Court Opinion

ID: 9559354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:27:23.24602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:46.759666
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent. While I agree that the majority correctly analyzes the first prong of the competency standard as to Woodland’s present understanding of the proceedings against him, I do not believe that the majority correctly analyzes the second prong, relating to Woodland’s ability to assist or consult with counsel.
First, the majority explicitly assumes that “subsection (2) [of section 77-15-2] was changed from ‘assist his counsel’ to the less demanding ‘consult with his counsel.’” In my view, the assertion that the amendment rendered the standard less demanding is not *672correct. The phrase stating that a defendant must be able to “consult with his counsel” is drawn directly from Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)(per curiam).1 Supreme Court cases subsequent to Dusky have indicated that there is no substantive distinction between the ability to “consult” with counsel and the ability to “assist” counsel. In fact, Supreme Court opinions have employed the terms “consult” and “assist” interchangeably and synonymously within the text of the same opinions. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392, 402, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2683, 2688, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (assist); id. at 396, 398, 113 S.Ct. at 2685, 2686 (consult); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 440, 450, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2574, 2579-80, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (assist); id. at 448, 112 S.Ct. at 2578-79 (consult); see also Vincent v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 1166, 105 S.Ct. 928, 83 L.Ed.2d 939 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (assist); id. at 1167, 105 S.Ct. at 929 (consult). Consequently, section 77-15-2 should not be construed as permitting a lesser standard for determinations of competence than the previous version of the statute.
Second, the majority assumes that Woodland’s bizarre version of the events occurring on the day of Bruce Larsen’s death does not affect Woodland’s present ability to stand trial. I disagree. Although Woodland appears to have achieved a relatively lucid mental state at present, he clearly was in a highly delusional state of mind for a significant period of time after the homicide. He was adjudged incompetent to stand trial on at least two separate occasions. Testimony at various competency hearings indicates that he was also delusional on the day of the killing. Notwithstanding Woodland’s apparent partial recovery, he has continued to assert a memory of events at trial that is derived directly from that delusional state.
Third, the testimony presented by the psychiatrists at the competency hearing provided only minimal support for the trial court’s ruling of competency.. One psychiatrist, Dr. Gardner, found Woodland competent; another, Dr. Heinbecker, found him incompetent; and the third, Dr. Hummel, offered an equivocal opinion. Dr. Hummel noted that he had a conflict of interest, and the trial court stated that it did not rely heavily upon his testimony. Hummel and Heinbecker both expressed serious reservations about Woodland’s ability, in light of the delusional view he possessed of the historical events relating to the crime, to assist or consult with counsel. Dr. Heinbecker found that Woodland’s inability to perceive the events surrounding the crime in a rational manner prevented him from consulting with counsel adequately. Although the State claims that Hummel’s ultimate conclusion was that Woodland was competent, that claim is taken out of context. Hummel in fact stated an opinion that is similar to Heinbeckerls in that Hummel felt Woodland’s competency depended upon the legal interpretation of the standard at issue. To the extent Woodland was unable to cooperate with his counsel by presenting a nonde-lusional version of the events surrounding the crime, Hummel expressed doubts about Woodland’s competency: “If ‘consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ includes defendant’s ability to communicate with his attorney, to aid in his defense, and to have a working relationship with his attorney, then I would question Mr. Woodland’s competence to stand trial.”
The majority asserts that a defendant’s unwise or improbable version of historical events does not constitute a reason for finding the defendant incompetent. I submit that this proposition oversimplifies the issue. It is true that defendants who are otherwise competent are clearly entitled to choose their trial strategy, no matter how absurd or unlikely it may be. It is unfortunately relatively common for criminal defendants to entertain paranoid and unrealistic views of the world, believing that the charges against them are the result of a conspiracy. Not*673withstanding an unrealistic view, they are generally entitled to pursue their perspective as to what happened and to hope that the jury will find them more credible than the witnesses against them.
That choice, however, is far removed from an inability to confront reality that arises out of a severe mental pathology. I believe that such a scenario as is presented in this case undermines the finding of competence. A defendant who was delusional at the time of a crime and whose perspective at the time of trial continues to be distorted by those delusional beliefs cannot rationally consult with counsel about the key issues of the trial.

. Dusky offered no citation or rationale for the proffered language. Indeed, the Dusky “standard” appears to merely have been drawn verbatim from the government's brief in that case and was neither explicitly approved nor disapproved by the Supreme Court. Later cases, however, have ignored this critical fact and have repeatedly cited the Dusky language as the binding standard.