Court Opinion

ID: 9505542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:06:16.778098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:34.423134
License: Public Domain

BOEHM, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in Parts I and III. I concur in result in Part II because although I believe that it was error to admit Lopez's prior consistent statement, I believe that error was harmless.
Indiana Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a prior consistent statement may be admitted to rebut a charge of fabrication if it was made before the motive to fabricate arose. Because I believe that Lopez's statement to police was made after her motive to fabricate arose, I would conclude that it was error for the trial court to admit that statement.
I agree with the majority that we do not "automatically" find that a participant in a crime has a motive to fabricate. Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 475 (Ind.2001); Sturgeon v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (Ind.1999); cf. United States v. Awon, 135 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir.1998) (motive to fabricate, namely, a desire for leniency, pre-dated plea negotiations); Farris v. State, 732 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (no question that accomplice with familial relationship to defendant had motive to fabricate); McCray v. State, 122 Md.App. 598, 716 A.2d 302, 308 (1998) (noting that accomplice's motive to fabricate existed from the moment that the robbery and murder, in which she was admittedly involved, took place). I also agree that whether a motive to fabricate has arisen is a fact sensitive issue. Stephenson, 742 N.E.2d at 475; Sturgeon, 719 N.E.2d at 1178. However, after comparing the facts of this case to those of previous cases considered by this Court, I would arrive at a different result.
The majority stresses the facts that: (1) no evidence was presented that suggested that Lopez herself committed the murders; and (2) Lopez admitted her role in the robbery, and therefore opened herself up to charges of robbery and felony murder. However, it is undisputed that Lopez accompanied Holsinger to the crime seene, stood by while two victims were murdered, participated in the robbery of the victims, and fled with Holsinger to another state. Only after learning that police were searching for both Lopez and Holsinger did Lopez voluntarily go to the police to give a statement. In her first statement, she attempted to minimize the roles that both she and Holsinger played in the crimes. In her second statement, given the next day, she admitted her role in the robbery and implicated Holsinger in the murder and robbery. Lopez's voluntary statements to police included an admission of her culpability in the crimes, but they also minimized her role vis-&-vis the other participants and set the stage for her eventual plea agreement. Before she voluntarily spoke to police, Lopez knew that she was wanted for questioning in connection with these crimes. It seems reasonable to conclude that she decided that a proactive approach was her best bet to secure a reduced sentence.
*368This Court recently considered a different fact pattern in Stephenson. In that case, the accomplice/witness, Dale Funk, had a level of involvement in a triple murder comparable to Lopez's here. Stephenson, 742 N.E.2d at 470-72. However, Funk's prior consistent statement was not a voluntary admission to police. Id. at 472-78. Rather, it was a part of a conversation with an uninvolved third party a few days after the crime. Funk received no prosecutorial benefit for his testimony. Id. at 475. Thus, although I agree with the conclusion in Stephenson that Funk had no motive to fabricate when he made his prior consistent statement, I believe that the differences in the fact patterns justify a different result in this case.
The facts of Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.1997), are analogous to this case. The accomplice/witness, Douglas Perey, voluntarily went to police and made a statement implicating Jerry Thompson in a double murder and robbery. Id. at 228. Perey admitted participating in the robbery after Thompson unexpectedly shot the victims. Id. Pending charges against Perey for another felony were dismissed in exchange for his testimony against Thompson. Id. Given these facts, we noted that admission of Percy's statement to police consistent with his testimony was arguably improper because "Perey had every reason to shift culpability to Thompson while minimizing his own involvement." Id. at 282 n. 8; accord Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620, 625-26 (Ind.1998) (accomplice's motive to fabricate arose at the time of the crime).
I would find that Lopez had a motive to fabricate before she made her voluntary statement to police. I would therefore hold that admission of her prior consistent statement was error. However, given the other evidence against Holsinger, I would find the error harmless.