Court Opinion

ID: 9900770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 15:00:44.930459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:17.742544
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10104    Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 11/20/2023   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10104
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        BREON D. HICKS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cr-80040-RLR-1
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10104

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Following a jury trial, Breon Hicks appeals his convictions
        for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
        crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and possession of a
        firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, in violation
        of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). 1 He argues that the district court
        erroneously instructed the jury as to the § 924(c) count on which
        he was convicted,2 and that there was insufficient evidence to
        support his § 922(g)(3) conviction. After review, we affirm.
                                      I.      Background
               A grand jury charged Hicks in a superseding indictment with
        nine drug- and firearm-related counts: (1) possession with intent to
        distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
        (b)(1)(D) (Counts 1, 3, 5, 6, and 9); (2) possession of firearm—a
        Masterpiece Arms Model MPA 57, 5.7 x 28 mm semi-automatic
        pistol—in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 2); (3) possession of a firearm—a
        Glock Model 17, 9mm semi-automatic pistol—in furtherance of a
        drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)

        1 The jury also found Hicks guilty of six other drug-related and firearm counts,
        but he does not appeal those convictions. Therefore, this opinion will focus
        only on the two convictions Hicks challenges on appeal.
        2 Hicks was acquitted of one § 924(c) count.
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        22-10104                Opinion of the Court                           3

        (Count 4); (4) possession of one or more firearms while being an
        unlawful user of a controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 922(g)(3) (Count 7); and (5) knowingly making a false statement
        on a firearms application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A)
        (Count 8).
               Briefly, at trial, as relevant to the convictions on appeal, the
        evidence established that, following a police surveillance operation
        in 2019, Hicks, who was a suspected drug dealer, was pulled over
        as part of a traffic stop. During the stop, officers discovered five
        pounds of marijuana in the vehicle, over two thousand dollars in
        cash, a box of 9-millimeter hollow point ammunition, and a loaded
        Glock 17 under the driver’s seat. In a post-arrest interview—
        portions of which were played for the jury at trial—Hicks stated
        that he initially thought when he was pulled over that he was being
        robbed because the officer was in an unmarked car and wearing a
        ski mask, and Hicks considered reaching for the gun to protect
        himself.
               Upon execution of search warrants on the two residences
        connected with Hicks, 3 police discovered additional boxes and
        receipts for other guns, various types of ammunition, a loaded
        Masterpiece Arms Model MPA 57 semi-automatic pistol in Hicks’s

        3 The police searched Hicks’s residence and the residence of his then-
        girlfriend, Jada Brody, which police had observed Hicks visit on numerous
        occasions while surveilling him.
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10104

        girlfriend’s bedroom closet, large quantities of marijuana, a digital
        scale, plastic baggies, and a vacuum sealing device. 4
                Jada Brody, Hicks’s girlfriend at the time of the traffic stop,
        testified that Hicks dealt marijuana and that he carried a gun every
        day that she saw him. 5 She said Hicks used the firearms to protect
        himself and their home from anyone who might try to rob him.
        She explained that she smoked marijuana, but Hicks did not use
        marijuana around her.
              Hicks testified in his own defense and admitted the
        marijuana and guns were his and that he sold “small quantities of
        marijuana.” However, he denied any connection between his guns
        and his drug activity. He maintained that he did not need firearms
        during his drug sales because he dealt with “high end clientele”

        4 The evidence from the traffic stop and the search of the residences served as
        the basis for Counts 1–5, and 7. Because Hicks appeals his convictions on
        Counts 4 and 7, we focus primarily on this evidence. Nevertheless, we note
        that, in May 2020, hotel staff at a Courtyard Marriott in Florida discovered a
        large amount of marijuana in a hotel room rented by Hicks. Hotel staff
        contacted the police and officers seized approximately 22 pounds of marijuana
        from the room. This evidence formed the basis of Count 9. And in October
        2020, police arrested Hicks at an outlet mall, pursuant to an arrest warrant,
        and found a bag filled with marijuana in the trunk of his vehicle, which formed
        the basis of Count 6.
        5 Both the government and defense counsel brought to the jury’s attention
        that Hicks’s ex-girlfriend was facing a separate drug charge for possession of a
        large amount of fentanyl, which carried a significant sentence, and that she
        was testifying in hopes of getting a reduced sentence.
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        22-10104                  Opinion of the Court                                5

