Court Opinion

ID: 9403994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 22:03:26.480386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:10.628852
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/21/23 P. v. McGirt CA2/2
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  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                 B320579

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No. MA078789)
         v.

LAWRENCE JAMAAL McGIRT,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Alan Z. Yudkowsky, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

     Heather J. Manolakas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Stephanie Yee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                _______________________________________
       Lawrence Jamaal McGirt, hereinafter, defendant, contends
the trial court erred in denying his motion to take judicial notice of
two federal court orders in a class action lawsuit in which he was a
member, and by admitting testimony he claims was character
evidence. Defendant adds that cumulative prejudice from these
errors requires reversal. Defendant also contends, and the People
agree, the trial court erred in staying the great bodily injury
enhancement in count 3, battery by a prisoner on a non-confined
person. We modify the order staying the enhancement but finding
no merit to defendant’s other contentions, we otherwise affirm the
judgment.
                           BACKGROUND
       Defendant was charged with six felony counts alleging
offenses occurring on two occasions while he was confined in
California State Prison. In count 3 it was alleged defendant
committed battery by a prisoner on a non-confined person, Officer
M. Morataya, and count 4 alleged battery by a prisoner on a
non-confined person, Officer L. Martinez, in violation of Penal Code
section 4501.5.1 It was also alleged as to count 3 that defendant
personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Officer M. Morataya
within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a); and under

1     All further unattributed code sections in this section are to
the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

       Counts 1 and 2 allege an assault on December 3, 2019, by a
life prisoner by means likely to produce great bodily injury, in
violation of section 4500 upon Officer M. Morataya and upon Officer
L. Martinez, respectively. Defendant’s motion pursuant to section
995 was granted in part, and counts 1 and 2 were dismissed prior to
trial.

                                  2
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) that defendant had suffered three
serious or violent felonies as defined in sections 667, subdivision (d)
and 1170.12, subdivision (b). Count 5 alleged attempted battery by
a prisoner on a non-confined person, Officer A. Rodriguez, in
violation of sections 664/4501.5, on August 19, 2020; and count 6
alleged battery by a person confined in a local detention facility
upon a peace officer, Officer P. Castellanos, in violation of section
243.9, subdivision (a), also on August 19, 2020. It was alleged the
three prior convictions were serious or violent felonies under the
Three Strikes Law, section 667, subdivisions (b)-(j) and section
1170.12.
      A jury found defendant guilty of counts 3, 4, and 6 as charged,
and found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted
great bodily injury upon Officer Morataya. The jury was unable
reach a verdict on count 5, that was then dismissed.
      At the May 18, 2022 sentencing hearing, defendant waived
jury trial on the allegations of prior convictions. The trial court
struck two allegations pursuant to section 1385, and defendant
admitted he suffered a prior robbery conviction in 2014. The court
dismissed the two serious felony enhancements and stayed the
great bodily injury enhancement, and sentenced defendant to six
years in prison comprised of the low term of two years for counts 3
doubled to four years as a second strike, and one year (one-third the
midterm) as to each of counts 4 and 6, doubled to two years as a
second strike. The court stayed the term imposed as to count 6
pursuant to section 654.
      Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.

                                  3
Prosecution evidence
       Counts 3 and 4
       On December 3, 2019, Correctional Officers Milton Morataya
and Lanny Martinez were monitoring inmates in a housing unit at
the California State Prison in Los Angeles County. The unit held
200 inmates and it was almost full. Officer Sommer Davis, was also
present in the control booth. Officers Morataya and Martinez were
armed with batons and pepper spray. Officer Davis had a firearm
and sponge rounds launcher in the control booth.
       At approximately 8:15 a.m., 20 or 30 inmates were out of their
cells getting medication, and being monitored as they entered the
day room from the medication line outside, when defendant was
observed to be attempting to use a telephone, that was not allowed
until 9:00 a.m. and then only for those inmates who had signed up
the preceding night. Officer Davis discovered defendant had lost
phone privileges as discipline for a rules violation, so Officer
Morataya ordered defendant to return to his cell.
       Defendant ignored the order, continued to try to use the
phone and gave no indication he was listening to the officers.
Speaking louder, Officer Morataya said defendant’s name and again
gave the order. Defendant replied, “I’m not talking to you. I’m
talking to Davis.” Officer Davis said she was too busy to talk to
him. Officer Martinez also told defendant to go back to his cell, but
was ignored by defendant.
       When Officers Morataya and Martinez approached defendant,
he took a rigid stance, clenched his fists, looked angry, and said,
“Don’t come up on me like that.” Officer Morataya told defendant to
turn around and submit to handcuffs. When defendant failed to
comply, a second order to submit to handcuffs was given.
Defendant began to comply, turned around, and put his hands

