Court Opinion

ID: 9926832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 19:00:46.895536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:02.267391
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10478         Document: 00517044344             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/25/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 23-10478
                                     Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                     ____________                               January 25, 2024
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   Alexis C. Norman,                                                                  Clerk

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Federal Bureau of Prisons, Director Michael Carvaial; Michael
   Smith, Medical Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons; United States of
   America,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:22-CV-1041
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Plaintiff-Appellant Alexis C. Norman appeals the district court’s
   dismissal of her tort claim against the United States. For the reasons set forth
   below, we AFFIRM.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10478        Document: 00517044344                Page: 2     Date Filed: 01/25/2024

                                            No. 23-10478

                                       I.     Background
           Norman alleges the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to provide her care
   and medical treatment as required by the Eighth Amendment and 18 U.S.C.
   § 4042 while she was incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center Carswell.
   She alleges this lack of care led to her contracting COVID-19 in July 2020
   and experiencing long-term related health defects. Proceeding pro se and in
   forma pauperis, Norman filed a federal tort claim and attached a copy of an
   administrative tort claim she previously sent to the BOP, thus satisfying the
   notification requirement under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). 1
   See Cook v. United States, 978 F.2d 164, 165–66 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
   (requiring an FTCA plaintiff to give the appropriate federal agency notice of
   her claim prior to filing suit). The district court determined the United States
   was the correct defendant and ordered service thereupon. 2
           On March 6, 2023, the government filed a motion to dismiss
   Norman’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
   arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Norman did
   not file a response within the 21-day deadline set by the local rules. See N.D.
   Tex. Local Civil Rule 7.1(e). In the absence of opposition from
   Norman, the district court granted the motion to dismiss on April 6, 2023.

           _____________________
           1
            Norman’s complaint refers to her suit as a “tort claim” against the BOP, and the
   attached administrative claim invokes the FTCA and the discretionary function exception.
   In its motion to dismiss, the government construed Norman’s complaint as asserting an
   FTCA claim, and Norman has embraced that characterization, so we address that issue.
           2
              Norman originally named two BOP officials in their official capacities as
   defendants, who were never served. However, she has not contested that the United States
   is the correct defendant, and FTCA claims may be brought only against the United States,
   so those other defendants are no longer in this case and not part of this appeal. See Galvin
   v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that an
   FTCA claim against a federal agency or employee instead of the United States must be
   dismissed).

                                                 2
Case: 23-10478          Document: 00517044344                Page: 3       Date Filed: 01/25/2024

                                            No. 23-10478

   The district court concluded that the United States had not waived sovereign
   immunity for Norman’s claims arising out of the Eighth Amendment and
   that Norman failed to allege a claim that was facially outside of the
   discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
           The district court received Norman’s response to the government’s
   motion to dismiss on April 11, 2023. Norman subsequently filed a motion to
   vacate the district court’s judgment, which the district court construed as a
   Rule 59(e) motion and then denied.
           While Norman’s Rule 59(e) motion was pending, Norman filed a
   notice of appeal pertaining to the district court’s final judgment signed April
   6, 2023. Norman did not file a new or amended notice of appeal after the
   court denied her Rule 59(e) motion.
                         II.    Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
           Norman’s notice of appeal was timely, see Fed. R. App. P.
   4(a)(1)(B)(i), and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to
   review the district court’s order from April 6, 2023, granting the
   government’s motion to dismiss. She did not seek an appeal from the ruling
   on the Rule 59(e) motion and did not ask us to review that specifically in her
   brief, so we do not address it. “We review de novo a district court’s grant of
   a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
   because of state sovereign immunity.” Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 410
   F.3d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 2005). 3

           _____________________
           3
             As noted previously, Norman’s response reached the district court on April 11,
   2023, which was well past the 21-day deadline prescribed by the local rules. See N.D.
   Tex. Local Civil Rule 7.1(e). The district court had not received Norman’s
   response at the time it issued its April 6 order, which is the only order at issue on this appeal.
   In her briefing before us, Norman does not object to the district court’s failure to consider
   her response, nor does she provide any explanation for her untimeliness. As such, our

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Case: 23-10478         Document: 00517044344                Page: 4     Date Filed: 01/25/2024

