Court Opinion

ID: 9939381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 21:03:02.585206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:01.419523
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/24 Korean American Presbyterian Church v. Park CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 KOREAN AMERICAN                                                  B313495
 PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
                                                                  (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                               Super. Ct. No. BC582128)

           v.

 HUN SUNG PARK,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
      PKIMLAW and Donna Bullock Carrera for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
      McKay, de Lorimier & Acain, Paul A. de Lorimier and
Paul W. Park for Defendant and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

      This is the second appeal in this case, which in turn is one
case among many between the various leaders and members of
the Korean American Presbyterian Church (KAPC) and the
International Reformed University & Seminary (IRUS) in a
decades-long dispute over control of the church and its (which is
actually part of the dispute) seminary.1 In the prior appeal, we
reversed a judgment in favor of Hun Sung Park and various other
current and former directors of IRUS and directed the trial court
to, among other things, grant KAPC leave to amend its complaint
to cure a standing deficiency. After KAPC made that
amendment, the trial court dismissed the complaint, agreeing
with Park and the other defendants on demurrer that the
language of a settlement agreement and release in another

1     See, e.g., Korean American Presbyterian Church v. Park
(Nov. 13, 2019, B284852) [nonpub. opn.]; The Western California
Presbytery v. Holy Hill Community Church (Nov. 1, 2012,
B236877) [nonpub. opn.]; Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian
Church v. The California Presbytery (Apr. 28, 2008, B194519)
[nonpub. opn.]; Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. Cho
(Sept. 10, 2003, B151945) [nonpub. opn.]; Korean Philadelphia
Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1074; Korean American Presbyterian
Church v. IRUS (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. BC687605); Cho v.
Park (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. BC582128); Korean American
Presbyterian Church v. Kim (Super. Ct. L.A. County,
No. BC555357); Korean American Presbyterian Church v. Korean
American Presbyterian Church (Super. Ct. L.A. County,
No. BC540136); IRUS v. Whang (Super. Ct. L.A. County,
No. BC518771). And that’s e.g.

                                2
KAPC-IRUS lawsuit barred KAPC’s claims in this action. We
reverse again.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

     A.      KAPC Sues Park and Others, Loses in the Trial
             Court, but Obtains a Partial Victory on Appeal
       In May 2015 KAPC and various former directors of IRUS
filed this action against Hung Sun Park and others for, among
other things, declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty,
conversion, and trademark infringement. KAPC alleged that it is
a nonprofit religious corporation that operates as a denomination
of the Presbyterian Church and that IRUS is a nonprofit public
benefit corporation that operates as a seminary for KAPC. KAPC
alleged that in 1979 IRUS “donated the seminary” to KAPC
pursuant to a petition by Rev. Chun-Il Cho, who was the
president of KAPC at the time. But then, KAPC claimed, in 2014
“‘a dissident faction of apostates’ wrested control of IRUS away
from KAPC by improperly removing KAPC-affiliated directors
from IRUS’s board and illegally changing IRUS’s bylaws to
eliminate any required association with KAPC, thus
fundamentally altering IRUS’s mission of providing ordained
ministers for KAPC.” KAPC also claimed Park and his associates
improperly used the KAPC name and trademark to hold
themselves out as KAPC. (Korean American Presbyterian Church
v. Park (Nov. 13, 2019, B284852) [nonpub. opn.] (KAPC I).)
       The trial court made several rulings adverse to KAPC,
some on demurrer (several of the individual plaintiffs lacked
standing), some on summary judgment (another individual
plaintiff lacked standing), some at the court trial (KAPC lacked

                               3
standing to bring a derivative claim and KAPC’s trademark
claims were barred). Of relevance to this appeal, the trial court
ruled a settlement agreement and release in another case,
Korean American Presbyterian Church v. Korean American
Presbyterian Church (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. BC540136)
(KAPC v. KAPC), barred KAPC’s trademark claims in this action
and that an exception or carve-out from that release for claims
involved in yet another lawsuit, IRUS v. John Eun Whang (which
the parties and the trial court refer to as the “Whang exception”
or the “Whang exemption”), did not apply. The court entered
judgment in favor of Park and other defendants, and KAPC
appealed. (KAPC I, supra, B284852.)
       We reversed. We held that, although KAPC did not have
standing as a public benefit corporation under Corporations Code
section 5710 to maintain a derivative cause of action on behalf of
IRUS against Park and the other defendants, the trial court
erred in denying KAPC leave to amend to allege it had standing
as a religious corporation under Corporations Code section 9142
to maintain a breach of trust cause of action. We affirmed the
trial court’s ruling the release in the KAPC v. KAPC settlement
agreement barred KAPC’s trademark claims. In particular, we
rejected KAPC’s argument the release applied only to the two
defendants in this action who were signatories to the settlement
agreement, concluding KAPC had forfeited the argument by not
making it in the trial court. We did not reach the merits of
whether the language of the settlement agreement and release
applied to KAPC’s trademark claims.

