Court Opinion

ID: 9364078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 14:02:36.996698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:35.651057
License: Public Domain

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                 Decided: January 18, 2023

S23Y0306. IN THE MATTER OF CHANDRA McNEIL NORTON.

     PER CURIAM.

     This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of the Special Master, Charles David Jones, filed

pursuant to Bar Rule 4-106 (e). The Special Master recommends

that this Court disbar Respondent Chandra McNeil Norton (State

Bar No. 498550), who has been a member of the Bar since 1993, for

her violations of Rules 8.4 (a) (2) and 9.1 (a) (2) found in Bar Rule 4-

102 (d).

     The record before us shows that in November 2020, Norton

pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, see 18

USC § 1349, in the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Georgia for defrauding the federal government of nearly

$8 million in Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans. Her
conviction went unreported to the State Bar of Georgia. Upon

learning of her conviction, the State Bar initiated disciplinary

proceedings under Bar Rule 4-106; this Court appointed a Special

Master, see Case No. S22B1122 (appointed June 28, 2022); and the

Special Master then conducted a hearing, at which Norton testified

regarding her conduct and offered evidence in mitigation.

     Norton then filed a brief in support of a two-year suspension.

In her brief, Norton argued that although a felony conviction can

serve as a basis for disbarment pursuant to Rule 8.4 (a), it does not

necessarily demand disbarment. See In the Matter of Ortman, 289

Ga. 130 (709 SE2d 784) (2011) (holding that this Court should “never

foreclose[] the possibility that a lesser punishment than disbarment

might be appropriate where the circumstances and mitigating

factors are sufficient to justify a lesser penalty”); In the Matter of

Suttle, 288 Ga. 14 (701 SE2d 154) (2010) (attorney who pled guilty

to real estate fraud was suspended rather than disbarred); In the

Matter of Haugabrook, 278 Ga. 721 (606 SE2d 257) (2004) (guilty

plea to two counts of filing false tax returns; one year suspension).

                                  2
She claimed that in arriving at the punishment to be imposed,

disciplinary cases are largely governed by their own particular facts,

see In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981),

and that the mitigating factors here support suspension. In

particular, she noted that prior to her knowledge of the federal

investigation or prosecution, she approached the government to

return the monies obtained from the PPP; that she acknowledged

and accepted full responsibility for her actions and that she was

cooperating with federal authorities; and that in approaching the

government, she did not seek special requests, waivers, departures,

or extra consideration from the government in exchange for her

proffer or cooperation. In addition, Norton noted that she has never

before been subject to a complaint or disciplinary action with the

Bar; that she had never before been convicted of any crimes; and

that she did not practice law as her primary profession, which was

one of the main reasons she was unaware of her responsibility to

contact the Bar upon her guilty plea. She further noted that she has

now fully cooperated with the Bar in this proceeding and is

                                  3
extremely remorseful for her actions. In addition, Norton noted that

she has a commendable reputation in the community, as evidenced

by the numerous letters of support from family and friends that she

included with her brief. Norton also listed as evidence of her good

reputation that she was a Board Member for an adoption agency and

a charitable organization supporting youth in Atlanta and Memphis;

that she is a sponsor and volunteer for several other youth

organizations; and that she is also an adoptive parent and

permanent guardian for an at-risk minor. Moreover, she noted that

she was convicted in her role as a citizen, not an attorney, and that

there were little to no aggravating factors in this case.

     The State Bar responded that disbarment was appropriate,

given that this Court routinely imposes disbarment (or accepts

voluntary surrender of licenses, which is tantamount to disbarment)

in cases involving felony convictions for financial crimes. See In the

Matter of Celello, 308 Ga. 339 (840 SE2d 349) (2020) (voluntary

surrender of license for attorney convicted of conspiracy to commit

securities fraud); In the Matter of Fudge, 301 Ga. 793 (804 SE2d 59)

                                  4
(2017) (voluntary surrender of license for attorney convicted of

conspiracy to commit bank fraud); In the Matter of Houser, 299 Ga.

