Court Opinion

ID: 9865200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:27:00.3266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:53.381744
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Knous,
dissenting.
I am unable to concur in the conclusion of the majority of the court. It is my belief that the majority opinion discloses a. misconception of the position and contention of the city of Denver. As I understand, the city does not assert that a petition was not necessary to initiate the improvement herein involved; neither do I apprehend that there is any controversy, factual or legal, with reference to the character of this district as being a paving district, or otherwise. As its. principal contention, the city asserts that the manager of improvements and parks, in the first instance, and the city council, secondly, have the right and authority to' pass upon the sufficiency of the petition, and that their findings in this respect are final and conclusive.
Subdivision 9 of section 22 of the charter provides as follows: “The finding of the council by ordinance, that any improvements provided for in this article were duly ordered after notice duly given, or that a petition or remonstrance was, or was not filed, or was or was not duly subscribed and acknowledged by the required number of owners, as in this article provided, shall be conclusive in every court or other tribunal. ’ ’
Hnder this provision of the charter, a determination by the Denver council of the question of the legal sufficiency of a remonstrance was accorded a conclusive and final effect in the case of Londoner v. Denver, 52 Colo. 15, 31, *513119 Pac. 156. The court, in this connection, said: “The people of the municipality, having full and unrestricted power over the matters involved, vested in the city council the power to pass upon and make conclusive findings as to the existence or non-existence of certain things which might have been dispensed with entirely by the legislative power. Nor did such people see fit to provide any mode of review of the acts of that tribunal, but declared that its findings thereon ‘shall be conclusive in every court or other tribunal. ’ We think the jurisdiction conferred upon the park commission, in the first instance, and in the city council finally, to pass upon and determine the existence or non-existence of the alleged jurisdictional facts, is absolute and exclusive. ’ ’
It seems to me the Londoner case is decisive of this .question, and that of necessity under that authority the position of the city should be sustained. The majority opinion would seem to be more in accord with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gabbert in the Londoner case, supra.
Further, and as a corollary to the proposition last discussed, the city claims the plaintiffs in error are precluded from maintaining this action, because they did not exhaust the legal and administrative remedies provided by the charter with respect to the sufficiency of the petition. It seems certain from the charter provisions, even if the question of the conclusiveness of determination is not considered, that the manager of improvements and parks and the council, in that order, are given the power to pass upon the sufficiency of the petition. In the case at bar, no such opportunity was accorded either tribunal. The plaintiffs in error, pursuant to the usual preliminary notice given by the manager of improvements and parks before a special improvement is ordered, protested against the authorization upon the basis of the expense involved and the character of the improvements contemplated; but at no time, before either the managér of improvements and *514parks, or the city council, did they object in any form or manner to the sufficiency of the petition. It would seem elementary that under these circumstances plaintiffs in error should not be permitted to rush into a court of equity and, on the ground of some alleged procedural defect in proceedings before administrative bodies having full power to grant remedial relief, object to the proposed improvement without even having raised the question there. Neither is it proper, in my opinion, to inject in this proceeding any question as to the proposed plan of assessment. There are no allegations in the complaint, as I read it, which indicate, even prima facie, that the proposed plan of assessment is illegal or that it violates the principles announced in Santa Fe Co. v. Denver, 89 Colo. 309, 2 P. (2d) 238; Farncomb v. Denver, 64 Colo. 13, 171 Pac. 66, and Spalding v. Denver, 33 Colo. 172, 80 Pac. 126. Likewise, it appears to me that plaintiffs in error have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law with respect to the assessment matter, as under the charter they are accorded the legal right of appearing before the city council—sitting as a board of equalization—and having a full and complete hearing upon any complaints and objections which they might have to present. Until this administrative remedy is exhausted, no recourse can be had to a court of equity with respect to the assessment. This court said in Spalding v. Denver, supra: “Before parties aggrieved by an assessment levied under a fixed rule which appears to be reasonable and likely to proximate an equality of assessments, can appeal to a court of equity to relieve them from an alleged excess, or because their property was not, in fact, benefited, they must at least first apply for such relief to the special tribunal which the law has provided to settle these questions. The plaintiffs never attempted to raise any of these questions before the city authorities, and are, therefore, not in a position to litigate them in a. court of equity. ’ ’
In the light of the provision of the Denver charter and *515the decisions of this court mentioned, it is my conviction that the conclusion reached by the majority is a departure from the well-established rule in this jurisdiction.