Court Opinion

ID: 9928182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:32.322356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:31.727107
License: Public Domain

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               DXR FINANCE PARENT, LLC v.
                    THERAPLANT, LLC
                       (AC 46769)
                  Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Suarez, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property of the
   defendant, T Co. The plaintiff alleged that certain lenders entered into
   a credit agreement with G Co. as the borrower, T Co. and N Co. as
   guarantors, and the plaintiff acting as the lenders’ agent. The credit
   agreement provided that the lenders would make certain financial
   accommodations to G Co. T Co., as a guarantor, was liable for all
   payment obligations if G Co. defaulted, and, subsequently, T Co. entered
   into a mortgage deed with respect to the subject property to secure its
   obligations under the credit agreement and guaranty. Following several
   events of default, the plaintiff commenced this action. The trial court
   granted the parties’ motion for entry of a stipulated judgment of strict
   foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon. T Co. waived its rights to
   appeal and to an appraisal, and the parties stipulated to a fair market
   value of the property based on records of the municipal tax assessor. On
   the law day assigned by the court, S Co., a nonparty, filed a postjudgment
   motion to intervene as a party defendant, asserting that it was the
   plaintiff in a separate action against G Co., which owned T Co., and
   that it had filed an application for a prejudgment remedy seeking to
   attach T Co.’s assets, including the subject property. S Co. claimed that
   the property was substantially undervalued in the foreclosure judgment
   because the valuation was not based on an appraisal and that its ability
   to collect a judgment against G Co. would be impaired in the absence
   of its involvement in the foreclosure action. The trial court denied the
   motion to intervene after the law day had passed, and S Co. appealed
   to this court. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
   as moot. Held that, because the appeal was moot, this court lacked
   subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed:
   there was no appellate stay affecting the running of the law days because
   S Co., as a nonparty, could not file an appeal from the judgment of strict
   foreclosure, and, although S Co. filed a motion to intervene, it did not
   also file a motion that, if granted, would have rendered the judgment
   ineffective, such that a new appeal period from the judgment would have
   been created, and, therefore, the denial of S Co.’s motion to intervene,
   in the absence of the granting of a discretionary stay, which S Co. did
   not request, did not stay this foreclosure action; moreover, no practical
   relief could be granted to S Co. because title had already vested in the
   plaintiff by the time the trial court denied S Co.’s postjudgment motion
   to intervene, the right of redemption by T Co. had been extinguished,
   and the rare exception in which fact-specific relief could be granted to
   a would-be intervenor did not exist here, as the granting of the motion
   to intervene would have necessitated opening the foreclosure judgment,
   which would have required further proceedings by the trial court; fur-
   thermore, there was no colorable claim implicating this court’s equitable
   authority to open the foreclosure judgment as established in U.S. Bank
   National Assn. v. Rothermel (339 Conn. 366), as S Co. did not file a
   motion to open the judgment along with its motion to intervene, and,
   even if it had, S Co. did not raise any colorable claims of the type that
   would have caused this court to determine that equity required opening
   the judgment after title had vested in C Co., and, notwithstanding S
   Co.’s argument that T Co.’s waiver of an appraisal and the parties’
   stipulated property value based on the tax assessor’s records were
   improper and unlawful, the valuation was part of the stipulation, was
   based on a municipal tax assessor’s valuation, and was accepted by the
   trial court in its order rendering the judgment of strict foreclosure, and,
   thus, T Co.’s waiver of an appraisal, without additional factual allegations
   to establish the rare and exceptional circumstances of fraud, accident,
   mistake or surprise, did not convert S Co.’s disagreement with the
   stipulated valuation of the property into a claim sufficient to invoke
   this court’s continuing equitable authority, particularly given that S Co.
   had no direct interest in the property that could be foreclosed in the
   underlying action.
   Considered October 11, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

                           Procedural History

  Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop-
erty, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the court,
Spader, J., rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure
in accordance with the parties’ stipulation; thereafter,
the court denied the motion to intervene filed by Share-
holder Representative Services, LLC, and Shareholder
Representative Services, LLC, appealed to this court;
subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal. Motion to dismiss granted and appeal dis-
missed.
