Court Opinion

ID: 9786291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:52:37.74692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:43.900353
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice,
dissenting:
133 I respectfully dissent. There is, I believe, abundant support for the proposition that a long-term care facility resident's right to manage her own funds is a matter of clear and substantial public policy. We are dealing here with one of our system's most fundamental and well-understood rights: the right of a legally competent person to control her property and manage her financial affairs.
11 34 This right is so fundamental and well-understood that it has not in fact been elaborated extensively in our constitution or legislative enactments; instead, it is a "given," a predicate for numerous related policies and protections in the law. These policies are reflected in the Utah Administrative Code, in federal statutes and regulations, in the Utah Probate and Criminal Code, in our own decision in In re Guardianship of Valentine, 4 Utah 2d 355, 294 P.2d 696 (1956), and in section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
1 35 This court has stated that public policy is "clear" when it is plainly defined in one of the following sources: (1) legislative enactments, (2) constitutional standards, or (3) judicial decisions. See Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, 972 P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998). In Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989), the source of this trilogy, this court stated:
[We will construe public policies narrowly and will generally utilize those based on prior legislative pronouncements or judicial decisions, applying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental that there ean be virtually no *1031question as to their importance for the promotion of public good.
Id. (emphasis added).
136 In Berube this court adopted for the first time a public policy exception to the at-will employment rule. We expressed caution about the limits of the exception and therefore identified possible sources of public policy that were unquestionably legitimate. Be-rube, however, was not intended to create an exclusive list of all possible sources as the language above reflects. Rather, it was an attempt to ensure that this court deferred to legitimate sources of public policy in the broader community instead of having a free rein to "invent" public policy on its own.
¶ 37 Three years after Berube, in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992), we explored the issue further:
We will not attempt here to define the full scope of the term "public policy" for the purposes of the exception to the at-will doctrine.... [The public policy exception applies in this state when the statutory language expressing the public conscience is clear and when the affected interests of society are substantial. The identification of clear and substantial public policies will require case-by-case development.
Id. at 1282 (emphasis added).
[ 38 This court is now faced with the question of whether to recognize a public policy exception protecting the right of a legally competent long-term care facility resident to manage her own financial affairs. I believe that the majority's view of the legitimacy of the public policy in question is mistaken. We can, and should, recognize administrative regulations as a valid source of Utah public policy for exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine; the regulatory process occurs through legislative delegation and under legislative oversight. It is undertaken by persons and entities with considerable expertise and knowledge regarding legislative intent. Furthermore, there is clear and substantial public policy supporting a long-term care facility resident's right to manage her funds in related federal regulations identical to those adopted by this state, in the Utah Probate and Criminal Code, in Utah case law, and in the Utah Constitution.
I. UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE RULE 482-270-19(1) & RULE 432-270-10(5)(s)
€ 39 Rule 482-270-10(5)(s) of the Utah Administrative Code expressly sets forth the rights of long-term care facility residents. Among other rights, residents are granted "the right to manage and control personal funds, or to be given accounting of personal funds entrusted to the facility." Utah Admin.Code R482-270-10(5)(s). The Utah Administrative Code further states, "[rlesidents have the right to manage and control their financial affairs. The Facility may not require residents to deposit their personal funds or valuables with the facility." Utah Admin.Code R432-270-19(1).
140 The majority opinion acknowledges this language but fails to regard it as an expression of public policy because "administrative regulations by their very nature are not 'substantial.'" First, I disagree with the notion that the administrative regulatory process is, by definition, not substantial. More importantly, however, it is the content of the regulation that should be examined for substance, not merely its location in statutory or regulatory language. Ignoring administrative regulations merely because they are not "legislative enactments" overlooks the reality of the process of statutory delegation to administrative agencies and the hugely significant role that administrative regulation plays in our economy and society.
41 Other states have recognized administrative regulations as a legitimate source of public policy. Recently, the California Supreme Court held that administrative regulations could be a source of fundamental public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. See Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 19 Cal.4th 66, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046 (1998). In Green, the California Supreme Court explained:
[OJne of the primary reasons for requiring the public policy that gives rise to a wrongful termination action to have a basis in either constitutional or statutory provisions is to limit judicial policymaking lest [courts] mistake their own predilections for *1032public policy which deserves recognition at law. . .. [When courts discover public policy in regulations enacted under statutory authority, they are not mistaking] their own predilections for public policy, but rather are recognizing a public policy that the Legislature has formulated and the executive branch has implemented.
