Court Opinion

ID: 9839228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 17:01:17.91208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:45.794842
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, a non-            No. 22-16483
profit corporation,
                                           D.C. No.
             Plaintiff-Appellant,       1:22-cv-00710-
                                          AWI-EPG
 v.

CICELY MULDOON, in her official            OPINION
capacity as Superintendent of
Yosemite National Park; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;
UNITED STATES NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE, an agency of the
United States Department of the
Interior,

             Defendants-Appellees.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Eastern District of California
      Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted May 9, 2023
              San Francisco, California

               Filed September 12, 2023
2              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

    Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Michelle T.
        Friedland and Mark J. Bennett, Circuit Judges.

                  Opinion by Judge Friedland

                          SUMMARY *

                      Environmental Law

    The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Earth
Island Institute’s motion for a preliminary injunction against
the Superintendent of Yosemite National Park, the National
Park Service, and the Department of the Interior
(collectively, “the Agency”) to halt parts of two projects to
thin vegetation in Yosemite National Park in preparation for
controlled burns.
    Earth Island Institute sued the Agency under the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), arguing that it was
unlawful for the Agency to approve the projects without
conducting a full review of their environmental impacts.
    Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, the panel
upheld the Agency’s determination that the projects fell
under a categorical exclusion called the “minor-change
exclusion” that exempted them from the requirement that the
Agency prepare an environmental assessment or an
environmental impact statement. The projects fell under that
categorical exclusion because they were “changes or

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
             EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON            3

amendments” to the 2004 Fire Management Plan that would
cause “no or only minimal environmental impact.” The
panel held that the projects were consistent with the Fire
Management Plan, contributing to its goals and using its
methods, with only minor modifications. The Agency
adequately explained its conclusion that those modifications
would have “no or only minimal” environmental impacts,
including on threatened and endangered species. In holding
that the Agency’s determination was not arbitrary and
capricious, the panel emphasized that the relevant issue was
the expected environmental impact of the aspects of the
projects that deviated from the Fire Management Plan, not
the environmental impact of the projects overall.
     The panel acknowledged that even if a proposed project
fits within a categorical exclusion, an agency may not rely
on that exclusion if there are “extraordinary circumstances
in which a normally excluded action may have a significant
effect” on the environment. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). The panel
rejected Earth Island Institute’s argument that the projects
are highly controversial and upheld the Agency’s
determination that no extraordinary circumstances were
present.
    Because Earth Island Institute failed to meet the
threshold inquiry of showing a likelihood of success on the
merits, the panel did not consider the other preliminary
injunction factors.
4            EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

                        COUNSEL

Thomas C. Buchele (argued) and Haley Nicholson, Earthrise
Law Center, Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon;
Bridgett A. Chevallier, Willamette Law Group, Oregon City,
Oregon; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
David S. Frankel (argued), Sommer H. Engels, Rachel
Heron, and Andrew C. Mergen, Attorneys; Jeffrey S.
Thomas, Trial Attorney; Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney
General; United States Department of Justice, Environment
& Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C.; David W.
Gehlert, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice,
Environment & Natural Resources Division, Denver,
Colorado; for Defendants-Appellees.

                         OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

    In 2004, the National Park Service adopted a
comprehensive plan for fire management in Yosemite
National Park. In 2021 and 2022, the National Park Service
approved two projects to thin vegetation in Yosemite in
preparation for controlled burns. Those projects comported
with the fire management plan except for minor alterations.
The Earth Island Institute sued under the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), arguing that it was
unlawful for the National Park Service to approve the
projects without conducting a full review of their expected
environmental impacts. The Institute then moved for a
preliminary injunction to halt parts of the projects. The
district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction,
              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON              5

holding that the National Park Service had sufficiently
evaluated the environmental impact of the projects. We
affirm.
                              I.
                              A.
    Ever since Congress established the first national park in
1872, there has been a “tension” between the goals of
preserving nature, which includes fire, and making “nature
available for the enjoyment of all Americans” by
suppressing fire. Hal K. Rothman, Blazing Heritage: A
History of Wildland Fire in the National Parks 6 (2007).
The history of fire management in Yosemite epitomizes that
tension.
    Established by Congress in 1890, id. at 15, Yosemite
National Park sits on the western slope of the Sierra Nevada,
the highest and longest mountain range in California.
Historically, that area was subject to periodic fires typically
of low-to-moderate intensity. During those periodic burns,
small plants would die, while larger, fire-resistant trees
would survive. The smaller plants would then grow back,
thickening the understory—the layer of vegetation beneath
the main canopy of the forest—until another fire occurred
and the cycle started anew.
    Government efforts to suppress fire disrupted that fire
cycle, starting around the late nineteenth century. Id. at 6–
7. When the National Park Service was founded in 1916, it
began leading these efforts, adopting a policy of
extinguishing any fires in national parks, including
Yosemite, as soon as possible. See id. at 7. Fire suppression
altered the composition of the forest as small plants that
would have burned in periodic fires instead accumulated.
6            EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