  Jonathan A. Kaplan, James T. Shearin, and Dana
M. Hrelic, in support of the motion.
  Jeffrey J. Mirman, in opposition to the motion.
                          Opinion

  CRADLE, J. In this foreclosure action, Shareholder
Representative Services, LLC (SRS), a nonparty,
appeals from the denial of its motion to intervene that
was filed after the judgment of strict foreclosure was
rendered but before the law days passed. Because an
automatic appellate stay did not apply, title to the sub-
ject property has vested in the plaintiff, and there is no
basis for this court to invoke its continuing equitable
authority to afford practical relief to the proposed inter-
venor. We therefore grant the plaintiff’s motion to dis-
miss this appeal as moot.
   The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our review. On April 6, 2023, the plaintiff, DXR
Finance Parent, LLC, filed a one count complaint for
strict foreclosure of a guaranty mortgage to which it
had been assigned the rights. The defendant, Ther-
aplant, LLC (Theraplant), is the owner of the subject
mortgaged property located at 856 Echo Lake Road in
Watertown (property). A cannabis facility occupies the
property that includes buildings, equipment, and inven-
tory used to grow, manufacture, and package cannabis
products. SRS, the proposed intervenor, alleges that the
property hosts ‘‘one of the largest growers of cannabis
in Connecticut,’’ and that ‘‘the Department of Consumer
Protection . . . relied upon [Theraplant] in approving
the [recreational cannabis] program . . . .’’
  The complaint alleges that, on November 26, 2021, a
group of lenders entered into a credit agreement, that
was subsequently amended, with The Greenrose Hold-
ing Company, Inc. (Greenrose), as the borrower and
Theraplant and GNRS CT
  Merger Sub, LLC (GNRS) as guarantors. In this trans-
action, the plaintiff acted as the lenders’ agent.
Greenrose, which is a nonparty to this action, wholly
owns Theraplant. Also of relevance and discussed sub-
sequently in this opinion, SRS brought a separate action
against Greenrose for breach of the merger agreement
through which Greenrose purchased Theraplant.
   The underlying credit agreement provides that the
lenders would make certain financial accommodations
available to Greenrose, up to $105,000,000, pursuant to
its terms and conditions, and included a maturity date
and acceleration provision. Theraplant, as a guarantor,
was liable for all payment obligations if Greenrose failed
to pay. On or about January 21, 2022, Theraplant, to
secure its obligations under the credit agreement and
guaranty, granted and executed a mortgage deed, an
assignment of rents, a security agreement and a fixture
filing with respect to the property in favor of DXR
Finance, LLC, as agent for the lenders (mortgage).
  Following several events of default without cure, the
plaintiff accelerated the obligations under the credit
to be immediately due and payable. On March 22, 2023,
the plaintiff made a demand on Theraplant pursuant to
the guaranty agreement.
   On April 6, 2023, after the lenders assigned their rights
to the plaintiff under the credit agreement, the plaintiff
filed a complaint against Theraplant seeking a judgment
of strict foreclosure, possession of the property, and
damages. Also on April 6, 2023, the plaintiff filed in the
trial court a notice of lis pendens that it had recorded
on the Watertown land records.
   On July 24, 2023, the plaintiff and Theraplant jointly
filed a motion for entry of a stipulated judgment of
strict foreclosure. The stipulation provided that the trial
court may render a judgment of strict foreclosure of
the guaranty mortgage in favor of the plaintiff and that
Theraplant waived its right to appeal. Theraplant also
waived an appraisal, as the parties stipulated to a fair
market value of the property of ‘‘$4,107,400.00 pursuant
to the Watertown Tax Assessor’s Records,’’ and that
the ‘‘debt owed . . . as secured by the mortgage, is
$155,390,197.17 . . . .’’ The parties requested a law day
of July 31, 2023, and expressly agreed that the law day
may run ‘‘within the [twenty] day appeal period.’’
   On July 26, 2023, the trial court, Spader, J., rendered
a judgment of strict foreclosure in accordance with the
parties’ stipulation. Its order set the law day for ‘‘July
31, 2023, for the owner of the equity of redemption,
and subsequent days for subsequent encumbrances in
the inverse order of their priorities.’’
