Court Opinion

ID: 9892980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 18:00:40.180266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:28.803211
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30320    Document: 00516943715        Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/25/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                                  FILED
                                                                      October 25, 2023
                                No. 22-30320                            Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                  Clerk

   Ronald Chisom; Marie Bookman, also known as Governor;
   Urban League of Louisiana,

                                                         Plaintiffs—Appellees,

   United States of America; Bernette J. Johnson,

                                              Intervenor Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                     versus

   State of Louisiana, ex rel. Jeff Landry, Attorney General,

                                          Defendant—Appellant.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                          USDC No. 2:86-CV-4075
                 ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Stewart, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

   Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Circuit Judge:

         Defendant-Appellant State of Louisiana, ex rel. Jeff Landry (“the
   State”), seeks to dissolve a consent decree that pertains to the method of
   selecting justices for the Louisiana Supreme Court. The State attempts to
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   dissolve the consent judgment under the first and third clauses of Rule
   60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The State contends that the
   judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged because the State has
   substantially complied with the decree for more than thirty years and the
   decree was intended to terminate at a defined milestone. The State further
   contends that it is no longer equitable to enforce the consent judgment
   prospectively because of widespread malapportionment in Louisiana’s
   supreme court election districts. The district court denied the State’s motion
   to dissolve, holding that the State had failed to meet the evidentiary burdens
   associated with the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5). For the following
   reasons, we AFFIRM.
                               I.     FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
           This case arises from the complex and controversial history
   concerning Black voter dilution in the state of Louisiana. On September 19,
   1986, Ronald Chisom, Marie Bookman, Walter Willard, Marc Morial, Henry
   Dillon, III, and the Louisiana Voter Registration/Education Crusade filed a
   class action against the State of Louisiana and various state officials in their
   official capacities. Those plaintiffs challenged the method of selecting
   Louisiana Supreme Court justices, alleging that the former First Supreme
   Court District violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C.
   § 10301 (“the VRA”), by diluting Black votes in Louisiana. 1 At the time, the

           _____________________
           1
             See Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 1507 (2023) (“Section 2 prohibits States
   from imposing any standard, practice, or procedure ... in a manner which results in a denial
   or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color . . . [w]hat

                                                  2
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   First Supreme Court District was a multi-parish, multi-member district that
   included Orleans Parish, which had a majority-minority population, as well
   as three majority-white parishes: Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines
   Parishes.
           The plaintiffs’ election district challenge spawned six years of
   litigation which included multiple appeals to the Fifth Circuit and the U.S.
   Supreme Court. One of the initial questions was whether Section 2 applied
   to state judicial elections, which the United States Supreme Court answered
   in the affirmative in its 1991 decision, Chisom v. Roemer. 2 Following more
   contentious litigation regarding Section 2, the parties entered into a consent
   judgment to resolve their claims (“the Consent Judgment”). The Consent
   Judgment emphasized that the “defendants do not agree with” the plaintiffs’
   contention that the multi-member district violated Section 2. Rather, the
   State explained that it “only enter[ed] into this compromise agreement to
   resolve [the] extensive and costly litigation.”
           The Consent Judgment’s stated purpose is to “ensure that the system
   for electing the Louisiana Supreme Court is in compliance with Section 2 of
   the Voting Rights Act,” using a combination of temporary and long-term
   action items. The Consent Judgment directs the Louisiana Legislature to

           _____________________
   that means, § 2 goes on to explain, is that the political processes in the State must be equally
   open, such that minority voters do not “have less opportunity than other members of the
   electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
   choice.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
           2
               501 U.S. 380, 385 (1991).

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   reapportion the seven districts of the Louisiana Supreme Court to create one
   new supreme court district that is majority Black in voting age population and
   that includes all of Orleans Parish. The Consent Judgment also specifies that
   the justice for this new district will be elected once a vacancy occurs in the
   former First Supreme Court District. Additionally, the Consent Judgment
   establishes a temporary eighth seat on the Louisiana Supreme Court (“the
   Chisom Seat”), to be occupied by a Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
   judge until such vacancy occurred.
          The Consent Judgment was signed by Judge Charles Schwartz, Jr. of
   the Eastern District of Louisiana and took effect on the enactment of
   legislation that codified the Consent Decree’s terms on August 21, 1992.
   That year, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 776, which reapportioned
   Louisiana into seven voting districts and mandated that the Louisiana
   Supreme Court be comprised of one justice from each of those districts. 3 The
   new majority Black district—known as District Seven—encompasses most
   but not all of Orleans Parish. An addendum reflecting this caveat was added
   to the Consent Judgment in January 2000 by agreement of the parties. The
   Louisiana Legislature also enacted Act 512, which created the temporary
   Chisom Seat on the Louisiana Supreme Court. 4 On January 1, 1993, Revius
   Oliver Ortique, Jr. became the first ever Black justice to serve on the
   Louisiana Supreme Court, as well as the first justice elected to the Chisom

          _____________________
          3
              La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 776 (H.B. 581) (1992).
          4
              La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 512 (S.B. 1255) (1992).

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   Seat. The following year, Bernette Johnson was elected to the Chisom Seat,
   and in 2000, she was elected as the first associate justice from the new
   District Seven.
         In 2012, litigation arose regarding whether Justice Johnson’s service
   in the Chisom Seat could be credited toward chief justice tenure. 5 United
   States District Judge Susie Morgan, who had recently succeeded Judge
   Schwartz in supervising the Consent Judgment, ruled that the language of the
   Consent Judgment contemplated that Justice Johnson’s Chisom Seat service
   would count toward chief justice tenure. 6 Judge Morgan also addressed
   whether the federal court had continuing jurisdiction over the Consent
   Judgment. 7 She ruled in the affirmative, explaining that the Consent
   Judgment in this case “provide[s] the Court with a sufficient jurisdictional
   basis to resolve the dispute pending before it.” 8 She further held that the
   federal court retained jurisdiction until the “final remedy [of the of the
   Consent Judgment] is implemented.” 9 Justice Johnson became the Louisiana
   Supreme Court’s first Black chief justice on February 1, 2013, and served
   with distinction in that role until December 2020. 10 Following Chief Justice
   Johnson’s retirement, Piper D. Griffin, who is also a Black woman, was
         _____________________
         5
             Chisom v. Jindal, 890 F. Supp. 2d 696 (E.D. La. 2012).
         6
             Id. at 711-18.
         7
             Id. at 711.
         8
             Id.
         9
             Id.
         10
              Id.

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   elected by the voters of District Seven to serve a ten-year term as an associate
   justice.
          In 2019, a different group of plaintiffs filed suit in the Middle District
   of Louisiana with the goal of creating a second majority-minority supreme
   court district. 11 The Middle District of Louisiana certified an interlocutory
   appeal to this circuit to decide whether the Eastern District of Louisiana has
   exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over all matters contemplated by the
   Consent Decree. 12 In Anthony Allen, et al. v. State of Louisiana, et al., this
   court held that the Eastern District did not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over
   election-districting matters contemplated by the Consent Decree. 13 We
   explained that the Consent Judgment “aimed to remedy alleged vote dilution
   in one supreme court district, not to reform the whole system.” 14 In dicta,
   this court stated that it was unsure that the Consent Judgment was still in
   force because its final remedy might have been implemented when Johnson
   became Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court. 15 We declined to
   answer that question, however, noting that “Louisiana has evidently never
   asked the Eastern District to vacate the decree.” 16

          _____________________
          11
               Allen v. Louisiana, 14 F.4th 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2021).
          12
               Id.
          13
               Id.
          14
               Id. at 374.
          15
               Id.
          16
               Id.

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                           II.    PROCEEDINGS BELOW
          On December 2, 2021, the State filed a motion to dissolve the Consent
   Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), asserting that the
   Consent Judgment had been satisfied, released, or discharged and that
   applying the Consent Judgment prospectively was no longer equitable. The
   State alleged that this court’s opinion in Allen “ma[de] clear that the Consent
   Decree has accomplished its objectives.” The State contended that the
   Consent Judgment’s final remedy was satisfied in 2020 when Justice Johnson
   retired as Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
          The State also asserted that the Consent Judgment had increased
   malapportionment in the seven supreme court districts and had stymied the
   Louisiana Legislature’s efforts to remedy that issue. It claimed that “the
   Louisiana Legislature is currently preparing to redraw Louisiana’s political
   districts” and that “[t]he boundaries of the seven Supreme Court districts
   that resulted from the Consent Decree can no longer be maintained while
   adhering to traditional redistricting principles.” The State also contended
   that, as a result of the Consent Judgment, “the voting strength of voters in
   one district is considerably greater than the voting strength of voters in
   another district in violation of the one man, one vote principle.”
          In support of its motion, the State attached the following exhibits: this
   circuit’s opinion in Allen; the Consent Judgment in its original and amended
   forms; the Secretary of State election rolls for Justice Ortique, Chief Justice
   Johnson, and Justice Griffin; a September 2021 presentation entitled

