Court Opinion

ID: 9727867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:51:34.22546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:43.816396
License: Public Domain

G. R. McDonald, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the facts of this case. However, I strongly disagree with its holding that offensive use of collateral estoppel precludes defendant from litigating the issue of battery.
Collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues previously decided between the same parties in a different cause of action. Howell v Vito’s Trucking & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37; 191 NW2d 313 (1971). When discussing litigated issues our Court has held:
A question has not been actually litigated until put into issue by the pleadings, submitted to the trier of fact for a determination, and thereafter determined. [Sahn v Brisson, 43 Mich App 666, 670; 204 NW2d 692 (1972); Cogan v Cogan, 149 Mich App 375, 379; 385 NW2d 793 (1986). Emphasis added.]
The pleadings in the divorce action failed to raise the issues of battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus they were not actually litigated under the criteria set forth in Sahn and Cogan.
Fault is no longer material in obtaining a divorce in a "no-fault” state such as Michigan. However, our case law has held that fault may be considered by the court in determining an equitable division of property between the parties. Evidence concerning fault may encompass a broad *669range of behavior between spouses which may include not only battery, but also infidelity, lack of support and love, etcetera. The torts of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress were not the issues in the divorce action. They were merely evidence received in deciding the issue of who was at fault in causing the breakdown of the marriage relationship for the purpose of dividing the marital estate.
Further, in allowing the use of collateral estoppel offensively, the majority has deprived the defendant of his right to raise defenses based upon the pleadings under MCR 2.116(C), such as the statute of limitations. Since the issues herein were not pled in the first action, a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C) would have been inappropriate.
I would reverse the opinion of the trial court and allow the action to proceed on its merits.