                                 4
behind his back. When Officer Morataya grabbed defendant’s wrist
with one hand and reached for the handcuffs with the other,
defendant said, “Fuck this shit,” spun to his left, swung his left
elbow upward, and while looking directly at Officer Morataya’s face,
struck the officer in the nose. The officer felt excruciating pain, was
dazed, and his eyes became watery. Both Officers Morataya and
Martinez then forced defendant to the floor, intending to stop the
threat. Neither officer punched defendant during the struggle. Nor
did they use their batons or pepper spray. Officer Davis radioed a
report of a resisting inmate, hit the alarm, and let the responding
staff enter through the back door. She also followed protocol by
getting out leg restraints.
       In the fracas Officer Morataya’s arm became stuck under
defendant’s body, and due to body weight, he was trapped. As a
result, Officer Morataya experienced pain in his shoulder and
thumb. The struggle continued with defendant twisting and
attempting to again elbow Officer Morataya, who moved his face
and dodged a hit, resulting in defendant’s elbow stricking Officer
Martinez in the face. Defendant then tucked his arms under his
body, preventing the officers from getting control.
       Officer Schneider had responded and was able to pull out
defendant’s left arm. Officer Martinez then got defendant’s right
arm, and Officer Morataya placed defendant in handcuffs.
Defendant then stopped resisting and was escorted out of the
building. Officer Morataya went first to the prison’s medical facility
for evaluation. He was then sent to an outside clinic where he was
treated for his broken and twisted nose, swelling of his face and left
eye, and a black eye. It took two months for his nose and thumb to
heal. He had surgery on his left shoulder two months before the
April 2022 trial, and remained unable to return to work. Officer

                                  5
Martinez suffered swelling, pain and redness on his left cheekbone,
as well as swelling and pain to his left knee. Defendant had a
bloody nose.
       Officers Morataya, Martinez, and Davis each testified they
were unaware of any lawsuits or complaints brought by or in which
defendant was involved.
       Count 6
       Correctional Officer Armando Rodriguez was a floor officer in
a maximum-security disciplinary unit housing inmates who had
committed rules violations. His duties included escorting hand
cuffed inmates to and from showers, medical appointments, and the
exercise yard. It was considered a dangerous unit for both inmates
and staff, and the officer’s job was to keep both safe from attack.
Officer Rodriguez had been assaulted numerous times. He had
been kicked, subjected to headbutts, and had bodily fluids including
spit thrown at him.
       On August 19, 2020, defendant was handcuffed and Officer
Rodriguez was escorting him to or from a medical appointment.
Defendant began to walk fast and Officer Rodriguez told him to
slow down. Defendant complied. When they entered a small
rotunda or hallway of the building, without warning, defendant
became aggressive. Defendant entered first and faced away from
Officer Rodriguez. Defendant then turned, and aggressively leaned
or lunged toward the officer who stepped to the side to avoid being
headbutt. The officers pushed defendant away and defendant
collided with the wall. Officer Rodriguez, who was armed with a
baton and pepper spray, did not think they were necessary to stop
the threat and did not use them. Instead, he activated his alarm
and held defendant against the wall while defendant resisted by

                                 6
attempting to pull away. Officer Rodriguez ordered defendant to
stop resisting.
      When Officer Pedro Castellanos responded, he found Officer
Rodriguez with both hands against defendant’s upper back.
Sergeant Phillip Doty, and Officer Castellanos arrived and took
over from Officer Rodriguez. Defendant was medically evaluated,
and found to have nothing beyond abrasions and redness with no
active bleeding. He was then returned to his cell.
      As defendant entered his cell, he turned suddenly and spit
toward Officer Castellanos’s face, hitting the left side of the
protective shield. Officer Castellanos who had turned his head, was
hit by some of defendant’s saliva on his face. A medical check
found no ill effect.
      Though they have since been installed, at that time there
were no cameras in the areas where defendant was housed.
      Officers Rodriguez, Castellanos, and Doty all testified they
were unaware of any lawsuits or complaints brought by defendant
or in which defendant was involved. Rodriguez however testified to
being familiar with a lawsuit related to disabled inmates and
mentally ill inmates at the prison.
Defense evidence
      The December 3, 2019 incident
      Defendant testified he had been transferred from another
prison five days earlier. When he attempted to use the dayroom
phone, he thought it was allowed since he had signed up the
previous day. He dialed but did not get through, so he tried to
speak to Officer Davis about signing up for the next day, but was
not able to get her attention. Officers Morataya and Martinez
approached him aggressively and said he could not use the phone,
and to turn around and cuff up. Defendant claims he complied, that

