Court Opinion

ID: 9963589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 19:28:16.078451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:52.864821
License: Public Domain

J-A05043-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MALEAK J. HAINES                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 133 EDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 22, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0005616-2018

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 25, 2024

       Maleak J. Haines (“Haines”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following the revocation of his probation. We affirm.

       We briefly summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this

case as follows. In 2018, the trial court accepted Haines’ negotiated guilty

plea to aggravated assault and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”),1

for physically assaulting Tyriqua Washington, the mother of his five-year old

daughter, by stabbing her with a screwdriver and hitting her with a hammer.

See N.T., 11/22/21, at 3-4, 28. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial

court sentenced Haines to nine to twenty-three months of imprisonment

followed by five years of reporting probation with a domestic violence

condition for aggravated assault, and imposed a concurrent sentence of nine

to twenty-three months followed by three years’ probation to be supervised
____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4), 907(a).
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by the domestic violence unit of the probation department for PIC.2 Id. at 3-

4. In October 2019, the trial court granted Haines’ petition for early parole.

       While on parole and probation, Haines appeared before the trial court

several times for persistent violations.3 See id. at 4. After each hearing, the

trial court permitted Haines’ parole and probation to continue. However, in

December 2020, based on allegations that Haines was physically abusing his

wife, Safira Haines (“Mrs. Haines”), the court issued a probation detainer and

set a violation of probation (“VOP”) hearing for January 25, 2021.      At the

conclusion of the January 25, 2021 VOP hearing, the trial court found Haines

in technical violation of his probation based on the abuse allegations,

continued his probation, and ordered him to have no-negative contact with

Mrs. Haines. Id. at 4-5. Haines did not file a post-sentence motion or appeal

the January 25, 2021 sentencing order.

       In August 2021, the probation department advised the trial court that

[Haines] was violating the [January 25, 2021] no-negative contact order and

was abusing [Mrs.] Haines. Id. at 5. The trial court conducted a VOP hearing

on November 22, 2021 at which Mrs. Haines testified via telephone. The trial

court found Mrs. Haines testimony credible that Haines had physically abused
____________________________________________

2 The maximum sentence for a conviction graded as a second-degree felony,

such as the aggravated assault conviction herein, is ten years’ imprisonment.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(2). The maximum sentence for a conviction graded
as a misdemeanor of the first degree, such as the PIC conviction herein, is
five years’ imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1104(1).

3 To address Haines’ repeated violations, the trial court ordered him to appear

for status hearings on December 10, 2019, March 20, 2020, and July 14, 2020.

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her multiple times since January 25, 2021, while she was pregnant. The abuse

included Haines frequently shooting her with a BB gun, beating her with a

wooden hanger until it broke, punching her in the face so hard that her nose

fractured, and intentionally crashing a car while she was a passenger in it. Id.

at 8-21, 23-24. The trial court also found as credible Mrs. Haines’ testimony

regarding a particular incident in which Haines shot her big left toe with the

BB gun in April 2021, requiring a pellet to be removed at a medical center.

Id. at 11, 13, 19, 21.              In addition, the Commonwealth introduced

photographic evidence of Mrs. Haines’ injuries and her medical records

documenting the injuries.        At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

found Haines in violation of the no-negative contact condition of his probation,

revoked his probation, and resentenced him to two and one-half to five years’

imprisonment for aggravated assault, with no further penalty for PIC. Id. at

24-25, 27.

       Haines timely filed a motion to reconsider his VOP sentence, which was

denied by operation of law. Haines did not initially appeal his VOP sentence.

However, upon filing a timely petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief

Act (“PCRA”)4 Haines’ direct appeal rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc.

Haines thereafter timely appealed from the VOP judgment of sentence. Both

Haines and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Haines raises the following issues for our review:

____________________________________________

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

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       1. Whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to make
          a determination that [Haines] was in technical violation of the
          terms and conditions of his probation, since the “no[-]negative
          contact” order added as a term of [Haines] probation at the
          January 25, 2021 revocation hearing was improper and
          unenforceable, as no evidence of any violation was presented
          at that hearing to allow an amendment to the original probation
          conditions, and the Commonwealth failed to establish [Haines]
          violated any legitimate conditions of his probation during the
          November 21, 2021 revocation hearing, because the [trial]
          court did not have authority or legal basis to add additional
          conditions at the January 25, 2021 revocation hearing.

