Court Opinion

ID: 9408242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 23:03:28.824681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:32.962249
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/11/23 P. v. Smith CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115   .

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B324042

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. GA103520)
           v.

 JARED DEAN SMITH,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Teri Schwartz, Judge. Affirmed.
      David R. Evans, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        INTRODUCTION

       Jared Dean Smith appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his motion for reconsideration of the court’s order
denying his request for misdemeanor diversion. Smith, when he
was 18 years old, had a sexual relationship with a 14-year-old
classmate. The People charged him with three felonies, one of
which was a “wobbler,” a crime punishable as a felony or a
misdemeanor. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Smith
pleaded no contest to the wobbler as a misdemeanor, and the trial
court dismissed the other two counts.
       After the trial court convicted Smith on his plea, Smith
filed a motion requesting diversion under Penal Code
section 1001.95,1 which authorizes the court to offer diversion to
defendants who are being prosecuted for a misdemeanor. The
trial court denied Smith’s request and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
       Smith appeals, arguing the trial court erred in ruling it did
not have discretion to offer diversion after he was convicted on
his plea. Smith contends he was eligible for diversion under
section 1001.95 after he pleaded no contest because he requested
diversion before sentencing. The People argue that a defendant
is eligible for diversion under section 1001.95 only before trial
and that Smith is ineligible because he did not request diversion
until after he had been convicted. We affirm.

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     The People Charge Smith with Three Felonies, and
             Smith Pleads No Contest to a Misdemeanor
      The People charged Smith in a felony complaint with
participating in an act of oral copulation with another person
under 18 years of age, in violation of section 287,
subdivision (b)(1) (count 1, a wobbler);2 participating in an act of
sodomy with another person under 18 years of age, in violation of
section 286, subdivision (b)(1) (count 2); and advertising for sale
or distribution obscene matter knowing it depicts a person under
the age of 18 years personally engaging in or personally
simulating sexual conduct, in violation of section 311.10,
subdivision (a) (count 3). In January 2020, pursuant to a plea
agreement, Smith pleaded no contest to count 1 as a
misdemeanor. At Smith’s request, the trial court postponed
sentencing several times, initially to January 2021 and
ultimately to May 2021, to allow section 290, subdivision (c)(2),

2      “Wobblers” are crimes that “are chargeable or, in the
discretion of the court, punishable as either a felony or a
misdemeanor; that is, they are punishable either by a term in
state prison or by imprisonment in county jail and/or by a fine.”
(People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 789; see § 287, subd. (b)(1)
[“any person who participates in an act of oral copulation with
another person who is under 18 years of age shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail for a period
of not more than one year”].)

                                 3
which would make the requirement Smith register as a sex
offender discretionary, to become effective.3

       B.    The Trial Court Denies Smith’s Request for Diversion
       Section 1001.95 also became effective on January 1, 2021.
It authorizes the trial court to offer diversion to defendants
charged with misdemeanors, even over the objection of the
prosecutor.
       On May 3, 2021, the day before the sentencing hearing,
Smith filed a motion for an order granting diversion under
section 1001.95. The court denied Smith’s motion “without
prejudice, subject to reconsideration upon legal authority.” The
court also ruled that, “in light of [Smith’s] age, lack of criminal
history and due to multiple evaluations from mental health
professionals who have assessed [Smith] and found he is not a
risk for re-offending,” Smith would not have to register as a sex
offender. The trial court sentenced Smith to summary probation
for one year, imposed various fines and fees, and dismissed the
remaining two counts.
       In December 2021 Smith filed the motion for
reconsideration contemplated by the trial court in its order

3     Section 290, subdivision (c)(2), provides in relevant part:
“A person convicted of a violation of subdivision (b) of
Section 286, subdivision (b) of Section 287, or subdivision (h) or (i)
of Section 289 shall not be required to register if, at the time of
the offense, the person is not more than 10 years older than the
minor, as measured from the minor’s date of birth to the person’s
date of birth, and the conviction is the only one requiring the
person to register.” Because Smith was convicted of violating
section 287, subdivision (b), the new law applied to him once it
became effective on January 1, 2021.

                                  4
denying Smith’s motion for diversion without prejudice. The
court denied the motion. The court stated granting diversion
would be “beyond what was contemplated by the statute and
tremendously unfair to the People” after they had agreed to
reduce the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor and Smith had
agreed to plead no contest pursuant to the plea agreement. The
court also stated that, because the People had initially charged
Smith with felonies, “there was no opportunity for a pre-plea
judicial diversion” and that “it would be an abuse of whatever
discretion” for the court to offer diversion. The court also
expressed concern that granting diversion would require the
court to vacate Smith’s conviction, which Smith had not asked
the court to do. Smith timely appealed from the order denying
his motion for reconsideration.

                          DISCUSSION

       Effective January 1, 2021 section 1001.95 “gives judges
discretion to offer diversion to misdemeanor defendants.” (Islas
v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1104, 1107.) Section 1001.95, subdivision (a), states that “a judge
in the superior court in which a misdemeanor is being
prosecuted, may, at the judge’s discretion, and over the objection
of a prosecuting attorney, offer diversion to a defendant pursuant
to these provisions.”
       Smith argues he was eligible for diversion under
section 1001.95, even though he did not ask for diversion until
after he was convicted on his plea, because the statute does not
limit the trial court’s discretion to offer diversion to proceedings
before trial. Smith also argues that, even if section 1001.95

