Court Opinion

ID: 9961017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 19:01:03.83979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:09.705511
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2046    Document: 010111033725   Date Filed: 04/17/2024   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                        Tenth Circuit
                                     PUBLISH
                                                                       April 17, 2024
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  ALBERT BUSTILLOS,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,                           No. 22-2046

  v.

  THE CITY OF ARTESIA; DAVID
  BAILEY,

        Defendants - Appellants.
                     _________________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the District of New Mexico
                   (D.C. No. 2:20-CV-01060-JCH-GJF)
                    _________________________________

 K. Renee Gantert of Atwood, Malone, Turner & Sabin, P.A., Roswell, New
 Mexico (Bryan Evans, Atwood, Malone, Turner & Sabin, P.A., with her on the
 briefs), for Defendant-Appellants.

 Joseph P. Kennedy of The Kennedy Law Firm, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico
 (Shannon L. Kennedy, The Kennedy Law Firm, P.C., with him on the brief),
 for Plaintiff-Appellee.
                       _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                _________________________________

 ROSSMAN, Circuit Judge.
                  _________________________________
Appellate Case: 22-2046   Document: 010111033725   Date Filed: 04/17/2024   Page: 2

       Albert Bustillos sued Corporal David Bailey and the City of Artesia,

 alleging violations of his rights under the First and Fourth Amendments

 and New Mexico law. Corporal Bailey and the City moved for summary

 judgment. The district court denied the motion, and as relevant here,

 rejected Corporal Bailey’s qualified immunity defense. This interlocutory

 appeal followed. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm

 the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. And, because Defendants

 have failed to establish our jurisdiction to address Mr. Bustillos’s state-law

 claims, we dismiss that portion of the appeal.

                                        I

                                       A

       Mr. Bustillos is an “independent journalist who films content for his

 YouTube channel.”1 Aplt. App. at 173. On September 11, 2018, he went to

 the Navajo oil refinery in Artesia, New Mexico (Refinery) “to film a story on

 how the refinery works to turn fuel into gas or asphalt.” Aplt. App. at 173.

 A fence surrounds the Refinery and concrete barriers separate the Refinery

       1 Our jurisdiction is limited by the interlocutory nature of this appeal.

 For that reason, we draw these facts from the district court’s summary
 judgment order, as it comprises “the universe of facts upon which we base
 our legal review of whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”
 Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 2008).

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 from the public road. Between the fence and the concrete barriers is an

 “open area that allows pedestrian travel.” Aplt. App. at 174.

       Refinery security approached Mr. Bustillos while he was standing

 outside the fence and concrete barriers. Security guards asked Mr. Bustillos

 what he was doing, and he said he was filming content for a story and

 planned to stay on public property. Mr. Bustillos then continued filming at

 the perimeter of the Refinery. Mr. Bustillos remained outside the concrete

 barriers, walking along the road. Meanwhile, a Refinery security guard

 called 911 and reported a “suspicious person” on the “outside of the fence”

 filming “in towards the refinery.” Aplt. App. at 174.

       Officers from the Artesia Police Department responded. Corporal

 Marcie Sanchez arrived first and asked Mr. Bustillos for his identification.

 Mr. Bustillos refused, “explaining that he was doing a story and had stayed

 on public property the entire time.” Aplt. App. at 175. Mr. Bustillos added,

 “he would not give [Corporal Sanchez] his identification because he had not

 broken the law”—a prerequisite, he said, to having to identify himself to

 law enforcement. Aplt. App. at 175.

       Corporal Bailey arrived at the scene soon after. He “observed [Mr.

 Bustillos] . . . arguing with [Corporal] Sanchez” and “film[ing] with his

 handheld camera.” Aplt. App. at 175. As Corporal Bailey approached, Mr.

 Bustillos explained he was an independent journalist. Corporal Bailey

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 asked Mr. Bustillos for identification and again, Mr. Bustillos refused.

 Corporal Bailey then arrested Mr. Bustillos “for failure to identify himself

 in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-3.” Aplt. App. at 177.

                                       B

       Mr. Bustillos sued Defendants in New Mexico state court alleging

 violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C.

 § 1983. He also brought claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.

       Defendants removed the case to federal district court and moved for

 summary judgment. Corporal Bailey contended he was entitled to qualified

 immunity from Mr. Bustillos’s federal claims. The district court disagreed,

 denying qualified immunity under the familiar two-step framework. Under

 the first prong, the district court concluded a reasonable jury could find

 Corporal Bailey violated Mr. Bustillos’s First and Fourth Amendment

 rights. And under the second prong, the district court decided Mr. Bustillos

 successfully proved his Fourth Amendment2 rights were clearly established.

 The district court denied summary judgment on Mr. Bustillos’s state-law

       2 The district court did not discuss clearly established law with respect

 to Mr. Bustillos’s First Amendment claim. But, as we soon explain, Corporal
 Bailey offered no argument to the district court suggesting Mr. Bustillos’s
 First Amendment rights were not clearly established.

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 claims, finding questions of fact precluded summary judgment. Aplt. App.

 at 189. This timely appeal followed.

                                        II

       We begin with Corporal Bailey’s contentions regarding qualified

 immunity. Because this is an interlocutory appeal, we first discuss the legal

 principles that limit our jurisdiction and guide our review. We then

 consider, and reject, each of Corporal Bailey’s appellate challenges.

                                        A

       We have jurisdiction to review “all final decisions of the district courts

 of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Orders denying summary

 judgment are ordinarily not appealable final [decisions] for purposes of . . .

 § 1291.” Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting

 Roosevelt-Hennix v. Prickett, 717 F.3d 751, 753 (10th Cir. 2013)). “The

 denial of qualified immunity to a public official, however, is immediately

 appealable under the collateral order doctrine to the extent it involves

 abstract issues of law.” Id. (quoting Fancher v. Barrientos, 723 F.3d 1191,

 1198 (10th Cir. 2013)); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

 Abstract issues of law involve “(1) whether the facts that the district court

 ruled a reasonable jury could find would suffice to show a legal violation”

 and “(2) whether that law was clearly established at the time of the alleged

 violation.” Est. of Valverde ex rel. Padilla v. Dodge, 967 F.3d 1049, 1058

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 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Roosevelt-Hennix, 717 F.3d at 753). In the

 interlocutory posture, we review legal issues, and “we are not at liberty to

 review a district court’s factual conclusions, such as the existence of a

 genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide, or that a plaintiff’s

 evidence is sufficient to support a particular factual inference.” Fogarty, 523

 F.3d at 1154; see also Packard v. Budaj, 86 F.4th 859, 864, 866–67 (10th

 Cir. 2023) (rejecting on jurisdictional grounds defendants’ challenges to

 district court factual conclusions on an interlocutory appeal from the denial

 of qualified immunity).3

       “Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not

 violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

 reasonable person would have known.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595

 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78–79 (2017) (per

 curiam)). To overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must

 “demonstrate (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional

       3 This well-settled rule has three limited exceptions. Lewis v. Tripp,

 604 F.3d 1221, 1225–26 (10th Cir. 2010) (permitting review of factual
 conclusions in the interlocutory posture when the district court “fails to
 identify the particular charged conduct that it deemed adequately
 supported by the record,” when the “version of events” credited by the
 district court is “blatantly contradicted by the record,” and when evaluating
 “the factual inferences that arise from a complaint at the motion to dismiss
 stage.”). None of these exceptions applies here, and no party argues
 otherwise.

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 right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the

 challenged conduct.” Surat v. Klamser, 52 F.4th 1261, 1270–71 (10th Cir.

 2022) (quoting Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir. 2015)). “If we

 conclude that the plaintiff has not met his burden as to either part of the

 two-prong inquiry, we must grant qualified immunity to the defendant.”

 Andersen v. DelCore, 79 F.4th 1153, 1163 (10th Cir. 2023).

