Court Opinion

ID: 9962046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 16:02:09.454215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:42.299271
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
         FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDREW MATTIODA,                                   No. 22-15889

                  Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No. 5:20-cv-
    v.                                             03662-SVK

CLARENCE WILLIAM NELSON II;
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND                             OPINION
SPACE ADMINISTRATION,

                  Defendants-Appellees.

           Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the Northern District of California
         Susan G. Van Keulen, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted September 13, 2023
                    San Francisco, California

                       Filed April 22, 2024

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Danny J. Boggs, * and Danielle
                 J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

                    Opinion by Judge Forrest

*
 The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2                       MATTIODA V. NELSON

                          SUMMARY **

                       Employment Law

    The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of
Dr. Andrew Mattioda’s hostile-work-environment claim,
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
his employer the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (“NASA”) on his disability-discrimination
claim, and remanded for further proceedings.
    Dr. Mattioda, a scientist with NASA, has physical
disabilities related to his hips and spine that he alleged
required him to purchase premium-class airlines tickets for
flights over an hour long. He sued NASA under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, alleging that he suffered a hostile
work environment after informing his supervisors of his
disabilities and requesting upgraded airline tickets for work
travel, and alleging he was discriminated against due to his
disability by being passed over for a promotion.
    Addressing the hostile-work-environment claim, the
panel held that a disability-based harassment claim is
available under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
and the Rehabilitation Act. Turning to the merits of
Dr. Mattioda’s claim, the panel held that the district court
correctly applied the Iqbal/Twombly standard in assessing
his complaint. The district court erred, however, in
concluding that Dr. Mattioda failed to allege a plausible
causal nexus between the claimed harassment and his
disabilities. The panel also rejected NASA’s argument that

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    MATTIODA V. NELSON                     3

Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work environment claim failed on the
alternative ground that he did not allege sufficiently severe
or pervasive harassment. The panel concluded that
Dr. Mattioda alleged sufficiently severe or pervasive
harassment to survive NASA’s motion to dismiss, and
plausibly alleged a hostile-work environment claim based on
his disability.
    Addressing the disability-discrimination claim, the panel
held that the district court correctly applied the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework in assessing
Dr. Mattioda’s claim. Even assuming that Dr. Mattioda
established a prima facie case of disability discrimination,
NASA proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
not selecting Dr. Mattioda for an available senior scientist
position. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment to NASA on this claim.

                        COUNSEL

Erika A. Heath (argued), Duckworth & Peters LLP, San
Francisco, California; Richard D. Schramm, Berliner Cohen
LLP, San Jose, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Adrienne Zack (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;
Michelle Lo, Chief, Civil Division; Stephanie M. Hinds,
United States Attorney; United States Department of Justice,
Office of the United States Attorney, San Francisco,
California; James A. Scharf, Assistant United States
Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Office of the
United States Attorney, San Jose, California; for
Defendants-Appellees.
4                    MATTIODA V. NELSON

                         OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

     Dr. Andrew Mattioda, a scientist with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), has
physical disabilities related to his hips and spine that he
alleges require him to purchase premium-class airlines
tickets for flights over an hour long. He sued NASA and its
Administrator (collectively referred to as NASA) under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., alleging, among other things, that he
suffered a hostile work environment after informing his
supervisors of his disabilities and requesting upgraded
airline tickets for work travel as a reasonable
accommodation and that he was discriminated against due to
his disability by being passed over for a promotion. The
district court dismissed Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-
environment claim for failure to state a claim and granted
summary judgment for NASA on Dr. Mattioda’s disability-
discrimination claim based on the denied promotion.
    Dr. Mattioda appeals from both orders, and we affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. We
agree that the district court erred in dismissing
Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-environment claim and hold,
consistent with our sister circuits, that this claim may be
asserted under the Rehabilitation Act. However, we affirm
the district court’s order granting summary judgment for
NASA on the disability-discrimination claim.
                   I. BACKGROUND
    Because much of the background is relevant to the
district court’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
                     MATTIODA V. NELSON                      5

dismissal, we primarily refer to Dr. Mattioda’s allegations in
his operative complaint. See Wilson v. Craver, 994 F.3d
1085, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The [c]ourt is obliged to
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and
construe them” favorably to the plaintiff. (alterations
adopted) (citation omitted)). To the extent we rely on
evidence presented at summary judgment, we view such
evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Mattioda.
Alexander v. Nguyen, 78 F.4th 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2023).
        A. Dr. Mattioda’s Employment at NASA
     Dr. Mattioda began working for NASA in 2000. He
suffers from, among other things, a degenerative defect in
his hips and Scheurermann’s disease of the spine, which
causes uneven vertebrae growth and scoliosis. Since 2007,
his orthopedist has written reasonable-accommodation
letters stating that Dr. Mattioda must fly in premium class
for flights longer than an hour because he needs to avoid
prolonged sitting and be able to change positions frequently
and stretch due to physical disabilities affecting his hips and
spine. By 2011, after multiple surgeries, Dr. Mattioda had
informed the NASA Ames Research Center, where he
worked, about all his disabilities and orthopedic limitations.
    Thereafter, from 2011 to 2018, Dr. Mattioda’s
experience at NASA was plagued by: (a) derogatory
comments from his supervisors; (b) supervisors who
inhibited his work opportunities; (c) unwarranted negative
job reviews; and (d) resistance to his accommodation
requests. In 2011, Dr. Mattioda approached his supervisor,
Dr. Timothy Lee, about an upcoming work trip and advised
Dr. Lee of his physical disabilities and premium-class travel
request. After Dr. Lee learned of the cost for the requested
travel upgrade, he “openly discussed” Dr. Mattioda’s
6                     MATTIODA V. NELSON