Over time, like other national park forests, Yosemite’s forest
became much denser and its canopy became increasingly
closed, allowing less sunlight to get through to the
understory. Id. at 8.
    In the 1960s, the National Park Service realized that fire
suppression had unintended consequences. See id. at 7, 117.
Fire suppression had led to a greater density of burnable
vegetation that increased the intensity of the fires that did
occur, making it more difficult for firefighters to control
them. See id. at 20. Accordingly, the National Park Service
reassessed its fire policy, allowing some naturally ignited
wildfires to burn and even intentionally starting additional
fires—a technique known as “prescribed” or “controlled”
burning. See id. at 117–19.
    In 2004, after nearly five years of preparation that
included public notice and comment, the National Park
Service published an 800-page document proposing an
updated approach to fire management in Yosemite and
analyzing its expected environmental impacts: the Final
Yosemite Fire Management Plan/Environmental Impact
Statement (“2004 Environmental Impact Statement” or
“Impact Statement”). The Impact Statement acknowledged
that what the National Park Service had been doing up to that
point was not enough. Despite allowing fire to “play a more
natural role in park ecosystems” for decades, the National
Park Service’s fire-management program had “not been able
to meet park land management objectives of ecosystems
restoration.” In fact, the “long-term buildup of fuels”—such
as small trees and dense understory—that had occurred
under the fire-suppression policy persisted in many areas.
The National Park Service concluded that “[i]ncreased
application of prescribed fire” was needed to adequately
“reduce forest fuels.” But the accumulation of fuel over the
             EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON             7

decades of fire suppression made prescribed burning
difficult. The National Park Service recognized that it was
unsafe to initiate burns in many areas that desperately
needed them because the density of fuel could cause fires to
burn too intensely to control.
    As a result, the 2004 Environmental Impact Statement
considered other fuel-reduction techniques that could be
used to treat overgrown areas, either on their own or in
preparation for prescribed burns. Many of the fuel-reduction
techniques involved cutting down and removing trees and
other vegetation (whether mechanically or by hand), a
process called “thinning.” Some of the fuel-reduction
techniques described in the Impact Statement were permitted
under the National Park Service’s then-existing fire-
management program, but many were new, such as using
mechanical tools to remove vegetation.
    The 2004 Environmental Impact Statement articulated
two high-level goals: (1) “to reduce the threat of wildland
fire to public safety” and (2) “to return the influence of
natural fire to park ecosystems” so that the park ecosystems
would be “restored to, and maintained in, as natural a
condition as possible.” It then considered four different
paths that the National Park Service could take to attempt to
achieve those goals—four “Alternatives”—and analyzed the
expected results and environmental impacts of each.
Alternative A represented the status quo. Under Alternative
A, “the fire management program would continue to use the
[fuel-reduction] strategies of the existing 1990 fire
management plan.” The National Park Service concluded
that maintaining the status quo would not meet the
ecosystem restoration goals described in the Impact
Statement. The other three alternatives (Alternatives B
through D) leveraged the new fuel-reduction techniques
8               EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

described in the Impact Statement but differed in the
aggressiveness of their application and thus in their timeline
for achieving restoration goals. The Impact Statement’s
recommended course of action—Alternative D—was the
intermediate option and was expected to achieve restoration
goals within fifteen to twenty years. Alternative D was
deemed “environmentally preferred” because it would cause
“the least damage to the environment” and “best protect[],
preserve[], and enhance[] historic, cultural, and natural
resources.” Unsurprisingly, in a subsequent Record of
Decision, the National Park Service adopted Alternative D.
    The 2004 Environmental Impact Statement and Record
of Decision (together, the “Fire Management Plan” or
“Plan”), provided a blueprint for Alternative D’s
implementation, describing what actions were to be taken
and where. 1 For instance, the Plan contemplated that trees
less than 20 inches in diameter would be thinned within 200
feet from the centerline of certain identified roads to serve as
boundaries for prescribed burns. In sequoia groves, by

1
  In the Record of Decision, the National Park Service reviewed the four
alternatives presented in the 2004 Environmental Impact Statement and
selected Alternative D, noting that the action it was selecting was
“unchanged from what is presented” in the portion of the Impact
Statement that described that alternative. The National Park Service
instructed the reader to “[r]efer to the [2004] Final Yosemite Fire
Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement for complete details
on the selected action.” In the remainder of this opinion, “Fire
Management Plan” refers to the portions of the 2004 Environmental
Impact Statement that were approved in the Record of Decision—i.e.,
the portions of the Impact Statement describing and analyzing
Alternative D.
                 EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON                       9

contrast, the Plan permitted thinning of non-sequoia trees
only less than 12 inches in diameter. 2
                                    B.
    Although the Fire Management Plan predicted that
Alternative D would be complete within roughly twenty
years, progress has been slow. In that time, fewer acres have
been treated than would have been had the National Park
Service implemented Alternative A—the status-quo
alternative. The National Park Service attributes much of
the delay to a drought that plagued California from 2012 to
2016, killing millions of trees in the Sierra Nevada. The high
density of the resulting dead biomass, combined with the
high density of live trees and understory, make it
extraordinarily difficult for firefighters to control and
contain fires, increasing the preparation that must be done
before a prescribed burn can occur.
    Still, progress continues, one project at a time. Two such
projects are at issue here: the Wawona Project and the
Yosemite Valley Project (collectively, the “Projects”). 3
    The National Park Service approved the Wawona Project
in August 2021. The Project will reduce fuel along certain
roads and trails in preparation for a prescribed burn

