Court Opinion

ID: 9723092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:02:05.769448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:44.525593
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting). As purportedly redrawn by the majority, sec. 227.42(lm), Stats., would provide:
(a) Whenever a person requests a hearing pursuant to sec. 227.42(1), the agency shall:
(1) hold brief proceedings or consider supplemental materials or submissions from the person requesting a hearing, and thereafter determine whether the requirements of sec. 227.42, Stats., have been met; or
(2) determine from correspondence or otherwise inadequate material whether the requirements of sec. 227.42 have been met.
(b) If the agency has proceeded under sec. 227.42(lm)(a)(l), judicial review shall be pursuant to sec. 227.52, Stats.
(c) If the agency has proceeded under sec. 227.42(lm)(a)(2), judicial review shall be pursuant to sec. 227.57(1), Stats.
Of course, the legislature has not yet enacted sec. 227.42(lm), Stats. Nor need it do so because the majority opinion makes legislative action unnecessary. I dissent because I conclude that substantive changes to ch. 227 are better made by the legislature.
I agree with the majority that the legislature has not provided an answer to the question: "Who determines whether the requirements of sec. 227.42, Stats., are met and how is that determination made?" I disagree that we *172should provide that answer by injecting summary judgment methodology into judicial reviews of administrative decisions.1 We have previously followed supreme court precedent holding that summary judgment procedure is inapplicable to administrative reviews under ch. 227. Chicago & N.W.R.R. v. Labor & Ind. Rev. Comm., 91 Wis. 2d 462, 475-76, 283 N.W.2d 603, 610 (Ct. App. 1979), aff'd, 98 Wis. 2d 592, 297 N.W.2d 819 (1980). We should continue to do so. State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 533, 348 N.W.2d 159, 163 (1984).
I am particularly concerned that the procedure enacted by the majority substantially departs from the general concept that there is only limited judicial review of administrative agency determinations. Whether a person is entitled to a contested case hearing should be a question answered by an agency and reviewed by the judiciary. The majority has substituted a circuit court trial for a review of agency action. It does so because it concludes the agency action in this case is unreviewable. I agree that review is difficult, but I do not agree that the solution is the circuit court mini-trial the majority has decreed.
When a circuit court makes inadequate findings of fact, making its decision unreviewable, we may still *173affirm if the judgment finds support in the evidence, or we may remand for further findings. Perrenoud v. Perrenoud, 82 Wis. 2d 36, 42-43, 260 N.W.2d 658, 661 (1978). We use a similar procedure where a circuit court abuses its discretion by failing to consider proper factors. Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 237, 330 N.W.2d 547, 552 (1983). I see no reason to be less deferential to an agency determination, given the policy of limited judicial review found in ch. 227, Stats.
Ironically, the majority criticizes the circuit court for conducting the very sort of hearing the majority now requires where an agency's conclusion is difficult to review. "[T]he cart overtook the horse and the [circuit] court assumed the agency's functions." Majority opinion at 162. That is not what occurred. The circuit court considered The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Decisions in Wisconsin, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 554, and the deferential scope of review of an agency's conclusions of law found in Dept. of Revenue v. Milwaukee Refining Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 44, 48, 257 N.W.2d 855, 857 (1977). The circuit court's opinion reflects that it recognized its limited role in reviewing an agency decision. It wrote: "Does the record support the findings of the DNR? It does," and "I am satisfied the DNR findings are rooted in reason," and
[t]hat the ability of the dam to control during high water episodes is minimal is regrettable, but the DNR is not required to come up with the perfect solution for all time to this or any other problem it is empowered to address. DNR must consider all those statutory and procedural matters required to reach a decision, and this court then will affirm its decision. The DNR has done what it is required to do, and this court must affirm.
*174These are not words used by a trial court reviewing a matter de novo, but the language of deferential review. The majority has confused the length and complexity of the circuit court hearing with its purpose: "The trial court's decision that Shearer was not entitled to a DNR hearing on the merits of the agency's proposal was based on the court's analysis of volumes of testimony and exhibits from its earlier hearings on Shearer's request for a temporary injunction. And that is the problem." Majority opinion at 162. That was not the trial court's decision. What the trial court did decide was that DNR's conclusion was supported by the record, and therefore should be affirmed.
DNR's findings and conclusions take no more than three typewritten pages. That does not imply that a hearing to test the data and assumptions underlying those facts and conclusions would be cursory. Given the 138-year history of the Indianford Dam, and the various conflicting interests affected by the water level of Lake Koshkonong, I am not surprised that the trial court needed seven days of hearings to determine whether the DNR had improperly denied appellants a contested case hearing on its proposed order. I agree with the trial court's conclusion that sec. 227.42, Stats., did not require the DNR to hold a contested case hearing.
The majority does not address the other issues raised by appellants because the issue it addresses determines the case. Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 334 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Ct. App. 1983). There is therefore no reason to address those other issues in this dissent, and I do not do so.

 The majority's "prima facie case for entitlement," a concept taken from the procedure required by Walter Kassuba, Inc. v. Bauch, 38 Wis. 2d 648, 655, 158 N.W.2d 387, 391 (1968) is in reality nothing other than standard summary judgment methodology. The majority does not explain why it chose that procedure rather than other procedures, such as that employed in criminal preliminary hearings, sec. 970.03, Stats. That procedure, involving an evidentiary hearing rather than an affidavit review, would seem to be a better way to find facts. This reinforces my belief that the legislature ought to decide issues such as the one addressed in these opinions.