Court Opinion

ID: 9395956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 22:05:55.002648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:12.899483
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                COURT OF APPEAL

                                  FIRST CIRCUIT

                                   2022 CA 1240

                   LIVINGSTON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD

                                      VERSUS

                               ASHLEY KELLETT

                                              Judgment Rendered:     MAY 18

                   On Appeal from the 21 st Judicial District
                         In and for the Parish of Livingston    C
                                  State of Louisiana
                    Trial Court Docket Number 165$ 64, Div. "F"

                      Han. William S. Dykes, Judge Presiding

Claiborne W. Brown                            Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant,
Mandeville, Louisiana                         Ashley Kellett

Mark D. Boyer                                 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee,
Diana L. Tonagel                              Livingston Parish School Board
Denham Springs, Louisiana

            BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
PENZATO, J.

      Appellant,   Ashley Kellett, appeals from a February 22, 2023 judgment

denying, in part, her motion for dissolution of preliminary injunction.       Ms. Kellett

challenges certain portions of a preliminary injunction, issued on April 8, 2020, in

favor of the Livingston Parish School Board,        which   enjoined,   restrained,   and

prohibited Ms. Kellett from making certain statements regarding the School Board

and its faculty, staff, and employees.

      First, we recall the show cause order issued by this court and maintain the

appeal.   Next, we reverse the portion of the February 22, 2023 judgment denying

Ms. Kellett' s motion for dissolution of preliminary injunction to the extent the

motion sought reversal of the portion of the April 8, 2020 preliminary injunction,

which constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on Ms. Kellett' s right to free

speech protected by the First Amendment. Finally, we grant Ms. Kellett' s motion

for dissolution of preliminary injunction in part and strike the portion of the April

8, 2020 preliminary injunction that enjoined, restrained, and prohibited Ms. Kellett

from engaging in any form of written or verbal "         disparagement" toward any

School Board member,      administrator, faculty, or staff at Live Oak Elementary

School and from "   making or publishing and/ or from engaging in any activity to

make, disseminate, publish or broadcast defamatory, slanderous, libelous, frivolous

and/ or fraudulent claims or statements concerning [ the School Board], its faculty,

staff and employees, as defined by La. R. S.    14: 47- 48, 13: 3381( B),   directly or by

her enlisting the assistance of any other person( s) on her behalf ...."    The matter is

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      The instant dispute began when the School Board discovered that Ms.

Kellett, the mother of a child attending Live Oak Elementary School, "         repeatedly

concealed"   electronic devices in her child' s clothing or personal belongings in

                                           0)
November 2019,          Ms.   Kellett purportedly used these devices to "           intercept

communications by and between faculty, students, and others in the school and/ or

classroom during school hours and while on school property."            One such device, an

AngelSense, had GPS capability to track the child' s whereabouts and also allowed

verbal communications between Ms. Kellett and her child.                 The School Board

obtained a temporary restraining order ( TRO) on January 27, 2020,                     then   a

preliminary injunction on April 8, 2020, prohibiting Ms.              Kellett' s use of these

devices on school property.

      The School Board also accused Ms. Kellett of being critical of the School

Board and publicly discussing " her child' s special needs"         and individual education

plan with the media.     Ms. Kellett allegedly maintained a " live web blog and other

ongoing social media posts" that involved discussion and disclosure of information

related to the School Board, the special education program, and other identified

individuals.    According to the School Board, these posts have "        caused concern for

parents of other [ Livingston Parish School System] students and have defamed and

slandered the reputations of [the School Board] and Live Oak Elementary staff."

The January 27, 2020 TRO and April 8, 2020 preliminary injunction addressed this

additional     complaint by the School Board.              Pertinently, the April 8,    2020

preliminary injunction enjoined, restrained, and prohibited Ms. Kellett from:

      d) ... engaging in any form of written, verbal, or physical displays of
      hostility, anger, or disparagement, and/ or from making threats of any
      physical assault, and/or any disorderly conduct that results in fear or
      disruption of activities through hostile and inappropriate behavior
      toward      any   LPSB [   Livingston       Parish   School    Board]   member,

      administrator, faculty or staff at Live Oak Elementary School and/ or
      on any LPSS [ Livingston Parish School System] public school bus or
      other school property, and/or while participating in any educational or
      other school related business or function, including but in no way
      limited to any Individual Education Plan ( IEP) or Individual Health
      Plan ( IHP) meetings or evaluations required to facilitate the minor
      child' s special education and health care needs;

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         f) ...making    or publishing and/or from engaging in any activity to
         make,    disseminate,   publish or broadcast defamatory,           slanderous,

         libelous, frivolous and/ or fraudulent claims or statements concerning
           the School Board], its faculty, staff and employees, as defined by La.
         R. S. 14: 47- 48, 13: 3381( B),    directly or by her enlisting the assistance
         of any other person( s) on her behalf ....

