Court Opinion

ID: 9578401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:44:53.703165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:19.997875
License: Public Domain

Eberhardt, Presiding Judge,
dissenting. The uncontradicted evidence discloses that the draft, tendered as a fair and equitable settlement, was retainéd in the hands of the plaintiff or his attorney from April 27, 1970 until July 19, 1971—a period of a year and three months, and that from August 25, 1970, it was kept for a period of more than eleven months, despite repeated requests for its negotiation or return.
When a check or draft is tendered in settlement of a disputed claim it is the duty of the party receiving it to proceed with promptness to negotiate it or return it, and if he does neither an accord and satisfaction results. Hamilton & Co. v. Stewart, 108 Ga. 472, 476 (34 SE 123); Plowden v. Hall, 55 Ga. App. 321 (1) (190 SE 37); Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 57 Ga. App. 294 (1) (195 SE 326); Gay v. American Oil Co., 115 Ga. App. 18, 21 (153 SE2d 612); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. C. E. B. M., Ltd., 116 Ga. App. 92 (156 SE2d 467); Holton Dodge, Inc. v. Baird, 118 Ga. App. 316 (163 SE2d 346).
There can be no doubt that the draft was tendered to Mr. Studstill in settlement of his claim for injury and damage. Both the draft notation and the letter enclosing it so indi*729cate. Moreover from August 25, 1970, until suit was filed April 22, 1971, Aetna repeatedly so informed Mr. Studstill or his attorney, and requested that it be negotiated or returned.
The rule is expressed in Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. C. E. B. M., Ltd., 116 Ga. App. 92, supra, which very soundly rests upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Hamilton & Co. v. Stewart, 108 Ga. 472, supra. The retention of the draft here was, as a matter of law, for an unreasonable time, and an accord and satisfaction had occurred before the suit was filed.
A contention that the draft had become stale before the suit was filed and that thus the bank would have been authorized under Code Ann. § 109A-3—503 (2) (a) to dishonor and return it, does not require a different conclusion. It should have been used or returned before staleness occurred. Who brought about the staleness of the demand? If the draft had become stale because the issuer had stopped payment on it, we should have a very different situation. But it does not lie in the mouth of the payee to assert that as a defense against the plea when that situation results from his retention of the draft in the face of requests from the issuer that he proceed to negotiate it or return it. Cf. Sims v. Bolton, 138 Ga. 73 (74 SE 770). Moreover, it appears that up to, and even past the time when suit was filed, Aetna was asking that the draft be negotiated or returned, which carries with it an assurance that if negotiated the draft would be paid, whether stale or not. Even if the bank were not bound to honor it, nevertheless the maker was bound to pay it. Haynes v. Wesley, 112 Ga. 668 (37 SE 990, 81 ASR 72); Byrd Printing Co. v. Whitaker Paper Co., 135 Ga. 865 (1) (70 SE 798, AC 1912A 182); Mason v. Blayton, 119 Ga. App. 203 (166 SE2d 601).
Nor does the principle that a bank check or draft is not payment until it is itself paid, found in Code § 20-1004, require a different result. "The same ruling [that an accord and satisfaction has resulted] applies where the claimant, instead of receiving money as a settlement of his claim, *730receives a check or draft from the other party in full settlement of the claim. And this is so even though the claimant makes no effort to, and does not, cash the . check or draft, and subsequently tenders it back to the other party.” Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 57 Ga. App. 294, supra.
See also Redmond & Co. v. Atlanta & Birmingham Air-Line R., 129 Ga. 133 (58 SE 874); Jenkins v. National Mut. Bldg. &c. Assn., 111 Ga. 732 (36 SE 945); Thompson v. Hecht, 110 Ga. App. 505 (139 SE2d 126); Bass Dry Goods Co. v. Roberts Coal Co., 4 Ga. App. 520 (61 SE 1134).
The plea here is one of accord and satisfaction, not one of payment. There is a difference. While payment may very well work an accord and satisfaction, it does not follow that a compromise agreement, while working an accord and satisfaction, amounts to payment. The sending of the draft in settlement of the claim was an offer of compromise and settlement of a disputed and unliquidated claim, and Mr. Studstill’s receipt and retention of it, despite requests that he negotiate it or return it, estops him from setting up a denial of his acceptance of the offer. "In such cases, if the debtor tenders the sum as to which he is willing to concede a liability, on condition that it is to be accepted in full settlement, the creditor must decline the tender and not retain and use the money, check, or other thing of value offered in full settlement,” and this is true "notwithstanding he protests, at the time, that the remainder of his claim is still due and owing.” Bass Dry Goods Co. v. Roberts Coal Co., 4 Ga. App. 520, supra. "Nothing could be clearer than the proposition that where one person delivers to another property, to be retained upon a condition stated, the party receiving it can not retain the property and repudiate the condition.” Hamilton & Co. v. Stewart, 105 Ga. 300, 302 (31 SE 184). Accord: Burgamy v. Holton, 165 Ga. 384, 396 (141 SE 42); Wilcox, Ives & Co. v. Rogers, 13 Ga. App. 410 (79 SE 219); Ryan v. Progressive Retailer Pub. Co., 16 Ga. App. 83 (84 SE 834); Hornbuckle v. Continental Gin Co., 116 Ga. App. 449 (157 SE2d 829); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. C. E. B. M., Ltd., 116 Ga. App. 92, supra. The majority simply *731ignores the condition upon which the check or draft was delivered, and the result flowing from an acceptance and retention of the instrument for an unreasonable length of time, the condition having never been withdrawn.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly sustained.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Bell and Judges Quillian and Clark join in this dissent.