Court Opinion

ID: 9389814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 15:01:50.285207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.881196
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1447    Document: 38     Page: 1   Filed: 04/26/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                  WILFRED D. BEAN,
                   Claimant-Appellant

                             v.

       DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
              VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                        2022-1447
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 19-4116, Judge Coral Wong Pi-
 etsch.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: April 26, 2023
                  ______________________

     JENNIFER ANN ZAJAC, Paralyzed Veterans of America,
 Washington, DC, argued for claimant-appellant. Also rep-
 resented by LINDA E. BLAUHUT.

      ERIC JOHN SINGLEY, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also repre-
 sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI,
 PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; Y. KEN LEE, DEREK SCADDEN, Of-
 fice of General Counsel, United States Department of Vet-
 erans Affairs, Washington, DC.
Case: 22-1447     Document: 38     Page: 2    Filed: 04/26/2023

 2                                       BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

                   ______________________

     Before NEWMAN, SCHALL, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
 SCHALL, Circuit Judge.
      Wilfred D. Bean appeals the December 30, 2021 deci-
 sion of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
 Claims (“Veterans Court”) in Bean v. McDonough, No. 19-
 4116, 2021 WL 6143707 (Vet. App. Dec. 30, 2021). In that
 single-judge memorandum decision, the Veterans Court
 dismissed Mr. Bean’s appeal of the May 10, 2019 decision
 of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) for lack of ju-
 risdiction. In its May 2019 decision, the Board dismissed
 Mr. Bean’s appeal of two rulings of the Oakland, California
 Regional Office (“RO”) of the Department of Veterans Af-
 fairs (“VA”). J.A. 19–23. In the first ruling, in a decision
 dated September 10, 2013, the RO denied Mr. Bean’s claim
 for an effective date earlier than August 14, 2006, for the
 award of disability benefits for service-connected post-trau-
 matic stress disorder (“PTSD”). J.A. 245–50. In the second
 ruling, in a Statement of the Case (“SOC”) dated Septem-
 ber 21, 2015, the RO rejected Mr. Bean’s contention that he
 had pending before the VA an unadjudicated claim for ben-
 efits based upon service-connected generalized anxiety dis-
 order or major depressive disorder. J.A. 51–73. For the
 reasons set forth below, we hold that the Veterans Court
 erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction. We therefore re-
 verse the court’s decision and remand the case to the court
 for further proceedings.
                        BACKGROUND
                               I
     Mr. Bean served on active duty in the U.S. Army from
 November 1966 to November 1969. Bean, 2021 WL
 6143707, at *1. Following his release from service, on Feb-
 ruary 24, 1997, he presented to the RO a claim for disabil-
 ity compensation based upon PTSD, chloracne, and soft
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 BEAN    v. MCDONOUGH                                       3

 tissue sarcoma. Id. 1 On the basis of a June 26, 1997 VA
 examination, Mr. Bean was diagnosed with major depres-
 sion and generalized anxiety disorder, but not PTSD. Id.;
 J.A. 748. In a rating decision dated July 11, 1997, the RO
 denied entitlement to service connection for PTSD. Bean,
 2021 WL 6143707, at *1, *3. The rating decision noted that
 Mr. Bean had been diagnosed with major depression and
 generalized anxiety disorder. However, it did not other-
 wise address those conditions. Id. at *1–2; J.A. 741. Mr.
 Bean did not appeal the July 1997 rating decision. Bean,
 2021 WL 6143707, at *1.
      On August 14, 2006, the RO received an informal claim
 from Mr. Bean. The claim sought service connection for
 major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and PTSD.
 Id. at *2. In response to Mr. Bean’s informal claim, on June
 12, 2007, the RO notified Mr. Bean that it was “working on
 [his] application for service-connected compensation” for
 major depression and generalized anxiety disorder as well
 as his “claim to reopen for” his PTSD-related claim. J.A.
 626. Subsequently, Mr. Bean underwent another VA ex-
 amination on July 11, 2007, as a result of which he was
 diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder.
 Bean, 2021 WL 6143707, at *2; J.A. 563. In an October 4,
 2007 rating decision, the RO found service connection for
 PTSD, deemed the PTSD 30% disabling, and assigned the
 rating an effective date of August 14, 2006. Bean, 2021 WL
 6143707, at *2; J.A. 512–15.
     On November 29, 2007, Mr. Bean filed a Notice of Dis-
 agreement (“NOD”), disagreeing with the disability rating
 and effective date assignment and noting his intention to
 submit a supplemental letter further explaining his disa-
 greement with the decision. J.A. 502. In the promised