        who were “not violent people.” He explained that he had a
        “friendly” relationship with his clients.
                 Hicks stated that the guns were for protection because he
        had previously been the victim of a violent crime and “for the [gun]
        range.” But he admitted that he would have used the guns to
        defend himself if necessary. He denied ever being robbed or
        threatened over his marijuana business. He explained that, on the
        day of the traffic stop, he left Brody’s house with the Glock and put
        it in his car. He stated that he was distracted and forgot that he had
        the Glock under the driver’s seat when he was pulled over because
        he had been “with a woman that wasn’t [his] girlfriend” that day.
        He maintained that the Glock had nothing to do with the
        marijuana in the vehicle. He also admitted to using marijuana, but
        stated that he was “not accustomed to smoking” and did not do it
        often.6 When confronted with his post-arrest statement to police
        following the traffic stop, in which he stated that he used marijuana
        multiple times every day, Hicks explained that he had “exaggerated
        a little bit.”
               As relevant to the § 924(c) charges (Counts 2 and 4) for
        possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime,
        Hicks requested that the court add to the pattern jury instruction
        that “[t]he mere presence of a firearm in an area where a criminal
        act occurred is not sufficient to meet the ‘in furtherance of’

        6 Hicks also stated that he had a medical marijuana card, but officers testified
        that they could not find any record of Hicks having a medical marijuana card.
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-10104

        requirement.”7 The government objected to the addition of the
        proposed language, arguing that it was not an accurate reflection
        of the law and likely to cause confusion among the jurors. The
        district court concluded that the pattern instruction accurately

        7 The pattern jury instruction provides as follows:
               It’s a separate Federal crime to possess a ﬁrearm in furtherance
               of a . . . [drug-traﬃcking crime].

               The Defendant can be found guilty of this crime only if all the
               following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

               1. that the Defendant committed the . . . [drug-traﬃcking
               crimes] charged in Count __ of the [Superseding] Indictment;
               and

               2. that the Defendant knowingly possessed a ﬁrearm in
               furtherance of that crime, as charged in the [Superseding]
               Indictment.

               A “ﬁrearm” is any weapon designed to or readily convertible
               to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. The term
               includes the frame or receiver of any such weapon.

               To “possess” a ﬁrearm is to have direct physical control of the
               ﬁrearm or to have knowledge of the ﬁrearm’s presence and the
               ability and intent to later exercise control over the ﬁrearm.

               Possessing a ﬁrearm “in furtherance of ” a crime means that
               the ﬁrearm helped, promoted, or advanced the crime in some
               way.

        Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction O35.3 (ﬁrst and second alteration in
        original).
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        22-10104                Opinion of the Court                            7

        reflected the law, and it declined to include Hicks’s proposed
        language. However, the court explained that Hicks’s counsel could
        make the “mere presence” argument to the jury in closing. The
        district court later provided the pattern instruction to the jury.
               During closing arguments, Hicks’s counsel argued that the
        “mere presence” or mere possession of a gun in relation to criminal
        activity was not sufficient to support the § 924(c) charges. Rather,
        the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
        Hicks “did something with the gun in furtherance of his” drug
        dealing. His counsel then emphasized that the guns were for
        protection because Hicks was previously “a victim of a crime,” and
        the guns had “nothing to do with narcotics.” With regard to the
        Glock discovered during the traffic stop, his counsel pointed out
        that Hicks forgot the gun was in the car at that time but, regardless,
        the government had not shown that the gun was in furtherance of
        the drug activity.8
               Following deliberations, the jury convicted Hicks of Count
        1 and Counts 3 through 9, and acquitted him of Count 2 (the
        § 924(c) charge based on the Masterpiece Arms firearm found in a
        closet during a search of his home). This appeal followed.

        8 Following the government’s case-in-chief and again at the close of the
        evidence, Hicks moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the
        district court denied.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10104

                                   II.    Discussion
               Hicks argues that the district court erroneously instructed
        the jury as to the § 924(c) charge, and that there was insufficient
        evidence to support his § 922(g)(3) conviction. We address each
        argument in turn.
                  A. The § 924(c) Jury Instruction
                Hicks argues that the district court erroneously crafted its
        own instruction for the § 924(c) counts, and “in essence, instructed
        the [j]ury that mere connection between the firearm and a drug
        trafficking crime could support a conviction.” He maintains that
        this was a misstatement of the law. As we explain further, Hicks’s
        claim is belied by the record.
               When, as here, a defendant preserved an objection to the
        jury instructions, “[w]e review de novo the legal correctness of jury
        instructions but review the phrasing of the instructions for abuse
        of discretion.” United States v. Focia, 869 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir.
        2017). Importantly, “[j]ury instructions need not be perfect, and
        we review the instructions in light of the entire charge and do not
        isolate individual statements in order to contrive error.” United
        States v. Ruan, 56 F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations
        omitted). “[W]e will not reverse a conviction . . . unless the issues
        of law were presented inaccurately, or the charge improperly
        guided the jury in such a substantial way as to violate due process.”
        Focia, 869 F.3d at 1280 (quotations omitted).
             Here, the district court gave the pattern jury instruction for
        the § 924(c) charges, which included the statement that
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        22-10104                  Opinion of the Court                              9

