Court Opinion

ID: 9941239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 13:01:57.458173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:24.762025
License: Public Domain

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                             F. S. v. J. S.*
                              (AC 45698)
                     Alvord, Seeley and Westbrook, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court awarding sole
   legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor child, O, to the plaintiff
   and imposing certain restrictions on his visitation with O. After the
   plaintiff initiated the underlying marital dissolution action, the parties
   filed numerous motions with the court, and, given the volume and nature
   of the motions, the court ordered that neither party could file any
   additional motions without first requesting leave from the court, with
   an exception for ex parte emergency requests approved by the guardian
   ad litem. The parties thereafter entered into an agreement to dissolve
   their marriage, which indicated that, although they agreed upon the
   division of their marital property and debt and the issue of alimony,
   they had been unable to resolve issues related to custody, access and
   care of O and that those issues should be resolved by the court in
   subsequent proceedings after completion of a custody evaluation by S,
   a clinical psychologist. The court subsequently rendered a judgment of
   dissolution of marriage that incorporated the parties’ agreement. S filed
   her custody evaluation with the court, and the custody hearing was
   scheduled to commence in March, 2020, but, due to the COVID-19 pan-
   demic, it did not go forward as scheduled. When the trial ultimately
   commenced, the court heard testimony from L, a social worker from
   the Department of Children and Families, over repeated objections by
   the defendant. L testified that she had investigated an anonymous call
   made to the department concerning the plaintiff’s purported physical
   removal of O from a baseball game in which he was participating.
   During L’s testimony, a redacted version of the relevant department
   investigation protocol was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit. L
   testified that her investigation included, among other things, interviews
   with O and conversations with G, O’s former therapist, and that, as a
   result of her investigation, the department discovered no concerns with
   the plaintiff’s actions during the baseball game incident or her ability
   to parent O, but the department did develop concerns about O’s emo-
   tional well-being with respect to the defendant. L also testified that the
   department subsequently substantiated emotional neglect of O by the
   defendant, and, in response to questions from the defendant on cross-
   examination, that she had reviewed an affidavit sworn to by G and that
   G’s opinion, both as expressed in the affidavit and in interviews, was
   relied on by the department in its investigation. L’s testimony did not
   disclose the actual contents of G’s affidavit. The defendant later
   attempted to have a copy of G’s affidavit admitted into evidence, but
   the plaintiff objected on hearsay grounds, and it was marked for identifi-
   cation purposes only. Several days into the trial, the defendant made
   an oral motion for a continuance, arguing that he would not go forward
   upon medical advice and indicating that, inter alia, his blood pressure
   that morning was at unacceptable levels and that he was disabled as a
   result of an auto accident. The court denied the defendant’s oral motion,
   noting that he had filed several motions for continuance within the
   previous few days citing other reasons, all of which were denied. Later
   that day, after the defendant provided the court with a letter from his
   medical provider that indicated that the defendant suffered from angina
   and asked the court to adjust the trial schedule in an attempt to reduce
   the defendant’s stress, the defendant indicated to the court that his
   stress was largely due to not having time between hearing dates to
   eat properly and prepare his case. The defendant did not refer to the
   Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) or
   clarify that he was seeking an accommodation under the ADA. The court
   reconsidered the defendant’s oral motion for a continuance, stating on
   the record that it was going to adjust the court’s schedule to accommo-
   date the defendant’s health and to reduce his stress, and later issued
   a written order granting the defendant’s motion for continuance and
     indicating that the remaining days of trial would continue in half day
     morning sessions. Approximately ten half day morning sessions were
     held. Thereafter, the court scheduled additional sessions for alternating
     full days. The defendant, with permission, filed a motion for a scheduling
     order in which he argued that the court previously had granted him an
     ADA accommodation limiting trial dates to half days and stating that
     the full day trial dates scheduled by the court were contrary to his
     medical provider’s advice and contrary to the existing order of accommo-
     dation. The defendant requested that the court reschedule further ses-
     sions to half day morning sessions. The court denied the motion for a
     scheduling order on the record, and the next day the defendant filed a
     motion in which he indicated that he had filed a grievance with the
     ADA administrator for the Connecticut Judicial Branch. He asked the
     court to stay any further full day proceedings until the grievance matter
     was resolved, although he indicated that he was able to go forward with
     half day morning sessions pursuant to the original accommodation. The
     court denied the motion, and, at the next day’s hearing, the defendant
     made an oral motion for a continuance that the court denied without
     prejudice to the defendant producing documentation from his physician
     regarding his health status. The defendant informed the court that he
     was not proceeding with his case and abruptly left the courthouse and
     did not return. The defendant appeared for the next scheduled court
     date. Before the lunch recess, the defendant informed the court on the
     record that he was not going to return to court for a full day trial until
     the court modified its order. The court informed the parties that the
     hearing would resume at 2 p.m. unless a written motion for a continuance
     was filed and granted. The defendant neither filed a motion for a continu-
     ance nor appeared for the afternoon session. Several days later, the
     defendant again appeared for the hearing in the morning but again failed
     to appear for the afternoon session and did not file a motion for a
     continuance. On the basis of the defendant’s failure to appear, the court
     determined that the defendant had failed to present his testimony and
     evidence as set forth in the court’s scheduling order, and, therefore, the
     court determined that the defendant’s case was concluded. The court
     also denied all of the defendant’s pending motions with prejudice for
     failure to present any testimony, evidence, and argument to the court.
     The plaintiff was permitted to provide rebuttal testimony. In the court’s
     memorandum of decision, it set forth detailed findings with respect to
     the defendant’s behavior generally, his parenting skills, and his difficult
     relationship with O, which contrasted with the healthy relationship that
     the court found O had with the plaintiff. The court noted in some detail
     the defendant’s medical diagnosis by two separate doctors of narcissistic
     personality disorder and his failure to make or maintain any significant
     progress through treatment. The court ultimately awarded full legal and
     physical custody of O to the plaintiff. With respect to parenting time,
     the court ordered that the defendant was entitled to weekly supervised
     access to O via a third-party therapeutic supervised visitation agency,
     with the cost paid by the defendant. However, the defendant’s parenting
     access would begin only after the defendant provided proof to the
     plaintiff and/or her counsel that he had engaged a clinician to address
     his narcissistic personality disorder, and such proof was required to be
     updated on a quarterly basis. The court also issued orders limiting the
     defendant’s right to seek modification or expansion of his parenting
     access. The court further ordered that the defendant could not partici-
     pate in any of the child’s extracurricular and sporting activities until
     he satisfied the conditions for seeking modification/expansion of the
     parenting access orders. Held:
1. The defendant’s claims that the trial court violated his rights under the
     ADA were unavailing, this court having determined that, even assuming
     for purposes of argument that the defendant had a disability that entitled
     him to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA as a matter of
     procedural due process, he in fact received such accommodation and
     failed to demonstrate otherwise or to point to any evidence in the record
     from which it reasonably could be concluded that any of the trial court’s
     adverse actions or rulings in the present matter were the product of
     retaliatory animus rather than a proper exercise of judicial discretion:
    a. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court
    improperly refused to provide him with the same medical accommoda-
    tion granted to him earlier in the trial, as he did not make a formal ADA
    request prior to his oral motion to the court, and the letter from his
    medical provider did not suggest any particular accommodation but only
    recommended that the court adjust the hearing schedule, which at that
    time consisted of back-to-back full day hearings, so as to reduce the
    defendant’s stress; moreover, nothing in the language of the court’s order
    limiting the length of the remaining then scheduled hearing dates to half
    days rendered that accommodation nonmodifiable in the future, and, to
    the contrary, it could be reasonably inferred from the court’s requirement
    that the defendant keep it apprised of any changes in his medical condi-
    tion that the accommodation was never intended to be permanent or to
    bind future courts in the event of a change in relevant circumstances;
    furthermore, the defendant provided no authority that stands for the
    proposition that once a public entity has provided an accommodation
    it is not permitted to adjust it under appropriate circumstances or to
    provide a substitute accommodation, and, in the present case, when it
    became clear to the court that continuing with half day sessions would
    be untenable and interfere with docket management and the fair adminis-
    tration of justice, it was well within the court’s discretion to substitute
    the prior accommodation for one that was equally reasonable, and pro-
    ceeding with full day hearings on nonconsecutive days still allowed time
    for the defendant to rest and recover from the prior day’s proceedings
    and reduced the stress of preparing for the next day, which was fully
    in accord with the recommendation of the defendant’s medical provider
    and was, in fact, the exact accommodation the defendant originally
    requested.
    b. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court
    retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the ADA by denying
    motions and prematurely resting his case; the defendant failed to point
    to anything in the record that would support his assertion that the trial
    court’s actions were made with discriminatory animus rather than, as
    reflected in the record, as a response to the defendant’s failure to appear,
    which was a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis for the court’s
    actions for which the defendant failed to account.