     1    Until his appeal to the Veterans Court that re-
 sulted in the court’s decision that is now before us Mr. Bean
 at all times acted pro se.
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 4                                        BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

 supplemental statement, dated December 8, 2007, Mr.
 Bean informed the RO that he disagreed with both the rat-
 ing of 30% for PTSD and the August 14, 2006 effective date
 assigned for the rating. He also stated: “It is my contention
 that my claim for service connection for [PTSD] constituted
 a claim for an acquired psychiatric disorder to include ma-
 jor depression and generalized anxiety disorder as docu-
 mented in the evidentiary records to include . . . the VA
 examination of June 26, 1997.” JA. 487–88. Mr. Bean con-
 cluded that the VA’s failure to consider service connection
 for these conditions meant that he had an “unadjudicated
 (pending) claim in accordance with 38 CFR 3.160(c).” J.A.
 488. 2
     In an SOC dated June 11, 2008, the RO confirmed the
 30% rating for PTSD and denied an effective date earlier
 than August 14, 2006, for PTSD. Bean, 2021 WL 6143707,
 at *2; J.A. 480. Addressing Mr. Bean’s assertion of unad-
 judicated pending claims, the RO stated:
     You contend that your claim for service connection
     for [PTSD] constituted a claim for an acquired psy-
     chiatric disorder to include major depressive disor-
     der and generalized anxiety disorder. A review of
     your claims folder indicates you specifically
     claimed service connection for [PTSD]. There was
     no indication that you were claiming service con-
     nection for any other disability. In addition, you[r]
     examination report did not relate your major de-
     pressive disorder or generalized anxiety disorder to
     any psychiatric disorder in service. . . . There is no
     evidence of a claim for a psychiatric disorder which
     was not adjudicated.

     2    At the time, § 3.160(c) defined a “pending claim” as
 “[a]n application, formal or informal, which has not been
 finally adjudicated.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c) (2006).
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 BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH                                          5

 J.A. 482.
     In a VA Form 9, dated August 6, 2008, Mr. Bean con-
 tinued to assert to the RO that he was entitled to a rating
 greater than 30% for his PTSD and that his 1997 PTSD
 claim constituted a claim for additional psychiatric condi-
 tions. Bean, 2021 WL 6143707, at *2; J.A. 455–57. In that
 regard, Mr. Bean added that there remained pending “an
 unadjudicated claim in accordance with 38 CFR 3.160(c).”
 J.A. 457.
     In a Supplemental Statement of the Case (“SSOC”)
 dated May 20, 2010, the RO increased Mr. Bean’s rating
 for PTSD to 70%, effective April 30, 2010, based upon a VA
 examination on that date. Bean, 2021 WL 6143707, at *2.
 In the SSOC, the RO continued the denial of an effective
 date earlier than August 14, 2006, for the award of service
 connection for PTSD. Id. In addition, the RO rejected
 again Mr. Bean’s contention that there was an unadjudi-
 cated pending claim for an acquired psychiatric disorder.
 J.A. 416 (“As noted in our [SOC] dated [June] 11, 2008,
 there is no evidence of a claim for a psychiatric disorder
 which was not adjudicated.”). Dissatisfied with this deci-
 sion, Mr. Bean appealed to the Board. J.A. 390–91.
     On May 31, 2012, the Board issued its decision in re-
 sponse to Mr. Bean’s appeal. The Board determined that
 Mr. Bean was entitled to a 70% rating for service-connected
 PTSD, with an effective date of August 14, 2006, but not
 earlier. Bean, 2021 WL 6143707, at *2; J.A. 338–39. The
 Board acknowledged Mr. Bean’s assertion that, because he
 was diagnosed with major depression and generalized anx-
 iety disorder by the VA in June 1997, the RO, in July 1997,
 should have considered his claim for PTSD as a claim for
 an acquired psychiatric disability. In that regard, the
 Board stated:
    If the veteran believes that the RO made a mistake
    in its decision, he can file a claim alleging clear and
    unmistakable error (CUE) in the July 1997 RO
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 6                                       BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

