Court Opinion

ID: 9473221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:23:09.994889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:23.642857
License: Public Domain

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Although the majority opinion is not without some support from our decision in Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429 (7th Cir.1978), I would draw the Heidelberg line just short of this case.
Sisk brought his civil suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act for reimbursement for various items of his personal property he claimed had been lost or stolen from his cell while incarcerated in the federal penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana. He is now a state prisoner in Arizona.
According to plaintiff’s own appraisal his missing property is valued at $216.46. The government offered plaintiff $50 in settlement, so what we have left is a small claims justice of the peace action for $166.46. Judge Dillin, in the seasoned exercise of his sound discretion, dismissed the claim when plaintiff, knowing of the trial date well in advance, failed to contact the clerk or the court, or do anything else to see what might be done about the trial. I see no need now to show more concern about plaintiff’s small claim than plaintiff did himself at the critical time in the process. Already four federal judges, here and in the trial court, have been involved with his claim. I would not send it back to a fifth.
There is admittedly some similarity with Heidelberg, but I do not, as the majority does, see it to be “virtually identical” with the present case. I think there is a fundamental distinction. Heidelberg was a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging serious violations in connection with the plaintiff’s Illinois murder conviction. Section 1983 is not a small claims statute, but is recognized to be for the protection of constitutional rights. Heidelberg alleged that his murder conviction was tainted by state destruction of his legal papers, electronic eavesdropping on conversations between himself and his attorney, falsification of a line-up report, police tapping of incoming telephone calls, and perjury. He was serving a sentence of 99 to 199 years. That all adds up to more than $166.46, but the amount is only one factor to be weighed by the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion. We considered the Heidelberg case also to justify the appointment of counsel to represent plaintiff on appeal as a public service contribution and suggested that the trial court do the same on remand. The majority does not find that this case likewise merits the appointment of counsel. Heidelberg made it clear that the error that was found was error in the circumstances of that particular case. 577 F.2d at 430-31. Heidelberg was not intended to be a rule under all circumstances for all times. I find no fault with the Heidelberg decision.
*502The majority recognizes that the disputed dismissal determination is a discretionary one for the trial judge, but then seems to leave him little discretion to exercise. The majority states that it does not intend to abrogate the plaintiffs general responsibility to move his case forward, and does not intend to condone plaintiffs failure to apply for a continuance or a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum or his failure to notify the court of his inability to be present; nor, it is said, does it intend to condone plaintiff's complacency in placing the burden upon the trial judge to effect an alternate method. Nevertheless, it seems to me that that is exactly what the majority has done.
In the present case plaintiff has given no satisfactory explanation for his trial setting default. I would, therefore, decline to keep this case bouncing around on our crowded dockets as an undeserved accommodation to Sisk’s own neglect and complacency.
I therefore respectfully dissent.