Court Opinion

ID: 9468994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:29:00.379192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:09.226624
License: Public Domain

GARTH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s holding that there is substantial evidence to support the *1192Board’s holding that National’s conduct in staffing its Edison facility was motivated by an anti-union animus and thus amounted to discrimination against union members. As I read the majority opinion, it is fully consistent with the general principle that an employer’s preference that a facility be nonunion does not, without more, give rise to an unfair labor practice: there is no obligation on the part of an employer to invite a unión in to seek to represent the employees at a newly opened plant. Section 8(a)(3), however, does prohibit discrimination against present or prospective employees on the basis of union membership, and I agree with the majority that the testimony regarding National’s flat refusal to consider the transfer of union members to Edison, in conjunction with National’s “numerous earlier expressions that Edison would be nonunion,” Majority opinion at 1187, in this case and under the circumstances present here constitutes “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the Board’s] conclusion,” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 459, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951).
I depart from the majority in its disposition of the waiver issue,1 however, because I believe that the majority has failed to give the findings of the ALJ in this case the weight that they deserve under the decisions of both the Supreme Court and this court. Further, although I agree with the majority that the Board abused its discretion in issuing a bargaining order, I write separately on this issue to call attention to the Board’s continuing — and inexcusable— refusal to respect this court’s long-standing requirement that the Board articulate specific reasons for issuing a bargaining order.
I.
As the majority notes, the Board reversed the ALJ’s finding that the union had waived its right to bargain over the effects of the decision to close the Newark facility and transfer some of the Newark accounts and employees to the new facility in Edison. In doing so, the Board in my opinion erred by not giving proper weight to the ALJ’s demeanor and credibility findings.
In Eastern Engineering & Elevator Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1980), this court reaffirmed the long-standing principle that to the extent that they are based on credibility and demeanor determinations, the findings of an ALJ are to be given great weight in reviewing the question whether a decision of the Board is supported by substantial evidence.2 In that case, the ALJ had credited the testimony of the company president that an employee had been discharged for legitimate business reasons, and had refused to credit the testimony of the fired employee and a union official that the discharge had resulted from the employee’s filing of an internal union charge against a fellow employee. Claiming that its reversal of the ALJ’s decision stemmed from a disagreement with the ALJ over ultimate evidentiary inferences and the proper interpretation of the NLRA, the Board overturned the ALJ’s factual findings. This court denied enforcement, however, finding that despite its protestations, to the contrary, the Board in that case had simply disagreed with the ALJ on credibility and demeanor issues, crediting testimony that the ALJ had found unbelievable and discounting testimony on which the ALJ had relied.
In refusing to enforce the Board’s order in Eastern Engineering, this court did no more than heed the Supreme Court’s admonition in Universal Camera Corp. that the “evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn *1193conclusions different from the Board’s than when he has reached the same conclusion.” 340 U.S. at 496, 71 S.Ct. at 468. Certainly in this case as well the court is faced with a disagreement by the Board with the conclusions of an ALJ who has “observed the witnesses and lived with the case.” The hearing before the ALJ took five days, during which the AU had ample opportunity to observe firsthand the testimony of all the witnesses who appeared before him. Still, as this court has made clear, the Board is “required to extend some, but not absolute, deference to the ALJ’s determinations,” Eastern Engineering, 637 F.2d at 197; Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 496, 71 S.Ct. at 468; the weight that the Board must attach to the ALJ’s findings in any given case depends on the extent to which credibility and demeanor factors played a role in the ALJ’s decision. In this case, it is clear to me that such factors were critical to the ALJ’s finding of waiver, and that the Board therefore erred in displacing that finding.
The ALJ gave two reasons for his finding that the union had waived its rights to bargain over the effects of the move to Edison. First, the ALJ found that in December of 1977, union president Zingone had in fact received actual notice of a possible move to Edison, and yet made no efforts to initiate bargaining with National. 252 N.L.R.B. at 173.3 The Board, on the other hand, found that “[t]he first the Union or the employees heard of the closing of the Newark facility was on February 22, [1978,] simultaneously with the notification that the entire unit was being terminated.” Id. at 163. Although in so concluding the Board did not give explicit reasons for discounting the finding of actual notice in December, it apparently relied on the general doctrine that “plant gossip, conjecture and rumors cannot take the place of formal notice when notice is required,” NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1965).
