Court Opinion

ID: 9633351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:44:05.393414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:41.014990
License: Public Domain

Springer, J.,
dissenting:
This case is similar to Bush v. State, Dep’t Hum. Res., 112 Nev. 1298, 929 P.2d 940 (1996), in which I dissented because I objected to this court’s affirming the termination of parental rights of parents because they were mentally handicapped. In the Bush case, the parents whose parental rights were terminated were mentally deficient, having IQs in the 60s. In the present case, the child’s mother, Michele Deck, is disabled by chronic paranoid schizophrenia that manifests itself in the form of intermittent auditory and visual hallucinations. The State claims that this mother’s mental disability renders her incapable of continuing to be the mother of her daughter, Amber. The difference between this case and the Bush case is the difference between the handicap of mental deficiency and the handicap of mental disorder.
I dissent with respect to the termination of parental rights of the mother, Michele Deck, only. Ms. Deck suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, a chronic mental disorder that is treatable chemically. Although the trial court ruled that the “inability of the mother to complete her case plan is not based solely on her mental condition,” it is quite apparent that this mother’s schizophrenia was the main reason (as was mental deficiency in the Bush case) for (as put by the majority) “Michele’s failure to make necessary parental adjustments.”
As pointed out by the majority, although Ms. Deck has suffered from “periodic auditory and visual hallucinations and violent mood shifts,” she does have extended periods of remission and, at present, has custody of her other, younger child, Joseph, born December 25, 1991. The “terminated” child, Amber, has been living with her aunt and uncle and apparently is doing well in their home; and, I am not saying, of course, that Amber should be snatched out of her present environment and placed now, full-time, in her mother’s custody. All I am saying is that it is not necessary under the circumstances of this case to sever permanently the parental relationship of this child with her mother. “[A] parent does not deserve to forfeit the sacred liberty right of parenthood unless such unfitness is shown to be severe and *140persistent and such as to render the parent unsuitable to maintain the parental relationship.” Champagne v. Welfare Division, 100 Nev. 640, 648, 691 P.2d 849, 855 (1984) (emphasis added). Ms. Deck does not “deserve” to have her daughter taken permanently away from her; and, although Ms. Deck may be sick, she is raising her son Joseph in her home, and it appears to me that her treatable mental illness has not created the “irremediable inability to function” as a parent that was referred to in Champagne. ” Id. at 648 n.5, 691 P.2d at 855.
I complained in Bush about this courts failing to deal with the principles that should be applied to handicapped parents who have difficulties in raising their children. I complain again here. As the law now stands, welfare officials do not have to be concerned about faultless disabilities and handicaps. I would like to see the court define what circumstances, if any, would justify permanent severance of the parental ties of mentally deficient, mentally disordered, or, for that matter, physically disabled parents. It continues to refuse to do so. The attitude of welfare officials and this court appears to me to be: “We’ll try to help you for a while, but after that if your handicap prevents you from conforming to our ‘case plan,’ we are going to take your children away permanently.” This is not right.
As recognized by the majority, dispositional grounds for permanently severing the parental relationship are present only when under no reasonable circumstances the child’s best interest can be served by sustaining the parental tie. There are many ways in which the child’s interest can be served in this case without taking her mother away from her. Apparently, she has been living with her aunt and uncle for some time and will continue to live with them in the same fashion whether her mother is permanently taken away from her or not. About the only, remote circumstance that I can see that could possibly justify a termination in this case would be if the aunt and uncle were to take the unreasonable position that they would not continue to serve as foster parents unless the State effected a termination of the natural mother’s parental rights. Even under such a hypothetical circumstance, I would still have to be convinced that there were no reasonable circumstances under which the child could keep her mother.
As I have indicated in my dissents to other termination cases, the State seems to be running amok, spouting pop psychology and terminating parental rights in cases where it is clearly not necessary to do, particularly in cases of poor and otherwise handicapped parents. See Bush, supra; In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Bow, 113 Nev. 141, 930 P.2d 1128 (1997).