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   “Redistricting in Louisiana;” and a letter from the Department of Justice
   regarding Act 776.
          Plaintiffs-Appellees Ronald Chisom, Marie Bookman, and the Urban
   League of Louisiana (collectively, “the Chisom Plaintiffs”) and Intervenor
   Plaintiffs-Appellees United States of America and Bernette Johnson, filed
   oppositions to the motion to dissolve. The Chisom Plaintiffs and Intervenor
   Plaintiffs-Appellees contended that the motion to dissolve should be denied
   because the State had not carried its evidentiary burden to show that the
   fundamental purpose of the Consent Judgment had been satisfied or that
   changed circumstances warranted dissolution. The Chisom Plaintiffs also
   took issue with the fact that the State had sought dissolution absent any
   guarantees that no additional VRA or constitutional violations would occur.
   Referencing “Louisiana’s long history of discrimination in the judicial
   branch,” the Chisom Plaintiffs asserted that the State sought to “wipe this
   slate clean with the stroke of a pen and without any assurance that a new,
   undisclosed map will not snatch away Black Louisianans[’] hard-won
   opportunity to participate in these elections equally.”
          On May 24, 2022, the district court issued an order and reasons
   denying the State’s motion to dissolve the Consent Judgment. 17 The district
   court evaluated the State’s motion under the first and third clauses of Rule
   60(b)(5) and held that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof under
   both theories. For the first clause, which states that a Consent Judgment may

          _____________________
          17
               Chisom v. Edwards, 342 F.R.D. 1, 6 (E.D. La. 2022).

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   be dissolved when “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
   discharged,” the court looked to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Board
   of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent School District No.
   89 v. Dowell. 18 That decision established the so-called Dowell standard, which
   asks “whether the [State] had complied in good faith with the . . . decree since
   it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been
   eliminated to the extent practicable.” 19 The court applied Dowell and
   concluded that the State’s motion failed under both prongs. The court
   emphasized that the Consent Judgment “reiterates its purpose is ‘to ensure
   black voters in the Parish of Orleans have an equal opportunity to participate
   in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.’”
          The district court then evaluated the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5),
   which states that a consent judgment may be dissolved when “applying it
   prospectively is no longer equitable.” 20 For this clause, the court evaluated
   whether the State had demonstrated a “significant change in factual
   conditions” which would warrant termination of the consent judgment. The
   court looked to Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, in which the U.S.
   Supreme Court devised a two-part test to evaluate whether applying a
   consent decree prospectively is equitable. 21 Applying Rufo, the district court

          _____________________
          18
               498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
          19
               Id.
          20
               Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
          21
               502 U.S. 367, 391–92 (1992).

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   observed that the “severe malapportionment” identified by the State did not
   constitute a “significant change” under step one of Rufo. The court
   explained that malapportionment throughout Louisiana’s supreme court
   districts is not a new problem and that “District Seven in particular has
   become         less   malapportioned,         shifting     from     approximately       32.3%
   underpopulation          after      the   2010        census   to   approximately      28.4%
   underpopulation today.” The court further noted that the State had not
   shown that continued enforcement of the Consent Judgment would be
   detrimental to the public interest. The court observed that the Supreme
   Court had held that juridical districts are not representative districts and
   therefore do not need to be equally apportioned, and it concluded that the
   Consent Judgment does not prevent the Louisiana legislature from
   reapportioning Louisiana’s supreme court districts. The State timely
   appealed.
                                III.     STANDARD OF REVIEW
           We review a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate or modify a
   judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) for abuse of discretion. 22 In this circuit, “the
   district court’s ruling is ‘entitled to deference,’ but we review de novo ‘any
   questions of law underlying the district court’s decision.’” 23 We review any
   factual findings for clear error. 24 When reviewing the denial of a Rule 60(b)
           _____________________
           22
                Anderson v. City of New Orleans, 38 F.4th 472, 479 (5th Cir. 2022).
           23
                Frew v. Janek, 780 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted).
           24
              Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 912 F.2d 819, 825 (5th Cir. 1990); see
   also Frew v. Janek, 820 F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 2016).

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   motion, “[i]t is not enough that the granting of relief might have been
   permissible, or even warranted—denial must have been so unwarranted as to
   constitute an abuse of discretion.” 25 Moreover, “[t]he burden is on the
   moving party to prove that modification is warranted, regardless of whether
   the party seeks to lessen its own responsibilities under the decree, impose a
   new and more effective remedy, or vacate the order entirely.” 26
                                      IV.      ANALYSIS
           The State contends that the district court abused its discretion in
   denying the motion to dissolve the Consent Judgment under the first and
   third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5) because (1) the State has substantially complied
   with the Consent Judgment for decades and the Consent Judgment’s action
   items have been implemented, and (2) applying the Consent Judgment
   prospectively      is    inequitable     because      it   has     caused      widespread
   malapportionment and constrained the Louisiana legislature. The State
   requests that we reverse the district court’s judgment regarding the State’s
   motion to dissolve and that we then completely dissolve the Consent
   Judgment.
           Because the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5) command different
   evidentiary burdens, we examine each separately to determine whether the
           _____________________
           25
              Cooper v. Noble, 33 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1994), supplemented by Cooper v.
   Noble, 41 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402
   (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981)).
           26
              League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Dist. 19 v. City of Boerne, 659 F.3d 421, 438
   (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391
   U.S. 244, 249 (1968)).

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   district court abused its discretion in denying the State’s motion to dissolve.
   We begin first with a clarification of the Consent Judgment’s “final remedy”
   under Louisiana’s contract law, which the parties have hotly disputed
   throughout this matter and which is relevant to our jurisdiction as well as our
   Rule 60(b)(5) analysis. We next turn to the appropriate evidentiary burden
   under Rule 60(b)(5)’s first clause and whether the State met it through its
   motion to dissolve. Finally, we identify the appropriate evidentiary burden
   under Rule 60(b)(5)’s third clause and determine whether it was met by the
   State.
       A. Whether the State met the requisite evidentiary burden under Rule
            60(b)(5)’s first clause
                 i.    The Consent Judgment’s final remedy
            “Consent judgments have elements of both contracts and judicial
   decrees.” 27 Because of their hybrid nature, consent decrees are construed
   according to “general principles of contract interpretation.” 28 Moreover,
   “[t]he primary concern of a court in construing a written contract is to
   ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument.” 29
   Courts must therefore examine the “unambiguous language in a contract”
   and enforce “‘the objective intent’ evidenced by the language used.” 30 This

            _____________________
            27
              Frew ex rel Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (citing Firefighters v.
   Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986)).
            28
                 Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir. 2006).
            29
                 Tex. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 463 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 2006).
            30
                 Id. at 407 (internal citation omitted).

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   analysis must include consideration of all the contractual terms because
   “courts should examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to
   harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none
   will be rendered meaningless.” 31
           Under Louisiana law, until the specified goal or “final remedy” of a
   consent decree has been achieved, the court overseeing the decree retains
   subject matter jurisdiction to interpret and enforce it. 32 The court overseeing
   a consent decree is the ultimate tribunal for determining compliance and
   deciding whether the decree should be dissolved or vacated. 33 However, a
   contract that resolves a lawsuit “extends only to those matters the parties
   intended to settle and the scope of the transaction cannot be extended by
   implication.” 34
           Here, the district court applied Louisiana contract law when it
   analyzed the final remedy of the Consent Judgment and concluded that it

           _____________________
           31
                Id. at 408.
           32
             La. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Louisiana, 490 F. Supp. 3d 982, 1019–22 (M.D.
   La. 2000); see also Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 494 F.3d 846, 856 (9th Cir.
   2007).
           33
                La. State Conf. of the NAACP, 490 F. Supp. at 1000 (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at
   247-50).
           34
             Trahan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc., 2004-0100, p. 15 (La. 3/2/05); 894
   So. 2d 1096, 1107 (citing La. Civ. Code art. 3073; Ortego v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev.,
   96-1322, p. 7 (La. 2/25/97); 689 So. 2d 1358, 1363; Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019, p.7 (La.
   1/14/94); 630 So. 2d 741, 748; see also La. Civ. Code art. 3076 (“A compromise settles only
   those differences that the parties clearly intended to settle, including the necessary
   consequences of what they express.”).

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   retained subject matter jurisdiction. The district court acknowledged that the
   Consent Judgment “implements specific remedies” but held that its final
   remedy had not yet been implemented. The court determined that the
   Consent Judgment is prospective in nature because it “repeatedly states its
   purpose is to ensure compliance with Section 2 of the VRA.” The district
   court held that the State had not shown that it was well-positioned to ensure
   future compliance with the Section 2 of the VRA and thus denied its motion
   to dissolve.
           The parties in this matter dispute the Consent Judgment’s final
   remedy under Louisiana contract law. Relying on this circuit’s dicta in
   Allen, 35 the State contends that the final remedy of the Consent Judgment
   was implemented when Chief Justice Johnson’s tenure ended in 2020. The
   State asserts that enforcing the Consent Judgment beyond that event is
   inappropriate because there are no action items left for the State to fulfill.
   Intervenor Plaintiffs-Appellees, on the other hand, agree with the district
   court’s assessment that the Consent Judgment is prospective in nature. They
   point out that the Consent Judgment “clearly contemplates future
   compliance as applied to Black voters in Orleans Parish.”
           There are several key clauses in the Consent Judgment that assist in
   identifying its final remedy. At its beginning, the Consent Judgment states
   that “[t]he relief contained in this consent judgment will ensure that the

           _____________________
           35
              14 F.4th at 374 (“In light of those developments, one might think the decree’s
   final remedy has been implemented. But Louisiana has evidently never asked the Eastern
   District to vacate the decree.”).

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   system for electing the Louisiana Supreme Court is in compliance with
   Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” The Consent Judgment next details
   specific action items associated with this objective, including the
   establishment of the Chisom Seat, the enactment of Acts 776 and 512, and
   the creation of a new judicial district. In the language ordering the creation of
   District Seven, the Consent Judgment states that “[t]he reapportionment
   shall be effective on January 1, 2000, and future Supreme Court elections
   after the effective date shall take place in the newly reapportioned districts.”
   The Consent Judgment concludes by stating, “[t]he Court shall retain
   jurisdiction over this case until the complete implementation of the final
   remedy has been accomplished.”
          The district court correctly determined that the Consent Judgment’s
   final remedy is the State’s prospective compliance with Section 2 of the
   VRA. This circuit recently recognized that the Consent Judgment is an
   “institutional reform injunction” that contemplates future compliance. 36
   When a consent decree contemplates future compliance, “the prospective
   provisions of the consent decree operate as an injunction.” 37 As noted above,
   however, the Consent Judgment repeatedly states that its goal is to “ensure”
   that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s election methods comply with the VRA.
   Each action item in the Consent Judgment is in furtherance of the ultimate

          _____________________
          36
               Allen, 14 F.4th at 373.
          37
              La. State Conf. of the NAACP, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 999; see also Williams v.
   Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d
   654, 659 (2d Cir. 1982); Carson v. Am. Brands, 450 U.S. 79, 84 n.9 (1981)).

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   remedy of ensuring compliance with the VRA. It is true that some of these
   action items have already been fulfilled. Whether the Consent Judgment’s
   final remedy has been satisfied by the State is a separate question that is
   addressed in turn.
          We analyze whether the final remedy was implemented, mindful of
   the Consent Judgment’s proper scope. Our precedent instructs us to avoid
   overreading consent decrees and adding “new requirement[s] to which the
   parties never agreed.” 38 Moreover, “federalism is protected, not by
   overextending such injunctions, but by confining them to their proper
   scope.” 39 In Allen, we clarified the scope of the Consent Judgment, holding
   that the Consent Judgment “aim[s] to remedy alleged vote dilution in one
   supreme court district, not to reform the whole system.” 40 We therefore
   confine our analysis to the State’s prospective compliance with Section 2 of
   the VRA through District Seven specifically.
               ii.   Determining the correct evidentiary burden
          The parties disagree about the appropriate evidentiary burden for
   determining whether “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
   discharged” under the first clause of Rule 60(b)(5). 41 The State advocates for
   a lenient “substantial compliance” standard, while the Chisom Plaintiffs and

          _____________________
          38
               Janek, 780 F.3d at 328–29.
          39
               Allen, 14 F.4th at 373 (quoting Horne, 557 U.S. at 448).
          40
               Id. at 374.
          41
               Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).

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   Intervenor-Appellees advocate for the more demanding Dowell standard,
   which asks “whether the [State] had complied in good faith with the . . .
   decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination
   had been eliminated to the extent practicable.” 42
          The district court applied the Dowell standard to determine whether
   dissolution of the Consent Judgment under Rule 60(b)(5)’s first clause is
   warranted. The court acknowledged that Louisiana contract law governs the
   Consent Judgment but noted that, because of its nature as an institutional
   reform decree, the Consent Judgment requires a “flexible standard” to
   determine whether dissolution is appropriate. In support, the court
   referenced League of United Latin American Citizens, District 19 v. City of
   Boerne, in which this circuit held that “[d]istrict courts must take a flexible
   approach to motions to modify consent decrees and to motions to modify or
   vacate institutional reform decrees.” 43 The district court noted that,
   although City of Boerne interpreted Rule 60(b)(5)’s third clause rather than
   its first, the opinion references a passage in Rufo which discusses and
   approves of the Dowell standard. 44 The district court also noted that in Frew
   v. Janek, this circuit held that “motions under the first clause of Rule

          _____________________
          42
               498 U.S. at 250.
          43
               659 F.3d 421, 437–40 (5th Cir. 2011).
          44
               See 502 U.S. at 380.

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   60(b)(5) are subject to the same flexible theme articulated by the Supreme
   Court in the context of the third clause.” 45
           The district court further explained that, even though the Fifth
   Circuit has not directly addressed the applicability of Dowell to consent
   decrees outside the context of desegregation, it could draw on guidance from
   other circuits. The district court provided a survey of cases from the Sixth,
   Ninth, Eleventh, Fourth, Eighth, and First circuits in which Dowell was
   applied or cited in reference to motions to dissolve institutional reform
   decrees under Rule 60(b)(5), particularly in its first clause. 46 The court
   concluded that there is enough support from those other circuits to reliably
   apply Dowell to the present motion to dissolve. The court also noted that, in
   multiple cases, the Fifth Circuit had indirectly approved of Dowell by
   endorsing the “flexible approach” to resolving motions under Rule 60(b)(5).
           The district court ultimately held that dissolution of the Consent
   Judgment under Rule 60(b)(5)’s first clause was inappropriate because the
   State had not met either of Dowell’s requirements. With regard to good faith,
   the court held that “although the State has complied with the terms of the
   Consent Judgment” by implementing various action items, it “has not shown

           _____________________
           45
                See 780 F.3d 320 at 327.
           46
              See, e.g., Johnson v. Heffron, 88 F.3d 404, 405 n.1 (6th Cir. 1996); Youngblood v.
   Dalzell, 925 F.2d 954, 960–62 (6th Cir. 1991); Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F.3d 278, 283 (9th Cir.
   2011); Alexander v. Britt, 89 F.3d 194, 199–203 (4th Cir. 1996); Allen v. Ala. State Bd. of
   Educ., 164 F.3d 1347, 1350–54 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated, 216 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000);
   McDonald v. Carnahan, 109 F.3d 1319, 1321–22 (8th Cir. 1997); Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail
   v. Rufo (Rufo II), 12 F.3d 286, 288, 290, 292-94 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993).

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   that there is little or no likelihood the original violation will not be repeated
   when the Consent Judgment is lifted.” The court stressed that “the good
   faith inquiry looks to both past compliance and future prospects.” 47 The
   court further held that the State had not demonstrated that the vestiges of
   past discrimination had been nearly eliminated because it had not shown that
   “the purpose of the consent order has been fulfilled.”
           The State takes issue with the district court’s application of the Dowell
   standard and contends that doing so constituted reversible error. It asserts
   that Dowell is wholly inapplicable to this case because the case (1) did not
   involve a motion under Rule 60(b)(5), and (2) arose in the context of school
   desegregation. The State contends that the district court should have instead
   applied the “substantial compliance” standard under Louisiana contract law.
   Substantial compliance does not require perfect compliance, says the State,
   because that standard “‘excuses deviations from a contract’s provisions that
   do not severely impair the contractual provision’s purpose.’” 48 Referencing
   Janek, the State claims that this circuit “recently clarified” that a defendant
   “can obtain relief under prong 1 by demonstrating ‘substantial compliance’
   with” a consent judgment. 49 The State asserts that, because the purpose of

           _____________________
           47
                See Johnson, 88 F.3d at 405 n.1.
           48
                Janek, 820 F.3d at 721 (quoting Janek, 780 F.3d at 330).
           49
              Id. The State also references a recent unpublished case from this circuit in
   support: Frew v. Young, No. 21-40028, 2022 WL 135126, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2022). In
   that case, we applied the substantial compliance standard to relief sought under Rule
   60(b)(5)’s first prong. However, that case involved a Texas consent decree and substantial

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   the Consent Judgment was fulfilled over the past thirty years, it has
   “substantially complied” with the terms of the agreement. Citing Horne, the
   State concludes that “continued enforcement of the order is not only
   unnecessary, but improper” because the objective of the Consent Judgment
   has been achieved.
           “It is well-settled that a federal court has the inherent authority to
   enforce its own orders, including consent decrees agreed to by parties and
   approved by the Court.” 50 “Federal courts are not reduced to approving
   consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once entered, a consent decree
   may be enforced.” 51 In Hawkins, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the party
   seeking dissolution of a consent decree must “establish[] reason to modify
   the decree,” and “where it has not done so . . . the decree should be enforced
   according to its terms.” 52 The Court has also observed that a district court’s
   experience with a consent decree and the passage of time puts that court in a
   unique position to observe compliance. 53

           _____________________
   compliance under Texas—not Louisiana—law. Moreover, it is not binding authority for
   this case.
           50
               La. State Conf. of the NAACP, 490 F. Supp. at 999, aff’d sub nom. Allen, 14 F.4th
   at 366; see also United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 533 F.3d 278, 287 (5th Cir. 2008).
           51
                Hawkins, 540 U.S. at 442.
           52
                Id.
           53
                Dowell, 490 U.S. at 249.

