Court Opinion

ID: 9959676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:09:10.20225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:44.209483
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1708-22

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THOMAS MAHER,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Submitted February 27, 2024 – Decided April 12, 2024

                   Before Judges Sumners and Rose.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-0054-21.

                   Thomas Maher, appellant pro se.

                   Adam J. Beedenbender (Burke Moore Law Group,
                   LLC), attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

          Defendant Thomas Maher appeals pro se from a January 6, 2023 Law

Division order, granting plaintiff Bank of America, N.A. summary judgment on
its breach of contract claim pursuant to a home equity line of credit secured by

plaintiff's residence. Because plaintiff's complaint was filed within the six-year

statutory time frame, we affirm. 1

      We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history from the motion

record in a light most favorable to defendant as the non-moving party. See R.

4:46-2(c); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). In

May 2006, Countrywide Bank, N.A. extended to defendant a home equity line

of credit. The agreement was secured by a mortgage on residential property

located in Monmouth Beach. Effective April 27, 2009, Countrywide Bank

"merged into and under the charter title of Bank of America, National

Association." Pursuant to the merger, plaintiff "became the owner and holder

of the [c]ontract and the [m]ortgage."

      On May 17, 2006, defendant made an "initial draw" of $991,888.

Thereafter, he made regular payments between June 19, 2006 and July 25, 2014,

when he made his last payment, leaving a balance of $785,259.21. Section 12

of the agreement permitted plaintiff the "right[] to terminate or accelerate

[defendant's] account and take other action" if defendant "fail[ed] to meet the

1
  Defendant also appeals from a November 4, 2022 Law Division order, denying
plaintiff's initial summary judgment motion and defendant's second cross-
motion to dismiss the complaint.
                                                                            A-1708-22
                                         2
repayment terms of this agreement." Eight months later, on March 23, 2015,

plaintiff exercised its right to accelerate the debt pursuant to the agreement. Two

years later, defendant's senior mortgage lender filed a foreclosure action against

the Monmouth Beach property, which was then sold at sheriff's sale.

       In September 2019, plaintiff sent a notice of default to defendant. In

January 2021, plaintiff filed a single-count complaint alleging breach of

contract. The motion judge denied defendant's ensuing self-represented motion

to dismiss the complaint but, with consent of plaintiff, vacated default.

Defendant thereafter answered the complaint and asserted various affirmative

defenses, including plaintiff's complaint was barred by the six-year limitations

period set forth in N.J.S.A. 12A:3-118(a) and 2A:14-1.

      Shortly thereafter, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and to extend

the deadline to serve responses to defendant's discovery requests. Plaintiff's

summary judgment motion was adjourned until discovery was complete. In

November 2022, the motion judge denied plaintiff's motion, without prejudice,

for failure to comply with Rule 4:46-2. The same day, the judge also denied

defendant's second cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. Pertinent to this

appeal, the judge found plaintiff was neither time-barred from filing the

complaint nor required to provide pre-suit notice of default or acceleration.

                                                                             A-1708-22
                                        3
      Days later, plaintiff filed its second summary judgment motion.

Defendant thereafter filed his third cross-motion to dismiss. Following oral

argument, the judge issued a written statement of reasons and memorializing

order, granting plaintiff's motion and denying defendant's cross-motion. The

judge reasoned defendant "entered into the credit agreement, received the agreed

upon funds, and breached his obligation to repay the debt owed to plaintiff."

The judge also concluded "[d]efendant's motion to dismiss the complaint [wa]s

without support in the facts presented or the applicable law."

      On appeal, defendant raises two arguments. He maintains plaintiff's cause

of action was time-barred. In addition, apparently for the first time on appeal,

defendant contends plaintiff's initial summary judgment motion was defective

because the statement of material facts was contained within plaintiff's brief and

its affiant lacked personal knowledge to authenticate certain business records.

      We are unpersuaded by defendant's first argument for the reasons that

follow. Because defendant's second argument was not raised before the motion

judge, we could decline to address it. See Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 227

(2014) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) ("[D]eclin[ing] to

consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an

opportunity for such a presentation is available . . . .")). Nonetheless, we have

                                                                            A-1708-22
                                        4
considered defendant's contentions and conclude they lack sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We simply add the

motion judge denied plaintiff's initial summary judgment motion, rendering

moot defendant's belated challenges to the November 4, 2022 order.

      We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Conforti

v. County of Ocean, 255 N.J. 142, 162 (2023). Employing the same standard as

the trial court, we review the record to determine whether there are material

factual disputes and, if not, whether the undisputed facts viewed in the light

most favorable to defendant, as the non-moving party, nonetheless entitles

plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. See Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73,

78 (2022); Brill, 142 N.J. at 540; see also R. 4:46-2(c). We owe no deference

to the trial court's legal analysis or interpretation of a statute. Palisades at Fort

Lee Condo. Ass'n v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427, 442 (2017).

