Court Opinion

ID: 9897664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:19:52.918323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:38.794411
License: Public Domain

10/30/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                         Assigned on Briefs October 10, 2023

            STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GLEN EDWARD MILLER

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marshall County
                  No. 18-CR-28       Forest A. Durard, Jr., Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. M2023-00138-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

The Defendant, Glen Edward Miller, pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two
counts of kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-year effective sentence,
to be served on probation after one year of confinement. In response to the Defendant’s
second proven probation violation, the trial court ordered him to serve the balance of his
sentence in confinement. On appeal from this judgment, the Defendant contends that: (1)
the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to
prove that he violated his probation; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered him to
serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN W.
CAMPBELL, SR., and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Mitchell Aaron Raines, Assistant Public Defender, Appellate Division, Franklin,
Tennessee (on appeal); and Michael J. Collins and William J. Harold, Assistant Public
Defenders, Lewisburg, Tennessee (at hearing) for the appellant, Glen Edward Miller.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Assistant Attorney
General; Robert J. Carter, District Attorney General; and William Bottoms, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION
                                         I. Facts

       This case arises from the Defendant using a weapon in August 2017 to put two
victims in fear and to take their XBOX, XBOX 360, Play Station 4, various games, an
Amazon firestick, and a cellphone. After being indicted for multiple offenses, the
Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two counts of kidnapping.1 The
trial court sentenced him to six years for each conviction, ordering that the robbery
sentences run concurrently with each other and the kidnapping sentences run concurrently
with each other, but the robbery sentences run consecutively to the kidnapping sentences.
The total effective sentence was, therefore, twelve years, to be served at 30%. The trial
court ordered the Defendant to probation after he served one-year day for day. The trial
court entered the judgments of conviction on February 20, 2019. The Defendant’s
conditions of probation included that he not use illegal substances and that he not possess
a weapon.

        On April 3, 2019, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit swearing that
the Defendant had violated his probation. He stated that the Defendant had failed drug
screens for marijuana and cocaine on March 14, 2019 and March 21, 2019. The trial court
entered an agreed order on June 19, 2019, in which it revoked the Defendant’s probation.
The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an additional six months in jail, consecutive
to the sentence that the Defendant was serving at the time for a different conviction, and to
attend a twelve-month drug rehabilitation program after being released from custody.

       In August 2020, another probation violation was filed in which the Defendant’s
probation officer alleged that the Defendant had an active warrant for aggravated burglary
and theft of property and had not verified his employment. After a hearing, the trial court
dismissed the probation violation warrant and gave the Defendant jail credit for his
incarceration between September 13, 2021, and December 15, 2021.

        On November 22, 2022, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging
that the Defendant had violated his probation by possessing a firearm on October 4, 2020,
as evidenced by his charge by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms. The trial court
issued a warrant and held a hearing. At a hearing, the parties presented the following
evidence.

        Matt Thomas, the Defendant’s probation officer, testified that he had supervised the
Defendant since November 2022. He explained that, on February 20, 2019, the probation
office instructed the Defendant to report on February 28, 2019. The Defendant informed
them that he did not have to report because he had not yet served his one year of
incarceration. The probation officer at the time, Mr. Thomas’s colleague, informed the
Defendant that he did, in fact, have to report. The Defendant did not report but did turn
himself into jail to serve his one-year sentence. When he turned himself in to jail, he was
drug screened and tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. He was, therefore, determined
to have violated his probation and sentenced to six months of additional incarceration and
also was instructed to attend a rehabilitation program. Mr. Thomas testified that his file
did not show that the Defendant had attended the required program.

       1
           A transcript of the guilty plea is not included in the record.

                                                        2
        Mr. Thomas testified that he had never had contact with the Defendant for the
duration of his supervision of him. The Defendant was under house arrest and being
supervised by the federal pre-trial probation for his underlying charge. He said that the
Defendant was under federal investigation stemming from him being the victim of a
shooting on October 4, 2020 in Columbia, Tennessee. During the course of the
investigation into the shooting, federal officers discovered the Defendant in possession of
a firearm.

       During cross-examination, Mr. Thomas said that the Defendant had been in jail or
house arrest since Mr. Thomas began supervising him. He said that the federal case had
not yet been resolved.

       Neylan Barber, an officer with the Columbia Police Department testified that he
knew the Defendant from the Defendant’s previous encounters with law enforcement. He
had knowledge of the October 4, 2020, shooting. He testified that he was called to a crime
scene during the early morning hours of October 4, 2020, where he found over twenty shell
casings in the roadway including those expended from a nine-millimeter and forty caliber
weapon. There were over sixteen bullet impressions on the vehicle that was wrecked at
the scene. There were cell phones and a gun visible in the vehicle. Both the Defendant
and his passenger were taken to Maury Regional Hospital with gunshot wounds.

