Court Opinion

ID: 9709495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:48:55.023006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:49.387601
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE NASH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority do not consider the issue of defendant’s liability in this case, stating it has not been preserved for review in his post-trial motion. I believe that issue is properly before us and should be considered. Supreme Court Rule 366(b)(3) governs the scope and procedure on review in nonjury cases and provides, in part: “(i) 000 The sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment is subject to review without formal action to preserve the question. (ii) Post-Trial Motions. Neither the filing of nor the failure to file a post-trial motion limits the scope of review.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 366(b)(3)(i)(ii).) It seems apparent that the failure to include a point in a post-trial motion in a nonjury case does not preclude raising it on appeal. (Shumak v. Shumak (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 188,193, 332 N.E.2d 177,182.) Nor can it be said in this case that the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s determination of liability on the part of defendant was not first presented to the trial court for its consideration, thus precluding its consideration on appeal. (See generally Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 141,324 N.E.2d 417.) Plaintiffs’ complaint in this small claims action simply stated that defendant was indebted to them in the sum of *500 for personal property damages regarding the death of a dog which defendant ran over and killed in plaintiffs’ driveway. Defendant answered, denying both killing the dog and being indebted to plaintiffs. The matter was tried before, the court and defendant’s motions for directed verdicts made at both the close of plaintiffs’ case and at the close of all the evidence were denied by the trial court without hearing argument. In his closing argument to the trial court, however, defendant contended there was “no showing of any negligent conduct on the part of the defendant,” and suggested plaintiffs may have been contributorily negligent in tying the dog near the driveway where it could be injured by a visitor to plaintiffs’ home. The trial judge stated that this case was not a negligence or tort action, concluded that the plaintiffs’ version of the facts (that defendant did strike the dog with his car) was most creditable and entered judgment for plaintiffs. While he was not required to do so, defendant filed a post-trial motion in which he stated the judgment was contrary to the law and against the manifest weight of the evidence and argued to the trial court that these contentions were based upon his earlier objections made to the court. In his brief and argument on appeal defendant again presents the issue to us that plaintiffs failed to prove that any conduct on his part violated any duty owed to plaintiffs and they thus failed to sustain their burden of proof. It is axiomatic that any cause of action sounding in negligence must be supported by evidence of a duty which has been breached by a negligent act. There is no evidence of negligent conduct on the part of defendant seen in this record. If all conflicts in the testimony are resolved in favor of plaintiffs the conclusion can go no further than a determination defendant accidentally ran over plaintiffs’ dog who was tied in such a manner that it could run out onto the driveway. The trial court rejected consideration of a negligence theory of liability urged by defendant and apparently then applied a theory of absolute liability in its determination. In any event, even should we feel that the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s determination of liability against defendant was not presented to it and thus not preserved for our consideration, all of the facts necessary for a review of that issue are found in the record before us and may be considered if we believe that necessary in the interest of justice (Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 513, 520, 337 N.E.2d 23, 27-28, cert. denied (1976), 425 U.S. 936,48 L. Ed. 2d 178, 96 S. Ct. 1669), and I would do so in this case.