Court Opinion

ID: 9588251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:31:49.622953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:40.191458
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur fully with the majority’s conclusions that the prosecutor’s argument was improper and that Cantrell’s defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to it, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s final conclusion that Cantrell did not *656satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Cantrell’s burden was to show a reasonable probability, i.e., one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, existed that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of his second trial would have been different. Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 266 (VI) (587 SE2d 613) (2003). The record before us shows that he satisfied that burden.
This is an unusual case because we have the benefit of knowing the result of a trial without the prosecutor’s improper argument. We know that because Cantrell’s first trial, without the prosecutor’s improper argument, resulted in a mistrial on these charges after the jury could not reach a verdict. We also know that this was not merely a jury that did not weigh the evidence, because it convicted Cantrell of obstructing a police officer by running from an officer. This strongly suggests that the prosecution’s case was not so overwhelming that without the prosecutor’s irrelevant and inflammatory argument a conviction was the only likely outcome.
Even though we do not have the complete record of the first trial before us, we have no reason to believe that the prosecution’s evidence was significantly stronger in this trial. Moreover, the prosecution has not asserted that the evidence in the two trials was materially different.
Cantrell’s trial hinged largely on the relative credibility of two divergent accounts of what happened during and immediately after a drug bust by the Hall County Multi Agency Narcotics Squad (‘MANS”). Equally important is the credibility of the confidential informant, who did not testify. Without the informant, Cantrell has an innocent explanation for his actions that night.
In his closing argument Cantrell’s counsel urged the jury to accept his client’s version of events. He also argued that the evidence did not prove Cantrell guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In doing so, counsel called into question several key facts and decisions made during the course of an undercover investigation. Specifically, he argued that the police did not fingerprint the bags containing the recovered cocaine, which could have proved conclusively that Cantrell actually possessed and threw them. Further, no DNA tests were performed on the packets.
He also argued that the arresting officers did not execute a written Miranda form, which could have proved Cantrell was, in fact, given Miranda warnings. More tellingly, he argued that the officer, who said that Cantrell admitted possessing the cocaine, denied having interviewed Cantrell when he testified at Cantrell’s commitment hearing.
Moreover, although the majority relies upon this statement as overwhelming proof of Cantrell’s guilt, this was not the typical police interrogation. The officer testified that after Cantrell arrived at the *657detention center he questioned Cantrell. He did not use a Miranda warning form and could not recall whether he used a warning card, or gave the warnings from memory. According to the officer, he asked Cantrell whether he met anybody, and Cantrell responded that he did not meet anybody because he already had the cocaine. Apparently, having obtained this nonresponsive answer to his question, the officer lost interest in questioning Cantrell and asked no other questions.
When asked why he testified at the commitment hearing that he did not interview Cantrell, the officer explained that he did not consider asking one question to be an interview. Also, according to the officer, no other witness heard Cantrell’s statement. Although a jury could believe the officer, the testimony also leaves room for doubting whether Cantrell did make the statement.
Counsel attributed Cantrell’s initial inclination to flee rather than confront an unknown armed man to his upbringing in a very tough area. He also raised the possibility that the officer who said he saw Cantrell throw something may simply have expected2 him to do so based on the officer’s prior similar experiences. This was further buttressed by the officer’s testimony that he only saw one item thrown and did not realize that two items were found.
Cantrell’s counsel further noted that the cocaine was found away from the path of the chase. The officer testified that the cocaine was found 40 or 50 yards or 60 or 70 feet from where the officer fell; he really did not know. Additionally, the officer who testified that he saw Cantrell throw something was not the officer who found the cocaine, and the officer who testified that he saw the throw never saw the cocaine the other officer found while at the scene. At trial the officer testified that the cocaine introduced in evidence appeared to be the same size and type of bag.
The informant did not testify even though he allegedly arranged the deal and sat with Cantrell for 40 minutes before transmitting a prearranged signal to officers on the scene indicating he had seen the cocaine. Finally, counsel argued that no records of any phone calls between the informant and Cantrell were submitted by the prosecution to confirm their discussions leading up to the transaction even though Cantrell’s cell phone was in evidence. Counsel noted that Cantrell had no prior criminal record for drug-related offenses, and nothing in the evidence suggested that Cantrell had been a suspect before his arrest.