Id. at 1054 (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
142 Other states have accepted administrative regulations as a source of public policy. See Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1550 (8th Cir.1994) ("An at-will employee may state a claim under Missouri's public policy exception when an employer's act of discharging the employee is violative of a statute, a regulation based on a statute, or a constitutional provision."); Adolphsen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (stating that regulations governing public policy will often relate to a clear mandate of public policy); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980) ("The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions."); Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 401 Pa.Super. 467, 585 A.2d 1022, 1026 (1990) ("The sources of public policy ... include legislation; administrative rules, regulation, or decision; and judicial decision." (citation omitted)).
143 This court should follow such well-reasoned authority and acknowledge administrative regulations as a legitimate source of public policy in Utah. Administrative regulations may in some cases be even more authoritative than statutory language because the agencies that draft them are more aware of the issues facing the organizations being regulated and the needs of individuals being protected. It is entirely clear, in my view, that the subject administrative regulations reflect the values of the state of Utah concerning the fundamental right to control one's property and to manage one's financial affairs when one is a competent resident of a long-term care facility.
IL 42 U.S.C. § 1896r(c)(6) & 42 C.E.R. § 488.10
44 In addition to rule 482 of the Utah Administrative Code, we have further evi-denee of public policy in the virtually identical federal regulatory language enacted pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1896r(c)(6). See 42 C.F.R. §$ 488.10. In Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992), this court held that federal law, and even the law of other states, is a valid source of public policy:
Persons who are terminated from their employment because they refuse to engage in illegal activities that implicated clear and substantial Utah public policy considerations should be protected regardless of whether the applicable law is that of Utah, the federal government, or another state.
Id. at 1283. We required in Peterson that there be a connection between the Utah public policy and the law from another jurisdiction. "Although many state and federal laws will reflect Utah public policy, and may, in fact, provide a source of Utah public policy, a plaintiff must establish the connection between the law violated and the public policies of Utah." Id.
11 45 A review of the federal statutes and regulations concerning long-term care facility residents cited above establishes the connection between the federal regulations and the public policies of Utah. Under 42 U.S.C. § 18396r(c)(6), "[the nursing facility ... may not require residents to deposit their personal funds with the facility" 42 U.S.C. § 18396r. Subsection (c)(6) of the statute gives long-term care facilities guidelines for managing residents' funds when the facilities are granted authority to do so. The underlying policy of 42 U.S.C. § 1896r(c)(6) is clearly to protect the rights of long-term care facility residents, including their right to manage their funds. There would be no reason for these guidelines without the fundamental premise that residents have the right to manage their own financial affairs. Contrary to the majority opinion, I believe this federal statute does more than "hint to such an underlying policy." Rather, the principle the statute embodies is so fundamental it requires no more explicit reference; it easily rises to the level of the clear and substantial *1033public policy necessary to establish an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Virtually no one-lawmaker, judge, or private citizen-would be willing to controvert the notion that competent persons cannot be deprived of their right to control their property, even if they live in a long-term care facility.
'I 46 The language of the related regulation contained in 42 C.F.R. § 483.10 (identical to that in rule 432-270-19) is directly tied to the statutory purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1896r. It states:
A facility must protect and promote the rights of each resident, including ... [tlhe resident has the right to manage his or her financial affairs, and the facility may not require residents to deposit their personal funds with the facility.
42 C.F.R § 488.10(c)(1) (emphasis added).
147 We made clear in Peterson that we will accept federal law when it has a connection to a Utah public policy or value. The connection is evidenced here by the nearly word-for-word replication of this federal rule by the Utah Administrative Code.1
III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5401
{48 Further support for the public policy in question is found in the Utah Probate Code. Section 75-5-401 deals with protective proceedings for minors and disabled persons. It states:
(2) Appointment of conservator or other protective order may be made in relation to the estate and affairs of a person if the court determines that the person: (a) is unable to manage the person's property and affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, confinement, detention by a foreign power or disappearance; and (b) has property which will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is provided or that funds are needed for the support, care and welfare of the person or those entitled to be supported by the person and protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or provide funds.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-401(2)(a), (b) (emphasis added). This section provides a structure to ensure due process for allegedly disabled persons before they may lawfully be deprived of their right to control their property. This is clear evidence that the Utah legislature recognizes the right to control property as an important and fundamental value. This section explicitly protects the rights of all persons to manage their "property and affairs" unless and until they are determined by a court to be incompetent to do so. It is, in my view, an entirely adequate legislative source for the public policy ensuring the right to manage one's property.
