Court Opinion

ID: 9371172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 17:09:08.095001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.901281
License: Public Domain

J-A29031-22

                                   2023 PA Super 24

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KARISSA SMITH                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1185 WDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2021,
             in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-SA-0000237-2020.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                           FILED: FEBRUARY 15, 2023

       Karissa Smith appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after she

failed to appear at a trial de novo on a charge of driving while operating

privilege is suspended or revoked.1 She argues that because the officer who

observed the alleged offense also failed to appear, the trial court was required

to dismiss the charge under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 462(C).

We hold that Rule 462(C) is mandatory when applicable, and the defendant’s

failure to appear does not negate it. Accordingly, we vacate Smith’s conviction

and judgment of sentence, and we dismiss the charge against her.

       On August 12, 2019, Ross Township Police Officer Justin Allenbaugh

issued a traffic citation, alleging that Smith “operated a [motor vehicle] with

a suspended operators license” at 10:01 p.m. on August 9, 2019. On January

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175 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). As charged, this is a first offense of driving
under a DUI-related suspension.
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22, 2020, Smith was convicted in absentia before a magisterial district judge,

who imposed a $500.00 fine.               The magisterial district judge did not

contemporaneously sentence Smith to the required term of imprisonment.2

       On February 12, 2020, Smith timely appealed her conviction to the

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas for a trial de novo. The scheduled

trial was postponed once on Smith’s motion and four times on the trial court’s

own motion. On June 30, 2021, the trial court heard the case. The assistant

district attorney informed the court that neither Smith nor Officer Allenbaugh

were present. The trial court indicated that neither Smith nor anyone on her

behalf had contacted the court to explain her absence. It therefore ordered

on the record that Smith’s appeal was dismissed and judgment was entered

on the sentence of the issuing authority. The trial court entered a separate

order sentencing Smith to pay a fine of $500.00 and serve a term of 60 days

of imprisonment.

       Smith appealed nunc pro tunc to this Court. On preliminary review of

the record, we directed the trial court to clarify whether Smith was entitled to

appointed counsel. The trial court concluded that she was and thus appointed

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2 A defendant convicted under Section 1543(b)(1)(i) “shall . . . be sentenced
to pay a fine of $500 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less
than 60 days nor more than 90 days.” A handwritten notation on the citation
issued in the case states “Impose jail after filing appeal [period].” We
interpret this as the magisterial district judge waiting to sentence Smith to a
term of imprisonment until Smith’s time to appeal to the Court of Common
Pleas had ended. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 460(A) (providing 30 days to file a notice
of appeal with the clerk of courts). Because Smith timely appealed, the
magisterial district judge never imposed a jail sentence.

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present counsel. Smith filed a concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal nunc pro tunc, and the trial court entered an opinion.

       Smith presents two issues for our review:

        I.    Based on a patent violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(C), as well
              as her federal and state constitutional rights to due process
              of law, whether Ms. Smith’s judgment of sentence and
              conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i) must be
              vacated and the case dismissed?

       II.    Based on a patent violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 122(A), as well
              as her federal and state constitutional rights to counsel and
              due process of law, whether Ms. Smith’s judgment of
              sentence and conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i)
              must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new
              summary appeal hearing?

Smith’s Brief at 5.

       Smith first contends that this Court should vacate her judgment of

sentence and dismiss her case based on Rule 462(C).3 Smith’s Brief at 12–

17. She argues that the Rule is unambiguous and mandatory. Id.

       The Commonwealth counters that Rule 462(C) and (D) create an

ambiguity in a case like this, where neither the defendant nor the officer

appears for trial de novo. Commonwealth’s Brief at 6–13. It suggests that

this Court should determine that the rule is not mandatory and remand for a

new trial.   Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Baker, 690 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa.

1997) (listing examples of “shall” meaning “may”)).

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3Because we grant relief based on Smith’s rule-based argument, we do not
address her constitutional argument. Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 263 A.3d
247, 253 n.5 (Pa. 2021).

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      When this Court interprets the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal

Procedure, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Libengood, 152 A.3d 1057, 1059 (Pa. Super.

2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Hann, 81 A.3d 57, 65 (Pa. 2013)). We

construe the rules “in consonance with the rules of statutory construction” as

set forth in the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501–1991.

Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717, 733 (Pa. 2020); Pa.R.Crim.P.

101(C). Generally, this requires “that provisions be interpreted in accordance

with the plain meaning of their terms.” Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887

A.2d 220, 223 n.5 (Pa. 2005) (citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a)).

