Court Opinion

ID: 9940945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 18:01:29.17537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:04.224815
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
         FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL                        Nos. 22-55204
DISTRICT,                                              22-55226

                 Plaintiff-Appellant /              D.C. No.
                 Cross-Appellee,                 2:21-cv-00757-
    v.                                              ODW-PD

A.O., a minor, by and through her                   OPINION
parents, Kateri and Alex Owens,

                 Defendant-Appellee /
                 Cross-Appellant.

         Appeals from the United States District Court
             for the Central District of California
          Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

              Argued and Submitted June 7, 2023
                    Pasadena, California

                    Filed February 15, 2024

    Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., DAVID F.
HAMILTON, * and DANIEL P. COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

*
 The Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
2                          LAUSD V. A.O.

            Opinion by Judge David F. Hamilton;
                  Dissent by Judge Collins

                          SUMMARY **

        Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

    The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court’s summary judgment affirming in part and
reversing in part an administrative law judge’s decision in an
action brought under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act by A.O., a child with profound hearing loss
who has cochlear implants.
    The panel affirmed the district court’s affirmance in
large part of the administrative law judge’s decision, which
held that Los Angeles Unified School District’s proposed
individualized education program for A.O. violated the
IDEA. The panel held that: (1) the school district violated
the IDEA by failing to specify clearly the frequency and
duration of proposed speech therapy and audiology services;
(2) the school district’s proposed program failed to offer a
meaningful educational benefit to A.O.; and (3) the proposed
program failed to place A.O. in the least restrictive
environment appropriate for her.
   Reversing in part and remanding, the panel held that the
school district’s proposed program also violated the IDEA
by failing to provide for individual speech therapy. The

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                       LAUSD V. A.O.                        3

panel thus effectively affirmed the decision of the
administrative law judge on all issues.
    Dissenting, Judge Collins wrote that the school district’s
proposed individualized education program did not deny
A.O. a free appropriate public education by using unduly
broad frequency ranges in describing how often particular
services would be provided to A.O., nor by failing to specify
that A.O.’s speech and language services would be provided
in a strictly individualized setting. Judge Collins also
disagreed with the majority’s conclusions that the proposed
program would not have provided A.O. with meaningful
educational benefit and would not have placed her in the
least restrictive environment.

                        COUNSEL

Mary Kellogg (argued), Los Angeles Unified School District
Office of the General Counsel, Los Angeles, California;
Lyndsy B. Rodgers, Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost LLP, Los
Angeles, California; Lynn M. Beekman, Fagen Friedman
Fulfrost LLP, Carlsbad, California; David R. Mishook,
Fagen Friedman Fulfrost LLP, Oakland, California; for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
David M. Grey (argued), Grey & Grey, Santa Monica,
California; Valerie Vanaman, Janeen Steel, and Eric
Menyuk, Vanaman German LLP, Sherman Oaks, California;
for Defendant-Appellee.
Sue Ann S. Evans, Meagan M. Kinsey, and Dannis W.
Kelley, Dannis Woliver Kelley, Long Beach, California;
Keith J. Bray, Education Legal Alliance of the California
School Boards Association, West Sacramento, California;
4                     LAUSD V. A.O.

for Amicus Curiae Education Legal Alliance of The
California School Boards Association.
Selene A. Almazan-Altobelli, Council of Parent Attorneys
and Advocates, Towson, Maryland; Ellen M. Saideman,
Law Office of Ellen Saideman, Barrington, Rhode Island;
for Amici Curiae Council of Parent Attorneys and
Advocates, Inc., Disability Rights Legal Center, and
Learning Rights Law Center.
Maureen R. Graves, California Association for Parent-Child
Advocacy (CAPCA), Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus Curiae
California Association of Parent-Child Advocacy.

                       OPINION

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:

    These appeals present both substantive and procedural
issues under the federal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act as applied to a child with profound hearing
loss who has cochlear implants. Unlike hearing aids,
cochlear implants do not amplify sound. Instead, they
directly stimulate the recipient’s auditory nerves. Once a
deaf child receives cochlear implants, she can begin the
process of language learning that, for typically hearing
children, begins at birth. Because children with cochlear
implants were deprived of sound at a young age, they need
as much exposure to language as possible so that they can
catch up to their typically hearing peers.
    Defendant A.O. was born with profound hearing loss in
both ears. When she was not quite two years old, she
received cochlear implants that, with time and practice,
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                        5

should allow her to enjoy full abilities to listen to language
and speak. As A.O. approached her third birthday, her
parents and plaintiff Los Angeles Unified School District
conferred to develop an individualized education program
for A.O. under the federal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., also known as the
IDEA. A.O.’s parents were ultimately not satisfied with the
school district’s proposed program, so they filed a due
process complaint with the California Office of
Administrative Hearings.
    An administrative law judge held a six-day evidentiary
hearing and in the end agreed on most issues with A.O.’s
parents. The judge found that the school district’s proposed
program failed to specify the duration and frequency of
services, would not provide A.O. a meaningful benefit, and
would not place her in the least restrictive environment
appropriate for her. The judge ordered the school district to
pay for A.O. to attend a private school in Los Angeles with
a program geared to help A.O. catch up to her peers in
language skills.
    The school district then filed this action in federal court
under the IDEA asserting that the administrative law judge
had made legal and factual errors. The district court
affirmed the vast majority of the administrative law judge’s
decision but agreed with the school district that the
individualized education plan for A.O. did not need to
specify whether she would receive individual speech
therapy.
    The school district has appealed to this court, and A.O.
and her parents have cross-appealed on that one issue of
individual speech therapy. We affirm on all issues where the
district court agreed with the administrative law judge. We
6                      LAUSD V. A.O.

reverse on the defendants’ cross-appeal. We thus effectively
affirm the decision of the administrative law judge on all
issues presented in these appeals.
I. Statutory Framework
    The IDEA was enacted “to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare
them for further education, employment, and independent
living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). In exchange for federal
funds, states agree to provide a “free appropriate public
education”—known to the cognoscenti as a “FAPE,”
rhyming with “tape”—to all children with disabilities
residing in the state from ages 3 to 21. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
    To provide each eligible student with an appropriate
education, school districts work with parents to develop an
individualized education program for each child with
disabilities. K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t of Educ., 665 F.3d
1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). The individualized program
should assess the child’s current academic performance,
articulate measurable educational goals, and specify the
nature of the special education and services the school
district will provide. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). The Act
requires substantively that the individualized program be
“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F.
ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School Dist. RE-1, 580
U.S. 386, 403 (2017).
    If parents and school officials disagree regarding the
child’s individualized program, the IDEA provides for
dispute resolution procedures.      The parties are first
encouraged to resolve their dispute through mediation. 20
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                        7

U.S.C. § 1415(e). If mediation fails, parties are entitled to
an impartial due process hearing conducted by the local or
state educational agency. § 1415(f)(1)(A). Any party
dissatisfied with the outcome of the state administrative
hearing may seek review in a federal district court.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A).
II. Factual Background
    A.O. was born in January 2017 with profound hearing
loss in both ears. In December 2018, she received cochlear
implants, which were activated in January 2019. Shortly
after she received her cochlear implants, A.O.’s speech and
language ability was assessed by a speech and language
pathologist at the University of California, Los Angeles.
That assessment indicated that A.O. was severely delayed in
all aspects of spoken language development.           With
appropriate services and support, however, her prognosis for
reaching age-appropriate auditory, speech, and language
skills was “excellent.”
    In October 2019, when A.O. was approaching her third
birthday, her parents enrolled her on a trial basis at the John
Tracy Center (JTC), a nonpublic school. JTC educates deaf
and hard-of-hearing children in a classroom together with
typically hearing children. The program with the blended
classroom is designed specifically to benefit deaf and hard-
of-hearing children in learning to speak and understand
spoken language by immersing them in a rich environment
of speech by both adult teachers and peer students.
    As a child with a disability, A.O. was entitled to a free
appropriate public education when she turned three years old
in January 2020. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). The school
district began developing an individualized education
program for her by performing several assessments of A.O.
8                      LAUSD V. A.O.

in November 2019. Those assessments indicated that her
language skills were still emerging and that she was not yet
ready for a general classroom environment, at least not
without supports and services.
    On December 10, 2019, A.O.’s parents met with the
school district’s specialists to discuss A.O.’s individualized
education program in the public schools. At the meeting,
school officials shared their assessments of A.O., their
proposed educational goals for A.O. in the coming year, and
their recommended educational placement and services.
A.O.’s parents had the opportunity to ask questions, and at
the end of the meeting, school officials gave A.O.’s parents
a written proposed individualized education program that
was finalized during the meeting.
    The school district recommended placing A.O. for 22.5
hours per week in a special education preschool classroom
for deaf and hard-of-hearing students at Saticoy Elementary
School, a public school that serves both deaf and hard-of-
hearing students and typically hearing students. At Saticoy,
A.O. would not have been in a blended classroom with
typically hearing students, but she would have been with
hearing peers for thirty minutes per day at recess. She would
also have attended music, art, and library classes with
hearing peers once per week for thirty minutes each, as well
as attended occasional holiday parties with them. According
to the proposed individualized education program, A.O.
would have spent 85% of her time at Saticoy outside of
general education with typically hearing children.
   The school district’s proposed individualized education
program also provided that A.O. would receive language and
speech therapy one to ten times per week for a total of thirty
minutes per week and audiology services one to five times
                            LAUSD V. A.O.                              9

per month for a total of twenty minutes per month. The
document did not specify whether A.O. would receive
language and speech therapy individually or in a group.
Instead, the document listed the service delivery model for
speech therapy as “Direct Service (Collaborative),” a term
the written proposal did not define. 1
    School district officials had explained at the meeting
with A.O.’s parents that she would receive speech and
language therapy and audiology services. They did not,
however, inform A.O.’s parents in the meeting that she
would receive speech therapy one to ten times per week and
audiology services one to five times per month, nor did they
explain how those ranges would be implemented in practice.
A.O.’s parents discovered those frequency ranges only when
they returned home from the meeting and studied the school
district’s written proposal. At the later administrative
hearing, A.O.’s mother testified that, upon reading the
document, she did not understand how often her daughter
would receive speech and language therapy and audiology
services.
    After the meeting that produced the proposed
individualized education plan, A.O.’s parents told the school
officials that they needed time to consider the district’s offer.
A meeting was scheduled for the following week, which
A.O.’s mother later canceled. On January 21, 2020, a district
official sent a message to A.O.’s mother asking whether the
parents had filled out the document’s consent page and
whether they had any questions. A.O.’s mother replied that
they needed more time.

