Court Opinion

ID: 9402926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-19 15:08:09.653243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.546578
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued June 15, 2023

                                        In The

                                Court of Appeals
                                       For The

                           First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                                NO. 01-21-00648-CV
                             ———————————
                       RAVEN SIMONE POPE, Appellant
                                          V.
   SHELLY MARIE PERRAULT F/K/A SHELLY MARIE MELANCON,
                        Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 300th District Court
                           Brazoria County, Texas
                        Trial Court Case No. 113216-F

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This is an appeal of the trial court’s denial of a bill of review. In a prior

proceeding in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the trial court entered an

order appointing appellee Shelly Marie Perrault f/k/a Shelly Marie Melancon
(“Perrault”) sole managing conservator of her grandson, who is the biological child

of appellant Raven Simone Pope. The order appointed Pope possessory conservator

of the child.

      Pope filed a bill of review challenging the conservatorship appointment on

several grounds. The trial court set a preliminary hearing for Pope to present prima

facie proof of a meritorious defense to the prior suit. After the preliminary hearing

before an associate judge and a subsequent de novo preliminary hearing before the

trial judge, the trial court denied the bill of review and dismissed it in its entirety. In

four issues, Pope argues that the trial court erred by denying her bill of review

because: (1) the court ruled on issues outside the scope of the preliminary hearing,

specifically her claim that she was not served with process in the prior proceeding;

(2) the court exhibited bias and prejudice against some of her evidence; (3) she

presented prima facie proof that Perrault lacked standing in the prior proceeding;

and (4) she presented prima facie proof that Perrault did not overcome the

presumption that it was in the child’s best interest to have Pope—his mother—

appointed as his conservator. We reverse and remand.

                                            2
                                      Background

      Pope gave birth to her second child, J.J.D. (“James”), in February 2018.1 She

was twenty years old at the time and had an older daughter, who is James’s half-

sibling. Perrault is James’s paternal grandmother.

A.    SAPCR Proceeding

      In May 2018, shortly after James was born, Perrault filed an original petition

in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (“SAPCR”) requesting that she be

appointed James’s conservator. Her petition alleged that she had standing under

Family Code section 102.004. The petition further stated that “[n]o service is

necessary at this time” upon Pope.2

      At the end of May, the court entered a temporary order appointing Perrault as

the temporary sole managing conservator of James and appointing Pope as a

temporary possessory conservator. The order stated that no party appeared in person

for a hearing on the order but that Perrault and Pope had both agreed to the terms of

the order as evidenced by their signatures on the order.

      In August 2018, the court entered a final order appointing Perrault as James’s

sole managing conservator and appointing Pope as James’s possessory conservator.

1
      We refer to J.J.D., who is a minor child, by a pseudonym to protect his privacy.
2
      Perrault also named James’s father, Johnny Demease, as a respondent in the SAPCR
      proceeding. Demease died after the SAPCR proceeding concluded. He therefore
      was not a party to the bill-of-review proceeding, and he is not a party to this appeal.

                                             3
This final order stated that Perrault did not appear in person for a hearing on the

SAPCR petition but that she agreed to the terms of the order as evidenced by her

signature. The order did not recite whether Pope had appeared or agreed to the

order’s terms, but her signature appeared below Perrault’s signature on the order as

“approved and consented to as to both form and substance.”

      Pope, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal of the final order. The

appellate record does not indicate the outcome of this appeal, although the parties’

appellate briefs appear to agree that Pope did not pursue the appeal. Pope also filed

an original answer and a motion for new trial.

      The trial court held a hearing on Pope’s motion for new trial. Pope appeared

and proceeded pro se. She testified that child protective services (“CPS”) was

involved with the family when James was born, so she decided to allow James and

her daughter to live with Perrault temporarily because it was her understanding that

CPS would close its case if she did so. Pope also understood that once CPS closed

its case, her children would be returned to her.

      Pope also testified that, unbeknownst to her, Perrault had filed the SAPCR

petition seeking to be appointed as James’s conservator. Pope testified that she did

not sign the temporary or final SAPCR orders. Rather, Perrault had presented Pope

with a single blank page and requested that Pope sign it. Perrault represented to Pope

that the signature was for a power of attorney. Pope signed the page without reading

                                          4
it because she trusted Perrault. Perrault then allegedly used Pope’s signature to

indicate Pope’s agreement to the terms of the SAPCR orders. A CPS caseworker

eventually sent Pope the SAPCR orders she had purportedly signed, but Pope

testified that she had never seen the documents before. After CPS closed its case,

Perrault refused to return Pope’s children, although Perrault had returned Pope’s

daughter by the time of the hearing on the motion for new trial.

      At the end of the hearing, the trial court orally denied the motion for new trial.

The court also signed a written order denying the motion. Pope subsequently

retained counsel and filed a combined motion to vacate a void order and to dismiss.

The appellate record does not show that the trial court ruled on this motion.

B.    Bill of Review Proceeding

      On June 11, 2021, with the assistance of new counsel, Pope filed an original

petition for bill of review in the SAPCR court. Pope’s petition primarily alleged that

she was not served with process in the SAPCR proceeding. She also alleged two

meritorious defenses to the SAPCR proceeding: Perrault lacked standing, and

Perrault did not overcome the presumption that awarding custody to a parent is in a

child’s best interest. Pope also alleged that Perrault had engaged in extrinsic fraud

by using Pope’s signature on the SAPCR orders. She further alleged that she was

neither at fault nor negligent in having the orders entered.

