Court Opinion

ID: 9752249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:52:33.271123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:11.568688
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
concurring and dissenting. I agree with the majority that defendant made out a prima facie showing of gender discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Because of the unique circumstances of this ease, however, I disagree that this case should be remanded for a Batson hearing and instead believe that the proper remedy should be a new trial. In this case, the prosecutor was given an opportunity to explain his peremptory challenges, but he chose not to do so. Then on appeal, the prosecutor offered an explanation for his strikes that is discriminatory on its face. Because the prosecutor essentially admitted to discrimination in the jury selection, the Batson analysis is complete on the record before us. Thus, as a matter of judicial economy, it makes no sense to remand to the trial court for a hearing whose outcome, as a matter of law, is predetermined.
After defendant presented his evidence at the Batson hearing, which we have concluded established a prima facie case of discrimination, the court turned to the prosecution, giving the State a chance to respond. As the majority noted, the court queried the prosecutor directly by name. “Mr. Sipples?” The colloquy that follows, which the majority leaves out, demonstrates a deliberate attempt by the prosecutor to stall rather than offer a nondiscriminatory reason for his strikes. Because of the importance of the dialogue I shall reproduce it in full here:
The Court: Mr. Sipples?
Mr. Sipples: Thank you, your Honor. With respect to Mr. Donaghy’s motion, I don’t see him here today. If that’s the case, —
*444Mr. Sleigh [defense attorney]: He’s right here.
Mr. Sipples: Mr. DuBois? [another defendant with the same complaint]
Mr. Sleigh: Mr. DuBois is not here. We weren’t able to get him here on short notice.
Mr. Sipples: I ask that that motion be dismissed here.
The Court: I don’t think we’re going to do it on that basis.
Mr. Sipples: Very well. Your Honor, perhaps before we get to the merits of either of the motions that were filed, we should address the prejudice that’s resulted from the filing of motions and the subsequent press attention that’s been given thereto ....
The prosecutor went on to argue that the panel should be struck because of extensive coverage in the local media, completely failing to rebut defendant’s prima facie Batson charge. Instead, the prosecutor twice attempted to divert attention to another issue before settling on the media coverage issue as his foil. I am hard pressed to see how the majority can conclude that based on this interaction, the trial court never asked the prosecutor to explain his strikes or that the prosecutor was never given an opportunity to do so.
The prosecution’s failure to respond to the defendant’s prima facie case is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to respond. The prosecutor had previously filed his own Batson motion, arguing that defendant had struck jurors solely on the basis of their gender. When the court gave the prosecutor his opportunity to speak, he could have either presented his own prima facie case or responded to the defendant’s argument. Instead, he did neither. The majority argues that the prosecutor did not proffer an explanation for his strikes because he was not asked to do so. Because both parties had filed cross-motions to strike the jury based on Batson and the hearing had been convened for that express purpose, the prosecutor should not have expected the trial court to lead him by the hand through the final steps. Presumably, if the prosecutor had gender-neutral reasons for the strikes, he would have given them at the first opportunity.
The proper way to handle this situation is illustrated by United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 (9th Cir. 1992). There the prosecutor established a prima facie case of gender discrimination on the part of the defendant. Id. The defendant refused to explain her *445challenge, and consequently, the court disallowed her challenge. Id. Here, the court did not recognize the prosecutor’s refusal to answer and allowed the improper challenges to stand. While saving time, this ruling does not protect defendant’s, nor the excused juror’s, Fourteenth Amendment rights as mandated by Batson. See Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2000) (trial court’s perfunctory handling of Batson claim did not constitute meaningful inquiry into question of discrimination and case was remanded for new trial).
Even if I were to accept the majority’s rationale that a remand for a Batson hearing is appropriate because the prosecutor did not explain his strikes, I still believe that a new trial is required in this case because of arguments the prosecutor made to this Court on appeal. In the State’s appellate brief, the prosecutor argues, “[t]he State’s use of peremptory challenges is further supported by the fact that men are much more likely than women to have been charged and/or convicted of a criminal offense, making them potentially biased against the prosecution.” Although the first half of this statement may state a true fact, the prosecutor’s extension of the rationale to all men is blatant gender discrimination. To claim, in effect, that men are more likely to be biased against the prosecution is precisely the type of “invidious group stereotypes” that have “wreaked injustice in so many other spheres of our country’s public life.” J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.
Thus, the prosecutor has made it perfectly clear on appeal that his motives for the strikes were, in fact, discriminatory. Because this information is available on the face of the record, I .see no point in remanding to the trial court when we have all the information to complete the Batson analysis as a matter of law at this level. Furthermore, a retrial would take less time than a Batson hearing, another round of appeals, and then finally a retrial.
This remedy, although unusual, is not without precedent. Again, De Gross is instructive. In that case, after the trial court ruled that the defense had made a prima facie showing of discrimination in its challenge to the strike of an Hispanic woman, the court asked the prosecutor to respond. The prosecutor did so by stating that he excluded the juror because the prosecutor wanted more men on the jury. While the trial court accepted this justification and seated the juror, the Ninth Circuit rejected the justification and found it discriminatory as a matter of law. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1443. The proper remedy, according to the appeals court, was a new trial. Id. That situation is analogous to the one before us, except that here it *446was not the trial court that determined the defense had established a prima facie case of discrimination. This distinction is not substantive, however, because today the majority decides, in a decision in which I concur, that as a matter of law the defense did establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination. Further, in De Gross, the prosecutor offered an explanation for the strike that was discriminatory on its face to the trial court, while here the prosecutor offered a similarly discriminatory explanation in his appellate briefs. Again, this difference should not be significant because I, like the Ninth Circuit, would hold that the prosecutor’s explanation before us is discriminatory as a matter of law. The fact that these two legal determinations could be made at the appellate level rather than at the trial court should not affect the outcome or the remedy. Thus, because jurors were excluded from the panel as a result of unlawful discrimination and the jury rendered a guilty verdict, the only possible remedy is to strike the conviction and order a new trial.
I recognize, however, that a new trial is not required in most cases. There may be other circumstances where the trial court could make the proper inquiries in a hearing after remand. For instance, in United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1991), the trial court had made appropriate findings regarding Batson challenges to two jurors, but failed to rule on two others. The Second Circuit remanded the case for a final determination on those two jurors. Id. In the instant case, the trial court has not made a partial ruling, but has failed to make any ruling. Therefore, this is not a case appropriate for remand for a Batson hearing.
I conclude by noting that Batson does not require the prosecutor to articulate reasons that would rise to the level of a challenge for cause. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The State’s failure to rebut the defendant’s case, however, taints the trial with the appearance of gender discrimination. Defendant’s conviction should be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. Because the majority would insist on a procedure whose outcome is predetermined, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins in this dissent.