Court Opinion

ID: 9906101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 23:01:55.440158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:06.045211
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Ramirez CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E080013

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FVI17001930)

 NATHAN JOAO RAMIREZ,                                                    OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Joseph B. Widman,

Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

         Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and

Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                                             I.

                                      INTRODUCTION

       After defendant and appellant Nathan Joao Ramirez admitted to violating his

probation, in 2019 he was sentenced under Penal Code1 section 1170,

subdivision (h)(5)(A), to a split sentence of four years, with two years to be served in

custody and two years to be served on mandatory supervision. In 2020, defendant was

arrested on federal drug charges and was sentenced to 51 months in federal prison.

Meanwhile, in the state court action, a warrant was issued for defendant’s arrest and a

petition to revoke mandatory supervision was filed. Defendant filed motions to quash his

warrant, plead guilty, and run his state sentence concurrent with his federal sentence.

The trial court denied the motions.

       On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court misinterpreted the statutory

language of section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), and was unaware it had discretion to

grant his motions based on the plain language of section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B); and

(2) excluding those individuals on mandatory supervision from section 1203.2a relief

violates equal protection principles. For the reasons explained, we conclude the trial

court was unaware that it had discretion to grant defendant’s request to terminate his

mandatory supervision under section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), and therefore reverse

the order and remand the matter for the trial court to rehear defendant’s motion to

terminate his mandatory supervision consistent with this opinion.

       1 All statutory future references are to the Penal Code.

                                             2
                                             II.

                             PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In October 2017, defendant pled no contest to theft of identifying information

from 10 or more persons (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3); count 3) and admitted that he had

sustained three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In return, the remaining

allegations were dismissed, and defendant was placed on probation for a period of

36 months on various terms and conditions of probation, including serving 180 days in

county jail on work release.

       On February 15, 2019, a petition was filed to revoke defendant’s probation based

on defendant failing to appear for jail time, associating with known felons and drug users

or sellers of drugs, and possessing a controlled substance. Four days later, on

February 19, 2019, defendant admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his

probation as alleged in the petition and was sentenced under section 1170,

subdivision (h)(5)(A), to a split sentence of four years, with two years to be served in

county jail and two years to be served on mandatory supervision on various terms and

conditions of supervision.

       On July 20, 2020, defendant was arrested by federal authorities for conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine pursuant to 21 U.S. Code section 841, subdivision (a)(1).

       On November 4, 2020, a petition was filed with a no-bail bench warrant to revoke

defendant’s mandatory supervision based on defendant failing to cooperate with, and

follow directives of, his probation officer, failing to keep his probation officer informed

                                              3
of his place of residence, using or possessing controlled substances, and associating with

known felons or anyone engaged in criminal activity.

       Defendant was convicted of the federal offense for conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine, and on February 4, 2022, he was sentenced to 51 months in federal

prison, followed by five years of supervised release.

       On May 27, 2022, defendant filed a nonstatutory motion seeking to quash his

bench warrant, plead guilty, and run his state sentence concurrent with his federal

sentence. On August 29, 2022, defendant filed another motion pursuant to

section 1203.2a requesting that the trial court make a final disposition of the state case,

execute sentence, have that sentence run concurrent with his federal sentence, and rescind

all warrants. In both motions, defendant stated that the existence of the bench warrant

precluded him from transferring to a halfway house or a residential reentry center,

attending any drug treatment program available for his rehabilitation, participating in

certain educational programs offered in federal prison, and receiving good time credits,

favorable institutional work assignments, and higher institutional custody scores.

       A hearing on defendant’s motions was held on September 30, 2022. Defendant

was not present but was represented by counsel. The trial court indicated that it was

“initially inclined to, essentially, give him what he wanted considering the length of his

federal sentence. [¶] But then I sort of had second thoughts, procedurally.” The court

then inquired whether the parties had “a stipulation as to what” they wanted the court to

do. Defense counsel responded that he “would offer a stipulation.” After the prosecutor

                                              4
stated, “No,” the court heard argument from the parties. Defense counsel argued that

defendant’s state conviction from 2017 was “stale” and asked the court to “consider just

sentencing him so that way his sentence is complete, supervision is over, [and] he can

move on.” In response to the court’s query, defense counsel confirmed that defendant

also sought to rescind the bench warrant and terminate the state case. The trial court

acknowledged that having a warrant out can affect what security classification a federal

prisoner may receive.

