Court Opinion

ID: 9767326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:16:44.522099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:30.586394
License: Public Domain

FISHER, Associate Judge,
with whom WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, and GLICKMAN and OBERLY, Associate Judges, join, dissenting:
This appeal is about legislative authority — that vested in the Council of the District of Columbia and that granted to the voters at large. In 1978, five years after the Home Rule Act transformed governance in the District of Columbia, the Council, the voters, and the Congress of the United States, acting in collaboration, amended the District Charter (Title IV of the Home Rule Act) for the first time, creating the right of initiative so that the voters themselves could propose and approve legislation.1
*121The following year, the Council enacted implementing legislation known as the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Procedures Act of 1979 (the “IPA”). In addition to establishing procedures for submitting, processing, and voting on an initiative petition, the IPA placed a limit on the subject matter that could be addressed by an initiative. The Council instructed the Board of Elections and Ethics not to accept a measure if it “authorizes, or would have the effect of authorizing, discrimination prohibited under” the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. This subject matter limitation on the right of initiative is not found in the Charter, which created that right, or in the more comprehensive Home Rule Act, which places certain limits on the legislative power of the District.
In 2009, appellants2 proposed that the voters exercise their right of initiative and declare that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in the District of Columbia.” The Board refused to accept the measure, holding that the proposal was not a “proper subject of initiative” because it would authorize, or have the effect of authorizing, discrimination prohibited by the Human Rights Act. This court must decide, as a matter of first impression, whether the IPA’s “Human Rights Act limitation” is a valid restriction on the right of initiative. For the reasons which follow, we would hold that it is not.
Had our view prevailed, we would not have reached the question whether the Board properly refused to accept the proposed initiative. In light of the majority’s holding, however, and in light of recent legislation recognizing and authorizing same-sex marriages in the District of Columbia, we agree with the majority’s conclusion that the proposed initiative would authorize, or have the effect of authorizing, discrimination prohibited by the Human Rights Act, as amended in 2002.
I. The Factual and Procedural Background
On two occasions (in 2009 and 2010), appellant Jackson and others presented referendum3 petitions to the Board, seeking to suspend two acts of the Council relating to same-sex marriage, but their efforts were unsuccessful. The Board rejected the proposed referenda, citing the Human Rights Act (“HRA”), litigation ensued, and the acts became law.4 “No act is subject to referendum if it has become law according to the provisions of § 1-204.04 [after a period of congressional review].” D.C.Code § l-204.102(b)(2) (2006).
The Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of 2009, which became law on July 7, 2009, *122provides that the District of Columbia will recognize “[a] marriage legally entered into in another jurisdiction between 2 persons of the same sex....” D.C.Code § 46-405.01 (2010 Supp.). On March 3, 2010, the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009 became law. It allows couples of the same sex to marry in the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 46-101 (2010 Supp.).
Meanwhile, on September 1, 2009, appellants submitted the Marriage Initiative of 2009. The Board refused to accept the initiative, reasoning that, “[i]f passed, [it] would, in contravention of the HRA, strip same-sex couples of the rights and responsibilities of marriages currently recognized in the District.... Because the Initiative would authorize discrimination prohibited by the HRA, it is not a proper subject for initiative, and may not be accepted by the Board.” Appellants petitioned for review by the Superior Court, and for a writ of mandamus. The trial court allowed the District of Columbia to intervene and later granted summary judgment to the Board and the District. This appeal followed.5
II. The “Constitutional” Framework
The Constitution of the United States of America vests in Congress the power to legislate for the District of Columbia “in all Cases whatsoever.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 17. However, in 1973 Congress enacted the District of Columbia Self Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub.L. 93-198, 87 Stat. 777 (1973) (codified at D.C.Code §§ 1-201.01 — 1-207.71), popularly known as the Home Rule Act. Through this transforming legislation, Congress delegated some, but not all, of its legislative power over this jurisdiction to the Council of the District of Columbia while retaining ultimate legislative authority over the District. See D.C.Code §§ 1-204.04, 1-206.01; see also District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Central Labor Council, AFL-CIO, 442 A.2d 110, 113-14 (D.C.1982) (discussing Congress’s delegation of legislative power). Congress intended, among other things, to “grant to the inhabitants of the District of Columbia powers of local self-government ... and, to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the constitutional mandate, relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essentially local District matters.” D.C.Code § 1-201.02 (2006).
Nevertheless, the Home Rule Act contains several limitations on the legislative power of the District.6 For example, the Council has no authority to “[ijmpose any tax on property of the United States,” to enact a “commuter tax” on the income of persons who do not reside in the District, to alter the organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts, or to “amend or repeal any Act of Congress ... *123which is not restricted in its application exclusively in or to the District[.]” D.C.Code § 1 — 206.02(a)(1), (3), (5), (8) (2006); see also D.C.Code § 1-206.03 (restrictions related to the budget process).
