Court Opinion

ID: 9391238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 17:00:55.322059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:40.309493
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UPPER SKAGIT INDIAN TRIBE,            No. 21-35985
          Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                         D.C. Nos.
SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL               2:20-sp-00001-
COMMUNITY,                                 RSM
          Intervenor-Plaintiff-       2:70-cv-09213-
          Appellee,                        RSM

 v.
                                        OPINION
SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE,
          Defendant-Appellant,

PUYALLUP TRIBE OF INDIANS,
          Real-party-in-interest-
          Appellee,

and

STATE OF WASHINGTON;
TULALIP TRIBES; PORT GAMBLE
S'KLALLAM TRIBE; JAMESTOWN
S'KLALLAM TRIBE; SKOKOMISH
INDIAN TRIBE; SQUAXIN ISLAND
TRIBE; HOH INDIAN TRIBE,
            Real-party-in-interest.
2                 UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Western District of Washington
         Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted November 9, 2022
                    Seattle, Washington

                        Filed May 1, 2023

     Before: Sandra S. Ikuta and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit
       Judges, and Sidney A. Fitzwater, * District Judge.

                     Opinion by Judge Ikuta

                          SUMMARY **

                     Tribal Fishing Rights

    The panel affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe in a case
concerning the usual and accustomed fishing areas
(“U&As”) of the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe (“the Sauk
tribe”) under United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312
(W.D. Wash. 1974) (Final Decision I).
    In Final Decision I, Judge George Boldt resolved
disputes arising from the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliot, in

*
  The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE                 3

which tribes in the area covered by the treaty agreed to
convey most of their tribal land to the United States, in
exchange for retaining their rights of taking fish “at usual
and accustomed grounds and stations.” Final Decision I
included an injunction retaining jurisdiction to implement
the decision.
    The dispute in this case relates to the meaning of Finding
of Fact 131 in Final Decision I, which defines the Sauk
tribe’s U&As. The Sauk tribe’s U&As in Finding of Fact
131 include rivers and creeks that are tributaries to the Skagit
River, but does not include the Skagit River itself.
Therefore, fish migrating to the Sauk tribe’s U&As must
travel on the Skagit River, which is part of the U&As for the
Upper Skagit tribe and the Swinomish Indian Tribal
Community. The Sauk tribe contends that the Upper Skagit
tribe and the Swinomish tribe should alter their fishing
practices so that more fish reach the Sauk tribe’s U&As. At
the start of the 2020 fishing season, the Sauk tribe issued a
fishing regulation that permitted its tribal members to
harvest Coho salmon in two areas that include a portion of
the main stem of the Skagit River. The Upper Skagit tribe
invoked the continuing jurisdiction of the district court and
sought an emergency order requiring the Sauk tribe to close
its fishery. The district court concluded that Judge Boldt
intentionally omitted the Skagit River from the Sauk tribe’s
U&As and therefore the Sauk tribe’s attempts to open
fisheries in the mainstream of the Skagit River were not in
conformity with Final Decision I.
    The panel agreed with the Upper Skagit tribe’s
contention that Finding of Fact 131 clearly and
unambiguously established Judge Boldt’s intent not to
include the Skagit River in the Sauk tribe’s U&As. The
panel held that if Judge Boldt intended to include the Skagit
4               UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE

River in the U&As of the Sauk tribe, he would have used
that specific term, as he did elsewhere. The panel held that
the Lane Report, on which Judge Boldt heavily relied,
reinforced its conclusion.
    The panel rejected the Sauk tribe’s four arguments to
support their claim. First, the Sauk Tribe argued that Finding
of Fact 131 was ambiguous because it lists rivers and creeks
that are tributaries to the Skagit River, raising the inference
that Judge Boldt intended to include the Skagit River as
well. The panel held that it could not draw such an inference
because Judge Boldt expressly included both the Skagit
River and its tributaries in his determination of the
Swinomish tribe’s U&As. Second, the Sauk tribe pointed to
a transcript of the testimony of James Enick (a member of
the Sauk tribe), which allegedly indicated that Sauk tribal
members must have fished “[u]p and down” the Skagit
River. The panel concluded that Enick’s testimony was not
evidence showing that Judge Boldt meant to include the
Skagit River in the U&As, and therefore did not change the
panel’s conclusion that Judge Boldt’s intent was
clear. Third, the Sauk tribe argued that the Sauk River and
the Cascade River were part of the Sauk tribe’s U&As, and
that the most likely path of travel between the Sauk River
and Cascade River is the Skagit River. This raised the
inference that the Sauk tribe traveled and fished on the
Skagit River, and thereby was evidence that Judge Boldt
intended to include the Skagit River as part of the Sauk
tribe’s U&As. The panel held that the Sauk tribe’s “path of
travel” theory did not make Judge Boldt’s intent unclear, or
constitute evidence that Judge Boldt intended to include the
Skagit River in the Sauk tribe’s U&As. Finally, the Sauk
tribe relied on scattered statements in the Final Decision I
and the Lane Report as evidence that the Sauk tribe
               UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE              5

historically fished in the Skagit River. The panel held that
none of the statements undermined its conclusion that Judge
Boldt’s intent was clear, or showed that he intended to
include the Skagit River in the U&As contrary to the plain
text of Finding of Fact 131.

                       COUNSEL

Jennifer Anne Gore Maglio (argued), Benjamin A.
Christian, and Kehl Van Winkle, Maglio Christopher &
Toale PA, Sarasota, Florida; Talis M. Abolins, Maglio
Christopher & Toale PA, Seattle, Washington, for
Defendant-Appellant.
David S. Hawkins (argued), Upper Skagit Indian Tribe,
Sedro Wooley, Washington; Arthur W. Harrigan Jr., Tyler
L. Farmer, and Bryn R. Pallesen, Harrigan Leyh Farmer &
Thomsen LLP, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
James M. Jannetta and Emily H. Haley, Office of the Tribal
Attorney Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, La Conner,
Washington, for Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee.
Joseph V. Panesko, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
the Washington Attorney General, Olympia, Washington,
for Real-Party-in-Interest State of Washington.
Samuel Judge Stiltner, Puyallup Tribe of Indians, Tacoma,
Washington, Real-Party-in-Interest Puyallup Tribe of
Indians.
6               UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE

                          OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

    The Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (the Upper Skagit tribe)
claims that the usual and accustomed fishing areas of the
Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe (the Sauk tribe) under a 1974
decision do not include the Skagit River, and therefore that
decision did not authorize the Sauk tribe to open salmon
fisheries on that river. We conclude that the district court
intended to omit the Skagit River from the Sauk tribe’s usual
and accustomed fishing areas.
                               I
                               A
    This case is a subproceeding arising out of United States
v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (Final
Decision I). In Final Decision I, Judge George Boldt
resolved disputes arising from the 1855 Treaty of Point
Elliot, in which tribes in the area covered by the treaty agreed
to convey most of their tribal land to the United States, in
exchange for retaining their rights of taking fish “at usual
and accustomed grounds and stations.” Treaty of Point
Elliott art. v, 12 Stat. 927 (Apr. 11, 1859). Final Decision I
defined the term “usual and accustomed grounds and
stations” to include “every fishing location where members
of a tribe customarily fished from time to time at and before
treaty times, however distant from the then usual habitat of
the tribe, and whether or not other tribes then also fished in
the same waters.” 384 F.Supp. at 332. In a lengthy and
detailed opinion, Judge Boldt determined many of the usual
and accustomed fishing places where tribes fished before the
treaty. We refer to a tribe’s usual and accustomed grounds
                  UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE                       7

