Court Opinion

ID: 9914232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 20:09:01.775788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:49.001782
License: Public Domain

J-S34017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN RE: Z.J.C., A MINOR                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: C.C., MOTHER                 :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :   No. 632 WDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered December 19, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
              Orphans' Court at No: Docket No. 2022 AD 15

 IN RE: E.R.K., A MINOR                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: C.C., MOTHER                 :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :   No. 633 WDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered December 19, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
                    Orphans' Court at No: 2022 AD 15A

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                   FILED: December 29, 2023

      C.C. (“Mother”) appeals nunc pro tunc from the decrees entered on

December 19, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County,

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Z.J.C., born in
J-S34017-23

October of 2015, and son, E.R.K., born in July of 2020 (“the Children”).1 We

affirm.

       Mother has eight children, and the Children in this case are her two

youngest. R.R.C., Jr., now deceased, was the biological father of all but E.R.K.

Mother and R.R.C., Jr., have an extensive history of substance abuse and

incarceration.     See N.T., 10/3/22, at 63.       Further, Mother suffers with

psychological symptoms which the court-appointed forensic psychologist,

Terry O’Hara, Ph.D., described as “lack of assumption of responsibility,

impulsivity, substance use, depression and anxiety.” N.T., 8/18/22, at 8.

       The genesis of the subject decrees was when Blair County Children,

Youth & Families (“CYF”) opened a case for this family in March of 2020, due

to R.R.C., Jr.’s, impending incarceration, and behavioral problems of Z.J.C.

and some of her siblings.2, 3         On December 30, 2020, the juvenile court

____________________________________________

1 In addition to Mother, the subject decrees involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of R.R.C., Jr., who was Z.J.C.’s natural father and E.R.K.’s
presumptive father. R.R.C., Jr., subsequently died on a date unspecified in
the record but prior to Mother filing the nunc pro tunc appeals. E.R.K.’s natural
father, B.S.E., relinquished his parental rights, and the court terminated them
by decree dated March 17, 2023.

2 CYF first opened a case for this family in 2016. Z.J.C. was previously
adjudicated dependent from November of 2016, until April of 2017.

3 Unless otherwise noted, the relevant facts and procedural history is derived

from the Children’s dependency records which were incorporated into the
record during the involuntary termination proceeding. See N.T., 5/10/22, at
8. The Honorable Wade A. Kagarise presided over the involuntary termination
proceeding as well as the underlying dependency matters.

                                           -2-
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adjudicated Z.J.C. dependent. She remained in the legal and physical custody

of Mother under a safety plan until March 26, 2021, when the court transferred

custody to CYF due to Mother’s lack of supervision and incarceration that same

month.4 Z.J.C., then five years old, was placed in foster care with a married

couple who had been Mother’s landlords.5

        With respect to E.R.K., he was born prematurely in July of 2020, at

which    time    he   and    Mother     tested   positive   for    amphetamines   and

methamphetamines, inter alia. E.R.K. was discharged into Mother’s custody,

where he remained until he was four months old.                   He was placed in the

emergency protective custody of CYF in December of 2020, as a result of

Mother failing to take him to his scheduled medical appointments. Like Z.J.C.,

____________________________________________

4 In March of 2021, Mother was charged with multiple drug-related felonies

and incarcerated for an unspecified time. She was ultimately released while
the charges were pending. It is undisputed that Mother was sentenced to a
term of incarceration of three and one-half to six years and re-incarcerated in
the Fall of 2022, prior to the conclusion of the termination proceeding,
discussed infra.

5 According to H.G., Z.J.C.’s foster mother, she and her husband were

        the landlords of the apartments that [Mother] was living in at the
        time and just kind of organically formed a relationship through
        that. A lot of times [Z.J.C.] would be down hanging out with my
        husband and I while we [were] working on other units for hours.
        Then she started to ask about coming over and we started doing
        sleepovers and stuff and just kind of organically developed a
        relationship that way. Then when [Mother] went to jail the first
        time she had called and asked if I was willing to care for [Z.J.C.]
        while she was in prison.

N.T., 8/18/22, at 48.

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E.R.K. was adjudicated dependent on December 30, 2020, and the court

placed him in the legal and physical custody of his paternal aunt.

      The Children’s placement goals were reunification with the concurrent

goal of adoption. Permanency review hearings were held at regular intervals.

