Court Opinion

ID: 9861588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:10:57.531162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:41.729439
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
dissents.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion wherein it orders that the conviction for kidnapping be reversed and instructs the trial court to grant appellant a new trial. I am in agreement with the majority opinion in all other provisions.
It is true that a literal translation of our statutes would indicate that the jury was to include in its verdict “the amount of fine and the punishment to be inflicted.” It is obvious that the intent of this legislation was to require the jury to include in its verdict the fine and punishment where it is within their province to fix the fine and punishment. This was the rationale underlying the holding of Currier v. State, (1901) 157 Ind. 114, 60 N.E. 1023, which indicated that since the jury had nothing to do with *21fixing the penalty for the crime, it was therefore not a necessary part of the verdict. When the legislature passed Ind.Code § 35-8-2-1 in 1927, it made exception to those cases where the jury could determine that the defendant would be given a penalty of either a life term or the death penalty. At that time, kidnapping did not carry a fixed penalty of a term of life and so was not made an exception to the statute. Code provisions 35-8-2-2 and 35-8-2-3 did make exceptions where the penalty was fixed by an indeterminate sentence and the jury did not fix the punishment or penalty.
Since the statutes above cited were in effect at the time of sentencing in this case, the majority is correct in holding that the letter of the law required that the verdict form include the amount of the penalty even though the jury had nothing to do with fixing the penalty but had only to determine whether or not the defendant was guilty or not guilty. I therefore agree that the trial court erred by excluding this information from the jury. But this error was harmless in the same way that it was found to be harmless error in the case of Kelsie v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 363, 354 N.E.2d 219. In Kelsie, we found that the error was harmless even though the statute in question was one which required the jury to fix the penalty. Second degree murder, under Ind.Code 35-1-54-1, (Burns 1975) provided for alternative sentences of either life or 15-25 years. This Court, in Kelsie, held that since the trial court did, in fact, fix the lesser penalty of 15-25 years, there was no harm to the defendant and any error occasioned by not including a statement of the penalty was harmless. Similarly, in the present case, the court improperly failed to have the jury advised of the penalty as provided by law. However, there was no prejudice to the defendant by its failure to do so since the punishment was fixed by law and was not subject to determination by the jury. The defendant cannot assert prejudice based on the supposition that the jury might have determined guilt or innocence on the basis of the severity of punishment. This would have been an improper ground for the jury to use in assessing guilt or innocence and one we cannot recognize in this argument. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.
GIVAN, C. J., concurs.