The Home Rule Act is now found in Chapter 2 of Title 1 of the D.C.Code, and Subchapter IV of Chapter 2, the District Charter, “establish[es] the means of governance of the District....” D.C.Code § 1-203.01. As we have noted, see supra note 6, legislation passed by the Council (or by initiative) must be “consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this chapter [the Home Rule Act],...” D.C.Code § 1-203.02. The Home Rule Act and the District Charter thus serve as a constitution for the District. See Convention Center III, 441 A.2d at 903 (plurality opinion) (legislation enacted by the Council must “be consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Home Rule Act”); id. at 930 (dissenting opinion) (“it is beyond serious dispute that legislation may not amend a constitution (the Charter)”); District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., 415 A.2d 1349, 1367 (D.C.1980) (en banc) (concurring opinion) (referring to the Home Rule Act as “the ‘constitutional’ analog”).
The Home Rule Act includes a process for amending the Charter which requires collaboration among the Council, the voters of the District of Columbia, and Congress. With certain exceptions not relevant here, the Charter “may be amended by an act passed by the Council and ratified by a majority of the registered qualified electors of the District voting in the referendum held for such ratification.” D.C.Code § l-203.03(a). At the time of the Charter Amendments Act, on which we will focus here, the Home Rule Act required that Congress “adopt a concurrent resolution ... approving such amendment” before it would become effective. D.C.Code § l-125(b) (1977 Supp.). Now, an amendment to the Charter takes effect unless Congress, during a period of congressional review, enacts a joint resolution disapproving the amendment. D.C.Code § l-203.03(b).
III. The Right of Initiative and Its Limits
The rights of initiative, referendum, and recall were added to our form of government in 1978 by the Charter Amendments Act (“CAA”) and thereby became part of the District’s Charter. D.C. Law 2-46, 24 D.C.Reg. 199 (1977) (as approved by H.R. Con. Res. 464 & 471, 95th Cong. (1978)) (codified at D.C.Code § 1-204.101-107 (initiative and referendum) and D.C.Code § 1-204.111-115 (recall)). These Charter Amendments are “functionally equivalent” to constitutional amendments, Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board of Elections and Ethics, 399 A.2d 550, 551 (D.C.1979) (Convention Center I), and they may not be changed by ordinary legislation. “We are required to construe the right of initiative liberally ... and may impose on the right ‘only those limitations expressed in the law or “clear[ly] and eom-pelling[ly]” implied.’” Hessey v. Burden, 584 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.1990) (Hessey I) (quoting Convention Center III, 441 A.2d at 913).
As amended, the Charter includes one express limitation on the subject matter of an initiative7 — the voters may not propose “laws appropriating funds.”8 Other ex*124press limitations are found elsewhere in the Home Rule Act; as we have already mentioned, the legislative power of the District (whether exercised by the electors directly or by the Council) does not extend to certain enumerated subjects. Some limitations are implicit — “[t]he initiative right must conform to the structure of government established by Congress in the Charter.” Hessey v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 601 A.2d 3, 19 (D.C.1991) (Hessey II). Importantly, all of these limitations, whether express or implied, are found in the Charter or the Home Rule Act.
IV. The Human Rights Act
In 1973, the District of Columbia Council (the predecessor of the current Council of the District of Columbia) adopted Title 34 of the District of Columbia Rules and Regulations, known as the “Human Rights Law” (34 DCRR § 3.1). “In enacting Title 34, the City Council looked beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII, to other civil rights legislation enacted by Congress more than 100 years ago [referring to an 1866 law now codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.]” Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 371 (D.C.1993). Title 34 also drew upon a rich history of local legislation, police regulations, and Commissioners’ Orders dating back to 1869 that prohibited various types of discrimination in the District of Columbia.9
Concerned that the police power regulations in Title 34 might not have the same force and effect as a statute, the (post Home Rule) Council of the District of Columbia re-enacted the regulations as The Human Rights Act of 1977. Blodgett v. University Club, 930 A.2d 210, 217 (D.C.2007). The first section of the Human Rights Act explains that the legislature intended “to secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination for any reason other than that of individual merit....” The substantive provisions which existed in 1977 prohibited discrimination in public accommodations, employment, educational institutions, and housing and commercial space based upon many characteristics, including sex and sexual orientation.
“In amending the [Human Rights Act] in 1997, the legislature emphasized its ‘broad scope’ and the fact that its coverage is wider than Title VII:
The District’s human rights law has long been praised for its broad scope. The law bans discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and education. It protects people from *125discrimination based on characteristics covered in federal civil rights law — race, color, sex, religion, age, national origin, and disability — as well as other characteristics not covered under federal law, such as sexual orientation, marital status, and family responsibilities.”
Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass’n, 830 A.2d 874, 887 (D.C.2003) (en banc) (quoting D.C. Council, Committee on Government Operations, Report on Bill 12-34, “The Human Rights Amendment Act of 1997,” at 2 (May 29,1997)).
We have described the Human Rights Act as “a powerful, flexible, and far-reaching prohibition against discrimination of many kinds,” Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 732 (D.C.2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and its reach has expanded significantly since 1977.10 “Among the statute’s basic purposes is reinforcement of the Council's view that the Human Rights Act is among our most important laws and is to be vigorously enforced by all agencies and officials of the District Government....” Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1, 33 (D.C.1987) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, by contrast to the Charter, the Human Rights Act is not part of our local “constitution.” The Council may amend the Human Rights Act by ordinary legislation, and frequently has done so. See supra note 10.
