Court Opinion

ID: 9889359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 10:09:20.143147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:31.198264
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                       NO. 03-22-00758-CV

                                 Robert Douglas Rue, Appellant

                                                 v.

                                Alicia McCullough Rue, Appellee

              FROM THE 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-FM-16-007132, THE HONORABLE MAYA GUERRA GAMBLE, JUDGE PRESIDING

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION

                Robert Douglas Rue appeals from a judgment dissolving his marriage to

Alicia McCullough Rue. 1 Robert argues that the district court abused its discretion in dividing

the community estate and by ordering Robert to pay $3,000 per month in spousal maintenance

for ten years. We affirm.

                                        BACKGROUND 2

                The parties married in 1990. Robert worked in the insurance industry at the

beginning of the marriage but transitioned full time into building homes in 2003 or 2004. Alicia

taught school from 1990 to May 1994, when she became pregnant with the first of their four

children. Alicia was a stay-at-home mother for the next twenty-seven years.

       1   We refer to the parties by their first names because they share a surname.
       2  We draw these facts from the testimony of Robert and Alicia and the documentary
evidence admitted at trial.
               Alicia testified that Robert “always handled the finances” during the marriage and

that this was a source of conflict. She “did not feel comfortable not knowing about the finances”

but, “for some reason, either [Robert] couldn’t, didn’t want to, [or] didn’t know how” to include

her. Approximately once a month, Alicia would ask him: “How are we doing? Like what’s

going on? What work do you have?” In response, Robert “would hand [her] a piece of paper to

tell me what projects he had or where he was at.” Alicia acknowledged on cross-examination

that she could have accessed their joint accounts but did not because Robert frequently assured

her that “we’re fine.”

               That changed in 2016 when Alicia wanted to check the bank account of one of her

daughters. She discovered the account was empty and learned that Robert had drained $8,000

from the account of one daughter and $6,000–$7,000 from the account of another.                This

prompted Alicia to investigate their finances, and she discovered that they “were in financial

trouble, big trouble.” Alicia estimated that it took “about a year, year and a half to really figure

out everything” because Robert would tell her only “what he needed to tell [her] or what [she]

found out, and then there would be more later.” She discovered that Robert had, without her

knowledge, opened a line of credit at Wells Fargo and taken out at least $35,000; incurred

between $80,000–$100,000 in debt on credit cards that she did not know existed; taken out a

second mortgage on their main residence, the University Club property; and drained $100,000

from a savings account, $150,000 from an IRA at LPL Financial, and $100,000 from an

Edward D. Jones brokerage account. Alicia also discovered that the parties owed $200,000 to

the IRS because Robert had not filed their taxes since 2011. Alicia testified that she signed their

tax return every year and gave it to Robert, who always assured her later that he filed it. Alicia

                                                 2
testified that Robert explained to her that he had “got behind” with their finances and “thought

that he was going to get out of it before [she] needed to know.”

                 Alicia filed a petition for divorce in 2016 but did not pursue it because the parties

attempted to reconcile. She explained at trial that she felt Robert had “gotten caught up” with

maintaining the same lifestyle as their neighbors and friends and appreciated that he was taking

steps to get the family out of their financial difficulties. The parties placed their residence on

University Club Drive and a Kerrville rental house (Wigwam Property) on the market while they

moved into a rental house in Austin with their youngest daughter, E.G.R. 3 Both properties sold

after a year, and the parties used the equity to settle the tax debt and pay off the second

mortgage. With $75,000 remaining from the sale of the University Club property, the parties

purchased the Canyon Glen home. In 2018, Robert moved to Kerrville to be closer to several

houses he was developing.

                 Alicia started looking for jobs when the parties moved out of the University Club

home. The parties mutually agreed that she should find a job that would enable her to be at

home when E.G.R. returned from school. Alicia took a part-time job delivering cookies for

Tiff’s Treats and, in 2018, began working part-time at the front desk of a doctor’s office. The

doctor agreed that Alicia would work from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. until E.G.R. received her

driver’s license and then transition to working full time. When that time came, Alicia decided to

take a job nannying two to three days a week instead because it paid better and was closer to

her house.

