Court Opinion

ID: 9929814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 14:09:51.177549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:51:42.997885
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued February 1, 2024

                                  In The

                           Court of Appeals
                                  For The

                       First District of Texas
                         ————————————
                           NO. 01-22-00687-CR
                        ———————————
               EMILIANO ROMERO PADILLA, Appellant
                                    V.
                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the 228th District Court
                         Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 1681498
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Emiliano Romero Padilla was convicted of the offense of

aggravated sexual assault of a child.1 In one issue, Padilla asserts that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

                                      Background

      On July 6, 2020, the complainant, C.F., who was nine at the time, and her

nineteen-year-old brother, P.F. (“Brother”), were at home with Padilla, who was

their mother’s boyfriend.2 Their mother was at work. That evening, Brother testified

he made C.F. dinner and, when she was finished eating, C.F. went to her room.

Padilla, who had been sitting with C.F. and Brother at the dining room table, stayed

at the table, and Brother went into the living room to watch videos on his phone.

After a few minutes, Brother testified he noticed that the house was “too quiet,” so

he went to check on C.F. On his way to C.F.’s room, he noticed that Padilla was no

1
      See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B).
2
      As is our common practice, we refer to the complainant and her family members by
      their initials or pseudonyms for their privacy. See Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d
      501, 503 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Jenkins v. State, No. 01-18-00987-CR, 2020
      WL 1679697, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2020, pet. ref’d)
      (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1)
      (providing that “crime victim has . . . the right to be treated with fairness and with
      respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
      process”).

                                            2
longer in the dining room. When he came to C.F.’s room, he saw that her door,

which was usually always open, was partially closed.

       Brother testified that, when he opened the door and walked into the room, he

saw C.F. lying on her back on the bed with her legs up in the air while Padilla knelt

in front of the bed with his face between C.F.’s legs, and his mouth on C.F.’s vagina.

C.F. was wearing only a shirt, she had no pants on, and she looked scared. Brother

told C.F. to put on her pants, then he grabbed her and ran out of the house. Brother

carried C.F., who did not have shoes on, out of the house and called 9-1-1. Brother

stayed on the phone with the 9-1-1 operator until the police arrived and described

what he had seen to the operator. Brother’s 9-1-1 call was admitted as State’s

Exhibit 9 at trial and was played for the jury. On the call, Brother provided the

details of the sexual assault and his actions on that night, which was consistent with

his testimony at trial.

       When officers from the Friendswood Police Department arrived, Officer S.

McCaffrey stayed with C.F. and Brother while Sergeant D. Wilkerson and his

partner knocked on the front door of Padilla’s house. Sergeant Wilkerson testified

that he knocked on Padilla’s front door, which was slightly opened, and could hear

someone moving around inside. It took Padilla a few minutes to answer the door,

and when he finally opened the door, his hair was wet, and he stated he had just

gotten out of the shower. When Sergeant Wilkerson and his partner explained that

                                          3
Brother had called 9-1-1 and reported that Padilla was “inappropriately touching”

C.F., Padilla said “no, I don’t think so” and claimed that Brother had misinterpreted

the situation. Padilla claimed that he was giving C.F. a hug from the side of the

couch in the living room, and that he did not know why Brother would make

something like that up.

      After speaking with Padilla, Sergeant Wilkerson testified that he placed

Padilla into custody and transported him to jail. Police officers then contacted C.F.’s

Mother at work to tell her what had happened. When she arrived at Padilla’s house,

she consented to a search of the house. During the search, police officers collected

the sheets from C.F.’s bed and clothing in Padilla’s bathroom. C.F.’s older sister

arrived on scene and C.F. told her that “this was not the first time” this had occurred.

      That night, C.F. was taken to Texas Children’s Hospital for a sexual assault

examination. The examination was conducted by Tuesday Sowers, a registered

nurse and certified sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”).                During the

examination, Sowers testified that C.F. told her Padilla had touched her “private

parts” last night with his mouth. When asked if this was the first time this had

happened, C.F. said “yes.” As part of the examination, Sowers collected evidence,

including swabs and C.F.’s underwear for DNA analysis.

