Court Opinion

ID: 9861840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:47:11.243267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:21.334341
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: Although I join in today’s opinion, I write separately in order to make several observations. In People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 179 (1990), this court, relying on both state and federal case law, noted that the reconsideration and vacation of an oral grant of a motion to direct a verdict violated the double jeopardy clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. More recently, we iterated this rule in People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 301 (1999), stating that “reconsideration and vacation of an order directing a verdict of not guilty exposes a criminal defendant to further proceedings for resolving the factual elements of the offense in violation of double jeopardy principles.” We reaffirm this rule in today’s opinion. 204 Ill. 2d at 288. I note, however, that our conclusion that “reconsideration and vacation of an order directing a verdict of not guilty exposes a criminal defendant to further proceedings for resolving the factual elements of the offense in violation of double jeopardy principles” appears to be in conflict with decisions from federal courts which have addressed similar factual circumstances. For example, in United States v. Washington, 48 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1995), the district court orally granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal at the close of the government’s case in chief. The judge did not enter judgment, however, and the trial continued with the defense calling its first witness. The court then adjourned the proceedings for a lunch break, during which time the judge reconsidered the oral grant of acquittal. After lunch, the judge reversed the order outside the presence of the jury. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s reversal, stating that “[a]n oral grant of a motion for acquittal is ‘no more than an interlocutory order,’ which the court has ‘inherent power to reconsider and modify ... prior to the entry of judgment.’ ” Washington, 48 F.3d at 79, quoting United States v. LoRusso, 695 E2d 45, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Byrne, 203 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Baggett, 251 F.3d 1087, 1095 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that an oral grant of a directed finding does not terminate jeopardy inasmuch as a court is free to change its mind prior to the entry of judgment). My review of these federal authorities reveals that the federal courts have grounded their decisions on the same case law from the United States Supreme Court that this court relied upon in both Mink and Williams. Nevertheless, the federal courts do not appear to bar reconsideration of an oral grant of a motion for a directed finding as strictly as our court. In Washington, for example, it is clear that the district court did not “allow[ j but then denfy] the motion for a directed verdict ‘virtually with the same breath,’ ” such that it could be said that the defendant was never actually acquitted (People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 303 (1999), quoting with approval People v. Vilt, 119 Ill. App. 3d 832, 835 (1983)) because after the oral motion had been granted, the trial continued with the defendant’s case in chief. The reconsideration came later when the district court had adjourned the proceedings for lunch. Thus, federal case law seems to suggest that the reconsideration of an oral grant of a motion for a directed finding may not be repugnant to the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. That the federal courts appear to reach a conclusion different from ours on a given issue is of no moment in most cases. See, e.g., People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 293-94 (1989) (explaining that decisions of lower federal courts on questions of constitutional law are not binding on state courts). In this case, however, I believe the difference in outcomes is noteworthy because we have repeatedly stressed that our own state constitutional double jeopardy clause is to be considered in the same manner as the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution. See In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d 79, 91 (1997); People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138 (1993). I note that there is nothing in our opinions in Williams and Mink that suggests that the analyses employed in those cases were the result of a decision to view the double jeopardy clause contained in the Illinois Constitution more comprehensively than that contained in the fifth amendment. The result we reach in today’s decision is predicated on the analysis contained in our opinion in Williams. This is in accordance with the views of the parties, both of whom have maintained throughout this appeal that the outcome in this case is controlled solely by Williams. The parties have not cited to this court any federal cases nor do they argue that the analysis in Williams is flawed and should be revisited. Accordingly, the question of whether this court has interpreted the double jeopardy clause properly in light of the clause’s construction by the federal courts is not before us. I believe that the difference between our case law and that of the federal courts, along with the reasons for it, is deserving of this court’s future consideration. Because the parties have not raised this issue in the present case, I limit my discussion here to noting the divergence of opinion that appears to exist on this double jeopardy question. In so doing, I offer no opinion as to what impact, if any, federal double jeopardy decisions would have on the outcome in the case at bar.