Court Opinion

ID: 9407739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-08 19:09:57.869826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.873998
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00032-CV

                                    COURT OF APPEALS

                        THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                           CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

                       IN THE INTEREST OF R.R.G. IV, A CHILD

                   On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
                            of Nueces County, Texas.

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

       Appellants A.A.N.P. (Alexis) and R.G. III (Ryan)1 appeal from the trial court’s final

order terminating their parental rights to R.R.G. IV (Roger). Alexis and Ryan both argue

that the trial court’s jurisdiction was extinguished when it failed to render an order

extending the automatic dismissal date prior to the deadline lapsing. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 263.401(b). Alexis additionally argues that the trial court erred by: (1) terminating

       1   We identify the parties and child in this case by aliases. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
her parental rights when the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that it

was in Roger’s best interest; and (2) denying her motion for new trial based on newly

discovered evidence.2 We affirm.

                                I.     PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On May 10, 2021, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the

Department) filed an original petition for the protection of Roger and to terminate the

parental rights of Alexis and Ryan. According to the affidavit in support of removal

attached to the petition, the Department received a report of potential child neglect on

May 4, 2021. As part of its preliminary investigation, the Department learned that Roger

was born testing positive for methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), amphetamine,

and benzodiazepine. Alexis submitted to a urinalysis test, which yielded positive results

for methamphetamine.

       That same day, the trial court signed an order removing the child from the parents’

custody and appointing the Department as temporary managing conservator. Throughout

the course of the proceedings, Alexis was permitted two-hour supervised visits with Roger

twice weekly. On May 16, 2022, the trial court signed an order requiring Alexis to complete

inpatient drug treatment.

       Trial commenced on November 7, 2022. At the conclusion of trial, the court took

the matter under advisement. On December 28, 2022, the trial court signed an order

terminating Alexis’s and Ryan’s parental rights and finding that the termination was in

Roger’s best interest. Alexis filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered

       2   We have renumbered Alexis’s issues.
                                                 2
evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. This accelerated appeal followed. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4.

                                    II.    JURISDICTION

       Alexis and Ryan contend that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the termination

proceedings by failing to extend the automatic dismissal deadline.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       “Before a court may enter judgment against a party, the court must have obtained

jurisdiction over that party pursuant to applicable rules or statutes.” Whatley v. Walker,

302 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). A judgment is

void when the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction over the parties or property,

no jurisdiction over the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or

no capacity to act. In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tex. 2020). We review whether a

trial court has jurisdiction de novo. Joyner v. Joyner, 352 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2011, no pet.).

       “Section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code establishes a deadline for rendition of

a final order in suits affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCRs) brought by the

[Department].” In re Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 611 (Tex.

2006) (orig. proceeding) (op. on reh’g). This provision requires trial courts to commence

a trial on the merits by “the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court

rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing

conservator.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a). If the trial court finds certain

extraordinary circumstances exist, the statute allows the trial court to extend the deadline

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by a maximum of 180 days. Id. § 263.401(b); In re Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,

210 S.W.3d at 612. “But if the trial court neither commences trial by the dismissal date

nor extends it in accordance with [§] 263.401(b), the statute dictates a dire consequence:

the trial court’s jurisdiction over the suit ‘is terminated and the suit is automatically

dismissed.’” In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Tex. 2021) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.401(a)).

B.     Analysis

       On May 10, 2021, the trial court rendered a temporary order appointing the

Department as temporary managing conservator. This made the automatic dismissal date

May 16, 2022. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a). At a docket call on May 5, 2022,

the Department and counsel for Alexis informed the trial court that the automatic dismissal

deadline was looming and that the trial court had not extended the deadline yet. Counsel

for Ryan announced that he was not ready for trial. Counsel for Alexis discussed her

client’s attempts to begin inpatient drug treatment and stated the case “need[ed] an

extension.” The trial court pronounced, “Okay. I’ll order the [263.]401 [extension], but let’s

set it for trial. If she gets into treatment—I mean, that’s the goal here. . . . If she’s in

treatment in 45 days, my inclination will be to let her finish her treatment.” However, the

trial court failed to explicitly make the findings mandated by § 263.401(b). See id.

