Court Opinion

ID: 9388503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 18:02:31.055933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.687077
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/20/23 P. v. Salas CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D078838

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. FSB18002597)

 ENRIQUE SALAS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Ronald M. Christianson, Judge. Remanded for resentencing.
         Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson, Christine Y. Friedman, and Marvin E. Mizel, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Enrique Salas was convicted of attempted, premeditated murder (Pen.

Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 667) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)). The jury found firearm and great bodily allegations to be true.
It also found an alleged prior strike, a prior serious felony, and a prior prison
term true in a bifurcated trial. Salas requested a bifurcated trial on a gang
enhancement charge, which the court denied. However, the jury was unable
to reach a verdict on that charge, and it was dismissed.
      At sentencing, the court noted that Salas had engaged in a pattern of
violent conduct, and that his adult convictions are numerous and increasing
in seriousness, and it expressed concern that Salas would continue to be a
danger to others in the community. It declined to exercise discretion to strike
or stay enhancements, stating that the maximum sentence was appropriate.
It sentenced Salas to life in prison with a minimum parole eligibility of
14 years and 25 years to life, to run consecutive, for the enhancement of
discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury. It also stayed the eight-
year sentence it imposed for the assault with a firearm conviction, the
aggravated term of 10 years for use of a firearm, and a three-year sentence
for the great bodily injury allegation.
      Salas appeals, contending the court erred by denying his request to
bifurcate the gang allegation, by issuing jury instruction CALCRIM No. 315,
which lists a witness’s level of certainty among factors in evaluating
eyewitness identifications, by failing to consider its discretion to issue a
lesser enhancement under sections 12022.5, subdivision (a) or 12022.53, and
by relying on aggravating circumstances that were not properly proved under
the now-applicable version of section 1170, subdivision (b). He also contends

1      Further section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
specified.
                                          2
a series of changes and clarifications to sentencing laws that apply
retroactively could lead to a shorter sentence.
      We conclude that Salas was not prejudiced by the court’s denial of the
request to bifurcate the gang allegation or its use of CALCRIM No. 315.
However, in light of the number of statutory changes and clarifications that
apply to nonfinal matters and that could individually or cumulatively affect
the court’s imposition of sentence length in this case, we remand the matter
for resentencing, where Salas can present his sentence-related arguments for
the superior court to consider.
                BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
      Around 2:40 p.m. on July 7, 2018, C.D., an African-American man in
his 20’s, was on the sidewalk outside the Westwind Mobile Home Park
(Westwind) on 4th Street in Yucaipa. A Hispanic man in a hat and sweats
with a red band at the waist, who was standing across the street outside the
Rancho del Sol Mobile Home Park (Rancho del Sol), ran into the middle of 4th
Street and shot C.D. three times. C.D. fell, and the shooter ran into the
entrance of Rancho del Sol. When C.D. got back up, the shooter ran back to
the middle of the street and shot C.D. three more times, causing C.D. to fall
to the ground. The shooter then fled through Rancho del Sol.
      E.W., the manager of Rancho Del Sol, was in the mobile home closest to
4th Street, and he saw the shooter’s arm raised and heard two sets of three
shots. The manager chased the shooter, who had a gun tucked into his
waistband area, through Rancho del Sol before losing track of the shooter
between 3rd and 4th Streets. He described the shooter as wearing gray and
black sweats. In court, E.W. identified Salas as the man he chased.
      M.J. observed the shooting as he was driving down 4th Street. He
could not identify the shooter on the day of the incident, but he was 90