In light of this community’s longstanding commitment to securing an end to discrimination, it is entirely understandable that citizen groups and the Council would recognize the possibility that “a proposed initiative measure [might seek to] authorize discrimination as a policy for this community.” D.C. Council, Report on Bill 2-317 at 11 (May 3,1978). These concerns emerged when the Council turned to the task of implementing the newly created rights of initiative, referendum, and recall.
Y. The Initiative, Referendum and Recall Procedures Act of 1979
The Charter Amendments Act did not prescribe how the newly-created rights of initiative, referendum, and recall were to be implemented. Instead, Section 8 of Amendment No. 1 (which established the rights of initiative and referendum) instructed:
The Council of the District of Columbia shall adopt such acts as are necessary to carry out the purpose of this Amendment within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the effective date of this Amendment. Neither a petition initiating an initiative nor a referendum may be presented to the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics prior to October 1,1978.
D.C. Law 2-46, Amendment No. 1 § 8, 1978 D.C. Statutes-ab-Large 33, 34-35 (1978 Comp.) (the codified statute, D.C.Code § 1-204.107, uses the term “sub-part” in place of “Amendment”). The outcome of this appeal depends mainly on how *126we construe this portion of Amendment No. 1.
A. Creating Time to Implement the CAA
The District of Columbia asserts that “[d]eeiding what acts are ‘necessary to carry out’ the undefined ‘purpose’ of the CAA requires policy decisions that are properly left to the Council and that this Court cannot make without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.” We disagree.
We focused on these same provisions in Convention Center I, where this court held that the Charter Amendments were not self-executing. After quoting or describing various excerpts from the legislative history, we characterized Section 8 as a “legislative mandate,” 399 A.2d at 553, for the Council to pass “enabling legislation,” id. at 551, 552, “implementing legislation,” id. at 553, or “implementing acts.” Id. “[T]he drafters chose the October 1 date on the assumption that the necessary preparations for administering an initiative election — the passage of implementing legislation and the allocation of monies to the Board — would be completed.” 399 A.2d at 553. If the Council acted, as directed, within 180 days, the implementing steps would be completed before the Amendment took effect on October l.11 Notably, Section 8 of Amendment No. 1 does not purport to enlarge the Council’s authority; it does not contain any additional delegation of Congressional power.
The majority points to models of other language that might have been used if the Council were expected “to enact merely procedural rules governing the initiative and referendum process.” (Judge Thompson’s opinion at 24) A similar point should be made about the majority’s comparison of Section 8’s language to the “necessary and proper” clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution.12 That model might have been used if the Council, the voters, and the Congress intended that Section 8 enhance the power of the Council. The fact that the word “necessary” appears in both places does not make this an apt comparison.
Moreover, any mystery about the purpose of the CAA evaporates when Section 8 of Amendment No. 1 is considered in context, as it should be. See District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 652 (D.C.2005) (en banc) (“[W]e do not read statutory words in isolation; the language of surrounding and related paragraphs may be instrumental to understanding them.”). Rather than being “undefined,” and perhaps indiscernible, as the District suggests, the “purpose” of the CAA was “[t]o amend the Charter of the District of Columbia to provide for the power of initiative, referendum, and recall.” D.C. Law 2-46, Preamble, 1978 D.C. Statutes-at-Large 33 (1978 Comp.). The CAA contained two amendments to *127the District Charter, each of which had a distinct purpose. Charter Amendment No. 1 — now codified as Subpart 1 — establishes the rights of initiative and referendum. The codified version of Section 8 of Amendment No. 1 (D.C.Code § 1-204.107) instructs the Council to “adopt such acts as are necessary to carry out the purpose of this subpart [Amendment] within 180 days of the effective date of this subpart.” Charter Amendment No. 2 — Subpart 2 as codified — establishes the right of recall. A corresponding provision, D.C.Code § 1-204.115, instructs the Council to “adopt such acts as are necessary to carry out the purpose of this subpart.... ”
Considered in context, this “necessary to carry out the purpose” language was a mandate to enact implementing legislation — to adopt such acts as are necessary to make the rights of initiative, referendum, and recall available to the people of the District of Columbia — and to do so in a timely manner. It did not grant any license to restrict those rights, which had been established through the painstaking process of amending the Charter.
B. Limiting Subject Matter
The implementing legislation arrived (albeit beyond the 180-day period allotted) in the form of the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Procedures Act of 1979. This legislation, among other things, prescribed the form in which a measure must be submitted and the number of copies required, and established timetables and procedures for processing it. D.C.Code § 1-1001.16.13 The Board must reject a petition that is not in the proper form. D.C.Code § 1-1001.16(b)(1)(B). Moreover, “the Board shall refuse to accept the measure if the Board finds that it is not a proper subject of initiative ... under the terms of title IV of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act [the District Charter].... ” D.C.Code § 1-1001.16(b)(1). These were genuine implementing steps. But the Council went further and inserted a restriction on the subject matter an initiative could address-a limitation not found in the Charter or in the Home Rule Act.
