Court Opinion

ID: 9925758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 21:14:11.784822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.457261
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Marriage of:
                                                  DIVISION ONE
 KATHY JO ROHRS,
                                                  No. 84708-2-I
                      Appellant,
                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
               and

 JOEL DAMON ROHRS,

                      Respondent.

       DWYER, J. — Kathy Rohrs appeals from an order of the superior court

confirming an arbitration award and correcting a qualified domestic relations

order (QDRO) previously entered by the court. On appeal, Kathy asserts that the

superior court erred by confirming the arbitration award because, she avers,

several statutory bases exist upon which the superior court should have vacated

the award. Kathy also asserts that the superior court erred by correcting its

QDRO because, she contends, the court did not have the authority to correct its

own judgment entry and did not follow certain civil rule and statutory

requirements in so doing. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                         I

       On January 12, 2021, Kathy filed a petition in the superior court seeking

the dissolution of her marriage to Joel. Twelve months later, in December 2021,

Kathy and Joel participated in private mediation with their respective legal

counsel and retired Judge Palmer Robinson. During the mediation, Kathy and
No. 84708-2-I/2

Joel reached an agreement as to the division of their marital property and

obligations. The parties’ agreement was initially memorialized in a writing

captioned as a “CR2A Stipulation and Agreement.” The initial writing reflected, in

pertinent part, the parties’ agreement that

        [Kathy][1] shall receive the following property: . . . [Joel’s] John
        Hancock 401(k) funds at the time the Decree is entered. No
        distributions or changes in investment will be made by [Joel] to this
        account until the QDRO is recognized by the Plan Administrator
        and the monies are segregated for [Kathy]).[2]
        ....
        [Joel] shall receive the following property: . . . [Joel’s] [Phantom
        Stock Appreciation Plan (PSAP)] with his employer[.] [Joel’s] Profit
        Sharing-Pooled Funds with his employer.

The writing reflected the parties’ agreement that Kathy was to receive a

segregation of monies from Joel’s John Hancock 401(k) funds—i.e., his

employee contributions to his 401(k) plan—and that Joel would retain the

remainder of the funds therein (his employer’s stock and profit-sharing

contributions thereto).

        The initial writing also reflected the parties’ intent that Judge Robinson act

as arbitrator in any disputes arising during the memorialization of their original

agreement:

        Any disputes in drafting or implementation of the final documents or
        as to omitted issues shall be submitted to [retired] Judge Palmer
        Robinson for binding arbitration. The parties agree that the
        arbitrator has authority to resolve disputes as to implementation of
        this Agreement, all authority of Judge Palmer Robinson to arbitrate
        terminates upon entry of the final documents unless otherwise
        agreed in writing.

        1 For clarity, we have replaced “Petitioner” or “Wife” with “Kathy” and replaced

“Respondent” or “Husband” with “Joel” in several of the writings at issue on appeal.
        2 As applicable here, a QDRO entered by a superior court is a legal instrument that would

create and recognize Kathy’s right to receive some portion of Joel’s retirement plan benefits.

                                               2
No. 84708-2-I/3

This provision reflected the parties’ agreement that Judge Robinson’s authority to

act as arbitrator would terminate when their final writings were entered as an

order of the superior court, unless the parties agreed otherwise in a later writing.

        Between December 2021 and March 2022, Kathy and Joel submitted

several disputes to Judge Robinson while attempting to reduce their agreement

to a subsequent writing.

        In late March 2022, Judge Robinson reviewed the parties’ subsequent

writing, captioned as a “Property Settlement Agreement,” and approved it as

consistent with their agreement.3 The Property Settlement Agreement

incorporated the terms and conditions of their CR 2A Stipulation and Agreement.

It set forth, in pertinent part, the parties’ agreement that

               [Kathy] shall be granted and conveyed the following
        property, free and clear of any right, title or interest of [Joel] therein:
               ....
               B. All interest (100%) in the assets held in the Andersen
        Construction 401(k) Plan (John Hancock account X4145) in [Joel’s]
        name as of the dater [sic] of the [CR 2A agreement], December 6,
        2021, including any gains and losses thereon on that amount, until
        transferred to [Kathy] by QDRO. . . .
               ....
               [Joel] shall be granted and conveyed the following property,
        free and clear of any right, title or interest of [Kathy] therein:
               ....
               C. All interest (100%) in the Andersen Construction Phantom
        Stock Appreciation Plan in [Joel’s] name.
               D. All interest (100%) in the Andersen Construction Profit
        Sharing Pooled Funds in [Joel’s] name.

Consistent with the initial writing, the division of Joel’s 401(k) fund contributions

in the parties’ subsequent writing mirrored their original agreement.

        3 Judge Robinson required Kathy to pay 80 percent—rather than 50 percent—of the

arbitration costs due to her intransigence during the arbitration.

                                                  3
No. 84708-2-I/4

       Their subsequent writing also contained a new arbitration provision:

               Any dispute or misunderstanding arising out of or in
       connection with this Agreement, its implementation and operation,
       or unresolved or omitted issues shall be resolved by binding
       arbitration as set forth below:
               There shall be a single arbitrator who shall be Judge (ret.)
       Palmer Robinson . . . . The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final
       and binding on the Parties pursuant to RCW 7.04(A).
               ....
               The Arbitrator shall have full authority to make an award in
       the form of injunctive or other equitable relief, as well as damages
       or other monetary awards, and any such award shall be fully
       enforceable by any court of competent jurisdiction.

The subsequent writing’s arbitration provision did not have an end date or a

condition terminating the arbitrator’s authority to act as arbitrator in disputes

arising from the memorialization of the parties’ agreement. This provision, in light

of the arbitration provision in the parties’ initial writing, reflected Kathy’s and

Joel’s written agreement that Judge Robinson’s authority to act as arbitrator

would continue even after the superior court entered the parties’ final writings as

an order of the court.

       In late March and early April 2022, Kathy and Joel submitted their

Property Settlement Agreement to the superior court, which the court signed and

entered as the court’s order. Shortly thereafter, Kathy drafted a QDRO.4 The

sixth paragraph, regarding the assets that Kathy was purportedly entitled to

receive, reads as follows:

       The portion of [Joel’s] Plan benefits payable to [Kathy] under this
       QDRO is 100% of assets credited to [Joel’s] account segregated as
       of the date December 6, 2021, [plus earnings and losses to the

       4 Although the parties’ initial writing provided that Joel’s counsel would draft the QDRO,

Kathy’s counsel drafted the QDRO instead.

                                                4
No. 84708-2-I/5

       date of distribution] to [Kathy]. The balance of the assets credited
       to [Joel’s] account shall remain [Joel’s].

(Fourth alteration in original.) The paragraph did not mirror the language of

Kathy’s and Joel’s earlier writings.

       On April 21, 2022, the superior court entered its judgment, signing its

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and its decree of dissolution. Each judgment

entry incorporated Kathy’s and Joel’s Property Settlement Agreement, itself a

memorialization of their original agreement.

       Five days later, on April 26, 2022, the superior court entered as an order

of the court the QDRO drafted by Kathy and signed by both parties. In doing so,

the superior court entrusted that the QDRO was in harmony with the court’s

decree and the Property Settlement Agreement incorporated therein.

       The following month, Joel was informed that the trustee plan administrator

for Joel’s employer’s benefits plan had reviewed the QDRO but that, as written,

the plan administrator could not process the QDRO for assignment of Joel’s

401(k) plan contributions to Kathy.5 Counsel for Joel’s employer suggested a

correction to paragraph 6 of the QDRO that would make clear that the funds to

be assigned to Kathy were only those funds that Joel himself had contributed to

his 401(k) account (along with any investment earnings or losses), rather than a

combination of both Joel’s contributions and his employer’s contributions. The

language proposed by his employer’s counsel reads as follows:

       “The portion of [Joel’s] Plan benefits awarded to [Kathy] under this
       QDRO is 100% of the amount credited to [Joel’s] Plan account

       5 Joel’s counsel promptly notified Kathy’s counsel of the trustee plan administrator’s

rejection of the QDRO.

