Court Opinion

ID: 9595776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:43:17.793709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:42.932850
License: Public Domain

Quinn, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. The majority opinion holds that the transcript of the oral report by Dr. Appleman was inadmissible for any purpose, and that the medical authorization signed by Mr. Cartwright at the time of applying for insurance did not constitute a waiver of the physician-patient privilege. The majority further holds that the admission of the report was reversibly erroneous, because,
"We believe the exhibit may have been determinative. With the exhibit in evidence, defendant could point to its reason for rejection. Without the exhibit defendant would be left with its claim of good faith unfortified except by the autopsy and the testimony of Dr. Climie, the pathologist. He was not asked to testify how long this condition existed, or whether it existed on November 4, 1969. The cause of death was pneumonia.”
The trial court admitted the transcript as proof that defendant acted in good faith in denying the application, not for the truth of the matter contained in the transcript. This was not error because the transcript was admissible as proof of the truth of its contents. The physician-patient privilege was waived when Mr. Cartwright executed the medical authorization.
*685On the basis of defendant’s concession and Wohlfeil v Bankers Life Co, 296 Mich 310; 296 NW 269 (1941), the majority holds that there was no waiver of the physician-patient privilege. I am not bound by defendant’s concession nor can I read Wohlfeil as holding that the medical authorization in this case of Cartwright was not a waiver. In Wohlfeil, the insurance was in force and the medical authorization was contained in a proof of loss statement. The use of the physician’s testimony was to defeat an existing right, and the non-waiver holding is understandable. In the case before us, the authorization permits the physician to disclose information that is essential for a determination by the insurance company whether or not to issue the insurance, thereby creating the right. The effect of the majority’s non-waiver holding is that the medical authorization permits the insurance company to obtain medical information it needs to determine whether or not to issue a policy of insurance but this same information cannot be used to explain why the insurance was not issued. This offends reason. If that is the law, it is further basis for the ancient saying, "The law is an ass”.
Assuming error in the admission of the transcript, I consider the error harmless. The autopsy established the fact that Mr. Cartwright suffered from systemic lupus erythematosus. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p 1347, defines the disease as,
"[A] slowly progressive systemic disease of unknown origin marked by degenerative changes of collagenous tissues with erythematous skin lesions, arthritic changes, lesions of internal organs, and wasting and by fever, leukemia, and endocarditis.”
It was not a disease that Mr. Cartwright developed *686the day he died. Dr. Appleman’s transcript merely corroborated a fact independently established.
Finally, the majority finds error in taking from the jury the question of unreasonable delay because the proofs at the time of the motion for directed verdict indicated a fact question for jury determination. I cannot agree with this analysis. Our review covers the whole record, Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 192; 94 NW2d 388, 394 (1959). That record discloses that the delay was caused by Dr. Appleman’s refusal to comply with defendant’s request for information which Mr. Cartwright had authorized defendant to obtain. To me, as a matter of law, that record establishes no unreasonable delay.
Affirmed with costs to defendant.