Court Opinion

ID: 9746342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:12:55.411834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:12.368141
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority today purports to “revise” the salutary standards announced in Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973), and Commonwealth v. Roots, 482 Pa. 33, 393 A.2d 364 (1978), governing the admissibility of a criminal defendant’s prior convictions as impeachment evidence, “in favor of more concrete guidelines.” At 414. In reality the majority sweeps aside a variety of evidentiary considerations heretofore regarded as crucial to a determination of admissibility, substituting in their place a per se rule based on a single arbitrary factor, i.e., whether the *416prior conviction or release from confinement thereon occurred within ten years of the commencement of trial. The rule announced today is not only inadequate to protect the right of the defendant to a fair trial, but is also an unnecessary departure from our settled jurisprudence.
I seriously question the legitimacy of the concern which gives rise to the majority’s ill-considered reassessment of the Bighum-Roots test of admissibility. In essence, the problem identified by the majority is that Bighum-Roots is being misapplied by reviewing courts. In reality, however, discretionary trial court rulings applying the teaching of Bighum and Roots have been upheld on appeal in the overwhelming majority of reported appellate decisions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nenninger, 359 Pa.Super. 444, 519 A.2d 433 (1986); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 355 Pa.Super. 25, 512 A.2d 1191 (1986); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 350 Pa.Super. 595, 504 A.2d 1310 (1986); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 347 Pa.Super. 564, 500 A.2d 1200 (1985); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 341 Pa.Super. 152, 491 A.2d 196 (1985); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 340 Pa.Super. 26, 489 A.2d 821 (1985); Commonwealth v. Bunch, 329 Pa.Super. 101, 477 A.2d 1372 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kearse, 326 Pa.Super. 1, 473 A.2d 577 (1984); Commonwealth v. Toomey, 321 Pa.Super. 281, 468 A.2d 479 (1984); Commonwealth v. Gonce, 320 Pa.Super. 19, 466 A.2d 1039 (1983); Commonwealth v. Zabala, 310 Pa.Super. 301, 456 A.2d 622 (1983); Commonwealth v. Tabas, 308 Pa.Super. 43, 454 A.2d 12 (1982); Commonwealth v. Brunner, 305 Pa.Super. 411, 451 A.2d 714 (1982), vacated on other grounds, 502 Pa. 358, 466 A.2d 991 (1983); Commonwealth v. Kaster, 300 Pa.Super. 174, 446 A.2d 286 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 290 Pa.Super. 254, 434 A.2d 740 (1981); Commonwealth v. Clark, 280 Pa.Super. 1, 421 A.2d 374 (1980), aff'd. per curiam, 501 Pa. 393, 461 A.2d 794 (1983); Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa.Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980); Commonwealth v. Woods, 275 Pa.Super. 392, 418 A.2d 1346 (1980); Commonwealth v. Washington, 274 Pa. Super. 560, 418 A.2d 548 (1980); Commonwealth v. Dombrauskas, 274 Pa.Super. 452, 418 A.2d 493 (1980); Com*417monwealth v. Stafford, 272 Pa.Super. 505, 416 A.2d 570 (1979); Commonwealth v. Herman, 271 Pa.Super. 145, 412 A.2d 617 (1979); Commonwealth v. Epps, 270 Pa.Super. 295, 411 A.2d 534 (1979); Commonwealth v. Henson, 269 Pa.Super. 314, 409 A.2d 906 (1979); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 267 Pa.Super. 34, 405 A.2d 1290 (1979). Commonwealth v. Ashmore, 266 Pa.Super. 181, 403 A.2d 603 (1979); Commonwealth v. Golson, 263 Pa.Super. 143, 397 A.2d 441 (1979); Commonwealth v. Vickers, 260 Pa.Super. 479, 394 A.2d 1027 (1978); Commonwealth v. Vickers, 260 Pa.Super. 469, 394 A.2d 1022 (1978); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 258 Pa.Super. 429, 392 A.2d 869 (1978); Commonwealth v. Connor, 258 Pa.Super. 246, 392 A.2d 776 (1978); Commonwealth v. Quartman, 253 Pa.Super. 460, 385 A.2d 429 (1978); Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 250 Pa.Super. 139, 378 A.2d 865 (1977); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 247 Pa.Super. 386, 372 A.2d 880 (1977); Commonwealth v. Flores, 247 Pa.Super. 140, 371 A.2d 1366 (1977); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 244 Pa.Super. 505, 368 A.2d 1299 (1976); Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 Pa.Super. 212, 361 A.2d 862 (1976), rev’d. on other grounds, 477 Pa. 424, 383 A.2d 1280 (1978). Moreover, the rate of affirmance in cases in which a published opinion has been deemed unnecessary is, in all likelihood, even greater. Thus it is evident that the predicate for the majority’s hasty dismantling of Bighum-Roots is for all practical purposes nonexistent. Even if it could be demonstrated that the Superior Court consistently substituted its judgment for that of the trial court, the solution would be to circumscribe review of Bighum-Roots questions by that court, not to eliminate the trial court’s opportunity to exercise its discretion in the first instance. What is significant is that the majority implicitly accepts the validity of the underlying rationale of the Bighum-Roots approach.
