Court Opinion

ID: 9449636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:17:36.333179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:55.124975
License: Public Domain

*188BIGGS, Chief Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority that the issue presented is neither moot nor barred by lapse of time. But I cannot agree that the petitioner, Carióla, is not entitled to relief. The writ of error comm nobis is apt for the purpose for which it is sought. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 503-513, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954), and generally, “The Writ of Error Coram Nobis,” Freedman, 3 Temple L.Q., p. 365 et seq.
The petitioner testified that the trial judge stated in the course of the proceedings that he thought that the United States had not proved its case and that the petitioner had committed only “a minor violation”, “a technical violation”, of the Mann Act. The attorney for the petitioner, an inexperienced member of the bar, testified that the judge said that “he didn’t think it was much of a case there by the government; that at the most this [offense] was the most technical violation possible that you could think of [sic]”, and suggested that the petitioner should enter “a technical plea of guilty”, and that if the petitioner did so he would sentence him to twenty-four hours in the custody of the United States marshal. The docket entries show that the petitioner’s plea of not guilty was then withdrawn and a plea of guilty was “entered as a technical one” “by the order of the court.”
The petitioner is entitled to the writ sought by him.
First, a “technical” plea of guilty is unknown to the federal law. The court below could not enter a valid judgment of conviction on such a plea. It lost jurisdiction of the case when it tried to do so. It follows that the court’s act in entering the judgment of conviction was comm non judice, a nullity.
Second, there was bargaining between the court and the petitioner and his attorney for a light sentence if the technical plea of guilty was entered by the petitioner. The bargain was consummated despite the fact that the judge, as the present record shows — and we must accept that record as it stands in the absence of anything more- — stated that he thought that the United States-had not proved its case. If the court was of this view, it should have directed a verdict in favor of Carióla. The course which the court pursued is repugnant to-our present day views of justice under the law and, in my opinion, the judgment of conviction is voidable and should now be voided as contrary to public policy.1
Third, the petitioner was induced to-enter the plea, not by the United States attorney or by his deputy, but by the action of the judge himself. As was. said by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 294-295, (1957), a case bearing some resemblance to that at bar: “Fundamental standards of procedure in criminal cases require that a plea of guilty to the charge or charges contained in an indictment or information be entered freely, voluntarily, and without any semblance of coercion.”' The persuasion employed by the court in the instant case in my opinion must, be deemed to be the equivalent of coercion. The prestige and influence of a United States district judge, particularly in relation to a defendant under indictment who stands before him for trial, is so enormous that a strong suggestion from the judge amounts to a command and a command that must be obeyed. Carióla had counsel of his own choosing but by that counsel’s own admission at the time of the proceeding against Carióla since he had been practicing for only a short time he had but. *189small experience in criminal law. It takes wisdom and experience as well as strength to withstand the suggestion of a United States judge under the circumstances at bar. In my judgment Cariola was deprived of due process of law. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942).
This aspect of the case should be judged from another pertinent angle. A plea of guilty, made voluntarily and deliberately, to the charge of an indictment is not only a waiver of a right to a jury trial and a consent to the imposition of any sentence authorized by law,2 but it is also a confession of guilt. Donnelly v. United States, 185 F.2d 559, 560 (10 Cir., 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 949, 71 S.Ct. 528, 95 L.Ed. 684 (1951). These two aspects of the plea of guilty seem to be joint and logically unseverable. Surely one cannot entertain the slightest doubt that, treating Cariola’s plea as a confession, that confession cannot be deemed to be a voluntary one, for it was induced by a promise of reward made by the presiding judge himself, 1. e., if you, Cariola, will enter a technical plea of guilty, confess your guilt, you will receive a light sentence, viz., twenty-four hours in the custody of the United States marshal. Had a confession of guilt, “technical” or otherwise, made by Carióla under such circumstances been offered by the United States in the course of Cariola’s trial and had been received in evidence, one entertains no doubt that a reversal of the judgment of conviction, had he been found guilty, would have followed. See Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 45 S.Ct. 1, 69 L.Ed. 131 (1924) and Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897).
Fourth and finally, it is clear that the petitioner entered the “technical” plea of guilty without any clear understanding' of the effect of the consequences which a judgment of conviction would impose upon him. The fact that an accused is-represented by counsel of his own choice-is insufficient to relieve the trial court of determining that the plea is made voluntarily and with an understanding' of the nature of the charge. This principle is embodied in Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim. Proc., 18 U.S.C.3 It is also set out fully and explicitly in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223-224, 47 S.Ct.. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927). The Supreme Court said: “Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full’ understanding of the consequences. When one so pleads he may be held' bound.” The principle so stated, in so far as I am aware, has never before been questioned. If a defendant is not aware-of and does not possess a full understanding of the consequences of his plea, the court shall advise him and make certain that his comprehension is adequate. If this be not done it is necessary to conclude that the court loses jurisdiction of’ the cause and cannot enter a valid judgment of conviction. It is obvious here-that the United States can offer no rebuttal in the instant case to Cariola’s. assertions that he was not aware of the-consequences of his plea and it does not appear, and cannot be made to appear, that his then inexperienced counsel or the court advised him of the effect of his “technical” plea of guilty.
For the reasons stated I am convinced that Carióla was denied his rights under the Fifth Amendment and therefore I must respectfully dissent from the refusal of the majority to grant the writ of error coram nobis and to vacate the-judgment of conviction.

. Ordinarily, allowing withdrawal of a plea of not guilty and the substitution of a plea of guilty is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the court. Compare Rule 32(d), Fed.R.Crim.Proc., 18 U.S.C. See United States v. Swag-gerty, 218 E.2d 875 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 959, 75 S.Ct. 889, 99 L.Ed. 1282 (1955). But the action of the court here transcends an abuse of discretion and was-impermissible under the circumstances at bar.

. It may be observed that in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S. Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927), it is stated that a plea of guilty “is itself a conviction”.

. There can be no suggestion that Rule 11 effected any substantial change in the law. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.