Court Opinion

ID: 9595201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:37:01.813273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:26.616755
License: Public Domain

KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion in part; however, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion concerning defendant’s request for surrebuttal closing argument on the issue of insanity.
Along with the United States Supreme Court, our supreme court has recognized that shifting to the defendant the burden of proving his defense of insanity withstands constitutional challenge. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 717 P.2d 866 (1986). In Arizona, a criminal defendant who raises the defense of insanity is obligated to prove his assertion of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. A.R.S. § 13-502(B).
Our trial courts have the discretion to alter the order of proceedings during a criminal trial. Rule 19.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. In this case, the sole dispute was over his mental state. Consequently, the argument in favor of adhering to the trial proceedings established in Rule 19.1, that the prosecution must prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, is a fiction. The only party with a substantive burden of proof in this case was the defendant.
Consequently, under the facts of this case, I do not find State v. Turrentine, 152 Ariz. 61, 730 P.2d 238 (App.1986) dispositive, and I would hold that the trial judge abused her discretion when she denied defendant’s request to make a surrebuttal closing argument on the issue of insanity.