Court Opinion

ID: 9747240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:05:10.077617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:51.362227
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
dissenting.
Unlike my colleagues in the majority, I find myself in substantial agreement with the written opinion of the trial judge, Honorable Patricia A. Wynn, in which she set aside the verdict in Ms. Strass’ favor and held that Kaiser was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 For some of the reasons stated by Judge Wynn, and for the additional reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent.
I.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
I begin, as did the trial judge, with a consideration of Ms. Strass’ claim for breach of contract. Ms. Strass asserts that Kaiser’s Personnel Policy Manual imposed a contractual obligation on Kaiser to follow the progressive discipline policies described therein. Although a policy manual may, under some circumstances, constitute a contract, an effective disclaimer will defeat any inference that a contractual obligation is being undertaken. See, e.g., Smith v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 265, 269 (D.C.1993). In this case, the trial judge held as a matter of law that Kaiser’s express disavowals of any intention to enter into a binding contract were fatal to Ms. Strass’ breach of contract claim. See appendix at pp. 1022-25. I find the judge’s reasoning persuasive, and add the following observations of my own.
Kaiser made it clear in the very first paragraph of its Personnel Policy Manual that “[t]his manual is not a contract.” (Emphasis added.) In addition, Kaiser’s Employee Handbook, of which Ms. Strass acknowledged receiving a copy, states that *1015the contents of the Manual “are presented as a matter of information only and are not to be understood or construed as a promise or contract between the Company and its employees.” (Emphasis added.) Kaiser could hardly have stated more clearly its intention not to be legally required to adhere to the procedures described in the Manual and not to give up its freedom of action. Nevertheless, my colleagues in the majority hold that Kaiser was contractually obligated to Ms. Strass.
“In order to form a binding agreement, both parties must have the distinct intention to be bound; without such intent, there can be no assent and therefore no contract.” Edmund J. Flynn Co. v. LaVay, 431 A.2d 543, 547 (D.C.1981). Accordingly, in determining whether the parties have entered into a contract, the question whether the parties intended to be bound must be “closely” examined. See Jack Baker Inc. v. Office Space Dev. Corp., 664 A.2d 1236, 1239 (D.C.1995) (citing LaVay). A “dose” examination of the Personnel Manual and Employee Handbook reveals that Kaiser did not intend to be contractually bound and took the trouble to say so, prominently and forcefully. In my opinion, Ms. Strass is effectively asking the court to write a new and binding contract for parties who never entered into one. This we are not empowered to do. See, e.g., Waters v. Kopp, 34 App. D.C. 575, 582 (1910).
Moreover, an employment relationship, such as the one between Kaiser and Ms. Strass, is subject to well-established legal principles. A contract of employment is presumed to be terminable at-will, and this presumption may be successfully rebutted only where the parties have “stated clearly their intention to limit the employer’s right to terminate.” Perkins v. District Gov’t Employees Fed. Credit Union, 653 A.2d 842 (D.C.1995) (quoting Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 73 App.D.C. 409, 410, 120 F.2d 36, 37 (1941)). “[WJhere no such intent is clearly expressed ... the assumption will be that ... the parties have in mind merely the ordinary business contract for a continuing employment, terminable at the will of either party.” Littell, supra, 73 App.D.C. at 410, 120 F.2d at 38.
My colleagues point to the use of words such as “shall” elsewhere in the Manual. They suggest that such terminology is mandatory in nature and renders the Manual ambiguous, in spite of Kaiser’s disclaimers. I cannot agree that use of these words can convert a non-binding statement of policy into an enforceable contract. In my opinion, the document as a whole leaves no doubt as to its meaning, which can be summarized as follows: “This is the way we ordinarily do things, but we are not contractually bound to do them in that way.” In sum, Kaiser did not intend to enter into a contract, it unequivocally stated that intention, and the court cannot make and enforce a contract to which the parties never agreed. But even if there were some doubt as to the meaning and effect of Kaiser’s disclaimers — and I discern none — it cannot fairly be said that the parties in this case have clearly entered into a binding contract modifying Ms. Strass’ status as an at-will employee, see Perkins, supra, 653 A.2d at 842, when the documents which, according to Ms. Strass, constitute that contract, explicitly state that there is no contract and that the Manual is not to be understood or construed as an enforceable obligation or even as a promise.
My colleagues rely heavily on Greene v. Howard Univ., 134 U.S.App. D.C. 81, 412 F.2d 1128 (1969). See maj. op., ante, at 1011-12. In that case, non-tenured instructors at Howard University who had allegedly participated in on-campus disturbances claimed that, without notice to the instructors, the University had refused to renew their appointments, and that this refusal was in violation of the University’s obligations as set forth in the Faculty Handbook. Section IX of the Handbook provided that “[i]t will be the practice of the University, without contractual obligation to do so,” to give advance written *1016notice at specified times during the academic year to instructors who would not be retained for the following academic year. In a university setting, the necessity for such notice is apparent, for faculty members need to know in advance whether they will be retained, so that they may make timely application elsewhere in case of non-retention. The notification dates specified in the Faculty Handbook having passed, the instructors had been led to believe that their contracts would be routinely renewed. After the on-campus disturbances, however, the instructors were peremptorily notified, without opportunity for a hearing, that they would not be retained on the Howard faculty.
Reversing the trial court’s decision in favor of the University, the Court of Appeals held that
