Court Opinion

ID: 9965370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 15:00:46.605646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:56.082634
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2163     Document: 010111042022         Date Filed: 05/02/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                                May 2, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  ANTHONY J. AGUILAR,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 23-2163
                                                     (D.C. No. 2:20-CV-00362-RB-LF)
  CHELSEA WHITE; ATTORNEY                                       (D.N.M.)
  GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW
  MEXICO,

        Respondents - Appellees.

                          _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
                     _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        Anthony J. Aguilar, presently in New Mexico state custody, appears pro se

 seeking a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s dismissal

        
         Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Chelsea White replaces Dwayne
 Santisteven as a respondent in this case.
        
           This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
 case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
 value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule
 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2163     Document: 010111042022          Date Filed: 05/02/2024      Page: 2

        of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 Concluding

 reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Aguilar’s § 2254

 petition, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.

                                I.       BACKGROUND

                              A.       State Court Conviction

        In New Mexico state court, a grand jury returned a sixteen-count indictment

 against Mr. Aguilar stemming from a physical altercation that occurred at the home of his

 former girlfriend in March 2015. Mr. Aguilar pleaded guilty to five of the counts,

 including second-degree aggravated burglary, third-degree aggravated battery with a

 deadly weapon, third-degree child abuse recklessly caused with no death or great bodily

 harm, fourth-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated battery, and fourth-degree

 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Per his plea agreement, Mr. Aguilar would

 receive a sentence between zero and eighteen years.

        Prior to accepting Mr. Aguilar’s plea, at the change of plea hearing, the state trial

 court explained that the agreement was for a sentence of between zero to eighteen years,

 and that some of the charges were mandatory or optional “serious violent offense[s]” and

 would or could result in substantial incarceration. ROA at 104. Mr. Aguilar testified that

 he had reviewed the agreement with his attorney, it left nothing out, there were no other

        1
         Mr. Aguilar is proceeding without the assistance of counsel. We therefore
 “construe his pleadings liberally.” Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th
 Cir. 2003). However, we “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in
 constructing arguments.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
 (10th Cir. 2005).
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 promises that might have enticed him to plead guilty, he was not under the influence of

 any substance and did not have any mental health disabilities that might affect his

 understanding, and he was satisfied with his attorney’s explanation and advice on the

 case. The trial court accepted Mr. Aguilar’s plea, finding that he had entered the

 agreement knowingly and voluntarily.

        After Mr. Aguilar pleaded guilty, his attorney submitted a sentencing

 memorandum to the district court. The memorandum asserted that Mr. Aguilar was

 “seriously intoxicated and mentally impaired” when he committed the crime, that it was

 “an alcohol-induced event,” that Mr. Aguilar had an excellent reputation in the

 community and was a first-time offender, and that Mr. Aguilar had been attending

 Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and a mental health and anger management class. Id. at

 113, 115. In the memorandum, Mr. Aguilar further argued that he should receive no

 prison time and be released on probation or, if a sentence was required, that he first

 receive a sixty-day diagnostic evaluation. Mr. Aguilar and his attorney then “respectfully

 request[ed] that the Court sentence him to a term of five years’ supervised probation with

 a Conditional Discharge and for the other relief as outlined above.” Id. at 118.

        At Mr. Aguilar’s subsequent sentencing hearing, his attorney had multiple

 witnesses testify that Mr. Aguilar’s crime was the result of alcohol and that he was

 trusted and beloved in the community. Mr. Aguilar’s attorney also reiterated that

 Mr. Aguilar has “an issue with alcohol” which “impaired his reason [and] his ability to

 think clearly,” and was “absolutely out-of-his-mind intoxicated.” Id. at 175, 179. The

 court ultimately sentenced Mr. Aguilar to eighteen years’ imprisonment with eight years

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 suspended for an actual imprisonment term of ten years, followed by five years of

 supervised probation and two years’ parole.

        Mr. Aguilar’s attorney submitted a motion to reconsider the sentence, reiterating

 Mr. Aguilar’s remorse and issues with alcohol. The motion also challenged the

 sentencing court’s reliance on certain facts as inaccurate. Mr. Aguilar subsequently

 withdrew the motion.

