Court Opinion

ID: 9391712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 00:01:00.618414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:43.953621
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-11095        Document: 00516735049             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/02/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                                                                  May 2, 2023
                                       No. 20-11095                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Julian Moreno Diaz,

                                                                 Defendant—Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 6:15-CV-73

   Before Ho, Oldham, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Julian Moreno Diaz asked the district court to let him represent
   himself in his habeas proceeding. The district court denied the request.
   Because we lack jurisdiction to review that decision, we DISMISS this
   appeal.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 20-11095     Document: 00516735049          Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/02/2023

                                   No. 20-11095

                                 I. Background
                                  A. The Crime
          In 2007, someone stabbed a man multiple times with a weapon.
   Eyewitnesses identified that ‘someone’ as Diaz. Nine days later, police saw
   Diaz driving a car. They stopped him, searched the vehicle, and found two
   loaded guns.
         Problem was, Diaz was a felon who could not lawfully possess guns or
   ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Prosecutors thus charged him with
   being a felon in possession.     And because Diaz also had three state
   convictions for burglary, prosecutors sought an enhanced sentence for him
   under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
         Diaz pleaded guilty to all offenses.      He admitted to unlawfully
   possessing a firearm as a felon and that he had three prior burglary
   convictions, making him eligible for a sentence enhancement under the
   ACCA. The district court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced Diaz to 210
   months of incarceration. We affirmed. See United States v. Diaz, 286 F.
   App’x 192, 193 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished), cert. denied, 129
   S. Ct. 748, 748 (2008).
                             B. The Habeas Proceeding
          Fast forward seven years. In 2015, Diaz filed this habeas petition pro
   se, seeking to vacate his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. His reason: that
   trial counsel failed to raise that Diaz “only ha[d] 2-qualifying” burglaries—
   one short of the three convictions required for an ACCA-enhancement. In
   reply, the Government admitted one of Diaz’s burglaries no longer qualified
   as a predicate offense under the ACCA but argued that his petition was
   untimely.

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                                             No. 20-11095

          At Diaz’s request, the district court appointed counsel to represent
   him. But by 2018, Diaz decided he was dissatisfied and tried to replace her.
   The district court denied the request. And when Diaz moved again to replace
   her, the court denied that too.
          Two years later, the district court denied Diaz’s petition on the merits
   and denied him a certificate of appealability (COA).
          Diaz now appeals from the final judgment. Because he did not request
   a COA in his notice of appeal, we construed the notice as a request for one.
   See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(2). After identifying a potential question about
   the denial of Diaz’s right to self-representation, this court denied the request
   for a COA as unnecessary and ordered the parties to brief the issue. 1
                                          II. Discussion
          The sole issue before us is whether the district court violated Diaz’s
   right to represent himself. Diaz claims he asserted this right when he moved
   to replace his counsel. But even if we were to assume that he did so, we
   cannot review Diaz’s challenge because we lack jurisdiction.
          Federal courts of appeals are courts of limited jurisdiction. Our
   jurisdiction is limited to final orders of the district court, as well as certain
   interlocutory and collateral orders. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292; Cohen v.
   Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). Diaz challenges the
   district court’s 2018 orders denying his request to withdraw counsel. To
   invoke our appellate jurisdiction, Diaz had two choices. First, he could have
   appealed the orders under the collateral order doctrine. See United States v.
   Davis, 629 F. App’x. 613, 617 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).
   Second, he could have appealed the orders with the final judgment. See

          1
              Diaz has not filed a reply brief.

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                                     No. 20-11095

   Diesce-Lisa Indus. v. Disney Enters., 943 F.3d 239, 247 (5th Cir. 2019).
   Neither option is viable.

   A. Diaz Cannot Appeal the District Court’s 2018 Orders Under the Collateral
                                   Order Doctrine
          Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction over “non-
   final judgments that are conclusive, that resolve important questions
   completely separate from the merits, and that would render such important
   questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the
   underlying action.” Prewitt v. City of Greenville, 161 F.3d 296, 298 (1998)
   (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We previously held that the
   denial of a habeas petitioner’s right to self-representation meets these
   requirements. See Davis, 629 F. App’x. at 617. Citing Davis, Diaz argues we
   may also exercise jurisdiction here.
          Not so. To take an appeal under the collateral order doctrine, Diaz
   needed to comply with “all the usual appellate rules and time periods.”
   United States v. Moats, 961 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations
   omitted). The rules required Diaz to appeal the 2018 orders within 60 days
   after the district court entered them. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(i).
   Because he missed this deadline by over two years, Diaz’s appeal is not
   timely. See Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1186 (5th Cir. 1984).
          B. Nor Can He Appeal the Orders as Part of the Final Judgment
          That leaves option two. “[A] party may obtain review of prejudicial
   adverse interlocutory rulings upon his appeal from adverse final judgment.”
   Dickinson v. Auto Ctr. Mfg. Co., 733 F.2d 1092, 1102 (5th Cir. 1983). That is
   because we regard “interlocutory rulings . . . as [having] merged into the final
   judgment terminating the action.” Id.; see 15A Wright & Miller, Fed.

