Court Opinion

ID: 9480990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:04:26.486132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:01.870257
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Without adequate proof, the district court sentenced a twenty-six-year-old man to more than twenty-one years of imprisonment for conduct allegedly connected to a drug conspiracy. This sentence is plainly erroneous and constitutionally intolerable.
Under the Guidelines, only drug sales in furtherance of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty may be used to calculate base offense level. United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 713 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2574, 109 L.Ed.2d 756 (1990); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4, comment. (n. 1) (Oct.1987) (amended Nov. 1, 1989).1 This limitation persists notwithstanding the potentially broader conduct *73encompassed by the Guidelines relevant conduct provisions, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (Oct.1987) (as amended Jan. 15, 1988) (amended Nov. 1, 1989). Turner, 898 F.2d at 713.2
In a one-count indictment, the Government accused Lawrence of conspiring with unnamed persons to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and an undetermined amount of marijuana. At the plea hearing, Lawrence admitted conspiring with Joe Newland, Chris Mottinger, Mark Stearns and Roger Stockman to distribute up to a pound and a half of cocaine (approximately 682 grams) and thirty pounds of marijuana. Plea tr. at 33. Aside from this admission, the record contains virtually no description of the particular, functioning conspiracy to which Lawrence pled guilty. Neither the Presentence Report nor Government counsel ever defined the membership or scope of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Moreover, neither the Presentence Report nor the Government ever attempted to relate the drug quantities used to enhance Lawrence’s sentence to the particular conspiracy alleged.
To the contrary, the Presentence Report description of offense conduct consisted of a random listing of drug sales in no apparent chronological or otherwise discernable order. Additionally, the Presentence Report frequently made no attempt to determine when or to whom the drugs were distributed, see, e.g., 1Í1Í11-12, 16, 22-23, 30, or whether the conspiracy provided the drugs or aided their distribution, see, e.g., ¶¶ 8, 13, 16-24, 30-32. As a result, the Presentence Report may have double-counted drug quantities or included drug quantities that came from conspiracies not charged by the indictment. In any event, the record shows no proper tie-in between the charged conspiracy and the drug tabulation. See United States v. North, 900 F.2d 131, 133-34 (8th Cir.1990).
For similar reasons, the enhancement for obstruction of justice must also fall. In approving the obstruction enhancement, the majority makes much of the fact that Lawrence provided false information to the district court and probation officer. But on analysis, the district court and the probation officer confused Lawrence’s obligation under the Guidelines to provide the court with truthful information about the offense of conviction with Lawrence’s obligation under the plea agreement to provide the Government with incriminating information vnthout limitation. With respect to the latter obligation, the Government’s remedy in the event of a breach was to revoke Lawrence’s plea agreement. The Government chose to forego this option. See sent, tr. at 104-09 (July 24, 1989).
As to the former obligation, the Government must prove that Lawrence’s statements to the court or probation office contained material falsehoods, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment, (nn. 1(c), (e)) (Oct.1987), when viewed in the light most favorable to Lawrence, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment, (n. 2) (Oct.1987). Seemingly then, any alleged misstatement must involve conduct (1) relevant to the conspiracy, charged, and (2) not accounted for by Lawrence’s previous admissions. In view of the Government’s failure to coherently delineate the conspiratorial conduct alleged here, the Government cannot be said to have met this burden.
Besides this, the obstruction enhancement was fundamentally unfair. Lawrence pled guilty and cooperated with the Government. Equally important, the Government conceded that Lawrence’s assistance was an important factor in holding another “cooperating defendant” to the full disclosure terms of his plea bargain.
Under the circumstances, Lawrence’s sentence violates fundamental concepts of due process. The enabling statute for the Sentencing Guidelines provides that “[t]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range” applicable to the category of defendant set forth in the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (incorporating by reference 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added)). These provisions give convicted defendants *74a protected liberty interest to a sentence within the Guidelines range appropriate for their conduct and circumstances. Cf. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373-81, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2418-22, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (use of mandatory language creates liberty interest in parole release); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469-72, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870-72, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (mandatory language creates liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation).3 The extent of protection required depends on the need to minimize the risk of error. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2106-07, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979).
In the instant case, the deprivation is great and cannot withstand the questions raised by a careful review of the record. Here, the Government failed to delineate the conspiracy or present a reliable accounting of the drug quantities delivered in furtherance thereof. Consequently, the only remaining evidence is Lawrence’s admission to conspiring to distribute approximately 682 grams of cocaine and thirty pounds of marijuana. The above drug quantities would have placed Lawrence at a base offense level of 26 rather than the level 32 that the majority approves here. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(e)(9) & comment, (n. 10) (Oct.1987) (as amended Jan. 15, 1988) (amended Nov. 1, 1989). In addition, without the enhancement for obstructing justice, Lawrence might have qualified for a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility.4 Cumulatively, such findings would have reduced Lawrence’s final offense level by ten points (from level 37 to level 27), resulting in a sentencing range of 87 to 108 months.5 In practical terms, this difference translates into an extra twelve to fifteen. years in prison for Lawrence.
Lawrence’s plight is by no means unusual in these days of “sentencing by the numbers.” To the contrary, the Sentencing Guidelines, despite their aura of objectivity, produce results that vary with the attitudes and judgments of human beings who interpret (and often misinterpret) them. Here, the district court accorded great weight to the numerous judgment calls in the probation officer’s report. I see these administrative decisions as error.
Lawrence’s present sentence ought not to be affirmed. Notwithstanding defense counsel’s failure to raise many proper objections, in my view this court has an independent duty to review the sentence and to reverse when plain error is demonstrated on the record. Accordingly, I would reverse Lawrence’s sentence and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. The relevant Guidelines provisions are those in effect at the time of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) — (5) (1988). Lawrence was sentenced on September 18, 1989.

. Under the Guidelines, drug quantities outside the count of conviction are not, of course, irrelevant. However, such quantities may be considered only to determine the appropriate sentence within the applicable Guidelines range or as a basis for departure. See U.S.S.G. § IB 1.4 & comment, (backg’d.) (Oct.1987) (as amended Jan. 15, 1988).

. Likewise, society has an interest in promoting basic fairness and in avoiding error when depriving citizens of their liberty. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601-02, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

. At the time of Lawrence’s sentencing, the Guidelines prohibited credit for accepting responsibility when the court imposed an enhancement for obstructing justice. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 4) (Oct. 1987) (amended Nov. 1, 1989).

.Lawrence was in Criminal History Category III.