     decision (the standard is very high). However, that
     issue has not been properly developed and is not
     before the Board at this time.
 J.A. 335. The Board thus did not rule on whether the RO
 had before it in 1997, but failed to adjudicate, claims for
 benefits based on major depression or generalized anxiety
 disorder; the Board said only that the question was not at
 that time before it and should be presented to the RO.
      Mr. Bean did not appeal to the Veterans Court. In-
 stead, he followed the Board’s suggestion. Thus, in a VA
 Form 21-4138 dated July 26, 2012, that he submitted to the
 RO, he asked, in accordance with the Board’s May 2012 de-
 cision, that “the VA reconsider the issue of the effective
 date” for his service-connected PTSD. J.A. 310. In addi-
 tion, he repeated his contention that there was pending an
 unadjudicated claim in accordance with 38 C.F.R.
 § 3.160(c), while also citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a), the VA
 regulation that governs CUE claims. Id.
     Subsequently, after the RO denied an earlier effective
 date for service connection for PTSD on September 10,
 2013, J.A. 251, and Mr. Bean submitted an NOD on Sep-
 tember 30, 2013, J.A. 237–38, the RO issued an SOC on
 September 21, 2015. J.A. 53. In relevant part, the SOC
 stated:
     Your prior claims for service connection for ac-
     quired psychiatric disorder to include generalized
     anxiety disorder, major depression and/or [PTSD]
     became final on July 18, 1998 and October 7, 1999.
     There is no evidence of a clear and unmistakable
     error (38 CFR 3.105(a)) and no evidence that a for-
     mal or informal claim was pending which has not
     been finally adjudicated (38 CFR 3.160(c)). Prior
     decisions were found to be correct and finally adju-
     dicated at the time you re-opened your claim on Au-
     gust 14, 2006.
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 BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH                                        7

 J.A. 73. Mr. Bean then appealed to the Board both the is-
 sue of an earlier effective date for his PTSD and the issue
 of alleged unadjudicated claims. J.A. 49.
                              II
      On May 10, 2019, the Board issued its decision dismiss-
 ing Mr. Bean’s appeal. J.A. 19. In its decision, the Board
 stated that, when Mr. Bean applied to the RO in July of
 2012, he asked that the RO reconsider the issue of an effec-
 tive date assigned for the award of service connection for
 PTSD. J.A. 20. The Board also stated that Mr. Bean ar-
 gued before the RO that, in its May 2012 decision, “the
 Board should have considered whether he should have
 been service-connected for depression and anxiety from
 1997 since his original claim had been for an ‘acquired psy-
 chiatric disorder’ and not just PTSD therefore it remained
 an unadjudicated claim.” J.A. 20–21; see J.A. 310. The
 Board then noted that Mr. Bean had not appealed its May
 2012 decision to the Veterans Court. J.A. 21. The Board
 also noted that, when the Board issued that decision, Mr.
 Bean was informed that, any time after issuance of the de-
 cision, he could file with the Board a motion for reconsider-
 ation, a motion to vacate, or a motion for revision based on
 CUE. Id. The Board stated:
     [T]he issue on appeal has already been addressed
     by the Board in a final, unappealed decision, and
     cannot be revisited in the absence of a motion for
     reconsideration or a motion of CUE in the May
     2012 Board decision. The Veteran in this case has
     not, at any point, argued that his request for an
     earlier effective date should be construed as a mo-
     tion to revise the May 2012 Board decision based
     on clear and unmistakable error, nor has the
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 8                                       BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

     Veteran filed the necessary motion to have that
     prior decision revised or reconsidered. 3
 J.A. 21–22. On this basis, the Board dismissed Mr. Bean’s
 appeal, stating: “[T]he May 2012 Board decision is final;
 the appeal for an earlier effective date for service connec-
 tion for PTSD is dismissed.” J.A. 23. Mr. Bean timely ap-
 pealed to the Veterans Court, and at that point he obtained
 counsel.
                              III
     On March 2, 2020, after his appeal had been filed, Mr.
 Bean sought from the Veterans Court extraordinary relief
 in the form of a writ of mandamus. Mr. Bean asked the
 court to order the VA to issue a decision on what he con-
 tended were his unadjudicated claims for service connec-
 tion for anxiety and depression that had been pending
 since 1997. Bean, 2021 WL 6143707, at *3; J.A. 1025, 1033.
     Responding to Mr. Bean’s petition on April 9, 2020, the
 VA informed the Veterans Court that, on April 4, 2020, the
 RO had issued a decision determining that the rating deci-
 sion dated July 11, 1997, did not contain CUE and that the
 decision did not leave unadjudicated any claims of service
 connection for generalized anxiety disorder and major de-
 pression because neither of those conditions were ever
 claimed. Bean, 2021 WL 6143707, at *3; J.A. 1036, 1041.
     In a single-judge memorandum decision issued on
 April 27, 2020, the Veterans Court denied Mr. Bean’s peti-
 tion. J.A. 1078. The court stated that Mr. Bean had failed
 to carry his burden of demonstrating that he lacked alter-
 native means of relief. Specifically, the court said that Mr.

