Court Opinion

ID: 9905254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 23:02:17.939197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:55.769420
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/6/23 Modified and Certified for Pub. 11/28/23 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                              DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                     B321325

       Plaintiff and Respondent,                (Los Angeles County
                                                Super. Ct. No. NA054828)
       v.

RODNEY DEON HOLLIE,

       Defendant and
       Appellant.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James Otto, Judge. Affirmed.
      Winston Kevin McKesson, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     _________________________
       Rodney Hollie was convicted following a jury trial in 2004
of first degree murder and robbery arising from the shooting
death of James Treder on July 12, 2002 and attempted murder
and a second count of robbery based on two separate incidents on
June 30, 2022. In January 2020 the superior court granted
Hollie’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95),1 expressly finding Hollie
had been a major participant in the robbery of Treder but not the
actual shooter and impliedly finding he did not act with reckless
indifference to human life during the robbery. The court vacated
the murder conviction, resentenced Hollie on the remaining
three convictions and ordered him released from custody based on
time served.
       In 2021 Hollie petitioned pursuant to section 851.8 for a
finding of actual innocence, arguing as evidence of his innocence
that Treder’s companion, the only eyewitness to the robbery-
murder, had not identified Hollie as a participant in the crime
and that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence in
violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. The superior
court denied the petition.
       On appeal Hollie argues the order vacating his murder
conviction under section 1172.6 necessarily entitled him to a
finding of factual innocence.2 We affirm.

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2      Hollie also suggests in his opening brief that he was subject
to a discriminatory prosecution in violation of the Racial Justice
Act, section 745, subdivision (a). That issue is not properly before

                                 2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Hollie’s Convictions for Murder, Attempted Murder and
         Robbery
       In the early morning of July 13, 2002 two young Black men
approached Treder and Tyese Givens as they sat in their parked
car (a black 2002 Mercedes CL500).3 After a brief struggle taking
place through the driver’s side window, one of the young men
shot and killed Treder. Hollie’s left palm print was found on the
driver’s side door of the Mercedes, which had been detailed the
day before the murder and was largely inaccessible to the public
after the detailing and before the crime. According to Givens, the
young man who remained behind the principal at the time of the
initial confrontation had a “big afro” of about four or five inches.
A July 19, 2002 photograph introduced at trial established that
Hollie, 15 years old at the time of the crimes, wore his hair in a
four- to five-inch afro as of that date.
       Two weeks earlier a car with four Black men drove near
Felipe Gonzalez’s car in Long Beach. Gonzalez heard several
gunshots and realized he had been hit. A bullet was recovered
from his stomach. About the same time, also in Long Beach, a
car pulled up parallel to Allan Calulot’s car. A Black male left
the car, pointed a gun in Calulot’s face and demanded his wallet.
The driver of the car also yelled for Calulot to give up his wallet.

us in reviewing the denial of a section 851.8 petition. (See § 745,
subd. (b) [after judgment has been entered and a defendant is no
longer in custody, an allegation of a violation of section 745,
subdivision (a), must be filed in a motion under section 1473.7].)
3     In his brief on appeal, as he did in the superior court, Hollie
adopts for purposes of his petition the facts as recited in our
decision affirming his convictions on direct appeal, People v.
Hollie (Sept. 21, 2006, B175934) [nonpub. opn.].

                                  3
Hollie admitted following his arrest (after being advised of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436) that he had
been the driver of the car during the attempted murder of
Gonzalez and the robbery of Calulot.
       Hollie was convicted by a jury of first degree murder,
attempted murder and two counts of robbery with a true finding
on a firearm enhancement allegation and sentenced to an
indeterminate state prison term of 26 years to life. We affirmed
the judgment on appeal, rejecting Hollie’s arguments that the
evidence was insufficient to find him guilty as an aider and
abettor of any of the crimes charged and that the trial court had
abused its discretion in denying his motions to suppress his
admissions relating to the shooting of Gonzalez and the robbery
of Calulot and to sever trial of the charged offenses. (People v.
Hollie (Sept. 21, 2006, B175934) [nonpub. opn.].)
     2. The Petition for Resentencing
       On January 28, 2020 the superior court granted Hollie’s
petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 and
dismissed his conviction for Treder’s murder. The minute order
stated the court found Hollie “is a major participant based on
conviction by the jury but is not the actual shooter.” The record
on appeal does not indicate why the court determined Hollie had
been tried for Treder’s murder under the felony-murder rule, and
the court’s order does not include further findings regarding
Hollie’s mental state—that is, whether he had acted with malice
as an aider and abettor or with reckless indifference to human

