Court Opinion

ID: 9400622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 17:13:01.48372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:46.877620
License: Public Domain

J-A09002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 JASMINE RAMIREZ                         :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :           PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant            :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 LANCASTER EARLY EDUCATION               :      No. 568 MDA 2022
 CENTER AND MADELINE ECKERT              :

                Appeal from the Order Entered March 14, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
                     Civil Division at No(s): CI-18-00661

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                           FILED JUNE 08, 2023

     Jasmine Ramirez appeals from the order granting the motion for

summary judgment filed by Lancaster Early Education Center (“LEEC”) and

Madeline Eckert, the director of LEEC (collectively, “Appellees”). Ramirez

argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her

negligence and retaliation claims. We affirm.

     In January 2018, Ramirez had her 5-year-old son enrolled at LEEC, a

daycare facility. At the time she enrolled her son, Ramirez signed a fee

agreement contract, which, inter alia, specified that the agreement could be

cancelled at any time with or without notice. Additionally, Ramirez

acknowledged she received a parent handbook, which stated that the

agreement was not meant to be a contract that guaranteed service for any
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duration and that LEEC reserved the right to dismiss the children with or

without cause.

       On January 8, 2018, due to forecasted freezing rain, LEEC sent a mobile

alert to parents warning that the daycare might close early. Thereafter, LEEC

sent another alert indicating the facility would close at 12:30 p.m. As a result,

Ramirez went to LEEC early to pick up her son.

       When she arrived at LEEC, it was not raining. Because it was her son’s

birthday, Ramirez brought cupcakes for the children and stayed for

approximately 20 minutes. Ramirez left LEEC around 12:50 p.m. At this time,

it was raining, and the ground was wet.

       Notably, the entrance to LEEC has a small staircase on one side and a

ramp on the other. While Ramirez saw ice accumulating down the street, she

did not see ice on the sidewalk or the immediate area outside LEEC. Ramirez

slipped and fell while walking down the stairs. An LEEC employee, who was

salting the facility’s ramp, came over and applied salt to the stairs where

Ramirez had fallen. As a result of the fall, Ramirez suffered a comminuted

displaced distal fibula fracture of her right ankle.

       Ramirez retained counsel, and on January 18, 2018, her counsel sent

LEEC    correspondence    indicating   that   they     should   have   no   further

communications regarding the incident with Ramirez and retain any video

recordings/surveillance tapes and photos of the event. On January 22, 2018,

after receiving counsel’s correspondence, LEEC terminated the enrollment of

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Ramirez’s son. Significantly, Ramirez’s son had no disciplinary record or

history of tardiness, and school dues were up to date.

      On January 25, 2018, Ramirez filed a writ of summons, and on

December 10, 2020, a complaint, alleging that LEEC was negligent for failing

to keep the premises free and clear of snow and ice, and that LEEC wrongfully

terminated her son in retaliation for her lawsuit. After discovery, Appellees

moved for summary judgment, arguing Ramirez could not prove negligence

because they owed no duty to Ramirez. In the alternative, Appellees argued

that the hills and ridges doctrine would prevent Ramirez’s recovery. Appellees

further claimed that Ramirez was precluded from recovering for retaliation

because the agreement between LEEC and Ramirez permitted LEEC to dismiss

anyone at any time from their facility. Following argument, the trial court

granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the hills and

ridges doctrine precluded Ramirez’s negligence cause of action against

Appellees, and that the retaliation claim failed because the agreement allowed

LEEC to terminate a child’s enrollment at any time for any reason. Ramirez

filed a timely appeal.

      On appeal, Ramirez raises the following questions for our review:

      1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it found the hills
         and ridges doctrine barred [Ramirez’s] action where [Ramirez]
         described slipping on black ice, [Appellees] admitted it had
         rained earlier that day with freezing rain forecasted, and no
         salting had occurred by the time of the fall hours later?

      2. Did the trial court err when it viewed [Ramirez’s] retaliation
         claim as a contractual violation (or lack thereof) rather than a

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           common law action for retaliation when [Appellees] feigned a
           conflict of interest as a pretext for dismissing her child from
           [LEEC] rather than the obvious reason; her child was dismissed
           because [Ramirez] was exercising her legal rights?

      3. Did the trial court err when it concluded as a matter of law the
         documents produced by [Appellees] created a contract that
         was both unambiguous and not a contract of adhesion?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

      Our standard of review from an order granting summary judgment is as

follows:

      In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, our scope of
      review is plenary, and our standard of review is the same as that
      applied by the trial court. Our Supreme Court has stated the
      applicable standard of review as follows: An appellate court may
      reverse the entry of a summary judgment only where it finds that
      the lower court erred in concluding that the matter presented no
      genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is clear that the
      moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In
      making this assessment, we view the record in the light most
      favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the
      existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
      against the moving party. As our inquiry involves solely questions
      of law, our review is de novo.

      Thus, our responsibility as an appellate court is to determine
      whether the record either establishes that the material facts are
      undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out
      a prima facie cause of action, such that there is no issue to be
      decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence that would allow a
      fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party,
      then summary judgment should be denied.

Gerber v. Piergrossi, 142 A.3d 854, 858 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation and

brackets omitted).

      In her first claim, Ramirez contends that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment on her negligence claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-18,

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20. Ramirez argues that the hills and ridges doctrine should not bar her claim.

See id. at 13, 20. According to Ramirez, the ice spot that caused her fall could

have formed during the morning rain on that day, and despite the fact the

ground was wet when she left the daycare at 12:50 p.m. and more rain had

fallen, the daycare committed negligence by failing to salt the steps after the

first rain. See id. at 18-19. Ramirez highlights that Appellees knew that it had

rained early in the day, freezing rain was forecasted during the day, and the

daycare sent two messages to parents that it might close early due to

inclement weather. See id. at 13, 18-19.

      In other words, Ramirez claims that there were separate weather events

that allowed ample time to Appellees to remedy the ice patch. See id. at 19.

Ramirez further asserts that there were areas of the sidewalk which had

precipitation from an earlier snow event and this showed that the areas were

not treated or cleared properly even before the freezing rain. See id.

      To have a cause of action for negligence, Ramirez was required to

establish that Appellees owed her a duty, that they breached that duty, that

there was a causal relationship between that breach of duty and her injury,

and that she suffered actual loss. See Koziar v. Rayner, 200 A.3d 513, 518-

19 (Pa. Super. 2018). Whether Appellees owed Ramirez a duty is a question

of law. See Baumbach v. Lafayette College, 272 A.3d 83, 89 (Pa. Super.

2022).

      A land possessor is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
      an invitee only if the following conditions are satisfied: [the land

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      possessor] knows of or reasonably should have known of the
      condition and the condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm,
      [the possessor] should expect that the invitee will not realize it or
      will fail to protect [herself] against it, and the [possessor] fails to
      exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee against the danger.
      An invitee must present evidence proving either the [possessor]
      of the land had a hand in creating the harmful condition, or he had
      actual or constructive notice of such condition.

Collins v. Philadelphia Suburban Dev. Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 73-74 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (paragraph break, quotation marks, footnote, and citations

omitted).

      Where an accident is caused by generally slippery conditions that result

from natural accumulation of snow or freezing rain, a property owner’s duty

to remove or treat ice and snow is limited by Pennsylvania’s “hills and ridges

doctrine.” Id. at 74. The hills and ridges doctrine “protects an owner or

occupier of land from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from

ice and snow where the owner has not permitted the ice and snow to

unreasonably accumulate in ridges or elevations.” Morin v. Traveler’s Rest

Motel, Inc., 704 A.2d 1085, 1087 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation omitted). “[T]he

protection afforded by the doctrine is predicated on the assumption that these

formations are natural phenomena incidental to our climate.” Collins, 179

A.3d at 74 (citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).

      Nevertheless, “a landowner has no duty to salt or sand a parking lot

during/immediately after an ice storm.” Id. at 76. “In fact, the entire ‘gist’ of

the hills and ridges doctrine is that a landowner has no duty to correct or take

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reasonable measures with regard to storm-created snowy or icy conditions

until a reasonable time after the storm has ceased.” Id. (citation omitted).

      To avoid the application of the hills and ridges doctrine, a plaintiff must

show:

      (1) that snow and ice had accumulated on the sidewalk in ridges
      or elevations of such size and character as to unreasonably
      obstruct travel and constitute a danger to pedestrians travelling
      thereon; (2) that the property owner had notice, either actual or
      constructive, of the existence of such condition; [and] (3) that it
      was the dangerous accumulation of snow and ice which caused
      the plaintiff to fall.

Id. at 74 (citation omitted).

