Court Opinion

ID: 9466479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:17:25.42071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:45.931512
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in Judge Hill’s opinion in this case. I write specially, however, because I believe that Toney should not be permitted to raise his evidentiary claims at all. As Judge Hill points out, ante, at 279, Toney, who never took the stand in his own defense or even proffered his proposed testimony, is permitted to appeal the trial court’s ruling on the Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2) question because of our holding in United States v. Langston, 576 F.2d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932, 99 S.Ct. 324, 58 L.Ed.2d 327 (1978). See United States v. Hitsman, 604 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1979). In my view, that decision, by which we are bound, was ill-considered.
Prior crimes impeachment under rule 609(a)(1) for a non -crimen falsi is based on a judicial balancing of the need for the impeachment and the potential prejudice to the defendant. Quite often, such a balance will be a fine one, and the court will be torn between the prosecution’s right to show a defendant’s true colors and the defendant’s right to be tried only on the charges of the indictment, not on his prior criminal record. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). In Toney’s case, the court was moved initially to find that the scale tipped towards exclusion, ante, at 278-279, but ruled as it did because the weighing of probative value vis-a-vis prejudice is foreclosed under rule 609(a)(2).
A court should not be expected to determine before trial whether the defendant will be subject to impeachment under rule 609, even when the defense proffers what the defendant would be expected to say in the event he chose to testify. Rather, the determination should be made only when the actual moment for prior crimes impeachment arrives. At that time, the court will have heard the prosecution’s case and part of the defense’s case and can assess the impact of the evidence on the jury. Having heard the defendant’s testimony on direct examination and on cross, up to the point of the attempted impeachment, the court would be in the best possible position to determine (1) whether the defendant has left himself open to impeachment at all1 *281and, (2) if a non-crimen falsi is involved, whether the probative value of the impeachment outweighs its prejudicial effect.
By reviewing a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of prior crimes for impeachment, we invite resourceful defense counsel to create reversible error. Under the Langston construction of rule 609, reinforced by today’s holding, defense counsel might be considered remiss, perhaps incompetent, for not seeking a pretrial determination whether his client will be subject to impeachment with a criminal record. We invite counsel to pursue such a determination even though he has no intention of placing the defendant on the stand in the presence of the jury. If the court rules that the defendant will be subject to prior crimes impeachment, defense counsel holds potential error in his pocket as a trump card in case of conviction. On appeal, the defendant should be expected to claim that he was kept off the stand by the court’s adverse ruling, and that, had he testified, he would have convinced the jury of his innocence or at least created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
Langston stands for the proposition that we must review the trial court’s ruling even where, as here, the record on appeal contains nothing to indicate (1) whether any impeachment of the defendant by prior crimes was in order and, if so, (2) whether, under rule 609(a)(1), the probative value of the impeachment outweighed its prejudicial effect. I find such a task an impossible exercise. Even in a case where the defendant or his counsel has proffered the defendant’s proposed testimony, I -still would have great difficulty in saying with any degree of confidence, in a rule 609(a)(1) situation, whether the likelihood of undue prejudicial effect on the jury made inappropriate prior crime impeachment. We would be inclined, I think, to accept an appellant’s representation that he would have testified but for the trial judge’s ruling; we would also be inclined to hold that the trial judge’s erroneous ruling was not harmless.
Should the trial judge rule for the defense on the impeachment question, the defendant could not be forced to take the stand, even where he has represented in his pretrial motion, or in his proffer, that he would testify. Any trial changes complexion as it progresses, and a defendant who, earlier, may have anticipated testifying, may well conclude at the eleventh hour that to do so would be foolhardy.
If a trial judge adopts the policy of considering objections to prior crimes impeachment after a defendant has taken the stand, direct examination is over, and the moment of impeachment has arrived, only those defendants actually prejudiced by an adverse ruling will be heard on appeal. If the impeachment was inappropriate, reversible error would be found. It is true that a defendant will have to risk an adverse ruling if he chooses to testify, but this is not an undue burden for him to bear. It is a burden that he must bear when faced with any other potentially damaging impeachment.
