Court Opinion

ID: 9686606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:58:26.237851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:29.197222
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
I specially concur in the majority opinion to express that the ultimate judgment of the highest Court of this state, based upon the recommendations of the referee, is stern and not lenient; it is not indulgent but is exacting to the degree that it forewarns young lawyers, unaffected by these *498instant proceedings, of the dangers of the usage of a drug such as cocaine.
I specially concur to say that not one of these three lawyers sold nor distributed cocaine but apparently became involved in a fast-moving society in the largest city of our state which believed that it was rather chic to use cocaine — socially. There is nothing in the record to suggest that their clients were affected adversely by this usage, but given the severely damaging effects of this hard drug, time would surely yield an adverse impact upon their office procedures.
There has been a great deal of publicity in this state concerning the usage of cocaine by young lawyers in Eastern South Dakota. Like a father would tell an arrant son, this Court should direct the path of these young lawyers away from a wrong that would destroy them. The judgment of this Court should teach them to appreciate their law degree which they worked so hard for to make a living in life.
The referee is the fact finder and the decision-maker below, not the Disciplinary Board. “[W]e are mindful that the referee saw and heard the witnesses with all the advantage that is gained from such personal contact.” Matter of Discipline of Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104, 106 (S.D.1981); In re Goodrich, 78 S.D. 8, 98 N.W.2d 125 (1959); In re Schmidt, 70 S.D. 161, 16 N.W.2d 41 (1944). The referee in this case, the Honorable Robert L. Tsehetter, was selected by this Court to act as referee and in him this Court reposed confidence in his legal ability, wisdom, and impartiality. His circuit entails the extreme northwestern part of South Dakota and he is some 450 miles removed from the factual situation of these parties. As such, he is imbued with total objectivity and aligned with no fraternal, social, or day-by-day legal contacts. Therefore, under our previous decisions and the objective, first-hand impressions of Judge Tsehetter, I believe that the referee was in a better position to determine the effect of Strange’s activities on the integrity of the Bar of this state than the Disciplinary Board as espoused by Justice Morgan’s dissent. Judge Tsehetter is blatantly neutral and is aloof to any type of bias or suspicioned judgment. Nay, there cannot be even the slightest suggestion of an appearance of an unobjective recommendation to this Court.
Indeed, the lawyers who serve on the Disciplinary Board have a most arduous and difficult calling. As I specifically pointed out in Matter of Voorhees, 294 N.W.2d 646, 649 (S.D.1980), their recommendations should be given great weight. But I also pointed out that the awesome responsibility of making the final decision rests with this Court, not the Disciplinary Board. SDCL 16-19-22 provides:
The Supreme Court shall have sole power to strike from the roll the name of any attorney and counselor at law and to revoke his license or to suspend him from the practice for such time as shall seem just for cause shown. (Emphasis supplied.)
Ultimately, and with one aspect of Justice Morgan’s dissent, I agree, namely: This Court must make a determination of the reinstatement to the practice of law of these attorneys, after application and hearing has been made before the Disciplinary Board and recommendations presented to this Court, and upon which a due process hearing should then and there be held.