     3   Thus, the Board read Mr. Bean’s July 2012 appli-
 cation to the RO as a request for reconsideration of the
 Board’s May 2012 decision, rather than a request for the
 RO to correct its own earlier error.
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 BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH                                       9

 Bean had failed to explain why his appeal of the May 2019
 Board decision or initiating review of the April 2020 rating
 decision were not adequate remedies. J.A. 1077.
     Rather than appealing the April 2020 RO decision, Mr.
 Bean continued with the prosecution of his pending appeal
 in the Veterans Court. In his appeal, Mr. Bean did not
 challenge the Board’s May 10, 2019 decision insofar as it
 dismissed his appeal to the extent it sought an earlier ef-
 fective date for the award of service connection for PTSD.
 J.A. 909–10. What Mr. Bean did challenge was the Board’s
 failure to address his contention that he had unadjudicated
 pending claims for service-connected generalized anxiety
 disorder and major depressive disorder. J.A. 912–17.
     In a single-judge memorandum decision issued on
 April 28, 2021, the Veterans Court considered Mr. Bean’s
 argument that he had presented to the Board the conten-
 tion that he had unadjudicated pending claims for service
 connection for generalized anxiety disorder and major de-
 pressive disorder. After doing so, the court concluded:
    [A]ppellant . . . has continually asked VA to deter-
    mine whether he has an outstanding claim for gen-
    eralized anxiety disorder and major depression,
    and VA has done little to address that argument.
    Thus, the Court finds that the Board erred when it
    failed to address his contention that he has unad-
    judicated pending claims for service connection for
    generalized anxiety and major depressive disorder
    dating back to 1997. These issues were raised by
    the record and should have been addressed by the
    Board.
 Bean v. McDonough, No. 19-4116, 2021 WL 1647629, at *6
 (Vet. App. Apr. 28, 2021). The Veterans Court concluded
 its decision by dismissing what it described as “the appeal
 for an effective date earlier than August 14, 2006, for the
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 10                                       BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

 grant of service connection for PTSD.” Id. at *7. 4 At the
 same time, however, the court remanded to the Board “for
 further proceedings consistent with this decision” the issue
 of whether Mr. Bean had unadjudicated pending claims.
 Id.
     The court’s statement just quoted above, as well as its
 remand to the Board, reflect the court’s finding that, when
 Mr. Bean submitted his Form 21-1438 to the RO in July of
 2012, he was not seeking reconsideration of the May 2012
 Board decision. Rather, he was presenting to the RO his
 contention that there were unadjudicated claims for gener-
 alized anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder, al-
 legedly pending since 1997. The statement and remand
 also reflect the court’s finding that those claims were before
 the Board in 2019 and that the Board erred in failing to
 consider them.
     On May 13, 2021, the VA Secretary moved for recon-
 sideration of the Veterans Court’s April 2021 decision. On
 December 30, 2021, the court withdrew its April 2021 deci-
 sion and issued the single-judge memorandum decision
 now on appeal.
     In its December 30, 2021 decision, the Veterans Court
 concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Bean’s ap-
 peal. Bean, 2021 WL 6143707, at *4. The court reached
 that conclusion even though Mr. Bean contended before the
 Board that he had unadjudicated pending claims for ser-
 vice-connected generalized anxiety and major depressive
 disorder and that the Board erred when it failed to address
 those claims. The Veterans Court reasoned, simply, that
 the Board did not actually decide that issue in the decision
 on appeal, but decided only the issue of whether Mr. Bean