2
 The National Park Service amended the 2004 Fire Management Plan in
2017 to “allow more opportunities for fire to play its critical role in the
ecosystem.” The amended Plan increased the areas of Yosemite in
which prescribed burns were permitted.
3
  The full names of the Projects are (1) “Biomass removal and thinning
to protect sequoias, wildlife habitat and communities—Wawona Road to
Merced Grove” (“Wawona Project”), and (2) “Biomass removal and
thinning—Yosemite Valley, Wawona, and Yosemite West” (“Yosemite
Valley Project”).
10             EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

scheduled for the fall of 2023. The goal of the thinning and
subsequent prescribed burning is to protect the Merced and
Tuolumne groves of giant sequoias and the towns near them.
The Project contemplates thinning non-sequoia trees with
diameters less than 20 inches in designated areas, including
in the Merced Sequoia Grove. Dead and downed trees will
then be removed from the area, either by being hauled offsite
or by being piled and burned.
   The National Park Service approved the Yosemite
Valley Project in April 2022. Like the Wawona Project, the
Yosemite Valley Project aims to protect the identified areas
by thinning trees less than 20 inches in diameter in
preparation for a prescribed burn. 4
    The actions contemplated by the Projects deviate
somewhat from the measures described in the Fire
Management Plan. The Wawona Project authorizes removal
of certain non-sequoia trees less than 20 inches in diameter
in the Merced Sequoia Grove, whereas the Fire Management
Plan had contemplated removal of trees in sequoia groves
only with diameters less than 12 inches. 5 The National Park
Service explained that this deviation was necessary because
tree density had increased in the years since the Fire
Management Plan’s adoption, making the removal only of
trees less than 12 inches in diameter “insufficient to protect
the sequoias.” The Projects also expand the locations in
which fuel-reduction work will take place. Both Projects
add new road segments along which thinning will occur that
were not included in the Fire Management Plan. And the

4
 The Yosemite Valley Project does not involve any thinning in sequoia
groves.
5
  The Fire Management Plan generally permitted the removal of trees up
to 20 inches in diameter, but not in sequoia groves.
                EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON                      11

Wawona Project contemplates thinning trees within 209 feet
from the centerline of certain roads, whereas the Fire
Management Plan contemplated the removal of trees up to
only 200 feet from a road’s centerline.
    Although NEPA generally requires federal agencies to
prepare a lengthy environmental impact analysis of new
projects before their adoption, the National Park Service
concluded that both Projects were categorically excluded
from that requirement under regulations implementing
NEPA because the Projects were “changes or amendments
to an approved plan” (i.e., the Fire Management Plan) that
“would cause no or only minimal environmental impact.”
                                   C.
    In May 2022, a member of the California-based
environmental organization Earth Island Institute observed
trucks carrying timber through Yosemite. After some
investigation, the Institute learned of the Wawona Project
and initiated this lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California. The suit challenged
the Wawona Project’s approval as procedurally deficient
under NEPA. The lawsuit named as Defendants Cicely
Muldoon (the Superintendent of Yosemite National Park) in
her official capacity, the National Park Service, and the
Department of the Interior (collectively, “the Agency”). 6
    The Institute filed a motion for a preliminary injunction
two days later, requesting that the court enjoin the Agency
from “allowing or implementing any of the logging,
thinning, or biomass removal authorized by” the Wawona

6
 The National Park Service is a division of the Department of the Interior
and manages Yosemite as part of the National Park System. See 54
U.S.C. § 100101(a).
12            EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

Project, with limited exceptions. The Agency then informed
the Institute about the Yosemite Valley Project and produced
records documenting the Agency’s approval of both
Projects. In response, the Institute amended its Complaint
and preliminary injunction motion to include the Yosemite
Valley Project. The amended motion requested that all
“logging, thinning, or biomass removal” be enjoined except
for within certain areas and except for the thinning of trees
under 12 inches in diameter in the Merced Sequoia Grove.
    The parties agreed to an expedited briefing schedule that
would resolve the preliminary injunction motion before the
Agency was required to produce the complete administrative
record.    After receiving that briefing and a partial
administrative record, the district court found that the
Institute had shown that it was likely to suffer irreparable
harm absent an injunction. The district court nonetheless
denied relief because it concluded both that the Institute had
not shown that it was likely to succeed on the merits (at least
on the “limited record” presently before it) and that the
“balance of equities/public interests tip[ped] firmly in favor
of denying the injunction.”
    The Institute appealed a few days later. Because the
Agency informed the Institute that it planned to work on the
Projects during the appeal, the Institute moved for an
injunction pending appeal in both the district court and our
court. Both motions were denied. The Institute also moved
to supplement the record on appeal to include additional
documents from the administrative record that had been
produced to the Institute after this appeal was filed. We
denied that motion too.
              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON              13

                              II.
    “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ‘must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’”
Kennedy v. Warren, 66 F.4th 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
20 (2008)). “A plaintiff alternatively can meet his burden
under the first element by raising ‘serious questions going to
the merits’ if ‘the balance of hardships tips sharply in [his]
favor.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting All. for the Wild
Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011)).
“Likelihood of success on the merits is a threshold inquiry
and is the most important factor.” Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v.
Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020).
    “We review a district court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
California, 921 F.3d 865, 877 (9th Cir. 2019). “The district
court’s interpretation of the underlying legal principles,
however, is subject to de novo review and a district court
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Id. at
877–78 (quoting Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v.
Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
                              III.
   The Institute argues that the Agency failed to comply
with NEPA in its approval of the Projects. We disagree.
                              A.
   In NEPA, Congress took a procedural approach to
environmental protection. Rather than mandating that
agencies take specific actions or achieve certain outcomes,
14           EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

