Court Opinion

ID: 9919656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 21:01:14.782132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.794674
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1643         Doc: 59         Filed: 01/17/2024   Pg: 1 of 21

                                                 PUBLISHED

                                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                  No. 22-1643

        In re: LUMBER LIQUIDATORS CHINESE-MANUFACTURED FLOORING
        PRODUCTS MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS
        LIABILITY LITIGATION.

        ------------------------------

        CARLA J. KAPPEL, as mother and next friend of K.I.T, a minor and A.J.T, a
        minor as Special Administrator of the Estate of Ozan Tarabus, deceased,

                                Plaintiff – Appellant,

                        v.

        LL FLOORING, INC., f/k/a Lumber Liquidators, Inc.,

                                Defendant – Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:15-md-02627-AJT-MSN;
        1:20-cv-02825-AJT-IDD)

        Argued: December 7, 2023                                        Decided: January 17, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, KING, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which
        Judge Wilkinson and Judge Heytens joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a concurring opinion.
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        ARGUED: Kenneth Gordon Anspach, ANSPACH LAW OFFICE, Chicago, Illinois, for
        Appellants. Halli D. Cohn, TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP,
        Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert J. Augenlicht, LAW OFFICE OF
        ROBERT J. AUGENLICHT LLC, Chicago, Illinois; Kathleen Holmes, HOLMES
        COSTIN & MARCUS PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael E. Lacy,
        TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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        KING, Circuit Judge:

                 Plaintiff Carla J. Kappel, as mother and next friend of the children of Ozan Tarabus,

        deceased, and as Special Administrator of his Estate, initiated this Illinois wrongful death

        lawsuit in an Illinois state court in July 2020 against defendants LL Flooring, Inc., formerly

        known as Lumber Liquidators, Inc. Plaintiff Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit, having been

        removed from the state court to the Northern District of Illinois — and thereafter

        transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia — was dismissed in May 2022. In re Lumber

        Liquidators Chinese-Manufactured Flooring Products Mktg., Sales Practices and

        Products Liab. Litig., No. 1:20-cv-2825 (E.D. Va. May 13, 2022), ECF No. 49 (the

        “Dismissal Order”). The district court predicated its dismissal of Kappel’s wrongful death

        lawsuit on the proposition that the claim was barred by a settlement agreement that had

        been made in connection with two multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) actions conducted in

        the Eastern District of Virginia. Those MDL actions had resolved various consumer

        protection claims relating to LL Flooring’s products. Kappel appeals from the Dismissal

        Order.

                 On appeal, Kappel presents two primary contentions: (1) that the district court

        lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make and enter the Dismissal Order; and (2) that the

        MDL settlement agreement relied on in the Dismissal Order did not bar Kappel’s wrongful

        death lawsuit on behalf of the children. As explained herein, the court possessed subject

        matter jurisdiction. We are satisfied, however, that Kappel should prevail on her second

        contention and that her wrongful death lawsuit must be reinstated. The Dismissal Order is

        therefore vacated, and Kappel’s lawsuit is remanded for further proceedings.

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                                                          I.

                                                          A.

               In 2015, a series of civil actions — pursued both individually and as class actions

        — were filed against LL Flooring in various jurisdictions in the United States and related

        to the sale and marketing of LL Flooring’s Chinese-manufactured laminate flooring. More

        specifically, multiple plaintiffs alleged that:

               Despite being marketed as compliant with regulations of the California Air
               Resources Board and other applicable regulations . . . [the] laminate flooring
               emits illegal and unsafe levels of formaldehyde, a known carcinogen.

        See J.A. 182. 1 Additionally, a series of allegations were made in the pre-MDL proceedings

        concerning deficient durability and longevity of the laminate flooring marketed and sold

        by LL Flooring. In June 2015, the various individual and class actions lodged against LL

        Flooring were centralized and transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia, pursuant to

        order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the “JPML”).

