Court Opinion

ID: 9554846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 07:13:51.937421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:52.378639
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                     EL PASO, TEXAS

 LORETTA SALAZAR, Individually, and on             §                No. 08-22-00245-CV
 Behalf of the Estate of ERNEST SALAZAR,
                                                   §                   Appeal from the
                                Appellant,
                                                   §            120th Judicial District Court
 v.
                                                   §              Of El Paso County, Texas
 HECTOR A. PAYAN, M.D.,
                                                   §                (TC# 2016DCV4437)
                                Appellee.

                                            OPINION

                                         BACKGROUND

       In a single issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence

of her settlement with former defendants. We affirm.

                              Factual and Procedural Background

       Appellant, Loretta Salazar, Individually, and on Behalf of the Estate of Ernest Salazar

(Salazar), initiated suit against Appellee, Hector A. Payan, M.D. (Dr. Payan), and five other

defendants on theories of medical negligence and vicarious liability for the death of her husband,

Ernest Salazar. Salazar’s live petition included the following named defendants: Nhu Nguyen T.

Nguyen, M.D., Hospitalists Group of El Paso, Hector A. Payan, M.D., Ric A. Bradford, D.O., The

Hospitals of Providence Memorial Campus, and Zening He, M.D. Prior to trial, a mediation was
held, and settlements were reached. Salazar proceeded to a jury trial against only Dr. Payan and

Dr. Ric Bradford.

        The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Payan. The trial court issued its final judgment,

finding no negligence on the part of Dr. Payan. Salazar filed a motion for new trial. This appeal

followed.

                                             DISCUSSION

        Salazar contends the admission of testimony relating to the settlement with other

defendants rendered an improper judgment and requests reversal. We disagree.

                                          Standard of Review

        We review an evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Graham v. Scott, 547 S.W.3d

245, 249 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when

its ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence is “so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount

to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law.” Id.

In making this determination, we review the entire record as a whole and “require the complaining

party to demonstrate that the judgment turns on the particular evidence admitted.” Id. Specifically,

in civil cases, Rule 44.1(a)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, “No judgment

may be reversed on appeal on the ground that the trial court made an error of law unless the court

of appeals concludes that the error complained of . . . probably caused the rendition of an improper

judgement.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1).

                                            Applicable Law

        The traditional rule in Texas is to exclude evidence of settlement agreements. Mi-Jack

Prod., Inc. v. Braneff, 827 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.). Rule

408 of the Texas Rules of Evidence specifically provides:

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       (a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible either to prove or
           disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim:

           (1) furnishing, promising, or offering--or accepting, promising to accept, or
               offering to accept--a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting
               to compromise the claim; and

           (2) conduct or statements made during compromise negotiations about the
               claim.

TEX. R. EVID. 408(a). However, settlement evidence may be admitted for other purposes, “such as

proving a party’s or witness’s bias, prejudice, or interest, negating a contention of undue delay, or

proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.” TEX. R. EVID. 408(b);

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 406 S.W.3d 326, 339

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. denied) (“Exclusion is not required when the evidence is offered

for another purpose, such as proving bias, prejudice, or interest of a witness or party, negating a

contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or

prosecution.”). “The trial court may properly exercise its discretion when deciding whether

evidence is impermissibly offered as evidence of a settlement offer or is offered for another valid

reason.” Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 406 S.W.3d at 340.

                                             Analysis

       In a single issue, Salazar maintains the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence

concerning her settlement with other defendants. Salazar testified at trial, and the following

testimony is the subject of this appeal:

       Counsel for Dr. Payan:                 All right. Ms. Salazar, in this lawsuit, you’ve
                                              placed blame with Dr. He and Dr. Nguyen.
                                              Correct?

       Salazar:                               Correct.

       Counsel for Dr. Payan:                 You’ve also placed blame with the hospital.
                                              Correct?

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Salazar:                        Correct.

