Court Opinion

ID: 9376756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 19:00:49.86229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.948376
License: Public Domain

FILED
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                               MAR 3 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Erick Mercado Arechiga,                          No.   21-243

              Petitioner,                        Agency No. A075-486-845

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                     Argued and Submitted February 15, 2023
                            San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, MILLER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge MILLER.

      Erick Mercado Arechiga, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his appeal from an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying him asylum, withholding of removal,

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, the BIA

both conducted its own analysis and affirmed the IJ’s reasoning on the relevant

issues, “our review ‘is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s

opinion is expressly adopted.’” Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting Cordon-Garcia v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000)). We

“review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s . . . determination that an individual was

convicted of a particularly serious crime [(‘PSC’)].” Mairena v. Barr, 917 F.3d

1119, 1124 n.4 (9th Cir. 2019). “In particular, we review whether ‘the agency

relied on the appropriate factors and proper evidence to reach [its] conclusion.’”

Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original)

(quoting Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015)).

      Generally, “if a petitioner wishes to preserve an issue for appeal, he must

first raise it in the proper administrative forum.” Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674,

677 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tejeda-Mata v. I.N.S., 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.

1980)). However, “we retain jurisdiction to review due process challenges” that

are not based on “correctable procedural errors,” and we review due process

challenges de novo. Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of the case,

we discuss them only as necessary. We grant and remand in part, dismiss in part,

and deny in part the petition for review.

                                              I

       The IJ and BIA abused their discretion in finding that Mercado Arechiga

committed a PSC. When determining whether a noncitizen committed a

particularly serious crime, an immigration court must consider “the circumstances

and underlying facts of the conviction.” Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir.

2020) (quoting Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1347–48 (9th Cir.

2013). The IJ and BIA improperly limited their analysis of the underlying facts of

Mercado Arechiga’s crime to “the information filed in the criminal case, which

simply restated the statutory definition of the crime with the victim’s name

inserted.” Flores-Vega, 932 F.3d at 885. An immigration court’s particularly

serious crime determination “cannot rest solely on the elements of conviction.”

Id.; see also Guerrero v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Critically,

the ‘particularly serious crime’ inquiry . . . applies only to real-world facts. [It] . . .

requires the BIA to assess what the [noncitizen] actually did.”) (emphasis in

original). The only evidence in the record of the individual facts of Mercado

Arechiga’s burglary conviction was his own undisputed testimony that the house

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he burglarized was unoccupied, which the IJ and BIA disregarded. This amounted

to abuse of discretion. See id. at 885–86 (holding that finding a PSC was an abuse

of discretion when the BIA ignored the petitioner’s explanation of the crime, even

though the petitioner’s “own account of the crime was not found credible”).

Accordingly, this portion of the petition is granted and remanded to the BIA for

analysis under Flores-Vega.

                                          II

      Mercado Arechiga’s notice of appeal to the BIA indicated only that he was

challenging the IJ’s determinations related to his withholding claim—not those

related to his CAT claim. Mercado Arechiga thus did not “raise” his CAT claim

“in the proper administrative forum,” and this portion of the petition is dismissed

for a lack of jurisdiction. See Barron, 358 F.3d at 677.

                                         III

      We dismiss in part and deny in part the portions of the petition claiming due

process violations. Mercado Arechiga did not argue to the BIA that the IJ failed to

help him develop the record properly and misstated the rules regarding hearsay

evidence. However, if asked, the BIA could have considered both of these issues,

and the BIA could have remanded if Mercado Arechiga showed the IJ’s

performance was deficient. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider these due

                                          4
process arguments, and this part of the petition is dismissed. See id. at 676, 678

(we could not review petitioners’ claims, never raised below, that the IJ denied

them the opportunity to present their case when the IJ proceeded to hear their case

even though their attorney failed to appear for their hearing).

      As to Mercado Arechiga’s expert witness, the IJ granted Mercado Arechiga

two continuances to allow him to secure this witness’s attendance, and the IJ tried

to call the witness several times. The IJ’s efforts were sufficient for due process,

so this part of the petition is denied. See Benedicto v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1049,

1059–60 (9th Cir. 2021) (“While the continuances did not produce [witnesses]

willing to testify on [the noncitizen’s] behalf, that is not a requirement for due

process. The IJ did not refus[e] to permit [witnesses] to develop the record . . . .”)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis in original).

      PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED IN PART, DISMISSED IN
      PART, AND DENIED IN PART.

                                           5
                                                                             FILED
                                                                              MAR 3 2023
Mercado Arechiga v. Garland, No. 21-243                                   MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

MILLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

      I agree that Mercado Arechiga did not exhaust his CAT claim and that his

only exhausted due process claim lacks merit. Unlike the court, however, I believe

that the Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion in determining

that Mercado Arechiga’s California burglary offense was a particularly serious

crime. I would deny the petition for review with respect to that issue.

      Our review of particularly-serious-crime determinations is narrow: We are

“limited to ensuring that the agency relied on the ‘appropriate factors’” and that it

did not consider improper evidence. Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d

1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 676 (9th

Cir. 2010)). “We may not reweigh the evidence and reach our own determination

about the crime’s seriousness.” Id.

      The Board correctly articulated the “appropriate factors.” It stated that “[a]

determination whether a respondent has been convicted of a particularly serious

crime requires an examination, on a case-by-case basis, of the nature of the

conviction, the sentence imposed, and the circumstances and underlying facts of

the conviction.” See Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2020) (setting out

the same factors). It then applied those factors to Mercado Arechiga’s offense.

                                          1
Whether or not we would weigh the factors the same way that the Board did, we

must uphold its decision.

      Mercado Arechiga faults the Board for not saying more about the third

factor, namely, the facts and circumstances of the offense. Specifically, he says

that the Board should have discussed his assertion that no one was present in the

house that he burglarized. Set aside that the only evidence for that assertion was his

own testimony, and that the immigration judge found that he had not testified

credibly. What exactly was there for the Board to say? It is obviously dangerous to

break into a house and confront an angry inhabitant, so most burglars target empty

houses. That Mercado Arechiga did the same does not make his crime particularly

unusual or require special mention.

      That is especially true because Mercado Arechiga did not focus on this

aspect of his crime in his appeal to the Board. We have held that “[t]he agency

need not engage in a lengthy discussion of every contention raised by a petitioner.”

Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 768 (9th Cir. 2022). A fortiori, it need not

write about contentions the petitioner has not bothered to discuss.

      Our decision in Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2019), does not

require a different result. There, the Board had relied on the legally erroneous

proposition that “the elements of the offense alone can establish that the offense,

by its nature, qualifies as particularly serious.” Id. at 885. Here, the Board said

                                           2
nothing of the sort. To the contrary, it said that it had considered the facts and

circumstances of the offense, and it found that they did not support Mercado

Arechiga’s position. Because we must uphold an agency’s decision so long as its

“path may reasonably be discerned,” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best

Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974), I would take the Board at its word.

                                           3