Court Opinion

ID: 9481620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:25:59.541923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:27.789253
License: Public Domain

ALTIMARI, Circuit Judge, concurring:
Under constraint of this Court’s recent decision in Taggart v. Time Inc., 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir.1991), I concur in the decision reached by the majority. I write separately to express my concern that Taggart will make summary judgment in many Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) cases a rarity and will place numerous employers in an untenable predicament.
A literal reading of Taggart strongly suggests that whenever an employer refuses to hire or retain an “overqualified” person, who is protected under the ADEA, a resulting employment discrimination action will automatically present a triable issue of fact. While this outcome might be justified if the term “overqualified” were invariably a buzzword for “too old,” in reality an employer may have legitimate reasons for declining to employ overqualified individuals. Indeed, the Court in Taggart acknowledged this point when it indicated that ov-erqualifieation is a permissible basis to refuse to hire or retain “a younger person.” Taggart, 924 F.2d at 47-48 (“An employer might reasonably believe that an overqualified candidate — where that term is applied to a younger person — will continue to seek employment more in keeping with his or her background and training.”).
Certainly, an employer might reasonably determine that placing an “overqualified” individual in a particular position would, as defendant-appellee LILCO contends, demoralize the individual and engender frustration, low morale and poor job performance. When such a judgment is made, under circumstances that fail to give rise to an inference of age discrimination, summary judgment should be available. To hold otherwise bestows talismanic significance on the term “overqualified” and needlessly permits ADEA plaintiffs to evade meritorious motions for summary judgment. This result is at odds with the precedent of this Circuit, see Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985), Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir.1988), and contrary to the spirit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
It also seems to me that Taggart foists an unfair and unnecessary “heads I lose, tails you win” choice upon employers. After Taggart, when an employer legitimately concludes that a job applicant — who is within the ADEA’s protected class — is overqualified for the position sought, what are the employer’s choices? The employer can reject the applicant and risk an ADEA action that will necessarily require trial on the merits. Alternatively, the employer can extend an offer to the applicant and *195wait to see if its concerns about morale, frustration and poor job performance were accurate. I seriously doubt that Congress intended this Hobson’s Choice when it enacted the ADEA.
Finally, as the majority notes, Taggart was decided after the district court granted summary judgment on behalf of LILCO. Thus, when Judge Mishler issued his thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion, he was unaware of Taggart and its implications. I therefore believe that on remand the district court should initially consider whether evidence exists that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that LILCO’s stated reason for not retaining Binder was pretextual.