Court Opinion

ID: 9759191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:08:27.473179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.143360
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In this case the requested instruction placed before the court the defensive theory that, viewed from appellant's standpoint, her belief was reasonable that her actions were immediately necessary to prevent the imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault.
When properly requested the trial court must instruct the jury on every defensive theory raised by the evidence, and it makes no difference whether such defensive evidence might be strong, weak, unimpeached, or contradicted. Smith v. State, 676 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).
TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 (Vernon Supp.1986) provides:
*247A person is justified in using deadly force against another:
(1) if he would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31 of this code;
(2) if a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would not have retreated; and
(3) when and to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary (emphasis added):
(A) to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or
(B) to prevent the other’s imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery.
The words “immediately necessary” relate to and modify the subjective belief of the defendant. In the present case appellant must reasonably believe the deadly force was immediately necessary to protect herself against the other’s imminent commission of the offense.
Had the application of the law to the facts omitted the words “immediately necessary” in relation to (A), supra, (to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force), it is clearer that reversible error would result. Since this provision instructs the jury to find whether the defendant’s subjective belief, that his use of deadly force is immediately necessary is reasonable from the defendant’s standpoint, the refusal to submit the instruction cannot benefit the defendant. Rather, it causes the jury to look at the circumstances in an objective manner and determine whether any prudent person would have so acted. Texas applies the subjective test when the evidence raises the issue of justification. Section 9.32(3), supra. See, e.g., Semaire v. State, 612 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
Appellant in the present case correctly requested that the jury consider the situation from her standpoint, that is, whether or not she reasonably apprehended imminent danger. The jury should have determined whether or not hers was a reasonable belief that her use of deadly force against the other was immediately necessary to prevent the other’s imminent commission of the offense.
The jury charge applying the law to the facts should have encompassed the subjective test required by subsection (3) of section 9.32. The failure to apply this law is reversible error. This is the basis of my dissent.