Court Opinion

ID: 9791843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:19:01.945054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.901364
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting: I adhere to what was expressed and held in our former majority opinion (Shunga Plaza, Inc. v. American Employers’ Ins. Co., 204 Kan. 790, 465 P. 2d 987) and dissent from the present majority opinion.
It should be pointed out that the cancellation or deletion of insurance coverage in this case was initiated by a representative of the insurance company. In such case there is no reason to delay termination of the coverage until confirmation from the company. The advantages and reasons for agreeing in advance on an effective date for the cancellation are apparent. The company could then determine the total extent of its liability on that date. The agent could then figure the pro-rata amount of the premium to be refunded to the insured and the insured then knew when he must obtain insurance protection from other sources.
The endorsement form used by the agent and the insured to delete the coverage was a uniform standard insurance form. It was executed or signed by Bob Gucker, as agent for the company and by Robert J. Bemica as an officer of the insured corporation, Shunga Plaza, Inc. The effective date of the endorsement which reduced the coverage was stated in the endorsement to be February 23, 1966. Without that set date for the deletion of coverage the prorata amount of return premium to be paid ($20.00) could not be properly calculated.
The present holding of a majority of this court is that regardless of the effective date set in an endorsement the deletion of coverage does not become effective until there is a further confirmation of the endorsement by the company or an actual payment of the return premium due.
Such a holding results in a hiatus. The pro-rata return premium cannot be figured until the effective date of the cancellation is set and the date of cancellation cannot be set until the pro-rata return premium is calculated and paid.
The present majority of the court lay too much stress on the letter of transmittal. Such letter was not signed by either of the parties. *21It was prepared and signed by Alice Doyle, who was designated in the letter of transmittal as a “secretary” in “Bob Gucker’s office”. It contained nothing to indicate the letter was dictated by Bob Gucker.
The effect of our present holding reaches far beyond the authorities cited by the majority in support thereof. As I interpret the opinion as now written it has the effect of holding that the terminology used by secretarial help in a letter of transmittal may change the clear and unambiguous terms of a separate written agreement signed by two contracting parties. This should not be the law and I respectfully dissent.
Kaul, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.