Court Opinion

ID: 9746396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:14:21.510728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:12.803235
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
concurring.
I disagree that, before a declaration against penal interest may be admitted, a preliminary determination that there exists a “considerable assurance of reliability” is required. At the outset, some assurance of reliability inheres in the “circumstance that the fact stated, being against the declarant’s interest, is not likely to have been stated untruthfully.” 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1455. The ultimate question of the degree of reliability which should be attributed to the evidence is a proper one for resolution by the fact-finder. During the trial, opposing counsel, through the vehicle of cross-examination, may probe for weaknesses, inconsisten*368cíes, and the bias of the witness attesting to the out-of-court declaration. In closing, the fact-finder’s attention may again be focused upon the reliability of the declaration through proper argument. Ultimately, the question of the degree of reliance to be placed on the declaration should be determined by the fact-finder.
Those courts which have imposed a requirement of additional indicia of reliability have, as the opinion authored by Mr. Justice Larsen correctly notes, been largely motivated out of fear of opening a door to perjured testimony regarding declarations that were never made. In the words of Professor Wigmore, however, “This would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived by their lies. The truth is that any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent.” 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1477. Thus, where the out-of-court declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, I would admit evidence of his declaration against penal interest, and allow this evidence to be tested in the traditional fashion.
Because it has not been demonstrated that the out-of-court declarant was indeed unavailable at the time of trial, however, I would exclude the evidence in this case. The witness Tobias would have testified that the declarant left for Florida on the 21st of February. The trial of the instant matter was conducted in June of the same year. It seems likely that the declarant intended to absent himself from the jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding prosecution, and Tobias’s testimony would have indicated the same. But whether the declarant was still absent at the time of trial is not known. Before admitting the out-of-court declaration, I would require the party offering the evidence to show that the declarant’s presence at trial could not have been secured. As this was not done, the evidence was properly excluded. Thus, I concur in the result.