Court Opinion

ID: 9725618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:56:15.277761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:14.580143
License: Public Domain

T. L. Ludington, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully disagree with the opinion authored by the majority. I would find that Dr. Yung A. Chung, a Wayne County Medical Examiner, did have a duty to plaintiff that was unique or special from the duty that she owed to the public in general as a public employee. In addition, I would find that plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of an issue that should be resolved by the jury with respect to Dr. Chung’s breach of the standard of care.
FACTS
The majority opinion succinctly explains the facts. However, several factual matters should be emphasized because they directly relate to the legal issues framed for this Court’s consideration.
First, the importance of Dr. Chung’s medical opinion with regard to Assistant Prosecutor Less’ decision to charge plaintiff with the murder of his wife and daughter cannot be overstated. Dr. Chung’s opinion that Robin Reno was unable to talk after receiving her throat wounds was integral to Less’ conclusion that plaintiff was lying. As Less testified in deposition, Dr. Chung’s medical opinion was “the most important part of my decisionmaking process.”
Second, in preparation for trial, Less sought the opinions of a respected pathologist and otolaryngologist to corroborate Dr. Chung’s expected trial testimony. Less consulted with Robert Mathog, M.D., who was the Chairman of Otolaryngology at Wayne State University, and Laurence R. Simson, Jr., M.D., the Ingham County Medical Examiner. Dr. Chung was unwilling to voluntarily share any of the medical evidence *108concerning Robin Reno’s wounds. The prosecutor acquired the necessary evidence for independent review only after the issuance of a court order.
Third, Dr. Mathog and Dr. Simson agreed not only that Dr. Chung’s physical findings in the autopsy of Robin Reno were erroneous, but also, as stated in an affidavit by Dr. Simson, that there was “no anatomic or physiologic basis for her assertion that Robin Reno would have been unable to speak because of her laryngeal injuries.” Dr. Simson’s affidavit concluded with his opinion that “[s]ince Robin Reno’s ability or inability to speak was such an important issue in the case of People v Reno, it would have been prudent for the medical examiner to have sought consultation if she did not have confidence in her own ability to interpret such laryngeal injuries.”
Dr. Mathog furnished a similar affidavit replete with criticism of Dr. Chung’s analysis and concluding with his opinion that Dr. Chung’s conduct was “a breach of her duty to perform her duties as medical examiner as a reasonably prudent medical examiner would have, and was gross negligence defined as conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a' substantial lack of concern for whether an injury was likely to result, resulting in the imprisonment of Mr. Reno based on her testimony.”
PUBLIC-DUTY DOCTRINE
The trial court and my appellate colleagues believe that application of the public-duty doctrine to the facts of this case is dispositive. While I agree that our Supreme Court’s decision in White v Beasley, 453 Mich 308; 552 NW2d 1 (1996), reversing White v Humbert, 206 Mich App 459; 522 NW2d 681 (1994), is *109controlling, I do not agree that application of the principles enunciated in White is dispositive. However, before outlining my understanding of the special-relationship exception applied in White, I must acknowledge that I concur with the comments of Justice Levin in his dissenting opinion related to the public-duty doctrine.
The lead opinion in White, authored by Chief Justice Brickley, accurately observes that the public-duty doctrine has not been expressed as a doctrine of governmental immunity but one of tort, based on the initial question applicable to any negligence action, that is, whether the defendant owes the plaintiff any judicially cognizable duty.
The question whether a legal duty exists in a negligence action historically has been a question for the court to resolve on the basis of its balancing of the societal interest involved, the severity of the risk to the plaintiff, the burden of imposing a duty upon the defendant, the likelihood of the occurrence, and the relationship of the parties. Dumka v Quaderer, 151 Mich App 68; 390 NW2d 200 (1986); Swartz v Huffmaster Alarms Systems, Inc, 145 Mich App 431; 377 NW2d 393 (1985). The question whether a duty should be imposed is, as it has been described, an exercise of judicial policy making based not only on logic and science but also on resolution of the competing public policy considerations. 57A Am Jur 2d, § 87, p 143.
Notwithstanding the analytically separate points of departure, the public-duty doctrine and the doctrine of governmental immunity have more in common than merely arising in similar factual settings and always, when applicable, being dispositive of the case. Both doctrines have developed as a result of *110judicial efforts to balance public-policy interests, on the one hand promoting the vigorous and effective administration of governmental policy, while on the other hand deterring arbitrary or negligent conduct on the part of government employees.
A survey of the development of the public-duty doctrine reflects the fact that courts in many jurisdictions apply the public-duty doctrine when, as part of determining whether immunity is appropriate, they are classifying a governmental actor’s actions as either ministerial or discretionary. Anno: Modem status ofmle excusing governmental unit from tort liability on theory that only general, not particular, duty was owed under circumstances, 38 ALR4th 1194. Indeed, Justice Cavanagh makes this point persuasively in White, supra at 331, n 2, where he observes that the Legislature has chosen to disregard any distinction between discretionary or ministerial acts with respect to the tort liability of governmental individuals. However, he then explains that “the distinction remains useful for explaining the policy reasons behind the public-duty doctrine.”
Moreover, Justice Cavanagh’s observation that the public-duty doctrine is justified because “[t]he legal tort system is ill-equipped to second-guess” decisions in the public sector is one of the primary arguments historically advanced to justify the doctrine of governmental immunity. White, supra at 331. I find it difficult to accept the notion that juries are unable to evaluate such decisions, for example, the assignment of priority to distress calls received by a police station. We routinely ask juries to evaluate far more complex private-sector problems in the fields of professional negligence, products liability, construction, *111and pharmacology, just to name a few. Nevertheless, the point remains that the public-policy argument, whatever its merit, is one of the same primary arguments advanced to justify the doctrine of governmental immunity.
More importantly, the Legislature has given careful attention to the policy considerations underlying both doctrines in conjunction with the Legislature’s attention to the doctrine of governmental immunity. In Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), our Supreme Court addressed immunity for “lower level” governmental employees and held as follows:
