Court Opinion

ID: 9711804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:39:38.041591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.604922
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting in part.
In November 1985, the State indicted defendant, Nathan Harvey for capital murder, robbery in the second degree, and burglary in the second degree. Following a jury trial, in October 1986, defendant was convicted on all counts.
*445The Court now reverses defendant’s capital murder conviction and death penalty. I concur in its judgment. I am in accord with the Court’s determinations that reversible error occurred in the admission into evidence of defendant’s confession and in the failure to provide defendant with a charge that clearly distinguished between intentional murder and murder based only on intent to cause serious bodily injury resulting in death. I write separately to stress what I believe to be additional reasons for the reversals of the conviction and sentence. These relate to the admission and use of expert testimony and of evidence of other crimes. I also reiterate my view that the State’s capital murder statute is unconstitutional as enacted, construed and applied, also warranting the reversals in this case. See State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 284, 571 A.2d 914 (1990) (Handler, J., dissenting and concurring).
I.
The Court recognizes, and the State concedes, that defendant’s confession is the most significant evidence of guilt in this case. The Court now rules that the confession was unconstitutionally obtained because the police failed to scrupulously honor his request to remain silent. Ante at 420, 581 A.2d at 489. I agree with that ruling.
The Court emphasizes that the murder charge in this case clearly failed to comply with the standards of State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 69, 549 A.2d 792 (1988). I concur in the Court’s determination that defendant is entitled to a murder charge that distinguishes intentional murder from serious-bodily-injury murder. Ante at 412-414, 581 A.2d at 485-486. It is also clear that the failure to give a Gerald charge resulted in a determination that cannot be the basis of a capital murder conviction. The jury verdict sheet stated that a finding of intent to cause either death or serious bodily injury resulting in death constituted capital murder. Moreover, as the Court points out, there was adequate evidential support for a Gerald *446charge. Ante at 413-414, 581 A.2d at 486; see State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 209, 574 A.2d 951 (1990). Because the jury was charged on felony-murder, aggravated manslaughter, and manslaughter, there was sufficient evidence to support murder verdicts that were neither knowing nor purposeful. See State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 562, 575 A.2d 816 (1990).
II.
The Court recognizes the problematic quality of much of the expert testimony in this case. Ante at 425-431, 581 A.2d at 492-495. I have the same misgivings as does the Court with respect to much of this evidence. In my view, however, portions of it were unquestionably incompetent and inadmissible, and the resultant prejudice constitutes added grounds for reversal of the conviction.
I concur in the Court’s determination that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the purportedly expert testimony of Dr. Lovejoy. Ante at 426-429, 581 A.2d at 492-493. Dr. Lovejoy’s analysis of the blood-stained pillowcase, and conclusion that a “small man” or an “average-size woman” with a shoe size of 6V2 plus or minus one-half size left the print on the pillowcase, were based on an unproven and unreliable methodology. See State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 447-48, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988). Moreover, because this opinion testimony was central identification evidence linking Harvey to the crime, as stressed by the prosecutor in his guilt-phase summation, the error in admitting Dr. Lovejoy’s opinion is reversible in my view.
Another serious error involves the expert opinion of Dr. Marvin Shuster. Dr. Shuster performed the autopsy on the victim and testified as a State witness to his opinions and conclusions regarding the cause of death. Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously allowed critical aspects of this opinion testimony which were not based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty or probability. The Court acknowledges *447the validity of that standard, noting that “opinions as to possibility are inadmissible,” but rules only that it must be satisfied on a retrial. Ante at 431, 581 A.2d at 495. This opinion testimony was important, the error in its admission serious, and the prejudice caused thereby substantial. I believe it constitutes an independent ground for reversal and the Court, rather than content itself with a precatory admonition, should so state.
On direct examination, Dr. Shuster testified about the length and location of a major head wound. He then indicated the “particular wound____looked like it was a confluence or at least two.” He also stated that “there were pressure marks on the neck” and that “[i]t usually takes quite a number of minutes, probably more in the realm of an hour,” to apply that pressure.
That testimony had the potential of being highly significant evidence of the manner in which the killing occurred. Nevertheless, the witness’ conclusions were based on no more than “possibilities.” He testified as follows:
Q. And [the autopsy report] talks about that six inch opening?
A. That’s right.
Q. And it says, does it not, obvious fracturing of the skull is present in the depths of this wound which may represent the confluence of several wounds, is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. In other words you say that its possibly two wounds?
A. Yes.
Q. And it’s possibly not?
A. That’s correct.
Q. This marking on the neck you said could have been the result of pressure for approximately an hour, is that correct?
A. That’s what I said, yes, sir.
Q. And again this is in the area of possibility, is that correct, it could be possibly less, possibly more?
A. That’s correct, yes.
********
Q. And you said that it was a blunt object that caused these injuries, is that correct?
A. I said object or objects.
Q. You said object or objects?
A. Yes.
*448Q. Outside the presence of this jury you had voiced an opinion that there was possibly two objects?
