Court Opinion

ID: 9919187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 18:00:54.773311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:52.737096
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 17 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SUSAN CLARK, for herself and/or on              No.    21-35334
behalf of all others similarly situated,
                                                D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01106-JCC
                Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

EDDIE BAUER LLC; EDDIE BAUER
PARENT, LLC,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Washington
                  John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted February 9, 2022
                        Submission Vacated April 14, 2022
                          Resubmitted January 17, 2024
                               Seattle, Washington

Before: BYBEE, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge BEA.

      Plaintiff Susan Clark appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of

her putative class-action complaint against Defendants Eddie Bauer LLC and Eddie

Bauer Parent, LLC (collectively, “Eddie Bauer”). Because the parties are familiar

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
with the facts of this case, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

      Clark alleges that Eddie Bauer’s signs, product tags, and receipts misled her

into believing that she was purchasing clothing items for 50% of their normal sale

prices, when, in reality, Eddie Bauer had never sold those items at their normal sale

prices. Under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”), Clark seeks

punitive damages in addition to the greater of her actual or statutory damages,

retrospective equitable relief in the form of disgorgement or restitution, and

prospective equitable relief in the form of an injunction.

      1.     The district court dismissed Clark’s claims for monetary damages on

the basis that she could not plead “ascertainable loss of money or property[.]” Or.

Rev. Stat. § 646.638(1). According to the district court, Clark could not state a claim

under the UTPA because she did not allege a misrepresentation as to “a

characteristic, quality, or feature” of the clothing items she purchased. Employing

Oregon’s certification procedure, see Or. R. App. P. 12.20, we asked the Oregon

Supreme Court whether such a misrepresentation is necessary to state a claim under

the UTPA. See Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC, 30 F.4th 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2022). The

Oregon Supreme Court accepted the certified question, Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC,

510 P.3d 880 (Or. 2022), and answered as follows:

             [A]n “ascertainable loss” within the meaning of the UTPA
             can, under some circumstances, flow from a consumer’s

                                          2
            decision to purchase a product in reliance upon the
            retailer’s misrepresentation as to price history or
            comparative prices. Thus, plaintiff’s purchase price
            theory is a viable theory of ascertainable loss even in the
            absence of a showing that the seller misrepresented some
            characteristic or quality of the product sold.

Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC, 532 P.3d 880, 893 (Or. 2023).

      Because Clark’s “purchase price theory” adequately alleges ascertainable loss

under the UTPA,1 we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Clark’s claims for

monetary damages under the UTPA.2

1
            At its essence, the purchase price theory is that one person
            has been induced by another person’s unlawful activities
            to pay money for something that the first person would not
            otherwise have bought. In plaintiff’s case, what she
            wanted was items of clothing whose selling price had, at
            some earlier time, been what defendants’ false price
            listings indicated. What she received, on the other hand,
            was merchandise that had never been offered for sale at
            those prices. Thus, whether or not those items ever sold at
            those higher price points, and whether or not defendants’
            alleged pricing scheme can be viewed as representing that
            the items previously had retail or market values equivalent
            to the prices shown on their product tags, plaintiff paid
            money to defendants for articles of clothing that she would
            not have bought had she known their true price history.
            The money that plaintiff is out as a result is her “loss.”

Clark, 532 P.3d at 891 (emphasis in original).
2
       Clark also alleged ascertainable loss under what she describes as her
“advantageous bargain” and “inflated consumer demand” theories. In our
certification order, we invited the Oregon Supreme Court to address these theories,
Clark, 30 F.4th at 1156–57, but it declined, Clark, 532 P.3d at 885 n.6, 887. It
“express[ed] no view” on those theories. Id. at 887 n.10. We do not address the

                                         3
       2.    The district court dismissed Clark’s claims for equitable relief for

failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), reasoning that she did not

sufficiently plead that she lacked an adequate remedy at law, see Sonner v. Premier

Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm in part and reverse

in part.

       a.    We agree that Clark fails to state a claim for retrospective equitable

relief, because her complaint contains no allegations as to why she lacks an adequate

remedy at law for her disgorgement and restitution claims. Even assuming that the

UTPA permits equitable relief without proof of inadequate legal remedies, “state

law can neither broaden nor restrain a federal court’s power to issue equitable relief.”