                                4
       B.    KAPC Files a Third Amended Complaint
       On remand KAPC filed a third amended complaint. The
allegations in that pleading, which we assume are true (Aghaian
v. Minassian (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 447, 461), describe some of
the details of the dispute among certain individuals involved in,
and the opposing factions of, the church.
       KAPC alleged in its third amended complaint it “is an
ecclesiastical denomination of the Christian faith” whose
“primary purpose is to grow churches and maintain order for
their particular belief system.” KAPC alleged that it “operates as
a denomination of the Presbyterian Church overseeing thirty (30)
district presbyteries,[2] six hundred fifty (650) churches,
one thousand two hundred fifty (1,250) pastors, and at least
sixty thousand (60,000) members.” Park is a pastor who was a
member of KAPC. IRUS is a California religious corporation that

2      “A presbytery is the basic unit of presbyterian church
government, composed of ministers and elders who represent all
the particular churches in a certain geographic area and meet
regularly as a legislative body. Presbyteries, in turn, are grouped
under the jurisdiction of a synod, the next higher governing
body.” (Korean United Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of the
Pacific (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 480, 488, disapproved on another
ground in Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th
725, 744, fn. 11.) “A presbytery consists of all the ministers in
the geographical area and at least one ruling elder from each
individual church. Each presbytery supervises the churches
within its area and has the authority to, among other things,
organize and dissolve churches, remove pastors from their
pulpits, and suspend the powers of a session,” the governing body
of a local church. (Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church
of Palm Springs (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 910, 915-916.)

                                 5
owns property in Los Angeles. IRUS educates and prepares
students to become pastors of KAPC’s religious denomination.
       In 1979 IRUS “was donated for the benefit of KAPC.” Since
that time, “IRUS has accepted the benefits of being a KAPC
property including receiving core theological teaching curriculum;
the installation of KAPC[-]designated directors on the IRUS
Board of Directors; financial benefits; and, continued support
from the Denomination in the training of new ordained pastors of
the Christian religion.” KAPC has the right to review and
approve all aspects of IRUS’s “corporate governance, including
the appointment of officers and directors; annual financial
reports; [and] corporate name changes. . . .”
       In 2006 KAPC appointed Park to serve as president of
IRUS. He served until July 2010, when he resigned after “an
investigation into the questionable issuance of ministry decrees
by the accrediting body known as the Association for Biblical
Higher Education.” After his resignation, Park “began a
campaign where he and his associates would restock the Board of
Directors with those loyal to Park,” hold IRUS corporate
meetings without notice, and dismiss IRUS directors appointed
by KAPC. In July 2012, after “hotly contested” board meetings
and litigation between Park and other church officials, Park “was
ostensibly elected as President of IRUS once again.” A complaint
was filed with the Western California Presbytery, “a sub-
presbytery within the hierarchical structure of KAPC,”3 and a

3    The Western California Presbytery (WCP) “is one of several
presbyteries within the Korean American Presbytery Church
(KAPC). The WCP and its member churches are governed, in
ascending hierarchical order, by the WCP bylaws and . . . KAPC’s

