Court Opinion

ID: 9690607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:26:13.75131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:02.956309
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that part of the majority opinion holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of Ms. Kelly, the licensed social worker, but I respectfully dissent otherwise.
At the outset, I would hold that SVPs, and Bernat in particular, are not similarly situated to other persons under civil commitments for mental illness so as to invoke equal protection concerns. That, of course, is the threshold showing that must be made, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), but one that the majority disregards. In this Court’s first SVP case, In re Notion, 123 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Mo. banc 2004), the Court sidestepped the issue by “assuming, arguendo, that other persons rendered dangerous by a mental disorder compose a comparable class to that of [SVPs],” and decided the remaining issues anyway. The court of appeals, however, has aptly observed that “sexually violent predators suffer from a mental condition that differs substantially from the mental conditions which are the subjects of the usual civil commitment proceedings.” State ex rel. Nixon v. Askren, 21 S.W.3d 834, 842 (Mo.App.2000). And as this Court noted in Norton, sexual predators have mental abnormalities that “make[] them distinctively dangerous because of the substantial probability that they will commit future crimes of sexual *872violence if not confined in a secure facility.” In re Norton, 123 S.W.3d at 174. Indeed, to qualify as an SVP, a person must “suffer from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence....” Sec. 632.480(5), RSMo 2000.
In contrast, persons are subject to civil commitment merely if, as a result of mental illness, they present a “substantial risk” of serious harm to themselves or others. Secs. 632.335, 632.005(9), RSMo 2000. It is not necessary to show, as is required in SVP cases, that the person has committed a sexually violent offense in the past, that the chance of serious harm is “more likely than not,” or even that the potential harm would be the result of a criminal act. These distinctions preclude SVPs from being similarly situated with persons under other civil commitments, and for this reason, I would hold that there is no equal protection violation. See In re Detention of David C. Samuelson, 189 Ill.2d 548, 244 Ill.Dec. 929, 727 N.E.2d 228, 237 (2000) (holding that SVP defendants are not similarly situated to other civil detainees because “persons subject to [Illinois’ SVPA] possess characteristics which set them apart from the greater class of persons who fall within [Illinois’ civil commitment statutes], and such persons present different societal problems”); Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93, 112 (Fla.2002) (“West-erheide’s equal protection argument rests on the false premise that individuals subject to commitment under [Florida’s SVPA] are similarly situated to mentally ill persons committed under [Florida’s civil commitment statutes].”).
Regarding the equal protection issue that the majority did see fit to address, again I would find no equal protection violation. The majority’s holding is that “while the state has identified a compelling interest in presenting an alleged SVP’s mental condition to the jury so as to enhance the reliability of the proceedings, allowing the state to comment on an alleged SVP’s failure to testify is not narrowly tailored to further that interest and fails the equal protection analysis.” The majority defends this holding by claiming that there is no rationale by which the state’s comments on the defendant’s failure to testify “would further the truth-seeking process ... [and that] the truth-seeking process is aided by testimony ... not ... by speculative inference.”
In my view, this truth-seeking analysis has little truth to it. The very reason a party is allowed to comment on the opposing party’s failure to testify is to promote the truth-seeking process! This is a well-entrenched rule which, as defendant Ber-nat acknowledges, “permits an unfavorable inference to be drawn against a party, knowledgeable of the facts of the controversy, who fails to testify and [the rule] permits such failure so to be used by an opponent in argument to the jury,” Pasternak v. Mashak, 428 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. banc 1967). The rationale for the inference, as capsulized from the host of cases on point, is that a party’s silence indicates that nothing can be said in contravention of the opposing party’s evidence where “the case is such as to call for an explanation, or the evidence is such as to call for a denial.” 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence sec. 257 (1994). See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54, 44 S.Ct. 54, 68 L.Ed. 221 (1923) (“Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character.”). In fact, the case at hand is a quintessential example of the proper application of the rule and the truth-seeking purpose it fulfills. Given the substantial evidence presented in the state’s case in chief that defendant is an SVP, why would the defendant not testify in his own behalf to convince the jury otherwise? What *873purpose does his silence serve if not to avoid even further damaging testimony? And what is he hiding, if not something detrimental?
It appears, too, that the majority is concerned that the state is using the defendant’s silence “to gain a tactical advantage,” as if the state were manipulating the truth-seeking process by not calling the defendant in its case in chief. But once the state has made out a prima facie case that defendant is an SVP, the state is doing nothing to dilute the truth-seeking process by not calling the defendant. The defendant can take the stand himself! And he should fail to do so at his own peril!
I confess that I am somewhat unsure of the majority’s exact position. Is the majority really contending that the most narrowly tailored procedure to achieve the state’s compelling interest in a truth-seeking process is one in which the state must call the defendant in its case in chief or otherwise refrain from commenting on the defendant’s silence? If so, that position does not square with the majority’s implicit concession that the defendant does not have the right to remain silent and can indeed be compelled to testify against himself at the state’s behest. Prohibiting the state from arguing the adverse inference from defendant’s silence is an incident or corollary to the right to remain silent, so that if, as here, there is no right to remain silent, there is no justification for prohibiting the state from arguing the adverse inference. It matters not a whit that the state did or did not call the defendant in its case in chief.
Having determined that the trial court committed no error, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.