Court Opinion

ID: 9774806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:34:19.059782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:16.294436
License: Public Domain

Justice BAER,
concurring.
I fully agree with, and therefore join, the first part of the majority’s opinion holding that the lawsuit brought by Appellees against Appellant ski resort is barred by Pennsylvania’s Skier’s Responsibility Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(c), because, pursuant to such Act, Appellee, Lori Chepkevich, assumed the risks inherent to the sport of downhill skiing, including the use of the ski lift involved in this matter.1 In Hughes v. Seven Springs, 563 Pa. 501, 762 A.2d 339 (2000), our Court made it clear that the risks encompassed in the Skier’s Responsibility Act include risks that are “common, frequent, and expected,” not only to the activity of skiing down a hill, but also to those activities that are directly and necessary to the act of downhill *42skiing such as “boarding the ski lift, riding the lift up the mountain, alighting from the lift, skiing from the lift to the trail and, after a run is complete, skiing toward the ski lift to start another run or skiing toward the base lodge or other facility at the end of the day.” Id. at 344. Because application of the Act alone settles the question at issue in this case, I would find it unnecessary to address the propriety of the release issued by Appellant Hidden Valley and signed by Lori.2
Nevertheless, as the majority analyzes the validity of the release at issue and concludes that it also bars Appellees’ lawsuit, I feel the need to comment, generally, about the validity of such releases and in particular about “the Release” at issue in this case. As noted by the majority, our Court, in Topp Copy Prods. Inc. v. Singletary, 533 Pa. 468, 626 A.2d 98 (1993), set forth the general standards governing the enforceability of exculpatory language contained in a release provision. Specifically, we stated that:
It is generally accepted that an exculpatory clause is valid where three conditions are met. First, the clause must not contravene public policy. Secondly, the contract must be between persons relating entirely to their own private affairs, and, thirdly, each party must be a free bargaining agent to the agreement so that the contract is not one of adhesion.
Id. at 99. We further noted that exculpatory language is not favored in the law and must be strictly construed against the drafter of the clause. Id. The majority concludes that the Release meets the necessary requirements for allowing an exculpatory clause to be enforced and holds that the Release is, therefore, valid. As to the first prong, regarding public *43policy, the majority notes that this requirement is met because, “the clear policy of this Commonwealth, as embodied by the [Skier’s Responsibility] Act, is to encourage the sport and to place the risks of skiing squarely on the skier.” Maj. Op. at 30, 2 A.3d at 1191.
The release at issue, however, seems to go beyond the risks encompassed within the public policy set forth in the Skier’s Responsibility Act, which, as noted, insulates a ski resort from liability involving the inherent risks of skiing. The release employed by Appellant Hidden Valley in this case, which Lori signed, not only recognizes and insulates the resort from liability related to risks inherent to “[S]kiing, Snowboarding, and Snowblading, including the use of lifts,” but also purports to insulate the resort from “other risks” associated therewith.
The majority recognizes as much in rejecting Appellees’ argument that the Release only exempted Hidden Valley from liability when its negligence gave rise to a risk otherwise inherent to the sport of skiing and not negligence giving rise to other unexpected risks not inherent to the sport. The majority disagrees "with Appellees’ assertion in this regard and notes that the actual language of the Release is not limited to risks inherent to the sport of skiing, “but clearly includes, ‘other risks.’ ” Maj. Op. at 34, 2 A.3d at 1194. The majority additionally notes that the Release states that “All the risks of skiing and boarding present risk of serious of fatal injury” and that the Release then absolves Hidden Valley of “these risks” regardless of negligence. Id. (emphasis in original).
In my view, to the extent the Release employed by Hidden Valley could be construed as exculpating it from liability as it relates to risks other than those inherent to the sport of skiing (i.e., the risks specified by our Court in Hughes, see supra, at 2), I would find that it contravenes the public policy of the Commonwealth as set forth in the Skier’s Responsibility Act. See Topp Copy; cf. Appeal of Diamond, 413 Pa. 379, 196 A.2d 363 (1964) (by action or inaction, one may be deemed to have waived rights statutorily or constitutionally guaranteed where waiver is not contrary to public policy); Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 396 Pa. 557, 154 *44A.2d 492 (1959) (where statute expresses public policy designed to alleviate condition of possible distress among public, or segment thereof, and explicitly proscribes waiver of benefits of the act, no private agreement, however valid between the parties, can operate as such a waiver). As such, I would not find the Release enforceable if, in fact, the risks at issue were not ones inherent to the sport of skiing.3
Regardless, as I find it unnecessary to reach the issue of the Release’s validity in this case, I would leave such question for another day.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(c), entitled "Downhill skiing” provides:
(1) The General Assembly finds that the sport of downhill skiing is practiced by a large number of citizens of this Commonwealth and also attracts to this Commonwealth large numbers of nonresidents significantly contributing to the economy of this Commonwealth. It is recognized that as in some other sports, there are inherent risks in the sport of downhill skiing.
(2) The doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk as it applies to downhill skiing injuries and damages is not modified by subsections (a) and (b).

. The Superior Court never addressed the propriety of the Act even though Hidden Valley raised the Act’s applicability in the alternative as a basis to sustain the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. As noted by the majority, the court solely addressed the Release, found it to be unenforceable, and simply reversed the trial court on this basis. Hidden Valley again raises the Act’s applicability to our Court. If the Act applies to bar Appellees’ lawsuit, however, review of whether the Superior Court properly found the Release unenforceable is not necessary.

. I, likewise, share Mr. Justice Saylor’s sentiment, expressed in his Concurring Opinion, that the type of release employed by Hidden Valley is, in fact, a contract of adhesion. I too would prefer an analysis of general principles of conscionability with regard to such a contract in any future case. I, therefore, join Justice Saylor's Concurring Opinion in this regard.