Court Opinion

ID: 9363873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 21:00:31.597556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.667734
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 17 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELVIN UDIEL MATEO-ROBLEDO,                      No.   18-70660

                Petitioner,                      Agency No. A208-548-357

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                              Submitted January 12, 2023**
                                 Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, R. NELSON, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Melvin Udiel Mateo-Robledo, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an

immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

      When the BIA adopts some of the IJ’s reasoning and adds its own further

analysis, we review both decisions. Vahora v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th

Cir. 2011). We review “denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief

for ‘substantial evidence’ and will uphold a denial supported by ‘reasonable,

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” Garcia-

Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kamalyan v. Holder,

620 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010)). But whether a group constitutes a particular

social group “is a question of law we review de novo.” Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson,

987 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2021).

      1. The BIA did not err in concluding that Mateo-Robledo failed to establish

eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on his membership in a

particular social group. Mateo-Robledo contends that his proposed social group—

young men from Guatemala who are of gang recruitment age and have resisted gang

recruitment—is legally cognizable and that the government applies an “absurdly

narrow” construction of the particularity requirement. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d

1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting proposed social groups must be socially distinct

and defined with particularity).

      But this court has rejected nearly identical proposed groups for lacking social

distinction or particularity. See, e.g., Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 854–55 (9th

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Cir. 2009) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that young males in Guatemala who are

targeted for gang recruitment but refuse to join are a particular social group),

abrogated in part on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081

(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see also Santos-Ponce, 987 F.3d at 890 (concluding that

proposed social group of “minor Christian males who oppose gang membership” in

Honduras is not sufficiently particular or socially distinct); Santos-Lemus v.

Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the proposed social

group of “young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence, is too loosely defined

to meet the requirement for particularity” and “is insufficiently socially visible”),

abrogated in part on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d 1081.

      2. The BIA also determined that Mateo-Robledo is ineligible for CAT

protection, and substantial evidence supports this conclusion. In particular, Mateo-

Robledo points to nothing in the record that compels the conclusion that he is more

likely than not to be tortured in Guatemala or that government officials would

acquiesce in the torture. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.

2010) (per curiam); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d at 1031 (“In order to reverse the BIA, we must determine

‘that the evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it—and

also compels the further conclusion’ that the petitioner meets the requisite standard

for obtaining relief.” (emphasis removed) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

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478, 481 n.1 (1992)).

      PETITION DENIED

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