Court Opinion

ID: 2963648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:29.008016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:21.783202
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          September 22, 1995    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No.  95-1407

                                JOHN VIRAPEN, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                            ELI LILLY, S.A., ETC., ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                                 ____________________

               Jorge Miguel Suro Ballester on brief for appellants.
               ___________________________
               Carl Schuster and Schuster Aguilo Rivera & Santiago on brief
               _____________     _________________________________
          for appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                ____________________ 

                    Per  Curiam.   This appeal stems  from a  suit alleging
                    Per  Curiam
                    ___________

          employment discrimination  in violation  of federal  statutes and

          local law.  The  principal plaintiff, John Virapen, who  was born

          in  British Guyana  and is  of Indian  descent, alleges  that his

          employer, Eli  Lilly S.A., a pharmaceutical  firm, discharged him

          from an executive position  because of his skin color,  race, and

          national origin.   The other  plaintiffs are  Virapen's wife  and

          conjugal partnership;  their claims are wholly  derivative of his

          claim, and need not be addressed separately.

                    The  district  court conducted  a four-day  bench trial

          concerning Virapen's  allegations.  The court  thereafter wrote a

          meticulously reasoned opinion in  which it concluded that Virapen

          had failed  to prove his case.   See Virapen v.  Eli Lilly, S.A.,
                                           ___ _______     _______________

          No. 90-1453, slip op. (D.P.R.  March 23, 1995).  Having read  the

          record and carefully considered  the parties' briefs, we find  no

          basis to disturb the  district court's decision.  To  the precise

          contrary, we  regard this as a suitable case in which to put into

          practice our stated belief that, when "a trial court has produced

          a first-rate  work product, a reviewing  tribunal should hesitate

          to wax  longiloquent simply to hear its  own words resonate."  In
                                                                         __

          re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel  Fire Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st
          ___________________________________________

          Cir.   1993).     Consequently,  we   affirm  the   judgment  for

          substantially  the reasons elucidated  in the opinion  below.  We

          add only a few brief comments.

                    First:   Virapen essentially  asks that we  reweigh the
                    _____

          facts de  novo.  Our  standard of review,  however, is much  more

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          circumscribed.  Following a bench trial, an appellate tribunal is

          not warranted in rejecting the trial court's "findings of fact or

          conclusions  drawn therefrom unless, on the  whole of the record,

          [the court of appeals] form[s] a strong, unyielding belief that a

          mistake  has been made."   Cumpiano v. Banco  Santander P.R., 902
                                     ________    _____________________

          F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990).  Findings concerning an employer's

          intent are  subject to review under this standard, and can be set

          aside only for  clear error.  See id. (citing  authorities).  The
                                        ___ ___

          record,  read objectively,  does not  yield a  conviction that  a

          mistake has been made, and no error     clear or otherwise     is

          discernible.

                    Second:   Virapen's  complaint  that he  was wrongfully
                    ______

          denied the opportunity to  adduce rebuttal evidence rings hollow.

          The trial court has the right to exercise reasonable control over

          the mode and  manner of  presenting evidence, see  Fed. R.  Evid.
                                                        ___

          611, and the court did not abuse its broad discretion here.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g.,  Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec.  Corp., 922 F.2d  184, 190 (3d
          ____   _____    _________________________

          Cir. 1990), cert.  denied, 501 U.S. 1217  (1991) (explaining that
                      _____  ______

          "a trial judge's decision regarding the scope of rebuttal may not

          be  reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion");

          Hickok v. G.D.  Searle & Co., 496 F.2d 444,  447 (10th Cir. 1974)
          ______    __________________

          (explaining  that the  determination of  what constitutes  proper

          rebuttal  evidence   lies  within  the  district   court's  sound

          discretion).

                    What is more, Virapen  has not identified any evidence,

          unavailable  to him during the presentation of his case in chief,

                                          4

          that the court  precluded him from  presenting after the  defense

          rested.   Nor has he  pointed to any  specific excluded evidence,

          the  need for  which could not       and should not     have been

          anticipated from the outset.   That ends the matter.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Cates v. Sears Roebuck &  Co., 928 F.2d 679, 685 (5th  Cir. 1991)
          _____    ____________________

          (warning  that  rebuttal  evidence  "is  not  to  be  used  as  a

          continuation of the case-in-chief"); Pignons S.A. de Mecanique v.
                                               _________________________

          Polaroid Corp., 701 F.2d 1, 2  (1st Cir. 1983) ("Once a plaintiff
          ______________

          has had  a chance to  prove a fact,  he cannot reopen  the matter

          simply  by stating  that he  wishes to  introduce more  or better

          evidence.").

                    Third:   Virapen's insistence that  the district  court
                    _____

          erred in respect to  whether he established a prima facie case of

          employment  discrimination misses the  mark.   Where, as  here, a

          discrimination  case that  rests  on  circumstantial evidence  is

          tried  to  a  conclusion,   "the  burden-shifting  framework  has

          fulfilled  its  function,  and  backtracking   serves  no  useful

          purpose."  Sanchez v. Puerto Rico  Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 720 (1st
                     _______    ____________________

          Cir. 1994).  Thus, as we have said, "[t]o focus  on the existence

          of a prima facie case after a discrimination case has  been fully

          tried on  the merits is  to 'unnecessarily  evade[] the  ultimate

          question of discrimination vel non.'"  Id. (quoting United States
                                                 ___          _____________

          Postal  Serv.  Bd.  of Govs.  v.  Aikens,  460  U.S. 711,  713-14
          ____________________________      ______

          (1983)); see also  Mesnick v.  General Elec. Co.,  950 F.2d  816,
                   ___ ____  _______     _________________

          824-25 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 (1992).  So it
                                  _____ ______

          is here.

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                    Fourth:   Virapen's  jeremiad that  the district  court
                    ______

          erred  in respect to his local-law claims  is without merit.  The

          district  court analyzed both the  Law 100 claim,  P.R. Laws Ann.

          tit. 29,   146 (1985), and the Law  80 claim, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.

          29,   185(a) (1985),  under the appropriate tests.   See Virapen,
                                                               ___ _______

          supra, slip op. at 4.   It supportably found that Virapen did not
          _____

          establish a case of  employment discrimination under the  Law 100

          test.  See id. at 19.  The court similarly found that Virapen did
                 ___ ___

          not establish unjustified dismissal within  the meaning of Law 80

          because "[t]he repetitive nature of plaintiff's misconduct . .  .

          constituted 'good cause' as a 'pattern of improper . . . conduct'

          under Law 80."   Id. (quoting statute).   Those findings are  not
                           ___

          clearly erroneous.

                    We  need go no further.   The judgment  of the district

          court is summarily affirmed.  See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.
                                        ___

                    Affirmed.
                    Affirmed
                    ________

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