Court Opinion

ID: 9581753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:18:22.776721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:13.712049
License: Public Domain

Sharpe, J.
(dissenting). The principal issue involved in this case may be stated as follows: Did the trial- court abuse its discretion in granting a partial retrial? The order granting a partial retrial contains the following:
“In his argument to the jury defense counsel made a point of contributory carelessness on the part of the decedent’s mother. This argument, despite the court’s charge that the only question- to be- considered (aside from amount of pecuniary injury) was that of defendant’s negligence, may have been carried into the jury room. - If such assumption be correct then the verdict rests on the false premise of -compromise because the mother’s alleged carelessness could not have been proximately connected with the boy’s death — neither could it have affected the father’s right to damages for pecuniary injury. * * *
“Defendant’s negligence was the sole proximate cause, and consideration of precedent action or inaction of the mother should not "under the court’s instructions have entered jury deliberation, if dt did SO. - -r =
*261“If the verdict be attributed to alternative assumption that the jury decided per defense argument that the father - by his only son’s death sustained no pecuniary loss whatever, it stands equally indefensible. The argument was that necessary deduction of modern-day. cost of maintenance and education of á minor, from prospective worth if any of the minor’s service's, leaves a net loss.”
The reason, for granting a partial retrial is found in the trial court’s opinion filed July 28, 1955, under Court Rule No 60 (1945):
“Assuming defendant had successfully moved, prior to instant application for leave to appeal, for dissolution of such sua sponte order this court undoubtedly and ultimately would be obliged to grant due motion for new trial by plaintiff addressed to any one of the following grounds:
“1. Failure in substantial accord with plaintiff’s request 2 of jury instruction that defendant was guilty of actionable negligence.
“2. Failure of jury instruction complying substantially with plaintiff’s request 6, the substance of which is the rule of implication of pecuniary loss and right to substantial damages as set forth in the Blade Case. 
“3. Failure of the court to eliminate from its instructions reference to or jury consideration of the funeral and burial expense, same having been stipulated as to right and amount and, hence, being no subject of jury consideration or jury assessment.”
It is the rule that the granting of a new trial is discretionary with the trial court except in a case of clear abuse of such discretion. In Fort Wayne & Belle Isle R. Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 110 Mich 173, we held that the trial court has the discretionary power to set aside a verdict and order a new trial if it deems the award insufficient. See, also, Wheeler *262v. Jenison, 120 Mich 422; O’Brien v. Judge of Recorder’s Court of Detroit, 234 Mich 554; Deffenbaugh v. Inter-State Motor Freight Corp., 254 Mich 180. In the case at bar the action was brought under CL 1948, § 691.581 et seq. (Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp § 27.711 et seq.). Section 2 of the statute (CL 1948, § 691.582 [Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp § 27.712]) provides, in part, as follows:
“In every such action the court or jury may give such damages, as, the court or jury, shall deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death.”
The rule relating to the granting or refusal to grant a new trial is not affected by the act under which plaintiff filed his declaration in the above case. In the case at bar the trial court was clearly of the opinion that the verdict of the jury was an injustice to the parties. His reasons for granting a partial retrial as contained in his opinion and order constrains me to hold that his action in so doing was not an abuse of discretion. I therefore concur in the result of the opinion filed by Mr. Justice Smith.
Boyles, J., concurred with Sharpe, J.
Black, J., took no part in the decision of this case.