       3     We follow the parties in referring to E.G.R. by her initials even though she is now
an adult.
                                                   3
                  E.G.R. sustained a serious concussion in the summer of 2019. Alicia testified that

E.G.R. could not “walk down the stairs to make food,” watch television, or use her phone or

laptop. When school started in the fall, Alicia would read E.G.R.’s assignments to her and write

down her responses. Alicia took a different nannying job with a family who allowed E.G.R. to

sleep in their house while Alicia was working. In January and February of 2020, E.G.R attended

school in person for a few hours a day. She briefly returned to full-time attendance before

schools stopped in-person instruction because of COVID-19.

                  On Father’s Day 2020, Robert informed Alicia that he had been in a relationship

with someone for six months. Alicia looked at their finances and discovered that Robert paid

for restaurants, concerts, traveling, and substantial purchases at H-E-B with his paramour from

the parties’ joint account. Alicia opened a checking account and began depositing all her

earnings there.

                  E.G.R improved enough to do her schoolwork without assistance and graduated

from high school in 2021. After she left for college, Alicia continued nannying and began

training to work for a chiropractor. The chiropractor told her a few months later that he could

not find office space for her, and she decided to take additional nannying jobs. She had

considered applying for a teaching position but thought she could make more money nannying.

Alicia wanted to continue nannying and “maybe even turn it into a business of some sort” but

ultimately decided to apply to teaching positions at two school districts. She had not received a

decision on either application by the time of trial.

                  The district court admitted two budgets Alicia had prepared. The first showed a

total of $7,199.16 in monthly expenses. The second showed her monthly expenses at $5,050 but

omitted items such as groceries and expected medical care. In the same budget, she calculated

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that her net monthly salary from a teaching job (should she be offered one) would be between

$2,600–$3,000.

               In February of 2022, Alicia filed an amended petition asking the district court to

find that Robert committed fraud on the community, award her a disproportionate share of the

community estate, and order him to pay spousal maintenance. The parties tried the case to the

bench on April 11–12, 2022. The district court subsequently signed a final decree of divorce,

awarding 55% of the community estate to Alicia and 45% to Robert and awarding Alicia a

$545,222.45 judgment—payable in monthly installments of $4,543.52—for Robert’s fraud on

the community. The district court further ordered Robert to pay Alicia $3,000 in spousal

maintenance per month for ten years. At Robert’s request, the district court issued findings of

fact and conclusions of law. Robert’s motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law,

and this appeal followed.

                                         DISCUSSION

               Robert argues in two issues that the district court abused its discretion by finding

that he committed fraud on the community and awarding Alicia a disproportionate share of the

community estate and by ordering him to pay spousal maintenance.

Standard of Review

               We review a trial court’s division of community property and award of spousal

maintenance for an abuse of discretion. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981)

(property division); Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021,

no pet.) (spousal maintenance). It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to rule arbitrarily,

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unreasonably, without regard for guiding rules or principles, or without supporting evidence.

Transcor Astra Group S.A. v. Petrobras Am. Inc., 650 S.W.3d 462, 482 (Tex. 2022).

               Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the “legal and factual sufficiency of

the evidence are not independent grounds of error but instead are factors used to determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion.”      A.S. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective

Servs., 665 S.W.3d 786, 795 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (citing Zeifman v. Michels,

212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied)). The reviewing court considers

first whether the trial court had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion and, if

so, whether the trial court erred in its application of discretion. Id. (citing Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d

at 588). “The traditional sufficiency review comes into play with regard to the first question.”

T.E. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00067-CV, 2022 WL 3092885, at *8

(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 4, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588). The

court then determines whether, based on that evidence, the trial court’s decision was reasonable.