                                       3
percent sure of his identification of Salas as the shooter at an infield showup,
and he thought the gun used was a pistol.
      D.B. looked toward 4th Street from inside Westwind when she heard
the shots. She saw a tall male with black hair, wearing a black shirt and red
shorts underneath another pair of shorts. She observed him shoot C.D., who
was wearing blue, and then run into Rancho del Sol. She did not see the gun,
but she identified Salas as the shooter in court.
      J.S. went outside her Westwind mobile home when she heard gunshots,
and she saw Salas fire three shots from a revolver into the victim before
running away. She said the shooter wore black shorts with red shorts
underneath so that a waistband of red showed, and he wore a dark-colored
shirt. She identified Salas as the shooter that day.
      San Bernardino County Sheriff Deputy Melissa Miller responded to a
“shots fired” call on 4th Street around 2:40 p.m. She found C.D. on the
ground on the west side of the street in front of Westwind. He was unarmed.
No shell cases were located near C.D. or in an enlarged search area, leading
deputies to believe a revolver was used.
      At around 2:45 p.m., a Hispanic man wearing a black T-shirt and red
jogging shorts, walked into J.H.’s backyard and appeared to be holding
something in the waistband of his shorts. J.H. began chasing him. The
person jumped the fence and ran away. J.H. later discovered balled-up gray
shorts between a brick wall and a shed in his backyard; a deputy collected the
shorts.
      When deputies encountered Salas around 2:55 p.m. in the storage area
of the Yucaipa Land Yacht Mobile Home Park, located between 3rd and 4th
Streets, he was wearing red shorts and no shirt. Salas was out of breath and
his entire body was sweaty; there was methamphetamine on the ground next

                                        4
to him, and deputies recovered four hypodermic needles from his person.
Salas’s hands tested negative for gunshot residue. Deputies arrested Salas
and placed him in the back of the patrol unit. Behind some nearby bushes,
one deputy found a black shirt that matched one description of what the
shooter had worn.
        Deputy Chris Coillot conducted infield showups, transporting witnesses
one by one to observe Salas from inside the patrol car. The deputy read each
witness an admonition before the witnesses answered whether Salas was the
shooter. Witnesses D.B. and J.S. each identified Salas as the shooter. M.J.
said he was 90 percent sure Salas was the shooter.
        At trial, D.B., J.S., E.W., two residents of Westwind and the manager of
Rancho del Sol, identified Salas as the shooter. They each described what the
shooter wore. D.B. testified the shooter may have been wearing a black shirt
and two pairs of shorts; the inner pair of shorts was red. J.S. testified that
the shooter wore a black or dark blue shirt, sagging black shorts, and red
shorts under the black ones. E.W. testified the shooter wore some
combination of black and gray. He testified about surveillance video footage
captured by Rancho del Sol cameras that showed the shooter running
through Rancho del Sol. The prosecution played that video for the jury.
        Another witness, W.G., testified the shooter wore a black T-shirt and
gray basketball shorts. He also testified that his mobile home’s surveillance
camera captured a video of the events. The prosecution played the video for
the jury; it showed a person cross 4th Street from Rancho del Sol and shoot
C.D.
        C.D. underwent surgery the day of the shooting for gunshot wounds to
his stomach, chest, arm, thigh, and back; he is paralyzed from the waist
down.

                                        5
                                      Defense
         G.J. witnessed the shooting and testified the shooter wore a black T-
shirt and beige shorts. She could not remember the shooter’s face, and at her
infield showup, she told police the shooter had a darker complexion than
Salas.
         M.H. also witnessed the shooting. He described the shooter as wearing
a black shirt and gray pants. At the infield showup, he told police the shooter
wore different clothing than Salas was wearing. He could not be sure of an
identification.
         R.G. witnessed somebody running into Rancho del Sol after he heard
shots. He could not identify Salas as the shooter during the infield showup
and said he could not identify the shooter in court because he did not see the
person’s face.
         Several witnesses did not mention red shorts to the deputies.
         One deputy commented loudly enough for witnesses to hear that “they
got him, good,” in reference to Salas being captured.
         Michael Eisen, a psychologist who testified as an expert in eyewitness
memory and suggestibility, explained facets of memory, factors associated
with solid eyewitness identification, and the inherently suggestive nature of
showups. He said it is common for people to feel more confident in their
identifications over time.
         Sheriff crime lab criminalist Jason McCauley explained that when a
revolver fires at close range, there is typically more residue than a
semiautomatic weapon of the same caliber. He analyzed the gunshot residue
kit done on Salas and noted there were no characteristic particles present.
Residue can be eliminated by sweating, washing hands, or wearing gloves.

