Court Opinion

ID: 9927797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 01:00:29.468077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:23.732597
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30808     Document: 00517047785         Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/29/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                                ____________                            FILED
                                                                  January 29, 2024
                                 No. 22-30808
                                                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________
                                                                        Clerk

   Conti 11. Container Schiffarts-GMBH & Co. KG M.S.,
   MSC Flaminia,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A.,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:22-CV-1114
                  ______________________________

   Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
          Conti chartered its cargo vessel, the M/V FLAMINIA, to the
   Mediterranean Shipping Company (“MSC”). During one voyage, the
   FLAMINIA received three chemical tanks from the Port of New Orleans.
   The tanks exploded during Atlantic transit, causing extensive damage and
   three deaths. After a London arbitration panel awarded Conti $200 million,
   Conti sued to confirm the award in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The
   district court, ruling it had personal jurisdiction over MSC because the tanks
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   had been loaded in New Orleans, confirmed the award. MSC appealed,
   arguing the court lacked personal jurisdiction.
          While agreeing with much of the district court’s well-stated decision,
   we must reverse because we conclude the court lacked personal jurisdiction
   over MSC. We agree with the district court that, when assessing personal
   jurisdiction to confirm an award under the New York Convention, a court
   should consider contacts related to the underlying dispute—not only
   contacts related to the arbitration itself. That holding aligns us with every
   other circuit to have considered the issue. But we disagree with the district
   court that MSC waived its personal jurisdiction defense through its insurer’s
   issuance of a letter of understanding that was expressly conditioned on
   MSC’s reserving all litigation defenses. We also disagree that the sole forum
   contact, the loading of the tanks in New Orleans, conferred specific personal
   jurisdiction over MSC. That contact arose from the unilateral activities of
   other parties whose actions are not attributable to MSC.
          Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to
   dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.
                                          I.
                                         A.
          Conti, a German corporation based in Hamburg, owns the
   FLAMINIA. In November 2000, Conti chartered the FLAMINIA to
   MSC, a Swiss corporation based in Geneva. The charterparty required all
   disputes arising out of the agreement to be arbitrated in London. For the next
   12 years, the FLAMINIA carried thousands of cargo containers to and from
   ports around the world, including the Port of New Orleans.
          In June 2012, an employee in the Houston office of MSC (USA)—a
   wholly-owned New York subsidiary of the Swiss MSC—received a request

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   from Deltech, an American chemical manufacturer, to ship three tank
   containers of 80% divinylbenzene (“DVB”) out of New Orleans. The MSC
   (USA) employee booked the DVB for carriage onboard the FLAMINIA
   via the Port of New Orleans. MSC’s office in Antwerp, Belgium approved
   the booking.
           On June 30, 2012, the FLAMINIA arrived at the New Orleans
   Terminal. The DVB tanks had already been at the terminal nine days, stored
   outdoors. DVB must be kept at or below 80F or it will undergo
   “autopolymerization,” resulting in rapid temperature increase and emission
   of flammable vapors. On July 1, 2012, New Orleans Terminal LLC loaded
   the DVB onto the FLAMINIA, which departed the next day. Thirteen days
   later, while transiting the Atlantic Ocean, the DVB tanks exploded. The
   explosion and ensuing fire killed three crewmembers, damaged the cargo
   onboard, and caused over $100 million in damages.
                                              B.
           Conti brought an arbitration proceeding against MSC in London as
   required by the charterparty.1 The arbitration panel ruled that MSC
   breached the charterparty by failing to comply with the International
   Maritime Dangerous Goods Code. It awarded Conti about $200 million in
   total damages.
           Conti then sued MSC in the Eastern District of Louisiana seeking to
   confirm the award pursuant to the New York Convention on the Recognition
   and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York
   Convention”). See 9 U.S.C. § 207. MSC moved to dismiss for lack of

           _____________________
           1
             Litigation also ensued in the Southern District of New York. MSC and Conti
   were both found to be free of fault, which was affirmed on appeal. In re M/V MSC Flaminia,
   72 F.4th 430, 438 (2d Cir. 2023).

