Court Opinion

ID: 9536778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:06:55.59521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:14.875069
License: Public Domain

NIX, Judge
(dissenting).
I am compelled to dissent from the decision adopted in this case at it has not dealt with a fundamental legal concept and express statutory provision.
Title 21, O.S.1961, § 23 provides:
“An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this Code, or other penal statute, may be punished under either of such provisions, except that in cases specified in Sections 2805 and 2808 [21 O.S.1961, §§ 51 and 54], the punishments therein prescribed are substituted for those prescribed for a first offense, but in no case can it be punished under more *324than one; and an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one, bars the prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.”
It is significant that this statute speaks of an “act or omission” while the double jeopardy prohibition speaks of a conviction or acquittal of an “offense” as being a bar to another prosecution for the same “offense.” If an “act” violates two different laws, it may be two “offenses” under double jeopardy interpretation, but Section 23 prohibits a single act being punished more than once under different statutes.
Although there has been little reference to this statutory provision in Oklahoma case law, the identical statute in California has been applied frequently. The California Penal Code, Section 654, provides as follows:
“An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this Code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other. In the cases specified in Sections 648, 667 and 668, the punishments therein prescribed must be substituted for those prescribed for a first offense, if the previous conviction is charged in the indictment and found by the jury.” (Enacted 1872).
In Neal v. State, 55 Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960), certiorari denied 365 U.S. 823, 81 S.Ct. 708, 5 L.Ed. 2d 700, the California court ruled under its section 654 that the defendant could not be punished for attempted murder and arson where he had thrown gasoline into an occupied home and ignited it. In Neal the court held:
“Section 654 has been applied not only where there was but one ‘act’ in the ordinary sense * * * but also where a course of conduct violated more than one statute * * *.
* * * If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” 9 Cal.Rptr., at 611, 357 P.2d, at 843.
The Neal decision, however, makes it clear that where there are two victims in such a criminal attack, the defendant can be charged twice with attempted murder.
Further amplification of this statute was made in People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962):
“* * * the divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the defendant; and that if all the offenses are incident to one objective the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one.” 26 Cal.Rptr., at 480, 376 P. 2d, at 456.
Alabama also has a similar statute and has adopted California’s interpretation in Neal v. State, supra, and People v. McFarland, supra, in prohibiting punishment under more than one statute for a single criminal transaction. Wildman v. State, 42 Ala.App. 357, 165 So.2d 396 (1963). Wade v. State, 42 Ala.App. 400, 166 So.2d 739 (1964).
In the instant case, defendant Ryan was charged with possession of narcotic drugs taken in a robbery, the possession being on his arrest for the robbery. There is no controversy that the drugs were the same as those taken in the robbery, along with other items. It seems apparent that defendant Ryan’s criminal act was essentially an armed robbery which violated both the statute against armed robbery and the statute against possession of narcotics, as both offenses were part of an indivisible criminal transaction.
This was holding of the California court in the same fact situation. In People v. Quinn, 61 Cal.2d 551, 39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705 (1964), defendant Quinn was one of two men who robbed a San Francisco pharmacy taking cash and narcotics, and *325the court held he could not be punished for both a robbery conviction and possession of narcotics:
“The trial court also erred in sentencing defendant to concurrent sentences for first degree robbery and possession' of narcotics. Section 654 of the Penal Code proscribes double punishment of a criminal act that constitutes more than one crime and concurrent sentences are double punishment, [citations] The section applies not only when there is one act in the ordinary sense, but when there is a course of conduct that constitutes an indivisible transaction punishable under more than one statute, [citations] In the present case, the theft and possession of the narcotics, the theft of the money, and the robbery were all part of an indivisible criminal transaction, [citations] Accordingly, if on retrial defendant is convicted of both possession of narcotics and robbery, he may be sentenced only for first degree robbery, the more serious of the two offenses.” 39 Cal.Rptr., at 396, 393 P.2d, at 708.
The reasoning of the California courts in this regard is sound and highly persuasive.1 Accordingly, the better rule in Oklahoma would be to apply the statute, 21 O.S.1961, § 23, as it was intended, and prohibit imposing punishment both for armed robbery and possession of narcotic drugs where the defendant’s course of conduct constituted an indivisible transaction which incidentally violated two statutes. It seems abundantly clear that the legislature intended for a criminal act to be punished but not more than once. The legislative directive in this regard should not be lightly disregarded.
For other citations in accord with this dissent, see: People v. McFarland, supra; People v. Griffin, 209 Cal.App.2d 125, 129, 25 Cal.Rptr. 667; People v. Nor Woods, 37 Cal.2d 584, 586, 233 P.2d 897; People v. Kehoe, 33 Cal.2d 711, 715, 204 P.2d 321.

. Oklahoma has previously held California cases highly persuasive in matters involving similar statutes. Harness v. Myers, 143 Okl. 147, 288 P. 285 (1930); Lester v. Smith, 83 Okl. 143, 200 P. 780 (1921).