                                         6
                                Gang Evidence
      Salas moved in limine to bifurcate the trial on gang evidence, and the
court denied the motion.
      The parties stipulated that Northside Rialto (NSR) is a criminal street
gang within the meaning of section 186.22. No photographs or
documentation related to the street gang were admitted.
      Salas is a member of NSR, a Hispanic gang based in Rialto. He has
numerous tattoos that indicate his membership.
      C.D. is a member or associate of the Five Times Crips, a gang with a
territory that borders San Bernardino and Rialto. He was not “claiming”
Five Times in Yucaipa, where he was living with his grandfather, and he did
not know Salas. However, he had numerous Five Times tattoos, including on
his neck, and he wore mostly blue, his gang’s color, on the day he was shot.
Five Times and No Cuts, a Crip gang subset that also wears blue, are
primarily allies. NSR is a direct rival of No Cuts.
      Sergeant Robert Raymond Morales testified as a gang expert. He
explained that NSR has common signs or symbols. He opined that Salas’s
tattoos were common to NSR; a person who is not a member of that gang
would not have such tattoos, and a non-member of that gang sporting such
tattoos could be targeted for assault or death.
      When given a hypothetical that mirrored the evidence in this case,
Sergeant Morales opined that the shooting was done for the benefit of NSR,
with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by
that gang. He explained the shooting would enhance the gang member’s
reputation and the gang’s reputation because it showed the members of NSR
were gang members who also had “a tendency to be violent and are brazen.”

                                       7
      The prosecution introduced testimony that a resident of Rancho del Sol
had NSR gang paraphernalia in his residence and sported multiple NSR gang
tattoos. Sergeant Morales testified that the fact that another NSR member
lived in the mobile home park where the shooting occurred showed there was
another gang member to vouch for the incident to enhance the shooter’s
reputation. That person could also be there to aid and abet.
                    Jury Instructions & Closing Arguments
      The trial court indicated neither party objected to any jury instructions,
and neither requested additional instructions.
      The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 315, the eyewitness
identification instruction, and CALCRIM No. 332, which directed the jury to
consider the experts’ testimony. The jury was instructed with CALCRIM
No. 1401, the instruction on a gang enhancement, modified to delete the
definition of a criminal street gang.
      In closing arguments, defense counsel told the jury the case boiled
down to identification. He challenged the witness identifications in various
ways, arguing that some of the witnesses “hemm[ed] and haw[ed],” and that
suggested their uncertainty. He pointed out that although Salas wore red
shorts when arrested, the witnesses did not describe the shooter wearing red
shorts. He argued that witnesses may have been influenced by the deputies
on scene, who he suggested were biased in their belief that Salas was the
shooter. He also pointed out discrepancies in the various deputies’ testimony
and their recollection of the events. Defense counsel further emphasized
potential issues associated with witness identification and memory.
      Defense counsel highlighted the lack of physical evidence tying Salas to
a weapon, arguing there was no gun shot residue on the defendant, and no
gun was ever found.

                                        8
                                    Verdicts
      The jury found Salas guilty of count 1, premeditated attempted murder,
and count 2, assault with a deadly weapon. It found the firearm and great
bodily allegations to be true. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
gang enhancement charge. The People moved to dismiss that count, and the
court granted that motion.
      A bifurcated trial was held on the alleged prior strike, the prior serious
felony, and the prior prison term. The alleged priors were based on a 2016
robbery conviction and a separate conviction for assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury. The prosecution presented certified
records of those convictions, and the jury found the alleged priors to be true.
                                  Sentencing
      Defense counsel asked the court to take into consideration Salas’s
youthful age at the time of the crime; he was 21. Although Salas was under
the age of 25 at the time of the shooting, he was not eligible under the
youthful parole statute because he suffered a prior strike for which he had
been convicted. Defense counsel also noted for the court that new statutes
gave the court discretion to strike the gun enhancement under
section 12022.53.
      The court sentenced Salas on December 4, 2020, imposing life in prison
with a minimum parole eligibility of 14 years for count 1, the premeditated
attempted murder with the enhancement of a prior strike being found true.
Consecutive to that, for the enhancement of discharging a firearm causing
great bodily injury, the court sentenced Salas to 25 years to life. It stayed the
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c) as well as the
enhancement of great bodily injury under section 12022.7, subdivision (a),
pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (f).

                                        9
      With respect to count 2, assault with a firearm, the court imposed the
upper term of four years, doubled to eight years, for the admission of a prior
strike. It stayed the sentence under section 654. It also imposed an
aggravated term of 10 years for the use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). It
stayed that sentence under section 654.
      It also imposed and stayed three years for the great bodily injury
allegation (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on count 2, and it struck the enhancement
under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court found the mitigation
materials insufficient to justify any leniency in the case. In imposing this
sentence, the court referenced and relied upon four aggravating factors in the
probation report. The court stated:
      [Defendant] has engaged in a pattern of violent conduct which
      shows that if not in prison, he will continue to be a danger to
      others in the community. Prior to conviction of attempted
      murder with use of a firearm causing great bodily injury in this
      case, the defendant was previously convicted in separate
      incidents of robbery and of assault by means likely to produce
      great bodily injury.