§ 263.401(b). No party objected to the trial court’s oral rendition of the extension or its

omission of the required findings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). On May 27, 2022, the trial

court signed a written order setting the new dismissal date as November 13, 2022, and

explicitly finding “that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the subject child[

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]remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department and that

continuing the appointment of the Department as temporary managing conservator is in

the best interest of the subject child.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b).

       We conclude the trial court’s pronouncement that it would “order the [263.]401

[extension]” was sufficient to extend the mandatory dismissal deadline. See id. § 101.026;

In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 299 (explaining that Texas Family Code § 101.026 “permits

trial courts to render orders orally in the presence of the court reporter”); see also In re

J.P., No. 13-18-00648-CV, 2020 WL 103858, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

Jan. 9, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the trial court rendered judgment when

it stated, “The Court will approve the agreement of the parties and I will order the release

of [Mother]”). However, both Alexis and Ryan urge that because the trial court failed to

explicitly make the findings required by § 263.401(b) prior to the expiration of the original

dismissal deadline, the trial court’s attempt to extend the deadline was ineffective. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b).

       “[T]rial courts must expressly make the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and ‘best

interest’ findings” required by § 263.401(b) “either in a written order or orally at a hearing,

and their failure to do so is error.” In re J.S., No. 22-0420, 2023 WL 4036262, at *7 (Tex.

June 16, 2023). But “a trial court’s failure to make the mandatory [§] 263.401(b) findings

expressly does not affect the separate jurisdictional inquiry.” Id. at *9; see id. at *12

(concluding that “a trial court’s failure to make the mandatory ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ and ‘best interest’ findings prior to the initial automatic dismissal deadline

is a non-jurisdictional error”). Accordingly, the failure of the trial court to explicitly make

                                              5
the findings required by § 263.401(b) prior to the original dismissal deadline did not

deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. See In re J.S., 2023 WL 4036262, at *12. Further,

because Alexis and Ryan did not object below to the trial court’s failure to explicitly make

the required findings prior to the original dismissal deadline, any other complaints they

raise concerning this issue were not preserved for our review. See id. (“Because Mother

did not object to the trial court’s failure to comply with the non-jurisdictional findings

requirement prior to the initial automatic dismissal deadline, that error cannot be

addressed for the first time on appeal.”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

       We overrule Ryan’s sole issue and Alexis’s first issue.

                            III.   BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

       In her second issue, Alexis argues that the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to find that termination of her parental rights was in Roger’s best interest.

A.     Applicable Law

       “A parent’s right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management’ of her

children is a constitutional interest ‘far more precious than any property right.’” In re

D.S.P., 210 S.W.3d 776, 778 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, no pet.)

(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982)). “Because the natural right

between a parent and his child is one of constitutional dimensions, Holick v. Smith, 685

S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985), termination proceedings must be strictly scrutinized.” In re

K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014). “In parental termination cases, due process

requires application of the clear and convincing standard of proof.” Id. “‘Clear and

convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind

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of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be

established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007.

        To terminate parental rights, a court must find one of the grounds for termination

specified in § 161.001(b)(1) of the family code and that termination is in the best interest

of the child. Id. § 161.001(b)(1), (2). 3 “[T]here is a strong presumption that the best

interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a parent.” In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d

112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). In determining the best interest of the child, courts

may consider the following non-exhaustive factors:

        (1)      the desires of the children;

        (2)      the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;

        (3)      the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;

        (4)      the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;

        (5)      the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best
                 interest of the child;

        (6)      the plans for the children by the parents;

        (7)      the stability of the home or proposed placement;

        (8)      the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate the existing
                 parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and