   On the July 31, 2023 law day, SRS filed a postjudgment
motion to intervene as a party defendant under General
Statutes §§ 52-1021 and 52-107,2 and Practice Book § 9-
18.3 SRS asserted that it is the plaintiff in a related
action, Shareholder Representative Services, LLC v.
The Greenrose Holding Co., Superior Court, judicial
district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (SRS
action), in which it is acting ‘‘in its capacity as the
representative of the selling security holders of Ther-
aplant . . . . ’’ SRS alleged that its action arose from
a merger agreement between Greenrose and SRS, in
which ‘‘Greenrose purchased 100 [percent] of Ther-
aplant.’’ SRS also asserted that, on August 4, 2022, it
filed an application for a prejudgment remedy in the
SRS action seeking to attach Theraplant’s assets, includ-
ing the subject property. SRS further argued that the
property was substantially undervalued in the foreclo-
sure judgment because that valuation was not based on
an appraisal, and that SRS’s ability to collect a judgment
against Greenrose would be impaired significantly in
the absence of its involvement in this action.
  The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to
intervene, emphasizing that SRS ‘‘is an out of the money
creditor of nonparty [Greenrose],’’ which ‘‘does not
have any claim against [Theraplant].’’ The plaintiff
argued that (1) SRS’s motion was untimely filed post-
judgment, (2) SRS possessed no legal or equitable right
to the property that was at risk of diminution, (3) SRS
is—at most—a potential judgment creditor of
Greenrose, and not of Theraplant, and (4) the proposed
intervention would not affect the disposition of the
judgment of strict foreclosure.
  On August 1, 2023, the trial court, Spader, J., denied
SRS’s postjudgment motion to intervene. It concluded
that SRS did not ‘‘allege sufficient facts . . . to make
the requisite showing of its right to intervene.’’4 (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) On August 7, 2023, SRS filed
this appeal. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal as moot and SRS timely filed an opposition.
   This matter presents us with a novel question,
namely, whether relief may be granted in an appeal of
the denial of a postjudgment motion to intervene in a
strict foreclosure action where title has already vested.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the appeal
must be dismissed as moot because no appellate stay
applied to the running of the law day, no practical relief
can be granted to the proposed intervenor, and there
is no colorable claim implicating this court’s equitable
authority.
                               I
   We first consider whether an appellate stay affected
the running of the law day. SRS, as a nonparty, could not
file an appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure
rendered on July 26, 2023. Although SRS filed a motion
to intervene, it also did not file a motion ‘‘that, if granted,
would render the judgment . . . ineffective,’’ such that
a new appeal period from the judgment would be cre-
ated. See Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1).
   There is no automatic appellate stay of trial proceed-
ings that goes into effect upon the denial of a motion
to intervene. See, e.g., Episcopal Church in the Diocese
of Connecticut v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 386, 394, 28 A.3d
288 (2011) (defendants claimed appeal by proposed
intervenors stayed further proceedings in trial court;
trial court denied defendants’ motion for stay; and this
court dismissed defendants’ motion for review). A
motion to intervene typically is filed prior to the trial
court rendering judgment on the dispute between the
existing parties. If the trial court has determined that
the proposed intervenor does not have a sufficient inter-
est in the litigation to be made a party, the parties
should be able to proceed with the litigation unless, in
the trial court’s discretion, the matter is stayed while
the proposed intervenor appeals. See, e.g., Austin-
Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 640,
647, 81 A.3d 200 (2013) (noting that trial court granted
discretionary stay of trial proceedings pending pro-
posed intervenor’s appeal from trial court’s denial of
its motion to intervene). Consequently, the denial of
SRS’s motion to intervene, in the absence of the granting
of a discretionary stay, which SRS did not request, did
not stay the present foreclosure case.
   An appellate stay typically applies to proceedings
that ‘‘enforce or carry out the judgment . . . .’’ Practice
Book § 61-11 (a). Law days ‘‘carry out’’ the judgment
of strict foreclosure. RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley
View Associates, 278 Conn. 672, 683–84, 899 A.2d 586
(2006); see also id. (‘‘the law days are ineffective pend-
ing the stay because to treat them otherwise would
carry out the judgment in violation of the stay’’). Where
‘‘there was no appellate stay in effect when the law
days began to run . . . absolute title to the property
transferred to the plaintiff as a matter of law after all
law days expired.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
U.S. Bank, National Assn. v. Mamudi, 197 Conn. App.
