Court Opinion

ID: 9488969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:01:11.450128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:13.351502
License: Public Domain

PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The district court’s rulings of both obviousness and inequitable conduct depend on the court’s application of the law of derivation, 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). The district court found that the prior art lacks a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references that are necessary to make the invention obvious,1 and then erroneously invoked § 102(f) to provide that motivation. The panel majority finds “motivation” simply in its observation that raw and fully cooked waffle-cut potatoes existed in the prior art, apparently holding that the mere thickness of these known products as compared with potato chips is the “motivation” that made obvious the invention of a previously unknown product, as described in claims 1 and 4 of the patent in suit.2 The panel majority holds that this new product would have been obvious, despite the failure of the industry to have produced it, the several years of experimentation and development incurred by Lamb-Weston, and the absence of teaching or suggestion in the prior art as to what to make and how to make it. Lamb-Weston’s recognition of the potential of its proposed new product is not the teaching, suggestion, or motivation that precedent requires. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050-51, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (Fed.Cir.) (the prior art must contain the suggestion to make the specific combination that is claimed), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825, *547109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed.2d 51 (1988); In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 688, 2 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 (Fed.Cir.1987) (obviousness is not established by combining the teachings of the prior art “absent some teaching, suggestion, or incentive supporting the combination.”). Indeed, the long existence of raw and fully cooked waffle-cut potatoes if anything weighs against the obviousness of producing such a product in partially Med and frozen form. Commercial success, failure of others, and copying, are all evidence of unobviousness, not obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684, 693-94, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966); Cooper v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 677, 679, 223 USPQ 1286, 1287 (Fed.Cir.1984).
A. Recognition of the Value of a New Product is not a “Motivation” in the Prior Art
It is undisputed that raw and cooked waffle-cut potatoes have long been known. It is also undisputed that the prior art does not show partially Med and frozen waffle-cut potatoes, capable of reconstitution to provide a mixture of tastes and textures as described in the ’084 patent. On reconstitution the thinnest regions at the edges of the grid openings are described as tasting like crisp potato chips, the thickest regions like thick-cut french Med potatoes, and the intermediate regions like shoestring potatoes.
On reconstitution the product must be cooked all the way through, not raw on the inside; it must be mealy, not greasy, limp, or starchy; and it must be crisp yet not caramelized (burnt) on the thinnest portions. There was testimony that the greater the contrast between the thickest and thinnest portions in the waffle cut, the more uncertain the successful production of a partially Med and frozen product that can be successfully reconstituted.
The prior art shows waffle-cut potatoes, raw and fully cooked; the prior art shows thin lattice-cut potato chips; and the prior art shows partially Med and frozen potatoes, generally in the french-fry shape. The novelty of the claimed product is not disputed. The PTO Board has recognized that for a combination of prior art references to render an invention obvious, “[t]here must be some reason, suggestion, or motivation found in the prior art whereby a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention would make the combination.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1446 (Fed.Cir.1992). The Board correctly declined to reason backward from the Lamb-Weston invention and allowed the claims, explaining that “the examiner has not established the requisite motivation which would have led one having ordinary skill in the art to modify the primary references [lattice shaped sliced potatoes] by preparing a frozen potato product.” No ensuing information has materially affected this reasoning.

