Court Opinion

ID: 9947955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 22:03:17.874755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:47.872065
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/5/24 Gann v. Vines CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 GREGG GANN et al.,

      Plaintiffs and Respondents,                                        G062556

           v.                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01184693)

 HENRY ELLSWORTH VINES,                                                  OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Donald
F. Gaffney, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Henry Ellsworth Vines, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
                   The Torrey Firm, Rebecca L. Torrey, Judd Grutman; Kaplan Weiss,
Jonathon Kaplan and Yitz E. Weiss for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
              Attorney Henry Ellsworth Vines appeals from a judgment entered against
him following a jury trial. He contends (1) claim and issue preclusion support reversal;
(2) the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment; (3) the trial court erroneously
excluded evidence of other litigation between the parties; and (4) the court erroneously
refused to give the jury his proposed deliberation instructions. We affirm because Vines
has not carried his burden to show prejudicial error.
                                           FACTS
I. Context
              The underlying judgment was entered based on the jury’s verdicts for two
causes of action: interference with contractual relations and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. They were alleged by Westview Services, Inc., a public benefit
corporation, and Gregg Gann, who acted at all relevant times as Westview’s chief
executive officer and president (collectively plaintiffs).
              At the outset of litigation, Ned Leiba was named as a defendant. He was a
director on Westview’s board of directors and a client of attorney Vines, during relevant
times. Leiba settled with plaintiffs five days before trial, but participated as a witness.
                                                  1
              Gann’s employment by Westview began more than 20 years ago, when he
stepped in to lead it through a time of operational crisis. According to Vines’s briefing,
“[a] major disagreement started” between Gann and Leiba “in late 2018” and culminated
in a series of events in 2019, when Westview was deciding Gann’s employment for the
next year. On June 13, 2019, either one or two sessions of a Westview board meeting
happened, depending on who is asked. According to plaintiffs, only one session

1
              We distinguish between Westview and its board of directors only when
necessary.
                                              2
occurred, where a vote was completed to remove Leiba as a director. Under this version
of events, the meeting ended at noon.
              According to Vines, on the other hand, the vote did not effectively
terminate Leiba’s directorship, so Leiba and another director conducted a second session
and voted to expand board membership by an additional five members. Vines applied to
become one of the new directors.
              At the purported second session, Leiba and the other director signed a
“notice of termination of [Gann’s] employment agreement” (capitalization omitted) that
was purportedly delivered to Gann. At trial, Vines disputed his involvement with the
notice, whereas Leiba testified that Vines assisted in drafting the document “to a degree.”
              Six weeks after the termination notice, Vines sent a letter to Gann (the July
letter) that included, among other things, a draft of a complaint to the California Attorney
General about plaintiffs (the attorney general complaint), in essence asserting that Gann
had usurped the board’s powers, set unreasonable compensation for himself, and planned
corporate action not in Westview’s best interests. Among other things, the letter
contained the following statements: “If you oppose the addition of the five new
         2
directors[ ], then I need to advise you that I have been in contact with the California
Attorney General’s (CAG) office regarding our concerns at Westview. I am attaching
draft copies of the complaints that I have been preparing to file with both the CAG and
the Superior Court of California.”
              According to Vines, he submitted the attorney general complaint at the end
of July, within one day of the July letter. Two weeks later, Vines and Gann met at an

2
              Vines stated earlier in the letter: “I am one of those new five [b]oard
members.”
                                              3
office and discussed Gann’s future relationship with Westview, among other things (the
office meeting). The parties disputed at trial the details of what occurred there.
II. The Derivative Action
              Six days after the office meeting, Vines filed a lawsuit he drafted on behalf
of Leiba, to pursue a derivative action against Gann, in the name of Westview’s interests
(the derivative action). The essence of the allegations was that Gann’s compensation was
unreasonably high and his conduct furthered his personal interests at Westview’s
expense.
              Gann’s initial response to the derivative action included a special motion to
strike based on the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court in that case denied the motion, concluding
Gann had not shown the derivative action was based on conduct (by Gann) that was
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. In 2021, we affirmed the denial order based on the
same conclusion. (Leiba v. Gann (June 3, 2021, G058922) [nonpub. opn.].)
III. Judgment for Plaintiffs In This Litigation
              Twenty-one months after our opinion in the derivative action appeal, a five-
day trial for this litigation was conducted. As noted, the jury returned two verdict forms,
finding in plaintiffs’ favor on both the contract interference cause of action (in favor of
Westview and Gann) as well as the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of
action (in favor of Gann). In addition to compensatory damages, the jury awarded
against Vines $6,750 in punitive damages to Westview and $1,700 to Gann. Judgment
was ultimately entered against Vines for $181,700 plus interest in favor of Gann, and
$51,865 in favor of Westview, plus interest and costs of $31,412. Before entry of
judgment, Vines made an unsuccessful oral motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdicts. He timely appealed.

