Court Opinion

ID: 9750634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:14:11.55944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:14.984294
License: Public Domain

DUFRESNE, Justice
(dissenting in part).
The factual setting for the accident in which the plaintiff wife received her injuries need not be restated. Let us however retouch the painted scene so that certain significant existing physical conditions may show, which do not appear in the running account of the majority opinion. The automobile in which the plaintiff wife was riding made a right side exit into the low-level waters of the Little Androscoggin River from “an old wooden bridge sufficient in width to accommodate an automobile.” Said bridge was further described by a state police officer as having a top longitudinal plank flooring 10 feet wide, with, in addition thereto, on either side, an overlapping sub-planking extending another 2 feet to the “pretty weak” side railing. The officer testified that in dead center, between the dual sections of longitudinal planking, there was an open space of uncertain size, from which the traveler could peek through to the distant stream. Thus, the bridge had an over-all width of 14 feet 3 inches, while its length was stated to be 25 feet, maybe 30.
*410The defendant, Mrs. Curtis, 67 years of age and in possession of a learner’s permit, was driving her husband’s automobile while the plaintiff, Mrs. Corbett, 54 years old, was riding beside her as the licensed operator required under 29 M.R.S.A. § 537, and it is undisputed that the purpose of the trip was to permit the defendant to receive more practical experience in turning and backing the car preparatory to taking out her license for driving.
Initially, let us say that the majority characterizes the course of the travel of the car as a sudden veering off the bridge. In no less than 5 times it so describes the happening of the accident. But no witness has so particularized the occurrence. A close reading of the record disputes such a conclusion, and rather supports the inference that this “barely crawling” automobile traveled the ten to fifteen feet distance to the point where it crashed against the railing of the bridge in .a straight line that constantly swerved to the right. Such is the more reasonable interpretation of the evidence within the pre-accident factual •circumstances. Mrs. Corbett admitted that immediately prior to entering the bridge proper, she had to assist Mrs. Curtis in correcting her right turn which she was making too wide. She did this by taking the wheel, explaining that “we need to go a little more to the right.” She had hold of the wheel “long enough to get me headed straight, so I could enter the bridge on a •straight line.” Although both parties do aver that the defendant was operating the ■car on the bridge for that distance of 10 to 15 feet up to the crash against the side railing and that during that time Mrs. Cor-bett did not touch the wheel, the only reasonable deduction from the evidence is that the positioning of the car, immediately pri- or to its entry upon the bridge, with the ■physical assistance of Mrs. Corbett, was such that it was not located in exact center but displayed a position angling towards the right, which Mrs. Curtis carried forward by steering the automobile straight ■against the side of the bridge. The only other explanation would be that Mrs. Curtis could not during that short distance of 10 to 15 feet drive in a straight line without swerving somewhat to the right on this very narrow bridge. Such explanation appears reasonable if one considers that Mrs. Curtis’ driving inexperience, to the knowledge of Mrs. Corbett, had to do with keeping the automobile on the road. On a previous trip when Mrs. Curtis was practicing her driving with Mrs. Corbett, the latter described an incident as follows:
“Q. That trip was there anything eventful occurred?
A. Just once; heading up the hill I thought we were going to get [it] — we was a little too far on the right-hand side, and I just took hold of the wheel. And I says, ‘Olive, turn into the road a little more. You’re a little too far out.’ And we straightened out the machine.”
The majority says that the plaintiff must first prove the negligence of the defendant and it is apparent that it can only be done through the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We admit that the plaintiff had the burden of proving her case by proof of negligence of the defendant which proximately caused the accident and plaintiff’s injuries, but we do not agree that this could only be done through the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the instant trial. The evidence was sufficiently detailed for the jury to determine the cause of the accident without resort to the rule of res ipsa loquitur and the court’s instructions to the jury in relation thereto created an imbalance in favor of the plaintiff which aggrieved the defendant and was legal error.