Even more disturbing than the needless abandonment of Bighum-Roots is the majority’s decision to embrace a per se rule of admissibility concerned solely with whether the prior conviction or release after incarceration occurred with*418in the ten-year period preceding trial. Such an approach is both arbitrary and jurisprudentially unsound.1 The due process concern underlying this Court’s decisions in Big-hum-Roots was the inherent potential for prejudice in the revelation to the jury that the defendant has been convicted of a prior crime. We also recognized the prosecution’s right to confront a defendant who elects to testify in his own behalf. We attempted to strike a balance between these competing interests so that a prior conviction would be admissible as impeachment evidence only “where its introduction was of essential evidentiary valúe to the prosecution and not unreasonably unfair to the defense.” Roots, supra, 482 Pa. at 39, 393 A.2d at 367. To facilitate such a determination we identified a number of relevant factors to be considered. The age of the prior conviction was only one of those factors. Among the other considerations identified were: the degree of relevance to the veracity of the defendant; the likelihood that the evidence would merely smear the defendant’s character; the age and circumstances of the defendant; the Commonwealth’s need for the evidence given the strength of the prosecution’s case and the availability of alternative means of attacking credibility; and the availability of other witnesses to the defendant. Roots, supra, 482 Pa. at 39-40, 393 A.2d at 367. The majority makes no attempt to demonstrate why these important factors in weighing admissibility have lost their vitality or how a “ten-year” rule will conceivably satisfy the substantial concerns expressed in Bighum and Roots.
*419In my view the majority’s per se rule is purely arbitrary and fails to ensure even the relevance of the prior conviction. The rule makes no distinction between recent and stale convictions; a ten-year old conviction is of questionable relevance to a defendant’s veracity. Consider the example of a twenty-five year old defendant who was convicted of a prior crime at fifteen.2 That childhood conviction would be admissible to impeach that defendant’s credibility as an adult. Another example of the absurd operation of the rule would be the case of a defendant convicted at age twenty and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment who is released at age thirty and ten years later is tried for a new offense. That defendant’s twenty-year old conviction would be admissible in spite of its unquestionable remoteness. The “ten-year” rule will also produce the anomalies that are an inevitable result of arbitrary line-drawing. A ten-year old conviction, which in my judgment is too attenuated in any event to have bearing on the defendant’s credibility, will be admitted; but a conviction only slightly more remote will in all likelihood be excluded, notwithstanding the majority’s assertion that the latter decision would be discretionary. Such disparate results exacerbate the arbitrariness of an already mechanical test. In light of our trial courts’ documented ability to make appropriate determinations under Bighum-Roots on a case-by-case basis, and the Superior Court’s demonstrated deference to the exercise of that discretion, the majority’s per se rule is not only simplistic but demeaning to our judicial system.
In the instant case, the Superior Court properly concluded that because the defendant had no means other than his own testimony to substantiate his claim of self-defense and the Commonwealth had other adequate means of attacking the defendant’s credibility, the trial court’s decision to admit the six year-old prior burglary conviction was error under the Bighum-Roots standard. I agree with the Superior Court that the award of a new trial is appropriate.
*420For all of the foregoing reasons I am compelled to register my emphatic dissent.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. It should be noted that per se rules are not favored by this Court. See, e.g., Colosimo v. Pennsylvania Electric Company, 513 Pa. 155, 518 A.2d 1206 (1986); Kindle v. Commonwealth, State Board of Nurse Examiners, 512 Pa. 44, 515 A.2d 1342 (1986); Commonwealth v. Eubanks, 511 Pa. 201, 512 A.2d 619 (1986); Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 Pa. 112, 511 A.2d 1327 (1986); Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218, 465 A.2d 989 (1983); Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 501 Pa. 581, 462 A.2d 653 (1983); Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461, 462 A.2d 216 (1983); Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ceja, 493 Pa. 588, 427 A.2d 631 (1981); Commonwealth v. Pettus, 492 Pa. 558, 424 A.2d 1332 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sexton, 485 Pa. 17, 400 A.2d 1289 (1979).

. This hypothetical assumes, of course, that the defendant was certified for trial as an adult. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 6355.