                        B.      State Post-Conviction Proceedings

        Over the ensuing years, Mr. Aguilar filed multiple pro se habeas petitions in state

 district court and multiple petitions for writs of certiorari in the New Mexico Supreme

 Court. In his first post-conviction state habeas petition, Mr. Aguilar raised a claim for

 ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing among other things that his attorney made

 misrepresentations about the terms of the plea agreement and had him sign the agreement

 even though he did not understand it. The state district court dismissed the petition,

 finding Mr. Aguilar had “not stated a cognizable claim for relief. Id. at 274.” Mr. Aguilar

 then filed for writ of certiorari in the New Mexico Supreme Court, arguing among other

 things that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney misled him

 into signing the plea agreement when Mr. Aguilar believed he would receive a sentence

 of zero to five years, along with the possibility of a conditional discharge. The New

 Mexico Supreme Court denied the petition.

        Mr. Aguilar then filed a second habeas petition in state district court, reasserting

 his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis that his attorney coerced, tricked,

 and misled him into taking the plea and raising several other arguments related to the plea

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 agreement. The state district court summarily dismissed the petition, finding Mr. Aguilar

 was not entitled to relief as a matter of law. Mr. Aguilar then filed a petition for a writ of

 certiorari in the New Mexico Supreme Court, again arguing that he had received

 ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney forced him into a plea agreement by

 advising him to sign the agreement even though it did not reflect a sentence of zero to

 five years. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied the petition.

        Mr. Aguilar also filed a pro se motion for reconsideration of his sentence, in which

 he asserted, among other things, that he pleaded guilty due to counsel’s misdirection. The

 state district court denied Mr. Aguilar’s motion to reconsider.

        Mr. Aguilar then filed a motion to withdraw his plea based on ineffective

 assistance of counsel, arguing that he did not want to sign the plea agreement, but his

 attorney told him to sign it and informed him that she would fix it at sentencing. The

 district court construed the motion as a third state habeas petition, then entered an order

 denying it. Mr. Aguilar also filed a docketing statement in the New Mexico Court of

 Appeals, indicating he was appealing the district court’s denial of his third habeas

 petition. Mr. Aguilar argued he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his

 attorney misled him about his plea agreement, deceived him into hiring her because she

 was a white-collar criminal lawyer, and failed to adequately investigate his case or

 prepare for trial. The New Mexico Court of Appeals transferred the docketing statement

 to the New Mexico Supreme Court, and the New Mexico Supreme Court denied the

 petition. Mr. Aguilar filed a third petition for writ of certiorari in the New Mexico

 Supreme Court, again alleging his counsel forced him into a plea agreement and

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 erroneously advised him to accept the plea. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied the

 petition.2

                       C.      Post-Conviction Federal Proceedings

        In April 2020, Mr. Aguilar instituted this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding in the

 District of New Mexico. In his petition before the federal district court, Mr. Aguilar

 asserted he signed the plea deal only because his attorney misled him into believing that

 he would get no more than five years. He claimed he had previously rejected a plea deal

 for seven and a half years and made clear to his attorney that he would not accept a plea

 offer for more than five years. He further claimed that his attorney—unprepared for

 trial—presented him with the plea deal for a sentence of between zero and eighteen years,

 told him to “just sign it,” and assured him that she “would fix it later” when Mr. Aguilar

 protested. ROA at 20.

        Mr. Aguilar also argued that his attorney failed to raise a “Diminished Capacity”

 argument, had minimal contact with him, “did not present any argument for the court to

 show[] leniency at the [sentencing] hearing,” was “unprofessional,” gave “incompetent

 advi[c]e,” “is a white collar lawyer and not a criminal defense lawyer and was unfamiliar

 with sentencing guidelines and State Laws,” “offered no advice to the defendant at Plea

 Hearing[,] and conducted no Investigation to assist the defendant.” Id. 20–23. Finally,

 Mr. Aguilar argued that the state district court “abused it[]s discretion in allowing the

        2
          Mr. Aguilar also filed two additional petitions with the New Mexico Supreme
 Court. The record reflects that the New Mexico Supreme Court dismissed one and did not
 take action on the other.

