Court Opinion

ID: 9624506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:05:38.887472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:51:00.798109
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, J.,
dissenting.
I cannot accept the reasoning of the majority.
The Employment Appeals Board’s revised findings of fact do not adequately deal with the question of whether claimant terminated her employment for the convenience of the employer. The evidence on that point is undisputed. The employer’s personnel assistant testified as follows:
"Q Did you make it mandatory that she resign as of any particular date?
"A I don’t recall that I did. I am sure, though, that we did discuss the inconvenience that would be afforded the district if she worked for ten days beyond the *628starting of school, and then worked the ten days with kids, for example, and then we had to go out and hire somebody else.
"Q If she had objected to leaving or having her work terminated on September 1,1976, or August 31st, if you wish to refer to it as that, would you have continued her on to a later date?
"A We would have. We probably wouldn’t have liked it much but we would have.
"Q It was up to her, then, as to what the date would be that she would leave, is that correct?
"A Yes.
"Q Who picked the date of August 31st, or mentioned it as being the last day she would work?
"A I guess she picked the date of August 31st. I think I probably mentioned the date prior to school opening.”
Claimant’s testimony was that she was told that she had to resign by September 1. Thus, there is a conflict as to whether claimant was required to leave by August 31 or was merely acting for the convenience of the employer. In neither case can it be said that claimant voluntarily left work without good cause.
In Stevenson v. Morgan, 17 Or App 428, 432-33, 522 P2d 1204 (1974), we stated that:
" 'Good cause’ may be said to be such cause as would similarly affect persons of reasonable and normal sensitivity, * * * and is limited to those instances where the unemployment is caused by external pressures so compelling that a reasonably prudent person, exercising ordinary common sense and prudence, would be justified in quitting work under similar circumstances. * * *” (Citations omitted.)
See also Koach v. Employment Division, 25 Or App 585, 549 P2d 1301, rev den (1976); Aschenbrenner v. Employment Div., 29 Or App 345, 563 P2d 757 (1977). Although these cases deal with instances of harassment of the employe by the employer, they are relevant to demonstrate what constitutes "good cause.”
*629As we held in Smith v. Employment Division, 29 Or App 833, 836-37, 565 P2d 396 (1977):
"* * * Voluntary termination for the employer’s convenience generally is not leaving work 'without good cause’ under ORS 657.176(5)(c).”
The facts in this case demonstrate that claimant left her work at the time she did for the convenience of the employer.
Since this does not constitute voluntarily leaving work without good cause, the Board’s order should be reversed.
I therefore respectfully dissent.