Court Opinion

ID: 9897468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:28.320779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:49.772389
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion   31-
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                ZANE MICHAEL FLOYD,                                     No. 84081
                Appellant,
                vs.
                THE STATE OF NEVADA
                DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
                AND JAMES DZURENDA, DIRECTOR,
                                                                         SEP 28 2023
                NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
                                                                               TH A. BRO
                CORRECTIONS,                                                  suPr ME tØURT
                Respondents.                                               EF DEPLI1Y CLERK

                           Appeal from a district court order dismissing a complaint for
                declaratory relief challenging the Legislature's delegation of authority in
                NRS 176.355.      Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Adriana
                Escobar, Judge.
                           Affirmed.

                Rene L. Valladares, Federal Public Defender, and Jocelyn S. Murphy, David
                Anthony, and Bradley D. Levenson, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
                Las Vegas.
                for Appellant.

                Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Steven G. Shevorski, Chief Litigation
                Counsel, and Jeffrey M. Conner, Deputy Solicitor General, Carson City,
                for Respondents.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

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                                                  OPINION

                By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
                            Nevada's Constitution provides for three coequal branches of
                government and expressly prohibits each branch of government from
                exercising powers belonging to another branch of government. Nev. Const.
                art. 3, § 1. Consistent with that separation of powers, Nevada's Legislature
                cannot delegate its lawmaking authority to another branch of government,
                such as the executive branch.        This court has recognized that the

                Legislature does not impermissibly delegate its lawmaking authority so
                long as the Legislature establishes "'suitable' standards to govern the
                manner and circumstances under which an executive agency can exercise
                its delegated authority." Nat'l Ass'n of Mut. Ins. Cos. v. State, Dep't of Bus.
                and Indus., 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 524 P.3d 470, 484 (2023) (quoting Sheriff
                v. Luqman, 101 Nev. 149, 153, 697 P.2d 107, 110 (1985)).
                            Appellant Zane Michael Floyd is a death-row inmate who
                contends that NRS 176.355--Nevada's statute providing that an execution
                rnust be effectuated by "injection of a lethal drug"--unconstitutionally
                delegates lawmaking authority to respondents, the Nevada Departrnent of
                Corrections and its Director, James Dzurenda (collectively, the Director).
                Although NRS 176.355 provides that the method of execution must be by
                lethal injection, Floyd contends that the statute is unconstitutional because
                it gives the Director discretion to determine the process by which a lethal
                injection is administered.
                            We disagree with Floyd and conclude that NRS 176.355,
                combined with the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment prohibition on
                cruel and unusual punishment, provides the Director with suitable
                standards to determine the process by which a lethal injection is to be
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                  administered. We therefore affirm the district court's order dismissing
                  Floyd's declaratory relief action.
                                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                              In the early 2000s, Floyd was convicted by a jury and sentenced
                  to death for killing four people in 1999. See generally Floyd v. State, 118
                  Nev. 156, 42 P.3d 249 (2002) (recounting the circumstances of the murders
                  and affirming the jury's imposition of the death penalty). Throughout the
                  hext roughly two decades; Floyd's 'collateral challenges to his convictions
                  and death sentences -were unSuccessful. Consequently, in April 2021, the
                  Clark County District Attorney began the process of obtaining an order of
                  execution and warrant to carry out Floyd's death sentence.
                              In response, Floyd filed the underlying action against the
                  Director.' Th.erein, he sought a declaration .that NRS 176.355 violates the
                  separation-of-powers clause and cannot be enforced.         More specifically,
                  Floyd Sought a declaration that NRS 176.355 uncOnstitutionally delegates
                  to the Director the legislative authOrity to deterniine- how a lethal. injection
                  should be administered.                     •

                              The Director moved to dismiss Floyd's complaint.            In the
                  motion, the Director argtied generally that NRS 176.355 provides "suitable
                  standards" for the Director-ill. carrying out a death sentence. La4inan, 101
                  Nev. at 153, 697 P.2d at 110. The district- cöhrt entered a writtelF order
                  granting the Director's motion to dismiss, reasoning that .NRS -176355, -
                  combined With the Eighth Amend.ment's prohibition on •cruel an.d unusual
                  punishment, prOvides the Director with suitable standards to determine the

