Court Opinion

ID: 9755881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:57:43.707572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:12.096649
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Justice CUNNINGHAM,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I believe the majority has resolved most of Fugett’s issues in a logical and appropriate manner, I disagree with the handling of Fugett’s claim that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to grant a motion to strike Juror 119631 for cause. As this issue led the majority to reverse Fugett’s conviction, I must dissent.
*621The majority reasons that when “[c]on-sidering Shane, Stopher, Soto and Sholler together, they support the conclusion that Juror 119631 should have been stricken for cause in this case.” See slip opinion at 13. I disagree. I believe Shane can be distinguished and, thus, does not mandate this result. Further, I believe the reasoning applied by this Court in Stopher, Soto, and Sholler supports my conclusion that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike Juror 119631 for cause.
In Shane, the juror being challenged was an officer employed by the same organization and assigned to the same district as the officers testifying in the case. See 243 S.W.3d 336-37, (Ky.2007). Further, the prospective juror personally knew the officers. While the juror in Shane stated he did not believe his relationship with the witnesses or his position with the department would affect his ability to be impartial, he did indicate
he had “an inside point of view”; that he was “absolutely” pro-police; that while “police are just like everybody else” he did not believe they would lie under oath because they took the oath more seriously; and that he would find it more likely that a police officer was telling the truth than a lay witness.
See slip opinion at 13, quoting Shane, 243 S.W.3d at 337.
When the facts in the case before us are compared to those in Shane, I believe the distinction is clear. Juror 119631 was neither a police officer, nor was he employed by the department or working with the officers who testified. Further, unlike the prospective juror in Shane, Juror 119631 did not personally know, nor did he have any relationship with the officers who testified. Rather, as acknowledged by the majority, Juror 119631 stated that his wife’s second cousin, a former member of the Louisville Police Department, had been acquitted after shooting a suspected drug dealer. Juror 119631 stated that he had a lot of respect for police and the job they do. Rather than firmly asserting a belief that officers would not lie under oath, or that officers took the oath more seriously than lay witnesses, Juror 119631, in response to leading questions, agreed more weight should be given to the testimony of a police officer and that police were more credible. This contrasts sharply with the juror in Shane who went on to say “he would find it more likely that a police officer was telling the truth than a lay witness.” Id. at 13, quoting Shane, supra.
I also believe these factual distinctions place this case more in line with our reasoning in Stopher, Soto, and Sholler. In Sholler v. Commonwealth, 969 S.W.2d at 706, a retired Secret Service agent was a member of the jury pool. The juror admitted he was very pro-law enforcement and indicated he would give substantial credence to the testimony of police. Further, when asked if all law enforcement officers told the truth, the juror replied, “I don’t know, I think so, yeah, I’ve never experienced one who lied in court.” In finding no error in the court’s decision to reject a challenge for cause, this Court concluded that the juror’s answers did not indicate bias against the defendant, Id. at 708-09. See also Sanders v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Ky.1990) (that a juror was a police officer in the county of the trial and knew several of the testifying officers did not establish bias).
Likewise, in Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d at 850, this Court concluded the facts surrounding the prospective jurors did not establish bias against the defendant. We reached this conclusion knowing one juror knew members of the police department, and another juror stating he *622might give more weight to the testimony of police over that of a lay witness. In Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d at 797, the prospective juror acknowledged his father had been a police officer. The juror went on to say that he “did not have any preference for police officers and ... his family connection to the law enforcement profession would in no manner affect his ability to decide the case based on the evidence presented.”
In all three of these cases, the prospective jurors’ relationships with law enforcement were closer than those present in the case before us. While the juror in Stopher indicated that the relationship would not affect his ability to decide the case before him, the other cases involved jurors who indicated they were pro-law enforcement and would give credibility to the testimony of police officers. What distinguishes these cases and the case before us from Shane is not only the degree with which the juror expressed these views, but also the fact that the prospective juror simply did not believe a police officer-would lie under oath. The prospective juror went further and stated that he believed it was more likely that a police officer was telling the truth than a lay witness. These statements focus directly on the level playing field we sought in Shane. This circumstance simply is not present in the case before us, nor did we find it present in Stopher, Soto, and Sholler.
Further, the majority makes the point that one of the keys to our decision in Soto was our conclusion that there were no testimonial inconsistencies between the officers’ testimony and that of lay witnesses. I believe this same reasoning applies in Fugett’s case. The majority fails to point to any inconsistencies between the testimony of police officers and the testimony of lay witnesses. Fugett has not contested the substance of his changing version of events: first, as a helpful witness who could assist police; second, as a bystander present at the crime whose only participation was hiding the weapons at the shooter’s request; and finally, as a participant in the drug sale who shot in self-defense.
