Court Opinion

ID: 9942948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 15:06:40.795361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:25.759579
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                      CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                           FEBRUARY 22, 2024
                                                                       STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                 2024 ND 30

Alexander Tyson Williams,                                 Plaintiff and Appellant
      v.
Stefaney Vraa,                                        Defendant and Appellee
      and
Kyle Harley Lempia,                                                   Defendant

                                No. 20230248

Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial
District, the Honorable Todd L. Cresap, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.

Aften M. Grant, Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.

Megan M. Hogue, Minot, ND, for defendant and appellee.
                           Williams v. Vraa, et al.
                                No. 20230248

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] Alexander Williams appeals from an order dismissing his petition for
nonparent visitation. On appeal, Williams argues the district court erred in
dismissing his petition for failure to plead a prima facie case. We reverse and
remand for further proceedings, concluding Williams established a prima facie
case for nonparent visitation and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

                                       I

[¶2] Stefaney Vraa, now known as Stefaney Parker, and Kyle Lempia are the
biological parents of I.H.L., born in 2012. In 2014, Vraa began dating Williams
and later moved with I.H.L. from Bemidji, Minnesota, to Minot, North Dakota,
to live with Williams. Williams and Vraa married in November 2014 and had
one child, B.N.W., in 2015. Vraa was awarded primary residential
responsibility of I.H.L. in 2015. Throughout their marriage I.H.L. lived with
Williams and Vraa, subject to Lempia’s parenting time.

[¶3] The parties divorced in February 2018 and shared equal residential
responsibility of their biological child, B.N.W. Williams and Vraa agreed to
B.N.W. living with each parent on a week-on-week-off schedule. According to
Williams’s declaration, from February 2018 to December 2022, I.H.L.
accompanied B.N.W. to Williams’s home for the week Williams was parenting
B.N.W. In December 2022, Vraa informed Williams she planned to move to
Bismarck with I.H.L. and B.N.W. Williams opposed the move and a
disagreement arose amongst the parties. Vraa prevented Williams from seeing
I.H.L. and did not allow I.H.L. to accompany B.N.W. to Williams’s home.

[¶4] Williams filed a petition for nonparent visitation in March 2023. In his
petition and declaration, Williams argued he was a consistent caretaker of
I.H.L. and had a substantial relationship with I.H.L. Vraa moved to dismiss
the petition in April 2023. The district court dismissed Williams’s petition for
failing to plead a prima facie case for nonparent visitation, finding Williams
did not meet the required elements of a consistent caretaker. The court did not

                                       1
expressly rule on whether Williams pleaded a prima facie case of having a
substantial relationship with I.H.L. or that denial of visitation would result in
harm to I.H.L. Williams appeals.

                                        II

[¶5] Williams argues he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he
established a prima facie case for nonparent visitation as he was a consistent
caretaker of I.H.L. and had a substantial relationship with I.H.L.

[¶6] We review de novo a district court’s determination that a petitioner failed
to plead a prima facie case for nonparent visitation. Sailer v. Sailer, 2022 ND
151, ¶ 5, 978 N.W.2d 699, as amended (Oct. 4, 2022). We independently review
the record to determine whether sufficient facts were alleged to support a
finding of a prima facie case. Id. at ¶ 9. “A prima facie showing is not a finding,
but instead is a legal conclusion that a party has presented ‘evidence strong
enough, if uncontradicted, to support a finding in her favor.’” Id. at ¶ 5 (quoting
In re Est. of Clemetson, 2012 ND 28, ¶ 8, 812 N.W.2d 388). In determining
whether a party has established a prima facie case:

      We have explained that a prima facie case requires only enough
      evidence to permit a factfinder to infer the fact at issue and rule in
      the moving party’s favor. A prima facie case is a bare minimum and
      requires facts which, if proved at an evidentiary hearing, would
      support a change of custody that could be affirmed if appealed.
      Allegations alone do not establish a prima facie case, and affidavits
      supporting the motion for modification must include competent
      information, which usually requires the affiant have first-hand
      knowledge. Affidavits are not competent if they fail to show a basis
      for actual personal knowledge, or if they state conclusions without
      the support of evidentiary facts.

Id. at ¶ 8 (quoting Kerzmann v. Kerzmann, 2021 ND 183, ¶ 8, 965 N.W.2d 427).

