Court Opinion

ID: 9767930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:35:43.608336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:34.945497
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion written in these two cases. I agree with the conclusion reached therein that the transcripts before us do not show probable cause for the arrest of defendant Howell and that for this reason the trial court erred in overruling defendant’s motions to suppress those items seized from defendant’s person at the time of his arrest and erred in admitting into evidence those items and the test results with reference thereto. My disagreement with the principal opinion is with reference to what relief this court should direct at this time.
*22In my view, we should by order remand both cases to the trial court for the purpose of a further evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Deputy Sheriff Ivy had probable cause to arrest Howell at the time he was taken into custody. At such hearing the parties would have the opportunity to offer whatever proof they have on this issue, following which the trial court should make a finding on whether probable cause has been shown. The trial court then should certify to us the transcript of its supplementary hearing plus its findings and conclusions.
If, following this additional hearing, the trial court finds that the State has not established probable cause for defendant’s arrest, then a new trial in both cases will be necessary and our opinion should so hold. On the other hand, if, on remand, based on additional evidence introduced, the trial court finds and we concur that there was probable cause for the arrest of defendant, a new trial will be unnecessary, and we should affirm the judgment of conviction. This necessarily follows because in that event seizure of the various articles incident to the arrest was proper and defendant would not have been prejudiced by the introduction of those items and the tests thereon in evidence.
There is ample precedent and authority for the procedure which I suggest. It has been approved and utilized by the Supreme Court of the United States on several occasions, as the following cases disclose.
In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1963), defendant argued that he was entitled to have the trial judge, outside the hearing of the jury, decide whether his confession was voluntary and that this question of voluntariness should not have been left to the jury. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Jackson had a constitutional right to such a determination by the trial judge and that he had not received an adequate and reliable determination of that issue. However, having so held, the Supreme Court did not direct that the case be remanded for a new trial on guilt or innocence. Instead, it held that a procedure, such as I propose in this case, was proper and should be followed, saying, 378 U.S. at 393 — 95, 84 S.Ct. at 1790:
“It is New York, therefore, not the federal habeas corpus court, which should first provide Jackson with that which he has not yet had and to which he is constitutionally entitled — an adequate eviden-tiary hearing productive of reliable results concerning the voluntariness of his confession. It does not follow, however, that Jackson is automatically entitled to a complete new trial including a retrial of the issue of guilt or innocence. Jackson’s position before the District Court, and here, is that the issue of his confession should not have been decided by the convicting jury but should have been determined in a proceeding separate and apart from the body trying guilt or innocence. So far we agree and hold that he is now entitled to such a hearing in the state court. But if at the conclusion of such an evidentiary hearing in the state court on the coercion issue, it is determined that Jackson’s confession was voluntarily given, admissible in evidence, and properly to be considered by the jury, we see no constitutional necessity at that point for proceeding with a new trial, for Jackson has already been tried by a jury with the confession placed before it and has been found guilty. True, the jury in the first trial was permitted to deal with the issue of voluntariness and we do not know whether the conviction rested upon the confession; but if it did, there is no constitutional prejudice to Jackson from the New York procedure if the confession is now properly found to be voluntary and therefore admissible. If the jury relied upon it, it was entitled to do so. Of course, if the state court, at an evidentia-ry hearing, redetermines the facts and decides that Jackson’s confession was involuntary, there must be a new trial on *23guilt or innocence without the confession’s being admitted in evidence.
“Obviously, the State is free to give Jackson a new trial if it so chooses, bat for us to impose this requirement before the outcome of the new hearing on volun-tariness is known would not comport with the interests of sound judicial administration and the proper relationship between federal and state courts.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, in Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967), hereinafter referred to as Sims I, the Supreme Court concluded that on the record before it the confession of defendant had not been sufficiently shown and determined to be voluntary and hence admissible. In so holding the Supreme Court said that the trial court must rule with unmistakable clarity as to whether the confession was voluntary and that the trial court had not done that. In addition, the Court pointed out that at the earlier trial the state had not produced as witnesses the police officers who had been present at the time defendant claimed he was mistreated prior to his confession and thus had failed to rebut defendant’s testimony regarding physical abuse prior to his confession. However, having so held, the Supreme Court did not reverse and remand for new trial. Instead, following the procedure which had been utilized in Jackson v. Denno, supra, the Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing and a determination in the state court as to the voluntariness of defendant’s confession.
Thereafter, following disposition in the state courts on remand, the Sims case returned to the Supreme Court in Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct. 523, 19 L.Ed.2d 634 (1967), hereinafter referred to as Sims II. In this opinion the Court recognized that on remand the state trial judge had made a clear determination that the confession was voluntary. On that basis he had denied a new trial. However, the Supreme Court, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish voluntariness of the confession, reversed and remanded for a new trial. In so holding the Court said, 389 U.S. at 406, 88 S.Ct. at 525:
“Thus in remanding the case for a hearing on voluntariness we indicated to the State that as the evidence then stood it had failed adequately to rebut petitioner’s testimony that he had been subjected to physical violence prior to his confession. The State had every opportunity to offer the police officers, whose failure to testify had already been commented upon here, to contradict petitioner’s version of the events. Its failure to do so when given a second chance lends support to the conclusion that their testimony would not, in fact, have rebutted petitioner’s.” (Emphasis supplied.)