       Officer Barber learned that the vehicle at the scene was registered to Sierra Harmon,
who was the Defendant’s girlfriend. Law enforcement seized the vehicle and obtained a
search warrant for it. The search revealed fingerprints and blood on the gun in the vehicle,
which was found where the Defendant was sitting in the vehicle. DNA testing showed that
the Defendant’s DNA was present on the gun. His fingerprint was additionally found on
the weapon. A search of the phone in the car revealed that it belonged to the Defendant.
On the phone’s camera roll was a “selfie” of the Defendant and what appeared to be the
weapon upon which his DNA was found. The photograph was time stamped four days
before the shooting. Also, on the phone, the officer found messages related to the nine-
millimeter gun, asking for a “stick” for it (which the officer said meant a magazine).

        Officer Barber testified that the Defendant had multiple previous felony convictions,
the first of which was from 2010.

        Officer Barber interviewed the Defendant about the shooting. The Defendant said
that the handgun belonged to the passenger in the vehicle, but he admitted that he had held
the weapon at one point. Federal officials charged the Defendant with the federal offense
of being a felon in possession of a handgun.

                                             3
        During cross-examination, Officer Barber testified that the Defendant originally
told law enforcement that he was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the shooting but
later changed his statement, saying that he was the driver of the vehicle.

      The trial court then admitted into evidence the federal indictment against the
Defendant.

       After the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation. It ordered him
to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration, noting that he be given jail credit for
his incarceration between September 13, 2021, and December 15, 2021, and between
December 4, 2022, and January 11, 2023. In so doing, the trial court found:

              So, it appears from the testimony that there was an incident in
       Columbia, Tennessee where some warring factions got into a gun fight. The
       car that [the Defendant] was riding in got shot up. The car was wrecked.
       The car was determined to belong to [the Defendant’s] girlfriend . . . at the
       time.

               And when officers peered into the wrecked vehicle they were able to
       see cell phones and firearms. So, they got a search warrant and they obtained
       that and sent that information of those items to TBI which came back with
       latent prints on the gun and also DNA leading to [the Defendant].

               [The Defendant] was interviewed and admitted his presence at the
       event. Now we have got what I have deemed a properly authenticated cell
       phone record here on the day before the incident, the date of the incident,
       being October 4 of 2022, the cell phone text message being October 3rd. And
       from this somebody asked, they said they have a 9mm and they want a stick,
       a magazine, and that was the day before the event occurred. Also, it was
       testified one day before the incident occurred extracted from that same phone
       it was a picture of obviously [the Defendant] standing in the kitchen wearing
       some black camo type pants and a red shirt [and] a red hat, at his feet is a
       semi-automatic pistol. [Officer ] Barber testified that it had the same
       characteristics of a Ruger that was found in the vehicle that was wrecked on
       October 4th. And they believe that to be the same weapon laying at the
       [Defendant’s] feet and he should not be anywhere near that weapon being a
       convicted felon. And also laying at his feet looks like 2 bottles of alcohol,
       I’m not sure, and some type of square container. [A]nd that is the day before
       this incident happened.

       The trial court went on to state that the proof inferred that the texts before the
shooting indicated that there were two warring gangs or factions who were meeting to settle
a dispute. It found that the State had “unquestionably met its burden” because the

                                              4
Defendant was in possession of the weapon as evidenced by it being found in a car he was
driving, the weapon having on it his DNA and fingerprint, his text messages the day before
referring to this type of weapon, and the photograph on his phone showing him standing
next to the weapon on the ground. Based upon this, the trial court found that the Defendant
had violated the terms of his probation by being in possession of a weapon.

        It then turned to decide his punishment. The State noted that this was the second
time that the Defendant had been found in violation of the terms of his probation, with a
third violation being dismissed. It further noted that the Defendant’s probation officer had
testified that the Defendant’s reporting and contact had not been what it should be. The
trial court agreed that the Defendant had violated his probation before. It further noted that
the evidence indicated gang involvement and that the actions taken before the shooting
were “preparatory steps taken in the knowledge that there was going to be a fight of some
caliber.” The trial court stated that, considering the seriousness of the infraction, it was
appropriate to order the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration.

       It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals.