the contractual relationships existing here, when viewed against the regulations prescribed for, and the practices customarily followed in, their administration, required the University in the special circumstances here involved to afford the teachers an opportunity to be heard.
Greene, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 84, 412 F.2d at 1131 (emphasis added). The court did not decide the substantive issue, namely, whether, notwithstanding its disclaimer of a contractual obligation, the University was obliged to retain the instructors where the notice contemplated in the Handbook had not been timely given.
The key words in the above-quoted passage from Greene are those that I have italicized — “in the special circumstances here involved.” The court obviously wrote in this limitation deliberately, and the reader was thus forewarned that the court was not fashioning a broad rule embracing cases in which such special circumstances did not exist. The Greene case arose in the rather esoteric world of academe, with its own traditions and expectations, and the court’s entire opinion reflects this critical fact. The court explicitly stated:
Contracts are written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms of conduct and expectations founded upon them. This is especially true of contracts in and among a community of scholars, which is what a university is. The readings of the market place are not invariably apt in this noncommercial context
134 U.S.App.D.C. at 88, 412 F.2d at 1135 (emphasis added).
Because “the readings of the market place” were not implicated in Greene, the court made no mention at all of the principles that would have governed the controversy if the instructors had been discharged by a commercial enterprise such as Kaiser. The opinion in Greene contains no discussion, for example, of the presumption that an employment contract is at-will, nor did the court advert to the rule that an intention to rebut that presumption must be stated clearly and unequivocally.2 The court thus did not decide or even explicitly address the legal issue that controls the present appeal or the case law that informs that issue.
Given the fundamental principle that there can be no contract where the parties have not clearly agreed to be contractually bound, one might quarrel with the decision in Greene even in the academic context in which that case arose.3 But be that as it may, I discern no special or other circumstances in the present case which would permit the court to create and enforce a contract into which Kaiser never agreed to enter, nor should we hold that the Manual and Handbook reflect a “clear” intent to depart from the at-will doctrine when those documents forcefully proclaim the *1017exact opposite.4 If this court treats the description in a manual of an employer’s procedures as a binding and enforceable contract even in the face of strong disclaimers such as Kaiser’s, the foreseeable effect of such a holding will be to discourage employers from providing manuals to their employees and from reducing their ordinary (but non-mandatory) procedures to writing. Such a consequence will benefit neither employers nor employees.
II.
DISABILITY
In 1992, when Kaiser fired Ms. Strass, the District’s Human Rights Act made it unlawful, inter alia, to discharge an employee “wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon ... physical handicap.” D.C.Code § l-2512(a)(l) (1992). At that time, “physical handicap” was defined as “a bodily or mental disablement which may be the result of injury, illness or congenital condition for which reasonable accommodation can be made.” D.C.Code § 1-2512(28) (repealed). The present appeal is governed by the definition of physical handicap then in effect.
In 1994, the Council passed the Human Rights Act of 1977 Disability Definition Amendment Act (DDAA). See Act No. 10-228, 41 D.C.Reg. 2588-84 (May 13, 1994).5 In the new statute, the Council deleted all references to “physical handicap” and substituted therefor the term “disability.” The 1994 Act contained the following definition of that term:
“Disability” means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual having a record of such an impairment or being regarded as having such an impairment.
D.C.Code § 1-2502(5A) (1999). The definition of “disability” in § 1-2502 is identical to the “federal” definition that appears in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and in regulations adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a) (1999).
Ms. Strass seems to argue, and the majority appears to assume, that although the relevant provisions of the Human Rights Act are now identical to those of the ADA, the protections provided by District law in 1992 were broader than those available under federal law. This is incorrect. Indeed, any suggestion that the 1994 modernization of statutory terminology effected a significant change in substantive law is quite inaccurate.6 On the contrary, the *1018federal standard for determining disability-had been a part of District of Columbia law since 1986, when the Office of Human Rights and the Commission on Human Rights promulgated “Physical Handicap Guidelines.” These Guidelines stated, inter alia:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Office and the Commission adopt and incorporate by reference the provisions promulgated by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which appear in 29 C.F.R. § 1613.701 et seq.7
4 DCMR § 513.1; 33 D.C.Reg. 4546, 4553 (Aug. 1,1986).
The EEOC regulations, which the District’s human rights agencies adopted and “incorporated by reference” into the Physical Handicap Guidelines, contained, almost verbatim, the definition of “disability,” quoted above, which now appears in the ADA.8 The legal standard that was in effect in the District at the time of Ms. Strass’ discharge was thus identical, for all practical purposes, to the present legal standard. Under the law in effect in 1992, as under current law, a plaintiff claiming protection under the Human Rights Act was required to demonstrate that she was “substantially limit[ed]” in her major life “activities,” or that she was regarded as being so limited. 29 C.F.R. § 1615.103(1).
The EEOC has defined “major life activities” as
functions such as caring for one’s self [sic], performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.
29 C.F.R. § 1615.103(2). Kaiser contends that Ms. Strass did not show that she was disabled under the foregoing standard, and that no impartial jury could reasonably find that she was so disabled. I agree.