                                6
hearing was scheduled for November 2012. In anticipation of the
hearing, however, Park and the new IRUS board amended the
articles of incorporation and bylaws of IRUS to renounce KAPC’s
jurisdiction. The new amendments “eliminated any requirement
of KAPC membership and pastoral licensure by board members
of IRUS; eliminated any reference of KAPC’s role during
dissolution of IRUS; and, modified the appointment process for
IRUS board members by removing the authority of KAPC from
the process.” Park also “utilized the KAPC logos and marks” to
make it appear “his statements were somehow made jointly with
KAPC.”
       In September 2013 Park “was formally excommunicated
from KAPC as a pastor member.” In response, Park and his
supporters attempted to take over KAPC and “utilized a local
church that shared the same name as . . . KAPC in an effort to
hold themselves out as the ‘true church.’” Park also “continued to
advertise in local newspapers that IRUS was still a KAPC
institution and that its graduates would become ordained in the
KAPC denomination.”
       KAPC fought back, including by filing lawsuits in superior
court. One of these lawsuits was a derivative action against
Park, called Cho v. Park, designed “to undo the corporate actions
performed by” Park. All the third amended complaint alleged
about this action was that the “matter was successfully appealed
with an order granting [KAPC] leave to amend the pleading.”
       The other lawsuit was KAPC v. KAPC. At some point the
parties to this internecine litigation settled, with KAPC

book of church order (BOCO).” (Kim v. The True Church
Members of Holy Hill Community Church (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
1435, 1442.)

                                7
“retaining its rights to its name, logo and history as the proper
denominational body of KAPC.” The settlement agreement
included a release that applied to “all claims, demands, causes of
action, obligations, damages and liabilities, whether or not now
known, suspected or claimed, arising out of or based upon the
facts and circumstances giving rise to the Action [i.e., KAPC v.
KAPC], and any and all transactions or interactions between the
Parties prior to the date of this Agreement.” The release,
however, included an exception, which as stated the parties call
the “Whang exception.” The exception to the release stated:
“This Settlement Agreement shall not be construed as releasing
any claims or otherwise affecting the matter of International
Reformed University and Seminary v John Eun Whang et[] al.,
bearing case number B518771 and/or any settling parties’ claims
with regard to the Western California Presbytery or the Holy
Hills Community Church. Thus this agreement cannot be used
for any purposes in any matters or cases relating to said claims.”
This appeal is about the language of the Whang exception to the
release in the KAPC v. KAPC settlement agreement.
       And what was this lawsuit the parties refer to as the
“Whang litigation”? It’s hard to say. Other than alleging the
language of the release and the exception, KAPC’s third amended
complaint doesn’t say much about it. The third amended
complaint includes a series of allegations about the settlement
agreement and release (and the Whang exception), apparently
because it was an issue in the prior appeal. KAPC alleges the
Whang exception “applied to claims that were not resolved on
their merits, and have still not been resolved to this day, and that
is the illegitimate take-over of IRUS, and Park’s wresting of
control of IRUS from the control of KAPC.” Which sounds a lot

                                 8
like the claims in this lawsuit and many of the other lawsuits
that have proliferated throughout the superior court over the
recent past. But KAPC alleged that, because the Whang
exception refers to the Western California Presbytery, and
“KAPC is the governing organization for which Western
California Presbytery is a subsidiary,” the exception applies to
this action.4
       In its third amended complaint, KAPC asserted causes of
action for constructive trust, an accounting, declaratory relief,
and fraud (but not trademark infringement, because in KAPC I
we affirmed the dismissal of those claims). Though the first two
are not causes of action,5 KAPC essentially seeks a declaration

4      We know a little bit about the Whang litigation because
Park asked the trial court to take, and the court took, judicial
notice of Whang’s cross-complaint in that action. More on that
later.

5      A constructive trust is not a cause of action; it is a remedy.
(See American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1485; Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 277, fn. 4; PCO, Inc. v. Christensen,
Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 384, 398; Embarcadero Mun. Improvement Dist.
v. County of Santa Barbara (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 781, 793; Glue-
Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023,
fn. 3.) Similarly, an accounting is not an independent cause of
action, but a type of remedy that depends on the validity of
underlying claims. (Batt v. City and County of San Francisco
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 65, 82, disapproved on another ground in
McWilliams v. City of Long Beach (2013) 56 Cal.4th 613, 626;
Duggal v. G.E. Capital Communications Services, Inc. (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 81, 95.)

                                 9
IRUS holds in trust for KAPC certain property and funds
donated to IRUS; an accounting of IRUS’s income, assets, and
expenses; a declaration of who has the right to control and
operate IRUS; and damages for Park’s fraudulent
misrepresentations to students about IRUS’s affiliation with
KAPC.