and stations, as defined in the findings of facts included in
Final Decision I, and a 1991 modification of that decision,
United States v. Washington, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1213
(W.D. Wash. 1991), as the tribe’s “U&As.”
    Recognizing that a single decision could not resolve
every future dispute over tribal fishing rights, Final Decision
I included an injunction retaining jurisdiction to implement
the decision. 384 F. Supp. at 413–20. The injunction
provided that any of the parties “may invoke the continuing
jurisdiction of the court” to make one of seven types of
determinations. Id. at 419. The parties to Final Decision I
have most frequently invoked the court’s jurisdiction for the
determinations listed in paragraphs 25(a)(1) and 25(a)(6). 1
Paragraph 25(a)(1) allows tribes to invoke the court’s
jurisdiction to determine “[w]hether or not the actions,
intended or effected by any party . . . are in conformity with
[Final Decision I] or this injunction.” Id. Paragraph
25(a)(6) allows tribes to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to
determine what was left unsaid by Final Decision I—“the
location of any of a tribe’s usual and accustomed fishing
grounds [U&As] not specifically determined by [Final
Decision I].” Id. The court first exercised its continuing
jurisdiction shortly after issuing Final Decision I, when it
determined the U&As of several tribes whose U&As were
not “specifically determined” in Final Decision I. See
United States v. State of Wash., 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1028

1
 These paragraphs were previously termed paragraphs 25(a) and 25(f),
but were renumbered by United States v. Washington, 18 F. Supp. 3d
1172, 1213 (W.D. Wash. 1991), which modified Final Decision I.
Paragraph 25 prescribes procedural steps a tribe must take to invoke the
court’s jurisdiction to open a new subproceeding.
8               UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE

(W.D. Wash. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Final Decision II).
                              B
    The dispute in this case relates to the meaning of Finding
of Fact 131 in Final Decision I, which defines the Sauk
tribe’s U&As as follows:

       The usual and accustomed fishing places of
       the Sauk River Indians at the time of the
       treaty included Sauk River, Cascade River,
       Suiattle River and the following creeks which
       are tributary to the Suiattle River—Big
       Creek, Tenas Creek, Buck Creek, Lime
       Creek, Sulphur Creek, Downey Creek,
       Straight Creek, and Milk Creek. Bedal Creek,
       tributary to the Sauk River, was also a Sauk
       fishing ground. (Ex. USA-29, p. 13; Ex. MS-
       10, p. 3, l. 1-6).

Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 376.
    The parenthetical at the end of Finding of Fact 131 refers
to two exhibits. The first exhibit, USA-29, p. 13, refers to
an expert report prepared by Dr. Barbara Lane regarding the
fisheries of the Sauk tribe (the Lane Report). In general,
Final Decision I relies heavily on Dr. Lane’s conclusions. In
Final Decision I, Judge Boldt stated that “the reports of Dr.
Barbara Lane . . . have been exceptionally well researched
and reported and are established by a preponderance of the
evidence,” 384 F.Supp. at 350, that they are “authoritative
and reliable,” id., and that they are not “controverted by any
credible evidence in the case,” id. Finding of Fact 131 is
materially identical to Dr. Lane’s Conclusion Five in the
                     UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE                9

Lane Report. 2 The second reference, “Ex. MS-10, p. 3, l. 1-
6,” refers to an excerpt from the testimony of James Enick,
a member of the Sauk tribe, which is described below. See
infra at 14–16.
    The Sauk tribe’s U&As in Finding of Fact 131 include
rivers and creeks that are tributaries to the Skagit River, but
do not include the Skagit River itself. Therefore, fish
migrating to the Sauk tribe’s U&As must travel on the Skagit
River, which is part of the U&As for the Upper Skagit tribe
and the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community (the
Swinomish tribe). For several years, the Sauk tribe has taken
the position that the Upper Skagit tribe and the Swinomish
tribe should alter their fishing practices so that more fish
reach the Sauk tribe’s U&As. These tribes have not agreed
to do so, however. This dispute came to a head at the start
of the 2020 fishing season, when the Sauk tribe issued a
fishing regulation that permitted its tribal members to
harvest Coho salmon in two areas that include a portion of
the main stem of the Skagit River between the confluence of
the Cascade River and Rocky Creek.
   In response to the Sauk tribe’s regulation, the Upper
Skagit tribe invoked the continuing jurisdiction of the district
court pursuant to paragraph 25 of Final Decision I, and
sought an emergency order requiring the Sauk tribe to close

