Court Opinion

ID: 9718219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:19:04.85993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:57.981228
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. An essential prerequisite to seeking judicial redress for the alleged procedural error of the hearing examiner has not been satisfied. It is axiomatic that, before redress may be sought in the courts for an error committed by an administrative agency, administrative remedies must first be exhausted. Canonsburg General Hospital v. Department of Health, 492 Pa. 68, 73, 422 A.2d 141, 144 (1980); Packler v. State Employes’ Retirement Board, 487 Pa. 51, 408 A.2d 1091 (1979). Here, there has not even been a decision rendered by the administrative body. There has been no ruling by the Board, and the hearing examiner has only begun to receive evidence bearing upon the citation. No fines or license suspensions or revocations have been recommended or imposed. All that has occurred is a decision by a hearing examiner, in the normal course of receiving evidence, to grant a continuance. This decision is as much within the administrative realm as any ruling could possibly be, and is not one that should presently be the subject of judicial review.
*301By seeking immediate judicial review of the hearing examiner’s ruling, the licensees sought to bypass the administrative process, in an effort to obtain dismissal of the charges against them. The policy of allowing administrative processes to function without premature judicial intervention, however, is well recognized. When the legislature has enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme to address a particular subject and has established a governmental agency to administer that scheme, the courts are reluctant to interfere in matters which the legislature intended to b<3 considered, at least initially, by the administrative agency.
Generally, only where there exists no adequate administrative remedy is the exhaustion of administrative recourse not required. Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 477 Pa. 1, 7, 383 A.2d 791, 793 (1977); Ohio Casualty Group v. Argonaut Insurance Co., 514 Pa. 430, 525 A.2d 1195 (1987). Certainly, where there has been no decision by the Board, and where the issue is merely whether a continuance should have been granted, it cannot be presumed that administrative procedures are inadequate. As noted in Canonsburg General Hospital v. Department of Health, 492 Pa. at 73-74, 422 A.2d at 144, judicial action in a matter that is a proper subject for administrative adjudication, where there has not yet been such an adjudication, would constitute a premature intervention into the administrative process.
The inconvenience that the licensees may incur by having to attend a continued hearing, regrettable as perhaps that inconvenience may be, does not warrant a conclusion that the administrative process has failed in a manner so fundamental as to warrant immediate judicial intervention. Further, we have emphasized that futility cannot be presumed in the administrative process, and that, to the contrary, courts should assume that the administrative process will, if given a chance, discover and correct its own errors. Id., 492 Pa. at 74, 422 A.2d at 145. If the hearing examiner in the present case erred in granting a continuance, it must be presumed that the Board, upon completion of the hearings, if not sooner, will recognize and respond appropriately to *302the error. If an error is found, the Board will then have to determine whether it was of sufficient substance as to warrant dismissal of the citation.
In the event that the licensees are found to have committed violations for which sanctions can be imposed, and if the Board imposes such sanctions, the licensees are not without remedy. The Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders of the Board, and, if the licensees believe they have erroneously been found to have committed violations or that the penalties imposed are too severe, they are entitled to take an appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 933(a)(l)(v); 47 P.S. § 4-471. The proceeding before the Court of Common Pleas is de novo in nature, being therefore unhampered by any procedural irregularities that may have occurred at the administrative level. See Adair v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 519 Pa. 103, 546 A.2d 19 (1988) (under 47 P.S. § 4-471, judicial review of Board-imposed sanctions is de novo in form, with the court being entirely free to reject the findings, conclusions, and sanctions of the Board).
It should be recognized, too, that allowing judicial intervention in a case like the present one would permit widespread disruption of administrative processes by facilitating premature attempts to invoke judicial responses to all manner of minor rulings made during routine administrative proceedings. Petitions alleging a boundless variety of asserted errors in such proceedings could potentially be filed. Such a result would substantially undermine the longstanding policy of judicial deference to administrative processes, and would be contrary to the legislative intent that these matters be resolved initially at the administrative level. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court’s remand of this matter to the Board should be affirmed.
NIX, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.