                                7
Officer Morataya cuffed both hands, and then slammed defendant
to the ground. Defendant denied pulling away when Officer
Morataya grabbed his wrists before putting on the cuffs, and
claimed when he was on the ground, they started beating him.
Defendant remembered his body hitting the ground and being
punched in the face by both officers countless times. Still, he did
not resist. Other officers responded, shackled him and took him to
the rotunda, where they slammed him to the ground and kicked
him in the head. More officers came and assaulted him further. He
was then taken to the gym, and on the way, Officer Morataya
grabbed his shirt and started to choke him. In the gym, he was put
in a cage where, feeling dizzy, he sat down, and a nurse came to see
him. His shirt, pants and boots were covered with blood and he had
contusions and knots on his head.
       Defendant testified that except for in the visitors’ room, there
were no cameras in the facility then and no staff wore body
cameras; but because of a lawsuit that has changed. Defendant
testified he had complained about the correctional officers since
being transferred there. The officers who hit him that day called
him a “bitch” and told him to stop complaining. Defendant
interpreted this as referring to his past complaints. Defendant filed
a complaint about the incident on a 602 form, which falsely claims
there would be no reprisals. Defendant was sent to administrative
segregation for 14 months, and he was attacked again by Officers
Morataya and Rodriguez.
       The August 19, 2020 incident
       Defendant testified he was escorted by Officers Rodriguez and
Lewis to a medical appointment. It was a two-officer security escort
due to the previous allegations of assault against two officers, which
defendant denied. As Officer Lewis started to bring defendant

                                  8
back, Officer Rodriguez called defendant “bitch.” When defendant
returned the epithet, Officer Rodriguez slammed defendant against
the wall and punched him in the face. Defendant assumed Officer
Rodriguez was referring to the complaints defendant had made
since “to bitch” means to complain, and defendant filed a lot of
complaints. Defendant further testified Officer Rodriguez punched
him in the face and spit in his eye. Officer Lewis then stopped
Officer Rodriguez from assaulting defendant further. Officer King
was first to respond and told defendant to calm down as he yelled,
“Why are you hitting me like that?” Both told him not to do
anything. At the time he was in shackles with a chain around the
waist and one arm cuffed on the right and one on the left. Two
other officers arrived and took him to the nurse. He had a
laceration just below an eyebrow.
        Officers Doty and Castellanos then escorted defendant to his
cell, where Officer Castellanos laughed at him. Defendant claims to
have responded, “Fuck you, Castellanos,” whereupon Officer
Castellanos ran into the cell and started punching defendant in the
face. Defendant denied spitting on Officer Castellanos, and claims
to have been in great pain. He was taken to the clinic treatment
center where the nurse who was documenting his injuries, was told
by the officers they were pre-existing and to not write it down. She
followed their orders. Defendant believed the attacks were in
retaliation for reporting what happened to him on December 3, and
for filing grievances regarding his treatment.
        On cross-examination, defendant was asked about a
declaration regarding the December 3 incident which he submitted
in April 2020 for filing in a federal class action lawsuit. In the
declaration, defendant stated that Officers Morataya and Martinez
immediately slammed him to the ground, and later handcuffed him