       After noting that there was a warrant for defendant’s arrest because he had

absconded from supervision and committed a new crime that resulted in a federal prison

commitment, the prosecutor argued that the trial court should deny defendant’s motions

or request for relief for two reasons. First, the prosecutor stated that defense counsel’s

request offended the sense of justice because what he was requesting would be to give

defendant a “pass for not complying” with the court orders “based on his commission of

a new crime in another jurisdiction.” Second, the prosecutor explained: “Second,

legally, there’s no vehicle by which this Court can grant his request. His request

specifically is under [section] 1203.2(a) which requires him to be sentenced to

probation, and then be committed to another sentence, and then allow this Court to run

that sentence concurrent or some other fashion; however, he’s not on probation.

Probation was revoked and terminated and he was sentenced to county prison. He was

given a[ ] [section 1170, subdivision] (h) split sentence. [¶] The problem is the

[L]egislature . . . failed to amend [section] 1203.2(a) to contemplate [inclusion] of split

                                              5
sentences parolees from county prison in that remedy, and if the fact that they did not do

so really means they meant to exclude such people from such remedy. [¶] So there’s no

legal way for this Court to one have jurisdiction to do it because it’s in revoked status.

He’s not before this Court; and two, [section] 1203.2(a) doesn’t grant this Court

jurisdiction based on the circumstances.”

       Defense counsel responded that mandatory supervision is “the exact similar

mechanism” as probation since both probation and mandatory supervision have many

“parallels and similarities,” and a defendant must check in with a probation officer while

on mandatory supervision. In response to the court’s question, defense counsel stated

that there was no case law on this point. After the trial court conducted a brief research

of any case law on point, the court noted that it had found no “cases on point” and that it

was “left with . . . the plain reading of the statute.” The court thereafter denied

defendant’s “request on the basis that the Court lacks authority under [section] 1203.2a.”

The court explained that while it agreed with defense counsel that “functionally,

mandatory supervision does resemble probation” because “[i]t’s a very similar procedure

and function but the [L]egislature knows that. . . . And in many other areas, they make it

very clear when the realignment system basically dictates a different kind of law

enforcement sentence.” Defendant timely appealed.

                                              6
                                            III.

                                      DISCUSSION

       Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request because the

court misinterpreted the statutory language of section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), and

was unaware it had discretion to terminate his mandatory supervision based on the plain

language and legislative intent of the statute. He further asserts that if we determine

neither sections 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), nor 1203.2a are applicable to grant the

relief he seeks, then excluding those individuals on mandatory supervision from

section 1203.2a relief violates equal protection principles because there is no rational

basis for the Legislature’s failure to provide an avenue for those defendants on mandatory

supervision to terminate an underlying state case when they are serving time in a federal

institution.

       The People respond that section 1203.2a does not apply to defendants on

mandatory supervision and section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), does not authorize the

relief defendant seeks. The People further assert that precluding defendants on

mandatory supervision from obtaining section 1203.2a relief does not violate equal

protection.

       A. Standard of Review

       This case involves statutory interpretation of section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B).

This case also encompasses an interpretation of section 1203.2a, which is not “a model of

clarity.” (In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal.4th 992, 1003, fn. 7 (Hoddinott); People v. Holt

                                             7
(1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 962, 965 [“It is an unenviable chore to consider section 1203.2a.

The statute reflects a disregard for careful drafting and contempt for the English

language.”].) Section 1170, subdivision (h), in part, controls those offenders placed on

mandatory supervision with an imposition of a split sentence. (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).)

Section 1203.2a governs the procedures for when a defendant has been granted probation

in one case then subsequently is “committed to a prison in this state or another state for

another offense.” (§ 1203.2a.) The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law, which

we review de novo. (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562; accord, People v.

