Court Opinion

ID: 9483604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:25:56.852871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:43.302265
License: Public Domain

BRORBY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The district court’s factual findings can only be reversed if they are found to be clearly erroneous. United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1409 (10th Cir.1992). The evidence on appeal must be viewed in the light most favorable to the district court findings. Id. Nothing in the record persuasively suggests the district court’s findings of fact are in error.
The district court, in its factual findings, stated as follows:
Richard W. Laboy, an 18 year old black man, was walking northward on the west side of Washington Street. Mr. Laboy looked over to the parking lot behind the apartment complex and saw the three black men against the wall with Detective Quinones standing out in front of them and looking across Washington Street. Mr. Laboy and Detective Qui-nones made eye contact and acknowledged each other’s presence with head nods. Detective Quinones then waived [sic] to signal Mr. Laboy that he should come over to Detective Quinones. Mr. Laboy walked across the street and came up to within about ten feet of Detective Quinones, a total distance of about 100 feet.
... Mr. Laboy testified that it was obvious to him that the three black men lined up against the wall were under arrest and that he, too, was being arrested when Detective Quinones waved him over.
Findings, Conclusions and Order at 1-2 (emphasis added).
■ The majority set forth the controlling law when it cited Florida v. Bostick, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), and framed the inquiry as whether the totality of the circumstances constituted a show of authority sufficient to make a reasonable person believe that she or he was not free to leave.1
The majority sets forth a nonexclusive list of factors courts have used in conducting their analysis of whether or not the police officer’s actions were inherently coercive and found none of the factors present.- The majority ignores the fact that the police officer demonstratively signaled Mr. Laboy to come to his presence. Given our society’s propensity to obey the reasonable requests of police officers, I believe common sense is ignored by holding the actions of the police officer in signaling Mr. Laboy to cross the street and appear in front of the officer were not inherently coercive.
A nonverbal hand signal ordering a person to cross a street and travel 100 feet to the police officer’s presence would not lead a reasonable person to believe he or she was free to ignore the police officer’s directives and questions.
I would add to the list of factors to be utilized in analyzing the question of whether or not a police officer’s actions are coercive, the conduct of the police officer including the nonverbal commands issued by the police officer. Applying this factor to the analysis, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. I disagree with the majority’s classification of the Bostick inquiry as to whether a reasonable person feels free to leave. More accurately, the Supreme Court frames the standard as whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Bostick, — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2384. In this case, however, the distinction is irrelevant.