Court Opinion

ID: 9838615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 07:10:28.24556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:48.603094
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                     EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                          EL PASO, TEXAS

    ALAN J. LIMUEL,                                        §                  No. 08-23-00041-CV

                                     Appellant,            §                       Appeal from

    v.                                                     §              201st Judicial District Court

    CITY OF AUSTIN,                                        §                of Travis County, Texas

                                     Appellee.             §               (TC# D-1-GN-19-001786)

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

         Following a five-day jury trial on Alan Limuel’s employment discrimination claims against

the City of Austin, the jury found in the City’s favor on all but one of Limuel’s claims and awarded

him no damages. Proceeding pro se, Limuel appeals several rulings by the trial court and the jury’s

finding of no damages. We affirm. 1

                                                  Background

         Limuel began working for the City as an operator in the Austin Resource Recovery

Department in July 2015. His employment with the City was marred by a series of corrective

actions and conflicts with other City employees and supervisors, which the City characterizes as

1
  This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals to the extent they might conflict with our own.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
stemming from Limuel’s performance or behavioral issues and Limuel characterizes as illegal

retaliation by the City. Limuel filed a series of five discrimination charges with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission beginning in August 2017, which complained of sexual

harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.

           In April 2019, Limuel sued the City for retaliation and sexual harassment under Chapter

21 of the Texas Labor Code. 2 The trial court dismissed his sexual harassment claim on summary

judgment and denied his motion to disqualify the City’s trial attorney. The trial court also ruled on

motions in limine from both sides and entered its standing limine order.

           After a five-day trial on the merits, the jury returned its verdict. The first question of the

jury charge asked:

           Did the City of Austin take any of the alleged actions against Alan Limuel because
           of Alan Limuel’s complaint of sexual harassment against [his former supervisor],
           Alan Limuel’s complaints of retaliation starting in 2016 against [his new
           supervisor] and continuing against [his assistant manager], and [his manager], Alan
           Limuel’s request for a disability accommodation, his complaint of disability
           discrimination, his filing of charges with the federal Equal Employment
           Opportunity Commission (‘EEOC’), or his filing this lawsuit against the City of
           Austin?

           The “alleged actions” included a list of over a dozen things that occurred during Limuel’s

employment, including allegedly refusing to investigate his complaints of retaliation or harassment

after he filed this lawsuit, scheduling him for work-related training “under threat of discipline,”

and placing him and his union representative in a separate room for an Americans with Disabilities

Act interactive meeting. The jury answered yes. However, the jury answered no to other questions

probing the merits of Limuel’s claims, including harassment based on his alleged disability and

failure to provide a reasonable workplace accommodation. The jury then awarded Limuel zero

2
    Though Limuel proceeds pro se on appeal, he was represented by counsel at trial.

                                                          2
damages for past and future “emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, loss of

enjoyment of life, and other non-economic losses.” 3

          Limuel filed a motion to disregard the jury’s answer to damages, claiming no evidence

supported an award of zero damages. The trial court denied his motion and entered a judgment

reflecting the jury’s findings. Limuel then filed a pro se motion for new trial, which the court

denied. Limuel appealed.

                                       Standards for Pro Se Litigants

          “[C]ourts are required to construe the pleadings of pro se litigants to ensure that they are

afforded a fair opportunity to be heard.” Jonson v. Duong, 642 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2021, no pet.) (citing Feist v. Gutierrez, No. 03-18-00474-CV, 2019 WL 3436996, at *1, n.2

(Tex. App.—Austin July 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)). However, pro se litigants must also

comply with procedural rules. Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005). “Having two

sets of rules—a strict set for attorneys and a lenient set for pro se parties—might encourage

litigants to discard their valuable right to the advice and assistance of counsel.” Id.

          Thus, as with appellate briefs drafted by counsel, Limuel’s brief “must state concisely all

issues or points presented for review” and “contain a clear and concise argument for the

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1(f), (i). Failure to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure results in waiver of the

issue on appeal. See id.; Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no

pet.). “[W]e have ‘no duty—or even right—to perform an independent review of the record and

applicable law to determine whether there was error.’” Martinez v. Ward, 303 S.W.3d 326, 328

3
    Limuel did not seek back pay or other economic damages.

                                                        3
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.) (quoting Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845). “It would be

inappropriate for this Court to attempt to re-draft and articulate what we believe [the appellant]

may have intended to raise as error on appeal.” Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845.

                                                         Analysis

         Limuel raises several issues on appeal, including the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary

issues, his motion to disqualify counsel, and various jury selection issues. 4 He also urges that the

City made improper arguments to the jury during its closing argument and maintains the trial court

erred by denying his motion to set aside the jury’s verdict on damages and motion for a new trial.

Finally, Limuel generally claims the trial court’s actions at various points during the trial violated

his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 5 We address his issues in turn.