1
  An asterisk appears after “Direct Service (Collaborative),” but no note
in the document explains the term.
10                      LAUSD V. A.O.

    On January 27, A.O.’s parents returned the consent page
saying that they rejected the district’s proposed program.
The parents explained that they thought the offered program
was “too restrictive” and would deny A.O. “an educational
program with typical, hearing peers.” They also said that the
services offered were insufficient because they thought A.O.
needed one hour of individual speech therapy per week. The
parents informed the school district that they would provide
alternative services for A.O. and seek reimbursement. After
she turned three, A.O. enrolled in the private JTC program
with its blended classroom.
    A.O.’s parents filed a due process complaint under 20
U.S.C. § 1415 with the California Office of Administrative
Hearings alleging that the district’s proposed individualized
education program for A.O. did not satisfy the IDEA.
Specifically, the parents asserted that the proposed program
would not provide a meaningful benefit to A.O. and would
not educate her in the least restrictive environment
appropriate for her because the Saticoy program would not
provide sufficient interaction with typically hearing peers.
A.O.’s parents also criticized the proposed program as
insufficient because it did not provide individual speech
therapy. They also asserted that the school district had
violated IDEA procedural requirements by failing to indicate
clearly the frequency and duration of speech and audiology
services. They requested reimbursement for tuition at JTC
and other costs.
III.    Procedural History
       A. Proceedings before the Office of Administrative
          Hearings
   After a six-day evidentiary hearing, an administrative
law judge concluded that the school district’s proposed
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                       11

individualized education program violated the IDEA. The
judge found that the proposed program violated IDEA
procedural requirements by failing to specify clearly the
frequency and duration of speech therapy and audiology
services, as IDEA regulations require. The judge found that
this procedural violation denied A.O. a free appropriate
public education because it prevented her parents from
understanding the school district’s offer of services.
    The judge also found that the school district’s proposed
program at Saticoy violated IDEA’s substantive
requirements. The proposed program would not provide a
free appropriate public education in the least restrictive
environment because it offered insufficient opportunities for
A.O. to spend time with her typically hearing peers. Citing
witness testimony, including that of a Saticoy teacher, the
judge found that A.O. needed to interact regularly with
typically hearing children her age who could serve as
language models for her. The judge found that the proposed
Saticoy program, in which A.O. would spend 85% of her
time apart from typically hearing peers, did not offer
sufficient time and interaction with typically hearing peers
in an academic environment for A.O. to receive a
meaningful benefit. The judge also found that the school
district’s proposed program would not place A.O. in the least
restrictive environment appropriate for her because it offered
only limited interactions with typically hearing peers and
that the school district failed to “consider the full continuum
of appropriate placement options” for A.O. Finally, the
judge found that A.O. required individual speech and
language therapy and that, because the school district’s
proposed program did not offer that therapy on an individual
basis, the proposed program would deny her a free
appropriate public education. To remedy the violations, the
12                     LAUSD V. A.O.

judge ordered the school district to amend A.O.’s
individualized education program to reflect placement at
JTC at the school district’s expense.
     B. Proceedings in District Court
    The school district then filed this action in the district
court seeking review of the administrative law judge’s
decision. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
district court largely affirmed the decision of the
administrative law judge. The court affirmed the conclusion
that the individualized education program was procedurally
deficient because it did not clearly identify the duration and
frequency of speech therapy and audiology services. The
court also affirmed the substantive findings that the school
district’s proposed program would not offer A.O.
meaningful educational benefits and would deny A.O. a free
appropriate education in the least restrictive environment.
The court reversed, however, the finding that the proposed
individualized education program needed to specify that
A.O.’s speech and language therapy would be provided on
an individual basis.
IV. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review
    The district court entered a final judgment, so we have
jurisdiction on appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Judicial
review under the IDEA is an odd creature in administrative
law. The review is not limited to the administrative record,
nor does the court try factual issues de novo. The statute
instructs a reviewing court to receive the records of the
administrative proceedings but also tells the court it “shall
hear additional evidence at the request of a party” and, based
on the preponderance of the evidence, “shall grant such relief
as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(C). Courts must, however, give “‘due weight’
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                       13

to judgments of education policy” when reviewing state
administrative hearing decisions. Gregory K. v. Longview
School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)). That is, federal judges
are not experts in educating children with disabilities, and
courts may not “substitute their own notions of sound
educational policy for those of the school authorities which
they review.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. Administrative
findings that are thorough and careful are entitled to
“particular deference.” JG v. Douglas County School Dist.,
552 F.3d 786, 793 (9th Cir. 2008).
    The administrative law judge actively participated in
questioning witnesses during the six-day administrative
hearing. Her 28-page written decision contained fulsome
factual background and thoroughly analyzed each issue and
sub-issue. See R.B. ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch.
Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We treat a hearing
officer's findings as ‘thorough and careful’ when the officer
participates in the questioning of witnesses and writes a
decision ‘contain[ing] a complete factual background as well
as a discrete analysis supporting the ultimate conclusions.’”
(quoting Park ex rel. Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch.
Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2006))). Because we
find the administrative law judge’s decision to be “thorough
and careful,” we give the findings in the administrative
record particular deference in our review.
    In this case, the parties did not offer additional evidence
in the district court. Under our precedents, we review the
district court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings
of fact for clear error, even when those findings are based on
the written administrative record. Gregory K., 811 F.2d at
1310; see also, e.g., N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary School
14                     LAUSD V. A.O.

Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). Whether the
district’s proposed individualized education program would
provide A.O. a free appropriate public education is a
question of law that we review de novo. E.g., Crofts v.
Issaquah School Dist. No. 411, 22 F.4th 1048, 1053 (9th Cir.
2022); N.B., 541 F.3d at 1207.
V. Analysis
    States must comply procedurally and substantively with
the IDEA. E.g., Crofts, 22 F.4th at 1054. To determine
whether a student was denied a free appropriate public
education, the court assesses first “whether the IDEA’s
procedures were complied with and second whether the
district met its substantive obligation to provide a FAPE.”
Id. Procedural violations of the IDEA can be harmless, but
not if they “substantially interfere with the parents’
opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process,
result in the loss of educational opportunity, or actually
cause a deprivation of educational benefits….” Id. (quoting
Timothy O. v. Paso Robles Unified School Dist., 822 F.3d
1105, 1118 (9th Cir. 2016)). A school district violates the
IDEA’s substantive requirements when it fails to offer an
individualized education program “reasonably calculated to
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 403.
     We address first the three issues raised by the school
district: (A) whether the school district violated the IDEA by
failing to specify the frequency of proposed speech therapy
and audiology services; (B) whether the school district’s
proposed program failed to offer a meaningful educational
benefit to A.O.; and (C) whether the school district’s
proposed program failed to place A.O. in the least restrictive
environment appropriate for her. We conclude with the issue
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                        15

in defendants’ cross-appeal: (D) whether the school district’s
proposed program violated the IDEA by failing to provide
for individual speech therapy.
   A. Frequency and Duration of Services
    Recall that the school district proposed to provide A.O.
with speech therapy for thirty minutes per week in one to ten
sessions per week and audiology services for twenty minutes
per month in one to five sessions per month. According to
the school district, the frequency ranges provided additional
information about how the services would be delivered, but
their inclusion was not required by law. In the alternative,
the school district argues that even if it procedurally violated
the IDEA, the violation was harmless because A.O.’s parents
were not denied the opportunity to participate in the process
of formulating a proposed individualized education program
for A.O.
    The IDEA requires school districts to provide parents
with a formal, written, and specific offer of placement. 20
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i); Union School Dist. v. Smith, 15
F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994). This requirement is
“enforced rigorously” because it provides a clear record if
disputes arise and because the written offer helps parents
decide whether to accept or reject a proposed program.
Union School Dist., 15 F.3d at 1526. Regulations provide
that the written program must include the projected start date
for services and modifications, as well as the “anticipated
frequency, location, and duration of those services and
modifications.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(7).
    We agree with the administrative law judge and the
district court that the school district’s proposed program fell
short of the IDEA because it failed to specify clearly the
frequency and duration of offered services. The broad
16                     LAUSD V. A.O.