                                         II. Analysis

        On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted
hearsay evidence, namely the latent fingerprint report and a DNA report, both from the
weapon found in the vehicle the Defendant was driving; (2) the State presented insufficient
evidence to prove that he violated his probation; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion
when it ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. The State agrees
that the trial court failed to articulate the required “good cause” for admitting the hearsay
evidence but contends the error was harmless. It further contends that the trial court did
not err in any other regard.

        Appellate courts review a trial court’s revocation of probation decision for an abuse
of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness “so long as the trial court places
sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the
consequences on the record.” State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2022). “A
trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical
conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies
reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d
436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). If a trial court fails to state its findings and reasoning for the
revocation on the record, appellate courts may conduct a de novo review if the record is
sufficiently developed, or the appellate court may remand the case for the trial court to
make such findings. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 (citing State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316,
324 (Tenn. 2014)).

                                               5
        Probation revocation is a two-step consideration requiring trial courts to make two
distinct determinations as to (1) whether to revoke probation and (2) what consequences
will apply upon revocation. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 757. No additional hearing is required
for trial courts to determine the proper consequences for a revocation. Id. The trial court’s
findings do not need to be “particularly lengthy or detailed but only sufficient for the
appellate court to conduct a meaningful review of the revocation decision.” Id. at 759
(citing State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 705-06 (Tenn. 2021)).

        “The trial judge may enter judgment upon the question of the charges as the trial
judge may deem right and proper under the evidence adduced before the trial judge.”
T.C.A. § 40-35-311(d)(1). “If the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant has violated the conditions of probation and suspension of sentence, then the
court may revoke the defendant’s probation and suspension of sentence, in full or in part,
pursuant to § 40-35-310.” Id. Notwithstanding subdivision (d)(1), the probation statute
provides for two categories of probation violations, technical and non-technical, with
differing penalties for both. State v. Walden, No. M2022-00255-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL
17730431, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Dec. 16, 2022).

       The following are classified as non-technical violations: a defendant’s commission
of a new felony or a new Class A misdemeanor, a zero-tolerance violation as defined by
the department of correction community supervision matrix, absconding, or contacting the
defendant’s victim in violation of a condition of probation. T.C.A. § 40-35-311(e)(2).
Once a trial court determines that a defendant has committed a non-technical violation of
probation, the trial court may: (1) order confinement for some period of time; (2) cause
execution of the sentence as it was originally entered; (3) extend the defendant’s
probationary period not exceeding one year; (4) return the defendant to probation on
appropriate modified conditions; or (5) resentence the defendant for the remainder of the
unexpired term to a sentence of probation. See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-308(c); -310; -311(e)(2).

       The Defendant contends that the TBI’s latent fingerprint report and DNA report
were not reliable hearsay. Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). In general, hearsay statements are
inadmissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or otherwise by law.”). “Strict rules of evidence do not apply at revocation hearings.”
State v. Lewis, 917 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “Reliable hearsay has been
held admissible in a probation revocation hearing so long as the defendant had a fair
opportunity to rebut the evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Carney, 752 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1988)). In order for hearsay evidence to be deemed admissible, a trial court
must find that “good cause” exists to justify the denial of the right to confront witnesses
and that the hearsay evidence is reliable. State v. Wade, 863 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tenn. 1993).

                                             6
        At the hearing, the Defendant’s probation officer, Mr. Thomas, testified first, and
he started to mention that the Defendant had a firearm in his possession after an
investigation into the October 4, 2020 shooting. The Defendant objected to hearsay, and
the trial court sustained the objection saying that any hearsay admitted would have to be
first deemed reliable. The only other witness, Officer Barber, then testified that he had
sent swabs from the gun and the gun itself to the TBI Crime Laboratory, which found the
Defendant’s DNA and fingerprint on the weapon. The following occurred:

              MR. HAROLD: I am going to object to this.

               THE COURT: I am going to overrule that objection. The officer
       received presumably a report from the TBI about the results of the latent
       prints; is that correct?

              [OFFICER BARBER]: That is correct, sir.

             [THE COURT:] So that in the Court’s mind, a lab report from the TBI
       would be reliable hearsay.

              MR. HAROLD: Is that report here?

              [OFFICER BARBER]: I do have a copy in my file.

              MR. HAROLD: If we could see it.

               THE COURT: You can see it during cross examination. That is the
       distinction from what we had with the last witness and what we have with
       this witness. The last witness was testifying to hearsay but it is not as
       reliable, as I believe a latent print report would be a reliable form of hearsay.

During the State’s further direct examination of Officer Barber, he said that the Defendant
was confronted with the TBI report at which time he stated that the gun belonged to the
passenger in the vehicle but that he had in fact held it at one point, which would explain
his fingerprints on the weapon.

