Court Opinion

ID: 9677855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:02:08.722605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:59.087882
License: Public Domain

TOM GRAY, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
This mandamus proceeding raises a complaint about the garnishment by the State of money in an inmate trust account.
The majority has docketed this proceeding as a criminal proceeding. It is not. See Crawford v. State, 226 S.W.3d 688 (Tex.App.-Waco, 2007, no pet. h.) (Gray, C.J., dissenting). The process for garnishing an inmate’s trust account is a civil proceeding. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. Ch. 63 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.2006); Tex.R. Civ. P. 657-679. See Abdullah v. State, 211 S.W.3d 938 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (Docket Number 06-06-00064-CV).1 The fact that this particular garnishment proceeding relates to the garnishment for the assessment of court costs and fees as part of the judgment in a criminal proceeding is, at this juncture, irrelevant. Tex. Civ. PRAC. Rem.Code Ann. § 63.007 (Vernon Supp.2006).
*396The error in classifying this as a criminal proceeding then contributes to the determination that mandamus to this Court is an available means of review of the garnishment order.2
First, in order to give Keeling relief by mandamus, the majority must decide that the garnishment order is void. The majority relies on a case from Texarkana to hold that an order entered without due process is void. In re Taylor, 130 S.W.3d 448 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). However, Taylor was a habeas proceeding where the relator’s liberty was being restrained due to a contempt order. And, more importantly, what the Texar-kana Court said, relying on a Texas Supreme Court case, was, “An order is void if it is beyond the power of the court to enter it, or if it deprives the relator of liberty without due process of law.” Id. at 449. (Emphasis added.). The majority leaves out the emphasized portion of the quote which is the portion of the statement upon which Texarkana was relying. The garnishment order did not deprive Keeling of his liberty. Keeling’s criminal behavior did that. The Texarkana Court did not address the “beyond the power of the court” prong because a contempt order is not beyond the power of a district court.
Likewise, I do not believe the garnishment order was void as being “beyond the power of the court to enter it.” The order directed to TDCJ regarding the judgment against Keeling may not have been “authorized” or “valid” under the applicable law, see Abdullah, but it is not void. The distinction is one the Texas Supreme Court has addressed in Dubai and its progeny.3 See Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 74-75 (Tex.2000). As long as the court entering a judgment has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter and does not act outside its capacity as a court, the judgment is not void. Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex.2003). See Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., 221 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Tex.2006) (publication status pending).
Second, because the majority wrongly held the garnishment order was void, it avoided any discussion of whether Keeling had or has an adequate legal remedy.4
*397See In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.2000). And if the order is not void, as I contend, to prevail by mandamus, Keeling must still show he has no adequate legal remedy.
There appear to have been at least three adequate legal remedies available to Keeling: 1) direct appeal;5 2) restricted appeal; and 3) bill of review. If Keeling was deprived of due process, a bill-of-review should be a simple procedure. See Ross v. Nat’l Ctr. for the Empl. of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 797-798 (Tex.2006). Keeling also had an adequate legal remedy by direct appeal,6 Varner v. Koons, 888 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, orig. proceeding); see also Roberts v. Stoneham, 31 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Tex.Civ. App.-Austin 1930, no writ), and it also appears that a restricted appeal may have been available to him. See Tex.R.App. P. 30. Mandamus is not available if another remedy, though it would have been adequate, was not timely exercised. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex.2006); In re Johnson, No. 07-04-00416-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 7580 (Tex.App.-Amarillo Aug. 23, 2004, orig. proceeding). See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 380 F.3d 793, 799 (5th Cir.2004). See also Ex Parte Townsend, 137 S.W.3d 79, 81-82 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (applying the same rule to relief by petitions for writ of habeas corpus) (another form of extraordinary relief).
Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent.

. The Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that the designation "CV” is assigned to a civil case while the designation “CR” is assigned to a criminal case. TexR.App. P. 12.2(a)(4).

. Interestingly, although they distinguish the procedural posture of Abdullah because it was characterized as a civil appeal, the majority uses civil case law, rather than criminal case law, to determine that Keeling is entitled to mandamus relief. And because the majority relies on civil case law and because it should be set up as a civil proceeding, I, too, will rely on civil case law. But if it is a criminal proceeding, as they have docketed it, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ authority would absolutely prohibit the result they wish to reach. See discussion infra.

. The Court of Criminal Appeals also has an excellent discussion of the distinction in Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221, 224-225 (Tex. Crim.App.2001). And as will be discussed below, if this is a criminal proceeding, the Court of Criminal Appeals has not decided to allow a void order to be attacked by mandamus without a showing that there is no adequate legal remedy.

.While I recognize the Supreme Court held mandamus could be used to attack a void order, I wonder if that alone is the basis of their holding. When other routine remedies are so clearly available and effective, as discussed below, it seems that adding the mandamus remedy too is simply piling-on. On the other hand, the majority has previously determined that this type proceeding is a criminal proceeding. Unlike the Texas Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals requires a showing that there is no adequate legal remedy before a litigant may utilize a mandamus proceeding to attack an order, even a void order. See State v. Patrick, 86 S.W.3d 592, 594 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). In making this observation, I note the Supreme Court has also recently relaxed the no-adequate-legal-remedy requirement to avoid an unnecessary trial and the attendant cost and delay. In re Pmdential Ins. Co. of Am.., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex.2004) and In re MU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex.2004). The legal *397remedies available to Keeling would not be long delayed or incur unnecessary cost. In fact, he could have and should have pursued a direct appeal even before he brought this mandamus proceeding.

. The availability of direct appeal may hinge upon the proper characterization of this proceeding as criminal or civil. A majority of this Court has previously determined it to be a criminal proceeding over which we had no jurisdiction. See Crawford v. State, 226 S.W.3d 688 (Tex.App.-Waco, 2007, no pet. h.) (Gray, C.J., dissenting) (setting out withdrawn opinion of majority). The Texarkana Court, however, has characterized this as a civil proceeding. See Abdullah v. State, 211 S.W.3d 938 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

. If it is determined that this is actually a turnover order rather than a garnishment proceeding, the order is nevertheless a final appealable order. Bums v. Miller, 909 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Tex. 1995).