Court Opinion

ID: 9755556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:42:48.799393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:09.110218
License: Public Domain

MORRIS, Justice,
concurring.
The foremost precept in Texas for statutory construction is the plain meaning doctrine. At the root of the plain meaning doctrine is the tenet that the legislature chooses its words carefully and means what it says. Accordingly, when construing a statute, we begin with an examination of its exact wording. When the statute’s language, in the context of the entire act in which it is contained, logically lends itself to a single, unambiguous meaning, that meaning is applied so long as it comports with common sense and justice.
*116In discussing the meaning of section 21.211 of the Texas Labor Code,1 the majority concludes that the phrase “of this state” modifies only the words “political subdivision.” The majority goes on to conclude that, given this construction, the statute cannot be applied in this case because to do so would lead to an absurd result. Although I agree section 21.211 is not applicable here, I do so because of the statute’s plain meaning and not because of the conclusion reached by the majority.
The prohibition against filing a complaint set forth in section 21.211 applies to a person who is already the complainant in either of two types of actions: an action in a court of competent jurisdiction or an action pending before an administrative agency. The statute, which is entitled “Election of Remedies,” targets only persons who are pursuing forms of redress other than an unlawful employment practice claim and, therefore, is limited to those who are pursuing actions under “other law or an order or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state.” See Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tex.1991). Although the legislature placed the phrase “of this state” after the words “order or ordinance of a political subdivision,” nothing in the statute suggests that orders and ordinances should be treated differently than laws. It is a longstanding principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given a related meaning. See Riverside Nat’l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174 n. 2 (Tex.1980). Pursuant to the language of the statute, therefore, an action pending before an administrative agency would have to be brought under other law of this state or under an order or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state before section 21.211 would apply.
Applying the “doctrine of the last antecedent,” an aid to construction invoked by the majority, yields the same result. By virtue of the doctrine of the last antecedent, a qualifying phrase is confined to the words and phrases immediately preceding it to which it may be applied without impairing the meaning of the sentence. Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 9 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex.App.—Dallas), aff'd, 34 S.W.3d 578 (Tex.2000). Here, the two phrases “other law” and “order or ordinance of a political subdivision” precede the qualifying phrase “of this state.” The phrase “of this state” may be applied to both “other law” and “order or ordinance of a political subdivision” without impairing the meaning of the sentence. Indeed, applying the qualifying phrase “of this state” to the phrase “other law” aligns the meaning of the sentence with the purposes of the Act.
Among the stated purposes of the Act is to provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.001 (Vernon 1996). To effectuate this goal, the Act provides for the referral of complaints from the federal government to the Texas Commission on Human Rights for investigation. See id. § 21.204. A complaint referred by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to the TCHR is *117considered filed with the TCHR when the TCHR receives it. Price v. Phila. Am. Life Ins., 934 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). The referral by the EEOC is the equivalent of a “filing” by the complainant with the TCHR. See id. at 773-74. Section 21.211 prohibits, however, the filing of a complaint with the TCHR if the complainant already has an action pending before an administrative agency. If section 21.211 were read to prohibit a person from filing a complaint with the TCHR after first filing a complaint with the EEOC, section 21.211 would be violated every time the EEOC referred a complaint to the TCHR. Section 21.211 would, therefore, conflict with section 21.204, which expressly permits such referrals. Reading the phrase “of this state” to qualify the phrase “other law” avoids this conflict and accomplishes the purpose of the Act as intended by the legislature.
Applying the plain meaning of section 21.211, I conclude that Carmen Williams’s pending charge with the EEOC does not prevent her from pursuing a harassment claim against NGV in state court. Therefore, I concur in the majority’s conclusion, although not necessarily in its analysis, that section 21.211 does not preclude Williams’s suit. I join the majority in the disposition of the other issues presented.

. Section 21.211 states:
A person who has initiated an action in a court of competent jurisdiction or who has an action pending before an administrative agency under other law or an order or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state based on an act that would be an unlawful employment practice under this chapter may not file a complaint under this subchapter for the same grievance.
Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.211 (Vernon 1996).