[¶7] The North Dakota Legislative Assembly adopted the Uniform Nonparent
Custody and Visitation Act (“UNCVA”) in 2019. 2019 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 131,
§ 1. The UNCVA, found in chapter 14-09.4, N.D.C.C., governs nonparent
visitation rights. Section 14-09.4-03(1), N.D.C.C., provides:

                                        2
      A court may order custody or visitation to a nonparent if the
      nonparent proves:
      a.   The nonparent:
           (1)   Is a consistent caretaker; or
           (2)   Has a substantial relationship with the child and
                 denial of custody or visitation would result in harm to
                 the child; and
      b.   An order of custody or visitation to the nonparent is in the
           best interest of the child.

To receive an evidentiary hearing, a nonparent must file a verified petition for
custody or visitation alleging facts showing the nonparent is (a) a consistent
caretaker, or (b) has a substantial relationship with the child and the denial of
visitation would result in harm to the child. N.D.C.C. §§ 14-09.4-05, -06. The
petitioner must also prove the visitation is in the best interest of the child.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(1)(b). The petition must state the relief sought and
allege specific facts sufficient to show the petitioner meets the requirements as
a consistent caretaker or having a substantial relationship with the child.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-06(1). Based on the petition, the district court must
determine whether the nonparent has pleaded a prima facie case. N.D.C.C. §
14-09.4-07(1). Proving a prima facie case only requires the nonparent to show
he or she is a consistent caretaker or has a substantial relationship with the
child and denial of custody or visitation would result in harm to the child. Id.
The district court shall dismiss the petition if it determines the nonparent
failed to plead a prima facie case. N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-07(2).

                                       A

[¶8] To show a prima facie case of “consistent caretaker” status, the petitioner
must present evidence sufficient to support each of the following elements:

      2.    A nonparent is a consistent caretaker if the nonparent
            without expectation of compensation:
            a. Lived with the child for not less than twelve months,
                unless the court finds good cause to accept a shorter
                period;
            b. Regularly exercised care of the child;

                                       3
            c.   Made day-to-day decisions regarding the child solely or
                 in cooperation with an individual having physical
                 custody of the child; and
            d.   Established a bonded and dependent relationship with
                 the child with the express or implied consent of a parent
                 of the child, or without the consent of a parent if no
                 parent has been able or willing to perform parenting
                 functions.

N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(2).

                                       1

[¶9] Regarding the first element of N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(2), Williams alleged
I.H.L. lived with him for more than 12 months, from September 2014 to
February 2016. Williams further alleged I.H.L. lived with him consistently on
a week-on-week-off schedule spending approximately fifty percent of the time
with him since the parties’ divorce in 2018 until the summer of 2022. I.H.L.
would live at Williams’s home during the weeks Williams had parenting time
with B.N.W. In the summer of 2022, I.H.L.’s father moved to Bismarck, and
I.H.L. would spend part of the week with Williams and the weekends, Friday
through Sunday, with his father.

[¶10] Section 14-09.4-03(2)(a), N.D.C.C., requires the nonparent to have
“[l]ived with the child for not less than twelve months, unless the court finds
good cause to accept a shorter period.” The statute does not state whether the
12 months must be consecutive, nor does it indicate a basis for good cause. “Any
provision in this code which is a part of a uniform statute must be so construed
as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-13. “When we interpret and apply provisions
in a uniform law, we may look to official editorial board comments for
guidance.” Ferguson v. Wallace-Ferguson, 2018 ND 122, ¶ 8, 911 N.W.2d 324
(quoting Matter of Bradley K. Brakke Tr., 2017 ND 34, ¶ 12, 890 N.W.2d 549).
Section 4(b) of the UNCVA is the corresponding section to N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-
03(2). The official comment to the UNCVA explains the 12-month requirement
need not be consecutive months:

                                       4
             Regarding the first element, in subsections (b)(1), the 12-
      month period during which the nonparent lived with the child need
      not be consecutive months.
             ....
             . . . [I]f a nonparent was a caretaker of a child in the recent
      past, but the child is no longer living with the nonparent (such as
      because the child is back with the parent), the nonparent could still
      claim status as a consistent caretaker. Such an approach gives the
      act flexibility and does not force the nonparent to immediately seek
      relief after the nonparent has stopped living with the child or
      because the relationship between the parent and nonparent
      ended. . . . Determining whether too much time has elapsed before
      the nonparent sought relief will depend on multiple factors,
      including the child’s age and whether significant contact between
      the nonparent and child has continued.