      On August 7, 2020, C.F. was forensically interviewed by the Children’s

Assessment Center. During the interview, C.F. disclosed a “couple different”

                                           4
instances of sexual abuse by Padilla, “the main one was the oral penetration of her

vagina by [Padilla’s] mouth and tongue.” Based on C.F.’s disclosures in her

interview and sexual assault examination, Detective W. Higgs, the detective

assigned to investigate C.F.’s case, testified that he obtained a warrant for Padilla’s

DNA. The DNA evidence collected from Padilla was submitted for DNA testing

and comparison with the evidence and swabs that were collected from C.F.

      During trial, C.F., who was then eleven years old, testified that Padilla first

began touching her “private parts” when she was eight.3 C.F. described five

incidents that occurred before the charged incident, including one that took place

when she was eight, where Padilla began to pull down her underwear with his hand

while she was sitting on his lap. C.F. told her mother about this incident, but her

mom “said that [Padilla] was probably doing something else,” and C.F. did not feel

like her mom believed her.4

      C.F. also testified that on evening of the offense she came out of her bedroom

and saw Padilla sitting in the dining room. She said that Padilla gestured with his

3
      C.F. testified that she has two private parts on her body that no one is supposed to
      touch. The bottom part, where pee comes out, and her chest.
4
      The four other incidents involved Padilla tickling C.F. on the stomach with his
      mouth, touching her buttocks over her clothing, touching her chest with his hand,
      and touching her “private part” that pee comes out of with his mouth over her
      clothes. C.F. testified that, after these incidents, Padilla told C.F. not to tell anyone
      or “put his finger on his mouth, like to don’t tell.”

                                              5
finger for her to come to him and she shook her head no. Padilla told C.F. to go with

him, and she again shook her head no. Padilla then walked toward C.F., picked her

up “like a little baby,” brought her to her bedroom, and put her on her bed. Padilla

closed her bedroom door “a little bit,” and then took off C.F.’s pants and underwear.

While C.F. was lying on her back on the bed, Padilla held her legs up in the air,

“separating them,” and “started putting his mouth on [her] private part.” C.F.

testified that she remembered feeling Padilla’s tongue “licking [her] private part.”

She testified that this last for about five minutes, before Brother walked in.

      After Brother walked in, Padilla covered C.F.’s private part with a pillow and

“made a sign to not tell” before he walked out of the room. Brother told C.F. to put

her pants back on, and she and Brother went outside. She testified that she was not

wearing any shoes, so Brother gave her his shoes to wear. They walked to the corner

of the street and waited for police.

      Diane Donley, a DNA analyst at the Harris County Institute of Forensic

Sciences, testified that she conducted DNA analysis on the evidence collected in this

case. Donley testified that once she obtained a known saliva sample from Padilla,

she compared that known sample to portions of C.F.’s underwear. She testified that,

for area C of the underwear, which was taken from inside the crotch of the

                                          6
underwear, a sperm fraction test5 was conducted, and the DNA results obtained were

consistent with a mixture of DNA from three individuals. Donley testified that it

was 163 trillion times more likely that the DNA mixture came from C.F., Padilla,

and an unknown individual rather than from the complainant and two unknown

individuals. She explained that this “likelihood ratio of 163 trillion times . . .

provid[es] very strong support for the proposition that [Padilla] is a contributor to

the DNA obtained from . . . the inside of the crotch” of C.F.’s underwear.

      Donley testified that she was not able to identify the third contributor because

she did not have any other known DNA samples to use for comparison. However,

she explained that the DNA could have been from transferred skin cells that were

deposited on the underwear by touch, or there from sperm cells or saliva.

5
      Donley explained that when she is testing a sample for semen, “the sample will
      undergo a differential extraction and during that extraction, two fractions will occur
      at the end from one sample.” One will be the non-sperm fraction and the other is
      the sperm fraction. She stated that, ideally, any male DNA that may be in the sample
      will be isolated into the sperm fraction and the female DNA will be isolated into the
      non-sperm fraction. But she explained that it is not always possible to isolate male
      DNA from females, and they may obtain a mixture in the refraction. Donley also
      explained that although it is called a “sperm fraction,” that does not definitively
      mean that sperm is present. “It’s just how the fraction is named but we are isolating
      any male DNA from sperm that may be present but it is not indicative that it is
      present.” A separate test, a serology test, can be utilized to confirm the presence of
      sperm.

                                            7
      The jury found Padilla guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child.

Following the punishment phase, the trial court sentenced Padilla to 35 years in

prison.