       2. Whether the sentencing court abused [its] discretion by
          imposing a sentence after a technical probation violation that
          was not based upon the gravity of the violation, the extent of
          [Haines] record, his prospect of rehabilitation, nor an
          assessment of the mitigating and aggravating factors as noted
          in 42 Pa. C.S.[A.] [§[ 9721 of the Sentencing Code.

Haines’ Brief at 7 (issues reordered for ease of disposition).

       In his first issue, Haines purports to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the revocation of his probation.         However, Haines’

sufficiency challenge is premised entirely on his assertion that the trial court

lacked the statutory authority to impose the no-negative contact condition of

his probation following the January 25, 2021 VOP hearing.5

____________________________________________

5 The fact that Haines did not file a post-sentence motion from or seek to
appeal the January 25, 2021 sentencing order does not preclude our review
of his issue, as a claim challenging the legality of a sentence, cannot be
waived. See Commonwealth v. Tustin, 888 A.2d 843 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(holding that failure to file a post-sentence motion does not result in waiver
of a legality of sentencing claim on appeal); see also Commonwealth v.
Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that a challenge to the
legality of sentence is never waived so long as the court has jurisdiction to
address the claim).

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      Importantly, [a]n appeal challenging the statutory authority of the trial

court to modify the conditions of probation presents a question of law

regarding the legality of the sentence, and thus our standard of review is de

novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Whatley,

221 A.3d 651, 653 (Pa. Super. 2019) (holding that if no statutory

authorization exists for a particular condition of a probationary sentence, the

sentence is illegal and subject to correction); cf. Commonwealth v.

Concordia, 97 A.3d 366, 373 (Pa. Super. 2014) (distinguishing a legality of

sentence challenge to probation raised in a Post Conviction Relief Act petition

and holding that such a claim must be raised in the petition). An order placing

a defendant on probation is not a judgment of sentence as that term is

construed for the purposes of procedure. See Commonwealth v. Nicely,

638 A.2d 213, 216-17 (Pa. 1994). Rather, a probation order is conditional by

its very nature and permits a court to alter its terms at any time. Id.

      Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771:

      (a) General rule. — The court has inherent power to at any
      time terminate continued supervision, lessen the conditions upon
      which an order of probation has been imposed or increase the
      conditions under which an order of probation has been
      imposed upon a finding that a person presents an
      identifiable threat to public safety.

                                   ****

      (d) Hearing required. — There shall be no revocation or
      increase of conditions of sentence under this section
      except after a hearing at which the court shall consider the
      record of the sentencing proceeding together with
      evidence of the conduct of the defendant while on

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      probation. Probation may be eliminated or the term decreased
      without a hearing.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(a), (d). (emphasis added).

      Haines argues that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose

the no-negative contact condition of his probation at the conclusion of the

January 25, 2021 hearing.       According to Haines, the trial court “had no

evidence to make a finding that [he] presented an identifiable threat to public

safety,” because the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth at that

hearing was “the testimony of Mrs. Haines, and she vehemently denied that

[Haines] ever physically assaulted or abused her.” Haines’ Brief at 16. Haines

maintains that, without any evidence to establish that he was an identifiable

threat to public safety, the trial court had no legal authority to increase or add

a new condition to his probation pursuant to section 9771(a). On this basis,

Haines argues that the no-negative contact condition was a “legal nullity.” Id.

at 17. Applying this reasoning, Haines asserts that he could not have been

found in violation of an illegal condition of his probation.

      Instantly, on January 25, 2021, the trial court held the required hearing

pursuant to section 9771(d) before it imposed the no-negative contact

condition to Haines’ probation. However, the transcript of that hearing is not

included in the certified record. As the appellant in this matter, it was Haines’

responsibility to order the transcript for the January 25, 2021 hearing and to

ensure that the transcript was included in the certified record. See Pa.R.A.P.

1911(a). We have repeatedly held that our appellate review is limited to those

facts which are contained in the certified record. See Commonwealth v.

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O’Black, 897 A.2d 1234, 1240 (Pa. Super. 2006). Materials which are not

contained in the certified record cannot be considered by an appellate court in

its review of the issues. See Commonwealth v. Lowry, 560 A.2d 781, 785-

86 (Pa. Super. 1989). In this case, because the transcript for the January 25,

2021 hearing is not contained in the certified record, it does not exist for

purposes of our review. See O’Black, 897 A.2d at 1240. Thus, we may not

consider Haines’ unsupported arguments regarding evidence or testimony

which may have been presented at that hearing.