disabilities in front of others, “compared [his] disabilities to
Dr. Lee’s own hip issues,” and asked why Dr. Mattioda
could not “just tough it out or suck it up and travel coach.”
     This incident was the first in a “series of harassing
comments and events.” For example, Dr. Lee told
Dr. Mattioda that he believed another scientist was “doing
all the work for” Dr. Mattioda and that he did not “respect
[Dr. Mattioda] or [his] work.” And during a meeting with
colleagues, Dr. Lee criticized Dr. Mattioda’s work to the
point that one of the meeting attendees told Dr. Mattioda
after the meeting that he felt Dr. Lee was acting “aggravated
or angry at” Dr. Mattioda. In another meeting years later,
Dr. Mattioda suggested that he could oversee a colleague’s
work, and Dr. Lee nearly shouted at him. Additionally, at a
NASA holiday party, Dr. Lee told Dr. Mattioda “not to get
his ‘hopes up’” for a promotion for which Dr. Mattioda’s
name had been submitted.
    Dr. Lee also made comments about Dr. Mattioda to other
NASA employees. On one occasion, Dr. Mattioda’s
coworker “insisted on photographing” Dr. Mattioda giving a
presentation because Dr. Lee had stated that he did not
believe Dr. Mattioda was involved with the project. This
same coworker told Dr. Mattioda that Dr. Lee had expressed
that he did not respect Dr. Mattioda’s work, thought
Dr. Mattioda was lazy, and thought Dr. Mattioda was “using
his medical and disability issues to avoid work.” Other
colleagues told Dr. Mattioda that Dr. Lee disparaged
Dr. Mattioda so often that they considered such comments
“background noise.”
    In addition to openly criticizing Dr. Mattioda, Dr. Lee
inhibited Dr. Mattioda’s work opportunities. For instance,
he declined to support Dr. Mattioda’s nomination for a
                       MATTIODA V. NELSON                         7

promotion but supported other candidates. He failed to
authorize a spot for Dr. Mattioda’s Postdoctoral Program
candidate, who would have supported Dr. Mattioda’s work.
He lied to Dr. Mattioda by stating that Dr. Mattioda could
not virtually present at a conference to which he was unable
to travel. And he declined to involve Dr. Mattioda in projects
and required Dr. Mattioda to submit an itemized travel
request for a project that Dr. Lee did not require from another
colleague.
    Dr. Mattioda alleges that he also had problems with
another supervisor, Dr. Jessie Dotson. Dr. Mattioda
requested a travel upgrade as an accommodation from
Dr. Dotson in 2011. Dr. Dotson improperly told
Dr. Mattioda that he would have to use his own grant money
to pay for the upgrade. 1 Dr. Dotson also warned
Dr. Mattioda that he could “lose [his] job” if he kept
requesting travel accommodations. She was also resistant to
other accommodation requests from Dr. Mattioda, telling
him she could not “find any magic pots of” money and
requiring him to go through steps not required of others to
receive his requests.
    Dr. Dotson also mishandled her performance reviews of
Dr. Mattioda. In a May 2013 performance review,
Dr. Mattioda expressed concern that his disability-related
inability to travel would impact his career. Dr. Dotson told
Dr. Mattioda “not to worry” but then lowered one of
Dr. Mattioda’s ratings, which affected his yearly bonuses,
for this reason. During another review, Dr. Dotson showed
Dr. Mattioda an unexplained list of “proposal success rates,”

1
  Dr. Mattioda also alleged that Dr. Dotson and other NASA officials
were resistant to his travel-related accommodation and other funding
requests on other occasions.
8                    MATTIODA V. NELSON

and informed Dr. Mattioda that he was the lowest on the list.
At another review, Dr. Dotson questioned whether
Dr. Mattioda was “still committed to being a high-profile
scientist at NASA,” criticized him for not traveling, and
lowered his performance rating for not submitting a
particular proposal that she had previously counseled him
was the “right thing to do.” Thereafter, Dr. Dotson
acknowledged Dr. Mattioda’s failure to submit the proposal
should have had no impact on his performance rating, but
she denied Dr. Mattioda’s request to reconsider his
performance rating and also required Dr. Mattioda to sign
her rejection letter.
    Dr. Mattioda’s other harassment-based allegations
include that his supervisors disclosed his disabilities and
Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity to other
employees, and otherwise inhibited his opportunities at
NASA. And that in June 2016, NASA transferred
Dr. Mattioda to a different division “[t]o help calm the
waters and to provide [Dr. Mattioda] with a safe space.”
                  B. Denied Promotion
     In November 2016, a senior scientist position became
available at NASA (ST Position). Dr. Lee and other NASA
employees emailed about the position, and a human
resources (HR) manager emailed Dr. Eugene Tu, a Center
Director at NASA, asking for approval to appoint Dr. Scott
Sandford directly. Dr. Tu also supported Dr. Sandford’s
appointment, but he wanted “to have a brief discussion on
all the upcoming ST positions (including this one) and which
ones we are expecting to compete or fill directly” and
expressed that he thought they “need[ed] to take a look at the
diversity of our ST positions.”
                     MATTIODA V. NELSON                     9