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 defense attorney to withdraw as counsel,” id. at 21, and that the prosecution should have

 overcome a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness when it offered Mr. Aguilar a plea

 deal that was less favorable than a previously offered plea deal.

        The federal district court identified six claims in Mr. Aguilar’s petition. The court

 then concluded that not all of Mr. Aguilar’s claims were exhausted and narrowed his

 petition to three properly exhausted claims:

        1. [Mr. Aguilar’s] attorney was ineffective because she did not know how
           to adequately represent him because she was not a criminal defense
           lawyer;

        2. [Mr. Aguilar’s] attorney was ineffective because she did not file proper
           motions in a timely manner and did not prepare an adequate plea; and

        3. [Mr. Aguilar’s] attorney was ineffective because she did not adequately
           represent him/failed to counsel him so that he did not understand the
           plea or knowingly agree to it.

 ROA at 638–39, 641–42. The court found that Mr. Aguilar had failed to exhaust the

 claims that his counsel was ineffective because she did not pursue the defense discussed

 with him, did not provide an accounting of his funds upon termination of the attorney-

 client relationship, and failed to pursue or raise diminished responsibility and intoxication

 at his sentencing and to present his blood alcohol levels at the sentencing hearing. The

 court instructed Mr. Aguilar to clarify whether he intended to proceed with his habeas

 petition solely on his three exhausted claims. Mr. Aguilar filed a letter voluntarily

 dismissing his unexhausted claims and agreeing to proceed with the three claims

 identified by the district court.

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        The district court subsequently denied Mr. Aguilar’s petition and denied a COA.

 Regarding Mr. Aguilar’s first and second claims, the court held the claims were

 conclusory and thus did not warrant habeas relief. The court noted Mr. Aguilar made no

 allegations and provided no evidentiary support regarding his attorney’s lack of

 familiarity with sentencing guidelines or state law, or regarding his attorney’s alleged

 failure to file proper motions in a timely manner. Further, the district court noted that

 Mr. Aguilar failed to make any argument related to the state court’s ruling on either of

 these arguments.

        The district court also dismissed Mr. Aguilar’s third claim because he could not

 demonstrate his attorney was ineffective or coerced him into signing the plea agreement.

 The court first held that Mr. Aguilar failed to carry his burden and demonstrate that the

 state court had not adjudicated this claim on the merits. Under the deferential standard of

 review required when a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, the district court

 then held Mr. Aguilar could not “establish that the state court’s decisions were

 unreasonable in light of the evidence present in the state court record.” ROA at 667. The

 court relied on the language in the plea agreement signed by Mr. Aguilar and

 Mr. Aguilar’s testimony before the state court that he understood his plea and he had not

 been coerced, finding in light of the record before the state court that it was not

 unreasonable for the state court to accept his testimony that he was not coerced when he

 signed the plea agreement. In addition, the court noted that Mr. Aguilar had not directed

 it to any authority “show[ing] the decisions in the state court is contrary to or involved an

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 unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.” Id. The district court then

 denied Mr. Aguilar a COA.

        Mr. Aguilar now seeks a COA in this court, raising four arguments. First, he

 asserts the state trial court erred in denying his counsel’s motion for a continuance before

 Mr. Aguilar’s trial. Second, he asserts the Government should have been required to

 overcome a “rebuttable [presumption of] vindictiveness” when it offered Mr. Aguilar a

 plea deal in excess of a previously offered plea deal, or the Government should have been

 required to “reinstate [its] original plea offer to the petitioner.” Pet. at 7. Third, he argues

 both of his defense attorneys in state court provided ineffective assistance because they

 failed to investigate and request a diminished capacity defense. Finally, Mr. Aguilar

 broadly asserts that his counsel was ineffective because she did not offer advice at

 Mr. Aguilar’s plea hearing or conduct an adequate investigation before he entered the

 plea deal.

