Court Opinion

ID: 9453337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:10:07.686095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:36.712929
License: Public Domain

RUSSELL E. SMITH, District Judge
(dissenting).
Reluctantly I dissent. The defendants were fairly tried, and fairly convicted. I think they were not prejudiced by what was done. I think the rule should be that a defendant may not successfully claim double jeopardy in cases where a trial is interrupted unless it appears that the purpose of the interruption was to give some advantage to the prosecution or that the defendant has suffered some prejudice from it. I would not presume prejudice from the fact that the trial is not completed with the jury initially im-panelled. The inconveniences suffered by a defendant in attending a partial trial, and later a full trial, I would subordinate to the social need for determinations of guilt where guilt exists. These are the reasons for my reluctance.
Now the reason for my dissent: As I read the opinions of the Supreme Court from United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824) down to United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964), I am compelled to the conclusion that jeopardy does attach unless the interruption of the trial is due to some urgent circumstance or unless the ends of justice or an overriding public interest require its interruption, or unless it can be said that the interruption was for the benefit of the accused. The interruption in this case was not for the benefit of these appealing defendants. As I see it, there were no urgent circumstances here and the ends of justice would have been *674as well served by continuing the trial as to these defendants and interrupting it as to defendant De Jong. He would have been in no position to assert double jeopardy.