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           Because Rule 60(b)(5)’s first clause is rarely invoked in the context of
   consent decree dissolution, our jurisprudence is lacking. 54 The first clause
   of Rule 60(b)(5) is “almost never applied to consent decrees” and is typically
   reserved for disputes involving the amount of a judgment. 55 “The vast
   majority of motions for modification and termination of consent decrees,
   especially those involving institutional reform, invoke Rule 60(b)(5)’s third
   clause.” 56 Although we have implicitly approved of Dowell and its
   applicability to motions to dissolve consent decrees, we have never explicitly
   applied it in this context. For example, in City of Boerne and in Janek, we
   endorsed a more “flexible standard [such as in Dowell]” for evaluating
   motions to modify or dissolve under the first clause of Rule 60(b)(5). 57
   Moreover, in Allen, we discussed the applicability of Dowell’s holdings to
   consent decree disputes generally. 58
           Furthermore, as the district court noted, at least six other circuits have
   applied the Dowell standard to motions to dissolve consent decrees under
   Rule 60(b)(5). 59 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have applied Dowell to Rule

           _____________________
           54
                Janek, 780 F.3d at 327.
           55
                Id.
           56
                Id.
           57
                City of Boerne, 659 F.3d at 43740; Janek, 780 F.3d at 323, 327.
           58
                14 F.4th at 373.
           59
             See Johnson, 88 F.3d at 405 n.1; Youngblood, 925 F.2d at 960–62; Jeff D., 643
   F.3d at 283; Alexander, 89 F.3d at 199–203; Allen, 164 F.3d at 1350–54; McDonald, 109 F.3d
   at 1321–22 ; Rufo II, 12 F.3d at 288, 290, 292–94 n.3.

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   60(b)(5)’s first clause specifically. 60 Additionally, in N.L.R.B. v. Harris Teeter
   Supermarkets, the D.C. Circuit assessed a motion to dissolve under Rule
   60(b)(5)’s first clause, indicating its approval of Dowell. 61 That circuit court
   held that “Dowell and Rufo must be read together” and that “while . . . good
   faith compliance certainly matters, extended compliance alone does not
   compel the modification of a consent decree.” 62 Applying Dowell to the
   instant case comports with the same “flexible standard” endorsed by the
   U.S. Supreme Court in Horne v. Flores, in which it indicated that the Rufo and
   Dowell standards, while employing different factors, are of the “same theme”
   and allow district courts flexibility in the administration of institutional
   reform consent decrees. 63
           The State’s reliance on Janek for the application of the substantial
   compliance standard is misplaced. First, Janek interpreted a consent decree
   that was governed by Texas contract law—not by Louisiana law. 64 Louisiana
   contract law recognizes the concept of substantial performance under Article
   2014 of the Louisiana Civil Code, but it is rarely used outside of the context

           _____________________
           60
                See, e.g., Johnson, 88 F.3d at 404, 405 n.1; Jeff D., 643 F.3d at 283.
           61
                215 F.3d 32, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
           62
                Id.
           63
             Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380; see also Alexander, 89 F.3d at 199–203; Johnson, 348 F.3d
   at 1342-44.
           64
                Janek, 780 F.3d at 330.

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   of construction law. 65 The State has not cited any cases applying Article 2014
   to a motion to dissolve a consent decree. Lastly, if the substantial compliance
   standard were applied in this case, it would produce absurd results in the
   context of the Consent Judgment, which includes action items such as the
   implementation of legislation and the creation of a Black opportunity voting
   district.
             Second, the consent decree in Janek was not an institutional reform
   decree; it only aimed to improve Texas’s one-time implementation of a
   Medicaid program. 66 That is quite different from the Consent Judgment,
   which aims to ensure prospective compliance with the VRA and the U.S.
   Constitution. 67 This classification matters. The Supreme Court has held that
   institutional reform decrees are treated differently than ordinary consent
   decrees “because such decrees ‘reach beyond the parties involved directly in
   the suit and impact on the public’s right to the sound and efficient operation
   of its institutions.’” 68 As a result, “[d]istrict courts must take a flexible
   approach to . . . institutional reform decrees” because “[f]lexibility is ‘often
   essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation.’” 69

             _____________________
             65
             See Transier v. Barnes Bldg., LLC, 14-1256 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/10/15); 166 So. 3d
   1249, 1260 (citing La. Civ. Code art. 2769 (2022)).
             66
                  780 F.3d at 330.
             67
                  Id. at 323.
             68
                  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381 (quoting Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir.
   1989)).
             69
                  City of Boerne, 659 F.3d at 437 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381).

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            iii.      Applying Dowell to this dispute
           The State has not fulfilled Dowell’s good faith compliance prong. As
   discussed above, the final remedy contemplated by the Consent Judgment is
   prospective compliance with Section 2 of the VRA. The State correctly
   asserts that it has complied with the Consent Judgment for the past thirty
   years, but Dowell’s good faith inquiry examines both past compliance and
   “future prospects.” 70 Although a history of compliance is evidence of good
   faith, 71 the court must also be satisfied that “there is relatively little or no
   likelihood that the original . . . violation will promptly be repeated when the
   decree is lifted.” 72
           Here, the State provided no evidence, plans, or assurances of
   compliance with Section 2 of the VRA in the event that the Consent
   Judgment is terminated. The State’s evidence focuses only on past
   compliance with the Consent Judgment. During oral argument on the motion
   to dissolve, the district court indicated an openness to amending the Consent
   Judgment to include a new redistricting plan that addresses compliance and
   assuages the State’s concerns. The court noted that examples of future
   compliance may include a roadmap that demonstrates continued compliance

           _____________________
           70
                See Johnson, 88 F.3d at 405 n.1 (emphasis added).
           71
             Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Madison Cnty., 517 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying
   Dowell to a motion for declaratory judgment in a case involving a desegregation-related
   consent decree); see also Harris Teeter, 215 F.3d at 36 (holding that “compliance over an
   extended period of time is not in and of itself sufficient to warrant relief”).
           72
                Rufo II, 12 F.3d at 292 (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247).

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                                        No. 22-30320

   or a redistricting plan. The State responded that it had not presented such a
   plan because “[t]o do something more in the Consent Decree would require
   a new agreement,” notwithstanding the fact that the Consent Decree
   requires “future Supreme Court elections” to “take place in the newly
   reapportioned districts.”
           The State’s position is thus the antithesis of Dowell’s requirement
   that it show “relatively little or no likelihood” of repeat violations once the
   Consent Judgment is terminated. 73 The State has refused to provide
   evidence, plans, or assurances of future compliance, instead maintaining that
   Dowell is inapplicable. The State merely contends that there is no danger of
   future VRA violations because the Louisiana legislature’s recent bills 74 for
   Louisiana Supreme Court redistricting have all preserved District Seven.
   The State even conceded that, in the event the Consent Judgment is
   dissolved and the districts were redrawn in a manner that violates the VRA,
   a “suit would be filed. Facts would have to be alleged, and the case would go
   forward and be tried.” Accordingly, the State has not met the good faith
   compliance prong under Dowell, and the inquiry would typically end there.
           Even if it had met Dowell’s first prong, the State still fails to meet the
   second prong, which asks “whether the vestiges of past discrimination had
   been eliminated to the extent practicable.” 75 This inquiry ultimately
           _____________________
           73
                Id.
           74
              These bills were not introduced into evidence but were instead only mentioned
   at oral argument on the motion to dissolve.
           75
                Id.

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                                         No. 22-30320

   examines whether “the purpose of the consent order has been fulfilled.” 76 In
   the context of this case, Dowell required the State and the district court to
   consider the existence (or absence) of voter dilution in Louisiana. 77
           On appeal, the State maintains that Dowell is inapplicable to this case
   and therefore does not address whether the vestiges of past discrimination
   have been eliminated to the extent practicable. The State instead contends
   that the election of three Black justices from District Seven shows that the
   Black voter dilution is no longer a problem. 78 This is insufficient under
   Dowell. While the election of a member of the minority group is one factor to
   consider, 79 this alone does not demonstrate that the vestiges of past
   discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. In City of
   Boerne, we similarly held that “information regarding one candidate, who
   won as many competitive elections as she lost,” was inadequate to show the
   “consent decree had failed to achieve its intended purpose” such that
   modification of the decree was warranted to better remedy vote dilution. 80
           _____________________
           76
             Alexander, 89 F.3d at 202; see also McDonald, 109 F.3d at 1321-22 (examining the
   “goals and terms” of the consent decree); Johnson, 88 F.3d at 406 (examining the “goal”
   of the consent decree).
           77
             See Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 541, 595 (5th Cir. 2004); Thornburg v. Gingles,
   478 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1986).
           78
             In support, the State produced the Secretary of State election rolls for Justices
   Ortique, Johnson, and Griffin.
           79
             See City of Boerne, 659 F.3d, 659 F.3d at 439 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301) (“[t]he
   extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office” may be
   considered when examining impermissible vote dilution under the VRA).
           80
                Id.

