Court Opinion

ID: 9754779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:13:37.491262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:57.400697
License: Public Domain

GRACI, J.,
Concurring.
¶ 1 I join the opinion of the majority to the extent it rejects Appellant’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.
¶ 2 I also agree with the majority that the remaining issues, raised for the first time on appeal, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel, must be dismissed without prejudice to Appellant’s right to raise them in a PCRA petition as directed by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Grant, — Pa. -, 813 A.2d 726 (2002). Grant, as the majority notes, is applicable to this case. Id. at 738. I would go no further.
¶ 3 I am concerned with the majority’s statement that “[i]n Grant, the Supreme Court undoubtedly left the door open for the creation of exceptions” but that “this case is not one that warrants establishment of an exception because the facts herein fall squarely within the parameters of Grant.” Majority Op. at 96.
¶ 4 In Grant, the Supreme Court identified two “limited circumstances” where “[that] court may choose to create an exception to the general rule [which it had just announced] and review those claims on direct appeal.” Grant, 813 A.2d at 738 n. 14. Those “limited circumstances” were specifically identified as involving “an allegation [1] that there has been a complete or constructive denial of counsel or [2] that counsel has breached his or her duty of loyalty.” Id. The Supreme Court reserved unto itself the choice to create exceptions to the general rule it announced. It did not grant this Court any license to create any exceptions to its general rule. As an intermediate appellate court, it is our role to effectuate the decisional law of the Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382, 386 (1985). If these or any exceptions to the general rule are to be created, they are for the Supreme Court and that Court alone.
¶ 5 I am also concerned with the implication of the majority’s statement that “the record is not adequate for us to effectively *99review appellant’s claims.” Majority Op. at 96. Such a statement suggests that there are some claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be resolved when raised for the first time on appeal. Such a conclusion is directly at odds with the rule announced in Grant. Grant provides no exception for claims that may be resolved, either for or against an appellant, based on the record forwarded to the appellate court on direct appeal.5 The Supreme Court has yet to announce any exceptions to the rule it announced in Grant.
¶ 6 If, as the majority implies, there are some claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that may be resolved on direct appeal, then new counsel representing an appellant on direct appeal will be required to raise every such arguable claim on direct appeal, Grant notwithstanding. Otherwise, when a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is raised for the first time in a PCRA petition it will be subject to a legitimate waiver argument for dismissal since “the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so ... on appeal.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). The PCRA courts in the first instance, and this Court on appeal, will then be required to determine if the record on direct appeal was “adequate to effectively review [the] claims.” PCRA counsel in every instance will again be required to layer the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in order to avoid any possible PCRA waiver claim. That is exactly the situation which Grant intended to eliminate. Grant, 813 A.2d at 739. We will have turned a rule that was intended to curb such litigation into one that spawns it. We avoid such a result by applying what I believe is the clear dictate of Grant: dismiss claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that are raised for the first time on direct appeal.6
¶ 7 Lastly, since we can no longer resolve claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which are raised for the first time on direct appeal, I do not think we should comment further on the Appellant’s *100ineffectiveness claims. Majority Op. at 96. The PCRA court is required to examine any properly pleaded claims of ineffective assistance in the first instance. We should do nothing to intrude on that function. It is not our role to issue advisory opinions. Okkerse v. Howe, 521 Pa. 509, 556 A.2d 827, 833 (1989) (advisory opinion is without legal effect); Borough of Marcus Hook v. Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Board, 720 A.2d 803, 804 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (citing Okkerse for the proposition that a judicial determination that is unnecessary to decide case is an “advisory opinion and has no legal effect”).
¶ 8 Accordingly, I join the opinion to the extent it affirms Appellant’s conviction. Since the majority properly applies the rule of Grant as I understand it, I concur in the result.

. Of course, if an appellant obtained new counsel after verdict, new counsel could seek a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a timely-filed post-sentence motion under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(l)(a)(iv). Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(l)(a)(iv). The trial court would then have to determine if a hearing was required or if the claim could be resolved on the existing record. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(2)(b). Thereafter, the trial court could resolve the ineffectiveness claim in the time frame established by the rule. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3). If that issue was then raised on direct appeal, this court could resolve it. That situation is different from the one governed by Grant where the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was not raised in a timely post-sentence motion but was, instead, raised for the first time on appeal. Grant simply has no application where the issue was properly raised and decided by the trial court before the direct appeal process started. I note in this regard that while Grant specified that there would be no claim of waiver under the PCRA where new appellate counsel did not raise trial counsel's ineffective assistance for the first time on direct appeal, id., at 738, the same may not be true if new counsel represented the defendant at a time when he or she could have raised and preserved this issue in a post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 Comment (MISCELLANEOUS). Like many of the implications of Grant, resolution of that situation must await another day.

. I view Grant as a natural and logical extension of the body of case law developed by the Supreme Court over the last several years in which the "Court has consistently, repeatedly and unequivocally recognized ... the exclusivity of the PCRA in the arena in which it operates.” Commonwealth v. Eller, 569 Pa. 622, 807 A.2d 838, 842 (2002), citing Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564, 570 (1999). Clearly claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel are recognized under the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Such claims are regularly brought under the PCRA. It is in keeping with this body of case law that claims of trial counsel's ineffective assistance should be funneled through the PCRA.