It is clear, however, that the Board’s disagreement with the AU did not stem from a dispute over the correct statement of the legal standard, for the ALJ explicitly noted that a union has “no obligation to request bargaining simply on the basis of shop rumors,” 252 N.L.R.B. at 173. Rather, the AU found that National’s Acting City Manager for Newark had “told Zingone [in December] that [National] was contemplating a move from Newark, possibly to Edison,” and that with the rumors of a move as background, the City Manager’s December statement gave Zingone “all the notice he needed to conclude that if the Union wished to bargain over the prospective move the time was ripe to request bargaining.” Id. (footnote omitted). In light of the AU’s specific factual finding, based on live witness testimony, that the union had actual knowledge in December of a possible move to Edison, I cannot agree that the Board’s unsupported assertion that it was not until February 22 that the union learned of the move, is backed by substantial evidence.
The second reason that the ALJ gave for finding a waiver was the union’s conduct on February 22, 1978. Specifically, the AU found that
[o]n February 22, [National] gave Zingone notice that in 4 days the Newark terminal would close, the Newark employees would be terminated, and the Edison terminal would be opened. Zingone made no request to bargain at that time. On the following day, Zingone called San-ville to say that in his opinion Respondent’s actions were illegal and that he intended to file unfair labor practice charges, but he was not specific as to the nature of the claimed illegality and he again made no request to bargain. Although on the same day Zingone filed a charge alleging a refusal to bargain, that charge was never received by Respondent, and it was not until a month later *1194that Respondent learned that the Union charged it with a refusal to bargain.
Id. In overturning the ALJ’s finding of waiver, the Board stated that “the Union immediately contested the propriety of [National’s] precipitous announcement” which was now being made for the first time as a “fait accompli.” Id. at 163 (emphasis supplied). Once again, the Board’s decision amounts to no more than a different reading of evidence that the ALJ, as the one who observed the witnesses and lived with the case, was in a better position to evaluate. The ALJ, as noted, saw nothing “precipitous” in the announcement on February 22, because he found that the union had had actual notice of a contemplated move to Edison as early as the previous December. The immediate, vigorous protest which the Board found Zingone to have made, moreover, was not apparent to the ALJ. Based on the evidence before him, the ALJ found that Zingone did not even protest National’s decision on February 22, and that the union did not bring up the issue of refusal to bargain over the effects until a month later. In rejecting the ALJ’s finding of waiver, and in making its own findings which are not supported by this record, the Board, then, simply ignored the ALJ’s proper fact-finding role.4
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it fails to accord the factual findings of the ALJ the weight to which they are entitled in light of his firsthand observation of the witnesses and the evidence.
II.
The majority holds that the Board abused its discretion in issuing a bargaining order, ruling that in the circumstances of this case the imposition of a bargaining representative on the Edison employees would carry unjustifiably high costs in terms of the employees’ right to choose what union, if any, will represent them. I fully agree with this holding, and add a second, and in my view compelling basis for this court’s refusal to enforce the bargaining order: the Board’s failure to comply with our clear mandate that it articulate specific reasons why a bargaining order should be issued.
The requirement that the Board consider and specify all the factors leading to its determination that the extraordinary remedy of a bargaining order is appropriate is not only a long-standing one in this and other Circuits;5 it is also an essential prerequisite to this court’s ability effectively to review the Board’s bargaining orders. This requirement is one that we have imposed upon the Board, so that we may properly and competently discharge our function as a reviewing authority. Accordingly, even though there may be other grounds for refusing to enforce a bargaining order, we should not overlook the importance of a sufficient elaboration of reasons by the Board because it is primarily to benefit our function of review that this standard has been established. Thus, I strongly believe that in this case the Board’s failure to comply with a clearly established requirement, which we have imposed and which is essential to this court’s review, furnishes another compelling reason for refusing to enforce the bargaining order.