         3 Alexis’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds that she: (1) knowingly placed or allowed

Roger to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being, see
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D); (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangered Roger’s physical or emotional well-being, id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E); (3) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the
actions necessary to obtain Roger’s return and that Roger had been in the permanent or temporary
managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of Roger’s removal
from Alexis because of the abuse or neglect of Roger, id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O); and (4) used a controlled
substance, as defined by Chapter 481 of the health and safety code, in a manner that endangered the
health or safety of the child, and either failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment
program or after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program continued to abuse a
controlled substance, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(P). Alexis does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
to support these grounds.
                                                      7
       (9)     any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). However, there is no requirement

that the trial court hear evidence concerning each of the Holley factors, and the trial court

is permitted to consider additional factors in determining a child’s best interest. See In re

D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (citing Holley, 544

S.W.2d at 371–72). “While no one factor is controlling, analysis of a single factor may be

adequate in a particular factual situation to support a finding that termination is in the best

interest of the child.” In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2017, pet. denied). In child protection cases brought by the Department, there is also a

presumption that “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment

is . . . in the child’s best interest.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307.

       “In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light

most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have

formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,

266 (Tex. 2002). We “assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its

finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so,” and we “disregard all evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. If, after

this review of the evidence, we determine “that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm

belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true,” then the evidence is legally

insufficient. Id.

       “In reviewing termination findings for factual sufficiency of the evidence, we

consider and weigh all the evidence, including disputed or conflicting evidence.” In re

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L.C.L., 599 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (en banc).

The appropriate inquiry is “whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably

form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the [Department]’s allegations.” In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)). “Because

the factfinder ‘is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor,’ appellate

review must defer to the trial court’s factual determinations, even in parental termination

cases.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (footnotes omitted).

B.     Evidence

       At the final hearing, the following evidence was presented:

       1.     Kennedy Toungate’s Testimony

       Kennedy Toungate, a caseworker for the Department, testified that Roger was

removed at birth because both he and Alexis tested positive for “ecstasy, opiates,

methamphetamine, amphetamines, and benzodiazepine.” Toungate explained that a

family service plan was created, and that as part of this plan, Alexis was required to

complete parenting classes, individual therapy, psychological and psychosocial

assessments, and a drug assessment. Alexis was also required to submit to random drug

screenings and to allow a Department representative access to her home.

       Alexis was allowed supervised visits with Roger, and Toungate opined that these

visits had “gone fairly well” with Alexis behaving “pretty age appropriate[ly,] aside from

maybe giving [Roger] a bottle when he’s no longer on the bottle, and . . . one time where

she lunged at me with the child in her arms. But other than that, she’s been appropriate.”

Toungate expanded on this incident, explaining that Alexis “picked up the child, she

                                            9
lunged at me, and she was calling me—she was calling me names while holding the child

in her hands.” Alexis told Toungate “that she would not be handing the child over to

[Toungate] after that visitation was over and that [Toungate] would need to call law

enforce[]ment, which [Toungate] did.” Toungate believed this behavior was “not safe for

a child.”

       Toungate agreed that Alexis had completed her individual counseling. Alexis also

“completed drug courses in October of 2021,” but Alexis then relapsed on

methamphetamine, and the Department recommended she enroll in a relapse prevention

program. Alexis did not do so. Toungate testified that the Department would also “ask

[Alexis] to drug test once a week, once every other week, and she—most of the times,

she would not drug test.” Toungate explained that “the Department offered to take her

and even set up transportation for her and she did not complete those tests.” Toungate

added that the last time Alexis completed a drug test for the Department was August 19,

2022, despite asking Alexis to test every week between then and November 3, 2022.

Toungate also explained that she was not able to testify to the safety of Alexis’s residence,

as she had not been able to personally examine Alexis’s living arrangement.

       According to Toungate, Alexis would confirm that she was going to begin inpatient

treatment “[e]very week.” However, Toungate confirmed that Alexis “has not completed

inpatient rehab as ordered by the Court.” Toungate outlined Alexis’s attempts at obtaining

inpatient treatment as follows:

       I do know that she went to Santa Maria in Houston for a few days and then
       left. I do know that she attended Outcomes Recovery in Brownsville in June.
       She left [due] to a family emergency and then went back once her family
       emergency was completed and then left against recommendation. And then

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       she went to Outcomes as well, I believe, in September after I became the
       caseworker. She was there for a few days and then left against
       recommendation again.

Toungate testified that Alexis “left Laurel Ridge against medical advice,” as well.

       Toungate also explained that Alexis’s mental health “has been a concern,” and

Alexis has not adequately addressed the issue. Toungate did not “believe that [Alexis]

would be able to be a safe parent” because of her unaddressed mental health issues.

According to Toungate,

       [w]e started this group message at the beginning of September, just due to
       [Alexis] both texting myself and my supervisor anywhere from 20 to 70 times
       in a day after we addressed her concerns with her numerous times. So, we
       hoped that that would help regulate some of those messages and some of
       her concerns, which it didn’t. I still received text messages calling me, I
       quote, stupid fucking bitch weekly. So, it’s very erratic explosive behavior.

Toungate agreed that the Department was recommending the termination of Alexis’s

parental rights.

       2.     Desiree Villarreal’s Testimony

       Desiree Villarreal, Alexis’s sister, testified that she was Roger’s current caregiver.

According to Villarreal, Roger was originally placed with her on June 16, 2021, when he

was seven weeks old. Villarreal testified that she had not known of Alexis’s pregnancy

until close to Roger’s date of birth, and that from her observations of Alexis, Villarreal

suspected Alexis was “using” around that time, but she was not certain.

       Villarreal explained that when Roger was first placed with her, she wanted her

sister to “[g]o to rehab to get clean so she could possibly get him back.” During this initial

period, Villarreal and Alexis had a good relationship. However, around the time Roger

was “four to six months old,” things soured between the siblings. Villarreal described

                                             11
Alexis’s communications as “not violent, but ugly.” For instance, Villarreal said that Alexis

texted her that “she hates [her],” and “at one point, [Alexis] told [Villarreal] . . . [t]hat she

was going to basically, unfortunately, stalk [Villarreal] if that’s what it took for her to be

able to see her son.”

       Villarreal explained that she believed it was in the child’s best interest “[t]o stay

where he’s at.” Villarreal explained that Roger was “happy” and “thriving.” But Villarreal

also testified to some of the specialized health and developmental care Roger needed.

She explained that Roger “was evaluated for physical therapy in October and he just

started it, like, the second-to-last week of November and his physical therapy goal was to

start walking. . . . He is now walking. He is almost running now.” Roger also “started

occupational therapy at ten months old” because “[h]e did have a slow development with

motor skills and verbalizing as well,” but that “[a]ll the milestones that [were] set for him,

he hit.” Roger also attended “specialized skills training,” which “helps [Roger] to produce

environmental sounds such as, like, vehicle[ and] animal noises to help him speak more.”

Roger was also diagnosed with asthma, which requires the use of a “Symbicort inhaler

twice a day. Two pumps in the morning, two pumps at night,” and occasionally

necessitates the use of “an oral steroid.” Villarreal testified that if those interventions did

not work, “it’s to the ER we go.”

       Villarreal testified that she was in school to be a registered nurse and planned to

finish her degree in December of 2023. She sometimes picked up contract work at a drug

and genetic testing company, as well. Villarreal also testified that she was caring for four

children of her own. Villarreal testified that she did not “want to take [Roger] from [her]

                                               12
sister,” but she believed it was in Roger’s best interest for Alexis’s parental rights to be

terminated. She also testified that her goal was to move forward with kinship adoption.

       3.     Alexis’s Testimony

       Alexis testified via Zoom over the course of two days. On the first day, she was on

her way to an inpatient drug treatment facility called “The Right Step in Wimberley,

Texas.” On the second day, she testified from the facility.