There are cases other than ones involving admissibility of confessions in which the Supreme Court has utilized this same type of procedure instead of reversing and remanding for a new trial at the outset. For example, in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1966), one issue involved the effect of the absence of counsel for defendant at a lineup in which he had been required to appear. The Court concluded that defendant was guaranteed a right to counsel at said lineup by the sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution. The question then arising was what relief should be given as a result of the fact that counsel had not been provided at that time. The Court utilized a procedure comparable to that in Jackson v. Denno, saying, 388 U.S. at 239-40, 87 S.Ct. at 1939:
“We come now to the question whether the denial of Wade’s motion to strike the courtroom identification by the bank witnesses at trial because of the absence of his counsel at the lineup required, as the Court of Appeals held, the grant of a new trial at which such evidence is to be excluded. We do not think this disposition can be justified without first giving the *24Government the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, the opinion says, 388 U.S. at 242, 87 S.Ct. at 1940:
“On the record now before us we cannot make the determination whether the in-court identifications had an independent origin. This was not an issue at trial, although there is some evidence relevant to a determination. That inquiry is most properly made in the District Court. We therefore think the appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source, or whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error, Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, and for the District Court to reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be proper. See United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 233, 245-246, 78 S.Ct. 245, 253, 2 L.Ed.2d 234.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In United States v. Shotwell Manufacturing Co., 355 U.S. 233, 78 S.Ct. 245, 2 L.Ed.2d 234 (1957), a case cited and relied on in Wade, the defendants were convicted in federal court of willfully attempting to evade federal corporate income taxes. The conviction was reversed in the Court of Appeals on the ground that the privilege of defendants against self-incrimination had been violated by the admission of evidence obtained as a result of timely, voluntary disclosures made by them in good faith in the hope of obtaining immunity from criminal prosecutions under a policy then followed by the Treasury Department.
After petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, the government moved that the case be remanded to the district court on the ground that newly discovered evidence revealed that the testimony at the trial concerning the timeliness and good faith of respondents’ disclosures was perjured and fraudulent. Defendants objected, contending that further proceedings below might work to the advantage of the government and that it was unfair to allow, the government at that stage of the proceedings to bolster the record relating to the suppression issue. These objections were overruled by the Supreme Court which stated that in the district court both sides would have the opportunity to offer evidence with respect to the validity of the asserted voluntary disclosures. In the course of its opinion, the Court said, 355 U.S. at 244, 78 S.Ct. at 252:

“We should not lose sight of the fact that the Government’s new showing does not relate to an issue submitted to the jury in the proceedings below, but rather to a preliminary question as to the admissibility of evidence. Hence, to grant the Government’s motion is not to permit it to ‘bolster’ the evidence upon which the verdict of guilty was returned by the jury in this case. That verdict clearly must stand or fall on the sufficiency of the evidence already introduced at the trial.

“In these circumstances, acceptance of the respondents’ position on this motion would be tantamount to sanctioning a rule which would prohibit appellate review upon a record suspect of taint, if the taint might operate to the disadvantage of the defendants, but which would nevertheless require review if the taint might operate to their advantage. We cannot subscribe to that quixotic result. The fair administration of justice is not such a one-way street.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This court has followed the mechanism of Jackson v. Denno and other Supreme Court cases referred to herein on numerous occasions. State v. Ussery, 452 S.W.2d 146 (Mo.1970); State v. Taggert, 443 S.W.2d 168 (Mo.1969); State v. Edwards, 435 S.W.2d 1 *25(Mo.1968); State v. Auger, 434 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.1968); State v. Devoe, 430 S.W.2d 164 (Mo.1968); State v. Glenn, 429 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1968).
In explaining its conclusion not to have the circuit court conduct a further eviden-tiary hearing on the issue of probable cause, the principal opinion states that the trial court held such a hearing on the motion to suppress at which both parties had an opportunity to introduce whatever pertinent information they had and that they should be held thereto and not permitted later to supply additional evidence to support the judgment previously entered. In so ruling, the principal opinion completely ignores the contrary conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jackson v. Denno, Sims I, Sims II, Wade and Shotwell. In fact, none of these cases are even mentioned. Instead, the principal opinion relies for its authority in requiring a new trial on the case of Bynum v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 262 F.2d 465 (1959), a case decided prior to Jackson, Sims I, Sims II and Wade. Furthermore, this position taken in the principal opinion overlooks the nature of what is involved. We are not dealing with evidence relative to an issue to be resolved by the jury. Instead, we are concerned with evidence which relates to whether certain other evidence is admissible. If in this hearing outside the presence of the jury the judge determines that the officer had probable cause to arrest, then the articles taken from defendant incident to his arrest (and the tests performed thereon) are admissible in evidence and there is no need to retry the case on the theory that admission thereof in evidence prejudiced the defendant. They would be admissible in a new trial and, on the basis of the supplemental evidentiary hearing (assuming it to show probable cause) were admissible in the first trial. No new evidence bolstering the jury’s verdict is involved.