Mendoza (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 764, 774 (Mendoza).)

       “‘“‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is

to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.]

We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense

meaning. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘“When the language of a statute is clear, we need go

no further.” [Citation.] But where a statute’s terms are unclear or ambiguous, we may

“look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the

evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous

administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.”’”’

[Citation.]” (People v. Clark (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 133, 144 (Clark), quoting People v.

Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1421 (Scott).)

       Additionally, “[i]t is a settled principle of statutory construction that the

Legislature ‘“is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in

                                               8
existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]”

[Citation.]’” (Scott, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1424.) “Courts may assume, under such

circumstances, that the Legislature intended to maintain a consistent body of rules and to

adopt the meaning of statutory terms already construed.” (Ibid.; see People v. Harrison

(1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329; People v. Wood (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270.)

       B. Legal Principles

       The Realignment Act, codified under section 1170, subdivision (h), in 2011,

“significantly revamped California’s penal system by creating two new categories of

postrelease supervision: mandatory supervision upon release from jail and postrelease

community supervision (PRCS) following service of a prison term.” (People v. Bryant

(2021) 11 Cal.5th 976, 982 (Bryant).) This case involves the former. “The

[Realignment] Act shifts responsibility for the incarceration, rehabilitation, and

postrelease supervision of some felons from the state prison system to local jails and

probation departments. (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 450; § 1170, subd. (h)(1), (2), (5)(A) &

(B); Wofford v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1032.) For eligible felony

offenders, the trial court must generally impose a split local sentence with execution of a

portion of the term suspended and the defendant released from jail under terms of

‘mandatory supervision.’ (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B); see also id., subd. (h)(5)(A).).”

(Bryant, at p. 982.) When a defendant is on mandatory supervision, the defendant is

supervised by the probation department “in accordance with the terms, conditions,

and procedures generally applicable to persons placed on probation.” (§ 1170,

                                             9
subd. (h)(5)(B).) Although mandatory supervision has been characterized as “akin to

probation” (People v. Griffis (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 956, 963, fn. 2), mandatory

supervision is “distinct from both probation and parole” (Bryant, at pp. 982-983).

       Specifically, as relevant here, section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), provides: “The

portion of a defendant’s sentenced term that is suspended pursuant to this paragraph shall

be known as mandatory supervision, and, unless otherwise ordered by the court, shall

commence upon release from physical custody or an alternative custody program,

whichever is later. During the period of mandatory supervision, the defendant shall be

supervised by the county probation officer in accordance with the terms, conditions, and

procedures generally applicable to persons placed on probation, for the remaining

unserved portion of the sentence imposed by the court. The period of supervision shall

be mandatory, and may not be earlier terminated except by court order. Any proceeding

to revoke or modify mandatory supervision under this subparagraph shall be conducted

pursuant to either subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 1203.2 or Section 1203.3.”

(§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B), italics added.)

       “[S]ection 1203.2a provides that defendants released on probation, who are then

sentenced to ‘a prison in this state or another state’ in another case, may file a request for

sentencing in absentia, i.e., forgoing probation in the first case, so as to have the potential

to apply the time served to both cases. If the trial court fails to act on the petition in a

timely manner, it loses jurisdiction to impose sentence in the probation case.” (Mendoza,

supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.)

                                               10
       Section 1203.2a, in relevant part provides: “If any defendant who has been

released on probation is committed to a prison in this state or another state for another

offense, the court which released him or her on probation shall have jurisdiction to

impose sentence, if no sentence has previously been imposed for the offense for which he

or she was granted probation, in the absence of the defendant, on the request of the

defendant made through his or her counsel, or by himself or herself in writing . . . he or

she states that he or she wishes the court to impose sentence in the case in which he or

she was released on probation, in his or her absence and without him or her being

represented by counsel. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he court shall issue its commitment if sentence

has previously been imposed. If sentence has not been previously imposed and if the

defendant has requested the court through counsel or in writing in the manner herein

provided to impose sentence in the case in which he or she was released on probation in

his or her absence and without the presence of counsel to represent him or her, the court

shall impose sentence and issue its commitment, or shall make other final order

terminating its jurisdiction over the defendant in the case in which the order of probation

was made. . . . [¶] Upon imposition of sentence hereunder the commitment shall be dated

as of the date upon which probation was granted. If the defendant is then in a state prison

for an offense committed subsequent to the one upon which he or she has been on

probation, the term of imprisonment of such defendant under a commitment issued

hereunder shall commence upon the date upon which defendant was delivered to prison

                                              11
under commitment for his or her subsequent offense. Any terms ordered to be served

consecutively shall be served as otherwise provided by law.” (§ 1203.2a.)