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   personal jurisdiction, arguing that the only forum contact alleged by Conti—
   approval of the DVB for shipment out of New Orleans—did not arise out of
   or relate to Conti’s confirmation claim.
          While that motion was pending, MSC’s insurer issued a letter of
   undertaking (“LOU”) to Conti. The LOU promised to pay Conti up to
   $220 million on any final judgment entered by the Eastern District of
   Louisiana, provided that Conti did not interfere with MSC’s property or
   bring a separate action in another jurisdiction. The LOU was “given without
   prejudice to any and all rights or defenses MSC, its agents or affiliates have
   or may have” in the Eastern District of Louisiana proceedings. It also
   permitted Conti to return the LOU if Conti decided to discontinue those
   proceedings or if the court concluded Conti was not entitled to enforce the
   award in full.
          The district court denied MSC’s motion to dismiss. It rejected
   MSC’s argument that, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, the only
   relevant contacts were those relating to the London arbitration. Instead, the
   court considered MSC’s contacts relating to the underlying dispute that led
   to the arbitration. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied primarily on
   decisions from four of our sister circuits. See Compañía de Inversiones
   Mercantiles, S.A. v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V., 970 F.3d
   1269, 1287 (10th Cir. 2020) (considering “the defendant’s forum activities
   in connection with the claim that led to the arbitration, as opposed
   to . . . activities in connection with the arbitration proceeding itself”); see also
   Telcordia Tech Inv. v. Telkom S.A. Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2006); Solé
   Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir.
   2006); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284
   F.3d 1114, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2002). The court also rejected MSC’s argument
   that the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow v. Walters forbids “looking

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   through” the arbitration petition to the underlying dispute to assess personal
   jurisdiction. See 596 U.S. 1 (2022).
          Applying this analysis, the court concluded it had personal jurisdiction
   over MSC. It reasoned that the underlying claim—breach of the
   charterparty—related to MSC’s forum contacts because “[the DVB] could
   not have been on the FLAMINIA, and subsequently caused the explosion,
   if it was not loaded and shipped in New Orleans.” Thus, “[t]he loading and
   eventual shipping of the [DVB] out of New Orleans by MSC constitutes a
   relationship among the defendant (MSC), the forum (Louisiana), and the
   litigation (breach of clause 78 [of the charterparty]).” Alternatively, the court
   concluded that MSC waived its personal jurisdiction defense by entering the
   LOU.
          The court therefore granted Conti’s motion for judgment on the
   pleadings and confirmed the arbitral award. MSC now appeals, arguing the
   court lacked personal jurisdiction over it.
                                          II.
          “[W]hether personal jurisdiction can be exercised over a defendant is
   a question of law and subject to de novo review.” E. Concrete Materials, Inc. v.
   ACE Am. Ins. Co., 948 F.3d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).
                                          III.
          To confirm the arbitral award, the district court needed personal
   jurisdiction over MSC. See First Inv. Corp. of Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei
   Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 748 (5th Cir. 2012) (due process requires
   personal jurisdiction to confirm award under the New York Convention).
   Only specific personal jurisdiction is at issue. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires
   Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (distinguishing “general
   or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked jurisdiction” (citation

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   omitted)).2 Conti, then, had to show that MSC “purposefully avail[ed] itself
   of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Ford Motor
   Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (quoting
   Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). MSC’s forum contacts must
   be its “own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’” Id. at 1025
   (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). And,
   crucially, Conti’s claim against MSC “must arise out of or relate to” those
   contacts. Ibid. (citation omitted). In other words, for specific personal
   jurisdiction to exist over MSC, “there must be ‘an affiliation between the
   forum and the underlying controversy.’” Ibid. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb
   Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)).
          MSC challenges the district court’s personal jurisdictional ruling on
   several grounds. First, MSC contends that, because an action to confirm an
   arbitral award is distinct from the underlying dispute, the only relevant
   contacts concern MSC’s refusal to pay the award and not the DVB’s
   shipping from New Orleans. Second, MSC argues that Badgerow forbids
   “looking through” to the underlying dispute to assess personal jurisdiction.
   Third, MSC argues it did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense by
   entering the LOU. And, finally, MSC argues that—even considering the
   underlying dispute—the forum contacts resulted from the unilateral activity
   of others, not MSC. We address each argument in turn.
                                               A.
          We first address MSC’s argument that the district court erred by
   basing its personal jurisdiction analysis on contacts related to the underlying
   dispute—i.e., the storage, loading, and shipping of the DVB at the Port of
   New Orleans. MSC contends the court should have limited its analysis to
          _____________________
          2
              Conti concedes MSC is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Louisiana.

