Court Opinion

ID: 9690749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:40:24.605781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:03.734383
License: Public Domain

WIGGINS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. Specifically, I believe we should waive our judicially created standing doctrine in this case and allow Godfrey to challenge House File 2581, 80th General Assembly, First Extraordinary Session, section 11, as violative of the single-subject clause of article III, section 29 of the Iowa Constitution.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power of the federal courts to the resolution of cases and controversies. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. -, -, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2562, 168 L.Ed.2d 424, 437 (2007). The federal standing doctrine enforces article Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861, 164 L.Ed.2d 589, 602 (2006). The Iowa Constitution does not contain a case- or-controversy requirement. Hawkeye Bancorp. v. Iowa Coll. Aid Comm’n, 360 N.W.2d 798, 801-02 (Iowa 1985). Nevertheless, this court has adopted a standing requirement that is similar to the federal requirement. Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 869 (Iowa 2005).
The majority was correct when it found Godfrey does not have standing, under our judicially created standing requirement, to bring this action. The majority was also correct when it held we are free to waive the judicially created standing requirement if we determine the circumstances require us to do so. See Hawkeye Bancorp., 360 N.W.2d at 802. I disagree, how*429ever, with the majority’s analysis regarding whether the great-public-importance doctrine requires us to waive the standing requirement and allow Godfrey to maintain this action. I find the majority’s analysis, holding that the title clause of article III, section 29 of the Iowa Constitution trumps the single-subject clause, to be neither principled nor workable.
The majority’s analysis is unprincipled and unworkable because the application of the great-public-importance doctrine by the majority is dependent on whether one clause of article III, section 29 has more importance than another clause. The reason our court requires a party to have standing is to avoid issuing advisory opinions. Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 864. The analysis of whether a person has standing to bring a lawsuit must be made independent from the merits of the claim. Otherwise, a court will issue an advisory opinion on the merits of a claim in deciding the standing issue. This is exactly what the majority did in this case. The analysis employed by the majority allowed it to decide a violation of the single-subject clause of article III, section 29 is akin to harmless error if there was not a violation of the article’s title clause, and there was no fraud or deception in the enactment of the legislation. Had the majority found standing, I assume it would use the same analysis to defeat standing as it would use to defeat the claim on its merits. Thus, the majority effectively issued an advisory opinion on the merits of the claim.
A principled and workable analysis to determine whether to apply the doctrine of great public importance to waive standing first requires us to establish under what circumstances the doctrine should apply. The application of the doctrine should not be dependent on the merits of a claim.
This case appears to be the first opportunity for our court to grant a waiver of standing based upon the doctrine of great public importance. See Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Iowa 1994) (stating it is unnecessary for the court to consider the great-public-importance doctrine because the general rules of standing apply). In an earlier case involving an item veto, we came close to adopting the great-public-importance doctrine. State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Iowa 1971). There we stated, “The issue of interpretation of the item veto is an important matter and to dismiss this action would not serve the interests of either intervenors or defendants.” Id. However, in that case we appeared to say the inter-venors had standing because they were taxpayers. Id.
Finally, in a recent item-veto case brought by state legislators individually and in their capacity as state legislators, we found the legislators had standing to maintain the action. Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 198, 198 (Iowa 2004). In Rants, we did not distinguish between the legislators’ status as state officials or taxpayers when we decided the standing issue. Id. In doing so, we cited the Turner decision. One could argue by citing the Turner decision, we implicitly recognized the doctrine of great public importance and waived the standing requirement for state legislators to file an action contesting an item veto.
Regardless of whether we previously recognized the doctrine of great public importance, I agree with the majority that we can and should be able to waive the standing requirement under the doctrine. I contend the proper circumstances to apply the doctrine occur in the exceptional case where a citizen claims a branch of government violated a provision of the Iowa Constitution that presents a clear threat to the essential nature of state government as guaranteed by the constitution. See Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 961 P.2d *4301013, 1019 (1998) (holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances); see also State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 128 N.M. 154, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (1999) (stating the doctrine has been applied in cases that “generally involved clear threats to the essential nature of state government guaranteed to New Mexico citizens under their [constitution — a government in which the ‘three distinct departments, ... legislative, executive, and judicial,’ remain within the bounds of their constitutional powers” (citation omitted)).
The single-subject clause prevents logrolling, the practice whereby the legislature joins two or more unconnected matters in one bill to coerce legislators who support one of the matters into voting for the entire bill so they can secure passage of the individual matter they favor. Logrolling is not only inducive of fraud, it also makes it difficult to ascertain whether the legislature would have passed either of the matters had they been voted on separately. State ex rel. Clark v. State Canvassing BcL, 119 N.M. 12, 888 P.2d 458, 461 (1995).
The federal Constitution does not contain a single-subject clause. However, the framers of the Iowa Constitution thought a single-subject clause was important enough to include in both the 1846 constitution and our present-day constitution. See Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 26 (repealed 1857); Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 29. The single-subject clause is an essential constitutional restriction on the power of the legislature to enact laws. To disallow a citizen legal redress to contest a law on the grounds that it violates the single-subject clause is a clear threat to the essential nature of the operation of the legislative branch of state government as guaranteed by the constitution. The joinder of two or more unconnected matters in a bill is no mere irregularity. The single-subject clause goes to the heart of the legislative process mandated by the people of the State of Iowa when they adopted our constitution. Therefore, I would apply the doctrine of great public importance, waive the requirement of standing, and allow Godfrey’s challenge to proceed. See Sloan v. Wilkins, 362 S.C. 430, 608 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2005) (holding the doctrine of great public importance allows a citizen to challenge a bill under the single-subject clause of the South Carolina Constitution).
Consequently, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for a trial on the merits.
HECHT, J., joins this dissent.