NEPA “requires federal agencies to take a ‘hard look’ at the
environmental consequences of their actions” and to explain
their decisions to the public. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Bureau of
Ocean Energy Mgmt., 36 F.4th 850, 872 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062,
1066 (9th Cir. 2002)), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Petroleum
Inst. v. Env’t Def. Ctr., 143 S. Ct. 2582 (2023).
    Under NEPA, before an agency may take an action that
will “significantly affect[] the quality of the human
environment,” it must prepare an environmental impact
statement: a “detailed statement” describing (among other
things) the “reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of
the proposed agency action,” “any reasonably foreseeable
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,” and “a reasonable
range of alternatives to the proposed agency action.” 42
U.S.C. § 4332(C). The agency must notice its draft
environmental impact statement for public comment and
respond to comments before it can finalize the statement and
move forward with the underlying action. See Mountain
Cmtys. for Fire Safety v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 667, 674 (9th Cir.
2022); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b), (c).
    To determine whether an action will significantly affect
the quality of the human environment and thus require an
environmental impact statement, an agency may first prepare
a “less demanding” document—called an “environmental
assessment.” Mountain Cmtys., 25 F.4th at 674–75. If the
environmental assessment concludes that the action will not
significantly impact the environment, the agency may forego
preparing an environmental impact statement. Id. at 675.
    At issue here is an even more expedited track available
for a limited set of agency actions, under which preparation
               EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON                15

of an environmental assessment or environmental impact
statement is not required. For reasons of “efficiency,”
NEPA’s implementing regulations encourage agencies to
identify “categories of actions that normally do not have a
significant effect on the human environment.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 1501.4(a). Once such a “categorical exclusion” is defined,
an agency need not prepare an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement for an action that it
concludes fits within the exclusion, so long as no
“extraordinary circumstances” indicate that the action will
nonetheless have a significant effect. Id. § 1501.4(b). As
we have previously explained, “[a]pplication of a categorical
exclusion is not an exemption from NEPA; rather, it is a
form of NEPA compliance, albeit one that requires less than
where an environmental impact statement or an
environmental assessment is necessary.” Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013).
    The Department of the Interior has announced a range of
categorical exclusions. See 49 Fed. Reg. 39,233, 39,235–37
(Oct. 4, 1984). At issue here is Categorical Exclusion B-1,
which we will refer to as the “minor-change exclusion.”
That exclusion covers “[c]hanges or amendments to an
approved plan, when such changes would cause no or only
minimal environmental impact.” Id. at 39,235. 7
                                B.
    The Agency did not prepare an environmental impact
statement or environmental assessment for either of the
Projects. Instead, it concluded that both Projects were
exempt    from     the    environmental-impact-statement

7
  The Institute does not challenge the validity of the minor-change
exclusion, but rather only the exclusion’s application here.
16            EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

requirement under the minor-change exclusion because they
are “changes or amendments” to the Fire Management Plan
that will cause “no or only minimal environmental impact.”
Applying the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard,
we uphold the Agency’s conclusion.
                              1.
    “An agency satisfies NEPA if it applies its categorical
exclusions and determines that neither an [environmental
assessment] nor an [environmental impact statement] is
required, so long as the application of the exclusions to the
facts of the particular action is not arbitrary and capricious.”
California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d
1445, 1456 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996)). Agency action is arbitrary
and capricious

       only if the agency relied on factors Congress
       did not intend it to consider, entirely failed to
       consider an important aspect of the problem,
       or offered an explanation that runs counter to
       the evidence before the agency or is so
       implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
       difference in view or the product of agency
       expertise.

Env’t Def. Ctr., 36 F.4th at 871 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v.
Zinke, 856 F.3d 1248, 1257 (9th Cir. 2017)).
   The challenged Projects are easily characterized as
“changes” or “amendments” to the Fire Management Plan.
Both Projects fall within the ambit of the Fire Management
Plan, contributing to its goals and using its methods, with
minor modifications. Whereas the Plan expressly permitted
              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON              17

thinning of trees less than 12 inches in diameter in sequoia
groves, the Wawona Project permits thinning trees less than
20 inches in diameter in one sequoia grove. The Wawona
Project also contemplates thinning trees within 209 feet of
the centerline of certain roads, whereas the Fire Management
Plan contemplated the removal of trees up to only 200 feet
from a road’s centerline. And both Projects extend the Fire
Management Plan to some new road segments. Beyond
those modifications, the Projects exactly follow the Fire
Management Plan.
    The Agency also adequately explained its conclusion
that those modifications would have “no or only minimal”
environmental impact. For each Project, the Agency
prepared a collection of documents called an “Exclusion
Package” that described the Project’s parameters and
explained the Agency’s conclusion that the Project fell
within the scope of the minor-change exclusion. The
Packages show that the Agency expressly considered the
impact that the Projects will have on twenty-nine resources,
ranging from air quality to wildlife habitats and vegetation.
For example, regarding the impact on “wildlife and/or
wildlife habitat,” the Agency noted that “[t]hinning
vegetation, pile burning, and associated noise and
disturbance may have impacts [on] wildlife communities
and habitat” and that wildlife behavior may be impacted by
food scraps left by humans working on the sites. But the
Agency nonetheless concluded that, overall, the “[i]mpacts
from this action are expected to be beneficial to forest habitat
health and [are] intended to thwart the potential negative,
extensive impacts from large, catastrophic fire, which could
result from not taking action.” Similarly, the Agency
recognized that the Projects may impact vegetation but
determined that “[i]mpacts from this action are expected to
18              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