Mother’s permanency objectives included, in part, participating in random

drug screens; maintaining sobriety; attending supervised visitation and

displaying appropriate parenting skills; maintaining appropriate housing; and

resolving her criminal charges.    Mother was court-ordered to engage in

services related to drug and alcohol, mental health, and intimate partner

violence (“IPV”).

      By motions filed on April 24, 2022, CYF requested that the Children’s

goals be changed to adoption based on allegations that Mother tested positive

for   amphetamines    and    methamphetamines      in   February     of   2022;

communicated inappropriately with the Children during supervised visits; and

had unresolved criminal charges. On April 28, 2022, CYF filed petitions for

the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).

      The court held a combined goal change and involuntary termination

hearing which commenced on May 10, 2022, and was continued to August 18,

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2022, and October 3, 2022.6 Z.J.C., then seven years old, was represented

by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and separate legal counsel. E.R.K., who turned

two years old during the pendency of the proceeding, was represented by the

GAL.7

        CYF presented testimony from Candace Lawson, a family advocate for

the Bair Path House who supervised Mother’s visits with the Children; Terry

O’Hara, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist who performed both individual and

interactional psychological evaluations involving Mother; R.B., E.R.K.’s foster

mother and paternal aunt; H.G., Z.J.C.’s foster mother; Shane Fagan, CYF

caseworker; and Jennifer Walter; the supervisor from the Bair Path program

that supervised visits for Mother and the Children.8 Mother, then incarcerated

at Blair County prison, testified on her own behalf.

        By orders dated December 16, 2022, the orphans’ court changed the

Children’s permanency goals to adoption. By decrees entered on December

____________________________________________

6 In addition to the Children, the subject proceeding included the permanency

reviews for two of their older siblings.

7 Because E.R.K.’s legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to his

young age, the court did not appoint separate legal counsel for him. See In
re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-1093 (Pa. 2018) (holding, “if the preferred
outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very
young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal
interests and his or her best interests; as such, the mandate of Section
2313(a) of the Adoption Act” is satisfied.).

8 CYF also presented witnesses who testified solely with respect to Mother’s

older children, who we do not list here.

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19, 2022, the court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).

       On February 24, 2022, Mother sought relief in the orphans’ court to file

notices of appeal nunc pro tunc from the involuntary termination decrees,

which the court granted by orders docketed on March 28, 2023. On the same

date, Mother filed notices of appeal nunc pro tunc and concise statements of

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b),

which this Court consolidated sua sponte. On April 10, 2023, the orphans’

court filed an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a).

       On appeal, Mother raises the following two issues for review.

       I.     Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or abused its
       discretion in terminating the parental rights of [Mother] where
       insufficient evidence was presented supporting the petitions for
       involuntary termination and/or was significantly undermined by
       contradicting evidence during the evidentiary hearings on the
       petitions?

       II.   Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or abused its
       discretion in terminating the parental rights of [Mother], in that
       [Mother]’s projected release date from incarceration was 2023 or
       2024?

Mother’s Brief at 4.9

       We consider Mother’s issues in the context of determining whether the

involuntary termination decrees are supported by competent evidence. See

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When applying this

____________________________________________

9 The GAL joined in the appellee brief filed by CYF advocating for affirming the

termination decrees.

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standard, appellate courts must accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact

and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record.        See

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021).         “Where the trial

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may

not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or

abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa.

2021).

      Our Supreme Court has explained, “An abuse of discretion does not

result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different

conclusion,” or “the facts could support an opposite result.” In re Adoption

of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012). Instead, an appellate court may

reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. at 826.   This

standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often

observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings. See Interest of

S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123–1124.

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Adoption Act (“Act”), which requires a bifurcated analysis. See

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.    The trial court must initially determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under Section 2511(a). Only if

the court determines that the petitioner established grounds for termination

under Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under

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Section 2511(b), which involves a child’s needs and welfare.         See In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

       To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove

grounds under both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing evidence,

which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable

a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.”        C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (quoting Matter of

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

       In this case, we review Section 2511(a)(2) and (b),10 which provide as

follows.

       (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
       may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
       grounds:

                                           ...

           (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
           or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
           essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
           for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
           causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
           or will not be remedied by the parent.

                                           ...

