Court Opinion

ID: 9740346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:32:56.341784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.588058
License: Public Domain

T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). This case is simply not an appropriate vehicle to carry the rule of law which the Court of Appeals, and now this Court, has decided to promulgate.
There was no discussion of asportation at the trial of this cause. Otis Adams defended on the ground that he had nothing to do with the original *246assault, and participated in the event only out of fear and under duress.
The information was drawn and the jury was charged in the language of the statute. No objection to the charge was made by defense counsel with reference to the question of asportation.
On appeal, five errors were assigned:
"I. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in allowing the prosecutor to display to the jury certain knives before said knives were introduced into evidence?
"II. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in allowing into evidence knives surrendered by inmates other than the Defendant?
"HI. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in admitting into evidence testimony of one Robert Hubbard relating to an alleged beating administered to Robert Hubbard by the Defendant?
"IV. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in refusing to give a requested instruction on intoxication as a defense?
"V. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in refusing to give a requested instruction on a lesser includable offense?
The Court of Appeals, on its own motion, requested briefing of two additional issues:
"1. Whether, under MCLA §750.349 [MSA 28.581], kidnapping can be committed without either an asportation or secret confinement of the victim.
"2. If an asportation is required, do the facts in the instant case constitute an asportation sufficient to es*247tablish the offense of kidnapping? See People v Levy (1965), 15 NY2d 159 (256 NYS2d 793); and People v Daniels (1969), 71 AC 1165 (80 Cal Rptr 897).”
In response to the requested briefing, defendant filed a supplemental brief, which concluded as follows:
"It is the contention of the defendant-appellant that the facts in the instant case do not constitute asportation necessary to establish the offense.
"The defendant-appellant does admit that the facts in the case at bar would not support a Levy-Daniels argument. The assignment of error that the trial judge refused to grant instructions as to a lesser included offense is herein reiterated; but the defendant-appellant does not argue that the real crime committed in this case was felonious assault and not kidnapping. Defendant-appellant has no argument with the People’s opinion that if a reversal of this conviction is in order that People v. Shaw (1968), 11 Mich. App. 255, 160 N.W. 2d 761 should also be reconsidered and overruled. The facts upon which Shaws’ plea was affirmed are the same which buttress Adams’ conviction.
"The reason cited by defendant-appellant for the reversal of both cases is this: The asportation necessary to convict in a kidnapping situation cannot possibly be present where all movement of the victim by the kidnapper had its origin and terminus wholly within the confines of a walled enclosure. The facts in the instant case are indisputed. Inspector Dembosky’s movements initiated by Adams, et al. began and ended all within the confines of the State Prison of Southern Michigan. Defendant-appellant cites no cases for this proposition, but can put forward no better argument after an exhaustive review of the Levy-Daniels and related cases.”
Despite defendant’s lack of enthusiasm for the bench-suggested line of argument, the Court of Appeals concluded that the facts did not support an asportation sufficient to warrant conviction of kidnapping.
*248Now this Court injects still another unsolicited dimension to the lawsuit. We reverse for new trial upon a claimed omission from the trial court’s instruction never brought to the attention of the trial judge either by requested instruction or objection to the charge; never briefed nor argued in the Court of Appeals by the litigants either before or after the enlargement of the issues by that Court, sua sponte; and never argued nor briefed in this Court.
The issue of asportation was not before the Court of Appeals. The sufficiency of the trial court’s instruction is not before us.
Perhaps the reason why no such issues were made at trial was the simple fact that no one connected with the case doubted that the seizure of the prison official, his forced march at knife point for over a quarter of a mile, and his confinement under guard as a hostage for several hours, constituted kidnapping.
The disputed issue in this case was not whether Inspector Dembosky was kidnapped. It was whether Otis Adams was one of those who kidnapped him.
By attempting to use this lawsuit as a vehicle to pronounce a new definition of the crime, we force a square peg into a round hole.
By sending it báck for new trial, we impose upon able counsel on both sides and upon the trial court a brand new lawsuit, to be tried upon a brand new theory.
I would affirm the conviction.
Levin and M. S. Coleman, JJ., did not sit in this case.