Lower level officials, employees, and agents are immune from tort liability only when they are
a) acting during the course of their employment and are acting, or reasonably believe they are acting, within the scope of their authority;
b) acting in good faith; and
c) performing discretionary-decisional, as opposed to ministerial-operational, acts. [420 Mich 592.]
Subsequently, the Legislature addressed this field, culminating with the passage of 1986 PA 175, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). The statutory grant of immunity created a new standard for individual government employee immunity in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ross. Pursuant to the statute, an individual is immune from tort liability if the following three conditions are met:
(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
*112(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or volunteer’s conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. As used in this subdivision, “gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. [MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2).]
Because the public-duty doctrine and the governmental immunity doctrine address and seek to advance the same public-policy interests, and because the Legislature gave express attention to those interests in its passage of MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), I see no reason to fail to comply with the Legislature’s directive or to substitute judicial policy choices for the Legislature’s policy choice.
THE SPECIAL-RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
While I agree with the majority that the public-duty doctrine applies to this case, I do not agree that the special-relationship test enunciated in the lead opinion in White and defining the limits of the public-duty doctrine applies to this case.
Justice Brickley, when articulating the Court’s adoption of the Cuffy1 special-relationship test, is careful to explain that the test is applicable only in situations where one alleges that the police have failed to provide protection. Justice Brickley makes this point in no fewer than four separate instances within the lead opinion. Most importantly, Justice Brickley expressly indicates that the Court is not deciding whether the Cuffy special-relationship test, or a separate test, should be applied to governmental *113employees who are not police officers. White, supra at 315, n 3.
Justice Boyle, in her concurring opinion in White, outlines her belief that the public-duty doctrine as well as the Cuffy special-relationship test apply only “in cases of nonfeasance.” White, supra at 329. Indeed, she emphasizes that the Cuffy test is inherently inapplicable to cases where “an officer assumes an affirmative duty to act.” White, supra at 329.
Justice Cavanagh’s opinion expresses his agreement “that the public-duty doctrine serves a useful function and should be continued” with respect to a police officer’s alleged failure to protect an individual from the actions of a third party, but expressly dissents from “the lead opinion’s definition of the special-relationship exception.” Id. at 330. Indeed, Justice Cavanagh expresses his conclusion that the public-duty doctrine is applicable only to “governmental safety professionals.” Id. at 330, n 1. Finally, Justice Cavanagh expresses the modifications he believes are warranted to the Cuffy test, but limits these modifications to the unique circumstance of a police officer’s alleged “grossly negligent response” to a citizen’s peril. Id. at 333.
In the case before this Court, we are faced with a defendant who is not a police officer and not a governmental safety professional. Further, plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Chung failed to protect an individual from the actions of a third party. Plaintiff does allege, however, that Dr. Chung assumed a duty in connection with rendering her professional opinion and that her conduct caused harm.
In other words, according to each of the referenced opinions rendered in White, the Cuffy test is inappli*114cable to the immediate case. The test articulated by the Court of Appeals in White appears to provide the best guidance available.
In that opinion, the Court of Appeals observed that “the cases in which claims were dismissed on the basis of the public duty doctrine have the common thread of involving the speculative possibility of a tortfeasor’s injuring an unidentifiable member of the general public.” White, supra at 462-463. The Court of Appeals then proceeded to state:
The point made by Harrison [v Director of Dep’t of Corrections, 194 Mich App 446; 487 NW2d 799 (1992)], and other cases cited by defendants, is that while the defendants in those cases might have had some reason to believe that members of the general public might be endangered by the actions of a third party, there was no identifiable person who was being endangered. That is, the potential for iryury and the identification of the victim remain hypothetical until such time as the crime has occurred. [White, supra at 463.]
Clearly, on the facts of this case, the effect of Dr. Chung’s medical opinion was not only to identify plaintiff as a liar but also to subject him to immediate prosecution for the murders of his wife and daughter. The potential for injury was evident at the time Dr. Chung rendered her opinion, and the identification of the party directly affected by Dr. Chung’s opinion was neither hypothetical nor general; it was real and it was specific.
WITNESS PRIVILEGE
The majority also observes, and I agree, that the law is well settled that statements made by a witness in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely *115privileged. However, plaintiffs allegations in this case relate to Dr. Chung’s opinion, which she rendered to the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office long before she was called as a witness in a judicial proceeding.
Dr. Chung rendered her opinion before Mr. Reno was charged, and that opinion was “the most important part” of the prosecutor’s “decisionmaking process.” The privilege is simply inapplicable factually to Dr. Chung’s opinion.
GROSS NEGLIGENCE
The trial court also concluded that plaintiff failed to present a material question of fact concerning whether Dr. Chung’s conduct constituted gross negligence under the statute. A court may grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) only when the court is satisfied that reasonable jurors could not honestly reach different conclusions with regard to an issue of fact. Vermilya v Dunham, 195 Mich App 79; 489 NW2d 496 (1992). The two doctors who furnished affidavits in this case concluded that there was no anatomic or physiologic basis for Dr. Chung’s opinion that Robin Reno could not have spoken to Kenneth Reno before she died. Dr. Mathog furnished his very specific and detailed opinion that Dr. Chung’s conduct was “gross negligence.” Given these opinions, I am persuaded that plaintiff has a case that should be resolved by a jury, and I would remand for trial.

 Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255; 513 NYS2d 372; 505 NE2d 937 (1987).