At trial, and now on appeal, Ms. Strass has taken the position that her high blood *1019pressure, or hypertension, constitutes a “physical handicap” as that term was used in the Human Rights Act prior to 1994, and is also a “disability” under current law. But as the Supreme Court has recently noted, “[s]ome 50 million Americans have high blood pressure.” Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2149, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). In enacting the ADA, Congress found that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities....” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1); Sutton, supra, 119 S.Ct. at 2147. Many people suffer from disabilities unrelated to high blood pressure — blindness, deafness, and paraplegia, to name a few — and Congress obviously intended to provide protection to persons so afflicted. Since the number of people suffering from hypertension (approximately fifty million) exceeded the number that the ADA was enacted to protect (approximately forty-three million), Congress could not have considered hypertension, without more, to be a disability warranting protection under the Act. Thus, even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton, in which the Court gave the term “disability” a substantially narrower construction than it had previously been accorded by the EEOC and by eight of nine federal appellate courts, see Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2153 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the federal authorities uniformly supported Kaiser’s position that “blood pressure alone, without any evidence that it substantially affects one or more major life activities, is insufficient to bring an employee within the protection of the ADA.” Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (quoting and aff'g 889 F.Supp. 253, 258 (N.D.Miss. 1995)); accord, Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Amer., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1318-20 (8th Cir.1996); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 946 F.Supp. 872, 875 (D.Kan.1996), aff'd mem., 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir.1998), aff'd, 527 U.S. 516, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Strass, the record in this case does not support a finding that her high blood pressure substantially limited Ms. Strass in a “major life activity.” There was no evidence that she could not perform manual tasks, or walk, or see, or hear, or speak, or breathe, 29 C.F.R. § 1615.103(2). Ms. Strass likewise does not contend that she is unable to work, see id.; on the contrary, she has worked as a consultant since her discharge, and she has earned almost as much as she did at Kaiser. Moreover, according to Ms. Strass, she could even have done her old job if she had been provided with sufficient staff. Ms. Strass also asserts that she could have successfully handled the newly-created position of Director of Community Relations- — a job for which her superiors at Kaiser believed her to be unsuited.
There was, of course, evidence that Ms. Strass was unable to perform her former duties with a reduced staff, and that it was the stress caused by her attempts to do that job that precipitated her hypertension. But “the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” Aucutt, supra, 85 F.3d at 1319 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). As Ms. Strass points out in her reply brief, her own medical expert testified that Ms. Strass’ hypertension would have resolved if the “unusual and extraordinary stress” to which she was exposed at work beginning in late 1991 had been eliminated. It is difficult to reconcile this testimony with any claim that Ms. Strass was substantially limited in the life activity of working.
There was evidence that, from time to time, Ms. Strass’ hypertension caused severe headaches and neck pain, fatigue, and insomnia.9 Standing alone, however, such *1020symptoms constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA only if the employee’s major life activities are significantly affected. See, e.g., Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F.Supp. 102, 107-08 (D.R.I. 1997); cf. Grant v. The May Dep’t Stores, Inc., 127 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1709, 1711 (Super.Ct.D.C.1999) (Walton, J.) (applying “major life activity” standard under District’s Human Rights Act).
Finally, Ms. Strass contends that even if she was not in fact suffering from a disability, Kaiser regarded her as suffering from one. In this respect, however, the present case is indistinguishable from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Murphy, supra, which also involved an employee who was suffering from hypertension, who had been discharged from a particular job, but who was able to do other work:
[I]n light of petitioner’s skills and the array of jobs available to petitioner utilizing those skills, petitioner has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a par-tieular job. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2151-52.
119 S.Ct. at 2139.10
III.
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
Because, in my view, Ms. Strass was not suffering from a “bodily disablement,” I do not believe that the court needs to reach the question whether the accommodations sought by Ms. Strass were reasonable. On the merits of that issue, however, I agree entirely with Judge Wynn. In my opinion, “the only duty owed to a currently employed handicapped employee ... is to reasonably accommodate that individual within the position that [s]he presently holds.” Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320, 1326 (4th Cir.1992) (construing Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791).11 Judge Murnaghan put it concisely in Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir.1987):
*1021The case law is clear that, if a handicapped employee cannot do his job, he can be fired, and the employer is not required to assign him to alternative employment.
Finally, Kaiser’s ability to afford to hire more employees, and thus to reduce Ms. Strass’ stress level, is irrelevant. As the trial judge correctly observed, Kaiser was “not required to alter general decisions about personnel needs or revise program or budgetary priorities in order to accommodate [Ms. Strass’ alleged] disablement .” (Citation omitted.)
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
APPENDIX
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIVIL DIVISION
STEPHANIE A. STRASS, Plaintiff
v.
KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES, INC., Defendant
Civil Action: 92cal4841 Judge Wynn
Calendar 10