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   contacts related only to MSC’s refusal to pay the arbitral award. That award,
   argues MSC, “is no more than a contractual resolution of the parties’
   dispute,” and so any enforcement of the award is distinct from that dispute.
           This argument has been rejected by every circuit to have considered
   it. The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Compañía de Inversiones Mercantiles,
   quoted by the district court, is emblematic. See 970 F.3d 1269. That case
   asked whether a Colorado federal court had personal jurisdiction to confirm
   a Bolivian arbitral award against a group of Mexican companies. Id. at 1275–
   76. The defendants argued that “the only contacts that matter” in a
   confirmation action “are those relating to the arbitration.” Id. at 1285. The
   Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that “contracts relating to the
   underlying claim (i.e., the formation and alleged violation of the [contract at
   issue]) are pertinent.” Id. at 1285–86 (emphasis added). More specifically,
   the court explained that the “proper jurisdictional inquiry” in an action to
   confirm a foreign arbitral award is whether the award beneficiary was injured
   “by the defendant’s forum activities in connection with the claim that led to
   the arbitration, as opposed to the defendant’s forum activities in connection
   with the arbitration proceeding itself.” Id. at 1287.
           Also instructive is the Second Circuit’s decision in Solé Resort, which
   involved a petition asking a New York federal court to vacate a Florida
   arbitral award involving two foreign companies. 450 F.3d at 101–02.3 The
   defendant resisted personal jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff’s
   claim was only “about the actions of the arbitrators, not about the facts
   underlying the dispute that led to the arbitration.” Id. at 105. The Second
   Circuit disagreed. “Any arbitration proceeding,” the court reasoned,

           _____________________
           3
             A petition to vacate an arbitral award involves the same personal jurisdiction
   analysis as a petition to confirm an award. See Solé Resort, 450 F.3d at 101.

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   “is . . . an extension of the parties’ contract with one another,” and
   “[w]ithout the contract, the arbitration, and its resultant judgment, a
   subsequent challenge to that judgment never could exist.” Id. at 104.
   Accordingly, the court found “a substantial relationship between a challenge
   to the arbitrators’ decision and the contract that provided for the
   arbitration.” Ibid. “[W]hile the arbitrators’ actions themselves took place
   outside New York,” the court concluded, “those actions necessarily bear a
   substantial relationship to the events underlying the contract that created the
   arbitration.” Id. at 105.4
           Six other circuits follow an approach similar to the Tenth and Second
   Circuits with respect to evaluating personal jurisdiction over actions to
   confirm arbitral awards. That is, they consider a defendant’s contacts related
   to the underlying dispute that led to the arbitral award, and not only contacts
   related to the arbitration proceeding itself.5 While our circuit has not

           _____________________
           4
              The Solé Resort analysis has been adopted by the pertinent Restatement. The
   authors explain that “[i]n determining whether the requirement of minimum contacts is
   met, account is not taken only of the arbitration but also of the underlying transaction.”
   Restatement (Third) of U.S. Law of Int’l Com. Arb. § 4.25 note (a)(ii)
   (citing Solé Resort, 450 F.3d 100). Accordingly, “[a]ctions to enforce international arbitral
   awards do not call for any special personal jurisdictional rules. The adequacy of any
   particular exercise of personal jurisdiction is determined according to the generally
   applicable statutory and constitutional standards for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”
   Id. at § 5.19 cmt. (a).
           5
              See Telcordia Tech, 458 F.3d at 178 (analyzing contacts between defendant and
   forum relevant to underlying dispute before finding personal jurisdiction to confirm a
   foreign arbitral award); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum
   Factory”, 283 F.3d 208, 215–16 (4th Cir. 2002) (considering lack of regular shipments
   between the two companies and contact with the United States to deny personal
   jurisdiction to confirm foreign arbitral award); Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23
   F.3d 1110, 1116–17 (6th Cir. 1994) (considering state law tort and contract claims when
   determining personal jurisdiction to confirm a domestic arbitral award); Glencore Grain,
   284 F.3d at 1123–24 (analyzing the sale of rice to California distributors in evaluating
   personal jurisdiction to confirm a foreign arbitral award); Greenfield Advisors LLC v. Salas,

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   addressed this issue head-on, we have cited four of those sister circuit
   decisions approvingly. See First Inv. Corp., 703 F.3d at 750, 752 n.6 (citing the
   D.C., Ninth, Fourth, and Third Circuit decisions).
                                               B.
           Instead of engaging with the circuit decisions discussed above, MSC
   claims they have been overridden by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
   Badgerow. We disagree. Badgerow addressed subject matter jurisdiction, not
   personal jurisdiction. And Badgerow dealt with domestic arbitration, which is
   governed by Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provisions distinct from the
   ones applicable to this New York Convention case.
           Badgerow examined when federal courts have subject matter
   jurisdiction to confirm or vacate domestic awards under FAA §§ 9 and 10.
   See 596 U.S. at 4. The Court had ruled previously in Vaden that, to evaluate
   subject matter jurisdiction to compel arbitration under FAA § 4, courts must
   “look through” the agreement to the underlying dispute. See Vaden v.
   Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 53 (2009). Vaden turned on § 4’s “save for”
   clause, which told courts to disregard the agreement and look to the parties’
   controversy. Id. at 62; see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (federal court may compel arbitration
   if, “save for such [arbitration] agreement, it would have jurisdiction . . . of the
   subject matter of a suit arising out the controversy between the parties”
           _____________________
   733 F. App’x 364, 366–67 (9th Cir. 2018) (considering personal contacts between the
   appellant and state of Washington to find personal jurisdiction to enforce a foreign arbitral
   award); S & Davis Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2000)
   (considering contacts regarding contractual breach to find personal jurisdiction to enforce
   a foreign arbitral award); Creighton, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 127–28 (D.C. Cir.
   1999) (considering phone calls, ongoing business, and other communications between
   Qatar and Tennessee in the underlying dispute to find no personal jurisdiction to confirm
   foreign arbitral award); GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 817 (D.C. Cir.
   2012) (finding no contacts between defendant and forum as to underlying dispute and thus
   dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction).

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   (emphasis added)). Unlike Vaden, however, Badgerow involved an action to
   confirm an award, not compel arbitration, and the pertinent provisions—
   §§ 9 and 10—“contain[ed] none of the statutory language on which Vaden
   turned.” Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 11.6 “Most notably,” the Court explained,
   “those provisions do not have Section 4’s ‘save for’ clause.” Ibid.
   Accordingly, Badgerow held that subject matter jurisdiction to confirm a
   domestic arbitral award depends, not on the parties’ dispute, but only on
   “the application actually submitted to [the court].” Id. at 5.
           Badgerow does not support MSC’s argument. Most fundamentally,
   Badgerow addressed subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction.
   Congress must furnish an independent basis for federal courts to exercise
   subject matter jurisdiction over FAA cases. See Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 8
   (citing Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008)).7
   That is why Badgerow had to ferret out the differences between § 4 (which
   tied subject matter jurisdiction to the underlying controversy) and
   §§ 9 and 10 (which did not). See Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 10–11; cf. Vaden, 556
   U.S. at 62–63. Personal jurisdiction is a different matter, however. Federal
   courts have personal jurisdiction so long as defendants may be served under

           _____________________
           6
             Section 9 provides that any party to an arbitration may, within a year of the award,
   apply “to the court so specified [in the agreement] for an order confirming the award,” or,
   if no court is specified, “to the United States court in and for the district within which such
   award was made.” 9 U.S.C. § 9. Section 10 specifies grounds on which an award may be
   vacated upon application to “the United States court in and for the district wherein the
   award was made.” Id. § 10(a).
           7
             See also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
   (1983) (explaining that the FAA, though “creat[ing] a body of federal substantive law” on
   arbitration, “yet . . . does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under
   28 U.S.C. § 1331”); Lower Co. River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, L.L.C., 858 F.3d 916, 922–
   23 (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the FAA “‘bestow[s] no federal jurisdiction but rather
   requir[es] for [access to a federal forum] an independent jurisdictional basis’ over the
   parties’ dispute” (quoting Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59)).

