Court Opinion

ID: 9530142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:57:36.293861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:00.428273
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — I would affirm the Superior Court for Snohomish County's decision directing the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (the Board) to strike the physicians' testimony in the case of respondents Gloria Twombley and Warren Vankeirsbilck, and reverse the Superior Court for Grays Harbor County's decision refusing to strike the testimony of appellant Holbrook's treating physicians.
lb hold that the policies enumerated in Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wn.2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988) do not apply to injured workers is incongruent with the policy and intent of RCW Title 51, the Industrial Insurance Act. Indeed, the purpose of RCW Title 51 was to make workers' compensation claims easier for the worker to pursue. The Legislature certainly *316would not have countered this purpose by curbing the victims' privacy with their own physicians. This destruction of the physician-patient privilege in workers' compensation claims would, in fact, have a deterrent effect on injured workers wanting to pursue a claim.
The Industrial Insurance Act does not eliminate the physician-patient privilege because the policies underlying Loudon apply to workers' compensation cases; ex parte communications between defense counsel and the treating physician should be prohibited in workers' compensation cases as a violation of the physician-patient privilege. The Loudon decision prohibiting ex parte contact between defendant's attorney and plaintiff's treating physician should extend to proceedings before the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. Furthermore, RCW Title 51 should not be interpreted to eliminate the physician-patient privilege.
The issue presented is whether the Loudon decision applies to workers' compensation cases before the Board. We need not decide whether ex parte communications are allowed at the Department of Labor and Industries (Department) level, as all three claimants' disputes involve ex parte communications with their physicians which occurred at the Board level.
I
Public policy arguments in Loudon dictate that RCW Title 51 should not be construed to allow ex parte communications between a worker's physician and the defendant's attorney. The Loudon holding is premised on the protection of the physician-patient privilege in general — not just in personal injury cases. The Loudon court did not announce a narrow rule in stating that, "We hold that ex parte interviews should be prohibited as a matter of public policy", Loudon, at 677, and that, "We hold that defense counsel may not engage in ex parte contacts with a plaintiff's physicians." Loudon, at 682. Rather, the court stressed the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship and the importance of protecting the privilege. The court wrote that, *317"The relationship between physician and patient is 'a fiduciary one of the highest degree . . . involv[ing] every element of trust, confidence and good faith.'" Loudon, at 679 (quoting Lockett v. Goodill, 71 Wn.2d 654, 656, 430 P.2d 589 (1967)). Thus, the policies enumerated in Loudon should be taken into account in construing RCW Title 51's application to ex parte communications with the injured worker's physician.
The court in Loudon presented four policy arguments for prohibiting ex parte communications with physicians:
1. The opposing party will have access to irrelevant medical information;
2. This access will have a "chilling" effect on physician-patient relationships;
3. Disputes regarding differences between ex parte statements and statements under oath might require the defense attorney to take the stand as an impeachment witness; and
4. The fine line between relevant and irrelevant information might lead to causes of action brought against the physician for inadvertent disclosure of privileged information.
The strongest policy argument against allowing these communications is the first one listed — that such ex parte communications will result in disclosure of extraneous medical information. With the holding in Loudon, however, this worry is eliminated. The presence of plaintiff's attorney eliminates the fear that the physician might inadvertently disclose irrelevant information.
It is argued that unlimited access to medical information about the injured worker will result in the defense attorney and the employer acquiring confidential information. For-example, in order to ensure a correct diagnosis, the patient tells his/her doctor of problems of alcoholism, or marital difficulties if these personal problems were affecting his/her health. Without the application of Loudon, all of this information could be passed on to the defense attorney and, in tuna, the employer, thus jeopardizing the worker's job security. Allowing this deterrence to occur would undermine the *318purpose of the Industrial Insurance Act. Thus, the holding in Loudon should apply to workers' compensation cases.
II
RCW Title 51 does not eliminate the physician-patient privilege. It is well established, however, that the physician-patient privilege is not of common law origin, but is a creature of statutory law. Phipps v. Sasser, 74 Wn.2d 439, 445 P.2d 624 (1968). See also Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret, 39 Sw. L.J. 661 (1985) (tracing the roots of the privilege in common and civil law systems). One scholar's explanation for this is that in the 16th and 17th centuries in England, medicine was simply a trade, not a profession of high calling, and thus physicians were to be treated like all other witnesses. Shuman, at 673. (The author also notes that even to this day, there is no common law or statutory physician-patient privilege in England.) Shuman, at 674-75. Therefore, because the privilege is created only by legislation, and the Legislature limits its scope as to where it shall and shall not be applicable, such legislation is the sole basis for the privilege.
RCW Title 51 does not eliminate the privilege conveyed under RCW 5.60.060(4). RCW 5.60.060(4) grants the general physician-patient privilege. The majority argues that the workers' compensation statutes totally abolish this privilege. I disagree.