      The defendant’s convictions as an adult are numerous and of
      increasing seriousness. The defendant has served a prior prison
      term and was on a grant of parole at the time of the current
      offense.

For those reasons, the court declined to exercise its discretion to strike
or stay any enhancements and stated the maximum sentence was
appropriate.

                                       10
                                  DISCUSSION
                                        I.
                           ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 333
        Salas contends that Assembly Bill No. 333 (Assembly Bill 333) applies
to his case and requires us to reverse the judgment because the court denied
his request to bifurcate the trial on the gang-related enhancements.
        Among other changes, Assembly Bill 333 (Stats. 2021, ch. 699), which
became effective January 1, 2022, amended section 186.22 to impose
additional elements necessary to prove the substantive crime of active
participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) and the related
gang sentencing enhancement allegation (id., subd. (b)). Specifically, the bill
narrowed the definition of “ ‘criminal street gang’ ” to “an ongoing, organized
association or group of three or more persons . . . having as one of its primary
activities the commission of one or more [enumerated criminal acts], having a
common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang
activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f); People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 343-
344.)
        Assembly Bill 333 also amended the statutory definition of a “ ‘pattern
of criminal gang activity’ ” under section 186.22, subdivision (e). The
definition now requires that the commission or attempted commission of two
or more statutorily-enumerated offenses “occurred within three years of the
prior offense and within three years of the date the current offense is alleged
to have been committed.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) It also prohibits using the
currently-charged offense to establish the pattern of criminal gang activity,
requires the offenses to commonly benefit a criminal street gang, and

                                        11
requires the common benefit of the offense to be “more than reputational.”
(Id., subds. (e)(1) & (2).)
      Additionally, Assembly Bill 333 added section 1109, which requires the
court to bifurcate substantive charges and enhancement allegations under
section 186.22 upon the defendant’s request. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5, eff.
Jan. 1, 2022). The bifurcated trial on a gang enhancement occurs after the
defendant is first found guilty of the charged offense. (§ 1109,
subds. (a)(1) & (2); People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 64-65
(Ramirez).)
      Salas contends Assembly Bill 333 is retroactive under the rule
established in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-746, a case in which
the Supreme Court held that statutory amendments that reduce a
punishment apply retroactively when amendments to the Penal Code are
silent regarding their retroactivity and judgment is not final. The Attorney
General concedes that the substantive amendments to section 186.22 are

retroactive to nonfinal cases2 but challenges the retroactivity of section 1109,
which is a procedural provision. As the Attorney General notes, the Courts of
Appeal are split on whether section 1109 applies retroactively. (See
Montano, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 105-108 [finding section 1109
retroactive]; Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1126-1127 [same]; Burgos,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 564-567, review granted [same]; but see

2      Other courts have uniformly reached this conclusion, as well. (See,
e.g., People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1126-1128 (Ramos);
People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 564-567 (Burgos), review granted
July 13, 2022, S274743; People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206-207,
(Perez) review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275090; Ramirez, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at pp. 63-64; People v. Montano (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 82, 104
(Montano); People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 478 (E.H.); People v. Sek
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 667.)
                                       12
People v. Boukes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 937, 948, review granted Dec. 14,
2022, S277103 [finding section 1109 applies only prospectively]; Ramirez,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 64-65 [same]; Perez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 192,
review granted [same].)
      We do not need to resolve this issue because even were we to assume
that section 1109 applies retroactively, we conclude Salas was not prejudiced

by the failure to bifurcate the gang enhancement.3
      First, we find unpersuasive Salas’s contention that the failure to
bifurcate gang enhancements under section 1109 “likely constitutes
‘structural error,’ ” which would defy harmless error analysis and require
reversal per se. (Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 568, review granted.)
“There is a strong presumption that any error falls within the trial error
category” and is “subject to harmless error analysis.” (People v.
Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 554.) Section 1109’s purpose is to prevent
the jury from being swayed by prejudicial gang evidence in deciding the
defendant’s guilt on the underlying offense. (Assem. Bill. 333, § 2,
subd. (d)(6).) However, as is the case with any alleged evidentiary error, the
probable effect of allowing a jury to hear such gang evidence may be
quantitatively assessed; it is not a structural error that defies harmless error
analysis. (Montano, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 108 [rejecting suggestion of
structural error]; see also Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1131-1133
[applying Watson harmless error standard in finding defendant not
prejudiced by failure to bifurcate gang enhancement allegation]; E.H., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 480 [explaining defendant could not show it was

