Court Opinion

ID: 9833788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:01:35.216946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.737840
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In our original opinion we sustained appellant’s third proposition relative to the measure of damages based upon the understanding that the defendant by his cross-action sought recovery of damages for false representations, or, in other words, for fraud. In the motion for rehearing it is insisted that the pleading sought recovery, and the verdict and judgment awarded recovery of damages for breach of a warranty., On this.point the record is not free'from ambiguity, "if it be granted that damages for breach of a warranty were claimed, the measure of damages would be the difference between the purchase price of the automobile ($700) and the value of same in its defective condition at the time *402of the purchase. Gutta Percha & Rubber Mfg. Co. v. City of Cleburne, 102 Tex. 36, 112 S. W. 1047; Alba-Malakoff Lignite Co. v. Hercules Powder Sales Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 235 S. W. 547; Swift et al. v. Roach (Tex. Civ. App.) 266 S. W. 846. It therefore appears that the measure of damages applied was not correct under either interpretation of the pleadings. It is suggested that before another trial, defendant’s pleadings in this respect should be amended to show with certainty whether the damages be ela’med for false representations or for breach of a warranty.
 The principle that a parol agreement which constitutes the consideration for a written contract may, when the latter shows no consideration of a promissory nature, be proved by parol evidence, is not denied in the original opinion. On the contrary, it is recognized, but with its proper qualification that the asserted rights or obligations resting in parol cannot be proved if they contradict, add to, or restrict the rights or obligations expressed in the written portion of the contract. As said by Williston: “If a contract is even partially reduced to writing, the written portion is no more subject to contradiction by parol than the . entire contract would be had it been wholly reduced to writing.” Williston on Contracts, vol. 2, § 636.
The oral agreement alleged to have been a part of the consideration for the mortgage of a thousand bushels of oats was to the effect that plaintiff would allow credit (on the note) for at least 25 cents per bushel for the thousand bushels of oats at the time of their delivery.
The testimony, the exclusion of which is assigned as error, when closely examined, seems to be subject to an objection not made, viz., that there was no pleading to support same. In other words, the testimony) tended to show a different agreement than the one alleged. Testimony excluded even for an improper reason would not be prejudicial error if it tended to prove no issue in the case. We shall, therefore, for the purpose of this discussion ignore the apparent variance and limit the inquiry to the question of whether testimony tending to prove the particular agreement alleged would be admissible.
In the original opinion we construed the agreement alleged to be one, the effect of which was to impose upon appellant the obligation to purchase the thousand bushels of oats at a minimum price of 25 cents a bushel. Under .that construction we rightly concluded, we think, that the parol agreement was in conflict with the terms of the written mortgage, which, among other things, gave appellants the right to sell the oats at public auction and to become the purchaser at such sale. A pre-agreed price would be wholly inconsistent with a sale at public auction, in which the sale would be determined by the highest price bid. We now recognize, however, that we misconstrued the agreement alleged.' Plainly and simply stated, the agreement alleged was that in the event the oats should sell for less than 25 cents per bushel appellants would credit the note with the difference between the sale price and 25 cents per bushel. Proof of such agreement, if permitted, would vary the obligation of appellee as expressed in the note, which the mortgage on the thousand bushels of oats was given to secure, and which, therefore, was part of one and the same contract.' Its direct effect would be to show that $307.50, the amount which the note purported to obligate appellee to pay absolutely, was not the amount he was liable to pay, but that upon the contingency that the oats sold for less than, 25 cents per bushel the amount he was really liable to pay was the principal of the note less the difference between the actual sale price of the thousand bushels of oats and a price of 25 cents per bushel.
 We recognize that much inconsistency is to be found in the decisions. It is our conclusion, however, that this case is properly ruled by* a proposition which may be stated as follows: The parol evidence rule forbids the proof of any oral agreement varying the time of payment, or reducing, or increasing the amount stipulated in the written contract to be paid, as for example (of the latter) an affi'eement that a less sum is to he paid upon a certain, contmgencg or providing for a remission or rebatel of a portion of the principal or interest, or providing that payment is to be made in something besides money. 17 Tex. Jur. p. 845, § 383; Evans v. Swartz (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S. W. 234; Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Browder (Tex. Com. App.) 283 S. W. 154; Shaw v. Lumpkin (Tex. Civ. App.) 241 S. W. 220; Chalk v. Daggett (Tex. Com. App.) 257 S. W. 228; Helmke v. Prasifka (Tex. Civ. App.) 17 S.W.(2d) 463; Lawther Grain Co. v. Winniford (Tex. Com. App.) 249 S. W. 195; Guarantee Life Ins. Co. v. Davidson (Tex. Com. App.) 234 S. W. 883; Coverdill v. Seymour, 94 Tex. 1, 57 S. W. 37; Earle v. Marx, 80 Tex. 39, 15 S. W. 595; Morriss v. Hesse (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S. W. 710, affirmed (Tex. Com. App.) 231 S. W. 317.
We, therefore, conclude that the motion for rehearing should be overruled, which is accordingly so ordered.