                                                5
No. 84708-2-I/6

           attributable to elective employee contributions under the Plan’s
           cash or deferred arrangement, as of December 6, 2021, adjusted
           for any investment earnings or losses until the date of distribution to
           [Kathy]. The balance of the benefit credited to [Joel’s] Plan
           Account (i.e., amount attributable to employer-funded contributions)
           shall remain [Joel’s].”

           Thereafter, Joel drafted an amended QDRO containing the suggested

language. Its sixth paragraph reads as follows:

           The portion of [Joel’s] Plan benefits payable to [Kathy] under this
           QDRO is 100% of the amount credited to [Joel’s] Plan account
           attributable to elective employee contributions, as of the date
           December 6, 2021, adjusted for any investment earnings or losses
           until the date of distribution to [Kathy]. The balance of the assets
           credited to [Joel’s] account (i.e. employer-funded “Profit Sharing
           Trust” contributions) shall remain [Joel’s].

Joel sought to obtain Kathy’s signature on the amended QDRO. Kathy did not

sign it.

           In July 2022, Joel sent the draft amended QDRO to the trustee plan

administrator, and the plan administrator indicated that, as amended, it was able

to process the QDRO for assignment of Joel’s 401(k) plan contributions to Kathy.

Joel again sought to obtain Kathy’s signature on the amended QDRO. Kathy

again did not sign it.

           In August 2022, Joel submitted the dispute regarding the amended QDRO

to arbitration before Judge Robinson. Joel requested that Judge Robinson, as

the parties’ designated fact finder, review the amended QDRO to determine

whether it was consistent with their original agreement as he and Kathy had

memorialized in their earlier writings.6 Kathy’s counsel, in a letter, responded

           6 Joel’s counsel also requested an award of attorney fees and costs, due to Kathy’s

actions and her intransigence.

                                                  6
No. 84708-2-I/7

that (1) per the parties’ CR 2A Stipulation and Agreement, the arbitrator’s

authority to act as arbitrator had expired when the superior court entered its

dissolution decree, (2) Joel did not properly initiate a new arbitration proceeding,

and (3) the plan administrator for Joel’s employment benefits had breached a

fiduciary duty owed to Kathy.

       In late August 2022, Judge Robinson issued her arbitration award. Judge

Robinson determined that, upon review of the arbitration provisions in Kathy’s

and Joel’s earlier writings, she retained the authority to act as arbitrator in their

submitted dispute even after the superior court had entered its dissolution

decree. Judge Robinson also found that

       [b]oth the CR2A and the property settlement agreement provide
       that [Kathy] will get, among other things, 100% of the assets in the
       Andersen Construction 401(k) Plan (John Hancock account x4145)
       and that [Joel] will get 100% of the Andersen Construction Profit
       Sharing Pooled Funds and 100% of the Andersen Construction
       Phantom Stock Appreciation Plan (referred to as PSAP in the
       CR2A Agreement).

       The original QDRO provided, in paragraph 6, “The portion of
       [Joel’s] Plan benefits payable to [Kathy] under this QDRO is 100%
       of assets credited to [Joel’s] account segregated as of the date . . .”
       After the QDRO was entered, the plan administrator stated that
       they could not process the QDRO as currently written and
       suggested alternate language[.]

Judge Robinson quoted the correction to paragraph 6 suggested by counsel for

Joel’s employer and continued:

       [Joel] is asking for an order approving his proposed Amended
       QDRO to substitute that language in Paragraph 6. [Kathy’s]
       Objection and Response does not address the specifics of the
       proposed language or argue that the proposed language does not
       accurately reflect the agreement of the parties.

                                           7
No. 84708-2-I/8

        Rather, the Objection and Response challenges the authority of the
        undersigned to act. I have dealt with that argument. [Kathy] also
        argues that [Joel] did not properly initiate arbitration. However, this
        is not a new proceeding requiring service of process to obtain
        jurisdiction. The parties already agreed to arbitration as part of
        ongoing litigation. [Kathy] also challenges actions of the Plan
        Administrator. I agree that those arguments are outside my
        authority.

        Because none of the arguments raised by [Kathy] dispute that the
        proposed language accurately reflects the agreement of the parties
        in both the CR2A and the Property Settlement Agreement, I find it
        appropriate to award attorney’s fees to [Joel] in an amount to be
        determined on written motion, without oral argument.

Thus, the arbitrator determined that the substitute language in the amended

QDRO reflected the parties’ original agreement as provided in their initial and

subsequent writings. Joel requested that Kathy sign the amended QDRO

approved by the arbitrator, but she did not do so.7

        In October 2022, Joel filed a motion in the superior court requesting that

the court, without oral argument, confirm the arbitration award, enter the

amended QDRO, and grant him an award of attorney fees. Kathy’s counsel filed

a response, arguing that Kathy was not properly served with notice of the

initiation of an arbitration proceeding and that the superior court did not have

authority to amend the previously entered QDRO.8

        The superior court confirmed Judge Robinson’s arbitration award

approving the amended QDRO. Having thereby apprised itself that its previously

        7 Rather, Kathy’s counsel responded that he was never authorized by Kathy to represent

her in the amended QDRO dispute arbitration and that he was obligated to file a motion to vacate
the arbitration award.
         8 Kathy also requested that the superior court consolidate her response to Joel’s motion

with a motion to vacate the arbitration award that she had purportedly filed. The superior court
denied her request, finding that “while [Kathy’s response to Joel’s motion] states a Motion to
Vacate Arbitration Award has been filed and ask[s] the court to consolidate the two motions, a
review of the court docket indicates that no such motion has been filed.”

                                                8
No. 84708-2-I/9

entered QDRO was inconsistent with its judgment, the superior court entered

“the Amended QDRO separately in conformance with the arbitration award,”

thereby correcting the language of its previously entered QDRO with the

language of the amended QDRO.9

       Kathy now appeals.

                                              II

       Kathy asserts that the superior court erred by confirming the arbitration

award. This is so, she contends, because several statutory bases exist upon

which the superior court should have vacated the arbitration award. The arbitral

award should have been vacated, according to Kathy, because (1) the arbitrator

abused her arbitral powers by approving the amended QDRO, (2) the arbitration

notice provided to her attorney did not properly notify her of the arbitration

dispute, and (3) the arbitrator committed misconduct by not providing certain

procedural protections to her. We disagree.

       We recently set forth the standard of review of an arbitration decision:

               Under Washington law, “[c]ourts will review an arbitration
       decision only in certain limited circumstances, such as when an
       arbitrator has exceeded [their] legal authority.” Int’l Union of
       Operating Eng’rs v. Port of Seattle, 176 Wn.2d 712, 720, 295 P.3d
       736 (2013). “To do otherwise would call into question the finality of
       arbitration decisions and undermine alternative dispute resolution.”
       Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 176 Wn.2d at 720. Our review of an
       arbitrator’s award is “limited to the same standard applicable in the
       court which confirmed, vacated, modified, or corrected that award.”
       Salewski v. Pilchuck Veterinary Hosp., Inc., 189 Wn. App. 898, 903,
       359 P.3d 884 (2015). We review only whether one of the statutory
       grounds to vacate an award exists. Salewski, 189 Wn. App. at 903-

       9 The superior court also awarded to Joel attorney fees and costs for his motion based on

RCW 7.04A.250 and Kathy’s intransigence.

                                              9
No. 84708-2-I/10

        04. The party challenging the award bears the burden of showing
        such grounds exist. Cummings v. Budget Tank Removal & Env’t
        Servs., LLC, 163 Wn. App. 379, 388, 260 P.3d 220 (2011).

State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 84265-0-I, slip op. at 26 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 16,

2023), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/842650.pdf.

