Court Opinion

ID: 9736927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:10:12.551117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:55.504302
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent. Unlike the majority, I believe that Workmen’s Compensation referees have both the authority and the expertise to settle fee disputes between two attorneys who have represented a claimant in the same matter.
Previously, we have held that section 440 of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), 77 P.S. § 996, authorizes referees to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee for purposes of settling fee disputes between claimant and employer. Eugenie v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Sheltered Employment Service), 140 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 51, 592 A.2d 358 (1991).
We have also held that section 442 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 998, authorizes referees to hear evidence on what constitutes a reasonable fee for purposes of settling fee disputes between claimant and attorney. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal *67Board (Gilroy) v. General Machine Products Co., 24 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 95, 353 A.2d 911 (1976).
The reasonableness of a fee depends on the amount and difficulty of the work performed. R.M. Friction Materials Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 52 Pa. Commonwealth 279, 415 A.2d 965 (1980). Where the referee has not made a finding of reasonableness, the case will be remanded to the referee for specific findings on the amount and difficulty of the work performed. Donald Spangler t/a Scott & Thomas v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Ford), 145 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 56, 602 A.2d 446 (1992).
Given that Workmen’s Compensation referees are vested by statute with the authority to settle fee disputes between claimant and employer and between claimant and attorney, I see no reason why the referee would lack the power to settle fee disputes between multiple attorneys representing the same claimant in an action. The Workmen’s Compensation Act is unique in that it directly involves itself in fee dispute resolution. It would be inconsistent with this policy if the referee could not settle a fee dispute between two attorneys.
In addition, referees are particularly well-suited to adjudicate fee disputes between attorneys. Workmen’s Compensation referees are keenly aware of the equities in the cases they hear. They are familiar with the facts and issues of their cases and they observe firsthand the respective efforts of the attorneys involved. This expertise should not be wasted. According to the majority, Attorney Pitt’s claim is properly a common law claim for breach of contract, a claim on principles of quantum meruit, or an equitable claim for damages under a theory of unjust enrichment. I believe that because of their intimate awareness of the attorney’s efforts on a client’s behalf, Workmen’s Compensation referees are better able than any other body to apply the principles of quantum meruit and adjudicate an equitable claim of damages under a theory of unjust enrichment or a legal claim of damages under a theory of breach of contract.
*68The majority also suggests that Attorney Pitt’s claim should be submitted to the Bar Association’s fee dispute committee. I disagree because I firmly believe that referees are legislatively endowed with the power to adjudicate fee disputes in workmen’s compensation matters and that they should not be divested of this authority in instances where one claimant was represented by multiple attorneys. The mere fact that two attorneys were involved in this case does not lessen the referee’s legislatively recognized ability to adjudicate such disputes, nor does it magically confer greater expertise upon the Bar Association’s fee dispute committee.
Moreover, to submit this claim to any forum other than the Workmen’s Compensation referee requires that evidence be presented anew and, therefore, is a waste of judicial resources.
I also disagree with the majority that Attorney Pitt’s appeal should be quashed on grounds that it was untimely. Section 423 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 853, requires that appeals to the WCAB be taken within twenty days of the date the referee’s decision is circulated. However, the same section provides that the WCAB may, “upon cause shown,” extend the time within which appeals must be taken. The fact that the referee never sent a copy of his decision to Attorney Pitt was, in my opinion, sufficient cause for the WCAB to extend the time within which Attorney Pitt could appeal the decision.
I would vacate and remand this case for the referee to make specific findings of fact distinguishing the amount and difficulty of work by the attorneys involved, and based on those findings, to award a reasonable fee, limited to a total of twenty percent of Claimant’s award, to each attorney involved.
SMITH, J., joins in this dissent.