A. Either two objects or one object with several either sides or characteristics capable of giving different patterns to the injuries, yes.
Q. And this in the range, again, of possibility?
A. That’s correct.
********
Q. And the number of blows as you said, this is the range of possibilities, too, you can’t say that definitely or probably that it was fifteen, as far as you know it’s possibly fifteen or more?
A. Fifteen or more, yes.
Critical portions of Dr. Shuster’s testimony were not couched in terms of sufficient medical certainty. I believe the failure to explicitly categorize all significant portions of Dr. Shuster’s testimony in terms of reasonable medical certainty resulted in the disclosure of speculative and inádmissible evidence.
Dr. Shuster’s testimony cannot be minimized with respect to its force and influence in this case. His opinions about the number of blows and the type of instrument causing the victim’s injuries were crucial to the prosecution’s theory that this was not a reflexive or impulsive homicide justifying a manslaughter verdict. The opinion evidence escalated the case into an intentional homicide coupled with a purpose to inflict gratuitous pain and suffering, clearly prejudicing defendant’s ability to have a fair determination under Gerald as well as to avoid the death penalty under aggravating factor c(4)(c). Yet that opinion evidence was so patently inadequate in terms of the standards that govern medical testimony that its admission must be deemed reversible error.
III.
The Court finds no major difficulty with respect to a prior conviction admitted for impeachment purposes, nor is particularly troubled by the admission of other-crimes evidence. Ante at 431-432, 581 A.2d at 495. I believe the conventional standards under which these evidentiary rulings were made are inadequate in the capital-murder context and that, in both *449instances, reversible error occurred. See State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 513-18, 575 A.2d 435 (1990) (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting).
The Court finds unexceptional the admission of a prior rape conviction to impeach defendant’s credibility under State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 386 A.2d 378 (1978). “Given the seriousness of his prior offenses, we see no reason to second-guess the trial court.” Ante at 432, 581 A.2d at 495. It is extraordinary that such evidence could be received in light of other evidence relating to a single pubic hair attributable to a black person found on the victim, which disclosure had the unmistakable potential to inject sexual assault into the case. Ante at 429-430, 581 A.2d at 493-494.
The Court rules that, “[o]n retrial the prosecution should refrain from referring to the hair as a ‘pubic hair.’ ” Ibid. That does not eliminate the grave potential for prejudice inherent in the prior rape conviction, however. Informing the jury that defendant had committed another serious, violent crime in the past has the clear capacity to influence its determination of substantive guilt on the capital-murder count. In a capital case, the slight bearing on credibility that such a prior conviction may have can never outweigh such profound prejudice in my estimation. See State v. Pennington, supra, N.J. at 561-63, 575 A.2d 816 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting).
The Court recognizes that the other-crimes evidence pertaining to defendant’s theft of a hatchet could have a prejudicial impact with respect to the penalty phase of the trial. Ante at 432-434, 581 A.2d at 495-96. In my view, it is imperative that the potential for prejudice of such evidence in the penalty -phase trial be considered by the trial court in determining its admissibility in the guilt-phase trial. I stressed in State v. Long, supra, that
under Evidence Rule 55 and Evidence Rule 4, the court must go further and determine the existence of potential prejudice, and weigh the prejudice against the probative worth of the evidence. Because “other-crime evidence has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant,” State v. Stevens, 115 *450N.J. 289, 302-03 [558 A.2d 833] (1989), that weighing process is particularly critical in a capital-murder prosecution. Such proof offered in the guilt phase of a capital-murder trial has an “evidentiary fallout” that can taint not only the jury’s determination of guilt but also its determination of life or death. [119 N.J. at 515, 575 A.2d 439 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting).]
I repeat:
Those several considerations underscore the need in a capital-murder prosecution to require that any Evidence Rule 4 hearing to determine the admissibility of other-crimes evidence — other uncharged crimes, other charged crimes, and other prior convictions — must take into account not only the prejudicial effect on the determination of guilt but also the prejudicial effect on the determination of sentence. See State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 586-87 [575 A.2d 816], The court must, in the guilt-phase of a capital-murder prosecution, I submit, bring into the equation a consideration of the prejudice such evidence can have in terms of arousing, inflaming, or confusing a jury in its critical assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors, and in terms of the capacity of such evidence to mark defendant as an evil, violent and dangerous person. [Id. at 516, 575 A.2d 439 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting).]
Those considerations apply here. As I view the record they justify reversal.
IV.
I concur and dissent in part from the judgment of the Court.
Concurring in part, dissenting in part — Justices HANDLER, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 4.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD and POLLOCK — 3.