Court Opinion

ID: 9556805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 18:01:09.212487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:18.112048
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 18 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEAN-PIERRE RONET,                              No. 22-15942

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01677-DLR-MHB

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
STEPHEN MORRISON, Administrative
Service Manager, Arizona Department of
Public Safety, in his official and individual
capacity; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Arizona
                    Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted August 15, 2023**

Before:      TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

      Jean-Pierre Ronet appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims related to his

registration as a sex offender and his attempt to register to vote. We have

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,

1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Ronet’s claims against defendants

Morrison and Rubio because Ronet failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he

was not required to register as a sex offender or that he was denied any process that

was due. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); Conn. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (rejecting a

procedural due process argument where sex offender registration requirements

“turn[ed] on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact that a convicted offender has

already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest”); Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process

is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”

(citation omitted)).

      The district court properly dismissed Ronet’s claim against defendant Richer

because Ronet failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Richer had any personal

involvement in Ronet’s failure to receive a voter registration card or that Ronet

was denied a voter registration card as the result of a Maricopa County policy,

                                           2                                       22-15942
practice, or custom. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)

(explaining that “in an official-capacity suit the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must

have played a part in the violation of federal law” (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (“A plaintiff must

allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally

involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”).

      Because Ronet failed to make any argument in his opening brief regarding

the district court’s dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claims, Ronet has waived

any challenge to the dismissal of these claims. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v.

Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “we cannot

manufacture arguments for appellant and . . . will not consider any claims that were

not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)).

      AFFIRMED.

                                           3                                   22-15942