Unif. Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act § 4 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2018).

[¶11] The district court provided the following analysis on the 12-month
requirement:

             The Court questions whether or not Williams has satisfied
      the 12 month requirement set forth above. While technically
      Williams did reside with I.H.L. for 12 months, he did so over seven
      years ago. The Court questions whether or not the legislature
      intended to allow such a gap in time between the satisfaction of
      this requirement and the initiation of the action.

[¶12] We conclude the district court misapplied the law in determining
Williams failed to meet N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(2)(a). Here, although there was
a gap in time since I.H.L. lived full-time with Williams, I.H.L. continued to live
with Williams nearly fifty percent of the time during the years following
Williams and Vraa’s divorce. The official comment to the corresponding section
of the UNCVA supports our interpretation that the 12-month requirement of
N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(2)(a) need not be consecutive months and need not be
immediately preceding the petition when the nonparent caretaker continues
significant contact with the child. Based on the duration alleged in the petition
and declaration, I.H.L. has lived with Williams for not less than 12 months and
there is good cause to consider Williams a consistent caretaker based on his

                                        5
regular visitation with I.H.L. allowed by Vraa since the parties’ divorce.
Therefore, the court erred in determining Williams failed to show facts
supporting the first element.

                                         2

[¶13] Regarding the second and third elements, Williams argues over the last
eight years he consistently cared for I.H.L. and made day-to-day decisions for
him.

[¶14] In Sailer, we discussed whether a petitioner pleaded a prima facie case
for nonparent visitation on the basis of being a consistent caretaker. 2022 ND
151, ¶¶ 9-11. We concluded “the children staying with the grandparents for an
occasional weekend and the grandparents periodically caring for their needs
failed to establish a prima facie case that the grandparents were consistent
caretakers.” Id. at ¶ 9. The grandparents asserted in their petition and
declarations that they “pick[ed] the children up and drop[ped] them off as
needed, wash[ed] their clothes, cut their fingernails, spen[t] holidays and
special events together, and even [bought] groceries for the children.” Id.

[¶15] Here, unlike Sailer, the petition and declaration alleged specific
instances of ongoing regular care of the child. Williams alleged he cared for
I.H.L. since September 2014 and provided specific instances of such care.
Williams alleged: he cared for I.H.L. and adopted the role of a father figure
since I.H.L. was two years old; he helped with potty training; he taught I.H.L.
to tie his shoes; he attended all of I.H.L.’s soccer games and parent teacher
conferences; he transported I.H.L. to see his father; he was active in raising,
teaching, and supporting I.H.L. and provided discipline while in his care; he
facilitated I.H.L. developing close bonds with Williams’s family through
regular family gatherings, dinners, and attending church together; he
attended I.H.L.’s baptism when he was nine years old and considered it a very
special day; he voluntarily paid for “food, clothing, winter gear, school supplies,
CLC, extracurricular activities, and gifts for [I.H.L.].” Williams alleged that
Vraa asked to use Williams’s home address as I.H.L.’s residence for the
purposed of I.H.L. attending the same school as B.N.W.

                                        6
[¶16] Williams’s allegations support a showing that he regularly exercised care
of I.H.L. and made day-to-day decisions for I.H.L. when he lived with him full-
time and thereafter nearly every other week for a period of years. Williams was
also involved in the decision-making process of where I.H.L. attended school,
and accommodated Vraa’s request to use his home address for the child. Vraa
did not present a declaration refuting Williams’s allegations. The district court
did not determine whether Williams failed to plead the second and third
elements. We conclude Williams presented uncontradicted evidence adequate
to support a determination in his favor on the second and third elements.

                                        3

[¶17] Regarding the fourth element of N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(2), Williams
alleged that he took on a father-figure role for I.H.L. since meeting him in 2014;
I.H.L. referred to Williams as “dad” for the last eight years; and Williams has
been “active in raising, teaching, and supporting him in every way and IHL
has regularly come to [him] for help or guidance.”