        “[p]ossessing a firearm ‘in furtherance of’ a crime means that the
        firearm helped, promoted, or advanced the crime in some way.”
        Although Hicks maintains that the instruction erroneously
        permitted the jury to convict him if there was only a “simple
        connection” between the guns and the marijuana, the jury
        instruction accurately conveyed the law and did not mention
        anything about merely requiring a “connection” between the guns
        and the drug activity.
                Specifically, § 924(c) prohibits using or carrying a firearm in
        relation to a drug-trafficking crime as well as possessing a firearm
        in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
        The statute does not define what it means to be in furtherance of a
        drug-trafficking crime, but we have held that “a conviction under
        this portion of § 924(c) requires that the prosecution establish that
        the firearm helped, furthered, promoted, or advanced the drug
        trafficking.” United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir.
        2002). Thus, the jury instruction provided in this case accurately
        stated the law. 9

        9 Hicks argues that the jury instruction was “a far cry from” the standard set
        forth in the Supreme Court’s Bailey decision, but his reliance on Bailey is
        misplaced. Specifically, in Bailey, the Supreme Court held that the term “use”
        in § 924(c)(1) required evidence to show “an active employment of the firearm
        by that defendant”—mere proximity and accessibility did not suffice. Bailey,
        516 U.S. at 143. As we explained in Timmons, however, following the Bailey
        decision, Congress amended § 924(c) and added the “in furtherance of”
        portion of the statute. Timmons, 283 F.3d at 1252. Hicks was convicted under
        the “in furtherance of” provision of § 924(c), which does not require active
        employment of the firearm. Instead, as we explained in Timmons, under this
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                       22-10104

               To the extent that Hicks quarrels with the district court’s
        decision not to include his requested language in the instruction
        that “[t]he mere presence of a firearm in an area where a criminal
        act occurred is not sufficient to meet the ‘in furtherance of’
        requirement,” the district court concluded that the pattern
        instruction accurately stated the law and that the addition of the
        requested language could generate confusion among the jury. We
        cannot say this was an abuse of discretion.
                Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that Hicks is correct
        that the instruction was erroneous because it failed to specify that
        the mere presence of a gun was insufficient to sustain a § 924(c)
        conviction under the “in furtherance of” portion of the statute, we
        conclude that any error was harmless. Focia, 869 F.3d at 1280
        (explaining that jury instructions are “subject to harmless error
        review,” and “[a]n error is harmless if the reviewing court is
        satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
        did not contribute to the verdict obtained” (quotations omitted)).
        Hicks argued to the jury throughout his closing that the mere
        presence of a gun was not sufficient and that the government failed
        to prove that either of the guns charged in Count 2 and Count 4
        were connected to his drug activity. The jury clearly understood
        that the mere presence of a firearm was insufficient as a matter of
        law to sustain a § 924(c) conviction under the in furtherance of
        provision because it acquitted Hicks of Count 2. In other words,

        provision, “the prosecution [must] establish that the firearm helped, furthered,
        promoted, or advanced the drug trafficking.” Id.
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        22-10104                   Opinion of the Court                                 11

        the acquittal demonstrates that the jury agreed with Hicks that the
        government failed to meet its burden of showing a connection
        between the Masterpiece Arms semi-automatic pistol charged in
        Count 2—which was found in the master bedroom closet—and the
        drug activity. On the other hand, the jury disagreed with Hicks
        that the government failed to show a connection between the
        Glock found under his driver’s seat during the traffic stop and the
        marijuana in the vehicle, as evidenced by the fact that the jury
        convicted him of Count 4. 10
                B. The § 922(g)(3) conviction
              Hicks argues that the government failed to present sufficient
        evidence to sustain his § 922(g)(3) conviction for possessing a