                                4
life under the amended version of the felony-murder rule in
section 189, subdivision (e)(3).4
       The court resentenced Hollie to consecutive determinate
state prison terms on the remaining three convictions: the upper
term of nine years for attempted murder plus one year for the
firearm enhancement and two consecutive terms for the robbery
convictions, properly recorded on the abstract of judgment as one-
third the middle term of three years for second degree robbery.5
Because Hollie then had more than 17 years of actual custody
credit, the superior court ordered him released forthwith.
      3. The Petition for a Finding of Factual Innocence
       On July 9, 2021 Hollie, represented by retained counsel,
filed a petition for factual innocence and sealing of arrest records
pursuant to section 851.8. The petition asserted the court’s order
vacating his murder conviction constituted a finding that no
reasonable cause existed to believe he had committed the offense
for which his arrest had been made. Hollie’s counsel also argued
newly discovered evidence (that is, evidence not available at trial
but presented to both the superior court and this court in
unsuccessful habeas corpus petitions) established his actual
innocence: Givens had come forward and confirmed Hollie was
not the shooter, the men in front of the Mercedes did not include

4      The record on appeal does not include Hollie’s petition for
resentencing, any other filings relating to the resentencing
petition by Hollie’s retained counsel or the prosecutor, or a
reporter’s transcript of the January 28, 2020 hearing.
5      The court’s January 29, 2020 minute order incorrectly
reflected a middle term of four years for the two robberies, using
the triad for first degree, rather than second degree, robbery.
(See § 213, subd. (a)(2).)

                                 5
Hollie, and none of the perpetrators had touched the car door.
Counsel claimed this evidence was known to the prosecutor but
withheld from Hollie in violation of Brady v. Maryland, supra,
373 U.S. 83.6
       The People opposed the petition, arguing there had been no
findings of prosecutorial misconduct or Brady violations and
Hollie was no longer guilty of Treder’s murder because of
ameliorative changes in the law regarding accomplice liability for
murder, not because he was factually innocent of the crime as
charged at the time and for purposes of section 851.8.
       At the hearing on Hollie’s motion on May 24, 2022, Hollie’s
counsel again argued the prosecutors had violated their
obligations under Brady by not disclosing Givens’s failure to
recognize Hollie as one of the participants in the robbery-murder
and asserted Hollie had been the victim of a biased prosecution.7
The court denied the petition, stating Hollie was not using the
proper procedural vehicle to pursue those claims, most of which
had been addressed in prior habeas corpus petitions. Explaining
its ruling, the court wrote in its order after hearing, “There was
no prior finding of a Brady violation or prosecutorial misconduct.
There was sufficient evidence that defendant was involved in the
case, for it to be filed.”

6     Hollie also argued the prosecutors had misled the court in
connection with the decision to file the murder charge directly in
adult court although he was only 15 years old at the time of the
crime by asserting he had been the actual shooter, which they
knew was false.
7     Counsel claimed the district attorney’s office had targeted
Hollie because prosecutors were pursuing his father, whom they
viewed as an original member of the Insane Long Beach Crips.

                                 6
      Hollie filed a timely notice of appeal.
                          DISCUSSION
      1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
       Section 851.8, subdivision (c), provides, “In any case where
a person has been arrested, and an accusatory pleading has been
filed, but where no conviction has occurred, the defendant may,
at any time after dismissal of the action, petition the court that
dismissed the action for a finding that the defendant is factually
innocent of the charges for which the arrest was made. . . . The
hearing shall be conducted as provided in subdivision (b).”8
       Section 851.8, subdivision (b), in turn, provides in part,
“[A]ny judicial determination of factual innocence made pursuant
to this section may be heard and determined upon declarations,
affidavits, police reports, or any other evidence submitted by the
parties which is material, relevant, and reliable. A finding of
factual innocence and an order for the sealing and destruction of
records pursuant to this section shall not be made unless the
court finds that no reasonable cause exists to believe that the
arrestee committed the offense for which the arrest was made. In
any court hearing to determine the factual innocence of a party,
the initial burden of proof shall rest with the petitioner to show

8     “There are three classes of persons who may petition the
court for a finding of factual innocence. . . . (1) persons who have
been arrested but no accusatory pleading has yet been filed;
(2) persons who have been arrested and an accusatory pleading
has been filed but no conviction has occurred; and (3) persons
who are acquitted of a charge and it appears to the judge
presiding at the trial that the defendant was factually innocent.”
(People v. Mazumder (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 732, 738 [cleaned
up].)