      Here, in a deposition, Ramirez testified that on January 8, 2018, she

went to pick up her son from LEEC because the daycare was closing early due

to a forecast of freezing rain. See N.T., 4/12/21, at 21-22, 24. Ramirez

indicated that there was no precipitation at the time she drove to LEEC or

when she arrived at the daycare. See id. at 25, 28. Ramirez stated that she

had no problem climbing the steps when she entered the daycare. See id. at

26.

      Upon leaving LEEC, Ramirez noticed that it was raining. See id. at 29,

30-31. Ramirez stated that she did not see or feel any ice on the ground but

maintained that the ground was slippery and there was black ice. See id. at

30-31, 33-34. Ramirez slipped on the last step before stepping onto the

sidewalk. See id. at 31-32. Ramirez indicated a daycare employee threw salt

on the sidewalk and steps after she fell. See id. at 33, 35. Ramirez observed

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the accumulation of ice after she got up and walked to her vehicle. See id. at

33-34.

      Here, the trial court properly applied the “hills and ridges” doctrine

because there is no dispute that Ramirez slipped on the steps resulting from

the rain that was falling at the time she left the daycare. Ramirez does not

contend that the ice on the sidewalk was caused by a defect in the sidewalk

or by any affirmative conduct by Appellees that created a hazard beyond that

created by the weather. In fact, Ramirez has not established that the ice upon

which she fell existed hours prior to her fall, since she testified she had no

trouble entering the LEEC, she did not see any accumulation of snow or ice,

and only saw ice accumulating in the surrounding area after she fell. See Trial

Court Opinion, 5/31/22, at 5-6 (“Although video footage shows the sidewalk

had been cleared from previous winter weather, there is no evidence

suggesting negligent snow clearing had left ice on the sidewalk; [Ramirez] did

not develop evidence regarding prior winter weather, negligent snow removal

on the property, or icy patches existing when entering the building.”).

      Moreover, as noted above, under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, a

property owner has no duty to treat or remove ice and snow until a reasonable

period of time after the precipitation that created the hazard has ended. See

Collins, 179 A.3d at 76; see also Morin, 704 A.2d at 1088-89. To the extent

Ramirez argues that LEEC’s salting of the ramp and steps after she fell

established negligence, we note that “one who voluntarily undertakes to salt

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and sand an icy area where no duty exists, does not create a duty merely by

salting and sanding some of the area.” Morin, 704 A.2d at 1089. Accordingly,

where the freezing rain is still ongoing at the time that Ramirez fell on an icy

step, Appellees, as a matter of law, are not liable to Ramirez because they did

not have any duty to remove or treat ice or snow that caused the fall. See

Collins, 179 A.3d at 74-75 (explaining that under the hills and ridges doctrine,

an owner or possessor of land is not liable when “the accident occurred at a

time when general slippery conditions prevailed in the community as a result

of recent precipitation”, and further that “a landowner has no obligation to

correct the conditions until a reasonable time after the winter storm has

ended”) (citations omitted)). The trial court therefore correctly concluded that

Ramirez did not have a negligence cause of action against Appellees, and her

first claim is without merit.

      In her second claim, Ramirez contends that the trial court erred in

dismissing her retaliation claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 22, 25. Ramirez

raises a public policy argument, arguing that the courts in Pennsylvania may

act when it is in the interest of the public, such as preventing LEEC from

retaliating against her child because Ramirez brought an action for injuries

she suffered, as is her right under the law. See id. at 21-22. Ramirez asserts

that her public policy claim should trump any purported contract between the

parties. See id. at 22.

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      As a preliminary matter, Ramirez at least implicitly acknowledges that

Pennsylvania does not recognize a cause of action for retaliation for a daycare

dismissing a child due to a lawsuit filed by a parent. See id. at 21-22. To that

end, the trial court noted that Pennsylvania “acknowledges common law

actions for retaliation in certain employment contexts. … There is no action at

common law for retaliation in cases where a business terminates a child from

its daycare program under a contract for daycare services.” Trial Court

Opinion, 5/31/22, at 7-8. Although Ramirez invites this Court to create such

a cause of action based on public policy, “it is not the institutional role of the

Superior Court to make such policy decisions. Rather, the Superior Court is an

error-correcting court and we leave policy questions to the Supreme Court

and the General Assembly.” Z.F.1 by & through Parent v. Bethanna, 244

A.3d 482, 494 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted); see also id. (“It is not

the prerogative of an intermediate appellate court to enunciate new precepts

of law or to expand existing legal doctrines.” (citation omitted)). We therefore

decline Ramirez’s invitation to create a new retaliation cause of action on

policy grounds.

