Court Opinion

ID: 9492158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:33:34.41553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:08.622203
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
It is true that Cozad, Hayes and McDonald all agreed that Jack Cozad, Director of ITT, was the ultimate decision-maker. Ms. Murphy does not challenge that point on appeal. Because Cozad had sole responsibility for the decision not to hire Ms. Murphy as an outside sales representative, “any direct evidence supporting the discrimination claim must relate to [Cozad’s] motivation for the [decision].” Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 396 (7th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1795, 140 L.Ed.2d 936 (1998).
Ms. Murphy offers evidence that I believe is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning Cozad’s motivation for refusing to hire her for the position. First, Cozad’s written statement clearly reflects his initial concern about Ms. Murphy’s disability. Even before interviewing Ms. Murphy for the position as outside sales representative, he sought the advice of his human resources manager about what he could or could not ask Ms. Murphy about her disability.1 Although he attested in his affidavit that he had no reason to believe that Ms. Murphy’s disability would affect her ability to perform the duties of a sales representative, he did ask why she worked only 17 hours a week in her telemarketing position. In addition, Cozad stated unequivocally in his deposition that Ms. Murphy was qualified for the position; nevertheless, his focus seemed to be on her disability. Cozad’s after-the-fact explanation for his concern — that he was not familiar with the ADA and did not want to make a fundamental mistake when questioning her about her disability — does not comport with his assertion that he knew the disability would not be a factor.2
Cozad also admitted that he had expressed his concern about Ms. Murphy’s disability to Hayes. That admission leads to the second significant piece of evidence, Hayes’ memo. Hayes stated in that memo that Cozad had discussed with him “his concern about the disability issue”:
Jack [Cozad] did discuss with me of his concern about the disability issue. He *940was advised ... about how to address this question. I did tell Debra [Murphy] that a letter explaining her disability situation might help explain that she was not a risk for hire.
R.26, Ex. VII. Indeed, on the basis of his conversation with Cozad, Hayes suggested to Ms. Murphy that she write a letter explaining her disability to show she wasn’t a “risk for hire.”
The majority dismisses Hayes’ memo and other statements from his deposition as the “indefinite comments” of a non-decisionmaker, the mere speculation of Co-zad’s subordinate concerning Cozad’s thoughts and motivations. However, the majority has mischaracterized Hayes’ comments; Hayes clearly and definitively reported that he had had a conversation with Cozad (verified by Cozad) and that Cozad was concerned about Ms. Murphy’s disability. He apparently addressed his superi- or’s concern by asking Ms. Murphy to write a letter explaining her disability. Ms. Murphy did write that letter, assuring the company that “the job you describe I am physically capable of performing.” R.26, Ex. VIII. There is no dispute about these occurrences. Hayes’ memo and actions are relevant evidence of Cozad’s intent.
This case is very different from Chiara-monte, upon which the majority relies. In Chiaramonte, the non-decisionmakers denied making the statements that Chiara-monte claimed were evidence of the deci-sionmaker’s motivation. See 129 F.3d at 397. In this case, however, Hayes reiterated the memo statements in his depositions; more importantly, Cozad himself admitted discussing his concern about Ms. Murphy’s disability with Hayes. Of course, Cozad later reported that his reason for the concern was that he wanted to avoid inadvertently violating the ADA. Co-zad’s asserted justification for his conversation with Hayes simply raises a genuine issue of material fact as to the real motivation for his not hiring Ms. Murphy. When we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Ms. Murphy, and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in her favor, as we are required to do, it seems clear that Hayes’ statements, corroborating the decisionmaker’s deposition testimony but reflecting a different motivation, are extremely relevant to our inquiry because they “relate to the motivation of the decisionmaker.” Id. at 396 (quoting Cheek v. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200, 203 (7th Cir.1996)).
The majority also holds that Ms. Murphy failed to establish discrimination under the indirect burden-shifting method because ITT’s reason for not hiring or promoting Ms. Murphy, her absenteeism, was a valid nondiscriminatory business judgment. Again I respectfully must disagree. It is undisputed that the attendance policy for telemarketers was flexible, that Ms. Murphy met all expectations of her superiors under that policy, and that her record contained no criticism whatsoever of her attendance on that job.3 This certainly is not a case of repeated absenteeism that is tantamount to the “unsatisfactory job performance” that we found in Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1171 (7th Cir.1997). Moreover, Ms. Murphy handled the telemarketer’s job with no accommodation to her disability and told ITT that her disability would have no impact on her ability to do the outside sales representative position. Yet Cozad focused on her disability, all the while denying such a concern, and never told her that her attendance performance as a telemarketer was the reason she was not hired as a sales rep. There is a genuine issue of material fact whether Cozad’s decision was based on her attendance record, in light of his knowledge of the difference in attendance expectations between the two jobs, or on her disability. Had the majority construed all facts in the light most favorable *941to Ms. Murphy, the non-moving party, it would have concluded that Ms. Murphy has provided sufficient evidence that her disability was a “determining factor” motivating Cozad’s decision. I therefore would allow a jury to determine whether Cozad’s express reason for not hiring Ms. Murphy as a sales representative, her attendance record in the telemarketing position, was pretextual and unworthy of credence. I respectfully dissent.

. Cozad’s written statement stated, in part:
Before I interviewed Debra for the position of representative, I talked with you [Lisa Cardona, manager of personnel] concerning what I could ask her in the interview. I knew at that time that she was on disability from her former job. Per your recommendation, I asked her why she was only able to work 17 hours and she explained to me her situation. She stated that it was no longer a problem.
R.26, Ex. IX.

. It is noteworthy, as well, that ITT hired 7 other sales reps, none of whom had a disability, but did not hire Ms. Murphy.

. Although the majority noted that her attendance records indicate that she worked less than 17 hours about one-third of the time, Ms. Murphy points out that she worked more than 17 hours many weeks and that, over her entire work period, she averaged more than 17 hours per week.