Court Opinion

ID: 9499032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:35:54.877289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:14.538600
License: Public Domain

BERZON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I would grant the petition and remand for further consideration.
The Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision, summarily affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), held that Zehatye did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution sufficient for asylum eligibility. That conclusion was based on clear errors regarding some facts in the record and complete disregard of others. For these reasons, it should not stand.
In Tukhowinich v. INS, 64 F.3d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir.1995), we granted the petition for review where the IJ failed to address a number of factors, pertinent to the merits of a suspension of deportation determination, including evidence introduced by the petitioner as to the political conditions in her native country. In that case, we stated that “[w]hen important aspects of the individual claim are distorted or disregarded, denial of relief is arbitrary. Without prescribing any final result, we must remand such cases for proper consideration.” Id. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted). Other circuits have taken the same approach. See Tan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir.2006) (granting a petition for review where the IJ failed to acknowledge the Country Reports and newspaper articles submitted by the petitioner and “misstated the contents of the record”); Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 272-75 (2d Cir.2005) (granting a petition for review where the BIA failed to consider evidence in the country conditions report that corroborated petitioner’s account of persecution, stating “[w]here the immigration court fails to consider important evidence supporting a petitioner’s claim, we are deprived of the ability adequately to review the claim and must vacate the decision and remand for further proceedings” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *1191Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 123-24 (1st Cir.2004) (vacating a decision of the BIA and remanding for reconsideration where the BIA failed to mention the background and country conditions evidence offered by the petitioner which, even on “a quick look,” would support the petitioner’s claim of persecution); Chen v. U.S. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir.2004) (“[W]here the agency’s determination is based on an inaccurate perception of the record, omitting potentially significant facts, we may remand for reconsideration or rehearing....”); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 477-78 (3d Cir.2003) (remanding for reconsideration where the BIA mischaracterized the country reports and “cavalierly dismissed the substantial documentation” contained therein); Palavra v. INS, 287 F.3d 690, 693-94 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the BIA “failed to perform its fact-finding function” when it failed to discuss supporting evidence in the record, and remanding for reconsideration, stating “[w]hen an agency finds a fact without mentioning or analyzing significant evidence, the agency needs to reconsider its decision”).
As these cases make clear, the substantial evidence standard does not insulate from review an IJ’s decision that cherry-picks from the administrative record only those facts that would cast doubt on a petitioner’s claim, while misstating or failing to acknowledge the existence of those facts that would lend support to an account of persecution. See Shah v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 446 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir.2006) (“[W]e [do not] expect [an immigration] judge to selectively consider evidence, ignoring that evidence that corroborates an alien’s claims and calls into question the conclusion the judge is attempting to reach.”). Here there were several material misstatements or omissions that, in my view, necessitate a remand.
First, the IJ emphasized that the only indication that Zehatye was slated for conscription was that her name appeared on a list issued by the Kebele, a local government organization. In his oral decision, the IJ stated: “The names of individuals residing in the Kebele are normally maintained by the Kebele but not necessarily for military purposes or for recruitment purposes. The respondent maintains that her name was on this list in 1998 and that meant that she was subject to recruitment for national service in Eritrea as a result of the hostilities.” The IJ further remarked: “The closest this respondent ever got to a national service was, according to her testimony, her name on a list in a kebele in Asmara.”
That is simply not so. Zehatye testified — in testimony that, as the majority agrees, must be deemed credible — that the police came to her home and ordered her to prepare to report for military duty, and that neighbors informed her that the police were planning to take her into custody the very night she fled Eritrea. So the premise for the IJ’s conclusion that she was unlikely to be faced with the need to refuse conscription because of her religious beliefs were she to return to Eritrea is just wrong.
