Court Opinion

ID: 9895828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:01:41.392864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:42.227679
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
             C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                          ________________________

                           Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01
                          ________________________

                       In re Gregory P. BANKER
                               Petitioner
                          ________________________

  Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Coram
                                Nobis
                         Decided 8 November 2023
                          ________________________

Military Judge: Gregory E. Pavlik; Shad R. Kidd (post-trial hearing).
Approved sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 2 years, and
reduction to E-1. Sentence adjudged 9 February 2001 by GCM convened
at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas.
For Petitioner: Major Megan R. Crouch, USAF; Major Kasey W. Haw-
kins, USAF; Major Sara J. Hickmon, USAF.
For Respondent: Colonel Naomi P. Dennis, USAF; Major John P. Patera,
USAF; Major Brittany M. Speirs, USAF; Captain Jocelyn Q. Wright,
USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before RICHARDSON, CADOTTE, and ANNEXSTAD, Appellate Mili-
tary Judges.
Senior Judge RICHARDSON delivered the opinion of the court, in which
Senior Judge CADOTTE and Senior Judge ANNEXSTAD joined.
                          ________________________

    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
    precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                          ________________________

RICHARDSON, Senior Judge:
   On 26 January 2022, Petitioner, through counsel, filed with this court a
Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis.
                       In re Banker, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01

Petitioner requested this court issue “a writ of error coram nobis setting aside
his 9 February 2001 conviction, as it was based upon false testimony.”
    On 6 February 2023, we returned the record for a hearing in accordance
with United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411 (C.M.A. 1967) (per curiam). In re
Banker, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01, 2023 CCA LEXIS 61, at *8 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 6 Feb. 2023) (unpub. op.). We asked that the detailed military judge con-
ducting the hearing make findings of fact on Denedo1 factors (3) and (4), spe-
cifically addressing:
        (1) The circumstances surrounding LG’s recantation(s) of her
        testimony from Petitioner’s court-martial, including when Peti-
        tioner learned that LG was recanting. (Denedo factor (3)).
        (2) The circumstances leading to Petitioner filing his Petition for
        Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Error Coram
        Nobis in January 2022, nearly 21 years after his conviction.
        (Denedo factor (3)).
        (3) The circumstances relating to LG’s 28 October 2021 affidavit
        statement2 that LG would have admitted her allegations were
        untrue to any investigator or participant to the court-martial,
        had she been asked directly, before Petitioner was convicted.
        (Denedo factor (4)).
Id. at *8–9. Understanding that in consideration of the Denedo factors, evi-
dence relating to LG’s veracity and Petitioner’s underlying request may be re-
vealed, we specifically did not request findings of fact on the merits of Peti-
tioner’s request for a new trial.
    Because we find Petitioner has not met all six threshold requirements for
the court to grant a writ of coram nobis, we do not evaluate whether a new trial
would be warranted. We find a writ should not issue.

                                  I. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-DuBay hearing
   On 9 February 2001, Petitioner was convicted at a general court-martial
composed of officer and enlisted members at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas.
Contrary to his pleas, Petitioner was found guilty of sodomy with a child under

1 Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 126 (C.A.A.F. 2008), aff’d, 556 U.S. 904 (2009).

2 Specifically, LG states, “During the trial, on cross-examination, I admitted that I had

provided inconsistent and false statements to investigators, but I never directly was
asked or made [Petitioner’s] defense counsel aware that my allegations were false.”

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                       In re Banker, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01

the age of 16 years on divers occasions and sodomy on divers occasions, in vio-
lation of Article 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 925; and indecent acts with a child under the age of 16 years on divers occa-
sions, indecent acts with another on divers occasions, and adultery on divers
occasions, in violation of Article 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934.3,4 The offenses
involved LG, who testified as the primary government witness. The court mem-
bers sentenced Petitioner to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for two
years, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority approved the
adjudged sentence. On 8 October 2002, this court modified the specification of
indecent acts with a child and set aside the finding of guilty to the specification
of indecent acts with another. United States v. Banker, 57 M.J. 699, 706 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 2002). Additional history of Petitioner’s case is detailed in our
6 February 2023 opinion. See In re Banker, unpub. op. at *2–5.
    In his petition, Petitioner argued we should issue the writ because (1) we
have jurisdiction, (2) issuance is “necessary and appropriate,” and (3) “there
are sufficient grounds to grant a new trial due to fraud on the court.”5 Addi-
tionally, Petitioner asserted that “[i]n this case, where LG’s testimony was the
only evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, and no physical evidence corroborated her
testimony, there is sufficient basis for this [c]ourt to grant the writ.” Respond-
ent opposed issuance of the writ. In response to the petition, Respondent con-
ceded that this court has jurisdiction to consider the petition; however, it did
not agree that issuance is necessary and appropriate, or that there are suffi-
cient grounds to grant a new trial due to fraud upon the court.
B. Post-DuBay hearing
    The DuBay hearing was conducted on 30 and 31 May 2023. We received
the military judge’s findings of fact on 5 June 2023 and the record of trial—to
include the DuBay hearing transcript—on 10 July 2023.
   On 15 June 2023, Respondent filed a motion to attach documents. The doc-
uments consisted of (1) a declaration from a trial counsel at Petitioner’s 2001
court-martial (Mr. TJ), along with an email LG sent to Mr. TJ after the DuBay
hearing on 6 June 2023, and (2) a declaration from the senior trial counsel
(STC) at the DuBay hearing, along with an email LG sent to the STC after the

