Court Opinion

ID: 9951775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 00:02:09.321943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:24.188616
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10199            Document: 77-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/18/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________
                                                                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit
                                    No. 23-10199
                                  Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                  ____________                                March 18, 2024
                                                                               Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America,                                                           Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                          versus

Pablo Santana Arellano,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 2:21-CR-88-1
                   ______________________________

Before Wiener, Stewart, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       Defendant-Appellant Pablo Santana Arellano appeals his jury trial
convictions for (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess 400 grams or more of
a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl with intent
to distribute (Count One) and (2) possession of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of fentanyl with intent to distribute (Count

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10199        Document: 77-1        Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/18/2024

                                  No. 23-10199

Two). He asserts that the district court violated his right to confrontation by
limiting his cross-examination of his codefendant, Bridgette Star
Gardeazabel. He maintains that the district court did not allow him to expose
Gardeazabel’s hope for a sentence of probation and avoidance of a 10-year
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.
         “We review alleged Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
violations de novo, but any violations are subject to a harmless error
analysis.” United States v. Templeton, 624 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2010). “If
there is no Confrontation Clause violation, we review the district court’s
limitation of cross-examination for abuse of discretion.” Id. To demonstrate
an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show clear prejudice. United
States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir. 2004). “That is, the defendant
must show that a reasonable jury might have had a significantly different
impression of the witness’s credibility if defense counsel had been allowed to
pursue the questioning.” Id.
         The Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when defense counsel
has been “permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the
sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating
to the reliability of the witness.” United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th
Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The relevant
inquiry is whether the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and
motives of the witness.” United States v. Tansley, 986 F.2d 880, 886 (5th Cir.
1993).
         The district court did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment or abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination
of Gardeazabel. Her potential bias and motivation were adequately addressed
by defense counsel on cross-examination. See Tansley, 986 F.2d at 886. The
only limitations on defense counsel’s cross-examination of Gardeazabel were

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Case: 23-10199        Document: 77-1       Page: 3    Date Filed: 03/18/2024

                                 No. 23-10199

that counsel could not ask Gardeazabel about the specific sentence she hoped
she would receive or about the specific mandatory minimum for Count One.
The jury was made aware that (1) Gardeazabel had entered into a plea
agreement with the Government; (2) the Government had agreed to dismiss
one of the counts against her, which carried a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment and a maximum of life; (3) the count to which she pleaded
guilty carried a 20-year maximum but no mandatory minimum; and (4) she
had agreed to cooperate with the Government by providing truthful
testimony, in return for which the Government would ask for a lesser
sentence. “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). Arellano has not shown that reasonable
jurors would have received a significantly different impression of
Gardeazabel’s credibility had she testified about the specific sentence she
hoped to receive or about the specific mandatory minimum for Count One.
See Davis, 393 F.3d at 548.
       Finally, after Arellano filed his notice of appeal, the district court
amended the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to
correct a clerical error as to Arellano’s United States Marshal’s number. The
district court, however, was without jurisdiction to enter the amended
judgment during the pendency of this appeal because Arellano’s “notice of
appeal . . . divested the district court of jurisdiction to act under Rule 36.”
United States v. Willis, 76 F.4th 467, 472 (5th Cir. 2023).
       Accordingly, the original judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED, but we REMAND for the limited purpose of allowing the
district court to correct the original judgment’s clerical error. See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 36.

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