31, 50, 231 A.3d 297, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 921, 231
A.3d 1169 (2020).
   In the present case, the trial court denied SRS’s post-
judgment motion to intervene, and SRS did not move the
court for a discretionary stay of the law days pending
its appeal. We conclude that, where a proposed inter-
vention was denied postjudgment but before the run-
ning of the law days, an appellate stay of the judgment
does not automatically arise. There also was no action
taken by the parties that would reset or stay the running
of the law days. Accordingly, the running of the law
day on July 31, 2023, carried out the judgment of strict
foreclosure.
                            II
   We next address the question of mootness, which is
the basis for the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. This case
presents, for the first time, an opportunity for this court
to consider whether any practical relief may be granted
from a postjudgment denial of a motion to intervene
in a strict foreclosure action where title has already
vested. We conclude that such an appeal is moot and
must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
   In its motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that this
court cannot afford SRS any practical relief in this
appeal. SRS is separately litigating its claims against
Greenrose, which is not a party to this action. Ther-
aplant’s equity of redemption in the subject property
was extinguished by the running of the law day, and it
is not within the power of appellate courts to disturb
the absolute title of the redeeming encumbrancer.
Accordingly, the plaintiff maintains that considering
this appeal on the merits ‘‘would amount to a purely
academic discussion of the propriety of the trial court’s
responses to the parties’ postjudgment motions . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
  In response, SRS relies heavily on the proposition
that, ‘‘[b]ecause foreclosure is peculiarly an equitable
action . . . the court may entertain such questions as
are necessary to be determined in order that complete
justice may be done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) As such, SRS argues that ‘‘Connecticut courts have
continuing jurisdiction in foreclosure cases after the
passage of the law days . . . .’’ SRS further submits
that our Supreme Court has ‘‘previously . . . con-
cluded that opening a judgment after title has vested
in a strict foreclosure case is permissible if equity so
requires.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) SRS also
contends that this court should similarly exercise its
equitable jurisdiction to conclude that this appeal is
not moot because SRS has challenged the trial court’s
valuation of the property as having been ‘‘improperly,
and unlawfully, determined . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.)
SRS underscores that, although its motion to intervene
was filed postjudgment and concurrent with the law
day, this appeal was filed within twenty days from the
trial court’s denial of its motion to intervene. See Prac-
tice Book § 63-1 (a). Additionally, SRS maintains that
it ‘‘should not be penalized because the trial court set
the law days within the twenty day’’ appeal period by
the agreement of the parties. We are not persuaded.
  ‘‘Mootness is a threshold issue that implicates subject
matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the court
to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practi-
cal relief to the parties. . . . [T]he existence of an
actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate
jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts
to decide moot questions, disconnected from the grant-
ing of actual relief or from the determination of which
no practical relief can follow.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, National Assn. v. Mamudi,
supra, 197 Conn. App. 39. ‘‘Our review of the question
of mootness is plenary.’’ Id.
   We have routinely dismissed appeals by defendants
in foreclosure actions as being moot once title to the
property had vested in the plaintiff. The dispositive
question in those contexts ‘‘is whether the law days
have run so as to extinguish the defendant’s equity of
redemption and vest title absolutely in the plaintiff.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ocwen Federal
Bank, FSB v. Charles, 95 Conn. App. 315, 324, 898 A.2d
197, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 909, 902 A.2d 1069 (2006).
If the law days have run, ‘‘no practical relief [could]
follow from a determination of the merits of [the] case
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Accord-
ingly, with limited exceptions discussed in part III of
this opinion, ‘‘it is not within the power of appellate
courts to resuscitate the mortgagor’s right of redemp-
tion or otherwise to disturb the absolute title of the
redeeming encumbrancer.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. ‘‘Simply put, once title has vested abso-
lutely in the mortgagee, the mortgagor’s interest in the
property is extinguished and cannot be revived by a
reviewing court.’’ Id.; see also Connecticut National
Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen, 323 Conn. 684, 687 n.5, 150
A.3d 675 (2016) (‘‘an appeal from a judgment of strict
foreclosure is moot when the law days pass, the rights
of redemption are cut off, and title becomes uncondi-
tional in the plaintiff’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
   ‘‘[I]f a favorable decision necessarily could not afford
the practical relief sought, the case is moot.’’ State v.
