Court Opinion

ID: 9960159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:11:21.617651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:15.143794
License: Public Domain

J-S10013-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LAMAR ANELLA KEYS                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1275 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 1, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-62-CR-0000317-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                               FILED: APRIL 15, 2024

       Appellant, Lamar Anella Keys, appeals from the September 1, 2023

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County

that imposed a sentence of 4 to 10 years’ incarceration after Appellant pleaded

guilty to one count of robbery – threatening another with immediate bodily

injury.1 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:

       On August 22, 2022, at approximately 10:00 [p.m., Appellant],
       wearing dark clothes and a mask, and brandishing a handgun,
       entered the Family Dollar store in Warren, Pennsylvania, as two
       employees were in the process of closing the store. [Appellant]
       pointed the gun at both employees and demanded cash and
       cigarettes. [Appellant] left the store with over $2,000.00 in cash
       and several packs of cigarettes. [Appellant] was apprehended

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(iv).
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       approximately an hour later with the stolen money and cigarettes
       in his possession.

       [Appellant] was charged with robbery[ - threatening another with
       fear of immediate serious bodily harm], a first[-]degree felony; []
       recklessly endangering another person, [a second-]degree
       misdemeanor[ (2 counts)]; theft by unlawful taking, a
       third[-]degree felony; robbery – threatening another with
       immediate bodily injury, a second[-]degree felony; and terroristic
       threats, a first[-]degree misdemeanor.[2]       On July 6, 2023,
       [Appellant] entered a plea of guilty to one count of
       robbery[ – threatening another with immediate bodily injury], a
       second[-]degree felony. In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed
       to enter a nolle prosequi on the remaining [charges.3] The plea
       was entered as an "open plea" with no agreement regarding
       sentence.

       By sentence order dated September 1, 2023, and entered on
       September 5, 2023, [Appellant] was sentenced to a state
       correctional institution to a minimum period of [4] to [10] years[’
       incarceration,] applying the deadly weapon used enhancement.
       [Appellant] was given credit for time served of [5] days.
       [Appellant] was not eligible for boot camp nor[] eligible [for the
       recidivism risk reduction incentive (“RRRI”) program].        This
       sentence was outside the sentencing guidelines. On the record at
       sentencing and as set forth in the sentence order, the sentence
       was outside of the guidelines due to the extreme harm caused to
       the victims.     [Appellant] was [ordered] to pay the cost of
       prosecution, a central booking fee of $125[.00], and make
       restitution to Family Dollar in the amount of $3,381.59 and to []
       the victims in the [aggregate] amount of $157.50. [Appellant]
       was ordered not to have contact whatsoever with the victims and
       [] not [to] trespass on the victim's property or any Family Dollar
       properties. Furthermore, pursuant to 61 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 6137.2, as
       [Appellant’s] minimum sentence of total confinement is for [4]
       years, [Appellant] was also sentenced to a period of reentry
____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 2705 (2 counts), 3921(a), 3701(a)(1)(iv),

and 2706(a)(1), respectively.

3 On September 6, 2023, pursuant to     a motion by the Commonwealth, the
trial court nolle prossed Appellant’s remaining charges to which he did not
plead guilty.

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        supervision of [12] months consecutive to the sentence
        [imposed]. Defense counsel made no argument regarding the
        discretionary aspects of sentence [] following the imposition of
        sentence.

        On September 11, 2023, [Appellant] filed a "post[-]sentence
        motion for special relief[.”] In the motion, [Appellant] requested
        that the restitution sentence imposed by the [trial] court be
        reduced as a portion of the stolen funds was recovered by the
        Commonwealth. No challenge of any kind was made to the
        discretionary aspects of [Appellant’s] sentence. The [trial] court
        denied the post[-]sentence motion on September 22, 2023.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/23, at 1-3 (extraneous capitalization and footnotes

omitted). This appeal followed.4

        Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court

abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant outside of the standard range and

above the aggravated range?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.

        Appellant’s issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence on

the ground that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a

sentence that is “unreasonable in duration” and considered only the

aggravating factors without consideration of the mitigating factors.      Id. at

7-10.

        It is well-settled that “the right to appeal [the] discretionary
        aspect[s] of [a] sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v.
        Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where
        an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence,
        we should regard his[, or her,] appeal as a petition for allowance
        of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162

____________________________________________

4 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.