       Alexis gave conflicting testimony concerning her drug use. She agreed that she

had an issue with drugs beginning in 2008, and that she had never sought treatment prior

to the initiation of this case. According to Alexis, her “baby was positive for a benzo”

because “[t]hey gave [her] that in [her] IV when [she] was having [her] C-section.” Alexis

acknowledged the “MDMA” in Roger’s system when he was born “came from the line of

meth . . . . ingested by [her].” However, she later testified that she “didn’t take

methamphetamines when [she] was pregnant.” Alexis admitted that she had continued to

use meth over the course of the proceedings, and that the date she last used meth was

June 20, 2022. However, she also claimed that she just “said that [she] used meth to get

into rehab,” and that she was actually clean and could not recall the last time she used

drugs. Alexis acknowledged that her “baby being born positive . . . clearly shows that [she

is] an addict.” However, she also testified that she was “not a frequent user of meth” and

expressed confusion as to why she “didn’t bring [her] baby home” from the hospital.

       Alexis acknowledged that she “[p]robably” missed at least three drug tests between

July 30 and November 8, 2021. She also agreed she “wasn’t drug testing all of the month”

of December 2021. According to Alexis, in the months leading up to March of 2022, she

                                            13
“had tested. Not every single time, but [she] had tested and [her] UA was negative.”

However, when she missed drug tests, it was either “because [she] didn’t have

transportation or [she] was at work.” She testified that she would get rides from “[s]ome

friends” or from her father as “one of the last resorts,” but that she would often have to

take taxis which would always cost “over $100.” Alexis testified that “the Department didn’t

lend a hand to help [her] complete [her] services.”

       According to Alexis, on May 12, 2022, she “was getting admitted to Santa Maria in

Houston” for inpatient treatment. She then “found Outcomes in the Valley and they

accepted [her], but right before then, before June 20[], [she] had found Starlite Recovery.”

Alexis testified that she “was at Outcomes for a week[ but l]eft in an emergency.” Alexis

testified that she was then admitted to San Antonio Recovery, but that she “had an

altercation with another person,” and was then transferred to Laurel Ridge. Alexis stated

that she would complete inpatient treatment at The Right Step, regardless of the outcome

of the termination proceedings.

       Alexis testified that she worked as “a private nurse.” She was paid $20 per hour in

cash and worked “about 25 hours a week, but, sometimes they need [her] more than

that.” However, Alexis also testified, “I quit. I closed down my business and I have no

more money.” Alexis testified that she lived with her father, and that a previous

Department caseworker had approved the residence. After completing treatment, she

planned to continue living with her father or to live with one of her adult children. She also

testified that several people, including her father and her adult children, were willing to

act as 24-hour monitors, so she could have increased supervised visits with Roger. Alexis

                                             14
denied having any mental health issues, other than an ADHD diagnosis.

       Alexis testified that she did “not want to take [her] sister away from [Roger].”

According to Alexis, “that’s the mother that he knows because I’ve been kept away from

my son.” However, Alexis also stated that “he’s my baby,” and “[h]e needs to be with his

mother.”

C.     Best Interest Analysis

       1.     Desires of the Child

       The first Holley factor takes into account the child’s desires. See Holley, 544

S.W.2d at 372. Roger was sixteen months old at the time of the final hearing. “When

children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may consider whether the

children have bonded with the [placement], are well-cared for by them, and have spent

minimal time with a parent.” In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 369 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

       Here, Villarreal testified that Roger was placed with her since he was seven weeks

old. Toungate testified that Roger was “doing well” in his current placement, and that

Villarreal and Roger “have a really good bond.” Alexis acknowledged the bond between

Villarreal and Roger, stating, “that’s the mother that he knows.”

       On the other hand, Alexis was awarded two-hour supervised visits twice a week

with Roger. By all accounts, Alexis would, for the most part, behave appropriately at these

visits. She would bring toys, books, diapers, food, etc. Toungate testified that Roger and

Alexis “have a very good relationship.” This factor weighs slightly against terminating

Alexis’s parental rights. See id.