Jerzy G., 326 Conn. 206, 221, 162 A.3d 692 (2017). As
it applies to the denial of a motion to intervene, this
court has observed that ‘‘[m]ost postjudgment appeals
filed by would-be intervenors will be moot because
the relief sought, i.e., intervention into the underlying
action, cannot be granted once the action has gone to
judgment.’’ Wallingford Center Associates v. Board of
Tax Review, 68 Conn. App. 803, 806 n.3, 793 A.2d 260
(2002); see also, e.g., Jones v. Ricker, 172 Conn. 572,
576–77, 375 A.2d 1034 (1977) (appeal from denial of
motion to intervene dismissed as moot where underly-
ing matter had gone to judgment and ‘‘the only relief
sought by the plaintiffs in [that] action [had] been
granted and executed’’).
  However, there are narrow exceptions possible
where fact specific relief may exist in a postjudgment
motion to intervene. Unlike ‘‘[m]ost post judgment
appeals filed by would-be intervenors’’; Wallingford
Center Associates v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 68
Conn. App. 806 n.3; a ‘‘rare’’ exception; id., 804 n.1; can
exist if relief could be granted, for example, by directing
the trial court to amend the judgment. Id., 804–805.5 In
addition to practical relief being available, the relief
must also be capable of being ‘‘given by this court with-
out further trial court proceedings.’’ Id., 804 n.1.
   This narrow exception does not apply to the present
case. SRS filed its postjudgment motion to intervene
as a party to the underlying action, the granting of which
would necessitate opening the stipulated judgment of
strict foreclosure and would require further proceed-
ings by the trial court. Moreover, the law day ran on July
31, 2023, which vested title absolutely in the plaintiff
as the foreclosing mortgagee and extinguished Ther-
aplant’s right of redemption as the mortgagor. This
court cannot grant the relief sought by SRS because
the underlying matter has gone to judgment, the judg-
ment has been fully executed, and the plaintiff’s title
to the property cannot be disturbed. Accordingly, there
is no practical relief available to SRS and, therefore,
this appeal is moot.
                            III
   Finally, this appeal does not present the facts and
circumstances that would cause this court to extend
its continuing equitable authority as established in U.S.
Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel, 339 Conn. 366, 260
A.3d 1187 (2021).
   Our Supreme Court in Rothermel concluded that
there is ‘‘a limited exercise of jurisdiction over a narrow
class of equitable claims raised in postvesting motions
to open,’’ despite the general prohibition of such juris-
diction by General Statutes § 49-15 (a) (1).6 Id., 373. The
category of claims that fall within this class of cases
sound in ‘‘ ‘[f]raud, accident, mistake, and surprise
. . . .’ ’’ Id., 379; see, e.g., id., 370–71 (finding continuing
equitable jurisdiction where movant relied on misrepre-
sentations by loan servicer that caused her to fail to
file motion to open before passage of law day); New
Milford Savings Bank v. Jajer, 244 Conn. 251, 260, 708
A.2d 1378 (1998) (concluding that there was continuing
jurisdiction where motion to open filed after running
of law days sought ‘‘to correct an inadvertent omission
in a foreclosure complaint’’); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. Melahn, 148 Conn. App. 1, 3–4, 85 A.3d 1 (2014)
(concluding there was continuing equitable authority
where plaintiff misrepresented to court that it had sent
notice of judgment to movant prior to law day but, in
fact, did not actually provide notice until law day).
These are rare exceptions, applicable only in unusual
circumstances. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, National Assn. v.
Fitzpatrick, 206 Conn. App. 509, 510–13, 515 n.5, 260
A.3d 1240 (2021) (holding in Rothermel inapplicable to
extend this court’s postvesting equitable authority to
appellant’s challenge to order waiving newspaper
advertisements for foreclosure sale where sale was
advertised elsewhere).