                                 9
while beating him up. The declaration did not mention being
handcuffed before he was on the ground or kicked in the head,
although his testimony on direct examination was that he was
cuffed first, while still standing. Defendant filed a federal lawsuit
seeking money damages against the officers for his injuries.
       Defendant acknowledged it would be harder to be paroled if
he were convicted of committing crimes in prison. Though he could
have, he did not request separation from any of the staff he accused
of beating him.
       Inmate Thomas Gadson testified that in 2018, he tried to
commit suicide in a holding cage by hanging himself, and that
Officer Castellanos sprayed him with pepper spray while calling
Gadson by a racial epithet. Gadson filed a complaint against
Officer Castellanos. Inmate Andrew Gatlin testified that he once
saw Officer Rodriguez slam another inmate on the ground, and that
Officer Rodriguez had retaliated against Gatlin and other inmates
by slamming them onto the ground. Gatlin also testified that in
2019, Officer Rodriguez forced Gatlin to be strip searched in the
yard where female guards were present.
       Another inmate, Darnell Lemons, testified he was in his cell
on December 3, 2019, and observed the incident regarding the
telephone. He testified Officers Morataya and Martinez told
defendant to turn around and cuff up, that he saw Officer Martinez
slam defendant to the ground, and Officer Morataya then get on top
of defendant. Lemons said Officer Martinez swung a fist to hit
defendant, but missed and instead punched Officer Morataya in the
left jaw or cheek area, but not his nose. A sergeant and other
officers arrived and took defendant to the rotunda, where he saw
defendant attacked while not resisting. Lemons told a defense

                                 10
investigator before trial that he could not see what happened in the
rotunda.
      Rebuttal
      Department of Corrections investigator Donal Gaines
inspected Lemons’s cell and confirmed that one cannot see into the
rotunda from the cell. Photographs which demonstrated the view
were taken.2 The investigator also interviewed defendant on video
approximately four or five days after the August 20, 2020 incident.
Still photos taken from video were produced. One shows defendant
with redness above the right eyebrow. Despite defendant’s
testimony his face appeared to be caved in, no other injury is
apparent in the photos. Nor do the photos show a black eye or a
laceration on defendant’s face.
       Officer Castellanos testified he recalled having to rescue an
inmate who was trying to hang himself in a holding cage, but did
not remember details of the incident. He explained it was
dangerous to get in a cell with an inmate, especially a holding cell,
and pepper spray would be used in such rescues because it quickly
stops the inmate and it is safer for the officer. Officer Castellanos
denied shoving defendant into his cell on August 19, 2020, when he
returned him. He would not do that because it is unsafe and illegal.

2     The parties stipulated Lemons was interviewed on June 30,
2021, by a defense investigator, and told him, in part: “Supervisor
Villalobos came and they escorted [defendant] to the rotunda. At
this point Lemons could no longer see what they were doing to
[defendant]. A couple of hours later, Lemons saw [defendant] being
moved in the direction of administrative segregation D5 in a
wheelchair.”

                                 11
      Officer Rodriguez testified that during the times inmate
Gatlin claimed he was assaulted by the officer, Gatlin was
incarcerated in different prisons. Officer Rodriguez did not work in
those other prisons and had never crossed paths with Gatlin.
                           DISCUSSION
I. Request for judicial notice
      A. Evidence Code section 402 hearing and ruling
      After conducting a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section
402,3 the trial court denied defendant’s motion in limine for judicial
notice of two orders dated March 11, 2021 (the Armstrong orders),
issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California in Armstrong v. Newsome, 94-CV-02307-CW, a class
action lawsuit brought by disabled prisoners in which defendant
claimed to be a class member. In particular, the motion sought to
introduce the remedial measures ordered by the federal court in the
two orders, including the installation of cameras, and the directive
against retaliation against inmate class members, which defendant
alleged was the motive for the assaults upon him on December 3,
2019 and August 19, 2020.
      Also at the section 402 hearing, defense counsel argued he
should be able to show the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) was ordered to place cameras in facilities, to
have officers use body-worn cameras, and to change their

3      Evidence Code section 402 provides that when the existence
of a preliminary fact necessary to the admissibility of evidence is
disputed, its existence or nonexistence shall be determined in a
hearing outside the presence of the jury.

      All further unattributed code sections in the Discussion
section are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise stated.