         No appeal was taken from the issuance of the April S,              2020 preliminary

injunction.      See La. C. C. P. art. 3612.       Instead, Ms. Kellett filed a motion for

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dissolution of preliminary injunction on June 13, 2022.              Ms. Kellett asserted that

the   preliminary     injunction " unquestionably        constitutes   unconstitutional   prior

restraint" on her right to free speech and the School Board failed to meet its " heavy

burden"     of proving entitlement to the preliminary injunction restricting speech.

Ms. Kellett further asserted that the School Board failed to show irreparable harm

would result from the use of the complained -of electronic devices placed on her

child.

         At the conclusion of the June 20, 2022 contradictory hearing, the trial court

granted Ms. Kellett' s motion for dissolution of preliminary injunction in part with

respect to the prohibition of her use of the AngelSense device and amended the

April 8, 2020 preliminary injunction to allow Ms. Kellett to use the AngelSense

device within the articulated parameters, which are not pertinent here.              The trial

court denied Ms. Kellett' s motion in all other respects. Ms. Kellett then filed this

appeal.

                                  SHOW CAUSE ORDER

         This court issued a show cause order on November 21, 2022, noting that the

appellate record did not contain a written judgment as to the June 20, 2022 oral

ruling.    After receiving briefs from both parties, an interim order was issued on

1 Ms. Kellett' s motion was filed shortly after the School Board filed a motion and order for
enforcement of the preliminary injunction and for sanctions against Ms. Kellett for contempt of
court. The merits of this motion and the trial court' s ruling are not before this court in this
appeal and are, therefore, not discussed.

                                                  4
January 25, 2023, remanding the matter for the limited purpose of requesting that

the trial court issue a written judgment addressing Ms.                      Kellett' s motion for

dissolution        of
                        preliminary      injunction.    The     appeal     record    was   thereafter

supplemented with a written judgment, signed February 22,                      2023,   granting Ms.

Kellett' s motion for dissolution with respect to the prohibition of the use of the

AngelSense device, subject to conditions set forth in the judgment ( not pertinent

here),    and denying the motion in all other respects.          Thus, we recall the show cause

order and maintain the appeal, finding the appeal is timely and properly before us.2

See La. C. C. P. art. 3612( 0); Stevens Construction &            Design, L.L. C. v St. Tammany

Fire Protection District No. 1, 2018- 1759 (            La. App. 1st Cir. 1/ 16/ 20),      295 So. 3d

954, 958 ( en Banc), writ denied, 2020- 00977 ( La. 1114120), 303 So. 3d 650.

                                            DISCUSSION

          On appeal, Ms. Kellett asserts that the trial court erred in denying the motion

for dissolution of preliminary injunction " pertaining to any prohibition upon the

defendant from making certain public statements regarding the [ School Board] and

its employees."          Ms. Kellett argues that the prohibition against making public

statements that are purportedly defamatory, slanderous, libelous, frivolous, and/ or

fraudulent        concerning      the   School   Board,   its   faculty,    staff,   and   employees

 constitute[ s] unconstitutional prior restraint of protected speech under the [ united

States Constitution."           Ms.   Kellett does not assert that the trial court erred by

2 In response to the show cause order, the School Board argued that Ms. Kellett "              cannot

circumvent" the appellate process by filing a motion for dissolution rather than filing an appeal
and that she improperly sought a devolutive appeal from an interlocutory order. However, La.
C. C. P. art. 3612( C) states, " An appeal from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary
injunction must be taken, and any bond required must be furnished, within fifteen days from the
date of the order." ( Emphasis added.) This broad language applies to the February 22, 2023
judgment on the motion for dissolution of preliminary injunction filed in accordance with La.
C.C.P. art. 3607. See Turbine Powered Technology, LLC v. Crowe, 2018- 0881 ( La. App. 1 st Cir.
9/ 5/ 19) (   unpublished),   2019 WL 4201579, * 9, writ denied, 2019- 01548 ( La. 11119119), 282
So. 3d 1063 ( considering a motion for dissolution of preliminary injunction on appeal where no
appeal was taken following the issuance of the preliminary injunction). We likewise find no
merit to the School Board' s argument that the appeal is moot because of statements purportedly
made by Ms. Kellett during a December 2022 hearing. Most significantly, the appeal record
contains no evidence of these alleged statements.