IV. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-111
149 As the majority points out, we have held that prohibitions contained in our criminal code reflect public policy. See Fox v. MCI Comm. Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1997). Section 76-5-111 of the Utah Code deals with the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a disabled or elder adult. In part, it states:
(4)(a) A person commits the offense of exploitation of a disabled or elder adult when the person: (i) is in a position of trust and confidence, or has a business relationship, with the disabled or elder adult and knowingly, by deception or intimidation, obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or use, the disabled or elder adult's funds, credit, assets, or other property with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the disabled or elder adult of the use, benefit, or possession of his property, for the benefit of someone other than the disabled or elder adult.
§ 76-5-1(1(4)(a)(i))
150 I do not suggest that this statute demonstrates that criminal conduct occurred in this case. It does, however, plainly criminalize acts that "temporarily or permanently deprive" an elder adult of the "use, benefit, or possession of his property." Utah Code *1034Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(@). It is noteworthy that the criminal statute explicitly mentions "deception" as a prohibited means of depriving older persons of the "use, benefit, or possession" of their property. Id. Thus, this section provides a further illustration of the fact that the state of Utah has a well-defined public policy for the safeguarding of the property of older adults and their control thereof.
V. IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF VALENTINE
151 For over forty-five years, this court has recognized a citizen's right to control his or her financial affairs. In a case involving a petition for the appointment of a guardian of the property of an alleged incompetent, this court stated, "[the right of every individual to handle his own affairs even at the expense of dissipating his fortune is a right jealousy guarded and one which will not be taken away except in extreme cages." In re Guardianship of Valentine, 4 Utah 2d 355, 294 P.2d 696, 702 (1956) (emphasis added).
1 52 In this case, Sharon Mellen, Ms. Mel-len's daughter-in-law, asked Ms. Merkeley, Fairview's management person in charge of residents' funds, not to inform Ms. Mellen of the arrival of a check from the Veteran's Administration. - According to Fairview, Sharon Mellen wanted to tell Ms. Mellen personally about the arrival of the check. Apparently, Sharon Mellen wanted to proceed in this manner because she planned to buy Ms. Mellen a new wheelchair with this money but knew she would have to convince Ms. Mellen to agree to the purchase. Fair-view argues that it was proper for Fairview's staff to withhold this information from Ms. Mellen because Sharon Mellen was authorized to handle Ms. Mellen's money.
153 It is undisputed that Ms. Mellen signed a document stating: "I hereby certify that Sharon Mellen has authorization to assist me in managing my personal needs allowance funds." (Emphasis added.) However, the language of this document does not in any way authorize Sharon or Fairview to deprive Ms. Mellen of her right to manage her personal finances by concealing the whereabouts of her funds or withholding information from her. As stated in In re Guardianship of Valentine, the right of every individual to manage his or her own financial affairs is jealously guarded. Id. at 702. It is impossible for one to manage one's financial affairs if one is purposefully deprived of the knowledge of relevant information, such as the arrival or deposit of a personal check. Furthermore, according to the language of section 75-5-401, Sharon cannot handle Ms. Mellen's money, or direct Ms. Mellen on how to spend her money, without Ms. Mellen's knowledge and consent, unless Ms. Mellen has been declared incompetent. The written document relied on by defendants does not constitute a relinquishment by Ms. Melien of her right to manage her financial affairs, nor has Ms. Mellen been declared incompetent through the proper procedures.
154 It is important to note that Ms. Merkely and Ms. Maroney received written reprimands from Fairview for failing to tell Ms. Mellen about her check. In fact, a new policy was instituted by Fairview after this incident requiring that residents be informed of all their incoming funds, regardless of who assists them with their financial affairs. This change was, I submit, an acknowledgment by Fairview of what the laws and public policy of Utah require.
VI. ARTICLE I, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
1 55 Finally, I disagree with the majority's rejection of article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution as a source for the public policy at issue here. That section declares that "[all men have the inherent and inalienable right to ... acquire, possess and protect property." The majority claims that while these provisions "protect the right to acquire, possess, and protect property, they do not enunciate the narrow type of policy envisioned by case law creating the public policy exception." - It is difficult to imagine a right more fundamental and more well understood than the right to "protect" and manage one's own property, including one's financial affairs. Unlike the majority, I believe that public policies so broad and unquestioned as these are in fact enforceable through an ex*1035ception to the at-will employment rule. This is particularly so where the Utah legislature, its regulatory agencies, this court, and the federal government have all incorporated the policy into law. Constitutional rights by their nature are fundamental, and I am at a loss to understand the majority's rejection of the right to "acquire, possess and protect property" as a reflection of universal public policy in the state of Utah. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse.

. Residents have the right to manage and control their financial affairs. The facility may not require residents to deposit their personal funds or valuables with the facility." Utah Admin.Code R432-270-19(1).