B. The District Court Recognized the Absence of Suggestion to Combine Prior Art References

The district court had a more extensive collection of prior art than was before the patent office, but within the same two groups of subject matter. In one group were the waffle-cut potatoes, raw and cooked, and assorted devices to aid in cutting this shape. Several machines had been devised in attempts to mechanize the cutting, including those of Messrs. Matsler and Jayne, although none produced a waffle-cut slice thicker than six millimeters, or 0.236 inch.
The other group of prior art references showed partially Med and frozen potatoes. Several manufacturers made such products, particularly in french-fry shape. Lamb-Weston’s witnesses, including persons employed by Lamb-Weston’s competitors, testified as to the technologic problems caused by the varying thicknesses of the waffle-cut potato. Witnesses pointed out the difficulties in producing a partially Med and frozen product that would on reconstitution be fully cooked and pleasant tasting in its thickest parts without being burnt or unpleasant in taste or texture in any other parts. Witnesses testified that it required several years of work for Lamb-Weston to achieve such a product. An employee of a competitor (Simplot) testified that
it was very difficult to control the textures. The laboratory people had put in a lot of time and effort into trying to understand *548the blanching times, frying times, and process parameters in general, to come up with a product that would even be acceptable to our standards of a product going into the food service marketplace.
It was not challenged that Lamb-Weston conducted extensive experimentation in the course of developing the patented product. Several competitors had seen and tested the Matsler and Jayne machines and products, but none had made the invention made by Lamb-Weston. The failure of others to do what the patentee achieved is strong evidence of nonobviousness. Uniroyal Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley, Corp., 837 F.2d at 1054, 5 USPQ2d at 1440-41; see W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553, 220 USPQ 303, 313 (Fed.Cir.1983) (objective considerations serve “as insurance against the insidious attraction of the siren hindsight”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851, 105 S.Ct. 172, 83 L.Ed.2d 107 (1984); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538, 218 USPQ 871, 879 (Fed.Cir.1983) (“Evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence [of nonobviousness] in the record.”)
The district court recognized, as had the Board, that the prior art contained no teaching, suggestion, or motivation to select from the two groups of references in the way that would produce the product described and claimed in the ’084 patent. However, the district court found such “motivation” in the machines of Messrs. Matsler and Jayne. The district court did not find that Mr. Matsler or Mr. Jayne knew or taught how to make the partially fried/frozen waffle-cut potatoes of the ’084 patent. However, the district court found that the Matsler and Jayne machines and their known waffle-cut product were prior art for the purpose of “derivation” under § 102(f),3 and that when combined with the other prior art they filled the gap in the § 103 obviousness determination. In this the district court erred, for even if the disclosure of these machines and their product spurred Lamb-Weston into action, inspiration or spur is not a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to combine selected references in a specific way to make a specifically detailed new product.
To defeat patentability based on obviousness, the suggestion to make the new product having the claimed characteristics must come from the prior art, not from the hindsight knowledge of the invention that was made by Lamb-Weston. See Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1143, 227 USPQ 543, 551 (Fed.Cir.1985):
When prior art references require selective combination by the court to render obvious a subsequent invention, there must be some reason for the combination other than the hindsight gleaned from the invention itself. There must be “something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combination.”
(citing ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 & n. 14, 221 USPQ 929, 933 & n. 14 (Fed.Cir.1984), and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1462, 221 USPQ 481, 488 (Fed.Cir. 1984)).
The district court found that Lamb-Weston received an idea from Matsler and Jayne that “when combined with the relevant prior art and the ordinary level of skill in the art, renders the claimed invention obvious,” the court holding the patent invalid under § 102(f) combined with § 103. Lamb-Weston, 818 F.Supp. at 1388. The district court held that “[t]he derived information constitutes prior art under Section 102(f) even if it is secret, has not been reduced to practice, or is abandoned.” Id. That is not a correct general statement, for secret or abandoned knowledge is not prior art.4 Derived knowledge can indeed be invalidating, but it is not *549properly described as “prior art,” which is defined as actual or presumed public knowledge. In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 223 USPQ 603 (Fed.Cir.1984), the court explained that prior art in patent law is knowledge that is available to the public:
[I]t has been unusual that opinions have explained the real reason for the denial of patent rights, which is the basic principle (to which there are minor exceptions) that no patent should be granted which withdraws from the public domain technology already available to the public. It is available, in legal theory at least, when it is described in the world’s accessible literature, including patents, or has been publicly known or in the public use or on sale “in this country.” 35 USC § 102(a) and (b). That is the real meaning of “prior art” in legal theory — it is knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious from it, at a given time, to a person of ordinary skill in an art.
Id. at 1453, 223 USPQ at 614 (citations omitted). Thus 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) define prior art as what is known in the literature or deemed to be publicly available through use or sale, and § 102(e) establishes an inference of public knowledge of an issued patent as of its filing date. Sections 102(c), (d), (f), and (g) state additional conditions of patentability, and serve different purposes than do the prior art provisions.
Section § 102(f) relates to “derivation,” the taking of the invention of another and patenting it as one’s own. It is irrelevant whether or not that invention is also prior art. As explained in In re Bass, § 102(f) relates to originality, that “one who ‘did not himself invent the subject matter’ (ie., he did not originate it) has no right to a patent on it.” In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290, 59 CCPA 1342, 177 USPQ 178, 189 (1973) (legislatively modified on other grounds). The court explained in Bass that § 102(f) has “no relation to § 103 and no relevancy to what is ‘prior art’ under § 103.” 474 F.2d at 1290, 177 USPQ at 189. As summarized in 2 Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 5.03[3][e][vi][B] (Eel. 55 1995):
A few decisions by lower courts and the Board of Appeals view specific derived knowledge as prior art under [§ 102(f)], but neither the Federal Circuit nor its two predecessor courts ... has so held.
Thus § 102(f) prohibits the patenting of an invention made by someone else. However, the district court did not find that Mr. Matsler or Mr. Jayne invented the subject matter of the ’084 patent. Their communication to Lamb-Weston was a machine and its product. The product was already known to the art. There is no allegation that Lamb-Weston obtained a patent on subject matter that “he did not himself invent,” Bass, supra. A patented invention is not “derived” from another person unless that other person was in possession of the invention.
Accepting for the purpose of this discussion that Messrs. Matsler and Jayne spurred Lamb-Weston’s interest in developing the patented product, § 102(f) is not concerned with inspiration or spur. Whatever the relationship between Lamb-Weston and Mr. Matsler or Mr. Jayne, invalidity based on derivation requires that the patentee, in the words of the statute, did not invent the subject matter that was patented. The district court erred in holding that in accordance with § 102(f) the Matsler and Jayne machines and products filled the gap in the teachings of the prior art by motivating Lamb-Weston to make the invention described in the ’084 patent. As I have discussed, a commercial motivation is not a technologic suggestion to combine reference teachings. The panel majority similarly errs, although without reliance on § 102(f), in holding that the known waffle-cut potatoes produced on the Matsler and Jayne machines provided the motivation to make the invention of the ’084 patent.5

