Court Opinion

ID: 9386441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:05:23.198912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.420992
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-1032
                               Filed April 12, 2023

DOUGLAS KENT LINDAMAN,
    Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal     from   the    Iowa    District   Court    for   Mitchell   County,

Rustin T. Davenport, Judge.

      An applicant appeals the denial of his third postconviction-relief application.

AFFIRMED.

      Douglas K. Lindaman, Charles City, self-represented appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

       Douglas Lindaman, a former attorney1, was convicted in 1988 after pleading

guilty to two counts of lascivious acts with a child. The convictions were premised

on sexual acts Lindaman engaged in with an eleven-year-old boy. He served two

consecutive five-year terms in prison. His conviction was upheld on direct appeal,

and two prior postconviction-relief (PCR) applications—one in 1991 and the other

in 1997—were denied.2 Lindamen filed a third PCR application on March 12, 2021,

which was denied.

       Lindaman now appeals the denial of his third PCR application. According

to his appellate brief:

       Lindaman outlined a claim of actual innocence pertaining to health
       care, like the treatment for ego-dystonic homosexuality, (similar to
       involuntary intoxication) based upon: (A) the Privileges and
       Immunities Clause of art. I, section 6, Iowa constitution as to
       accessing health care; (B) pursuing and obtaining safety and
       happiness in art. I, section 1, Iowa constitution as to accessing health
       care; (C) psychological torture under the 8th amendment to the U.S.
       constitution and art. I, section 17 to the Iowa constitution by denial of
       access to health care.

He further alleges his direct appeal and first PCR should be considered void

because he lacked an attorney in each instance after electing to proceed pro se.

And he believes “Iowa’s legal officials traditionally live in a litigation bubble of

1 Lindaman’s law license was revoked in 1989. See Comm. on Pro. Ethics &
Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Lindaman, 449 N.W.2d 341 (Iowa 1989).
2 This court reversed Lindaman’s sentence on direct appeal because the district

court considered unproven allegations of criminal acts. State v. Lindaman, No. 88-
1756 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1989). Both dismissals of prior PCR applications
were affirmed by this court. Lindaman v. State, No. 91-0737 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 24, 1992); Lindaman v. State, No. 97-724 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1998).
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discrimination and denial as to equal protection analysis over privileges and

immunities for gay sex offenders.”

       We determine Lindaman’s claims are untimely. A PCR application “must

be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the

event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code

§ 822.3 (2021). Lindaman’s judgment was final in 1988—he is well past the three-

year time-bar. As a result, his claims are time-barred.

       That said, the “limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could

not have been raised within the applicable time period.” Id. Lindaman asserts that

Schmidt v. State, which recognized a right to bring a freestanding actual innocence

claim to challenge a conviction based on a plea agreement, is a new ground of law

that resets the three-year period.      909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018).            But

Lindaman is not actually raising an actual innocence claim. Actual innocence

claims are premised on the applicant “claiming he or she is factually and actually

innocent.” Id. at 797. Here, Lindaman’s claim is one “pertaining to health care”—

he asserts the sex offender treatment program (SOTP) discriminates against gay

offenders.   (Emphasis added.)       But challenging the SOTP does nothing to

undermine the factual basis for Lindaman’s conviction. Lindaman does not allege

factual and actual innocence. In fact, he admits to having committed the act.

Therefore Schmidt does not act as a new ground of law for time-bar purposes.

       To the extent Lindaman’s argument could be interpreted as an actual

innocence claim based on his assertions that he was involuntarily intoxicated at

the time of the offense due to “ego-dystonic homosexuality,” his claim is still time-

barred by section 822.3. “We have found Schmidt does not apply to overcome the
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statute of limitations where the evidence put forward to support a claim of actual

innocence was available to the applicant or could have been discovered with due

diligence within the limitations period.” Quinn v. State, 954 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2020). Lindaman raised the issue of his mental state related to “ego-

dystonic homosexuality” in his first PCR application in 1991—within the three-year

time frame from when judgement was final. The facts Lindaman relies on to

support his actual innocence claim were available to him within the section 822.3

timeframe and cannot be used to circumvent the time-bar.3

      Because Lindaman’s application is time-barred by the three-year statutory

limit imposed by section 822.3, we affirm the district court’s denial of Lindaman’s

PCR application.

      AFFIRMED.

3Lindaman’s claims are also barred under section 822.8. Because his claims have
been raised in prior proceedings, they may not be the basis for later applications.
See Iowa Code § 822.8.