Court Opinion

ID: 2685407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-07-23 21:00:45.657367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:56.341154
License: Public Domain

FILED
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                 JUL 22 2014

                                                                            MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 13-50257

              Plaintiff - Appellee,               D.C. No. 3:12-cr-02304-AJB-1

  v.
                                                  MEMORANDUM*
FRANCISCO JAVIER LIZARRAGA-
ESPINOZA,

              Defendant - Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of California
                   Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

                        Argued and Submitted June 5, 2014
                              Pasadena, California

Before: REINHARDT, FISHER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

       Defendant-appellant Francisco Javier Lizarraga-Espinoza appeals his

conviction after a jury trial under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b) for illegal reentry

after removal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

        *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
      Lizarraga-Espinoza contends that his two removal orders–one from 1998

and one from 2000–are invalid and thus cannot serve as the basis for prosecution

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In order to collaterally attack a predicate removal order, a

defendant must demonstrate, among other things, that the removal order was

“fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see also United States v. Pallares-

Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004). For a removal order to be

“fundamentally unfair,” the removal proceedings must have violated the

defendant’s due process rights in a manner that caused prejudice–meaning that

absent the due process violation some relief from removal would have been

plausible. United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1089 (9th Cir.

2011); United States v. Garcia-Martinez, 228 F.3d 956, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2000).

      We assume without deciding that Lizarraga-Espinoza’s 1998 removal order

was invalid and cannot serve as the predicate removal order for his conviction.

However, we conclude that the 2000 removal order is a valid predicate for his

conviction. In 2000, Lizarraga-Espinoza sought admission into the United States

without valid documentation and by falsely claiming citizenship. An immigration

officer ordered him removed after an expedited removal proceeding. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225. Lizarraga-Espinoza now contends that he should have been treated as a

lawful permanent resident (LPR) in 2000 and thus should not have been subjected

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to an expedited removal proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(ii). He further

contends that such an error–having an expedited removal proceeding instead of a

formal hearing before an immigration judge–causes prejudice per se.

      First, Lizarraga-Espinoza offers no authority for the contention that a

defendant improperly denied a formal immigration hearing need not show

prejudice, and we have consistently required a showing of actual prejudice. See

Garcia-Martinez, 228 F.3d at 964. Second, Lizarraga-Espinoza can show no

prejudice from the entry of the removal order in 2000; regardless of the nature of

the proceedings afforded him, he had no plausible form of relief from that removal

order. He had been convicted in 1996 of a crime of violence and had been given a

suspended sentence of three years in jail. Thus, by 2000, Lizarraga-Espinoza was

an aggravated felon. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). As an aggravated felon,

Lizarraga-Espinoza was ineligible for relief from removal even if he had been

treated as an LPR and placed in formal removal proceedings. See, e.g., United

States v. Sandoval-Orellana, 714 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the

district court correctly denied a motion to dismiss a § 1326 indictment where the

defendant “was ineligible for discretionary relief as an aggravated felon”); see

also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated

felony at any time after admission is deportable.”). Because he cannot show that

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relief was plausible in 2000, Lizarraga-Espinoza cannot demonstrate that his 2000

removal order was fundamentally unfair. His challenge to his 8 U.S.C. § 1326

conviction thus fails.

      AFFIRMED.

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