A.S., 665 S.W.3d at 795.

               In reviewing for legal sufficiency, “we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence when reasonable jurors could do so and

disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Pike v. Texas EMC Mgmt.,

LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 794 (Tex. 2020). A party challenging the legal sufficiency of an adverse

finding on which it did not bear the burden of proof at trial “must demonstrate on appeal that no

evidence supports the adverse finding.” Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261,

263 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam). We will sustain a no-evidence challenge when (1) evidence of a

vital fact is absent, (2) rules of law or evidence bar us from giving weight to the only evidence

offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere

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scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Bos v. Smith,

556 S.W.3d 293, 299–300 (Tex. 2018).

                In reviewing for factual sufficiency, “we examine the entire record and consider

and weigh all the evidence, both in support of and contrary to the challenged finding.” Ortiz

v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an

adverse finding on which it did not bear the burden of proof, we will set aside the finding “only

if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and

unjust.” Republic Petroleum LLC v. Dynamic Offshore Res. NS LLC, 474 S.W.3d 424, 433

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176

(Tex. 1986)).

                Under either standard, the trier of fact “is the sole judge of the credibility of

witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Altice v. Hernandez, 668 S.W.3d 399,

410 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (citing Golden Eagle Archery, Inc.

v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003)). We therefore “may not pass upon the witnesses’

credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder.” 4922 Holdings, LLC v. Rivera,

625 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied).

Reconstituting the Community Estate

                Robert argues in his second issue that the district court erred by concluding that

he depleted the community estate through constructive fraud and awarding Alicia a

disproportionate share of the reconstituted estate.

                In a divorce case, the trial court must order a division of the community estate in a

manner the court deems “just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any

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children of the marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001. Trial courts have “wide latitude” in

determining what constitutes a just and right division, Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698, and may order

an unequal division of property if there is a reasonable basis for doing so, O’Carolan v. Hopper,

414 S.W.3d 288, 311 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).

               Waste of community assets by a spouse may support an unequal division of

property. Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998). “A fiduciary duty exists

between a husband and a wife as to the community property controlled by each spouse.”

Puntarelli v. Peterson, 405 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). A

presumption of “‘constructive fraud’ arises when one spouse disposes of the other spouse’s

interest in community property without the other’s knowledge or consent.” Id. at 137–38. Once

the presumption arises, the burden of proof “shifts to the disposing spouse to prove the fairness

of the disposition of the other spouse’s one-half community ownership.” Id. at 138. If the trier

of fact finds that a spouse committed fraud, the trial court shall “calculate the value by which the

community estate was depleted as a result of the fraud on the community and calculate the

amount of the reconstituted estate” and “divide the value of the reconstituted estate between the

parties in a manner the court deems just and right.” Tex. Fam. Code § 7.009(b).

               In its findings and conclusions, the district court concluded that Robert

improperly dissipated $628,000 in community property. In an attached spreadsheet, the district

court listed seven specific dispositions included in that amount:

               (1) $100,000 of equity from the sale of the University Club residence used to
                   settle the tax debt;

               (2) $95,000 from the sale of the Wigwam Property;

               (3) $257,000 depleted from the brokerage and retirement accounts;

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               (4) $6,000 from the children’s savings accounts;

               (5) $100,000 from the second mortgage on the University Club residence;

               (6) $45,000 in credit card debt that was cleared with community funds; and

               (7) $20,000 of the line of credit that was cleared with community funds.

Robert argues that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence that these dispositions were

constructively fraudulent.

               First, Robert argues that there is no presumption of fraud regarding the $100,000

from the sale of the University Club residence to settle the tax debt because Alicia testified that

she was aware of the tax debt and the sale of the property. While Alicia testified that she

reviewed and signed the tax returns each year, she also testified that she believed Robert when he

told her each year that he had paid the taxes. Robert does not challenge Alicia’s testimony that

she was unaware of his failure to pay the taxes. The presumption of fraud arose regarding this

sum. Cf. Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 402–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991),

writ denied, 867 S.W.12d 766 (Tex. 1993) (upholding jury finding that husband committed

waste by incurring debt without wife’s knowledge or consent).