                                                 1

        Kathy first asserts that she is entitled to vacatur of the arbitration award

because Judge Robinson’s approval of the amended QDRO exceeded her

arbitral powers, contrary to RCW 7.04A.230(1)(d). We disagree.

        We recently discussed the “‘narrow [statutory] circumstances for vacatur

of an arbitral award’” in which the “‘arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers.’”

Am. Tobacco Co., slip op. at 26 (quoting RCW 7.04A.230(1)(d)). There, we

stated that, “[i]n considering a motion to vacate on this ground, we examine

whether there is an error of law ‘on the face of the award’ that goes to the

arbitrator’s decision.” Am. Tobacco Co., slip op. at 26 (emphasis added) (quoting

Salewski, 189 Wn. App. at 904). To be sure, “[u]nless the [arbitrator’s] award on

its face shows adoption of an erroneous rule or a mistake in applying the law, the

award will not be vacated or modified.” Harris v. Grange Ins. Ass’n, 73 Wn. App.

195, 198, 868 P.2d 201 (1994) (emphasis added) (citing N. State Constr. Co. v.

Banchero, 63 Wn.2d 245, 249-50, 386 P.2d 625 (1963)).10 Indeed, “[b]arring a

statutory basis for vacating an arbitration award, the general rule is that

‘[a]rbitrators, when acting under the broad authority granted them by both the

         10 “‘Limiting judicial review to the face of the award is a shorthand description for the

policy that courts should accord substantial finality to arbitrator decisions.’” Am. Tobacco. Co.,
slip op. at 26-27 (quoting Federated Servs. Ins. Co. v. Pers. Representative of Est. of Norberg,
101 Wn. App. 119, 123, 4 P.3d 844 (2000)).

                                                 10
No. 84708-2-I/11

agreement of the parties and the statutes, become the judges of both the law and

the facts.’” Am. Tobacco Co., slip op. at 27 (quoting Banchero, 63 Wn.2d at

249); see also Pegasus Constr. Corp. v. Turner Constr. Co., 84 Wn. App. 744,

749, 929 P.2d 1200 (1997) (citing Boyd v. Davis, 127 Wn.2d 256, 263, 897 P.2d

1239 (1995)). This is because “[a]rbitration’s desirable qualities would be heavily

diluted, if not expunged, if a trial court reviewing an arbitration award were

permitted to conduct a trial de novo.” Boyd, 127 Wn.2d at 263.

        Here, during arbitration, Judge Robinson reviewed the parties’ initial and

subsequent writings and found that Kathy did not dispute that the language of the

amended QDRO reflected the parties’ original agreement as memorialized in

their writings. Finding no meaningful dispute on the matter, Judge Robinson

therefore approved the amended QDRO as consistent with Kathy’s and Joel’s

original agreement.

        In so doing, the arbitrator did not exceed her powers. The parties had

contracted for Judge Robinson to act as fact finder in arbitration of any disputes

arising from their original agreement.11 Judge Robinson was acting pursuant to

that authority in reviewing their writings—the QDRO drafted by Kathy’s attorney

and the amended QDRO—for consistency with their original agreement and their

        11 Kathy asserts that the parties’ initial writing did not grant the arbitrator the authority to

act as arbitrator once final orders were entered by the court. However, Kathy does not contest—
or meaningfully dispute—that their subsequent writing granted the arbitrator authority to act as
arbitrator without limiting the arbitrator’s authority to when the court entered its final orders.
Therefore, Kathy’s and Joel’s writings reflected their intent that the arbitrator’s authority to act as
arbitrator would survive entry of final orders. See Berman v. Tierra Real Est. Grp., LLC, 23 Wn.
App. 2d 387, 394, 515 P.3d 1004 (2022) (Washington courts apply a “‘strong presumption in favor
of arbitrability,’” and “‘[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of coverage’” (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Peninsula Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Pub. Sch. Emps. of
Peninsula, 130 Wn.2d 401, 414, 924 P.2d 13 (1996))). Kathy’s assertion fails.

                                                   11
No. 84708-2-I/12

memorializations of those writings. By finding that there was not a meaningful

factual dispute regarding whether the amended QDRO reflected the parties’

original agreement, Judge Robinson acted squarely within her broad authority as

the parties’ designated arbitrator in approving the amended QDRO.

        Kathy nevertheless asserts that, because Judge Robinson approved the

amended QDRO after the superior court’s dissolution decree had been entered,

Judge Robinson’s approval constituted a modification of the QDRO and,

therefore, was a modification of the parties’ marital property division.

        This argument is without merit. When Joel submitted their dispute to

arbitration, he was not calling upon the arbitrator to make a legal determination.12

As discussed above, his request that the arbitrator approve the amended QDRO

was a request for a factual determination by the parties’ designated fact finder.

Because the arbitral decision challenged by Kathy was a factual determination,

not a legal determination, Kathy’s assertion does not implicate an arbitral error of

law subject to our review.13 See Am. Tobacco Co., slip op. at 26 (quoting

Salewski, 189 Wn. App. at 904). Kathy fails to establish that the arbitrator

exceeded her arbitral powers. Accordingly, we conclude that Kathy has not

         12 The record does not suggest that Joel was asking the arbitrator to reopen or modify the

QDRO entered by the superior court. Nor, for that matter, could the arbitrator do so. Indeed,
neither Kathy nor Joel contest that the authority to reopen and modify an order of the superior
court resides with the superior court, not with a private arbitrator.
         13 If Kathy is instead asserting that the arbitrator’s finding was erroneous, that assertion

fails as well. When parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration, the arbitrator becomes
the judge of law and facts. Am. Tobacco Co., slip op. at 27 (quoting Banchero, 63 Wn.2d at 249).
Once a dispute is covered by a parties’ arbitration agreement, barring a statutory basis for
vacatur, we do not second-guess the parties’ contracted-for agreements. Boyd, 127 Wn.2d at
263 (in reviewing an arbitration award, we do not “conduct a trial de novo”). Moreover, in
arbitration and before the superior court, Kathy did not meaningfully dispute whether the
amended QDRO reflected the parties’ original agreement. Thus, Kathy’s assertion fails.

                                                 12
No. 84708-2-I/13

established that Judge Robinson exceeded her powers by approving the

amended QDRO.14

                                                 2

        Kathy next asserts that she is entitled to vacatur of the arbitration award

because the arbitration in question was conducted without proper notice of the

initiation of an arbitration so as to substantially prejudice her rights. This is so,

Kathy contends, because when Joel notified her designated legal counsel,

Dennis McGlothin, of having submitted their amended QDRO dispute to

arbitration, he was no longer Kathy’s designated counsel in arbitration matters.

This contention is devoid of merit.

        The notice provision in the arbitration award vacatur statute sets forth that

        (1) [u]pon motion of a party to the arbitration proceeding, the court
        shall vacate an award if:
                 ...
                 (f) The arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the
        initiation of an arbitration as required in RCW 7.04A.090 so as to
        prejudice substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration
        proceeding.

RCW 7.04A.230.

          14 Kathy also asserts that she is entitled to relief pursuant to RCW 7.04A.230(1)(d)

because one of the arbitrator’s factual findings was that the plan administrator rejected Kathy’s
QDRO and, according to Kathy, the plan administrator’s rejection of Kathy’s QDRO violated the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), codified at 29 U.S.C., ch. 18. Kathy
here misses the mark. RCW 7.04A.230(1)(d) regards vacatur of an arbitration award due to an
arbitrator exceeding their arbitral powers. The plan administrator is not the arbitrator, and Kathy
provides no decisional authority in support of such a conflation.
          Additionally, Kathy vaguely asserts that a purportedly erroneous determination by the
plan administrator somehow deprived the superior court of its authority and subject matter
jurisdiction over confirmation of the arbitration award in this matter. However, Kathy provides no
relevant decisional authority in support of this far-reaching proposition. Accordingly, Kathy’s
assertions fail.