3     The jury did not reach a verdict on the gang enhancement charge, and
the People moved for it to be dismissed. Thus, Salas also was not prejudiced
by any finding of guilt on that charge.
                                       13
reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable result if trial
had been bifurcated].)
      Nothing in section 1109 prohibits use of a defendant’s gang
membership as evidence on the issue of motive or another issue provided for
in Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Indeed, “evidence of gang
membership is often relevant to, and admissible regarding, the charged
offense. Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation—including evidence of
the gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices,
criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove identity, motive,
modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or fear, or other
issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.” (People v. Hernandez (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049; see Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132 [“[I]t is
likely some . . . of the evidence of Ramos’s gang membership and the gang
rivalry would have come in at a trial on just the substantive offenses. . . .”];
see also People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1370 [gang membership
and activities relevant to prosecution theory of how and why victim was
killed].) Here, Salas’s participation in a gang supplied the motive for the
otherwise seemingly inexplicable conduct of the shooter firing a weapon
without provocation or any relationship to the victim.
      Further, the gang evidence was relatively sanitized and not
inflammatory. The parties stipulated that NSR was a criminal street gang,
and neither party presented evidence about the most inflammatory aspects of
the gang. The testimony focused on information about the gang’s signs and
symbols, as well as its territory and rivals. Sergeant Morales testified that
the shooting would enhance Salas’s and NSR’s reputation because it showed
they had “a tendency to be violent and are brazen.” There was testimony
about the presence of another NSR gang member in Rancho del Sol, but only

                                        14
for the purpose of explaining that the other gang member present could
vouch for the incident or be available to aid the shooter, as part of developing
the motive in the case.
      Moreover, the prosecution did not use the gang evidence to
demonstrate Salas’s guilt; there was no dispute that C.D. was the victim of a
premeditated attempted murder and assault with a firearm. The dispute
here regarded who committed the act.
      The prosecutor also did not focus on Salas’s membership in gang to
prove identity. Instead, the prosecutor primarily relied on video evidence and
witness identifications to identify Salas as the shooter. That evidence
overwhelmingly supports the verdict. Several witnesses identified Salas as
the shooter during infield showups, and they restated their identifications in
court. E.W., who witnessed the shooting and chased the shooter, identified
Salas. Witnesses’ descriptions of the shooter were consistent with one
another, predominantly describing the shooter as wearing a black shirt and
two pairs of shorts with the inner pair red, or identifying the grey outer pair.
When Salas was detained, he was wearing a pair of red shorts and no shirt,
and deputies recovered a black shirt in some nearby bushes and balled up
gray shorts in one of the yards where Salas had been chased. Further, the
video footage appeared to corroborate the testimony. It is simply not
reasonably probable that Salas would have received a more favorable result
had the gang enhancement, the dismissed charge, been tried separately. (See
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Accordingly, the failure to
bifurcate the gang enhancement did not result in a miscarriage of justice and
was harmless as to the underlying convictions. (See Ramos, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1125-1132; E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 478-480.)

                                       15
                                       II.
                              CALCRIM NO. 315
      Salas next argues that the court erred by providing CALCRIM No. 315,
which lists factors to consider in determining whether an eyewitness’s
identification is accurate, contending that jurors may have been led “to
conclude all the certain identifications were accurate.” We review challenges
to jury instructions de novo. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
      Our Supreme Court addressed this issue in People v. Lemcke (2021) 11
Cal.5th 644 (Lemcke). Lemcke held that listing the witness’s level of
certainty among the factors a jury considers under CALCRIM No. 315 to
evaluate eyewitness identifications does not render a trial fundamentally
unfair or otherwise amount to a due process violation. (Lemcke, at pp. 647,
660-661.) Nothing in the instruction operates “to ‘lower the prosecution’s
burden of proof’ ” because “the instruction does not direct the jury that
‘certainty equals accuracy.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 647, 657, 658.)
      The defendant in Lemcke presented a rigorous identification defense,
his counsel cross-examined investigating officers to explore problematic
aspects of identification procedures, and he called an eyewitness expert who
“testified at length about the weak correlation between certainty and
accuracy, particularly with respect to in-court identifications.” (Lemcke,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 660.) In the end, although the court acknowledged
that “an enhanced or modified version of the certainty instruction might well
be advisable,” it explained that the inclusion of witness certainty as a factor
for jurors to consider nonetheless did not establish a due process violation.
(Id. at p. 661.)
      The case before us is comparable. Like the defendant in Lemcke, Salas
presented a rigorous defense challenging his identification as the shooter,