Id. at 841. In federal court, “a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law must be

wanting” before the court may grant equitable relief. Id. at 840 (quoting Guar. Tr.

Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945)). We therefore affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Clark’s disgorgement and restitution claims.

       b.    The district court’s dismissal of Clark’s injunctive relief claim,

however, was error. First, we conclude that Clark has Article III standing to bring

this claim based on our precedent in Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d

956 (9th Cir. 2018). In Davidson, a class of consumers paid extra for wipes labeled

viability of Clark’s other theories because she states that “[i]t should not matter for
purposes of this appeal which of these theories fits which of Ms. Clark’s forms of
loss.”

                                           4
as “flushable” that were not, in fact, flushable. Id. at 961–62. We held that “misled

consumers may properly allege a threat of imminent or actual harm sufficient to

confer standing to seek injunctive relief” to prohibit the defendants from falsely

advertising their product in the future. Id. at 961. Although the reasoning of

Davidson has since been called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), the Supreme Court has not

sufficiently undermined Davidson to meet the “clearly irreconcilable” standard that

we articulated in Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Under Miller, “[i]t is not enough for there to be ‘some tension’ between the

intervening higher authority and prior circuit precedent.” Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d

1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131,

1140 (9th Cir. 2012)). Because Davidson “can be applied consistently” with

TransUnion, we must apply Davidson here. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Consumer Def.,

LLC, 926 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2019).

      In her complaint, Clark alleges that she “would shop at one of Eddie Bauer’s

Oregon Outlet Stores again if she could have confidence regarding the truth of Eddie

Bauer’s prices and the value of its products.” Accordingly, she “will be harmed if,

in the future, she is left to guess as to whether Eddie Bauer is providing a legitimate

sale or not, and whether products are actually worth the amount that Eddie Bauer is

representing.” Cf. Davidson, 889 F.3d at 969–70 (“In some cases, the threat of future

                                          5
harm may be the consumer’s plausible allegations that she will be unable to rely on

the product’s advertising or labeling in the future, and so will not purchase the

product although she would like to.”). Our dissenting colleague argues that Clark’s

alleged harm is insufficient to establish Article III standing but does not distinguish

Clark’s alleged harm from the harm we found suffered in Davidson. Whatever the

impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion, we are not persuaded that it

has entirely undercut the reasoning and cases on which Davidson rested. See

Davidson, 889 F.3d at 971 (citing Wilderness Soc., Inc. v. Rey, 622 F.3d 1251, 1258

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982))).

      Eddie Bauer asserts a “factual attack on jurisdiction,” San Diego Cnty. Credit

Union v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union, 65 F.4th 1012, 1028 (9th Cir. 2023), by

submitting an affidavit attesting that it changed the above-described pricing

representations seven months before Clark filed her complaint. At that time, Eddie

Bauer began using “the term ‘Comparable Value’ to describe” its prices, which is

“based on the price of competing products of similar quality and style in the market.”

Eddie Bauer represents that it “has no intention to return to the previous price tags.”

      Eddie Bauer’s adoption of the new pricing policy does not change our analysis

of Clark’s standing. Davidson instructs us to look at the injury the plaintiff has

suffered and may suffer in the future, not the method by which that injury is

inflicted. See Davidson, 889 F.3d at 971 (“[W]here standing for prospective

                                          6
injunctive relief is premised entirely on the threat of repeated injury,” the claimant

must show “a sufficient likelihood that she will again be wronged in a similar way.”

(internal quotations and citation omitted and alteration adopted)). By making claims

about the value of competitors’ products, Eddie Bauer is representing that its own

products are being offered at a discount relative to products of similar quality. In

any event, Eddie Bauer’s new policy only changes a single component of what Clark

alleges to be a broader false advertising scheme consisting of misleading signage,

tags, and receipts. As a result, Clark will continue to face the same prospective

injury of being unable to rely on “the validity of the information advertised [by Eddie

Bauer] . . . despite [a] desire” to do so—the same injury evident in Davidson. Id.