      Nevertheless, we do have the benefit of the trial court’s assurance that,

following the January 25, 2021 hearing, the court specifically determined that

Haines presented an identifiable threat to public safety.     See Trial Court

Opinion, 2/23/23, at 9 (explaining that, “at [the January 25, 2021] hearing,

[the court] used all the professional knowledge the judge had acquire[d] in

nearly three decades on the [b]ench to determine that [Haines] was clearly

an identifiable threat to public safety, specifically to the safety of Mrs.

Haines”). Thus, on the record before us, the trial court properly exercised its

inherent power to increase Haines’ probation conditions pursuant to section

9771(a) when imposing the no-negative contact condition. Accordingly, given

our determination that the trial court did not exceed its statutory authority

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when imposing the no-negative contact condition, Haines’ first issue merits no

relief.6

       In his second issue, Haines challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence.     The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a

sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to

appeal.     See Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa.

Super. 2014). An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s

jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Id. We

conduct this four-part test to determine whether:

       (1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the
       time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the
       appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth
       a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of
       his appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant
       raises a substantial question for our review.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation

omitted).
____________________________________________

6 Mindful that Haines purported to raise a sufficiency challenge, we note that

he has not developed any argument in his brief that the evidence presented
at the November 22, 2021 hearing was insufficient to support a finding that
he violated the no-negative contact condition of his probation. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (stating that the parties’ briefs must include a discussion of each
question raised on appeal along with citation of authorities as are deemed
pertinent); see also Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 811 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (holding that arguments which fail to adhere to our appellate
rules may be considered waived, and arguments which are not appropriately
developed are waived). Moreover, Haines conceded that, had the no-negative
contact condition been properly imposed, the testimony provided by Mrs.
Haines at the November 22, 2021 hearing “is arguably enough to find [him]in
technical violation of his probation.” Haines’ Brief at 16. Thus, any genuine
sufficiency challenge is waived.

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      Here, Haines filed a timely notice of appeal, and he preserved

discretionary sentencing issue in his post-sentence motion. He has also set

forth a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. Therein, Haines claims

that, when imposing his revocation sentence, the trial court failed to consider

the appropriate sentencing factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). See

Haines’ Brief at 8. We conclude that Haines has raised a substantial question

for our review.    See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 995 (Pa.

Super. 2016) (holding that a claim that the VOP court failed to consider the

section 9721(b) factors presents a substantial question for our review).

Accordingly, we will address the merits of Haines’ discretionary sentencing

claim.

      Our standard of review of a probation revocation sentence is well-

settled.   Because [t]he imposition of sentence following the revocation of

probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, we will not

disturb a revocation sentence on appeal unless we determine the trial court

abused that discretion. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1043

(Pa. Super. 2014). An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment—

a sentencing court has not abused its discretion unless the record discloses

that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Id.

      When imposing a probation revocation sentence, the trial court must

follow the general principle that the sentence be “consistent with the

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact

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on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs

of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

      Additionally,

      Upon revoking probation, a sentencing court may choose from any
      of the sentencing options that existed at the time of the original
      sentencing, including incarceration.      [See] 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
      9771(b). However, the imposition of total confinement upon
      revocation requires a finding that either “(1) the defendant has
      been convicted of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the
      defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another
      crime if he is not imprisoned[;] or (3) such a sentence is essential
      to vindicate the authority of the court.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9771(c).

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338 (Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote

omitted).

      In all cases where the trial court resentences an offender following

revocation of probation, the trial court must place its reasons for the sentence

on the record. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); see also Commonwealth v.

Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1040-41 (Pa. Super. 2013). A trial court need not

undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or

specifically reference the statute in question, but the record as a whole must

reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and

character of the offender. See Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280,

1282-83 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      [S]entencing guidelines do not apply to sentences imposed as a result

of probation or parole revocations. See Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770

A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2001). Instead, a VOP sentencing court is limited

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only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally at the

time of the probationary sentence. See Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107

A.3d 21, 27-28 (Pa. 2014).       The rationale for this difference is that a

“convicted defendant released into the community under such control of the

sentencing judge, who violates the terms of his release[,] thereby betrays the

judge’s trust.” Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1131 n.12 (Pa.

