Court Opinion

ID: 9676827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:35:25.069818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:51.580059
License: Public Domain

NYE, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
The majority affirms appellant’s convictions for injury to an elderly individual, aggravated sexual assault and burglary, but it orders appellant acquitted of the robbery. I agree that the first three convictions should be affirmed, but I dissent to reversing the robbery conviction, cause number 13-90-407-CR.
The robbery indictment alleged that appellant threatened and placed the victim in fear of imminent bodily injury and death *608“by telling the said victim he would kill her.” The majority concedes that the evidence is sufficient to show that appellant threatened the victim with death, but it then holds that the evidence is insufficient to show that he told the victim he would kill her. The majority reasons that the word “tell” implies oral or written communication. It then goes on to find that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal because appellant never explicitly “told” the victim he would kill her. It is ludicrous to acquit the appellant on this ground. I would affirm the conviction.
The majority’s holding is based on what it perceives as a variance between the proof and the indictment. Almost a decade ago, I urged the Court of Criminal Appeals and the State Legislature to address the rules of law which require an appellate court to acquit defendants when surplus-age in the indictment has not been proved, even though the evidence clearly establishes all the essential elements of the offense. See Blevins v. State, 672 S.W.2d 828, 832-839 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.) (Nye, C.J., dissenting). In Blevins, this Court acquitted a defendant when the State failed to prove the particular deer in question had a white tail. Blevins, 672 S.W.2d at 830. Later, in Casares v. State, 703 S.W.2d 246, 247-48 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1985, pet. ref’d), this Court acquitted a defendant when the State failed to prove that he broke a door with his shoulder. See Casares, 703 S.W.2d at 248-250 (Nye, C.J., concurring). Today, I dissent because the majority does not need to interpret the word “tell” so narrowly that appellant must be acquitted.
“Tell” is synonymous with “communicate.” There is no question that appellant communicated a threat to kill the victim through his words and brutal actions. This evidence is sufficient to affirm the conviction. The majority, however, acquits appellant not because he did not commit robbery; not because he did not threaten to kill his victim; but because he did not use the explicit words, “I will kill you.” I would not find that the indictment required this proof. The evidence here is overwhelmingly sufficient to establish that appellant communicated the threat to his victim by not only his words, but by violent conduct. The evidence shows that after the appellant woke the elderly man and his wife, he severely beat the husband, inflicting a wound to the head that required many stitches to repair. He raped the elderly woman, forcing her to commit oral sex and told them that he had a gun and a knife. Although the appellant never orally told the wife he would kill her, his acts and words conveyed a threat that was equally as meaningful as if he had spoken the majority’s magic words. The State introduced evidence to establish every essential element of robbery. Appellant’s conduct violated the Penal Code. The State proved the violation, and the jury found appellant “guilty.”
The majority invokes the “prohibition against variance rule” and then narrowly interprets the term “tell” to acquit a guilty defendant. This holding exemplifies injustice. It permits a guilty defendant to go free although the State proved every essential element of the offense. Two elderly persons, victims of a merciless crime, are now denied justice by the majority’s application of a technical rule that is useless and unnecessary in today’s society. In Casares and Blevins, I wrote at length about the rationale of the Texas “variance rule” and noted that strict application was not required. It is not necessary to repeat everything that was stated in those opinions.
I believe the majority’s narrow holding if it becomes law, will ultimately prove unfair to criminal defendants who desire the State’s allegations to go beyond the statutory minimum. The majority’s holding is surely unfair to the victim of this senseless crime and to the community where the crime was committed. It produces an absurd result. It has gone too far. Today, we have decided a case which is unjust to the victims of crime and unjust to the citizens accused of crime. We could not have reached a worse decision. I urge the Court of Criminal Appeals to examine this problem and the State Legislature to act to cure these injustices.