Court Opinion

ID: 9764838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:41:29.630698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:01.886356
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DUNN, Justice.
This is an appeal of a conviction for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. A jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at confinement for 180 days, probated for 180 days, and a fine of $1,000.
Appellant brings three points of error.
Appellant’s first point of error contends that the trial court committed error by not instructing the jury to return a verdict of not guilty at the conclusion of the State’s case, as the evidence was insufficient to show appellant committed the offense of possession.
Houston Police Officer S.C. Boyce testified that he and his partner observed four cars blocking Silverline Street around 12:45 a.m. on November 2, 1985. Seven people, including appellant, were standing around the cars. When Boyce approached the cars, he saw a tray of “green leafy residue” on the back of one of the cars. Boyce believed that the “green leafy residue” was marijuana. Boyce testified that he shined his flashlight into a Buick, saw on the console of the front seat a plastic bag containing a green leafy substance, opened the car door, and retrieved the bag. He also testified that the appellant was standing next to the driver’s side of the car. The door was closed. He said that he checked the registration of the Buick and discovered that the car was registered to James C. Winter. Officer Boyce’s partner, Mark W. Stephens, testified as to finding marijuana in the car.
At the close of the State’s case, the appellant moved for an instructed verdict based on insufficient evidence. The court at first granted the instructed verdict but later, over appellant’s objection, withdrew its order and allowed the State to reopen *730its case. Further testimony was then introduced, through Boyce, that he asked the appellant “whose car this was,” and that he got “a response” from appellant. Boyce did not say what the response was. Boyce was then asked, “after you got that response, what, if anything, did you do?” Boyce answered, “I placed the defendant under arrest for possession of marijuana.” Later, on being asked if he directed other questions to the appellant, Boyce stated that he asked appellant “[w]ho the marijuana that I recovered from the car belonged to.” He again testified that the appellant “responded” to this question. He did not say what the response was, but testified that as a result of the response, he placed him under arrest. The appellant again requested an instructed verdict, and it was denied.
The appellant did not testify during the guilt-innocence stage of the trial. However, appellant did testify at the punishment phase of the trial that the car belonged to his father; that he had been riding in the car that night; that the marijuana did not belong to him; and that he did not know about the marijuana until after the car stopped, and his friend took some marijuana out of a box that the friend had with him that contained a game. Officer Boyce also testified at the punishment stage as follows:
[Officer Boyce]: I asked him whose marijuana it was there in the car. [Prosecutor]: What did he tell you when you asked that question as to whose bag of marijuana it was?
[Officer Boyce]: He told me that it was his.
Generally, the law in Texas is that if a defendant does not testify at the guilt stage of the trial, but does testify at the punishment phase of the trial and admits his guilt to the crime for which he has been found guilty, he has for legal purposes entered the equivalent of a plea of guilty. Such a defendant waives a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and waives any non-jurisdictional error that might have occurred during the trial. DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).
In this case, the appellant did not testify at the guilt stage of the trial, but did testify at the punishment phase of the trial. However, he did not admit guilt to the crime for which he had been found guilty. Therefore, the appellant has not waived the error complained of, nor has he waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, we will consider only the evidence introduced at the guilt stage of the trial to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.
In determining sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465, 471 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (op. on reh’g).
To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove: (1) that appellant exercised care, custody, control, and management over the substance; and (2) that appellant knew the substance was contraband. Rhyne v. State, 620 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Naquin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 583 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Possession describes the accused’s relationship to the property. Phelps v. State, 623 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
Where there is an absence of direct evidence that an accused was in exclusive possession of a narcotic, the possession, if any, must be proven by circumstances tending to connect the accused to the offense. Abercrombie v. State, 528 S.W.2d 578, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); Collini v. State, 487 S.W.2d 132, 135-136 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). Various facts and circumstances may be used to prove that the accused and another acted together in jointly possessing a controlled substance. Oaks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). However, mere presence at the *731scene of an offense, or even knowledge of an offense, does not make one a party to joint possession. Waldon v. State, 579 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
The evidence must affirmatively link the accused to the offense in such a manner and to such an extent that a reasonable inference arises that the accused knew of the contraband’s existence and exercised control over it. Dubry v. State, 582 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). However, the circumstances affirmatively linking the accused must also exclude alternative reasonable hypotheses beyond a reasonable doubt, because a finding of guilt is not a rational finding if the evidence supports an inference other than appellant’s guilt. Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d at 471; Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450, 456-457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (op. on reh’g); Oaks v. State, 642 S.W.2d at 179; Cameron v. State, 703 S.W.2d 254 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, pet. ref’d).
The State attempts to prove control and knowledge by a possible inference to be drawn by the trier of fact in support of the officer’s arrest of the appellant, induced from an inferred response of the appellant. There are no direct facts to support these inferences. In this case, appellant was in the area where the drug was found, but was not found to be in personal possession or exercising control over the marijuana. There is no evidence showing that the appellant owned or had control over the automobile, even though his last name was the same as that of the registered owner. There was no evidence of furtive gestures toward the contraband, no attempt to escape, no evidence that the appellant was under the influence of marijuana or other drugs, and no incriminating statements. Compare Reyes v. State, 575 S.W.2d 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Humason v. State, 699 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. pending). The evidence in the present record amounts to a suspicion of guilt through the stacking of inferences, and is, therefore, insufficient to sustain the conviction. Oaks v. State, 642 S.W.2d at 179.
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that there is insufficient evidence to support the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s first point of error is sustained.
Because of our ruling on appellant’s first point of error, we need not address his second and third points of error.
The judgment of conviction of the appellant, Joseph Anthony Winter, is reversed and reformed to show acquittal. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978).
COHEN, J., concurs.