    Dr. Tu then sent out a letter explaining that the open
position would follow NASA’s “procedural framework for
merit staffing of ST positions,” which includes convening a
panel “of three or more senior leaders . . . to assist in the
selection process.” The designated selection panel consisted
of Dr. Steven Zornetzer, as chair, and Drs. Max Bernstein,
Steve Howell, and Lee, as voting members. An equal
opportunity (EO) officer and an HR manager served as non-
voting member and staff, respectively, on the panel.
Dr. Mark Fonda ultimately replaced Dr. Howell. And
Dr. Lee recused himself a week after initially agreeing to
serve, and he was replaced by Dr. Jaya Bajpayee.
    The ST Position posting stated that candidates would be
evaluated according to criteria assessing: (1) education level
and training; (2) technical excellence and contributions
including experience, technical problem solving, and
publications and “[i]nformation [t]ransfer”; (3) awards and
recognition; (4) outside professional activities; and
(5) corporate cooperation and technical leadership skills,
including “coaching/mentoring and diversity and inclusion.”
The posting also mentioned that candidates should possess
experience related to supporting “space science missions.”
The evaluation criteria warned “[u]ndue emphasis should
not be accorded to the mere number of publications.”
    There were seven applicants, and the selection panel
ultimately narrowed their consideration to Drs. Mattioda,
Sandford, and Farid Salama. Dr. Mattioda’s application
indicated that he qualified for Schedule A hiring
consideration, which is an affirmative-action schedule for
federal employees with disabilities. See U.S. Off. of Pers.
Mgmt., Disability Employment, Hiring, available at
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/disability-
employment/hiring/ (stating that “[i]n the non-competitive
10                    MATTIODA V. NELSON

hiring process, agencies use a special authority (Schedule A)
to hire persons with disabilities without requiring them to
compete for the job. In the competitive process, applicants
compete with each other through a structured process.”)
However, Dr. Mattioda does not appear to dispute that his
Schedule A hiring eligibility was not transmitted to NASA’s
internal system nor that the ST Position was subject to the
typical competitive process. Of the panel members,
Drs. Fonda and Bernstein were aware of Dr. Mattioda’s
disability status and prior EEO activity during the selection
process.
    In their applications for the ST Position, Drs. Salama and
Sandford self-reported their “h-index” values, a score which
measures the impact of a scientist’s published research
articles. Dr. Salama reported an h-index of 34, and
Dr. Sandford reported an h-index of 67 and that he had
“published 207 papers.” In his application, Dr. Mattioda
stated that he had 33 publications in peer-reviewed journals,
but he did not disclose his h-index. Dr. Mattioda also pointed
out in his written responses to the evaluation criteria that
“due to the lack of sufficient travel funding for scientists
with disabilities at NASA . . . I have been unable to
participate more fully in . . . professional activities.” Before
Dr. Lee recused himself from the selection panel, he emailed
Dr. Zornetzer information containing each candidate’s h-
index, with Dr. Sandford having the highest score.
    The panel did not interview the candidates, but all panel
members individually rated them according to the evaluation
criteria included in the job posting, and each rated
Dr. Sandford the highest. Although Dr. Bajpayee gave
Drs. Mattioda and Sandford the same overall rating,
Dr. Bajpayee rated Dr. Sandford higher on the “awards and
recognition” criteria and stated that he thought
                         MATTIODA V. NELSON                           11

Dr. Sandford’s application was the “most articulate.”
Dr. Bernstein noted that Dr. Mattioda’s publications were
low and that he did not have impressive mission experience.
In contrast, he thought that Dr. Sandford’s publications are
“really changing paradigms” and that Sandford’s mission-
involvement experience was “far beyond the other[s’.]” 2 The
other panel members made similar observations on their
rating sheets.
    After the panel members individually rated the
candidates, they met to discuss their ratings and
unanimously decided to recommend Dr. Sandford for the ST
Position. Dr. Zornetzer sent Dr. Tu the panel’s
recommendation emphasizing Dr. Sandford’s “strong
professional contributions to major deep space missions”
and his “positive impact and robust recognition by his
peers,” among other qualifications.
    Dr. Tu reviewed Dr. Zornetzer’s memorandum and each
candidate’s application materials. Dr. Tu agreed with the
panel’s recommendation to select Dr. Sandford because he
thought Dr. Sandford had a strong publication record,
mission experience, and engagement with professional
societies, and Dr. Mattioda and the other candidate did not
have “backgrounds as strong as Dr. Sandford” in these areas.
After receiving the selection panel’s recommendation,
Dr. Tu sent a memorandum to NASA’s Acting
Administrator indicating he wanted to select Dr. Sandford,
and the Acting Administrator concurred in his decision.

