Court Opinion

ID: 9853486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:30.962189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:49.766222
License: Public Domain

Shaw, Judge,
dissenting:
In 1975 Capers Barr cancelled his mortgage, assumed by his son and daughter-in-law, Thomas and Katherine Barr, by writing “cancelled” at the foot of the mortgage. Six years later the parties divorced. The family court found Capers *19Barr cancelled the mortgage as a gift to Thomas Barr alone. I disagree.
In appeals from family courts, this court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 283 S. C. 87, 320 S. E. (2d) 706 (1985).
A donor’s intention to give is a prerequisite to a valid gift. Meyerson v. Manilow, 231 S. C. 14, 97 S. E. (2d) 88 (1957). Capers Barr manifested no bifurcated intent to cancel the mortgage as a gift to his son alone until the time of trial. At the time he cancelled the mortgage, he simply wrote “can-celled,” even though he knew Thomas and Katherine Barr had jointly purchased and titled the subject property, and jointly assumed the mortgage. He neither required nor requested payment from either his son or his daughter-in-law, following cancellation. At the time of trial, he could not recall the names of the donees on his gift tax records, but he could recall he did not change his will as a result of this transaction. I would hold had he intended to cancel the mortgage as a gift to Thomas Barr alone, he would have written “cancelled as a gift to my son alone,” or words to that effect, on the mortgage. One cannot undo by self-serving testimony what he has done by documentation.
In Baptist Foundation for Christian Education v. Baptist College, 282 S. C. 53, 317 S. E. (2d) 453 (Ct. App. 1984), a donor manifested no intent to restrict a gift until the time of trial. At the time of donation, nothing in writing pointed towards restrictions. This court rejected the donor’s testimony, holding, “In determining the intent with which a transfer of property is made, the testimony of the transferor cannot override the written statement of his intentions in terms of probative value.” 317 S. E. (2d) at 453.
I reject Capers Barr’s testimony as to donative intent. Therefore, I would remand to award Katherine Barr an additional $14,000 as equitable distribution. I find no abuse of discretion in the other awards made by the trial judge.