Court Opinion

ID: 9717501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:04:40.026774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:53.560017
License: Public Domain

Barney, C.J.
(Ret.), Specially Assigned, concurring. I concur that a reversal is required in this case based on the errors in the *339charge concerning the ground rules for establishing the presence or absence of malice in distinguishing murder from manslaughter. I do wish, however, to question that portion of the opinion not essential to the disposition of the case which gratuitously imports the so-called “Tsanas Rule” into our jurisprudence. See United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
It is, at best, only a sometime rule, since it appears to have two possible forms, each of which may, in hindsight, result in error because of poor strategizing on the part of defense counsel. It seems an open invitation for an appeal based on a claim of incompetency of counsel, wherever a conviction occurs in a case where one or the other transitional charges is selected. It also places the trial court in the position of being bound to deliver a certain charge in response to an advocate’s strategic judgment, rather than fully delineating the issue to the jury.
When a jury has to deal with a series of included offenses, as in this case, it should be instructed as to its responsibility in the matter. The duty of the jury is to determine the highest level of criminal offense which the jury can unanimously agree is established beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence. Quite plainly this determination can be approached from two directions. One method is to start with the lowest included offense and move upward through the more serious crimes until the highest offense is found that, in the view of the entire jury, is fully sustained by the evidence, See, e.g., State v. Myer, 58 Vt. 457, 466-67, 3 A. 195, 200-01 (1886), overruled on other grounds, State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 25 A. 964 (1892). Some see a problem with this approach in that the jury, in spite of their instructions, might be inclined to minimize criminality by reaching a verdict short of the most serious established by the evidence.
The second approach is, of course, for the jury to examine the essential elements of the crime that have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, beginning at the level of the most serious charge. The jury would then seek unanimity by moving progressively toward lesser included offenses until total agreement is reached. See, e.g., State v. Long, 95 Vt. 485, 496, 115 A. 734, 739 (1922). The difficulty seen by some is that the jury might merely return to court in disagreement because they were divided on a more serious charge, rather than going on to explore whether all *340the elements of lesser charges were established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Tsanas court resolved the problem as it perceived it by allowing the defense to elect whether to charge the jury to move upward or downward in terms of severity in arriving at the established included offense. This sort of approach seems to show a regrettable lack of confidence in the jury’s common sense, or in the ability of a trial court to communicate the problem. Why should an unnecessary issue and possible error be constructed out of the direction from which a jury approaches a problem when logic can sustain either analysis? Is not the better choice one reflecting our oft-stated belief in the fundamental wisdom of the jury and its presumed ability and willingness to comply with the court’s instructions? Why not give, in each case, a charge that points out to the jury its basic duty, whatever its manner of proceeding, to properly weigh the evidence as required by law and arrive at a proper verdict. The trial court should make clear to the jury its obligation under the law to seek out the highest level of criminal activity, if any, sustained under the charges brought, by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
This result need not be reached under threat of error or in spite of hidden pitfalls because of the mechanical application of a rule requiring the choice of a charge either directing deliberation from the lesser offense upward to the most serious, on in the opposite direction. It is the sound, practical judgment of the jury we seek, applied according to the evidentiary burden on the State, and consistent with presumed innocence. With a full exposition of the jury’s duty and the reasoning upon which it is based, I feel certain that juries will continue to function as effectively and fairly as they have in the past. I see no justification for manipulation. I, therefore, would not have adopted the Tsanas rule. I am authorized to say that Justice Peck joins in this concurrence.