2
  Dr. Bernstein sent an email indicating that his overall rating was “not
merely the average of all of the scores” as that would make it “harder to
see the very real differences between the candidates in the technical
area[.]”
12                       MATTIODA V. NELSON

    Dr. Zornetzer later told Dr. Mattioda that he was
considered for the ST Position but not selected mainly
because of his lower h-index score and lack of “‘deep space’
mission experience,” neither of which was listed as a
requisite qualification in the job position announcement. In
the same conversation, Dr. Zornetzer informed Dr. Mattioda
that he had no knowledge about the h-index and thought it
was a “astrophysics thing.”
    Dr. Mattioda filed an EEO complaint alleging that he
was not selected because of his disabilities and prior EEO
activity. 3 Dr. Mattioda did not know who was on the
selection panel when he filed his EEO complaint and
speculated that Drs. Michael Bicay, Dotson, and Lee were
involved. Dr. Mattioda criticized the panel’s reliance on the
h-index. As Dr. Mattioda points out, the record is
inconsistent as to the source of the candidates’ h-indices
considered by the selection panel. 4 He also contends that the
panel had differing understandings of this metric and that the
panel give it undue weight. According to Dr. Mattioda, a
better index would have been the “M index,” which accounts
for the time from a person’s first publication in the field,
giving more weight to a shorter publication history with the
same productivity. Dr. Mattioda further attacked the panel’s
reliance on “deep space” mission experience because this

3
  Dr. Mattioda had filed three prior EEO complaints alleging he was
discriminated against in prior incidents because he is Native American
and because he is disabled.
4
 Dr. Fonda attested that Dr. Zornetzer provided the h-index information
for each candidate. Dr. Zornetzer attested that Dr. Bernstein provided the
h-index for each candidate. Drs. Bernstein and Bajpayee attested that the
candidates’ h-indices were in the application packets.
                     MATTIODA V. NELSON                     13

was not listed in the job posting and panel members also did
not have a uniform understanding of this criteria.
    Additionally, Dr. Mattioda asserted that panel members
were biased. He claimed that Dr. Bernstein had a conflict of
interest because Dr. Sandford mentored him for years.
Dr. Mattioda also claimed that most of the panel members
were aware of his disabilities or EEO activity, and that the
panel should have considered his disabilities to account for
why he had less experience.
    Despite Dr. Mattioda’s various challenges, he
acknowledged that Dr. Sandford has significantly more
experience and publications, noting that because
Dr. Sandford entered the field early on, his publications were
the first in the novel field. In Dr. Mattioda’s view, the panel
was “determined to pick the candidate with the most years
of experience,” which was Dr. Sandford.
              C. NASA’s Motion to Dismiss
    Dr. Mattioda filed four actions in 2020 (following his
separate EEO complaints), which the district court
consolidated. In his complaint in the consolidated action, he
alleged various claims under the Rehabilitation Act,
including hostile work environment, harassment, and
discrimination. NASA moved to dismiss the consolidated
action, and the district court granted NASA’s motion in part.
In doing so, the court explained that discrimination claims
based on discrete adverse actions are analyzed separately for
purposes of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
timeliness. The district court concluded that Dr. Mattioda
could not state a discrimination claim based on events
occurring before July 7, 2015 (45 days before Dr. Mattioda
contacted an EEO counselor) or after August 8, 2017 (the
final date of allegations in Dr. Mattioda’s EEO actions), to
14                     MATTIODA V. NELSON

the extent the conduct was not sufficiently similar to the
allegations made in the EEO complaints, but that those
incidents could be used as background to support
Dr. Mattioda’s exhausted and timely claims.5 As for
Dr. Mattioda’s timely claim of discrimination, the district
court concluded that Dr. Mattioda had stated a prima facie
case under the Rehabilitation Act.
    The district court indicated that hostile-work-
environment claims are different from discrimination claims
because they “involve[] repeated conduct,” and are timely
“so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the
same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls
within the time period.” The district court acknowledged that
this court had not yet decided whether a harassment claim is
cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act but assumed that it
was. Concluding that Dr. Mattioda’s allegations did not
contain a “readily apparent link to [his] disability” or
establish that he suffered severe or pervasive harassment, the
district court dismissed Dr. Mattioda’s harassment claim
with leave to amend.
    Dr. Mattioda then filed his operative complaint, which
NASA again moved to dismiss. In its order on this motion,
the district court reiterated that Dr. Mattioda had plausibly
alleged a discrimination claim based on his disability. But
the district court granted NASA’s motion in part, without
leave to amend, concluding that Dr. Mattioda still failed to
link the alleged harassment that he endured to his disability.