               Next, Robert argues that here is no evidence of constructive fraud regarding the

$95,000 from the sale of the Wigwam Property because it is “undisputed that the parties agreed

to sell the rental property in Kerrville to pay for bills and living expenses.” The sale of the

property, however, is not the allegedly fraudulent disposition. Alicia testified that she proposed

selling the property—intended as an asset for their retirement—to pay off the debt to the IRS and

the second mortgage. 4 Robert does not dispute that Alicia was unaware of his failure to pay the

       4   To the extent Robert contends that the $95,000 was used to settle different debts, the
district court implicitly determined that Alicia’s testimony was more credible, and we must defer
                                                 9
taxes, and we conclude below that even if Alicia was aware of the second mortgage, she did not

consent to it. The presumption of fraud thus arose as to both debts. See Puntarelli, 405 S.W.3d

at 138 (explaining that no “intent to deceive” required for proof of constructive fraud).

The district court did not err by including the $95,000 used to settle these debts in the

reconstituted estate.

               Next, Robert argues that the district court abused its discretion by including the

$257,000 from the retirement and brokerage accounts, the line of credit cleared with $20,000 in

community funds, and $45,000 in credit card debt that was settled with community funds

because there is no evidence “that either spouse dishonestly or purposefully with the intent to

deceive, deprived the community estate of assets to the detriment of the other spouse.” These

arguments reference an alternative form of committing waste, actual fraud. See Strong v. Strong,

350 S.W.3d 759, 771 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (“Fraud on the community can be

committed through actual or constructive fraud.”). Establishing actual fraud requires showing

that a spouse transferred community property or expended community funds “for the primary

purpose of depriving the other spouse of the use and enjoyment of the assets involved in the

transaction.” Id. (citing Wright v. Wright, 280 S.W.3d 901, 908 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no

pet.)).   Proving actual fraud requires evidence of the spouse’s “subjective intent,” but

“[n]o ‘dishonesty of purpose of intent to deceive’ must be established” for constructive

fraud. Puntarelli, 405 S.W.3d at 138 (quoting Everitt v. Everitt, No. 01-11-00031-CV,

2012 WL 3776343, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

to that determination. See Altice v. Hernandez, 668 S.W.3d 399, 410 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2022, no pet.); 4922 Holdings, LLC v. Rivera, 625 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied).
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Alicia alleged both actual and constructive fraud, but the district court concluded that Robert had

engaged in constructive fraud. 5 Alicia testified that she was unaware of the line of credit or the

credit cards he used to incur $45,000 in debt, and she did not know that he had liquidated the

retirement and brokerage accounts. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding

these dispositions were constructively fraudulent and including them in the reconstituted estate.

               Robert’s sole argument regarding the children’s savings accounts is that he

eventually replaced part of the funds that he removed. He does not dispute that Alicia was

unaware he drained the accounts, and he does not argue that she consented. The district court

did not err in including these funds in the reconstituted estate.

               Next, Robert argues that no presumption of fraud arose regarding the second

mortgage because Alicia signed off on it. That the mortgage document bears her signature does

not necessarily prevent the presumption of fraud from arising if she did not consent to it. See

Everitt, 2012 WL 3776343, at *3 (“The presumption may arise even when the other spouse has

knowledge of the disposition, so long as she did not also consent to the disposition.”). Alicia

denied that she knew of the mortgage and explained in her testimony that she routinely signed

documents Robert gave her without inquiring into the details because she trusted him.

Moreover, Alicia testified that she would not have signed off on any second mortgage if she

knew their true financial situation, particularly the debt to the IRS. Based on this evidence, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly concluding the presumption of constructive

fraud arose because she did not consent to taking out the second mortgage.