       With these legal principles in mind, we turn to Corporal Bailey’s

 appellate arguments.

                                       B

       As to the Fourth Amendment claim, Corporal Bailey contends the

 district court erred by finding Mr. Bustillos satisfied both steps of the

 qualified immunity analysis. We disagree.

                                        1
       To defeat qualified immunity at the first step, Mr. Bustillos must

 prove a reasonable jury could find Corporal Bailey violated the Fourth

 Amendment by engaging in a warrantless arrest. Generally, the Fourth

 Amendment permits a warrantless arrest supported by probable cause the

 suspect has committed a crime. Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912,

 922 (10th Cir. 2015). Here, Corporal Bailey arrested Mr. Bustillos for the

 misdemeanor offense of “concealing his identity in violation of New Mexico

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 law”—namely, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-3.4 Aplt. App. 180. Our Fourth

 Amendment jurisprudence is clear, however, that an officer may not

 lawfully arrest someone for concealing identity without “reasonable

 suspicion of some predicate, underlying crime.” Keylon v. City of

 Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008).

       Here, then, our task is two-fold. We must first determine whether

 Corporal Bailey “possessed reasonable suspicion” Mr. Bustillos “had

 committed or was committing a crime such that the demand for his ID was

 lawful.” Corona v. Aguilar, 959 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2020). If so, we

 then must ask “whether there also was probable cause to arrest” Mr.

 Bustillos for refusing Corporal Bailey’s demand for identification. Id.

       4 That statute is called “Concealing Identity” and it provides:

       Concealing identity consists of concealing one’s true name or
       identity, or disguising oneself with intent to obstruct the due
       execution of the law or with intent to intimidate, hinder or
       interrupt any public officer or any other person in a legal
       performance of his duty or the exercise of his rights under the laws
       of the United States or of this state.
       Whoever commits concealing identity is guilty of a petty
       misdemeanor.
       N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-3.

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 Because we conclude Corporal Bailey lacked reasonable suspicion of a

 predicate crime, we limit our analysis to the first question.

       “For reasonable suspicion to exist, an officer must have a

 ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting’ criminal conduct under

 the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449

 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). We apply this objective standard based on “the

 perspective of the reasonable officer.” United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d

 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2007).5 Even still, the “officer must point to specific,

 articulable facts” to support reasonable suspicion. United States v.

 Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2010). While not an onerous

 standard, id. at 1153, reasonable suspicion squarely demands “something

 more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” United

 States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States

 v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

       We understand Corporal Bailey to make two reasonable-suspicion

 arguments supporting reversal. Corporal Bailey first suggests the district

 court erroneously required him to prove reasonable suspicion of some

       5 Corporal Bailey seems to suggest the district court necessarily
 misapplied the reasonable suspicion standard by viewing the facts in the
 light most favorable to Mr. Bustillos, as required by the summary judgment
 standard. Opening Br. at 14. We see no basis in the record or the law for
 such an argument.

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  specific crime committed by Mr. Bustillos. According to Corporal Bailey,

  that he harbored generalized suspicions something was amiss when he

  encountered Mr. Bustillos at the Refinery satisfied the Fourth Amendment.

  Opening Br. at 21. Second, even if reasonable suspicion of a specific crime

  was required, says Corporal Bailey, the district court erred by finding he

  did not have it when arresting Mr. Bustillos for concealing his identity.

  Neither argument is availing.

        Corporal Bailey’s first contention fails quickly. Our cases are clear:

  law enforcement needs reasonable suspicion of a “predicate, underlying

  crime,” not a generalized suspicion a person is simply up to no good, to

  support an arrest for concealing identity. Keylon, 535 F.3d at 1216

  (warrantless arrest for the offense of concealing identity will not satisfy the

  Fourth Amendment unless supported by reasonable suspicion suspect

  committed a predicate offense); see also Mocek, 813 F.3d at 922–23 (same);

  Corona, 959 F.3d at 1283–85 (same).

        As Corporal Bailey appears to acknowledge, we look to the “totality of

  the circumstances” to determine whether an officer had reasonable

  suspicion. Opening Br. at 21–22 (citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583

  U.S. 48, 61 (2018)). But Corporal Bailey cites no authority suggesting the

  Fourth Amendment’s general mandate to consider the totality of the

  circumstances gave him reasonable suspicion simply because, according to

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  him, Mr. Bustillos seemed suspicious.6 The law has long been otherwise.

  Corporal Bailey’s argument is little more than an attempt to rely on

  “[i]ncohate suspicions and unparticularized hunches” to satisfy the Fourth

  Amendment. Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1147.

        Corporal Bailey next argues he had reasonable suspicion Mr. Bustillos

  committed specific, underlying crimes and insists the district court

  mistakenly held otherwise. We cannot agree.

        In the district court, Corporal Bailey contended it was reasonable to

  suspect Mr. Bustillos of trespassing, committing disorderly conduct,

  engaging in potential terrorist activity, and loitering. The district court

  considered, and rejected, Corporal Bailey’s arguments about these specific

  crimes.7 We discern no error in the district court’s analysis.

        6  Confusingly, Corporal Bailey acknowledges an “officer may not
  arrest someone for concealing identity without reasonable suspicion of some
  predicate, underlying crime.” Opening Br. at 12 (quoting Mocek, 813 F.3d
  at 922).

        7  Corporal Bailey identified these particular offenses after Mr.
  Bustillos’s arrest, while preparing for trial. Aplt. App. at 178. As the district
  court found, based on Corporal Bailey’s deposition testimony, “[a]t the time
  [Corporal] Bailey arrested [Mr.] Bustillos, his understanding of the law for
  concealing identification based on his academy training was that if he was
  dispatched to a call for service, he was within his rights to demand
  identification.” Aplt. App. at 178. But through his research, Corporal Bailey
  explained he learned he had to have “reasonable suspicion of a predicate
  crime” to support an arrest for failing to produce identification. Aplt. App.
  at 178. At that point, Corporal Bailey identified crimes he believed were

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                                      i. Trespass

        Under New Mexico law, “[c]riminal trespass consists of knowingly

  entering or remaining upon posted private property without possessing

  written permission from the owner or person in control of the land” or of

  “knowingly entering or remaining upon the unposted lands of another

  knowing that such consent to enter or remain is denied or withdrawn by the

  owner or occupant thereof.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-14-1(A)–(B). The district

  court concluded, “[c]onstruing [the] facts in Plaintiff’s favor, a jury could

  determine that Bailey did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that

  [Bustillos] committed a trespass.” Aplt. App. at 185.8 In support, the district

  predicate offenses supporting the arrest of Mr. Bustillo and litigated the
  qualified immunity issues on that basis. Aplt. App. at 178.

         Corporal Bailey appears to suggest the district court erred by
  confining its analysis to the crimes he identified. But on this record, we find
  it entirely reasonable the district court did so.

        8
          The district court also said there was “a fact question as to whether
  Bailey had reason to believe that Bustillos committed a trespass and as to
  whether Bailey’s mistaken belief that Bustillos may have been trespassing
  was reasonable.” Aplt. App. at 185. But the parties do not contend the
  historical facts are disputed, and the “objective legal reasonableness of the
  [defendant]’s actions is a legal question.” Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535
  F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson,
  328 F.3d 1230, 1251 (10th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, “a defendant, entitled to
  invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court’s
  summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not
  the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v.
  Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1995).

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  court found security approached Mr. Bustillos when he arrived at the

  Refinery, and after the encounter,

        Bustillos walked next to the refinery while filming it. The area
        between the fence and the barriers is an open area that allows
        pedestrian travel the length of the property. There are no signs
        stating private property or prohibiting trespass in the area on which
        Bustillos was walking. Bustillos, however, walked alongside the
        highway because the cement barriers in front of the property were
        several feet on public property.