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                                     No. 22-30320

   Here, too, the record cannot support a determination that the vestiges of past
   discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable, of which the
   election of Black justices is insufficient evidence.
          In summary, the State has not shown that the Consent Judgment has
   been “satisfied, released, or discharged” under the first clause of Rule
   60(b)(5). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
   the State relief.
      B. Whether the State met the requisite evidentiary burden under Rule
          60(b)(5)’s third clause
          The State’s secondary argument on appeal is that it has met the
   requirements of Rule 60(b)(5)’s third clause, which permits dissolution when
   the prospective application of a consent decree ceases to be equitable. The
   State acknowledges that the U.S. Supreme Court’s two-part test in Rufo
   applies and alleges that it was satisfied here because (1) significant changes in
   factual or legal circumstances have occurred, and (2) continued enforcement
   of the Consent Judgment is detrimental to the public interest. The State
   asserts that “[t]hirty years of compliance with the consent judgment,
   widespread malapportionment, and Louisiana officials’ concern for
   correcting malapportionment are each significant changes in fact or law that
   warrant dissolution under the third prong of Rule 60(b)(5).” The State
   contends that the Seventh District has shrunk significantly because of
   population shifts, giving Seventh District members extra voting power
   compared to members of the other six districts. Relying on Horne, the State

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                                      No. 22-30320

   alleges that it has experienced “new policy insights” regarding
   malapportionment that require reexamination of the original judgment. 81
          The State also asserts that the Consent Judgment’s alleged
   stranglehold over the Louisiana legislature is detrimental to the public
   interest under Rufo. It contends that continued enforcement of the Consent
   Judgment is “offensive to the State’s sovereignty, democratic principles of
   republican government, and ‘Our federalism’” because the State must
   operate in “the confines of a federal consent decree.” The State asserts that
   the Consent Judgment “makes the redistricting process harder than
   necessary because it requires input from several unauthorized parties.” This,
   according to the State, has effectively hamstrung the Louisiana legislature’s
   efforts to address growing malapportionment in Louisiana’s electoral
   districts.
          The district court applied the two-part Rufo test in its analysis of Rule
   60(b)(5)’s third clause. The district court applied the first prong of Rufo to
   determine whether the State had shown that a significant change in factual
   conditions or the law had taken place. The court reviewed the statistical
   analysis of malapportionment presented by the Chisom Plaintiffs and
   observed that the allegedly “severe malapportionment” identified by the
   State did not constitute a “significant change in circumstances” under Rufo.
   The court pointed out that malapportionment in Louisiana’s supreme court
   districts had existed long before the current districts were drawn and that no

          _____________________
          81
               See 557 U.S. at 448.

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   significant increase or decrease in malapportionment had occurred since the
   2010 census. 82 The court further noted that “District Seven in particular has
   become        less   malapportioned,     shifting     from   approximately       32.3%
   underpopulation         after   the   2010     census   to   approximately       28.4%
   underpopulation today.” Thus, the district court concluded that the State
   had not shown that malapportionment in Louisiana’s supreme court election
   districts constitutes the changed factual or legal conditions necessary to
   satisfy step one of Rufo.
          Under Rufo, the moving party’s failure to satisfy the first prong ends
   the inquiry. 83 Here, however, out of an abundance of caution, the district
   court also analyzed the second prong of Rufo. The second prong assesses
   whether the moving party’s proposed modification, which in this case is
   termination, properly addresses the changed factual or legal circumstances.
   The court held that the State had not satisfied Rufo because “termination is
   far beyond what would be necessary to address malapportionment in the
   Louisiana Supreme Court districts.” The district court observed that
   nothing in the Consent Judgment prohibits the State from reapportioning six
   of Louisiana’s supreme court districts, and that the State is free to “propose
   a modification of District Seven’s boundaries through amendment of the
   Consent Judgment, as the parties did in 1999.” The court explained that

          _____________________
          82
             “The Chisom Plaintiffs’ analysis of this data shows the districts were
   malapportioned by approximately 18% after the 2000 census, approximately 54.5% after the
   2010 census, and approximately 54.4% after the 2020 census.”
          83
               502 U.S. at 391.

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   “modification rather than termination under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5)
   is often a more appropriate remedy to cure hardships caused by changed
   circumstances.”
          Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that
   dissolution is inappropriate under Rule 60(b)(5)’s third clause. First, the
   State did not meet the evidentiary burden associated with Rufo’s first prong,
   which requires a showing of changed factual or legal circumstances that
   warrant reexamination of a consent decree. 84 The State only makes very
   general claims about malapportionment and asserts that “new policy
   concerns” have arisen which satisfy Rufo. But the State offers almost no
   evidentiary support for this argument.
          As noted above, the State attached only eight exhibits to its motion to
   dissolve—most of which lend little support for dissolution under Rule
   60(b)(5). The only exhibit that addresses malapportionment is a September
   2021 presentation given at a Joint Governmental Affairs Committee
   Meeting. One slide in the presentation is a snapshot of malapportionment in
   Louisiana’s seven supreme court election districts. That slide does not show
   that supreme court election district malapportionment is a new, changed
   circumstance. The Chisom Plaintiffs, on the other hand, demonstrated that
   (1) malapportionment in Louisiana’s supreme court election district is not a
   new problem, (2) District Seven has grown less malapportioned over time,
   and (3) the remaining election districts have remained consistently

         _____________________
          84
               Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391

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                                          No. 22-30320

   malapportioned since the 2010 census. Accordingly, the State has not met
   the evidentiary burden associated with the first prong of Rufo’s test.
          Moreover, the State’s argument that continued enforcement of the
   Consent Judgment is detrimental to the public interest is unavailing. In Allen,
   this court clarified the scope of the Consent Judgment, holding that it applied
   only to redistricting matters concerning District Seven. 85 The Consent
   Judgment itself allows the State to reapportion the election districts as long
   it complies with the Consent Judgment. Moreover, Act 776, which was
   incorporated into the Consent Judgment in 2000, explicitly states that “[t]he
   legislature may redistrict the supreme court following the year in which the
   population of this state is reported to the president of the United States for
   each decennial federal census.” 86 These facts significantly weaken the
   State’s assertion that the Louisiana Legislature is hamstrung by the Consent
   Judgment in redistricting matters. The State has presented no other evidence
   to show that continued enforcement of the Consent Judgment is detrimental
   to the public interest.
          In summary, the State has not demonstrated that applying the
   Consent Judgment prospectively is no longer equitable under the third clause
   of Rule 60(b)(5). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by
   denying relief under Rule 60(b)(5)’s third clause.

          _____________________
          85
               14 F.4th at 374.
          86
               La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 776 (H.B. 581) (1992).

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       C. Flexibility and federalism concerns
           The State contends that “federalism concerns” require a standard of
   review more exacting than abuse of discretion, and the parties dispute what
   “flexibility” means in the context of consent decree litigation. The State
   contends that federalism concerns compel the district court to “apply[ ] a
   flexible standard that seeks to return control to state and local officials as soon
   as a violation of federal law has been remedied.” The State asserts that any
   more deference to the district court is incompatible with Horne, in which the
   Supreme Court noted that federalism concerns are especially elevated when
   the decree involves “areas of core state responsibility” and state actors have
   taken contrary positions. 87 The State also points to Allen, in which this court
   remarked that “federal ‘consent decrees are not intended to operate in
   perpetuity’ and that the state does not champion ‘federalism’ by trying to
   consign its supreme court elections to perpetual federal supervision.” 88
           The Tenth Circuit recently acknowledged the tension between Horne,
   Rufo, and Dowell, explaining that “when applying the flexible approach and
   evaluating whether a moving party implemented a durable remedy, a district
   court must consider the totality of the moving party’s efforts to demonstrate
   sustained compliance with federal law.” 89 That court held that there is “not
   a single path” to demonstrating future compliance, explaining that

           _____________________
           87
                557 U.S. at 451.
           88
              14 F.4th at 373 (quoting Guajardo v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 363 F.3d 392, 394
   (5th Cir. 2004)).
           89
                Jackson v. Los Lunas Cmty. Program, 880 F.3d 1176, 1203 (10th Cir. 2018).

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   “[u]ltimately, the district court’s wealth of experience overseeing the
   litigation should inform its assessment of whether the Defendants are now in
   compliance with federal law, and whether they are committed to remaining
   in compliance.” 90 We agree.
           Here, “flexibility” does not necessarily mean that the district court
   should divest itself of its authority over the Consent Judgment as soon as
   federalism concerns are raised. Rather, flexibility can also mean that the court
   requires more of the parties to show that dissolution is warranted because of
   its extensive experience with the decree. 91 Given its three decades of
   experience with the Consent Judgment, the district court is in the best
   position to determine whether the totality of the circumstances point toward
   dissolution.
           As noted above, the federalism concerns set forth by the State are
   exaggerated because Allen recently clarified the proper scope of the Consent
   Judgment, and because there is little evidence that the Consent Judgment has
   significantly restricted the Louisiana legislature’s redistricting efforts. Even
   so, the Consent Judgment—at least in its current form—is not designed to
   last forever. During oral argument on the motion to dissolve and in its order
   and reasons, the district court expressed its openness to modifying the
   Consent Judgment to address the concerns of the State. The district court

           _____________________
           90
                Id.
           91
             City of Boerne, 659 F.3d at 437–40 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 379–80); see also
   Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1203.

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                                            No. 22-30320

   remarked that “modification rather than termination under the third clause
   of Rule 60(b)(5) is often a more appropriate remedy to cure hardships caused
   by changed circumstances.”
          At this juncture, the State has failed to show that termination—the
   most extreme option—is warranted under either the first or third clauses of
   Rule 60(b)(5). As the Chisom Plaintiffs pointed out, “determining whether
   the Decree has been ‘satisfied’—or even ‘substantially complied’ with—
   thus requires some showing that its essential remedial promise . . . will
   continue to exist.” The State has not set forth any positive evidence to
   demonstrate that “there is relatively little or no likelihood that the original .
   . . violation will promptly be repeated when the decree is lifted.” 92
   Furthermore, the State has not presented evidence demonstrating that the
   vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent possible or
   that continued enforcement of the Consent Judgment is detrimental to the
   public interest. The record is thus inadequate to support dissolution under
   Rule 60(b)(5).
          The dissent characterizes the majority opinion as an endorsement of
   “nearly unchecked judicial authority over fundamentally political activity.”
   It is not. Where the plain, unambiguous terms of the consent decree mandate
   that “future Supreme Court elections . . . shall take place in the newly
   reapportioned districts,” and the State fails to present any evidence
   whatsoever of the measures taken to ensure that the object of that mandate

          _____________________
          92
               Rufo II, 12 F.3d at 292 (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247).

