Court Opinion

ID: 9635447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:50:43.401507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:29:06.427709
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with Judge Wickersham that the trial court’s order of January 4, 1983 must be affirmed insofar as it denies public and media access to interceptions of private telephone conversations. The right of the public to examine the Commonwealth’s Bill of Particulars, which is now a part of the trial court’s records, however, is not properly, before this Court. Therefore, I find it unnecessary to decide the merits of that issue.
Criminal proceedings against Nicholas Catania and others were terminated prior to trial. A closed hearing pursuant to United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.1975), had previously been conducted by the court to determine authenticity, audibility, integrity and identification of tapes of intercepted telephone conversations.1 The issues presented at that hearing had not been finally determined when the *425criminal proceedings were terminated. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable, Inc. and Central States Publishing, Inc. (the media) then petitioned the trial court for access to the transcripts of the Starks hearing. The media’s petition was denied. An appeal followed.
The media’s argument that there is a First Amendment guarantee of media access to judicial records and documents, although accepted by the dissent, is erroneous. The First Amendment guarantees freedom of the press; it does not grant to the news media a right of access to judicial records which is greater than the right of access enjoyed by the general public. “ ‘Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a news-gathering agency may publicize, within wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the courtroom. But the line is drawn at the courthouse door; and within, a reporter’s constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public.’ ” Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1318, 55 L.Ed.2d 570, 587 (1978), quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1663, 14 L.Ed.2d 543, 584 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also: United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir.1981).
The right upon which the media’s request must rise or fall in the instant case is a common law right, widely recognized by the courts, to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., supra at 597, 98 S.Ct. at 1312, 55 L.Ed.2d at 579; United States v. Criden, supra; In re National Broadcasting Co. (Myers), 635 F.2d 945, 949 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 314 (D.C.Cir.1980). This right, it is now agreed, extends to records which are not in written form, such as audio and video tapes. In re National Broadcasting Co. (Jenrette), 653 F.2d 609, 612 (D.C.Cir.1981). It is clear, however, that this right is not absolute. Id. at 613. “Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, *426and access has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.” Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., supra at 598, 98 S.Ct. at 1312, 55 L.Ed.2d at 580. “The public has ... been excluded, temporarily or permanently, from court proceedings or the records of court proceedings to protect private as well as public interests: to protect trade secrets, or the privacy and reputations of victims of crimes, as well as to guard against risks to national security interests, and to minimize the danger of an unfair trial by adverse publicity.” In re National Broadcasting Co., supra, 653 F.2d at 613.
These are not necessarily the only situations in which public access to judicial records can properly be denied. A bright line test has yet to be formulated. Meanwhile, the decision as to public access must rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.
This discretion,- however, is not open-ended. Rather, access may be denied only. if the [trial] court, after considering “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case,” and after “weighing the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the courts,” concludes that “justice so requires.” The court’s discretion must “clearly be informed by this country’s strong tradition of access to judicial proceedings.” In balancing the competing interests, the court must also give appropriate weight and consideration to the “presumption — however gauged — in favor of public access to judicial records.” Any denial or infringement of this “precious” and “fundamental” common law right-remains subject to appellate review for abuse.
Id. at 613 (footnotes omitted). See also: United States v. Criden, supra.
In the instant case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying public access to the substance of intercepted telephone conversations. The privacy rights of the individuals whose conversations were intercepted and the absence .of compelling reason for the disclosure of. private conversations unnecessary to or for any criminal *427proceeding weigh heavily in favor of the court’s denial of access.
Interceptions of private telephone conversations are illegal. See: 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5703, 5725. Although interceptions by law enforcement authorities have been authorized by federal and state statutes, an overriding concern for the individual’s right of privacy has prompted strict controls, including the sealing of evidence thus obtained. See: Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. and the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act of October 4, 1978, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5701 et seq. Authorized disclosures of intercepted telephone communications are extremely limited. Under the Pennsylvania Act, disclosure is authorized for law enforcement purposes and in criminal proceedings. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5717. Unauthorized disclosure or use of intercepted telephone conversations is punishable criminally as a felony, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5703(2) and (3), and civilly by compensatory and punitive damages, as well as the payment of counsel fees and costs. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5725(a). These provisions suggest emphatically the high priority which the legislature has placed upon the individual’s right of confidentiality in connection with the use of his or her telephone.