  Aplt. App. at 174. The district court found “none of the security guards

  reported that Bustillos was trespassing.” Aplt. App. at 185.

        Corporal Bailey urges reversal, insisting he had reasonable suspicion

  of trespass based on the totality of the circumstances. He claims the district

  court “ignored” his “undisputed belief at the time of his encounter [with Mr.

  Bustillos] that the area from which Bustillos was filming was private

  Navajo property.” Opening Br. at 16. He also insists the district court

  overlooked his “undisputed belief Bustillos had walked in an area that was

  private property.” Opening Br. at 29. According to Corporal Bailey, the

        Here, the district court, viewing the summary judgment evidence in
  favor of the nonmovant, concluded Mr. Bustillos satisfied his burden to
  show a constitutional violation at the first step of the qualified immunity
  analysis. Corporal Bailey challenges only the district court’s legal
  conclusion regarding his reasonable suspicion of trespass. Relatedly, he
  appears to contend he was reasonably mistaken about the Refinery’s
  boundaries. We focus on these legal questions in our de novo review. To the
  extent Corporal Bailey advances a fact-bound contention, we are without
  jurisdiction to resolve it.

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  reports from dispatch “undoubtedly suggest close proximity to the refinery’s

  fence, which, combined with Corporal Bailey’s understanding that the

  refinery owned all the way to the curb, raised a reasonable suspicion of

  trespass.” Opening Br. at 30. We are not persuaded.

        “‘Reasonable suspicion’ is a question of law for the court.” United

  States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 544 (10th Cir. 1994). A reasonable mistake

  of fact may support reasonable suspicion. United States v. Pena-Montes, 589

  F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e may weigh objectively reasonable

  mistakes of fact made by the officer in favor of reasonable suspicion.”). But

  the Fourth Amendment does not abide “[i]nchoate suspicions and

  unparticularized hunches.” Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1147.

        While Corporal Bailey insists he “underst[ood]” the Refinery “owned

  all the way to the curb,” Opening Br. at 30, he has provided no “specific,

  articulable” facts to support his understanding. Id. And an officer’s

  subjective belief is “irrelevant” for qualified immunity purposes. Anderson

  v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). The district court’s factual findings

  on this issue, which “we are not at liberty to review,” Fogarty, 523 F.3d at

  1154, undermine Corporal Bailey’s assertion that he reasonably believed

  the area between the Refinery’s fence and concrete barriers was private

  property. Aplt. App. at 174 (“The area between the fence and the barriers is

  an open area that allows pedestrian travel the length of the property.”).

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        Nor does Corporal Bailey do more than speculate Mr. Bustillos walked

  between the concrete barriers and the Refinery’s fence. When Corporal

  Bailey encountered him, Mr. Bustillos was nowhere near the area Corporal

  Bailey believed to be private property. Video at 16:15–24:00. Mr. Bustillos

  also “repeated that he remained on public property when [filming the

  Refinery], and he knew the boundaries and the applicable laws.” Aplt. App.

  at 175. The information available to Corporal Bailey thus fails to support

  the reasonableness of his suspicion or mistake.

        Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court that,

  based on the summary judgment record, an officer in Corporal Bailey’s

  position would not have had an objectively reasonable basis for suspecting

  Mr. Bustillos committed trespass under New Mexico law.9

        9 Our colleague in dissent reaches a different conclusion on trespass,

  agreeing with Corporal Bailey that a reasonable officer could have believed
  the property between the Refinery’s fence and concrete barriers was private
  and that Mr. Bustillos entered it. But we respectfully fail to see how these
  legal conclusions are sustainable on the record before us.

          For example, the dissent finds the appearance of the area could
  reasonably suggest the path between the Refinery’s fence and the concrete
  barriers was private property. Partial Dissent at 6. According to the dissent,
  Mr. Bustillos characterizes the area between the Refinery’s fence and
  concrete barriers as “a clear pedestrian right of way” and “does not explain
  or support this assertion.” Partial Dissent at 6. But it was the district
  court’s finding that this “open area . . . allows pedestrian travel the length
  of the property.” Aplt. App. at 174. Corporal Bailey’s belief about the

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                                ii. Disorderly Conduct

        Disorderly conduct involves “engaging in violent, abusive, indecent,

  profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct

  which tends to disturb the peace.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-1. The New

  Mexico Supreme Court has described “conduct that tends to disturb the

  peace” as “a disturbance of public order by an act of violence, or by an act

  likely to produce violence, or which, by causing consternation and alarm,

  disturbs the peace and quiet of the community.” State v. Florstedt, 419 P.2d

  248, 249 (N.M. 1966) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see

  also Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008)

  (finding plaintiff’s conduct did not provide reasonable suspicion of

  disorderly conduct under New Mexico law because, on the facts found by the

  district court, the plaintiff’s conduct did not “threaten[] to incite violence or

  create ‘consternation and alarm[.]’” (citation omitted)). “Conduct [under the

  disorderly conduct statute] is not criminal, or suspicious, simply because it

  property, even if mistaken, cannot be reasonable in light of the district
  court’s factual finding, which we are bound to accept.

        We likewise see no basis in the record for the dissent’s conclusion that
  “a police officer could reasonably assume that Mr. Bustillos had used this
  walking path while filming the refinery.” Partial Dissent at 9. There is no
  evidence Corporal Bailey was told Mr. Bustillos used the walking path, nor
  does he claim he saw Mr. Bustillos walking on it.

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  is boisterous or unreasonably loud; the conduct must also tend to disturb

  the peace.” City of Las Cruces v. Flores, 2020 WL 1845195, at *3 (N.M. Ct.

  App. 2020). The statute must be construed narrowly. State v. Correa, 222

  P.3d 1, 7 (N.M. 2009).

        The district court was “not convinced that [Corporal] Bailey had

  reasonable suspicion that [Mr.] Bustillos violated § 30-20-1” because Mr.

  Bustillos was not attempting to enter the Refinery or causing a disturbance.

  Aplt. App. at 183. On appeal, Corporal Bailey contends the district court

  committed legal error by failing to account for the uniquely sensitive setting

  of the Refinery. In support, he relies on our decision in Mocek, which

  emphasized “the uniquely sensitive setting” of airport security checkpoints.

  813 F.3d at 924. There, we explained “[o]rder and security are of obvious

  importance at an airport security checkpoint. . . . As a result, conduct that

  is relatively benign elsewhere might work to disturb the peace at these

  locations.” Id. Again, we must disagree with Corporal Bailey.

        A simple confrontation is not enough to establish disorderly conduct

  under New Mexico law. See, e.g., Flores, 2020 WL 1845195, at **3–4 (“The

  public’s sensibilities are tough enough that, typically, the act of yelling

  alone does not shatter public order or threaten to do so. . . . Without evidence

  of anything more than Defendant’s loud remarks and cell phone recording

  of the officers, all of which occurred in their presence, the testimony did not

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  give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion that Defendant had

  committed or was committing the crime of disorderly conduct.”); see also

  State v. Hawkins, 991 P.2d 989, 992 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (“The mere fact

  that people may have heard [the d]efendant’s remarks, however loud or

  offensive they may have been, is insufficient to support a charge of

  disorderly conduct.”).

        And Mr. Bustillos’s conduct, as the district court viewed it, was not

  violent, distracting, or disruptive. Mr. Bustillos “was not attempting to

  enter the refinery”: instead, he was “filming from a public location” behind

  the concrete barriers outside the Refinery. Aplt. App. at 182. As he filmed,

  he walked in a manner “that d[id] not suggest he was likely to cause violence

  or disturb[] the peace of the area,” and, when asked, he identified himself

  as a journalist filming for a story. Aplt. App. at 182–83. On these facts,

  which we are not free to revisit, Corporal Bailey lacked reasonable suspicion

  Mr. Bustillos committed disorderly conduct.