The principal opinion comments that on occasion this court has remanded cases to the trial court pursuant to the Jackson v. Denno procedure for the purpose of further determination as to admissibility of evidence prior to this court writing its opinion and reaching a conclusion as to disposition of the case but that those have been instances where the lower court had simply failed to make sufficient findings for this court to perform its appellate function. Our prior decisions are not so limited. For example, in State v. Ussery, supra, this court by order directed the trial court to conduct a further hearing “giving the state and the defendant an opportunity to present evidence in addition to that contained in the transcript of the record,” subsequent to which the trial court was to make an express finding as to whether the confession was voluntary. Such a hearing was held and a supplemental transcript of the testimony and findings was certified to this court. On the basis of that supplemental record this court then affirmed the finding of the trial court that the statements, admissions and confessions of the defendant were voluntary and that their admission into evidence was not prejudicial to the defendant. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction and no new trial was required.
In State v. Taggert, supra, the court entered a similar order. Further testimony was taken after which the trial court, made a finding that defendants’ confessions were voluntary. On the basis thereof, the judgment of conviction was affirmed, the court concluding that admission of the confessions of defendants did not result in prejudice to the defense. Again the need for holding a new trial was avoided.
In State v. Devoe, supra, this court entered a similar order which provided for the trial court to conduct a hearing and receive such additional evidence as should be offered by the state or by the defendant and then make a finding as to voluntariness. At that subsequent hearing, additional testimony was taken after which the court made a finding that the confession was *26voluntary. As a result of that supplemental hearing, the judgment of conviction was affirmed without a new trial.
If in Ussery, Taggert, and Devoe, this court had followed the procedure proposed in the principal opinion instead of ordering the trial court to conduct an additional Jackson v. Denno type of hearing on volun-tariness and admissibility of the confessions, the courts of this state would have been required to conduct new jury trials with subsequent new appeals even though the confessions were found to be voluntary and hence admissible. The procedure followed avoided unnecessary retrials. Our experience in those instances demonstrates the utility and the desirability of the Jackson v. Denno procedure.
In recent years the volume of litigation, particularly criminal, has increased considerably. Our trial courts are busy trying to dispose of their dockets. Much emphasis is being placed, nationally and in this state, on efforts to find ways to simplify and expedite the disposition of cases. Under such circumstances, it seems completely unnecessary to me to reverse and remand these two cases for complete new trials and probable appeals when we have available for use a procedure which has been approved repeatedly by the Supreme Court of the United States and which has been successfully utilized by this court. It is not an overstatement to say that the Supreme Court of the United States has been amply solicitous of the rights of persons accused of crime. If that Court had felt that the admission of evidence such as confessions or items taken from the person of the defendant without probable cause necessitated automatic remand for new trials rather than utilizing the procedure employed in Jackson v. Den-no, Sims I, Sims II, Wade and Shotwell, it is reasonable to conclude that said Court would have ordered those cases reversed and remanded for new trial. Instead, the Court found that the rights of those defendants were protected by having the trial court conduct an additional hearing in which additional testimony could be heard and a finding then made on admissibility of the evidence in question. Not only did the Supreme Court reach that conclusion but it also said in Jackson v. Denno, as previously noted, that to do otherwise “would not comport with the interests of sound judicial administration.” I completely agree with that viewpoint and at this time would by order direct the trial court in these two cases, as we have done on previous occasions, to conduct a further hearing at which the State and the defendant would be given an opportunity to present evidence in addition to that contained in the transcript of the record on appeal. The trial court then would make an express finding as to whether Deputy Ivy had probable cause to arrest defendant.
Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court said in Jackson v. Dénno, I would hold that Howell is entitled to a reliable determination concerning the existence of probable cause before evidence taken incident to his arrest is admissible in evidence. Unless the evidence shows and the court finds therefrom that there was probable cause for his arrest, articles taken from him incident to that arrest are not admissible in evidence against him. He is now entitled to a hearing in the trial court for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause for his arrest. It does not follow, however, that he automatically is entitled to a complete new trial including a retrial of the issue of guilt or innocence. If, at the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing in the trial court on the probable cause issue, it is determined that there was probable cause for his arrest so that articles taken from his person at that time incident to that arrest are admissible in evidence and properly to be considered by the jury, there is no constitutional necessity at that point for proceeding with a new trial because Howell already has been tried by a jury with this evidence placed before it and has been found guilty. If the jury relied upon such evidence, it was *27in that event entitled to do so. Of course, if the trial court at an evidentiary hearing redetermines the facts and finds that there was not probable cause for Howell’s arrest, then the evidence taken from him incident to that arrest was not admissible in evidence and there must be a new trial on guilt or innocence without those articles being received in evidence.