Counsel for Dr. Payan:          And you have accepted money from these
                                three defendants --

Counsel for Salazar:            Objection, Your Honor --

The Court:                      Approach, please.

                         (Bench discussion held.)

Counsel for Dr. Payan:          Your Honor, we’re not going to get into the
                                numbers, just the fact that they were a party
                                and that she has received --

                         .     .       .

Counsel for Dr. Payan:          We’re not getting into the numbers. We’re
                                going to get into the fact that she sued them
                                and that the cases have since been settled.

                         .     .       .

Counsel for Dr. Payan:         And she accepted payment for that.

Counsel for Salazar:            I don’t think you can get into that. I don’t
                                think you can get into -- you can say there
                                was a case against them, but you can’t get
                                into the settlement.

The Court:                      And I guess I thought you weren’t going to
                                get into it at all. Maybe say they were parties
                                and they’ve settled.

Counsel for Dr. Payan:         Okay. Fair enough.

Counsel for Salazar:            I don’t think you can even say they settled, I
                                think you can just say that they were parties
                                that are no longer in this case. But I think to
                                say they settled is prejudicial to us and I think
                                -- how do we correct it now, I don’t know.

Counsel for Dr. Payam:          I believe he waived it now that we’ve already
                                started discussing it --

Counsel for Salazar:            You said it and I objected as soon as I could
                                get out of my seat. I object to any reference

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                                              to a settlement. I’m going to move for a
                                              mistrial.

        The Court:                            It’s going to be denied, but I think you need
                                              to move on.

        Counsel for Salazar:                  It’s already out there.

        Counsel for Dr. Payan:                Am I permitted just to say they have
                                              settled[?]

        The Court:                            Yes.

                                      (Bench discussion concludes.)

       Counsel for Dr. Payan:                 Ms. Salazar, you have since settled with Dr.
                                              He, Dr. Nguyen and the hospital. Correct?

       Salazar:                               Correct.

       Counsel then moved on and questioned Salazar regarding the Salazars’ business operation.

       According to Salazar, the erroneous admission of this evidence caused the rendition of an

improper verdict. However, as a threshold matter, we must first address the preservation and record

inadequacies of this appeal.

       To begin, Dr. Payan maintains Salazar failed to preserve error. We agree. Salazar failed to

obtain a ruling on her objection as required by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A); see Palmer v. Off. of the Att’y Gen., 656 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2022, no pet.) (“To preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must raise the

complaint before the trial court ‘by a timely request, objection, or motion’ and either obtain an

express or implicit ruling or show that the trial court refused to rule.”). On appeal, Salazar

maintains the trial court’s response, “And I guess I thought you weren’t going to get into it at all.

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Maybe say they were parties and they’ve settled[,]” constitutes a ruling to her objection. We

disagree; the trial court’s response did not constitute either an express or implicit ruling. 1

           Salazar also failed to request an instruction to disregard. According to Salazar, she did not

do so because “there was no possible curative instruction that could undo the damage that had

already been done.” However, Texas precedent establishes otherwise. See Columbia Medical

Center of Las Colinas v. Bush, 122 S.W.3d 835, 862 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied)

(“Although an offer in compromise and settlement is inadmissible as evidence, error in informing

a jury of a settlement can be cured by an instruction to disregard. Therefore, the error here could

have been cured by an instruction to disregard the comments concerning the doctors’ settlement .

. . Because Appellants did not request an instruction to disregard, their complaint is not preserved

for our review.”) (citations omitted); see also Beutel v. Paul, 741 S.W.2d 510, 513-14 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no pet.) (“An offer in compromise and settlement is improper and

inadmissible as evidence. However, the error is usually curable by an instruction from the trial

court to disregard. Appellant did not object to the testimony but instead moved for a mistrial.”)

(citations omitted).