                                              4
                                      DISCUSSION
              As noted, Vines asserts four contentions to reverse the judgment. To each
we apply “three fundamental principles of appellate review: (1) a judgment is presumed
correct; (2) all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of correctness; and
(3) the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record affirmatively proving
error. [Citations.]” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42,
58 (Fladeboe).)
              The three principles dovetail with another: it is an appellant’s duty to
demonstrate a miscarriage of justice through adequate analysis and citation to the record.
(Cal. Const., art . VI, § 13; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564
(Denham) [appellate burden of persuasion]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a) [contents
of appellate briefs]; see Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 (Cahill) [“‘The absence of cogent legal argument . . . allows
this court to treat the contention as waived’”].) We apply the principles to each of
Vines’s contentions in turn.
I. Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion
              Vines contends for the first time on appeal that the doctrines of claim and
issue preclusion should be applied in this case because we affirmed the denial of the anti-
SLAPP motion in the derivative action, Leiba v. Gann, supra, G058922. We decline to
exercise our discretion to excuse the forfeiture (Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1275-1276, fn. 3), but briefly explain why the asserted ground
would be irrelevant to our analysis even if it had been properly preserved for appellate
review.
              Vines’s preclusion theories provide him no support because our ground for
affirming the anti-SLAPP ruling in the derivative action was not the same as the grounds

                                             5
he asserts for a reversal here. (See Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. v. Founding
Members of Newport Beach Country Club (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1123 [“when a
trial court judgment decides a case on two alternate grounds, and the appellate court
affirms based on one ground, the judgment is binding under principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel only on the ground addressed by the appellate court”].) In the
derivative action, we agreed with the trial court on a narrow conclusion that Gann had not
shown the conduct he was being sued for was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e.,
petitioning or free speech activity. (Leiba v. Gann, supra, G058922.) Contrary to
Vines’s interpretation, we did not reach any issue about whether a prima facie showing of
meritorious claims was made by Leiba’s derivative action lawsuit. (See Bonni v. St.
Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1026-1027.)
              Vines’s preclusion theories in this appeal have no relevance to whether
Gann engaged in protected activity so he cannot demonstrate a mutual issue that was
actually litigated. (Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 93 [five issue
preclusion elements].) He separately does not demonstrate any final judgment on the
merits in the derivative action that could serve as the basis for claim preclusion. (DKN
Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) Accordingly, his preclusion
theories would fail even if he had properly preserved them for our review.
II. Evidence Sufficiency
              Similarly, for the reasons discussed below, Vines’s briefing has forfeited
his evidence insufficiency contention, which would fail on the merits in any case. His
general position is that there was no evidence “to show that [he] did anything other than
[properly] act as an attorney.”
              In his reply brief on appeal, Vines argues, “Nothing happened as [Gann]
and his attorneys claimed to the jury.” The argument improperly attempts to portray the

                                             6
trial evidence in a light of credibility favorable to his view of events. (See People v.
Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330 [“It is the exclusive function of the trier of fact
to assess the credibility of witnesses and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence”];
see also Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143 [when
factual determination is attacked for evidence insufficiency “‘the power of an appellate
court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
determination’”].)
              Vines also argues it was “legally ‘absolutely impossible’ to truthfully claim
that [he] did anything wrong.” Vines cites to Gann’s testimony about the office meeting,
which plaintiffs presented to the jury as an example of Vines improperly forcing Gann to
either accept certain demands or face the filing of the attorney general complaint. Vines
asserts the portrayal of such a “contingent threat” was factually impossible because it
                                  3
reversed the true order of events, and argues the false portrayal of the office meeting was
“[t]he only basis” for Gann’s claim of “emotional distress.”
              Vines fails to establish that the only factual ground the jury could have
based its essential findings on was a threat at the office meeting. He presents no
discussion on what cause of action element is negated if his argument is true. More
fundamentally, he fails to discuss all of the material evidence that was presented to the
jury. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [where appellate

3
              Vines’s quotation of Gann’s testimony includes the following: “Mr. Vines
just reminded me to make sure that I understood that the message was either I allowed
him and the other four people onto the board or he would be making a complaint to the
attorney general accusing me of embezzling funds, of diverting funds to myself, and they
would be prosecuting that and he would be suing me under a complaint he had drafted.”
Vines asserts he had already filed the attorney general complaint 11 days before the
meeting.