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      (Pa. Super. 2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Moury,
      992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010)[,]

         An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his[,
         or her,] sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by
         satisfying a four-part test[.]

         We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         [the] appellant [] filed a timely notice of appeal, see
         Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
         preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
         modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
         appellant's brief has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);
         and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the
         sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
         Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

      [Moury, 992 A.2d] at 170. We evaluate on a case-by-case basis
      whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about
      the appropriateness of sentence. Commonwealth v. Kenner,
      784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2019) (original

brackets omitted), appeal denied, 220 A.3d 1066 (Pa. 2019). If an appellant

fails to challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence either by presenting

a claim to the trial court at the time of sentencing or in a post-sentence

motion, then the appellant’s challenge is waived.         Commonwealth v.

Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted),

appeal denied, 75 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2013).

      In determining whether a substantial question exists, this Court “cannot

look beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory Rule

2119(f) statement[.]” Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10

(Pa. Super. 2013), aff’d, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa. 2015).           The Rule 2119(f)

statement “must explain where the sentence falls in relation to the sentencing

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guidelines, identify what specific provision of the [Sentencing] Code [or] what

fundamental norm was violated, and explain how and why the [trial] court

violated that particular provision [or fundamental] norm.” Commonwealth

v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 384 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 963 A.2d

467 (Pa. 2008). While it is not necessary that the Rule 2119(f) statement

“provide elaborate factual and procedural details,” the statement must provide

more than “bald assertions or non-specific claims of error [and] must state

the way in which the penalty imposed is inappropriate.” Feucht, 955 A.2d at

384. A substantial question exists when an appellant presents a colorable

argument that the sentence imposed is either (1) inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code or (2) is “contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Mastromarino,

2 A.3d 581, 585 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 14 A.3d 825 (Pa. 2011).

       Here, the record demonstrates that Appellant filed a timely notice of

appeal.    Appellant did not, however, raise a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of his sentence pertaining to the duration of sentence or consideration

of certain factors at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing or in his

post-sentence motion.5        See N.T., 9/1/23, at 10; see also Post-Sentence

Motion, 9/11/23. Therefore, Appellant waived a challenge to the discretionary

____________________________________________

5 In his post-sentence motion, Appellant challenges the amount of restitution

that he was ordered to pay to Family Dollar on the ground that a certain
portion of the stolen funds was recovered upon Appellant’s apprehension. See
Post-Sentence Motion, 9/11/23.

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aspects of his sentence.6        Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794

(Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 831 A.2d 599 (Pa. 2003); see also

Lamonda, 52 A.3d at 371; Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 936

(Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013); Commonwealth

v. Carroll, 2024 WL 743169, at *5 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 23, 2024)

(unpublished memorandum). Consequently, we affirm Appellant’s judgment

of sentence.7

____________________________________________

6 The fact that the trial court, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, addressed
Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence does not
save Appellant’s claims from waiver. See Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107
A.3d 788, 798-799 (Pa. Super. 2015) (finding a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of sentence waived for failure to raise the claim before the trial court
despite the trial court addressing the challenge in its Rule 1925(a) opinion),
appeal denied, 119 A.3d 351 (Pa. 2015).

7 We further note that Appellant failed to include a Rule 2119(f) statement in

his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (stating, “An appellant who challenges the
discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in a
separate section of the brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon
for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.
The statement shall immediately precede the argument on the merits with
respect to the discretionary aspects of the sentence.”). The Commonwealth,
although noting the lack of a Rule 2119(f) statement, did not, however, raise
a formal objection to the lack of a Rule 2119(f) statement.                 See
Commonwealth Brief at 9 n.1 (recognizing that, Appellant failed to include a
Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief, but declining to formally object
“in an effort to circumvent the need to address the issues in [a petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546)]”).      When an appellant fails to include a Rule 2119(f)
statement, but the Commonwealth does not object, this Court may ignore the
omission and proceed to determine whether a substantial question has been
raised. In the case sub judice, we decline to examine whether, or not,
Appellant raised a substantial question because Appellant waived his challenge
to the discretionary aspects of his sentence as discussed supra.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 04/15/2024

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