Court Opinion

ID: 9679410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:52:11.799232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:13.378944
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I dissent for two reasons: First, I would dismiss the petition to review as having been improvidently granted. Second, I disagree with the result reached by the majority; I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Petition Improvidently Granted. As the majority states, this case raises two issues on review: (1) Does sec. 948.02, Stats. 1975, require the state to prove *566intent as an element of the crime of treating an animal in a cruel manner?1 (2) Was sufficient evidence presented for the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of intentionally aiding and abetting the commission of the crime of treating an animal in a cruel manner. Sec. 939.05, Stats. 1975.2
Neither issue should be reviewed by this court.
As to the first issue on review, that of statutory interpretation, the majority acknowledges, swpra- at 559, n. 4, that the 1975 law has been amended and that the new statute does not pose the question of scienter which is raised under the 1975 law. The state concedes that there are no other prosecutions pending under the 1975 statute. Consequently, this court’s decision on the meaning of the 1975 statute has no precedential or long-term value; it affects only this case. And as shall be clearer from the discussion to follow the court’s decision on *567whether the 1975 statute requires proof of scienter is not relevant to deciding the case at bar. The issue of scienter presented in this review is not whether the person who trained the dog intentionally mistreated it but whether the defendant in this case intentionally aided and abetted the crime.
As to the second issue on review, sufficiency of the evidence, this court has said that it does not ordinarily take a case on review which involves only the question of sufficiency of the evidence; and if the issue of sufficiency is involved in a review, we ordinarily defer to the decision of the court of appeals on this issue and do not re-review the sufficiency of the evidence. Winkie, Inc. v. Heritage Bank, 99 Wis. 2d 616, 621-22, 299 N.W. 2d 829 (1981).
Accordingly I conclude that this case does not fit any of our published criteria for granting review. 85 Wis. 2d xiii (1978).
“The purpose of successive review by a higher appellate court is principally that of resolving questions of law of general significance.” American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating to Appellate Courts, Standard 3.10, pp. 15-16 (1977). See also, Leflar, Internal Operating Procedures of Appellate Courts, 74-78 (1976). For the vast majority of cases in this state the court of appeals is the court of last resort. To allow the court of appeals and this court to perform their respective functions well, we must resist the temptation to review decisions of the court of appeals any time three members of this court tentatively decide that their review would produce an answer different from the one reached by the court of appeals.
Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court expressed the same concern about that Court’s granting of certiorari to review decisions of the federal court of appeals as follows:
*568“[The courts of appeals] are in truth the courts of last resort for almost all federal litigation. Like other courts of last resort — including this one — they occasionally render decisions that will not withstand the test of time. No judicial system is perfect and no appellate structure can entirely eliminate judicial error. Most certainly, this Court does not sit primarily to correct what we perceive to be mistakes committed by other tribunals. Although our work is often accorded special respect because of its finality, we possess no judicial monopoly on either finality or respect. The quality of the work done by the Courts of Appeals merits the esteem of the entire Nation, but, unfortunately, is not nearly as well or as widely recognized as it should be. Indeed, I believe that if we accorded those dedicated appellate judges the deference that their work merits, we would be better able to resist the temptation to grant certiorari for no reason other than a tentative prediction that our review of a case may produce an answer different from theirs. In my opinion, that is not a sufficient reason for granting certiorari. Because no other reason for reviewing this case is apparent, a simple denial of certiorari would have been an appropriate and efficient disposition.” (Footnotes omitted.) Watts v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 101 S. Ct. 1673, 1682-83 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring opinion).
Because the question of law (the statutory construction issue) has already been answered by the legislature and is not directly relevant in the case at bar and because the sufficiency of the evidence issue does not justify this court reviewing the decision of the court of appeals, I would dismiss the petition as having been improvidently granted.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. The second issue posed on review is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury verdict that the defendant was a party to a crime. There are three alternative ways of being a party to the crime, i.e. by directly committing the crime, by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime, or by being a party to a conspiracy to commit the crime. *569There is no evidence in the record that the defendant directly committed the crime or that he was a party to a conspiracy to commit the crime. Therefore, the only possible basis for conviction is that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the commission of the crime.
To prove that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the commission of the crime, the state must prove the following two elements:
(1) That the defendant undertakes conduct which as a matter of objective fact aids the execution of a crime; and
(2) That the defendant undertakes such conduct with the knowledge or belief that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime. Supra at 562.