                                          5
      Pope attached several documents to her petition. In a sworn affidavit, Pope

averred that Perrault had her “sign a piece of paper with only my [Pope’s] name on

it, [Demease’s] name, and her [Perrault’s] name.” No other sheets of paper were

attached to the signature page, and Perrault represented that the signature would give

Perrault the power of attorney for James. Pope further averred that she was only

twenty years old at the time and “did not notice anything out of the ordinary or

suspicious about this at the time.” She later learned that Perrault had allegedly used

her signature to indicate that Pope agreed to the temporary SAPCR order. In addition

to her affidavit, Pope attached the original SAPCR petition, the temporary and final

SAPCR orders, and her answer and motion for new trial in the SAPCR case.

      Three days after Pope filed her petition for bill of review, the trial court

entered an order setting “a preliminary hearing under Baker v. Goldsmith” for the

express purpose of determining whether Pope “is able to make a prima facie showing

of a meritorious defense to proceed to trial on the merits on the remaining grounds

alleged” in her petition. See 582 S.W.2d 404, 408–09 (Tex. 1979) (outlining trial

procedure and burdens of persuasion in bill-of-review proceeding). An associate

judge presided over this hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, Pope’s counsel

stated that the purpose of the hearing “is specifically just to show the prima facie

case in order to proceed to trial on the remaining Bill of Review grounds on fraud

and lack of negligence, on the lack of service.” Pope argued that she had three

                                          6
meritorious defenses: her signature on the SAPCR order was obtained through fraud

or forgery; Perrault lacked standing in the SAPCR proceeding; and Perrault did not

meet her burden in the SAPCR proceeding to overcome the presumption that it was

in James’s best interest to have Pope, his mother, appointed as his managing

conservator.

      The only evidence admitted at this hearing was the transcript from the hearing

on Pope’s motion for new trial in the SAPCR case, which Perrault introduced

without objection. At the end of the hearing, the associate judge took the matter

under advisement. In a letter ruling, the associate judge recommended denial of the

bill of review because Pope “failed to pursue her legal remedy of a direct appeal

after her Motion for New Trial was denied” in the SAPCR proceeding.

      Pope filed a motion requesting a de novo preliminary hearing before the trial

court. The motion argued that the hearing before the associate judge was limited to

the determination of whether Pope could present prima facie proof of a meritorious

defense, but the associate judge’s ruling concerning her pursuit of a direct appeal

fell outside the scope of that hearing. The trial court granted the motion and set a

date for a de novo hearing.

      At the start of the de novo hearing, Pope stated the hearing was “limited in

scope to specifically [] the issues of meritorious defenses.” Pope made the same

arguments she had made to the associate judge. She requested that the trial court take

                                          7
judicial notice of the SAPCR proceeding, but the trial court did not respond. Pope

also argued that she had obtained a report from a forensic handwriting analyst, which

she had filed with the court. Perrault objected that the report was “outside of the

scope of the Baker hearing,” and the trial court sustained the objection.

      At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated that it would “deny the bill of

review” because “there has not been a sufficient showing of no default or negligence

on [Pope’s] part which contributed to the entry of those orders.” The court

additionally remarked that Pope’s signatures “are all different” and expressed

uncertainty about “how an expert can tell you which one was which.” The trial court

subsequently signed an order denying all relief and dismissing the bill of review in

its entirety.3 The order stated that the trial court took “judicial notice of all pleadings

and contents contained in the Court’s files[.]”

      Pope filed a motion for new trial. She argued that the trial court erred by

making findings outside the scope of a preliminary Baker hearing, violating her right

to due process by converting the preliminary hearing into a trial on the merits without

notice, expressing an opinion on the weight of the evidence concerning the

3
      Pope filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law on November 17,
      2021, more than twenty days after the trial court signed the judgment dismissing her
      bill of review on September 28, 2021. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 296 (requiring party to
      file written request for findings of fact and conclusions of law “within twenty days
      after judgment is signed”). The trial court did not file findings or conclusions. On
      appeal, Pope does not challenge the court’s failure to file findings and conclusions.

                                            8
handwriting analysis before she could offer the report into evidence, and concluding

that she had not presented prima facie proof of a meritorious defense.

      The trial court held a brief hearing on the motion for new trial. After Pope

argued her motion, the trial court said that it “didn’t make a determination that we

were having a limited scope or an open, full-scope hearing.” The court stated that

Pope’s remedy was by appeal and denied the motion for new trial. This appeal

followed.

                                    Bill of Review

      Pope challenges the dismissal of her bill of review in four issues on appeal.

First, she contends that the trial court violated her right to due process by dismissing

her bill of review after holding a preliminary Baker hearing that was limited in scope

to considering whether she presented prima facie proof of a meritorious defense. She

argues that her claim of non-service did not require prima facie proof to survive the

preliminary hearing stage, and therefore the trial court erred by prematurely

dismissing this claim. She also argues that the trial court erred to the extent it

dismissed her remaining claims based on her failure to present prima facie proof of

bill-of-review elements other than a meritorious defense.