                                 12
documentation and investigation process with regard to grievances,
officer misconduct and retaliation of inmates. Defendant’s counsel
acknowledged the orders did not mention the officers involved in
this case, but argued that due to the corrections by the Armstrong
orders, a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt could arise. The
prosecutor argued that since the orders did not name specific
officers or describe conduct specific to them but were instead
generally directed toward all officers at the prison, the orders were
not relevant to this case.
       The trial court refused to take judicial notice of the facts and
conclusions of law recited in the orders, as defendant had not made
a showing of the preliminary facts sufficient to satisfy issues of
relevance or issues arising under section 352.
       B. The trial court’s discretion
       “It is well recognized that the purpose of judicial notice is to
expedite the production and introduction of otherwise admissible
evidence.” (Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 565,
578 (Mozzetti), italics added.) Judicial notice may be taken of the
records of any court of record of the United States. (§ 452, subd.
(d).) Section 453 provides that a court must take judicial notice of
any matters specified in section 452 so long as the moving party
gives sufficient notice of the request and furnishes the court with
sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice. However,
judicial notice may be taken only as authorized by law. (§ 450.)
Thus, only relevant evidence is admissible. (§ 350.)
       Nevertheless, defendant suggests the trial court was required
under section 453 to take notice of the Armstrong orders solely
because he gave the prosecution sufficient notice of his request and
furnished the court with sufficient information. Providing sufficient
information means “information relevant to (1) the propriety of

                                  13
taking judicial notice of the matter and (2) the tenor of the matter
to be noticed.” (§ 455, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, “[e]ven if a
matter is a proper subject of judicial notice, it must still be
relevant,” as required by section 350. (People v. Payton (1992) 3
Cal.4th 1050, 1073, citing Mozzetti, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 578.)
In addition, as provided in section 454, subdivision (a)(2), section
352 applies to the determination of “the propriety of taking judicial
notice of a matter, or the tenor thereof.” Even where evidence is
shown to be relevant, section 352 allows the trial court the
discretion to exclude it “ ‘if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate
undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ”
(Mozzetti, supra, at p. 578.)
       Thus, the information required of defendant to make judicial
notice mandatory was that the evidence was admissible. Where
admissibility of proffered evidence depends on the existence of a
preliminary fact or facts, it is the burden of the proponent of the
proffered evidence to produce evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding of the existence of the preliminary fact. (§ 403, subd. (a)(1).)
Here, the trial court found defendant had not met his burden to
make a showing of the preliminary facts sufficient to satisfy issues
of relevance or issues arising under section 352. On appeal, the
trial court’s rulings on both relevance and the admission of evidence
under section 352 are reviewed for abuse of discretion (People v.
Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 799), which will not be disturbed
“except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Id. at p. 800, internal quotation
marks omitted.) In any appeal claiming an abuse of discretion, it is

                                  14
defendant’s burden to clearly establish both the abuse of discretion
and a miscarriage of justice. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 566.)
       C. Relevance and section 352 issues
       The trial court found defendant had failed to show the
preliminary fact that the officers involved in the two incidents knew
of the orders and knew of defendant’s involvement in the litigation.
Defendant makes no claim he made any offer to prove any such
preliminary fact, but merely disagrees with the trial court and
declares that the Armstrong orders were “extremely” relevant to his
defense the correctional officers attacked him in retaliation for his
involvement in the Armstrong lawsuit. Defendant argues that the
orders were key to this defense because they show the danger
inmates such as he faced in prison due to retaliation for the
Armstrong lawsuit.
       Defendant’s reasoning on this point rests in part on a claim
that, in his words, “[t]he fact that the guards denied knowledge of
the lawsuit only went to their credibility and ultimately the
believability of appellant’s defense, not its relevance.” As authority
for this assertion, defendant cites section 210, which provides: “
‘Relevant evidence’ ” means evidence, including evidence relevant to
the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.” Defendant
acknowledges the Armstrong orders were issued on March 11, 2021,
long after the events in this case took place; however, he points out
that they “memorialize the history of the case and why prisoners
like appellant would be the target of retaliation.”
       Defendant’s reasoning appears to be that the Armstrong
orders would have demonstrated the officers were lying when they

                                 15
said they did not know about his involvement in the lawsuit;
however, he fails to explain just how he might do so without any
evidence the officers knew or even had reason to know about
defendant’s involvement in that litigation. Defendant also fails to
cite any authority that suggests a witness’s claim of ignorance may
be countered solely by evidence of the matter they claim to know
nothing about.
       Defendant has made no offer to prove that the correctional
officers involved in this case knew of defendant’s involvement in the
Armstrong case. His arguments amount to a claim he should have
been allowed to prove the mental state of the officers involved in
this case by arguing that CDCR correctional officers in general
might know about the Amstrong litigation and might wish to
retaliate against inmates due to resentment caused by the lawsuit.
As neither logic nor authority support defendant’s position, we
agree with the trial court that he failed to show the orders were
relevant to his defense that the correctional officers in this case
attacked him in retaliation for the Armstrong lawsuit.
       Defendant next argues that because the evidence was highly
relevant, the risk of confusion did not substantially outweigh the
orders’ relevance, and the trial court thus erred in excluding them
under section 352. As we have already agreed with the trial court
that defendant has failed to show the orders were relevant to his
defense, we need not discuss defendant’s additional arguments
based upon the same premise.
       Defendant also contends the court erred in excluding the
evidence under section 1101 because, he argues, that statute is not

