Court Opinion

ID: 9690612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:26:37.922595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:03.462700
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Justice. Petitioners Ronald A. May, Susan E. May, and Gayle Bradford have filed an original action asking this court to declare the popular name and ballot title of Proposed Amendment 3 insufficient and to enjoin Respondent Arkansas Secretary of State Charlie Daniels from placing the measure on the ballot for the November 2, 2004 General Election. The proposed amendment is sponsored by Intervenors Jerry Cox and Chris Stewart, acting individually and on behalf of the Arkansas Marriage Amendment Committee. Our jurisdiction to determine this matter is pursuant to Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution and Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-5(a). We deny the petition. The text of Proposed Amendment 3 is as follows: SECTION 1: Marriage Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman. SECTION 2: Marital Status Legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas, except that the Legislature may recognize a common law marriage from another state between a man and a woman. SECTION 3: Capacity, rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities The Legislature has the power to determine the capacity of persons to marry, subject to this amendment, and the legal rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities of marriage. The initiative’s popular name is “AN AMENDMENT CONCERNING MARRIAGE.” Its ballot title, which mirrors the text of the initiative, is as follows: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION PROVIDING THAT MARRIAGE CONSISTS ONLY OF THE UNION OF ONE MAN AND ONE WOMAN; THAT LEGAL STATUS FOR UNMARRIED PERSONS1 WHICH IS IDENTICAL OR SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO MARITAL STATUS SHALL NOT BE VALID OR RECOGNIZED IN ARKANSAS, EXCEPT THAT THE LEGISLATURE MAY RECOGNIZE A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE FROM ANOTHER STATE BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN; AND THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE CAPACITY OF PERSONS TO MARRY, SUBJECT TO THIS AMENDMENT, AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES OF MARRIAGE. On March 12, 2004, the Attorney General issued an opinion approving the popular name and ballot title and concluding that they accurately and impartially summarize the provisions of the proposed amendment. That same date, Respondent also certified the sufficiency of the popular name and ballot title. Thereafter, Intervenors collected sufficient signatures to place the proposed amendment on the ballot. On July 22, Respondent announced that the signatures were sufficient and certified the proposed amendment to be placed on the ballot for the November 2 General Election. Petitioners filed this original action on August 26, and we heard oral argument on September 23. Petitioners note at the outset that they are not challenging the wisdom or folly of the proposed amendment, as they concede that such a challenge is not proper at this time. Rather, they challenge the sufficiency of the information supplied to the voters in the measure’s popular name and ballot title. They argue that the popular name is insufficient because it contains partisan language and misleads the voter into believing that the proposed amendment deals exclusively with marriage. As for the ballot title, Petitioners argue that it is vague and misleading and that it does not inform voters of the consequences of voting for the proposed amendment. I. Popular Name For their first point, Petitioners argue that the popular name, “An Amendment Concerning Marriage,” is misleading because it deceptively and inaccurately declares that the amendment only addresses marriage, while it actually has a broader effect. They contend that although the popular name adequately describes Section 1 of the proposed amendment, it ignores Sections 2 and 3. The standard for reviewing an initiative’s popular name is well settled. The popular name is primarily a useful legislative device that need not contain the same detailed information or include exceptions that might be required of a ballot title. Parker v. Priest, 326 Ark. 123, 930 S.W.2d 322 (1996). Its purpose is to identify the proposal for discussion prior to the election. Roberts v. Priest, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376 (2000); Arkansas Women’s Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984). The popular name is not held to the same stringent standards and need not be as explicit as a ballot title; however, it cannot contain catch phrases or slogans that tend to mislead or give partisan coloring to a proposal. Id. Thus, the popular name must be intelligible, honest, and impartial. Gaines v. McCuen, 296 Ark. 513, 758 S.W.2d 403 (1988). This court considers the popular name along with the ballot title in determining its sufficiency. Roberts, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376. Petitioners argue that the popular name, “An Amendment Concerning Marriage,” only describes Section 1 of the proposed amendment, which states that “Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman[.]” They argue that the popular name omits any information regarding the limitations that the amendment will impose on the rights of unmarried couples or single persons or of the impact that the amendment will have on the legal