Court Opinion

ID: 9758445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:31:10.803236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:51.761925
License: Public Domain

GLASSMAN, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join part A of the majority opinion, which holds that the record rationally supports the finding of the suppression justice that Durepo’s statement to Officer Paul was voluntary. Believing, however, that the Harris-Havens rule works a fundamental deprivation of rights guaranteed by article VI of the Maine Constitution, I cannot join in part B. I would hold as a matter of state constitutional law that statements suppressed as a result of a Miranda violation may not be used at trial to impeach a defendant’s credibility.
Article I, section 6 of the Maine Declaration of Rights provides in part, “In all criminal proceedings, the accused ... shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself .. .. ” Me. Const. art. I, § 6. Compare U.S. Const. amend. 5 (no person shall be compelled to be witness against himself). We have recognized that article I, section 6 is similar in nature and purpose to the federal privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore, that precedent with respect to construction of one may serve as precedent for construction of the other. State v. Vickers, 309 A.2d 324, 326 (Me.1973); Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 395, 82 A.2d 773, 780 (1951). This principle, however, is not an absolute. In State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120 (Me.1982), we observed that federal decisions do not furnish a complete statement of controlling law, but rather “delineate a constitutional minimum or universal mandate for the federal control of every state.”1 Id. at *9251122. Therefore, we stated that the maximum statement of the substantive content of the privilege against self-incrimination must be decided as a matter of Maine constitutional law. Id. Accordingly, we reaffirmed our decision in State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me.1972), in which we held that the Maine Constitution requires as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a confession that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt the confession was voluntary, even though the United States Constitution requires only that voluntariness be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Compare Collins, 297 A.2d at 625-27 with Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 626, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) (prosecution must show voluntariness of confession by preponderance of evidence). A departure from the federal Harris-Havens rule is similarly warranted in the instant case.
Although I do not disagree with the majority’s assertion that the use of trustworthy suppressed evidence for the purpose of impeachment facilitates the search for truth, see ante p. 923, our system of government, to preserve the rights of all persons accused of crime, maintains a number of countervailing values which in some instances mandate that all evidence potentially available to the state against an accused not be used. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). Because the detriments of the Harris-Havens rule clearly outweigh the benefits, I would uphold the rights of those accused of crime to have evidence obtained against them in violation of Miranda excluded from trial for all purposes. I now turn to a review of the criticisms of the Harris-Havens rule.
The constitutional argument against the use of Miranda -violative statements to impeach one accused of a crime was outlined by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Harris. Justice Brennan, writing for three of the four dissenters,2 argued that the privilege against self-incrimination is satisfied only when an accused is guaranteed the absolute right to remain silent, “ ‘unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ ” Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230, 91 S.Ct. 643, 647, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964)) (emphasis in Harris). The choice to testify is an exercise of the constitutional privilege, and therefore, must be “unfettered.” When threatened by the use of an illegally obtained statement to impeach, the choice is no longer wholly free.3 Id.; see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1232, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (prosecutorial comment on accused’s failure to take stand or court instruction that such failure is evidence of guilt impermissibly “fetters” choice whether to testify in own behalf). Therefore, Justice Brennan argued, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is secure only when illegally obtained evidence is excluded from trial for all purposes.
The second major criticism of the impeachment exception to the exclusionary *926rule focuses on the rationale underlying the rule itself. Having its origins in both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the exclusionary rule was designed to serve two important societal interests. First, the rule was deemed necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial system. If the courts allowed the use at trial of illegally obtained evidence, they would, in effect, acquiesce in the illegality, and thus become an “accomplice in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold.” Elkins v. United States, 346 U.S. 206, 223, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Second, if illegally obtained evidence was admitted at trial, the police would have little incentive to conform their conduct to the requirements of law. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-47, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3028, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484-86, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3047-3048, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). The latter rationale has emerged as the primary justification for the exclusionary rule. Janis, 428 U.S. at 436, 96 S.Ct. at 3023; United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2316, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975).4
Critics of Harris and its progeny argue that the impeachment exception jeopardizes the underlying rationale of the exclusionary rule. The Harris dissenters observed, “it is monstrous that courts should aid or abet the law-breaking police officer.” Harris, 401 U.S. at 232. Quoting Justice Clark in Mapp v. Ohio, the dissenters wrote, “ ‘[N]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.’ ” Harris, 401 U.S. at 232, 91 S.Ct. at 649 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1693, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). Equally important, courts and commentators have argued that the Harris-Havens rule actually encourages police officers to disregard a suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent. E.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 725, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1222, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 Yale L.J. 1198, 1219-21 (1971); 85 Harv.L.Rev. 44, 52 (1971). These critics have depicted the following scenario: An individual, suspected of a serious crime, is arrested and given his Miranda warnings. Although the suspect communicates his desire not to answer questions until he has spoken with counsel, the police, aware that any minimally competent counsel will advise the suspect to remain silent,5 interrogate the suspect in knowing violation of Miranda. The police simply have nothing to lose, and much to gain. Any inculpatory statement made, although obtained illegally, may be used to impeach the suspect if he chooses to testify at trial. Hass, 420 U.S. at 725, 95 S.Ct. at 1222; State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 123 n. 2, 358 A.2d 163, 176 n. 2 (1976) (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting); Dershowitz and Ely, supra, at 1219-21.
