Court Opinion

ID: 9579726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:57:56.073006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:43.432887
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s application to this case of Cook v. Delite Beauty Supply, 165 Ga. App. 859 (303 SE2d 40) (1983) and the majority’s resulting conclusion that “the trial court was authorized to disregard the affidavit” of appellant. (Majority opinion, p. 193.) Cook was based upon the Supreme Court case of Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. v. Sheats, 247 Ga. 713 (279 SE2d 210) (1981). In Cook, this court recognized that in Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth., “the Supreme Court has recently ruled that where there is a direct contradiction in the testimony of the respondent as to a material issue of fact, that party’s unfavorable testimony will be taken against him. [Cits.]” Cook v. Delite Beauty Supply, supra, 860. In Cook there was a “direct” contradiction in the testimony of the plaintiff because, in her deposition, she “testified that she had not been talking to anyone and that nothing had distracted her as she exited the store.” (Emphasis supplied.) Cook v. Delite Beauty Supply, supra, 859. However, in her affidavit, the Cook plaintiff stated that the sales clerk diverted her attention “causing her to look up to respond and thus to fail to notice the precipice.” Cook v. Delite Beauty Supply, supra, 860. Thus, in Cook, the plaintiff’s affidavit was correctly disregarded in accordance with Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth.
In this case, there is no direct contradiction in that while the distraction was not specifically mentioned in appellant’s deposition, there was no unequivocal statement in the deposition that she had not been distracted. In clarifying the earlier confusion with regard to the rule to be applied on summary judgment, the Supreme Court in Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. reiterated that “[t]he rule to be applied on motion for summary judgment when the movant would not have the burden of proof at trial was announced by this court in Burnette Ford, Inc. v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551 (181 SE2d 866) (1971). Burnette held that all evidence adduced on a motion for summary judgment, including the testimony of the party opposing the motion, was to be construed more strongly against the movant.” Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. v. Sheats, supra. The Supreme Court in Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. then cited Combs v. Adair Mtg. Co., 245 Ga. 296 (264 SE2d 226) (1980) wherein that court had “concluded that the rule enunciated in Burnette remained in effect and that our holding in Chambers [v. C & S *195Nat. Bank, 242 Ga. 498 (249 SE2d 214) (1978)] came about as a result of factual differences. The two cases were compatible on that basis.” Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. v. Sheats, supra, 714. In order to clearly set forth the correct rule, the Supreme Court then held in unequivocal terms as follows: “We take the opportunity today to reiterate that Burnette is the predominant rule and only in cases where there is a direct contradiction in the testimony of the respondent as to a material issue of fact will that party’s unfavorable testimony be taken against him.” (Emphasis supplied.) Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. v. Sheats, supra, 714. See also King v. Brasington, 252 Ga. 109 (312 SE2d 111) (1984).
In the instant case, there was no direct contradiction in the testimony of appellant, the Burnette rule applies, and the evidence must be construed more strongly against the appellee. Therefore, I believe that the trial court erred in disregarding appellant’s affidavit.
In her affidavit, appellant stated: “I then looked for a salesgirl to help me. I was still on the platform at this time, with boxes on the floor on either side of me. ... I saw a salesgirl, and when stepping forward to gain her attention while signaling with my right hand, I fell off the platform. . . . My attention was diverted away from the edge of the platform to safely negotiating my way thru the boxes in order to get some assistance from the sales personnel.”
“[I]ssues of negligence, diligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, and the exercise of ordinary care for one’s protection are ordinarily for the jury [cit.] and are usually incapable of summary adjudication and should be resolved by trial. [Cit.] Whether the invitee customer might have discovered the [distraction] and avoided the injury to [herself] by the exercise of ordinary care, must be determined in the light of all the attendant circumstances [cit.], and is a question for the jury. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Chandler, 152 Ga. App. 427, 430 (263 SE2d 171) (1979).
Considering the entire record before the court at the time of the grant of summary judgment, I do not believe that we can “say under these circumstances that a conclusion, as a matter of law, is demanded that the plaintiff should have had a full appreciation of the danger, and that in the exercise of ordinary care she should have avoided the injury to herself. This ... is a question for the jury.” Firestone Service Stores v. Gillen, 58 Ga. App. 782, 787 (199 SE 853) (1938).
I believe that genuine issues of material fact remain and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope, Judge Benham and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.
*196Decided June 5, 1985
Rehearing denied June 24, 1985.
Clifton 0. Bailey III, L. Paul Cobb, Jr., for appellant.
Jeffrey S. Gilbert, Bryan Dorsey, for appellees.