Court Opinion

ID: 9566511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:40:16.028914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:10.026812
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
dissenting to Division II (b).
I, too, believe that corporations should be accountable under a criminal bid-rigging statute. However, the determination that corporations are to be held accountable is for the legislature. The majority’s holding that the legislature has made such a determination can only be described as legal fantasy.
Code Ann. § 26-2308 (a) provides only for corporal punishment — “imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.” “[I]t is .. . well settled that where the only penalty provided for a criminal offense is corporal punishment, that is where an offender can be punished only by death or imprisonment, a corporate offender is not liable to criminal prosecution. This result proceeds from the impossibility of subjecting the artificial person of a corporation to a corporal penalty.” Annot., Corporation’s Liability to Criminal Prosecution as Affected by Punishment or Penalty Imposed, 80 ALR3d 1220, 1222 (1977); Southern R. Co. v. State, 125 Ga. 287 (54 SE 160) (1906); State ex rel. Losey v. Willard, 54 S2d 183 (Fla. 1951); People v. Duncan, 363 Ill. 495 (2 NE2d 705) (1936); State ex rel. Kropf v. Gilbert, 213 Wis. 196 (251 NW 478) (1933). Presumably our *8legislature was cognizant of an almost universally recognized legal principle when it enacted Code Ann. § 26-2308. See Brookins v. State, 221 Ga. 181, 190 (144 SE2d 83) (1965).
I find it inconceivable that Code Ann. §§ 27-2502 and 27-2509 were intended to provide the basic sentence for violation of the bid-rigging statute. “The manifest purpose of Code Ann. § 27-2502 is merely to enforce those other provisions which fix the punishment for an offense...” Lackey v. State, 116 Ga. App. 789, 790 (159 SE2d 188) (1967). Code Ann. § 27-2529 simply authorizes the imposition of a fine where the basic sentence has been probated. It is obvious that, under this statutory scheme, a basic sentence, capable of being imposed and probated, must exist apart from the fine. However, the only lawful sentence provided in Code Ann. § 26-2308 is imprisonment, and, as the majority recognizes, such a sentence cannot be imposed on a corporation. Southern R. Co. v. State, supra. The majority’s resort to legal fiction (i.e. probation of a sentence which cannot be imposed, followed by imposition of a fine incident to the probation) in order to reach a particular result seriously undermines the previously unassailable rule that “criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the state.” Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 775 (257 SE2d 182) (1975).1
Although the plain language of the two statutes should be dispositive of the “issue” (Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 125, 127 (1874); Balkcom v. Heptinstall, 152 Ga. App. 539 (263 SE2d 275) (1979)), it must also be noted that there is absolutely nothing in the legislative history of Code Ann. §§ 27-2502 and 27-2529 to support the majority’s conclusion that these provisions were intended to provide the basic sentence for violation of the bid-rigging statute. The two sections were enacted during different legislative sessions than Code Ann. § 26-2308, and the statements of purpose preceding the enactments make no reference to it.
Manifestly, the majority has chosen to ignore a number of established legal principles in Division II (b) of its opinion. I must respectfully dissent.

 Even the legal fiction employed by the majority does not stand scrutiny. Under Code Ann. § 27-2502, the authority of the trial court to probate a sentence is discretionary. The fine authorized by Code Ann. § 27-2529 is also discretionary. Thus, the very existence of a sentence capable of being imposed against a corporation for violation of Code Ann. § 26-2308 (a) will, in every case, depend upon a post facto exercise of discretion by the trial court. This hardly comports with my understanding of a sentence “prescribed” for an offense. See Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 817 (152 SE 76) (1929).