recognition of any future union or partnership. They also argue that the word “marriage” is an inviting catchword, and that its use in this popular name is misleading in that very few persons would vote against marriage, even though they may be in favor of other types of relationships. Petitioners rely heavily on the holding in Arkansas Women’s Political Caucus, 283 Ark. 463, 677 S.W.2d 846, wherein this court struck a proposed amendment from the ballot on the ground that its popular name, “The Unborn Child Amendment,” was misleading, contained partisan language, and omitted pertinent information. This court explained: More significantly, the enactment of the proposed amendment would do two things, equallyfar-reaching: it would immediately prohibit the use of public funds for abortion, including a female impregnated by rape or incest, unless the Hfe of the mother were in danger; and two, it would empower the General Assembly to prohibit abortion under any circumstances to the extent permitted under the Constitution of the United States. Yet, the popular name makes no reference whatsoever to this emotionally charged subject. Instead, the ballot name contains only the inviting catch words “unborn child,’’ which gives the voters only the impression the proponents of the amendment want them to have. Very few would vote against a child, born or unborn, even though they are for a woman’s right to have an abortion or for the state paying for it. The popular name is a clear-cut example of the partisan coloring of ballots which we have uniformly condemned in our decisions holding that a ballot name must be fair and impartial. Id. at 468, 677 S.W.2d at 849 (emphasis added).  Petitioners’ reliance on Arkansas Women’s Political Caucus, is misplaced. The popular name of Proposed Amendment 3, “An Amendment Concerning Marriage,” clearly and concisely identifies the measure to the voters. It is intelligible, honest, and impartial and does not contain inflammatory language, political catchwords, or partisan coloring. It merely alerts the voters to the subject on which they will be voting, without attempting to influence them one way or the other. Contrary to Petitioners’ urging, we do not believe that the term “marriage” evokes the same type of emotional reaction as the phrase “unborn child.”  Moreover, there is no merit to Petitioners’ suggestion that only Section 1 of the proposed amendment concerns the subject of marriage. Section 3 plainly concerns marriage by providing that the legislature has the power to determine the capacity of persons to marry and the rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities of marriage. Even Section 2 concerns marriage in that it prohibits recognition of marital status for unmarried persons, except that the legislature may recognize certain common law marriages. We thus reject Petitioners’ argument on the sufficiency of the popular name. II. Ballot Title Petitioners next argue that the ballot title for Proposed Amendment 3 is vague and misleading and fails to inform the voters of the consequences of voting for the proposed amendment. They also argue that the title fails to disclose to the voters the full scope of the proposed amendment and its impact on current laws. We begin our analyses with a review of the law regarding the sufficiency of ballot titles. The ballot title must be an impartial summary of the proposed amendment and it must give voters a fair understanding of the issues presented and the scope and significance of the proposed changes in the law. Scott v. Priest, 326 Ark. 328, 932 S.W.2d 746 (1996); Parker, 326 Ark. 123, 930 S.W.2d 322. It must be free from misleading tendencies that, whether by amplification, omission, or fallacy, thwart a fair understanding of the issues presented. Id. It cannot omit material information that would give the voters serious ground for reflection. Id. While it is not required that the ballot title contain a synopsis of the amendment, it is required that the title be complete enough to convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of the proposed law. Roberts, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376; Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994). Thus, it must be intelligible, honest, and impartial so that it informs the voters with such clarity that they can cast their ballots with a fair understanding of the issues presented. Id. This court has long recognized the impossibility of preparing a ballot title that would suit everyone. Parker, 326 Ark. 123, 930 S.W.2d 322; Hogan v. Hall, 198 Ark. 681, 130 S.W.2d 716 (1939). Thus, the ultimate issue is whether the voter, while inside the voting booth, is able to reach an intelligent and informed decision for or against the proposal and understands the consequences of his or her vote based on the ballot title. Roberts, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376; Christian Civic Action Comm. v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994). The issue of the sufficiency of a ballot title is a matter of law to be decided by this court. Bailey, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938. Thus, we will consider the fact of Attorney General certification and attach some significance to it; however, we will not defer to the Attorney General’s certification or give it presumptive effect. Id. Our most significant rule in determining the sufficiency of the title is that it be given a liberal construction and interpretation in order that it secure the purposes