Court Opinion

ID: 9711478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:32:50.420789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.368814
License: Public Domain

*506BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, there are matters which require additional comment.
To begin with, the majority asserts that the record is deficient because there was no “disinterested testimony evaluating the relative environments which the parties could provide.” Although it is not completely clear what is meant by the phrase “disinterested testimony,” it may be assumed, based upon prior cases, that it refers to the type of testimony offered by social workers, psychiatrists, doctors, psychologists and other similarly trained personnel. See J. F. G. v. K. A. G., n/b/m K. A. K., 278 Pa.Super. 25, 419 A.2d 1337 (1980); In re Custody of Neal, 260 Pa.Super. 151, 393 A.2d 1057 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Cox v. Cox, 255 Pa.Super. 508, 388 A.2d 1082 (1978); Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa.Super. 382, 361 A.2d 307 (1976).
The advantage of this type of testimony lies in its objectivity. The disadvantage, however, is that it is costly not only financially but in terms of manpower and time. Having a professional make an evaluation and prepare a report for the court may involve many months of study. Because time is so precious in a child custody case, it is my opinion that this type of testimony should not be sought on remand in every instance, as it may be entirely sufficient in some cases to have the parties themselves provide witnesses who will testify to the type of home environments each party could provide, such as a close neighbor or family physician. I, therefore, propose that where a social worker’s testimony would aid the court in its determination, it should be sought on remand; but that where the parties themselves can provide such “disinterested testimony,” they should be encouraged to do so.
The majority also asserts that the trial court’s opinion was not sufficiently comprehensive for purposes of appellate review. As we have stated in the past, remand is appropriate where the trial court has not made a comprehensive inquiry; where it does not specify the reasons underlying its decision; or where the opinion is not supported by a full *507discussion of the evidence. Commonwealth ex rel. Leighann A. v. Leon A., 280 Pa.Super. 249, 421 A.2d 706 (1980); In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa.Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Schall v. Schall, 251 Pa.Super. 262, 380 A.2d 478 (1977).
While I am in agreement that the trial court here should have made every attempt in its opinion to thoroughly analyze and discuss the evidence presented, I feel that the time has come for our court to give some guidance to the trial courts of our state in this regard.
I, therefore, strongly suggest that in child custody cases, the trial court should prepare specific findings of fact, from which its conclusions shall be deduced. As we stated in Garrity v. Garrity, 268 Pa.Super. 217, 225, 407 A.2d 1323, 1327 (1979): “Absent . . . the reasoning process employed to reach the ultimate conclusion, this court cannot pass on the fate of a child.”
In a child custody case, the trial court should record in its opinion its findings of fact with regard to the following: the fitness of the parties; the home surroundings of the parties; the care and condition of the child; the credibility of the parties; and the probability of the incidents testified to at the hearing. Veihdeffer v. Veihdeffer, 235 Pa.Super. 447, 344 A.2d 613 (1975); In re Custody of White, 270 Pa.Super. 165, 411 A.2d 231 (1979). Also, where the court has interviewed the child, it should also make and note findings of fact with regard to the child’s competency to testify, particularly where the child is of tender years, such as the four-year old child here.
In this case, the opinion does not contain sufficient findings with respect to the probability of the mother’s alleged drug use. The court here was not presented with any medical testimony concerning the effects of methadrine, one of the drugs allegedly used by Theresa G. I would direct that expert testimony be sought with regard to the known effects of methadrine, as well as to the effects, if any, that her usage of such a drug would have upon Rebecca.
*508Finally, the majority states that on remand the trial court should determine the appropriate weight to be given to the child’s testimony. I agree that this is necessary, since it appears from the opinion that considerable weight was accorded to her testimony, especially with regard to her mother’s alleged drug use, despite the fact that she was found to be “too young to ask questions.” Whether a minor child is competent to testify depends upon his or her intelligence and comprehension of the obligation to tell the truth. Commonwealth v. Allabaugh, 162 Pa.Super. 490, 58 A.2d 184 (1949). There is no indication here whether the trial judge attempted to ascertain Rebecca’s intelligence or her understanding of the obligation to tell the truth before he elicited testimony from her. It is well established that “[Cjourts must clearly indicate the weight given to the child’s testimony.” Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa.Super. 229, 812 A.2d 58 (1973).