                                                13
No. 84708-2-I/14

       Here, during the amended QDRO arbitration, Kathy asserted, as she does

now on appeal, that she did not receive proper notice of the initiation of

arbitration because her designated counsel was not her designated counsel

when Joel submitted the dispute to arbitration. Judge Robinson rejected these

assertions, finding that “this is not a new proceeding requiring service of process

to obtain jurisdiction. The parties already agreed to arbitration as part of ongoing

litigation.” On appeal, Kathy urges us to determine that Joel’s letter to the

arbitrator, a copy of which he sent to Kathy’s counsel, did not properly notify her

of the initiation of arbitration.

       We have noted that, once a dispute can fairly be said to be covered by the

parties’ arbitration agreement, “‘any inquiry by the courts must end.’” Berman v.

Tierra Real Est. Grp., LLC, 23 Wn. App. 2d 387, 394, 515 P.3d 1004 (2022)

(quoting Heights at Issaquah Ridge, Owners Ass’n v. Burton Landscape Grp.,

Inc., 148 Wn. App. 400, 403, 200 P.3d 254 (2009)). Indeed, in Verbeek

Properties, LLC v. GreenCo Environmental, Inc., 159 Wn. App. 82, 246 P.3d 205

(2010), we stated that whether a party’s letter to another party to the arbitration

had

       properly initiated an arbitration was not a question for the trial court
       to decide. The Uniform Arbitration Act envisions a limited role for
       courts. Heights, 148 Wn. App. at 403. That role is to decide
       whether or not there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. . . .
       The act does set forth procedures for initiating arbitration in RCW
       7.04A.090. But the question of compliance with these procedures
       must be left to the arbitrator.

Verbeek Props., 159 Wn. App. at 87-88 (emphasis added). Thus, the factual

questions of whether Joel’s notice to Kathy complied with the notice procedures

                                          14
No. 84708-2-I/15

and of whether McGlothin was Kathy’s designated counsel at the time that Joel

sent notice to him must be left to the arbitrator. See Verbeek Props., 159 Wn.

App. at 87-88. It is clear that the arbitrator answered those questions in the

affirmative.

       In any event, the record clearly reflects that Kathy received proper notice

from Joel of the arbitration proceeding. It is axiomatic that “notice or knowledge

of an attorney, acquired during the time he or she is acting within the scope of his

or her employment, is imputed to the client.” 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law

§ 150 (citing Armstrong v. Ashley, 204 U.S. 272, 27 S. Ct. 270, 51 L. Ed. 482

(1907)). The relationship between a client and their attorney need not be

formalized in a written contract but, rather, may be implied from the parties’

conduct. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against McGlothlen, 99 Wn.2d 515, 522,

663 P.2d 1330 (1983) (citing 7 AM.JUR.2D Attorneys at Law § 118 (1980);

8 JAMES HENRY W IGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2303, at 584 (rev. 1961)).

       Here, Kathy does not contest that, both before and after McGlothin

received notice of Joel’s intent to submit the parties’ QDRO dispute to arbitration

in July 2022, she and McGlothin conducted themselves as if they were in an

attorney-client relationship. For instance, McGlothin was identified as Kathy’s

attorney in the filing of her divorce petition in January 2021, as well as in the

early stages of their litigation between January 2021 and December 2021.

Moreover, McGlothin had represented Kathy in mediation and in submitting the

CR 2A Stipulation and Agreement in December 2021, in the arbitration

proceedings between December 2021 and March 2022, in the entry of the

                                          15
No. 84708-2-I/16

Property Settlement Agreement in early April 2022, in the entry of the dissolution

decree in late April 2022, and in the drafting and entry of Kathy’s QDRO and the

sending of that QDRO to the plan administrator in late April 2022. Moreover,

after entry of the dissolution decree in late April 2022, McGlothin continued to

represent Kathy in matters relating to the QDRO, as evidenced by a June 2022

letter to the plan administrator inquiring on Kathy’s behalf as to the status of the

QDRO that had been submitted for implementation.

       Indeed, it was not until McGlothin was notified by letter of Joel’s intention

to submit their QDRO dispute to their designated arbitrator in July 2022 that

McGlothin communicated to Joel that he was no longer Kathy’s attorney of

record.15 Moreover, even after McGlothin represented to Joel’s counsel that he

was purportedly not representing Kathy in the arbitration, McGlothin continued to

respond to e-mail communications regarding the ongoing arbitration, responded

during arbitration to Joel’s submission of the amended QDRO dispute to Judge

Robinson, responded to Joel’s superior court motion to confirm the arbitration

award, filed appeals of both the superior court order confirming the award and

the court order denying his motion to vacate the court’s earlier order, and is now

representing Kathy on appeal before this court.

       Kathy’s assertion is without merit. McGlothin’s conduct at nearly all times

during these proceedings strongly implies that he and Kathy were acting toward

one another as if they were in an attorney-client relationship. Therefore, the

       15 Neither Kathy nor McGlothin contest that McGlothin received a copy of that letter.

                                              16
No. 84708-2-I/17

notice that McGlothin received of Joel’s submission of the amended QDRO

dispute to arbitration was fairly imputed to Kathy.16

        Kathy next asserts that she was substantially prejudiced by the purported

failure to receive proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration proceeding.

However, a party cannot be said to be prejudiced by having to do what they have

already legally obligated themselves to do. In re Marriage of Hunter, 52 Wn.

App. 265, 271, 758 P.2d 1019 (1988). As discussed herein, Judge Robinson’s

arbitration award did not result in a pecuniary change to Kathy’s rights or

obligations. Rather, Joel requested that Judge Robinson resolve a factual

dispute in her designated role as fact finder. And Judge Robinson did so,

approving the language of the amended QDRO as being consistent with their

original agreement. Thus, the outcome of the arbitration proceeding did not

result in prejudice to Kathy but, rather, resulted in her receipt of precisely that

which she had originally agreed to receive.

        Furthermore, the record reflects that, if Kathy had not received proper

notice, she was clearly not substantially prejudiced by the absence thereof.

Indeed, despite the purported absence of proper notice, Kathy—through her

designated legal counsel—managed to successfully respond to Joel’s letter

        16 Kathy also asserts that she did not receive proper notice because the provisions of

RCW 7.04A.090 were not met. The pertinent provision reads as follows: “A person initiates an
arbitration proceeding by giving notice in a record to the other parties to the agreement to
arbitrate in the agreed manner between the parties . . . . The notice must describe the nature of
the controversy and the remedy sought.” RCW 7.04A.090(1). Kathy does not argue or
meaningfully dispute that Joel’s arbitration letter constituted a record sent to her in the parties’
agreed manner, that McGlothin received the letter, and that Joel’s letter described the nature of
the controversy and the remedy that he sought from the arbitrator. Thus, Kathy’s assertion fails.

                                                 17
No. 84708-2-I/18

submitting their dispute to arbitration and the arbitrator addressed Kathy’s

arguments in setting forth her arbitration award.17

        Kathy fails to demonstrate that she did not receive proper notice of the

initiation of an arbitration proceeding so as to substantially prejudice her rights.

Accordingly, Kathy has not met her burden of establishing, pursuant to RCW

7.04A.230(1)(f), such a basis as a statutory ground for vacatur of the arbitration

award.18

                                                 3

        Kathy next asserts that the arbitration award should be vacated because

the arbitrator committed misconduct contrary to RCW 7.04A.230(1)(b)(iii) and

that such misconduct was prejudicial. This is so, Kathy contends, because the

arbitrator did not provide her with certain arbitration procedures set forth in RCW

7.04A.150(2)-(4). Again, we disagree.

