Court Opinion

ID: 9419834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:51:45.622658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:20.853332
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting.
I believe we should reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals and remand the cause to it with directions to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the Union was not a proper party to appeal. The money judgment was in favor of Fishgold and against the Sullivan Dry Dock and Repair Company. Had the Company paid the judgment, I see no way in which the Union would have been “aggrieved.” The only reason advanced by the Court for holding that the Union was “aggrieved” is that, had the District Court judgment remained on the books, the judicially formulated doctrine of res judicata would have barred the Union in any future proceedings from challenging the District Court’s application of the federal statute to the particular collective bargaining agreement. A fair application of res judicata bars a party in a second litigation only if that proceeding involves the same issues as the first litigation between the same adverse parties or privies. This means that res judicata could bar the Union only in a new proceeding between it and Fish-gold or his privies. But there is no possibility of such litigation since the seniority right which the District Court held Fishgold had under the statute had under its provisions expired by the time the Union appealed. Res judicata would not have barred the Union in a proceeding between it and any other party, since no other party was *292a party adverse to the Union in the present suit. And this includes any possible proceeding between the Union and the Sullivan Dry Dock Company since that Company, though a party, was not an adverse party in the trial court. None of the cases cited by the Court’s opinion support the proposition that a party is bound in a future litigation against a party that was not an adverse party, but on the same side, in the earlier litigation. Nor do these cases, or any other decision of this Court of which I am aware, formulate as the rule of this Court the harsh doctrine of collateral estoppel, adopted in a few state jurisdictions, which always bars a losing party, so long as the issue is the same, even though the later litigation involves different adverse parties. It is unlikely that this harsh doctrine, never adopted by this Court, would in the future have been applied to bar the Union in any further proceedings involving interpretation of the scope of its collective bargaining agreement in the light of the federal statute. In my opinion the Union would not have been barred by the trial court’s judgment. It was therefore not an aggrieved party and not entitled to appeal.
The result of permitting parties not adversely affected to appeal a judgment is to impose burdens upon litigants actually interested when those litigants may themselves be fully satisfied with the judgment. The scope of res judicata should not be extended to produce such a result. This case illustrates the wisdom of the practice which permits parties to settle their own lawsuits without intervention by others interested only in precedents. Boston Tow Boat Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 632.