                                 5
requires the defendant to request misdemeanor diversion before
trial, he was still eligible for diversion because, even though he
had been convicted, he had not yet been sentenced and thus his
case was not final. The People argue that section 1001.95
authorizes only pretrial diversion and that, in any event, Smith
“was not ‘being prosecuted’ because he had already admitted his
guilt through his no contest plea, and was merely awaiting
sentencing for an agreed-upon sentence by the court.”
       Whether Smith was eligible for diversion under
section 1001.95 after pleading no contest is not entirely clear.
Section 1001.95, subdivision (a), states that a judge may grant
diversion for defendants who are “being prosecuted for a
misdemeanor.” As the People correctly point out, after Smith
pleaded no contest and the court convicted him on his plea, he
was no longer being prosecuted for anything, let alone for a
misdemeanor. In fact, Smith was never prosecuted for a
misdemeanor; he was prosecuted for three felonies, two of which
were dismissed and one of which was reduced to a misdemeanor
when he pleaded no contest and the prosecution was over.
       Moreover, although no California case has directly
addressed whether a defendant can request misdemeanor
diversion under section 1001.95 after pleading guilty or no
contest, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Braden
(June 5, 2023, S268925) ___ Cal.5th ___ [2023 WL 3807557],
which involved mental health diversion under section 1001.36,
casts doubt on the merits of Smith’s position. In Braden the
Supreme Court held a defendant must request mental health
diversion under section 1001.36 before jeopardy attaches or the
court enters a plea of guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs
first. (Braden, at p. ___ [p. 16].) Although the language of the

                                 6
two diversion statutes is different (section 1001.36, unlike section
1001.95, refers to “pretrial diversion”), there are some
similarities. For example, section 1001.95, like section 1001.36,
lacks language indicating diversion is available “‘during the
pendency of an action and prior to judgment’”; “makes no mention
of a diversion grant following ‘conviction,’ which would be the
more logical terminology if diversion were also permitted after
conviction by trial or plea”; “contemplates that the defendant is
facing ‘charges’ [“is being prosecuted,” in the language of section
1001.95] ‘at the time’ diversion is granted”; and “gives the court
no authority to set aside a plea or trial verdict, which would be
required if diversion were granted after ‘adjudication’ of guilt by
trial or plea.” (Braden, at p. ___ [pp. 5-6]; see People v. Superior
Court of Riverside County (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 851, 857 [section
1001.95 “authorizes superior court judges to offer pretrial
diversion, over the prosecution’s objection, to persons being
prosecuted for ‘a misdemeanor’”].)
       We need not decide this issue or resolve the effect of the
Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Braden on the timing of
requests for misdemeanor diversion under section 1001.95. Here,
the trial court clearly stated that, even if it had discretion to offer
Smith post-conviction diversion under section 1001.95, the court
would not exercise that discretion to grant Smith’s request.
       Where the trial court states that, even if it had discretion,
it would not have exercised it, there is no need to remand the
case for the trial court to exercise that discretion. (See People v.
Cervantes (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 326, 331 [where there has been
“a change in either statutory or decisional law that grants
authority to trial courts to strike or dismiss a sentencing
enhancement where none existed prior to the effective date of

                                  7
such change,” “remand is necessary only where the record is
unclear whether the trial court would not use the discretion to
sentence the defendant differently”]; People v. Jones (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 267, 273 [remand was not required where the
trial court clearly stated it would not have stricken the
defendant’s firearm enhancement even if the court had the
discretion to do so].) Remand is unnecessary, however, only
where the trial court “clearly indicated” it would not have
exercised its discretion. (People v. Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th
883, 892; see People v. Billingsley (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1076,
1081.) In making this assessment, the reviewing court considers
the trial court’s statements and sentencing decisions to
determine whether the court gave a clear, unequivocal indication
it would not have exercised its discretion. (See People v. McVey
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 405, 419 [trial court’s statements at
sentencing clearly indicated that, even if it had the discretion to
strike a firearm enhancement, the court would not have done
so].)
       Here, the trial court clearly stated, as an alternative ruling,
it would not have granted Smith’s request for diversion even if it
had the discretion under the new statute to do so. The trial court
stated that offering Smith misdemeanor diversion would be
“tremendously unfair to the People” and inappropriate in a
“serious felony case” where the defendant bargained for a
misdemeanor pursuant to a plea agreement. The court stated
that, while it “may have some authority to do something here,”
the court was “not willing to do it,” and that the court did not
“think the interest of justice would be served” by offering Smith
diversion. Thus, it is clear from the record the trial court would

                                  8
not have offered Smith diversion, even if the court believed it had
the discretion to do so.
       Smith does not challenge the trial court’s reasons for
declining to exercise any discretion it had to offer misdemeanor
diversion. Smith asserts only that the trial court did not make
such an alternative ruling and that the trial court’s statements
were “little more than acquiescence to the People’s displeasure
with the new law.” But the trial made that ruling. As discussed,
the trial court stated an alternative ground for denying Smith’s
request for diversion: “While I may have some authority to do
something here, I am not willing to do it.” The trial court gave
several reasons for denying Smith’s request for diversion on the
merits, including that diversion would not be in the interests of
justice, would be unfair to the People, and would undermine the
good-faith negotiations of the parties. Nothing in the record
suggests the trial court was agreeing with or acquiescing to any
displeasure on the part of the People with the new law. Rather,
the trial court found offering Smith diversion under section
1001.95 was inappropriate and unjust under the circumstances of
the case. There would be no point in requiring the trial court to
make these findings again. (See People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th
371, 432 [remand is not appropriate where the record shows
“‘with unusual clarity that remand would be an idle act”’]; People
v. Torres (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 76, 80 [remand is not appropriate
where the trial court “has indicated it would reach the same
sentencing decision”]; People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
420, 425 [“if ‘“the record shows that the trial court would not
have exercised its discretion even if it believed it could do so, then
remand would be an idle act and is not required”’”].)

                                  9
                         DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed.

                                   SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             FEUER, J.

                              10