Court Opinion

ID: 9848993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:32:10.168561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:56.444000
License: Public Domain

Oxner, Justice
(dissenting).
The Court holds that the consent order of the Virginia Court dismissing the habeas corpus proceedings instituted there after appellant and respondent had reached an agreement as to the custody of their children is a judgment which, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution, precludes the courts of this State, in the absence of any change in conditions, from inquiring into and determining what is for'the welfare and best interests of these children.- At the time this agreement was made the marital domicile of the parties was in North Carolina. Appellant *319continues to be a resident of that State. Under the view taken by the majority of the Court, not only would this order constitute, in the absence of a change in conditions, an adjudication binding on the courts of this State but also on those of North Carolina. I do not agree that it has such effect.
It is generally held that the judgment of a Court of one State as to custody of children must, in the absence of fraud or want of jurisdiction, be given full effect in every other State as to the facts before the Court at the time such judgment was rendered. Hartley v. Blease, 99 S. C. 92, 82 S. E. 991; Annotation 116 A. L. R. 1299. The underlying reason for this was stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion in People of State of New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610, 67 S. Ct. 903, 907, 91 L. Ed. 1133, as follows: “The constitutional policy formulated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot be fitted into tight little categories or too abstract generalities. That policy was the nationwide restriction of litigiousness, to the extent that States, autonomous for certain purposes, should not be exploited to permit repetitive litigation. In substance, the Framers deemed it against the national welfare for a controversy that was truly litigated in one State to be relitigated in another. Such limitation does not foreclose inquiry into what was litigated and what was adjudicated.”
In this proceeding respondent is not seeking to relitigate an issue which has been litigated in Virginia. The merits of the present controversy were never considered nor passed upon in that State. In fact, the agreement made between the parties was never exhibited to the Court. It follows that the order entered by the Virginia Court was not pronounced in the exercise of its judicial function. Such order, referred to in the Virginia decisions as an order “dismissed agreed”, is apparently there regarded as binding on the parties because the courts “cannot change the contract of the parties without their consent.” Bardach Iron and Steel Co. Inc., v. Tenenbaum, 136 Va. 163, 118 S. E. 502. This is in accord with *320the general rule that a judgment or decree, though entered by consent of the parties, is res judicata to the same extent as if entered after contest. Norton v. Planters Fertilizer & Phosphate Co., 206 S. C. 119, 33 S. E. (2d) 247; Annotation 2 A. L. R. (2d) 514. I do not question the soundness of this principle when applied to an ordinary civil action. If this were purely a personal contest between the parties over a legal right, there would exist a basis for holding that the Virginia order is binding. But I do not think it is binding in another State in a proceeding relating to the custody of children. Such a proceeding is not to be judged, nor the results measured, altogether by technical rules that have to do with property rights. Like marriage, the custody of young children is of importance to the State. It is not a property right of the parents. It is stated in 17A Am. Jur., page 31: “If the original award was made casually, pursuant to an agreement of the parties and without a true judicial consideration of the facts, it is proper to consider the facts as they existed at the time the decree was entered in determining whether the order should be modified.”
The reasons advanced in the Virginia decisions for the binding effect of an order “dismissed agreed” have no application here. While these parties were at liberty to contract with each other with respect to the custody of their children, such a contract is not binding on the courts. It is always open to judicial inquiry as to whether such agreement is for the best interests of the children. “Parents have no ‘property rights,’ in the ordinary sense of that term, in or to their minor children, and accordingly a parent’s right of control or custody of a minor child is not a property right which may be bargained, sold, or otherwise disposed of.” 67 C. J. S., Parent and Child, § 11, page 636. As stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 73 S. Ct. 840, 847, 97 L. Ed. 1221: “Custody is viewed not with the idea of adjudicating rights in the children,1 as if they were chattels, but rather with the idea of making the best disposition possible for the welfare of the children.”
*321In a case of this kind the rights of the parents are subordinate to the welfare of the children. Graydon v. Graydon, 150 S. C. 117, 147 S. E. 749. While their rights will be duly regarded, the paramount consideration is the best interests of the children. Koon v. Koon, 203 S. C. 556, 28 S. E. (2d) 89; West v. West, 208 S. C. 1, 36 S. E. (2d) 856; Dillon v. Dillon, 219 S. C. 255, 64 S. E. (2d) 649. This paramount consideration is for determination by the courts and not by the parents. The contract between these parties entered into in Virginia does not under my view preclude the courts of this State from determining the question of custody or as to how custody should be divided between these parties. The children are lawfully in this State and, in my opinion, the question as to whether the agreement made by the parents is for their best welfare is open for judicial determination.