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   will be achieved (or continue to be achieved), it cannot be said that the State
   has satisfied its burden under the first clause of Rule 60(b)(5)—regardless of
   the chosen standard. 93 The dissent asserts that the State has completed the
   eight concrete action items in the Consent Judgment and that any additional
   “final remedy” involving prospective relief is too vague to require continued
   enforcement. But if the State believes that the requirement of remedying
   “some undefined later breach” is too vague, then it should move to modify
   the Consent Judgment to create a more defined ultimate remedy. Our job is
   to enforce the Consent Judgment as written, not as the State wishes it had
   been written. Likewise, when—as here—the State has failed to present an
   adequate evidentiary basis for concluding that continued application of the
   Consent Judgment would be inequitable, it cannot be said that it has
   discharged its burden under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5). While this
   court recognizes the State’s federalism interests, those interests alone do not
   relieve the State of its evidentiary burdens.

                                   V.     CONCLUSION
          The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
   dissolution motion, as the State has failed to meet its evidentiary burdens
   under both the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5). We therefore

          _____________________
          93
               The dissent’s summary of Section C of the Consent Judgment fails to
   acknowledge that paragraph 8 expressly requires future Supreme Court elections “to take
   place in the newly reapportioned districts.”

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   AFFIRM the district court’s order denying the State’s motion to dissolve
   the Consent Judgment.

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   Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          Democracy can sometimes challenge the faint-hearted. Although the
   enduring constraints of the Constitution and federal laws such as the Voting
   Rights Act (“VRA”) provide invaluable guiderails, we can only entrust our
   governance to a democratically-elected legislature with the expectation that
   it operates within those guiderails. Our nation has made the considered judg-
   ment to place power in the hands of the people. Today’s majority decision
   rejects both this cherished principle and controlling jurisprudence in favor of
   nearly unchecked judicial authority over fundamentally political activity. So,
   I respectfully must dissent.

                 I. Standard of Review and Federalism Concerns
          Federal “consent decrees are ‘not intended to operate in
   perpetuity.’” Guajardo v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 363 F.3d 392, 394 (5th
   Cir. 2004) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991)). “The
   federal court must exercise its equitable powers to ensure that when the
   objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the
   State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.” Frew
   ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004). “In general, . . .
   institutional reform injunctions are disfavored, as they ‘often raise sensitive
   federalism concerns.’” M. D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 271 (5th
   Cir. 2018) (quoting Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009)).
          Appellees advocate for a heightened standard of deference to the
   district court’s decision on the basis of Cooper v. Noble, in which this Court
   held that “our deference to the magistrate judge’s exercise of his discretion

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   is heightened in cases such as the one before us, which involve consent
   decrees directed at institutional reform” on the grounds that “[w]e owe
   substantial deference to the magistrate judge’s many years of experience with
   this matter.” 33 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1994). However, Supreme Court
   precedent instructs not only that heightened deference is unwarranted in
   cases like this but, if anything, that deference should be lessened relative to
   an ordinary case. In Horne v. Flores, the Supreme Court critiqued the Ninth
   Circuit’s application of a heightened standard: “Rather than applying a
   flexible standard that seeks to return control to state and local officials as soon
   as a violation of federal law has been remedied, the Court of Appeals used a
   heightened standard that paid insufficient attention to federalism concerns.”
   557 U.S. at 450–51. 1 The Supreme Court held that institutional reform
   consent decrees require a “flexible approach” that “allows courts to ensure
   that ‘responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned
   promptly to the State and its officials’ when the circumstances warrant.”
   Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (quoting Frew ex rel. Frew, 540 U.S. at 442). Thus, the
   Supreme Court held, “a critical question in this Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry is
   whether the objective of the . . . order . . . has been achieved. If a durable
   remedy has been implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not
   only unnecessary, but improper.” Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (citations omitted).

           _____________________
           1
            Appellees seem to dispute that Horne overruled Cooper but neglect to address this
   language, which directly rejects a “heightened standard” such as the one applied in Cooper.
   Indeed, the Supreme Court said bluntly that the Ninth Circuit applied “a Rule 60(b)(5)
   standard that was too strict.” Horne, 557 U.S. at 452.

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          Moreover, Horne raises concerns about the arrangement of power in
   consent decrees. “[R]eview of the denial of Rule 60(b)(5) relief should
   generally be somewhat closer in the context of institutional injunctions
   against states due to federalism concerns.” Id. at 451 (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). Consent decrees like the Chisom decree “often
   raise sensitive federalism concerns” because “[s]uch litigation commonly
   involves areas of core state responsibility.” Id. at 448. Like this case, Horne
   involved competing positions from different state authorities. 2 “Precisely
   because different state actors have taken contrary positions in this litigation,
   federalism concerns are elevated.” Id. at 452. The Chisom decree involves
   fundamental political elements of Louisiana state governance—elections and
   redistricting—that have been conditionally submitted to the discretion of an
   unelected federal judge. Undoubtedly, this raises significant federalism
   concerns. Thus, a decision to keep the decree in place requires close review.
          In sum, in light of Horne’s admonition not to use a heightened
   standard, as well as the significant federalism concerns raised by consent
   decrees like the one at issue here, I believe that the “heightened deference”
   standard of review is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
          The majority does not explicitly employ a “heightened” level of
   deference to the district court’s decision, but it purports to use Horne’s

          _____________________
          2
             Here, the Governor’s amicus brief is directly opposed to the position of the
   appellant, the Attorney General of Louisiana. The Governor recognized that “[t]he
   disagreement between the Governor and the Attorney General presents its own set of
   federalism concerns.” Amicus Br. at 5.

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   “flexible approach” in a manner that is, by all accounts, highly deferential to
   the district court’s assessment of the State’s compliance with the Consent
   Judgment. The majority asserts that “[g]iven its three decades of experience
   with the Consent Judgment, the district court is in the best position to
   determine whether the totality of the circumstances point toward
   dissolution” and that “the federalism concerns set forth by the State are
   exaggerated.” However, under any level of review, and considering the
   totality of the circumstances, it is clear that the district court abused its
   discretion in denying the State relief from the Consent Judgment.
                        II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5)
           The majority holds that the State cannot meet its evidentiary burden
   under either the first or third clause of Rule 60(b)(5) allowing for the
   dissolution or modification of final judgments. 3 However, even under the
   majority’s chosen evidentiary standards, the State has met its burden, and
   thus, the district court should have dissolved the Consent Judgment.
           As to the first clause, the parties dispute whether a “substantial
   compliance” standard or the Dowell standard should apply. The majority
   ultimately follows Dowell, joining the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in applying
   this standard to cases involving Rule 60(b)(5)’s first clause. The Dowell test
   requires proof that (1) the State has complied in “good faith” with the
   Consent Judgment since its entry and (2) “the vestiges of past discrimination

           _____________________
           3
            Rule 60(b)(5) states that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment where
   “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged” (clause one) or “applying it
   prospectively is no longer equitable” (clause three). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).

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   [have] been eliminated to the extent practicable.” Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250.
   The majority’s detailed analysis of these competing standards is, ultimately,
   of no moment here: under either Dowell or the “substantial compliance”
   standard, the State clears its evidentiary hurdle.
          As to the third clause, all parties agree that the Supreme Court’s two-
   prong test in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail applies. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
   Under this test, the State must show that (1) “a significant change in
   circumstances warrants revision of the decree” and (2) “the proposed
   modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Id. at 383.
   The State argues that it satisfied both prongs of Rufo because it demonstrated
   that (1) significant changes in both factual and legal circumstances have
   occurred and (2) termination of the Consent Judgment best serves the public
   interest.
          Because the State has shown entitlement to dissolution of the Consent
   Judgment under both the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5), I would
   reverse the judgment of the district court finding otherwise.
                 III. The Consent Judgment’s “Final Remedy” 4
          The evidentiary burdens discussed above are considered in light of the
   terms of the specific Consent Judgment here. The majority recognized as
   much, noting that “a clarification of the Consent Judgment’s ‘final remedy’
   under Louisiana’s contract law” is necessary to determine the Consent

          _____________________
          4
            Consistent with the vagaries of its discernment of the Consent Judgment’s end,
   the majority also refers to this as the “ultimate remedy.”

