Court Opinion

ID: 9907017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 18:02:51.065221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:22.526596
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/5/23 Hanford v. Div. of Adult Parole Operations etc. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 ALLISON HANFORD,                                              B325231

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 20STCV46995)
           v.

 DIVISION OF ADULT PAROLE
 OPERATIONS SOUTHERN
 REGION HEADQUARTERS,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.
      Allison Hanford, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Monica N. Anderson, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Neah Huynh, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Jamie M. Ganson and Colin A. Shaff, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
               _________________________________
       Allison Hanford sued the Division of Adult Parole
Operations Southern Region Headquarters (DAPO) for false
imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court sustained DAPO’s demurrer to the second
amended complaint without leave to amend on the grounds that
Hanford failed to comply with the Government Claims Act (Gov.
Code, § 810 et seq.)1 and DAPO is statutorily immune. Hanford
appeals, arguing that these determinations were incorrect and
the trial court erred in denying leave to amend. We conclude
Hanford’s noncompliance with the Government Claims Act is
dispositive and affirm the judgment.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A.    Hanford Is Arrested and Jailed for a Parole Violation
       Hanford alleges that she was unlawfully arrested by DAPO
for a parole violation on August 1, 2014. After being sentenced to
135 days in jail, and serving 67.5 days, Hanford was set to be
released on October 7, 2014. On that day, however, DAPO held
her “under arrest for an [additional] two (2) days with no
probable cause and no new charges” before it released her on
October 10, 2014.
      B.    The Previous Government Claim and Lawsuit
      In January 2015, Hanford presented a government claim to
the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (the
Board) seeking damages for an alleged unlawful detention in
October 2014.

1    Statutory references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise indicated.

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       In March 2015, the Board rejected the claim, which it
labeled Government Claim 622637. The Board informed Hanford
that she could initiate litigation if she wished to pursue the
matter further.
       More than four years later, on August 29, 2019, Hanford
filed a lawsuit against DAPO alleging due process violations,
false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based
on her arrest and detention in 2014. The trial court in that case
sustained DAPO’s demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that
Hanford’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. As
part of its ruling, the court rejected Hanford’s argument that she
was entitled to tolling. The court entered judgment on July 29,
2020, and Hanford did not appeal.
      C.    The Current Government Claim and Lawsuit
       On December 12, 2019, while the first lawsuit against
DAPO was pending, Hanford submitted a new government claim
to the Department of General Services (the Department). In this
claim, Government Claim 20000135, Hanford asserted that
DAPO failed to comply with its legal obligation to pay her certain
“gate money” in connection with her 2014 arrest and detention.
For this noncompliance, Hanford sought $10 million.
       On January 14, 2020, the Department informed Hanford
that it would not consider her claim without payment of the
requisite $25 filing fee or submission of a fee waiver request. In
its written notice, the Department also stated, “In order for tort
claims to be considered timely, they must comply with the
requirements of Government Code sections 905.2(c), 910 and
910.2, and be presented within six months of the original date of
incident (see Government Code Section 901 and 911.2). If you
respond later than six months, but prior to one year from the

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original date of incident, you must apply without delay for leave
to present a late claim (Government Code Sections 911.2 through
911.4, inclusive, 946.6). [¶] The [Department] has no jurisdiction
over tort or contract claims presented more than one year from
the date of incident.”
       One week later, on January 21, 2020, Hanford submitted
an amended claim along with a filing fee payment and a fee
waiver request. In the January 21 submission, Hanford newly
asserted, among other allegations, that she had sustained severe
emotional distress because of her 2014 arrest. Hanford sought
$13 million.
       On February 6, 2020, the Department sent Hanford written
notice that it had received and reviewed her latest submission.
Citing section 911.2, the Department explained that it “w[ould]
take no further action” on the claim because “[it] was presented
more than one year beyond the date the damages accrued.” The
Department also informed Hanford that it would return her
filing fee.
       Notwithstanding this response, Hanford resubmitted her
claim in March 2020 and sent a letter in April 2020 asking for the
claim to be considered. On June 26, 2020, the Department sent
Hanford notice that her efforts were duplicative and that,
consistent with its previous notice, no further action would be
taken.
       Several months later, on December 9, 2020, Hanford filed
her complaint in this case, alleging causes of action against
DAPO for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.2 After Hanford amended her complaint,