               The MDL proceedings in the Eastern District of Virginia were thereafter divided

        into two MDLs, one titled the “Formaldehyde MDL” (1:15-md-2627 (E.D. Va.)) and the

        other titled the “Durability MDL” (1:16-md-2743 (E.D. Va.)). On September 18, 2015,

        the class representatives for the Formaldehyde MDL filed an amended complaint and

        alleged 12 causes of action, which included, inter alia, fraudulent concealment, breach of

               1
                 Citations herein to “J.A. ___” refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by
        the parties in this appeal.

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        implied warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of assorted unfair business

        practice laws. About two weeks later, on September 30, 2015, LL Flooring moved to strike

        from the amended class action complaint in the Formaldehyde MDL all class claims for

        personal injuries. After discussions with the parties, the district court denied the motion to

        strike as moot, in that the parties had agreed that “no Chinese formaldehyde class action

        pending in the MDL will seek damages for personal injury on a class-wide basis.” See J.A.

        104. Notably, no wrongful death claims were pursued on a class basis in the Formaldehyde

        MDL.

               In February of 2017, the class representatives for the Durability MDL filed their

        class action complaint. It alleged 10 causes of action, including, inter alia, breach of

        implied warranties, fraudulent concealment, and violations of assorted unfair business

        practice statutes. Like the class representatives in the Formaldehyde MDL, the class

        representatives in the Durability MDL did not pursue any claims for personal injury or

        wrongful death.

               On March 15, 2018, after mediation proceedings, a class action settlement

        agreement was reached between the class representatives of each MDL and with LL

        Flooring, resolving all class action claims in each MDL (the “Settlement Agreement”).

        Funded by the sum of $36 million, the Settlement Agreement provided that the class

        members would each receive a portion of what they had paid for LL Flooring products, by

        way of cash payments and vouchers.

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              In the Settlement Agreement, the parties summarized the earlier motion to strike the

        personal injury claims in the Formaldehyde MDL and its resolution by the district court as

        follows:

              [LL Flooring] filed a motion to dismiss all personal injury claims asserted in
              class action complaints. Plaintiffs subsequently agreed and the Court ordered
              that no Chinese formaldehyde class action pending in the Formaldehyde
              MDL will seek damages for personal injury on a class-wide basis.

        See J.A. 111 (emphasis added).

              Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, “Class Member[s]” were defined as “all

        persons in the United States who purchased Chinese-made laminate flooring from [LL

        Flooring] between January 1, 2009, and May 31, 2015.” See J.A. 116. If a Class Member

        was not otherwise excepted from that definition, the Settlement Agreement included a

        broad release of claims. That is, the Settlement Agreement released LL Flooring from the

        following:

              [A]ny and all claims . . . that have been, could have been, or in the future can
              or might be asserted in any court . . . (including but not limited to any . . .
              personal injury claim) . . . related to Chinese-manufactured laminate flooring
              sold by [LL Flooring] between January 1, 2009 and May 31, 2015.

        See J.A. 142-43. The Settlement Agreement also provided that, if a Class Member was not

        to be bound by the Settlement Agreement and its release of claims, the Member “must

        submit a written Request for Exclusion.” See J.A. 132.

              On June 15, 2018, the district court entered an order that preliminarily approved the

        Settlement Agreement. The parties then implemented the proposed class notice plan of the

        Settlement Agreement. On October 9, 2018, the court certified the various classes for

        settlement purposes and approved the Settlement Agreement (the “Final Approval Order”).

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        The Final Approval Order explained that the court “retains its jurisdiction for purposes of

        enforcing the Settlement Agreement . . . and also its jurisdiction over those class members

        who have opted out of the settlement classes certified herein.” See J.A. 178.

               On January 31, 2019, the district court entered an Order of Dismissal and Judgment

        (the “MDL Order”). The MDL Order differed slightly from the Final Approval Order,

        however, and did not contain any explicit language retaining jurisdiction to enforce the

        Settlement Agreement. The MDL Order provided, however, that both MDLs would remain

        open for “future opt-out cases that are transferred” by the JPML. See J.A. 180. On appeal,

        we approved the fairness and adequacy of the Settlement Agreement. See In re: Lumber

        Liquidators Chinese-Manufactured Flooring Products Mktg., Sales Practices and

        Products Liab. Litig., 952 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2020).

                                                    B.

