Court Opinion

ID: 9905533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:14.561036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:40.355126
License: Public Domain

J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

                               2023 PA Super 244

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 STUART HARRISON                         :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 519 MDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered November 1, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-67-CR-0007632-2018

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant             :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 STUART HARRISON                         :   No. 520 MDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered November 1, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-67-CR-0007632-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:               FILED: NOVEMBER 28, 2023

     Former police officer, Stuart Harrison, faces one count of simple assault

despite the Commonwealth’s two attempts to terminate that prosecution. In

its second attempt, which is the subject of this interlocutory appeal by

permission, the Commonwealth claimed that it could not proceed due to the

death of a witness.   The trial court disagreed with the Commonwealth’s
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

evidentiary analysis.      Harrison and the Commonwealth1 ask this Court to

conclude that the trial court improperly credited its own view of the evidentiary

question instead of deferring to the Commonwealth’s judgment. The parties

submit that this Court should look to In re Ajaj, 288 A.3d 94 (Pa. 2023),

which addresses judicial review of prosecutors’ declining to file private criminal

complaints, for the relevant standard of review.      Under that standard, the

Commonwealth’s petition must be granted unless its request was due to “bad

faith, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional.”              Id. at 97.

       We decline to adopt this standard, as the decision to file charges is

distinguishable from a decision to withdraw charges.        In the former case,

which In re Ajaj addresses, the prosecutor has decided that criminal charges

were not warranted. The judicial branch must tread lightly when interfering

with that judgment call. In the latter scenario, the prosecutor decided at one

time that charges were warranted. That is a conscious choice to implicate the

judicial branch. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that a motion

to withdraw a charge due to purported evidentiary insufficiency is subject to

de novo review, as it presents a pure question of law. We agree with the trial

court’s assessment of the evidence and therefore affirm.

                                               I.

       On May 30, 2018, employees of the Santander Bank requested

assistance from the Southwestern Regional Police Department. Harrison, an
____________________________________________

1 The victim is not a party to this appeal, and it does not appear he ever sought

to participate. Hence, the victim’s interests are not represented.

                                           -2-
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

officer employed by that department, responded and met the bank manager,

who pointed out Ryan Smith. The manager informed Harrison that Smith was

attempting to withdraw money from his account but did not have any

identification. Smith refused to comply with Harrison’s command to leave the

bank. Harrison eventually informed Smith that he was under arrest and twice

deployed his TASER, which did not make sufficient contact with Smith’s skin

to disable him.

      A second officer, Michael Matthews, arrived to assist after the second

TASER deployment.      Eventually, the two officers were able to cuff Smith’s

hands behind his back and escorted him from the building. Smith refused to

enter the patrol vehicle, and the two officers struggled to force him into the

backseat. Ultimately, Harrison “decided that he was going to drive stun …

Smith in the thigh with his TASER to see if that would get him to buckle his

leg so that they could get him in the back seat of the car.” Affidavit of Probable

Cause, 11/30/18, at 3 (summarizing interview with Harrison). Smith pulled a

trigger and immediately realized he had mistakenly drawn his firearm. The

bullet entered Smith’s leg, requiring a 17-day hospital stay.

      Smith’s mother, Christine Smith, witnessed the shooting.          She told

investigators that Smith said he was going to get money from the bank. She

explained that Smith had a mental illness, had been treated at the hospital for

psychiatric reasons and had just been released the day before, and seemed

delusional. She followed her son and told the arresting officers during the

struggle that Smith was experiencing a mental break.

                                      -3-
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

      The Pennsylvania State Police investigated and interviewed, among

others, Amanda Hendrickson-Cozio, who worked at the bank as a cleaner, and

Harry Harrington, a customer at the bank.           Hendrickson-Cozio saw the

shooting but did not witness the events inside the bank. Harrington witnessed

the entire encounter. The investigators also obtained video footage recorded

on a phone, which showed the initial dispute and TASER deployments.

Harrison was charged with one count of negligent simple assault. 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2701(a)(2) (“[A] person is guilty of assault if he … negligently causes bodily

injury to another with a deadly weapon[.]”).

      Hendrickson-Cozio, Christine Smith, and Trooper Daniel Weldon testified

at the preliminary hearing on December 21, 2018. Harrison was held on the

sole charge.

                  The first attempt to terminate prosecution

      The Commonwealth first tried to terminate this prosecution on May 19,

2020. While that ruling is not before us, it is referenced within the trial court’s

opinion on this matter and provides context.

      The Commonwealth attached a memorandum of law to its petition,

explaining that the nolle pros was “in the interests of justice.” Memorandum

in Support of Nolle Prosequi, 5/19/20, at 1 (unnumbered). The memorandum

was almost entirely based on the Commonwealth’s analysis of the sentencing

factors set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) (instructing a court to consider “the

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs

                                       -4-
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

of the defendant”). The Commonwealth cited Harrison’s 16-year career and

argued     that   Harrison    was    not    likely   to    recidivate.      Similarly,    the

Commonwealth determined that Harrison’s rehabilitative needs were non-

existent as the incident was a mistake.               The Commonwealth also cited

Harrison’s expressions of remorse and his conduct after-the-fact, which

included    addressing       two    cadet   classes       about   the    shooting.       The

Commonwealth believed that these actions “establish that he highly

appreciates the seriousness of this offense and his great degree of remorse

for injuring Mr. Smith.” Id. at 4.

