Court Opinion

ID: 9492564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:44:05.122358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:22.051232
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the search of the closet was lawful because the closet area was within the apartment’s “curtilage.” There is, however, no reason for the majority to opine in dicta that McCaster did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the duplex’s common closet. Because they unnecessarily reach this conclusion, I am forced to dissent.
In my view, a tenant in a duplex has a reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas shared only by the duplex’s tenants and the landlord. Three cases in our circuit have directly addressed this issue. See United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164 (1980); and United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir.1977). Both McGrane and Luschen follow Eisler and hold that a tenant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment budding. See Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816; McGrane, 746 F.2d at 634; Luschen, 614 F.2d at 1173. Each of these cases is distinguishable from the facts of this case.
Eisler was the first case to address this issue directly. In Eisler, a DEA agent entered the defendant’s apartment complex and surveyed the defendant’s apartment from a common hallway. 567 F.2d at 816. From that location, the agent overheard conversations coming from the defendant’s apartment. See id. The court held that because the common hallways were available for use by all residents and their guests, as well as the landlord and his agents, the defendant had no reasonable expectation that his conversations, heard from the common hallway, would be free from intrusion. See id.
In McGrane, a DEA agent entered the basement of the defendant’s apartment building and looked in the defendant’s storage locker. 746 F.2d at 633. The agent saw containers of a chemical used in manufacturing a controlled substance. See id. Following Eisler, the court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement because it was a common area of the building accessible to all tenants and the landlord. See McGrane, 746 F.2d at 634.
In Luschen, a police officer surveyed the defendant’s apartment from the second-floor landing near his apartment door. 614 F.2d at 1167. Also following Eisler, the court held that the surveillance did not constitute an illegal search because a per*935son has no reasonable expectation of privacy in halls and common areas of apartment buildings. See Luschen, 614 F.2d at 1173.
These cases are distinguishable from the facts of this case. First, McCaster lived in a duplex, where only he and the upstairs tenants resided. (See Appellant’s Br. at 8.) Eisler, McGrane and Luschen involved multiple-unit apartment buildings with more than two tenants. See Eisler, 567 F.2d at 815-16; McGrane, 746 F.2d at 633; Luschen, 614 F.2d at 1167. Hence, fewer individuals had access to the common area in this case than in our prior cases.
Second, the common area in this case was a closet shared by McCaster, the upstairs tenants, and the landlady. Unlike a hallway or basement, the closet was isolated. It was located under the stairs that led to the upstairs apartment and was used as a storage area for the tenants and the landlady. (Tr. of May 22, 1998, at 22.) As a storage area, the closet likely would not be accessed by anyone other than the tenants and landlady and would certainly not be accessed as frequently as a hallway or basement. Thus, accessibility to the closet was more limited than the hallways or basement addressed in our prior cases.
Third, the facts of this case are similar to United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir.1976), a case we distinguished in Eisler. See Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816. In Fluker, the court held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the corridor separating the door of his apartment from the outer doorway of the apartment building. 543 F.2d at 716. The court noted that the defendant lived in a building with only two other tenants and that access to the entryway was limited as a matter of right to the two basement tenants. See id. Furthermore, the outer door was always locked, with only the building’s three tenants having keys. See id. Based on these facts, the court found that the two basement tenants exercised “considerably more control over access to that portion of the building than would be true in a multi-unit complex, and hence could reasonably be said to have a greater reasonable expectation of privacy than would be true of occupants of large buildings.” Id.
Similar to the defendant in Fluker, McCaster’s building consisted of only two units. Both the front and back doors of the duplex had locks, and only the tenants and the landlady had access to the duplex. {See Appellant’s Br. at 12.) Further, the closet was shared only by the tenants and the landlady. Thus, because the right to access to the duplex and use of the closet was limited to these individuals, McCaster could reasonably have expected greater privacy than if he resided in a multiple-unit building.
The nature of the living arrangement in a duplex, as opposed to a multi-unit building, leads me to conclude that a tenant in a duplex has a reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas shared only by the duplex’s tenants and the landlady.
In so concluding, I must address the majority’s last point on this issue. The majority states that if it were to hold as I would that McCaster had a reasonable expectation of privacy under these circumstances, it “would allow a criminal to keep contraband from the legitimate reach of law enforcement by the simple act of storing it in a shared common area.” I find no support in decided cases for this proposition. Holding that a tenant in a duplex has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the duplex only provides the tenant with standing to challenge a warrantless search. It simply requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before searching such areas. It by no means provides criminals a safe harbor for their contraband.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.