be beneficial to forest health” by reducing the risk of
catastrophic fire. 8
    The Exclusion Packages also show that the Agency
expressly considered the impact of the Projects on threatened
and endangered species. Beginning with the Wawona
Project, the Agency concluded that the Project “is not likely
to adversely affect threatened, endangered, or rare species
and/or their critical habitat,” and described mitigation
measures that it would undertake to avoid adversely
affecting two such species (the Pacific Fisher and the Great
Grey Owl). Before arriving at that conclusion, the Agency
consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service regarding the
impact of the Project on the Pacific Fisher. The Fish and
Wildlife Service concluded that the Wawona Project “may
affect, but is not likely to adversely affect,” that species,
because the Project would remove only conifers less than 20
inches in diameter, thus “retain[ing] the most important
habitat features for fisher[s].” When performing that
consultation, the Fish and Wildlife Service emphasized that
“fisher habitat will remain suitable and protected from future
catastrophic wildfires that destroy habitat.” The Agency
reached a similar conclusion with respect to the Yosemite
Valley Project, once again formally consulting with the Fish
and Wildlife Service before concluding that the Project was
“not likely to adversely affect the Fisher.”
   We emphasize that the relevant issue here is the expected
environmental impact of the aspects of the Projects that

8
  The Institute does not suggest that any significant beneficial
environmental impacts cause the Projects to fall outside the scope of the
minor-change exclusion. We therefore consider only the Institute’s
contention that the Agency insufficiently analyzed the potential for the
Projects to have significant adverse environmental consequences.
                 EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON                      19

deviate from the Plan, not the expected environmental
impact of the Projects themselves. This is evident from the
text of the minor-change exclusion, which encompasses
“[c]hanges or amendments to an approved plan, when such
changes would cause no or only minimal environmental
impact.” 49 Fed. Reg. at 39,235 (emphasis added). The
Institute appropriately criticizes the Packages for analyzing
the Projects as a whole, rather than expressly describing how
the parts of the Projects that deviate from the Fire
Management Plan may impact the environment. But the
Agency’s conclusion that the Projects as a whole will not
significantly impact the environment entails the conclusion
that the aspects of the Projects that are challenged here—the
changes from the Plan—will not significantly impact the
environment either. 9
                                    2.
    The Institute argues that the Agency’s invocation of the
minor-change exclusion was arbitrary and capricious for
three reasons. Its arguments are unpersuasive.

9
  In its opposition to the Institute’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
the Agency relied on declarations from scientists and administrators
familiar with the Projects. The Institute moved to strike all references to
the declarations within the merits portion of the Agency’s briefing,
arguing that the Agency’s reliance on those declarations was
impermissible “post-hoc rationalization[] and analysis.” The district
court denied the Institute’s motion to strike, although the court then
relied on only limited parts of the challenged declarations in its merits
analysis. Because we hold that the Agency’s explanations in the
Exclusion Packages are sufficient to justify the Agency’s invocation of
the minor-change exclusion, we need not decide whether it was
appropriate for the district court to consider any additional information
in the challenged declarations.
20            EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

                               i.
    First, the Institute argues that the minor-change
exclusion should not be read to encompass the Projects
because there exists another, potentially more applicable
exclusion. We need not consider whether another exclusion
might apply, because “in selecting a [categorical exclusion]
for a project,” an agency “only needs to cite and rely on one”
exclusion, “even if other[s] . . . may apply.” Mountain
Cmtys., 25 F.4th at 679–80; see also id. at 680 (“[T]he fact
that a project fits into one [categorical exclusion] does not
mean that it could not also have fit into another one.”
(quotation marks omitted)).
                              ii.
    The Institute next argues that the Projects cannot be
considered “changes or amendments” to the Fire
Management Plan because they “implement, rather than
amend” the Plan. In making that argument, the Institute
draws from cases in which we have distinguished between
agencies’ “programmatic” statements and “site-specific”
analyses. In Pit River Tribe v. United States Forest Service,
469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006), for example, the Department
of the Interior attempted to justify its approval of power plant
leases by relying on a “programmatic environmental impact
statement” that it had previously prepared. Id. at 773, 781.
The programmatic statement had “not address[ed] the
environmental implications” of approving power plant
development “in particular locations,” leaving such site-
specific analyses to be prepared “for each lease area prior to
any leasing action.” Id. at 773. We held that the Department
could not rely upon that programmatic statement as its
environmental analysis for specific power plant leases that
the plaintiffs there challenged, because the approval of each
             EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON            21