The trial court’s instructions on res ipsa loquitur were as follows:
“If the jury finds that the motor vehicle in question was under the control or wholly within the control of this defendant and it left the highway or the traveled portion of the road unexplained, then that is evidence upon which this *411jury could make a finding of negligence on the part of this defendant. * * *. And if the evidence is such * * * and it is undisputed that this vehicle left the traveled portion of a road and went over the bridge and into the water * * * so unless you find, and it will be for you to say that it is explained or unexplained * * * if you find it is unexplained, and the vehicle was under the control of the defendant, and it left the road, then upon that basis the jury would be justified in finding that this defendant was guilty of negligence. That, as I say, will be your first responsibility. And, as I have indicated in general, there are no great conflicts, or there is no great conflict in the facts, in the factual situation. The parties are in substantial agreement as to what occurred on this particular day. And I don’t think that there is any conflict over the fact that this vehicle being operated by this defendant left the surface of the road and went outside the limits of the bridge and dropped down into the water below. It will be, however, for the jury to make the determination that the vehicle was solely within the control of this defendant at the time that it left the highway, and that the * * * that its reason for leaving the highway was unexplained.”
The court did not further instruct the jury as to what it meant when it referred to the reason for leaving the highway being unexplained; nor did it instruct the jury that it could apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur only after it had considered the plaintiff’s participation in the occurrence and had exonerated her of any contributory negligent conduct, especially in the discharge of her statutory duties imposed by 29 M.R.S.A. § 537.
This is not the case of the ordinary guest passenger who at no time is duty bound to take physical control of the operation of the vehicle. His duties at the most consist in warning the operator against apparent danger. In the absence of a duty to exercise control over the vehicle, the guest’s conduct whatever it may be is no obstacle to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and comes up for court or jury evaluation only as a matter of contributory negligence. Not so however in the instant case where the statute permits the licensed operator to enter the field of driver education; in undertaking to participate therein, the licensed operator is invested with the right of control and is charged with the duty to exercise control whenever necessary for safety. Indeed, this court, as pointed out by the majority, indicated in Blanchard v. City of Portland, 120 Me. 142, 113 A. 18, that the purpose of the statute which requires that the unlicensed operator who holds an instruction permit ride beside a licensed operator was to provide and maintain such supervision and assistance when necessary over the unlicensed operator as will make for the safe operation of the motor vehicle. Such construction of our statute imposes upon the licensed operator who undertakes to accompany the holder of a learner’s permit for the purpose of the latter’s learning about the use and handling of motor vehicles, as fully as if the statute itself had spelled it out, the duty to supervise the operation of the vehicle at all times and to render meaningful assistance when required for the safety of the operation to the extent of taking physical control thereof when necessary.
In Smith v. Tatum, 199 Va. 85, 97 S.E.2d 820 (1957), the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in a similar case, said:
“The doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] is inapplicable here because the defendant did not have exclusive control. The decedent was present in the automobile because the statute required the defendant to have a licensed driver on the front seat with her. This was obviously for the purpose that he give directions and exercise control if the occasion required.” [Emphasis supplied.]
We do recognize that the Virginia court’s pronouncement on the inapplicability of *412the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the facts of that case was not required for the ultimate decision therein as that court further stated that "if the doctrine applied it would not carry the plaintiff’s burden of proving gross negligence.” Even so, the court’s judicial treatment of the rule as applied to cases where simple negligence is involved meets with our approval.
The majority opinion puts upon the plaintiff the duty to prove that the defendant had “exclusive control” as an element of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; yet it seems to indicate an abandonment of that requirement for a rule that simply required the injury-causing instrumentality to be “under the management and control” of the defendant. Is the proffered preference for the simple management and control device at the time of the accident an express overruling in principle of our recent decision in J. & Jay, Inc. v. E. Perry Iron & Metal Co., Inc., 161 Me. 229, 210 A.2d 462, which carries the fresh imprimatur of this Court concerning the “exclusive control” test?
In J. & Jay, Inc., supra, we have indicated limitations in the application of the “exclusive control” test. The qualification of the rule was stated to be “that the jury properly could have excluded negligence of others than the defendant from the cause of the accident.” We agree, as stated in J. & Jay, Inc., that “[t]he plaintiff must eliminate the possibility of negligence on the part of others [including the injured party plaintiff] than the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.” If in the instant case the trial court had instructed the jury to that effect as a prerequisite to the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur, there would have been no error and the jury verdict could stand.
The use of the “exclusive control” or “management and control” test is merely to aid the courts in determining whether, under the general rule of res ipsa loquitur, it is more probable than not that the injury was the result of the defendant’s negligence: But the requirement of control, whether we call it exclusive control or management and control is not an absolute one. Although the doctrine will not ordinarily apply if it is equally probable that the negligence that caused the accident was that of someone other than the defendant, the plaintiff need not exclude all other persons who might possibly have been responsible where the defendant’s negligence, as in J. & Jay, Inc. supra, appears to be the more probable explanation. See, Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952). Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 402 P.2d 979 (1965).