of reserving to the people the right to adopt, reject, approve, or disapprove legislation. Porter v. McCuen, 310 Ark. 562, 839 S.W.2d 512 (1992); Mason v.Jernigan, 260 Ark. 385, 540 S.W.2d 851 (1976). It is not our purpose to examine the relative merit or fault of the proposed changes in the law; rather, our function is merely to review the measure to ensure that, if it is presented to the people for consideration in a popular vote, it is presented fairly. Roberts, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376. In other words, “[t]he question is not how the members of this court feel concerning the wisdom of this proposed amendment, but rather whether the requirements for submission of the proposal to the voters have been met.” Ferstl v. McCuen, 296 Ark. 504, 509, 758 S.W.2d 398, 401 (1988). Ultimately, Amendment 7 places the burden upon the party challenging the ballot title to prove that it is misleading or insufficient. Roberts, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376; Christian Civic Action Comm., 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605. With these standards in mind, we discuss each of the points raised by Petitioners. A. Vague and Misleading Language Petitioners first argue that the following phrase in the second clause of the ballot title is vague and misleading: “that legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas [.]” They submit that the word “status,” as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 1447 (8th ed. 2004), refers to “the sum total of a person’s legal rights, duties, liabilities, and other legal relations, or any particular group of them separately considered.” They submit that the term “legal status” is commonly used in Arkansas law to classify an individual and identify the legal rights and duties for such a classification, like the legal status of an invitee or a stepparent. Petitioners submit further that the term “marital status” is vague and open-ended in- that it is merely a basis of classification consisting of either “married” or “unmarried.” They cite to Black’s Law Dictionary, 987 (8th ed. 2004) as defining the term as “[t]he condition ofbeing single, married, divorced, or widowed.” Given this definition, they contend that the ballot title’s second clause prohibits an unmarried person from having a legal status that is identical or substantially similar to that of either a married or unmarried person. Thus, they argue that the phrase is vague and nonsensical. Petitioners also argue that, contrary to what Intervenors may have intended, the term “marital status” does not mean marriage. They argue further that Intervenors could have used that readily understood term, but they chose not to do so. To support their argument, Petitioners cite to various proposed amendments from other states which do not employ the term “marital status.” Both Respondent and Intervenors argue that Petitioners’ interpretation of these words is unreasonable and absurd and ignores the context in which they are used. They assert that in the context of an employment application, the term “marital status” may be easily understood as referring to the status of being either married, single, divorced, or widowed. However, they assert that the context of this proposed measure enables the voters to understand that “marital status” means the status ofbeing married.  We conclude that the term “marital status” is not vague because it can be understood by the voters within the context of the ballot title. The fact that a term is capable of more than one possible meaning does not render the term meaningless, so long as its meaning may be fairly gleaned from the context in which it is used. The entire clause in which this term is found provides: that legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas, except that the Legislature may recognize a common law marriage from another state between a man and a woman. [Emphasis added.] We agree with Intervenors that the meaning becomes apparent when considering that the one exception to the ban on recognition of legal status for unmarried persons that is identical or substantially similar to marital status is the recognition of common law marriages between a man and a woman from another state. We are not persuaded that the voters will view the term with the same degree of technicality as have Petitioners and their attorneys. Indeed, to accept their construction of the ballot tide, that the amendment prohibits unmarried persons from having a legal status identical or substantially similar to that of unmarried persons, would lead to an absurd result.  Moreover, we observe that the ballot title clearly puts the voters on notice that the passage of this amendment is just the beginning, not the end, of the matter. The proposed amendment is not self-executing. In fact, the third clause of the ballot title reflects that the amendment specifically empowers the General Assembly to pass enabling legislation “to determine the capacity of persons to marry, subject to this amendment, and the legal rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities of marriage.” Because the actions of the legislature will occur in the future, an interpretation of the particulars of this amendment is yet to come. The voters are sufficiently informed of this. In sum, our job is not to review the relative merit or fault of the proposed initiative, nor is it to fashion a perfect or even a better ballot title. Rather, we are to review the ballot title liberally, using