Court Opinion

ID: 9626094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:01:54.723334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:21.148671
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Mitchell
dissenting.
In its opinion, the majority for the first time accepts the doctrine of equitable adoption for North Carolina. As applied by the majority in this case, the doctrine results in neither an adoption nor equity. Therefore, although I am convinced the majority is engaged in an honest but unfortunate attempt to do good in the present case, I must dissent.
“Equity” is that established set of principles under which substantial justice may be attained in particular cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law seem to be inadequate. 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 1 (1994). Equity “is a complex system of established law and is not merely a reflection of the judge’s sense of what is appropriate.” Id. § 2. It arose in response to the restrictive and inflexible rules of the common law, and not as a means of avoiding legislation that courts deemed unwise or inadequate.
For purposes of governing and regulating judicial action, equity courts over the centuries “have formulated certain rules or principles which are described by the term ‘maxims.’ ” Id. § 108. It is these maxims which must control the equity jurisdiction of the courts if their judgments are to reflect anything other than the peculiar preferences of the individual judges involved.
A court of equity has no more right than has a court of law to act on its own notion of what is right in a particular case; it must be guided by the established rules and precedents. Where rights are defined and established by existing legal principles, they may not be changed or unsettled in equity. A court of equity is thus bound by any explicit statute or directly applicable rule of law, regardless of its views of the equities.
Id. § 109 (footnotes omitted).
*122One maxim of equity, as the majority explains, is that equity regards as done that which in fairness and good conscience ought to be done. A court’s notion of what is good or desirable does not determine what “ought to be done” in applying equity. The maxim of equity upon which the majority relies must yield to other controlling and established rules or maxims. One such maxim is that a court of equity, however benevolent its motives, is “bound by any explicit statute or directly applicable rule of law, regardless of its view of the equities.” Id. Thus, no equitable remedy may properly be applied to disturb statutorily defined and established rights, such as those rights created by North Carolina statutes controlling intestate succession or those controlling legal adoption.
The North Carolina Intestate Succession Act provides a comprehensive and extensive legislative scheme controlling intestate succession by, through, and from adopted children. N.C.G.S. § 29-17(a) provides:
A child, adopted in accordance with Chapter 48 of the General Statutes or in accordance with the applicable law of any other jurisdiction, and the heirs of such child, are entitled by succession to any property by, through and from his adoptive parents and their heirs the same as if he were the natural legitimate child of the adoptive parents.
N.C.G.S. § 29-17(a) (1995) (emphasis added). The extensive scheme created by the legislature is clear and unambiguous. It provides, in pertinent part, that only those children who are adopted in compliance with chapter 48 or adopted according to the requirements of another jurisdiction are eligible to take by intestate succession. Therefore, the maxim relied upon by the majority may not properly be applied here.
Equity will not interfere where a statute applies and dictates requirements for relief. Use of equitable principles to trump an apposite statute thus is legally indefensible. The disregard of an unambiguous law based on sympathy is unjustifiable under the rubric of equity.
27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 246 (footnotes omitted).
It is well established that “[w]here an extensive legislative scheme governs, it is incumbent upon chancellors to restrain their equity powers.” Id. The application of the doctrine of equitable adoption by the majority in this case violates this principle of equity *123requiring greater restraint when dealing with statutory law than when addressing the common law. The majority’s application of the doctrine of equitable adoption here negates the rights of other heirs such as defendants which are expressly provided for in the extensive legislative scheme established by the North Carolina Intestate Succession Act. In the instant case, the application of the doctrine of equitable adoption denies other rightful heirs their statutory intestate shares, in effect voiding the intestate succession hierarchy enacted by our legislature. This result is contrary to established maxims of equity.
Further, contrary to established maxims of equity, the decision of the majority also “trumps” another applicable extensive legislative scheme. Adoption did not exist at common law in North Carolina. Therefore, we have expressly and correctly held that adoption “can be accomplished only in accordance with provisions of statutes enacted by the legislative branch of the State government.” Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N.C. 212, 215, 59 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1950). The North Carolina General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive and extensive legislative scheme governing adoptions contained in chapter 48 of the General Statutes. Plaintiff does not fall within the requirements of these statutes. Therefore, I believe that the majority errs in failing to apply restraint in the exercise of its equity powers and in applying its own notion of what “ought to be done” in order to improperly “trump” an apposite statute. 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 246.