frequency ranges—one to ten sessions of speech therapy per
week totaling thirty minutes and one to five sessions of
audiology services per month totaling twenty minutes—
provided maximum flexibility for district providers, but they
also rendered the proposed program unclear. The proposed
program would have permitted A.O. to receive speech
therapy in a single thirty-minute session each week, in ten
sessions averaging just three minutes each, or anything in
between.
    As the administrative law judge observed, offering
speech therapy once a week for thirty minutes is very
different from offering A.O. ten three-minute sessions per
week. This is especially true given record evidence that a
speech therapist would not be able to target the skills A.O.
needed to develop in five- or six-minute sessions. The
school district’s proposed program thus left A.O.’s parents
uncertain as to both the services their daughter would receive
and whether those services would even benefit her.
    The school district argues that the frequency ranges
provide needed flexibility, especially with a child as young
as A.O. The district cites the testimony of speech therapist
Natalie Rubinstein, who explained that while she would
typically deliver therapy in one thirty-minute session, she
might provide two fifteen-minute sessions if the child had
difficulty sitting still for a thirty-minute session. We
recognize that teaching or providing therapy, especially for
such very young children, requires some flexibility. Still,
that fact does not relieve the district of its duty under the
IDEA to specify the anticipated frequency and duration of
services. Reasonable clarity of these terms is essential so
that parents can decide whether to accept the proposed
educational program and so that they can ensure compliance
with its terms. Union School Dist., 15 F.3d at 1526. The
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                       17

administrative law judge did not err in finding that the
frequency ranges here did not provide reasonable clarity. In
light of Rubinstein’s testimony, we would see nothing wrong
with a range here of, say, one to three speech therapy
sessions per week, retaining some flexibility, but a range of
one to ten was simply too wide to provide reasonable clarity.
    Moreover, the flexibility the school district seeks already
exists under the IDEA. To start, the regulations require
districts to specify only the “anticipated” duration and
frequency of services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(7). While
they should aim to implement each student’s program as
written, school districts do not violate the IDEA every time
they deviate from a program’s terms. Only “material”
failures to implement an individualized education program
violate the statute. Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker
School Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007); accord,
Sumter County School Dist. 17 v. Heffernan, 642 F.3d 478,
484 (4th Cir. 2011); Houston Independent School Dist. v.
Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000); L.J. by N.N.J.
v. School Bd. of Broward County, 927 F.3d 1203, 1213 (11th
Cir. 2019). We doubt that occasional, minor deviations of
the kind described in Rubinstein’s testimony would be
deemed material. See Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d
at 822 (“A material failure occurs when there is more than a
minor discrepancy between the services a school provides to
a disabled child and the services required by the child’s
IEP.”).
    Because the school district’s proposed broad frequency
ranges for speech therapy and audiology services violated
the IDEA, we consider next whether the violation was
harmless. It was not because the violation “seriously
impair[ed] the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP
formulation process.” Timothy O., 822 F.3d at 1124. This
18                       LAUSD V. A.O.

is not a case where, even though the written proposal omitted
essential information, A.O.’s parents knew and understood
the district’s offer. Cf. J.L. v. Mercer Island School Dist.,
592 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that parents were
not denied opportunity to participate in developing an
individualized education program where, though district
failed to list the amount of services offered, “everyone
involved in the individualized educational team—including
K.L.’s parents—knew of the amounts”).
    After hearing the parents’ testimony, the administrative
law judge found as a fact that they did not understand how
frequently their daughter would receive audiology and
speech services, which left them “unable to decide if they
agreed with the proposed services.” The administrative law
judge found that even school district staff did not know how
A.O.’s services would be delivered. The district court
agreed, finding that district officials “provided conflicting
understandings regarding how the services were to be
provided.” A proposed individualized education program
that is so unclear that neither the parents nor the district staff
charged with implementing it can understand its terms
substantially interferes with parents’ ability to participate in
formulating the program because it prevents them from
understanding and assessing the school district’s offer.
    The school district and the dissenting opinion insist that
any violation was harmless because A.O.’s parents actually
participated in formulating the program and had the
opportunity to ask questions at the meeting. District
officials, however, did not inform A.O.’s parents of the
frequency ranges at that meeting. The parents discovered
the ranges only when they returned home and studied the
written document they were given at the end of the meeting.
The dissenting opinion asserts that A.O.’s parents could have
                            LAUSD V. A.O.                              19

sought further clarification after the meeting as well, making
the violation harmless. But the parents’ failure to clarify an
ambiguous term after the IEP team meeting took place does
not relieve the school district of its obligations under the
IDEA. 2
    We have often said that a school district cannot “blame
a parent for its failure to ensure meaningful procedural
compliance with the IDEA.” Doug C. v. Hawaii Dep’t of
Educ., 720 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Anchorage School Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“participating educational agencies cannot
excuse their failure to satisfy the IDEA’s procedural
requirements by blaming the parents”). This is because “the
IDEA’s protections are designed to benefit the student, not
the parent.” Doug C., 720 F.3d at 1045. Consequently, the
fact that A.O.’s parents could have asked more questions

2
  The administrative law judge found as a matter of fact that school
officials themselves did not know how the speech therapy and audiology
services would be provided based on the frequency ranges written in the
IEP. We are therefore skeptical that follow-up questions from the
parents would have clarified the IEP enough for the parents to understand
the school district’s offer and thus have an opportunity to participate as
mandated under the IDEA. We also do not see a limiting principle in the
dissenting opinion’s suggestion that parents should be obliged to ask
follow-up questions until all terms of the IEP are reasonably clear, and
that parents’ failure to do so means they have not been denied an
opportunity to participate. The statute and implementing regulations
make clear that the burden is on the school district, not the parents, to
ensure that parents are afforded an opportunity to participate. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415(a); 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(a) (“[e]ach public agency must
take steps to ensure that one or both of the parents … are afforded the
opportunity to participate ….”). Requiring parents to ask follow-up
questions would impermissibly shift the burden to the parents,
essentially requiring parents to secure their own opportunities to
participate.
20                          LAUSD V. A.O.

does not excuse the school district’s “failure to fulfill its
affirmative obligation” to provide a clear offer of services to
A.O. See id. 3 We agree with the administrative law judge
and the district court that the school district violated the
IDEA and denied A.O. a free appropriate public education
by failing to specify with reasonable clarity the frequency
and duration of the proposed speech therapy and audiology
services.
     B. Meaningful Benefit
    We next turn to the parties’ more substantive
disagreements.     The school district argues that the
administrative law judge and district court erred in finding
that the Saticoy preschool program the district offered to
A.O. would not have provided her with a meaningful
educational benefit, as the IDEA requires.
    To comply substantively with the Act, school districts
must design individualized education programs that are
“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress

3
  We have consistently stressed that parents “must be involved in the IEP
creation process,” e.g., Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark County Sch.
Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added), and that mere
“[a]fter-the-fact parental involvement is not enough,” Shapiro ex rel.
Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 317 F.3d 1072,
1078 (9th Cir. 2003), superseded by statute on other grounds, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(B). Thus, the mere possibility that parents could have
asked follow-up question after the fact does not mean they were provided
an opportunity to participate. “An IEP which addresses the unique needs
of the child cannot be developed if those people who are most familiar
with the child’s needs are not involved or fully informed.” Amanda J.,
267 F.3d at 892 (emphasis added). The ambiguities in this IEP meant
that the school district did not ensure A.O.’s parents were fully informed
of the contents of the proposed plan and therefore the school district
impeded their opportunity to participate.
                       LAUSD V. A.O.                      21

appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew
F., 580 U.S. at 403. An appropriate public education “does
not mean the absolutely best or ‘potential-maximizing’
education for the individual child.” Gregory K., 811 F.2d at
1314, quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n.21. Yet an
individualized education program must still be
“appropriately ambitious,” and a program that offers
“merely more than de minimis” progress violates the IDEA.
Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 402–03. The program must be
designed to convey a “meaningful benefit” to the student.
Adams v. State of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir.
1999).
    Under California law, deaf and hard-of-hearing children
are entitled to an educational program in which their “unique
communication mode is respected, utilized, and developed
to an appropriate level of proficiency.” Cal. Educ. Code
§ 56000.5(b)(2). That requirement of state law is consistent
with the federal IDEA and is therefore “enforceable in
federal court.” Union School Dist., 15 F.3d at 1524. Here,
A.O.’s parents are themselves typically hearing, and they
communicate through spoken language. They want their
daughter to communicate through spoken language.
Assessments of A.O. after she received the cochlear implants
indicated that is indeed a realistic goal for her. A.O. was
entitled to an educational program that would offer her
meaningful benefit in oral communication.
    We agree with the administrative law judge and the
district court that the district’s proposed individualized
education program denied A.O. a free appropriate public
education because it did not propose to provide enough
interaction with typically hearing peers for A.O. to make
meaningful progress in spoken language. Bridgette Klaus,
JTC’s chief program officer, explained that children with
22                      LAUSD V. A.O.