Further, although the majority correctly states that forced conscription, even in the face of religious objections to service, is not necessarily persecution on a proscribed ground, the case law in both our circuit and our sister circuits confirms that discriminatory treatment based on the religion of those who refuse conscription is persecution on a proscribed ground. See Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1116, 1120 (7th Cir.2004) (“When a country subjects a draft evader to more serious punishment than others who have also evaded service because of his race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion, *1192this amounts to persecution rather than simple nationalism.”); Mekhoukh v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 118, 126 (1st Cir.2004) (stating that disproportionately severe punishment on account of protected ground for failure to submit can support claim of asylum); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that religious conscientious objectors could establish persecution claim provided that they could demonstrate that they were selected for mistreatment for their religious beliefs); Barraza Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1450-51 (9th Cir.1990) (relying on United Nations publication for proposition that “punishment for desertion or draft evasion, in itself, does not constitute persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion ... [b]ut disproportionately severe punishment on account of any of these factors does constitute persecution”); see also In re A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502, 506 (BIA 1987) (“We hold to the long-accepted position that it is not persecution for a country to require military service of its citizens. Exceptions to this rule may be recognized in those rare cases where a disproportionately severe punishment would result on account of one of the five grounds enumerated in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act .... ” (citations omitted)), aff'd sub nom. M.A. v. U.S. INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc).
Indeed, the case the majority relies upon for the proposition that a country’s decision to require military service does not amount to persecution states that “forced conscription or punishment for evasion of military duty generally does not constitute persecution on account of a protected ground.” Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir.2005) (emphasis added). Two sentences after that statement, however, Movsisian recognizes the exception to the general rule, noting that, in that case, the petitioner presented “no evidence that the Armenian government would target him for conscription or punishment on account of his religion or other protected ground.” Id. (citing Canas-Segovia, 970 F.2d at 601). Accordingly, Movsisian militates in favor of a finding of persecution where, as here, the petitioner’s testimony, coupled with ample supporting evidence in the administrative record, confirms that her refusal to submit to military service could be met with disproportionate punishment because her objection was premised on her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness.
The IJ cites a denial by the Eritrean government that such discrimination occurs, but disregards specific confirmation in the same United States governmental publication containing that denial, the 2002 International Religious Freedom Report for Eritrea, that differential treatment with regard to refusal to participate in national service does occur. That publication states:
Most members of Jehovah’s Witnesses have refused on religious grounds to participate in national service or to vote, which has led to widespread criticism that members of Jehovah’s Witnesses collectively were shirking their civic duty. Some Muslims also have objected to universal national service because of the requirement that women perform military duty. The Government does not excuse individuals who object to national service for religious reasons or reasons of conscience, nor does the Government allow alternative service. Although persons from other religious groups, including Muslims, reportedly have been punished in past years for failure to participate in national service, only members of Jehovah’s Witnesses have been subject to dismissal from the civil service, revocation their trading licenses, eviction from government-owned housing, and denial of passports, identity cards, and exit visas. However, there *1193were no reports that Jehovah’s Witnesses who performed national service and participated in the national independence referendum were subject to discrimination.
There is no indication that any persons are detained or imprisoned solely because of their religious beliefs or practices; however, the Government has singled out members of Jehovah’s Witnesses for harsher treatment than that received by members of other faiths for similar actions. At the end of the period covered by this report, four members of Jehovah’s Witnesses remained in detention without charge and without being tried for failing to participate in national service. The individuals have been detained for varying periods of time, some for more than 5 years. The maximum penalty for refusing to do national service is 3 years. Ministry of Justice officials have denied that any members of Jehovah’s Witnesses were in detention without charges, although they acknowledge that some members of Jehovah’s Witnesses and a number of Muslims were in jail serving sentences for convictions on charges of evading national service.
The army resorted to various forms of extreme physical punishment to force objectors, including some members of Jehovah’s Witnesses, to perform military service.