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s motion for remittitur and supplemental motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial, plaintiffs oppositions thereto, and defendant’s reply. After considering all of the pleadings and the record in this case, this Court finds that defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50 should be granted.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an employment relationship between plaintiff Stephanie Strass and defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. (Kaiser). Ms. Strass was employed as Kaiser’s Director of Public Affairs between April 14, 1988 and February 18, 1992. In the fall of 1991, Ms. Strass informed her supervisors at Kaiser of her belief that she suffered from hypertension. On February 18, 1992, Ms. Strass was fired, and on November 18, 1992, Ms. Strass filed a complaint against Kaiser alleging breach of ah employment contract, violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, and infliction of emotional distress. Subsequently, Ms. Strass amended her complaint and withdrew the infliction of emotional distress claim. Kaiser filed a motion seeking summary judgment as to the two remaining counts on January 14, 1994, which this Court denied on March 8, 1994.
A jury trial commenced on September 19, 1994, and at the close of defendant’s case on September 26, 1994, defendant renewed its motion for a directed verdict. The Court reserved ruling on the motion and on September 28, 1994, a jury verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff in the amount of five hundred twenty-five thousand forty-seven ($525,047.00) dollars. The Court now has before it defendant’s motion for remittitur and supplemental motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial, plaintiff’s oppositions thereto, and defendant’s reply.
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50 provides that “[wjhenever a motion for a judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the Court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.” Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50(b). Therefore, when deciding a motion *1022for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court shall apply the same standards as applied to a motion for directed verdict. Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 404 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C.1979); District of Columbia v. Cassidy, 465 A.2d 395, 397 (D.C.1983). Consequently, the Court must construe the evidence and all legitimate and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Clement v. People’s Drug Store, Inc., 634 A.2d 425, 427 (D.C.1993); Cassidy, 465 A.2d at 397; Gabrou v. May Dep’t Stores, 462 A.2d 1102, 1104 (D.C.1983); Washington Welfare Ass’n Inc. v. Poindexter, 479 A.2d 313, 315 (D.C.1984); Faniel, 404 A.2d at 150. Once the court has construed the evidence in such a manner, the moving party is entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could have found for the nonmoving party. Washington Welfare Ass’n Inc., 479 A.2d at 315; Gabrou, 462 A.2d at 1104; Faniel, 404 A.2d at 150; Cassidy, 465 A.2d at 397. See Stokes v. Children’s Hosp. Inc., 805 F.Supp. 79, 81 (D.C. Cir.1992) (stating that judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted when the evidence is so one-sided against the non-moving party that the moving party must prevail).1 Applying the above-stated principles, this Court finds that defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted on both the breach of contract claim and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act claim.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
Plaintiff claims that defendant breached an implied contract by terminating her without applying the progressive discipline policies outlined in Kaiser’s Personnel Policy Manual (the Manual). Plaintiff admits that there was no express employment contract between her and Kaiser, but claims that Kaiser’s conduct of rigidly applying the progressive discipline policies created an implied contract which converted her employment status from that of an at-will employee, to that of an employee who could be discharged only if certain preconditions were met. Kaiser moves this Court to enter judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract claim, arguing that the evidence at trial was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that an implied employment contract existed between plaintiff and Kaiser. Defendant denies the existence of an express or implied contract, relying on the disclaimers in the Manual and the Kaiser Permanente Employee Handbook (the Employee Handbook), both of which clearly state that the policies and procedures set out in the Manual do not constitute a contract.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has consistently held that in this jurisdiction there is “a presumption that a hiring not accompanied by an expression of a specific term of duration creates an employment relationship terminable at will by either party at any time.” Nickens v. Labor Agency of Metro. Washington, 600 A.2d 813, 816 (D.C.1991) (citations omitted). This presumption can be rebutted by evidence that the parties intended that employment be subject to specific preconditions before termination. Id. The parties must, however, clearly state their intention to alter an at-will employment agreement. Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 73 App.D.C. 409, 410, 120 F.2d 36, 37 (1941); Perkins v. District Gov’t Employees Fed. Credit Union, 653 A.2d 842, 843 (D.C.1995). Provisions in personnel policy manuals can, under certain circumstances, provide sufficiently clear evidence of the parties’ intent as to the terms of an employment contract. See, e.g., Washington Welfare Ass’n, Inc. v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 613, 615 (D.C.1985). But *1023employers also can effectively disclaim any implied contracts arising from such manuals, as Kaiser did in the instant case. Smith v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 265, 269 (D.C.1993).
Both the Manual and the Employee Handbook have express disclaimers stating that the provisions of the Manual are not intended to create any contractual rights. The disclaimer in the Manual reads as follows:
This Personnel Policy Manual is designed to provide each employee with a clear set of guidelines for situations which develop in the workplace. This manual is not a contract, but rather a statement of the intention of the Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc. in matters covered by the policies contained herein.
Personnel Policy Manual, Introduction, Plaintiffs Ex. 32. Similarly, the Employee Handbook states:
The contents of [the Personnel Policy Manual] are presented as a matter of information only and are not to be understood or construed as a promise or contract between the Company and its employees.
Kaiser Permanente Handbook at 6, Defendant’s Ex. 3. In the absence of evidence that the disclaimer was unconscionable or that the parties had entered into some separate agreement, this Court must conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff was an employee-at-will. Smith, 620 A.2d at 269 (given no facts or circumstances indicating that the disclaimer was unconscionable or that the employer and employee had entered into some kind of agreement that superseded the disclaimer in the handbook, employee was a management employee at-will who could be discharged with or without cause).
Plaintiff makes no claim of unconsciona-bility, but contends that she presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that there was a separate agreement which superseded the disclaimers in the Manual and the Employee Handbook. Plaintiff does not claim that there was a separate agreement which was specific to her. Compare, Rinck v. Ass’n of Reserve City Bankers, 676 A.2d 12 (D.C. 1996). Instead plaintiff claims that Kaiser’s rigid application of the progressive discipline procedures and the various memoranda and training concerning those procedures were both evidence of Kaiser’s intent to bind itself to provide these procedural protections as a matter of right to all of its employees.