2. The trial court properly considered the defendant’s mental health diagnosis
     as a basis for determining custody and setting conditions regarding
     visitation: pursuant to the statute (§ 46b-56) governing orders regarding
     the custody and care of minor children in dissolution actions, one of
     the factors that a court may consider is the mental and physical health
     of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial
     parent, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the
     proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interest of the child,
     and, in the present case, the court did not award the plaintiff sole custody
     of the parties’ child solely on the basis of the defendant’s mental health
     diagnosis but, rather, it was but one of a number of reasons provided
     by the court for its decision and, therefore, was not in and of itself
     determinative of the court’s custody order; moreover, the court’s focus
     was not on the defendant’s mental health per se, but, rather, the court
     identified that it was concerned by the defendant’s failure to make
     reasonable progress to address its harmful effect on his parenting of
     O; furthermore, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the court made
     any clearly erroneous factual findings regarding his mental health or to
     point to anything in the record that would support his assertions that
     the court’s consideration of his mental health diagnosis amounted to
     retaliation or disability discrimination.
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the custody
     evaluation prepared by S in determining the best interest of O: the court
     did not rely solely on S’s custody evaluation but, rather, it had ample
     current evidence before it of the defendant’s present ability to parent,
     and, although the court accepted S’s evaluation into evidence, it consid-
     ered and evaluated it in light of the updated testimony from S and others,
     as well as evidence submitted by both parties regarding the child’s and
     parents’ current situations; moreover, although S’s custody evaluation
     may have had some limitations due to the delay of the courts being
     closed due to COVID-19, this went solely to the weight the trial judge
     gave the report rather than to its admissibility.
4. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
     required the parties to request leave of the court before filing trial and
     pretrial motions and improperly denied multiple such requests: although
     the defendant relied on language from Ahneman v. Ahneman (243 Conn.
     471), in which the Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked the
     discretion to refuse to rule on certain motions filed by the defendant
    in that case, there was nothing in the decision in Ahneman curtailing
    a trial court’s exercise of its considerable discretion over its docket or
    expressly barring the type of prohibitory order issued in the present
    case, and, to the contrary, the court in Ahneman acknowledged that
    exceptions to the general rule that a trial court must consider and decide
    on a reasonably prompt basis all motions properly placed before it may
    exist in an extreme, compelling situation; moreover, several years after
    the Ahneman decision, this court in Strobel v. Strobel (92 Conn. App.
    662) opined that a prohibitory order essentially identical to the one at
    issue in the present case constituted a praiseworthy attempt by the trial
    judge to limit the parties’ barrages of repetitive and abusive motions,
    and this court found that the record in the present case reflected no
    less a compelling reason for an order attempting to curtail the flood of
    repetitive and oftentimes frivolous motions filed in this matter.
5. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
    awarded sole custody of O to the plaintiff even though the parties had
    always shared custody and the plaintiff made no showing of a change of
    circumstances; in the present case, the parties shared legal and physical
    custody of O until the time of the dissolution of marriage, and whether
    such joint custody should continue in the future was precisely the issue
    that the parties could not agree upon in their separation agreement and
    left for the court in the present action to decide, and, accordingly, the
    case law cited by the defendant holding that courts lack the authority
    to modify existing custody orders in the absence of a material change
    of circumstances was inapposite to the facts of this case.
6. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court errone-
    ously found that the defendant had narcissistic personality disorder;
    this court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that any
    mistake was made with respect to the trial court’s challenged findings,
    as the evidence in the record, including testimony from S and her custody
    evaluation, adequately supported the court’s findings that the defendant
    had been diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder and that this
    diagnosis constituted a long-term pattern of maladaptive behavior that
    was not amenable to treatment.
7. The defendant could not prevail on his evidentiary claims that the trial
    court improperly admitted certain testimony of L and improperly admit-
    ted and relied on an affidavit of G: on the basis of this court’s thorough
    review of the transcripts of L’s testimony and the many objections raised
    during her testimony by the defendant, this court concluded that the
    defendant failed to demonstrate how the trial court abused its broad
    discretion with respect to the admission of L’s testimony; moreover, to
    the extent that the defendant attempted to raise additional objections
    that were not raised at trial, this court declined to review these unpre-
    served aspects of his claim, and, with respect to the objections he did
    raise at trial, this court concluded that the trial court properly ruled on
    them in the manner that it did for the reasons provided and that further
    explication by this court was unwarranted; furthermore, there was noth-
    ing in the record from which to conclude that the trial court improperly
    relied on G’s affidavit in awarding custody to the plaintiff, as the court
    never stated in its memorandum of decision that it relied on G’s affidavit,
    which was not in evidence, and the few references to G by the court
    in its memorandum of decision were incidental and did not reflect any
    error in the court’s reasoning.
    Argued November 13, 2023—officially released February 20, 2024

                             Procedural History

   Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Hartford, where the court, Prestley, J., accepted
the parties’ stipulation to bifurcate the trial as to the
issue of custody; thereafter, the case was tried to the
court, Prestley, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage
and granting certain other relief in accordance with the
parties’ separation agreement; subsequently, the case
was transferred to the Regional Family Trial Docket
and the issue of custody was tried to the court, Nguyen-
O’Dowd, J.; judgment granting sole legal and physical
custody of the parties’ minor child to the plaintiff, from
which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  J. S., self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
  Dennis Francis O’Toole, for the appellee (plaintiff).
                           Opinion

   WESTBROOK, J. In this marital dissolution action,
the defendant, J. S., appeals from the judgment of the
trial court awarding the plaintiff, F. S., sole legal and
physical custody of the parties’ minor child, O. The
self-represented defendant claims on appeal that he is
entitled to a new custody hearing because the court
improperly (1) violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2018),1 by
refusing to continue to provide him with a medical
accommodation previously granted to him by the court;
(2) terminated the defendant’s presentation of evidence
and denied certain motions in retaliation for his exercis-
ing his rights under the ADA; (3) relied on the defen-
dant’s mental disability as a basis for awarding custody
to the plaintiff and restricting his right to visitation; (4)
relied on a stale custody evaluation in determining the
best interest of O; (5) required the parties to request
leave of the court before filing motions and denied
multiple such requests made by the defendant; (6)
awarded sole custody of O to the plaintiff despite the
fact that the parties previously shared custody and the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate any substantial change
in circumstances; (7) found that the defendant suffered
from narcissistic personality disorder; and (8) commit-
ted evidentiary errors by (a) admitting the testimony
of a social worker from the Department of Children and
Families and (b) admitting and relying on an affidavit of
O’s former therapist, Damion Grasso. Having carefully
reviewed the voluminous record presented,2 we con-
clude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate any
reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the court.
   The record reveals the following facts, which were
either found by the court or are undisputed in the
record, and procedural history. The plaintiff initiated
the underlying marital dissolution action in September,
2016. The parties have one child together, O, who was
born in May, 2011. By agreement of the parties, the
court issued a number of pendente lite orders at the
start of the dissolution proceedings, including appoint-
ing Attorney Margaret Bozek as guardian ad litem (GAL)
for O; awarding the defendant twice weekly supervised
parenting time; and ordering the defendant to pay child
support to the plaintiff in the amount of $142 per week.
On January 3, 2017, the parties reached a subsequent
agreement regarding the defendant’s parenting time.
The court approved that agreement, which provided
the defendant with weekly overnight parenting time
and an additional five hours of parenting time on week-
ends.3
  Early in the proceedings, the parties also filed numer-
ous motions with the court, the bulk of which were
disposed of by the court, Simon, J., on March 3, 2017,
following a hearing.4 Given the volume and nature of
the motions, Judge Simon also ordered that neither
party could file any additional motions without first
requesting leave from the court, except that the parties
could file any ex parte emergency request without leave
of the court provided that such request also included
an affidavit from the GAL stating that she agreed with
the request.
