Court Opinion

ID: 9781873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:34:31.525185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.827333
License: Public Domain

Rosen, J.,
dissenting: I join with Justice Beier’s dissent and rationale to remand to the district court for further factual findings and legal conclusions under K.S.A. 59-2136(h). I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with and concern over the apparent lack of consideration of the best interests of the child, A.A.T. While the majority and the other dissents are concerned with protecting the rights and interests of the adoptive parents and natural father, they do not provide for meaningful consideration of the best interests of the child, which I consider the principal issue in this matter. Promoting the best interests of children permeates both statutory and case law. The best interests of a child are the implicit goal of any custody determination and should be considered here, even though K.S.A. 59-2136 did not expressly require the district court to do so.
When this court makes the statutory rights of the adoptive parents and the due process rights of the natural father dispositive, it dehumanizes A.A.T., treating him as if he were a piece of chattel property with no rights and interests of his own. This court has long held, however, that “a child is not in any sense like a horse or any other chattel.” Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 652 (1881). “[A] parent’s right to the custody of a child is not like the right of property, an absolute and uncontrollable right.” 26 Kan. at 652-53.
The United States Supreme Court has held that, unlike chattel, children have independent rights under the Constitution. “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.” Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976). We recently *671recognized this status by holding that juveniles charged with crimes have the same right to a jury trial as adults under the United States and Kansas Constitutions. See In re L.M., 286 Kan. 460, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 186 P.3d 164 (2008).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the need for considering the best interests of the child in a variety of contexts. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 483, 111 L. Ed. 2d 344, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (“Limitations have emerged on the prerogatives of parents to act contrary to the best interests of the child with respect to matters such as compulsory schooling and child labor.”); Palmare v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 80 L. Ed. 2d 421, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984) (“goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44, 61 L. Ed. 2d 797, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979) (minor may obtain judicial consent for medical procedure if the minor shows the desired procedure is in the minor’s best interests).
Not only has the United States Supreme Court emphasized that courts must safeguard the rights of children, this court as well has consistently encouraged weighing the best interests of children in determining custody, stepparent adoption, and paternity. Even where not explicitly required by statute, we have considered the best interests of the child in custody cases.
For example, in In re Adoption of B.G.J., 281 Kan. 552, 558, 133 P.3d 1 (2006), the best interests of the child and bonding between the child and the adoptive parents were considered in addition to custody-determining factors explicitly delineated by the Indian Child Welfare Act. Although the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation expressed its intent to seek custody of B.G.J., the adoption agency placed B.G.J. with her adoptive parents less than 3 weeks after birth. Federal guidelines established a preference for adoptive placement of an Indian child with members of the Indian child’s tribe over nonmembers but allowed for factors which would create good cause to disregard the preference order. Although the guidelines in question did not expressly list the best interests of the child as a consideration, we found the list of factors was not ex*672haustive and the best interests of the child could be taken into account. 281 Kan. at 565. “The best interest of the child remains the paramount consideration, with [the Indian Child Welfare Act] preferences an important part of that consideration.” 281 Kan. at 565.
Likewise, the best interests of A.A.T. deserve consideration here despite the fact that the statute in effect at the time did not expressly instruct the district court to do so.
In numerous other situations, Kansas statutes and supporting case law have consistently included the best interests of the child. See K.S.A. 38-1114(c); Reese v. Muret, 283 Kan. 1, 6-10, 150 P.3d 309 (2007) (determining presumption of paternity; district court must conduct hearing prior to issuing order for genetic testing to determine whether such testing is in best interests of child, even when “child” has attained age of majority); In re Adoption of B.M.W., 268 Kan. 871, 881-82, 2 P.3d 159 (2000) (granting or denying stepparent’s adoption application; best interests of child not controlling factor but may be considered); Parish v. Parish, 220 Kan. 131, 132, 551 P.2d 792 (1976) (determining custody between two fit biological parents; “In determining the right of custody of children between parents, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the children, and all other issues are subordinate thereto.”); In re D.C., 32 Kan. App. 2d 962, 966, 92 P.3d 1138 (2004) (permanent placement determinations after termination of parental rights; “[A] reasonable permanent placement decision necessarily implies a decision that is in the best interests of the child under the circumstances. . . . [T]he court must consider all of the facts and circumstances in light of the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs.”); see also K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 59-2136(d) (best interests of child stepparent adoption). Further, the Supreme Court has observed that state law, which generally governs custody and adoption, has a “general overarching concern for serving the best interests of children.” Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614, 103 S. Ct. 1985 (1983).