                             II.        LEGAL STANDARDS

      A.       Standards Governing a § 2254 Proceeding and a Request for a COA

        “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has

 denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits

 in the absence of any indication . . . to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,

 99 (2011). When a petitioner includes in his habeas application a “claim that was

 adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” a federal court shall not grant relief

 on that claim unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

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     (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
         application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
         Supreme Court of the United States; or

     (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
         the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

         Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

  clearly established precedent if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

  forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially

  indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result

  different from [that] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). A

  state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law if the decision

  “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a

  particular prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407–08. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the

  writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

  state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.

  Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

         In considering a challenge to a state court decision under § 2254(d)(2), a state

  court’s findings of fact are “presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Thus, a

  petitioner challenging a state court’s decision on this basis must show by clear and

  convincing evidence that the determination was factually erroneous. See Miller-El v.

  Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005); Sharp v. Rohling, 793 F.3d 1216, 1219–20 (10th Cir.

  2015) (“When reviewing a § 2254 habeas petition, we must presume the state supreme

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  court’s factual findings are correct unless the petitioner presents clear and convincing

  evidence the findings are incorrect.”). “[A] state-court factual determination is not

  unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different

  conclusion in the first instance.” Sharp, 793 F.3d at 1228 (alteration in original) (quoting

  Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). “If ‘reasonable minds reviewing the record

  might disagree about the finding in question,’ we defer to the state court's determination.”

  Id. (quoting Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015)).

         Before we may exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Aguilar’s case, however, he must

  obtain a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (“Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

  certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . .

  the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises

  out of process issued by a State court.”). Without a COA, we do not possess jurisdiction

  to review the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

  U.S. 322, 335–36 (2003). We may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a

  substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Charlton v. Franklin, 503

  F.3d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). “This standard

  requires ‘a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate

  whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a

  different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to

  proceed further.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

  484 (2000)).

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                      B.       Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

         “The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the States by the terms of the Fourteenth

  Amendment, provides that the accused shall have the assistance of counsel in all criminal

  prosecutions.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 138 (2012). The Supreme Court “has

  recognized that ‘the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’”

  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson,

  397 U.S. 759, 771, n.14 (1970)). “We review a challenge to a guilty plea based on a

  claim of ineffective assistance of counsel using the two-part test announced in

  [Strickland].” United States v. Reed, 39 F.4th 1285, 1293 (10th Cir. 2022), cert. denied,

  143 S. Ct. 745, 214 L. Ed. 2d 449 (2023) (quotation marks omitted); United States v.

  Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 417 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Strickland test also applies to challenges

  to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .”). Under this test, the

  defendant must show: (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

  reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s performance was prejudicial. Reed, 39 F.4th at 1293.

                                  III.       DISCUSSION

         We address each of Mr. Aguilar’s exhausted ineffective assistance of counsel

  claims below and conclude that he is not entitled to a COA.3 As an initial matter, we note

         3
            “Under our firm waiver rule, failure to timely object forecloses appellate review
  unless the interests of justice require our review or unless a pro se litigant was not
  ‘informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences of failing to object.’”
  Hayes v. Norwood, No. 23-6089, 2023 WL 8665005, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 2023)
  (unpublished) (quoting Johnson v. Reyna, 57 F.4th 769, 778 (10th Cir. 2023)). Because
  Mr. Aguilar failed to specifically object to the Report and Recommendation issued by the
  magistrate judge in this case, he may have waived his right to appellate review of the
  district court’s factual and legal determinations. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d
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  that three of Mr. Aguilar’s four arguments in his application for a COA are irrelevant to

  his claims. Mr. Aguilar’s arguments that the state trial court should not have denied his

  counsel’s motion for a continuance and that the prosecution should have been required to

  overcome a “rebuttable [presumption of] vindictiveness” when it offered Mr. Aguilar a

  plea deal do not address the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in these § 2254

  proceedings. Pet. for COA at 8. Similarly, Mr. Aguilar’s argument that his counsel was

  ineffective because she failed to investigate and raise a diminished capacity defense

  relates to one of the unexhausted claims that Mr. Aguilar voluntarily dismissed before the

  district court, rather than any of his remaining claims. Thus, the only relevant argument

  Mr. Aguilar raises in his application for a COA is the broad assertion that his counsel was

  ineffective because she did not offer advice at Mr. Aguilar’s plea hearing or conduct an

  adequate investigation before he entered the plea deal.

