Court Opinion

ID: 9851374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:11:33.76113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:54.634479
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
In June 1990, Tommy J. Dees (Insured) purchased a standard fire insurance policy from Southern General Insurance Company (Insurer). The policy covered Insured’s residence and the contents thereof for a one-year period and listed Tippins Bank & Trust Company (Lienholder) as a loss payee. In May 1991, Insurer mailed a renewal notice to Insured, informing him that the policy would expire on June 18, 1991 unless the renewal premium was paid before that date. No such notice was sent to the lienholder. Thereafter, the renewal premium was not paid and, on July 5,1991, Insured’s residence and its contents were destroyed by fire. When a claim for payment under the policy was denied, Insured and Lienholder filed suit against Insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Insured and Lienholder, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Tippins Bank &c. Co., 213 Ga. App. 176 (444 SE2d 331) (1994). We granted certiorari in order to review the holding of the Court of Appeals and a majority of this Court affirms that holding. In my opinion, the trial court was correct and the Court of Appeals erred. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
The “cancellation” of an insurance policy differs from the “non-renewal” thereof. Goodley v. Fireman’s Fund American Life Ins. Co., 173 Ga. App. 277 (326 SE2d 7) (1985); Robertson v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 807, 808 (3) (204 SE2d 505) (1974). OCGA § 33-24-44 deals with the “cancellation” of policies in general. OCGA § 33-24-46 specifically addresses both the “cancellation” and the “nonrenewal” of certain property insurance policies, while OCGA § 33-24-45 specifically addresses “cancellation” and “nonrenewal” of *100automobile policies. There can be no “cancellation” requirement as to a policy which has been the subject of a previous “nonrenewal.” Goodley, supra; Robertson, supra. The policy at issue here provides property insurance as contemplated by OCGA § 33-24-46. Accordingly, the first issue for resolution is whether, under OCGA § 33-24-46, there was a “nonrenewal” of Insured’s policy so that the coverage expired as of June 18, 1991.
OCGA § 33-24-46 (d) provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o insurer shall refuse to renew a policy . . . unless a written notice of nonrenewal is mailed or delivered in person to the named insured.” The error that I perceive in the holdings of both the Court of Appeals and the majority relates to the construction given to this language of OCGA § 33-24-46 (d). I would hold that, under this language, it is incumbent upon the insurer to effectuate a nonrenewal of the policy and an insurer’s failure to give the requisite notice of nonrenewal results in the automatic renewal thereof. See Bank of Toccoa v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 211 Ga. App. 389, 393 (2) (439 SE2d 60) (1993) and Ga. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mims, 187 Ga. App. 783, 784 (2) (371 SE2d 426) (1988) (construing the identical language of OCGA § 33-24-45 (e) (1)). Compare Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fox, 142 Ga. App. 706 (236 SE2d 851) (1977) (decided prior to enactment of OCGA § 33-24-46)). If this language mandates an automatic renewal of automobile insurance for failure of the insurer to give notice of nonrenewal under OCGA § 33-24-45 (e) (1), then the identical language of OCGA § 33-24-46 (d) mandates an automatic renewal of property insurance under that same circumstance. Statutes are not to be construed in a vacuum, but in relation to other statutes of which they are a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together, and harmonized wherever possible. East West Express v. Collins, 264 Ga. 774, 775 (1) (449 SE2d 599) (1994). It is undisputed that Insurer did not provide any notice of its refusal to renew Insured’s policy. To the contrary, Insurer affirmatively gave notice of its intent to renew the policy. Accordingly, if OCGA § 33-24-46 (d) applies here, Insured’s policy was renewed automatically on June 18, 1991 as the result of Insurer’s failure to give notice of nonrenewal.
With regard to automobile insurance, the automatic renewal provision of OCGA § 33-24-45 (e) does not apply in certain enumerated instances, including the case wherein the insurer has “manifested its willingness to renew” the policy. OCGA § 33-24-45 (f) (3). Thus, if this case involved automobile insurance, the insurer’s giving of notice of its intent to renew the policy would preclude a finding of automatic renewal based on the failure of the insurer to give notice of nonrenewal. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Brown, 261 Ga. 837 (413 SE2d 430) (1992); Smith v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 171 Ga. App. 26 (318 SE2d 708) (1984); Garner v. GEICO, 129 Ga. App. 235 (199 *101SE2d 350) (1973). However, this case involves property insurance within the ambit of OCGA § 33-24-46, rather than automobile insurance controlled by the provisions of OCGA § 33-24-45. At all relevant times, there was no language in OCGA § 33-24-46 comparable to that of OCGA § 33-24-45 (f) (3), which would render the automatic renewal provision of OCGA § 33-24-46 (d) inapplicable in a case wherein the insurer has “manifested its willingness to renew.”
The majority posits that the amendment to OCGA § 33-24-46 (b) (1), which became effective on July 1, 1995, constitutes comparable language to that of OCGA § 33-24-45 (f) (3). However, even assuming that the majority is correct in its interpretation of the substantive effect of that amendment, it has no applicability here. It is the latest applicable expression of the legislative intent which controls. Gunn v. Balkcom, 228 Ga. 802, 804 (188 SE2d 500) (1972) (holding that there was no valid law defining the crime of foeticide at the time the criminal defendant committed the acts for which he was convicted of that crime). The amendment to OCGA § 33-24-46 (b) (1) may be the latest expression of the legislative intent, but it is not applicable to the resolution of a case, such as this, which is controlled by the law as it existed prior to July 1, 1995. In cases involving statutory construction, this Court will not give a retroactive interpretation unless the language of the enactment itself mandates that interpretation. Wilmoth v. Henry County, 251 Ga. 643, 644 (2) (309 SE2d 126) (1983). There is nothing in the language of the amendment to OCGA § 33-24-46 (b) (1) which mandates its application to events occurring prior to July 1, 1995. It follows that, regardless of Insurer’s notice of its intent to renew, the property insurance policy in this case was renewed automatically on June 18, 1991 as the result of Insurer’s failure to give notice of nonrenewal in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-46 (d).
Since Insured’s policy was renewed automatically for a one-year term on June 18, 1991, the policy would be in effect on July 5, 1991 unless it had been cancelled in the interim. No cancellation of a property insurance policy within the ambit of OCGA § 33-24-46 “shall be effective unless mailed or delivered as prescribed in Code Section 33-24-44.” OCGA § 33-24-46 (c) (1). Under OCGA § 33-24-44 (d), a failure on the part of the insured to make premium payments authorizes the insurer to cancel the policy by giving ten days’ written notice. Thus, notwithstanding the automatic renewal of the policy on June 18, 1991 resulting from Insurer’s failure to give notice of nonrenewal, Insurer could have cancelled the policy within ten days based upon Insured’s failure to have timely paid the renewal premium. However, it is undisputed that Insurer did not give Insured and Lienholder notice of cancellation in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-44 (d). It follows that, because the automatically renewed policy was not validly cancelled prior to the date of the fire, the trial court correctly granted *102summary judgment in favor of Insured and Lienholder on the issue of coverage. See Bank of Toccoa v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., supra at 393 (2). Accordingly, I would hold that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing that correct judgment and I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s contrary holding.
Decided December 4, 1995 —
Reconsideration denied December 18, 1995.
Franklin, Taulbee, Rushing, Bunce & Brogdon, W. M. Brogdon, Jr., for appellants.
Groover & Childs, Denmark Groover, Jr., Newton, Smith, Durden, Kaufold & Rice, Wilson, R. Smith, for appellee.
Long, Aldridge & Norman, W. Stell Huie, amicus curiae.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.