The Court finds plaintiffs underlying premise to be highly questionable. Ms. Strass claims that Kaiser’s conduct of setting out the progressive discipline procedures and then rigidly applying these procedures superseded its express disclaimer that the Manual did not create contractual rights. If the language establishing the procedures cannot be evidence of an implied contract in the face of express disclaimers, see Smith, 620 A.2d at 269, citing Alameda v. Martin Marietta Corp., 6 IER cases 95, 97, 1990 WL 236125 (D.D.C.1990), then it is hard to understand how the application of those same procedures, no matter how rigidly enforced, can be evidence of a separate implied contract. Similarly, the development of training materials and internal personnel memoranda in an attempt to uniformly apply the disciplinary procedures cannot create a contractual right which supersedes the express disclaimers. As Kaiser stated in its manual, the manual is simply “a statement of the intention of [Kaiser] in matters covered by the policies contained [in the manual].” Conduct consistent with that statement of intention cannot convert the Manual’s provisions into a separate superseding agreement.
Even if the Court were to accept plaintiffs theoretical premise, plaintiff failed to present evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the progressive discipline procedures were in fact rigidly and uniformly applied. Plaintiff relies *1024heavily on internal personnel memoranda and training materials addressing the progressive discipline procedures which were provided to the managers and supervisors. The existence of such training materials, however, is not evidence that the procedures were actually strictly enforced. Indeed, introductory language in the Phillips Memorandum, plaintiffs Ex. 34, written in December of 1991, just before plaintiff was fired, indicates that an unevenness existed in the level of understanding among supervisors with regard to the various aspects of formal discipline. Further, the training memoranda themselves repeatedly emphasize that they are guidelines only, and suggest that there are various exceptions to the stated policies. The memoranda adopt a goal of consistency but also recognize that a flexible approach is necessary and the progressive discipline procedures must be applied on a case-by-case basis. Plaintiff also cites her personal training as a supervisor and advice she received in addressing particular personnel matters. But her limited personal experiences do not support a logical inference that all terminations were preceded by progressive discipline. At the most, plaintiffs evidence proves only that Kaiser attempted to act consistently with the intentions stated in the Manual. There is no evidence which would support a finding that those procedures were rigidly applied to all employees as a matter of right.
Plaintiff appears to present an alternative theory, that the training and personnel memos were themselves evidence of an intent by Kaiser to modify the employment agreement. The unilateral adoption of a policy does not in and of itself create a binding agreement. By the same token, the development of internal personnel memoranda and training to carry out a policy of the employer does not create contractual rights in the absence of a clear statement of the intent to do so. Shankle v. DRG Fin. Corp., 729 F.Supp. 122, 124 (D.D.C.1989) (citation omitted) (the presumption of terminable-at-will employment can be rebutted only by a clear statement of the parties’ intention to do so.) The language in the Manual and the Employee Handbook clearly states that the procedures outlined are not a contract and nothing in the language of the training memo-randa suggests an intent to supersede that disclaimer and create contractual rights. As described above, the memoranda state that they are being provided as guidelines on the implementation of progressive discipline. Furthermore, the language of the memoranda referring to ease-by-case application suggests various exceptions without precisely defining such exceptions, an approach which is inconsistent with an intent to create contractual rights with such a document. Finally, the language of the memoranda suggests a completely different business purpose, namely, to provide procedures which will protect the company from potential lawsuits.2 Cf. Shankle, 729 F.Supp. at 125 (termination procedures outlined in the manual are not designed to confer any procedural rights on the company’s employees, but rather to provide direction to supervisors and protect defendant from unwarranted claims).
A third theory alluded to by plaintiff is that as a result of her training as a supervisor and the advice she received with regard to applying the progressive discipline procedures to her staff, plaintiff justifiably believed that these procedures were contractual rights. Even if this training and advice created a subjective belief in plaintiff that these procedures were contractual rights for all employees, including herself, such a belief is insufficient to support a finding that Kaiser agreed that plaintiffs “at-will” employment was con*1025verted to a “just cause” employment contract. See Shankle, 729 F.Supp. at 125. The fact that plaintiffs belief was based on Kaiser’s conduct is not probative of Kaiser’s intent. Kaiser’s intent must be gleaned from its conduct and statements alone, without regard to plaintiffs subjective understanding of such conduct. As stated above, Kaiser’s conduct does not reasonably support a finding that Kaiser clearly intended to supersede the published disclaimers and modify its contract with its employees.
Thus the Court finds that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that there was an express or implied agreement between Kaiser and its employees which superseded the disclaimer in the Manual, or that there were any special circumstances or inducements suggesting that plaintiff had a contract different from that of the other Kaiser employees. No reasonable jury could conclude that the internal personnel memoranda and training regarding the implementation of Kaiser’s progressive discipline policy created contractual rights in the absence of a clear statement of the parties’ intent to do so. Nor was there evidence that Kaiser rigidly enforced the progressive discipline procedures or that its conduct in applying these procedures in any way created an agreement with its employees which superseded the disclaimers. Therefore, defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law must be granted on the breach of contract claim.-
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
Defendant also moves this Court to enter judgment as a matter of law on the District of Columbia Human Rights Act violation claim. Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because her hypertension did not meet the Act’s definition of a “handicap.” On this point, Kaiser states that because plaintiffs hypertension was controlled by medication, and, further, because there was no evidence that a reasonable accommodation could have been made for her condition, she did not qualify as a handicapped individual. Alternatively, Kaiser argues that even if plaintiff proved that she suffered from a physical handicap as defined by the Human Rights Act, no reasonable jury could find that Kaiser failed to provide plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation or that plaintiff was discharged because of her alleged handicap. In support of the verdict reached by the jury, plaintiff argues that her hypertension was a physical handicap within the meaning of the Human Rights Act and that Kaiser could have, but failed to accommodate her hypertension, and terminated her instead.
A physical handicap, as defined by the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, is “a bodily or mental disablement which may be the result of injury, illness or congenital condition for which reasonable accommodation can be made.” D.C.Code § 1-2502(23). Thus, in order to come within the protection of the Human Rights Act, plaintiff must first prove that she suffers from a physical handicap for which reasonable accommodation can be made. American University v. Com’n on Human Rights, 598 A.2d 416, 422 (D.C.1991). In particular plaintiff is required to show that:
(a) except for [her] physical handicap, [she] is qualified to fill the position; (b) [she] has a handicap that prevents [her] from meeting the physical criteria for employment; and (c) the challenged physical standards have a disproportionate impact on persons having the same handicap from which [she] suffers. To sustain this prima facia case there should also be a facial showing or at least plausible reasons to believe that the handicap can be accommodated or that the physical criteria are not “job related.”
Id. quoting Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 309-10 (5th Cir.1981). *1026Applying this legal standard to the present case, the Court finds that defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted as there was no reasonable accommodation that Kaiser could have provided that would have enabled plaintiff to perform the essential functions of her job.3
At trial and in her post-trial pleadings, plaintiff argues that her hypertension was caused by job-related stress and Kaiser could have accommodated her handicap by reducing stress in her job in either of two ways: 1) by filling vacant positions in thp/ public relations staff; or 2) or by offering her a newly created “Community Affairs” position. Plaintiff cites no authority to support her position that these proposals are “reasonable accommodations.” Defendant argues that case law has given defini-tioh to the term “reasonable” as used in the Act, and that neither of these proposed accommodations fall[s] within that definition.
As set out above, the Court of Appeals in American University stated that “the statutory definition [of a handicap] requires more than a showing that one has a mental [or bodily disablement]. To come within the Act’s protection, a complainant must first prove that he or she has a mental disablement for which reasonable accommodation can be made.” American University, 598 A.2d at 422 (citations omitted). Reversing the Commission on Human Rights, the Court held that although the record supported the Commission’s finding that the complainant suffered from a mental disablement, there was no evidence showing that the deficiencies in her job performance were related to that disablement, or that reasonable accommodation for her disablement was possible.
As a first step in proving that a handicap can be reasonably accommodated, the employee must prove that the condition is susceptible to some accommodation which the employer could provide. Id. at 423. Like the disablement in American University, the claimed handicap in this case is one for which the causes and effects and the methods of controlling or accommodating the disablement are not readily apparent. And like the plaintiff in American University, Ms. Strass has offered no expert evidence that her hypertension would have been controlled by either of the accommodations she proposes. Although there was expert testimony to support plaintiffs claim that it was job-related stress which caused or at least contributed to her hypertension, there was none to support her claim that either .of the proposed accommodations would have relieved the hypertension. Indeed, there was un-controverted evidence that plaintiff had performed this same job for over two years without suffering from hypertension and further that her hypertension continued up to the time of the trial, even though she had left her position at Kaiser over two years earlier. The Court therefore agrees with defendant that plaintiffs claims that her condition could have been *1027accommodated by Kaiser are speculative. See, Carrozza v. Howard County, Md., 847 F.Supp. 865 (D.Md.1994) (plaintiffs conclu-sory observations that certain accommodations would enable her to perform the job do not meet the criterion of factual evidence), aff'd “per curiam, 45 F.3d 425 (4th Cir.1995).
Assuming for the sake of argument that the proposed accommodations would have been effective, plaintiff must also show that such accommodations were reasonable. Courts have consistently held that the accommodations required of employers for the purpose of relieving employee stress are limited. Employers have no duty to change the nature of an employee’s job in order to accommodate that employee’s disablement. Johnston v. Morrison, Inc., 849 F.Supp. 777 (N.D.Ala.1994).4 Although reasonable accommodation may include “job restructuring” or the implementation of a part-time work schedule, an employer is not required to reallocate essential functions of the job. Id. (citations omitted); Carrozza v. Howard County, Md., supra. An employer may be required to have someone assist the disabled individual to perform the job. See, e.g., Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 68 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (the employer provided readers to assist a blind employee). The employer is not required, however, to have someone perform the job for the disabled individual. Johnston, 849 F.Supp. at 779 (citations omitted). Nor must employers provide a stress free environment in order to accommodate a “stress-sensitive” employee. Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 941 F.2d 437, 442 (6th Cir.1991); Johnston, 849 F.Supp. at 777. Finally, an employer is required to accommodate only the employee’s present position. The employer is not required to find another job for the disabled employee. Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir.1992); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467-8 (4th Cir. 1987); Florence v. Frank, 774 F.Supp. 1054 (N.D.Tex.1991);
Although reasonableness of accommodation is a question of fact which is usually to be decided by a jury, here undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that the proposed accommodations are unreasonable. See, Carrozza v. Howard County, Md., 45 F.3d 425 (4th Cir.1995) (affirming trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on plaintiffs failure to proffer sufficient evidence that her handicap could have been reasonably accommodated) (opinion attached). Stress was inherent in plaintiffs position as Director of Public Affairs. Indeed, in a job description prepared by plaintiff, planning and implementing “crisis communication efforts” is listed as one of the major job functions. Plaintiffs Ex. 10. Coping with the inherent stressors of the position of Director of Public Affairs is, arguably, one of the fundamental requirements of the job. Hiring additional staff in order to reduce the stress on the manager of a busy and demanding department goes well beyond the “restructuring” of a position. Plaintiff argues fervently that Kaiser had ample funds to hire additional people, citing its profit in 1991 and the money expended on a major board meeting which plaintiff characterizes as “nonfunctional,” “supremely wasteful,” and “overblown.” All of this is completely irrelevant. An employer is not required to alter general decisions about personnel needs or revise program and budgetary priorities in order to accommodate an employee’s disablement. Florence v. Frank, 774 F.Supp. at 1061. Nor is an employer required to “ ‘restructure’ a job as to change its fundamental requirements, such as the ability to cope with its inherent stressors.” Carrozza v. Howard County, Md., 847 F.Supp. at 368 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs proposed accommodation is clearly not within *1028the definition of a reasonable accommodation.5
Plaintiffs second proposed accommodation, that she be given a new position, is also unreasonable as a matter of law. Although there is mention of reassignment in some of the regulations adopted for the implementation of the federal Rehabilitation Act, the case law is clear that such reassignment is not within the definition of a reasonable accommodation. Guillot v. Garrett, supra; Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d at 467-8; Florence v. Frank, supra. Plaintiff cites no authority to the contrary.
Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Ms. Strass was a handicapped individual and that by terminating her Kaiser discriminated against plaintiff in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. Since plaintiff did not present evidence that a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform the essential functions of her job was possible, plaintiff was not a handicapped individual within the meaning of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law must therefore be granted on the District of Columbia Human Rights Act violation claim.
THEREFORE, it is this 28th day of June, 1996,
ORDERED that the judgment for plaintiff entered September 28, 1994, be and hereby is VACATED, and it is further
ORDERED that defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the breach of contract claim be GRANTED, and it is further
ORDERED that defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the
District of Columbia Human Rights Act violation claim be GRANTED, and it is further
ORDERED that the remaining pending motions — Defendant’s Motion for Remitti-tur, Plaintiffs Motion for Status Conference, and Plaintiffs Motion for Prompt Decision of Defendant’s Post-Trial Motions — be DENIED AS MOOT.
s/ Patricia Wynn
PATRICIA WYNN JUDGE