        To be sure, the location of an investigative stop is “a factor that

  contributes to an officer’s reasonable suspicion.” See, e.g., United States v.

  Guardado, 699 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2012) (considering that a stop

  occurred in a high crime area in the reasonable suspicion analysis). And

  we agree with Corporal Bailey that the sensitive nature of the Refinery is

  part of the reasonable suspicion inquiry here. But contrary to Corporal

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  Bailey’s position, the district court fully considered the unique setting, in

  accordance with Mocek. Mr. Bustillos was not attempting to enter the

  Refinery, the district court reasoned, nor was he causing a disturbance “in

  a crowded security line that distracted the security guards in a manner

  that threatened order and security at the refinery.” Aplt. App. at 182. We

  thus cannot say the district court committed legal error, as Corporal

  Bailey insists.

                           iii. Potential Terrorist Activity

        Corporal Bailey also contends the totality of the circumstances

  established reasonable suspicion of terrorism. On this front, Corporal

  Bailey has identified no specific offense but posited instead Mr. Bustillos’s

  suspected engagement in “potential terrorist activity.” Opening Br. at 26.

  The district court rejected Corporal Bailey’s argument, and so do we.

        On appeal, Corporal Bailey insists the district court should have

  found he had reasonable suspicion because “the refinery is part of the

  nation’s uniquely critical energy sector and as such, a potential terrorist

  target,” Opening Br. at 27, Mr. Bustillos filmed the Refinery on the

  anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks, and Mr. Bustillos’s

  behavior, in Corporal Bailey’s experience, was unusual, id. at 28–29. The

  problem for Corporal Bailey’s legal argument is the district court did

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  consider these unique facts. Aplt. App. at 184.10 As the district court

  observed, the record showed Mr. Bustillos had a reason to film the Refinery;

  it “is a place of public interest.” Aplt. App. at 184. And when asked about

  what he was doing, Mr. Bustillos informed Refinery security and law

  enforcement he was an independent journalist gathering content for a story.

  Aplt. App. at 184. Nor was Mr. Bustillos “carrying any sort of weapons,” the

  district court observed, or acting in a threatening manner. Aplt. App. at

  184.

         At bottom, we discern no reversible error in the district court’s

  conclusion Corporal Bailey lacked reasonable suspicion Mr. Bustillos was

  involved in crimes related to potential terrorist activity.

                             iv. Loitering and Prowling

         Section 5-1B-3 of the Artesia Municipal Code states it is “unlawful for

  any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual

  for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the

         10 Corporal Bailey at times concedes as much. See Opening Br. at 27

  (describing the sensitive nature of the Refinery as “a fact the Court itself
  acknowledged”); Opening Br. at 28 (admitting “[t]he District Court did not
  dispute [the September 11 date] was of ‘some relevance’”).

                                        20
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  safety of persons or property in the vicinity.”11 The district court rejected

  Corporal Bailey’s argument that filming the Refinery could give rise to

  reasonable suspicion Mr. Bustillos was loitering or prowling. It defined

  loitering as “to spend time idly or to hang around aimlessly.” Aplt. App. at

  185 (citing Balizer v. Shaver, 1971-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 20-21, 82 N.M. 347 and

  “Loiter,”    Merriam-Webster.com        Dictionary,     https://www.merriam-

  webster.com/dictionary/loiter). It defined prowling as “to move about or

  wander stealthily in or as if in search of prey” or “to roam over in a predatory

  manner.” Aplt. App. at 185 (quoting “Prowl,” Merriam-Webster.com

  Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prowl).

        The district court explained “[t]he facts here, construed in Plaintiff’s

  favor, do not suggest Plaintiff was acting with idleness, lack of purpose,

  stealth, or in a predatory manner.” Aplt. App. at 185. Instead, Mr. Bustillos

  “was actively filming in the open during daytime hours while walking

  outside the perimeter of the refinery.” Aplt. App. at 185–86. Nothing in the

  record suggests otherwise. Corporal Bailey simply insists the district court

  failed to consider the “whole picture.” Opening Br. at 30–31.12 But as our

        11 In the district court, Mr. Bustillos argued the City’s loitering and

  prowling ordinance “suffers from constitutional infirmness.” Aplt. App. at
  106. He does not reprise this argument on appeal, so we do not consider it.
        12 Corporal Bailey asserts the district court erred by relying on the

  dictionary definitions of “loiter” and “prowl” to interpret the ordinance.

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  discussion thus far shows, we are unpersuaded. Mr. Bustillos actions, while

  perhaps unusual in the experience of Corporal Bailey and Refinery security,

  did not “warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property” at the Refinery.

  § 5-1B-3, Artesia Municipal Code.

                                       ***

        As Corporal Bailey admits, “Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims rise

  and fall on whether Corporal Bailey possessed reasonable suspicion to

  demand Plaintiff’s identification. If Corporal Bailey lacked reasonable

  suspicion, then it was not lawful for him to arrest Plaintiff when he failed

  to produce identification.” Aplt. App. at 30; see also Opening Br. at 39. And

  that is precisely the result here. We thus affirm the district court’s

  conclusion that, for purposes of the first prong of the qualified immunity

  inquiry, Mr. Bustillos established a Fourth Amendment violation.13

  Opening Br. at 31. This argument is not developed on appeal, so we do not
  consider it. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir.
  1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.”).

        13 Corporal Bailey contends the district court failed to consider: (1) the

  sensitive nature of the Refinery; (2) Corporal Bailey’s belief Mr. Bustillos
  was on private property; (3) the information conveyed to Corporal Bailey by
  Refinery security; (4) Mr. Bustillos’s conduct (filming); and (5) Corporal
  Bailey’s experience. Opening Br. at 13–23. To the extent Corporal Bailey
  advances a discrete argument that the district court committed a legal error
  by failing to consider the totality of the circumstances, we disagree. As made
  plain by our discussion of each crime invoked by Corporal Bailey, the
  district court appropriately considered each of these facts, alone and
  cumulatively, to find Corporal Bailey lacked reasonable suspicion. To the

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                                        2
        Turning to the second prong of the inquiry, we now must consider

  whether Mr. Bustillos met his burden to show his Fourth Amendment rights

  were clearly established. On this front, “the plaintiff [generally] must point

  to a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly

  established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law

  to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Cox v. Wilson, 971 F.3d 1159, 1171 (10th

  Cir. 2020) (quoting Callahan v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 806 F.3d

  1022, 1027 (10th Cir. 2015)). The precedent must have clearly established

  the right “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

  proposition.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam);

  accord Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (emphasizing “the

  importance of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant” when deciding

  the clearly-established prong of the standard and taking care “not to define

  a case’s ‘context’ in a manner that imports genuinely disputed factual

  propositions.” (citations omitted)). The precedent must provide “fair

  extent Corporal Bailey contends these facts, unmoored from a specific
  crime, established some generalized reasonable suspicion, as we have
  explained, we disagree.

                                        23
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  warning” to a defendant “that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.”

  Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656.

        The district court concluded Corporal Bailey violated clearly

  established law by arresting Mr. Bustillos for refusing to produce

  identification without reasonably suspecting he committed a predicate,

  underlying crime. Aplt. App. at 187. In support, the district court relied on

  our decision in Keylon, which held “to arrest for concealing identity, there

  must be reasonable suspicion of some predicate, underlying crime.” 535 F.3d

  at 1216. Corporal Bailey urges reversal, asserting neither Mr. Bustillos nor

  the district court identified a factually similar case to the one before us.

  This argument is unavailing.