I would hold that while the child’s testimony should be transcribed and made a part of the récord, it is not mandatory that counsel be present. The majority cites Commonwealth ex rel. Morales v. Morales, 222 Pa.Super. 373, 294 A.2d 782 (1972), for the proposition that counsel must be present where a child’s testimony is taken by the trial judge out of the presence of the contending parties. In Morales, we were confronted with a factual situation in which the trial judge had refused to allow one of the children in question to testify as a witness when called by counsel for the appellee on the ground that the children had already been heard in chambers. No record was made of the children’s testimony. We found that the trial court’s decision was not supported by the record since the children’s testimony was not transcribed and held that in such a situation, “[c]ounsel should be present and have an opportunity to examine them [the children] . . . and their testimony should be on the record.” Id., 222 Pa.Super. at 375-376, 294 A.2d at 782, 783.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, supra, our court discussed Morales, stating that
*509[I]n Commonwealth ex rel. Morales v. Morales . . . two requirements were specified: that counsel be permitted to be present when the children were questioned, so that they could examine the children; and that the children’s “testimony should be on the record.”
Id. 226 Pa.Super. at 238, 312 A.2d at 63. [Emphasis added.] In Grillo, the court noted, counsel had been offered the opportunity to be present when the children were questioned by the trial judge in chambers but had declined.
In Cheppa v. Cheppa, 246 Pa.Super. 149, 369 A.2d 854 (1977), we stated that
[N]otwithstanding the language of both Morales and Grillo, these two cases actually turned on the absence of a record of the children’s testimony, rather than on the absence of counsel while the children testified. A record was kept in the instant case. Id., 246 Pa.Super. at 151, 369 A.2d at 856. [Emphasis added.]
The opinion went on to state that
[t]he most important consideration for the lower court when attempting to ascertain the true feelings of a child must be to create an atmosphere in which the child will feel free to express himself. Such a setting is much less likely to exist when representatives of the parents (representatives who are going to repeat what the child has said) are present. The hearing judge in the case before us made every effort to ask impartial questions, to put the children at ease, and to attempt to determine their true feelings toward their parents. Under the circumstances of this case, there was no error by the lower court in questioning the children without counsel being present.
Id., 246 Pa.Super. at 151—152, 369 A.2d at 856 [emphasis added].
In Commonwealth ex rel. Lee v. Lee, 248 Pa.Super. 155, 374 A.2d 1365 (1977), we were again confronted with a situation in which the child’s interview with the judge was not transcribed. In stating that “[t]he hearing judge’s failure to comply with the requisite procedure denied counsel *510the opportunity to question Kelly Ann . . .,” the reasoning of the Cheppa case, supra, is overlooked.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Scott v. Rider, 248 Pa.Super. 383, 375 A.2d 149 (1977), a child custody case decided the same day as Lee, it was stipulated that counsel would not be present when the hearing judge interviewed the children in question. Although we stated that generally where a child’s testimony is to be taken out of the presence of the contending parties, counsel should be present, the opinion focused on the failure to transcribe the interview:
Although in the instant case it was stipulated that counsel would not be present at the in camera interview of the children, the failure to transcribe this interview precludes adequate review of the order entered below. It is evident from the lower court’s opinion that the interview with the children was a significant factor influencing its decision.
Id., 248 Pa.Super. at 386, 375 A.2d 151 (emphasis added).
In both Lee and Rider, therefore, the focus was upon the trial court’s failure to have the interview transcribed, resulting in our being unable to adequately review the order entered by the trial court.
I, therefore, submit that the analysis of the Morales and Grillo cases contained in Cheppa, supra, is the proper one. As the Cheppa opinion correctly points out, the real issue in all these cases, including Lee and Rider, is whether there can be proper appellate review where the trial judge interviews a child but does not have the interview transcribed and made a part of the record, thus depriving the appellate court “[o]f all of the information necessary to discharge our responsibility to exercise the ‘broadest type’ of review” [citing, inter alia, the Grillo case, supra.] Id. 248 Pa.Super. at 162, 374 A.2d at 1369.
In Cheppa, we recognized that when “representatives of the parents,” i. e., counsel, are present, the child involved is not likely to feel as free to express himself, and as a result may not tell the judge his true feelings. The rationale behind interviewing the child is negated if the child cannot be honest and forthright with the judge and reveal his true *511feelings. For this reason, I submit that it is not proper to assert that in all situations counsel must be present since to have such a requirement may do more harm than good. However, in such cases, it is absolutely essential that the interview be transcribed for the record.