Court Opinion

ID: 9483525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:23:06.356235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:40.352864
License: Public Domain

RADER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I.
This court, in its opinion, reaches a result in which I concur. The district court has wide discretion in modifying a consent decree under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). System Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Employees Dep’t v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647, 81 S.Ct. 368, 371, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961). The trial court’s ruling, on the facts of this case, did not constitute an abuse of discretion. I write separately to explain that this court’s attempt to limit strictly the Supreme Court’s decision in System Federation is dicta.
Despite the broad discretion afforded trial courts under Rule 60(b), CTS Corp. v. Piher Int’l Corp., 727 F.2d 1550, 1555, 221 USPQ 11, 14 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871, 105 S.Ct. 221, 83 L.Ed.2d 151 (1984), an intervening change in law may warrant modification of a judicial decree. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 748, 762, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992); System Fed’n, 364 U.S. at 648, 81 S.Ct. at 372. In System Federation, the Supreme Court ordered modification of a consent decree to accommodate a change in law. 364 U.S. at 653, 81 S.Ct. at 373-74.
In numerous cases, including System Federation, an intervening change in law justified modification of a continuing injunction. Williams v. Butz, 843 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956, 109 S.Ct. 392, 102 L.Ed.2d 381 (1988); Williams v. Atkins, 786 F.2d 457 (1st Cir.1986); Jordan v. School Dist. of Erie, 548 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.1977). This court purports to distinguish away this extensive body of authority in one sentence: “In all of these eases a decree involving a public or service institution had been affected by a change of law relating to the institution.”
This language suggests that modification of a consent decree involving a public or service institution is different than modifying a decree between C.R. Bard, Inc. and W.L. Gore, Inc. To the contrary, Bard and Gore both undoubtedly consider themselves “service institutions” in the same sense that the private entities in System Federation (a railroad and a union) are “service institutions.” Thus, this court’s attempt to set a different standard for “public or service institutions” does not distinguish System Federation nor define the class subject to the new standard.
This court seems nonetheless to suggest that private parties to settlements in patent cases may no longer rely on System Federation in a motion to modify under Rule 60(b). The court, however, provides no principled basis for distinguishing patent law from the corpus of American law governed by System Federation. Because this court cannot disregard Supreme Court *565precedent, I must conclude that this court’s attempt to distinguish System Federation is dicta.
II.
This court only affirms the district court’s denial of Bard’s motion to modify its consent decree. Paragraph 4 of the consent decree merely enjoins Bard “from infringing or actively inducing infringement of one or more of [the claims].” Testing is no longer infringing conduct. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1988). This court does not have before it a declaratory judgment action to determine. whether Bard’s testing procedures would constitute infringement. Consequently this court does not decide whether the consent decree bars Bard’s testing.