In Parlow v. Dan Hamm Drayage Co., 391 S.W.2d 315 (Mo.1965) at page 321, the rule on exclusive control is stated as follows:
"In this connection the ‘exclusive control’ which is spoken of as an essential element of the res ipsa doctrine does not have the same connotation as the element of control which bears upon the master-servant relationship. The essential meaning of this requirement for res ipsa is that ‘the evidence must afford a rational basis for concluding that the cause of the accident was probably “such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with it.” That does not mean that the possibility of other causes must be altogether eliminated, but only that their likelihood must be so reduced that the greater probability lies at defendant’s door.’ 2 Harper and James on Torts, Sec. 19.7, p. 1086.”
Thus, a stool on which an injured plaintiff sat may have been in the temporary possession of the plaintiff who had temporary occupancy thereof, yet the stool itself with its base mechanism was not thereby withdrawn from the exclusive control of the defendant hotel which had the responsibility for the stool as a proper instrumentality for the normal use of sitting thereon. “True, the lag bolt would not have broken if no one had touched the chair, but since the evidence excluded the plaintiff as the responsible cause, it may be fairly said *413that there was an inference of negligence on the part of the defendants when the bolt broke as plaintiff attempted to rise from the stool.” Gow v. Multnomah Hotel, 191 Or. 45, 224 P.2d 552, 228 P.2d 791 (1950).
Our own court stated in Cratty v. Samuel Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, at page 132, 116 A.2d 623, that the rule of res ipsa loquitur did not apply where the accident was in part the fault of the plaintiff. See also, Moose-A-Bec Quarries Co. v. Eastern Tractor & Equipment Co., 139 Me. 249, 29 A.2d 167.
In the instant case, plaintiff’s possible breach of duty in her failure to exercise physical control over the steering of the car along the bridge as demanded by the statute, 29 M.R.S.A. § 537, may have been a contributing proximate cause of the accident and her injuries, at least equally as much so as defendant’s negligence in the operation of the automobile. The defendant would not be responsible for the injuries resulting to the plaintiff, if as a matter of fact, plaintiff was guilty of the violation of her duties under the statute and said violation was a contributing proximate cause of the accident. The defendant was entitled to clear-cut instructions as to the duty of the plaintiff under the statute and as to the plaintiff’s burden of eliminating her own contributory negligence proximately causing the accident before the jury could put the res ipsa loquitur doctrine into operation.
“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply where the facts shown are equally consistent with the hypothesis that the injury sued for was caused by negligence of either party or of both combined.” Nieman v. Jacobs, 87 Ariz. 44, 347 P.2d 702, 705 (1959).
“Where the evidence creates any doubt as to existence of the conditions for application of res ipsa loquitur, the decision is one of fact to be made by the jury, not one of law for the trial judge.” Houser v. Floyd, 220 Cal.App.2d 778, 34 Cal.Rptr. 96, 100, 94 A.L.R.2d 1423 (D.C. Third District, 1963).
The instructions to the jury in the instant case permitted recovery by the plaintiff on the mere application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Such an instruction without limitation on its application sanctioned a recovery based on conjecture and surmise. To eliminate the'conjectural aspect of the situation, the jury should have been instructed that before it could consider to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff had to establish as a fact by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff herself was not contributorily negligent in the discharge of the positive duties incumbent upon her under the statute.
See also, National Construction Company v. Holt, 137 Colo. 208, 322 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1958); Castille v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., (1957, La.Ct. of App. First Circuit) 92 So.2d 137; Lamb v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 180 Kan. 157, 300 P.2d 387, 393 (1956); Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co., 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 at 231 (1954).
We have no way of telling whether the jury reached its verdict on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and therefore, even though the jury might otherwise have resolved the factual question in dispute in favor of the plaintiff, if properly instructed as to the application of the doctrine or if the case had been submitted without the benefit of the doctrine, there was reversible error in permitting the jury to apply the rule without limitation or qualification. See, Johnson v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 194 Cal.App.2d 367, 15 Cal.Rptr. 17 at page 19 (D.C. of App., Third District 1961); Boulder Valley Coal Co. v. Jernberg, 118 Colo. 486, 197 P.2d 155 (1948); Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal et al., 341 Ill. 539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930).
The issues of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk were for the jury.
For the reasons stated, we would sustain the appeal.