                       "Floyd also sued NDOC's Chief Medical Officer, Ihsan Azzam. Dr:
                  Azzam filed a motion to dismiSs, Which- the district céurt granted, and Dr.
                  Azzarn is not a party to this appeal.
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                process by which a lethal injection is to be administered.      This appeal

                followed.
                                               DISCUSSION

                            Floyd's constitutional challenge to NRS 176.355 presents a
                question of law that we review de novo. State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court
                (Hearn), 134 Nev. 783, 786, 432 P.3d 154, 158 (2018) (observing that "the
                constitutionality of a statute," including whether a statute violates the
                separation-of-power doctrine, is a "queStion of law, which this court reviews
                de novo" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We presume the statute is
                valid and hold the challenger to the burden of showing that it is not. Taylor
                v. Colon, 136 Nev. 434, 436, 482 P.3d 1212, 1215 (2020) ("[S]tatutes are
                presumed to be valid, and the challenger bears the burden of showing that
                a -statute is unconstitutional." (quoting Tam v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
                131 Nev. 792, 796, 358 P.3ci 234, 237-38 (2015))); see also McNeill v. State,
                132 Nev. 551 556, 375 P.3d 1022, 1025 (2016) ("Because we presume that
                the Legislature is aware that it may not delegate the power to legislate
                pursuant to the separation of powers, we presume that it acted in
                accordance.").
                            The   Nevada    Constitution   divides   the   powers   of state

                government into "three separate departrnents"—the legislative, executive,
                and judicial departments—and provides that "no persons charged with the
                exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments shall
                exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others." Nev. Const.
                art. 3, § 1.      The question at issue is whether the Legislature
                unconstitutionally delegated its lawmaking authority to an executive

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                      branch official, the Director. Our decision in Luqmart provides the general
                      framework for answering that question.2
                                   In Luqtnan, we considered an amendment to the Uniform
                      Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) that delegated authority to an executive

                      branch agency, the State Board of Pharmacy, to categorize drugs into
                      various "schedules." Two defendants charged with illegal possession of
                      certain drugs argued that because the scheduling of drugs determined the
                      penalty they faced, the amendment impermissibly delegated lawmaking
                      authority to the Pharmacy Board. 101 Nev. at 152-53, 697 P.2d at 109-10.
                      In rejecting that argument, we observed that "failthough the legislature
                      may not delegate its power to legislate, it may delegate the power to
                      determine the facts or state of things upon which the law makes its own
                      :operations depend." Id. at 153, 697 P.2d at 110. From that premise, we
                      reasoned that "the legislature can make th.e application or operation of a
                      statute complete within itself dependent upon the existence of certain facts
                      or conditions, the ascertainment of which is left to the administrative
                      agency." Id. in other words, if "the legislature vests the agency with mere
                      fact finding authority," the Legislature has not delegated its lawmaking
                      authority.   Id.   We determined that so long as legislation provides the

                      agency with "suitable standards," meaning those that are "sufficient to
                      guide the agency with respect to the purpose of the law and the power
                      authorized," the Legislature has not delegated its lawmaking authority. Id.