                         Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      In his sole issue, Padilla points to several alleged errors committed by his trial

counsel that he contends, when reviewing the totality of the representation, resulted

in an overall deficient performance. Padilla acknowledges that this is not a case

where he can “point to a particular mistake made by trial counsel, and the

ramifications of that singular error.” But considering the totality of the record, he

maintains that his trial counsel’s representation was plainly ineffective.

      The legal analysis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires us to

consider the totality of counsel’s representation.6 To the extent Padilla argues that

we must look to trial counsel’s performance as a whole and not consider whether

each of the alleged errors, in isolation, amounts to ineffective assistance, we

disagree. Rather, if none of the alleged actions alone constitutes error—then such

non-errors taken together cannot “in their cumulative effect cause error.”7

Accordingly, we address each alleged error in turn.

6
      See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
7
      See Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also
      Straight v. State, 515 S.W.3d 553, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet.
      ref’d) (“Having concluded that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in
                                            8
A.    Standard of Review

      The United States Constitution, Texas Constitution, and Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure guarantee an accused the right to assistance of counsel. See U.S.

CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051. As

a matter of state and federal law, this right includes the right to reasonably effective

assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Ex

parte Gonzales, 945 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel’s performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness and that (2) there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694; Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011). A failure to make a showing under either prong of the Strickland

test defeats a claim for ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . .

that course should be followed.”); Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009).

      appellant’s complained of actions, we likewise conclude that the cumulative effect
      of trial counsel’s actions does not amount to ineffective assistance.”).

                                           9
      Under Strickland’s first prong, we must look to the totality of the

representation to determine the effectiveness of counsel—indulging a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance and was motivated by sound trial strategy. 466 U.S. at 689;

Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 482–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We “must be

highly deferential to trial counsel and avoid the deleterious effects of hindsight.”

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “The mere fact that

another attorney might have pursued a different tactic at trial does not suffice to

prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d

866, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

      Allegations of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record.

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14. In most cases, a direct appeal is an inadequate

vehicle for raising an ineffective assistance claim because the record is undeveloped,

and a silent record cannot adequately reflect the motives behind trial counsel’s

actions. See Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see

also Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

      When, as here, the record does not reveal the reasons for trial counsel’s

actions, we “will assume a strategic motivation if any can possibly be imagined.”

Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Trial counsel should

generally have an opportunity to explain his or her actions before we find the

                                         10
performance deficient. Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392. Without that opportunity,

we should not find trial counsel’s performance deficient “unless the challenged

conduct was ‘so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”

Id. (quoting Garcia, 57 S.W.3d at 440).

      In rare cases in which counsel’s ineffectiveness is apparent from the record,

an appellate court may address the claim on direct appeal. Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143.

But “the record must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, and that no reasonable trial strategy

could justify trial counsel’s acts or omissions, regardless of his or her subjective

reasoning.” Id.

      Under Strickland’s second prong, we must determine whether there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

That an error had “some conceivable effect on the outcome” will not suffice. Perez

v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Rather, there must be a

reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a

reasonable doubt with respect to guilt. Id.

                                          11
B.    Pre-trial Motions

      Padilla first directs this Court to his trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies related

to pre-trial motions. Padilla argues that his trial counsel filed only a small number

of pre-trial motions, including two motions for a hearing outside the presence of the

jury and a motion in limine. According to Padilla, his trial counsel never requested

a ruling on these motions. The only motion on which trial counsel received a ruling

was a motion to transfer.

      We first note that, like any other claim, an ineffective-assistance claim must

be properly briefed to present the issue for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1. Thus, a party who fails to support an ineffective-assistance claim with

supporting citations to authority waives the claim. See Nanez v. State, 346 S.W.3d

875, 876 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); Tufele v. State, 130 S.W.3d 267,

270–71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).8

      Padilla cites to no legal authority to support his arguments related to his trial

counsel’s acts or omissions in filing only a small number of pre-trial motions and

failing to obtain rulings on those motions. Nor does he explain how his trial

counsel’s acts or omissions related to the pre-trial motions constitute deficient

8
      See also Gutierrez v. State, No. 01-17-00734-CR, 2019 WL 5606627, at *7 (Tex.
      App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
      publication).

