Court Opinion

ID: 9760875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:21:07.84567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:18.208190
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
It is a rule of appellate courts to give each litigant every opportunity to be heard upon the merits of the case, and we will not deny such right to any litigant unless compelled to do so. Allen v. United Supermarkets, Inc., 467 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1971, no writ). The object of the rules of procedure is “to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants.” Smirl v. Globe Laboratories, 144 Tex. 41, 188 S.W.2d 676, 678 (1945); Tex.R.Civ.P. 1. Where this can be done without doing violence to the rules or injustice to the rights of the parties, it is the duty of the court to do so. Smirl, 188 S.W.2d at 678.
Rule 41(a)(2) provides, in part:
If a contest to an affidavit in lieu of bond is sustained, the time for filing the bond is extended until ten days after the contest is sustained....
The majority construes this rule to mean that the 10-day extension runs from the date the trial court sustains the contest. I disagree with the majority’s narrow reading of this rule.
When a trial court sustains a contest to an affidavit of inability to pay costs, the appellant’s remedy is to seek a review of the trial court’s order by mandamus proceedings in the court of appeals. Allred v. Lowry, 597 S.W.2d 353, 354 n. 2 (Tex.1980); Underwood v. Cartwright, 795 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). To hold that an appellant must file an appeal bond within 10 days after the contest to the pauper’s affidavit is sustained by the trial court, even though mandamus proceedings are pending to obtain a review of the trial court’s ruling, would make the right to review by mandamus meaningless. See Stein v. Frank, 575 S.W.2d 399, 400 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1978, orig. proceeding) (once appellant filed her appeal bond, she abandoned her affidavit of inability to pay costs.).
Clearly, the Texas Supreme Court in Allred did not intend for an appellant to be denied the opportunity to seek review of the trial court’s order, yet the majority’s strict reading of rule 41(a)(2) would effectively do just that. Under the majority’s construction, if an appellant chooses to ask a higher court to review the trial court’s order sustaining the contest to a pauper’s affidavit, the appellant proceeds at its own risk. If the appellate court denies mandamus relief, and more than 25 days have passed since the trial court’s order, the appellant has lost its right to appeal.
In my opinion, a contest to a pauper’s affidavit is not finally sustained until the appellate courts have had an opportunity to review and rule on the appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s order. Accordingly, I would hold that the contest in this case was not finally sustained until January 23, 1992, when the Fourteenth Court of Appeals overruled the motion for rehearing. *332Therefore, appellant’s filing of his appeal bond eight days later, on January 31, 1992, was timely.
I would grant appellant’s motion for rehearing and overrule appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal.