Court Opinion

ID: 9747886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:41:04.609066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:28.243564
License: Public Domain

CAPERTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The issue at hand that prompts my dissent is the propriety of a res ipsa loquitur instruction in medical negligence cases. In the wake of Nazar v. Branham, 291 S.W.3d 599 (Ky.2009), overruling Laws v. Harter, 534 S.W.2d 449 (Ky.1975), our case law on medical negligence is open for reform. In giving consideration to such an instruction, I believe that Nazar as well as the cases of other states are informative. In Nazar, our Supreme Court stated
The res ipsa loquitur approach avoids this unfairness by permitting juries to infer negligence from the fact of the retained foreign object, while granting them the latitude to analyze other facts and evidence relevant to liability. As such, juries are free to analyze the reliability and veracity of the defendant’s expert witnesses and weigh it against the likelihood that the surgeon was negligent in failing to remove an object from the plaintiffs body during surgery. The res ipsa loquitur standard simply provides a more equitable method for resolving retained foreign object cases. Nazar at 604.
The first sentence, in stating that the jury can infer negligence from the fact of the retained object, should serve to illuminate our understanding of the newly-adopted res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Absent a jury instruction advising the jury of their ability to infer negligence from the fact of a retained object, how can a jury be expected to fully understand the weight that can be attached to such evidence? True, the arguments of counsel can illuminate the jury as to the facts, but such are only arguments and do not instruct on the law. And, if the law is that the jury can infer negligence from the fact of a retained object, why is it that they are deprived of an instruction? No doubt some will argue that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is an effective tool to thwart directed verdict and fend-off summary judgment. If true, then why would our Supreme Court say that the jury can infer anything at all, why not merely state that the purpose of the doctrine is only a consideration for the trial court when presented with motions for directed verdict and summary judgment?
Such an instruction merely allows the jury to understand that the facts supporting res ipsa loquitur could support a finding of negligence but only in conjunction, as stated in the second half of the sen*694tence, with other facts and evidence relevant to liability. Thus, the jury would give full consideration to all the evidence but understand that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows a finding of negligence if they so decide.
In the second sentence of the above quote, our Supreme Court specifically considered the “weighing” of the testimony of defendant’s expert witnesses against a retained object in the body of a plaintiff. If the guidance given was not to impose a 'res ipsa loquitur instruction is such cases, why address the jury weighing such evi-dentiary matters?
Consider the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Sides v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, 258 S.W.3d 811 (Mo.2008), wherein the Supreme Court of Missouri quoted the Virginia Law Review in stating “In the 43 years since the Second Restatement was promulgated, the commentators have noted that, ‘the modern trend is to allow both a res ipsa loqui-tur instruction and expert evidence in medical malpractice cases.’ ” Sides at 816, quoting Karyn K. Ablin, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Expert Opinion Evidence in Medical Malpractice Cases: Strange Bedfellows, 82 Va. L.Rev. 325, 327 (1996). One might read the article to question the appropriateness of the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Nevertheless, when the doctrine is adopted our courts must give consideration as to how it is to be applied.
While the change in the law is complete, the changes it effects will need to be determined. I would allow a res ipsa loquitur instruction under Nazar.