Court Opinion

ID: 9586806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:15:25.529345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:52.651712
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I completely concur in the majority opinion. I write only to discuss more fully the remand of the case “for a hearing and appropriate findings concerning the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel” as set forth in Division 3 of the majority opinion. I agree, of course, that Smith v. State, 255 Ga. 654 (3) (341 SE2d 5) (1986) and Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 148 (5) (344 SE2d 639) (1986) mandate the remand of a case in the procedural posture we find here. However, Smith and Hambrick are silent with regard to the actual effect of affirming the judgment and still remanding for further hearing. Nevertheless, I think we can ascertain the intent of the Supreme Court by the fact that, subsequent to the first decision in Smith, the case came back to the Supreme Court on another direct appeal. In the second appearance of the case, the Court stated: “We remanded to the trial court for a determination of [the issue of denial of ineffective assistance of counsel]. The trial court held a hearing, made findings of fact, and entered an order holding that Smith had not been denied effective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the record, and because the findings of the trial court are not shown to be clearly erroneous, we affirm.” Smith v. State, 256 Ga. 483 (351 SE2d 641) (1986). Thus, I believe that it is clear that the effect of an appellate court’s affirming the judgment and remanding in accordance with the mandates of Smith and Hambrick is to end the case as far as the appellate court is concerned until and unless a notice of appeal is filed by the defendant after an adverse ruling subsequent to the holding of the required hearing and the entry of the required findings concerning the issue of effective assistance of counsel. Of course, should the trial court find ineffective assistance of counsel requiring the grant of new trial, the new trial would proceed. Therefore for all purposes, this particular case has been completed from the appellate review standpoint and will not reappear here except by virtue of a new notice of appeal from some future order entered by the trial court.
*527Decided July 2, 1987.
Billy L. Spruell, for appellant.
Rafe Banks III, District Attorney, T. Russell McClelland II, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.