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   Judgment’s “proper scope.” Thus, an analysis of what constitutes the “final
   remedy” of the Consent Judgment is a necessary prerequisite to a
   determination of the State’s compliance.
              Consent decrees, as the majority rightly points out, are interpreted
   according to the general principles of contract law. See Frew v. Janek, 780
   F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 2015). Under Louisiana law, courts seek the parties’
   common intent starting with the contract’s words, which control if they are
   clear and lead to no absurdities. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2045, 2046.
   “Furthermore, a contract is to be construed as a whole and each provision in
   the contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions.” Baldwin v.
   Bd. of Supervisors for Univ. of La. Sys., 2014-0827 (La. 10/15/14), 156 So. 3d
   33, 38 (citing La. Civ. Code art. 2050).
              In the words of the Consent Judgment, “[t]he Court shall retain
   jurisdiction over this case until the complete implementation of the final
   remedy has been accomplished”—and, by implication and indisputably, no
   later. The undisputed factual history here is set forth in the majority opinion,
   and the plain language of the Consent Judgment is clear: the “final remedy”
   contemplated therein is the implementation of the action items contained in
   Section C of the Consent Judgment. Because the “final remedy” has been
   implemented, the State’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief on the grounds that
   “the judgment has been satisfied” should have been granted by the district
   court. 5

              _____________________
              5
             This Court suggested as much in dicta in Allen v. Louisiana in addressing whether
   the Eastern District had exclusive jurisdiction over the election issues contemplated by the

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           Here, the purpose or goal of the Consent Judgment, as stated by the
   majority and the district court, is to “ensure that the system for electing the
   Louisiana Supreme Court is in compliance with Section 2 of the Voting
   Rights Act.” However, the “purpose” of the Consent Judgment, by
   definition, cannot be its remedy. A “remedy” is the means by which a purpose
   is achieved. A remedy cannot be an end. Both the legal definition of a remedy—
   that is, “the legal means to recover a right or to prevent or obtain redress for
   a wrong,” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737 (2001) (emphasis added)
   (citation omitted) 6—and the plain English definition of a remedy—that is,
   “something that corrects or counteracts” 7—demonstrate this plain
   principle. As a matter of clear, incontrovertible language, the “final remedy”
   of the Consent Judgment cannot be “the State’s continued compliance with
   Section 2 of the VRA.” It must instead be a course of action, a means of
   redress, or a corrective for the harm (i.e., existing non-compliance with the

           _____________________
   Chisom decree. 14 F.4th 366, 374 (5th Cir. 2021). Recognizing that Justice Bernette J.
   Johnson (a party to this case) had become Chief Justice and later retired, this Court stated:
   “In light of those developments, one might think the decree’s final remedy has been
   implemented. But Louisiana has evidently never asked the Eastern District to vacate the
   decree.” Id.
           6
             Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “remedy” as “[t]he means of enforcing
   a right or preventing or redressing a wrong.” Remedy, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
   2019).
           7
                 Merriam       Webster’s      second     definition.    https://www.merriam-
   webster.com/dictionary/remedy. The first definition is “a medicine, application, or
   treatment that relieves or cures a disease,” which, though clearly not the intended meaning
   here, likewise refers to a means of correction rather than an end in itself.

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   VRA at the time the Consent Judgment was entered into) that it seeks to
   remediate.
           What, then, is the remedy prescribed in the Consent Judgment to
   achieve the purpose of the decree? 8 Simple: the Consent Judgment itself
   explicitly identifies “remedial” actions and lists them in Section C. The plain
   language of the Consent Judgment makes this clear, providing that “the
   defendants shall take the following actions”: eight specific and discrete items
   designed to remedy the identified wrong in furtherance of the purpose of
   compliance with the VRA. 9 The parties agreed these were “remedial”; and
   not surprisingly, the final one would be the last to be accomplished.
           While the majority states that “some of these action items have already

           _____________________
           8
           Notably, it is unclear whether the district court identified anything as the “final
   remedy.”
           9
              In short, the Consent Judgment required the State to (1) create a new Louisiana
   Supreme Court district comprised solely of Orleans Parish and (2) a new Fourth Circuit
   Court of Appeal position. Requirement (2) also required the La. Supreme Court to assign
   the new Fourth Circuit judge to the Supreme Court. The La. Supreme Court was also (3)
   mandated to give that judge the same benefits, emoluments, etc. as any other La. Supreme
   Court Justice, including (4) the same equal rights to participate in La. Supreme Court cases.
   The Fourth Circuit position was (5) to expire once an election for the district described in
   requirement (1) took place, but should the Fourth Circuit position become vacant before
   expiration, (6) the Governor was to call an election to fill the position. If (7) a vacancy were
   to have opened up in the then-First Supreme Court District prior to January 1, 2000, it was
   to be filled by an election in the district described in requirement (1). Finally, the Consent
   Judgment required (8) the enactment of legislation in the 1998 regular session of the
   Louisiana Legislature providing for reapportionment of the seven Supreme Court electoral
   districts in keeping with the VRA and the Consent Judgment. It appears that requirement
   (3) was the last outstanding remedial action item (thus, the “final remedy”), and with the
   retirement of Chief Justice Johnson, it too has been fulfilled. See Allen, 14 F.4th at 374.

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   been fulfilled,” there is no actual dispute that the State has enacted all eight
   remedies. 10 And whichever of them was the eighth or final remedy to be fully
   implemented should have been the cue for the district court to recognize the
   end of its jurisdiction. 11 That the district court held otherwise is an abuse of
   discretion. See Frew ex rel. Frew, 540 U.S. at 442 (“The federal court must
   exercise its equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree
   have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is
   returned promptly to the State and its officials.”) (emphasis added).
           The majority suggests that limiting the remedy to the State’s

           _____________________
           10
               Appellees conceded, both in briefing and at oral argument, that the State had in
   fact completed all eight action items. See, for e.g., Pl.-Appellee’s Br. at 25 (asserting that
   the State must “do more than simply accomplish the checklist” contained in the Consent
   Judgment) (emphasis added). The district court also admitted as much, stating that “the
   State has complied with the terms of the Consent Judgment by enacting Act 512 to create
   the temporary Chisom seat and Act 776 to create the current District Seven.” Chisom v.
   Edwards, 342 F.R.D. 1, 12 (E.D. La. 2022). After so acknowledging the State’s completion
   of its assigned remedial tasks, the district court and appellees pointed generally towards
   some “durable ongoing institutional reform” the State needed to implement, above and
   beyond the enumerated action items. Pl.-Appellee’s Br. at 29.
           11
                This is entirely consistent with Judge Morgan’s decision in 2012, in which she
   then correctly wrote: “Because . . . the Consent Judgment calls for Justice Johnson’s tenure
   . . . to be credited to her for all purposes under Louisiana law, the Court finds that the ‘final
   remedy’ in the Consent Judgment has not yet been implemented. By law and by the terms
   of the Consent Judgment, this Court expressly retains jurisdiction over this case until that
   final remedy is implemented.” Chisom v. Jindal, 890 F. Supp. 2d 696, 711 (E.D. La. 2012).
   This requirement is found in Section C, Item 3 of the Consent Judgment. Thus, as of 2012,
   the “final remedy” had not yet been fully implemented. But ten years later, Judge
   Morgan’s 2022 decision identifies no such remedial action item undone or lacking, nor do
   any of the parties to this case, nor does the majority opinion.

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   complete compliance with the eight remedial action items “would produce
   absurd results in the context of the Consent Judgment.” Instead, the majority
   now proposes that the newly-discovered “final remedy” is “the State’s
   prospective compliance with Section 2 of the VRA” (emphasis added). But
   where the State has fully complied with the remedial action items—and
   neither the courts nor the parties can identify a single, concrete step left to be
   taken—it is instead absurd to require the State to remedy some undefined
   future imaginary breach, policed by a federal judge. See Janek, 780 F.3d at
   328 (“The whole point of negotiating and agreeing on a plethora of specific,
   highly detailed action plans was to establish a clearly defined roadmap for
   attempting to achieve the Decree’s purpose.”); Trahan v. Coca Cola Bottling
   Co. United, Inc., 2004-0100 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So. 2d 1096, 1107 (“[A]
   compromise extends only to those matters the parties intended to settle and
   the scope of the transaction cannot be extended by implication.”). Even the
   majority admits that its gain-of-function Consent Judgment needs to end at
   some point and that we must “avoid overreading consent decrees.” Yet the
   majority does just that, reaching broadly into the future with no feasible end
   to judicial control in sight.
          The majority also makes much of Dowell’s requirement that “the
   vestiges of past discrimination [have] been eliminated to the extent
   practicable.” 498 U.S. at 250. But throughout its opinion, the majority fails

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   to identify 12 what might constitute “practicable” efforts by the State to
   eliminate the alleged discrimination, save the eight remedial actions already
   completed. The majority asserts that “the election of a member of the
   minority group is one factor to consider” in fulfilling the Dowell standard.
   What are the other factors? By failing to explain the limits of the Consent
   Judgment’s requirements with any specificity, or when termination will be
   warranted, the majority seems to say, “We’ll know it when we feel it.” This
   not only shows an unwarranted and extraordinary mistrust of the State and
   its duly elected officials, but further perpetuates a scenario in which these
   parties will never agree—and, under the majority’s holding, this
   disagreement will prevent the Consent Judgment from ever being satisfied.
   See Janek, 780 F.3d at 329 (emphasizing that where “Plaintiffs have not
   pointed to any discrete endpoint . . ., they may never be satisfied with
   Defendants’ . . . efforts”) (emphasis in original). The goal of prospective
   compliance with the VRA is unquantifiable and unworkable, and therefore, it
   constitutes no “remedy” at all.
                         IV. The State’s “Good Faith” Compliance
           To extend the imposition of the federal judiciary’s hands-on role in
   the State’s future compliance with the VRA, the majority and the appellees
   assert that the State has failed to show evidence of its “good faith” in

           _____________________
           12
             For that matter, the majority also fails to identify the particular “vestiges” for
   which the State will be held responsible.

