Court Opinion

ID: 9363832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 20:00:33.378222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.467228
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13809    Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 01/17/2023    Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13809
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        MICHAEL PRUITT,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00436-AKK
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                 21-13809

        Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Michael Pruitt applied for disability and supplemental secu-
        rity income benefits, but the Social Security Administration denied
        his applications. The district court upheld the denial, and we af-
        firm.
                                           I.
               Pruitt is a former bus and truck driver who has suffered sev-
        eral serious injuries. In 2011, Pruitt accidentally shot himself in his
        right foot near the ankle. And in 2012, Pruitt was involved in a
        vehicle crash that knocked him unconscious, herniated his stom-
        ach, ruptured his diaphragm, and required lung intubation and cor-
        rective surgery. In 2014, Pruitt’s doctor cleared him for work with-
        out restrictions. Between 2014 and 2017, Pruitt worked several dif-
        ferent jobs but continued to seek medical attention for back and leg
        pain. In 2018, Pruitt briefly worked at a Styrofoam factory but had
        to quit because the lifting requirements caused him too much pain.
               From September 2017 to December 2018, Pruitt received
        medical treatment from Dr. Larry Scarborough. Dr. Scarborough
        noted that Pruitt suffered from back and joint pain, an abnormal
        gait, and decreased mobility. Dr. Scarborough also completed a
        Medical Health Source statement that indicated Pruitt had diffi-
        culty concentrating for more than two hours. Pruitt also sought
        treatment from Cherokee Pain Management between November
        2017 and June 2018. There, he was found to have decreased range
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        21-13809                 Opinion of the Court                           3

        of motion and reported pain in his back and limbs. He was pre-
        scribed Percocet to manage his pain.
               After filing his initial claims for disability benefits, Pruitt re-
        ceived consultative evaluations for his physical and mental health.
        Dr. Ronald Borlaza evaluated Pruitt in July 2017, and Pruitt re-
        ported difficulty walking and pain in his foot, hips, neck, and spine.
        Pruitt also told Dr. Borlaza that he was able to do laundry and cook,
        although his fiancée helped him bathe and dress. Dr. Borlaza
        opined that Pruitt could sit for up to four hours, manually handle
        objects without limitation, and occasionally climb stairs—but not
        stand for more than two hours or climb a ladder. Dr. Samuel Flem-
        ing evaluated Pruitt’s mental health and diagnosed him with a neu-
        rocognitive disorder due to a traumatic brain injury from the car
        crash. Dr. Fleming opined that Pruitt could understand and carry
        out instructions but would have trouble remembering them. He
        also opined that Pruitt would be able to respond appropriately to
        supervision and work pressures.
                                          II.
               Pruitt filed petitions for disability benefits, disability insur-
        ance benefits, and supplemental security income on June 20, 2017.
        His claim was initially reviewed by a disability officer, who ob-
        tained medical opinions from two agency-appointed medical ex-
        aminers, Drs. James Stallworth and Kirstin Bailey. Dr. Stallworth
        concluded that Pruitt was physically able to work, though only
        with lifting restrictions. Dr. Bailey evaluated Pruitt’s mental con-
        dition and found that, though he had some memory and attention
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-13809

        limitations, Pruitt would be able to “tolerate ordinary work pres-
        sures” and would benefit from a “familiar work routine.” The dis-
        ability officer determined that Pruitt was not disabled, and Pruitt
        requested a hearing before an administrative law judge.
               In April 2019, after holding a hearing and evaluating the
        medical evidence, the administrative law judge determined that
        Pruitt was not “disabled” as defined by the Social Security Act and
        thus denied his claims. The administrative law judge evaluated
        Pruitt’s claims through the five-step process outlined in 20 C.F.R.
        section 404.1520.
               The administrative law judge first concluded that Pruitt had
        not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the claims period.
        See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Although Pruitt was briefly em-
        ployed in 2018, she determined this was an “unsuccessful work at-
        tempt” because he quit from pain. She also concluded that Pruitt’s
        depression and spinal issues qualified as severe impairments. How-
        ever, the administrative law judge determined that Pruitt did not
        show an impairment or combination of impairments that met the
        severity requirements in the disability benefits regulations. See 20
        C.F.R. app. 1 § 404; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). She found that, while
        Pruitt had some “mild” or “moderate” limitations, both physical
        and mental, these limitations were not enough to qualify him as
        disabled.
              The administrative law judge relied on Drs. Bailey and Stall-
        worth’s medical opinions to conclude that Pruitt was mentally able
        to function independently, albeit with moderate mental
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        21-13809               Opinion of the Court                        5