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   the state’s long-arm statute and due process is satisfied. See, e.g., Pervasive
   Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. Kg, 688 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2012).8
   So, Badgerow answered a question different from the one before us—one that
   required examining whether Congress had granted subject matter
   jurisdiction over FAA proceedings. The question here, by contrast, is
   whether exercising personal jurisdiction over MSC is “‘reasonable, in the
   context of our federal system of government,’ and ‘does not offend
   traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Ford Motor Co., 141
   S. Ct. at 1024 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Off. of Unemployment Comp. &
   Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945)). Answering that question does not
   turn on parsing different provisions of the FAA.
           Second, even if such an interpretive exercise were called for, the FAA
   provisions at issue here are meaningfully distinct from those in Badgerow.
   Keep in mind that Badgerow involved domestic arbitration governed by FAA
   Chapter One, see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, whereas this case involves foreign
   arbitration under the New York Convention, governed by FAA Chapter
   Two, see id. §§ 201–208. As the district court carefully explained, Chapter
   Two lacks any textual indication that forbids looking to the underlying
   dispute in assessing personal jurisdiction to confirm an award under the
   Convention.
           Start with the basic Chapter Two confirmation provisions. Chapter
   Two “deem[s]” any Convention-related proceeding to arise under federal
   law, id. § 203, and, in turn, permits a party to file for confirmation in “any
   court having jurisdiction under [Chapter Two],” id. § 207. In other words,
   Chapter Two broadly confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over
           _____________________
           8
             The reach of Louisiana’s long-arm statute is not at issue here because it permits
   service up to the limits of due process. See, e.g., Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615
   F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2010). Both parties concede this point.

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   confirmation actions involving the Convention. See id. § 203 (providing
   “[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have original jurisdiction
   over such an action or proceeding [under the Convention], regardless of the
   amount in controversy”). Contrast this with Chapter One’s narrower grant.
   It permits a party to seek confirmation only in the court “specified” in the
   agreement or, if none is specified, in the federal court “in and for the district
   within which such award was made.” Id. § 9. As the district court correctly
   observed, these provisions are “drastically different.” The Chapter One
   provision is, as Badgerow explained, narrowly confined to the agreement.
   Chapter Two’s broader provision suggests no such limitation.
          Even more telling is Chapter Two’s venue provision. An action to
   confirm a Convention-related award
          may be brought in any [district] court in which save for the
          arbitration agreement an action or proceeding with respect to the
          controversy between the parties could be brought, or in such court
          for the district and division which embraces the place
          designated in the agreement as the place of arbitration if such
          place is within the United States.
   Id. § 204 (emphasis added). This provision contains the same “save for”
   language as the analogous domestic provision addressed in Vaden (§ 4),
   which the Supreme Court held requires looking to the underlying dispute.
   See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62–63. True, § 204 addresses venue, not personal
   jurisdiction. But, as the district court pointed out, “it would only make sense
   for the personal jurisdiction analysis under the Convention to follow that of
   venue because [otherwise] it would lead to irrational results”—namely,
   being able to consider the underlying dispute for venue purposes but not for
   personal jurisdiction. This is another strong clue that Chapter Two, unlike

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   the Chapter One provisions in Badgerow, does not forbid considering the
   parties’ dispute for purposes of assessing jurisdiction.9
           Finally, MSC cites one line from Badgerow, which, it contends,
   supports its argument. MSC quotes Badgerow’s statement that “[an arbitral]
   award is no more than a contractual resolution of the parties’ dispute—a way
   of settling legal claims.” Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 9 (citing Vaden, 556 U.S., at
   63). MSC takes this statement out of context, however. As the next sentence
   clarifies, the Court was discussing subject matter jurisdiction: “And quarrels
   about legal settlements—even settlements of federal claims—typically
   involve only state law, like disagreements about other contracts.” Ibid. (citing
   Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378–82 (1994)).
   Badgerow’s statement, then, has no bearing on this case. The quarrel here
   involves an arbitral award under the New York Convention—not state law—
   over which the FAA extends federal subject matter jurisdiction.
   See 9 U.S.C. § 203. Moreover, Badgerow was not even addressing personal
   jurisdiction.10