        The district court correctly concluded our decision in Keylon supplied

  the clearly established law. There, an officer approached Ms. Keylon outside

  her home seeking information about her son. Keylon, 535 F.3d at 1213. She

  told the officer she had no such information, and then, the officer demanded

  her identification. Id. Ms. Keylon refused to provide it, and the officer

  arrested her for concealing her identity in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-

  22-3—the same statute at issue here. Id. She then sued the arresting officer

  under § 1983 for violating her Fourth Amendment rights. After a trial ended

  with a verdict in favor of the arresting officer, Ms. Keylon moved for

  judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Id. at 1213–14. The

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  district court denied the motion, and we reversed, finding, as a matter of

  law, the arresting officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at

  1214–16.

        As relevant to our analysis here, the arresting officer claimed that

  before he asked for identification, he had reason to suspect Ms. Keylon

  violated N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-1, which prohibits “resisting or abusing . . .

  [a] peace officer in the lawful discharge of his duties.” Id. at 1216–17. But

  we disagreed, finding the statute did not criminalize merely evasive speech,

  like Ms. Keylon’s. Id. Because the arresting officer lacked reasonable

  suspicion Ms. Keylon committed a “predicate, underlying crime,” we

  concluded Ms. Keylon’s arrest for concealing her identity violated the

  Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1217. Importantly, our conclusion in Keylon

  adheres to principles long established by the Supreme Court. Id. at 1216–

  17 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“But even assuming [the

  goal of preventing crime] is served to some degree by stopping and

  demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for

  believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth

  Amendment do not allow it. When such a stop is not based on objective

  criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable

  limits.”)).

                                        25
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        Corporal Bailey arrested Mr. Bustillos for refusing to provide

  identification in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-3, and he did so simply

  because Mr. Bustillos refused to identify himself. Keylon thus provided

  Corporal Bailey “fair warning” that an arrest for concealing identity

  without reasonable suspicion of a predicate, underlying crime violates the

  Fourth Amendment. Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656.14

        Still, Corporal Bailey insists the district court defined clearly

  established law at an inappropriately “high level of generality.” Opening

  Br. at 35–36. True, we must take care not to do so, given the Supreme

  Court’s “repeated warning.” Opening Br. at 35; see also City of Tahlequah,

  Oklahoma v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021). But ours is not a close case. Keylon

  makes it “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

        14 We  have since demonstrated our understanding that “in light of
  Keylon” an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when making an arrest
  for concealing identity under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-3 without reasonable
  suspicion of a predicate, underlying crime. See Corona, 959 F.3d at 1285–
  88 (affirming the denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment to an
  officer who arrested a suspect for concealing his identity, relying on Keylon
  to find the officer lacked reasonable suspicion the suspect resisted, evaded,
  or obstructed an officer in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann § 30-22-1(D)). Corona
  was decided after Mr. Bustillos’s arrest, but “[t]his court has recognized
  that a case decided after the incident underlying a § 1983 action can state
  clearly established law when that case ruled that the relevant law was
  clearly established as of an earlier date preceding the events in the later
  § 1983 action.” Soza v. Demsich, 13 F.4th 1094, 1100 n.3 (10th Cir. 2021).
  We thus find Corona relevant to our analysis and consistent with our
  disposition.

                                        26
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  understood that what he is doing,” if the facts found by the district court

  are proven true, violates the Fourth Amendment. Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S.

  at 5 (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11). And in any event, we require only

  the relevant “legal principle [to] clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the

  particular circumstances before him.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 (emphasis

  added). Here, a “materially similar” case like Keylon will do. Shepherd v.

  Robbins, 55 F.4th 810, 815 (10th Cir. 2022).

        We conclude Mr. Bustillos satisfied his burden to show Corporal

  Bailey violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. He has

  therefore met his burden under the second prong of the qualified immunity

  analysis.

                                        ***

        Because the district court correctly found Mr. Bustillos carried his

  burden on both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis, we affirm the

  denial of summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim.

                                         C

        The district court also denied Corporal Bailey’s qualified immunity

  defense to Mr. Bustillos’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Corporal

  Bailey argues this was error. We disagree.

        As to this claim, only the first element of qualified immunity is at

  issue. On appeal, Corporal Bailey appears to suggest Mr. Bustillos’s First

                                        27
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  Amendment rights were not clearly established, Opening Br. at 42–43, but

  he did not make that argument in the district court, Aplt. App. at 41–42,

  162–63. When a party fails to make an argument in the district court, we

  generally consider it forfeited and will review only for plain error. A.N. ex

  rel. Ponder v. Syling, 928 F.3d 1191, 1194 n.2 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding

  argument made on appeal but not raised in the district court in a § 1983

  action forfeited); Ave. Cap. Mgmt. II, L.P. v. Schaden, 843 F.3d 876, 885

  (10th Cir. 2016) (“We may consider forfeited arguments under the plain-

  error standard.”). But when a litigant fails “to argue for plain error [review]

  and its application on appeal . . . ordinarily, we will not review the argument

  at all.” Havens v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 897 F.3d 1250, 1260 (10th Cir. 2018)

  (quoting Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011)).

  Corporal Bailey has not urged plain error review on appeal. Therefore, we

  assume the law is clearly established and address only whether a

  reasonable jury could find Corporal Bailey’s conduct violated Mr. Bustillos’s

  First Amendment rights.

                                        1

        If a government official takes adverse action against an individual

  because that person engaged in protected speech, and “non-retaliatory

  grounds are in fact insufficient to provoke the adverse consequences,” the

  person may generally succeed on a First Amendment claim. Nieves v.

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  Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019). To prove a First Amendment

  retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) he was engaged in

  constitutionally protected activity[;] (2) the government’s actions caused

  him injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing

  to engage in that activity[;] and (3) the government’s actions were

  substantially motivated as a response to his constitutionally protected

  conduct.” Mocek, 813 F.3d at 930 (quoting Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty.

  Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1165 (10th Cir. 2009)). The Supreme Court has

  held a plaintiff must show “but-for” causation—meaning the adverse action

  against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory

  motive—to prove the third element of a First Amendment retaliation claim.

  Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722.

                                        2

        In the district court, Defendants challenged only the third element—

  whether Mr. Bustillos’s exercise of his First Amendment rights was a

  but-for cause of his arrest.15 Aplt. App. at 189. The district court found

  “Plaintiff has some evidence of but-for causation sufficient to” survive

  summary judgment “[b]ased on the timing of the events and the basis for

  [Corporal] Bailey’s suspicions of [Mr.] Bustillos being linked to his filming.”

        15 There is no dispute Mr. Bustillos had a First Amendment right to

  film the Refinery.

                                        29
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  Aplt. App. at 189. “[Corporal] Bailey arrested [Mr.] Bustillos for concealing

  identification,” the district court reasoned, “but a jury could determine,

  after considering the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, that [Corporal] Bailey asked

  for [Mr.] Bustillos’ identification because he was filming the refinery.” Aplt.

  App. at 189. The district court also rejected Defendants’ alternative

  argument that Mr. Bustillos could not satisfy this third requirement

  because Corporal Bailey had reasonable suspicion to demand Mr. Bustillos’s

  identification. Aplt. App. at 190.

        On appeal, Corporal Bailey argues: (1) the district court should have

  concluded he had reasonable suspicion to demand Mr. Bustillos’s

  identification, which would have “ma[de] it impossible for any retaliatory

  motive to be the ‘but-for’ cause of that action”; or (2) alternatively, Mr.

  Bustillos did not point to any evidence of a retaliatory motive on Corporal

  Bailey’s part. Opening Br. at 40–41. We reject both arguments.

        The first argument rises and falls with our earlier reasonable

  suspicion analysis. As we have explained, the district court correctly

  concluded Corporal Bailey lacked reasonable suspicion of a predicate,

  underlying crime.

