Court Opinion

ID: 9576618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:26:22.635986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:56.044940
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because I am persuaded that the Nevada Supreme Court did not misapply federal law with respect to sufficiency of the evidence review, I must respectfully dissent.
I
A habeas petitioner “is entitled to habe-as corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (emphasis added).1
After Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781. In conducting the sufficiency of the evidence inquiry, a reviewing court must “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. at 319.
AEDPA adds deference to such inquiry. In Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir.2007), we wrote:
[28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(1) plainly applies to Jackson cases. A state court must decide under Jackson whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. Thus, AEDPA permits habeas relief only if “a state court determination that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction was an “objectively unreasonable” application of Jackson.” Id.
With respect, I am persuaded that the Nevada Supreme Court complied with this standard. Although the state court did not cite Jackson, it noted that “[t]he standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence upon appeal is whether the jury, acting reasonably, could have been convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brown, 934 P.2d at 241. That standard mirrors the Jackson approach, and AEDPA does not require express citation to federal law. See Early *799v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam). The Nevada Supreme Court then reviewed the record and concluded that “a jury, acting reasonably, could have been convinced of Troy’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”:
Testimony indicated that Troy left the bar around 12:15 a.m., that Troy lived relatively close to the bar, and that Troy lived very close to Jane Doe. Troy had enough time to get from the bar to Jane Doe’s house and to assault Jane Doe before she made the telephone call to her mother at approximately 1:00 a.m. While Jane Doe could not identify her assailant, her description of his clothing was similar to what Troy was wearing; she also said that her assailant smelled like beer or vomit and testimony indicated that Troy had been drinking beer and had vomited several times that night. Furthermore, testimony indicated that Troy got home at approximately 1:30 a.m., which gave him enough time to assault Jane Doe. Additionally, the Dokes testified that they saw someone resembling Troy in a black jacket and black hat stumbling in the road near Jane Doe’s house at 1:05 a.m. Troy also washed his pants and shirt when he got home, arguably to remove the blood evidence from his clothes. Finally, the DNA evidence indicated that semen collected from Jane Doe’s underwear matched Troy’s and that only 1 in 3,000,-000 other people had matching DNA (the second DNA test indicated that 1 in 10,000 people had matching DNA).
Brown, 934 P.2d at 241-42.
In reviewing the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision, the district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Unlike in Sarau-sad, the district court parsed the conflicts in the trial testimony and found several inconsistencies that it considered to be of “grave concern.” Order, pg. 9. For example, the court cited to evidence first added to the record on federal habeas, that the prosecution’s DNA expert “incorrectly calculated” the DNA matching probability and misleadingly stated “the lowest probability possible among siblings.” Order, pg. 8. It also stated that “there was conflicting testimony about the time that Petitioner actually left the bar and headed home” and “[tjhere is also conflict between the victim’s description of her assailant and Petitioner’s apparel and appearance.” Order, pg. 9. But under Jackson, these disputed facts simply should have been viewed in the light most favorable to the government.
In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court viewed the facts in a manner that accorded with the Jackson standard. For example, it stated that Jane Doe had called her mother around 1:00 a.m., although the evidence conflicted as to whether Jane Doe placed the call at about midnight or around 1:00 a.m. Because the latter testimony gave Troy more time to assault Jane Doe, the Nevada Supreme Court correctly assumed that the jury had accepted that version of the facts. Furthermore, the Court did not mention conflicting points in the testimony, such as statements that the emblem on Troy’s jacket was yellow and orange and other statements that it was bright green. See Sarausad, 479 F.3d at 683 (“We have considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. We have not considered (or described here) the evidence that contradicted or minimized the importance of the evidence favoring the prosecution.”).
Again, with respect, I am not persuaded by the district court’s view that the Nevada Supreme Court’s description of the facts was a series of “factual determinations,” Order, pg. 9 (emphasis added); rather, it was not making factual findings *800but simply reading the evidence in the light that most supported a finding of guilt.
But even more problematic than the district court’s focus on the testimonial conflicts is its, and the majority’s, failure to give any weight to the DNA evidence. See id. at 17-20. The district court stated: “[Ajbsent the DNA testimony and even after weighing the evidence in favor of the prosecution, there are [sic ] sufficient conflicting testimony to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of any rational trier of fact.” Id. at 9. Jackson does not permit a federal court to resolve a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim by imagining a different state trial in which evidence actually presented would have been excluded-especially not on the basis of reports added to the record during federal habeas review.
Even if one accepts Dr. Mueller’s estimate that “the chance of a single sibling matching Troy Brown’s DNA profile is 1 in 263,”2 “the chance that among two brothers, one or more would match is 1/132,” and the chance of “four brothers [matching would be] 1 in 66,” no rational trier of fact would have changed its mind. First, the DNA still would have suggested that the rape was committed by Brown or one of his brothers. And the likelihood that one of his brothers would have such DNA was very slim: if not 1/6500, then at most 1/132. Thus, it was extremely unlikely that a random person committed the crime, and of the brothers, it was extremely unlikely that the specimen DNA would match not only Troy — as it did-but another brother.3 These probabilities put together still constitute overwhelming DNA evidence against Troy which the jury was entitled to consider.
Moreover, there was considerable circumstantial evidence to focus the jury’s attention on Troy and to remove any reasonable doubt as to whether one of his brothers committed the crime. As noted above, two of Troy’s brothers were not even in the state at the time, and one of those was only 13. Another brother (Travis) was present in the area but had an uncontested alibi that he had been sleeping at or shortly after the time of the crime. The fifth brother (Trent) was present at the time and warranted greater suspicion because Jane Doe had stated at one point that she thought he was her attacker.
The likelihood that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt based on Trent’s being in the picture was negligible. Trent already played a visible and non-incriminating role in the events. He and his wife Raquel had met Pam at the bar that night and had been at their house thereafter; no evidence suggested that he went over to Jane Doe’s trailer. Moreover, the jury had overwhelming grounds to conclude that between the two brothers, the rapist was Troy. The attacker smelled like vomit, and Troy had gotten drunk by having twenty drinks over the course of the night and had vomited. In contrast, the evidence was that Trent had spent 30 minutes at the bar and was home with his wife and children thereafter. Furthermore, the Dokes saw someone staggering along the road by Jane Doe’s trailer around the time of the crime, wearing clothes they described as closely resembling those that Troy was wearing the night of the crime. In contrast, no evidence suggested that *801Trent was wearing similar clothes (and Brown does not contend so now). The timing and the circumstantial evidence all pointed toward Troy, not Trent.
The Nevada Supreme Court -properly considered the evidence, including the DNA evidence, as it was presented by the prosecution at trial. The compelling force of the DNA evidence, coupled with the strong circumstantial evidence and inferences supported by the totality of the evidence, firmly grounded the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision. See Sarausad, 479 F.3d at 678 (“In performing a Jackson analysis, ‘[cjircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from [the record] may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.’ ”) (citation omitted).
II
In sum, in light of the standard of review prescribed by AEDPA, I would reverse the district court’s order granting the petition for habeas relief. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm.

. The district court acknowledged this standard. See District Court Order on Merits, pg. 5. (hereinafter "Order”) ("It is the evidence actually presented at trial, not evidence that should have or might have been presented, which is reviewed by the court.”).

. The numbers, as estimated by the district court and various experts, differ. I cannot say which are right, but they all suggest that a proper calculation would have taken into greater account the probability of sibling allele identity.

. Such reasoning does not commit the “prosecutor’s fallacy” because the set of persons in my data pool is specified (whether it contains the three brothers in the area or all five brothers).