Court Opinion

ID: 9660305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:09:54.43721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:17.600186
License: Public Domain

BARDGETT, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of the conviction but dissent from that part of the principal opinion which holds that the trial court need not comply with the statutory procedures required by and set forth in § 558.021, RSMo 1978, before imposing an extended term of imprisonment.
The power of the trial judge to discre-tionarily impose an additional term of imprisonment to the punishment assessed by the jury is new in Missouri. It subjects a defendant to the discretionary assessment of punishment by the trier of facts — here the jury — and then to additional imprisonment to be imposed within the discretion of the judge. This is a very substantial power, about which the jury is not even informed. In this case the exercise of that power added twenty-five years of consecutive imprisonment to the jury verdict.
The general assembly recognized that § 558.016, RSMo 1978, added substantially to the discretionary power of a trial judge and imposed upon a defendant risks he had not previously been subjected to. Previously a judge had no power to increase the term of imprisonment over the jury assessment. The general assembly made it perfectly clear that the trial judge had no authority to impose an additional term of imprisonment unless that judge complied with the statutorily mandated procedure.
The statute, § 558.021, states in part:
1. The court shall not impose an extended term under section 558.016 unless
(1) .. .
(2) After a finding of guilty [the jury verdict] ..., a sentencing hearing is held at which evidence establishing the basis for an extended term is presented in open court with full rights of confrontation and cross-examination, and with the defendant having the opportunity to present evidence; and
(3) .... (Emphasis added.)
Admittedly, subparagraph 2 of this statute was totally ignored. The issue is not whether the trial judge is entitled to remember what he previously heard during the course of the case or take “judicial notice” of such evidence. Of course he will remember it and it obviously will play some part in his judgment on the matter. But the statute requires that the defendant be afforded full rights of confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses called by the state at the hearing which is required to be held after the jury verdict has been returned. That hearing, being before the judge and not the jury and held at a time when issues of guilt or innocence of the crime have been resolved and are not involved, will not be subject to the same practical constraints as the trial itself. What cross-examination would develop remains to be seen but the defendant’s statu*957tory right to that kind of hearing after guilt has been found is not open to question. The statute absolutely requires it and specifically conditions the judge’s power to impose an extended term upon that type of evidentiary hearing being held. In this case the trial court did not hold a sentencing hearing which included presentation of evidence establishing the basis for an extended term and which afforded the defendant his statutory rights to confront and cross-examine the witnesses. Consequently the trial judge had no authority under the statute to impose an extended term in this case.
The power to impose years of imprisonment upon a defendant in addition to the imprisonment assessed by the jury is a new and substantial power. In my opinion this Court ought not to approve a procedure which short circuits the specific procedure required by the very law that granted the power. I certainly cannot say with any degree of confidence that the legislature would have granted this power to the trial judge without conditioning its exercise upon compliance with the requirements of § 558.021.1(2), supra, and therefore I cannot agree that the trial judge may ignore 558.-021.1(2) and yet still add years of imprisonment to the term assessed by the jury.
For the foregoing reasons I would vacate the order imposing the additional or extended terms of imprisonment and affirm the convictions and order judgment and sentence entered in accordance with the jury verdicts.