Court Opinion

ID: 2965075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:34:53.834191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:05.136254
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 97-1531

                                  JIMMY D. BATISTE,

                                     Petitioner,

                                          v.

                                    SANDRA SCOTT,
                       DIRECTOR OF HILLSIDE PRE-RELEASE CENTER,

                                     Respondent.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                              Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                   ____________________
                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                                 ____________________

            Jimmy D. Batiste on brief pro se.
            ________________
            Scott  Harshbarger,  Attorney  General,  and  William  J.   Meade,
            __________________                            ___________________
        Assistant Attorney General, on brief for respondent.

                                 ____________________

                                   January 23, 1998
                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.   Petitioner  Jimmy Batiste  appeals pro  se
                 __________

            from a  district court  judgment dismissing  his 28  U.S.C.  

            2254  habeas corpus petition.   Two  successive Massachusetts

            state court  convictions are  here at  issue.   Both involved

            assault and battery with a dangerous weapon; both resulted in

            prison  terms.   Petitioner  seeks  to  challenge  his  first

            conviction.  Yet the district  court determined that, at  the

            time the instant petition  was filed, the first sentence  had

            expired and petitioner was serving his  second sentence.  The

            court therefore  dismissed the  petition on  the ground  that

            petitioner  was not "in  custody" pursuant to  the conviction

            and sentence under attack.  See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488,
                                        ___ ______    ____

            490-91 (1989) (per  curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C.     2241(c)(3),

            2254(a)).  Petitioner has offered nothing, either below or on

            appeal, to  call this  conclusion into  question.  We  affirm

            substantially  for the reasons recited by the district court,

            adding  only the following comments for purposes of emphasis.

                 Contrary  to petitioner's  assertion, the  two sentences

            did not run consecutively.   His second sentence, rather than

            constituting a "from and after" sentence under Mass. G.L.  c.

            279    8A, was imposed pursuant to Mass. G.L.  c. 279   27 to

            take  effect   "forthwith  and  notwithstanding"   the  first

            sentence.   See Dale v.  Commissioner of Correction, 17 Mass.
                        ___ ____     __________________________

            App.  Ct. 247, 249  (1983) (noting that  "forthwith" sentence

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            imposed under  this provision "terminate[s]"  the preexisting

            sentence); In re Kinney, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 457, 461 n.3 (1977)
                       ____________

            (same).   As consecutive  sentences were  not involved  here,

            petitioner's reliance  on Garlotte  v. Fordice,  515 U.S.  39
                                      ________     _______

            (1995), and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), is misplaced.
                        ______    ____

                 Alternatively, petitioner contends that he is still able

            to challenge  his  first conviction,  by  means of  a  habeas

            petition directed  at his  second sentence,  inasmuch as  the

            first conviction  was used  to enhance  the second  sentence.

            See, e.g., Young  v. Vaughn, 83 F.3d 72, 75-76, 78 (3d Cir.),
            ___  ____  _____     ______

            cert. denied,  117 S.  Ct. 333 (1996);  see also  Maleng, 490
            ____________                            ________  ______

            U.S. at 494 (leaving question open).  We need not address the

            propriety  of  such  a procedure,  however,  because  no such

            enhancement has been shown to have occurred here.   Certainly

            no  formal  sentencing enhancement  mechanism--such  as those

            appearing in Mass. G.L. c. 265   15A(a); id. c. 279   25--was
                                                     ___

            triggered;  despite  petitioner's  initial  reliance  on  the

            former,  those  provisions  are  inapplicable  by  their very

            terms.    Petitioner  instead  suggests  that  some  sort  of

            informal  enhancement was  undertaken.   Yet  various factors

            belie such speculation--such as that the minimum term of  the

            second  sentence (which  called  for  2 1/2  to  10 years  in

            prison) was the lowest then permitted, and that  the superior

            court  judge  eschewed  a  consecutive  sentence.    Nor  has

            petitioner provided any  basis for suspecting that  the first

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            conviction influenced the maximum term of the second sentence

            or the timing of his eventual release.

                 Petitioner is correct  in observing that, had  the first

            conviction not occurred,  there would have been  no reason to

            impose a "forthwith" sentence for his second conviction.  But

            this assertion accomplishes  nothing.  It does not mean that,

            were  petitioner able to  overturn his first  conviction, the

            forthwith sentence would  have been invalidly imposed.   More

            important, it does not mean that his second sentence would be

            reduced as a result.  

                 For these reasons, which the district court explained at

            greater length, petitioner's contention that he satisfied the

            "in  custody"  requirement  proves  mistaken.    His  further

            complaint--that  the  cancellation  of  a  scheduled  hearing

            deprived him  of an  adequate opportunity  to articulate  his

            views--is belied by the record. 

                 Affirmed.  See Loc. R. 27.1.
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