2   In addition to DAPO, Hanford named as defendants two
DAPO employees and the California Department of Corrections

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DAPO demurred on the grounds that it was statutorily immune
and that Hanford failed to both comply with the Government
Claims Act and state a cognizable claim for relief. The trial court
sustained DAPO’s demurrer with leave to amend, ruling that
Hanford had failed to timely present a claim under the
Government Claims Act (sections 911.2 and 945.4).
       Hanford amended her pleading, and DAPO filed a second
demurrer. DAPO again argued, among other grounds, that the
Government Claims Act barred Hanford’s action based on her
failures to timely present a claim and file this case. In
opposition, Hanford argued she timely presented her claim after
she regained mental capacity in March 2020, and that even if she
did not, DAPO waived any challenge to the timeliness of her
claim or suit. In response to DAPO’s request for judicial notice of
her first lawsuit, Hanford emphasized that the current lawsuit
was based solely on Government Claim 20000135 and that
Government Claim 622637—the basis for her previous lawsuit—
was “moot” and “not at issue” in this action.
       The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend, ruling that Hanford had failed to timely present a
government claim and that DAPO was immune from liability.
The court took judicial notice of Hanford’s previous lawsuit,
which it explained undermined her argument that she had been
mentally incapable of presenting a government claim between
February 12, 2014 and March 5, 2020.

and Rehabilitation. While this appeal was pending, we granted
the parties’ joint request to dismiss these additional defendants
from the appeal such that DAPO now proceeds as the sole
respondent.

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     The trial court entered judgment on October 11, 2022.
Hanford timely appealed.3
                          DISCUSSION
      A.    Standard of Review
       We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer.
(Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768.) We accept as
true properly pleaded facts and liberally construe the pleading
with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 452; Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v.
Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Ivanoff
v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 726.) We may
also consider matters subject to judicial notice. (Reynolds v.
Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1083.)
       We review a trial court’s decision to deny leave to amend
for an abuse of discretion. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 (Aubry).) A plaintiff shows an abuse of
discretion by establishing there is a reasonable possibility
amendment can cure any pleading defect. (Ibid.) To carry that
burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate “in what manner the
pleadings can be amended and how such amendments will

3      Hanford failed to include in her designation of the record on
appeal DAPO’s demurrer briefing and related documents.
Because these documents inform our decision, we augment the
record on our own motion to include DAPO’s demurrers to the
first and second amended complaints, DAPO’s reply in support of
its demurrer to the second amended complaint, DAPO’s request
for judicial notice in support of its demurrer to the first amended
complaint, and the trial court’s ruling on DAPO’s demurrer to the
first amended complaint. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

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change the legal effect of their pleadings.” (Careau & Co. v.
Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371,
1388.)
      B.    Hanford’s Causes of Action Are Barred Because She
            Failed To Timely Present Her Government Claim
       The trial court correctly ruled that Hanford’s action is
barred by her failure to timely present a government claim.
       The Government Claims Act requires a plaintiff seeking
damages against a public entity to present a government claim
before filing a lawsuit. (§ 945.4.) A claim based on an “injury to
person” must be presented no later than six months after accrual
of the cause of action. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) “[F]ailure to timely
present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a
plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” (State of
California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239
[discussing sections 911.2 and 945.4].)
       The recourse for an injured party who fails to present a
timely claim is to submit an application for leave to present a late
claim. (§ 911.4.) If a late-claim application is denied, the party
may petition the court for relief from the claim presentation
requirement. (§ 946.6.) Without submission of a timely late-
claim application, however, the court is without jurisdiction to
grant such relief. (Munoz v. State of California (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779 (Munoz).)
       Hanford did not present a timely claim before filing this
lawsuit. Her causes of action accrued at the earliest on August 1,
2014, when she alleges she was unlawfully arrested, and at the
latest on October 10, 2014, when she alleges she was last
subjected to false imprisonment. She did not submit Government