    A. Evidentiary rulings

         Limuel contends the trial court erred in its limine rulings, which, in relevant part: (1) denied

his request to keep out testimony regarding his criminal history, except for certain details of his

December 2017 arrest, and (2) granted the City’s request to prevent him from testifying about his

theory that the City’s attorney improperly communicated with the Travis County District

Attorney’s office regarding his since-dismissed criminal case. Limuel relatedly complains that

witnesses and the City’s counsel improperly referenced “domestic violence allegations details and

false news reports.”

4
  In his brief, Limuel notes the trial court “made rulings on three [m]otions all against [his] interest with no justification
given,” without clarifying which motions he means. At another point in his brief, he states the trial court made “several
improper rulings throughout the trial . . . including but not limited to” seven listed motions. Despite these
discrepancies, we construe Limuel’s brief “liberally” and review each issue properly before us, i.e., that complies with
Rule 38.1. Martinez, 303 S.W.3d at 328.
5
  Limuel also complains of the trial judge’s purported bias and the City’s counsel’s “abhorrent” behavior throughout
the parties’ litigation. However, because he does not identify any appealable issue in compliance with Rule 38.1, those
grievances are not properly before us.

                                                              4
       A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In

re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005). A trial court abuses its discretion by acting without

reference to any guiding rules or principles. Elness Swenson Graham Architects, Inc. v. RLJ II-C

Austin Air, LP, 520 S.W.3d 145, 157 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pets. denied). On appeal, we will

not reverse an erroneous evidentiary ruling “unless the ruling probably caused the rendition of an

improper judgment.” Mitchell v. Bank of Am., N.A., 156 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2004, pet. denied) (citing Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 906 (Tex.

2000)). “A trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine is a preliminary ruling on admissibility and

does not preserve anything for appellate review.” In Interest of M.G.N., 491 S.W.3d 386, 400–01

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (citing Hiroms v. Scheffey, 76 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). In other words, a party must timely object when

testimony is offered to preserve error. In re Commitment of Hebert, 578 S.W.3d 154, 156 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 2019, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) and TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)).

       Limuel failed to preserve error on the trial court’s evidentiary rulings related to testimony

about his criminal history (which includes references to “domestic violence allegations” and “news

reports” about the same) because he did not timely object to that testimony during trial. Id. Indeed,

a review of the trial transcript reflects that Limuel’s own testimony addressed those same matters,

so he cannot complain about the admission of that evidence on appeal. McInnes v. Yamaha Motor

Corp., U.S.A., 673 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. 1984) (“A party on appeal should not be heard to

complain of the admission of improper evidence offered by the other side, when he, himself,

introduced the same evidence or evidence of a similar character.”).

       Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Limuel from testifying

about his theory of allegedly improper communications between the City’s counsel and the District

                                                 5
Attorney’s office. In his related offer of proof, Limuel attempted to admit an exhibit consisting of

a series of emails he said he obtained from the District Attorney’s office. The City made several

objections to the exhibit, including that it was unauthenticated and had never been produced in

discovery. In sustaining the City’s objections and preventing the admission of that evidence, the

trial court did not act “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Elness Swenson

Graham Architects, 520 S.W.3d at 157.

       Limuel’s issue regarding the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary matters is overruled.

   B. Motion to disqualify counsel

       Limuel references his motion to disqualify the City’s counsel as a ruling “made against

[his] interests with no reasonable justification given” by the trial court. However, to the extent

Limuel intends to raise this as an issue on appeal, it is not properly before us because his brief does

not include “a clear and concise argument” for this contention “with appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Because Limuel fails to meet the Rule 38.1

requirements on this issue, it is overruled.

   C. Jury selection

       Limuel complains of several issues related to jury selection. Decisions related to voir dire

are within the sound discretion of the trial court, so we find error only when there is an abuse of

discretion. Cortez ex rel. Estate of Puentes v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Tex.

2005). “[T]rial judges are in a better position to evaluate the veniremembers’ sincerity in their

responses and capacity for fairness and impartiality.” McMillin v. State Farm Lloyds, 180 S.W.3d

183, 196 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied).

       First, Limuel claims four veniremembers should have been struck for cause because they

“present[ed] bias on awarding damages for mental harm and bias towards domestic violence

                                                  6
allegations[.]” Limuel also contends the trial court improperly released four veniremembers before

voir dire without consulting with counsel. 6 Similarly, Limuel protests that the trial court moved

forward with voir dire despite his objections that six veniremembers did not respond to the jury

duty summons. Finally, Limuel argues the City improperly went “into facts of the case during voir

dire.” 7 Though Limuel states the trial court’s decisions were in “contravention of law,” he

provides no further argument or citation to legal authorities to support his positions. That fails to

meet what Rule 38.1 requires, so these issues are not properly before us on appeal.

         Limuel’s issues related to jury selection are overruled.

