Court Opinion

ID: 9796091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:48:32.935129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:57.748037
License: Public Domain

MEMORANDUM DECISION
BENCH, Judge:
T 1 Plaintiff Richins Drilling, Inc. (Richins) appeals the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendants Golf Services Group, Inc. and Tuhaye, LLC (collectively, Golf). After a four-day bench trial, the trial court ruled against Richins on its breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and mechanics lien claims.
T2 On appeal, Richins claims that the trial court violated the parol evidence rule by hearing expert testimony regarding whether Riching's performance complied with industry standards. Specifically, Richins claims that the trial court, relying on this expert testimony, impermissibly added multiple terms to the contract: a maximum price; a time for completion; and a prescribed method of drilling. We review a trial court's interpretation of a written contract for correctness. See Utah Transit Auth. v. Salt Lake City S. R.R., 2006 UT App 46, 17, 181 P.3d 288 (explaining that challenges to contract interpretations present questions of law).
«3 Richins relies on the parol evidence rule in claiming that the trial court erred in its decision. However, Richins has mischaracterized the applicability of the par-ol evidence rule to the instant case. "Simply stated, the [parol evidence] rule operates ... to exclude evidence of [the parties'] prior or contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract." Ward v. Intermoun-tain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); see also Tangren Fomily Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 111, 182 P.3d 326. The parol evidence rule is therefore not "a rule of interpretation; it defines the subject matter of interpretation." Restatement (Second) Contracts § 213 emt. a (1981).
1 4 Here, Richins has confused the applicability of the parol evidence rule with the trial court's interpretation of the terms of the contract. The evidence that Richins complains of does not fall under the scope of the parol evidence rule because it consisted of expert testimony evidence and not evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreement between the parties. The trial court utilized the expert's testimony in interpreting the express terms of the contract, namely that Richins was to adhere to "generally accepted practices and methods customary in the industry" while drilling the well. Further, because the evidence on which the trial court relied does not implicate the parol evidence rule, the trial court did not err in failing to rule preliminarily on whether the contract was integrated.
(5 Richins argues that the trial court impermissibly read a "time for completion" term into the contract. On appeal, the parties have acknowledged that the contract did not specify a time by which Richins was to have completed the well. "[TJhe settled rule is that if a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be done within a reasonable time under the cireumstances." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998); see also Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1986). The trial court did not use the expert testimony to impose a firm deadline on Richins. Rather, the court relied on the testimony to compare Riching's performance with industry standards. Expert testimony established that a well of the depth contemplated by the parties should have been completed in less than half the time Richins had *1282worked on the well. The trial court therefore did not err in finding that Richins breached the contract by not completing the well within a reasonable time.
T6 Richins further claims that the trial court erred in adding other terms to the contract, such as "maximum price" and an express drilling method to be used. However, the trial court did not impose a maximum price into the contract. The trial court simply ruled that Richins had breached the term of the contract requiring Richins to adhere to industry standards, as evidenced by the expert testimony. Golf was therefore excused from making the last payment allegedly due Richins. Also, the trial court did not read a drilling method into the contract but ruled that, based on the evidence, Riching's methods did not adhere to the industry standards required by the contract.
T7 Finally, Richins claims that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Golf in relation to the counterclaim, which the parties settled prior to trial. In connection with the settlement, Golf signed a release of all claims related to the counterclaim, including attorney fees (the Release). After the trial, in a lengthy dispute over the amount of attorney fees and costs Richins would be required to pay, Richins claimed that some of the fees and costs awarded were incurred in furtherance of both the counterclaim and Golfs defense (the Contested Fees)1 The trial court awarded Golf a portion of the Contested Fees without requiring Golf to delineate which of the Contested Fees were specifically attributable to its defense.
T8 A trial court's findings "must show that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion" was reached. Acton v. Deliran, 7837 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We are unable to discern how the trial court arrived at its award of the Contested Fees, which Golf itself characterized as being attributable to both the defense and the counterclaim. The Release unambiguously states that attorney fees "relating to" the counterclaim are not recoverable, and we therefore remand the award of the attorney fees and costs for a more detailed accounting of which fees and costs were incurred in furtherance of Golf's defense as differentiated from those "relating to" its counterclaim.
T9 As the prevailing party below and on appeal, Golf is also entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. On remand, the trial court should determine the amount of that award.
T10 Accordingly, we affirm in part and remand in part.
T 11 I CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.

. The Contested Fees with which we are concerned include the award of $15,586 in fees and $770.40 in costs that Golf itself indicated were incurred in furtherance of both the counterclaim and the defense. Further, the court awarded Golf $4987 in expenses for an unnamed expert witness.