        The second argument falls outside our limited interlocutory

  jurisdiction. As discussed, the district court concluded a reasonable jury

  could find “Bailey asked for [Mr.] Bustillos’ identification because he was

                                        30
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  filming the refinery.” Aplt. App. at 189. Corporal Bailey seems to

  acknowledge motive is generally a question of fact. Opening Br. at 41 (“The

  District Court found a factual issue here from the ‘timing of the events and

  the basis for [Corporal] Bailey’s [suspicions] of [Mr.] Bustillos being linked

  to his filming.’ The District Court offered no logical or legal basis for this

  finding.”). We have no jurisdiction to consider this challenge in our

  interlocutory posture. Buck, 549 F.3d at 1292 (finding no jurisdiction to

  review district court’s finding that a fact dispute existed as to whether

  defendant’s actions were motivated by plaintiff’s First Amendment

  activity); see also Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316 (reasoning “intent” is a “factual

  controvers[y]” rather than a “purely legal matter[]” suited for resolution by

  interlocutory appeal). We reject Corporal Bailey’s attempts to cast his

  factual arguments as contentions of legal error.

        We affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on Mr.

  Bustillos’s First Amendment claim.

                                       III

        Defendants also assert the district court erred by denying summary

  judgment on Mr. Bustillos’s state-law claims. Opening Br. at 42–43. Mr.

  Bustillos contends we should decline to exercise jurisdiction over this

  portion of Defendants’ appeal. Answer Br. at 21. We agree with Mr.

  Bustillos.

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        Generally, our interlocutory jurisdiction extends only to the district

  court’s denial of qualified immunity, “and thus [we] may reach defendants’

  state law arguments only by exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction.”

  Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514

  U.S. 35, 42 (1995)). “It is appropriate to exercise pendent appellate

  jurisdiction only where resolution of the appealable issue necessarily

  resolves the nonappealable issue, or where review of the nonappealable

  issue is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the appealable one.”

  Berrey v. Asarco, Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 647 (10th Cir. 2006). Pendent appellate

  jurisdiction is discretionary, and it is “generally disfavored” in “cases in

  which primary appellate jurisdiction is based on the denial of qualified

  immunity.” Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2019). The

  party seeking pendent jurisdiction has the burden to “support [an] assertion

  that we may exercise [it].” Id.; see also Raley v. Hyundai Motor Co., 642 F.3d

  1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Where an appellant fails to lead, we have no

  duty to follow. It is the appellant’s burden, not ours, to conjure up possible

  theories to invoke our legal authority to hear her appeal.”). Defendants

  failed to meet their burden here.

        Defendants did not discuss pendent appellate jurisdiction in their

  Opening Brief. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7

  (10th Cir. 1994) (“[A]ppellant failed to raise this issue in his opening brief

                                        32
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  and, hence, has waived the point.”). But even considering the points

  advanced only in the Reply Brief, we are not persuaded. First, Defendants

  argue that because the district court exercised pendent jurisdiction over Mr.

  Bustillos’s state court claims, so should we. This argument misses the mark,

  as it conflates jurisdiction to hear the state law claims at all and our

  appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.

        Defendants’ second argument fares no better. They contend “pendent

  jurisdiction over the state law claims” is appropriate because the claims

  “turn on the same issues of law upon which [the] federal claims turn.” Reply

  Br. at 19. Defendants have generally identified the correct standard but

  have failed to show how it applies here. As we have explained, by “providing

  us with bare assertions rather than analytical guidance,” an appellant

  “effectively ask[s] us to ‘make arguments for [them] that [they] did not make

  in [their appellate] briefs,’ which we ‘will not’ do.” Cummings, 913 F.3d at

  1236 (quoting Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1256 (10th Cir. 2019)).

        Because Defendants have failed to meet their burden to support

  pendent appellate jurisdiction, we decline their invitation to exercise it.

                                       IV

        We DISMISS the portion of Defendants’ appeal relating to Mr.

  Bustillos’s state-law claims. The district court’s order denying summary

  judgment is otherwise AFFIRMED.

                                        33
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  Albert Bustillos v. The City of Artesia and Officer David Bailey,
  No. 22-2046, BACHARACH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

        This appeal involves qualified immunity for an arrest. The immunity

  is triggered if the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the

  suspect concealed his identity. But probable cause required reasonable

  suspicion of some other crime.

        Here the suspicion includes the crime of trespass. This suspicion

  grew out of a report to police dispatch, stating that someone was walking

  along a private entity’s property and filming that property. In my view, an

  officer could reasonably suspect trespass based on the combination of

  information from dispatch and the appearance of the property itself. 1

  I.    Mr. Albert Bustillos was reportedly filming private property.

        Mr. Albert Bustillos was filming as he walked along a private

  refinery. A security officer for the refinery grew suspicious and called

  9-1-1. The police dispatch told officers that

             a male individual was outside the fence and filming in toward
              the refinery and

             this individual was walking and filming employees’ vehicles.

        A police officer arrived, spotted the man, and asked for his

  identification. He refused, saying that he was on public property and had

  1
        The defendant also argues that reasonable suspicion existed for
  disorderly conduct, terrorist activity, loitering, and prowling. I agree with
  the majority’s discussion of reasonable suspicion as to these crimes.
Appellate Case: 22-2046   Document: 010111033725   Date Filed: 04/17/2024   Page: 35

  not committed a crime. Officer David Bailey then arrived and asked the

  man for his name. When he refused to answer, he was arrested and

  identified as Mr. Bustillos.

        Mr. Bustillos sued Officer Bailey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

  violating the First and Fourth Amendments. 2 Officer Bailey moved for

  summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied

  the motion, and Officer Bailey appealed.

  II.   Officer Bailey is entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Bustillos’s
        Fourth Amendment claim.

        For his Fourth Amendment claim, Mr. Bustillos alleges that Officer

  Bailey lacked probable cause for the arrest. Officer Bailey counters by

  asserting qualified immunity.

        A.    Mr. Bustillos must prove the violation of a clearly
              established right.

        Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, “the plaintiff must

  establish (1) the defendant violated a statutory or constitutional right and

  (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s

  unlawful conduct.” Corona v. Aguilar, 959 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir.

  2020).

  2
       Mr. Bustillos also asserted state-law claims, which the district court
  dismissed. The majority upholds these dismissals, and I agree with the
  majority’s discussion of these claims.

                                        2
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        B.    Probable cause turns on reasonable suspicion of trespass.

        A warrantless arrest doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment if

  probable cause exists. Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 922

  (10th Cir. 2015). So we consider the existence of probable cause based on

  the suspected crime.

        Officer Bailey arrested Mr. Bustillos for concealing his identity. In

  New Mexico, concealment of identity can constitute a crime when

  individuals refuse to identify themselves in order to hinder an

  investigation. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-3. But to arrest individuals for

  concealing their identities, the officer needs “reasonable suspicion of some

  predicate, underlying crime.” Mocek, 813 F.3d at 922 (quoting Keylon v.

  City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008)). So we must

  consider whether Officer Bailey had reasonable suspicion of some other

  crime.

        When determining whether reasonable suspicion blossomed into

  probable cause, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to

  Mr. Bustillos. See Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198, 1205

  (10th Cir. 2008). In viewing the evidence favorably to Mr. Bustillos, we

  consider two steps. First, Officer Bailey needed “reasonable suspicion [of

  trespass] to stop [Mr. Bustillos] and request his identity.” Mocek, 813 F.3d

  at 922. Second, Officer Bailey needed probable cause to believe that Mr.

  Bustillos had concealed his identity. Id. at 922–23. Both steps involve

                                        3
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  objective inquiries, where Officer Bailey’s “state of mind (except for the

  facts that he knows) is irrelevant.” Keylon, 535 F.3d at 1219 (quoting

  Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004)).