The trial court weighed this right of privacy against the public’s right of access to judicial records in the instant case and found that the right of privacy should prevail. Where, as here, the substance of intercepted telephone conversations was not necessary to and was not to be revealed publicly in criminal proceedings, the court held, the public’s right of access had to yield to the individual’s right of privacy. I find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision. The representatives of law enforcement have no need to make public disclosure of the intercepted conversations— all criminal proceedings have been terminated — and both the federal and state statutes suggest that private telephone conversations are privileged and should not be made *428public. See: 18 Pa.C.S. § 5711. See also: In re Kansas City Star, 666 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir.1981).
The record in this case fails to disclose any factual showing of good cause for disclosure. Although public officials necessarily surrender a great deal of their privacy by virtue of office, their private telephone conversations continue to be cloaked with confidentiality except as otherwise provided by statute. The media have failed to show good cause for making public the telephone conversations intercepted in this case; it is not enough that one of the conversants was a public official. Therefore, I agree with Judge Wickersham that the trial court’s order should be affirmed insofar as it seals the tapes of the intercepted telephone conversations and that portion of the transcript of the closed Starks hearing which refers to the substance of those intercepted conversations.
The procedure with respect to the sealing of the Commonwealth’s Bill of Particulars, as Judge Wickersham and Judge Lipez have observed, is irregular. The Court Administrator in Delaware. County, acting according to his perceived interpretation of the trial court’s prior orders, attempted to prevent media examination of a document which was then a part of the court’s records. Apparently the media similarly interpreted the trial court’s prior orders as compelling nondisclosure, for they have filed immediately in this Court a petition for an order granting access to the Bill of Particulars.
The procedure followed by all parties, in my judgment, was defective. It was the trial court which in the first instance had supervisory powers over its own records. The right of access to those records, as previously observed in this opinion, is not absolute but depends on the exercise of a sound discretion. This discretion must be exercised by the judges of the trial court and not by the court administrator. The latter officer has neither power nor authority to make discretionary decisions required to be made by the court. See and compare: Gonzales v. Procaccio Brothers Trucking Co., 268 Pa.Super. 245, 251, 407 A.2d 1338, 1341 (1979). *429When the court administrator nevertheless took it upon himself to seal a portion of the court’s records, a request for access should have been directed in the first instance to the judges of the trial court.
I disagree with Judge Lipez that this Court, an intermediate appellate court, should assume original jurisdiction to direct the trial court either to seal or unseal its records. Admittedly, the petition in the instant case is shrouded by the shadow of the separate appeal-pending in this Court from the trial court’s order sealing the transcript of the Starks hearing. In the usual situation, however, the necessity for a prior petition, to the trial court for access to its own records will be clear. Only by such a petition can the trial court exercise the discretion which has been vested in it. Only in this manner can a record be prepared which will enable an intermediate appellate court to review the exercise of the discretion which has been vested in the trial court.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition and mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S. § 721(2). The Superior Court, however, can issue such writs only to the extent that an action in prohibition or mandamus is ancillary to proceedings within the Superior Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Butz, 411 Pa. 360, 364, 192 A.2d 707, 710 (1963); 42 Pa.C.S. § 741. The Superior Court’s issuance of writs of prohibition and mandamus, therefore, are proper only when subordinate to or auxiliary to a pending appeal. This Court has no original jurisdiction to order a court of inferior jurisdiction to allow public examination of the court’s records where that court has never acted on a request therefor.
Because the trial court has not acted to grant or deny access to the Commonwealth’s Bill of-Particulars, which is a part of the trial court’s records, and because this Court lacks original jurisdiction to order public access to the records of the trial court, I would deny the petition which the media has filed in this' Court. The attempt by the Court *430Administrator in Delaware County to seal the records of the trial court is neither appealable to nor presently before this Court. A request to open the Bill of Particulars to public inspection should, in the first instance, be made to the trial court. Only after that court has exercised its discretion by granting or denying the petition will the matter be ripe for appellate review.

. The propriety of the order closing the pre-trial Starks hearing is not before us and is not properly subject to review in the present appeal.