Court Opinion

ID: 9579984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:00:37.013011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:56.398742
License: Public Domain

*745HINES, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority opinion violates standards of judicial review and steps beyond the proper role of the judiciary, I respectfully dissent.
The majority states that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding that the level of treatment required in the permit is “the highest and best practicable under existing technology” under Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-6-.03 (2) (b). But in doing so, the majority not only substitutes its own judgment for that of the ALJ, but effectively rewrites the regulation to read “the highest and best possible” rather than “the highest and best practicable.” It is not this Court’s function to perform either task.
The ALJ’s review of the record and of the Environmental Protection Division’s (“EPD”) decision is made de novo. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 616-1-2-.21. Under the proper standard of review, the question for a reviewing court is whether there is any evidence presented to the ALJ to support the ALJ’s findings. See Ga. Dept. of Community Health v. Freels, 258 Ga. App. 446, 447 (576 SE2d 2) (2002), citing Emory Univ. v. Levitas, 260 Ga. 894, 898 (1) (401 SE2d 691) (1991). Unfortunately, the majority has turned this standard on its head; it seeks, and states that it finds, some evidence to support a finding contrary to that of the ALJ. But, the question is not if any evidence opposes the ALJ’s decision, but whether any evidence supports it. What the majority has done is simply substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ.
This Court’s review should determine whether the evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that the technology employed was the highest and best “practicable.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-6-.03 (2) (b). By focusing upon the fact that the effluent levels the plant can achieve are superior to those required under the permit, the majority ignores that role. Essentially, the majority holds that no practicable engineering safety buffer can ever be allowed under a discharge permit; the most stringent level that can be possibly achieved is the only one that may be set forth in the permit. This not only departs from this Court’s proper role, but by completely ignoring the regulatory requirement that the permit’s level of treatment is “the highest and best practicable under existing technology,” effectively rewrites the regulation.
The majority also writes new language into the statutes and regulations concerning the public notice and comment procedure. It is disingenuous of the majority to hold that the ALJ erred in not providing an opportunity for the challengers to show that a “renewed public notice and comment period” was required; there can be no such error because there is no avenue for providing such an opportunity. The majority simply creates its “renewed public notice and comment *746period” out of whole cloth. There is absolutely nothing in the statutes or regulations that even suggests such a process. Rather, the procedural requirements concerning public notice and comment enacted by the proper bodies state otherwise. When a proposed permit is subjected to public comment, EPD determines based on those comments whether any change to the proposed permit is necessary, and if so, those changes are incorporated into any permit issued. See OCGA § 12-5-30; Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-6-.06 (7). If EPD wishes to issue a final permit that differs from a draft permit, the proper requirements are set forth in 40 CFR § 124.17 (a) (1); in such a circumstance, EPD is required to specify in the final permit “which provisions, if any, of the draft permit have been changed in the final permit.” See also Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-6-.06 (7) (b) (1) (iv). Not only does nothing in the statutes or regulations require starting the public notice and comment period anew if EPD has changed the draft permit, but nothing can be read even to authorize such a possibility. The majority opinion simply creates this new procedure because it wishes it to exist.
The fact that the discharge point shown in the final permit has changed from that shown in the draft permit is of no moment. Under the regulations, a change in the specific discharge point does not transform the draft permit into some “new” proposed permit. Rather, under 40 CFR § 124.10 (d) (vii), the public notice of a proposed permit must include “a general description of the location of each existing or proposed discharge point and the name of the receiving water. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) There is no requirement of any designation of a discharge point other than the “general” location.
In embracing its new requirement of a “renewed public notice and comment period,” the majority apparently believes it is advancing public policy considerations. But, there is no discussion or analysis of contrary policy considerations, such as the effect of such a requirement on decision-making bodies; if the permitting process must be started anew whenever an administrative agency makes a change to a proposed permit, the agency could be disinclined to make changes to permits for needed projects, defeating the very purpose of the public notice and comment process. See Intl. Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F2d 615, 632, n. 51 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Of course, the declaration of such policy is best left to the General Assembly. See Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 358 (5) (519 SE2d 210) (1999).
Further, in creating its new regulation, the majority has not even given guidance to the ALJ or other judicial bodies, as to how to determine whether a change in a permit warrants this new “renewed public notice and comment period.” In this case, the ALJ is instructed to hold an evidentiary hearing concerning the “significance” of the change, but to what end and under what standard? The ALJ cannot *747look to the existing regulations or statutes for guidance, for this procedure does not exist there, nor will it find guidance from this Court’s opinion.
Decided November 23, 2004.
Smith, Gambrell& Russell, Stephen E. O’Day, Andrew M. Thompson, Justine I. Thompson, for appellants.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Issac Byrd, Deputy Attorney General, William R. Phillips, John E. Hennelly, Assistant Attorneys General, Alston & Bird, Lee A. DeHihns III, Daniel N. Esrey, William B. Carver, for appellees.
D. Lee Biola, Andrew, Merritt, Reilly & Smith, Paul E. Andrew, Clyde Y Morris, Jr., Harry L. Cashin, Jr., Mary M. Asbill, amici curiae.
In any event, the judiciary is ill equipped to create regulations for the granting of a discharge permit and should not usurp that role.