Court Opinion

ID: 9833698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:57:18.574645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:05.989172
License: Public Domain

■ On Motions for Rehearing.
Both appellant Cross and appellees have moved for rehearing.
Appellees-urge that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed on the authority of Gaston v. Dashiell, 55 Tex. 508, which holds that notice becomes a. question of law when it is based in part upon written instruments and in part upon admitted or unquestioned facts'connected with those instruments. That holding is not applicable here. In our- original opinion we held that Jesse R. and S. H. Chandler were charged as a matter of law with notice of the trust deed from Charles Hardee to the bank, the trustee’s deed to Womack, and the decree in the Brown county suit based thereon. The issue in this ease, however, was notice to Jesse R. and S. H. Chandler of the adverse claim of the Hardees to their interest in the balance of the survey. We adhere to our original holding that under the facts in this case such notice did not follow as a matter of law from notice of the trust deed, trustee’s deed, and decree.
Appellant’s only contention which we think requires mention is to the effect that the judgment against John G. Cross should be reversed and the cause remanded as to him, upon two grounds: (1) Because he was a defendant in the court below and was entitled to the benefit of S. H. Chandler, Jr’s., outstanding title as a defense, to the extent of that interest, to plaintiffs’ suit; and (2) that the evidence was in any event not fully developed upon the issue of S. H. Chandler, Jr’s., death.
The first of. these contentions we overrule for two reasons:
(1) If S. H. Chandler, Jr., was alive, as must be presumed under the evidence, his interest passed to the plaintiffs by virtue of the judgment in this suit. He was made a party defendant; was cited by publication; the judgment was against him; and he has not appealed. We have not found a case in point upon this exact question, but we are clearly of the view that the right of a defendant in trespass to try title to set up an outstanding title in a third party does not apply, where such outstanding title is in a codefendant made a party by the plaintiff, and his title passes to the plaintiff by the judgment in the suit.
In Woods v. Selby Oil & Gas Co., 2 S.W. (2d) 895, this court held, Associate Justice Baugh writing, that the defense of outstanding title was not available to a codefendant, where the defendant holding the outstanding title was made a party by the plaintiff and filed a disclaimer. The holding there was that the disclaimer inured to the benefit of the plaintiff who had brought the codefend-ant into the suit asserting title against him. In a concurring opinion the writer said:
“Appellees as plaintiffs below could only recover on the strength of their own title. But since the Frys disclaimed they were entitled to judgment against them on their disclaimer, and therefore the Frys’ title could not be asserted by Woods as an outstanding title against appellees. If the Frys had not been made defendants, appellants’ contention upon this phase of the case would be correct.”
A writ of error was granted in that case and our judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court upon recommendation of the commission. 12 S.W.(2d) 994. We are unable to determine from the commission’s opinion whether it was intended to base its recommendation of affirmance on both grounds in the concurring opinion. The following language would indicate that such was the holding of the commission:
“Though there is an occasional phrase which may be slightly incorrect, this [the concurring] opinion substantially states the law of the case, rendering further discussion by us unnecessary.”
However that may be, we feel confident in the view above expressed that the defense of outstanding title is not available here, because the holder of that title was impleaded, and it was adjudicated in plaintiffs’ favor.
(2) Plaintiffs sued for the entire title to the land. Upon the assumption that S. H. Chandler, Jr., was alive, he was a cotenant of plaintiffs, and they were entitled to recover the entire title for the benefit of themselves and their cotenants. John G. Cross was a total stranger to the title under the above assumption. The case here is clearly distinguishable from Steddum v. Kirby Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 5, 13, 221 S. W. 920, in this: Here plaintiffs sued for the entire title to the land, whereas there they sued for only an undivided half interest therein. This distinction is clearly brought out in the opinion of Chief Justice Phillips in disapproving the holding of the commission on that point.
Upon the second ground appellant relies upon that line of cases which holds that, where the appellate court reverses a judgment of the trial court, and the record does not show that the case has been fully developed, judgment will not be rendered for the prevailing party on appeal, but the cause will be remanded for a new trial. ⅞ That rule does not apply where the judgment of the trial court is not reversed for some error. As was said in Simmons v. Dickson, 110 Tex. 230, 218 S. W. 365:
“We would not be warranted in reversing a correct judgment to enable the losing party here to adduce proof which he should have offered in the first instance. Harris v. Shafer, 86 Tex. 314, 23 S. W. 979, 24 S. W. 263.”
Both motions are overruled.
Overruled.