      4  As noted above, Mr. Bean did not raise the issue of
 an earlier effective date for service connection for PTSD in
 his appeal to the Veterans Court.
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 BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH                                        11

 was entitled to an effective date earlier than August 14,
 2006, for the grant of service connection for his PTSD and
 that, for that reason, the court lacked jurisdiction over the
 issue raised by Mr. Bean on appeal—“whether the Board
 erred in failing to address whether he had unadjudicated,
 pending claims for generalized anxiety and major depres-
 sive disorder dating back to 1997.” Id.; see also id. (“[T]he
 only issue addressed in the May 2019 decision is whether
 [Mr. Bean] was entitled to an effective date earlier than
 August 14, 2006, for the grant of service connection for his
 PTSD. Thus, the Court does not possess jurisdiction over
 the issue raised by the appellant in his brief—specifically
 whether the Board erred in failing to address whether the
 appellant had unadjudicated, pending claims for service
 connection for generalized anxiety and major depressive
 disorder dating back to 1997.”). It therefore dismissed the
 appeal. Id. at *5. This appeal followed.
                         DISCUSSION
                               I
      On appeal, Mr. Bean argues that the Veterans Court
 erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the
 issue that he raised on appeal, that issue being whether
 the Board erred in failing to address whether he had unad-
 judicated pending claims for generalized anxiety disorder
 and major depressive disorder dating back to 1997. Mr.
 Bean contends that this issue was before the Board and
 that the Board thus should have addressed it. Appellant’s
 Br. 20. In making this argument, he contends that the de-
 cision of the Veterans Court is inconsistent with 38 U.S.C.
 § 7104(a) (1994) (formerly 38 U.S.C. § 4004(a)), the statute
 governing Board jurisdiction; and 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (1994)
 (formerly 38 U.S.C. § 4052), the statute governing the ju-
 risdiction of the Veterans Court. Mr. Bean also contends
 that the decision of the Veterans Court is inconsistent with
 prior decisions of that court in, e.g., Travelstead v. Derwin-
 ski, 1 Vet. App. 344, 346 (1991), Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet.
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 12                                       BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

 App. 429, 433–44 (1995), and In re Smith, 10 Vet. App. 311,
 314 (1997), as well as the decision of this court in Maggitt
 v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Mr. Bean
 argues that these decisions stand for the proposition, ap-
 plicable in this case, that the jurisdiction of the Veterans
 Court extends to matters properly raised before, but not
 decided by, the Board. According to Mr. Bean, this was the
 case with respect to his assertion of unadjudicated pending
 claims. He presented the assertion to the Board, he says,
 but the Board failed to address it. Mr. Bean also argues
 that what he refers to as the “Secretary’s failure to adjudi-
 cate [his] claims for almost 25 years” violates his Fifth
 Amendment constitutional due process rights. Appellant’s
 Br. 38–43. Mr. Bean asks us to reverse the decision of the
 Veterans Court and order the court to direct the VA to
 grant him benefits for service-connected generalized anxi-
 ety disorder and major depressive disorder. Appellant’s Br.
 43; Appellant’s Reply Br. 14–15.
      The government responds by addressing first the mat-
 ter of our jurisdiction. Citing Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776,
 778 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the government acknowledges that
 generally the question of whether the Veterans Court has
 jurisdiction over an issue is a matter of statutory interpre-
 tation and thus within the scope of our jurisdiction under
 38 U.S.C. § 7292. Appellee’s Br. 17. It continues, however,
 that we lack jurisdiction to review factual findings of the
 Veterans Court relating to jurisdictional issues, or to re-
 view the Veterans Court’s application of its jurisdictional
 statute to the facts of a particular case, citing Albun v.
 Brown, 9 F.3d 1528, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1993). This rule ap-
 plies here, the government argues. That is because, in this
 case, the Veterans Court’s decision did not involve the in-
 terpretation of any statute or regulation. Rather, in this
 case, the Veterans Court simply made (i) the determina-
 tion that the only issue before the Board and addressed by
 the Board was whether Mr. Bean was entitled to an earlier
 effective date for his PTSD and (ii) the determination that
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 BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH                                       13

