Court Opinion

ID: 9591694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:06:49.833214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:29.449609
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, P. J.
(concurring). I write separately to lament the untimely demise of common courtesy in the legal profession. The factual background of this *658case is but one example of the hostile environment that is the leading cause of the collapse of common courtesy.
Despite knowing that Midland was represented by counsel and despite having negotiated with counsel in an attempt to resolve the dispute between the parties, counsel for Miro did not extend any common courtesy to counsel for Midland. Miro's counsel did not notify opposing counsel that a lawsuit was being commenced against Midland; did not send opposing counsel a courtesy copy of the summons and complaint; did not ask opposing counsel if an answer was forthcoming; and did not warn opposing counsel that a default judgment would be taken.
I understand that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not require notice to opposing counsel that a lawsuit was commenced or that a default judgment is going to be requested. However, I believe that common courtesy imposes such an obligation. Here, the failure to extend a common courtesy has resulted in the considerable expense of time and money by both parties. Midland, having retained counsel to negotiate the dispute with Miro, rightfully expected that its counsel would respond to the lawsuit; little did it know that counsel for Miro failed to extend a common courtesy to Midland's counsel. Midland's naive expectation resulted in an untimely answer being filed by its counsel.1
The events that followed the granting of the default judgment compound the problem. With a default judgment in hand, Miro hosted a meeting of representatives of Miro and Midland, along with their *659attorneys, to discuss how to verify and determine whether the fixtures manufactured by Miro were capable of performing to the specifications. It was at this meeting, eleven days after Miro took the default judgment, that Midland learned, for the first time, that there was a judgment against it. Also at this meeting, Miro assured Midland that if the terms of the agreement were carried out it would not execute on the default judgment. Based upon this representation, Midland instructed its counsel not to take any further action with respect to the litigation. Midland took steps to fulfill its obligations under the agreement. Thus, it came as a complete surprise to Midland when a garnishment action was commenced.
Common courtesy in the legal profession is not memorialized in the statutes, Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys or the recently adopted Standards of Courtesy and Decorum for the Courts of Wisconsin. Indeed, it is obvious that there should not be a need to have a rule that counsel will treat each other with respect and courtesy.2
*660Counsel for Miro cannot be faulted for complying with the technical requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, his failure to go the extra step, to alert counsel for Midland that a lawsuit was forthcoming and a default judgment would be requested, overlooks the very purposes for which courts were created — that is, to try cases on their merits and render judgments in accordance with the substantial rights of the parties. Rather than extending respect and courtesy to opposing counsel and having the dispute resolved on a level playing field, Miro's counsel chose to do nothing more than meet the minimum requirements of the law.
Although Wisconsin has no reported cases on the legal or ethical obligations of counsel to put opposing counsel on notice that a lawsuit or default judgment is close at hand, California, among several jurisdictions, has addressed the issue. California requires that if the plaintiffs counsel knows the identity of the lawyer representing the defendant, he or she owes an ethical obligation to warn before requesting entry of the defendant's default. Failure to do so is considered a professional discourtesy to opposing counsel that will not be condoned by the courts. "[E]ven legitimate tactics must sometimes yield to the only goal that justifies the very existence of our judicial system; i.e., the resolution of our citizens' disputes and the administration of justice." Brown v. Presley of S. Cal., 261 Cal. Rptr. 779, 784 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). "While as a matter of professional courtesy counsel should have given notice of the impending default, and we decry this lack of professional courtesy, counsel was under no legal obligation to do so." Bellm v. Bellia, 198 Cal. Rptr. 389, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citation omitted). "The quiet speed of plaintiffs' attorney in *661seeking a default judgment without the knowledge of defendants' counsel is not to be commended." Smith v. Los Angeles Bookbinders Union No. 63, 284 P.2d 194, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
