Court Opinion

ID: 9526031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:10:27.744057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:12.546908
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
Involved in this case is the identical rights form considered by the Court in Emler v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 241, 286 N. E. 2d 408. I remain convinced that this form does not conform to the constitutional requirements of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 694. It did not inform appellant that if he did not have sufficient funds to employ a lawyer, one will be furnished him before questioning and that he had a right to have a lawyer present during the questioning. It is also contradictory and confusing. The accused is told that he has a right to an attorney now. He is then told that if he has no money to employ a lawyer he has a right to have one appointed by the court, and this at a time when he is obviously not in court and does not *116know when he will be taken to a court. To say that a lawyer will be appointed by the court without further explanation is the same as saying that the lawyer will be appointed at some unspecified time in the future and is contradictory to the former statement that he has a right to counsel now. Emler v. State, supra, (DeBruler, dissenting). This is not the “effective and express explanation” of the right to counsel required by the Miranda case. In holding a similar incomplete and confusing rights form to be a violation of the Miranda requirement, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F. 2d 1248 (7th Cir., 1972), recently stated:
“In one breath, he [appellant] was informed that he had the right to appointed counsel during questioning. In the next breath, he was told that counsel could not be provided until later. In other words, the statement that no lawyer can be provided at the moment and can only be obtained if and when the accused reaches court substantially restricts the absolute right to counsel previously stated; it conveys the contradictory alternative message that an indigent is first entitled to counsel upon an appearance in court at some unknown future time. The entire warning is therefore, at best, misleading and confusing and, at worst, constitutes a subtle temptation to the unsophisticated, indigent accused to forego the right to counsel at this critical moment.”
The same must be said of the rights form in the case before us.
Additionally involved in the case before us is a problem arising from multiple advisements and multiple statements. Appellant was twice interrogated by the police. During each interrogation he gave a statement. Prior to each interrogation session appellant was given an advice of rights anew at least twice. These advisements are quoted in the majority opinion. The majority then lumps all of these together and concludes that they collectively demonstrate that appellant was fully apprised of his Miranda rights, and that the second statement was therefore constitutionaly admissible. I disagree with this approach. The only relevant advice of rights in this case would be those which preceded the giving of the first statement *117to the police interrogators. In my view, if the first statement was taken in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, the second statement, given six hours thereafter while appellant was in continuous custody and without benefit of counsel would likewise be constitutionally inadmissible. The second statement would be the direct product of the first illegally obtained statement, and as such would likewise be illegally obtained. Darwin v. Connecticut (1968), 391 U.S. 346, 88 S. Ct. 1488, 20 L. Ed. 2d 630; Williams v. Twomey, supra. I conclude that the second statement was erroneously admitted in evidence. This conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Note.—Reported in 292 N. E. 2d 790.