Court Opinion

ID: 9518752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:01:11.786882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:41.295942
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While I conclude that the practice of juror questioning should be discouraged; I am unable to ascertain a basis for its total prohibition under our supervisory powers or under the federal or state' constitutions. At first blush, the majority appears to have provided a basis for the total prohibition of juror questioning using our supervisory powers. However, the logical foundation of the opinion rests on the debatable premise that jurors must be passive to be impartial. It also rests on the notion, rejected by the federal system and an overwhelm*216ing majority of other states, that safeguards used to insure the integrity of the judicial process from any potential problems of juror questioning are so inadequate that the only solution is the total elimination of the practice. While I understand the concerns, and even the anxiety, that underlie the majority’s holding, the prohibition of juror questioning is an unnecessary solution to the concerns raised, particularly in light of the available safeguards. Therefore, even though I conclude that juror questioning should be the exception, I would hold that, subject to certain safeguards, the practice is permissible.
The majority begins its analysis by explaining that the role of jurors is to be passive, neutral observers. According to the majority, jurors maintain their independence and objectivity by waiting to form an opinion until all the evidence has been received. But the majority then goes on to conclude that asking any question is contrary to the passive, neutral role of jurors because asking a question requires a juror to develop a hypothesis or identify a flaw with one party’s theory.
The majority’s conclusion that a juror who raises a question can no longer be impartial because she has a hypothesis in mind or has identified a flaw in the evidence is based on (1) an article by Bostjan M. Zupancic, a former visiting professor at Pordham University School of Law,1 and (2) an opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. According to the majority, Zupancic argues that jurors who ask questions are encouraged to form a prior tentative opinion because “one cannot investigate unless one has a hypothesis about what happened in the particular criminal case.” Bostjan M. Zupancic, Truth and Impartiality in Criminal Process, 7 J. Contemp. L. 39, 70 (1982). The majority also bases its conclusion on a statement by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. More particularly, that court stated that passive detachment encourages the probability that jurors will remain open-minded until the presentation of all the evidence and that jurors who ask questions draw conclusions or settle on a given legal theory before the parties have completed their case presentations. Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
In my view, the majority’s reliance on Professor Zupancic’s article and the opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is insufficient to justify the result reached here. The article by Zupancic does not specifically address the issue of questioning by jurors. Rather, it discusses the issue of investigation and impartiality in the abstract sense. The decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is based on the argument that juror questioning undermines the ability of jurors to be neutral fact-finders. But the authority cited by the Texas court for this proposition are mere assertions by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits that juror questioning undermines juror impartiality. See United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 713 (8th Cir.1989) (Lay, J., concurring); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516-17 (4th Cir.1985). Notably, all of the federal courts to address the issue of juror questioning, including the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, have permitted it subject to certain safeguards. Johnson, 892 F.2d at 710; United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir.1986). None has utilized the assertion that juror questioning undermines juror impartiality to eliminate the practice altogether.
Not only do I find the authority cited by the majority unconvincing, I also find that the majority’s assumption that jurors must *217be passive to be impartial is at odds with both the adversary system and the process of rational intellectual inquiry used by jurors. Under the adversary system, the parties begin the trial process by making opening statements identifying their respective ease theories and demonstrating how the evidence will support those theories. Throughout the trial, jurors evaluate each piece of evidence to determine the extent to which it supports the alternative case theories. Jurors constantly evaluate the evidence during the trial, but make their ultimate decision after all of the evidence has been received. Part of this evaluation process contemplates that each juror will constantly ask herself questions about the flaws in the evidence and consider which party’s theory the evidence supports.
Thus, contrary to the majority’s argument that jurors are passive recipients of information, jurors continuously evaluate the evidence. When jurors ask themselves questions, it is appropriate for them to have the respective case theories in mind or to be thinking about the flaws in the evidence. Indeed, the'parties themselves have provided the jurors with the theories and hypotheses and likely have identified the flaws in the evidence. Because jurors engage in analytical thinking throughout the trial, thinking of a question does not automatically undermine a juror’s impartiality.
In addition to the majority’s concern about the impact of juror questioning on impartiality, the majority is also concerned that allowing jurors to pose questions could elicit testimony from a witness that might tend to prove an element of a crime, thus relieving the state of its burden. I share this concern. However, the safeguard of the judge reviewing the written question before it is posed to the witness should be adequate to ensure that the sensitive balance in areas of burden of proof will not be upset. Thus, there is no need to totally prohibit the practice, particularly in light of the fact that, as the majority acknowledges, it is not a common occurrence for juror questioning to assist the prosecution in its burden of proof. Indeed, only four states have absolutely prohibited juror questioning in criminal trials while the vast majority of states as well as the federal system have permitted juror questioning subject to certain safeguards. See State v. Hays, 256 Kan. 48, 883 P.2d 1093, 1097-1100 (1994) (reviewing the extent to which juror questioning is permitted in state and federal criminal trials).
A court should not encourage or actively solicit questions. However, if a juror does pose a question, I would impose the following safeguards to insure the integrity of the judicial process. A court should permit questions only for purposes of clarification. Questions should be submitted in writing to the court in a nonintrusive manner. Questions should be raised by the jurors without discussion with the other jurors. The testimony of witnesses should not be interrupted by questions from jurors. The court should determine the propriety of the question. The court should also decide when the question should be asked and the court itself should pose the question. Counsel should be afforded the opportunity to object to the question outside the presence of the jury. When appropriate, the court should instruct the jury not to draw inferences from the fact that a submitted question is not asked. Finally, counsel should be given the opportunity to further examine the witness after the juror’s question is posed. If these safeguards are followed, the majority’s concerns that juror questioning undermines juror impartiality and alters the burden of proof and production should be alleviated.
*218In the end, I conclude that it is not necessary to totally prohibit juror questioning to maintain the integrity and fairness of the judicial process. Instead, while discouraging its use, we can allow the practice subject to procedural safeguards. Accordingly, I would hold that juror questioning is permissible within the sound discretion of the district court subject to the nonexclusive list of procedural safeguards I have set forth above. I would therefore affirm the court of appeals by holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted individual jurors to submit questions for witnesses.

. Zupancic is currently an elected judge on the European Human Rights Court.