           _____________________
           9
             MSC argues that the district court’s analysis of § 204 conflated venue and
   personal jurisdiction. We disagree. The court plainly recognized that § 204 is “the
   Convention’s venue statute” and does not address personal jurisdiction. The court’s point,
   rather, was that the Chapter Two provisions (especially § 204) show no intent to foreclose
   looking to the underlying dispute to assess personal jurisdiction, as did the distinct Chapter
   One provisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction over confirmation actions.
           10
               MSC also relies on an unpublished district court opinion from outside our
   circuit. See Balan v. Tesla Motors Inc., No. C-19-67 MJP, 2022 WL 2192872, at *3–4 (W.D.
   Wash. June 16, 2022). After successfully arbitrating an employee defamation claim in San
   Francisco, Tesla and Elon Musk sued there to confirm the award. Id. at *1. The employee
   sued to vacate the award in a Washington federal court. Ibid. The Washington court ruled
   it lacked personal jurisdiction over Musk because “nothing about the arbitration relate[d]
   to Washington” and because Musk had not “performed any type of conduct related to the
   arbitration that promotes business within the State.” Id. at *3. It is unclear whether the
   district court’s analysis was limited to the arbitration itself or also considered Musk’s
   underlying contacts with Washington. Furthermore, the arbitration did not implicate the

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          In sum, we disagree with MSC’s argument that Badgerow prohibits
   looking to the parties’ underlying dispute to determine whether the court had
   personal jurisdiction over Conti’s confirmation action.
                                          C.
          Next, we turn to the district court’s ruling that MSC waived any
   challenge to personal jurisdiction when its insurer issued the LOU. Recall
   that the LOU promised to pay Conti up to $220 million on any final
   judgment and was “given without prejudice to any and all rights or defenses
   MSC, its agents or affiliates have or may have.” MSC argues the district
   court erred because the LOU plainly reserved its defenses to Conti’s suit,
   including lack of personal jurisdiction. We agree.
          “Louisiana law recognizes broad freedom to contract” and
   “[c]ontractual intent is determined by the words of the contract.” Luv N’
   Care, Ltd. v. Groupo Rimar, 844 F.3d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 2016); see also La.
   Civ. Code art. 1971 (“Parties are free to contract for any object that is
   lawful, possible, and determined or determinable.”). Contractual provisions
   like the ones here may be “relevant” to a personal jurisdiction analysis, “but
   they are not dispositive.” See Haliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore
   Specialty Ins. Co., 921 F.3d 522, 542 (5th Cir. 2019) (considering relevance of
   “[c]hoice-of-law provisions and forum-selection clauses” to personal
   jurisdiction analysis). When a party contractually submits to the court’s
   power for a “limited purpose,” it does “not waive its personal jurisdiction
   defense” for issues falling outside that purpose. Id. at 541.
          The district court ruled that MSC waived its personal jurisdiction
   defense by entering into the LOU for two reasons. First, the court relied on
          _____________________
   New York Convention. So, Balan does not clearly support MSC’s position and, in any
   event, is not binding on us.

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   our decision in Trafigura Beheer B.V. v. M/T PROBO ELK, 266 F. App’x 309
   (5th Cir. 2007) to find that entering an LOU constitutes consent to
   jurisdiction. Second, it found that, despite the reservation of defenses, the
   LOU “implicitly” consented to the Eastern District’s jurisdiction by, for
   instance, agreeing to pay Conti if it refrained from suing MSC anywhere else
   and stipulating the Eastern District has “exclusive jurisdiction” over LOU-
   related disputes. We respectfully disagree.
          First, Trafigura is distinguishable. In that case, “the ship’s
   underwriters entered into a letter of undertaking . . . agreeing to appear as
   claimants in the suit and pay any final judgment.” Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
   In other words, Trafigura’s LOU explicitly waived personal jurisdiction.
   MSC’s does not. Its LOU contains conditional language pertaining to the
   district court’s jurisdiction. For example, it states it will pay the $220 million
   “unless and until the Proceedings [the dispute over personal jurisdiction and
   the confirmation action] are finally determined.” And MSC agreed to pay
   only “after all appeals (if any).” The LOU also states that “[i]n the event that
   the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana concludes (in
   the Proceedings) that you are not entitled to enforce the Awards in
   full . . . you are at liberty to . . . seek to enforce the Awards in another
   jurisdiction.” This language is quite different from Trafigura’s express
   agreement to “appear as claimants in the suit.” 266 F. App’x at 311.
          Second, the LOU has no implicit waiver. To the contrary, it states it
   was “given without prejudice to any and all rights or defenses MSC, its agents
   or affiliates have or may have in the Proceedings.” This includes the defense
   of lack of personal jurisdiction, which MSC was litigating when the LOU
   issued. That should end the waiver inquiry. See La. Civ. Code art. 2046
   (“When the words of the contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd
   consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’
   intent.”). Putting that aside, however, the parts of the LOU the district court

