Court Opinion

ID: 9697888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:36:09.912835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:36.659198
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Justice.
On January 31, 1967 plaintiff, Central Savings & Loan Association, filed its petition seeking to foreclose on mortgaged real estate as described therein and then occupied by defendants, Gaylord W. Engle and Elva M. Engle. Plaintiff alleged the mortgage was executed by defendants, Paul Gene Gaumer and Janice Kay Gaumer, and that Engles, when they bought the property from Gaumers, assumed and agreed to meet the obligations of the mortgage. Several secondary lien holders were also made defendants.
Plaintiff’s petition alleged a $375.60 delinquency in payments of principal and interest on the promissory note and mortgage, unpaid taxes and asked personal judgment against the Engles and the Gau-mers. Plaintiff also alleged waste was being committed on the premises and asked that a receiver be appointed and given possession thereof.
Engles, Gaumers and at least one lien holder appeared by their respective attorneys. Engles filed a motion for stay of proceedings pending adjudication on their bankruptcy proceedings. A stay was granted until April 15, 1967 and on July 29 plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against Engles. As required by rule *657238, Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff’s motion was supported by an affidavit verifying the claim, the amount due and the affiant’s statement he believed no defense existed against it.
Within the 10 day period stated in the rule, Engles filed their resistance to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. By affidavit Engles asserted plaintiff was not entitled to any personal judgment against them as prayed by plaintiff. It included statements of fact that plaintiff’s claim had been listed in their bankruptcy proceedings and they had been granted a discharge. They also set out they were occupying the premises as their home.
Simultaneously with filing their resistance Engles filed an answer putting at issue several material allegations of plaintiff’s petition. They asserted the defense of a discharge in bankruptcy and denied plaintiff’s right to the appointment of a receiver. They also asserted homestead and possession rights. The district court clerk noted copies of the resistance and answer were mailed or delivered to plaintiff’s attorneys on August 8, the filing date.
On September 1, 1967, apparently a court motion day, this calendar sheet entry was made: “Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment overruled, (s)- Hobert Newton, Judge.”
September 8, 1967 on another calendar sheet, this entry was made: “Judgment per entry, (s) Robert O. Frederick, Judge.”
The judgment and decree contained a finding: “That the Plaintiff has heretofore filed herein its motion for summary judgment; that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is in proper form, and that Defendants appearing of record (Engles) have not in any manner resisted Plaintiff’s motion as required by R.C.P. 238.”
The decree did not include a personal judgment against Engles but did provide for the appointment of a receiver in event the property sold for less than the judgment, attorney fees and costs. In such an event it further provided the receiver have immediate possession of the premises involved.
On October 20,1967 Engles filed a motion to set aside the decree: “for the reason that the motion for summary judgment filed by the Plaintiff had not been ruled upon by this Court and that the Court was without jurisdiction to enter any decree in this case.”
At the sheriff’s sale on October 27, 1967 plaintiff bought the property in for $13,-700, leaving a deficiency of $839.74. Later Engles were evicted by the receiver.
On October 23, 1967 this entry was made on the calendar page previously used by Judge Frederick: “Defendants’ motion to set aside decree continued for the attention of Judge Frederick unless Plaintiffs confess said motion, (s) Hobert C. Newton, Judge.”
Plaintiff did not confess the motion but filed resistance thereto as did the Gaumers.
After hearing on the motion to set aside the decree and receiver’s application this entry was made on the calendar sheet originally used by Judge Newton: “February 7, 1968, Motion of defendant Engle to set aside Decree filed October 20, 1968, is specifically overruled.
“February 7, 1968, Hearing on receiver’s application and order as per signed entry, (s) M. C. Herrick, Judge.” The entry included a judgment in favor of the receiver against the Engles of $459 as rent from October 27, 1967 to February 6, 1968. En-gles have appealed from the orders of February 7.
I. The issue here presented, as stated by appellants Engles, is whether a judge of the district court could enter a decree on a motion for summary judgment after timely resistance had been made and another judge of that district had overruled the motion. In short Engles contend the second judge had no jurisdiction to enter a decree in this matter until the prior *658ruling had been changed puráuant to a hearing. They maintain under the pleadings a genuine issue as to material facts appears and that Judge Frederick’s decree was erroneously entered particularly because it was based on a finding no resistance had been filed to the motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff-appellee contends the second judge had jurisdiction to act in this matter, that only a procedural irregularity appears and asserts the pleadings, admissions, and affidavits show there was no genuine issue as to any material facts. We are unable to agree. When Judge Frederick ruled on the motion and entered the foreclosure decree, in the absence of Engles and their attorney, no motion for summary judgment was pending. His finding that no resistance had been filed was contrary to the record. The resistance and answer raised real issues which Engles should have been given an opportunity to present on trial of the case.