      In her second issue, which we discuss last, Pope argues that the trial court

violated her right to due process by commenting on her expert handwriting analysis

report. Pope argues that the comments exhibited judicial bias and prejudice.

                                           9
      In her third and fourth issues, Pope contends that she presented sufficient

prima facie proof of two meritorious defenses: (1) Perrault’s lack of standing, and

(2) Perrault’s failure to overcome the statutory presumption that it was in James’s

best interest to have his mother—Pope—appointed conservator.

A.    Standard of Review

      Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a bill of review for abuse of

discretion. Joseph v. Jack, 624 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021,

no pet.); Woods v. Kenner, 501 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2016, no pet.). However, whether a petitioner has presented prima facie proof of a

meritorious defense is a legal question that we review de novo. Baker, 582 S.W.2d

at 408–09; Ramsey v. State, 249 S.W.3d 568, 574 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.);

Mosley v. Dallas Cnty. Child Protective Servs. Unit of the Tex. Dep’t of Protective

& Regul. Servs., 110 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied).

B.    Procedure for Bill of Review

      A bill of review is an equitable proceeding to set aside a prior judgment that

is no longer challengeable by a motion for new trial or appeal. Caldwell v. Barnes,

154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406; see TEX. R.

CIV. P. 329b(f) (“On expiration of the time within which the trial court has plenary

power, a judgment cannot be set aside by the trial court except by bill of review for

sufficient cause, filed within the time allowed by law.”). A plaintiff seeking a bill of

                                          10
review ordinarily must plead and prove: (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying

cause of action; (2) which the plaintiff was prevented from making by the fraud,

accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or by official mistake; (3) unmixed

with any fault or negligence on their own part.4 Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96. To

invoke the trial court’s equitable power, the petition must allege these elements

factually and with particularity. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408.

      1.     Ordinary Procedure

      Ordinarily, courts use a two-step inquiry when deciding a bill of review that

is not based on a claim of non-service. Id. at 408–09; Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141,

141–42 (Tex. 1989). This case solely concerns the first step.

      Under the first step, prior to trial, the petitioner must present prima facie proof

of a meritorious defense. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408. This usually occurs during a

pretrial Baker hearing. See id.; see also Maree v. Zuniga, 502 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (stating that, prior to Baker hearing, trial

court may consider and rule on other bill-of-review elements raised in summary

judgment motion or in separate trial prior to deciding whether petitioner has prima

4
      A petitioner may also seek a bill of review when the parties participated at trial and
      the losing party was prevented from filing a motion for new trial or appeal because
      of the fraud, accident, or a wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake
      unmixed with any fault or negligence on the petitioner’s part. Petro-Chem. Transp.,
      Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 244–46 (Tex. 1974). Neither party argues that the
      Petro-Chemical standard applies in this case. We therefore assume without deciding
      that Petro-Chemical does not apply here.

                                            11
facie proof of meritorious defense); Ramsey, 249 S.W.3d at 576 (“The Baker pretrial

hearing is a ‘suggested procedure’ which a trial court may choose not to employ.”).

“This preliminary showing is essential in order to assure the court that valuable

judicial resources will not be wasted by conducting a spurious ‘full-blown’

examination of the merits.” Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408. The “only relevant inquiry”

in this pretrial determination “is whether the petitioner has presented prima facie

proof of a meritorious defense.” Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142.

      A petitioner presents prima facie proof of a meritorious defense by

establishing that the defense is not barred as a matter of law and the petitioner would

be entitled to judgment on retrial if no evidence to the contrary is offered. Baker,

582 S.W.2d at 408–09; Maree, 502 S.W.3d at 365. This is a question of law for the

court to decide. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409. Prima facie proof may consist of

documents, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits as well as “other

evidence that the trial court may receive in its discretion.” Id. The respondent may

present evidence showing that the defense is barred as a matter of law, but factual

disputes are resolved in favor of the petitioner for purposes of this pretrial

determination. Id.

      If the petitioner does not establish a prima facie meritorious defense, the court

should dismiss the case after this first step. Id.; see also Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142. If,

however, the petitioner does establish a prima facie meritorious defense, then the

                                           12
court should proceed to the second step: discovery and a trial on the merits of the

bill of review.5 Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409; Boateng v. Trailblazer Health Enters.,

L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 481, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

If the petitioner proves her entitlement to a bill of review, the parties revert back to

their original status as plaintiff and defendant with the burden on the original plaintiff

to prove her case. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 407–08, 409.

      2.     Slightly Modified Procedure for Claim of Non-Service

      When a bill-of-review petitioner alleges lack of service, the two-step Baker

procedure is “slightly modified.” Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 97. A petitioner alleging

lack of service is relieved from proving the first and second elements of a bill of

review as to that claim, i.e., that she has a meritorious defense and that she was

prevented from asserting the defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of her

opponent or by official mistake. Id. at 96–97; see Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc.,

485 U.S. 80, 86–87 (1988) (holding that meritorious-defense element of bill of

review violates due process where petitioner had no notice of proceeding in which

default judgment was rendered against petitioner). The petitioner must still prove the

5
      In this context, “trial” contemplates the possibility of a summary judgment on the
      motion of a party. Maree v. Zuniga, 502 S.W.3d 359, 362 n.2, 365 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Boateng v. Trailblazer Health Enters., L.L.C.,
      171 S.W.3d 481, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“The
      trial court had discretion to entertain cross-motions for summary judgment before
      conducting a Baker hearing.”).