5
 Dr. Mattioda does not challenge the court’s exhaustion or timeliness
holdings.
                      MATTIODA V. NELSON                     15

      D. NASA’s Motion for Summary Judgment
    NASA subsequently moved for summary judgment on
Dr. Mattioda’s surviving claims, which the district court
granted in relevant part. Applying the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), to Dr. Mattioda’s
discrimination claim based on his non-selection for the ST
Position, the district court first held that Dr. Mattioda failed
to establish a prima facie case of disability-based
discrimination because his “wide-ranging complaints about
the selection of [Dr.] Sandford over him for the ST position
focus on process issues.” The district court rejected
Dr. Mattioda’s cat’s-paw theory—that Dr. Lee had
discriminatory animus and influenced the selection panel’s
decision—reasoning that, even if Dr. Lee had such bias,
there was no evidence that Dr. Lee improperly influenced
the panel. The district court further explained that
Dr. Mattioda had not demonstrated that Dr. Lee provided
inaccurate information regarding the candidates’ h-indices.
And the district court emphasized that Dr. Mattioda admitted
that he was less experienced than Dr. Sandford in several
areas the panel considered, and that all panel members, even
the one who Dr. Mattioda described as “obviously neutral,”
rated Dr. Sandford the highest.
    Even if Dr. Mattioda had established a prima-facie case,
the district court further concluded that NASA established a
non-discriminatory justification for its hiring decision: that
Dr. Sandford was a superior candidate. And the court also
held that Dr. Mattioda failed to present any evidence that
NASA’s justification was pretext by showing, for example,
that he was the superior candidate.
16                    MATTIODA V. NELSON

     After the district court’s rulings, the parties settled
Dr. Mattioda’s remaining discrimination claim based on his
negative performance reviews, which was scheduled for
trial, and the district court dismissed that claim with
prejudice and entered judgment in May 2022.
                      II. DISCUSSION
          A. Hostile-Work-Environment Claim
    We review the district court’s dismissal of
Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-environment claim for failure
to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo.
Lathus v. City of Huntington Beach, 56 F.4th 1238, 1240 (9th
Cir. 2023). “We accept as true all well-pleaded allegations
of material fact in the operative complaint and construe them
in favor of [Dr. Mattioda], the non-moving party.” Id.
                               1.
    As an initial matter, while this court has held that “[t]here
is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and
obligations created by the [Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA)] and [the Rehabilitation Act],” Zukle v.
Regents of Univ. of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11
(9th Cir. 1999), we have not yet decided whether a hostile-
work-environment claim is cognizable under either statute.
See McIntyre v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 976 F.3d 902, 916 (9th
Cir. 2020). But we have recognized that the “weight of
authority supports” concluding that a plaintiff can bring a
disability-based harassment claim under the ADA—and thus
under the Rehabilitation Act—because “every circuit to have
[addressed this issue] has [so] concluded.” Id.; see also Ford
v. Marion County Sheriff’s Off., 942 F.3d 839, 851–52 (7th
Cir. 2019) (collecting cases). Today we affirmatively decide
this threshold question and join the weight of consensus in
                      MATTIODA V. NELSON                      17

holding that a disability-based harassment claim is available
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
    It is well established that a plaintiff may bring a hostile-
work-environment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). And as the Seventh Circuit
succinctly stated, this same claim is available under the ADA
because “Congress wrote the ADA using the language of
Title VII.” Ford, 942 F.3d at 852. The Fifth Circuit similarly
reasoned that because the ADA and Title VII use almost
identical language and “are also alike in their purposes and
remedial structures,” the ADA also “provides a cause of
action for disability-based harassment.” Flowers v. S. Reg’l
Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 2001).
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “[i]t is evident,
after a review of the ADA’s language, purpose and remedial
framework, that Congress’s intent in enacting the ADA was
. . . to eradicate disability-based harassment in the
workplace.” Id. at 233. And the Fifth Circuit observed that
the Supreme Court construed Title VII, which has nearly
identical language, “to provide a cause of action for
‘harassment [which is] sufficiently severe or persuasive to
alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create
an abusive working environment . . . because it affects a
term, condition, or privilege of employment.’” Id. (quoting
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180
(1989) (alterations in original); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). Thus, applying the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Title VII, the Fifth Circuit “interpret[ed] the
phrase ‘terms, conditions, and privileges of employment,’ as
it is used in the ADA to ‘strike at’ harassment in the
workplace.” Id.
18                  MATTIODA V. NELSON

    This reasoning is sound, and we now join our sister
circuits that have held that hostile-work-environment claims
are cognizable under the ADA. Additionally, we have held
that “[t]he Rehabilitation Act is materially identical to and
the model for the ADA,” the difference being the application
of the Rehabilitation Act is limited to federally funded
programs. Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 908 (9th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 862
n.17 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504–05 (2005)). Thus, we also
hold that hostile-work-environment claims are cognizable
under the Rehabilitation Act.
                             2.
    We now turn to whether Dr. Mattioda pleaded a plausible
hostile-work-environment claim. For this claim,
Dr. Mattioda must allege that he was subjected to
harassment because of his disability, and that the harassing
“conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive work
environment.” Manatt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792,
798 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (stating that a
complaint must provide “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face”). The district court
concluded that Dr. Mattioda failed to state a plausible
allegation that the harassing conduct occurred because of his
disability. On appeal, Dr. Mattioda argues that the district
court erred because he adequately pleaded causation and the
district court should have applied the more liberal pleading
standard articulated by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534
U.S. 506 (2002), over the Iqbal/Twombly standard.
                     MATTIODA V. NELSON                    19