      A cause of action accrues when the right arises for the enforcing party; in

installment contracts, accrual occurs when a payment is missed. Metromedia

Co. v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 139 N.J. 532, 535-36 (1995) (quoting Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Valencia Pork Store, 212 N.J. Super. 335, 338 (Law Div.

1986)). "[T]he statute of limitations [(SOL)] may begin to run against each

                                                                              A-1708-22
                                         5
installment as it falls due." Ibid. (quoting Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 212 N.J.

Super. at 338).

      Two statutes govern the SOL for contracts: N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 and 12A:3-

118. The six-year limitations period set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applies "for

recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, expressed or implied, not under

seal, or upon an account other than one which concerns the trade or merchandise

between merchant and merchant, their factors, agents, and servants." Similarly,

under the Uniform Commercial Code, "an action to enforce the obligation of a

party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six

years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated,

within six years after the accelerated due date." N.J.S.A. 12A:3-118(a). As

plaintiff correctly notes, N.J.S.A. 12A:3-118(a) does not apply here because the

parties' contract does not concern a commercial transaction in goods. See

N.J.S.A. 12A:2-10.      Instead, the six-year limitations period under N.J.S.A.

2A:14-1(a) governs the present dispute.

      Further, "[u]ntil the debt [i]s due and payable, no cause of action . . .

accrue[s]."   Guerin v. Cassidy, 38 N.J. Super. 454, 460 (Ch. Div. 1955);

Metromedia Co., 139 N.J. at 535 ("[A] plaintiff may sue for each breach only as

it occurs."). When an acceleration clause is activated, a cause of action occurs

                                                                               A-1708-22
                                          6
when payment is not made because the debt becomes immediately due and

payable. Therefore, once the debt is accelerated, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a) provides

a six-year SOL.

        In the present matter, the acceleration clause was activated on March 23,

2015. Because plaintiff filed its complaint on January 7, 2021, the six-year

limitations period was satisfied. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, plaintiff was

afforded the option to accelerate all sums payable immediately but elected to

accelerate the debt eight months after defendant's last payment was received,

which made the remaining balance payable immediately. The six-year SOL

therefore ran from the acceleration date. See e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Dist. 15

Machinists' Pension Fund v. Kahle Eng'g Corp., 43 F.3d 852, 857 (3d Cir. 1994)

(holding the SOL will run when each installment is due, unless the acceleration

clause is exercised, then the SOL runs from the day the acceleration clause is

exercised on the full debt); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gold, 171 N.Y.S.3d 1029,

1030 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (holding "the [SOL] begins to run anew on the

entire debt upon acceleration"); Blair v. EMC Mortg., LLC, 139 N.E.3d 705,

711 (Ind. 2020) (holding the SOL will run against each installment as it becomes

due).

                                                                             A-1708-22
                                        7
      Notably, in In re Estate of Balk, 445 N.J. Super. 395, 401 (App. Div.

2016), we held a repudiation "entails a statement or 'voluntary affirmative act'

indicating that the promisor 'will commit a breach' when performance becomes

due." A missed payment is categorized as a "partial breach" and not a "total

breach" unless accompanied by a repudiation that is anticipatory with respect to

performances due in the future. Ibid. Thus, "a missed payment is insufficient

to constitute a total breach of an installment contract or agreement unless

accompanied by anticipatory repudiation indicating a failure to perform future

obligations specified in the contract." Ibid.

      In the present matter, however, defendant stopped making payments under

the agreement on March 15, 2014. There is no indication in the record defendant

intended to repudiate the contract outside of missing payments.         Deciding

otherwise would negate any good-faith efforts to enforce grace periods provided

by lenders. As Corbin on Contracts explains:

            Where a contract contains an acceleration clause
            making all installments payable in case of failure to pay
            any one installment when due, the creditor is not
            required to join subsequent installments in his action
            for the first installment, if the acceleration clause is
            regarded as giving him an option. In such case, the
            statute does not begin to run against later installments
            until each falls due in regular course. In some cases[,]
            the contrary has been held because of the positive
            wording of the acceleration clause, with nothing to

                                                                           A-1708-22
                                        8
     indicate an option. Such a holding may be unduly harsh
     on the plaintiff who has delayed in good-faith without
     harm to the debtor.

     [10 Corbin on Contracts § 53.9 (2024).]

Affirmed.

                                                              A-1708-22
                               9