Court Opinion

ID: 9589731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:47:56.064873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:40.080971
License: Public Domain

Undercofler, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent to Division lof the majority opinion which follows Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831 (225 SE2d 281) (1976), to which I also dissented. It holds that an accomplice’s testimony of crimes other than the one on trial, which are admissible to show motive, scheme, and intent, must also be corroborated by independent evidence linking the defendant to those other crimes. This is an unnecessary extension of the corroboration rule.
The accomplice’s testimony in Georgia is viewed with some skepticism based on the question of that witness’ credibility. In order to satisfy that credibility problem, some independent evidence of the accused’s participation in the crime on trial is required by law. Code Ann. § 38-121. Only slight evidence is necessary, and the accomplice’s testimony need not be corroborated in every material part. Once so corroborated, however, all his testimony is admissible because its credibility has been thus bolstered. Wigmore on Evidence § 2056. This reasoning should extend to whatever testimony the accomplice offers without the necessity of further *564corroboration of that portion of his testimony concerning other related offenses.