     As an initial matter, we hold that the district court
correctly applied the Iqbal/Twombly standard in assessing
Dr. Mattioda’s complaint. The Supreme Court decided
Swierkiewicz before Iqbal and Twombly, holding that an
employment-discrimination claim is not subject to a
heightened pleading standard. 534 U.S. at 510–15. In
Twombly, the Supreme Court explained that “Swierkiewicz
did not change the law of pleading, but simply re-
emphasized that the . . . use of a heightened pleading
standard for Title VII cases was contrary to the Federal
Rules’ structure of liberal pleading requirements.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570 (alteration adopted) (citation omitted). To
the extent that any differences remain between the pleading
standards relied upon in Swierkiewicz and Twombly, in
reconciling these decisions, we have explained that a
complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that
plausibly suggest entitlement to relief. Starr v. Baca, 652
F.3d 1202, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Austin v. Univ.
of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1136–38 (9th Cir. 2019) (“In
Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court reiterated that the prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement.”). The district court
did not employ a heightened pleading standard as prohibited
by Swierkiewicz, see Austin, 925 F.3d at 1136–38, nor did it
err in applying the Iqbal/Twombly standard.
    Applying the correct pleading standard, the district court
concluded that Dr. Mattioda failed to allege a plausible
causal nexus between the claimed harassment and his
disabilities. This was error. On the record here, the district
court’s conclusion that Dr. Mattioda plausibly alleged
disability-based discrimination, conflicts with its conclusion
that he did not plausibly allege his disability was the basis
for the harassment. For example, the district court
20                       MATTIODA V. NELSON

acknowledged that Dr. Dotson’s threat to Dr. Mattioda’s job
was explicitly linked to his disabilities, but concluded that
this allegation concerned only his disability claim based on
“failure to accommodate,” even though this allegation was
“particularly” realleged as part of Dr. Mattioda’s harassment
claim. Such parsing of Dr. Mattioda’s complaint is
inconsistent with the district court’s obligation to construe
well-pleaded allegations in Dr. Mattioda’s favor. See Lathus,
56 F.4th at 1240.
    Further, the district court failed to acknowledge
Dr. Mattioda’s allegation that Dr. Lee’s “series of harassing
comments” began after Dr. Mattioda informed Dr. Lee of his
disabilities. 6 See Flowers, 247 F.3d at 236–37 (concluding
that evidence the employer’s treatment of plaintiff changed
after discovering her HIV-positive status supported a verdict
for disability-based harassment). Construing this fact in
Dr. Mattioda’s favor and considering that Dr. Lee denigrated
Dr. Mattioda as lazy and as using his disabilities to avoid
work, Dr. Mattioda plausibly alleged a nexus between the
described harassment and his disabilities. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th
Cir. 2008) (concluding that “the inference that racial animus
motivated [a] nurse’s requests that [plaintiff] perform the
tasks of a maintenance man [wa]s a reasonable one that . . .
must [be] construe[d] in his favor at the motion to dismiss
stage”); id. (quoting McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d
1103, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004)) (“[A] coworker’s use of a ‘code
word or phrase’ can, under certain circumstances, contribute
to a hostile work environment.”). Dr. Mattioda’s allegation
that Dr. Dotson treated “non-disabled researchers” better,

6
 In fact, after learning of Dr. Mattioda’s disability, Dr. Lee openly asked
why Mattioda could not “tough it out.”
                     MATTIODA V. NELSON                    21

further linked Dr. Dotson’s allegedly harassing conduct to
his disability. See EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Alaska, 422
F.3d 840, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding discriminatory
harassment claim should survive summary judgment where
plaintiffs alleged supervisor treated female employees worse
than males).
                              3.
    Finally, although it is a close call, we are not persuaded
by NASA’s argument that Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-
environment claim fails on the alternative ground that
Dr. Mattioda did not allege sufficiently severe or pervasive
harassment.
    To establish a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must
show that the conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create
an abusive working environment.” Craig v. M & O Agencies,
Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
“[T]he required showing of severity or seriousness of the
harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or
frequency of the conduct.” Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Alaska, F.3d
at 847 (citation omitted). “‘[A]ll the circumstances,’
including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance’” inform
whether an environment is sufficiently hostile. Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998) (quoting
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). “[S]imple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)
are not sufficient to create an actionable claim.” Reynaga v.
Roseburg Forest Prod., 847 F.3d 678, 687 (9th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
22                    MATTIODA V. NELSON

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (explaining that harassment
claims should not be based on “ordinary tribulations of the
workplace” (citation omitted)). But it is enough if “hostile
conduct pollute[d] the victim’s workplace, making it more
difficult for h[im] to do h[is] job, to take pride in h[is] work,
and to desire to stay in h[is] position.” Reynaga, 847 F.3d at
687 (citation omitted).
    The conduct must be both subjectively and objectively
abusive. Craig, 496 F.3d at 1055. Objective hostility is
assessed by looking at the totality of the circumstances
through the lens of a reasonable person with the same
protected characteristic. Id. Supervisor harassment has
“potentially greater impact” than coworker harassment.
Zetwick v. County of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 445 (9th Cir. 2017).
    While some of our hostile-work-environment cases have
involved relatively extreme conduct, see, e.g., Reynaga, 847
F.3d at 687–88 (employee made “repeated” demeaning and
“explicit racial and national origin comments in the
workplace”); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters. Inc., 256 F.3d
864, 873 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff testified that employees
“habitually called him sexually derogatory names, referred
to him with the [incorrect] gender, and taunted him for
behaving like a woman”); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,
873–75, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff’s male co-worker
repeatedly asked her out and sent her disturbing love letters
and “h[u]ng around her desk” and “pester[ed] her with
unnecessary questions”), we have also recognized that less
extreme conduct may be sufficient if it is repetitive.
    For example, in Davis v. Team Electric Company, we
held that it was a “close[] question” whether “an ‘objective’
reasonable woman” would find the harassment at issue
severe or pervasive where “the incidents f[ell] far short of
                      MATTIODA V. NELSON                       23

physical abuse or aggressive sexual advances.” 520 F.3d
1080, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff was a female
electrician and her supervisor agreed to transfer her, telling
her another employee there needed “a girlfriend,” and the
supervisor repeatedly referred to his wife as “astrobitch.” Id.
at 1085. Her supervisors made it difficult for her to complete
tasks, assigned her to hazardous assignments, and excluded
her from meetings and breaks. Id. at 1085–87. Her
supervisors also made some derogatory comments,
including that “the donuts are for the guys,” and “we don’t
mind if females are working as long as they don’t complain.”
Id. at 1085 (alteration omitted). There, we concluded that in
such close cases “where the severity of frequent abuse is
questionable, it is more appropriate to leave the assessment
to the fact-finder.” Id. at 1096 (emphasis added).
       In another case, we recognized that the conduct at
issue—calling plaintiff “Manny” instead of “Mamdouh”
over his repeated objections and belief that the nickname had
racial implications—“may not have been especially severe,”
but was sufficiently pervasive because such incidents, which
continued for almost a year, “were frequent and consistent
rather than isolated.” El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068,
1073–74 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Zetwick, 850 F.3d at 443–
44 (concluding that where plaintiff’s harasser hugged her
more than 100 times over many years, a reasonable jury
could consider cumulative effect and determine that hugging
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable); Ray v.
Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1238, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that “[r]epeated derogatory or humiliating
statements . . . can constitute a hostile work environment”
and concluding plaintiff’s claim should survive summary
judgment where supervisors targeted him “for verbal abuse
. . . for a period lasting over one and [a] half years,” subjected
24                     MATTIODA V. NELSON

him to pranks, made a physically threatening gesture toward
him, and falsely accused him of misconduct).
    On the other hand, harassment is not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to establish a hostile work environment where
the conduct at issue consists of limited or isolated behavior.
Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.
2000). For example, in Kortan, after the plaintiff complained
about her male supervisor using racist and sexist
terminology on one occasion, he started “giving her looks
instead of smiling” and told her that he made a mistake in
assuming that she was Artemis because she was Medea. Id.
at 1107–08. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, we considered the fact that, although offensive,
the comments that the plaintiff complained about “were
mainly made in a flurry on [one day]” and that this conduct
was “concentrated on one occasion.” Id. at 1110–11; see
also, e.g., Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642–44
(9th Cir. 2003) (relying on Kortan to conclude that “[t]wo
isolated offensive remarks,” two incidents of yelling, and a
couple of false complaints about plaintiff was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct for a hostile-work-
environment claim).
    Here, Dr. Mattioda has alleged sufficiently severe or
pervasive harassment to survive NASA’s motion to
dismiss. 7 Similar to El-Hakem, Ray, and Zetwick,
Dr. Mattioda alleges that Dr. Lee inhibited Dr. Mattioda’s
work opportunities and repeatedly made harassing and
derogatory comments over a period of years, and he has
described several specific examples. Dr. Mattioda further

7
 Most of our cases assessing whether sufficiently severe or pervasive
harassment was present were resolved at summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1108; Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 639.
                     MATTIODA V. NELSON                    25

alleges, among other conduct, that Dr. Dotson vaguely
threatened his job, demeaned him by making him sign a
letter acknowledging Dr. Dotson’s refusal to reconsider
Dr. Mattioda’s poor performance rating, and made insulting
comments about his reasonable-accommodation requests
and job performance. While neither the severity nor the
frequency of the alleged offensive conduct alone indicates
that the hostile-work-environment standard obviously is
satisfied, see, e.g., Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1110–11,
Dr. Mattioda’s allegations do indicate that the “severity of
frequent abuse is questionable” such that “it is more
appropriate to leave the assessment to the fact-finder.”
Davis, 520 F.3d at 1096.
    For these reasons, we conclude that Dr. Mattioda
plausibly alleged a hostile-work-environment claim based
on his disability.
           B. Disability-Discrimination Claim
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo “to determine whether, viewing all evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any
genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court
correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Whitman v.
Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008).
    As previously stated, the parties agree that the district
court correctly used the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework in assessing Dr. Mattioda’s claim. Mustafa v.
Clark County. Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1174–76 (9th Cir.
1998) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to
plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim). Under
this framework, a plaintiff must make a prima facie case
establishing that (1) he is a person with a disability;
(2) otherwise qualified for employment; and (3) suffered
26                       MATTIODA V. NELSON