U.S. Dep’t Of State, Eritrea: International Religious Freedom Report 2002 (Oct. 7, 2002) (hereinafter “Religious Freedom Report”) (emphasis added). The State Department’s 2002 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Eritrea, also a part of the administrative record in this case, contains substantially similar evidence of the treatment suffered by Jehovah’s Witnesses at the hands of the Eritrean government for failing to submit to military service, including indefinite detention and “extreme physical punishment.” See U.S. Dep’t Of State, Eritrea: Country Reports On Human Rights Practices 2002 (Mar. 31, 2003) (hereinafter “Country Report”). The IJ did not mention this very specific information in United States government documents, reciting instead the claim by the Eritrean Ministry of Justice to the contrary' — that no Jehovah’s Witnesses were in detention without charge for evading national service.1
At a minimum, we cannot evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence regarding whether Zehatye’s fear of future persecution was well-founded unless we know why the IJ chose to disregard detailed, on-point statements in U.S. Government-authored reports in favor of a self-interested denial by the Eritrean government. I would therefore hold that the IJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir.2006) (“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Country Report also dispels any notion that the standard “punishment” for draft evasion could be considered to be simple law enforcement. “During the year, the police severely mistreated and beat army deserters and draft evaders. *1194The police subjected deserters and draft evaders to various military disciplinary actions that included prolonged sun exposure in temperatures of up to 113 degrees Fahrenheit or the tying of the hands and feet for extended periods of time.” Moreover, although the economic deprivation Zehatye complains of likely does not rise to the level of persecution by itself, see Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir.2004), both the Country Report and Religious Freedom Report lend substantial credibility to her story that her family suffered economic discrimination at the hands of the Eritrean government on account of their religious beliefs. When this propensity to disadvantage Jehovah’s Witnesses is coupled with the punishment generally imposed for failing to take up arms, I believe she has demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution on a proscribed ground.
The Seventh Circuit has recently held in a strikingly similar case that the evidence contained in the 2003 Country Report and Religious Freedom Report for Eritrea as to the persecution suffered by Jehovah’s Witnesses in Eritrea, particularly with regard to punishment for refusing conscription, was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could determine that the petitioner lacked a well-founded fear of persecution. See Ghebremedhin, 385 F.3d at 1119-20. Citing the same language contained in the 2002 Country Report and Religious Freedom Report submitted in Zehatye’s case, the Seventh Circuit held that the IJ’s denial of asylum was not supported by substantial evidence because of Eritrea’s predilection to incarcerate, occasionally indefinitely, Jehovah’s Witnesses who refuse to serve in the military for religious reasons, and the observation that Jehovah’s Witnesses are singled out “for harsher treatment.” Id. at 1120. I agree with the Seventh Circuit. Seeing no practical difference between Ms. Zehatye’s claim and that of the petitioner in Ghebremedhin,2 I would grant the petition for review.
I add one further note: The attitude of some IJs to the asylum seekers and others who appear before them has become the subject of national attention recently. See Memorandum from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Jan. 9, 2006) (noting with concern that recent reports have indicated that some immigration judges “fail to treat aliens appearing before them with appropriate respect and considerations” and acknowledging that the conduct of some immigration judges “can aptly be described as intemperate or even abusive”); see also Cham v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir.2006) (“The case now before us exemplifies the severe wound ... inflicted when not a modicum of courtesy, of respect, or of any pretense of fairness is extended to a petitioner and the case he so valiantly attempted to present.” (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir.2005) (“[T]he adjudication of [immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”), Wang v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir.2005) (“The tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ seem more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court proceeding.”), Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir.2005) (“Both the decision issued by the IJ and her conduct of the hearing demonstrate that the IJ did not conduct herself *1195as an impartial judge but rather as a prosecutor anxious to pick holes in the petitioner’s story.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The overall tone of Immigration Judge Brian Simpson’s opinion in this case is such that I can have no confidence in his factual findings. His opinion is belittling and patronizing as well as inaccurate, even as to less material details.
For example, Judge Simpson suggested — but did not hold — that Zehatye’s entire story is suspect because women may not be conscripted in Eritrea: “The respondent claims that she was threatened with national service and the Court cannot find that that is inherently unworthy of belief, although it has very little information with regard to the extent to which females are required to perform national service and what happened to them if they refused.” Yet, the Country Report contained in the administrative record makes quite clear that women in Eritrea are in fact conscripted, and subject to detention for failure to report: “The law requires women between the ages of 18 and 40 to participate in national service. During the year there were increased efforts to detain women draft evaders and deserters.” (internal cross-references omitted). The Country Report goes on to note:
During the year, the Government deployed military police throughout the country using roadblocks, street sweeps, and house-to-house searches to find deserters and draft evaders. The military police detained persons who had not completed their national service requirement, and those who had evaded previous drafts. There was a general public perception that these round-ups were directed particularly at female draftees.