Reacting to understandable concerns that the rights of initiative and referendum could be misused by the majority to discriminate against minorities, the Council instructed the Board (in the IPA) to refuse to accept a measure if it “authorizes, or would have the effect of authorizing, discrimination prohibited under Chapter 14 of Title 2 [the Human Rights Act.]” D.C.Code § l-1001.16(b)(l)(C). But the legitimacy of this concern does not mean that the Council had the authority to restrict a right established in the Charter. In light of the current litigation, it is striking that, while the IPA was under consideration, both the Corporation Counsel and the legislature’s own General Counsel warned that the Council did not have the power to impose this limitation on the right of initiative. The Office of Corporation Counsel explained, for example, that
[t]he merits of the policy embodied by this restriction on the voters’ rights is *128beside the point. Any substantive restrictions on the rights of the voters granted by Charter Amendment No. 1 are contrary to that Amendment and, hence, are void and of no effect. Such legislation may only be accomplished by the Charter Amending Procedure or by Act of Congress.
Supplemental Memorandum from Louis P. Robbins, Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel, Office of the Corporation Counsel, to Judith W. Rogers, Special Assistant for Legislation, 2 (June 2, 1978); 3 Op. C.C.D.C. 102,103 (1978).14
The majority brushes aside these “doubts expressed by lawyers,” emphasizing that “the elected representatives of the people — the Council and the Mayor— thought otherwise.” (Majority Opinion at 31, 32) But this is a question of legal or “constitutional” authority, not a matter of political judgment.
We perceive no principled basis for deferring to the Council’s interpretation of the Home Rule Act, apart from the merits of the Council’s argument. Although “the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others[,] ... ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ ” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)).
District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., 415 A.2d at 1351 n. 5.
The Corporation Counsel gave sound advice in 1978. The rights of initiative, referendum, and recall had become part of the Charter, which cannot be amended except by Act of Congress or by going through the Charter Amendment process. The “necessary to carry out” language in the Charter Amendments Act did not give the Council power to enact legislation inconsistent with the Charter Amendments. Price v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 645 A.2d 594, 598-99 (D.C.1994) (citing Convention Center III, 441 A.2d at 915). “[Legislation implementing the Charter Amendments is valid only if it does not conflict with the Charter Amendments.” Id. “Nor could the Council amend the Charter Amendments by enacting the IPA since, as the Self-Government Act clearly provides, the Charter may be amended only as provided in D.C.Code § l-205(a) (1992) [now codified as D.C.Code § l-203.03(a) (2001)].” Price, 645 A.2d at 599.
VI. Appellees’ Arguments
A. Should We Abstain?
Invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. *129691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), the District urges us to abstain from deciding this case. It argues, among other things, that the Council’s inclusion of anti-discrimination provisions in the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Procedures Act of 1979 has “functioned successfully” over the past decades and now forms part of a statutory scheme upon which the government and the public rely. This argument surely overstates the ease. Although the Human Rights Act limitation on the right of initiative has existed for more than thirty years, this is the first challenge to its validity.15 More importantly, Baker makes plain that “[t]he courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority[,]” 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, which is precisely what is at issue here.
By conducting this review of the Council’s action, we are not, as the District of Columbia asserts, expressing a lack of the respect due a coordinate branch of government. To the contrary, we proceed cautiously, recognizing “the need to ‘balance deference to the legislative authority of the Council, with our own duty to oversee Council action which might exceed con-gressionally delegated authority.’ ” Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 156 (D.C.1991) (quoting American Federation of Government Employees v. Barry, 459 A.2d 1045, 1050 (D.C.1983)).
We frequently have had to decide the scope of the Council’s authority under the Home Rule Act. Compare Washington Home, 415 A.2d 1349 (Council had no authority to pass another substantially identical emergency act in response to same emergency) with United States v. Alston, 580 A.2d 587 (D.C.1990) (after period of congressional review was doubled for certain types of legislation, Council had authority to pass successive, substantially identical emergency acts to preserve the status quo while identical legislation enacted by the Council after two readings was pending before Congress for review); see also Umana v. Swidler & Berlin, Chartered, 669 A.2d 717, 724 n. 15 (D.C.1995) (Home Rule Act does not “limit the Council’s authority to enact or to alter the substantive law to be applied by the courts”); Capitol Hill Restoration Society, Inc. v. Moore, 410 A.2d 184 (D.C.1979) (Council’s grant of appellate court jurisdiction in certain noncontested cases imper-missibly altered this court’s jurisdiction.). Furthermore, we have often considered the proper scope of the right of initiative, and we have rejected an “argument that adoption of the initiative right by the Council, Mayor, and electorate violated the District’s Charter.” Stevenson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 683 A.2d 1371, 1375 (D.C.1996). We also have addressed the validity of a separate portion of the IPA. See Price, 645 *130A.2d at 600 (concluding that a portion of the IPA conflicted with the Charter Amendments). The District does not satisfactorily explain why this case is so different that we must, or even may, abstain from deciding it.
B. Unique Insight?
The District also points out that most of the same Councilmembers who passed the Charter Amendments Act approved the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Procedures Act of 1979. It argues that, “although the second Council could not change the Charter through ordinary legislation, its unique insight into what the CAA meant gave its interpretation through the IPA presumptive validity.” However, the cases on which the District relies do not support this proposition. Moreover, we have seen no indication that the Councilmembers who enacted the IPA (thereby imposing the Human Rights Act limitation on the right of initiative) thought they were interpreting the CAA or purported to rely on insiders’ knowledge of its purpose. Nor did they profess unique understanding of what the “necessary to carry out” language meant.
The District and the majority focus single-mindedly on the supposed intent of the Council in drafting and “interpreting” the CAA. See, e.g., ante at 160 (“what the Council did in enacting the IPA provides an authoritative interpretation of the intent and meaning of the CAA”). Tellingly, however, they point to no evidence that the voters of the District or members of Congress (all indispensable partners in amending the Charter) thought they were delegating to the Council an undefined power to limit the right of initiative in any way the Council thought necessary.16
The District misplaces its reliance on Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 123 S.Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003), where the Supreme Court noted that it “has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given [the Constitution’s] provisions.” Id. at 213, 123 S.Ct. 769 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926)). This case is not comparable to Eldred, where the Court relied upon “Congress’ unbroken practice since the founding generation.... ” 537 U.S. at 213-14, 123 S.Ct. 769. “History reveal[ed] an unbroken congressional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime.” Id. at 200, 123 S.Ct. 769. The Court explained: “Such consistent congressional practice is entitled to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established have not been disputed during a period of [over two] centurfies], it is almost conclusive.” Id. at 213, 123 S.Ct. 769 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
By contrast to Eldred, the provision at issue here has been in existence for about thirty years (as opposed to over two hundred). More importantly, the District has not pointed us to, nor can we find, any *131“routine application” or “consistent legislative practice” that has been followed by the Council or approved by the voters or Congress.17 The most that can be said is that the Human Rights Act limitation has gone unchallenged for more than thirty years. The Myers decision, on which El-dred relied, makes clear that the legislature may not unilaterally determine the extent of its authority:
In the use of Congressional legislation to support or change a particular construction of the Constitution by acquiescence, its weight for the purpose must depend not only upon the nature of the question, but also upon the attitude of the executive and judicial branches of the Government, as well as upon the number of instances in the execution of the law in which opportunity for objection in the courts or elsewhere is afforded. When instances which actually involve the question are rare, or have not in fact occurred, the weight of the mere presence of acts on the statute book for a considerable time, as showing general acquiescence ..., is minimized.
272 U.S. at 170-71, 47 S.Ct. 21. It was a crucial factor in Myers that “the decision of the First Congress on a question of primary importance in the organization of the government ... was soon accepted as a final decision of the question by all branches of the government.” Id. at 136, 47 S.Ct. 21. Nothing comparable has happened here, and we therefore are not persuaded by the District’s argument relying on Eldred and Myers.
C. The Council’s Rationale
Wfiien one focuses on the subject matter restriction imposed by the IPA, an obvious question arises: Why didn’t the Council simply add the Human Rights Act limitation to its draft of the Charter Amendments Act?18 No satisfactory answer has emerged from the legislative history of the CAA. However, the history of the IPA strongly suggests that the “Human Rights Act limitation” was an afterthought, a concern brought to the Council’s attention after the Charter had been amended. D.C. Council, Report on Bill No. 2-317 at 5 (May 3, 1978) (“Subsequent to the public hearing [on the IPA], the Committee staff received myriad telephone calls in support of an amendment to the enabling legislation which would restrict consideration of initiative measures which foster discrimination. Such an amendment was adopted by the Committee in reporting this measure.”). When *132imposing this limitation on subject matter, the members of the Council did not suggest that the CAA had empowered them to do so. Rather, they invoked authority outside the CAA-the Supreme Court’s decision in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967), and the Council’s own statutory authority over elections. D.C. Council, Report on Bill No. 2-317 at 11 (May 3, 1978). Neither rationale gave the Council authority to amend the Charter.
1. Reitman v. Mulkey
Reitman considered a provision of the California Constitution that had been initiated by the voters, but the Supreme Court’s holding is no more a check on the right of initiative than it is on acts passed by a legislature. So far as the decision discloses, it was irrelevant that the provision was adopted by initiative.
According to the California Supreme Court, that initiative (Proposition 14) was designed “to overturn state laws that bore on the right of private sellers and lessors to discriminate” and “to forestall future state action that might circumscribe this right.” 387 U.S. at 374, 87 S.Ct. 1627. When enacted, it became Art. I, § 26, of the California Constitution,19 but the state Supreme Court held that it “was invalid as denying the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 373, 87 S.Ct. 1627. Affirming, the Supreme Court of the United States accepted the California court’s conclusion “that § 26 would and did have wider impact than a mere repeal of existing statutes.... The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in the State’s basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government.” Id. at 376-77, 87 S.Ct. 1627. “The California Supreme Court believes that the section will significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations[,]” and the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that it had “been presented with no persuasive considerations indicating that these judgments should be overturned.” Id. at 381, 87 S.Ct. 1627.
Of especial interest here, the Supreme Court of California had rejected an effort to keep the proposition off the ballot, reasoning “that it would be more appropriate to pass on those questions after the election ... than to interfere with the power of the people to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject the same at the polls.” Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal.2d 529, 50 Cal.Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825, 829 (1966) (quoting the court’s previous order). Moreover, the provision was struck down because it violated the federal Constitution, not because it was deemed inconsistent with a state law. Reitman clearly does not stand for the proposition that one act of the Council (here, the IPA) can place another act of the Council (even one prohibiting discrimination) off-limits to the initiative process.
2. Section 752
The Council also invoked, and appellees now rely upon, D.C.Code § 1-207.52 (2006) (“Section 752” of the Home Rule Act), *133which grants the Council “authority to enact any act or resolution with respect to matters involving or relating to elections in the District.” We emphasize, however, what we have said before — “nothing in Section 752 ... grants the Council authority to amend the Charter....” Price, 645 A.2d at 599.
At the time Section 752 was enacted, the right of initiative did not exist. It therefore is far from clear that Congress would have thought that the phrase “matters involving or relating to elections in the District” encompassed initiatives. More fundamentally, given that Section 752 predates by five years the creation of the right of initiative, it is implausible that Congress intended Section 752 to confer upon the Council power to exclude whole subject areas from consideration by the electorate.
In any event, if Section 752 is as broad as appellees assert, why was the Charter Amendments Act necessary? Why didn’t the Council simply use its power over elections to create the rights of initiative, referendum, and recall? One obvious answer is that, even if an initiative is an election, it is much more — it is an exercise of legislative power. The Charter provided that “the legislative power granted to the District by [the Home Rule Act] is vested in and shall be exercised by the Council in accordance with this chapter.” D.C.Code § 1-204.04. Allowing the voters to exercise legislative power amounted to a further delegation of Congress’s authority. Creating that right thus required a Charter Amendment.
If a Charter amendment was necessary to create the right of initiative, an amendment is equally necessary to limit that right. See Price, 645 A.2d at 599. And by restricting the subject matter which an initiative may address, the Human Rights Act limitation unmistakably alters (and reduces) the right of initiative. The Council’s authority relating to elections, found in Section 752, did not (and cannot) authorize a restriction amounting to an amendment of the Charter.20
Finally, appellees have offered no satisfactory answer to the following question: If the Council’s powers are as broad as they assert, what is to preclude the Council from imposing additional subject matter limitations on the right of initiative or, indeed, from extinguishing that right altogether? It appears that a candid answer to that question would be “nothing.” Yet, under our “constitutional” principles, a Charter right may not be limited or extinguished by ordinary legislation. That may be done only by going through the intentionally-eumbersome process of amending the Charter.
D. Inappropriate for Direct Democracy?
The District also argues that it is a mistake to read the CAA literally, as establishing a right of initiative “coextensive” with the legislative power of the Council except for one express limitation — “laws appropriating funds.” It asserts that “the most reasonable conclusion is that the CAA was intended to authorize the electorate to vote on topics generally, but not those inappropriate for direct democracy.” We have found no support whatsoever for this proposition in the CAA’s text or its legislative history.
*134Although the District concludes that the “Human Rights Act limitation” was wisely imposed, “consistently with our fundamental political traditions[,]” it offers little guidance on how one determines which topics are “inappropriate for direct democracy.” If this is to be the standard, it is impossible to predict how large this newly hypothesized exception to the right of initiative may grow in the future.
Even if we assume that the people at large are more likely to discriminate against minorities than are then- elected representatives, appellees forget that there are numerous checks and balances in place here to protect against the tyranny of the majority. Appellants’ proposal may be defeated at the polls. If the initiative passes, Congress may disapprove it. See D.C.Code § 1-204.105 (2006). Moreover, the Council will have the opportunity to amend or repeal the measure if it becomes law. See Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d at 155 (“[T]he plenary legislative power given the Council includes the authority to repeal existing legislation, whether or not derived from an initiative.”). And the courts will strike down any measure that is unconstitutional. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 187, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). In short, in the District of Columbia, the right of initiative is not an example of unchecked democracy. It exists, rather, in conjunction with a republican form of government based on the principle of separation of powers.
It should be clear that no one on this court doubts the importance of the Human Rights Act. Non-discrimination, tolerance, acceptance, and inclusion are all fundamental values to be fostered in a pluralistic society. But these aspirations are best achieved through a system of laws, and it is vital that the institutions of the District government observe the limits placed upon them by the Home Rule Act and the Charter. It is “our ... duty to oversee Council action which might exceed congressionally delegated authority.’ ” Atchison, 585 A.2d at 156. The Council of the District of Columbia exceeded its authority when it imposed the “Human Rights Act limitation” on the right of initiative. We respectfully dissent.