   On June 29, 2017, the criminal court in the judicial
district of Hartford, geographical area number twelve
(G.A. 12), informed the court that the defendant had
been arrested and arraigned for violating a protective
order involving the plaintiff and that he was being held
on a $500,000 bond. That same day, the court issued
an order in which it granted the plaintiff temporary
sole decision-making authority over O’s activities and
vacated the then existing visitation order for the defen-
dant, indicating that the defendant’s access to O would
revert to the court’s orders of January 3, 2017.5 Subse-
quently, on July 19, 2017, the court suspended the defen-
dant’s parenting time due to court-ordered competency
evaluations in his pending criminal matters. The court
also granted sole temporary legal custody of O to the
plaintiff until further order of the court.6
   On January 19, 2018, in response to motions filed by
the defendant, the court, Olear, J., entered an order
restoring the defendant’s parenting time with O to once
a week for ninety minutes through a supervised visita-
tion facility. Additionally, by agreement of the parties,
the court ordered them to participate in conflict man-
agement therapy with Stephen Humphrey, a clinical
psychologist, and to undergo a custody/psychological
evaluation with Linda Smith, also a clinical psycholo-
gist.
   On April 3, 2018, the parties entered into an agree-
ment to dissolve their marriage. The agreement, in rele-
vant part, provided the following: ‘‘The parties acknowl-
edge that as of the date hereof, they have been unable
to resolve the issues related to custody, access and
care of [O]. The issues shall be resolved by subsequent
proceedings after completion of the custody evaluation
being conducted by Dr. Smith.’’ Although the parties
were unable to reach a custody agreement, they agreed
upon the division of their marital property and debt
and that neither would pay alimony to the other. The
court, Prestley, J., rendered a judgment of dissolution
of marriage that same day that incorporated the parties’
agreement. The court also ordered that the current child
support order of $142 per week would remain in effect.
   Following a hearing on April 4, 2018, the court, Olear,
J., issued an order granting the defendant unsupervised
parenting time with O on Thursdays after school. If
a Little League practice or game interfered with the
Thursday parenting time, the visitation would occur on
Monday. The court also granted the GAL’s request for
permission to withdraw from this matter. The court,
Hon. Gerard I. Adelman, judge trial referee, subse-
quently denied the defendant’s motion, which objected
to the GAL expenses and sought to remove/replace the
GAL. The court ordered the defendant to pay the GAL
the sum of $22,286.42.
  On June 22, 2018, Judge Olear denied the defendant’s
request to resume overnight visits with O but granted
the defendant additional parenting time on Sundays for
two hours. The court also clarified that the previously
ordered Thursday parenting time was for two hours.
   On October 15, 2018, the defendant sought leave of
the court to file several motions. Specifically, he sought
to file three motions for contempt in which he alleged
that the plaintiff had violated court orders regarding
visitation, the nonconsumption of alcohol, and O’s par-
ticipation in youth soccer. The defendant also asked
the court for a hearing on previously filed motions that
sought orders to restore his custodial rights, to increase
visitation time, and to award costs.7 On December 14,
2018, the defendant filed a largely duplicative motion
asking again for permission to file a motion for con-
tempt regarding visitation and a motion seeking an
order requiring the parties to undergo drug and alcohol
testing. He also requested a scheduling order to hear
all of his then outstanding motions. Judge Olear denied
both of the defendant’s requests for leave to file motions
but granted his request for a hearing on his motion
seeking an increase in parenting time.
   On March 6, 2019, the parties entered into an agree-
ment allowing O to participate in Little League tryouts.
Following a hearing on April 5, 2019, the court issued
orders that the parties would take O to and from prac-
tices and/or games during their respective parenting
time. The court increased the defendant’s parenting
time to Tuesdays and Thursdays starting after school
to 5:30 p.m. and moved his Sunday parenting time to
Saturdays from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m.
  On May 8, 2019, the defendant filed a request for
leave to file six motions for contempt and a motion for
restoration of custody. The court denied the request for
leave without prejudice, indicating that the defendant
could ‘‘request to have the motions heard at the custody
hearing.’’ On July 23, 2019, the defendant filed a request
for leave to file four motions for contempt and a motion
to restore his parenting time. The next day, he filed
another motion for leave to file a motion for contempt.
The court, Nastri, J., granted the defendant’s motions
for leave with respect to the motions for contempt but
denied leave to file the motion to restore visitation.
  On September 10, 2019, the court ordered the parties
to go to the caseflow coordinator to obtain a hearing
date for the defendant’s pending motions for contempt.
The court also granted the defendant permission to file
several additional motions, all of which were to be
heard at the custody hearing, which, at the time, was
scheduled for December 9, 2019.
   On December 6, 2019, Dr. Smith filed her custody
evaluation with the court. The December 9, 2019 hearing
date was continued by the court, and the matter was
transferred to the Regional Family Trial Docket and
scheduled for five consecutive hearing dates to com-
mence in March, 2020. The March, 2020 custody hearing,
however, did not go forward as scheduled.8
   In addition to filing a variety of motions and objec-
tions directed at discovery, on October 13, 2020, the
defendant filed a request asking to have all of his pend-
ing motions for contempt heard separately from the
custody dispute. The court denied that request on Octo-
ber 26, 2020. The defendant’s outstanding motions for
contempt and the custody matter were then scheduled
for hearing dates to begin on December 14, 2020.
   The parties and the plaintiff’s counsel appeared virtu-
ally on December 14, 2020, for the custody hearing.
Neither party, however, had complied with the court’s
standing orders by filing a witness or exhibit list. More-
over, motions in limine and a motion for protective
order remained outstanding, and depositions had not
yet been completed. As a result, the court, Nguyen-
O’Dowd, J., continued the custody hearing to February,
2021, and issued a scheduling order to resolve all neces-
sary outstanding matters prior to the February hearing.9
   The custody hearing did not commence in February
as scheduled because the court was closed due to
inclement weather. On February 16, 2021, the plaintiff
sought a further continuance of the custody hearing
due to an emergent medical condition of her counsel
and related treatment. The court granted the continu-
ance over an objection from the defendant. The defen-
dant then proceeded to file more than thirty separate
requests and motions directed toward the plaintiff’s
alleged violations of court orders.
  On March 10, 2021, the defendant filed a notice of
intent to file a writ of error, which he filed on April 9,
2021, and later amended on April 21, 2021.10 This court
denied the defendant’s motion to expedite that appeal
and, on May 26, 2021, issued an order dismissing the
amended writ of error for lack of jurisdiction because
the defendant was a party to the underlying action; see
Practice Book § 72-1 (b) (1); and because there was no
appealable final judgment.
  The contested custody trial and hearing on the defen-
dant’s motions for contempt was rescheduled to com-
mence starting on May 24, 2021. On May 24 and 25, 2021,
Judge Nguyen-O’Dowd conducted the trial remotely on
Microsoft Teams.11 The parties then appeared in person
on May 26 and 27, June 2 and 3, November 29 and 30,
and December 1 and 2, 2021.
  On December 3, 2021, the parties were scheduled
for a full day, in person hearing. That morning, the
defendant filed a motion seeking reissuance of certain
subpoenas and a continuance of the hearing to the
afternoon due to a flat tire. The presiding judge, Diana,
J., issued an order that the matter, as requested, would
resume at 2 p.m. and denied all other relief sought in
the motion. The defendant later filed another motion to
continue the afternoon session, which the court denied.
The defendant did not appear in court at 2 p.m. for the
hearing.
   The parties next appeared in person for full day hear-
ings on December 6, 7 and 8, 2021. During this time,
the defendant filed multiple motions that, if granted,
would have further delayed completion of the custody
hearing. For example, on December 6, 2021, the defen-
dant, who had chosen to proceed as a self-represented
party, filed a motion for a continuance to ‘‘consult coun-
sel.’’ Judge Diana denied the motion. On December 7,
2021, the defendant filed a motion for a continuance
so he could seek the advice of counsel regarding a
motion that he had filed to disqualify Judge Nguyen-
O’Dowd. Judge Diana denied that motion on December
8, 2021.
   Also on December 8, 2021, the defendant made an
oral motion for a continuance, arguing that he would
not go forward ‘‘upon medical advice.’’ He did not have
a medical provider present or a medical letter. Nonethe-
less, he indicated to the court that his blood pressure
that morning was ‘‘at unacceptable levels’’ and that he
is ‘‘disabled as a result of an auto accident [and] has
complications and eye pain from a current hemorrhage
of a broken eye socket received as a result of domestic
violence.’’ He further argued that the custody proceed-
ings were going ‘‘in a reckless pace and marathon ses-
sion requiring the pro se defendant to burn the candle
at both ends.’’ The court denied the defendant’s oral
motion, noting that the defendant had filed several
motions for continuance within the previous few days
citing other reasons, all of which were denied. The
court indicated, however, that the denial was without
prejudice to the defendant producing ‘‘written docu-
mentation from his physician regarding his health sta-
tus.’’
   Later that day, the defendant provided the court with
a letter from his medical provider that, as described by
the court, asked the court to ‘‘please adjust this court
schedule in an attempt to reduce [the defendant’s]
stress.’’ The medical provider also indicated in his letter
that the defendant suffered from angina. The defendant
indicated to the court that his stress was largely due
to not having time between hearing dates to eat properly
and prepare his case. At no point did the defendant
refer to the ADA or clarify that he was seeking an
accommodation under the ADA. Judge Diana reconsid-
ered the defendant’s oral motion for a continuance,
stating on the record that, ‘‘I’m going to adjust the
court’s schedule to accommodate the gentleman’s
health to reduce his stress.’’ He later issued the follow-
ing written order: ‘‘The court grants the defendant’s
oral motion for [a] continuance and shall make accom-
modations as follows: the remaining days of trial shall
continue in half day morning sessions.’’12
   The parties appeared in person for half day morning
sessions on December 9, 10, 20, 21 and 22, 2021, and
January 3, 4, 5 and 6, 2022. The court held a half day
remote session on February 9, 2022. Thereafter, the
court scheduled additional sessions for alternating full
days on February 14, 16 and 18, and March 9 and 15,
2022. The defendant, with permission, filed a motion
for a scheduling order in which he argued that Judge
Diana previously had granted him an ADA accommoda-
tion limiting trial dates to half days and stating that
the full day trial dates scheduled by the court were
‘‘contrary to the defendant’s current doctor’s medical
advice and contrary to the existing order of accommo-
dation.’’ The defendant requested that the court
‘‘reschedul[e] further sessions to half day morning ses-
sions.’’
  The court denied the motion for a scheduling order
on the record at the February 14, 2022 hearing.13 The
next day, the defendant filed a motion in which he
indicated that he had filed a grievance with the ADA
administrator for the Connecticut Judicial Branch. He
asked the court to stay any further full day proceedings
until the grievance matter was resolved, although he
indicated that he was ‘‘able to go forward with half day
morning sessions as per the original accommodation.’’
The court denied the motion on February 17, 2022.
   At the February 18, 2022 hearing, the defendant made
an oral motion for a continuance that Judge Nguyen-
O’Dowd denied without prejudice to the defendant pro-
ducing documentation from his physician regarding his
health status. The defendant informed the court that
he was not proceeding with his case and abruptly left
the courthouse and did not return. The defendant
appeared for the next scheduled court date on March
9, 2022. Before the lunch recess, the defendant informed
the court on the record that he was not going to return
to court for a full day trial until Judge Diana modified
his December 8, 2021 order. Judge Nguyen-O’Dowd
informed the parties that the hearing would resume at
2 p.m. unless a written motion for a continuance was
filed and granted. The defendant neither filed a motion
for a continuance nor appeared for the afternoon ses-
sion. On March 15, 2022, the defendant again appeared
for the hearing in the morning but, once again, failed
to appear for the afternoon session and did not file a
motion for a continuance.
  On the basis of the defendant’s failure to appear, the
court determined that the defendant ‘‘failed to present
his testimony and evidence as set forth in the court’s
scheduling order,’’ and, therefore, the court determined
that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s case [was] concluded.’’ More-
over, the court denied all of his pending motions for
contempt and motions to disqualify with prejudice for
failure to present any testimony, evidence, and argu-
ment to the court.14 The plaintiff was permitted to pro-
vide rebuttal testimony. The court ordered the parties
to file proposed findings of fact by April 14, 2022.15
The plaintiff timely complied. The court granted the
defendant an extension of time to April 17, 2022, and
he filed his statement of proposed findings of facts on
April 18, 2022.
   On July 15, 2022, the court issued its memorandum
of decision regarding custody and disposing of a num-
ber of outstanding motions. The court set forth detailed
findings with respect to the defendant’s behavior gener-
ally, his parenting skills, and his difficult relationship
with O, which contrasted with the healthy relationship
that the court found O has with the plaintiff. The court
noted in some detail the defendant’s medical diagnosis
by two separate doctors of narcissistic personality dis-
order and his failure to make or maintain any significant
progress through treatment. The court stated, in part,
that, ‘‘throughout the custody dispute, the defendant
has been more concerned with proving that an injustice
has been committed against him by the plaintiff and
the individuals and institutions involved in this case,
whether directly or indirectly, than with advocating for
an outcome that is in [O’s] best interest. . . . The
defendant is also a high conflict individual. . . . He is
unable to communicate effectively with the plaintiff
and others without conflict. His response to any request
for compromise is to threaten litigation and exert con-
trol over the situation. His pathology for paranoia and
conspiracy theories displayed itself at trial when he
was adamant in his belief that Dr. Smith accepted a
bribe in this case. Aside from this bold accusation,
no other evidence was provided to the court on this
accusation. In sum, the defendant has displayed no
change in his psychological functioning [that] nega-
tively impacts his parenting abilities; he has gained no
insight into the obstacles that prevent him from becom-
ing an effective parent; and [he] fails to recognize the
need to engage in treatment.’’ The court found that O
displayed ‘‘significant [negative] behaviors related to
his visitation with the defendant’’ and that, during visits,
‘‘the defendant has an inability to display appropriate
boundaries.’’
  The court found, moreover, that the defendant had
poor parenting skills even when the parties were living
together. The court explained: ‘‘The defendant modeled
his parenting based on a puppy training book. He
referred to training puppies like raising [O]. The defen-
dant referred to himself as the alpha and dominant
member in the pack as to his relationship with [O]. As
a young child, [O] was afraid of the defendant, often
hiding and not wanting to go to him. The defendant
would tower over [O] and yell at him and threaten to
spank him. Additionally, he would exhibit irrational
behavior toward [O]. The defendant wanted to expose
[O] to his love for golf. When the defendant went to
the golf course, he tied [O] to a stake in the ground. In
another incident, [O] had scratches on his skin and the
defendant insisted that they were cactus spines caught
under the skin and pulled them out. The defendant
unnecessarily gave [O] lice treatment. He medicated [O]
for pinworm even after medical and school personnel
indicated that [O] did not have them. These are but a
few of the examples in which the defendant displayed
a lack of empathy and irrational behavior related to his
interaction with [O].
   ‘‘The defendant lacks the ability to play an active and
positive role in [O’s] life. He views [O] as an object to
fulfill his needs rather than providing him with love and
affection and respecting his feelings. Throughout the
defendant’s testimony, he described in detail the activi-
ties that he engages in with [O]. . . . There was nothing
in [his] testimony that these were activities that [O]
selected or enjoyed. These activities were selected by
the defendant to meet his goals to ensure that [O]
obtains a level of academic superiority like the defen-
dant and [O’s] adult brother.’’ The court credited the
observation of Dr. Smith that, although ‘‘usually a parent
and child spend time interacting with one another . . .
this was not the case with the defendant and [O]. They
functioned in parallel and not in interaction. Much of
their interaction was separate. [O] would engage in
his activities and the defendant in his own talk and
activities. [O] made efforts to engage the defendant in
an activity of his choice or to talk about a topic he
initiated. However, the defendant’s response was to
ignore [O] or bring [up] a topic that had nothing to
do with [O’s] statement. This is problematic from a
psychological perspective because it will result in the
child having a less intimate relationship with his or her
parent. In [O’s] case, it will limit how much [O] will
connect and feel safe with the defendant without receiv-
ing this emotional support.’’
   The court concluded: ‘‘It would be negligent for the
court to allow [O] to continue to be subjected to the
defendant’s maladaptive behaviors. This protracted
custody case has allowed [O] to be continually exposed
to the defendant’s gaslighting, negative tirades about
the plaintiff, oversharing of information and lack of
emotional connection and support. [O’s] current sur-
roundings while in the defendant’s care negatively
impact his emotional well-being. The defendant is
unable to recognize the real harm that his conduct is
causing [O]. Rather, the defendant is more interested
in proving that he is right at all costs no matter who is
negatively affected, even if [O] is at the center.’’
   With respect to custody, the court ordered as follows:
‘‘The plaintiff shall have sole legal and physical custody.
The plaintiff shall have sole decision-making authority
as to [O’s] school, extracurricular activities, sports,
camps and medical care to include medical, dental,
psychiatric and therapeutic care. The defendant shall
not enroll [O] or schedule appointments for [O] in those
areas in which the plaintiff has sole decision-making
authority. The defendant shall not interfere with [O’s]
participation and engagement in the areas in which the
plaintiff has sole decision-making authority. This shall
include contacting, either by written, electronic or in
person communication, the providers or organizations
to harass them.’’ Neither party was permitted to relocate
with O out of state without prior order of the court.
   With respect to parenting time, the court ordered that
the defendant was entitled to weekly supervised access
to O on Wednesdays after school, or at 3 p.m. if there
is no school, until 7 p.m., and on alternating Saturdays
from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. A third-party therapeutic super-
vised visitation agency would be responsible for super-
vision, with the cost paid by the defendant. The defen-
dant’s parenting access was ordered to begin once the
defendant provided proof to the plaintiff and/or her
counsel that he had engaged a clinician to address his
narcissistic personality disorder. Such proof was
required to be updated on a quarterly basis. The court
also issued orders limiting the defendant’s right to seek
modification or expansion of his parenting access until
a motion for modification has been filed with the court
with a request for leave and a showing that he had
exercised at least 75 percent of his parenting access
and has engaged in regular and consistent treatment
for at least one year, including, but not limited to, engag-
ing ‘‘a clinician who has the skills and training to address
narcissistic personality disorder; consultation with a
psychiatrist and neurologist; and group therapy for
domestic abuse/trauma.’’ The court further ordered that
the defendant could not participate in any of O’s extra-
curricular and sporting activities until he satisfied the
conditions for seeking modification/expansion of the
parenting access orders. The court issued a number of
other orders related to child support, taxes, legal fees
and the resolution of certain outstanding motions.
  This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
   Before turning to the defendant’s claims on appeal,
we first set forth our standard of review and other
applicable legal principles. ‘‘[T]he standard of review
in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will
not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations
cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it
is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did,
based on the facts presented. . . . In determining
whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in
domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable
presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.
. . . Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact
is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.
. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there
is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
. . . Our deferential standard of review, however, does
not extend to the court’s interpretation of and applica-
tion of the law to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter
of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, 207
Conn. App. 28, 33–34, 263 A.3d 403 (2021). ‘‘As has often
been explained, the foundation for [our deferential]
standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta-
geous position to assess the personal factors significant
to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Buxenbaum v. Jones, 189 Conn. App.
790, 794, 209 A.3d 664 (2019).
   Orders regarding the custody and care of minor chil-
dren in dissolution actions are governed by General
Statutes § 46b-56, which grants the court broad discre-
tion in crafting such orders. Subsection (a) of § 46b-56
provides in relevant part that ‘‘the court may assign
parental responsibility for raising the child to the par-
ents jointly, or may award custody to either parent or
to a third party, according to its best judgment upon
the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and
limitations as it deems equitable. . . .’’
  ‘‘In making . . . any order as provided in subsection
(a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities of
both parents shall be considered and the court shall
enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests
of the child and provide the child with the active and
consistent involvement of both parents commensurate
with their abilities and interests. Such orders may
include . . . the award of sole custody to one parent
with appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial
parent where sole custody is in the best interests of
the child . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes
§ 46b-56 (b).
   ‘‘[Section] 46b-56 (c) provides in relevant part that
when making custody orders, the court shall consider
the best interests of the child, and in doing so may
consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of
[seventeen enumerated factors]. . . . The court is not
required to assign any weight to any of the factors that
it considers.16 In reaching a decision as to what is in
the best interests of a child, the court is vested with
broad discretion and its ruling will be reversed only
upon a showing that some legal principle or right has
been violated or that the discretion has been abused.’’
(Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Morrone v. Morrone, 142 Conn. App. 345, 351, 64 A.3d
803 (2013). As our Supreme Court recently reiterated,
‘‘[t]he authority to exercise the judicial discretion
[authorized by § 46b-56] . . . is not conferred [on] [the
state’s appellate courts], but [on] the trial court, and
. . . we are not privileged to usurp that authority or
to substitute ourselves for the trial court. . . . A mere
difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our
intervention. Nothing short of a conviction that the
action of the trial court is one [that] discloses a clear
abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zhou v. Zhang, 334
Conn. 601, 632–33, 223 A.3d 775 (2020); see also Yontef
v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 279, 440 A.2d 899 (1981) (‘‘[i]t
is a rare case in which a disappointed litigant will be
able to demonstrate abuse of a trial court’s broad discre-
tion in [child custody] matters’’). With these standards
in mind, we turn to the claims on appeal.
                            I
   The defendant’s first two claims assert that the trial
court violated his rights under the ADA. Specifically,
the defendant claims that the court (1) refused to pro-
vide him throughout the underlying proceedings with
the same medical accommodation first granted to him
by Judge Diana and (2) retaliated against him for exer-
cising his ADA rights by denying motions and prema-
turely resting his case. We conclude that both claims
are without merit.
   We begin by noting that the defendant has brought
both an administrative grievance and an action in fed-
eral District Court that raise, inter alia, the same ADA
claims now raised in the present appeal. The parties
have not raised or briefed whether principles of comity
between state and federal courts, the prior pending
action doctrine, failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies or some other justiciability doctrine should militate
against our review of the merits of the defendant’s
claims. The plaintiff has argued that no trial court has
made any express findings regarding whether the defen-
dant has a ‘‘disability’’ for purposes of the ADA,17 and
the record is at best ambiguous as to whether the
‘‘accommodation’’ Judge Diana granted the defendant
was intended by the court as an ADA accommodation
or merely a pragmatic solution to issues raised by the
defendant via his oral motion for a continuance. The
defendant did not seek an articulation from Judge Diana
regarding his order, and it is axiomatic that this court
does not make findings of fact; see Zitnay v. Zitnay,
90 Conn. App. 71, 81, 875 A.2d 583, cert. denied, 276
Conn. 918, 888 A.2d 90 (2005); both of which implicate
the adequacy of the record before us.
  In any event, we need not resolve any reviewability
concern because, even if we were to assume for pur-
poses of argument that the defendant had a disability
that entitled him to a reasonable accommodation under
the ADA as a matter of procedural due process, we
conclude, for the reasons that follow, that he, in fact,
received just that and has failed to demonstrate other-
wise. Furthermore, he has failed to direct us to any
evidence in the record from which we reasonably could
conclude that any of the court’s adverse actions or
rulings in this matter were the product of retaliatory
animus rather than a proper exercise of judicial discre-
tion.
                            A
   The ADA defines a public entity as, inter alia, ‘‘(A)
any State or local government; [or] (B) any department,
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumental-
ity of a State or States or local government . . . .’’ 42
U.S.C. § 12131 (1) (2018). ‘‘For purposes of the ADA,
the Connecticut Superior Court is considered to be a
public entity.’’ State v. Riddick, 61 Conn. App. 275, 283
n.5, 763 A.2d 1062, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 946, 769 A.2d
61 (2001). Accordingly, once a court identifies a litigant
as having a disability, it should act to provide some
reasonable accommodation to allow the litigant to par-
ticipate in the court proceedings. A court has consider-
able discretion, however, in choosing the type of accom-
modation to offer. See id., 283–84; see also McElwee v.
Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 2012) (‘‘[a]lthough
a public entity must make reasonable accommodations,
it does not have to provide a disabled individual with
every accommodation he requests or the accommoda-
tion of his choice’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A party is not entitled to the precise accommodation
that he or she requests but only a reasonable accommo-
dation. See Cooling v. Torrington, 221 Conn. App. 567,
584–85, 302 A.3d 319 (2023). Moreover, if a party needs
a specific accommodation, then he or she needs to
provide enough information to demonstrate why only
that accommodation is sufficient. See id., 586.
  In the present case, the defendant made an oral
request for a continuance in which he argued that he
was under stress and needed time between hearing
dates to rest and effectively present his case. The defen-
dant did not make a formal ADA request prior to his
oral motion to the court either by contacting the court’s
ADA coordinator or by completing a form requesting
accommodations by a person with disabilities that is
available on the Judicial Branch website. His medical
provider submitted a letter that did not suggest any
particular accommodation but only recommended that
the court adjust the hearing schedule, which at that
time consisted of back-to-back full day hearings, so as
to reduce the defendant’s stress. Judge Diana, upon
review of the recommendation of the defendant’s medi-
cal provider and having listened to the defendant
explain the source and nature of his stress, ‘‘adjust[ed]
the court’s schedule to accommodate the [defendant’s]
health’’ by limiting the length of the remaining then
scheduled hearing dates to half days only. Nothing in
the language that the court used rendered that accom-
modation nonmodifiable in the future. To the contrary,
the court required the defendant to keep the court
apprised of any changes in his medical condition, from
which it can be reasonably inferred that the accommo-
dation was never intended to be permanent or to bind
future courts in the event of a change in relevant circum-
stances.
   It is axiomatic that a trial court ‘‘has a responsibility
to avoid unnecessary interruptions, to maintain the
orderly procedure of the court docket, and to prevent
any interference with the fair administration of justice.
. . . In addition, matters involving judicial economy,
docket management [and control of] courtroom pro-
ceedings . . . are particularly within the province of a
trial court. . . . The court inherently holds reasonable
control over its schedule.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) M. B. v. S. A., 194 Conn. App.
727, 733–34, 222 A.3d 551 (2019). The defendant has
provided no authority, nor are we aware of any, that
stands for the proposition that once a public entity has
provided an accommodation it is not permitted to adjust
it under appropriate circumstances or to provide a sub-
stitute accommodation.
   Here, when it became clear to Judge Nguyen-O’Dowd
that continuing with half day sessions would be untena-
ble and interfere with docket management and the fair
administration of justice, it was well within the court’s
discretion to substitute Judge Diana’s prior accommo-
dation for one that was equally reasonable. Proceeding
with full day hearings on nonconsecutive days still
allowed time for the defendant to rest and recover from
the prior day’s proceedings and reduced the stress of
preparing for the next day, which was fully in accord
with the recommendation of the defendant’s medical
provider. In fact, it was the exact accommodation the
defendant originally requested from Judge Diana. See
footnote 12 of this opinion.
  We are unpersuaded that the court conducted the
custody hearing in a manner that violated the defen-
dant’s rights under the ADA. Accordingly, he is not
entitled to a new hearing on that basis.
                             B
  We briefly turn next to the defendant’s claim that the
court retaliated against him for exercising his rights
under the ADA. The record before this court is insuffi-
cient to establish that the court took any action against
the defendant in retaliation for his exercising his rights
under the ADA.
  The ADA prohibits retaliation against ‘‘any individual
because such individual has opposed any act or practice
made unlawful by [the ADA] . . . .’’ 42 U.S.C. § 12203
(a) (2018). To ultimately succeed on a claim of retalia-
tion under the ADA, however, a plaintiff must establish
that the alleged retaliatory actions of the defendant
would not have occurred ‘‘but for’’ the plaintiff having
exercised his ADA rights. See Natofsky v. City of New
York, 921 F.3d 337, 346–50 (2d Cir. 2019). In other words,
if the defendant has even one legitimate, nonretaliatory
reason for its actions, the plaintiff’s claim of retaliation
will fail unless the plaintiff produces evidence to rebut
the proffered nondiscriminatory reason. See Ring v.
Boca Ciega Yacht Club Inc., 4 F.4th 1149, 1163 (11th Cir.
2021) (defendant was entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim because plaintiff failed
to rebut nondiscriminatory reason proffered by defen-
dant).
   In the present case, the defendant asserts that the
acts of retaliation by the court are its denial of his
motions and the court’s resting of his case following
his repeated failures to appear. The defendant, how-
ever, has not pointed us to anything in the record that
would support his assertion that these actions were
done with discriminatory animus rather than, as
reflected in the record, as a response to the defendant’s
failure to appear. As aptly argued by the plaintiff, there
was a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis for the
court’s actions for which the defendant has failed to
account, and, therefore, the defendant’s claim of dis-
criminatory retaliation under the ADA necessarily fails.
   In sum, even if we assume for the sake of argument
that the defendant’s ADA claims are properly before us
and that he had a right to a reasonable accommodation
in accordance with the ADA, the defendant has failed
to show that he was denied a reasonable accommoda-
tion or that the court retaliated against him for asserting
his federal statutory rights. For the reasons provided,
the defendant’s first two claims are without merit.
                             II
   The defendant next claims that the court improperly
relied on the defendant’s mental health diagnosis as a
basis for limiting his right to visitation and awarding
custody to the plaintiff. The plaintiff counters that the
court appropriately considered the mental health of the
defendant in determining custody and setting condi-
tions regarding visitation. We agree with the plaintiff.
   The touchstone of any custody determination is what
is in the best interest of the child. General Statutes
§ 46b-56 (c); Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 517, 72
A.3d 367 (2013). One of the enumerated factors that a
court may consider in determining issues of custody
and visitation in the context of a divorce is ‘‘the mental
and physical health of all individuals involved, except
that a disability of a proposed custodial parent . . . in
and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody
unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in
the best interests of the child . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (13).18
   In the present case, the court did not award the plain-
tiff sole custody of O solely on the basis of the defen-
dant’s mental health diagnosis. This was but one of a
number of reasons provided by the court for its decision
and, therefore, was not ‘‘in and of itself’’ determinative
of the court’s custody order. The defendant has not
directed our attention to anything in the record that
suggests otherwise or that would support his assertions
that the court’s consideration of his mental health diag-
nosis amounted to retaliation or disability discrimina-
tion. Moreover, the court’s focus was not on the defen-
dant’s mental health per se but, rather, the court
identified that it was concerned by the defendant’s fail-
ure to make reasonable progress to address its harmful
effect on his parenting of O as set forth in the court’s
decision. As discussed further in part VI of this opinion,
the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court
made any clearly erroneous factual findings regarding
his mental health.
   It was not improper for the court to rely in part
on the defendant’s mental health and its effect on the
development of O in determining custody. Likewise, it
is not the province of this court to reweigh the evidence
before the court or to substitute our judgment in this
matter. Accordingly, we reject this claim.
                           III
  The defendant further claims that the court improp-
erly relied on a stale custody evaluation in determining
the best interest of O. We are not persuaded.
   The parties stipulated in February, 2018, that Dr.
Smith would conduct a custody evaluation. This agree-
ment was approved by the court. Dr. Smith completed
her evaluation in December, 2019, and filed her report
with the court that same month. Although the trial had
been set to begin in March, 2020, the court closed
around this time due to the COVID-19 pandemic and
trials were suspended. The trial in this matter began in
May, 2021, and concluded in March, 2022. Dr. Smith’s
2019 evaluation was admitted into evidence, and she
testified regarding the substance of her evaluation and
her findings and recommendations, all of which were
subject to cross-examination by the defendant.
   It is well settled that in exercising its considerable
discretion in assessing a child’s best interest and the
ability of parents to meet a child’s needs related to
custody or visitation, ‘‘the court . . . may hear the rec-
ommendations of professionals in the family relations
field . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Merkel
v. Hill, 189 Conn. App. 779, 787, 207 A.3d 1115 (2019).
Ultimately, however, ‘‘the trial court is bound to con-
sider the [child’s] present best interests and not what
would have been in [his or her] best interests at some
previous time.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 788. Thus, a ‘‘court’s reliance
on outdated information and past parental conduct in
making . . . orders concerning [custody or] parental
access may be improper, particularly if the record has
adequate current information demonstrating a present
ability to parent.’’ Balaska v. Balaska, 130 Conn. App.
510, 518, 25 A.3d 680 (2011).
   In the present case, rather than relying solely on the
2019 custody evaluation, the court had ample current
evidence before it of the defendant’s present ability to
parent. Although the court accepted Dr. Smith’s evalua-
tion into evidence, it considered and evaluated it in light
of the updated testimony from Dr. Smith and others,
as well as evidence submitted by both parties regarding
O’s and the parents’ current situations. See id. (court’s
reliance on outdated report did not constitute abuse of
discretion because ‘‘there was adequate current infor-
mation in [the] record to support [the court’s] orders’’).
We agree with the plaintiff’s assessment in her brief
that, ‘‘although the custody evaluation of Dr. Smith may
have had some limitations due to the delay of the courts
being closed due to COVID-19, this goes solely to the
weight the trial judge gives the report rather than its
admissibility.’’ Because we are convinced from our
review of the record that other, more current evidence
introduced at trial amply supports the court’s custody
determination, the court did not abuse its discretion by
considering Dr. Smith’s custody evaluation.
                            IV
   The defendant claims next that the court improperly
required the parties to request leave of the court before
filing trial and pretrial motions and denied multiple
such requests. The defendant asserts that the court
cited no authority permitting it to limit the parties in
this way and suggests that it was the court’s requiring
the parties to seek permission before filing motions
that resulted in ‘‘this litigation [becoming] one of the
longest running custody matters in state history . . . .’’
The defendant’s claim is unavailing.
   In support of his claim, the defendant relies on lan-
guage from Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 706
A.2d 960 (1998), in which our Supreme Court held that
the trial court lacked the discretion to refuse to rule
on certain motions filed by the defendant in that case.
See id., 482. The court in Ahneman stated that trial
courts ‘‘are in the business of ruling on litigants’ conten-
tions, and they generally operate under the rule essen-
tial to the efficient administration of justice, that where
a court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject-
matter . . . and . . . obtains jurisdiction of the per-
son, it becomes its . . . duty to determine every ques-
tion which may arise in the cause . . . . This general
rule is particularly important in the context of marital
dissolution cases because of the likelihood of continu-
ing changes in the parties’ circumstances requiring con-
tinuing dispute resolution by the court.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 484. There
is nothing in the Ahneman decision, however, curtailing
a trial court’s exercise of its considerable discretion
over its docket or expressly barring the type of prohibi-
tory order issued by Judge Simon in the present case.
To the contrary, the court in Ahneman acknowledged
that ‘‘exceptions to the general rule that a trial court
must consider and decide on a reasonably prompt basis
all motions properly placed before it may exist in an
extreme, compelling situation. For example, we do not
rule out the possibility that a trial court may have discre-
tion to refuse to entertain or decide motions in order
to prevent harassing or vexatious litigation. . . .
Likewise, there may be other circumstances in which
a trial court properly could refuse to consider certain
motions.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id.,
484–85.
   Several years after the Ahneman decision, this court,
in Strobel v. Strobel, 92 Conn. App. 662, 886 A.2d 865
(2005), opined that a prohibitory order essentially iden-
tical to the one rendered by Judge Simon in the present
case;19 see id., 663; constituted a ‘‘praiseworthy’’ attempt
by the trial judge to limit the parties’ ‘‘barrages of repeti-
tive and abusive motions in an apparently ceaseless
war of hostility and vindictiveness toward one another
and that those motions are not only abusive to the
system but, more importantly, to their now teenage
son.’’ Id., 665. The record in the present case reflects
no less of a compelling reason for an order attempting
to curtail the flood of repetitive and oftentimes frivolous
motions filed in this matter. Accordingly, we reject the
defendant’s claim.
                              V
  The defendant claims that the court improperly
awarded sole custody of O to the plaintiff even though
the parties had always shared custody and the plaintiff
made no ‘‘showing of a change of circumstance.’’ We
are not persuaded.
   In making this claim, the defendant cites case law
holding that courts lack the authority to modify existing
custody orders in the absence of a material change of
circumstances. See Hall v. Hall, 186 Conn. 118, 122,
439 A.2d 447 (1982) (noting that after final decree dis-
solving marriage enters, our Supreme Court ‘‘has lim-
ited the broad discretion given the trial court to modify
custody orders under . . . § 46b-56 by requiring that
modification of a custody award be based upon either
a material change of circumstances [that] alters the
court’s finding of the best interests of the child . . .
or a finding that the custody order sought to be modified
was not based upon the best interests of the child’’
(citations omitted)).
  Here, up until the time of the dissolution of marriage,
the parties shared legal and physical custody of O.
Whether such joint custody should continue in the
future, however, was precisely the issue that the parties
could not agree upon in their separation agreement and
left for the court in the present action to decide. Custody
had not been finally determined. The cases relied on
by the defendant addressing the court’s authority to
modify a prior custody order are inapposite to the facts
before us. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim asserting
an improper modification of custody fails.
                            VI
  The defendant next claims that the court erroneously
found that the defendant had narcissistic personality
disorder. Because there was evidence in the record to
support this finding, and we lack a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was made, the defendant’s
claim fails.
   Whether the defendant suffered from a particular
medical condition is a factual determination that we
review under our clearly erroneous standard of review.
See Malpeso v. Malpeso, 189 Conn. App. 486, 505, 207
A.3d 1085 (2019). As previously stated, ‘‘[a] finding of
fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in
the record to support it . . . or when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, supra,
207 Conn. App. 34.
    Here, the court heard testimony from Dr. Smith that
she administered several psychological tests to the
defendant in the course of conducting her custody eval-
uation, including one in which he tested high on the
narcissistic personality scale. Dr. Smith was asked dur-
ing direct examination whether it was her opinion at
the time she prepared her report that the defendant
‘‘has narcissistic personality disorder?’’ She responded:
‘‘I believe that was my clinical opinion.’’ She was further
asked whether it was ‘‘typically a temporary condition’’
if an individual presented with a high score on the
narcissism scale. She responded: ‘‘So, narcissism and
any personality disorder generally tend to be a long-
term pattern of enduring traits, symptoms and behav-
iors, typically not amenable to significant change, espe-
cially if there isn’t significant, meaningful treatment.’’
(Emphasis added.) This testimony was consistent with
observations made by Dr. Smith in her custody evalua-
tion, in which she had determined on the basis of multi-
ple sources of information, including her own testing
and clinical observations, that the defendant suffers
from ‘‘very high levels of narcissism/narcissistic person-
ality disorder.’’ Dr. Smith also noted in her evaluation
that the defendant’s own personal therapist, Robert
Fogel, with whom she had consulted, previously diag-
nosed the defendant with narcissistic personality disor-
der and had shared this diagnosis with the defendant.
Fogel, who testified at the custody hearing for the defen-
dant, confirmed that he had informed Dr. Smith that
he had diagnosed the defendant with narcissistic per-
sonality disorder.
  The evidence in the record adequately supports the
court’s findings that the defendant has been diagnosed
with narcissistic personality disorder and that this diag-
nosis constituted a ‘‘long-term pattern of maladaptive
behavior that is not amenable to treatment.’’ We are
not left with a definite and firm conviction that any
mistake has been made with respect to the court’s chal-
lenged findings. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s
claim that the court’s findings were clearly erroneous.
                            VII
  Finally, the defendant claims that the court commit-
ted the following evidentiary errors: (1) improperly
admitting certain testimony of Lineth Santos, a social
worker from the Department of Children and Families
(department), and (2) improperly admitting and relying
on an affidavit of Dr. Grasso, O’s therapist. We reject
the defendant’s evidentiary claims.
   The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to the defendant’s claims. At trial, over repeated
and often duplicative objections by the defendant,20 the
court heard testimony from Santos, who was called as
a witness by the plaintiff. Santos testified that she had
investigated an anonymous call made to the department
concerning the plaintiff’s purported physical removal
of O from a baseball game in which he was participating.
During her testimony, a redacted version of the relevant
department investigation protocol was admitted into
evidence as a full exhibit. Santos testified that her inves-
tigation included, among other things, interviews with
O and conversations with Dr. Grasso. Santos testified
that, as a result of her investigation, the department
discovered no concerns with the plaintiff’s actions vis-
à-vis the baseball game incident or her ability to parent
O, but the department did develop concerns about O’s
emotional well-being with respect to the defendant.
Santos testified that the department subsequently sub-
stantiated emotional neglect of O by the defendant.
Santos testified in response to questions from the defen-
dant on cross-examination that she had reviewed an
affidavit sworn to by Dr. Grasso21 and that Dr. Grasso’s
opinion, both as expressed in the affidavit and in inter-
views, was relied on by the department in its investiga-
tion. Santos, however, never testified in a manner that
disclosed the actual contents of Dr. Grasso’s affidavit.
The defendant later attempted to have a copy of Dr.
Grasso’s affidavit admitted into evidence, but the plain-
tiff objected on hearsay grounds, and it was marked
for identification purposes only.
  It is axiomatic that a ‘‘trial court’s ruling on the admis-
sibility of evidence is entitled to great deference. . . .
[T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the
admissibility . . . of evidence . . . [and its] ruling on
evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a
showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seder v. Errato, 211
Conn. App. 167, 177, 272 A.3d 252, cert. denied, 343
Conn. 917, 274 A.3d 868 (2022). Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is well
established that this court will not review unpreserved
evidentiary claims.’’ Braham v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, 132 Conn. App. 57, 61, 31 A.3d 71 (2011), cert.
denied, 303 Conn. 939, 37 A.3d 153 (2012).
  We have thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of San-
tos’ testimony as well as the many objections raised
during her testimony by the defendant. We conclude
that the defendant has failed to demonstrate how the
court abused its broad discretion with respect to the
admission of Santos’ testimony. To the extent that the
defendant has attempted to raise additional objections
that were not raised at trial, we decline to review these
unpreserved aspects of his claim. With respect to the
objections he did raise at trial, we conclude that the
court properly ruled on them in the manner that it did
for the reasons provided and that further explication
by this court is unwarranted.