                                           13
third and final element of a bill of review: the judgment was rendered unmixed with

any fault or negligence on the petitioner’s part. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 97. This

third element is conclusively established by proof that the petitioner was never

served with process. Id. “Because proof of non-service conclusively negates a

plaintiff’s fault or negligence, then, the question of service is properly resolved at

trial and not by the trial court in a pretrial proceeding if the material facts are

disputed.” Id.; see Sozanski v. Plesh, 394 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (stating that issue of lack of service is pure question of fact

to be determined by factfinder).

      Thus, for claims of non-service, the court should skip the first Baker step and

proceed directly to trial under the second step:

      When a plaintiff claims lack of service, the trial court should:
      (1) dispense with any pretrial inquiry into a meritorious defense,
      (2) hold a trial, at which the bill of review plaintiff assumes the burden
      of proving that the plaintiff was not served with process, thereby
      conclusively establishing a lack of fault or negligence in allowing a
      default judgment to be rendered, and (3) conditioned upon an
      affirmative finding that the plaintiff was not served, allow the parties to
      revert to their original status as plaintiff and defendant with the burden
      on the original plaintiff to prove his or her case.

Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 97–98.

C.    Preliminary Baker Hearings

      In her first issue, Pope contends that the trial court erred by dismissing her

claim of non-service and by dismissing her remaining claims on grounds other than

                                           14
a lack of prima facie proof of a meritorious defense. She argues that at the

preliminary Baker stage of the proceeding, the trial court was limited to determining

whether she presented prima facie evidence of meritorious defenses on the claims

other than her claim of non-service.

      1.     Notice and Scope of Preliminary Hearings

      We first address the parties’ dispute about whether the preliminary hearing

was converted into a trial on the merits. Perrault does not dispute that the preliminary

hearings before the associate judge and the trial court were noticed as preliminary

Baker hearings for the express purpose of determining whether Pope could present

prima facie proof of a meritorious defense. Instead, Perrault argues that Pope did not

object to the admission of her prior testimony into evidence at the preliminary

hearing before the associate judge, which thereby “opened the door” to consideration

of the merits of all issues raised in Pope’s bill-of-review petition.

      “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any

proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under

the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and

afford them the opportunity to present their objections.” Peralta, 485 U.S. at 84

(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).

“Failure to give notice violates ‘the most rudimentary demands of due process law.’”

Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965)).

                                           15
      The appellate record in this case shows that both hearings were noticed as

preliminary Baker hearings. See 582 S.W.2d at 408–09; see also Peralta, 485 U.S.

at 84 (stating that due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise

interested parties of lawsuit and afford them opportunity to present objections). The

notice for the first hearing before the associate judge expressly stated the hearing

would be a “preliminary hearing under Baker v. Goldsmith” to determine whether

Pope had prima facie proof of a meritorious defense.

      Similarly, the notice of the de novo hearing before the trial court indicated

that its purpose was to reconsider the preliminary issue of meritorious defenses.

Although this notice did not express the purpose of the de novo hearing as clearly as

the notice of the initial preliminary hearing, it granted Pope’s motion requesting a

de novo hearing, not a trial on the merits. Perrault does not argue on appeal that these

notices constituted notice of a trial on the merits. We therefore conclude that the

hearing notices apprised Pope only that the court was holding a preliminary Baker

hearing, not a trial on the merits. See Peralta, 485 U.S. at 84.

      Without citing any legal authority, Perrault nevertheless argues that the

preliminary hearing before the associate judge was converted into a trial on the

merits when Pope did not object to the introduction into evidence of her prior

testimony from the motion for new trial hearing. According to Perrault, this “opened

                                          16
the door to the trial court considering more than just a meritorious defense . . . .” We

disagree.

      Although Perrault correctly states that this prior testimony was admitted

without objection, neither Perrault’s argument on appeal nor the reporter’s record

clarifies the purpose for which Perrault introduced the evidence. The evidence was

admitted during Perrault’s argument disputing Pope’s claim that Perrault obtained

Pope’s signature on the SAPCR orders by fraud or forgery. Although this claim

primarily concerns the second element of a bill of review—whether fraud prevented

Pope from asserting a meritorious defense in the SAPCR proceeding—it also

concerns the meritorious defense element at issue in the preliminary hearing. As we

discuss below, Pope argues that the trial court in the SAPCR proceeding did not hold

a hearing or otherwise require Perrault to prove that she had standing to assert her

claims or that she was entitled to the relief she sought. Thus, our review of the record

indicates that the evidence was at least partially relevant to the issue of meritorious

defenses.

      In any event, “[t]he fact that a preliminary Baker hearing at times addresses

irrelevant issues does not convert this preliminary hearing into a trial on the merits.”

Boateng, 171 S.W.3d at 491. Pope’s allegations are largely intertwined among the

various bill-of-review elements, and understanding her allegations requires some

consideration of the other elements. Indeed, both parties’ arguments relied on the

                                          17
other elements to put the allegations into context. But discussing the other elements

did not convert the preliminary hearings into a trial on the merits. See id.