3 References to the punitive articles of the UCMJ are to the Manual for Courts-Martial,

United States (1995 ed.).
4 Petitioner was found not guilty of carnal knowledge under Article 120, UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. § 920.
5 Petitioner does not claim “newly discovered evidence” as grounds for a new trial. Rule

for Courts-Martial 1210(f)(2).

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                     In re Banker, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01

DuBay hearing on 5 June 2023. Respondent asserted the emails from LG “di-
rectly contradict portions of her affidavit filed with this [c]ourt and her testi-
mony during the DuBay hearing, and they assist this [c]ourt in determining
LG’s credibility.” In the email to Mr. TJ, LG references her testimony at the
DuBay hearing regarding a gift she presented to Mr. TJ after Petitioner’s
court-martial, a photo of which was presented at the DuBay hearing. She
states, inter alia,
       This random clock that meant more to a near stranger in 20
       years than I have ever have to him. How am I so stupid, again.
       I really thought if I saved him it would finally save me. But that
       was never gonna be the case, and he knew it.
In the email, LG also apologized to Mr. TJ for involving him in this case. She
states, “I’m so very sorry, that because of me, you now may believe that your
life’s passion for truth and justice for others, may be a little less. Because of
my willingness to lie for him.” LG’s email to the STC primarily consisted of a
comment on part of his closing argument and an apology.
   Petitioner opposed the motion to attach. Petitioner argued “[i]t is unclear
from the emails and declarations how they provide context to or demonstrate
potential influence on LG’s testimony at the hearing.” Additionally, quoting
United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 137, 444 (C.A.A.F. 2020), he argued they “are
not ‘necessary for resolving issues raised by materials in the record’ because
there is no discernable contradiction or revelation of improper influence.” The
court granted Respondent’s motion on 26 July 2023.
    On 22 June 2023, Petitioner filed a motion to strike portions of the military
judge’s findings of fact. He asserted that the military judge exceeded the scope
of our order when he made conclusions of law. Respondent opposed the motion,
arguing that this court “is not bound by those conclusions of law.” We denied
Petitioner’s motion on 29 June 2023.
    Petitioner identified three assignments of error post-DuBay hearing: (1) the
DuBay-hearing military judge exceeded the scope of this court’s order by mak-
ing conclusions of law; (2) valid reasons exist for Petitioner not seeking relief
earlier (Denedo factor 3); and (3) the new information presented in the petition
could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence
prior to the original judgment (Denedo factor 4).
    Respondent challenged Petitioner’s post-DuBay assignments of error. Re-
spondent asserted: (1) the military judge did not exceed the scope, and even if
he did, this court reviews conclusions of law de novo; (2) Petitioner attempted
to hire but did not fully pay attorneys to assist him, had a “laissez-faire atti-
tude” toward pursuing relief, and should have known how to find more effective

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                     In re Banker, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01

avenues for relief; and (3) because LG did not lie at Petitioner’s court-martial,
no evidence existed to discover.

