Court Opinion

ID: 9613204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:15:17.956534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:26.816539
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE SHEA
dissenting:
I agree with Justice Morrison that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and thus the conviction must be reversed and the case dismissed. But my dissent does not stop there. Due to the pressures of writing other dissents, and the time pressures of handing down opinions, I do not have time to write a full dissent on the issues as I would like. I therefore briefly express my views on the other issues.
Although a conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional on its face could take care of the problem, I believe also that the charge as filed, is unconstitutional as applied. I believe also that the prosecution is guilty of gross overkill in filing these charges against defendant. During the hearing on oral arguments, the prosecution contended that intimidation was the only crime that could be charged. But during questioning from the bench, the prosecution admitted that defendant’s conduct fell within the ambit of a misdemeanor assault charge. I believe that misdemeanor assault was the appropriate charge, and that the decision to charge defendant with intimidation so to subject him to a 10-year prison sentence, was an example of vindictiveness at its worst. Nor can I accept the fact that defendant was sentenced to the maximum 10 years in prison for this conviction. It demonstrates a vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge. Although a defendant’s background should certainly be considered for sentencing purposes, there must also be a reasonable relationship between the crime committed and the sentence given. Here there is no reasonable relationship at all.
In addition, the crime of intimidation was not proved. It can*241not be disputed that the defendant frightened the woman by his words and by his actions — but this fright cannot be translated into the crime of intimidation. His words and acts certainly constituted misdemeanor assault, but to say that he is guilty of intimidation is to use the statute in a situation for which it was never designed.
Further, it was error to the extreme for the trial court to admit other crime evidence through the testimony of the woman whom defendant had assaulted near the high school. Not only were the elements for admissibility not complied with, the court failed miserably in not determining that the inherent prejudicial effect of this testimony would outweigh the probative value of this witness’ testimony. I have no doubt that this witness’ testimony sealed the defendant’s fate before the jury. Once the jury heard what the defendant had done on a previous occasion, no matter what the charge was, a jury would be out to convict — and convict it did. It is clear to me that the trial courts are paying only lip-service to the balancing test before • admittng such evidence. Rather, they are simply concluding that if the evidence will help convict a defendant it should be admitted. ■