Court Opinion

ID: 9894905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 16:09:08.437165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:58.623592
License: Public Domain

J-S18040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MICHAEL NOEL YARD                            :   No. 2644 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 18, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-45-CR-0001222-2022

BEFORE:       PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                       FILED NOVEMBER 3, 2023

       The Commonwealth brings this appeal from the order entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County denying its motion for recusal of

the trial judge in this criminal matter. Upon careful review, we conclude that

the Commonwealth has waived its claim for failure to raise it at the earliest

possible moment as required under well-settled jurisprudence. Accordingly,

we affirm the determination of the trial court and remand for further

proceedings.

       The trial court has set forth the pertinent facts and procedural history,

as follows:

       [The Commonwealth appeals] from the trial court order dated
       October 18, 2022, denying the Commonwealth’s Motion for
       Recusal. On April 8, 2022, the Commonwealth charged Michael
       Yard, Defendant with Criminal Homicide, Endangering the Welfare
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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     of a Child, and Aggravated Assault—Victim Less than 6 years of
     Age as a result of the death of Defendant’s three-month-old son.
     The District Magistrate held a preliminary hearing on May 9, 2022.
     At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the MDJ bound over
     all charges and denied Defendant bail. Defendant filed a Motion
     to Set Bail on May 10, 2022.

     On May 24, 2022, [the trial court, with the Honorable Jennifer
     Harlacher Sibum presiding,] held a hearing on Defendant’s Motion.
     The parties submitted a stipulation of facts on the record [on
     which the trial court could] base [its] bail decision. No testimony
     was presented at the bail hearing. [The trial court] announced
     [its] decision on the record and issued an order on May 27, 2022,
     granting Defendant’s motion and setting bail at $200,000 with
     several nonmonetary conditions. At the conclusion of the hearing,
     the Commonwealth made an oral motion to stay [the trial court’s]
     May 27, 2022, order. [The trial court] declined to entertain the
     Commonwealth’s oral motion and directed counsel to file a written
     motion. The Commonwealth did not file a written motion with the
     trial court as directed, but instead filed an Emergency Motion for
     Stay and Petition for Review with the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
     The Superior Court granted the Commonwealth’s request for a
     stay and directed [the trial court] to submit a statement of [its]
     reasons for [its] May 27, 2022, order.

     On May 31, 2022, the Commonwealth filed motions for transcripts
     seeking the transcripts of [the trial court’s] May 24, 2022, bail
     hearing and May 27, 2022, proceeding where [the trial court]
     placed the reasons for [its] granting of bail on the record. The
     transcripts were filed of record on June 8, 2022. In the interim,
     on June 6, 2022, Monroe County Children and Youth filed a Motion
     to Quash Subpoena issued upon it by Defendant.

     [The trial court] filed the statement of [its] reasons for granting
     bail with the Superior Court on June 23, 2022. In [the] statement,
     [the trial court] wrote that [it] committed an error of law when
     [it] based [its] May 27, 2022, decision upon the facts stipulated
     to by the Commonwealth and Defendant as the Pennsylvania
     Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Talley, 265 A.3d
     485 (Pa. 2021), specifically prohibits courts, in cases where the
     Commonwealth is seeking the denial of bail, from deciding bail on
     a cold record. Talley, at 524. Accordingly, [the trial court] asked
     the Superior Court to vacate [the trial court’s] May 27, 2022, order

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     and remand the matter for hearing so that [trial court] may make
     the qualitative and quantitative analysis required by Talley.

     [The trial court] further wrote in [its] statement that in the event
     the Superior Court did not vacate [its] May 27th bail order for the
     reasons stated above, that [it] did not find, based upon the
     stipulated facts, that the Commonwealth had established by either
     evident proof or great presumption the premeditated, specific
     intent necessary for first degree murder, particularly where the
     death in this case is unexplained and the mechanism of injury is
     unknown. Specifically, [the trial court] found that the stipulated
     facts may establish a prima facie case for first degree when all of
     the facts and inferences are considered in the light most favorable
     to the Commonwealth, but [the trial court] did not find that the
     evidence met the evident proof/great presumption standard
     required by Talley in order to deny Defendant bail. [The trial
     court] acknowledged in [its] statement, however, that [its]
     estimation of the Commonwealth’s evidence may change after
     viewing and listening to witness testimony at hearing and making
     the required qualitative and quantitative assessment of that
     evidence prior to denying a defendant bail.

     [On July 11, 2022, the trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion
     in another matter suggesting the Commonwealth had filed pretrial
     appeals without a good faith basis as required under Pennsylvania
     Rule of Appellate Procedure 311. Specifically, in the trial court’s
     concise statement, Judge Sibum stated, “Further, the
     Commonwealth’s use of Pa.R.A.P. § 311(D) to obtain de facto
     continuance or delays is not new to the Monroe County bench.”]

     On July 12, 2022, the Superior Court issued an order vacating [the
     trial court’s] May 27 bail order, lifting its temporary stay, and
     remanding the case for further proceedings.

     On July 29, 2022, [following remand and prior to any other motion
     having been filed or hearing being held,] the Commonwealth filed
     a Motion for Recusal. [The trial court] took the matter under
     advisement.

     On August 3, 2022, [the trial court] arraigned Defendant, held a
     hearing on CYS’s Motion to Quash, and scheduled a pretrial
     conference for September 14, 2022. On August 15, 2022, [the
     trial court] issued an order scheduling a hearing on Defendant’s
     bail motion for October 25, 2022. On August 5 and September 6,

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     2022, [the trial court] issued orders disposing of CYS’s Motion to
     Quash. [The trial court] held a pretrial conference on September
     14th. The Commonwealth did not object to [the trial court’s]
     presiding over formal arraignment or the pretrial conference. Nor
     did the Commonwealth object to [the trial court’s] adjudication of
     Monroe County Children and Youth’s Motion to Quash.