                                 16
relevant to this situation.4 He reasons the statute is not relevant,
as he merely intends to show that “because of prisoner complaints,
the CDCR was required to take certain actions which clearly did not
reflect positively on the guards as a whole.” Defendant argues this
would show why guards in general would be motivated to retaliate.
Even if Armstrong’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were
probative of such a contention, defendant has not made any offer to
prove that all, some, or any prison guards in the California prison
system have knowledge of Armstrong’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law; nor has he made any offer to prove that any
guards thought ill of Armstrong, or that any of them harbored a
retaliatory motive as a result. Thus, even if we agreed that section
1101 had no relevance to the trial court’s determination,
defendant’s argument provides ample demonstration of the
irrelevance of the orders to his defense. As we have found the trial
court’s ruling correct on that ground, we need not further discuss
defendant’s argument. (See People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39
[we affirm the ruling if correct on any ground].)
       As defendant’s arguments have failed to produce facts
showing the relevance of the orders and he has failed to
demonstrate the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner, we find no error or abuse of
discretion. (See People v. Battle, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 799.)
       Further, defendant has not met his burden to demonstrate a
miscarriage of justice. (See § 353, subd. (b); Cal. Const., art. VI,

4     Section 1101, subdivision (a) provides that with exceptions,
“evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character
(whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or
evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible
when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.”

                                  17
§ 13.) Defendant acknowledges the test for prejudice is the
standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, under
which error is harmless unless it is “ ‘reasonably probable’ ” that
defendant would have achieved a more favorable result in the
absence of the error. It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate
the reasonable probability of a different result. (See People v.
Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733, 746.) Defendant’s showing
consists of arguing the orders supported his theory that the guards
were motivated to retaliate against him, followed by his conclusion
that had the evidence been admitted, it is reasonably probable that
the jury would have reached a more favorable verdict. As we have
already found the evidence was not relevant to prove his theory of
defense, we reject defendant’s conclusory prejudice argument.
II.    Character evidence
       Defendant objects to testimony elicited by the prosecutor that
was inadmissible “character evidence” under section 1101,
subdivision (a).5
       During direct examination of Officers Morataya, Martinez,
Davis, Rodriguez, Castellanos, and Doty, the prosecutor asked
questions regarding their reliance and that of their families on their
salaries, healthcare benefits, and pension; whether they could be
fired for lying in a police report; whether they knew the
consequences for perjury; and whether they would risk that by
beating defendant and testifying falsely about it. Defendant made
no timely objection on the ground advanced here and did not object
at all to most of the questions.
       During such questions to Officer Morataya (which covered
four pages of reporter’s transcript) there were two objections. After

5     See footnote 4.

                                 18
the prosecutor asked whether his wife and children hoped to live on
his pension after he retired, defense counsel objected on relevance
grounds. The objection was overruled. After Officer Morataya
testified that he could lose his job for lying on a police report, the
prosecutor followed up with, “So you could get terminated at
CDCR?” The trial court sustained a defense objection as to leading.
       In the three pages of questions put to Officer Martinez, when
the prosecutor asked, “If you commit perjury yourself, you are
aware you could be convicted and go to prison, right?” Officer
Martinez replied, “Yes,” and the trial court sustained a defense
objection as to leading. There was however, no motion to strike the
answer. The prosecutor then asked, “What if you saw another
officer [commit perjury and assault and battery just to get
defendant], would you just come into court and lie for that officer?”
The court overruled the defense objection made on the ground the
question called for speculation.
       When the prosecutor asked similar questions of Officer Davis,
there were no objections. When similar questions were posed to
Officer Rodriguez, defense counsel objected on relevance grounds to
the question, “Do you get a pension?” The objection was overruled.
Finally, when the prosecutor asked similar questions of Officer
Castellanos, there were no objections.
       We agree with the People that defendant has not preserved
this issue for review. A challenge to the admissibility of evidence is
generally not cognizable on appeal in the absence of a specific and
timely objection or motion to strike the evidence in the trial court on
the ground urged on appeal. (§ 353.) An objection on one ground
does not preserve a challenge based upon a different ground.
(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434–435.)

