Court Opinion

ID: 9424177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:10:40.921671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:48.673077
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
with whom Mr. Justice Black concurs,
dissenting.
All constitutional questions aside, there was in the present case a right to trial by jury on “the issue of just compensation” as provided in Rule 71A (h). I do not *22see how “the issue of just compensation” can be decided without considering whether or not the property was probably within or not within the project's original scope. As the opinion of the Court makes plain, important questions of value turn on that decision. In this case it is seen in the difference between the value of the property as agricultural land and its value as potential lakeside residential or recreational property.
If it were certain beyond doubt that the property was within the original scope of the project, a different question might be presented. But there is nothing in this record to show that respondents’ property was included in the original design. We deal here with probabilities or perhaps with possibilities. If the property were not within the original design, a purchaser could reasonably anticipate that he would be able to devote the land to its highest economic use reflected in part by its proximity to the Government’s project. Henry George1 would have it otherwise; but that has not been the direction of our economy. Hence what we are talking about is market value and that in turn includes all of the ingredients that make up price. The most central element of price in the area now litigated was the relation of the land to the original project and that issue was one of fact. The “issue of just compensation”2 as used in Rule 71A (h) *23truly cannot be resolved without considering that question.
There seems to be no reason why the jury chosen by Congress to decide the final issue of "just compensation” should be denied the power to determine the subordinate issues of fact upon which the jury’s final verdict must rest.
There are powerful forces loose in this country that deprecate the use of juries. The Department of Justice and other federal agencies3 often seem to dislike juries in *24condemnation cases. In my Circuit, juries have unexpectedly risen up in favor of homeowners and against Washington, D. C., and granted “just compensation” in large sums, in retaliation, it is believed, against hard-nosed officials who, with all the power of the central government, seek to plow them under. At other times the jury has acted differently and cut down the award.4 Juries in these condemnation cases perform, in other words, an historic restraint on both executive and judicial power. See Bushell’s Case. 6 How. St. Tr. 999, decided in 1670.

 Progress and Poverty, Book VI (50th Ann. ed. 1945).

 In United States v. Certain Lands, 144 F. Supp. 206, a road was taken and the question of “just compensation” turned on whether the construction of a substitute facility was necessary. The court held that that issue of necessity was properly left to the jury:
“In the average condemnation proceeding, many factors must be considered in arriving at just compensation, factors which are only established and available after the exercise of a fact-finding process. There appears to be no reason for introducing a trial by jury into condemnation proceedings unless the jury’s province is broad enough to include the weighing of evidence which directly relates *23to the issue of compensation. It would seem that in this case the determination as to whether any substitute facilities are required at all is indeed a part of the ‘issue of just compensation/ one of the factors to be taken into account by the jury in reaching its verdict.” Id., at 214.

 The present Rule 71A, which in absence of an Act of Congress gives the courts discretion to have the issue of compensation decided by a commission of three, was inspired by the Act governing condemnations by the TVA which required the appointment of a commission in all cases, 48 Stat. 70. See Notes of Advisory Committee, 28 U. S. C., following Rule 71A. But that Act was amended in 1968. See 82 Stat. 885, 16 U. S. C. § 831x (1964 ed., Supp. IV). Under the bill as reported out of the Senate Committee on Public Works either party had on demand “an absolute right to a jury trial.” S. Rep. No. 930, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2. “Proponents of the legislation indicated that no landowner should be denied his basic right to a trial by jury involving the condemnation of his property. In addition, it was indicated that the absence of a right to a jury trial had generated friction between TVA and landowners which was seriously affecting the public relations of that agency.” Ibid.
The Senate Committee stated: “While the committee makes no judgment as to the benefits of either the commissioner or jury-trial system, it does feel that a right to trial-by-jury is basic to our American way of life, and accordingly recommends adoption of this legislation.” Id., at 3.
That bill was amended on the floor of the Senate to modify the provision for an absolute right to jury trial by making Rule 71A applicable to TVA condemnation proceedings. The discussion in support of this amendment, however, again stressed the general *24dissatisfaction with the commission system, and emphasized the right to jury trial in all but the most “extraordinary circumstances.” 113 Cong. Rec. 36979-36981.

 See John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. United States, 150 F. 2d 329, where the jury refused the land owner any increment of value occasioned by the land’s proximity to the project.