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       2.     Emotional and Physical Needs of and Danger to Roger, Now and in the
              Future

       “The need for permanence is a paramount consideration for a child’s present and

future physical and emotional needs.” In re J.G.S., 550 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2018, no pet.). “[T]he prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe

environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.307(a). “Conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability

endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being.” In re R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d 645,

651 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).

       A “factfinder can give ‘great weight’ to the ‘significant factor’ of drug-related

conduct.” In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.

denied). “[A] parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may

qualify as an endangering course of conduct.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex.

2009). And “[a] fact finder may infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a

child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent.” In re G.C.S., 657 S.W.3d

114, 134 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied).

       Alexis offered a variety of explanations for why three drugs were found in Roger’s

system at his birth. As to amphetamines, she testified, “I’m saying I didn’t take

methamphetamines when I was pregnant. I took Adderall and my OB doctor knew that.”

As to benzodiazepines, she testified, “[Y]ou tell me my baby is dirty with three drugs. One

of them is a benzoid and that’s when the anesthesiologist gave me Percocet. I didn’t put

my baby in the NICU. The Percocet put the baby in the NICU.” As to MDMA, she stated,

“I was very concerned that somebody was giving me something and how [sic] my baby

                                              16
was positive for MDMA.” We will not “second-guess the trial court’s resolution of a factual

dispute by relying on evidence that is either disputed, or that the court could easily have

rejected as not credible.” In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. 2003). The trial court

could have disbelieved Alexis’s testimony and instead determined that Roger was born

with these illicit substances in his system not because of the medical care Alexis received

or because someone was drugging her, but because of her own prior, unlawful drug use.

See id.; In re J.J.L., 578 S.W.3d 601, 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.)

(“A parent’s unwillingness to admit she has a substance abuse problem suggests she will

continue to abuse drugs and therefore continue to endanger her child.”).

       Villarreal testified to Roger’s special needs, both because of developmental delays

and because of his young age. Villarreal testified that Roger: (1) required occupational

therapy “two times a month,” (2) required specialized skills training “four times a month,”

(3) “sees pulmonology regularly” and “does a Symbicort inhaler twice a day” for his

asthma, and (4) requires physical therapy. Villarreal testified that Roger “has a routine”

and that “[h]e’s thriving.” See In re J.G.S., 550 S.W.3d at 705.

       Alexis provided no testimony regarding how she would be able to transport Roger

to his various therapies. Instead, she testified that she was unaware of most of Roger’s

needs, stating, “My child is always sick. I didn’t even know my kid had asthma. Then my

son can’t walk or talk right now. I didn’t even know what therapies he’s getting.” See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(12)(F) (providing court may consider whether parent has an

understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities in determining whether the parent is

willing and able to provide the child with a safe environment); In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d at

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206 (“The record evidence about the Child’s medical needs weighs in favor of the trial

court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of the Child.”).

       Toungate expressed concerns over Alexis’s “erratic explosive behavior” and her

lack of cooperation with the Department. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10)

(providing that a parent’s willingness “to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate

agency’s close supervision” is an appropriate consideration in determining the child’s best

interest). Toungate also recounted an incident where Alexis “lunged” at Toungate while

Alexis was holding Roger. Given the specialized care Roger needs and the evidence

concerning Alexis’s inability to safely provide for those needs, these factors weigh in favor

of termination.

       3.     Parenting Abilities and Programs Available

       The fourth and fifth factors concern the parenting abilities of and the programs

available to the individuals seeking custody. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372. Alexis’s

continued drug use over the course of the proceedings, her failure to timely complete

inpatient treatment, and her failure to submit to random drug testing per her service plan

are all factors that indicate Alexis does not have the parenting abilities to adequately care

for Roger. See In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017,

pet. denied) (“[G]iven his illegal drug use, failure to complete services, and his failure to

maintain contact with [the child] during the suit, the trial court could have reasonably

inferred that Father did not have the necessary parental abilities to care for a young

special-needs child.”); see also In re S.W.W., No. 14-22-00503-CV, 2022 WL 17982904,

*12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Based on

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Father’s inability to achieve and maintain sobriety, the trial court reasonably could have

found that Father’s parental abilities weighed in favor of finding termination was in Sam’s

best interest.”). Further, the trial court could have concluded that because Alexis was

unable to comply with her drug testing because of transportation issues, she would also

have difficulty ensuring Roger attended his necessary medical appointments. See In re

J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 270 (“A fact finder may infer from a parent’s failure to take the

initiative to complete the services required to regain possession of [her] child that [s]he

does not have the ability to motivate [her]self to seek out available resources needed now

or in the future.”).