                            2 In his reply brief, Floyd relies on McNeill v. State, 132 Nev. 551, 375

                      R3d 1022 (2016). We are not convinced that McNeill is relevant. Our
                      decision in that case primarily addressed whether an administrative agency
                      had exceeded its statutory grant of authority in enacting a regulation, not
                      whether the Legislature had improperly delegated lawmaking authority to
                      the agency. Id. at 555-57, 375 P.3d at 1025-26.
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                    at 153..54, 697 P.2d at 110. ApplYing that test, we determined that the
                    amendment to the UCSA was constitu.tional because the Legislature
                    provided the Pharmacy Board with "specific guidelines listing various
                    factors which are to be taken into account ... when scheduling drugs as
                    well as delineating the requirements by which a drug is classified in an
                    appropriate schedule." Id. at 154, 697 P.2d at 110.
                                 The statute challenged in this case specifies the manner in
                    which the Director must carry out a death sentence—"by an injection of a
                    lethal. drug"—and authorizes the Director to determine which drUg or
                    combination of drugs to use after •consulting with NDOC's Chief Medical
                    Officer. NRS 176.355(1), (2)(b). In its entirety, th.e statute provides as
                    follows: •
                                       1. The judgment of death must be inflicted by
                                 an injection of a-lethal drug.
                                       2. The Director of the Department of
                                 Corrections shall:
                                       (a) Execute a sentence of death within the
                                 week, the first day being Monday and the last day -
                                 being Sunday, that the judgment is to be executed,
                                 as designated b.y the district court. The Director
                                 may execute the judgment at any time during that
                                 week if a stay of execution is not entered by a court
                                 of appropriate jurisdiction.
                                       (b) Select the drug or combination of drugs to
                                 be used for the -_,xecution after consulting with the
                                 Chief Medical Officer.
                                       (c)Be present at th.e execution.
                                       (d) Notify those members of the immediate
                                 family of the victim who have, pursuant to NRS
                                 176.357, requested to be informed .of the time, date
                                 and place scheduled for the execution.
                                       (e)Invite a competent physician, the county
                                 coroner, a psychiatrist and not less than. si.x
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                            reputable citizens over the age of 21 years to be
                            present at the execution.      The Director shall
                            determine the maximum number of persons who
                            may be present for the execution. The Director
                            shall give preference to those eligible members or
                            representatives of the immediate family of the
                            victim who requested, pursuant to NRS 176.357, to
                            attend the execution.
                                  3. The execution must take place at the state
                            prison.
                                  4. A person who has not been invited by the
                            Director may not witness the execution.
                NRS 176.355 (emphases added).
                            Floyd contends that NRS 176.355 lacks suitable standards
                because, aside from declaring that an execution must be "inflicted by
                injection of a lethal drug," it affords the Director complete discretion to
                determine the types, dosages, and sequencing of drugs to be used in the
                execution. According to Floyd, "a statute that does nothing more than state
                a means of execution does not provide suitable and sufficient standards" for
                the Director to implement the lethal-injection process.3
                            We are not persuaded by Floyd's argument. Most significantly,
                NRS 176.355 must be read in context with NRS 200.030, which authorizes
                the imposition of the death penalty and lists the crimes for which execution
                is the appropriate punishment.     In these statutes, the Legislature has

                      3Floyd identifies ten concerns with NRS 176.355, many of which are
                redundant and some of which have only marginal relevance. We have
                considered all of them in deciding this case. Relatedly, Floyd suggests that
                the Chief Medical Officer may simply refuse to consult with the Director,
                thereby leaving the Director with unfettered and uninformed discretion
                regarding how to administer a lethal injection. We find this suggestion
                implausible. In this, we note that Floyd's record citations do not establish
                a factual basis for that argument.
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                identified the types of crimes that are punishable by death and deterinined
                the manner of execution—injection cf a lethal drug—thereby exercising its

                exclusive authority to define crimes and penalties. See Lapinski v. State,
                84 Nev. 611, 613, 446 P.2d 645, 648 (1968) ("The power to define crimes and
                penalties lies exclusively in the legislature."). By specifying the manner of
                execution, the Legislature has given the Director clear guidance with
                respect to the delegated authority to determine the execution protocol.
                            Moreover, the Director's discretion in choosing the drug or

                combination of drugs is not unguided; rather, the Director must make those
                decisions "after consulting with the Chief Medical Officer."              NRS

                176.355(2)(b). The Chief Medical Officer is appointed by the Director of the
                Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, NRS 439.085, and
                must be a licensed physician or administrative physician, eligible for a
                license as a physician or administrative physician, or a physician or
                administrative physician who has a master's degree or doctoral degree in
                public health or a related field, NRS 439.095(3). Among other duties, the
                Chief Medical Officer is responsible for "[e]nforc[ing] all laws and
                regulations pertaining to the public health."      NRS 439.130(1)(a).      By

                requiring consultation with the Chief Medical Officer, the Legislature has
                ensured the Director will ascertain facts and conditions relevant to making
                operation of the death penalty statute complete. This fits within the "fact
                finding" that Luqman recognized may be appropriately delegated.
                            In addition to the statutory guidance, the Eighth Amendment's
                prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment further guides and limits the
                Director's discretion. See Cook . State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Ariz. Ct. App.
                201.2) (pointing to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as an implicit
                guide and limit on the Department of Corrections' discretion in developing