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Claim 20000135 until December 2019, more than five years later,
and she did not apply for leave to present a late claim.
       Hanford contends the claim was timely because the
presentation deadline was tolled under section 911.6 based on
her lack of mental capacity. But section 911.6 does not toll the
deadline for presenting a government claim; it sets forth grounds
on which a late-claim application shall be granted. (See § 911.6,
subd. (b); State of California v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th
at p. 1245 [describing this statute as one part of an intentional
and detailed scheme “permitting litigants to petition the public
entity and the court for leave to present a late claim”].) Put
another way, if Hanford was prevented by mental incapacity from
presenting a timely claim, she needed to set forth that contention
in an application for leave to present a late claim.4 (§ 911.4.)
Having failed to do so, she has no basis to obtain relief from the
claim presentation deadline. (Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1779.)
       Hanford also argues that DAPO waived its right to assert a
timeliness defense by failing to notify her that the claim was late.
This contention, too, is unavailing. Under section 911.3, a public
entity waives “[a]ny defense as to the time limit for presenting a
claim” if it fails to give notice within 45 days that the claim is
untimely. (§ 911.3, subd. (b).) On January 14, 2020, the
Department of General Services informed Hanford of the
deadline for presenting a claim and the imperative of applying for
leave to present a late claim “without delay.” Then, on
February 6, 2020, the Department notified Hanford that it was

4     We decline Hanford’s request to take judicial notice of
medical records she presented with her demurrer opposition as
those records are not relevant to our decision.

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taking “no further action” on her claim because the claim was
untimely. The Department sent this notice within 45 days of
January 21, 2020, the date that Hanford perfected the
presentation of her claim by submitting a filing fee and fee
waiver request. (§ 905.2, subd. (d) [the time for the Department
to determine timeliness of claim begins when filing fees are paid
or fee waiver is granted].) Accordingly, the Department did not
waive its timeliness defense.
      C.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Leave To
            Amend
       Hanford contends that she should be granted leave to
amend her complaint, but she has not identified any specific facts
she could allege or shown how any amendment could cure the
untimely government claim. (See Schifando v. City of
Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 [“The plaintiff has the
burden of proving that an amendment would cure the defect”].)
       Hanford refers in her briefing to Government Claim 622637
as a claim that was timely presented in January 2015.5 But
Hanford did not identify this additional claim in her pleading,
and it would be futile for her to do so now because any lawsuit
based on this claim is time-barred. (See Royalty Carpet Mills,
Inc. v. City of Irvine (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1124 [“When

5     Hanford does not expressly contend that this is a basis for
granting her leave to amend. Indeed, in the trial court, Hanford
explicitly disclaimed any reliance on Government Claim 622637,
a claim she described as “moot” and “not at issue” in this case.
We nonetheless examine the question because leave to amend is
reviewable on appeal “‘even in the absence of a request’” and
“even if the plaintiff does not claim on appeal that the trial court
abused its discretion.” (Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 970-971.)

                                  9
amendment would be futile because the amended [complaint]
would be barred by the statute of limitations, the trial court does
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for leave to
amend”].) Section 945.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides that a
lawsuit must be filed within six months after a claim is rejected,
and subdivision (a)(2) extends that period to two years from
accrual of the cause of action where notice of the rejection is not
properly given. Here, Hanford’s causes of action accrued at the
latest on October 10, 2014, and the Department sent Hanford
notice that Government Claim 622637 was rejected on March 5,
2015. Hanford filed this case more than four and a half years
later, on December 9, 2020. (§ 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) The trial
court in Hanford’s first lawsuit determined that her suit was
barred by the statute of limitations, a ruling that Hanford did not
appeal. (§ 945.6, subd. (a)(2).) In short, even if Hanford amended
her complaint to rely on Government Claim 622637, the case
would be time-barred.
       Because we conclude the demurrer was properly sustained
without leave to amend, we do not address the parties’ remaining
arguments regarding other pleading defects.

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                         DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. DAPO shall recover its costs on
appeal.

                                        EVENSON, J.*

We concur:

             SEGAL, Acting P. J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

*     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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