Court Opinion

ID: 9570255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:21:39.318242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:16.809765
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I am not greatly disturbed by the result of this case, but rather by its ramifications.
The folk, whose return address is Box 400, Rawlins, Wyoming 82301, are playing games with the criminal justice system, and this court is their cheerleader. The game starts by the criminal defendant entering into a favorable plea bargain. Usually in the plea agreement some of the multiple charges are dismissed and/or the prosecution agrees not to urge a stiff penalty.1
In the next phase of the game, the convicted criminal lays low for a season. He enjoys hospitality of the penitentiary for a few months or years, depending on the circumstances. During this hiatus witnesses against the convicted felon die, leave the state or their memories become dim. During this same period of hibernation, the felon receives tidings to the effect that his rights were seriously violated when he pled guilty.
This court now sedulously enters the game and determines that the convicted person is entitled to a lawyer, at taxpayer’s expense of course, to check out everything and see if he or she can possibly find error. The outcome of the game is uncertain. It may go on forever. Some criminal cases outlive most of the principals.
In its search for error, the majority has ignored some basic principles that we have set out in earlier cases. The post-conviction statutes provide relief only when deprivations of constitutional rights have occurred. Munoz v. Maschner, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1352, 1354 (1979). In reviewing a petition for post-conviction relief, the inquiry is limited to a determination of whether or not the defendant was denied *553the right to be represented by counsel, to have witnesses and to have a fair opportunity to prepare and present a defense. Morgan v. State, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1244, 1244-1245 (1985). Relief can be granted “ * * * only in extraordinary circumstances where there is a likelihood that without it the defendant would not have been found guilty and the probability of the miscarriage of justice is strong. * * * ” Johnson v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 285, 286, cert. denied 442 U.S. 932, 99 S.Ct. 2864, 61 L.Ed. 2d 300 (1979).
A post-conviction proceeding is not a substitute for an appeal. “ * * * The remedy does not permit review of error which could or should have been brought by direct appeal. [Citation.]” Hoggatt v. State, Wyo., 606 P.2d 718, 722 (1980); see also, State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton County, Wyo., 696 P.2d 54, 64 (1985); and Munoz v. Maschner, supra, at 1354. In this case appellant did not take a direct appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court, which was the proper forum for consideration of his allegations. The district court acted properly in dismissing the petition, since all of appellant’s claims could or should have been raised on direct appeal.
When the legislature enacted the post-conviction relief statute, I am certain it did not intend that the statute be a substitute for an appeal, a second appeal, a substitute for a motion for a new trial or to correct an illegal sentence.
Under the authority of this case, it appears that there is no limitation on providing an attorney for a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief. If a petitioner alleges that he is tired of being in the joint and wants a lawyer to help him find a way out, under the authority of this case he is entitled to an attorney. This attorney must then search for and find irregularities. Surely, the legislature never intended that an incarcerated convict could assert any frivolous circumstance and automatically trigger the appointment of an attorney. One of the ramifications of this case is that the public defender will have to set up a branch office within the walls of the penitentiary. The public defender will need an enlarged staff to search for errors.
The court should resist the temptation to search for ways to reverse criminal convictions.
I would affirm.

. In exchange for a plea of guilty, the state dismissed three criminal charges against appellant.