 Mr. Bean’s arguments regarding allegedly unadjudicated
 pending claims were not pertinent or related to that issue.
 These determinations, speaking to the scope of Mr. Bean’s
 claim and appeal, the government says, are factual deter-
 minations. Appellee’s Br. 17–18 (citing Comer v. Peake,
 552 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009) and Bonner v. Nichol-
 son, 497 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
     Turning to the merits, the government argues that the
 Veterans Court correctly determined that it lacked juris-
 diction to consider Mr. Bean’s assertions regarding alleg-
 edly unadjudicated pending claims. Appellee’s Br. 25. The
 government states that, in July 2012, Mr. Bean submitted
 to the RO a statement in support of a claim seeking recon-
 sideration of the May 2012 Board decision. The govern-
 ment then states that, in its May 2019 decision, the Board
 found that the filing could not be a “motion for reconsider-
 ation, revision, or vacatur” of the Board’s May 2012 deci-
 sion because it did not meet the requirements for such a
 motion. Appellee’s Br. 26. Because Mr. Bean made his
 submission to the RO and not the Board, the government
 states, the Board correctly determined that the filing could
 not constitute a motion for reconsideration or of CUE in the
 May 2012 Board decision. Id. The government also asserts
 that the Board correctly determined that Mr. Bean’s July
 2012 filing did not constitute a CUE claim in regard to the
 1997 RO decision. Id. at 26–28.
      The government further states that, in his appeal to
 the Veterans Court, Mr. Bean did not raise any arguments
 with respect to the issue that the Board did decide, entitle-
 ment to an earlier effective date for his service-connected
 PTSD. Instead his arguments solely addressed the issue of
 whether he had unadjudicated pending claims, a matter
 the Board did not decide. Appellee’s Br. 26–27. “Thus,” the
 government asserts, “because the scope of the [B]oard’s de-
 cision defines the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court, the
 only issue before the Veterans Court in this matter was Mr.
 Bean’s entitlement to an earlier effective date for his
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 14                                        BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

 service-connected PTSD.” Appellee’s Br. 28. According to
 the government, since Mr. Bean did not contest that issue,
 the court properly dismissed his appeal. Appellee’s Br. 28.
 The government urges us to reject Mr. Bean’s argument,
 noted above, that he did present to the Board the issue of
 unadjudicated pending claims.
     Finally, the government urges that Mr. Bean’s Fifth
 Amendment due process rights have not been violated be-
 cause he has no unadjudicated pending claims. Appellee’s
 Br. 33–35.
     The government concludes by asking us to dismiss Mr.
 Bean’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative,
 to affirm the decision of the Veterans Court.
                               II
     We address first the issue of our jurisdiction. We have
 jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court “with
 respect to the validity of a decision of the Court on a rule of
 law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation
 thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter)
 that was relied on by the Court in making the decision.” 38
 U.S.C. § 7292(a). More specifically, we have jurisdiction “to
 determine whether the legal requirement of the statute or
 regulation has been correctly interpreted in a particular
 context where the relevant facts are not in dispute.”
 Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
 However, except with respect to constitutional issues, we
 do not have jurisdiction to “review (A) a challenge to a fac-
 tual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation
 as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C.
 § 7292(d).
     We have no difficulty concluding that we have jurisdic-
 tion in this case. That is so for two reasons. First, Mr.
 Bean’s appeal requires us to determine whether, in its De-
 cember 30, 2021 decision, the Veterans Court correctly in-
 terpreted the legal requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 7104, the
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 BEAN    v. MCDONOUGH                                      15

 Board’s jurisdictional statute, and 38 U.S.C. § 7252, its
 own jurisdictional statute. 5 Szemraj, 357 F.3d at 1375.
 And second, “the relevant facts are not in dispute” for pur-
 poses of our jurisdiction to address legal errors in the Vet-
 erans Court’s decision or to reverse its holding that it
 lacked jurisdiction. Id.
      The relevant facts are established by the unchallenged
 documentary record of (1) Mr. Bean’s July 26, 2012 appli-
 cation to the RO, (2) the RO’s denial of the application on
 September 10, 2013, (3) Mr. Bean’s September 30, 2013
 NOD, (4) the RO’s SOC on September 21, 2015, and (5) Mr.
 Bean’s subsequent appeal to the Board, all of which are re-
 cited above. The facts evident from those documents are
 reflected in the Veterans Court’s April 28, 2021 remand de-
 cision, also recited above, where the court expressly found
 that the issues of Mr. Bean’s claims of generalized anxiety
 disorder and major depressive disorder “were raised by the
 record and should have been addressed by the Board.”
 Bean, 2021 WL 1647629, at *6. Although that decision was
 withdrawn, the VA, in its motion asking the Veterans
 Court to reconsider the April 2021 decision, did not chal-
 lenge the court’s recitation of facts in the decision. Secre-
 tary’s Mot. For Recons., Bean v. McDonough, No. 19-4116
 (May 13, 2021).
     This case is thus different from Albun, Comer, and Bon-
 ner, the decisions upon which the government relies to ar-
 gue that we lack jurisdiction. In Albun, we were called