                                  7
that no reasonable cause exists to believe that the arrestee
committed the offenses for which the arrest was made.”
       “A petitioner’s burden to establish factual innocence has
been described as ‘“incredibly high”’ and as requiring ‘“no doubt
whatsoever.”’ [Citation.] “‘Section 851.8 is for the benefit of those
defendants who have not committed a crime.”’ [Citation.]
‘Establishing factual innocence . . . entails establishing as a
prima facie matter not necessarily just that the arrestee had a
viable substantive defense to the crime charged, but more
fundamentally that there was no reasonable cause to arrest him
in the first place.’” (People v. Mazumder (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
732, 738-739; see People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 902-903.)
       A verdict of not guilty at trial does not compel the
conclusion the defendant is factually innocent; “‘it merely proves
the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.’” (People v.
Medlin (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101; accord, People v.
Bleich (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 292, 300.) “‘[M]uch more than a
failure of the prosecution to convict is required in order to justify
[a finding of factual innocence and] the sealing and destruction of
records under section 851.8.’” (People v. Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at p. 905.)
       “A court cannot order the partial sealing and destruction of
a factually innocent petitioner’s arrest records. Section 851.8
does not provide ‘for the surgical excision of only certain portions
of an arrest record.’ [Citation.] ‘We would defeat the statutory
purpose of leaving a factually innocent person with an
unblemished record and run afoul of the legislative objective
sought to be achieved were we to permit the sealing and
destruction of only part of an accused’s arrest record.’” (People v.

                                  8
Mazumder, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 739; accord, People v.
Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1063.)
      Although we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if
supported by substantial evidence, we independently review the
court’s denial of a petition for factual innocence. (People v. Adair,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 897.)
      2. Hollie’s Successful Section 1172.6 Petition Did Not
         Entitle Him to a Finding of Factual Innocence
      Although in the superior court Hollie focused his argument
in support of a finding of factual innocence on what he described
as newly discovered evidence that Givens had told prosecutors
she did not recognize him as one of the perpetrators of the
robbery-murder, together with his continuing claims of
prosecutorial misconduct, on appeal he contends only that,
because he could not be found guilty of Treder’s murder under
current law (as the superior court’s order granting his petition for
resentencing presumably established),9 then he must be factually
innocent of that crime.10 Hollie’s argument is doubly flawed.
      First, an order granting Hollie’s petition for resentencing
does not mean, without more, Hollie is factually innocent of the

9     Hollie mistakenly asserts the superior court granted relief
under section 1172.6 for the attempted murder of Gonzalez. To
the contrary, as discussed, after vacating the murder conviction,
the court resentenced Hollie to the upper term of nine years for
attempted murder, plus a one-year firearm enhancement.
10     We disagree with the Attorney General that Hollie forfeited
this issue by failing to raise it in the superior court. Although
largely undeveloped, Hollie did contend in his petition that the
court’s order vacating his murder conviction constituted a finding
that no reasonable cause existed to believe he had committed the
offense for which his arrest had been made.