      The totality of Perrault’s conduct at both preliminary hearings contradicts her

argument on appeal that the first Baker hearing was converted into a trial on the

merits. She did not object to or refute Pope’s arguments that both Baker hearings

were limited to the issue of meritorious defenses. To the contrary, Perrault objected

twice during the de novo hearing on the ground that Pope was arguing outside the

scope of a Baker hearing. Thus, Perrault’s conduct at both hearings indicates her

understanding of the limited nature of the preliminary hearing.

      Finally, we note that the trial court “did not conduct the [de novo] hearing in

accordance with the usual order of proceedings for a trial, which begins with the

parties making opening statements followed by the introduction of evidence by the

party ‘upon whom rests the burden of proof on the whole case.’” See Barnes v.

Deadrick, 464 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.)

(quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 265). We further note that both notices of the hearings

provided less than the “reasonable notice of not less than forty-five days” required

for trial of a contested case. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 245; see Rodriguez v. Marcus, 564

S.W.3d 216, 221 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (“The forty-five days’ notice

provision [in Rule 245] is mandatory.”).

                                           18
      Contrary to Perrault’s unsupported arguments on appeal, our review of the

record shows that Pope was not put to her proof on the merits of her bill-of-review

claims. See Barnes, 464 S.W.3d at 58. Therefore, we conclude that the preliminary

hearings preceding dismissal of the bill of review in this case were limited to the first

step in the Baker procedure: determining whether Pope presented prima facie proof

of a meritorious defense. See 582 S.W.2d at 408–09; see also Beck, 771 S.W.2d at

142. To the extent the trial court dismissed the bill-of-review petition on a ground

other than lack of prima facie proof of a meritorious defense, the trial court erred

because it exceeded the scope of a preliminary Baker hearing.

      2.     Claim of Non-Service

      As stated above, a petitioner is not required to establish prima facie proof of

a claim of non-service to proceed to trial on that claim. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 97.

When the material facts regarding non-service are disputed, the issue is a pure

question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. Id.; Sozanski, 394 S.W.3d at 604.

Thus, for claims of non-service, the court should skip the first Baker step—a

showing of prima facie proof of a meritorious defense—and proceed to trial.

Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 97. From our conclusion above that the hearings were

preliminary Baker hearings, it necessarily follows that the non-service claim was not

ripe for dismissal. See id.

                                           19
      Perrault argues on appeal that Pope did not prove her non-service claim at the

Baker hearing and urges that the Court must give “proper deference” to “the trial

court’s resolution of historical facts and conflicts in testimony.” We decline to do

so. Perrault’s contention that the trial court resolved facts and conflicting evidence

confirms that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the non-service issue.

Therefore, the issue presents a pure question of fact to be decided by the factfinder,

not by the trial court at a preliminary Baker hearing. See id.; Sozanski, 394 S.W.3d

at 604. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Pope’s claim

of non-service at the preliminary Baker stage of this bill-of-review proceeding. See

Joseph, 624 S.W.3d at 6 (stating that trial court abuses its discretion by acting

without reference to guiding rules or principles).

      3.     Remaining Claims

      Pope next argues that her right to due process was violated because findings

by the associate judge and the trial court were outside the scope of the Baker hearing,

and therefore the findings could not support dismissal of her remaining claims.

Specifically, she challenges the associate judge’s statement in a letter ruling that the

bill of review should be dismissed because Pope “failed to pursue her legal remedy

of a direct appeal after her Motion for New Trial was denied” in the SAPCR

proceeding. She also challenges the trial court’s comment during the de novo

preliminary hearing that the court would “deny the bill of review” because “there

                                          20
has not been a sufficient showing of no default or negligence on [Pope’s] part which

contributed to the entry of those orders” in the SAPCR proceeding.

      In a case tried without a jury, “any party may request the court to state in

writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. “Findings

of fact shall not be recited in a judgment.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 299a. Findings of fact filed

by the court “shall form the basis of the judgment upon all grounds of recovery and

of defense embraced therein.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 299. In the absence of written findings

of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed if it can

be upheld on any legal theory supported by the evidence. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d

716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam); Barnes, 464 S.W.3d at 55.

      In this case, the record shows that the trial court did not file findings of fact

or conclusions of law after it entered judgment dismissing the bill of review. Pope

filed a request for findings and conclusions, but it appears that the request was not

timely. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 296 (stating that party’s request for findings of fact and

conclusions of law “shall be filed within twenty days after judgment is signed”);

Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 243 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (stating

that untimely request for findings and conclusions waives party’s right to complain

of trial court’s failure to prepare findings and conclusions). Regardless of the

timeliness of the request, however, Pope does not raise any issue on appeal

concerning the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.

                                           21
Instead, she challenges only the associate judge’s statement in the letter ruling and

the trial court’s comments from the bench.

      The associate judge’s statement in the letter ruling does not constitute a

finding that is reviewable on appeal. After the associate judge entered the order,

Pope filed a request for a de novo hearing before the trial court specifying that she

sought consideration of all issues considered by the associate judge. See TEX. FAM.