       (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
       of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
____________________________________________

10 Based on this disposition, we need not review the decrees with respect to

Section 2511(a)(5) and (8). See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662,
672 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (reiterating that we need only agree with
any one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), to affirm
the termination of parental rights) (citation omitted).

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      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      The grounds for termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2)

due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct; those

grounds may also include acts of refusal and incapacity to perform parental

duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted). Section 2511(a)(2) “emphasizes the child’s present and future need

for essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical

or mental well-being,” especially “where disruption of the family has already

occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” In re Z.P., 994

A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and emphasis omitted).

      We have long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent

efforts   towards   the   reasonably   prompt   assumption   of   full   parental

responsibilities.   See In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (citation omitted). At a termination hearing, the orphans’ court

may properly reject as untimely or disingenuous a parent’s vow to follow

through on necessary services when the parent failed to co-operate with the

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agency or take advantage of available services during the dependency

proceedings. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105 (citation omitted).

      In In re Adoption of S.P., supra, our Supreme Court addressed the

relevance of incarceration in termination decisions under Section 2511(a)(2).

The S.P. Court held that “incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a

determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist

under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent

due to incarceration has caused the child to be without essential parental care,

control or subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not

be remedied.” Id. at 828.

      With respect to Section 2511(b), the court is required to “give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Regarding the “emotional needs and

welfare” of the child, our precedent has interpreted it to include “intangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

      Our Supreme Court in In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), first

recognized that the “emotional needs and welfare” analysis under Section

2511(b) should include, in part, the child’s bond with his or her parent. In

doing so, trial courts must examine the effect on the child of severing such a

bond, and this includes “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and

beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s

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developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” In the Interest

of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023).

      The K.T. Court recognized that “case law indicates that bond, plus

permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors may contribute equally to the

determination of a child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional

needs and welfare, and thus are all of ‘primary’ importance in the Section

2511(b) analysis.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109. For instance, if relevant in a case,

a trial court “can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child” in its

analysis under Section 2511(b). See In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa.

Super. 2014).

      In the case sub judice, initially we observe that Mother failed to assert

an error regarding Section 2511(b) in her concise statements of errors

complained of on appeal and statements of questions involved in her brief.

Therefore, Mother has waived any claim concerning it. It follows that we do

review the decrees in the context of Section 2511(b). See In re M.Z.T.M.W.,

163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted) (finding that, because

the appellant-mother “failed to include a challenge to Section 2511(b) in her

statement of questions involved and concise statements that issue is also

waived.”)

      Turning to Mother’s arguments regarding Section 2511(a), she contends

that her conduct did not warrant termination. Specifically, in her first issue,

she asserts that she “was actively engaged in discussions regarding the

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[C]hildren’s educational needs and medical appointments.” Mother’s Brief at

16.   In addition, she asserts that she consistently attended supervised

visitation with the Children. Id. at 16-17.

      In her second issue, Mother asserts that she was sentenced on her

multiple felony charges to a term of incarceration following the first day of the

termination proceeding.    Mother claims that her minimum release date is

three-and-one-half years, and that she is eligible for the state drug treatment

program.     Id. at 17-18.    Mother baldly asserts that, if she successfully

completes the state drug treatment program, she will be eligible for release

from incarceration in 2023 or 2024, prior to her minimum sentencing date.

Id. Because of Mother’s alleged early release date, she argues that the court

abused its discretion to the extent it terminated her parental rights due to her

incarceration. Id. at 18. For the reasons that follow, Mother’s issues are

meritless.

      The orphans’ court found as follows.

      Mother was convicted in the Fall of 2022 for various drug offenses
      and received a sentence of 3 ½ to 6 years [of] incarceration. The
      court acknowledges that Mother did receive permission in the
      state drug treatment program which would allow for release prior
      to her minimum sentence. However, it is uncertain as to whether
      or not Mother will successfully complete the state drug treatment
      program. In addition to her incarceration, testimony established
      that Mother never acquired stable housing to effectuate
      reunification with the Children, did not consistently engage in her
      court ordered services, and did not take responsibility in her role
      in the Children’s initial placement. Mother failed to engage with
      [CYF] and their directives which included failure to show up for
      office appointments and refusal to participate in consistent drug
      tests. She also had positive drug tests in 2022. We also note that

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       [CYF] presented expert testimony from Dr. Terry O’Hara, a
       forensic psychologist, who concluded that Mother’s ability to
       successfully reunify with the Children was poor. . . .