                                              7
contentions turn on factual issue subject to substantial evidence review, failure to brief all
material evidence forfeits contention]). For example, even after plaintiffs cite to Leiba’s
trial testimony in their briefing, to counterargue that “[t]he notice of termination [of
Gann’s employment] was drafted by Leiba with assistance of and review by Vines,”
Vines provides no meaningful discussion about any of Leiba’s testimony. And on the
order of events surrounding the attorney general complaint Vines drafted, he does not
respond to plaintiffs’ discussion about the July letter that Vines sent to Gann, more than a
week before the office meeting. As quoted earlier, it discussed the attorney general
complaint as not yet filed. In other words, Vines does not demonstrate that other conduct
he engaged in—i.e., outside of the office meeting—could not have provided a factual
ground for the jury’s findings.
              “‘We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.’” (Cahill,
supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) Based on the absence of discussion in his briefing,
Vines’s evidence insufficiency contention fails.
III. Evidentiary Rulings
              Next, Vines argues the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him
to present the jury with evidence about the derivative action. We disagree.
              In his briefing, Vines repeatedly refers to the purported error as “the trial
judge’s gag order,” without citing to an actual ruling that categorically excluded such
evidence. Instead, Vines quotes from a proceeding conducted before opening statements
were made to the jury. There, the judge discussed plaintiffs’ motion to “exclude all
evidence of the derivative action” in a manner that directly contradicts Vines’s claim of a
gag order. Specifically, following an unreported “mini[-]opening” by counsel to
potential jurors, the judge said:

                                              8
              “I think it’s accurate to say that [plaintiffs’] counsel expressed some
concerns regarding things [Vines] had said. The court indicated much of what the court
had heard with regards to any reference to the derivative action or a handicap [Vines] has
or his brother has or giving his fees on contingency to -- or whatever he does with them
don’t appear to be relevant to the court and that the court would caution the jurors if such
things are said that what the parties are saying is not evidence.
              “The court advised both sides the court thought it would be unfortunate if I
had to repeatedly give that caution in front of the jury as the jury would certainly catch on
as to what was happening and that would not be to the benefit of the party for whom that
cautionary instruction was being given, but I am not at this moment -- I can’t in this
context exclude evidence in a vacuum. I don’t know how such evidence might be
presented such that it would end up being relevant. I certainly had great difficulty
imagining the relevance of [Vines’s] alleged handicap, I don’t see how it could possibly
be relevant to the causes of action that are pending, but that may go more to my lack of
imagination than anything else.
              “So until evidence is attempted to be presented, I don’t think I can simply
make a broad ruling to exclude certain things. When that evidence is attempted to be
submitted, [plaintiffs’] counsel can certainly make the necessary objection. The court
will rule accordingly.” (Italics added, capitalization omitted.)
              Vines also cites the trial court’s entry in its minutes about the motion:
“Court is in session, reported and out of the presence of the jury, with plaintiff(s),
defendant(s) and counsel present as noted above. The court and counsel discuss
plaintiff’s motion to exclude all evidence of derivative action. Oral argument heard.”
(Capitalization omitted.)

                                              9
              As seen from the above quotations, Vines’s citations do not contain a single
objection to a ruling he claims prejudiced him as a matter of evidence. (See Evid. Code,
§ 354 [preservation of evidence exclusion issue].) Generally, “[a] party cannot argue the
court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct” (People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435) and, unless excused, “an appellate court will not
consider a claim of error if an objection could have been, but was not, made in the lower
court. [Citation.]” (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46.) “‘[T]he forfeiture rule
ensures that the opposing party is given an opportunity to address the objection, and it
prevents a party from engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the
outcome, and then claiming error.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
              Vines provides one citation to specific evidentiary rulings made during his
own testimony about the July letter. The cited record contains three instances of the trial
court striking his cross-examination testimony. To illustrate, in the final instance, the
following occurred:
              “[Plaintiffs’ counsel]: And are you saying that you were not thinking when
you wrote the letter?
              “[Vines]: Nope. I’m saying, as you can see, it’s cc’ed to . . . Leiba. I was
being directed by what . . . Leiba, my client, wanted to have done and also following the
California Attorney General’s suggestions.
              “[Plaintiffs’ counsel]: I move to strike that answer as nonresponsive.
              “THE COURT: Pause. Everything after the word, ‘no,’ will be stricken as
nonresponsive. The word ‘no’ remains.”

                                             10
              Vines’s sole record citation, followed by a single conclusory sentence about
    4
it, does not carry Vines’s burden to demonstrate either an isolated miscarriage of justice
or his general claim that the trial court imposed a gag order regarding the derivative
action. (Cal. Const., art . VI, § 13; Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) Contrary to
Vines’s portrayal of proceedings, we agree with plaintiffs’ reading of the record as
showing the court specifically left open for trial the question of whether Vines would be
able to discuss certain topics in front of the jury, depending on the specific issues that
arose. The approach was sound and, because Vines fails to meaningfully discuss any
particular instance where the court prejudicially prohibited discussion about the
derivative action, he has failed to show the court abused its discretion.
IV. Jury Instructions
              Finally, Vines contends the trial court erroneously rejected his proposed
jury instructions. His briefing specifies three form instructions that plaintiffs do not
dispute were refused by the court: CACI Nos. 406, 2507, and 3933.
              “A party is entitled upon request to correct, nonargumentative instructions
on every theory of the case advanced by him which is supported by substantial evidence.”
(Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572.) Although we view the
evidence in a light most favorable to an appellant for this issue (Viner v. Sweet (2004)
117 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1225), “the refusal of a proper instruction is [reversible as a]
prejudicial error only if ‘“it seems probable” that the error “prejudicially affected the
verdict” [citations]’ [citation.]” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 655, 685). It remains an appellant’s burden to demonstrate a

