Court Opinion

ID: 9793851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:54:25.78985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:43.034293
License: Public Domain

PERRY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the result reached by my colleagues today for the simple reason that the case has been decided on an issue neither raised nor briefed on appeal. In order to reach the desired result in this case, the majority has had to raise the issue, make the arguments and provide adequate legal authority in support of those arguments. The majority cursorily remarks in a footnote that “we believe [Wood] has adequately challenged the State’s entire tactic of eliciting Almandinger’s testimony denying the choking in order to set the stage for Banderob’s ‘impeachment’ testimony.” The briefing and framing of issues on appeal, however, simply cannot support such a conclusion.
On appeal, Wood has only argued that the testimony of Wilma Banderob was erroneously admitted. Wood framed his issues on appeal as follows:
A.WOULD WILMA BANDEROB’S TESTIMONY HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE? B. DID THE STATE IMPEACH ITS OWN WITNESS FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF INTRODUCING OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY TESTIMONY?
C. WAS DEFENDANT/APPELLANT PREJUDICED BY BANDEROB’S TESTIMONY CONCERNING ' THE ALLEGED PRIOR BAD ACT?
Under each of these headings, Wood has also included the following subheadings:
A. RULE 607 I.R.E. PROHIBITS THE STATE FROM IMPEACHING ITS OWN WITNESS AS A SUBTERFUGE TO INTRODUCE OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
B. WILMA BANDEROB’S TESTIMONY WAS NOT OTHERWISE ADMISSIBLE.
1. Wilma Banderob’s Testimony Was Not Relevant Because It Did Not Pertain to a Contested Material Issue.
2. Banderob’s Testimony Should Have Been Excluded Because It Had Marginal, if Any, Probative Value and It Was Unfairly Prejudicial to the Accused.
C. BANDEROB’S TESTIMONY DID NOT FIT THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
D. THE STATE IMPEACHED PAMELA [ALMANDINGER] AS A SUBTERFUGE TO INTRODUCE OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
E. APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE ADMISSION OF WILMA BANDEROB’S TESTIMONY WHICH WAS IMPROPER PROPENSITY EVIDENCE.
This Court, as well as the Idaho Supreme Court, has long followed the proposition that “the failure of the appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate the consideration of that issue in the appeal.” State v. Prestwick, 116 Idaho 959, 961, 783 P.2d 298, 300 (1989). See also Grand Canyon Dories, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com’n, 121 Idaho 515, 826 P.2d 476 (1992); Sun Valley Shopping Center., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 *251Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (1991); State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 657 P.2d 17 (1983); Jensen v. Doherty, 101 Idaho 910, 623 P.2d 1287 (1981); Drake v. Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 672 P.2d 1064 (Ct.App.1983).
Similarly, issues unsupported by legal argument or authority will not be considered on appeal. Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101 (1990); Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 848 P.2d 984 (Ct.App.1992); Berning v. Drumwright, 122 Idaho 203, 832 P.2d 1138 (Ct.App.1992).
This case presents the unique situation where the issue has not been raised in the statement of issues as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) nor has it been argued in the brief itself. It is, of course, impractical to recite Wood’s brief in this opinion. The “Summary of Argument,” however, is a fair representation of the entirety of the argument contained in the brief:
The State acted in bad faith by introducing Banderob’s testimony under the pretext of impeachment. The defense objected timely when the State laid foundation for “impeachment,” and it also objected when Banderob took the stand. The defense argued that the State’s motive in eliciting Pamela [Almandinger’s] testimony regarding the “choking” incident was an improper impeachment and that Banderob’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay, unfairly prejudicial, narrative, and improper impeachment used to present otherwise inadmissible hearsay.
Banderob’s testimony was not admissible under Rules 613 and 607 because it was not relevant to a material issues. The court erred when it held that Banderob’s testimony was admissible because it pertained to material proof of motive pursuant to Rule 404(b) I.R.E. and that it was otherwise admissible as a present sense impression.
Rule 404(b) I.R.E. was not applicable because motive was not a contested material issue, and because the testimony’s lack of probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice due to lack of similarity to the offense charged. Pamela [Almandinger’s] discussion with Banderob testimony was too remote in time from the event explained to constitute a present sense impression.
The State improperly impeached its own witness as a pretext to introduce otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence that prejudiced the defense. The State had no need to impeach its own witness and, in fact, relied upon her credibility for its case in chief as far as proving that Tasha seemed “fine” that day, thus precluding an assertion of the possibility that she suffered a blow before she was left in Appellant’s care. The testimony relative to the alleged choking incident was unrelated to Pamela [Almandinger’s] other testimony. There was no need to raise the issue other than as a pretext to enter propensity evidence.
Banderob’s testimony was extremely prejudicial propensity evidence and Appellant was denied a fair trial because it was improperly admitted. Therefore, the defense asks that the judgment be reversed and remanded for a new trial with instructions prohibiting the improper introduction of propensity evidence under the guise of impeachment.
The issue upon which the majority decides this case, which is never raised, would 'be framed, “The trial court erred by allowing Pamela Almandinger’s testimony regarding the choking incident.” It is true that Wood questions the tactic of impeaching one’s own witness, but never directly challenges the underlying questioning of Pamela Almandinger. The only challenge is to the testimony of Banderob. Indeed, if Banderob had never testified, the entirety of Wood’s argument on appeal would be rendered meaningless.
The state, in its respondent’s brief, also did not address the issue of the admissibility of Pamela Almandinger’s testimony. It wasn’t until this Court, after hearing oral argument, ordered the state to further brief the issue that the state was afforded the opportunity to present argument regarding Pamela Almandinger’s testimony. The state, in its supplemental brief, attacks the consideration of this issue because it has not been raised on appeal but then goes on to argue that even if properly raised, Pamela Almanding*252er’s testimony was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b).
The difficulty I have with the majority opinion stems from what I believe to be a substitution of authority for argument. Had Wood properly challenged the testimony of Pamela Almandinger on appeal, that challenge would have been based primarily on I.R.E. 404. Wood does, in fact, discuss I.R.E. 404 in great detail and argues quite strenuously that it should have prohibited Banderob’s testimony. Nowhere in Wood’s brief do we find an argument that I.R.E. 404 prohibited the questioning of Pamela Almandinger surrounding Wood’s prior alleged misconduct. The majority apparently feels justified in supplying an unraised argument because the legal authority to support such an argument, had it been made, is supplied in relation to an entirely separate issue.
If the issue had been properly raised, I may agree with the majority’s analysis. Unfortunately, it appears that Wood, for whatever reason, has chosen not to make that argument.9 However egregious a party’s mistake, an appellate court should never abandon its role as a decisionmaker and take on that of an advocate. I believe such is the case by the majority here.
The majority notes, “We might be persuaded by the State’s argument if Almandinger’s testimony that was directly impeached by Banderob had itself been admissible, but we have held that it was not.” Because I would conclude that Pamela Almandinger’s testimony was never challenged on appeal, and therefore is not reviewable, I would accept the state’s argument that no error was committed in this case. Thus, I would affirm the judgment of conviction.

. It appears that counsel for Wood may have labored under the impression that the testimony of Pamela Almandinger was admissible. At trial, counsel stated, in arguing that impeachment testimony was an improper method to introduce propensity evidence stated:
Again, it seems to go toward the propensity aspect, and again propensity is something that the prosecution is entitled to get into with Ms. [Almandinger], but it doesn’t seem like they should be entitled to prove it by virtue of impeachment. That is the whole concern here.