Court Opinion

ID: 9666363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:11:50.540081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:26.963437
License: Public Domain

CULVER, Justice,
concurring.
I respectfully disagree with the reasoning expressed by the majority in this case. The record clearly shows that the relator Oscar Calvillo Amaya, a/k/a Oscar Calvillo was held in constructive contempt for violating a previous order of the 103rd Judicial District Court.
As so often happens, the hearing concluded late on a Friday afternoon. The ruling of contempt was verbally delivered at 5:15 P.M., October 2, 1987. Relator did not go to jail. He was released on bond. Relator has not to this day been imprisoned as a result of this case. The commitment order was formally signed on the following Monday, October 5, 1987.
I concur in the conclusions reached in the majority opinion that a contemnor may only be detained for a “short and reasonable” time while the judgment of contempt and the order of commitment are being prepared for the judge’s signature. If relator had spent three days in jail waiting for the orders to be signed, a different conclusion might be reached.
If a “short and reasonable” time to prepare and submit the orders to the judge is the same day that the order is verbally rendered, or the next business day, or some other time certain, the rules or statutes should be amended to define the outer limits of “short and reasonable” time.
Until the rules are changed, a conscientious judge could have fill-in-the-blank orders at the bench to avoid delays, and attorneys seeking to have someone held in contempt of court could bring to the hearing orders holding relator in contempt and for commitment of relator. The judge can fill in the blanks about how much fine, jail time or both are ordered.
Under the facts of this case, I would say that the signing of the orders on the next business day meets the “short and reasonable” time test, especially since relator was out on bond. The habeas should be denied on this point.
However, the order is ambiguous in that relator was ordered to turn over to the receiver certain corporate assets in his possession. He turned an automobile over to the receiver. The remaining eleven pieces of equipment are in Mexico, not in relator’s “possession.”
To be enforceable, an order of contempt must be clear and unambiguous. The order of contempt should be vacated and relator discharged.
SPEARS, J., joins in this concurring opinion.