contribution were increased, the increase would not enhance the child’s standard of living, but merely reduce the amount of Nancy's contribution. He points out that by increasing his support obligation, the trial court acted not in the best interest of the child, but in the best interest of his ex-wife.
Nancy contends that her son’s needs for food, clothing, and general living expenses have increased since the child support agreement was approved by the court, and argues that inflationary pressures have increased the amount necessary to furnish adequate support. She does not specify any unusual expenses other than the ordinary living expenses which increase as a child matures. I find no evidence in the record that the child is not receiving adequate support. His legitimate needs have been met, and sometimes met to excess. Nancy does not contest this fact. The additional support will not go to meet the legitimate needs of the child, because no additional legitimate needs have been shown. Absent the “best interest of the child” standard of section 14.056(a), there is no reason to increase support because there has been no showing that the child is not receiving adequate support.
The significant question raised by this case is whether the statute authorizes an increase in contractual child support, absent proof of (1) a material and substantial *659change m circumstances; and (2) the failure of current support levels to meet the legitimate needs of the child. Does the enactment of sections 14.055 and 14.056 allow Nancy to repudiate her contractual child support agreement on the grounds that it is not in substantial compliance with the guidelines of section 14.055? I decline to adopt that construction.
As noted by the majority, the trial court is not powerless to review, approve, and modify child support agreements. This power must be retained by the court to fulfill its obligation to protect the child’s legitimate needs for support. If, due to subsequent material and substantial changes in circumstances, a contractual support agreement is not meeting the child’s legitimate needs, it can and should be modified.
If, however, the child’s legitimate needs are met and he or she is adequately supported, the trial court has no grounds to modify the contract entered into by the parties and previously approved by the court. I see no grounds for modifying the decree in this case. The record contains no evidence that the child is not receiving adequate support. I, therefore, conclude the trial court abused its discretion by increasing Jim’s child support obligation. Accordingly, I would sustain Jim’s third point of error, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and render judgment vacating the order modifying the decree.

. That is, the amount of support necessary to meet the legitimate needs of the child, taking into account the total support furnished by both parents and the ability of each parent to furnish support.