Court Opinion

ID: 9672713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:59:10.890284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.946335
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C.J.
(dissenting). In McGhee v GMC Coach & Truck Division, General Motors Corp, 98 Mich App 495, 505; 296 NW2d 286 (1980), we held that, where a suit by an aggrieved buyer alleges injury which consists of damages to the goods themselves, the buyers’ sole remedies are those which are provided in the Uniform Commercial Code. MCL 440.2313; MSA 19.2313 thru MCL 440.2315; MSA 19.2315. Although McGhee, supra, involved a case in which a contractual relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant, I do not believe that the holding in McGhee, supra, should be limited to only those cases in which the relationship between the parties is contractual. In Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich *4485, 98; 133 NW2d 129 (1965), the Supreme Court held that in a breach of warranty action it is unnecessary to establish vertical privity of contract between the manufacturer and purchaser. The rule stated in Piercefield, supra, applies even where the loss is solely economic. Cova v Harley Davidson Motor Co, 26 Mich App 602; 182 NW2d 800 (1970). The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code did not alter those decisions. See Official UCC Comment to §2-318; Cova, supra. Therefore, since the protections of the Uniform Commercial Code exist even where a remote seller is the named defendant, I am of the opinion that plaintiffs negligence claim should be barred for the reasons stated in McGhee, supra.
Even assuming that McGhee, supra, does not bar plaintiff’s negligence claim, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiffs strict liability claim. Strict liability has not been recognized as a viable theory of recovery in Michigan. Johnson v Chrysler Corp, 74 Mich App 532, 535; 254 NW2d 569 (1977); Hartford Fire Ins Co v Walter Kidde & Co, Inc, 120 Mich App 283, 291; 328 NW2d 29 (1982).
Finally, I am of the opinion that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiffs breach of warranty claim. I am in agreement with the trial court’s conclusion that the use of the language "as is” in the contract entered into between the seller and plaintiffs subrogors operated to exclude all implied warranties given by the seller to plaintiff. MCL 440.2316; MSA 19.2316; McGhee, supra. However, I do not believe that the inclusion of that language in the sales agreement plaintiff’s subrogors entered into with the seller operated to exclude the implied warranties given by defendant Chrysler, the manufacturer.
*45A purchaser’s cause of action for breach of implied warranty against the manufacturer is direct and does not depend on the existence of a contract between the manufacturer and the purchaser. Cova, supra; Gauthier v Mayo, 77 Mich App 513, 515-516; 258 NW2d 748 (1977). I perceive no cogent reason for permitting a manufacturer to avoid a breach of warranty claim merely by resorting to language contained in an agreement to which it was not a party and in which there was no reference to the agreement.
I do not mean to suggest by the foregoing that a seller may never include language in its contract with the purchaser excluding a manufacturer’s implied warranties. However, the agreement entered into between the seller and plaintiff did not contain such an exclusion.
I would affirm the trial court’s decision with respect to the negligence claim and the strict liability claim. I would reverse and remand for trial on the breach of warranty claim.