      Finally, Ramirez argues that she did not enter into a contract with LEEC.

See Appellant’s Brief at 24. According to Ramirez, the fee agreement and

handbook were not contracts because the agreement stated that she would

have to abide by the conditions in the handbook, but the handbook explicitly

stated that the enrollment application and fee agreement were not contracts.

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See id. In the alternative, Ramirez asserts that even if the fee agreement was

a contract, permitting Appellees to dismiss her son at any time, for any reason,

it was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. See id. at 23. Ramirez

claims these documents constitute a contract of adhesion because the

provisions clearly favor the drafter in that LEEC was not required to give any

notice to remove a child from the program, but she would have to provide two

weeks written notice to remove her child. See id. at 24-25. Ramirez claims

that no reasonable person would have agreed to such provisions if given a

choice. See id. at 25.

      The fee agreement contract indicated that LEEC would provide childcare

services for Ramirez’s son in exchange for tuition paid by the parents. See

Fee Agreement Contract, 9/29/17. Relevantly, the fee agreement contract

stated that “[t]his contract for childcare services/fee agreement may be

cancelled by [LEEC] at any time with or without notice, in its sole discretion.”

Id. (emphasis and capitalization omitted). Further, the fee agreement

contract stated that “[t]his contract for childcare services/fee agreement may

be cancelled by the parents/guardians with two weeks written notice.” Id.

(emphasis and capitalization omitted). Moreover, the terms of the handbook

provide that the “Enrollment Application and Fee Agreements are not meant

to serve as contracts guaranteeing service for any duration. [LEEC] reserves

the right to dismiss any parent or child at any time with or without cause.”

Handbook, at 9 (emphasis omitted).

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      Here, the fee agreement clearly created a contract between LEEC and

Ramirez for childcare services, which, in part, allowed LEEC to terminate

Ramirez’s son at any time and for any reason in its discretion. See N.T.,

4/12/21, at 58 (Ramirez acknowledged that she had a contract with LEEC for

childcare services for her son); see also id. at 59-60 (Ramirez testified that

she received the handbook and understood that it stated that LEEC could

dismiss any child at any time with or without cause). In her argument, Ramirez

mischaracterizes the handbook by omitting specific language that stated the

enrollment application and fee agreement did not guarantee service for any

duration and allowed LEEC to terminate the contract with or without cause.

See Handbook, at 9. Therefore, the parties entered into a contract for

childcare services, which allowed LEEC to terminate services for a child for any

reason at any time.

      Likewise, Ramirez has not established that the fee agreement contract

was a contract of adhesion. “An adhesion contract is a standard-form contract

prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usually

a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms.”

Am. S. Ins. Co. v. Halbert, 203 A.3d 223, 228 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted). “The manner in which a party may establish that a contract is one

of adhesion is dependent upon the particular circumstances and parties

involved.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, “[n]ot every

contract of adhesion is unenforceable.” Id. (citation omitted). “[O]nce a

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contract is deemed to be one of adhesion, its terms must be analyzed to

determine whether the contract as a whole, or specific provisions of it are

unconscionable.” Bayne v. Smith, 965 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citation omitted). “The burden of proof generally concerning both elements

has been allocated to the party challenging the agreement, and the ultimate

determination of unconscionability is for the courts.” Id. at 267 (citation

omitted).

     Here, Ramirez fails to cite any evidence of record that would support a

finding that the agreement was a contract of adhesion. In fact, she cited no

evidence that she lacked an opportunity to read the agreement or handbook

and did not have a choice in any of the terms. See, e.g., Fee Agreement,

9/29/17 (noting that any requests in changes to the enrollment schedule must

be in writing and submitted to the director in accordance with the handbook);

see also Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 1061, 1067-68 (Pa. Super.

1992) (finding no contract of adhesion where there was no evidence the

contracting party attempted to negotiate or change any terms of the contract

or was told the terms were non-negotiable). Moreover, the different

termination clauses in the agreement do not establish that the provision

allowing termination at any time by LEEC unnecessarily favored Appellees, as

Ramirez was under no compulsion to engage LEEC for childcare services.

Importantly, Ramirez was still able to terminate the agreement. Therefore,

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the agreement between LEEC and Ramirez was not a contract of adhesion,

and Ramirez’s final claim is without merit.

      In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Appellees.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 06/08/2023

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