discrimination because of his disability. See Snead v. Metro.
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001).
Where a plaintiff establishes such a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to provide a non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Coghlan v. Am.
Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005). If
the employer meets that burden, then the employee must
show that the employer’s reason is pretextual. Id. Even if a
biased employee was not the final decisionmaker, a plaintiff
may rely on a “cat’s paw” theory to establish a causal link
by proving that the biased non-decision-making employee
“influenced or was involved in the decision or
decisionmaking process.” France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d
1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended on reh’g (Oct. 14,
2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Dr. Mattioda argues that Dr. Lee influenced the selection
panel to prevent Dr. Mattioda’s selection. 8 Dr. Mattioda’s
reliance on the cat’s-paw theory is dubious where the only
supporting evidence is his own speculative declaration and
evidence that Dr. Lee was initially appointed to the selection
panel and shared the candidates’ h-indices before recusing
himself. The record is devoid of evidence that the panel
“deferred to” Dr. Lee or that the h-index values Dr. Lee
provided were a determinative factor in the panel’s decision,
particularly where Dr. Mattioda concedes that he is less
experienced than Dr. Sandford and that the two other

8
  Dr. Mattioda also argues in passing that NASA failed “to take
‘affirmative action’” or give him a preference for the ST Position based
on his disability status. But he points to no authority that the failure to
give him a preference supports a discrimination claim and, therefore, the
argument is waived. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“Arguments made in passing and not supported by citations
to the record or to case authority are generally deemed waived.”).
                        MATTIODA V. NELSON                          27

candidates self-reported their h-indices. 9 Cf. France, 795
F.3d at 1176 (reversing summary judgment where biased
employee formally recommended the candidates and the
other interviewers deferred to his recommendation); Shager
v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 399–400, 405 (7th Cir. 1990)
(concluding there was evidence a biased supervisor tainted
the committee’s firing decision where supervisor
recommended termination and exaggerated the employee’s
deficiencies, and committee’s deliberations were “brief” or
“perfunctory” and deferential).
    But even assuming, as the district court did, that
Dr. Mattioda established a prima facie case of disability
discrimination, he repeatedly conceded that NASA’s non-
discriminatory reason for not selecting him for the
position—that Dr. Sandford was more qualified for the
selective position—is valid. Further, there is no evidence
that the “technical excellence” criteria that the selection
panel considered, including a candidate’s mission
experience and publication impact, were invented to
discriminate against Dr. Mattioda based on his disability.
“Technical excellence” was one of the five criteria listed on
NASA’s evaluation form for the ST Position. And although
Dr. Mattioda contends that the form makes no mention of the
h-index or “deep space” mission experience, the form
referenced experience and publications as considerations,
the job posting referenced “space science missions,” and
other NASA panels have considered the “h-index as a
criteria for selecting a scientist.”

9
  Dr. Mattioda contends that Dr. Howell was a “panelist who was clearly
influenced by Dr. Lee’s data.” But Dr. Howell was not ultimately on the
panel that selected the candidate for the ST Position.
28                    MATTIODA V. NELSON

    Where NASA proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for selecting Dr. Sandford for the ST Position, and
Dr. Mattioda concedes that Dr. Sandford has more relevant
experience, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment on this claim. See Opara v. Yellen, 57 F.4th 709,
725–27 (9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that employer’s burden
under McDonnell Douglas is one of production, not
persuasion, and affirming summary judgment in favor of
employer based on employee’s failure to raise a genuine
dispute as to the employer’s motive); see also Dep’t of Fair
Emp. & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 746–48
(9th Cir. 2011) (same).
    Relying primarily on Bergene v. Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement & Power District, 272 F.3d 1136
(9th Cir. 2001), Dr. Mattioda argues that there is sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
pretext. But Bergene is inapposite. In that case, where a
plaintiff alleged that she was denied a promotion in
retaliation for bringing a Title VII claim, there was
“evidence of a direct threat [from her former supervisor] of
adverse employment consequences if [she] vigorously
pursued her earlier Title VII claim.” Id. at 1142. The plaintiff
in Bergene also produced circumstantial evidence
supporting that the employer’s justification for denying her
promotion was pretextual, including that her immediate
supervisor—who was responsible for selecting the candidate
for promotion—called her “trouble” and said that he had
“heard about [her],” and that the job promotion was awarded
to another candidate who was qualified only because the
plaintiff’s supervisor changed the job requirements to
“remove [the plaintiff’s] competitive advantage.” Id. There
is no similar direct or circumstantial evidence here.
Moreover, unlike in Bergen, where the comments were made
                           MATTIODA V. NELSON                         29

by either the decisionmaker or someone that could influence
the decision, Dr. Lee’s prior comments to and treatment of
Dr. Mattioda are irrelevant to the pretextual analysis because
the selection panel made an independent assessment and
selection.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s summary
judgment in NASA’s favor on Dr. Mattioda’s disability-
discrimination claim based on his non-selection for the ST
Position.
    AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part;
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. 10

10
     Each party shall bear its own costs. Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4).