common sense, with an eye toward the purpose of Amendment 7, which is to reserve to the people the right to adopt or reject constitutional amendments or legislation. See Walker v. Priest, 342 Ark. 410, 29 S.W.3d 657 (2000); Crochet v. Priest, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128 (1996); Christian Civic Action Comm., 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605. This court’s holding in Becker v. Riviere, 270 Ark. 219, 604 S.W.2d 555 (1980), is instructive: We must also bear in mind that strict technical construction is not required, but that substantial compliance with Amendment No. 7 is all that is required. As was pointed out in Hoban v. Hall, Sec’y of State, 229 Ark. 416, 316 S.W.2d 185 (1958), it is our duty to approve a ballot title “if it represents an impartial summary of the measure and contains enough information to enable the voters to mark their ballots with a fair understanding of the issues presented.” Our task is not to require nor draft the perfect proposed popular name and ballot title, but merely to determine if those presented are legally sufficient. Id. at 225-26, 604 S.W.2d at 558 (citation omitted). Thus, while Petitioners may be correct in asserting that the ballot title could have been written more clearly, they have not met their burden of proving that the ballot title is misleading or insufficient. See Roberts, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376; Christian Civic Action Comm., 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605. B. Failure to Disclose Effect on Laws Protecting Both Married and Unmarried Persons For their next challenge, Petitioners argue that the ballot title fails to disclose to the voter the effect of the amendment. Specifically, they assert that the voter is not informed that the amendment will allegedly repeal existing laws, such as those that prohibit discrimination against and protect the rights of persons regardless of whether they are married or single. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 4-87-104 (Repl. 2001); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-3-107 (Repl. 2002). They assert further that Proposed Amendment 3 will impliedly repeal Article 9, § 3, of the Arkansas Constitution, which provides homestead rights to state residents who are either married or the head of a family. They contend that the ballot title’s failure to disclose these consequences to the voters renders it insufficient.  We note at the outset that Petitioners have failed to cite any legal authority or make any convincing argument in support of this point. Instead, their argument is based entirely on speculation and conjecture as to how this amendment may be interpreted or construed in the future and how it may affect current laws. The present case is not like that of Bailey, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938, where the proposed amendment undeniably would have changed the current state of the law, but the ballot title made no mention of the change. There, the text of the proposed amendment plainly provided that the workers’ compensation laws would be interpreted liberally, but the ballot title made no such mention of this liberal interpretation. This court concluded that the ballot title was misleading in omitting this information, on the ground that the amendment would have repealed the current law requiring strict construction. This court held that the omission of this information “would give the voters a serious basis for reflection on how to cast their ballots.” Id. at 288, 884 S.W.2d at 944. Nor is this case like that of Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669 (2000), where the ballot title failed to inform the voters of the far-reaching consequences of the measure, which would have, immediately upon its approval, ceased the collection of revenues collected from sales and use taxes on used goods. The ballot title further failed to inform the voters that those lost revenues could not be made up for until the next regularly scheduled statewide election. This court concluded that such information was so significant and material that it would give the voter serious ground for reflection. This court held that because such information was omitted, the ballot title failed to convey to the voters the scope and import of the proposed measure.  In the present case, the argument made by Petitioners amounts to nothing more than an assertion that some current laws may be affected or even impliedly repealed with the passage of Proposed Amendment 3. Unlike the two cases cited above, the laws allegedly implicated in this case are by no means certainly implicated, such that the ballot title must inform the voters of this. Accordingly, the ballot title does not fail in this respect. This court has held that it is not necessary that a ballot title include every possible consequence or impact of a proposed measure. In Ferstl, 296 Ark. 504, 510, 758 S.W.2d 398, 401, this court stated unequivocally: “Certainly not every detail of an amendment or how it will work in every situation can be revealed in the name and title. It is not possible to do so.” (Emphasis added.) More recently, this court has reiterated: “The [ballot] title is not required to be perfect, nor is it reasonable to expect the title to cover or anticipate every possible legal argument the proposed measure might evoke.” Plugge v. McCuen, 310 Ark. 654, 658, 841 S.W.2d 139, 141 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds by Bailey, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938. The bottom line is that Petitioners’ assertions on this point are too speculative for us to hold that such information is so material that it would give the voter serious ground for reflecting.2   Before we leave this point, we must address Petitioners’ assertion that where the language of the ballot title mirrors that of the amendment itself, this court has no choice but to interpret the amendment. While we agree that in such a situation, our review of the language of one will necessarily result in the review of the other, we do not agree that such a review extends to the prospective application of the amendment. In other words, while we may be required to consider the language of the amendment itself to determine whether a term or phrase in the title is vague or misleading, this does not mean that we will interpret the amendment in the sense of construing or applying it. However, we note that our holding today does not foreclose Petitioners from pursuing this argument in the event the proposed amendment is approved by the voters. Until that time, our review is limited. C. Failure to Disclose Prohibition on Legal Relationships Other Than Marriage Petitioners’ third argument is that the ballot title does not inform the voters that a vote for this proposal will prohibit the future recognition of legal relationships between unmarried couples other than marriage, like civil unions or domestic partnerships. In other words, they contend that the ballot title does not inform the voter that the amendment not only bans same-sex marriage, but also bans any similar legal relationship between unmarried persons. They contend that by using the phrase “legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status,” Intervenors are attempting to cloak the intended meaning, which is to prohibit civil unions or domestic partnerships. They rely on this court’s holdings in Christian Civic Action Comm., 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605, Crochet, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128, and Kurrus, 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669. In Christian Civic Action Comm., 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605, this court struck a proposed measure from the ballot in part due to the misleading term “additional racetrack wagering.” This court explained: It is evident, as the petitioners suggest, that “additional racetrack wagering” is a euphemism and, further, that the definition consists of compounded euphemisms designed to cloak in semantic obscurity the actual nature of the proposed enterprise. What, in fact, the definition obliquely describes in highly technical terms are the elements of casino-style gambling. Yet voters favoring or opposing the inauguration of casino-style gambling may well be unaware that this is precisely what Amendment 4 seeks to accomplish. Id. at 249, 884 S.W.2d at 609-10 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Crochet, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128, this court concluded that the proposed measure’s use of the term “video terminal games” was misleading, holding: While voters may be able to discern that the term “video terminal games” means slot machines, they should not be forced to guess the meaning of a proposed amendment to their state’s constitution. The very purpose of the ballot title is to convey a fair and impartial understanding of the proposal. To call slot machines "video terminal games,’’which connotes a present-day videogame such as Nintendo or Sega Genesis, is anything but fair and impartial. Consequently, we conclude that the use of the term “video terminal games” creates a fatally misleading tendency in the popular name and ballot title and tinges them with partisan coloring. Id. at 346-47, 931 S.W.2d at 133 (emphasis added). Finally, Petitioners rely on this court’s statement in Kurrus, 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669, that misleading or vague language “placing the voter in a position of either having to be an expert in the subject of [the proposed amendment] or having to guess as to the effect his or her vote would have is impermissible.” Id. at 444, 29 S.W.3d at 674 (citing Dust v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 1, 638 S.W.2d 663 (1982)). Petitioners argue that because Proposed Amendment 3 fails to disclose what particular kinds of relationships will be prohibited by the amendment and leaves the voters to guess what the amendment means, it is, by its own terms, vague and misleading. Intervenors argue that it is Petitioners who are being unclear. They assert that the terms “civil union” and “domestic partnership” are not legally recognized terms in Arkansas and would not be readily understood by voters. They also assert that, contrary to Petitioners’ urging, Proposed Amendment 3 will not prohibit unmarried couples from entering into civil unions or domestic partnerships, so long as these relationships are not marriage by another name. They contend that Proposed Amendment 3 makes clear that whatever alternative forms of marital status other jurisdictions may recognize and by whatever terms such jurisdictions use to identify them, those unions will not be recognized in Arkansas if they are nothing more than marriages with new labels. Intervenors assert that this is a concept that the voters can readily understand.  