                                  9
crime of murder. To decide the petition for resentencing the
superior court was required to determine whether Hollie could be
convicted of murder under current law. The ameliorative
changes to the law relating to felony murder that occurred after
Hollie’s conviction narrowed but did not eliminate the felony-
murder rule. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 703;
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842.) Pursuant to
section 189, subdivision (e)(3), an individual who participated in
the perpetration of a robbery or any other of the felonies
identified in section 189, subdivision (a), who was not the actual
killer and did not with the intent to kill aid or abet the actual
killer in the commission of the first degree murder of the victim,
is still liable for murder if he or she was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life as described in the felony-murder special-
circumstance provision of the Penal Code.
        Ruling on Hollie’s petition for resentencing, the superior
court expressly found Hollie was not the actual shooter but was a
major participant in the robbery of Treder. The court also
impliedly found the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Hollie had acted with reckless indifference
to human life—the petition otherwise could not have been
granted. In other words, the court found the evidence was
insufficient to convict Hollie of murder under current law.
        However, a finding of insufficient evidence, like a failure of
the prosecution to convict, is not enough for a finding of factual
innocence. (See People v. Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th 895 at p. 905.)
“‘Factually innocent’ as used in [section 851.8, subdivision (b)]
does not mean a lack of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
or even by a preponderance of evidence. Defendants must show

                                  10
that the state should never have subjected them to the
compulsion of the criminal law—because no objective factors
justified official action. In sum, the record must exonerate, not
merely raise a substantial question as to guilt.” (Id. at p. 909
[cleaned up]; accord, People v. Esmaili (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
1449, 1459.) Indeed, that is the premise of section 851.8,
subdivision (e), which provides, when a person has been acquitted
of a charge, the trial judge has discretion—but is not obligated—
to make a finding of factual innocence.11 Granting Hollie’s
section 1172.6 petition did not exonerate him of Treder’s
murder.12
       Second, as discussed, partial sealing of an arrest record is
not permitted under section 851.8. (See People v. Mazumder,
supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 739; People v. Matthews, supra,
7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1063.) Although it was his burden as the
petitioner to do so, Hollie presented no information about the
basis for his arrest; but it is reasonable to assume it was for both
the robbery and murder of Treder (and, quite possibly at the
same time, for the attempted murder of Gonzalez and robbery of
Calulot). Hollie still stands convicted of the robbery of Treder (as

11    Section 851.8, subdivision (e), states, “Whenever any
person is acquitted of a charge and it appears to the judge
presiding at the trial at which the acquittal occurred that the
defendant was factually innocent of the charge, the judge may
grant the relief provided in subdivision (b).”
12    The Attorney General argues vacatur of a conviction under
section 1172.6 does not satisfy the threshold requirement of
section 851.8, subdivision (c), that “no conviction has occurred.”
However, we need not address this argument because, even if a
section 1172.6 vacatur does satisfy the threshold requirement,
Hollie’s claim of factual innocence fails on the merits.

                                 11
well as the crimes against Gonzalez and Calulot). Accordingly,
even if he were otherwise properly found factually innocent of
Treder’s murder, “the surgical excision” of a portion of Hollie’s
arrest record would not be authorized.
                         DISPOSITION
      The order denying Hollie’s section 851.8 petition is
affirmed.

                                           PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            FEUER, J.

            MARTINEZ, J.

                                12
Filed 11/28/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                           B321325

       Plaintiff and Respondent,      (Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No.
       v.                             NA054828)

RODNEY DEON HOLLIE,                  ORDER MODIFYING
                                     OPINION AND
       Defendant and Appellant.      CERTIFYING OPINION
                                     FOR PUBLICATION
                                     (No change in the
                                     appellate judgment)

      THE COURT:
      It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on November 6,
2023 be modified as follows:
      On page 2, third paragraph, after the first sentence and the
footnote call add “It does not.” As modified the paragraph reads:

             On appeal Hollie argues the order vacating his
       murder conviction under section 1172.6 necessarily entitled
       him to a finding of factual innocence.2 It does not. We
       affirm.

       There is no change to the appellate judgment.
       The opinion in this case filed November 6, 2023 was not
certified for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the
standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court,
rule 8.1105(c), the respondent’s request pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a) for publication is granted.
       IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the
standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court,
rule 8.1105(c); and
       ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the
Official Reports” appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted
and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.

____________________________________________________________
FEUER, Acting P. J.      MARTINEZ, J.         PERLUSS, J.*

      2.     Hollie also suggests in his opening brief that he was
subject to a discriminatory prosecution in violation of the Racial
Justice Act, section 745, subdivision (a). That issue is not
properly before us in reviewing the denial of a section 851.8
petition. (See § 745, subd. (b) [after judgment has been entered
and a defendant is no longer in custody, an allegation of a
violation of section 745, subdivision (a), must be filed in a motion
under section 1473.7].)
*      Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
                                   2