Court Opinion

ID: 9379737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 15:00:23.291854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.654529
License: Public Domain

21-6041
     Khorshe Alam v. Garland
                                                                                BIA
                                                                        Thompson, IJ
                                                                        A208 896 231
                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 16th day of March, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            ROBERT D. SACK,
 9            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   MOHAMMAD KHORSHE ALAM,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                    v.                                      21-6041
18                                                            NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                      Thomas V. Massucci, New York, NY.
25
26   FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
27                                        Attorney General; Linda S.
28                                        Wernery, Assistant Director; Sarah
 1                                   Byrd, Trial Attorney, Office of
 2                                   Immigration Litigation, United
 3                                   States Department of Justice,
 4                                   Washington, DC.

 5         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 7   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 8   is GRANTED.

 9         Petitioner Mohammad Khorshe Alam, a native and citizen

10   of Bangladesh, seeks review of a January 15, 2021 decision of

11   the   BIA    affirming   an    October      15,    2018    decision    of   an

12   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

13   withholding    of   removal,    and       relief   under    the   Convention

14   Against Torture (“CAT”).         In re Mohammad Khorshe Alam, No.

15   A208 896 231 (B.I.A. Jan. 15, 2021), aff’g No. A 208 896 231

16   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 15, 2018).              We assume the parties’

17   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

18         We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions.

19   See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528

20   (2d   Cir.    2006).      We     review       an    adverse       credibility

21   determination “under the substantial evidence standard,” Hong

22   Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and

23   “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

                                           2
 1   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

 2   contrary,”    8   U.S.C.   § 1252(b)(4)(B).         “Considering    the

 3   totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 4   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . .

 5   the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s

 6   account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s

 7   written and oral statements . . .          the consistency of such

 8   statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any

 9   inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard

10   to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to

11   the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant

12   factor.”    Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).      The agency found Khorshe

13   Alam’s testimony consistent as to his beating and the burning

14   of his store by members of the Awami League, but determined

15   that his claim was not credible because he submitted two

16   identical    affidavits    from   two   different    members   of   the

17   Bangladesh National Party.         We cannot conclude that this

18   finding constitutes substantial evidence under the “totality

19   of the circumstances.”      8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

20       “When an asylum applicant himself has submitted two or

21   more affidavits in support of his application that, he says,

                                       3
 1   have    been   provided    by   different   persons,      but   which   are

 2   strikingly      similar   in    their   structure    or   language,     our

 3   [C]ourt has allowed an [IJ] to treat those similarities as

 4   evidence supporting an adverse credibility finding.”                    Mei

 5   Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 519 (2d Cir.

 6   2007).     We have previously upheld an adverse credibility

 7   determination based on “nearly identical language in the

8    written affidavits allegedly provided by different people”

9    where the IJ further identified inconsistencies, omissions,

10   vague testimony, and a lack of specific corroboration.              Singh

11   v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 2006).

12          Here, the agency failed to consider the totality of the

13   circumstances.         Neither the BIA’s nor the IJ’s decisions

14   discuss Khorshe Alam’s other documentary evidence, which

15   included       country    conditions      evidence     and      additional

16   affidavits      from     Khorshe   Alam’s    mother,      sister-in-law,

17   brother, cousins, sister, aunt, other shopkeepers, and a

18   medical doctor. “[U]nder the substantial evidence standard,”

19   the adverse credibility determination must “be supported by

20   reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record

21   when considered as a whole.”            Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76

                                         4
 1   (quotation marks omitted).

 2          Furthermore, the agency’s conclusion that the affidavits

 3   were    fabricated        is    itself    not    supported     by    substantial

 4   evidence.      To begin, the affidavits were notarized by the

 5   same person on the same day in Bangladesh, indicating that

 6   they were prepared together or at the same time.                         Indeed,

 7   Khorshe      Alam    testified         that     his   father    obtained       the

 8   affidavits for him and that though the affiants may have

9    copied each other, they had witnessed the same event and the

10   information in the affidavits was true.                  See Mei Chai Ye, 489

11   F.3d    at    524        (acknowledging       that    similar       language    in

12   affidavits     could       be   owed     to   affiants    “relat[ing]      their

13   stories to the same scrivener”).                 The record similarly does

14   not support the IJ’s conclusion that the affidavits were

15   fabricated because they were mailed from Dubai rather than

16   Bangladesh.      The IJ relied on a DHL mailing label that listed

17   the    address      of    the   sender    as     “Mohammad     Liton    Patwary,

18   Bangladesh, CO First Flight Courier LLC Dubai VL.”                             But

19   Khorshe Alam testified that the sender was his cousin who

20   lived in Bangladesh, not Dubai, that the documents were sent

21   through DHL, and that he did not know why Dubai was mentioned.

                                               5
 1   While the label lists a sender in Bangladesh and a courier

 2   company seemingly based in Dubai, there is nothing on the

 3   label to establish that the documents were turned over to the

 4   courier    company   for   mailing   in   Dubai   rather   than   in

 5   Bangladesh.

 6       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 7   GRANTED, the BIA’s decision is VACATED, and the case is

 8   REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ORDER.

9    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays

10   VACATED.

11                                  FOR THE COURT:
12                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
13                                  Clerk of Court

                                      6