Court Opinion

ID: 9571527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:25.693367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:32.819969
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring in affirmance). I vote to affirm.
*69The time has come for majority concurrence with Justice Kelly’s 1964 determination (In re Winkle, 372 Mich 292) that section 10 of article 2 (Const 1908 as last amended in 1952) has remained valid as against Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (81 S Ct 1684, 6 L ed 2d 1081, 84 ALR2d 933). Such concurrence would of course sustain currently section 11 (of aiticle 1, Const 1963) as against corresponding attack, 'the former and present sections being substantially alike.
What is advocated by this opinion of concurrence would mean simply that our “outside the curtilage” constitutional provision stands presumptively valid until that day comes, if it does, when the Supreme Court of the United States holds otherwise.
I am less ready than ever (see separate opinion, Scholle v. Secretary of State, 360 Mich 1, 110) to “attempt to outrun the Supreme Court of the United States.”* That Court on successive bids of Winkle now has had two opportunities to strike down said section 10, utilizing Mapp, yet has not done so. That fact, considered with the presumption of validity said section 10 has always enjoyed, suggests that section 10 should be upheld now in the interest (a) of bringing it to challenging test on the Potomac and (b) settling for the time being a Fourteenth Amendment question that has nagged our trial and *70appellate courts no end ever since Mapp was handed down June 19, 1961.
When Winkle’s first appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was made, that appeal resulted in an order of remand “for consideration in the light of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643” (November 6, 1961; Winkle v. Bannan, 368 US 34 [82 S Ct 146, 7 L ed 2d 91]). Then came the second opportunity. This Court duly complied with the aforesaid order of remand (See our order of December 11, 1961, quoted 372 Mich at 306). Upon resubmission this Court again denied Winkle the writ sought by him (February 3, 1964; In re Winkle, 372 Mich 292). Winkle filed again for review by the United States Supreme Court. January 18, 1965 the Supreme Court entered the following order (Winkle v. Bannan, 379 US 645, 85 S Ct 611, 13 L ed 2d 551):
“Per Curiam: The motion to strike excerpts from the motion to dismiss is denied. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.”
April 5, 1965, Winkle’s petition for rehearing was denied (380 US 967, 85 S Ct 1102, 14 L ed 2d 157).
When the Winkle opinions of 1964 were signed and released the members of this Court viewed the quoted order of remand, and our second refusal to grant Winkle the writ prayed for by him, as posing said section 10 squarely before the Supreme Court for test by Mapp. Such at least was the reason for my own concurrence in the result only this Court reached on that occasion.
The ensuing situation has boiled down to this, so far as the present writer is concerned: if the Supreme Court is not yet ready to strike down— upon authority of Mapp — a State Constitutional *71provision such as Michigan adopted in 1936, 1952 and again in 1963, neither am I.

 This expression, one I suggest Justiee Adams in particular cannot ignore, is Ms own. He wrote (In re Apportionment of State Legislature-1964, 372 Mich 418 at 473, 474) :
“Nevertheless there is great- cogency and force in the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment which Justiee Soltéis would make. It may well reflect the decision the United States Supreme Court will hand down any day now. When that day comes I will be pleased to join with him. Until it does, I do not conceive it to be the proper duty or function of this Court to attempt to outrun the Supreme Court of the United States., As was found by a majority of this Court in the first Scholle Case (Scholle v. Secretary of State, 360 Mich 1), we have no right to extend our interpretation of the United States Constitution beyond the boundaries that have been delineated by the United States Supreme Court,” - :