        The pertinent misconduct provision reads as follows: “(1) Upon motion of a

party to the arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate an award if: . . . (b)

There was: . . . (iii) Misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to

          17 On appeal, Kathy does not provide any argument or theory that, had she received the

notification that she purportedly did not receive, she would have otherwise advanced in the
arbitration proceeding. In the absence of such an argument, Kathy appears to be asserting that
under RCW 7.04A.230(1)(f), in the event of an absence of notice, a party is per se substantially
prejudiced. However, this provision does not explicitly set forth such a standard, and Kathy does
not provide any argument or citation to legal authority in support of this proposition. RAP 10.3(a).
Therefore, her assertion fails.
          18 Kathy also relies on CR 5(b)(4) and subsection (6) and RCW 2.44.030 to bolster her

assertion that, because McGlothin was not her appointed representative during the amended
QDRO dispute arbitration, any notice served upon him could not be imputed to her. Once again,
Kathy’s claim fails. Kathy cannot successfully bolster an assertion that, as discussed herein, has
no merit. Her reliance on the above rules and statutory provision is unavailing.

                                                18
No. 84708-2-I/19

the arbitration proceeding.” RCW 7.04A.230. RCW 7.04A.150 reads, in

pertinent, part, as follows:

               (2) The arbitrator may decide a request for summary
       disposition of a claim or particular issue by agreement of all
       interested parties or upon request of one party to the arbitration
       proceeding if that party gives notice to all other parties to the
       arbitration proceeding and the other parties have a reasonable
       opportunity to respond.
               (3) The arbitrator shall set a time and place for a hearing and
       give notice of the hearing not less than five days before the
       hearing. Unless a party to the arbitration proceeding interposes an
       objection to lack of or insufficiency of notice not later than the
       commencement of the hearing, the party’s appearance at the
       hearing waives the objection. . . .
               (4) If an arbitrator orders a hearing under subsection (3) of
       this section, the parties to the arbitration proceeding are entitled to
       be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, and to
       cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.

       Here, the record reflects that Kathy participated in the amended QDRO

arbitration proceeding. She received notice of the proceeding and responded to

Joel’s submission of their amended QDRO dispute to arbitration. The record

does not reflect that Kathy objected to the arbitrator’s chosen procedures or

requested any additional procedures pursuant to RCW 7.04A.150. The

arbitrator’s subsequent award included resolution of Kathy’s arguments. The

arbitrator’s award was sent to each party.

       Kathy’s assertion lacks merit. Kathy does not contest on appeal that she

had the opportunity to participate in the proceeding, did participate in the

proceeding, did not object to the arbitrator’s mode of proceeding, and did not

request that the arbitrator provide any of the procedural protections set forth in

RCW 7.04A.150(2)-(4). Moreover, Kathy provides no analysis or decisional

                                         19
No. 84708-2-I/20

authority in support of her assertion that an absence of these procedural

protections constitutes arbitral misconduct.19 Additionally, Kathy does not

support her assertion of prejudice arising from the purported misconduct with any

argument, analysis, reference to the record, or decisional authority. Moreover,

as discussed herein, the result of the amended QDRO arbitration proceeding

was such that Kathy did not lose an interest in marital property to which she was

entitled.

         Thus, Kathy has demonstrated neither misconduct by the arbitrator nor

prejudice resulting from any such purported misconduct. Accordingly, Kathy has

not met her burden of establishing such a basis as a statutory ground for vacatur

of the arbitration award pursuant to RCW 7.04A.230(1)(b)(iii).

         As the party seeking to vacate an arbitration award on appeal, Kathy has

the burden of establishing the existence of a statutory ground for doing so. Kathy

does not carry her burden. Thus, Kathy does not establish the existence of a

statutory basis upon which the superior court should have vacated the arbitration

award. Accordingly, the superior court did not err by confirming the arbitration

award.

         19 A brief survey of relevant decisional authority does not support Kathy’s assertion of

arbitrator misconduct. Compare Kempf v. Puryear, 87 Wn. App. 390, 393, 942 P.2d 375 (1997)
(no arbitrator misconduct where arbitrator refused to hear certain evidence, refused cross-
examination, did not swear in witnesses, and had ex parte contact, where participant was able to
participate in the arbitration and did not object to the arbitrator’s conduct); Martin v. Hydraulic
Fishing Supply, Inc., 66 Wn. App. 370, 377, 832 P.2d 118 (1992) (no arbitrator misconduct where
arbitrator did not postpone hearing in the absence of any request that hearing be continued), with
Tombs v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 83 Wn.2d 157, 162, 516 P.2d 1028 (1973) (arbitrator misconduct
occurred when arbitrator denied participant any opportunity to participate in the arbitration);
Harris, 73 Wn. App. at 200 (arbitrator misconduct occurred when two out of three arbitrators
excluded third arbitrator from deliberations).

                                                 20
No. 84708-2-I/21

                                          III

       Kathy next asserts that the superior court erred by entering the amended

QDRO. This is so, she contends, because the court lacked the authority to enter

the amended QDRO. She bases this assertion on her claim that the court did not

properly notify her of the proceeding and her claim that the court did not follow

certain statutory requirements for modifying a judgment entry. We disagree in all

respects.

                                          A

       Kathy first asserts that the superior court erred by correcting its previously

entered QDRO with the language of the amended QDRO because, according to

Kathy, the court did not have authority to alter its previously entered QDRO. We

disagree.

       We review a superior court’s correction of clerical error under CR 60(a) for

abuse of discretion. See Presidential Ests. Apt. Assocs. v. Barrett, 129 Wn.2d

320, 325, 917 P.2d 100 (1996). We additionally review a superior court’s

application of its inherent power to amend and reform its judgment entry for

abuse of discretion. Litzell v. Hart, 96 Wash. 471, 477-78, 165 P. 393 (1917). A

superior court abuses its discretion if its exercise of discretion is manifestly

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In re

Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

                                          21
No. 84708-2-I/22

                                                 1

        Kathy’s assertion on appeal requires that we review the superior court’s

authority to correct its own judgment entries. On this topic, a well-respected

authority on civil rules in Washington once wrote the following:

               To be distinguished from the vacation or setting aside of a
        judgment is the correction of a judgment because of a clerical error.
        This involves the matter of amending the judgment to make it
        correspond to the facts and law as actually decided and applied. It
        has long been established in Washington that a court has inherent
        power to modify a judgment entry to make it conform to the
        judgment actually rendered.

Philip A. Trautman, Vacation and Correction of Judgments in Washington, 35

WASH. L. REV. 505 (1960) (citing Pappas v. Taylor, 138 Wash. 31, 244 P. 393

(1926); Fisher v. Jackson, 120 Wash. 107, 206 P. 929 (1922); Litzell, 96 Wash.

at 471; Shaughnessy v. Northland S.S. Co., 94 Wash. 325, 162 P. 546 (1917)).20

        The leading case in Washington, per Professor Trautman,

        is O’Bryan v. American Investment & Improvement Co.[, 50 Wash.
        371, 97 P. 241 (1908)]. A judgment was entered dismissing an
        action. Several months later a petition was filed to have the
        judgment corrected to read that the dismissal was without
        prejudice. An order to this effect had been entered in the minutes
        prior to the entry of the judgment. The supreme court reversed the

        20 In Bernard v. Abel, 156 F. 649 (9th Cir. 1907), the Ninth Circuit also recognized this

well-established power:
        This principle is distinctly stated in Matheson’s Adm’r v. Grant’s Adm’r, [43 U.S.
        263, 264,] 2 How. 263, 11 L. Ed. 261 [(1844)]. “It is a familiar doctrine,” said the
        Supreme Court in Insurance Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117, [5 Otto 117,] 24 L.[]Ed.
        395 [(1977)], “that courts always have jurisdiction over their records to make
        them conform to what was actually done at the time; and, whatever may have
        been the rule announced in some of the old cases, the modern doctrine is that
        some orders and amendments may be made at a subsequent term, and directed
        to be entered, and become of record, as of a former term.”
                 This power is one to make the record speak the truth. It is salutary, and
        enables courts to prevent injustice through mere mistake or inadvertence of the
        judge, or counsel, or the clerk.
Abel, 156 F. at 652.