The jury was properly instructed pursuant to Wis. JI —Criminal No. 400 (1962) as to these two elements as follows:
“A person intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime when, acting with knowledge or belief that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he knowingly either
“ (a) renders aid to the person who commits the crime, or
“(b) is ready and willing to render aid if needed, and the person who commits the crime knows of his willingness to aid him. However, a person does not aid and abet if he is only a bystander or spectator, innocent of any unlawful intent, and does nothing to assist or encourage in the commission of the crime. If a person intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime, then that person is guilty of the crime as well as the person who directly committed it.” (Emphasis added.) R. 50-5.
If the animals were treated in a cruel manner, the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the first element of intentionally aiding and abetting, namely that the defendant engaged in acts which as a matter of ob*570jective fact aided the execution of the crime. The defendant contracted for the training; he instructed employees to pick up and return the dogs for purposes of training; and he received payment for the training.
It is the second element of intentionally aiding and abetting — the knowledge that another person is committing a crime — referred to as scienter (the mental element) , that should be the focus of this court’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence.
Although the 1975 crime of treating animals in a cruel manner is a strict liability crime and no proof of scienter is required in order to convict the person directly committing the crime, in this case the state must prove the scienter which is an element of the party to a crime statute. In other words, the state must prove that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the commission of the strict liability crime.
Strict liability is not the same as vicarious liability. LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law sec. 82 (1972). The 1975 statute in issue does not make the defendant, here the principal shareholder of the corporation, criminally liable for the conduct of persons working with or for him. In civil law we are accustomed to the concept of vicarious liability, generally referred to as the doctrine of re-spondeat superior. In criminal law, however, there is generally no vicarious liability unless the statute imposes liability on the principal for the conduct of his agent. See, e.g., a statute which punishes “whoever by himself or his agent sells, transfers, [etc.] . . . .”
The 1975 law in the case at bar has not been interpreted by this court as a vicarious liability law, and the jury was not instructed on vicarious liability. The defendant thus cannot be held liable criminally on the doctrine of vicarious liability for the acts of employees. See Wis. JI — Criminal Nos. 435, 440 (1966), and comments re vicarious liability; Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses — A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 463 (1981). *571If the defendant in the case at bar is to be convicted, the state must prove that he is a party to this strict liability crime. Thus the state had to prove that the defendant had “knowledge or belief that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime.” See State v. Ehlenfeldt, supra, p. 562; jury instruction on intentionally aiding and abetting, p. 569, supra.
The majority and I agree that there is no direct evidence that the defendant knew or believed that the three dogs involved in the offenses for which the defendant was convicted were being treated in a cruel manner. The defendant testified he had been to the kennels where the dogs were trained only once in three years. Even if the jury disbelieved the defendant, there is no proof that the defendant saw the animals in question being trained or knew that the trainers had crossed the line from training to abuse (if in fact they had crossed the line).
Thus, as the majority recognizes, supra p. 564, if defendant’s knowledge is to be proved, it must be by circumstantial evidence. When circumstantial evidence is relied on, it must be sufficiently strong to exclude to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This court has explained the proper use of circumstantial evidence by a jury as follows:
“[W]hen circumstantial evidence is relied upon, this evidence must be sufficiently strong to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This does not mean that, if any of the evidence brought forth at trial suggests innocence, the jury cannot find the defendant guilty. The function of the jury is to decide which evidence is credible and which is not, and how conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved. The jury can thus, within the bounds of reason, reject testimony suggestive of innocence. The rule that the circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable theory of innocence refers to the evidence which the jury could have believed and relied upon to support its verdict.” (Footnotes omitted.) Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 22, 34, 233 N.W.2d 420 (1975).
*572I conclude, as did Judge Decker writing for the court of appeals, that the “voluminous record of this case . . . is devoid of direct or circumstantial evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Stanfield . . . intentionally aided and abetted mistreatment of the animals in question.” (Ct. of App. unpublished decision, p. 4).
The majority says the jury could infer that the defendant knew the trainers had treated the dogs in a cruel manner from the condition of the dogs when they were returned to the owners and from the testimony of the three owners that Stanfield discussed their dogs’ training and condition with them over the telephone. Swpra at 565.
