Court Opinion

ID: 9555137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 21:00:48.024712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:24.537133
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                       File Name: 23a0170p.06

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                             ┐
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                             │
                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,      │
                                                              >        No. 22-5567
                                                             │
        v.                                                   │
                                                             │
 GERALD LYNN CAMPBELL,                                       │
                                 Defendant-Appellant.        │
                                                             ┘

                           Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
               No. 1:21-cr-00005-1—Charles Edward Atchley, Jr., District Judge.

                              Decided and Filed: August 10, 2023

                 Before: GIBBONS, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
                                 _________________

                                            COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Dana C. Hansen Chavis, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN
TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
                                      _________________

                                             OPINION
                                      _________________

       CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Gerald Lynn Campbell brandished a pistol and
told a group of laborers that he had a bullet for each of them. Following an indictment,
Campbell pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced
him to fifteen years’ imprisonment, concluding that Campbell’s prior convictions for robbery
and drug offenses triggered the Armed Career Criminal Act’s mandatory minimum. Campbell
appealed, challenging his sentence. We affirm.
 No. 22-5567                       United States v. Campbell                                 Page 2

                                                 I.

       A group of construction workers were performing road repairs in Chattanooga,
Tennessee. Gerald Lynn Campbell approached the group in his vehicle. When he arrived, he
asked who had voted for Donald Trump in the recent presidential election. Seemingly unhappy
with the responses he received, Campbell brandished a firearm. He told the laborers that he “had
a bullet for each one of them.” Campbell then drove away, eventually parking his truck not far
from the construction site. When responding officers found the vehicle, they also discovered
Campbell sitting in his vehicle with a semi-automatic pistol in his lap.

       A grand jury indicted Campbell for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Campbell pleaded guilty. At the time of Campbell’s offense, being a
felon in possession of a firearm typically carried a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment.
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2021). The Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, however,
mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant with “three previous convictions” for “a
violent felony or a serious drug offense,” each committed on “occasions different from another.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). With respect to Campbell, the potential predicate offenses the district
court considered were: (1) an August 1985 Tennessee robbery; (2) an April 1987 Tennessee
aggravated assault; (3) an August 1992 Tennessee drug trafficking offense; (4) a December 1992
Virginia drug trafficking offense; and (5) a March 1993 Virginia drug trafficking offense.

       Campbell objected on multiple grounds. Among them, he argued that Tennessee robbery
is not a predicate offense, that the drug offenses were not committed on different “occasions,”
and that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that the different-occasion issue be decided by
a jury. Campbell also challenged one of the Eastern District of Tennessee’s standard supervised
release conditions.    The condition states that if Campbell’s probation officer determined
Campbell posed a “risk” to another, the probation officer could require Campbell to notify the
person about the risk. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.10(c)(12). Campbell objected on the grounds that the
provision was unconstitutionally vague.
 No. 22-5567                       United States v. Campbell                             Page 3

        The district court overruled Campbell’s objections. It sentenced him to 180 months’
imprisonment, ACCA’s mandatory minimum, relying on the conviction for Tennessee robbery
and the three drug offenses as predicates. Campbell timely appealed.

                                               II.

        A.      The Armed Career Criminal Act triggers an enhanced sentence for felonious
possession of a firearm when a criminal defendant has three or more prior “violent felony” or
“serious drug offense” convictions committed on different “occasions.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
Congress has defined “violent felony” for us. Under the statute’s “elements” clause, a violent
felony is a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year that “has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Id.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). We utilize the so-called categorical approach to determine whether an offense
satisfies that clause. United States v. Smith, 70 F.4th 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2023). Under that
approach, we ask whether the generic offense “necessarily” involves such force. See id. The
offense also must have a mens rea greater than recklessness. United States v. White, 58 F.4th
889, 895 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021)
(plurality)).    We review challenges to whether an offense is a violent felony and whether
offenses were committed on separate occasions de novo. United States v. Buie, 960 F.3d 767,
770 (6th Cir 2020); United States v. Southers, 866 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2017).

        Before the district court, the government’s position was that Campbell’s aggravated
assault conviction was categorically a violent felony, satisfying the ACCA predicate offense
requirements. The district court did not reach the issue, however, and the government does not
ask us to do so now. That leaves the robbery and drug offenses as potential predicate crimes.

        1. We begin with Tennessee robbery. Tennessee defines “robbery” as “the intentional or
knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401(a). We have repeatedly considered that offense categorically a
violent felony. That is so, we have explained, because Tennessee robbery requires the use or
threat of physical force with the requisite knowing or purposeful mens rea. United States v.
 No. 22-5567                       United States v. Campbell                               Page 4

Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054, 1060 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Southers, 866 F.3d at 367; United States
v. Belcher, 40 F.4th 430, 431 (6th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 606 (2023).