                                    II. LAW
    The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), grants this court authority to issue
extraordinary writs. Loving v. United States, 62 M.J. 235, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005)
(citing Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534 (1999)). “The writ of coram
nobis is an ancient common-law remedy designed ‘to correct errors of fact.’”
United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 910 (2009) (quoting United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507 (1954)). Appellate military courts have jurisdiction
over “coram nobis petitions to consider allegations that an earlier judgment of
conviction was flawed in a fundamental respect.” Id. at 917. The writ of coram
nobis is an extraordinary writ and an extraordinary remedy. Id. It should not
be granted in the ordinary case; rather, it should be granted only under cir-
cumstances compelling such action to achieve justice. Id.; Morgan, 346 U.S. at
511; Correa-Negron v. United States, 473 F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1973).
    Although a Petitioner may file a petition for a writ of coram nobis at any
time, to be entitled to issuance of the writ, he must meet the following thresh-
old requirements:
       (1) the alleged error is of the most fundamental character; (2) no
       remedy other than coram nobis is available to rectify the conse-
       quences of the error; (3) valid reasons exist for not seeking relief
       earlier; (4) the new information presented in the petition could
       not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable dil-
       igence prior to the original judgment; (5) the writ does not seek
       to reevaluate previously considered evidence or legal issues; and
       (6) the sentence has been served, but the consequences of the
       erroneous conviction persist.
Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 126 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citations omitted),
aff’d, 556 U.S. 904 (2009).
    “This court uses a two-tier approach to evaluate claims raised via a writ of
coram nobis. First, petitioner must meet the aforementioned threshold re-
quirements for a writ of coram nobis. If petitioner meets the threshold require-
ments his claims are then evaluated under the standards applicable to his is-
sues.” Chapman v. United States, 75 M.J. 598, 601 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2016)
(citing Denedo, 66 M.J. at 126). “Recantations of trial testimony are viewed by
federal courts with extreme suspicion.” United States v. Rios, 48 M.J. 261, 268
(C.A.A.F. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Military
courts have held that a request for a new trial should not be granted unless
“the court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material

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                      In re Banker, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01

witness is false.” See, e.g., See United States v. Cuento, 60 M.J. 106, 112
(C.A.A.F. 2004) (quoting Rios, 48 M.J. at 268) (additional citation omitted).
    Regarding the third Denedo requirement, a petitioner who has the infor-
mation needed to raise his claim must explain a delay in not seeking relief
earlier. See Bergdahl v. United States, No. 21-418, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
127510, at *78, *83–84 (D.D.C. 25 Jul. 2023). In a “clear case of actual inno-
cence, [ ] a delayed coram nobis petition should not ordinarily bar relief.”
United States v. Lesane, 40 F.4th 191, 201 (4th Cir. 2022) (finding valid reasons
for delay where petitioner’s innocence of the underlying crime based on a
change in the law was not disputed).

                                  III. ANALYSIS
    We find that Petitioner has failed to satisfy at least one coram nobis thresh-
old requirement, and that “the failure to meet any one alone warrants a denial
of Petitioner’s writ.” Chapman, 75 M.J. at 601. Therefore, we do not reach the
issues of whether LG’s recantations are credible or whether a new trial is war-
ranted.6 We address the issues specified for the DuBay hearing, relating to
Denedo factors (3) and (4), and conclude valid reasons do not exist for Appellant
not seeking relief from this court until 2022.
A. Affidavits Accompanying Petition
     In his petition, Petitioner failed to show valid reasons for not seeking relief
earlier. In the affidavits accompanying his petition, Petitioner is silent about
when and how he came to learn about LG’s recantation. In her affidavit dated
28 October 2021, LG stated “[her] role in [Petitioner’s] wrongful conviction has
weighed on [her] for decades, but [she] did not know what to do or how to fix
it.” LG continued, stating:
       In May of 2017, I was travelling on business in the area in which
       [Petitioner] currently lived. I was able to locate a phone number
       and contacted him via text. He agreed to meet with me, and we
       had a discussion, about events that occurred. I had not had any
       contact with [Petitioner] from the time of his court-martial.

6 While we are not convinced LG was untruthful at Petitioner’s trial, we allow that a

claim of perjured testimony may constitute an alleged error of the most fundamental
character.

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                         In re Banker, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01