                                             No. 23-10478

                                      III.      Discussion
           Our review is limited to Norman’s FTCA claim against the United
   States. 4 The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for some tort suits against
   the United States, although that waiver is subject to several exceptions.
   Gonzalez v. United States, 851 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v.
   Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 318 n.4 (1991); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–80.
   Relevant here, the discretionary function exception “preserves the federal
   government’s immunity . . . when an employee’s acts involve the exercise of
   judgment or choice.” Gonzalez, 851 F.3d at 543 (quotation omitted); see 28
   U.S.C. § 2680(a). This exception applies if “(1) the conduct [is] a matter of
   choice for the acting employee” and “(2) the judgment [is] of the kind that
   the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Gonzalez, 851
   F.3d at 543–44 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).                         If a
   regulation or policy “leaves it to a federal agency to determine when and how
   to take action, the agency is not bound to act in a particular manner and the
   exercise of its authority is discretionary.” Id. at 544 (quotation omitted).

           _____________________
   analysis does not consider the arguments raised in her untimely response. See Webster v.
   Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting our court follows the general rule that
   “arguments not raised before the district court are waived and cannot be raised for the first
   time on appeal” (quotation omitted)).
           4
             Norman does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that her claims arising
   out of any alleged Eighth Amendment violation are barred by sovereign immunity, so we
   do not review that holding. See United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir.
   2000) (per curiam) (“It has long been the rule in this circuit that any issues not briefed on
   appeal are waived.”). Her limited briefing on the notion that the alleged Eighth
   Amendment violation demonstrates that BOP officials were not acting within their
   discretion when they allegedly denied her medical care is not properly before us as it was
   not pled before the district court and her briefing does not provide analysis or proper cites.
   Accordingly, she has waived the issue. See Horton v. Bank One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 435
   (5th Cir. 2004); Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d at 912.

                                                  4
Case: 23-10478          Document: 00517044344                Page: 5       Date Filed: 01/25/2024

                                            No. 23-10478

           We agree with the district court that Norman failed to allege a claim
   facially outside the discretionary function exception. See Gaubert, 499 U.S.
   at 324–25. Norman has not identified any statute, regulation, or policy that
   required the BOP to address Norman’s COVID-related concerns in a
   particular manner. She alleges the BOP violated a duty of care owed to her
   under 18 U.S.C. § 4042 and the Eighth Amendment, but neither one
   prescribes any specific procedures the BOP must follow in providing care and
   medical treatment to prisoners. For that reason, we and our sister circuits
   have held that neither 18 U.S.C. § 4042 nor the Eighth Amendment
   “define[s] a non-discretionary course of action specific enough to render the
   discretionary function exception inapplicable.” See Garza v. United States,
   161 F. App’x 341, 343 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing cases); see also Nichols v. United
   States, No. 21-50368, 2022 WL 989467, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 2022) (per
   curiam) (stating that “our court has held § 4042 affords officials
   discretion”). On appeal, Norman disclaims reliance on BOP COVID-related
   guidance and instead relies on four other BOP policies, which were also cited
   in the claim form attached to and referenced in her complaint. 5 But none of
   those policies mandate that the BOP take specific actions under the
   circumstances alleged by Norman.

           _____________________
           5
              In her administrative tort claim (attached to her complaint), Norman expressly
   argued that her claim was not barred by the discretionary function exception based on
   multiple BOP policies. As such, Norman did not waive these arguments even though she
   failed to timely respond to the government’s motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
   10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the
   pleading for all purposes.”); Horton, 387 F.3d at 435 (“[A]n argument is not waived on
   appeal if the argument on the issue before the district court was sufficient to permit the
   district court to rule on it.”); see, e.g., Velazquez v. United States, 835 F. App’x 733, 736 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (considering administrative tort claim attached to FTCA complaint when
   evaluating 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss). Nevertheless, as stated herein, these arguments are
   meritless.

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                                    No. 23-10478

          Where, as here, the policies at issue allow the BOP to exercise
   discretion, we presume that the BOP’s actions are grounded in policy when
   exercising that discretion. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 315. Indeed, “policy and
   procedures, and care, custody, and control are decisions typically in the
   discretion of [prison] administrators.” Nichols, 2022 WL 989467, at *3; see
   also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (“We must accord
   substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators,
   who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a
   corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to
   accomplish them.”).
          Norman has therefore failed to allege a claim that would fall outside of
   the discretionary function exception, meaning the United States is entitled
   to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   dismissal of Norman’s claims.

                                         6