       Campbell responds with two intervening Supreme Court decisions he says require a new
approach. According to Campbell, those cases—Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015),
and Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021)—instruct that ACCA’s definition of violent
felony excludes offenses that are triggered when a defendant threatens physical force
negligently. And, Campbell adds, Tennessee robbery sweeps in negligent threats of force, citing
State v. Witherspoon, 648 S.W.2d 279 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), and Sloan v. State, 491 S.W.2d
858 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). But here again, our precedent forecloses Campbell’s argument.
See Belcher, 40 F.4th at 432 (referencing Witherspoon, 648 S.W.2d at 281, and Sloan, 491
S.W.2d at 861). Throughout the “long history” of Tennessee’s robbery statute, “not once” has a
Tennessee court construed the fear element to encompass instances where a defendant
negligently caused the victim fear. Id. at 431–32; see also United States v. Hubbard, No. 21-
6219, 2023 WL 319604, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 19, 2023).

       Changing gears, Campbell argues that Tennessee robbery stretches beyond threats of
physical force and includes threatening to falsely accuse the victim of sodomy. Campbell hangs
his hat on a case that pre-dates the Civil War, Britt v. State, 26 Tenn. 45 (1846). This argument
too is a familiar one. See Hubbard, 2023 WL 319604, at *3. In an earlier case, we described
Britt as holding that “fear constituting an element of the crime is a fear of present personal peril
from violence offered or impending.” Id. (citing Britt, 26 Tenn. at 46). Although Britt mused
that robbery could include threatening to prosecute one for sodomy, no subsequent Tennessee
case appears to have ever picked up the proposition. See id.

       2. Campbell next turns our attention to his drug offenses. He challenges the district
court’s conclusion that those offenses were committed on three separate “occasions,” making
them three ACCA predicate offenses. The occasions element springs from the statute’s text. See
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (offenses must be committed “on occasions different from one another”).
A multi-factor inquiry guides our analysis. United States v. Williams, 39 F.4th 342, 350 (6th Cir.
2022) (citing Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1070–71 (2022)). Those factors include
the timing, the locations, the character, and the relationship of the offenses. Id. (citing Wooden,
 No. 22-5567                      United States v. Campbell                              Page 5

142 S. Ct. at 1071). Substantial time and distance gaps will generally indicate different offense
occasions. Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1071. On the other hand, offenses with a “common scheme”
are more likely to be the same occasion. Id. In many instances, however, our analysis can be
limited to inquiries like whether the offenses were committed a “day or more apart” or at
“significant” distances, factors that can singularly decide the question.      See id. (citations
omitted).

       That is the case here. The offenses at issue are a Chattanooga drug trafficking offense in
August 1992, a Norfolk drug trafficking offense in December 1992, and another Norfolk drug
trafficking offense from March 1993. Months separate each of the offenses—far more than the
“day” of separation the Supreme Court used as a benchmark in Wooden. 142 S. Ct. at 1071; see
also Williams, 39 F.4th at 350 (robberies separated by “at least six days” were separate
occasions). And the first two offenses are both remote in time as well as in proximity too: eight
hundred miles as the bird flies separated the Tennessee offense from those in Virginia. See
Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1071.

       Campbell characterizes the offenses as sharing a common “purpose” (trafficking drugs)
because the Tennessee federal court considered the Virginia drug trafficking offenses as
“relevant conduct” during Campbell’s sentencing. But the Guidelines’ relevant conduct differs
from Wooden’s § 924 “occasions” test. Compare U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(b)(ii) (defining
relevant conduct to include “ongoing series of offenses”), with Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1069
(defining “occasion” as a single “event, occurrence, happening, or episode”); see also United
States v. Cogdill, No. 22-5603, 2023 WL 4030069, at *2 (6th Cir. June 15, 2023) (rejecting the
same argument). Campbell’s view—that all offenses with the purpose of “trafficking” drugs
occur on the same occasion—would seemingly obviate the statute’s text.           See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1) (indicating that “three” “drug offense[s]” can be three ACCA predicates).

       Campbell also invokes the rule of lenity, summoning Justice Gorsuch’s Wooden
concurrence.   In Justice Gorsuch’s view, when “reasonable minds could differ” regarding
whether offenses were committed on multiple occasions, the rule of lenity demands a judgment
in the defendant’s favor. Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1081 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). That view,
however, seemingly is not a universal one.       Cf. id. at 1075 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
 No. 22-5567                        United States v. Campbell                                Page 6

(“[T]he rule of lenity rarely if ever comes into play.”); Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22-506, slip op. at
2 (U.S. June 30, 2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (noting that the rule of lenity is not a “strong-
form” substantive canon). Either way, after considering offenses separated by months and two
with many miles between them, no reasonable minds here could diverge on the occasion
question. See Williams, 39 F.4th at 350 & n.4.

       3.   Lastly, Campbell argues that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that the
government charge the separateness of the ACCA predicates in an indictment and prove the
supporting facts to a jury. See Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1087 n.7 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting
that a “constitutional question simmers”). The United States, we note, likewise “agrees that a
jury should find (or a defendant should admit) that ACCA predicates were committed on
occasions different from one another.” Yet as the government also points out, Campbell’s
argument is precluded by precedent. At present, in our circuit, a sentencing judge may decide
whether prior offenses were committed on different occasions. Williams, 39 F.4th at 351;
Belcher, 40 F.4th at 432; see also United States v. Cook, No. 22-5056, 2022 WL 4684595, at *2
(6th Cir. Oct. 3, 2022) (explaining that on this point “Wooden didn’t disrupt our prior caselaw”).
In any event, Campbell’s argument does not have much purchase here. After all, he admitted
that he committed the ACCA predicates on four different dates, each separated by months or
years. See Belcher, 40 F.4th at 432 (rejecting defendant’s similar argument in part because
defendant admitted that at least three of his prior offenses were separated by at least six years).