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   relied on do not implicitly waive personal jurisdiction. Everything MSC
   consented to—payment, not suing elsewhere, jurisdiction over LOU-related
   matters, etc.—was expressly conditioned on the outcome of ongoing
   litigation over the district court’s personal jurisdiction.
           In sum, the district court erred by finding that MSC waived its
   personal jurisdiction defense in the LOU.
                                                  D.
           Finally, MSC argues that, even if it is proper to consider contacts
   related to the underlying dispute, the district court erred in finding personal
   jurisdiction based only on the fact that the DVB shipped from the Port of
   New Orleans.11 We agree with MSC because that contact with New Orleans
   resulted not from MSC’s activity but rather that of its subsidiary, MSC
   (USA), and third parties.
           “Generally, a foreign parent corporation is not subject to the
   jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its subsidiary is present or doing
   business there[.]” Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir.
   1983) (citing 2 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice
   ¶ 4.25[6], at 4–272 (2d ed. 1982)).12 “This presumption of institutional

           _____________________
           11
              MSC raised this alternative argument in the district court in its motion to dismiss
   for lack of personal jurisdiction.
           12
              See also, e.g., Diece-Lisa Indus., Inc. v. Disney Enters., Inc., 943 F.3d 239, 251 (5th
   Cir. 2019) (“Generally, ‘the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
   corporation may not be based solely upon the contacts with the forum state of another
   corporate entity with which the defendant may be affiliated.’” (quoting Freudensprung v.
   Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 346 (5th Cir. 2004))); Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI
   Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]ypically, the corporate
   independence of companies defeats the assertion of jurisdiction over one by using contacts
   with the other.”); Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1999)
   (“Courts have long presumed the institutional independence of related corporations, such
   as parent and subsidiary, when determining if one corporation’s contacts with a forum can

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   independence . . . may be rebutted, however, by clear evidence” that the two
   corporations are “fused . . . for jurisdictional purposes.” Diece-Lisa, 943 F.3d
   at 251 (quoting Freudensprung, 379 F.3d at 346) (cleaned up); see also
   Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1161 (explaining, “so long as a parent and subsidiary
   maintain separate and distinct corporate entities, the presence of one in a
   forum state may not be attributed to the other”). In this inquiry, we consider
   the following factors: “(1) the amount of stock owned by the parent of the
   subsidiary; (2) whether the entities have separate headquarters, directors,
   and officers; (3) whether corporate formalities are observed; (4) whether the
   entities maintain separate accounting systems; and (5) whether the parent
   exercises complete control over the subsidiary’s general policies or daily
   activities.” Diece-Lisa, 943 F.3d at 251 (citation omitted); see also Hargrave,
   710 F.2d at 1160 (discussing factors).
           As the party invoking jurisdiction, Conti bore the burden of showing,
   by clear evidence, that MSC and its subsidiary are not distinct corporate
   entities. See Diece-Lisa, 943 F.3d at 251; Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1159. It failed
   to do so, both in the district court and before us. 13 Indeed, Conti’s appellate
   briefing treats MSC (USA)’s contacts with Louisiana as if they were

           _____________________
   be the basis of a related corporation’s contacts.” (citing Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing
   Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925))); Southmark Corp. v. Life Invs., Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 773–74 (5th
   Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is well-settled that where . . . a wholly owned subsidiary is operated as a
   distinct corporation, its contacts with the forum cannot be imputed to the parent.”).
           13 In the district court, Conti argued that MSC (USA) is MSC’s general agent

   whose contacts can be imputed to MSC. It does not press that argument here and has
   forfeited it. In any event, Conti presented no evidence to support the claim. It merely cited
   a finding by the arbitration panel that MSC (USA) owned 60% of the stock in its own
   subsidiary, the New Orleans Terminal LLC. That tells us nothing about the relationship
   between MSC and MSC (USA). Furthermore, based on uncontroverted record evidence
   MSC has never had a registered agent for service of process in Louisiana.