      Having concluded that Clark has standing, we turn now to the district court’s

finding that Clark has failed to state a claim for injunctive relief. The injunctive

relief requested in Clark’s complaint was to “enjoin Defendants from the unlawful

conduct alleged herein,” that is, to prevent Eddie Bauer from engaging in misleading

pricing schemes in the future. Unlike a claim for disgorgement or restitution,

injunctive relief does not seek “the same amount of money for the exact same harm”

that Clark had suffered in the past. Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844. The district court thus

erred in concluding that both “past and future harms . . . are financial and both can

be cured by the monetary damages.” See, e.g., Andino v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-

01628-JAM-AC, 2021 WL 1549667, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2021) (“Money

                                          7
damages are an inadequate remedy for future harm, as they will not prevent

Defendant from continuing the allegedly deceptive practice.”). We therefore reverse

the district court’s dismissal of Clark’s injunctive relief claim.

        3.     Finally, the district court concluded that Clark’s complaint is barred by

the UTPA’s one-year statute of limitations. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.638(6). Clark

purchased the clothing items in March 2017 and April 2018, but did not file her

complaint until July 2020. Although Clark alleges that she did not discover that she

was defrauded until March 2020, the district court found that Clark failed to explain

the circumstances associated with that discovery, which is a requirement for

application of the discovery rule. The district court acknowledged that Clark could

cure this defect through an amendment but reasoned that an amendment would be

futile because Clark failed to plead ascertainable loss. Because we conclude that

Clark did adequately plead ascertainable loss, we reverse the district court’s denial

of leave to amend.

        AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.3

3
    The parties shall bear their own costs on remand.

                                            8
                                                                             FILED
Susan Clark v. Eddie Bauer, LLC, No. 21-35334                                 JAN 17 2024
                                                                          MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
BEA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:             U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

      I concur in Parts 1, 2.a, and 3 of the memorandum disposition. But in my view,

Clark’s claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed because she has not “identified

a close historical or common-law analogue for [her] asserted injury,” as is required

to establish Article III standing and, in turn, to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal

courts. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 424 (2021). In concluding

that Clark has established Article III standing, the majority considers itself bound by

our Circuit’s prior decision in Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956 (9th

Cir. 2018). But Davidson’s reasoning was “fatally undercut by the Supreme Court”

in TransUnion and is therefore no longer binding in this Circuit. See United States

v. Lindsey, 634 F.3d 541, 550 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Langere v. Verizon Wireless

Servs., LLC, 983 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020) (“While following our past

decisions is important to preserve the stability of circuit law, that is secondary to

following the Supreme Court.”). Hence, I would dismiss Clark’s claim for injunctive

relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent.

   1. Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power to the resolution of

“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III. That limit on our jurisdiction

reflects the principle that “[f]ederal courts do not possess a roving commission to

publicly opine on every legal question.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423.

                                            1
      To establish a case or controversy, the plaintiff must establish the “irreducible

constitutional minimum” of Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A plaintiff has standing only if he can show, among other

elements, that he has suffered a “concrete harm.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 417. And

the Supreme Court has instructed that, to establish a concrete harm, the plaintiff must

“identif[y] a close historical or common-law analogue for [his] asserted injury.”

TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 424; id. (“[C]ourts should assess whether the alleged

injury . . . has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing

a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.

330, 341 (2016)). We do not open the doors to the federal courts merely because a

plaintiff is confused, distraught, upset, or the victim of a “microaggression.” See

Pucillo v. Nat’l Credit Systems, Inc., 66 F.4th 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2023) (“If we were

to recognize standing based solely on confusion or alarm, unmoored from concrete

harm, there would be no limiting principle.”). As the Supreme Court has put it, we

cannot “loosen Article III based on contemporary, evolving beliefs about what kinds

of suits should be heard in federal courts.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425.

   2. In my view, Clark lacks Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief because

she has not alleged a concrete harm to pursue that form of relief. See Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff

must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”); TransUnion,

                                           2
594 U.S. at 435 (explaining that, to establish standing for injunctive relief, a plaintiff

must show a risk of future harm that is “imminent and substantial”). Clark’s alleged

“injury”—that she is unable to rely on Eddie Bauer’s future marketing

representations, despite her desire to do so, because Eddie Bauer deceived her in the

past—does not have a historical or common-law analogue. Clark is merely upset

with Eddie Bauer. That does not give us the power to hear her suit. See TransUnion,