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   Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3911 (3d ed. 2022). Diaz appears to have tried
   to do just that: he appealed the final judgment, which the 2018 orders merged
   into.
           If that was all that was required, we would have jurisdiction. But we
   do not. One hurdle forecloses our review: Diaz does not have a COA.
           Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
   (AEDPA), a habeas petitioner must first obtain a COA before appealing
   “the final order” in a habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Federal
   courts can issue a COA “only if the [petitioner] has made a substantial
   showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). A COA is
   jurisdictional. Without it, we may not “rule on the merits of appeals from
   habeas petitioners.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
           When a petitioner claims his constitutional rights have been violated
   on direct appeal, this is a straightforward test. But what if the petitioner
   asserts a statutory right, and not a constitutional one? 2 In that event, we have
   held “the non-constitutional claims [can] only [be] considered to the extent
   that they are connected to a claim on which a COA is granted.” Alix v.
   Quarterman, 309 F. App’x. 875, 878 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
   (unpublished); see Norman v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 2016), cert.
   denied, 137 S. Ct. 1201 (2017).
           In Alix, petitioner challenged the district court’s denial of his habeas
   petition, arguing that the court failed to grant him an evidentiary hearing. 309
   F. App’x. at 878. Finding the denial implicated a statutory right, a panel of

           2
              The Supreme Court has acknowledged this scenario may raise jurisdictional
   concerns but has yet to address the issue. See Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080, 1088 n.1
   (2018) (there is an open question about whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction to
   consider an appeal from the final order in a habeas proceeding where petitioner raises
   statutory issues but never obtained a COA).

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   this court denied the petitioner a COA and held the evidentiary ruling could
   be reviewed only “as a corollary to a constitutional violation.” Id.
          We later explained in Davis our rationale for this rule. United States
   v. Davis, 971 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 122 (2021).
   When a habeas petitioner “identifie[s] a substantial and reasonably debatable
   constitutional claim,” we can issue a COA on that issue. Id. at 534. That
   requirement is jurisdictional; it “gives us the correlative power to consider”
   ancillary non-constitutional issues. Id. On the other hand, where there is no
   substantial and reasonably debatable constitutional question and thus no
   basis for a COA, “we have no judicial power to do anything without it.” Id.
   at 535 (citation omitted). In other words, a statutory claim “stands or falls
   with the applicant’s COA showing.” Id. at 534; see Norman, 817 F.3d at 234
   (“Because we have determined that [petitioner’s] constitutional claims fail,
   we do not address the merits of his [] request.”).
          We hold the same logic also applies here. As in Alix and Davis, Diaz
   cannot make a “substantial showing” that the right he asserts—to represent
   himself in a habeas proceeding—is constitutional. Davis, 971 F.3d at 534.
   Rather, this right is statutory. See Scott v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 99, 102 n.3
   (5th Cir. 1980) (a habeas petitioner has a statutory right to self-representation
   under 28 U.S.C. § 1654). Although Diaz garbs this right in the cloth of the
   Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the right to self-
   representation beyond a defendant’s criminal trial. See Martinez v. Court of
   Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000). Indeed, in Martinez, the Supreme
   Court went as far as to say that a defendant has no such constitutional right
   on direct appeal. Id. at 163. We strain to see how Diaz can make a substantial
   showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his habeas proceeding, which
   is even more removed from his criminal trial than a direct appeal.

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                                         No. 20-11095

          We may thus only review Diaz’s challenge “as a corollary to a
   constitutional violation” for which a COA is granted. Davis, 971 F.3d at 534-
   35 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Lacking that here, Diaz
   cannot invoke our appellate jurisdiction.
          One other factor guides our analysis: the relief that Diaz seeks, which
   is to undo the district court’s final judgment. In effect, Diaz asks us to reverse
   the district court’s denial of his petition on the merits. But without a COA,
   we must decline this invitation. See Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017);
   cf. Canales v. Quarterman, 507 F.3d 884, 888 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
   (COA is required for a Rule 60(b) motion alleging a procedural defect
   because it seeks to “alter the . . . judgment in his [] habeas proceeding”), cert.
   denied, 128 S. Ct. 1697 (2008).
                                     *        *         *
          Diaz’s collateral appeal was untimely. And even if we reviewed his
   claims on direct appeal of the final judgment, we lack jurisdiction because
   Diaz does not have a COA. We therefore DISMISS his appeal for lack of
   jurisdiction.

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