Court Opinion

ID: 9760804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:17:26.850349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:17.450527
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment reached by the majority and the supporting rationale save the suggestions that “valid service” of process conditions on insurer’s duty to defend. My reasons for excepting the latter proposition follow.
First, the duty to defend is a creature of contract. Whether, and the extent to which, it exists depends upon the provisions of the insurance policy. Wheelways Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 872 S.W.2d 776, 786 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994, no writ); Daca, Inc. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 822 S.W.2d 360, 364 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). That policy must expressly obligate the insurer to defend. Id. Furthermore, the act or injury giving rise to the suit for which a defense is sought must fall within the coverage provided by the policy. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex.1982); 7C J. ppleman Insurance Law and Practice, § 4682, p. 22-23 (West 1979). To explain the latter, one may picture a scenario wherein a plaintiff intentionally alleges a wholly baseless claim in his petition. In doing so, he violates Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and, assuming justice is done, absolutely prevents himself from securing a valid judgment, that is, from lawfully assessing the insured with liability. Yet, this does not automatically free the insurer, for if the allegation falls within the umbrella of coverage it must defend. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d at 788; 7C J. Appleman Insurance Law and Practice, § 4682, p. 22-23. Thus, coverage, as opposed to the likelihood of liability, controls an insurer’s duty to defend. Id.; 14 M. Rhodes, R. Anderson, G. Couch Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance § 51.228 (1982).
By conditioning the duty to defend upon effective service of process, it renders controlling procedural rules encompassing service. Furthermore, such rules were intended merely to regulate the court’s power to adjudicate a dispute and validly assess liability via a binding judgment. They have nothing to do with the substantive issues underlying the suit and cause of action. They are utterly distinct from the questions of contract, *512insurance coverage provided by the contract, and duties emanating from coverage and the contract. They are not made to control unless so established by the contract.
Next, in perusing the insurance contract at bar one finds a clause stating that “the Company [Texas Farmers Insurance Co.] shall defend any suit against the Insured alleging such bodily injury or property damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this policy, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent_” (Emphasis added). The provision says nothing of defending against only “properly served” suits, but “any suit.” (Emphasis added). Furthermore, and assuming that the provision “shall defend any suit” were vague, one must interpret it in a strict manner favoring the insured. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Reed, 873 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex.1993). To clear the gray by limiting its scope to properly served actions contradicts this Supreme Court admonition. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Reed, 873 S.W.2d at 699 (expressly stating that “[i]f the policy is worded so that it can be given only one reasonable construction, it will be enforced as written ... if ... [it] is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we must resolve the uncertainty by adopting the construction most favorable to the insured.”).
In further perusing the policy, one also discovers a provision directing the insured to “immediately forward to the Company every demand, notice, summons, or other process received by him or his representative.... ” Admittedly, this and similarly worded provisions serve as conditions precedent to the insurer’s obligation to defend. Unless fulfilled, no duty arises. However, it, like the clause discussed above, mandates the delivery of “every ... summons or other process” not just those “properly served.” (Emphasis added). Moreover, if only “properly served” citation were to trigger the duty to defend then one can only wonder why “every” summons and process must be sent to the insured. In other words, conditioning the duty to defend upon proper service implicitly renders meaningless part of the insurance contract, thereby running afoul of this Court’s own precedent. Fort Worth Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Willham, 406 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Civ. App.—Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that courts may not needlessly reject any words or terms used in contracts or delete therefrom as surplusage any clause.).
Next, in addition to triggering the duty to defend, the imposition upon the insured to forward summons and process serves other purposes. It enables the insurer to control the litigation. Weaver v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 570 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.1978). That this was intended is buttressed by the further contractual duty imposed on the insured to cooperate with the insurer. Combined, the two restrain the insured from impermissibly interfering in the performance of the insurer’s obligations.
Yet, if notice is required to trigger the duty to defend and the latter carries with it the correlative right to control, then until the duty to defend accrues the insurer has no right to control. The insured, therefore, must be deemed to have the privilege, if not right, to assume and effectuate his own defense until the defective citation is cured.1 Thus, conditioning the insurer’s duty on proper service not only limits the coverage afforded an insured but also diminishes the insurer’s lawftd opportunity to control the litigation. More importantly, should the insured actually take control of his defense during the gap period, an insurer would be hard-pressed to argue that he violated his duty to cooperate. Again, because the insurer had no duly to defend, it lacked the correlative right to control. Without either, it had no cognizable interest with which the insured could interfere.