                                           12
performance or how he was harmed by these specific acts or omissions. 9 Thus, we

conclude that Padilla waived his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument related

to pre-trial motions. See Gutierrez v. State, No. 01-17-00734-CR, 2019 WL

5606627, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication); Nanez, 346 S.W.3d at 876; Tufele, 130 S.W.3d at

270–71.

      But, even if this argument were not waived, we would still conclude that,

based on the record before us, Padilla failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s

performance was constitutionally deficient. Failure to file pre-trial motions does not

result in ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel may decide not to file

pre-trial motions as part of his trial strategy. See Martinez v. State, 449 S.W.3d 193,

208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). “If [a] failure to file pre-trial

motions is not ineffective assistance, it necessarily follows that failing to obtain a

ruling is also not ineffective assistance.” Wills v. State, 867 S.W.2d 852, 857 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, unless an appellant

shows that the pretrial motion had merit and that a ruling on the motion would have

9
      See Nanez v. State, 346 S.W.3d 875, 876 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.)
      (“[N]either appellant nor his appellate attorney provided us with statutory or case
      citation purporting, in any way, to illustrate that the particular conduct of which they
      complained was unreasonable or deficient. Omitting such authority alone permits
      us to deem the issues inadequately briefed and, therefore, waived.”).

                                             13
changed the outcome of the case, counsel will not be ineffective for failing to assert

the motion. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

       Further, Padilla filed a motion for new trial but did not raise this ineffective-

assistance argument. Accordingly, the record is silent as to trial counsel’s strategy

for pursuing (or not pursuing) a particular pretrial motion and we must presume that

trial counsel’s performance was not deficient on this ground. See Lopez, 343 S.W.3d

at 143.10 He likewise raises no argument that had any of the pretrial motions filed

been ruled on, the outcome of the case would have changed. We therefore conclude

that Padilla has failed to satisfy either Strickland prong and, thus, he has failed to

demonstrate that defense counsel’s actions with respect to the filing of this motion

were constitutionally deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Williams, 301

S.W.3d at 687.

C.    Jury Selection

      Padilla next argues that his trial counsel “rendered plainly ineffective

assistance during the voir dire phase of trial” by failing to object to certain statements

made by the prosecutor during voir dire. According to Padilla, the prosecutor’s

statement that “around one in four girls and one in six boys experience some type of

10
      See also Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (in cases
      where record silent as to trial counsel’s reasoning, appellate court should find
      ineffective assistance only if challenged conduct so outrageous that no competent
      attorney would have engaged in it).

                                           14
sexual abuse in their lifetimes” was improper, and should have been objected to,

because there was no evidence before the jury as to this fact and the statement could

serve no purpose but to inflame the jury. Next, he argues the prosecutor’s statement

that if “the defendant is found not guilty, he’ll be free to leave. He’ll get on that

elevator with you and walk out of the courtroom,” was improper and intended to

frighten the jury pool.

      As with his argument related to pre-trial motions, Padilla fails to cite any legal

authority to support his arguments that the prosecutor’s above statements were

improper, that the failure to object to those statements amounted to deficient

performance, or that the failure to object to those statements harmed him.

Accordingly, we conclude that Padilla waived his ineffective assistance of counsel

argument related to voir dire. See Gutierrez, 2019 WL 5606627, at *7; Nanez, 346

S.W.3d at 876; Tufele, 130 S.W.3d at 270–71.

      But, even if these contentions were not waived, we still conclude that based

on the record before us, Padilla failed to demonstrate that his defense counsel’s

performance was constitutionally deficient. In that regard, the record contains no

indication why Padilla’s trial counsel chose not to object. To find trial counsel

ineffective would call for speculation, which we will not do. See Jackson v. State,

877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Garcia v. State, 106 S.W.3d 854, 860

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). Further, the rationale, if any, for

                                          15
that decision was not explored at trial, and the issue was not raised in a motion for

new trial. “Trial counsel ‘should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his

actions before being denounced as ineffective.’” Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591,

593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392). “If trial

counsel is not given that opportunity, then the appellate court should not find

deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was ‘so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Id. (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d

at 392).

      Here, the record is silent on trial court’s reason for not objecting, and her

failure to object to the prosecutor’s two remarks is not so outrageous as to warrant

speculation into the matter. Thus, we must presume that counsel’s performance was

not deficient on this ground. See Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143; see also Goodspeed, 187

S.W.3d at 392.