       These factors weigh in favor of termination.

       4.      Plans for the Child and Stability of the Home

       “The fact finder may compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child

and determine whether the plans and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and

ill-defined.” In re U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d 391, 403 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).

Toungate testified that Roger is well-cared for by Villarreal and Villarreal testified that she

plans to move forward with adoption. Alexis testified that she had offers to continue living

with her father or to move in with one of her adult children. Toungate was not able to

testify to the safety of Alexis’s father’s home, as she had not been able to personally

examine it. However, Alexis testified that a prior Department caseworker had approved

Alexis’s father’s home.

       Alexis discussed the possibility of having a 24-hour monitor with her so that she

could have increased supervised visitation with the child. However, the trial court could

                                              19
have disbelieved her testimony in this regard. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312.

Moreover, progressing from having two-hour supervised visits at a public facility twice a

week to having the child with her at all times, albeit supervised by a friend or family

member, is not necessarily realistic. See In re U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d at 403. Alexis also did

not explain how she would be able to support the child or how she would transport him to

or from his necessary appointments. See In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 270. After comparing

Alexis’s plan with that of the Department and Villarreal, the trial court could have found

that Villarreal will be able to offer Roger the permanency and stability that he would not

be able to have with Alexis. These factors weigh in favor of termination.

       5.     Acts or Omissions and Excuses Therefor

       The eighth and ninth factors deal with any acts or omissions on the part of a parent

that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and whether

there are any excuses for those acts or omissions. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372. Drug

or alcohol abuse can be considered an act or omission that constitutes a threat of

significant impairment to the child. In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d at 492. Additionally, “[a]

factfinder may reasonably infer from a parent’s refusal to take a drug test that the parent

was using drugs.” In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied).

According to Alexis, she would miss drug tests “because [she] didn’t have transportation

or [she] was at work.” Alexis maligned the Department for not helping her with getting

transportation to and from the drug tests. However, Toungate testified that “the

Department offered to take her and even set up transportation for her and she did not

complete those tests.” The trial court was entitled to believe Toungate and disbelieve

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Alexis. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312.

       Alexis also acknowledged that she was a drug addict stating, “My baby being

positive, yes, that clearly shows that I’m an addict.” Alexis testified that she “did a line of

meth” on June 20, 2022, after she had been court-ordered to attend inpatient treatment.

And although she later testified that she was actually clean and had difficulty being

admitted into treatment because of this, the trial court could have resolved this disputed

evidence against her. See id.; In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d at 492.

       Although Alexis was in an inpatient facility on the second day of her testimony,

“[t]he trial court may reasonably decide a parent’s changes before trial are too late to

impact the best-interest decision.” In re J.J.L., 578 S.W.3d at 612. “Although a reasonable

fact finder could look at Mother’s attempts at sobriety and decide they justified the risk of

keeping her as a parent, we cannot say the trial court acted unreasonably in finding

[Roger’s] best interest lay elsewhere.” Id. Further, in a legal sufficiency challenge, we do

not attribute “greater weight to [a parent’s] recent improvements and less to [her] past

challenges.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346. These final factors weigh in favor of

termination.

       In conducting our legal and factual sufficiency review, we observe that eight of the

nine Holley factors weigh in favor of the trial court’s finding that termination was in Roger’s

best interest. This evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s

finding. See In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 268. We therefore overrule Alexis’s second issue.