CODE § 201.015(a), (b) (providing that any party may request “de novo hearing

before the referring court” by specifying issues to be presented to court). The trial

court granted the request and held a de novo hearing. Because Pope filed a timely

request for a de novo hearing, the associate judge’s order did not become an order

of the referring trial court. See id. § 201.013(b). The trial court could consider the

record from the hearing before the associate judge, see id. § 201.015(c), but the de

novo hearing was “a new and independent action on those issues raised” in the

request for a de novo hearing. See In re R.R., 537 S.W.3d 621, 622–23 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2017, no pet.) (citation omitted). Thus, the statements in the associate judge’s

letter ruling do not constitute findings that are reviewable on appeal.

      Furthermore, the trial court’s comments from the bench also do not constitute

findings or conclusions that are reviewable on appeal. It is well established that oral

comments from the bench cannot substitute for written findings of fact and

conclusions of law. In re Jane Doe 10, 78 S.W.3d 338, 340 n.2 (Tex. 2002); In re

                                          22
W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 716; Haining v. Haining, No. 01-08-00091-CV, 2010 WL

1240752, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem.

op.).

        Because the trial court did not file findings and conclusions, we must affirm

the trial court’s judgment on any legal theory that is supported by the evidence. See

In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717; Barnes, 464 S.W.3d at 55. In subsequent issues,

Pope argues that the trial court erred to the extent it dismissed her claims other than

her non-service claim for lack of prima facie proof of meritorious defenses. Because

the meritorious-defense issues were the only issues properly before the trial court

when it dismissed the bill of review, these are the only grounds that can properly

support the trial court’s judgment. A lack of prima facie proof of a meritorious

defense is an independent ground that would properly support the dismissal of

Pope’s claims other than the non-service claim. We therefore cannot conclude that

the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing these claims on alternate grounds.

We discuss the meritorious-defense issues below.

        Most of Perrault’s arguments on appeal address these alternate grounds for

dismissal. For example, she argues that Pope’s failure to file a direct appeal from the

SAPCR proceeding constitutes a negligent act, and therefore Pope cannot prevail on

a bill of review. Perrault further argues that Pope’s allegations of fraud concern

intrinsic fraud, which cannot support a bill of review. However, in a pretrial Baker

                                          23
hearing, “the only relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner has presented prima

facie proof of a meritorious defense.” Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of

appeals’ decision affirming trial court’s dismissal of bill of review after Baker

hearing on ground other than lack of prima facie proof of meritorious defense);

Maree, 502 S.W.3d at 366–67 (reversing trial court’s dismissal of bill of review

based on petitioner’s failure to prove at Baker hearing that judgment was rendered

unmixed with any fault or negligence on petitioner’s part). “A bill-of-review

proceeding . . . may not be summarily dismissed for a reason other than the failure

to make a prima facie showing of a meritorious claim or defense.” Ramsey, 249

S.W.3d at 577. Therefore, we do not consider Perrault’s arguments concerning the

other elements of a bill of review.

      We sustain Pope’s first issue to the extent she argues that the trial court erred

by dismissing her claim of non-service at the preliminary Baker stage of the bill-of-

review proceeding. We overrule the remainder of her first issue.

D.    Prima Facie Proof of Meritorious Defenses

      In her third and fourth issues, Pope argues that the trial court erred by

dismissing her bill of review on her two remaining claims for lack of prima facie

evidence of a meritorious defense. Specifically, Pope argues that she presented

prima facie proof that Perrault lacked standing to bring the SAPCR proceeding and

that Perrault did not overcome the presumption that it was in James’s best interest to

                                         24
have his mother (Pope) appointed as his conservator over a non-parent (Perrault).

These two issues challenge fundamental aspects of the SAPCR proceeding:

Perrault’s authority to initiate the SAPCR proceeding and her entitlement to the

relief which she sought and was awarded. We review these issues of law de novo.

See, e.g., Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408–09; Ramsey, 249 S.W.3d at 574; Mosley, 110

S.W.3d at 661.

      1.     Lack of Standing

      In her third issue, Pope contends that Perrault lacked standing under three

sections of the Family Code: section 102.003(a)(9) and subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2)

of section 102.004. Pope argues that the trial court did not determine the threshold

issue of standing in the SAPCR proceeding.

      Standing is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction, and it is a

threshold issue in a child custody proceeding. Rolle v. Hardy, 527 S.W.3d 405, 415

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). “Subject matter jurisdiction is never

presumed and cannot be waived.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852

S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993). Ordinarily, “standing is based on the existence of

certain facts, not the existence of certain proof.” Rolle, 527 S.W.3d at 415 (quoting

In re K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no

pet.)); see also Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27

(Tex. 2004) (holding that, in determining issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, courts

                                         25
construe pleadings liberally in plaintiff’s favor and consider relevant evidence

submitted by parties when necessary to resolve jurisdictional issue).

      The Legislature has, however, set forth a different standard when questions of

standing impact a parent’s right to make decisions about how to best care for her

children free from interference by nonparents. Rolle, 527 S.W.3d at 415; see also

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68, 72–73 (2000) (recognizing presumption that fit

parents act in best interests of their children and holding that absent evidence parent

is not fit, Due Process Clause protects parental decisions from interference by state

courts and other government officials). In a child custody suit, “[a] party seeking

relief must allege and establish standing within the parameters of the language used

in the statute.” Compton v. Pfannenstiel, 428 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (quoting In re McDaniel, 408 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding)).