                                                 22
No. 84708-2-I/23

        trial court’s denial of the requested relief and set forth the principle
        of inherent power, independent of any statute.

Trautman, supra, at 505 (footnote omitted). In O’Bryan, our Supreme Court

instructed that the superior court’s inherent power enables it “to so modify its

judgment entry as to make it conform to the judgment actually entered at any

time when to do so will not affect substantial rights of innocent third persons who

have acted on the faith of the entry.” 50 Wash. at 374. The court’s ability to

correct its judgment entries flows from the court’s “inherent power to make its

judgments conform to the truth.” State ex rel. N. Pac. Railway Co. v. Superior

Court for King County, 101 Wash. 144, 147, 172 P. 336 (1918); accord Huseby v.

Kilgore, 32 Wn.2d 179, 192, 201 P.2d 148 (1948); Penchos v. Ranta, 22 Wn.2d

198, 206, 155 P.2d 277 (1945); Callihan v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 10 Wn. App.

153, 156-57, 516 P.2d 1073 (1973). Therefore, “if the court directs a certain

judgment and another and different judgment is entered, this may be corrected.”

Trautman, supra, at 505 (citing McCaffrey v. Snapp, 95 Wash. 202, 207-08, 163

P. 406 (1917)).21 See, e.g., Gordon v. Hultin, 146 Wash. 61, 65, 261 P. 785

(1927) (“The record renders it apparent that it was a mere clerical error in the

drafting of the decree, which would have been corrected at that time had the

court’s attention been called to it by counsel.”); Litzell, 96 Wash. at 477-78

(where original decree was not decree actually rendered and intended to be

rendered by the court, court has inherent power to modify judgment entered to

        21 See also Bernard, 156 F. at 652-53 (noting that it is within the power of a court to

amend its record of a judgment at a subsequent term to prevent injustice through a mistake or
inadvertence of the judge or counsel or the clerk, as by correcting the wording of an order of
dismissal which by mistake did not conform to the motion on which it was based).

                                               23
No. 84708-2-I/24

make it conform to judgment actually rendered). In correcting its judgment entry,

the court may do so

      “on its own motion at any time. . . . If the court directs judgment for
      one party, and the clerk enters it for another, or if the court directs a
      certain judgment and another and different judgment is entered,
      doubtless the court can order its correction when the matter is
      brought to its attention; but the error must appear on the face of the
      record; the court cannot, in this manner, correct or modify a
      judgment entered in accordance with its directions.”

Huseby, 32 Wn.2d at 192 (quoting McCaffrey, 95 Wash. at 207-08).

      In addition to the superior court’s inherent power to correct its own

judgment, the superior court has been granted similar authority, as set forth in

CR 60(a). See Trautman, supra, at 506 (“This inherent power is now embodied

in Washington Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 60.”).

      The rule reads as follows:

      Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
      parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or
      omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own
      initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any,
      as the court orders.

CR 60(a) (emphasis added).

      It must be noted, however, that “[a] distinction exists between a clerical

error, which may be corrected under CR 60(a), and a judicial error, which may

not.” In re Marriage of Stern, 68 Wn. App. 922, 927, 846 P.2d 1387 (1993). Our

Supreme Court has instructed that,

              [i]n deciding whether an error is “judicial” or “clerical,” a
      reviewing court must ask itself whether the judgment, as amended,
      embodies the trial court’s intention, as expressed in the record at
      trial. Marchel v. Bunger, 13 Wn. App. 81, 84, 533 P.2d 406, review
      denied, 85 Wn.2d 1012 (1975). If the answer to that question is

                                         24
No. 84708-2-I/25

        yes, it logically follows that the error is clerical in that the amended
        judgment merely corrects language that did not correctly convey
        the intention of the court, or supplies language that was
        inadvertently omitted from the original judgment. If the answer to
        that question is no, however, the error is not clerical, and, therefore,
        must be judicial. Thus, even though a trial court has the power to
        enter a judgment that differs from its oral ruling, once it enters a
        written judgment, it cannot, under CR 60(a), go back, rethink the
        case, and enter an amended judgment that does not find support in
        the trial court record.

Presidential Ests. Apt. Assocs., 129 Wn.2d at 326; accord Wilson v. Henkle, 45

Wn. App. 162, 167, 724 P.2d 1069 (1986). Indeed,

        [w]hether a trial court intended that a judgment should have a
        certain result is a matter involving legal analysis and is beyond the
        scope of CR 60(a). The rule is limited to situations where there is a
        question whether a trial court intended to enter the judgment that
        was actually entered.

Presidential Ests. Apt. Assocs., 129 Wn.2d at 326 n.5.22

        We have reiterated that CR 60(a) provides that the court may, of its own

initiative, correct a clerical error at any time and without any notice to the affected

parties. Wilson, 45 Wn. App. at 167 (“CR 60(a) authorizes on the court’s own

motion the correction of clerical mistakes” (emphasis added) (citing Entranco

Eng’rs v. Envirodyne, Inc., 34 Wn. App. 503, 507, 662 P.2d 73 (1983); Krueger

Eng’g, Inc. v. Sessums, 26 Wn. App. 721, 723, 615 P.2d 502 (1980))); DeVogel

v. Padilla, 22 Wn. App. 2d 39, 56, 509 P.3d 832 (2022) (“CR 60(a) provides that

‘[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors

therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any

time’” (emphasis added)); Wilson, 45 Wn. App. at 167 (“Such corrections may be

        22 See, e.g., Barough v. Israel, 46 Wn.2d 327, 332-33, 281 P.2d 238 (1955) (concluding

that predecessor civil rule to CR 60(a) granted trial court authority to correct clerical mistake in
description of the real property awarded to a party in divorce decree).

                                                  25
No. 84708-2-I/26

made without notice to the parties affected” (citing Barough v. Israel, 46 Wn.2d

327, 333, 281 P.2d 238 (1955))); see also Trautman, supra, at 506. Accordingly,

as pertinent here, under CR 60(a), a clerical mistake or error in a court’s

recorded judgment may be corrected “by the court” “at any time” “of its own

initiative” “after such notice, if any, as the court orders.”23 (Emphasis added.)

        Here, the superior court’s judgment incorporated the parties’ marital

property division as awarded to them in arbitration—including the agreement that

Kathy would receive Joel’s contributions to his employer’s 401(k) plan and that

Joel would retain his employer’s contributions thereto. Thereafter, the court

entered the judgment record at issue—the QDRO drafted by Kathy’s lawyer—

unaware that the QDRO did not reflect the court’s judgment. “In this situation,

the court was a victim of a misplaced confidence in the attorney, and the decree

was not what [the court] intended to sign.” In re Estate of Kramer v. Nelson, 49

Wn.2d 829, 830-31, 307 P.2d 274 (1957).

        Later, when Joel asked the court to confirm the arbitration award and

enter the amended QDRO, the court became aware of the discrepancy between

its judgment and its QDRO. The court then reviewed the arbitration award,

confirmed the award, and corrected its QDRO.

        23 We interpret the word “any,” as set forth in CR 60(a) broadly.See Thomas Ctr.
Owners Ass’n v. Robert E. Thomas Tr., 20 Wn. App. 2d 690, 703, 501 P.3d 608, review denied,
199 Wn.2d 1014 (2022) (“In plain English, ‘any and all’ means any and all.”); Newport Yacht
Basin Ass’n of Condo. Owners v. Supreme Nw., Inc., 168 Wn. App. 86, 101, 285 P.3d 70 (2012)
(“We have previously determined that the phrase ‘any and all claims’ is to be given its ordinary
meaning.” (citing MacLean Townhomes, LLC v. Am. 1st Roofing & Builders, Inc., 133 Wn. App.
828, 831, 138 P.3d 155 (2006))). Thus, in CR 60(a), “any” means any.