*658Without question the thrust of the defense’s argument was to challenge the police officers’ credibility. In response, the prosecutor finished his closing with the following, in pertinent part:
I am almost reluctant to even mention this, go into this, but I feel obligated to because of the testimony of the defendant and closing argument of Mr. Burroughs, how three career law enforcement officers are going to risk their careers by lying to you ladies and gentlemen in order to convict one person.
Last week — please don’t interpret this as an attempt to inflame your passions whatsoever. It may be a bad time to bring it up, but Hall County suffered a tragedy last week when an officer was killed in the line of duty. I attended his funeral. Horse-drawn carriage with a casket on it, 21-gun salute, bugle playing taps, killed in the line of duty, an officer who dedicated his life to protecting the citizens of this county, fighting crime. And I am offended when a defendant and a defense attorney accuses officers of being liars, being cheats, and making up statements of defendants and fabricating evidence.
We all have contact with officers at some point in our lives, maybe even daily. You’ve had a chance to observe every one of the officers that testified. You judge their credibility, because in order to find the defendant guilty, you will have to call each of those officers liars.
The prosecutor personalized his remarks and injected emotionally charged and prejudicial material entirely unrelated to the evidence. The remarks were not used to paint an alternate explanation of the facts. At best the inappropriate argument here is a momentary rush of sentimentality; at worst it represents a bald and calculated attempt to channel the present despair of a community in mourning into sympathy for the prosecution’s case.
Indeed, the prosecutor seemed to know he should not refer to the outside events at the outset when he said, “I am almost reluctant to even mention this [and]... [i]t may be a bad time to bring it up.” And, he clearly recognized the danger that those remarks could inflame the passions of the jury because he said as much.
As to prejudice, there is a reasonable probability that the result of Cantrell’s trial would have been different, but for the prosecutor’s closing remarks. The intense and repeated imagery of death played on the emotions of the jury. The prosecutor repeated that the officer *659was killed and he described the funeral in detail by referencing the flag-draped coffin and the 21-gun salute, almost implying a patriotic duty to convict.
Further, the remarks came at the end of his closing and, therefore, would have been fresh in the minds of jurors as they deliberated. Finally, to introduce such comments by explicitly warning against the possibility that they might inflame passions did not eliminate the threat. Instead, it sowed a strong seed of suggestion and may have transformed a disclaimer into reality.
The majority maintains that Cantrell cannot satisfy the second Strickland prong because the evidence against him was overwhelming, as Cantrell admitted having cocaine and cocaine was recovered less than 40 yards from where he surrendered. Cantrell, however, denied making the admission which the police officers attribute to him, and the officers’ testimony and Cantrell’s denial were before the jury in his first trial. That the jury still could not reach a verdict on these charges can only mean that the evidence was not overwhelming.
Further, the prosecutor clearly did not consider the evidence against Cantrell so overwhelming that he should forego what he admittedly knew was an improper argument likely to inflame the passions of the jury. Such intentional misconduct should not be rewarded.
The first trial against Cantrell resulted in a hung jury, and a mistrial was declared as to Counts 1 and 2, trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. We have no reason to believe the evidence in the second trial varied from the first, and thus we may compare the two for the purpose of determining what effect the inappropriate closing may have had on the jury’s decision. All else being equal, it is reasonable to conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks tipped the balance in favor of the prosecution. The extreme nature of these remarks created a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different but for the deficient performance of counsel in not objecting to them. Allen v. State, 271 Ga. 502, 503 (2) (521 SE2d 190) (1999).
We can never be certain how a case will turn out, but we are not required to forecast that an acquittal would have resulted. Our law requires that Cantrell show “only a reasonable probability of a different outcome, not that a different outcome would have been certain or even ‘more likely than not.’ ” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Schofield v. Gulley, 279 Ga. 413, 416 (I) (A) (614 SE2d 740) (2005). Given the result of the first trial, no speculation is required to determine whether a reasonable probability of a different outcome existed for such a result has already occurred in this case.
*660Decided March 28, 2008.
Valpey & Parks, Gregory W. Valpey, for appellant.
Lee Darragh, District Attorney, Juliet Aldridge, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
As I am satisfied that Cantrell met his burden of showing prejudice, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Miller and Judge Adams join in this dissent.

 The officer testified that throwing motions were the main thing he looked for in a chase and he watched Cantrell’s hands the whole time. He testified, “I knew that it was a plastic bag. I really didn’t — I really didn’t have time to really look at it and see what it was to that effect, but, I mean, I knew why we were there and what the possibility was.”