Court Opinion

ID: 9830093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:51:55.515452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:12.449316
License: Public Domain

WILDSON, C. J.
(after stating the facts as above). The judgment complained of is not erroneous, unless the legal effect of B. Fronhoff’s agreement, set out in the statement above, was to transfer to appellants an interest in the cause of action in the subject-matter of the suit; for if that was not the effect of that agreement, appellants had no cause of action against H. Eronhoff, and therefore no right to intervene in the pending suit for the purpose of prosecuting it against him on their own account.
The language of the agreement is not like that used in Ry. Co. v. Vaughan, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 40 S. W. 1065, Ry. Co. v. Miller, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 609, 53 S. W. 709, Lumber Co. v. Holt (Tex. Civ. App.) 144 S. W. 1029, and Gibson v. Coal Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 266 S. W. 137, cited by appellants as supporting their claim of a right to intervene in the suit. In each of those cases the intent to transfer an interest in the cause of action ,or subject-matter thereof was shown by apt words. Not so here. The language used by B. Fronhoff was that—
Appellants “are to have one-third of any sum of money or property, or both or either, that may be recovered or paid as a compromise of said suit for their services therein.”
That language, it seems to us, should' not be construed as evidencing an intention1 that title to an interest in the property or cause of action therefor was thereby and then to pass to appellants, and it is plain under the authorities, that unless the language evidenced such an intent the agreement did not operate to then pass anything to appellants. Cotton Co. v. Simmons, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 189, 87 S. W. 842; 2 Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur. § 1280; 6 C. J. 742 et seq., and authorities there cited.
The view most favorable to appellants which can be taken Of the language, of the agreement, we think, is that it showed that appellants were to own one-third of any money or property recovered by B. Eronhoff, or paid to him as a compromise, when, and not before, same was so recovered or paid. In that view, if he did not recover anything, and if nothing was paid to him in settlement .of his claim, appellants, of course, acquired nothing because of the agreement.
It was. not alleged in appellants’ peti*889tion that B. Fronhoff recovered or was paid anything as a result of the suit. If, however, the petition had contained such allegations, they would have shown no more than a liability on the part of B. Fronhoff to appellants, and not a liability .on the part of H. Fronhoff to them; for the latter owed appellants no duty to see that B. Fronhoff complied with his contract with them. So, and for the same reason, if B. Fronhoff wrongfully and to the injury of appellants compromised the suit, appellants’ remedy, if any they had, was by a suit for damages against B. Fronhoff, and not against H. Fronhoff.
Appellees also urge as a reason why the trial court should have ruled as he did that appellants’ petition “was filed too late,” and cite Lambie v. Wibert (Tex. Civ. App.) 31 S. W. 225, which seems to support the conten.tion. Whether it really does or not, and, if so, whether it correctly interprets the law, we will not undertake to determine, as we are satisfied the judgment complained of is not erroneous for the other reason urged by them.
The judgment is affirmed.