Court Opinion

ID: 9702465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:12:24.950907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:37.723257
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) and to hold that George W. Yohe, II (Claimant) is ineligible for benefits under Section 402(e.l) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, added by Section 3 of the Act of December 9, 2002, P.L. 1330, 43 P.S. § 802(e.l). That provision relates to a claimant’s ineligibility for benefits “due to failure to submit and/or pass a drug test conducted pursuant to an employer’s established substance abuse policy....” The majority holds that a claimant is ineligible for benefits upon discharge for a refusal to submit to drug testing under an employer’s “established” substance abuse policy that permits the employer to conduct drug tests and holds further that this policy “need not explicitly state that an employee may be discharged for refusal to submit to such a test (although well-drafted policies will do so).” 940 A.2d at 1282.
I
Because the majority has engaged in its own fact finding and usurped the fact finding authority of the Board, I recite verbatim relevant findings made by the Board to support its decision that Claimant was not ineligible for benefits:
1. The claimant was last employed as a builder II with Architectural Testing, Incorporated, from November 25, 2001 to May 30, 2006, at an hourly rate of $14.50.
2. Pertinent language from the employer’s policy manual relative to drugs, alcohol and mental fitness states, “Additionally, a drug & alcohol screening may be requested from any employee that demonstrates cause for concern regarding use of drugs or alcohol. Any employee whose screening detects use of an illegal drug may be immediately terminated. Any other drug or alcohol detection may result in appropriate disciplinary action, up to and including termination”.
3. The claimant did undergo a drug screening test in December of 2005 after an accident. Henry Taylor, president of the employer (hereinafter “Taylor”), testified that said test was mandatory pursuant to the employer’s policy manual. A minor accident occurred involving the claimant and he voluntarily submitted to a drug screen test, which initially was reported as invalid. The claimant was notified to retake the test, which he did; the specimen was negative for drugs and/or alcohol.
4. The employer testified that the events leading up to the claimant’s termination on May 30, 2006 included the following: complaints from employees and customers relative to the claimant resulted in the [sic] Taylor feeling that he could require a drug screen test on the claimant because the aforementioned constituted cause for concern in his mind.
5. On May 30, 2006, the claimant was confronted by Dan Detzel (hereinafter “Detzel”), his supervisor, who *1285told the claimant that he would be asked to take a drug test. Detzel also said that he had no reason to believe the claimant was on drugs.
6. Thereafter, when asked by Taylor to submit to a drug screen test, the claimant refused because he believed that he was being harassed.
7. Despite the employer having no written policy in place for disciplinary actions relative to an employee refusing to submit to a drug screen test, the claimant was still discharged.
8. Throughout the claimant’s employment, he had not been disciplined. Taylor testified that the claimant was a good employee and performed his job well.
The Board reasoned as follows to support its decision:
Specifically, the claimant was not discharged pursuant to a written employer policy relative to disciplinary action to take for an employee who refuses to submit to a drug screen test. Also, the employer’s concerns were based on speculation and hearsay reports. The claimant’s actions, not spelled out in an employer policy, can not be considered to rise to the level of willful misconduct, and based upon the employer’s policy and the present record, the Board is constrained to allow benefits.1
Notwithstanding the Board’s findings and its reasoning, the majority concludes that the Board’s reading and application of Section 402(e.l) of the Law is no different than under Section 402(e), 43 P.S. § 802(e), and that its reasoning renders Section 402(e.1) redundant and leads to an absurd and unreasonable result. Similarly, the majority rejects the Board’s findings, among others, that Claimant submitted to drug testing in December 2005, which produced a negative specimen; that the president of Employer, Henry Taylor, required a drug test based upon complaints from other employees and customers; that Claimant’s supervisor told Claimant on the day of his discharge that he would be requested to take a test but that no reason existed to believe that he was on drugs; that Claimant believed he was being harassed when asked to take a test; that Claimant was discharged even though Employer had no written policy governing an employee’s refusal of testing; and that Claimant had never been disciplined and according to Taylor was a good employee and had performed well. The majority finds, however, that employee statements made to Taylor indicated that Claimant’s job performance was sub par and that he was abusing alcohol and that customer statements indicated concerns relative to Claimant’s safety on the job. The majority then finds that the statements supported Employer’s cause for concern that led it to request the drug test.
Employer argues, inter alia, that the circumstances here are analogous to those in Brannigan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 887 A.2d 841 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005), where the claimant refused to submit to the employer’s drug and aleo-*1286hoi test and the record was replete with evidence that the claimant was aware of the drug and alcohol policy and consequences for refusing to submit to testing. Employer further argues that Claimant failed to establish good cause for his refusal to submit to testing and that he merely proffered unsupported suspicions of harassment as the basis for his refusal. Employer cites Rebel v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 692 A.2d 304, 308 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), aff'd, 555 Pa. 114, 723 A.2d 156 (1998), where the Court noted that “the essence of disparate treatment is that similarly situated people are treated differently as a result of improper criteria.” Employer asserts that as in Brannigan and Rebel it acted within policy guidelines when it sought the screening due to safety reasons and reports from others and that its interest in protecting the safety of employees and customers outweighs any allegations of harassment. Employer also contends, as the majority has found, that its decision was not made based upon speculation and hearsay because the reports it received regarding Claimant were not used to show the truth of his actual drug or alcohol use.