As early as 1976, this court established a requirement that the Board articulate its reasons for issuing a bargaining order instead of issuing a cease and desist order, calling for a new election, or taking some other appropriate action. See NLRB v. Armcor Industries, 535 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1976). And as recently as seven months ago, this court, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the principle that “when the Board imposes a bargaining order, it must articulate the factors that justify the choice of this remedy over the ordering of a new election.” NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 519 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). Moreover, *1195the requirement is not peculiar to this court; the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits all have adopted a similar requirement. See NLRB v. Permanent Label, 657 F.2d at 531 & n.2 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collecting cases).
In this case, the Board provided only the most summary of “explanations” of the need for a bargaining order rather than some other remedy:
We think the facts of this case ... clearly support a bargaining order. Here Respondent had expressly stated that the Edison facility would be nonunion, although it had decided to transfer non-unit employees from Newark to Edison. Further, it subsequently concealed the decision to transfer operations from Newark to Edison, and rejected inquiries for transfers as soon as unit employees were notified of the Newark closing. Any ambiguity with respect to which and precisely how many of the 13 unit employees would have been rehired for the 4 Edison openings, a matter properly reserved for compliance proceedings, should not serve to relieve Respondent of its ongoing bargaining obligations with respect to unit employees. A fair inference in these circumstances is that the Union would have retained its majority status absent Respondent’s wrongdoing. A contrary result would provide Respondent with an impermissible windfall.
252 N.L.R.B. at 164 n.26. To accept this statement as a sufficient articulation of reasons for imposing a bargaining order would amount to an abandonment of the articulation requirement itself. Nowhere does the Board explain why the traditional, and less drastic, remedy of an order to the employer to cease and desist from unfair labor practices would not be sufficient to eliminate the impact of the past unfair practices on the Edison employees’ freedom to choose their own bargaining representative.6 Indeed, indicative of the extent to which the Board’s opinion falls short of our articulation requirement is its utter failure to mention, let alone consider and give weight to, the central value the Supreme Court sought to protect in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969): the right of employees, whenever possible, to make their own choice of bargaining representative rather than having one imposed on them by the Board. See Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d at 45.
Thus, I concur fully in the majority’s refusal to enforce the Board’s bargaining order. I would also add as an independent and sufficient basis for doing so the Board’s inexcusable and incomprehensible failure to comply with our clearly established requirement that specific reasons be articulated as to why a bargaining order is needed instead of some other remedy less intrusive on the employees’ freedom to make their own choice on bargaining representation.
III.
In sum, I would enforce the Board’s remedy only to the extent that it was recommended by the ALJ, who proposed that National be ordered to: (1) cease and desist from its unfair labor practices; (2) offer the former Newark employees the jobs they would have been offered absent the anti-union discrimination, or in the alternative offer them substantially equivalent jobs or place them on a preferential hiring list; and (3) pay to each of the former Newark employees who were refused transfer the amounts they would have earned absent the discriminatory refusal to consider them for employment at Edison, less net earnings. See 252 N.L.R.B. at 174-75.

. As the majority has stated, no issue is presented in this case as to bargaining over the decision to transfer the facilities from Newark to Edison. With respect to the bargaining over the effects, the ALJ found that the union had waived its right.

. See also ABC Trans-National Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 675, 683-86 (3d Cir.), disapproved on other grounds in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 101 S.Ct. 2573, 69 L.Ed.2d 318 (1981).

. In making this finding, the ALJ was technically concerned with the question whether the union had waived whatever rights it might have to bargain over National’s decision to close the Newark facility and open one in Edison. But the ALJ relied on his finding of waiver in this respect in reaching his conclusion that the union had waived its right to bargain over the effects of that decision. See 252 N.L.R.B. at 173.

. In upholding the Board’s determination, the majority points to testimony of Zingone and National’s vice president. See Maj. Op., at 1189. Obviously, though, the ALJ gave substantially different credit to the testimony.

. See, e.g., Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 45-46 & n.18 (D.C.Cir.1980).

. As the majority opinion notes, see Maj. Op. at 1190, “there is no evidence that National would not recognize Local 723 as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Edison garage-men and mechanics” if enough former Newark employees were to accept the offer of employment at Edison to form a union majority.