Court Opinion

ID: 9624257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:55:52.024947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:03.736854
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
concurring specially.
In concluding that Fox’s waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights was invalid because this condition of probation was not properly obtained as part of the plea bargaining process, the opinion concludes that Fox can only be charged with knowledge of the existence of those conditions articulated by the District Attorney and the trial judge during sentencing. I do not agree. In my opinion the record supports the conclusion that Fox and his counsel were aware of the numerous conditions included in the standard form made a part of the second page of the sentence, including the probation requirement address*168ing the Fourth Amendment waiver. It is also my opinion that it is not incumbent upon a sentencing judge to review each and every probation condition from the bench in order to guard against the very circumstance presented here.
The written sentence signed by Fox and his attorney consists of two separate references to Fox’s probationary obligation to comply with the special and general conditions “stated in this sentence” and “stated in Page 2 of this sentence.” The sentence form contains blocks next to these references, and both of the blocks are checked. Thus Fox explicitly acknowledged that he was aware of the condition at issue. The suppression transcript shows that the Cherokee County trial court heard testimony from Fox’s probation officer as well as Fox and was presented with the sentencing transcript and the written sentence. The Cherokee County court thereafter made the specific, straightforward finding that Fox was aware of the waiver as a probation condition. The suppression transcript shows that the trial court was unpersuaded by Fox’s claim that the waiver was flawed because the sentencing court did not select and articulate that express condition; one out of the twenty-three general and special probation conditions imposed. However, there was no obligation on the sentencing court to articulate the entire list of conditions as that oral declaration would not constitute the sentence; the written sentence signed by the court controlled. See Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183 (4) (281 SE2d 604) (1981).
It is my opinion that the mere fact that a probation officer fulfills his obligation to meet with a probationer after sentencing to ensure that the probationer has a complete understanding of the terms of his probation should not defeat any of the conditions made a part of the sentence by the trial judge. Meeting with the probation officer after sentencing benefits the probationer by ensuring that the probationer is fully aware of the terms of probation and what behavior will run afoul of the conditions attached to probation. Because I believe that the plain language of the negotiated guilty plea to the burglary charge in Bartow County cannot be interpreted in any other manner than to conclude that Fox was aware that compliance with the assorted special conditions was required to remain on probation in lieu of serving the ten-year sentence under incarceration and that he was aware of the probation conditions which included the Fourth Amendment waiver, at the time of his sentence, I cannot agree with Division 1 of the opinion. Although I would affirm the finding of the trial court as to the validity of the waiver, I nevertheless concur in judgment only because I believe the warrantless probationer search conducted by a police officer instead of a probation officer is violative of the protection given by the Fourth Amendment. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868 (107 SC 3164, 97 LE2d 709) (1987).
*169Decided March 6, 2000.
John A. Nuckolls, for appellant.
Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, Cecelia M. Harris, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this special concurrence.