        impairments. She also found that Pruitt’s own description of his
        physical limitations was “not entirely consistent” with the medical
        evidence before her. That evidence included Dr. Borlaza’s consult-
        ing examination report—which highlighted Pruitt’s ability to per-
        form some physical activities—and other medical records between
        2017 and 2018 that did not mention substantial physical limitations.
        It also included Drs. Bailey and Stallworth’s opinions that Pruitt’s
        mental and physical limitations were mild enough that he could
        work at a “light level.” Though the administrative law judge clari-
        fied that she was not required to adopt the consulting doctors’
        opinions, she found Drs. Bailey and Stallworth persuasive because
        they were experienced at evaluating claims for disability benefits.
               On the other hand, the administrative law judge found that
        Drs. Fleming, Scarborough, and Borlaza’s opinions that Pruitt was
        unable to work were unpersuasive in light of Pruitt’s “medical rec-
        ords as a whole.” Dr. Fleming had opined that Pruitt had a neu-
        rocognitive disorder that caused memory problems, but the ad-
        ministrative law judge noted that Pruitt was able to handle his own
        finances, take care of his child, and live on his own. She also dis-
        credited Dr. Fleming’s opinion about Pruitt’s mental limitations
        based on Pruitt’s brief 2018 employment, which he left due to phys-
        ical pain and not mental limitations. Likewise, Dr. Scarborough
        claimed that Pruitt was unable to concentrate for more than two
        hours, but the administrative law judge found no evidence that
        Pruitt’s past employment history and other daily functions “indi-
        cate[d] disabling mental limitations. Finally, the administrative law
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        6                      Opinion of the Court               21-13809

        judge explained that Dr. Borlaza’s opinion that Pruitt could only
        stand for two hours and sit for four hours was inconsistent with
        other evidence and opinions from other doctors. And she noted
        that Dr. Borlaza’s opinions were based on Pruitt’s self-reported
        pain instead of “objective medical evidence.” The administrative
        law judge concluded that because Pruitt had the residual functional
        capacity to work, he was not “disabled” and thus did not qualify for
        benefits.
               After the administrative law judge issued her opinion, Pruitt
        sought review from the appeals council. Along with arguments
        that the administrative law judge’s conclusions were wrong, Pruitt
        included a September 2019 psychological evaluation from Dr. June
        Nichols. Dr. Nichols reviewed Pruitt’s medical records and the
        evaluations that Drs. Fleming and Scarborough had provided. She
        concluded that Pruitt’s “[t]hought processes were within normal
        limits,” that he had “grossly intact” recent memory functions, and
        that he could relay his personal history in detail. But she also
        opined that Pruitt struggled with “[i]mmediate memory func-
        tions,” had learning disorders related to reading and writing, and
        was “likely unable . . . to deal with normal pressures in a competi-
        tive work setting.” In Dr. Nichols’s view, Pruitt would not be able
        to concentrate for more than two hours, keep a punctual work
        schedule, work without supervision, or maintain socially appropri-
        ate behavior. And she concluded that all of these limitations ex-
        isted back to April 2017.
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        21-13809               Opinion of the Court                         7

               The appeals council denied Pruitt’s request for review and
        upheld the administrative law judge’s decision. It declined to con-
        sider Dr. Nichols’s report because the evaluation was from Septem-
        ber 2019 and, thus, it was not relevant to the claims beginning in
        April 2017.
               Pruitt then appealed to the district court. He made four ar-
        guments: (1) the administrative law judge should have given more
        weight to his treating physicians’ opinions; (2) his “unsuccessful
        work attempt” from 2018 should not have disqualified him from
        receiving benefits; (3) the appeals council erred by refusing to con-
        sider Dr. Nichols’s report; and (4) the administrative law judge’s
        decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Pruitt relied
        on the “treating physician rule”—a presumption in our caselaw
        that required the Social Security Administration to defer to a treat-
        ing physician’s opinion unless there is good cause to depart from it.
        See, e.g., Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir.
        2004).
                The district court affirmed the denial of benefits. It con-
        cluded that, under new regulations, the treating physicians’ opin-
        ions were no longer entitled to deference under the treating physi-
        cian rule. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (applicable to claims for dis-
        ability benefits filed on or after March 27, 2017). The court also
        concluded that the administrative law judge’s finding that the state
        psychiatric examiner’s opinion was more credible than Dr. Scar-
        borough’s or Dr. Fleming’s was supported by substantial evidence.
        And it found that substantial evidence supported the administrative
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                21-13809