I do not write on a clean slate here. In New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979), the Supreme Court permitted a state court defendant who failed to testify at trial to raise a constitutional objection to a trial court ruling that, he claimed, kept him off the stand. In so holding, the Court did not say that it had to consider the claims, but, rather, that it would do so because a state appellate court heard the case on its merits. 440 U.S. at 452-56, 99 S.Ct. at 1294-95. Justices Powell and Rehnquist pointed out that the Constitution does not require review of such a claim. In fact, “requiring that the claim be presented only by those who have taken the stand will prevent defendants with no real intention of testifying from creating artificial constitutional challenges to their convictions.” Id. at 462, 99 S.Ct. at 1299 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Since New Jersey chose *282to review the defendant’s contention, however, Justice Powell felt that the Court should do so as well. Id. In dissent, Justice Blackmun and the Chief Justice argued that Portash’s complaint was so remote and speculative that it could not constitutionally be reviewed due to the “case or controversy” requirement of article III of the Constitution. Id. at 462 — 471, 99 S.Ct. at 1299-1303 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, the Supreme Court would not require appellate review of a contention such as Toney’s, and at least two justices would not permit it at all.
A number of other courts have ruled on the specific issue I address. The First Circuit does not require advance rulings on rule 609 questions, but it certainly encourages them. United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir. 1977); see United States v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082, 1087 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 107, 62 L.Ed.2d 70 (1979). Cf. United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528, 530 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1978) (allows pretrial ruling on motion to exclude impeachment with prior conviction' over ten years old under rule 609(b)). The Ninth Circuit formerly held that a defendant waived his objection to an advance ruling if he did not take the stand, even though he later represented that he had elected not to testify because of that ruling. E. g., United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1977). The Eighth Circuit has reached a similar result. United States v. Johnston, 543 F.2d 55, 59 (8th Cir. 1976). In United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit overruled its prior decisions and held that a defendant may fail to testify and still preserve his objection to a rule 609(a)(1) ruling. Five judges disagreed with that result, and in so doing expressed some of the concerns I have raised. Id. at 1188-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1191-92 (Sneed, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As for the Fifth Circuit, we, without any real discussion or analysis, adopted a result in United States v. Langston like that the Ninth Circuit now has reached.
There are some procedural problems inherent in the pretrial hearing device, especially where impeachment by a non -crimen falsi is being considered, that I have not touched upon but are worthy of mention. First, what kind of hearing is the court to hold? If the defendant does not take the stand to proffer what he intends to tell the jury later in his own defense, then how is the prosecutor to carry his burden of proving “that the probative value of admitting [the prior conviction] outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant”? Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1). Unless the defendant is placed under examination, the prosecutor may well be foreclosed from establishing the admissibility of the impeachment evidence. If the defendant submits to examination, how extensive may the prosecutor’s examination be? If it is restricted to matters brought out by the defendant on direct, the direct examination will be brief — too brief to warrant prior crimes impeachment, the defense will no doubt contend. If the defendant participates in the proffer and is subjected to cross-examination, the question then arises: may the prosecutor use the proffered testimony for impeachment purposes when the defendant testifies before the jury? Suppose the defendant develops a line of defense before the jury that he withheld from his proffer; may the prosecutor establish the point on cross?
Finally, suppose the trial judge, at the pretrial hearing, concludes that the defendant is not subject to prior crimes impeachment or that the impeachment would be too prejudicial to be admissible under rule 609(a)(1). Armed with this favorable ruling, the defendant elects to testify in the defense’s case-in-chief. By the time cross-examination arrives, it is apparent that the defendant is clearly open to impeachment by a non-crimen falsi and any prejudice is outweighed by the probative value of the impeachment. If the trial judge reverses himself and allows the impeachment, the defendant should be expected to claim something akin to “entrapment.” The favorable pretrial ruling, he might argue, induced him to testify; moreover, it dictated an entire trial strategy he would, otherwise, not have followed.
*283If there is any utility in the Langston approach, it is, in my judgment, made worthless by the mischief it will create.

. It is conceivable, albeit highly unlikely, that the credibility of the defendant’s testimony will not be in issue; hence, the court may disallow altogether any prior crimes impeachment, even with a crimen falsi. Or, if impeachment by a non -crimen falsi is sought, the court may well conclude that the defendant’s testimony is so incredible and, in light of the overwhelming *281evidence against him, will, clearly, be disregarded by the jury, that to impeach the defendant with a prior offense would serve no goal other than to convince the jury that he is a bad person.