individual lease required consideration of site-specific
factors that had not been analyzed in the programmatic
statement. Id. at 783–84.
    Pit River does not help the Institute because the
relationship between the Projects and the Plan at issue here
is significantly different from the relationship between the
power plant leases and programmatic statement there. In Pit
River, the challenged leases allowed power plant
development in specific geographic locations, the
environmental impact of which had not been analyzed in the
programmatic statement. But here, the Plan considered the
environmental impacts of performing the relevant fuel-
reduction techniques in specifically identified parts of
Yosemite.
    Take, for example, the Plan’s discussion of one fuel-
reduction technique: “machine crushing/shredding.” Under
the Plan, this technique is permitted only in specified parts
of Yosemite.          After outlining where machine
crushing/shredding may be performed, the Plan analyzed the
expected environmental impacts of performing the
technique in those areas. That analysis was not a theoretical
discussion of how machine crushing/shredding could impact
the environment in the abstract but rather a site-specific
discussion of how the technique was likely to impact the
environment if implemented in the areas contemplated by
the Plan, including discussion of the predicted impacts on
certain endangered species and on local communities. The
Plan took a similar approach for the other fuel-reduction
techniques it permitted. Unlike the plan discussed in Pit
River, then, the Fire Management Plan is not purely
programmatic; instead, it contains both programmatic and
site-specific elements. And the Projects will utilize the
Plan’s fuel-reduction techniques (though on somewhat
22              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

larger trees) in the same parts of Yosemite (with minor
additions) that were analyzed in the Plan. 10 The new aspects
of the Projects are thus appropriately characterized as
“changes” or “amendments” to the Plan.
                                  iii.
    Finally, the Institute attacks the Agency’s explanation
for its invocation of the minor-change exclusion, arguing
that the Agency “failed to demonstrate” that the Projects’
deviations from the Fire Management Plan would result in
no or only minimal environmental impacts. According to
the Institute, the Agency did not “sufficiently analyze site-
specific impacts of the Projects” because the Exclusion
Packages “offer only the equivalent of checked boxes,”
which “do[] not satisfy NEPA” under Klamath-Siskiyou
Wildlands Center v. Bureau of Land Management, 387 F.3d
989 (9th Cir. 2004).
    To begin, Klamath-Siskiyou was reviewing an
environmental assessment, not the invocation of a
categorical exclusion. Id. at 993–94. “Where agency action
falls under a categorical exclusion, it need not comply with
the requirements of an environmental impact statement” or
environmental assessment. See Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1097

10
   The Institute argues that the Projects as a whole require further
environmental review because they should be considered
“implementations” under our caselaw, not that the aspects of the Projects
that deviate from the Plan trigger treatment as implementations. As we
explain in the next Section, the Agency has reasonably concluded that
those deviations are sufficiently minor to fall within the scope of the
minor-change exclusion. And, again, the Institute does not challenge the
validity of the minor-change exclusion. See supra note 7. We therefore
need not consider whether some larger expansion of a previously
adopted plan would trigger a need for further environmental review
under Pit River.
              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON            23

(cleaned up). Klamath-Siskiyou is therefore of limited
relevance to this case. In any event, the Institute’s argument
fails because the Exclusion Packages are considerably more
detailed than the “checked boxes” we criticized in Klamath-
Siskiyou. There, the relevant portion of the agency’s
analysis contained only “a list of environmental concerns
such as air quality, water quality, and endangered species,
with a ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ checkbox to indicate whether the
respective condition . . . will be ‘affected.’” Klamath-
Siskiyou, 387 F.3d at 995. For some of the resources for
which the “No” box was checked in Klamath-Siskiyou, there
was an accompanying asterisk noting that the “affected
critical elements would be impacted by implementing the
proposed action,” with no further explanation. Id. The
record here is different.          Although the Agency’s
consideration of the Projects’ resource impacts was
formatted in a table (like the analysis in Klamath-Siskiyou),
the table entries here are more substantive, giving a sentence
or two of explanation for the majority of the entries.
    It is true that the Exclusion Packages do not discuss the
Projects’ expected environmental impacts with the same
level of detail as the Fire Management Plan. But that is not
surprising; the entire point of categorical exclusions is to
reduce the administrative burden of approving certain
projects. See Norton, 311 F.3d at 1176 (“In many instances,
a brief statement that a categorical exclusion is being
invoked will suffice.”); Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1097 (holding
that imposing procedures required for environmental impact
statements on the invocation of a categorical exclusion
would be “inconsistent with the efficiencies that the
abbreviated categorical exclusion process provides”).
Although the analysis in the Exclusion Packages is brief, the
Packages demonstrate that the Agency considered the
24             EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

relevant factors when reaching its conclusion that the
Projects are likely to have no or only minimal environmental
impact, and nothing in the record suggests that this
conclusion was unreasonable. See Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Once
the agency considers the proper factors and makes a factual
determination on whether the impacts are significant or not,
that decision implicates substantial agency expertise and is
entitled to deference.”).
                                ***
    It is always possible to quibble with an agency’s
explanation; a motivated litigant will be able to identify parts
of any agency explanation that could have been more precise
or thorough. But the arbitrary and capricious standard does
not demand perfection. As the Supreme Court has
instructed, we “should ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’”
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14
(2009) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys. Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). In light of the
deference we owe the Agency and the purpose behind “the
abbreviated categorical exclusion process,” Salazar, 706
F.3d at 1097, we hold that the Institute is not likely to prevail
on its argument that the Agency improperly concluded that
the Projects fall within the scope of the minor-change
exclusion. 11