        law judge’s decision to discount Dr. Borlaza’s negative evaluation
        of Pruitt’s physical limitations because Dr. Borlaza’s opinion was
        based on Pruitt’s self-reporting and did not reflect the rest of
        Pruitt’s medical records.
                The district court also noted that the administrative law
        judge referred to Pruitt’s 2018 work attempt as a “failed” one. So,
        the administrative law judge had not erred by considering Pruitt’s
        attempt to find work as part of the total evaluation of the medical
        evidence. Finally, the district court agreed with Pruitt that the ap-
        peals council erroneously found Dr. Nichols’s evaluation not to be
        chronologically relevant, because her conclusions related back to
        Pruitt’s claims period. But the district court upheld the appeals
        council’s decision because it found there was no reasonable proba-
        bility that Dr. Nichols’s opinion would have changed the adminis-
        trative law judge’s decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5). Dr.
        Nichols’s report was “largely cumulative” of other doctors’ opin-
        ions and her conclusions were “inconsistent with the medical rec-
        ords as a whole.”
                                          III.
               “We review de novo the district court’s decision on whether
        substantial evidence supports the [administrative law judge’s] deci-
        sion.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).
        “Our review of the [administration’s] decision is limited to an in-
        quiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support [its]
        findings . . . and whether the correct legal standards were applied.”
        Id. “Substantial evidence must do more than create a suspicion of
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        21-13809                Opinion of the Court                         9

        the existence of the fact to be established.” Id. (quotation omitted).
        The administration’s “factual findings are conclusive if supported
        by substantial evidence.” Id.
                                         IV.
               Pruitt raises five arguments on appeal. He argues that: (1)
        the district court should have remanded his benefits claim to the
        appeals council to consider Dr. Nichols’s report; (2) the district
        court erred when it found that substantial evidence supported the
        administrative law judge’s findings of fact; (3) the administrative
        law judge failed to give proper weight to Dr. Scarborough’s medi-
        cal opinion under the “treating physician rule”; (4) the district court
        should have found that the administrative law judge failed to show
        good cause for rejecting Drs. Fleming and Borlaza’s opinions; and
        (5) the administrative law judge erroneously found that Pruitt’s
        2018 work attempt “preclude[d] benefits.”
               The administration argues that Pruitt has forfeited several of
        these issues, and we agree. For example, Pruitt’s third issue de-
        pends on the “treating physician rule,” but he ignores that the rule
        was abrogated for disability benefit claims filed on or after March
        27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The district court applied
        the new regulations, and in Harner v. Social Security Administra-
        tion, Commissioner, 38 F.4th 892 (11th Cir. 2022), we found that
        the new regulations abrogated our treating physician rule. Id. at
        896 (“Because section 404.1520c falls within the scope of the Com-
        missioner’s authority and was not arbitrary and capricious, it abro-
        gates our earlier precedents applying the treating-physician rule.”).
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13809

        To the extent Pruitt argues that the treating physician rule still ap-
        plies, Harner forecloses his claim. And he has forfeited any argu-
        ment about the proper weight of Dr. Scarborough’s opinion under
        the new regulations, which he neither cites nor acknowledges. See
        Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.
        2004) (explaining that “a legal claim or argument” that has not been
        briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will
        not be addressed” (emphasis added)); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian
        Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (appellants had forfeited
        argument by failing to “advanc[e] any arguments or cit[e] any au-
        thorities to establish” error).
                Pruitt has also forfeited his second and fourth issues, both of
        which involve the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the ad-
        ministrative law judge’s decision. In Harner, we found that the ap-
        pellant had forfeited several issues relating to the “substantiality of
        the evidence” because the argument portion of the appellant’s
        brief—written by the same counsel who submitted Pruitt’s brief in
        this case—“consist[ed] only of block quotations from and cursory
        mentions of various decisions of this and other courts” that
        “provid[ed] no meaningful explanation as to how the decision she
        cite[d] appl[ied] to her claim.” Harner, 38 F.4th at 899. So it is here.
                When we peel back the many block quotations in Pruitt’s
        brief, his arguments boil down to conclusory statements that the
        administrative law judge improperly failed to credit favorable med-
        ical opinions and “wrongly repudiated the opinions of the . . . med-
        ical experts.” But Pruitt neither discusses the administrative law
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        21-13809                  Opinion of the Court                            11