      C.     The Trial Court Sustains Park’s Demurrer to the
             Third Amended Complaint
       Park demurred to the third amended complaint, arguing it
did not state any cause of action because all of KAPC’s claims
“have been released” by the settlement agreement in the KAPC v.
KAPC case.6 Park also argued that, although the trial court had
denied a motion for summary judgment because there were
triable issues of fact regarding whether KAPC’s claims in this
action “affect or relate to those operating in” the Whang case, the
court should dismiss KAPC’s complaint because the Whang
matter had been resolved. Park argued that, because the Whang
matter was resolved on the merits pursuant a stipulated
judgment, nothing occurring after that stipulated judgment could
affect the claims that were “made and adjudicated” in the Whang
action. Thus, Park asserted, “[r]eleasing Park from KAPC’s
claims in this matter as a result of the very broad releasing
language” of the settlement agreement in KAPC v. KAPC “will

6      As we will discuss, Park had it backward. He was not
demurring on the ground KAPC had failed to allege sufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10,
subd. (e)), but rather on the ground the affirmative defense of
settlement and release barred KAPC’s causes of action. (See
Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
1298, 1309; Baker v. Ferrel (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 578, 579.)

                                10
have no impact upon Whang,” which meant “the Whang
exemption does not apply to Park in this instance.” Park also
argued KAPC failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause
of action for fraud.
       KAPC argued in opposition to the demurrer that the
release in the KAPC v. KAPC settlement agreement did not bar
KAPC’s claims in this action because the Whang “carve-out
exception” to the release applied to claims “with regard to” the
Western California Presbytery, and KAPC brought before that
entity the claims KAPC was bringing in this case. KAPC also
argued that the Whang exception further stated the release
“cannot be used for any purposes in any matters or cases relating
to said claims,” that “said claims” referred to claims in the Whang
case or claims regarding Western California Presbytery, and that
this case, “with its causes of action[] being directly related to
Park illegitimately taking control of IRUS, relates to these said
claims.” KAPC argued that the exception still applied, even
though the Whang action “no longer exists,” because it “has not
been fully resolved.” KAPC also argued it sufficiently alleged a
cause of action for fraud.
       The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend. The court ruled that the release barred KAPC’s causes of
action and that the Whang exception did not apply. Referring to
the Whang exception, the court stated: “The common definition
of ‘affect’ is to ‘produce an effect upon.’ KAPC relies on the
‘relating to said claims’ language in the last sentence of the
exemption and argues that ‘[t]his instant case, with its causes of
action[ ] being directly related to [Park] illegitimately taking
control of IRUS, relates to these said claims.’ [Citation.] In this
matter, the ‘said claims’ language refers to the ‘claims or

                                11
otherwise affecting [Whang].’[7] Therefore, the last sentence of
the exemption should be interpreted as reading as follows: the
settlement agreement ‘cannot be used for any purposes in any
matters or cases relating to [claims or otherwise affecting
Whang]. KAPC’s present claims cannot have a direct effect upon
Whang as that matter has concluded. KAPC’s present claims
also cannot relate to claims affecting Whang.” The court
concluded by stating that, “to the extent certain language in the
[settlement agreement] and the carve out could be construed as
ambiguous, in light of this Court’s prior factual findings, the
findings of the Court of Appeal, and, as noticed, the Whang
judgments—adverse to all parties and sides, it is clear that Park
has been released.”
       The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of
Park. KAPC timely appealed.8

7     It is unclear whether the court was referring here to Whang
the lawsuit or Whang the individual. The word in the court’s
order is not italicized.
8     KAPC does not argue the trial court erred in sustaining
Park’s demurrer to the fraud cause of action.

                                12
                          DISCUSSION

       A.     Standard of Review
       “‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine
the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’”
(Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; accord, Martin v.
Gladstone (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 681, 688-689; Thompson v.
Spitzer (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 436, 451.) “We treat the demurrer
as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Mathews,
at p. 768, internal quotation marks omitted; accord, Martin, at
p. 689; Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Assn. (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 889, 899.) “‘[W]e accept as true even improbable
alleged facts, and we do not concern ourselves with the plaintiff’s
ability to prove [the] factual allegations.’” (Marina Pacific Hotel
and Suites, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104-105; see Thomas v. Regents of University
of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 618, fn. 12 [“when
California trial courts consider a demurrer, ‘“the facts alleged in
the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they
may be”’”]; see also Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970)
2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [“the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove
these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof
does not concern the reviewing court”].) “[W]e give the complaint
a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context.” (Mathews, at p. 768, internal quotation marks
omitted; accord, Lauckhart, at p. 899; Marina Pacific, at p. 105.)
       “We interpret a release or settlement agreement under the
same rules of construction that apply to contracts generally.

                                 13
[Citations.] We interpret a contract to give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties at the time they formed the contract.
[Citations.] We discern the parties’ intention based on the
written contract alone, if possible, but may also consider the
circumstances under which the contract was made and its subject
matter. [Citations.] We consider the contract as a whole, and
interpret contested provisions in their context, not in isolation,
with the aim of giving effect to all provisions, if doing so is
reasonably possible.” (Camacho v. Target Corp. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 291, 306.)
       “‘An ambiguity exists when a party can identify an
alternative, semantically reasonable, candidate of meaning of a
writing. [Citations.] An ambiguity can be patent, arising from
the face of the writing, or latent, based on extrinsic evidence.’”
(Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351,
1357; accord, Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708,
722; see Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384,
391 [“‘[a]n ambiguity arises when language is reasonably
susceptible of more than one application to material facts’”];
Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1287-
1288 [“If an alternative, ‘“semantically reasonable”’ meaning
exists the release is ambiguous.”].) The court generally cannot
resolve a contractual ambiguity on demurrer. (See Performance
Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc.
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 672 [ambiguity in a settlement
agreement could not be resolved on demurrer].)
       As stated, settlement or release is an affirmative defense.
(Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1309; Baker v. Ferrel (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d
578, 579.) “‘“‘[A] demurrer based on an affirmative defense will

                               14
be sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that
the action is necessarily barred by the defense.’”’” (Silva v.
Langford (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 710, 716; accord, Committee to
Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
607, 622; see Heshejin v. Rostami (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 984,
992.)

      B.     The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining Park’s Demurrer
             to the Third Amended Complaint
       As discussed, the release in the KAPC v. KAPC settlement
agreement contained a mutual release of all claims and
transactions “arising out of or based upon the facts and
circumstances giving rise to” the lawsuit between the two
KAPCs. The parties do not dispute the meaning of this part of
the release; they dispute the meaning of the exception at the end
of the release. As quoted, that language stated: “This Settlement
Agreement shall not be construed as releasing any claims or
otherwise affecting the matter of International Reformed
University and Seminary v. John Eun Whang et[] al., bearing
case number BC518771 and/or any settling parties’ claims with
regard to the Western California Presbytery or the Holy Hills
Community Church. Thus this agreement cannot be used for any
purposes in any matters or cases relating to said claims.”
       The trial court ruled the release applied and the exception
did not because the Whang case was over (by stipulated
judgment), which meant KAPC’s claims in this action could not
have affected the Whang matter. After all, it’s hard to affect a
lawsuit that’s over. The trial court also ruled the language
“cannot be used for any purposes in any matters or cases relating
to said claims” meant “cannot be used for any purposes in any

                                15
matters or cases relating to claims or otherwise affecting
Whang.”
       Well, that’s one possible interpretation. But here’s another
one: The first half of the first sentence of the Whang exception
(“[t]his Settlement Agreement shall not be construed as releasing
any claims or otherwise affecting the” Whang case) may no longer
apply because, now that the Whang case is resolved, nothing (in
this case or otherwise) can affect it. Fair enough. But the second
half of the first sentence, which continues after “and/or” (“[t]his
Settlement Agreement shall not be construed as releasing . . . any
settling parties’ claims with regard to the Western California
Presbytery”), may still apply. KAPC was a “settling party” in
KAPC v. KAPC. It had claims that related to (were “with regard
to”) Western California Presbytery (and, for that matter, Holy
Hill Community Church). Those claims were not released, and
KAPC is pursuing them in this action. Therefore, under this
equally (if not more) reasonable interpretation of the Whang
exception, the release in the settlement agreement does not
apply, at least on demurrer. (See Russell City Energy Co., LLC v.
City of Hayward (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 54, 62 [“So long as the
pleading does not place a clearly erroneous construction upon the
provisions of the contract, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
complaint, we must accept as correct plaintiff’s allegations as to
the meaning of the agreement. (internal quotation marks
omitted)”]; Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th
1342, 1385 [same].)
       But there’s more: The second sentence of the Whang
exception stated the settlement agreement “cannot be used for
any purposes in any matters or cases relating to said claims.”
Park “used” the settlement agreement for a purpose in this case:

                                16
to bar KAPC’s claims and obtain judgment on the pleadings. A
legitimate purpose, to be sure, but a purpose. And which claims
are “said claims”? The trial court ruled that “said claims” meant
“claims or otherwise affecting” Whang and that the second
sentence meant the settlement agreement could not be used for
any purpose in any matters or cases relating to claims or
otherwise affecting Whang. That’s one possible interpretation
(although the sentence doesn’t say that; the trial court imported
the phrase “claims or otherwise affecting Whang” from the first
half of the first sentence and added it to the end of the second).
But an equally, if not more, reasonable interpretation is that
“said claims” referred to what the exemption is about: the claims
of the settling parties “with regard to” the Western California
Presbytery (and, though not relevant here, Holy Hill Community
Church). That’s what KAPC (quite reasonably) alleges it means,
and on demurrer we accept that interpretation. (See Aluma
Systems Concrete Construction of California v. Nibbi Bros. Inc.
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 620, 626 [even if the defendant’s
“construction of the Contract were possible, we must accept [the
plaintiff’s] reasonable interpretation for purposes of . . .
demurrer”]; Marzec v. Public Employees’ Retirement System
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 889, 909 [“‘“‘So long as the pleading does
not place a clearly erroneous construction upon the provisions of
the contract, in passing upon the sufficiency of the complaint, we
must accept as correct plaintiff’s allegations as to the meaning of
the agreement.’”’”]; Performance Plastering v. Richmond
American Homes of California, Inc., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at
p. 672 [where a term in a “settlement agreement is arguably
ambiguous,” the court “must accept [the plaintiff’s] reasonable

                                17
interpretation of the terms of the settlement agreement in testing
the sufficiency of the complaint”].)
        Indeed, KAPC’s claims in this action relate directly to the
claims involving Western California Presbytery that KAPC
asserted in KAPC v. KAPC, bringing those claims even further
within the ambit of the Whang exception. Remember that in this
action KAPC alleged Park and his associates wrongfully removed
the president of IRUS and arranged to have himself re-installed
as the president? Well, Whang was the president Park deposed.
Here’s what Whang alleged about that in his cross-complaint in
IRUS v. Whang: In 1979 IRUS was donated to KAPC and
became “subject to the management and control of KAPC”; in
2006 Park became president of IRUS; in July 2010 Park
“resigned in disgrace as the President of IRUS and . . . Whang
was elected as the new President”; in July 2012 Park “was
illegally-elected [sic] as the new President of IRUS”; and in the
fall of 2012 Park “committed an act of tergiversation by
purportedly holding a special meeting of the” IRUS board of
directors “to amend the Bylaws of IRUS to remove the provision
requiring IRUS to adhere to the direction, management, control
and guidance of KAPC,” which “apostasy violated the entire basis
for donating IRUS to KAPC in 1979.”9 Whang further alleged in
his cross-complaint that he filed a complaint with the “Central
Los Angeles Presbytery (a local presbytery of KAPC)” and that

9     “Tergiversation is defined as ‘[t]he action of “turning one’s
back on” i.e. forsaking, something in which one was previously
engaged, interested, or concerned; desertion or abandonment of a
cause, party, etc.; apostasy, renegation.’” (B. Handler,
Abandoning the Cause: An Interstate Comparison of Candidate
Withdrawal and Replacement Laws (2004) 37 Colum. J.L. & Soc.
Probs. 413, 446.)