      The purpose of section 1203.2a is to require the trial court to consider exercising

its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence and to avoid inadvertent consecutive

sentences through inaction. (Hoddinott, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 999-1000.)

Section 1203.2a does permit a probationer who, while on probation for an earlier case,

receives a prison sentence in another criminal proceeding to request that probation be

revoked and sentence imposed. (In re White (1969) 1 Cal.3d 207, 210.) Section 1203.2a

serves to prevent a defendant from inadvertently being denied the benefit of section 669,

subdivision (a), which applies when a defendant has been convicted of two or more

crimes in different proceedings. Sentences under section 1170, subdivision (h), are

prison sentences for purposes of making a section 1203.2a demand. (Mendoza, supra,

241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 785-794.)

      C. Analysis

      Defendant contends the trial court misinterpreted or was unaware of the statutory

language of section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), when it denied his request to terminate

his mandatory supervision and believed it had no authority to do so. We agree.

      As previously noted, under section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), “[t]he period of

supervision shall be mandatory, and may not be earlier terminated except by court order.

Any proceeding to revoke or modify mandatory supervision under this subparagraph

                                            12
shall be conducted pursuant to either subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 1203.2 or

Section 1203.3.” (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B), italics added.)

       Section 1203.2, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part that at any time during

the period of supervision the court may, upon rearrest of the person or issuance of a

warrant for rearrest, “revoke and terminate the supervision of the person if the interests of

justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of

the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the

conditions of their supervision, or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless

of whether the person has been prosecuted for those offenses.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (a),

italics added.)

       Under section 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1), “[u]pon its own motion or upon the

petition of the supervised person, the probation or parole officer, or the district attorney,

the court may modify, revoke, or terminate supervision of the person pursuant to this

subdivision.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), italics added.) That subdivision further provides,

“After the receipt of a written report from the probation or parole officer, the court shall

read and consider the report and either its motion or the petition and may modify, revoke,

or terminate the supervision of the supervised person upon the grounds set forth in

subdivision (a) if the interests of justice so require.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), italics

added.) Finally, under section 1203.3, subdivision (a), the trial court “has the authority at

any time during the term of mandatory supervision pursuant to subparagraph (B) of

paragraph (5) of subdivision (h) of Section 1170 to revoke, modify, or change the

                                              13
conditions of the court’s order suspending the execution of the concluding portion of the

supervised person’s term.” (§ 1203.3, subd. (a).)

       Analyzing the express words of the statutory language, giving them a plain and

commonsense meaning of sections 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), 1203.2, subdivisions (a)

and (b), and 1203.3, a trial court has the authority to revoke, modify, and/or terminate

mandatory supervision by court order. Hence, the trial court here erred when it believed

it did not have the authority to terminate defendant’s mandatory supervision. Our

conclusion is supported by People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461 (Camp), a case

relied upon by defendant.

       In Camp, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th 461, the People challenged the trial court’s

decision to terminate the mandatory supervision portion of the defendant’s split sentence

early and modify his sentence to release him to the custody of the Immigration and

Customs Enforcement Agency for deportation. (Id. at p. 464.) The People argued the

trial court lacked “‘authority to substantially modify the original judgment after it ha[d]

been imposed and executed.’” (Id. at p. 470.) Our colleagues in Division One rejected

the People’s argument and held, under section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), a trial court

may terminate a defendant’s mandatory supervision early without ordering the defendant

to serve the suspended portion of the sentence. (Camp, at pp. 464, 474.) The court

further noted, “neither former section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B)(i), nor subdivisions (a)

and (b) of section 1203.2 or section 1203.3 contains any language that would suggest that

                                             14
a court’s power to terminate mandatory supervision is restricted in any manner.” (Id. at

p. 474.)