       5  The district court found that Robert “improperly dissipated” or wasted assets from the
community estate without Alicia’s knowledge or consent but makes no mention of the subjective
intent requirement of actual fraud.
                                                  11
               Applying the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that there is legally

and factually sufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive fraud regarding these seven

sums. We overrule Robert’s second issue.

Spousal Maintenance

               Next, Robert argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to

pay Alicia spousal maintenance of $3,000 per month for ten years.

               The Family Code authorizes trial courts to “award spousal maintenance ‘only

under ‘very narrow’ and ‘very limited circumstances.’” Marin v. Marin, No. 03-22-00013-CV,

2023 WL 2776296, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 5, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Dalton

v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. 2018)).          Alicia sought maintenance under Section

8.051(2)(B), which provides in relevant part that:

       In a suit for dissolution of a marriage . . . the court may order maintenance for
       either spouse only if the spouse seeking maintenance will lack sufficient property,
       including the spouse’s separate property, on dissolution of the marriage to provide
       for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs and:

       ...

       (2) the spouse seeking maintenance:

       …

               (B) has been married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and lacks
               the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum
               reasonable needs . . . .

Tex. Fam. Code § 8.051(2)(B).

               There is a “rebuttable presumption” that maintenance under this subsection “is not

warranted” unless the spouse seeking maintenance has exercised diligence in either “earning

                                                12
sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs” or “developing the

necessary skills to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs during a period of

separation and during the time the suit for dissolution of the marriage is pending.”

Id. § 8.053(a). Additionally, a maintenance order may not exceed ten years in duration, id.

§ 8.054(a)(1)(C), and the trial court must further limit its duration “to the shortest reasonable

period that allows the spouse seeking maintenance to earn sufficient income to provide for the

spouse’s minimum reasonable needs,” id. § 8.054(a)(2).

               Robert argues that the district court abused its discretion because there is legally

and factually insufficient evidence that Alicia (1) will lack sufficient property to meet her

minimum reasonable needs after the divorce, (2) has been diligent in seeking employment,

(3) requires $3,000 per month to meet her needs, and (4) that ten years is the minimum

reasonable time for her to earn sufficient income.

Sufficient Property

               Robert first argues that there is insufficient evidence that Alicia will lack

“sufficient property” to meet her minimum reasonable needs after the divorce.              See id.

§ 8.053(a). The district court awarded Alicia the following assets: the $545,222.45 equalization

judgment; $13,311 in a checking account; her teacher retirement account valued at $20,497.63;

her vehicle; and the Canyon Glen home, which is valued at $715,000. Alicia testified that she

intends to sell the home, which Robert estimated will yield a net profit of $361,718.73. Robert

asserts that these assets are “more than sufficient” to provide for her minimum reasonable needs

of $7,199.16 per month.

                                                13
               The Family Code does not define the term “minimum reasonable needs,” Everitt,

2012 WL 3776343, at *8, and determining what the “minimum reasonable needs” are for a

particular individual “is a fact-specific determination which must be made by the trial court on a

case-by-case basis,” Diaz v. Diaz, 350 S.W.3d 251, 254 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet.

denied).   When considering whether the spouse seeking maintenance will have sufficient

property after the divorce, “the trial court may consider the liquidity of the assets awarded to her

and their ability to produce income,” Everitt, 2012 WL 3776343, at *8, but “the law does

not require a spouse to spend down long-term assets, liquidate all available assets, or incur new

debt simply to obtain job skills and meet needs in the short term,” Sherman v. Sherman,

650 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.); see also Martinez v. Martinez,

No. 02-21-00353-CV, 2022 WL 17986023, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 29, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]he mere fact that Wife received significant property in the divorce is not

sufficient to show that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Wife spousal

maintenance.”). Alicia estimated that her net income from a teaching job would be $2,600 a

month. As Robert admits in his fourth argument, that salary plus the monthly installment

payment of $4,543.52 is less than her estimated minimum reasonable needs of $7,199.16 per

month. Alicia is not required to liquidate the assets she was awarded to make up the shortfall.

