Court Opinion

ID: 9669224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:44:27.347324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:54.004295
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the trial court erred when it directed a' verdict against appellant, and therefore the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded as to appellant. I reach this conclusion because I think the arguments appellant makes in her brief are meritorious. This is a “concurring opinion,” however, because I disagree with the majority’s analysis. The majority relies on an argument that, for good reason, was not advanced by appellant.
This case involves a lease of a boxcar-sized container, calling for regular monthly rental payments. The plaintiff sued to recover the total amount of delinquent monthly rental payments, costs of repossessing the container, and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff filed the suit as a sworn account, complying with the pleading requirements of Tex.R.Civ.P. 185. In my opinion, this was a valid suit on a sworn account.
The majority holds that, because this is a suit on a lease agreement, the sworn account rules are inapplicable. I disagree.
Rule 185 covers “any action ... founded upon a ... claim for goods, wares and merchandise, including any claim for a liquidated money demand based upon written contract ... on which a systematic record has been kept.” In the present case, the plaintiff sued on a written contract involving the transfer of goods; a systematic record of charges and payments had been kept; and the claim was for a liquidated money demand. The majority holds, however, that this is not enough, relying on eases1 that add the jfurther requirements that to qualify for a sworn account, a claim must involve:
(1) a purchase and sale; and
(2) passing of title to personal property from one party to another.
The majority notes that the Murphy case relies on the Great-Ness case, and the Great-Ness case relies on the Meineke case; however, the majority prematurely stops there. The important point is that the Mei-neke case relies on Meaders v. Biskamp, 159 Tex. 79, 316 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1958), and cases that relied on Meaders. Meineke, 635 S.W.2d at 138. The 1958 Meaders case applied the “common law sworn account” rules; since then, the scope of rule 185 has been expanded by amendment beyond the contour’s of the common law sworn account. See William V. Dorsaneo, 1 Tex.Litigation Guide § 11.05[2] (1995). See also Vance v. Holloway, 689 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Tex.1985) (rule 185 sworn account suit proper in action by oil well developer to recover operating costs from working interest owner); Seisdata v. Compagnie Generate De Geophysique, 598 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suit to recover for service of interpreting refraction lines in offshore oil and gas field properly brought as suit on sworn account). Accordingly, Meaders and its progeny are no longer controlling.
Professor Dorsaneo accurately states that, “The courts have had difficulty in arriving at a consistent interpretation of the scope of Rule 185.” 1 Tex.Litigation Guide, Sec. 11.05[2] pp. 11-39 (1995). Hopefully, the Texas Supreme Court will see fit to set us straight before too much longer.

. The majority relies on Murphy v. Cintas, 923 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1996, n.w.h.); Great-Ness Professional Serv. v. First Nat’l Bank of Louisville, 704 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Coldwell Banker Property Management Co., 635 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).