     5   The Veterans Court did not identify these express
 statutory provisions in its December 30, 2021 decision.
 However, it is clear from the court’s April 2021 decision and
 the Secretary’s motion for reconsideration of that decision
 that it was those provisions on which the court based its
 subsequent dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. See Bean,
 2021 WL 1647629, at *1; Secretary’s Mot. for Recons., Bean
 v. McDonough, No. 19-4116 (May 13, 2021).
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 16                                        BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

 upon to rule on the Veterans Court’s factual determina-
 tions and the court’s application of its jurisdictional statute
 to those factual determinations. See 9 F.3d at 1530. In
 Comer and Bonner, we were called upon to rule on the fac-
 tual inquiry into the scope of a veteran’s claim. See Comer,
 552 F.3d at 1372; Bonner, 497 F.3d at 1328. In contrast,
 the question of whether the Veterans Court has jurisdic-
 tion in this case boils down to a question of statutory inter-
 pretation, Ledford, 136 F.3d at 778, requiring no resolution
 of disputed factual issues.
                               III
     We turn now to the merits of the Veterans Court’s ju-
 risdictional ruling. Two statutes are relevant to this ap-
 peal. As noted above, 38 U.S.C. § 7104 sets forth the
 jurisdiction of the Board. Subsection (a) of that statute pro-
 vides that “[d]ecisions of the Board shall be based on the
 entire record in the proceedings and upon consideration of
 all evidence and material of record and applicable provi-
 sions of law and regulation.” As also noted above, the ju-
 risdiction of the Veterans Court is set forth at 38 U.S.C.
 § 7252. Subsection (a) of that statute provides that the Vet-
 erans Court has “exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions
 of the [Board].” Pursuant to subsection (b), review in the
 court is “on the record of proceedings before the Secretary
 and the Board.”
      A prerequisite to Veterans Court jurisdiction is a deci-
 sion of the Board. Andre v. Principi, 301 F.3d 1354, 1360
 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1375; Ledford, 136
 F.3d at 779; see May v. McDonough, 61 F.4th 963, 965 (Fed.
 Cir. 2023). Relevant to this case, in Maggitt we stated that
 “[a] ‘decision’ of the Board, for purposes of the Veterans
 Court’s jurisdiction under section 7252, is the decision with
 respect to the benefit sought by the veteran.” 202 F.3d at
 1376. Denial of a claim, which includes the failure of the
 Board to consider a claim that was reasonably raised before
 it, constitutes a decision of the Board—reviewable by the
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 BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH                                        17

 Veterans Court. See id.; Travelstead, 1 Vet. App. at 346
 (“When the [Board] makes a decision (implicitly or explic-
 itly) not to deal with an issue considered at the [RO] level,
 then that decision not to decide an issue is a decision by the
 [Board] which is properly before this Court.”). In addition,
 the Veterans Court, upon exercising jurisdiction in such
 circumstances, has repeatedly held—as did the Veterans
 Court in its withdrawn April 2021 decision in the present
 case—that the Board commits error in not deciding such
 issues. Smith, 10 Vet. App. at 314 (“Where the [Board] fails
 to adjudicate a claim that was reasonably raised before it,
 the net outcome for the veteran amounts to a denial of the
 benefit sought. Accordingly, the Court holds as a matter of
 law that the Board’s failure to adjudicate the TDIU claim
 that was properly before it constitutes a final adverse
 [Board] decision with respect to that claim.”); Owens, 7 Vet.
 App. at 433 (remanding to the Board for consideration a
 claim not addressed by the Board and stating, “[w]hen the
 appellant reasonably raises a claim for a particular benefit,
 the Board is required to adjudicate the issue of the claim-
 ant’s entitlement to such a benefit, or if appropriate, to re-
 mand the issue to the RO for development and adjudication
 of the issue”); see also Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 545,
 552 (2008), aff’d sub nom. Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d
 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
      The Veterans Court’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction
 is clearly contrary to the legal principle that when a claim
 is adequately presented to the Board but not addressed by
 the Board, the Board’s disposition of the appeal constitutes
 a decision of the Board on that claim that may be appealed
 to the Veterans Court. The Veterans Court deemed its ju-
 risdiction to be limited to the affirmative determinations
 made by the Board, and not to cover a Board disposition of
 an appeal that is challenged as improperly failing to ad-
 dress contentions clearly before the Board. See supra pp.
 10–11. That is legally incorrect.
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 18                                      BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

