Court Opinion

ID: 9548016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:56:22.014677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:22.505506
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BV CIRCUIT
JUDGE M. DOI
I concur.
However, because I find it difficult to glean any clear and meaningful criteria from the “well-settled rules of law” mentioned in the majority opinion to determine *392whether Apana and Kaiwi were loaned servants, I find it necessary to state my thinking.
The loaned servant doctrine permits a general employer to avoid respondeat superior liability for injury caused by his servant’s negligence in the course of employment by shifting the servant on to a borrowing employer. The critical question under that doctrine is how to determine when such shifting takes place in a given case resulting in the employee becoming a loaned servant of the borrower. As succinctly stated in Nepstad v. Lambert, 235 Minn. 1, 50 N.W.2d 614 (1951),
“Though well established, the loaned servant principle has proved troublesome in its application to individual fact situations. The criteria for determining when a worker becomes a loaned servant are not precise; as a result, the state of the law on this subject is chaotic. Respectable authority for almost any position can be found, for even within a single jurisdiction the decisions are in conflict.” 50 N.W.2d at 620.
The instant case involves the renting out of an instrumentality (a crane) together with its operator (crane operator and a signalman for the operator). For such a case,. I find Nepstad., supra, most enlightening and the “right to control the particular act giving rise to the injury” test contained therein most persuasive.
“The so-called ‘right of control or direction’ test assumes to place the responsibility for the servant’s negligence upon the employer having the right to control his actions at the time the negligent act occurs. The theoretical basis for this test is probably the desire to impose the liability upon the employer who was in the best position to prevent the injury. Although this may be considered inconsistent with the liability-without-fault nature of respondeat superior, the con*393trol test has received widespread approval from the courts.” 50 N.W.2d at 620.
This test has two elements in it: (1) control over (2) the particular act giving rise to the injury:
. . Since the question of liability is always raised because of some specific act done, the important question is not whether or not he remains the servant of the general employer as to matters generally, but whether or not, as to the act in question, he is acting in the business of and under the direction of one or the other.” (Emphasis added.) Restatement, Agency, § 227, Comment (a).
In a general sense, both lending and borrowing employers have relationships with an equipment operator which may be considered elements of control. The general employer may pay the wages, retain the power of discharge, or substitute different operators on different days. The borrower may direct the operator as to the work to be accomplished. However, the control which is meaningful is that which is directed over the particular act causing the injury.
And that control must be detailed authoritative control, as distinguished from mere suggestions or the giving of information to induce cooperative effort.
Applying the test to the instant case, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict.
The evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the negligent conduct resulting in injury to the plaintiff was that of Kaiwi in not keeping his eye on the bucket as it was lowered towards the men and/or that of Apaña in not halting the crane’s movement when he noticed Kaiwi looking away from the bucket. In either case, the manner in which the bucket was lowered would be the particular *394act giving rise to injury, and Johnson Pacific exercised no detailed authoritative control over the manner in which the delivery of the bucket was executed.
The evidence indicates that between its crew foreman and bucket man (plaintiff), Johnson Pacific did give authoritative directions to Apaña through Kaiwi as to when and where to deliver the buckets of concrete. From this, appellant argues that the particular conduct causing injury was Kaiwi’s and'Apana’s delivery of the bucket without receiving any directions, at a time when and to a place where it was not expected, and that since that particular conduct was one which was under the authoritative control of Johnson Pacific, Apana and Kaiwi must be deemed loaned servants as a matter of law.
Although appellant’s contention is an arguable one, and although the wrong timing of delivery to which appellant points may well be considered a cause of the injury, it is just as arguable and also reasonable to point to the negligent manner of delivery as a cause of plaintiff’s, injury. And, as has been previously pointed out, under the latter finding there would not be any detailed authoritative control on the part of Johnson Pacific over the manner of delivery.
Nepstad and the later case of McCollum v. Smith, 339 F.2d 348 (1964), both crane rental cases in which the crane operator was,, as a matter of law, declared to be loaned servants are distinguishable on their facts. In each of those cases, the negligent act involved was in the movement of the crane by the operator, and the operator was directly under the detailed signals of the borrower as to each movement of the crane in its operation. In the instant case, the borrower directed the lender’s operator through the lender’s signalman as to when and where to deliver buckets of concrete but gave no signals to either as to the manner of lowering the bucket.