cochlear implants, if given proper support, can learn to
communicate orally and be educated in general classrooms.
Speech-language pathologist Jennifer Reeder testified that,
to catch up with their peers, children like A.O. need “to have
access to typical language models as much as possible as
many hours of their day as they can.”
    In her thorough and careful decision, the administrative
law judge credited the testimony of JTC’s Klaus, who
explained that deaf and hard-of-hearing children need
regular interaction with typically hearing peers in particular.
Because other deaf and hard-of-hearing children are
themselves learning to communicate orally, they can offer
children like A.O. only “fragmented” language models.
And, while teachers do serve as language models, Klaus
explained that adults’ language is far more sophisticated than
that of another three-year-old. It is important that children
like A.O. practice communicating with children their own
age so that they are socially prepared to transition to a
general education classroom. Alyssa Soto, the deaf and
hard-of-hearing classroom instructor at Saticoy, agreed that
mainstreaming opportunities are beneficial for students like
A.O.
    Given the strong evidence of A.O.’s need to interact
frequently with her hearing peers, we agree with the
administrative law judge and district court that the proposed
Saticoy program would not have offered sufficient
opportunities for mainstreaming and thus for A.O. to benefit
from interactions with typically hearing peers. At Saticoy,
A.O. would have spent about 85% of her time in a segregated
classroom with other deaf and hard-of-hearing students. She
would have interacted with typically hearing peers only at
recess for thirty minutes each day, in music, art, and library
classes for a total of ninety minutes each week, and at
                          LAUSD V. A.O.                           23

occasional holiday parties. The majority of mainstreaming
would thus have taken place during recess. As the
administrative law judge noted, Saticoy’s playground is not
designed to amplify sound. According to Reeder, it would
be difficult for A.O. to hear her peers in that environment.
Considering the evidence that A.O. needs frequent, regular
interaction with hearing peers, the administrative law judge
and the district court reasonably found that the
mainstreaming opportunities offered at Saticoy were
inadequate for her to receive a meaningful benefit.
    The school district’s and dissenting opinion’s arguments
to the contrary are not persuasive. First, the district and
dissenting opinion argue that the administrative law judge’s
decision was not thorough and careful and thus not entitled
to deference based on two supposed factual errors in the
decision. See post at 42, n.2; 45–49. The district argues that,
when discussing proposed mainstreaming opportunities at
Saticoy, the administrative law judge did not consider the
ninety minutes per week A.O. would spend in art, music, and
library classes. At the administrative hearing, only one
witness, teacher Alyssa Soto, mentioned art, music, and
library. A different witness for the school district, Debbie
Lutz, did not discuss those classes when she listed
mainstreaming opportunities at Saticoy. It is not clear from
the judge’s 28-page written decision whether she found
Lutz’s testimony more credible than Soto’s on this point or
if she perhaps just overlooked that portion of Soto’s
testimony or thought it did not need to be addressed
specifically. 4

4
 We do not find that the judge’s handling of this minor factual issue
undermines the deference owed to her decision. The factual issue
24                          LAUSD V. A.O.

     In any case, the district court found that children at
Saticoy do mainstream with typically hearing peers in music,
art, and library each week, and that finding is not clearly
erroneous. We have therefore considered those ninety
minutes in our analysis of the school district’s proposed
program for A.O. at Saticoy. Those ninety minutes per week
did not convince the district court to change the result, nor
do they convince us to do so. With or without them, the
proposed program did not offer A.O. sufficient interaction
with typically hearing peers.
    The school district and dissenting opinion also assert that
the administrative law judge mistakenly described students
in the other preschool class at Saticoy as English language
learners. The typically hearing peers at Saticoy were
enrolled in a dual language program in which they were
instructed in English and Armenian. It is not clear from the
record whether or how many of those students were English
language learners. But even if the administrative law judge
might have been mistaken on this point, she did not find that
students at Saticoy could not serve as adequate language
models for A.O. The judge based her decision on the amount
of mainstreaming time available at Saticoy, not the English
language abilities of typically hearing peers there.
    The school district and dissenting opinion argue that the
administrative law judge, instead of focusing on whether the
district’s proposed program offered A.O. a meaningful
benefit, improperly compared Saticoy to JTC’s program to
determine which would provide A.O. the greater benefit.
We disagree. As we read the judge’s decision, she carefully

concerns a small fraction of the proposed plan for A.O. and appears not
to have been highlighted by the parties in the hearing or their briefs to
the administrative law judge.
                             LAUSD V. A.O.                              25

considered A.O.’s need for peer language models and the
opportunities for mainstreaming at Saticoy, and she
reasonably concluded that the district’s program would not
provide a meaningful benefit. The school district cites the
testimony of speech-language pathologist Reeder, who
testified that students in a blended, immersion program like
JTC’s obtain “more benefit” than students placed in
classrooms with only deaf and hard-of-hearing peers. The
judge did not actually apply that standard, however. Instead,
she concluded that the district denied A.O. a free appropriate
public education because the Saticoy program, considered in
its own right, simply would not allow A.O. “to make
meaningful progress.” 5
    Finally, the school district argues that the administrative
law judge should have deferred to the expertise of the
district’s witnesses who testified that Saticoy would be an
appropriate program for A.O. instead of relying on the
testimony of JTC’s Klaus. It was not unreasonable for the
judge to conclude that Klaus was “qualified to opine on what

5
  Contrary to the dissenting opinion’s depiction of our holding, we do
not find that the Saticoy program would not have provided A.O. a
“meaningful educational benefit” because it would have been inferior in
comparison to the program offered at the John Tracy Center. See post at
44–45.       Rather, the Saticoy program would have provided
mainstreaming opportunities to A.O. only 15% of the time, with 37.5%
of that limited mainstreaming time spent in an academic environment.
That means the school district proposed to have A.O. spend less than 6%
of her time in a mainstreamed classroom. Given the compelling
evidence that A.O. needed to maximize her time interacting with
typically hearing peers to reach age-appropriate auditory, speech, and
language skills, we agree with the administrative law judge and the
district court that the limited mainstreaming opportunities included in the
Saticoy program itself would not have provided A.O. a meaningful
educational benefit.
26                      LAUSD V. A.O.

would be an appropriate program” for A.O. Klaus has a
master’s degree in education with credentials for teaching
deaf and hard-of-hearing students. She is a certified auditory
verbal therapist and has worked with deaf and hard-of-
hearing students for twenty years.
    The school district insists that the judge was required to
defer to the opinions of its staff. As we have observed,
though, “if the views of school personnel regarding an
appropriate educational placement for a disabled child were
conclusive, then administrative hearings conducted by an
impartial decisionmaker would be unnecessary.” Ojai
Unified School Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir.
1993).      Under the IDEA, courts owe deference to
administrative hearing officers in light of their expertise, but
not necessarily to the witnesses for the school district that is
party to the dispute. See id. at 1474. The Supreme Court
told us in Rowley that courts should not substitute their own
notions of sound educational policy for those “of the school
authorities which they review.” 458 U.S. at 206. The school
authorities whose decisions courts review under the IDEA
are the hearing officers, not the staff of individual school
districts. See Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist.
5J, 502 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2007) (connecting the “due
weight” given to administrative decisions to the admonition
in Rowley that courts not substitute their own notions of
sound educational policy for those of the school authorities
they review); J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist.,
626 F.3d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).
   The school district cites no pertinent support for its
ambitious assertion that the administrative law judge was
required to defer to the expertise of the district’s teachers
over that of other experienced educators. The administrative
law judge and district court did not err in concluding that the
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                        27

school district’s proposed program to educate A.O. at
Saticoy did not offer A.O. a meaningful benefit.
   C. Least Restrictive Environment
    The school district argues next that the administrative
law judge and district court erred in finding that the proposed
program at Saticoy did not offer A.O. an education in the
least restrictive environment appropriate for her. The IDEA
requires states to educate students with disabilities in the
“least restrictive environment,” meaning that, to “the
maximum extent appropriate,” children with disabilities
should be educated with children who are not disabled. 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).         “[S]pecial classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from
the regular educational environment” should occur “only
when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such
that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.” Id. The IDEA thus establishes “Congress’s
preference for educating children with disabilities in regular
classrooms with their peers.” Sacramento City Unified
School Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.
1994).
    The mainstreaming requirement in the IDEA can at times
be in tension with the other requirement in the IDEA that
schools provide programming designed individually to meet
the specific needs of each child. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(5);
1414(d). That’s why we adopted a four-part balancing-test
to determine if a student will be educated in the “least
restrictive environment.” The court balances: “(1) the
educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular class;
(2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the
effect [student] had on the teacher and children in the regular
28                     LAUSD V. A.O.

class; and (4) the costs of mainstreaming [student].” Rachel
H., 14 F.3d at 1404. The evidence here shows, however,
considerably less tension between mainstreaming and
providing individualized support for children like A.O. with
cochlear implants. A.O. needed as much exposure to peer
language models as possible so that she could catch up to her
typically hearing peers. Maximizing A.O.’s mainstreaming
time, with appropriate supplementary aids and services, is
part and parcel of an appropriate plan to offer a meaningful
educational benefit in light of her specific needs.
    The administrative law judge and district court found
that the school district’s proposed plan for A.O. would not
have placed her in the least restrictive environment. We
agree. A.O.’s parents and district educators agreed that A.O.
was not yet ready for a general classroom without supports
or services, but the district’s proposed Saticoy program
would have deprived her of being educated “[t]o the
maximum extent appropriate” with her non-disabled peers.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). At Saticoy, A.O. would have
been placed in a segregated classroom and 85% of her time
would have been spent outside general education, without
typically hearing peers. Though Saticoy offered some daily
and weekly opportunities for mainstreaming, as described
above, those limited opportunities would have fallen well
short of appropriate mainstreaming, especially in light of the
evidence that A.O. would benefit greatly from as much
interaction as possible with typically hearing peers. Because
the school district’s proposed program at Saticoy would not
have mainstreamed A.O. to the “maximum extent
appropriate” for her, it was not the least restrictive
environment. Id.
   The dissenting opinion argues that the 15% of the time
A.O. would spend mainstreaming at Saticoy was the
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                       29