2007).   Further, “since the defendant has previously appeared before the

sentencing court, the stated reasons for a revocation sentence need not be as

elaborate as that which is required at initial sentencing.” Pasture, 107 A.3d

at 28; see also Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 446-47 (Pa.

Super. 2018).

      Haines contends that the VOP court abused its discretion by imposing

an excessive sentence without considering the factors set forth in section

9721(b). Haines’ Brief at 14-15. Specifically, Haines asserts that the trial

court failed to consider the gravity of the violation as it relates to the

community and his rehabilitative needs. Haines claims that the trial court only

considered the testimony of Mrs. Haines regarding the incidents and the

nature of the violation. Haines argues that the trial court did not state any

findings upon which the imposition of sentence was based. Haines points out

that he had no new arrests or convictions, was reporting as directed, provided

documentation of employment, completed all required programs while

incarcerated, and had negative drug screens.      According to Haines, when

imposing his revocation sentence, the trial court ignored Haines’ compliance

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with the terms and conditions of his probation and disregarded his redeeming

characteristics.7

       Based on our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court

when resentencing Haines to a period of total confinement for two and one-

half to five years imprisonment upon revocation of his probation. The trial

court heard ample testimony and evidence that Haines repeatedly violated the

no-negative condition of his probation by physically abusing his pregnant wife,

frequently shooting her with a BB gun causing a pellet to lodge in her toe,

beating her with a wooden hanger until it broke, punching her in the face so

hard that her nose fractured, and intentionally crashing a car while she was a

passenger in it. See N.T., 11/22/21, at 8-21; see also Trial Court Opinion,

2/23/23, at unnumbered 3-6.

       Further, the trial court provided its reasons for imposing the revocation

sentence on the record at the VOP hearing:

       [Haines’] probation is revoked. [Haines’] new sentence on the
       aggravated assault is two and a half to five years in state prison.
       No further penalty on the [PIC] with credit for time served . . ..
       The maximum possible sentence is ten years. This sentence of
       two and a half to five in state prison takes into consideration other
       time in custody before today’s date.

                                      ****
____________________________________________

7 Haines additionally argues that all but one of the alleged incidents occurred

prior to the imposition of the no-negative contact order in January 2021.
However, the record reflects that Mrs. Haines testified that each of the alleged
incidents occurred after the no-negative contact provision had been imposed.
See N.T., 11/22/21, at 9-11, 13-15, 20-21 (wherein Mrs. Haines testified that
the alleged incidents occurred in April 2021, June 2021, and August 2021).

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      For the record, this sentence is absolutely necessary because
      [Haines] is a repeated batterer. He is a person who has total
      disrespect for the women who’ve been around him and he has
      total disrespect for this [trial] court. He has not successfully
      completed any of the anger management sessions that would
      assist him in treating the women around him with respect and
      courtesy. [Haines] came before me originally for having beat on
      the mother of his five-year-old daughter. When [Haines] came
      back with M[rs.] Haines and indicated he was a changed man, . .
      . I told [Haines] to keep his hands off his new wife. . . . [Mrs.
      Haines’] testimony has the ring of truth about what was really
      happening in their relationship and that’s who [Haines] is. . . .
      [H]opefully this trip to state prison will assist [Haines] in
      understanding that he has a problem with anger management and
      his treatment of women.

N.T., 11/22/21, at 27-29.

      Based on our review, we conclude that the record as a whole reflects

that the trial court carefully considered the section 9721(b) factors when

imposing its revocation sentence, including the protection of the public, the

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and

on the community, and Haines’ rehabilitative needs.        The trial court was

familiar with Haines, as he had appeared before the court on multiple

occasions and the court knew of his criminal history. The court specifically

noted on the record that Haines is a serial batterer because he was previously

convicted of beating the mother of his minor daughter and, while on probation

for that offense, repeatedly physically abused and assaulted Mrs. Haines.

While Mrs. Haines did not press charges and no conviction resulted from

Haines’ most recent abuses, the record is clear that a sentence of total

confinement was justified since Haines’ conduct indicated that he was likely

to commit another crime if he was not imprisoned.         See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

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9771(c).   At a minimum, the record reflects that a sentence of total

confinement for Haines was necessary to vindicate the trial court’s authority.

Id.

      Thus, as we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in

sentencing Haines to two and one-half to five years’ imprisonment for

aggravated assault based on violations of the no-negative contact condition

of his probation, he is not entitled to relief on his second issue. Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 4/25/2024

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