Court Opinion

ID: 9445969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:42:33.340899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:28.338222
License: Public Domain

MAJOR, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I feel obliged to dissent and shall briefly state my reasons therefor. I agree that a search warrant was properly issued for the search of defendant’s safety deposit box in the Maywood-Proviso Bank. I also agree that the search of defendant’s apartment incidental to his arrest was proper. I part company, however, with the statement, “The volume of evidence in this case may not be great, but its quality is high.” In my view, the volume of evidence is meager and its quality inferior. The weakness of the government’s case is at once apparent from the fact that it dwells upon how it demolished defendant’s alibi. Of course, the validity of that defense was for the jury, but whether true or false it was without probative value in support of the bank robbery charge.
The sole affirmative proof relied upon by the government consists of two circumstances. The first is that defendant passed five $2 bills in a Sears, Roebuck & Company store, which were identified as having been stolen from the bank in the robbery. Thus, of fifty $2 bills stolen, five were found in possession of defendant. The significant fact regarding this possession, however, which renders it of little or no value, is that the bank was robbed November 4, 1955, and the five $2 bills were found in possession of defendant on January 14, 1956, seventy-one days after the robbery.
The second circumstance relates to the so-called rubber heel imprint testimony. An P.B.I. agent assigned to the F.B.I. laboratory in Washington concluded that the imprint on the counter in the robbed bank was made by the heel of the shoe found in defendant’s apartment. The testimony of this witness is, in my view, far from conclusive, particularly in view of the fact that the government had no direct proof that the shoe belonged to defendant. This essential link had to be inferred from the fact that the shoe was found in defendant’s apartment seventy days after the robbery.
Weak as the government’s proof was, however, I agree, with some hesitation, that it was sufficient to take the case to the jury and that its verdict should be respected, providing the trial was free from prejudicial error. This, in my view, was not the case. The record reeks with testimony heard by the jury which cannot be characterized as other than prejudicial, even though it was subsequently stricken. For my purpose it is sufficient to refer only to that which had its genesis in the search made of defendant’s bank box which admittedly was rented by defendant under an assumed name on January 14, 1956, seventy-one days after the robbery. As a result of the search of this bank box, $3,150 was seized. This money was produced in court by the government, displayed before the jury and a mass of testimony heard relative thereto. This testimony was offered evidently with the intention of identifying it or some of it with the money seized in the robbery. However, after the jury had witnessed the display and listened to this testimony, it developed that the government was unable to make identification. In fact, the testimony of the witness relied upon for this purpose was characterized by the court as “incredible.” Thereupon, the testimony of this witness, as well as that of all other witnesses, concerning the money found in defendant’s bank box, was stricken and the jury was specifically instructed by the court both at that time and subsequently to disregard it.
The trial judge did all that was possible to ameliorate the damaging effect of this testimony by admonishing the jury to disregard it. That the court succeeded is, in my judgment, highly improbable, particularly in view of the meager proof relied upon by the government. The situation calls for a reversal “unless it affirmatively appears from the whole record that it was not prejudicial.” McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, *7347, 56 S.Ct. 764, 766, 80 L.Ed. 1205. The record furnishes no basis for such a belief.
We are told that the government was disappointed in the testimony of its witness by whom it attempted, but failed, to make identification. I do not doubt that such was the case but this disappointment cannot be utilized to impair defendant’s right to a trial free from prejudicial error. In cases where proof of guilt is strong and convincing, it may be that a reviewing court can say, as often has been done, that an error made during the course of the trial could not have affected the result and is, therefore, not prejudicial. There is no justification, however, in my opinion, for the application of such a theory in the instant case.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.