Presently, all states recognize a parent-child relationship through adoption if the certain and unambiguous statutory procedures of each specific state are followed. A strong minority of courts that have reviewed the issue have declined to recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption. See Wilks v. Langley, 248 Ark. 227, 235, 451 S.W.2d 209, 213 (1970) (holding inheritance under theory of “virtual adoption” unknown in Arkansas); Maui Land & Pineapple Co. v. Naiapaakai Heirs of Makeelani, 69 Haw. 565, 568, 751 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1988) (“to depart from the statutes by creating a doctrine of equitable adoption would import mischief and uncertainty into the law”); In re Estate of Edwards, 106 Ill. App. 3d 635, 637, 435 N.E.2d 1379, 1381 (1982) (“Illinois has not expressly recognized the theory of equitable adoption”); Lindsey v. Wilcox, 479 N.E.2d 1330, 1333 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (“the doctrine of equitable adoption has never been approved in Indiana and it continues to be denied judicial approval”); In re Estate of Robbins, 241 Kan. 620, 621, 738 P.2d 458, 460 (1987) (“Kansas courts do not recognize the doctrine of equitable adop*124tion”); Pierce v. Pierce, 198 Mont. 255, 259, 645 P.2d 1353, 1356 (1982) (the adoptive parent or parents must follow the required procedures set forth in the Uniform Adoption Act in order for an adoption to occur); Alley v. Bennett, 298 S.C. 218, 221, 379 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1989) (the method of adoption provided by statute is exclusive); Couch v. Couch, 35 Tenn. App. 464, 476, 248 S.W.2d 327, 333 (1951) (“The right of adoption was unknown to the common law. It is of statutory origin, and to create the contemplated relation the procedure fixed by the statute must be substantially followed.”).
Asserting their belief that adoption is singularly defined by statute, these courts have properly deferred to the judgment of their legislators and the procedures established in their state adoption statutes. These courts have also deferred to their legislative bodies to enact laws governing the many complex issues that will arise if the doctrine of equitable adoption is recognized. Such issues would include whether the equitably “adopted” child would inherit from his or her natural parents or from a natural sibling who had not been equitably adopted. Moreover, a court deciding to recognize “equitable adoption” would have to determine for inheritance purposes the relationship between the equitably adopted child’s issue and the equitably adoptive parents, versus the child’s biological parents. The complexities abound.
The North Carolina General Assembly clearly enacted chapter 48 of the General Statutes of North Carolina with the intent to establish the exclusive procedure by which a minor child may be adopted. The preface to chapter 48 states the legislative intent in adopting this chapter.
The General Assembly finds that it is in the public interest to establish a clear judicial process for adoptions, to promote the integrity and finality of adoptions, to encourage prompt, conclusive disposition of adoption proceedings, and to structure services to adopted children, biological parents, and adoptive parents that will provide for the needs and protect the interests of all parties to an adoption, particularly adopted minors.
N.C.G.S. § 48-l-100(a) (1995) (emphasis added). The legislature intended that adoption in North Carolina be accomplished only through the formal judicial proceedings provided for in the extensive legislative scheme created in chapter 48. Therefore, equity may not properly interfere by creating a new form of partial or total adoption.
*125In effect, this Court preempts statutes enacted by our legislature in order to recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption. However, because our legislature has extensively, comprehensively, and unambiguously acted, both with regard to adoption and with regard to intestate succession, I am persuaded that the majority improperly “trumps” clear legislative intent in the name of equity.
Despite plaintiff’s foster parents’ verbal acknowledgments and holding plaintiff out as their natural child, they never legally adopted her by complying with the statutory process. “A mere contract to adopt a child, however, is not a contract to devise or bequeath property to that child.” Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 314 N.C. 477, 486, 334 S.E.2d 751, 758 (1985). Thus, it is my opinion that this Court should not declare plaintiff to have been “equitably adopted,” thereby subrogating the rights of the statutorily determined heirs for purposes of intestate succession.
Finally, another principle of equity prevents the proper application here of the maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to be done. Defendants in this case include the heirs of Lula Newton under the North Carolina Intestate Succession Act. There is no allegation, contention, or evidence that they are anything other than innocent third parties to the transactions between plaintiff and her natural parents on the one hand and the Newtons on the other concerning any promise to adopt. This Court, like most courts, has expressly recognized and held that the maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to be done ought not to be and “will not be enforced to the injury of innocent third parties.” Hood ex rel. N. C. Bank & Trust Co. v. N.C. Bank & Trust Co., 209 N.C. 367, 381, 184 S.E. 51, 63 (1936); see Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 314 N.C. at 487, 334 S.E.2d at 758; see also Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467, 24 L. Ed. 779 (1877); Riganti v. McElhinney, 248 Cal. App. 2d 116, 56 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1967); Kennedy v. Bank of America, 237 Cal. App. 2d 637, 47 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1965); Rigby v. Liles, 505 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 P 641 (1923); Kelsey v. Kelsey, 190 N.Y.S. 52 (Sup. Ct. 1921), rev’d on other grounds, 204 A.D. 116, 197 N.Y.S. 371 (1922); Crahane v. Swan, 212 Or. 143, 318 P.2d 942 (1957); Smith v. Schwartz, 398 Pa. 555, 159 A.2d 220 (1960); Crabb v. Uvalde Paving Co., 23 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1930). Here, the majority injures such innocent third parties.
The record in the present case does not indicate that either plaintiff or defendants are anything other than innocents. Therefore, gen*126eral principles of equity do not arise concerning what “ought to be done” as between them; “where equities are equal, ‘the law must prevail.’ ” 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 139 (footnotes omitted).
In the present case, the controlling maxims of equity clearly require that this Court restrain its equity powers so as not to overrule comprehensive statutory schemes and, thereby, do harm to innocents. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority and would affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the trial court.
Justice Parker joins in this dissenting opinion.