284 (787 SE2d 689) (2016) (disbarring attorney convicted of

conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, payroll tax fraud, and failure

to file income taxes); In the Matter of Thompson, 297 Ga. 790 (778

SE2d 226) (2015) (disbarring attorney convicted of conspiracy, bank

fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud). In addition, the Bar contended

that the cases relied upon by Norton to support a two-year

suspension were distinguishable, because Ortman involved a felony

conviction for a violent crime; Haugabrook involved purely personal

conduct arising from the respondent’s failure to accurately report

his personal income for certain tax years, whereas this case affected

other individuals and entities; and Suttle involved unusual

circumstances, not present here, that warranted a lesser sanction

than disbarment. See In the Matter of Temple, 299 Ga. 854, 855-856

(792 SE2d 322) (2016) (“The Suttle opinion referenced the facts that

Suttle was a young lawyer who did not prepare the closing

documents used in the fraudulent real estate transactions, that he

                                 5
was not the closing lawyer scheduled to preside at the closings but

was called in on short notice, that nothing on the face of the

documents indicated mortgage fraud, and that he was arrested

before the closing was completed in a manner that would have

revealed the fraud to him. Note also that Suttle pleaded guilty under

North Carolina v. Alford[, 400 U.S. 25 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162)

(1970)], and continued to assert his actual innocence to the criminal

charges.” (footnote omitted)). Moreover, the Bar stated that the fact

remained that Norton failed to report her conviction to the Bar for

over a year in violation of the ethics rules and that as a licensed

attorney, she had to comply with all of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct, not just the ones that she was aware of. The

Bar further argued that the aggravating factors in this case, which

it asserted included Norton’s dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of

misconduct in submitting at least 11 false and fraudulent PPP loan

applications and related conduct over the course of several months,

multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary

proceedings by failing to report her conviction, and substantial

                                 6
experience in the practice of law, outweighed any of the mitigating

factors.

     The      Special     Master        then   issued   this   report   and

recommendation of disbarment. In his report, the Special Master

made the following findings of fact. Norton has spent most of her

professional life serving as a water and sewer contractor for the City

of Atlanta and DeKalb County, Georgia, although she has also

practiced some law handling domestic, transactional, and personal

injury cases. Norton is currently president and CEO of CamKen and

is tasked with overseeing the operations of the company,

maintaining client relationships, procuring projects, and ensuring

that such projects are successfully executed. She is also responsible

for navigating the local, state, and federal regulatory environment

on behalf of the company. In addition, she has experience in

registering the company as a minority business enterprise and

participating as a member of joint venture partnerships with out-of-

state entities. Her company at one time was one of the top 25

contractors    in   the   City     of    Atlanta, and    CamKen earned

                                         7
approximately $80 million in revenue over 23 years in the

contracting business.

     The Special Master found that in the summer of 2020, the

federal government charged Norton with one count of conspiracy to

commit wire fraud for conduct which included, but was not limited

to, submitting false and fraudulent PPP applications, using the

funds she received for personal expenses, and conspiring to defraud

and obtain money and property by false and fraudulent pretenses,

all of which resulted in a loss of approximately $7.8 million dollars

to the PPP program. On November 12, 2020, she pled guilty in

federal court to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, which is a felony.

As of the date of this opinion, Norton has not yet been sentenced.

     The Special Master then concluded that she violated Rule 8.4

(a) (2), by pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and

that for purposes of Rule 8.4 (a) (2), a conviction includes a guilty

plea, regardless of whether a sentence has been imposed. See Rule

8.4 (b) (1) and 1.0 (e). In addition, the Special Master concluded that

Norton violated Rule 9.1 (a) (2), by failing to report her conviction to

                                   8
the Bar. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) is

disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 9.1

(a) (2) is a public reprimand.

     In determining the appropriate level of discipline, the Special

Master considered the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions. See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232)

(1996) (ABA Standards are instructive in determining the

appropriate level of discipline); ABA Standard 3.0 (providing that in

imposing a sanction, courts should consider the duty violated; the

lawyer’s mental state; the potential or actual injury caused by the

lawyer’s misconduct; and the existence of aggravating or mitigating

factors). Regarding Norton’s mental state and the injury she caused,

the Special Master found that her conduct was knowing and

intentional, as evidenced by her guilty plea, and that her conduct

resulted in significant injury, a loss of almost $8 million to the PPP

program. The Special Master noted that ABA Standard 5.11

provides that disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer

engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which

                                  9
includes fraud, or any other intentional conduct involving fraud that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice. And

while Norton argued for a suspension, the Special Master pointed

out that ABA Standard 5.12 provides that suspension is generally

appropriate when a lawyer engaged in criminal conduct which does

not include fraud. The Special Master determined that Norton pled

guilty to a felony involving a serious financial crime and intentional

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation,

and that the seriousness of this crime did not justify a suspension.