“maximum extent appropriate” for A.O. to be in a regular
education environment. Post at 54–55. To reach this
conclusion, the dissenting opinion has framed the
mainstreaming requirements in the IDEA as a strict binary
choice—a student is either “separate” in a “special education
classroom” or mainstreamed in a “regular classroom.” Post
at 52–54. The IDEA does not draw such a formalistic and
binary distinction.
    “The IDEA permits a more restrictive placement only if
‘education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.’” D. R.
ex rel. R. R. v. Redondo Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 56 F.4th
636, 646 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)
(emphasis in original)). “Whenever feasible, a school
district must push support services into the regular classroom
rather than pull students out of it.” Id. The IDEA
specifically contemplates intermediary steps between a
student being educated in a special education classroom, and
a student being educated in a general education classroom
without any specialized assistance. In fact, “a school district
may not remove a child from the regular classroom ‘solely
because of needed modifications in the general education
curriculum.’” Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(e)). That is
why schools must “ensure that a continuum of alternative
placements is available to meet the needs of children with
disabilities.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.115(a); Poolaw v. Bishop, 67
F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting prior version of 34
C.F.R. 300.115(a)).
    No one thought that A.O. was ready for a general
education classroom without supplementary aids and
services. At the same time, the school district concluded it
was appropriate for A.O. to mainstream with typically
hearing peers for one and a half hours each week in academic
30                     LAUSD V. A.O.

classes in art, music, and library. It is unclear from the
record what additional support, if any, A.O. would have
received while in such general education classrooms. But
given the undisputed fact that A.O. was not ready for a
general education environment without supplementary aids
and services, clearly the district intended to provide A.O.
some support during the proposed academic mainstreaming.
    The question, then, is why a plan tailored to A.O.’s needs
should not have called for her to spend more than one and a
half hours per week mainstreaming with her peers in a
classroom environment as proposed by the district,
particularly if she could be provided support services during
the mainstreaming. Providing extra support to A.O. in a
general education classroom does not render it a “special
education classroom,” as the dissenting opinion seems to
assert. Again, given the compelling evidence on how
important it would be for A.O. to spend time listening to and
learning to talk with typically hearing peers, the district’s
proposed plan did not offer the “least restrictive
environment.” It failed to weigh properly the benefits of
maximizing A.O.’s mainstreaming time or take into account
the “continuum” of services that could be provided to ensure
that more than 15% of A.O.’s time at school was spent
around typically hearing peers.
    On appeal, the school district invites this court to
compare the relative restrictiveness of its proposed Saticoy
program and the private JTC program. In the school
district’s view, a “special” school like JTC is necessarily
more restrictive than Saticoy’s program, which is offered on
a “regular” public school campus. The issue under the
IDEA, however, is not whether the school district’s proposed
program would have been more or less restrictive than the
parents’ preferred program, but whether the district proposed
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                        31

to educate A.O. “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate” with
non-disabled peers. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). It did not.
The administrative law judge ordered the school district to
place A.O. at JTC as an equitable remedy after she found
that the district had failed to offer A.O. a free appropriate
public education in the least restrictive environment. The
school     district     unsuccessfully     challenged     the
appropriateness of that remedy in the district court. It has
not sought further review of that issue here.
     In any event, the school district is mistaken. The district
seems to argue that because Saticoy Elementary is a large,
diverse public school that enrolls many non-disabled
students, it is necessarily less restrictive for A.O. than the
smaller, private JTC, which enrolls typically hearing
students in its preschool class for deaf and hard-of-hearing
students. We reject the school district’s effort to measure the
least restrictive environment based on the size of a school’s
campus or the diversity of its entire student body, or whether
it is a public or private school.
    What matters under the IDEA is the educational
experience offered to the particular student with disabilities.
The Act requires that the student be educated to “the
maximum extent appropriate” with non-disabled peers. 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). It matters little that A.O. would be
educated on a large, diverse, public-school campus at
Saticoy if she would not be able to experience that campus
or to engage meaningfully with those non-disabled peers
because she would be kept, for 85% of her day, in a
segregated classroom. The administrative law judge had
sound reasons for finding that the school district’s proposal
was unnecessarily restrictive for A.O., given that it offered
her only minimal interaction with typically hearing peers.
32                      LAUSD V. A.O.

    The school district also insists incorrectly that the
administrative law judge’s finding would imply that “every
specialized classroom designed for students with
disabilities” would fail the least-restrictive-environment
analysis unless it also enrolled general education students in
that classroom. We disagree. Nothing in the judge’s
decision implied that the only permissible placement for
A.O. was a blended classroom like that offered at JTC, much
less that every student with special needs would require such
a placement. See Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 580
U.S. 154, 170–71 (2017) (IDEA “guarantees individually
tailored educational services”). The school district could
have offered additional mainstreaming opportunities for
A.O. within Saticoy that, while short of creating a blended
classroom akin to the JTC program, might still have satisfied
the least-restrictive-environment analysis. See Daniel R.R.
v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989)
(IDEA does “not contemplate an all-or-nothing educational
system in which handicapped children attend either regular
or special education” but instead requires “schools to offer a
continuum of services” and to take “intermediate steps
where appropriate”). Moreover, the administrative law
judge and the district court tied their reasoning quite
specifically to the special need of deaf and hard-of-hearing
children with cochlear implants: to spend time and interact
with typically hearing peers to catch up with their abilities to
speak and understand others’ speech. The administrative
law judge and district court did not err on this point.
     D. Individual Speech and Language Therapy
    Finally, we consider A.O.’s and her parents’ cross-
appeal asserting that the school district needed to specify that
her speech and language therapy would be delivered on an
individual basis. The administrative law judge found that
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                       33

the school district had substantively violated the IDEA and
denied A.O. a free appropriate public education by failing to
offer individual speech therapy. The district court reversed
on this issue because it found no procedural violation of the
IDEA. The court noted correctly that federal regulations do
not expressly require school districts to specify in an
individualized education program whether services will be
provided individually or in a group setting. The district court
did not address, however, the administrative law judge’s
substantive finding that A.O. would need individual therapy
as part of any free appropriate public education for her.
    The IDEA “accords educators discretion to select from
various methods for meeting the individualized needs of a
student” so long as those methods are “reasonably calculated
to provide him with educational benefit.” R.P. ex rel. C.P. v.
Prescott Unified School Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir.
2011). Put another way, a school district “need not specify
an instructional method unless that method is necessary to
enable a student to receive a FAPE.” Crofts, 22 F.4th at
1057.
    Here, the school district’s proposed program said that
that A.O.’s speech therapy would be delivered as a “Direct
Service (Collaborative).” At the administrative hearing, the
district’s Rubinstein explained that this meant that the speech
and language pathologist would see the child “directly” and
would be working “collaboratively” with the teacher in the
classroom toward A.O.’s goals. Other witnesses during the
administrative hearing said that “Direct Service
(Collaborative)” referred to both individual or group
services—or at least was ambiguous.
    At oral argument, counsel for the school district told us
that the label “Direct Service (Collaborative)” does not
34                     LAUSD V. A.O.

distinguish between individual and group therapy, but that
the service would not have been delivered in a group setting
if A.O. had attended Saticoy. Attorney arguments are not
evidence. The school district has not pointed us to any place
in the record where the meaning of “Direct Service
(Collaborative)” was clarified to mean individual speech
therapy.
    The administrative law judge found that A.O. needed
individual speech and language therapy to be provided with
a free appropriate public education. The judge found
persuasive the testimony of Reeder, a licensed speech-
language pathologist who opined that A.O. needed
individual therapy to improve her articulation. Reeder
explained that, to practice her pronunciation of final
consonants, A.O. needed to be able to hear the therapist,
which would be difficult in a loud, busy classroom. The
judge also considered the testimony of the school district’s
Rubinstein but found that she offered no rationale for
providing A.O. speech therapy in a group. Granting due
deference to the careful and thorough findings of the
administrative law judge, we conclude that A.O.’s speech
and language therapy needed to be delivered on an
individual basis for her to obtain a meaningful benefit from
that service. The school district violated the IDEA by failing
to offer A.O. individual speech and language therapy.
    The school district’s violation was substantive, not
procedural, because the failure to provide a disabled student
with appropriate services denies that student a free
appropriate public education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)
(defining “free appropriate public education” to include
“special education” and “related services”). In their briefs
in this court, the parties principally debate whether the
school district committed a procedural violation of the IDEA
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                       35

by failing to specify whether A.O.’s speech therapy would
be delivered to her individually or in a group.
    We view the issue primarily as a substantive one. The
administrative law judge found a substantive violation,
finding that A.O. “required individual speech and language
services,” and that the school district denied A.O. a free
appropriate public education “by failing to offer individual
speech and language services.” The school district’s label
“Direct Service (Collaborative)” is opaque, but the evidence
in the record shows that the label can mean either individual
or group therapy. The proposed individual education
program thus would have failed to offer A.O. the individual
therapy she required. In any event, we agree with A.O. that
there still would have been a procedural violation because
the opaque reference in the proposed individual educational
plan did not allow the parents to evaluate what the school
district was proposing for an important aspect of their child’s
education.     The administrative law judge reasonably
determined that the school district denied A.O. a free
appropriate public education in this respect.
                         Conclusion
    The school district violated the IDEA in several ways:
by failing to indicate clearly the frequency and duration of
the services offered, by failing to offer A.O. a meaningful
benefit, and by not placing her in the least restrictive
environment appropriate for her. We AFFIRM the district
court’s judgment on these issues. We REVERSE the district
court’s finding that the individualized education program
was not required to specify that A.O. would receive
individual speech and language therapy. The case is
REMANDED to the district court to modify its judgment
36                      LAUSD V. A.O.