The unusual facts and the questions presented here seem to be without precedent in this court or other courts except Dunkelbarger v. Myers, 211 Iowa 512, 233 N.W. 744, which considers jurisdiction of different judges making ruling in the same case. We shall discuss it infra.
The method, or lack thereof, of the Warren district court clerk of keeping records appears to be the real cause of the controversy now presented to us. Two calendar sheets were used. They have been referred to as number one and two. Number one was used by Judges Newton and Herrick. Number two was used by Judge Frederick. The attorneys and Judge Frederick were not advised of Judge Newton’s order until it was apparently discovered at the hearing to set aside the decree. No attack has been made on it. It remains as a valid order.
Engles’ resistance to the motion had been on file a month before Judge Frederick’s ruling but it did not come to his attention. Ordinarily it would be in the court files with the pleadings and plaintiff’s motion. It is difficult to believe plaintiff’s attorneys were advised of the resistance or that it was properly placed in the court file and they took a decree based on a finding of no filing of a resistance by Engles.
Although not exactly in point factually we believe our holding in Dunkelbarger v. Myers, supra, is controlling here. There Judge Thompson of the Polk District Court heard and took under advisement the issues in that case. Later an associate, Judge Franklin, under a court rule, not knowing it had been submitted to Judge Thompson, dismissed the case for lack of attention. Subsequently Judge Thompson discovered the dismissal order, set it aside and entered judgment for plaintiff. On appeal we affirmed on the ground Judge Franklin did not have jurisdiction to make the dismissal order.
At pages 515, 516, 211 Iowa, page 745, 233 N.W., we say: “If the action of the lower court is to be sustained, it must be on the ground that Judge Franklin had no jurisdiction to enter the order of dismissal. True, the record shows that the entry of such order by Judge Franklin was through inadvertence or mistake; as he states in his testimony that, had he known that the case was held under advisement by Judge Thompson, he would not have entered such order. The question here involved may arise in any of our districts, especially in the larger cities, where two or more judges are holding court during the same term at the same time.
“Generally speaking, where there are several judges holding court at the same place at the same time, the action of any one of them in matters before him is the action of the court. But we have here a condition where a case was duly assigned, tried, and submitted to one judge, and he took such case under advisement. In so doing, we think he excluded all other judges in his district from making any orders which in any way would affect the substantial rights of the parties, or which *659would in any way interfere with Judge Thompson’s final disposition of the case. In other words, we think that, when this case was tried and submitted to Judge Thompson, and he took it under advisement, he took full jurisdiction of the cause, and thus deprived other associate judges from jurisdiction to dismiss the case. We think this is the practical rule; for, were it not so, under the circumstances of the instant case, utter confusion might be brought about in any case if different judges made orders or rulings therein.”
This reasoning is applicable here. Judge Newton in the regular course of his duties had overruled plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. It was no longer pending before the court. Judge Frederick was without jurisdiction to make a contrary ex parte order thereon.
II. Plaintiff and Gaumers argue no prejudice resulted to Engles and the decree, sale and the subsequent judgment for rent should be allowed to stand. We do not agree.
The record and order authorizing foreclosure sale of Engles’ home resulted in a serious cloud on the title which would readily appear to a prospective bidder. He would certainly know he was buying a lawsuit.
It seems reasonable to conclude plaintiff’s bid was made with this knowledge. A clear title would be inducive to a much higher bid and perhaps the avoidance of a receiver taking possession and asserting a rent claim against Engles.
We hold Judge Herrick should have sustained Engles’ motion to set aside the ruling and foreclosure decree entered by Judge Frederick. Plaintiff would have been wise to adopt Judge Newton’s suggestion in his order of October 23 that the motion to set aside the decree be confessed.
This case is reversed and remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits. Costs of this appeal are taxed against plainti f f-appellee.
Reversed and remanded.
All Justices concur except LARSON, J., who dissents, and STUART, J., who takes no part.