              On December 14, 2014, the now deceased Mr. Tarabus, who resided in Illinois,

        purchased laminate flooring that had been manufactured and sold by LL Flooring. Tarabus

        installed the laminate flooring himself in his residence in January 2015. After installing

        the laminate flooring, Tarabus experienced serious health problems. He was soon afflicted

        with breathing issues and thus needed to use a CPAP machine. His health seriously

        deteriorated, and in April 2017 Tarabus was diagnosed with inoperable Stage 4 liver and

        pancreatic cancer. He began receiving chemotherapy treatments and was hospitalized in

        June 2018. Later that month, Tarabus’s doctors ceased his chemotherapy treatments

        because they were ineffective. Before the end of June, the doctors informed Tarabus that

        he was about to pass away, and he entered hospice care on June 27, 2018. Tarabus’s

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        medical treatments thereafter focused only on managing his pain, including the use of

        morphine and OxyContin.

               Two days after entering hospice care, on June 29, 2018, Mr. Tarabus received an

        email notice from LL Flooring that sought to advise him of the Settlement Agreement. The

        notification email — had Tarabus read it — asserted that Tarabus was a Class Member

        because he had purchased LL Flooring’s products during the applicable time period. And

        the email sought to inform Tarabus of his opt-out rights with respect to the Settlement

        Agreement. The email was followed by an identical paper copy from LL Flooring, sent by

        regular mail, on June 30, 2018. Tarabus passed away on July 18, 2018, at the age of 48.

        In the 19 days that Tarabus was alive after receiving notice of the Settlement Agreement,

        he did not seek to opt out. And no one opted him out of the Settlement Agreement before

        or after he died. Tarabus is survived by two minor children — aged 15 and 13 at the time

        of his death — plus his ex-wife, plaintiff Kappel. 2

                                                     C.

               On July 20, 2020, Kappel, as mother and next friend of Mr. Tarabus’s two minor

        children, filed her one-count complaint against LL Flooring, which alleged a single

        wrongful death claim on behalf of the children, under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act. Her

        wrongful death lawsuit was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and it

               2
                The foregoing facts about Mr. Tarabus and his health problems are drawn from
        Kappel’s complaint. Like the district court, we “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations
        and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” See Mylan
        Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).

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        alleged that Tarabus had contracted cancer as the proximate result of his exposure to LL

        Flooring’s laminate flooring — which contained formaldehyde — resulting in his untimely

        death.

                 On August 31, 2020, LL Flooring removed Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit from

        the state court to the Northern District of Illinois. The removal notice was predicated on

        diversity of citizenship jurisdiction — pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 — with Kappel and

        the two children being citizens of Illinois, and LL Flooring being incorporated in Delaware

        and having its principal place of business in Virginia. The notice of removal alleged that

        the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional sum of $75,000. Kappel did not

        dispute the jurisdictional allegations.

                 On September 1, 2020, LL Flooring filed a “Notice of Tag-Along Action” before

        the JPML, representing that Kappel’s Illinois lawsuit was “identical in all material

        respects” to the Formaldehyde MDL. See J.A. 99. As a result, the JPML transferred

        Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit to the Eastern District of Virginia. Kappel was then given

        a seven-day window to object to the transfer, and she did not object.

                 On September 25, 2020, LL Flooring moved in the Eastern District of Virginia for

        dismissal of Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit under Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a

        claim upon which relief can be granted or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. LL

        Flooring represented to the court that the deceased Mr. Tarabus was a Class Member and

        that he — along with Kappel — had failed to opt out of the Settlement Agreement by the

        court-ordered deadline. As a result, LL Flooring asserted that Tarabus had assented to the

        Settlement Agreement and its broad release. As LL Flooring saw it, Tarabus — by failing

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        to opt out of the Settlement Agreement — had settled all of his claims arising from LL

        Flooring’s defective laminate flooring, which barred Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit on

        behalf of his children. Stated differently, LL Flooring maintained that Kappel could not

        pursue her wrongful death lawsuit because Tarabus had already “settled” his claims that

        LL Flooring’s defective laminate flooring caused his death.

               Kappel pursued several counterarguments in the district court, which included, inter

        alia, (1) that the court was without jurisdiction, and (2) that Kappel’s wrongful death

        lawsuit on behalf of Mr. Tarabus’s children was not barred because no class representative

        in either MDL had ever pursued any claims alleging that the laminate flooring caused

        personal injury or death. Otherwise stated, Kappel maintained that a subset of claims had

        not been settled — that is, claims that LL Flooring’s products had caused Tarabus to suffer

        personal injury or death — more specifically, that Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit simply

        was not barred.

                After initial briefing, the district court conducted a hearing on whether the

        Settlement Agreement was binding on the wrongful death claim of Mr. Tarabus’s minor

        children. By its Dismissal Order of May 13, 2022, the court agreed with LL Flooring, and

        ruled (1) that it had retained jurisdiction over subsequent actions transferred to the MDL

        for purposes of enforcing the Settlement Agreement, (2) that Tarabus was a Class Member

        and therefore subject to the Settlement Agreement, and (3) that because Tarabus was

        subject to the Settlement Agreement, his claims had been settled, including any claims

        involving bodily injuries or death caused by the subject flooring. Thus, the Dismissal

        Order ruled that the wrongful death claim being pursued in Kappel’s lawsuit was barred.

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        The court also conducted an “excusable neglect” analysis of whether Kappel could seek

        relief from the opt-out deadline, and ruled that the circumstances did not warrant relief.

               The Dismissal Order thus dismissed Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit and the court

        entered judgment in favor of LL Flooring. Kappel timely noted this appeal, and we possess

        jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

                                                      II.

               We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint, accepting all well-

        pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See

        Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). We also review

        de novo a district court’s ruling on a jurisdictional issue. See Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Ship.

        Co. Ltd., 708 F.3d 527, 533 (4th Cir. 2013). An issue concerning the potential preclusive

        effect of a settlement agreement is a question of law, which is also assessed de novo. See

        United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 912 (4th Cir. 2013).

                                                     III.

               On appeal, Kappel maintains that the district court’s dismissal of her complaint was

        erroneous because, inter alia, (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the

        Settlement Agreement did not resolve her claim that LL Flooring’s products caused Mr.

        Tarabus bodily injuries and death, and thus did not dispose of Kappel’s wrongful death

        lawsuit. As explained below, we are satisfied that the court possessed subject matter

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        jurisdiction. We nevertheless agree with Kappel’s major appellate contention, and herein

        rule that the Settlement Agreement failed to resolve Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit.

                                                      A.

               By her first contention, Kappel maintains that the district court erroneously decided

        that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction over her wrongful death complaint. According

        to Kappel, the MDL Order did not expressly provide that it was retaining jurisdiction over

        disputes arising under the Settlement Agreement. In response, LL Flooring makes two

        arguments: (1) that the court had retained ancillary jurisdiction under its Final Approval

        Order, which was incorporated into the MDL Order; and (2) that the court possessed

        diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. In disposing of the jurisdictional issue, the court ruled

        that it had retained subject matter jurisdiction by way of ancillary jurisdiction.

               Ancillary jurisdiction is a theory that “recognizes federal courts’ jurisdiction over

        some matters (otherwise beyond their competence) that are incidental to other matters

        properly before them.” See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378

        (1994) (parenthetical in original, emphasis added). Ancillary jurisdiction is therefore

        usually a fallback, and applies when a court otherwise lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

        See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378; Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass’n v. Fairfax Cnty., Va.,

        571 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that district court is not empowered to

        enforce settlement agreement “unless the agreement had been approved and incorporated

        into an order of the court, or . . . there exists some independent ground upon which to base

        federal jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)). In this situation, we will not rely on the ancillary

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        jurisdiction theory, because we are readily satisfied that the district court possessed

        diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

               Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit was initiated in the Illinois state court and removed

        to the Northern District of Illinois on diversity of citizenship grounds. The facts supporting

        removal and recited in the removal notice included the following: (1) Kappel is a citizen

        of Illinois; (2) LL Flooring is a citizen of Delaware and Virginia; and (3) the amount in

        controversy exceeds $75,000. Kappel did not challenge those allegations or otherwise seek

        a remand to the Illinois state court. LL Flooring then secured a transfer of Kappel’s

        wrongful death lawsuit from the Northern District of Illinois to the Eastern District of

        Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. But § 1407 of the Code is not a jurisdictional statute. It

        is a venue-giving provision “that allows the JPML to override a plaintiff’s choice of

        forum,” and thus transfer a lawsuit to the district court that is handling the MDL. See

        Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 451 (4th Cir. 2005). In this situation, even if there

        were sound arguments against the JPML’s transfer to Virginia, they were merely venue

        contentions, and they did not undermine the Virginia court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

        Furthermore, Kappel never sought a remand and agrees that there is diversity jurisdiction.