. I attach Judge Wynn’s order as an appendix to this opinion.

. The court in Greene did not cite its own earlier decision in Littell, nor did it discuss the legal principles set forth in that case.

. Greene is, however, binding on us under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971), and the question whether that case was correctly decided on its facts is therefore academic.

. Although my analysis makes it unnecessary to reach the point, I note that the court in Greene also relied on the University’s consistent adherence to the provisions of the University’s Handbook, which adopted the “Standard for Notice of Non-Reappointment” adopted by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 86-87 & n. 7, 412 F.2d at 1133-34 & n. 7. In this case, on the other hand, the trial judge concluded that "[tjhere was no evidence which would support a finding that the [progressive discipline] procedures were rigidly applied to all employees as a matter of right.”

. Nothing in this opinion suggests that the DDAA applies retroactively to this case. Cf. maj. op. at 1009-10 & nn. 16 & 17. Rather, my point is that the coverage provided by the District of Columbia law and regulations in 1992 was identical to, and no broader than, the reach of the Human Rights Act today.

.Ms. Strass’ argument that coverage under the Human Rights Act, before its amendment in 1994, was broader than federal coverage under the federal ADA assumes that in 1994, when the Council adopted the federal terminology, it intended to cut back on the coverage of the Act. If, as Ms. Strass insists, the pre-1994 statute was broader than the ADA, then it was also broader than the current District statute, which is identical in relevant respects to the ADA. Under Ms. Strass' theory, the Council must have enacted the 1994 amendment in order to reduce the protections provided to disabled citizens of the District.
There is not a shred of evidence to support any claim that the 1994 revision weakened the District’s Human Rights Act. No such intention to place new limits on the Act’s coverage is disclosed or even suggested by the legislative history. See Council of the District of Columbia, Committee on Public Services and Youth Affairs, Report on Bill 10-298, Human *1018Rights Amendment Act of 1993 (January 12, 1994). (This Report also embraces the DDAA.) The Report, which is quite brief, makes no mention of substantive changes in the reach of the law. Rather, the Council was apparently seeking to adopt the more up-to-date (some might say politically correct) terminology utilized in the federal statute.
If, as Ms. Strass’ position assumes, the DDAA had been designed to weaken the Human Rights Act's protections for disabled people, such an intent would surely have precipitated some debate among the members of the Council. Chairman Lightfoot’s Report reveals, however, that "there [was] no need to have an additional hearing on Bill 10-298 because of the overwhelming support for this bill at the December 2, 1992 hearing.”

. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.701 is now 29 C.F.R. § 1615.103.

. The Employment Guidelines further defined "Physical Handicap” as follows:
A bodily or mental disablement which may be the result of injury, illness or congenital condition which does not preclude the capacity to perform a particular job and for which reasonable accommodation can be made. Physical or mental disablement means any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskele-tal, special sense organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinaiy, hemic, and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. The term physical or mental disabilities includes, but is not limited to, such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, acquired immune deficiency syndrome, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, and emotional illness.
33 D.C.Reg. at 4560.
I do not believe that this definition can fairly be viewed as meaning that the provision of the Physical Handicap Guidelines incorporating the EEOC regulations does not apply. The definition includes a disorder of the skin, but this obviously does not mean that every summer rash is a physical handicap entitling the employee to statutory protection. The affirmative adoption in the Physical Handicap Guidelines of the EEOC regulations provides a means of distinguishing a trivial ailment, which does not trigger protection, from a significant one which substantially limits a major life activity and places the employee within the protected class.

. Ms. Strass asserts that these symptoms might have been more frequent if she had not taken medication for them. She also claims that "[her] hypertension, left unmitigated, exposed her to the risk of life-threatening heart attack and stroke." In presenting these contentions, Ms. Strass relies on authorities holding that the determination whether an em*1020ployee suffers from a disability should be made without reference to available medication or other corrective measures. See, e.g., Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 522 (11th Cir.1996), and the EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). These authorities, however, are no longer viable in light of the Supreme Court’s supervening decision in Sutton, in which the Court disapproved the EEOC regulations on this issue and adopted what had been the minority view among the federal appellate courts, namely, that mitigating measures must be considered.

. Kaiser failed to request a jury instruction to the effect that Ms. Strass’ disabilities must substantially limit a major life function. On the basis of that failure, my colleagues assert, maj. op. at 1009 n. 16, that the point was thereby waived. I cannot agree. To be sure, a party who fails at trial to request an instruction ordinarily will not be heard to assert on appeal that such an instruction should have, been given. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 51. Kaiser is not asserting instructional error, however. Rather, Kaiser is arguing that the evidence of disability was insufficient to support the verdict in Ms. Strass' favor.
There can be no doubt that Kaiser preserved the substantive issue. Kaiser’s memorandum in support of its oral motion for judgment as a matter of law stated, inter alia, that "a hypertensive employee who claimed to suffer severe headaches and an upset stomach has been held to be not handicapped absent evidence that his high blood pressure substantially interfered with one of his major life activities." (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)

. The court noted in Guillot, however, that as a matter of federal administrative practice independent of the duty to make a reasonable accommodation, "an employer may not forbid an employee who is unqualified for the position he holds from availing himself of other employment opportunities (i.e., transfer or reassignment) that are available under the employer’s existing policies.” Id. at 1327 (internal quotation marks omitted). I would hold, by imperfect analogy, that a disabled employee of a private business must be accorded the same right as her non-disabled counterpart to transfer to another position within the organization.

. Because Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50 is identical to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, federal court decisions may be used as persuasive authority in interpreting Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50. Street v. Hedgepath, 607 A.2d 1238, 1243 n. 5 (D.C.1992).

. In the cover memo attached to various articles on progressive discipline circulated to the managers, Mr. Charles Phillips, the Director of Labor Relations and Compensation, stated that the purpose of the Human Resources Department was to help supervisors to "make appropriate decisions regarding the imposition of discipline that can withstand grievances and/or lawsuits.” Plaintiff’s Ex. 34.

. Defendant argues on three separate grounds that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that her condition was a "handicap” as defined by the District of Columbia Human Rights Act: 1) that plaintiff's hypertension was controlled by medication and therefore it was not a "disablement”; 2) that there was no evidence that the hypertension was caused by job stress, and, therefore, there was" no basis for finding that the hypertension could be accommodated by anything the employer might do; and 3) that, given the nature of the job, there was no "reasonable accommodation” which would relieve the hypertension. Plaintiff presented evidence through her own testimony, as well as the testimony of Dr. Pak, Dr. Marón, and her husband, which would arguably rebut the first two of defendant's arguments. In addition, Kaiser argues that at least part of plaintiff’s human rights claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Because the Court finds that plaintiffs evidence cannot support a finding that her condition could be reasonably accommodated, the Court does not address defendant’s other arguments or its alternative argument that even if plaintiff established a prima facie case, there was insufficient evidence that Kaiser’s conduct was discriminatory.

. The claim in Johnston is brought under the federal Americans With Disabilities Act. In determining the kind of proof required in claims for discrimination based on handicap, the Court of Appeals has looked to cases under the analogous federal statute for guidance. American University, 598 A.2d at 422 (citations omitted).

. Indeed, even the accommodation which Kaiser provided, allowing plaintiff to take time off whenever she wanted to, was not an accommodation which could have been required of the defendant. Johnston, 849 F.Supp. at 779 (in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., courts have found that an employee's inability to work necessary hours justifies an employee’s termination).