         Turning to Mr. Aguilar’s exhausted ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we

  first consider Mr. Aguilar’s claim that his attorney was not a criminal defense attorney.

  Second, we consider his assertion she did not file proper motions in a timely manner and

  prepare an adequate plea. Finally, we consider his argument that his attorney did not

  adequately represent him or help him understand his plea. We deny a COA on the first

  656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). However, we have not decided whether the firm waiver rule
  operates as an independent basis for denying a COA. See Glaser v. Archuleta, 736 F.
  App’x 733, 736 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished); United States v. Thyberg, 722 F. App’x
  847, 850 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished). We need not decide this question in this case,
  however, because we conclude even without the firm waiver rule as a bar that
  Mr. Aguilar is not entitled to a COA under the traditional framework.

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  two claims because they are conclusory and unsupported by the record. We deny a COA

  on the third claim because Mr. Aguilar has provided us with no evidence that the state

  court’s adjudication of this claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved

  an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or in a decision that was

  based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

  before the state court.

                                 A.       Dismissal of Claim 1

         The district court denied relief on Mr. Aguilar’s first claim, that his attorney was

  not a criminal defense lawyer and was unfamiliar with sentencing guidelines and state

  laws. The court concluded that Mr. Aguilar had made only a conclusory statement and

  failed to provide any evidentiary support for this assertion. The district court noted that

  Mr. Aguilar failed to identify which sentencing guidelines or state laws she was

  unfamiliar with and how that prejudiced his defense. Reasonable jurists could not debate

  this conclusion. Thus, denial of a COA on this issue is appropriate.

         First, in his application for a COA, Mr. Aguilar fails to address this ground for

  denying relief at all. He has therefore waived consideration of his first claim, providing

  sufficient basis to deny a COA on this issue. See Davis v. McCollum, 798 F.3d 1317,

  1320 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he district court rejected Davis’s last two grounds of error as

  time-barred. Davis waived any potential challenge to that conclusion by failing to address

  it in his opening brief on appeal.”).

         Even if Mr. Aguilar had properly challenged the district court’s reasoning on this

  point, we would deny Mr. Aguilar a COA. “We have repeatedly held that conclusory

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  allegations are insufficient to warrant habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel.”

  Quintana v. Mulheron, 788 F. App’x 604, 609 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished); United

  States v. Fisher, 38 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining in the § 2255 context

  that “we are not required to fashion Defendant’s arguments for him where his allegations

  are merely conclusory in nature and without supporting factual averments”); Hall v.

  Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onclusory allegations without

  supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be

  based.”).

         As the district court properly pointed out, Mr. Aguilar does not provide any

  evidence to support his claim that his attorney was ineffective. To meet his burden under

  Strickland, Mr. Aguilar must show this objective deficiency based on an evaluation of his

  attorney’s actual performance, not her experience. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

  648, 665 (1984) (“The character of a particular lawyer’s experience may shed light in an

  evaluation of his actual performance, but it does not justify a presumption of

  ineffectiveness in the absence of such an evaluation.”). Thus, Mr. Aguilar’s allegations

  that his attorney practices as a white-collar lawyer, rather than a criminal defense lawyer,

  do not alone render her assistance ineffective. Additionally, Mr. Aguilar makes no

  allegations and provides no evidence to support the assertion that his counsel was

  unfamiliar with the sentencing guidelines or state law. He makes an unsupported

  allegation in his habeas petition that his attorney advised him to accept the plea

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  agreement “based on a mistaken understanding of the law,” but provides no support for

  this allegation.4 ROA at 23.

         For the foregoing reasons, reasonable jurists could not debate whether the district

  court should have dismissed Mr. Aguilar’s first exhausted claim. We therefore deny a

  COA on this issue.

