Court Opinion

ID: 9744256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:58:35.838035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.027151
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McGLOON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from that part of my colleagues’ opinion regarding the interpretation and construction of the will. The primary goal of construing a will is determining the intent of the testator. (In re Estate of Rettig (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 653, 427 N.E.2d 235.) Intent is generally ascertained from the language of the will (Rettig) and every word, phrase and clause should be given effect. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bailey (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 433 N.E.2d 1098. wellyn (1966), 67 Ill. App. 2d 171, 214 N.E.2d 471.) “[W]hen the word ‘issue’ is used in reference to the parent of that issue, as where the issue are to take the share of the deceased parent, it must mean his children, that is, the word ‘parent’ confines the word ‘issue’ to children of the taker.” (Arnold, v. Alden (1898), 173 Ill. 229, 239, 50 N.E. 704, 708; Trustees of Schools v. Steele (1965), 54 Ill. App. 2d 337, 203 N.E.2d 605, rev’d on other grounds (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 575, 216 N.E.2d 786.) In the present case the testator provided that the issue will take the share of their parent when the parent dies. The trial court did not err in determining that within the context of this will the testator intended the word “issue” to refer only to her grandchildren. Therefore, the will does not violate the rule against perpetuities as argued by appellant. Only if section 9(b) were considered alone would it be appropriate to allow the children’s issue (here, Walter) to receive the trust income. However, section 9(c) expressly provides that at the death of the surviving daughter, the entire net income from the trust is to be paid to the testator’s nieces. The trial court’s construction of section 9 does not give effect to the intent of the testator as expressed in section 9(c) of the will. Also, as evidenced by the following remarks, the trial court added words of contingency to section 9(c): “[Ernestine O’Brien] wanted to give [the net income] to her daughters, share and share alike. If one dies, she didn’t know anything about children, the whole net income, she says to us, goes to the other daughter. In the event that daughter dies, I’m reading in, and has no survivors, it goes, *** to the two nieces. *** What I’m doing then is saying that a reasonable, you know, addition, by way of construction, ‘C’ should have read upon the death of the survivor, — now that’s talking about the one that survives, that’s only talking about the daughters, — if there be no issue, the entire net income, — and now we are moving the net income from the last survivor who is gone, the two daughters are gone and there is no issue, it goes to the two nieces. But I’m aware there is an issue.” (Emphasis added.) In construing this section, the trial court concluded the testator would have provided for the surviving grandchild of the last surviving daughter had she known of his existence. Having made this determination, the trial court proceeded to supply the omitted language. I would find that the trial court improperly added the condition that the surviving daughter die without issue before the nieces could receive any interest in the trust. A court may neither read words of condition into unconditional provisions (Rosenthal v. First National Bank (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 266, 239 N.E.2d 826) nor supply omissions under the guise that a particular provision would probably have been made if the testator had anticipated the occurrence of subsequent events. (In re Estate of Hayden (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 242, 318 N.E.2d 668.) This is so even if the scheme of distribution is illogical. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bailey (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 433 N.E.2d 1098. I find that Walter Serabian’s interest under the will was a contingent life estate per autre vie. The duration of his interest would have been measured by the life of the surviving daughter Marjorie. The interest was contingent in that it would not vest unless his mother Virginia predeceased Maijorie, which event did not happen here. As noted above, upon the death of the surviving daughter, the net income of the trust is to be paid to the surviving nieces. If the testator intended that her daughters’ issue enjoy a life interest in the trust income upon the death of the surviving daughter, appropriate language could have easily been used. The testator did not do so. Admittedly, the conclusions of the trial court and the majority are emotionally appealing. However, the law is that the language of the will is controlling. Here, the will provides that the nieces’ interests vested at the death of the last surviving daughter. For all the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings.