Court Opinion

ID: 9760057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:39:40.539217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:07.978781
License: Public Domain

TERRY, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I agree generally with much of what Judge Ferren says in his dissent, and, like him, I would be prepared to vote for disbarment or a longer suspension than two years in a comparable case in the future, after due notice to the members of the bar of a tightening of disciplinary standards. In this case, however, I have voted for a two-year suspension for three reasons.
First, although respondent’s conduct has been unconscionable, disbarment is clearly not warranted on the facts of this case, in light of our evolving body of case law. Second, although comparing one case with another is always an inexact process, I believe that this case falls somewhere between In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768 (D.C.App. 1980), in which we adopted the recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility for a three-year suspension, and In re Fogel, 422 A.2d 966 (D.C.App.1980), in which we imposed a year-and-a-day suspension, again adopting the Board’s recommen*1366dation. Although we must always give due deference to the recommendations of the Board, we must also decide where each case fits on the disciplinary spectrum. In my judgment the relative severity of respondent’s misconduct, compared with that of other respondents, places this case at or near the two-year mark, between Haupt and Fogel.
Third, and most importantly, to me there is little practical difference between a two-year and a three-year suspension, especially in this case. Under Rule XI, § 21 of our Rules Governing the Bar, an attorney suspended for more than one year may be reinstated only on petition. Since reinstatement is not automatic (as it is for one suspended for a year or less), and since respondent’s failure to appear in this court suggests, at the very least, that he is unconcerned about his standing in the legal profession, I think it is highly unlikely that he will seek to return to the practice of law after two years, after three years, or at any time in the foreseeable future. Thus whether he is suspended for two years or three is not a matter of great consequence.
One additional matter merits comment. I cannot accept the view of my other dissenting colleagues who would treat this case as equivalent to a disbarment by consent. Respondent’s failure to appear in this court is certainly a factor for us to consider in deciding what sanctions to impose, but in my view it is not sufficient in itself to justify disbarment. Respondent’s inaction does not relieve us of our independent duty to weigh all the facts before reaching a decision. In this regard I agree completely with footnote 1 of Judge Ferren’s opinion.