Court Opinion

ID: 9352371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 21:00:49.82542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:36.203430
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-1921

        AMOS N. JONES,

                             Petitioner - Appellant,

                      v.

        CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY; JOHN BRADLEY CREED; ROBERT CLYDE
        COGSWELL, JR.; TIMOTHY ZINNECKER; CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF
        AMERICA,

                             Respondents - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:20-cv-00029-BO)

        Submitted: November 29, 2022                                      Decided: January 4, 2023

        Before THACKER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Tillman J. Breckenridge, BRECKENRIDGE PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
        Appellant. Kevin S. Joyner, Robert A. Sar, Jefferson P. Whisenant, OGLETREE
        DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, PC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Amos N. Jones appeals the district court’s orders awarding him only $500 in

        sanctions for the Defendants’ violation of the district court’s local rules, awarding the

        Defendants sanctions based on Jones’ failure to attend his deposition, and denying his

        motion for sanctions as moot after he requested that the district court dismiss his case.

        Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

               We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s imposition of sanctions under

        Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, see Southern States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318

        F.3d 592, 595 (4th Cir. 2003), and for a violation of the district court’s local rules, see Iota

        Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2009). “A

        court abuses its discretion when its conclusion is guided by erroneous legal principles or

        rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.” In re Jemsek Clinic, P.A., 850 F.3d 150,

        156 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). When determining what sanctions

        to impose under Rule 37, * a court must consider “(1) whether the non-complying party

        acted in bad faith, (2) the amount of prejudice that noncompliance caused the adversary,

        (3) the need for deterrence of the particular sort of non-compliance, and (4) whether less

        drastic sanctions would have been effective.” Anderson v. Found. for Advancement, Educ.,

        & Emp. of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1998).

               We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. As for the

        Defendants’ failure to comply with the local ADR rules, the Defendants did not act in bad

               *
                The district court’s local alternative dispute resolution (ADR) rules incorporate the
        sanctions listed in Rule 37. See E.D.N.C. ADR R. 101.1d(h).
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        faith— the mediation occurred during the peak of the pandemic, the insurance carrier had

        a no-travel policy because of the pandemic, and the university officials had official tasks

        to which they were attending on the day of the mediation. Moreover, the defense parties

        present had full authority to settle the case on behalf of all the Defendants. Thus, Jones

        was not prejudiced by the absence of the parties who failed to appear.

               This is in contrast to Jones’ conduct in failing to attend his deposition. There is a

        significant need to deter parties from unilaterally deciding not to attend a properly

        scheduled deposition. Although Jones compares his conduct to how the Defendants

        handled the mediation, this is not an apt comparison. The Defendants could accomplish

        nothing at the deposition but to identify exhibits for the record, whereas Jones was able to

        engage in settlement discussions during the mediation. And Jones took no steps to notify

        either the Defendants or the district court of his decision not to attend his deposition.

               Finally, Jones concedes that a motion for sanctions seeking substantive relief

        becomes moot when a case is dismissed. The only sanction Jones sought in his motion for

        sanctions was a default judgment against the Defendants.           Thus, his motion sought

        substantive relief and the district court appropriately denied it as moot when it granted his

        request to dismiss his case.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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