                                                26
No. 84708-2-I/27

                                                 2

        In correcting a clerical mistake in its QDRO, the court appeared to rely on

its authority under CR 60(a) or under its inherent power. Regardless of the

approach elected by the court, it plainly had the authority to do so.

        If the superior court relied upon its CR 60(a) authority to correct its QDRO,

then the superior court did not err.

        In entering the amended QDRO, the court had authority under CR 60(a) to

correct a clerical error in its previously entered QDRO when that error resulted in

a writing that was inconsistent with its judgment. As discussed herein, the

judgment of the court in this matter had, in essence, incorporated the party’s

original arbitration award.24 It was therefore the court’s plain intention that its

division of the parties’ marital property reflect the marital property division

agreement arising out of their arbitration. However, the court later entered

Kathy’s proposed QDRO, an order that, unbeknownst to the court at the time,

purported to divide the parties’ marital property in a manner inconsistent with

their original agreement.25 When this issue was brought to the court’s attention—

after the parties’ arbitrator had approved the amended QDRO as being

consistent with their original agreement and after the court had confirmed the

arbitration award—the court entered the amended QDRO to correct the

        24 The parties’ arbitration resulted in an agreement regarding their marital property

division. Their agreement was later memorialized in their initial and subsequent writings, which
were incorporated as part of the court’s judgment. The court’s incorporation of the parties’
writings was recorded in the court’s dissolution decree.
         25 Indeed, had this issue been brought to the court’s attention by Joel’s counsel at the

time of entry of Kathy’s QDRO, the court might well have instructed the parties to take the factual
dispute to their arbitrator to address it.

                                                27
No. 84708-2-I/28

unintended mistake set forth in its previously entered QDRO. See Presidential

Ests. Apt. Assocs., 129 Wn.2d at 326 n.5. This was plainly not an attempted

modification of judicial error but, rather, a correction of a clerical mistake.26

        Given that the superior court was correcting a clerical error in its own

judgment record, the court had the authority under CR 60(a) to do so on its own

initiative, at any time, and without any notice to an affected party. Therefore,

under CR 60(a), the court had the authority to correct its QDRO, one of its

judgment entries, and to do so in reliance on its own initiative and timing, and

without needing to provide notice thereof to the parties.27 Thus, had the court,

under its CR (60)(a) authority, corrected the QDRO by substituting the previously

entered QDRO for the amended QDRO, the superior court would not have

abused its discretion in so doing.

        If the superior court relied on its inherent power to correct its QDRO, then

the court also did not err. As set forth herein, it is well-established that the

superior court has inherent power “to so modify its judgment entry as to make it

conform to the judgment actually entered at any time when to do so will not affect

substantial rights of innocent third persons who have acted on the faith of the

entry.” O’Bryan, 50 Wash. at 374; accord Huseby, 32 Wn.2d at 192; Penchos,

        26 Even if we were to conclude that the court’s change was not clerical in nature, we

would nevertheless conclude that the superior court did not err. As we stated in DeVogel v.
Padilla, “even if we agree that the court’s amendment was not clerical, it corrects an ‘error[ ] . . .
arising from oversight or omission,’ which is permitted under CR 60(a). Therefore, the court did
not err under CR 60 by amending the order.” 22 Wn. App. 2d at 57 (alteration in original). Thus,
even if this error was not a clerical change under CR 60(a), the court’s entry of the amended
QDRO plainly corrected an error arising from oversight or omission in one of its recorded
judgments, which CR 60(a) permits.
         27 Nevertheless, as discussed below, the court provided the parties with appropriate due

process protections during this proceeding.

                                                 28
No. 84708-2-I/29

22 Wn.2d at 206; Gordon, 146 Wash. at 65; Pappas, 138 Wash. at 33; Fisher,

120 Wash. at 109; Superior Court for King County, 101 Wash. at 147; Litzell, 96

Wash. at 477-78; McCaffrey, 95 Wash. at 207-08; Shaughnessy, 94 Wash. at

337-38; Callihan, 10 Wn. App. at 156-57. This inherent power permits the court

to correct an error in its judgment record on its own motion at any time and

without notice to the affected parties. See, e.g., Huseby, 32 Wn.2d at 192;

Gordon, 146 Wash. at 65. See also Trautman, supra, at 505-06.

        As analyzed herein, the superior court initiated a correction of its QDRO

so as to make it conform with the judgment it actually rendered regarding the

parties’ marital property division. Moreover, the record does not reflect that the

court’s initiative affected any substantial rights of innocent third parties who acted

on the faith of the QDRO’s entry by the superior court. Indeed, the previously

entered QDRO in question was never effectuated due to the rejection of the

QDRO authored by Kathy’s attorney by the plan administrator. Thus, had the

court, in reliance on its inherent power, corrected its QDRO by replacing Kathy’s

proposed QDRO with the amended QDRO, it would not have abused its

discretion in so doing.

        Accordingly, the superior court did not err by correcting the amended

QDRO, its judgment record, under either CR 60(a) or its inherent authority. 28

        28 Kathy relies on In re Marriage of Knutson, 114 Wn. App. 866, 60 P.3d 681 (2003), for

the proposition that, because a QDRO is a final order, the superior court did not have authority to
amend or otherwise modify the QDRO. Kathy is mistaken. Knutson involved a superior court
vacating a QDRO and modifying a dissolution decree under CR 60(b) on the basis that, after
entry of its decree, the economy had changed, rendering the parties’ original agreement unfair.
Knutson does not support Kathy’s assertion. Here, the superior court neither vacated a QDRO
nor amended the dissolution decree under CR 60(b), nor relied on factual findings that did not

                                                29
No. 84708-2-I/30

                                                  B

        Kathy next asserts that the superior court erred by not providing her notice

of a correction to the QDRO. We disagree.

        As discussed herein, it is well established that the court, under its inherent

power or under CR 60(a), need not provide notice to affected parties of a

correction to its own record. CR 60(a); Barough, 46 Wn.2d at 332-33; Huseby,

32 Wn.2d at 192; Gordon, 146 Wash. at 65; Wilson, 45 Wn. App. at 167;

Entranco Eng’rs, 34 Wn. App. at 507; Krueger Eng’g, Inc., 26 Wn. App. at 723;

DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 56; see also Trautman, supra, at 506. Because the

superior court was merely correcting a mistake in its judgment record, no notice

to any affected party—including Kathy—was required.

        Kathy nevertheless contends that she should prevail on appeal because

she did not receive proper notice of the court’s proceeding to correct its

previously entered QDRO, contrary to CR 60(e). Because Kathy received

form part of the court’s original judgment. Rather, the superior court corrected the QDRO
pursuant to CR 60(a) and its inherent authority, which it could do at any time, on its own initiative.
         In taking this initiative, the superior court could rely on its implied powers to do so:
         When no proceeding is prescribed, a court may draw from its implied
         powers . . . :
                   “When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution of this state, or by
                   statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means to
                   carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of the
                   jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding is not specifically pointed
                   out by statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may
                   be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of
                   the laws.”
In re Marriage of Cox, 20 Wn. App. 2d 594, 598-99, 501 P.3d 155 (2021) (quoting RCW
2.28.150), review denied, 199 Wn.2d 1013 (2022). We have held that RCW 2.28.150 “is
sufficiently broad to supply any deficiency of procedure which has been omitted in the primary
grant of jurisdiction.” State ex rel. McCool v. Small Claims Court of Jefferson County Dist. Court,
12 Wn. App. 799, 801, 532 P.2d 1191 (1975) (citing State ex rel. McAvoy v. Gilliam, 60 Wash.
420, 111 P. 401 (1910)). The court’s process, discussed herein, appears to us most conformable
to the spirit of the law. Cox, 20 Wn. App. 2d at 598.

                                                 30
No. 84708-2-I/31

minimum due process protections in the proceeding and the court’s correction of

its judgment entry was not a vacation of a judgment, we disagree.

