Court Opinion

ID: 9677161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:45:04.963868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:54.285016
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Murphy v. State, 700 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985), applied literally the definition of “prior criminal record,” distinguished on its facts and thus declined to be guided by a broad statement in Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) (evidence that is relevant to the application for probation is also admissible), held Article 37.07, § 3 “controls the instant case” and, therefore, concluded: “The unadjudi-cated extraneous offense testimony admitted by the trial court was admitted in violation of article 37.07(3).” Id., at 749-750.
Being in agreement with that particular rationale, but for the leading opinion by Judge Miller, like three other judges I too would concur in the resulting affirmance of the judgment rendered by the Dallas Court of Appeals.
In my view, however, the Legislature has yet to provide in Article 42.12, § 3a (a), that discretion of a jury in determining an application for probation need be informed by any evidence beyond that permitted in Article 37.07, § 3 — much more evidence on the alleged “issue [of] whether appellant was a worthy candidate for probation,” including unadjudicated offenses for the ostensible purpose of showing his “probable future conduct,” slip opinion, at 6.
Therefore, I must dissent to that proposition, albeit expressed by a plurality of three judges. Similar issues await decision in other causes, and more will no doubt be written then.