accordingly and for any further appropriate proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

COLLINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

    The majority holds that, in multiple different respects,
Plaintiff Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD” or
“the school district”) denied a free appropriate public
education (“FAPE”) to Defendant A.O., in violation of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Because, in my view, LAUSD’s
proposed individualized education program (“IEP”) did not
deny A.O. a FAPE, I respectfully dissent.
    Before turning to the specific asserted deficiencies
identified by the majority, I think it is important to
emphasize the unusual framework for judicial review that
applies under the IDEA. “Unlike other cases reviewing
administrative action, in IDEA cases, the Ninth Circuit does
not employ a highly deferential standard of review; rather, it
gives due weight to the state administrative proceedings.”
Crofts v. Issaquah Sch. Dist. No. 411, 22 F.4th 1048, 1053
(9th Cir. 2022) (simplified). In assessing the “due weight”
to give to “administrative findings,” we give deference to
findings of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that are
“thorough and careful.” Doug C. v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ.,
720 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). To the extent that the
district court, upon its review of the matter, makes specific
findings of fact, we review those findings for clear error. Id.
But on the ultimate question whether a proposed IEP
provides a FAPE, we apply de novo review. Crofts, 22 F.4th
at 1053; see also Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887 (9th Cir. 2001). Nonetheless,
                       LAUSD V. A.O.                      37

we must also keep in mind that, when assessing whether a
FAPE has been denied, “we are not free ‘to substitute [our]
own notions of sound educational policy for those of the
school authorities which [we] review.’” Amanda J., 267
F.3d at 887 (quoting Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)). Under
these standards, I disagree with each of the majority’s
grounds for holding that LAUSD denied a FAPE to A.O.
                             I
   I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that LAUSD
denied A.O. a FAPE by using unduly broad frequency
ranges in describing how often particular services would be
provided to A.O.
    Under the IDEA, an IEP must include “the anticipated
frequency, location, and duration” of the “special education
and related services and supplemental aids and services . . .
to be provided to the child, or on behalf of the child.” 20
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV), (VII). With respect to
speech and language services, LAUSD’s proposed IEP
stated that A.O. would be provided such services for a total
of 30 minutes per week, to be given in 1–10 sessions per
week. As to “audiology services,” the proposed IEP stated
that they would be provided for a total of 20 minutes per
month, with that total broken into 1–5 sessions per month.
The majority holds that, while a frequency band of 1–3
sessions for a total of 30 minutes of speech and language
services would satisfy the statutory requirement to
adequately specify the “anticipated frequency . . . and
duration” of such services, a band of 1–10 sessions is too
broad, thereby rendering materially “unclear” the
sufficiency of the services being proposed. See Opin. at 16–
17. According to the majority, 10 sessions would suggest
38                     LAUSD V. A.O.

that only 3 minutes of services would be provided per
session, which could impair their quality. See Opin. at 16.
The majority further concludes that the band of 1–5 sessions
for a total of 20 minutes of audiology services is also
insufficiently clear. See Opin. at 15–16.
    Even assuming that LAUSD’s proposed frequency
ranges were unduly broad and thereby violated the IDEA’s
requirement to adequately specify the “anticipated
frequency . . . and duration” of the services, that does not
suffice to establish that A.O. was ultimately denied a FAPE.
Rather, as the majority recognizes, a violation of the IDEA’s
procedural requirements results in the denial of a “free
appropriate public education only if” that violation:

         (I) impeded the child’s right to a free
       appropriate public education;
         (II) significantly impeded the parents’
       opportunity      to   participate   in the
       decisionmaking process regarding the
       provision of a free appropriate public
       education to the parents’ child; or
         (III) caused a deprivation of educational
       benefits.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); see also Timothy O. v. Paso
Robles Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir.
2016). The majority holds that the second of these
alternatives is satisfied here, see Opin. at 17–20, but I
disagree.
    The majority notes that the ALJ made a factual finding
that A.O.’s parents were confused by the breadth of the
ranges—which, as explained, could be construed as
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                       39

suggesting completely cursory, and therefore inadequate,
sessions—and that the parents were therefore unable
sufficiently to “assess[] the school district’s offer.” See
Opin. at 18. But to constitute a denial of a FAPE, this lack
of clarity must have “significantly impeded the parents’
opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process.”
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II) (emphasis added). I do not
see how that standard can be said to have been met in this
case. Because the defect here involves a lack of clarity
arising from an issue about how to construe these frequency
ranges in light of the stated total minutes, the matter is one
that could have been further clarified simply by asking
follow-up questions about that point. That is, the lack of
clarity here may have been a technical violation of the
statute, but it did not deprive the parents of the opportunity
to participate in the process.
    The majority rejects this conclusion on the ground that it
amounts to “blam[ing] [the] parent[s]” for the school
district’s error. See Opin. at 19 (quoting Doug C., 720 F.3d
at 1045). That is wrong. Here, the school district—and the
school district alone—was responsible for the improperly
broad frequency ranges in the proposed IEP, and I have not
in any way sought to “blame the parents” for that erroneous
lack of clarity. Cf. Doug C., 720 F.3d at 1045 (rejecting
school district’s effort to blame the parent for the school
district’s underlying procedural failure to include that parent
in the key IEP meeting). But the statute squarely requires us
to ask whether that error “significantly impeded the parents’
opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process,”
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II) (emphasis added), which
requires us to ask whether, after the error was committed,
the parents still had an “opportunity to participate” in that
process in a meaningful way. Given that parents are, by
40                      LAUSD V. A.O.

statute, part of the “IEP Team” that is responsible for
“developing each child’s IEP,” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B),
(d)(3)(A), that opportunity to participate necessarily
includes the ability to ask simple follow-up questions that
might be able to resolve the problematic lack of clarity.
There is no contention here that A.O.’s parents were in any
way prevented from asking such questions; indeed, A.O.’s
mother did not deny that she understood that she could raise
issues about the written IEP after it had been provided to her.
On this record, A.O.’s parents’ “opportunity to participate”
in the development of the IEP cannot be said to have been
“impeded,” much less “significantly” so.
    Furthermore, there is no basis in the record to conclude
that the mere lack of clarity in the broad frequency ranges
actually “impeded [A.O.’s] right to a free appropriate public
education” or “caused a deprivation of educational benefits.”
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). That might arguably have
been the case if, for example, follow-up questions could not
be expected to have resulted in a clarification that would
have eliminated the underlying uncertainty about the
adequacy of the proposed services. But no such situation is
presented here. On the contrary, when the school district
was pressed on the point in the context of the administrative
process, it became clear that no one actually expected that as
many as 10 speech and language service sessions would be
required.     Because the substantive adequacy of the
underlying services here could potentially have been
resolved by follow-up questions, I do not see how the unduly
broad ranges can be said to have actually impeded A.O’s
right to a FAPE or deprived her of educational benefits.
    Accordingly, because none of the statutory alternatives
for establishing a denial of a FAPE were met, there was no
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                        41

such denial and any procedural error on this score was
harmless.
                              II
    In my view, the majority also errs in reversing the district
court’s conclusion that LAUSD did not deny a FAPE to A.O.
by failing to specify that A.O.’s speech and language
services would be provided in a strictly individualized
setting.
    As we have held, school districts are entitled to exercise
their educational judgment in determining which
methodology to use in providing particular services that are
properly included in an IEP. Crofts, 22 F.4th at 1056; see
also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208. Accordingly, school districts
“need not specify an instructional method unless that method
is necessary to enable a student to receive a FAPE.” Crofts,
22 F.4th at 1057 (emphasis added). Here, A.O. contends
that, unless her speech and language services were provided
in a strictly individualized setting—i.e., not inside her
classroom—those services would be so inadequate as to
deny her a FAPE. The ALJ erred in accepting that
proposition.
    On this score, the ALJ stated that A.O. needed
“individual therapy” rather than services “in a group
setting,” because Jennifer Reeder, a speech pathologist,
testified that, as the ALJ put it, “for [A.O.] to work on
articulation she needed to hear, learn, and use the articulation
sounds she was working on with a therapist.” But as the
testimony offered by LAUSD’s speech pathologist (Natalie
Rubinstein) made clear, LAUSD did not propose providing
speech and language services to multiple children at the
same time, and the ALJ erred to the extent she relied on that
view.       Reeder construed the IEP’s reference to
42                           LAUSD V. A.O.