The purpose of Washington's Industrial Insurance Act (the Act) is set forth in RCW 51.04.010. It recognizes that the Act replaces all personal injury causes of actions brought by workers, establishes a "no fault" basis for recovering, and announces that the Act establishes the only "remedy, proceeding, or compensation" for injured workers. This section does not declare that the established rules of evidence concerning physician-patient privileges no longer apply to workers' compensation privileges.
The majority believes it is significant that Loudon began by quoting language in Kime, indicating that the court had *319not been advised of the need for "easier, less formal, and more economical means for securing information". Kime v. Niemann, 64 Wn.2d 394, 396, 391 P.2d 955 (1964). The majority quotes RCW 51.04.010 as, in effect, advising the court of this need for easier access to information. However, the overriding concern in the passage of RCW Title 51, as section 51.04.010 demonstrates, was to improve the remedy of the worker, because the preexisting remedy was "economically unwise and unfair."7 Furthermore, this court has held that, "the guiding principle in construing provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act is that the Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed . . . with doubts resolved in favor of the worker." Dennis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987); Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Carrado, 92 Wn.2d 631, 635, 600 P.2d 1015 (1979).
The majority also declares that RCW 51.04.050 "abolishes" the physician-patient privilege. Yet, this section, entitled "Testimony of physicians not privileged", only requires physicians to testify at hearings, actions or proceedings before the Department or the Board. Black's Law Dictionary defines testimony as "Evidence given by a competent witness under oath or affirmation". (Italics mine.) Thus, RCW 51.04.050 should not apply to ex parte communications.
Most significant in this case is RCW 51.36.060, which addresses the attending physician's duties, and provides:
All medical information in the possession or control of any person and relevant to the particular injury in the opinion of the department pertaining to any worker whose injury or occupational disease is the basis of a claim under this title shall be made available at any stage of the proceedings to the employer, the claimant's representative, and the department upon request, and no person shall incur any legal liability by reason of releasing such information.
Former RCW 51.36.060.
*320RCW 51.36.060 does not authorize ex parte communications between defense counsel and the worker's attending physician at the Board level for several reasons.
The section's application is confined to the Department level, before the proceedings become adversarial. Indeed, RCW 51.04.050 addresses physician testimony at hearings before the Department and the Board, whereas this section arguably applies to proceedings only at the Department level. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals is not even mentioned in this section, and the Department is given the authority to determine what is relevant information that the physician must release. Once the Department's decision is appealed to. the Board, however, this section does not apply.
In addition, the section provides that relevant information shall be available at "any stage of the proceedings". Again, one needs to determine what the lawmakers meant by "stage" and "proceedings". Does this mean at any time, or only during formal discoveiy, such as a deposition or during actual hearings?
Respondents Twombley and Vankeirsbilck also contend in their brief that the Department used the civil rules of discovery in contravention of their current interpretation of RCW 51.36.060 in Price v. Department of Labor & Indus., 35 Wn. App. 139, 665 P.2d 434 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 101 Wn.2d 520, 682 P.2d 307 (1984). In Price, the Department argued that CR 26 controls the scope of discovery in actions before the Board. Price, at 141. See RCW 51.52.140; WAC 263-12-125. The appellate court agreed and denied the claimant's motions to compel the Department to produce a copy of an investigation report containing interviews with unnamed witnesses. We reversed on different grounds.
Lastly, even if RCW 51.36.060 is interpreted to require physicians to release all relevant medical information, the Department is well equipped to obtain this information through the discovery process. The majority incorrectly con-*321eludes that "Loudon's concern about the possible disclosure of irrelevant, privileged information has less force in this context." Majority opinion, at 312. Furthermore, the expense of formal discovery could be minimalized by informal interviews, with both parties present. See Loudon, at 680.
The source of the physician-patient privilege, if it exists at all, is found in statute. RCW 5.60.060(4) acknowledges the general physician-patient privilege. The majority argues that RCW Title 51 provisions abolish all rights to this privilege for injured workers. However, RCW Title 51 does not eliminate the physician-patient privilege for two reasons. The first is the ambiguity in the sections addressing access to medical information, and the second is the underlying purpose of RCW Title 51 to improve the system governing injured workers' remedies and create more equality and economic feasibility in pursuing such claims.
For these reasons the Superior Court for Snohomish County's decision directing the Board to strike the physician's testimony in Twombley and Vankeirsbilck's cases should be affirmed, and the Superior Court for Grays Harbor County reversed in refusing to strike the testimony of appellant Holbrook's treating physicians.
Dore, C.J., and Johnson, J., concur with Utter, J.
Reconsideration denied August 5, 1992.

RCW Title 51 begins, "The common law system governing the remedy of workers against employers for injuries received in employment is inconsistent with modem industrial conditions. In practice it [i.e., the remedy of workers] proves to be economically unwise and unfair." (Italics mine.) RCW 51.04.010.