                               IV.    MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

       Finally, Alexis contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion

                                              21
for new trial based on newly discovered evidence—namely, that after trial concluded,

Alexis successfully completed her inpatient treatment.

A.     Standard of Review

       A party seeking a new trial on grounds of newly-discovered evidence must
       demonstrate to the trial court that (1) the evidence has come to its
       knowledge since the trial, (2) its failure to discover the evidence sooner was
       not due to lack of diligence, (3) the evidence is not cumulative, and (4) the
       evidence is so material it would probably produce a different result if a new
       trial were granted.

Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 813 (Tex. 2010). In custody cases, “the

newly-discovered evidence must strongly show that the original custody order would have

a serious adverse effect on the interest and welfare of the child and that presentation of

that evidence at another trial would probably change the result.” In re K.L.R., 162 S.W.3d

291, 311 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.). We review the denial of a motion for new trial

for an abuse of discretion. Waffle House, Inc., 313 S.W.3d at 813.

B.     Analysis

       Trial concluded in this case on December 2, 2022. At the hearing on Alexis’s

motion for new trial, she introduced as evidence a certificate from The Right Step which

indicated that she had successfully completed “The Promises Right Step RTC Program”

on December 27, 2022. Alexis continued to maintain at the hearing that she “finished all

[her] services back in October” of 2021. However, Alexis also recognized that she had

been admitted to inpatient treatment facilities on at least four occasions prior to trial but

failed to complete those programs for one reason or another.

       The Department argues that Alexis’s evidence cannot support a new trial because

it is newly created evidence rather than newly discovered evidence. Some of our sister

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courts have held that “evidence not in existence prior to judgment cannot support a new

trial.” See Banker v. Banker, 517 S.W.3d 863, 878 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2017, pet. denied) (collecting cases); Sifuentes v. Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 754 S.W.2d

784, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ) (“Sifuentes’ evidence fails in one obvious

respect. Even with due diligence, the evidence could not have been discovered prior to

trial because prior to trial it did not exist.”); see also In re C.Y.C., No. 14-11-00341-CV,

2012 WL 3223674, at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 2012, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (“Mother’s evidence constitutes new evidence rather than newly discovered

evidence; this evidence does not satisfy the burden that must be met to obtain a new trial

on the ground of newly discovered evidence.”); Martin v. Martin, No. 09-94-370CV, 1995

WL 599023, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 12, 1995, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The reason

for granting a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence is exactly what the

name implies: evidence has been ‘newly discovered’ rather than newly created.”).

       However, we have not adopted a similar blanket rule. See Banker, 517 S.W.3d at

878–80 (declining to adopt the rule that new evidence does not constitute newly

discovered evidence and instead holding that the new evidence was cumulative). And we

need not adopt such a rule here, as Alexis has failed to meet her burden to show that “the

evidence is not cumulative” and that “the evidence is so material it would probably

produce a different result if a new trial were granted.” See Waffle House, 313 S.W.3d at

813.

       “[A] child’s need for permanence through the establishment of a ‘stable, permanent

home’ has been recognized as the paramount consideration in determining best interest.”

                                            23
In re J.L.C., 582 S.W.3d 421, 432 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d). It was within the

trial court’s discretion to determine that Roger’s need for permanence outweighed the

progress demonstrated by Alexis’s completion of inpatient treatment after trial was

completed. See id. Additionally, Alexis testified that, regardless of the outcome of the

termination hearing, she would complete the inpatient drug treatment in which she was

then-enrolled. Thus, the “evidence of post-trial events was cumulative of [Alexis’s] well-

developed projections at trial.” Banker, 517 S.W.3d at 879. Finally, although the discovery

of this particular certificate was not possible prior to trial, Alexis had ample opportunity to

“discover” evidence of a similar probative force by completing inpatient treatment prior to

trial. See Waffle House, Inc., 313 S.W.3d at 813. Based on this record, we conclude the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Alexis’s motion for new trial. See id. We

overrule Alexis’s final issue.

                                     V.     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                 GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                                 Justice

Delivered and filed on the
6th day of July, 2023.

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