Court Opinion

ID: 9836872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:18.612983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.109659
License: Public Domain

EFFRON, Judge
(dissenting):
I agree with Judge Sullivan’s dissent and offer the following additional views.
As indicated in the majority opinion, both parties agree that it was error to have appellant’s post-trial recommendation prepared by a “command services officer” who was nei*395ther the convening authority’s staff judge advocate (SJA) nor his legal officer. In this case, as in United States v. Finster, 51 MJ 185 (1999), the erroneous use of a statutorily unqualified person to prepare the post-trial recommendation requires a remand to the convening authority for a new recommendation and action.
Article 60(d), UCMJ, 10 USC § 860(d) (1983), requires the convening authority to “obtain and consider the written recommendation of his staff judge advocate or legal officer.” (Emphasis added). The express language of the statute indicates that Congress contemplated that there would be a command-staff relationship between the convening authority and “his” legal advisor. As discussed in Finster, although the Military Justice Act of 1983 streamlined the post-trial process, see 51 MJ at 186, Congress emphasized the continuing importance of the post-trial recommendation prepared by the convening authority’s SJA or legal officer. Although the 1983 Act eliminated the requirement for a lengthy legal review of the record, Congress continued to expect the post-trial recommendation to reflect the legal advisor’s discretion, judgment, and knowledge.
During hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense highlighted the fact that the SJA or legal officer, as the convening authority’s senior advisor on military justice matters, would be the person best qualified to make a recommendation to the convening authority as to how he should exercise his powers. See id. at 187, quoting Hearings cm S. 2521 Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1982) (response by Mr. Taft to question from Senator Exon). In its report on the legislation, the Senate Armed Services Committee emphasized the importance of the relationship between the convening authority and his legal advisor by stating that the post-trial recommendation would still be provided “by the convening authority’s principal advisor on military justice matters.” Id., quoting S.Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983, p. 2177.
The relationship between the convening authority and his or her legal advisor has been an important feature of the UCMJ since its enactment in 1951. Article 6(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 806(a), places the assignments of all judge advocates and legal officers under the control of the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which they are members. In 1951, then-Major Kenneth J. Hodson, an authoritative commentator on the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, noted that Article 6(a) contemplated that the Judge Advocate General would assign judge advocates and legal officers that possess the basic qualifications and characteristics necessary to form a confidential and advisory relationship with the convening authority. See Legal and Legislative Basis, Manual, supra at 137-40 (“The Staff Judge Advocate and Legal Officer”). According to Hodson, the relationship with the SJA or legal officer as trusted advisor would facilitate decisions being made by the convening authority on matters of military justice. Id.
Other provisions of the UCMJ underscore the significance of the relationship between the convening authority and his SJA or legal officer. Article 6(b) requires the convening authority to communicate directly with his or her SJA or legal officer in matters relating to military justice. According to Major Hod-son, “[ajrticle 6(b) not only authorizes direct communication within military justice channels but also enhances the position of judge advocates and legal officers by requiring direct communication on military justice matters between such officers and their commanding officers.” Id. at 138. Art. 6(b) also authorizes the SJA or legal officer to communicate with the SJA or legal officer of superi- or or subordinate commands. In sum, Articles 6 and 60 confer a special status on the legal advisor, both in terms of his or her relationship with the convening authority and within the chain of command.
As the majority points out, there are certain circumstances in which a substitute SJA or legal officer from another command may be assigned to prepare the post-trial reeom-*396mendation, but such action is permissible only in cases where the convening authority actually requests such assistance under particular circumstances. RCM 1106(c)(1), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1998 ed.). Once the convening authority designates a substitute SJA or legal officer, that officer becomes the convening authority’s SJA or legal officer within the meaning of Article 60(d). These provisions do not permit a command legal officer to arrange informally for another officer outside the chain of command to prepare the post-trial recommendation.
In the present case, the post-trial recommendation was prepared by LT Stampher, an officer on limited duty temporarily assigned to the Trial Service Office West as a “Command Service Officer”. The Government conceded during oral argument that LT Stampher was not formally designated by competent authority to act as the legal officer in this case. The Government acknowledged that the convening authority’s legal officer asked LT Stampher to prepare the post-trial recommendation because the legal officer did not know how to properly prepare the document. Rather than asking for assistance or for the convening authority to refer the case to a qualified legal officer, the legal officer took it upon himself to ask LT Stampher to prepare the document for the convening authority.
The Government contends that “[h]ad the command’s legal officer known how to prepare the recommendation it would have been identical in every respect except its authorship.” Answer to Final Brief at 7. Therein lies the fundamental problem with this case. The post-trial recommendation is not simply a fill-in-the-blank form that anyone can complete by inserting personnel data. It is statutorily designated as a “recommendation.” As such, it must reflect an exercise in discretion, judgment, and reason by the person designated to serve as the convening authority’s advisor on military justice matters. The Government’s assumption that recommendations written by two different people — exercising their own discretion, judgment, and reason — would necessarily produce identical recommendations demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding as to the very purpose of a post-trial recommendation. As the Court of Criminal Appeals said in United States v. Cunningham, “The recommendation is much more than a ministerial action or mechanical recitation of facts concerning the trial. Its heart and soul exist in the judgment of the drafter____” 44 MJ 758, 763 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App.1996).
The Government suggests that appellant benefited from the fact that the designated legal officer did not prepare the recommendation because he “was unsure how one should be drafted.” Answer to Final Brief at 7. In other words, appellant should feel grateful that the recommendation was prepared by an unqualified nonlawyer rather than an incompetent nonlawyer. Considering the fact that only the seagoing services are permitted to use nonlawyers to prepare post-trial recommendations, see Arts. 1(12) and 60(d), there is no excuse for permitting a servicemember’s ease to be reviewed by a nonlawyer who is either unqualified or incompetent.
As this Court indicated in United States v. Curry, Congress afforded the flexibility of using nonlawyers to the naval services because many “special courts-martial are convened by commanders of vessels and deployed units to which a staff judge advocate is not assigned; and for them it may be difficult and time-consuming to arrange for the record of trial to be examined by a lawyer.” 28 MJ 419, 422 (CMA 1989). This exception, however, did not contemplate that the seagoing services would fail to properly train its nonlawyer legal officers to perform these critical functions, or that they would permit these officers to designate unqualified persons to do so.
As we held in Finster, and as the Navy-Marine Corps Court correctly noted in Cunningham, the use of a statutorily unqualified person to prepare the post-trial recommendation
strikes at the core of the integrity and reputation of military justice in the naval service____ [Ejvery appellant in the naval service should be able to expect that as a matter of fairness, his or her case will be *397reviewed by and have a post-trial recoin-mendation from a statutorily qualified officer.
51 MJ at 188, quoting Cunningham, supra at 764. Appellant is entitled to the same expectation in this case. See Finster, supra at 189 (“appellate court[s] ... do not have to accept incomplete or sloppy work. I would never require a showing of ‘prejudice’ before sending a case back to a convening authority to fix administrative errors in the record.”) (Cox, C.J., concurring).
In accordance with the Code and applicable case law, I would reverse the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals and order a new convening authority’s action and recommendation by his own legal officer.