     On October 3, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion for hearing
     seeking a decision on its Motion for Recusal. On October 17, 2022,
     the Commonwealth filed a motion for continuance of the October
     25, 2022, bail hearing as the Commonwealth wanted [the trial]
     court to decide its Recusal Motion prior to the bail hearing. [The
     trial court] denied the Commonwealth’s Recusal Motion and
     dismissed its motion for continuance of the October 25, 2022, bail
     hearing as moot by order dated October 18, 2022. The next day,
     October 19, 2022, Commonwealth filed a Notice of Appeal from
     [the trial court’s] October 18th order and sought a stay of
     proceedings from the Superior Court. The Superior Court denied
     the Commonwealth’s request for stay.

     On October 25, [the trial court] held the bail hearing as scheduled.
     At the hearing, the Commonwealth attempted, over objection of
     Defendant, to submit Defendant’s bail motion on a cold record.
     Specifically, the Commonwealth sought to introduce the transcript
     and audio recording of the preliminary hearing, the affidavit of
     probable cause, and the autopsy report as the sole evidence for
     the [trial] court’s consideration with respect to Defendant’s bail
     motion. [The trial court] allowed the exhibits to be entered of
     record for appeal purposes but took under advisement the
     propriety of the [trial] court deciding Defendant’s bail motion on
     a cold record and directed the parties to file brief. The matter
     remains under advisement.

     On October 26, 2022, [the trial court] directed the Commonwealth
     to file its Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal
     pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within twenty-one days. The
     Commonwealth complied with [the trial court’s] order and filed its
     concise statement on November 14, 2022, raising [a challenge to
     the trial court’s order denying its motion for recusal].

Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/22, at 1-4.

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      In its sole issue on appeal, the Commonwealth contends that a record

of the trial court’s “clear bias, prejudice and unfairness in favor of the

Defendant” supported the Commonwealth’s motion for recusal and, thus,

demonstrates the abuse of discretion attendant to the court’s denial of the

motion.

      Before we may address the merits of the Commonwealth’s issue, we

must consider whether the Commonwealth’s recusal issue is time-barred and

waived for failure to present it at the time it learned of the facts that formed

the basis for its motion to recuse. Here, the Commonwealth learned of the

trial court’s July 11, 2022, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion in another matter

questioning the good faith of the Monroe County District Attorney’s Office’s

practice of filing pre-trial motions. Yet, it waited 18 days before it filed its

motion seeking the recusal of the Honorable Jennifer Harlacher Sibum. Similar

delays have been met with waiver.

      This Court presumes the impartiality of lower court judges and reviews

the denial of a recusal motion under an abuse of discretion standard:

      This Court presumes judges of this Commonwealth are
      “honorable, fair and competent” and when confronted with a
      recusal demand have the ability to determine whether they can
      rule impartially and without prejudice. The party who asserts a
      trial judge must be disqualified bears the burden of producing
      evidence establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessitating
      recusal, and the decision by a judge against whom a plea of
      prejudice is made will not be disturbed except for an abuse of
      discretion.

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Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1157 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations omitted).

      “The case law in this Commonwealth is clear and of long standing; it

requires a party seeking recusal or disqualification to raise the objection at

the earliest possible moment, or that party will suffer the consequence of

being time barred.”    Lomas v. Kravitz, 170 A.3d 380, 389 (Pa. 2017)

(quoting Goodheart v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757, 763 (Pa. 1989)) (emphasis

added). The “earliest possible moment” for bringing a recusal claim is “when

the party knows of the facts that form the basis for a motion to recuse.”

Lomas, 170 A.3d at 390.

      For example, in Coulter v. Lindsay, 159 A.3d 947, 950 (Pa. Super.

2017), this Court held in a per curiam opinion that where a party argued all

three members of a Superior Court panel should recuse themselves, the

Appellant waived the recusal claim by not raising it instantly at oral argument

and instead waiting nine days after the case was argued to do so. Similarly,

in Commonwealth v. Schorshinsky, 285 A.3d 918 (Pa. Super. filed

September 8, 2022) (non-precedential decision constituting persuasive

authority pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)), appeal denied, 292 A.3d 849 (Pa.

2023), a panel of this Court considered the “earliest possible moment”

standard in light of Coulter to find waiver where counsel, for no apparent

reason, waited 37 days after the trial judge made complained-of statements

in open court leading up to the rejection of his negotiated plea agreement.

Notably, that the delay in filing the recusal motion caused no delay in court

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proceedings did not provide an exception to the “earliest possible moment”

deadline applicable to making a recusal claim. Id. See also Commonwealth

v. Blount, 207 A.3d 925 (Pa. Super. 2019) (holding defendant failed to

preserve recusal claim based on trial judge’s refusal to accept parties’

negotiated sentence where defendant failed to object or seek recusal at

moment judge indicated it would first need to hear all testimony, evidence,

and arguments before reaching sentence).

      The asserted basis for the Commonwealth’s motion to recuse in the case

sub judice is Judge Sibum’s statement, incorporated in a Rule 1925(a) opinion

filed with this Court, questioning the Monroe County District Attorney’s

practice of filing interlocutory appeals. Like the moving parties’ fatal delays

in Lomas, Coulter, and Schorschinsky, the Commonwealth elected, for no

apparent reason, to wait 18 days after learning the facts that formed the basis

for its recusal motion before it filed the motion. Such an unexplained delay

fails to satisfy the due diligence implicit in the “earliest possible moment”

standard. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commonwealth has waived its

claim.

      Order affirmed.

      President Judge Panella joins the memorandum.

      Judge Dubow concurs in the result.

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Date: 11/03/2023

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