11
   In addition to challenging the substance of the Exclusion Packages,
the Institute challenges their form, arguing that the Agency was not
permitted to “tier” its analysis to the Fire Management Plan and that,
even if tiering was permitted, the Packages did not comport with
regulatory requirements for tiering. “Tiering” is a term of art in the
                 EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON                       25

                                    C.
    Even if a proposed project fits within a categorical
exclusion, the agency may not rely on that exclusion if there
exist “extraordinary circumstances in which a normally
excluded action may have a significant effect” on the
environment. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). “In such extraordinary
circumstances, a categorically excluded action would
nevertheless trigger preparation of an [environmental impact
statement] or an [environmental assessment].” Norton, 311
F.3d at 1168. NEPA’s implementing regulations list a range
of situations in which extraordinary circumstances would
exist. See 43 C.F.R. § 46.215. The Institute invokes one of
these situations, arguing that extraordinary circumstances
are present here because the Projects may have “highly
controversial environmental effects.” Id. § 46.215(c). We
conclude that the Agency’s determination that the potential
effects of the Projects are not highly controversial was not
arbitrary or capricious. 12

NEPA context, referring to the practice of incorporating by reference
previously conducted environmental analyses into a subsequent
environmental analysis. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.11; Kern v. U.S. Bureau
of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002). We have held that
agencies are permitted to refer to prior environmental analyses when
invoking a categorical exclusion. See Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1098.
Moreover, the regulation governing tiering that the Institute accuses the
Agency of violating is applicable only to environmental impact
statements and environmental assessments—not categorical exclusions.
40 C.F.R. § 1501.11; see also Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1098.
12
  Aside from controversial effects, the Institute also briefly suggests that
extraordinary circumstances exist due to the Projects’ potential
significant impact on endangered or threatened species. See 43 C.F.R.
§ 46.215(h). We reject that argument because, as we explained above,
26             EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

    “A project is highly controversial if there is a substantial
dispute about [its] size, nature, or effect.” Safari Club Int’l
v. Haaland, 31 F.4th 1157, 1179 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Bark v. U.S. Forest Serv., 958 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 2020)).
“Mere opposition to an action does not, by itself, create a
controversy within the meaning of NEPA regulations.” Id.
(quoting Am. Wild Horse Campaign v. Bernhardt, 963 F.3d
1001, 1011 (9th Cir. 2020)). But “[w]here there is
substantial evidence in the record that” a project may have
highly controversial environmental effects, “the agency
must at the very least explain why” it will not. Norton, 311
F.3d at 1177.
    The Institute argues that the Projects are “highly
controversial” because some scientists dispute the Agency’s
position that tree-thinning aids fire prevention and
management—some going so far as to say that thinning can
increase the risk of severe fires. In support of its position,
the Institute offers declarations from Dr. Chad Hanson, a
research ecologist at the Institute. Dr. Hanson asserts that
“[p]ost-fire logging and clearcutting, which Defendants are
in fact doing in the Park through the challenged logging
projects . . . is perhaps the most highly controversial of all
forest management activities.” He explains:

        Unlike prescribed fire, managed wildfire, and
        thinning of genuinely small trees and
        underbrush, commercial logging operations
        like commercial thinning and post-fire
        logging    fundamentally      change       the

the Agency reasonably determined that the Projects would have only
minor impacts on the environment, including on endangered or
threatened species. See supra Section III.B.1. The Institute offers no
argument challenging this determination as to any species.
              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON             27

       microclimate of a forest and often tend to
       increase overall fire severity and tree
       mortality.    In fact, research by U.S.
       government scientists that promotes
       commercial thinning . . . acknowledges this,
       such as Prichard et al. (2021).

    As an initial matter, Dr. Hanson overstates the relevant
controversy by mischaracterizing the Projects. According to
Dr. Hanson, there is significant scientific controversy
surrounding “commercial thinning” and “post-fire logging.”
But contrary to Dr. Hanson’s assertion, the Agency is not “in
fact doing” these things. First, the Agency represents that
“no entity profits from the sale of any timber cut during
project work,” explaining that the “minimal monies received
from collecting small trees and biomass are dedicated
entirely to offsetting project costs and cover a small fraction
of project expenses.” Other than Dr. Hanson’s conclusory
accusations, there is no evidence to the contrary. Second,
the thinning contemplated by the Projects is in preparation
for a prescribed burn and accordingly is not appropriately
characterized as post-fire logging.
    Similarly, the literature on which Dr. Hanson relies as
evidence of scientific disagreement does not criticize
thinning of the sort contemplated by the Projects. For
example, Dr. Hanson cites a paper by Susan J. Prichard et al.
as evidence of the purportedly relevant controversy. But that
paper discusses the deficiencies of thinning conducted
without subsequent prescribed burns—not thinning
conducted in preparation for prescribed burns. See Susan J.
Prichard et al., Adapting Western North American Forests to
Climate Change and Wildfires: 10 Common Questions, 31
Ecological Applications, no. 8, Dec. 2021, at 10 (“On most
28            EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

