Court Opinion

ID: 9397087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 15:05:41.555505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.325443
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                      No. 22-0421
                                  Filed May 24, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MELTON RAY CARTER,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Steven J.

Andreasen, Judge.

      Melton Carter appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana, third

violation, as an habitual offender. AFFIRMED.

      Michael J. Jacobsma of Jacobsma Law Firm, P.C., Orange City, for

appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

      Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.

Schumacher, J., takes no part.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

       A Sioux City police officer was sitting in his car doing paperwork, with the

window of his squad car partially down. He “detected an odor of marijuana,” looked

up, and “saw a gentleman crossing in front of” him, who was identified as Melton

Carter. He “[c]alled [Carter] back over to” him and “once again detected the odor

of marijuana.” The officer asked Carter if he could search him. Carter said no.

The officer told him he “was going to search him anyway due to the odor of

marijuana coming from his person.” He told Carter “to place his hands on his head

and” he “went to search him.” The officer stated that, “[a]t that point,” Carter told

him “he had marijuana on him.” The officer continued with the search and found

marijuana.

       The State charged Carter with possession of marijuana, third violation, as

an habitual offender. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(5), 902.8 (2017). Carter moved

to suppress the evidence gained in the search on the ground that “[t]here was no

probable cause to justify the police in searching [him] and no exigent

circumstances . . . to allow a warrantless search.” He also claimed “the search

was not consensual and the evidence seized was not in plain view.” The district

court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for further

proceedings. See State v. Carter, No. 18-1502, 2019 WL 2372231, at *1–2 (Iowa

Ct. App. June 5, 2019).

       On remand, Carter filed a second motion to suppress, this time claiming that

his statement to “the officer that he had marijuana” was the product of a custodial

interrogation that was not preceded by Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The district court denied the motion following an
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evidentiary hearing. The court preliminarily noted that the court of appeals opinion

finding “probable cause and exigent circumstances to conduct the warrantless

search” was “based solely upon the odor of marijuana.” Accordingly, the court

stated, “Evidence of the search and the marijuana that was discovered during that

search” would “remain admissible at trial, regardless of the [c]ourt’s [r]uling . . . on

[Carter’s] second [m]otion to [s]uppress.”      Nonetheless, the court determined

Carter’s admission to marijuana possession might “have some bearing and

relevance at trial” on whether he “knowingly” possessed marijuana. For that

reason, the court addressed “whether the statement was voluntarily made.” The

district court concluded Carter “was not subjected to a custodial interrogation”

triggering the obligation to give him Miranda warnings and Carter’s “statement was

‘voluntary.’”   See State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 171 (Iowa 2015) (first

determining whether Miranda warnings were required and were properly given and

then determining whether the statement was voluntary).

       On appeal, Carter contends the district court should have found that he was

“in custody” and Miranda warnings were required. In his view, the incriminating

statement that followed “had significant bearing on” whether he knew of the drug’s

presence and whether he knew the drug was a controlled substance and, for that

reason, the error in declining to suppress the statement was not harmless. The

State counters that “even if the statement had been suppressed and the jury never

heard it, it would have made no difference to the verdict.” If we reach the merits,

the State argues Carter was not in custody and was not interrogated. We will focus

on the harmless-error question.
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       “Harmless-error review looks . . . to the basis on which ‘the jury actually

rested its verdict.’” State v. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 431 (Iowa 2003) (quoting

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). “The inquiry ‘is not whether, in a

trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been

rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely

unattributable to the error.’” Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 431 (quoting Sullivan, 508

U.S. at 279). We ask “what evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its

verdict” and we “weigh the probative force of that evidence against the probative

force of the erroneously admitted evidence standing alone.” Id. “[W]e must ask

whether the force of the evidence is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a

reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the

same without the erroneously admitted evidence.” Id.

       The evidence the jury actually considered consisted of testimony from three

State witnesses: (1) the police officer who searched Carter, (2) a backup officer,

and (3) the police department’s supervisor of the identification and property

section. The officer who searched Carter began by reprising his testimony from

the suppression hearings concerning how he came into contact with Carter.

Following Carter’s denial of consent to a search, the officer told Carter he “would

be searching him based off of probable cause.” At that point, Carter said “that he

did, in fact, have marijuana on his person.” The officer located the marijuana “in

his left pants pocket.” The backup officer testified that, when he arrived, the first

officer “was explaining to Mr. Carter that he could smell marijuana coming from his

person and that he was going to search him.” The backup officer then stated, “At

that time I asked Mr. Carter if he had marijuana on him, and he said he had
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marijuana in his pocket. I saw [the first officer] search him and pull marijuana out

of his left pants pocket.” The backup officer also testified Carter “was holding on

to a piece of clear plastic,” which, on examination was an empty bag that “smelled

like raw marijuana.” The final witness confirmed that the substance seized from

Carter was marijuana.

      The probative value of the evidence the jury actually considered—without

Carter’s admission—was overwhelming. The officer had probable cause to search

Carter, said he intended to do so, and discovered marijuana in his pocket. The

backup officer smelled marijuana in the empty bag held by Carter. Weighed

against this evidence, Carter’s admission simply confirmed what the officer was

about to discover independently. See State v. Hensley, 524 N.W.2d 379, 384

(Iowa 1995) (stating “the State’s circumstantial proof forcefully” established the

defendant’s knowledge). In short, his admission “paled in comparison to the other

evidence of his guilt.” See State v. Zarate, No. 11-0530, 2012 WL 652449, at *11

(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2012). We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the

verdict “would have been the same without the erroneously admitted evidence.”

The district court’s denial of the second motion to suppress was harmless.

      We affirm Carter’s judgment and sentence.

      AFFIRMED.