      As a meritorious defense to the SAPCR proceeding, Pope’s bill-of-review

petition alleged that Perrault had the burden to establish standing in the SAPCR

proceeding, but she lacked standing under Family Code sections 102.003(a)(9) and

102.004(a). Perrault does not dispute that these allegations met Pope’s burden to

allege standing as a meritorious defense. See Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408.

      Pope attached several documents to her petition. Relevant here, Pope attached

Perrault’s SAPCR petition alleging that Perrault had “standing to bring this suit in

                                          26
that pursuant to Section 102.004 of the Texas Family Code, . . . the order requested

is necessary because the child’s present circumstances would significantly impair

the child’s physical [] health or emotional development.” This allegation references

standing under section 102.004(a)(1). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.004(a)(1).

Perrault’s SAPCR petition did not, however, mention or allege standing under either

section 102.004(a)(2) or section 102.003(a)(9). The petition broadly cited to section

102.004(a), but subsection (a)(2) applies only if the parent filed or consented to the

suit. See id. § 102.004(a)(2). The petition does not contain any allegation that Pope

filed or consented to the SAPCR suit.

      Perrault had the burden in the SAPCR proceeding to allege the basis of her

standing and, to the extent she alleged standing under section 102.004, to provide

“satisfactory proof” of her standing. See Rolle, 527 S.W.3d at 416; Compton, 428

S.W.3d at 885; TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.004(a). Because Perrault’s SAPCR petition

failed to allege either section 102.003(a)(9) or section 102.004(a)(2) as bases for

standing, the SAPCR petition is prima facie proof—if not conclusive proof—that

Perrault lacked standing under either of these two sections. See Baker, 582 S.W.2d

at 408–09 (stating that petitioner presents prima facie proof of meritorious defense

by establishing defense is not barred as matter of law and petitioner will be entitled

to judgment on retrial if no contrary evidence is offered).

                                          27
      Perrault’s SAPCR petition alleged section 102.004(a)(1) as the sole basis for

standing. Section 102.004(a)(1) provides:

      In addition to the general standing to file suit provided by Section
      102.003, a grandparent . . . may file an original suit requesting
      managing conservatorship if there is satisfactory proof to the court that:

      (1)    the order requested is necessary because the child’s present
             circumstances would significantly impair the child’s physical
             health or emotional development . . . .

TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.004(a)(1). A party seeking grandparent standing under

section 102.004 is thus statutorily required to establish standing with “satisfactory

proof.” Id. § 102.004(a); Compton, 428 S.W.3d at 885; see Rolle, 527 S.W.3d at 416

(stating that section 102.004(a) is unusual because Legislature conferred standing on

certain parties based on existence of proof rather than pleading of facts).

“Satisfactory proof” is proof established by a preponderance of the evidence as the

facts existed at the time the suit was filed. Compton, 428 S.W.3d at 885. If a plaintiff

fails to establish standing, then the trial court must dismiss the suit. Id.

      Pope’s bill-of-review petition attached the temporary and final orders in the

SAPCR proceeding. The relevant portions of both of these orders are substantially

similar. The temporary order states that the trial court heard the application for

temporary orders, neither Perrault nor Pope appeared in person, and Perrault and

Pope had agreed to the terms of the order as evidenced by the signatures appearing

on the order. The final order similarly states that the trial court heard the case,

                                           28
Perrault did not appear in person, and Perrault had agreed to the terms of the order

as evidenced by her signature. Notably, however, the final order did not state

whether Pope appeared or agreed to the terms of the order, although her purported

signature appears on the order.

      Neither order shows that Perrault presented any evidence of standing. See id.

(stating that section 102.004(a) requires “satisfactory proof” of standing). Rather,

the orders indicate that the trial court entered the orders based on Pope’s purported

agreement to their terms. The problem, however, is that Perrault did not allege

consent as a basis for standing or provide satisfactory proof of her standing under

section 102.004(a)(2). Standing cannot be waived by agreement of the parties. Tex.

Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443–44.

      On their face, these orders are prima facie proof that Perrault did not meet her

burden to present satisfactory proof to the court that the orders were necessary

because James’s then-present circumstances would significantly impair his physical

health or emotional development. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.004(a)(1); Compton,

428 S.W.3d at 885 (stating that “satisfactory proof” in section 102.004(a) is proof

by preponderance of evidence as facts existed when suit was filed). Standing is not

a defense that is barred as a matter of law, and these orders establish that Pope would

be entitled to judgment on a retrial of the SAPCR proceeding if Perrault offered no

evidence to the contrary. See Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408–09. Because Perrault had

                                          29
the burden to plead and prove standing in the SAPCR proceeding, a lack of evidence

of standing on retrial would entitle Pope to dismissal of the SAPCR proceeding.

Accordingly, we conclude that Pope presented prima facie proof of lack of standing

in the SAPCR proceeding.

      On appeal, Perrault points to a CPS document as satisfactory proof that the

SAPCR orders were necessary because James’s then-present circumstances would

significantly impair his physical health or emotional development.6 See TEX. FAM.