   Furthermore, there is also nothing in the record from
which to conclude that the court improperly relied on
Dr. Grasso’s affidavit in awarding custody to the plain-
tiff. The court never stated in its memorandum of deci-
sion that it relied on Dr. Grasso’s affidavit, which, as
we have indicated and the defendant agrees, was not
in evidence. The few references to Dr. Grasso by the
court in its memorandum of decision are incidental and
do not reflect any error in the court’s reasoning. This
aspect of the defendant’s evidentiary claim, therefore,
also fails.
  In summary, having carefully reviewed the record,
the transcripts provided, the parties’ briefs, oral argu-
ment, and all relevant law, we conclude that the defen-
dant has failed to demonstrate any error by the court
that warrants a remand for a new trial in this matter.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.
   The judgment is affirmed.
   In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of family violence, we decline to use the parties’ full names or to
identify the victims or others through whom the victims’ identities may be
ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
  Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
  1
    The ADA provides in relevant part that ‘‘no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.’’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (2018).
   2
     This case has been pending for more than seven years, and the docket
sheet contains well over one thousand entries.
   3
     Originally, the defendant would have parenting time with O beginning
after school on Wednesdays and return him to school on Thursdays. On
April 19, 2017, the court modified the defendant’s parenting time to accom-
modate the defendant’s request that O be permitted to play Little League
baseball. Pursuant to the new order, the defendant’s weekly overnights
would occur on whichever day that O had a game, and the weekend visit
was moved from Sundays to Saturdays.
   4
     The defendant filed the overwhelming majority of these motions, a prac-
tice that continued throughout the underlying proceedings.
   5
     The court indicated in its order that the defendant’s most recent arrest
was the seventh criminal case pending against him in G.A. 12.
   6
     As stated by the court in the underlying memorandum of decision, ‘‘[i]t
was not until October 21, 2020, when the court, Connors, J., acting upon
the defendant’s motion for clarification (#438), vacated the prior order for
temporary sole legal custody to the plaintiff (#438.10). The court . . .
restored joint legal custody to the parties with the plaintiff having final
decision-making for summer camp and therapy issues.’’
   7
     In the memorandum of decision underlying this appeal, the court stated
that throughout the proceedings, rather than allowing matters to be sched-
uled by the court, it was customary for the defendant to inundate the court
and the plaintiff with multiple, often duplicative, filings. This observation
is borne out by our own review of the record.
   8
     The defendant continued to file numerous requests and motions with
the court throughout 2020. On January 21, 2020, the court, Connors, J.,
denied requests by the defendant to file motions regarding the scheduling
of a new hearing date to address his pending contempt motions and motions
regarding O’s participation in Little League that spring, a holiday visitation
schedule, and increased parenting time. On July 8, 2020, the defendant filed
an application for a restraining order alleging that he was in immediate
physical danger and harm because the plaintiff had allowed O to participate
in summer camp, increasing O’s exposure to COVID-19 and, therefore, his
own. That application was denied following a contested hearing on July 22
and 28, 2020. On August 24, 2020, Judge Connors granted the defendant’s
request for leave to file a motion for order to determine what elementary
school O would attend in the fall of 2020. On August 31, 2020, the court,
M. Murphy, J., denied the motion for order. On September 9, 2020, the
defendant filed a request for leave to file a motion regarding O’s participation
in fall Little League. The court, Connors, J., denied that request.
   9
     In January, 2021, the defendant filed a request for leave to file a motion
for clarification as to the court’s January 19, 2018 order regarding payments
to the custody evaluator. The request was granted, and the court, Olear, J.,
clarified its orders, explaining that the parties’ oral agreement was that the
defendant was solely responsible for the $10,000 retainer to Dr. Smith and
the $4000 owed to Dr. Humphrey.
   10
      According to his appeal form, the defendant sought review of the trial
court’s refusal to timely schedule and hear fifty-three pending motions for
contempt filed from 2017 to 2021; its denial of a motion in limine regarding
the December 6, 2019 custody evaluation; and its refusal to restore his
visitation rights.
   11
      Although no transcript of the May 25, 2021 hearing was filed with this
court, it is clear from the record that there was a remote hearing on that day.
   12
      The court had the following colloquy with the defendant:
   ‘‘The Court: So how can . . . a change in the trial schedule reduce your
stress? . . . Do you want half days, not full days?
   ‘‘[The Defendant]: At this point in time, Your Honor, I think I need a rest.
   ‘‘The Court: How long do you need a rest?
   ‘‘[The Defendant]: Well, at least for the balance of the week. And I think
I can continue into next week every other day. . . .
   ‘‘The Court: [T]hat’s the problem. The court’s schedule is set through
March where all of our schedules are already determined because people
have to have notice of when they have their other trials. So, I can’t just say
that you can have next week, every other day. You understand?’’ (Empha-
sis added.)
   13
      The defendant did not order transcripts for the proceedings on February
16, 2022.
   14
      The defendant filed an appeal from the court’s order, which this court
later dismissed on June 21, 2022, for failure to comply with an order to file
preliminary paperwork. See Practice Book § 63-4 (a) and (c).
    15
       In the interim, the defendant filed a civil rights complaint with the United
States Department of Justice and initiated a civil rights action against Judge
Nguyen-O’Dowd in federal District Court, arguing that the court had violated
his rights under the ADA.
    16
       General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) provides: ‘‘In making or modifying any
order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so, may consider, but
shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The physical
and emotional safety of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental
needs of the child; (3) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to
understand and meet the needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material
information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of
the child; (5) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (6) the past
and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the
child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best
interests of the child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent to
facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between
the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with
any court orders; (8) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents
in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (9) the ability of
each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (10) the child’s
adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (11)
the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environ-
ment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily
leaves the child’s family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the
household; (12) the stability of the child’s existing or proposed residences,
or both; (13) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved,
except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in
and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed
custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (14) the child’s
cultural background; (15) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser,
if any domestic violence, as defined in section 46b-1, has occurred between
the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (16)
whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected,
as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (17) whether the party satis-
factorily completed participation in a parenting education program estab-
lished pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any
weight to any of the factors that it considers, but shall articulate the basis
for its decision.’’
    17
       As used in the ADA, ‘‘[t]he term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an
individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual . . . .’’ 42 U.S.C. § 12102
(1) (A) (2018). There is undisputed evidence in the present case that the
defendant had coronary artery disease and suffered related angina attacks.
The court made no factual determination, however, whether his conditions
substantially affected or limited major life activities, which the ADA states
‘‘include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speak-
ing, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
and working.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (A) (2018); see also Aucutt v. Six Flags
Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming District
Court’s holding that, although it was undisputed that plaintiff suffered from
‘‘angina, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease,’’ plaintiff was not
‘‘disabled’’ within meaning of ADA because ‘‘he had presented no evidence
suggesting that his medical problems ‘substantially limit[ed]’ one or more
of his ‘major life activities’ ’’).
    18
       In the context of child protection proceedings, courts have recognized
on a fact-specific basis that it may not be in the best interest of a child to
be in the custody of a parent who has a mental deficiency or illness, where
such illness renders the parent unable to provide the child with necessary
care. See, e.g., In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. 463, 473, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).
This is no less the case when considering custody in the context of a marital
dissolution action.
    19
       The trial judge in Strobel ordered: ‘‘Neither parent shall file any motions
or pleadings without prior approval of the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Strobel v. Strobel, supra, 92 Conn. App. 663.
    20
       The defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the testimony of any
and all department officials in this matter. The court denied this blanket
request without prejudice to the defendant’s right to raise any specific
objections at trial with respect to issues concerning privilege or confidential-
ity. When Santos was called to testify, the defendant renewed his request
to preclude her testimony, which the court also denied.
   21
      We note that, on July 7, 2021, the plaintiff filed in the present action
an application for an emergency ex parte order of custody. Attached as an
exhibit in support of the application was an affidavit of the plaintiff asserting
that the defendant had ‘‘engaged in a pattern of alarming behavior that is
erratic, disturbing, delusional, and dangerous for [O].’’ The application stated
that an affidavit of Dr. Grasso also was attached, although that affidavit is
not part of the application as it appears in the trial court file. In any event,
the court, Nguyen-O’Dowd, J., denied the application without comment on
July 8, 2021.