     The legal error matters here. After receiving the
 Board’s May 2012 decision, Mr. Bean followed the Board’s
 suggestion and submitted to the RO a Statement in Sup-
 port of Claim on Form 21-4138. In that form, he not only
 cited the CUE regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a), but he also
 argued that, in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c), he had
 pending, unadjudicated claims from 1997 for disability
 from service-connected generalized anxiety disorder and
 major depressive disorder. Then, after the RO denied the
 claim, Mr. Bean appealed to the Board. In its May 2019
 decision, however, the Board failed to address the claim on
 its merits, even though, in the words of its jurisdictional
 statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a), it was part of “the entire rec-
 ord in the proceeding.” See Cogburn v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.
 App. 205, 214–15 & n.5 (2010) (finding “it was error for the
 Board not to address Mr. Cogburn’s disagreement with the
 [RO]’s refusal to adjudicate what Mr. Cogburn argued were
 pending claims”). Instead, the Board concluded that the
 only matter before it was an improper request for reconsid-
 eration of its May 2012 decision, which by its terms did not
 decide whether the RO had before it in 1997, and did not
 adjudicate, the claims based on anxiety and depression
 now at issue. As a result, the Board in May 2019 dismissed
 Mr. Bean’s appeal.
      When Mr. Bean appealed to the Veterans Court, the
 Veterans Court recognized in its April 2021 decision that
 Mr. Bean had clearly presented his claim to the Board and
 that the Board had erred by failing to consider it. Accord-
 ingly, it remanded the case to the Board for the Board to
 address the unadjudicated claims issue. Thus, in April of
 2021, the court correctly exercised jurisdiction over a “de-
 cision[] of the Board.” That decision arose from the Board’s
 denial of Mr. Bean’s claim by reason of the Board’s failure
 to exercise jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) and to
 consider the claim.
     Then, however, in response to the Secretary’s motion
 for reconsideration, the court reversed itself, withdrew its
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 BEAN    v. MCDONOUGH                                       19

 April 2021 decision and issued the December 30, 2021 de-
 cision that is now on appeal. That was error. In dismissing
 Mr. Bean’s appeal, the Veterans Court misinterpreted the
 pertinent law of both this court and the Veterans Court re-
 garding its jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7252. As seen,
 that law is that the Board’s failure to decide a claim clearly
 presented to it constitutes a “decision” of the Board, which
 vests the Veterans Court with jurisdiction. In short, the
 court got the issue of its own jurisdiction right the first
 time.
      Accordingly, the Veterans Court erred in holding that
 it lacked jurisdiction. Mr. Bean is entitled to have the De-
 cember 30, 2021 decision of the Veterans Court reversed
 and his case remanded for the Veterans Court to decide an
 issue within its jurisdiction: whether, as the Veterans
 Court ruled in its withdrawn April 2021 decision, the
 Board erred in not addressing on the merits Mr. Bean’s
 contention, plainly presented to the Board, that the RO had
 before it in 1997, and did not adjudicate, claims based on
 generalized anxiety disorder and major depressive disor-
 der. Without expressing doubt about the correctness of the
 now-withdrawn April 2021 resolution of that issue, we do
 not decide it ourselves at this jurisdictional stage. Having
 noted above some precedent on the issue, we add that, to
 the extent relevant, the Veterans Court should also take
 account of our precedent establishing that, when the RO
 has not adjudicated claims before it, there is not a final de-
 cision on those claims and “a CUE analysis [with its de-
 manding standards] is not required.” Lang v. Wilkie, 971
 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2020); id. at 1352 (agreeing that
 “only final decisions are subject to CUE”); see also Richard-
 son v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 64, 72 (2006). 6

     6  Since Mr. Bean’s claim of unadjudicated pending
 claims was before the Board in 2019, his failure to appeal
 the April 2020 RO decision appears to be irrelevant under
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 20                                     BEAN   v. MCDONOUGH

                        CONCLUSION
     For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Veterans
 Court is reversed. The case is remanded to the court for
 further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 7
                REVERSED AND REMANDED
                           COSTS
 Costs to Mr. Bean.

 the principle, long recognized by the Veterans Court, that
 “where the claim was placed into appellate status by virtue
 of an NOD, subsequent RO decisions cannot resolve the
 pending claim.” Jones v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 122, 125
 (2009), aff’d on other grounds, 619 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
 2010); see Grimes v. McDonough, 34 Vet. App. 84, 92
 (2021).
     7   Because Mr. Bean’s claim will be remanded to the
 Board for further proceedings, his constitutional due pro-
 cess argument is moot at this time. See Cushman v.
 Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The need
 for a remand also suffices to answer Mr. Bean’s request
 that we direct the VA to grant him benefits.