Court Opinion

ID: 9848827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:28:09.680753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:48.591529
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe there is a question of fact with respect to whether Sharpe was within the scope of his employment when the collision occurred.
“The law is clear that in the absence of special circumstances a servant in going to and from work in an automobile acts only for his own purposes and not for those of his employer. But this rule does not apply ‘where the vehicle is taken to the employee’s home because the employee’s possession of it enables him more conveniently to perform some duty for the master.’ [Cit.]” Chappell v. Junior Achievement &c. Atlanta, 157 Ga. App. 41, 42-43 (276 SE2d 98) (1981).
For the purpose of determining whether activity in which employee is engaged is within the scope of his employment, the test is whether the activity serves in some way to prosecute the employer’s business or does some work which will benefit the employer for which the employee is to be compensated. Massey v. Henderson, 138 Ga. App. 565, 567 (226 SE2d 750) (1976), aff'd 238 Ga. 217 (232 SE2d 53) (1977). Accord West Point Pepperell v. Knowles, 132 Ga. App. 253 (208 SE2d 17) (1974); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Scott, 132 Ga. App. 245 (207 SE2d 705) (1974); Harden v. Clarke, 123 Ga. App. 142 (179 SE2d 667) (1970). See also Grant v. Jones, 168 Ga. App. 690, 691 (310 SE2d 272) (1983). “ ‘The expressions, “in the scope of his business,” or “in the scope of his employment,” or similar words, have sometimes been given too narrow a meaning. A master rarely commands a servant to be negligent, or employs him with the expectation that he will commit a negligent or wilful tort; but if the act is done in the prosecution of the master’s business, that is, if the servant is at the time engaged in serving the master, the latter will be liable . . .’” Southern Grocery Stores v. Herring, 63 Ga. App. 267, 270 (11 SE2d 57) (1940).
Here there is testimony by the company president that the vehicle could be used “only for company business” and that the vehicle was for “company use and [the employee] can’t use it on [his] own . . .” There is no evidence that Sharpe was engaged in a personal er*353rand at the time. Was the employee making solely personal use of the vehicle when he was driving it home from work that day? If he was, the employer is not liable. Healthdyne, Inc. v. Odom, 173 Ga. App. 184 (325 SE2d 847) (1984). If he was authorized to drive it home, which is what the uncontradicted evidence is, then there is at least a question of when the “scope of employment” ceased for this employee in the use of the company-owned vehicle. If it ceased when he left the office or the last assignment, then the president’s testimony leads to the conclusion that he was operating it without authorization. Yet there is evidence that he was authorized to take it home and that this enabled him to conduct company business on his way to and from home and office. Whether or not the use of the vehicle for transport to and from work was part of Sharpe’s compensation is not established.
There is evidence that the use of the company vehicle at the time in question was for the benefit of both the employee and the employer, that is, to serve joint purposes. It was at least advantageous to the employee to be able to use a company vehicle for transport to and from work, even if it was not a formal part of his employment agreement as compensation. Yet it also served the convenience of the employer because the employee could better serve the customers by quicker and more extended service than during regular working hours; the employee became more accessible and more readily available to do the employer’s business, and of course, driving the vehicle about with the employer’s identification on it served as advertisement. Thus, while at the time of the collision the employee was not strictly and solely on the employer’s business as he would be if he were on a service call, nor was he strictly and solely on his own business such as on a personal errand beyond the scope of authority, there is some evidence that he was then using the vehicle partly for the benefit of each of them, with permission. Whether that was within his “scope of employment” depends on what that scope was. Merely using the vehicle with permission would not of course bring it within the scope, as an employer may permit an employee to take a company vehicle to attend to some personal matter. To prevail on summary judgment, the employer must show that there is no factual issue that the employee was outside the scope of his employment at the crucial time, and that has not been done. The rule is that the scope is generally a question of fact. See the discussion of this in Edwards v. State of Ga., 173 Ga. App. 87 (325 SE2d 437) (1984). The rule applies here.
I do not believe the rule quoted by the majority from Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776 (257 SE2d 186) (1979) is relevant, because the testimony of the defendant is not uncontradicted; it is contradicted by its own witness.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Judge *354Carley and Judge Benham join in this dissent.
Decided September 3, 1985
Rehearing denied October 7, 1985
M. David Merritt, William S. Sutton, for appellant.
Thomas 0. Duvall, Jr., David Doverspike, Jerry D. McCumber, for appellees.