       By its terms, CR 60(e) applies only to a proceeding to vacate a judgment.

Such a request is governed by CR 60(b). CR 60(e) does not apply. Kathy’s

contention to the contrary is unpersuasive.

       In addition, although no notice was required to act to correct its judgment

entry, here, in fact, the notice provided met the minimum requirements of due

process. In re Marriage of Campbell, 37 Wn. App. 840, 843, 683 P.2d 604

(1984). As a result of Joel’s motion and briefing filed before the superior court,

both parties were aware of the subject matter and purpose of the proceeding and

of the dispute in question—that the proceeding regarded the court’s previously

entered QDRO and that Joel sought the entry of a QDRO that was consistent

with the parties’ original agreement as incorporated into the court’s judgment.

Both parties had the opportunity to participate, in the form of briefing and a

response thereto—and both parties did participate by filing such submissions.

       Thus, the superior court, acting either under its inherent power or under

CR 60(a), although not required to provide notice to Kathy of its initiative

correcting its own judgment record, nevertheless provided the parties with

minimum due process protections during the proceeding.

       Accordingly, the superior court did not err.

                                          C

       Kathy next asserts that the superior court did not comply with the mandate

of RCW 26.09.170(1). This is so, Kathy contends, because the court modified

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the provisions of the parties’ property disposition without finding the existence of

conditions that justified doing so under the laws of this state. We disagree.

       RCW 26.09.170(1) sets forth, in pertinent part, that “[t]he provisions as to

property disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the

existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of

this state.” Contrary to Kathy’s assertion, this provision is inapplicable here.

       As discussed herein, the court did not substantially modify the parties’

property division but, rather, corrected a clerical error in its own judgment record

so that it correctly conveyed the court’s intention. The court’s correction of its

judgment record did not change the parties’ original marital property division

agreement as incorporated into the court’s judgment.

       Regardless, under a broad reading of the statute—in which reopening of a

judgment is read to include correction of a court’s judgment entry—the superior

court found the existence of conditions that justified modifying—i.e., correcting—

the judgment record under the laws of this state. In confirming the arbitration

award, the superior court became apprised of an inconsistency between its

judgment and its judgment entry, the previously entered QDRO. The superior

court found that its QDRO did not align with its original intent but that the

amended QDRO did. Having made such findings, the court entered the

amended QDRO, in reliance on either CR 60(a) or its inherent powers. By

becoming aware of the inconsistency in its judgment record upon confirming the

arbitration award, the court apprised itself of the conditions necessary to correct

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its own judgment. The superior court did not err in so doing.29 Thus, the superior

court did not contravene RCW 26.09.170(1).

        Accordingly, the superior court did not err by correcting the previously

entered QDRO by entering the amended QDRO.

                                                  IV

        On appeal, Joel requests an award of attorney fees because he is “a

prevailing party to a contested judicial proceeding.” RAP 18.1(a). Kathy also

requests such an award, in the event that she prevails on appeal. The parties

therefore appear to agree that the prevailing party on this appeal is entitled to an

award of attorney fees. Because Joel is the prevailing party in this instance, we

grant Joel an award of reasonable attorney fees.30

          29 Furthermore, even if the court had erred, any error would have been harmless. As

discussed herein, Joel did not seek a change to his and Kathy’s original property agreement and
the relief granted by the court did not result in any pecuniary loss to Kathy. See In re Marriage of
Irwin, 64 Wn. App. 38, 64, 822 P.2d 797 (1992) (holding that, despite trial court’s error in granting
relief to modify a divorce decree under CR 60(b)(11), any error under RCW 26.09.170(1) was
harmless because the relief sought was not “a change in the property award itself” and the relief
granted “did not result in any pecuniary loss” to the other party). Thus, if any error had occurred,
it would have been harmless.
          Kathy also relies on In re Marriage of Thompson, 97 Wn. App. 873, 988 P.2d 499 (1999),
to support her proposition that the superior court improperly modified the parties’ marital property
division, contrary to RCW 26.09.170(1). Kathy’s reliance is unavailing. Unlike the court in
Thompson, which issued a postdecree enforcement order that had substantially altered the
parties’ marital property division, the superior court herein merely corrected a judgment entry so
that it reflected Kathy’s and Joel’s original marital property division as incorporated into the court’s
judgment. Kathy’s assertion fails.
          30 Kathy also assigns error to the following: the trial court’s grant of attorney fees and

costs to Joel pursuant to RCW 7.04A.250(3), the trial court’s finding that she was intransigent, the
trial court’s finding that she did not file a motion to vacate the arbitration award, the trial court’s
establishment of personal jurisdiction over her when it confirmed the arbitration award, and the
arbitrator’s issuance of attorney fees to Joel. Kathy does not support these assignments of error
with adequate analysis, argument, authority, or references to the record. Accordingly, we do not
consider them. RAP 10.3(a)(4), (6); State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 320-21, 893 P.2d 629
(1995)).
          Additionally, consolidated with this appeal is Kathy’s appeal from the superior court’s
order denying her motion to vacate the court’s order, discussed herein, confirming the arbitration
award and entering the amended QDRO. On appeal, she asserts several assignments of error
pertaining to the superior court’s denial of her motion to vacate that order. However, apart from
identifying these assignments of error, her briefing provides no analysis, argument, authority, or

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No. 84708-2-I/34

                                               V

        Two pending motions filed by Kathy remain for our consideration.

        First, we address Kathy’s motion for a continuance to file a reply brief, her

third such motion. We previously granted Kathy’s three motions for a

continuance to file her opening brief, despite these motions occurring on the day

that her brief was due. Kathy was later notified that her reply brief was due on

September 27, 2023 and that this matter was set for oral argument on November

15, 2023. On September 26, the day before her reply brief was due, Kathy

submitted a motion for an extension of the time to file a reply brief and requested

a 30-day extension—until October 27. A commissioner of the court granted this

request. However, on October 27, Kathy did not file a reply brief. Instead, she

filed her second request for an extension of time to file her reply brief. Three

days later, a commissioner of this court denied Kathy’s request, ruling that

Kathy’s

        [r]eply brief remains overdue, originally due September 27, 2023,
        despite an extension granted to October 27, 2023. On October 27,
        2023, appellant’s counsel filed a motion to accept late filing of reply
        brief, stating counsel “will be able to file Reply Brief today.” As of
        this ruling (October 30, 2023), a reply brief has not been filed. Oral
        argument has been scheduled for November 15, 2023.
                At this time, the motion to accept late filing of reply brief is
        denied. This case will be considered without a reply brief.

references to the record to support the existence of these purported errors. Thus, she has not
adequately supported these assignments of error. Accordingly, we do not consider them. RAP
10.3(a)(4), (6).

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        Kathy did not file a motion to modify the commissioner’s order. Instead,

on that same day, she filed another motion seeking an extension of time to file a

reply brief—her third such motion. She subsequently filed a proposed reply brief.

        We deny Kathy’s motions. This matter has been considered without a

reply brief.31

        We next address Kathy’s November 16, 2023 motion, captioned as a

“Motion to Accept Supplemental Brief to Address Panel Questions at Oral

Argument.” Kathy predicates this motion on RAP 10.1(h), which provides that

“[t]he appellate court may in a particular case, on its own motion or on motion of

a party, authorize or direct the filing of briefs on the merits other than those listed

in this rule.” Kathy’s motion is denied. We have reviewed her motion to file a

supplemental brief. We decline to authorize such a filing.

        Affirmed.

         31 We have nevertheless noted Kathy’s mention of a recent decision from this court, In re

Marriage of Gudnason, No. 83845-8-I (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2023) (unpublished)
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/838458.pdf. In this way, we regard Kathy’s proposed
submission as a statement of additional authorities, which we have considered without argument.
RAP 10.8. We have considered Gudnason as part of our decision in this matter.

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WE CONCUR:

                   36