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                a. lethal injection protocol); cf. State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 437, 211 P. 676,
                682 (1923) ("We must presume that the officials [e]ntrusted with the
                infliction of the death penalty... will carefully avoid inflicting cruel
                punishment."). Specifically, to comply with the Eighth Amendment, the
                protocol approved by the Director must avoid inflicting severe pain. See
                Glossip u. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 882 (2015) ("[A]n inmate challenging a
                protocol bears the burden to show, based on evidence presented to the court,
                that there is a subStantial risk of severe pain.").
                            We are not alone in rejecting a separation-of-powers challenge
                to a statute addressing t.he manner of carrying out a death sentence.
                Several other courts have rejected similar separation-of-powers challenges.4
                See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12- CV-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155. at
                *8 2(W.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2012); Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056; Sims v. Kernan, 24].
                Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 309 (Ct. App. 2018); .Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 669-70
                (Fla. 2000); State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d. 187, 201 (Idaho 1981); State v. Ellis,
                799 N.W.2d 267, 28g-90 (Neb. 2011); O'Neal v. State, 146 N.E:3d 605, 621
                (Ohio Ct. App. 2020); State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 55, 60-61 (Tenn.
                2017); Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W:2d 503, 514-15 (Tex. Crim.. App. 1978);
                Brown u. Vail, 237 P.3d 263, 270 (Wash. 2010). At least four of these courts
                h.ave based their analyses in part on pragmatic considerations, namely, that
                an administrative agency is often better-equipped than a legislature to deal
                with the granular details of formulating an execution protocol. See, e.g., Ex
                parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d -at 514 ("When the Legislature itself cannot

                      4While Floyd urges us to disregard these decisions and instead follow
                the Arkansas Supreme Court's analysis in Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844
                (Ark. 2012),* we are not persuaded that our suitable-standards test requires
                the Legislature to . provide the level of specificity that the Hobbs court
                deemed necessary under Arkansas law.
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                   practically or efficiently perform the functions required, it has the authority
                   to designate some agency to carry out the purposes of such legislation . . . .");
                   see also Zink, 2012 WL 12828155, at *8 (observing that it is "impracticable"
                   for a legislature to provide details in legislation when "the relations to be
                   regulated are highly technical or where the regulation requires a course of
                   continuous decision" and that, in such instances, "the agency official is
                   better qualified to make the policy" regarding certain details (internal
                   quotation marks omitted)); Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056 (observing that the
                   Arizona Department of Corrections' execution protocol is 35 pages long and
                   that it would be "impracticable for the Legislature to supply the details of
                   the execution process itself '); Ellis, 799 N.W.2d at 289 (recognizing that the
                   nondelegation doctrine "permit[s] delegation of details that the legislature
                   cannot practically or efficiently perform itself ').5
                                We share these pragmatic concerns, particularly given that our
                   Legislature convenes for only 120 days every other year. See Nev. Const.
                   art. 4, § 2. An execution protocol must take into account ever-changing
                   resources, such as personnel, facilities, and drugs, and coordinate a complex
                   procedure.     See generally Glossip, 576 U.S. at 869-71 (discussing
                   "obstacle [s]" to lethal injection protocols presented by the changing
                   availability of drugs used to carry out death sentences); Cook, 281 P.3d at
                   1056 (discussing the kind of details covered in an execution protocol).
                   Having determined which offenses may carry the penalty of death and
                   specified the manner in which a death sentence must be inflicted, it was

                         5At oral argument, Floyd suggested for the first time that these states'
                   nondelegation tests are less stringent than Luqman. We do not perceive
                   any substantive difference between our suitable-standards test and those
                   states' analogous tests.
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                within the Legislature's authority to delegate the details of implementing
                the death penalty to the Director, who is in a better position to consider all
                relevant facts and ensure that the death penalty is implemented consistent
                with legislative directive and the Eighth Amendment.
                                                CONCLUSION
                             In sum, we conclude that the Legislature has provided suitable
                standards and safeguards to guide the Director in exercising the authority
                delegated in NRS 176.355. We therefore affirm the district court's order
                dismissing Floyd's complaint.

                                                                                            J.
                                                           Parraguirrea-2 6

                We concur:

                                            , C.J.
                Stiglich      o-

                                            ,   J.
                Cadish

                                                J.

                Lee

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