        See Br. of Appellant at 44.

               Put simply, the district court in Virginia possessed subject matter jurisdiction over

        Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit — predicated on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C.

        § 1332. The court thus had no need to rely on an ancillary jurisdiction theory, and we need

        not resolve whether the MDL Order retained ancillary jurisdiction over Kappel’s wrongful

        death lawsuit.

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                                                    B.

                                                     1.

               The principal issue on appeal is thus whether the preclusive effect of the Settlement

        Agreement applies to Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit. Again, this dispute is relevant

        because the district court reasoned that Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit was settled and

        reduced to judgment because all claims against LL Flooring regarding its defective

        laminate flooring were covered by the Settlement Agreement. Kappel contends, however,

        that her wrongful death lawsuit is not barred, in that no class representative of the

        settlement classes had ever pursued personal injury or wrongful death claims on a class

        basis. And LL Flooring counters by pointing to the terms of the Settlement Agreement

        qualifying Mr. Tarabus as a Class Member and stating that LL Flooring is released from

        “all claims . . . relating to Chinese-manufactured laminate flooring sold by Lumber

        Liquidators between January 1, 2009 and May 31, 2015.” See J.A. 142-43.

               When a federal court enters a judgment that is predicated on a release of claims, we

        have recognized that the scope of the judgment’s preclusive effect is a “legal question

        governed by federal common law and subject to de novo review.” See United States ex

        rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 912 (4th Cir. 2013). And when a civil

        action has been dismissed under a settlement agreement, the preclusive effect of a dismissal

        judgment “can be no greater than the preclusive effect of the agreement itself.” Id. at 913.

               To assess and decide the preclusive scope of a class action settlement, we turn to

        the so-called “identical factual predicate” doctrine. See McAdams v. Robinson, 26 F.4th

        149, 160 (4th Cir. 2022); Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 616 (4th Cir. 2015). That

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        doctrine has roots in the 1981 decision of the Second Circuit in National Super Spuds, Inc.

        v. New York Mercantile Exchange. See 660 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1981). Rejecting an overbroad

        settlement release, Judge Friendly therein recognized that, “[i]f a judgment after trial

        cannot extinguish claims not asserted in the class action complaint, a judgment approving

        a settlement in such an action ordinarily should not be able to do so either.” See Natl. Super

        Spuds, Inc, 660 F.2d at 18. A footnote of this influential opinion elaborated, recognizing

        that the factual predicate for the settlement controls the scope of the claims it settles.

        Important here, the Super Spuds decision explicitly acknowledged that a release can be

        circumscribed by its factual predicate. Observing that the release in Super Spuds was

        overly broad, Judge Friendly emphasized that:

               The settlement before us would bar . . . others . . . asserting claims, distinct
               from those represented by the class action plaintiffs, which depend not only
               upon a different legal theory but upon proof of further facts.

        Id. 18 n.7 (emphasis added).

               In 1982, the “identical factual predicate” doctrine was further explained and

        recognized by the Second Circuit. See TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d

        456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982) (“As long as the overall settlement is found to be fair and class

        members were given sufficient notice and opportunity to object to the fairness of the

        release, we see no reason why the judgment upon settlement cannot bar a claim that would

        have to be based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the

        settled class action.”). The identical factual predicate doctrine has spread to other circuits,

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        including our Court. See Berry, 807 F.3d at 616 (4th Cir. 2015). 3 We have recognized

        that, in order to have an identical factual predicate, the claims must “depend upon the very

        same set of facts.” See McAdams, 26 F.4th at 160 (emphasis added). And the identical

        factual predicate doctrine makes good sense. As the Second Circuit has recognized:

               Parties often reach broad settlement agreements encompassing claims not
               presented in the complaint in order to achieve comprehensive settlement of
               class actions, particularly when a defendant’s ability to limit his future
               liability is an important factor in his willingness to settle.

