Court Opinion

ID: 9698165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:43:53.732505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:39.026275
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would adopt the rationale set forth in the opinion of the learned Commonwealth Court. In addition, I write separately to emphasize my concern that the majority posits its conclusion upon a factual basis that is dehors the record. The majority, in direct contradiction to *199the position of the parties and the lower courts herein, concludes that a public utility is “a private entity subject to extensive regulation; it is not a public entity.” (Maj. opinion p. 196). Not only is this premise dehors the record and thus an improper basis for this Court’s opinion, but more importantly, Appellant does not argue that a public utility is a private enterprise. In fact, Appellant admits that his case also presents the “same private enterprise versus public enterprise question” as was seen in Kavanagh v. London Grove Township, 486 Pa. 133, 404 A.2d 393 (1979) (Appellant’s Brief at p. 18). The majority turns this zoning case upon an issue which was not presented by the parties and upon which there appears to be no evidence within the record from which a rational conclusion can be reached.1 This Court, in reviewing a zoning case where the trial court has taken additional evidence (as the trial court did here), is limited to determining whether the lower court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Appeal of Bilotta, 440 Pa. 105, 107, 270 A.2d 619, 620 (1970). Making a determination based on that which is dehors the record violates this standard.
In addition, the uncontroverted testimony of record concerning various safety hazards and disturbances such as “gas emerging from a hole, fire, explosion and noises” (Maj. op. p. 196) cannot be dismissed summarily by an appellate court by means of a sweeping general statement, unsupported by the record, that “these hazards and disturbances, by and large, are associated with drilling a well rather than its subsequent operation; gas production is not a noisy or unduly hazardous operation.” (Slip op. p. 5; emphasis mine.) In fact, on this record, the Commonwealth Court relied heavily upon the testimony of Appellant’s own expert witness with regard to the issue of “hazards and disturbances.” The expert, Mr. Weiss, testified that “[w]hen you are operating a well its (sic) in danger. Many of rigs has (sic) been burned up.” Reproduced record at 18a (emphasis mine). Furthermore, Appel*200lant’s expert, in response to questions about what precautions may be taken against fire hazards, testified that “I do not know what precautions in the oil and gas business you can take against a sudden blowout.” Reproduced récord at 19a-20a. The majority’s disregard of this testimony, given our limited standard of review, is striking.
Since I find more than adequate uncontradicted evidence of record to support the conclusions of both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court, I respectfully dissent.
NIX, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. I would encourage the majority to refrain from reaching a sweeping conclusion as to the classification of public utilities in a case where none of the parties is a public utility.