Court Opinion

ID: 9574126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:02:34.076935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:07.849704
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment affirming the conviction; however, I do not join in the paragraph of the opinion that adresses the construction of the statute. In that paragraph, the majority expresses views that I do not believe are supported by the law or the facts of this case.
Timothy E. Johnson seeks to have this Court conclude that because the incident involved a family conflict, a greater disturbance would have occurred if he had stopped to rendered assistance. He contends that the potential for greater conflict was justification for not stopping and rendering assistance. See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law §§ 49-50 (1972). However, the record clearly establishes that, at trial, Johnson defended against the prosecution on the basis that the was not aware that *773his automobile struck Dickerson. He testified that he “certainly would have” stopped his automobile if he had known his automobile had hit Dickerson. After trial, in a mo.tion to reconsider and set aside the verdict, Johnson’s new counsel first raised the issue of the volatility of family disputes as a justification for not stopping.
It is not difficult to conceive of exigent and volatile circumstances in which a driver may well be justified in violating the statutory command to stop and render assistance. That justification, however, must be based upon compelling circumstances shown to exist at the time of the incident and not upon a generalized notion that family quarrels are per se more violent than other confrontations. Because Johnson testified that, had he known his automobile had hit Dickerson, he would have stopped, the evidence in the record does not support his contention that this family quarrel was a compelling reason not to stop. Johnson’s own testimony refutes the argument now advanced on appeal. Moreover, no evidence proves that Johnson had a reasonable basis to fear that by stopping and rendering assistance he would have caused a greater confrontation. Thus, the facts in the record do not prove a sufficient justification for Johnson’s failure to stop and render assistance.
I agree with the majority that upon the evidence in the record the trial judge did not err in concluding that Johnson knew or should have known that his automobile struck Dickerson. Accordingly, I would also affirm the conviction.