                                18
there was a “Church Trial” with “the California Presbytery and
the Central Los Angeles Presbytery.” Whang asserted causes of
action for, among other things, injunctive relief to enjoin Park
and others from managing and controlling IRUS and using
IRUS’s name, logo, or materials; declaratory relief regarding who
was in charge of IRUS; constructive trust over IRUS’s property
and income; and an accounting of IRUS’s assets, liabilities,
income, and expenses. Sure sounds a lot like KAPC’s claims in
this case, and the very kind of claims the Whang exception was
drafted not to release.
       We need not decide now which interpretation of the Whang
exception is more reasonable. That very well may have to await
the trial court’s evaluation of extrinsic evidence. (See City of
Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008)
43 Cal.4th 375, 393 [extrinsic evidence “is admissible to resolve
ambiguities in the contract’s language”]; Wolf v. Superior Court
(2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1350 [courts may consider extrinsic
evidence in ascertaining the meaning of an ambiguous
contractual term]; Neverkovec v. Fredericks (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th
337, 350 [parol evidence is admissible to resolve an ambiguity in
a release].) We can safely conclude, however, that at the pleading
stage both interpretations are reasonable and that the trial court
erred in sustaining Park’s demurrer based on the settlement
agreement and release. (See People v. Superior Court
(J.C. Penney Corp., Inc.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 376, 399
[a “‘demurrer based on an affirmative defense cannot properly be
sustained where the action might be barred by the defense, but is
not necessarily barred’”]; CrossTalk Productions, Inc. v. Jacobson
(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 631, 635 [same]; see also Stella v. Asset
Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 191

                               19
[“‘a demurrer based on an affirmative defense will be sustained
only where the face of the complaint discloses that the action is
necessarily barred by the defense’”].)
       The trial court also ruled that, to the extent there was any
ambiguity in the settlement agreement and the Whang exception,
the release still applied because of the trial court’s “prior factual
findings” and “the findings of” this court in KAPC I. Both
reasons were flawed. Whatever the trial court’s prior factual
findings were, they were irrelevant on demurrer. (See Payne v.
Rader (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1575 [“a ruling on a
demurrer does not involve either admission of evidence or
findings of fact”], disapproved on another ground in Ryan v.
Rosenfeld (2017) 3 Cal.5th 124, 135, fn. 4; Mink v. Maccabee
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 835, 839 [“a demurrer does not permit the
trial court to make any factual findings at all, including ‘implicit’
ones”].) And we did not make any findings in KAPC I. We rarely
do. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [“‘Although
appellate courts are authorized to make findings of fact on appeal
by Code of Civil Procedure section 909 and rule 23 of the
California Rules of Court, the authority should be exercised
sparingly,” and “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, no such
findings should be made.”]; Technology Credit Union v. Rafat
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 314, 323 [same].) As discussed, in KAPC I
we affirmed the dismissal of KAPC’s trademark claims and
directed the trial court to give leave to amend to allege standing
to assert KAPC’s other claims.

                                 20
       C.     The Law of the Case Doctrine Did Not Apply
       Park argues that we held in KAPC I the settlement
agreement released Park and that our decision in KAPC I is law
of the case. Not quite.
       Under the law of the case doctrine, “a matter adjudicated
on a prior appeal normally will not be relitigated on a subsequent
appeal in the same case.” (Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502,
507; see People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246 [“when an
appellate court ‘“states in its opinion a principle or rule of law
necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law
of the case and must be adhered to throughout [the case’s]
subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon
subsequent appeal”’”]; Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985)
38 Cal.3d 425, 434 [“The rule of ‘law of the case’ generally
precludes multiple appellate review of the same issue in a single
case.”].) “The doctrine applies to decisions of intermediate
appellate courts as well as courts of last resort” (San Francisco
Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Com. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 562,
569, fn. 4), and “‘“even if the court that issued the opinion
becomes convinced in a subsequent consideration that the former
opinion is erroneous”’” (Finato v. Keith A. Fink & Associates
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 136, 148). The doctrine promotes finality
by preventing relitigation of issues previously decided. (George
Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1989)
49 Cal.3d 1279, 1291; Searle, at p. 434.)
       In KAPC I we held the settlement and release barred
KAPC’s trademark claims. KAPC I did not involve, and we did
not adjudicate, whether the settlement and release barred any
other causes of action. Indeed, we did not really decide that the
Whang exception did not apply to KAPC’s trademark claims; we

                               21
held only that KAPC forfeited its right to make the argument.
Either way, the law of the case doctrine does not apply here.

                        DISPOSITION

      The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to
vacate its order sustaining KAPC’s demurrer to the third
amended complaint and enter a new order sustaining the
demurrer to KAPC’s fraud cause of action without leave to amend
and otherwise overruling the demurrer. KAPC is to recover its
costs on appeal.

                                            SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                 FEUER, J.

                 MARTINEZ, J.

                               22