Court Opinion

ID: 9833837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:04:30.570955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:07.370627
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Counsel for appellant has filed an able argument on motion for rehearing, and it is thought proper, if not necessary, to briefly discuss some of the points of attack upon our original opinion.
It is insisted we were in error in holding that, under the present statutes, a plaintiff is not deprived of his right to take a voluntary nonsuit, or to discontinue his suit against one or more defendants, when a plea of privilege has been sustained. Several authorities have been cited in support of this proposition, but we do not find that they sustain it. We referred to the ease of Rutledge v. Evans, 219 S. W. 218, a decision by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourth District, in which it was held that, where actions are severable, the court may sustain a plea of privilege as to one of the defendants and transfer the cause as to him, but hold it for trial as to the others. It appears that the Supreme Court has granted a writ of error in that case, and has indicated its opinion that this practice is not permissible, but that the entire cause should be transferred as to all the parties. This would appear to be in line with previous holdings of the Supreme Court, especially Hickman v. Swain, 106 Tex. 431, 167 S. W. 209, but in no case which we have examined does it appear that there was a dismissal by the plaintiff as to one or more of the parties.
We are not convinced that our original opinion upon this question is incorrect, and we are still strongly inclined to the view that our venue statute, as amended, does not prevent a plaintiff from taking a voluntary non-suit or discontinuance, notwithstanding a plea of privilege may have been sustained. A contrary view would seem to be an unreasonable construction of the statute. If a plaintiff should desire to discontinue his suit and entirely abandon the litigation, upon the sustaining of a plea of privilege, we do not see how a defendant could complain of the exercise of such right, where he has no cross-action, and does not seek affirmative relief. It would seem to be folly to require a transfer of the cause to another court, with the increased costs necessarily resulting, in order to permit the plaintiff to take his non-suit in another jurisdiction. We are unwilling to'impute such an intention to the Legislature, in the absence of language more clearly indicating a purpose to restrict the legal right of the plaintiff, conferred by other statutes, to enter a voluntary dismissal. That our interpretation is the correct one is strongly intimated in the case of Garrison v. Stokes, 151 S. W. 898. There it was indicated that the plaintiff, upon the sustaining of the plea of privilege of one defendant, might have dismissed as to such defendant.
As pointed out in our opinion, however, the correctness of the trial court’s ruling does not alone depend on the right of a plaintiff to take a nonsuit after a plea of privilege has been sustained. As we view the record, the plaintiff in this case made his motion orally, and in open court, before the court had made any judicial pronouncement upon' the plea of privilege of either defendant, and he was granted leave to file his motion in writing. It is true that on, the same day, and before the written motion to dismiss was filed, the court made'a docket entry sustain*810ing the plea of privilege of the defendant Carter, and noted the plaintiff’s exception thereto. On the following day, however, the written motion to dismiss was filed, and was sustained. We still adhere to the view that, the plaintiff having sought a discontinuance as to Mr. Carter before the decision of the court was announced as to the latter’s plea of privilege, his right to a nonsuit and discontinuance as to such defendant was not prejudiced or affected by the subsequent decision and order sustaining the plea of privilege. Furthermore, the hill of exceptions fairly discloses that the trial court refused to approve the order prepared by the defendants for transfer of the cause, and entered an order instructing the clerk not to make entry of the same on the minutes; and, taking the hill as a whole, it substantially appears that the court set aside the order sustaining the plea of privilege before granting the motion to dismiss. It does not appear that there was a formal setting aside of the order sustaining the plea of privilege, but this was what was substantially done, and we do not think -that the court was without jurisdiction so to do. An appeal from such order had not been perfected, and, indeed, has never been taken.
For all the reasons indicated, we reiterate the conclusion that there was no error in permitting the plaintiff to take a nonsuit as to the defendant Carter, and in retaining venue over the cause as to the remaining defendant, the bank.
Our opinion is also vigorously challenged because of the claim that it was not proven that Mr. Carter had authority to act for the bank in doing the acts claimed to constitute a cause of action for damages. It is especially urged that we have virtually overruled our decision in the case of First National Bank v. Gates, 213 S. W. 720, which has been cited and approved by other Courts/ of Civil Appeals. A consideration of the facts and holdings in the cases referred to has convinced us that there is no conflict between these decisions and our holding in this case. In the Gates Case, there were several grounds urged for maintaining the venue in Coleman county as against the Brownwood National Bank. We expressly held, and adhere now to the view, that it was not enough to plead facts sustaining the venue in the county where the suit was brought, but that such facts must be proved. However, our holding there was that the facts proven did not show that the Brownwood National Bank was connected with the alleged fraud, nor the alleged conversion, nor the other matters which it was claimed conferred venue on the courts of Coleman county. Furthermore, there were findings by the jury as to these matters which were adverse to the plaintiff, and which we held were Supported by the evidence. In the other cases cited by appellant here, there was no proof whatever of the authority of the alleged agent to execute the contracts sued on, and this was an indispensable element in fixing the venue.
[7] In the instant case, while we do not think it proper to express an opinion as to the sufficiency of the proof to finally fix liability upon the bank, there was some proof tending to show that Mr. Carter, as attorney for the bank, acted with authority in doing the alleged wrongful acts ¾ behalf of the bank and tending to show ratification or acquiesence in his actions by the bank. The evidence on this point, while circumstantial, was, in our opinion, • sufficient to raise the issue, and, for the purposes of venue, was sufficient to overcome the prima facie right to a change of venue arising from the filing of the sworn plea of privilege. We cannot accede to the proposition that, upon the trial of such issues, it was necessary to prove the facts with such certainty and completeness as would entitle the plaintiff to a judgment on the merits. We reiterate the view that “in such a proceeding it is not necessary to prove all the elements finally fixing liability upon the defendant.”
We have found nothing in the cases cited, originally, or on rehearing, which militates against this holding. We have given careful consideration to all of the matters urged in the motion, and have concluded that it should be overruled.
Motion overruled.