D.    Failure to Object at Trial

      Padilla next argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to object to various pieces of evidence at trial. “When an ineffective

assistance claim alleges that counsel was deficient in failing to object to the

admission of evidence, the defendant must show, as part of his claim, that the

                                         16
evidence was inadmissible.” Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002).11

       1.     Sexual Assault Examination Report

       Padilla first argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to object to the admission of C.F.’s sexual assault examination report,

conducted by Tuesday Sowers, because it contained hearsay statements of C.F.

Padilla acknowledges the Rule 803(4) exception to the hearsay rule for statements

made for medical diagnosis and treatment but argues that this exception does not

apply here because the complainant was not seeking medical diagnosis or treatment;

rather, this was a forensic examination requested by police. Thus, Padilla argues

that this evidence was inadmissible, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to it.

       Hearsay—a statement not made by the declarant while testifying at trial that

a party offers into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted—is generally

inadmissible. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d), 802. However, this general prohibition does not

bar a statement made for and reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment

that “describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their

11
       See also Prine v. State, 537 S.W.3d 113, 117–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The
       failure to object will not support a claim of ineffective assistance unless the trial
       judge would have erred in overruling the objection.”).

                                            17
inception; or their general cause.” TEX. R. EVID 803(4)(A)–(B). This exception may

encompass medical records documenting the sexual abuse of children. See, e.g.,

Sandoval v. State, 52 S.W.3d 851, 856–57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001,

pet. ref’d) (trial court did not err in admitting medical records in their entirety).

      Sowers is a registered nurse who is certified as a sexual assault nurse examiner

(SANE) through the Office of the Attorney General in Texas. Sowers explained that

when she conducts a SANE exam on a child or adolescent, she takes a “detailed

history of what has occurred,” conducts a “head-to-toe assessment assessing for

trauma and injuries,” followed by a “detailed ano-genital exam assessing for injury

or trauma,” and finally, if needed, she collects and preserves evidence. Sowers

testified that it is important to collect a medical history from the child so that she

“can come up with a medical diagnosis.”

      Sowers testified that she examined C.F. in the early morning hours of July 7,

2020. As part of her examination, Sowers completed a five-page report. The report

included C.F.’s relevant medical history, her description of the alleged abuse, the

results of Sowers’ physical examination of C.F., and Sowers’ impressions. Sowers

stated in her report that the “[h]ead to toe exam reveals no acute trauma or injuries”

and that the “[a]no-genital exam reveals no acute trauma or injuries.” This report

was admitted into evidence as part of Exhibit 10, with no objection from Padilla’s

trial counsel. During her testimony, Sowers referred to C.F.’s statements related to

                                           18
her description of the alleged abuse that were contained in the report, including her

statements that Padilla touched her private part with his mouth.

      We disagree with Padilla’s contention that Sowers’ sexual assault

examination of C.F. was part of a criminal investigation and not made for the

purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, and therefore, inadmissible under Rule

803(4). In fact, we have previously rejected this precise argument. See Martinez v.

State, No. 01-15-00823-CR, 2016 WL 6803233, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Nov. 17, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In

Martinez, we reiterated that the purpose of these sexual assault examinations is to

ascertain whether the child was sexual abused and whether the child needs medical

attention. See id. (citing Sandoval, 52 S.W.3d at 857).12 And, we held that the

pediatric nurse’s sexual assault examination report, containing among other things

the complainant’s description of the alleged abuse, was prepared for the purpose of

ascertaining whether the child was sexually abused and whether the child needed

medical attention and was therefore admissible under Rule 803(4). Id.

      As demonstrated by Sowers’ testimony in this case, and contents of her report,

the purpose of the exam was to obtain a “detailed history of what has occurred” and

12
      See also Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet.
      ref’d) (holding that, because “[t]he object of a sexual assault exam is to ascertain
      whether the child has been sexually abused and to determine whether further
      medical attention is needed[,] . . . statements describing acts of sexual abuse are
      pertinent to the victim’s medical diagnosis and treatment”).

