Court Opinion

ID: 9676252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:19:17.2284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:46.417215
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Bank One as to Murphy’s KRS 344.040 sexual harassment claim. I write separately, however, because I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Murphy’s motions to amend her complaint to allege KRS 344.280(1) retaliation claims connected with Bank One’s decision to interrupt the settlement negotiations and bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court. Although this Court has addressed interpretive issues concerning KRS 344.280(1) only once *547before1 (and then merely in passing), the majority devotes only two (2) paragraphs to this issue and cites no meaningful authority in support of its conclusion that “such conduct does not constitute a violation of the statute nor is it tortious.” Upon remand, I would require the trial court to allow Murphy to amend her complaint to include these claims. Although I recognize that Murphy may not be able to prove that a retaliatory motive prompted Bank One to file a declaratory judgment action in federal court, and, as such, Murphy may not prevail at trial — or perhaps even survive summary judgment — Murphy’s amended complaint raises a claim upon which the trial court could grant relief, and the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Murphy’s motion to amend her complaint.
The Kentucky Civil Rights Act creates a cause of action for, among other acts, retaliation against employees who have asserted claims under the Act:
It shall be an unlawful practice for a person, or for two (2) or more persons to conspire:
(1) To retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because he has opposed a practice declared unlawful by this chapter, or because he has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter .... 2
Count III of Murphy’s Amended Verified Complaint set out a retaliation claim under KRS 344.280(1):
26. On or about June 19, 1996, the Plaintiff informed Defendant Bank One through one of its employees of the above described conduct of Defendant Gaunt.
27. Plaintiff was asked if she wanted to leave work during the pending investigation and then told to “kick back and relax and enjoy her paid vacation” by an employee of Defendant Bank One.
28. Plaintiff contacted and retained attorney, Thomas E. Clay. Attorney Clay informed Bank One of his representation of Plaintiff.
29. An employee of Bank One requested that attorney Clay make a demand to resolve Plaintiffs claim. Attorney Clay complied.
30. In response to attorney Clay’s demand, Defendant Bank One, requested a meeting with attorney Clay and Plaintiff. Again, attorney Clay and Plaintiff complied.
31. On August 6, 1996, attorney Clay, attorney Mayfield and Plaintiff met with Bank One’s attorneys, John Zeiger and Jeffrey Lipps. During this meeting, Bank One’s attorneys discussed the law with attorney Clay and then extensively questioned Plaintiff. At the conclusion of this meeting, Bank One’s attorneys requested time to contemplate *548the information that they had obtained in this meeting and then respond to attorney Clay’s demand. A date and time was set for the following Monday, August 12, 1996 at 9:30 a.m., for a telephonic conference in which Bank One, via its attorneys, would respond to attorney Clay’s demand.
32. Instead, however, on Friday, August 9, 1996, Bank One filed in Federal Court and had served on Plaintiff its Declaratory Judgment action.
33. The above described conduct is retaliatory in nature and in violation of KRS 344.280(1).
34. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s conduct, the Plaintiff has sustained severe emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment.
35. The amount to compensate for her injuries involved exceed the jurisdictional limits of this Court.
The trial court interpreted Murphy’s claim as alleging a cause of action against only Bank One’s attorneys and denied the motion:
Plaintiff tenders a new Count III which names defense counsel as defendants to this action. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that defense counsel’s filing of a Declaratory Judgment Complaint constitutes retaliatory employment discrimination in violation of KRS 344.280.
CR 15.01 allows a party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course any time before a responsive pleading is filed. Thereafter, a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or written consent of the adverse party. “[Ljeave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” CR 15.01. However, the court may deny a motion to amend when the proposed amendment fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Hartmann, Ky.App., 747 S.W.2d 614, 616 (1988).
The purpose of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act is “to provide for execution within the state of the policies embodied in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended.” KRS 344.020. Therefore, Kentucky courts look to federal case law for guidance regarding issues of sex discrimination. In the case of Mountain Clay, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights, Ky.App., 830 S.W.2d 395 (1992), the Kentucky Court of Appeals used federal case law to determine whether Mountain Clay filed a retaliatory action pursuant to KRS 344.280(1).
Under federal law, in order to prove a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the employee must establish that:
(1) he was engaged in opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII or was a participant in the Title VII proceeding
(2) his activity was protected
(3) he was subjected to adverse treatment by the employer or labor union, and
(4) there was a causal connection between his opposition or participation and the retaliation.
Mountain Clay, 830 S.W.2d at 396.
In the case at bar, defense counsel, Mr. Lipps and Mr. Zeigler, are clearly not Plaintiffs employers. Rather, Bank One hired these gentlemen to defend this action. If Plaintiff has any viable claim of retaliation regarding the filing of the Declaratory Judgment Complaint, it is against Plaintiffs employer, Bank One, not the attorneys who filed the claim.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion to file a verified amended complaint is DENIED as to Count III.
Murphy subsequently filed another motion containing an identical Count III and asked the trial court to allow her to amend her complaint to allege a retaliation claim against Bank One itself. The trial court denied the motion after concluding that the Kentucky Rules of Evidence prevented Murphy from proving the material allegations of her retaliation claim and that, in any event, Murphy had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted:
This matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs motion to Amend Verified Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to add three new counts. Count III contains an allegation that the Defendant Bank One’s conduct in filing a Declaratory Judgment action in federal court constitutes retaliation ....
The Court first addresses Count III. In part, the opposition is based on the language in an Order of this Court dated December 31, 1996. Said order concerned another motion to amend the Complaint in which plaintiff sought to add an allegation of retaliation against two attorneys for Bank One. In denying the motion as to that Count of the Complaint, the Court stated that “[i]f the Plaintiff has any viable claim of retaliation regarding the filing of the Declaratory Judgment Complaint, it is against Plaintiffs employer, Bank One, not the attorneys who filed the claim.”
Upon further reflection the Court is not certain that this statement is correct. This conclusion is based on two reasons. First, the Court is mindful of the fact that the Plaintiff will not be able to introduce evidence of the Declaratory Judgment Complaint without offering the explanation that it occurred in response to settlement negotiations. It is fundamental law that a party may not introduce evidence at trial of offers to settle or compromise. Whitney v. Pen-ick, Ky., [281 Ky. 474,] 136 S.W.2d 570 (1940); Elam v. Wollery [Woolery], Ky., 258 S.W.2d 452 (1953). The Court cannot allow the charge of retaliation to circumvent an otherwise established rule of evidence.
The second reason for the change in the Court’s opinion is that the Court questions whether the actions of Defendant Bank One in exercising its legal right to seek a declaratory judgment may constitute “retaliation” under KRS Chapter 344. To so hold would effectively deny an employer its rightful access to the courts which is guaranteed by Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court may deny a motion to amend a complaint when the proposed amendment fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Hartmann, KyApp., 747 S.W.2d 614, 616 (1988).
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WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED.
CR 15.01 governs amendments to pleadings:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A *550party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be longer, unless the court otherwise orders.3
Murphy first sought to amend her complaint in November of 1996 — over a month after one of the defendants, Gaunt, filed and served his answer. Because Murphy sought to add the retaliation claim after she had been served with a responsive pleading, she could not amend her complaint as a matter of course,4 and instead sought leave of the court by filing a motion to amend her complaint.
We allow the trial courts discretion with regal’d to such motions, and review their rulings for abuse of that discretion.5 However, this Court has recognized “the freedom with which pleadings may be amended” 6 and that CR 15.01⅛ language reflects policy considerations “favorfing] the right of litigants to have their rights disposed of on the merits rather than technicalities.”7 Accordingly, we factor those policy considerations into our abuse-of-discretion review 8 and focus upon whether the amendment fails to state a claim upon which the trial court could grant relief, or, in other words “the futility of the amendment itself,” 9 and:
The primary consideration of the court should be the proper presentation of the merits of the case. Amended pleadings should be permitted to the extent that they are an aid in the proper disposition of the controversy, provided the party acts in good faith and not for the purpose of delay, and the opposing party is not prejudiced or the trial undu*551ly delayed.10
In my opinion, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Murphy’s motion to amend her complaint.
Bank One argues that the trial court correctly concluded that Murphy’s retaliation claim was futile because: (1) Count III failed to state a claim upon which the trial court could grant relief; (2) KRE 408 would prevent Murphy from proving the material facts underlying her claims because those facts concern “settlement negotiations”; and (3) Bank One’s attorneys cannot be individually liable for acts of retaliation. Each of these arguments is independently flawed, and none of them support the trial court’s rulings.
Bank One argues that Count III of Murphy’s Amended Verified Complaint failed to state a claim upon which the trial court could grant relief because (1) retaliation claims require an “adverse employment action,” and, as a matter of law, the filing of a federal declaratory judgment action is not an adverse employment action; (2) Kentucky Constitution § 14 guarantees Bank One access to the courts; and (3) under the United States Constitution’s supremacy clause, the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act trumps the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. I will address each conclusion in turn.
First, although the federal courts have traditionally required plaintiffs to demonstrate an adverse employment action as an element of the prima facie case for retaliation,11 many of the Circuit Courts of Appeal have embraced a broad view of adverse employment actions12 and have recognized that “[t]he law deliberately does not take a ‘laundry list’ approach to retaliation, because unfortunately its forms are as varied as the human imagination will permit,” 13 and held that “even actions taken in litigation could constitute retaliation in appropriate circumstances.”14
*552Second,. although this Court has stated that, because of the overlapping policy goals, federal authority “offers some guidance” 15 to Kentucky Courts faced with interpretive questions, Bank One’s reliance upon federal authority in this instance ignores substantive differences between the Kentucky and federal statutes. Kentucky’s anti-retaliation provision, KRS 344.280(1), explicitly makes it unlawful for any person “[t]o retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person ... because he has made a charge ... under this chapter.”16 The Kentucky provision is thus broader than the one contained in Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act17 because: (1) the Kentucky provision applies to all persons instead of merely employers and labor organizations;18 and (2) the Kentucky provision condemns any retaliatory act instead of merely acts of discrimination.
Finally, in Mountain Clay v. Commission on Human Rights,19 the Court of Appeals has interpreted KRS 344.280(l)’s language to include retaliatory litigation:
The Kentucky Civil Rights Act was enacted “to safeguard all individuals within the state from discrimination because of race, color, religion, national original, sex, and age” and to “further the interest, rights and privileges of individuals within the state.” KRS 344.020(b). The prohibition against employer retaliation was enacted to protect these rights. As one court has said, “retaliation, whether in the form of a *553subsequent discharge or court proceeding, places an added cost on the exercise of those rights and as such has a ‘chilling effect.’ Only by enjoining suits filed in retaliation for the exercise of protected rights can those rights be ensured.”20
Bank One argues that the facts of this case are factually distinguishable from Mountain Clay. While the defendant in Mountain Clay sought an injunction to prevent the Commission from conducting a hearing on the plaintiffs sexual discrimination claim and requested that the plaintiff “be held personally liable for all costs incurred by the corporation in defending against her action,”21 Bank One sought only declaratory judgment and specifically disclaimed any entitlement to costs or attorneys’ fees. We believe, however, that this emphasis on facts ignores the nature of the inquiry — -whether Count III of Murphy’s amended complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. WMe the factual differences may be relevant to whether Murphy can prevail on the merits of her claim by proving that Bank One had retaliatory purposes for filing the action in federal court,22 authority from both the federal courts and the Kentucky Court of Appeals supports the conclusion that litigation brought in bad faith and for retaliatory purposes can constitute actionable retaliation. Bank One’s decision to file a federal declaratory judgment action raises the possibility of coercive retaliatory purposes because the federal case created an additional layer of expense and exposure. Murphy “must yet prove her case, and nothing in this opinion should be read to suggest a particular outcome on the merits of Plaintiffs claim.”23
Bank One’s latter two arguments concerning Kentucky Constitution § 14 and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution constitute little more than grandstanding because the fact that state anti-discrimination law would provide a remedy for retaliatory abuse of the federal declaratory judgment process does not implicate either constitutional provision. Parties remain free to seek declaratory judgment in the federal courts, but may not abuse that right with impunity. In Raine v. Drasin,24 this Court stated that *554“[pjublic policy requires that all persons be able to freely resort to the courts for redress of a wrong, and the law should and does protect them when they commence a civil ... action in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.”25 If a party uses the courts to coerce an individual into abandoning her employment discrimination claim, these constitutional provisions offer no refuge.
Nor do the Kentucky Rules of Evidence provide a basis for concluding that Murphy’s claim is futile. Initially, I would note that questions regarding a plaintiffs ability to prove the merits of his or her claim are not relevant to whether that claim is one upon which relief can be granted. In this case, however, it does not appear that the Rules of Evidence would interfere with Murphy’s proof. Although Murphy’s retaliation claim is connected with Bank One’s actions during the course of settlement negotiations, KRE 408 prohibits the introduction of offers to compromise and statements made in the context of settlement negotiations only if such evidence is offered to “prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount”26 and KRE 408 specifically states that it “does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose...”27 Accordingly, while policies favoring voluntary dispute resolution28 would prevent Murphy from introducing evidence that Bank One offered a sum of money to settle her claim as evidence of Bank One’s liability for sexual harassment, KRE 408 would not prevent her from framing the context of Bank One’s decision to unilaterally and without warning withdraw from settlement negotiations and file a federal declaratory judgment action as evidence of bad faith.
Finally, the trial court erroneously held that Bank One’s attorneys could not be individually liable under Kentucky’s anti-retaliation provision because they did not have an employer-employee relationship with Murphy. KRS 344.280(1) refers to the unlawful practices of “a person, or ... two (2) or more persons [in conspiracy]”29 and the word “employer” cannot be found in this provision. This Court has interpreted this language according to its plain meaning to include non-employers.30 Of course, Murphy must prove retaliatory motives on the part of any defendant before she may prevail on her claim, but the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Murphy’s motion to amend her complaint to include a KRS 344.280(1) retaliation claim against Bank One’s attorneys.
Because none of the reasons given for the trial court’s rulings withstand scrutiny and proper presentation of the merits of this action requires consideration of Murphy’s KRS 344.280(1) retaliation claim, the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that Count III in Murphy’s Amended Verified Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. I would affirm the entirety of the Court of Appeals opinion and remand the case to the trial court for it to allow *555Murphy to amend her complaint to include Count III.
STUMBO, J., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

. See Palmer v. Intern. Ass’n of Machinists, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 117, 120 (1994).

. KRS 344.280(1). See also KRS 344.450 ("Any person injured by any act in violation of the provision of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action in Circuit Court to enjoin further violations, and to recover the actual damages sustained, together with the costs of the lawsuit....” Id.). I would note that KRS 344.280(1) offers protection from retaliation to any person while KRS 344.040 affords protection from discrimination only to those in an employer-employee relationship. Admittedly, in most cases, alleged acts of retaliation occur in an employment context, and existing caselaw tends to characterize retaliation in that context. KRS 344.280(1), however, covers a broader range of retaliatory acts. See infra note 18 and surrounding text.

. CR 15.01.

. See Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. State of Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341, 1348 (6th Cir.1993) ("[T]he responsive pleading by the State defendants cut off the Community's right to amend as a matter of course.” Id.); Textor v. Bd. of Regents of N. III. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1391 n. 1 (7th Cir.1983); Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 F.2d 1515, 1521 (9th Cir.1983), cert, denied 465 U.S. 1081, 104 S.Ct. 1446, 79 L.Ed.2d 765 (1984).

. See Graves v. Winer, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 193, 197 (1961) ("Though CR 15.01 provides that leave to amend 'shall be freely given when justice so requires,’ it is still discretionary with the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed unless it is clearly an abuse.” Id.); Bradford v. Billington, Ky., 299 S.W.2d 601, 603 (1957) ("While liberality in granting leave to amend is desirable, the application is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Id.).

. Hoke v. Cullinan, Ky„ 914 S.W.2d 335, 339 (1995).

. Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 277 Ky. 565, 126 S.W.2d 427, 431 (1938).

. See Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.1992) ("We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of leave to amend after responsive pleadings have been filed. The denial is, however, 'strictly reviewed in light of the strong policy permitting amendment.’ ” Id. (citations omitted)).

. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Hartmann, Ky.App., 747 S.W.2d 614, 616 (1988). See also Stem v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1334 (1977):
Rule 15(a) provides that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires,” and this circuit has adopted a liberal policy respecting amendments to pleadings so that cases may be decided on the merits and not on the basis of technicalities. As was stated in Führer v. Führer, [292 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir.1961) ] "leave to amend should be freely given unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.”
Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted).

. Kurt A. Phillips, Jr., 15 Kentucky Practice (Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated) § 15.01, Comment 3 at 299 (West Publishing Co. 1995).

. See Hanison v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 80 F.3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir.1996), Wrennv. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987).

. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241-1242 (9th Cir.2000) (observing that "the First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits ... all take an expansive view of the type of actions that can be considered adverse employment actions.” Id. at 1241). See also Berty v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir.1996) (rhetorically reconfiguring the "adverse employment action” element when defining the prima facie case for retaliation as: “(1) protected opposition to Title VII discrimination or participation in a Title VII proceeding; (2) adverse action by the employer subsequent to or contemporaneous with such employee activity; and (3) a causal connection between such activity and the employer’s adverse action." Id. (emphasis added)).

. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.1996).

.Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998). See abo Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, supra note 12 at 985-986 (finding a prima facie retaliation case in an allegation of malicious prosecution); Beckham v. Grand Affair of North Carolina, Inc., 671 F.Supp. 415, 419 (W.D.N.C.1987) ("[T]he allegation that Defendant caused Plaintiff to be arrested and prosecuted in retaliation for her having filed or contemplated an EEOC charge against Defendant states a cause of action against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)." Id.)-, Yankelevitz v. Cornell University, 1996 WL 447749, 1996 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 11298, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1662 (S.D.N.Y.1996) ("[T]he Court is unwilling to adopt a rule stating that compulsory counterclaims, or any other legal cause of action, cannot, as a matter of law, constitute retaliation in violation of the employment discrimination laws.” Id. 1996 WL 447749 at *4, 1996 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 11298 at 14); EEOC v. Levi Strauss & Co., 515 F.Supp. 640, 643 (N.D.I11.1981) ("[A] state court defamation action filed in retaliation for having engaged in conduct protected by § 704(a), including the filing of a charge with the Commission, violates [the anti-retaliation provisions.]” Id.)-, EEOC v. Virginia *552Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F.Supp. 775, 778 (W.D.Va.1980) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff on retaliation claim based on defendant's filing of groundless state court defamation action). Even the primary authority cited by Bank One, Zanders v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 898 F.2d 1127 (6th Cir.1990), examines the plaintiff's claim that the defendant brought a lawsuit against her in retaliation for her testimony in connection with a former co-worker’s employment discrimination case in the context of summary judgment — not FRCP 12(b)(6) — and evaluated the plaintiff's evidence of retaliatory motivations. See Id. at 1136 ("Viewed in light of the evidentiary burdens in this case, and given Zanders' burden to prove that the state lawsuit was a means of retaliating against her, Zanders has failed to present any evidence which would tend to show that Amtrak's articulated reason was pretextual.” Id.).

. Mountain Clay v. Com'n on Human Rights, Ky.App., 830 S.W.2d 395, 396 (1992).

. KRS 344.280(1).

. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2001):
(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful unemployment practice by this title or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.

Id.

. See KRS 344.010(1) (" 'Person' includes one (1) or more individuals, labor organizations, joint apprenticeship committees, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, fiduciaries, receivers, or other legal or commercial entity; the state, any of its political or civil subdivisions or agencies.” Id.); Palmer v. Intern. Ass’n of Machinists, supra note 1 at 120 (remanding retaliation action against two non-employer individuals)

. Supra note 15.

. Id. al 397 (quoting EEOC v. Levi Strauss & Co., supra note 14 at 642).

. Id. at 396.

. See Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Handley, Ky.App., 827 S.W.2d 697, 701 (1991):
The plaintiff, in making out a prima facie case, must show that 1) she engaged in a protected activity, 2) she was disadvantaged by an act of her employer, and 3) there was a causal connection between the activity engaged in and the employer’s act. Again, if the employer articulates a legitimate, non-retaliatoiy reason for the decision, the employee must show that "but for” the protected activity, the adverse action would not have occurred.
Id.; Zanders v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., supra note 14 at 1134 (“In a retaliation claim, a plaintiff alleges that she has been mistreated for engaging in protected activity, and that the employer’s motivations are therefore illicit. Thus, a retaliation claim is analogous to an intentional discrimination claim, or ‘disparate treatment’ claim, where the employee must prove the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Id. (emphasis added)); EEOC v. Levi Strauss Co., supra note 14 at 644 (”[I]t cannot be concluded that all defamation actions in the wake of sexual harassment charges filed before the Commission are violations of Title VII. Rather those suits initiated in state court in good faith and as an attempt to rehabilitate the employer's reputations which may have been tarnished by the charges are not necessarily violations of the Act.... [T]he Commission must demonstrate that the action was filed for improper, i.e. retaliatory purposes.” Id.).

. Beckham v. Grand Affair of North Carolina, Inc., supra note 14 at 419-420.

. Ky., 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (1981).

. Id. (emphasis added).

. KRE 408.

. Id.

. See 1992 Kentucky Evidence Rules Study Commentary to KRE 408 ("The law has long fostered voluntary dispute resolution by protecting against the possibility that a compromise or offer of compromise might be used to the disadvantage of a party in subsequent litigation. This is the essence of the first sentence of Rule 408...." Id.).

. KRS 344.280(1).

. See supra note 18 and surrounding text.