Court Opinion

ID: 9785654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:15:16.626667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:31.066768
License: Public Domain

WOLLHEIM, J.,
dissenting.
The majority affirms the trial court’s order of recoupment under ORS 151.505, concluding that the order may not be reviewed because petitioner’s argument was not preserved below. Petitioner argues that the trial court failed to make a determination on the record,‘pursuant to ORS 151.505(4), whether petitioner had the ability to pay the $975 for attorney fees. The majority reasons that petitioner’s argument was not preserved because petitioner “did not request any express finding regarding his ability to pay and did not object to the trial court’s failure to make such a determination.” 169 Or App at 47-48. I disagree and would hold that the trial court failed adequately to “take account of’ petitioner’s ability to pay and the burden of the payment on petitioner.
ORS 151.505(4) provides:
“The court may not order a person to pay costs under this section unless the person is or may be able to pay the costs. In determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take account of the financial resources of the person and the nature of the burden that payment of costs -will impose. The determination of the ability of a person to pay costs and the amount of costs to be paid shall be subject to the guidelines and procedures issued by the State Court Administrator under ORS 151.487.”
*51The majority does not contest that defendant’s counsel’s objection raised the issue of the applicability of ORS 151.505(4).1 However, the majority concludes that counsel’s objection only challenged that, as a substantive matter, the facts did not show that petitioner had the ability to pay. With respect, I fail to see how counsel’s objection, raising ORS 151.505(4), did not necessarily question the meaning of and the court’s obligation to “take account of the financial resources of the person and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose.” A facial reading of ORS 151.505 leads one logically to the following question: Because the court may not order recoupment “unless the person is or may be able to pay the costs,” when the record does not in fact show that petitioner can pay the costs, how could the trial court have “take[n] account of’ petitioner’s ability to pay when it ordered the recoupment? This question was squarely before the trial court. See Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc., 328 Or 487, 500, 982 P2d 1117 (1999) (the purpose of the preservation doctrine is to help ensure that the positions of the parties are presented clearly to the initial tribunal and that parties are not taken by surprise, misled, or denied opportunities to meet an argument).
The issue on appeal is the sufficiency of the court’s consideration of the statutory factors. Accordingly, petitioner’s appeal simply raises an issue of statutory interpretation. Petitioner argues that “take account of’ means that the trial court must make some record of its consideration. It is incumbent on us to interpret correctly the meaning of a statute, which can mean addressing specific arguments on appeal that were not made below. Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77, 948 P2d 722 (1997) (court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation of a statute and specific alternative argument could be raised for first time on appeal); accord Oregon Account Systems, Inc. v. Greer, 165 Or App 738, 742, 996 P2d 1025 (2000). The preservation doctrine does not bar our consideration of petitioner’s appeal, and I would, therefore, address the merits of petitioner’s argument.
*52In my review of the relevant case law in my concurrence in Antunez v. Lampert, 169 Or App 196, 7 P3d 735 (2000) (Wollheim, J., concurring), I concluded that while ORS 151.505 does require the court to “consider” the statutory factors of ability to pay and the burden of payment, the statute does not require the trial court to make findings before requiring petitioner to pay for his court-appointed attorney. Again, however, the record of the trial court’s “consideration” must be sufficient to review for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 199.
Here, we cannot review for an abuse of discretion because we cannot tell from the trial court’s terse phrase that petitioner’s “objection is noted” whether the trial court even exercised its discretion. We cannot tell whether the trial court considered petitioner’s financial resources and the nature of the burden that payment would impose on him. Nor can we assume that the trial court relied on the record in making its decision because the record does not reflect that petitioner had any ability to pay. Petitioner’s affidavit in support of his motion for appointed counsel stated that he had no monthly income. We do not know whether petitioner had no monthly income because he is physically or mentally unable to work or because there was no work available for petitioner at the correctional facility.
The trial court must do more than it did in this case. For example, in Wright v. Jones, 155 Or App 249, 252-53, 964 P2d 1048 (1998), we held that the trial court sufficiently explained its decision to award prevailing party fees pursuant to ORS 20.190(3). There, the trial court explained on the record the statutory factors that caused it to award the enhanced party fee. The trial court’s consideration need not be lengthy or complex, but it must explain why it took the action that it took.
Previously, we reached a similar conclusion in State v. Jones, 124 Or App 489, 863 P2d 480 (1993). There, the defendant objected to the trial court’s judgment to pay restitution under ORS 137.106. The defendant objected and the trial court responded, “Well, the objection is noted.” Id. at 492. We reasoned that
*53“the trial court’s fleeting reference to the ability to pay is not consideration of that matter. A court ‘considers’ a matter by devoting some element of thoughtful deliberation to it. Here, the court’s only purpose in mentioning the ability to pay was to express its disdain for and rejection of defendant’s suggestion that defendant’s ability to pay be considered. That is not enough.” Id. at 493.
That same reasoning applies here.
Similarly, I agreed that, in Antunez, the trial court did consider the statutory criteria when it noted that (1) the petitioner had the opportunity to earn some money in prison by working, and (2) the petitioner had the ability to work after his release. 169 Or App at 200. There, we affirmed the imposition of $975 for the cost of his court-appointed attorney in the post-conviction proceeding. Id. at 198.
Here, in contrast, I simply cannot tell why the trial court ordered petitioner to pay for the cost of his court-appointed counsel. I cannot say that there is no basis for ordering petitioner to pay for the cost of his attorney. The appropriate disposition would be to vacate that portion of the judgment ordering payment of $975 and to remand this matter to the trial court, so that it can “take account of the financial resources of [petitioner] and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose.”
I dissent.

 There is no doubt that the trial court considered ORS 151.505 to be the applicable authority for ordering the recoupment.