      Rule 462, titled “Trial De Novo,” provides in relevant part:

      (C) In appeals from summary proceedings arising under the
      Vehicle Code or local traffic ordinances, other than parking
      offenses, the law enforcement officer who observed the alleged
      offense must appear and testify. The failure of a law enforcement
      officer to appear and testify shall result in the dismissal of the
      charges unless:

         (1) the defendant waives the presence of the law enforcement
         officer in open court on the record;
         (2) the defendant waives the presence of the law enforcement
         officer by filing a written waiver signed by the defendant and
         defense counsel, or the defendant if proceeding pro se, with
         the clerk of courts; or
         (3) the trial judge determines that good cause exists for the
         law enforcement officer’s unavailability and grants a
         continuance.

      (D) If the defendant fails to appear, the trial judge may dismiss
      the appeal and enter judgment in the court of common pleas on
      the judgment of the issuing authority.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(C), (D).

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      We first hold that Rule 462(C) is mandatory when applicable.         The

precursor to Rule 462(C) provided in part: “Unless the presence of the law

enforcement officer is waived in open court by the defendant, the failure of

the officer to appear and testify shall result in a dismissal of the charges.”

Commonwealth v. Hightower, 652 A.2d 873, 873 (Pa. Super. 1995)

(quoting former Pa.R.Crim.P. 86(f)). This Court found the words were “clear;

where an officer fails to appear to testify, the charges must be dismissed

unless the defendant waives the officer’s presence in open court.” Id. at 873–

74. After Hightower, the rule was amended to allow the trial court to grant

a continuance upon a showing of good cause for the officer’s unavailability.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 462, Comment. However, the operative phrase “shall result in a

dismissal of the charges” has not changed. Nor do we change our reading of

this language as mandatory in cases under Rule 462(C).

      We next hold that the defendant’s failure to appear does not negate Rule

462(C), notwithstanding Rule 462(D). By its plain language, Rule 462(C) does

not depend on the defendant’s presence. While Rule 462(C) is mandatory,

Rule 462(D), which permits the trial court to dismiss a summary appeal upon

the defendant’s failure to appear, is not. When the officer who observed an

alleged motor vehicle offense fails to appear at the trial de novo, Rule 462(C)

requires the trial court to dismiss the charges unless one of the listed

exceptions applies. See Hightower, 652 A.2d at 873. Because there is no

additional exception for a case like this, where the defendant also fails to

appear, we decline to create one.

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      In reaching this conclusion, we find no ambiguity in Rule 462. However,

rules of statutory construction would resolve any ambiguity in favor of our

holding that Rule 462(C) is mandatory, even when the defendant fails to

appear as contemplated in Rule 462(D).       While Rule 462(D) applies to all

summary appeals, Rule 462(C) applies only in certain Vehicle Code and local

traffic ordinance cases where a law enforcement officer observed the alleged

offense. See Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 679 A.2d 779, 781–82 (Pa.

Super. 1996). Because its reach is more specific, Rule 462(C) would prevail

in a conflict over Rule 462(D). See Commonwealth v. Callen, 198 A.3d

1149, 1159 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933). Furthermore,

Rule 462 is subject to the rule of lenity, codified at 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(a),

which requires ambiguity in a penal statute to be interpreted in a light most

favorable to the accused. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 270 A.3d 512, 516

(Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 242 A.3d 923, 931

(Pa. Super. 2020)).      Finally, our interpretation is consistent with the

Commonwealth’s burden of proof at the trial de novo; Rule 462(C) sets one

instance   where   the   Commonwealth      cannot   meet   its   burden.   See

Commonwealth v. Beam, 923 A.2d 414, 417 (Pa. Super. 2007) (explaining

that at a trial de novo under Rule 462(A), the trial court must redecide the

case).

      Here, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Smith’s Section 1543

charge upon Officer Allenbaugh’s failure to appear. There is no dispute that

Smith’s case was an appeal from a summary proceeding arising under the

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Vehicle Code, and that Officer Allenbaugh had observed the alleged offense to

issue the citation. Therefore, Rule 462(C) applied to Smith’s case. Because

Smith was not present, she could not waive the officer’s presence in open

court on the record. Nor did she sign a written waiver. Finally, the trial court

did not determine that good cause existed for the officer’s unavailability and

thus did not grant a continuance. As none of the exceptions listed in Rule

462(C) applied, the trial court was required to dismiss the charge against

Smith, and it erred in not doing so.4,         5   Therefore, we will vacate Smith’s

conviction and judgment of sentence and dismiss the charge against her.

       Conviction and judgment of sentence vacated.              Charge dismissed.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/15/2023

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4Further, as the magisterial district judge had not imposed the mandatory jail
sentence before Smith appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, the trial court
could not enter judgment “on the judgment of the issuing authority” without
adding the additional term of imprisonment. Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(D).
5 Because the parties have not briefed the issue, we offer no opinion whether
the Commonwealth can re-file its charge.

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