      Turning to the victim’s needs, the Commonwealth did not mention

Smith, instead citing its discussions with his mother. The memorandum stated

that Mrs. Smith had “stressed two matters as critical outcomes for this case,”

which were that Harrison no longer carry a firearm while working and that the

shooting serve as an educational example for dealing with mental health

issues. The Commonwealth noted that Harrison is no longer working as a

police officer and cited the trainings conducted by Harrison.                            “The

Commonwealth believes that these primary outcomes sought by Mrs. Smith

are accomplished.” Id. at 5. The Commonwealth conceded that Mrs. Smith

objected to withdrawing the charge but asserted that any further punishment

“would be … punishment for punishment’s sake.”                          Id. at 5-6.      The

Commonwealth stressed that “Mr. Harrison has, in fact, undergone a lasting

punishment” because he had been arrested and suffered “collateral

                                            -5-
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

consequences and public stigma. That lasts regardless of whether a conviction

occurred.” Id. at 6.

        The Honorable Maria Musti Cook denied the petition following a hearing

on June 15, 2020.         The court stated at the outset its concern that the

Commonwealth’s filings indicated that Smith had not been given notice of the

hearing. District Attorney David Sunday explained that, as set forth in the

memorandum, the Commonwealth had discussed its plan with Smith’s

mother. Attorney Sunday added that he spoke with Smith’s “personal injury

lawyer and … I certainly thought that everything was being communicated to

him.” N.T., 6/15/20, at 3-4.

        The   trial   court   then    asked     Smith,   who   was    present,   what

communications he had received.                Smith stated, “None.     The [District

Attorney] has never reached out to me once.” Id. at 5. Smith stated that he

was present only because “Ashley contacted me and told me what was going

on….”      Id. at 6.2 The trial court then asked Mrs. Smith about the

Commonwealth’s discussions with her. She agreed that the District Attorney’s

Office had discussed the matter with her and confirmed that she disapproved

of the decision to drop the charge. Attorney Sunday explained at length why

he believed a withdrawal was appropriate and argued that most prosecutors

would not have filed charges at all.

____________________________________________

2 It is not clear who Ashley is, and no last name was given.

                                           -6-
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

      The trial court characterized the Commonwealth’s memorandum as

focusing on “sentencing considerations, and sentencing considerations come

into play after there’s a plea or a verdict.” Id. at 16. The court opined that

a nolle pros is appropriate when “the evidence is insufficient to sustain a

conviction,” and the Commonwealth “[is] not saying that.”              Id.   The

Commonwealth replied that sentencing law is “the closest that we can find.”

Id. at 17. The trial court denied the petition as well as the Commonwealth’s

request that the court amend the order to state it “involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion

and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the

ultimate termination of the matter.”     42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b).     See Pa.R.A.P.

311(a)(1)   (authorizing   appeal    certified   under   that   statute).    The

Commonwealth then sought permission to appeal, which we denied on

November 9, 2020.

                  Second attempt to terminate prosecution

      The next event on the criminal docket sheet after the Commonwealth’s

petition to appeal was denied is dated September 16, 2021, when the

Commonwealth filed its second motion for nolle prosequi, which is the subject

of this appeal. On November 1, 2021, the parties appeared for a hearing.

The Commonwealth claimed that it could no longer proceed as Harrington had

died on March 23, 2019.        The Commonwealth stated that, without his

testimony, “the Commonwealth does not believe it can meet its burden

beyond a reasonable doubt. When we cannot meet our burden, it is our ethical

                                      -7-
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

obligation to the [c]ourt to ask that the charges be dismissed.” N.T., 11/1/21,

at 2. The court responded, “I have to say, I’m trying to say this politely, I

found [the petition] quite lame for two reasons.” Id. at 3. The first was that

Harrington had died on March 23, 2019, which predated the Commonwealth’s

first attempt to withdraw all charges.     The second was the trial court’s

conclusion that Harrington’s testimony was not needed to secure a conviction.

The Commonwealth replied that “Harrington was the sole independent witness

at that time” who saw what occurred both inside and outside the bank. Id.

at 4. The trial court did not buy this argument, averring that this case is no

different “from any domestic violence case, any rape case, any case where all

we have is a victim and a perpetrator and no other witnesses.”        Id.   The

Commonwealth responded that Harrington’s testimony was relevant to “what

we anticipate [the] defense to present at the time of trial. Here, in what we

anticipate the defense to be, Mr. Harrington is critically necessary to refute

that defense.” Id. The Commonwealth also stated that it was unaware of

Harrington’s death when it first sought to terminate the case because it had

yet to start preparing for trial due to its plea discussions.   The trial court

rejected the Commonwealth’s arguments and entered an order denying the

Commonwealth’s second motion for nolle prosequi.

                              Trial court opinion

      The Commonwealth again requested that the trial court certify the order

for appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b), which the trial court denied. Both

parties filed a petition for permission to appeal, which this Court granted. We

                                     -8-
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

then consolidated the appeals sua sponte and the trial court ordered the

parties to file concise statements pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).          The

Commonwealth raised the following claims, which are virtually identical to the

issues presented on appeal:

     I. Did trial court err in denying the Commonwealth’s Motion for
     Nolle Prosequi where [the court] found the rationale for the
     Commonwealth’s motion to be ‘lame’ and based its decision … on
     generalizations concerning evidentiary sufficiency and not on an
     assessment of the individualized evidentiary sufficiency of this
     case?

