Court Opinion

ID: 9723829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:34:44.051226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:52.416656
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
concurring in result.
I cannot agree that an arrestee’s first appearance before a judge more than a week after his arrest and the appointment of counsel six weeks after his arrest afford substantial compliance with the Indiana Code.
The statutes in effect at the time of May’s arrest are noted by Justice Pivarnik. A person arrested without a warrant must be “taken promptly before a judicial officer” for his initial hearing. Ind. Code § 35-33-7-1. At this hearing, the court must inform the accused of the nature of the charges against him, the amount and conditions of bail, his right to a speedy trial, the privilege against self-incrimination, and that a preliminary plea of not guilty is being entered for him. Ind. Code § 35-33-7-5. Before recessing the initial hearing, the court must inform a defendant of his right to retained or appointed counsel. Ind. Code § 35-33-7-3(c). If the person is indigent, the judicial officer must assign counsel. Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.
In the case at bar, the judge apparently followed the predecessor statutes which provided separate hearings for arraignment and preliminary charge. Ind. Code §§ 35-4.1-1-1; 35-4-1-1; 35-1-8-1 (repealed by 1981 Ind. Acts P.L. 298, § 9(a)). Johnny May was arrested on September 25, 1981. Three calendar days later, an ex parte proceeding was held by the county court to determine probable cause for his arrest. Bond was set, and the defendant was ordered to “be held to answer for the charges.” May was bound over to circuit court because the county court did not have jurisdiction over the offenses. The next day, appellant was served with an arrest warrant at the county’jail. On September 30th, the circuit court scheduled an arraignment for October 5th, which is the first time May appeared before a judge. At this arraignment, May appeared pro se. Appellant was informed that his attorney must enter an appearance within twenty days, a plea of not guilty was entered on his behalf, the trial date was scheduled, discovery procedures were delineated, and he was remanded to the custody of the sheriff. On November 2nd, a preliminary hearing for the appearance of defense counsel was scheduled for seven calendar days later. At the preliminary hearing, May moved for the appointment of counsel and the court appointed counsel, who entered his appearance that same day. At the hearing on the motion to correct errors, May testified that prior to the appointment on November 9th he was represented by counsel only at the line-up held after his arrest.
May claims that the delay in bringing him before a magistrate prolonged the appointment of counsel and was prejudicial because it impacted his ability to preserve evidence and secure a witness. He maintains that during the week of his arrest he could have subpoenaed a witness in South Bend, Indiana, who subsequently moved to Colorado, address unknown.
The warrantless arrestee must be “taken promptly before a judicial officer” for an initial hearing.1 The statute does not state the period of time which can elapse between the arrest and the initial hearing for a warrantless arrestee who remains in jail.2 Several purposes which attach to the requirement of a prompt initial hearing serve as guidelines for a proper time frame: to *105advise the arrestee of the charges against him and of his constitutional rights, to provide an arrestee with an attorney if he is without funds to hire one, and to determine whether there is sufficient evidence that the crime charged has been committed and that the accused committed it. Nacoff v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 97, 267 N.E.2d 165. One reason for informing the accused of the crime charged is to enable the accused to prepare a defense. McGee v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 537.
These purposes are not achieved when a warrantless arrestee remains in jail and does not appear before a judge until one week after his arrest. That such a delay defeats these purposes is particularly apparent when counsel is not appointed until six weeks after the arrest.
Preparation of a defense may have been impeded in this case. However, appellant has the burden to show that the delay between his arrest and the initial hearing was both prejudicial and unreasonable. Cf., Gee v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 28, 389 N.E.2d 303; Owens v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 487, 333 N.E.2d 745. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, May testified that within the week of his arrest he could have subpoenaed a witness from Indiana, but that this witness had subsequently moved to another state. He did not make an adequate offer of proof concerning the witness’ testimony and how it would have assisted his defense. Accordingly, I concur in the decision to affirm the conviction.
DeBRULER and DICKSON, JJ., concur.

. "Prompt,” in the context of a "prompt judicial hearing" for an administrative suspension of a driver’s license, "denotes readiness without delay or unreasonable hesitation.” Huge v. Kovach (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 673, 679.

. The statute does require an initial hearing, for a warrantless arrestee who has been released on bail or an arrestee under warrant released according to the warrant, to be held within twenty calendar days or twenty days, respectively, of the arrest. Ind. Code §§ 35-33-7-1; 35-33-7-4. The released person is thus able to assist in the preparation of a defense and the accumulation of evidence. Presumably, an initial hearing should be held earlier when the person remains in jail.