Court Opinion

ID: 9810669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:55:52.245005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:08.592361
License: Public Domain

Winborne and Denny, JJ.,
concurring in dissenting opinion: We fully concur in what is said in the dissenting opinion of Stacy, C. J., but desire to say also, if the question were properly before us, we might not have any quarrel with the majority view that the expenses incurred in question here, might fall within that class of expenditures that come within the definition of “necessary expenses,” within the meaning of Art. VII, sec. 7, of the Constitution of North Carolina. But if this Court is going to decide both questions of law and fact involved in what is “necessary expense” and when such expense is a necessary one for a particular locality, then governing authorities of municipalities may find themselves confronted with a mandamus to require them to send all their officers to a police school at public expense, whether they think it proper to do so or not.
None of our predecessors has said that what constitutes a necessary expense of a municipal corporation is purely a question of law. If it is purely a question of law, the governing bodies of municipal corporations are divested of any discretion or authority in the matter except to provide funds, and will on mandamus be liable to be required to provide for expenses which they might not in their sound discretion authorize.
We do not agree with the majority opinion that the allegation in the complaint to the effect that the expenses incurred in sending P. R. *463Kitchin, a policeman of the Town of Weldon, to the National Police Academy, in Washington, D. C., were not necessary expenses of the Town of Weldon, is merely a conclusion of law and is therefore not admitted by the demurrer. Such a conclusion is not in accord with our decisions. The term “necessary expense” includes both law and fact. Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C. 269, 132 S. E. 25. What is necessary expense is for the courts to decide, but whether or not an expenditure which the courts have declared falls within the class of “necessary expenses” is a necessary expense for a particular municipal corporation, must be determined by the governing authorities of such corporation in their sound discretion. Insurance Co. v. Guilford County, 225 N. C. 293, 34 S. E. (2) 430; Power Co. v. Clay Co., 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E. 603; Sing v. Charlotte, 213 N. C. 60, 195 S. E. 271; Palmer v. Haywood County, 212 N. C. 284, 193 S. E. 668; Starmount Co. v. Hamilton Lakes, 205 N. C. 514, 171 S. E. 909; Henderson v. Wilmington, supra; Storm v. Wrightsville Beach, 189 N. C. 679, 128 S. E. 17; Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 47 S. E. 400; Black v. Comrs., 129 N. C. 121, 39 S. E. 818; Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244. In the last cited case, Pearson, C. J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Who is to decide what, are the necessary expenses of a county? The county commissioners; to whom are confided the trust of regulating all county matters. 'Repairing and building bridges’ is a part of the necessary expenses of a county, as much so as keeping the roads in order, or making new roads; so the case before us is within the power of the county commissioners. IIow can this Court undertake to control its exercise? Can we say, such a bridge does not need repairs; or that in building a new bridge near the site of an old bridge, it should be erected as heretofore, upon posts, so as to be cheap . . . ? In short, this Court is not capable of controlling the exercise of power on the part of the General Assembly, or of the county authorities, and it cannot assume to do so, without putting itself in antagonism as well to the General Assembly, as to the county authorities, and erecting a despotism of five men; which is opposed to the fundamental principles of our government, and the usages of all times past. For the exercise of powers conferred by the Constitution, the people must rely upon the honesty of the members of the General Assembly, and of the persons elected to fill places of trust in the several counties. This court, has no power, and is not capable if it had the power, of controlling the exercise of power conferred by the Constitution, upon the legislative department of the government, or upon the county authorities.”
Also in Black v. Comrs., supra, the plaintiff alleged that certain expenditures made by the County Commissioners were not for necessary expenses; the defendants in their answer alleged they were; whereupon this Court held the pleadings “raised an issue of fact which the Judge *464is not authorized to try.” The Court said further: "'The defendant, probably seeing this trouble in its case, contended that the Court would presume that the Commissioners acted properly, and that the notes were given for necessary expenses of the county, and cited McCless v. Meekins, 117 N. C. 34, as authority for this contention. But that was where it was not denied but what that indebtedness was based upon the necessary expenses of the county; and this being so, the Court presumed that it was. But where there is an allegation and denial as to whether they were or were not for necessary expenses, the Court can presume nothing.”
In the instant case we have no finding' one way or the other by the governing authorities of the Town of Weldon, but the defendants, who are the members of the governing board of the Town of Weldon, have elected to demur to the complaint rather than answer and go to trial on the issues raised by the pleadings. Therefore, as we construe the pleadings, we are faced with an allegation that the expenditure was not a necessary expense for the Town of Weldon and an admission that the allegation is true. Even so, the majority opinion not only holds that expenses incurred in training a police officer fall within the class of expenditures that are “necessary expenses,” within the meaning of our Constitution, but goes further and finds in the face of the admission to the contrary, that such expense is a necessary one of the Town of Weldon.
In the case of Wilson v. Charlotte, 206 N. C. 856, 175 S. E. 306, the City of Charlotte undertook to issue bonds for the purpose of erecting a fire drill tower, to be used in training firemen. The resolution authorizing the bond issue did not recite that such a tower was a “necessary expense” of the City of Charlotte, neither did the trial Judge so find, but on the contrary in the order entered therein the trial Judge stated “the Court is of opinion . . . that the construction of the fire drill tower is not a necessary expense for the City of Charlotte,” and there being no exception to such finding of fact, this Court affirmed the judgment. The Court in the face of such finding, which surely could be no stronger than the admission by demurrer here, did not reach the question as to whether or not expenditures for a fire drill tower fall within the class of expenditures which are “necessary expenses,” within the meaning of our Constitution. Neither do we, in our opinion, reach the question in this case.
We do not think this Court should usurp the fact finding powers vested exclusively in local municipal authorities, and it has never done so until now. The citizens of our respective municipal corporations have the right to expect and require the governing authorities of such corporations to determine in their sound discretion whether or not a given expense is necessary for that particular locality, and when the governing authorities have determined that an expenditure is a necessary expense for a locality, such finding, made in good faith, is binding on the courts if such expense *465falls within the category of necessary expenses. Black v. Comrs., supra. However, the governing body of the Town of Weldon has made no such finding with respect to the expenditure involved in this action.
We think the demurrer should have been overruled, and we so vote.
Addendum.
Since writing the above, the last two pages of the majority opinion, except the paragraph beginning on the preceding page, have been added. In this, they seem to try to say just the opposite to what the opinion decides. The case of Black v. Comrs., supra, is directly pertinent on the point at issue.