Admittedly, the failure to treat opposing counsel with courtesy is not the equivalent of referring to opposing counsel as an "asshole" and remarking that he could "gag a maggot off a meat wagon," Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 54 (Del. 1994), or calling the opposing party a "son of a bitch," threatening to kill him and finally, running his car off the road with a front-end loader, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 12, 17-18, 19, 510 N.W.2d 129, 131 (1994), but it is still symptomatic of the decline of civility in the legal profession.
Many lawyers, judges and academicians have contemplated this decline. Mark Neal Aaronson, a professor of law at Hastings School of Law, theorizes that "the inability of lawyers to conduct themselves in a reasonable fashion has less to do with a lack of good manners or ignorance about what conduct is expected, but has more to do with not having the strength of character needed to exercise self-discipline when making practical or ethical choices." Mark Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts on Civility, Moral Character, and Professionalism, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 113, 116 (1995). Professor Aaronson's preliminary comments on civility and the basic virtues provide some clues to the general demise of civility:
Civility as a concept has a rich and deep etymology that embraces much more than today's common usage of the term — as little more than a synonym *662for courtesy or politeness. It originates in classical political and moral philosophy, and generally refers to the kinds of virtues associated with good citizenship.
These distinctive virtues, which harken back to the ancient polis, are the cardinal civic virtues: practical wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice. They represent a set of interdependent ideas about the relationship of moral character to human self-fulfillment, and they comprise a good part of the idea of civility in its classical sense. Together they establish a moral decision-procedure for making important choices about both means and ends in carrying out various societal roles. To act wisely and justly, with moderation and courage as appropriate, requires considerable self-awareness and self-restraint.
Because, for too long, the cardinal virtues have been either taken for granted or overlooked as presuppositions for the practice of law, they have not been sufficiently nurtured as part of a lawyer's education and, consequently, have been too often neglected or forgotten in actual practice. Their absence as a conscious or habitual part of how individuals practice law partially explains what others perceive as a fairly pervasive breakdown in contemporary legal professionalism.
Id. at 116-18 (footnotes omitted).
On a more practical level, Judge Penny J. White of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals discusses common courtesy in her list of 10 Things They Never Taught You in Law School:
#2: Becoming a lawyer does not require that you lose your humanity. Even though you have reached *663that elevated and lofty place — lawyerhood—don't leave your civility and common decency behind. Act like a human. If you have forgotten how, fake it. Treat other lawyers, witnesses, clients, judges, jurors and clerks with respect and dignity.
Many lawyers seem to fall into a modified golden rule posture. Do unto others what they have done unto you or even better, before they get a chance to do unto you. Don't do it. Treat your clients and all professional associates with respect. . . . Don't harangue or harass victims, adverse witnesses, or opponents. Don't seek out confrontation rather than cooperation.
Common sense and common courtesy, right and wrong, and justice still matter. Make them your trademark.
Penny J. White, 10 Things They Never Taught You in Law School, 30-JUN Tenn. B. J. 20, 21 (1994).
The result of this appeal is dictated by the analysis included in the lead opinion; it is lamentable that under the prevailing law we cannot grant relief to Midland. Default judgments are not favored because the justice system is designed to provide a level playing field for the resolution of disputes on their merits. The failure of counsel to be forthright, to deal with opposing counsel with respect and to extend common courtesy is regrettable and illustrates the legal profession's neglect of the cardinal virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage and justice.

 On February 21, 1994, Midland ultimately learned that its attorney was unaware of the lawsuit; counsel filed an answer on February 22, five days after the default judgment was granted.

 There have been efforts to provide rules requiring attorneys to practice courtesy. In State v. Rossmanith, 146 Wis. 2d 89, 90 n.7, 430 N.W.2d 93, 94 (1988), the supreme court noted:
The ABA newly proposed Lawyer's Code of Professionalism section C states: "I will be a vigorous and zealous advocate while paying heed to concepts of common courtesy and recognizing that excessive zeal can be detrimental to my client's interest and to the proper functioning of our system of justice."
And before the adoption of the current SCR 20, there was a requirement in SCR 20.34(3)(t) (1986), that "[a] lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel. . . ." Oostburg State Bank v. United Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 12, 386 N.W.2d 53, 57 (1986).