*550
C. This Court’s Incorrect New Criterion of Obviousness

Although it was apparent to the Board, and indeed to the district court, that the ’084 invention would not have been obvious from the prior art, the majority of this panel holds that the existence of waffle-cut potatoes, which had been known for many decades, “creates the motivation to combine” the prior art references. The panel majority finds this motivation in “the knowledge and use of waffle fries sold in the 1930s,” and states that “The evidence of prior use and sale of waffle fries, in addition to the Matsler and Jayne potato slices, provides sufficient motivation to combine the known waffle-cut shape and the parfry cooking method of the Strong Patent.” That is, the panel majority holds that the prior existence of raw and fully cooked waffle-cut potatoes provided the motivation to combine previously uncombined references to make the new parfried frozen product under the selected conditions described and claimed in the ’084 patent.
The Federal Circuit has attempted to set a uniform standard whereby the teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art information must itself come from the knowledge in the prior art. The concept of a new product is not the “motivation” that negates patentability. That inventors hope to profit from their invention is irrelevant to the determination of obviousness. The motivation to which precedent is directed is that which would make obvious the technologic advance, not the motivation to achieve a competitive advantage.

D. Inequitable Conduct

The district court held that there was inequitable conduct because Lamb-Weston did not tell the patent examiner of the Matsler and Jayne machines and their product, which the district court viewed as prior art under § 102(f). This position was incorrect, as I have discussed, and the district court’s holding of -inequitable conduct should be reversed.

Summary

The PTO Board held that there was no suggestion in the prior art to combine the prior art references to make the claimed product. The district court agreed, but found such suggestion in Messrs. Matsler and Jayne’s unsuccessful machines and known potato product, holding that these were prior art under § 102(f). The panel majority finds the motivation to combine pri- or art references in the existence of the known waffle-cut potato and in the potential commercial value of the patented invention. I respectfully, but with concern, dissent from this court’s departure from the laws of § 102(f) and § 103.

. Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 1376 (E.D.Wash.1993) and Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Inc., No. CV-90-3082AAM (E.D.Wash. Oct. 6, 1993) (final judgment).

. Claims 1 and 4 are as follows:
1. A parfried'potato product, suitable for reconstitution by cooking, comprising:
a frozen, sliced potato section having a substantially ellipsoidal shape and a variable thickness, including a peak to peak thickness within the range of about 4/i6 to l%6 inch;
the section including opposed first and second sides, each side having longitudinal ridges and grooves therebetween, the ridges and grooves of the first side extending angularly to the ridges and grooves of the second side;
the grooves of the first and second sides having a depth sufficient to intersect one another to form a grid of openings in the potato section;
the section, before reconstitution, having an oil content of about 6-20%, by weight, and a solids content of about 32-40%, by weight;
whereby the product, upon reconstitution by cooking, is characterized by very thin, crisp portions of locally increased oil flavor adjacent the openings, relatively thick portions defined by intersecting ridges having an internal mealy texture and strong potato flavor similar to thick-cut french fried potato strips, and portions of intermediate thickness whose characteristics are similar to french fried shoe string potato strips.
4. The product of claim 1 wherein the peak-to-peak thickness is about inch.

. 35 U.S.C. § 102. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.

. Except for the condition stated in 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) whereby, upon issuance of a patent, the filing date is deemed its effective date for prior art purposes, despite the secrecy of pending patent applications. If the patent application does not issue (and is not referred to in an issued patent) its content remains secret and does not become prior art.

. The panel majority cites by footnote the second paragraph of § 103 as "authority” for the proposition that § 102(f) information is prior art. The cited provision was added to § 103 in 1984, to facilitate team research by precluding the citation of the work of one team member as prior art against the invention of another. See Section by Section Analysis, 130 Cong.Rec. H10525, HI 0527 (Oct 1, 1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5833. The majority also cites Dale Elect, v. R.C.L. Elect., 488 F.2d 382, 180 USPQ 225 (1st. Cir.1973), which states broadly *550that all of § 102 qualifies as prior art, an oversimplification never endorsed by the Federal Circuit. Nor does the partial quotation from Chi-sum, or the usage in New England Braiding, advance consideration of the matter. Should there indeed be the conflict proposed by the panel majority our obligation is to resolve it, particularly because of the incorrect application of § 102(f) by the district court as reported at 818 F.Supp. 1376. Further, the panel majority inappropriately intermingles its § 102(f) analysis with the issue of confidentiality.