Court Opinion

ID: 9586146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:07:40.855142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:21.409320
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
The defendant, an African-American, used 11 out of 12 strikes to remove white jurors. This established a prima facie case for the use of race-based strikes. See, e.g., Russell v. State, 230 Ga. App. 546, 548 (2) (497 SE2d 36) (1998). Further, this Court has concurred with the trial court that two of the defense’s allegedly “race-neutral” explanations for the exercise of such strikes were, in reality, simply pretext, further strengthening the prima facie case.
However, after a strong prima facie case demonstrating the use of race-based strikes and after a demonstration that the defense used allegedly race-neutral explanations as a cover-up for impermissible race-based strikes, this Court then finds that the trial court was unauthorized to find that two additional explanations were pretext. Why? Because “the record does not authorize a finding that the State, as the opponent of [the] peremptory strike [s], met its burden of persuasion to rebut the race-neutral explanation [s] given by defense counsel.” This is wrong.
The determination as to whether the State met its burden of persuasion is the trial court’s, not ours. The evidence was clearly there for the trial court to disbelieve the defense, and the trial court had the authority to do so. In a McCollum challenge, the State’s burden of persuasion need go no further than the prima facie case: “The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 511 (113 SC 2742, 125 LE2d 407) (1993); McKenzie v. State, 227 Ga. App. 778, 779 (490 SE2d 522) (1997).
The majority’s determination in the instant case must be *373examined in light of the above.
1. The defense struck juror no. 16. When asked to explain the strike, defense counsel stated:
Judge, I had a no here for Mrs. Robinson because of a 64-year-old teacher whose husband is an insurance auditor, in my opinion and my experience, is a prosecution witness — a pro-prosecution juror. I mean, you know, if she were white and her husband was a deacon and she were 64 years old, I would say, Judge, you know, just because I have had bád luck in the past with deacon’s wives that isn’t race neutral but in 28 years, I’m not smart, but you know I had to learn one or two things.
The trial court — rightfully — did not accept this explanation.
It was only after the trial court refused to accept the first explanation that defense counsel added that Robinson “was a teacher and she works with young children. . . . So, I mean, this is a drug case.” However, Robinson was a teacher’s aide, not a teacher. Such was a misstatement of the record. Further, she worked with young children in a local school’s vision program, not in the classroom or in counseling. Contrary to the majority’s position, there was no relation to drugs in Robinson’s voir dire testimony, no mention of drugs, and no such reasonable “inference” was raised by her testimony.
Most importantly, and also contrary to the majority’s opinion, the defense initially did not state that she was struck because of any drug-related inference; the defense “had a no for Mrs. Robinson” because defense counsel decided that a white, 64-year-old insurance adjuster’s wife would be pro-prosecution.2 Based on the prima facie case, the prior improper use of strikes, and the lack of factual support for the second explanation offered when defense counsel’s initial explanation rightfully failed, the record supports the trial court’s ruling. This Court has no authority to reverse the trial court’s legitimate credibility determination that defense counsel’s “race-neutral” explanation for striking Robinson was, in essence, a crock.
2. The defense struck juror no. 19, a 51-year-old white female employee with the Department of Human Resources in the contracts and purchasing department. The explanation was because she was a “career state employee.” That was it. The majority contends that “[d]efense counsel’s inference that a career state employee might be *374an establishment-oriented juror tending to favor the government is neither whimsical nor fanciful.” However, that is the inference drawn by the majority. Defense counsel never stated such, and the trial court did not draw such inference.3 The majority raises its own inferences; expands defense counsel’s sole explanation, “career state employee”; and substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court. However, based upon the prima facie case, the defense counsel’s prior use of pretextual explanations, and defense counsel’s inability to articulate a cogent rationale for striking yet another older white female, the trial court did not err in disallowing the strike. The record supports the trial court’s credibility determination.
3. Finally, the majority holds that “the trial court’s written findings denying defendant’s motion for new trial . . . erroneously continue to place the onus on the proponent to establish bias during voir dire.” However, this is simply inaccurate.
In its order, the trial court found that “[t]he State made a prima facie showing that the defense had discriminated against whites in its peremptory strikes.” Thereafter, the trial court held:
[T]he Court must consider the burden of persuasion on the State, as opponent of the strikes, in reaching a conclusion as to whether defense counsel’s strikes were motivated by discriminatory intent. The Court has considered the State’s burden of persuasion, the content of defense counsel’s explanations, and defense counsel’s demeanor. The Court concludes that defense counsel’s explanations for his strikes were subjective, vague, not based on the juror’s answers on voir dire, and not neutrally applied. It is for these reasons the Court placed four jurors struck by the defense back on the jury.
The trial court placed the burdens exactly where they belonged and evaluated the defense strikes in light thereof. See, e.g., Haynes v. State, 234 Ga. App. 272, 276 (5) (507 SE2d 151) (1998). It just does not get any cleaner than that.
This Court has repeatedly substituted its own evaluation of the striker’s explanations for that of the trial court. In those instances wherein the trial court disbelieves otherwise race-neutral reasons, i.e., McCollum challenges, this Court routinely reverses.4 Accord*375ingly, the efficacy oí McCollum in Georgia has been seriously compromised. A review of the record in this case shows that this is yet another instance where a conscientious trial judge attempted to follow the law as it relates to McCollum and to hold both parties to that law, as well. “In evaluating the trial court’s findings, this Court must keep in mind the unique perspective the trial court judge has in evaluating the rationdle given by the [striker]. A cold transcript cannot convey all of the subtle nuances of the process of jury selection.” Berry v. State, 263 Ga. 493, 494 (435 SE2d 433) (1993). Yet this Court, again, reverses and substitutes its own judgment as to whether the State met its “burden of persuasion.” It is wrong and I dissent.
Decided March 30,1999
Manning & Leipold, Calvin A. Leipold, Jr., Sharon Smith-Knox, for appellant.
Fitzgerald Hinson, pro se.
J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Benjamin M. First, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
I am authorized to state Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.

 “[W]here racially-neutral and neutrally applied reasons are given for a strike, the • simultaneous existence of any racially motivated explanation results in a Batson violation.” Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 667 (1) (c) (437 SE2d 463) (1993); Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga. App. 85, 87 (5) (424 SE2d 368) (1992).

 “[W]e are not authorized to create an inference of discrimination where none is apparent, and where none has been found by the trial court, to whose findings we must give great deference.” Lingo v. State, supra at 668.

 See, e.g., Malone v. State, 225 Ga. App. 315 (484 SE2d 6) (1997); O’Neal v. State, 226 Ga. App. 224 (482 SE2d 478) (1997); Leeks v. State, 226 Ga. App. 227 (483 SE2d 691) (1997); Gilbert v. State, 226 Ga. App. 230 (486 SE2d 48) (1997); Pickett v. State, 226 Ga. App. 743 *375(487 SE2d 653) (1997); Smith v. State, 229 Ga. App. 765 (494 SE2d 757) (1997); Smith v. State, 232 Ga. App. 458 (501 SE2d 622) (1998).