Court Opinion

ID: 9584431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:48:12.589097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:48.968731
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.
I concur in the conclusion that Wells, at the time he attacked the prison guard, was “. . . undergoing a life sentence in a State prison ...” within the meaning of section 4500 of the Penal Code. The decisions of this court uniformly declare that a sentence for a minimum term of years is one for life unless and until reduced. The penal history of Wells conclusively shows that in refusing to remit any portion of his sentence, the Adult Authority committed no abuse of discretion but, on the contrary, exercised sound judgment.
However, the second ground of Wells’ petition presents a question which, if more broadly stated, would require a reexamination of the evidence upon which he was convicted. He *896asserts that he was denied due process of law by the decision of this court upon rulings of the trial judge excluding testimony. I agree that upon the appeal from the judgment, the “appraisal of the effect of the erroneously excluded evidence” did not violate any constitutional guaranty. This answer meets the narrow issue tendered by the allegations of the petition but ignores the basic question which is stated in the points and authorities in support of Wells’ demand for relief upon constitutional grounds.
In the petitioner’s brief that question is presented as follows:
“A. Petitioner at his trial . . . was not allowed to present to the jury his only major defense; i.e., evidence regarding his state of mind and intent at the time of the alleged act;
“B. The matter of the intent with which an act is done is within the exclusive province of the jury. ’ ’ Strictly speaking, these charges are not pleaded as one of the formal grounds for habeas corpus. But unquestionably counsel is not basing his claim of lack of due process solely upon the action of this court in considering the evidence tendered at the trial. His argument challenges the rulings of the trial judge and is built upon the premise that intent is an essential element of the crime of which Wells was convicted.
Under such circumstances, and particularly with human life at stake, niceties of pleading should not be the decisive factor in this court’s conclusions. Justice requires a determination of the question as to whether the exclusion of the evidence offered by Wells upon the trial violated constitutional guarantees. As to that question, I again state my conclusions concerning it as follows: ‘‘ The refusal to admit such evidence allows one to be convicted of the crime defined by section 4500 of the Penal Code without proof of the requisite mental intent specified by the statute and constitutes a denial of due process of law ...” and “. . . the ruling necessarily constitutes a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of section 4% of Article VI of the Constitution.” (People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 359 [202 P.2d 53].)
For these reasons, in my opinion the writ of habeas corpus should issue.
Carter, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.