Court Opinion

ID: 9940131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:13:47.589773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:36.511013
License: Public Domain

Recently, this court reiterated the long established rule that "(t)o overturn a will on the ground of undue influence, not only must there be evidence of activity *Page 15 
on the part of the beneficiary, it also `is necessary to show that the influence was such as, in effect, to destroy the testator's free agency and substitute for his own another person's will. . . . Evidence must be produced that pressure was brought to bear directly upon the testamentary act . . . mere opportunity to influence the mind of the testator, even though coupled with an interest or motive to do so, is not sufficient.'" (Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571, 586 [241 P.2d 990].)
The activity must be of such a nature that it "overpowered the mind and bore down the volition of the testator at the very time the will was made." (Estate of Carithers, 156 Cal. 422-428 [105 P. 130].) Moreover, it must be proved by evidence in addition to that tending to establish such other factors as unnaturalness of the will, motive by the proponent, and susceptibility to influence on the part of the testator. As I read the record in the present case, there are no facts from which such conduct reasonably may be inferred.
The evidence relied upon by the contestants as giving rise to such an inference shows only motive, unnaturalness in the will, or the testator's susceptibility to influence, factors which do not replace but are in addition to the requirement that the proponent's activity in procuring the will be shown. Other facts are mentioned in the majority opinion, but it is not held that they are sufficient to support an inference of activity which invalidates the testamentary document. Estate of De Laveaga,165 Cal. 607 [133 P. 307], is said to be "quite persuasive" of the conclusion reached but the facts of that case clearly distinguish it from the present situation.
There, from childhood, the decedent had been incapable of carrying on her own business affairs, entrusting all of such matters to her brothers and sisters. Her sister, the proponent of the will, directed all of her activities, the decedent obeying without protest. Her mind was that of a child, "unable to comprehend anything beyond the most simple matters." It was found specifically that she was incompetent mentally to execute a will.
In addition, it was shown that the decedent had no knowledge of the nature or value of her property, but the will was explicit in designating items and amounts. The proponent and her husband, who with others managed her business affairs, were alone with the decedent at the time the will was executed. There was evidence that she signed any and all papers which they presented to her, without inquiry as to their nature and effect, and "she never indicated her ability *Page 16 
unaided to compose and write any paper beyond the simplest and most childish messages, the few writings of any other character shown, exclusive of the alleged will, having been produced with great and laborious effort and under such circumstances as to indicate the aid and assistance of others." (P. 621.)
Here, the evidence viewed most favorably to the contestants shows only the following facts: Prior to the execution of the will, Chance Jamison, each time in the presence of at least one other person, sought twice to have the testator revoke a previous will and execute a new one dividing the estate among the children. Chance knew how to prepare a holographic will. The mind of the testator was weak, but not to such an extent as to justify a finding of mental incompetency. The testator prepared a will which was concise and legally complete, the appearance of which "shows it must have been a laborious task for the writer." Chance and his wife visited the testator on the day the will was executed, being alone with him part of that time; the rest of the day he was either alone or in the company of various other persons, no evidence being offered as to the time of day the will was executed.
The most that can be said for this evidence is that it shows a possible desire and opportunity to influence the testator to prepare a new will. But to say that from such evidence it may be found that the proponent "overpowered the mind and bore down the volition of the testator at the very time the will was made" is to permit the will to be overturned, not upon proof, but upon speculation.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Spence, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 4, 1953. Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted. *Page 17