See Sherman, 650 S.W.3d at 901. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding

that Alicia will lack sufficient property to meet her minimum reasonable needs after the divorce.

See Tex. Fam. Code § 8.053(a).

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Diligence

               Robert argues that the record shows Alicia did not exercise diligence in earning

sufficient income. See id. § 8.053(a)(1). Specifically, he argues that Alicia never applied for a

teaching job until the week before trial even though she has an active teaching certificate.

Instead, she worked part time as a nanny. The inquiry is not limited to whether she applied for

the most lucrative job available but whether she earned “sufficient income” to provide for her

minimum reasonable needs. See id.; Day v. Day, 452 S.W.3d 430, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (rejecting argument that spouse claiming maintenance “must show

that she has sought additional or more lucrative employment”). Alicia testified that when she

began looking for work, the parties agreed she should be at home when E.G.R. (a freshman in

high school at the time) returned from school because she was troubled by her parents’ marital

problems. Alicia took the job at Tiff’s Treats and negotiated the temporary part-time hours at the

doctor’s office for that purpose. Alicia did not start working a full schedule at the doctor’s office

because nannying paid better and was closer to her home. Later, when E.G.R. sustained the

concussion, the part-time schedule allowed Alicia to care for her while Robert lived most of the

time Kerrville. And as Robert reminds us in his brief, he paid her expenses, such as the

mortgage on the Canyon Glenn residence, the utility bill, and the grocery bill, during this time.

Under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Alicia

exercised due diligence in earning sufficient income. See Day, 452 S.W.3d at 435.

Duration

               Next, Robert argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to

pay maintenance for ten years because a shorter period would be reasonable for her to earn

                                                 15
sufficient income to meet her own reasonable needs.          See Tex. Fam. Code § 8.054(a)(2)

(requiring that maintenance order must be limited “to the shortest reasonable period that allows

the spouse seeking maintenance to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum

reasonable needs . . . .”). Robert argues that there is insufficient evidence Alicia needs ten years

because the record reflects that he paid all her expenses during the five-and-a-half years the

divorce was pending because she “never attempted to gain full time employment.” As we have

already discussed, the undisputed evidence shows that the parties were attempting to reconcile

during that time, and that Alicia took employment that reflected their mutual priority of having

Alicia be around for E.G.R. Moreover, Alicia testified that even though she is concerned her

teaching experience is twenty-seven years out of date, she plans to continue seeking out a

teaching job while nannying. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

ordering Robert to pay maintenance for ten years.

Amount of Award

               Finally, Robert argues that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to

support the amount of the award.        First, he argues that the monthly payments from the

equalization judgment and the maintenance award total $7,543.52 and that this amount far

exceeds Alicia’s estimated minimum reasonable needs. The equalization judgment, however, is

part of the division of property rather than a means of support. See id. § 7.009(c)(2) (“In making

a just and right division of the reconstituted estate under Section 7.001, the court may grant any

legal or equitable relief necessary,” including “awarding a money judgment in favor of the

wronged spouse against the spouse who committed the actual or constructive fraud on the

community.”). Next, he argues that $3,000 is excessive because she usually makes between

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“$500 and $1,000 per month” nannying and could have significantly more income if she takes a

teaching job. But it is undisputed that Alicia has not received a decision on her two pending

applications. In any event, her estimated teaching salary of $2,600–$3,000 plus the $3,000

maintenance payment would not equal her estimated minimum reasonable needs of $7,199.16.

The district court did not abuse it discretion by ordering Robert to pay $3,000 in maintenance.

               We overrule Robert’s first issue.

                                        CONCLUSION

               We affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                             __________________________________________
                                             Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: October 6, 2023

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