Court Opinion

ID: 9764744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:38:38.377989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:01.259940
License: Public Domain

*93Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Musmanno:
In my opinion the case of Peden v. Baltimore & Ohio, 324 Pa. 444, is controlling of the facts in the case at bar. There, the fireman on a railroad engine, which ran down two children on the railroad tracks, testified that from his place in the engine cab he was watching ahead, “as far as I could see.” Although the children were necessarily within his vision as the train approached them, the fireman testified that he did not see them. This Court, speaking through our present Chief Justice Stern, said: “The jury did not have to accept Gravely’s statement that he did not see the boys, because it is a well settled principle of law based on ordinary human experience that ‘one cannot be heard to say that he looked and did not see when the facts show he must have seen’: McMillan v. Penna. R.R. Co., 311 Pa. 163. So, in Cover v. Hershey Transit Co., supra, the motorman of the car involved in an accident testified that he did not see children on a trestle ahead of him until he was only 25 feet from them, but the Court held that the case was for the jury in view of the fact that the children were in plain sight on the trestle for a considerable distance away and there was testimony that the motorman was looking in that direction. In other words, while it is not sufficient to prove that defendant’s employee could have seen had he looked, the inference may be drawn, and is indeed inescapable, that he did in fact see if he admits that he did look and if from the other testimony it appears that looking enabled him to see.”
In that same case a brakeman testified that he was standing at the crossing and although he could see the railroad tracks on which the children admittedly were, he looked but did not see the children. As to this, Chief Justice Stern said: “Here, again, notwithstanding this denial, his admission justified the jury in finding that he saw.”
*94How, then, in the instant case can there be any acceptance of the engineer’s testimony that although he was looking ahead on an admitted straightaway he did not see the plaintiff’s truck?
In the Peden case the train was moving at the speed of 5 miles per hour. In this case the engine-caboose Avas moving at an estimated speed of from 10 to 15 miles per hour. The engineer admitted on the witness stand that he could stop Avithin a distance of 60 feet. At 15 miles per hour he could stop Avithin 90 feet. Since the plaintiff’s truck was stalled at the crossing for from one-half to one minute, the engineer, had he been attentive and alert, could easily have brought his engine-caboose to a halt before striking the plaintiff’s vehicle. Even if he could not have come to a complete stop before reaching the crossing, he could have decelerated his approach so that the impact with the truck would have been far less violent than the one which resulted in the infliction of serious injuries to the plaintiff.
In the case of Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, the decedent Avas run down by a street car Avhile in plain view of the motorman. The trial court gave binding instructions for the defendant but this Court reversed the decision and sent the case back for trial, saying (again through Chief Justice Stern) : “Instead of giving binding instructions for defendant, the learned trial judge should have instructed the jury that, even if the motorman was grossly negligent, plaintiff, because of decedent’s contributory negligence, cannot recover, but that such contributory negligence Avould not be a bar if the motorman- was guilty of wanton misconduct, that is if he exhibited- a reckless disregard for decedent’s safety after observing his perilous position and realizing the danger involved, in.proceeding .at a-high rate of speed and AArithout giving warning of his approach.” T
The lower court, in ruling that there .was no wanton misconduct on the part of the engineer, quoted from *95Sankey v. Young, 370 Pa. 339: “ ‘Negligence consists of inattention or inadvertence, whereas wantonness exists where the danger to the plaintiff, though realized, is so recklessly disregarded that, even though there be no actual intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a conscious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong.’ ”
I filed a dissenting opinion in the Sankey case and I am still of the belief that wanton misconduct does not have to include “a willingness to inflict injury.” A wilful injuring passes from wanton misconduct into outright criminality. “To the commission of a wilful tort, as, for example, assault and battery, contributory negligence is clearly not a defense.” Kasanovich v. George, supra.
The accident in this case occurred at the Railroad Street crossing in East Vandergrift, a regularly established and recognized grade crossing, which the engineer could see 1,000 feet away. The plaintiff testified that when he arrived at the tracks the engine was from 600 to 700 feet distant. The engineer was thus alerted of a potential collision at that time. It was his duty from that moment forward to keep his eyes glued to the crossing and his hand on the brakes. His failure to respond to the obvious possibilities of the situation caused the crash.
When the engineer took the witness stand in court, being called for cross-examination by the plaintiff, he found himself riding the horns of a double dilemma. If he said he did not look while approaching a grade crossing, he would admit to a gross dereliction of duty; if he said that he looked and saw the truck but made no effort to avoid the collision, he would admit to a gross dereliction of duty. He thought to slide off the impaling horns by pleading a supernatural visitation which prevents open eyes from seeing what is directly before them. He said he looked but did not see the truck.
*96The law should not accept so palpable an invention.
It is my opinion that the jury should have been permitted to decide, under all the circumstances, whether the action of the engineer in carrying his locomotive toward and into a vehicle astride the railroad tracks, does not constitute wanton misconduct, entitling the injured person to recover for his injuries.