Additionally, it cannot be sincerely disputed that motions to transfer venue or dismiss via special appearances are defensive tactics available to an insurer. They have potential to influence the course of the proceeding. So too does a motion to quash service have such potential. Experience and research discloses that questions of whether to quash citation are as much in the realm of interposing a *513defense as are decisions relating to transferring venue, dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction, specially excepting, or abating. Yet, these defensive tactics should not be removed from the defensive arsenal available to the insurer by conditioning the duty to defend and right to counsel on proper service. It does so by merely denying the insurer the right to control during the period in which it has no duty to defend.
Next, forwarding summons also notifies the insurer that the insured has been sued and expects a timely defense. Weaver v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 570 S.W.2d at 369. That service may, unbeknownst to the insured, be defective, does not somehow diminish his desire to be defended. Nor does it affect the notice afforded the insurer. Indeed, the case relied upon by Farmers entailed situations where the insured did not deliver summons, citation or petition as he agreed to. E.g. Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.1995); Members Ins. Co. v. Branscum, 803 S.W.2d 462 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, no writ). Thus, it was conceivable that the insurer had no notice of the suit. When no notice is afforded, the courts deem it appropriate to protect the insurer. Yet, at bar, that is not the case. At the very least a question of fact exists regarding whether Farmers had notice. And, if it had notice, every purpose espoused in Weaver and Harwell for delivering citation to the insurer was fulfilled. Thus, there would be no logical reason for Farmers to escape its duty simply because of a defect in the mode of service made upon its insured.
Finally, a passage in Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.1995), states that “State Farm would have gratuitously subjected itself to liability if it appeared on the insured’s behalf before it received notice Harwell was joined in the lawsuit and properly served, or that she had accepted service and appeared in the suit.” Id. at 174 (emphasis added). Yet, I note that it is inapposite.
First, in Harwell, service was made on someone who was neither the insured, his legal representative, nor a party to the suit. Id. at 172-73. Here, service was made on the insured who was also a party to the underlying action. Second, in Harwell, neither the insured nor his legal representative sent a copy of the five petition to the insurer, as required by the policy. Id. at 172. Here, the insured timely sent the requisite documents; at the very least, a question of fact exists with regard to the issue.
Third, the Harwell court took care to distinguish its circumstances from those wherein the insurer had actual knowledge of the suit. Id. at 174 n. 3. As the Supreme Court apparently believes, it is the lack of such notice coupled with prejudice which causes the insurer to escape liability. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cruz, 883 S.W.2d 164, 165-66 (Tex.1993). Though it may have known of the claim, the Harwell insurer was not notified of the suit. Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d at 174 n. 3. Here, the insurer knew of the suit once citation was forwarded, by the insured, to its agent, as per the policy terms.
Fourth, and to the extent that prejudice underlies the reason for relieving an insurer of its responsibility, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cruz, 883 S.W.2d at 165-66, Harwell involved instances of prejudice. Here, no one attempts to explain, much less prove as a matter of law, how defective service prejudiced the insurer given that it may have received a copy of the suit papers as per the insurance policy.
Fifth, Harwell cites Weaver v. Hartford, supra, as support for its reference to “proper service.” Yet, Weaver says nothing of “proper” service. Indeed, both it and Harwell, unlike here, concerned the insured’s failure to comply with the policy by sending any of the suit papers to the insurer. Because the insureds failed to comply there, the Supreme Court felt it appropriate, as it should have, to protect the insurer. Here, the insured complied with its obligation, or at the very least, a question of fact exists with regard to it.
In sum, Harwell did not address the issue here pertinent. It did not resolve the question of whether an insurer, because of a defect in the mode of service, should be relieved of providing a defense to its insured who has otherwise complied with the terms of the insurance policy. Nor does the brief, *514unexplained quip provide basis for subjecting an insured, who is often a layperson unschooled in the law, with the additional unwritten duty to not only determine whether the technical legal rules of service were met but also to coerce effective service as a condition to his insurer’s duty to defend.
The conduct which “triggers” the duty to defend is sending the suit papers to the insurer. Members Ins. Co. v. Branscum, 803 S.W.2d at 466-67. Whether the insured received them via proper service is irrelevant, as long as he received and sent them to his carrier. To make it relevant, constitutes an undue act of judicial interference with private contracts. “Courts cannot make new contracts between the parties....” Royal Indem. Co. v. Marshall, 388 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Tex.1965). Had the parties cared to condition the duty to defend upon valid service, it was their option, not ours, to do so.

. At the very least, the insured would most likely be compelled to secure his own counsel to defen-mine whether process was effective and how to proceed if it is not.