Court Opinion

ID: 9885211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:53:43.530806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:48.037169
License: Public Domain

Ekafcis, J.
(dissenting in part). I concur in the result announced by the court but cannot agree with what appears to be the principal reason advanced for reaching the result.
The reversal is predicated largely on the failure of the trial court to remold an improper request to charge submitted by defendant on an incidental aspect of the case, and submit the corrected request to the jury. There is not a case to be found in New Jersey which imposes any such burden. On the contrary, and with good reason, the law has always been otherwise.
We aTe not dealing here with a request to instruct the jury concerning an essential element of the crime charged against the defendant, which the trial judge has failed to cover in his main charge. A mandatory duty exists on the part of trial courts to advise the jury with respect to the fundamental principles of law which control the case being tried. The obligation exists without regard to whether a valid or legally incorrect request to charge is presented. In fact, even an oral request in most general terms, for example, to define the crime alleged or its essential elements, made at the conclusion of the instructions must be honored. State v. Butler, 27 N. J. 560, 594 (1958). But *176that positive duty had never been applied to issues incidentally in the case, such as possible adverse inferences to be drawn by a jury from failure of a party to a suit or indictment to produce certain witnesses. If instructions are desired on collateral or incidental matters, they must be made the subject of specific written requests by the interested party. B. B. 4:52-1. In absence thereof, the court has no affirmative obligation to deal with the law relating to such phases of the case. 5 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure (1957) § 2090, pp. 257, 258.
Moreover, it is the burden of the attorney to prepare requests to charge in such fashion that they correctly state the law. When that is done, the requests must be complied with if the matter to which they relate is a factor for consideration by the jury. The court, however, is not bound to follow the precise language employed by counsel. He may state the principle involved in his own words so long as there is no material departure from the theme. It is common, and, I think, the better practice, for trial judges to integrate requests into their main charge. Such procedure makes for better treatment of the issues in the case, and facilitates understanding by the jury.
But if a request incorrectly states the law or is partly correct and partly incorrect, the trial judge is, of course, justified in rejecting it. State v. Firth, 103 N. J. L. 275, 279 (Sup. Ct. 1927); State v. Reilly, 89 N. J. L. 627, 629 (E. & A. 1916); State v. Harrington, 87 N. J. L. 713, 715, 716 (E. & A. 1915); State v. Herron, 77 N. J. L. 523 (E. & A. 1908); Wharton, supra, § 2094, pp. 262, 263; 23A C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 1334. If the subject is in the case incidentally, in his discretion he may revise or remodel the request and then include the correct statement in his charge. Eailure to do so, however, is not ground for reversal; he is under no dutjr to pick out the good part and charge it, and reject the bad part. ETor is he under any obligation to rewrite a requested instruction or to correct erroneous statements contained in it. As *177the Court of Errors said in Hoffman v. Trenton Times, 125 N. J. L. 450, 453 (E. & A. 1940) :
“We perceive no error in the trial court’s refusal to charge the request as submitted. It has been held that ‘A request must stand or fall by the language in which it is presented to the court unless modified by counsel. If a modification of such language, however slight, is required, in order to entitle the party, as a matter of strict right, to have his request charged, it is not error to refuse to charge such request. The reversal of a judgment for the failure of the court to so modify a request that it would be error not to charge it, is a thing yet to be heard of.’ ” (Emphasis the court’s)
And see to the same effect, Gimbel v. Laird & Co., 119 N. J. L. 170, 173 (E. & A. 1937); Manchester B. & L. Ass’n v. Allee, 81 N. J. L. 605, 611 (E. & A. 1911).
It is a matter of common knowledge that just before summation of counsel the trial judge is frequently handed multiple requests to charge covering many typewritten pages. See R. R. 4:52-1. (In this case 40 requests were submitted.) He examines them and generally undertakes to integrate the correct ones into the framework of his charge. If they refer to fundamental elements of the case, he knows the subject must be covered in his instructions, irrespective of the phraseology employed by counsel, and so he is not too much concerned with the accuracy of that type of requests. But if some of them relate to collateral matters and incorrectly state the law thereon, he is justified in discarding them and usually does so unless in his discretion, conscious of the atmosphere of the ease, he feels that in fairness he should make necessary corrections and instruct the jury accordingly. Whether that course should he followed or the improper requests rejected, has always been regarded as -within the judgment of the trial court, and I know of no instance where a court has been reversed for rejecting a request containing an improper statement of the law, or for failing to correct it and give it to the jury as refashioned. And in this case, where a strikingly thorough and fair charge was delivered to the jury, I can see no just cause for departing from the established rule.
*178I do agree, however, that a new trial is warranted, but only because plain error was committed in the summation of the State. The Special Assistant Prosecutor said to the jury:
“Finally, where was Booker Drinkard? Booker Drinkard was arrested, taken into custody on the testimony of Barbara Holmes. The State has no duty to produce hostile witnesses. The State has no duty to produce witnesses that are going to say what their attorney wants them to say. * * (Emphasis added)
This statement was unfair and prejudicial and possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. State v. Corby, 28 N. J. 106, 108 (1958). The defendant was being tried for allegedly suborning false swearing. Resolution of the issue of guilt or innocence depended upon a difficult evaluation of her credibility. In that atmosphere the representative of the State, cloaked in the prestige of his office, suggested (so the jury could infer) by the quoted assertion that it would be futile for him to call Drinkard because defendant would suborn him too.
Hall, J., concurs in this dissent.
Francis and Hall, JJ., concurring in result.
For reversal — Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Proctor, Hall, Sci-iettino and Hane-MAN-7.
For affirmance — Hone.