        judge’s detailed explanation of its review of the medical evidence
        nor explains why the administrative law judge should have given
        more weight to his preferred physicians under applicable law. We
        find that he has forfeited these issues. 1
              That leaves two issues: whether the district court should
        have remanded Pruitt’s claim for the appeals council to evaluate
        Dr. Nichols’s opinion, and whether the district court erred in af-
        firming the administrative law judge’s consideration of Pruitt’s
        2018 work attempt. We address each in turn.
                                             A.
                The Social Security Administration allows claimants to sub-
        mit additional evidence to the appeals council, after the adminis-
        trative law judge has denied benefits, if the evidence is “new, ma-
        terial, and relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing
        decision, and there is a reasonable probability that the additional
        evidence would change the outcome of the decision.” 20 C.F.R.
        § 404.970(a)(5). When a claimant properly presents new evidence
        after an administrative law judge has ruled and the appeals council
        upholds the administrative law judge’s decision, the district court
        “must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of

        1
          Even if we reached the merits, we would readily conclude that the adminis-
        trative law judge’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. The ad-
        ministrative law judge carefully considered various medical records, the con-
        sistency of different healthcare providers’ opinions about those records, and
        information she gathered from Pruitt’s in-person hearing.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13809

        benefits erroneous.” Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496
        F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007).
                Here, the district court agreed with Pruitt that the appeals
        council should not have found that Dr. Nichols’s report concerned
        an irrelevant time frame. Although Dr. Nichols evaluated Pruitt
        after the administrative law judge’s decision, her report indicated
        that her conclusions would have been valid as far back as April
        2017, before Pruitt filed his initial claim for benefits. However, the
        district court went on to conclude that the evidence was not “ma-
        terial” because there was no reasonable probability that Dr. Nich-
        ols’s report would have changed the administrative law judge’s de-
        cision.
                 Pruitt claims that because the district court relied on a dif-
        ferent justification than the appeals council for excluding evidence,
        we must automatically remand the decision to the appeals council
        to consider his claim along with Dr. Nichols’s report. This is incor-
        rect. Whether new evidence was properly before the appeals coun-
        cil is a matter of de novo review. See Washington v. Soc. Sec. Ad-
        min., Comm’r, 806 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015). And, as part
        of our de novo review, we may consider factors that the appeals
        council did not when it initially refused to consider new evidence.
        See id. (considering both chronological relevance and materiality,
        when appeals council had considered only chronological rele-
        vance).
               Here, the appeals council did not need to consider Dr. Nich-
        ols’s report. As the district court correctly held, Pruitt has not
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        21-13809               Opinion of the Court                      13

        shown a reasonable probability that Dr. Nichols’s report would
        have changed the decision to give him benefits. Almost everything
        in Dr. Nichols’s report was cumulative of Drs. Fleming and Scar-
        borough’s opinions and identified the same limitations. And Dr.
        Nichols’s conclusions were inconsistent with the other objective
        medical evidence that the administrative law judge considered.
        Where evidence submitted to the appeals council contradicts other
        records that the administrative law judge found more credible, the
        new evidence is not material and the appeals council did not need
        to consider it. See Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 883 F.3d
        1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2018).
                                        B.
              Pruitt next argues that the administrative law judge should
        not have used his brief 2018 employment—what the administrative
        law judge called an “unsuccessful work attempt”—as a reason to
        deny him benefits. We find his argument unpersuasive.
               In order to qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must
        show that he is not engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20
        C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Here, the administrative law judge
        found that Pruitt was not engaged in substantial gainful activity—
        she agreed with Pruitt that his 2018 work attempt had been “un-
        successful.” However, she later discussed his work attempt as one
        of several facts that weighed against crediting Dr. Fleming’s opin-
        ion that Pruitt had a neurocognitive disorder that caused difficulty
        remembering instructions. That was not improper, because Pruitt
        quit work in 2018 due to physical pain—not mental limitations.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13809

        Pruitt’s arguments address only whether he was engaged in sub-
        stantial gainful activity, not what facts the administrative law judge
        was permitted to consider when it determined whether Dr. Flem-
        ing’s opinion was credible. He has not shown any error.
              AFFIRMED.