Court Opinion

ID: 9726469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:51:38.920208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:27.626769
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the opinion of my colleagues. In my opinion the term “compensation” as used in the statute is not intended to refer to the proceeds of the offense. As the majority has indicated, and I agree with such indication, there are no cases interpreting the term “compensation” nor any comments from which the intention of the drafters can be inferred. The issue raised in this case is not one of great significance, and no great rules of law will be affected by the outcome in this case. However, it is the little questions which make up the fabric of our legal system, and I think that at least the uncertainty of the statutory provision ought to be pointed out and a reasonable construction ought to be adopted. The phrase in the statute does not merely state “compensation” but “* ° 0 compensation for committing the offense.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(2).) It seems to me this phrase refers to the commission of an offense for hire only and does not refer to the value of proceeds from an offense. I think the majority’s reference to the “murder for hire” provision offers little support for its conclusion because the term “compensation” does not appear in that section. If the intent of the statute was to refer to the value of the proceeds received as an element or part of the offense, the statute could have easily described such circumstance. If one substitutes die majority’s synonym of “payment” for the term “compensation,” we have the provision referring to “payment for committing the offense,” which suggests that the offense was committed pursuant to some kind of an agreement or contract and implies necessarily that it was something other than the commission of the offense itself.