Court Opinion

ID: 9770610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:11:56.164518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:18.800040
License: Public Domain

Terry Crabtree, Judge, dissenting. While I agree with the majority opinion that an “implied easement” was created when there was unity of ownership of the two parcels in question, I cannot agree with the majority that the easement was “apparent and necessary” at the time the appellant purchased his property. Before the parties acquired their respective properties, all of the property was owned by Bobby Taylor. Taylor constructed a building with a septic system on part of the property and used it for a real estate office that was open to the public. In 1976, Taylor sold the portion of the land with the building and septic tank to Jolly Baugh. Taylor owned the adjoining property on three sides, and Highway 71 was on the fourth side. The property was used as a restaurant for approximately three years and then was sold to another party. Baugh regained the property through a foreclosure action and conveyed the property to the appellee, John Ratterree, by warranty deed dated July 13, 1983. The appellee ran a satellite business at the location until 1987 when the business was closed. In December 1993, the appellee opened a restaurant on the premises. The appellee did not modify or change the original septic system. The appellant purchased the property that adjoins the appel-lee’s property on August 25, 1982. The warranty deed to the appellant was “Subject to, existing right of ways, easements, restrictions and previous reservations, if any.” After purchasing the property, a wet spot developed and the appellant discovered that the lateral lines from the septic tank on the appellee’s property ran onto his property. The appellant testified at trial that he had inspected the property before buying it and was not aware of the lateral lines buried on his property. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the appellee and stated in its order, in part: The Court finds that the test of apparent and obvious which is required by law has been met where the Defendant, as in this case, is knowledgeable with the fact that property within that area with indoor plumbing was required to be on a septic or similar system. Knowledge of other property in the area does not rise to the level of apparent and obvious sufficient to put the appellant on notice that his neighbor had septic system lateral lines running beneath his property. The lines were buried several feet beneath the surface of the land and, at the time the appellant purchased his property, the restaurant was not in operation. The appellant testified that after the restaurant started in business, sewage would bubble to the surface of his property. While credibility of the witnesses is reserved for the trial court and I would normally defer to the superior position of the trial court, the trial court found in this instance that the test of apparent and obvious was met because other property in the area with indoor plumbing had to be on a septic or similar system. This is not the visible use contemplated in Greasy Slough Outing Club, Inc. v. Amick, 224 Ark. 330, 274 S.W.2d 63 (1954), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court quoted John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 2 N.E. 188 (1885), stating: In such case, the law implies that with the grant of the one an easement is also granted or reserved, as the case may be, in the other, subjecting it to the burden of all such visible uses and incidents as are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant heritage, in substantially the same condition in which it appeared and was used when the grant was made. Id. at 338, 274 S.W.2d at 67 (emphasis added). In the case of Hannah v. Daniel, 221 Ark. 105, 252 S.W.2d 548 (1952), relied on by the majority opinion for the proposition that “where a man has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed cognizant of it,” the supreme court reversed the trial court and stated: [W]e think the preponderance of the evidence is against appellees’ contention that the physical condition of lot 12 at the time of appellants’ purchase was such, by reasonable inspection, to make it apparent of the existence of a servitude that would charge them with notice of an easement. Id. at 109-10, 252 S.W.2d at 551 (emphasis added). The Hannah case was cited in Childress v. Richardson, 12 Ark. App. 62, 670 S.W.2d 475 (1984), for the rule that: “A purchaser of real estate is charged with notice of an unrecorded easement when the existence of the servitude is apparent upon an ordinary inspection of the premises.” Id. at 64, 670 S.W.2d at 476. In the Childress case, this court reversed the trial court’s finding that a subsequent purchaser of real property was bound by an unrecorded prescriptive easement for a private gas line that went across the appellant’s property. There were three meters for various gas lines and the appellant testified that he thought that two of the meters serviced an adjoining property owner but not the appellee. The court stated: In the present case, there was no actual notice to appellants and there was no evidence of the gas fine sufficient to put appellants on notice of its presence. The fine was entirely underground, and there was nothing to put appellants on notice that one of the three meters east of appellants’ property serviced appellees’ residence. Appellant James Childress testified that he was aware of the three meters, but had thought that one of the meters was his and that the other two serviced the two houses on the Flack property. Under the circumstances of this case his belief was a reasonable one. Id. at 65, 670 S.W.2d at 476. This case is similar to the Childress case, and, rather than overrule a long line of cases that require some use, preferably visible, that would put a prospective purchaser on notice, I would reverse. I dissent. Robbins, C.J., and Hays, S.J., join.