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denying the motion for dissolution of preliminary injunction in any other respect or

by modifying the preliminary injunction concerning the use of the AngelSense
device.     Therefore, we review the narrow issue of whether subsection ( f) of the

preliminary injunction, set forth above, is an unconstitutional prior restraint on free

speech in violation of Ms. Kellett' s First Amendment rights. Because portions of

subsection ( d)   also restrain Ms. Kellett from engaging in any form of written or

verbal "   disparagement"   and is reasonably included within the scope of review

requested by Ms.      Kellett, we also examine this portion of the April 8, 2020

preliminary injunction.

Scope and Standard ofReview

        Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3607 provides that an interested

person may move for the dissolution or modification of a temporary restraining

order or preliminary injunction.    The mover is not required to show that a change

in circumstances has occurred before a preliminary injunction may be dissolved.

Zanella' s Wax Bar, LLC v. Trudy' s Wax Bar, LLC, 2019- 0043 ( La. App.        1 st Cir.

1117119), 291 So. 3d 693, 697, writ denied, 2019- 01931 ( La. 1/ 28/ 20), 291 So. 3d

1052.      However, on a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction, a trial court

should not consider arguments or evidence that could have been raised at the time

the preliminary injunction was issued.          Turbine Powered Technology, LLC u

Crowe, 2018- 0881 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 915119), (   unpublished) 2019 WL 4201579, * 9,

writ denied, 2019- 01548 ( La. 11119/ 19), 282 So. 3d 1063.

        The sole question to be determined at a hearing to dissolve a preliminary

injunction is whether, on the facts disclosed, the court should have granted the

injunction in the first instance.    Turbine Powered Technology, LLC, 2019 WL

4201579 at * 9.     A party seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction must

show that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue and must

show entitlement to the relief sought.      La. C. C. P. art. 3601; Dale v. Louisiana

                                            0
Secretary ofState, 2007- 2020 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 10/ 11/ 07),     971 So.2d 1136, 1141.

To satisfy this burden, the party must make a prima facie showing, by ordinary

proof or by verified petition or affidavits, that he will prevail on the merits of the

case.
          A trial court enjoys considerable discretion in determining whether a

preliminary injunction is warranted. Thus, the trial court' s ruling on the request for

a preliminary injunction will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of

discretion. Dale, 971 So. 2d at 1141.

          The hearing on the School Board' s request for a preliminary injunction took

place in March 2020.        During the hearing, Ms. Kellett asserted, " it' s my [ F] irst

Almendment right to voice whatever opinion that I have ...                 it is my [   F] irst

A] mendment right to         be   able to   talk."   Since   Ms.    Kellett raised   a First

Amendment argument at the time the preliminary injunction was issued, we must

determine whether, on the facts disclosed, the trial court should have granted the

preliminary injunction in the first instance.        Turbine Powered Technology, LLC,

2019 WL 4201579 at * 9.

Impermissible Prior Restraint on Speech

          The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that

 Congress shall make no law ...       abridging the freedom of speech."         U. S. Const.

Amend. I; In re Warner, 2005- 1303 ( La. 4/ 17109), 21 So. 3d 218, 228.          The liberty

of speech granted by the First Amendment is safeguarded from invasion by state

action through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.                      In re

Warner, 21 So.3d at 228, citing First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.

765, 779, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1417, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 ( 1978).            The trial court is a state

entity,    and the judgment granting the preliminary injunction at issue is "            state

action."     La. Const. Art. 5, §§ 14, 16; La. C. C. P. art. 3601, et seq.    Consequently,

the protections of the First Amendment are applicable in the instant matter.            See In

re Warner, 21 So. 3d at 228.

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         The    term "    prior   restraint"   describes       orders
                                                                        forbidding     certain

communications that are issued before the communications occur. Alexander v.

United States, 509 U.S. 544, 544, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2768, 125 L.Ed. 2d 441 ( 1993)

Prior restraint is that restraint or suppression of an expression without judicial

determination of the right to suppress before any publication, any exhibition, or

any communication of that expression. Gulf States Theatres of Louisiana, Inc. v.

Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 489- 90 ( La. 1973).            A free society prefers to punish

the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them

and all others beforehand. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,

559, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 1246- 47, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 ( 1975).

      Prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least

tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights and are, therefore, presumed to

be constitutionally invalid. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,

559, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2803, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 ( 1976); State v. Lee, 2000- 2516 ( La.

App. 4th Cir. 4/ 6/ 01), 787 So. 2d 1020,           1037.   Although prior restraint may be

imposed under some extraordinary circumstances, a party seeking this relief carries

a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.

There is a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of a prior restraint

on speech.     Guste v. Connick, 515 So. 2d 436, 438 ( La. 1987).

         The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the permissibility of prior restraint

on speech in Guste.         There,   Guste sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit

Connick from running a campaign ad making purportedly false statements against

Guste.    Connick asserted that the granting of a preliminary injunction would be a

prior restraint of free speech in violation of his First Amendment rights.             Guste,

515 So. 2d at 437.       The trial court granted the request for a preliminary injunction

and ordered Connick to " cease and desist" running the campaign ad.                  After the

court of appeal denied writs, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted review and

                                               Ed
reversed the judgment, dissolving the preliminary injunction.          The Court explained,

 in a case of this kind, courts do not concern themselves with the truth or validity

of the publication.    An injunction, so far as it imposes prior restraint on speech and

publication, constitutes an impermissible restraint on [ F] irst [ A]mendment rights."

Guste, 515 So. 2d at 437- 38.    See also Brandner a Molonguet, 2014-0712 ( La. App.

1st Cir. 12/ 23114), (   unpublished)   2014 WL 7332206, * 9 ( recognizing that courts

are also generally reluctant to issue an injunction to restrain torts such as

defamation or harassment.)

        The School Board argues that false statements, like Ms. Kellett' s accusations

against the School Board and its employees, which purportedly include allegations

of   criminal    conduct,   are not constitutionally protected free speech.         Worse, it

asserts, the words uttered by Ms. Kellett are defamatory per se.             In Kennedy v.

Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 2005- 1418 ( La. 7110106), 935 So.2d 669, 675, the

Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that words that expressly or implicitly accuse

another of criminal conduct, or which by their very nature tend to injure one' s

personal    or    professional   reputation,   without   considering    extrinsic   facts   or

circumstances,      are considered defamatory per se. "       When a plaintiff proves

publication of words that are defamatory per se, falsity and malice ( or            fault) are

presumed, but may be rebutted by the defendant." Kennedy, 935 So.2d at 675.

Thus,   before liability can be imposed for the publication of words that are

defamatory per se, the defendant must be given an opportunity to rebut the

presumption.      See Thompson v. Bank One of Louisiana, NA, 2013- 1058 ( La. App.

4th Cir. 2126114), 134 So. 3d 653, 662, writ denied, 2014- 0793 ( La. 6{ 30{ 14), 148

So. 3d 182.

        These cases and others cited by the School Board, which hold that an abuse

of the right of free speech is actionable under Louisiana law, concern liability for

the commission of the tort of defamation, not an action to enjoin the utterance of

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allegedly defamatory speech before it is spoken and before it is judicially
determined to be defamatory. See Yanong v. Coleman, 53, 933 ( La. App. 2d Cir.

5/ 17121), 317 So. 3d 905, 911, writ denied, 2021- 01107 ( La. 11/ 10/ 21), 326 So. 3d

1249 ("   Defamation is a tort which involves the invasion of a person' s interest in

his or her reputation and good name.... A cause of action for defamation arises out

of a violation of La. C.C. art. 2315.").     See Johnson v. Purpera, 2020- 01175 ( La.

5/ 13/ 21),   320 So. 3d 374, 386 ( before the court on the defendant' s motion for

summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs cause of action for the tort of

defamation).

        The United States Supreme Court explained the rationale behind prohibiting

prior restraint of speech not yet adjudged to be defamatory —        a judgment in a

defamation case is subject to the "        whole panoply of protections afforded by

deferring the impact of the judgment until all avenues of appellate review have

been exhausted."      Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S. Ct. at 2803.   The law' s

sanctions only become fully operative after the judgment has become final. A prior

restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction.

Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S. Ct. at 2803.

        Here,   there has been no judicial determination that the words allegedly

spoken by Ms. Kellett and the accusations purportedly by her made were

defamatory or defamatory per se.      Several School Board employees and Live Oak

Elementary School faculty and staff testified during the March 2020 preliminary

injunction hearing. Although each witness denied the truth of various accusations

purportedly made by Ms.        Kellett, the trial court was not asked to, nor did it,

determine that Ms. Kellett, in fact, made these statements and was liable for

defamation.