sites, thinning alone achieves a reduction of canopy fuels but
contributes to higher surface fuel loads [that] . . . can
contribute to high-intensity surface fires.” (emphasis
added)). The paper in fact supports the Agency’s position,
concluding that “although the efficacy of thinning alone as a
fuel reduction treatment is questionable and site dependent,
there exists widespread agreement that combined effects of
thinning plus prescribed burning consistently reduces the
potential for severe wildfire across a broad range of forest
types and conditions.” Id.
    In any event, to the extent a scientific controversy exists,
that controversy concerns the approach taken by the Fire
Management Plan, and our inquiry must be focused on the
ways in which the Projects deviate from the Plan. That is, to
show that the Projects are “highly controversial” such that
extraordinary circumstances bar the Agency from relying on
the minor-change exclusion, the Institute must show that the
new aspects of the Projects will have controversial effects.
Holding otherwise would mean that an agency’s minor
change or amendment to a NEPA-compliant, yet
controversial, plan would always require its own
environmental impact statement or environmental
assessment, even if everyone agreed that the change or
amendment itself would have no environmental impact
whatsoever.
    Here, the Institute has mounted a challenge only to the
Projects, not to the Agency’s continued reliance on the 2004
Fire Management Plan. Although the Institute may disagree
with the approach taken in the Plan, the Agency was aware
of, and thoughtfully rejected, the objection the Institute
raises. During the notice and comment phase of the
development of the Fire Management Plan, some
commenters flagged precisely the concern that the Institute
              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON               29

now asserts: that thinning may increase the risk of severe
fires or otherwise harm the environment. One commenter,
for example, argued that thinning “could increase the fire
risk” because “reducing the canopy can result in drying out
of the land.” The Agency defended its decision over that
objection, explaining that “[a]s a result [of thinning], fire
will play a more natural role in these ecosystems while
mitigating the risk of high intensity wildland fires and
preventing an accumulation of unnaturally heavy fuels.” In
response to another comment criticizing the Agency’s
conclusion that thinning trees would aid its fire-management
goals, the Agency stated that the thinning strategy was
“based on the best scientific information” because it would
return the park to conditions closer to those that “existed
when wildland fires played a more benign and natural role.”
The Institute does not point to any ways in which the
relevant science has materially changed since 2004. The
Institute cannot use this challenge to the Projects as a
backdoor means to relitigate a decision that the Agency
previously made, after notice and comment and a detailed
environmental impact statement.
    Finally, the Institute argues that our precedent compels
us to conclude that thinning of the sort at issue here is highly
controversial. The Institute points to Bark v. United States
Forest Service, in which we held that the Forest Service’s
decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement
for a logging project was arbitrary and capricious because
the project was highly controversial. See 958 F.3d at 870–
71. The project at issue there would have used a technique
called “variable density thinning,” which gives the agency
flexibility in choosing which trees to cut, setting only a target
range for the percentage of canopy cover rather than limiting
thinning to trees of a certain size. Id. at 868. After preparing
30            EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON

an environmental assessment, the agency concluded that the
project would have no significant environmental effects. Id.
at 869. We held that the agency’s conclusion was arbitrary
and capricious because the agency failed to address
arguments raised during the administrative process that
challenged whether variable density thinning effectively
reduces the risk of wildfires. Id. at 870–71.
    Bark is distinguishable from this case for two reasons.
First, the Projects here cannot be characterized as involving
variable density thinning. Whereas variable density thinning
does not impose limits on which trees may be cut, the
Projects do, limiting the Agency to trees below 20 inches in
diameter. Second, whereas the project in Bark contemplated
thinning without subsequent prescribed burns, the thinning
here (as we have emphasized) will be conducted in
preparation for prescribed burns. Indeed, the fact that the
Bark thinning would not be followed by a prescribed burn
was one of the reasons why we concluded that the scientific
evidence demonstrated that a significant controversy
existed. See id. at 871 (describing a study that concluded
that “fuel treatments are unlikely to reduce fire severity and
consequent impacts, because often the treated area is not
affected by fire before the fuels return to normal levels”).
Regardless, to the extent that Bark is relevant at all, it speaks
only to the controversy surrounding the Fire Management
Plan itself—not the aspects of the Projects that deviate from
the Plan.
    The Institute’s strongest objection is that the Agency did
not explain why it concluded that the Projects were not
“highly controversial.” We acknowledge that it would have
been preferable for the Agency to provide an explanation.
Still, considering the record presently before us, the Institute
has not offered substantial evidence that the Projects are
              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MULDOON             31

highly controversial in the relevant sense. See Safari Club,
31 F.4th at 1179 (holding that a project was not “highly
controversial” because the plaintiffs had not shown “that the
disputed parts of the [agency action] have highly
controversial, uncertain, or unique environmental effects,”
without suggesting that the agency offered any
contemporaneous documentation explaining why it did not
consider the projects highly controversial). “Employing the
deferential [arbitrary and capricious] standard of review,”
we conclude that the Institute has not shown that the Agency
failed to “consider[] the relevant factors” when it
“determined that no extraordinary circumstances were
present.” Alaska Ctr., 189 F.3d at 859.
                              D.
   The Institute’s remaining merits argument is that the
Agency failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental
impacts of the Projects, as NEPA requires it to do. But the
Agency’s reasonable invocation of the minor-change
exclusion fully satisfies its obligations under NEPA. See
Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1096 (“Application of a categorical
exclusion . . . is a form of NEPA compliance.”). Nothing
more is required.
                             IV.
    The Institute has not shown that it is likely to succeed on
the merits—or even raised serious questions going to the
merits. Because the Institute has failed to meet that
“threshold inquiry,” we need not consider the other
preliminary injunction factors. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d
558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Disney Enters., Inc. v.
VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017)).
   For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.