I agree with the Board that Claimant’s refusal in this case to submit to drug and alcohol screening does not constitute willful misconduct in the absence of an established policy setting forth consequences of his refusal. Employer admitted that it had no policy setting forth the consequences of a refusal, and in addition it failed to produce competent evidence of Claimant’s lack of fitness while at work. This matter is distinguishable from Bran-nigan where the employer had a specific policy informing employees of consequences for failing to take a test, whereas here Claimant was requested to take the test, according to the Board, at the whim of Employer. The Board views this case as one turning upon the absence of a policy and on Employer’s contention that it has wide latitude to impose consequences for Claimant’s refusal of screening, unlike the situation, e.g., in UGI Utilities, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 851 A.2d 240 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004). Discussions in Brannigan, UGI Utilities and in Turner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 899 A.2d 381 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 669, 916 A.2d 636 (2007), all turned on whether drug test results or refusal of testing showed employer policy violations. There could be no violation here when Employer had no established policy with regard to a refusal.
As for the hearsay issue, the Board argues that the second prong of the hearsay rule enunciated in Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa.Cmwlth. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976), applies because there was no objection to Taylor’s hearsay testimony. Taylor’s statements were not corroborated in any way, and Walker precludes the statements from being used as competent evidence. Taylor testified regarding what third parties not present at the hearing told him, with the out-of-court statements being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and there is no exception to the hearsay rule that permits this testimony. The business records exception does not apply since Claimant’s absentee record was not established as a business record, and his admission to overindulging and being unable to report to work on one remote occasion does not corroborate the hearsay. Employer did not prove that screening was warranted by any relevant events, and there is no evidence to show prior discipline of Claimant.
II
I disagree with the majority’s decision as the Board’s determination does not add another element to the text of Section *1287402(e.l) of the Law, which provides that an employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week:
In which his unemployment is due to discharge or temporary suspension from work due to failure to submit and/or pass a drug test conducted pursuant to an employer’s established substance abuse policy, provided that the drug test is not requested or implemented in violation of the law or of a collective bargaining agreement.
The majority concludes that after UGI Utilities the Court will no longer analyze a discharge based upon refusal of drug testing as though it were a willful misconduct case and that it will henceforth recognize that under Section 402(e.l), a refusal of testing and the resulting discharge already satisfy willful misconduct requirements. The majority ignores the distinctions between the case sub judice and those decided under Section 402(e.l), and to buttress its position it cites cases, including Rebel, where claimants were discharged from employment for failing tests (Artis v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 699 A.2d 849 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997); Singleton v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 125 Pa.Cmwlth. 397, 558 A.2d 574 (1989)) or violating policy on being fit for duty (Lindsay v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 789 A.2d 385 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001)). The majority would impose a strict liability standard under Section 402(e.l) neither expressed nor implied by its terms or supported by case law, and it consequently would deny benefits in each and every case where a claimant refuses drug testing, no matter what the cause, the reason or the circumstance. The majority fails to explain adequately why the Court should refuse to recognize the undeniable distinctions between the case sub judice and those where benefits were denied due to a refusal.
In Brannigan the Court explained that “Section 402(e.l) of the Law requires an employer to demonstrate that it had adopted a substance abuse policy that was violated by the employee in order for that employee to be rendered ineligible for benefits.” Brannigan, 887 A.2d at 843 (citing UGI Utilities). The Court affirmed the denial of benefits to the claimant, a nursing assistant, for his refusal to submit to a drug test pursuant to the employer’s policy that allowed drug and alcohol testing of employees based on suspicion of impairment. The claimant reported to work smelling of alcohol and exhibiting abnormal behavior and refused an alcohol screening test. Unlike in the case sub judice, the policy provided that refusal to consent to testing would be reported to the employee’s supervisor and to employee relations and that further disposition would be at the discretion of the department. The claimant argued that his refusal did not warrant discharge as he was unaware of the consequences, but the Board rejected the finding that the claimant was unaware of policy details. In affirming, the Court further observed:
The Board made specific findings that (1) Employer did in fact adopt a substance abuse policy, and (2) such policy was violated by Claimant. In unemployment compensation proceedings, the Board is the ultimate factfinder and is empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses. Findings made by the Board are conclusive and binding on appeal if the record, when examined as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support those findings.
Id., 887 A.2d at 843 (citation omitted).
In Rebel the employer had an express random drug and alcohol testing policy. The case involved a discharged management level employee who refused random drug and alcohol testing and was the only employee in his division (out of approxi*1288mately 1300) who refused testing. All employees were subject to random testing, and, unlike the case sub judice, a supervisor explained to the employees that they would be subject to disciplinary action for refusing to comply with the policy. The claimant, an electrical engineer, performed duties in connection with a nuclear power plant, and although he argued that he had legal justification for refusing the drug test based upon privacy grounds, the Court held that the Board did not err in rejecting the claimant’s good cause arguments and in denying benefits. Moreover, his discharge was not only for refusing the test but also for refusing to follow his supervisor’s instructions, and the Court rejected the added claim of disparate treatment as no evidence existed to show that the claimant was treated differently from bargaining unit employees. That case is distinguishable.
