Court Opinion

ID: 9678596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:25:01.729602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:06.064100
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ADELE HEDGES, Justice.
In this premise liability suit, a jury found appellant, Rice Food Market, Inc., negligent and awarded appellee, Rhonda Hicks, $75,287.67 plus post-judgment interest and costs. In its first, second, and third points of error, Rice challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that it was negligent. In its fourth point of error, Rice challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the amounts awarded for future medical care and loss of earning capacity. We reverse and render judgment.
Background
Hicks, accompanied by her daughter, Noelle, and her son, Dorian, went to a Rice Food store. While attempting to purchase candy at a See’s Candy kiosk located in the store, one end of a See’s Candy sign fell off the canopy of the kiosk and struck Hicks on the right side of her face and right arm. Although Noelle and Dorian saw the sign fall, the Rice employee did not see the accident.
When the sign struck her, Hicks lost her balance, but her daughter caught her before she fell. An ambulance took Hicks to the hospital where she received treatment for severe bruising to her face and forearm.
The sign in question was made of plexiglass. It was approximately 54 inches long, eight inches wide, and weighed approximately three and one-half pounds.
Standard of Review
When, as here, the party without the burden of proof challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we will sustain the challenge only if, considering the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the finding, there is not more than a scintilla of evidence supporting it. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1995). “More than a scintilla of evidence exists where the evidence supporting the finding, as a whole, ‘rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.’ ” Id. (quoting Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 25 (Tex.1994)).
Analysis
When the injured party is an invitee, as Hicks was, the elements of a premise liability cause of action are:
(1) Actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises by the owner/operator;
(2) the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm;
(3) the owner/operator did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and
(4) the owner/operator’s failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries.
CMH Homes, Inc., v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 99 (Tex.2000); National Convenience Stores, Inc., v. Arrington, 896 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
Rice contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to prove the first three elements of the cause of action..
*613Actual or Constructive Notice
In its second point of error, Rice contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show that it had actual or constructive notice that the sign on the kiosk posed an unreasonable risk of harm. “The fact that the owner or occupier of a premises created a condition that posed an unreasonable risk of harm may support an inference of knowledge.” Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex.1992). Even with an inference of knowledge, the jury must still find that the owner or occupier knew or should have known of the condition. Id. Such an inference as a matter of law is improper unless knowledge is uncontroverted. Id.
Thus, we consider whether there is any evidence that Rice had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonable risk of harm. Rice denied actual knowledge that the sign posed an unreasonable risk of harm. Therefore, actual knowledge was not established as a matter of law.
We examine the record to determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to establish Rice’s actual or constructive knowledge. There is no evidence that the sign had ever fallen down before this incident, and a Rice representative testified that he knew of no similar incident. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the sign was a dangerous condition from the moment it was installed. Therefore, there is no evidence that Rice had actual knowledge that the sign on the kiosk posed an unreasonable risk of harm.
Likewise, Hicks presented no evidence of Rice’s constructive knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition. Constructive knowledge may be established by showing that the condition had existed long enough for the owner or occupier to have discovered it upon reasonable inspection. CMH Homes, Inc., 15 S.W.3d at 102. Hicks failed to present any evidence on how long the sign had been attached to the canvas. The evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding of knowledge.
While we are sympathetic to anyone who is innocently injured, we emphasize that premise owners neither are insurers nor are they strictly liable. Id. Hicks argues that the use of a velcro strip to attach the sign to the kiosk and the presence of unused screw mounts on the sign are evidence of constructive notice. We disagree. “Evidence that an owner or occupier knew of a safer, feasible alternative design, without more, is not evidence that the owner knew or should have known that a condition on its premises created an unreasonable risk of harm.” Id.
We, therefore, sustain Rice’s second point of error.
Because our determination of Rice’s second point of error is dispositive, we decline to address its other points.
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that Hicks take nothing.
Justice ALCALA dissenting.