“collaborative” services as meaning “group” services, but
Rubinstein explained that the IEP described the services as
“direct” and “collaborative” because “the speech and
language pathologist would need to see the child directly”
and would also need to work “collaboratively . . . with the
teacher in the classroom.” 1 There is thus no basis for
Reeder’s or the ALJ’s supposition that LAUSD proposed to
have multiple students receive such services at the same
time. 2
    Although Reeder also stated that she did not think that
these services could “be offered within the classroom
setting” because “classrooms are very busy and usually loud
places,” the ALJ’s decision does not explicitly mention that
particular point. But even assuming that the ALJ relied on
that statement, it still does not establish that a strictly
individualized setting—i.e., one that is physically outside
the classroom walls rather than merely conducted separately
from other students within those walls—is necessary to
enable A.O. to receive a FAPE. Crofts, 22 F.4th at 1057. A
generalized statement that classrooms are “usually loud”
does not prove that in-the-classroom provision of speech and
language services in the particular context of the program at
issue here cannot work. But absent such evidence, an

1
 Further, in response to a specific question on this point at oral argument,
LAUSD’s counsel expressly stated that “it was not a group service” that
was being proposed. See Opin. at 33–34. And to the extent that the
clarity of the IEP’s description raises a potential issue of a procedural
violation, I reject that contention for the reasons explained below. See
infra note 3.
2
 This provides a further reason—in addition to the ALJ’s other multiple
errors, discussed below—for concluding that the ALJ’s ruling is not as
careful and thorough as the majority claims. As such, I give it little
deference here.
                             LAUSD V. A.O.                                43

individualized setting has not been shown to be a necessary
detail for the provision of a FAPE. The IEP therefore did
not deny A.O. a FAPE by omitting that specification, and I
would affirm the district court’s judgment on this point. 3
                                    III
    I also disagree with the majority’s further conclusions
that LAUSD’s proposed program at Saticoy Elementary
School (“Saticoy”) (1) would not have provided A.O. with a
“meaningful educational benefit”; and (2) would not have
placed A.O. in the “least restrictive environment.”
                                     A
    As the Supreme Court has explained, the IDEA’s
substantive requirement to provide a FAPE “is satisfied . . .
if the child’s IEP sets out an educational program that is
‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits.’” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v.
Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 394 (2017)
(quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207). But it is not sufficient to
offer a “merely more than de minimis” level of educational
benefit; rather, the IDEA “requires an educational program
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Id. at 402–
03. In the context of a “child who is deaf or hard of hearing,”
the IEP must specifically “consider the child’s language and

3
  To the extent that A.O. also presents this claim as one involving the
procedural error of failing to describe the services with sufficient clarity,
I would reject that contention. For the reasons I have stated, the omission
does not go to the adequacy of a FAPE, and it is therefore a detail that
did not need to be included in the IEP. And to the extent that the IEP
was not clear as to what a “collaborative” approach to delivering these
services meant, that error would be harmless for reasons similar to those
discussed above in relation to the frequency bands.
44                     LAUSD V. A.O.

communication        needs,      opportunities   for  direct
communications with peers and professional personnel in
the child’s language and communication mode, academic
level, and full range of needs, including opportunities for
direct instruction in the child’s language and communication
mode.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(iv).
    While a “meaningful educational benefit” is thus
required, see D.O. ex rel. Walker v. Escondido Union Sch.
Dist., 59 F.4th 394, 417 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted),
we have also cautioned that a FAPE “does not mean the
absolutely best or ‘potential-maximizing’ education for the
individual child.” Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811
F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S.
at 197 n.21). The judgment required by the IDEA is thus not
a comparative one—i.e., whether the proposed program is
the best of the available options. Rather, the question is an
absolute one—i.e., whether, considered on its own merits,
the proposed program provides a meaningful educational
benefit. As we made clear in Gregory K.:

       Our de novo review . . . must focus primarily
       on the District’s proposed placement, not on
       the alternative that the family preferred.
       Even if the [family’s preferred option] were
       better for [the student] than the District’s
       proposed placement, that would not
       necessarily mean that the placement was
       inappropriate.      We must uphold the
       appropriateness of the District’s placement if
       it was reasonably calculated to provide [the
       student] with educational benefits.

Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314.
                       LAUSD V. A.O.                       45

     Like the ALJ and the district court, the majority loses
sight of these standards and effectively holds that, because,
in its view, the Saticoy program is inferior to the program at
A.O.’s parents’ preferred placement—the John Tracy Center
(“JTC”)—the Saticoy program does not provide a FAPE.
Although the majority vigorously denies that either the
ALJ’s or its own reasoning rests on such a comparative
judgment, see Opin. at 24–25, I do not think that this claim
withstands analysis.
    Certain points are, for present purposes, undisputed.
First, as the ALJ noted, the parties agreed “that a regular
education classroom without supports and services was not
appropriate” for A.O. As the ALJ noted, there was no
testimony, from either side, that “a general education
preschool class would be appropriate for [A.O.].” Second,
A.O. has not challenged the ALJ’s determination that she
failed to show that the Saticoy program would have led to
her “regress[ing] in her speech and language abilities.”
Third, A.O. has not challenged the ALJ’s determination that
the half-day length of the Saticoy program did not deny her
a FAPE. As the ALJ explained, A.O. “did not prove there
was any significant difference in the length of academic time
between the John Tracy Center and the Saticoy program,”
because the “difference in duration of instructional time
between the two programs was minimal.” Against this
agreed-upon backdrop, the question, then, is whether the
level of benefit that would concededly have been provided
by the Saticoy special education program would have been
“meaningful” under the Endrew F. standard.
    In answering that question in the negative, the ALJ relied
solely on the conclusion that the Saticoy program would not
provide “adequate peer language modelling for [A.O.] to
make meaningful progress.” That was true, the ALJ
46                     LAUSD V. A.O.

concluded, because, unlike the JTC program, the Saticoy
program did not “offer[] any academic mainstreaming
opportunities” (emphasis added). According to the ALJ,
“[t]he only interaction [A.O.] would have with typical
hearing peers [at Saticoy] was at an occasional holiday
celebration and unstructured recess time.” The recess time
provided inadequate peer language opportunities, the ALJ
concluded, because it was “not in an acoustically sensitive
environment to allow [A.O.] equal opportunity for
communication access.” The ALJ also stated that “most” of
the “typically developing peers” at Saticoy “were English
language learners.”
    As LAUSD notes, the ALJ’s analysis is predicated on
several errors. First, the ALJ simply overlooked the
unrebutted evidence from the special education preschool
teacher at Saticoy, Alyssa Soto, that the students in the
special education program were also combined with the
“typical hearing children” in the Saticoy preschool class for
several additional activities, including “music,” “art,” and
“library,” for about 30 minutes each, once each week. Those
additional 90 minutes per week of mainstreaming
opportunities with peers were improperly disregarded by the
ALJ. That undermines her substantive conclusion, and it
also confirms that her assessment of the record does not
demonstrate the sort of carefulness that would warrant our
giving it much deference.
     In response, the majority wrongly contrives a supposed
conflict in the testimony on this point, claiming that a
different LAUSD witness, who described herself as an
“itinerant” teacher who went from classroom to classroom
for different grades, “did not discuss those classes when she
listed mainstreaming opportunities at Saticoy.” See Opin. at
23. The majority’s suggestion is that this itinerant teacher’s
                            LAUSD V. A.O.                              47

failure to mention those additional activities is affirmative
testimony that there was no such additional mainstreaming
at Saticoy. This flawed contention is apparently based on
the following response that the teacher gave when she was
asked “what’s your understanding of whether or not” A.O.
would have “that opportunity” to “interact with typical peers
on the playground or otherwise”:

           So they do have an opportunity, um, the
         teachers team up for holidays and they could,
         depending on the schedules, um, have
         interaction on the yard every day. Um, it
         depends on how they set their schedules up.
         So there is opportunities.

Contrary to the majority’s insinuation, this response did not
even purport to be an exhaustive description of the
mainstreaming opportunities at Saticoy; it was an
affirmative answer to the yes/no question “whether or not”
there would be such opportunities, and the witness expressly
stated that the exact opportunities would “depend[] on how
they”—i.e., “the teachers”—“set their schedules up.” Far
from contradicting Soto’s testimony about the exact
structure and schedule of her classroom, this testimony
defers to it. The majority’s claimed conflict is thus itself
clearly erroneous.
    The district court’s analysis on this point is not much
better. Although the district court acknowledged the
additional “ninety minutes of weekly blended student
interactions” in “music, art, [and] library,” 4 it claimed that

4
 Despite its gratuitous and erroneous claim of a conflict in the testimony
on this point, the majority ultimately concedes that the finding of an
additional 90 minutes per week is not clearly erroneous. See Opin. at 24.
48                      LAUSD V. A.O.

