Court Opinion

ID: 9374826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 07:00:17.952377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:53.357584
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     HEATHER LYNN DAUJOTAS,                          DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         CH-0752-19-0455-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: February 23, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Ericka Owens, Great Lakes, Illinois, for the appellant.

           Lauren Leathers, Falls Church, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her indefinite suspension appeal as moot. For the reasons discussed
     below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     decision, and REMAND the case to the Central Regional Office for further
     adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was appointed to the position of Physical Science Technician
     at the Initial Testing Department, Directorate of Operations, with the Navy Drug
     Screening Laboratory in October 2016. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 198.
     The record reflects that, as of July 24, 2017, the agency design ated her position as
     “non-critical sensitive.”     Id. at 394-95.   On May 2, 2019, the Department of
     Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DODCAF) revoked the appellant’s
     “eligibility for access to classified information and/or assignment to duties tha t
     were designated national security sensitive.” Id. at 35. The notice informed the
     appellant that she could appeal the decision to the Personnel Security Appeals
     Board (PSAB). Id.
¶3         On May 8, 2019, the Deputy of Operations with the Initial Testing
     Department, Navy Drug Screening Laboratory, proposed to indefinitely suspend
     the appellant from duty and pay status based on the “revocation [of her] secret
     eligibility determination” pending the final adjudication of her security clearance.
     Id. at 32. The agency placed the appellant in an unpaid non-duty status beginning
     the following day. Id. at 33-34. She was advised of her right to respond to the
     proposal notice. Id. at 33.
¶4         On May 13, 2019, the agency issued the appellant a revised proposal to
     indefinitely suspend her. Id. at 28. Contrary to the original proposal, however,
     the revised proposal informed the appellant that she would be given 30 days of
     advance notice, during which she would remain in a non -duty paid status, or
     administrative leave, throughout this notice period. Id. at 23, 29-30.
¶5         On May 14, 2019, the appellant elected to appeal the DODCAF decision to
     the PSAB. Id. at 26. On May 28, 2019, the agency issued its decision affirming
                                                                                        3

     the proposed indefinite suspension. 2 Id. at 22-23.     The decision informed the
     appellant that she would be indefinitely suspended effective June 8, 2019,
     pending the final adjudication of her security clearance by DODCAF. Id. at 23.
¶6         The appellant subsequently appealed her indefinite suspension to the Board.
     IAF, Tab 1. She alleged that her security revocation and subsequent indefinite
     suspension were the product of disability discrimination and harmful procedural
     errors. IAF, Tab 9 at 4-7. During a telephonic status conference, the agency
     represented that it planned to rescind the appellant’s indefinite suspension and
     was in the process of completing the requisite paperwork to do so. IAF, Tab 11
     at 1. The administrative judge informed the parties that this action might render
     the appeal moot, provided the agency returned the appellant to status quo ante.
     Id. at 1-2. The administrative judge ordered the agency to file a notice of its
     rescission and informed the appellant that she could object to the rescission if she
     did not believe she was returned to status quo ante. Id. at 3.
¶7         The agency responded, asserting that on August 12, 2019, it unilaterally
     cancelled the appellant’s indefinite suspension effective June 8, 2019 , and
     submitted documentation that it retroactively placed the appellant in an
     administrative leave status from June 8 through August 3, 2019. IAF, Tab 12
     at 4-15, Tab 15 at 5-6. The agency subsequently provided documentation that it
     awarded the appellant a bonus that she would have been aw arded had she not
     been in a non-pay status during that period. IAF, Tab 15 at 6, 8. The appellant
     argued that she had not been returned to status quo ante and thus the appeal was
     not moot. IAF, Tabs 13, 17. According to the appellant, in order to be returned
     to status quo ante, the agency needed to reinstate her to her same shift, strike the
     disciplinary action from her personnel record, and award her lost overtime
     compensation and attorney fees and costs. IAF, Tab 13 at 4-6.

