Court Opinion

ID: 9394143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 15:00:23.075984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.530371
License: Public Domain

21-6269
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                            Golovnin, IJ
                                                                           A216 385 102

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of May, two thousand twenty-
 4   three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
 8              WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
 9              SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   JAI SINGH,
14             Petitioner,
15
16                      v.                                       21-6269
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                    Anas J. Ahmed, Esq., Pannun the Firm, P.C.,
 2                                      Jackson Heights, NY.
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 5                                      General; Daniel E. Goldman, Senior Litigation
 6                                      Counsel, Todd J. Cochran, Trial Attorney,
 7                                      Office of Immigration Litigation, United
 8                                      States Department of Justice, Washington,
 9                                      DC.

10         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

11   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

12   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

13         Petitioner Jai Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of an April

14   13, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming a December 6, 2018, decision of an

15   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

16   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jai Singh, No. A216 385 102

17   (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2021), aff’g No. A216 385 102 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 6, 2018).

18   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural

19   history.

20         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan

21   Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s legal

22   conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Y.C. v.

                                             2
 1   Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are

 2   conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

 3   the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 4         Singh challenges the agency’s conclusion that he could safely relocate

 5   within India to avoid persecution by the Congress Party on account of his support

 6   for the Shiromani Akali Dal Mann Amritsar Party (“SADA”). Where, as here, an

 7   IJ determines that an asylum applicant has established past persecution, the

 8   applicant is presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution. See

 9   8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). “That presumption may be rebutted” where an IJ finds

10   that “[t]he applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part

11   of the applicant’s country . . . and under all the circumstances, it would be

12   reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). 1 Where an

13   applicant has established past persecution, the Government has the burden to

14   show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the applicant can safely

15   relocate. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii). Factors affecting the reasonableness of relocation

16   include “whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of

     1Citations are to the version of the regulations in effect at the time of Singh’s
     proceedings before the agency.
                                            3
 1   suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative,

 2   economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and

 3   cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties.” Id.

 4   § 1208.13(b)(3).

 5         Singh testified that members of the Congress Party attacked him twice

 6   because of his membership in the SADA, and that the local police refused to accept

 7   his complaint when he tried to report the first attack.       Substantial evidence

 8   supports the agency’s conclusion that Singh, who is originally from Punjab, could

 9   safely relocate to Delhi.

10         Singh argues that the agency erred in finding that he could relocate because

11   he testified credibly that he believed the police in Delhi would look at his ID card

12   and notify the Congress Party, and that when he previously lived in Delhi he never

13   went out because he felt that it was not safe. However, Singh’s subjective beliefs

14   on these issues did not preclude the Government from demonstrating with

15   objective evidence that Singh could safely relocate.          Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii).

16   Moreover, the record contains objective evidence to support safe relocation. A

17   Library of Congress report concluded that Sikhs from Punjab can safely relocate

18   in India so long as the individual is not of interest to the central authorities, and

                                              4
 1   that only high-profile militants would be at risk of persecution following

 2   relocation.   See Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 206–08, 211–15.

 3   Singh was not a high-ranking member in SADA. Singh was attacked by members

 4   of a political party, not government authorities or officials; he was never attacked

 5   by the police or by members of any party other than the Congress Party. See Singh

 6   v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 115 (2d Cir. 2021) (“An applicant’s allegation that he was

 7   persecuted by members of a political party—even one that is in power nationally

 8   or . . . is aligned with a party in power nationally—does not establish that the

 9   applicant was persecuted by the government.”). Singh agreed that the Congress

10   Party was not in power in Delhi (a city of then more than 16 million), and there

11   was no objective evidence that showing identification to local authorities in Delhi

12   would provide means for Congress Party members to track him. See CAR at 211–

13   15 (Library of Congress report), 216 (population). We have considered Singh’s

14   remaining arguments and find them without merit.

15         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

16   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

17                                         FOR THE COURT:
18                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
19                                         Clerk of Court

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