[¶18] This Court has not previously interpreted the fourth element of N.D.C.C.
§ 14-09.4-03(2). Section 14-09.4-03(2)(d), N.D.C.C., requires the nonparent to
have a “bonded” and “dependent” relationship with the child with the express
or implied consent of the child’s parent, if that parent is performing parenting
functions. The statute does not define the terms “bonded” and “dependent.”
The official comment to the UNCVA provides explanations of the terms
“bonded” and “dependent,” stating:

            Regarding the fourth element, the term “bonded” refers to
      the closeness of the relationship. The term “dependent” refers to
      the degree to which the child relies upon, and is in need of, the
      nonparent.
            ....
            . . . In addition, the “consistent caretaker” provision does not
      require that the individual has undertaken “full and permanent
      responsibilities of a parent.”

Unif. Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act § 4 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2018).

                                        7
[¶19] The district court provided the following analysis on the fourth element:
“During the entire time that William[s] claims to have spent with I.H.L., I.H.L.
has had two parents who have consistently been involved in his life. They are
the individuals who have made all major and most all other decisions
regarding I.H.L.” (Emphasis added.) The court further determined the
activities Williams claimed to engage in with I.H.L. did not rise to the level of
those contemplated by N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03. The court stated, “Simply
because Williams has been another person who has voluntarily cared for I.H.L.
does not mean that he has stepped into the role of a consistent caretaker as
defined by the statute.” The district court determined Williams failed to show
a bonded and dependent relationship with I.H.L.

[¶20] The allegations made by Williams indicate a closeness between Williams
and I.H.L. and demonstrate that I.H.L. relies upon, and is in need of, Williams.
Furthermore, Williams’s allegation that Vraa used Williams’s home address as
I.H.L.’s residence, instead of her own, to allow I.H.L. to attend a certain school,
as well as Vraa’s agreeing to I.H.L. living with Williams on a week-on-week-off
basis, reflects that he made day-to-day decisions for I.H.L. and also shows
Vraa’s implied consent to Williams’s relationship with I.H.L. over a long period
of time. Vraa did not present any evidence disproving Williams’s allegations.

[¶21] In determining whether a prima facie case has been established, the
district court must accept the truth of the moving party’s allegations. Kartes v.
Kartes, 2013 ND 106, ¶ 9, 831 N.W.2d 731. It appears the court relied on factual
allegations made in Vraa’s brief supporting the motion to dismiss regarding
who I.H.L.’s consistent caretakers were, and made inferences based upon those
facts to conclude Williams failed to show a prima facie case for nonparent
visitation. A trial court can find the moving party has failed to bring a prima
facie case only if the opposing party presents counter affidavits conclusively
establishing the allegations of the moving party have no credibility, or if the
movant’s allegations are insufficient, on their face, to justify custody
modification. Tank v. Tank, 2004 ND 15, ¶ 9, 673 N.W.2d 622. Here, the court
misapplied the law by not considering facts pleaded by Williams as true, and
considering facts alleged by Vraa which were not supported by declarations.

                                        8
We conclude the court erred in determining Williams failed to show the fourth
element.

[¶22] We conclude the unrefuted evidence Williams presented established a
prima facie case of a consistent caretaker that could justify nonparent
visitation, warranting an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the district court
erred in dismissing Williams’s petition for nonparent visitation.

                                       B

[¶23] Williams also argues he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because
he had a substantial relationship with I.H.L. and denial of visitation would
result in harm to the child.

[¶24] The district court did not expressly address whether Williams met the
requirements for nonparent visitation based on a substantial relationship with
the child. However, by dismissing the petition it impliedly concluded no prima
facie case was pled. See Sailer, 2022 ND 151, ¶ 9.

[¶25] To show a prima facie case under the second basis for nonparent
visitation, the nonparent must present evidence sufficient to support a showing
of a substantial relationship with the child and that denial of visitation would
result in harm to the child. N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(1)(a)(2).

[¶26] A nonparent must first show they have a substantial relationship with a
child which requires:

      a.    The nonparent:
            (1)   Is an individual with a familial relationship with the
                  child by blood or law; or
            (2)   Formed a relationship with the child without
                  expectation of compensation; and
      b.    A significant emotional bond exists between the nonparent
            and the child.