                                           19
assessment of the child for injuries and trauma, in order to come up with a medical

diagnosis and treat any injuries. Because Padilla has not shown that the sexual

assault examination report was inadmissible, he has not demonstrated that trial

counsel was deficient for failing to object. See Ortiz, 93 S.W.3d at 93. Thus, Padilla

has failed to satisfy the first prong of Strickland.13

      2.     Statements by Prosecutor Presuming Guilt of Accused

      Padilla next asserts that his trial counsel failed to object to questions by the

prosecutor that “presumed the guilt of the accused.” Specifically, Padilla asserts that

the prosecutor’s question to Friendswood Police Department Sergeant D. Wilkerson,

“did you come to learn in which room the abuse occurred,” was deficient because

the officer did not witness the alleged offense or have any knowledge if any abuse

had been committed.

      As with many of Padilla’s other arguments, he cites no legal authority to

support his argument that this question and the elicited response were inadmissible

13
      Even if this evidence were inadmissible and the failure to object constituted
      deficiency, Padilla cannot satisfy the second prong of Strickland because C.F.’s
      statements in the sexual assault examination report describing the alleged assault
      was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence at trial, including the testimony
      of C.F. and Brother. See McNeil v. State, 452 S.W.3d 408, 419–20 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (admission of hearsay evidence was cumulative
      and its admission harmless and, therefore, lack of objection to hearsay evidence was
      not ineffective assistance).

                                           20
and, thus, that trial counsel’s failure to object was deficient. Nor does he identify a

specific objection that trial counsel should have made but did not.

      But even assuming that this evidence was inadmissible and that trial counsel’s

failure to object was deficient, Padilla cannot satisfy the second prong of Strickland

because the officer’s response that the abuse occurred in C.F.’s bedroom was

cumulative of other properly admitted evidence at trial. See McNeil v. State, 452

S.W.3d 408, 419–20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). For instance,

both C.F. and Brother testified that the sexual assault occurred in C.F.’s bedroom.

      C.F. testified that Padilla carried her to her bedroom, closed the door, and

placed her on her back on her bed. She testified that Padilla removed her pants and

underwear, spread her legs apart, and placed his tongue on her “private part.” C.F.

testified that Padilla “lick[ed] [her] private part” for about five minutes, until her

brother walked in. Brother similarly testified that he walked into C.F.’s bedroom

and saw C.F. lying on her back on the bed with her legs up in the air while Padilla

knelt in front of the bed with his mouth on C.F.’s vagina.

      Because the unobjected-to evidence was cumulative, any error in its

admission was harmless. Thus, Padilla cannot show that the lack of objection

constituted ineffective assistance. See id.

                                          21
E.    Closing Argument

      Padilla next asserts that his trial counsel “abandoned her role as an advocate

for the accused” during closing argument, though he concedes this was not “the most

damaging to [his] case.” Padilla argues that by telling the jury to take her argument

“with a grain of salt,” his trial counsel was essentially washing her hands of her

client. He also argues that trial counsel essentially apologized for representing her

client, by saying:

      So it’s up to you to decide what happened. To what extent can I say to
      you it didn’t happen? I don’t know. I wasn’t there. I heard the evidence
      and I will always go in favor of my client and I will ask you to find the
      defendant not guilty.

Finally, Padilla asserts that his trial counsel should have, but did not, mention the

“critical” inconsistencies between C.F.’s and Brother’s testimony.14 Rather, he

contends that trial counsel only made a “futile argument that runs contrary to the

14
      Some of the “critical” inconsistencies Padilla points out include:

          • C.F.’s testimony that she did not eat the night of the assault; Brother’s
            testimony that he made dinner for C.F.

          • C.F.’s testimony that Padilla sat by himself eating at the dining table;
            Brother’s testimony that Padilla did not eat but was drinking.

          • C.F.’s testimony that Padilla came home from work on the night of the
            assault; Brother’s testimony that Padilla was not working at the time of the
            assault.

      Padilla does not point to any inconsistencies between C.F.’s testimony related to the
      assault itself and what Brother testified that he witnessed.

                                           22
evidence,” i.e., that Brother was angry at Padilla and did not want to live with him.15

Padilla contends that if these omissions do not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel, “it is difficult to imagine what could.”

      The right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses closing arguments of

the defense. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). Closing arguments involve

inherently tactical decisions that must be tailored to the strategy of the defense based

on events that transpired during trial. Id.; Ex parte Scott, 541 S.W.3d 104, 119 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). Accordingly, deference to counsel’s strategic decisions during

closing arguments is particularly important because of the wealth of legitimate

strategies that can be employed, and those decisions will be second-guessed only if

there is no plausible basis for the attorney’s actions. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 6;

Scott, 541 S.W.3d at 119.