B. DuBay Hearing Findings of Fact7
    1. Due Diligence
    Respondent asserts that because LG told the truth in her testimony at Pe-
titioner’s trial, no lie existed to be discovered through due diligence. We need
not determine LG’s credibility to resolve this issue. Instead, based on our de
novo review, we find Denedo factor (4) was met. We concur with the military
judge’s findings on this factor:
           LG’s willingness to state that her allegations against [Peti-
           tioner] were untrue . . . could not have been discovered through
           the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to the original judg-
           ment because, after she overcame her initial reluctance to par-
           ticipate in the investigation and prosecution, LG was not willing
           to state [that her allegations were untrue] until well after [Peti-
           tioner] was convicted. After her initial claims to [Air Force Office
           of Special Investigations] agents that nothing happened, she
           would not have stated her allegations were untrue to any inves-
           tigator or participant to the court-martial before [Petitioner] was
           convicted regardless of how directly she was asked.
    2. Delay
    LG sought out Petitioner around May 2017. “She had maintained some
awareness of his whereabouts in the years since the trial.” She messaged Peti-
tioner, and they arranged to meet in person—according to LG, so she could get
“closure.” The military judge noted that despite the fact that LG
           was a person who sexually abused [Petitioner’s] son and wrong-
           fully accused [Petitioner] of sexually abusing her, leading to
           wrongful convictions, divorce, severing of most family and social
           ties, two years in prison, loss of military retirement pay and ben-
           efits, and all the negative repercussions stemming from having
           to register as a sex offender, . . . [Petitioner] asserted he agreed
           to go out of his way to meet LG.
At the meeting, Petitioner and LG “discussed the investigation, trial, and their
lives since the trial for several hours” and “LG deepened or rekindled a connec-
tion with [Petitioner] during this conversation.” After the meeting, LG felt bet-
ter about her participation in Petitioner’s court-martial.
   “LG and [Petitioner] became close over the next few years.” The military
judge related specifics about their relationship, including how, where, and how

7 Unless otherwise noted, we quote the military judge’s findings of fact throughout this

section.

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                     In re Banker, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01

often they communicated; hiding or sharing their relationship with their fam-
ilies; and supporting each other through health issues. The military judge con-
cluded that, “[a]t the time of the hearing, LG was emotionally attached to [Pe-
titioner] and considered him to be her closest friend. This attachment seemed
particularly important to LG because she asserted she did not have other
friends and evinced negative feelings toward at least some of her family mem-
bers.”
    “[S]ometime between May and November 2017, LG told [Petitioner] she
had lied and that she wanted to fix it and make things right.” Both Petitioner
and LG took steps to that end. Petitioner consulted legal counsel, who advised
him that an affidavit from LG would be helpful. “Thus, [Petitioner] knew relief
was possible and the basic elements required for seeking relief by late 2017.”
Petitioner relayed this to LG, who on 6 November 2017 provided an affidavit
to Petitioner, who in turn provided it to his legal counsel. Petitioner could not
afford the services of this legal counsel, so he found another legal counsel in
February 2018. Petitioner’s case appears to have languished with this second
legal counsel and Petitioner “eventually ended his professional relationship
with [the second counsel] in March 2021, after [three] years with no demon-
strable progress toward seeking relief.”
    Meanwhile, “LG took steps to assist [Petitioner] in seeking relief. She con-
tacted at least two of the attorneys, one defense counsel and one prosecutor
[Mr. TJ], who worked on the court-martial. She also contacted JAJA [Air Force
Appellate Defense Division].”
       Through her efforts, [Petitioner] learned he could work with
       JAJA to seek relief, and he pursued that option beginning in late
       2020 or early 2021. LG swore to multiple affidavits in 2021, and
       [Petitioner] swore to an affidavit in late 2021. LG’s most recent
       affidavit and [Petitioner’s] affidavit were used in the petition
       [Petitioner] filed with the [Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals]
       in January 2022.
The military judge concluded by noting Petitioner’s previous experience with
JAJA and the appellate courts: “[D]espite his own experience with attorneys
from the original trial and a lengthy appellate process, reaching out to any of
his former attorneys apparently never occurred to him, even though it did oc-
cur to LG.”

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                       In re Banker, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-01

    We find Petitioner's reliance on his first two legal counsel is not a valid
reason for delay in this case.8 We conclude, as the military judge did, that Pe-
titioner “knew of LG’s willingness to recant as early as mid-2017, had been
advised that he should prepare a statement of facts, and had been told there
was a way to seek relief by late 2017.” Thereafter, Petitioner failed to fully pay
or to follow-up with counsel in a timely manner. Additionally, LG not only co-
operated with Petitioner post-recantation, she contacted several attorneys on
his behalf and signed three affidavits. Petitioner’s own ignorance of the need
to pursue post-recantation coram nobis relief with a sense of urgency does not
itself justify his delay. Petitioner has failed to show a valid reason existed for
his delay in filing this petition with our court post-recantation.

                                  IV. CONCLUSION
   The Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Error Co-
ram Nobis dated 26 January 2022 is hereby DENIED.

                       FOR THE COURT

                       CAROL K. JOYCE
                       Clerk of the Court

8 Even if Petitioner’s Air Force appellate defense counsel for this writ acted with haste,

Petitioner cannot justify the delay between learning of LG’s recantation and receiving
her first affidavit in November 2017 and contacting JAJA around three years later.

                                            9