In UGI Utilities the Court reversed the Board’s refusal to deny the claimant benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 802(e). The Court rejected the argument that the employer failed to show that the claimant committed willful misconduct by violating a company substance abuse policy after submitting to random drug testing and being found positive for cocaine. She refused retesting and was then discharged. The policy provided that a positive test result would be reported to the designated human resources representative who might then inform appropriate management officials. The Board also agreed that the employer failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the chain of custody, and it granted benefits. In reversing, the Court held that the Board erred in concluding that no difference existed between Section 402(e) (general provision denying benefits for violating work rule) and Section 402(e.l) (specific provision denying benefits for failing to pass test conducted under substance abuse policy so long as it was not requested or implemented in violation of the law or of a collective bargaining agreement). The Court concluded that Section 402(e.l) required an employer to show that “it followed its established ‘substance abuse policy’ in discharging an employe for drug use on the job.” Id., 851 A.2d at 246.
In Turner the Court affirmed the denial of benefits and indicated that the case should be analyzed under Section 402(e.l) of the Law rather than under Section 402(e) where the claimant was terminated for drug use after failing a drug test. While the majority cited UGI Utilities as support, the case in Turner turned on violation of an employer’s policy providing that a violation would subject the employees to discipline up to and including discharge subject to applicable provisions and procedures of the collective bargaining agreement. The claimant questioned on appeal whether his positive test results violated the policy, which prohibited employee use, sale and possession of illegal drugs while on duty and allowed for random testing. The Court rejected the claimant’s arguments that the employer failed to prove a violation of the policy.
Specific policies existed in Brannigan and in UGI Utilities, and also in Rebel, that informed the employees of consequences of their refusal to take a drug test. As the Court concluded in UGI Utilities, Section 402(e.l) requires an employer to show that it followed “its established” policy in discharging an employee for drug use. If an employer does not have an established policy that informs the employees of the consequences of their refusal of testing, then it cannot show that it followed the policy when it discharged an employee for his/her refusal of drug testing. The majority fails to follow UGI Utilities, but it readily acknowledges that a “well-drafted” policy should inform .employees that a refusal to take a drug test may result in discharge. Employer’s policy *1289fails to inform its employees of consequences of refusing drug and alcohol screening. In reaching its determination, the Board reasonably interpreted Section 402(e.l) of the Law.
The fundamental basis for the Board’s determination is that there was no established policy with respect to the consequences of Claimant’s refusal to submit to drug and alcohol testing. Notably, the Board found that the supervisor advised Claimant that no reason existed to believe that he was on drugs, a finding that the majority ignores. As a consequence of the lack of an established policy, the Board could not presume that an employee knew that his or her refusal to take a test would result in discharge under the findings made. To meet the burden under Section 402(e.l) of the Law, an employer must prove that it has an established policy regarding an employee’s refusal to submit to drug or alcohol testing, i.e., it has a policy that is settled or fixed firmly, created or placed beyond doubt or dispute. See Black’s Law Dictionary 586 (8th ed.2004) for the definitions of “establish.” Employer did not meet that burden.
Finally, with regard to hearsay, I note the well-settled rule stated in Walker, containing guidelines for allowing hearsay in administrative proceedings:
(1) Hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board.
(2) Hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand.
Id., 367 A.2d at 370 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The Board applied the second prong of the Walker rule because there was no objection to Taylor’s testimony regarding the hearsay statements of employees or customers. Because the statements were not corroborated, the Board correctly ruled that this evidence was not competent to support a finding.2 As the ultimate fact finder, the Board had authority to decide all issues of credibility, and it found from Taylor’s testimony that Claimant was a good employee and performed his job well and that he had not been disciplined during his almost five years of employment with Employer. The fact that hearsay statements may have been offered to show Taylor’s state of mind was for the Board to find, not the majority. Because the Board did not commit an error of law nor make findings that were not supported by substantial evidence of record, its determination should be affirmed. I therefore dissent.
Judge FRIEDMAN joins in this dissent.

. The Court’s review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed or whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Leone v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 885 A.2d 76 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). The Board is the ultimate fact finder, and it is empowered to determine witness credibility and evidentiary weight. Peak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 509 Pa. 267, 501 A.2d 1383 (1985). Also, willful misconduct has been defined in part to include an employee’s acts of wanton or willful disregard of an employer’s interest, a deliberate violation of work rules and a disregard of the standards of behavior that an employer has a right to expect of its employees. Orend v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 821 A.2d 659 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003).

. The Board noted Employer's failure to introduce Claimant’s absentee record to fall within the exception to the hearsay rule. See Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108 (providing that written disciplinary record is admissible if made promptly upon report of the incident described and offered after authentication by a custodian of the records).