     Regarding the aggravating factors, the Special Master

considered Norton’s dishonest or selfish motive given that she

personally benefitted from her misconduct; her pattern of

misconduct, given that she submitted at least 11 false and

fraudulent PPP loan applications and her related conduct took place

over the course of several months; and the multiple offenses, given

that her conduct consisted of multiple offenses of dishonest,

deceitful, and fraudulent conduct. See ABA Standards 9.22 (b), (c),

and (d). In addition, the Special Master considered her bad faith

                                 10
obstruction of the disciplinary process by intentionally failing to

comply with the disciplinary rules by not self-reporting her

conviction to the Bar, and her substantial experience in the practice

of law. See ABA Standards 9.22 (e) and (i). As to the latter point,

Norton contended in her brief before the Special Master that her

inexperience in the law (because she does not practice law as her

primary profession), should be considered in mitigation, but the

Special Master concluded that this is not the type of case in which

experience in the practice of law has any relevance to misconduct.

The Special Master stated that some duties and obligations – in this

case, to not lie, defraud, or deceive – should be understood by every

citizen and every lawyer, however new to the Bar. See In the Matter

of Manning-Wallace, 287 Ga. 223, 227 (695 SE2d 237) (2010)

(Nahmias, J., concurring). In addition, the Special Master

determined that regardless of the amount of time a lawyer has been

practicing, she ought to know not to engage in certain types of

conduct, including conspiring to commit wire fraud. See In the

Matter of Saunders, 304 Ga. 824, 825 n. 2 (822 SE2d 235) (2018); In

                                 11
the Matter of Jones, 293 Ga. 264, 267 n. 8 (744 SE2d 6) (2013).

     As for mitigating factors, the Special Master considered the

absence of a prior disciplinary record and Norton’s character and

reputation, noting that Norton submitted 19 letters in support from

various individuals attesting to her reputation and character. See

ABA Standards 9.32 (a) and (g). The Special Master found that,

without question, Norton had given her time and money towards

worthy causes. In addition, the Special Master considered her

remorse, noting that at the hearing on this case, Norton accepted

responsibility for her actions. See ABA Standard 9.32 (l).

     In conclusion, the Special Master determined that the

appropriate level of discipline for Norton’s conduct is disbarment,

see In the Matter of Stoner, 246 Ga. 581 (272 SE2d 313) (1980)

(holding that appearance of convicted attorney continuing to

practice does more to disrupt public confidence in the legal

profession than any other disciplinary problem), and noted that this

Court routinely imposes disbarment, or accepts a voluntary

surrender of license which is tantamount to disbarment, as

                                 12
discipline in cases involving felony convictions for financial crimes.

See Celello, 308 Ga. at 339; Fudge, 301 Ga. at 793; Houser, 299 Ga.

at 284; Thompson, 297 Ga. at 790. The Special Master determined

that Norton’s lack of disciplinary history combined with the

character evidence     she   presented    was outweighed      by the

seriousness of her crime and other aggravating factors, and observed

that even in cases involving significant mitigating factors, this Court

has disbarred attorneys who were convicted of felonies involving

fraud and dishonesty. See, e.g., In the Matter of Vickers, 291 Ga. 354

(729 SE2d 355) (2012) (disbarring attorney convicted of conspiracy

to defraud the United States and wire fraud who presented

mitigating factors of no prior disciplinary history, good character,

reputation and involvement in the community, isolated incident of

wrongdoing, remorse, cooperation, and compliance with terms of his

probation); In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865 (621 SE2d

750) (2005) (disbarring attorney convicted of making a false

statement who presented mitigating factors of no prior disciplinary

history, cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, remorse, no

                                  13
harm to client, and isolated incident); In the Matter of Calhoun, 268

Ga. 675 (492 SE2d 514) (1997) (disbarring attorney convicted of

money laundering and aiding and abetting who presented

mitigating factors of addiction to prescription drugs and alcohol,

family health problems, good character, and rehabilitation). In sum,

the Special Master stated that eroding confidence in the legal

profession is something that all lawyers must take seriously, and

that while there is no doubt that Norton has done good things for

family, friends, and the community, her guilty plea and failing to

report it to the Bar seriously adversely reflects on her fitness to

practice law, is a violation of the law, and in turn, is a violation of

the Bar Rules, all of which points to a more severe sanction than

suspension.

     Having reviewed the record and considered the parties’

arguments, we agree with the Special Master that despite the

mitigating circumstances in this case, disbarment is the appropriate

sanction and is consistent with similar cases involving felony

convictions for financial crimes. See, e.g., Houser, 299 Ga. at 284;

                                  14
Thompson, 297 Ga. at 790. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the

name of Chandra McNeil Norton be removed from the rolls of

persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Norton is

reminded of her duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

     Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

                                 15