                                  19
       Defendant asserts that an objection would have been futile
and asks we excuse his forfeiture. Defendant suggests futility is
shown by the trial court having overruled two relevance objections
during the officers’ testimony that defendant now challenges under
section 1101. As the People point out, defendant made few
objections at all and gave the trial court no opportunity to make a
ruling which might have suggested that any objection on the issue
of character evidence would be overruled. Such circumstances do
not demonstrate futility. (Cf. People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691,
745 [defendant objected to only six of the 18 challenged instances
and none of the objections was made on the ground urged on
appeal].)
       Defendant also suggests futility is shown by the denial of
defendant’s later motion for reconsideration of the overruling of
various defense objections, including defendant’s relevance
objections to questions regarding the consequences of perjury and
filing false police reports. Defendant did not seek reconsideration
on the ground urged here; and he fails to provide a legal argument,
or any reasoned argument, to explain how the denial of a motion to
reconsider an objection on a ground different from that urged on
appeal would demonstrate the futility of making a specific and
timely objection on the appropriate ground.
       In addition, defendant’s argument on the merits consists of
his opinion the prosecution’s purpose was to show the guards were
upstanding, moral people who would not act inappropriately on the
job, followed by defendant’s conclusion the officers’ testimony
challenged here “is exactly the type of evidence that Section 1101
seeks to exclude.” Defendant fails to cite any authority other than
section 1101 to support his conclusion. He also fails to make a legal
or any reasoned argument to demonstrate the challenged testimony

                                 20
was inadmissible character evidence. Where a defendant provides
no legal analysis to support a point raised, or presents an
undeveloped argument, the reviewing court need not discuss the
issue and may treat the issue as waived. (People v. Bryant, Smith
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363; People v. Medrano (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1520.)
       Defendant provides an equally undeveloped prejudice
argument when he asserts the officers’ testimony created a false
inference that the guards would not have initiated the incidents in
retaliation for defendant’s involvement in the Armstrong lawsuit
that adversely affected defendant’s credibility. Although defendant
acknowledges we review the exclusion of evidence for an abuse of
discretion and apply the Watson test to determine prejudice, he
concludes without further argument that without this evidence,
there would be a reasonable probability that the jury may have
reached a different verdict. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at
p. 836.) However, defendant makes no mention of the trial court’s
finding when it denied his motion for reconsideration, “Given the
fact that the Court is allowing Pitchess witnesses to impeach the
credibility of these same witnesses, there is no prejudice to
Defendant in allowing this line of questions.”6

6     See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. A
Pitchess motion “allow[s] criminal defendants to seek discovery
from the court of potentially exculpatory information located in
otherwise confidential peace officer personnel records. If [the
moving] party . . . makes a threshold showing, the court must
review the records in camera and disclose to that party any
information they contain that is material to the underlying case.
(See Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 1045.)” (People v. Superior Court
(Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 705; see also Pen. Code, §§ 832.5,
832.7, subd. (a).)

                                 21
       Given defendant’s failure to provide a reasoned argument or
relevant authority for any of the points made relating to his
character- evidence claim, it is deemed waived and forfeited.
III. Cumulative prejudice
       Defendant contends that reversal is required due to the
cumulative prejudice from all the errors he claims to have
established. Because we have rejected defendant’s claims of error
and have found none of the alleged errors to be prejudicial, we
reject defendant’s claim of cumulative prejudice. (See People v.
Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 316.)
IV. Penal Code section 12022.7 enhancement7
       Defendant contends that although the trial court was
authorized to dismiss or strike the great bodily injury enhancement
found true as to count 3, it was not authorized to stay the
enhancement. The People agree, but the parties disagree whether
this court should modify the judgment by striking the enhancement
or by remanding the matter to the trial court to exercise its
discretion.
       Section 1385, subdivision (a) permits a court to strike or
dismiss an enhancement in furtherance of justice. (People v. Barber
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 814.) Subdivision (b)(1) of section 1385
also permits the court to strike the additional punishment provided
by an enhancement.8 “There is nothing in the language of section
1385, which permits a ‘stay’ of all or part of a sentence.” (People v.
Calhoun (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 117, 125.) As such, an