    D. Jury argument

         Limuel also contends the City made improper jury argument by referring to his “domestic

violence allegation details and false news reports” in “efforts to taint [the] jury” during closing

arguments. To prove an improper jury argument, the appellant must show, in relevant part, that he

preserved the argument at trial by objection, motion to instruct, or motion for mistrial. Standard

Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. 1979). However, Limuel did not object or move

to instruct or for mistrial during the City’s closing argument. He has waived the issue. 8

         Limuel’s jury argument issue is overruled.

    E. Post-trial motions

6
  The record shows that the trial judge rescheduled (and did not excuse) these four veniremembers for a later jury duty
at their request for health reasons.
7
  Specifically, Limuel objects to the City’s statement that “[t]his is a case, as counsel told you earlier, that involves
an employee of [Austin Resource Recovery] who is complaining that he is getting retaliated against.” The trial judge
overruled the objection, stating to Limuel’s counsel, “[y]ou covered the same material, so overruled. Generic statement
is okay.”
8
  Limuel does not contend that the City’s jury argument was incurable—i.e., that it was so prejudicial it would not
have been rendered harmless by an instruction to disregard such that his failure to object does not waive his objection
on appeal. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Wasiak, 917 S.W.2d 883, 894 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996), aff'd sub nom.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998).

                                                           7
        Limuel also contends the trial court should have granted his motion to disregard a jury

answer and motion for new trial. Construing Limuel’s brief liberally, we understand his argument

as it relates to both motions to challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the jury’s finding of

zero damages for mental anguish.

       “When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which she

has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter

of law, all vital facts in support of the issue.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex.

2001). In reviewing such a challenge, we first examine the record for evidence supporting the

finding and ignore all evidence to the contrary. Id. Only if there is no evidence to support the

finding will we then examine the record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as

a matter of law. Id. “The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at

trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of

Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).

       “When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which

she has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the

great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 242. We may set aside a

verdict “only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.” Id.

       “Matters of pain and mental anguish are necessarily speculative, and it is particularly

within the jury’s province to resolve these matters and determine the amounts attributable thereto.”

Grant v. Cruz, 406 S.W.3d 358, 363 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); see Union Pac. R. Co. v.

Legg, No. 03-07-00512-CV, 2009 WL 2476636, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 12, 2009, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (noting that the term “mental anguish” is “an ‘admittedly nebulous definition’ and can

                                                 8
involve symptoms that are subjective in nature” (quoting Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d

434, 444 (Tex. 1995)). “A jury is free to reject the subjective testimony of a plaintiff as to the

existence, amount, or severity of the plaintiff’s pain.” Grant, 406 S.W.3d at 364. “The mere fact

that injury resulted does not establish pain and suffering or impairment.” Grove v. Overby, No. 03-

03-00700-CV, 2004 WL 1686326, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin July 29, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Blizzard v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988,

no writ)). “[C]ourts of appeals have affirmed zero-damages jury verdicts on the issue of mental

anguish.” Legg, 2009 WL 2476636, at *4 (collecting cases).

         Limuel has not proved that he is entitled to damages as a matter of law nor that the jury’s

finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and

unjust. Though the jury answered in Limuel’s favor on question one of the jury charge, it declined

to award him damages for past and future mental anguish. Based on the testimony at trial, the jury

could have reasonably believed, for example, that Limuel’s suffering did not rise to the level of

compensable mental anguish 9 or Limuel did suffer mental anguish but it stemmed from other

circumstances in his life unconnected to his work environment or the City’s actions. 10 It was

within the jury’s discretion to “consider the circumstantial evidence, weigh witness credibility,

and make reasonable inferences from the evidence it chooses to believe.” Grove, 2004 WL

1686326, at *8 (citing Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. 2001)). In sum, the jury’s

9
 For example, Limuel testified that after the alleged retaliation at work, he felt “humiliat[ed]” and like he was
“walking around on eggshells[.]”
10
  For example, Limuel’s psychotherapist testified that Limuel had “[l]ots of depression, anxiety, fluctuations in
weight, appetite” but that there were “other stresses” besides his “work stress,” including “constant conflict” with his
mother. Limuel did not call an expert witness.

                                                           9
finding of zero damages for Limuel’s pain and mental anguish is supported by the record before

us.

         Limuel’s issue regarding his two post-trial motions is overruled.

      F. Constitutional claims

         Finally, Limuel claims the court’s “refusal to correct the jury’s erroneous decision”

violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, Limuel did not raise

these issues at the trial court level. Constitutional claims that are not raised in the trial court are

not preserved for review on appeal. Perry v. U.S. Auto. Ass’n, 602 S.W.3d 915, 916 n.1 (Tex.

2020). Limuel’s constitutional claims are thus overruled.

                                          CONCLUSION

         For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice

September 6, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

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