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   complying with the Consent Judgment thus far. 13 When asked at oral
   argument what kind of evidence would demonstrate good faith, the appellees
   ultimately suggested that the State should have presented new electoral maps
   to the federal district judge for approval. But there is no judicial preclearance
   requirement 14 for future district maps in the Consent Judgment, and the
   State was correct to assume that this was simply unnecessary both under the
   terms of its Consent Judgment and under the VRA itself. To require the State
   to seek court approval of each subsequent redistricting map now and forever,
   when the Consent Judgment contains no such language, would expand and
   perpetuate the Consent Judgment in a manner entirely inconsistent with the
   parties’ agreement as well as this Court’s precedent. See Guajardo, 363 F.3d
   at 394; Janek, 780 F.3d at 328–29 (noting that inserting additional
   assessments by the court into a decree “would introduce a new requirement
   to which the parties never agreed”); Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 13:24–25 (“To do
   something more in the Consent Decree would require a new agreement.”).
           Appellees also ignore the plethora of evidence indicating that the State
   has indeed followed the Chisom decree in good faith for the past thirty years.
   It is undisputed that the State has fully complied with all eight remedial action

           _____________________
           13
             Notably, the Dowell opinion cited by the majority does not articulate any clear
   standard or definition as to what may constitute “good faith.” See 498 U.S. at 249–50. Nor
   do appellees or the majority define “bad faith” with any clarity, or cite to evidence of such.
           14
             The only mention of a “preclearance” requirement in the Consent Judgment
   appears in Section D (and later referred to in Section I), requiring the State “to seek
   preclearance from the Attorney General” for the changes made in compliance with the
   Consent Judgment. Undisputedly, the State did so.

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   items in the Consent Judgment, and the majority opinion concedes that “a
   history of compliance is evidence of good faith.” 15 In fact, even after Justice
   Bernette Johnson retired, Justice Piper Griffin was elected in her place,
   cementing the presence of a minority member of the Louisiana Supreme
   Court for another ten years and evincing the effectiveness of the State’s
   fulfillment of the “final remedy.”
           To its credit, the State has also articulated specific concerns about
   malapportionment and the obstacles that the Consent Judgment imposes to
   solving that problem. These arguments are backed by concrete evidence. 16
   The malapportionment in the election districts, the State argues, constitutes
   a significant change in circumstances that alone warrants dissolution of the
   Consent Judgment. Finally, and perhaps most telling, the State has watched
   the population of District Seven shrink over time and has seen those voters

           _____________________
           15
             The majority takes issue with the fact that the State’s evidence of good faith
   “focuses only on past compliance with the Consent Judgment.” But this follows logically
   from the nature of the Consent Judgment—it was a deal, entered into by the parties, and
   when the obligations contained therein were fulfilled, the deal was completed. See, for e.g.,
   Janek, 780 F.3d at 328 (“In other words, the parties already agreed that substantial
   compliance with the roadmap would achieve their common goal.”) (emphasis in original).
   The State’s comparison of the Consent Judgment to a resolutory contract is a compelling
   one.
           16
             The district court noted that “the districts were malapportioned by
   approximately 18% after the 2000 census, approximately 54.5% after the 2010 census, and
   approximately 54.4% after the 2020 census.” Chisom v. Edwards, 342 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. La.
   2022).

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   thus gain “extra” power compared to those in the other six districts17—yet
   despite this disparity, the State made no effort to engage in redistricting to
   maintain the minority population’s previous (lesser) voting strength. The
   State asked the district court to take judicial notice of the absence of any
   proposed legislation to reverse the effects of the Consent Judgment and to
   note the clear lack of effort to undermine minority voting power. This is
   hardly a “threadbare evidentiary record.” The State has met its Rule
   60(b)(5) evidentiary burden, even under the majority’s demanding
   standards, through its clear showing of good faith compliance with the
   Consent Judgment’s terms.
           Further, where is the evidence of bad faith? The majority stresses that
   there must be “relatively little or no likelihood that the original…violation
   will promptly be repeated when the decree is lifted.” Inmates of Suffolk Cnty.
   Jail v. Rufo, 12 F.3d 286, 292 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247).
   No evidence has been presented showing a “likelihood” of the State’s future
   violation of the VRA, and general conjecture regarding the State’s motives
   does not suffice. This Court’s vague suspicions are insufficient to overcome
   the clear language of the Consent Judgment and the State’s strong track
   record of compliance.

           _____________________
           17
             The State, using U.S. census data, calculated that the majority-minority District
   Seven was 28.28% less populated than it should be. Appellant’s Br. at 41. The result of such
   population shrinkage is that individuals in that district have much weightier votes—nearly
   double the weight of votes in other districts. Id.

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                                          No. 22-30320

           Let us not forget that the Voting Rights Act remains in full force.
   Should the State of Louisiana perchance violate the VRA after the Consent
   Judgment is dissolved—as the majority, the district court, and the appellees
   imagine—the parties will have a well-known remedy. See Jackson v. Los
   Lunas Cmty. Program, 880 F.3d 1176, 1204 (10th Cir. 2018) (“If the state
   again violates federal law, victims may file a new lawsuit to bring the state
   back into compliance.”). The majority views with suspicion the State’s
   concession as to its liability under the VRA should a violation occur in the
   future, but recognition of the controlling effect of the law is not bad faith—it
   is quite the opposite. This also demonstrates a fundamental difficulty with
   the position of the majority and the district court: under the theory that the
   “final remedy” of the Consent Judgment is merely “prospective compliance
   with the VRA,” the Consent Judgment (1) adds nothing to the State’s legal
   obligations and (2) represents a potentially endless 18 subordination of the
   State’s political power to a single unelected federal judge. The majority and
   the district court both expect the State to guarantee future compliance with
   the VRA, but, as the Governor’s amicus brief makes clear, “the State” is not
   a unified or unitary body that can make straightforward guarantees at will but
   is instead a political creature subject to frequent elections, legislative

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           18
              “[T]his circuit…does not favor perpetual contracts. As we stated in Besco, ‘the
   construction of a contract conferring indefinite duration is to be avoided unless compelled by
   the unequivocal language of the contract.’” Delta Servs. & Equip., Inc. v. Ryko Mfg. Co., 908
   F.2d 7, 9 (5th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original) (quoting Besco, Inc. v. Alpha Portland Cement
   Co., 619 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1980)).

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Case: 22-30320         Document: 00516943715                Page: 52        Date Filed: 10/25/2023

                                            No. 22-30320

   sessions, and political divisions. But the VRA itself is enduring, and as strong
   a prospective relief possible if that political creature violates the law in the
   future. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (“If a federal consent decree is not limited
   to reasonable and necessary implementations of federal law, it may
   improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and
   executive powers.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

           The Chisom decree is not an injunction, issued by the district court to
   enjoin the State from ever violating the law again. Not only would this be an
   invalid and overbroad form of injunctive relief, 19 it simply is not what the
   Consent Judgment itself says. The Consent Judgment clearly provides that
   the court will have jurisdiction “until the complete implementation of the
   final remedy has been accomplished.” Every remedial action item agreed to
   by all parties and listed in the Consent Judgment has been completely
   implemented. The district court therefore should have dissolved the Consent
   Judgment upon request of the State.

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           19
               Injunctions that require litigants to generally follow the law are consistently held
   to be overbroad. See, for e.g., Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606, 609 (1918) (“Courts will not
   issue injunctions against administrative officers on the mere apprehension that they will
   not do their duty or will not follow the law.”); N.L.R.B. v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426,
   435 (1941) (“But the mere fact that a court has found that a defendant has committed an
   act in violation of a statute does not justify an injunction broadly to obey the statute.”); Int'l
   Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 383 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “the
   Supreme Court has denounced broad injunctions that merely instruct the enjoined party
   not to violate a statute”); Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 689 n.35 (9th Cir. 2014) (requiring
   relief “that is more specific than a bare injunction to follow the law”).

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Case: 22-30320     Document: 00516943715           Page: 53   Date Filed: 10/25/2023

                                    No. 22-30320

                                  V. Conclusion
          The majority opinion searches diligently for what it calls both the
   “final remedy” and “ultimate remedy,” but fails to establish anything more
   than an illusory, unquantifiable aspiration that “the vestiges of past
   discrimination [be] eliminated to the extent practicable” at some
   undetermined time in the future. Although the State of Louisiana entered
   into the Consent Judgment in good faith, and by all accounts has performed
   each and every task set forth therein, this Court now not only moves the
   proverbial goal posts, it places them beyond sight. But the Voting Rights Act
   is truly “the law of the land.” It can and will be invoked by anyone aggrieved
   by a perceived violation, and enforced by the Court.

          Though the people of Louisiana, through their state Constitution,
   have placed authority in their elected representatives to draw up lawful and
   compliant Supreme Court election districts, they have been deprived of that
   governance for over thirty years—again, with no end in sight. Now, the
   people of Louisiana can only wait for a day in the future when the federal
   judiciary will relinquish its continued usurpation of their Constitution. To
   perpetuate this Consent Judgment prospectively, void of any demonstrable
   VRA violation, is an unwarranted affront to self-governance. Federalism
   demands a different result. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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