     2
       The agency’s decision identifies the notice of proposed indefinite suspension as
     “dated May 8, 2019 and revised on May 13, 2019.” IAF, Tab 10 at 22.
                                                                                           4

¶8         The administrative judge subsequently issued an initial decision dismissing
     the appeal as moot. IAF, Tab 18, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. According to the
     administrative judge, the agency’s cancellation of the indefinite suspension and
     retroactive placement of the appellant on administrative leave, effective June 8,
     2019, and continuing, restored her to the same status she held prior to the
     issuance of the indefinite suspension decision. ID at 6. The administrative judge
     found that the agency provided the appellant with the requisite back pay and the
     applicable bonus. Id. She further found that, because the appellant was placed on
     administrative leave, she was not eligible for overtime pay.        Id.   Finally, the
     administrative judge found that the Board does not adjudicate attorney fee
     requests until a final decision has been issued. ID at 7. However, she suggested
     that, under the circumstances here, the appellant was not a “prevailing party”
     entitled to attorney fees and costs. Id.
¶9         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Pe tition
     for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. She argues that her appeal is not moot because she
     has not been returned to status quo ante. Id. at 9-12. She also argues that she is
     entitled to attorney fees because she was the prevailing party. Id. at 12-19. She
     attaches new documents on review, including correspondence between her and
     her attorney, an April 2019 performance review, and documents relating to her
     payment of attorney fees. 3 PFR File, Tab 2 at 4-18. The agency has responded to
     her petition for review, and the appellant has replied to its response. PFR File,
     Tabs 6, 7.

     3
       The appellant additionally asserts that, beyond the evidence submitted for   the first
     time on review, there is new and material evidence or legal argument that      was not
     available when the record closed despite her due diligence. PFR File, Tab      1 at 11,
     Tab 7 at 4-5. We need not address the new arguments or evidence on review      because,
     as set forth below, we remand this appeal for further adjudication.
                                                                                           5

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      The appellant has sufficiently alleged that she has not been returned to status quo
      ante, and thus, her appeal is not moot.
¶10         The appellant argues on review that she has not been returned to status quo
      ante, and thus her appeal is not moot because the disciplinary actions must be
      purged from her record, she should be returned to active duty in “her 6 AM shift,”
      and she is entitled to overtime compensation and attorney fees and costs. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 9. The administrative judge held that, because the agency rescinded
      the indefinite suspension, returned the appellant to administrative leave, paid her
      back pay, and paid her a bonus, the agency returned the appellant to status quo
      ante. 4 ID at 7. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.
¶11         The Board’s jurisdiction is determined by the nature of an agency’s action
      at the time an appeal is filed with the Board. Sredzinski v. U.S. Postal Service,
      105 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 4 (2007).         An indefinite suspension lasting more than
      14 days is an adverse action appealable to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d).
      5 U.S.C. § 7512(2); Palafox v. Department of the Navy, 124 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 8
      (2016). An agency’s unilateral modification of its adverse action after an appeal
      has been filed cannot divest the Board of jurisdiction unless the appellant
      consents to such divesture or unless the agency completely rescinds the action
      being appealed. 5 Sredzinski, 105 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 4. Thus, the Board may dismiss
      an appeal as moot if the appealable action is cancelled or rescinded by the
      agency. Id. For an appeal to be rendered moot, an appellant must receive all of

      4
        The agency did not process the appellant’s lost wages and benefits as back pay, as
      suggested by the administrative judge. Instead, it retroactively pla ced her in an
      administrative leave status from June 8 to August 3, 2019. IAF, Tab 15 at 5 -6.
      5
        The administrative judge suggested below that the appellant consented to such
      divesture by agreeing at the status conference that, if the agency rescinded the
      indefinite suspension and reinstated the appellant with full back pay and benefits, the
      rescission would be complete. ID at 7. We disagree. The appellant’s repeated
      assertions that she had not been returned to status quo ante demonstrates that she did
      not consent to such divesture. IAF, Tabs 13, 17.
                                                                                         6

