Court Opinion

ID: 9959542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 05:05:33.878865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.869227
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     April 11, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 365645
                                                                     Oakland Circuit Court
MICHAEL ANDREW KITCHEN,                                              LC No. 87-078807-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order denying his motion to correct
invalid sentence. We affirm.

       This case arises from an incident in 1987 where defendant, who was 17 years old at the
time, broke into a home, stole items from the home, and threatened the couple who owned the
home with several guns. Defendant then sexually assaulted the female victim and later fled the
home after stealing the couple’s vehicle. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery,
MCL 750.529, two counts of possession of a firearm in commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b, one count of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit
armed robbery, MCL 750.110, and one count of unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle, MCL
750.413. After a jury trial, defendant was also found guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC-I), MCL 750.520b, and another count of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b.

        A sentencing hearing was held in July 1987. Defendant’s trial counsel stated that if
defendant “could somehow undo what he has done on this particular night that he would not
hesitate to do that.” Defense counsel also argued, “We have a situation where a young 17-year-
old man with no prior criminal [] contact for a period of 24 hours engaged in what can only be
described as extremely wayward conduct[,] and he is going to have to pay for that.” Defendant’s

1
 See People v Kitchen, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 21, 2023
(Docket No. 365645).

                                                -1-
counsel then urged the court to focus on defendant’s rehabilitation and argued that “there is nothing
to indicate that [defendant] cannot, in fact, be redeemed, and that he has, in fact, some social
value.” Defendant then expressed remorse and apologized to “everybody [he] caused trouble to.”

        As relevant to this appeal, the trial court then sentenced defendant to 40 to 60 years’
imprisonment for his CSC-I conviction. The court noted this was an “intentional crime” and that
it was “one of the most heinous crimes that it has presided over.” Specifically, the court reasoned:
               Threats were made against the victim that if she were to make certain
       movements again that [defendant] would kill her, put the gun to her head and this
       court says this society cannot tolerate such action and this court feels that this is the
       only appropriate sentence, unless it was to be a little longer, but this court would
       feel justified in giving to the Defendant. Other things that the court took into
       consideration was the disciplining and punishment of the Defendant. The
       protection of society and the deterring of others from committing like offenses.

Defendant directly appealed his convictions and sentences, which this Court affirmed in November
1988. See People v Kitchen, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
November 16, 1988 (Docket No. 104485). Defendant then filed a motion for relief from judgment
in 1996 and argued that his sentence lacked proportionality under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich
630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). The trial court denied the motion, and this Court denied leave to appeal.
See People v Kitchen, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 17, 1999 (Docket
No. 212333).

        In April 2022, defendant, in propria persona, filed a motion to correct his allegedly invalid
CSC-I sentence under MCR 6.502(G). Defendant argued, as relevant, that his CSC-I sentence was
invalid because the trial court had failed to properly consider the mitigating factors of his youth or
juvenile status when imposing the sentence. Thus, defendant was entitled to resentencing. The
prosecution responded to defendant’s motion and argued that the original sentencing judge was
aware of defendant’s youth, which was considered during sentencing. Thus, even though the trial
court did not explicitly make a finding regarding defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor, the
record shows the court clearly considered that factor in its sentencing determination.

        In its written opinion and order, the trial court concluded that defendant failed to establish
his sentence was invalid.2 The court stated that, while the original sentencing court was required

2
  We note that a defendant may file only one motion for relief from judgment unless the successive
motion for relief from judgment is based on “a retroactive change in law that occurred after the
first motion for relief from judgment was filed,” MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a), or “a claim of new evidence
that was not discovered before the first such motion was filed,” MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b). Here, the
trial court determined that defendant satisfied this procedural threshold by showing a retroactive
change in law. Based on recent decisions in People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 322; 987 NW2d 85
(2022), People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 232; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), and People v Boykin, 510
Mich 171, 189; 987 NW2d 58 (2022), a trial court must consider a defendant’s youth during
sentencing. Thus, the trial court concluded that the recent “trend can fairly be understood to be an

                                                 -2-
to consider defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor, the court was not required to specifically
articulate its finding. The court noted that defendant’s trial counsel made an argument concerning
defendant’s youth during sentencing, and thus, “[the original sentencing judge] was undoubtedly
aware of the Defendant’s age in light of the fact that he presided over the case, tried the case, and
heard the Defense counsel’s allocution at sentencing.” Because the original trial judge “articulated
his basis for the Defendant’s sentence on the record in a compelling fashion, implicitly rejecting
youth as a mitigating factor in light of the egregious[ness] of the crime,” the court concluded
defendant’s sentence was not invalid and subsequently denied defendant’s motion.