                                 B.     Dismissal of Claim 2

         The district court also denied relief on Mr. Aguilar’s second claim, that his

  attorney was ineffective because she did not file proper motions in a timely manner,

  because the claim was too vague and conclusory to warrant habeas relief.5 The court

  noted that Mr. Aguilar did not identify any motions he believes his counsel should have

  filed or explain how any such alleged omission prejudiced his defense. As with his first

  claim, Mr. Aguilar has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists could debate the district

  court’s conclusion.

         4
           Specifically, Mr. Aguilar appears to suggest that his counsel should have
  informed him that the prosecution would be required to overcome a presumption of
  vindictiveness when it offered him a less favorable plea deal after he rejected the
  prosecution’s initial plea offer. But Mr. Aguilar makes no argument to support his
  allegation that such a presumption would attach to the second plea offer. See United
  States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1443 (10th Cir. 1997) (“To establish a claim of
  prosecutorial vindictiveness, the defendant must prove either (1) actual vindictiveness, or
  (2) a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness which then raises a presumption of
  vindictiveness.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
         5
          The district court addressed Mr. Aguilar’s assertion under this claim that his
  counsel did not prepare an adequate plea in conjunction with his third claim: that his
  attorney was ineffective because she did not adequately represent him and failed to
  counsel him so that he did not understand the plea or knowingly agree to it. We take the
  same approach here. See discussion supra Section II.C.

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         In his application for a COA, Mr. Aguilar again does not address the district

  court’s ground for denying relief at all and has therefore waived consideration of this

  claim. See Davis, 798 F.3d at 1320. Even if we were to consider this claim, however, we

  would deny Mr. Aguilar a COA. As the district court pointed out, in his habeas petition,

  Mr. Aguilar does not identify any motions which his attorney failed to file in a proper and

  timely manner, nor does he explain how any such alleged failure prejudiced him. For

  example, while Mr. Aguilar asserts his attorney filed a motion for a continuance before

  his trial, his sole allegation regarding that motion relates to the state court’s allegedly

  improper denial of the motion. But Mr. Aguilar provides no evidence and makes no

  allegations regarding his attorney’s failure to submit proper and timely motions. In his

  application for a COA, Mr. Aguilar similarly does not identify any argument he made or

  evidence he provided to the district court in support of his claim that his attorney did not

  file proper and timely motions, instead reiterating his arguments before the district court.

         Reasonable jurists could not debate whether Mr. Aguilar’s second exhausted claim

  should be dismissed. We therefore deny a COA on this issue.

                                 C.       Dismissal of Claim 3

         Finally, the district court addressed Mr. Aguilar’s argument that his counsel was

  ineffective because she did not adequately represent him and coerced him into signing the

  plea agreement.6 The court first found the state courts had adjudicated this claim on the

         6
           As has been noted, the district court considered, and we now consider,
  Mr. Aguilar’s argument under his second claim that his counsel provided ineffective
  assistance in preparing his plea agreement in conjunction with this third claim.

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  merits, then concluded Mr. Aguilar’s claim did not warrant relief under either prong of

  § 2254(d). A reasonable jurist could not debate this conclusion.

         In his application for a COA, Mr. Aguilar again does not identify any alleged

  errors made by the district court in dismissing this claim. Instead, he generally reasserts

  that his attorney provided ineffective assistance because she did not offer advice at

  Mr. Aguilar’s plea hearing or conduct an adequate investigation before he entered the

  plea deal. Mr. Aguilar also reiterates that he was told he would be sentenced to five or

  fewer years of imprisonment if he pleaded guilty.

         Adjudication on the Merits

         The district court first found that the state courts had adjudicated Mr. Aguilar’s

  claim on the merits, thus warranting deference to their decisions. Mr. Aguilar raises no

  argument on this point in his habeas petition or in his application for a COA.

         “By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’

  in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2).” Harrington v.

  Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state

  court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court

  adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication . . . to the contrary.”

  Id. at 99. Importantly, “[t]he petitioner bears the burden of showing a claim was not

  adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Simpson v. Carpenter, 912 F.3d 542, 583 (10th

  Cir. 2018).