        See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copy. Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 247-48 (2d Cir.

        2011). But to authorize and approve a class settlement that seeks to settle materially

        distinct and non-litigated claims goes too far. As aptly put by Judge Friendly:

               An advantage to the class, no matter how great, simply cannot be bought by
               the uncompensated sacrifice of claims of members, whether few or many,
               which were not within the description of claims assertable by the class.

        See Natl. Super Spuds, 660 F.2d at 19. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recognized, an

        uncircumscribed ability to settle non-litigated claims would run headlong into “our deep-

        rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,” and would present

        serious due process concerns. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).

               3
                 At least six other circuits — the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth —
        recognize and apply the identical factual predicate doctrine, and its effect on settlement
        agreements. See Reppert v. Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 58-59 (1st Cir.
        2004); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2005); Freeman
        v. MML Bay State Life Ins. Co., 445 F. App'x 577, 579 (3d Cir. 2011); Moulton v. U.S.
        Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease,
        Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th
        Cir. 2008).

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               Even before the Second Circuit’s Super Spuds decision, we had recognized and

        applied the wisdom of carefully limiting the preclusive effect of a class action settlement.

        See Woodson v. Fulton, 614 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1980). In our Woodson case, a police officer

        had pursued an individual civil action in the Eastern District of Virginia against the City of

        Richmond’s police bureau, alleging (1) discriminatory treatment as an employee — e.g.,

        discriminatory discipline and hindering of advancement — and (2) discriminatory

        discharge. See 614 F.2d at 941. Prior to Woodson’s lawsuit, a class action had already

        been pursued against the same police bureau for discriminatory treatment of its employees.

        That class action had been — before Woodson’s lawsuit — settled by a consent decree.

        Id. During the pre-Woodson class action proceedings, the district court “explicitly ruled

        that the class action would not address issues arising from allegedly discriminatory

        discharges.” Id. at 942. Despite that explicit limitation, Woodson’s claims were all

        dismissed — including his discriminatory discharge claim — as barred by the earlier class

        action consent decree. Id. Our Court, in an opinion by Judge Winter, reversed the district

        court, ruling that although Woodson was a member of the class, his discriminatory

        discharge claim was not barred by the consent decree, because the “definition of the scope

        of the class action prevents the consent decree from settling Woodson’s claim of

        discriminatory discharge.” Id.

                                                      2.

               With those legal principles in mind, we return to and resolve the issues relating to

        Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit. When LL Flooring first argued that the preclusive effect

        of the Settlement Agreement barred Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit in the district court,

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        Kappel responded that the claims for bodily injury and death being pursued on behalf of

        Mr. Tarabus and his children were materially distinct from all the claims in the MDL

        proceedings, and thus not covered by the Settlement Agreement. 4 As we have recognized,

        “[w]hether the release covers claims not alleged in the class action complaint is for a court

        enforcing the release to decide.” See McAdams, 26 F.4th at 161. Indeed, several other

        courts of appeals have recognized that the identical factual predicate doctrine can apply

        after a settlement has been approved. See, e.g., Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590

        (9th Cir. 2010); Reppert v. Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co., Inc., 359 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir.

        2004).

                 Here, the scope of the class claims and the facts underlying the class complaints

        conclusively show that the Settlement Agreement did not settle claims premised on bodily

        injury or wrongful death. The class claims included allegations focused on the quality of

        the subject flooring and on LL Flooring’s deception in its sales and marketing.

        Undoubtedly, Mr. Tarabus is a Class Member who failed — under unique circumstances

        — to opt out of the Settlement Agreement. And he did not otherwise meet any exceptions

        specified in the Settlement Agreement. As a result, the Settlement Agreement may have

        resolved consumer claims (or factually identical claims) that could have been pursued on

                 It was entirely reasonable and proper for Kappel to liken her wrongful death
                 4

        lawsuit to a personal injury claim. As Illinois law recognizes, its Wrongful Death Act cures
        an unjust feature of the common law, which barred a personal injury action when the
        injured party died of her injuries. Williams v. Manchester, 888 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. 2008)
        (citing 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 180/1 (2002)). That is, the Illinois Wrongful Death Act
        generally extends liability for common law wrongful acts “notwithstanding the death of
        the person injured.” 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 180/1 (2023).