the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion was still correct because the
“ALJ properly found that the total amount of mainstreaming
per week in the Saticoy Program was ‘occasional,’ and
therefore insufficient.” On the cited page from which this
quotation was taken, the ALJ stated: “The only interaction
[A.O.] would have with typical hearing peers was at an
occasional holiday celebration and unstructured recess
time” (emphasis added). What the ALJ found was that the
“holiday celebration[s]” were “occasional”; the ALJ did not
conclude that the 90 minutes per week of art, music, and
library time could be dismissed as “occasional.” The district
court thus plainly misread the ALJ’s decision and failed
properly to assess the significance of that additional 90
minutes.
    Second, the ALJ erred in stating that the regular
preschool program at Saticoy consisted mostly of students
who “were English language learners.” There is no evidence
in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that these
preschool students lacked fluency in English. The record
instead shows that the regular preschool program was a dual-
language program involving both English and Armenian,
and Alyssa Soto testified that, during the joint sessions, those
students “[o]nly ever [used] English.” This additional patent
error further vitiates any claim that the ALJ’s analysis was
“careful” or should be given deference. The majority
nonetheless asserts that this erroneous factual statement
made no difference to the ALJ’s analysis. See Opin. at 24.
This confidence is misplaced. In her ultimate conclusion,
the ALJ stated that, “without mainstreaming opportunities
with typical hearing peers, [LAUSD] denied [A.O.] a FAPE
because it did not offer an appropriate classroom with
adequate peer language modelling for [A.O.] to make
meaningful progress.” Nothing in that sweepingly worded
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                       49

sentence provides any assurance that the ALJ did not rely on
the mistaken premise that the typical-hearing peers at
Saticoy were fluent only in Armenian. And nothing in the
district court’s analysis takes this error into account either.
     Once these errors are set aside, the only remaining
criticism of the Saticoy program that was offered by the ALJ
or the district court was that, unlike the unique JTC program,
the Saticoy program did not include typically-hearing
students in the special education classes. But that is purely
a comparative point, and while it may suggest that the JTC
program was preferable, and perhaps optimal, for A.O., we
have consistently held that the IDEA does not require that
the school district provide the very best possible program.
Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314. Rather, it only requires that
the program provide a meaningful benefit, i.e., a program
that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”
Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 403. The record evidence confirms
that the Saticoy program meets that standard. The ALJ
acknowledged that LAUSD based its placement
recommendation on “assessment results,” and numerous
witnesses for the school district testified that the various
features of the Saticoy program, including the acoustically
designed classrooms, the trained and credentialed staff, and
the opportunities for peer interaction, were reasonably
calculated to provide appropriate educational benefits.
Alyssa Soto also testified about the program’s prior
successes in helping students to later mainstream into regular
classrooms.
    Moreover, the chief witness on whom the ALJ relied in
rejecting the adequacy of the Saticoy program—Bridgette
Klaus, who is JTC’s chief programs officer—conceded that
A.O. “would receive educational benefit in language and
50                     LAUSD V. A.O.

speech” in a classroom such as Saticoy. Moreover, Klaus
further conceded that she did not personally “know the
Saticoy program” and did not “have any knowledge” of the
full scope of its opportunities for interacting with typical-
hearing peers. Her view was that deaf and hard-of-hearing
(“DHH”) children should be “with their hearing peers to the
greatest extent possible”—which is a comparative and
maximalist judgment, and not one focused on whether a
given program is sufficient or appropriate. Jennifer Reeder,
a speech pathologist whose testimony the majority cites,
similarly opined that JTC would provide “more benefit”
given the additional opportunity for interaction with typical-
hearing peers (emphasis added). But the fact that these
witnesses thought that JTC would be a better option does not
establish the distinct proposition that Saticoy would not have
sufficiently provided a meaningful benefit, and neither of
these witnesses provided testimony that would support that
view.
    The majority’s unfortunate precedential opinion now
effectively establishes that, in order to provide a FAPE for
students such as A.O., school districts must provide the only
additional element that JTC offers, which is reverse
mainstreaming, i.e., inclusion of nondisabled students into
the DHH special education class. That holding cannot be
correct. As one of the amici curiae in this case notes, it is
not entirely clear to what extent such reverse mainstreaming
is even consistent with California law, which generally
precludes placing nondisabled children into special
education classrooms. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56364.2.
A.O. argues that the IDEA overrides that judgment, which
seems to me to be a rather remarkable contention. Even if
the IDEA would ordinarily be thought to override conflicting
                           LAUSD V. A.O.                            51

provisions of state law, 5 something is fundamentally wrong
with our interpretation of the IDEA if it would lead to the
preemption of this sort of state law, which generally blocks
placing nondisabled students into special education classes
that may not be appropriate for them. Indeed, under A.O.’s
and the majority’s view, the IDEA would seemingly require
the creation of such reverse-mainstreaming opportunities if
they do not already exist.
    The majority’s opinion is further flawed in that it
effectively second-guesses the educational policy judgments
of school officials, contrary to the Supreme Court’s explicit
direction that courts generally must defer to “the application
of expertise and the exercise of judgment by school
authorities.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404. The majority
instead takes the view that the caselaw requires only
deference to the “hearing officers, not the staff of individual
school districts.” See Opin. at 26 (emphasis added). That is
incorrect. While we have held that deference may be
warranted to the “educational expertise” of ALJs in IDEA
cases, see Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d
840, 865 (9th Cir. 2004), that does not mean that deference
is not also warranted to the school officials involved in
preparing the IEP. On the contrary, in explaining the
deference that is required under the IDEA, the Supreme
Court in Rowley emphasized the respect that should be given
to judgments made by “state and local educational agencies
in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child.”
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. That language obviously refers to

5
 A.O. does not discuss the potential applicability of the IDEA’s carve-
out for conflicting state laws “respecting the provision of public
education to children” who are “aged 3 through 5.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1)(B)(i). I express no view on that point.
52                      LAUSD V. A.O.

the school district staff who are part of the IEP Team, and
not to the ALJ in a subsequent administrative proceeding. In
addition, for the reasons I have already explained, the ALJ
in this case does not deserve any deference. And the
majority’s further statement that deference to school
officials cannot be “conclusive,” Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1993), is a strawman
argument that cannot justify the majority’s failure to give the
appropriate non-conclusive deference.
                               B
    For similar reasons, I think that the majority errs in
concluding that LAUSD failed to provide A.O. with the
“least restrictive environment.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)
(heading).
    As described in the IDEA, the requirement to use the
“least restrictive environment” means that,

           To the maximum extent appropriate,
       children with disabilities, including children
       in public or private institutions or other care
       facilities, are educated with children who are
       not disabled, and special classes, separate
       schooling, or other removal of children with
       disabilities from the regular educational
       environment occurs only when the nature or
       severity of the disability of a child is such that
       education in regular classes with the use of
       supplementary aids and services cannot be
       achieved satisfactorily.

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). Nothing in this language
contemplates that school districts, in considering appropriate
                        LAUSD V. A.O.                       53

education plans for a student—such as A.O.—who
concededly requires special education classes, must
consider or employ reverse mainstreaming in which
“children who are not disabled” are placed into such “special
classes” for “children with disabilities.” Id. To the contrary,
the language of this provision addresses the distinction
between “special classes” and “separate schooling,” on the
one hand, and the “regular educational environment” on the
other. Id. Thus, as we have recognized, this “least restrictive
environment requirement” requires the use of a “regular
classroom,” rather than “a special education classroom,” to
the “maximum extent appropriate.” D.R. ex rel. R.R. v.
Redondo Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 56 F.4th 636, 643 (9th
Cir. 2022) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But to the
extent that “special classes” are required, and a “regular
educational environment” is not an appropriate option,
nothing in this statutory provision goes further and requires
school districts to then consider the option of making things
better for the disabled child by adding nondisabled children
to those special classes.
    The statute’s focus on the distinction between special
classes and the regular educational environment is
underscored by the fact that the four factors that we have
long considered in analyzing this requirement are all focused
on comparing the regular classroom to a special education
classroom:

         We have established a four-factor test to
       determine whether a school district has
       complied with the least restrictive
       environment requirement. The first and most
       important factor compares the academic
       benefits a child receives from placement in
54                     LAUSD V. A.O.

       the regular classroom with the academic
       benefits available in a special education
       classroom. The second factor considers the
       non-academic benefits a disabled child
       derives from being educated in a regular
       classroom, such as the development of social
       and communication skills from interaction
       with nondisabled peers. The third factor
       weighs the potential negative effects a
       disabled child’s presence may have on the
       education of other children in the [regular]
       classroom. The fourth factor considers the
       costs to the school district of providing the
       supplementary aids and services necessary to
       educate a disabled child in the regular
       classroom.

Id. at 643 (emphasis added) (citing Sacramento City Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)
(other citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Here, all agree that A.O. requires “special classes” and
cannot be placed into a “regular educational environment.”
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). Nor is there any contention that
the Saticoy program does not adequately provide, outside the
context of the required “special classes,” the “maximum”
appropriate extent of “educat[ion] with children who are not
disabled.” Id. As explained earlier, the Saticoy program
combines the DHH and nondisabled students together for
art, music, library, recess, and celebrations, reflecting a
proper and uncontested assessment that a special education
environment is not required for those particular activities.
The only respect in which A.O. complains that the Saticoy
program does not mainstream DHH students is in the special
                              LAUSD V. A.O.                          55

education portion of the program that all agree that A.O.
needs. Because the Saticoy program thus mainstreams the
students to the “maximum extent appropriate,” it satisfies the
“least restrictive environment” requirement.
    In reaching a contrary conclusion that LAUSD had to do
more than what it did in order to provide a FAPE, the
majority necessarily holds that the IDEA required LAUSD
to offer A.O. special education classes that included
nondisabled children. 6 Thus, under the majority’s reading,
the statutory requirement to ensure that, “[t]o the maximum
extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including
children in public or private institutions or other care
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled,”
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A), may sometimes require that
nondisabled students be placed into special education
classes. I am aware of no precedent that supports this novel
holding, which lacks any basis in the statutory text, and the
majority does not cite any such authority.
                          *        *          *
    For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

6
  The majority vaguely suggests that LAUSD should perhaps have
provided regular-classroom academic opportunities to A.O. with
unspecified “supplementary aids and services” to make that possible.
See Opin. at 30. But A.O. has not raised such an argument, and the ALJ
did not rely on any such theory either. On the contrary, the ALJ flatly
stated that “[n]one of [LAUSD’s] witnesses, [A.O.’s] Parents, or
[A.O.’s] own experts, opined that a general education preschool class
would be appropriate for [A.O.].” Moreover, in concluding that
additional “academic mainstreaming opportunities” were available for
A.O., the only evidence that the ALJ cited consisted of evidence related
to JTC’s unique program, which placed regular hearing students into a
special education classroom.