    Notably, SRS did not file a motion to open the foreclo-
sure judgment along with its motion to intervene. Even
if it had, however, SRS did not raise any colorable claims
of the type that would cause this court to determine
that equity requires the opening of the judgment after
title vested in the plaintiff.
   Nevertheless, on appeal, SRS attempts to invoke a
Rothermel-like argument that Theraplant’s waiver of
an appraisal and the parties’ stipulated property value
based on the tax assessor’s records is improper and
unlawful. The property valuation was part of the parties’
stipulation, was based on a municipal tax assessor’s
valuation and was accepted by the trial court in its
order rendering the judgment of strict foreclosure.
Theraplant’s waiver of an appraisal, without any addi-
tional specific factual allegations regarding the ‘‘rare
and exceptional’’ circumstances of fraud, accident, mis-
take or surprise, does not convert SRS’s disagreement
with the parties’ valuation of the property into a claim
sufficient to invoke this court’s continuing equitable
authority. SRS’s failure to file a motion to open alleging
facts that satisfy the very narrow class of claims eligible
for Rothermel treatment leads us to determine that this
court does not have jurisdiction to reach the merits of
this otherwise moot appeal. This is especially true given
that SRS has no direct interest in the property that can
be foreclosed in the underlying action.
  For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is moot
because an automatic stay did not stay the running of
the law days, no practical relief can be granted on the
denial of the motion to intervene because title has
vested in the plaintiff, and there does not appear to be
any basis for this court to invoke its continuing equita-
ble authority after title in the subject property has
vested in the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
this appeal as moot is therefore granted.
      The appeal is dismissed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     General Statutes § 52-102 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon a motion made
by any . . . nonparty to a civil action . . . the nonparty so moving . . .
(1) may be made a party by the court if that person has or claims an interest
in the controversy, or any part thereof, adverse to the plaintiff, or (2) shall
be made a party by the court if that person is necessary for a complete
determination or settlement of any question involved therein . . . .’’
   2
     General Statutes § 52-107 provides: ‘‘The court may determine the contro-
versy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to
the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without
the presence of other parties, the court may direct that such other parties
be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the
judgment will affect, the court, on his application, shall direct him to be
made a party.’’
   3
     Practice Book § 9-18 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may determine
the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without
prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot
be had without the presence of other parties, the judicial authority may
direct that they be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title
while the judgment will affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall
direct that person to be made a party.’’
   4
     The court reasoned that SRS’s pending prejudgment remedy application,
even ‘‘if it is granted, is subsequent to the mortgage’’ and, therefore, would
be ‘‘undisturbed by this foreclosure.’’ The trial court found that ‘‘[t]he motion
is also untimely when considering General Statutes § 52-325 (a),’’ which
‘‘authorizes intervention after a notice of lis pendens is filed when the motion
to intervene is filed prior to the date when the judgment . . . is rendered.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moreover, the court found that SRS
‘‘still has remedies available to it’’ but ‘‘has no standing to litigate’’ the
foreclosure and underlying issues, such as ‘‘whether an attorney made proper
representations to the court about the authority to stipulate on behalf of
his client . . . .’’
   5
     Wallingford Center Associates involved an appeal of a municipal tax
assessor’s property revaluation to the trial court. Wallingford Center Associ-
ates v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 68 Conn. App. 804–805. The trial court
in that case had already rendered judgment lowering the valuation when a
nonparty filed a motion to intervene as the new titleholder to whom the
previously overinflated valuation would apply in the absence of intervention.
Id., 804. The trial court denied the motion, and the would-be intervenor
appealed to this court. Id., 804–807. Although the previous owner’s tax
appeal was no longer pending before the trial court, this court determined
that the appeal from the denial of the motion to intervene was not moot
because relief was possible by directing the trial court to amend the judgment
to extend the lower valuation to the new titleholder of the property. Id., 804–
805.
   6
     General Statutes § 49-15 (a) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any judgment
foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may . . . be opened
and modified . . . provided no such judgment shall be opened after the
title has become absolute in any encumbrancer . . . .’’