(internal cross-references omitted).
In addition, Judge Simpson’s discussion of Zehatye’s residence in Ethiopia, where she lived after fleeing Eritrea borders, to say the least, on the illogical, as well as on the intemperate. He first expressed doubts about why Zehatye would seek refuge in neighboring Ethiopia: “Why, therefore, this respondent should have chosen to leave Eritrea for Ethiopia in 1999 is simply something this Court cannot understand and this respondent, in the Court’s opinion, did not satisfactorily answer the question.” Judge Simpson then answered his own question, quite satisfactorily in my opinion, by detailing Zehatye’s rationale for her flight to Ethiopia, which Judge Simpson noted, is supported by the record: “Her answer was because Jehovah’s Witnesses fared better in terms of their situation vis-a-vis the government of Ethiopia than the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Eritrea. There is some support for that position in terms of the position of the Ethiopian government as indicated in the Country Reports on Ethiopia for 2001.”3 Later on in his oral decision Judge Simpson commented: “The question that begs the answer is what was she doing in Ethiopia at all in 1999, much less why she remained there for two years before going to Kenya? *1196We may never get the answer to these questions.”
The entire discussion on this point is quite simply baffling. We do have the answer to why Zehatye fled to Ethiopia, as Judge Simpson himself noted in his decision a mere eight pages earlier: Jehovah’s Witnesses fared much better in Ethiopia than in neighboring Eritrea. Not only do we have to accept Zehatye’s testimony on this point as credible, we have evidence in the Country Report for Ethiopia to support her account. Judge Simpson’s puzzlement as to Zehatye’s residence in Ethiopia is therefore inexplicable.
As a final example, Judge Simpson was repeatedly critical of Zehatye’s lack of identification documents, which she testified was due to the Eritrean government’s refusal to provide such documentation to members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith. Again, to anyone who read the Country Report, this would come as no surprise, as that publication specifically states: “Jehovah’s Witnesses often were denied identification cards, passports, exit visas, trading licenses, government housing, and government employment unless they hid their religion.”
Judge Simpson’s degree of suspicion of the petitioner with regard to easily confirmable facts, as well as the intemperate manner in which he expressed that suspicion, indicates to me intolerance for the applicant for asylum inconsistent with fair decisionmaking.
I would therefore grant the petition and remand for a new, accurate determination regarding eligibility for asylum, before a different IJ.

. Notwithstanding the majority’s claim that the State Department's 2003 Country Report "does not mention" detention of Jehovah’s Witnesses, that report specifically states that the Eritrean government "continued to harass, detain, and discriminate against the small community of members of Jehovah’s Witnesses because of their refusal, on religious grounds, to vote in the independence referendum or the refusal of some to perform national service." U.S. Dep't Of State, Eritrea: Country Reports On Human Rights Practices 2003 (Feb. 25, 2004).

. The majority suggests that Ghebremedhin is not apposite because in that case, the petitioner had a personal association with individuals who had been persecuted. Ms. Zehatye did as well: She testified that her brother was imprisoned because of his religious beliefs.

. In her testimony before the IJ, Zehatye stated that she left Eritrea for Ethiopia because Jehovah's Witnesses were treated better in Ethiopia where there was "freedom of religion.” Zehatye also testified that although the Ethiopian government was hostile to native Eritreans, it "wouldn't deport” Jehovah’s Witnesses back to Eritrea. This testimony is largely consistent with the State Department Country Report for Ethiopia which states:
"There are more than 6,000 members of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the country. The Government continued its policy of not deporting members of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Eritrean origin, who might face religious repression in Eritrea.” U.S. Dep’t Of State, Ethiopia: Country Reports On Human Rights Practices 2001 (Mar. 4, 2002). The Country Report for Ethiopia also states that the Ethiopian government provided land for Jehovah’s Witnesses outside Addis Ababa. See id.