                                       16
questioning the credibility of witnesses and what may have influenced their
identifications, and noting the lack of physical evidence connecting him to the
scene. Salas also offered expert testimony to challenge the accuracy of
witness identifications. Further, the jury was instructed that the People bore
the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who
committed the crime (CALCRIM No. 315) and that it was required to
consider the expert’s testimony (CALCRIM No. 332). And defense counsel
reiterated the People’s burden of proof in closing arguments. These actions
helped ensure fairness.
      We recognize that the Supreme Court has directed trial courts to omit
the certainty factor from CALCRIM No. 315 going forward, until the Judicial
Council can consider how the language might be better worded to minimize
any possible juror confusion on that point. (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 668-669.) However, “nothing in CALCRIM No. 315’s instruction on
witness certainty operates to ‘lower the prosecution’s burden of proof.’ ”
(Lemcke, at p. 657.) It leaves it to the jury to decide the credibility of a
witness’s level of certainty and what weight to assign the certainty. (Ibid.)
Additionally, nothing in CALCRIM No. 315 suggests to a jury that it should
ignore expert testimony regarding witness certainty. (Lemcke, at p. 658.)
      Here, like in Lemcke, other instructions undercut the claim that the
certainty language lowers the burden of proof. (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 658.) The court instructed the jury that Salas was presumed innocent, and
that the prosecution bore the burden of proving the crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt, and CALCRIM No. 315 states that the People bear the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who
committed the crime. Under these facts, the reference to witness certainty
was not error.

                                        17
                                      III.
              CHANGES TO SENTENCING REQUIREMENTS
      Salas also presents a series of arguments regarding the court’s
discretion to sentence him based on recent changes and clarifications to the
law that individually or cumulatively could impact the length of sentence.
We detail those changes and clarifications below.
                           A. Assembly Bill No. 518
      Assembly Bill No. 518, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 654,
subdivision (a), so that the court is no longer required to impose sentence
based on the “longest potential term of imprisonment,” staying other terms.
(§ 654, former subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.) “[S]ection 654 now
provides the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of
either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the
shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence.” (People v. Mani (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 343, 379.) This means the court could now opt to sentence Salas
for the assault conviction and stay the attempted murder conviction.
                            B. Senate Bill No. 567
      Senate Bill No. 567 amended subdivision (b) of section 1170 by making
the middle term the presumptive term unless aggravating circumstances
justifying a higher term have been stipulated to by the defendant or found
true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(3).) These
amendments apply retroactively. (See People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
459, 465 [“The People properly concede that Senate Bill No. 567’s
ameliorative amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) apply retroactively
to all cases not yet final as of January 1, 2022”].) Here, the court sentenced
Salas to the upper term on count 2 before staying it, and the court considered
two aggravating factors that were not stipulated to or found true beyond a

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reasonable doubt by the jury. Under the current version of section 1170,
subdivision (b), the court would have to take into consideration fewer
aggravating factors in sentencing Salas.
                   C. People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688
      Section 12022.53 requires the court to impose an additional,
consecutive sentence of 10, 20, or 25 years to life for use of a firearm,
discharge of a firearm, or discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury,
respectively. (§ 12022.53, subs. (b)-(d).) Effective January 1, 2018,
section 12022.53 was amended to provide the court with discretion to strike
or dismiss an enhancement that was otherwise required. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (h).) In January 2022, our Supreme Court held in People v. Tirado
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado) that the superior court had discretion under
section 12022.53, subdivision (h) and section 1385 to impose penalties under
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), or (d) if the facts required within the
applicable subdivision were alleged and found true. (Tirado, at pp. 696, 702.)
The superior court also has discretion to impose a sentence for a charged or
uncharged lesser enhancement when the facts supporting the lesser
enhancement have been alleged and found true. (Id. at p. 697.) That means
a trial court can strike a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement and
impose the sentence outlined under subdivisions (b) or (c), or it can even
impose the sentence applicable to the enhancements in section 12022.5,

subdivision (a).4 (Tirado, at p. 700.) This discretion applies retroactively to
nonfinal cases (People v. Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663), which means the
court could have imposed a significantly shorter sentence for the firearm

4     Section 12022.5 subdivision (a) provides for sentences of three, four, or
10 years for personal use of a firearm in the commission or attempted
commission of a felony.
                                        19
enhancement had it chosen to exercise its discretion in that manner.
Although the court was aware of its discretion to strike or dismiss an
otherwise-required enhancement, there was a split of authority regarding the
extent of that discretion that was not clarified until after the court sentenced
Salas. (See Tirado, at pp. 697-702.)
                              D. Senate Bill No. 81
      Finally, Senate Bill No. 81, which applies to all sentencing after
January 1, 2022, added subdivision (c) to section 1385. Subdivision (c)(1)
provides in part, “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss
an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.”
Subdivision (c)(2) of this statute provides in part, “In exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove” various “mitigating
circumstances.”
      “Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).) One such circumstance is whether the application of the
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. (Id.,
subd. (c)(3)(C).) In such instances, unless the court finds dismissal would
endanger public safety, the enhancement shall be dismissed. (Id.,
subds. (c)(2) & (c)(3)(C).) While the Attorney General argues that Salas’s
callous and calculated conduct evidences his danger to public safety, the court
would need to consider this characteristic directly when deciding whether to
dismiss the firearm enhancement.

                                       20
                                   E. Analysis
      The Attorney General argues that remand is not necessary because the
court had broad discretion of which it was aware when it imposed Salas’s
sentence in December 2020. The Attorney General points out that the court
stated it planned to impose the maximum possible sentence, and it imposed
the upper terms on the assault conviction and firearm enhancements before
staying those terms under section 654. This argument resonates with us to
some degree. The court was authorized to consider whether the lower,
middle, or upper term best served the interests of justice (§ 1170, subd. (b);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(e); People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 464), and it already could consider circumstances in aggravation and
mitigation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(b)). Defense counsel alerted the
court that it had discretion to strike the gun enhancement under section
12022.53, and because the lesser enhancements were charged and found true,
the court had the authority to impose punishment under section 12022.53
subdivisions (b) or (c). Moreover, the court stated its preference to impose the
maximum sentence. Further, the court clearly found aggravating factors
relevant, and a single aggravating factor has been held sufficient to support
an upper term. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728.)
      However, considering the number of changes and clarifications that
have occurred since the initial sentencing, we are not convinced that the trial
court would “not, in any event have [imposed a lower punishment].”
(People v. Gutierrez (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1894, 1896; People v. McDaniels
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.) The Attorney General concedes that the
court erred under new section 1170, subdivision (b) by relying on two
aggravating circumstances that were not properly proved when it imposed
the upper term on the assault conviction. (See People v. Dunn (2022) 81

                                       21
Cal.App.5th 394, 404, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655 [all aggravating
circumstances relied upon must meet requirements of section 1170,
subdivisions (b)(2) or (b)(3)].) And Salas contends that his attorney did not
address matters that could have influenced the trial court’s decision to
impose lesser enhancements or sentences because he proceeded on the basis
that the trial court’s discretion was limited in a way that it now is not. Salas
also indicates that the court had no incentive to explore mitigation or
otherwise evaluate whether a lesser sentence would have been appropriate
considering the state of the law, particularly the law regarding firearm
enhancements, at the time of sentencing.
      Given the number of changes that indicate the Legislature’s preference
for reduced sentences and our uncertainty whether these changes would have
individually or cumulatively altered the court’s perspective, we deem it best
to remand the matter for resentencing. There, Salas can present his
sentence-related arguments for the trial court to consider. (People v.
Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a
court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a
defendant”]; People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of a
sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate’ ”]; People v. Fuller (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 394, 400, review granted Nov. 22, 2022, S276762.) We express
no view on the sentence Salas may receive on remand.

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                              DISPOSITION
     The matter is remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.

                                                    HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

DATO, J.

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