Court Opinion

ID: 9722147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:17:42.912625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:30.879954
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, J.
I dissent.
The record in this case is replete with evidence that the officers had probable cause to believe that a felony was being committed on the premises where the arrest was made. The majority, relying on People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263 [127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333], feel compelled to hold that, nevertheless, the officers’ entry into the premises was unreasonable.
In my opinion, this is just another one of the absurd results which flow from the exclusionary rule. Whatever value the exclusionary rule may be said to have, its stated primary purpose is to provide a protection against unreasonable intrusions into the homes of law-abiding citizens. The judicial engrafting of the concept of Ramey onto the fundamental rule is supposed to achieve this objective.
In my opinion, constitutional liberties are not advanced one iota by endowing the transient occupancy of motel accommodations under the circumstances of this case with the attributes of a “home and castle.” It is obvious that these individuals were using the premises to operate what amounted to a volume store-front business of trading narcotics for stolen property. While they may have sought privacy, they are entitled to none.
The very experienced trial judge in this case made a factual determination that the conduct of the officers was reasonable and that even *274accepting the application of Ramey, the evidence disclosed the existence of exigent circumstances. In my opinion, the trial judge applied the proper test and it ill behooves this court to second guess him and override his factfinding powers.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 10, 1981. Compton, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 12, 1981.