CODE § 102.004(a)(1). However, at the preliminary bill-of-review stage, factual

disputes are resolved in favor of Pope, and Perrault was limited to presenting proof

that the defense was barred as a matter of law. See Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409. The

CPS document does not show that the defense was barred as a matter of law. At best,

the document raises a fact issue concerning whether Perrault presented satisfactory

proof of her standing.

      We conclude that Pope presented prima facie proof that Perrault lacked

standing under section 102.004(a)(1). Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by

dismissing the bill of review on this claim. We sustain Pope’s third issue.

6
      This document was introduced into evidence at a hearing on a motion for new trial
      in the SAPCR proceeding, which occurred after the trial court entered both SAPCR
      orders. Perrault does not argue or show that either document was before the trial
      court when it entered the orders.

                                         30
      2.     Failure to Overcome Parental-Custody Presumption

      In her fourth issue, Pope argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her

second meritorious defense: Perrault did not overcome the presumption that it was

in James’s best interest to have Pope, his mother, appointed as his managing

conservator. Pope’s arguments are similar to those she raised for standing. That is,

Pope contends that the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing or a trial on the

merits in the SAPCR proceeding, and therefore Perrault could not have presented

evidence to overcome the presumption. Perrault does not address this issue on

appeal.

      The United States Constitution “protects the fundamental right of parents to

make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” In re

C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Troxel, 530

U.S. at 66). Both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Supreme Court

have recognized a presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interest.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 807. Thus, when a court is called

upon to determine conservatorship between a parent and a nonparent, “a

presumption exists that appointing the parent as the sole managing conservator is in

the child’s best interest; this presumption is deeply embedded in Texas law.” In re

F.E.N., 542 S.W.3d 752, 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied)

(citation omitted); accord In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 812.

                                          31
      The presumption is codified in the Family Code:

      [U]nless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would
      not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would
      significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional
      development, a parent shall be appointed sole managing conservator or
      both parents shall be appointed as joint managing conservators of the
      child.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131(a); see In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 812–13 (stating that

section 153.131(a) is “a statutory parental presumption applicable to original

custody determinations”). Section 153.131(a) “creates a parental preference by

placing the burden on the non-parent seeking conservatorship to establish that the

parent’s appointment would result in significant impairment to the child.” In re

F.E.N., 579 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (denying petition for review).

      For substantially similar reasons as those discussed above concerning

standing, we conclude that Pope presented prima facie proof that Perrault did not

overcome the parental-preference presumption that would entitle Perrault, the

grandmother, to be appointed as James’s conservator over Pope, the mother. As

discussed above, both SAPCR orders indicated that the trial court believed the case

to be an agreed case, and therefore the trial court entered the orders without holding

an evidentiary hearing or otherwise requiring Perrault to present proof to overcome

this presumption. Perrault bore the burden on this issue in the SAPCR proceeding.

See id. If Perrault offered no evidence to the contrary on retrial of the SAPCR case,

Pope would be entitled to judgment because Perrault did not meet her burden to rebut
                                         32
the parental-preference presumption. See Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408–09; Maree, 502

S.W.3d at 365. We hold that the trial court erred by dismissing the bill of review on

this ground. We sustain Pope’s fourth issue.

E.    Evidentiary Issue

      Finally, in her second issue, Pope argues that the trial court violated her right

to due process by making prejudicial and biased comments about an expert

handwriting analysis of Pope’s signatures on the SAPCR orders.

      In the de novo preliminary hearing before the trial court, Pope attempted to

rely on an expert report from a forensic handwriting analyst to support her claims

that her signatures on the SAPCR orders were obtained by Perrault’s fraud or

forgery. The report had been filed with the court, but Perrault objected to

consideration of the report on the ground that it was outside the scope of the Baker

hearing. The trial court sustained the objection. At the end of the hearing, the court

stated:

      And I have two signatures, if not more in the current pleadings. I’m not
      a handwriting expert; but just looking at them, they are all different. I
      don’t know how an expert can tell you which one was which. And there
      are enough differences on all of them for there to be—everybody has
      different signatures.

      To preserve error for appellate review, the record must show that the

complaining party made a timely objection to the trial court stating the specific

grounds for the complaint. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). A party’s failure to object

                                         33
can waive even errors involving constitutional rights. In re J.B., 605 S.W.3d 650,

656 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). The Texas Supreme Court has

held that an “objection to a trial court’s alleged improper conduct or comment must

be made when it occurs if a party is to preserve error for appellate review, unless the

conduct or comment cannot be rendered harmless by proper instruction.” Dow

Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam); see State v.

Wilemon, 393 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1965). Because Pope did not object to the trial

court’s comments when they were made, Pope has not preserved this claim of error

for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 241; In re

M.J.M., 406 S.W.3d 292, 299–300 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.)

(concluding that party’s failure to object to trial judge’s remarks when made waived

appellate review of those remarks).

      But even if Pope had not waived this complaint, we have already reversed the

entirety of the trial court’s judgment dismissing the bill of review. A favorable ruling

on this issue would not provide Pope any greater relief, and therefore a decision on

this issue is not “necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P.

47.1. On remand, the trial court may consider the admissibility of the expert report

if Pope chooses to introduce it into evidence. We overrule Pope’s second issue.

                                          34
                                   Conclusion

      We reverse the trial court’s judgment dismissing Pope’s bill of review and

remand for further proceedings.

                                             April L. Farris
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

                                        35