       In overruling the Defendant’s objection to the reports, the trial court stated, “As far
as latent fingerprints and DNA, I deem those are reliable hearsay in this particular case.”

       The trial court made a specific finding that the TBI report was a reliable form of
hearsay. The trial court did not make a finding of “good cause” that would justify the
absence of the TBI crime lab technician who authored the report at the probation revocation
hearing. Rather, the trial court simply noted the lab report was “reliable hearsay,” and
denied the Defendant his right to confront and cross-examine this adverse witness. Some

                                              7
of our decisions conclude that “[a]lthough the trial court did not make a specific finding of
‘good cause’ for the admission hearsay testimony, such a finding was implicit in the trial
court’s words and findings.” See, e.g., State v. Jackson No. W2022-01288-CCA-R3-CD,
2023 WL 2609643, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2023), no perm. app. filed; State v.
Cherry, No. W2015-01084-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 520304, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov.
3, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 8, 2016). Others have held in these circumstances
that the defendant’s confrontation rights were violated when the trial court admitted the lab
report into evidence. See, e.g., State v. Gribbons, M2005-01992-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL
1916811, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., June 14, 2006); State v. Wiley, No. E2004-01463-CCA-
R3-CD, 2005 WL 1130222, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., May 13, 2005) (reversing a
revocation of probation based on hearsay evidence deemed reliable where the trial court
“made no findings concerning the unavailability of the witness, nor did the court make a
specific finding of good cause for the admission of the evidence”). We need not reach that
issue in this case because we determine that any error, if it does exist, is harmless given the
weight of the other evidence admitted.

        Admission of this hearsay testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). It is well-established that a conviction
need not be reversed due to an error of constitutional dimensions as long as the State
demonstrates “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also State v.
Vaughan, 144 S.W.3d 391, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

        In this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that the State had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant
violated his probation by possessing a firearm, even without considering the TBI crime lab
report. The Defendant’s cell phone, which was legally searched, shows that he exchanged
messages referencing his need for a magazine for a weapon days before this shooting. He
is pictured in a self-taken photograph on his cell phone with a weapon that appears to match
the one used in this shooting. At the scene of the shooting, the weapon was found near
where he was sitting. When confronted with the TBI report, the Defendant admitted that
he had held the weapon but said his passenger was the owner of the weapon. Constructive
possession principles aside, the Defendant clearly possessed this weapon, and there is
sufficient evidence to prove that by a preponderance of the evidence even without
consideration of the TBI report. Therefore, we conclude the outcome would not have been
different in this case had the hearsay evidence been precluded. See State v. Watson, No.
M2003-01814-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1562553 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2004), perm.
app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2004); State v. Cline, No. M2000-01674-CCA-R3-CD, 2001
WL 1379877 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2001), no perm. app. filed (both holding the trial
courts’ failure to find “good cause” for denying the defendant’s confrontation rights was
error, but harmless error, in light of other evidence that supported revocation of probation).

                                              8
        In contending that the evidence presented was not sufficient to sustain his violation
of probation, the Defendant notes that there was insufficient proof that the cell phone
belonged to him. He further contends that the picture showing him with the gun is not
sufficient to prove that he possessed the weapon. We find this well-drafted argument
unpersuasive. Tennessee courts recognize that “‘possession’ may be either actual or
constructive.” State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001); see also State v. Bigsby,
40 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). A person constructively possesses an item
when he or she has “the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and
control over [the contraband] either directly or through others.” Shaw, 37 S.W.3d at 903
(quoting State v. Patterson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 445 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)). Constructive
possession has also been described as the “ability to reduce an object to actual possession.”
State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). We have previously found
that a probation violation existed when the defendant had the ability to reduce a handgun
to his actual possession. See, e.g., State v. Fife, No. M2013-02211-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL
2902276, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2014), no perm. app. filed; State v. Griggs, No.
W2005-00198-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1005176, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2006)
(upholding a conviction for possession of a firearm under the principle of constructive
possession, where a firearm was found in the defendant’s house). In this case, even if the
Defendant did not have actual possession, he clearly had constructive possession of this
weapon on multiple occasions.

       The record reflects that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation by
possessing a weapon, which was a non-technical violation for which he faces a federal gun
charge. Accordingly, it was within the trial court’s authority to order the Defendant to
serve his original sentence upon revoking the Defendant’s probation sentence. See T.C.A.
§§ 40-35-308(c); -310; -311(e)(2). The Defendant is not entitled to relief.

                                      III. Conclusion

   Based on the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                              ____________________________________
                                                   ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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