        The School Board is correct that the protection of the First Amendment does

not extend to defamatory and libelous speech.           See Ashcroft v. Free Speech

                                             IH
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245- 46, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed. 2d 403 ( 2002) ( As a

general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what

we see, read, speak, or hear.       But freedom of speech has its limits; it does not

embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation.) However, for First

Amendment protection to be in jeopardy, there must first be a determination that

the words are defamatory. Until words lose First Amendment protection, they are

guarded against prior restraint.     See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S. Ct. at

2803; Guste, 515 So. 2d at 437- 38; Johnson, 320 So. 3d at 387 (" to avoid the

chilling effect and self -censorship that defamation cases invite, it falls to the court

to determine in the first instance whether words fall outside the realm of protected

speech").    As the Supreme Court of California explained in Balboa Island Village

Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 40 Cal. 4th 1141, 1149- 50, 156 P. 3d 339, 344- 45 ( 2007),

         P] reventing a person from speaking or publishing something that,
        allegedly,     would constitute a libel if spoken or published is far
        different from issuing a posttrial injunction after a statement that
        already has been uttered has been found to constitute defamation.
        Prohibiting a person from making a statement or publishing a writing
        before that statement is spoken or the writing is published is far
        different from prohibiting a defendant from repeating a statement or
        republishing a writing that has been determined at trial to be
        defamatory and, thus, unlawful. This distinction is hardly novel.

 Emphasis original.)       We also note that the preliminary injunction issued in favor

of the School Board prohibits more than the utterance of allegedly defamatory

statements.    It prohibits speech that is merely disparaging or " frivolous" — speech

that is not within the categories excluded from First Amendment protection.

         Therefore, we find the School Board failed to show that it was entitled to the

relief sought, i.e.,   a preliminary injunction preemptively enjoining, restraining, and

prohibiting the speech at issue.     See La. C. C. P. art. 3 60 1; Dale, 971 So. 2d at 1141.

The trial court abused its discretion by granting this portion of the requested

preliminary injunction. See Turbine Powered Technology, LLC, 2019 WL 4201579

at *   9; Dale, 971 So. 2d at 1141.      The trial court further erred by denying Ms.

                                              11
Kellett' s motion for dissolution of those portions of the April 8, 2020 preliminary
injunction that constituted an impermissible prior restraint on Ms. Kellett' s free

speech rights.

                                       CONCLUSION

         For the foregoing reasons, we recall the show cause order and maintain the

appeal.
              We reverse the portion of the February 22, 2023 judgment denying Ashley

Kellett' s motion for dissolution of preliminary injunction as to the trial court' s

denial of the motion to dissolve that portion of the April 8, 2020 preliminary

injunction, which constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on Ms. Kellett' s right

to free speech protected by the First Amendment.

         We grant Ms. Kellett' s motion for dissolution of the preliminary injunction

in part and vacate subsection ( f) of the April 8, 2020 preliminary injunction in its

entirety.       We also vacate the portion of subsection ( d) of the April 8, 2020

preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining, and prohibiting Ashley Kellett from

engaging in any form of written or verbal disparagement toward any Livingston

Parish    School     Board   member,   administrator,
                                                        faculty, or staff at Live Oak

Elementary School,        such that subsection (   d) of the April 8,   2020 preliminary

injunction is amended and shall state:

         d)  Enjoining, restraining, and prohibiting Ashley Kellett from
         engaging in any form of written, verbal, or physical displays of
         hostility or anger and/ or from making threats of any physical assault,
         and/ or any disorderly conduct that results in fear or disruption of
         activities through hostile and inappropriate behavior toward any LPSB
         member, administrator, faculty or staff at Live Oak Elementary School
         and/ or on any LPSS public school bus or other school property, and/ or
         while participating in any educational or other school related business
         or function, including but in no way limited to any Individual
         Education Plan ( TEP) or Individual Health Plan ( IHP)         meetings   or

         evaluations required to facilitate the minor child's special education
         and health care needs;

         We remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this

appeal in the amount of $ 1, 770. 00 shall be cast against the Livingston Parish

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School Board.

APPEAL     MAINTAINED;   JUDGMENT   DENYING   MOTION   FOR
DISSOLUTION OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION REVERSED IN PART;
JUDGMENT GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION VACATED IN
PART AND AMENDED IN PART. REMANDED.

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