2
    Conclusion Five in the Lane Report states:

           The principal fisheries of the Sauk Indians included
           Sauk River, Cascade River, Suiattle River and the
           following creeks which are tributary to the Suiattle
           River—Big Creek, Tenas Creek, Buck Creek, Lime
           Creek, Sulphur Creek, Downey Creek, Straight Creek,
           and Milk Creek. Bedal Creek, tributary to the Sauk
           River was also a Sauk fishing ground.
10              UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE

its fishery. The district court denied the motion for a
temporary restraining order but granted the Upper Skagit
tribe’s request to open a new subproceeding. The Upper
Skagit tribe then filed a motion for summary judgment
requesting a determination that the Sauk tribe has no U&As
in the Skagit River, and so the fishing regulation violated
Final Decision I. The district court granted the Upper Skagit
tribe’s summary judgment motion under paragraph 25(a)(1).
It concluded that Judge Boldt intentionally omitted the
Skagit River from the Sauk tribe’s U&As and therefore the
Sauk tribe’s attempts to open fisheries in the mainstem of the
Skagit River were not in conformity with Final Decision I.
The Sauk tribe appealed.
                              II
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Muckleshoot Tribe v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 141 F.3d 1355,
1357 (9th Cir. 1998) (Muckleshoot I). We review de novo
the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of
the Upper Skagit tribe and its interpretation of Final
Decision I. See Tulalip Tribes v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
794 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015).
    As with any other judicial decision, a court must interpret
Final Decision I “so as to give effect to the intention of the
issuing court.” Muckleshoot I, 141 F.3d at 1359 (citing
Narramore v. United States, 852 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir.
1988)). In determining Judge Boldt’s intent, a court begins
by reviewing the language used in the decision. See
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Lummi Indian Nation, 234 F.3d
1099, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2000) (Muckleshoot II). Because
“[o]pinions, unlike statutes, are not usually written with the
knowledge or expectation that each and every word may be
the subject of searching analysis,” we do not follow statutory
                UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE                11

canons of construction with their focus on “textual
precision” when interpreting judicial opinions. United
States v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 429, 433 (9th
Cir. 2000) (Muckleshoot III). Rather, a court reads the
language of the decision in the context of the decision as a
whole and the entire record before Judge Boldt, “augmented
only by evidence of contemporaneous understanding of
ambiguous terms.”        Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v.
Washington, 590 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010). The
court “may resolve conflicting inferences and evaluate the
evidence to determine Judge Boldt’s intent.” Id.
     When a moving party invokes the district court’s
jurisdiction under paragraph 25(a)(1), it bears the burden of
establishing that its interpretation of Final Decision I is
consistent with Judge Boldt’s intent. See Tulalip Tribes, 794
F.3d at 1133. The moving party must carry this burden
regardless whether it claims that a contested area is part of
its own U&As, or that a contested area is not part of another
tribe’s U&As. See id. We have sometimes described a
subproceeding under paragraph 25(a)(1) as involving “a
two-step mode of analysis.” Id.; see also Upper Skagit, 590
F.3d at 1023.
    At step one, a court uses the standard tools for
interpreting precedent, starting with the text of the applicable
Finding of Fact and considering the language at issue in the
context of the Final Decision as a whole. A court also
considers the record evidence before Judge Boldt, see
Muckleshoot III, 235 F.3d at 432, along with any other
evidence raised by the moving party that sheds light on
Judge Boldt’s understanding of geography at the time, see
Upper Skagit, 590 F.3d at 1024–25. At this step, we have
upheld a “district court’s decision [as] correctly
interpret[ing] Judge Boldt’s opinion on the basis of
12                 UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE

information known to Judge Boldt and the words he chose.”
Muckleshoot II, 234 F.3d at 1101. However, “whether the
text [of a Finding of Fact] is unambiguous or not,” a court
must understand the Finding of Fact “in light of the facts of
the case,” Muckleshoot III, 235 F.3d at 433, and so may
proceed to step two to determine whether the moving party
has carried “the burden of showing that there was no
evidence in the record before Judge Boldt,” that favors the
non-moving party’s contrary interpretation of the Finding of
Fact in a way that would undermine the moving party’s
theory of Judge Boldt’s intent. See Tulalip Tribes, 794 F.3d
at 1133 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 3
     In sum, in undertaking this two-step inquiry, the district
court must determine whether the moving party has carried
its burden of showing that its interpretation of the Finding of
Facts is consistent with Judge Boldt’s intent. If so, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Upper Skagit, 590 F.3d at 1023, 1026. In contrast, if the
moving party’s interpretation is not consistent with Judge
Boldt’s intent, the court must dismiss the moving party’s
claim. See Tulalip Tribes, 794 F.3d at 1135–36.

3
  See id. at 1133–35 (holding that, at step two, the moving party failed to
carry its burden of showing that the contested area was excluded from
the non-moving party’s U&As because the evidence before Judge Boldt
demonstrated that the non-moving party had fished in the contested
area); see also Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 871
F.3d 844, 849–50 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that, at step two, the moving
party met its burden of showing that the contested area was excluded
from the non-moving party’s U&As because the non-moving party
presented only general evidence of travel through waters adjacent to the
contested area, which did not undermine the moving party’s
interpretation of Judge Boldt’s intent.)
                UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE                13

                              III
                               A
    We now turn to Finding of Fact 131, which determined
the Sauk tribe’s U&As. The Upper Skagit tribe argues that
this finding clearly and unambiguously establishes Judge
Boldt’s intent not to include the Skagit River in the Sauk
tribe’s U&As. See Suquamish, 871 F.3d at 848.
    We agree. The text of Finding of Fact 131 does not
include the Skagit River. Instead, it lists the Suiattle River
and nine creeks which flow into the Sauk River and Cascade
River. It also lists the Sauk River and the Cascade River,
which flow into the Skagit River. Despite including three
rivers, it does not list the Skagit River. Judge Boldt’s
inclusion of the Skagit River in the Upper Skagit tribe’s
U&As, see Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 379, and in the
Swinomish tribe’s U&As, Final Decision II, 459 F. Supp. at
1049, while omitting it from the Sauk tribe’s U&As,
indicates that his omission was intentional, see United States
v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000).
Had Judge Boldt intended to include the Skagit River in the
U&As of the Sauk tribe, “he would have used that specific
term, as he did elsewhere.” Id.
    The Lane Report, on which Judge Boldt heavily relied,
reinforces our conclusion. Conclusion Five of the Lane
Report, which is substantially identical to Finding of Fact
131, did not include the Skagit River as one of the Sauk
tribe’s fishing grounds. Elsewhere, the Lane Report stated
that “some of the [Sauk tribal members], if not most”
continued to live “along the Sauk and Suiattle rivers where
their descendants still reside,” and were “distinguished from
the residents of the main Skagit River.” This evidence
strongly suggests that the Sauk tribe did not fish in the Skagit
14              UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE

River itself, which further supports our conclusion that
Judge Boldt did not intend to include it.
                               B
    The Sauk tribe disagrees with our conclusion. It argues
that Finding of Fact 131 is ambiguous in the context of Final
Decision I as a whole and the evidence in the record, and we
cannot reliably determine Judge Boldt’s intent. The Sauk
tribe raises four arguments to support this claim. We address
each argument in turn.
                               1
    First, the Sauk tribe argues that Finding of Fact 131 is
ambiguous because it lists rivers and creeks that are
tributaries to the Skagit River, raising the inference that
Judge Boldt intended to include the Skagit River as well. We
cannot draw such an inference because Judge Boldt
expressly included both the Skagit River and its tributaries
in his determination of the Swinomish tribe’s U&As, Final
Decision II, 459 F. Supp. at 1049. Judge Boldt’s inclusion
of rivers and tributaries in other tribes’ U&As strongly
indicates that Judge Boldt did not intend to include a river
by reference to its tributaries alone; rather, he listed a river
and its tributaries when he intended to include both.
Therefore, we reject the Sauk tribe’s argument that Finding
of Fact 131’s list of tributaries undermines our conclusion
that Judge Boldt’s intent is clear.
                               2
    Second, the Sauk tribe points to a transcript of the
testimony of James Enick (a member of the Sauk tribe) in
September 1973 regarding his knowledge of the Sauk tribe’s
fishing locations. The transcript stated:
                UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE               15

       Q: What were the areas where your tribe
       traditionally fished?
       A: Wherever the people were, but mostly on
       the Sauk River, the whole river, and all the
       streams coming into the river, that’s where
       the Indians fished.
       Q: Where has the Sauk-Suiattle Tribe lived?
       A: Up and down the Skagit River and the
       Sauk River mostly.