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        behalf of Tarabus. But the issue before us is not about claims related to deceptive sales or

        marketing. Our question is whether the preclusive effect of the Settlement Agreement

        reaches Kappel’s Illinois wrongful death claim on behalf of the two children.

               As a general rule, consumer protection claims — such as fraudulent concealment

        and violations of state unfair business practice laws — are not likely to “depend upon the

        very same set of facts” as personal injury or wrongful death claims, because there are

        distinct factual inquiries. See McAdams, 26 F.4th at 160. This appeal is a striking example.

        The allegations in Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit concern the bodily injuries Mr. Tarabus

        experienced and the contaminated laminate flooring’s causal connection to his cancer

        diagnosis. Although there are shared factual allegations with the consumer class claims —

        i.e., LL Flooring had marketed and sold flawed flooring products — the class

        representatives notably failed to allege that any member of the class had experienced bodily

        injuries or death.

               Important here, the settlement class representatives at least twice made clear that

        they were not pursuing personal injury claims on a class-wide basis. On April 5, 2016, the

        court ordered that a motion seeking to strike personal injury claims from the class action

        complaint was moot because the class representatives had agreed that they would not “seek

        damages for personal injury on a class-wide basis.” See J.A. 104. And the Settlement

        Agreement memorialized that fact. It was agreed therein that no “class action . . . will seek

        damages for personal injury on a class-wide basis.” See J.A. 111. Of great importance, at

        no point did any class representative ever allege or pursue a wrongful death lawsuit.

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               In these circumstances, our situation is quite similar to that faced by Judge Winter

        and his fellow panelists more than 40 years ago in the Woodson case. The Woodson class

        action expressly excluded claims predicated on a different factual universe, and therefore

        could not settle such claims. See 614 F.2d at 942. Because the class representatives to the

        Settlement Agreement in these proceedings failed to allege that the laminate flooring

        produced and sold by LL Flooring caused personal injuries or deaths, Kappel’s wrongful

        death claim for the benefit of Mr. Tarabus’s children could not “depend upon the very same

        set of facts” as the settled class claims. See McAdams, 26 F.4th at 160. Thus, the preclusive

        effect of the Settlement Agreement does not reach Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit. 5

                                                    IV.

               Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the Dismissal Order and corresponding

        judgment of the district court and remand for such other and further proceedings as may be

        appropriate.

                                                                     VACATED AND REMANDED

               5
                On December 1, 2023, a few days before our oral argument of this appeal, LL
        Flooring moved our Court for judicial notice of six docket entries in the Formaldehyde
        MDL, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. For reasons appearing to the Court, that
        motion is denied.

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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

               I concur in the majority opinion because I am persuaded that it does no serious

        damage to the basic utility of class action releases. While class actions are often justifiably

        criticized as, inter alia, benefitting attorneys rather than class members, this form of Federal

        Rule 23 litigation aids both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs, because individual class

        members may lack the resources to bring their own suit. Defendants because they are

        spared the trickle of individual suits based on the same basic set of facts and claims.

               To restrict releases unduly risks undermining the utility of an important tool in class

        action litigation, one which assists the settlement of claims and alleviates the need for go-

        for-broke trials. I do not understand the majority to say that releases cannot bar claims that

        have not been brought or fully litigated, but only those claims that lie distinctly outside the

        ambit of the class action proper. I likewise do not understand the majority to announce a

        per se rule that a release in every products liability suit necessarily allows subsequent

        actions for injuries arising from the product itself. Rules that broad could well drain all

        meaning from the release. I trust that the “identical factual predicate” doctrine will be

        applied with the facts of the particular litigation foremost in mind and with due respect for

        the lubricative role that releases play in beneficial class action settlements.

               With that understanding, I concur in the majority opinion.

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