Court Opinion

ID: 9929048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 18:01:03.481893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:36.267286
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                _______________

                                     No. 21-1981
                                   _______________

                                          JGQ,
                                           Petitioner

                                            v.

              ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                           _______________

                     On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the
                            Board of Immigration Appeals
                              (Agency Case A000-00-001)
                                   _______________

                     Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                               on September 26, 2023.

                Before: KRAUSE, ROTH, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

                                (Filed: February 1, 2024)
                                    _______________

                                      OPINION *
                                   _______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

      Petitioner JGQ, a Mexican citizen, seeks review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ final order upholding the Immigration Judge’s denial of his applications for

withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §

      *
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not
binding precedent.
1231(b)(3)(A), and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”),

adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 86 (entered into force

in United States Nov. 20, 1994). Because the BIA and IJ applied the correct legal

standards and their decisions are supported by substantial evidence, we will deny the

petition for review.

I.     DISCUSSION 1

       On appeal, JGQ claims he is entitled to relief because his membership in the

particular social group (“PSG”) gay men who are HIV-positive would subject him to

persecution and torture if removed to Mexico. 2 Because JGQ did not offer evidence of

past persecution, he had the burden to show a “clear probability” of future persecution on

account of his PSG, Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 505 (3d Cir. 2011), and that the

persecution would be committed through the government’s “act or omission,” Galeas

Figueroa v. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 77, 86 (3d Cir. 2021), or “by forces the government is

unable or unwilling to control,” Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 591 (3d

1
 This Court has jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1). We review legal determinations de novo and will uphold factual findings
supported by “substantial evidence.” Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582,
590 (3d Cir. 2011). Where, as here, “‘the BIA’s opinion directly states that the BIA is
deferring to the IJ, or invokes specific aspects of the IJ’s analysis and factfinding in
support of the BIA’s conclusions,’” we review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions.
Thalayan v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 132, 137 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Udin v. Att’y Gen.,
870 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 2017)).
2
 The IJ also rejected JGQ’s asylum claim because he failed to file a timely application.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D). JGQ did not challenge that determination before the
BIA, nor does he do so here, so that issue is forfeited. See United States v. DeMichael,
461 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2006).
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Cir. 2011). Likewise, to establish eligibility for CAT protection, he had to show a

likelihood that he would be tortured upon removal by the government or with its

acquiescence. Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003); 8 C.F.R.

§§ 208.16(c)(2), 208.18(a)(1).

       As the deficits in JGQ’s claim for withholding of removal apply to his CAT claim

as well, we will focus on his arguments in the former context before addressing them

briefly in the latter.

       A. Withholding of Removal

       JGQ raises three arguments concerning the denial of his application for

withholding of removal. None is persuasive.

       First, he contends that the IJ and BIA failed to evaluate the likelihood that he will

be persecuted directly by the Mexican government, but the record proves otherwise. In

considering whether JGQ faced a clear probability of direct government persecution, the

IJ specifically examined whether “the government is actively discriminating on people

due to their sexual orientation,” A.R. 66, and whether “the harm is coming directly from

the government,” A.R. 64. She also acknowledged reports of “involvement by police,

military and other government officials” in “violence targeting . . . lesbian, gay, bisexual,

transgender, and intersex persons.” A.R. 64 (citing A.R.238, U.S. Dep’t of State, Human

Rights Report for Mexico 2019 (2020) (“DOS Report”), 74).

       At the same time, however, she considered the significant evidence in the record

of state protections for sexual minorities, including anti-discrimination laws, marriage

equality guarantees in Mexico City and ten states, and provisions forbidding sexual

                                              3
orientation discrimination in the constitutions of twenty of the nation’s thirty-one states.

And based on that evidence, the IJ found that the government itself was not

“discriminating on people due to their sexual orientation; rather, it appears to be taking

steps to combat these issues.” A.R. 66. Given the substantial evidence on which that

finding rested, the BIA concluded “there [wa]s no legal or clear factual error in this

determination,” A.R. 3, and we cannot say on this record that “‘any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,’” Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663

F.3d at 590 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

       Second, JGQ claims that the IJ’s analysis of the government’s willingness or

ability to control private actors was faulty because it did not account for police

complicity. Yet the IJ expressly acknowledged that “there is mistreatment and

discrimination against individuals due to their sexual orientation … in Mexico” by

private groups and, in some instances, by police officers. A.R. 64 (citing A.R. 238, DOS

Report at 74). It simply found, in view of the government’s significant “steps to combat

some of the issues that individual may face due to their sexual orientation,” A.R. 65, that

the record as a whole did not establish a likelihood that JGQ would be subject to

persecution by forces the government was unwilling or unable to control.

       While JGQ urges a contrary conclusion based on Doe v. Attorney General, 956

F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2020), we agree with the BIA that this case is distinguishable. A.R. 2.

In Doe, we determined that the Ghanian government was unwilling or unable to protect

LGBT people, in part because of the police’s record of harassing or intimidating them, id.

at 146–48, but the record in that case was “replete with evidence that Ghanian law

                                              4
deprives gay men … of any meaningful recourse to government protection,” id. at 147.

Here, in contrast, the record is replete with the evidence catalogued by the IJ that the

Mexican government is working to combat anti-LGBT discrimination. Because “a

reasonable factfinder could agree with [that] determination,” the IJ’s determination was

supported by substantial evidence, and the BIA did not err in upholding it. Thalayan v.

Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 132, 143 (3d Cir. 2021).

       Third, JGQ maintains that the IJ overlooked relevant evidence of the government’s

inability or unwillingness to prevent violence against LGBT people. Petitioner’s Br. 21–

22, 33. But the IJ and BIA are “not required to write an exegesis on every contention, but

only to show that [they have] reviewed the record and grasped the movant’s claims.”

Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002). And here, the IJ’s careful

discussion of many of the sources submitted by JGQ, coupled with her recognition that

JGQ had submitted “other articles” describing discrimination against LGBT people in

Mexico, satisfies us that she fulfilled this obligation. A.R. 86. At bottom, JGQ’s

argument appears to be that the IJ gave insufficient weight to certain parts of the record,

but “[t]he substantial-evidence standard does not permit this Court to re-weigh evidence,”

Thalayan, 997 F.3d at 143, and that standard is met here.

       B. Protection Under CAT

       JGQ makes similar arguments as to why the IJ and BIA erred in rejecting his CAT

claim, but they also lack support in the record. JGQ offered no evidence that he had

endured past torture or attempted to relocate to a safer location within Mexico, see 8

C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3), and, after weighing the record in its entirety, the IJ reasonably

                                                5
determined that he was not likely to be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of

the government. Given the government’s efforts to combat anti-LGBT discrimination,

which the IJ recounted at length, the BIA did not err in concluding that determination was

legally sound and was supported by substantial evidence, A.R. 9.

I.    CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we will deny JGQ’s petition for review.

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