Court Opinion

ID: 9719466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:53:46.595446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:07.542988
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Jackson, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion herein on the question of the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue of the search warrant.
*370The facts in this case, on the points involved in this dissent, are as follows:
On December 14, 1956, a search warrant was issued to any police officer in the State of Indiana, to search “a certain dwelling-house numbered 824 on South Penn Street, in the City of Muncie, Delaware County, Indiana, or in a certain frame building situated immediately adjacent to said dwelling house and on the east side thereof, or in a certain building numbered 1305 on East Second Street, in the City of Muncie, Delaware County, Indiana, and known as ‘The Glamour Inn.’ ”
It seems that the rights of the individual, secured by the Bill of Rights, after centuries of oppression should not be lightly disregarded or discarded; to do so, in my opinion, only facilitates the further development of a police state and the erosion of our system of society.
Article 1, §11, of the Constitution of Indiana reads as follows: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.” (My italics.)
Such article and section, in thus requiring that the warrant particularly describe the place to be searched, refers to the place in the singular, and I am convinced that had the founding fathers intended otherwise they would have so stated.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads as follows:
“UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. —The right of the people to be secure in their persons, *371houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (My italics.)
There again the place to be searched is in the singular.
The appellant has raised the question of the validity of the search warrant alleging that it is illegal because one warrant only was used to describe and search two (2) distinct properties and places. I think this contention is valid. The case of State v. Duane (1905), 100 Me. 447, 62 Atl. 80, cited with approval by this court in Hess v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 1, 5, 151 N. E. 405, and Thompson v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 496, 501, 154 N. E. 278, supports appellant’s position and in the opinion of the writer is a correct exposition of the law as it relates to this case.
The same rule, as to search of more than one place in the same warrant, has been upheld in other jurisdictions. Myer v. State (1926), 34 Okla. Crim. 421, 246 Pac. 1105; Wiese et al. v. State (1925), 32 Okla. Crim. 203, 240 Pac. 1075; United States v. Innelli et al. (1923), D.C. 286 Fed. 731; State v. Duane, supra (1905), 100 Me. 447, 62 Atl. 80; Larthet v. Forgay et al. (1847), 2 La. Ann. 524; Herrion v. State (1944), 79 Okla. Crim. 48, 150 P. 2d 865; Linthicum v. State (1929), 66 Okla. Crim. 327, 92 P. 2d 381; Siverson v. Olson et al. (1937), 149 Or. 323, 40 P. 2d 65; Cornelius, Search and Seizure, Description in Warrant, §126 et seq., p. 338.
This court has long been dedicated to the rule that Section 11, Article 1, of the Constitution of Indiana must be strictly construed against the State and given *372a liberal construction for the protection of the people. Idol v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 307, 119 N. E. 2d 428; Dalton v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 626, 105 N. E. 2d 509, 31 A. L. R. 2d 1071; Wallace v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 317, 157 N. E. 657; Flum v. State (1923), 193 Ind. 585, 141 N. E. 353.
The motion to quash the search warrant and to suppress the evidence should have been sustained, and I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Bobbitt, J., concurs.
Note.—Reported in 157 N. E. 2d 174.