         The New Mexico Supreme Court and state trial courts summarily denied all of

  Mr. Aguilar’s petitions. In each of those petitions, Mr. Aguilar raised his claim that he

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  agreed to the plea deal due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. We must therefore

  presume, subject to rebuttal, that Mr. Aguilar’s third claim was adjudicated on the merits.

  See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 293 (2013) (“[W]hen a state court issues an order

  that summarily rejects without discussion all the claims raised by a defendant, including a

  federal claim that the defendant subsequently presses in a federal habeas proceeding, the

  federal habeas court must presume (subject to rebuttal) that the federal claim was

  adjudicated on the merits.”). Mr. Aguilar made no effort to challenge this presumption.

  Thus, we defer to the state-court decisions.

         Entitlement to Relief Under § 2254(d)

         The district court dismissed Mr. Aguilar’s third claim, concluding that neither

  provision of § 2254(d) warranted relief. A reasonable jurist could not debate the district

  court’s resolution of this claim.

         “Even if a state court resolves a claim in a summary fashion with little or no

  reasoning, we owe deference to the state court’s result.” Paine v. Massie, 339 F.3d 1194,

  1198 (10th Cir. 2003). Thus, “[w]here a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an

  explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no

  reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief [on the merits].” Harrington, 562 U.S.

  at 98 (emphasis added).

         First, to be entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(1), the state court’s adjudication of

  this claim must have “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

  unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

  Supreme Court of the United States.” The district court correctly noted that Mr. Aguilar

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  cited to no such authority in his habeas petition. Similarly, in his application for a COA,

  Mr. Aguilar again provides no Supreme Court authority to support an argument that the

  state-court decisions were contrary to or involved the unreasonable application of federal

  law. Although he cites to several decisions issued by the courts of appeals,7 our inquiry

  under § 2254(d)(1) “begins and ends with ‘the holdings . . . of [the Supreme Court’s]

  decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’” Anderson v. Mullin, 327

  F.3d 1148, 1153 (10th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade,

  538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003)). Thus, “circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established

  Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’” and cannot form the basis for habeas

         7
           Review of the cases upon which Mr. Aguilar relies also demonstrates that they
  can be differentiated from the facts of his case. For example, Mr. Aguilar relies on Moore
  v. Bryant, a case in which the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas
  relief where the defendant submitted an affidavit stating the defendant’s attorney had
  misinformed him regarding an impending change to state law. 348 F.3d 238, 240 (7th
  Cir. 2003). As a result of that misinformation, the attorney informed the defendant that he
  would likely serve twenty to twenty-seven years if convicted at trial, but ten years if he
  pleaded guilty. Id. at 240. The defendant was actually facing the choice between a ten-
  year sentence and a twelve-and-a-half- to fifteen-year sentence. Id. The defense attorney
  testified about his advice to the defendant at a hearing before the state court, and the
  Seventh Circuit noted that the attorney’s testimony was consistent with the defendant’s
  affidavit. Id. at 240–41. Other cases upon which Mr. Aguilar relies similarly involve
  dissimilar factual patterns, e.g., Hart v. Marion Corr. Inst., 927 F.2d 256, 258–59 (6th
  Cir. 1991) (granting habeas relief where the trial judge and defense attorneys incorrectly
  informed the defendant that his maximum period of incarceration would be only fifteen
  years, when the actual maximum was seventy-five years), or otherwise do not
  demonstrate that the state court’s decision in Mr. Aguilar’s case was contrary to or an
  unreasonable application of federal law, e.g., Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th
  Cir. 1970) (“An erroneous sentence estimate by defense counsel does not render a plea
  involuntary”).

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  relief under § 2254(d)(1). Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48–49 (2012) (quoting 28

  U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).

         Second, to be entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(2), the state court proceeding must

  have “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

  in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” We find nothing in the

  record before the state courts to suggest that the courts’ findings were unreasonable in

  light of the evidence before them. To the contrary, the record supports a finding that

  Mr. Aguilar had not been coerced into signing the plea agreement and that he was

  satisfied with his attorney’s participation in his obtaining a plea agreement. Mr. Aguilar

  signed an agreement that stated “[t]here are no agreements as to sentence. 0-18 years.”