594 U.S. at 424.

      The closest historical analogue to Clark’s alleged injury is the tort of

misrepresentation. But “[f]or centuries, misrepresentation torts have required a

showing of justifiable reliance and actual damages.” Trichell v. Midland Credit

Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 998 (11th Cir. 2020); see Restatement (Second) of Torts,

§ 552. At common law, the justifiable reliance requirement “exclude[d] recovery if

the [plaintiff] knows or suspects the truth.” Mayer v. Spanel Intern. Ltd., 51 F.3d

670, 676 (7th Cir. 1995). Thus, there is no justifiable reliance if the plaintiff “is on

notice that the statement is not to be trusted.” Dobbs Law of Torts, § 672. Indeed,

“once the plaintiff believes the defendant to be dishonest,” a plaintiff generally must

investigate before transacting. Id. § 673. Here, Clark already believes Eddie Bauer’s

marketing representations are misleading. At common law, she could not establish

justifiable reliance if she opted to transact with Eddie Bauer despite her suspicions.

                                            3
      Moreover, at common law, a claim for misrepresentation was available only

if the plaintiff suffered pecuniary damages. See Pasley v. Freeman (1789) 100 Eng.

Rep. 450, 453 (Buller, J.) (“Fraud without damage, or damage without fraud, gives

no cause of action; but where these two concur, an action lies.”); Trichell, 964 F.3d

at 998 (referring to actual damages as a “bedrock element” of misrepresentation at

common law); Perez v. McCreary, Veselka, Bragg & Allen, P.C., 45 F.4th 816, 825

(5th Cir. 2022) (“The nature of the harm recognized by fraudulent misrepresentation

is a traditional, tangible harm: the ‘pecuniary loss’ the plaintiff sustains. And that

means . . . intangible harm, if it’s a harm at all—is necessarily different ‘in kind’

from her common-law analog.”). Common law did not protect people like Clark,

who merely wished to transact in the future, before any damages were suffered. See

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 525; Restatement (First) of Torts, § 549. Thus, the

historical tort of misrepresentation does not make Clark’s confusion a concrete harm.

      Nor has Clark stated a claim that is similar to the tort of Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress (“IIED”). At most, Clark claims she is disillusioned to learn

that what she thought was her coup in scoring a bargain turned out to have

evaporated; she can’t boast to her friends of her sharp shopping. But to state a claim

for IIED, Clark would need to allege that Eddie Bauer (1) engaged in “extreme and

outrageous conduct,” and (2) “intentionally or recklessly cause[d] severe emotional

distress to [her].” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46. Clark’s allegations of

                                          4
confusion and disillusionment do not amount to the severe emotional distress

necessary to state an IIED claim. See id. cmt. j (“The law intervenes only where the

distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure

it.”). Moreover, Clark did not allege that Eddie Bauer intended to cause her severe

emotional distress.

      In sum, Clark has not identified a historical or common-law analogue for her

alleged injury. Under TransUnion, then, she has not established a concrete harm. See

594 U.S. at 424. Thus, she lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief. See id. at 417.

   3. In holding that Clark has established a concrete harm, the majority does not

even consider whether Clark satisfies the requirements of TransUnion. Instead, the

majority opts to follow our Circuit’s prior decision in Davidson, 889 F.3d at 971.

The problem for the majority, however, is that TransUnion—which postdated

Davidson—directly undercut Davidson and is “clearly irreconcilable” with its

reasoning and holding. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Regardless whether Clark’s injury is distinguishable from that recognized in

Davidson, our duty as inferior court is to apply the Supreme Court’s commands

whenever the Court has “undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior

circuit precedent.” See id. We should not simply follow our precedent reflexively.

      In Davidson, we held that the plaintiff’s “inability to rely on the validity of

the information advertised on Kimberly-Clark’s wipes despite her desire to

                                          5
purchase” those wipes amounted to a “concrete . . . informational injur[y]” sufficient

for Article III standing. 889 F.3d. at 971. We concluded that Davidson’s injury was

“concrete” because “[t]his court recognizes a history of lawsuits based on similar

informational injuries.” Id. (citing Wilderness Soc., Inc. v. Rey, 622 F.3d 1251, 1258

(9th Cir. 2010)). That “history of lawsuits” derived from Rey, which we described

as “discussing the history of informational injury serving as an injury-in-fact

sufficient for standing.” Id. Rey, in turn, held “the notion of an informational injury

serving as an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing can be traced” to Federal Election

Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t of

Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), and Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363

(1982).1 622 F.3d at 1258. Davidson, in turn, rests exclusively on those same cases.