       We find Camp’s majority opinion persuasive and decline the People’s invitation to

follow the dissenting opinion in Camp. (See People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 585

[“dissenting opinions are not binding precedent”].) Thus, under section 1170,

subdivision (h)(5)(B), the trial court had the express statutory authority to terminate

defendant’s mandatory supervision for violating the conditions of his supervision. As the

Camp court noted, section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), “contain[s] no limitation of any

kind on a trial court’s exercise of [its] authority” to terminate mandatory supervision.

(Camp, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 470.)

       We now turn to section 1203.2a. As explained previously, section 1203.2a, in

relevant part states: “If any defendant who has been released on probation is committed

to a prison in this state or another state for another offense, the court which released him

or her on probation shall have jurisdiction to impose sentence . . . .” (§ 1203.2a, italics

added.) By its express terms, examined in its entirety, section 1203.2a provides

procedures for service of sentences by probationers incarcerated for a subsequent

offense. However, defendant had been given a split sentence followed by mandatory

supervision, not probation. “Under the Realignment Act, qualified persons convicted of

nonserious and nonviolent felonies are sentenced to county jail instead of state prison.

[Citation.] Trial courts have discretion to commit the defendant to county jail for a full

term in custody, or to impose a hybrid or split sentence consisting of county jail followed

                                             15
by a period of mandatory supervision.” (People v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173,

178.) “A split sentence is a hybrid sentence in which a trial court suspends execution of a

portion of the term and releases the defendant into the community under the mandatory

supervision of the county probation department. Such sentences are imposed pursuant to

Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B)(i), a provision originally adopted as part

of the ‘2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public safety.’” (Camp, supra, 233

Cal.App.4th at p. 464, fn. 1.)

       Examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning,

we believe that section 1203.2a applies to persons placed on probation. “‘“‘“When the

language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.”’”’” (Clark, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th

at p. 144.) Furthermore, following the passage of the Realignment Act in 2011, the

Legislature did not amend section 1203.2a. The Legislature “‘is deemed to be aware of

statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a

statute in light thereof. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529,

538.) Under such circumstances, we may assume that “the Legislature intended to

maintain a consistent body of rules and to adopt the meaning of statutory terms already

construed.” (Scott, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1424.)

       As explained above, the Realignment Act, codified under section 1170,

subdivision (h)(5)(B), itself expressly sets forth, and limits, the means by which

mandatory supervision may be revoked, modified, or terminated and does not include

section 1203.2a among them. By its express terms, then, the Realignment Act precludes

                                             16
defendant’s claim that he could invoke the procedures generally available through

section 1203.2a to terminate or modify his mandatory supervision. “The words of the

statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their

statutory context.’ [Citation.] If the statutory language is unambiguous, ‘we presume the

Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs.’” (Whaley

v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 479, 484-485;

People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 885.) Here, the Legislature unambiguously

limited the statutory mechanisms by which mandatory supervision may be revoked or

modified, and we may not disregard that express directive.2

       In sum, defendant did not qualify for section 1203.2a, but did so under

section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B). While the trial court was correct that defendant did

not qualify for the relief he sought under section 1203.2a, the court was unaware that

defendant did so under sections 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), and 1203.2, subdivision (a).

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s request to terminate

his mandatory supervision and remand the matter for the trial court to rehear defendant’s

motion to terminate his mandatory supervision.

       2 If section 1203.2a was inadvertently excluded from section 1170,
subdivision (h)(5)(B), in the Realignment Act, that oversight can be corrected by the
Legislature.

                                            17
                                           IV.

                                     DISPOSITION

       The trial court’s order denying defendant’s request to terminate his mandatory

supervision is reversed and the matter is remanded for a rehearing consistent with this

opinion.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                               CODRINGTON
                                                                         Acting P. J.
We concur:

FIELDS
                          J.

RAPHAEL
                          J.

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