        C.    Reasonable suspicion existed for trespass.

        The district court denied summary judgment, concluding that factual

  disputes precluded a finding that Officer Bailey had reasonably suspected a

  trespass. In reaching this conclusion, the district court identified three

  facts that a jury could find:

        1.    Mr. Bustillos had stayed on public property.

        2.    No signs had marked the walking path as private property.

        3.    No one had reported a trespass.

  Appellants’ App’x at 184–85. In addition, Mr. Bustillos asserts a fourth

  fact: that the area between the fence and the concrete barricade was an

  “obvious” walking path for pedestrians. Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 16. The

  issue for us is whether these four facts would demonstrate the violation of

  a clearly established constitutional right. See Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d

  1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2012). I would answer no because a reasonable

  police officer could have suspected Mr. Bustillos of trespassing.

        The reasonableness of this suspicion is a legal question that we

  review based on the facts that the district court identified. Id. Answering

  that legal question here involves two steps:

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        1.    Could a reasonable officer believe that the property between
              the fence and concrete barricade was privately owned?

        2.    Could a reasonable officer believe that Mr. Bustillos had
              entered that area?

  The answer is yes to both questions.

        1.    A reasonable officer could have believed that the pertinent
              area was privately owned.

        New Mexico defines trespass as “knowingly entering or remaining

  upon the unposted lands of another knowing that such consent to enter or

  remain is denied or withdrawn by the owner or occupant thereof.” N.M.

  Stat. Ann. § 30-14-1(B). A reasonable officer would have applied this

  definition of trespass to the information known, which consisted of the

  report from dispatch and the appearance of the scene.

        The refinery was surrounded by a fence. Between the refinery’s fence

  and the road was a concrete barricade. Although the area between the fence

  and barricade was actually public property, Officer Bailey believed that

  this area was privately owned.

        Though Officer Bailey was mistaken, he would enjoy qualified

  immunity if his mistake had been reasonable. See Stonecipher v. Valles,

  759 F.3d 1134, 1141–42 (10th Cir. 2014) (concluding that qualified

  immunity protects against liability for a reasonable mistake of fact). And

  Mr. Bustillos bore the burden of showing that Officer Bailey’s mistake had

  been unreasonable. See Deutsch v. Jordan, 618 F.3d 1093, 1099 (10th Cir.

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  2010) (stating that the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming a

  defendant’s claim of qualified immunity based on a reasonable mistake of

  fact).

           To determine whether Mr. Bustillos had satisfied this burden, we

  must consider what Officer Bailey would have seen. He would have seen

  an open space between the fence and the concrete barricade:

                                               Fence

                                               Property
                                                                        Barricade

  Appellants’ App’x at 146 (aerial view); id. at 57 (Mr. Bustillos’s

  livestream, at 11:24). This concrete barricade could have suggested a

  boundary between the perimeter of the refinery and public property.

  Although that wasn’t the case here, an officer could have reasonably

  regarded the concrete barricade as a boundary between the refinery and

  public property. So the district court’s universe of facts didn’t satisfy Mr.

  Bustillos’s burden to show that Officer Bailey’s mistake had been

  unreasonable.

           Mr. Bustillos asserts that this area was a clear pedestrian right of

  way. But Mr. Bustillos does not explain or support this assertion. See
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  Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 16 (stating that “the space between the fence line

  and concrete barriers is an obvious pedestrian right of way”). Despite the

  lack of explanation or support, the majority agrees with Mr. Bustillos,

  reasoning that the area appears suitable for pedestrians. Maj. Op. at 15–16

  n.9. But the majority doesn’t explain why the availability of a path for

  pedestrians would undermine an officer’s assumption that the area was

  privately owned. 3

        Even if conflicting inferences were possible, a reasonable officer

  could assume that the path belonged to the owner of the refinery. See, e.g.,

  p. 6, above (photograph from Mr. Bustillos’s livestream). Surely an officer

  wouldn’t need to check property records before concluding that a private

  entity owned the area inside the concrete barricade. See Kelley v. Myler,

  149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that officers had probable

  cause to arrest the plaintiff for trespass without checking official records);

  Bodzin v. City of Dallas, 768 F.2d 722, 724–25 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding

  that officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for trespass even

  though the plaintiff had been on a public right-of-way because probable

  cause didn’t require the officers to check property lines); see also Saldana

  3
        The majority points to the district court’s factual finding about the
  suitability for pedestrian traffic, concluding that this finding undermines
  Officer Bailey’s reason to regard the area as private. Maj. Op. at 15–16
  n.9. But Mr. Bustillos doesn’t make this argument; he instead argues only
  that a “pedestrian right of way” existed. Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 16.

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  v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159, 1164–65 (5th Cir. 1982). 4 So Mr. Bustillos hasn’t

  satisfied his burden to overcome Officer Bailey’s reliance on a reasonable

  mistake of fact as to ownership of the area inside the concrete barricade. 5

        2.    A reasonable officer could have believed that Mr. Bustillos
              had entered the area thought to be private.

        Officer Bailey could also have reasonably believed that Mr. Bustillos

  had walked between the fence and the concrete barricade.

        The dispatcher had told Officer Bailey that someone was spotted

  walking outside the fence. 6 Between the fence and the concrete barricade

  was a walking path:

  4
         The Garza court concluded that a police officer enjoyed qualified
  immunity for his mistaken belief that the plaintiff was standing outside his
  own property. 684 F.2d 1159, 1163–65 (5th Cir. 1982). Even if the
  plaintiff had stayed on his property, qualified immunity would prevent
  liability for the police officer’s mistake: “Certainly we cannot expect our
  police officers to carry surveying equipment and a Decennial Digest on
  patrol; they cannot be held to a title-searcher’s knowledge of metes and
  bounds . . . .” Id. at 1165.
  5
        Mr. Bustillos also points out that there were “no signs” warning
  against trespassing. Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 17. But the absence of signage
  does not require a reasonable officer to scuttle evidence suggesting that the
  area was privately owned.
  6
        The dispatcher told Officer Bailey:

        1.    “[T]he call was ‘in reference to a suspicious person’ at the
              Navajo refinery, that the reporting party was a security guard
              who was standing by, and that the guard reported the male
              subject was standing outside of the fence but filming in
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                   Fence

                                                    Barricade

  Appellants’ App’x at 57 (Mr. Bustillos’s livestream, at 11:11). Given the

  information that Mr. Bustillos was outside the fence and walking, a police

  officer could reasonably assume that Mr. Bustillos had used this walking

  path while filming the refinery.

        In fact, Mr. Bustillos didn’t deny walking between the fence and the

  concrete barricade. He instead insisted that he

             had stayed on public property and

             had known the boundaries of the refinery.

  After insisting that he had stayed on public property, Mr. Bustillos said

  that he didn’t need to provide identification “just for . . . walking on the

              towards the refinery yard.” Appellants’ App’x at 174 (quoting
              Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 11).

        2.    “The dispatcher then relayed to Bailey the suspect’s description
              and that the subject was on foot and that the guard reported that
              he was also filming employee’s vehicles.” Appellants’ App’x at
              174 (citing Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 12–
              13).

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  sidewalk.” Appellants’ App’x at 176. Officer Bailey could reasonably

  assume that Mr. Bustillos was referring to the area between the fence and

  the concrete barricade.

        Granted, it’s possible that Mr. Bustillos had stayed outside the

  concrete barricade, for there was also an area there for someone to walk.

  But a “determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out

  the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,

  277 (2002).

        Mr. Bustillos argues that

               no one accused him of trespass and

               there was no information that he walked between the concrete
                barricade and the fence.

  Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 16–17. But even if “it is more likely than not that

  [Mr. Bustillos was] not involved in any illegality,” Officer Bailey’s

  suspicion could still have been reasonable. United States v. McHugh, 639

  F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Albert, 579

  F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009)). Indeed, the required likelihood of

  criminal activity “falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of

  the evidence standard.” Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 923

  (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). We ask only whether

  the facts “warranted an officer of reasonable caution in believing the

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  action taken was appropriate.” Id. (quoting United States v. Winder, 557

  F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009)).

