Court Opinion

ID: 9738446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:53:18.455328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.781017
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
I cannot agree that appellant received the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment. This guarantee entitles the accused to representation by counsel whose allegiance is not divided between that of accused and the conflicting interests of a co-defendant. Glasser v. United States, (1941) 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; United States v. Gaines, (7th Cir., 1976) 529 F.2d 1038; United States v. Bell, (D.C. Cir. 1974) 506 F.2d 207. The “presumption of competence” and “mockery of justice” language has no place in determining whether conflicting interests of jointly represented defendants, deprive the accused of effective representation:
“To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the court’s appointment of Stewart [Glasser’s attorney] as counsel for Kretske [Glasser’s co-defendant] is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” Glasser v. United States, supra, at 315 U.S. 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 467. Accord, Holloway v. Arkansas, (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 53 L.Ed.2d 426.
I agree that in the trial of appellant and his co-defendant Edwards, the interests of the defendants were not initially in conflict. Both sought to avoid the force of their respective statements to the police, which were substantially identical, by *316offering trial testimony recounting wholly consistent versions of the alleged offense. Up until the defense rested, no actual conflict between the interests of the two defendants had emerged. Since the accused is denied effective representation only when actual conflict or other prejudice is shown, Martin v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 232, 314 N.E.2d 60, the events up to this stage of the trial disclose no infringement of appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
However, when both sides had rested, the trial court, before announcing its finding and judgment, inquired whether appellant and Edwards wished to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Appellant refused, but Edwards agreed, and the court received and accepted his plea. Then the following exchange occurred:
“BY THE COURT:
Come on up here, Mr. Edwards, by yourself.
Q. Mr. Hudson tells me that he doesn’t know anything about it. He was there, was he not?
A. Yes.
BY THE COURT:
All right, Mr. Edwards, the Court now sentences you to one (1) year at the Indiana State Farm. Mr. Hudson, will you please step up here, come up here, please ?
Court now sentences you to life imprisonment.”
(Emphasis added.)
Thereupon defense counsel endeavored to persuade appellant to change his plea to guilty; appellant persisted in his refusal. The trial court then explained:
“BY THE COURT:
I already found him guilty; I just asked if they wanted to withdraw their plea.
BY MR. SENAK:
It had nothing to do with their guilty [sic], or in sentencing ?
BY THE COURT:
That’s right.”
*317Appellant was entitled to a determination of his guilt based upon evidence received in court, subject to cross-examination. Parker v. Gladden, (1966) 385 U.S. 363, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420; Turner v. Louisiana, (1965) 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424. Notwithstanding the lower court’s disclaimer of reliance upon Edwards’ response, the question was improper. Had appellant’s counsel objected promptly, the court might have withdrawn the question before it was answered. Trial counsel was placed in a position of divided allegiance by the question; his duty to protect appellant from prejudicial non-evidentiary remarks conflicted with his duty to secure the benefits of an advantageous plea bargain for Edwards. This conflict could have been avoided had counsel withdrawn his appearance for Edwards, whose guilty plea could have been continued for the arranging of other representation. Counsel sought to resolve this conflict by importuning appellant to avail himself of the same bargain. In hindsight it appears that appellant might have been wise to do so. Nonetheless a criminal defendant who declines to plead guilty, wisely or unwisely, is entitled to a defense unhindered by his attorney’s conflicting duty to safeguard a co-defendant’s plea bargain. Appellant was denied this, and his conviction should therefore be reversed.
Note. — Reported at 375 N.E.2d 195.