       B.1. That leaves Campbell’s challenge to one of the Eastern District of Tennessee’s
standard supervised release conditions. We review the imposition of the condition for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Widmer, 785 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 2015).

       First, some history on the condition in question. District courts have discretion to impose
supervised release conditions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(22).               The United States
Sentencing Commission promulgates recommended “standard” conditions.                   See U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(c); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(B). One is the risk notification condition, which has seen a
transformation. The Commission’s prior version stated that a probation officer could direct a
defendant to notify “third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant’s criminal
record or personal history or characteristics.” See United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 379
 No. 22-5567                       United States v. Campbell                               Page 7

(7th Cir. 2015). Finding “personal history” and “characteristics” impermissibly vague, a few
circuits (including ours) directed district courts to modify the condition. See id. at 379, 382;
United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1162–64 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Sexton, 719 F.
App’x 483, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). In response, the Commission updated the
language to the current text, which the Eastern District of Tennessee adopted. See U.S. Sent’g
Guidelines Manual supp. to app. C, amend. 803 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2016); U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(c)(12); E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.10(c)(12).

       The risk notification condition now instructs that if a probation officer determines that a
defendant poses “a risk” to “another person,” the probation officer may require the defendant to
notify the person about the risk, and the defendant “shall” comply. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(12);
E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.10(c)(12). This standard condition is not uncommon in the district courts.
See United States v. Cruz, 49 F.4th 646, 652–53 (1st Cir. 2022) (collecting cases). According to
Campbell, however, the new language is still impermissibly vague such that it violates the due
process clause. A prior panel of our Court has upheld the condition’s new language, albeit in an
unpublished opinion. See United States v. Marcum, No. 20-5280, 2021 WL 1038272, at *4 (6th
Cir. Jan. 20, 2021) (per curiam) (order). Other circuits have rejected similar challenges. See
Cruz, 49 F.4th at 653; United States v. Janis, 995 F.3d 647, 653 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Gibson, 998 F.3d 415, 423–24 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Hull, 893 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th
Cir. 2018). But see United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that the
condition was impermissibly vague). We uphold the language again today.

       True, as Campbell notes, the due process clause forbids vague supervised release
conditions. United States v. Shultz, 733 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2013). At the same time, a
condition need not “spell out every one of its applications.” Id. Instead, it must “fix an
ascertainable standard of guilt.” Id. (cleaned up). That is the case here. The prior version of the
condition was fatally flawed because the district court provided no clarification regarding what
was meant by “risks,” “personal history,” or “characteristics.” Sexton, 719 F. App’x at 484–85.
But the latter two categories have been removed from the condition. See E.D. Tenn. L.R.
83.10(c)(12). And the district court clarified the scope of “risk” in the challenged condition; the
“risk” referred to Campbell’s “past criminal history”—a definition that clears the “ascertainable”
 No. 22-5567                         United States v. Campbell                              Page 8

bar. See Marcum, 2021 WL 1038272, at *4; see also Gibson, 998 F.3d at 423 (rejecting
vagueness challenge because “risk” was cabined to those posed by the “defendant’s criminal
record” (emphasis omitted)).

       2. Campbell has one last salvo. He argues that the condition was an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial authority. Because Campbell did not object before the district court, we
review the issue for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). That requires Campbell to show (1)
error, (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected his substantial rights, and (4) affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his judicial proceedings. United States v. Johns, 65
F.4th 891, 893 (6th Cir. 2023). He falters from the start.

       Federal law affords probation officers extensive authority. See 18 U.S.C. § 3603; United
States v. Logins, 503 F. App’x 345, 349 (6th Cir. 2012). That authority, however, has its limits.
Article III draws a line in the sand: imposing punishment upon a defendant convicted of a crime,
a core judicial function, cannot be delegated. See Whitehead v. United States, 155 F.2d 460, 462
(6th Cir. 1946); United States v. Henderson, 29 F.4th 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Ex Parte
United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41–42 (1916). Here the record indicates that the court reserved the
“ultimate authority” to determine the condition’s contours. See United States v. Thompson, 653
F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2011); Cruz, 49 F.4th at 654; Janis, 995 F.3d at 653; see also United
States v. Kidd, No. 12-5420, 2013 WL 870263, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2013) (per curiam)
(citation omitted).   In particular, the court explained that if there were “any questions or
concerns,” the court would “take [the issue] up” to “resolve” it. See Cruz, 49 F.4th at 654
(rejecting a delegation challenge to an identical condition); Janis, 995 F.3d at 653 (same);
Henderson, 29 F.4th at 276 (same). That was enough to satisfy any delegation concerns under
our precedent.

                                 *        *       *      *       *

       We affirm the district court’s judgment.