        Officer Bailey could see the walking path inside the concrete

  barricade and had been told that Mr. Bustillos was

             outside the fence,

             filming in toward the refinery, and

             walking.

  And Mr. Bustillos admitted that he had “walk[ed] on the sidewalk.”

  Appellants’ App’x at 176. Given the totality of circumstances, Officer

  Bailey could reasonably suspect that Mr. Bustillos had walked on the path

  between the fence and the concrete barricade.

        A similar issue arose in Grice v. McVeigh, 873 F.3d 162 (2d Cir.

  2017). There the court had to decide whether a police officer had a

  reasonable basis to suspect that someone had trespassed on train tracks.

  The police officer had been told that someone was “by the train tracks

  crossing.” Id. at 165. When the police officer arrived, he saw the plaintiff

  standing “approximately 12–15 feet from the tracks, next to a barricade.”

  Id. Even though the police officer never saw the plaintiff on the tracks, he

  was nearby and was photographing the trains. Id. at 165–66. This

  information sufficed for reasonable suspicion of trespass. Id. at 167.

        Grice is persuasive and equally applicable here. Like the plaintiff in

  Grice, Mr. Bustillos was near private property and was recording what was
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  taking place on that property. The plaintiff’s proximity to that property

  was enough for reasonable suspicion in Grice, and the same is true here.

        3.    The location of the arrest wouldn’t undermine the
              reasonableness of suspicion.

        The majority contends that the location of the eventual arrest

  undermines the reasonableness of Officer Bailey’s suspicion. For this

  contention, the majority cites the livestream footage, stating that Officer

  Bailey encountered Mr. Bustillos “nowhere near” the area considered to be

  private. Maj. Op. at 15 (citing Appellants’ App’x at 57 (Mr. Bustillos’s

  livestream, at 16:15–24:00)). Mr. Bustillos doesn’t make this argument.

  But even if we were to consider where the confrontation took place, the

  location could have suggested private ownership.

        Officer Bailey confronted Mr. Bustillos right in front of the

  refinery’s sign. See Appellants’ App’x at 57 (Mr. Bustillos’s livestream, at

  20:32). This is how the corner looked 7:

  7
        This image was obtained from Google Maps based on Mr. Bustillos’s
  livestream footage. See Appellants’ App’x at 57 (Mr. Bustillos’s
  livestream, at 20:32); see also Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1216 n.1
  (10th Cir. 2013) (taking judicial notice of an image from Google Maps).
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  The proximity to a private entity’s sign, only feet away from the entity’s

  parking lot, could suggest that Mr. Bustillos was standing on private

  property when he was approached by Officer Bailey. So the location of the

  arrest could reasonably reinforce Officer Bailey’s suspicion of trespass.

        4.    A reasonable officer could believe that the owner of the
              refinery hadn’t consented to Mr. Bustillos’s entry.

        Officer Bailey also had reason to believe that the owner of the

  refinery hadn’t consented to Mr. Bustillos’s entry onto the property. The

  New Mexico Supreme Court held that when land is unposted, “the

  knowledge element may [] be established through a sufficient quantity of

  direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Merhege, 394 P.3d 955, 958

  (N.M. 2017). For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that

  “jurors could have reasonably determined that [a three-foot high] wall

  communicated to members of the public that they did not have permission

  to enter the front yard . . . by any route other than the path to the front

  door.” Id. at 958–59.

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        Officer Bailey could reasonably draw a similar inference from the

  concrete barricade surrounding the refinery. This barricade suggested that

  the owner of the refinery was limiting entry to designated places. Officer

  Bailey saw not only the concrete barricade but also refinery employees

  waiting for the police. And Officer Bailey knew that a security guard for

  the refinery had reported Mr. Bustillos to dispatch. Together, this

  information created reasonable suspicion that the owner of the refinery

  hadn’t consented to Mr. Bustillos’s presence inside the concrete barricade.

        D.    Probable cause existed when Mr. Bustillos refused to
              identify himself.

        Officer Bailey also needed probable cause that Mr. Bustillos had

  concealed his identity. See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912,

  924 (10th Cir. 2015). Probable cause exists when the “facts and

  circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he or

  she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent

  person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an

  offense.” Id. at 925 (quoting York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205,

  1210 (10th Cir. 2008)).

        New Mexico law makes it a crime to “conceal[] one’s true name or

  identity . . . with intent to obstruct the due execution of the law or with

  intent to intimidate, hinder or interrupt any public officer or any other

  person in a legal performance of his duty.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-3. To

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  arrest a suspect for this crime, an officer needs reasonable suspicion of a

  predicate crime. Mocek, 813 F.3d at 922. Reasonable suspicion existed for

  trespass, and Mr. Bustillos declined to identify himself. So Officer Bailey

  had probable cause to believe that Mr. Bustillos had committed the crime

  of concealing his identity.

         With probable cause, Officer Bailey did not violate the Fourth

  Amendment by arresting Mr. Bustillos. So Officer Bailey is entitled to

  qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.

  III.   The district court erred in denying summary judgment to Officer
         Bailey on the First Amendment claim.

         Mr. Bustillos also asserted a First Amendment claim for retaliation

  based on the exercise of a protected right (refusing to identify himself).

  Officer Bailey moved for summary judgment on this claim, and the district

  court denied his motion. I would reverse this ruling.

         To prevail on this claim, Mr. Bustillos needed to show “(1) that []he

  was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) that a defendant’s

  action caused [him] to suffer an injury that would chill a person of

  ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that a

  defendant’s action was substantially motivated as a response to [his]

  exercise of [his] First Amendment speech rights.” A.M. v. Holmes, 830

  F.3d 1123, 1162 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904,

  925 (10th Cir. 2007)). Relief is generally available “[i]f an official takes

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  adverse action against someone based on that forbidden motive, and ‘non-

  retaliatory grounds are in fact insufficient to provoke the adverse

  consequences.’” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (quoting

  Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)).

        Liability exists only if the retaliatory motive caused the injury. Id.

  So “[t]he plaintiff . . . must . . . prove the absence of probable cause for

  the arrest.” Id. at 1724; see also Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.

  Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1227 (10th Cir. 2020) (concluding that the

  plaintiff’s “retaliatory-arrest claim must fail” when the “Deputy [] had

  probable cause to arrest [the plaintiff]”); Fenn v. City of Truth or

  Consequences, 983 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[W]here the adverse

  action takes the form of an arrest and subsequent prosecution, the plaintiff

  must show an absence of probable cause.”).

        Officer Bailey had probable cause to arrest Mr. Bustillos. See

  Part II(D), above. And “a retaliatory arrest claim fails” when the arresting

  officer had probable cause. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1725

  (2019). 8 So the district court erred in denying Officer Bailey’s motion for

  summary judgment on the First Amendment claim.

  8
        The Supreme Court explained that “[a]lthough probable cause should
  generally defeat a retaliatory arrest claim, a narrow qualification is
  warranted for circumstances where officers have probable cause to make
  arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.” Nieves v.
  Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). So “the no-probable-cause
  requirement should not apply when a plaintiff presents objective evidence
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  IV.   Conclusion

        I would reverse the denial of summary judgment on the claims

  involving the First and Fourth Amendments.

        On the claim involving the Fourth Amendment, Officer Bailey had

  (1) reasonable suspicion that Mr. Bustillos had committed trespass and

  (2) probable cause that Mr. Bustillos had concealed his identity. Because

  probable cause existed, Officer Bailey didn’t violate the Fourth

  Amendment by arresting Mr. Bustillos. So the district court should have

  granted summary judgment to Officer Bailey on the Fourth Amendment

  claim.

        The existence of probable cause also dooms Mr. Bustillos’s claim

  under the First Amendment. So the district court should also have granted

  Officer Bailey’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

  that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not
  engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.” Id. But
  Mr. Bustillos has not made this showing.

                                        17