    According to the Sauk tribe, the excerpt indicates that the
Sauk tribe fished “[w]herever the people were,” meaning
wherever tribal members lived, and that the Sauk tribe lived
“[u]p and down the Skagit River.” Therefore, according to
the Sauk tribe, Sauk tribal members must have fished “[u]p
and down” the Skagit River. The Sauk tribe notes that Judge
Boldt incorporated this testimony by including a
parenthetical reference to “Ex. MS-10, p. 3, l. 1-6” at the end
of Finding of Fact 131. The Sauk tribe argues that the
inclusion of this parenthetical, which incorporates Enick’s
1973 testimony by reference, makes Finding of Fact 131
ambiguous and raises the inference that Judge Boldt
intended to include the Skagit River in the Sauk tribe’s
U&As.
    We disagree. First, Enick’s testimony does not state that
the Sauk tribe fished on the mainstem of the Skagit River,
and so is not evidence that the river was part of the Sauk
tribe’s U&As. Moreover, in identifying the Sauk tribe’s
fishing areas elsewhere in his testimony, Enick states that the
Sauk tribe fished “mostly on the Sauk River, the whole river,
and all of the streams coming into the river.” This testimony
is consistent with Finding of Fact 131, which also includes
16               UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE

the Sauk River and a tributary to the river. Second, although
the Sauk tribe puts weight on Judge Boldt’s reference to this
excerpt in the parenthetical at the end of Finding of Fact 131,
that reference indicates only that Judge Boldt was aware of
this testimony, yet nevertheless chose not to include the
Skagit River in his findings.
    We therefore conclude that Enick’s testimony is not
evidence showing that Judge Boldt meant to include the
Skagit River in the U&As, and therefore does not change our
conclusion that Judge Boldt’s intent is clear.
                               3
    Next, the Sauk tribe argues that the Sauk River and the
Cascade River are part of the Sauk tribe’s U&As, and that
the most likely path of travel between the Sauk River and
Cascade River is the Skagit River. According to the Sauk
tribe, this raises the inference that the Sauk tribe traveled and
fished on the Skagit River, which is evidence that Judge
Boldt intended to include the Skagit River as part of the Sauk
tribe’s U&As.
     In making this argument, the Sauk tribe relies on our
cases analyzing U&As describing large marine areas
between distant geographic anchor points. For example,
Finding of Fact 46 of Final Decision I provided that “the
usual and accustomed fishing places of the Lummi Indians
at treaty times included the marine areas of Northern Puget
Sound from the Fraser River south to the present environs of
Seattle.” 384 F. Supp. at 360. We held that this Finding of
Fact was “ambiguous, because it does not delineate the
western boundary of the Lummi’s usual and accustomed
grounds and stations.” Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d at 449.
                UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE               17

    We nevertheless discerned that even though the Finding
of Fact did not mention Admiralty Inlet (a marine
“passageway along the west side of Whidbey Island”) by
name, Judge Boldt intended to include it “within the ‘marine
areas of Northern Puget Sound from the Fraser River south
to the present environs of Seattle’” because “Admiralty Inlet
would likely be a passage through which the Lummi would
have traveled from the San Juan Islands in the north to the
‘present environs of Seattle.”’ Id. at 450, 452; see also
Tulalip Tribes, 794 F.3d at 1133 (holding that U&As
described as “the marine waters of Puget Sound from the
northern tip of Vashon Island to the Fraser River” were
ambiguous).
    The Sauk tribe’s reliance on these cases is misplaced.
For example, unlike the finding of fact determining the
Lummi’s U&As, Finding of Fact 131 does not ambiguously
describe marine areas between two distant geographic
anchor points. Instead, Finding of Fact 131 describes
specific rivers and tributaries, and does not describe any area
extending between the Sauk River and Cascade River, or
indicate that Judge Boldt intended to include a path of travel
between those rivers. Therefore, the Sauk tribe’s “path of
travel” theory does not make Judge Boldt’s intent unclear, or
constitute evidence that Judge Boldt intended to include the
Skagit River in the Sauk tribe’s U&As.
                              4
    Finally, the Sauk tribe relies on scattered statements
throughout Final Decision I and the Lane Report evidencing
that the Sauk tribe historically fished in the Skagit River.
    First, the Sauk tribe points to statements suggesting that
Sauk tribal members lived near the Skagit River. For
instance, Finding of Fact 129 states that the Sakhumehu tribe
18              UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE

(predecessor to the Sauk tribe) resided in a village located at
the confluence of the Sauk River and Skagit River and that
the historical residence of the Sauk tribe was on “the upper
reaches of the Skagit River System.” Final Decision I, 384
F. Supp at 375. Further, Dr. Lane’s summary of her report
states that the “principal fisheries” of the Sakhumehu “were
the headwaters of Skagit River including Baker River, Sauk
River, and the smaller creeks which belonged to that water
system.”
    The Sauk tribe also points to evidence that individual
Sauk tribal members had access to the Skagit River. For
instance, Finding of Fact 129 indicates that Sauk tribal
members sometimes married Upper Skagit tribal members.
Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 375–76. The Lane Report
stated that “some of the Sauk people went to the Cascades
on the Skagit River to fish and to Baker River to fish with
Upper Skagit friends and relatives there.”
    Further, the Sauk tribe points to Finding of Fact 132,
which states that the tribe “traveled to the saltwater in order
to procure marine life unavailable in their own territory.” Id.
at 376. Because the rivers listed in the Sauk tribe’s U&As
do not connect to the saltwater, the Sauk tribe argues that the
tribe must have traveled on the Skagit River to the ocean.
    Finally, the Sauk tribe relies on Dr. Lane’s general
statement that “Indian fisheries existed at all feasible places
along a given drainage system from the upper reaches of the
various tributary creeks and streams, down the main river
system to the saltwater.”
    None of these statements undermines our conclusion that
Judge Boldt’s intent was clear, or shows that Judge Boldt
intended to include the Skagit River in the U&As contrary
to the plain text of Finding of Fact 131. Neither the
                UPPER SKAGIT V. SAUK-SUIATTLE               19

statement that a Sauk village is located at the confluence of
the Sauk and Skagit Rivers, nor that Sauk tribal members
resided on the upper reaches of the Skagit River system, is
evidence of U&As on the mainstem of the Skagit River.
Likewise, Dr. Lane describes headwaters as distinct from the
main part of a river, so the presence of the Sauk tribe’s
principal fisheries in the headwaters of the Skagit River does
not establish U&As on the mainstem of the river. Nor does
evidence that some Sauk tribal members fished with friends
and relatives on the Skagit River establish U&As for the
tribe. As Final Decision I made clear, “occasional and
incidental [fishing] was not considered to make the marine
waters traveled thereon the usual and accustomed fishing
grounds of the transiting Indians.” 384 F. Supp. at 353. The
statement that the Sauk tribe traveled to the saltwater,
without more, does not establish customary fishing on the
Skagit River to support U&As on it. Finally, Dr. Lane’s
general statement about Indian fisheries is not sufficiently
specific to the Sauk tribe to inform Judge Boldt’s intent
regarding the Sauk tribe’s U&As.
                              IV
    We conclude that Judge Boldt did not intend to include
the Skagit River in the Sauk tribe’s U&As. See Tulalip
Tribes, 794 F.3d at 1133. Because there is no ambiguity as
to Judge Boldt’s intent, we affirm the district court’s holding
that the Upper Skagit tribe was entitled to summary
judgment.
   AFFIRMED.