As with the previous point, we conclude that Petitioners’ argument on this point requires us to interpret the amendment or, at a minimum, to assume that Petitioners are correct in asserting that the amendment will in fact prohibit civil unions or domestic partnerships. We cannot make such an assumption. The ballot title itself does not specifically prohibit unmarried persons from having the legal status of a “civil union” or “domestic partnership”; rather, it prohibits unmarried persons from having a legal status that is “identical or substantially similar to marital status.” The text of the amendment mirrors the ballot title. Thus, the ballot title is not misleading for failing to give specifics where the amendment does not. Moreover, the amendment clearly provides the General Assembly with the power to pass further legislation determining the rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities of marriage. Until such legislation is enacted, we cannot know whether the amendment will prohibit civil unions or domestic partnerships. Finally, we note that the terms “civil union” and “domestic partnership” have not been legally defined in this state.3 Thus, if the terms were used in the ballot title, we would have to engage in legal interpretation and construction to ascertain what those terms mean in order to determine whether they will be prohibited as a legal status that is identical or substantially similar to marital status. As with the previous point, Petitioners must .wait to be heard on this issue until the amendment is approved by a majority of the voters and a justiciable case arises. D. Misleading as to the Amendment’s Effect on Existing Common Law Marriages Finally, Petitioners argue that the ballot title is misleading because it gives the voters a false indication of the effect that the measure will have on existing common law marriages. Particularly, they take issue with the phrase: “the Legislature may recognize a common law marriage from another state between a man and a woman].]” (Emphasis added.) They claim that this phrase misleads the voters into thinking that the amendment would expressly require the legislature to vote to recognize common law marriages from other states before such marriages would be recognized. They argue that voters will be misled into thinking that a vote for the amendment would be a vote to ban all existing common law marriages in Arkansas. They claim that this impression is misleading because Arkansas statutory law already provides for recognition of all marriages from other states, except those between persons of the same sex, “which would be valid by the laws of the state or country in which the marriages were consummated!].]” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-107 (Repl. 2002).  If we understand Petitioners’ argument on this point, it is that the voters will think that the amendment requires an affirmative act of the legislature before common law marriages will be recognized, even though such marriages are recognized, in some instances, under our current law. Thus, their argument amounts to nothing more than a claim that the voters will be misled into thinking that a change in the law will occur. As this court stated in Becker, 270 Ark. 219, 224, 604 S.W.2d 555, 558: “The fact that it is an amendment is sufficient to inform [the voter] that change will result.” Id. at 224, 604 S.W.2d at 558. Moreover, in that same case, this court held that a ballot title is not insufficient merely because it fails to reflect the current state of the law. Petitioners are not entitled to relief on this point. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ballot title and popular name of Proposed Amendment 3 are sufficient, and we deny Petitioners’ request to remove the measure from the ballot. The mandate herein will issue within five days from the filing of this opinion unless a petition for rehearing is filed. Petition denied. Brown, J., concurs. Thornton and Hannah, JJ., dissent.   The letter of certification from Respondent Secretary of State uses the singular “PERSON,” while the Attorney General’s opinion, No. 2004-081, uses the plural “PERSONS.” The parties use the plural term; hence, we will do so as well.    Justice Thornton’s dissent illustrates the speculative nature of this inquiry by posing several questions as to how Proposed Amendment 3 “might be interpreted” or “may result” in the loss of some property rights. Undoubtedly, the dissent uses these contingent terms because the proposed measure has yet to be implemented by the General Assembly or interpreted by this court. Notwithstanding, the dissent then concludes that these speculative, possible future occurrences are so significant that they should be disclosed to the voters. It is unclear how the voter can be adequately informed of the alleged consequences of his vote if such consequences have yet to be realized. Apparently, the dissent would prefer that we skip the step of allowing the citizens the right to vote on the measure and jump right into the step of interpreting it.    Our statutory code only mentions the term “domestic partnership” two times, both of which are contained in the Uniform Partnership Act for businesses. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-46-906 and § 4-46-1207 (Repl. 2001). The term “domestic partner” is used in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-ll-208(d) (Repl. 2002), which provides that “nothing in this section shall prevent an employer from extending benefits to persons who are domestic partners of employees.” That term, however, is not defined.