      But three years later, the Supreme Court in TransUnion held Akins and Public

Citizen do not establish a concrete harm in cases, like this one, involving the receipt

of inaccurate information. There, the plaintiffs sued under the Fair Credit Reporting

Act after they had received inaccurate credit reports. 594 U.S. at 439. The United

1
       In Akins, the Court held that voters had suffered a concrete harm because they
had been denied information that the Federal Election Campaign Act required to be
made public. 524 U.S. at 24–25. In Public Citizen, the Court held that public interest
organizations had suffered a concrete harm because they had been denied reports
and notes from an advisory committee that the Federal Advisory Committee Act
required to be made public. 491 U.S. at 449. In Havens, the Court held a Black
“tester” had standing to sue for a violation of the Fair Housing Act because a real
estate agent failed to disclose apartments to her because of her race. 455 U.S. at 373.
                                           6
States, as amicus curiae, argued the plaintiffs suffered a concrete “informational

injury” under Akins and Public Citizen. Id. at 441. The Court rejected that argument:

             The plaintiffs did not allege that they failed to receive any
             required information. They argued only that they received
             it in the wrong format. Therefore, Akins and Public Citizen
             do not control here. In addition, those cases involved
             denial of information subject to public-disclosure or
             sunshine laws that entitle all members of the public to
             certain information. This case does not involve such a
             public-disclosure law.
             Moreover, the plaintiffs have identified no “downstream
             consequences” from failing to receive the required
             information. They did not demonstrate, for example, that
             the alleged information deficit hindered their ability to
             correct erroneous information before it was later sent to
             third parties. An asserted informational injury that causes
             no adverse effects cannot satisfy Article III.
Id. at 441–42 (cleaned up) (emphases added).

      Like the plaintiffs in TransUnion, neither Clark nor Davidson “allege[d] that

they failed to receive any required information.” See id. “Therefore, Akins and

Public Citizen do not control here.” Id. And like the Fair Credit Reporting Act in

TransUnion, Oregon’s Unfair Trade Practices Act “does not involve such a public-

disclosure law” as at issue in Akins and Public Citizen. See id. Finally, as in

TransUnion, neither Clark nor Davidson alleged the misrepresentations would cause

them monetary harm or any other harm that has a historical or common-law analogue

in the future. To the contrary, Clark alleged her lack of intent to shop at Eddie Bauer

until she can trust its marketing representations. In other words, Clark alleged there

                                          7
is no risk that she will “imminent[ly]” suffer any “downstream consequences”—

such as money damages—that amount to a concrete harm. See id. at 435, 442. Under

the express terms of TransUnion, then, Akins and Public Citizen “do not control,”

notwithstanding Davidson’s irreconcilable reasoning to the contrary. See id. at 441.

      Nor does Havens save Davidson. The Court in TransUnion did not even

suggest that Havens might support the plaintiffs’ injuries, even though both cases

involved the receipt of misleading information. Indeed, Havens involved the weighty

interest in not being subjected to racial discrimination, a far cry from the receipt of

an incorrect credit report, or, as here, an inability to rely on a retail store’s purported

bargains. If Havens supported an injury in more benign contexts, the Court in

TransUnion would have reached a contrary conclusion or explained why Havens

was inapposite. But it did not do so. In fact, the Court has, in other cases, clarified

that racial discrimination alone can afford standing to “persons who are personally

denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)

(“[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ or by

stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ and therefore as

less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious non-economic

injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment . . . .”)).

                                            8
Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Havens, who was told no units were available,

Clark’s access to Eddie Bauer’s goods was never impeded. See 455 U.S. at 368.

      In sum, Davidson’s reasoning was “fatally undercut” by the Supreme Court

in TransUnion and is, therefore, no longer binding. See Lindsey, 634 F.3d at 550.

And under TransUnion, Clark lacks Article III standing because her grievance with

Eddie Bauer lacks a historical or common-law analogue. Thus, I would dismiss

Clark’s claim for injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I dissent.

                                           9