While one witness, Fields, stated at trial that she had not told police Fugett had a pistol when they went to the hotel, this is not a case of the word of police versus the word of a lay witness. Fields’ statement, given after receipt of her Miranda rights, was recorded on January 28, 2004. Thus, in effect the dispute was between the initial recorded words of Fields and her subsequent testimony at trial. Under these circumstances, as in Soto, supra, there are no testimonial inconsistencies between the officers’ testimony and the testimony of lay witnesses. This reinforces my conclusion that the answers given by Juror 119631, in response to leading questions, that more weight should be given to the testimony of a police officer and that police were more credible, simply did not create an uneven playing field for Fugett.
The majority expresses concern over whether Juror 119631’s responses indicate he could not consider mitigating evidence. I disagree. I believe a review of the juror’s answers simply indicates his lack of knowledge as to the law concerning aggravating factors and mitigating evidence. Those answers also indicate his surprise that some things, such as age and substance abuse, can be considered as mitigating factors. As this Court noted in Mabe v. Commonwealth
Voir dire examination occurs when a prospective juror quite properly has little or no information about the facts of the case and only the most vague idea about the applicable law. At such time a juror is often presented with the facts in their harshest light and asked if he *623could consider imposition of a minimum punishment. Many jurors find it difficult to conceive of minimum punishment when the facts as given suggest only the most severe punishment. Similarly, many citizens are astounded to learn that being under the influence of drugs or alcohol may be considered by them as factors mitigating the punishment which should be imposed. Predictably, when asked whether they believe being under the influence should mitigate punishment, the answer is often in the negative. A per se disqualification is not required merely because a juror does not instantly embrace every legal concept presented during voir dire examination. The test is not whether a juror agrees with the law when it is presented in the most extreme manner. The test is whether, after having heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.
884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky.1994).
In the case before us, the circuit court gave examples and asked Juror 119631 if he could consider evidence of mitigation. Juror 119631 indicated he would consider the evidence, but could not say whether he would automatically give a certain penalty if there was mitigating evidence. When the court rephrased the question in terms of being in a group who could take the evidence into consideration, or being in a group who simply would not give it any consideration, Juror 116931 indicated that he would be in the group that could consider everything presented. Further, Juror 119631 indicated that he could consider the full range of penalties. In light of the totality of the juror’s answers, I am unable to say the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Fugett’s motion to strike Juror 119631 for cause based on this reason.
As noted by the majority,
Kentucky has long recognized that “a determination as to whether to exclude a juror. for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless the action of the trial court is an abuse of discretion or is clearly erroneous, an appellate court will not reverse the trial court’s determination.” Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Ky.2002) (Internal quotes and citations omitted.). See also Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 848 (Ky.2004) (“A determination whether to excuse a juror for cause lies within he sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for a clear abuse of discretion.”).
See slip opinion at 9-10. The majority goes on to recognize that
the decision to exclude a juror for cause is based on the totality of the circumstances, not on a response to any one question. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d at 104, overruled in part on other grounds by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky.2007). This recognizes the duty of the trial court “to evaluate the answers of prospective jurors in context and in light of the juror’s knowledge of the facts and understanding of the law.” Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 797.
Id. It is my belief that the circuit court’s decision simply does not amount to an abuse of its discretion. While the possibility exists that any one of us, sitting as a trial judge, may have reached a different conclusion, this is not the standard for review. The fact that this trial judge reached another result after considering the totality of Juror 119631’s answers, the forms of the questions asked, and the juror’s knowledge of the law at the time, *624simply does not amount to reversible error.
I am also seriously concerned that this decision, coupled with our holding in Shane, will place too much pressure upon our trial judges when dealing with the very difficult and inexact science of selecting fail” jurors. This case will resonate with every trial judge in this state. Judge Abramson struggled with a troublesome issue that is even more prevalent in the rural areas of the state where jurors are more likely to know witnesses and law enforcement personnel involved in a case.
It is not a far fetched notion that many persons hold members of the law enforcement profession to a higher standard than ordinary citizens. If that is the case, these same persons, when serving as jurors, would reasonably be inclined to give more weight to the testimony of law enforcement personnel. Indeed, it would make for a more wholesome and orderly society if the star of our law enforcement cadre shone so brightly that all of us would have more confidence in their word than we would in the word of the rabble and the rude. If fact, there are many who do.
Perhaps an area where this dilemma is most acute concerns lay witnesses with whom prospective jurors are familiar. Again, this is most likely to occur in rural areas of the Commonwealth. It seems to me that to ask a juror to initially give no greater weight to the statements of someone he or she knows, even if remotely, than to a rank stranger defies common sense and the ways of the world. This problem can become a double whammy when jurors are both friends and acquaintances of the sheriff, the leading law enforcement officer in the state, and a witness in the case.
How to deal with these citizen jurors in a way which does not bleed our jury panels dry, and yet balances the interest of the defendant, is not a simple task. This reality brings us back to the current case before us. Trial judges must be given ample leeway and deference in their voir dire of these types of jurors. There must be sufficient give and take so that the judge’s determination is not evaluated on one or two comments or answers of the jurors.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision reached by the majority and would affirm Fugett’s conviction in the Jefferson Circuit Court.