     II. Did the trial court err in denying Commonwealth’s Motion for
     Nolle Prosequi, despite the Commonwealth’s repeated averments
     that it could not ethically proceed due to a lack of sufficient
     evidence to proceed to trial pursuant to Rule 3.8 of the Rules of
     Professional Conduct?

     III. Did trial court violate the constitutional requirements
     governing Separation of Powers by denying the Commonwealth’s
     Motion for Nolle Prosequi based upon a review of all evidence,
     including that of the defense in light of the passing of a material
     Commonwealth witness, and determination that the evidence was
     insufficient to proceed to trial, and ordering the Commonwealth to
     proceed to trial despite this independent evaluation of the
     executive branch and that doing so requires the Commonwealth
     to violate the ethical mandates of Pennsylvania Rule of
     Professional Conduct 3.8?

Concise Statement, 5/12/22, at 1-2 (unnumbered).

     In response to the Commonwealth’s concise statement, the trial court

elaborated on its assessment of the evidence remaining to the Commonwealth

in its Rule 1925(a) opinion.    First, the trial court pointed out that the

Commonwealth’s description of Harrington as the only “independent” witness

is incorrect, as Hendrickson-Cozio said she witnessed the shooting. Thus, the

trial court stated that “independent evidence exists from a witness unrelated

                                    -9-
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

to Smith or [Appellant] or the police department.” Trial Court Opinion (TCO),

6/13/22, at 8 (unnumbered). Addressing the fact that Hendrickson-Cozio did

not witness the dispute inside of the bank, the court referenced the video

evidence showing what happened inside the bank, and noted that “there are

several witnesses who can provide testimony regarding observations of what

occurred outside of the bank from the time Smith exited the bank until he was

shot by [Harrison].” Id. at 8-9.

      The trial court also determined, for largely the same reasons, that

prosecuting Harrison would not violate Rule 3.8 of the Rules of Professional

Conduct.   The trial court noted that the Commonwealth did not cite any

particular provision of that Rule, but did not deem the issue waived for that

failure, as it presumed that the Commonwealth referenced Rule 3.8(a), which

states that “[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall … refrain from prosecuting

a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause[.]” PA

ST RPC Rule 3.8. The court quickly dispensed with the argument, reiterating

that the evidence was sufficient to convict, and that the Commonwealth

“regularly proceeds to trial with much less evidence and often with nothing

more than a ‘he said-she said’ scenario….” TCO at 10.

      Finally, the trial court found that its order did not violate separation of

powers, as Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 585 requires the trial

court to consent to the Commonwealth’s petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 585(A)

(“Upon motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth, the court may, in open

                                     - 10 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

court, order a nolle prosequi of one or more charges notwithstanding the

objection of any person.”).

                                      II.

                              Parties’ Arguments

      The parties are largely aligned in their presentations, as Appellant

adopts wholesale the Commonwealth’s arguments as to the second and third

issues raised on appeal.

      Regarding the first issue, the Commonwealth first contends that the trial

court improperly conducted its own assessment of the strength of the evidence

when reviewing the petition to nolle prosequi the charge. The Commonwealth

faults the trial court for citing “generalized” assessments, such as the ability

to prove a domestic violence assault case through the testimony of one

witness, instead of examining the specific details of this case.

      Relatedly, the Commonwealth expresses the view that its own review of

the evidence should be credited. Harrington was the only witness to see what

happened both inside and outside the bank, was the only witness “not

affiliated with either the victim and his family or the police,” and the only

“independent witness whose testimony would establish that [Harrison] acted

with criminal negligence.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. The Commonwealth

disagrees that the other witnesses will suffice because “none of these

witnesses offered the same type of testimony as Mr. Harrington,” which

“cannot be replicated by any other witness….” Id. at 16.

                                     - 11 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

       The Commonwealth agrees that it does not have unlimited discretion

and accepts that judicial approval is required, but highlights case law linking

a petition for nolle prosequi to judicial review of a prosecutor’s refusal to file

a private criminal complaint.        Following In re Ajaj, wherein our Supreme

Court established a unitary standard of review for examining a prosecutor’s

reasons for not approving a private criminal complaint, the Commonwealth

states that the trial court was required to grant its petition unless the request

was due to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional.         The

Commonwealth argues that “[d]isapproving a private criminal complaint and

seeking to terminate a prosecution though a nolle prosequi implicate[s] the

same type of prosecutorial discretion. … [I]t stands to reason to employ the

same standard in each circumstance.” Commonwealth’s Supplemental Brief

at 13.3 Harrison adopts this argument and adds that the trial court’s ruling

will force him “to litigate claims for months or years that have already been

assessed by the Commonwealth as legally insufficient.” Harrison’s Brief at 10.

This will cause “emotional burden[s] and severe financial hardship.” Id.

       The Commonwealth’s second claim on appeal is that it cannot ethically

proceed because it lacks sufficient evidence to convict. Pennsylvania Rule of

Professional Conduct 3.8 says that the Commonwealth cannot prosecute a
____________________________________________

3 We requested supplemental briefing as In re Ajaj was issued after the briefs

were filed. The Commonwealth’s initial brief argued that a trial court abuses
its discretion if it does not accept a “reasonable” request for seeking a nolle
prosequi. We interpret the Commonwealth’s supplemental brief to argue the
position that an abuse of discretion standard is too lenient in light of In re
Ajaj.

                                          - 12 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

charge if it is not supported by probable cause. The Commonwealth argues

that “[i]t is axiomatic that a prosecutor has an on-going duty to evaluate her

cases to ensure that the cases being brought before juries are those for which

guilt can be decided based upon sufficient evidence.” Commonwealth’s Brief

at 21. The Commonwealth states that four separate prosecutors from the

District Attorney’s Office for York County reviewed the case and each

concluded that, without Harrington’s testimony, a conviction could not be

obtained.

      Finally, the Commonwealth claims that the trial court’s ruling violated

the separation of powers doctrine. It says that the judiciary, executive, and

legislative branches are all independent and co-equal, and “the prosecutor has

the power to decide whether to initiate formal criminal proceedings, to select

those criminal charges which will be filed against the accused, to negotiate

plea bargains, to withdraw charges where appropriate, and, ultimately, to

prosecute or dismiss charges at trial.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 24 (quoting

Commonwealth        v.   Clancy,   192     A.3d     44,    53   (Pa.   2018)).       The

Commonwealth does not claim that requiring judicial approval for a nolle

prosequi in and of itself violates the separation of powers.            However, the

Commonwealth      argues   that,   in    the     absence   of   a   finding   that   the

Commonwealth acted in bad faith, or that its decision was unconstitutional or

discriminatory, the trial court must grant the petition. The trial court’s ruling

was not based on any of those possibilities. The trial court merely disagreed

                                        - 13 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

with the Commonwealth, which is not a proper basis for denying its petition

and impermissibly exercises a power reserved to the executive branch.

                                           III.

       The parties’ arguments proceed from the premise that the nolle prosequi

inquiry should be analyzed under precedents examining a prosecutor’s refusal

to process a private criminal complaint filed by a citizen.4 We thus begin by

briefly discussing the evolution of the common law nolle prosequi power in

this Commonwealth and how that power has been analogized to the private

complaint process.

       Our sister court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

explains a petition for nolle prosequi as follows: “Under this doctrine,

prosecutors have the power to decide whether to proceed with the prosecution

of a charged defendant. Absent a controlling statute or rule to the contrary,

this power resides solely in the prosecutor’s hands until the impanelment and

swearing of a jury.”       In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 782 (3d Cir. 2000).

Pennsylvania likewise historically viewed the nolle prosequi power as not

subject to judicial oversight. “A nolle prosequi is a voluntary withdrawal by

the prosecuting attorney of present proceedings on a particular bill.          At

common law it might at any time be retracted and was not a bar to a

subsequent prosecution on another indictment, but it might be so far canceled
____________________________________________

4 We address the parties’ claims together because the second and third claims

are variations of the first claim, which concerns the standard of review to be
applied. Our resolution of the standard of review argument suffices to
dispense with the second and third points of error.

                                          - 14 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

as   to    permit      a    revival   of    the    proceedings    on    the   original    bill.”

Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 142 A. 213, 216 (Pa. 1928). Pennsylvania

law restricted this prosecutorial prerogative as early as 1850:

      Historically, at common law, a prosecutor had the authority to
      enter a nolle prosequi on his own motion. See Commonwealth
      ex rel. Thor v. Ashe, … 11 A.2d 173 ([Pa. Super.] 1939). This
      unfettered power was modified by the Acts of May 3, 1850, P.L.
      654, and the Criminal Procedure Act of 1860, which required that
      before a nolle prosequi could be entered, the assent of the proper
      court must be obtained. Id.

Commonwealth v. Stivala, 645 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa. Super. 1994).

      The power to request a nolle prosequi is currently governed by rule and

requires    judicial       consent.        “Upon    motion   of   the   attorney    for    the

Commonwealth, the court may, in open court, order a nolle prosequi of one

or more charges notwithstanding the objection of any person.” Pa.R.Crim.P.

585(A). That requirement raises the question at the heart of this appeal: what

principles inform whether the trial court should (or even must) assent, and

what standard does an appellate court apply when reviewing that ruling?

      Most cases involving judicial review of a motion for nolle prosequi

involve an adversarial dispute, because a successful motion leaves the door

open for future prosecutions.              “Nolle prosequi, if entered before jeopardy

attaches, neither operates as an acquittal nor prevents further prosecution of

the offense.”       Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641, 642 (1976).                     Thus, a

defendant may wish to contest a nolle prosequi or argue that the prosecution

is attempting to circumvent the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial.

                                              - 15 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

      Our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 246

A.2d 430 (Pa. 1968), is an example of how a prosecutor’s motion for nolle

prosequi does not necessarily benefit the defendant. There, DiPasquale was

accused of murdering several people on June 17, 1966. The trial court had

granted six Commonwealth postponements, and trial was set for March 11,

1968. The Commonwealth informed the court that it “had only one witness,

namely Boyesky, who could incriminate the defendant, and that Boyesky had

informed the District Attorney that he would repudiate the statement he had

made to the police in which he incriminated the defendant, and that if called

as a witness he would plead the Fifth Amendment.”            Id. at 431.    The

Commonwealth stated it would not be able to prove its case and “was forced

to request leave to nolle pros the indictments.” Id. The trial court denied the

request and forced the case to trial, which resulted in a not guilty verdict.

      The Commonwealth appealed, claiming that the acquittal was a nullity

as the trial court should have granted its petition.       Our Supreme Court

acknowledged a prosecutor’s “widely recognized power to conduct criminal

litigation and prosecutions on behalf of the Commonwealth, and to decide

whether and when to prosecute, and whether and when to continue or

discontinue a case,” but those principles must be considered alongside the

court’s own powers, which include protection “of a defendant’s rights to a fair

trial and due process under the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 432.

      In Stivala, we addressed whether the trial court’s role should be viewed

any differently when the application for a nolle prosequi benefits the

                                     - 16 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

defendant. Martin Stivala was accused of setting a building on fire, and the

Commonwealth charged him with, among other crimes, felony murder. The

Commonwealth had moved to nolle prosequi the murder charge due to

evidentiary insufficiency prior to trial, which the trial court denied. The jury

convicted Stivala of several crimes but was unable to reach a verdict on

murder, and a mistrial was declared on that count. Stivala asserted on appeal

that the trial court erred by rejecting the Commonwealth’s request to dismiss

that charge.   He advanced a maximalist position: if the Commonwealth’s

motion benefits the defendant, then the trial court must grant the request. In

addition, he brought a separation-of-powers argument:

      [Stivala] contends that the trial court was without power to deny
      the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi because the
      Commonwealth has discretion whether to prosecute a matter, and
      for a court to interfere with that decision is a violation of the
      constitutional guarantee of the separation of powers. In effect,
      [Stivala] claims that the judicial branch may not intervene here to
      usurp the discretion of the executive branch.

Stivala, 645 A.2d at 261.

      Stivala sought to distinguish DiPasquale, asserting that, “although the

court could protect the rights of defendants, there is nothing to permit the

court to protect the public good in denying a nolle prosequi, and thus forcing

a defendant to go to trial.” Id. at 261-62. We disagreed, analogizing the

Commonwealth’s assessment of the evidentiary sufficiency to cases in which

a prosecutor declines to process a private complaint.       We looked to our

Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Benz, 565 A.2d 764 (Pa.

1989), abrogated by In re Ajaj, 288 A.3d 94 (Pa. 2023), which held that a

                                     - 17 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

determination of the sufficiency of evidence is a judicial function and does not

implicate prosecutorial discretion.     We concluded, “[f]rom the Supreme

Court’s decision in Benz, supra, it is apparent that the determination of

whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case is

ultimately a judicial one and subject to the trial court’s determination.”

Stivala, 645 A.2d at 262. We then reviewed the sufficiency of evidence de

novo.

        Notwithstanding this conclusion, the parties argue that Benz supports

their position because, in dicta, it suggested that policy reasons are afforded

special deference.    In Benz, an off-duty police officer, Joseph Benz, was

waiting for an elevator door to close when Paaron Jones approached and held

the door open to speak with another person. Benz and Jones began to argue,

and Jones attacked Benz. Benz pulled out his badge and gun, and identified

himself as a police officer. Jones ran and Benz pursued. A second scuffle

began, during which Benz’s firearm accidentally discharged. Jones was shot

in the head and ultimately died.

        The Allegheny County District Attorney chose not to file charges,

concluding that the evidence showed the men were wrestling over the gun

when it discharged.    Jones’ mother then sought approval to file a private

complaint charging Benz with voluntary manslaughter. “The District Attorney

disapproved the complaint on the grounds that insufficient evidence existed

to establish that a crime had been committed.” Benz, supra at 767. She

appealed and the Superior Court reversed, concluding that the evidence was

                                      - 18 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

sufficient to establish a prima facie case of voluntary manslaughter.          The

Commonwealth then appealed to our Supreme Court, which affirmed.

      In an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Chief Justice Nix,

joined by Justices Larsen and Zappala, agreed with this Court’s ruling that, as

a matter of law, the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

The Court did not address the Commonwealth’s argument that separation-of-

powers principles required the appellate courts to defer to the exercise of

prosecutorial discretion, responding that this argument was irrelevant under

the circumstances:

      The fallacy of this argument is its lack of relevancy.            The
      prosecutor in this instance never purported to predicate his
      decision not to prosecute upon the exercise of his prosecutorial
      discretion to make policy. He expressly stated that the decision
      to decline prosecution resulted from his determination that the
      evidence would not sustain a prima facie case. Thus[,] the issue
      before both lower courts required an assessment of that legal
      judgment and not an intrusion upon prosecutorial discretion. Had
      the district attorney utilized policy discretion to refuse prosecution
      and had the lower courts reviewed that decision, the question of
      separation of powers would have been appropriately raised.
      However, we need not stray from the issues properly presented
      to decide this case.

Benz, supra at 768 (footnote omitted).

      The plurality suggested in a footnote that if the Commonwealth had

cited policy reasons, the result would have been different:

      If the district attorney had stated policy reasons to support the
      decision not to prosecute, this Court would show the deference
      accorded to such a discretionary use of the executive powers
      conferred in that officer. However, because the reason stated was
      the ultimate determination by the district attorney that no crime
      had been committed, this Court is authorized to review that

                                     - 19 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

      determination without the special deference afforded a separate
      branch of government.

Id. at 767 n.4.

      Benz has been abrogated by In re Ajaj, which announced a unitary

standard of review over a prosecutor’s decision not to accept a private

complaint, thereby rejecting the notion that policy reasons should be assessed

differently than legal determinations. In that case, Luay Ajaj and Saja Ibrahim

Abdulkareem Al Rabeeah had been involved in a custody dispute over their

two children. Ajaj alleged that the children’s mother had kept their children

in Iraq in violation of court orders and sought the assistance of various law

enforcement agencies.     Those efforts were unsuccessful, and Ajaj sought

approval to file a private complaint against their mother for violations of

criminal law.     An assistant district attorney disapproved the complaint,

“identifying ‘evidentiary issues’ as the sole reason for her decision in the

limited space provided on the complaint form.” In re Ajaj, supra at 100.

Ajaj petitioned the court of common pleas for de novo review as authorized

by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 506(B)(2). The District Attorney’s

office filed a response, listing five separate reasons for disapproving the

complaint, which referenced policy-based reasons, legal reasons, and

practical/evidentiary difficulties as reasons for disapproving the complaint.

The court of common pleas reversed the disapproval, and the Superior Court

affirmed.

      Our Supreme Court reversed. The Court explained that no precedential

holding had emerged in this arena.      The Court ultimately established the

                                    - 20 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

following standard of review for a trial court’s review of a prosecutor’s decision

not to approve a private complaint:

      [A] court of common pleas may only overturn that decision if the
      private complainant demonstrates that the disapproval decision
      amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was
      unconstitutional. In so holding, we denounce the prior rubric,
      where the applicable standard of review depended on the asserted
      basis for the prosecutor’s disapproval decision.

Id. at 109. This standard “ensures that a court of common pleas will afford

proper deference to the discretionary decision of the prosecutor—a member

of the executive branch of the Commonwealth’s government.” Id. at 109-10.

Additionally, while the Court did not address what standard of review would

apply on appellate review of that decision, it suggested that an abuse of

discretion standard is inappropriate. See id. at 110 n.11.

                                       IV.

      With this background in mind, we now address the November 1, 2021

order.

      We stress that the only order under review is the trial court’s ruling on

the second petition, which had the effect of benefitting Harrison but not, as

far as the record goes, the intent. Certainly, the first petition had both the

intent and effect of benefitting Harrison. As recounted in the factual history

section, the Commonwealth intended to terminate the prosecution as a “plea

bargain” of sorts. The trial court refused to grant that petition.

      The Commonwealth assiduously avoids mentioning in its brief any of the

reasons it tried to terminate the prosecution the first time. It maintains that

                                      - 21 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

its second petition was filed due entirely to the death of a witness it deems

crucial. Thus, the Commonwealth represents that it would have continued its

prosecution but for the death of Harrington. Thus, the petition would have

the effect of benefitting Harrison, but it was not intended to do so as the

Commonwealth’s request was made after a review of the evidence it could

present at the forthcoming trial. Our analysis therefore does not encompass

the trial court’s first ruling.5

       Because our review is limited to the Commonwealth’s assertion that the

evidence is insufficient to convict, we conclude that Stivala is largely on point.

Like this case, Stivala involved the Commonwealth’s seeking a nolle prosequi

on the basis that the available evidence could not meet its burden to convict,

and it deemed Benz relevant to motions that benefit the defendant.            The

Commonwealth asserts that the In re Ajaj case enshrines what Benz left

open: if the Commonwealth makes a policy determination in concluding that
____________________________________________

5 Portions of the trial court’s opinion suggest that the Commonwealth’s second

petition to terminate prosecution cited Harrington’s death as a pretext to
relitigate its first failed petition. Specifically, the trial court stated:

       This has never been a case where evidence was insufficient. The
       Commonwealth negotiated a plea agreement with defense counsel
       that included a nolle prosequi of the charges and now wants
       that agreement enforced by the [c]ourt; this [c]ourt did not
       find the agreement to give consideration to [Smith]’s rights and
       [Smith] was opposed to the negotiated plea agreement.

TCO at 10-11 (unnumbered; emphasis added).           Notwithstanding this
observation, the trial court addressed the merits of the Commonwealth’s
evidentiary claim. Absent an explicit finding by the trial court that the
Commonwealth’s cited basis for withdrawing the charge was made in bad
faith, we limit our analysis to the second petition.

                                          - 22 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

the evidence was insufficient to convict, then that decision must be afforded

great deference.    See Benz, supra at 767 n.11 (suggesting that, if the

prosecution cites a policy reason, the courts “would show the deference

accorded to such a discretionary use of the executive powers conferred in that

officer”). The Commonwealth cites its policy of not pursuing cases that are

unlikely to result in a conviction, as well as its ethical duties not to pursue

cases it cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

      We disagree. We acknowledge that this issue presents difficulties. “Few

subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive

of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal

proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a

proceeding once brought.” Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480

(D.C. Cir. 1967).   The Commonwealth’s position is not unreasonable, as a

district attorney’s office has wide discretion to prosecute cases as it sees fit.

However, we disagree with its position that the decision to commence a

prosecution and the decision to terminate it calls for an identical standard

review.   That argument ignores the fact that “the scope of prosecutorial

discretion changes as a criminal case proceeds, narrowing as the case nears

completion.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 145 (Pa. 2018). The

decision to file charges is the initial step, and the most critical one.       It

represents the prosecutor’s choice to involve, or not involve, the judicial

branch. Prosecutors still enjoy wide latitude from that point on, especially

before the jury has rendered a verdict. They can offer plea bargains as to

                                     - 23 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

charges, agree to recommend a particular sentence, or make agreements on

both points. Simultaneously, there is no absolute right to have a judge accept

the parties’ negotiated agreement. “While the Commonwealth and a criminal

defendant are free to enter into an arrangement that the parties deem fitting,

the terms of a plea agreement are not binding upon the court. Rather the

court may reject those terms if the court believes the terms do not serve

justice.” Commonwealth v. White, 787 A.2d 1088, 1091 (Pa. Super. 2001).

What plea bargain to offer is an act of prosecutorial discretion, yet the parties

do not argue that the standards announced in In re Ajaj would apply to

whether a trial court must accept a plea.

      We therefore disagree with the argument that every exercise of

prosecutorial discretion that can be described as implicating policy is governed

by the In re Ajaj standard. That case addressed only whether a prosecutor

decides to charge at all. A court’s second guessing a prosecutor’s decision

that criminal charges are not warranted poses a serious risk that the judicial

branch is encroaching on the executive branch’s powers, and warrants the

demanding standard set forth by In re Ajaj. This point is underscored by

Justice Dougherty’s concurring opinion, which addressed the fact that the rule

does not specify a remedy if a court overrules a prosecutor’s decision not to

accept the private complaint. He noted the “long-held belief among the courts

that [Rule 506] ‘reposes an awesome power in the judiciary, namely, the

authority to order a prosecutor … to prosecute a criminal complaint in the

name of the Commonwealth.’” In Re Ajaj, 288 A.3d at 112 (Dougherty, J.,

                                     - 24 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

concurring) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 669 A.2d 984, 994 (Pa.

1995) (en banc) (Saylor, J., dissenting)) (emphasis supplied by In re Ajaj).

Justice Dougherty is skeptical of that power, opining that “there is a colorable

argument that when a court forces a district attorney to commence a

prosecution he opposes — whether for legal or policy reasons — it inevitably

‘interfere[s] with the prosecutor’s discretionary functions’ and thereby

‘violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers.’” Id. at 112-13

(quoting Commonwealth v. Buonopane, 599 A.2d 681, 684 (Pa. Super.

1991)).

      Forcing a prosecutor to commence prosecution is distinct from a ruling

that serves to force the Commonwealth to continue a prosecution it chose to

commence. The prospect of encroaching on powers reserved to the executive

branch is far more pronounced when a court conscripts the District Attorney’s

Office into service. In contrast, the denial of the Commonwealth’s petition for

a nolle prosequi due to a claim that the evidence will be insufficient to convict

at trial simply requires it to continue prosecuting a charge that it believed was

worthy of criminal sanctions. And the denial of a motion seeking to withdraw

all charges does not preclude the Commonwealth from amending the charges

or reaching a plea bargain.      The trial court’s ruling does not force the

Commonwealth’s hand in the same way that forcing it to file a private

complaint does.     Forcing a prosecutor to bring charges overrides the

prosecutor’s authority at the very beginning of the process.        Requiring a

prosecutor to proceed with the charges he or she chose to file only regulates

                                     - 25 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

the authority they chose to exercise. In re Ajaj demands a high standard for

the former but it does not dictate that the same standard governs the latter.

      Because we conclude that In re Ajaj does not control, we must decide

what standard to apply.      We conclude that Stivala applied the correct

standard of de novo review. We see no need to address the parties’ claim

that the Commonwealth made a pure policy judgment in choosing not to

proceed.   Reasonable jurists can disagree on that point.     Compare In re

Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 217 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc) (agreeing with trial

court that a conclusion “that the likelihood of conviction is minimal and/or the

likelihood of acquittal is great … is a policy determination”) with id. at 223

(Bowes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he district attorney concluded that the likelihood

of a conviction was minimal, which constituted a legal evaluation of the

evidence and is subject to appellate de novo review.”); In re Ajaj, supra at

117 (Wecht, J., concurring and dissenting) (opining that the majority and

dissenting opinion in In re Wilson “reach wholly reasonably yet contradictory

conclusions” on that point). The dispositive fact is that the Commonwealth

chose to pursue charges, so we know the York County District Attorney’s Office

found that the case warranted prosecution both as a matter of law and policy.

Had Harrington died while the Commonwealth was still deciding whether to

press charges and cited his death as the reason for disapproval, the In re

Ajaj standard would clearly apply.            But the fact remains that the

Commonwealth chose to file charges, and by doing so made the judiciary a

part of the case.

                                     - 26 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

      That includes, of course, Rule 585’s requirement that the trial court must

approve the petition.    The Commonwealth could always claim that some

change in circumstance warranted withdrawing charges due to a concern that

a conviction cannot be obtained, including a reevaluation of the available

evidence. And it could always claim that conviction, even if not impossible, is

unlikely, and therefore not a good use of its resources. It is difficult to see

how these claims would ever amount to “bad faith” or any of the other bases

set forth in In re Ajaj.    When the Commonwealth claims that it cannot

proceed for legal reasons, the de novo standard for a pure question of law

ensures that the Rule serves its purpose.

      Two recent precedents from our Supreme Court support our holding that

a de novo standard does not apply to a motion for nolle prosequi based on an

asserted lack of evidentiary sufficiency. In Brown, 196 A.3d 130, Brown filed

a PCRA appeal from an order denying his claims for relief, which included

allegations of trial counsel ineffectiveness during his capital sentencing phase.

The Philadelphia County District Attorney’s Office originally filed a brief

opposing relief. Later, the Commonwealth and Brown filed a joint motion in

which the Commonwealth confessed error, concluding that Brown was entitled

to an order vacating his death sentence and imposing a sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Commonwealth argued

that our Supreme Court was required to accept the legal concession without

examining the legal merits of the underlying claim of ineffectiveness. The

Commonwealth “insist[ed] that only district attorneys, as a result of their

                                     - 27 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

‘wide grant of prosecutorial discretion,’ have the ‘power to decide whether to

seek or continue to seek the death penalty in view of the facts of any particular

case.’” Id. at 142-43 (quoting brief). The Court disagreed. As previously

quoted, the Court observed that prosecutorial discretion narrows as the case

proceeds, and where the jury has reached a verdict “neither the parties, by

agreement, nor this Court, absent a finding of legal error, have the power or

ability” to commute the death sentence. Id. at 143.

      Brown is not directly on point, as the case proceeded to trial and the

jury rendered a verdict.   But it illustrates that a prosecutor’s discretionary

powers do not extend to binding a court to adopting its own preferred legal

judgments. The Commonwealth here attempted to do just that, and its brief

to this Court continues to emphasize its own view of the legal question instead

of explaining why Harrington’s testimony is so critical that a conviction cannot

be obtained without that testimony.

      In Commonwealth v. Perrin, 291 A.3d 337 (Pa. 2023), the

Philadelphia County District Attorney’s Office prosecuted Perrin for a robbery.

At trial, only the victim and Lynwood Perry, who admitted he participated in

the robbery, testified.    Perrin was convicted and, on direct appeal, the

Commonwealth disclosed that an FBI agent had interviewed Curtis Brown,

Perry’s cellmate. The agent related that Perry had told Brown that he falsely

implicated Perrin. This Court granted Perrin’s request for a remand; at the

hearing, both the FBI agent and Brown testified. Perry did not. The court

denied relief, concluding that Perry’s testimony was needed.         This Court

                                     - 28 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

reversed and remanded, determining that Perry was unavailable as a matter

of law and his statements were admissible hearsay. The original judge was,

by that time, no longer on the bench. We ordered the new judge to hold an

evidentiary hearing on remand.

      Upon remand, the Commonwealth and Perrin submitted a stipulation

that Brown would testify consistently with his prior testimony and that this

testimony was credible. The trial court refused to accept the stipulation. Our

Supreme Court ultimately granted a petition for allowance of appeal, and held

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept a

stipulation to credibility. “[A]ny attempt by the parties to force the trial court

to accept a proposed stipulation as to witness credibility does not solely affect

the parties and intrudes on the jurisdiction and prerogative of the court.” Id.

at 346.

      Perrin, like Brown, involves a verdict entered after trial, but its core

holding that a trial court is not required to accept the Commonwealth’s

concession of a legal point applies here.       The trial court is permitted to

evaluate the Commonwealth’s legal conclusion for itself.

                                       V.

      The remaining question is whether the trial court correctly concluded

that Harrington’s absence was not fatal to the Commonwealth’s ability to

pursue the charge of simple assault. This presents a pure question of law,

and we review it de novo.

                                     - 29 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

       The crucial facts of this case are relatively simple, as the key is simply

whether Harrison negligently grabbed and deployed his firearm.6 Thus, the

question for the fact-finder is simply whether Harrison acted negligently under

the circumstances. Notably, there is no suggestion that this case involved a

justified shooting based on Smith’s conduct.          Thus, it is unclear why

Harrington is so crucial given that everything from inside is captured on the

cell phone video and other witnesses are available to testify as to the events

outside.7

       The Commonwealth does not elaborate on its claim that Harrington’s

testimony is critical, instead focusing on its preference to describe its

assessment as involving a pure policy question. Indeed, the Commonwealth

does not even claim that the evidence is needed to prove its case-in-chief.

Instead, it claims that Harrington’s testimony would be needed to combat an

anticipated defense. Even extending the Commonwealth the benefit of the

doubt that the Commonwealth is referring to cross-examination of the

Commonwealth’s witnesses, the Commonwealth does not explain what that

defense would be. None of this is to say that Harrison will be found guilty;

____________________________________________

6 The statute also requires that the Commonwealth establish that Harrison
caused bodily injury with a deadly weapon. There is no assertion that these
two requirements are in dispute.

7 The Commonwealth argues that Harrington “is critically necessary is [sic]
establishing the uninterrupted chain and sequence of events that surround
that shooting and illuminate [Harrison]’s state of mind.” Commonwealth’s
Brief at 17. It is not explained how Harrington could lawfully speculate on
Harrison’s thought process.

                                          - 30 -
J-A16020-23
J-A16021-23

the finder-of-fact may well conclude that Harrison did not act negligently. We

must only determine whether the evidence available to the Commonwealth is

sufficient to establish the elements of the crime if accepted by the fact-finder,

and we conclude that it does. That conclusion is corroborated by the fact that

the Commonwealth did not call Harrington at the preliminary hearing. We

therefore conclude that, as a matter of law, Harrington’s unavailability did not

require the trial court to grant the Commonwealth’s petition.8

       Order affirmed.

       President Judge Panella joins this opinion.

       Judge McCaffery files a concurring opinion in which President Judge

Panella joins.
Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/28/2023

____________________________________________

8 We do not express any opinion on whether the      trial court may accept the
Commonwealth’s concession that the evidence is insufficient without any
examination of the merits. See Perrin, 291 A.3d at 346 n.7 (declining to
“address the question of whether the trial court, in its discretion, may accept
a proposed stipulation as to witness credibility”). We hold only that the trial
court is not obligated to do so.

                                          - 31 -