Court Opinion

ID: 9903784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:04:03.362772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.241791
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                   FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                   DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

J. W.,

             Appellant,
                                           Case No. 5D21-2299
v.                                         LT Case No. 2021-MH-004110-O

R. W.,

             Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed December 2, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Orange County,
Leticia J. Marques, Judge.

Jacob V. Stuart, Jr., of The Law
Office of Jacob V. Stuart, P.A., Orlando
and Christopher R. Kaigle, of The Kaigle
Law Firm P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.

R. W., Oviedo, pro se.

WALLIS, J.
      J.W. appeals the trial court’s order granting R.W.'s petition for

Involuntary Assessment and Stabilization under the Marchman Act. J.W.

argues that the trial court erred by granting the petition without hearing

testimony from the qualified professional who executed the involuntary

assessment, as required by sections 397.6957(1) and (3), Florida Statutes

(2021). We agree and reverse.

      We review de novo the order for involuntary substance abuse

treatment under chapter 397. J.C. v. State, 293 So. 3d 627, 628 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2020). Chapter 397, otherwise known as the Hal S. Marchman Alcohol

and Other Drug Services Act, "explicitly places the burden of proof on the

petitioner to establish the requirements for involuntary treatment by clear and

convincing evidence." Id. (citing § 397.6957(2), Fla. Stat. (2019)). Section

397.6957, which governs the procedure for the evidentiary hearing on a

petition for involuntary services, states that a petitioner must present witness

testimony, under oath, from "one of the qualified professionals who executed

the involuntary services certificate." § 397.6957(3), Fla. Stat. Additionally,

"the court shall hear and review all relevant evidence, including the review of

results of the assessment completed by the qualified professional in

connection with the respondent’s protective custody, emergency admission,

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involuntary   assessment,     or   alternative   involuntary    admission."    §

397.6957(1), Fla. Stat.

      In this case, the record on appeal reflects that Tennille Gordon, a

licensed mental health counselor, was the qualified professional who

conducted the assessment pursuant to chapter 397 and recommended

involuntary treatment for J.W. Upon conducting the assessment, Gordon

prepared and executed a Qualified Professional Certificate that contained

her findings and the reason for her recommendation. However, the

transcripts from the hearing on R.W.'s petition do not show that Gordon ever

testified as required by the statute. 1 Moreover, the transcripts do not indicate

that Gordon's certified assessment was ever offered or admitted into

evidence at the hearing. Thus, as J.W. argued below and on appeal, R.W.'s

failure to present testimony from Gordon and to offer the certified

assessment into evidence fails to satisfy the burden of proof required by

sections 397.6957(1) and (3). 2 See J.C., 293 So. 3d at 628–29 (reversing

      1
       The hearing on the petition took place over two days with the parties
and their witnesses appearing remotely.
      2
       Notably, J.W.'s attorney filed a written closing argument after the
hearing arguing that R.W. failed to meet her burden of proof by failing to
present testimony from Gordon, and further arguing that testimony from
other medical professionals who did not execute the certified assessment
was insufficient to meet the statutory requirement.

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and remanding order for involuntary treatment because trial court deviated

from express requirement of section 397.6957); see also Lund v. Project

Warm, 177 So. 3d 283, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quashing trial court's order

for continued commitment under chapter 397 and explaining that "[s]tatutes

which authorize the deprivation of an individual's liberty must be strictly

construed").

     Because the record on appeal does not show that the trial court

considered Gordon's certified assessment or that it heard testimony from any

other qualified professional that executed that assessment, we reverse the

trial court’s order and remand for a new hearing.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

SASSO and TRAVER, JJ., concur.

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