. An initiative is "the process by which the electors of the District of Columbia may propose laws (except laws appropriating funds) and present such proposed laws directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or disapproval." D.C.Code § 1-204.101(a) (2006). If a majority of those voting approves an initia*121tive, it becomes law, assuming (as is also true for an act of the Council) that it is not disapproved during a mandatory period of Congressional review. D.C.Code § 1-204.105 (2006).

. Appellants, the proponents of the Marriage Initiative of 2009, are Bishop Harry Jackson, Jr., Reverend Walter Fauntroy, Reverend Dale Wafer, Melvin Dupree, Apostle James Silver, Reverend Anthony Evans, Robert King, and Elder Howard Butler.

. "The term 'referendum' means the process by which the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia may suspend acts of the Council of the District of Columbia (except emergency acts, acts levying taxes, or acts appropriating funds for the general operation budget) until such acts have been presented to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or rejection.” D.C.Code § 1-204.101(b) (2006).

.The Superior Court, this court, and Chief Justice Roberts, sitting as Circuit Justice, declined to stay the effective date of the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009. See Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1279, 176 L.Ed.2d 102 (2010).

. Although the acts of the Council related to same-sex marriage have become law, this appeal is not moot. We have held that the right of initiative may be used to repeal or amend existing legislation. Convention Center Referendum Committee v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 441 A.2d 889, 909 & n. 38 (D.C.1981) (enbanc) (Convention Center III).

. See D.C.Code § 1-203.02 (entitled “Legislative power”), which states:
Except as provided in §§ 1-206.01 to 1-206.03, the legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within the District consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this chapter subject to all the restrictions and limitations imposed upon the states by the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States.
Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution forbids the states to do a variety of things, including entering into treaties, coining money, granting a title of nobility, or, without the consent of Congress, laying any duty of tonnage.

. Demonstrating that it thought carefully about the need for express limitations when drafting the Charter Amendments Act, the Council placed three express limitations on the right of referendum. See supra note 3.

. The parties agree that this case does not implicate this express limitation on the right of initiative.

. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953) (involving 1872 and 1873 acts of the Legislative Assembly of the District of Columbia which, among other things, prohibited racial discrimination by restaurant keepers and hotel proprietors); Newsweek Magazine v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, 376 A.2d 777, 783 (D.C.1977) (noting that Title 34 repealed and replaced Article 40 (Concerning Admission to, and Accommodation in, Licensed Places of Public Amusement in the District of Columbia), Article 45 (Prohibiting Discrimination by Reason of Race, Color, Religion or National Origin Against Persons Seeking or Utilizing Housing Units), and Article 47 (Prohibiting Discrimination by Reason of Race, Color, Religion, National Origin or Sex Against Persons Seeking or Engaged in Employment in the District of Columbia) of the Police Regulations of the District of Columbia); Filippo v. Real Estate Commission of the District of Columbia, 223 A.2d 268 (D.C.1966) (affirming order which suspended license of real estate broker who violated fair housing regulations found in Article 45 of the Police Regulations); Central Amusement Co. v. District of Columbia, 121 A.2d 865 (D.C.1956) (prosecution for violating 1869 police regulation, then still in effect, which prohibited racial discrimination in places of public amusement).

. The Human Rights Act was extended to cover government services in 2002. Human Rights Amendment Act of 2002, D.C. Law 14-189 § 2(g) (Act 14-399), 49 D.C.Reg. 6523 (2002) (codified at D.C.Code § 2-1402.73 (2007)). Since 1977, several protected categories, including “gender identity or expression” and "familial status,” have been added. Compare D.C.Code § 2-1401.01 (2007) with D.C.Code § 6-2201 (1978 Supp.). Council-member Alexander has recently introduced a bill to amend the Human Rights Act “to protect victims and family members of victims of domestic violence, sexual abuse, and stalking against discrimination by employers.” Bill 18-0796, proposing the "Protecting Victims of Crime Amendment Act of 2010.”

. The House Report accompanying the concurrent resolution which approved the CAA explained: “Section 8 requires the Council to adopt appropriate implementing acts, and makes October 1, 1978, the effective date of this Council Act.” H.R.Rep. No. 95-890, at 5 (1978). The attached report from the Council of the District of Columbia similarly states that Section 8 "directs the Council to adopt any further acts which may be necessary to implement the Amendment and prohibits the submission of any initiative or referendum petitions to the Board until after October 1, 1978.” Id. at 17.

. Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”

. For example, the supporters of an initiative "shall file with the Board 5 printed or typewritten copies of the full text of the measure, a summary statement of not more than 100 words, and a short title of the [proposed initiative]....” D.C.Code § 1-1001.16(a)(1). If the Board accepts the initiative or referendum measure, "[wjithin 20 calendar days, of [such acceptance],” it must, among other things, "[p]repare, in the proper legislative form, the proposed [measure].” D.C.Code § 1-1001.16(c)(3). "After preparation, the Board shall adopt the summary statement, short title, and legislative form at a public meeting and shall within 5 days, notify the proposer of the measure of the exact language. In addition, the Board, within 5 days of adoption, shall submit the [same information] to the District of Columbia Register for publication.” D.C.Code § 1-1001.16(d).

. Both, the Office of Corporation Counsel and the General Counsel of the Council of the District of Columbia issued cautionary advice on more than one occasion while the IPA was under consideration. For example, commenting in the spring of 1978, Corporation Counsel stated: "Additional restrictions in the subjects subject to initiative which are not in the Charter Amendment could not be made pursuant to an act of the Council, but only through the Charter Amendment procedure.” Memorandum from Louis P. Robbins, Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel, to Judith W. Rogers, Special Assistant for Legislation, 6 ¶ 2 (May 2, 1978); 3 Op. C.C.D.C. 60, 65 (1978). The General Counsel stated that in contrast to all the other limitations on the right of initiative, which were "procedural in quality” and provided for a "ministerial review process ... consistent with the function of an implementing act[,]" the antidiscrimination provision "engrafts ... a new requirement not in the Charter amendment....” Memorandum from Edward B. Webb, Jr., General Counsel, to Council Members, 2 (June 7, 1978) (attaching the supplemental memorandum from Corporation Counsel). The General Counsel opined that "[cjlearly, this is an indirect attempt to further amend the Charter and is, therefore, legally without effect.” Id.

. In Hessey III we held that a proposed initiative would not violate the HRA. Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 579 (D.C.1992) (Hessey III). Apparently none of the parties challenged the validity of the HRA limitation on the right of initiative. In Committee for Voluntary Prayer v. Wimberly, 704 A.2d 1199 (D.C.1997), opponents of a voluntary prayer initiative argued that it violated the HRA as well as the constitution. We did not consider whether the initiative violated the HRA because we affirmed the trial court’s holding that the initiative was "patently, obviously, and unquestionably unconstitutional.” Id. at 1201, 1203. More importantly, there is no indication that either party challenged the validity of the HRA limitation. "When instances which actually involve the question are rare, or have not in fact occurred, the weight of the mere presence of acts on the statute book for a considerable time, as showing general acquiescence in the legislative assertion of a questioned power, is minimized.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 171, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926).

. “Since amendments to the Charter required Congressional approval when the initiative right was approved by Congress, D.C.Code § 1-1320 (1991 Repl.), the court must consider Congressional intent in approving the amendment. Because the Charter amendment is in the form of an act passed by the Council, and because the Charter Amendment on the right of initiative included authority for the Council to adopt implementing legislation, the court must address the intent of the Council.'' Hessey II, 601 A.2d at 7.

. No inference of approval may fairly be drawn from the failure of Congress to disapprove the IPA, which contained the Human Rights Act limitation on the right of initiative. See Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928) ("The inference of an approval by Congress from its mere failure to act at best rests upon a weak foundation. And we think, where the inference is sought to be applied, as here, to a case where the legislation is clearly void as in contravention of the Organic Act, it cannot reasonably be indulged.”); Clayton v. People of the Territory of Utah, 132 U.S. 632, 642, 10 S.Ct. 190, 33 L.Ed. 455 (1890) ("At all events, it can hardly be admitted, as a general proposition, that, under the power of congress reserved in the organic acts of the territories to annul the acts of their legislatures, the absence of any action by congress is to be construed to be a recognition of the power of the legislature to pass laws in conflict with the act of congress under which they were created.”). But see majority opinion at note 45.

. The Council approved the original version of the Charter Amendments Act before it passed the Human Rights Act. The Mayor signed the Human Rights Act on September 28, 1977. 24 D.C.Reg. 6038 (Jan. 27, 1978). However, the Council amended the Charter Amendments Act four weeks later, before it was presented to the voters on November 8, 1977. H.R.Rep. No. 95-890, at 2.

. Art. I, § 26, provided:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
387 U.S. at 371, 87 S.Ct. 1627. The real property covered by § 26 was limited to residential property. Id. The section did not apply to state-owned real estate. Id.

. If the logic of the majority’s argument were followed, one wonders if the Council, using its power under Section 752, could instruct the Board of Elections to refuse to accept petitions from certain classes of candidates running for election to the Council— even though they met the qualifications for holding office established in the District Charter?