The evidence showed that the defendant personally saw only one dog of the three dogs involved in the offenses for which he was convicted. This dog was a seven- to eight-month-old Great Dane which the defendant personally returned to the owner after the five-weeks’ training session ended. The owner testified as follows: The dog was wearing a nylon muzzle; it was “thin in comparison to when it went in.” The dog was clean. The dog had sores on his back, on the elbows of his legs and on the tip of his tail. The owner testified the defendant explained to her, as he had several weeks previously over the telephone, that the dog (which was very large) had rubbed the fur off his back getting in and out of his quarters. The owner testified the defendant told her the dog’s tail was injured because the dog wagged the tail so hard that it cracked it open. The owner further testified the dog had strain sores at the mouth area “that he had evidently gotten fighting the muzzle.” The owner also testified that the dog was scared, excited and confused when he was brought into the house. The owner said she did not purchase the muzzle from the defendant but did purchase the spiked training collar (which she described as “the normal training collar . . . . It’s procedure.”) The owner also testified that *573after the defendant left the house and after the owner petted the dog awhile she noticed a “big lump [the size of which was not described] behind the ear.” The owner commented, “How he got it, I have no idea.” Four weeks after the dog was returned home, the dog had urinary problems. The owner also described the deterioration of the dog’s personality in the three to four months after the dog returned home.
The other two dogs, whom the defendant had not seen, were described as thin, having a rash (diagnosed by one of the state’s witnesses as a staph infection), sore paws, worn-down hair around the nose, one-quarter to one-half inch bumps (not open sores) around the neck and shoulders.
It is possible that the condition of the dogs resulted from cruel treatment. It is also reasonable to infer that these conditions can occur in the absence of cruel treatment in dogs kept at home or at a kennel. The jury could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that when the defendant saw a dog in this condition or knew of this condition, the defendant knew (actual knowledge is required, it is not sufficient that the defendant had reason to know, i.e. was negligent if he did not know) that the dogs had been treated in a cruel manner.
When an owner called the Canine College, the owner generally left a message asking that the call be returned. Either the defendant or an employee returned the owner’s call and gave the owner a general status report on the dog. It is possible that the defendant reported on the dogs on the basis of his personal observation of the dogs. It is also reasonable to infer that the defendant’s reports were not based on personal observation of the dogs, but on reports he received from others. Thus, even if the jury chose not to believe the defendant’s testimony that he never saw the dogs being trained, there *574was no evidence in the record from which the jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the dogs were being treated in a cruel manner. Stewart v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 185, 193, 265 N.W.2d 489 (1978). The state has not met its burden of proof.
The testimony might lead the jury to believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was negligent and liable for damages in not checking on the employees or that the defendant was negligent in not checking on the training and the care of the dogs or that the defendant should be held vicariously liable for the acts of other persons. But the circumstantial evidence adduced, believed and rationally considered by the jury does not exclude to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, supra p. 564, and is not sufficient to enable the jury, acting reasonably, to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the dogs were being treated in a cruel manner.
The majority has reviewed the record and has reached the opposite conclusion. If the fact that the court of appeals and I view the record one way and the majority the other makes the question a close one, it only reinforces my opposition to this court’s review of the sufficiency of evidence. The message we send today to the defendant, counsel, the courts and the public is that if appeal from this court were possible, the outcome in the next appellate court might be different. In Wisconsin there is one appellate review of right. That review was by the court of appeals; a second review of the sufficiency of the evidence should not be undertaken.
I fully agree with the majority that “cruelty to animals is a particularly despicable offense.” Supra at 559. But when cruelty to animals is made a criminal offense, as it should be, the courts cannot allow the “despicable” nature of the offense to reduce the state’s burden of *575proof. In every case criminal guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
For the reasons set forth, I would dismiss the petition for review as having been improvidently granted.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Bruce F. Beilfuss joins this dissenting opinion.

 “9148.02 Mistreating animals. No person may treat any animal, whether belonging to himself or another, in a cruel manner. This section does not prohibit bona fide experiments carried on for scientific research or normal and accepted veterinary practices.”
“948.01 Definitions. In this chapter:
“(2) ‘Cruel’ means causing unnecessary and excessive pain or suffering or unjustifiable injury or death.”

 Sec. 939.05, Stats. 1975, provides as follows:
“939.05 Parties to crime (1) Whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime is a principal and may be charged with and convicted of the commission of the crime although he did not directly commit it and although the person who directly committed it has not been convicted or has been convicted of some other degree of the crime or of some other crime based on the same act.
“(2) A person is concerned in the commission of the crime if he:
“(a) Directly commits the crime; or
“(b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission of it; or
“(c) Is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit it.