        On appeal, defendant argues that his 40-to-60-year sentence for his CSC-I conviction is
invalid because the trial court failed to consider the mitigating factor of his youth when sentencing
him. We disagree.

        We “review a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of
discretion and its findings of fact supporting its decision for clear error.” People v Swain, 288
Mich App 609, 628; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). Sentencing decisions are also reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 182; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). “A trial court abuses
its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes or
makes an error of law.” Swain, 288 Mich App at 628-629 (citation omitted).

        Defendant relies on recent Michigan caselaw holding that trial courts must consider a
defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor during sentencing. See, e.g., People v Stovall, 510 Mich
301, 322; 987 NW2d 85 (2022) (concluding that “a parolable life sentence for a defendant who
commits second-degree murder while a juvenile violates Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan
Constitution”); People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 232; 987 NW2d 161 (2022) (concluding that a
mandatory life-without-parole sentence for an 18-year-old offender violates Michigan
Constitution’s ban on cruel or unusual punishment “because it fails to take into account the
mitigating characteristics of youth, specifically late-adolescent brain development”); Boykin, 510
Mich at 189 (“[I]n all sentencing hearings conducted under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, trial
courts are to consider the defendant’s youth and must treat it as a mitigating factor.”). “Youth
matters in sentencing decisions involving juvenile offenders, and the trial court is responsible for
tailoring a sentence to an individual defendant and for giving reasons for imposing each sentence
in order to facilitate appellate review.” Boykin, 510 Mich at 192. However, “[a]n on-the-record
sentencing explanation is not necessary to ensure that a sentencer considers a defendant’s youth.”
Id. at 193 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        In Boykin, a 17-year-old defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced
to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. at 179. The defendant
appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor,
and thus, his sentence was invalid. Id. at 179-180. The Court concluded that, while the trial court
must consider youth as a mitigating factor during sentencing, the court is not required to make
“specific, on-the-record findings” regarding the consideration of youth as a mitigating factor. Id.

applicable change in the law that meets the procedural threshold outlined in MCR 6.502(G), and
[] Defendant’s Motion is entitled to consideration.”

                                                  -3-
at 192. Further, “if the sentencer has discretion to consider the defendant’s youth, the sentencer
necessarily will consider the defendant’s youth, especially if defense counsel advances an
argument based on the defendant’s youth.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court
also noted, “Faced with a convicted murderer who was under 18 at the time of the offense and with
defense arguments focused on the defendant’s youth, it would be all but impossible for a sentencer
to avoid considering that mitigating factor.” Id. at 193 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Here, the record shows that the original sentencing judge considered defendant’s youth as
a mitigating factor during sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, defendant’s counsel explicitly
argued that defendant was only 17 years old. Defense counsel argued that defendant’s young age,
lack of prior record, and good upbringing were mitigating factors, and thus, the court should focus
on defendant’s rehabilitation instead of his punishment. Like in Boykin, defense counsel explicitly
advanced an argument based on defendant’s youth at sentencing, therefore, the court was aware of
defendant’s age and juvenile status when making its determination. See id. at 192-193. Further,
because an “on-the-record sentencing explanation is not necessary to ensure that a sentencer
considers a defendant’s youth,” we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to make an
explicit finding regarding defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor. See id. at 193. The record
establishes that defendant’s youth was argued at the sentencing hearing, and thus, the court
necessarily considered defendant’s youth in making its determination. See id. at 192.
Additionally, the court properly tailored its sentence to defendant and gave specific reasons for
imposing the sentence, including the disciplining of defendant, the protection of society, and
deterrence. See id. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s
motion to correct his allegedly invalid sentence.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Michelle M. Rick

                                                 -4-