Court Opinion

ID: 9534525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:40:35.780574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:11.595795
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, C. J.
(dissenting) — As the majority state, when this case was before the court before (In re Sherman, 58 Wn.2d 1, 354 P.2d 888, 363 P.2d 390), it was decided that the applicable rule should be:
Mental irresponsibility is a complete defense to conduct of an attorney which would otherwise warrant disciplinary action: (1) if such conduct was the result or the consequence of mental incompetency; and (2) if the mental condition which was responsible for such conduct has been cured so completely that there is little or no likelihood of a recurrence of the condition. The burden of *726proof of this defense, in all of its aspects, is upon the respondent attorney.
This was a very liberal rule which we enunciated, much more liberal than the rule we apply in judging the conduct of a layman. See In re White v. Rhay, 64 Wn.2d 15, 390 P.2d 535. In my opinion, it gives the attorney the full benefit of the doubt as to his responsibility for his actions, and should not be liberalized further by relieving him of the necessity of showing that the illness which generated his misconduct has been cured.
In the proceeding before this court, there was definitely no showing that the respondent’s mental illness (paranoid personality) has been cured. Insofar as the record shows, no cure has been attempted. Although this proceeding has been pending since 1958, and the respondent defends his highly reprehensible actions in falsifying his application for admission to practice and in making unseemly attacks upon the courts of Oregon with an assertion that he was a victim of mental illness, he has not sought psychiatric help. He merely promises to do so if he is not disbarred or suspended.
During the time that the respondent has been practicing law, it appears that he has committed no major offense of the type which paranoia induces, at least none that were brought to the attention of the trial committee. But “secretiveness” is a characteristic of paranoia, and we do not know what falsifications may have occurred and been concealed. It can be seen, from the record before us, in my opinion, that the respondent has not rid himself of all of his feelings of persecution or his tendency to duplicity.
For example, there is the matter of the appointment of an attorney to represent him in this proceeding. Rule 7 K, Discipline of Attorneys, RCW vol. 0, provides for the appointment of an attorney to represent a respondent if it appears that he is incapable of conducting a proper defense to the formal complaint against him. While it was and is the contention of the respondent that he is fully capable of practicing law (and has been since shortly after the time he falsified his application for admission), he insisted that an attorney be appointed to represent him. He discharged the *727attorney who was appointed and who did represent him well and in evident good faith, protesting that he did not feel the attorney could represent him while he was also representing undesignated “conflicting” interests.
The respondent also insisted that a member of the trial committee was prejudiced against him, although he was not able to point to any evidence of such prejudice on the part of the committee member.
I have examined the record closely and find it devoid of any indication that the respondent realizes the seriousness of his offenses, that he truly regrets his action in falsifying his application, or that he feels now that it was unjustified. The respondent’s appearances before the trial committee were, to my mind, characterized by a lack of candor consistent with the finding of the Board of Governors that his paranoia has not been cured. The psychiatrists who testified stated that it is very unlikely that the illness can be cured without extensive treatment, and it cannot be predicted when or how its symptoms will be manifested in the future.
As this court stated in the earlier opinion in this case, we are not concerned here with punishment of an individual who is suffering from a mental illness, but rather in protecting the public and the legal profession from the possible consequences of allowing a person handicapped by such an illness to practice law. I cannot believe that a doctor suffering with palsey would be allowed by the medical profession to practice surgery. By the same token a man afflicted with a mental or emotional disease which compels him to perform dishonest acts and warps his judgment, should not be allowed to practice law.
I would either vacate the order of admission or adopt the recommendation of the Board of Governors and order a suspension until such time as the respondent can produce satisfactory medical testimony that the disease has been treated and cured.
Donworth, Ott, and Hale, JJ., concur with Rosellini, C. J.