Court Opinion

ID: 9601292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:41:12.727944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:22:22.200572
License: Public Domain

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the release bars Plaintiffs claim. I write separately to note that, even in the absence of the release, Plaintiffs claim would fail.
*773An intentional tort is a narrow exception to Ohio’s workers’ compensation system. Brookover v. Flexmag Indus., Inc., No. 00CA49, 2002 WL 1189156, at *11 (Ohio Ct.App. Apr.29, 2002). The exception is limited to egregious employer conduct. Sanek v. Duracote Co., 43 Ohio St.3d 169, 539 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (1989). It is a difficult claim to establish. Taulbee v. Adience, Inc., BMI Div., 120 Ohio App.3d 11, 696 N.E.2d 625, 629 (1997).
The Ohio Supreme Court articulated the requirements to prove intent for an intentional tort as follows:
(1) knowledge by the employer of the existence of a dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition within its business operation; (2) knowledge by the employer that if the employee is subjected by his employment to such dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to the employee will be a substantial certainty; and (3) that the employer, under such circumstances, and with such knowledge, did act to require the employee to continue to perform the dangerous task.
Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc., 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, 1109 (1991).
Plaintiff does not meet the standard for the second element of the Fyffe test: “knowledge by the employer that if the employee is subjected by his employment to such dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to the employee will be a substantial certainty.” 1 Id. at 1109. This element requires proof beyond “knowledge and appreciation of a risk.” Id. at 1112. “Exposure to conditions or processes that are dangerous — even unusually so — is insufficient in itself to establish substantial certainty of injury.” Cheriki v. Black River Indus., Inc., No. 07CA009230, 2008 WL 2229632, at *8 (Ohio Ct.App. June 2, 2008).
Though it is, by its nature, a fact-specific inquiry, an Ohio appellate court described some of the factors used in assessing this element: “knowledge of a high probability of harm, including prior accidents of a similar nature, inadequate training, and whether the employer deliberately removed or deliberately failed to install safety features.” Tucker v. Huff, No. 07-HA-7, 2008 WL 2587054, at *5 (Ohio Ct.App. June 30, 2008). Another court recited these factors: “the employer’s concealment or misrepresentations concerning the danger, and federal and/or state safety violations or noncompliance by the employer with industry safety standards.” Marks v. Goodwill Indus. of Akron, Ohio, Inc., No. 20706, 2002 WL 462864, at *2 (Ohio Ct.App. Mar. 27, 2002).
At most, only one of these factors support Plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff could plausibly argue that there was a high probability of harm. GM affidavits suggest that a broken or missing retaining plate would have been treated seriously. It is plausible to infer from these affidavits that GM knew there would be a high risk of injury if a retaining plate was not fixed. No other factor supports Plaintiffs claim. *774There are no reports of similar accidents, Plaintiff does not mention any relevant training, nor did GM deliberately remove or fail to install a safety feature. GM made no misrepresentations about safety, and neither party refers to any relevant state, federal, or industry safety standards.
Plaintiff argues that GM’s failure to repair the retaining plate is analogous to removing or failing to install a safety feature. This argument misses the mark. Failing to “take corrective action” is an example of conduct that “may be characterized as gross negligence or wantonness ... [but] should not be classified as an ‘intentional tort.’ ” Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, 504-505 (1988).
The cases Plaintiff cites do not suggest anything other than that a deliberate act contributes to finding a substantial certainty. In Brookover, the court stated that “the trier of fact may consider evidence that an employer has deliberately removed or deliberately failed to install a safety guard.” 2002 WL 1189156, at * 18. It found that the employer had deliberately failed to install a safety guard. Id. In Walton v. Springwood Products, Inc., the employer copied another piece of equipment, but failed to copy the safety guard. 105 Ohio App.3d 400, 663 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1995). It did so despite the fact that the guard was required under OSHA standards. Id. The employer’s failure was found to be deliberate and thus supported a finding that the employer knew there was a substantial certainty of harm.
Plaintiff has only presented evidence that GM did not repair the safety feature within a week of learning of the missing plate. There is no proof that the failure to repair was deliberate. At most, there is proof of GM’s knowledge and appreciation of some risk involved if a retaining plate was missing. These do not establish substantial certainty. See Cross v. Hydracrete Co., Inc., 133 Ohio App.3d 501, 728 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (1999). At most, delaying a week might have been negligent; it was not so egregious as to satisfy the Fyffe test.
Because Plaintiff did not raise an issue of material fact with regard to the substantial certainty element, the district court appropriately granted summary judgment for GM regardless of the effect of the release.

. The district court also held that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the knowledge of a dangerous condition element. Seals v. General Motors Corp., No. 1:06 CV 1592, 2007 WL 2579401, at *7 (N.D.Ohio Aug.30, 2007). Plaintiff presented several incident reports and an email created by GM supervisors in the normal course of their business activities that indicated GM knew the retaining plate had been missing. These statements were admissible against GM as party admissions. See Fed. R.Evid. 801(D)(2). An admission is probative evidence of an employer’s knowledge. See Crane v. Lakewood Hosp., 103 Ohio App.3d 129, 658 N.E.2d 1088, 1091-92 (1995). A jury could find based on this evidence that GM had prior knowledge of the missing plate, so summary judgment based on this element was inappropriate.