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/10/23, at 3 (unpaginated) (cleaned up). The record

supports the court’s findings.

       We begin with Dr. O’Hara’s testimony regarding his December 2021

individual psychological evaluation of Mother.      Dr. O’Hara summarized “a

variety of concerns,” as follows.

       [Mother] was homeless at the time of the evaluations in
       December. She acknowledged using substances as soon as she
       was released from incarceration.[11] She acknowledged relapsing
       with cocaine, meth and bath salts. She reported a “toxic end of”
       relationship with the children’s father. She alleged controlling
       behaviors and verbal abuse by her form[er] paramour. She
       reported extreme impulsivity, significant depression, and
       significant anxiety, both of which negatively impacted her
       functioning. She endorsed hypomania for two[-]day periods.
       That would include symptoms of bipolar disorder lasting for two
       days to include elevated energy levels, a lot of impulsivity, racing
       thoughts, that sort of presentation.       Further, she had not
       participated with Women Aware.            She cited a lack of
       transportation, even though she had disclosed IPV from a few
       relationships. She acknowledged her recent relapse. She was
       actually kicked out of Crossroads due to positive urines. She had
       multiple pending felonies. . . . Her responses were in the clinical
       range with regard to depression on the BDI-II, which is the Beck
       Depression Inventory. Her presentation was in the significant
       range on the Beck Anxiety Inventories. So that essentially
       indicates that depression and anxiety are problematic for her likely
       negatively impacting her functioning.

____________________________________________

11  As stated supra, Mother was incarcerated in March of 2021, which
precipitated the transfer of Z.J.C.’s custody to CYF. Mother was ultimately
released and participated in supervised visitation with the Children until her
sentencing and re-incarceration in the Fall of 2022.

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N.T., 8/18/22, at 7-8 (cleaned up). With respect to his interactional evaluation

between Mother, the Children, and their older siblings which also occurred in

December of 2021, Dr. O’Hara testified that Mother

      did not show any prioritization of the children’s psychological
      needs. She did not engage with several of the children for much
      of the evaluation. She spoke about inappropriate topics including
      being robbed by a roommate. . . . She often weep[ed] during
      the evaluation. It was very poor emotional regulation by her. . .
      . She essentially ignored four of the younger children. . . . It
      was my impression that the children had to assume more of a
      parental role with [M]other during this evaluation. They were
      offering her reassurance as opposed to [Mother] really prioritizing
      their need. . . .

Id. at 8-9.   Dr. O’Hara concluded that Mother had a “poor prognosis” for

rehabilitation “given the extent of the mental health issues, given the extent

of the substance abuse concerns, and how these issues have negatively

impacted her functioning and her capacity to prioritize her children’s needs. .

. .” Id. at 16.

      Notwithstanding Mother’s recent sentence of incarceration, Dr. O’Hara

opined that the Children “would not be able to see consistency, stability,

security and safety if they were to be with [M]other at this time.” Id. at 9-

10. Further, he testified that the Children achieving permanency at this point

in their lives “is extremely important.” Id. at 11. He explained:

      Children of those ages really have much better outcomes in a
      variety of areas if they experience a factor that is typically
      inherent in permanency, including safety, stability and security.
      They do much better in terms of school of readiness. They do
      better with regard to . . . achievement in school. They are left at
      risk for psycho pathology. They are left at risk for substance
      abuse issues. So, there is a lot of factors which can influence an

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      upward trajectory developmentally for children when they
      experience factors in parents in permanency as opposed to
      children who don’t experience those factors.

Id. at 11-12. In sum, Dr. O’Hara opined that Mother was not capable of being

successfully reunified with the Children due to her “mental state, her

struggling with a variety of psychological symptoms, her appearing

overwhelmed with her presentation, the unaddressed IPV issues and the

unaddressed substance abuse concerns.” Id. at 10.

      Shane Fagan, the CYF caseworker for the family from January of 2022,

through the time of the termination proceeding, corroborated Dr. O’Hara’s

conclusion that, notwithstanding Mother’s incarceration, she was unable to

reunify with the Children. See N.T., 10/3/22, at 49. Indeed, he testified that

Mother did not satisfy her drug and alcohol or housing objectives prior to her

incarceration in the Fall of 2022. See id. at 39, 48-49, 51-52.