      Again, we note that Padilla fails to cite to any legal authority to support his

argument that trial counsel’s statements (or omissions) during closing argument

were deficient. And although Padilla filed a motion for new trial in this case, he did

not assert this ineffective assistance argument in that motion and, therefore, the

15
      As the State pointed out, this argument was not contrary to the evidence as Padilla
      suggests. During cross-examination, Brother agreed that he was not happy that he
      had to move in with Padilla and explained that he “had no choice.” He also
      characterized his relationship with Padilla as “okay” and conceded during cross-
      examination that he never had a “close relationship” with Padilla and that they “just
      didn’t cross paths.”

                                           23
record is silent as to his trial counsel’s specific strategy during closing argument. See

Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 592–93.16

      Furthermore, attempting to persuade a jury to convict a defendant of a lesser-

included offense or even conceding the defendant’s guilt has been held to constitute

a reasonable trial strategy. See Hathorn v. State, 848 S.W.2d 101, 118 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1992); Guzman v. State, 539 S.W.3d 394, 408–09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d).17      Likewise, courts have concluded that in some

circumstances, trial counsel’s decision to forego closing argument entirely is not

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 6; Forge v. State, No.

13-13-00120-CR, 2013 WL 7864083, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

Dec. 5, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that trial

counsel “may have chosen not to make a closing argument urging a lesser sentence

because that may have led the prosecutor to invoke his right to make a closing

16
      Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“[T]rial
      counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before
      being denounced as ineffective.”); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tex. Crim.
      App. 2002) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not built on retrospective
      speculation; they must ‘be firmly founded in the record.’”).
17
      See also Jordan v. State, 859 S.W.2d 418, 421–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
      1993, no pet.) (“It is logical to conclude that trial counsel, faced with overwhelming
      evidence of [defendant]’s guilt, chose to placate the jurors rather than to possibly
      antagonize them with an impassioned, though weakly supported, plea for a verdict
      of not guilty.”).

                                            24
argument, which may have resulted in a harsher sentence” and, thus, rejecting

appellant’s argument of ineffective assistance).

      Here, Padilla’s trial counsel did not go so far as to forego closing argument

entirely or concede guilt. Rather, instead of focusing on minor inconsistencies

between witness testimony, she chose to remind the jury of its role in evaluating the

evidence and to not be controlled by emotions but to review the evidence.18 And

given the overwhelming strength of the State’s evidence in this case, we cannot say

that such a strategy by Padilla’s trial counsel would have been illogical or

unreasonable. Cf. Hathorn, 848 S.W.2d at 118; Jordan, 859 S.W.2d at 421–22.

      For this same reason, the overwhelming evidence of Padilla’s guilt also

renders Padilla unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s

closing argument. Padilla makes no attempt to show that, but for his trial counsel’s

closing argument, a reasonable probability exists that he would have been found not

guilty. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

      In fact, Padilla all but concedes that he was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s

closing argument, stating in his brief: “The pinnacle of ineffective assistance, in this

case, occurred during closing argument. While not the most damaging to the

18
      For instance, trial counsel admonished the jury that “these cases are very emotional,
      extremely emotional” and that these types of cases can be dangerous “[b]ecause
      emotions usually close our eyes and we just go for it.” Because of that, trial counsel
      reminded the jury to “read the Court’s instructions” and to talk amongst themselves
      “and then decide on the evidence.”

                                            25
[Padilla’s] case, it shows most clearly how trial counsel had abandoned her role as

an advocate for the accused.” (Emphasis added). Faced with C.F.’s testimony,

Brother’s eyewitness testimony of the assault, his 9-1-1 call, C.F.’s statements

during her sexual assault examination, and the DNA evidence, we cannot conclude

that a reasonable probability exists that he would have been found not guilty, even

if trial counsel presented the closing argument urged by Padilla.

      Without evidence of trial counsel’s strategy for closing argument, and based

on the overwhelming evidence of Padilla’s guilt, we conclude that Padilla has failed

to establish either that trial counsel’s closing argument was deficient or that, but for

this deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Thus, he has failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland. See 466 U.S. at 694–98.

      We overrule Padilla’s sole issue.

                                     Conclusion

      We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment in all things.

                                                      Terry Adams
                                                      Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas-Molloy.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           26