      the relief that she could have received if the matter had been adjudicated and she
      had prevailed. Murphy v. Department of Justice, 107 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 6 (2007).
      That is, the employee must be returned to the status quo ante and not left in a
      worse position because of the cancellation than she would have been in if th e
      matter had been adjudicated. Gillespie v. Department of Defense, 90 M.S.P.R.
      327, ¶ 7 (2001). If an appeal is not truly moot despite cancellation of the action
      under appeal, the proper remedy is for the Board to retain jurisdiction and to
      adjudicate the appeal on the merits.        Fernandez v. Department of Justice,
      105 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 5 (2007). The record does not support the finding that the
      appellant has been returned to status quo ante for several reasons.

            The record is devoid of any evidence that the agency has purged the
            indefinite suspension from the appellant’s personnel file.
¶12         The appellant argued, both below and on review, that the agency has not
      purged the indefinite suspension from her personnel file. IAF, Tab 13 at 4; PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 9. In response to her request that the disciplinary action be struck
      from her record, the agency stated that “[o]n August 12, 2019, the Agency
      cancelled the Indefinite Suspension.” IAF, Tab 15 at 5. To cancel an appealable
      action either when ordered by the Board or to render an appeal moot, an agency
      must remove all references to that action from the employee’s personnel record.
      Price v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 13 (2012). The agency has the
      burden of proving mootness.        See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Landlaw
      Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (reflecting that the
      burden of proving mootness is on the moving party); Price, 118 M.S.P.R. 222,
      ¶ 10 (finding that an administrative judge did not, as an appellant claimed, allow
      an agency to avoid its burden of proving mootness).        The agency here neither
      alleged nor offered evidence indicating that it purged the proposal s to indefinitely
      suspend or the indefinite suspension decision from the appellant’ s record. On
      remand, the administrative judge should resolve whether the agency can meet its
      burden of proving it did so. In supporting its assertions, the agency should be
                                                                                         7

      mindful that the statements of a party’s representative in a pleading do not
      constitute evidence. Hendricks v. Department of the Navy, 69 M.S.P.R. 163, 168
      (1995). This rule applies equally to the appellant.

               On remand, the administrative judge should determine whether the agency
               provided the appellant with status quo ante relief when it placed her in an
               administrative leave status going forward.
¶13            The administrative judge found that the appellant was returned to the same
      status she held prior to the issuance of the indefinite suspension, which was
      placement on administrative leave pending adjudication of her security clearance.
      ID at 6; IAF, Tab 15 at 5. The appellant continues to argue, as she did below,
      that status quo ante is a return to active duty, rather t han administrative leave.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 21; IAF, Tab 13 at 4-6. We are unable to resolve this issue on
      the record before us.
¶14            The Board generally has held that placing an appellant on administrative
      leave following the cancellation of an adverse action does not constitute a
      complete rescission of the agency action and thus a return to the status quo ante.
      Sredzinski, 105 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 8.       The appellant was in a duty status as of
      May 8, 2019. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 10 at 32-34. On that date, the agency issued
      the proposed indefinite suspension that also placed her in an unpaid, non -duty
      status pending a decision on her proposed suspension. IAF, Tab 10 at 32 -34. It
      subsequently corrected that status to administrative leave.        IAF, Tab 1 at 6,
      Tab 10 at 28-30. In the absence of the proposed indefinite suspension here, there
      was no mechanism that placed the appellant on administrative leave. IAF, Tab 10
      at 29.     Moreover, the placement on administrative leave and the indefinite
      suspension both arose out of the May 2, 2019 DODCAF revocation decision. Id.
      at 28, 35.      Accordingly, absent an exception, placement of the appellant on
      administrative leave is not status quo ante relief, as she should have been returned
      to active duty, the status she occupied prior to the rescin ded action.
                                                                                         8

¶15         Such an exception exists if an agency’s refusal to return the appellant to
      duty status is supported by a “strong overriding interest.”              Sredzinski,
      105 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 8. The agency contended below that it could not return the
      appellant back to work because her access to sensitive information had been
      removed and her security clearance was being adjudicated. IAF, T ab 15 at 5. It
      is unclear from the record below whether this sufficiently demonstrates a strong
      overriding interest.   For example, while the agency asserted in its proposed
      indefinite suspension that the appellant’s position required a secret clearance, t he
      record reflects that her position was designated as non-critical sensitive. IAF,
      Tab 10 at 28, 394; see Gamboa v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R.
      594, ¶ 7 (2014) (explaining that, although adjudicated under the same standard,
      occupying a non-critical sensitive position is distinct from needing a security
      clearance). If the agency fails to make such a showing on remand, the appellant’s
      placement on administrative leave cannot be said to be status quo ante.
      Sredzinski, 105 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 8.

            On remand, the administrative judge should adjudicate the appellant’s
            entitlement to overtime pay from June 8, 2019, forward.
¶16         Regarding the issue of overtime pay, the appellant contends that she was not
      returned to status quo ante because she was not compensated for missed overtime
      beginning with the period of her proposed indefinite suspension on May 8, 2019.
      IAF, Tab 13 at 5; PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10. The administrative judge did not
      address the appellant’s entitlement to overtime pay during the 30 -day notice
      period preceding the effective date of the action. ID at 6 -7. Nonetheless, her
      failure to do so was not harmful because the appellant is not en titled to overtime
      for this period, which spanned May 8 to June 7, 2019. IAF, Tab 10 at 23, 29 -30;
      see Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981) (explaining
      that an administrative judge’s procedural error is of no legal consequence unless
      it is shown to have adversely affected a party’s substantive rights). The Board
      lacks jurisdiction to award back pay for pay enhancements such as overtime pay
                                                                                             9

      lost during periods of administrative leave preceding an appealable action.
      Rittgers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 12 (2015).
¶17         Here, documents submitted by the agency reflect that the appellant was in
      an administrative leave status during the notice period. IAF, Tab 10 at 23, 29-30.
      The appellant essentially conceded the point below by requesting overtime, but
      not back pay, for this period. IAF, Tab 13 at 5. To the extent that her demand for
      overtime pay on review includes this period, we are without authority to gra nt it.
¶18         The administrative judge held that the appellant was not eligible for
      overtime pay beginning June 8, 2019, the effective date of her suspension,
      because she was on administrative leave. ID at 6. As to the period of June 8,
      2019, the effective date of the suspension, to August 12, 2019, the cancellation of
      that suspension, we disagree. 6      As discussed above, the status the appellant
      occupied prior to the rescinded action was active duty, not administrative leave.
¶19         Overtime back pay may be computed based on either the appellant’s own
      overtime history or the average overtime hours worked by similarly situated
      employees during the relevant time period.         Rittgers, 123 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 13.
      Before this appeal can be dismissed as moot, the agency must calculate and pay
      the appellant’s overtime back pay for the period from June 8, 2019, forward,
      using a method most likely to restore her to status quo ante. 7           IAF, Tab 10
      at 32-34, Tab 12 at 6; see Rittgers, 123 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 13.

      6
        In light of the agency’s cancellation of the suspension on August 12, 2019, we
      presume the appellant was placed in an administrative leave status at the beginning of
      the pay period that included that date, i.e., as of August 4, 2019. On remand, the
      administrative judge should clarify with the parties that the appellant received pay for
      the period from August 4 through 11, 2019. IAF, Tab 12 at 8 -15.
      7
         This is so regardless of whether the agency demonstrates that it has a strong
      overriding interest in placing the appellant on administrative leave as opposed to
      returning her to active duty. If the agency fails to demonstrate a strong overriding
      interest, then the appellant’s overtime calculation should encompass the entire time that
      she was not in an active duty status. However, if the agency successfully demonstrates
      a strong overriding interest in placing the appellant on admin istrative leave following
      its cancellation of the indefinite suspension, the overtime calculation would end on the
                                                                                             10

