Court Opinion

ID: 9578881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:49:25.188907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:04.751414
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I concur with the affirmation of the trial court’s judgment, I do not agree with all that is said therein.
The trial court found that Judge Barnes was an employee of the State for purposes of the Workers’ CompensationAct, OCGA§ 34-9-1 et seq. Pursuant to the definition of employee contained in that act, however, I do not believe Judge Barnes is covered by the act.
A superior court judge is vested with the judicial power of the State and is defined as a “state official” for purposes of compensation. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I; OCGA § 45-7-4 (a) (20). As discussed in Georgia Attorney General’s Opinion 71-29,4
there is a difference between a state official and state employee. An official, such as those referenced in your letter (Governor, Secretary of State, etc.), is one who holds or is invested with an office, while an employee is one employed by another for wages or salary and, customarily, in a position below the executive level. The term employee generally indicates that one is under the direct supervision of another person, firm, corporation, or other entity, with his duties specified and his actions controlled and directed. In the case of most elected officials in Georgia, their salary is set by statute and rather than being directly controlled and supervised, they supervise and control others. The General Assembly has recognized the difference between employee and official many times by specifically providing that certain things may be done by state “officials or employees” or may not be done by state “officials or employees”, thereby indicating a distinction (see, e.g., Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 60, 61, Ga. Code Ann. § 89-913).
(Emphasis in original.)
In an official opinion in 1980, the Attorney General cited Op. Atty. Gen. 71-29 and specifically found that superior court judges are not covered by the Workers’ CompensationAct. Op. Atty. Gen. 80-71.5
An examination of the Workers’ Compensation Act supports these opinions. In addition to the common-law definition of employee *903contained in OCGA § 34-9-1 (2), numerous specific types of employment are specified as included for coverage by the act: firefighters, law enforcement personnel, personnel of emergency management or civil defense agencies, emergency medical services, and rescue organizations, all full-time county employees and employees of elected salaried county officials, volunteer firefighters of any county or municipality of this State, any volunteer law enforcement personnel of any county or municipality of this State who are certified by the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, any person who is a volunteer member or worker of an emergency management or civil defense organization, emergency medical service, or rescue organization, whether governmental or not, of any county or municipality, any person certified by the Department of Human Resources or the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners and registered with any county or municipality of this State as a medical first responder for any volunteer first responder services rendered in such capacity, various elected county officers and elected members of the governing authority of an individual county, employees of county and district health agencies, employees of community service boards, and members of the Georgia National Guard and the State Defense Force serving on state active duty.
The maxim, expressio unis exclusio alterius, applies. Walker v. Walker, 28 Ga. 140, 156 (5) (1859); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. App. 713, 721 (560 SE2d 525) (2002). Had the legislature intended to include state officials, it could have done so; but it did not. See Wadkins v. Smallwood, 243 Ga. App. 134, 137 (1) (530 SE2d 498) (2000) (legislature is presumed to know the existing law at the time that it enacts a statute and the effects of the change).
We note that, in the majority, Freeman’s counsel attempts to explain why these two attorney general opinions are not applicable by saying that they were issued before local legislation (apparently that passed by Fulton County to allow superior court judges to participate in county benefit programs) had been passed. That, however, has nothing to do with whether superior court judges are state employees for purposes of workers’ compensation and the two attorney general opinions are, I believe, still applicable. Further, Freeman’s counsel cited OCGA § 34-9-11, instead of the applicable definition section, OCGA§ 34-9-1 (2).
As a state official, I believe Judge Barnes was not included in the Workers’ Compensation Act and the parties could not stipulate otherwise. Erskine v. Klein, 218 Ga. 112, 116 (1) (126 SE2d 755) (1962); Brown v. State, 175 Ga. App. 246, 249 (4) (333 SE2d 124) (1985).
*904Decided November 9, 2006
Reconsideration denied December 14, 2006
Robert D. Ware, Allison K. James, for appellant.
Rosser A. Malone, George B. Spears, for appellees.

 1971 Op. Atty. Gen. 40.

 1980 Op. Atty. Gen. 155.