  ROA at 92. He further affirmed in the agreement, “I have read and I understand this

  agreement” and “I have discussed the case and my constitutional rights with my lawyer.”

  Id. at 94. Mr. Aguilar also affirmed he understood that, in pleading guilty, he gave up

  certain constitutional rights.

         In addition, at Mr. Aguilar’s change of plea hearing, Mr. Aguilar testified under

  oath about his plea, confirming that he had reviewed the document with his attorney and

  that she had answered all his questions regarding what he was pleading to. The court then

  described the plea agreement, noting among other things that “it looks like there is an

  agreement to your sentence of being zero to 18 years.” Id. at 102. The court asked

  Mr. Aguilar “[i]s that your understanding of this agreement?” to which Mr. Aguilar

  responded “[y]es.” Id. at 103. The court then asked, “[i]s there anything that you feel I’ve

  left out,” to which Mr. Aguilar responded “[n]o.” Id. After summarizing the penalties

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  associated with each of the charges to which Mr. Aguilar was pleading guilty, the court

  asked, “[h]as anyone threatened you, coerced you or otherwise forced you to accept this

  agreement, Mr. Aguilar?” to which Mr. Aguilar responded “[n]o.” Id. at 104. The court

  further asked, “[h]ave there been any promises, other than what I just listed to you to get

  you to plead guilty to these charges?” to which Mr. Aguilar again responded “[n]o.” Id.

  The court then explained the constitutional rights that Mr. Aguilar was giving up in

  signing the plea agreement, and Mr. Aguilar confirmed that he was knowingly and

  willingly giving up those rights. The court then asked whether Mr. Aguilar was “satisfied

  with [his] attorney’s explanation and advice on this case,” and Mr. Aguilar affirmed that

  he was. Id. at 107. Finally, the court asked Mr. Aguilar, “[d]o you have any questions,

  either for your attorney or for the Court before we go forward?” and Mr. Aguilar

  responded “[n]o.” Id.

         Despite these sworn statements in open court, Mr. Aguilar argued in his state

  habeas petitions that his attorney represented Mr. Aguilar would receive a five-year

  sentence and that she would amend the plea agreement after Mr. Aguilar signed it. In

  support of this argument, Mr. Aguilar attached two letters to his second and third state

  habeas petitions, and provided them as exhibits to his habeas petition before the federal

  district court. In the first, an associate of Mr. Aguilar’s asserts that he accompanied

  Mr. Aguilar to a meeting with his attorney and during that meeting, Mr. Aguilar’s

  attorney told him she would change the plea agreement after he signed it. In the second

  letter, another of Mr. Aguilar’s associates represents that Mr. Aguilar signed his plea

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  agreement under much distress. Both letters post-date Mr. Aguilar’s first state habeas

  petition.

         Based on this record, which reflects that Mr. Aguilar was repeatedly informed

  both in the plea agreement and during his change of plea hearing that he could be

  sentenced for up to eighteen years, the state courts consistently rejected Mr. Aguilar’s

  arguments that his counsel had misinformed him about the number of years to which he

  could be sentenced and thus provided ineffective assistance. In light of the record, and

  particularly Mr. Aguilar’s declarations in open court that he understood his plea

  agreement, had not been threatened or coerced into signing it, and had not been made any

  promises beyond those in the plea agreement, we cannot conclude the state court’s

  finding was unreasonable.

         A state court’s finding on this point is not unreasonable “merely because the

  federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”

  Sharp, 793 F.3d at 1228 (quoting Wood, 558 U.S. at 301). And to the extent reasonable

  minds might disagree upon reviewing the record, we must defer to the state court’s

  determination. Id. Reasonable jurists could not debate whether Mr. Aguilar’s third

  exhausted claim should be dismissed. We therefore deny a COA on this issue.

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                             IV.      CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons we DENY Mr. Aguilar’s request for a COA and

  DISMISS this matter.

                                           Entered for the Court

                                           Carolyn B. McHugh
                                           Circuit Judge

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