4
               The entirety of Vines’s discussion of the citation is that “[w]hen issues
related to [his] representation or working with the California Attorney General would
come up, these statements would be quickly objected to with the judge sustaining and
striking.”
                                              11
miscarriage of justice. (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580 [instructional error not
automatically reversible].)
                 In his briefing section titled “Rejection of all Appellant’s Jury
Instruction[s],” Vines simply quotes the instruction forms without providing a single
citation to legal authorities to support his position. In contrast, plaintiffs present specific
counterarguments. First, they argue the proposed instruction based on CACI No. 2507,
titled “‘Substantial Motivating Reason’ Explained,” pertains to a concept only relevant to
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), which
they assert was not at issue at trial. Vines does not respond in his reply brief so we
conclude he has conceded the point. (Johnson v. English (1931) 113 Cal.App. 676, 677
[“[a]ppellant, by failing to file a reply brief, concedes that respondent’s position is
unassailable”].)
                 The remaining two instructions, based on CACI Nos. 406 and 3933, sought
to instruct the jury to assign comparative responsibility between Vines and Leiba for any
             5
harm found. Plaintiffs counterargue that Vines “cites to no legitimate evidence or offers

5
               As provided in the record, the proposed version of CACI No. 406 stated:
“[Gann] claims that the conduct of [Leiba] and [Vines] contributed to [Gann]’s harm. To
succeed on this claim, [Gann] must prove both of the following: [¶] 1. That [Leiba]
and/or [Vines] were at fault; and [¶] 2. That the wrongful conduct of [Leiba] and/or
[Vines] were a substantial factor in causing [Gann]’s harm. [¶] If you find that the
wrongful conduct of more than one person including [Leiba] and/or [Vines] was a
substantial factor in causing [Gann]’s harm, you must then decide how much
responsibility each has by assigning percentages of responsibility to each person listed on
the verdict form. These percentages must total 100 percent. [¶] You will make a
separate finding of [Gann]’s total damages, if any. In determining an amount of
damages, you should not consider any person’s assigned percentage of responsibility.”
                                                12
of proof at trial supporting a claim that other tortfeasors, including Leiba, acted
improperly or caused [plaintiffs’] harm.” They go further by asserting that “the evidence
presented [at trial] supports a contrary conclusion, that [Vines] acted without Leiba’s
authority or knowledge, and outside the scope of his representation, thereby bearing all
responsibility himself.”
              Vines does not provide any direct response to the points in his reply brief,
and again does not present a single legal authority on the issues implicated by the two
forms. (Johnson v. English, supra, 113 Cal.App. at p. 677.) Equally problematic, Vines
fails to meaningfully discuss why we should conclude that the lack of the proposed
instructions should be deemed prejudicial under applicable case law, even assuming error
occurred. (Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) He does not discuss the state of the
                                                                                      6
evidence material to our analysis, the effect of other instructions given to the jury, the
effect of counsel’s arguments, or whether the jury was misled about the case that had
been presented. (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 685.)
Given his briefing and the record presented on appeal, Vines has not carried his burden

               Next, Vines’s proposed version of CACI No. 3933 stated: “In this case,
[plaintiffs] seek damages from more than one defendant. You must determine the
liability of each defendant to [plaintiffs] separately. [¶] If you determine that more than
one defendant is liable to [plaintiffs] for damages, you will be asked to find [plaintiffs]’
total damages and the comparative fault of [Leiba] and [Vines]. [¶] In deciding on the
amount of damages, consider only [Gann] and [Westview]’s claimed losses. Do not
attempt to divide the damages between the defendants. The allocation of responsibility
for payment of damages among multiple defendants is to be done by the court after you
reach your verdict.”
6
               Indeed, Vines does not provide a record of what instructions were actually
given to the jury, nor does he provide a copy of a special verdict form he asserts the trial
court erroneously refused. (See Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 58; accord
Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [“‘Failure to provide an adequate record on
an issue requires that the issue be resolved against’” an appellant].)
                                             13
to show he advanced a theory of the case that justified the instructions at issue and that
the trial court’s decision on them resulted in prejudicial error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13;
Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.)
                                       DISPOSITION
              The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to recover their costs
on appeal.

                                                   O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

GOODING, J.

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