Court Opinion

ID: 9764346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:19:25.136432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.940260
License: Public Domain

HILL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
It is a basic principle of tort law that a tort requires: (1) a civil wrong; and (2) damage cognizable in a court of law. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS sec. 1 at 2 (4th ed. 1971); 1 DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LA W LIABILITY AND LITIGATION sec. 2.01 at 8 (1982).
Actual damages are an essential element of a cause of action for negligence. Nominal damages, to vindicate a technical right, cannot be recovered in a negligence action where an actual loss has not occurred. The threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough. HANDBOOK OF THE LA W OF TORTS, supra, at 143.
*486Since Mrs. Gray did not suffer any legally cognizable damage prior to August 1980, when the hole developed between her bladder and vagina, she had suffered no tort and had no cause of action prior to August 1980.
Therefore, with the tolling of the statute by her notice of claim, Mrs. Gray’s case was timely filed within two years from the date of her tort in August 1980, as permitted BY TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4590i, sec. 10.01 (Vernon Supp.1984). See Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.1967); McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Pack v. Taylor, 584 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Sims v. Southland Corporation, 503 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The majority indicates that there is no basis in the record for asserting that the hole developed no earlier than August, 1980, even though they note that Mrs. Gray’s doctor observed no hole during an August, 1980 examination. They say that she suffered legally cognizable damage pri- or to the development of the hole, but neither they nor the appellees have enlightened us as to what those legally cognizable damages might have been.
The majority’s opinion is based upon its view that the word “tort,” as used in the statute, was intended to mean the “act or omission on which the claim is founded”, so that it was not intended to mean “tort” in its common-law meaning. Such an interpretation is in conflict with the interpretation provisions of the Medical Liability And Insurance Improvement Act. Section 1.03(b) of art. 4590i provides that “[a]ny legal term or word of art used in this part, not otherwise defined in this part, shall have such meaning as is consistent with the common law.” The interpretation of the word “tort” as “the act or omission on which the claim is founded” is not consistent with the common-law meaning of the term “tort”,' as previously noted.
Even if the use of the settled common-law meaning of the word “tort” were not mandated, it would be presumed under the rules of statutory construction. It has been stated that:
“The language of a statute is presumed to have been selected and used with care and deliberation. Every word or phrase is presumed to have been used intentionally, ... Ordinarily, words are presumed to have been used in the sense in which they are commonly understood. But when a word has a settled meaning or legal significance, it is presumed to have been used in that sense.”
53 TEX.JUR.2d Statutes sec. 181 at 270-271; Turullols v. San Felipe Country Club, 458 S.W.2d 206 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
It is interesting to note that the majority, in defining the word “tort”, makes no reference to sec. 1.03(b) of art. 4590i, which requires that the word be given its common-law meaning, nor do they make any reference to the common-law meaning of the word “tort.”
This case involves a situation wherein Mrs. Gray did not suffer legally cognizable damage until August, 1980, several months after the date of last treatment. She gave notice of her claim within two years from the time she first suffered these damages. Since such legally cognizable damage is a necessary part of a tort and of a cause of action for negligence, the claim was filed within two years of the tort. The rule urged by the majority would mean that as to those who first suffer legally cognizable damage after the last date of treatment, limitations in a cause of action for medical malpractice would begin to run prior to the existence of the tort and prior to the existence of the cause of action itself. The announced rule would, therefore, fail to give Mrs. Gray and others similarly situated the right to bring their action within two years of the date of the tort, as they have the right to do under the provisions of art. 4590i, sec. 10.01.
I would hold that the appellees failed to meet their burden of establishing as a matter of law that Mrs. Gray suffered a tort *487prior to August 1980, and I would sustain appellant’s first point of error.
I concur in the majority’s disposition of the appellant’s second point of error.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment and remand the case for trial.