Court Opinion

ID: 9444593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:05:46.43257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:55.534816
License: Public Domain

MAJOR, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I agree with the holding by Judge Finnegan that the involved provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act is constitutional and with his reasoning in that respect. I also agree that the conviction should be reversed for a new trial because of the prejudicial error committed by the trial court. However, I do not agree with some of the statements contained in Judge Finnegan’s opinion. For instance, he states, “Validity of the underlying deportation order was put squarely in issue by defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment.” Statements of similar effect appear at other points in the opinion. In my view, this is an erroneous statement. Nothing was placed in issue by defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment other than the legal question as to whether an offense was charged under the terms of the statute. If not, defendant was entitled to have the charge dismissed and that would have ended the matter. I think, however, that the indictment stated a good cause of action and that the motion to dismiss was properly denied.
The prejudicial error for which I would reverse and remand was the court’s refusal to permit an attack by the defendant upon the validity of the deportation order. I agree, of course, that the defendant was not entitled to a trial de novo. He was entitled, however, to attack the validity of the deportation order and, for the purpose of making a determination thereon, it was incumbent upon the trial court to review the proceedings before the administrative agency upon which the order was predicated. There is no precedent of which I am aware which delineates the scope of such review. However, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521 prescribes the requirements to be met and the rights to be accorded an alien as a basis for a valid deportation order.2 True, the deportation order in the instant case was entered prior to the effective date of the *8941952 Aeí and the latter is not controlling. Even so, these provisions laid down by Congress as to the procedure to be followed a id the nature of the hearing to be accorded an alien whose deportation is soug.it appear reasonable and fair. Therefore, I would adopt them as a guide to the District Court in determining the scope of review to which defendant is entitled in connection with his contention that the deportation order is invalid.
SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.
I joir. in the concurring opinion.

. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1503, inc.

. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b):
“(1) the alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circumstances, of the nature of the charges against him and of the timo and place at which the proceedings will be held;
“(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, au-*894thorised to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose;
“(c) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence agairst him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government; and “(4) no decision of deportability shall
be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.”