¶20          According to the appellant, she worked 29 hours of overtime per week.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 10; IAF, Tab 13 at 5. The agency declined to provide any
      overtime. IAF, Tab 15 at 6. The record does not contain any records to confirm
      that the appellant routinely worked overtime, and if so, how much. Therefore, we
      must remand this issue to the administrative judge to further develop the record
      and make a determination as to whether the agency has provided status quo ante
      relief. 8

      The appellant’s claim of attorney fees does not bar the dismissal of the appeal as
      moot.
¶21          The appellant asserts on review that, because the agency rescinded the
      indefinite suspension, she is the “prevailing party,” and thus is entitled to
      reimbursement of attorney fees. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-22. Because she has not
      been paid said attorney fees, argues the appellant, she has not been returned to
      status quo ante and the appeal is not moot.         Id. at 20-22. The administrative
      judge held that, when an agency unilaterally rescinds an adverse action, the
      appellant generally is not considered the prevailing party. ID at 7. She further
      held that, in any event, the Board does not adjudicate attorney fee requests until a
      final decision has been issued. Id. We agree with the administrative judge that,
      if the agency on remand sufficiently returns the appellant to status quo ante as set
      forth in this order, the Board is not barred from dismissing the appeal as moot,
      regardless of the appellant’s claim of attorney fees.
¶22          For an appeal to be rendered moot, an appellant must receive all of the
      relief that she could have received if the matter had been adjudicated and she had

      date the agency cancelled the appellant’s suspension, August 12, 2019. IAF, Tab 12
      at 6; see Rittgers, 123 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 12 (finding an appellant generally is not entitled
      to overtime pay during a period of administrative leave).
      8
        The appellant has filed a motion for leave to file an additional pleading in which she
      alleges that she was not returned to the status quo ante because of a time -off award that
      she was not permitted to use and which expired while she was on admin istrative leave.
      PFR File, Tab 9. On remand, the administrative judge shall permit the app ellant to
      submit evidence and argument relating to this issue.
                                                                                      11

      prevailed. Murphy, 107 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 6. However, the Board has held that the
      potential recovery of attorney fees under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) does not prevent
      the dismissal of an appeal as moot. Murphy, 107 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 6. Rather, the
      award of attorney fees to a prevailing party is considered to be separate from
      relief on the merits. See id. Thus, the appellant here may file for such award in
      accordance with the requirements of the Board’s regulations, and the potential
      dismissal of this appeal as moot will have no prejudicial effect on the outcome of
      that separate proceeding. Alleman v. Department of the Army, 79 M.S.P.R. 233,
      239-40 (1998); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.203.           Because the issue of the appellant’s
      entitlement to attorney fees is not properly before us, we decline to consider the
      appellant’s arguments that such fees are warra nted in the interest of justice. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 12-17. Similarly, we decline to address the appellant’s argument
      that her attorney failed to convey the appellant’s arguments regarding attorney
      fees to the administrative judge. Id. at 11, 17.
¶23         On remand, even if the administrative judge determines that the agency has
      returned the appellant to status quo ante and dismisses the appeal as moot, the
      appellant may seek attorney fees in a separate proceeding. Alternatively, if the
      agency fails to return the appellant to status quo ante, the administrative judge
      will adjudicate the appeal on the merits. See Fernandez, 105 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 5
      (finding that, if an appeal is not truly moot despite cancellation of the action
      under appeal, the proper remedy is for the Board to retain jurisdiction and to
      adjudicate the appeal on the merits). In that scenario, the appellant may similarly
      file for such attorney fees if she is the prevailing party.