Third, critics of the Harris-Havens impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule argue that a jury is unable to distinguish properly between the use of suppressed evidence for impeachment purposes and its use as substantive proof of guilt. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal.3d 101, 112, 127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 367, 545 P.2d 272, 279 (1976); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.6, at 708-09 (1978 & Supp.1983); Dershowitz and Ely, supra, at 1216; Note, United States v. Havens, Impeachment by Illegally Obtained Evidence, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 *927L.Ed.2d 559, 32 Syracuse L.Rev. 637, 673 (1981). These critics note that empirical studies have concluded that limiting instructions do not sufficiently negate the danger that a jury might consider illegally obtained evidence as part of the state’s case-in-chief. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 127-28, 177-80 (1966); Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School, 24 Ins. Counsel J. 368, 371 (1957). The Supreme Court has itself acknowledged the inability of a jury to disregard highly inculpatory evidence even when instructed to so do. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Court observed, “There are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. at 1627; see also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 382-83 and n. 10, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1783-1784 and n. 10, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).
Finally, commentators argue that the dangers posed by the Harris rule, i.e., illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach an accused’s direct testimony, are greatly exacerbated by the Havens rule, i.e., tainted evidence may be used to impeach statements elicited for the first time during cross-examination. LaFave, supra, § 11.6(a) at 703-05; Note, The Exclusionary Rule: Impeachment Exception Broadened to Include Statement Elicited Upon Cross-Examination—United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559, 30 DePaul L.Rev. 225, 238-40 (1980); Case Note, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence—The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule, People v. Taylor—8 Cal.3d 174, 501 P.2d 918, 104 Cal.Rptr. 350 (1972), 34 Ohio St.L.J. 706 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Erosion of Exclusionary Rule]. The choice to take the stand in one’s own defense is more “fettered” under Havens than under Harris. Under Harris, defense counsel could carefully control the areas of questioning to guard against eliciting responses at odds with suppressed evidence. Havens allows a prosecutor to design questions for the sole purpose of laying a foundation for the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. If the defendant testifies and, even in a general manner, denies the accusation against him, he faces the almost sure introduction of illegally obtained evidence. As a result, the defendant is further discouraged from taking the stand in his own defense.
Moreover, allowing the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach statements made for the first time during cross-examination further undermines the exclusionary rule. The integrity of the judiciary is called into question in a system which sanctions the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, requiring as the sole prerequisite that the prosecution, bringing all its expertise and power to bear, elicit testimony inconsistent with a previously suppressed statement. Additionally, under Havens, the police have a further incentive to disregard a suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent, given the ease with which illegally obtained evidence may subsequently be used at trial. See Erosion of Exclusionary Rule, supra, at 704-05, 100 S.Ct. at 1959-1960.
Having reviewed the arguments for and against allowing the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach one charged with a crime, I would reject the Harris-Havens rule as a matter of the Maine Constitution. Although the search for truth in a criminal trial is the worthiest of goals, and although I abhor the thought that a defendant in a criminal case might use Miranda as a shield to insulate himself from the exposure of perjured testimony, I cannot subscribe to a rule which significantly discourages one from testifying in one’s own defense, calls into question the integrity of the judicial system, encourages the police, in the custodial interrogation context, to violate deliberately the invocation of the right to remain silent, and creates the very real danger that a jury will consider unconstitutionally obtained evidence as substantive proof of guilt. I find intoler*928able this fundamental erosion of constitutional rights. Accordingly, I would join the courts of California, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania, and reject Harris and Havens as a matter of state constitutional law. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal.3d 101, 127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272 (1976); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975).
The instant case is illustrative of the dangers posed by the Harris-Havens rule. In Harris, the Supreme Court termed the notion that impermissible police conduct would be encouraged by its decision a “speculative possibility.” Harris, 401 U.S. at 225, 91 S.Ct. at 645. The conduct of the police in the instant ease tends to show the opposite to be true. After having made several incriminating responses to Officer Paul’s questions, Durepo stated he no longer wished to talk. Rather than respecting this invocation of the right to remain silent, Officer Paul stated:
Tom, look at me. Don’t change what you were saying. Ya know you’re in trouble. But why stop now? You’ve already gone over the edge. I told you I could help you. I’m just trying to get the whole story.
The interrogation then continued. Subsequently, Durepo again stated he no longer wished to talk. Officer Paul similarly ignored this request, imploring the defendant for “five more minutes” of talk.
The majority, by sanctioning the use of the statements Durepo made after his invocation of the right to remain silent, in effect, acquiesce in a deliberate violation of his constitutional rights and encourage law enforcement officials to disregard the mandates of law to increase the chance of obtaining a conviction. I would vacate the judgment of conviction and remand to the Superior Court.

. We are free, of course, to accord an accused in a criminal proceeding greater protections *925under the Maine Constitution than those offered by the United States Constitution. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 389 passim (1977) (discussing state court activism in the area of protection of individual rights).

. Justice Black dissented without opinion.

. Additionally, Justice Brennan argued that the issue before the Court in Harris had been settled in Miranda, where the Court stated:
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner .... [Statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial .... These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.
Harris, 401 U.S. 222, 230-31, 91 S.Ct. 643 (1971) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628-1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) (emphasis in Harris).

. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has refused to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution when exclusion would not have a deterrent effect. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1975) (grand jury proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (federal habeas corpus proceedings).

. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59, 69 S.Ct. 1357, 1358, 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances”).