While the weight of case law supports promotion of the best interests of the child, and while A.A.T. has an interest in protecting his familial bonds, Justice Beier’s dissent is correct in its statement *673that the statute in effect at the time of the original adoption hearing did not explicitly require weighing A.A.T.’s best interests. The Kansas Legislature has since recognized the need for consideration of the best interests of a child in cases such as this. When the natural father began to contest this adoption, the version of the statute in effect at the time listed seven factors to be considered. K.S.A. 59-2136(h). In 2007, the Kansas Legislature amended the statute in order to explicitly allow the court to “consider and weigh the best interest of the child” in addition to hearing evidence regarding the seven factors. K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 59-2136(h)(2). I do not agree, however, that this amendment implies it is unnecessary to examine the best interests of the child when deciding whether to overturn an adoption in instances prior to the legislative amendment.
Although both the majority and Justice Beier’s dissenting opinion touch on the topic of the best interests of A.A.T., the other dissents do not allow for such consideration, while the majority seems to conclude — without the benefit of fact-finding by the district court — that continuing the adoptive relationship is inherently in A.A.T.’s best interests. The adoptive parents and the natural father focus on protecting their own rights and interests rather than the best interests of A.A.T. — the person who arguably will be most intimately and personally affected by the outcome of this case.
A.A.T. has lived his life in the custody and care of his adoptive parents, who took him home from the hospital after his birth. He is now 4 years old, old enough that removal from the only home he has known would likely be a traumatic event. Psychiatric and other mental health research and evidence has demonstrated that removing a child from the only parents the child has ever known, even if the removal is from adoptive parents to the custody of a natural parent, can be traumatic, painful, and permanently damaging to the child. See Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or SpecterP, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 917, 978 (1991).
When constitutional interests are being considered, “the Court has emphasized the paramount interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257. Courts have recognized that the term “family,” while traditionally *674applying to more formal structures, may be applied to nontraditional family units as well. “[Bjiological relationships are not the exclusive determination of the existence of the family.” Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843, 53 L. Ed. 2d 14, 97 S. Ct. 2094 (1977). While the cases discussed above deal with recognizing the parental liberty interest, they nevertheless show “the Court has found that the relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protection.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 258.
Well over a centuiy ago, this court recognized the importance of considering the child’s well-being when adoptive parents and the natural father both seek custody: “[Once] the child has been left for years in the care and custody of others, who have discharged all the obligations of support and care which naturally rest upon the parent, then, whether the courts will enforce the father’s right to the custody of the child, will depend mainly on the question whether such custody will promote the welfare and interest of such child.” Chapsky, 26 Kan. at 653. Both the majority and the other dissents reject that wisdom in the case now before us.
The majority glosses over A.A.T.’s best interests, and the other dissenting opinions do not take into account the preservation of A.A.T.’s interest in a familial relationship with his adoptive parents. All decline to accept arguments that A.A.T. has a constitutionally protected interest. I do not believe that his best interests are necessarily synonymous with those of either the adoptive parents or the natural father, and I certainly do not agree that those interests should be weighed and determined by this court. See McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566, Syl. ¶ 8, 876 P.2d 1371 (1994) (appellate courts not to weigh evidence or evaluate credibility of witnesses); In re J.D.D., 21 Kan. App. 2d 871, 875-76, 908 P.2d 633 (1995) (in termination cases, appellate courts will not search record and weigh evidence). Rather, I concur with Justice Beier’s dissent in remanding this case for further factual findings and conclusions of law. I part from her dissent in that I believe the best interests of the child should be considered and given weight by the district court when determining whether to set aside the adoption even though such *675consideration is not explicitly set forth in the statute in effect at the time of the adoption proceeding.