      With respect to Mother’s supervised visitation, they occurred for four

hours weekly with the Children and their two older siblings.        See N.T.,

5/10/22, at 9. Both Ms. Lawson and Ms. Walter testified that Mother regularly

initiated inappropriate conversations with the Children and their siblings. See

id. at 46-47; see also N.T., 10/3/22, at 17, 25. Ms. Lawson testified that,

despite re-direction, Mother “struggled to keep conversations appropriate

[and away from] court-related topics or discussions on jail or when you return

home conversations.”    N.T., 5/10/22, at 12, 15.    Ms. Walter testified that

Mother’s inappropriate conversations occurred up until her last supervised

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visit on August 2, 2022, just prior to her re-incarceration, which Ms. Lawson

corroborated. See N.T., 10/3/22, at 15, 17; see also N.T., 5/10/22, at 13.

      In addition, Ms. Lawson testified that Mother had an ongoing problem

with supervising E.R.K. during the visits. See N.T., 5/10/22, at 17, 47. She

explained that at “[m]any visits, no one knows that [E.R.K.] is missing. He

explores into the kitchen, the office and other visit rooms.         Other staff

members and myself and [Mother’s older] children do intervene to go get him

when redirected.” Id. at 12-13; see also id. at 39. Ms. Lawson testified on

redirect examination:

      Q. [G]iven [E.R.K.]’s age, would you have concerns with
      [Mother]’s current ability to effectively supervise him in any other
      manner other than the complete supervision that Path House
      provides?

      A. Yes, without supervision, I would have concerns.

Id. at 47.

      Moreover, Mother’s testimony supports the court’s finding that she does

not take responsibility for the placement of the Children and their siblings.

Mother exclaimed on cross-examination, “[I]t wasn’t the drug addiction. It

was the harassment that CY[F] constantly is doing,” which resulted in the

Children’s dependencies. N.T., 10/3/22, at 65; see also id. at 63 (On cross-

examination, with respect to whether her substance abuse has impacted the

children’s ability to have consistency and stability in their lives stemming from

CYF’s initial involvement with the family and 2016, Mother responded, “No,

because if CY[F] wouldn’t have been involved, me and [R.R.C., Jr.,] would

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have never stepped out of our kids’ lives.       They still would have had us

consistently one way or another.”). Mother ultimately provided the following

self-contradictory testimony.

      Drug addiction is not the end of anything. [R.R.C., Jr., and I]
      wouldn’t be drug addicts if we didn’t relapse. I am sorry for the
      people that are affected along the way, but that is why there’s
      programs and that’s why there is supposed to be agencies like
      CY[F] who are supposed to help families get back together and
      not rip them apart. But when it is one-sided and all I have heard
      is how I haven’t done this and I haven’t done that, but yet I
      haven’t abused my kids and neglected them. I neglected myself
      which turned into neglect for them.

Id. at 67.

      Mother   admitted   using   illegal   substances   during   the   Children’s

dependencies, and that she “did struggle with staying in a Suboxone clinic. .

. .” Id. at 58, 60. She also testified that she never completed the program

Women Aware, which we glean was related to her IPV history. Id. at 60.

Mother stated to the orphans’ court, “I believe my children should come home

eventually. I’m not asking you to do it tomorrow, and I’m not asking you to

do it January 1st when [R.R.C., Jr.,] gets out of jail. I am just asking you to

give us a chance to be good parents. . . . Give us a chance to do the programs

and prove that we can be good people.” Id. at 68.

      The orphans’ court was not required under Section 2511(a)(2) to permit

Mother more time to provide the Children with essential parental care, control

or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being. See In re

S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105 (citation omitted). We do not disturb the decrees to

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the extent that the court found Mother’s vow to comply with necessary

treatment programs untimely or disingenuous. See id.

     Based on the foregoing, the evidence amply demonstrates that Mother’s

repeated and continued incapacity, neglect or refusal caused by her substance

abuse, related incarceration, and mental illness has caused the Children to be

without essential parental care necessary for their physical and mental well-

being. Further, the testimony of Dr. O’Hara as well as Mother, inasmuch as

she blames CYF for her family disruption, amply demonstrates that her

incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. Thus, Mother’s

issues on appeal are meritless. Accordingly, we affirm the decrees pursuant

to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).

      Decrees affirmed.

 12/29/2023

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