7     All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

8     Exceptions set forth in section 1385 which are not relevant to
our discussion are not enumerated here.

                                 22
enhancement should be stricken, not stayed, if the court chooses not
to impose it. (People v. Jones (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 756, 758; but see
People v. Lopez (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 162, 165.)
       Defendant asks this court to modify the sentence to dismiss
the great bodily injury enhancement, arguing we need not remand
for the trial court to exercise discretion, because the court made
clear that defendant would not serve the three-year enhancement
under section 12022.7. Defendant relies on People v. Gutierrez
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391, which held: “ ‘A court which is
unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or
may have been based on misinformation regarding a material
aspect of a defendant's record.’ [Citation.] In such circumstances,
we have held that the appropriate remedy is to remand for
resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial
court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been
aware that it had such discretion.’ [Citations.]”
       The trial court here was unaware that its discretion did not
extend to staying the section 12022.7 enhancement. However, the
record clearly indicates that the trial court intended to impose an
aggregate sentence of about six years, as there was much discussion
with counsel as to how to fashion the sentence. The court finally
settled on a sentence that would result in a six-year commitment by
staying the term on count 6. The court restated the sentence
without changing the orders dismissing enhancements, including
the great bodily injury enhancement, which it had already
pronounced.
       The People argue that the matter should nevertheless be
remanded for two reasons: (1) because the trial court did not make
clear its finding that dismissal of some of the enhancements would

                                 23
not endanger public safety applied to the great bodily injury
enhancement as well as the other enhancements; and (2) because
the court failed to state the reasons for staying the great bodily
injury enhancement.
       The court is required to orally state its reasons for a dismissal
on the record. (§ 1385, subd. (a).) Here the court stated: “The great
bodily injury enhancement shall remain but as set forth later, will
be stayed.” We agree that the trial court did not later set forth
reasons for the stay; however, the reasons appear earlier in the
sentencing hearing when the court agreed with recommendations in
the prosecution’s sentencing memorandum. The memorandum
urged the court to strike the punishment for the great bodily injury
enhancement while keeping the conviction (apparently meaning its
true finding of great bodily injury). In addition the prosecution
gave the reason for doing so, and for striking other enhancements,
was to encourage rehabilitation with the possibility of eventual
release, that a longer sentence in addition to his current
commitment would likely eliminate that possibility.
       The trial court agreed. The court acknowledged defendant’s
lengthy criminal history, and noted under his current commitment
he would not be eligible for parole until he reached 67 years old.
Defendant would have no incentive to rehabilitate if he faced a new
sentence that would effectively guarantee he would die in prison.
The court therefore struck defendant’s serious or violent prior
“strike” convictions and as well as such felonies alleged under
section 667, subdivision (a) which were more than five years old.
The court then stayed the great bodily injury enhancement.
       In light of the proceedings just summarized, we find the trial
court did in fact give reasons for its treatment of the great bodily
injury enhancement, but was mistaken in how to strike the

                                  24
enhancement while keeping the conviction and the true finding of
great bodily injury.
       With regard to the People’s public safety argument, section
1385, subdivision (c) requires the court, when dismissing an
enhancement in furtherance of justice, to consider, and give great
weight to certain circumstances in mitigation unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
However, striking the punishment is governed by section 1385,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). The People have not provided any
authority with extends subdivision (c) to the striking of punishment
under subdivision (b), and we have found none.
       We thus find the appropriate remedy is to vacate the order
staying the section 12022.7 enhancement and replace it with the
order intended by the trial court. As there is no need to remand, we
will exercise our power under section 1260 to modify the judgment,
and defendant’s sentence will remain the term intended by the
court. (Cf. People v. Ledbetter (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 896, 903–904
[appellate court vacated finding that Tennessee offense was a
serious or violent felony conviction]; People v. Alford (2010) 180
Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473–1474 [appellate court modified section 654
stay to correct failure to impose term before staying].)

                                25
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment is modified to vacate the stay of the Penal Code
section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement imposed as to count 3,
and to instead order the additional punishment imposed due to
Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a) be stricken. The trial
court is directed to forward to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation a new abstract of judgment reflecting this
modification.
      In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          ________________________
                                          CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:

_________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

____________________________
KWAN, J.*

*    Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County under
appointment by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

                                 26