N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(3). Williams did not allege he is a person with a familial
relationship with I.H.L. by blood or law. He did allege he has formed a
relationship with I.H.L. without expectation of compensation. This allegation

                                       9
is supported by Williams’s declaration and is not disputed. As to whether there
is a significant emotional bond between the nonparent and the child, Williams
alleges he took on a father figure role to I.H.L., and that I.H.L. refers to him
as “dad” even after Williams and Vraa’s divorce. Williams has shown he has a
substantial relationship with I.H.L.

[¶27] The second prong for nonparent visitation based on a substantial
relationship requires the nonparent to show that denial of visitation would
result in harm to the child. N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(1)(a)(2). “‘Harm to a child’
means significant adverse effect on a child’s physical, emotional, or
psychological well-being.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-01(5). “‘Harm to a child’ can be
physical, emotional, or psychological. The harm must result in a ‘significant
adverse effect.’ Testimony from a mental health professional can be helpful –
but not required – to show the effect.” Unif. Nonparent Custody and Visitation
Act § 2 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2018).

      In claims for either custody or visitation, a nonparent with a
      substantial relationship with the child must show harm, but the
      focus of the evidence will vary. In general, a nonparent seeking
      custody must show that a change in the child’s custody is necessary
      to prevent harm to the child, while a nonparent seeking visitation
      will need to show that continued contact with the nonparent
      through visitation is necessary to prevent harm.

Unif. Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act § 4 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2018)
(emphasis added).

[¶28] Williams alleged in his petition and declaration denying him visitation
with I.H.L. would cause I.H.L. lasting negative effects because I.H.L.
expressed emotional pain from not being able to see Williams. Williams alleged
that he saw increased anxiety in both I.H.L. and B.N.W. when Vraa prevented
I.H.L. from seeing Williams and did not allow I.H.L. to accompany B.N.W. to
Williams’s home, stating: “IHL and BNW are used to being together and I have
noticed an increase in anxiety in both kids and BNW expressing great sadness
because IHL is not with us during her time with me.” Williams further alleged
the sadness he observed in I.H.L. when Williams was prevented from seeing
I.H.L., stating: “I feel that completely removing me from IHL’s life will

                                      10
negatively affect him due to the long-lasting close relationship we have. He has
cried to me about Stefaney taking him away from me and he is hurting.”
(Emphasis added.)

[¶29] This Court analyzed “harm to a child” in Sailer. 2022 ND 151, ¶¶ 10-11.
In Sailer, we concluded the grandparents seeking nonparent visitation failed
to show a prima facie case under N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-03(1)(a)(2) because they
did not plead sufficient facts to support the “harm to a child” element. Id. at
¶ 10. The grandparents alleged in their petition that “further denial of
visitation by [the mother] would be detrimental to the minor children in that
their emotional and behavioral development may be affected,” but failed to
support their conclusory statements with any evidentiary facts. Id. at ¶ 11.
“[F]acts showing that the children would ‘smile, wave, and often times throw
kisses’ at the grandparents when they attended their sporting events would
not support a finding that denial of visitation would have a significant adverse
effect on the children’s well-being.” Id. We held the petitioners’ failure to plead
sufficient facts showing the “harm to the child” element is dispositive of the
appeal when the petition is based on a substantial relationship with the child.
Id.

[¶30] Here, Williams alleged seeing an increase in anxiety in I.H.L. after Vraa
prevented him from seeing I.H.L. and did not allow I.H.L. to accompany B.N.W.
to Williams’s home. Williams alleged I.H.L. cried to him about Vraa taking him
away from Williams and that I.H.L. is hurting.

[¶31] Unlike Sailer, Williams’s petition includes minimally adequate
information that, if proven, could show denial of visitation would result in
harm to I.H.L. Williams’s allegations of observing anxiety and crying on the
part of I.H.L., following Vraa’s changes to I.H.L.’s visitation with Williams,
tend to show a significant adverse effect on I.H.L.’s physical, emotional, or
psychological well-being.

[¶32] We conclude the unrefuted evidence Williams presented established a
prima facie case of having a substantial relationship with I.H.L. that could
justify nonparent visitation, warranting an evidentiary hearing.

                                        11
                                   III

[¶33] We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing consistent with this
opinion.

[¶34] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                    12