        10 We note that the nexus between the gun and the drug trafficking, “can be
        established by the type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of
        the firearm, the type of the weapon, . . . whether the gun is loaded, proximity
        to the drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstance under which the
        gun is found.” Timmons, 283 F.3d at 1253 (quotations omitted). Here,
        although Hicks testified that the Glock found during the traffic stop was not
        related to the marijuana, the jury was free to disbelieve this testimony. United
        States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “when
        a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the risk that if disbelieved the jury might
        conclude the opposite of his testimony is true” (quotations omitted)).
        Furthermore, the jury could have found a nexus between the gun and the drug
        activity based on Brody’s testimony that Hicks carried a gun every day, the
        fact that the Glock was loaded and under Hicks’s driver’s seat, and it was in
        close proximity to the marijuana in the vehicle. Timmons, 283 F.3d at 1253; see
        also Williams, 390 F.3d at 1323 (explaining that “[a] jury is free to choose among
        reasonable constructions of the evidence” and “[a]ll credibility choices must
        be made in support of the jury’s verdict”).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10104

        firearm while being an unlawful user of marijuana. He notes that,
        although he admitted during his testimony to using marijuana, he
        never said how much or how often, and there was no evidence that
        he used marijuana on the date of his arrest, at the time he
        purchased firearms, or at any time when he was in possession of
        firearms.
               “We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges de novo,
        making all factual and credibility inferences in the government’s
        favor.” United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2023)
        (alteration adopted) (internal citation omitted) (quotations
        omitted). “A jury’s verdict cannot be overturned if any reasonable
        construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find
        the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
        Capers, 708 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted).
        “The evidence need not be inconsistent with every reasonable
        hypothesis except guilt, and the jury is free to choose between or
        among the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the evidence
        presented at trial.” Id. (quotations omitted).
                 Under § 922(g)(3), it is “unlawful for any person . . . who is
        an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance . . .
        to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm of
        ammunition[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The term “unlawful user”
        is not defined in the statute, see id., and we have not adopted
        pattern instructions for § 922(g)(3) offenses. We have, however,
        considered the definition of “unlawful user” in the context of a
        provision of the Sentencing Guidelines that cross-references
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        22-10104                  Opinion of the Court                               13

        § 922(g) offenses. See United States v. Edmonds, 348 F.3d 950, 953
        (11th Cir. 2003). 11 In that context, we held that to be an unlawful
        user of marijuana, “a defendant’s use must be ongoing and
        contemporaneous with the commission of the offense.” Id.
        (quoting United States v. Bernardine, 73 F.3d 1078, 1082 (11th
        Cir.1996)). However, we clarified that the government is not
        required to show that the use was simultaneous with the firearm
        possession or that the defendant was under the influence at the
        time of the possession. Id.
               Here, sufficient evidence was presented at Hicks’s trial that
        he was an unlawful user of marijuana contemporaneously with his
        possession of firearms. At Hicks’s home and in his vehicle, officers
        discovered marijuana, and Hicks testified that he used marijuana.
        Although he never specified as part of his trial testimony how
        much he used or when he used marijuana, the government
        presented his post-arrest statement in which he told officers that he
        used marijuana multiple times every day. The jury was entitled to
        credit this evidence over Hicks’s trial testimony that this statement
        was simply an exaggeration and that he was not accustomed to

        11 In Edmonds, we interpreted § 2K2.1 of the guidelines, which provides for a
        specific base offense level if the offense involved a firearm and the person was
        a “prohibited person.” 348 F.3d at 953 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)). And
        we explained that the guidelines defined a “prohibited person” by reference to
        any person described in § 922(g), which includes a person “who is an unlawful
        user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1,
        cmt. (n.6)—we note that (n.6) now appears as (n.3) in the current guidelines).
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10104

        smoking marijuana.12 Williams, 390 F.3d at 1325 (explaining that
        “when a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the risk that if
        disbelieved the jury might conclude the opposite of his testimony
        is true” (quotations omitted)). Accordingly, viewing the evidence
        in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that
        Hicks’s § 922(g)(3) conviction was supported by sufficient
        evidence.
                AFFIRMED.

        12 Hicks also maintains that the government argued that he was addicted to
        marijuana, but that the government failed to prove such an addiction. We
        need not address this argument because as discussed above § 922(g)(3) makes
        it “unlawful for any person . . . who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any
        controlled substance . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm
        of ammunition.” Thus, the government needed to show either that Hicks was
        an unlawful user of a controlled substance or that Hicks was addicted to a
        controlled substance; it did not have to prove both. And, here, the
        government presented sufficient evidence to show that Hicks was an unlawful
        user.