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   MSC’s without presenting any argument concerning the lack of corporate
   distinctness. That is insufficient.
           Furthermore, the record suggests MSC and MSC (USA) are in fact
   distinct entities. While MSC (USA) is wholly owned by MSC,14 the two
   corporations have different headquarters—MSC (USA) in New York and
   MSC in Geneva. They have different officers and directors. And the record
   does not show that MSC and MSC (USA) failed to observe corporate
   formalities. To the contrary, the only evidence on that score is the arbitration
   panel’s finding that MSC (USA) followed corporate formalities with its own
   subsidiary, the New Orleans Terminal LLC. Nor does any evidence show
   MSC’s exercising complete authority over MSC (USA)’s operations. This
   evidence cannot overcome the presumption of separateness between MSC
   (USA) and MSC for personal jurisdiction purposes.15

           _____________________
           14
              A parent’s ownership of a subsidiary’s stock, even 100% of it, does not ipso facto
   impute the subsidiary’s contacts to the parent for personal jurisdiction purposes. See, e.g.,
   Consol. Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 88 (1933) (declining to attribute Wisconsin
   contacts of wholly-owned subsidiary to New York-based parent company); Cannon Mfg.,
   267 U.S. at 338 (declining to attribute North Carolina contacts of wholly-owned Alabama
   subsidiary to Maine parent company because the “existence of the Alabama company as a
   distinct corporate entity [wa]s . . . in all respects observed”); People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am.
   Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918) (“The fact that the company owned stock in the local
   subsidiary companies did not bring it into the State in the sense of transacting its own
   business there.”); Peterson v. Chi., R.I. & P.R. Co., 205 U.S. 364, 390–94 (1907) (court
   lacked personal jurisdiction over parent company because the wholly-owned subsidiary
   controlled its day-to-day operations and personnel decisions).
           15
                Additionally, MSC has declared under penalty of perjury that
           it has never had any corporate or operating records in Louisiana; [it] has
           never had a bank account in Louisiana; [it] has never had a telephone
           listing, facsimile listing, business listing or post office box in Louisiana; [it]
           has never exercised any executive, management or corporate functions in
           Louisiana; [it] has never owned, leased or purchased any immovable
           property in Louisiana; [it] does not have a registered agent for service of

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            This means that the dispute’s sole contact with the forum—the
   DVB’s shipping from the Port of New Orleans—did not occur as a result of
   MSC’s “own choice.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (citation omitted).
   That choice was made by others. The manufacturer, Deltech, chose to ship
   the DVB out of New Orleans. A Houston-based MSC (USA) employee
   received the order and booked carriage on the FLAMINIA via New
   Orleans. A Charleston-based MSC (USA) employee created the stowage
   plan. And New Orleans Terminal LLC received, stored, and loaded the
   DVB onto the FLAMINIA. The only putative “contact” involving MSC
   itself occurred when its Antwerp, Belgium office approved the booking. That
   action, however, merely screened the booking for conformance with MSC’s
   internal policies and the policies of any port of call.
            So, the fact that the DVB was loaded onto the FLAMINIA in New
   Orleans was the result of “the unilateral activity” of other parties, not MSC.
   See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (explaining the
   “‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be
   haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result . . . of the ‘unilateral activity of
   another party or a third person’” (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253;
   Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984))).
   The district court thus lacked personal jurisdiction to confirm the London
   award.
                                              IV.
            We agree with much of the district court’s well-stated opinion. When
   assessing personal jurisdiction in a confirmation action under the New York
            _____________________
            process in Louisiana and has not appointed the Louisiana Secretary of
            State as its agent for service of process in Louisiana.

   Conti contests none of these statements.

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                                   No. 22-30808

   Convention, a federal court should consider contacts related to the parties’
   underlying dispute and not only contacts related to the arbitration proceeding
   itself. That holding aligns our court with every other circuit to address this
   issue. Nonetheless, we must ultimately reverse the district court’s judgment
   because (1) MSC did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense by entering
   into the LOU, and (2) the sole contact with the forum arose, not from
   MSC’s own deliberate activities, but rather from the unilateral activities of
   others that cannot be attributed to MSC.
          Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and
   REMAND with instructions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

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