      The appellant’s discrimination claim does not prevent a mootness finding.
¶24         The appellant claims, both below and on review, that the DODCAF’s
      decision to revoke her security clearance            was the result of disability
      discrimination. IAF, Tab 9 at 4-5, Tab 10 at 35, 49; PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17.
      The administrative judge found that the Board lacks the authority to review the
      substance of the underlying security determination, including the authority to
                                                                                     12

      consider the appellant’s assertion of disability discrimination. ID at 3 n.1. We
      agree.
¶25           Ordinarily, if an appellant raises a claim of compensatory damages over an
      appealable action, the agency’s complete rescission of the action appealed does
      not afford her all of the relief available before the Board and the appeal is not
      moot.     Hess v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶ 8 (2016).       Lack of
      mootness in such circumstances is premised on the Board’s ability to award
      compensatory damages.       Id., ¶¶ 8, 19.    The Board lacks authority to review
      allegations of prohibited discrimination or reprisal related to the revocation or
      suspension of a security clearance. Putnam v. Department of Homeland Security,
      121 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 19 (2014).         Because the Board cannot consider such
      allegations, it cannot make a finding that the agency violated the appellant’s
      rights under the Rehabilitation Act. Such a finding is a prerequisite to awarding
      compensatory damages for disability discrimination in Federal employment.
      42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2).     Thus, the fact that the appellant raised a disability
      discrimination claim does not prevent a mootness finding here.

      Should the agency fail to return the appellant to status quo ante, the
      administrative judge should address the appellant’s claim of harmful procedural
      error.
¶26           The appellant on review repeats her argument from below that the
      DODCAF’s decision to revoke her security clearance, and the ensuing indefinite
      suspension, suffered from harmful procedural errors. IAF, Tab 9 at 5 -7; PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 12-15, 17.       The administrative judge did not address these
      arguments. We also do not address them because such alleged procedural errors
      involve the merits of the appellant’s indefinite suspension and thus are only
      before the Board if her appeal is not moot.
¶27           As discussed above, the Board lacks the authority to review the merits of
      the decision to suspend access to classified information, including whether that
      decision was based on impermissible discrimination . Palafox, 124 M.S.P.R. 54,
                                                                                        13

      ¶ 8; Putnam, 121 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 19. However, the Board retains the authority to
      review whether:     (1) the appellant’s position required access to classified
      information; (2) the appellant’s access to classified information was suspended;
      and (3) the appellant was provided with the due process and the procedural
      protections specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7513 and under the agency’s own regulations.
      Palafox, 124 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 8.
¶28         We observe that the record is unclear as to whether the appellant’s position
      required access to classified information or a Secret Clearance, as charged. IAF,
      Tab 10 at 22, 28, 394-95; see Gamboa, 120 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 8-11 (finding that an
      agency failed to prove its charge based on an appellant’s clearance revocation
      because it failed to prove the appellant was required to maintain a security
      clearance). Furthermore, Department of Defense regulations preclude the agency
      from indefinitely suspending an employee based on a personnel security
      determination when the employee has filed an appeal with the PSAB and is
      awaiting a written decision on that appeal. See Schnedar v. Department of the Air
      Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 516, ¶¶ 9-10 (2014).
¶29         On remand, should the administrative judge find that the agency fails to
      return the appellant to status quo ante, she must adjudicate this appeal on the
      merits and address these procedural issues as they pertain to the revocation of the
      appellant’s security clearance and the subsequent indefinite suspension.

                                            ORDER
¶30         Accordingly, we REMAND this appeal to the Central Regional Office for a
      determination as to whether, after the parties have an opportunity to respond, the
      agency has returned the appellant to status quo ante. This includes the purging of
      both proposed indefinite suspensions and the suspension decision from the
      appellant’s personnel file, the calculation of overtime pay, and whether the
      agency has a strong overriding interest in refusing to return the appellant to active
      duty. If the agency has done so, the administrative judge shall dismiss the appeal
                                                                              14

as moot. If the agency has not done so, the administrative judge shall adjudicate
the appeal on its merits, including whether the indefinite suspension suffered
from harmful procedural errors.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.