Court Opinion

ID: 9641430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:31:49.215671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:37.568735
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The vigorous motion for rehearing filed by appellant deserves an answer. Appellant contends that the evidence in this case does not meet the test to be applied, which test is, in appellant’s words, “whether or not, in the opinion of the doctor, there is a medical probability (not a *311possibility)” that there was a causal connection between the specific injury and the general disability. We disagree. The test should not be limited to mere “medical probability”. The proper test to be applied in this appeal is whether the evidence in its entirety, including medical, lay and circumstantial evidence, shows that the specific injury in reasonable probability caused the general injury. “Particular words from the medical experts are not necessary to create a probability”. Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 440 S.W.2d 43, 49 (Tex.Sup. 1969).
Insofar as we are able to determine, the restrictive test advocated by appellant is required to be met only in the following instances: first, where the question of causation is peculiarly within the realm of scientific knowledge; second, in predicting the future manifestations of a present injury; and, third, in malpractice cases. See Insurance Company of North America v. Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710, 713-714 (Tex.Sup.1966). The case at bar does not fall within any of the above mentioned categories.
It is now settled that lay testimony is adequate in some cases to prove that the specific injury in reasonable probability caused the claimed result. The Supreme Court, in Griffin v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, 450 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Sup. 1970), said:
“. . . In some cases, lay testimony supplied this necessary proof by showing such circumstances as the nature and seriousness of the original injury; the immediate onset and the successive and continuous development of the symptoms or abnormality; or the progressive worsening of the condition. In such cases, lay proof of a sequence of events provided a strong, logically traceable connection between cause and result.
It was held in Carter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 120 S.W.2d 581 (1938), that evidence “largely circumstantial”, together with the opinion of doctors that the lifting and straining by the injured workman could have caused the ruptured blood vessel, was sufficient to show that it was caused in the course of employment.
One of the early cases on the subject is Atkinson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 235 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1950, writ ref’d n. r. e.). Justice Norvell, in writing for the Court, recognized the rule that something more than a mere “possibility” is necessary to establish a finding of causal connection. He clarified the rule in these words:
“. . .In determining whether or not a showing of mere possibility and no more has been made, all of the pertinent evidence on the point must be considered. The fact that an expert medical witness, in speaking of cause and effect uses such expressions as ‘might cause’, ‘could cause’, ‘could possibly cause’, or phrases similar thereto, does not preclude a jury finding of casual connection, provided there be other supplementary evidence supporting the conclusion. Causal connection is generally a matter of inference, and possibilities may often play a proper and important part in the argument which establishes the existence of such relationship. It is well settled that the medical expert in testifying as to a present or past physical condition, may express his opinion as to causal relationship in terms of possibility.”
The above case has been cited by our Supreme Court on several occasions.
In Insurance Company of North America v. Myers, supra, the Supreme Court said:
“. . . Reasonable probability, in turn, is determinable by consideration of the substance of the testimony of the expert witness and does not turn on semantics or on the use by the witness of any particular term or phrase. . . . ”
The instant case is closely analogous to Insurance Company of North America v. *312Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Sup.1969). In that case, the evidence consisted of medical testimony, factual circumstances and lay testimony. There, as here, there was the problem of proof of causal connection between the specific injury (an electrical shock) and the claimant’s disability which resulted from a subsequent heart attack. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court held that the “possibility” testimony of the doctor, when coupled with the factual circumstances of the case, was sufficient for the jury to draw conclusions as to the causal connection of the electrical shock and the heart attack.
The substance of the testimony of Dr. Sloan in the Kneten case is strikingly similar to that of Dr. Miller in the instant case insofar as “medical probability” as, opposed to “medical possibility” is concerned. When asked if in reasonable probability the electric shock and the heart attack were causally related, Dr. Sloan answered: “I don’t know ... I think there is a possibility it could have ... I don’t think that you can say without medical doubt though because I have doubts whether it did or did not, you see”. When Dr. Sloan was asked if he could put his finger on the cause of the heart attack, hie replied: “I can’t say that (it) did have, and I certainly can’t say it didn’t have something to do with it ... I think that the chronological events that have happened makes it a strong possibility that this could help precipitate a heart attack”. When asked to look at the question from the standpoint of circumstantial evidence and say if medical probability was reasonable in this case, Dr. Sloan said: “Well, circumstantially, I would say, yes, strong possibility”.
The testimony of Dr. Miller in the case at bar is just as strong, or stronger, on”the issue of “reasonable probability” as was the testimony of Dr. Sloan in the Kneten case. The testimony of appellee himself, and of his supervisor, Mr. Watson, plus the medical evidence, show the circumstances of appellee’s injury, what occurred thereafter, and the immediate onset of disability. The lay proof of a sequence of events provided a strong, logically traceable connection between the specific injury that extended to and affected other parts of the body and the resultant general disability. This lay evidence supports the conclusions and opinions of Dr. Miller, even though the doctor expressed his opinion as to causal relationship in terms of “possibility”. Causal connection was not left to surmise or conjecture by the jury. The evidence as a whole presented a fact issue of reasonable probability of causation, and such evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the findings by the jury.
As stated by our Supreme Court, in Kneten, “there are areas for jury and judge to construe the testimony of the doctor”. This case presents such an area.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.