           Salazar did not obtain a ruling to her objection, did not request an instruction to disregard,

but instead, only moved for a mistrial. Accordingly, Salazar further waived error. See One Call

1
    During the jury charge conference, the parties discussed the matter once more, and the following occurred:

Counsel for Grost:          I moved for a mistrial immediately.

The Court:                  Right. But I don’t know if I ruled on an objection. I don’t think you actually objected, I
                            think you said let’s approach. So I don’t know that there’s a ruling on an on objection, but
                            you definitely did approach. We had a conversation and then I said just what I said right
                            now. Well, I didn't think you were going to get it before this jury, why would you submit
                            the fact of settlement as Exhibit 1 or 2 or whatever it was, 1 and 2, but not to go to the jury
                            if we were just going to tell them. That’s what I said and [Counsel for Dr. Payan] moved
                            on and I denied the motion for mistrial.

Counsel for Salazar:        Your Honor, I objected here at my table and then we approached.

The Court:                  But I don’t know that I ruled.

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Sys., Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power, 936 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

1996), writ denied) (“To preserve error after inadmissible evidence is allowed before the jury, a

party must sequentially pursue an adverse ruling from the trial court by: (1) objecting to the

complained-of evidence, (2) moving the court to strike the evidence from the record, (3) requesting

the court to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence, and (4) moving for a mistrial. Absent an

adverse ruling from the trial court, nothing is preserved for appellate review.”).

         Moreover, even if Salazar had preserved error, we cannot reverse the jury’s verdict for an

alleged erroneous evidentiary ruling on the record Salazar has provided. Salazar filed a partial

reporter’s record that consists of four volumes: a chronological index of the four volumes (RR I),

Salazar’s trial testimony (RR II), the jury charge conference (RR III), and a post-verdict motion to

pay costs hearing (RR IV). The clerk’s record reveals several people were designated as trial

witnesses; however, the only witness testimony before us is Salazar’s. Salazar also elected not to

request a reporter’s record in the appellate record.

         Under Rule 34.6(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, if an appellant requests a

partial reporter’s record, he or she must include in the request a statement of the points or issues

to be presented on appeal and will then be limited to those issues. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(c). However,

we do not have the required statement of the issues in the record before us, and we cannot consider

what we do not have. As we have previously held , “[w]hen an appellant completely fails to include

any statement of the issues, the record is deemed incomplete, and the appellate court presumes the

omitted portions of the reporter’s record are relevant and support the trial court’s judgment.” Est.

of Soto by & through Amador v. Mireles, 587 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2019, no

pet.).

         Salazar contends the admission of testimony concerning the settlement of other defendants

at trial rendered an improper judgment and asks this Court to find reversable error based on the

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trial court’s alleged erroneous admission of such evidence. As articulated above, this requires a

review of the entire record, and as the complaining party, Salazar must demonstrate the judgment

turned on the complained of evidence. See Graham, 547 S.W.3d at 249. However, without the

entire record before us, we are unable to conduct a proper review. Mireles, 587 S.W.3d at 449 (“A

determination of whether evidentiary error caused an improper judgment cannot be made without

a review of the entire trial record.”). For this additional reason, we are unable to find reversible

error.

         Furthermore, considering Salazar’s failure to include a statement of issues in violation of

Rule 34.6(c), and because we are required to presume the omitted portions of the reporter’s record

are relevant and support the trial court’s judgment, it follows we must also “presume the evidence

omitted from the record would have shown that any error, if any, was harmless.” Id. at 449-50

(“Texas appellate courts have consistently held that harmful reversible error based on an

evidentiary ruling cannot be established with a partial reporter’s record that lacks statements of

issues.”).

         In sum, Salazar has failed to preserve error, and the record inadequacies and failure to

comply with Rule 34.6(c) further impedes Salazar’s success in this appeal. Accordingly, we find

the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Salazar’s sole issue on appeal is overruled.

                                           CONCLUSION
         For these reasons, we affirm.

                                               YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice

August 4, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

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